prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: DOJ and its components, as well as the judiciary, play important roles in requesting and collecting restitution  DOJ and select components: Prosecutors in DOJ’s Criminal Division and the Criminal Divisions of the 94 USAOs are responsible for overseeing criminal matters, including identifying and notifying victims, determining their losses as part of a case investigation, prosecuting cases and negotiating the terms of plea agreements, of which restitution may be a part  Within DOJ’s Criminal Division, the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section manages DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Program  As previously stated, FLUs within each USAO undertake activities to collect restitution from offenders in their district  Additionally, all USAOs have asset forfeiture staff responsible for forfeiting property seized by law enforcement agencies because the property was used in criminal activities or purchased with the proceeds of criminal activities  According to EOUSA guidance, coordination between the FLU and Asset Forfeiture units is highly encouraged to use forfeited assets as a means to collect on unpaid restitution debts  DOJ requires each USAO to have its own policies and procedures related to debt collection efforts but allows them discretion in developing these policies and procedures to ensure that they are appropriate for local conditions  DOJ also requires USAOs to have policies and procedures to make early, effective, and coordinated asset investigations and recovery a routine part of every case involving victims but allows USAOs to specify these policies and procedures  DOJ’s EOUSA provides USAOs with management assistance, guidance, training, and administrative support  Among other activities, EOUSA provides management assistance to USAOs by administering internal evaluations for each USAO, which are intended to provide on-site management support for that office  Further, EOUSA provides guidance to enhance offices’ efforts to request and collect restitution  Judiciary: Within the judiciary, the 94 federal district courts order restitution, receipt restitution payments, and disburse restitution to victims  Within the federal district where the offender was convicted, a probation officer prepares the presentence investigation report (PSR) for the court, which includes information on the victim’s losses and an offender’s financial information  Probation officers may obtain this information from DOJ, which has the statutory responsibility for the enforcement and collection of criminal debt  The court uses the PSR, among other things, to determine whether to order restitution  If an offender is released to the community by the court and placed on supervision, probation officers are responsible for ensuring the offender abides by the terms of release, including paying any restitution owed to victims  The Clerk of each District Court is responsible for the receipt of restitution from offenders and for disbursing payments to victims  The Judicial Conference is the national policy-making body for the federal courts  The Conference operates through a network of committees created to address and advise courts on a wide variety of subjects such as information technology, personnel, probation and pretrial services, space and facilities, security, judicial salaries and benefits, budget, defender services, court administration, and rules of practice and procedure  The Judicial Conference has taken policy positions on restitution-related issues and has supported legislative proposals to improve the restitution process  AOUSC is the agency within the judiciary that provides a broad range of legislative, legal, financial, technology, management, administrative, and program support services to federal courts  AOUSC is responsible for carrying out Judicial Conference policies and a primary responsibility of AOUSC is to provide staff support and counsel to the Judicial Conference and its committees  USSC is an independent agency within the judiciary which, among other activities, establishes and promulgates detailed sentencing guidelines that judges are to consider in sentencing offenders convicted of federal crimes, including guidelines on when and how to order restitution  Additionally, each district court is required to submit to USSC a report of each offender’s sentence that includes, among other information, details on the offenses for which the offender was convicted; the sentence imposed on the offender; and if the judge departed from the sentencing guidelines, information on reasons why  USSC maintains a database containing sentencing data on federal offenders convicted of felonies or serious misdemeanors, analyzes it and publishes these data on an annual basis  USSC is also statutorily required to annually report to Congress its analysis of sentencing-related documents, including an accounting of districts USSC believes have not submitted appropriate information to the commission, among other things  During the course of a federal criminal investigation, federal prosecutors identify and notify victims, as well as determine their losses in conjunction with the federal agents investigating the case  If a defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty at trial, the prosecutor has the burden of proving the victims’ losses in court  To facilitate this, a Victim-Witness coordinator within the USAO responsible for the case provides victims the opportunity to explain their losses in detail, usually through a Victim Impact Statement  This information is then to be provided to a federal probation officer who uses it to begin a PSR  To develop the PSR, probation officers use information provided by the USAO and may contact victims and verify the loss amounts  Additionally, probation officers will investigate an offender’s economic circumstances— such as if the offender has a job, any assets or any dependents  If a judge determines that restitution is to be ordered, the judge must order restitution for the full amount of a victim’s losses for offenses without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant  Judges may decline to order restitution in certain instances, for example, where restitution is discretionary, or in certain cases where the number of identifiable victims makes restitution impracticable or the complexity of calculating restitution would unduly prolong the sentencing process  If the court does not order restitution, or orders only partial restitution, the judge must provide the reason, and judges usually do so in a written Statement of Reasons document  Figure 1 provides an overview of the federal restitution process  Upon imposition of a restitution debt by the court, FLU staff use two mechanisms to determine the collectability of the debt and what collection actions to take  First, FLU staff classify the debt into one of four categories to determine the extent to which the FLU will pursue enforcement actions to collect upon the debt  FLUs classify debts from a Priority Code 1 debt (indicating that FLUs will make collection of this debt the highest priority) to a Priority Code 4 debt (indicating that FLUs will make collection of this debt the lowest priority)  Second, FLUs may suspend collection action on criminal debts, regardless of their categorization, under certain circumstances if they determine the debts are uncollectible  FLU staff may also determine that debts are permanently uncollectible and categorize them as Priority Code 4 debts  If a debtor does not provide payment, FLU staff then use various enforcement actions to collect the restitution debt  These can include, among other actions, filing liens against an offender’s property, coordinating with asset forfeiture staff to use forfeited assets to pay the restitution debt, and garnishing wages an offender may earn  Victims can be compensated for losses with the proceeds of forfeited assets through DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Program and in accordance with law and regulation  Federal regulations provide that the proceeds from forfeited assets are first used to cover program costs associated with forfeiture-related activities and next to pay valid owners, lien-holders, and federal financial regulatory agencies  Forfeited assets can then be distributed to other victims of crime as compensation for their losses if their loss is a direct result of the commission of the offense underlying forfeiture or a related offense  Any remaining funds from the forfeited asset may be placed into official use, distributed to foreign governments, state or local law enforcement agencies as part of the equitable sharing program to enhance cooperation with federal investigations  When victims are eligible for compensation using forfeited assets, DOJ employs two processes: restoration and remission  The restoration process involves the USAO staff requesting funds on behalf of a victim when there is both an order of forfeiture and an order of restitution  Under the restoration process, USAO staff request DOJ’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section to use the forfeited asset to pay a restitution debt  If DOJ approves the request for restoration, the funds from the forfeited property are then transferred to the Clerk of the Court who disburses this money to the victim  The remission process requires a victim of a crime to directly petition DOJ to receive funds from the forfeited property  According to officials in DOJ’s Criminal Division, the courts may not order restitution on behalf of victims who suffered a specific actual loss as a direct result of a crime for a variety of reasons, and therefore the remission process serves as a complement to the restoration process to ensure victims are made whole  For example, these officials stated that, among other reasons, the courts may not order restitution if a defendant dies prior to sentencing or if the case is one in which a court is not required to, and does not, order restitution, but the victim has suffered eligible losses  EOUSA and USAO officials in all six of the offices with whom we spoke told us that prosecutors document requests for restitution in their case files and that their offices employ other internal controls, such as the use of templates and forms, throughout the prosecution process to ensure that prosecutors request restitution as appropriate  EOUSA officials told us that although the agency does not track this information, they believed all USAOs generally document requests for restitution in their offices’ case files  Further, USAO officials in all six offices told us that prosecutors document requests for the court to order restitution in their case files by including this information in a written memorandum  To support prosecutors in documenting this information, all six offices we selected provide prosecutors with a prosecution memorandum template  Of the six templates we reviewed, four explicitly include a section for prosecutors to indicate whether victims have been identified and the extent of any victim losses  In addition to these templates, four of six USAOs we selected had forms that prosecutors could use to identify whether cases have victims and their need for restitution when drafting criminal charging documents  Moreover, officials from two of the six USAOs told us their offices use this form as an internal control to ensure prosecutors have identified all victims and considered their need for restitution, if applicable  All six offices we selected also provided prosecutors templates for drafting plea agreements, and templates we reviewed from all six USAOs included language requesting the offender pay restitution, if applicable  However, prosecutors are not required to use plea agreement templates, nor are they required to request restitution as part of a plea agreement  USAO officials from one office stated that including this language in the plea agreement template served to remind prosecutors of their requirement to consider requesting restitution as stated in the U S  Attorney’s Manual  Select USAO officials also described various forms of management oversight to ensure prosecutors request restitution as appropriate  Specifically, four USAOs we selected require supervisory review of the form that prosecutors fill out when drafting criminal charging documents, which includes information on victims  Additionally, officials in all six USAOs told us that they require supervisory review of plea agreements for every case  For example, officials from two USAOs told us their office requires the Criminal Chief, the supervisor of all criminal cases, to approve documents in the plea agreement, which may include requests for restitution  Federal courts sent information on sentencing decisions to USSC and USSC had information on restitution decisions for 95 percent of all offenders from fiscal years 2014 through 2016  According to our analysis of USSC data, 214,578 federal offenders were sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016 and restitution was ordered for 33,158 of those offenders, or 15 percent  Collectively, courts ordered these offenders to pay $33 9 billion in restitution during this period  Courts did not order restitution for the remaining 181,420 offenders, or 85 percent  Table 1 shows the number of federal offenders sentenced and ordered to pay restitution for fiscal years 2014 through 2016, as well as the total amount of restitution ordered by the courts  The majority of federal offenders were sentenced for immigration or drug- related offenses, and USAO officials in all six offices we selected told us that these types of offenses do not typically have victims with actual losses  For example, from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, USSC data showed that 131,088 offenders, 61 percent of offenders sentenced, were sentenced for immigration or drug-related offenses and courts ordered 999 (or less than 1 percent) of these offenders to pay restitution  USSC data show that courts ordered restitution more often for offenders sentenced for other offenses, such as fraud  For example, courts sentenced 21,551 offenders for fraud offenses from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, and courts ordered restitution for 15,902 of these offenders, or 74 percent  Table 2 shows the number of offenders sentenced and the number ordered to pay restitution by offenses for which restitution was most often and least often ordered by courts from fiscal years 2014 through 2016  The percentage of federal offenders ordered to pay restitution varied across federal court districts; from 2 percent of offenders in one district to 42 percent in another district  USAO officials we interviewed stated that some of this variation may be due to the types of offenses prosecuted within different districts  For example, officials from one USAO stated that their office, which had a high volume of immigration–related offenders, had few cases in which restitution was applicable  Our analysis of USSC data showed that from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2016 and across all districts, districts with a higher than average rate of immigration-related offenders had lower than average rates of restitution ordered  Conversely, districts with above-average rates of offenders convicted of financial offenses such as fraud, embezzlement, money laundering, tax offenses, counterfeiting or bribery had higher than average rates of restitution ordered, as shown in table 3  Judges indicated on documents sent to USSC that restitution was not applicable and thus did not order it for most offenders sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016—167,230 offenders—or 78 percent of all offenders sentenced during this time period  Our analysis of sentencing information for the remaining offenders found that courts ordered restitution at a higher rate as compared to all offenders  Specifically, after excluding offenders for whom restitution was not applicable and were not ordered to pay it, we found that courts ordered restitution for 70 percent of the remaining 47,348 offenders  EOUSA and USAO officials told us that in cases where there are identifiable victims, restitution may not be ordered for other reasons  EOUSA officials told us that restitution may not be ordered for several reasons, such as when victims provide no proof of their losses or when victims recover compensation through other means, such as through civil proceedings  Further, officials from one USAO told us that victims must provide documentation of their losses for restitution and, if victims are not able to provide this documentation, courts may decline to order restitution  Also, in certain cases, courts are not required to order restitution—such as when there is no identifiable victim or, on the other hand, when the number of identifiable victims is so large as to make restitution impractical, among other reasons  Additionally, the court