prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: The Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988 established the foundation for the current U S  policy to potentially provide federal payment for a portion of claims by third parties for injury, damage, or loss that results from a commercial launch or reentry accident  A stated goal of the act was to provide a competitive environment for the U S  commercial space launch industry  The act also provided for, among other things, government protection against some losses—referred to as indemnification—while still minimizing the cost to taxpayers  All FAA- licensed commercial launches and reentries by U S  companies, whether unmanned or manned and from the United States or overseas, are covered by federal indemnification for third-party damages that result from the launch or reentry  According to agency officials, in 2016 FAA issued five active licenses, which had an average third-party MPL of about $51 million and ranged from $10 million to $99 million  The amount of insurance coverage that FAA requires launch companies to purchase—the MPL value—is intended to reflect the greatest dollar amount of loss to third parties and the federal government for bodily injury and property damage that can be reasonably expected to result from a launch or reentry accident  FAA calculates separate MPL values for potential damages to third parties and the federal government  For each launch license that it issues, FAA determines MPL values for third parties with the intent of estimating the greatest dollar amount of losses that reasonably could be expected from a launch or reentry accident, which have no less than a 1 in 10 million chance of occurring  For damages to the federal government, FAA determines MPL values with the intent of estimating the greatest dollar amount of losses that reasonably could be expected from a launch or reentry accident, which have no less than a 1 in 100,000 chance of occurring  According to FAA, the agency defines these probability thresholds to estimate the federal government’s exposure to losses above the MPL  Agency officials said that the current probability thresholds are set such that losses are very unlikely to exceed launch companies’ private insurance and become potential costs for the government under CSLCA  FAA’s process for determining the MPL value for a launch or reentry license generally includes three elements: 1  Number of casualties  Estimating the number of third-party casualties involves adding the number of direct and secondary casualties that could result from a launch accident  Direct casualty estimates include serious injuries and deaths  Secondary casualties include those resulting from fires and collapsing buildings  2  Cost of casualties  FAA uses $3 million as an estimate of the average loss per casualty, which is multiplied by the number of estimated casualties  3  Property damage  FAA applies a predetermined factor—which it recently changed from 50 percent to 25 percent—to the estimated cost of casualties to derive estimated losses from property damage  The total MPL is equal to the estimated cost of casualties plus property damage  FAA has revised two components of its MPL methodology since our 2012 report  For example, in April 2016, the agency adopted a new method for estimating the number of casualties, known as the risk profile method  This method uses different tools to simulate a range of possible scenarios to create a distribution of potential casualty numbers and the simulated probability of different levels of casualty numbers  The risk profile method replaced FAA’s “overlay method,” which was a method it had used since the early 1990s which the agency said did not work well for launches of small launch vehicles in remote areas, or for reentries  In addition, FAA reduced the factor it uses to estimate losses due to property damage, based on tests of a new process for estimating such losses that showed the previous factor was too high  We have previously reviewed FAA’s MPL methodology in 2012 and 2017  In 2012 we examined the U S  government’s indemnification policy, the federal government’s potential costs for indemnification, and the effects of ending indemnification on the competitiveness of U S  launch companies, among other aspects of FAA’s MPL methodology  In 2017 we examined the extent to which FAA had revised its MPL methodology since our 2012 report to address previously cited weaknesses and the potential effect of any changes to that methodology on financial liabilities for the federal government  The findings and recommendations of those reports, including any unaddressed weaknesses, are discussed later in this report  CSLCA required FAA to evaluate its MPL methodology incorporating three requirements, but the agency’s report did not fully address these requirements  First, the act required FAA to ensure a balance of risk between launch companies and the federal government  However, agency officials told us that they did not re-evaluate the probability thresholds—which are used to divide the risk of loss between launch companies and the federal government—as part of evaluating its MPL methodology when implementing the risk profile method due to resource constraints  Second, the act required FAA to consider the cost impact of implementing an updated MPL methodology, but the agency did not evaluate the impact of implementing its revised methodology on the direct costs to launch companies (insurance premiums) and to the federal government (indemnification liability)  Third, the act required FAA to consult with the commercial space sector and insurance providers in evaluating its MPL, but they did not consult such parties in response to the act  Without fully addressing CSLCA’s mandated requirements, FAA cannot ensure that the federal government is not exposed to greater liability costs than intended or that launch companies are not required to purchase more insurance coverage than necessary  In its report, FAA states that implementing an updated MPL methodology in April 2016—the risk profile method—helps ensure that the federal government is not exposed to greater liability costs than intended and that launch companies are not required to purchase more insurance coverage than necessary, as required under CSLCA  Further, agency officials told us that their updated methodology is technically more valid and improves their ability to avoid overestimating MPL values (which can cause launch companies to purchase more insurance coverage than necessary) or significantly underestimating MPL values (which can expose the federal government to greater costs than intended)  While an improved model may provide a more realistic calculation of the MPL, by changing the resulting estimates it can also change the balance between the federal government’s exposure to liability costs and the amount of insurance launch companies are required to purchase  For example, if the more realistic results produced by the revised methodology increased the MPL estimates, this would increase insurance costs for the launch companies and reduce the federal government’s exposure, thereby shifting the balance of costs between the two and suggesting a reevaluation of the