prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, and gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations  The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition strategies and proposed funding levels for the Aegis BMD program  Congress's decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U S  BMD capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base  For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the Aegis BMD program may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  Most of the Navy's cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are equipped with the Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers, software, displays, weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that defended Zeus  The Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s for defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and subsurface threats  The system was first deployed by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated many times since  The Navy's Aegis ships include Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers  A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994  The first five ships in the class (CGs 47 through 51), which were built to an earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005, leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73)  A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and FY2005; the first entered service in 1991 and the 62 nd entered service in FY2012  The first 28 ships are known as Flight I/II DDG-51s  The next 34 ships, known as Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some design changes, including the addition of a helicopter hangar  No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009  The Navy during this period instead procured three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers  The DDG-1000 design does not use the Aegis system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations  Navy plans do not call for modifying the three DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable  Procurement of DDG-51s resumed in FY2010, following procurement of the three DDG-1000s  A total of 20 DDG-51s were procured in FY2010-FY2019  DDG-51s procured in FY2017 and subsequent years are being built to a new version of the DDG-51 design called the Flight III version  The Flight III version is to be equipped with a new radar, called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) or the SPY-6 radar, that is more capable than the SPY-1 radar installed on all previous Aegis cruisers and destroyers  Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s  Allied countries that now operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway  Most of Japan's Aegis-equipped ships are currently BMD-capable, and Japan plans to make all of them BMD-capable in coming years  The Aegis-equipped ships operated by South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway are not BMD-capable  Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to the Aegis system's computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor missiles  In-service Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s procured in FY2010 and subsequent years are being built from the start with a BMD capability  The Aegis BMD system exists in several variants  Listed in order of increasing capability, these include (but are not necessarily limited to) 3 6 X variant, the 4 0 3 variant, the 4 1 variant (also known as the Aegis Baseline [BL] 5 4 variant), the 5 0 CU (Capability Upgrade) variant (also known as the BL 9 1 variant), the 5 1 variant (also known as the BL 9 2 variant), and the 6 X variant (also known as the BL 10 variant)  Figure 1 summarizes the capabilities of some of these variants (using their designations as of 2016) and correlates them with the phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA; see discussion below) for European BMD operations  As shown in Figure 1 , the Aegis BMD system was originally designed primarily to intercept theater-range ballistic missiles, meaning short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs, respectively)  In addition to its capability for intercepting theater-range ballistic missiles, detection and tracking data collected by the Aegis BMD system's radar might be passed to other U S  BMD systems that are designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which might support intercepts of ICBMs that are conducted by those other U S  BMD systems  With the advent of the Aegis BMD system's new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor (which is discussed further in the next section), DOD is now evaluating the potential for the Aegis BMD system to intercept certain ICBMs  Section 1680 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  2810 / P L  115-91 of December 12, 2017) directed DOD to "conduct a test to evaluate and demonstrate, if technologically feasible, the capability to defeat a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat using the standard missile 3 block IIA missile interceptor " DOD's January 2019 missile defense review report states the following: The SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor is intended as part of the regional missile defense architecture, but also has the potential to provide an important "underlay" to existing GBIs [ground-based interceptors] for added protection against ICBM threats to the homeland  This interceptor has the potential to offer an additional defensive capability to ease the burden on the GBI system and provide continuing protection for the U S  homeland against evolving rogue states' long-range missile capabilities  Congress has directed DoD to examine the feasibility of the SM-3 Blk IIA against an ICBM-class target  MDA will test this SM-3 Blk IIA capability in 2020  Due to the mobility of sea-based assets, this new underlay capability will be surged in a crisis or conflict to further thicken defensive capabilities for the U S  homeland  Land-based sites in the United States with this SM-3 Blk IIA missile could also be pursued  A March 18, 2019, press report states: The Pentagon plans a "first-of-its-kind" test of an unprecedented weapons capability to intercept and destroy an enemy Intercontinental Ballistic Missile "ICBM" -- from a Navy ship at sea using a Standard Missile-3 Block IIA  The concept, as articulated by Pentagon officials and cited briefly in this years' DoD "Missile Defense Review," would be to use an advanced SM-3 IIA to "underlay" and assist existing Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI), adding new dimensions to the current US missile defense posture … The testing, Pentagon officials tell Warrior, is slated for as soon as next year  The effectiveness and promise of the Raytheon-built SM-3 IIA shown in recent testing have inspired Pentagon weapons developers to envision an even broader role for the weapon  The missile is now "proven out," US weapons developers say…  "The SM-3 IIA was not designed to take out ICBMs, but is showing great promise  This would be in the upper range of its capability -- so we are going to try," the Pentagon official told Warrior…  The SM-3 IIA's size, range, speed and sensor technology, the thinking suggests, will enable it to collide with and destroy enemy ICBMs toward the beginning or end of their flight through space, where they are closer to the boundary of the earth's atmosphere  "The SM-3 IIA would not be able to hit an ICBM at a high altitude, but it can go outside the earth's atmosphere," the Pentagon official said  "You want to hit it as far away as possible because a nuke could go off " A March 26, 2018, press report states the following: [MDA] Director Lt  Gen  Sam Greaves said MDA "is evaluating the technical feasibility of the capability of the SM-3 Block IIA missile, currently under development, against an ICBM-class target " "If proven to be effective against an ICBM, this missile could add a layer of protection, augmenting the currently deployed GMD [ground-based missile defense] system," Greaves said in written testimony submitted March 22 to the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee  [Greaves] said MDA will conduct a demonstration of the SM-3 Block IIA against an ICBM-like target by the end of 2020 " The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), the SM-2 Block IV, and the SM-6  The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles above the atmosphere (i e , exo-atmospheric intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy ballistic missile's flight  It is equipped with a "hit-to-kill" warhead, called a kinetic vehicle, that is designed to destroy a ballistic missile's warhead by colliding with it  MDA and Navy plans call for fielding increasingly capable versions of the SM-3 in coming years  The current versions, called the SM-3 Block IA and SM-3 Block IB, are to be supplemented in coming years by SM-3 Block IIA  Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting its course  Compared to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster stage at the bottom but are 13 5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block IIA version has a 21-inch diameter along its entire length  The increase in diameter to a uniform 21 inches provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout velocity (a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater than that of the Block IA and IB versions, as well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead  The United States and Japan have cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA version, with Japan funding a significant share of the effort  The SM-2 Block IV is designed to intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere (i e , endo-atmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy ballistic missile's flight  It is equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead  The existing inventory of SM-2 Block IVs—72 as of February 2012—was created by modifying SM-2s that were originally built to intercept aircraft and ASCMs  A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs were modified, and at least 3 were used in BMD flight tests  MDA and the Navy are now procuring a more capable terminal-phase (endo-atmospheric intercept) BMD interceptor based on the SM-6 air defense missile (the successor to the SM-2 air defense missile)  The SM-6 is a dual-capability missile that can be used for either air defense (i e , countering aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles) or ballistic missile defense  A July 23, 2018, press report states the following: The Defense Department has launched a prototype project that aims to dramatically increase the speed and range of the Navy's Standard Missile-6 by adding a larger rocket motor to the ship-launched weapon, a move that aims to improve both the offensive and defensive reach of the Raytheon-built system  On Jan  17, the Navy approved plans to develop a Dual Thrust Rocket Motor with a 21-inch diameter for the SM-6, which is currently fielded with a 13 5-inch propulsion package  The new rocket motor would sit atop the current 21-inch booster, producing a new variant of the missile: the SM-6 Block IB  On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new approach for regional BMD operations called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA)  The first application of the approach is in Europe, and is called the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)  EPAA calls for using BMD-capable Aegis ships, a land-based radar in Europe, and two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland to defend Europe against ballistic missile threats from countries such as Iran  Phase I of EPAA involved deploying Aegis BMD ships and a land-based radar in Europe by the end of 2011  Phase II involved establishing the Aegis Ashore site in Romania with SM-3 IB interceptors in 2016  Phase 3 involves establishing the Aegis Ashore site in Poland with SM-3 IIA interceptors by perhaps FY2020  The completion of construction of the Poland site has been delayed by at least a year, MDA says, due to contractor performance issues  Each Aegis Ashore site in the EPAA is to include a structure housing an Aegis system similar to the deckhouse on an Aegis ship and 24 SM-3 missiles launched from a relocatable Vertical Launch System (VLS) based on the VLS that is installed in Navy Aegis ships  Although BMD-capable Aegis ships were deployed to European waters before 2011, the first BMD-capable Aegis ship officially deployed to European waters as part of the EPAA departed its home port of Norfolk, VA, on March 7, 2011, for a deployment to the Mediterranean that lasted several months  Under the FY2020 budget submission, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is projected to increase from 38 at the end of FY2018 to 59 at the end of FY2024  During the period FY2018-FY2024, the portion of the force equipped with earlier Aegis variants is to decrease, and the number equipped with later variants is to increase  On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the EPAA, four BMD-capable Aegis ships were to be forward-homeported (i e , based) at the naval base at Rota, Spain  The four ships were transferred to Rota in FY2014 and FY2015  Navy officials have said that the four Rota-based ships can provide a level of level of presence in the Mediterranean for performing BMD patrols and other missions equivalent to what could be provided by about 10 BMD-capable Aegis ships that are homeported on the U S  east coast  The Rota homeporting arrangement thus effectively releases about six U S  Navy BMD-capable Aegis ships for performing BMD patrols or other missions elsewhere  The Aegis BMD development effort, including Aegis BMD flight tests, has been described as following a development philosophy long held within the Aegis program office of "build a little, test a little, learn a lot," meaning that development is done in manageable steps, then tested and validated before moving on to the next step  For a summary of Aegis BMD flight tests since 2002, see Appendix A   Japan is modifying all six of its Aegis destroyers to include the Aegis BMD capability  As of August 2017, four of the six ships reportedly had been modified, and Japan planned to modify a fifth by March 2018, or perhaps sooner than that  In November 2013, Japan announced plans to procure two additional Aegis destroyers and equip them as well with the Aegis BMD capability, which will produce an eventual Japanese force of eight BMD-capable Aegis destroyers  The two additional ships are expected to enter service in 2020 and 2021  Japanese BMD-capable Aegis ships have participated in some of the flight tests of the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor (see Table A-1 in Appendix A )  Japan cooperated with the United States on development the SM-3 Block IIA missile  Japan developed certain technologies for the missile, and paid for the development of those technologies, reducing the missile's development costs