prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: To varying extents, Internet content providers—also called “edge providers”—and Internet service providers collect, use, and share information from their customers to enable their services, support advertising, and for other purposes  Many companies describe these and other privacy-related practices in privacy policies, to which consumers may be required to consent in order to use the service  Consumers access such services through a variety of devices, including mobile phones and tablets, computers, and other devices connected to the Internet by wired or wireless means  A nationwide survey that the U S  Census Bureau conducted for NTIA in 2017 found that 78 percent of Americans ages 3 and older used the Internet  Another nationwide survey that the Pew Research Center conducted in 2018 found that 69 percent of American adults reported that they use some kind of social media platform such as Facebook  No comprehensive federal privacy law governs the collection, use, and sale or other disclosure of personal information by private-sector companies in the United States  Rather, the federal privacy framework for private-sector companies is comprised partly of a set of tailored laws that govern the use and protection of personal information for specific purposes, in certain situations, or by certain sectors or types of entities  These laws include the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which protects the security and confidentiality of personal information collected or used to help make decisions about individuals’ eligibility for such products as credit or for insurance or employment; the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which protects nonpublic personal information that individuals provide to financial institutions or that such institutions maintain; and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act which establishes a set of national standards for the protection of certain health information  In addition, as detailed in this report, FTC addresses consumer concerns about Internet privacy using its broad authority to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices  We have reported on a variety of Internet privacy concerns in recent years that include the collection and use of data such as people’s Internet browsing histories, purchases, locations, and travel routes, including: Internet of things: In 2017, we found that as new and more devices become connected, they increase not only the opportunities for security and privacy breaches, but also the scale and scope of any resulting consequences  Vehicle data privacy: We found in 2017 that most selected automakers reported limiting their data collection, use, and sharing, but their written notices did not clearly identify data sharing and use practices  Information resellers: In a 2013 report on companies that collect and resell information on individuals, we found that no overarching federal privacy law governs the collection and sale of personal information among private-sector companies, including information resellers  We found that gaps exist in the federal privacy framework, which does not fully address changes in technology and the marketplace  Among the issues we noted were the potential need for changes to privacy controls for web tracking, mobile devices, and other technologies  We recommended that Congress consider strengthening the consumer privacy framework to reflect the effects of changes in technology and the marketplace  Such legislation has not been enacted to date  Mobile device location data: In 2012, we found that, according to privacy advocates, consumers are generally unaware of how their location data are shared with and used by third parties  We recommended that FTC consider issuing guidance establishing FTC’s views regarding mobile companies’ appropriate actions to protect location data privacy  FTC implemented that recommendation in 2013  To guide their privacy practices, many organizations and governments have used the Fair Information Practice Principles  As noted above, these principles—which are not limited to Internet privacy—address the collection and use of personal information, data quality and security, and transparency, among other things, and have served as the basis for many of the privacy recommendations federal agencies have made  The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development developed a version of these principles in 1980 that has been widely adopted and was updated in 2013  In 2000, FTC recommended that Congress enact a consumer Internet privacy statute that would require companies to comply with broad and flexible definitions of the principles, and an FTC commissioner said in a 2014 speech that they are a solid framework and are flexible and effective  While they are principles, not legal requirements, they provide a possible approach for balancing the need for privacy with other interests  Table 1 provides more detailed information about the principles  FTC is primarily a law enforcement agency that, among other responsibilities, currently has the lead in overseeing Internet privacy at the federal level  Specifically, it addresses consumer concerns about Internet privacy, both for Internet service providers and content providers, using its general authority under section 5 of the FTC Act  Section 5, as amended in 1938, prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce ” Although the FTC Act generally empowers FTC to take enforcement action, it prohibits FTC from taking action against common carriers such as telecommunication services, airlines, and railroads under certain circumstances  FTC also does not have jurisdiction over banks, credit unions, or savings and loans institutions  Even though the FTC Act does not speak in explicit terms about protecting consumer privacy, the Act authorizes such protection to the extent it involves practices FTC defines as unfair or deceptive  According to FTC, an act or practice is “unfair” if it causes, or is likely to cause, substantial injury not reasonably avoidable by consumers and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition as a result of the practice  FTC has used this “unfairness” authority to address situations where a company has allegedly failed to properly protect consumers’ data  According to FTC, a representation or omission is “deceptive” if it is material and is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances  For example, the omission of terms in an advertisement would need to be material and likely to mislead consumers in order to be deceptive  FTC applies this “deceptive” authority to address deceptions or violations of written privacy policies and representations concerning data security  FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection investigates Internet privacy complaints from various sources, including consumers, other agencies, Congress, and industry, and also initiates investigations on its own  If the bureau has reason to believe that an entity is engaging in an unfair or deceptive practice, it may forward an enforcement recommendation to the commission  The commission then determines whether to pursue an enforcement action, which can include the following: litigating commission-filed administrative complaints before an FTC administrative law judge; filing and litigating complaints in federal district court seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions, monetary redress for consumers or other equitable relief; or referring complaints seeking civil penalties for violations of rules authorizing such penalties or for violations of administrative orders to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and assisting DOJ in litigating those cases (if DOJ does not take action, FTC can pursue the action on its own)  FTC’s Internet privacy enforcement cases may be settled without the imposition of civil penalties  Instead, FTC typically enters into settlement agreements requiring companies to take actions such as: implementing reasonable privacy and security programs; being subject to long-term monitoring of compliance with the settlements by outside entities; providing monetary redress to consumers; forfeiting any money gained from the unfair or deceptive conduct; deleting illegally obtained consumer information; and providing transparency and choice mechanisms to consumers  If a company violates an FTC final consent order, the agency can then request civil monetary penalties in court for the violations  In addition, as discussed below, FTC can seek to impose civil monetary penalties directly for violations of certain privacy statutes and regulations such as the statute pertaining to the Internet privacy of children and its implementing regulations  Although FTC can levy civil penalties up to $41,484 per violation, per day, against an entity that violates a trade regulation rule under the FTC Act, it has not promulgated trade regulation rules under section 5 specific to privacy  Although FTC has not implemented its section 5 authority by issuing regulations regarding Internet privacy, it has issued regulations to implement other statutory authorities  Likewise, other federal agencies use regulations to implement the statutes they are charged with administering  The process by which federal agencies typically develop and issue regulations is spelled out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)  Section 553 of the APA establishes procedures and requirements for what is known as “informal” rulemaking, also known as notice-and- comment rulemaking  Among other things, section 553 generally requires agencies to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register  After giving interested persons an opportunity to comment on the proposal by providing “data, views, or arguments,” the statute then requires the agency to publish the final rule in the Federal Register  Regulations may be enforced in various ways, for example, by seeking civil penalties for non-compliance  FTC has authority to seek civil penalties, for example, when a company knowingly violates a regulation or, as discussed below, a final consent order  In contrast to the APA section 553 rulemaking process, the rulemaking process that FTC generally must follow to issue rules under the FTC Act is spelled out in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act amendments to the FTC Act (Magnuson-Moss)  The Magnuson-Moss amendments— enacted in 1975 partly in response to industry opposition to FTC’s trade regulations, and amended in 1980—require additional rulemaking steps beyond APA section 553  For example, Magnuson-Moss requires FTC to publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in addition to the notice of proposed rulemaking required by the APA, and to offer interested parties the opportunity for an informal hearing involving oral testimony  FTC has not promulgated any regulations using the Magnuson-Moss procedures since 1980; according to FTC staff, the additional steps required under Magnuson-Moss add time and complexity to the rulemaking process  The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), enacted in 1998, governs the online collection of personal information from children under the age of 13 by operators of websites or online services, including mobile applications  COPPA required FTC to issue and enforce regulations concerning children’s online privacy and directed FTC to promulgate these regulations using the APA section 553 notice-and- comment rulemaking process  COPPA contained a number of specific requirements that FTC was directed to implement by regulation, such as requiring websites to post a complete privacy policy, to notify parents directly about their information collection practices, and to obtain verifiable parental consent before collecting personal information from their children or sharing it with others  The commission’s original COPPA regulations became effective on April 21, 2000, and amended COPPA regulations took effect on July 1, 2013  According to an FTC staff member, COPPA and FTC’s implementing regulations reflect various principles that are similar to the Fair Information Practice Principles  FCC regulates the telecommunications industry pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Communications Act)  FCC follows the APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking process to promulgate regulations implementing the Communications Act  FCC also has an enforcement bureau that pursues violations of its regulations and the Communications Act  The Communications Act establishes separate definitions for “information services” and “telecommunications services” and treats these two types of services differently  Specifically, information services are subject to less regulation by FCC than telecommunications services under the Communications Act  However, FTC is prohibited from regulating telecommunications carriers (a provider of telecommunications services) under the common carrier exemption  Prior to 2015, Internet services were considered information services under the Communications Act, and thus FTC was not prohibited from considering the privacy practices of Internet service providers under its FTC Act authority to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices  This changed in 2015 when FCC classified broadband as a telecommunications service, which meant that broadband Internet service providers were considered telecommunications carriers and FCC asserted primary oversight over them  As a result of the reclassification, FTC no longer had jurisdiction over Internet service providers  Once FCC had asserted primary oversight over Internet service providers, FCC promulgated privacy regulations specific to them  However, before the privacy regulations went into effect, Congress repealed them under the Congressional Review Act  In December 2017, FCC reclassified broadband as an information service—reverting Internet service providers’ classification to what it had been prior to 2015  When that reclassification became effective in June 2018, jurisdiction of Internet privacy for Internet service providers was effectively transferred from FCC back to FTC  As a result, FCC currently has limited Internet privacy oversight responsibilities, as shown in figure 1  Perspectives on the benefits of and concerns about the collection and use of consumers’ data from the Internet varied somewhat across stakeholder groups  Various stakeholders we interviewed—including those from academia, industry, and government—said that there should be a balance between the freedom of companies to collect and use consumers’ data needed to provide services and the necessity to protect consumers’ privacy  In general, industry stakeholders highlighted the benefits of data collection and use, such as facilitating innovation, while consumer advocacy groups and other stakeholders emphasized concerns about consumers’ loss of control over their data and their lack of understanding of how companies collect and use their information  Additionally, surveys and other literature that we reviewed on Internet privacy highlighted concerns among consumers  The key benefits of information collection were identified as: Enables certain services  According to two industry stakeholders, the collection and use of consumer data from the Internet enable content providers to provide services  These stakeholders said that sometimes a content provider must collect and use information from consumers to provide the service  For example, a mapping service must collect and use consumers’ current location to provide them with up-to-date directions  Provides low-cost or free services  A representative from a content provider said that revenue from targeted advertising helps allow some content providers’ services to be offered to consumers at little or no charge  Instead of charging a subscription fee, a social media company may be able to provide free service because it uses information that it collects from consumers to target advertisements to users on a customized, user-by-user basis  These ads are targeted to users based on interests they express through their use of social media, among other things  According to a representative from an Internet search engine, using consumer data for targeted advertising may be relatively less important for some kinds of content providers, such as search engines  This company representative said that search engines may use keywords entered for a particular Internet search to provide advertisements relevant to the search  For example, a search for “car insurance” can offer the consumer advertisements from car insurance companies without any additional data from the consumer other than the search’s keywords  Supports innovation and customization  According to some stakeholders, the collection and use of data also benefit consumers through other means such as providing innovative products or customized services  According to a representative from a content provider, the collection of personal information, with consent, for commercial purposes can at times have benefits  The representative said, for example, that collection of images containing identifiable information, like faces, can help in the development of new technologies such as object and facial recognition  According to two content providers, consumers may also benefit from customized services and content  For example, according to a representative from a travel-related company, that company can collect information about a consumer to suggest travel itineraries and suggestions for activities  Additionally, representatives from a consumer advocacy group and a content provider stated that direct-marketing approaches are enabled through data collection  Such marketing approaches allow consumers to receive advertisements that are uniquely tailored to their interests  For example, a consumer that a content provider has identified as being a hiker may receive advertisements for hiking boots  Despite these benefits, public opinion surveys have shown concerns about the collection and use of consumers’ information on the Internet  For instance, recent analyses based on surveys by the Pew Research Center and NTIA showed that the public lacks trust in Internet privacy, a concern that may limit economic activities  NTIA’s survey results show that privacy concerns may lead to lower levels of economic productivity as people decline to make financial transactions on the Internet  According to the NTIA analysis, in 2017, 24 percent of American households surveyed avoided making financial transactions on the Internet due to privacy or security concerns  Consumers NTIA surveyed indicated that their specific concerns were identity theft, credit card or banking fraud, data collection by online services, loss of control over personal information, data collection by government, and threats to personal safety  Stakeholders we interviewed elaborated on some of these concerns: Public disclosure and data breaches  Some stakeholders, including representatives from content providers, said that personal information from the Internet can be publicly disclosed, including through data breaches  An academic and a former FCC commissioner told us that such disclosures are becoming more frequent  Various consumer advocacy groups and state governments continue to report data breaches  This personal information can include financial information such as credit card information, the disclosure of which can result in financial harm to the consumer  It can also include other kinds of sensitive information such as political views or medical conditions, the disclosure of which can cause non-financial harms such as embarrassment or harassment  According to public reports, the 2017 breach of consumer information from Equifax, a credit-reporting agency, resulted in the disclosure of 143 million American consumers’ sensitive information  According to NTIA’s 2017 survey, 45 percent of households surveyed reported major concerns about credit card fraud  Regarding non-financial information, in a recent case FTC alleged that an Internet-based company publicly disclosed patients’ sensitive medical information without their knowledge after patients submitted what they thought were confidential reviews of physicians  According to FTC, these reviews were then publicly posted on the company’s website  Financial and other harms  Stakeholders identified both potential financial and non-financial harms associated with misuse of personal information from the Internet  A former FTC acting chair has said that privacy and data-security incidents can cause injuries that do not only involve financial loss and that it may be difficult to measure this type of non-financial injury  In a February 2018 speech, this former acting FTC chair cited a case that the agency filed involving the misuse of personal information from the Internet that resulted in people losing jobs or job opportunities or being threatened, stalked, and harassed  The acting chair said that in another case, there was evidence that several people committed suicide after their names and other data were disclosed  The commission can, by bringing suit in district court, obtain an order compelling content providers to provide monetary relief to consumers if a data disclosure results in financial harm to a consumer  However, an academic noted that many data disclosures of sensitive information cannot be financially redressed; information can indefinitely persist on the Internet once it is disclosed  Consumers’ lack of understanding  A range of stakeholders we interviewed, including those from industry, said that consumers lack an understanding of how their data are collected and used  Some stakeholders said content providers are insufficiently transparent about how they collect and use data  For instance, content providers’ privacy policies, according to various stakeholders, may contain technical language that is difficult for typical consumers to understand, may be located in a difficult-to-access or inconspicuous part of the content provider’s website, or may be lengthy to the point where it becomes prohibitively difficult for a consumer to set aside enough time to read  Furthermore, according to an academic, companies may have an incentive to intentionally obscure their privacy practices, since clarity could put the companies at a competitive disadvantage  The academic also stated that different privacy policies may apply to different parts of a consumer’s experience on a single website  For example, the academic described how a website may have contracts with third-party vendors for specific services included on the website that consumers use, such as an online shopping cart’s features  The privacy policy for the website and the third-party shopping cart can be separate and unrelated to each other, and consumers may not be aware of this since these policies may never appear to consumers or be hard to obtain  A representative from a consumer advocacy group also mentioned that consumers may be unaware that companies track consumers’ Internet activity in order to target those consumers with customized prices  An academic said that these practices may disproportionately affect people with low computer literacy, as they may not be aware of tracking or know of ways to counteract it  In 2015, we found that the lack of computer and Internet skills is one of the primary barriers people face in using the Internet and that this is a particular problem for certain demographic segments who may lack exposure to or knowledge about computers, such as those of age 65 and older and those with low levels of income and education  Consumer lack of control  Some academics and consumer advocacy groups also identified a lack of control as a concern with respect to Internet privacy—consumers have little or no control over how their information is collected, used, and shared  In a 2015 survey conducted by Pew Research Center, 65 percent of respondents said it is very important to be in control of what information is collected about them  However, according to an academic and a consumer advocacy group we interviewed, privacy policies offer consumers little or no bargaining power, and consumers may be forced to either accept the terms of the policy as written or not use the application or service at all  Furthermore, we recently reported that sometimes consumers’ information is used for purposes that are altogether separate from what those consumers originally anticipated  For example, FTC alleged in an enforcement action that in 2009 and 2010, a company told consumers that it would track the websites they visited in order to provide them with personalized offers, when in fact the company was also transmitting credit card information it collected through such tracking to third parties  The company settled with FTC  We also recently reported on how devices that comprise the Internet of Things pose privacy concerns for consumers, including that information collected by such Internet-connected devices can be used in ways to which the consumer was not given the option to opt out  As discussed above, stakeholders described various types of harm that could result from Internet privacy violations  Regardless of whether violations involve financial or other types of harm, a challenging factor in providing Internet privacy oversight is identifying the responsible parties  A former federal government official with experience in privacy issues said that it frequently is difficult to identify which Internet entity in the chain is ultimately responsible for a privacy-related harm  For example, if a consumer is harmed by the theft of his or her Social Security number, it can be difficult to determine which entity