thresholds  In addition, FAA officials told us that they had not reevaluated the probability thresholds upon implementing the revised MPL methodology, although defining these thresholds is their primary mechanism for adjusting the balance of risk between launch companies and the federal government  Agency officials acknowledged that an examination of the thresholds’ continued appropriateness would be warranted in the future  However, they told us that changing the probability thresholds would require significant effort because it would require them to change federal regulations and that resources are currently allocated to other rulemaking priorities  Nevertheless, without evaluating the appropriateness of the probability threshold as part of the mandated evaluation of the MPL methodology, FAA cannot ensure that the federal government is not exposed to greater liability costs than intended or that launch companies are not required to purchase more insurance coverage than necessary  CSLCA also required FAA to consider the cost impact on both the commercial space launch industry and the federal government of implementing an updated MPL methodology  In its report to Congress, the agency discussed indirect costs to launch applicants and the federal government  For example, FAA discussed indirect data burden costs on launch company applicants and FAA analysts associated with the agency’s risk profile method implementation  The report states that the risk profile method requires more data from a launch applicant than the previous method, but that the added burden is minimal because the information is similar to the type of information required by FAA for a risk analysis  Agency officials also said that the risk profile method requires more of an FAA analyst’s time than the overlay method, but that the added burden is minimal because the work done by FAA on risk analysis provides much of the foundation for an MPL analysis  However, FAA’s report did not include an evaluation of the direct costs to launch companies and the federal government of implementing an updated MPL methodology  The report identifies the direct cost to the launch industry as insurance premiums, and the direct cost to the federal government include potential indemnification payments  Agency officials also told us that the agency does not track commercial space launch insurance costs, and that they do not have meaningful insights on insurance premiums paid by commercial launch companies  FAA officials told us that they only have a general notion of insurance premiums because the industry is reluctant to share such information  FAA officials also told us that, outside of the work done for the report, they have not evaluated the economic implications for launch companies of implementing an updated MPL methodology  Without evaluating direct costs to both the launch companies and the federal government, FAA will be limited in its ability to consider the impact of the cost to both the industry and the federal government of implementing an updated methodology  Although CSLCA required FAA to consult with the commercial space sector and insurance providers in evaluating its MPL methodology for the mandated report, it obtained limited input  For example, FAA officials told us that they obtained input from their Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) in April 2016 about what to include in their report to Congress, but did not consult with the commercial space sector and insurance providers to evaluate their MPL methodology in response to CSLCA  FAA officials also said that, to respond to CSLCA’s consultation requirement, they did not think they needed to repeat the consultations they took in 2013  In January 2013, the agency solicited input from COMSTAC’s Business/Legal Working Group about how to best conduct a review of FAA’s methodology for calculating MPL, in response to our July 2012 report  FAA also briefed the Business/Legal Working Group in May 2013 to solicit input on MPL methodologies, including the risk profile method  In the January 2013 meeting, a COMSTAC member suggested several contractors for a study by outside experts of the complete MPL methodology, and FAA subsequently hired one of these contractors to develop the risk profile method that it implemented in April 2016  However, the agency did not solicit input from COMSTAC about its risk profile methodology prior to its April 2016 implementation or following CSLCA’s November 2015 mandated evaluation  As a result, FAA lacks input on the effect of its revised MPL methodology on launch companies and the federal government, making it difficult to evaluate the balance of risk between the two  Our 2012 report identified concerns with all three components of FAA’s MPL methodology: estimating the number of casualties, estimating the cost of casualties, and deriving estimated property damage costs from estimated casualty costs  In that report we recommended that the agency reassess its methodology, including the reasonableness of several key elements  As noted in our 2017 report, FAA has since made improvements to its methodology  However, it still has not yet updated the cost of a casualty
Report 2:  Examples of schedule D positions include those involving science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) occupations and positions in the Presidential Management Fellows Program  Schedule D positions generally require an applicant to satisfy basic qualification standards established by OPM for the relevant occupation and grade level  Like employees in the competitive service, excepted service employees are generally paid in accordance with the General Schedule  In addition, excepted service employees maintain the same notice and appeal rights for adverse personnel actions  Some employees in the excepted service, however, must satisfy different durational requirements before these rights become available  So-called "preference eligibles" in an executive agency, the Postal Service, or the Postal Rate Commission must complete one year of current continuous service to avail themselves of the relevant notice and appeal rights  The term "preference eligible" refers to specified military veterans and some of their family members, such as an unmarried widow, and the wife or husband of a service-connected disabled veteran  Employees in the excepted service who are not preference eligibles and (1) are not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service, or (2) have completed two years of current or continuous service in the same or similar position, have the same notice and appeal rights as qualifying employees in the competitive service  The SES is a cadre of high-level government administrators who manage major programs and projects within most federal agencies  While they are considered federal employees within the civil service system, the SES is governed by a regulatory structure separate from the competitive and excepted services  As defined in statute, SES positions are generally managerial or supervisory positions that are classified above the GS-15 grade (or certain equivalent positions) and need not be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate  In these leadership roles, SES members may serve as