prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Geographic shifts in the veterans’ population, changes in health care delivery, an aging infrastructure, and limited stakeholder involvement affect VA’s efforts to align its services and real property portfolio to meet the needs of veterans  For example, there has been a shift over time from inpatient to outpatient care  This shift will likely result in underutilized space once used for inpatient care  In such instances, it is often difficult and costly for VA to modernize, renovate, and retrofit these older facilities  In June 2017, VA reported that its facility inventory includes 430 vacant or mostly vacant buildings that are, on average, more than 60 years old, and an additional 784 buildings that are underutilized  The historic status of some VA facilities adds to the complexity of converting or disposing of them  In 2014, VA reported holding 2,957 historic buildings, structures, or land parcels—the third most in the federal government after DOD and the Department of the Interior  In some instances, it may be more expensive to renovate than to demolish and rebuild outdated facilities  In other cases, however, there may not be an option to demolish if these buildings are designated as historic  For example, planning officials at four medical facilities in our review told us that state historic preservation efforts prevented the VA from demolishing vacant buildings, even though these buildings require upkeep costs and pose potential safety hazards  (See fig  1 ) VA has also encountered challenges to its facility alignment efforts, in part, because it has not consistently followed best practices for effectively engaging stakeholders  VA may align its facilities to meet veterans’ needs by expanding or consolidating facilities or services  Stakeholders— including veterans; local, state, and federal officials; Veterans Service Organizations; historic preservation groups; VA staff; and Congress— often view changes as working against their interests or those of their constituents, especially when services are eliminated or shifted from one location to another  We found that VA has not consistently engaged with stakeholders, and, in some cases, this inconsistency resulted in adversarial relationships that reduced VA’s ability to better align facilities with the needs of the veteran population  In our April 2017 report, we recommended that VA improve stakeholder communication guidance and evaluate its efforts  VA agreed with our recommendations and outlined a plan to implement them  Two of the planning processes VA uses to align its facilities—VA’s Strategic Capital Investment Planning (SCIP) and the VA Integrated Planning (VAIP)—have limitations  VA relies on the SCIP process to plan and prioritize capital projects system-wide, but SCIP’s limitations—including subjective narratives, long timeframes, and restricted access to information—undermine VA’s ability to achieve its goals  For example, the time between when planning officials at VA medical facilities begin developing the SCIP narratives and when they are notified that a project is funded has taken between 17 and 23 months over the past 6 fiscal-year’s SCIP submissions  (See fig  2 ) As such, VA routinely asks its facility planners to submit their next year’s planned project narratives before knowing if their project submissions from the previous year have been funded  An official from the office that oversees SCIP told us that the timing of the budgeting process, which is outside VA’s control, contributes to these delays  While these aspects are outside of VA’s control, VA has chosen to wait about 6 to 10 months to report the results of the SCIP scoring process to the medical facilities  This situation makes it difficult for local officials to understand the likelihood that their projects will receive funding  A VA official said that for future SCIP cycles, VA plans to release the scoring results for minor construction and non-recurring maintenance projects to local officials earlier in the process  At the time of our review, however, the official did not have a time frame for when VA would do this  Although VA acknowledges many of these limitations, it has taken little action in response  Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should evaluate and determine appropriate corrective action for identified limitations on a timely basis  If VA does not address known limitations with the SCIP process, it will not have reasonable assurance that SCIP can be used to accurately identify the capital necessary to address VA’s service and infrastructure gaps  In our April 2017 report, we recommended that VA address identified limitations to the SCIP process, including limitations to scoring and approval, and access to information  VA concurred with the recommendation to the extent the limitations were within its control  While VA has taken some actions, the recommendation remains open  The VAIP process produces a market-level health services delivery plan for each Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) and a facility master plan for each medical facility  VA has estimated the entire process to create plans for VISNs and facilities to cost $108 million when fully complete  However, the VAIP process’s facility master plans assume all future growth in services will be provided directly through VA facilities  This assumption is not accurate given that (1) VA obligated about $10 1 billion to purchase care from non-VA providers in fiscal year 2015 and (2) VA can provide care directly through its medical facilities or purchase health care services from non-VA providers through both the Non-VA Medical Care Program (referred to as “care in the community” by VA) and clinical contracts  The Office of Management and Budget’s acquisition guidance notes that investments in major capital assets should be made only if no alternative private sector source can support the function at a lower cost  In our April 2017 report, we recommended that VA assess the value of the VAIP’s facility master plans as a facility-planning tool, and based on conclusions from the review, to either (1) discontinue the development of VAIP’s facility master plans or (2) address the limitations of VAIP’s facility master plans  VA concurred with the recommendation, and in August 2017, VA noted that it has discontinued its VAIP facility master plans while VA pursues a national realignment strategy, after which it plans to adjust its future facility master plans to incorporate pertinent information, including care in the community realignment opportunities  As Congress evaluates proposed legislation for disposing of or realigning VA property, it may wish to consider seven elements DOD relied on as it developed its recommendations for the BRAC Commission  Establish goals for the process  The Secretary of Defense emphasized the importance of transforming the military to make it more efficient as part of the 2005 BRAC round  Other goals for the 2005 BRAC process included fostering jointness among the four military services, reducing excess infrastructure, and producing savings  Prior rounds focused more on reducing excess infrastructure and producing savings  Develop criteria for evaluating closures and realignments  DOD proposed selection criteria, which were made available for public comment via the Federal Register  Ultimately, Congress enacted the final BRAC selection criteria in law with minor modification and specified that four selection criteria, known as the “military value criteria,” were to be given priority in developing closure and realignment recommendations  Further, Congress required that the Secretary of Defense develop and submit to Congress a force structure plan that described the estimated size of major military units needed to address probable threats to national security for the 20- year period beginning in 2005, along with a comprehensive inventory of global military installations  In authorizing the 2005 BRAC round, Congress specified that the Secretary of Defense publish a list of recommendations for the closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States based on the statutorily-required 20-year force structure plan and infrastructure inventory, and on the final selection criteria  Estimate costs and savings to implement closure and realignment recommendations  To address the cost and savings criteria, DOD developed and used the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model, a quantitative tool that DOD has used since the 1988 BRAC round to provide consistency in potential cost, savings, and return-on-investment estimates for closure and realignment options  We found the COBRA model to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and savings among alternatives  (See fig  3 ) As with any model, the quality of the output from COBRA was a direct function of the data DOD included in the model  Also, DOD’s COBRA model relied to a large extent on standard factors and averages and did not represent budget quality estimates that were developed once BRAC decisions were made and detailed implementation plans were developed  Nonetheless, the financial information provided important input into the selection process as decision makers weighed the financial implications—along with military value criteria and other considerations—in arriving at final decisions about the suitability of various closure and realignment options  Establish an organizational structure  The Office of the Secretary of Defense emphasized the need for joint cross-service groups to analyze common business-oriented functions  For the 2005 BRAC round, as for the 1993 and 1995 rounds, these joint cross-service groups performed analyses and developed closure and realignment options in addition to those developed by the military departments  Our evaluation of DOD’s 1995 BRAC round found that few cross- service recommendations were made, in part because of the lack of high-level leadership to encourage consolidations across the departments’ functions  In the 1995 BRAC round, the joint cross- service groups submitted options through the military services for approval, but few were approved  The number of approved recommendations that the joint cross-service groups developed significantly increased in the 2005 BRAC round  This increase was, in part, because high-level leadership ensured that the options were approved not by the military departments but rather by a DOD senior- level group, known as the Infrastructure Steering Group  As shown in figure 4, the Infrastructure Steering Group was placed organizationally on par with the military departments  Establish a common analytical framework  To ensure that the selection criteria were consistently applied, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, and the seven joint cross- service groups first performed a capacity analysis of facilities and functions  Before developing the candidate recommendations, DOD’s capacity analysis relied on data calls to hundreds of locations to obtain certified data to assess such factors as maximum potential capacity, current capacity, current usage, and excess capacity  Then, the military departments and joint cross-service groups performed a military value analysis for the facilities and functions based on primary military value criteria, which included a facility’s or function’s current and future mission capabilities, physical condition, ability to accommodate future needs, and cost of operations  Develop BRAC oversight mechanisms to improve accountability for implementation  In the 2005 BRAC round, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the first time required the military departments to develop business plans to better inform the Office of the Secretary