is responsible if multiple entities have suffered data breaches of information systems that contained the Social Security number  In addition to the challenges in identifying responsible parties, the federal government has faced challenges in providing Internet privacy oversight  Our prior work has found that such efforts lack clearly defined roles, goals and performance measures, and that gaps exist in the current privacy framework  We found that during the last decade, FTC filed 101 Internet privacy enforcement actions for practices that the agency alleged were unfair, deceptive, a violation of COPPA, a violation of a settlement agreement, or a combination of those reasons  Most of these actions pertained to first-time violations of the FTC Act for which FTC does not have the authority to levy civil penalties  In those cases where a party violated an FTC regulation or settlement agreement, however, FTC does have the authority to impose civil penalties  The 101 cases—filed between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2018—involved a variety of products, services, and industries that collect and use personal information from the Internet  During the years for which we examined full-year data, the number of enforcement actions taken per year ranged from 5 in 2010 and 2016 to 23 in 2015  For example, in recent years, FTC took enforcement action against the following entities for alleged conduct that the agency contended violated section 5 or COPPA: a toy manufacturer for collecting personal information from children online without providing direct notice and obtaining their parents’ consent; a computer manufacturer for pre-loading laptops with software that compromised security protections in order to deliver ads to consumers; a mobile ride-hailing business for misrepresenting the extent to which it monitored its employees’ access to personal information about users; a television manufacturer for installing software on its televisions to collect viewing data on 11 million consumers without their knowledge or consent and providing the viewing data to third parties; and a mobile advertising network for deceptively tracking the locations of hundreds of millions of consumers, including children, without their knowledge or consent, to serve them geographically targeted advertising  Of the 101 actions filed during the 10-year period, 51 involved Internet content providers, 21 involved software developers, 12 involved the sale of information or its use in advertising, 5 involved manufacturers, 1 involved an Internet service provider, and 11 involved a variety of different products, such as those provided by rent-to-own companies or certification services  In nearly all 101 cases, companies settled with FTC, which required the companies to make changes in their policies or practices as part of the settlement  FTC levied civil penalties against two of those companies for violating their settlement agreements  Also during this 10-year period, FTC levied civil penalties against 15 companies (a total of $12 7 million) for alleged violations of the COPPA regulations  The COPPA civil penalties ranged from $50,000 to $4 million and the average amount was $847,333  FTC can also seek to compel companies to provide monetary relief to those they have harmed  During this time period, FTC levied civil penalties against companies for violations of consent decrees or ordered monetary relief to consumers from companies for a total of $136 1 million  These payment orders ranged from $200,000 to $104 5 million and the average amount was $17 million  In the majority of these 101 enforcement actions that FTC settled, FTC alleged that companies engaged in practices that were deceptive  Examples of the charges FTC brought include: “Deceptive practices” cases (61 cases): In 2016, FTC alleged that Turn, Inc , an Internet advertising company, continued to track the Internet activities of consumers for targeted advertising purposes after the company had made representations that it would stop doing so  According to FTC, the company led consumers to believe they could turn off such tracking when in fact they were unable to do so  “Unfair practices” cases (4 cases): In 2014, FTC alleged that LeapLab, a data broker, knowingly provided scammers with hundreds of thousands of consumers’ sensitive personal information, including Social Security and bank account numbers  “Unfair and deceptive” practices cases (19 cases): In 2015, FTC alleged that Equiliv Investments, a software developer, lured consumers into downloading its “rewards” application, saying it would be free of malware, when the application’s main purpose was actually to load the consumers’ mobile phones with malicious software to mine virtual currencies for the developer  COPPA and COPPA regulations cases (6 cases): In 2011, FTC alleged that Broken Thumbs Apps, a software developer, had collected information from Internet applications that the developer specifically targeted toward children under the age of 13  FTC’s complaint stated that the company had, among other things, failed to provide notice of what information it collected and how it was used and also had failed to inform parents of these practices and receive their consent as COPPA required  Violation of settlement agreement cases (2 cases): In 2012, Google agreed to pay a $22 5 million civil penalty to settle FTC charges that it misrepresented to users of Apple’s Safari Internet browser that Google would not place tracking cookies or provide targeted ads to those users, violating an earlier settlement agreement between the company and FTC  In 14 of the 101 cases, FTC required companies to be audited by outside entities to monitor compliance with the terms of the settlement  The audit period ranged from 5 years to 20 years, with an average of 17 5 years  As noted above, 2 of the 101 cases involved a violation of FTC settlement agreements  In addition, in March 2018, FTC announced that it is investigating whether Facebook’s privacy practices violate a 2012 Facebook settlement agreement with FTC  In the case that resulted in the 2012 settlement, FTC charged Facebook with deceiving consumers by telling them they could keep their information private, but then allowing it to be shared and made public  Appendix II contains more detailed information about the 101 cases  As stated earlier, in 2015, FCC classified broadband Internet service as a telecommunications service, placing primary oversight of broadband Internet service providers’ privacy practices under FCC’s jurisdiction instead of FTC’s jurisdiction  In 2016, FCC filed a privacy enforcement action against a mobile Internet service provider, alleging, in part, violation of section 222 of the Communications Act and FCC’s Open Internet Transparency Rule  Section 222 requires telecommunications carriers to protect the confidentiality of customers’ proprietary information  In that case, FCC fined Verizon Wireless $1 4 million for failing to disclose that it was inserting “unique identifier headers,” also called “perma- cookies” or “super cookies” (mobile web tracking cookies that users cannot remove), into customers’ Internet traffic over its wireless network  Although the settlement was finalized during the 2015-2017 period when FCC had asserted jurisdiction over the privacy practices of Internet providers, the Verizon Wireless practices occurred prior to the classification of Internet service providers as telecommunications carriers  The investigation therefore did not rely upon FCC’s subsequent assertion of authority over Internet service providers’ privacy practices  In October 2016, after FCC had reclassified broadband as a telecommunications service, the commission issued Internet service provider privacy regulations, asserting its authority under section 222 of the Communications Act  In April 2017, however, Congress repealed these regulations under the Congressional Review Act before they took effect  In December 2017, FCC then reversed its 2015 classification of broadband, and oversight of broadband Internet service providers’ privacy practices reverted to FTC once the decision took effect in June 2018  In explaining the December 2017 decision, FCC’s new chair said that FTC’s privacy oversight approach regarding Internet service providers—using its authority to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive, and anti- competitive practices—had worked well in the past and that this action would “put the nation’s most experienced privacy cop back on the beat ” Under FCC’s new legal approach, it no longer asserts jurisdiction to take enforcement action against Internet service providers for privacy-related matters, including mobile Internet service providers


Report 2:  As part of FTC’s resumption of Internet service provider oversight, FCC and FTC entered into a memorandum of understanding in December 2017 spelling out their roles and responsibilities regarding oversight of these companies  FTC staff said that they regularly communicate with FCC and have an agreement to share Internet privacy complaints  As previously discussed, no federal statute comprehensively and specifically governs Internet privacy across all sectors  FTC oversees some aspects of Internet privacy by using its FTC Act section 5 authority to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices  FTC also uses its specific COPPA authority to police the collection and use of personal information from children by online services  Some industry representatives said that FTC’s enforcement has been effective because the agency has expertise and experience in privacy issues and has the flexibility to take enforcement action on a case-by-case basis  In addition, a content provider said that FTC has taken enforcement actions against companies of various sizes in different sectors and has a powerful tool by being able to require companies to be audited by outside entities for up to 20 years  Industry stakeholders we interviewed generally said that “direct enforcement” of a statute is preferable to promulgating and enforcing regulations implementing that statute (which constitutes enforcement of the statute as well)  These stakeholders noted several key concerns they believe exist with regulatory versus statutory enforcement of Internet privacy: Regulations can stifle innovation  Two industry stakeholders said that regulations can hinder companies’ ability to innovate  For example, representatives from an Internet service provider said that innovation can stop during the rulemaking process as the industry waits for the regulation to be finalized  Regulations may create loopholes  Representatives from an Internet industry group and a content provider said that regulations can also contain loopholes that can be legally exploited because imprecise language in a regulation may allow a company to legally engage in an action that was originally unforeseen by the regulator  Regulations can become obsolete  Several industry stakeholders said regulations also may become obsolete quickly because the Internet industry is rapidly changing  An Internet industry representative noted that there can be large shifts in the Internet industry from year to year, while it often takes an agency much longer than a year to adopt a rule  Industry stakeholders said the flexibility of FTC’s approach allows FTC to adapt continuously to changing market conditions  Rulemakings can be lengthy  FCC officials said that in some cases, rulemakings can take a long time, especially when the issues are complex and there is no statutory deadline  Our previous work on rulemaking found that length of time required for the development and issuance of final rules varied both within and among agencies  Additionally, while some stakeholders suggested that regulations can clarify acceptable practices, other stakeholders, including from industry and academia, said that enforcement actions can send a similar message  According to both a representative from a content provider and an academic, enforcement actions such as settlement agreements, for example, establish precedents that companies can follow, similar to the way that case law developed by courts provides guidance for companies  Although some industry representatives we interviewed said that FTC’s use of settlement agreements provides companies with guidance, certain trade associations took a different position in a recent case brought before the U S  Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, FTC v  Wyndham Worldwide Corp  799 F 3d 236 (3d Cir  2015)  However, the court did not agree with the associations’ arguments  The case involved an enforcement action against Wyndham Worldwide Corporation where FTC alleged that data security failures led to three data breaches at the company in less than 2 years  The court considered whether FTC could bring an enforcement case involving cybersecurity using FTC’s section 5 “unfair practices” authority and, if so, whether Wyndham had “fair notice” that its specific cybersecurity practices could be deemed “unfair ” A group of companies and the U S  Chamber of Commerce wrote a friend- of-the-court brief supporting Wyndham, criticizing FTC’s “regulation- through-settlements” approach  The companies argued this approach subjects businesses to “vague, unknowable, and constantly changing data-security standards” and businesses often are unaware of the standards to which they are held until after they receive a notice of investigation from FTC, at which point they must settle or expend considerable resources fighting the agency  Potential Limits on Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Remedies A recently decided federal appeals court case illustrates potential limits on the remedies that FTC can order in an “unfair practices” enforcement proceeding  In this 2018 case, LabMD, Inc  v  FTC, 891 F 3d 1286 (11th Cir  2018), the U S  Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that FTC could not direct a medical laboratory to create and implement wholesale data-security protective measures as a remedy to the laboratory’s alleged unfair practices  FTC had filed a complaint against LabMD under section 5 of the FTC Act for allegedly committing an unfair act or practice by failing to provide reasonable and appropriate security for personal information on its computer networks  The commission found that LabMD’s inadequate security constituted an unfair act or practice and ordered LabMD to take various actions, including establishing and maintaining a reasonable and comprehensive information security program  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that FTC’s order exceeded its authority because it did not prohibit a specific act or practice but instead, mandated a complete overhaul of the company’s data-security program  FTC had argued that the FTC Act gives it broad discretion to prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices that injure the general public and that FTC had spelled out standards for LabMD to craft a reasonable security program  The court ruled, however, that such a general approach would make it difficult for a reviewing court to determine if LabMD had complied with the order, in the event of a future FTC challenge  company can reasonably foresee that a court could construe its conduct as falling within the meaning of the statute ” A majority of non-industry stakeholders we interviewed identified limitations in the current Internet privacy oversight approach because they view regulations in conjunction with enforcement as being more effective  These stakeholders include all of the former FTC commissioners we interviewed, three of the four former FCC commissioners we interviewed, and representatives from consumer advocacy groups we interviewed  In addition, a former FCC commissioner said that the current Internet privacy oversight approach is limited in part because he viewed regulations applying equally to all players in the Internet ecosystem in conjunction with enforcement as being more effective  A representative from a consumer advocacy group also said that regulations in conjunction with enforcement are essential for effective privacy protection  Some of these stakeholders noted key ways that they believe Internet privacy regulations can provide clarity to industry and consumers, as well as fairness and flexibility in enforcement: Regulations can provide clarity  An Internet industry group representative said that various companies have favorable views of regulations because they can provide clear expectations about what actions are permissible  Similarly, a former congressional staff member with expertise on privacy issues said that some companies have favorable views of regulations because the regulations often provide clearer expectations about what the companies can do  FCC officials said that with respect to telephone privacy provisions of the Communications Act, the telephone industry wanted rules because it sought greater clarity about what it should be doing, what constituted a violation, how to comply, and what behaviors were acceptable  Regulations may promote fairness  Some other stakeholders discussed the ability of regulations to provide fairness  For example, a former federal enforcement official described regulations as creating a fair and consistent oversight regime across the entire industry in a way that case-by-case enforcement actions do not  Another former federal enforcement official said that regulations give companies fair notice of what actions may be violations and thus help those companies avoid surprising or unexpected enforcement  Regulations can be flexible  An academic said that by targeting behaviors and not specific technologies, regulations can be written in such a way that they do not become obsolete  An academic also said that regulations based on broad performance-standards principles can avoid being overly prescriptive  FCC officials also noted that regulations can be amended to adapt to changes in technology often faster than new laws can be enacted  Furthermore, regulations determined to be obsolete can be repealed  FTC staff told us that the agency systematically reviews all of its regulations every 10 years, even though it is only legally required to review its most significant ones, and that the number of FTC regulations has decreased because the agency determined prior ones were obsolete  The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires federal agencies to analyze the effect of their regulations on small entities  Regulations can be a deterrent  FCC officials said that rules can have a deterrent effect on bad practices in the industry or have a role in mitigating the negative effects of bad practices after they occur  They said, for example, that the practice of pretexting (improperly obtaining people’s telephone records) was greatly curtailed by an FCC regulation prohibiting such practices  They also said that rules can foreclose arguments by companies claiming that because no rule was in place, they had no reasonable notice or awareness that they should behave in a particular way  Consumer advocacy groups and other stakeholders, including some former FTC and FCC commissioners, had concerns about the efficacy of an enforcement approach such as FTC’s approach to Internet privacy oversight, which focuses on enforcing a statute rather than implementing regulations  They said that FTC’s enforcement approach limits the ability of the agency to affect companies’ behavior, and that any enforcement activity occurs after the violation, undesirable behavior, harm, or illegal action has already occurred  A former federal enforcement official also said that regulations can prevent companies from engaging in bad practices in the first instance and thus have a preventive effect  A former FCC commissioner said that by the nature of a direct statutory- enforcement approach (as opposed to rulemaking), an agency would only address a harm after it has occurred  As discussed above, for example, data often cannot be removed from the Internet because copies of the data can exist among many bad actors, and it can be difficult to identify the entity responsible for unwanted disclosures  Therefore, it may be more important to avoid such Internet privacy harms from occurring in the first place  Another former FCC commissioner told us that Internet privacy oversight should be returned to FCC because it has APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking authority and considerable enforcement experience  Representatives from consumer advocacy groups said that FTC’s enforcement action has been insufficient because it investigates only a small portion of actual Internet-privacy violations or takes action regarding only the most egregious or outrageous cases that it can win  FTC has also stated in its strategic plan that it focuses on investigating and litigating cases that cause or are likely to cause substantial injury to consumers and that by focusing on practices that are actually harming or likely to harm consumers, FTC can best use its limited resources  Representatives from an Internet association said that FTC’s Internet- privacy enforcement actions should focus on concrete harms  An FTC staff member from the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection said that the agency has been effective with the limited enforcement resources it has available  Furthermore, the staff member said the agency uses no formal written criteria or template to assess individual cases but considers the size and scale of a company’s effect on consumer privacy when deciding whether to take enforcement action  However, a former FTC commissioner told us that the agency needs more resources to effectively oversee Internet privacy  We asked stakeholders whether it was clear under what circumstances FTC will take Internet privacy enforcement action  In response, some stakeholders said that FTC’s enforcement priorities are reflected in its settlement agreements, which provide information that is similar to a body of case law  Individual commissioners also may issue statements explaining their decisions  Two stakeholders also said that FTC’s closing letters, which the agency sends to companies and posts on its website when it closes an investigation without taking enforcement action, may explain its decisions  Other stakeholders said that more guidance would be helpful to provide additional clarity on how the agency uses its Internet privacy enforcement authority  FTC staff and other stakeholders also said that FTC has provided useful Internet privacy guidance  For example, in 2015, FTC published guidance for businesses on complying with COPPA  Various stakeholders we interviewed said that opportunities exist for enhancing Internet privacy oversight  A key component of FTC’s mission, as specified by the FTC Act, is to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive practices  As discussed earlier, some stakeholders believe that FTC’s reliance on its unfair and deceptive practices authority to address Internet privacy issues has limitations  In addition, although the Fair Information Practice Principles provide internationally recognized principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal information, they are not legal requirements and FTC cannot rely on them to define what constitutes unfair and deceptive practices related to privacy and data security  We stated in our 2013 information resellers report that the current U S  privacy framework is not always aligned with the Fair Information Practice Principles and that these principles provide a framework for balancing the need for privacy with other interests  We found that there are limited privacy protections under federal law for consumer data used for marketing purposes  We said that although the Fair Information Practice Principles call for restraint in the collection and use of personal information, the scope of protections provided under current law has been narrow in relation to: (1) individuals’ ability to access, control, and correct their personal data; (2) collection methods and sources and types of consumer information collected; and (3) new technologies, such as tracking of web activity and the use of mobile devices  Although we recommended in that report that Congress consider strengthening the consumer privacy framework to reflect the effects of changes in technology and the marketplace, this matter for congressional consideration was not specific to Internet privacy or to the oversight authorities of any particular agency or agencies  As noted above, various stakeholders expressed concern about the ability of consumers to control their data and understand how that data are used  These concerns suggest that companies are not always following the Fair Information Practice Principles, such as that companies’ data practices should be transparent, allow consumers the right to access and edit their data, and limit the collection of data to the extent feasible  Those stakeholders who believe that FTC’s current authority and enforcement approach is unduly limited identified three main actions that could better protect Internet privacy: (1) enactment of an overarching federal privacy statute to establish general requirements governing Internet privacy practices of all sectors; (2) APA section 553 notice-and- comment rulemaking authority; and (3) civil penalty authority for any violation of a statutory or regulatory requirement, rather than allowing penalties only for violations of settlement agreements or consent decrees that themselves seek redress for a statutory or regulatory violation  Stakeholders from a variety of perspectives—including from academia, industry, consumer advocacy groups, and former FTC and FCC commissioners—told us that a privacy statute could enhance