might not order, or order only partial restitution for other reasons, such as when the value of property the defendant returned to the victim was deducted from the restitution award or because the victim received compensation from insurance  If a court does not order restitution, or orders partial restitution, it is required to provide the reason for its decision and to provide that reason to USSC, but our analysis showed USSC did not always have these data  Specifically, from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, we found that restitution was not ordered—and no reason was documented in USSC data for that decision—for 9,848 offenders (5 percent of the 214,578 offenders sentenced during this time period)  Information on offenders’ sentences, including restitution, assists USSC in its continuous reexamination of its guidelines and policy statements and ensures that various sentencing practices are achieving their stated purposes  Further, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management should evaluate issues identified through monitoring activities or reported by personnel to determine whether any of the issues rise to the level of an internal control deficiency  In response to our questions about the missing information on reasons why restitution was not ordered, AOUSC and USSC officials stated that they were unaware of the missing information or why it was missing  Judiciary officials stated that because various entities within the judiciary participate in the process of collecting and recording information on reasons restitution was not ordered, they did not know which entities could take action to improve USSC data  However, as previously discussed, if the court does not order restitution, or orders only partial restitution, the judge must provide the reason, and judges usually do so in a written Statement of Reasons form  The Judicial Conference, along with USSC, has developed guidance to help judges fill out the Statement of Reasons form and AOUSC supports the Judicial Conference in carrying out its policies  Further, courts must provide USSC the written Statement of Reasons form for sentences imposed  USSC is also responsible for collecting, analyzing, and distributing information on federal sentences provided by each district court, including information related to orders for restitution  However, judicial officials, including from the entities listed above, agreed that further studying the missing data may inform the judiciary of the cause of the missing data, as well as any efforts needed to improve USSC information  Courts are required to provide reasons for not ordering restitution and to provide this information to USSC so that the agency can analyze and report on sentencing data  Determining why USSC data are incomplete could help inform the judiciary whether the issue rises to the level of an internal control deficiency and whether additional action can be taken to improve the transparency of sentencing decisions  Doing so could help the judiciary ensure reasons for not ordering restitution are provided consistently in all cases and potentially improve data provided to USSC, in turn supporting its mission to promote transparency in sentencing decisions  Our analysis of DOJ data showed that DOJ collected $2 95 billion in restitution debt from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, half of which was collected on debts imposed during this period  The extent of collections across the 94 USAOs ranged from a high of $848 million in one USAO to a low of $1 2 million in another USAO  The median amount collected for USAOs was $10 7 million  DOJ was more successful at collecting restitution on newer debts—debts imposed from fiscal years 2014 through 2016  Of the $2 95 billion in restitution debt collected, about half was collected from new debts imposed by courts during this time period  Specifically, DOJ collected $1 5 billion (4 percent), of the $34 billion ordered from fiscal years 2014 through 2016  The remaining half of the debt collected during this time frame was collected from debts imposed between fiscal year 1988 and fiscal year 2014  New debts—imposed in fiscal years 2014 through 2016—were also more likely to be fully paid during this time period compared to all debts  Specifically, from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, DOJ collected the full amount of restitution on 4,003 of the 24,950 debts imposed during this time, 16 percent  However, across all debts, including debts imposed prior to fiscal year 2014, DOJ collected the full amount of restitution ordered on only 5 percent of debts  Across all restitution debts, DOJ collected at least some of the debt for one-third of debts and did not collect any restitution on the remaining two-thirds  More than 60 percent of the restitution DOJ collected in fiscal years 2014 through 2016 was owed to non-federal victims ($1 8 billion), including individuals, corporations and state and local governments  An additional 37 percent of restitution was collected on behalf of federal agencies that were victims of crimes  One percent of restitution collected was community restitution, which is restitution collected for drug offenses that otherwise have no victims and which is disbursed to state victim assistance agencies and state agencies dedicated to the reduction of substance abuse, as shown in table 4  AOUSC officials noted that some collected restitution is not disbursed to non-federal victims due to a lack of accurate contact information for these victims  Specifically, according to AOUSC, as of June 2017, courts had more than $132 million in restitution due to 113,260 victims that could not be disbursed because of a lack of accurate contact information for these victims  DOJ is required to provide courts with victim contact information, and victims are to notify DOJ if their contact information changes  However, AOUSC and USAO officials told us that this notification by victims may not always occur  For example, officials in one USAO told us that due to the length of court proceedings, victims may move without notifying the court prior to the disbursement of restitution and, as a result, the court is unable to disburse restitution to those victims  According to our analysis of DOJ data, at the end of fiscal year 2016, $110 billion in restitution was outstanding and USAOs had identified $100 billion of that debt as uncollectible, as shown in figure 2  USAOs may identify debts as uncollectible and suspend collection actions on a debt for a variety of reasons, including that the offender has no, or only a nominal, ability to pay the debt  Probation officials, EOUSA officials, and officials from five of six USAOs we interviewed stated that most outstanding restitution debt is identified as uncollectible and collection action is suspended because many offenders have little ability to pay the debt—a conclusion supported by USSC data  For example, according to USSC data, 95 percent of offenders ordered to pay restitution from fiscal years 2014 through 2016 received a waiver from paying a court-ordered fine, indicating their inability to pay  While courts are allowed to take an offender’s economic circumstances into consideration when issuing fines, they generally may not do so when ordering restitution  As a result, EOUSA and federal probation officials with whom we spoke stated that offenders ordered to pay restitution often do not have an ability to do so and therefore a large amount of restitution orders is uncollectible  Through various guidance documents, DOJ has identified and recommended numerous practices for DOJ prosecutors and FLU staff to use throughout the restitution process to help ensure full and timely restitution for victims  USAO officials in all six offices with whom we spoke stated that, based on their experience, these practices were generally effective  Specifically, DOJ and EOUSA officials identified practices for prosecutors and FLU staff to use when requesting restitution, facilitating court orders for restitution, and collecting restitution and documented these practices in several guidance manuals  Officials we interviewed from all six USAOs stated they were generally satisfied with the guidance from EOUSA and that they thought most of DOJ’s recommended practices were effective when requesting restitution, facilitating court orders for restitution, and collecting restitution  Requesting restitution  Officials we interviewed from three USAOs identified coordination between prosecutors and case investigators prior to sentencing to identify victims and their losses as an important practice for requesting restitution  USAO officials from three of the six offices stated that gathering detailed information on an offender’s financial resources, which include assets that could be forfeited and used to pay a restitution debt, was a very effective practice related to requesting restitution  Facilitating court orders of restitution  Although the courts, and not prosecutors, are responsible for ordering restitution, DOJ guidance identifies several practices that prosecutors can use to facilitate orders of restitution that may increase the likelihood of full and timely restitution for victims  Officials from three of six USAOs stated that the most effective practice related to ordering restitution was ensuring courts ordered restitution as due and payable immediately  Specifically, when offenders cannot pay restitution in an immediate lump-sum payment, the courts must specify a payment schedule through which the offender will pay restitution based on the offender’s ability to pay  In these cases, USAO officials stated that it is effective for prosecutors to ensure the restitution order specifies that restitution is due and payable immediately  According to an EOUSA official, this permits the agency to immediately pursue all collection remedies allowed by law whenever the debtor has or subsequently obtains the ability to pay  Collecting restitution  Officials from all six USAOs stated that using the Treasury Offset Program (TOP), a program that allows for the reduction or withholding of a debtor’s federal benefits, such as a tax refund, was one of the most effective practices for collecting restitution  Specifically, officials in one USAO told us that TOP requires minimal effort for FLU staff and can result in a high amount of collections  As an example, officials from two USAOs told us their respective offices each recovered more than $500,000 dollars in restitution debt in fiscal year 2016 through TOP  Officials from three of the six offices also identified using wage garnishment as an effective practice for collecting restitution  Across all parts of the restitution process, USAO officials we spoke with also consistently identified DOJ recommended practices related to internal and external communication and collaboration as effective for improving the restitution process  Specifically, the officials identified collaboration between various units in the USAO as an effective practice to ensuring restitution for victims  For example, USAO officials in two of the six offices highlighted coordination between Victim-Witness coordinators and prosecutors to help identify victims and quantify their losses as effective to assisting in the request for restitution  Additionally, USAO officials in all six offices stated that strong coordination between FLU personnel and criminal prosecutors to identify an offender’s financial resources and available assets was an effective practice to help ensure FLU staff could collect restitution using those resources or assets  USAO officials from five of six offices identified external communication between FLU and the federal probation office as an effective practice  Specifically, officials from these USAOs stated that FLUs coordinating with probation officers during the offender’s supervision period to enforce restitution terms was an effective practice for collecting restitution  Additionally, according to EOUSA guidance, FLU staff can use outreach and training with other partners such as the probation office to facilitate information sharing on restitution collection issues and officials from five of six USAOs told us that FLUs conducting training and outreach is a very effective practice  In addition, probation officials we interviewed in each of the six federal judicial districts we selected stated that ongoing communication between USAO staff and probation officers is effective to ensuring victims are identified and receive full and timely restitution  Probation officials from one court district emphasized the importance of a good working relationship with the USAO, stating that the probation office and USAO are better able to ensure victims and their losses are accurately identified and defendants’ ability to pay is adequately addressed when working collaboratively  A probation official from another office said that probation officers regularly coordinated with the USAO’s FLU, and this coordination was particularly important on cases involving complex financial crimes, where the offender has a complicated financial portfolio  Further, probation officials from five of six probation offices also stated that attending training conducted by the FLU is a very effective practice  EOUSA and selected USAO officials told us that while these practices may be useful in some circumstances, they may not be effective or applicable in all cases or in all districts  Specifically, practices DOJ recommends may be effective when offenders have the ability to pay restitution but are simply unwilling to do so; however, USAO officials in five of six offices stated that these practices cannot mitigate the fact that many offenders lack the ability to pay restitution because they lack assets and income  Additionally, while EOUSA guidance recommends that FLU staff contact co-defendants or victims for information on the whereabouts or assets of offenders who owe restitution, officials from three USAOs told us this was not effective  According to one official, although co- defendants are sometimes eager to share information, the information is usually unreliable  USAO officials also identified some recommended practices as not applicable to their district  For example, EOUSA recommends that FLU units request Asset Investigation assistance from EOUSA for complex cases involving large amounts of valuable assets  However, USAO officials in a small, rural district with whom we spoke stated that the types of cases their office prosecutes tend not to be the type of financial cases that warranted use of this resource  DOJ has identified improving debt collection—including court-ordered restitution—as a major management initiative in its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan  However, it does not have any measures or goals in place to assess its performance in meeting this initiative or meet requirements that it evaluate its performance in seeking and recovering restitution as required by statute  In 2001, we recommended that DOJ adequately measure its criminal debt collection performance against established goals to help improve collections and stem the growth in uncollected criminal debt  DOJ concurred with this recommendation, and as of fiscal year 2003, annually assessed each district based on established collection goals for that district  However, as of September 2017, DOJ no longer evaluates each district based on established goals  EOUSA officials stated that DOJ no longer uses these performance goals and that the agency did not maintain records for when or why it stopped  EOUSA officials stated that while the agency does not have any measures or goals to assess USAOs’ performance in improving debt collection, including the collection of federal restitution, they are working with DOJ’s Justice Management Division to develop a suite of analytical tools to monitor the collection of debt across all offices  According to DOJ, some of these analytical tools have been implemented and additional tools will be implemented by March 2018  EOUSA officials stated that these tools will help the agency determine which cases are most likely to result in significant collections and the types and timing of enforcement actions that generate maximum debt recovery results  EOUSA officials further stated the analytical tools will allow the agency to compare districts’ efforts based on a variety of factors (e g , caseload, staff size, and enforcement actions)  These analytical tools may provide EOUSA with valuable insight into the present condition of the collection of restitution across USAOs, but they will not provide DOJ with a baseline performance standard that could be used to indicate if USAOs’ efforts to collect restitution debts are having a measurable impact in meeting DOJ’s objective of improving debt collection  Additionally, EOUSA conducts evaluations of each USAO every 4 years, which include a review of FLU operations, but EOUSA officials stated that these reviews do