of Defense of the status of implementation and financial details for each of the BRAC 2005 recommendations  These business plans included: (1) information such as a listing of all actions needed to implement each recommendation; (2) schedules for personnel relocations between installations; and (3) updated cost and savings estimates by DOD based on current information  This approach permitted senior-level intervention if warranted to ensure completion of the BRAC recommendations by the statutory completion date  Involve the audit community to better ensure data accuracy  The DOD Inspector General and military department audit agencies played key roles in identifying data limitations, pointing out needed corrections, and improving the accuracy of the data used in the process  In their oversight roles, the audit organizations, which had access to relevant information and officials as the process evolved, helped to improve the accuracy of the data used in the BRAC process and thus strengthened the quality and integrity of the data used to develop closure and realignment recommendations  For example, the auditors worked to ensure certified information was used for BRAC analysis and reviewed other facets of the process, including the various internal control plans, the COBRA model, and other modeling and analytical tools that were used in the development of recommendations  We identified two key challenges that affected DOD’s implementation of BRAC 2005 and would need to be addressed for VA to adopt a BRAC- like process for its asset and infrastructure review  Some transformational-type BRAC recommendations required sustained senior leadership attention and a high level of coordination among many stakeholders to complete by the required date  Implementation of some transformational BRAC recommendations—especially those where a multitude of organizations had roles to play to ensure the achievement of the goals of the recommendation—illustrated the need to involve key stakeholders and effective planning  For example, the Defense Logistics Agency committed sustained high-level leadership and included relevant stakeholders to address implementation challenges faced with the potential for disruptions to depot operations during implementation of the BRAC consolidation recommendation  To implement the BRAC recommendations, the agency had to develop strategic agreements with the services that ensured that all stakeholders agreed on its plans for implementation, and had to address certain human capital and information technology challenges  Large number of actions and interdependent recommendations complicated the implementation process  The large number and variety of BRAC actions presented challenges during implementation  The BRAC 2005 round had more individual actions (813) than the four prior rounds combined (387)  The executive staff of the Commission told us that it was more difficult to assess the costs and the amount of time for the savings to offset the implementation costs since many of the recommendations contained multiple interdependent actions, all of which needed to be reviewed  Specifically, many of the BRAC 2005 recommendations were interdependent and had to be completed in a sequential fashion within the statutory implementation period  In cases where interdependent recommendations required multiple relocations of large numbers of personnel, delays in completing one BRAC recommendation had a cascading effect on the implementation of other recommendations  Specifically, DOD had to synchronize the relocations of over 123,000 people with about $24 7 billion in new construction or renovation  Commission officials told us that in prior BRAC rounds each base was handled by a single integrated recommendation  However, in BRAC 2005, many installations were simultaneously affected by multiple interconnected BRAC recommendations  Given the complexity of interdependent recommendations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense required the military departments and defense agencies to provide periodic updates on implementation challenges and progress  Chairman Roe, Ranking Member Walz, and Members of the Committee, this concludes our prepared statement  We are happy to answer any questions related to our work on VA’s efforts to align its medical facilities and services or on DOD’s BRAC process  If you or your staff members have any questions concerning this testimony, please contact David Wise at (202) 512-2834 or wised@gao gov regarding federal real property, or Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao gov regarding the BRAC process  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Other individuals who made key contributions to this testimony include Keith Cunningham, Assistant Director; Gina Hoffman, Assistant Director; Tracy Barnes; Jeff Mayhew; Kevin Newak; Richard Powelson; Malika Rice; Jodie Sandel; Eric Schwab; Amelia M  Weathers; and Crystal Wesco  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2:  In FY2020, the discretionary spending limits are slated to decrease, after having been increased in FY2018 and FY2019 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of FY2018 (BBA; P L  115-123 )  The nondefense discretionary cap (the one relevant for housing programs and activities) will decline by more than 9% in FY2020, absent any additional legislative changes  More than three-quarters of HUD's appropriations are devoted to three rental assistance programs serving more than 4 million families: the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, Section 8 project-based rental assistance, and the public housing program  Funding for the HCV program and project-based rental assistance has been increasing in recent years, largely because of the increased costs of maintaining assistance for households that are currently served by the programs  Public housing has, arguably, been underfunded (based on studies undertaken by HUD of what it should cost to operate and maintain it) for many years  Despite the large share of total HUD funding these rental assistance programs command, their combined funding levels only permit them to serve an estimated one in four eligible families, which creates long waiting lists for assistance in most communities  A similar dynamic plays out in the U S  Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service budget  Demand for housing assistance exceeds the supply of subsidies, yet the vast majority of the RHS budget is devoted to maintaining assistance for current residents  In a budget environment with limits on discretionary spending, the pressure to provide increased funding to maintain current services for existing rental assistance programs must be balanced against the pressure from states, localities, and advocates to maintain or increase funding for other popular programs, such as HUD's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, grants for homelessness assistance, and funding for Native American housing  The Trump Administration's budget request for FY2020 proposes an 18% decrease in funding for HUD's programs and activities as compared to the prior year  It proposes to eliminate funding for several programs, including multiple HUD grant programs (CDBG, the HOME Investment Partnerships Program, and the Self-Help and Assisted Homeownership Opportunity Program (SHOP)), and to decrease funding for most other HUD programs  In proposing to eliminate the grant programs, the Administration cites budget constraints and proposes that state and local governments take on more of a role in the housing and community development activities funded by these programs  Additionally, the budget references policy changes designed to reduce the cost of federal rental assistance programs, including the Making Affordable Housing Work Act of 2018 (MAHWA) legislative proposal, released by HUD in April 2018  If enacted, the proposal would make a number of changes to the way tenant rents are calculated in HUD rental assistance programs, resulting in rent increases for assisted housing recipients, and corresponding decreases in the cost of federal subsidies  Further, it would permit local program administrators or property owners to institute work requirements for recipients  In announcing the proposal, HUD described it as setting the programs on "a more fiscally sustainable path," creating administrative efficiency, and promoting self-sufficiency  Low-income housing advocates have been critical of it, particularly the effect increased rent payments may have on families  Beyond HUD, the Administration's FY2020 budget request for USDA's Rural Housing Service would eliminate funding for most rural housing programs, except for several loan guarantee programs  It would continue to provide funding to renew existing rental assistance, but also proposes a new minimum rent policy for tenants designed to help reduce federal subsidy costs  For more on HUD appropriations trends in general, see CRS Report R42542, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): Funding Trends Since FY2002   For more on the FY2020 budget environment, including discretionary spending caps, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions   Several pieces of assisted housing legislation that were enacted in prior Congresses are expected to be implemented during the 116 th Congress  In the FY2016 HUD appropriations law, Congress mandated that HUD expand the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration by 100 public housing authorities (PHAs)  MTW is a waiver program that allows a limited number of participating PHAs to receive exceptions from HUD for most of the rules and regulations governing the public housing and voucher programs  MTW has been controversial for many years, with PHAs supporting the flexibility it provides (e g , allowing PHAs to move funding between programs), and low-income housing advocates criticizing some of the policies being adopted by PHAs (e g , work requirements and time limits)  Most recently, GAO issued a report raising concerns about HUD's oversight of MTW, including the lack of monitoring of the effects of policy changes under MTW on tenants  HUD was required to phase in the FY2016 expansion and evaluate any new policies adopted by participating PHAs  Following a series of listening sessions and advisory committee meetings, and several solicitations for comment, HUD issued a solicitation of interest for the first two expansion cohorts in December 2018  As of the date of this report, no selections had yet been made for those cohorts  The Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) was an Obama Administration initiative initially designed to test the feasibility of addressing the estimated $25 6 billion backlog in unmet capital needs in the public housing program by allowing local PHAs to convert their public housing properties to either Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers or Section 8 project-based rental assistance  PHAs are limited in their ability to mortgage, and thus raise private capital for, their public housing properties because of a federal deed restriction placed on the properties as a condition of federal assistance  When public housing properties are converted under RAD, that deed restriction is removed  As currently authorized, RAD conversions must be cost-neutral, meaning that the Section 8 rents the converted properties may receive must not result in higher subsidies than would have been received under the public housing program  Given this restriction, and without additional subsidy, not all public housing properties can use a conversion to raise private capital, potentially limiting the usefulness of a conversion for some properties  While RAD conversions have been popular with PHAs, and HUD's initial