prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs to enhance small business access to capital; contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in securing federal contracts; direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist business formation and expansion  Congressional interest in these programs has increased in recent years, primarily because assisting small business is viewed as a means to enhance economic growth  The SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program has been operational since April 1971  It is designed to increase small business' access to federal, state, and local government contracting, as well as private-sector contracting, by guaranteeing bid, performance, payment, and specified ancillary bonds "on contracts … for small and emerging contractors who cannot obtain bonding through regular commercial channels " The program guarantees individual contracts of up to $6 5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary  The $6 5 million limit is periodically adjusted for inflation  The SBA's guarantee currently ranges from 80% to 90% of the surety's loss if a default occurs  In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 10,800 bid and final surety bonds (a payment bond, performance bond, or both a payment and performance bond) with a total contract value of nearly $6 5 billion  Although the surety industry does not report the total value of the bonds it issues each year, estimates based on the total amount of premiums collected by the private sector in recent years suggest that the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program represents, by design, a relatively small percentage of the market for surety bonds (from about 1 1% to 6 7% of the value of surety bonds issued by the private sector)  A surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety (that agrees to be responsible for the debt or obligation of another), a contractor, and a project owner  The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the contract's terms and conditions  If the contractor is unable to successfully perform the contract, the surety assumes the contractor's responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed  The surety bond reduces the risk of contracting  Surety bonds are viewed as a means to encourage project owners to contract with small businesses that may not have the credit history or prior experience of larger businesses and are considered to be at greater risk of failing to comply with the contract's terms and conditions  The four general types of surety bonds are bid bonds guarantee that the bidder on a contract will enter into the contract and furnish the required payment and performance bonds if awarded the contract, payment bonds guarantee that suppliers and subcontractors will be paid for work performed under the contract, performance bonds guarantee that the contractor will perform the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions, and ancillary bonds ensure completion of requirements outside of performance or payment, such as maintenance  Surety bonds are important to small businesses interested in competing for a federal contract because the federal government requires prime contractors, prior to the award of a federal contract exceeding $150,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building or public work of the United States, to furnish a performance bond issued by a surety satisfactory to the officer awarding the contract, and in an amount the contracting officer considers adequate, to protect the government  Prime contractors are also required to post a payment bond with a surety satisfactory to the contracting officer for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material in carrying out the work provided for in the contract  Both bonds become legally binding upon award of the contract and their "penal amounts," or the maximum amount of the surety's obligation, must generally be 100% of the original contract price plus 100% of any price increases  Most state and local governments have adopted similar legislation, often called "Little Miller Acts," referencing the Miller Act of 1935 that established the federal requirement  Many private project owners also require contractors to furnish a surety bond before awarding them a contract  This report opens with an examination of the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program's legislative origin and provides a historical summary of the major issues that have influenced the program's development, including the decision to supplement the original Prior Approval Program with a Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program (PSB program) that initially provided SBA-approved sureties a lower guarantee rate (not to exceed 70%) than those participating in the Prior Approval Program (not to exceed 80% or 90%, depending on the size of the contract and the type of small business) in exchange for allowing preferred sureties to issue SBA-guaranteed bonds to small businesses without the SBA's prior approval; P L  114-92 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which increased the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses; and the decision to increase the program's bond limit  It then examines the program's current eligibility standards and requirements, and provides performance statistics, including the number and amount of bond guarantees issued annually  In addition, it provides data concerning the number and amount of final bonds guaranteed from FY1971 through FY2017 (see Table A-1 ) and for bid and final bonds combined from FY2000 through FY2017 (see Table A-2 )  P L  91-609, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, authorized the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program  The act amended Title IV of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (P L  85-699, as amended) to provide the SBA authority to guarantee any surety against loss as the result of a breach of the terms of a bid bond, payment bond, or performance bond by a principal on any contract up to $500,000  The act specified that (1) the principal of the bond is a small business, (2) the bond is required as a condition of bidding on the contract or serving as a prime contractor or subcontractor on the project, (3) the small business is not able to obtain such bond on reasonable terms and conditions without the guarantee, (4) the SBA determines that there is a reasonable expectation that the small business will perform the covenants and conditions of the contract, (5) the contact meets SBA requirements concerning the feasibility of the contract being completed successfully and at a reasonable cost, and (6) the bond's terms and conditions are reasonable in light of the risks involved and the extent of the surety's participation  The act also required that the SBA's guarantee not exceed 90% of the loss incurred by the surety in the event of a breach of the bond's terms and conditions by the small business  The SBA was authorized to finance the program through the Leasing Guarantee Revolving Loan Fund within the Department of the Treasury, which renamed that fund the Lease and Surety Bond Guarantee Revolving Fund  The act authorized the transfer of $5 million from the SBA's Business Loan and Investment Revolving Fund to the Lease and Surety Bond Guarantee Revolving Fund, raising that fund's capital to $10 million available without fiscal year limitation, to support both the lease guarantee program and the surety bond guarantee program  The act also recommended that the program be appropriated up to $1 5 million each fiscal year for three fiscal years after its date of enactment (December 31, 1970) if additional funding were needed to offset the program's expenses  The SBA was directed to administer the program "on a prudent and economically justifiable basis " It was authorized to offset the program's administrative costs by charging a uniform annual fee, subject to periodic review to ensure that the fee is the "lowest fee that experience under the program shows to be justified," and uniform fees for the processing of applications for guarantees  The SBA also was authorized to "obligate the surety to pay the Administration such portions of the bond fee as the Administration determines to be reasonable in light of the relative risks and costs involved " The program's sponsors argued in 1970 that "there is widespread evidence that a significant number of construction contracting organizations find varying degrees of difficulty in obtaining surety bonds" and that "the major share of these organizations are small businesses, and many of them are headed by minority groups " They argued that the Surety Bond Guarantee Program would "facilitate the entry and advancement of small and minority contractors in the construction business " At that time, witnesses at congressional hearings testified that surety bonds were not necessarily required for most private sector construction contracts, but they were required for most public sector construction contracts  The SBA implemented the program on a pilot basis on April 5, 1971, in Kansas City  The program later was expanded to Los Angeles and became nationwide on September 2, 1971  Initially, the SBA guaranteed 90% of the amount of all of the surety bonds in the program and charged sureties 10% of the bond premium paid to the surety company by the contractor  It also charged small business applicants for payment and performance bonds 0 2% of the contract price upon their obtaining the contract  It did not charge for the processing of bid bonds, rejected applications, or applications that did not result in a contract award  Contractors wishing to participate in the program were required to have less than $750,000 in gross annual receipts for the past fiscal year or to have averaged less than $750,000 in gross annual receipts over the past three fiscal years  This size standard was more stringent than for other SBA programs, and it was designed "to reach that segment of small business which was obviously intended to benefit from the legislation as evidenced by the limit of $500,000 on any one contract " Demand for the program exceeded the SBA's expectations  In 1971, the SBA estimated that it would guarantee about 8,000 contracts amounting to about $540 million from FY1972 through FY1974  Instead, it guaranteed 16,118 contracts amounting to nearly $1 1 billion (see Table A-1 in the Appendix)  Because the demand for the program exceeded expectations and the initial fees proved to be insufficient to recoup the program's expenses, in 1974, the SBA requested an additional $25 million for the program  The SBA argued that the additional funds were necessary to take into account the program's projected growth and to establish a reserve fund "to protect against having to suspend [the] program in the fact of more rapid growth than is projected " In response to the SBA's request for additional funding for the program, Congress held congressional hearings to reassess the need for the program and to explore options concerning how to finance the program's proposed expansion  The financing discussions focused on the relative merits of relying primarily on higher fees to increase the program's revenue, reductions in the guarantee percentage to reduce the program's expenses, or additional appropriations to finance the program's