prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: Federal agencies’ personal property may include commonly used items, such as computers, office equipment, and furniture, and more specialized property reflective of their mission, such as scientific devices, fire control equipment, heavy machinery, precious metals, generators, and chemicals  Some items require special handling, such as hazardous materials, animals, and firearms  See figure 1 for examples of federal personal property  Federal agencies manage personal property while they are using it  Specifically, executive agencies are required by law to: maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under their control; continually survey property under their control to identify excess; promptly report excess property to GSA and dispose of it in accordance with GSA regulations; and use existing agency property or obtain excess property from other federal agencies before purchasing new property  GSA assists agencies when they no longer need personal property and has established a government-wide personal-property disposal process in federal regulation  The process generally begins when an agency declares a personal property item as “excess”—that is, the agency determines it no longer needs the item to carry out its mission  Agencies are to make this determination only after ensuring the property is not needed elsewhere within the agency  Once property is declared excess, there are four potential property disposal methods: transfer to another federal agency or certain non-federal entities, donation, sale, and abandonment or destruction  Federal agencies and some non-federal entities have the priority to acquire excess property, through transfer  If none of these eligible entities have requested the property for transfer after 21 days, the property becomes “surplus”—that is, GSA determines that federal agencies no longer need the item to carry out their missions  Surplus property may be donated to eligible entities through a State Agency for Surplus Property, representing the state of the prospective donee  Property not donated within 5 days after the close of the 21-day screening period may be sold to the general public and, finally, unsold property may be abandoned or destroyed  See appendix II for an expanded description of the personal property disposal process  OMB is responsible for establishing government-wide management policies and requirements and provides guidance to agencies to implement them  OMB has issued guidance for specific types of personal property, such as for government aircraft and information technology systems  OMB also implemented the Freeze the Footprint and Reduce the Footprint initiatives, starting in 2012, to reduce the amount of domestic office and warehouse space needed by the federal government, in part, through consolidations and improved space utilization  As a result, federal agencies have reported achieving space reductions, and they have goals for additional reductions in the future  Although these reductions are a relatively small part of the federal government’s overall footprint, according to OMB, through this and other efforts agencies collectively reduced their office and warehouse space by about 25 million square feet from fiscal years 2012 through 20156  As federal agencies continue to reduce office and warehouse space, they will also likely have to manage or dispose of personal property, such as office furniture or stored property, from these spaces  Each of the five selected agencies we reviewed have policies and processes for carrying out their responsibilities to maintain adequate accountability systems and inventory controls for property under their control: All five agencies have policies for regularly inventorying their personal property to physically locate and verify property tracked in their asset management systems  EPA, GSA OAS, and IRS policies require physical inventories of personal property once a year, while Forest Service’s policy requires inventories every other fiscal year and a 10 percent sample inventory in the alternate years  HUD policies require inventories every 2 years at its headquarters, but according to HUD officials, field locations conduct inventories annually  All of the agencies also have an electronic asset-management system for maintaining information on personal property  Although each agency has its own system, and the type of information maintained varied by agency or type of property, generally each system generates a record for each property item that provides descriptive information about the item, such as manufacturer name, model number, serial number or other identifier, acquisition cost, condition, and current location  We found that the five agencies use these policies and processes to track and inventory certain property determined by each agency to be “accountable ” Accountable property is nonexpendable personal property with an expected useful life of 2 years or longer that an agency determines should be tracked in its property records, based on an item’s acquisition cost and sensitivity  Each agency determines its own appropriate acquisition cost threshold: four of the agencies—EPA, Forest Service, HUD, and IRS—consider property with an original acquisition cost of $5,000 or greater to be accountable; GSA OAS’s accountable threshold is $10,000 or greater  In addition, certain sensitive property— such as digital cameras, laptop computers with hard drives, and firearms—is considered accountable regardless of acquisition cost because it could be easily stolen or can store data or personal information  Table 1 provides a snapshot of accountable personal property items— including the reported original acquisition cost, amount, and examples— reported from 4 of the selected agencies’ asset management systems in 2017  The agencies in our review generally did not track in their asset management systems or formally inventory their remaining—or “non- accountable”—personal property that did not meet their definition of accountable property  According to agency officials we interviewed, they do not track or inventory low value items because: (1) the cost and manpower required to do so are too high; (2) certain property, such as office furniture, is less susceptible to theft; or (3) agencies believe they are not required by law to inventory low value items  While agencies are required to have systems of accounting and internal controls that provide effective control over, and accountability for, their assets, they generally have latitude in how they implement these procedures, including which property to track and inventory  While the five selected agencies had policies and processes for their property accountability and inventory control responsibilities, they largely did not have policies and processes for carrying out their responsibilities, as established in law, to continually survey property under their control to identify excess  According to officials at each of the selected agencies, the responsibility for identifying unneeded property generally lies with that agency’s property custodians—designated officials who are assigned responsibility for the property—or the agency program or individual using the property  Four of the five selected agencies’ policies do not require property custodians or other property users to assess property for continued need  Furthermore, these four agencies’ policies did not have specific criteria for the property custodian or user to assess property for continued need  Only IRS’s personal-property management policy specifies that the property custodian is responsible for identifying excess property and provides criteria to be applied in doing so, such as whether property is still needed in its location and the feasibility of transferring it to other locations, taking into account the property’s condition and transportation charges  An official at one of the selected agencies identified several specific criteria that should be used to assess property for continued need, including the item’s serviceability, whether it poses a safety hazard, and the feasibility of relocating it  However, the official acknowledged that these or any other criteria are not part of the agency’s formal policy  The personal property policy of an agency not included in our review— NASA—includes requirements and criteria to review NASA property for continued need in multiple ways  For example, it requires a high-level NASA official to conduct a walk-through inspection annually to identify idle or underused equipment that is no longer needed and report it as excess  It also requires, as part of an annual property inventory, that property that appears to be excess, worn out, or in obvious need of repair be noted as such and that guidance on identifying unneeded property be provided to personnel involved in conducting the inventories as well as employees assigned to use the property  In addition to not having policies on identifying and assessing property for continued need, agencies we reviewed also did not have a systematic process for doing so  Instead, when describing situations in which they declared property as excess, officials said they typically did so as a result of a “triggering event ” The types of triggering events the officials cited include an office move or consolidation or a lifecycle replacement of laptops  For example, officials from field locations of three of these agencies reported declaring most of their existing furniture as excess as the result of an office relocation or renovation  Agency officials said they were unable to use their existing furniture and had to declare it excess because it did not conform to new space utilization standards  At another agency, officials were disposing of a large number of laptop computers that had been declared excess because they had been replaced by new computers  Officials at two agencies said an assessment of property for continued need is an assumed practice that is part of the inventory for accountable property  However, an official from one of these agencies acknowledged that assessing need is not addressed in the written instructions provided to those conducting the inventory  Officials from two other agencies acknowledged that they continue to retain unneeded property that should be declared excess in storage on-site but had not pursued disposal due to other competing responsibilities with higher priorities  Proactively assessing personal property for continued need instead of responding to a triggering event can help agencies achieve both effective and efficient operations by ensuring that only needed property is retained and unneeded property is identified and declared excess  Federal internal control standards require that agencies design and maintain internal control activities—such as policies and procedures—to identify risks arising from mission and mission-support operations, and to provide reasonable assurance that agencies are operating in an efficient manner that minimizes the waste of resources  Such a system also provides reasonable assurance that agency property is safeguarded against waste, loss, or unauthorized use  OMB staff and GSA officials agreed that assessing all types of property—accountable and non-accountable—for continued need is important and called-for by internal control standards  Because the agencies we reviewed did not have systematic processes for assessing the continued need for personal property, they may not be aware of potential risks of maintaining property that may no longer be needed for operational purposes  Furthermore, previous work others have performed has shown that inaction on unneeded or idle property can limit efficient use of the government’s personal property, unnecessarily use an agency’s resources, or miss opportunities for potential cost savings, for example: The Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General found that the U S  Coast Guard could not ensure that personal property was efficiently reutilized or properly disposed of to prevent unauthorized use or theft because the Coast Guard did not have adequate policies, procedures, and processes to identify and screen, reutilize, and dispose of excess personal property properly, including criteria for identifying such property  The EPA’s Inspector General estimated EPA could save $8 9 million in reduced warehouse costs through improved management of stored personal property  GSA personal property asset management studies conducted in 2003 and 2005 found, among other things, that personal property is not being used to its fullest extent in some agencies and that no government-wide usage assessment or standard exists to detect whether property is no longer needed and can be reported as excess  Without a triggering event, agencies may not be seeking out or identifying property that is no longer needed and declaring it excess as often as they should  Such unneeded property may be put to better use elsewhere within the agency or the federal government, or agencies may purchase or lease new property instead of using another agency’s property that is unneeded but not reported as excess  In addition, agencies may be missing opportunities to realize cost savings by identifying and disposing of unneeded property, such as property stored in warehouses, to reduce or make better use of that space  While the requirements for agencies to continually survey property under their control to identify excess is established in law, according to GSA officials, there are no government-wide regulations on managing personal property or fulfilling this specific requirement  According to GSA OGP officials, GSA does not have the authority to promulgate regulations or issue formal guidance on personal property that is in use by executive agencies  Furthermore, according to the officials, GSA is only authorized by law to prescribe regulations on excess and surplus personal property  OMB staff stated that they could issue a notification, such as a controller alert to agencies’ chief financial officers, to reinforce the statutory requirement that agencies conduct assessments of personal property for continued need  OMB periodically issues such alerts to highlight emerging financial management issues for agencies and also issues guidance to agencies through bulletins, circulars, and memorandums  By issuing a controller alert or other guidance, OMB can help ensure that agencies are proactively taking steps to evaluate their property for continued need, including developing appropriate policies for doing so, and can thereby improve efforts to promote maximum use of excess personal property  Officials from the five agencies we reviewed reported that they followed GSA’s automated process to dispose of property once they had made the determination it was no longer needed to support their agency’s mission  As previously described, GSA regulations on disposing of property establish a specific process for all executive agencies to follow, and GSA has also issued guidance to help agencies dispose of property under this process  In particular, once an agency has determined that the property it has is no longer needed within the agency, the agency is required to promptly report the property to GSA as excess, typically by entering information about it into GSAXcess, GSA’s web-based system for facilitating personal property disposal  This method requires agency employees to manually enter information using data entry screens that include help screens and error messages  GSA encourages agencies to provide a complete description of the property and to include multiple photographs of it  Officials from the five agencies we reviewed reported no significant difficulties with entering information into GSAXcess; collectively, these agencies reported over 37,000 items as excess property from fiscal year 2012 through 2016  Figure 2 indicates the number of items each selected agency reported to GSA as excess during that period  Once information entry is completed, the disposal process begins  If the property is not disposed of during one stage, it advances to the next stage  The disposal process is shown in figure 3  Agency officials we interviewed told us that responsibility for disposing of property is decentralized and typically occurs at the property’s location, whether at an agency headquarters, regional office, or lower level  Because of the large federal government presence in the Washington, D C , area, agency offices in that area may have access to resources to facilitate the disposal process that are unavailable elsewhere, such as transferring excess property to certain entities that complete some or all aspects of the disposal process for a fee  Two such entities are GSA’s Personal Property Center in Springfield, Virginia, which takes full accountability and control of an agency’s excess property for a fee and handles all the details of the disposal process, and USDA’s Centralized Excess Property Operation in Beltsville, Maryland  According to USDA’s Agriculture Property Management Regulations, property not needed by USDA or its bureau offices in the Washington, D C , area must be transferred to this office for final disposal actions  It also provides these same services to some non-USDA agencies  Agencies also use GSAXcess to search for and select available excess property  Agency officials told us that the system also sends disposition instructions to the property-holding agency, when the property is to be transferred to other federal agencies, donated, or sold and that the agencies follow these instructions  For example, when an agency requests an excess item in GSAXcess and GSA approves the request, the system notifies the requesting agency and the property-holding agency and provides contact information to arrange to complete the transaction  None of the selected agency officials reported difficulties completing a transfer or donation transaction  For property not transferred, donated, or sold, GSA notifies the agency that the property has no commercial value and can be abandoned or destroyed  All of our selected agencies reported trying to recycle such property  Selected agency officials told us they disposed of property from space reduction efforts, such as Freeze the Footprint and Reduce the Footprint, the same way as other personal property—using GSA’s disposal process  To meet space reduction goals, selected agencies are undertaking projects at dozens of locations  Projects have primarily involved leased space for offices and warehouses and have included office moves, consolidations, and closures  As federal agencies carry out these space reduction projects, they must also address any personal property in the project spaces  Selected agencies reported several factors that affected their decisions about this property, which for three of the agencies was primarily office furniture  Four agencies reported needing less space than they previously occupied because of changes in agency missions or staffing levels  Furthermore, officials from GSA OAS and IRS noted that workplace trends, including teleworking and decreased staffing, reduced the space needed  Finally, agencies also reported that the office furniture itself was mostly unsuitable because it was old and because it could not be configured for use in more efficient office space designs  As a result, some selected agency locations that completed an office move or renovation project reported that most of their existing furniture was not needed in their new space  For example, in its Reduce the Footprint plan for fiscal years 2017 through 2021, HUD noted that many of its locations were designed and furnished when it had a much larger staffing level and reported that in 2016, its usable square feet per employee was 356  Subsequently, HUD revised its space design standards, requiring future office spaces to adhere to a utilization rate of 175 square feet or less  At the HUD project we visited, an official told us the furniture in use before the project was old and was generally too large to be used to achieve space design standards  In 2017, Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reduced its Denver regional office space by 30 percent  HUD’s lease was expiring and it needed less space because it had fewer employees in the office, in part due to increased telework  Adhering to new space utilization standards in its office and furniture design further reduced HUD’s overall required space  An example of a new workstation is shown above  Before the project, the agency occupied about five floors of a commercial building  HUD renovated in place, one floor at a time, and replaced its existing office furniture with new  Personal property at this office included primarily office furniture, such as desks and 25-year old modular systems, and equipment, such as telephones  As each floor was completed and employees moved to new workstations, the property official on-site disposed of their old furniture and workstations by entering its information in GSAXcess  The official reported selling some of the excess furniture after completing the first floor but recycled or discarded excess furniture in subsequent rounds  In some cases, agencies did not dispose of all the personal property after a space reduction project but instead were able to retain it for other uses within the agency  For example, IRS officials reported closing an office in Englewood, Colorado, and transferred its furniture to Ogden, Utah, for storage for an upcoming project  GSA OAS officials in Denver said that after a space reduction project in which GSA decreased the size of its regional office, it retained the unneeded furniture and office space for temporary use by other agencies  For property that was declared excess following a space reduction project, agencies reported transferring, donating, and selling property to dispose of it, using GSA’s process  For example, officials in GSA OAS, Forest Service, and IRS locations told us they transferred some excess property to other federal agencies  The Forest Service in Denver transferred some modular office furniture to the Bureau of Land Management and the U S  Postal Service  The Forest Service and IRS also reported donating property, such as office furniture and equipment, through the State Agencies for Surplus Property program  Four agencies reported selling some of their property from a space reduction project  For example, HUD’s regional office in Denver sold some of its excess office furniture, which dated to 1992, and recycled or discarded the remainder  When disposing of property from a space reduction project, some agencies sought assistance from GSA  GSA’s Office of Personal Property Management (GSA OPPM) assists agencies, when requested, in disposing of personal property, and officials at selected agency locations reported receiving assistance and training  In one example, GSA officials told us that a regional office of a selected agency needed to dispose of an office full of furniture and, in addition to using the disposal process, contacted GSA OPPM for additional assistance  Because of the large amount of property, GSA OPPM took steps to make other agencies in the area aware of the available property and facilitated access to allow agencies to view the property  In another example, GSA OPPM officials met with officials from another agency in the planning stages of a relocation to answer questions and provided advice and guidance for disposing of personal property  When the Forest Service’s lease on its Denver-area office expired, the agency leased space in another location, requiring a move but reducing its office by over 21,000 square feet  The agency sought to conform to new space utilization standards, which required more efficiently-designed furniture than its existing office furniture  Because the Forest Service did not reuse most of its old furniture in its new space, it no longer had a need for it  The Forest Service retained some of the furniture for use in other Forest Service offices within the region and declared the remainder as excess  Through GSAXcess, the Forest Service transferred some of its excess furniture to other federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management and the U S  Postal Service  The Forest Service sold some furniture at auction; broken items were recycled  Agencies may dispose of large amounts of property during a space reduction project, but overall, agency officials reported few challenges in doing so  This may be in part because any effects from space reductions are distributed across an entire agency  Although selected agencies’ average Reduce the Footprint space reduction goals ranged from 97,000 square feet to 662,000 square feet each fiscal year from 2016 to 2020, each agency’s efforts consisted of dozens of geographically dispersed projects of various sizes to be completed over several years  For example, as of fiscal year 2016, EPA had 21 space reduction projects planned from fiscal years 2016 through 2021, with individual anticipated reductions ranging from less than 1,000 square feet to more than 140,000 square feet  At least one project is present in 8 of EPA’s 10 regions  Agencies’ ability to pay for space reduction projects may also have affected these projects’ effects  Two selected agencies said they delayed projects because of a lack of funding  Agencies may reduce costs over the long term because of lower rent for smaller spaces but they may have to pay some expenses upfront, such as for moving, renovations, and new furniture  Although officials from all five agencies told us they have been able to manage personal property disposals from space reductions, they identified factors that can impact the efficient use of the disposal process during a space reduction project and some strategies taken to address them: Inventorying non-accountable property: As a space reduction project commenced at a location, most selected agencies reported that they did not have a complete list of the personal property affected by the project  As previously described, selected agencies do not maintain an itemized list of non-accountable personal property and for four agencies, office furniture is generally non-accountable  During a space reduction project, property personnel had to develop some type of inventory to identify property that would be needed and property that should be disposed of  Selected agencies had various methods for conducting such an inventory  For example, officials from two agencies said they walked through the affected space and created a list of all the items  Officials from one agency said a contractor was hired for this purpose  Most agencies reported using the inventory they created to enter information on excess property into GSAXcess  Officials at GSA’s OPPM offices in Philadelphia and Fort Worth said that they offer training and guidance to agencies in conducting inventories  Managing disposals within time frames: Agencies generally are not able to begin the disposal process until the property is no longer in use  For example, agency staff continue to use their old workspaces until they can move to new workspaces  Agencies also face deadlines, such as vacating space due to a lease expiration or commencement of renovation work  Officials from three agencies described challenges completing the disposal process—reporting excess personal property as well as completing transactions to transfer, donate, sell or abandon or destroy it—within required time frames  Some agency officials reported using different strategies to address this timing challenge  For example, one agency official was able to enter information about the excess property items into GSAXcess while employees were still using them  According