for the United States  Japan plans to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems that reportedly are to be located at Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) facilities in Akita Prefecture in eastern Japan and Yamaguchi Prefecture in western Japan, and would be operated mainly by the GSDF (i e , Japan's army)  The two systems reportedly will be equipped with a new Lockheed-made radar called the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) rather than the Raytheon-made SPY-6 AMDR that is being installed on U S  Navy Flight III DDG-51s, and reportedly will go into operation by 2023  A July 6, 2018, press report states that "The U S  and Japan are looking to jointly develop next-generation radar technology that would use Japanese semiconductors to more than double the detection range of the Aegis missile defense system " An October 12, 2018, press report states that "the South Korean military has decided to buy ship-based SM-3 interceptors to thwart potential ballistic missile attacks from North Korea, a top commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed Oct  12  Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Denmark, and Australia  Spain, South Korea, and Australia either operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis ships  The other countries operate destroyers and frigates with different combat systems that may have potential for contributing to BMD operations  The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA's budget  The Navy's budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts  Table 1 shows MDA procurement and research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program  Research and development funding for the land-based SM-3 is funding for Aegis Ashore sites  MDA's budget also includes additional funding not shown in the table for operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) for the Aegis BMD program  One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA's FY2019 procurement and research and development funding requests for the program  In considering this issue, Congress may consider various factors, including whether the work that MDA is proposing to fund for FY2019 is properly scheduled for FY2019, and whether this work is accurately priced  Another potential issue for Congress concerns required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships  Some observers are concerned about the potential operational implications of a shortfall in the available number of BMD-capable relative to the required number  Regarding the required number of BMD-capable Aegis ships, an August 15, 2018, Navy information paper states the following: The [Navy's] 2016 Force Structure Assessment [FSA] sets the requirement [for BMD-capable ships] at 54 BMD-capable ships, as part of the 104 large surface combatant requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support defense of the sea base and limited expeditionary land base sites…  The minimum requirement for 54 BMD ships is based on the Navy unique requirement as follows  It accepts risk in the sourcing of combatant commander (CCDR) requests for defense of land  - 30 to meet CVN escort demand for rotational deployment of the carrier strike groups - 11 INCONUS for independent BMD deployment demand - 9 in forward deployed naval forces (FDNF) Japan to meet operational timelines in USINDOPACOM - 4 in FDNF Europe for rotational deployment in EUCOM  A related potential issue for Congress is the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy's fleet of Aegis ships, particularly since performing BMD patrols requires those ships to operate in geographic locations that may be unsuitable for performing other U S  Navy missions, and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U S  Navy Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites  A June 16, 2018, press report states the following: The U S  Navy's top officer wants to end standing ballistic missile defense patrols and transfer the mission to shore-based assets  Chief of Naval Operations Adm  John Richardson said in no uncertain terms on June 12 that he wants the Navy off the tether of ballistic missile defense patrols, a mission that has put a growing strain on the Navy's hard-worn surface combatants, and the duty shifted towards more shore-based infrastructure  "Right now, as we speak, I have six multi-mission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea," Richardson said during his address at the U S  Naval War College's Current Strategy Forum  "And if you know a little bit about this business you know that geometry is a tyrant  "You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile  So, we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little box, defending land " Richardson continued, saying the Navy could be used in emergencies but that in the long term the problem demands a different solution  "It's a pretty good capability and if there is an emergent need to provide ballistic missile defense, we're there," he said  "But 10 years down the road, it's time to build something on land to defend the land  Whether that's AEGIS ashore or whatever, I want to get out of the long-term missile defense business and move to dynamic missile defense " The unusually direct comments from the CNO come amid growing frustration among the surface warfare community that the mission, which requires ships to stay in a steaming box doing figure-eights for weeks on end, is eating up assets and operational availability that could be better used confronting growing high-end threats from China and Russia  The BMD mission was also a factor in degraded readiness in the surface fleet  Amid the nuclear threat from North Korea, the BMD mission began eating more and more of the readiness generated in the Japan-based U S  7th Fleet, which created a pressurized situation that caused leaders in the Pacific to cut corners and sacrifice training time for their crews, an environment described in the Navy's comprehensive review into the two collisions that claimed the lives of 17 sailors in the disastrous summer of 2017  Richardson said that as potential enemies double down on anti-access technologies designed to keep the U S  Navy at bay, the Navy needed to focus on missile defense for its own assets  "We're going to need missile defense at sea as we kind of fight our way now into the battle spaces we need to get into," he said  "And so restoring dynamic maneuver has something to do with missile defense  A June 23, 2018, press report states the following: The threats from a resurgent Russia and rising China―which is cranking out ships like it's preparing for war―have put enormous pressure on the now-aging [U S  Navy Aegis destroyer] fleet  Standing requirements for BMD patrols have put increasing strain on the U S  Navy's surface ships  The Navy now stands at a crossroads  BMD, while a burden, has also been a cash cow that has pushed the capabilities of the fleet exponentially forward over the past decade  The game-changing SPY-6 air and missile defense radar destined for DDG Flight III, for example, is a direct response to the need for more advanced BMD shooters  But a smaller fleet, needed for everything from anti-submarine patrols to freedom-of-navigation missions in the South China Sea, routinely has a large chunk tethered to BMD missions  "Right now, as we speak, I have six multimission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea," Chief of Naval Operations Adm  John Richardson said during an address at the recent U S  Naval War College's Current Strategy Forum  "You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile  So we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little box, defending land " And for every six ships the Navy has deployed in a standing mission, it means 18 ships are in various stages of the deployment cycle preparing to relieve them  The Pentagon, led by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, wants the Navy to be more flexible and less predictable―"dynamic" is the buzzword of moment in Navy circles  What Richardson is proposing is moving standing requirements for BMD patrols away from ships underway and all the associated costs that incurs, and toward fixed, shore-based sites, and also surging the Navy's at-sea BMD capabilities when there is an active threat     In a follow-up response to questions posed on the CNO's comments, Navy spokesman Cmdr  William Speaks said the Navy's position is that BMD is an integral part of the service's mission, but where long-term threats exist, the Navy should "consider a more persistent, land-based solution as an option " "This idea is not about the nation's or the Navy's commitment to BMD for the U S  and our allies and partners―the Navy's commitment to ballistic missile defense is rock-solid," Speaks said  "In fact, the Navy will grow the number of BMD-capable ships from 38 to 60 by 2023, in response to the growing demand for this capability  "The idea is about how to best meet that commitment  In alignment with our national strategic documents, we have shifted our focus in an era of great power competition―this calls us to think innovatively about how best to meet the demands of this mission and optimize the power of the joint force "    While the idea of saving money by having fixed BMD sites and freeing up multimission ships is sensible, it may have unintended consequences, said Bryan McGrath, a retired destroyer skipper and owner of the defense consultancy The FerryBridge Group  "The BMD mission is part of what creates the force structure requirement for large surface combatants," McGrath said on Twitter after Defense News reported the CNO's comments  "Absent it, the number of CG's and DDG's would necessarily decline  This may in fact be desirable, depending on the emerging fleet architecture and the roles and missions debate underway  Perhaps we need more smaller, multi-mission ships than larger, more expensive ones  "But it cannot be forgotten that while the mission is somewhat wasteful of a capable, multi-mission ship, the fact that we have built the ships that (among other things) do this mission is an incredibly good thing  If there is a penalty to be paid in peacetime sub-optimization in order to have wartime capacity--should this not be considered a positive thing?" McGrath went on to say that the suite of combat systems that have been built into Aegis have been in response to the BMD threat  And indeed, the crown jewels of the surface fleet―Aegis Baseline 9 software, which allows a ship to do both air defense and BMD simultaneously; the Aegis common-source library; the forthcoming SPY-6; cooperative engagement―have come about either in part or entirely driven by the BMD mission     A Navy official who spoke on condition of anonymity, to discuss the Navy's shifting language on BMD, acknowledged the tone had shifted since the 2000s when the Navy latched onto the mission  But the official added that the situation more than a decade later has dramatically shifted  "The strategic environment has changed significantly since the early 2000s―particularly in the western Pacific  We have never before faced multiple peer rivals in a world as interconnected and interdependent as we do today," the official said  "Nor have we ever seen technologies that could alter the character of war as dramatically as those we see emerging around us  China and Russia have observed our way of war and are on the move to reshape the environment to their favor " In response to the threat and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis' desire to use the force more dynamically, the Navy is looking at its options, the official said  "This includes taking a look at how we employ BMD ships through the lens of great power competition to compete, deter and win against those who threaten us " A January 29, 2019, press report states the following: The Navy is looking to get out of the missile defense business, the service's top admiral said today, and the Pentagon's new missile defense review might give the service the off-ramp it has been looking for to stop sailing in circles waiting for ground-based missile launches  This wasn't the first time Adm  John Richardson bristled in public over his ships sailing in "small boxes" at sea tasked with protecting land, when they could be out performing other missions challenging Chinese and Russian adventurism in the South China Sea and the North Atlantic…  "We've got exquisite capability, but we've had ships protecting some pretty static assets on land for a decade," Richardson said at the Brookings Institute  "If that [stationary] asset is going to be a long-term protected asset, then let's build something on land and protect that and liberate these ships from this mission " Japan is already moving down the path of building up a more robust ground-based sensor and shooter layer, while also getting its own ships out to sea armed with the Aegis radar and missile defense system, both of which would free up American hulls from what Richardson on Monday called "the small [geographic] boxes where they have to stay for ballistic missile defense " Another related potential issue for Congress concerns burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U S  naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations, particularly in light of constraints on U S  defense spending, worldwide operational demands for U S  Navy Aegis ships, and calls by some U S  observers for increased allied defense efforts  The issue can arise in connection with both U S  allies in Europe and U S  allies in Asia  Regarding U S  allies in Asia, a December 12, 2018, press report states the following: In June, US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson said during a speech at the US Naval War College that the US Navy should terminate its current practice of dedicating several US Navy warships solely for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)  Richardson wanted US warships to halt BMD patrols off Japan and Europe as they are limiting, restrictive missions that could be better accomplished by existing land-based BMD systems such as Patriot anti-missile batteries, the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and the Aegis Ashore anti-missile system  In the months since dropping his bombshell, Richardson—and much of the debate—has gone quiet  "My guess is the CNO got snapped back by the Pentagon for exceeding where the debate actually stood," one expert on US naval affairs told Asia Times  But others agree with him  Air Force Lt Gen Samuel A Greaves, the director of the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA), acknowledges Richardson's attempts to highlight how these BMD patrols were placing unwelcome "strain on the (US Navy's) crews and equipment " But there are complications  While it may free US Navy warships for sea-control, rather than land defense, there is a concern that next- generation hypersonic cruise missiles could defeat land-based BMD systems, such as Aegis Ashore, while the US Navy's