prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) is an agency of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that insures private mortgage lenders against the possibility of borrowers defaulting on certain mortgage loans  If a mortgage borrower defaults on a mortgage—that is, does not repay the mortgage as promised—and the home goes to foreclosure, FHA is to pay the lender the remaining amount that the borrower owes  FHA insurance protects the lender, rather than the borrower, in the event of borrower default; a borrower who defaults on an FHA-insured mortgage will still experience the consequences of foreclosure  To be eligible for FHA insurance, the mortgage must be originated by a lender that has been approved by FHA, and the mortgage and the borrower must meet certain criteria  FHA is one of three government agencies that provide insurance or guarantees on certain home mortgages made by private lenders, along with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)  Of these federal mortgage insurance programs, FHA is the most broadly targeted  Unlike VA- and USDA-insured mortgages, the availability of FHA-insured mortgages is not limited by factors such as veteran status, income, or whether the property is located in a rural area  However, the availability or attractiveness of FHA-insured mortgages may be limited by other factors, such as the maximum mortgage amount that FHA will insure, the fees that it charges for insurance, and its eligibility standards  This report provides background on FHA's history and market role and an overview of the basic eligibility and underwriting criteria for FHA-insured home loans  It also provides data on the number and dollar volume of mortgages that FHA insures, along with data on FHA's market share in recent years  It does not go into detail on the financial status of the FHA mortgage insurance fund  For information on FHA's financial position, see CRS Report R42875, FHA Single-Family Mortgage Insurance: Financial Status of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund)   The Federal Housing Administration was created by the National Housing Act of 1934, during the Great Depression, to encourage lending for housing and to stimulate the construction industry  Prior to the creation of FHA, few mortgages exceeded 50% of the property's value and most mortgages were written for terms of five years or less  Furthermore, mortgages were typically not structured to be fully repaid by the end of the loan term; rather, at the end of the five-year term, the remaining loan balance had to be paid in a lump sum or the mortgage had to be renegotiated  During the Great Depression, lenders were unable or unwilling to refinance many of the loans that became due  Thus, many borrowers lost their homes through foreclosure, and lenders lost money because property values were falling  Lenders became wary of the mortgage market  FHA institutionalized a new idea: 20-year mortgages on which the loan would be completely repaid at the end of the loan term  If borrowers defaulted, FHA insured that the lender would be fully repaid  By standardizing mortgage instruments and setting certain standards for mortgages, the creation of FHA was meant to instill confidence in the mortgage market and, in turn, help to stimulate investment in housing and the overall economy  Eventually, lenders began to make long-term mortgages without FHA insurance if borrowers made significant down payments  Over time, 15- and 30-year mortgages have become standard mortgage products  When the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was created in 1965, FHA became part of HUD  Today, FHA is intended to facilitate access to affordable mortgages for some households who otherwise might not be well-served by the private market  Furthermore, it facilitates access to mortgages during economic or mortgage market downturns by continuing to insure mortgages when the availability of mortgage credit has otherwise tightened  For this reason, it is said to play a "countercyclical" role in the mortgage market—that is, it tends to insure more mortgages when the mortgage market or overall economy is weak, and fewer mortgages when the economy is strong and other types of mortgages are more readily available  Some prospective homebuyers may have the income to sustain monthly mortgage payments but lack the funds to make a large down payment or otherwise have difficulty obtaining a mortgage  Borrowers with small down payments, weaker credit histories, or other characteristics that increase their credit risk might find it difficult to obtain a mortgage at an affordable interest rate or to qualify for a mortgage at all  This has raised a policy concern that some borrowers with the income to repay a mortgage might be unable to obtain affordable mortgages  FHA mortgage insurance is intended to make lenders more willing to offer affordable mortgages to these borrowers by insuring the lender against the possibility of borrower default  FHA-insured loans have lower down payment requirements than most conventional mortgages  (Conventional mortgages are mortgages that are not insured by FHA or guaranteed by another government agency, such as VA or USDA  ) Because saving for a down payment is often the biggest barrier to homeownership for first-time homebuyers and lower- or moderate-income homebuyers, the smaller down payment requirement for FHA-insured loans may allow some households to obtain a mortgage earlier than they otherwise could  (Borrowers with down payments of less than 20% could also obtain non-FHA mortgages with private mortgage insurance  See the nearby text box on "FHA and Private Mortgage Insurance ") FHA-insured mortgages also have less stringent requirements related to credit history than many conventional loans  This might make FHA-insured mortgages attractive to borrowers without traditional credit histories or with weaker credit histories, who would either find it difficult to take out a mortgage absent FHA insurance or may find it more expensive to do so  FHA-insured mortgages play a particularly large role for first-time homebuyers, low- and moderate-income households, and minorities  For example, 83% of FHA-insured mortgages made to purchase a home (rather than to refinance an existing mortgage) in FY2018 were obtained by first-time homebuyers  Over one-third of all FHA loans (both purchase and refinance loans) were obtained by minority households, and FHA-insured mortgages accounted for about 57% of all forward mortgages made to low- or moderate-income borrowers during the year  Since FHA-insured mortgages are often obtained by borrowers who cannot make large down payments or those with weaker credit histories, some have questioned whether FHA-insured mortgages are similar to subprime mortgages  Like subprime mortgages, FHA-insured mortgages are often obtained by borrowers with lower credit scores, though some borrowers with higher credit scores also obtain FHA-insured mortgages  However, FHA-insured mortgages are prohibited from carrying the full range of features that many subprime mortgages could carry  For example, FHA-insured loans must be fully documented, and they cannot include features such as negative amortization  (FHA mortgages can include adjustable interest rates ) Some of these types of features appear to have contributed to high default and foreclosure rates on subprime mortgages  Nevertheless, some have suggested that FHA-insured mortgages are too risky, and that they can harm borrowers by providing mortgages that often have a higher likelihood of default than other mortgages due to combinations of risk factors such as low down payments and lower credit scores  Traditionally, FHA plays a countercyclical role in the mortgage market, meaning that it tends to insure more mortgages when mortgage credit markets are tight and fewer mortgages when mortgage credit is more widely available  A major reason for this is that FHA continues to insure mortgages that meet its standards even during market downturns or in regions experiencing economic turmoil  When the economy is weak and lenders and private mortgage insurers tighten credit standards and reduce lending activity, FHA-insured mortgages may be the only mortgages available to some borrowers, or may have more favorable terms than mortgages that lenders are willing to make without FHA insurance  When the economy is strong and mortgage credit is more widely available, many borrowers may find it easier to qualify for affordable conventional mortgages  This section briefly describes some of the major features of FHA-insured mortgages for purchasing or refinancing a single-family home  Single-family homes are defined as properties with one to four separate dwelling units  FHA-insured loans are available to borrowers who intend to be owner-occupants and who can demonstrate the ability to repay the loan according to the terms of the contract  FHA-insured loans must be underwritten in accordance with accepted practices of prudent lending institutions and FHA requirements  Lenders must examine factors such as the applicant's credit, financial status, monthly shelter expenses, funds required for closing expenses, effective monthly income, and debts and obligations  In general, individuals who have previously been subject to a mortgage foreclosure are not eligible for FHA-insured loans for at least three years after the foreclosure  As a general rule, the applicant's prospective mortgage payment should not exceed 31% of gross effective monthly income  The applicant's total obligations, including the proposed housing expenses, should not exceed 43% of gross effective monthly income  If these ratios are not met, the borrower may be able to present the presence of certain compensating factors, such as cash reserves, in order to qualify for an FHA-insured loan  Since October 4, 2010, FHA has required a minimum credit score of 500, and has required higher down payments from borrowers with credit scores below 580 than from borrowers with credit scores above that threshold  See the " Down Payment " section for more information on down payment requirements for FHA-insured loans  In general, borrowers must intend to occupy the property as a principal residence  FHA-insured loans may be used to purchase one-family detached homes, townhomes, rowhouses, two- to four-unit buildings, manufactured homes and lots, and condominiums in developments approved by FHA  FHA-insured loans may also be obtained to build a home; to repair, alter, or improve a home; to refinance an existing home loan; to simultaneously purchase and improve a home; or to make certain energy efficiency or weatherization improvements in conjunction with a home purchase or mortgage refinance  FHA-insured mortgages may be obtained with loan terms of up to 30 years  The interest rate on an FHA-insured loan is negotiated between the borrower and lender  The borrower has the option of selecting a loan with an interest rate that is fixed for the life of the loan or one on which the rate may be adjusted annually  FHA requires a lower down payment than many other types of mortgages  Under changes made by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA, P L  110-289 ), borrowers are required to contribute at least 3 5% in cash or its equivalent to the cost of acquiring a property with an FHA-insured mortgage  (Prior law had required borrowers to contribute at least 3% in cash or its equivalent ) Prohibited sources of the required funds include the home seller, any entity that financially benefits from the transaction, and any third party that is directly or indirectly reimbursed by the seller or by anyone that would financially benefit from the transaction  HUD has interpreted the 3 5% cash contribution as a down payment requirement and has specified that contributions toward closing costs cannot be counted toward it  Since October 4, 2010, FHA has required a 10% down payment from borrowers with credit scores between 500 and 579, while borrowers with credit scores of 580 or above are still required to make a down payment of at least 3 5%  FHA no longer insures loans made to borrowers with credit scores below 500  There is no income limit for borrowers seeking FHA-insured loans  However, FHA-insured mortgages cannot exceed a maximum mortgage amount set by law  The maximum mortgage amounts allowed for FHA-insured loans vary by area, based on a percentage of area median home prices  Different limits are in effect for one-unit, two-unit, three-unit, and four-unit properties  The limits are subject to a statutory floor and ceiling; that is, the maximum mortgage amount that FHA will insure in a given area cannot be lower than the floor, nor can it be higher than the ceiling  In 2008, Congress temporarily increased the maximum mortgage amounts in response to turmoil in the housing and mortgage markets, with the intention of allowing more households to qualify for FHA-insured mortgages during a period of tighter credit availability  New permanent maximum mortgage amounts were later established by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008  The maximum mortgage amounts established by HERA were higher than the previous permanent limits, but in many cases lower than the temporarily increased limits  However, the higher temporary limits were extended for several years, until they expired at the end of calendar year 2013  Since January 1, 2014, the maximum mortgage amounts have been set at the permanent HERA levels  For a one-unit home, HERA established the maximum mortgage amounts at 115% of area median home prices, with a floor set at 65% of the Freddie Mac conforming loan limit and a ceiling set at 150% of the Freddie Mac conforming loan limit  For calendar year 2019, the floor is $314,827 and the ceiling is $726,525  (That is, FHA will insure mortgages with principal balances up to $314,827 in all areas of the country  In higher-cost areas, it will insure mortgages with principal balances up to 115% of the area median home price, up to a cap of $726,525 in the highest-cost areas ) These maximum mortgage amounts, and the maximum mortgage amounts for 2-4 unit homes, are shown in Table 1   Borrowers of FHA-insured loans pay an up-front mortgage insurance premium (MIP) and annual mortgage insurance premiums in exchange for FHA insurance  These premiums are set as a percentage of the loan amount  The maximum amounts that FHA is allowed to charge for the annual and the upfront premiums are set in statute  However, since these are maximum amounts, HUD has the discretion to set the premiums at lower levels  The maximum up-front premium that FHA may charge is 3% of the mortgage amount, or 2 75% of the mortgage amount for a first-time homebuyer who has received homeownership counseling  Currently, FHA is charging the same up-front premiums to first-time homebuyers who receive homeownership counseling and all other borrowers  Since April 9, 2012, HUD has set the up-front premium at 1 75% of the loan amount, whether or not the borrower is a first-time homebuyer who received homeownership counseling  This premium applies to most single-family mortgages  The amount of the maximum annual premium varies based on the loan's initial loan-to-value ratio  For most loans, (1) if the loan-to-value ratio is above 95%, the maximum annual premium is 1 55% of the loan balance, and (2) if the loan-to-value ratio is 95% or below, the maximum annual premium is 1 5% of the loan balance  FHA increased the actual annual premiums that it charges several times in recent years in order to bring more money into the FHA insurance fund and ensure that it has sufficient funds to pay for defaulted loans  However, in January 2015, FHA announced a decrease in the annual premium for most single-family loans  For most FHA case numbers assigned on or after January 26, 2015, the annual premiums are 0 85% of the outstanding loan balance if the initial loan-to-value ratio is above 95% and 0 80% of the outstanding loan balance if the initial loan-to-value ratio is 95% or below  This is a decrease from 1 35% and 1 30%, respectively, which is what FHA had been charging from April 1, 2013, until January 26, 2015  These premiums apply to most single-family mortgages; FHA charges different annual premiums in certain circumstances, including for loans with shorter loan terms or higher principal balances  Table 2 shows the up-front and annual mortgage insurance premiums that have been in