to the official, this was possible because a note could be included in the property item’s description in GSAXcess, with the date when the property would be available  When the property was no longer in-use within the agency, the transfers or other transactions were completed  Additionally, an agency may conduct an on-site screening of its unneeded property to allow other federal agencies or authorized parties to physically view and identify any furniture they want  For example, GSA OPPM officials in Philadelphia conducted an on-site screening of unneeded office furniture resulting from the agency’s regional office relocation  Federal agencies collectively have billions of dollars’ worth of personal property, ranging from office furniture to highly specialized equipment that, when in use, supports agency missions  However, the agencies in our review did not have policies and systematic processes for identifying unneeded property  Furthermore, other’s previous work has shown that agencies across the government may not be effectively assessing their property for continued need, leading to idle property that could be put to better use elsewhere within the agency or the federal government and potential unnecessary storage costs  Consequently, agencies may be retaining property that is no longer needed  GSA has recognized that opportunities may exist for agencies to more effectively manage property under their control, but according to GSA OGP officials, GSA’s authority is limited to agency property that has been declared excess or surplus  According to OMB staff, OMB has the authority to issue guidance, such as controller alerts, emphasizing agencies’ property management obligations, and thus, it is well-positioned to assist agencies to more effectively manage their property and to ensure unneeded property is made available to others, as appropriate  The Director of OMB should provide guidance to executive agencies on managing their personal property, emphasizing that agencies’ policies or processes should reflect the requirement to continuously review and identify unneeded personal property  (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this report to OMB, EPA, the Forest Service, GSA, HUD, and IRS for comment  OMB stated that it did not have any comments on our draft report in an email and provided a technical clarification to the report, which we incorporated  GSA and IRS provided technical comments in an email, which we incorporated as appropriate  EPA, the Forest Service, and HUD each stated in an email that they did not have any comments on the draft report  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of the U S  Department of Agriculture, the Administrator of the General Services Administration, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff making key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  The objectives of this report were to examine (1) how selected federal agencies assess whether personal property is needed and (2) how selected federal agencies dispose of unneeded personal property, and how, if at all, space reduction efforts have affected disposals  We excluded certain types of personal property, such as aircraft and vehicles, from our review because of our prior or ongoing work  To address our objectives, we reviewed applicable federal statutes and regulations pertaining to personal property management and disposal, our prior work, and reports by federal agencies’ Offices of Inspector General on personal property issues  In addition, to determine how selected federal agencies assess whether personal property is needed, we conducted background searches to inform our understanding of key practices for personal property and asset management through a search of databases containing peer-reviewed articles, government reports, general news, hearings and transcripts, and association and think tank papers  We also reviewed relevant asset management practices, such as ASTM standards and the General Services Administration’s (GSA) Federal Asset Management Evaluation and Personal Property Asset Management Study  In order to select agencies that may have had recent experiences with excess personal property, we selected 5 of the 24 agencies that were included in the Freeze the Footprint and Reduce the Footprint initiatives  We selected agencies based on their overall Freeze the Footprint results, in terms of the amount of square feet reduced, and Reduce the Footprint goals for reducing domestic office and warehouse space, and the amount of personal property declared excess over the last 5 years, as reported to GSA’s GSAXcess system from fiscal years 2012 to 2016, to coincide with the Freeze the Footprint time frame  Specifically, we obtained information on the Freeze the Footprint results and Reduce the Footprint goals from the Office of Management and Budget’s public website and from Performance gov  We limited our scope to civilian federal agencies with personal property within the United States  Although we have previously reported that the overall accuracy of data that agencies reported on office and warehouse space reductions could be improved, we found that the data were generally reliable for our purposes  After reviewing the data for any inconsistencies and discussing the information with selected agency officials to ensure that the reported numbers for the Reduce the Footprint initiative were current, we determined that the quality of the data were sufficient for our use in selecting agencies  In order to select agencies that were more likely to have relevant, recent experience with excess personal property from space reduction efforts, we ranked these agencies based on their Freeze the Footprint results, Reduce the Footprint goals, and the amount of declared excess personal property, and eliminated the bottom third of the agencies  We selected GSA as our first agency due to its central role in excess personal property disposal, and randomly selected four additional agencies from the remaining agencies  These agencies were the Environmental Protection Agency, the U S  Department of Agriculture, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of the Treasury  The organizational structure of two selected agencies, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Treasury, is different than the other three agencies in that they are comprised primarily of sub-agencies  Therefore, we selected the largest sub-agency for both departments—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Internal Revenue Service within the Department of the Treasury  We obtained information from the five selected federal agencies on the total value and number of items in their asset management systems in 2017 to understand the size and scope of personal property assets they manage  As we used the information to describe the scope of the agencies’ property holdings, we did not verify the data  We also analyzed documents, such as the selected agencies’ personal property management policies, along with policies from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Department of Energy, to understand how they addressed requirements for managing personal property  We included these agencies’ policies based on our review of prior work related to personal property  We interviewed officials from the selected agencies about their processes for managing personal property assets, such as their inventory procedures  However, we did not independently assess agencies’ inventory practices  We also interviewed staff from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to discuss regulations and policies pertaining to personal property and OMB’s role in personal property management  To determine how selected federal agencies dispose of excess and surplus personal property and how space reduction efforts may have affected disposals, in addition to the above, we obtained information from each selected agency on its space reduction projects and interviewed officials about their roles and responsibilities in the agency’s space reduction planning efforts and personal property disposal process  We also conducted site visits to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Denver, Colorado to meet with regional and local officials from each selected agency responsible for managing and disposing of personal property  These locations were chosen based on the number of our selected federal agencies present, the amount of excess personal property declared, and the existence of space reduction projects  We discussed property accountability policies, overall personal property disposal processes, and how the disposal processes were affected by government-wide space savings initiatives, such as Freeze the Footprint and Reduce the Footprint, and any efforts to prepare for them, and requested supporting documentation on the amount of property declared as excess and the disposition outcomes of that property  We did not independently verify the information that was provided, as data reported as excess from space reduction projects are not always tracked separately from other property disposed of for other reasons  We reviewed documents and interviewed officials from GSA’s Office of Personal Property Management (GSA OPPM) in GSA’s headquarters, in Philadelphia and in Fort Worth, Texas, to discuss their role in assisting agencies in disposing of personal property and to obtain their views on how personal property disposals have been affected by space reductions  Finally, we interviewed GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy (GSA OGP) officials about the Interagency Committee on Property Management and the Property Management Executive Council regarding their personal property and asset management efforts and met with officials and representatives from the following: the U S  Department of Agriculture’s Centralized Excess Property Operation, the Users and Screeners Association–Federal Excess Personal Property, and the National Association of State Agencies for Surplus Property to discuss their roles in the reuse and disposal of Federal personal property  We conducted this performance audit from July 2016 to February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, requires executive agencies, in part, to promptly report excess property to the General Services Administration (GSA) and dispose of it in accordance with GSA regulations  Each executive agency is also required to fulfill requirements for personal property by using existing agency property or by obtaining excess property from other federal agencies before purchasing new property  GSA’s disposal process, as laid out in federal regulation, incorporates and facilitates these requirements, providing a means for both disposing of and acquiring unneeded property: agencies with excess personal property can dispose of it and other agencies, authorized non-federal entities, and, eventually, the general public can acquire this property  After determining that a property item is no longer needed to complete its mission, an agency may have several options for proceeding before formally declaring the property as excess to GSA: Immediately authorize abandonment or destruction of the property: Determine, in writing, that the property has no commercial value or the estimated cost of its continued care and handling would exceed the estimated proceeds from its sale  If an agency makes such a determination, it may abandon or destroy the property without reporting it to GSA as excess  In lieu of abandonment or destruction, an agency may donate excess personal property to a public body without going through GSA  Directly transfer the property to another federal agency: Agencies usually become aware of available property through informal means, such as a contact at the disposing agency, according to GSA  GSA approval for such a transfer is not needed if the total original acquisition cost for each item does not exceed $10,000  If this cost is greater than $10,000, the acquiring agency must obtain prior approval from GSA  In either case, the acquiring agency must notify GSA of the transfer  Directly transfer the property to an eligible recipient under a special authority: Special authorities are legal provisions that are designed to give excess assets to groups that may use them for a particular purpose, such as universities that can use the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s scientific equipment in their research  Some authorities exist to collectively support all federal agencies and some support an agency-specific program  According to GSA, the primary government-wide programs are the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 and Executive Order 12999, also known as the Computers for Learning program  Recipients meeting eligibility requirements of the special authority contact agencies to determine the availability of property, and the agency and recipient must complete the appropriate documentation to make a record of the transfer  An agency initiates GSA’s disposal process by formally declaring property as excess, either by completing and submitting a form to GSA or, more typically, by electronic entry of an item into GSAXcess, GSA’s real-time, Web-based site for facilitating the disposal process  The latter method requires agency employees to enter information about the excess property using data entry screens that include help screens and error messages  GSA encourages reporting agencies to provide a complete description of the property and to include multiple photographs of the property  The disposal process generally consists of four sequential stages in which personal property may be transferred to another agency or eligible recipient, donated, sold, or abandoned or destroyed, as described below  If the property is not disposed of during one stage, it advances to the next stage, though the holding agency generally retains physical custody of the property until it is disposed of  Table 2 illustrates actions a disposing agency and eligible property recipients take during each of the four stages of the disposal process after an agency declares property excess  In addition to the individual named above, the following individuals made important contributions to this report: David J  Wise (Director), Nancy Lueke (Assistant Director), Travis Thomson (Analyst-in-Charge), Lacey Coppage, Rosa Leung, Josh Ormond, Amy Rosewarne, Pamela Vines, and Elizabeth Wood 
Report 2:  Such controls would minimize the risk of abuse when officials act as both proposing and deciding officials  In addition, VA does not have oversight measures to ensure that all allegations of misconduct referred by the OIG to facility and program offices are investigated by an entity outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct  The investigation of allegations of misconduct by the program office or facility where the complaint originated may present the appearance of a conflict of interest in which managers and staff at facilities may investigate themselves or other allegations where they may have a personal stake or bias in the matter to be investigated  Therefore, the risk that the results of the investigation are minimized, or not handled adequately, is increased  VA’s newly developed process to communicate the scope of its reviews that involve matters referred by the OSC to the Office of the Secretary will be important to ensure any allegations outside the purview of the OIG’s investigation are fully addressed by a departmental entity in accordance with OSC requirements  Further, the OIG’s inability to locate investigative documentation prevents a third party from verifying whether the OIG examined the disclosures, whether any recommendations were addressed, or whether appropriate disciplinary action was taken for these cases  This lack of information has direct influence on management’s ability to make sound decisions relating to investigative matters  According to OIG officials, a spreadsheet is being used for tracking case numbers associated with disclosures, but plans to implement a process within the new system  Nonanonymous whistle-blowers faced higher rates of adverse action subsequent to their disclosure than the VA population as a whole  In addition, these individuals also had attrition rates higher than their peers who had not filed a disclosure  The disparities between whistle-blowers and other employees may be an indication that retaliation by senior officials may have occurred after misconduct was disclosed  Although VA has started to provide additional information for potential whistle-blowers who wish to report criminal or other activity to the OIG, VA does not have a process to inform employees of how their information may be shared between organizations when misconduct is reported  Without a clear understanding of how the lines for reporting misconduct operate, whistle- blowers may be uncertain as to their options for reporting misconduct, increasing the risk that they may not report workplace misconduct  We are making the following 16 recommendations to VA  The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should develop and implement guidance to collect complete and reliable misconduct and associated disciplinary-action data department-wide, whether through a single information system, or multiple interoperable systems  Such guidance should include direction and procedures on addressing blank data fields, lack of personnel identifiers, and standardization among fields, and on accessibility  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct applicable facility and program offices to adhere to VA’s policies regarding employee misconduct adjudication documentation  (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Office of Human Resource Management (OHRM) to routinely assess the extent to which misconduct-related files and documents are retained consistently with VA’s applicable documentation requirements  (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OHRM to assess whether human-resources personnel adhere to basic principles outlined in VA Handbook 5021 when informing employees of their rights during the adjudication process for alleged misconduct  (Recommendation 4) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should adhere to OPM and NARA guidance and establish a specific record-retention period for adverse action files  In doing so, the Secretary should direct applicable administration, facility, and program offices that have developed their own record-retention schedules to then adhere to the newly established record-retention period  (Recommendation 5) The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Inspector General should revise its policy to include a requirement to verify whether evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  (Recommendation 6) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) to review responses submitted by facility or program offices to ensure evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  (Recommendation 7) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will verify whether appropriate disciplinary action has been implemented for all substantiated misconduct by senior officials  (Recommendation 8) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to develop a process to ensure disciplinary actions proposed in response to findings of misconduct are recorded within appropriate information systems to maintain their relevance and value to management for making decisions and take steps to monitor whether the disciplinary actions are implemented  (Recommendation 9) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will review the disposition of accountability actions for all substantiated misconduct cases involving senior officials resulting from investigations  (Recommendation 10) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should implement internal controls to ensure that proper adherence to separation-of-duty standards involving the removal of an employee are consistent with policy  (Recommendation 11) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should develop oversight measures to ensure all investigations referred to facility and program offices are consistent with policy and reviewed by an official independent of and at least one level above the individual involved in the allegation  To ensure independence, referred allegations of misconduct should be investigated by an entity outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct  (Recommendation 12) The VA Inspector General, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of OAWP, should develop a process to ensure that OSC case numbers are linked to the investigative case number and final report  (Recommendation 13) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to develop a time frame for the completion of published guidance that would develop an internal process to monitor cases referred to facility and program offices  (Recommendation 14) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should ensure that employees who report wrongdoing are treated fairly and protected against retaliation  (Recommendation 15) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to develop a process to inform employees of how reporting lines operate, how they are used, and how the information may be shared between the OSC, the OIG, OAWP, or VA facility and program offices when misconduct is reported  (Recommendation 16) We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), VA Office of Inspector General (OIG), and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) for review and comment  In its comments, VA concurred with nine of our recommendations and partially concurred with five (see app  VI for a copy of VA’s letter)  Regarding our recommendations to the Inspector General, the OIG concurred with one recommendation and partially concurred with the other  The OIG also provided comments on our findings (see app  VII for a copy of the OIG’s letter)  We received technical comments by e-mail from OSC’s Principal Deputy Special Counsel, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate  Regarding VA’s comments, in its response to our first recommendation that the Secretary develop and implement guidance to collect complete and reliable misconduct and associated disciplinary-action data department-wide, VA concurred and outlined steps it plans to take to address our recommendations  These steps include the creation of new policies to address blank data fields, lack of personnel identifiers, lack of standardization among fields, and accessibility issues related to misconduct and associated disciplinary-action data department-wide  The target date for system implementation, dependent on approved funding and acquisition-related requirements, is January 1, 2020  On our second recommendation, that the Secretary direct applicable facility and program offices to adhere to VA’s policies regarding employee-misconduct adjudication documentation, VA concurred  It stated that a memorandum will be distributed to reiterate facility and program-office requirements to adhere to VA Handbook 5021, Employee/Management Relations, no later than October 1, 2018  VA also concurred with our third recommendation, that the Secretary direct the Office of Human Resource Management (OHRM) to routinely assess the extent to which misconduct-related files and documents are retained  According to VA, OHRM will assess, during periodic Oversight and Effectiveness Service reviews, the extent to which misconduct- related files and documents are retained  The first assessment is to be incorporated into the fiscal year 2019 Oversight and Effectiveness Service schedule no later than November 1, 2018  VA concurred with our fourth recommendation, that the Secretary direct OHRM to assess whether human-resources personnel adhere to basic principles outlined in VA Handbook 5021  VA stated that OHRM will assess, during periodic Oversight and Effectiveness Service reviews, whether human-resources and administration personnel adhere to basic principles outlined in VA Handbook 5021  The first assessment is to be incorporated into the fiscal year 2019 Oversight and Effectiveness schedule no later than November 1, 2018  In its response to our fifth recommendation, that the Secretary adhere to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) guidance and establish a specific record- retention period for adverse-action files, VA concurred and indicated that the Human Resources and Administration Assistant Secretary will establish VA guidance regarding the retention period for adverse-action files  In addition, the Human Resources and Administration Assistant Secretary is to advise applicable administration, facility, and program offices that have developed their own record-retention schedules to adhere to the newly established directive  According to VA, the directive will be established no later than November 1, 2018  VA partially concurred with our seventh recommendation, that the Secretary direct departmental heads to review responses submitted by facility or program offices to ensure evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  VA stated that the process described in our report pertaining to OIG findings or results will be changed to require all such reports to be submitted to OAWP  VA also indicated that it expects to publish new guidance by October 1, 2018, that will require the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) to review responses and recommendations from facilities or program offices  Given VA’s comments, we have revised our draft recommendation to have the Secretary direct OAWP, not the department heads, to ensure evidence demonstrates that the six elements have been addressed  VA also partially concurred with our eighth recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP review all substantiated misconduct by senior officials to verify whether disciplinary action has been implemented  VA stated that all substantiated misconduct by senior leaders in VA is handled by OAWP from intake, through investigation, working with the proposing and deciding officials  VA also stated that it expects to publish written guidance by October 1, 2018, that will clarify how OAWP will work with the appropriate servicing personnel office to ensure that the recommended disciplinary actions decided are implemented for substantiated misconduct involving senior officials  Given VA’s comments, we have revised our draft recommendation to have the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will verify that appropriate disciplinary action has been implemented for all substantiated misconduct by senior officials  VA partially concurred with our ninth recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP develop a process to ensure disciplinary actions proposed are recorded within appropriate information systems  VA stated that the VA-wide discipline tracking system currently used by OAWP will eventually be phased out  It added that once the Human Resources Information System (HRSmart) is capable of capturing and recording similar data, it will be used for this purpose  Accordingly, we have not revised our draft recommendation  VA partially concurred with our 10th recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP assess all misconduct cases involving senior officials to ensure investigative reports with findings of substantiated misconduct include recommendations for action  According to VA, OAWP has instituted several processes since our review  VA plans to issue written guidance that outlines the process for the review and disposition of appropriate accountability actions for allegations of misconduct by senior officials by October 1, 2018  Given VA’s comments, we have revised our