proposed expansion  Although the SBA has periodically increased the program's fees and later instituted a tiered system of guarantee percentages, historically, the SBA has tried to keep the program's fees as low as economically feasible and the guarantee percentage as high as economically feasible to encourage the program's use  As an SBA official testified before Congress in 1975: SBA's loss exposure could be reduced by a decrease in the guarantee extended to sureties from 90% to 80%  Before proceeding with this recommendation, a thorough analysis will have to be made of the adverse effect on the willingness of sureties to participate in the program which would result from the increase from 10% to 20% of the sureties' share of the loss potential  An increase in contractor's fees would obviously be beneficial to the operating income of the program, but would also increase the bids which small business-contractors would have to make, thus placing them at a competitive disadvantage with contractors with more ready access to bonding  Moreover, as mentioned previously, the SBA is required by statute to ensure that the fees are the lowest "that experience under the program shows to be justified " Determining the program's appropriate size became a recurring theme at congressional hearings, and continues to be of congressional interest today  For example, Congress has regularly requested testimony from representatives of the surety bond industry and various construction organizations concerning the extent to which the program is necessary to assist small businesses generally, and minority-owned small businesses in particular, in gaining access to surety bonds  Congress has also periodically asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to examine the need for the SBA's surety bond guarantee program and to recommend ways to improve the program's management  That testimony and GAO's reports have supported a need for the program, but, as will be discussed, have had somewhat limited usefulness in helping Congress determine the program's appropriate size  In 1974, Congress responded to the SBA's request for additional funding by passing P L  93-386 , the Small Business Amendments of 1974  It established a separate Surety Bond Guarantees Revolving Fund account (hereinafter Revolving Fund) within the Department of the Treasury to support the program  The act also increased the total contract amount that could be guaranteed to $1 million from $500,000 and recommended that the Revolving Fund receive $35 million in additional funding  The Ford Administration objected to providing additional appropriations for the Revolving Fund  Instead, the Administration recommended that the Revolving Fund receive a $20 million transfer from the SBA's Business Loan and Investment Revolving Fund  The transfer would provide the program access to additional capital without affecting the federal budget deficit  Congress approved the Administration's proposal  As shown in Table 1 , the Revolving Fund received $130 5 million in additional appropriations for FY1976 through FY1979 and continued to receive additional appropriations during the 1980s and 1990s  In addition, the program's bond limit was increased to $1 25 million from $1 million in 1986  As discussed below, the increased appropriations and bond limit were not sufficient to continue the program's growth  Instead, both the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA began to slowly diminish  This general trend continued until the maximum individual surety contract amount was increased, first on a temporary basis by P L  111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and later, on a permanent statutory basis, by P L  112-239 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013  As shown in Table 1 , Congress did not appropriate funding for the Revolving Fund from FY2000 to FY2004, allowing the program to cover the cost of claim defaults through its reserve  Congress also increased the program's bond limit to $2 million from $1 25 million in 2000  Congress provided the Revolving Fund $2 9 million in FY2005, $2 86 million in FY2006, $2 86 million in FY2007, and $3 million in FY2008  During the 111 th Congress, P L  111-5 provided the Revolving Fund a separate appropriation of $15 million to support a temporary increase in the program's bond limit to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that a guarantee in excess of $5 million was necessary, from $2 million  Those funds were in addition to the $2 million appropriation that had already been approved for FY2009  In FY2010, the Revolving Fund received $1 million  Congress has not approved appropriations for the Revolving Fund since then, noting that there have been sufficient funds in the program's reserve to cover the cost of anticipated claim defaults  As mentioned previously, the SBA relied primarily on increased appropriations to finance the program's expansion during the 1970s, but it also increased the program's fees charged to applicants and sureties  For example, in 1976, the SBA increased its fees to sureties to 20% from 10% of the bond premium, instituted a deductible clause on bond claims, and generally limited its approval for bid, participation, and performance bonds to $250,000 unless specified circumstances were met  In 1977, it increased the contractor applicant fee for payment and performance bonds to 0 5% from 0 2% of the contract price upon obtaining the contract  The program's current fee structure is discussed later in this report  Both the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA increased relatively rapidly during the 1970s (see Table A-1 in the Appendix)  The number of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA increased from 1,339 in FY1972 to 20,095 in FY1979, and the amount guaranteed by the SBA increased from $94 4 million in FY1972 to $1 39 billion in FY1979  During the 1980s and 1990s, both the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA generally declined, in both nominal and inflation-adjusted dollars  A review of congressional testimony during that period suggests that there was no single, discernible factor to account for the program's slow contraction  Because the demand for surety bonds tends to fluctuate with changes in the economy, the program might have been expected to contract somewhat during recessions, but the economy experienced periods of both economic growth and decline during the 1980s and 1990s  There also was no indication that the ability of small businesses to access surety bonds in the private marketplace without the SBA's assistance had materially improved, which, if that had been the case, might have contributed to the decline by reducing the number of small businesses applying for assistance  One possible contributing factor to the decline in SBA-guaranteed surety bonds during that period was the continuing reluctance of many surety companies to participate in the program, either because they did not view the program as particularly profitable or they "had developed alternative methods to the program, such as requiring collateral or funds controls and underwriting programs based in part on credit scores, in order to write small and emerging contractors " Another possible contributing factor was a change in the way the program was perceived by congressional leaders and their reluctance to provide additional resources to continue the program's expansion  During the 1970s, at congressional hearings, witnesses praised the program as a great success in helping small businesses access surety bonds and compete for government contracts  During the 1980s and 1990s, congressional hearings focused less on the program's successes and more on its shortcomings  For example, in 1982, the chair of the Senate Committee on Small Business indicted that the program was subject to "the most insidious types of fraud," including "evidence of involvement of organized crime figures " In addition, reports by both GAO and the SBA's inspector general questioned the SBA's management of the program, arguing, among other things, that the SBA lacked useful underwriting guidelines for surety companies and adequate procedures for verifying applicants' information  During the 1980s, the SBA guaranteed, on average, 11,840 final surety bonds each fiscal year, with the SBA's share of those bonds' value averaging $1 0 billion  During the 1990s, the SBA guaranteed, on average, 5,859 final surety bonds each fiscal year, with the SBA's share of those bonds' value averaging $823 million  During the first decade of the 2000s, the SBA guaranteed, on average, about 1,802 final surety bonds each fiscal year, with the SBA's share of those bonds' value averaging about $385 million  Since then, as indicated in Table 2 and Table A-1 , the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA has generally increased  This increase is likely due to generally improving economic conditions and the increase in 2013 of the maximum individual contract amount that could be guaranteed from $2 million to $6 5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary  The surety bonding process begins when a contractor applies for a bond  As GAO has reported Surety companies are generally corporations that are licensed under various insurance laws and, under their charters, have legal power to act as a surety (making themselves responsible for another's obligations) for others  Most surety companies accept business only through independent agents and brokers  In screening a bond applicant, a surety attempts to measure the contractor's ability to undertake and complete the job  When the surety's evaluation of the contractor's acceptability to perform the contract is favorable, the surety underwrites the bond  If the surety does not provide a bond to the bond applicant, the appropriate forms are forwarded to SBA for consideration of a surety bond guarantee  Initially, the SBA surety guaranteed program's bonds were underwritten and issued by large, "standard" surety companies  However, these companies' participation in the program soon began to decline, reportedly because of the administrative burdens associated with the program, such as the SBA's requirement that sureties submit all bond applications to the SBA for review and approval  In addition, the administrative costs of dealing with relatively small bonds versus relatively large ones may have also played a role in the larger, standard surety companies leaving the program  As a congressional witness testified in 1976: You have a professional underwriter, who     is going to be asked to spend 3 or 4 days looking into a $25,000 first-time application  There are many expenses involved  That same underwriter could very easily be writing four or five bonds for $10 million for contractors that everyone knows can perform  And it becomes a matter of how much time and resources can the surety industry devote to this type of business  Another reason may have been the outbreak of the Israeli-Egyptian War in 1973, which was followed by a tripling of oil prices and double-digit inflation  This led to the failure of many smaller contracting companies  In response to the economic downturn, many surety companies enhanced their underwriting standards to protect themselves from rising defaults  As a result, many of the larger surety companies became increasingly reluctant to participate in