Internet privacy oversight by, for example, clearly articulating to consumers, industry, and privacy enforcers what behaviors are prohibited, among other things  In addition, a former FCC commissioner said that a new privacy statute could enhance Internet privacy oversight by creating uniform standards for all players in the Internet ecosystem that is focused on the consumer rather than the regulatory legacy of the companies involved (regulations that apply to specific types of companies based on what they are or used to be, such as telecommunications carriers, cable companies, broadcasters, and mobile wireless providers)  The former FCC commissioner said that as companies, technologies, and markets change, there is a question about whether existing law should be modernized  In 2015, FTC staff recommended that Congress enact broad-based legislation that is flexible and technology-neutral, while also providing clear rules of the road for companies about such issues as how to provide choices to consumers about data collection and use practices  Some stakeholders suggested that such a framework could either designate an existing agency as responsible for privacy oversight (such as FTC) or create a new privacy-oriented agency  A representative from a consumer advocacy group mentioned that the European Union, for example, has established the European Data Protection Supervisor, an independent data protection authority, to monitor and ensure the protection of personal data and privacy  Similarly, in Canada, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, an independent body that reports directly to the Parliament, was established to protect and promote individuals’ privacy rights  Some stakeholders also stated that the absence of a comprehensive Internet privacy statute affects FTC’s enforcement  For example, a former federal enforcement official said that FTC is limited in how it can use its authority to take action against companies’ unfair and deceptive trade practices for problematic Internet privacy practices  Similarly, another former federal enforcement official said that FTC is limited in how and against whom it can use its unfair and deceptive practices authority noting, for example, that it cannot pursue Internet privacy enforcement over exempted industries such as common carriers  In addition, a former FCC commissioner said that it is more difficult for FTC to take effective action because its enforcement comes only after a complaint and after an often lengthy review process  The former FCC commissioner also said that without “ex ante” rules (rules that define prohibited activity before it has occurred), there inevitably will be delay, confusion, and lack of knowledge about what is and is not acceptable behavior  In addition, some stakeholders—including a representative from a consumer group, a former federal enforcement official, and a former FCC commissioner—said FTC’s section 5 “unfair or deceptive practices” authority may not enable it to fully protect consumers’ Internet privacy because it can be difficult for FTC to establish that Internet privacy practices are legally “unfair ” For example, under section 5, FTC has charged companies with committing a “deceptive” practice if their privacy policies said they would not collect or use consumers’ personal information but then did so  However, a former congressional staff member said that companies often write broad and vague policy statements, making it difficult for FTC to charge companies with committing deceptive practices  Instead, according to a representative from a consumer advocacy group, FTC would have to show the companies’ actions were “unfair,” which, according to the representative, is legally difficult to establish  We found in our 2017 report on vehicle data privacy that most automakers’ written privacy notices used vague language  Similarly, we found in our 2012 report on mobile device location data that although companies’ policies stated that they shared location data with third parties, they were sometimes vague about which types of companies these were and why they were sharing the data  Some stakeholders said that FTC relies more heavily on its authority to take enforcement action against deceptive trade practices compared with the agency’s unfair trade practices authority  This was confirmed in our analysis of FTC’s Internet privacy enforcement actions discussed previously  However, a representative from a consumer advocacy group said that FTC’s ability to take such action is limited practically to instances where a company violates its own privacy policy—companies generally can collect and use data in any way they want if they include language in their policies asserting their intent to do so  According to a former FCC commissioner, a privacy statute could clarify the situations in which FTC could take enforcement action  Various stakeholders said that there are advantages to overseeing Internet privacy with a statute that provides APA section 553 notice-and- comment rulemaking authority  As discussed above, that provision lays out the basic process by which so-called informal agency rulemaking shall be conducted, namely, publication of proposed regulations in the Federal Register; an opportunity for public comment (written and possibly oral submission of data and views); and publication of final regulations in the Federal Register with an explanation of the rules’ basis and purpose  Also as noted above, Congress imposed additional rulemaking steps on FTC in the Magnuson-Moss Act when FTC is promulgating rules under section 5 of the FTC Act  These additional steps include providing the public and certain congressional committees with advance notice of proposed rulemaking (in addition to notice of proposed rulemaking)  FTC’s rulemaking under Magnuson-Moss also calls for, among other things, oral hearings, if requested, presided over by an independent hearing officer, and preparation of a staff report after the conclusion of public hearings, giving the public the opportunity to comment on the report  Finally, Congress made it easier for the public to appeal FTC’s Magnuson-Moss rules by making the agency meet a higher standard when the rules are challenged in court  FTC staff said that these additional steps add time and complexity to the rulemaking process  In congressional testimony in 2010, the then-Director of FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection said that “if Congress enacts privacy legislation, the commission agrees that such legislation should provide APA rulemaking authority to the commission ” According to FTC, this testimony was voted on and approved by the commissioners and, therefore, constituted the commission’s official position at the time  Moreover, according to stakeholders, in many cases regulations can be used to implement statutes  Officials from other consumer and worker protection agencies we interviewed described their enforcement authorities and approaches  For example, officials from the CFPB and the FDA, both of which use APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking, said that their rulemaking authority assists in their oversight approaches and works together with enforcement actions  OSHA officials said that the standards that the agency promulgates under its authority specify what employers are required to do to reduce safety and health risks to workers  Such standards lay out the workplace conditions that must be maintained by employers and require that employers implement certain practices, operations, or processes that ensure worker protections  EEOC officials said that regulations are used to guide investigations that establish whether enforcement action is appropriate  CPSC officials said that the agency conducts consumer protection not only by establishing and enforcing mandatory regulations, but also through collaborative actions such as educating industry, developing consensus voluntary safety standards, removing defective products from the marketplace through voluntary corrective actions, and litigating when necessary  In addition, in contrast to FTC’s approach, FCC has APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking authority and has issued regulations implementing section 222 of the Communications Act using that rulemaking authority to protect the privacy of telephone users  Some stakeholders suggested that FTC’s current ability to levy civil penalties could also be enhanced  Currently, FTC can levy civil penalties against companies for violating certain regulations, such as COPPA regulations, or if the company violates the terms of a settlement agreement already in place  According to most former FTC commissioners and some other stakeholders we interviewed, FTC should be able to levy fines for initial violations of section 5 of the FTC Act  An academic told us that the power of an agency to levy a fine is a tangible way to hold industries accountable  Another academic noted, however, that fines may be relatively less effective in industries where there is limited competition because the costs of those fines may be more effectively passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for services  In addition, some stakeholders said that payments required by FTC orders are not large enough to act as a deterrent and that companies may consider them to be a cost of doing business  There is a growing debate about the federal government’s role in overseeing Internet privacy  In a July 2018 congressional hearing, FTC’s new chair testified that the FTC Act cannot address all privacy and data- security concerns in the marketplace  The chair said, for example, that FTC’s lack of civil penalty authority for violations of the FTC Act reduces its deterrent capability  He also noted the agency lacks authority over non-profits and over common carrier activity, even though those entities and activities often have serious implications for consumer privacy and data security  In November 2018, FTC’s chair testified before Congress and urged Congress to consider enacting privacy legislation that would be enforced by FTC  A majority of the commission has indicated support for APA rulemaking and civil penalty authority for privacy  FTC also held hearings in September, November, and December 2018 to advance the discussion around privacy issues, among other topics, and FTC plans to hold an additional hearing on data security and consumer privacy in February 2019  In a Federal Register notice, FTC announced that it is interested in the benefits and costs of various state, federal and international privacy laws and regulations, including the potential conflicts among those standards  FTC also indicated that it is particularly interested in the efficacy of the commission’s use of its current authority and the identification of any additional tools or authorities the commission may need to adequately deter unfair and deceptive conduct related to privacy and data security  Also in July 2018, an NTIA official announced that NTIA, in coordination with the Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration and National Institute of Standards and Technology, had recently started holding stakeholder meetings to identify common ground and formulate core, high-level principles on data privacy  Regarding the development of the Administration’s approach to consumer privacy, in September 2018, NTIA requested comments on ways to advance consumer privacy while protecting prosperity and innovation  Our 2009 report on a framework for assessing proposals for modernizing the financial regulatory system similarly found that regulators should have the authority to carry out and enforce their statutory missions  We further said that a regulatory system should be flexible and forward looking, allowing regulators to readily adapt to market innovations and changes, including identifying and acting on emerging risks in a timely way without hindering innovation  These factors are useful considerations as the federal government explores how it can better oversee privacy and data security  Having sufficient and appropriate authorities and providing flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment could better ensure that the federal government can protect consumers’ privacy  Recent developments regarding Internet privacy suggest that this is an appropriate time for Congress to consider comprehensive Internet privacy legislation  Although FTC has been addressing Internet privacy through its unfair and deceptive practices authority, among other statutes, and other agencies have been addressing this issue using industry-specific statutes, there is no comprehensive federal privacy statute with specific standards  Debate over such a statute could provide a vehicle for consideration of the Fair Information Practice Principles, which are intended to balance privacy concerns with the need for using consumers’ data  Such a law could also empower a specific agency or agencies to provide oversight through means such as APA section 553 rulemaking, civil penalties for first time violations of a statute, and other enforcement tools  Comprehensive legislation addressing Internet privacy that establishes specific standards and includes APA notice-and-comment rulemaking and first-time violation civil penalty authorities could help enhance the federal government’s ability to protect consumer privacy, provide more certainty in the marketplace as companies innovate and develop new products using consumer data, and provide better assurance to consumers that their privacy will be protected  Congress should consider developing comprehensive legislation on Internet privacy that would enhance consumer protections and provide flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment  Issues that should be considered include: which agency or agencies should oversee Internet privacy; what authorities an agency or agencies should have to oversee Internet privacy, including notice-and-comment rulemaking authority and first-time violation civil penalty authority; and how to balance consumers’ need for Internet privacy with industry’s ability to provide services and innovate  We provided a draft of this report to FTC, FCC, and the Department of Commerce for their review and comment  FTC and FCC provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  The Department of Commerce indicated that it did not have comments  As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the FTC chair, the FCC chair, the Secretary of Commerce, and interested congressional committees  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or members of your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Alicia Puente Cackley at (202) 512-8678 or cackleya@gao gov or Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III  For this review, we interviewed staff from agencies with roles in Internet privacy; officials from other consumer- and worker-protection agencies; stakeholders from consumer advocacy groups, industry groups, Internet service providers, and Internet content providers; academics; and former government officials  To obtain a variety of perspectives, we selected Internet service providers that represented different industry sectors and Internet content providers that provide a variety of information and social media services  Academic stakeholders were selected because of their expertise in privacy, consumer protection, and regulatory issues  We also interviewed former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) commissioners who served during the Barack Obama and George W  Bush administrations and are from different political parties  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) The following table identifies 101 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Internet privacy enforcement actions filed between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2018 in which the agency alleged a violation of either the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) or the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) and implementing COPPA regulations and subsequently entered into a settlement agreement with the target entity  Although some of these cases may involve both Internet data privacy and security issues, this table does not include cases that involved data security issues only  In addition to the contact names above, Andrew Huddleston, Assistant Director; Kay Kuhlman, Assistant Director; Bob Homan, Analyst-in- Charge; Melissa Bodeau; John de Ferrari; Camilo Flores; Erica Miles; Josh Ormond; and Sean Standley made significant contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The federal government pays benefits to coal miners affected by coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP, commonly referred to as black lung disease) and other lung diseases linked to coal mining in cases where responsible mine operators are not able to pay. In 2019, the monthly benefit for a miner with no dependents is $660.10. Benefits can be as much as $1,320.10 per month for miners with three or more dependents. Medical benefits are provided separately from disability benefits. Benefit payments and related administrative expenses in cases in which the responsible operators do not pay are paid out of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. The primary source of revenue for the trust fund is an excise tax on coal produced and sold domestically. If excise tax revenue is not sufficient to finance Black Lung Program benefits, the trust fund may borrow from the general fund of the Treasury. For 2018, the tax rates on coal were $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 4.4% of the sales price. These rates were established in 1986. Starting in 2019, under current law, these tax rates are $0.50 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.25 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 2% of the sales price. These are the rates that were set when the trust fund was established in 1977. The decline in the excise tax rates will likely put additional financial strain on a trust fund that already borrows from the general fund to meet obligations. The decline in domestic coal production, recent increases in the rate of CWP, and bankruptcies in the coal sector also contribute to the financial strain on the trust fund. The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund and associated excise tax on coal were established so that the coal industry, as opposed to taxpayers in general, would bear the burden associated with providing black lung benefits. Throughout its history, the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund has not raised revenues sufficient to meet obligations. As a result, at various points in time, Congress and the President have acted to increase the excise tax on coal, forgive or refinance trust fund debt, and modify black lung benefits eligibility. With the rate of the excise tax on coal reduced in 2019, the 116th Congress may again evaluate options for improving the fiscal condition of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, or other issues related to providing federal benefits to miners with black lung disease.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: T he federal government pays benefits to coal miners affected by coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP, commonly referred to as black lung disease) and other lung diseases linked to coal mining in cases where the responsible mine operators are not able to pay  Benefit payments and related administrative expenses are paid out of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  The primary source of revenue for the trust fund is an excise tax on coal produced and sold domestically  If excise tax revenue is not sufficient to finance Black Lung Program benefits, the trust fund may borrow from the general fund of the Treasury, which contains federal receipts not earmarked for a specific purpose  For 2018, the tax rates on coal were $1 10 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0 55 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 4 4% of the sales price  Starting in 2019, under current law, these tax rates are $0 50 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0 25 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 2% of the sales price  This decline in the excise tax rates will likely put additional financial strain on a trust fund that already borrows from the general fund to meet obligations  The decline in domestic coal production, recent increases in the rate of CWP, and bankruptcies in the coal sector also contribute to the financial strain on the trust fund  This report provides background information and policy options to help inform the debate surrounding the coal excise tax rate, and other considerations related to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  The report begins with an overview of the federal black lung program, providing information on black lung disease and benefits under the program  The report proceeds to examine Black Lung Disability Trust Fund revenues, focusing on the coal excise tax and its history  The report closes with a discussion of policy options, evaluating various revenue- and benefits-related policy options that could improve the fiscal outlook of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund is used to finance the payment of federal Black Lung Program benefits under Part C of the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) when a responsible coal operator does not meet its obligations under the law to pay benefits  Coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP, commonly referred to as black lung disease) is an interstitial lung disease caused by the inhalation of coal dust  Like in other types of pneumoconioses, the inhalation of coal dust results in the scarring of the lung tissue and affects the gas-exchanging ability of the lungs to remove carbon dioxide and take oxygen into the bloodstream  Exposure to coal dust over an extended period of time can lead to CWP and continued exposure can lead to the progression from the early stages of CWP referred to as "simple CWP," to more advanced stages of scarring referred to as "complicated CWP" or progressive massive fibrosis (PMF)  There is no cure for CWP and PMF  CWP can lead to loss of lung function, the need for lung transplantation, and premature death  CWP can be identified by observing light spots, or opacities, in x-ray images of the lungs and can be classified using guidelines established by the International Labour Organization (ILO)  Despite technological advances in mining dust control, mandatory chest x-rays for miners, free CWP surveillance offered to miners by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the enactment of numerous pieces of mine safety and health legislation, and the promulgation and enforcement of mine safety and health standards by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), CWP persists in American coal miners, especially those in the Appalachian region  After reductions in rates of PMF in the 1990s, this advanced form of CWP has recently been found in Central Appalachia at rates not seen since the early 1970s  In 2017 researchers discovered, among coal miners mostly living in Kentucky and Virginia and served by three federally funded Black Lung Clinics in Virginia, what may be the largest cluster of PMF ever recorded  This cluster of miners with PMF includes a relatively high number of miners with less than 20 years of mining experience as well as cases of PMF in current miners  The occurrence of this advanced stage of CWP in short-tenured and current miners is noteworthy since MSHA standards require that any miner with evidence of CWP be given the option, without loss of compensation or other penalty, to work in an area of the mining operation in which the average concentration of coal dust in the air is continuously maintained at or below an established level that is lower than the permissible exposure level for all miners with the goal of preventing the progression of CWP  The federal Black Lung Program was created in 1969 with the enactment of Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Coal Act, P L  91-173, later renamed the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 by P L  95-164 )  Section 401 of the Coal Act provides the congressional justification for the federal Black Lung Program and cites the lack of benefits for disability and death caused by CWP provided by existing state workers' compensation systems as justification for the creation of a federal program  This section also states that the program is intended to be a cooperative effort between the federal government and the states  The Coal Act also established mandatory safety and health standards for coal mines, including standards limiting exposure of miners to coal dust and giving miners with CWP the option of being moved, without loss of compensation or penalty, to an area of the mine with lower dust concentrations  The Coal Act was later amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 (BLBA, P L  92-303)  The Coal Act established Part B of the federal Black Lung Program to provide cash benefits to miners totally disabled due to CWP and to the survivors of miners who die from CWP  Part B only applies to cases filed on or before December 31, 1973  Part B benefits are paid out of general revenue and were initially administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA)  Today, with the exception of a small number of pending appellate cases, Part B benefits are administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP)  The Coal Act established Part C of the Federal Black Lung Program for cases filed after December 31, 1973, and was later amended by the BLBA  Under Part C of