draft recommendation to have the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will review the disposition of accountability actions for all substantiated misconduct cases involving senior officials resulting from investigations  In its response to our 11th recommendation, that the Secretary implement internal controls to ensure that separation-of-duty standards involving the removal of an employee are consistent with policy, VA concurred  It stated that it will also establish and distribute internal controls to ensure that separation-of-duty standards involving the removal of an employee are consistent with policy no later than November 1, 2018  VA partially concurred with our 12th recommendation, that the Secretary take steps to ensure independence of referred allegations of misconduct by requiring that investigations be conducted outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct  VA stated that OAWP is responsible for recording, tracking, reviewing, and confirming the implementation of recommendations from audits and investigations  However, VA did not address how it will ensure the independence of the entity responsible for conducting an investigation  As we discuss in our report, during the review OAWP officials stated that the process of referring cases of misconduct back to facilities and program offices where the misconduct occurred will continue  Accordingly, we have not revised our draft recommendation and believe implementation of it will help ensure independence  VA concurred with our 14th recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP develop a time frame for the completion of published guidance for the development of an internal process to monitor cases referred to facility and program offices  VA provided an expected date of October 1, 2018, for publishing the internal VA guidance, with the subsequent Directive and Handbook to be published as rapidly as staff coordination permits  In its response to our 15th recommendation, that the Secretary ensure that employees who report wrongdoing are treated fairly and protected against retaliation, VA concurred  It stated that OAWP and OSC have developed a functional process to ensure whistle-blower protections are implemented, but did not indicate what the process entails  The VA Secretary has also delegated authority to the Executive Director, OAWP, to put individual personnel actions on hold if the actions appear motivated by whistle-blower retaliation  VA added that OAWP has also hired two whistle-blower program specialists specifically to increase awareness of whistle-blower protections and work with individuals that disclose employee wrongdoing to ensure individuals are treated fairly and protected from retaliation for their disclosures  VA concurred with our 16th recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP develop a process to inform employees of how reporting lines operate  VA stated that it will provide whistle-blower training to all employees on a biennial basis, which will include the reporting lines for disclosures of wrongdoing, the manner in which disclosures flow once they are made, how information is shared among the whistle-blower entities, and what protections exists for those who disclose wrongdoing  Regarding our recommendations to the Inspector General, the OIG partially concurred with our sixth recommendation, to revise its policy to include a requirement to verify whether evidence produced in senior- official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  The OIG indicated that VA Directive 0701 is currently being updated to require a written or electronic signature from the person preparing the responses as an attestation that the specific requirements of the directive were met  The OIG also indicated in its letter that the OIG’s Hotline staff carefully review the case response but Hotline staff are not required to request an updated response from VA to address matters not necessary to the resolution to the referral  The OIG asserted that requesting an update would detract from the resources for other important VA activities  On page 4 of the OIG’s letter, the OIG states that Hotline analysts are allowed to exercise some discretion in accepting responses that may include minor departures from the six elements  We continue to believe that, in order to have a complete response to a referral, all six elements required by the directive should be addressed  In addition, Directive 0701 does not allow for the use of professional judgement to decide which elements to include or not to include in a response  While we agree that requiring a written or electronic signature from the person preparing the responses as an attestation will help ensure that the specific requirements of the directive were met, we maintain that not requiring Hotline analysts to review responses to ensure that all elements of the directive are addressed is inconsistent with the intent of the directive  In its response to our 13th recommendation, that the OIG develop a process to ensure that an OSC case number is linked to the investigative case number and the final report, the OIG concurred  It stated that it will engage with the Executive Director of OAWP to develop a process to ensure that OSC case numbers are linked to OIG and OAWP investigative case numbers, as appropriate, and linked to any final report of investigation  In addition to its response to recommendations, the VA OIG also raised a number of concerns with our findings  Page 1 of its letter summarizes some of these concerns and then provides more detail on each concern raised, starting on page 2  Our responses to each of these detailed concerns are provided below  The OIG stated that our report does not focus on the most important cases, but focuses primarily on case referrals regarding senior officials that were not handled by the OIG because the allegations were lower risk or because of resource constraints  In addition, the OIG stated that GAO risks presenting a skewed picture of the OIG’s oversight work  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  We requested that the OIG provide us with data from the OIG’s Master Case Index (MCI) information system that would allow us to select a sample of cases, in accordance with the scope of our review  The OIG was unable to provide the requested information due to several reasons  Instead, the OIG provided data from the OIG Hotline and Office of Investigations case- management systems (subsystems within MCI) that contained a limited number of fields for analysis and 23 cases pertaining to SES misconduct that were referred to VA for investigation during GAO’s period of review  Therefore, as we discuss in the report, we were only able to review the 23 senior-official misconduct cases included in our report because the OIG was only able to provide related documentation for these cases  The OIG stated that we only reviewed a sample of just 23 case referrals from fiscal years 2011 through 2014  As described, we reviewed all 23 senior-official misconduct cases that were referred to VA for investigation that the OIG was able to provide us, not a sample  The OIG stated that our report inaccurately states that the extracts received from the MCI information system contained missing information  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  Our review included a comprehensive assessment of the reliability of the OIG’s data  To conduct this assessment, we requested an explanation of each data field to clarify when fields are normally populated and how they are used  Our findings are consistent with the information provided in response to this request  For example, the OIG’s response to our data-reliability assessment stated that the data field used to identify the type of allegations being investigated should never be blank  However, we found that field to be blank in some cases in the data that were provided to us, though the OIG asserted that the MCI information system is a relational database where each case may be associated with multiple allegations and codes  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested supporting documentation to demonstrate that the fields analyzed during our period of review did not contain missing data  The OIG provided the MCI information system user’s manual that contains detailed procedures for accessing and entering data into the MCI information system, and a compilation of various internal documents  However, the documentation did not provide evidence of the completeness of data entered into the MCI information system as part of quality-assurance reviews performed by the OIG or other designated entity  Absent evidence of data-quality reviews aimed at assessing the accuracy and completeness of data contained in the MCI information system, we did not change the conclusions based on our previous analysis  The OIG stated that our report provides incomplete information regarding sampled cases and mischaracterized one of the OIG’s case referrals in the body of the report  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  Specifically, the OIG said that we inaccurately stated that a medical center director conducted the investigation into his own alleged misconduct and found no allegations were substantiated  The synopsis included in our report clearly articulates that the medical center director was named in the allegation for having received a similar complaint involving time and attendance abuse by a physician  The medical center director, who provided the response to the OIG, was implicated in the allegation as having not addressed a similar time and attendance complaint regarding the same physician 2 years earlier  The OIG did not provide any supporting documentation to demonstrate that the alleged time and attendance abuse allegations against the physician were not substantiated  The OIG stated that our report inaccurately stated that the medical center director conducted his own investigation of himself and found no allegations were substantiated  We disagree  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested that the OIG provide additional support used to determine that the medical center director did not investigate the allegation in which he was named  The additional case documentation provided by the OIG further reaffirmed our assessment that the medical center director performed his own investigation and found no allegations were substantiated  Additional documentation provided by the OIG indicated that the OIG referred the case to the Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) for a response  However, documentation we examined during the course of our audit, and the documentation provided in response to our draft report, indicates that the medical center director performed the investigation of the allegations and then the results were routed through the VISN back to the OIG  The OIG stated that routing the response through the VISN should address our concerns of independence  This process does not address our concerns regarding independence because VA Directive 0701 states that all responses to Hotline case referrals must contain evidence of an independent review by an official separate from and at a higher grade than the subject / alleged wrongdoer  In this case, the name of the medical center director who signed the facility response provided to the OIG was the same individual named in the allegations  The OIG stated that the report does not provide a balanced presentation of the rigor with which the OIG reviews all incoming Hotline contacts and case responses  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  As described above, the OIG was unable to provide comprehensive data to select a sample of OIG audits, evaluations, and inspections for review due to the limitations cited  We focused on misconduct involving senior officials consistently with the scope of our review and thoroughly reviewed all 23 senior-official misconduct cases that were referred to VA for investigation, which were the only cases that the OIG was able to provide  The OIG stated that the description for one of the cases included in appendix V of the draft report was incomplete because we misunderstood the OIG’s process  We disagree with this characterization  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested additional supporting documentation  The documentation provided reaffirmed our assessment that another medical center director performed his own investigation and found no allegations were substantiated  Similar to the case described above, the medical center director completed his own investigation and then routed the response through the VISN back to the OIG  In contrast to the previous case, however, the Hotline Workgroup reviewed the response to the OIG and found it to be insufficient  Specifically, the OIG noted that the medical center director who provided the response was the subject of the complaint, despite the response being directed to the VISN, and requested clarification  The VISN informed the OIG that it is not its policy for the complainant to have any involvement in the review and data submission on a case in which the complainant is involved  The VISN stated that while this did obviously occur in this instance, it has taken steps to ensure it does not occur in the future  The supporting evidence provided for the case included in appendix V also contradicts the OIG’s previous assertion that the routing of a response through the entity with oversight (VISN) over the medical center director should have addressed GAO’s concerns of independence  The OIG stated our report provides a misrepresentation of the OIG’s failure to follow internal policies for department responses  We disagree  According to OIG statements on page 4 of the OIG’s letter, Hotline analysts are allowed to exercise some discretion in accepting responses that may include minor departures from the six elements required in VA Directive 0701  We continue to believe that in order to have a complete response to a referral, all six elements required by the directive should be addressed  On the basis of our review, the OIG does not have an effective method to ensure that cases referred to VA are reviewed in accordance with VA Directive 0701  Out of the 23 cases we reviewed, only 4 included sufficient documentation needed to support VA’s findings, and we could not identify a case that contained all six elements required in VA Directive 0701  This suggests that the current OIG review process is not adequately resolving case referrals, as asserted by the OIG’s response  In addition, VA Directive 0701 does not currently include a provision that would allow Hotline analysts to deviate from the six required elements  As stated in our report, the OSC also raised concerns regarding 40 percent of disclosure cases that were referred to VA facility and program offices  The OIG stated that much of the information in the draft report is dated and ignores system updates, specifically several key Hotline-related process improvements since 2014  Although our review began in 2015, we disagree with this characterization of our findings  In our report, we included relevant improvements to demonstrate where the OIG was able to provide support for those improvements  For example, our report discusses: (1) a new process for communicating the scope of reviews that involve matters referred by the OSC to the Office of the Secretary, (2) a description on the VA website of the process for employees who wish to report criminal or other activity to the OIG, (3) a new Enterprise Management System, and (4) a new process for receiving whistle-blower disclosures by the Secretary  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested additional documentation for any systems, practices, or personnel changes that have been implemented since 2011, including improvements to Hotline-related processes since 2014 that were not included in our report  In response, the OIG provided a copy of the OIG’s organizational chart (current as of Apr  23, 2018), described the oversight responsibilities of each OIG component, and summarized the pertinent staff positions within each component  On the basis of this documentation, we identified a new office (the Office of Special Reviews), a promotion, staff reassignments, and numerous vacancies during our review period  However, the OIG did not provide evidence of any measures to improve the MCI information system, case-referral processes, or relevant staff roles that were not already included in our report  As described above, the OIG was unable to provide comprehensive data to select a sample of OIG audits, evaluations, and inspections for our initial review due to the limitations cited  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested documentation related to any significant changes that have been made to the MCI information system that allows the OIG to identify all allegations of misconduct for export and analysis  The OIG provided additional information regarding overall departmental achievements that are highlighted in the OIG’s Semiannual Report to Congress, and other products from its website published between fiscal years 2011 through 2018  We recognize the OIG’s broader administrative and oversight work described in the published reports  However, this information does not address changes specifically made to the MCI information system that would enable the OIG to analyze cases pertaining to alleged misconduct by senior officials that we requested  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5045 or larink@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Our objectives were to determine the extent to which the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (1) collects reliable information associated with employee misconduct and disciplinary actions that is accessible and could be used to analyze misconduct department-wide; (2) retains documentation that demonstrates VA adheres to its policies when adjudicating cases of employee misconduct; (3) ensures allegations of misconduct involving senior officials are reviewed in accordance with VA investigative standards, and these officials are held accountable; (4) has procedures to investigate whistle-blower allegations of misconduct; and the extent to which (5) data and whistle-blower testimony indicate whether retaliation for disclosing misconduct occurs at VA  For the first objective, we obtained VA employee misconduct data from 12 information systems operated by various VA components covering October 2009 through July 2017, where available  To determine the reliability of VA’s misconduct data, we analyzed the contents of the 12 information systems operated by various offices across VA  These data encompass each of the three major administrations that constitute VA— the National Cemetery Administration (NCA), Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and Veterans Health Administration (VHA)  We selected the information systems based on our discussions with VA officials and staff that oversee the data and, hence, identified databases capable of collecting information pertaining to either employee misconduct or disciplinary actions  Data fields were selected based on whether they would provide beneficial information to better understand the disciplinary process  VA’s Personnel and Accounting Integrated Data (PAID) system, which was developed to track payroll actions, contains information about adverse disciplinary actions that affect employee salary department-wide  We obtained an extract of all adverse disciplinary actions from the PAID system  We assessed the reliability of each system for the purposes of identifying and tracking misconduct cases  To do this, we performed electronic tests on 12 information systems to determine the completeness and accuracy of the fields contained in the data files  We also submitted to the overseeing offices for all 12 information systems general data-quality questions regarding the purpose of the data, their structure, definitions and values for certain fields, automated and manual data-quality checks to ensure the accuracy of the data, and limitations  As discussed further, the data were generally not reliable for a department-wide assessment of all misconduct and disciplinary actions due to the lack of completeness and compatibility of the data across all information systems  VA staff could not confirm whether some of the missing data we identified were artifacts of the database extraction process VA used to assemble the data files we used in our review  Despite challenges with aspects of the data, we found the data sufficiently reliable for conducting analysis where fields were populated and field definition concurrence was obtained by program offices  For the second objective, we selected a generalizable stratified random sample of 544 misconduct cases from October 2009 through May 2015  Where available, we reviewed the employees’ disciplinary-action files and Electronic Official Personnel Folders to determine the extent to which VA’s actions were consistent with disciplinary policy outlined in VA Handbook 5021, Employee/Management Relations  These data encompass each of the three major administrations that constitute VA— NCA, VBA, and VHA  We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for analysis of disciplinary actions affecting salary that resulted from misconduct that was not reported to supervisors directly from employees  Accordingly, our sample only includes misconduct cases that resulted in a change in salary or were reported to departmental organizations within the 12 information systems selected  We developed a data-collection instrument to document the results of our case reviews  We revised our data-collection instrument to address issues found during the course of our analysis, and developed a companion document that outlined the decision rules for reviewing cases  We also designated two primary reviewers to ensure the decision rules were consistently applied across all cases  Our review of laws and regulations revealed that disciplinary rules sometimes vary depending on whether employees fall under Title 5, Title 38, or hybrid Title 5 and Title 38 hiring authority  To minimize confusion associated with these differences, we incorporated criteria into our data- collection instrument  In addition, we were unable to obtain complete case information for 25 percent of the cases  For these cases, we obtained direct access to the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Electronic Official Personnel Folders system to attempt to recover some of the missing information  Ultimately, we were unable to complete our review for 10 percent of cases in our sample because of missing files  In addition to reporting missing case information, we used our generalizable analysis results to project VA-wide figures for several data elements that were not in compliance with VA policy  Unless otherwise noted, estimates in this report have a margin of error of +/-7 4 percentage points or less for a 95 percent confidence interval  For the third objective, we analyzed data from the Office of Accountability Review (OAR) Legacy Referral Tracking List and VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) case-referral and investigative case-management systems, and we selected cases for in-depth review  We selected these two systems based on discussions with VA officials who were knowledgeable with databases that have the capacity to track misconduct information pertaining to senior officials  The OAR Legacy Referral Tracking List comprises referrals from January 2011 through May 2015  The OIG provided 23 case-referral files involving senior officials from calendar years 2011 through 2014  As part of our review of the OIG case files, we evaluated specific data elements contained in VA’s response documents using VA policy for referring and reviewing misconduct cases  We assessed the reliability of the OAR Legacy Referral Tracking List and OIG case-management systems for the purposes of identifying and tracking misconduct cases  To do this, we performed electronic tests on each database to determine the completeness and accuracy of the fields contained in the data files, including senior-official indicators  Where feasible, we opted to match individual datasets to PAID to determine whether disciplinary actions were administered as prescribed  We also submitted to OAR and the OIG general data-quality questions regarding the purpose of the data, their structure, definitions and values for certain fields, automated and manual data-quality checks to ensure the accuracy of the data, and limitations  On the basis of this information, we found the OAR data to be sufficiently reliable for conducting analysis where fields were sufficiently populated  For the OAR data, we matched the persons of interest to adverse-action files from PAID to determine whether adverse disciplinary actions were administered as prescribed during the available time frame (January 2011 through May 2015)  We also obtained VA’s response documents for the 23 case-referral files provided by the OIG to evaluate whether VA was adhering to its own policy for referring and reviewing misconduct cases  Through our OAR Legacy Referral Tracking List analysis, we identified illustrative case examples of misconduct involving senior officials  Further, based on our evaluation of the 23 OIG case referrals using VA’s referral policy, we developed several illustrative case examples  For the fourth objective, we interviewed senior officials from VA and the OSC responsible for investigating whistle-blower complaints  We obtained the OSC’s procedures for referring disclosure complaints and VA’s policy for investigating these complaints once received at the agency  In addition, we obtained whistle-blower disclosure data from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) covering calendar years 2010 through 2014  To determine the reliability of the data, we conducted electronic testing and traced data elements to source documentation  We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable to identify the total number of cases that were investigated by the OIG, or referred to facility and program offices  We also observed a course to assess VA’s training provided to VA employees conducting investigations  We identified 135 OSC disclosure cases for analysis based on two criteria: (1) they contained at least partial complainant information (i e , the allegations were not anonymously reported or could be identified with supplemental information) and (2) they contained an indicator that the case had been closed by the OSC pending an ongoing investigation by VA or the OIG  These cases represent the universe of VA disclosures accepted by the OSC  Of the 135 disclosure cases referred to VA, 53 cases were referred to VA facility and program offices for further investigation  The remaining 82 disclosure cases indicated that they were investigated by the OIG  We reviewed the results of OSC’s assessment of investigative documentation developed by VA for these whistle-blower disclosure cases  For the fifth objective, we analyzed the 135 whistle-blower disclosure cases obtained from the OSC  These cases represent the universe of VA disclosures accepted by the OSC from calendar years 2010 through 2014, which were investigated by VA  We obtained an extract of year-end rosters from the PAID system as of September for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, with a final extract through May 30, 2015  Finally, we interviewed representatives from whistle-blower advocacy groups, as well as established whistle-blowers who disclosed wrongdoing or retaliation at VA and who were referred to us by one advocacy group  