a program in which the profit margins were relatively small given the required paperwork and the program's limitation on the bond amount, and when the risk of defaults was at a historically high level  As standard sureties left the program, "specialty" surety companies filled the void  Initially, specialty sureties devoted almost all their business exclusively to SBA-guaranteed surety bonds  These companies later expanded their business into offering other high-risk bonds not normally handled by standard sureties  Specialty sureties typically required the contractor to provide collateral for the projects they bonded, and, in most cases, charged higher premiums than standard sureties  In 1982, the SBA invited officials from the Surety Association of America, representing the standard surety companies, to recommend ways to encourage their participation in the program  As mentioned previously, at that time, some specialty surety companies had been accused of associating with organized crime and GAO and the SBA's inspector general had reported fraud and mismanagement in the program  This may help to explain why the SBA was interested in encouraging the larger, more established surety companies to return to the program  The SBA also hoped that greater participation by the larger sureties would lead to lower premiums for small business contractors  During this outreach period, standard surety companies indicated a willingness to increase their participation in the program if the SBA would create a second special program, similar to the SBA's 7(a) loan guarantee program's Preferred Lenders Program  Under the proposal, a surety meeting specified qualification standards would be designed as a "preferred surety" and would be allowed to issue SBA-guaranteed surety bonds prior to receiving the SBA's approval  To participate in the preferred program, the surety's underwriting and administrative standards and procedures would be pre-approved by the SBA, and the surety's decisions would be subject to regular, annual audits  In addition, the SBA's reporting and access to records requirements would be retained  As a measure of their confidence in their own underwriting standards and claims decisions, the standard surety firms indicated that they would accept a 70% guarantee against losses as opposed to the then-allowed 80% or 90% guarantee against losses, as long as firms would not be required to seek the SBA's prior approval for underwriting decisions, bond administration, and claims procedures  Congress subsequently authorized the proposed Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program in P L  100-590 , the Small Business Administration Reauthorization and Amendment Act of 1988 (Title II, the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program Act of 1988)  The program was initially authorized on a three-year trial basis, and it was provided permanent statutory authority by P L  108-447 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005  As discussed in " 114th Congress: Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Rates " below, P L  114-92 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, increased the SBA's guarantee for preferred sureties from not less than 70% to not less than 90% of losses  The SBA is authorized to guarantee surety bonds issued to contractors or subcontractors when the business, together with its affiliates, meets the SBA's size standard for the primary industry in which it is engaged; the bond is required; the applicant is not able to obtain such bond on reasonable terms and conditions without a guarantee; and there is a reasonable expectation that the applicant will perform the covenants and conditions of the contract, and the terms and conditions of the bond are reasonable in light of the risks involved and the extent of the surety's participation  The applicant must also "possess good character and reputation," as demonstrated by (1) not being under indictment, being convicted of a felony, or having a final civil judgment stating that the applicant has committed a breach of trust or has violated a law or regulation protecting the integrity of business transactions or business relationships; (2) not having a regulatory authority revoke, cancel, or suspend a license held by the applicant, which is necessary to perform the contract; and (3) never having obtained a bond guarantee by fraud or material misrepresentation or failing to keep the surety informed of unbonded contracts or of a contract bonded by another surety  Applicants must also certify the percentage of work under the contract to be subcontracted  The SBA does not guarantee bonds for applicants that are primarily brokers or have effectively transferred control over the project to one or more subcontractors  Applicants must also certify that they are not presently debarred, suspended, proposed for debarment, declared ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from transactions with any federal department or agency  In addition, the SBA will not guarantee a bond issued by a particular surety if that surety, an affiliate of that surety, or a close relative or member of the household of that surety or affiliate owns, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of the business applying for the guarantee  This conflict of interest prohibition also applies to ownership interests in any of the applicant's affiliates  As mentioned previously, the SBA guarantees contracts up to $6 5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary  There is no limit to the number of bonds that can be guaranteed for any one contractor  The SBA guarantees up to 90% of the loss incurred and paid by a surety if the contract is $100,000 or less, or if the bond is issued on behalf of a socially and economically disadvantaged-owned and controlled small business, a qualified HUBZone small business, a veteran-owned and controlled small business, or a service-disabled veteran-owned and controlled small business  The guarantee rate is 80% if the contract is greater than $100,000, and the business is not owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, a qualified HUBZone small business, or a veteran-owned or service-disabled veteran-owned small business  The SBA does not charge principals (small business applicants) application or bid bond guarantee fees  If the SBA guarantees a final bond, the principal must pay a contractor fee equal to a percentage of the contract amount, which is determined by the SBA and published in the Federal Register   The FY2019 contractor fee is 0 6% of the contract price for a final bond  The contractor fee is rounded to the nearest dollar, paid to the surety, and the surety remits the fee to the SBA  Sureties also charge principals a premium for issuing and servicing the bond  Sureties are not allowed to charge principals a premium that is more than the amount permitted under applicable state law  Premiums vary depending on the surety's assessment of the risk involved and job size; typically ranging from 1 5% to 3 0% of the contract amount  Sureties interested in participating in the Prior Approval Program or the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program (PSB program) must apply in writing to the SBA  Applicants must be a corporation listed by the U S  Treasury as eligible to issue bonds in connection with federal procurement contracts  The SBA considers several factors when evaluating sureties for the PSB program: the surety must have an underwriting limitation of at least $6 5 million on the Department of the Treasury's list of acceptable sureties; the surety must agree that it will neither charge a bond premium in excess of that authorized by the appropriate state insurance department nor impose any non-premium fee unless such fee is permitted by applicable state law and approved by the SBA; the surety's premium income from contract bonds guaranteed by any government agency (federal, state, or local) can account for no more than one-quarter of the surety's total contract bond premium income; and the surety must vest the underwriting authority for SBA guaranteed bonds to its own employees and final settlement authority for claims and recovery to employees in the surety's permanent claims department  The SBA also considers the surety's rating or ranking designation assigned by a recognized authority  Sureties participating in the PSB program are not eligible to participate in the Prior Approval Program  However, this prohibition does not apply to the surety's affiliates provided that the affiliate is not a participant in the PSB program, their affiliation has been fully disclosed to the SBA, and the affiliate has been approved to participate in the Prior Approval Program  Sureties in the Prior Approval Program must obtain the SBA's approval before issuing a guaranteed bond  Sureties in the PSB program may issue, monitor, and service SBA-guaranteed bonds without prior approval  However, these sureties must notify the SBA electronically of all bonds issued and, for final bonds, they must report and submit to the SBA on a monthly basis all contractor and surety fees that are due  These sureties are also subject to a periodic maximum guarantee authority amount set by the SBA  In addition, effective August 21, 2017, sureties are required, during their initial nine months in the PSB program, to obtain the SBA's prior written approval before executing a bond greater than $2 million  The SBA argued that it was in the taxpayer's interest to require newer sureties to "demonstrate an understanding of the program before being allowed to issue bonds larger than $2 million without SBA's oversight " The terms and conditions of the SBA's bond guarantee agreements with the surety, including the guarantee percentage, may vary from surety to surety, depending on past experience with the SBA  The SBA may take into consideration, among other things, the rating or ranking assigned to the surety by recognized authorities, the surety's loss rate, average contract amount, average bond penalty per guaranteed bond, and the ratio of bid bonds to final bonds, all in comparison with other sureties participating in the same SBA Surety Bond Guarantee Program (Prior Approval or PSB programs)  Sureties are required, among other things, to evaluate the credit, capacity, and character of a principal using standards generally accepted by the surety industry and in accordance with the SBA's standard operating procedures on underwriting and the surety's principles and practices on unguaranteed bonds; reasonably expect that the principal will successfully perform the contract to be bonded; provide bond terms and conditions that are reasonable in light of the risks involved and the extent of the surety's participation; be satisfied as to the reasonableness of cost and the feasibility of successful completion of the contract; ensure that the principal remains viable and eligible for the program; monitor the principal's progress on guaranteed contracts; maintain documentation of job status requests; take all reasonable action to minimize risk of loss, including, but not limited to, obtaining from each principal a written indemnity agreement, secured by such collateral as the surety or the SBA finds appropriate, which covers actual losses under the contract and imminent breach payments; and in the case of loss, pursue all possible sources of salvage and