Aegis-equipped warships offer the advantages of high-speed mobility and stealth, resulting in greater survivability overall  As Japan prepares to acquire its first Aegis Ashore BMD system – and perhaps other systems such as the THAAD system which has been deployed previously in Romania and South Korea – the possibility that the US Navy will end its important BMD role represents abrupt change…  Japan's decision to deploy Aegis Ashore can fill in any gap created by a possible US Navy cessation of BMD patrols  "The land-based option is more reliable, less logistically draining, and despite being horrendously expensive, could be effective in the sense that it provides a degree of reassurance to the Japanese people and US government, and introduces an element of doubt of missile efficacy into [North Korean] calculations," said [Garren Mulloy, Associate Professor of International Relations at Daito Bunka University in Saitama, Japan], adding, however, that these systems could not cover Okinawa  "Fixed sites in Japan could be vulnerable, and the Aegis vessels provide a flexible forward-defense, before anything enters Japanese airspace, but with obviously limited reactions times," Mulloy said  "Aegis Ashore gives more reaction time – but over Japanese airspace "… The silence about this sudden possible shift in the US defense posture in the western Pacific is understandable: it is a sensitive topic in Washington and Tokyo  However, the Trump administration has urged its allies to pay more for their own defense needs and to support US troops deployed overseas  Meanwhile, Tokyo needs to proceed cautiously given the likelihood that neighbors might view a move on BMD as evidence that Tokyo is adopting an increasingly aggressive defense posture in the region  But for them, it is a no-win situation  If the US does ditch the BMD patrol mission, China and North Korea might view the shift as equally menacing given that it greatly enhances the US Navy's maritime warfare capabilities  Another potential issue for Congress is whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site  DOD's January 2019 missile defense review report states, in a section on improving or adapting existing BMD systems, that Another repurposing option is to operationalize, either temporarily or permanently, the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center in Kauai, Hawaii, to strengthen the defense of Hawaii against North Korean missile capabilities  DoD will study this possibility to further evaluate it as a viable near-term option to enhance the defense of Hawaii  The United States will augment the defense of Hawaii in order to stay ahead of any possible North Korean missile threat  MDA and the Navy will evaluate the viability of this option and develop an Emergency Activation Plan that would enable the Secretary of Defense to operationalize the Aegis Ashore test site in Kauai within 30 days of the Secretary's decision to do so, the steps that would need to be taken, associated costs, and personnel requirements  This plan will be delivered to USDA&S, USDR&E, and USDP within six months of the release of the MDR  A January 25, 2019, press report states the following: The Defense Department will examine the funding breakdown between the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency should the government make Hawaii's Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center into an operational resource, according to the agency's director  "Today, it involves both Navy resources for the operational crews -- that man that site -- as well as funds that come to MDA for research, development and test production and sustainment," Lt  Gen  Sam Greaves said of the test center when asked how the funding would shake out between the Navy and MDA should the Pentagon move forward with the recommendation  Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential for ship-based lasers, electromagnetic railguns (EMRGs), and gun-launched guided projectiles (GLGPs, previously known as hypervelocity projectiles [HVPs]) to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles  Another CRS report discusses the potential value of ship-based lasers, EMRGs, and GLGPs for performing various missions, including, potentially, terminal-phase BMD operations  Another potential oversight issue for Congress is technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program  Regarding this issue, a December 2018 report from DOD's Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—DOT&E's annual report for FY2018—stated the following in its section on the Aegis BMD program: Assessment • Results from flight testing, high-fidelity M&S, HWIL, and distributed ground testing demonstrate that Aegis BMD can intercept non-separating, simple-separating, and complex-separating ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase  However, flight testing and M&S did not address all expected threat types, ground ranges, and raid sizes  • FTM-45 successfully and fully demonstrated the Aegis BL 9 2 organic engagement capability and corrective action for the previous FTM-29 missile failure  FTM-29 was only partially able to demonstrate EOR capability given the in-flight missile failure  In FTM-29, the Aegis Weapon System supported the SM-3 Block IIA missile and demonstrated bi-directional communication between the SM-3 Block IIA guidance section and the KW until loss of signal at horizon  However, the weapon system did not exercise all aspects of communication after KW eject  DOT&E considers the FTM-29 failure to be an example of a shortfall in conducting ground testing in an operationally representative way, and an example of a deficiency found in OT that DT should have discovered  • The MDA implemented process improvements to better identify, report, and fi x common failures and anomalies identified during SM-3 ground testing prior to flight testing  • SM CTV-03 demonstrated the capability of the Aegis BMD 4 1 upgrade to fi re an SM-6 Dual I missile  The BMD 4 1 build incorporates BL 9 C1 capabilities into the BMD 4 0 baseline  • FS-17 demonstrated the Aegis BMD 4 0 3 capability to interoperate with NATO partners over operational communication architectures during cruise missile and ballistic missile engagements, and to use remote data provided by NATO partners to prosecute remote engagements  JFTM-05 Event 2 demonstrated inter-ship communication between U S  and Japanese destroyers using a realistic communications architecture while prosecuting ballistic missile engagements  Pacific Dragon demonstrated interoperability between U S  Aegis BMD assets, Japanese destroyers, and Republic of Korea naval assets  • Aegis BMD has exercised rudimentary engagement coordination with Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense firing units, but not with Patriot  The MDA plans to include Patriot in FTO-03  MDA ground tests have routinely demonstrated that inter-element coordination and interoperability need improvement to increase situational awareness and improve engagement efficiency  • The MDA has been collaborating with DOT&E and the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) to establish an affordable ground testing approach to support assessments of reliability  DOT&E cannot assess SM-3 missile reliability with confidence until the MDA is able to provide additional ground test data that simulates the in-flight environment  DOT&E is working with the MDA to determine if existing ground test venues are able to provide the needed missile reliability data  Recommendations The MDA should: 1  Ensure that ground tests of all SM-3 missile components, sections, and all-up rounds use the same configuration as will be flown in flight tests (i e , "test as you fly")  2  Determine how to properly score acceptance ground test data for production missiles to enable their use in estimating SM-3 reliability  3  Fund and execute high-fidelity M&S RFRs for Aegis BL 9 2 SM-3 Block IIA and SM-6 Dual II scenarios that span the engagement battlespace  Regarding the SM-6 missile, the January 2018 DOT&E report also stated the following: Assessment • As reported in the DOT&E FY18 SM-6 BLK I FOT&E Report, the SM-6 remains effective and suitable with the exception of the classified deficiency identified in the FY13 IOT&E Report  The SM-6 Block 1 satisfactorily demonstrated compatibility with Aegis Weapon System Baseline 9 Integrated Fire Control capability  • In FY17-18, the Navy developed and tested specific software improvements to SM-6 BLK I to mitigate the classified performance problems discovered during IOT&E  As previously reported, testing conducted by the Navy demonstrated the software improvements perform as intended, but did not eliminate them  Recommendation 1  The Navy should continue to improve software based on IOT&E results and verify corrective actions with flight tests  Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the FY2020 request for MDA procurement and research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program  Appendix A  Aegis BMD Flight Tests Table A-1 presents a summary of Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002  As shown in the table, since January 2002, the Aegis BMD system has achieved 33 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 42 attempts using the SM-3 missile (including 4 successful intercepts in 5 attempts by Japanese Aegis ships, and 2 successful intercepts in 3 attempts attempt using the Aegis Ashore system), and 7 successful endo-atmospheric intercepts in 7 attempts using the SM-2 Block IV and SM-6 missiles, making for a combined total of 40 successful intercepts in 49 attempts  In addition, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser operating northwest of Hawaii used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system with the SM-3 missile to shoot down an inoperable U S  surveillance satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit  Including this intercept in the count increases the totals to 34 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 43 attempts using the SM-3 missile, and 41 successful exo- and endo-atmospheric intercepts in 50 attempts using SM-3, SM-2 Block IV, and SM-6 missiles 
Report 2: 1 million (about 3 percent of IPA rotator costs) in fiscal year 2017  NSF officials told us that the new limit applies only to an IPA rotator’s trips to their home institution and does not limit travel to other locations for fieldwork or scientific conferences, among other things  These officials explained that NSF chose not to limit trips to these other locations because they are considered fundamental to IPA rotators’ research and are infrequent—occurring one to three times per year, on average, per IPA rotator  Additionally, rotators are permitted to use annual leave, leave without pay, or flexitime to take trips using non-NSF funds for activities performed on a rotator’s own time  In adopting this cost-management strategy, NSF sought to balance the benefits of IPA rotators’ travel with the travel costs  According to the Task Force on Fiscal Oversight’s October 2016 report, NSF’s support for travel benefits the agency by providing a way for program directors and executives to stay current in their scientific fields, conduct outreach with scientific communities, and provide oversight and stewardship of NSF’s programs and awards  NSF officials told us that the agency sought to control travel costs under the Independent Research and Development program by setting a reasonable limit to NSF-funded trips that would cause the least harm to rotators’ research so as not to discourage them from coming to NSF  As a result, NSF decided on a maximum of 12 trips per year under this program because, historically, more than 80 percent of the IPA rotator participants traveled to their home institution less than once per month  In fiscal year 2017, for IPA rotators who entered into new agreements in that fiscal year, NSF ended reimbursements for consulting income that the rotators forgo as a result of their assignment to NSF  Previously, when an IPA rotator discontinued consulting activities during an IPA assignment, NSF would reimburse the rotator up to $10,000 a year  IPA rotators who entered into negotiations or agreements with NSF prior to this change may still receive this reimbursement  In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for lost consulting reimbursements to IPA rotators was $150,000  This amount represented a decrease of about $160,000, or about 52 percent, from fiscal year 2016  NSF made this change because it determined that doing so would not negatively affect the IPA program  In particular, NSF found that other federal science agencies typically did not reimburse IPA rotators for lost consulting income and it concluded that IPA rotators typically do not expect NSF to offer reimbursement  In addition to the three adopted strategies, NSF’s Task Force on Fiscal Oversight identified other potential cost management strategies for the IPA program  The task force reviewed various data on the costs that make up the IPA program, such as the number of IPA rotators who received a particular form of compensation or who would be affected by the potential strategies  In addition, the task force took into account anecdotal and other evidence on how IPA rotators might react to the strategies  Using input from the task force, NSF opted against the other potential strategies because it either (1) expected the resulting cost savings to be small or (2) anticipated potential negative effects from implementing them, such as increased difficulty in hiring IPA rotators  These potential cost-management strategies primarily related to IPA rotator compensation, as described below  Capping IPA rotators’ salaries  NSF decided against establishing a salary cap for IPA rotators at various levels between about $185,000 and $240,000 annually  The task force found that salary caps at lower levels would have greater cost savings because of the higher number of individuals covered by the cap, but that the caps would also pose a significant risk to NSF’s ability to recruit IPA rotators  In particular, the task force found that salary caps at lower levels would disproportionately affect IPA rotators in two of its directorates—the Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering and the Directorate for Engineering—because of the higher salaries of individuals in positions associated with those fields  As a result, the task force recommended that NSF first assess the effects of its cost-sharing pilot program before proceeding with any cap on IPA rotators’ salaries  Reducing or eliminating IPA rotators’ supplemental pay  NSF decided against reducing or eliminating the supplemental pay that IPA rotators receive when their salary at their home institution is below the minimum for their NSF position  In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for IPA rotators’ supplemental pay was $1 0 million (about 3 percent of IPA rotator costs)  The task force recommended against this potential cost-management strategy because it would