evaluations of the program have been favorable, a recent GAO study has raised questions about HUD's oversight of RAD, and about how much private funding is actually being raised for public housing through the conversions  RAD, as first authorized by Congress in the FY2012 HUD appropriations law, was originally limited to 60,000 units of public housing (out of roughly 1 million units)  However, Congress has since expanded the demonstration  Most recently, in FY2018, Congress raised the cap so that up to 455,000 units of public housing will be permitted to convert to Section 8 under RAD, and it further expanded the program so that Section 202 Housing for the Elderly units can also convert  Not only is HUD currently implementing the FY2018 expansion, but the President's FY2020 budget request to Congress requests that the cap on public housing RAD conversions be eliminated completely  Several major disasters that have recently affected the United States have led to congressional activity related to disaster response and recovery programs  When such incidents occur, the President may authorize an emergency or major disaster declaration under the Robert T  Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act; P L  93-288 , as amended), making various housing assistance programs, including programs provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) , available to disaster survivors  FEMA-provided housing assistance may include short-term, emergency sheltering accommodations under Section 403—Essential Assistance—of the Stafford Act (e g , the Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program, which is intended to provide short-term hotel/motel accommodations)  Interim housing needs may be met through the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) under Section 408—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households—of the Stafford Act  IHP assistance may include financial (e g , assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations ) and/or direct assistance (e g , multi family lease and repair , Transportable Temporary Housing Units , or direct lease ) to eligible individuals and households who, as a result of an emergency or disaster, have uninsured or under-insured necessary expenses and serious needs that cannot be met through other means or forms of assistance  IHP assistance is intended to be temporary and is generally limited to a period of 18 months following the date of the declaration , but it may be extended by FEMA  The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA, Division D of P L  115-254 ), which became law on October 5, 2018, is the most comprehensive reform of FEMA's disaster assistance programs since the passage of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA, Division B of P L  113-2 ) and, prior to that, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA, P L  109-295 )  The DRRA legislation focuses on improving pre-disaster planning and mitigation, response, and recovery, and increasing FEMA accountability  As such, it amends many sections of the Stafford Act  In addition to those amendments, DRRA includes new standalone authorities and requires reports to Congress, rulemaking, and other actions  The 116 th Congress has expressed interest in the oversight of DRRA's implementation, including sections that amend FEMA's temporary housing assistance programs under the Stafford Act  These sections include the following: DRRA Section 1211—State Administration of Assistance for Direct Temporary Housing and Permanent Housing Construction—amends Stafford Act Section 408(f)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, State Role—to allow state, territorial, or tribal governments to administer Direct Temporary Housing Assistance and Permanent Housing Construction, in addition to Other Needs Assistance (ONA)  It also provides a mechanism for state and local units of government to be reimbursed for locally implemented housing solutions  This provision may allow states to customize disaster housing solutions and expedite disaster recovery; however, FEMA may need to provide guidance to clarify the requirements of the application and approval process for the state, territorial, or tribal government that seeks to administer these programs  DRRA Section 1212—Assistance to Individuals and Households—amends Stafford Act Section 408(h)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, Maximum Amount of Assistance—to separate the cap on the maximum amount of financial assistance eligible individuals and households may receive for housing assistance and ONA  The provision also removes financial assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations from the cap, and creates an exception for accessibility-related costs  This may better enable FEMA's disaster assistance programs to meet the recovery-related needs of individuals, including those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, and households who experience significant damage to their primary residence and personal property as a result of an emergency or major disaster  However, there is also the potential that this change may disincentivize sufficient insurance coverage because of the new ability for eligible individuals and households to receive separate and increased housing and ONA awards that more comprehensively cover disaster-related real and personal property losses  DRRA Section 1213—Multifamily Lease and Repair Assistance—amends Stafford Act Section 408(c)(1)(B)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, Direct Assistance—to expand the eligible areas for multifamily lease and repair, and remove the requirement that the value of the improvements or repairs not exceed the value of the lease agreement  This may increase housing options for disaster survivors  The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security must assess the use of FEMA's direct assistance authority to justify this alternative to other temporary housing options, and submit a report to Congress  For more information on DRRA, see CRS Insight IN11055, The Disaster Recovery Reform Act: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress   Additionally, tables of deadlines associated with the implementation actions and requirements of DRRA are available upon request  Native Americans living in tribal areas experience a variety of housing challenges  Housing conditions in tribal areas are generally worse than those for the United States as a whole, and factors such as the legal status of trust lands present additional complications for housing  In light of these challenges, and the federal government's long-standing trust relationship with tribes, certain federal housing programs provide funding specifically for housing in tribal areas  The Tribal HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (Tribal HUD-VASH) program provides rental assistance and supportive services to Native American veterans who are homeless or at risk of homelessness  Tribal HUD-VASH is modeled on the broader HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) program, which provides rental assistance and supportive services for homeless veterans  Tribal HUD-VASH was initially created and funded through the FY2015 HUD appropriations act ( P L  113-235 ), and funds to renew rental assistance have been provided in subsequent appropriations acts  However, no separate authorizing legislation for Tribal HUD-VASH currently exists  In the 116 th Congress, a bill to codify the Tribal HUD-VASH program ( S  257 ) was ordered to be reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in February 2019  A substantively identical bill passed the Senate during the 115 th Congress ( S  1333 ), but the House ultimately did not consider it  For more information on HUD-VASH and Tribal HUD-VASH, see CRS Report RL34024, Veterans and Homelessness   The main federal program that provides housing assistance to Native American tribes and Alaska Native villages is the Native American Housing Block Grant (NAHBG), which was authorized by the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA,  P L  104-330 )  NAHASDA reorganized the federal system of housing assistance for tribes while recognizing the rights of tribal self-governance and self-determination  The NAHBG provides formula funding to tribes that can be used for a range of affordable housing activities that benefit primarily low-income Native Americans or Alaska Natives living in tribal areas  A separate block grant program authorized by NAHASDA, the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant (NHHBG), provides funding for affordable housing activities that benefit Native Hawaiians eligible to reside on the Hawaiian Home Lands  NAHASDA also authorizes a loan guarantee program, the Title VI Loan Guarantee, for tribes to carry out eligible affordable housing activities  The most recent authorization for most NAHASDA programs expired at the end of FY2013, although NAHASDA programs have generally continued to be funded in annual appropriations laws  (The NHHBG has not been reauthorized since its original authorization expired in FY2005, though it has continued to receive funding in most years  ) NAHASDA reauthorization legislation has been considered in varying degrees in the 113 th , 114 th , and 115 th Congresses but none was ultimately enacted  The 116 th Congress may again consider legislation to reauthorize NAHASDA  In general, tribes and Congress have been supportive of NAHASDA, though there has been some disagreement over specific provisions or policy proposals that have been included in reauthorization bills  Some of these disagreements involve debates over specific program changes that have been proposed  Others involve debate over broader issues, such as the appropriateness of providing federal funding for programs specifically for Native Hawaiians and whether such funding could be construed to provide benefits based on race  For more information on NAHASDA, see CRS Report R43307, The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA): Background and Funding   In the past, Congress has regularly extended a number of temporary tax provisions that address a variety of policy issues, including certain provisions related to housing  This set of temporary provisions is commonly referred to as "tax extenders " Two housing-related provisions that have been included in tax extenders packages recently are (1) the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, and (2) the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, each of which is discussed further below  The most recently enacted tax extenders legislation was the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ) in the 115 th Congress  That law extended the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and the ability to deduct mortgage insurance premiums through the end of 2017 (each had previously expired at the end of 2016)  As of the date of this report, these provisions had not been extended beyond 2017  In the 116 th Congress, S  617 , the Tax Extender and Disaster Relief Act of 2019, would extend each of these provisions through calendar year 2019  For more information on tax extenders in general, see CRS Report R45347, Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders")   Historically, when all or part of a taxpayer's mortgage debt has been forgiven, the forgiven amount has been included in the taxpayer's gross income for tax purposes  This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income  During the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, some efforts to help troubled borrowers avoid foreclosure resulted in canceled mortgage debt  The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P L  110-142 ), signed into law in December 2007, temporarily