Of the 135 disclosures received by the OSC, a total of 129 employees made a total of 130 disclosures nonanonymously  For these 130 disclosure cases, we reviewed OSC and OIG investigative reports, as well as PAID roster files, to gather additional information to perform analysis of potential retaliation  We also interviewed six individual whistle- blowers with formal disclosure cases accepted by the OSC, indicating that the OSC had previously reviewed the case and determined that it contained sufficient evidence and merit to warrant further investigation  Our analysis of potential retaliation comprised two parts  First, we compared the 129 employees associated with the selected OSC cases to the PAID rosters using the complainants’ information to determine whether employees associated with the selected OSC cases were more likely to leave the agency  We identified the overall count and proportion (across years) of roster-matched employees who made a disclosure between fiscal years 2010 through 2014 but were not employed at VA the following fiscal year  Second, to determine whether employees associated with the selected OSC cases were more likely to receive disciplinary action, we also calculated the yearly totals and proportion of roster-matched employees identified above for whom a record existed in the PAID disciplinary action information system  We did this by comparing the proportion of employees who received one or more disciplinary actions in the year prior to the appearance in the roster, in the same fiscal year as the roster, and in the subsequent fiscal year  We also completed this analysis utilizing the PAID roster file to determine the yearly proportion of all VA employees who left the agency  On the basis of the results of our analysis, we reported by fiscal year the percentage of whistle-blowers that received disciplinary action or left VA at a higher rate than the overall VA population following a disclosure  To address all objectives, we interviewed senior officials from VA’s major components responsible for investigating and adjudicating cases of employee misconduct  We also reviewed standard operating procedures, policy statements, and guidance for staff charged with investigating and adjudicating allegations of employee misconduct  We conducted this performance audit from January 2015 to May 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  This data file is designed to track referrals made to OAR, including allegations of misconduct related to senior officials  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 11 fields out of 92 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Complainant #1 (First Name) (20 percent of 1,245 blank)— According to OAR, this field is populated when there is a known complainant for a matter  Some matters referred to OAR may be anonymously disclosed and not contain complainant information  This file also contains a case-origin field that specifies whether a case was anonymous  Our review of both the complainant and case-origin field indicated that only 11 percent of the complaints were generated from an anonymous source, and the remaining records should have included a complainant name  Disciplinary Action (96 percent of 1,245 blank)—This field should be populated to indicate whether a disciplinary action was taken after the completion of an investigation  Grade (97 percent of 1,245 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the grade of the Person of Interest (POI), if known  Our review of this field indicated that 97 percent were blank, therefore we were unable to analyze the variation in grade level for officials who were the subject of complaints  OAR Action (77 percent of 1,245 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated as an internal reference to describe what stage in the administrative process the matter was in when received  The lack of information did not allow for analysis of the types of actions taken for each case  Person of Interest (POI) (47 percent of 1,245 blank)—This field specifies the first and last name of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employee who is the subject of an allegation  POI (Person of Interest) Last Name 1–5 (51 to 99 percent of 1,245 blank)—This field specifies the last name of VA employee who is the subject of an allegation  There are a total of five person-of-interest (POI) fields for each matter  According to OAR, blank POI fields occur when the case has fewer than five POIs or the POI was not specified in the matter referred  Our review of the five POI fields indicated that more than half of the records did not contain at least one POI because no individual was specified  The lack of information did not allow for further investigation of senior-level officials involved in misconduct  Proposed Action (97 percent of 1,245 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated to notify OAR staff if any disciplinary action was proposed  Our review of this field indicated that 97 percent were blank, suggesting that very few high-level officials received corrective action, or the field was not consistently completed for each record  Due to the large share of blank values, the data posed limitations when analyzing how many senior officials received corrective action as a result of a complaint  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary actions taken against VA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 9 fields out of 21 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Action Taken (3 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the action that the deciding official takes, with the exception of pending actions  If there is a pending action, this field will remain blank  Our review of the action-taken field found three records that were annotated as a “pending decision” within this field, which indicates that there is an option for entering information into this field when there is an action pending and the field should never be blank  Admin Leave (30 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated if an employee is placed on administrative leave while an adverse action is pending  If an employee is not placed on administrative leave, the field may be left blank  Our review of the admin-leave field found that about 66 percent of the records were annotated as “no” within this field, which indicates that there is an option for entering information into this field when an employee was not placed on administrative leave  Date Proposed (11 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field is used when an adverse action is proposed for an employee  There are some actions that are not proposed, such as probationary terminations or admonishments that may be taken without being proposed, and therefore result in this field being blank  Our analysis found that about 95 percent of these records containing blank proposed date fields also had an entry in the proposed adverse-action field, which contained such entries as removals, suspensions, and demotions that require a proposed date  Deciding Official (14 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the name of the official who issued the action taken  Effective Date (5 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the date of the action taken  Some entries will not have an effective date if an entry is pending decision  Also, if no action is taken, the decision was counseling, or the proposed action was rescinded, this field may not have an effective date  Our review found that about 14 percent of the cases that included adverse actions, such as a suspension, removal, reassignment, or demotion, and that should have included a date of action, were blank  Offense 2 and 3 (79 and 95 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field tracks the second- and third-most-significant charge against the employee when applicable  Proposing Official (16 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the name of the official who makes the proposed adverse action  Instances where a proposing official has left the agency at the time of entry and could not be found in the lookup feature that relies on the e-mail global address list may produce blank fields  Also, disciplinary actions that were taken without proposal would not have a proposing official  In these instances, the human-resources specialists who enter the actions are instructed to include the name in the other-comments box  Our review of these records indicated that a majority of records lacking an entry in the proposing official field also lacked an annotation in the other- comments field to accurately identify the proposing official  Settlement (14 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field tracks whether a settlement agreement occurred  This data file is designed to collect allegations of criminal activity, waste, abuse, and mismanagement received by the OIG Hotline Division  Through our analysis of this information system, we identified one field out of seven that was missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Nature of Complaint (54 percent of 896 blank)—According to the OIG, this field should contain a brief description of the issue that most closely matches the allegation  Each case can have more than one nature of complaint and corresponding administrative action, if any  OIG officials stated that this field identifies the type of allegations being investigated and should never be blank  Our review of these cases found that over half of the cases involving the OIG contained entries for administrative action taken, but the nature-of-complaint fields corresponding to these actions were blank  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary action taken against VBA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 3 fields out of 20 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Alleged Offense 2 and 3 (92 and 99 percent of 1,375 blank)— According to VBA officials, this field should be populated if an individual is charged with multiple offenses, or has additional offenses in the same reporting period  In most instances, there is typically only one offense at the time of reporting  Sustained (52 percent of 1,375 blank)—According to VBA, this field should be populated if an offense is sustained at the time of reporting  This data file is designed to track all allegations of misconduct and associated disciplinary actions taken against VA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 8 fields out of 34 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Deciding Official (3 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated with the name of the official who makes the decision for adverse action  Detail Position (89 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated with the position an employee was detailed to if removed from official position  Offense 2 and 3 (69 and 91 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field tracks the most-significant charges against the employee  If there are fewer than three charges, these fields are left blank  Offense 1 Sustained (14 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated if an individual’s first offense has been sustained  Offense 2 and 3 Sustained (73 and 91 percent of 5,571 blank)— According to OAWP, these fields should be populated if an individual’s second and third offenses have been sustained  The majority of cases only involve one offense  Proposing Official (9 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated with the name of the official who makes the proposed adverse action  This data file tracks Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) discrimination complaints  Through our analysis of this information system, we identified 1 field out of 66 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Employment—We found that the values for this field were not mutually exclusive, or independent of one another  For example, this field includes two distinct categories of information: employment status, such as full time or part time; and hiring authority, such as Title 5 or Title 38  This method of storing information resulted in undercounting each of the separate values due to the system’s failure to account for expected overlap  For instance, an employee could be both a full-time and Title 5 employee and the field only tracks one or the other  ORM officials stated that this field has since been modified to capture more options to account for the overlap  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary actions taken against Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 21 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Position—We found the VA-Wide Adverse Employment Action Database contained variations within this field, such as multiple values for the “Cemetery Caretaker” position name  According to OAR, this field is a free-text field, and the office conducts manual searches to review and analyze position titles when needed  Our review found that the different variations in position titles made it difficult to successfully determine the frequency and nature of allegations by position  This is an information system designed to collect allegations of criminal activity, waste, abuse, and mismanagement received by the OIG Hotline Division  Through our analysis of this data file, we identified 1 field out of 7 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Nature of Complaint—Our review of the Master Case Index file found variations of similar values in this field  For example, this field contained 21 different claim types pertaining to similar types of fraud, which made it difficult to assess the frequency and nature of claims entered into the system  OIG officials stated that they do not attempt to account for these variations or assess the frequency of use because they are assigned based on a “best match” to the allegations of the case  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary action taken against VBA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 20 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Position—Our review found some duplication and overlapping values among this field  For example, the position title for “service representative” contained 21 similar categories with numerous variations in spelling (i e , Veteran Service Representative vs  Veterans Service Representative, and Rating Veteran Service Representative vs  Rating Veterans Service Representative)  We were unable to verify the number of distinct positions due to the lack of standardization within this field  This data file is a tracking spreadsheet for monitoring misconduct and disciplinary action workload  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 5 fields out of 12 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Action Proposed/Decided/Taken—We were unable to analyze this data field because the action taken was tracked in one single field and updated with the most-recent action, rather than each distinct action being entered in a separate field  Consequently, we were not able to distinguish those cases where corrective action may have been taken, to verify whether the corrective action had been implemented  Current Status—We were unable to analyze this data field because it was not a standardized field  For example, we were unable to determine the total number of cases that were closed, open, or pending due to the variations in the data field (e g , Open, open, open – pending, open-pending)  Full Name of Employee, Grievant, Appellant, Complainant, Non- Employee—We were unable to distinguish whether the individual filing a complaint was an employee, grievant, appellant, complainant, or nonemployee because the information entered into this single field only provided the employee’s full name and did not provide a distinction as to which category the record was assigned, as indicated by the field name  NCA Facility—We were unable to analyze this data field because it was not a standardized field  For example, we were unable to run demographic information on the different facilities involved because this field contained erroneous information  Examples of erroneous information included the name of the Memorial Service Network in one case, and the region, rather than the facility name, in another  Supervisor Name—We were unable to analyze this data field because it was not a standardized field  For example, we were unable to determine the total number of supervisors that were associated with each case due to the variations in the names entered within this field, which included misspelled first or last names, addition/omission of middle initials, or no first name  This data file is a tracking spreadsheet for all allegations received by the VA Secretary regarding misconduct, patient care, or other wrongdoing  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 9 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Subject—Our review of this tracking spreadsheet found over 380 different possible categories that could be assigned to one record  These categories contained a significant number of variations  For example, we found 38 different categories that contained possible EEO-related issues such as “EEO/Whistleblower,” “Potential EEO,” and “EEO Violations ” We were unable to distinguish the different subject categories for this field due to the lack of standardization  CSRT officials stated that ExecVA reports contain only data corresponding to specific search criteria  This is an information system for tracking allegations of misconduct at all VA facilities that include violation of law and misdemeanors  Through our analysis of this data file, we identified 3 fields out of 29 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Classification—We found that this field contained at least three different variations of assault categories (i e , assault, assault-other, and assault-aggravated)  VAPS officials stated that this field is determined and entered by the user  Crime Type—We found this field contained at least five different variations of alcohol-consumption categories, such as “entering premises under the influence” and “alcohol – under the influence ” VAPS officials stated that this field is determined and entered by the user  Final Disposition—We found this field contained at least two different variations of charge type (i e , charged, charged – Issued Ticket), six different variations of open type (for example, open/referred to Court, open/cvb), and two different variations of closed type (i e , closed, case closed)  VAPS officials stated that this field is determined and entered by the user  This data file is designed to track all allegations of misconduct and associated disciplinary actions taken against VA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 34 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Position Title—We found this field contained at least 15 different variations of Registered Nurse, such as “Registered Nurse,” “Staff RN,” and “RN ” Allegations surrounding inadequate staffing, patient care, and safety at a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) emergency room were investigated by the medical center director of the facility  The medical center director found that the inadequate patient care and safety issue was unsubstantiated based on a review of patient safety incidents for the last 6 months  The medical center director did not provide a copy of her report review to support this conclusion  She also indicated that an external consultant was hired to assess staffing issues, and found generally that improvements could be made for staffing to address surge capacity  The director stated the medical center was in the process of implementing the recommendations made by the consultant, but her response did not discuss the specific improvements planned or include the external consultant’s report  A fact-finding was performed by a panel comprised of VA Connecticut Healthcare System officials in response to alleged violations of law, gross mismanagement, and waste of funds that included the improper billing of services for a Las Vegas conference and paying contracts through a VA nonprofit corporation to handle such expenditures  The allegations specifically requested a cost-benefit analysis for the conference location  The response received from the program office stated that an outside accounting firm performs an annual financial audit of the VA nonprofit corporation and found no material issues  Neither a copy of the annual financial audit nor a cost-benefit analysis was provided in the response as support  Additionally, the response did not address allegations regarding the status of several essential positions vacated over the prior 3 years  Allegations involved time-and-attendance abuse by a physician who was accused of not responding to calls from peers or coming into the clinic, in favor of his private practice  According to the complainant, physician assistants (PA) examine the physician’s patients at the clinic for him  The medical center director, who was also named in the allegation as having received a similar complaint against the physician 2 years earlier, reviewed the case against the physician and himself  The medical center director’s response claimed that the location indicated in the allegation was not a private practice, but rather a location where the physician reviews medical records and sometimes serves as an expert witness  He did not provide evidence to support his claim  The medical center director also stated that he had not received any reports against the physician for missed calls or clinics and that PAs are expected to participate in these activities  However, he did not provide the physician’s work log, or the PA position descriptions showing that they are allowed to perform these functions autonomously  Finally, the medical center director claimed he did not recall the allegation made against the physician 2 years prior and neither formally substantiated nor disproved the current allegations against the physician  No recommendations were made  The medical center director was accused of hiring an unqualified individual to a Quality Manager position due to their romantic relationship  The response received from the human-resources consultant noted that it was unusual to find a Nurse II manager with only an associate’s degree, but was not illegal, and the employee was qualified based on prior experience  Concerns were also raised concerning the medical center director’s use of over $400 in government funds to “soundproof” the Quality Manager’s office, including having panels attached to one wall and the hollow office door replaced with a solid door  The Chief of Engineering Services was interviewed regarding the request and stated it was an odd request, and the first time he was asked to soundproof an administrative employee’s office  The response provided by the program office did not address why the director used government funds to soundproof the Quality Manager’s office  The response provided also did not address whether recommendations that the Quality Manager’s retention allowance be reviewed for compliance and that she be counseled for appropriate office dress code were implemented  The medical center director was alleged to have misrepresented a plan to track and provide mental-health services to veterans in non-VA hospitals and created a hostile work environment against African-American veterans and employees  The medical center director investigated the allegations against himself and provided a response that was eventually submitted late to the OIG  His response indicated that a review was completed and all allegations were unsubstantiated  Several documents provided with his response showed that only 12 contacts were made to veterans with mental-health care needs during the requested 24-month period, the percentage of patients experiencing wait times greater than 14 days before receiving mental-health services averaged 18 percent, and two veteran suicides occurred  The medical center director did not address allegations of creating a hostile work environment for African American veterans and employees  The medical center director improperly reannounced a vacancy in order to hire an individual with whom he allegedly had a close personal relationship to an Assistant Director position  He also requested the master key to the facility be issued to her against regulations  The allegation involving the master key was substantiated, but the Deputy Under Secretary who conducted the investigation stated that while there was no record of the key being returned, the key was returned and the general engineer brought the facility into compliance with VA regulations  Nonetheless, the Deputy Under Secretary found that a master key was issued in violation of policy, but no recommendations were made to the medical center director for corrective action  Allegations involved false patient wait-time documentation and abuse of authority  Specifically, a medical center director instructed staff to falsify patient wait times between follow-up appointments in order to meet VA’s 14-day timeliness metric  The investigation concluded that the false documentation allegation was substantiated, but attributed the cause to staff not understanding how to enter a follow-up appointment date into the system  It was also concluded that the correction of several hundred dates in the system improved the performance of the department for the national wait-time metric  However, no documentation was provided to (1) prove the medical center director had not abused his authority by instructing staff to review wait times greater than 14 days to determine how they could be reduced, and (2) support the conclusion that the original wait times were entered in error  In addition to the contact above, Dave Bruno (Assistant Director), Erica Varner (Analyst in Charge), Hiwotte Amare, Chris Cronin, Carrie Davidson, Ranya Elias, Colin Fallon, Mitch Karpman, Grant Mallie, Anna Maria Ortiz, Sabrina Streagle, Reed Van Beveren, and April Van Cleef made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: This report provides an overview and analysis of FY2019 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The primary focus of this report is on congressional direction and funding provided to DHS through the appropriations process. It includes an Appendix with definitions of key budget terms used throughout the suite of Congressional Research Service reports on homeland security appropriations. It also directs the reader to other reports providing context for specific component appropriations. As part of an overall DHS budget that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimated to be $74.88 billion, the Trump Administration requested $47.43 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority through the appropriations process for DHS for FY2018. The request amounted to a $0.29 billion (0.6%) decrease from the $47.72 billion in annual appropriations enacted for FY2018 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141, Division F). The Administration also requested discretionary funding for DHS components that does not count against discretionary spending limits and is not reflected in the adjusted net discretionary budget authority total. The Administration requested an additional $6.65 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25; BCA), and in the budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD), $165 million in Overseas Contingency Operations designated funding (OCO) from the Operations and Maintenance budget of the U.S. Navy. On June 21, 2018, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out S. 3109, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, accompanied by S.Rept. 115-283. Committee-reported S. 3109 included $48.33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2019. This was $901 million (1.9%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $611 million (1.3%) above the enacted level for FY2018. The Senate committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, and included the OCO funding in an appropriation to the Coast Guard, rather than as a transfer from the U.S. Navy. On July 26, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee marked up H.R. 6776, its version of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019. H.Rept. 115-948 was filed September 12, 2018. Committee-reported H.R. 6776 included $51.44 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority. The House committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, but unlike S. 3109, did not include the OCO funding for the Coast Guard. As some of the annual appropriations for FY2019 remained unfinished, a consolidated appropriations bill that included a continuing resolution was passed by Congress and signed into law on September 28, 2018. The resolution, which covered DHS along with several other departments and agencies, continued funding at a rate of operations equal to FY2018 with some exceptions. This continuing resolution was extended through December 21, 2018, after which point annual appropriations lapsed. A partial government shutdown ensued for 35 days until continuing appropriations were resumed January 25, 2019, by P.L. 116-5. P.L. 116-6, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, was passed by Congress on February 14, 2019, and signed into law the following day. Division A of the act included the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, which included $49.41 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, $12 billion designated for the costs of major disasters, and $165 million in OCO funding for the Coast Guard. This report will be updated in the event of FY2019 supplemental appropriations actions.