intermediaries between top-level political appointees of an agency who seek to carry out the objectives of a particular President and career civil servants with institutional experience relating to relevant issues  According to a 2018 report, there are currently more than 7,000 permanent SES positions  There are two types of SES positions: (1) career reserved and (2) general  Career reserved positions must be filled with career appointees to shield certain SES roles from political influence  Generally, agency heads are to determine whether a particular SES position warrants a career reserved designation, to "ensure impartiality, or the public's confidence in the impartiality, of the Government " OPM regulations reflect the types of SES roles in which this designation is appropriate, including those involving adjudication and appeals, auditing, and law enforcement duties  General positions may be filled by career appointees, as well as other noncareer and limited term (i e , political) appointees  There are four types of SES appointments: career, noncareer, limited term, and limited emergency appointees  The SES mainly consists of "career appointees" chosen through a merit-based competitive hiring process  As part of this process, each agency must maintain a recruitment program for career appointees, as well as at least one executive board that reviews qualifications and makes recommendations regarding SES candidates  An OPM-convened Qualification Review Board (QRB) must certify the executive and managerial qualifications of a selected candidate before a career appointment may be made to an SES position  Unlike career appointees, noncareer appointees are not subject to the competitive selection process, but agency heads must determine that these appointees meet the qualifications of the SES position  While noncareer appointees are not QRB-certified, OPM must approve these appointees  Limited term and limited emergency appointees make up a small subset of the SES, and their terms are non-renewable  These appointments are used when a position is needed for a specified period (such as to manage a special project), or a position is established to meet a "bona fide, unanticipated, urgent need " Limited term and limited emergency appointments are also subject to OPM approval  To restrict the politicization of the SES, Title 5 of the U S  Code (Title 5) limits the number of noncareer and limited term appointees who may serve in SES positions  The SES pay structure is also distinct from the rest of the civil service  Title 5 specifies that the pay rate of each senior executive is based on the executive's individual performance or contribution to agency performance (or both), as measured under a "rigorous" performance appraisal system  Each federal agency must maintain at least one of these appraisal systems, subject to OPM standards, review, and approval  Performance appraisals of SES members may consider factors such as improvements in efficiency, productivity, and quality of work or service, cost efficiency, and performance timeliness  In response to earlier concerns that SES appraisal systems were flawed because most executives received the highest rating, Title 5 tasks OPM, in collaboration with the Office of Management and Budget, with the establishment and maintenance of a government-wide performance appraisal system certification process, in an effort to ensure that an agency's appraisal systems for SES employees make "meaningful distinctions based on relative performance " Title 5 also sets out different pay rates for the SES, with a minimum rate of basic pay equal to 120 percent of the rate for GS-15, step 1, and a maximum rate of basic pay equal to the rate for Level III of the Executive Schedule  But SES members' annual aggregate pay (that includes additional compensation such as bonuses, awards, and other payments in addition to basic pay) is capped at the rate for Level I of the Executive Schedule  If a senior executive's total compensation exceeds the aggregate limitation, the executive receives the overage in the following calendar year  To encourage federal agencies to establish and maintain an OPM-certified performance appraisal system, Title 5 allows for a higher range of SES pay for agencies that have these certified systems  Title 5 also articulates conditions and procedures for removing, suspending, or taking other adverse actions against a member of the SES  Career SES appointees who have successfully completed a one-year probationary period may be removed or subject to adverse action only for specified reasons  For example, an SES career appointee may be removed from the civil service or suspended for more than 14 days only for misconduct, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or failure to accept a directed reassignment or to accompany a position in a transfer of function  SES members must receive advance written notice about the action and opportunity to provide an answer or receive hearing, subject to exception  The senior executive may also appeal the employment action to the MSPB  A career appointee receiving a single unsatisfactory performance rating may be reassigned or transferred within the SES or removed from the SES  A career SES member who receives two unsatisfactory ratings in any period of five consecutive years, or twice in any period of three consecutive years receives less than fully successful ratings, must be removed from the SES  Affected SES career appointees must receive advance written notice of these actions  While these appointees may not appeal these actions to the MSPB, they may request an informal hearing before the Board  SES career appointees are also generally entitled to be placed in a civil service position at GS-15 or above (or an equivalent position)  In comparison, noncareer, limited term, and limited emergency appointees are generally not subject to the same removal protections and may be removed from the SES at any time  The procedures for removal of noncareer and limited term appointees are largely not addressed in federal statute, and the terms and procedures for their removal are mainly at the discretion of the agency head  In response to concerns about performance and accountability of SES members employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Congress recently created special removal requirements that apply to these positions  In 2017, Congress passed the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act, which amended an existing provision concerning removal procedures for these covered senior executives  Under the 2017 Act, the VA Secretary has discretion to suspend, demote, remove, or take other actions against SES career appointees or other high-level executives if the Secretary determines that the individual's misconduct or performance warrants such action  To address SES job performance issues more expeditiously, SES employees at the VA Department are entitled to abbreviated notice and appeals rights, as compared to the removal procedures in place in other federal agencies 