excluded qualified canceled mortgage debt income associated with a primary residence from taxation  The provision was originally effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010, and was subsequently extended several times  Rationales put forth when the provision was originally enacted included minimizing hardship for distressed households, lessening the risk that nontax homeownership retention efforts would be thwarted by tax policy, and assisting in the recoveries of the housing market and overall economy  Arguments against the exclusion at the time included concerns that it makes debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, which could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations, and concerns about fairness given that the ability to realize the benefits depends on a variety of factors  More recently, because the economy, housing market, and foreclosure rates have improved significantly since the height of the housing and mortgage market turmoil, the exclusion may no longer be warranted  For more information on the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, see CRS Report RL34212, Analysis of the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Income   Traditionally, homeowners have been able to deduct the interest paid on their mortgage, as well as property taxes they pay, as long as they itemize their tax deductions  Beginning in 2007, homeowners could also deduct qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as a result of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P L  109-432 )  Specifically, homeowners could effectively treat qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as mortgage interest, thus making the premiums deductible if homeowners itemized and their adjusted gross incomes were below a specified threshold ($55,000 for single, $110,000 for married filing jointly)  Originally, the deduction was to be available only for 2007, but it was subsequently extended several times  Two possible rationales for allowing the deduction of mortgage insurance premiums are that it assisted in the recovery of the housing market, and that it promotes homeownership  The housing market, however, has largely recovered from the market turmoil of the late 2000s, and it is not clear that the deduction has an effect on the homeownership rate  Furthermore, to the degree that owner-occupied housing is over subsidized, extending the deduction could lead to a greater misallocation of the resources that are directed toward the housing industry  In the past, Congress has regularly extended a number of temporary tax provisions that address a variety of policy issues, including certain provisions related to housing  This set of temporary provisions is commonly referred to as "tax extenders " Two housing-related provisions that have been included in tax extenders packages recently are (1) the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, and (2) the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, each of which is discussed further below  The most recently enacted tax extenders legislation was the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ) in the 115 th Congress  That law extended the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and the ability to deduct mortgage insurance premiums through the end of 2017 (each had previously expired at the end of 2016)  As of the date of this report, these provisions had not been extended beyond 2017  In the 116 th Congress, S  617 , the Tax Extender and Disaster Relief Act of 2019, would extend each of these provisions through calendar year 2019  For more information on tax extenders in general, see CRS Report R45347, Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders")   Historically, when all or part of a taxpayer's mortgage debt has been forgiven, the forgiven amount has been included in the taxpayer's gross income for tax purposes  This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income  During the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, some efforts to help troubled borrowers avoid foreclosure resulted in canceled mortgage debt  The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P L  110-142 ), signed into law in December 2007, temporarily excluded qualified canceled mortgage debt income associated with a primary residence from taxation  The provision was originally effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010, and was subsequently extended several times  Rationales put forth when the provision was originally enacted included minimizing hardship for distressed households, lessening the risk that nontax homeownership retention efforts would be thwarted by tax policy, and assisting in the recoveries of the housing market and overall economy  Arguments against the exclusion at the time included concerns that it makes debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, which could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations, and concerns about fairness given that the ability to realize the benefits depends on a variety of factors  More recently, because the economy, housing market, and foreclosure rates have improved significantly since the height of the housing and mortgage market turmoil, the exclusion may no longer be warranted  For more information on the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, see CRS Report RL34212, Analysis of the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Income   Traditionally, homeowners have been able to deduct the interest paid on their mortgage, as well as property taxes they pay, as long as they itemize their tax deductions  Beginning in 2007, homeowners could also deduct qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as a result of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P L  109-432 )  Specifically, homeowners could effectively treat qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as mortgage interest, thus making the premiums deductible if homeowners itemized and their adjusted gross incomes were below a specified threshold ($55,000 for single, $110,000 for married filing jointly)  Originally, the deduction was to be available only for 2007, but it was subsequently extended several times  Two possible rationales for allowing the deduction of mortgage insurance premiums are that it assisted in the recovery of the housing market, and that it promotes homeownership  The housing market, however, has largely recovered from the market turmoil of the late 2000s, and it is not clear that the deduction has an effect on the homeownership rate  Furthermore, to the degree that owner-occupied housing is over subsidized, extending the deduction could lead to a greater misallocation of the resources that are directed toward the housing industry  

ground_truth: VA operates one of the largest health care systems in the United States, utilizing more than 6,000 federally owned and 1,500 leased buildings. DOD has repeatedly applied the BRAC process to reduce the amount of unneeded property that it owns and leases and to save billions of dollars that could be applied to higher priority defense needs. This statement is based on GAO's April 2017 report related to VA facility alignment ( GAO-17-349 ) and numerous GAO reports related to the BRAC process as summarized in a June 2011 testimony ( GAO-11-704T ) and a March 2012 testimony ( GAO-12-513T ). This statement addresses (1) the factors that affect VA's facility alignment and the extent to which VA's capital-planning process facilitates the alignment of facilities with the veterans' population, and (2) the key elements and challenges affecting DOD and the Commission in BRAC 2005. Detailed information on our scope and methodologies for this work can be found in these published products, cited throughout this testimony. Geographic shifts in the veterans' population, changes in health care delivery, aging infrastructure, and limited stakeholder involvement affect the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) efforts to align its services and real property portfolio to meet the needs of veterans. For example, a shift over time from inpatient to outpatient care will likely result in underutilized space once used for inpatient care. Further, the historic status of some VA facilities adds to the complexity of converting or disposing of them. In such instances, it is often difficult and costly for VA to modernize, renovate, and retrofit these older facilities. GAO reported that two of the planning processes VA uses to align its facilities—VA's Strategic Capital Investment Planning (SCIP) and the VA Integrated Planning (VAIP)—have limitations that undermine VA's efforts to achieve its goals. Specifically: VA relies on the SCIP process to plan and prioritize capital projects, but VA routinely asks its facility planners to submit their next year's planned project narratives before knowing if their previous submissions have been funded. The overlapping budget cycle, which is outside of VA's control, combined with other SCIP limitations—including subjective narratives, long time frames, and restricted access to information—make it difficult for VA to rely on SCIP to accurately identify the capital necessary to address its service and infrastructure gaps. VA concurred that it needs to address SCIP limitations that are within its control, as GAO recommended; VA has made some progress in implementing the recommendation has made some progress in implementing the recommendation.\ The VAIP process is estimated to cost $108 million and to produce market-level service delivery plans and facility master plans. However, the VAIP master plans incorrectly assume that all future growth in services will be provided directly through VA facilities without considering alternatives, such as purchasing care from the community. GAO recommended that VA consider discontinuing the VAIP facility master plans pending an assessment of their value as a facility-planning tool. VA agreed with the recommendation and is implementing it while pursuing a national realignment strategy.. Key elements of the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process could benefit VA's asset and infrastructure review. The key elements included: (1) establishing goals for the process, (2) developing criteria for evaluating closures and realignments, and (3) establishing an organizational structure to develop closure and realignment options. GAO identified key challenges that affected DOD's implementation of BRAC 2005 and the results achieved; these challenges would need to be addressed if VA is to successfully apply the process. These challenges included: (1) large, complex recommendations required sustained senior leadership's attention and a high level of coordination among many stakeholders, and (2) the large number of actions that depend on each other for successful implementation. In the April 2017 report, GAO made recommendations related to capital planning and stakeholder involvement. VA concurred with the recommendations to the extent that they were within its control and has started making improvements.