effect for most loans since January 26, 2015  In the past, if borrowers prepaid their loans, they may have been due refunds of part of the up-front insurance premium that was not "earned" by FHA  The refund amount depended on when the mortgage closed and declined as the loan matured  The Consolidated Appropriations Act 2005 ( P L  108-447 ) amended the National Housing Act to provide that, for mortgages insured on or after December 8, 2004, borrowers are not eligible for refunds of up-front mortgage insurance premiums except when borrowers are refinancing existing FHA-insured loans with new FHA-insured loans  After three years, the entire up-front insurance premium paid by borrowers who refinance existing FHA-insured loans with new FHA-insured loans is considered "earned" by FHA, and these borrowers are not eligible for any refunds  The annual mortgage insurance premiums are not refundable  However, beginning with loans closed on or after January 1, 2001, FHA had followed a policy of automatically cancelling the annual mortgage insurance premium when, based on the initial amortization schedule, the loan balance reached 78% of the initial property value  However, for loans with FHA case numbers assigned on or after June 3, 2013, FHA will continue to charge the annual mortgage insurance premium for the life of the loan for most mortgages  This change responded to concerns about the financial status of the FHA insurance fund  FHA has stated that, since it continues to insure the entire remaining mortgage amount for the life of the loan, and since premiums were cancelled on the basis of the loan amortizing to a percentage of the initial property value rather than the current value of the home, FHA has at times had to pay insurance claims on defaulted mortgages where the borrowers were no longer paying annual mortgage insurance premiums  An FHA-insured mortgage is considered delinquent any time a payment is due and not paid  Once the borrower is 30 days late in making a payment, the mortgage is considered to be in default  In general, mortgage servicers may initiate foreclosure on an FHA-insured loan when three monthly installments are due and unpaid, and they must initiate foreclosure when six monthly installments are due and unpaid, except when prohibited by law  A program of loss mitigation strategies was authorized by Congress in 1996 to minimize the number of FHA loans entering foreclosure, and has since been revised and expanded to include additional loss mitigation options  Prior to initiating foreclosure, mortgage servicers must attempt to make contact with borrowers and evaluate whether they qualify for any of these loss mitigation options  The options must be considered in a specific order, and specific eligibility criteria apply to each option  Some loss mitigation options, referred to as home retention options, are intended to help borrowers remain in their homes  Other loss mitigation options, referred to as home disposition options, will result in the borrower losing his or her home, but avoiding some of the costs of foreclosure  The loss mitigation options that servicers are instructed to pursue on FHA-insured loans are summarized in Table 3   Additional loss mitigation options are available for certain populations of borrowers  For example, defaulted borrowers in military service may be eligible to suspend the principal portion of monthly payments and pay only interest for the period of military service, plus three months  On resumption of payment, loan payments are adjusted so that the loan will be paid in full according to the original amortization  Certain loss mitigation options are also available in areas affected by presidentially declared major disasters  FHA's single-family mortgage insurance program is funded through FHA's Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund)  Cash flows into the MMI Fund primarily from insurance premiums and proceeds from the sale of foreclosed homes  Cash flows out of the MMI Fund primarily to pay claims to lenders for mortgages that have defaulted  This section provides a brief overview of (1) how the FHA-insured mortgages insured under the MMI Fund are accounted for in the federal budget and (2) the MMI Fund's compliance with a statutory capital ratio requirement  For more detailed information on the financial status of the MMI Fund, see CRS Report R42875, FHA Single-Family Mortgage Insurance: Financial Status of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund)   The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA) specifies the way in which the costs of federal loan guarantees, including FHA-insured loans, are recorded in the federal budget  The FCRA requires that the estimated lifetime cost of guaranteed loans (in net present value terms) be recorded in the federal budget in the year that the loans are insured  When the present value of the lifetime cash flows associated with the guaranteed loans is expected to result in more money coming into the account than flowing out of it, the program is said to generate negative credit subsidy  When the present value of the lifetime cash flows associated with the guaranteed loans is expected to result in less money coming into the account than flowing out of it, the program is said to generate positive credit subsidy  Programs that generate negative credit subsidy result in offsetting receipts for the federal government, while programs that generate positive credit subsidy require an appropriation to cover the cost of new loan guarantees  The MMI Fund has historically been estimated to generate negative credit subsidy in the year that the loans are insured and therefore has not required appropriations to cover the expected costs of loans to be insured  The MMI Fund does receive appropriations to cover salaries and administrative contract expenses  The amount of money that loans insured in a given year actually earn for or cost the government over the course of their lifetime is likely to be different from the original credit subsidy estimates  Therefore, each year as part of the annual budget process, each prior year's credit subsidy rates are re-estimated based on the actual performance of the loans and other factors, such as updated economic projections  These re-estimates affect the way in which funds are held in the MMI Fund's two primary accounts: the Financing Account and the Capital Reserve Account  The Financing Account holds funds to cover  expected  future costs of FHA-insured loans  The Capital Reserve Account holds additional funds to cover any additional unexpected future costs  Funds are transferred between the two accounts each year on the basis of the re-estimated credit subsidy rates to ensure that enough is held in the Financing Account to cover updated projections of expected costs of insured loans   If FHA ever needs to transfer more funds to the Financing Account than it has in the Capital Reserve Account, it can receive funds from Treasury to make this transfer under existing authority and without any additional congressional action  This occurred for the first time at the end of FY2013, when FHA received $1 7 billion from Treasury to make a required transfer of funds between the accounts  The funds that FHA received from Treasury did not need to be spent immediately, but were to be held in the Financing Account and used to pay insurance claims, if necessary, only after the remaining funds in the Financing Account were spent  The MMI Fund has not needed any additional funds from Treasury to make required transfers of funds between the two accounts since that time  The MMI Fund is also required by statute to maintain a capital ratio of at least 2%, which is intended to ensure that the fund is able to withstand some increases in the costs of loans guaranteed under the insurance fund  The capital ratio measures the amount of funds that the MMI Fund currently has on hand, plus the net present value of the expected future cash flows associated with the mortgages that FHA currently insures (e g , the amounts it expects to earn through premiums and lose through claims paid)  It then expresses this amount as a percentage of the total dollar volume of mortgages that FHA currently insures  In other words, the capital ratio is a measure of the amount of funds that would remain in the MMI Fund after all expected future cash flows on the loans that it currently insures have been realized, assuming that FHA did not insure any more loans going forward  Beginning in FY2009, and for several years thereafter, the capital ratio was estimated to be below this mandated 2% level  The capital ratio again exceeded the 2% threshold in FY2015, when it was estimated to be 2 07%  This represented an improvement from an estimated capital ratio of 0 41% at the end of FY2014, and from negative estimated capital ratios at the ends of FY2013 and FY2012  The capital ratio has remained above 2% since that time, and was estimated to be 2 76% in FY2018  A low or negative capital ratio does not in itself trigger any special assistance from Treasury, but it raises concerns that FHA could need assistance in order to continue to hold enough funds in the Financing Account to cover expected future losses  In the years since the housing market turmoil that began around 2007, FHA has taken a number of steps designed to strengthen the insurance fund  These steps have included increasing the mortgage insurance premiums charged to borrowers; strengthening underwriting requirements, such as by instituting higher down payment requirements for borrowers with the lowest credit scores; and increasing oversight of FHA-approved lenders  The number of new mortgages insured by FHA in a given year depends on a variety of factors  In general, the number of new mortgages insured by FHA increased during the housing market turmoil (and resulting contraction of mortgage credit) that began around 2007, reaching a peak of 1 8 million mortgages in FY2009 before beginning to decrease somewhat  FY2014 was the only year since FY2007 that FHA insured fewer than 1 million new mortgages  As shown in Table 4 , FHA insured just over 1 million new single-family purchase and refinance mortgages in FY2018  Together, these mortgages had an initial loan balance of $209 billion  About 77% (776,284) of the mortgages were for home purchases, while about 23% (238,325) were for refinancing an existing mortgage  The overall number of mortgages insured by FHA in FY2018 represented a decrease from FY2017, when it insured 1 25 million mortgages  Many FHA-insured mortgages are obtained by first-time homebuyers, lower-and moderate-income homebuyers, and minority homebuyers  Of the home purchase mortgages insured by FHA in FY2018, about 83% were made to first-time homebuyers  Over a third of all mortgages (both for home purchases and refinances) insured by FHA in FY2018 were made to minority borrowers  As shown in Table 5 , at the end of FY2018 FHA was insuring a total of over 8 million single-family loans that together had an outstanding balance of nearly $1 2 trillion  Since it was first established in 1934, FHA has insured a total of over 47 5 million home loans  FHA's share of the mortgage market is the amount of mortgages that are insured by FHA compared to the total amount of mortgages originated or outstanding in a given time period  FHA's market share can be measured in a number of different ways  Therefore, when evaluating FHA's market share, it is important to recognize which of several different figures is being reported  First, FHA's share of the mortgage market can be computed as the number of FHA-insured mortgages divided by the total number of mortgages, or as the dollar volume of FHA-insured mortgages divided by the total dollar volume of mortgages  Furthermore, FHA's market share is sometimes reported as a share of all mortgages , and sometimes only as a share of home purchase mortgages (as opposed to both mortgages made to purchase a home and mortgages made to refinance an existing mortgage)  A market share figure can be reported as a share of all mortgages originated within a specific time period , such as a given year, or as a share of all mortgages outstanding at a point in time , regardless of when they were originated  Finally, FHA's market share is sometimes also reported as a share of the total number of mortgages that have some kind of mortgage insurance (including mortgages with private mortgage insurance and mortgages insured by another government agency) rather than as a share of all mortgages regardless of whether or not they have mortgage insurance  FHA's market share tends to fluctuate in response to economic conditions and other factors  Between calendar years 1996 and 2002, FHA's market share averaged about 14% of the home purchase mortgage market and about 11% of the overall mortgage market (both home purchase mortgages and refinance mortgages), as measured by number of mortgages  However, by 2005 FHA's market share had fallen to less than 5% of home-purchase mortgages and about 3% of the overall mortgage market  Subsequently, as economic conditions worsened and mortgage credit tightened in response to housing market turmoil that began around 2007, FHA's market share rose sharply, peaking at over 30% of home-purchase mortgages in 2009 and 2010, and over 20% of all mortgages (including both home purchases and refinances) in 2009  In 2017, FHA insured 19 5% of new home purchase mortgages and about 16 7% of new mortgages overall, a small decrease compared to its market share in 2016  Figure 1 shows FHA's market share as a percentage of the total number of new mortgages originated for each calendar year between 1996 and 2017  As described, FHA's market share can be measured in a number of different ways  The figure shows FHA's share of (1) all newly originated mortgages, (2) just newly originated purchase mortgages, and (3) just newly originated refinance mortgages  FHA's share of home purchase mortgages tends to be the highest, largely because borrowers who refinance are more likely to have built up a greater amount of equity in their homes and, therefore, might be more likely to obtain conventional mortgages  For the number of mortgages insured by FHA in each year calendar since 1996, see the Appendix   The increase in FHA's market share after 2007 was due to a variety of factors related to the housing market turmoil and broader economic instability that was taking place at the time  Housing and economic conditions led many banks to limit their lending activities, including lending for mortgages  Similarly, private mortgage insurance companies, facing steep losses from past mortgages, began tightening the underwriting criteria for mortgages that they would insure  Furthermore, in 2008 Congress increased the maximum mortgage amounts that FHA can insure, which may have made FHA-insured mortgages a more viable option for some borrowers in certain areas  More recently, FHA's market share has decreased somewhat from its peak during the housing market turmoil, although it generally remains somewhat higher than it was in the late 1990s and early 2000s  A number of factors may have contributed to this decrease, including lower loan limits in some high-cost areas, higher mortgage insurance premiums, and greater availability of non-FHA-insured mortgages  While not the focus of this report, the appropriate market share for FHA has been a subject of ongoing debate among policymakers  It is likely to continue to be a topic of debate, both in the context of policies specifically related to FHA as well as part of broader debate about the future of the U S  housing finance system  Table A-1 provides data on the number of mortgages insured by FHA in each calendar year since 1996, along with FHA's overall market share in each calendar year 


