prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Agencies generally acquire equipment from commercial vendors and through GSA, which contracts for the equipment from commercial vendors  In acquiring heavy equipment from a commercial vendor or GSA, agencies can purchase or lease the equipment  Generally, agencies use the term “lease” to refer to acquisitions that are time-limited and therefore distinct from purchases  The term “lease” is used to refer to both long-term and short-term leases  For example, the three agencies we reviewed in-depth use the term “rental” to refer to short-term leases of varying time periods  According to Air Force officials, they define rentals as leases that are less than 120 days while FWS and NPS officials said they generally use the term rental to refer to leases that are a year or less  For the purposes of this report, we use the term “rental” to refer to short-term leases defined as rentals by the agency and “long-term lease” to refer to a lease that is not considered a rental by the agency  (See fig  1 ) In 2013, GSA began offering heavy equipment through its Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part to eliminate ownership and maintenance cost for infrequently used heavy equipment  Under this program, agencies can request a short-term equipment rental (less than a year) from GSA, and GSA will work with a network of commercial vendors to provide the requested heavy equipment  Unlike for some other types of federal property, there are no central reporting requirements for agencies’ inventories of heavy equipment  However, each federal agency is required to maintain inventory controls for its property, which includes heavy equipment  Agencies maintain inventory data through the use of agency-specific databases, and each agency can set its own requirements for what data are required and how these data are maintained  For example, while an agency may choose to maintain data in a headquarters database, it could also choose to maintain data at the local level  As another example, an agency may decide to track and maintain data on the utilization of its heavy equipment (such as the hours used) or may choose not to have such data or require any particular utilization levels  The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) governs the acquisition process of executive branch agencies when acquiring certain goods and services, including heavy equipment  Under the FAR, agencies should consider whether to lease equipment instead of purchasing it based on several factors  Specifically, the FAR provides that agency officials should evaluate cost and other factors by conducting a “lease-versus-purchase” analysis before acquiring heavy equipment  Additionally, DOD’s regulations require its component agencies to prepare a justification supporting lease-versus-purchase decisions if the equipment is to be leased for more than 60 days  Twenty agencies reported data on their owned heavy equipment, including the (1) number, (2) types, (3) acquisition year, and (4) location of agencies’ owned heavy equipment in their inventories as of June 2017  The 20 agencies reported owning over 136,000 heavy equipment items  DOD reported owning most of this heavy equipment—over 100,000 items, about 74 percent  (See app  I for more information on agencies’ ownership of these items ) The Department of Agriculture reported owning the second highest number of heavy equipment items—almost 9,000 items, about 6 percent  (See fig  2 ) Four agencies—the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Agency for International Development—reported owning five or fewer heavy equipment items each  The 20 agencies reported owning various types of heavy equipment, such as cranes, backhoes, and road maintenance equipment in five categories: (1) construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance equipment; (2) airfield-specialized trucks and trailers; (3) self-propelled warehouse trucks and tractors; (4) tractors; and (5) soil preparation and harvesting equipment  Thirty-eight percent (almost 52,000 items) were in the construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance category (see fig  3)  Fifteen of the 20 agencies reported owning at least some items in this category  Twenty-four percent (over 33,000 items) were in the airfield- specialized trucks and trailers category, generally used to service and re-position aircraft on runways  DOD reported owning 99 percent (over 32,000) of these items, while 9 other agencies, including the Department of Labor and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, reported owning the other one percent (317 items)  Twenty-two percent (over 29,000 items) were in the self-propelled warehouse trucks and tractors category, which includes equipment such as forklift trucks  All 20 agencies reported owning at least one item in this category, and five agencies—the Agency for International Development, Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Office of Personnel Management—reported owning only items in this category  (For additional information on agencies’ ownership of heavy equipment in various categories, see app  I ) The twenty agencies reported acquiring their owned heavy equipment between 1944 and 2017, with an average of about 13 years since acquisition (see fig  4)  One heavy equipment manager we interviewed reported that a dump truck can last 10 to 15 years, whereas other types of equipment can last for decades if regularly used and well-maintained  The 20 agencies reported that over 117,000 heavy equipment items (86 percent) were located within the United States or its territories  Of these, about one-fifth (over 26,000) were located in California and Virginia, the two states with the most heavy equipment (see fig  5)  Of the equipment located outside of the United States and its territories, 94 percent was owned by the Department of Defense  The rest was owned by the Department of State (714 items in 141 countries from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe) and the National Science Foundation (237 items in areas such as Antarctica)  The twenty agencies reported spending over $7 4 billion in 2016 dollars to acquire the heavy equipment they own (see table 1)  However, actual spending was higher because this inflation-adjusted figure excludes over 37,000 heavy equipment items for which the agencies did not report acquisition cost or acquisition year, or both  Without this information, we could not determine the inflation-adjusted cost and therefore did not include the cost of these items in our calculation  The Army owns almost all of these items, having not reported acquisition cost or acquisition year, or both, for 36,589 heavy equipment items because, according to Army officials, the data were not available centrally but may have been available at individual Army units and would have been resource- intensive to obtain  The heavy equipment items reported by the 20 agencies ranged in acquisition cost from zero dollars to over $2 million in 2016 dollars, with an average acquisition cost in 2016 dollars of about $78,000, excluding assets with a reported acquisition cost of $0  Of the items which we adjusted to 2016 dollars and for which non-zero acquisition costs were provided: 94 percent cost less than $250,000 and accounted for 57 percent of the total adjusted acquisition costs (See fig  6 ) 6 percent of items cost more than $250,000 and accounted for 43 percent of the adjusted acquisition costs  (See fig  6 ) High-cost items included a $779,000 hydraulic crane acquired by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1997 ($1 2 million in 2016 dollars), a $1 4 million ultra-deep drilling simulator acquired by the Department of Energy in 2009 ($1 6 million in 2016 dollars), and several $2 2 million well-drilling machines acquired by the Air Force in 2013 ($2 3 million in 2016 dollars)  In calendar years 2012 through 2016, the Air Force, FWS, and NPS purchased almost 3,500 pieces of heavy equipment through GSA and private vendors at a total cost of about $360 million to support mission needs  (See table 2 ) These agencies also spent over $5 million on long- term leases and rentals during this time period  The Air Force spent over $300 million to purchase over 2,600 heavy equipment assets in calendar years 2012 through 2016 that were used to support and maintain its bases globally  For example, according to Air Force officials, heavy equipment is often used to maintain runways and service and reposition aircraft on runways  While the majority of Air Force heavy equipment purchased in this time period is located in the United States, 41 percent of this heavy equipment is located outside the United States and its territories in 17 foreign countries to support global military bases  The Air Force could not provide complete information on its heavy equipment leases for fiscal years 2012 through 2016  Specifically, the Air Force provided data on 33 commercial heavy equipment leases that were ongoing as of August 2017 but could not provide cost data for these leases because this information is not tracked centrally  Additionally, the Air Force could not provide any data on leases that occurred previously because, according to Air Force officials, lease records are removed from the Air Force database upon termination of the lease  Officials said that rentals are generally handled locally and obtaining complete data would require a data call to over 300 base contracting offices  Air Force officials stated that rentals are generally used in unique situations involving short- term needs such as responding to natural disasters  For example, following Hurricane Sandy, staff at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia used rental equipment to clean up and repair the base  Although Air Force did not provide complete information on rentals, data we obtained from GSA’s Short-Term Rental program indicated that Air Force rented heavy equipment in 46 transactions not reflected in the Air Force data we received totaling over $3 7 million since GSA began offering heavy equipment through its Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program in 2013  FWS spent over $32 million to purchase 348 heavy equipment assets from calendar years 2012 through 2016  FWS used its heavy equipment to maintain refuge areas throughout the United States and its territories, including maintaining roads and nature trails  FWS also used heavy equipment to respond to inclement weather and natural disasters  Most of the heavy equipment items purchased by FWS were in the construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance equipment category and include items such as excavators, which were used for moving soil, supplies, and other resources  FWS officials reported that they did not have any long-term leases for any heavy equipment in fiscal years 2012 through 2016 because they encourage equipment sharing and rentals to avoid long-term leases whenever possible  FWS officials provided data on 228 rentals for this time period with a total cost of over $1 million  Information regarding these rentals is contained in an Interior-wide property management system, the Financial Business Management System (FBMS)  FWS officials told us that they have not rented heavy equipment through GSA’s program because they have found lower prices through local equipment rental companies  NPS spent over $27 million to purchase 471 heavy equipment assets from calendar years 2012 through 2016  NPS uses heavy equipment— located throughout the United States and its territories—to maintain national parks and respond to inclement weather and natural disasters  For example, NPS used heavy equipment such as dump trucks, snow plows, road graders, and wheel loaders to clear and salt the George Washington Memorial Parkway in Washington, D C , following snow and ice storms  Most of the heavy equipment items purchased by NPS were in the construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance equipment category and include items such as excavators, which are used for moving soil, supplies, and other resources  NPS reported spending about $360,000 on 230 long-term leases and rentals in fiscal years 2012 through 2016, not including rentals through GSA’s Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program  As with FWS, NPS leases and rentals are contained in FBMS, which is Interior’s property management system  Data we obtained from GSA’s Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program indicated that NPS rented heavy equipment in 26 transactions totaling over $200,000 since GSA began offering heavy equipment through its Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program in 2013, for a potential total cost of over $560,000 for these long-term leases and rentals  As mentioned earlier, the FAR provides that executive branch agencies seeking to acquire equipment should consider whether it is more economical to lease equipment rather than purchase it and identifies factors agencies should consider in this analysis, such as estimated length of the period that the equipment is to be used, the extent of use in that time period, and maintenance costs  This analysis is commonly referred to as a lease-versus-purchase analysis  While the FAR does not specifically require that agencies document their lease-versus-purchase analyses, according to federal internal control standards, management should clearly document all transactions and other significant events in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination and also communicate quality information to enable staff to complete their responsibilities  As discussed below, we found that most acquisitions we reviewed from FWS, NPS, and the Air Force did not contain any documentation of a lease-versus-purchase analysis  Specifically, officials were unable to provide documentation of a lease-versus-purchase analysis for six of the eight acquisitions we reviewed  FWS officials were able to provide documentation for the other two  Officials told us that a lease-versus- purchase analysis was not conducted for five of the six acquisitions and did not know if such analysis was conducted for the other acquisition  According to agency officials, the main reason why analyses were not conducted or documented for these six acquisitions is that the circumstances in which such analyses were to be performed or documented were not always clear to FWS, NPS, and Air Force officials  In addition to the FAR, Interior has agency guidance stating that bureaus should conduct and document lease-versus-purchase analyses  This July 2013 guidance—that FWS and NPS are to follow—states that requesters of equipment valued at $15,000 or greater should perform a lease-versus- purchase analysis when requesting heavy equipment  According to the guidance, this analysis should address criteria in the FAR and include a discussion of the financial and operating advantages of alternate approaches that would help contracting officials determine the final appropriate acquisition method  At the time the guidance was issued, Interior also provided a lease-versus-purchase analysis tool to aid officials in conducting this analysis  Additionally, in April 2016, Interior issued a policy to implement the July 2013 guidance  The 2016 policy clarifies that program offices are required to complete Interior’s lease-versus-purchase analysis tool and provide the completed analysis to the relevant contracting officer  Within Interior, bureaus are responsible for ensuring that procurement requirements are met, including the requirements and directives outlined in Interior’s 2013 guidance and 2016 policy on lease-versus-purchase analyses, according to agency officials  Within FWS, local procurement specialists prepare procurement requests and ensure that procurement requirements are met and that all viable options have been considered  Regional equipment managers review these procurement requests, decide whether to purchase or lease the requested equipment, and prepare the lease-versus-purchase analysis tool if the procurement specialist has indicated that it is required  Within NPS, local procurement specialists are responsible for ensuring that all procurements adhere to relevant requirements and