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: This report provides responses to frequently asked questions about the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant  It is intended to serve as a quick reference to provide easy access to information and data  Appendix B presents a series of tables with state-level data  This report does not provide information on TANF program rules (for a discussion of TANF rules, see CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements , by Gene Falk)  On January 24, 2019, the President signed legislation ( P L  116-4 ) that funds TANF and related programs through June 30, 2019  The legislation permits states to receive their quarterly TANF grants for the 2 nd quarter (January through March) and 3 rd quarter (April through June) of FY2019  Additional legislation would be required to pay TANF grants in the final quarter (July through September) of FY2019  TANF programs are funded through a combination of federal and state funds  In FY2018, TANF has two federal grants to states  The bulk of the TANF funding is in a basic block grant to the states, totaling $16 5 billion for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Indian tribes  There is also a contingency fund available that provides extra federal funds to states that meet certain conditions  Additionally, states are required to expend a minimum amount of their own funds for TANF and TANF-related activities under what is known as the maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement  States are required to spend at least 75% of what they spent in FY1994 on TANF's predecessor programs  The minimum MOE amount, in total, is $10 3 billion per year for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories  TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, P L  104-193 )  A TANF basic block grant amount—both nationally and for each state—was established in the 1996 welfare reform law  The amount established in that law for the 50 states, District of Columbia, territories, and tribes was $16 6 billion in total  From FY1997 through FY2016, that amount remained the same  It was not adjusted for changes that occur over time, such as inflation, the size of the TANF assistance caseload, or changes in the poverty population  During this period, the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the block grant declined by one-third (33 1%)  Beginning with FY2017, the state family assistance grant was reduced by 0 33% from its historical levels to finance TANF-related research and technical assistance  The reduced block grant amount is $16 5 billion  Table 1 shows the state family assistance grant, in both nominal (actual) and real (inflation-adjusted) dollars for each year, FY1997 through FY2018  In real (inflation-adjusted) terms, the FY2018 block grant was 36% below its value in FY1997  Figure 1 shows the uses of federal TANF grants to states and state MOE funds in FY2017  In FY2017, a total of $31 1 billion of both federal TANF and state MOE expenditures were either expended or transferred to other block grant programs  Basic assistance—ongoing benefits to families to meet basic needs—represented 23% ($7 1 billion) of total FY2017 TANF and MOE dollars  TANF is a major contributor of child care funding  In FY2017, $5 billion (16% of all TANF and MOE funds) were either expended on child care or transferred to the child care block grant (the Child Care and Development Fund, or CCDF)  TANF work-related activities (including education and training) were the third-largest TANF and MOE spending category at $3 3 billion, or 11% of total TANF and MOE funds  TANF also helps low-wage parents by helping to finance state refundable tax credits, such as state add-ons to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)  TANF and MOE expenditures on refundable tax credits in FY2017 totaled $2 8 billion, or 9% of total TANF and MOE spending  TANF is also a major contributor to the child welfare system, which provides foster care, adoption assistance, and services to families with children who either have experienced or are at risk of experiencing child abuse or neglect, spending about $2 2 billion on such activities  TANF and MOE funds also help fund state prekindergarten (pre-K) programs, with total FY2017 expenditures for that category also at $2 5 billion  TANF and MOE funds are also used for short-term and emergency benefits and a wide range of other social services  For state-specific information on the use of TANF funds, see Table B-1 and Table B-2   TANF law permits states to "reserve" unused funds without time limit  This permits flexibility in timing of the use of TANF funds, including the ability to "save" funds for unexpected occurrences that might increase costs (such as recessions or natural disasters)  At the end of FY2017 (September 30, 2017, the most recent data currently available), a total of $5 1 billion of federal TANF funding remained neither transferred nor spent  However, some of these unspent funds represent monies that states had already committed to spend later  At the end of FY2017, states had made such commitments to spend—that is, had obligated—a total of $1 8 billion  At the end of FY2017, states had $3 3 billion of "unobligated balances " These funds are available to states to make new spending commitments  Table B-3 shows unspent TANF funds by state  This number is not known  Federal TANF reporting requirements focus on families receiving only ongoing assistance   There is no complete reporting on families receiving other TANF benefits and services  Assistance is defined as benefits provided to families to meet ongoing, basic needs  It is most often paid in cash  However, some states use TANF or MOE funds to provide an "earnings supplement" to working parents added to monthly Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) allotments  These "earnings supplements" are paid separately from the regular TANF cash assistance program  Additionally, TANF MOE dollars are used to fund food assistance for immigrants barred from regular SNAP benefits in certain states  These forms of nutrition aid meet an ongoing need, and thus are considered TANF assistance  As discussed in a previous section of this report, TANF basic assistance accounts for about 24% of all TANF expenditures  Therefore, the federal reporting requirements that pertain to families receiving "assistance" are likely to undercount the number of families receiving any TANF-funded benefit or service  Table 2 provides assistance caseload information  A total of 1 2 million families, composed of 3 1 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded assistance in September 2018  The bulk of the "recipients" were children—2 3 million in that month  For state-by-state assistance caseloads, see Table B-4   Figure 2 provides a long-term historical perspective on the number of families receiving assistance from TANF or its predecessor program, from July 1959 to September 2017  The shaded areas of the figure represent months when the national economy was in recession  Though the health of the national economy has affected the trend in the cash assistance caseload, the long-term trend in receipt of cash assistance does not follow a classic countercyclical pattern  Such a pattern would have the caseload rise during economic slumps, and then fall again during periods of economic growth  Factors other than the health of the economy (demographic trends, policy changes) also have influenced the caseload trend  The figure shows two periods of sustained caseload increases: the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s and a second period from 1988 to 1994  The number of families receiving assistance peaked in March 1994 at 5 1 million families  The assistance caseload fell rapidly in the late 1990s (after the 1996 welfare reform law) before leveling off in 2001  In 2004, the caseload began another decline, albeit at a slower pace than in the late 1990s  During the recent 2007-2009 recession and its aftermath, the caseload began to rise from 1 7 million families in August 2008, peaking in December 2010 at close to 2 0 million families  By September 2018, the assistance caseload had declined to 1 2 million families  Table B-5 shows recent trends in the number of cash assistance families by state  Before PRWORA, the "typical" family receiving assistance has been headed by a single parent (usually the mother) with one or two children  That single parent has also typically been unemployed  However, over the past 20 years the assistance caseload decline has occurred together with a major shift in the composition of the rolls  Figure 3 shows the change in the size and composition of the assistance caseload under both AFDC (1988 and 1994) and TANF  In FY1988, an estimated 84% of AFDC families were headed by an unemployed adult recipient  In FY2016, families with an unemployed adult recipient represented 32% of all cash assistance families  This decline occurred, in large part, as the number of families headed by unemployed adult recipients declined more rapidly than other components of the assistance caseload  In FY1994, a monthly average of 3 8 million families per month who received AFDC cash assistance had adult recipients who were not working  In FY2016, a monthly average of 485,000 families per month had adult recipients or work-eligible individuals, with no adult recipient or work-eligible individual working  With the decline in families headed by unemployed adults, the share of the caseload represented by families with employed adults and "child only" families has increased  In FY2017, families with all adult recipients unemployed and families with employed adult recipients each represented 31% of all assistance families  The latter category includes families in "earnings supplement" programs separate from the regular TANF cash assistance program  "Child-only" families are those where no adult recipient receives benefits in their own right; the family receives benefits on behalf of its children  The share of the caseload that was child-only in FY2017 was 38%  In FY2017, families with a nonrecipient, nonparent relative (grandparents, aunts, uncles) represented 14% of all assistance families  Families with ineligible, noncitizen adults or adults who have not reported their citizenship status made up 9% of the assistance caseload in that year  Families where the parent received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and the children received TANF made up 9% of all assistance families in FY2017  There are no federal rules that help determine the amount of TANF cash benefits paid to a family  (There are also no federal rules that require states to use TANF to pay cash benefits, though all states do so ) Benefit amounts are determined solely by the states  Most states base TANF cash benefit amounts on family size, paying larger cash benefits to larger families on the presumption that they have greater financial needs  The maximum monthly cash benefit is usually paid to a family that receives no other income (e g , no earned or unearned income) and complies with program rules  Families with income other than TANF often are paid a reduced benefit  Moreover, some families are financially sanctioned for not meeting a program requirement (e g , a work requirement), and are also paid a lower benefit  Figure 4 shows the maximum monthly TANF cash benefit by state for a single mother caring for two children (family of three) in July 2016  The benefit amounts shown are those for a single-parent family with two children  For a family of three, the maximum TANF benefit paid in July 2017 varied from $170 per month in Mississippi to $1,201 per month in New Hampshire  The map shows a regional pattern to the maximum monthly benefit paid, with lower benefit amounts in the South than in other regions  Only New Hampshire (at 60% of the federal poverty guidelines) had a maximum TANF cash assistance amount for this sized family in excess of 50% of poverty-level income  TANF's main federal work requirement is actually a performance measure that applies to the states, rather than individual recipients  States determine the work rules that apply to individual recipients  The TANF statute requires states to have 50% of their caseload meet standards of participation in work or activities—that is, a family member must be in specified activities for a minimum number of hours  There is a separate participation