disproportionately affect IPA rotators in two of its directorates—the Directorate for Biological Sciences and the Directorate for Geosciences  In addition, the task force expected that any cost savings associated with this strategy would be small  Reducing IPA rotators’ per diem payments  NSF decided against reducing or eliminating per diem payments for lodging (excluding taxes), meals, and incidental expenses incurred during the length of rotators’ assignments  In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for per diem payments was $3 1 million (about 8 percent of IPA costs)  The task force concluded, based on its analysis of per diem costs and anecdotal evidence, that many IPA rotators would opt to depart NSF if NSF did not provide per diem payments  As a result, the task force recommended against this strategy  As of June 2018, NSF had not developed an agency-wide workforce strategy for using rotators, as its IPA program steering committee recommended  In addition, NSF has not fully evaluated or developed plans to evaluate both IPA and VSEE rotator program results in terms of progress toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results  As of June 2018, NSF had not developed an agency-wide workforce strategy that includes use of rotators, as NSF’s IPA program steering committee had recommended  In an August 2016 report on the IPA program, the steering committee stated that NSF did not have an agency- wide workforce strategy; instead, each directorate made decisions on its own about when and how to use IPA rotators in executive and program director positions  According to the report, an agency-wide framework would enable NSF to ensure an optimal balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors, which is a strategic principle that the steering committee developed for the IPA program  In February 2017, the committee issued an internal report to agency leadership that recommended expanding what was originally envisioned as a workforce strategy for the IPA program into a comprehensive agency-wide workforce strategy  The report stated that expanding the scope of the workforce strategy would have the greatest impact across the agency and would help NSF leadership in making strategic human capital decisions  The report outlined a process for developing a workforce strategy with various steps, including the following: Job analyses  The report recommended job analyses to review the roles and responsibilities of executive and staff-level positions and to identify the skills and capabilities required for successful performance of the work  According to the report, the steering committee’s working group for developing a workforce strategy found, based on its initial efforts to review position descriptions and roles and responsibilities, that some functions may be better served if performed by permanent federal employees and other functions by rotators  However, the working group concluded that NSF should obtain additional input and evidence before initiating large-scale changes in its workforce  Analysis of workforce gaps and surpluses  The report stated that identifying gaps and surpluses in the demand and supply for federal and rotator scientific staff would inform opportunities to optimize recruitment and retention efforts  The report recommended separate analyses for executive and scientific staff- level positions  Development of strategies to close workforce gaps and address surpluses  According to the steering committee’s report, examples of strategies include succession planning and rebalancing the mix of permanent federal staff and rotators to ensure an optimal workforce with the skills, experience, and capabilities to accomplish NSF’s science-related work  According to NSF officials, the agency’s Division of Human Resource Management was responsible for implementing the steering committee’s recommendation  In particular, it undertook an effort to work with senior leadership to develop a broad strategic workforce plan for the agency  However, in June 2018, NSF officials told us that they shifted their focus from developing a separate workforce strategy in order to focus instead on (1) development of a human capital operating plan, which agencies are required to develop and approve annually, and update as needed, under OPM regulations that went into effect on April 11, 2017; and (2) an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) memorandum issued in April 2017 directing agency heads to develop reform plans that identify ways to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of their respective agencies  The NSF officials explained that they recognized the value in having a workforce strategy, but they did not consider it appropriate for the Division of Human Resource Management to develop a workforce strategy at the same time that the agency was completing the OPM and OMB plans  NSF did not specify how its efforts to complete the OPM and OMB plans would address the need the steering committee identified for an agency- wide framework that would enable NSF to ensure an optimal balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors  In particular, NSF’s human capital operating plan, which it approved in April 2018, does not discuss NSF’s use of rotators or include information on balancing the agency’s use of rotators with permanent staff  Furthermore, NSF has not yet determined how it will address its use of rotators as part of its agency reform plan  In particular, NSF officials told us in June 2018 that they may address the agency’s use of rotators under the workforce focus area of its reform plan, but that they were only just beginning to identify and select initiatives under this focus area and that these initiatives have not yet been finalized  The process the NSF steering committee laid out in its internal report, when implemented, would align with two key principles GAO has identified for effective strategic workforce planning  Specifically, it would align with the principles of (1) determining the skills and competencies that are critical to successfully achieving missions and goals, and (2) developing human capital strategies to address gaps and enable the contribution of critical skills and competencies needed for mission success  By incorporating the NSF’s steering committee’s recommendation for a workforce strategy—and the process outlined by the steering committee for developing this strategy—into its human capital operating plan or agency reform plan, NSF could better manage its use of rotators and balance them with its permanent staff  We have previously found that high-performing organizations recognize the fundamental importance of measuring both the outcomes of human capital strategies and how these outcomes have helped the organizations accomplish their missions and programmatic goals  However, as of May 2018, NSF had not fully evaluated and did not have plans to evaluate the results of its IPA and VSEE rotator programs in terms of progress toward human capital goals and the contributions the programs made toward achieving programmatic results  One of GAO’s key principles for effective strategic workforce planning states that agencies should monitor and evaluate progress toward the agencies’ human capital goals and the contribution that human capital results have made toward achieving programmatic results  In particular, we previously found that evaluation activities can improve the effectiveness of workforce strategies by identifying shortfalls in performance and other improvement opportunities  OPM also requires agencies to develop a human capital operating plan that will support the evaluation of the agency’s human capital strategies  In March 2014, NSF published a summary of the results of focus groups with IPA rotators and their supervisors  This summary outlined benefits and challenges of the program from the perspectives of both groups, such as the benefit of bringing fresh perspective and new ideas to NSF and the challenge of recruiting and retaining qualified IPA rotators  However, the summary did not provide the agency’s assessment of progress towards programmatic results and human capital goals  For example, it summarized the benefits of the program from the standpoint of rotators and did not provide NSF’s assessment of how individual IPA rotators or the program as a whole contributed to NSF’s scientific mission  In addition, the summary did not provide an assessment of the extent to which the current workforce balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors is aligned with NSF’s work  In our semistructured interviews with federal staff and rotators in executive and staff-level positions at NSF, most were comfortable with the current balance, but three individuals raised concerns about the use of rotators in executive positions, suggesting that NSF could benefit from further analysis of its balance of rotators and federal staff  In April 2018, NSF adopted its human capital operating plan which identifies specific, short-term actions that the agency will take to achieve its human capital goals  In its plan, NSF identified strategies derived from NSF’s commitment to ongoing improvement, such as reviewing and realigning its workforce to meet future needs  Also, NSF’s process for developing a workforce strategy, outlined in the steering committee’s February 2017 internal report, included recommendations to conduct an assessment of the outcomes of workforce strategies and the impact of these outcomes on helping NSF accomplish its scientific mission and related programmatic goals  However, plans for this assessment did not include an evaluation of the agency’s rotator programs  Moreover, neither the steering committee’s February 2017 internal report nor NSF’s April 2018 report committed to conducting such an evaluation or specified how assessments described in its reports would address NSF’s rotator programs  For example, neither report specified how NSF would evaluate the extent to which the rotator programs have achieved NSF’s objectives, which we identified through our review of NSF documentation and interviews with NSF officials  These objectives include: bringing fresh perspectives from across the country and across all fields of science and engineering supported by NSF; helping influence new directions for research in science, engineering, and education, including emerging interdisciplinary fields; providing scientific leadership and management of NSF’s research and education programs; and providing opportunities for researchers to gain first-hand knowledge of the philosophy and mechanisms of federal support for research and bring this knowledge back to their home institutions  According to NSF officials, the agency has not separately evaluated the results of its rotator programs in part because rotators are blended into its permanent federal workforce, making it difficult to evaluate the results of its rotator programs separately from those of its overall workforce  In our December 2003 report on key principles for effective strategic workforce planning, we found that federal agencies in general have experienced difficulties in defining practical and meaningful measures that assess the effects human capital strategies have on programmatic results  However, without an evaluation of the extent of the rotator programs’ contributions toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results, NSF is limited in its ability to demonstrate the programs’ benefits to external stakeholders, such as the Congress, and to adjust the programs, if warranted  Such adjustments could include increasing or decreasing the use of rotators overall or in certain types of positions, such as executive or staff-level positions  In recent years, NSF has recognized the need to think more strategically about its use of rotators and has taken positive steps to manage its rotator programs  For example, beginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted several strategies to manage the cost of rotators  However, as of June 2018, NSF had decided against developing a separate agency-wide strategy for balancing its use of IPA rotators and federal staff, as NSF’s steering committee for the IPA program recommended in February 2017  NSF officials said that they recognized the value in having a workforce strategy but wanted to focus instead on addressing OPM and OMB requirements related to workforce planning  By following through on the steering committee’s recommendation for a workforce strategy, NSF could better manage its use of rotators and balance them with its permanent staff  Moreover, as of June 2018, NSF had not fully evaluated the results of the rotator programs, as called for by key principles for effective strategic workforce planning  NSF officials told us they have not done so, in part, because rotators are blended into NSF’s permanent federal workforce, making it difficult to evaluate the results of its rotator program separately from those of its overall workforce  However, without an evaluation of the extent of the rotator programs’ contributions toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results, NSF is limited in its ability to demonstrate the programs’ benefits to external stakeholders, such as the Congress, and to adjust the programs, if warranted  We are making the following two recommendations to NSF: The NSF Director of Human Resource Management should complete the development of an agency-wide workforce strategy for balancing the agency’s use of IPA and VSEE rotators with permanent staff as part of NSF’s current agency reform planning efforts or updates to its human capital operating plan  (Recommendation 1) The NSF Director of Human Resource Management should evaluate the contributions of the IPA and VSEE rotator programs toward NSF’s human capital goals and the contributions the programs have made toward achieving programmatic results  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to NSF for comment  In its written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I, NSF concurred with our recommendations and stated that implementation of the recommendations will enhance efforts to fulfill the agency’s mission and strengthen its workforce  NSF also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies to the appropriate Congressional Committees, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or neumannj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the individual named above, Joseph Cook (Assistant Director), Nkenge Gibson, Kathryn Smith, and Douglas Hunker made key contributions to this report  Also contributing to this report were Antoinette Capaccio, Serena Lo, Timothy Guinane, Cynthia Norris, and Sara Sullivan 