the BLBA, all claims for benefits for disability or death due to CWP are to be filed with each state's workers' compensation system, but only if such systems have been determined by DOL as providing benefits that are equivalent to or greater than the cash benefits provided by the federal government under Part B of the BLBA and the medical benefits provided to disabled longshore and harbor workers under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)  If a state's workers' compensation system is not determined by DOL to meet these standards, then Part C benefits are to be paid by the each miner's coal employer, or, if no such employer is available to pay benefits, by the federal government  In 1973, Maryland, Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia submitted their state workers' compensation laws to DOL for approval, but were denied  To date, no state workers' compensation system has been approved by DOL under Part C of the BLBA  Because no state's workers' compensation system has been determined to be sufficient to pay benefits under Part C, each operator of an underground coal mine is responsible for the payment of benefits to that operator's miners  Operators are required to provide for these benefits either by purchasing insurance for benefits or through self-insurance approved by DOL  A self-insured operator is required to purchase an indemnity bond or provide another form of security (such as a deposit of negotiable securities in a Federal Reserve Bank or the establishment of a trust) in an amount specified by DOL  In order to be approved for self-insurance, federal regulations require that a mine operator have been in business for at least the three previous years and have average assets over the previous three years that exceed current liabilities by the sum of expected benefit payments and annual premiums on the indemnity bond  When a claim for benefits is approved, benefits are to be paid by the "responsible" operator, which is generally the last coal operator to employ the miner  If a company has acquired the assets of a mine operator, then that company is considered a "successor operator" and is responsible for the payment of claims related to the original operator  The federal government pays benefits in cases in which the responsible operator no longer exists and has no successor operator, or is unable to pay benefits  The federal government pays benefits when an operator has not made payment within 30 days of a determination of eligibility or when benefits are otherwise due to be paid  Initially, under Part C of the Coal Act, these federal benefits were paid out of general revenue  However, pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977 ( P L  95-227 ), these benefits are now paid from the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund established by this law and primarily financed by an excise tax on coal  If a responsible operator can later be identified, the trust fund is authorized by law to seek to recover from this operator the amount of benefits paid by the trust fund and any interest earned on these amounts  The trust fund is also used for the following federal Black Lung Program-related expenses: the payment of benefits for miners whose last coal mine employment was before January 1, 1970; reimbursement to the Treasury for the costs of Part C benefits paid from general revenue before April 1, 1978, for periods of benefit eligibility after January 1, 1974; the repayment and payment of interest on advances made from the general fund to the trust fund; the payment of administrative expenses related to Part C of the BLBA and the coal excise tax incurred after March 1, 1978; and the reimbursement of coal operators who paid Part C benefits before April 1, 1978, for miners whose last coal mine employment ended before January 1, 1970  A miner is eligible for benefits if that miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment  The survivors of a miner are eligible for benefits if the miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment  Benefits are only available to miners and their survivors  The BLBA defines a miner as any individual who works or has worked in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility in the extraction or preparation of coal  Such term also includes an individual who works or has worked in coal mine construction or transportation in or around a coal mine, to the extent such individual was exposed to coal dust as a result of such employment  Thus, other workers who may be exposed to coal dust in their work, such as railroad workers or workers at coal-fired power plants are not eligible for benefits  Persons who live near coal mines or power plants are also not eligible for benefits even if they are exposed to coal dust  In addition, while a miner's family members may receive benefits as survivors and the number of family members can increase the amount of a miner's monthly benefits, family members may not claim benefits on their own due to exposure to coal dust in the home such as from cleaning the miner's soiled clothing  The BLBA defines pneumoconiosis for the purposes of benefit eligibility as "a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment " The BLBA directs the Secretary of Labor to develop, through regulations, standards for determining if a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or died due to pneumoconiosis  The federal Black Lung Program regulations provide that the definition of pneumoconiosis includes medical or "clinical" pneumoconiosis and statutory or "legal" pneumoconiosis  Clinical pneumoconiosis is defined as follows: "Clinical pneumoconiosis" consists of those diseases recognized by the medical community as pneumoconioses, i e , the conditions characterized by permanent deposition of substantial amounts of particulate matter in the lungs and the fibrotic reaction of the lung tissue to that deposition caused by dust exposure in coal mine employment  This definition includes, but is not limited to, coal workers' pneumoconiosis, anthracosilicosis, anthracosis, anthrosilicosis, massive pulmonary fibrosis, silicosis or silicotuberculosis, arising out of coal mine employment  Legal pneumoconiosis is defined as any chronic lung disease or impairment and its sequelae arising out of coal mine employment  This definition includes, but is not limited to, any chronic restrictive or obstructive pulmonary disease arising out of coal mine employment  Through these definitions, DOL has established that benefits are available not just to miners with CWP, but also to those miners with other respiratory diseases arising out of coal mine employment such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) even though these diseases are not pneumoconioses and may be linked to other factors unrelated to exposure to coal dust such as cigarette smoking  The BLBA contains five presumptions used to determine if a miner is eligible for black lung benefits  Three of these presumptions are "rebuttable," meaning that, in the absence of any contrary evidence, eligibility is presumed  One presumption is "irrebutable" and eligibility for Black Lung program benefits is established if the statutory requirements of the presumption are met  Three of these presumptions apply to current Black Lung Program claims while two apply only to cases filed before the end of 1981  Table 1 provides a summary of the following five presumptions provided by the BLBA  1  A rebuttable presumption that the pneumoconiosis of a miner who was employed in mining for at least 10 years was caused by his or her employment  2  A rebuttable presumption that the death of a miner who worked in mining for at least 10 years and who died of any respirable disease, was due to pneumoconiosis  This presumption does not apply to claims filed on or after January 1, 1982, the effective date of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981 ( P L  97-119 )  3  An irrebuttable presumption that a miner with any chronic lung disease which meets certain statutory tests or diagnoses is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or died due to pneumoconiosis  4  A rebuttable presumption that a miner employed in mining for at least 15 years, and who has a chest x-ray that is interpreted as negative with respect to certain statutory standards but who has other evidence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or died due to pneumoconiosis  This presumption may only be rebutted by the Secretary of Labor establishing that the miner does not or did not have pneumoconiosis or that the miner's respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of connection to mine employment  5  A presumption that a miner who died on or before March 1, 1978, and who was employed in mining for at least 25 years before June 30, 1971, died due to pneumoconiosis, unless it is established that at the time of the miner's death, he or she was not at least partially disabled due to pneumoconiosis  This presumption does not apply to claims filed on or after June 29, 1982, which is 180 days after the effective date of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981  This presumption is not listed in the law as either rebuttable or irrebuttable  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA), P L  111-148 ) included two provisions that amended the BLBA to reinstate one of the eligibility presumptions and a provision affecting survivors' benefits  The effect of these changes was to increase the opportunity to establish eligibility through the statutory presumptions and make it easier for certain survivors to receive benefits  Pursuant to Section 202(a) of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, the fourth presumption did not apply to cases filed on or after January 1, 1982  Section 1556(a) of the ACA removed the prohibition on applying the fourth presumption to cases filed on or after January 1, 1982  It is expected that this ACA provision will increase the number of miners eligible for benefits  The BLBA provides that, for Part C claims, the survivors of a miner who was determined to be eligible to receive benefits at the time of his or her death are not required to file new claims for benefits or revalidate any claim for benefits, thus permitting the payment of survivors' benefits in these cases even if the miner's death was not caused by pneumoconiosis  Pursuant to Section 203(a)(6) of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, this provision did not apply to claims filed on or after January 1, 1982  Section 1556(b) of the ACA removed from this provision the exception for claims filed on or after January 1, 1982  It is expected that this ACA provision will increase the number of survivors eligible for benefits  The amendments to the BLBA provided in Section 1556 of the ACA apply to any claims filed under Part B or C of the act after January 1, 2005, that were pending on or after March 23, 2010, the date of enactment of the ACA  Eligible miners receiving benefits under Parts B and C are entitled to medical coverage for their pneumoconiosis and related disability  This medical coverage is provided at no cost to the miner and can generally be obtained from the miner's choice of medical providers  Eligible miners are also entitled to cash disability benefits  The basic benefit rate is set at 37 5% of the basic pay rate at GS-2, Step 1, on the federal pay schedule without any locality adjustment  If the miner has one dependent (a spouse or minor child) the miner is eligible for a benefit of 150% of the basic benefit  A miner with two dependents is eligible for 175% of the basic benefit and a miner with three or more dependents is eligible for 200% of the basic benefit  Benefits may also be paid to the divorced spouse of a miner if the marriage lasted at least 10 years and the divorced spouse was dependent on the miner for at least half of the spouse's support at the time of the miner's disability  A child is considered a dependent until the child marries, or reaches age 18, unless the child is either disabled using the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) definition of disability or is under the age of 23 and a full-time student  The benefit rates are adjusted whenever there are changes to the federal employee pay schedules, but are not separately adjusted to reflect changes in the cost of living  Table 2 provides the benefit rates for 2019  Benefits are offset by state workers' compensation or other benefits paid on account of the miner's disability or death due to pneumoconiosis  Part C benefits, but not Part B benefits, are considered workers' compensation for the purposes of reducing a miner's SSDI benefits  The total amount paid in cash disability benefits has fallen over time, as illustrated in Figure 1   More is paid in cash disability benefits than is paid in medical benefits  Certain survivors of a miner whose death was due to pneumoconiosis are eligible for cash benefits  In the case of a surviving spouse or divorced spouse, the spouse's benefit is equal to what the miner would have received and is based on the number of dependents of the spouse as provided in Table 2   If there is no surviving spouse, then benefits are awarded to the surviving minor children in equal shares  If there are no surviving minor children, then benefits can be paid to the miner's dependent parents or dependent siblings  If there are no eligible survivors, no benefits are paid upon the miner's death and benefits do not go to the miner's estate or to any other person, including a person named by the miner in a will  The number of miners and survivors receiving benefits has declined over time, as illustrated in Figure 2   The primary revenue source for the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund is a per-ton excise tax on coal  Historically, the coal excise tax has not generated enough revenue to meet the trust fund's obligations  Thus, additional funds have been provided from the general fund of the Treasury  The general fund includes governmental receipts not earmarked for a specific purpose, the proceeds of general borrowing, and is used for general governmental expenditures  Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 4121 imposes the black lung excise tax (BLET) on sales or use of domestically mined coal  Generally, a producer that sells the coal is liable for the tax  Producers that use their own domestically mined coal, such as integrated utilities or steel companies, are also liable for the tax  The tax rate depends on how coal is mined  Effective January 1, 2019, the tax on underground-mined coal is the lesser of (1) $0 50 per ton, or (2) 2% of the sale price  The tax on surface-mined coal is the lesser of (1) $0 25 per ton, or (2) 2% of the sales price  Before 2019, the tax rates were $1 10 per ton for coal from underground mines or $0 55 per ton for coal from surface mines, with the tax being no more than 4 4% of the sale price  In FY2017, $229 million was collected on coal mined underground (see Figure 3 )  Nearly all of this coal was taxed at the $1 10 per ton rate  In FY2017, $200 million was collected on surface-mined coal  Just over half of this coal was taxed at the $0 55 per ton rate, with the rest subject to the 4 4% of sales price maximum tax  On January 1, 2019, the BLET rates declined to their current levels  The rates that took effect January 1, 2019, would also have taken effect if the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund had repaid, with interest, all amounts borrowed from the General Fund of the Treasury  The tax is imposed on "coal from mines located in the United States" and does not apply to imported coal  The tax is designed to support the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund for domestic miners  Very little domestically consumed coal is imported  The BLET also does not apply to exported coal under the Export Clause of the United States Constitution  A credit or refund can be claimed if coal is taxed before it is exported  Black lung excise tax collections have generally declined in recent years (see Figure 3 )  In FY2009, more than $650 million was collected from the BLET  In FY2017, collections were about $429 million  The decline in BLET collections follows the general decline in U S  coal production  As the price of coal rose in the 2000s, coal mined underground tended to pay the tax at a fixed rate of $1 10 per ton, as opposed to paying 4 4% of the sales price  In the years beyond 2018, coal excise tax receipts are expected to fall sharply, reflecting the decrease in the coal excise tax rate (see Figure 3 )  The excise tax on coal was established to help ensure the coal industry shared in the social costs imposed by black lung disease  Over time, the rate of the tax has been increased, in an effort to provide sufficient revenue to meet this objective  The Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977 ( P L  95-227 ) first imposed the Section 4121 excise tax on coal  When enacted, the tax was $0 50 per ton for coal from underground mines, and $0 25 per ton for coal from surface mines  The tax was limited to 2% of the sales price  The tax was effective for sales after March 31, 1978  Before P L  95-227 was enacted there was considerable debate surrounding how black lung benefits programs should be financed  Various mechanisms to shift the costs of the black lung benefits program to the coal industry and its customers were considered  These debates ultimately led to the establishment of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund and the related excise tax on coal  There was also debate about how to structure the proposed tax  Some suggested a graduated tax, with higher rates imposed on coal with a higher British thermal unit (Btu) content, as such coal was believed to be more likely to cause black lung disease  There were concerns, however, that such a tax could be difficult to administer  Other proposals suggested that coal be subject to a uniform rate, with coal mined from underground deposits subject to a higher rate than other coal (including lignite)  A concern with this approach was that coal prices vary substantially per ton for different types of coal (lignite is less expensive than anthracite), meaning that the tax as a percent of the sales price could differ substantially across different types of coal  One answer to this concern is to impose an ad valorem tax, or a tax based on the sales price  Another approach that was considered was to impose a "premium rate" at a level that would fully finance the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, giving authority to the Department of Labor to adjust the fee as necessary  The tax as enacted was the lesser of the per-unit price or the ad valorem rate of 2%  In the early 1980s, it was observed that coal excise tax revenues were not sufficient to meet the trust fund's obligations  The Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981 ( P L  97-119 ) doubled the excise tax rates to $1 00 per ton for coal from underground mines, and $0 50 per ton for coal from surface mines, not to exceed 4% of the sales price  The higher rates were effective January 1, 1982  The doubled rates were temporary, and scheduled to revert to the previous rates on January 1, 1996  Further, the rates could be reduced earlier if the trust fund repaid all advances and interest from the general fund of the Treasury  A stated goal of this legislation was to eliminate the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund's debt  The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ( P L  99-272 ) again increased the BLET rates to $1 10 for underground-mined coal, and $0 55 for surface-mined coal, not to exceed 4 4% of the sales price  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 ( P L  100-203 ) extended these rates through 2013  Increased excise tax rates on coal were again extended in 2008  Current-law rates were extended through 2018 as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P L  110-343 )  When extending the increased rates, Congress reiterated the original intent of establishing trust fund financing for black lung benefits, observing that it is "to reduce reliance on the Treasury and to recover costs from the mining industry " It was also observed that the program's expenses had continued to exceed revenues over time, and that the debt to the Treasury was not likely to be paid off by 2013  For these reasons, "the Congress believe[d] that it [was] appropriate to continue the tax on coal at the increased rates beyond the expiration date " When receipts of the trust fund are less than expenditures, advances are appropriated from the general fund of the Treasury to the trust fund  These advances are repayable, and interest charged on these advances is also payable to the general fund  The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ( P L  99-272 ) provided a five-year forgiveness of interest on debt owed to the Treasury's general fund  As a result, the principal amount of trust fund debt outstanding was relatively unchanged throughout the late 1980s  The moratorium on interest payments ended September 30, 1990  Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, the cumulative end-of-year debt of the trust fund grew, and the trust fund continued to receive repayable advances from the general fund to cover expenses  The trust fund was subject to financial restructuring when the current excise tax rate was extended until January 1, 2019, in EESA  The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund debt was restructured in FY2009  Essentially, the partial forgiveness and restructuring allowed the trust fund to refinance outstanding repayable advances and unpaid interest on those advances  As a result of the partial forgiveness and refinancing, the cumulative debt was reduced from $10 4 billion at the end of FY2008 to $6 2 billion by the end of FY2009  At the time of the restructuring it was expected that the trust fund's debt would be fully eliminated by FY2040  The trust fund's cumulative debt has trended downward since the restructuring (see Figure 4 )  However, coal excise tax revenue has been less than anticipated in recent years  As a result, current projections suggest that the trust fund debt will rise over time when considering annual borrowing as well as legacy debt  The trust fund's debt is therefore not on a path to be eliminated  By FY2050, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) projects the trust fund's debt will be $15 4 billion without any changes in current policy  In addition to revenue from the BLET and repayable general fund advances, the trust fund receives revenue from the collection of certain fines, penalties, and interest paid by coal operators and miners and reimbursements from responsible operators  Part C of the BLBA authorizes the following fines and penalties for violations of the act: a civil penalty of up to $1,000 per day for a mine operator's failure to secure benefits through insurance or approved self-insurance; a fine of up to $1,000 upon conviction of the misdemeanor offense of knowingly destroying or transferring property of a mine operator with the intent to avoid the payment of benefits for which the mine operator is responsible; a fine of up to $1,000 upon conviction of the misdemeanor offense of making a false or misleading statement or representation for the purposes of obtaining benefits; and a civil penalty of up to $500 for a mine operator's failure to file a report on miners who are or may be entitled to benefits as required by DOL  The amount of these penalties and fines, as well as interest assessed, is paid into the trust fund  In FY2017, trust fund receipts from fines, penalties, and interest totaled $1 2 million  This is a small source of trust fund revenue relative to the coal excise tax, which generated $428 7 million in trust fund revenues in FY2017  The trust fund is authorized to begin paying benefits within 30 days if no responsible operator has begun payment  If, after paying benefits, DOL is able to identify a responsible operator, the trust fund may seek to collect from that operator the costs of benefits already paid by the trust fund and interest assessed on this amount  The amount of these collections is paid into the trust fund  In FY2017, $19 9 million was collected from responsible mine operators  The amount collected from responsible mine operators has fluctuated over time, but has averaged about 1% of total receipts since 1995  Various factors have contributed to the ongoing situation of trust fund expenditures exceeding trust fund revenues  Throughout the 1980s, black lung benefit payments and administrative expenditures exceeded trust fund revenue  As a result, the trust fund accumulated debt  As discussed above, over time, various efforts have been made to improve the fiscal condition of the trust fund  However, as of the end of FY2017, the trust fund remains in debt  The trust fund's cumulative debt at the end of FY2017 was $3 1 billion  The trust fund also borrowed $1 3 billion from the general fund that same year  Projections suggest that borrowing from the general fund will increase over the next few years, even as cumulative (or legacy) debt is paid down  Under the current excise tax rates, benefit payments and administrative expenses will be approximately equal to trust fund revenues in FY2020 through FY2022 (see Figure 5 )  However, revenues are not projected to be sufficient to repay debt, and expenses are projected to rise over time when debt and interest expenses are included  Specifically, by FY2022, it is projected that the trust fund will borrow $2 6 billion in repayable advances from the general fund  There are various policy options that Congress might consider to improve the fiscal condition