not include oversight of the collection of restitution  Among other aspects of USAO operations, these internal evaluations review the extent to which each FLU is complying with statutory and DOJ requirements related to debt collection, has sufficient program resources, and adequately manages its caseload  However, DOJ and EOUSA officials told us that it did not plan to use these internal evaluations to meet the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 requirement to evaluate each USAO on its performance in seeking and recovering restitution for victims  Specifically, the officials stated that these internal evaluations are not an appropriate mechanism to meet the law’s requirements because the internal evaluations do not specifically review the seeking and recovery of restitution for victims  According to DOJ officials responsible for the internal evaluation program, these evaluations are largely intended to provide onsite management assistance and analysis of how the USAO allocates its administrative and legal personnel resources rather than the office’s efficacy in collecting restitution  Consistent with requirements outlined in the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), performance measurement is the ongoing monitoring and reporting of program accomplishments—particularly towards pre-established, objective and quantifiable goals—and agencies are to establish performance measures to assess progress towards those goals  While GPRAMA is applicable to the department or agency level, performance measures and goals are important management tools at all levels of an agency, including the program, project, or activity level  Agencies can use performance measurement to make various types of management decisions to improve programs and results, such as developing strategies and allocating resources, including identifying problems and taking corrective action when appropriate  Further, the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 requires DOJ to evaluate each USAO in its performance in recovering restitution for victims  DOJ and EOUSA officials told us that DOJ does not require USAOs to establish performance measures or goals to assess their progress in improving the collection of restitution  DOJ and EOUSA officials also told us that each USAO could develop performance goals but that they were unaware of the extent to which USAOs did so, and further, they do not track the extent to which USAOs met performance goals  Additionally, these officials stated that because each USAO faces different constraints in its ability to collect restitution, establishing a uniform and consistent performance measure and goal would be challenging  EOUSA officials noted that some USAOs may have more resources, such as more FLU staff or specialized asset investigators, available to pursue collections as compared to other offices and therefore offices with fewer resources could have difficulty meeting a performance goal  Further, EOUSA and USAO officials stated that the extent to which DOJ can collect on a debt is heavily influenced by factors outside of the agency’s control, such as an offender’s ability to pay  USAOs could use information provided by performance measures and goals—such as an office’s ability to meet a performance goal—to make managerial decisions to help address these constraints, such as by increasing the allocation of staff resources  Further, to avoid comparing USAOs to a nationally set performance goal that does not account for specific constraints faced by each office, DOJ could—as it did in fiscal year 2003—require each USAO to establish its own objective, quantitative collection goals based on historical, district-specific collection statistics  Finally, as previously discussed, each USAO already accounts for external factors that affect the collectability of a debt, such as an offender’s ability to pay, by suspending collection action on debts it identifies as uncollectible  Therefore, any performance measures and goals developed could be based solely on debts that the USAO already has determined to be collectible  Stakeholders we interviewed—including officials from one USAO, probation officials in two districts, and officials with DOJ’s Office of Crime Victims—noted that receiving restitution is both emotionally and financially important to victims  Specifically, officials from one USAO and one probation office noted that while many victims may never receive the full amount of restitution ordered, receiving even a minimal amount of restitution is a symbolic victory and that it is important for victims to know the government is making efforts to collect restitution on their behalf  The legislative history of the MVRA echoes these sentiments, providing that even nominal restitution payments have benefits for the victim of crime, and that orders of restitution are largely worthless without enforcement  Yet, according to our analysis, $10 billion of restitution debt DOJ identified as collectible remained outstanding at the end of fiscal year 2016  Further, the extent to which USAOs collected restitution varied widely— from a high of one USAO district collecting nearly 350 percent of all collectible debt in fiscal years 2014 through 2016 to a low of one district collecting less than one percent of collectible debt in the same period  Without performance measures, including the establishment of goals, DOJ cannot assess if this variation is due to factors outside the control of USAOs or due to management deficiencies that require corrective action  Developing performance measures and goals for each USAO related to the collection of restitution would allow DOJ to assess its progress in achieving its major management initiative in improving debt collection— including debts owed to victims as court-ordered restitution  Doing so would also better position DOJ to meet the requirements of the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 to evaluate offices in their performance in recovering restitution on behalf of victims and to use performance information to improve the practices of offices as needed  Although asset forfeiture and restitution are separate parts of a criminal sentence, DOJ guidance states that using forfeited assets to benefit victims is a way that DOJ can help ensure eligible victims of crime are compensated for their losses  Further, DOJ regulations and policy require that eligible victims receive compensation from forfeited assets before certain other uses, such as official use or equitable sharing  However, while DOJ tracks the amount of compensation provided to victims through forfeited assets, it does not have assurances that forfeited assets are being used to compensate victims to the greatest extent possible  According to DOJ information, the agency made payments of about $595 million to eligible victims other than owners of the property from the Assets Forfeiture Fund from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, or 15 percent of $3 9 billion in paid expenditures during this period, as shown in table 5  As table 5 shows, DOJ can account for cases in which forfeited assets were used to compensate eligible victims who were not owners or lienholders  However, DOJ does not have information on the overall universe of victims who could have been eligible to receive compensation from forfeited assets  Further, it does not have insight into any reasons why funds from forfeited assets were not used for these victims  Specifically, DOJ officials stated that the department collects information on whether victims have been identified in cases associated with forfeited assets, and if restitution is anticipated in these cases, but it does not track the extent to which these victims were ultimately compensated using forfeited assets  Further, DOJ also does not collect information on reasons why victims were not compensated using funds from forfeited assets  While DOJ is required to use forfeited assets to compensate victims before using those assets for certain other purposes, the agency is unable to provide assurances that it is always doing so because it does not have information on the overall universe of victims or reasons why victims were not compensated using forfeited assets  As a result, DOJ does not have a basis to know whether the $595 million provided to victims from fiscal years 2014 through 2016 is the maximum amount of compensation the agency could have provided to victims using forfeited assets  Full use of forfeited assets for victim compensation has long been, and continues to be, a goal of DOJ  In 2005, an interagency task force—led by DOJ and including the Department of Treasury, Office of Management and Budget and AOUSC—developed a strategic plan to improve the collection of criminal debt  Among other goals included in its strategic plan, the task force stated a goal of examining how asset seizure and forfeiture procedures can be used to maximize recoveries for victims  More recently, DOJ reported in its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan that it would make every effort to recover full and fair restitution for victims using the federal forfeiture statutes to preserve and recover criminal proceeds  Specifically, DOJ stated that using federal forfeiture statutes to recover full and fair restitution for victims is one part of its strategy to protect the rights of the American people and enforce the rule of law  Finally, DOJ officials told us they considered providing compensation to victims as one goal of the Asset Forfeiture Program and EOUSA stated in guidance that asset forfeiture is the most widely available and effective tool to seize assets for restitution purposes  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call on federal managers to design control activities to achieve the agency’s objectives  These controls can include using quality information to make informed decisions, evaluate the entity’s performance in achieving key objectives, and address risks  DOJ officials told us that they do not track the extent to which victims were not compensated using forfeited assets because USAO staff are not required to request that these assets be used for victim compensation  DOJ officials explained that staff are required to indicate in the agency’s forfeited asset database, the Consolidated Asset Tracking System, if victims exist in cases associated with forfeited assets and if restitution is anticipated in these cases  However, these officials stated that staff are not required to then compensate these victims using the forfeited assets or to indicate why these assets were not used for this purpose  DOJ officials told us that decisions to compensate victims using forfeited assets are best left to the judgment of the USAO staff familiar with the case, such as the prosecuting attorney or asset forfeiture staff  DOJ officials pointed to informal communication and coordination among prosecutors, the FLU, and the Asset Forfeiture unit in each USAO as a means to provide compensation to victims as appropriate  However, communication and coordination among these groups has been a challenge for USAOs, as the DOJ Inspector General found in a June 2015 review of DOJ’s debt collection program  Similarly, during our current review, EOUSA and USAO officials we spoke with identified communication and coordination as an area for improvement  EOUSA officials told us that while they thought that FLU staff and Asset Forfeiture unit staff were collaborating more frequently to use forfeited assets to collect restitution debts since the issuance of the DOJ Inspector General’s report, the extent of collaboration between these two units still varied across USAOs  Further, officials we talked to in two USAOs and one probation office noted that USAO staff could improve their use of forfeited assets for restitution payments  For example, officials in one probation office noted that it was their practice to identify forfeited assets that could be used for compensation in the PSR because they had observed that USAO staff were frequently not applying such assets to victim compensation  While DOJ may allow USAO staff to use discretion when requesting restoration or alerting victims to assets available for compensation, increasing the agency’s understanding of the extent to which assets could have been—but were not—used for victim compensation, and the reasons for those decisions, does not affect that discretion  There are legitimate reasons why victims might not be compensated using forfeited assets; for example, the assets may have other owners or lienholders that must be compensated prior to victims, or offenders may have other means by which to pay victims restitution  However, there are also instances where victims may have not received compensation through forfeited assets as a result of unintentional circumstances  For example, according to DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Manual, forfeiture actions can proceed faster than the parallel criminal case  Consequently, assets might be equitably shared, placed into official use, or remitted to victims who file petitions long before restitution is ordered, and therefore would not be available for other victims who wait for restitution to be ordered after an offender is sentenced  To avoid this outcome, DOJ recommends that USAOs coordinate to ensure the retention of property for victim compensation  However, although DOJ officials responsible for leading DOJ’s asset forfeiture efforts highlighted the need for expedient coordination when USAO staff are considering using forfeited assets to compensate victims, they stated this may not always occur  As a result, otherwise eligible victims may not always be compensated through forfeited assets  By gathering information about the extent to which assets were used for victim compensation—including when they were not used and reasons why not—DOJ could have a better understanding of potential instances where victims could be, but are not, receiving compensation through forfeited funds and could take steps to address them accordingly  Options for gathering such information could include doing a one-time retrospective study of forfeited assets with victims or anticipated restitution to determine the extent that assets were used for victim compensation, or creating a tracking mechanism through its forfeited assets database, or another system  Gathering information on the extent to which forfeited assets were used for victim compensation, including when not used and reasons why not, could position DOJ to take action to increase the use of these assets for victim compensation if warranted  These actions could include providing funds for increased asset forfeiture staff in USAOs, providing additional training or changing policies or procedures for using forfeited assets to compensate victims  Fully and systematically understanding the extent to which issues, such as a lack of coordination within USAOs, result in victims not being compensated using forfeited assets would give DOJ a basis upon which to develop improvements to the Asset Forfeiture Program  Such information would also provide DOJ and staff at all USAOs with information to evaluate its performance in achieving one of the goals of the Asset Forfeiture Program and taking action to meet the agency goal of protecting the rights of the American people—including the right to full and fair restitution for victims  Restitution serves the criminal justice goal of holding offenders accountable and, to the extent possible, restoring victims of federal crimes to their prior position had the crime not occurred  Many victims are unlikely to receive any meaningful portion of court-ordered restitution owed to them because of offenders’ inability to pay these debts  However, the fact that restitution is difficult to collect does not negate the important responsibilities of the judiciary and DOJ to properly manage and oversee all aspects of the restitution process  By law, courts are to state why they did not order restitution and provide that information to USSC  While this information was collected and recorded in USSC data for most offenders, we found that this information was missing for thousands of offenders  It is important for the judiciary to ensure that this information is consistently collected and recorded to assist USSC in its continuous re-examination of its guidelines and policy statements and ensure that various sentencing practices are achieving their stated purposes  The judiciary could support USSC in this endeavor by determining why this information is missing  Results from this study could help inform the judiciary whether this issue rises to the level of an internal control deficiency and whether additional action can be taken to improve the transparency of sentencing decisions  While DOJ has delegated collection activities for restitution to USAOs, it could provide better oversight to ensure it is making reasonable efforts to collect restitution and meeting its