recovery  Participating sureties are subject to audits by SBA-selected and -approved examiners  Prior Approval Program sureties are audited at least once each year and PSB sureties are audited at least once every three years  The SBA does not charge sureties (or small businesses) application or bid bond guarantee fees  It does require sureties to pay a guarantee fee on each SBA-guaranteed bond (other than bid bonds)  The surety fee, which is determined by the SBA and published in the Federal Register , is a percentage of the bond premium  The FY2019 surety fee is 20% of the bond premium that the surety charges the small business, rounded to the nearest dollar  The surety fee is due within 60 days after the SBA's approval of the prior approval payment or performance bond  The SBA does not receive any portion of a surety's non-premium charges  As shown in Table 2 , the number and amount of bid bonds guaranteed by the SBA has generally increased in recent years  For example, in FY2007, the SBA guaranteed 4,192 bid bonds totaling $1 7 billion  In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 7,354 bid bonds totaling $4 7 billion  Table 2 also shows that the number and amount of SBA-guaranteed final bonds declined somewhat from FY2007 through FY2009 (coinciding with the 2007-2009 recession), and has generally increased since then  Recent increases are likely due to generally improving economic conditions and legislation that temporarily ( P L  111-5 ) and then permanently ( P L  112-239 ) raised the program's maximum individual contract amount from $2 million to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary  As shown in Table 3 , excluding program costs of about $4 million annually, the program has experienced a net positive cash flow in each of the past 12 fiscal years  There is about $97 million in the Surety Bond Guarantee Program Revolving Fund  Historically, the program's default rate has averaged about 3% to 5%  According to the SBA, on average, the default rate on larger contracts tends to be lower than for smaller contracts and the recovery rate for larger contract defaults tends to be greater than for smaller contract defaults  Currently, 28 sureties participate in the Prior Approval Program and 6 participate in the PSB program  Agents empowered to represent a participating surety company are located, or licensed, in all 50 states, American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands  About 80% of the SBA's surety bonds are issued through the Prior Approval Program and 20% through the PSB program  P L  111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the program an additional appropriation of $15 million and temporarily increased, from February 17, 2009, through September 30, 2010, the maximum bond amount from $2 million to $5 million  The act also authorized the SBA to guarantee a bond of up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that a guarantee in excess of $5 million was necessary  It also revised the program's size standard to "the size standard for the primary industry in which such business concern, and the affiliates of such business concern, is engaged, as determined by the Administrator in accordance with the North American Industry Classification System " The new size standard (e g , up to $36 5 million in average annual receipts over the previous three years for most heavy construction contractors, and up to $15 million in average annual receipts over the previous three years for specialty trade contractors) increased the number of businesses that qualified for the program  Using its rulemaking authority, the SBA made ARRA's temporary size standard permanent on August 11, 2010  Proponents argued that the increased bond limit and size were necessary to "ensure that small businesses are able to secure the surety bonds they need to compete for contracts, grow, and hire more employees " They also argued that "in our current economic recession, small businesses are finding it even more difficult to secure the credit lines necessary to get bonds in the private sector " In their view, the temporary changes would create "significant opportunities to create jobs now in which small businesses will participate and be the driving engine for creation of new jobs in our country " There was no apparent organized opposition to these specific temporary changes to the Surety Bond Guarantee Program  However, there was opposition to ARRA's package of program enhancements for the SBA as a whole, which among other things, provided the SBA $730 million in additional funding, including $255 million for a temporary, two-year small business stabilization program to guarantee loans of $35,000 or less to small businesses for qualified debt consolidation, later named the America's Recovery Capital (ARC) Loan program and $375 million to temporarily subsidize fees for the SBA's 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90%  Instead of modifying the SBA's program requirements and increasing the SBA's appropriation, opponents advocated business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses, generate economic growth, and create jobs  On September 12, 2011, the Obama Administration advocated, as part of its proposed American Jobs Act, a temporary increase in the SBA surety bond limit to $5 million until the end of FY2012  The Administration argued that raising the program's bond limit "will make it easier for small businesses to take advantage of contracting opportunities generated by the American Jobs Act's proposed infrastructure investments " On December 7, 2012, the Administration also recommended, as part of its request for an additional $60 4 billion in federal resources to address damage caused by Hurricane Sandy, that the SBA surety bond limit be increased to $5 million to enable "more small businesses to participate in the recovery efforts " There were several legislative efforts during the 112 th Congress to increase the program's bond limit  S  1334 , the Expanding Opportunities for Main Street Act of 2011, and its companion bill in the House, H R  2424 , would have reinstated and made permanent ARRA's higher limits (up to $5 million and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies in writing that a guarantee in excess of $5 million is necessary)  Neither of these bills was reported by a committee for consideration by the House or the Senate  S  1660 , the American Jobs Act of 2011, and its companion bill in the House, H R  12 , would have provided $3 million in additional funding to pay for the cost of temporarily increasing the program's bond limit to $5 million from $2 million until the end of FY2012  Cloture on a motion to proceed to S  1660 was not invoked in the Senate on October 11, 2011, by a vote of 50 to 49  H R  12 was not reported by a committee for consideration in the House  On December 12, 2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations released its draft of the Hurricane Sandy Emergency Assistance Supplemental bill  It included a provision to increase the program's bond limit to $5 million  This provision was later removed following congressional approval of H R  4310 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which became law ( P L  112-239 ) on January 2, 2013  It increased the program's bond limit to $6 5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary  There was relatively little discussion in the legislative record concerning the reasons for increasing the surety bond program's bond limits, and even less discussion of the reasons for not increasing the limits  Hearings were not held on S  1334 and H R  2424   Also, only one witness during hearings on H R  4310 addressed the SBA surety bond program  That witness supported an increase in the surety bond limit to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a contracting officer certifies its necessity  Advocates argued that bond limits should be raised to bring them more in line with the contracting amounts for other small business programs, such as the 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program, the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program, the Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract program, and the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Concerns Program  For example, under 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program, federal contracting officials, at that time, could provide a sole source award to a 8(a) small business if the anticipated award price of the contract did not exceed $6 5 million for manufacturing contracts (now $7 0 million) or $4 million for other contract opportunities, and the contracting officer believed that the award could be made at a fair and reasonable price  Advocates argued that raising the program's bond limit would provide more consistency across small business contracting programs and make it easier for agencies experiencing difficulty issuing contracts in increments of $2 million or less (e g , the Department of Defense [DOD], the General Services Administration, and the Department of State) to participate in the program  Advocates also argued that small businesses awarded contracts exceeding $2 million under the other small business contracting programs are at risk of not being able to complete those contracts due to difficulties in securing a surety bond  For example, the House Committee on Armed Services' Panel on Business Challenges in the Defense Industry argued that the SBA surety bond program's limit should be increased to $6 5 million to match the 8(a) program's $6 5 million threshold for manufacturing contracts and to "increase the opportunities for small businesses to compete for federal contracts, especially in those departments, such as the Department of Defense, where the average size of construction contracts awarded to small businesses for FY2010 exceeded $5 9 million—nearly triple the size for which SBA can provide bonding support " There was no organized opposition to raising the program's bond limits  One possible argument that could have been raised is that higher limits could lead to higher amounts being guaranteed by the SBA and, as a result, increase the risk of program losses  However, the SBA's experience with Recovery Act bonds (over $2 million) suggested that raising the limit may not lead to an increased risk of program losses  The SBA reported that the program's default rate on Recovery Act bonds was lower, in 2009 and 2010, than for its other bonds  The SBA guaranteed 166 Recovery Act bid bonds valued at $518 million and 52 Recovery Act final bonds valued at $145 4 million  There were two defaults, with a bond value of $2 7 million and $2 2 million, respectively  In an effort to enhance surety participation in the SBA's program, H R  776 , the Security in Bonding Act of 2013, introduced and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee on Small Business on February 15, 2013, would have increased the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses  The bill was reported favorably by both committees on May 21, 2014, and included in H R  4435 , the Howard P  "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, which was passed by the House on May 22, 2014  This provision was not included in the final version of the bill which was subsequently passed by Congress  Advocates of increasing the PSB program's guarantee rate argued that