ground_truth: USPS's competitive products have become increasingly important, comprising about 28 percent of USPS's total revenue. USPS scans these packages at various points throughout the postal network. When scans are inaccurate or missing, questions are raised about the veracity of USPS's data on scanning performance and can lead to customer complaints. GAO was asked to review USPS's scanning policies and procedures. In this report, GAO (1) describes USPS's scanning performance and (2) examines how USPS ensures accurate scanning. GAO reviewed USPS's policies and procedures and assessed them against internal control standards; interviewed officials from USPS and five high-volume mailers; and conducted site visits to six post offices in two USPS districts that represented a range of volume, number of routes, and performance. Mail products over which the United States Postal Service (USPS) does not exercise market dominance, such as many of its packages, are called competitive products. These items are scanned throughout the mail delivery system to track their progress (see figure). USPS data show that these products are almost always scanned. For example, USPS data showed that for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2018; all but one of USPS's 67 districts met their scanning goals. Additionally, mailers that account for a high volume of USPS's competitive products told GAO that they believed USPS was generally scanning products correctly. However, a small percentage of missed or inaccurate scans occur. For example, a report from one USPS district showed that for one week, 0.73 percent of the products delivered were missing a scan and that for the fiscal year to date almost 155,000 competitive products were missing a delivery scan. USPS has designed and implemented procedures and activities to help ensure accurate scanning, but some limitations could contribute to scanning errors. For example, USPS has not based its operational procedures for scanning on any internal control standards. USPS officials said the procedures were based on USPS's unique responsibilities, management experience, and sound business practices, but the officials could not identify specific standards or a framework that they followed as the basis for the procedures. USPS officials said they did not believe any internal controls standards applied to these procedures. By not basing procedures on standards, USPS may miss opportunities to improve how it achieves its mission to scan and measure the performance of competitive products. Additionally, USPS's scanning procedure documents, such as for outlining specific delivery scanning steps, are not always consistent, and USPS relies on more informal methods, such as meetings with employees to communicate changes. Thus, employees may not have accurate procedures available to them. Finally, USPS lacks procedures to help managers identify and address incorrect scans, address customer complaints or otherwise address scanning irregularities. For example, USPS's guidance for managers is limited to a list of bullet-points that do not detail the steps managers should follow to resolve scanning irregularities. In addition, this list has not been updated since 2005. Without consistent or detailed procedures, USPS's employees and managers may not scan items accurately or find information needed to resolve scanning issues—a situation that could hinder USPS's ability to reduce inaccurate or missing scans for these important mail products. GAO recommends that USPS: (1) identify and adopt internal control standards for its operational activities such as for scanning of competitive products; (2) improve the communication of procedures for scanning competitive products; and, (3) create procedures for supervisors on how to address inaccurate scans and resolve scanning issues. USPS agreed to explore addressing the first recommendation and agreed with the other two recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: USPS has a wide range of domestic competitive products that are a growing sector of its business  The volume of USPS’s competitive products increased from approximately 750 million pieces in fiscal year 2008 to 4 9 billion pieces in fiscal year 2017  Revenue from these products increased from about 10 percent of all USPS mail revenues in fiscal year 2008 to about 28 percent in fiscal year 2017 (see fig  1)  USPS forecasts that continued growth in e-commerce will increase the volume of its competitive products, especially for the “last-mile” delivery service to consumers—which involves delivery from retail locations and fulfillment centers (i e , where online orders are processed, packaged, and shipped out to USPS for delivery) to customers  USPS reported that in fiscal year 2017, revenue from competitive products exceeded USPS’s expectations by $500 million due to the growth in e-commerce and successful marketing and sales campaigns  USPS expects increased competition, though, in the first- and last-mile delivery services—collection and delivery of packages—from other delivery providers  To remain competitive in the competitive product delivery market, USPS officials have stated that information gained from scanning is leveraged to provide customers with real-time visibility for the location of a competitive product in USPS’s delivery process as well as accurate estimates of the delivery time of USPS’s competitive products  Further, USPS’s latest strategic plan states that this information is one factor used to reduce its own costs through optimizing its network, including processing facilities, post offices, and numerous other facilities across the United States, and streamlining its operations  USPS delivers competitive products across the nation, which it divides into seven postal areas comprised of 67 postal districts (see fig  2)  Managers at each level—postal area, postal district, and post office—are responsible for overseeing and reporting on the performance of the level below them  For example, each district manager is accountable to the area vice president  Postmasters, who manage individual post offices, are accountable to district managers and also monitor the performance of employees at their post office  To track the movement of competitive products, USPS leverages automation (i e , scanning by postal-processing equipment) and passive and active scan technology (i e , scanning devices used by postal employees) to capture barcode information  In addition, when competitive products are not able to go through all the automated scans, USPS employees are to manually scan barcodes that have been placed on each item  These barcodes link the item with information in USPS’s databases such as: the delivery address, the type of USPS product, and when the item was accepted by USPS  According to USPS procedures, competitive products could be scanned up to 13 times to generate visibility necessary for USPS, mailers, and customers to track their packages as they move through USPS’s network (see fig  3)  For example, the first scan of the product—the “Acceptance” scan—is made when the item is dropped off at the post office or by a carrier if the product is picked up at a mailbox or customer address  The last scan—the “Acceptable Delivery Event” scan—generally means the item was successfully delivered to the addressee or that a delivery attempt was made (e g , the product requires a signature but the recipient was not at home so another attempt will need to be made or the recipient will need to pick up the product)  The interim scans reflect the product’s progress through the postal network, including through mail-processing plants and equipment  The scan data are transmitted to USPS’s data systems throughout the day  Scan information from these systems is available to USPS managers as well as mailers and customers who wish to track the progress of their items  USPS’s employees use devices to scan competitive products in postal facilities and on delivery routes (see scans 1, 2, and 11–13 in fig  3)  Carriers usually use a handheld Mobile Delivery Device (MDD) to scan a package’s barcode  MDDs contain Global Positioning System (GPS) technology and transmit package scanning data and carrier location data using a cellular network  USPS employees working inside post offices or other facilities use similar scanning devices without GPS technology, such as the handheld Intelligent Mail Device (IMD) to perform the manual scans (see fig  4)  USPS reports we reviewed indicate that competitive products are almost always scanned and scanned correctly  USPS has an overall organizational goal of accurately scanning 100 percent of all mail pieces—both competitive and other products—that have a barcode  This includes scanning each competitive product at several points from acceptance, as described earlier  However, individual management employee-performance goals for scanning are set slightly lower than 100 percent, as USPS officials stated that they recognize that some scanning issues, such as for missing or damaged barcodes, may occur across post offices  According to USPS data we reviewed for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2018, all but one of USPS’s 67 districts met USPS’s scanning goals for all five required scans for competitive products  Additionally, in one district we visited, a USPS internal report showed that every group of post offices in the district met its scanning goal for the arrival-at-unit scan for the week, the preceding 4 weeks, and the year-to- date periods, and all but one group of post offices met their scanning goals for the acceptable delivery scan for the same measurement period  In addition, representatives for mailers we interviewed that use USPS’s competitive products stated that they were generally satisfied with USPS’s scanning performance  Representatives of all the major mailers we spoke with that rely on USPS’s delivery network said they believed that USPS is generally scanning competitive products accurately, although issues still occur  Representatives of mailers told us that they receive scanning data from USPS for their items throughout the day, with some mailers receiving the data every 15 minutes, a rate that allows them to track their items through USPS  Some mailers use this information to calculate the expected time of delivery and monitor USPS’s progress against their own estimates of delivery time to measure USPS’s performance  Representatives for major mailers we spoke with said they also get complaints from customers if items are late, lost, or inaccurately scanned, so the customers provide another source of information on any scanning issues  Four of the five representatives for major mailers we interviewed that sent items via USPS competitive products told us that they have seen improvement in USPS’s scanning performance in recent years  Additionally, all of the representatives for mailers we spoke with stated that USPS has increased the amount of scanning and the information provided from the scans in recent years  Although USPS has a high scanning rate, some missed and inaccurate scans for competitive products do occur, errors that could potentially affect millions of competitive products  For example, several USPS OIG reports between 2016 and 2018 found that instances of missed or inaccurate scans still occurred both nationwide and that in nine USPS districts they analyzed, were due in part, to post office personnel not always following proper scanning procedures and post office supervisors not adequately monitoring how scanning procedures were implemented  For example, the USPS OIG analyzed approximately 2 billion delivery scans over a 6-month period in 2017 and found that 1 9 million delivery scans (about 0 1 percent) occurred at the post office instead of at the delivery address and were considered improper scans  Furthermore, examples of USPS’s internal reports we reviewed containing scanning performance results showed that a small percentage of competitive mail items had not been scanned  For example, one USPS internal report for a district we visited showed that for one week, USPS employees in the district missed about 0 73 percent of the expected delivery scans for competitive products  Due to USPS’s large volume of competitive products, a small percentage of products not scanned can represent large numbers of items  For example, about 155,000 competitive products were missing a delivery scan in one district’s 2018 year-to-date report we reviewed  Additionally, the representatives of mailers we interviewed also reported occasional scanning issues with USPS’s competitive products  Most of the mailers’ representatives stated that when they see competitive items missing scanning data, it is generally an isolated situation and USPS usually fixes the issue  According to these representatives, USPS provides them with points of contact to work with to resolve scanning issues immediately and on a regular basis  However, one major mailer’s representative we spoke with stated that even though USPS’s employees are generally good at scanning packages, inaccurate delivery scanning is an issue  The representative stated that about 8 to 10 percent of the company’s products sent through USPS were scanned by carriers as delivered, but not at the customer’s delivery address—contrary to USPS’s standard operating procedures for scanning  The representative stated that, although this percentage has decreased in recent years, the mailer would like to see that number decrease further because delivery to the destination address assures them that the item was left as close as possible to the customer  USPS is taking some steps to address missed or inaccurate scans  For example, USPS officials stated that the current electronic scanning device carried by almost all carriers on their routes does not prevent scanning a mail item as delivered to an address that is not the delivery address associated with the item’s barcode information  They also stated that USPS is updating scanning devices to alert carriers when they scan items as delivered when not physically at the correct delivery address  According to USPS officials, as of May 2018, 80 percent of hand-held electronic scanning devices used by USPS carriers had this functionality and that this functionality is being fine-tuned  This capability, though, still does not preclude all scanning errors, as it only affects the final delivery scan  USPS officials also stated that employees may still encounter scanning issues, such as damaged barcodes, which could lead to missed scans  USPS has not based its operational policies and procedures, such as those that support the accurate scanning of competitive products, on any standards for internal controls  USPS officials told us that they have not used any specific criteria for designing, implementing, and operating an internal control system for meeting its operational policies and internal controls, such as those that help ensure competitive products are accurately scanned  According to USPS officials, USPS does not follow the COSO Framework to design, implement or evaluate its operational internal controls as they believe that the COSO Framework standards are traditionally related to internal controls over financial reporting  In addition, USPS officials stated that USPS is not required to follow Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, and