ground_truth: The Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 1341-1342, 1511-1519) generally bars the obligation of funds in the absence of appropriations. Exceptions are made under the act, including for activities involving "the safety of human life or the protection of property." The interval during the fiscal year when appropriations for a particular project or activity are not enacted into law, either in the form of a regular appropriations act or a continuing resolution (CR), is referred to as a funding gap or funding lapse. Although funding gaps may occur at the start of the fiscal year, they may also occur any time a CR expires and another CR (or the regular appropriations bill) is not enacted immediately thereafter. Multiple funding gaps may occur within a fiscal year. When a funding gap occurs, federal agencies are generally required to begin a shutdown of the affected projects and activities, which includes the prompt furlough of non-excepted personnel. The general practice of the federal government after the shutdown has ended has been to retroactively pay furloughed employees for the time they missed, as well as employees who were required to come to work. Although a shutdown may be the result of a funding gap, the two events should be distinguished. This is because a funding gap may result in a total shutdown of all affected projects or activities in some instances but not others. For example, when funding gaps are of a short duration, agencies may not have enough time to complete a shutdown of affected projects and activities before funding is restored. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget has previously indicated that a shutdown of agency operations within the first day of the funding gap may be postponed if a resolution appears to be imminent. Since FY1977, 20 funding gaps occurred, ranging in duration from 1 day to 34 full days. These funding gaps are listed in Table 1. About half of these funding gaps were brief (i.e., three days or less in duration). Notably, many of the funding gaps do not appear to have resulted in a "shutdown." Prior to the issuance of the opinions in 1980 and early 1981 by then-Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, while agencies tended to curtail some operations in response to a funding gap, they often "continued to operate during periods of expired funding." In addition, some of the funding gaps after the Civiletti opinions did not result in a completion of shutdown operations due to both the funding gap's short duration and an expectation that appropriations would soon be enacted. Some of the funding gaps during this period, however, did have a broader impact on affected government operations, even if only for a matter of hours. Two funding gaps occurred in FY1996, amounting to 5 days and 21 days. The chronology of regular and continuing appropriations enacted during FY1996 is illustrated in Figure 1. At the beginning of FY2014 (October 1, 2013), none of the regular appropriations bills had been enacted, so a government-wide funding gap occurred. It concluded on October 17, 2013, after lasting 16 full days. During FY2018, there was a funding gap when a CR covering all of the regular appropriations bills expired on January 19, 2018. It concluded on January 22, 2018, after lasting two full days. The most recent funding gap occurred during FY2019, when a CR covering federal agencies and activities funded in 7 of the 12 regular appropriations bills expired on December 21, 2018. It concluded on January 25, 2019, after lasting 34 full days. For a general discussion of federal government shutdowns, see CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects, coordinated by Clinton T. Brass.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The routine activities of most federal agencies are funded annually by one or more of the regular appropriations acts  When action on the regular appropriations acts is delayed, a continuing appropriations act, also sometimes referred to as a continuing resolution or CR, may be used to provide interim budget authority  Since the federal fiscal year was shifted to October 1-September 30 beginning with FY1977, all of the regular appropriations acts have been enacted by the beginning of the fiscal year in only four instances (FY1977, FY1989, FY1995, and FY1997), although CRs were not needed for interim funding in one of these fiscal years  CRs were enacted for FY1977 but only to fund certain unauthorized programs whose funding had been excluded from the regular appropriations acts  The Antideficiency Act (31 U S C  1341-1342, 1511-1519) generally bars the obligation or expenditure of federal funds in the absence of appropriations  The interval during a fiscal year when appropriations for a particular project or activity are not enacted into law, either in the form of a regular appropriations act or a CR, is referred to as a funding gap or funding lapse   Although funding gaps may occur at the start of the fiscal year, they may also occur any time a CR expires and another CR (or the relevant regular appropriations bill) is not enacted immediately thereafter  Multiple funding gaps may occur within a fiscal year  In 1980 and early 1981, then-Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti issued opinions in two letters to the President that have been put into effect through guidance provided to federal agencies under various Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circulars clarifying the limits of federal government activities upon the occurrence of a funding gap  The Civiletti letters state that, in general, the Antideficiency Act requires that if Congress has enacted no appropriation beyond a specified period, the agency may make no contracts and obligate no further funds except as "authorized by law " In addition, because no statute generally permits federal agencies to incur obligations without appropriations for the pay of employees, the Antideficiency Act does not, in general, authorize agencies to employ the services of their employees upon a lapse in appropriations, but it does permit agencies to fulfill certain legal obligations connected with the orderly termination of agency operations  The second letter, from January 1981, discusses the more complex problem of interpretation presented with respect to obligational authorities that are "authorized by law" but not manifested in appropriations acts  In a few cases, Congress has expressly authorized agencies to incur obligations without regard to available appropriations  More often, it is necessary to inquire under what circumstances statutes that vest particular functions in government agencies imply authority to create obligations for the accomplishment of those functions despite a lack of current appropriations  It is under this guidance that exceptions may be made for activities involving "the safety of human life or the protection of property " As a consequence of these guidelines, when a funding gap occurs, executive agencies begin a shutdown of the affected projects and activities, including the furlough of non-excepted personnel  The general practice of the federal government after the shutdown has ended has been to retroactively pay furloughed employees for the time they missed, as well as employees who were required to come to work  Under current practice, although a shutdown may be the result of a funding gap, the two events should be