Despite the different guarantee amounts and the differing levels of review, both the PAP [Prior Approval Program] and PSBP [Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program] have similar levels of default  However, over the years, the PSBP program has become less effective for small businesses since only four sureties currently participate in the program because the guarantee rates are no longer competitive enough to encourage commercial sureties to participate  Therefore, since the PSBP is the more efficient program and … does not expose taxpayers to any risk, this legislation amends the SBIA [Small Business Investment Act] to standardize the guarantee rate at 90 percent  The SBA did not formally endorse the proposed guarantee rate increase  However, in its FY2015 and FY2016 congressional budget justification documents, the SBA indicated that it "will investigate establishing a single guaranty percentage in the Prior Approval and PSB programs and restructuring the Prior Approval program " Also, when asked at a congressional hearing held on May 23, 2013, about the proposed guarantee rate increase, an SBA official testified that We are looking very closely at the program  We have seen a decline in the preferred sureties going down from 50% to 14% of our program, which is a very small number  We would like to see more participation in that program  Because of the additional cash flow we have, we do not expect it to increase our costs  And we have some history in our other programs that demonstrate that having the same guarantee level is not a disincentive  There was no discussion in the legislative record during the 113 th Congress opposing an increase in the guarantee rate for the PSB program  One possible objection might have been that increasing the guarantee rate could increase the risk of program losses and result in higher program fees  Higher fees, in turn, could cause hardship for some companies seeking a surety bond  H R  838 , the Security in Bonding Act of 2015, was introduced and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee on Small Business on February 10, 2015  The bill would have increased the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90%, specify requirements concerning the pledge of assets by individual sureties, and require GAO to examine the effects of these changes on small businesses  The House-passed version of H R  1735 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, included H R  838 's provisions  The Senate-passed version of the bill did not  The conference agreement for H R  1735 , which became P L  114-92 , included H R  838 's provision to increase the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses and its provision to specify requirements concerning the pledge of assets by individual sureties, subject to a one-year delay "to allow for the necessary rulemaking " Congress specified additional requirements concerning the pledge of assets by individual sureties as a means to ensure that "individual sureties have sufficient assets to redeem the bonds " The SBA's final rule implementing the increased PSB program's guarantee rate was effective as of September 20, 2017  The SBA has reported that it is focusing on "strengthening relationships with individual surety companies and the large network of bond agents and producers across the country in order to reach more small businesses in need of bonding " As part of this outreach effort, the SBA has reported that it will continue to emphasize "process improvements that will streamline the application requirements for small businesses and surety companies and their agents " For example, in August 2012, the SBA announced a "Quick APP" for surety bonds up to $250,000 that provides a streamlined underwriting and application process by combining "two applications into one to make it easier and faster for small businesses and contractors, including veteran-owned small businesses, to compete for contracts " The SBA increased the Quick APP (now called the Quick Bond Program) eligibility threshold to $400,000 in 2017  In addition, the SBA reported in 2016 that it was also considering combing the Prior Approval Program and PSB program into a single program featuring the streamlined bond approval and monitoring processes under the PSB program  Several industry groups, including the National Association of Surety Bond Producers and The Surety & Fidelity Association of America, have recommended that the programs be merged, the emphasis on reduced regulatory burdens under the PSB program be maintained, and the program's fees kept as low as economically feasible as a means to encourage more sureties to participate in the program  Perhaps because the proposal has not been formally introduced as a bill, there are no public statements opposing the merger of the two programs  Opposition might come from (1) those who are not convinced that the Surety Bond Guarantee Program is necessary to supplement the private market for surety bonds and would prefer that the program be eliminated rather than reformed or (2) those who believe that a federal program is necessary to supplement the private market for surety bonds, but the existing program is sufficient to meet that need and does not require changes to encourage its expansion  Still other opponents might argue that providing additional authority to sureties to approve and monitor bonds could increase the risk of defaults and program losses  Throughout the program's history, both congressional testimony and GAO examinations have indicated that smaller contracting firms, and especially minority-owned and women-owned small business contracting firms, often have a more difficult time accessing surety bonds in the private marketplace than larger firms  For example, in 1995, GAO reported that "it is not unusual for a small construction company to have some difficulty in obtaining a surety bond " GAO found that about one in three of the smallest contracting firms it surveyed, compared with about one in six of the larger contracting firms it surveyed, reported that they were required to provide collateral  GAO also reported The experiences of the minority-owned firms differed from those of the firms not owned by minorities in several areas  For example, these firms were more likely to be asked to provide certain types of financial documentation, as well as to provide collateral or to meet other conditions; were more likely to be denied a bond and to report losing an opportunity to bid because of delays in processing their request for a bond; and were more likely to depend on jobs requiring bonds for a higher proportion of their revenues  The women-owned firms differed from the firms not owned by women in a few key respects  For example, they … were more likely to be asked to provide more types of financial or other documentation to obtain a bond  In addition, the minority-owned firms reported more often than the firms not owned by minorities that they had to (1) establish an escrow account controlled by the surety company, (2) hire a CPA or a management or consulting firm selected by the surety company to manage the contract, and (3) enter into an arrangement that allows the surety company to manage the job even when the firm is not in default  Although congressional testimony and GAO examinations have supported the need for a program such as the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program, that testimony and GAO's surveys of businesses have been somewhat less useful in helping Congress determine the appropriate size for the program  For example, a review of congressional hearings since the program's inception suggests that congressional witnesses representing the surety companies and various construction organizations, including minority-owned small contracting businesses, have focused their testimony on the need to reduce the SBA's paperwork requirements, which are designed to prevent fraud but increase the sureties' costs; keep the program's fees as low as possible; and keep the program's guarantee rates as high as possible  The SBA's testimony has tended to focus on the need to attract more sureties to the program so that it can reverse the slow downward trajectory the program has experienced over the past two decades in the number and amount of final bonds guaranteed  There has been relatively little testimony provided concerning the broader issue of how large the program should be in comparison with the private sector and what measures or metrics could be used to help make that determination  One possible starting point for determining the program's size in comparison with the private sector is to examine congressional testimony concerning the supply and demand for sureties in the private sector  That testimony suggests that the supply and demand for sureties tends to fluctuate with changes in the overall economy, with the supply of sureties contracting during economic recessions and expanding during economic expansions and the demand for sureties slowing during economic recessions and increasing during economic expansions  Arguably, federal policies could take these fluctuations into account—enacting policies that expand federal support for surety guarantees when supply is tight and reducing federal support for surety guarantees when supply is more plentiful  Of course, when making these decisions, it is necessary to first establish measures or metrics to determine current market conditions  In addition, this line of reasoning assumes that having a federal presence in the surety marketplace is desirable, an assumption not held by all  Ultimately, although having established measures or metrics concerning the supply and demand for surety bonds might be helpful in determining the appropriate size for the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program, that decision will largely rest on personal views concerning the role of the federal government in the private marketplace and the level of acceptable risk in assisting small businesses to gain greater access to surety bonds 