of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  Broadly, increasing taxes on the coal industry (or maintaining 2018 rates) would pass the costs associated with paying black lung benefits onto the coal industry  Alternatively, forgiving trust fund interest or debt or financing black lung benefits out of general fund revenues would pass the costs of federal black lung benefits onto taxpayers in general  Another option would be to reduce federal black lung benefits  Additional revenue would likely need to be provided to the trust fund if the trust fund is to pay for past black lung benefits and maintain current benefit levels  Additional revenue may be needed even if past debt is forgiven (or assumed by the general fund), as anticipated trust fund revenues are not likely to be sufficient to cover anticipated trust fund expenditures  As discussed above, in the past, Congress and the President have opted to increase the excise tax on coal to address shortfalls in the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  These increased rates have been temporary, and scheduled to revert back to the reduced rate if the trust fund's debt is eliminated  Congress has chosen to extend the increased rates beyond their scheduled expiration when the trust fund is in debt  One option would be to extend 2018 rates   The GAO projects that if 2018 coal excise tax rates are extended, the trust fund will have a debt of $4 5 billion in 2050 (see "GAO Options for Improving Trust Fund Finances" below)  GAO projections suggest that increasing 2018 tax rates by 25% would eliminate the trust fund's debt, leaving the trust fund with a surplus of $0 6 billion in 2050  An alternative way to raise revenue from the coal industry is to scale back or eliminate various tax expenditures, or tax preferences, from which the coal industry benefits  For example, coal producers benefit from being able to expense exploration and development costs and are able to recover costs using percentage depletion (depletion based on revenue from the sale of the mineral asset) instead of cost depletion (depletion based on the amount of the mineral asset exhausted and the amount invested in the asset)  The Obama Administration regularly proposed repealing these tax incentives as part of the Administration's annual budget  It could be difficult to assign the revenues raised via the repeal of tax benefits to the trust fund  With an excise tax, it is straightforward to identify the revenue generated by the tax and earmark the revenue for a trust fund  It is not as straightforward to determine the amount of revenue that is raised through the repeal of an income tax expenditure, or direct the additional revenue raised because a certain preference is no longer in the code to a trust fund  Repeal of coal-industry tax benefits could, however, be used to offset the cost of a one-time transfer from the general fund to the trust fund  Revenue from various sources, including the general fund, could be used to supplement trust fund revenue generated from current sources  General fund revenues are not earmarked for a specific purpose, and there is generally no direct link between the source of general fund revenue and the government good or service provided  Black lung benefits were paid out of general revenue before the trust fund was established in 1977  Trust funds are generally established when there is a link between the government benefits or services being provided and the revenue source funding those benefits or services  The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund was established because Congress believed that the costs of the part C black lung program should be borne by the coal industry  Financing black lung benefits with general fund revenue would weaken the link between the industry and black lung benefits, while reducing the burden on the industry associated with paying for black lung benefits  In the past the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund's fiscal outlook has been improved through interest and debt forgiveness  As discussed above, in the late 1990s, there was a five-year forgiveness of interest on debt owed to the Treasury's general fund  More recently, debt was forgiven as part of the 2008 restructuring of the trust fund's debt  The GAO projects that if all current debt were forgiven, the trust fund would accumulate $2 3 billion in new debt by 2050  If all interest were forgiven, the trust fund debt is projected to be $5 8 billion by 2050  Forgiving the trust fund's interest or debt obligations would shift the burden of paying for black lung disability benefits from the coal industry to general taxpayers  However, a one-time appropriation to forgive interest or debt is a transparent option for satisfying the trust fund's obligations to the general fund  The primary expenditures of the trust fund are for the payment of Part C benefits to miners in cases in which there is no responsible operator  In order to reduce expenditures and improve the long-term financial health of the trust fund, Congress could consider several options to reduce the generosity and scope of benefits or increase the ability of the federal government to ensure that coal operators, even those who are in the bankruptcy process, pay benefits for their miners  A reduction in the amount of Part C benefits would result in lower Part C expenditures from both responsible coal operators and the trust fund  However, as compared to other workers' compensation benefits, Part C benefits are relatively low  The basic Part C benefit rate for a single miner is equal to 37 5% of the base rate of pay for federal employees at the GS-2, Step 1 level  For 2019 this benefit is just over $660 per month, or under $8,000 per year  In the majority of state workers' compensation programs, the basic benefit rate is set at two-thirds of the worker's pre-disability wage, subject to statutory minimums and maximums  The other workers' compensation programs administered by DOL, the LHWCA, and the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) use two-thirds of a worker's pre-disability wage as the basis for their benefits  A federal worker with a spouse or dependent in the FECA program is entitled to 75% of his or her pre-disability wage  The minimum benefit for total disability or death in the FECA program, 75% of GS-2, Step 1, is twice the amount of the Part C benefit rate  In addition, unlike the other federal workers' compensation programs and many state programs, there is no automatic adjustment to Part C benefits to reflect increases in the cost of living  Part C benefits instead increase only when federal pay rates are increased  The eligibility of miners and survivors to Part C benefits could be restricted to reduce expenditures from responsible operators and the trust fund  In 1981, Congress enacted several eligibility restrictions to miners and survivors as part of the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, to address concerns about the financial insolvency of the trust fund  Specifically, this law removed the following three eligibility presumptions for new claims going forward: A rebuttable presumption that the death of a miner who worked in mining for at least 10 years and who died of any respirable disease, was due to pneumoconiosis (listed as presumption 2 in Table 1 )  A rebuttable presumption that a miner employed in mining for at least 15 years, and who has a chest x-ray that is interpreted as negative with respect to certain statutory standards but who has other evidence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or died due to pneumoconiosis  This presumption may only be rebutted by the Secretary of Labor establishing that the miner does not or did not have pneumoconiosis or that the miner's respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of connection to mine employment (presumption 4 in Table 1 )  A presumption that a miner who died on or before March 1, 1978, and who was employed in mining for at least 25 years before June 30, 1971, died due to pneumoconiosis, unless it is established that at the time of the miner's death, he or she was not at least partially disabled due to pneumoconiosis (presumption 5 in Table 1 )  In addition to removing three of the five existing eligibility presumptions, the 1981 law also removed the right of the survivors of a miner who is determined to be eligible for Part C benefits at the time of his or her death to receive survivors' benefits without filing a new claim, thus permitting the payment of survivors' benefits in the case of a current beneficiary, even if the beneficiary's death is not proven to be linked to pneumoconiosis  Two of the restrictions put in place by the 1981 legislation were later removed by the ACA  The ACA reinstated the fourth eligibility presumption and expanded rights for survivors' benefits, thus expanding eligibility for both miners and certain survivors  Under Part C of the BLBA, the federal government may recover the costs of benefits, and interest accrued on those benefits, paid by the trust fund from identified responsible operators  In addition, Part C allows the federal government to place a lien on the property and rights to property of an operator that refuses to pay the benefits and interest it owes to the trust fund  In the case of a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, this lien is to be treated in the same manner as a lien for taxes owed to the federal government  However, in a 2016 letter to the Comptroller General requesting a GAO review of the trust fund, Representatives Bobby Scott, Ranking Member of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, and Sander Levin, Ranking Member of the House Committee on Ways and Means, claimed that the number of current and potential bankruptcies among coal operators is placing stress on the trust fund  Representatives Scott and Levin cited the example of Patriot Coal which, according to their letter, transferred $62 million in Part C liabilities to the trust fund when it became insolvent  In addition, this letter claims that insolvent coal operators may be able to avoid trust fund liens by continuing to make benefit payments until after the court in their bankruptcy cases has approved the sale of their assets to another company  Because the original company was never in default of its payments, no lien was filed, and these assets were able to be purchased by another company without any lien or future liability to the trust fund  Congress may examine the issue of the impact of coal operator bankruptcies and the interaction of bankruptcy law and the BLBA's lien provisions, to strengthen both the federal government's ability to ensure that responsible operators are paying for benefits and reduce the benefit expenditures of the trust fund 


Report 2: The United States has many international agreements that require treaty partners to provide certain information to IRS, which can help prevent the use of foreign bank accounts to facilitate tax evasion  FATCA goes much further, requiring FFIs to report more detailed information to IRS about their U S  customers annually  These provisions are important developments in efforts to combat tax evasion by U S  persons holding investments in offshore accounts  FATCA generally requires certain taxpayers to report foreign financial accounts and other specified foreign financial assets whose aggregate value exceeds specified thresholds to IRS on Form 8938  These taxpayers must report these assets and income generated from such assets to IRS with their tax return on Form 8938  These thresholds vary by filing status—such as single or married filing jointly—and by domestic or foreign residency  FATCA also promotes third-party reporting of foreign financial assets by requiring a withholding agent to withhold 30 percent on certain payments to an FFI unless the FFI or the jurisdiction in which the FFI is located has entered into an agreement with the United States to report certain account information of their U S  customers  Under such an agreement, participating FFIs report detailed information to IRS annually about accounts held by their U S  customers using an IRS Form 8966, FATCA Report (Form 8966)  According to IRS, FATCA improves visibility into taxable income from foreign sources, and enhances the agency’s ability to identify and pursue taxpayer noncompliance  For example, FATCA allows IRS to compare information reported by FFIs on Forms 8966 to information reported by U S  persons on Forms 8938  According to IRS, this comparison can be used to ensure taxpayers and FFIs are properly reporting foreign financial assets and income from international investments  This type of comparison is a common IRS enforcement technique  For example, IRS can directly compare information it receives from financial institutions’ IRS Form 1099-INT, Interest Income, against a tax return to determine if the taxpayer reported income generated from interest earned  To facilitate FATCA implementation for FFIs operating in jurisdictions with laws that would prohibit FFIs from complying with the terms of the FFI agreement, Treasury developed two alternative intergovernmental agreements (IGA)—Model 1 and Model 2—to facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of FATCA by removing partner jurisdictions’ legal impediments to comply with FATCA reporting requirements, and reducing burdens on FFIs located in partner jurisdictions  FFIs from countries with Model 1 IGAs report information on U S  persons’ accounts to their respective host country tax authorities (HCTAs)  The HCTAs, in turn, compile the information from FFIs and transmit it to IRS  In contrast, FFIs from countries with Model 2 IGAs, or countries treated as not having an IGA in effect, directly report information on U S  persons’ accounts to IRS  Separate from the FATCA requirements, regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA) also impose a separate self-reporting requirement for foreign accounts  Specifically, certain taxpayers and residents are required to file an FBAR with FinCEN annually if they have financial interest or signature or other authority over one or more foreign financial accounts with a total of more than $10,000, regardless of whether they reside within or outside the United States  Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies can use information from these reports to combat financial crimes, including terrorist financing and tax evasion  Appendix IV provides a comparison of Form 8938 and FBAR reporting requirements  Figure 1 depicts the flow of foreign financial account information from U S  persons and FFIs to IRS and FinCEN through the FATCA and FBAR reporting processes  As part of the FATCA reporting requirements, IRS collects information on financial accounts through forms and reports submitted by both taxpayers and FFIs  As part of this effort, IRS requires taxpayers to identify their TINs on Forms 8938 they submit  IRS also requires participating FFIs to report the TINs of each account holder who is a specified U S  person on Forms 8966  IRS intends to use reported TINs to link Form 8938 data filed by taxpayers to Form 8966 data filed by the FFIs to ensure that taxpayers and FFIs are properly reporting foreign financial assets  However, IRS often could not link account information collected from FFIs to the account’s owner because of incorrect or missing TINs  In July 2018, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) found that almost half of new Forms 8966 filed by FFIs did not include a TIN or included an invalid TIN  A consulting firm working with FFIs to implement FATCA reporting requirements told us that FFIs encountered significant challenges obtaining accurate TINs from U S  persons as part of the self-certification process  For instance, FFIs encountered situations where U S  persons provided incomplete or inaccurate TINs—such as Social Security Numbers (SSN) with less than nine digits—on forms used to self-certify their status as U S  persons  FFIs also encountered situations where U S  persons may not have obtained TINs or were unwilling to provide them to FFIs  Additionally, banking associations told us that it has taken time, effort, and expense for FFIs to report TINs, as they had to upgrade computer systems to collect and record TINs from U S  customers  Finally, Treasury told us that jurisdictions that have an IGA with the United States but no legal requirement to collect TINs are not in compliance with the requirements of the IGA  Treasury and IRS determined that some FFIs reporting from countries with Model 1 IGAs needed additional time to implement procedures to obtain and report required U S  TINs for preexisting accounts that are U S  reportable accounts  Consequently, IRS provided a transition period, through the end of 2019, for compliance with the TIN requirements for FFIs under Model 1 IGAs  Specifically, in September 2017, IRS issued a notice modifying procedures for FFIs reporting from countries with Model 1 IGAs to become compliant with TIN reporting requirements for preexisting accounts  For calendar years 2017-2019, IRS will not determine that certain FFIs in countries with Model 1 IGAs are significantly noncompliant with their obligations under the IGA solely as a result of a failure to report U S  TINs associated with the FFI’s U S  reportable accounts, providing they (1) obtain and report the date of birth of each account holder and controlling person whose TIN is not reported, (2) make annual requests for missing TINs from each account holder, and (3) search electronically searchable data maintained by such FFIs for missing required U S  TINs before reporting information that relates to calendar year 2017 to a partner jurisdiction  As a result, even without any further extensions, calendar year 2020 is the earliest IRS will be enforcing requirements for FFIs from countries with Model 1 IGAs to provide accurate and complete information on U S  account holders’ TINs to IRS  Without valid TINs on Forms 8966 submitted by FFIs, according to IRS officials, IRS faces significant hurdles in matching accounts reported by FFIs to those reported by individual tax filers on their Forms 8938  As a result, IRS must rely on information such as names, dates of birth, and addresses that the filers and/or FFIs may not consistently report  Without data that can be reliably matched between Forms 8938 and 8966, IRS’s ability to identify taxpayers not reporting accurate or complete information on specified foreign financial assets is hindered, interfering with its ability to enforce compliance with FATCA reporting requirements, and ensure taxpayers are paying taxes on income generated from such assets  In July 2018, TIGTA reported that IRS lacked success in matching FFI and individual taxpayer data because reports FFIs filed did not include or included invalid TINs  This, in turn, affected IRS’s ability to identify and enforce requirements for individual taxpayers  TIGTA recommended, among other things, that IRS initiate compliance efforts to address and correct missing or invalid TINs on Form 8966 filings from FFIs from countries with Model 2 IGAs or without any IGAs with the United States  IRS management said it disagreed with this recommendation because a system to ensure validation of every TIN upon submission of a Form 8966 would be cost prohibitive  However, IRS management said that IRS would address invalid TINs as they are uncovered on other compliance efforts, such as initiating development of a data product to automate risk assessments across the FATCA filing population  IRS also said it continues efforts to systematically match Form 8966 and Form 8938 data to identify nonfilers and underreporting related to U S  holders of foreign accounts  However, IRS management told us they are waiting until they have a full set of data, including TINs, before doing analysis to develop a compliance strategy  According to TIGTA, IRS management believed that having the FFI’s Global Intermediary Identification Number (GIIN) on Form 8938, which is filed by the taxpayer, would help with matching records  However, Form 8938 instructions identify that the field is optional for taxpayers to complete  TIGTA recommended that to reduce taxpayer burden in obtaining GIINs from FFIs, IRS add guidance to Form 8938 instructions to inform taxpayers on how to use the FFI List Search and Download Tool on the IRS’s website to obtain an FFI’s GIIN  IRS agreed with this recommendation  However, even if an individual taxpayer provided GIINs, IRS may continue to have difficulty matching accounts with U S  taxpayers if the TIN and name of the account holder reported on the Form 8966 do not match the TIN and name of the taxpayer on the Form 8938  IRS officials said they are aware of these difficulties and have attempted to match Forms 8938 and 8966 based on other criteria such as dates of birth  In its response to our draft report, IRS said that all financial institutions and foreign tax authorities that file required account information receive a notification listing administrative and other minor errors contained in their reporting  According to IRS, its Large Business and International division follows up with foreign tax authorities regarding these errors to ensure the tax authorities are working with financial institutions to correct these errors in compliance with the countries’ IGAs  IRS added it has initiated a campaign addressing FFIs that do not meet their compliance responsibilities with respect to account opening requirements  Additionally, IRS drafted a risk acceptance form and tool addressing risks in implementing FATCA compliance and business process capabilities  This risk assessment focused on the limitations IRS faces due to budget constraints, but did not address the specific risks it faces from not receiving complete and valid TINs on U S  account holders  We previously reported that risk management could help stakeholders make decisions about assessing risk, allocating resources, and taking actions under conditions of uncertainty  Key management practices for risk management we identified from our prior work include identifying, analyzing, and prioritizing risks; developing a mitigation plan to address identified risks; implementing the plan; and monitoring, reporting, and controlling risks  Without developing a risk mitigation plan to address risks IRS faces from not receiving complete and valid TINs moving forward, IRS may lose opportunities to adjust its compliance programs to better identify U S  persons who are not fully reporting specified foreign financial assets as required under FATCA  Several IRS databases store data collected from individuals’ electronic and paper filings of Form 8938 and/or elements of parent individual tax returns to which the Form 8938 is attached—the filer’s country of residence and filing status—used to determine specified reporting thresholds for Form 8938 filers  Additionally, data from these databases and other sources are transferred downstream to IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse (CDW)—a database used for research and analytical purposes  We extracted data from copies of Individual Return Transaction File (IRTF) and Modernized Tax Return Database (MTRDB) data copied into CDW to obtain information reported on Forms 8938 and relevant information from parent tax returns, such as filing status and filers’ country of residence  We found that IRTF and MTRDB had inconsistent and incomplete data  For example, neither database had consistent and complete information on foreign financial account and other asset information submitted by Form 8938 filers  While IRS officials told us that IRTF is the authoritative source for filers of Form 8938, it does not store account and other asset information submitted on Forms 8938  Additionally, IRS officials said MTRDB is not designed to store information submitted on paper filings of Forms 8938 and parent tax returns  Officials from IRS’s Research, Applied Analytics and Statistics (RAAS) division also noted that CDW did not have reliable information from Form 8938 paper filings  Because of the lack of foreign financial asset information from such filings, we could not report complete information on assets reported by Form 8938 filers  Further, IRS does not provide instructions to CDW users on how to extract appropriate data from CDW—such as data copied from IRTF and MTRDB—leading to confusion on which databases to use for extracting Form 8938 and relevant parent tax return data  For example, five distinct tables within CDW are required to identify the TIN, parent form, filing status, country of residence, and amount of foreign assets accurately  Without clear explanations of how data in each of these tables relate to each other and to the underlying filings, errors could be introduced into CDW users’ analyses of foreign asset information  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government notes that management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives  One attribute of this principle includes processing data into quality information that is appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and provided on a timely basis  Additionally, the Internal Revenue Manual states that IRS needs to measure taxpayer compliance so that customer-focused programs and services can be enhanced or developed so that compliance information and tools can be improved  According to IRS officials, IRS researchers have been taking additional steps to obtain and review Form 8938 and parent tax return data stored in the Integrated Production Model (IPM) database  They said IPM is the only database that contains complete data from individuals’ electronic and paper filings of Forms 8938 and relevant elements of parent tax returns  IRS officials said