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: This report describes and analyzes annual appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2019  It compares the enacted FY2018 appropriations for DHS, the Donald J  Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request, and the appropriations measures developed and considered by Congress in response to it  This report identifies additional informational resources, reports, and products on DHS appropriations that provide context for the discussion, and it provides a list of Congressional Research Service (CRS) policy experts with whom clients may consult on specific topics  The suite of CRS reports on homeland security appropriations tracks legislative action and congressional issues related to DHS appropriations, with particular attention paid to discretionary funding amounts  These reports do not provide in-depth analysis of specific issues related to mandatory funding—such as retirement pay—nor do they systematically follow other legislation related to the authorizing or amending of DHS programs, activities, or fee revenues  Discussion of appropriations legislation involves a variety of specialized budgetary concepts  The Appendix to this report explains several of these concepts, including budget authority, obligations, outlays, discretionary and mandatory spending, offsetting collections, allocations, and adjustments to the discretionary spending caps under the Budget Control Act (BCA; P L  112-25 )  A more complete discussion of those terms and the appropriations process in general can be found in CRS Report R42388, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction , coordinated by James V  Saturno, and the Government Accountability Office's A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process   All amounts contained in the suite of CRS reports on homeland security appropriations represent budget authority  For precision in percentages and totals, all calculations in these reports used unrounded data, which are presented in each report's tables  However, amounts in narrative discussions are rounded to the nearest million (or 10 million, in the case of numbers larger than 1 billion), unless noted otherwise  Data used in this report for FY2018 amounts are derived from the explanatory statement accompanying P L  115-141 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017—Division F of which is the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018  The explanatory statement also includes data on FY2018 supplemental appropriations for DHS enacted prior to the development of the consolidated appropriations act for FY2018  Data for the FY2019 requested levels and enacted levels are drawn from H Rept  116-9 , the explanatory statement accompanying P L  116-6   Data on the Senate Appropriations Committee recommendation are drawn from S Rept  115-283 , and data for the House Appropriations Committee recommendation are drawn from H Rept  115-948   Scoring methodology is consistent across this report, relying on data provided by the Appropriations Committees that has been developed with Congressional Budget Office (CBO) methodology  CRS does not attempt to compare this data with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) data because technical scoring differences do not allow precise comparisons  This section provides an overview of the process of enactment of appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for FY2019, from the Administration's initial request, through committee action in the House and Senate, continuing appropriations (and their lapse), and enactment of the consolidated appropriations bill that contained DHS annual appropriation  On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration released its budget request for FY2019  The enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ) three days before had established discretionary spending limits for FY2018 and FY2019, replacing the limits prescribed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P L  112-25 )  The Administration chose to submit an addendum to their request in a letter accompanying the formal request documentation, which included additional requests for resources for DHS and several other departments and agencies  The Trump Administration requested $47 43 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2019, as part of an overall budget that the Office of Management and Budget estimated to be $74 88 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not annually appropriated or does not score against discretionary budget limits)  The request amounted to a $0 29 billion (0 6%) decrease from the $47 72 billion in annual appropriations enacted for FY2018 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P L  115-141 , Division F)  The Trump Administration also requested discretionary funding for DHS components that does not count against discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act (BCA; P L  112-25 ) and is not reflected in the above totals  The Administration requested an additional $6 65 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the BCA, and in the budget request for the Department of Defense, $165 million in Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terror designated funding (OCO), to be transferred to the Coast Guard  On June 21, 2018, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out S  3109 , the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, accompanied by S Rept  115-283   Committee-reported S  3109 included $48 33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2019  This was $901 million (1 9%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $611 million (1 3%) above the enacted level for FY2018  The Senate committee-reported bill also included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, and $163 million in OCO-designated funding directly for the Coast Guard, as had been done in FY2018, rather than as a transfer, as had been requested by the Administration  This bill was never taken up for action on the Senate floor  On July 26, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee marked up H R  6776 , its version of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019  H Rept  115-948 was filed September 12, 2018  Committee-reported H R  6776 included $51 44 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority  The House committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, but unlike S  3109 , did not include the OCO funding for the Coast Guard  This bill did not see action on the House floor  As some of the annual appropriations for FY2019 remained unfinished, a consolidated appropriations bill that included a continuing resolution was passed by Congress and signed into law on September 28, 2018, as P L  115-245   The continuing resolution (Division C) continued funding for DHS at a rate of operations equal to that of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018, with some exceptions  The continuing resolution was extended through December 21, 2018, at which point it expired, and annual appropriations for DHS lapsed, resulting in a partial shutdown of DHS for 35 days  Continuing appropriations were restored at the FY2018 rate of operations with the enactment of P L  116-4 on January 25, 2019  On February 14, 2019, the House took up H J Res  31 , a consolidated appropriations bill that included eight annual appropriations bills  Division A, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, included $49 41 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, $1 69 billion (3 5%) more than had been provided for FY2018, and $2 04 billion more than had been requested by the Administration in February 2018  In addition to that total, the bill included $12 billion designated for the costs of major disasters—$5 35 billion (80 4%) more than had been requested, and the requested $165 million in OCO funding appropriated for the Coast Guard operating budget, rather than a transfer from the Navy  The bill passed the House by a vote of 300-128, and the Senate that same day by a vote of 83-16  The President signed it into law the next day  Generally, the homeland security appropriations bill includes all annual appropriations provided for DHS, allocating resources to every departmental component  Discretionary appropriations provide roughly two-thirds to three-fourths of the annual funding for DHS operations, depending how one accounts for disaster relief spending and funding for overseas contingency operations  The remainder of the budget is a mix of fee revenues, trust funds, and mandatory spending  Appropriations measures for DHS typically have been organized into five titles  The first four are thematic groupings of components, while the fifth provides general direction to the department, and sometimes includes provisions providing additional budget authority  Prior to the FY2017 act, the legislative language of many appropriations included directions to components or specific conditions on how the budget authority it provided could be used  Similarly, general provisions provided directions or conditions to one or more components  In the FY2017 act, a number of these provisions within appropriations and component-specific general provisions were grouped at the ends of the titles where their targeted components are funded, and identified as "administrative provisions " This practice has continued in subsequent years  When DHS was established in 2003, components of other agencies were brought together over a matter of months, in the midst of ongoing budget cycles  Rather than developing a new structure of appropriations for the entire department, Congress and the Administration continued to provide resources through existing account structures when possible  At the direction of Congress, in 2014 DHS began to work on a new Common Appropriations Structure (CAS), which would standardize the format of DHS appropriations across components  In an interim report in 2015, DHS noted that operating with "over 70 different appropriations and over 100 Programs, Projects, and Activities     has contributed to a lack of transparency, inhibited comparisons between programs, and complicated spending decisions and other managerial decision-making " After several years of work and negotiations with Congress, DHS made its first budget request in the CAS for FY2017, and implemented it while operating under the continuing resolutions funding the department in October 2016  For FY2017 and FY2018, all DHS components requested appropriations under the CAS except for the Coast Guard, due to constraints of its financial management system  For FY2019, all the components' requests generally conformed to the CAS  A visual representation of the FY2019 requested funding in this new structure follows in Figure 1   On the left, CAS appropriations categories are listed next to a black bar representing the total FY2018 funding levels requested for DHS for each category  A catch-all "other" category is included for budget authority associated with the legislation that does not fit the CAS categories  Colored lines flow to the DHS components listed on the right, showing how the amount of funding for each appropriations category is distributed across DHS components  Wider lines indicate greater funding levels, so it is possible to understand how components may be funded differently  For example, while Customs and Border Protection (CBP) gets most of its funding from Operations and Support appropriations, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) receives most of its discretionary funding from the Disaster Relief Fund appropriation  The following sections present textual and tabular comparisons among FY2018 enacted appropriations, FY2019 requested appropriations, the FY2019 appropriations bills developed by the appropriations committees, and the final enacted annual appropriation in Division A of the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P L  116-6 )  The structure of the appropriations reflects the organization outlined in the detail table of the explanatory statement accompanying the act ( H Rept  116-9 )  The tables summarize enacted appropriations for FY2018, and those requested by the Administration, and proposed in appropriations committee-developed legislation under development for FY2019  Only the formal request for FY2019 annual appropriations is reflected in the "Request" column  The tables include data on enacted annual and supplemental appropriations  Instances where appropriations are provided for a title's components in other parts of the bill (such as in general provisions or by transfer) are shown separately  Supplemental appropriations provided with an emergency designation for a given component in FY2018 are displayed after the subtotal of annual appropriations  Following the methodology used by the appropriations committees, totals of "appropriations" do not include resources provided by transfer or under adjustments to discretionary spending limits (i e , for emergency requirements, overseas contingency operations for the Coast Guard or the cost of major disasters under the Stafford Act for the Federal Emergency Management Agency)  Amounts covered by adjustments are included with discretionary appropriations in a separate total for "discretionary funding " A subtotal for each component of total estimated budgetary resources that would be available under the legislation and from other sources (such as fees, mandatory spending, and trust funds) for the given fiscal year is also provided at the end of each component section  Totals at the bottom of each table indicate the total net discretionary appropriation for the title on its own, the total net discretionary funding from the annual appropriations bill and any supplemental appropriations (when such were provided), and the projected total estimated budgetary resources for each phase in the appropriations process shown in the table  Title I, Departmental Management and Operations, the smallest of the component-specific titles, contains appropriations for the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management, the Management Directorate, Analysis and Operations (A&O), and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)  For FY2018, these components received $1 36 billion in net discretionary funding through the appropriations process, including $25 million in FY2018 supplemental appropriations  The Trump Administration requested $1 60 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for components included in this title  In addition, $24 million was requested as a transfer from the FY2019 appropriation for the Disaster Relief Fund to the OIG  Not including the transfer, the appropriations request was $241 million (17 7%) more than the amount provided for FY2018  Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S  3109 included $1 47 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $137 million (8 6%) less than requested by the Trump Administration and $103 million (7 6%) more than the amount provided for FY2018  S  3109 included $72 million in discretionary budget authority drawn from unobligated prior-year balances from the DRF, but did not include the proposed transfer of FY2019 DRF resources to the OIG  As a result, the gross budgetary resources provided to components funded in Title I was $89 million (5 5%) less than the request, and $176 million (12 9%) more than provided in FY2018  House Appropriations Committee-reported H R  6776 included $1 48 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $119 million (7 4%) less than requested by the Trump Administration and $122 million (8 9%) more than the amount provided for FY2018  H R  6776 , like the Senate committee-reported bill, did not include the proposed transfer of FY2019 DRF resources to the OIG  As a result, the gross budgetary resources provided to components funded in Title I were $143 million (8 8%) less than the request, and $122 million (8 9%) more than provided in FY2018  P L  116-6 included a total of $1 88 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This included $51 million in a general provision for financial systems modernization, controlled by the management directorate  The total was $513 million (37 7%) more than was provided in FY2018, and $248 million (15 2%) more than was requested by the Administration, if one included the Administration's proposed transfer of $24 million from the Disaster Relief Fund to the Office of the Inspector General  Table 1 shows these comparisons in greater detail  As resources were requested or provided for the Management Directorate and Office of the Inspector General in some cases from outside Title I, separate lines are included for each of those components showing a total for what is provided solely within Title I, then the individual items funded outside the title, followed by the total annual appropriation for the components  Title II, Security, Enforcement, and Investigations, contains appropriations for U S  Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Coast Guard (USCG), and the U S  Secret Service (USSS)  Title II funding represents the majority of DHS's budget, comprising roughly three-quarters of the funding appropriated annually for the department  For FY2018, these components received $39 52 billion in net discretionary funding, as part of $47 13 billion in projected total budget authority  This included $1 06 billion in supplemental appropriations  The Trump Administration formally requested $38 41 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for components included in this title, as part of a total budget request for these components of $47 08 billion for FY2019  The funding request was $45 million (0 1%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  Again setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations, the total resources proposed for FY2019 was $1 01 billion (2 2%) more than projected for FY2018  The Administration reportedly sought additional funding in this title for construction of border barriers, above the formally requested level  In January 2019, the acting director of the Office of Management and Budget sent a letter to congressional leaders officially seeking an additional $4 1 billion  Those amounts are not included in these comparative calculations or in the table below  Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S  3109 included $38 68 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $271 million (0 7%) more than formally requested by the Trump Administration and $227 million (0 6%) more than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  The total budgetary resources projected under S  3109 were $614 million (1 3%) less than the Administration's request (largely due to rejection of a proposed TSA fee increase), but $391 million (0 8%) more than projected for FY2018, again setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  House Appropriations Committee-reported H R  6776 included $41 28 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $2 87 billion (7 5%) more than formally requested by the Trump Administration and $2 82 billion (7 3%) more than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  The total budgetary resources projected under H R  6776 were $2 08 billion (4 4%) more than formally requested by the Administration and $3 12 billion (6 8%) more than projected for FY2018, again setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  H R  6776 would have provided $2 59 billion (6 7%) more than S  3019 , largely due to the House Appropriations Committee recommending $3 35 billion more than its Senate counterpart for CBP's Border Security Assets and Infrastructure activity  P L  116-6 included $40 00 billion in net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  The enacted annual appropriations were $1 59 billion (4 1%) more than requested, and $486 million (1 2%) more than the amount provided in FY2018  Setting aside FY2018 supplemental funding, FY2019 enacted net discretionary funding exceeded FY2018 levels by $1 55 billion (4 0%)  The total budgetary resources projected for components funded in this title were $47 82 billion, $704 million (1 5%) more than was formally requested by the Administration, and $1 75 billion (3 8%) more than was provided in FY2018, setting aside the FY2018 supplemental funding  Table 2 shows these comparisons in greater detail  Title III, Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, contains appropriations for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)  It is the second largest of the component-specific titles  For FY2018, these components received $7 22 billion in net discretionary appropriations and $7 37 billion in specially designated funding for disaster relief through the annual appropriations process  In addition to that annual funding, $58 23 billion was provided for FEMA in emergency supplemental appropriations in FY2018  Incorporating all these elements, the total net discretionary funding level for all Title III components was $72 61 billion for FY2018  The Trump Administration requested $6 19 billion in FY2019 net discretionary appropriations for components included in this title, and $6 65 billion in specially designated funding for disaster relief as part of a total net discretionary funding level for these components of $12 84 billion for FY2019  Setting aside the $58 23 billion in FY2018 supplemental appropriations, the appropriations request was $1 54 billion (10 7%) less than the amount provided for FY2018 in net discretionary funding  Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S  3109 included $13 54 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $694 million (5 4%) more than requested by the Trump Administration and $847 million (5 9%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  The total budgetary resources projected would be $718 million (3 8%) more than the Administration's request, but $1 29 billion (6 2%) less than projected for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  The Senate committee-reported bill included within these totals the requested disaster relief funding of $6 65 billion, and offset $228 million in its Federal Assistance appropriation from unobligated DRF balances  House Appropriations Committee-reported H R  6776 included $13 70 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $861 million (6 7%) more than requested by the Trump Administration and $681 million (4 7%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  The total budgetary resources projected would be $885 million (4 7%) more than the Administration's request, but $1 13 billion (5 4%) less than projected for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  The House committee-reported bill included within these totals the requested disaster relief funding of $6 65 billion  P L  116-6 included $18 27 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  The enacted discretionary funding level was $5 43 billion (42 3%) more than requested, and $3 89 billion (27 1%) more than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside the historically high level of supplemental appropriations  The total budgetary resources projected for FY2019 was $5 46 billion (29 0%) more than was requested, and $3 44 billion (16 5%) more than was projected for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental funding  Table 3 shows these comparisons in greater detail  As some annually appropriated resources were provided for FEMA from outside Title III in FY2018, a separate line is included for FEMA showing a total for what is provided solely within Title III, then the non-Title III appropriation, followed by the total annual appropriation for FEMA  Title IV, Research and Development, Training, and Services, the second smallest of the component-specific titles, contains appropriations for the U S  Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)  In FY2018, these components received $1 57 billion in net discretionary funding, as part of a projected total budget of $5 92 billion  This included $10 million in supplemental appropriations for FLETC  The Trump Administration requested $1 53 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for components included in this title, as part of a total budget for these components of $6 11 billion for FY2018  The funding request was $36 million (2 3%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside supplemental appropriations, although the overall budget request was $201 million (3 3%) higher than the annual budget projected for FY2018 (again, setting aside supplemental funding)  This is due to changes in anticipated fee collections for USCIS and reorganization of most of the Office of Health Affairs and DNDO into the new CWMD component reflected in the request  Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S  3109 included $1 53 billion in net discretionary funding for components included in this title, as part of a projected total budget of $6 23 billion  This was $115 million (7 5%) more than requested, and $79 million (5 0%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, not including supplemental funding  The total budgetary resources projected under S  3109 would have been $115 million (1 9%) more than the Administration's request, and $316 million (5 3%) more than projected for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  House Appropriations Committee-reported H R  6776 included $1 64 billion in net discretionary funding for components included in this title, as part of a projected total budget of $6 21 billion  This was $97 million (6 3%) more than requested, and $60 million (3 9%) more than the amount provided for FY2018, not including supplemental