Report 2:  As of 2018, at least one preference customer has terminated its contract with SEPA due to this issue  Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 (P L  78-534) established the Southwestern Power Administration  SWPA markets hydroelectric power in Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas from 24 multipurpose Corps dams with a combined capacity of 2,194 MW  SWPA serves more than 100 preference customer utilities with more than 8 million end-use customers  The agency manages nearly 1,400 miles of high-voltage transmission lines  SWPA is the only U S  electrical balancing area supported solely by hydroelectric generation, and its use of the reservoirs and river systems within the SWPA marketing area must be balanced with flood control and other required uses so that the power needs of its customers can be met  SWPA states that it uses alternative financing and offsetting collection authorities to fund expenses and purchase power to help SWPA meet its obligations while minimizing congressional appropriations  Periodically, SWPA has been challenged by low water conditions  It has a rain-based water supply—rather than one that is snow-based, like the mountain snowpack water supply of WAPA and BPA—and sells power from a comparatively small reservoir system which stores that water  Extended dry periods sometimes mean that SWPA must purchase replacement power and energy to meet its contractual obligations  This means that SWPA requires congressional authority to use its revenues from power sales over the long term—across high and low water years  Prior year balances have been available to Southwestern so that we are financially prepared and able to achieve rate stability for our customers  This authority is critical to operating our program according to sound business principles  Southwestern's program is funded by authority to use receipts, alternative financing, and other authorities approved by Congress, including appropriations, which represent only 6 5% of Southwestern's total program  Created by the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 ( P L  95-91 ), WAPA is the newest and largest of the PMAs in terms of service area  WAPA's service area covers 1 3 million square miles, and its power—transmitted by a high voltage grid over 17,000 miles long—serves customers in 15 western states  WAPA markets and transmits hydropower from 56 federal dams operated by BOR, and the Corps  It also sells hydropower power produced by facilities administered by the International Boundary and Water Commission, and markets the United States' 24 3% share (547 megawatts) of the coal-fired Navajo Generating Station in Arizona  In addition to the types of public bodies traditionally served as preference customers by the other PMAs, WAPA has developed a policy to give preference to Native American tribes regardless of their utility status  WAPA has been working with other regional entities to address the changing electric power needs of its customers  In 2014, WAPA published its Strategic Roadmap 2024, titled "Powering the Energy Frontier " The document is intended to serve as WAPA's strategic plan to guide the agency's actions for the next 10 years  However, according to some, the developing Energy Imbalance Market in the West may provide additional options for WAPA to address transmission development needs to balance regional generation and demand  An issue of continuing importance to WAPA is its role in relieving transmission congestion within its marketing area  There are a number of constrained transmission paths in the West whose limited capacity to transfer power may reduce the ability of utilities to serve electric loads on a seasonal or ongoing basis  In 2009, Section 402 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( P L  111-5 ) amended the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 to give WAPA authority to borrow up to $3 25 billion from the U S  Treasury to pursue transmission projects that integrate renewable generation sources into the electric transmission grid  The law provides authority to construct and upgrade transmission lines to help deliver renewable resources to market  Western created the Transmission Infrastructure Program, also known as TIP, to implement this new initiative  Several transmission projects have been initiated under the program  Previous budget proposals and legislation have proposed repealing WAPA's loan authority, but to date, none of these proposals have been enacted  In 2015, WAPA's Upper Great Plains (UGP) region joined the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO)  Under the operating agreement with SPP, WAPA was required to transfer functional control of UGP's eligible transmission facilities to SPP  WAPA is the first PMA to formally join an RTO, and states that benefits to date from joining SPP have significantly exceeded the original estimate of $11 5 million per year  WAPA reports that two of its other regions are considering joining SPP  For Water Year 2017, WAPA reported that it delivered 26,148 gigawatt-hours of hydroelectric power to its customers, which is 101% of average annual power sales  The West has been experiencing periodic droughts for a number of years, resulting in lower snowmelts and less water in storage and available for power generation  To help smooth the resulting annual differences, a "drought-adder" reduction program has been implemented in recent years  A drought-adder charge was levied to help repay deferred drought costs accrued during the 2000s in the Rocky Mountain and Upper Great Plains regions  The balance was paid a year ahead of schedule and, as of this year, has resulted in $40 million annual savings for more than 50 percent of WAPA's customers in Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas and the western sections of Minnesota and Iowa  This is the second year that 417 of WAPA's customers, out of 700, have had a rate reduction  The drought-adder component of the rate remains available to WAPA to adjust to the variable hydropower resource—a lasting risk if drought conditions persist in WAPA's territory  Moderate to extreme drought conditions have been reported in parts of the western United States  In addition to issues specific to individual PMAs, some recent proposals have applied to multiple PMAs  In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations  The proposal suggested that "eliminating or reducing" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets and increasing the private sector role would "encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers " The proposal calls for federal transmission infrastructure assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) to be sold, with the private sector and/or state and local entities potentially taking over the transmission functions now provided by the PMAs  The Federal entities that would result after such sales could contract with other utilities to provide transmission service for the delivery of Federal power just as the Southeastern Power Administration, which does not own transmission lines, already does  The proposal reports that according to the Administration's FY2019 budget justification, the sale of federal transmission assets would result in a net budgetary savings of $9 5 billion, in total, over a 10-year window  Reportedly, the Administration dropped the plan due to stakeholder opposition, with the Department of Energy stating that such a sale of PMA transmission assets would not proceed unless directed by Congress  Proposals to sell all or part of the PMAs are not new, and have been made in some form by almost every President since Reagan  However, Congress has sought to prevent executive branch alterations of PMA structures and authority  Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 ( P L  99-349 ), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress  The Trump Administration divestment proposal could have had an indirect impact on the original congressional intent for the PMAs to provide electricity at the lowest possible cost  This in turn could require changes to the following provisions: Flood Control Act of 1944, as amended (FCA; 16 U S C  §825s et seq  ); The 1937 Bonneville Project Act (BPA; 16 U S C  §832c ); and The Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (RPA; 43 U S C  §485h(c))   These laws also stipulate a preference of public bodies for the sale of federal power  Selling federally owned transmission assets could potentially affect the "lowest possible" rates of sale, and the statutory preference for publicly or cooperatively owned utilities to be the vehicle for sale of electric power produced by federal facilities 

ground_truth: The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Surety Bond Guarantee Program is designed to increase small businesses' access to federal, state, and local government contracting, as well as private-sector contracts, by guaranteeing bid, performance, and payment bonds for small businesses that cannot obtain surety bonds through regular commercial channels. The program guarantees individual contracts of up to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The SBA's guarantee currently ranges from 80% to 90% of the surety's loss if a default occurs. In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 10,800 bid and final surety bonds with a total contract value of nearly $6.5 billion. A surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety (who agrees to be responsible for the debt or obligation of another), a contractor, and a project owner. The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. If the contractor is unable to successfully perform the contract, the surety assumes the contractor's responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed. Surety bonds encourage project owners to contract with small businesses that may not have the credit history or prior experience of larger businesses and may be at greater risk of failing to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. Surety bonds are important to small businesses interested in competing for federal contracts because the federal government requires prime contractors—prior to the award of a federal contract exceeding $150,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building or public work of the United States—to furnish a performance bond issued by a surety satisfactory to the contracting officer in an amount that the officer considers adequate to protect the government. P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, increased the program's bond limit to $6.5 million, or up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The limit had been $2 million since 2000, with a temporary increase from February 17, 2009, through September 30, 2010, to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that such a guarantee was necessary. Advocates of raising the program's bond limit argued that doing so would increase contracting opportunities for small businesses and bring the limit more in line with limits of other small business programs, such as the 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program and the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) Program. Opponents argued that raising the limit could lead to higher amounts being guaranteed by the SBA and, as a result, increase the risk of program losses. This report examines the program's origin and development, including (1) the decision to supplement the original Prior Approval Program with the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program that initially provided a lower guarantee rate (not to exceed 70%) than the Prior Approval Program (not to exceed 80% or 90%, depending on the size of the contract and the type of small business) in exchange for allowing preferred sureties to issue SBA-guaranteed surety bonds without the SBA's prior approval; (2) P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which increased the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses; and (3) the decision to increase the program's bond limit.