directives, including documenting the lease- versus-purchase analysis  Of the three FWS heavy equipment acquisitions we reviewed for which the 2013 Interior guidance was applicable, one included a completed lease-versus-purchase analysis tool; one documented the rationale for purchasing rather than leasing, although it did not include Interior’s lease- versus-purchase analysis tool; and one did not include any documentation related to a lease-versus-purchase analysis  (See table 3 ) Regarding the acquisition for which no documentation of a lease-versus- purchase analysis was provided—a 12-month lease of an excavator and associated labor costs for over $19,000—FWS officials initially told us that a lease-versus-purchase analysis was not required because the equipment lease was less than $15,000, and Interior’s guidance required a lease-versus-purchase analysis for procurements of equipment valued at $15,000 or greater  However, we found the guidance did not specify whether the $15,000 threshold includes the cost of labor  We also found that Interior’s guidance did not specify if a lease-versus-purchase analysis was required if the total cost of a rental is less than the purchase price  FWS officials acknowledged that Interior guidance is not clear and that it would be helpful for Interior to clarify whether these leases require a lease-versus-purchase analysis  NPS officials were unable to provide documentation of a lease-versus- purchase analysis for the single heavy equipment acquisition we reviewed—the purchase of a wheeled tractor in 2015 for $43,177  According to these officials, they could not do so because of personnel turnover in the contracting office that would have documented the analysis  In addition, they told us that they believe that such analyses are not always completed for heavy equipment acquisitions because responsibility for completing these analyses is unclear  Specifically, they told us that it was unclear whether the responsibility lies with the official requesting the equipment, the contracting personnel who facilitate the acquisition, or the property personnel who manage inventory data  However, when we discussed our findings with Interior and NPS officials, NPS officials were made aware of the 2016 Interior policy that specifically requires program offices—the officials requesting the equipment—to complete the lease-versus-purchase analysis and provide documentation of this analysis to the contracting officer  As a result, NPS officials told us at the end of our review that program office officials will now be required to complete the lease-versus-purchase analysis tool and document this analysis  According to Air Force officials responsible for managing heavy equipment, financial or budget personnel at individual bases are responsible for conducting lease-versus-purchase analyses, also called economic analyses, to support purchase and lease requests  Air Force fleet officials told us that they then review these requests from a fleet perspective, considering factors such as whether the cost information provided in the request is from a reputable source, expected maintenance costs, and whether a requesting base has the capability to maintain the requested equipment  However, they said they do not check to ensure that a lease-versus-purchase analysis was completed or review the analysis  Equipment rentals can be approved at individual bases  In our review of four Air Force heavy equipment acquisitions, we found no instances in which Air Force officials documented a lease-versus- purchase analysis (see table 4)  For the acquisitions that we reviewed, Air Force officials told us they did not believe a lease-versus-purchase analysis was required because the new equipment was either replacing old equipment that was previously approved or could be deployed  Accordingly, the Air Force purchased two forklifts in 2013 without conducting lease-versus-purchase analyses because the forklifts were replacing old forklifts that were authorized in 1997 and 2005  Furthermore, Air Force officials told us that both of these forklifts could be deployed and indicated that lease-versus-purchase analyses are not required for deployable equipment  However, the Air Force does not have guidance that describes the circumstances that require either a lease-versus-purchase analysis or documentation of the rationale for not completing such analysis  Although we identified several instances in which officials in the three selected agencies did not document lease-versus-purchase analyses, officials from these agencies stated that they consider mission needs and equipment availability, among other factors, when making these decisions  For example, Air Force officials told us following Hurricane Sandy, staff at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia used rental equipment to clean and repair the base because the equipment was needed immediately to ensure the base could meet its mission  Moreover, availability of heavy equipment for lease or rental, which can be affected by factors such as geography and competition for equipment, is a key consideration  For example, FWS officials told us that the specialized heavy equipment sometimes needed may not be available for long-term lease or rent in remote areas such as Alaska and the Midway Islands, so the agency purchases the equipment  In addition, some agency officials told us that they may purchase heavy equipment even if that equipment is needed only sporadically if there is likely to be high demand for rental equipment  For example, following inclement weather or a natural disaster, demand for certain heavy equipment rentals can be high and equipment may not be available to rent when it is needed  While we recognize that mission needs and other factors are important considerations, without greater clarity regarding when to conduct or document lease-versus-purchase analyses, officials at FWS, NPS, and Air Force may not be conducting such analyses when appropriate and may not always make the best acquisition decisions  These agencies could be overspending on leased equipment that would be more cost- effective if purchased or overspending to purchase equipment when it would be more cost-effective to lease or rent  Moreover, without documenting decisions on whether to purchase or lease equipment, they lack information that could be used to inform future acquisition decisions for similar types of equipment or projects  Air Force guidance requires that fleet managers collect utilization data for both vehicles and heavy equipment items, such as the number of hours used, miles traveled, and maintenance costs  The Air Force provided us with utilization data for over 18,000 heavy equipment items and uses such data to inform periodic base validations  Specifically, Air Force officials said that every 3 to 5 years each Air Force base reviews the on- base equipment to ensure that the installation has the appropriate heavy equipment to complete its mission and reviews utilization data to identify items that are underutilized  If heavy equipment is considered underutilized, the equipment is relocated—either moved to another location or sent to the Defense Logistics Agency for reuse or transfer to another agency  According to Air Force officials the Air Force has relocated over 700 heavy equipment items based on the results of the validation process and other factors such as replacing older items and agency needs since 2014  Similarly, FWS guidance for managing heavy equipment utilization sets forth minimum utilization hours for certain types of heavy equipment and describes requirements for reporting utilization data  FWS provided us with utilization data on over 3,000 heavy equipment items  According to officials, condition assessments of heavy equipment are required by FWS guidance every 3 to 5 years  According to FWS officials, condition assessments inform regional-level decision making about whether to move equipment to another FWS location or dispose of the equipment  In contrast, NPS does not require the collection of utilization data to evaluate heavy equipment use and does not have guidance for managing heavy equipment utilization  However, NPS officials told us that they recognize the need for such guidance  NPS officials shared with us draft guidance that they have developed, which would require collection of utilization data for heavy equipment such as hours or days of usage each month  According to NPS officials, they plan to send the guidance to the NPS policy office for final review in March 2018  Until this guidance is completed and published, NPS is taking interim actions to manage the utilization of its heavy equipment  For example, NPS officials stated that they have asked NPS locations to collect and post monthly utilization data, discussed the collection of utilization data at fleet meetings, and distributed job aids to support this effort  During the course of our review, NPS officials provided us with some utilization data for about 1,400 of the more than 2,400 NPS heavy equipment items  Specifically, for the 1,459 heavy equipment items for which NPS provided utilization data, 541 items had utilization data for each month  For the remaining 918 items, utilization data were reported for some, but not all months  The federal government has spent billions of dollars to acquire heavy equipment  There is no requirement that agencies report on the inventory of this equipment, as there is no standard definition of heavy equipment  When deciding how to acquire this equipment, agencies’ should conduct a lease-versus-purchase analysis as provided in the FAR, which is a critical mechanism to ensure agencies are acquiring the equipment in the most cost-effective manner  Because FWS, NPS and the Air Force were unclear when such an analysis was required, they did not consistently conduct or document analyses of whether it was more economical to purchase or lease heavy equipment  In the absence of clarity on the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchase analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented, the agencies may not be spending funds on heavy equipment cost- effectively  We are making two recommendations—one to the Air Force and one to the Department of the Interior  The Secretary of the Air Force should develop guidance to clarify the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchase analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of the Interior should further clarify in guidance the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchase analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Justice, Labor, State, and Veterans Affairs; General Services Administration; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; National Science Foundation; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Personnel Management; and U S  Agency for International Development  The departments of Agriculture, Energy, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, State and Veterans Affairs, as well as the General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management; and U S  Agency for International Development did not have comments  The Department of Labor provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  In written comments, reproduced in appendix III, the Department of Defense stated that it concurred with our recommendation and plans to issue a bulletin to Air Force contracting officials  In written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, the Department of the Interior stated that it concurred with our recommendation and plans to implement it  If you or members of your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or RectanusL@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V  Specialized Trucks and Trailers 37   Self-Propelled Warehouse Trucks and Tractors 1,733 3                                       Specialized Trucks and Trailers 7   Self-Propelled Warehouse Trucks and Tractors 2,925 134                                     Specialized Trucks and Trailers   Self-Propelled Warehouse Trucks and Tractors 146             7       - 109       Self-Propelled Warehouse Trucks and Tractors 575 64 40                       4                   Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Personnel Management Social Security Administration United States Agency for International Development Grand Total         This report addresses: (1) the number, type, and cost of heavy equipment items that are owned by the 24 CFO Act agencies; (2) the heavy equipment items selected agencies have recently acquired and how selected agencies decided to purchase or lease this equipment; and (3) how selected agencies manage the utilization of their heavy equipment  To identify the number, type, and cost of heavy equipment owned by federal agencies, we first interviewed officials at the General Services Administration to determine whether there were government-wide reporting requirements for owned heavy equipment and learned that there are no such requirements  We then obtained and analyzed data on agencies’ spending on equipment purchases and leases from the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS-NG), which contains government-wide data on agencies’ contracts  However, in reviewing the data available and identifying issues with the reliability of the data, we determined that data on contracts would not be sufficient to answer the question of what heavy equipment the 24 CFO Act agencies own  We therefore conducted a data collection effort to obtain heavy equipment inventory information from the 24 CFO Act agencies, which are the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs; Environmental Protection Agency; General Services Administration; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; National Science Foundation; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Personnel Management; Small Business Administration; Social Security Administration; and Agency for International Development  Because there is no generally accepted definition of heavy equipment, we identified 12 federal supply classes in which the majority of items are self- propelled equipment but not passenger vehicles or items that are specific to combat and tactical purposes, as these items are generally not considered to be heavy equipment  (See table 5 ) We then vetted the appropriateness of these selected supply classes with Interior, FWS, NPS, and Air Force agency officials, as well as with representatives from a fleet management consultancy and a rental company, and they generally agreed that items in selected federal supply classes are considered heavy equipment  Federal supply classes are used in FPDS- NG and are widely used in agencies’ inventory systems  Overall, about 90 percent of the heavy equipment items that agencies reported were assigned a federal supply class in the agency’s inventory data  In discussing heavy equipment categories in the report, we use the category titles below  To identify points of contact at the 24 CFO Act agencies, we obtained GSA’s list of contact information for agencies’ national utilization officers, who are agency property officers who coordinate with GSA  As a preliminary step, we contacted these individuals at each of the 24 CFO Act agencies and asked them to either confirm that they were the appropriate contacts or provide contact information for the appropriate contact and to inform us if they do not own heavy equipment  Officials at 4 agencies—Department of Education, Department of the Treasury, General Services Administration, and Small Business Administration— indicated that the agency did not own any items in the relevant federal supply classes  Officials at 16 of these agencies indicated that they would be able to respond on a departmental level because the relevant inventory data are maintained centrally, while officials at 4 agencies indicated that we would need to obtain responses from officials at some other level because the relevant inventory data are not maintained centrally  (See table 7 for a list of organizations within the 20 CFO Act agencies that indicated they own relevant equipment and responded to our data collection effort ) After identifying contacts responsible for agencies’ heavy-equipment inventory data, we prepared data collection instruments for requesting information on heavy equipment and tested these documents with representatives from 4 of the 20 CFO Act agencies that indicated they own heavy equipment to ensure that the documents were clear and logical and that respondents would be able to provide the requested data and answer the questions without undue burden  These agency representatives were selected to provide a variety of spending on federal supply group 38 equipment as reported in FPDS-NG, civilian and military agencies, and different levels at which the agency would be responding to the data collection effort (e g , at the departmental level or at a sub- departmental level)  Our data collection instrument requested the following data on respondent organizations’ owned assets in 12 federal supply classes as of June 2017: Respondents provided data on original acquisition costs in nominal terms, with some acquisitions occurring over 50 years ago  In order to provide a fixed point of reference for appropriate comparison, we present in our report inflation-adjusted acquisition costs using calendar year 2016 as the reference  To adjust these dollar amounts for inflation, we used the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Producer Price Index by Commodity for Machinery and Equipment: Construction Machinery and Equipment (WPU112), compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of St  Louis  We conducted the data collection effort from July 2017 through October 2017 and received responses from all 20 agencies that indicated they own heavy equipment  In order to assess the reliability of agencies’ reported data, we collected and reviewed agencies’ responses regarding descriptions of their inventory systems, frequency of data entry, agency uses of the data, and agencies’ opinions on potential limitations of the use of their data in our analysis  We conducted some data cleaning, which included examining the data for obvious errors and eliminating outliers  We did not verify the data or responses received; the results of our data collection effort are used only for descriptive purposes and are not generalizable beyond the 24 CFO Act agencies  Based on the steps we took, we found these data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes  To determine the heavy equipment items that selected agencies recently acquired and how these agencies decided whether to purchase or lease this equipment, we first used data from the FPDS-NG to identify agencies that appeared to have the highest obligations for construction or heavy equipment, or both, and used this information, along with other factors, to select DOD and Interior  At the time, in the absence of a generally accepted definition of heavy equipment, we reviewed data related to federal supply group 38—construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance equipment—because (1) we had not yet defined heavy equipment for the purposes of our review; (2) agency officials had told us that most of what could be considered heavy equipment was in this federal supply group; and (3) our analysis of data from usaspending gov showed that about 80 percent of spending on items that may be considered heavy equipment were in this federal supply group  In meeting with officials at these departments, we learned that agencies within each department manage heavy equipment independently, so we requested current inventory data for Interior bureaus and the DOD military departments and selected three agencies that had among the largest inventories of construction and/or heavy equipment at the time, among other criteria: the U S  Air Force (Air Force); the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); and the National Park Service (NPS)  We then used information from our data collection effort—which included the number, type, cost, acquisition year and other data elements—to determine heavy equipment items that these agencies acquired during 2012 through 2016  We interviewed agency officials to determine what lease data were available from the three selected agencies  We assessed the reliability of these data with agency official interviews and reviewed the data for completeness and potential outliers  We determined that the data provided were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of documenting leased and rental heavy equipment  We also obtained data from GSA’s Short- Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program for August 2012, when the first item was rented under this program, to February 2017, when GSA provided the data  We used these data to identify selected agencies’ rentals of heavy equipment through GSA’s Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program and associated costs  We interviewed officials from GSA’s Short-Term Rental program to discuss the program history as well as the reliability of their data on these rented heavy equipment items  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes  To determine how the three selected agencies decide whether to purchase or lease heavy equipment, we interviewed fleet and property managers at these selected agencies and asked them to describe their process for making these decisions as well as to identify relevant federal and agency regulations and guidance  We reviewed relevant federal and agency regulations and guidance regarding how agencies should make these decisions, including: Federal Acquisition Regulation, Office of Management Budget’s A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit- Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Air Force Manual 65-506, Air Force Guidance Memorandum to Air Force Instruction 65-501, and Interior’s Guidance On Lease Versus Purchase Analysis and Capital Lease Determination for Equipment Leases  We also reviewed the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government for guidance on documentation as well as past GAO work that reviewed agencies’ lease-versus-purchase analyses  To determine whether the three selected federal agencies documented lease-versus-purchase decisions for selected acquisitions and adhered to relevant agency guidance, we selected and reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 10 heavy equipment acquisitions—two purchases each from the Air Force, FWS, and NPS, and two leases each from the Air Force and FWS  Specifically, we used inventory data obtained through our data collection effort, described above, to randomly select two heavy equipment purchases from each selected agency using the following criteria: calendar years 2012 through 2016; the two federal supply classes most prevalent in each selected agency’s heavy equipment inventory, as determined by the data collection effort described above; and for NPS and FWS, acquisition costs of over $15,000  In addition, we used lease data provided by the Air Force and FWS to randomly selected two heavy equipment leases per agency  Because NPS could not provide data on heavy equipment leases, we did not select or review any NPS lease decisions  To select the Air Force and FWS leases we used the following criteria: fiscal years 2012 through 2016; for the Air Force, which included federal supply classes in the lease data provided, the two federal supply classes most prevalent in the lease data and for FWS, which did not include federal supply class in the lease data provided, the two federal supply classes most prevalent in the purchase data; and for FWS, leases over $15,000  After selecting these acquisitions, we determined that one FWS lease and one NPS purchase we selected pre-dated Interior’s 2013 guidance on lease-versus-purchase analysis and excluded these acquisitions from our analysis for a total of eight acquisitions  In reviewing agencies’ documentation related to these acquisitions, we developed a data collection instrument to assess the extent to which agencies documented lease-versus-purchase analyses and, in the case of FWS and NPS, adhered to relevant Interior guidance  We supplemented our review of these acquisition decisions with additional information by interviewing officials at the three selected agencies and requesting additional information to understand specific circumstances surrounding each procurement  Our findings are not generalizable across the federal government or within each selected department  To determine how selected agencies manage heavy equipment utilization, we interviewed officials at the three selected agencies to identify departmental and agency-specific guidance and policies and to determine whether utilization requirements exist  We reviewed guidance identified by these officials, including Interior and Air Force vehicle guidance, both of which apply to heavy equipment, and FWS’s Heavy Equipment Utilization and Replacement Handbook  We also compared their practices to relevant Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  For the selected agencies with guidance for managing heavy equipment—Air Force and FWS—we reviewed the guidance to determine if and how selected agencies measured and documented heavy equipment utilization  For example, we reviewed whether selected agencies developed reports for managing heavy equipment utilization such as Air Force validation reports and FWS conditional assessment reports  We also reviewed Air Force, FWS, and NPS utilization data for heavy equipment but we did not independently calculate or verify the utilization rate for individual heavy equipment items because each heavy equipment item (backhoe, forklift, tractor, etc ,) has different utilization requirements depending on various factors such as the brand, model, or age of equipment  However, we did request information about agency procedures to develop and verify utilization rates  We assessed the reliability of the utilization data with agency official interviews and a review of the data for completeness and potential outliers  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing evidence of utilization data collection for heavy equipment assets  We also visited the NPS George Washington Memorial Parkway to interview equipment maintenance officials regarding the procurement and management of heavy equipment and to document photos of heavy equipment  We selected this site because of its range of heavy equipment and close proximity to the Capital region  We conducted this performance audit from October 2016 to February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the individual named above, John W  Shumann (Assistant Director), Rebecca Rygg (Analyst in Charge), Nelsie Alcoser, Melissa Bodeau, Terence Lam, Ying Long, Josh Ormond, Kelly Rubin, Crystal Wesco, and Elizabeth Wood made key contributions to this report 


Report 2: Requirements for military awards and decorations can change over time  New events and changes in military, political, or social conditions can generate debate over who is eligible for various military awards  These changes tend to be controversial, especially with veterans groups  Congress has considered several pieces of legislation that would change who would be eligible to receive the Purple Heart, and under what conditions  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have greatly increased the number of servicemembers receiving the Purple Heart award as well as the potential conditions under which they receive the award  Increasingly acknowledged conditions, such as traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as well as accidents and other events while deployed, bring up new questions as to when a servicemember deserves a Purple Heart  The July 17, 2015, shooting of servicemembers at a Marine recruiting office and a naval reserve center in Chattanooga, TN, again prompted questions about applying the Purple Heart to terrorist attacks versus criminal acts  Veterans groups often voice their views when Congress or the President proposes making changes to expand eligibility for the Purple Heart  These groups argue, for example, that a servicemember who acquires PTSD may not always deserve the same recognition as a servicemember killed or wounded in direct combat, while others contend that these medical conditions can debilitate servicemembers just as much as physical injuries and can have lasting effects on servicemembers' lives  Determining which actions and events make a servicemember qualified for receiving a Purple Heart, and whether expanding eligibility does a disservice to those who have already earned the award, are contentious elements of this debate  Although Congress has traditionally left many military award requirements to the executive branch, the Constitution does allow Congress to act in this area, and events have prompted changes regarding eligibility for the Purple Heart  On December 19, 2014, Congress passed The Carl Levin and Howard P  "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015  Section 571 of the NDAA for FY2015 expanded eligibility by redefining what should be considered an attack by a "foreign terrorist organization" for purposes of determining eligibility for the Purple Heart  As a result, servicemembers wounded and killed in the 2009 shootings in Little Rock, AR, and at Fort Hood, TX, were awarded Purple Hearts in 2015  Congressional offices often receive questions about Purple Heart eligibility from constituents, especially when eligibility rules change  The number of these questions is likely to increase as servicemembers return from conflicts around the world and if eligibility requirements are again changed  This report will examine the history of the Purple Heart and changes in eligibility over time as well as current issues facing Congress  In 1782, George Washington created the Badge of Military Merit to reward "any singularly meritorious action" displayed by a soldier, noncommissioned officer, or officer in the Continental Army  This award was intended to encourage gallantry and fidelity among soldiers, and would later become known as the Purple Heart  The Badge of Military Merit was designed as a purple heart of cloth edged with a narrow lace  Records are incomplete and researchers debate how many soldiers received this award  According to Military Order of the Purple Heart, three soldiers from Connecticut were the first to receive the Badge of Military Merit during the American Revolutionary War  All three were noncommissioned officers and the only recipients who received the award from General Washington  The soldiers were Sergeant William Brown, 5 th Connecticut Regiment of the Connecticut Line on May 3, 1783; Sergeant Elijah Churchill, 2 nd Continental Light Dragoons on May 3, 1783; and Sergeant Daniel Bissell, 2 nd Connecticut Regiment of the Connecticut Line, on June 10, 1783  However, the Badge of Military Merit fell into disuse shortly after its conception  The Badge of Military Merit was not seriously considered again until General Douglas MacArthur (then Army Chief of Staff) revived the award on February 22, 1932, the 200 th anniversary of George Washington's birth  This award, renamed the "Purple Heart," was redesigned to its modern appearance: a purple heart-shaped medal with bronze border and George Washington's coat of arms between two green spray leaves  See Figure 1   General MacArthur also redefined the eligibility requirements to those who received Meritorious Service Citation certificates from World War I or those authorized to wear wound chevrons by Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-22, Military Awards   It was at this point that the Purple Heart became focused on soldiers killed and wounded in combat, rather than "any singularly meritorious act " In 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt extended the Purple Heart award, which to this point was exclusively an Army award, to Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard members serving in World War II  In 1952, President Truman retroactively awarded Purple Hearts to personnel in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard that qualified after April 5, 1917, thus including World War I veterans of all services  From 1962 until 1998, eligibility for the Purple Hearts was changed on several occasions  President Kennedy authorized Purple Hearts to all servicemembers, and civilians serving with the Armed Forces, who were engaged in armed