distinguished  This is because a funding gap may result in a shutdown of all affected projects or activities in some instances but not in others  For example, when a funding gap is of a short duration, agencies may not have enough time to complete a shutdown of affected projects and activities before funding is restored  In addition, the Office of Management and Budget has previously indicated that a shutdown of agency operations within the first day of a funding gap may be postponed if it appears that an additional CR or regular appropriations act is likely to be enacted that same day  To avoid funding gaps, proposals have previously been offered to establish an "automatic continuing resolution" (ACR) that would provide a fallback source of funding authority for activities, at a specified formula or level, in the event that timely enactment of appropriations is disrupted  Funding would become available automatically and remain available as long as needed so that a funding gap would not occur  Although the House and Senate have considered ACR proposals in the past, none has been enacted into law on a permanent basis  As illustrated in Table 1 , there have been 20 funding gaps since FY1977  The enactment of a CR on the day after the budget authority in the previous CR expired, which has occurred in several instances, is not counted in this report as involving a funding gap because there was no full day for which there was no available budget authority  For example, between FY2000 and FY2018, "next-day" CRs were enacted on 21 occasions  A majority of the funding gaps occurred between FY1977 and FY1995  During this period of 19 fiscal years, 15 funding gaps occurred  Multiple funding gaps have occurred during a single fiscal year in four instances: (1) three gaps covering a total of 28 days in FY1978, (2) two gaps covering a total of four days in FY1983, (3) two gaps covering a total of three days in FY1985, and (4) two gaps covering a total of 26 days in FY1996  Seven of the funding gaps commenced with the beginning of the fiscal year on October 1  The remaining 13 funding gaps occurred at least more than one day after the fiscal year had begun  Ten of the funding gaps ended in October, four ended in November, three ended in December, and three ended in January  Funding gaps have ranged in duration from 1 to 34 full days  Six of the 8 lengthiest funding gaps, lasting between 8 days and 17 days, occurred between FY1977 and FY1980—before the Civiletti opinions were issued and for which there was no government shutdown  Between 1980 and 1990, the duration of funding gaps was generally shorter, typically ranging from one day to three days  In most cases these occurred over a weekend with only limited impact in the form of government shutdown activities  Notably, many of the funding gaps that have occurred since FY1977 do not appear to have resulted in a "shutdown " Prior to the issuance of the Civiletti opinions, the expectation was that agencies would not shut down during a funding gap  Continuing resolutions typically included language ratifying obligations incurred prior to the resolution's enactment  For example, the first CR for FY1980 provided All obligations incurred in anticipation of the appropriations and authority provided in this joint resolution are hereby ratified and confirmed if otherwise in accordance with the provisions of the joint resolution  Thus, while agencies tended to curtail some operations in response to a funding gap, they often "continued to operate during periods of expired funding " In addition, some of the funding gaps after the Civiletti opinions did not result in a completion of shutdown operations due to both a funding gap's short duration and an expectation that appropriations would soon be enacted  For example, during the three-day FY1984 funding gap, "no disruption to government services" reportedly occurred, due to both the three-day holiday weekend and the expectation that the President would soon sign into law appropriations passed by the House and Senate during that weekend  Some of the funding gaps during this period, however, did have a broader impact on affected government operations, even if only for a matter of hours  For example, in response to the one-day funding gap that occurred on October 4, 1984, a furlough of non-excepted personnel for part of that day was reportedly implemented  It should be noted that when most of these funding gaps occurred, one or more regular appropriations measures had been enacted, so any effects were not felt government-wide  For example, the three funding gaps in FY1978 were limited to activities funded in the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations Act  Similarly, 8 of 13 regular appropriations acts had been enacted prior to the three-day funding gap in FY1984  The most recent funding gaps—two in FY1996, one in FY2014, one in FY2018, and one in FY2019—all resulted in widespread cessation of non-excepted activities and furlough of associated personnel  The legislative history of these funding gaps are summarized below  The two FY1996 funding gaps occurred between November 13 and 19, 1995, and December 15, 1995, through January 6, 1996  The chronology of regular and continuing appropriations enacted during that fiscal year is illustrated in Figure 1   In the lead-up to the first funding gap, only 3 out of the 13 regular appropriations acts had been signed into law, and budget authority, which had been provided by a CR since the start of the fiscal year, expired at the end of the day on November 13  On this same day, President Clinton vetoed a CR that would have extended budget authority through December 1, 1995, because of the Medicare premium increases contained within the measure  The ensuing funding gap reportedly resulted in the furlough of an estimated 800,000 federal workers  After five days, a deal was reached to end the shutdown and extend funding through December 15  Agencies that had been zeroed out in pending appropriations bills were funded at a rate of 75% of FY1995 budget authority  All other agencies were funded at the lower of the House- or Senate-passed level of funding contained in the FY1996 full-year appropriations bills  The CR also included an agreement between President Clinton and Congress regarding future negotiations to lower the budget deficit within seven years  During the first FY1996 funding gap and prior to the second one, an additional four regular appropriations measures were enacted, and three others were vetoed  The negotiations on the six remaining bills were unsuccessful before the budget authority provided in the CR expired at the end of the day on December 15, 1995  Reportedly, about 280,000 executive branch employees were furloughed during the funding gap between December 15, 1995, and January 6, 1996  A CR to provide benefits for veterans and welfare recipients and to keep the District of Columbia government operating was passed and signed into law on December 22, 1995  The shutdown officially ended on January 6, 1996, when the first of a series of CRs to reopen affected agencies and provide budget authority through January 26, 1996, was enacted  This funding gap commenced at the beginning of FY2014 on October 1, 2013  None