that RAAS has been working with IRS’s information technology (IT) division to obtain read-only access to IPM, and import Forms 8938 and 8966 data from IPM into CDW for analysis  However, as of February 2019, this effort has been delayed due to budget constraints  In its response to our draft report, IRS said that obtaining read-only access would require a new technical process and plans to continue working with IT on the feasibility and timeframe for enabling this access  Enabling access to consistent and complete Form 8938 and parent tax return data for compliance staff and researchers from RAAS and other IRS business units would help IRS strengthen its efforts to enforce compliance with FATCA reporting requirements and conduct research to bolster enforcement efforts  However, such efforts may be hampered until IRS can ensure readily available access to such data  We previously recommended that IRS develop a broad strategy, including a timeline and performance measures, for how IRS intends to use FATCA information to improve tax compliance  IRS agreed with this recommendation and developed a strategy for FATCA in July 2013  IRS updated the strategy in 2016 by creating the FATCA Compliance Roadmap as a comprehensive plan to articulate IRS’s priorities to facilitate compliance with FATCA reporting requirements  The roadmap also provided an overview of compliance activities used solely for enforcing FATCA reporting requirements or enhancing existing compliance efforts  However, in July 2018, TIGTA reported that IRS had not updated the FATCA Compliance Roadmap since 2016, and had taken limited or no action on a majority of the planned activities outlined in it  We also found that IRS had not yet evaluated the effects of FATCA, including the effects on voluntary tax compliance  IRS documentation states that only 7 of 31 capabilities outlined in the FATCA Compliance Roadmap were delivered due to funding constraints  As of October 2018, IRS has stopped using the FATCA Compliance Roadmap and has not developed a revised comprehensive plan to manage efforts to leverage FATCA data to improve taxpayer compliance  According to IRS officials, IRS moved away from updating broad strategy documents, such as the FATCA Compliance Roadmap, to focus on individual compliance campaigns  These include a campaign to match individual tax filers to the reports from FFIs, and another campaign to identify FFIs with FATCA reporting requirements who are not meeting all of their obligations  According to what IRS told us, with the passage of time and as FATCA is becoming more integrated into agency operations, it has moved from updating the broad strategy documents focused on FATCA to working on compliance campaigns that incorporate FATCA into overall tax administration  Additionally, IRS and outside researchers plan to study the role of enforcement in driving overall patterns in reporting offshore assets and income generated from such assets  Though IRS maintains that FATCA is more integrated into its operations, TIGTA’s 2018 report concluded that IRS was still unprepared to enforce compliance with FATCA in part because it took limited or no action on the majority of planned activities outlined in the FATCA Compliance Roadmap  Documenting a framework for using FATCA reporting requirements to improve taxpayer compliance and measure their effect is consistent with three steps we found leading public sector organizations take to increase the accountability of their initiatives: (1) define clear missions and desired outcomes; (2) measure performance to gauge progress; and (3) use performance information as a basis for decision-making  We also previously reported that it is important for IRS to use a documented framework that defines a clear strategy, timeline, and plans for assessment  Having such a framework in place can help IRS better allocate resources and avoid unnecessary costs resulting from not having the necessary or appropriate data available to execute its objectives  In light of the challenges IRS faces to collect, manage, and use FATCA data to improve compliance in a resource-constrained environment, employing a comprehensive plan would help IRS maximize the use of collected data and better leverage individual campaigns to increase taxpayer compliance  Without such a plan, IRS’s ability to collect and leverage data collected under FATCA for compliance enforcement and other purposes is constrained  We could not report on total values of foreign financial assets on Forms 8938 in tax years 2015 and 2016  However, we could provide a range of total maximum account values reported on FBARs during the same period  Specifically, we determined that more than 900,000 individuals filed FBARs in calendar years 2015 and 2016, and declared total maximum values of accounts ranging from about $1 5 trillion to more than $2 trillion each year  A little more than one in five—or about 21 7 percent—of the approximately 404,800 Forms 8938 filed with IRS in tax year 2016 were done so from U S  persons living abroad, with the other 78 3 percent living in the United States  Table 1 shows that a higher proportion of Form 8938 filings from U S  persons living abroad for tax year 2016 were filed on paper (43 3 percent) than Form 8938 filings from U S  persons living in the United States during the same period (14 7 percent)  We extracted these data from IRTF, which IRS officials said is the authoritative source for filers of Form 8938  However, we could not report complete information on foreign financial assets reported by Form 8938 filers because such data are incomplete; as noted above, IRS databases we used to extract Form 8938 data—IRTF and MTRDB—do not include asset information reported on paper filings of Forms 8938  Of the approximately 404,800 Forms 8938 filed by individuals for tax year 2016—the most recent data available—we could access information on residency of filers and reported foreign financial assets from about 277,600 Forms 8938 that did not indicate that foreign financial assets and values were declared on other forms besides the Form 8938  Of the subset of these Forms 8938, more than one quarter—or about 73,500— reported foreign financial assets in amounts that indicate the Form 8938 may have been filed unnecessarily, since they reported specified foreign financial assets with aggregate values at or below reporting thresholds as of the last day of the tax year  Based on available Form 8938 data from tax year 2016, table 2 shows that about 61,900 filings from U S  persons living in the United States and about 11,600 filings from U S  persons living abroad during the same tax year reported specified foreign financial assets with aggregate values at or below end of tax year thresholds  These totals likely understate the total number of Forms 8938 that U S  persons may have filed unnecessarily in tax year 2016; due to data limitations, these totals exclude Forms 8938 without asset information stored in IRS’s databases, including most Forms 8938 filed on paper and Forms 8938 where filers identified that they declared foreign financial assets on other forms besides the Form 8938  There is no clear explanation as to why some U S  persons may have filed Forms 8938 unnecessarily  However, we identified a number of potential reasons from focus groups and other interviews with stakeholder groups  In focus groups we conducted, participants expressed confusion about IRS’s instructions for completing the Form 8938 and information provided on IRS’s website  In the instructions for completing Form 8938, IRS described the specific types of foreign financial assets that are to be reported on Form 8938, and the asset value thresholds that must be met for required reporting, depending on the location of residence and filing status of the taxpayer  IRS also posted responses to frequently asked questions on meeting FATCA reporting requirements on its website, and established a separate page on its website comparing foreign financial assets that must be reported on Form 8938 and/or FBAR  Nonetheless, focus group participants reported confusion on whether and how to report investment and retirement accounts and compulsory savings plans managed by their country of residence  In a meeting we convened with an organization representing tax attorneys, they told us taxpayers are unsure about what account values to report on the Form 8938  Tax practitioners participating in another focus group added that they filed Forms 8938 regardless of the aggregate value of the assets because it was too cumbersome for them to identify whether the assets exceeded reporting thresholds as of the end of the year or at any time during the year  IRS officials also cited a number of possible reasons why U S  persons may be filing Forms 8938 unnecessarily  For example, it may be easier for U S  persons to report all specified foreign financial assets they hold on the Form 8938, rather than determine whether the value of such assets met applicable thresholds  IRS officials also said that U S  persons might complete a Form 8938 for reasons besides meeting tax-filing requirements, such as providing evidence of assets for a loan application  IRS’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights states that taxpayers are entitled to clear explanations of the laws and IRS procedures in all tax forms, instructions, publications, notices, and correspondence  Furthermore, one of IRS’s strategic goals is to empower taxpayers by making it easier for them to understand and meet their filing, reporting, and payment obligations  IRS officials said they hosted sessions for tax practitioners at IRS Nationwide Tax Forums to address FATCA reporting requirements  However, they said IRS has not taken direct steps to identify or implement actions to further clarify instructions and related guidance on IRS’s website for completing Form 8938, such as information on which foreign financial assets to report, how to calculate asset values, and determine whether such values exceed required reporting thresholds  Additionally, IRS officials said they have not conducted additional outreach to educate taxpayers on required reporting thresholds under FATCA, or notify Form 8938 filers of instances where aggregate values of specified foreign financial assets reported on Forms 8938 were below reporting thresholds  IRS officials said they have not made efforts to determine whether there is a pattern of unnecessary Form 8938 filings that they could address  Rather, they said they believed resources should be devoted to FATCA implementation in general  However, as shown above, we have identified many tens of thousands of instances where U S  persons may have filed Forms 8938 unnecessarily  Without assessing factors contributing to unnecessary Form 8938 reporting—and identifying or implementing actions to further clarify and educate taxpayers on FATCA reporting requirements—IRS is missing opportunities to help taxpayers understand their filing and reporting obligations and minimize their compliance burdens while properly meeting their tax obligations  Additionally, IRS may be missing opportunities to reduce costs in processing forms that taxpayers did not need to file  Because of overlapping statutory reporting requirements, IRS and FinCEN—both bureaus within Treasury—collect duplicative foreign financial asset data using two different forms (Form 8938 and FBAR)  Our evaluation and management guide for fragmentation, overlap, and duplication states that overlap occurs when multiple agencies or programs have similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries  Table 3 shows that individuals required to report foreign financial assets on Form 8938, in many cases, also must meet FBAR reporting requirements  For example, specified individuals with foreign financial accounts exceeding $50,000 in aggregate value on the last day of the tax year must file both Form 8938 and FBAR if such values exceed the minimum Form 8938 thresholds; these thresholds depend on the filing status and address of specified individuals  Table 3 also shows that, in many cases, specified interests in foreign financial assets as defined in Form 8938 instructions are the same as the financial interest in such assets under FBAR  Further, as noted in table 3, the overlapping requirements lead to IRS and FinCEN collecting the same information on certain types of foreign financial assets  For example, both Form 8938 and FBAR collect information on foreign financial accounts for which a person has signature authority and a financial interest in the account  Form 8938 and FBAR also both collect duplicative information on several other types of foreign financial assets, such as foreign mutual funds and accounts at a foreign financial institution that include foreign stock or securities  Overlapping reporting requirements result in most Form 8938 filers also filing an FBAR during the same reporting year  Table 4 shows that close to 75 percent of Form 8938 filers in tax years 2015 and 2016 percent also filed an FBAR for the same year using the same TIN  Overlapping requirements to file both Form 8938 and FBAR increases the compliance burden on U S  persons and adds complexity that can create confusion, potentially resulting in inaccurate or unnecessary reporting  Focus group participants in all five countries included in our study affirmed that U S  persons experienced confusion and frustration with having to report duplicative foreign financial asset information on both forms  Focus group participants and others we interviewed also noted that U S  persons incurred additional financial costs to complete and file both Form 8938 and FBAR  For instance, one tax practitioner in Canada said the charge was about $190 to report four-to-five accounts on an FBAR in addition to charging about $540 for basic tax return packages  An accounting firm based in Japan typically charged between $300 and $800 to complete a Form 8938 and between $150 and $500 to complete an FBAR, depending on the number of accounts reported on the forms  Proposed revisions to regulations implementing BSA proposed by FinCEN may also increase the number of duplicative foreign financial accounts reported on Form 8938 and FBAR  Currently, U S  persons must report detailed information on all foreign financial accounts on Form 8938 if the value of such accounts and other specified foreign financial assets reaches applicable reporting thresholds  In contrast, U S  persons are generally exempted from reporting detailed account information on FBARs if they report having signature or other authority over 25 or more foreign financial accounts  FinCEN’s proposed revisions to BSA regulations would eliminate the exemption, requiring U S  persons to report detailed information on all foreign financial accounts in which he or she has a financial interest if the value of such accounts exceed FBAR’s $10,000 reporting threshold  FinCEN estimated that it will receive account information for the first time on about 5 4 million foreign financial accounts if it finalizes the proposed revisions  In turn, these revisions may lead to increased filings of duplicative asset data on both Form 8938 and FBAR, as U S  persons may have to report detailed information on all foreign financial accounts using both forms  U S  persons also face exposure to two different penalty regimes for any failures in accurately and completely reporting foreign financial asset information to two bureaus within Treasury—IRS and FinCEN  Officials from one organization representing U S  persons living abroad said penalties due to failure to report certain accounts on one or both forms can be significant, even if little or no taxes are owed on those accounts  The duplicative reporting of foreign financial asset data on two different forms also creates additional costs to the government to process and store the same or similar information twice, and enforce reporting compliance with both requirements  In 2012, we recommended that Treasury direct the Office of Tax Policy, IRS, and FinCEN to determine whether the benefits of implementing a less duplicative reporting process exceed the costs and, if so, implement that process  Treasury did not implement our recommendation  While we continue to believe that the agencies should have considered whether less duplicative reporting could have been implemented, we do recognize that FATCA and FBAR were enacted under two different statutes to serve different purposes  As mentioned above, according to IRS, FATCA improves visibility into taxable income from foreign sources and enhances the agency’s ability to identify and pursue taxpayer noncompliance  In contrast, the information reported on the FBAR is collected to identify money laundering and other financial crimes; law enforcement agencies can use BSA information—including information collected from FBARs— to aid regulatory and criminal investigations  Additionally, data collected from Form 8938 and FBAR are used in different systems for use by different bureaus within Treasury  Fully addressing issues stemming from overlapping reporting requirements and the resulting collection of duplicative information—while at the same time ensuring that such information can be used for tax compliance and law enforcement purposes—can only be done by modifying the statutes governing the requirements  Further, IRS and FinCEN have varying degrees of access to foreign financial asset information collected from Form 8938 and FBAR to enforce tax compliance and financial crime laws  FATCA was enacted, in part, to improve visibility into taxable income from foreign sources  However, information provided on Forms 8938 is taxpayer return information protected by section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), which generally prohibits IRS from disclosing information provided on Forms 8938  IRS can share return information with other government agencies and others when it is allowed by statute  For example, under section 6103, IRS may disclose return information related to taxes imposed under the IRC—such as self-employment income tax, Social Security and Medicare tax and income tax withholding—to the Social Security Administration (SSA) as needed to carry out its responsibilities under the Social Security Act  However, according to FinCEN officials, FinCEN, law enforcement, and regulators often cannot access information submitted on Forms 8938  While section 6103 provides other exceptions to disclosure prohibitions—such as allowing IRS to share return information with law enforcement agencies for investigation and prosecution of nontax criminal laws—such information is generally only accessible pursuant to a court order  As noted above, information reported on the FBAR can be used by law enforcement agencies to aid regulatory and criminal investigations  This includes IRS, which has been delegated responsibility from FinCEN to enforce compliance with FBAR reporting requirements  IRS has used FBAR information in addressing taxpayer noncompliance with reporting and paying taxes on foreign assets and income  For example, taxpayers accepted into one of IRS’s offshore voluntary disclosure programs must have filed amended or late FBARs as part of their program applications  Investigators from IRS’s Criminal Investigation division generally reviewed applications to determine if the taxpayer has made a complete and truthful disclosure  IRS examiners can also use information from case files of program participants—such as information disclosed on FBARs— to identify new groups of taxpayers suspected of hiding income offshore  IRS can then choose to continue offering offshore programs and encourage these newly identified groups of taxpayers, as well as all taxpayers with unreported offshore accounts, to disclose their accounts voluntarily  In addition to eliminating overlapping reporting requirements, harmonizing statutes governing foreign financial asset reporting and use of information collected on such assets to make such statutes fully consistent could yield additional benefits to both IRS and the law enforcement community  Specifically, and as shown in appendix IV, there are specified foreign financial assets reported on Form 8938—such as foreign hedge funds and foreign private equity funds—that are not required to be reported on an FBAR  In contrast, there are other specified foreign financial assets reported on an FBAR—such as indirect interests in foreign financial assets through an entity—that are not required to be reported on Form 8938  Without congressional action to address overlap in foreign financial asset reporting requirements, IRS and FinCEN will neither be able to coordinate efforts to collect and use foreign financial asset information, nor reduce unnecessary burdens faced by U S  persons in reporting duplicative foreign financial asset information  Two reporting systems for sharing foreign account information from foreign financial institutions are in operation globally—FATCA and the Common Reporting Standard (CRS)  According to officials from banking associations and a consulting firm, FFIs in the countries where we examined FATCA implementation encountered challenges implementing and now maintaining two overlapping reporting systems for collecting and transmitting account information to other countries for a seemingly similar purpose, and collecting sufficient information from customers to ensure they meet the requirements of both systems  As noted above, we previously identified overlap as occurring when multiple agencies or programs have similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries  According to an IRS official, collecting account information under FATCA ushered in an era of greater transparency; as noted above, FATCA’s passage sought to reduce tax evasion by creating greater transparency and accountability with respect to offshore accounts and other assets held by U S  taxpayers  When FATCA was first introduced, there was no international platform to share account information between countries  The United States and other countries worked together to reach an agreement on the electronic formatting that would be used to share the information  Other countries tax authorities’ became more interested in understanding the financial assets held abroad by their residents through an exchange of account information among themselves  In response, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) established the CRS reporting system for automatic exchange of information among member countries  According to the OECD, CRS was developed with a view to maximize efficiency and reduce cost for financial institutions  Thus, CRS drew extensively on the intergovernmental approach used to implement FATCA reporting requirements for FFIs  Countries participating in CRS exchange account information with each other using OECD’s Common Transmission System, which was modeled on FATCA’s International Data Exchange System  Figure 2 depicts the flow of account information between countries under FATCA and CRS  CRS reporting requirements are in many ways similar to FATCA, including required reporting of the account holders’ name and address, taxpayer identification number, account number, account balance, and income and sales proceeds  However, the requirements differ in significant ways  The biggest differences in requirements are driven by the nature of the U S  tax system  The United States, like many countries, generally taxes citizens and resident aliens on their worldwide income regardless of where that income is earned  However, the United States differs from other countries because it generally subjects U S  citizens who reside abroad to U S  taxation in the same manner as U S  residents  In contrast to U S  policy, most other countries do not tax their citizens if they reside in a country other than their country of citizenship  Further, IGAs implementing FATCA require FFIs to report the foreign-held accounts of U S  citizens and residents—including resident aliens—while CRS requires financial institutions in jurisdictions participating in CRS to report on almost all accounts held by nonresidents of the reporting country  Appendix V provides more detailed information on differences in reporting requirements, due diligence requirements, and definitions under FATCA and CRS  These differences in tax systems drive variations in due diligence procedures between FATCA and CRS  For example, FATCA aims to identify whether an account holder at a foreign institution is a U S  person based on citizenship and tax residency information  In contrast, CRS aims to identify the tax residency of all account holders of a financial institution, and does not consider citizenship  Due to the multilateral nature of CRS, if an account holder is determined on the basis of the due diligence procedures to have residency in two or more countries, information would be exchanged with all jurisdictions in which the account holder is determined a resident for tax purposes  Under CRS rules, information about foreign accounts held by a U S  citizen with a tax residence abroad would not be reported to IRS, but rather to the jurisdiction in which they were a resident for tax purposes  Because the United States taxes the worldwide income of U S  citizens, CRS rules would need to require identification of account holders’ citizenship in member countries where they are residents if FATCA were to be aligned with CRS  Table 5 shows a comparison of individuals reported to IRS under FATCA and hypothetically under CRS  Treasury and IRS, as part of its 2017-2018 Priority Guidance Plan, are considering modifying certain elements of the existing FATCA regulations  For instance, Treasury and IRS are considering coordinating certain documentation requirements for participating FFIs