conflict against an opposing military or hostile foreign force  This expansion was written to permit U S  servicemembers, and the civilians that accompanied them, who were killed or wounded in Vietnam to receive the Purple Heart, as many of those servicemembers were officially considered advisors to the Republic of Vietnam, rather than combatants  Purple Heart eligibility was expanded again by President Reagan to include military personnel and government civilians killed or wounded in international terrorist attacks after March 28, 1973, or those serving in peacekeeping operations outside of the United States  This expansion was in response to increased terrorist attacks against U S  servicemembers abroad, namely the Marine Corps Barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983  The NDAA for Fiscal Year 1996 expanded eligibility to prisoners of war injured or wounded in captivity prior to 1962, a group of servicemembers previously not covered for Purple Heart eligibility by President Kennedy's executive order  In 1997, President Clinton signed the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1998, which limited future awards of the Purple Heart to military personnel  It has since remained a military-only award  The Department of Defense does not maintain a record of the number of Purple Heart recipients  However, some military historians estimated more than 1 million Purple Hearts have been awarded mostly to soldiers since 1932  Likewise, the National Purple Heart Hall of Honor estimates 1 8 million Purple Hearts have been awarded since the medal was established by the Army in 1932  During the 115 th Congress (2017-2018), H R  7097 was introduced as the "Find our Hearts Act " It would have amended Title 10, United States Code, to require the establishment of a searchable database containing the names and citations of members of the Armed Forces who have been awarded the Purple Heart  H R  7097 was referred to the House Armed Services Committee but saw no further action  See Table 1 for current Purple Heart legislation  Currently, the Purple Heart is authorized for any member of the U S  Armed Forces who has been wounded or died from wounds sustained under one of the following conditions: (1) In accordance with E O  11016, subject to the provisions of Sections 1129, 1129a, and 1131 of Title 10, U S C , and P L  104-106 , the Secretary of a Military Department, will, in the name of the President of the United States, award the PH, with suitable ribbons and appurtenances, to any Service member under the jurisdiction of that Department who, after April 5, 1917, has been wounded, killed, or who has died or may hereafter die of wounds received under any of the following circumstances: (a) In action against an opposing armed force of a foreign country in which U S  Armed Forces are or have been engaged  (b) In any action with an opposing armed force of a foreign country in which the Military Services are or have been engaged  (c) While serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party  (d) As a result of an act of any such enemy or opposing armed forces  (e) As the result of an act of any hostile foreign force  (f) After March 28, 1973, as a result of an international terrorist attack against the United States or a foreign nation friendly to the United States, recognized as such an attack for purposes of award of the PH by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned, or jointly by the Secretaries of the Military Departments concerned if members from more than one Military Department are wounded in the attack  The Secretary of the Military Department concerned shall notify the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness USD(P&R) prior to awarding the PH for an international terrorist attack that occurs in the United States or its territories  (g) After March 28, 1973, as a result of military operations while serving outside the territory of the United States as part of a peacekeeping force  (h) On or after December 7, 1941, pursuant to Section 1129 of Title 10, U S C , a service member who is killed or wounded in action as the result of action by friendly weapon fire while directly engaged in combat, other than as a result of an act of an enemy of the United States, unless (in the case of a wound) the wound is the result of willful misconduct of the member  (i) Before April 25, 1962, pursuant to Section 521 of P L  104-106 which held as a prisoner of war (POW), or while being taken captive in the same manner as a former POW who is wounded on or after that date while held as a POW  A person will be considered to be a former POW if the person is eligible for the POW Medal under Section 1128 of Title 10, U S C  (j) On or after December 7, 1941, to a Service member who is killed or dies while in captivity as a prisoner of war (POW) under circumstances establishing eligibility for the POW medal pursuant to section 1128 of Title 10, U S C , and Volume 2 of DoD Manual 1348 33, Manual of Military Decorations and Awards , unless compelling evidence is presented that shows that the member's death was not the result of enemy action  (k) After September 11, 2001, pursuant to section 1129a of Title 10, U S C , to a Service member on active duty who is killed or wounded in an attack by a foreign terrorist organizations in circumstances where the death or wound is the result of an attack targeted on the member due to such member's status as a member of the armed forces  An attack by an individual or entity shall be considered to be a foreign terrorist attack if the individual or entity was in communication with the foreign terrorist organization before the attack and the attack was inspired or motivated by the foreign terrorist organization  An award is not authorized if the death or wound was the result of the willful misconduct of the Service member  To assist in making a PH determination pursuant to section 1129a of Title 10, U S C , the Military Department Secretary concerned may request an intelligence assessment from the Defense Intelligence Agencies' Defense Combating Terrorism Center (DCTC)  The DCTC assessment of potential foreign terrorist attacks by an individual or entity will assess whether the individual or entity was in communication with the foreign terrorist organization before the attack, and if the attack was inspired or motivated by the foreign terrorist organization  The assessment shall include supporting citations and rationale  (2) A wound for which the award is made must have been of such severity that it required treatment, not just examination, by a military medical officer  (a) Treatment must be noted in the Servicemember's medical record  (b) Award may be made of wounds treated by a medical professional other than a medical officer provided a medical officer issues a statement in the Service member's medical record that the extent of the wounds were such that the wounds would have required treatment from a medical officer if one had one been available to treat the wounds  (3) After May 17, 1998, pursuant to Section 1131 of Title 10, U S C , the PH may only be awarded to a person who is a Service member at the time the person is killed or wounded under circumstances otherwise qualifying that person for award of the PH  Before this date, the Secretary of the Military Department concerned was authorized to award the PH to U S  civilian nationals who were serving under competent authority in any capacity with the armed forces of that department  For deceased servicemembers, the Purple Heart may be given to the representatives of the deceased as the individual Service Secretary considers appropriate  Servicemembers can be awarded multiple Purple Hearts for separate incidents  The servicemember receives the Purple Heart medal for the first award  Subsequent awards are indicated with oak leaf clusters or 5/16 inch service stars, depending on the rules of the recipient's service  Purple Hearts may not be awarded to foreign military personnel  Although the decision to award medals and other military decorations traditionally rests with the executive branch, Congress has been expanding its role in this area in recent decades, exercising its constitutional power "To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces " Previously, Congress took the lead and adjusted Purple Heart eligibility in both the NDAA for FY1996 and the NDAA for FY1998  See Appendix A   In response to some mass shootings in recent years, Congress passed a provision in the NDAA for FY2015 that expanded the Purple Heart's eligibility requirements  On June 1, 2009, a man who was allegedly angry over the killing of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan opened fire on two U S  Army soldiers near a recruiting station in Little Rock, AR, killing one and wounding the other  On November 5, 2009, an Army major opened fire at Ft  Hood, TX, killing 13 and wounding 29, many of them servicemembers  Both men were charged with murder and other crimes  Federal and local law enforcement authorities initially considered these acts to be crimes, and the Defense Department reports the Fort Hood shooting as "workplace violence," not acts perpetrated by an enemy or hostile force, which made them ineligible for the Purple Heart  However, some believed these acts should be viewed as acts of war or domestic terrorism because they involved Muslim perpetrators angered over U S

ground_truth: Federal agencies use heavy equipment such as cranes and forklifts to carry out their missions, but there is no government-wide data on federal agencies' acquisition or management of this equipment. GAO was asked to review federal agencies' management of heavy equipment. This report, among other objectives, examines: (1) the number, type, and costs of heavy equipment items that are owned by 20 federal agencies and (2) the heavy equipment that selected agencies recently acquired as well as how they decided whether to purchase or lease this equipment. GAO collected heavy equipment inventory data as of June 2017 from the 24 agencies that have chief financial officers responsible for overseeing financial management. GAO also selected three agencies (using factors such as the heavy equipment fleet's size) and reviewed their acquisitions of and guidance on heavy equipment. These agencies' practices are not generalizable to all acquisitions but provide insight into what efforts these agencies take to acquire thousands of heavy equipment items. GAO also interviewed officials at the three selected agencies. Of the 24 agencies GAO reviewed, 20 reported owning over 136,000 heavy equipment items such as cranes, backhoes, and forklifts, and spending over $7.4 billion (in 2016 dollars) to acquire this equipment. The remaining 4 agencies reported that they do not own any heavy equipment. The three selected agencies GAO reviewed in-depth—the Air Force within the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service within the Department of the Interior (Interior)—spent about $360 million to purchase about 3,500 heavy equipment assets in calendar years 2012 through 2016 and over $5 million to lease heavy equipment from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Officials from all three agencies stated that they consider mission needs and the availability of equipment leases when deciding whether to lease or purchase heavy equipment. Federal regulations provide that agencies should consider whether it is more economical to lease or purchase equipment when acquiring heavy equipment, and federal internal control standards require that management clearly document all transactions in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination. However, in reviewing selected leases and purchases of heavy equipment from these three agencies, GAO found that officials did not consistently conduct or document lease-versus-purchase analyses. Officials at the Air Force and Interior said that there was a lack of clarity in agency policies about when they were required to conduct and document such analyses. Without greater clarity on when lease-versus-purchase analyses should be conducted and documented, these agencies may not be spending funds on heavy equipment effectively. The Department of the Interior and the Air Force should clarify the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchases analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented. The Departments of the Interior and Defense concurred with these recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  actions in Iraq and Afghanistan  Section 571 of the NDAA for FY2015 ( P L  113-291 ) expanded the eligibility for the Purple Heart by redefining what should be considered an attack by a "foreign terrorist organization" for purposes of determining eligibility for the Purple Heart  The law states that an event should be considered an attack by a foreign terrorist organization if the perpetrator of the attack "was in communication with the foreign terrorist organization before the attack" and "the attack was inspired or motivated by the foreign terrorist organization " Still, some are opposed to awarding the Purple Heart for terrorist acts that were initially deemed "workplace violence" by the Department of Defense (DOD) or a criminal act, and not earned on a battlefield  This act arguably sets a precedent for the future and could make Purple Heart eligibility more subjective, allowing public sentiment to determine what events are worthy of a Purple Heart  On April 10, 2015, then-Army Secretary John McHugh and Army Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland, 3 rd Corps and Fort Hood commanding general, presented Purple Hearts to the families of the 10 servicemembers killed and to the 26 servicemembers wounded during the attack  Defense of Freedom Medals were also awarded to DOD civilians killed and wounded during the attack  In a memorandum, Secretary McHugh directed the Army to "expedite certain other benefits for which soldiers receiving the Purple Heart are traditionally eligible " In addition to the victims of the Fort Hood shooting, the two victims of the June 2009, shooting at a recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, received Purple Hearts on July 1, 2015  Army Private William Andrew "Andy" Long was killed and Army Private Quinton Ezeagwula was wounded in that attack by Abdulhakim Muhammad, who was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole  Encouraged by the expanded eligibility provision in the NDAA for FY2015, legislation was introduced during the 114 th Congress to award Purple Hearts to other military victims of domestic terrorism  Section 583 of the House-passed version of H R  1735 , the NDAA for FY2016, would have awarded the Purple Heart to servicemembers who were victims of the April 19, 1995, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma bombing  Supporters for awarding the Purple Heart to the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing refer to the FY2015 NDAA as precedent  However, critics contend that the bombing was an act of domestic terrorism and does not meet the current eligibility requirements of the assailant being inspired by or motivated by an international terrorist organization  The final version of the FY2016 NDAA ( P L  114-92 ) did not include this provision  On July 16, 2015, Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez shot at a Marine Corps recruiting center and Naval Reserve Center in Chattanooga, TN  This incident again raised congressional interest regarding the eligibility for the Purple Heart for servicemembers killed and wounded during an attack inspired by or motivated by international terrorist organizations  Four marines were killed and one was injured during the rampage, and the lone sailor later died from his injuries  The FBI investigation later concluded that Abdulazeez was "motivated by foreign terrorist organization propaganda," but that it was difficult to determine which terrorist group may have inspired him  On December 16, 2015, then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that the Purple Heart would be awarded to five servicemembers killed and one wounded in the July 2015 shootings at two naval centers in Chattanooga, Tennessee  Secretary Mabus stated that "following an extensive investigation, the FBI and NCIS have determined that this attack was inspired by a foreign terrorist group, the final criteria required for the awarding of the Purple Heart to this Sailor and these Marines " On January 14, 2016, then-Navy Vice Admiral Robin Braun presented the Purple Heart to the family of Logistics Specialist 2 nd Class Randall Smith at the Navy Operational Support Center Chattanooga  Brigadier General Terry V  Williams presented the Purple Heart on January 26, 2016, to Sergeant DeMonte R  Cheeley, who survived the attack, at a ceremony in Chattanooga  On April 20, 2016, Lieutenant General Rex McMillian, then-head of Marine Corps Forces Reserve, presented Purple Hearts to the families of Gunnery Sergeant Thomas Sullivan, Staff Sergeant David Wyatt, Sergeant Carson Holmquist, and Lance Corporal Squire "Skip" Wells in a ceremony at the Hunter Museum of American Art in Chattanooga  U S  Airman 1 st Class Spencer Stone was onboard a train from Amsterdam to Paris with two friends, Anthony Sadler and Alek Skarlatos, when they subdued a heavily armed gunman who attempted to fire an AK-47 at the passengers  Stone was stabbed in the face and neck by the gunman as the trio restrained him before he could discharge his weapon  The vacationing Americans were hailed as heroes and awarded the French Legion of Honor on August 24, 2015  On September 14, 2015, Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James announced that Stone would receive the Purple Heart along with the Airman's Medal, the Air Force's highest noncombat award  At the Pentagon on September 17, 2015, then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter presented Stone the Purple Heart and Airman's Medal  During the ceremony, Carter presented the Soldier's Medal to Oregon National Guard Specialist Alek Skarlatos, and civilian Anthony Sadler received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Valor  On June 12, 2016, a security guard, Omar Mateen, killed 49 people and wounded 53 others in an attack inside Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida  Army Reserve Captain Antonio Davon Brown was one of the 49 people killed and may be eligible for the Purple Heart depending on the outcome of the FBI investigation  According to the FBI, Mateen had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group after his attack in a call to 911  At this time, it is unclear if the Army will make a decision regarding Captain Brown's eligibility for the Purple Heart  On September 28, 2016, H R  6234 was introduced to amend Title 18, U S C , to provide for penalties for the sale of any Purple Heart awarded to a member of the Armed Forces  This legislation would have made selling the medal punishable by fines and up to six months in prison  H R  6234 would have placed the Purple Heart into a new protected category, keeping it away from not just con artists but also memorabilia collectors  The measure was named for Private Corrado Piccoli, a World War II infantryman killed in action in 1944, whose Purple Heart was found for sale at an antique store in 2009  This bill was referred to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations but saw no further action in the 114 th Congress  This legislation was reintroduced in the 115 th Congress on January 13, 2017, as H R  544 , the Private Corrado Piccoli Purple Heart Preservation Act of 2017, and a related bill, S  765 , was passed by the Senate on August 3, 2017  Both bills were referred to committee in the House but saw no further action  On January 15, 2019, S  122 , Private Corrado Piccoli Purple Heart Preservation Act, was introduced in the 116 th Congress  The bill was read twice and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee  The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2019, H R  5515 , included a provision (Section 629) that would extend certain morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) privileges to certain veterans, including Purple Hearts recipients, and their caregivers  This bill became P L  115-232 on August 13, 2018  Section 621 of the enacted bill adopted House Section 629, which extends eligibility of certain MWR and commissary privileges to certain veterans, including Purple Heart recipients, and their caregivers starting in 2020  For additional information see section, "Defense Commissary System," in CRS Report R45343, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues   For bill summaries of Purple Heart legislation in the 116 th Congress as introduced, see Table 1   The large number of veterans with invisible wounds returning from Iraq and Afghanistan has the Department of Defense (DOD) reevaluating Purple Heart eligibility for traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and mental conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)  DOD considers some TBIs eligible for the Purple Heart, as many of those injuries can be diagnosed using brain scans and other objective medical tests  However, there is continued debate on the inclusion of mental conditions, such as PTSD, as part of the appropriate criteria for the Purple Heart  Congress, as well as various executive agencies and departments, is funding and conducting studies regarding PTSD  The National Alliance on Mental Illness, a national grassroots advocacy group representing families and people affected by mental illness, is advocating that the Purple Heart be awarded for psychological wounds including PTSD to eliminate stigma and encourage servicemembers to seek care  At this time, DOD does not consider servicemembers with PTSD eligible for the Purple Heart  Army Regulation 600-8-22 allows "concussion injuries caused as a result of enemy generated explosions" but specifically disqualifies post-traumatic stress disorders  Army guidance emphasizes "the degree to which the enemy caused the injury" when determining eligibility and places PTSD in a column of noneligible injuries  The Marine Corps defines PTSD as a "severe combat stress injury" and says that combat stress injuries are "not directly caused by the enemy's intentional use of an outside force or agent," and thus do not qualify  Servicemembers are divided on this issue  Some servicemembers believe that mental injuries such as PTSD should be eligible for the Purple Heart, while others believe that it would dishonor those who have received Purple Hearts for physical injuries  Proponents argue that some veterans are less likely to seek help for their mental-health injuries because of the stigma associated with PTSD, and that stigma could be lessened by recognizing their injuries as real  Opponents, including some veterans from the Military Order of the Purple Heart and Veterans of Foreign Wars, are resistant to accepting PTSD as grounds for eligibility  A representative of The Military Order of the Purple Heart stated, "We believe strongly in and support the criteria that the wound or death should be sustained in combat at the hands of the enemies of the United States " In addition, the national spokesman for the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Joseph E  Davis, said, "Medals aren't awarded for illness or disease, but for 'achievement and valor '" Appendix A  Timeline of Purple Heart Eligibility August 7, 1782: George Washington creates the Badge of Military Merit  Awarded to several Continental soldiers but it quickly falls from use  February 22, 1932: Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur revives the Badge of Military Merit as an Army award, renamed "the Purple Heart," and retroactively awarded to wounded WWI veterans  December 3, 1942: Executive Order 9277—President Franklin Roosevelt expands Purple Heart eligibility to include U S  Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard  Retroactively awards Purple Hearts to December 6, 1941  November 12, 1952: Executive Order 10409—President Truman retroactively awards Purple Hearts to U S  Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard veterans after April 5, 1917  April 25, 1962: Executive Order 11016—President Kennedy extends eligibility to civilians serving with military forces  February 23, 1984: Executive Order 12464—President Reagan awards Purple Hearts to those killed and wounded in terrorist attacks after March 28, 1973, or on peacekeeping missions outside the United States  February 10, 1996: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Section 521, P L  104-106 ) includes "prisoners of war wounded before April 25, 1962, while held as a prisoner of war (or while being taken captive) in the same manner as a former prisoner of war who is wounded on or after that date while held as a prisoner of war (or while being taken captive) " November 18, 1997: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Section 571, P L  105-85 ) limits future Purple Heart awards to members of the Armed Forces  October 17, 2006: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Section 556, P L  109-364 ) includes prisoners of war captured after December 7, 1941  April 30, 2008: Purple Heart Family Equity Act of 2007 ( P L  110-207 ) revises the congressional charter of the Military Order of the Purple Heart to authorize associate membership for the spouse and siblings of a recipient of the Purple Heart medal  December 19, 2014: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Section 571, P L  113-291 ) expands eligibility for the Purple Heart by redefining what should be considered an attack by a foreign terrorist organization, and awards Purple Heart medals to servicemembers wounded or killed during the 2009 shootings at Ft  Hood, Texas, and Little Rock, Arkansas  Appendix B  Staffer Instructions for Medal Requests Members of Congress are able to directly request that a Service Secretary consider awarding military decorations to individuals or groups  Upon receiving a request from a Member's office, the Service Secretary concerned will review the proposal for the award or presentation of a decoration (or the upgrading of a decoration)  Based on that review, the Secretary shall determine the merits of approving the award or presentation of the decoration and other necessary determinations  The Secretary shall submit a notice to the requesting Member, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the House Armed Services Committee with one of the following results: (1) The award or presentation of the decoration does not warrant approval on the merits  A statement explaining the Secretary's reason will be included  (2) The award or presentation of the decoration warrants approval and a waiver by law of time restrictions prescribed by law is recommended  (3) The award or presentation of the decoration warrants approval on the merits and has been approved as an exception to policy  (4) The award or presentation of the decoration warrants approval on the merits, but a waiver of the time restrictions prescribed in law is not recommended  A statement explaining the Secretary's reason will be included  Source: Compiled from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 ( P L  104-106 , §526), February 10, 1996 
Report 2:  As part of this exercise, the Secret Service also compared its employee work-life offerings (e g , on-site childcare and telework program) to those available at other agencies  In addition, the Secret Service developed and implemented action plans for improving employee morale  Among these action plans, for example, the component implemented a student loan repayment program and expanded its tuition assistance program’s eligibility requirements  Establish and track metrics of success for improving employee morale, and report to agency leadership on progress improving morale—fully implemented  The Secret Service tracked metrics for improving employee morale and reported the results to leadership  For example, the component tracked metrics on the percentage of the workforce, including IT staff, that participated in the student loan repayment and tuition assistance programs  In addition, the Chief Strategy Officer reported to the Chief Operating Officer the results related to meeting those metrics  Maintain leadership support and commitment to ensure continued progress in improving employee morale, and demonstrate sustained improvement in morale—partly implemented  Secret Service leadership developed and implemented initiatives that demonstrated their commitment to improving the morale of the Secret Service’s workforce  For example, since 2014, the Secret Service had worked with a contractor to identify ways to improve the morale of its entire workforce, including IT staff  However, as of June 2018, the Secret Service was unable to demonstrate that it had sustained improvement in the morale of the component’s IT staff  In particular, the component was only able to provide IT workforce-specific results from one employee morale assessment that was conducted subsequent to the consolidation of this workforce into OCIO in March 2017  These results were from an assessment conducted by the component’s Inspection Division in December 2017 (the assessment found that the majority of the Secret Service’s IT employees rated their morale as “very good” or “excellent ”) While the component also provided certain employee morale results from the Office of Personnel Management’s Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey in 2017, these results were not specific to the IT workforce  Instead, this workforce’s results were combined with those from staff in another Secret Service division  According to OCIO officials, the results were combined because, at the time of the survey, the IT workforce was administratively identified as being part of that other division  OCIO officials stated that, going forward, they plan to continue to assess the morale of the IT workforce on an annual basis as part of the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey  In addition, the officials stated that OCIO-specific results may be available as part of the 2018 survey results, which the officials expect to receive by September 2018  By measuring employee satisfaction on an annual basis, the Secret Service should have increased knowledge of whether its initiatives that are aimed at improving employee morale are in fact increasing employee satisfaction  Agencies can use performance management systems as a tool to foster a results-oriented organizational culture that links individual performance to organizational goals  We have previously identified numerous leading practices related to performance management that are intended to enhance performance and ensure individual accountability  Among the performance management practices, agencies should (1) establish a performance management system that differentiates levels of staff performance and defines competencies in order to provide a fuller assessment of performance, (2) explicitly align individual performance expectations with organizational goals to help individuals see the connection between their daily activities and organizational goals, and (3) periodically provide individuals with regular performance feedback  The Secret Service substantially implemented the selected three leading practices associated with the performance management workforce area  Specifically, the component fully implemented one of the three practices and partly implemented the other two practices  Table 12 lists these selected leading practices and provides our assessment of the Secret Service’s implementation of the practices  Establish a performance management system that differentiates levels of staff performance and defines competencies in order to provide a fuller assessment of performance—partly implemented  The Secret Service’s performance management process requires leadership to make meaningful distinctions between levels of staff performance  In particular, the component’s performance plans for IT staff, which are developed by the Office of Human Resources and tailored by OCIO, as necessary, specify the criteria that leadership use to determine if an individual has met or exceeded the expectations associated with each competency identified in their respective performance plan  The performance plans include pre-established, department-wide competencies that are set by DHS, as well as occupational series-specific goals that may be updated by the Secret Service  However, because OCIO did not fully define and document all of its technical competency needs for the IT workforce, as discussed earlier, the Secret Service’s performance plans for IT staff did not include performance expectations related to the full set of technical competencies required for their respective positions  In addition, because OCIO officials were unable to specify a time frame for when they will identify all of the technical competency needs for the IT workforce (as previously discussed), the officials were also unable to specify a time frame for when they would update the IT workforce’s performance plans to include those relevant technical competencies  Until OCIO updates the performance plans for each occupational series within the IT workforce to include the relevant technical competencies, once identified, against which IT staff performance should be assessed, the office will be limited in its ability to provide IT staff with a complete assessment of their performance  In addition, Secret Service management will have limited knowledge of the extent to which IT staff are meeting all relevant technical competencies  Explicitly align individual performance expectations with organizational goals to help individuals see the connection between their daily activities and organizational goals—partly implemented  The Secret Service’s performance plans for IT staff identified certain goals that appeared to be related to organizational goals and objectives  For example, the performance plan for the Telecommunications Specialist occupational series (which is one of the series included in OCIO’s IT workforce) identified a goal for staff to support the voice, wireless, radio, satellite, and video systems serving the Secret Service’s protective and investigative mission  This performance plan goal appeared to be related to the component’s strategic goal on Advanced Technology, which included an objective to create the infrastructure needed to fulfill mission responsibilities  However, the Secret Service was unable to provide documentation that explicitly showed how individual employee performance links to organizational goals, such as a mapping of the goals identified in employee performance plans to organizational goals  Specifically, while Office of Human Resources officials stated that each Secret Service directorate is responsible for ensuring that employee goals map to high-level organizational goals, OCIO officials stated that they did not complete this mapping  The officials were unable to explain why they did not align the goals in their employees’ performance plans to the component’s high-level goals  According to the officials, the Secret Service is in the process of implementing a new automated tool that will require each office to explicitly align individual performance expectations to organizational goals  The officials stated that OCIO plans to use this tool to create employees’ fiscal year 2019 performance plans  By explicitly demonstrating how individual performance expectations align with organizational goals, the Secret Service’s IT staff should have a better understanding of how their daily activities contribute towards achieving the Secret Service’s goals  Periodically provide individuals with regular performance feedback—fully implemented  Secret Service leadership periodically provided their IT staff with performance feedback  Specifically, on an annual basis, OCIO staff received feedback during a mid-year and end-of-year performance feedback assessment  In our prior work, we have stressed that candid and constructive feedback can help individuals maximize their contribution and potential for understanding and realizing the goals and objectives of an organization  Further, this feedback is one of the strongest drivers of employee engagement  According to leading practices of the Software Engineering Institute, effective program oversight includes monitoring program performance and conducting reviews at predetermined checkpoints or milestones  This is done by, among other things, comparing actual cost, schedule, and performance data with estimates in the program plan and identifying significant deviations from established targets or thresholds for acceptable performance levels  In addition, the Software Engineering Institute previously identified leading practices for effectively monitoring the performance of agile projects  According to the Institute, agile development methods focus on delivering usable, working software frequently; as such, it is important to measure the value delivered during each iteration of these projects  To that end, the Institute reported that agile projects should be measured on velocity (i e , number of story points completed per sprint or release), development progression (e g , the number of user stories planned and accepted), product quality (e g , number of defects), and post-deployment user satisfaction  DHS and the Secret Service had fully implemented the selected leading practice for monitoring the performance of one program and three projects within the IITT investment, and conducting reviews of this program and these projects at predetermined checkpoints  In addition, with regard to the selected leading practice for monitoring agile projects, the Secret Service had fully implemented this practice for one of its two projects being implemented using agile and had partially implemented this practice for the other project  Table 13 provides a summary of DHS’s and the Secret Service’s implementation of these leading practices, as relevant for one program and three projects within IITT  Monitor program performance and conduct reviews at predetermined checkpoints or milestones  Consistent with leading practices, DHS and the Secret Service monitored the performance of IITT’s program and projects by comparing actual cost, schedule, and performance information against planned targets and conducting reviews at predetermined checkpoints  For example, within the Secret Service: The Enabling Capabilities program and Multi-Level Security project monitored their contractors’ costs spent to-date on a monthly basis and compared them to the total contract amounts  OCIO used integrated master schedules to monitor the schedule performance of the Enabling Capabilities program and Multi-Level Security project  OCIO also monitored the cost, schedule, and performance of the Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management projects during monthly status reviews  In addition, DHS and the Secret Service conducted acquisition decision event reviews and systems engineering life cycle technical reviews of IITT’s program and projects at predetermined checkpoints and, when applicable, identified deviations from established cost, schedule, and performance targets  For example: Secret Service OCIO met with DHS’s Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management in February 2017, and with DHS’s Acting Under Secretary for Management in June 2017, to discuss a schedule breach for the Enabling Capabilities program  In particular, the Enabling Capabilities program informed DHS that the program needed to change the planned date for acquisition decision event 3 (the point at which a decision is made to fully deploy the system) in order to conduct tests in an operational environment prior to that decision event  This delay was due to the Secret Service misunderstanding the tests that it was required to conduct prior to that decision event  Specifically, the Enabling Capabilities program had conducted tests on “production representative” systems, but these tests were not sufficient to meet the requirements for acquisition decision event 3  The project team for Multi-Level Security identified that certain technical issues they had experienced would delay system deployment and full operational capability (the point at which an investment becomes fully operational)  As such, in October 2017, the project notified the Secret Service Component Acquisition Executive of these expected delays  In particular, the web browser that was intended to provide users on “Sensitive But Unclassified” workstations the ability to view information from different security levels, experienced technical delays in meeting personal identity verification requirements  The project team also described for the executive how the schedule delay would affect the project’s performance metrics and funding, and subsequently updated the project plan accordingly  Measure and monitor agile projects on, among other things, velocity (i e , number of story points completed per sprint or release), development progression (e g , the number of features and user stories planned and accepted), product quality (e g , number of defects), and post-deployment user satisfaction  Secret Service OCIO measured its two agile projects—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management— using certain agile metrics  In particular, OCIO officials measured the Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management projects using key metrics related to velocity and development progression  For example, the officials measured development progression for both projects on a daily basis  In addition, OCIO officials monitored each project’s progress against these metrics during bi-weekly reviews that they conducted with each project team  The OCIO officials also tracked product quality metrics for the Uniformed Division Resource Management System  For example, on a monthly basis, the officials tracked the number of helpdesk tickets that had been resolved related to the system  In addition, on a quarterly basis, they tracked the number of Uniformed Division Resource Management System defects that (1) had been fixed and (2) were in the backlog  However, while OCIO officials received certain post-deployment user satisfaction information from end-users of the Uniformed Division Resource Management System by, among other things, tracking the number of helpdesk tickets related to the system and via daily verbal, undocumented feedback from certain Uniformed Division officers, OCIO officials had not fully measured and documented post- deployment user satisfaction with the system, such as via a survey of employees who use the system  The officials stated that they had not conducted and documented a survey because they were focused on (1) addressing software performance issues that occurred after they deployed the system to a limited number of users, and (2) continuing system deployment to the remaining users after they addressed the performance issues  OCIO officials stated that they plan to conduct such a documented survey by the end of September 2018  The results of the user satisfaction survey should provide OCIO with important information on whether the Uniformed Division Resource Management System is meeting users’ needs  The Secret Service’s full implementation of 11 of 14 component-level CIO responsibilities constitutes a significant effort to establish CIO oversight for the component’s IT portfolio  Additional efforts to fully implement the remaining 3 responsibilities, including ensuring that all IT contracts are reviewed, as appropriate; ensuring that the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy appropriately specifies the CIO’s role in developing and reviewing the component’s IT budget formulation and execution; and ensuring agile projects measure product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction, will further position the CIO to effectively manage the Secret Service’s IT portfolio  When effectively implemented, IT workforce planning and management activities can facilitate the successful accomplishment of an agency’s mission  However, the Secret Service had not fully implemented all of the 15 selected practices for its IT workforce for any of the five areas— strategic planning, recruitment and hiring, training and development, employee morale, and performance management  The Secret Service’s lack of (1) a strategic workforce planning process, including the identification of all required knowledge and skills, assessment of competency gaps, and targeted strategies to address specific gaps in competencies and staffing; (2) targeted recruiting activities, including metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the recruitment program and adjustment of the recruitment program and hiring efforts based on metrics; (3) a training program, including the identification of required training for IT staff, ensuring that staff take required training, and assessment of performance data regarding the training program; and (4) a performance management system that includes all relevant technical competencies, greatly limits its ability to ensure the timely and effective acquisition and maintenance of the Secret Service’s IT infrastructure and services  On the other hand, by monitoring program performance and conducting reviews at predetermined checkpoints for one program and three projects associated with the IITT investment, in accordance with leading practices, the Secret Service and DHS provided important oversight needed to guide that program and those projects  Measuring projects on leading agile metrics also provided the Secret Service CIO with important information on project performance  We are making the following 13 recommendations to the Director of the Secret Service: The Director should ensure that the CIO establishes and documents an IT acquisition review process that ensures the CIO or the CIO’s delegate reviews all contracts containing IT, as appropriate  (Recommendation 1) The Director should update the enterprise governance policy to specify (1) the CIO’s current role and responsibilities on the Executive Resources Board, to include developing and reviewing the IT budget formulation and execution; and (2) the Deputy CIO’s role and responsibilities on the Enterprise Governance Council  (Recommendation 2) The Director should ensure that the Secret Service develops a charter for its Executive Resources Board that specifies the roles and responsibilities of all board members, including the CIO  (Recommendation 3) The Director should ensure that the CIO includes product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction metrics in the modular outcomes and target measures that the CIO sets for monitoring agile projects  (Recommendation 4) The Director should ensure that the CIO identifies all of the required knowledge and skills for the IT workforce  (Recommendation 5) The Director should ensure that the CIO regularly analyzes the IT workforce to identify its competency needs and any gaps it may have  (Recommendation 6) The Director should ensure that, after OCIO completes an analysis of the IT workforce to identify any competency and staffing gaps it may have, the Secret Service updates its recruiting and hiring strategies and plans to address those gaps, as necessary  (Recommendation 7) The Director should ensure that the Office of Human Resources (1) develops and tracks metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the Secret Service’s recruitment activities for the IT workforce, including their effectiveness at addressing skill and staffing gaps; and (2) reports to component leadership on those metrics  (Recommendation 8) The Director should ensure that the Office of Human Resources and OCIO adjust their recruitment and hiring plans and activities, as necessary, after establishing and tracking metrics for assessing the effectiveness of these activities for the IT workforce  (Recommendation 9) The Director should ensure that the CIO (1) defines the required training for each IT workforce group, (2) determines the activities that OCIO will include in its IT workforce training and development program based on its available training budget, and (3) implements those activities  (Recommendation 10) The Director should ensure that the CIO ensures that the IT workforce completes training specific to their positions (after defining the training required for each workforce group)  (Recommendation 11) The Director should ensure that the CIO collects and assesses performance data (including qualitative or quantitative measures, as appropriate) to determine how the IT training program contributes to improved performance and results (once the training program is implemented)  (Recommendation 12) The Director should ensure that the CIO updates the performance plans for each occupational series within the IT workforce to include the relevant technical competencies, once identified, against which IT staff performance should be assessed  (Recommendation 13) DHS provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendix III  In its comments, the department concurred with all 13 of our recommendations and provided estimated completion dates for implementing each of them  For example, with regard to recommendation 2, the department stated that the Secret Service would update its enterprise governance policy and related policies to outline the roles and responsibilities of the CIO and Deputy CIO, among others, by March 31, 2019  In addition, for recommendation 13, the department stated that the Secret Service OCIO will include relevant technical competencies in performance plans, as appropriate, in the next performance cycle that starts in July 2019  If implemented effectively, these actions should address the weaknesses we identified  The department also identified a number of other actions that it said had been taken to address our recommendations  For example, in response to recommendation 8, which calls for the Office of Human Resources to (1) develop and track metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the Secret Service’s recruitment activities for the IT workforce and (2) report to component leadership on those metrics, DHS stated that the Secret Service’s Office of Human Resources’ Outreach Branch provides to the department metrics on recruitment efforts toward designated priority mission-critical occupations  However, for fiscal year 2017, only 1 of the 12 occupational series associated with the Secret Service’s IT workforce was designated as a mission-critical occupation for the component (i e , the 2210 IT Specialist series)  The 11 other occupational series were not designated as mission- critical occupations  In addition, for fiscal year 2018, none of these 12 occupational series were designated as mission-critical occupations  As such, metrics on recruiting for these IT series may not have been reported to DHS leadership  Moreover, while we requested documentation of the recruiting metrics for the Secret Service’s IT workforce and, during the course of our review, had multiple subsequent discussions with the Secret Service regarding such metrics, the component did not provide documentation that demonstrated it had established recruiting metrics for its IT workforce  Tracking such metrics and reporting the results to Secret Service leadership, as we recommended, would provide management with important information necessary to make effective recruitment decisions  Further, in response to recommendation 10, which among other things, calls for the CIO to define the required training for each IT workforce group, the department stated that the Secret Service OCIO recently developed training requirements for each workforce group, which were issued during our audit  However, while during our audit OCIO provided a list of recommended training courses, the office did not identify them as being required courses  Defining training that is required for each IT workforce group, as we recommended, would inform OCIO of the necessary training for each position and enable the office to prioritize this training, to ensure that its staff have the needed knowledge and skills  In addition to the aforementioned comments, we received technical comments from DHS and Secret Service officials, which we incorporated, as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Secret Service, and other interested parties  In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  Should you or your staffs have any questions on information discussed in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4456 or HarrisCC@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  Our objectives were to evaluate the extent to which: (1) the U S  Secret Service (Secret Service) Chief Information Officer (CIO) has implemented selected information technology (IT) oversight responsibilities, (2) the Secret Service has implemented leading workforce planning and management practices for its IT workforce, and (3) the Secret Service and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have implemented selected performance and progress monitoring practices for the Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment  To address the first objective, we analyzed DHS’s policies and guidance on IT management to identify the responsibilities that were to be implemented by the component-level CIO related to overseeing the Secret Service’s IT portfolio, including existing systems, acquisitions, and investments  From the list of 33 responsibilities that we identified, we then excluded the responsibility that was associated with information security, which is expected to be addressed as part of a separate, subsequent GAO review  We also excluded those responsibilities that were significantly large in scope (e g , implement an enterprise architecture) or that, in our professional judgment, lacked specificity (e g , provide timely delivery of mission IT services)  As a result, we excluded from consideration for this review a total of 10 CIO responsibilities  For the 23 that remained, we then combined certain responsibilities that overlapped with other related responsibilities  For example, we combined related responsibilities on the component CIO’s review of IT contracts  As a result, we identified 14 responsibilities for review  We validated with the acting DHS CIO that these responsibilities were key responsibilities for the department’s component-level CIOs  We then included all 14 of the responsibilities in our review  The 14 selected component-level CIO responsibilities were: 1  Develop and review the component IT budget formulation and execution  2  Manage the component IT investment portfolio, including establishing an IT acquisition review process that enables component and DHS review of component acquisitions (i e , contracts) that contain IT  3  Develop, implement, and maintain a detailed IT strategic plan  4  Ensure all component IT policies are in compliance and alignment with DHS IT directives and instructions  5  Concur with each program’s and/or project’s systems engineering life cycle tailoring plan  6  Support the Component Acquisition Executive to ensure processes are established that enable systems engineering life cycle technical reviews and that they are adhered to by programs and/or projects  7  Ensure that all systems engineering life cycle technical review exit criteria are satisfied for each of the component’s IT programs and/or projects  8  Ensure the necessary systems engineering life cycle activities have been satisfactorily completed as planned for each of the component’s IT programs and/or projects  9  Concur with the systems engineering life cycle technical review completion letter for each of the component’s IT programs and/or projects  10  Maintain oversight of their component’s agile development approach for IT by appointing the responsible personnel, identifying investments for adoption, and reviewing artifacts  11  With Component Acquisition Executives, evaluate and approve the application of agile development for IT programs consistent with the component’s agile development approach  12  Set modular outcomes and target measures to monitor the progress in achieving agile implementation for IT programs and/or projects within their component  13  Participate on DHS’s CIO Council, Enterprise Architecture Board, or other councils/boards as appropriate, and appoint employees to serve when necessary  14  Meet the IT competency requirements established by the DHS CIO, as required in the component CIO’s performance plan  To determine the extent to which the Secret Service CIO has implemented these responsibilities, we obtained and assessed relevant component documentation and compared it to the responsibilities  Specifically, we obtained and analyzed documentation including evidence of the CIO’s participation on the Secret Service governance board that has final decision authority and responsibility for enterprise governance, including the IT budget; monthly program management reports showing the CIO’s oversight of IT programs, projects, and systems; monthly status reports on program spending; the Secret Service’s IT strategic plan; the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy; meeting minutes from the DHS board and council on which the CIO participated (i e , the CIO Council and Enterprise Architecture Board); and documentation demonstrating whether the CIO met the IT competency requirements  In addition, we obtained and analyzed relevant documentation related to the CIO’s oversight of the major IT investments on which the Secret Service was spending development, modernization, and enhancement funds during fiscal year 2017  As of July 2017, the component had one investment—IITT—that met this criterion  IITT is a portfolio investment that, as of July 2017, included two programs (one of which included three projects) and one standalone project (i e , it was not part of another program) that had capabilities that were in planning or development and modernization: the Enabling Capabilities program, Enterprise Resource Management System program (which included three projects, called Uniformed Division Resource Management System, Events Management, and Enterprise-wide Scheduling), and Multi-Level Security project  In particular, we obtained and analyzed documentation related to the CIO’s oversight of the systems engineering life cycles for IITT’s Enabling Capabilities program and the Uniformed Division Resource Management System, Events Management, and Multi-Level Security projects  This documentation included acquisition program baselines, systems engineering life cycle tailoring plans, and systems engineering life cycle technical review briefings and completion letters  We then compared the documentation against the five selected systems engineering life cycle oversight responsibilities (responsibilities 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9)  We also obtained and analyzed documentation related to the CIO’s oversight of two projects that the Secret Service was implementing using an agile methodology—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management  Specifically, we obtained and assessed documentation of (1) the CIO’s approval for these projects to be implemented using an agile methodology and (2) the agile development metrics that the CIO established for each of these projects  We then compared this documentation to the three agile development-related component-level CIO responsibilities (responsibilities 10, 11, and 12)  Further, to determine the extent to which the Secret Service CIO had established an IT acquisition (i e , contract) review process that enabled component and DHS review of component contracts that contain IT (which is part of responsibility 2), we first asked Secret Service officials to provide us with a list of all new, unclassified IT contracts that the component awarded between October 1, 2016, and June 30, 2017  The Secret Service officials provided a list of 54 contracts  We validated that these were contracts for IT or IT services by: (1) searching for them in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation; (2) identifying their associated product or service codes, as reported in that system; and (3) determining whether those codes were included in the universe of 79 IT product or service codes identified by the Category Management Leadership Council  In validating the list of 54 contracts provided by the Secret Service, we determined that 5 of the contracts were not associated with an IT product or service code  As such, we removed those contracts from the list  In addition, we found that three other items identified by the component were not in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation  Secret Service officials subsequently confirmed that these three items were not contracts  We therefore removed these three items from the list  As such, the final list of validated contracts identified by the Secret Service included 46 IT contracts  In addition, to identify any IT contracts that were not included in the list provided by the Secret Service, we conducted a search of the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation to identify all unclassified contracts that (1) the component awarded between October 1, 2016, and June 30, 2017; (2) were not a modification of a contract; and (3) were associated with 1 of the 79 IT product or service codes identified by the Category Management Leadership Council  Based on these criteria, we identified 144 Secret Service IT contracts in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation (these 144 contracts included the 46 contracts previously identified by Secret Service officials)  We then asked Secret Service officials to validate the accuracy, completeness, and reliability of these data, which they did  From each of these two lists of IT contracts (i e , the list of 46 IT contracts identified by the Secret Service and the list of 144 IT contracts that we identified from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation), we then selected random, non-generalizable samples of contracts, as described below  First, from the list of 46 IT contracts identified by Secret Service officials, we removed 4 contracts that had total values of less than $10,000  To ensure that we selected across all contract sizes, we randomly selected 12 contracts from the remaining list of 42 contracts, using the following cost ranges: $10,000 to $50,000 (4 contracts), more than $50,000 to less than $250,000 (4 contracts), and more than $250,000 (4 contracts)  Second, from our list of 144 IT contracts that we identified from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation, we removed the 46 contracts identified by Secret Service officials  We also removed 12 contracts that had total values of less than $10,000  To ensure that we selected across all contract sizes, we randomly selected 21 contracts from the remaining list of 86 contracts, using the following cost ranges: $10,000 to $50,000 (7 contracts), more than $50,000 to less than $250,000 (7 contracts), and more than $250,000 (7 contracts)  In total, we selected 33 IT contracts for review  We separated the contracts into the three cost ranges identified above in order to ensure that contracts of different value levels had been selected  This enabled us to determine the extent to which the CIO appropriately reviewed contracts of all values  To determine the extent to which the CIO had established an IT contract approval process that enabled the Secret Service and DHS, as appropriate, to review IT contracts, we first asked Secret Service Office of the CIO (OCIO) officials for documentation of their IT contract approval process  These officials were unable to provide such documentation  Instead, the officials stated that the Secret Service CIO or the CIO’s delegate approves all IT contracts prior to award  The officials also provided documentation that identified four staff to whom the CIO had delegated his approval authority  Further, the officials stated that, in accordance with DHS’s October 2016 IT acquisition review guidance, they submitted to DHS OCIO for approval any IT contracts that met DHS’s thresholds for review, including those that (1) had total estimated procurement values of $2 5 million or more, and (2) were associated with a major investment  Based on the IT acquisition review process that Secret Service OCIO officials described, we then obtained and analyzed each of the 33 selected IT contracts and associated approval documentation to determine whether or not the Secret Service CIO or the CIO’s delegate had approved each of the contracts  In particular, we (1) reviewed the name of the contract approver on the approval documentation, and (2) compared the signature dates that were on the contracts to the signature dates that were identified on the associated approval documentation  In addition, to determine whether or not the Secret