standard that applies to the two-parent portion of a state's caseload, requiring 90% of the state's two-parent caseload to meet participation standards  However, the statutory work participation standards are reduced by a "caseload reduction credit " The caseload reduction credit reduces the participation standard one percentage point for each percentage point decline in a state's caseload  Additionally, under a regulatory provision, a state may get "extra" credit for caseload reduction if it spends more than required under the TANF MOE  Therefore, the effective standards states face are often less than the 50% and 90% targets, and vary by state and by year  States that do not meet the TANF work participation standard are at risk of being penalized through a reduction in their block grant  However, penalties can be forgiven if a state claims, and the Secretary of HHS finds, that it had "reasonable cause" for not meeting the standard  Penalties can also be forgiven for states that enter into "corrective compliance plans," and subsequently meet the work standard  The 50% and 90% target standards that states face, as well as the caseload reduction credit, date back to the 1996 welfare reform law  However, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P L  109-171 ) made several changes to the work participation rules effective in FY2007 The caseload reduction credit was changed to measure caseload reduction from FY2005, rather than the original law's FY1995  The work participation standards were broadened to include families receiving cash aid in "separate state programs " Separate state programs are programs run with state funds, distinct from a state's "TANF program," but with expenditures countable toward the TANF MOE  HHS was instructed to provide definition to the allowable TANF work activities listed in law  HHS was also required to define what is meant by a "work-eligible" individual, expanding the number of families that are included in the work participation calculation  States were required to develop plans and procedures to verify work activities  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P L  111-5 ), a law enacted in response to the sharp economic downturn of 2007-2009, held states "harmless" for caseload increases affecting the work participation standards for FY2009 through FY2011  It did so by allowing states to "freeze" caseload reduction credits at pre-recession levels through the FY2011 standards  HHS computes two work participation rates for each state that are then compared with the effective (after-credit) standard to determine if it has met the TANF work standard  An "all-families" work participation rate is computed and compared with the all-families effective standard (50% minus the state's caseload reduction credit)  HHS also computes a two-parent work participation rate that is compared with the two-parent effective standard (90% minus the state's caseload reduction credit)  Figure 5 shows the national average all-families work participation rate for FY2002 through FY2017  For the period FY2002 through FY2011, states achieved an average all-families work participation rate hovering around 30%  The work participation rate increased since then  In FY2016, it exceeded 50% for the first time since TANF was established  However, it is important to note that the increase in the work participation rate has not come from an increase in the number of recipients in regular TANF assistance programs who are either working or in job preparation activities  This increase stems mostly from states creating new "earnings supplement" programs that use TANF funds to aid working parents in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps) or who have left the regular TANF assistance programs for work  Figure 6 shows which states did not meet the TANF all-families work participation standards from FY2006 through FY2017  Before FY2007, the first year that DRA was effective, only a few jurisdictions did not meet TANF all-families work participation standards  However, in FY2007, 15 jurisdictions did not meet the all-families standard  This number declined to 9 in FY2008 and 8 in FY2009  In FY2012, despite the uptick in the national average work participation rate, 16 states did not meet the all-family standard, the largest number of states that did not meet their participation standards in any one year since the enactment of TANF  FY2012 was the year that ARRA's "freeze" of the caseload reduction credit expired, and states were generally required to meet higher standards than in previous years  The number of jurisdictions that did not meet the all-families standard declined over the FY2012 to FY2017 period  In FY2017, two jurisdictions did not meet the all-family participation standard: Nevada and Guam  In addition to meeting a work standard for all families, TANF also imposes a second standard—90%—for the two-parent portion of its cash assistance caseload  This standard can also be lowered by caseload reduction  Figure 7 shows whether each state met its two-parent work participation standard for FY2006 through FY2017  However, the display on the table is more complex than that for reporting whether a state met or did not meet its "all family" rate  A substantial number of states have reported no two-parent families subject to the work participation standard  These states are denoted on the table with an "NA," indicating that the two-parent standard was not applicable to the state in that year  Before the changes made by the DRA were effective, a number of states had their two-parent families in separate state programs that were not included in the work participation calculation  When DRA brought families receiving assistance in separate state programs into the work participation rate calculations, a number of states moved these families into solely state-funded programs  These are state-funded programs with expenditures not countable toward the TANF maintenance of effort requirement, and hence are outside of TANF's rules  For states with two-parent families in their caseloads, the table reports "Yes" for states that met the two-parent standard, and "No" for states that did not meet the two-parent standard  Of the 28 jurisdictions that had two-parent families in their FY2017 TANF work participation calculation, 19 met the standard and 9 did not  Appendix A  Supplementary Tables Appendix B  State Tables
Report 2:  In FY2020, the discretionary spending limits are slated to decrease, after having been increased in FY2018 and FY2019 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of FY2018 (BBA; P L  115-123 )  The nondefense discretionary cap (the one relevant for housing programs and activities) will decline by more than 9% in FY2020, absent any additional legislative changes  More than three-quarters of HUD's appropriations are devoted to three rental assistance programs serving more than 4 million families: the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, Section 8 project-based rental assistance, and the public housing program  Funding for the HCV program and project-based rental assistance has been increasing in recent years, largely because of the increased costs of maintaining assistance for households that are currently served by the programs  Public housing has, arguably, been underfunded (based on studies undertaken by HUD of what it should cost to operate and maintain it) for many years  Despite the large share of total HUD funding these rental assistance programs command, their combined funding levels only permit them to serve an estimated one in four eligible families, which creates long waiting lists for assistance in most communities  A similar dynamic plays out in the U S  Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service budget  Demand for housing assistance exceeds the supply of subsidies, yet the vast majority of the RHS budget is devoted to maintaining assistance for current residents  In a budget environment with limits on discretionary spending, the pressure to provide increased funding to maintain current services for existing rental assistance programs must be balanced against the pressure from states, localities, and advocates to maintain or increase funding for other popular programs, such as HUD's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, grants for homelessness assistance, and funding for Native American housing  The Trump Administration's budget request for FY2020 proposes an 18% decrease in funding for HUD's programs and activities as compared to the prior year  It proposes to eliminate funding for several programs, including multiple HUD grant programs (CDBG, the HOME Investment Partnerships Program, and the Self-Help and Assisted Homeownership Opportunity Program (SHOP)), and to decrease funding for most other HUD programs  In proposing to eliminate the grant programs, the Administration cites budget constraints and proposes that state and local governments take on more of a role in the housing and community development activities funded by these programs  Additionally, the budget references policy changes designed to reduce the cost of federal rental assistance programs, including the Making Affordable Housing Work Act of 2018 (MAHWA) legislative proposal, released by HUD in April 2018  If enacted, the proposal would make a number of changes to the way tenant rents are calculated in HUD rental assistance programs, resulting in rent increases for assisted housing recipients, and corresponding decreases in the cost of federal subsidies  Further, it would permit local program administrators or property owners to institute work requirements for recipients  In announcing the proposal, HUD described it as setting the programs on "a more fiscally sustainable path," creating administrative efficiency, and promoting self-sufficiency  Low-income housing advocates have been critical of it, particularly the effect increased rent payments may have on families  Beyond HUD, the Administration's FY2020 budget request for USDA's Rural Housing Service would eliminate funding for most rural housing programs, except for several loan guarantee programs  It would continue to provide funding to renew existing rental assistance, but also proposes a new minimum rent policy for tenants designed to help reduce federal subsidy costs  For more on HUD appropriations trends in general, see CRS Report R42542, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): Funding Trends Since FY2002   For more on the FY2020 budget environment, including discretionary spending caps, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions   Several pieces of assisted housing legislation that were enacted in prior Congresses are expected to be implemented during the 116 th Congress  In the FY2016 HUD appropriations law, Congress mandated that HUD expand the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration by 100 public housing authorities (PHAs)  MTW is a waiver program that allows a limited number of participating PHAs to receive exceptions from HUD for most of the rules and regulations governing the public housing and voucher programs  MTW has been controversial for many years, with PHAs supporting the flexibility it provides (e g , allowing PHAs to move funding between programs), and low-income housing advocates criticizing some of the policies being adopted by PHAs (e g , work requirements and time limits)  Most recently, GAO issued a report raising concerns about HUD's oversight of MTW, including the lack of monitoring of the effects of policy changes under MTW on tenants  HUD was required to phase in the FY2016 expansion and evaluate any new policies adopted by participating PHAs  Following a series of listening sessions and advisory committee meetings, and several