with the requirements under IGAs  In December 2018, Treasury and IRS also proposed regulations intended, in part, to reduce the burdens of FATCA  The proposed regulations included a clarification of the definition of an investment entity that is similar to the guidance published by OECD interpreting the definition of a “managed by” investment entity under CRS  If the United States wanted to adopt CRS, some of the key differences between FATCA and CRS—as outlined above and in appendix V—could be aligned through regulation while others would require legislation  According to Treasury officials, to align FATCA and CRS, Congress would need to revise statutes to: provide for the collection of information for accounts that residents of partner jurisdictions maintain at U S  financial institutions; require certain U S  financial institutions to report the account balance (including, in the case of a cash value insurance contract or annuity contract, the cash value or surrender value) for all financial accounts maintained at a U S  office and held by foreign residents; expand the current reporting required with respect to U S  source income paid to accounts held by foreign residents to include similar non-U S  source payments; require financial institutions to report the gross proceeds from the sale or redemption of property held in, or with respect to, a financial account; and require financial institutions to report information with respect to financial accounts held by certain passive entities with substantial foreign owners  While better aligning FATCA and CRS to some extent is possible, anything short of the United States fully adopting CRS would not fully eliminate the burdens of overlapping requirements that FFIs must currently meet under the two different systems  While having the United States adopt the CRS reporting system in lieu of FATCA could benefit FFIs that may otherwise have to operate two overlapping reporting systems, it would result in no additional benefit to IRS in terms of obtaining information on U S  accounts  Additionally, it could generate additional costs and reporting burdens to U S  financial institutions that would need to implement systems to meet CRS requirements  The extent of these costs is unknown  Further, adoption of CRS would create the circumstance where foreign accounts held by U S  citizens with a tax residence in partner jurisdiction—including U S  citizens who have a U S  tax obligation—would not be reported to IRS  Tax practitioners and others we interviewed said that U S  persons living abroad—whether or not they are required to complete a Form 8938—risk being denied access to foreign financial services  U S  persons and tax practitioners located in four of the five countries where we conducted focus groups and interviews reported that some U S  persons and U S - owned businesses encountered difficulties opening bank accounts with FFIs after FATCA was enacted, with some FFIs closing U S  persons’ existing accounts or denying them opportunities to open new accounts  One focus group participant, for example, said that the financial institution closed down all accounts including business checking, savings, and money market accounts after FATCA was implemented, requiring this individual to find a local resident who could co-sign on a new account  Costs FFIs would incur from implementing FATCA were cited as a significant factor in increasing barriers faced by U S  persons in accessing foreign financial services  Officials from one organization representing tax attorneys said that as a result of costs associated with FATCA implementation, FFIs have found it less burdensome to close accounts of U S  persons or require the accounts to be moved to a Securities and Exchange Commission registered affiliate than comply with FATCA  Tax practitioners and an official from a bankers association added that because FFIs may gain only small margins of profit from U S  persons, FFIs may believe it is too troublesome to do business with them  Additionally, officials from a foreign government agency told us that because FATCA is expensive for FFIs to continue implementing, banks in their country might charge U S  persons seeking access to financial services additional fees to account for FATCA implementation costs  Tax practitioners, consultants working with FFIs to implement FATCA reporting requirements, and the National Taxpayer Advocate told us that FFIs with smaller asset sizes such as smaller trust companies were more prone to decline business with U S persons  Officials from an advocacy group representing U S  persons living abroad told the National Taxpayer Advocate that some smaller banks declined U S  persons as customers as a business decision, believing it would cost more for them to comply with FATCA reporting requirements than maintain U S  expatriates’ accounts  Banking associations we interviewed said that decisions made by FFIs on whether to accept U S  persons as customers also depends on the overall risks and benefits of taking on individual U S  persons, shaped in part from risks in not meeting FATCA reporting requirements  Representatives of a banking association and an advocacy group told us that some FFIs decided to avoid doing business with U S  persons after they became concerned about potential penalties for failure to comply—either willfully or in error—with FATCA reporting requirements  One banking association added that such errors could affect other aspects of FFIs’ relationships with the U S  government, such as nonprosecution agreements made with the U S  Department of Justice  Officials from one consulting firm that helped FFIs meet FATCA reporting requirements added that FFIs’ determination of risk depends on many layers, such as the value of clients’ assets or the country in which clients reside or possess citizenship  After FATCA’s implementation, according to officials from the consulting firm, FFIs decided to turn away U S  persons in some cases because the benefits of doing business with U S  persons were less than the potential risks  For example, if a U S  person only maintained a payroll account, the FFI may determine it would not make enough money to account for risks in incorrectly identifying the status of the customer as a U S  or non-U S  person  However, focus group participants from two countries said that FFIs may agree to accept U S persons as customers if they have higher account balances that offset risks from FATCA reporting requirements  One focus group participant, for instance, said banks in his country will do business with a U S  person if he or she has more than $500,000 in assets  Additionally, U S  persons and tax practitioners we interviewed said that other factors such as language barriers and U S  regulations designed to prevent money laundering may also inhibit U S  persons’ access to brokerage accounts while overseas  Focus group participants and others we interviewed said that Form 8938 reporting requirements contributed to denials of employment and promotion opportunities for U S  persons living abroad  Treasury officials noted that requirements imposed by FATCA do not directly hinder U S  persons from gaining employment or promotion opportunities overseas  However, focus group participants, a consulting firm, and a foreign government agency noted that foreign-owned companies and nonprofit organizations such as churches did not want to hire or promote U S  persons because they wanted to avoid exposing information to the U S  government on their organizations’ accounts and client trust accounts where the U S  person would have signature authority  As noted above, a U S  person is generally required to report on the Form 8938 foreign financial accounts for which the person has signature authority if he or she has a financial interest in the account  Focus group participants and others noted that such requirements have adversely affected the ability of U S  persons to serve on a corporate board or in a nonprofit organization, or maintain business relationships  Treasury and Department of Commerce officials stationed in one country included in our review added that FATCA implementation has played a role in dissuading foreign-owned corporations in some Asian countries from considering U S  persons for corporate leadership positions such as directorships  This is in part because FATCA has triggered additional paperwork burden and operating costs for onboarding U S  employees since they have had to help them meet Form 8938 reporting requirements  Two advocacy groups representing U S  persons living abroad added that it is also harder for U S -based companies to justify relocating U S  persons overseas and paying for such relocations since they also have had to help their U S  employees meet Form 8938 reporting requirements in addition to meeting other tax filing requirements  U S  embassy documents indicate there was increased demand for Social Security Numbers (SSN) since FATCA’s passage in 2010, driven in part by U S  citizens applying for an SSN to gain access to foreign financial services or resolve outstanding U S  tax obligations before completing renunciation  However, officials from two organizations representing Americans living abroad cited significant challenges faced by some U S  persons living abroad in obtaining SSNs required to meet their U S  tax obligations or obtain financial services  U S  persons living abroad might not possess an SSN because their parents did not obtain one for them as a minor  Often, this may have been due to the parents leaving the United States when the child was young  State officials also said that U S  citizens applying for U S  passports while overseas frequently forget their SSNs or do not know if their parents ever applied for an SSN on their behalf  Officials from organizations representing U S  persons living abroad added that without an SSN, these persons are unable to claim refunds or other tax benefits when filing their tax returns, or participate in IRS programs to voluntarily disclose previously unreported tax liabilities and assets  Additionally, some might be unable to gain or maintain access to financial accounts or other assets in their countries of residence without an SSN  According to these officials and tax practitioners we interviewed, U S  persons living abroad face greater challenges in obtaining SSNs than those living in the United States  For instance, they faced difficulties obtaining documentation from the United States that the Social Security Administration (SSA) requires with SSN applications; traveling to Social Security offices and U S  embassies or consulates to certify documents or submit applications in person; and receiving valid SSNs from SSA in a timely manner to file tax returns or participate in offshore disclosure programs  SSA officials also identified several challenges U S  persons experience when applying for an SSN from abroad  For instance, SSA officials said that efforts to authenticate documents submitted with SSN applications can cause delays for U S  persons living abroad in obtaining an SSN  Additionally, SSN applicants living abroad face significantly longer wait times than applicants living in the United States once their applications are processed  According to SSA officials, after an application is processed, it can take 3 to 6 months–-depending on the country’s mail service–-for an individual to receive a Social Security Card  This is significantly longer than the 2-week period it takes SSN applicants to receive a card after mailing in their applications from within the United States  According to Department of State (State) data, the annual number of approvals of requests for renunciations of U S  citizenships increased nearly 178 percent during a 6-year period, from 1,601 in 2011—the year after FATCA was enacted—to 4,449 in 2016, the most recent year to which full data on renunciations were available  According to U S  embassy documents and information provided by focus group participants and interviewees across all the countries we examined, FATCA was the reason or a contributing factor in some of these decisions and the resulting increase in total renunciations  Specific effects of FATCA implementation contributing to decisions to renounce U S  citizenship included reduced access to foreign financial services and employment or promotion opportunities in a foreign-owned company—as identified above from our document reviews, focus groups, and interviews—and burdens in meeting FATCA reporting requirements  However, the extent to which FATCA implementation contributed to increased renunciations is unclear  State officials said that data are unavailable to determine the extent to which these renunciation decisions were the direct result of FATCA because State has no legal obligation to collect information on the motivation behind renunciation of citizenship  In response to concerns about the availability of foreign financial services, Treasury implemented regulations that allow certain low-risk local FFIs to be deemed compliant with FATCA, but only if the FFIs do not implement policies or practices that discriminate against opening or maintaining accounts for specified U S  persons  Treasury and State also previously established joint strategies to address these challenges  For instance, Treasury and State developed guidance on FATCA that was posted on embassy websites to educate U S  persons and others  Additionally, Treasury and State officials conducted outreach events and workshops through U S  embassies and American chambers of commerce worldwide to provide information on FATCA and other tax filing requirements, According to State officials, the U S  embassies in at least two countries—Switzerland and France—also worked with foreign officials and/or FFIs to increase access to financial services for U S  citizens residing in those countries  For instance, Treasury and State officials reached agreements with FFIs in Switzerland to provide a wider range of financial services to U S  persons  Similarly, in 2017, SSA and State implemented an interagency agreement to streamline processes for providing SSNs to U S  persons living abroad after FATCA’s implementation in 2010  SSA officials said they are also in discussions with State on improving SSA’s website to include more transparent, specific information for SSN overseas applicants about SSA documentation requirements  Tax practitioners, advocacy groups, and Treasury officials we interviewed said FFIs have become more willing to accept U S  persons as customers compared to when FATCA was enacted in 2010  However, U S  persons living abroad continue to face issues gaining access to foreign financial services  For example, in a September 2018 letter sent by the Chair of the Finance Committee of the Netherlands House of Representatives to a member of Congress, U S  citizens born outside the United States and who have never lived, studied, or worked in the United States are effectively being denied access to financial services in the Netherlands  Focus group participants added that some banks will reject U S  clients or charge heavy fees for them to open an account  Agencies have ongoing efforts to address FATCA-related issues, as listed below, but some are ad hoc, fragmented, or otherwise not part of a broader effort between Treasury and other agencies such as State or SSA to use ongoing collaborative mechanisms to monitor and share information on such issues, and jointly develop and implement steps to address them: Treasury officials said they are participating in discussions with FFIs to address residual issues with access to foreign financial services  However, they said they have not involved other agencies in these discussions  IRS officials, in response to concerns from the French government, said they are developing a program to help streamline foreign asset- related tax compliance requirements for a small group of U S  born citizens that have been French residents most of their lives without an SSN, and—according to State officials—did not wish to take the necessary steps to renounce their citizenship  However, no effort has been made to address these issues more broadly  State encouraged U S  citizens to alert the nearest U S  embassy of any practices they encounter with regard to the provision of financial services  State documents noted that some Americans have been turned away by banks or required to meet a higher deposit threshold in part because of FATCA reporting requirements  State documentation also noted that there have been cases of U S  citizens with existing bank accounts who have been asked to close them  However, State documentation we reviewed does not highlight collaborative efforts currently underway with Treasury or other agencies to address banking access issues U S  persons living abroad are presently encountering worldwide  As described above, SSA and State streamlined processes and policies for U S  persons abroad seeking to obtain SSNs  However, SSA officials said they have not been involved in any ongoing efforts involving Treasury to identify systemic issues and related solutions involving SSNs for the purposes of tax compliance and citizenship renunciations  Treasury officials said they spoke with SSA officials about problems U S  persons living abroad face in obtaining SSNs, but SSA believed that cycle times for processing SSN applications submitted by U S  persons living abroad were not significantly greater than for applications submitted by U S  persons living in the United States, although mailing times could vary significantly and take up to 3 to 6 months  We have previously identified key practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration, including defining and articulating a common outcome, establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, and developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results  One goal in IRS’s strategic plan is to collaborate with external partners proactively to improve tax administration, while objectives in SSA’s strategic plan include improving service delivery and expanding service delivery options  Additionally, according to State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs website, one of State’s key priorities is to protect the interests of U S  citizens overseas, such as through ensuring responsive and efficient provision of consular services overseas  As noted above, there are a host of ongoing issues and challenges for U S  persons living abroad from implementation of FATCA, such as loss of access to foreign financial services, denial of employment and promotion opportunities overseas, and difficulty obtaining SSNs from abroad  However, Treasury currently lacks a collaborative mechanism to coordinate efforts with other agencies to address these issues, and Treasury officials said they do not plan to establish them  Without effective collaborative mechanisms to monitor and share information and implement cross-agency solutions, future efforts to address such issues will continue to be fragmented and less effective than they otherwise could be  In enacting FATCA, Congress sought to reduce tax evasion by creating greater transparency and accountability over offshore assets held by U S  taxpayers  Because of FATCA, IRS receives information on foreign financial assets from hundreds of thousands of filers annually  IRS could use this information to help ensure taxpayers holding offshore assets report and pay taxes owed on income generated from such assets  However, to take full advantage of the information, IRS must address key challenges  Specifically, Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TIN) reported by FFIs are often inaccurate or incomplete, which makes it difficult for IRS to match information reported by FFIs to individual taxpayers  As such, IRS must develop a plan to mitigate the risks that these data issues pose to agency efforts to identify and combat taxpayer noncompliance  Lack of consistent, complete, and readily available Form 8938 and related parent individual tax return data also affects IRS’s compliance activities, making it more difficult for IRS business units to extract and analyze FATCA data to improve tax compliance efforts and reduce tax revenue loss from income generated from offshore assets  At the same time, IRS has stopped following its FATCA Compliance Roadmap it developed in 2016 because, according to IRS officials, IRS moved away from updating broad strategy documents to focus on individual compliance campaigns  However, in light of the challenges IRS continues to face in fully integrating FATCA information into its compliance programs, it will not maximize use of such information and effectively leverage individual compliance campaigns unless it employs a comprehensive plan that enables IRS to better leverage such campaigns to improve taxpayer compliance  Our analysis of available data indicates that many of the Forms 8938 filed in tax year 2016 may have been filed unnecessarily  Factors that are contributing to this unnecessary reporting are unclear  While IRS has provided instructions and guidance on its website for completing Form 8938, focus group participants and tax practitioners reported confusion on whether and how to report investments in foreign accounts  Taking steps to identify and address factors contributing to unnecessary Form 8938 reporting would help reduce taxpayer burden and reduce processing costs for IRS  Reporting requirements for foreign financial assets under FATCA overlap with reporting requirements under FBAR  These overlapping requirements—implemented under two different statutes—have resulted in most taxpayers filing Forms 8938 also filing FBARs with FinCEN  Duplicative filings on foreign financial assets cause confusion, frustration, and compliance burdens for taxpayers  Duplicative filings also increased costs to the government to process and store the same or similar information  Modifying the statutes governing the requirements can fully address the issues outlined above, and can allow for the use of FATCA information for prevention and detection of financial crimes  This is similar to other statutory allowances for IRS to disclose return information for other purposes, such as for determining Social Security income tax withholding  Lastly, FATCA has created challenges for some U S  persons living abroad that go beyond increasing their tax compliance burdens  Some U S  persons living abroad are still facing issues accessing financial services and employment and obtaining SSNs  Treasury, State, and SSA have taken some steps to address these issues both separately and in coordination with each other  However, Treasury, as the agency ultimately responsible for effective administration of FATCA, currently lacks a collaborative mechanism with State and SSA to address ongoing issues  Establishing a formal means to collaboratively address burdens faced by Americans abroad from FATCA can help agencies develop effective solutions to mitigate such burdens  We are making the following matter for congressional consideration: Congress should consider amending the Internal Revenue Code, Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, and other statutes, as needed, to address overlap in foreign financial asset reporting requirements for the purposes of tax compliance and detection, and prevention of financial crimes, such as by aligning the types of assets to be reported and asset reporting thresholds, and ensuring appropriate access to the reported information  We are making the following four recommendations to IRS: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should develop a plan to mitigate risks with compliance activities due to the lack of accurate and complete TINs of U S  account holders collected from FFIs  (Recommendation 1) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should ensure that appropriate business units conducting compliance enforcement and research have access to consistent and complete data collected from individuals’ electronic and paper filings of Form 8938 and elements of parent individual tax returns  As part of this effort, the Commissioner should ensure that IRS provides clear guidance to the business units for accessing such data in IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse  (Recommendation 2) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should employ a comprehensive plan for managing efforts to leverage FATCA data in agency compliance efforts  The plan should document and track activities over time to ensure individuals and FFIs comply with FATCA reporting assess and mitigate data quality risks from FFIs; improve the quality, management, and accessibility of FATCA data for compliance, research, and other purposes; and establish, monitor, and evaluate compliance efforts involving FATCA data intended to improve voluntary compliance and address noncompliance with FATCA reporting requirements  (Recommendation 3) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should assess factors contributing to unnecessary Form 8938 reporting and take steps, as appropriate, to address the issue  Depending on the results of the assessment, potential options may include: identifying and implementing steps to further clarify IRS Form 8938 instructions and related guidance on IRS’s website on determining what foreign financial assets to report, and how to calculate and report asset values subject to reporting thresholds; and conducting additional outreach to educate taxpayers on required reporting thresholds, including notifying taxpayers that may have unnecessarily filed an IRS Form 8938 to reduce such filings  (Recommendation 4) We are also making the following recommendation to Treasury: The Secretary of the Treasury should lead efforts, in coordination