funding  The total budgetary resources projected under H R  6776 would have been $97 million (1 6%) more than the Administration's request, and $297 million (5 0%) more than projected for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  P L  116-6 included $1 62 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  Enacted FY2019 appropriations were $199 million (3 3%) more than was requested by the Administration, and $163 million (10 4%) more than was provided in FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental funding  Total budgetary resources projected for FY2019 are $199 million (3 3%) more than were requested by the Administration, and $400 million (6 8%) more than was projected for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental funding  Table 4 shows these comparisons in greater detail  As noted above, the fifth title of the FY2019 DHS appropriations act contains general provisions, the impact of which may reach across the entire department, affect multiple components, or focus on a single activity  Rescissions of prior-year appropriations—cancellations of budget authority that reduce the net funding level in the bill—are found in this title  For FY2018, Division F of P L  115-141 included $489 million in rescissions  For FY2019, the Administration proposed rescinding $300 million in prior-year funding from the DRF  S  3109 included $137 million in rescissions from other appropriations, but specifically directed the $300 million the Administration had proposed rescinding from the DRF to other activities within DHS  H R  6776 did not include any rescissions, although an amendment from Representative Palazzo was passed in full committee markup on a voice vote redirecting unobligated balances from the Science and Technology Directorate to the Coast Guard  Division A of P L  116-6 included $303 million in rescissions, and a provision directing that $300 million of DRF unobligated balances be used to offset new DRF appropriations  In FY2018, funding was also included in Title V for the Financial Systems Modernization initiative and a grant program for Presidential Residence Protection costs, which are reflected in the tables for Title I and Title III, respectively, as those titles fund the components that manage these resources  For FY2019, Title V of S  3109 only funded the Financial Systems Modernization initiative, and Title V of H R  6776 only funded Presidential Residence Protection costs  Title V of P L  116-6 , Division A, included funding for both the Financial Systems Modernization initiative and Presidential Residence Protection costs  The detail table in the back of H Rept  115-948 also notes the discretionary cost of several policy changes in H R  6776   Four amendments adopted in House Appropriations Committee markup resulted in a net $13 million increase in the score of the bill, which is reflected in the detail table, but not in the tables of this report  No such costs are reflected in the detail table of H Rept  116-9   For additional perspectives on FY2019 DHS appropriations, see the following: CRS Report R44604, Trends in the Timing and Size of DHS Appropriations: In Brief ; CRS Report R44052, DHS Budget v  DHS Appropriations: Fact Sheet ; and CRS Report R45262, Comparing DHS Component Funding, FY2019: In Brief   Congressional clients also may wish to consult CRS's experts directly  The following table lists CRS analysts and specialists who have expertise in policy areas linked to DHS appropriations  Budget Authority, Obligations, and Outlays Federal government spending involves a multistep process that begins with the enactment of budget authority by Congress  Federal agencies then obligate funds from enacted budget authority to pay for their activities  Finally, payments are made to liquidate those obligations; the actual payment amounts are reflected in the budget as outlays  Budget authority is established through appropriations acts or direct spending legislation and determines the amounts that are available for federal agencies to spend  The Antideficiency Act prohibits federal agencies from obligating more funds than the budget authority enacted by Congress  Budget authority also may be indefinite in amount, as when Congress enacts language providing "such sums as may be necessary" to complete a project or purpose  Budget authority may be available on a one-year, multiyear, or no-year basis  One-year budget authority is available for obligation only during a specific fiscal year; any unobligated funds at the end of that year are no longer available for spending  Multiyear budget authority specifies a range of time during which funds may be obligated for spending, and no-year budget authority is available for obligation for an indefinite period of time  Obligations are incurred when federal agencies employ personnel, enter into contracts, receive services, and engage in similar transactions in a given fiscal year—which create a legal requirement for the government to pay  Outlays are the funds that are actually spent during the fiscal year  Because multiyear and no-year budget authorities may be obligated over a number of years, outlays do not always match the budget authority enacted in a given year  Additionally, budget authority may be obligated in one fiscal year but spent in a future fiscal year, especially with certain contracts  In sum, budget authority allows federal agencies to incur obligations and authorizes payments, or outlays, to be made from the Treasury  Discretionary funded agencies and programs, and appropriated entitlement programs, are funded each year in appropriations acts  Discretionary and Mandatory Spending Gross budget authority , or the total funds available for spending by a federal agency, may be composed of discretionary and mandatory spending  Discretionary spending is not mandated by existing law and is thus appropriated yearly by Congress through appropriations acts  The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 defines discretionary appropriations as budget authority provided in annual appropriations acts and the outlays derived from that authority, but it excludes appropriations for entitlements  Mandatory spending , also known as direct spending , consists of budget authority and resulting outlays provided in laws other than appropriations acts and is typically not appropriated each year  Some mandatory entitlement programs, however, must be appropriated each year and are included in appropriations acts  Within DHS, Coast Guard retirement pay is an example of appropriated mandatory spending  Offsetting Collections Offsetting funds are collected by the federal government, either from government accounts or the public, as part of a business-type transaction such as collection of a fee  These funds are not considered federal revenue  Instead, they are counted as negative outlays  DHS net discretionary budget authority , or the total funds appropriated by Congress each year, is composed of discretionary spending minus any fee or fund collections that offset discretionary spending  Some collections offset a portion of an agency's discretionary budget authority  Other collections offset an agency's mandatory spending  These mandatory spending elements are typically entitlement programs under which individuals, businesses, or units of government that meet the requirements or qualifications established by law are entitled to receive certain payments if they establish eligibility  The DHS budget features two mandatory entitlement programs: the Secret Service and the Coast Guard retired pay accounts (pensions)  Some entitlements are funded by permanent appropriations, and others are funded by annual appropriations  Secret Service retirement pay is a permanent appropriation and, as such, is not annually appropriated  In contrast, Coast Guard retirement pay is annually appropriated  In addition to these entitlements, the DHS budget contains offsetting Trust and Public Enterprise Funds  These funds are not appropriated by Congress  They are available for obligation and included in the President's budget to calculate the gross budget authority  302(a) and 302(b) Allocations In general practice, the maximum budget authority for annual appropriations (including DHS) is determined through a two-stage congressional budget process  In the first stage, Congress sets overall spending totals in the annual concurrent resolution on the budget  Subsequently, these totals are allocated among the appropriations committees, usually through the statement of managers for the conference report on the budget resolution  These amounts are known as the 302(a) allocations   They include discretionary totals available to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations for enactment in annual appropriations bills through the subcommittees responsible for the development of the bills  In the second stage of the process, the appropriations committees allocate the 302(a) discretionary funds among their subcommittees for each of the appropriations bills  These amounts are known as the 302(b) allocations   These allocations must add up to no more than the 302(a) discretionary allocation and form the basis for enforcing budget discipline, since any bill reported with a total above the ceiling is subject to a point of order  The 302(b) allocations may be adjusted during the year by the respective appropriations committee issuing a report delineating the revised suballocations as the various appropriations bills progress toward final enactment  No subcommittee allocations are developed for conference reports or enacted appropriations bills  Table A-1 shows comparable figures for the 302(b) allocation for FY2018, based on the adjusted net discretionary budget authority included in Division F of P L  115-141 , the President's request for FY2019, and the House and Senate subcommittee allocations for the Homeland Security appropriations bills for FY2019  The Budget Control Act, Discretionary Spending Caps, and Adjustments The Budget Control Act established enforceable discretionary limits, or caps, for defense and nondefense spending for each fiscal year from FY2012 through FY2021  Subsequent legislation, including the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, amended those caps  Most of the budget for DHS is considered nondefense spending  In addition, the Budget Control Act allows for adjustments that would raise the statutory caps to cover funding for overseas contingency operations/Global War on Terror, emergency spending, and, to a limited extent, disaster relief and appropriations for continuing disability reviews and control of health care fraud and abuse  Three of the four justifications outlined in the Budget Control Act for adjusting the caps on discretionary budget authority have played a role in DHS's appropriations process  Two of these—emergency spending and overseas contingency operations/Global War on Terror—are not limited  The third justification—disaster relief—is limited  Under the Budget Control Act, the allowable adjustment for disaster relief was determined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), using the following formula until FY2019: Limit on disaster relief cap adjustment for the fiscal year = Rolling average of the disaster relief spending over the last ten fiscal years (throwing out the high and low years) + the unused amount of the potential adjustment for disaster relief from the previous fiscal year  The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 amended the above formula, increasing the allowable size of the adjustment by adding 5% of the amount of emergency-designated funding for major disasters under the Stafford Act, calculated by OMB as $6 296 billion  The act also extended the availability of unused adjustment capacity  In August 2018, OMB released a sequestration update report for FY2019 that provided a preview estimate of the allowable adjustment for FY2019 of $14 965 billion —the second-largest allowable adjustment for disaster relief in the history of the mechanism  $12 billion of that adjustment was exercised in P L  116-6 , Division A, in appropriations for the Disaster Relief Fund  No other annual appropriations used the disaster relief adjustment for FY2019  


Report 2:  Such controls would minimize the risk of abuse when officials act as both proposing and deciding officials  In addition, VA does not have oversight measures to ensure that all allegations of misconduct referred by the OIG to facility and program offices are investigated by an entity outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct  The investigation of allegations of misconduct by the program office or facility where the complaint originated may present the appearance of a conflict of interest in which managers and staff at facilities may investigate themselves or other allegations where they may have a personal stake or bias in the matter to be investigated  Therefore, the risk that the results of the investigation are minimized, or not handled adequately, is increased  VA’s newly developed process to communicate the scope of its reviews that involve matters referred by the OSC to the Office of the Secretary will be important to ensure any allegations outside the purview of the OIG’s investigation are fully addressed by a departmental entity in accordance with OSC requirements  Further, the OIG’s inability to locate investigative documentation prevents a third party from verifying whether the OIG examined the disclosures, whether any recommendations were addressed, or whether appropriate disciplinary action was taken for these cases  This lack of information has direct influence on management’s ability to make sound decisions relating to investigative matters  According to OIG officials, a spreadsheet is being used for tracking case numbers associated with disclosures, but plans to implement a process within the new system  Nonanonymous whistle-blowers faced higher rates of adverse action subsequent to their disclosure than the VA population as a whole  In addition, these individuals also had attrition rates higher than their peers who had not filed a disclosure  The disparities between whistle-blowers and other employees may be an indication that retaliation by senior officials may have occurred after misconduct was disclosed  Although VA has started to provide additional information for potential whistle-blowers who wish to report criminal or other activity to the OIG, VA does not have a process to inform employees of how their information may be shared between organizations when misconduct is reported  Without a clear understanding of how the lines for reporting misconduct operate, whistle- blowers may be uncertain as to their options for reporting misconduct, increasing the risk that they may not report workplace misconduct  We are making the following 16 recommendations to VA  The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should develop and implement guidance to collect complete and reliable misconduct and associated disciplinary-action data department-wide, whether through a single information system, or multiple interoperable systems  Such guidance should include direction and procedures on addressing blank data fields, lack of personnel identifiers, and standardization among fields, and on accessibility  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct applicable facility and program offices to adhere to VA’s policies regarding employee misconduct adjudication documentation  (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Office of Human Resource Management (OHRM) to routinely assess the extent to which misconduct-related files and documents are retained consistently with VA’s applicable documentation requirements  (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OHRM to assess whether human-resources personnel adhere to basic principles outlined in VA Handbook 5021 when informing employees of their rights during the adjudication process for alleged misconduct  (Recommendation 4) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should adhere to OPM and NARA guidance and establish a specific record-retention period for adverse action files  In doing so, the Secretary should direct applicable administration, facility, and program offices that have developed their own record-retention schedules to then adhere to the newly established record-retention period  (Recommendation 5) The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Inspector General should revise its policy to include a requirement to verify whether evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  (Recommendation 6) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) to review responses submitted by facility or program offices to ensure evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  (Recommendation 7) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will verify whether appropriate disciplinary action has been implemented for all substantiated misconduct by senior officials  (Recommendation 8) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to develop a process to ensure disciplinary actions proposed in response to findings of misconduct are recorded within appropriate information systems to maintain their relevance and value to management for making decisions and take steps to monitor whether the disciplinary actions are implemented  (Recommendation 9) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will review the disposition of accountability actions for all substantiated misconduct cases involving senior officials resulting from investigations  (Recommendation 10) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should implement internal controls to ensure that proper adherence to separation-of-duty standards involving the removal of an employee are consistent with policy  (Recommendation 11) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should develop oversight measures to ensure all investigations referred to facility and program offices are consistent with policy and reviewed by an official independent of and at least one level above the individual involved in the allegation  To ensure independence, referred allegations of misconduct should be investigated by an entity outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct  (Recommendation 12) The VA Inspector General, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of OAWP, should develop a process to ensure that OSC case numbers are linked to the investigative case number and final report  (Recommendation 13) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to develop a time frame for the completion of published guidance that would develop an internal process to monitor cases referred to facility and program offices  (Recommendation 14) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should ensure that employees who report wrongdoing are treated fairly and protected against retaliation  (Recommendation 15) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to develop a process to inform employees of how reporting lines operate, how they are used, and how the information may be shared between the OSC, the OIG, OAWP, or VA facility and program offices when misconduct is reported  (Recommendation 16) We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), VA Office of Inspector General (OIG), and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) for review and comment  In its comments, VA concurred with nine of our recommendations and partially concurred with five (see app  VI for a copy of VA’s letter)  Regarding our recommendations to the Inspector General, the OIG concurred with one recommendation and partially concurred with the other  The OIG also provided comments on our findings (see app  VII for a copy of the OIG’s letter)  We received technical comments by e-mail from OSC’s Principal Deputy Special Counsel, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate  Regarding VA’s comments, in its response to our first recommendation that the Secretary develop and implement guidance to collect complete and reliable misconduct and associated disciplinary-action data department-wide, VA concurred and outlined steps it plans to take to address our recommendations  These steps include the creation of new policies to address blank data fields, lack of personnel identifiers, lack of standardization among fields, and accessibility issues related to misconduct and associated disciplinary-action data department-wide  The target date for system implementation, dependent on approved funding and acquisition-related requirements, is January 1, 2020  On our second recommendation, that the Secretary direct applicable facility and program offices to adhere to VA’s policies regarding employee-misconduct adjudication documentation, VA concurred  It stated that a memorandum will be distributed to reiterate facility and program-office requirements to adhere to VA Handbook 5021, Employee/Management Relations, no later than October 1, 2018  VA also concurred with our third recommendation, that the Secretary direct the Office of Human Resource Management (OHRM) to routinely assess the extent to which misconduct-related files and documents are retained  According to VA, OHRM will assess, during periodic Oversight and Effectiveness Service reviews, the extent to which misconduct- related files and documents are retained  The first assessment is to be incorporated into the fiscal year 2019 Oversight and Effectiveness Service schedule no later than November 1, 2018  VA concurred with our fourth recommendation, that the Secretary direct OHRM to assess whether human-resources personnel adhere to basic principles outlined in VA Handbook 5021  VA stated that OHRM will assess, during periodic Oversight and Effectiveness Service reviews, whether human-resources and administration personnel adhere to basic principles outlined in VA Handbook 5021  The first assessment is to be incorporated into the fiscal year 2019 Oversight and Effectiveness schedule no later than November 1, 2018  In its response to our fifth recommendation, that the Secretary adhere to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) guidance and establish a specific record- retention period for adverse-action files, VA concurred and indicated that the Human Resources and Administration Assistant Secretary will establish VA guidance regarding the retention period for adverse-action files  In addition, the Human Resources and Administration Assistant Secretary is to advise applicable administration, facility, and program offices that have developed their own record-retention schedules to adhere to the newly established directive  According to VA, the directive will be established no later than November 1, 2018  VA partially concurred with our seventh recommendation, that the Secretary direct departmental heads to review responses submitted by facility or program offices to ensure evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  VA stated that the process described in our report pertaining to OIG findings or results will be changed to require all such reports to be submitted to OAWP  VA also indicated that it expects to publish new guidance by October 1, 2018, that will require the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) to review responses and recommendations from facilities or program offices  Given VA’s comments, we have revised our draft recommendation to have the Secretary direct OAWP, not the department heads, to ensure evidence demonstrates that the six elements have been addressed  VA also partially concurred with our eighth recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP review all substantiated misconduct by senior officials to verify whether disciplinary action has been implemented  VA stated that all substantiated misconduct by senior leaders in VA is handled by OAWP from intake, through investigation, working with the proposing and deciding officials  VA also stated that it expects to publish written guidance by October 1, 2018, that will clarify how OAWP will work with the appropriate servicing personnel office to ensure that the recommended disciplinary actions decided are implemented for substantiated misconduct involving senior officials  Given VA’s comments, we have revised our draft recommendation to have the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will verify that appropriate disciplinary action has been implemented for all substantiated misconduct by senior officials  VA partially concurred with our ninth recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP develop a process to ensure disciplinary actions proposed are recorded within appropriate information systems  VA stated that the VA-wide discipline tracking system currently used by OAWP will eventually be phased out  It added that once the Human Resources Information System (HRSmart) is capable of capturing and recording similar data, it will be used for this purpose  Accordingly, we have not revised our draft recommendation  VA partially concurred with our 10th recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP assess all misconduct cases involving senior officials to ensure investigative reports with findings of substantiated misconduct include recommendations for action  According to VA, OAWP has instituted several processes since our review  VA plans to issue written guidance that outlines the process for the review and disposition of appropriate accountability actions for allegations of misconduct by senior officials by October 1, 2018  Given VA’s comments, we have revised our draft recommendation to have the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will review the disposition of accountability actions for all substantiated misconduct cases involving senior officials resulting from investigations  In its response to our 11th recommendation, that the Secretary implement internal controls to ensure that separation-of-duty standards involving the removal of an employee are consistent with policy, VA concurred  It stated that it will also establish and distribute internal controls to ensure that separation-of-duty standards involving the removal of an employee are consistent with policy no later than November 1, 2018  VA partially concurred with our 12th recommendation, that the Secretary take steps to ensure independence of referred allegations of misconduct by requiring that investigations be conducted outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct  VA stated that OAWP is responsible for recording, tracking, reviewing, and confirming the implementation of recommendations from audits and investigations  However, VA did not address how it will ensure the independence of the entity responsible for conducting an investigation  As we discuss in our report, during the review OAWP officials stated that the process of referring cases of misconduct back to facilities and program offices where the misconduct occurred will continue  Accordingly, we have not revised our draft recommendation and believe implementation of it will help ensure independence  VA concurred with our 14th recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP develop a time frame for the completion of published guidance for the development of an internal process to monitor cases referred to facility and program offices  VA provided an expected date of October 1, 2018, for publishing the internal VA guidance, with the subsequent Directive and Handbook to be published as rapidly as staff coordination permits  In its response to our 15th recommendation, that the Secretary ensure that employees who report wrongdoing are treated fairly and protected against retaliation, VA concurred  It stated that OAWP and OSC have developed a functional