solicitations for comment, HUD issued a solicitation of interest for the first two expansion cohorts in December 2018  As of the date of this report, no selections had yet been made for those cohorts  The Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) was an Obama Administration initiative initially designed to test the feasibility of addressing the estimated $25 6 billion backlog in unmet capital needs in the public housing program by allowing local PHAs to convert their public housing properties to either Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers or Section 8 project-based rental assistance  PHAs are limited in their ability to mortgage, and thus raise private capital for, their public housing properties because of a federal deed restriction placed on the properties as a condition of federal assistance  When public housing properties are converted under RAD, that deed restriction is removed  As currently authorized, RAD conversions must be cost-neutral, meaning that the Section 8 rents the converted properties may receive must not result in higher subsidies than would have been received under the public housing program  Given this restriction, and without additional subsidy, not all public housing properties can use a conversion to raise private capital, potentially limiting the usefulness of a conversion for some properties  While RAD conversions have been popular with PHAs, and HUD's initial evaluations of the program have been favorable, a recent GAO study has raised questions about HUD's oversight of RAD, and about how much private funding is actually being raised for public housing through the conversions  RAD, as first authorized by Congress in the FY2012 HUD appropriations law, was originally limited to 60,000 units of public housing (out of roughly 1 million units)  However, Congress has since expanded the demonstration  Most recently, in FY2018, Congress raised the cap so that up to 455,000 units of public housing will be permitted to convert to Section 8 under RAD, and it further expanded the program so that Section 202 Housing for the Elderly units can also convert  Not only is HUD currently implementing the FY2018 expansion, but the President's FY2020 budget request to Congress requests that the cap on public housing RAD conversions be eliminated completely  Several major disasters that have recently affected the United States have led to congressional activity related to disaster response and recovery programs  When such incidents occur, the President may authorize an emergency or major disaster declaration under the Robert T  Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act; P L  93-288 , as amended), making various housing assistance programs, including programs provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) , available to disaster survivors  FEMA-provided housing assistance may include short-term, emergency sheltering accommodations under Section 403—Essential Assistance—of the Stafford Act (e g , the Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program, which is intended to provide short-term hotel/motel accommodations)  Interim housing needs may be met through the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) under Section 408—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households—of the Stafford Act  IHP assistance may include financial (e g , assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations ) and/or direct assistance (e g , multi family lease and repair , Transportable Temporary Housing Units , or direct lease ) to eligible individuals and households who, as a result of an emergency or disaster, have uninsured or under-insured necessary expenses and serious needs that cannot be met through other means or forms of assistance  IHP assistance is intended to be temporary and is generally limited to a period of 18 months following the date of the declaration , but it may be extended by FEMA  The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA, Division D of P L  115-254 ), which became law on October 5, 2018, is the most comprehensive reform of FEMA's disaster assistance programs since the passage of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA, Division B of P L  113-2 ) and, prior to that, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA, P L  109-295 )  The DRRA legislation focuses on improving pre-disaster planning and mitigation, response, and recovery, and increasing FEMA accountability  As such, it amends many sections of the Stafford Act  In addition to those amendments, DRRA includes new standalone authorities and requires reports to Congress, rulemaking, and other actions  The 116 th Congress has expressed interest in the oversight of DRRA's implementation, including sections that amend FEMA's temporary housing assistance programs under the Stafford Act  These sections include the following: DRRA Section 1211—State Administration of Assistance for Direct Temporary Housing and Permanent Housing Construction—amends Stafford Act Section 408(f)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, State Role—to allow state, territorial, or tribal governments to administer Direct Temporary Housing Assistance and Permanent Housing Construction, in addition to Other Needs Assistance (ONA)  It also provides a mechanism for state and local units of government to be reimbursed for locally implemented housing solutions  This provision may allow states to customize disaster housing solutions and expedite disaster recovery; however, FEMA may need to provide guidance to clarify the requirements of the application and approval process for the state, territorial, or tribal government that seeks to administer these programs  DRRA Section 1212—Assistance to Individuals and Households—amends Stafford Act Section 408(h)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, Maximum Amount of Assistance—to separate the cap on the maximum amount of financial assistance eligible individuals and households may receive for housing assistance and ONA  The provision also removes financial assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations from the cap, and creates an exception for accessibility-related costs  This may better enable FEMA's disaster assistance programs to meet the recovery-related needs of individuals, including those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, and households who experience significant damage to their primary residence and personal property as a result of an emergency or major disaster  However, there is also the potential that this change may disincentivize sufficient insurance coverage because of the new ability for eligible individuals and households to receive separate and increased housing and ONA awards that more comprehensively cover disaster-related real and personal property losses  DRRA Section 1213—Multifamily Lease and Repair Assistance—amends Stafford Act Section 408(c)(1)(B)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, Direct Assistance—to expand the eligible areas for multifamily lease and repair, and remove the requirement that the value of the improvements or repairs not exceed the value of the lease agreement  This may increase housing options for disaster survivors  The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security must assess the use of FEMA's direct assistance authority to justify this alternative to other temporary housing options, and submit a report to Congress  For more information on DRRA, see CRS Insight IN11055, The Disaster Recovery Reform Act: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress   Additionally, tables of deadlines associated with the implementation actions and requirements of DRRA are available upon request  Native Americans living in tribal areas experience a variety of housing challenges  Housing conditions in tribal areas are generally worse than those for the United States as a whole, and factors such as the legal status of trust lands present additional complications for housing  In light of these challenges, and the federal government's long-standing trust relationship with tribes, certain federal housing programs provide funding specifically for housing in tribal areas  The Tribal HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (Tribal HUD-VASH) program provides rental assistance and supportive services to Native American veterans who are homeless or at risk of homelessness  Tribal HUD-VASH is modeled on the broader HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) program, which provides rental assistance and supportive services for homeless veterans  Tribal HUD-VASH was initially created and funded through the FY2015 HUD appropriations act ( P L  113-235 ), and funds to renew rental assistance have been provided in subsequent appropriations acts  However, no separate authorizing legislation for Tribal HUD-VASH currently exists  In the 116 th Congress, a bill to codify the Tribal HUD-VASH program ( S  257 ) was ordered to be reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in February 2019  A substantively identical bill passed the Senate during the 115 th Congress ( S  1333 ), but the House ultimately did not consider it  For more information on HUD-VASH and Tribal HUD-VASH, see CRS Report RL34024, Veterans and Homelessness   The main federal program that provides housing assistance to Native American tribes and Alaska Native villages is the Native American Housing Block Grant (NAHBG), which was authorized by the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA,  P L  104-330 )  NAHASDA reorganized the federal system of housing assistance for tribes while recognizing the rights of tribal self-governance and self-determination  The NAHBG provides formula funding to tribes that can be used for a range of affordable housing activities that benefit primarily low-income Native Americans or Alaska Natives living in tribal areas  A separate block grant program authorized by NAHASDA, the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant (NHHBG), provides funding for affordable housing activities that benefit Native Hawaiians eligible to reside on the Hawaiian Home Lands  NAHASDA also authorizes a loan guarantee program, the Title VI Loan Guarantee, for tribes to carry out eligible affordable housing activities  The most recent authorization for most NAHASDA programs expired at the end of FY2013, although NAHASDA programs have generally continued to be funded in annual appropriations laws  (The NHHBG has not been reauthorized since its original authorization expired in FY2005, though it has continued to receive funding in most years  ) NAHASDA reauthorization legislation has been considered in varying degrees in the 113 th , 114 th , and 115 th Congresses but none was ultimately enacted  The 116 th Congress may again consider legislation to reauthorize NAHASDA  In general, tribes and Congress have been supportive of NAHASDA, though there has been some disagreement over specific provisions or policy proposals that have been included in reauthorization bills  Some of these disagreements involve debates over specific program changes that have been proposed  Others involve debate over broader issues, such as the appropriateness of providing federal funding for programs specifically for Native Hawaiians and whether such funding could be construed to provide benefits based on race  For more information on NAHASDA, see CRS Report R43307, The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA): Background and Funding   In the past, Congress has regularly extended a number of temporary tax provisions that address a variety of policy issues, including certain provisions related to housing  This set of temporary provisions is commonly referred to as "tax extenders " Two housing-related provisions that