responsibility to victims  USAOs have identified a significant portion of outstanding restitution debt as uncollectible, but they have also identified $10 billion of outstanding restitution debt that could be collected  Developing and implementing performance measures and goals for each USAO would allow DOJ to gauge USAOs’ success in collecting this restitution and, by extension, the department’s success in achieving its major management initiative to increase the collection of debt  Further, DOJ could use performance information to improve the practices of offices in seeking and recovering restitution, consistent with a requirement in the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016  Finally, DOJ could gain greater visibility into the use of forfeited assets to compensate victims by gathering information on cases in which victims have been identified and restitution is anticipated but forfeited assets are not used, and any reasons why  Doing so would better position DOJ to take action to increase the use of forfeited assets to compensate eligible victims if warranted and to provide assurance that it is maximizing the use of asset forfeiture in satisfying restitution debts, one of the agency’s most effective mechanisms for satisfying restitution  We are making three recommendations, including one to the judiciary and two to DOJ  Specifically: Judiciary officials, including AOUSC, USSC, and the Judicial Conference, should determine why USSC data on the reasons restitution was not ordered are incomplete  Additionally, if warranted based on this information, judiciary officials should take action to ensure USSC data records include all required information for orders of restitution  (Recommendation 1) To improve oversight of the collection of restitution we recommend that the Attorney General: Develop and implement performance measures and goals for each USAO related to the collection of restitution, and measure progress towards meeting those goals  (Recommendation 2) In cases where forfeited assets were not used to compensate victims, gather information on reasons why forfeited assets were not used for victims  If warranted based on this information, take action to increase the use of forfeited assets to compensate eligible victims  (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DOJ, the Judicial Conference of the United States, AOUSC, USSC, and the Federal Judicial Center  DOJ concurred with our recommendations and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  AOUSC provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III  In its written comments, AOUSC noted that it would work with the USSC to address our recommendation  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Attorney General, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Directors of AOUSC, the Staff Director of USSC, the Federal Judicial Center and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you and your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or goodwing@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions are listed in appendix IV  According to our analysis of data from the U S  Sentencing Commission (USSC), 214,578 federal offenders were sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016  Table 6 shows the number of offenders sentenced and the number and percentage of offenders ordered to pay restitution for each primary offense of conviction in fiscal years 2014 through 2016  The Department of Justice (DOJ) has identified and recommended numerous practices for federal prosecutors and Financial Litigation Unit (FLU) staff to use throughout the restitution process through various guidance documents  We conducted semi-structured interviews with officials from six U S  Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) to obtain their views on the restitution process and the extent to which they believed DOJ- recommended restitution practices related to the restitution process were effective  In particular, we spoke with USAO officials from the District of Connecticut; the Southern District of California; the District of New Jersey; the Southern District of Ohio; the District of South Dakota; and the District of Wyoming  Tables 7 through 9 show the results of our semi-structured interviews  In particular, table 7 shows practices related to requesting restitution and the extent to which USAO officials found these practices effective  Table 8 shows practices related to facilitating orders of restitution and the extent to which USAO officials found these practices effective  Table 9 shows practices related to collecting restitution and the extent to which USAO officials found these practices effective  Each table also indicates practices that officials we interviewed considered as most important or effective for helping ensure victims receive full and timely restitution  In addition to the contact named above, Chris Ferencik (Assistant Director); Kathleen Donovan (Analyst-in-Charge); Enyinnaya David Aja; David Alexander; Lacinda Ayers; Carla Brown; Emily Hutz; Janet Temko- Blinder; and Adam Vogt, made key contributions to this report 
Report 2:  14 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H R  1786 and H R  5539 ); and prohibit pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, H R  1789 , H R  1794 , H R  2214 , H R  4852 , H R  4870 , and S  2327 )  Legislation was introduced in the 114 th Congress to prohibit adjustments in pay (for example, H R  109 and H R  302 ); repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, H R  179 , H R  513 , H R  688 , H R  1585 , and S  17 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to congressional actions or economic indicators, including the passage of a budget resolution or existence of a deficit (for example, H Con Res  27 , S Con Res  11 , H R  92 , H R  110 , H R  174 , H R  187 , H R  3757 , H R  4814 , H R  4476 , and S  39 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H R  179 and H R  688 ); and prohibit or reduce pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, S  2074 , H R  3562 , H R  2023 , and H R  1032 )  The House budget resolution for FY2016, H Con Res  27 , included a policy statement that Congress should agree to a concurrent budget resolution each year by April 15, and if not, congressional salaries should be held in escrow (Section 819)  The statement proposed that salaries would be released from the escrow account either when a chamber agrees to a concurrent resolution on the budget or the last day of the Congress, whichever is earlier  The House agreed to this resolution on March 25, 2015, and no further action was taken  The Senate agreed to its resolution on the FY2016 budget, S Con Res  11 , on March 27, 2015, without this language  The conference report for S Con Res  11 —agreed to in the House on April 30 and in the Senate on May 5, 2015—contains a "Policy Statement on 'No Budget, No Pay'" (Section 6216), which refers to actions by the House  Legislation was introduced in the 113 th Congress to prohibit adjustments in pay (for example, H R  54 , H R  243 , H R  636 , S  18 , S  30 ); repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, H R  134 , H R  150 , H R  196 , S  65 , and H R  398 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to congressional actions or economic indicators, including passage of a budget resolution or reaching the debt limit (for example, H R  108 , H R  167 , H R  284 , H R  308 , H R  310 , H R  325 , H R  372 , H R  397 , H R  396 , H R  522 , H R  593 , H R  1884 , H R  2335 , H R  3234 , S  18 , S  30 , and S  263 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H R  37 , H R  150 , H R  391 , H R  396 , H R  398 , and H R  1467 ); prohibit pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, H R  3160 , H R  3215 , H R  3224 , H R  3234 , and H R  3236 ); and apply any sequester to Member pay (for example, S  436 , H R  1181 , H R  1478 , and H R  2677 )  H R  325 , which (1) included language holding congressional salaries in escrow if a concurrent resolution on the budget was not agreed to by April 15, 2013, and (2) provided for a temporary extension of the debt ceiling through May 18, 2013, was introduced on January 21, 2013  Salaries would have been held in escrow for Members in a chamber if that chamber had not agreed to a concurrent resolution by that date  Salaries would have been released from the escrow account either when that chamber agreed to a concurrent resolution on the budget or the last day of the 113 th Congress, whichever was earlier  H R  325 was agreed to in the House on January 23, 2013, and the Senate on January 31, 2013  It was enacted on February 4, 2013 ( P L  113-3 )  Both the House and Senate agreed to a budget resolution prior to that date, however, and salaries were not held in escrow  H R  807 , the Full Faith and Credit Act, was introduced in the House on February 25, 2013  The bill would have prioritized certain payments in the event the debt reaches the statutory limit  An amendment, H Amdt  61 , was offered on May 9, 2013, that would clarify that these obligations would not include compensation for Members of Congress  It was agreed to the same day  The bill passed the House on May 13, 2013  No further action was taken in the 113 th Congress  The House-passed version of H J Res  59 , the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2014, also contained a provision addressing actions by the Secretary of the Treasury in the event that the debt limit is reached and not raised  The provision (Section 138) would, in part, prohibit borrowing to provide pay for Members of Congress in the event that the debt reaches the statutory limit prior to December 15, 2014  The bill passed the House on September 20, 2013  It was enacted on December 26, 2013, without this section  Legislation was introduced in the 112 th Congress to repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, S  133 , S  148 , H R  187 , H R  235 , H R  246 , H R  343 , H R  431 , H R  3673 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to other action or economic indicators (for example, H R  124 , H R  172 , H R  236 , H R  994 , H R  1454 , H R  3136 , H R  3565 , H R  3774 , H R  3799 , H R  3883 , H R  4036 , H R  6438 , S  1442 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H R  204 , H R  270 , H R  335 , H R  1012 , H R  4399 ); otherwise alter or restrict pay for Members under certain conditions (for example, H R  6108 ); and freeze Member pay (for example, S  1931 , S  1936 , S  2065 , S  2079 , S  2210 , H R  3858 , H R  6474 , H R  6720 , H R  6721 , H R  6722 )  Legislation was also introduced in the 112 th Congress that would have affected Member pay in the event of a lapse of appropriations resulting in a government shutdown  These included H R  819 , H R  1255 , H R  1305 , H Con Res  56 , and S  388   The Senate passed S  388 on March 1, 2011  The bill would have prohibited Members of the House and Senate from receiving pay, including retroactive pay, for each day that there is a lapse in appropriations or the federal government is unable to make payments or meet obligations because of the public debt limit  The House passed H R  1255 on April 1, 2011  The bill would have prohibited the disbursement of pay to Members of the House and Senate during either of these situations  No further action was taken on either bill  On April 8, 2011, the Speaker of the House issued a "Dear Colleague" letter indicating that in the event of a shutdown, Members of Congress would continue to be paid pursuant to the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, which as stated above, states: "No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened"—although Members could elect to return any compensation to the Treasury  Additional legislation to prohibit any Member pay adjustment in 2013 was introduced but not enacted in the 112 th Congress, including the following: Section 5421(b)(1) of H R  3630 , as introduced in the House, would have prohibited any adjustment for Members of Congress prior to December 31, 2013  Section 706 of the motion to recommit also contained language freezing Member pay  On December 13, 2011, the motion to recommit failed (183-244, roll call #922), and the bill passed the House (234-193, roll call #923)  The House-passed version of the bill was titled the "Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011 " The Senate substitute amendment, which did not address pay adjustments, passed on December 17  It was titled the "Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 " The bill was enacted on February 22, 2012 ( P L  112-96 ), without the pay freeze language  H R  3835 , introduced on January 27, 2012, also would have extended the pay freeze for federal employees, including Members of Congress, to December 31, 2013  This bill passed the House on February 1, 2012  H R  6726 , introduced on January 1, 2013, would have extended the pay freeze for federal employees, including Members of Congress, to December 31, 2013  This bill passed the House on January 2, 2013  Table 1 provides a history of the salaries of Members of Congress since 1789  For each salary rate, both the effective date and the statutory authority are provided  Table 2 provides information on pay adjustments for Members since 1992, which was the first full year after the Ethics Reform Act that Representatives and Senators received the same salary  The table provides the projected percentage changes under the formula based on the Employment Cost Index and the actual percentage adjustment  The differences between the projected and actual Member pay adjustments resulted from the enactment of legislation preventing the increase (adjustments for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019); limits on the percentage increase of Member pay because of the percentage increase in GS base pay (adjustments for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019); and a combination of the above  In some years, the percentage adjustment for Member pay would have been lowered to match the percentage adjustment in GS base pay if Congress had not passed legislation denying the adjustment (adjustments for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019)  If Members of Congress had received every adjustment prescribed by the ECI formula since 1992, and the 2 U S C  §4501 limitation regarding the percentage base pay increase for GS employees remained unchanged, the 2019 salary would be $210,900  Table 3 lists the laws which have previously delayed or prohibited Member pay adjustments, the dates these laws were enacted, and the text of the provision  While many of the bills in this list are appropriations bills, a prohibition on Member pay adjustments could be included in any bill, or be introduced as a separate bill  Figure 1 , which follows, shows the salary of Members of Congress in current and constant (inflation adjusted) dollars since 1992  It shows that Member salaries, when adjusted for inflation, decreased 15% from 2009 until 2019 