process to ensure whistle-blower protections are implemented, but did not indicate what the process entails  The VA Secretary has also delegated authority to the Executive Director, OAWP, to put individual personnel actions on hold if the actions appear motivated by whistle-blower retaliation  VA added that OAWP has also hired two whistle-blower program specialists specifically to increase awareness of whistle-blower protections and work with individuals that disclose employee wrongdoing to ensure individuals are treated fairly and protected from retaliation for their disclosures  VA concurred with our 16th recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP develop a process to inform employees of how reporting lines operate  VA stated that it will provide whistle-blower training to all employees on a biennial basis, which will include the reporting lines for disclosures of wrongdoing, the manner in which disclosures flow once they are made, how information is shared among the whistle-blower entities, and what protections exists for those who disclose wrongdoing  Regarding our recommendations to the Inspector General, the OIG partially concurred with our sixth recommendation, to revise its policy to include a requirement to verify whether evidence produced in senior- official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  The OIG indicated that VA Directive 0701 is currently being updated to require a written or electronic signature from the person preparing the responses as an attestation that the specific requirements of the directive were met  The OIG also indicated in its letter that the OIG’s Hotline staff carefully review the case response but Hotline staff are not required to request an updated response from VA to address matters not necessary to the resolution to the referral  The OIG asserted that requesting an update would detract from the resources for other important VA activities  On page 4 of the OIG’s letter, the OIG states that Hotline analysts are allowed to exercise some discretion in accepting responses that may include minor departures from the six elements  We continue to believe that, in order to have a complete response to a referral, all six elements required by the directive should be addressed  In addition, Directive 0701 does not allow for the use of professional judgement to decide which elements to include or not to include in a response  While we agree that requiring a written or electronic signature from the person preparing the responses as an attestation will help ensure that the specific requirements of the directive were met, we maintain that not requiring Hotline analysts to review responses to ensure that all elements of the directive are addressed is inconsistent with the intent of the directive  In its response to our 13th recommendation, that the OIG develop a process to ensure that an OSC case number is linked to the investigative case number and the final report, the OIG concurred  It stated that it will engage with the Executive Director of OAWP to develop a process to ensure that OSC case numbers are linked to OIG and OAWP investigative case numbers, as appropriate, and linked to any final report of investigation  In addition to its response to recommendations, the VA OIG also raised a number of concerns with our findings  Page 1 of its letter summarizes some of these concerns and then provides more detail on each concern raised, starting on page 2  Our responses to each of these detailed concerns are provided below  The OIG stated that our report does not focus on the most important cases, but focuses primarily on case referrals regarding senior officials that were not handled by the OIG because the allegations were lower risk or because of resource constraints  In addition, the OIG stated that GAO risks presenting a skewed picture of the OIG’s oversight work  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  We requested that the OIG provide us with data from the OIG’s Master Case Index (MCI) information system that would allow us to select a sample of cases, in accordance with the scope of our review  The OIG was unable to provide the requested information due to several reasons  Instead, the OIG provided data from the OIG Hotline and Office of Investigations case- management systems (subsystems within MCI) that contained a limited number of fields for analysis and 23 cases pertaining to SES misconduct that were referred to VA for investigation during GAO’s period of review  Therefore, as we discuss in the report, we were only able to review the 23 senior-official misconduct cases included in our report because the OIG was only able to provide related documentation for these cases  The OIG stated that we only reviewed a sample of just 23 case referrals from fiscal years 2011 through 2014  As described, we reviewed all 23 senior-official misconduct cases that were referred to VA for investigation that the OIG was able to provide us, not a sample  The OIG stated that our report inaccurately states that the extracts received from the MCI information system contained missing information  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  Our review included a comprehensive assessment of the reliability of the OIG’s data  To conduct this assessment, we requested an explanation of each data field to clarify when fields are normally populated and how they are used  Our findings are consistent with the information provided in response to this request  For example, the OIG’s response to our data-reliability assessment stated that the data field used to identify the type of allegations being investigated should never be blank  However, we found that field to be blank in some cases in the data that were provided to us, though the OIG asserted that the MCI information system is a relational database where each case may be associated with multiple allegations and codes  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested supporting documentation to demonstrate that the fields analyzed during our period of review did not contain missing data  The OIG provided the MCI information system user’s manual that contains detailed procedures for accessing and entering data into the MCI information system, and a compilation of various internal documents  However, the documentation did not provide evidence of the completeness of data entered into the MCI information system as part of quality-assurance reviews performed by the OIG or other designated entity  Absent evidence of data-quality reviews aimed at assessing the accuracy and completeness of data contained in the MCI information system, we did not change the conclusions based on our previous analysis  The OIG stated that our report provides incomplete information regarding sampled cases and mischaracterized one of the OIG’s case referrals in the body of the report  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  Specifically, the OIG said that we inaccurately stated that a medical center director conducted the investigation into his own alleged misconduct and found no allegations were substantiated  The synopsis included in our report clearly articulates that the medical center director was named in the allegation for having received a similar complaint involving time and attendance abuse by a physician  The medical center director, who provided the response to the OIG, was implicated in the allegation as having not addressed a similar time and attendance complaint regarding the same physician 2 years earlier  The OIG did not provide any supporting documentation to demonstrate that the alleged time and attendance abuse allegations against the physician were not substantiated  The OIG stated that our report inaccurately stated that the medical center director conducted his own investigation of himself and found no allegations were substantiated  We disagree  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested that the OIG provide additional support used to determine that the medical center director did not investigate the allegation in which he was named  The additional case documentation provided by the OIG further reaffirmed our assessment that the medical center director performed his own investigation and found no allegations were substantiated  Additional documentation provided by the OIG indicated that the OIG referred the case to the Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) for a response  However, documentation we examined during the course of our audit, and the documentation provided in response to our draft report, indicates that the medical center director performed the investigation of the allegations and then the results were routed through the VISN back to the OIG  The OIG stated that routing the response through the VISN should address our concerns of independence  This process does not address our concerns regarding independence because VA Directive 0701 states that all responses to Hotline case referrals must contain evidence of an independent review by an official separate from and at a higher grade than the subject / alleged wrongdoer  In this case, the name of the medical center director who signed the facility response provided to the OIG was the same individual named in the allegations  The OIG stated that the report does not provide a balanced presentation of the rigor with which the OIG reviews all incoming Hotline contacts and case responses  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  As described above, the OIG was unable to provide comprehensive data to select a sample of OIG audits, evaluations, and inspections for review due to the limitations cited  We focused on misconduct involving senior officials consistently with the scope of our review and thoroughly reviewed all 23 senior-official misconduct cases that were referred to VA for investigation, which were the only cases that the OIG was able to provide  The OIG stated that the description for one of the cases included in appendix V of the draft report was incomplete because we misunderstood the OIG’s process  We disagree with this characterization  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested additional supporting documentation  The documentation provided reaffirmed our assessment that another medical center director performed his own investigation and found no allegations were substantiated  Similar to the case described above, the medical center director completed his own investigation and then routed the response through the VISN back to the OIG  In contrast to the previous case, however, the Hotline Workgroup reviewed the response to the OIG and found it to be insufficient  Specifically, the OIG noted that the medical center director who provided the response was the subject of the complaint, despite the response being directed to the VISN, and requested clarification  The VISN informed the OIG that it is not its policy for the complainant to have any involvement in the review and data submission on a case in which the complainant is involved  The VISN stated that while this did obviously occur in this instance, it has taken steps to ensure it does not occur in the future  The supporting evidence provided for the case included in appendix V also contradicts the OIG’s previous assertion that the routing of a response through the entity with oversight (VISN) over the medical center director should have addressed GAO’s concerns of independence  The OIG stated our report provides a misrepresentation of the OIG’s failure to follow internal policies for department responses  We disagree  According to OIG statements on page 4 of the OIG’s letter, Hotline analysts are allowed to exercise some discretion in accepting responses that may include minor departures from the six elements required in VA Directive 0701  We continue to believe that in order to have a complete response to a referral, all six elements required by the directive should be addressed  On the basis of our review, the OIG does not have an effective method to ensure that cases referred to VA are reviewed in accordance with VA Directive 0701  Out of the 23 cases we reviewed, only 4 included sufficient documentation needed to support VA’s findings, and we could not identify a case that contained all six elements required in VA Directive 0701  This suggests that the current OIG review process is not adequately resolving case referrals, as asserted by the OIG’s response  In addition, VA Directive 0701 does not currently include a provision that would allow Hotline analysts to deviate from the six required elements  As stated in our report, the OSC also raised concerns regarding 40 percent of disclosure cases that were referred to VA facility and program offices  The OIG stated that much of the information in the draft report is dated and ignores system updates, specifically several key Hotline-related process improvements since 2014  Although our review began in 2015, we disagree with this characterization of our findings  In our report, we included relevant improvements to demonstrate where the OIG was able to provide support for those improvements  For example, our report discusses: (1) a new process for communicating the scope of reviews that involve matters referred by the OSC to the Office of the Secretary, (2) a description on the VA website of the process for employees who wish to report criminal or other activity to the OIG, (3) a new Enterprise Management System, and (4) a new process for receiving whistle-blower disclosures by the Secretary  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested additional documentation for any systems, practices, or personnel changes that have been implemented since 2011, including improvements to Hotline-related processes since 2014 that were not included in our report  In response, the OIG provided a copy of the OIG’s organizational chart (current as of Apr  23, 2018), described the oversight responsibilities of each OIG component, and summarized the pertinent staff positions within each component  On the basis of this documentation, we identified a new office (the Office of Special Reviews), a promotion, staff reassignments, and numerous vacancies during our review period  However, the OIG did not provide evidence of any measures to improve the MCI information system, case-referral processes, or relevant staff roles that were not already included in our report  As described above, the OIG was unable to provide comprehensive data to select a sample of OIG audits, evaluations, and inspections for our initial review due to the limitations cited  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested documentation related to any significant changes that have been made to the MCI information system that allows the OIG to identify all allegations of misconduct for export and analysis  The OIG provided additional information regarding overall departmental achievements that are highlighted in the OIG’s Semiannual Report to Congress, and other products from its website published between fiscal years 2011 through 2018  We recognize the OIG’s broader administrative and oversight work described in the published reports  However, this information does not address changes specifically made to the MCI information system that would enable the OIG to analyze cases pertaining to alleged misconduct by senior officials that we requested  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5045 or larink@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Our objectives were to determine the extent to which the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (1) collects reliable information associated with employee misconduct and disciplinary actions that is accessible and could be used to analyze misconduct department-wide; (2) retains documentation that demonstrates VA adheres to its policies when adjudicating cases of employee misconduct; (3) ensures allegations of misconduct involving senior officials are reviewed in accordance with VA investigative standards, and these officials are held accountable; (4) has procedures to investigate whistle-blower allegations of misconduct; and the extent to which (5) data and whistle-blower testimony indicate whether retaliation for disclosing misconduct occurs at VA  For the first objective, we obtained VA employee misconduct data from 12 information systems operated by various VA components covering October 2009 through July 2017, where available  To determine the reliability of VA’s misconduct data, we analyzed the contents of the 12 information systems operated by various offices across VA  These data encompass each of the three major administrations that constitute VA— the National Cemetery Administration (NCA), Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and Veterans Health Administration (VHA)  We selected the information systems based on our discussions with VA officials and staff that oversee the data and, hence, identified databases capable of collecting information pertaining to either employee misconduct or disciplinary actions  Data fields were selected based on whether they would provide beneficial information to better understand the disciplinary process  VA’s Personnel and Accounting Integrated Data (PAID) system, which was developed to track payroll actions, contains information about adverse disciplinary actions that affect employee salary department-wide  We obtained an extract of all adverse disciplinary actions from the PAID system  We assessed the reliability of each system for the purposes of identifying and tracking misconduct cases  To do this, we performed electronic tests on 12 information systems to determine the completeness and accuracy of the fields contained in the data files  We also submitted to the overseeing offices for all 12 information systems general data-quality questions regarding the purpose of the data, their structure, definitions and values for certain fields, automated and manual data-quality checks to ensure the accuracy of the data, and limitations  As discussed further, the data were generally not reliable for a department-wide assessment of all misconduct and disciplinary actions due to the lack of completeness and compatibility of the data across all information systems  VA staff could not confirm whether some of the missing data we identified were artifacts of the database extraction process VA used to assemble the data files we used in our review  Despite challenges with aspects of the data, we found the data sufficiently reliable for conducting analysis where fields were populated and field definition concurrence was obtained by program offices  For the second objective, we selected a generalizable stratified random sample of 544 misconduct cases from October 2009 through May 2015  Where available, we reviewed the employees’ disciplinary-action files and Electronic Official Personnel Folders to determine the extent to which VA’s actions were consistent with disciplinary policy outlined in VA Handbook 5021, Employee/Management Relations  These data encompass each of the three major administrations that constitute VA— NCA, VBA, and VHA  We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for analysis of disciplinary actions affecting salary that resulted from misconduct that was not reported to supervisors directly from employees  Accordingly, our sample only includes misconduct cases that resulted in a change in salary or were reported to departmental organizations within the 12 information systems selected  We developed a data-collection instrument to document the results of our case reviews  We revised our data-collection instrument to address issues found during the course of our analysis, and developed a companion document that outlined the decision rules for reviewing cases  We also designated two primary reviewers to ensure the decision rules were consistently applied across all cases  Our review of laws and regulations revealed that disciplinary rules sometimes vary depending on whether employees fall under Title 5, Title 38, or hybrid Title 5 and Title 38 hiring authority  To minimize confusion associated with these differences, we incorporated criteria into our data- collection instrument  In addition, we were unable to obtain complete case information for 25 percent of the cases  For these cases, we obtained direct access to the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Electronic Official Personnel Folders system to attempt to recover some of the missing information  Ultimately, we were unable to complete our review for 10 percent of cases in our sample because of missing files  In addition to reporting missing case information, we used our generalizable analysis results to project VA-wide figures for several data elements that were not in compliance with VA policy  Unless otherwise noted, estimates in this report have a margin of error of +/-7 4 percentage points or less for a 95 percent confidence interval  For the third objective, we analyzed data from the Office of Accountability Review (OAR) Legacy Referral Tracking List and VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) case-referral and investigative case-management systems, and we selected cases for in-depth review  We selected these two systems based on discussions with VA officials who were knowledgeable with databases that have the capacity to track misconduct information pertaining to senior officials  The OAR Legacy Referral Tracking List comprises referrals from January 2011 through May 2015  The OIG provided 23 case-referral files involving senior officials from calendar years 2011 through 2014  As part of our review of the OIG case files, we evaluated specific data elements contained in VA’s response documents using VA policy for referring and reviewing misconduct cases  We assessed the reliability of the OAR Legacy Referral Tracking List and OIG case-management systems for the purposes of identifying and tracking misconduct cases  To do this, we performed electronic tests on each database to determine the completeness and accuracy of the fields contained in the data files, including senior-official indicators  Where feasible, we opted to match individual datasets to PAID to determine whether disciplinary actions were administered as prescribed  We also submitted to OAR and the OIG general data-quality questions regarding the purpose of the data, their structure, definitions and values for certain fields, automated and manual data-quality checks to ensure the accuracy of the data, and limitations  On the basis of this information, we found the OAR data to be sufficiently reliable for conducting analysis where fields were sufficiently populated  For the OAR data, we matched the persons of interest to adverse-action files from PAID to determine whether adverse disciplinary actions were administered as prescribed during the available time frame (January 2011 through May 2015)  We also obtained VA’s response documents for the 23 case-referral files provided by the OIG to evaluate whether VA was adhering to its own policy for referring and reviewing misconduct cases  Through our OAR Legacy Referral Tracking List analysis, we identified illustrative case examples of misconduct involving senior officials  Further, based on our evaluation of the 23 OIG case referrals using VA’s referral policy, we developed several illustrative case examples  For the fourth objective, we interviewed senior officials from VA and the OSC responsible for investigating whistle-blower complaints  We obtained the OSC’s procedures for referring disclosure complaints and VA’s policy for investigating these complaints once received at the agency  In addition, we obtained whistle-blower disclosure data from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) covering calendar years 2010 through 2014  To determine the reliability of the data, we conducted electronic testing and traced data elements to source documentation  We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable to identify the total number of cases that were investigated by the OIG, or referred to facility and program offices  We also observed a course to assess VA’s training provided to VA employees conducting investigations  We identified 135 OSC disclosure cases for analysis based on two criteria: (1) they contained at least partial complainant information (i e , the allegations were not anonymously reported or could be identified with supplemental information) and (2) they contained an indicator that the case had been closed by the OSC pending an ongoing investigation by VA or the OIG  These cases represent the universe of VA disclosures accepted by the OSC  Of the 135 disclosure cases referred to VA, 53 cases were referred to VA facility and program offices for further investigation  The remaining 82 disclosure cases indicated that they were investigated by the OIG  We reviewed the results of OSC’s assessment of investigative documentation developed by VA for these whistle-blower disclosure cases  For the fifth objective, we analyzed the 135 whistle-blower disclosure cases obtained from the OSC  These cases represent the universe of VA disclosures accepted by the OSC from calendar years 2010 through 2014, which were investigated by VA  We obtained an extract of year-end rosters from the PAID system as of September for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, with a final extract through May 30, 2015  Finally, we interviewed representatives from whistle-blower advocacy groups, as well as established whistle-blowers who disclosed wrongdoing or retaliation at VA and who were referred to us by one advocacy group  Of the 135 disclosures received by the OSC, a total of 129 employees made a total of 130 disclosures nonanonymously  For these 130 disclosure cases, we reviewed OSC and OIG investigative reports, as well as PAID roster files, to gather additional information to perform analysis of potential retaliation  We also interviewed six individual whistle- blowers with formal disclosure cases accepted by the OSC, indicating that the OSC had previously reviewed the case and determined that it contained sufficient evidence and merit to warrant further investigation  Our analysis of potential retaliation comprised two parts  First, we compared the 129 employees associated with the selected OSC cases to the PAID rosters using the complainants’ information to determine whether employees associated with the selected OSC cases were more likely to leave the agency  We identified the overall count and proportion (across years) of roster-matched employees who made a disclosure between fiscal years 2010 through 2014 but were not employed at VA the following fiscal year  Second, to determine whether employees associated with the selected OSC cases were more likely to receive disciplinary action, we also calculated the yearly totals and proportion of roster-matched employees identified above for whom a record existed in the PAID disciplinary action information system  We did this by comparing the proportion of employees who received one or more disciplinary actions in the year prior to the appearance in the roster, in the same fiscal year as the roster, and in the subsequent fiscal year  We also completed this analysis utilizing the PAID roster file to determine the yearly proportion of all VA employees who left the agency  On the basis of the results of our analysis, we reported by fiscal year the percentage of whistle-blowers that received disciplinary action or left VA at a higher rate than the overall VA population following a disclosure  To address all objectives, we interviewed senior officials from VA’s major components responsible for investigating and adjudicating cases of employee misconduct  We also reviewed standard operating procedures, policy statements, and