with the Secretary of State and Commissioner of Social Security, to establish a formal means to collaboratively address ongoing issues— including issues accessing financial services and employment and obtaining SSNs—that U S  persons living abroad encounter from implementation of FATCA reporting requirements  (Recommendation 5) We are also making the following recommendation to State: The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and Commissioner of Social Security, should establish a formal means to collaboratively address ongoing issues—including issues accessing financial services and employment and obtaining SSNs—that U S  persons living abroad encounter from implementation of FATCA reporting requirements  (Recommendation 6) We are also making the following recommendation to SSA: The Commissioner of Social Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of State and Treasury, should establish a formal means to collaboratively address ongoing issues—including issues accessing financial services and employment and obtaining SSNs—that U S  persons living abroad encounter from implementation of FATCA reporting requirements  (Recommendation 7) We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Acting Commissioner of Social Security  IRS provided written comments that are summarized below and reprinted in appendix VI  IRS did not state whether it agreed or disagreed with our four recommendations but otherwise provided responses  Regarding our recommendation to develop a plan to mitigate risks with compliance activities due to the lack of accurate and complete TINs of U S  account holders collected from FFIs (recommendation 1), IRS reiterated that it provided a transition period, through the end of 2019, for compliance with the TIN requirements for FFIs in countries with Model 1 IGAs with the United States  IRS also said that it continued to make progress on improving FATCA filing compliance, citing efforts such as initiating a campaign addressing FFIs that do not meet their compliance responsibilities  While these efforts may help IRS obtain more accurate and complete information from financial accounts, IRS did not specify how it will mitigate the ongoing hurdles it faces in matching accounts reported by FFIs without valid TINs to accounts reported by individual tax filers and ensure compliance  Regarding our recommendation that appropriate business units have access to consistent and complete data collected from Forms 8938 and tax returns filed by individuals (recommendation 2), IRS reiterated that RAAS has been working to obtain read-only access to the IPM database but that limited budgetary resources are delaying implementation  Enabling access to consistent and complete Form 8938 and tax return data would help IRS better target compliance initiatives and leverage limited available enforcement resources  While IRS continues to work on enabling access to IPM, it could still provide clear guidance to its business units for accessing Form 8938 and tax return data in IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse, as we recommended  Regarding our recommendation to employ a comprehensive plan for managing efforts to leverage FATCA data in agency compliance efforts (recommendation 3), IRS said the resources that would be required to develop a comprehensive plan would be better spent on enforcement activities  While implementing enforcement activities could increase compliance with FATCA reporting requirements, it risks not maximizing the value of such efforts without a comprehensive plan to manage and address the myriad of challenges discussed in this report  Further, it is our belief that IRS’s failure to execute the FATCA roadmap is not justification for abandoning a strategic approach going forward  Regarding our recommendation to assess factors contributing to unnecessary Form 8938 reporting and take appropriate steps to address the issue (recommendation 4), IRS said it will continue to observe filings of Form 8938 and, to the extent that there are unnecessary filings, assess options to inform account holders to reduce reporting and filing burdens followed by appropriate steps to implement any selected options  Our analysis of available data indicates that many Forms 8938 may have been filed unnecessarily  Implementing our recommendation reduces the risk that taxpayers file—and IRS processes—forms unnecessarily  Treasury provided written comments but did not state whether it agreed or disagreed with our recommendation that it lead efforts, in coordination with State and SSA, to establish a formal means to collaboratively address ongoing issues that U S  persons living abroad encounter from implementation of FATCA reporting requirements (recommendation 5)  Treasury said it will work collaboratively with State and SSA to answer questions that Americans abroad have regarding their tax obligations and, where appropriate, to direct U S  citizens to resources that will help them understand the procedures applied by SSA to apply for an SSN  However, Treasury said it is not the appropriate agency to lead coordination efforts involving foreign employment issues and issues regarding access to foreign financial services and obtaining SSNs  As we noted above, Treasury is ultimately responsible for effective administration of FATCA  As such, it is in a better position than State or SSA to adjust regulations and guidance implementing FATCA to address burdens FFIs and foreign employers face from FATCA implementation while ensuring tax compliance  Additionally, Treasury has an interest in helping U S  persons receive valid SSNs from SSA in a timely manner to meet their tax obligations  Treasury’s written response is reprinted in appendix VII  State and SSA also provided written comments in which they concurred with our recommendations to establish a formal means to address collaboratively together with Treasury ongoing issues that U S  persons living abroad encounter with FATCA (recommendations 6 and 7)  State and SSA’s written comments are reprinted in appendices VIII and IX, respectively  Treasury, State, and SSA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9110 or mctiguej@gao gov  Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs are on the last page of this report  GAO staff who contributed to this report are listed in appendix X  The objectives of this report are to (1) assess the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) efforts to use information collected under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) to improve taxpayer compliance; (2) examine available foreign financial asset reports submitted by U S  persons, including submissions that were below required filing thresholds; (3) examine the extent to which the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) administers overlapping reporting requirements on foreign financial assets; (4) describe similarities and differences between FATCA and Common Reporting Standard (CRS) reporting requirements; and (5) examine the effects of FATCA implementation that are unique to U S  persons living abroad  For our first objective, we reviewed Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration reports and collected information from Treasury and IRS to summarize efforts to collect complete and valid Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TIN) from foreign financial institutions (FFI)  We identified criteria from our prior work identifying key practices for risk management  The key practices are derived from the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Development and Office of Management and Budget guidance  We applied these criteria to assess steps IRS has taken to manage risks in not receiving complete and valid TIN information from FFIs  We also applied criteria from our prior work on use of documented frameworks to IRS documentation on FATCA compliance activities to determine the extent to which IRS implemented a comprehensive plan to maximize use of collected data to enforce compliance with FATCA  For our second objective, we identified total maximum account values reported by individual filers of Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Form 114s (commonly known as the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, or FBAR) in calendar years 2015 and 2016  See appendix III for more details on our methodology to evaluate these data  We also summarized the numbers of IRS Forms 8938, Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets (Form 8938) filed in tax year 2016, accounting for the data limitations described below  We also identified Forms 8938 filed in tax year 2016—the most recent year for which data were available—with available residency and asset information that reported specified foreign financial assets with aggregate values at or below end-of-year tax thresholds, which vary depending on the location of residence and filing status of such filers  For our third objective, we reviewed IRS and FinCEN documentation, and applied criteria from Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication: An Evaluation and Management Guide to identify the extent to which IRS and FinCEN were engaged in overlapping activities, and collecting duplicative information on foreign financial assets held by U S  persons  We assessed the extent to which individual filers who submitted a Form 8938 in 2015 and 2016 also submitted an FBAR for the same year by determining the number and percentage of Forms 8938 with TINs that also match the TIN listed on the corresponding FBAR for the same year  For the three objectives described above, we assessed the reliability of data submitted on Forms 8938 filed by individuals for tax years 2015 and 2016, the most recent data available  These data were extracted from IRS’s Individual Return Transaction File (IRTF) and Modernized Tax Return Database (MTRDB) through IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse (CDW)  We also assessed the reliability of data from FBARs for calendar years 2015 and 2016 by (1) reviewing documentation about the data and the systems that produced them; (2) conducting electronic tests, such as identifying data with significant numbers of missing Form 8938 or FBAR records, or values of foreign financial assets reported outside an expected range; (3) tracing selections or random samples of data to source documents; and (4) interviewing IRS and FinCEN officials knowledgeable about the data  We also reviewed Form 8938 and relevant parent tax return data stored in IRS databases to determine whether IRS management is using quality information collected from Forms 8938 to achieve its objectives, as defined in our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  We determined that data extracted from IRTF on characteristics of Form 8938 filers and from FBAR filings was sufficiently reliable for our purposes, subject to caveats identified in this report  However, we determined we could not obtain complete data on foreign financial assets reported on Forms 8938 filed on paper  For our fourth objective, we reviewed model international agreements and other documentation, and interviewed officials from Treasury, IRS, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to compare and contrast FATCA and CRS reporting requirements  We also used the collected information to identify what changes, if any, the United States and other countries could implement to align FATCA and CRS reporting requirements  For our fifth objective, we collected documentation and conducted focus groups and semi-structured interviews with 21 U S  persons living abroad that were subject to FATCA reporting requirements  We also conducted focus groups and interviews with tax practitioners, banking and CPA organizations, government agencies, advocacy groups representing Americans living abroad, and other organizations from the United States and five other countries (Canada, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom)  We selected these countries based on geography, relatively high numbers of U S  expatriates and Form 8938 filers, tax information sharing agreements, and other tax treaties with the United States  The findings from the focus groups and interviews are not generalizable to other U S  persons, tax practitioners or organizations, but were selected to represent the viewpoints of U S  persons, FFIs, and host country tax authorities required to transmit information on foreign accounts and other specified foreign financial assets to IRS  We conducted a thematic analysis of the focus groups and interviews, and reviewed cables from U S  embassies to identify the unique effects of FATCA implementation on U S  persons living abroad  We collected documentation from and interviewed Treasury, IRS, Department of State, and Social Security Administration officials on steps to monitor and mitigate such effects  We also identified criteria from our prior work on key practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration and mechanisms to facilitate coordination  We applied the criteria to agencies’ collaborative efforts addressing issues U S  persons living abroad faced from FATCA’s implementation, and identified the extent to which agencies established effective collaborative mechanisms to identify, assess, and implement cross-agency solutions to such issues  We conducted this performance audit from August 2017 to April 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  The following IRS databases store data collected from individuals’ electronic and paper filings of Forms 8938 and/or elements of individual parent tax returns—the filer’s address and filing status—used to determine specified reporting thresholds for Form 8938 filers: Individual Master File (IMF), which serves as IRS’s system for processing individual taxpayer account data  Using this system, accounts are updated, taxes are assessed, and refunds are generated as required during each tax-filing period  Individual Returns Transaction File (IRTF), which stores edited, transcribed, and error-corrected data from the Form 1040 series and related forms for the current processing year and two prior years  Modernized Tax Return Database (MTRDB), which serves as the official repository of all electronic returns processed through IRS’s Modernized e-File system  Tax return data is stored immediately after returns are processed  International Compliance Management Model (ICMM)-FATCA International Returns (ICMM-FIR), which collects, parses, and stores data from incoming form reports–such as Forms 8938 and 8966–into the FATCA Database (FDB), which serves as the repository where ICMM-FIR stores data and from which downstream applications can pull data  Integrated Production Model (IPM), which is a downstream data repository that houses IMF data, information returns, and other data  According to IRS officials, data from IPM are consolidated and made available to a variety of downstream, security certified, systems for use in conducive analysis, case selection, and report preparation  Additionally, data from these and other IRS databases are copied to IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse (CDW) periodically, which captures data from multiple production systems and organizes the data in a way that is conductive to analysis  Table 6 highlights several problems with the consistency and completeness of Form 8938 and relevant parent tax return data stored across the listed databases  Inconsistent and incomplete data on address and filing status of Form 8938 filers: As noted above, elements of parent tax returns— specifically the filer’s country of residence and filing status—are used to determine specified reporting thresholds for Form 8938 filers  However, IRTF and MTRDB have inconsistent and incomplete data on addresses linked to Form 8938 filers, and report inconsistent numbers of Forms 8938 filed from a U S  residence  For example, the variable identified as containing data on foreign countries of residence in IRTF shows approximately 8,100 foreign filers in tax years 2015 and 2016, whereas a similar variable in MTRDB shows approximately 89,000 foreign filers for those same years  Additionally, FDB does not contain country codes from paper filings of Form 8938  ICCM-FIR stores information from some elements from parent tax returns—such as TINs and document locator numbers  According to IRS officials, however, ICMM-FIR lacks data on country codes and filing status of Form 8938 filers  IRS officials said that ICMM-FIR was not designed or intended to store data on Form 8938 filers; rather, it was designed to be a database for use in comparing Form 8938 and 8966 data  In general, IRS officials indicated that they would like to adjust the way ICMM-FIR stores data, but that would require modifying the way the database was established  Incomplete data on assets reported on Forms 8938: MTRDB contains detailed information on specified foreign financial assets submitted on electronic filings of Form 8938 and the country code from which the Form 8938 was filed  IRS officials said it is not designed to store information submitted on paper filings of Forms 8938 and parent tax returns  IRS officials said that while IMF processes information transcribed from individual income tax returns, there is no requirement to cross-reference information from the tax return with information submitted with an accompanying Form 8938  Additionally, while IRS officials told us that IRTF is the authoritative source for filers of Form 8938, it does not store account and other asset information submitted from Forms 8938  When asked whether there is any move to store account and other asset information collected from Forms 8938 into IRTF, IRS officials said that the decision on what returns or portions of returns are transcribed are subject to resource constraints and are prioritized from year to year  Table 7 shows that more than 900,000 individuals filed Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Form 114s (commonly known as the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, or FBAR) in calendar years 2015 and 2016, and declared total maximum values of accounts ranging from about $1 5 trillion to more than $2 trillion each year  We are providing a range of estimates because we found a large number of filings made potentially in error  In some cases, for instance, FBAR filers reported more than $100 trillion in foreign financial accounts  We assume many of these filings are likely made in error, but have only limited means to determine which filings have errors, and which filings have accurate information  Because we cannot independently verify the accuracy of all self-reported FBAR data, we decided to present a range of data with (1) a lower bound discarding all FBAR filings reporting total values of reported foreign financial accounts at or above $1 billion; and (2) an upper bound discarding all filings reporting total values of such accounts at or above $5 billion  Table 2 excludes amended and duplicated FBAR filings  This table also excludes FBAR filings that reported a financial interest in 25 or more financial accounts, but reported total maximum account values of $0 from parts II and III of the FBAR  Although we identified problems with the data, we determined they were reliable enough to provide an estimated range of asset values to report the scale of foreign financial accounts held by U S  persons  Table 8 shows a detailed breakdown of 2015 and 2016 FBAR filings by residence and categories of total maximum account values reported on the FBARs  Appendix IV: Detailed Comparison of Individual Foreign Financial Asset Reporting Requirements 26 U S C  § 6038D; 26 C F R  §§ 1 6038D-1 to 1 6038D-8  26 C F R  § 1 6038D-2  Filers in this category include those who identify as single, married filing separately, “head of household,” or “qualifying widow(er) ” Includes maximum value of specified foreign financial assets (Form 8938) or maximum value of financial accounts maintained by a financial institution physically located in a foreign country (FBAR)  Under FATCA, any income, gains, losses, deductions, credits, gross proceeds, or distributions from holding or disposing of the account are or would be required to be reported, included, or otherwise reflected on a person’s income tax return  Under FBAR reporting requirements, a person has signature or other authority if he or she has the authority (alone or in conjunction with another) to control the disposition of money, funds or other assets held in a financial account by direct communication (whether in writing or otherwise) to the person with whom the financial account is maintained  The account itself is subject to reporting, but the contents of the account do not have to be separately reported  In addition to the contact named above, Brian James (Assistant Director), Mark Ryan (Analyst-in-Charge), Ariana Graham, George Guttman, Krista Loose, Daniel Mahoney, Cynthia Saunders, A J  Stephens, and Elwood White made key contributions to this report  Michael John Bechetti, Ted Burik, and Jacqueline Chapin also provided assistance 

ground_truth: Concerns over efforts by U.S. taxpayers to use offshore accounts to hide income or evade taxes contributed to the passage of FATCA in 2010, which sought to create greater transparency and accountability over offshore assets held by U.S. taxpayers. House Report 114-624 included a provision for GAO to evaluate FATCA implementation and determine the effects of FATCA on U.S. citizens living abroad. GAO—among other things—(1) assessed IRS's efforts to use FATCA-related information to improve taxpayer compliance; (2) examined the extent to which Treasury administers overlapping reporting requirements on financial assets held overseas; and (3) examined the effects of FATCA implementation unique to U.S. persons living abroad. GAO reviewed applicable documentation; analyzed tax data; and interviewed officials from IRS, other federal agencies and organizations, selected tax practitioners, and more than 20 U.S. persons living overseas. Data quality and management issues have limited the effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to improve taxpayer compliance using foreign financial asset data collected under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Specifically, IRS has had difficulties matching the information reported by foreign financial institutions (FFI) with U.S. taxpayers' tax filings due to missing or inaccurate Taxpayer Identification Numbers provided by FFIs. Further, IRS lacks access to consistent and complete data on foreign financial assets and other data reported in tax filings by U.S. persons, in part, because some IRS databases do not store foreign asset data reported from paper filings. IRS has also stopped pursuing a comprehensive plan to leverage FATCA data to improve taxpayer compliance because, according to IRS officials, IRS moved away from updating broad strategy documents to focus on individual compliance campaigns. Ensuring access to consistent and complete data collected from U.S. persons—and employing a plan to leverage such data—would help IRS better leverage such campaigns and increase taxpayer compliance. Due to overlapping statutory reporting requirements, IRS and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—both within the Department of the Treasury (Treasury)—collect duplicative foreign financial account and other asset information from U.S. persons. Consequently, in tax years 2015 and 2016, close to 75 percent of U.S. persons who reported information on foreign accounts and other assets on their tax returns also filed a separate form with FinCEN. The overlapping requirements increase the compliance burden on U.S. persons and add complexity that can create confusion, potentially resulting in inaccurate or unnecessary reporting. Modifying the statutes governing the requirements to allow for the sharing of FATCA information for the prevention and detection of financial crimes would eliminate the need for duplicative reporting. This is similar to other statutory allowances for IRS to disclose return information for other purposes, such as for determining Social Security income tax withholding. According to documents GAO reviewed, and focus groups and interviews GAO conducted, FFIs closed some U.S. persons' existing accounts or denied them opportunities to open new accounts after FATCA was enacted due to increased costs, and risks they pose under FATCA reporting requirements. According to Department of State (State) data, annual approvals of renunciations of U.S. citizenship increased from 1,601 to 4,449—or nearly 178 percent—from 2011 through 2016, attributable in part to the difficulties cited above. Treasury previously established joint strategies with State to address challenges U.S. persons faced in accessing foreign financial services. However, it lacks a collaborative mechanism to coordinate efforts with other agencies to address ongoing challenges in accessing such services or obtaining Social Security Numbers. Implementation of a formal means to collaboratively address burdens faced by Americans abroad from FATCA can help federal agencies develop more effective solutions to mitigate such burdens by monitoring and sharing information on such issues, and jointly developing and implementing steps to address them. GAO is making one matter for congressional consideration to address overlap in foreign asset reporting requirements. GAO is making seven recommendations to IRS and other agencies to enhance IRS's ability to leverage FATCA data to enforce compliance, address unnecessary reporting, and better collaborate to mitigate burdens on U.S. persons living abroad. State and Social Security Administration agreed with GAO's recommendations. Treasury and IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations.