prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) requires that private-sector firms provide workers' compensation coverage for their employees engaged in longshore, harbor, or other maritime occupations on or adjacent to the navigable waters of the United States  Although the LHWCA program is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), most benefits are paid either through private insurers or self-insured firms  The LHWCA is a workers' compensation system and not a federal benefits program  Like other workers' compensation systems in the United States, the LHWCA ensures that all covered workers are provided medical and disability benefits in the event they are injured or become ill in the course of their employment, and it provides benefits to the survivors of covered workers who die on the job  In 2016, the LHWCA paid approximately $1 41 billion in cash and medical benefits to injured workers and the families of deceased workers  Nearly all private- and public-sector workers in the United States are covered by some form of workers' compensation  The federal government has a limited role in workers' compensation and administers workers' compensation programs only for federal employees and several classes of private-sector workers, including longshore and harbor workers  For most occupations, workers' compensation is mandated by state laws and administered by state agencies  There is no federal mandate that states provide workers' compensation  However, every state and the District of Columbia has a workers' compensation system  There are no federal standards for state workers' compensation systems  However, all U S  workers' compensation systems provide for limited wage replacement and full medical benefits for workers who are injured or become ill as a result of their work and survivors benefits to the families of workers who die on the job  Workers' compensation in the United States is a no-fault system that pays workers for employment-related injuries or illnesses without considering the culpability of any one party  In exchange for this no-fault protection and the guarantee of benefits in the event of an employment-related injury, illness, or death, workers give up their rights to bring actions against employers in the civil court system and give up their rights to seek damages for injuries and illnesses, including pain and suffering, outside of those provided by the workers' compensation laws  Workers' compensation is mandatory in all states and the District of Columbia, with the exception of Texas  In Texas, employers may, under certain conditions, opt out of the workers' compensation system, but in doing so subject themselves to civil actions brought by injured employees  Prior to the enactment of the LHWCA in 1927, longshore and harbor workers were not covered by any workers' compensation system  Although persons who worked entirely on land were covered by workers' compensation laws in those states that enacted such laws, pursuant to the Supreme Court's 1917 decision in Southern Pacific Co  v  Jensen , state workers' compensation systems did not have jurisdiction over persons working on the "navigable waters" of the United States because the Constitution granted the authority over "matters of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" to the federal government  The LHWCA created a federal workers' compensation program to cover these workers  In 1972, the LHWCA zone of coverage was extended to include areas adjacent to navigable waters that are used for loading, unloading, repairing, or building vessels  The LHWCA provisions apply to any private firm with any covered employees who work, full- or part-time, on the navigable waters of the United States, including in any of the following adjoining areas: piers; wharves; dry docks; terminals; building ways; marine railways; or other areas customarily used in the loading, unloading, repairing, or building of vessels  With the exception of workers excluded by statute (listed below), the LHWCA covers any maritime employee of a covered firm, including longshore workers (those who load and unload ships) and harbor workers (i e , ship repairmen, ship builders, and ship breakers)  Sections 2(3) and 3(b) of the LHWCA exclude the following workers from coverage: Workers covered by a state workers' compensation law, including employees exclusively engaged in clerical, secretarial, security, or data processing work; persons employed by a club, camp, recreational operation, museum, or retail outlet; marina employees not engaged in the construction, replacement, or expansion of the marina; suppliers, transporters, and vendors doing business temporarily at the site of a covered employer; aquaculture workers; and employees who build any recreational vessel under 65 feet in length, or repair any recreational vessel, or dismantle any part of a recreational vessel in connection with the repair of the vessel  Workers, whether covered or not covered by a state workers' compensation law, including masters and crew members of vessels; persons engaged by the master of a vessel to unload any vessel under 18 tons net; and employees of the federal government, or any state, local, or foreign government or any subdivision of such a government  Section 803 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) modified