Report 2:  For example, the document that serves as direction for Forest Service personnel on how to enter into RACAs referred to an outdated financial system that was replaced in fiscal year 2013  Further, the manuals and handbooks for the RACA processes had no indication that they had been reviewed within the past 5 years  Forest Service policy requires routine review, every 5 years, of policies and procedures in its Directive System  According to Forest Service officials, a staff member from ORMS sends an e-mail to officials responsible for updating these policies and procedures  However, appropriate control activities have not been designed to reasonably assure that updates were made, reviewed, approved, and issued as needed for continued relevance and effectiveness  Without adequate descriptions of processes and related control activities in its manuals and handbooks over RACAs, the Forest Service is at risk that processes and related control activities may not be properly, consistently, and timely performed  Further, because it lacks a process and related controls for monitoring and reviewing the updates of the guidance and various process documents in the Directive System, the Forest Service is at risk that its policies and procedures may not provide appropriate agency-wide direction in achieving control objectives, particularly when financial systems change and old processes may no longer be applicable  SOPs and desk guides related to RACA processes were not in the Directive System and are not considered official Forest Service policy and procedures  Forest Service field staff responsible for various processes generally developed SOPs and desk guides to document day-to-day procedures for employees in carrying out RACA processes to supplement the manuals and handbooks  However, the SOPs and desk guides did not reference the applicable manuals and handbooks they supplemented  Further, the SOPs and desk guides did not provide descriptions of (1) review procedures for authorization, completeness, and validity of RACAs and related receivables; (2) detailed review procedures to be performed and by whom; (3) timing of review procedures; and (4) how to document the completion of the review procedures  Finally, SOPs and desk guides did not have evidence that responsible officials reviewed and approved them to authorize their use  These SOPs and desk guides are only available in the field office where these were developed, and if similar SOPs and desk guides were developed in other field offices, control activities and how they are performed could vary  We also noted that these SOPs and desk guides were not timely updated to reflect processes and systems currently in use  For example, there were many instances where the SOPs and desk guides referred to systems that the Forest Service no longer used  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should establish an organizational structure, assign responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve the entity’s objectives  Effective documentation assists in management’s design of internal control by establishing and communicating the who, what, when, where, and why of internal control execution to personnel  Documentation also provides a means to retain organizational knowledge and mitigate the risk of having that knowledge limited to a few personnel and to achieve the entity’s objectives  Management assigns responsibility and delegates authority to key roles throughout the entity  As a result of the issues discussed above, the Forest Service is at risk that control activities may not be properly and consistently performed and its related control objectives may not be achieved efficiently and effectively  In addition, the Forest Service is at risk that knowledge for performing the control activities may be limited to a few personnel or lost altogether in the event of employee turnover  The Forest Service lacked control activities over the segregation of incompatible duties performed by line officers and program managers for reimbursable agreements and any adjustments affecting the final disposition of related receivables  Field offices manage the majority of Forest Service projects, including authorizing the agreements and monitoring related collection  The Forest Service line officer for fire incident cooperative agreements and program managers for RACA at the RSA, unit, or field levels initiate and develop the terms of the agreements and are also responsible for any subsequent negotiation of the agreements  In the process of negotiating and settling costs, the line officer or program manager has the authority to cancel or change related receivables that they deemed uncollectible  For example, in a fire incident, the line officer at the region or field level is involved in both developing a Cost Share Agreement and after the fire incident has ended, negotiating the Cost Settlement Package with parties involved in the agreement to determine the final settlement amount that the Forest Service will be reimbursed for expenses paid in suppressing the fire incident  Therefore, the line officer is responsible for initiating the Cost Share Agreement, modifying the Cost Settlement Package, and changing or canceling the related receivable, which represent conflicting duties  We also found that the Forest Service did not have any mitigating controls, such as independent approval of any adjustments affecting the final disposition of receivables, to mitigate the risk of these incompatible duties  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks  Segregation of duties contributes to the design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of control activities  To achieve segregation of key functions, management can divide responsibilities among different people to reduce the risk of error, misuse, or fraud  This may include separating the responsibilities for authorizing or approving transactions, processing and recording them, and reviewing the transactions so that no one individual controls all key aspects of a transaction or event  Forest Service officials stated they did not consider segregating the conflicting duties related to reimbursable agreements because these line officers and program managers were most familiar with the terms of the agreement and the activities performed  However, a lack of adequate segregation of conflicting duties or proper monitoring and review of conflicting duties for receivables from reimbursable agreements could result in receivables not being collected, and an increased risk of fraud  The Forest Service’s processes and related control activities over review of unliquidated obligations were not properly designed to reasonably assure optimum utilization of funds and were inconsistent with USDA and Forest Service policy  Further, Forest Service manuals and handbooks related to the review of unliquidated obligations did not clearly describe control activities and were not timely reviewed by management  The Forest Service reported unliquidated obligations of approximately $2 6 billion and $2 5 billion in its financial statements as of September 30, 2015, and 2016, respectively  In fiscal year 2016, the Forest Service deobligated about $319 million of its unliquidated obligations from prior years  The Forest Service’s procedures related to the review of unliquidated obligations were not properly designed and were inconsistent with USDA and Forest Service policy  In accordance with USDA Departmental Regulation (Regulation 2230-001) and related Forest Service policy, the Forest Service identifies and reviews unliquidated obligations that have been inactive for at least 12 months to determine whether delivery or performance of goods or services is still expected to occur  Once a determination has been made that an unliquidated obligation can be deobligated, program or procurement personnel are to notify finance personnel, in writing, within 5 days of the determination to process the deobligation  Within 15 days of receipt of the written notification, the unliquidated obligations are to be adjusted in the financial management system  The Forest Service CFO is then to be notified in writing that the deobligation was processed  Within 1 month of the close of each quarter, the Forest Service CFO is to submit to USDA’s Associate CFO for Financial Operations a certification stating that the Forest Service has performed reviews of its unliquidated obligations and taken appropriate actions, such as promptly deobligating an unliquidated obligation that is no longer needed  However, the Forest Service’s quarterly certifications are inconsistent with USDA and Forest Service policy because the months included in each quarterly review do not line up with the months outlined in policy  For example, as shown in table 1, based on policy the certification due on October 31, covers the months July through September  However in practice, the certification that the Forest Service prepared for October 31 covers May through July  As a result, the review and certification for August and September would be delayed an entire quarter  According to Forest Service officials, it takes considerable time to produce accurate unliquidated obligations reports from USDA’s financial system and then distribute them to field offices  Therefore, there is not sufficient time for the field offices to review and deobligate amounts not needed from the unliquidated obligations balances to meet USDA’s certification timing and requirements  However, the Forest Service has not developed other processes and control activities that could help meet USDA and Forest Service policy and reasonably assure that unliquidated obligations are reviewed timely and appropriate actions are taken  As a result, there is an increased risk that the Forest Service may not achieve its control objectives of optimum utilization of funds and timely adjustments of obligated balances  The Forest Service’s process and related control activities over its review of unliquidated obligations and resulting certifications were not adequately described in manuals and handbooks in its Directive System  Further, the manuals and handbooks were not timely reviewed and updated to reflect processes and systems currently in use  In accordance with the Forest Service’s Directive System, policies are documented in its manuals while procedures for performing specialized activities are documented in its handbooks  However, we found that the Forest Service’s processes and related control activities for reviewing unliquidated obligations were not adequately described and documented in such manuals and handbooks  Although parts of the applicable section of the handbook referred to procedures, there were no detailed descriptions of the processes, and only references to objectives of the procedures for reviewing unliquidated obligations were listed  For example, in identifying unliquidated obligations for review, the narrative description of the procedures in the handbook states that the responsible obligating official must review each selected unliquidated obligation to determine whether (1) delivery or performance of goods or services has occurred or is expected to occur and (2) accounting corrections to the obligation data in the accounting system are necessary  The handbook also refers to an unliquidated obligations report listing the unliquidated obligations that must be reviewed  The narrative does not provide any detailed procedures that obligating officials or responsible personnel need to perform, how to perform those procedures, and how those control activities are to be documented  The guidance in the handbook was supplemented by two desk guides  However, the desk guides are outside the Forest Service’s Directive System and, as previously noted, the Directive System is the only place where the Forest Service’s policy and procedures are issued  In addition, these desk guides did not reference the applicable guidance in the Directive System that they were supplementing  Further, the process and related control activities for adjusting unliquidated obligations within 15 days of receipt of written notification, as stated in USDA’s policy, were not described in either the handbooks or the desk guides  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks to achieve an effective internal control system  Management’s design of internal control establishes and communicates the who, what, when, where, and why of internal control execution to personnel  Documentation also provides a means to retain organizational knowledge and mitigate the risk of having that knowledge limited to a few personnel  Further, the standards also explain that management clearly document internal control in a manner that allows documentation to be readily available and that documentation be properly managed and maintained  In addition, manuals and handbooks for processes related to review and certification of unliquidated obligations had no evidence that they had been reviewed within the past 5 years for ongoing relevance and effectiveness  According to a Forest Service manual, all service-wide directives, except interim directives, shall be reviewed at least once every 5 years  The Forest Service does not have an effective process in place to monitor the reviews and any updates of the manuals and handbooks in its Directive System  As previously discussed, while ORMS sends an e- mail requesting that the applicable officials review and update the guidance in the manuals and handbooks, there is no follow-up process to help ensure that documents were reviewed and updated as needed  Because the Forest Service’s process and related control activities over its review and certification of unliquidated obligations were not adequately described in its manuals and handbooks, the Forest Service is at risk that its control activities may not reasonably assure that control objectives provide (1) optimum utilization of funds and (2) for unliquidated obligations that are no longer needed to be efficiently and effectively deobligated and made available for other program needs  Adequate processes and related control activities over the Forest Service’s budgetary resources are critical in reasonably assuring that these resources are timely and effectively available for its mission operations, including fire suppression  However, we identified deficiencies in the Forest Service’s processes and related controls over allotments, unobligated no-year funds from prior years, administrative control of funds, fund transfers, reimbursable agreements, and available funds from deobligation of unliquidated obligations  Deficiencies ranged from a lack of processes to control activities that were not properly designed, resulting in an increased risk that Forest Service funds may not be effectively and efficiently monitored and used  In addition, the Forest Service’s manuals and handbooks, which provide the directives for the areas we reviewed, had not been reviewed by management in accordance with the Forest Service’s 5-year review policy  Further, Forest Service staff prepared SOPs and desk guides that documented control activities, but they were not issued as official policy and had not been reviewed and approved by responsible officials  As a result, the Forest Service is at increased risk that the control activities may not be consistently performed across the agency and that the guidance in the SOPs and desk guides may not comply with agency policy in the Directive System  To improve internal controls over the Forest Service’s budget execution processes, we are making the following 11 recommendations: The Chief of the Forest Service should (1) revise its process and (2) design, document, and implement related control activities to reasonably assure that amounts designated in appropriations acts for specific purposes are properly used for the purposes specifically designated  (Recommendation 1) The Chief of the Forest Service should (1) develop a process and (2) design, document, and implement related control activities to reasonably assure that unobligated no-year funds from prior years are reviewed for continuing need  (Recommendation 2) The Chief of the Forest Service should (1) design, document, and implement a comprehensive system for administrative control of funds and (2) submit it for review and approval by USDA before issuance, as required by the USDA Budget Manual  (Recommendation 3) The Chief of the Forest Service should design, document, and implement control activities over the preparation and approval of a fire suppression fund transfers strategy, to specify all appropriate factors to be considered in developing and documenting the strategy, and incorporate these control activities into the Directive System  (Recommendation 4) The Chief of the Forest Service should design, document, and implement processes and related control activities for its fire incident cooperative agreements to reasonably assure efficient and effective operations and timely and reliable reporting of reimbursable receivables related to fire incident cooperative agreements, and