ground_truth: Wildlife trafficking—the poaching and illegal trade of plants, fish, and wildlife—is a multibillion-dollar, global criminal activity that imperils thousands of species. FWS and NOAA enforce laws prohibiting wildlife trafficking that authorize the agencies to pay financial rewards for information about such illegal activities. GAO was asked to review FWS's and NOAA's use of financial rewards to combat wildlife trafficking. This report examines (1) laws that authorize FWS and NOAA to pay rewards for information on wildlife trafficking and the extent to which the agencies paid such rewards from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, (2) the agencies' reward policies, (3) information available to the public on rewards, and (4) the extent to which the agencies reviewed the effectiveness of their use of rewards. GAO reviewed laws, examined FWS and NOAA policies and public communications on rewards, analyzed agency reward data for fiscal years 2007 through 2017 and assessed their reliability, interviewed FWS and NOAA officials, and compared agency policies and public communications on rewards to federal internal control standards. Multiple laws—such as the Endangered Species Act and Lacey Act—authorize the Departments of the Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to pay rewards for information on wildlife trafficking. FWS and NOAA reported paying few rewards from fiscal years 2007 through 2017. Specifically, the agencies collectively reported paying 27 rewards, totaling $205,500. Agency officials said that the information was complete to the best of their knowledge but could not sufficiently assure that this information represented all of their reward payments. FWS and NOAA have reward policies that outline the general process for preparing reward proposals, but FWS's policy does not specify factors for its agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts. Some FWS agents GAO interviewed said that in developing proposals, they did not know whether their proposed reward amounts were enough, too little, or too much. By augmenting its policy to specify factors for agents to consider, FWS can better ensure that its agents have the necessary quality information to prepare proposed reward amounts, consistent with federal internal control standards. FWS and NOAA communicate little information to the public on rewards. For example, most agency websites did not indicate that providing information on wildlife trafficking could qualify for a reward. This is inconsistent with federal standards that call for management to communicate quality information so that external parties can help achieve agency objectives. FWS and NOAA officials said they have not communicated general reward information because of workload concerns, but they said it may be reasonable to provide more information in some instances. By developing plans to communicate more reward information to the public, the agencies can improve their chances of obtaining information on wildlife trafficking that they otherwise might not receive. FWS and NOAA have not reviewed the effectiveness of their use of rewards. The agencies have not done so because using rewards has generally not been a priority. FWS and NOAA officials agreed that such a review would be worthwhile but provided no plans for doing so. By reviewing the effectiveness of their use of rewards, FWS and NOAA can identify opportunities to improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking. GAO is making seven recommendations, including that FWS and NOAA track reward information, FWS augment its reward policy to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts, FWS and NOAA develop plans to communicate more reward information to the public, and FWS and NOAA review the effectiveness of their reward use. Both agencies concurred with these recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: As reported by the United Nations, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other organizations, wildlife trafficking networks span the globe  These organizations have attempted to measure the value of illegally traded wildlife, but available estimates are subject to uncertainty  In 2016, for example, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reported that various sources estimated the global scale of illegal wildlife trade to be from $7 billion to $23 billion annually  UNEP also estimated that the scale of wildlife crime has increased in recent years in part based on a rise in environmental crime  U S  trade in wildlife and related products includes a variety of species, such as live reptiles, birds, and mammals, as well as elephant ivory, according to law enforcement reports and government and nongovernmental officials  FWS and NOAA data on wildlife products seized at U S  ports provide examples of the diversity of illegally traded plants, fish, and wildlife imported into or exported from the United States  For example, from 2007 to 2016, the top 10 plant, fish, and wildlife shipments seized nationally by FWS were coral, crocodiles, conchs, deer, pythons, sea turtles, mollusks, ginseng, clams, and seahorses  During that time, FWS reported that more than one-third of the wildlife shipments it seized were confiscated while being imported from or exported to Mexico (14 percent), China (13 percent), or Canada (9 percent)  FWS and NOAA law enforcement offices are responsible for enforcing certain laws and treaties prohibiting wildlife trafficking  FWS Office of Law Enforcement  This office enforces certain U S  laws and regulations as well as treaties prohibiting the trafficking of terrestrial wildlife, freshwater species, and birds  Among other things, the office aims to prevent the unlawful import, export, and interstate commerce of foreign fish and wildlife, as well as to protect U S  plants, fish, and wildlife from unlawful exploitation  As of fiscal year 2016, the office had a budget of $74 7 million and employed 205 special agents to investigate wildlife crime, including international and domestic wildlife trafficking rings  Most of these special agents report to one of eight regional offices, which receive national oversight, support, training, and policy guidance from the FWS Office of Law Enforcement headquarters  The office’s headquarters houses a special investigative unit focused on conducting complex, large- scale criminal investigations of wildlife traffickers  In addition, the FWS Office of Law Enforcement has deployed special agents to serve as international attachés at seven U S  embassies  These attachés provide countertrafficking expertise to embassy staff, work with host government officials to build law enforcement capacity, and contribute directly to casework or criminal investigations of wildlife traffickers  According to FWS data, the FWS Office of Law Enforcement opened more than 7,000 investigations on wildlife trafficking and other illegal activities in fiscal year 2016, including nearly 5,000 cases involving Endangered Species Act violations and nearly 1,500 cases involving Lacey Act violations  FWS Office of Law Enforcement investigations have disrupted wildlife trafficking operations  For example, Operation Crash—an ongoing rhino horn and elephant ivory-trafficking investigation launched in 2011—has led to over 30 convictions and more than $2 million in fines  NOAA Office of Law Enforcement  This office enforces certain U S  laws and regulations as well as treaties prohibiting the trafficking of marine wildlife, including fish, as well as anadromous fish  Among other things, the office aims to prevent the illegal, unregulated, and unreported harvesting and trade of fish as well as the trafficking of protected marine wildlife  As of fiscal year 2016, the office had a budget of $68 6 million and employed 77 special agents to investigate wildlife crimes within its jurisdiction  These agents report to one of five regional offices, and those offices receive national oversight, support, and policy guidance from the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement headquarters  According to NOAA data, the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement initiated more than 5,000 investigations in fiscal year 2016  About half of those investigations involved violations of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, as amended, and some of the 5,000 investigations involved violations of the Endangered Species Act or the Lacey Act  NOAA Office of Law Enforcement investigations have disrupted wildlife trafficking operations  For example, in fiscal year 2016, a NOAA Office of Law Enforcement investigation led to the conviction of a company and five individuals for illegally trafficking whale bone carvings, walrus ivory carvings, black coral carvings, and other products derived from protected species into the United States  The FWS and NOAA law enforcement offices collaborate with other government agencies and organizations to combat wildlife trafficking  Both agencies work with other federal, state, and tribal law enforcement officers as well as their international counterparts as needed during wildlife trafficking investigations  For example, FWS and NOAA work with U S  Customs and Border Protection, U S  Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U S  Department of Agriculture to maintain import and export controls and interdict smuggled wildlife and related products at U S  ports of entry  In addition, FWS and NOAA collaborate with Department of Justice prosecutors on criminal cases that result from agency investigations  Both agencies also collaborate with nongovernmental organizations to combat wildlife trafficking  For example, FWS and NOAA officials said that nongovernmental organizations have, in some cases, offered financial rewards (in addition to rewards offered by FWS and NOAA) for information on a wildlife crime  In addition, some nongovernmental organizations proactively provide information to FWS and NOAA on wildlife trafficking activities in the United States or foreign countries that violate U S  laws  For example, in 2017, a nongovernmental organization created a website to collect tips on wildlife crime and to connect the sources of those tips with relevant U S  authorities for potential financial rewards  FWS may pay financial rewards from moneys in two accounts  Law Enforcement Reward Account  FWS may pay rewards under the Endangered Species Act, the Lacey Act, and the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act from moneys in the agency’s Law Enforcement Reward Account  The moneys in this account come from fines, penalties, and proceeds from forfeited property for violations of these three laws  According to FWS officials, these moneys are available until expended  These moneys can be used to (1) pay financial rewards to those who provide information that leads to an arrest, criminal conviction, civil penalty assessment, or forfeiture of property for any violation of the Endangered Species Act, the Lacey Act, or the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act or (2) provide temporary care for plants, fish, or wildlife that are the subject of a civil or criminal proceeding under the Endangered Species Act, Lacey Act, or the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act  As of the beginning of fiscal year 2017, the balance of the Law Enforcement Reward Account was about $7 million  Law Enforcement Special Funds Account  FWS may also pay rewards from moneys in its law enforcement office’s Special Funds Account  The moneys in this account come from an annual line item appropriation and are available until expended  Since fiscal year 1988, this appropriation has provided FWS up to $400,000 each year to pay for information, rewards, or evidence concerning violations of laws FWS administers, as well as miscellaneous and emergency expenses of enforcement activity that the Secretary of the Interior authorized or approved  NOAA generally pays rewards from moneys available in the Fisheries Enforcement Asset Forfeiture Fund  The moneys in this account come from fines, penalties, and proceeds from forfeited property for violations of marine resource laws that NOAA enforces, including the Magnuson- Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Lacey Act  According to NOAA officials, moneys are available until expended and can be used to pay certain enforcement- related expenses, including travel expenses, equipment purchases, and the payment of financial rewards  As of the beginning of fiscal year 2017, the Fisheries Enforcement Asset Forfeiture Fund had a balance of about $18 million  Academic literature on the use of financial rewards to combat illegal activities and stakeholders we interviewed identified several advantages and disadvantages of using financial rewards to obtain information on wildlife trafficking  Potential advantages of using financial rewards include the following: Providing incentives  The potential for a financial reward can motivate people with information to come forward when they otherwise might not do so  Increasing public awareness  Financial rewards may bring greater public attention to the problem of wildlife trafficking, including federal efforts to combat wildlife trafficking  Saving resources  Using financial rewards may save agency resources by enabling agents to get information sooner and at a lower cost than they could have through their own efforts  Potential disadvantages of using financial rewards include the following: Eliciting false or unproductive leads  Financial rewards may generate false or unproductive leads  Affecting witness credibility  Financial rewards may lead to a source’s credibility being challenged at trial by defense attorneys since sources receive compensation for the information they provide  Consuming resources  The potential for a financial reward may create a flood of tips that take agency time and resources to follow up on or corroborate  Outside of wildlife trafficking, multiple federal agencies and federal courts are authorized to pay financial rewards for information on illegal activities under certain circumstances  For example, U S  Customs and Border Protection—which controls, regulates, and facilitates the import and export of goods through U S  ports of entry—is authorized, under certain circumstances, to pay rewards for original information about violations of any laws that it enforces  The Department of State may also pay rewards under certain circumstances, including for information leading to the disruption of financial mechanisms of a transnational criminal group  Similarly, the U S  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may pay rewards for information about violations of federal securities laws and the underpayment of taxes, respectively, if certain conditions are met  Federal judges may award money to persons who give information leading to convictions for violating treaties, laws, and regulations that prohibit certain pollution from ships, including oil and garbage discharges  FWS and NOAA officials identified multiple laws, such as the Endangered Species Act and the Lacey Act, that authorize the payment of financial rewards to people who provide information on wildlife trafficking  FWS and NOAA reported paying few financial rewards under these laws from fiscal years 2007 through 2017  However, agency officials could not provide sufficient assurance that the reward information they provided to us represented all of their reward payments for this period  FWS and NOAA officials identified over 10 laws prohibiting wildlife trafficking—including the Endangered Species Act, Lacey Act, and Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act—that specifically authorize the payment of financial rewards in certain circumstances to people who provide information on violations of the law (see app  II for a complete list of the laws)  These laws provide discretion to the agencies to choose whether to pay rewards but have varying requirements for who is eligible to receive a reward and the payment amounts  For example, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act caps rewards at $2,500 for information that leads to a conviction  In contrast, the Endangered Species Act does not cap reward amounts and authorizes rewards for information that leads to a conviction as well as to an arrest, civil penalty, or forfeiture of property  Table 1 identifies the laws that FWS and NOAA officials indicated they have used to pay financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, along with information on these laws’ requirements for payment of rewards  FWS and NOAA reported paying few financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, but agency officials could not provide sufficient assurance that this information was complete  Officials from both agencies said that their agencies have not prioritized the use of rewards, and they believed that the reward information they identified—such as the number, dollar amount, and year that rewards were paid—appropriately captured the few reward payments they made during this time frame  Based on the agencies’ reviews of their records, FWS reported paying 25 rewards for a total of $184,500 from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, and NOAA reported paying 2 rewards for a total of $21,000 during that same period (see table 2)  See appendix III for additional details on the cases where financial rewards were paid  FWS reported paying rewards in trafficking cases involving a variety of wildlife species, such as eagles, bears, reptiles, and mollusks, across the 11-year period  FWS officials said they generally paid rewards to thank sources who proactively provided information  For example, based on our review of a reward case, FWS paid a reward in 2010 because the source provided information that was crucial in uncovering an attempt to illegally traffic leopards into the United States from South Africa  FWS would not have known about this illegal activity if the source had not come forward with the information  In several cases we reviewed, FWS officials said that the sources did not know about the possibility of receiving a reward when they contacted the agency with information  The two rewards NOAA reported paying from fiscal years 2007 through 2017 involved the illegal trafficking of sea scallops and a green sea turtle  NOAA officials said that in both cases they paid a reward to thank the source who proactively provided information to law enforcement agents  For example, the agent who investigated the sea scallop case reported requesting the reward because the information the source proactively provided was timely, credible, and led to the criminal conviction of several individuals  FWS and NOAA officials could not provide sufficient assurance that the reward information they reported to us represented all of the rewards their agencies had paid from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, but they said the information