guidance for staff charged with investigating and adjudicating allegations of employee misconduct  We conducted this performance audit from January 2015 to May 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  This data file is designed to track referrals made to OAR, including allegations of misconduct related to senior officials  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 11 fields out of 92 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Complainant #1 (First Name) (20 percent of 1,245 blank)— According to OAR, this field is populated when there is a known complainant for a matter  Some matters referred to OAR may be anonymously disclosed and not contain complainant information  This file also contains a case-origin field that specifies whether a case was anonymous  Our review of both the complainant and case-origin field indicated that only 11 percent of the complaints were generated from an anonymous source, and the remaining records should have included a complainant name  Disciplinary Action (96 percent of 1,245 blank)—This field should be populated to indicate whether a disciplinary action was taken after the completion of an investigation  Grade (97 percent of 1,245 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the grade of the Person of Interest (POI), if known  Our review of this field indicated that 97 percent were blank, therefore we were unable to analyze the variation in grade level for officials who were the subject of complaints  OAR Action (77 percent of 1,245 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated as an internal reference to describe what stage in the administrative process the matter was in when received  The lack of information did not allow for analysis of the types of actions taken for each case  Person of Interest (POI) (47 percent of 1,245 blank)—This field specifies the first and last name of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employee who is the subject of an allegation  POI (Person of Interest) Last Name 1–5 (51 to 99 percent of 1,245 blank)—This field specifies the last name of VA employee who is the subject of an allegation  There are a total of five person-of-interest (POI) fields for each matter  According to OAR, blank POI fields occur when the case has fewer than five POIs or the POI was not specified in the matter referred  Our review of the five POI fields indicated that more than half of the records did not contain at least one POI because no individual was specified  The lack of information did not allow for further investigation of senior-level officials involved in misconduct  Proposed Action (97 percent of 1,245 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated to notify OAR staff if any disciplinary action was proposed  Our review of this field indicated that 97 percent were blank, suggesting that very few high-level officials received corrective action, or the field was not consistently completed for each record  Due to the large share of blank values, the data posed limitations when analyzing how many senior officials received corrective action as a result of a complaint  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary actions taken against VA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 9 fields out of 21 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Action Taken (3 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the action that the deciding official takes, with the exception of pending actions  If there is a pending action, this field will remain blank  Our review of the action-taken field found three records that were annotated as a “pending decision” within this field, which indicates that there is an option for entering information into this field when there is an action pending and the field should never be blank  Admin Leave (30 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated if an employee is placed on administrative leave while an adverse action is pending  If an employee is not placed on administrative leave, the field may be left blank  Our review of the admin-leave field found that about 66 percent of the records were annotated as “no” within this field, which indicates that there is an option for entering information into this field when an employee was not placed on administrative leave  Date Proposed (11 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field is used when an adverse action is proposed for an employee  There are some actions that are not proposed, such as probationary terminations or admonishments that may be taken without being proposed, and therefore result in this field being blank  Our analysis found that about 95 percent of these records containing blank proposed date fields also had an entry in the proposed adverse-action field, which contained such entries as removals, suspensions, and demotions that require a proposed date  Deciding Official (14 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the name of the official who issued the action taken  Effective Date (5 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the date of the action taken  Some entries will not have an effective date if an entry is pending decision  Also, if no action is taken, the decision was counseling, or the proposed action was rescinded, this field may not have an effective date  Our review found that about 14 percent of the cases that included adverse actions, such as a suspension, removal, reassignment, or demotion, and that should have included a date of action, were blank  Offense 2 and 3 (79 and 95 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field tracks the second- and third-most-significant charge against the employee when applicable  Proposing Official (16 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the name of the official who makes the proposed adverse action  Instances where a proposing official has left the agency at the time of entry and could not be found in the lookup feature that relies on the e-mail global address list may produce blank fields  Also, disciplinary actions that were taken without proposal would not have a proposing official  In these instances, the human-resources specialists who enter the actions are instructed to include the name in the other-comments box  Our review of these records indicated that a majority of records lacking an entry in the proposing official field also lacked an annotation in the other- comments field to accurately identify the proposing official  Settlement (14 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field tracks whether a settlement agreement occurred  This data file is designed to collect allegations of criminal activity, waste, abuse, and mismanagement received by the OIG Hotline Division  Through our analysis of this information system, we identified one field out of seven that was missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Nature of Complaint (54 percent of 896 blank)—According to the OIG, this field should contain a brief description of the issue that most closely matches the allegation  Each case can have more than one nature of complaint and corresponding administrative action, if any  OIG officials stated that this field identifies the type of allegations being investigated and should never be blank  Our review of these cases found that over half of the cases involving the OIG contained entries for administrative action taken, but the nature-of-complaint fields corresponding to these actions were blank  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary action taken against VBA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 3 fields out of 20 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Alleged Offense 2 and 3 (92 and 99 percent of 1,375 blank)— According to VBA officials, this field should be populated if an individual is charged with multiple offenses, or has additional offenses in the same reporting period  In most instances, there is typically only one offense at the time of reporting  Sustained (52 percent of 1,375 blank)—According to VBA, this field should be populated if an offense is sustained at the time of reporting  This data file is designed to track all allegations of misconduct and associated disciplinary actions taken against VA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 8 fields out of 34 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Deciding Official (3 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated with the name of the official who makes the decision for adverse action  Detail Position (89 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated with the position an employee was detailed to if removed from official position  Offense 2 and 3 (69 and 91 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field tracks the most-significant charges against the employee  If there are fewer than three charges, these fields are left blank  Offense 1 Sustained (14 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated if an individual’s first offense has been sustained  Offense 2 and 3 Sustained (73 and 91 percent of 5,571 blank)— According to OAWP, these fields should be populated if an individual’s second and third offenses have been sustained  The majority of cases only involve one offense  Proposing Official (9 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated with the name of the official who makes the proposed adverse action  This data file tracks Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) discrimination complaints  Through our analysis of this information system, we identified 1 field out of 66 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Employment—We found that the values for this field were not mutually exclusive, or independent of one another  For example, this field includes two distinct categories of information: employment status, such as full time or part time; and hiring authority, such as Title 5 or Title 38  This method of storing information resulted in undercounting each of the separate values due to the system’s failure to account for expected overlap  For instance, an employee could be both a full-time and Title 5 employee and the field only tracks one or the other  ORM officials stated that this field has since been modified to capture more options to account for the overlap  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary actions taken against Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 21 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Position—We found the VA-Wide Adverse Employment Action Database contained variations within this field, such as multiple values for the “Cemetery Caretaker” position name  According to OAR, this field is a free-text field, and the office conducts manual searches to review and analyze position titles when needed  Our review found that the different variations in position titles made it difficult to successfully determine the frequency and nature of allegations by position  This is an information system designed to collect allegations of criminal activity, waste, abuse, and mismanagement received by the OIG Hotline Division  Through our analysis of this data file, we identified 1 field out of 7 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Nature of Complaint—Our review of the Master Case Index file found variations of similar values in this field  For example, this field contained 21 different claim types pertaining to similar types of fraud, which made it difficult to assess the frequency and nature of claims entered into the system  OIG officials stated that they do not attempt to account for these variations or assess the frequency of use because they are assigned based on a “best match” to the allegations of the case  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary action taken against VBA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 20 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Position—Our review found some duplication and overlapping values among this field  For example, the position title for “service representative” contained 21 similar categories with numerous variations in spelling (i e , Veteran Service Representative vs  Veterans Service Representative, and Rating Veteran Service Representative vs  Rating Veterans Service Representative)  We were unable to verify the number of distinct positions due to the lack of standardization within this field  This data file is a tracking spreadsheet for monitoring misconduct and disciplinary action workload  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 5 fields out of 12 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Action Proposed/Decided/Taken—We were unable to analyze this data field because the action taken was tracked in one single field and updated with the most-recent action, rather than each distinct action being entered in a separate field  Consequently, we were not able to distinguish those cases where corrective action may have been taken, to verify whether the corrective action had been implemented  Current Status—We were unable to analyze this data field because it was not a standardized field  For example, we were unable to determine the total number of cases that were closed, open, or pending due to the variations in the data field (e g , Open, open, open – pending, open-pending)  Full Name of Employee, Grievant, Appellant, Complainant, Non- Employee—We were unable to distinguish whether the individual filing a complaint was an employee, grievant, appellant, complainant, or nonemployee because the information entered into this single field only provided the employee’s full name and did not provide a distinction as to which category the record was assigned, as indicated by the field name  NCA Facility—We were unable to analyze this data field because it was not a standardized field  For example, we were unable to run demographic information on the different facilities involved because this field contained erroneous information  Examples of erroneous information included the name of the Memorial Service Network in one case, and the region, rather than the facility name, in another  Supervisor Name—We were unable to analyze this data field because it was not a standardized field  For example, we were unable to determine the total number of supervisors that were associated with each case due to the variations in the names entered within this field, which included misspelled first or last names, addition/omission of middle initials, or no first name  This data file is a tracking spreadsheet for all allegations received by the VA Secretary regarding misconduct, patient care, or other wrongdoing  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 9 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Subject—Our review of this tracking spreadsheet found over 380 different possible categories that could be assigned to one record  These categories contained a significant number of variations  For example, we found 38 different categories that contained possible EEO-related issues such as “EEO/Whistleblower,” “Potential EEO,” and “EEO Violations ” We were unable to distinguish the different subject categories for this field due to the lack of standardization  CSRT officials stated that ExecVA reports contain only data corresponding to specific search criteria  This is an information system for tracking allegations of misconduct at all VA facilities that include violation of law and misdemeanors  Through our analysis of this data file, we identified 3 fields out of 29 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Classification—We found that this field contained at least three different variations of assault categories (i e , assault, assault-other, and assault-aggravated)  VAPS officials stated that this field is determined and entered by the user  Crime Type—We found this field contained at least five different variations of alcohol-consumption categories, such as “entering premises under the influence” and “alcohol – under the influence ” VAPS officials stated that this field is determined and entered by the user  Final Disposition—We found this field contained at least two different variations of charge type (i e , charged, charged – Issued Ticket), six different variations of open type (for example, open/referred to Court, open/cvb), and two different variations of closed type (i e , closed, case closed)  VAPS officials stated that this field is determined and entered by the user  This data file is designed to track all allegations of misconduct and associated disciplinary actions taken against VA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 34 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Position Title—We found this field contained at least 15 different variations of Registered Nurse, such as “Registered Nurse,” “Staff RN,” and “RN ” Allegations surrounding inadequate staffing, patient care, and safety at a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) emergency room were investigated by the medical center director of the facility  The medical center director found that the inadequate patient care and safety issue was unsubstantiated based on a review of patient safety incidents for the last 6 months  The medical center director did not provide a copy of her report review to support this conclusion  She also indicated that an external consultant was hired to assess staffing issues, and found generally that improvements could be made for staffing to address surge capacity  The director stated the medical center was in the process of implementing the recommendations made by the consultant, but her response did not discuss the specific improvements planned or include the external consultant’s report  A fact-finding was performed by a panel comprised of VA Connecticut Healthcare System officials in response to alleged violations of law, gross mismanagement, and waste of funds that included the improper billing of services for a Las Vegas conference and paying contracts through a VA nonprofit corporation to handle such expenditures  The allegations specifically requested a cost-benefit analysis for the conference location  The response received from the program office stated that an outside accounting firm performs an annual financial audit of the VA nonprofit corporation and found no material issues  Neither a copy of the annual financial audit nor a cost-benefit analysis was provided in the response as support  Additionally, the response did not address allegations regarding the status of several essential positions vacated over the prior 3 years  Allegations involved time-and-attendance abuse by a physician who was accused of not responding to calls from peers or coming into the clinic, in favor of his private practice  According to the complainant, physician assistants (PA) examine the physician’s patients at the clinic for him  The medical center director, who was also named in the allegation as having received a similar complaint against the physician 2 years earlier, reviewed the case against the physician and himself  The medical center director’s response claimed that the location indicated in the allegation was not a private practice, but rather a location where the physician reviews medical records and sometimes serves as an expert witness  He did not provide evidence to support his claim  The medical center director also stated that he had not received any reports against the physician for missed calls or clinics and that PAs are expected to participate in these activities  However, he did not provide the physician’s work log, or the PA position descriptions showing that they are allowed to perform these functions autonomously  Finally, the medical center director claimed he did not recall the allegation made against the physician 2 years prior and neither formally substantiated nor disproved the current allegations against the physician  No recommendations were made  The medical center director was accused of hiring an unqualified individual to a Quality Manager position due to their romantic relationship  The response received from the human-resources consultant noted that it was unusual to find a Nurse II manager with only an associate’s degree, but was not illegal, and the employee was qualified based on prior experience  Concerns were also raised concerning the medical center director’s use of over $400 in government funds to “soundproof” the Quality Manager’s office, including having panels attached to one wall and the hollow office door replaced with a solid door  The Chief of Engineering Services was interviewed regarding the request and stated it was an odd request, and the first time he was asked to soundproof an administrative employee’s office  The response provided by the program office did not address why the director used government funds to soundproof the Quality Manager’s office  The response provided also did not address whether recommendations that the Quality Manager’s retention allowance be reviewed for compliance and that she be counseled for appropriate office dress code were implemented  The medical center director was alleged to have misrepresented a plan to track and provide mental-health services to veterans in non-VA hospitals and created a hostile work environment against African-American veterans and employees  The medical center director investigated the allegations against himself and provided a response that was eventually submitted late to the OIG  His response indicated that a review was completed and all allegations were unsubstantiated  Several documents provided with his response showed that only 12 contacts were made to veterans with mental-health care needs during the requested 24-month period, the percentage of patients experiencing wait times greater than 14 days before receiving mental-health services averaged 18 percent, and two veteran suicides occurred  The medical center director did not address allegations of creating a hostile work environment for African American veterans and employees  The medical center director improperly reannounced a vacancy in order to hire an individual with whom he allegedly had a close personal relationship to an Assistant Director position  He also requested the master key to the facility be issued to her against regulations  The allegation involving the master key was substantiated, but the Deputy Under Secretary who conducted the investigation stated that while there was no record of the key being returned, the key was returned and the general engineer brought the facility into compliance with VA regulations  Nonetheless, the Deputy Under Secretary found that a master key was issued in violation of policy, but no recommendations were made to the medical center director for corrective action  Allegations involved false patient wait-time documentation and abuse of authority  Specifically, a medical center director instructed staff to falsify patient wait times between follow-up appointments in order to meet VA’s 14-day timeliness metric  The investigation concluded that the false documentation allegation was substantiated, but attributed the cause to staff not understanding how to enter a follow-up appointment date into the system  It was also concluded that the correction of several hundred dates in the system improved the performance of the department for the national wait-time metric  However, no documentation was provided to (1) prove the medical center director had not abused his authority by instructing staff to review wait times greater than 14 days to determine how they could be reduced, and (2) support the conclusion that the original wait times were entered in error  In addition to the contact above, Dave Bruno (Assistant Director), Erica Varner (Analyst in Charge), Hiwotte Amare, Chris Cronin, Carrie Davidson, Ranya Elias, Colin Fallon, Mitch Karpman, Grant Mallie, Anna Maria Ortiz, Sabrina Streagle, Reed Van Beveren, and April Van Cleef made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The federal government owns billions of dollars of personal property—such as office furniture, scientific equipment, and industrial machinery. By law, each agency is required to follow GSA's disposal process so that an agency's unneeded property can be used by other agencies or certain non-federal entities. Since 2012, agencies have reduced their office and warehouse space due to government-wide initiatives, a reduction that in turn has required agencies to dispose of some affected personal property. GAO was asked to review how federal agencies identify and dispose of unneeded personal property. This report examines (1) how selected agencies assess whether personal property is needed and (2) how these agencies dispose of unneeded property and how, if at all, space reduction efforts have affected disposals. GAO reviewed federal statutes and regulations, and selected five agencies—EPA, Forest Service, GSA, HUD, and IRS—mainly based on space reduction results and goals. GAO reviewed these agencies' property disposal data for 2012 through 2016 and interviewed headquarters and field staff about their property management and disposal processes. The five agencies GAO reviewed—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Forest Service, General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS)—generally do not have policies or processes for identifying unneeded personal property, such as office furniture, on a proactive basis. Instead, officials from these agencies said they typically identified unneeded property as a result of a “triggering event,” such as an office space reduction. Executive agencies are required by law to continuously review property under their control to identify unneeded personal property and then dispose of it promptly. Without such policies or processes, agencies may not be routinely identifying unneeded property that could be used elsewhere, and efforts to maximize federal personal property use and minimize unnecessary storage costs may not be effective. GSA has issued regulations establishing a government-wide disposal process for unneeded personal property. However, according to GSA officials, the agency lacks the authority to promulgate regulations or formal guidance on management of in-use agency property, and there is no government-wide guidance to agencies on identifying unneeded personal property. Agencies are required to have internal control activities—such as policies and procedures—for reasonable assurance of efficient operations and minimal resource waste, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides guidance to agencies on implementing such activities. Guidance from OMB that emphasizes agencies' internal control responsibilities could help ensure that agencies are proactively and regularly identifying property that is no longer needed. The selected agencies reported little difficulty in following GSA's personal property disposal process, reporting over 37,000 items as unneeded property in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. This property was disposed of through transfers to other agencies, donations to authorized recipients, sales, or discarding. When disposing of personal property from space reduction projects at locations GAO visited, agencies also reported using GSA's process (see figure). Overall, agencies said they have not experienced major challenges with disposing of personal property from space reduction efforts. This lack of challenges could be because projects are geographically dispersed and spread over several years. OMB should provide guidance to executive agencies on managing their personal property, emphasizing that agencies' policies or processes should reflect the requirement to continuously review and identify unneeded personal property. OMB did not comment on GAO's recommendation.