incorporate them in the Directive System  (Recommendation 5) The Chief of the Forest Service should update the RACA manuals and handbooks to adequately describe the processes and related control activities applicable to RACAs to reasonably assure that staff will know (1) how and when to perform processes and control activities and (2) how to document their performance  (Recommendation 6) The Chief of the Forest Service should design, document, and implement segregation of duties or mitigating control activities over reimbursable agreements and any adjustments affecting the final disposition of related receivables  (Recommendation 7) The Chief of the Forest Service should modify, document, and implement control activities consistent with USDA and Forest Service policy to reasonably assure that unliquidated obligations are reviewed timely and appropriate actions are taken  (Recommendation 8) The Chief of the Forest Service should adequately describe the processes and related control activities for unliquidated obligations review and certification processes in manuals and handbooks within the Directive System  (Recommendation 9) The Chief of the Forest Service should develop, document, and implement a process and related control activities to reasonably assure that manuals and handbooks for allotments, reimbursable agreements, and review of unliquidated obligations are reviewed and updated every 5 years, consistent with Forest Service policy  (Recommendation 10) The Chief of the Forest Service should develop, document, and implement a process and related control activities to reasonably assure that SOPs and desk guides (1) clearly refer to guidance in the Directive System for allotments, reimbursable agreements, and review of unliquidated obligations and (2) are reviewed and approved by responsible officials prior to use  (Recommendation 11) We provided a draft of this report to USDA for comment  In its comments, reproduced in appendix III, the Forest Service stated that it generally agreed with the report and that it has made significant progress to address the report’s findings  Specifically, the Forest Service stated that its financial policies concerning budget execution have been revised to address our concerns with allotments, unliquidated obligations, commitments, and administrative control of funds as prescribed by OMB Circular No  A-11  Further, the Forest Service stated that it has undertaken an in-depth review of its unliquidated obligations and modified the certification process to comply with the USDA requirement  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and to the Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the Forest Service  In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9869 or khana@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  Our objectives were to determine the extent to which the Forest Service properly designed control activities over (1) allotments of budgetary resources, its system for administrative control of funds, and any fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations; (2) reimbursables and related collections; and (3) unliquidated obligations  We reviewed the Forest Service’s process documents and control activities, policies and procedures from its manual and handbooks in its Directive System, and other guidance in the form of standard operating procedures (SOP) and desk guides to obtain an understanding of internal controls at the Forest Service related to our three objectives  We reviewed the control activities that the Forest Service identified to determine whether the activities would achieve the control objectives that the service identified and whether the activities were consistent with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  We also reviewed recent relevant GAO and U S  Department of Agriculture (USDA) Office of Inspector General reports to obtain background information related to the Forest Service’s budget execution processes  We evaluated the design of the Forest Service’s control activities based on data for fiscal year 2016  To address our first objective, we reviewed Forest Service process documents related to allotments and budget authority to obtain an understanding of control activities over the allotments of budgetary resources, its system for administrative control of funds, and any related fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations  The process documents included a list of control objectives and related control activities that the Forest Service had used to assess its internal controls  We also reviewed the related guidance in appendix H to Office of Management and Budget Circular No  A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget for Administrative Control of Funds, to identify requirements that agencies must meet to ascertain whether their controls over funds management are properly designed  We interviewed key officials from the Forest Service’s Strategic Planning, Budget and Accountability Office to gain an understanding of their processes for allotments of budgetary resources, its system for administrative control of funds, and fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations for wildland fire suppression activities, including how each of their risk assessments were performed and their plans to mitigate the risks  We reviewed and analyzed the processes documented in the manuals and handbooks collectively referred to as directives to determine whether the processes and control activities were designed to achieve the Forest Service’s stated objectives  Specifically, we examined the Forest Service’s control activities to determine whether these sufficiently communicated the procedures to be performed and the documentation to be prepared  We also reviewed USDA Budget Manual to determine whether Forest Service guidance was consistent with USDA’s requirements for all of its component agencies, specifically requirements related to the administrative control of funds  To address our second objective, we reviewed the Forest Service’s policies, procedures, and other documentation and interviewed agency officials to develop an understanding of its processes related to reimbursable agreements and related collection activities  We first identified, through interviews with Forest Service officials, the different kinds of reimbursable agreements that the Forest Service enters into with other USDA components, other federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and nongovernment entities to carry out its mission for the benefit of the public  Two distinct types of reimbursable agreements include (1) fire incident cooperative agreements and (2) reimbursable and advanced collection agreements  We reviewed Forest Service process documents and templates related to these two types of reimbursable agreements provided to obtain an understanding of control activities over reimbursable processes  We reviewed the list of control objectives and related control activities that the Forest Service identified to determine whether the control activities were designed to achieve the applicable control objectives  To address our third objective, we reviewed the Forest Service’s policies, procedures, and other documentation related to and interviewed agency officials about unliquidated obligations to develop an understanding of the Forest Service’s review and certification processes for unliquidated obligations balances  We reviewed the Forest Service’s control activities related to its process for reviewing unliquidated obligations to obtain an understanding of control activities around its process and to determine whether the control activities were designed to achieve the applicable control objectives  Based on the results of our evaluation of the Forest Service’s design of internal control activities over the budget execution processes, we did not evaluate the implementation of the control activities or whether they were operating as designed  While our audit objectives focused on certain control activities related to (1) allotments of budgetary resources, the Forest Service’s system for administrative control of funds, and related fund transfers; (2) reimbursables and related collections for reimbursable agreements; and (3) unliquidated obligations, we did not evaluate all control activities and other components of internal control  If we had done so, additional deficiencies may or may not have been identified that could impair the effectiveness of the control activities evaluated as part of this audit  We conducted this performance audit from August 2016 to January 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides the overall framework for establishing and maintaining internal control  Internal control represents an agency’s plans, methods, policies, and procedures used to fulfill its mission, strategic plan, goals, and objectives  Internal control is a process by an entity’s oversight body, management, and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance that the objectives of the entity will be achieved  When properly designed, implemented, and operating effectively, it provides reasonable assurance that the following objectives are achieved: (1) effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) reliability of internal and external reporting, and (3) compliance with applicable laws and regulations  Internal control is not one event, but a series of actions that occur throughout an entity’s operations  The five components of internal control are as follows: Control Environment - The foundation for an internal control system that provides the discipline and structure to help an entity achieve its objectives  Risk Assessment - Assesses the risks facing the entity as it seeks to achieve its objectives and provides the basis for developing appropriate risk responses  Control Activities - The actions management establishes through policies and procedures to achieve objectives and respond to risks in the internal control system, which includes the entity’s information system  Information and Communication - The quality information management and personnel communicate and use to support the internal control system  Monitoring - Activities management establishes and operates to assess the quality of performance over time and promptly resolve the findings of audits and other reviews  An effective internal control system has each of the five components of internal control effectively designed, implemented, and operating with the components operating together in an integrated manner  In this audit, we assessed the design of control activities at the Forest Service related to its (1) allotments of budgetary resources and any related fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations, (2) reimbursables and related collections, and (3) review of unliquidated obligations  In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made key contributions to this report: Roger Stoltz (Assistant Director), Meafelia P  Gusukuma (Auditor-in-Charge), Tulsi Bhojwani, Cory Mazer, Sabrina Rivera, and Randy Voorhees 

ground_truth: The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an agency of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was created by the National Housing Act of 1934. FHA insures private lenders against the possibility of borrowers defaulting on mortgages that meet certain criteria, thereby expanding the availability of mortgage credit beyond what may be available otherwise. If the borrower defaults on the mortgage, FHA is to repay the lender the remaining amount owed. A household that obtains an FHA-insured mortgage must meet FHA's eligibility and underwriting standards, including showing that it has sufficient income to repay a mortgage. FHA requires a minimum down payment of 3.5% from most borrowers, which is lower than the down payment required for many other types of mortgages. FHA-insured mortgages cannot exceed a statutory maximum mortgage amount, which varies by area and is based on area median house prices but cannot exceed a specified ceiling in high-cost areas. (The ceiling is set at $726,525 in high-cost areas in calendar year 2019.) Borrowers are charged fees, called mortgage insurance premiums, in exchange for the insurance. In FY2018, FHA insured over 1 million new mortgages (including both home purchase and refinance mortgages) with a combined principal balance of $209 billion. FHA's share of the mortgage market tends to vary with economic conditions and other factors. In the aftermath of the housing market turmoil that began around 2007 and a related contraction of mortgage lending, FHA insured a larger share of mortgages than it had in the preceding years. Its overall share of the mortgage market increased from about 3% in calendar year 2005 to a peak of 21% in 2009. Since that time, FHA's share of the mortgage market has decreased somewhat, though it remains higher than it was in the early 2000s. In calendar year 2017, FHA's overall share of the mortgage market was about 17%. FHA-insured mortgages, like all mortgages, experienced increased default rates during the housing downturn that began around 2007, leading to concerns about the stability of the FHA insurance fund for single-family mortgages, the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund). In response to these concerns, FHA adopted a number of policy changes in an attempt to limit risk to the MMI Fund. These changes have included raising the fees that it charges and making changes to certain eligibility criteria for FHA-insured loans.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: We testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services in September 2017 after four significant mishaps at sea resulted in the loss of 17 sailors’ lives and serious damage to Navy ships  We reported on some of the Navy’s challenges, including the degraded condition and expired training certifications of ships homeported overseas, reductions to ship crews that contributed to sailor overwork and safety risks, and an inability to complete maintenance on time  Since that time, the Navy has completed two internal reviews to address these and other challenges, identifying 111 recommendations to improve surface fleet readiness  The Navy formed an executive group to guide and closely track the implementation of recommendations, and its reform efforts are ongoing  As of November 2018, the Navy reported that it had implemented 78 (i e , 70 percent) of these recommendations  Navy officials recognize that full implementation will take significant time and management attention to address the fundamental readiness challenges identified  In figure 1, we show photographs of two of the four Navy ships involved in significant mishaps that occurred in 2017  Both the USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S  McCain were involved in collisions that resulted in sailor fatalities  DOD has reported that more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and reductions in force structure have degraded its readiness; in response, the department has made rebuilding readiness a priority  The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness across the entire spectrum of conflict is critical to success in the emerging security environment  Nevertheless, DOD reported that readiness of the total military force remains low and has remained so since 2013  Our work has shown that the Navy has experienced increasing maintenance challenges as a high pace of operations has continued and maintenance has been deferred  Maintenance and personnel challenges also hinder readiness recovery of Navy aircraft  For the Marine Corps, our work has shown that ground force readiness has improved and remained stable in recent years, but acute readiness problems remain in aviation units  Over the past year, DOD has made department-wide progress in developing a plan to rebuild the readiness of the military force, with the military services providing regular input on the status of their readiness recovery efforts  In August 2018, we reported that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has developed a Readiness Recovery Framework that the department is using to guide the services’ efforts and plans to use to regularly assess, validate, and monitor readiness recovery  The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services have recently revised readiness goals and accompanying recovery strategies, metrics, and milestones to align with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance  We have ongoing work assessing DOD’s progress in achieveing its overall readiness goals  DOD’s readiness rebuilding efforts are occurring in a challenging context that requires the department to make difficult decisions regarding how best to address continuing operational demands while preparing for future challenges  Our work has shown that an important aspect of this, across all of the services, is determining an appropriate balance between maintaining and upgrading legacy weapon systems currently in operational use and procuring new ones to overcome rapidly advancing future threats  Based on updated information we received in November 2018, the Navy has taken steps to provide dedicated training time so its surface forces may meet existing Navy training standards and their training is certified when they deploy  However, the Navy continues to struggle with rebuilding the readiness of the existing fleet due to enduring maintenance and manning challenges  As the Navy seeks to expand its fleet by 25 percent, these challenges will likely be further exacerbated and the Navy will likely face additional affordability challenges  After the collisions in 2017, the Navy focused on training surface ship crews to its existing standards  We testified in September 2017 that there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers based in Japan and 37 percent of training certifications for these surface ship crews had lapsed as of June 2017  Since that time, the Navy has worked to ensure surface ships are certified before they are deployed  For example, the Navy has established controls to limit waivers that allowed training lapses to worsen, now requiring multiple high-level approvals for ships to operate uncertified  Based on our analysis of updated data, the Navy has improved markedly in the percentage of cruisers and destroyers with lapsed certifications in Japan, from 41 percent of certifications expired in September 2017 to 9 percent as of November 2018, with less than 3 percent of certifications expired on ships in operational status  While the Navy has demonstrated its commitment to ensuring that crews are certified prior to deploying, training for amphibious operations and higher-level collective training may not be fully implemented for several years  In September 2017, we reported that some Marine Corps units were limited in their ability to complete training to conduct an amphibious operation—a military operation that is launched from the sea to introduce a landing force ashore—by several factors, including a decline in the number of amphibious ships from 62 in 1990 to 32 as of November 2018, access to range space, and a high pace of deployments, among others  We recommended that the Navy and the Marine Corps develop an approach to mitigate their amphibious operations training shortfalls as the services await the arrival of additional amphibious ships into the fleet  Marine Corps officials told us that the Marine Corps and the Navy are working together to maximize amphibious training opportunities  Additionally, the Navy has plans to phase in high-level collective training into the operational schedules of its ships homeported in Japan over the next several years  Previously, advanced and integrated training involving multiple ships was conducted ad hoc if at all for ships homeported in Japan  Such collective training is important because the 2018 National Defense Strategy states that the department’s principal priority is to prepare for threats from strategic competitors due to the magnitude of the threat they pose  However, in November 2018, officials from Fleet Forces Command told us that fully implementing its training approach to prepare for advanced adversaries would not be fully implemented across the fleet for several years  We have reported that the Navy faces persistent challenges in completing maintenance on time and providing sufficient manning to its ships  Unless these challenges are addressed, the Navy will be hampered in its ability to rebuild readiness and prepare for the future  Our work has found that the Navy has been unable to complete ship and submarine maintenance on time, resulting in continuing schedule delays that reduce time for training and operations and create costly inefficiencies in a resource constrained environment  The Navy’s readiness recovery is premised on the rigorous adherence to deployment, training, and maintenance schedules  However, we reported in May 2016 on the difficulty that both the public and private shipyards were having in completing maintenance on time  We reported that, from 2011 through 2014, about 28 percent of scheduled maintenance for surface combatants was completed on time and 11 percent was completed on time for aircraft carriers  We updated these data as of November 2018 to include maintenance periods completed through the end of fiscal year 2018 and found that the Navy continues to struggle to complete maintenance on time  For fiscal years 2012-2018, our analysis for key portions of the Navy fleet shows that 30 percent of Navy maintenance was completed on time, leading to more than 27,000 days in which ships were delayed and unavailable for training and operations as shown in figure 2 below  In addition to affecting training and operations, maintenance delays are costly  In November 2018, we examined attack submarine maintenance delays and reported that the Navy was incurring significant operating and support costs to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that are delayed getting into and out of shipyard maintenance periods  We estimated that over the past 10 years the Navy has spent $1 5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle no longer certified to conduct normal operations—while waiting to enter the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards (see figure 3)  We recommended that the Navy analyze how it allocates its maintenance workload across public and private shipyards  DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that it has taken the first steps to take a more holistic view of submarine maintenance requirements and impacts across both the public and private shipyards  In an update provided in November 2018, the Navy told us that they are developing a contracting strategy to conduct two additional depot maintenance periods at private shipyards in the future  Our prior work has shown that three primary factors at the naval shipyards contribute to maintenance delays: Poor conditions and aging equipment limit the ability of the shipyards to meet current and future demands  We reported in September 2017 that facility and equipment limitations at the shipyards contributed to maintenance delays for the aircraft carriers and submarines, hindering the shipyards’ ability to support the Navy  Specifically, we found that the shipyards would be unable to support an estimated one-third of maintenance periods planned over the next 23 years  We recommended that the Navy take steps to improve its management of shipyard investments; the Navy concurred with this recommendation and we are encouraged by its response  For example, the Navy has developed a plan for the optimal placement of facilities and major equipment at each public shipyard, which the Navy estimates can ultimately increase its maintenance efficiency by reducing personnel and materiel travel by an average of 65 percent  This equates to recovering about 328,000 man days per year—an amount roughly equal to that of an aircraft carrier maintenance period  However, the Navy’s preliminary estimate —that this effort will require an estimated $21 billion and 20 years to address—is well beyond historical funding levels, and does not include some potentially significant costs (e g , for utilities, roads, or environmental remediation)  Shipyard workforce gaps and inexperience are limiting factors  The Navy has reported a variety of workforce challenges at the Navy’s four public shipyards such as hiring personnel in a timely manner and providing personnel with the training necessary to gain proficiency in critical skills  The Navy has noted that some occupations require years of training before workers become proficient  According to Navy officials, a large portion of its workforce is inexperienced  For example, 45 percent of the Puget Sound and 30 percent of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyards’ skilled workforce have fewer than 5 years of experience  According to DOD officials, workforce shortages and inexperience contribute to maintenance delays  For example, at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, two submarines were delayed approximately 20 months, in part because of shortages in ship fitters and welders, among other skilled personnel  Most of DOD’s depots, which include the naval shipyards, have taken actions to maintain critical skills through retention incentives, bonuses, and awards  We plan to issue a report examining DOD’s depot skill gaps, including those at the naval shipyards, later this month  Depot supply support may not be cost-effective  In June 2016, we reported that the naval shipyards and other depots had not implemented actions that would likely improve the cost-effectiveness of their supply operations  Specifically, the Navy had not transferred certain functions to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) at the shipyards in the same manner as the Navy and Air Force did for their aviation depots  The Navy and Air Force aviation depots that transferred these functions to DLA had reaped a number of efficiencies in their supply operations, including a 10-percent reduction in backorders over a 5-year period  We recommended that the Navy analyze whether such a transfer of functions is warranted at the shipyards and the Navy concurred with the recommendation  However, as of October 2018, the Navy had not conducted a comprehensive analysis of transferring these functions and had provided no plans to do so  In May 2017, we reported that the Navy’s process for determining manpower requirements—the number and skill mix of sailors needed on the Navy’s ships—did not fully account for all ship workload  The Navy was using outdated standards to calculate the size of ship crews that may have been leading to overburdened crews working long hours  We recommended steps to help ensure the Navy’s manpower requirements meet the needs of the existing and future surface fleet, and the Navy has been studying ship workload and revising its guidance  As of November 2018, the Navy was continuing to analyze the manpower requirements of its ship classes to better size and compose ship crews, and the Navy was also working to improve shipboard manning  However, these efforts are not yet complete and it is too early to assess their effectiveness  Until manpower requirements are reassessed across the fleet, the Navy risks that ship crews will continue to be undersized and sailors will be overworked with potential negative effects on readiness and safety  Additionally, the Navy provided information in November 2018 that showed that it is taking steps to ensure that ships have a minimum percentage of crew assigned and with the appropriate skills  The Navy has prioritized manning its surface ships homeported overseas  The Navy established a minimum threshold of filling at least 95 percent of authorized billets in its ship crews with sailors (referred to as fill), with a minimum goal of 92 percent of those sailors having the right qualifications for the billet (known as fit)  According to Navy officials, the Navy is for the most part meeting its fill goals Navy-wide, but has not consistently met its fit goals  However, during group discussions in November 2018 with ship crews and interviews with Navy officials in Japan, we learned that the Navy’s methods for tracking fit and fill do not account for sailor experience and may be inaccurately capturing the actual presence of sailors onboard and available for duty on its ships  Moreover, sailors consistently told us that ship workload has not decreased, and it is still extremely challenging to complete all required workload while getting enough sleep  Navy officials told us that manning challenges will continue through at least fiscal year 2021 as the Navy increases its end strength and trains its new sailors to gain the proper mix of skills to operate and maintain the fleet  To meet continued operational demands, the Navy is planning for the most significant fleet size increase in over 30 years  According to the Navy’s fiscal year 2019 shipbuilding plan, the Navy plans to build and maintain a fleet of 355 battle force ships—an increase of about 25 percent above the Navy’s current force of 287 ships  To reach its goal, the Navy plans to buy 301 ships through 2048 and extend the service life of its 66 Arleigh Burke class destroyers and up to 7 attack submarines  Together, the fiscal year 2019 shipbuilding plan and the service life extensions would allow the Navy to reach a 355-ship fleet by the 2030s  Congressional Budget Office reporting and our past work have shown that the Navy has consistently and significantly underestimated the cost and timeframes for delivering new ships to the fleet  For example, the Navy estimates that buying the new ships specified in the fiscal year 2019 plan would cost $631 billion over 30 years while the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that those new ships would cost $801 billion—a difference of 27 percent  We also reported in June 2018 that acquisition outcomes for ship classes built during the last 10 years have often not achieved cost, schedule, quality, or performance goals that were established  Furthermore, we have reported that: all 8 of the lead ships delivered over the past decade that we reviewed were provided to the fleet behind schedule, and more than half of those ships were delayed by more than 2 years, and six ships of different classes valued at $6 3 billion were delivered to the Navy with varying degrees of incomplete work and quality problems  As a result of past cost and schedule problems, our work has shown that the Navy has a less-capable and smaller fleet today than it planned over 10 years ago  The Navy has also received $24 billion more in funding than it originally planned in its 2007 long-range shipbuilding plan but has 50 fewer ships in its inventory today, as compared with the goals it first established  Therefore, we have reported that as the Navy moves forward in implementing its shipbuilding plan it will be paramount for the Navy to learn from and apply lessons learned from the past  In addition to the cost of buying the ships and submarines to expand fleet size, the Navy will likely face affordability challenges with regard to the manning of an expanded fleet with the right number of sailors with the right mix of skills  In May 2017, we reported that the personnel costs for surface ship classes in fiscal years 2000-2015 were the largest share of total operating and support costs and that careful planning will be needed as new ships are brought into the fleet  We also reported that crew sizes on recently inducted ship classes grew from original projections as the Navy gained experience operating them  For example, the total crew size of Littoral Combat Ships has grown from 75 in 2003 to 98 personnel in 2016, a 31-percent increase  Navy officials told us that they plan to better articulate the personnel and resources needed for a larger fleet after fully accounting for workload and right-sizing ship crews  The Navy’s end strength has since increased by over 11,000 personnel from fiscal year 2017 levels, which should help alleviate manning challenges as the fleet grows  In November 2018, officials from Fleet Forces Command provided us with projections of its manning shortfalls continuing through at least fiscal year 2021 and steps it was planning to take to mitigate them  Our work has shown that Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited by aging aircraft, delayed maintenance, and insufficient supply support  Pilot and maintenance personnel shortfalls further limit readiness recovery across legacy air platforms  The growing F-35 program, which is meant to replace many aging aircraft, has presented additional operational and sustainment challenges, which will likely persist into the future if not corrected  DOD, the Navy, and the Marine Corps have emphasized mission capability of critical aviation platforms— including the Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18s and F-35s—and are taking steps to improve availability, but these efforts will take time to realize results  Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited by challenges associated with aging aircraft fleets, depot maintenance, and supply support challenges that limit the services’ ability to keep aviation units ready  The Navy and Marine Corps spend billions of dollars each year on sustainment, such as for spare parts and depot maintenance, to meet aircraft availability goals  However, aircraft availability rates have generally declined since fiscal year 2011  While specific aircraft availability data are considered sensitive by the Navy and the Marine Corps, and cannot be discussed in detail, we found in September 2018 that the Navy and the Marine Corps generally did not meet aircraft availability goals in fiscal years 2011-2016 for the seven aircraft we reviewed  In updating data in November 2018, we found that none of the aircraft met aircraft availability goals for fiscal years 2017 and 2018  According to the Navy, the pace of operations has increased wear and tear on its aircraft and decreased the time available for maintenance and modernization—a necessity for an aging fleet  For example, the average age of a legacy F/A-18A-D Hornet is 26 years, of an AV-8B Harrier is 21 years, and of the C-2A Greyhound is 29 years  Both services expect these aircraft will continue to be used for the foreseeable future and in some cases into the 2030s  The Navy and the Marine Corps face delays in the arrival of the F-35 to replace their legacy F/A-18A-D Hornets and AV-8B Harriers  To compensate for the delay, the Navy and the Marine Corps are planning to procure additional aircraft, such as the F/A-18E-F Super Hornet, and extend the service life and upgrade the capabilities of their legacy aircraft  However, these efforts and the sustainment of the Navy and Marine Corps legacy aircraft fleet face key challenges as shown in figure 4  Specifically, our prior work has shown that the Navy and the Marine Corps are confronted with two sets of challenges in sustaining their aircraft: Depot maintenance complexities for aging aircraft and spare parts availability  Depot maintenance on aging weapon systems, including Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, becomes less predictable as structural fatigue occurs and parts that were not expected to be replaced begin to wear out  While the Navy and the Marine Corps reported that sustainment funding accounts, such as those for depot maintenance and spare parts, have been funded at increased levels in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, efforts to improve spare parts availability take time to produce results due to long lead times for acquiring some items  In addition, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft face challenges associated with diminishing manufacturing sources and parts obsolescence  DOD has a program intended to manage these risks, but we reported in September 2017 that its implementation varied across DOD weapon system program offices  We made recommendations to improve the program’s management; DOD concurred and has initiated improvement efforts  Maintenance personnel inexperience and retention  The Navy has had difficulty attracting and retaining skilled maintainers, such as sheet metal workers and machinists at its aviation depots (i e , Fleet Readiness Centers), which directly affects its ability to complete planned maintenance  Some of the depots experienced challenges attracting and retaining skilled personnel due to competition with nearby contractors that are able to offer higher pay, according to Navy depot officials  Similar to the shipyards, the aviation depots also lack experienced personnel, affecting the efficiency and quality of maintenance  For example, 41 percent of the skilled workers at Fleet Readiness Center Southwest have 2 years or fewer of experience  Workforce inexperience and attrition of skilled personnel were some of the reasons cited for machining defects detected in the landing gear for F/A-18, E-2, and C-2A aircraft by a recent Navy report  All of the depots have undertaken retention efforts such as incentives, bonuses, and awards to address these issues  Until the Navy and Marine Corps address maintenance and supply challenges it will be difficult to meet Secretary of Defense-established mission capability goals  Specifically, in September 2018, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum emphasizing that a key component of implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy is ensuring critical aviation platforms meet their mission capability targets by the end of fiscal year 2019  The memorandum established a goal of achieving a minimum of 80-percent mission capable rates for various aircraft, including for the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ F/A-18 inventories, by the end of fiscal year 2019 while also reducing operating and maintenance costs  To accomplish this, the Navy and the Marine Corps developed the Return to Readiness strategy in November 2018 that includes a broad array of actions to improve the availability of spare parts and evaluate the application of best commercial practices to naval aviation sustainment, among other actions  Office of the Secretary of Defense and Navy program officials told us, and based on our prior work we agree, that this goal will be challenging to achieve by the end of fiscal year 2019  We reported in April 2018 that fighter pilot shortages in the Navy and the Marine Corps have been worsening in recent years and shortfalls are projected to remain through at least fiscal year 2023  Our analysis of Navy and Marine Corps data showed that the Navy’s shortage of first operational tour fighter pilots more than doubled from 12 percent in fiscal year 2013 to 26 percent in fiscal year 2017  Similarly, the Marine Corps’ overall shortage of fighter pilots quadrupled from 6 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 24 percent in fiscal year 2017  Also, as we reported in April 2018, service officials attributed the pilot shortages to reduced training opportunities and increased attrition due to career dissatisfaction, among other factors  Officials from both services stated at the time that they have ensured that deploying squadrons have been fully staffed with fighter pilots by using various approaches including using senior pilots to staff junior positions and having pilots deploy more frequently and for longer periods  However, we reported that squadron leaders and fighter pilots said that these approaches had a negative impact on the fighter pilot training and retention and ultimately may be exacerbating the situation  Further compounding their pilot shortages, we also found that the services have not recently reevaluated squadron requirements to reflect an increased fighter pilot workload  As a result, the reported shortage actually could be greater  The services were taking actions, including increasing retention incentives for fighter pilots  To help determine the magnitude of the shortages and help target strategies to better meet their personnel needs, we recommended, and the Navy and Marine Corps agreed, to reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements  Sustainment challenges are not just an issue for older aircraft, but represent an enduring challenge for the F-35 Lightning II aircraft—a key component to the future of tactical aviation for the Navy and Marine Corps  The Navy and Marine Corps are both flying F-35s now as the program ramps up development, and they plan to procure nearly 700 aircraft over the coming decades  The sustainment costs of the F-35 fleet are projected to exceed $1 trillion over its 60-year life cycle  In October 2017, we reported that: F-35B aircraft (including Marine Corps aircraft) were available (i e , the aircraft were safe to fly, available for use, and able to perform at least one tasked mission) about 52 percent of the time from March 2017 through June 2017, which fell short of the 65-percent goal established by the Marine Corps for non-deployed units and F-35B aircraft (including Marine Corps aircraft) were fully mission capable (i e , the aircraft were capable of accomplishing all tasked missions) about 15 percent of the time from March 2017 through June 2017, which fell short of the 60-percent goal established by the Marine Corps for non-deployed units  We also reported on numerous sustainment challenges leading to less than desirable outcomes for F-35 warfighter readiness  For example, F-35 aircraft were unable to fly 22 percent of the time because of parts shortages from January 2017 through August 7, 2017  Additionally, DOD’s capabilities to repair F-35 parts at military depots were 6 years behind schedule, which resulted in average part repair times that are twice that of the program’s objective  As DOD gains experience with the F-35, our work has shown that the department has encountered additional challenges  In 2017, the Marine Corps became the first military service to station F-35 aircraft overseas, transferring aircraft to Iwakuni, Japan  While in the Pacific, DOD expects to disperse its F-35s into smaller detachments to outmaneuver the enemy and counter regional threats  However, in April 2018, we reported that this approach posed logistics and supply challenges  In June 2018, we reported that the F-35 program had not improved its reliability and maintainability over the past year and continued to fall short on half of its performance targets  Furthermore, we found that the program may not meet its required targets before each variant of the F-35 is expected to demonstrate maturity—the point at which the aircraft has flown enough hours to predictably determine reliability and maintainability over its lifespan  This means that the Navy and the Marine Corps may have to decide whether they are willing to accept less reliable and maintainable aircraft than originally planned  Among other outcomes, this could result in higher maintenance costs and lower aircraft availability than anticipated which also could pose readiness challenges in the future  As we reported in October 2017, the poor reliability of certain parts is already contributing to shortages of F-35 spare parts  Challenges posed by the F-35 program are largely the result of sustainment plans that do not fully include or consider key requirements  Our work has shown that planning for sustainment and aligning its funding are critical if DOD wants to meet its aircraft availability goals and effectively deploy to support operations  To address the challenges associated with F-35 sustainment and operational deployment, we recommended that DOD revise its sustainment plans, align associated funding, and mitigate the risks associated with key supply chain-related challenges for deployed F-35s in the Pacific, among others  DOD concurred with these recommendations and stated that it is taking steps to address them  Furthermore, as previously discussed, the Secretary of Defense has established an 80-percent mission capability goal for critical aviation assets, including the F-35  Due to current low availability and numerous sustainment issues, the F-35 fleet will be challenged in meeting the goal  In sum, the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ significant readiness challenges have developed over more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and reductions in force structure  Both services have made encouraging progress identifying the causes of their readiness decline and have begun efforts to arrest and reverse it; however, our prior work shows that fully addressing the persistent readiness challenges will require years of sustained management attention  Our work cited today contains 25 specific recommendations to the Navy and the Marine Corps and an additional 20 recommendations to various other DOD components to assist these services in rebuilding the readiness of their forces and in modernizing for the future  Attention to these recommendations can assist the Navy and the Marine Corps as they seek to rebuild the readiness of their forces  Chairmen Wicker and Sullivan, Ranking Members Hirono and Kaine, and Members of the Subcommittees, this concludes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time  If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact John H  Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Clarine Allen; Steven Banovac; John Bumgarner; Chris Cronin; Benjamin Emmel; Cynthia Grant; Mae Jones; Amie Lesser; Tobin McMurdie; Shahrzad Nikoo; Carol Petersen; Cody Raysinger; Michael Silver; John E  “Jet” Trubey; and Chris Watson  Over the past 4 years, we have issued a number of reports related to Navy and Marine Corps readiness and we used them to develop this statement  Table 1 summarizes the recommendations in these reports  The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with most of the 45 recommendations and has many actions underway  However, DOD has not fully implemented any of the recommendations to date  For each of the reports, the specific recommendations and any progress made in implementing them are summarized in tables 2 through 16  Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are classified  Report numbers with a SU suffix are sensitive but unclassified  Classified and sensitive but unclassified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances and need to know, upon request  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet  GAO-19-229  Washington, D C : November 19, 2018  Air Force Readiness: Actions Needed to Rebuild Readiness and Prepare for the Future  GAO-19-120T  Washington, D C : October 10, 2018  Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need to Be Clarified  GAO-18-678  Washington, D C : September 10, 2018  Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need Clarification  GAO-18-146SU  Washington, D C : April 25, 2018  Military Readiness: Update on DOD’s Progress in Developing a Readiness Rebuilding Plan  GAO-18-441RC  Washington, D C : August 10, 2018  (SECRET) Military Personnel: Collecting Additional Data Could Enhance Pilot Retention Efforts  GAO-18-439  Washington, D C : June 21, 2018  F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Development Is Nearly Complete, but Deficiencies Found in Testing Need to Be Resolved  GAO-18-321  Washington, D C : June 5, 2018  Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Share F-35 Operational Lessons Across the Military Services  GAO-18-464R  Washington, D C : April 25, 2018  Military Readiness: Clear Policy and Reliable Data Would Help DOD Better Manage Service Members’ Time Away from Home  GAO-18-253  Washington, D C : April 25, 2018  Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Fighter Pilot Workforce Requirements  GAO-18-113  Washington, D C : April 11, 2018  Military Aircraft: F-35 Brings Increased Capabilities, but the Marine Corps Needs to Assess Challenges Associated with Operating in the Pacific  GAO-18-79C  Washington, D C : March 28, 2018  (SECRET) Navy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training  GAO-18-212T  Washington, DC : December 1, 2017  F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Challenges Affecting Readiness and Cost Transparency  GAO-18-75  Washington, D C : October 26, 2017  Defense Supply Chain: DOD Needs Complete Information on Single Sources of Supply to Proactively Manage the Risks  GAO-17-768  Washington, D C : September 28, 2017  Navy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training  GAO-17-789  Washington, D C : September 26, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-809T  Washington, D C : September 19, 2017  Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions That Affect Operation  GAO-17-548  Washington, D C : September 12, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-798T  Washington, D C : September 7, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Maintain Viable Surge Sealift and Combat Logistics Fleets GAO-17-503  Washington, D C : August 22, 2017 (reissued on Oct 31, 2017)  Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges  GAO-17-369  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  Military Readiness: Coastal Riverine Force Challenges  GAO-17-462C  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  (SECRET) Navy Shipbuilding: Policy Changes Needed to Improve the Post-Delivery Process and Ship Quality  GAO-17-418  Washington, D C : July 13, 2017 Offshore Petroleum Discharge System: The Navy Has Not Mitigated Risk Associated with System Limitations  GAO-17-531C  Washington, D C : June 22, 2017  (SECRET) Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and Composition of Ship Crews  GAO-17-413  Washington, D C : May 18, 2017  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-841  Washington, D C : September 7, 2016  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-534C  Washington, D C : June 30, 2016  (SECRET) Defense Inventory: Further Analysis and Enhanced Metrics Could Improve Service Supply and Depot Operations  GAO-16-450  Washington, D C : June 9, 2016  Navy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness  GAO-16-481RC  Washington, D C : May 25, 2016  (SECRET//NOFORN) Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan  GAO-16-466R  Washington, D C : May 2, 2016  F-35 Sustainment: DOD Needs a Plan to Address Risks Related to Its Central Logistics System  GAO-16-439  Washington, D C : April 14, 2016  Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports  GAO-15-329  Washington, D C : May 29, 2015  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 