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: Section 420 of the Robert T  Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( P L  93-288 , hereinafter the Stafford Act) authorizes the President to "declare" a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG)  The current FMAG system was established by regulation in October of 2001  These grants provide federal assistance for fire suppression activities  This authority has been delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Regional Administrators  Once issued, the FMAG declaration authorizes various forms of federal assistance such as the provision of equipment, personnel, and grants to state, local, and tribal governments for the control, management, and mitigation of any fire on certain public or private forest land or grassland that might become a major disaster  This federal assistance requires a cost-sharing component such that state, local, and tribal governments are responsible for 25% of the expenses  This report discusses the most frequently asked questions received by the Congressional Research Service on FMAGs  It addresses questions regarding how FMAGs are requested, how requests are evaluated using thresholds, and the types of assistance provided under an FMAG declaration  FMAGs can be requested by a state when the governor determines that a fire is burning out of control and threatens to become a major disaster  At that point, a request for assistance can be submitted to FEMA  Typically, requests are submitted to the FEMA Regional Administrator  Requests can be submitted any time—day or night—and can be submitted by telephone to expedite the process  Telephone requests must be followed by written confirmation within 14 days of the phone request  Under the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA, Division B of P L  113-2 ), tribes are equivalent to states in their ability to request a major disaster declaration, an emergency declaration, or a request for an FMAG declaration  Note that some tribal land holdings are administered by the federal government and, therefore, receive fire suppression support through the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC)  The NIFC supports interagency "wildland" firefighting efforts on federal lands by the U S  Forest Service, National Weather Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), U S  Fish and Wildlife Service and FEMA's U S  Fire Administration  Unlike FMAGs, such support generally does not require tribes to reimburse firefighting costs (FMAGs require the state to pay a 25% cost-share)  In addition, tribes with their own fire suppression resources may receive reimbursement from BIA for their costs related to fire suppression on tribal lands  The FMAG request should include cost estimates to support the request as well as information about the fire including the size of the fire(s) in acres or square miles, the population of the community (or communities) threatened, the number of persons evacuated (if applicable), weather conditions, and the degree to which state and local resources are committed to this fire and other fires in federal, state, and/or local jurisdictions  The verbal request must be followed up with a completed "Request for Fire Management Assistance Declaration" (FEMA form 078-0-1) and the "Principal Advisor's Report" (FEMA form 078-0-2)  The following criteria are used to evaluate wildfires and make a determination whether to issue an FMAG: the threat to lives and property including critical facilities, infrastructures, and watershed areas; the availability of state and local fire resources; high fire danger conditions based on nationally accepted indices such as the National Fire Danger Ratings System; and the potential economic impacts of the fire  In addition, FEMA has developed fire cost thresholds that are typically updated on an annual basis  There are two types of fire cost thresholds used to help determine if a state or tribal nation is eligible for fire assistance: (1) individual thresholds for a single fire, and (2) cumulative thresholds for multiple fires  Cumulative thresholds are applied to multiple fires burning simultaneously, or the accumulation of multiple fires in a single fire season  Threshold amounts vary by state (see Table 1 )  Taking Pennsylvania as an example, generally, a single fire would need to meet or exceed $927,274 in damages for Pennsylvania to be eligible for an FMAG declaration  In contrast, the formula for the cumulative fire threshold for a given state is one of two amounts—$500,000 or the amount of that state's individual fire threshold multiplied by three, whichever is greater  Returning to the Pennsylvania example, the sum of three individual fire thresholds equals $2,781,822  Since that amount is larger than $500,000, cumulative fire damages in Pennsylvania must meet or exceed $2,781,822 to be eligible for assistance  In contrast, the individual fire threshold for Alaska is $100,000, but the cumulative threshold is $500,000, not the sum of three individual fire thresholds ($300,000)  If FEMA denies the request for assistance, the state has one opportunity to appeal the denial  The appeal must be submitted in writing to the Regional Administrator no later than 30 days from the date of the denial letter  The appeal should contain any additional information that strengthens the original request for assistance  The Regional Administrator will review the appeal, prepare a recommendation, and forward the appeal package to the FEMA Headquarters Office  The FEMA Headquarters Office will notify the state of its determination in writing within 90 days of receipt of the appeal (or receipt of additional requested information)  The state may request a time extension to submit the appeal  The request for an extension must be submitted in writing to the Regional Administrator no later than 30 days from the date of the denial letter  The request for an extension must include a justification for the need for an extension  The FEMA Headquarters Office will notify the state in writing whether the extension request is granted or denied  No, an emergency or major disaster can be declared after an FMAG declaration has been issued  However, the emergency or major disaster declaration must be initiated by a separate request for assistance by the state or tribal government  FMAGs are funded through FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), the main account FEMA uses to provide disaster assistance  The DRF is a no-year account—unused funds from the previous fiscal year are carried over to the next fiscal year  Funds in the DRF fall into two categories  The first category is for disaster relief costs associated with major disasters under the Stafford Act  This category reflects the impact of the Budget Control Act ( P L  112-25 , BCA), which allows appropriations to cover the costs incurred as a result of major disasters to be paid through an "allowable adjustment" to the discretionary spending limits  The second category is colloquially known as "base funding " Base funding includes activities not tied to major disasters under the Stafford Act  Base funding is scored as discretionary spending that counts against the discretionary spending limits, whereas FMAGs are funded through the DRF's base funding category  The decision to issue a FMAG declaration is not contingent on the DRF balance  Similarly, FMAGs do not reduce the amount of funding available for major disasters  When the DRF balance was low in the past, FEMA used its "immediate needs funding" (INF) policy until supplemental appropriations were passed to replenish the DRF  Under INF, long-term projects (such as mitigation work) are put on hold and only activities deemed urgent are funded  FMAGs would most likely fall into the category of events with an "urgent" need  Under the INF policy, FEMA also delays interagency reimbursements, and recovers funds from previous years in order to stretch its available funds  As with many other Stafford Act disaster assistance grant programs (Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation Grant assistance, Other Needs Assistance) the cost-share for FMAGs is based on a federal share of 75% of eligible expenses  The grantee (the state) and subgrantees (local communities) assume the remaining 25% of eligible costs  Under the FMAG process, FEMA reimburses grantees for eligible activities they have undertaken  The state application for specific grant funds must be submitted within 90 days after the FMAG is granted  That time frame permits the state to gather all information and supporting data on potentially eligible spending to include in their grant application package  The package must also stipulate that the fire cost threshold was met  Following submission of the grant application FEMA has 45 days to approve or deny the application  FMAG assistance is similar in some basic respects to other FEMA assistance  For example, FMAGs will not replicate or displace the work of other federal agencies, nor will FEMA pay straight-time salaries for public safety forces, though it will reimburse overtime expenses for the event  Other eligible expenses can include costs for equipment and supplies (less insurance proceeds); mobilization and demobilization; emergency work (evacuations and sheltering, police barricading and traffic control, arson investigation); prepositioning federal, out-of-state, and international resources for up to 21 days when approved by the FEMA Regional Administrator; personal comfort and safety items for firefighter health and safety; field camps and meals in lieu of per diem; and/or the mitigation, management, and control of declared fires burning on comingled federal land, when such costs are not reimbursable by another federal agency  Until recently, only major disaster declarations made statewide hazard mitigation grants available  Division D of P L  115-254 (Disaster Recovery Reform Act, hereinafter DRRA) amended the Stafford Act to make hazard mitigation available for FMAG declarations as well  Under Section 404 of the Stafford Act as amended by DRRA, mitigation grants from the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) are provided to states and tribes on a sliding scale based on the percentage of funds spent for FMAG assistance  For states and federally recognized tribes with a FEMA-approved Standard State or Tribal Mitigation Plan, the formula provides for up to 15% of the first $2 billion of estimated aggregate amounts of disaster assistance, up to 10% for amounts between $2 billion and $10 billion, and 7 5% for amounts between $10 billion and $35 333 billion  FEMA assistance through FMAGs is a direct relationship with the states to assist the state in fighting the fire on state lands  FMAGs are employed so a disaster declaration may not be necessary  The Forest Service and other federal agencies do provide other types of assistance related to wildfire management, such as postfire recovery assistance, or assistance planning and mitigating the potential risk from future wildfires  Most of these programs provide financial and technical assistance to state partners  In addition, other USDA agencies administer various other programs to provide disaster recovery assistance to nonfederal forest landowners, including the Emergency Forest Restoration Program and the Emergency Watershed Program  This depends on the type of assistance being provided by the Forest Service  FMAG assistance is not generally available in conjunction with emergency suppression assistance from the Forest Service, or any other federal agency engaged in suppression operations  FMAGs provide assistance for suppression operations on nonfederal lands, whereas suppression operations on federal lands are the responsibility of the federal agency with jurisdiction  Limited exceptions may occur for declared fires on lands in which the ownership is comingled federal and nonfederal, and the costs incurred by the eligible entity are not entitled to any other type of federal reimbursement  However, FMAGs may be provided in conjunction with other Forest Service assistance programs, such as any technical and financial assistance provided through the agency's state and volunteer fire assistance programs or state and private forestry office  FMAG and other federal assistance may potentially occur in conjunction when there is a cooperative agreement between federal, state, and other governmental or tribal partners to coordinate emergency wildfire protection and response activities  The cooperative agreement often delineates different geographic areas where the state government is responsible for initial suppression operations, regardless of land ownership, and vice versa, where the federal government may be responsible for providing suppression operations in lands under nonfederal ownership  The cooperative agreements (sometimes referred to as "fire compacts") specify how costs are to be apportioned among the partners, including provisions allowing for reimbursement, in accordance with applicable federal and state statutes  In the circumstance where a state (or other eligible entity) conducted suppression operations on federal land and the costs were not reimbursable, an FMAG may potentially be applied for and used to cover eligible costs  No, most fires that begin on federal land are the responsibility of the federal agency that owns or manages the land, and are not eligible to receive FMAG assistance  There are some exceptions, however  For example, FMAGs may be available to assist with declared fires that occur in areas with a mix of federal and nonfederal land, if the state has a responsibility for suppression activities under a cooperative agreement with the applicable federal agency, and those costs are not reimbursable under another federal statute 
Report 2:  As of 2018, at least one preference customer has terminated its contract with SEPA due to this issue  Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 (P L  78-534) established the Southwestern Power Administration  SWPA markets hydroelectric power in Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas from 24 multipurpose Corps dams with a combined capacity of 2,194 MW  SWPA serves more than 100 preference customer utilities with more than 8 million end-use customers  The agency manages nearly 1,400 miles of high-voltage transmission lines  SWPA is the only U S  electrical balancing area supported solely by hydroelectric generation, and its use of the reservoirs and river systems within the SWPA marketing area must be balanced with flood control and other required uses so that the power needs of its customers can be met  SWPA states that it uses alternative financing and offsetting collection authorities to fund expenses and purchase power to help SWPA meet its obligations while minimizing congressional appropriations  Periodically, SWPA has been challenged by low water conditions  It has a rain-based water supply—rather than one that is snow-based, like the mountain snowpack water supply of WAPA and BPA—and sells power from a comparatively small reservoir system which stores that water  Extended dry periods sometimes mean that SWPA must purchase replacement power and energy to meet its contractual obligations  This means that SWPA requires congressional authority to use its revenues from power sales over the long term—across high and low water years  Prior year balances have been available to Southwestern so that we are financially prepared and able to achieve rate stability for our customers  This authority is critical to operating our program according to sound business principles  Southwestern's program is funded by authority to use receipts, alternative financing, and other authorities approved by Congress, including appropriations, which represent only 6 5% of Southwestern's total program  Created by the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 ( P L  95-91 ), WAPA is the newest and largest of the PMAs in terms of service area  WAPA's service area covers 1 3 million square miles, and its power—transmitted by a high voltage grid over 17,000 miles long—serves customers in 15 western states  WAPA markets and transmits hydropower from 56 federal dams operated by BOR, and the Corps  It also sells hydropower power produced by facilities administered by the International Boundary and Water Commission, and markets the United States' 24 3% share (547 megawatts) of the coal-fired Navajo Generating Station in Arizona  In addition to the types of public bodies traditionally served as preference customers by the other PMAs, WAPA has developed a policy to give preference to Native American tribes regardless of their utility status  WAPA has been working with other regional entities to address the changing electric power needs of its customers  In 2014, WAPA published its Strategic Roadmap 2024, titled "Powering the Energy Frontier " The document is intended to serve as WAPA's strategic plan to guide the agency's actions for the next 10 years  However, according to some, the developing Energy Imbalance Market in the West may provide additional options for WAPA to address transmission development needs to balance regional generation and demand  An issue of continuing importance to WAPA is its role in relieving transmission congestion within its marketing area  There are a number of constrained transmission paths in the West whose limited capacity to transfer power may reduce the ability of utilities to serve electric loads on a seasonal or ongoing basis  In 2009, Section 402 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( P L  111-5 ) amended the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 to give WAPA authority to borrow up to $3 25 billion from the U S  Treasury to pursue transmission projects that integrate renewable generation sources into the electric transmission grid  The law provides authority to construct and upgrade transmission lines to help deliver renewable resources to market  Western created the Transmission Infrastructure Program, also known as TIP, to implement this new initiative  Several transmission projects have been initiated under the program  Previous budget proposals and legislation have proposed repealing WAPA's loan authority, but to date, none of these proposals have been enacted  In 2015, WAPA's Upper Great Plains (UGP) region joined the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO)  Under the operating agreement with SPP, WAPA was required to transfer functional control of UGP's eligible transmission facilities to SPP  WAPA is the first PMA to formally join an RTO, and states that benefits to date from joining SPP have significantly exceeded the original estimate of $11 5 million per year  WAPA reports that two of its other regions are considering joining SPP  For Water Year 2017, WAPA reported that it delivered 26,148 gigawatt-hours of hydroelectric power to its customers, which is 101% of average annual power sales  The West has been experiencing periodic droughts for a number of years, resulting in lower snowmelts and less water in storage and available for power generation  To help smooth the resulting annual differences, a "drought-adder" reduction program has been implemented in recent years  A drought-adder charge was levied to help repay deferred drought costs accrued during the 2000s in the Rocky Mountain and Upper Great Plains regions  The balance was paid a year ahead of schedule and, as of this year, has resulted in $40 million annual savings for more than 50 percent of WAPA's customers in Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas and the western sections of Minnesota and Iowa  This is the second year that 417 of WAPA's customers, out of 700, have had a rate reduction  The drought-adder component of the rate remains available to WAPA to adjust to the variable hydropower resource—a lasting risk if drought conditions persist in WAPA's territory  Moderate to extreme drought conditions have been reported in parts of the western United States  In addition to issues specific to individual PMAs, some recent proposals have applied to multiple PMAs  In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations  The proposal suggested that "eliminating or reducing" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets and increasing the private sector role would "encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers " The proposal calls for federal transmission infrastructure assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) to be sold, with the private sector and/or state and local entities potentially taking over the transmission functions now provided by the PMAs  The Federal entities that would result after such sales could contract with other utilities to provide transmission service for the delivery of Federal power just as the Southeastern Power Administration, which does not own transmission lines, already does  The proposal reports that according to the Administration's FY2019 budget justification, the sale of federal transmission assets would result in a net budgetary savings of $9 5 billion, in total, over a 10-year window  Reportedly, the Administration dropped the plan due to stakeholder opposition, with the Department of Energy stating that such a sale of PMA transmission assets would not proceed unless directed by Congress  Proposals to sell all or part of the PMAs are not new, and have been made in some form by almost every President since Reagan  However, Congress has sought to prevent executive branch alterations of PMA structures and authority  Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 ( P L  99-349 ), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress  The Trump Administration divestment proposal could have had an indirect impact on the original congressional intent for the PMAs to provide electricity at the lowest possible cost  This in turn could require changes to the following provisions: Flood Control Act of 1944, as amended (FCA; 16 U S C  §825s et seq  ); The 1937 Bonneville Project Act (BPA; 16 U S C  §832c ); and The Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (RPA; 43 U S C  §485h(c))   These laws also stipulate a preference of public bodies for the sale of federal power  Selling federally owned transmission assets could potentially affect the "lowest possible" rates of sale, and the statutory preference for publicly or cooperatively owned utilities to be the vehicle for sale of electric power produced by federal facilities 

ground_truth: Section 420 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, hereinafter the Stafford Act) authorizes the President to "declare" a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG). In the interest of saving time, the authority to make the declaration has been delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Regional Administrators. Once issued, the FMAG declaration authorizes various forms of federal fire suppression assistance such as the provision of equipment, personnel, and grants to state, local, and tribal governments for the control, management, and mitigation of any fire on certain public or private forest land or grassland that might become a major disaster. This federal assistance requires a cost-sharing component such that state, local, and tribal governments are responsible for 25% of the expenses. This report answers frequently asked questions about FMAGs. This report will be updated as events warrant.