therefore USPS does not follow these standards as well  Instead, USPS officials stated that USPS has designed its operational policies and internal controls over the years based on its unique responsibilities, management experience, and sound business practices  However, officials could not identify any specific standards or framework they had followed  We have reported that standards for the design, implementation, and operation of their internal-control system provide an overall framework for establishing and maintaining an effective internal-control system—which is a key factor in achieving an entity’s mission  Further, internal controls help managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources  USPS has options to choose from in selecting standards for internal controls  Two widely used standards are the COSO Framework and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which was adapted for federal entities from the COSO Framework  Both standards are designed to help an entity design, implement, and maintain an effective internal-control system  Such a system should encompass all aspects of an entity’s objectives, including operations, reporting, and compliance objectives, and can help an entity adapt to shifting environments, evolving demands, changing risks, and new priorities  Non-federal entities can adopt either of these standards in their efforts to design, implement, and operate an effective internal control system  As stated above, we found that the COSO Framework to be a reasonable and relevant set of internal control standards to evaluate USPS’s operational internal-control activities  However, we and the USPS OIG have applied both the COSO Framework and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government in evaluating USPS’s operational internal controls in recent reports  Without standards for an effective internal-control system for its operational policies and procedures for scanning competitive products, USPS may miss opportunities to improve how it achieves its mission to deliver those important products  USPS management has designed standard operating procedures to provide assurance that competitive products are scanned accurately  We found some of these procedures to be consistent with the COSO Framework, which states that an organization should deploy control activities through policies that establish what is expected and procedures that put policies into action  USPS has developed a scanning policy for its products, stating that “properly scanning all barcodes will result in World Class Visibility and be instrumental in retaining and growing our shipping business and providing valuable data to drive improved operational performance and reduce costs ” USPS also has procedures that establish the responsibilities of employees for accurately scanning barcodes for competitive products at various points in the mail flow  Although USPS officials stated that employees should rely on prompts from their scanning devices to ensure scans are done correctly, USPS communicates these procedures in three main ways: documents, such as City Carrier Handbook and Rural Carrier Handbook, that outline scanning procedures and that explain carriers’ duties, including scanning; job aids, such as posters showing proper scanning procedures (see fig  5); and, standard work steps or guidance that lists procedural steps either for competitive products or for scanning mail in general (see fig  6)  Following these procedures is important to fulfill USPS’s scanning goals  As stated above, the USPS OIG found instances of missed or inaccurate scans for competitive items in recent reports  Further, the USPS OIG also recently found that USPS employees at all 15 postal facilities it visited in the Los Angeles District did not follow correct scanning procedures for USPS’s competitive Parcel Return Service product, leading to inconsistent counts for these products  Such errors can put USPS at risk of not collecting revenue for these products  The USPS OIG has made several recommendations in its recent reports to USPS management to reinforce the importance of these procedures to employees  USPS officials agreed with some of these recommendations and stated that they are taking action to address them  While reinforcing these procedures can be helpful, we found that USPS’s scanning procedures may not provide the necessary assurance for accurate scanning because they are not consistent  For example: The USPS’s City Carrier Handbook states that mail with a barcode should be scanned at the delivery point (or address)  However, a standard operating procedures document for city carriers at a post office we visited stated that carriers must scan each delivery confirmation mail piece but did not specify that this scan had to be at the delivery point or address  Locally developed procedures may not be uncommon, as one district manager told us that USPS headquarters allows managers to make a certain amount of flexibility to adapt the standard operating procedures for each post office  The USPS document, SCANNING at a Glance: Delivering 100% Visibility, states that all mail items that require delivery scanning should be scanned at the delivery address, but this document also provides additional scanning procedures not contained in the City Carrier Handbook and other standard operating procedures documents we examined  In particular, the document contained procedures for scanning to account for mail being held for customers on vacation; scanning items correctly to account for mail not delivered to business that were closed; and for mail that was refused by the addressee  This inconsistency in USPS’s scanning procedures has likely occurred because many of the documents have been updated at different times and have not always reflected new operations  For city carriers, the online version of the USPS’s City Carrier Handbook was last updated in April 2001  USPS officials stated that the most recent update regarding scanning was issued in November 2015 via a separate Postal Bulletin  Further, a separate standard operating procedure document for city carriers at a post office we visited was dated June 2006  For rural carriers, the most recently updated scanning procedures we found was dated 2013  As a result, some of these documents are not updated with the latest information on new scanning procedures  In a related example, the USPS OIG recently found that employees at three of the six USPS facilities the USPS OIG visited did not have an adequate understanding of the procedures for processing election and political mail due, in part, to guidance that was not updated, even though the procedures were centrally documented on an internal USPS website  USPS officials recognized this issue and stated that these handbooks are not updated regularly as the content of the handbooks are subject to labor negotiations  Therefore, new procedures are presented to USPS employees outside of the handbooks  However, given that these efforts rely on employees to orally communicate information, having consistent documented procedures is even more important  In addition to stating that the organization should deploy control activities through policies and procedures, the COSO Framework states that senior management should communicate objectives clearly through the organization so that other management and personnel understand their individual roles in the organization  By not having consistent procedures, USPS risks not clearly communicating to its employees how they should carry out scanning procedures and therefore contributing to scanning errors  As discussed below, USPS officials told us that management updates its procedures typically through regular meetings with employees, which are documented in handouts or slides  USPS officials stated that management stresses the importance of scanning and that employees should follow the prompts on their electronic devices when scanning competitive products  However, employees can still scan competitive products as delivered even if they are not, as device prompts can be misread, misinterpreted, or ignored  Furthermore, even with current prompts, scanning errors can and do occur  Consistent procedures, clearly communicated to employees, have become increasingly important as USPS hires new employees to handle, in part, anticipated growth in the volume of competitive packages  For example, GAO analysis of USPS data showed that USPS’s carrier workforce increased by 6 4 percent between fiscal years 2015 and 2017  The USPS OIG has found that these new employees require training and guidance to properly perform their roles and to reduce turnover  In addition to deploying policies and procedures to achieve an organization’s objectives, the COSO Framework states that an organization should internally communicate objectives and responsibilities that are necessary to support the functioning of internal controls  This process can be accomplished through training and meetings  Specifically, the COSO Framework states that training should enable individuals to develop competencies appropriate for assigned roles and responsibilities, among other things, and that active forms of communication such as face-to-face meetings are often more effective than passive forms such as broadcast e-mails and intranet postings  To communicate how its procedures should be correctly implemented, USPS has developed both initial and on-going training for employees  USPS officials stated that new employees are formally trained in scanning procedures when they start their employment  For example, carriers are trained how to use USPS’s electronic scanning devices, when to scan competitive items, the correct codes to use for different delivery situations (i e , signature required, vacation holds, how to code where a package was left at a delivery address)  Any new procedures can be introduced through presentations given by managers during meetings, as described below  Required regular meetings may be tracked by USPS management to ensure they are completed  Some district officials we spoke with stated that they certify that their employees have received required training and send that certification to area and USPS headquarters officials  Additional training also helps USPS reinforce correct scanning procedures  When scanning procedures are not being followed or scanning goals are not met at a post office, USPS officials stated that reminders of the correct procedures designed to reinforce USPS’s scanning procedures are presented to employees through presentations, posters, job aids, and additional documents such as carriers’ handbooks  For example, the representative of the major mailer we spoke with that had 8 to 10 percent of competitive products not scanned to the final delivery address stated that training was needed for both new and experienced carriers to reinforce that they should scan items at the delivery address  To further ensure the accurate scanning of competitive products, USPS reported that it holds internal and external meetings  Specifically, these meetings are designed to: Reinforce procedures: Post office managers can use stand-up talks— weekly meetings between management and employees at the post office—to discuss scanning issues with employees and opportunities to address those issues  For example, the postmaster at one post office we visited stated that this post office reinforces the standard work procedures designed to improve the scanning performance of employees during these meetings  Carriers and clerks can ask questions and learn why they are asked to do something or how to do a specific task, allowing for additional training and reinforcement of procedures  For example, we reviewed a handout developed by USPS headquarters to provide managers with talking points for service talks  This handout provided information on carriers delivering and scanning accurately and instructions on scanning at point of delivery on rural routes  Introduce new procedures: USPS officials told us that post office managers use stand-up talks to introduce new procedures and processes with carriers and clerks  For example, postmasters stated that they used these meetings to introduce and train carriers on new scanning features at the post offices  USPS district and area management develop and disseminate memos and handouts to assist managers conducting these meetings  We reviewed handouts USPS provided to managers for service talks  These handouts provided information on the rollout of some of the most recent scanning procedure changes  Continuously improve operations: District managers we interviewed stated that post offices with low scanning performance scores are placed on a district’s list of underperforming post offices  USPS district managers we interviewed told us that they meet with these post offices to determine how each post office plans to improve its scanning performance  District management also conducts audits of underperforming post offices and post offices that are in need of improvement  Our review of one district office’s service review checklist identified the key areas of audit for underperforming post offices  Reassess procedures: Representatives of mailers we interviewed told us that they meet with USPS representatives to discuss ways USPS can share scanning information for competitive products  Given that inaccurate scans can and do occur, it is important that postal managers explore and investigate any instances of missed or inaccurate scans  To do so, USPS managers—including area vice presidents, district managers, and postmasters—use a variety of reports as tools to ensure that the required scans are made at the appropriate place and time, and take action to monitor the status of competitive products, track lost items, and identify scanning issues  USPS headquarters designs reports used by managers to review performance at the local level across the country  Managers at each level are responsible for overseeing and reporting on the performances of the level below them  For example, the postmaster monitors performance of employees at the post office and is accountable to the district manager  In turn, each district manager is held accountable by the area vice president  To monitor performance of scanning of competitive products, these managers have access to several USPS data systems to generate reports  They can use the reports to monitor scanning performance of carriers and clerks at each post office and to identify the causes of scanning issues, such as missing or incorrect scans  Managers can also use these reports to track the status of competitive products or to investigate customer complaints of lost items  Some examples of reports available to managers include the following: Report 1: USPS officials told us that each post office receives this report from their District Office  The report identifies competitive products that do not have all the required scans, such as scans when the item arrives at the post office or when a delivery attempt was made  For example, one district official sends postmasters weekly reports on competitive products that do not have all the required scans  The officials told us that these reports help managers investigate the cause of incorrect scans identified in the report and how to prevent future occurrences  Report 2: USPS officials told us that this report is generated by district managers to proactively identify scanning irregularities, such as scans that may be out of sequence or multiple competitive products that are scanned at the same time but are for different addresses  District management can query postmasters about these scans and ask them to investigate the reason for the irregularities and determine if the scan was appropriate  Report 3: USPS officials told us that this report is generated by postmasters to monitor scanning status and performances for each competitive product that has received an arrival scan but lacks a delivery scan  While this may indicate a problem, it could also just reflect that the final scan had not been made by the end of the day or the scan that had not been uploaded into the USPS data systems when the report was generated  While having these reports are helpful, their full potential to help USPS managers may be limited because USPS lacks detailed and up-to-date standard operating procedures for how managers should use these reports or conduct other activities to efficiently investigate and resolve scanning issues  USPS’s Scanning Performance: Delivery Standard Operating Procedures for managers are a list of bullet points outlining managers’ responsibilities to meet scanning performance target goals and not a list of detailed procedures for managers to follow, such as how to use Report 1 to identify items that do not have all the required scans  In addition, USPS officials told us that this list has not been updated since approximately October 2005  The COSO Framework states that organizations should internally communicate information, including objectives and responsibilities for internal control, necessary to support the functioning of internal control  Further, it states that a process should be in place to communicate required information to enable all personnel to understand and carry out their internal-control responsibilities  Absent such communication, managers may take different actions to address problems or may have difficulty knowing where to find the appropriate information to locate a missing item to resolve a customer’s complaint quickly  For example, one post office manager told us that he will look at the scanning history in the USPS data systems to determine if the item received an acceptable delivery event scan or what the status of the item is on the route, while another post office manager told us he will use GPS data to see where the scans were made to determine if the item was delivered to the right address  If managers do not know where to find the appropriate information, they may spend more time investigating and be less efficient in resolving issues  Further, not having detailed standard operating procedures means managers may not be aware of all the reports available to them  For example, some post office managers told us that they use Report 3 while other post office managers told us that this report was not available to them  Without using Report 3, some managers told us that they look in several sources to find the same information needed to resolve the issue, such as locating a lost package  Some managers told us that USPS management discontinued the report because it was being misused by some managers  Specifically, managers told us that some managers were manually entering scanning or service-performance information retroactively to improve their performance scores  However, they told us that USPS management recently made Report 3 available to managers again but changed features to reduce any misuse  Additionally, USPS may miss opportunities to prevent scanning issues from happening again by not clearly communicating how managers should use the various reports to address specific scanning issues  For example, the USPS OIG recently determined that instances of missed and inaccurate scans for competitive products were a result of USPS management not adequately monitoring the implementation of those procedures  Without detailed procedures to guide managers in finding and using specific information in available reports and other tools, managers will not have consistent information to use to investigate and resolve customer complaints quickly or accurately  In addition, new managers may not know where to go for the most appropriate information and how to use this information to address some issues  As competitive products have become essential to USPS’s economic viability, it is increasingly important for USPS to accurately track them to remain competitive in this market  While USPS may be scanning most mail accurately, there continue to be instances where mail is not scanned accurately or is missing scans  Given the volume and growth in these competitive products, even a small percentage of inaccurately scanned products could be a large number of such products  Since USPS’s procedures were developed absent standards for internal control, the adoption of a set of internal control standards could enhance USPS’s efforts to continuously improve the design, implementation, and evaluation of its operational internal controls for scanning of competitive products  Further, since USPS’s standard operating procedures for scanning are located in numerous documents and are not always consistent—and given USPS’s reliance on stand-up talks and meetings to keep employees current—USPS employees may not always have accurate scanning procedures easily accessible to them  Having consistent standard operating procedures is increasingly important to ensure that employees are making accurate scans  Additionally, standard procedures that guide managers to investigate and resolve scanning issues would help managers more efficiently address these issues and ideally prevent these issues from happening again  To improve USPS’s competitive products scanning, we recommend that the Postmaster General take the following three actions  The Postmaster General should identify and adopt a set of internal control standards that can be used as the basis for operational internal-control activities, such as those for scanning competitive products  (Recommendation 1) The Postmaster General should improve the communication of standard operating procedures for scanning competitive products by, for example, updating or consolidating USPS documents, job aids, and standard work steps  (Recommendation 2) The Postmaster General should create standard operating procedures for managers on how to address inaccurate scans and use available reports to investigate and resolve scanning issues  (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this product to USPS for its review and comment  USPS’s comments are reproduced in appendix I  USPS stated that it cannot agree with our recommendation to identify and adopt a set of internal control standards for USPS’s operational internal control activities at this time  Although USPS has adopted an internal control framework for its financial internal control activities, USPS does not know what the benefits and costs are of adopting internal control standards for its operational internal control activities  As a result, USPS agreed to conduct a cost study to determine whether to commit resources to identifying and adopting a set of internal control standards for its operational internal control activities  We are encouraged that USPS is planning to conduct such a study and anticipate that performing this study will result in the implementation of an appropriate set of internal control standards  USPS agreed with the two recommendations regarding scanning procedures and committed to completing corrective actions by November of 2018  In its general comments, USPS noted that our reference to the USPS OIG’s report, Processing Readiness for Election and Political Mail for the 2018 Midterm Elections did not appear germane to the scanning of competitive mail  We recognize that this report was focused on a different type of mail, but as USPS noted in its letter, we use the OIG report as a related example of how USPS has taken efforts to improve the communication of its scanning procedures to employees  Therefore, we determined that our use of the report is appropriate  We have added information from the OIG report to characterize the OIG’s recommendations and USPS’s actions to address those recommendations  USPS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Postmaster General, the Chairman of the Postal Regulatory Commission, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff making key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the individual named above, Kyle Browning (Assistant Director); Greg Hanna (Analyst-in-Charge); Michael Hansen; Thanh Lu; John Mingus; Faye Morrison; Malika Rice; Amy Rosewarne; Crystal Wesco; Elizabeth Wood; and Matthew Zaun made key contributions to this report 


Report 2: 1 million (about 3 percent of IPA rotator costs) in fiscal year 2017  NSF officials told us that the new limit applies only to an IPA rotator’s trips to their home institution and does not limit travel to other locations for fieldwork or scientific conferences, among other things  These officials explained that NSF chose not to limit trips to these other locations because they are considered fundamental to IPA rotators’ research and are infrequent—occurring one to three times per year, on average, per IPA rotator  Additionally, rotators are permitted to use annual leave, leave without pay, or flexitime to take trips using non-NSF funds for activities performed on a rotator’s own time  In adopting this cost-management strategy, NSF sought to balance the benefits of IPA rotators’ travel with the travel costs  According to the Task Force on Fiscal Oversight’s October 2016 report, NSF’s support for travel benefits the agency by providing a way for program directors and executives to stay current in their scientific fields, conduct outreach with scientific communities, and provide oversight and stewardship of NSF’s programs and awards  NSF officials told us that the agency sought to control travel costs under the Independent Research and Development program by setting a reasonable limit to NSF-funded trips that would cause the least harm to rotators’ research so as not to discourage them from coming to NSF  As a result, NSF decided on a maximum of 12 trips per year under this program because, historically, more than 80 percent of the IPA rotator participants traveled to their home institution less than once per month  In fiscal year 2017, for IPA rotators who entered into new agreements in that fiscal year, NSF ended reimbursements for consulting income that the rotators forgo as a result of their assignment to NSF  Previously, when an IPA rotator discontinued consulting activities during an IPA assignment, NSF would reimburse the rotator up to $10,000 a year  IPA rotators who entered into negotiations or agreements with NSF prior to this change may still receive this reimbursement  In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for lost consulting reimbursements to IPA rotators was $150,000  This amount represented a decrease of about $160,000, or about 52 percent, from fiscal year 2016  NSF made this change because it determined that doing so would not negatively affect the IPA program  In particular, NSF found that other federal science agencies typically did not reimburse IPA rotators for lost consulting income and it concluded that IPA rotators typically do not expect NSF to offer reimbursement  In addition to the three adopted strategies, NSF’s Task Force on Fiscal Oversight identified other potential cost management strategies for the IPA program  The task force reviewed various data on the costs that make up the IPA program, such as the number of IPA rotators who received a particular form of compensation or who would be affected by the potential strategies  In addition, the task force took into account anecdotal and other evidence on how IPA rotators might react to the strategies  Using input from the task force, NSF opted against the other potential strategies because it either (1) expected the resulting cost savings to be small or (2) anticipated potential negative effects from implementing them, such as increased difficulty in hiring IPA rotators  These potential cost-management strategies primarily related to IPA rotator compensation, as described below  Capping IPA rotators’ salaries  NSF decided against establishing a salary cap for IPA rotators at various levels between about $185,000 and $240,000 annually  The task force found that salary caps at lower levels would have greater cost savings because of the higher number of individuals covered by the cap, but that the caps would also pose a significant risk to NSF’s ability to recruit IPA rotators  In particular, the task force found that salary caps at lower levels would disproportionately affect IPA rotators in two of its directorates—the Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering and the Directorate for Engineering—because of the higher salaries of individuals in positions associated with those fields  As a result, the task force recommended that NSF first assess the effects of its cost-sharing pilot program before proceeding with any cap on IPA rotators’ salaries  Reducing or eliminating IPA rotators’ supplemental pay  NSF decided against reducing or eliminating the supplemental pay that IPA rotators receive when their salary at their home institution is below the minimum for their NSF position  In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for IPA rotators’ supplemental pay was $1 0 million (about 3 percent of IPA rotator costs)  The task force recommended against this potential cost-management strategy because it would disproportionately affect IPA rotators in two of its directorates—the Directorate for Biological Sciences and the Directorate for Geosciences  In addition, the task force expected that any cost savings associated with this strategy would be small  Reducing IPA rotators’ per diem payments  NSF decided against reducing or eliminating per diem payments for lodging (excluding taxes), meals, and incidental expenses incurred during the length of rotators’ assignments  In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for per diem payments was $3 1 million (about 8 percent of IPA costs)  The task force concluded, based on its analysis of per diem costs and anecdotal evidence, that many IPA rotators would opt to depart NSF if NSF did not provide per diem payments  As a result, the task force recommended against this strategy  As of June 2018, NSF had not developed an agency-wide workforce strategy for using rotators, as its IPA program steering committee recommended  In addition, NSF has not fully evaluated or developed plans to evaluate both IPA and VSEE rotator program results in terms of progress toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results  As of June 2018, NSF had not developed an agency-wide workforce strategy that includes use of rotators, as NSF’s IPA program steering committee had recommended  In an August 2016 report on the IPA program, the steering committee stated that NSF did not have an agency- wide workforce strategy; instead, each directorate made decisions on its own about when and how to use IPA rotators in executive and program director positions  According to the report, an agency-wide framework would enable NSF to ensure an optimal balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors, which is a strategic principle that the steering committee developed for the IPA program  In February 2017, the committee issued an internal report to agency leadership that recommended expanding what was originally envisioned as a workforce strategy for the IPA program into a comprehensive agency-wide workforce strategy  The report stated that expanding the scope of the workforce strategy would have the greatest impact across the agency and would help NSF leadership in making strategic human capital decisions  The report outlined a process for developing a workforce strategy with various steps, including the following: Job analyses  The report recommended job analyses to review the roles and responsibilities of executive and staff-level positions and to identify the skills and capabilities required for successful performance of the work  According to the report, the steering committee’s working group for developing a workforce strategy found, based on its initial efforts to review position descriptions and roles and responsibilities, that some functions may be better served if performed by permanent federal employees and other functions by rotators  However, the working group concluded that NSF should obtain additional input and evidence before initiating large-scale changes in its workforce  Analysis of workforce gaps and surpluses  The report stated that identifying gaps and surpluses in the demand and supply for federal and rotator scientific staff would inform opportunities to optimize recruitment and retention efforts  The report recommended separate analyses for executive and scientific staff- level positions  Development of strategies to close workforce gaps and address surpluses  According to the steering committee’s report, examples of strategies include succession planning and rebalancing the mix of permanent federal staff and rotators to ensure an optimal workforce with the skills, experience, and capabilities to accomplish NSF’s science-related work  According to NSF officials, the agency’s Division of Human Resource Management was responsible for implementing the steering committee’s recommendation  In particular, it undertook an effort to work with senior leadership to develop a broad strategic workforce plan for the agency  However, in June 2018, NSF officials told us that they shifted their focus from developing a separate workforce strategy in order to focus instead on (1) development of a human capital operating plan, which agencies are required to develop and approve annually, and update as needed, under OPM regulations that went into effect on April 11, 2017; and (2) an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) memorandum issued in April 2017 directing agency heads to develop reform plans that identify ways to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of their respective agencies  The NSF officials explained that they recognized the value in having a workforce strategy, but they did not consider it appropriate for the Division of Human Resource Management to develop a workforce strategy at the same time that the agency was completing the OPM and OMB plans  NSF did not specify how its efforts to complete the OPM and OMB plans would address the need the steering committee identified for an agency- wide framework that would enable NSF to ensure an optimal balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors  In particular, NSF’s human capital operating plan, which it approved in April 2018, does not discuss NSF’s use of rotators or include information on balancing the agency’s use of rotators with permanent staff  Furthermore, NSF has not yet determined how it will address its use of rotators as part of its agency reform plan  In particular, NSF officials told us in June 2018 that they may address the agency’s use of rotators under the workforce focus area of its reform plan, but that they were only just beginning to identify and select initiatives under this focus area and that these initiatives have not yet been finalized  The process the NSF steering committee laid out in its internal report, when implemented, would align with two key principles GAO has identified for effective strategic workforce planning  Specifically, it would align with the principles of (1) determining the skills and competencies that are critical to successfully achieving missions and goals, and (2) developing human capital strategies to address gaps and enable the contribution of critical skills and competencies needed for mission success  By incorporating the NSF’s steering committee’s recommendation for a workforce strategy—and the process outlined by the steering committee for developing this strategy—into its human capital operating plan or agency reform plan, NSF could better manage its use of rotators and balance them with its permanent staff  We have previously found that high-performing organizations recognize the fundamental importance of measuring both the outcomes of human capital strategies and how these outcomes have helped the organizations accomplish their missions and programmatic goals  However, as of May 2018, NSF had not fully evaluated and did not have plans to evaluate the results of its IPA and VSEE rotator programs in terms of progress toward human capital goals and the contributions the programs made toward achieving programmatic results  One of GAO’s key principles for effective strategic workforce planning states that agencies should monitor and evaluate progress toward the agencies’ human capital goals and the contribution that human capital results have made toward achieving programmatic results  In particular, we previously found that evaluation activities can improve the effectiveness of workforce strategies by identifying shortfalls in performance and other improvement opportunities  OPM also requires agencies to develop a human capital operating plan that will support the evaluation of the agency’s human capital strategies  In March 2014, NSF published a summary of the results of focus groups with IPA rotators and their supervisors  This summary outlined benefits and challenges of the program from the perspectives of both groups, such as the benefit of bringing fresh perspective and new ideas to NSF and the challenge of recruiting and retaining qualified IPA rotators  However, the summary did not provide the agency’s assessment of progress towards programmatic results and human capital goals  For example, it summarized the benefits of the program from the standpoint of rotators and did not provide NSF’s assessment of how individual IPA rotators or the program as a whole contributed to NSF’s scientific mission  In addition, the summary did not provide an assessment of the extent to which the current workforce balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors is aligned with NSF’s work  In our semistructured interviews with federal staff and rotators in executive and staff-level positions at NSF, most were comfortable with the current balance, but three individuals raised concerns about the use of rotators in executive positions, suggesting that NSF could benefit from further analysis of its balance of rotators and federal staff  In April 2018, NSF adopted its human capital operating plan which identifies specific, short-term actions that the agency will take to achieve its human capital goals  In its plan, NSF identified strategies derived from NSF’s commitment to ongoing improvement, such as reviewing and realigning its workforce to meet future needs  Also, NSF’s process for developing a workforce strategy, outlined in the steering committee’s February 2017 internal report, included recommendations to conduct an assessment of the outcomes of workforce strategies and the impact of these outcomes on helping NSF accomplish its scientific mission and related programmatic goals  However, plans for this assessment did not include an evaluation of the agency’s rotator programs  Moreover, neither the steering committee’s February 2017 internal report nor NSF’s April 2018 report committed to conducting such an evaluation or specified how assessments described in its reports would address NSF’s rotator programs  For example, neither report specified how NSF would evaluate the extent to which the rotator programs have achieved NSF’s objectives, which we identified through our review of NSF documentation and interviews with NSF officials  These objectives include: bringing fresh perspectives from across the country and across all fields of science and engineering supported by NSF; helping influence new directions for research in science, engineering, and education, including emerging interdisciplinary fields; providing scientific leadership and management of NSF’s research and education programs; and providing opportunities for researchers to gain first-hand knowledge of the philosophy and mechanisms of federal support for research and bring this knowledge back to their home institutions  According to NSF officials, the agency has not separately evaluated the results of its rotator programs in part because rotators are blended into its permanent federal workforce, making it difficult to evaluate the results of its rotator programs separately from those of its overall workforce  In our December 2003 report on key principles for effective strategic workforce planning, we found that federal agencies in general have experienced difficulties in defining practical and meaningful measures that assess the effects human capital strategies have on programmatic results  However, without an evaluation of the extent of the rotator programs’ contributions toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results, NSF is limited in its ability to demonstrate the programs’ benefits to external stakeholders, such as the Congress, and to adjust the programs, if warranted  Such adjustments could include increasing or decreasing the use of rotators overall or in certain types of positions, such as executive or staff-level positions  In recent years, NSF has recognized the need to think more strategically about its use of rotators and has taken positive steps to manage its rotator programs  For example, beginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted several strategies to manage the cost of rotators  However, as of June 2018, NSF had decided against developing a separate agency-wide strategy for balancing its use of IPA rotators and federal staff, as NSF’s steering committee for the IPA program recommended in February 2017  NSF officials said that they recognized the value in having a workforce strategy but wanted to focus instead on addressing OPM and OMB requirements related to workforce planning  By following through on the steering committee’s recommendation for a workforce strategy, NSF could better manage its use of rotators and balance them with its permanent staff  Moreover, as of June 2018, NSF had not fully evaluated the results of the rotator programs, as called for by key principles for effective strategic workforce planning  NSF officials told us they have not done so, in part, because rotators are blended into NSF’s permanent federal workforce, making it difficult to evaluate the results of its rotator program separately from those of its overall workforce  However, without an evaluation of the extent of the rotator programs’ contributions toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results, NSF is limited in its ability to demonstrate the programs’ benefits to external stakeholders, such as the Congress, and to adjust the programs, if warranted  We are making the following two recommendations to NSF: The NSF Director of Human Resource Management should complete the development of an agency-wide workforce strategy for balancing the agency’s use of IPA and VSEE rotators with permanent staff as part of NSF’s current agency reform planning efforts or updates to its human capital operating plan  (Recommendation 1) The NSF Director of Human Resource Management should evaluate the contributions of the IPA and VSEE rotator programs toward NSF’s human capital goals and the contributions the programs have made toward achieving programmatic results  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to NSF for comment  In its written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I, NSF concurred with our recommendations and stated that implementation of the recommendations will enhance efforts to fulfill the agency’s mission and strengthen its workforce  NSF also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies to the appropriate Congressional Committees, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or neumannj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the individual named above, Joseph Cook (Assistant Director), Nkenge Gibson, Kathryn Smith, and Douglas Hunker made key contributions to this report  Also contributing to this report were Antoinette Capaccio, Serena Lo, Timothy Guinane, Cynthia Norris, and Sara Sullivan 

ground_truth: The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under the FY2020 budget submission, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is projected to increase from 38 at the end of FY2018 to 59 at the end of FY2024. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA's budget. The Navy's budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA's proposed FY2020 budget requests a total of $1,784.2 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion) in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania. MDA's budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program. Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA's FY2020 funding procurement and research and development funding requests for the program; required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships; the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy's fleet of Aegis ships, and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites; burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations; whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site; the potential for ship-based lasers, electromagnetic railguns (EMRGs), and hypervelocity projectiles (HVPs) to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles; and technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program.