Report 2:  For example, the document that serves as direction for Forest Service personnel on how to enter into RACAs referred to an outdated financial system that was replaced in fiscal year 2013  Further, the manuals and handbooks for the RACA processes had no indication that they had been reviewed within the past 5 years  Forest Service policy requires routine review, every 5 years, of policies and procedures in its Directive System  According to Forest Service officials, a staff member from ORMS sends an e-mail to officials responsible for updating these policies and procedures  However, appropriate control activities have not been designed to reasonably assure that updates were made, reviewed, approved, and issued as needed for continued relevance and effectiveness  Without adequate descriptions of processes and related control activities in its manuals and handbooks over RACAs, the Forest Service is at risk that processes and related control activities may not be properly, consistently, and timely performed  Further, because it lacks a process and related controls for monitoring and reviewing the updates of the guidance and various process documents in the Directive System, the Forest Service is at risk that its policies and procedures may not provide appropriate agency-wide direction in achieving control objectives, particularly when financial systems change and old processes may no longer be applicable  SOPs and desk guides related to RACA processes were not in the Directive System and are not considered official Forest Service policy and procedures  Forest Service field staff responsible for various processes generally developed SOPs and desk guides to document day-to-day procedures for employees in carrying out RACA processes to supplement the manuals and handbooks  However, the SOPs and desk guides did not reference the applicable manuals and handbooks they supplemented  Further, the SOPs and desk guides did not provide descriptions of (1) review procedures for authorization, completeness, and validity of RACAs and related receivables; (2) detailed review procedures to be performed and by whom; (3) timing of review procedures; and (4) how to document the completion of the review procedures  Finally, SOPs and desk guides did not have evidence that responsible officials reviewed and approved them to authorize their use  These SOPs and desk guides are only available in the field office where these were developed, and if similar SOPs and desk guides were developed in other field offices, control activities and how they are performed could vary  We also noted that these SOPs and desk guides were not timely updated to reflect processes and systems currently in use  For example, there were many instances where the SOPs and desk guides referred to systems that the Forest Service no longer used  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should establish an organizational structure, assign responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve the entity’s objectives  Effective documentation assists in management’s design of internal control by establishing and communicating the who, what, when, where, and why of internal control execution to personnel  Documentation also provides a means to retain organizational knowledge and mitigate the risk of having that knowledge limited to a few personnel and to achieve the entity’s objectives  Management assigns responsibility and delegates authority to key roles throughout the entity  As a result of the issues discussed above, the Forest Service is at risk that control activities may not be properly and consistently performed and its related control objectives may not be achieved efficiently and effectively  In addition, the Forest Service is at risk that knowledge for performing the control activities may be limited to a few personnel or lost altogether in the event of employee turnover  The Forest Service lacked control activities over the segregation of incompatible duties performed by line officers and program managers for reimbursable agreements and any adjustments affecting the final disposition of related receivables  Field offices manage the majority of Forest Service projects, including authorizing the agreements and monitoring related collection  The Forest Service line officer for fire incident cooperative agreements and program managers for RACA at the RSA, unit, or field levels initiate and develop the terms of the agreements and are also responsible for any subsequent negotiation of the agreements  In the process of negotiating and settling costs, the line officer or program manager has the authority to cancel or change related receivables that they deemed uncollectible  For example, in a fire incident, the line officer at the region or field level is involved in both developing a Cost Share Agreement and after the fire incident has ended, negotiating the Cost Settlement Package with parties involved in the agreement to determine the final settlement amount that the Forest Service will be reimbursed for expenses paid in suppressing the fire incident  Therefore, the line officer is responsible for initiating the Cost Share Agreement, modifying the Cost Settlement Package, and changing or canceling the related receivable, which represent conflicting duties  We also found that the Forest Service did not have any mitigating controls, such as independent approval of any adjustments affecting the final disposition of receivables, to mitigate the risk of these incompatible duties  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks  Segregation of duties contributes to the design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of control activities  To achieve segregation of key functions, management can divide responsibilities among different people to reduce the risk of error, misuse, or fraud  This may include separating the responsibilities for authorizing or approving transactions, processing and recording them, and reviewing the transactions so that no one individual controls all key aspects of a transaction or event  Forest Service officials stated they did not consider segregating the conflicting duties related to reimbursable agreements because these line officers and program managers were most familiar with the terms of the agreement and the activities performed  However, a lack of adequate segregation of conflicting duties or proper monitoring and review of conflicting duties for receivables from reimbursable agreements could result in receivables not being collected, and an increased risk of fraud  The Forest Service’s processes and related control activities over review of unliquidated obligations were not properly designed to reasonably assure optimum utilization of funds and were inconsistent with USDA and Forest Service policy  Further, Forest Service manuals and handbooks related to the review of unliquidated obligations did not clearly describe control activities and were not timely reviewed by management  The Forest Service reported unliquidated obligations of approximately $2 6 billion and $2 5 billion in its financial statements as of September 30, 2015, and 2016, respectively  In fiscal year 2016, the Forest Service deobligated about $319 million of its unliquidated obligations from prior years  The Forest Service’s procedures related to the review of unliquidated obligations were not properly designed and were inconsistent with USDA and Forest Service policy  In accordance with USDA Departmental Regulation (Regulation 2230-001) and related Forest Service policy, the Forest Service identifies and reviews unliquidated obligations that have been inactive for at least 12 months to determine whether delivery or performance of goods or services is still expected to occur  Once a determination has been made that an unliquidated obligation can be deobligated, program or procurement personnel are to notify finance personnel, in writing, within 5 days of the determination to process the deobligation  Within 15 days of receipt of the written notification, the unliquidated obligations are to be adjusted in the financial management system  The Forest Service CFO is then to be notified in writing that the deobligation was processed  Within 1 month of the close of each quarter, the Forest Service CFO is to submit to USDA’s Associate CFO for Financial Operations a certification stating that the Forest Service has performed reviews of its unliquidated obligations and taken appropriate actions, such as promptly deobligating an unliquidated obligation that is no longer needed  However, the Forest Service’s quarterly certifications are inconsistent with USDA and Forest Service policy because the months included in each quarterly review do not line up with the months outlined in policy  For example, as shown in table 1, based on policy the certification due on October 31, covers the months July through September  However in practice, the certification that the Forest Service prepared for October 31 covers May through July  As a result, the review and certification for August and September would be delayed an entire quarter  According to Forest Service officials, it takes considerable time to produce accurate unliquidated obligations reports from USDA’s financial system and then distribute them to field offices  Therefore, there is not sufficient time for the field offices to review and deobligate amounts not needed from the unliquidated obligations balances to meet USDA’s certification timing and requirements  However, the Forest Service has not developed other processes and control activities that could help meet USDA and Forest Service policy and reasonably assure that unliquidated obligations are reviewed timely and appropriate actions are taken  As a result, there is an increased risk that the Forest Service may not achieve its control objectives of optimum utilization of funds and timely adjustments of obligated balances  The Forest Service’s process and related control activities over its review of unliquidated obligations and resulting certifications were not adequately described in manuals and handbooks in its Directive System  Further, the manuals and handbooks were not timely reviewed and updated to reflect processes and systems currently in use  In accordance with the Forest Service’s Directive System, policies are documented in its manuals while procedures for performing specialized activities are documented in its handbooks  However, we found that the Forest Service’s processes and related control activities for reviewing unliquidated obligations were not adequately described and documented in such manuals and handbooks  Although parts of the applicable section of the handbook referred to procedures, there were no detailed descriptions of the processes, and only references to objectives of the procedures for reviewing unliquidated obligations were listed  For example, in identifying unliquidated obligations for review, the narrative description of the procedures in the handbook states that the responsible obligating official must review each selected unliquidated obligation to determine whether (1) delivery or performance of goods or services has occurred or is expected to occur and (2) accounting corrections to the obligation data in the accounting system are necessary  The handbook also refers to an unliquidated obligations report listing the unliquidated obligations that must be reviewed  The narrative does not provide any detailed procedures that obligating officials or responsible personnel need to perform, how to perform those procedures, and how those control activities are to be documented  The guidance in the handbook was supplemented by two desk guides  However, the desk guides are outside the Forest Service’s Directive System and, as previously noted, the Directive System is the only place where the Forest Service’s policy and procedures are issued  In addition, these desk guides did not reference the applicable guidance in the Directive System that they were supplementing  Further, the process and related control activities for adjusting unliquidated obligations within 15 days of receipt of written notification, as stated in USDA’s policy, were not described in either the handbooks or the desk guides  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks to achieve an effective internal control system  Management’s design of internal control establishes and communicates the who, what, when, where, and why of internal control execution to personnel  Documentation also provides a means to retain organizational knowledge and mitigate the risk of having that knowledge limited to a few personnel  Further, the standards also explain that management clearly document internal control in a manner that allows documentation to be readily available and that documentation be properly managed and maintained  In addition, manuals and handbooks for processes related to review and certification of unliquidated obligations had no evidence that they had been reviewed within the past 5 years for ongoing relevance and effectiveness  According to a Forest Service manual, all service-wide directives, except interim directives, shall be reviewed at least once every 5 years  The Forest Service does not have an effective process in place to monitor the reviews and any updates of the manuals and handbooks in its Directive System  As previously discussed, while ORMS sends an e- mail requesting that the applicable officials review and update the guidance in the manuals and handbooks, there is no follow-up process to help ensure that documents were reviewed and updated as needed  Because the Forest Service’s process and related control activities over its review and certification of unliquidated obligations were not adequately described in its manuals and handbooks, the Forest Service is at risk that its control activities may not reasonably assure that control objectives provide (1) optimum utilization of funds and (2) for unliquidated obligations that are no longer needed to be efficiently and effectively deobligated and made available for other program needs  Adequate processes and related control activities over the Forest Service’s budgetary resources are critical in reasonably assuring that these resources are timely and effectively available for its mission operations, including fire suppression  However, we identified deficiencies in the Forest Service’s processes and related controls over allotments, unobligated no-year funds from prior years, administrative control of funds, fund transfers, reimbursable agreements, and available funds from deobligation of unliquidated obligations  Deficiencies ranged from a lack of processes to control activities that were not properly designed, resulting in an increased risk that Forest Service funds may not be effectively and efficiently monitored and used  In addition, the Forest Service’s manuals and handbooks, which provide the directives for the areas we reviewed, had not been reviewed by management in accordance with the Forest Service’s 5-year review policy  Further, Forest Service staff prepared SOPs and desk guides that documented control activities, but they were not issued as official policy and had not been reviewed and approved by responsible officials  As a result, the Forest Service is at increased risk that the control activities may not be consistently performed across the agency and that the guidance in the SOPs and desk guides may not comply with agency policy in the Directive System  To improve internal controls over the Forest Service’s budget execution processes, we are making the following 11 recommendations: The Chief of the Forest Service should (1) revise its process and (2) design, document, and implement related control activities to reasonably assure that amounts designated in appropriations acts for specific purposes are properly used for the purposes specifically designated  (Recommendation 1) The Chief of the Forest Service should (1) develop a process and (2) design, document, and implement related control activities to reasonably assure that unobligated no-year funds from prior years are reviewed for continuing need  (Recommendation 2) The Chief of the Forest Service should (1) design, document, and implement a comprehensive system for administrative control of funds and (2) submit it for review and approval by USDA before issuance, as required by the USDA Budget Manual  (Recommendation 3) The Chief of the Forest Service should design, document, and implement control activities over the preparation and approval of a fire suppression fund transfers strategy, to specify all appropriate factors to be considered in developing and documenting the strategy, and incorporate these control activities into the Directive System  (Recommendation 4) The Chief of the Forest Service should design, document, and implement processes and related control activities for its fire incident cooperative agreements to reasonably assure efficient and effective operations and timely and reliable reporting of reimbursable receivables related to fire incident cooperative agreements, and incorporate them in the Directive System  (Recommendation 5) The Chief of the Forest Service should update the RACA manuals and handbooks to adequately describe the processes and related control activities applicable to RACAs to reasonably assure that staff will know (1) how and when to perform processes and control activities and (2) how to document their performance  (Recommendation 6) The Chief of the Forest Service should design, document, and implement segregation of duties or mitigating control activities over reimbursable agreements and any adjustments affecting the final disposition of related receivables  (Recommendation 7) The Chief of the Forest Service should modify, document, and implement control activities consistent with USDA and Forest Service policy to reasonably assure that unliquidated obligations are reviewed timely and appropriate actions are taken  (Recommendation 8) The Chief of the Forest Service should adequately describe the processes and related control activities for unliquidated obligations review and certification processes in manuals and handbooks within the Directive System  (Recommendation 9) The Chief of the Forest Service should develop, document, and implement a process and related control activities to reasonably assure that manuals and handbooks for allotments, reimbursable agreements, and review of unliquidated obligations are reviewed and updated every 5 years, consistent with Forest Service policy  (Recommendation 10) The Chief of the Forest Service should develop, document, and implement a process and related control activities to reasonably assure that SOPs and desk guides (1) clearly refer to guidance in the Directive System for allotments, reimbursable agreements, and review of unliquidated obligations and (2) are reviewed and approved by responsible officials prior to use  (Recommendation 11) We provided a draft of this report to USDA for comment  In its comments, reproduced in appendix III, the Forest Service stated that it generally agreed with the report and that it has made significant progress to address the report’s findings  Specifically, the Forest Service stated that its financial policies concerning budget execution have been revised to address our concerns with allotments, unliquidated obligations, commitments, and administrative control of funds as prescribed by OMB Circular No  A-11  Further, the Forest Service stated that it has undertaken an in-depth review of its unliquidated obligations and modified the certification process to comply with the USDA requirement  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and to the Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the Forest Service  In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9869 or khana@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  Our objectives were to determine the extent to which the Forest Service properly designed control activities over (1) allotments of budgetary resources, its system for administrative control of funds, and any fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations; (2) reimbursables and related collections; and (3) unliquidated obligations  We reviewed the Forest Service’s process documents and control activities, policies and procedures from its manual and handbooks in its Directive System, and other guidance in the form of standard operating procedures (SOP) and desk guides to obtain an understanding of internal controls at the Forest Service related to our three objectives  We reviewed the control activities that the Forest Service identified to determine whether the activities would achieve the control objectives that the service identified and whether the activities were consistent with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  We also reviewed recent relevant GAO and U S  Department of Agriculture (USDA) Office of Inspector General reports to obtain background information related to the Forest Service’s budget execution processes  We evaluated the design of the Forest Service’s control activities based on data for fiscal year 2016  To address our first objective, we reviewed Forest Service process documents related to allotments and budget authority to obtain an understanding of control activities over the allotments of budgetary resources, its system for administrative control of funds, and any related fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations  The process documents included a list of control objectives and related control activities that the Forest Service had used to assess its internal controls  We also reviewed the related guidance in appendix H to Office of Management and Budget Circular No  A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget for Administrative Control of Funds, to identify requirements that agencies must meet to ascertain whether their controls over funds management are properly designed  We interviewed key officials from the Forest Service’s Strategic Planning, Budget and Accountability Office to gain an understanding of their processes for allotments of budgetary resources, its system for administrative control of funds, and fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations for wildland fire suppression activities, including how each of their risk assessments were performed and their plans to mitigate the risks  We reviewed and analyzed the processes documented in the manuals and handbooks collectively referred to as directives to determine whether the processes and control activities were designed to achieve the Forest Service’s stated objectives  Specifically, we examined the Forest Service’s control activities to determine whether these sufficiently communicated the procedures to be performed and the documentation to be prepared  We also reviewed USDA Budget Manual to determine whether Forest Service guidance was consistent with USDA’s requirements for all of its component agencies, specifically requirements related to the administrative control of funds  To address our second objective, we reviewed the Forest Service’s policies, procedures, and other documentation and interviewed agency officials to develop an understanding of its processes related to reimbursable agreements and related collection activities  We first identified, through interviews with Forest Service officials, the different kinds of reimbursable agreements that the Forest Service enters into with other USDA components, other federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and nongovernment entities to carry out its mission for the benefit of the public  Two distinct types of reimbursable agreements include (1) fire incident cooperative agreements and (2) reimbursable and advanced collection agreements  We reviewed Forest Service process documents and templates related to these two types of reimbursable agreements provided to obtain an understanding of control activities over reimbursable processes  We reviewed the list of control objectives and related control activities that the Forest Service identified to determine whether the control activities were designed to achieve the applicable control objectives  To address our third objective, we reviewed the Forest Service’s policies, procedures, and other documentation related to and interviewed agency officials about unliquidated obligations to develop an understanding of the Forest Service’s review and certification processes for unliquidated obligations balances  We reviewed the Forest Service’s control activities related to its process for reviewing unliquidated obligations to obtain an understanding of control activities around its process and to determine whether the control activities were designed to achieve the applicable control objectives  Based on the results of our evaluation of the Forest Service’s design of internal control activities over the budget execution processes, we did not evaluate the implementation of the control activities or whether they were operating as designed  While our audit objectives focused on certain control activities related to (1) allotments of budgetary resources, the Forest Service’s system for administrative control of funds, and related fund transfers; (2) reimbursables and related collections for reimbursable agreements; and (3) unliquidated obligations, we did not evaluate all control activities and other components of internal control  If we had done so, additional deficiencies may or may not have been identified that could impair the effectiveness of the control activities evaluated as part of this audit  We conducted this performance audit from August 2016 to January 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides the overall framework for establishing and maintaining internal control  Internal control represents an agency’s plans, methods, policies, and procedures used to fulfill its mission, strategic plan, goals, and objectives  Internal control is a process by an entity’s oversight body, management, and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance that the objectives of the entity will be achieved  When properly designed, implemented, and operating effectively, it provides reasonable assurance that the following objectives are achieved: (1) effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) reliability of internal and external reporting, and (3) compliance with applicable laws and regulations  Internal control is not one event, but a series of actions that occur throughout an entity’s operations  The five components of internal control are as follows: Control Environment - The foundation for an internal control system that provides the discipline and structure to help an entity achieve its objectives  Risk Assessment - Assesses the risks facing the entity as it seeks to achieve its objectives and provides the basis for developing appropriate risk responses  Control Activities - The actions management establishes through policies and procedures to achieve objectives and respond to risks in the internal control system, which includes the entity’s information system  Information and Communication - The quality information management and personnel communicate and use to support the internal control system  Monitoring - Activities management establishes and operates to assess the quality of performance over time and promptly resolve the findings of audits and other reviews  An effective internal control system has each of the five components of internal control effectively designed, implemented, and operating with the components operating together in an integrated manner  In this audit, we assessed the design of control activities at the Forest Service related to its (1) allotments of budgetary resources and any related fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations, (2) reimbursables and related collections, and (3) review of unliquidated obligations  In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made key contributions to this report: Roger Stoltz (Assistant Director), Meafelia P  Gusukuma (Auditor-in-Charge), Tulsi Bhojwani, Cory Mazer, Sabrina Rivera, and Randy Voorhees 

ground_truth: The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness is critical to success in the emerging security environment. The Navy and Marine Corps are working to rebuild the readiness of their forces while growing and modernizing their aging fleet of ships and aircraft. However, achieving readiness recovery goals will take years as both services continue to be challenged to rebuild readiness amid continued operational demands. This statement provides information on current and future readiness challenges facing (1) the Navy ship and submarine fleet and (2) Navy and Marine Corps aviation. GAO also discusses prior recommendations on Navy and Marine Corps readiness and progress to address them. This statement is based on previously published work since 2015 related to Navy and Marine Corps readiness challenges, including shipyard workforce and capital investment, ship crewing, weapon system sustainment, the fighter pilot workforce, and modernizing force structure. GAO conducted site visits to the Pacific fleet in November 2018 and analyzed updated data, as appropriate. The Navy has taken steps to address training shortfalls in the surface fleet, but faces persistent maintenance and personnel challenges as it seeks to rebuild ship and submarine readiness. While the Navy has corrective actions underway, they will take years to implement. Following ship collisions in 2017, the Navy has taken steps to ensure its crews are trained to standards prior to deployment and made significant progress in those efforts. However, the Navy has struggled to complete ship maintenance—with only 30 percent of maintenance completed on time since fiscal year 2012—leading to thousands of days that ships were unavailable for training and operations (see figure). Additionally, manning shortfalls and experience gaps continue to contribute to high sailor workload and are likely to continue through at least fiscal year 2021. The Navy has developed a plan to improve shipyards and is re-examining its ship manning, among other actions; however, these positive steps have not yet fully addressed GAO's recommendations. Looking to the future, the Navy has indicated that it wants to grow its fleet to meet demands. However, the costs of such growth are not yet known and would likely require resourcing well above currently planned levels. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited due to numerous challenges (see figure). Specifically, the seven aircraft GAO reviewed have generally experienced decreasing availability since fiscal year 2011 and did not meet availability goals in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. The F-35—the future of naval aviation—also has not met availability goals due to part shortages and poor sustainment planning. In September 2018, the Department of Defense established aggressive targets for aircraft availability. While the Navy and Marine Corps are taking actions to improve aircraft availability, including addressing GAO's recommendations, aviation readiness will take many years to recover. GAO has made a total of 45 recommendations in the prior work described in this statement. The Department of Defense concurred with most of them, and has many actions underway, but has not yet fully implemented any. Attention to these recommendations can assist the Navy and the Marine Corps as they seek to rebuild the readiness of their forces.