of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2014 was enacted prior to the beginning of the funding gap  Nor had a CR to provide budget authority for the projects and activities covered by those 12 bills been enacted  On September 30, however, an ACR was enacted to cover FY2014 pay and allowances for (1) certain members of the Armed Forces, (2) certain Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, and (3) other specified DOD and Department of Homeland Security contractors ( H R  3210 ; P L  113-39 , 113 th Congress)  At the beginning of this 16-day funding gap, more than 800,000 executive branch employees were reportedly furloughed  This number was reduced during the course of the funding gap due to the implementation of P L  113-39 and other redeterminations of whether certain employees were excepted from furlough  Prior to the resolution of the funding gap, congressional action on appropriations was generally limited to a number of narrow CRs to provide funding for certain programs or classes of individuals  Of these, only the Department of Defense Survivor Benefits Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 2014 ( H J Res  91 ; P L  113-44 ) was enacted into law  On October 16, 2013, the Senate passed H R  2775 , which had been previously passed by the House on September 12, with an amendment  This amendment, in part, provided interim continuing appropriations for the previous year's programs and activities through January 15, 2014  Later that same day, the House agreed to the Senate amendment to H R  2775   The CR was signed into law on October 17, 2013 ( P L  113-46 ), thus ending the funding gap  At the beginning of FY2018, none of the 12 regular appropriations bills had been enacted, so the federal government operated under a series of CRs  The first, P L  115-56 , provided government-wide funding through December 8, 2017  The second, P L  115-90 , extended funding through December 22, and the third, P L  115-96 , extended it through January 19, 2018  In the absence of agreement on legislation that would further extend the period of these CRs, however, a funding gap began with the expiration of P L  115-96 at midnight on January 19  A furlough of federal personnel began over the weekend and continued through Monday of the next week, ending with enactment of a fourth CR, P L  115-120 , on January 22  At the beginning of FY2019, 5 of the 12 regular appropriations bills had been enacted in two consolidated appropriations bills  The remaining seven regular appropriations bills were funded under two CRs  The first CR, P L  115-245 , provided funding through December 7, 2018  The second CR, P L  115-298 , extended funding through December 21, 2018  When no agreement was reached on legislation to further extend the period of these CRs, a funding gap began with the expiration of P L  115-298 at midnight on December 21, 2018  Because of this funding gap, federal agencies and activities funded in these seven regular appropriations bills were required to shut down  The funding gap ended when a CR, P L  116-5 , was signed into law on January 25, 2019, which ended the partial government shutdown and allowed government departments and agencies to reopen  The funding gap lasted 34 full days 


Report 2:  In addition, in our 2017 report we also noted that there are instances where deriving estimated property damage from estimated casualty costs is inappropriate  As of November 2017, FAA does not have guidance to identify such instances or to guide decisions on which tools to use in developing the MPL estimate  FAA has taken steps designed to improve two of three elements of its MPL methodology, including revising its methodology for estimating the number of potential casualties for a given launch and changing the factor it uses to derive estimated property damage from estimated casualties  However, the agency has not updated the third element, the amount it uses for the cost of an individual casualty, leaving a previously identified weakness unaddressed  Our 2012 report raised concerns with each of the three components of FAA’s MPL calculation methodology  First, we found that FAA’s method for estimating the number of casualties involved use of a single loss scenario instead of applying the insurance industry’s standard practice of catastrophe modeling, and that the agency’s method might significantly understate the number of potential casualties  Catastrophe modeling, unlike the single-loss approach, generally estimates losses by using various tools to simulate tens of thousands of scenarios to create a distribution of potential losses and the simulated probability of different levels of loss  Second, we reported that FAA had been using an outdated and likely understated figure of $3 million to estimate the cost of a single casualty—including injury or death—which Office of Commercial Space Transportation officials said has not been updated since they began using it in 1988  Third, we reported that the agency’s approach of estimating potential property damage by adding a flat 50 percent to the estimated casualty damage could lead to estimates that were too high in some cases  Given these weaknesses, we recommended that FAA reassess its MPL methodology, including assessing the reasonableness of the cost-of- casualty amount and other assumptions used  Because the agency took actions to assess its MPL methodology, we closed the recommendation as implemented  In March 2017 we reported that FAA had taken steps to address weaknesses in two of these three areas  Specifically, we reported that FAA’s adoption of the risk profile method in April 2016 had improved its estimates of the number of potential casualties associated with a particular license launch  In addition, we reported that the agency had revised the factor it uses to estimate losses from property damage in the MPL calculation from 50 percent to 25 percent  This change has resulted in property damage estimates that FAA officials believe are still conservative but more realistic than previous estimates  However, in our March 2017 report we also determined that FAA had not yet addressed weaknesses in the cost-of-casualty amount we had previously identified; despite the conclusion by a contractor it had hired to study the cost-of-casualty that it was too low  Agency officials told us that they had not addressed this weakness because of other priorities  Given the significance of the cost-of-casualty amount to the MPL calculations, we recommended that FAA prioritize the development of a plan to address the identified weakness in the cost-of-casualty amount, including setting time frames for action, and update the amount based on current information  In October 2017, FAA officials told us that they had not yet updated the cost-of-casualty because they have continued to prioritize completing other work with their limited resources, such as reviewing launch applications and fulfilling other safety responsibilities  As a result, our recommendation remains open  FAA officials told us that they have identified potential steps to update the cost-of-casualty amount, including seeking public input on whether and how to revise the amount, but that they do not expect to make a decision on whether to