was complete to the best of their knowledge  Specifically, FWS and NOAA officials said they track all their expenditures, including reward payments, in their financial databases  However, they are not able to readily identify reward payments because their financial systems do not include a unique identifier for such payments and their reward information is located in multiple databases and formats  As a result, FWS and NOAA officials said they identified the rewards they reported to us by manually reviewing their financial and law enforcement records  In particular, FWS officials said they reviewed their paper records to identify instances when the agency paid rewards and then retrieved additional information from their financial and law enforcement databases, such as final payment amounts  NOAA officials said they identified instances when the agency paid rewards by using a combination of paper and electronic records located at NOAA’s headquarters office  NOAA officials also contacted their regions to obtain additional information located at the regional offices to confirm information about the rewards NOAA had paid  Seventeen stakeholders we interviewed who had experience investigating wildlife trafficking or expertise in using financial rewards as a law enforcement tool said that it would be useful for FWS and NOAA to maintain comprehensive information on the rewards they paid  For example, two stakeholders said that maintaining comprehensive information and making that information available to law enforcement agents could motivate agents to make greater use of rewards as a law enforcement tool  Two other stakeholders said that maintaining information on and monitoring reward use would allow the agencies to make ongoing adjustments, such as adjusting payment amounts, to make the most effective use of rewards in combating wildlife trafficking  Federal internal control standards say that management should clearly document internal control and all transactions and other significant events in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination  Control activities can be implemented in either an automated or a manual manner, but automated control activities tend to be more reliable because they are less susceptible to human error and are typically more efficient  FWS and NOAA officials agreed that maintaining reward information so that complete information is easily retrievable may be beneficial  FWS officials said having clearly documented and readily available reward information could improve how they manage rewards and enable them to monitor and examine their use of rewards more holistically  The officials said they may analyze options for creating a single repository for reward information but did not commit to doing so  They said that creating a single repository for reward information may involve some drawbacks, such as duplicating some data entry in separate databases  Similarly, NOAA officials said having clearly documented and readily available reward information would provide agency management with easier and more consistent access to that information  As a result, they said that they are exploring modifications to their financial and law enforcement databases to better identify and track rewards  For example, NOAA officials said they may be able to create a unique identifier to flag payments that are for rewards in their financial system to enable them to identify payment amounts more easily  NOAA officials did not provide a time frame for completing modifications to their financial system  By tracking reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination, FWS and NOAA can better ensure that they have complete information on the rewards they have paid to help manage their use of rewards as a law enforcement tool  FWS and NOAA have policies to guide their law enforcement agents on the process for preparing and submitting a request to pay a financial reward  Specifically, both agencies’ policies call for agents to include a description of the case, the nature of the information that the source provided, a justification for providing a reward, and an explanation of how a proposed reward amount was developed  These policies also outline the general review and approval process, how payments are to be made upon approval of a request, and eligibility criteria to receive a reward  For example, FWS and NOAA policies prohibit paying rewards to foreign government officials as well as paying rewards to any person whose receipt of a reward would create a conflict of interest or the appearance of impropriety  NOAA’s policy explicitly states that the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement is to use statutorily authorized rewards as a tool to obtain information from the public on resource violations and that rewards can help promote compliance with marine resource laws  NOAA’s policy suggests that agents consider advertising reward offers to assist investigations, encourages press releases, and describes the process agents should follow to do so  Moreover, NOAA’s policy specifies factors that agents might include in their reward requests to support the proposed reward, such as (1) the benefit to the marine resources that was furthered by the information provided; (2) the risk, if any, the individual took in collecting and providing the information; (3) the probability that the investigation would have been successfully concluded without the information provided; and (4) the relationship between any fines or other collections and the information provided  FWS’s policy specifies that rewards may be provided in situations in which an individual furnishes essential information leading to an arrest, conviction, civil penalty, or forfeiture of property  However, it does not discuss the usefulness of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool or the types of circumstances when rewards should be used or advertised to the public  Further, FWS’s policy does not communicate necessary quality information internally that agents may need when deciding to request the payment of rewards  In particular, it does not specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts  Instead, the policy leaves it to the discretion of field and regional agents to develop proposed reward amounts within any limitations specified in law  Some FWS agents we interviewed said that they developed proposed reward amounts on a case-by-case basis and did not know whether their proposed amounts were enough, too little, or too much  In addition, some agents said that because FWS’s policy does not specify factors for agents to consider, the reward approval process is subjective and unclear and this has made it challenging for the agents to develop proposed reward amounts  For example, one agent we interviewed said he submitted a request to his supervisor to pay a $10,000 reward to a source who provided information on a major wildlife trafficker  But, for reasons unknown to the agent, his supervisor reduced the amount to $1,000  FWS headquarters officials said field agents submit reward requests to headquarters for approval, and these officials were not aware of instances of proposed reward amounts being changed or denied during the review process  Seven of the 20 stakeholders we interviewed suggested that FWS augment its reward policy to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts  For example, helpful factors to consider when developing a proposed reward amount may include (1) the number of hours the source dedicated to the case, (2) the risk the source took in providing the information, (3) the significance of the information provided by the source, and (4) the amount of fines or other penalties collected as a result of the information  Two stakeholders expressed concern that some of FWS’s reward payments were insufficient, especially when comparing the amount of time and effort or the risk a source faced in providing the information  A couple of stakeholders also said that without a policy that specifies factors for agents to consider, reward amounts may be subjective and could vary depending on which agent develops the reward proposal  Another stakeholder said that it was important to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts so that the agency has a reasonable and defensible basis for the reward amounts it pays across cases  According to federal standards for internal control, management should internally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve an agency’s objectives  For example, management communicates quality information down and across reporting lines to enable personnel to make key decisions  FWS officials said they believe that their reward policy is sound, indicating they believe that law enforcement agents have the information they need to develop proposals for reward amounts in cases where rewards are warranted  However, they also agreed that it may be helpful to review their policy but did not commit to doing so  By augmenting its policy to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts, FWS can better ensure that its agents have the necessary quality information to prepare defensible reward proposals  Based on our review of the agencies’ websites and other communications, we found that FWS and NOAA communicate little information to the public on financial rewards for reporting information on wildlife trafficking, such as the potential availability of rewards and eligibility criteria  Specifically, some FWS and NOAA law enforcement websites provided information to the public on ways to report violations of the laws that the agencies are responsible for enforcing, such as via tip lines  Some of the websites also provided examples of the types of information the public can report, such as photos or other documentation of illegal activities  However, most of the agencies’ websites did not indicate that providing information on illegal activities could result in a reward  In contrast, the FWS Alaska regional office’s website provided information on the potential availability of rewards and ways the public may submit information for a potential reward  For example, this website provided phone numbers and an e-mail address for the public to use when submitting information  Figure 1 shows the information available on FWS’s and NOAA’s national and regional websites relevant to reporting violations of the laws the agencies enforce in general and on receiving rewards in particular  In addition, FWS and NOAA headquarters officials said their field agents have used other means to communicate the potential availability of rewards in specific cases when the agents had no other information that could help solve those cases  For example, a FWS field official said that the agency advertised a reward offer for information on a case of bald eagle killings by distributing reward posters and posting news releases in the vicinity where the killings occurred  Similarly, NOAA officials said they have advertised reward offers through various means, including circulating reward posters in specific geographic areas after an illegal activity has occurred  Figure 2 shows a reward poster that NOAA distributed in Guam in 2017 advertising a $1,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of sea turtle poachers  Instead of having a plan for communicating general information to the public on rewards, FWS and NOAA grant discretion to their regional offices and law enforcement agents to determine the type and level of communication to provide, according to FWS and NOAA policies  FWS officials explained that because they typically use financial rewards to thank individuals who come forward on their own accord—rather than using rewards to incentivize individuals with information to come forward—they have not seen the need to communicate more information to the public on the potential availability of rewards  NOAA officials said they have targeted their communications on rewards by publicizing reward offers for specific cases where they do not have leads  They added that they want to receive quality information and already receive a substantial amount of information from sources who reach out to them proactively, so NOAA has not seen the need to communicate more information to the public on the potential availability of rewards  Sixteen of the 20 stakeholders we interviewed said that it would be useful for FWS and NOAA to advertise the potential availability of financial rewards  Several stakeholders said that if the public does not know about the possibility for rewards, then some people with information may not be incentivized to come forward  Two stakeholders added that agencies should carefully consider how and which reward information to communicate to the public so that people who are most likely to have information on illegal wildlife trafficking learn about the potential for rewards  For example, one stakeholder suggested advertising rewards at ports where international shipments are offloaded or placing advertisements at wildlife trafficking nodes, such as entrances to African wildlife refuges  This stakeholder suggested advertising rewards along with wildlife trafficking awareness-raising posters that nongovernment organizations place in some airports  In addition, 14 stakeholders suggested that it would be useful for FWS and NOAA to provide information to the public on the process for submitting information to potentially receive rewards  Several other stakeholders said that it is important for the public to understand whether they may be eligible for a reward, how to submit information, and whether or to what extent their confidentiality will be protected  Another stakeholder provided examples of how other agencies provide information about their reward programs on their websites  SEC and IRS, for instance, use their websites to communicate information to the public on the process for reporting illegal activity for financial rewards  This information includes the types of information to report, confidentiality rules, eligibility criteria, and the process for submitting information to obtain a reward  In addition, the Department of State posts instructions on its websites on how to submit information on an illegal activity and potentially receive a reward  Federal internal control standards say that management should externally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve an agency’s objectives  For example, using appropriate methods to communicate, management communicates quality information so that external parties, such as the public, can help the agency achieve its objectives  This could include communicating information to the public on the types of information and eligibility requirements for potentially receiving rewards for reporting information on wildlife trafficking  FWS officials said that making more reward information available could lead to a significant increase in the amount of information the agency receives, which, in turn, could strain FWS’s resources in following up on that information  However, FWS officials also agreed that it was reasonable to consider making more reward information available to relevant members of the public, particularly in targeted circumstances, but did not commit to doing so  Similarly, NOAA officials said they had some concerns about the additional resources it might take to investigate potentially unreliable or false tips that may result if they make reward information broadly available to the public, but they agreed that it would be reasonable for the agency to consider doing so  NOAA officials also said they may consider making more reward information publicly available at the conclusion of our audit but provided no plans for doing so  By determining the types of additional information to communicate to the public on rewards—such as providing information on the agency’s website on the potential availability of rewards—and then developing and implementing plans to do so, FWS and NOAA can improve their chances of obtaining information on wildlife trafficking activities that they otherwise might not receive  FWS and NOAA have not reviewed the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards or considered whether any changes might improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking  FWS officials said their agency has not reviewed or considered changes to its use of rewards because the agency has not prioritized the use of rewards  NOAA officials said their agency has not focused on using rewards or identified the need to review its use of this tool, particularly in light of other, higher mission priorities  Nine of the 20 stakeholders we interviewed said that FWS and NOAA should review the effectiveness of their use of rewards and consider potential improvements  Several stakeholders said that it would be useful for FWS and NOAA to compare their respective approaches to those of federal agencies that use rewards in contexts outside of wildlife trafficking to identify best practices or lessons learned that might be applicable in the context of combating wildlife trafficking  For example, one stakeholder said that SEC has an effective whistleblower program and may have lessons learned that are relevant for FWS and NOAA to consider  Another stakeholder we interviewed separately indicated that in 2010, before SEC had a whistleblower program that publicized rewards and provided detailed instructions on how members of the public could report information on illegal activities, SEC received few tips  Once SEC implemented a whistleblower program that publicized rewards and provided detailed instructions on its public website, the agency’s use of the program grew substantially, according to the stakeholder  Other stakeholders said it would be useful for the agencies to consider potential improvements to their use of rewards, such as making a standing reward offer for information on wildlife trafficking targeted at high-priority endangered species or particular criminal networks  Two of these stakeholders said such an offer might improve FWS’s and NOAA’s use of rewards by generating more tips than reward offers focused on individual cases  At the same time, they said such an offer would likely filter out some of the false or unproductive tips that the agencies might receive if they made an untargeted standing reward offer  Federal internal control standards state that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks by, for example, conducting reviews at the functional or activity level by comparing actual performance to planned or expected results and analyzing significant differences  Further, under the standards, management should periodically review policies, procedures, and related control activities for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving an agency’s objectives or addressing related risks  FWS and NOAA officials agreed that reviewing the effectiveness of their use of rewards would be worthwhile  Specifically, FWS officials said that it would be useful to compare their approach to those of other federal agencies that use rewards in investigating crimes that involve interstate and foreign smuggling of goods  Similarly, NOAA officials said that reviewing the agency’s use of financial rewards would be worthwhile but cautioned that such a review would need to be balanced against the agency’s constrained resources and many mission requirements  FWS and NOAA officials said they may consider conducting such a review at the conclusion of our audit but provided no plans for doing so  By reviewing the effectiveness of their use of rewards, FWS and NOAA can identify opportunities to improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking  Wildlife trafficking is a large and growing transnational criminal activity, with global environmental, security, and economic consequences  The federal government has emphasized strengthening law enforcement efforts to combat wildlife trafficking, and using financial rewards to obtain information on illegal activities is one tool that some federal agencies have used  However, to date, FWS and NOAA have not prioritized the use of rewards and were unable to provide sufficient assurance that the 27 rewards they paid during fiscal years 2007 through 2017 represented all of the rewards they provided during that period  By tracking reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination, FWS and NOAA can better ensure that they have complete information on the rewards they have paid to help manage their use of rewards as a law enforcement tool  Additionally, FWS and NOAA have policies outlining the processes their law enforcement agents are to use in making reward payments, and NOAA’s policy specifies factors for its agents to consider in developing proposed reward amounts, such as the risk the individual took in collecting the information  FWS’s policy does not specify such factors that could inform agents in achieving the agency’s objectives, which is not consistent with federal internal control standards  By augmenting its policy to specify factors for its agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts, FWS can better ensure that its agents have the necessary quality information to prepare defensible reward proposals  Both agencies have also advertised the potential for rewards in specific cases when agents had no other information, but FWS and NOAA have otherwise communicated little information to the public on the potential availability of rewards  If the public does not know about the possibility of rewards, then some people with information may not be incentivized to come forward  By determining the types of additional information to communicate to the public on rewards—such as providing information on the agency’s website about the potential availability of rewards—and then developing and implementing plans to do so, FWS and NOAA can improve their chances of obtaining information on wildlife trafficking activities that they otherwise might not receive  Finally, FWS and NOAA have not reviewed the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards or considered whether any changes might improve the usefulness of rewards as a law enforcement tool  By undertaking such reviews, the agencies can identify opportunities to improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking  We are making a total of seven recommendations, including four to FWS and three to NOAA  Specifically: The Assistant Director of the FWS Office of Law Enforcement should track financial reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination  (Recommendation 1) The Director of the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement should track financial reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination  (Recommendation 2) The Assistant Director of the FWS Office of Law Enforcement should augment FWS’s financial reward policy to specify factors law enforcement agents are to consider when developing proposed reward amounts  (Recommendation 3) The Assistant Director of the FWS Office of Law Enforcement should determine the types of additional information to communicate to the public on financial rewards and then develop and implement a plan for communicating that information  (Recommendation 4) The Director of the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement should determine the types of additional information to communicate to the public on financial rewards and then develop and implement a plan for communicating that information  (Recommendation 5) The Assistant Director of the FWS Office of Law Enforcement should review the effectiveness of the agency’s use of financial rewards and implement any changes that the agency determines would improve the usefulness of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool  (Recommendation 6) The Director of the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement should review the effectiveness of the agency’s use of financial rewards and implement any changes that the agency determines would improve the usefulness of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool  (Recommendation 7) We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Departments of Commerce and the Interior  The departments transmitted written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes IV and V of this report  The Department of Commerce concurred with the three recommendations directed to NOAA and stated that NOAA is developing procedures to ensure that its rewards are closely tracked, clearly documented, and better communicated  In written comments from NOAA, NOAA stated the report fairly and thoroughly reviews NOAA’s use of financial rewards  NOAA outlined the steps it plans to take in response to our recommendations, including developing a procedure to track financial reward information, reviewing information currently disseminated to the public and evaluating whether additional information may be useful, and reviewing the agency’s reward policy to determine whether changes are needed to enhance reward effectiveness  In its written comments, the Department of the Interior concurred with the four recommendations directed to FWS  Interior stated that it appreciated our review of the challenges faced by FWS’s Office of Law Enforcement in combating wildlife trafficking and identifying areas where FWS and NOAA can improve the use of financial rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking  Interior also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and of Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI  The objectives of our review were to (1) identify laws that authorize the U S  Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to pay financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking and the extent to which these agencies paid such rewards from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, (2) evaluate FWS’s and NOAA’s policies on financial rewards, (3) evaluate the information available to the public on financial rewards, and (4) determine the extent to which FWS and NOAA reviewed the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards in combating wildlife trafficking  To address these objectives, we reviewed academic literature on the use of financial rewards to combat illegal activities and United Nations Environment Programme reports on the scope and scale of wildlife trafficking  We also interviewed officials from federal agencies that play a role in combating wildlife trafficking or manage programs that pay financial rewards for information on illegal activities  Specifically, we interviewed officials from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, the Interior, Justice, and State, as well as officials from the Internal Revenue Service, the U S  Securities and Exchange Commission, and the U S  Agency for International Development  In addition, we reviewed documentation that the Department of the Treasury provided on its role in paying financial rewards  We did not compare FWS’s and NOAA’s use of financial rewards in combating wildlife trafficking to federal agencies’ use of financial rewards in other contexts because the different contexts are not directly comparable  However, we reviewed information on other federal agencies’ use of financial rewards as examples of how financial rewards are used in contexts outside of wildlife trafficking  In addition, we interviewed representatives of six nongovernmental organizations that we selected based on those organizations’ knowledge or experience in combating wildlife trafficking  Specifically, we interviewed representatives from the Elephant Action League, the Environmental Investigation Agency, the National Association of Conservation Law Enforcement Chiefs, the National Whistleblower Center, TRAFFIC, and the World Wildlife Fund  To identify laws that authorize FWS and NOAA to pay financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking, we asked FWS and NOAA attorneys to compile a list of laws that each of their agencies implements or enforces that prohibit wildlife trafficking and authorize the agency to pay rewards for providing information about trafficking  We then compared that list to the results of our search of the United States Code for such laws  We also reviewed FWS and NOAA documentation for accounts where the fines, penalties, and proceeds from forfeited property that are used to pay rewards are deposited as well as the accounts where appropriations available to pay rewards were deposited  To identify the extent to which FWS and NOAA have paid financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking, we analyzed FWS and NOAA data on financial rewards the agencies reported paying from fiscal years 2007 through 2017  The data included information on, among other things, the fiscal years in which rewards were paid, laws under which rewards were paid, types of wildlife involved in those cases, the amounts of civil penalties or criminal fines imposed in those cases, the numbers of arrests and convictions as a result of those cases, and whether reward recipients were individuals or groups and U S  or foreign citizens  To assess the reliability of the data FWS and NOAA provided on financial rewards, we interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data and compared the data to case records the agencies provided  Specifically, FWS and NOAA officials said they track all expenditures, including reward payments, in their financial databases, but they are not able to readily identify reward payments because their financial systems do not include a unique identifier for such payments and their reward information is located in multiple databases and formats  As a result, FWS and NOAA officials said they identified the rewards that they reported to us by manually reviewing their financial and law enforcement records, and officials said the information was complete to the best of their knowledge  Based on these steps, we found the data that the agencies provided to us to be sufficiently reliable for reporting information on the rewards the agencies reported paying  However, as we discuss in the report, FWS and NOAA officials could not provide sufficient assurance that the data included all the financial rewards that they had paid from fiscal years 2007 through 2017  To obtain additional detail about cases where financial rewards were paid, we reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 10 wildlife trafficking cases  We selected these cases based on the agency that investigated the case (to include both FWS and NOAA cases), the amount of the reward paid in the case (to reflect both low and high amounts), the year in which the reward was paid (to include rewards paid more recently), and the type of wildlife trafficked in the case (to include both fish and wildlife cases—there were no plant trafficking cases to select)  While the findings from our review cannot be generalized to cases we did not select and review, they illustrate how FWS and NOAA have used financial rewards in wildlife trafficking cases  To evaluate FWS and NOAA policies on financial rewards, we reviewed relevant FWS and NOAA policies and compared them to each other; interviewed FWS and NOAA officials about those policies; and compared the information in the policies with federal internal control standards on information and communication  To evaluate information available to the public on rewards, we reviewed relevant FWS and NOAA publications and examples of communications to the public on the availability of rewards in specific cases and interviewed FWS and NOAA officials  We also reviewed information available on FWS’s and NOAA’s national and regional websites as of December 2017 and January 2018, respectively, relevant to reporting violations of the laws that the agencies enforce in general and on receiving rewards in particular  We compared the agencies’ public communications on rewards with federal internal control standards on information and communication  To evaluate the extent to which FWS and NOAA reviewed the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards in combating wildlife trafficking, we interviewed FWS and NOAA officials and requested any reviews the agencies had conducted regarding their use of financial rewards to compare with federal internal control standards on control activities  FWS and NOAA did not have any such reviews to provide  In addition, for all four objectives, we interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 20 stakeholders who had experience investigating wildlife trafficking or expertise in the use of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool  To select stakeholders to interview, we first identified a list of stakeholders by reviewing (1) FWS and NOAA data on law enforcement agents with at least 5 years of experience who had investigated wildlife trafficking cases and used financial rewards, (2) Department of Justice data on federal prosecutors who had prosecuted wildlife trafficking cases since fiscal year 2014, (3) literature search results identifying academics with expertise in the use of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool and federal programs that use financial rewards to combat illegal activities in contexts outside of wildlife trafficking, (4) the biographies of members of the federal Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking, and (5) recommendations from stakeholders we interviewed  From this list, we then used a multistep process to select the 20 stakeholders to interview  To ensure coverage and a range of perspectives, we selected stakeholders from the following groups: FWS and NOAA law enforcement agents, including field and federal prosecutors responsible for prosecuting wildlife trafficking cases; federal officials responsible for programs that use financial rewards to combat illegal activities in contexts outside of wildlife trafficking; academics with expertise in the use of financial rewards as a law members of the federal Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking; and representatives of nongovernmental organizations that investigate wildlife trafficking  We conducted semistructured interviews with the 20 selected stakeholders using a standard set of questions  We asked questions about stakeholder views on the usefulness of financial rewards in combating wildlife trafficking; the strength and weaknesses of the statutory provisions that authorize federal agencies to pay financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking; FWS’s and NOAA’s use of financial rewards to combat wildlife trafficking; and how, if at all, the two agencies could improve their use of financial rewards to combat wildlife trafficking  We analyzed the stakeholders’ responses to our questions, grouping the responses into overall themes  We summarized the results of our analysis and then shared the summary with relevant FWS and NOAA officials to obtain their views  Views from these stakeholders cannot be generalized to those whom we did not select and interview  We conducted this performance audit from February 2017 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  The Department of the Interior’s U S  Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) implement or enforce multiple laws that specifically authorize the payment, under specified circumstances, of financial rewards to persons for information about violations of laws that prohibit wildlife trafficking  The laws that FWS officials identified are listed and summarized in table 3, and the laws that NOAA officials identified are listed and summarized in table 4  In addition, as noted above, the reward provisions in the Magnuson- Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act as amended and the Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act as amended authorize the payment of rewards for information about violations of multiple laws  Specifically, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act as amended authorizes the payment of rewards for information about violations of the act as well as any other marine resource law that the Secretary of Commerce enforces  Further, the Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act as amended authorizes the payment of rewards for information about violations of any law administered by NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service relating to plants, fish, or wildlife  NOAA officials identified 14 such laws that prohibit wildlife trafficking (see table 5)  If a violation of the laws listed in table 5 occurs, NOAA officials said they could use the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act or Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act reward provision to pay a reward for information on the violation  None of the laws listed in table 5 specifically authorize the payment of financial rewards  Table 6 provides information on U S  Fish and Wildlife Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration cases where these agencies reported paying rewards for information on wildlife trafficking from fiscal years 2007 through 2017  In addition to the contact named above, Alyssa M  Hundrup (Assistant Director), David Marroni (Analyst-in-Charge), Cindy Gilbert, Keesha Luebke, Jeanette Soares, Sheryl Stein, Sara Sullivan, and Judith Williams made key contributions to this report 


Report 2:  14 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H R  1786 and H R  5539 ); and prohibit pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, H R  1789 , H R  1794 , H R  2214 , H R  4852 , H R  4870 , and S  2327 )  Legislation was introduced in the 114 th Congress to prohibit adjustments in pay (for example, H R  109 and H R  302 ); repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, H R  179 , H R  513 , H R  688 , H R  1585 , and S  17 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to congressional actions or economic indicators, including the passage of a budget resolution or existence of a deficit (for example, H Con Res  27 , S Con Res  11 , H R  92 , H R  110 , H R  174 , H R  187 , H R  3757 , H R  4814 , H R  4476 , and S  39 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H R  179 and H R  688 ); and prohibit or reduce pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, S  2074 , H R  3562 , H R  2023 , and H R  1032 )  The House budget resolution for FY2016, H Con Res  27 , included a policy statement that Congress should agree to a concurrent budget resolution each year by April 15, and if not, congressional salaries should be held in escrow (Section 819)  The statement proposed that salaries would be released from the escrow account either when a chamber agrees to a concurrent resolution on the budget or the last day of the Congress, whichever is earlier  The House agreed to this resolution on March 25, 2015, and no further action was taken  The Senate agreed to its resolution on the FY2016 budget, S Con Res  11 , on March 27, 2015, without this language  The conference report for S Con Res  11 —agreed to in the House on April 30 and in the Senate on May 5, 2015—contains a "Policy Statement on 'No Budget, No Pay'" (Section 6216), which refers to actions by the House  Legislation was introduced in the 113 th Congress to prohibit adjustments in pay (for example, H R  54 , H R  243 , H R  636 , S  18 , S  30 ); repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, H R  134 , H R  150 , H R  196 , S  65 , and H R  398 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to congressional actions or economic indicators, including passage of a budget resolution or reaching the debt limit (for example, H R  108 , H R  167 , H R  284 , H R  308 , H R  310 , H R  325 , H R  372 , H R  397 , H R  396 , H R  522 , H R  593 , H R  1884 , H R  2335 , H R  3234 , S  18 , S  30 , and S  263 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H R  37 , H R  150 , H R  391 , H R  396 , H R  398 , and H R  1467 ); prohibit pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, H R  3160 , H R  3215 , H R  3224 , H R  3234 , and H R  3236 ); and apply any sequester to Member pay (for example, S  436 , H R  1181 , H R  1478 , and H R  2677 )  H R  325 , which (1) included language holding congressional salaries in escrow if a concurrent resolution on the budget was not agreed to by April 15, 2013, and (2) provided for a temporary extension of the debt ceiling through May 18, 2013, was introduced on January 21, 2013  Salaries would have been held in escrow for Members in a chamber if that chamber had not agreed to a concurrent resolution by that date  Salaries would have been released from the escrow account either when that chamber agreed to a concurrent resolution on the budget or the last day of the 113 th Congress, whichever was earlier  H R  325 was agreed to in the House on January 23, 2013, and the Senate on January 31, 2013  It was enacted on February 4, 2013 ( P L  113-3 )  Both the House and Senate agreed to a budget resolution prior to that date, however, and salaries were not held in escrow  H R  807 , the Full Faith and Credit Act, was introduced in the House on February 25, 2013  The bill would have prioritized certain payments in the event the debt reaches the statutory limit  An amendment, H Amdt  61 , was offered on May 9, 2013, that would clarify that these obligations would not include compensation for Members of Congress  It was agreed to the same day  The bill passed the House on May 13, 2013  No further action was taken in the 113 th Congress  The House-passed version of H J Res  59 , the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2014, also contained a provision addressing actions by the Secretary of the Treasury in the event that the debt limit is reached and not raised  The provision (Section 138) would, in part, prohibit borrowing to provide pay for Members of Congress in the event that the debt reaches the statutory limit prior to December 15, 2014  The bill passed the House on September 20, 2013  It was enacted on December 26, 2013, without this section  Legislation was introduced in the 112 th Congress to repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, S  133 , S  148 , H R  187 , H R  235 , H R  246 , H R  343 , H R  431 , H R  3673 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to other action or economic indicators (for example, H R  124 , H R  172 , H R  236 , H R  994 , H R  1454 , H R  3136 , H R  3565 , H R  3774 , H R  3799 , H R  3883 , H R  4036 , H R  6438 , S  1442 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H R  204 , H R  270 , H R  335 , H R  1012 , H R  4399 ); otherwise alter or restrict pay for Members under certain conditions (for example, H R  6108 ); and freeze Member pay (for example, S  1931 , S  1936 , S  2065 , S  2079 , S  2210 , H R  3858 , H R  6474 , H R  6720 , H R  6721 , H R  6722 )  Legislation was also introduced in the 112 th Congress that would have affected Member pay in the event of a lapse of appropriations resulting in a government shutdown  These included H R  819 , H R  1255 , H R  1305 , H Con Res  56 , and S  388   The Senate passed S  388 on March 1, 2011  The bill would have prohibited Members of the House and Senate from receiving pay, including retroactive pay, for each day that there is a lapse in appropriations or the federal government is unable to make payments or meet obligations because of the public debt limit  The House passed H R  1255 on April 1, 2011  The bill would have prohibited the disbursement of pay to Members of the House and Senate during either of these situations  No further action was taken on either bill  On April 8, 2011, the Speaker of the House issued a "Dear Colleague" letter indicating that in the event of a shutdown, Members of Congress would continue to be paid pursuant to the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, which as stated above, states: "No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened"—although Members could elect to return any compensation to the Treasury  Additional legislation to prohibit any Member pay adjustment in 2013 was introduced but not enacted in the 112 th Congress, including the following: Section 5421(b)(1) of H R  3630 , as introduced in the House, would have prohibited any adjustment for Members of Congress prior to December 31, 2013  Section 706 of the motion to recommit also contained language freezing Member pay  On December 13, 2011, the motion to recommit failed (183-244, roll call #922), and the bill passed the House (234-193, roll call #923)  The House-passed version of the bill was titled the "Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011 " The Senate substitute amendment, which did not address pay adjustments, passed on December 17  It was titled the "Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 " The bill was enacted on February 22, 2012 ( P L  112-96 ), without the pay freeze language  H R  3835 , introduced on January 27, 2012, also would have extended the pay freeze for federal employees, including Members of Congress, to December 31, 2013  This bill passed the House on February 1, 2012  H R  6726 , introduced on January 1, 2013, would have extended the pay freeze for federal employees, including Members of Congress, to December 31, 2013  This bill passed the House on January 2, 2013  Table 1 provides a history of the salaries of Members of Congress since 1789  For each salary rate, both the effective date and the statutory authority are provided  Table 2 provides information on pay adjustments for Members since 1992, which was the first full year after the Ethics Reform Act that Representatives and Senators received the same salary  The table provides the projected percentage changes under the formula based on the Employment Cost Index and the actual percentage adjustment  The differences between the projected and actual Member pay adjustments resulted from the enactment of legislation preventing the increase (adjustments for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019); limits on the percentage increase of Member pay because of the percentage increase in GS base pay (adjustments for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019); and a combination of the above  In some years, the percentage adjustment for Member pay would have been lowered to match the percentage adjustment in GS base pay if Congress had not passed legislation denying the adjustment (adjustments for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019)  If Members of Congress had received every adjustment prescribed by the ECI formula since 1992, and the 2 U S C  §4501 limitation regarding the percentage base pay increase for GS employees remained unchanged, the 2019 salary would be $210,900  Table 3 lists the laws which have previously delayed or prohibited Member pay adjustments, the dates these laws were enacted, and the text of the provision  While many of the bills in this list are appropriations bills, a prohibition on Member pay adjustments could be included in any bill, or be introduced as a separate bill  Figure 1 , which follows, shows the salary of Members of Congress in current and constant (inflation adjusted) dollars since 1992  It shows that Member salaries, when adjusted for inflation, decreased 15% from 2009 until 2019 

ground_truth: One of the goals of federal criminal restitution is to restore victims of federal crimes to the position they occupied before the crime was committed by providing compensation. Various entities within the federal government are involved in the process of requesting, ordering, and collecting restitution for crime victims, including DOJ and the judiciary. The Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 includes a provision for GAO to review the federal criminal restitution process for fiscal years 2014 through 2016. This report addresses, among other things: (1) the extent to which information is available on restitution requested by DOJ and ordered by courts; (2) the amount of restitution debt DOJ collected and the amount that remains outstanding; and, (3) the extent to which DOJ has conducted oversight on the collection of restitution. GAO analyzed laws, policies and procedures as well as USSC data on restitution orders and DOJ data on restitution collected from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. GAO also selected a non-generalizable sample of six federal judicial districts based on restitution collections and spoke with USAO officials and federal probation officers. Officials from selected U.S. Attorney's Offices (USAO) stated that they document requests for restitution in case files and employ other internal controls, such as the use of templates and forms, throughout the prosecution process to ensure that prosecutors request restitution as appropriate. GAO's analysis of U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC) data—an agency within the judiciary—showed that information on restitution orders was available for 95 percent of all offenders sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Specifically, 214,578 federal offenders were sentenced during this time period and restitution was ordered for 33,158, or 15 percent, of those offenders. Collectively, courts ordered these offenders to pay $33.9 billion in restitution. Most federal offenders sentenced during these years were sentenced for immigration or drug-related offenses. In interviews, USAO officials stated that these offenses do not typically have victims requiring restitution. GAO found that data on reasons why restitution was not ordered were incomplete for 5 percent of all offenders sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Determining why data on restitution orders are incomplete may inform the judiciary of the cause of the incomplete data and any efforts needed to improve USSC data. GAO's analysis of Department of Justice (DOJ) data showed that USAOs collected $2.95 billion in restitution debt in fiscal years 2014 through 2016, see figure below. However, at the end of fiscal year 2016, $110 billion in previously ordered restitution remained outstanding, and USAOs identified $100 billion of that outstanding debt as uncollectible due to offenders' inability to pay. DOJ identified improving debt collection—including restitution—as a major management initiative in its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan. While DOJ is developing analytical tools to monitor the collection of restitution, it has not established performance measures or goals. Performance measures and goals would allow DOJ to gauge USAOs' success in collecting restitution and, by extension, the department's success in achieving a major management initiative. GAO is making three recommendations. GAO is making one to the judiciary to determine why data on restitution orders are incomplete. GAO is making two recommendations to DOJ, including one to implement performance measures and goals for the collection of restitution. The judiciary and DOJ concurred with the recommendations.