Service CIO submitted to DHS OCIO for approval the IT contracts that (1) had total estimated procurement values of $2 5 million or more, and (2) were associated with major investments, we first analyzed the 144 Secret Service IT contracts that we had previously pulled from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation to determine which contracts met the $2 5 million threshold  We identified 4 contracts that met this threshold  We then requested that OCIO identify the levels (i e , major or non-major) of the investments associated with these contracts  According to OCIO officials, 3 of the 4 contracts were associated with non-major investments and 1 was not associated with an investment  As such, based on DHS’s October 2016 IT acquisition review guidance, none of these contracts needed to be submitted to DHS OCIO for review  We also interviewed Secret Service officials, including the CIO and Deputy CIO, regarding the CIO’s implementation of the 14 selected component-level responsibilities  We assessed the evidence against the selected responsibilities to determine the extent to which the CIO had implemented them  To address the second objective—determining the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented leading workforce planning and management practices for its IT workforce—we first identified seven topic areas associated with human capital management based on the following sources: The Office of Personnel Management’s Human Capital Framework  Office of Personnel Management and the Chief Human Capital Officers Council Subcommittee for Hiring and Succession Planning, End-to-End Hiring Initiative  GAO, High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others  GAO, IT Workforce: Key Practices Help Ensure Strong Integrated Program Teams; Selected Departments Need to Assess Skill Gaps  GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Taking Further Action to Better Determine Causes of Morale Problems Would Assist in Targeting Action Plans  GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government  GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Creating a Clear Linkage between Individual Performance and Organizational Success  DHS acquisition guidance  Secret Service acquisition guidance  Among these topic areas, we then selected five areas that, in our professional judgment, were of particular importance to successful workforce planning and management  They were also previously identified as part of our high-risk and key issues work on human capital management  These areas include: (1) strategic planning, (2) recruitment and hiring, (3) training and development, (4) employee morale, and (5) performance management  We also reviewed these same sources and identified numerous leading practices associated with the five topic areas  Among these leading practices, we then selected three leading practices within each of the five areas (for a total of 15 selected practices)  The selected practices were foundational practices that, in our professional judgment, were of particular importance to successful workforce planning and management  Table 14 identifies the five selected workforce areas and 15 selected associated practices  To determine the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented the selected leading workforce planning and management practices for its IT workforce, we obtained and assessed documentation and compared it against the 15 selected practices  In particular, we analyzed the Secret Service’s human capital strategic plan, human capital staffing plan, IT strategic plan, documentation of the component’s staffing model that it used to determine the number of IT staff needed, an independent verification and validation report on the component’s staffing models, documentation of the current number of IT staff, the Secret Service’s recruitment and outreach plans, documentation of DHS’s hiring authorities (which are applicable to the Secret Service), the Secret Service’s training strategic plan, IT workforce training plan, action plans for improving employee morale, and templates used for measuring and reporting employee performance  We also interviewed Secret Service officials—including the CIO, Deputy CIO, and workforce planning staff—about the component’s workforce- related policies and documentation  Further, we discussed with the officials the Secret Service’s efforts to implement the selected workforce practices for its IT workforce  Regarding our assessments of the Secret Service’s implementation of the 15 selected workforce planning and management practices, we assessed a practice as being fully implemented if component officials provided supporting documentation that demonstrated all aspects of the practice  We assessed a practice as not implemented if the officials did not provide any supporting documentation for that practice, or if the documentation provided did not demonstrate any aspect of the practice  We assessed a practice as being partly implemented if the officials provided supporting documentation that demonstrated some, but not all, aspects of the selected practice  In addition, related to our assessments of the Secret Service’s implementation of the five selected overall workforce areas, we assessed each area as follows, based on the implementation of the three selected practices within each area: Fully implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it had fully implemented all three of the selected practices within the workforce area; Substantially implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it had either fully implemented two selected practices and partly implemented the remaining one selected practice within the workforce area, or fully implemented one selected practice and partly implemented the remaining two selected practices within the workforce area; Partially implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it had partly implemented each of the three selected practices within the workforce area; Minimally implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it partly implemented two selected practices and not implemented the remaining one selected practice within the workforce area, or partly implemented one selected practice and not implemented the remaining two selected practices within the workforce area; or Not implemented: The Secret Service did not provide evidence that it had implemented any of the three selected practices within the workforce area  To address the third objective—determining the extent to which the Secret Service and DHS have implemented selected performance and progress monitoring practices for IITT—we reviewed leading project monitoring practices and guidance from the Software Engineering Institute  First, we reviewed the practices within the Project Monitoring and Control process area of the Institute’s Capability Maturity Model Integration® for Acquisition  Based on our review, we identified four practices associated with monitoring program performance and progress  In our professional judgment, all four of these practices were of significance to managing the IITT investment given the phase of the life cycle that the investment was in  As such, we elected to include all four of these practices in our review, and combined them into one practice, as follows: Monitor program performance and conduct reviews at predetermined checkpoints or milestones by, among other things, comparing actual cost, schedule, and performance data with estimates in the program plan and identifying significant deviations from established targets or thresholds for acceptable performance levels  Next, given the agile development methodology that the Secret Service was using for certain projects within IITT, we reviewed the Software Engineering Institute’s technical note on the progress monitoring of agile contractors  Based on our review, and in consultation with an internal expert, we selected four agile metrics that the Institute identified as important for successful agile implementations and that, in our professional judgment, were of most significance to monitoring the performance of IITT’s agile projects  We then combined these four metrics into one practice, as follows: Measure and monitor agile projects on velocity (i e , number of story points completed per sprint or release), development progression (e g , the number of features and user stories planned and accepted), product quality (e g , number of defects), and post-deployment user satisfaction  To determine the extent to which DHS and the Secret Service had implemented the first selected practice, we analyzed relevant program management and governance documentation for IITT’s Enabling Capabilities program, and Multi-Level Security, Uniformed Division Resource Management System, and Events Management projects  In particular, we analyzed acquisition program baselines, DHS acquisition decision event memorandums, artifacts from DHS and Secret Service program oversight reviews, cost monitoring reports, program integrated master schedules, and program status briefings, and compared this documentation to the selected practice  We also interviewed Secret Service OCIO officials regarding the Secret Service’s and DHS’s efforts to monitor the IITT investment’s performance and progress  To determine the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented the second selected practice related to measuring and monitoring agile projects on agile metrics (i e , velocity, development progression, product quality, and post-deployment user satisfaction), we obtained and analyzed agile-related documentation for the two projects that the Secret Service was implementing using an agile methodology—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management  Specifically, to determine the extent to which the Secret Service was measuring and monitoring these two projects on metrics for velocity and development progression, we obtained and analyzed documentation, such as sprint burndown charts and monthly program status reports, and compared it to the selected practice  In addition, the agile metrics for product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction were only applicable to projects that had been deployed to users  As such, these metrics were applicable to the Uniformed Division Resource Management System (which the Secret Service had deployed to users) and were not applicable to Events Management (which the Secret Service had not yet deployed to users, as of early May 2018)  We therefore obtained and analyzed documentation demonstrating that Secret Service OCIO measured product defects for the Uniformed Division Resource Management System  We also requested documentation demonstrating that OCIO had measured and monitored post-deployment user satisfaction for this project, including via a survey  OCIO officials stated that they had not conducted such a survey and were unable to provide documentation demonstrating they had measured post- deployment user satisfaction for the Uniformed Division Resource Management System  To assess the reliability of the cost, schedule, and agile-related data that were in DHS and the Secret Service’s program management and governance documentation for the IITT investment, we (1) analyzed related documentation and assessed the data against existing agency records to identify consistency in the information, and (2) examined the data for obvious outliers, incomplete, or unusual entries  We determined that the data in these documents were sufficiently reliable for our purpose, which was to evaluate the extent to which DHS and the Secret Service had implemented processes for monitoring the IITT investment’s performance and progress  We conducted this performance audit from May 2017 to November 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  As of June 2018, the Secret Service’s Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment included two programs (one of which included three projects) and one project that had capabilities that were in planning or development and modernization, as described below: Enabling Capabilities  This program is intended to, among other things, (1) modernize and enhance the Secret Service’s information technology (IT) network infrastructure, including increasing bandwidth and improving the speed and reliability of the Secret Service’s IT system performance; (2) enhance cybersecurity to protect against potential intrusions and viruses; and (3) provide counterintelligence and data mining capabilities to improve officials’ ability to perform the Secret Service’s investigative mission  Enterprise Resource Management System  This program comprises three projects that are intended to provide: a system that will enable the Secret Service’s Uniformed Division to efficiently and effectively plan, provision, and schedule missions (this project is referred to as Uniformed Division Resource Management System), a system that will unify the logistical actions (e g , assigning personnel) surrounding special events that Secret Service agents need to protect, such as the United Nations General Assembly (this project is referred to as Events Management), and a capability for creating schedules for Secret Service agents and administrative, professional, and technical staff, as well as the ability to generate reports on information such as monthly hours worked (this project is referred to as Enterprise-wide Scheduling)  Multi-Level Security  This project is intended to enable authorized Secret Service users to view two levels of classified information on a single workstation  Previously, data at various security levels were contained and used in multiple disparate systems  Multi-Level Security is intended to streamline users’ access to information at different security levels in order to enable them to more quickly and effectively perform their duties  Table 15 provides the planned life cycle cost and schedule estimates (threshold values) for each IITT program and project that had capabilities in planning or development and modernization, as of June 2018  In addition, the table describes any changes in those cost and schedule estimates, as well as the key reasons for any changes, as identified by officials from the Secret Service’s Office of the Chief Information Officer  In addition to the contact named above, the following staff made key contributions to this report: Shannin O’Neill (Assistant Director), Emily Kuhn (Analyst-in-Charge), Quintin Dorsey, Rebecca Eyler, Javier Irizarry, and Paige Teigen 

ground_truth: The Purple Heart is one of the oldest and most recognized American military medals, awarded to servicemembers who were killed or wounded by enemy action. The conflicts 2001 to the present have greatly increased the number of Purple Hearts awarded to servicemembers. Events over the past few years have spurred debate on the eligibility criteria for the Purple Heart. Shootings on U.S. soil and medical conditions such as traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have prompted changes to the eligibility requirements for the Purple Heart. Some critics believe that these changes may lessen the value of the medal and the sacrifices of past recipients on the battlefield. In the past, efforts to modify the Purple Heart's eligibility requirements were contentious, and veterans groups were vocal concerning eligibility changes. While medal requirements are often left to the military and executive branch to decide, Congress is involved in Purple Heart eligibility, utilizing its constitutional power "To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clause 14). The Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291) included language that expands eligibility for the Purple Heart. Previous debates have raised several questions about the Purple Heart. In some respects, how an event is defined can determine eligibility: Is a servicemember the victim of a crime or a terrorist attack? Conversely, arguing that killed or wounded servicemembers "should" be eligible for the Purple Heart can redefine an event: Is the servicemember an advisor to a foreign military or a combatant? Are PTSD and other mental health conditions adequate injuries to warrant the Purple Heart? These are questions that Congress might consider if it chooses to act on this issue.