make any changes to the cost-of-casualty amount until June 30, 2018, at the earliest  FAA officials told us that in order to prioritize the development of a plan to address the identified weakness in the cost-of-casualty amount they will need to consult with both the commercial space and insurance industries about the necessity and implications of any potential increase in the cost-of-casualty amount  Agency officials said that they plan to do such consultations through COMSTAC  However, because COMSTAC was just reestablished in June 2017 after not having been active since November 2016 and new members had not been approved as of October 2017, the anticipated decision date of June 2018 could be further delayed  As we reported in March 2017, an understated cost-of-casualty amount can lead to an inaccurate loss calculation, which in turn understates the amount of insurance a launch company must obtain  This could increase the potential exposure to the federal government, as the insurance amount would be less than the potential losses associated with the launch activity and the property would be inadequately protected  Because of this potential exposure, we maintain that addressing this weakness is a priority  As noted above, in our 2012 report we raised concerns about the first element of FAA’s MPL methodology, which is estimating the number of potential casualties  FAA officials said that they have implemented two tools for estimating the number of potential casualties, and that each tool requires a different level of resources and is more appropriate for different launch scenarios  The Range Risk Analysis Tool creates physics-based simulations of possible accidents using launch vehicle data, such as launch trajectory and types of failures, and assigns each simulated accident a probability of occurrence based on the failure rates of the different elements of the launch vehicle  According to agency officials, the Range Risk Analysis Tool is a comprehensive, high-fidelity tool and is the most appropriate tool for coastal launch sites, which are often located in heavily populated areas, and is labor intensive  The Risk Estimator Sub- orbital and Orbital Launch Vehicle and Entry tool, which in contrast to the Range Risk Analysis Tool, is a medium-fidelity tool that can be used for low-risk launches, such as launch sites located in very sparsely populated areas and reentry operations that do not need the use of a high-fidelity tool  According to FAA, this tool significantly reduces the time required to estimate the risk from launch and reentry vehicle operations  In our 2017 report, we also reiterated that there are cases where the third element of FAA’s methodology, deriving estimated property damage from estimated casualties, could lead to misleading MPL calculations  Specifically, in March 2017 we reported that estimating losses from property damage as a percentage of losses from casualties could lead to overestimates  For example, FAA’s contractor found that, if a launch accident affected a residential area, the agency’s practice of estimating property damage based on casualties would likely overstate property damages because residential structures have relatively low values compared to losses from casualties  We also reported in March 2017 that in some accidents the number of casualties may be low but property losses could still be very large, in which case FAA’s estimating property losses based on casualties would likely understate potential property damage  For example, a launch vehicle could strike an unoccupied structure that is very expensive, such as a neighboring launch complex  Agency officials said that while deriving property losses from casualty losses is a simpler method that may be an effective use of limited FAA resources, it could be inappropriate in scenarios where the number of casualties might be low but property losses could still be very large  In October 2017, agency officials said that FAA had not developed guidance for determining, for a given launch license, which of the available tools would be most appropriate to estimate the number of potential casualties, and whether it would be more appropriate to estimate property losses separately rather than derive them from estimated casualties  While FAA officials said they believe their current decision process is adequate and that they do not need more formal guidance at this time, they also told us that they were in the process of developing internal guidance on the most appropriate tool to use for future launches  The officials said that they did not have a projected completion date for the guidance, primarily because the agency has other priorities and resource limitations  As noted earlier, these priorities include reviewing commercial space launch license applications and managing program safety  Federal internal control standards state that, as part of an entity’s risk assessment component, management should identify, analyze, and respond to risks to achieving objectives  For example, the standards state that management should design control activities in response to the entity’s objectives and risks to achieve an effective internal control system  Without such guidance, FAA could face challenges in ensuring that it is using the most appropriate method to calculate an MPL for a given launch and is making the most efficient use of its resources  Such guidance could become more important as the number of commercial space launches increases, potentially creating greater demands on its resources  We have previously reported that the commercial space launch industry has experienced significant growth in the number and complexity of launches in the past half-decade  FAA has also reported that its licensed launches have increased 60 percent and industry revenue has increased 471 percent since 2012  FAA’s MPL methodology is critical in balancing the encouragement of the U S  commercial space industry with the need to manage the federal government’s risk exposure because it determines how much risk each party will bear for third-party damages resulting from potential space launch accidents  However, despite changes to the methodology, the probability threshold that the agency uses to achieve this balance of risk has been the same since the 1990s, and has not been reviewed for appropriateness  In addition, while FAA evaluated the effect of its MPL methodology on the indirect costs of launch companies and the federal government, it did not similarly evaluate direct costs  Further, although FAA has obtained input from some stakeholders on certain aspects of its MPL methodology, it has not consulted with launch providers and insurance companies to evaluate effects on key potential costs to launch companies and the federal government, as required under CSLCA  FAA officials told us that resource issues and pursuing other priorities have prevented them from taking these actions  However, the longstanding nature of these issues, as well as their importance in determining the federal government’s financial exposure, makes their completion a priority  FAA has also begun improving other aspects of its MPL process, but important actions remain incomplete  For example, the cost of a casualty, a key