have been included in tax extenders packages recently are (1) the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, and (2) the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, each of which is discussed further below  The most recently enacted tax extenders legislation was the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ) in the 115 th Congress  That law extended the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and the ability to deduct mortgage insurance premiums through the end of 2017 (each had previously expired at the end of 2016)  As of the date of this report, these provisions had not been extended beyond 2017  In the 116 th Congress, S  617 , the Tax Extender and Disaster Relief Act of 2019, would extend each of these provisions through calendar year 2019  For more information on tax extenders in general, see CRS Report R45347, Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders")   Historically, when all or part of a taxpayer's mortgage debt has been forgiven, the forgiven amount has been included in the taxpayer's gross income for tax purposes  This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income  During the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, some efforts to help troubled borrowers avoid foreclosure resulted in canceled mortgage debt  The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P L  110-142 ), signed into law in December 2007, temporarily excluded qualified canceled mortgage debt income associated with a primary residence from taxation  The provision was originally effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010, and was subsequently extended several times  Rationales put forth when the provision was originally enacted included minimizing hardship for distressed households, lessening the risk that nontax homeownership retention efforts would be thwarted by tax policy, and assisting in the recoveries of the housing market and overall economy  Arguments against the exclusion at the time included concerns that it makes debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, which could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations, and concerns about fairness given that the ability to realize the benefits depends on a variety of factors  More recently, because the economy, housing market, and foreclosure rates have improved significantly since the height of the housing and mortgage market turmoil, the exclusion may no longer be warranted  For more information on the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, see CRS Report RL34212, Analysis of the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Income   Traditionally, homeowners have been able to deduct the interest paid on their mortgage, as well as property taxes they pay, as long as they itemize their tax deductions  Beginning in 2007, homeowners could also deduct qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as a result of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P L  109-432 )  Specifically, homeowners could effectively treat qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as mortgage interest, thus making the premiums deductible if homeowners itemized and their adjusted gross incomes were below a specified threshold ($55,000 for single, $110,000 for married filing jointly)  Originally, the deduction was to be available only for 2007, but it was subsequently extended several times  Two possible rationales for allowing the deduction of mortgage insurance premiums are that it assisted in the recovery of the housing market, and that it promotes homeownership  The housing market, however, has largely recovered from the market turmoil of the late 2000s, and it is not clear that the deduction has an effect on the homeownership rate  Furthermore, to the degree that owner-occupied housing is over subsidized, extending the deduction could lead to a greater misallocation of the resources that are directed toward the housing industry  In the past, Congress has regularly extended a number of temporary tax provisions that address a variety of policy issues, including certain provisions related to housing  This set of temporary provisions is commonly referred to as "tax extenders " Two housing-related provisions that have been included in tax extenders packages recently are (1) the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, and (2) the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, each of which is discussed further below  The most recently enacted tax extenders legislation was the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ) in the 115 th Congress  That law extended the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and the ability to deduct mortgage insurance premiums through the end of 2017 (each had previously expired at the end of 2016)  As of the date of this report, these provisions had not been extended beyond 2017  In the 116 th Congress, S  617 , the Tax Extender and Disaster Relief Act of 2019, would extend each of these provisions through calendar year 2019  For more information on tax extenders in general, see CRS Report R45347, Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders")   Historically, when all or part of a taxpayer's mortgage debt has been forgiven, the forgiven amount has been included in the taxpayer's gross income for tax purposes  This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income  During the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, some efforts to help troubled borrowers avoid foreclosure resulted in canceled mortgage debt  The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P L  110-142 ), signed into law in December 2007, temporarily excluded qualified canceled mortgage debt income associated with a primary residence from taxation  The provision was originally effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010, and was subsequently extended several times  Rationales put forth when the provision was originally enacted included minimizing hardship for distressed households, lessening the risk that nontax homeownership retention efforts would be thwarted by tax policy, and assisting in the recoveries of the housing market and overall economy  Arguments against the exclusion at the time included concerns that it makes debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, which could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations, and concerns about fairness given that the ability to realize the benefits depends on a variety of factors  More recently, because the economy, housing market, and foreclosure rates have improved significantly since the height of the housing and mortgage market turmoil, the exclusion may no longer be warranted  For more information on the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, see CRS Report RL34212, Analysis of the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Income   Traditionally, homeowners have been able to deduct the interest paid on their mortgage, as well as property taxes they pay, as long as they itemize their tax deductions  Beginning in 2007, homeowners could also deduct qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as a result of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P L  109-432 )  Specifically, homeowners could effectively treat qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as mortgage interest, thus making the premiums deductible if homeowners itemized and their adjusted gross incomes were below a specified threshold ($55,000 for single, $110,000 for married filing jointly)  Originally, the deduction was to be available only for 2007, but it was subsequently extended several times  Two possible rationales for allowing the deduction of mortgage insurance premiums are that it assisted in the recovery of the housing market, and that it promotes homeownership  The housing market, however, has largely recovered from the market turmoil of the late 2000s, and it is not clear that the deduction has an effect on the homeownership rate  Furthermore, to the degree that owner-occupied housing is over subsidized, extending the deduction could lead to a greater misallocation of the resources that are directed toward the housing industry  

ground_truth: The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant funds a wide range of benefits and services for low-income families with children. TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193). This report responds to some frequently asked questions about TANF; it does not describe TANF rules (see, instead, CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements, by Gene Falk). TANF Funding and Expenditures. TANF provides fixed funding for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the territories, and American Indian tribes. The basic block grant totals $16.5 billion per year. States are also required in total to contribute, from their own funds, at least $10.3 billion annually under a maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirement. Though TANF is best known for funding cash assistance payments for needy families with children, the block grant and MOE funds are used for a wide variety of benefits and activities. In FY2017, expenditures on basic assistance totaled $7.1 billion—23% of total federal TANF and MOE dollars. Basic assistance is often—but not exclusively—paid as cash. In addition to funding basic assistance, TANF also contributes funds for child care and services for children who have been, or are at risk of being, abused and neglected. Some states also count expenditures in prekindergarten programs toward the MOE requirement. The TANF Assistance Caseload. A total of 1.2 million families, composed of 3.1 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded assistance in September 2018. The bulk of the "recipients" were children—2.3 million in that month. The assistance caseload is heterogeneous. The type of family once thought of as the "typical" assistance family—one with an unemployed adult recipient—accounted for 32% of all families on the rolls in FY2016. Additionally, 31% of cash assistance families had an employed adult, while 38% of all TANF families were "child-only" and had no adult recipient. Child-only families include those with disabled adults receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), adults who are nonparents (e.g., grandparents, aunts, uncles) caring for children, and families consisting of citizen children and ineligible noncitizen parents. Cash Assistance Benefits. TANF cash benefit amounts are set by states. In July 2017, the maximum monthly benefit for a family of three ranged from $1,021 in New Hampshire to $170 in Mississippi. Only New Hampshire (at 60% of the federal poverty guidelines) had a maximum TANF cash assistance amount for this sized family in excess of 50% of poverty-level income. Work Requirements. TANF's main federal work requirement is actually a performance measure that applies to the states. States determine the work rules that apply to individual recipients. TANF law requires states to engage 50% of all families and 90% of two-parent families with work-eligible individuals in work activities, though these standards can be reduced by "credits." Therefore, the effective standards states face are often less than the 50% or 90% targets, and vary by state. In FY2017, states achieved, on average, an all-family participation rate of 53.0% and a two-parent rate of 69.5%. In FY2017, two jurisdictions did not meet the all-family participation standard: Nevada and Guam. This is a reduction from FY2012, when 16 states did not meet that standard. In FY2017, nine jurisdictions did not meet the two-parent standard. States that do not meet work standards are at risk of being penalized by a reduction in their block grant.