component of the methodology, has not been updated since 1988  While FAA has identified potential steps to update this amount, it has not implemented these steps and our March 2017 recommendation to prioritize the updating of this amount remains open  Further, agency officials said they have begun to develop internal guidance on how to determine which methodological tools should be used for a given launch, but are not sure when this process will be completed  These are important steps to help ensure the validity of the MPL methodology and the results obtained for each launch, which in turn determine the balance between the amount of insurance launch companies are required to purchase and the potential financial exposure for the federal government  We are making the following four recommendations to FAA: The FAA Administrator should fulfill the CSLCA mandate to include ensuring a balance of risk between the federal government and launch companies as part of FAA’s MPL methodology evaluation by reexamining the current probability thresholds  (Recommendation 1) The FAA Administrator should fulfill the CSLCA mandate to analyze the cost impact of implementing its revised MPL methodology by evaluating the impact on the direct costs of launch companies and the federal government  (Recommendation 2) The FAA Administrator should fulfill the CSLCA mandate to evaluate its MPL methodology in consultation with the commercial space sector and insurance providers by consulting with those entities on the cost impact of its revised MPL methodology, including an updated cost-of-casualty amount, on the launch industry and the federal government  (Recommendation 3) The FAA Administrator should establish an estimated completion date for developing and implementing a plan to establish guidance on the most appropriate MPL methodologies and tools to use for each launch  (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for their review and comment  In its comments, reproduced in appendix I, the Department of Transportation concurred with our recommendations  The Department of Transportation also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees and the Secretary of the Department of Transportation  In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions or would like to discuss this work, please contact Alicia Puente Cackley at (202) 512-8678 or cackleya@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Individuals making key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the contact named above, Patrick Ward (Assistant Director), Jessica Artis, Isidro Gomez (Analyst in Charge), Courtney La Fountain, Maureen Luna-Long, Jessica Sandler, Jennifer Schwartz, Joseph Silvestri, and Shana Wallace made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The federal government shares liability risks with the commercial space launch industry for accidents that result in damages to third parties or federal property. This arrangement requires space launch companies to have a specific amount of insurance to cover these damages. The government is potentially liable for damages above that amount, up to a cap GAO estimated to be $3.1 billion in 2017, subject to appropriations in advance. CSLCA, enacted in 2015, directed the Department of Transportation, of which FAA is a part, to evaluate its MPL methodology and, if necessary, develop a plan to update that methodology. The act also included a provision requiring GAO to assess FAA's evaluation and any actions needed to update the methodology. This report discusses the extent to which (1) FAA's evaluation report addresses the requirements in CSLCA and (2) FAA has addressed previously identified weaknesses in the MPL methodology. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed FAA on its loss methodology evaluation and actions to address weaknesses. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) report evaluating its maximum probable loss (MPL) methodology did not fully address the evaluation and consultation requirements specified by the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA). Balance of Risk. CSLCA required FAA to include ensuring that the federal government is not exposed to greater indemnification costs and that launch companies are not required to purchase more insurance coverage than necessary as a result of FAA's MPL methodology. FAA said that it ensured this balance by improving its methodology, but it did not reevaluate its probability thresholds after revising its methodology. These thresholds are used to divide the risk of loss between launch companies and the government. Impact on Costs. The act required FAA to consider the costs to both the industry and the federal government of implementing an updated methodology. FAA's report discussed the impact on indirect costs, such as data collection, but did not discuss direct costs: insurance premiums for launch companies and indemnification liability for the federal government. Consultation. The act also required FAA to consult with the commercial space sector and insurance providers in evaluating its MPL methodology in accordance with the preceding requirements. While the agency consulted with some stakeholders, these consultations were limited in scope. FAA officials said they have not been able to take the actions needed to fully satisfy the mandated elements because of issues such as resource limitations and the lack of available data. However, by not resolving these issues, FAA lacks assurance that launch companies are not purchasing more insurance than needed or that the federal government is not being exposed to greater indemnification costs than expected. FAA has addressed two of three previously identified weaknesses in its MPL methodology but has not yet dealt with the remaining weakness. Specifically, the agency has revised its methodology for estimating the number of potential casualties for a launch and changed the factor it uses to derive estimated property damage from estimated casualties. However, FAA has not updated the amount used for the cost of an individual casualty. GAO recommended in a March 2017 report (GAO-17-366) that FAA update this amount. Not doing so could understate the amount of insurance launch companies are required to purchase, exposing the federal government to excess risk. GAO also determined that while FAA has two tools and methods it can use in making its MPL estimates, it does not have guidance on determining which are most appropriate for a given launch scenario. For example, one tool is more comprehensive but also labor intensive to use, while the other is inappropriate for certain launch scenarios and could result in misleading MPL amounts. Officials said they have begun to create such guidance but do not have an estimated completion date. Without such guidance, FAA cannot ensure that the most appropriate MPL methodology is used for each launch. FAA should fully address mandated requirements in evaluating its MPL—probability thresholds, direct costs, and stakeholder consultations— and establish an estimated completion date for developing guidance on tools and methods to use for specific launch scenarios. The Department of Transportation concurred with the recommendations, and provided technical comments.