one of the excluded classes of workers under the LHWCA by adding additional exclusions for persons who work on recreational vessels over 65 feet in length  Prior to the amendment, Section 2(3)(F) of the LHWCA read as follows: (3) The term "employee" means…but such term does not include… (F) individuals employed to build, repair, or dismantle any recreational vessel under sixty-five feet in length  This section, as amended, reads as follows (with additions in italics): (3) The term "employee" means…but such term does not include… (F) individuals employed to build any recreational vessel under sixty-five feet in length, or individuals employed to repair any recreational vessel, or to dismantle any part of a recreational vessel in connection with the repair of such vessel  By granting an exemption from the LHWCA to persons engaged in the repair of any recreation vessel, regardless of its size, this amendment limits the scope of the LHWCA and increases the types of workers excluded from coverage  In 2011, the DOL promulgated implementing regulations for the new recreational vessel provision provided by Section 803 of ARRA  These regulations provided definitions of recreational vessel for the purposes of the determination of LHWCA coverage  These definitions are based on the classification of vessels used by the U S  Coast Guard (USCG) and provided in statute and regulation  Specifically, under these current DOL regulations, a vessel is considered a recreational vessel if the vessel is being manufactured or operated mainly for pleasure or leased, rented, or chartered to another person for his or her pleasure  In addition, for a vessel being built or repaired under warranty by its manufacturer or builder, the vessel is considered a recreational vessel if it appears based on its design and construction to be intended for recreational uses  The manufacturer or builder bears the burden under this regulation to establish that the vessel is a recreational vessel  For a vessel being repaired, dismantled for repair, or dismantled at the end of its life (ship breaking), the vessel is not considered a recreational vessel if it was operating, more than infrequently, in one of the following categories provided in the U S  Code : "passenger vessel" (46 U S C  §2101(22)); "small passenger vessel" (46 U S C  §2101(35)); "uninspected passenger vessel" (46 U S C  §2101(42)); vessel routinely engaged in "commercial service" (46 U S C  §2101(5)); or vessel that routinely carries "passengers for hire" (46 U S C  §2101(21a))  A vessel being repaired, dismantled for repair, or dismantled at the end of its life is considered a recreational vessel if the vessel is a public vessel owned, or bareboat chartered, by the federal government or a state or local government and shares elements of design and construction with traditional recreational vessels and is not used for military or commercial purposes  Since the promulgation of the DOL's 2011 rules providing regulatory definitions of recreational vessels for the purposes of the LHWCA, numerous bills have been introduced that would, if enacted, remove the existing regulatory definitions for a vessel being repaired, dismantled for repair, or dismantled at the end of its life so that the USCG categories of vessels provided in Section 2101 of Title 46 of the United States Code would no longer be used in the classification of such a vessel under the LHWCA  This legislation would expand the types of recreational vessels  Because persons who work on recreational vessels are not covered by the LHWCA, the legislation would allow employers to purchase workers' compensation for these workers under state laws rather than the LHWCA, which, due to the more generous benefits frequently offered by the LHWCA and the limited number of providers, may be more expensive  In the 115 th Congress, Section 3509 of H R  2810 , the National Defense Authorization Act for 2018 (NDAA), as initially passed by the House of Representatives on July 14, 2017, contained this legislative provision  This provision was not included in the Senate version of the bill nor in the final NDAA enacted into law  The LHWCA has been amended four times to extend coverage to occupations outside the original scope of the law  In 1928, coverage was extended to employees of the District of Columbia   The provision was repealed, effective for all injuries occurring on or after July 26, 1982, with the enactment by the District of Columbia government of the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act of 1982  Benefits for injuries that occurred prior to July 26, 1982, continue to be paid under the LHWCA  Coverage was extended to overse a s military and public works contractors in 1941 with the enactment of the Defense Base Act  In 1952, coverage was extended to civilian employees of nonappropriated fund instrumentalities of the armed forces , such as service clubs and post exchanges  Coverage was extended in 1953 to employees working on the Outer Continental Shelf in the exploration and the development of natural resources , such as workers on offshore oil platforms  Employers required by the LHWCA to provide workers' compensation coverage to their employees may either purchase private insurance or self-insure  The DOL is responsible for authorizing insurance carriers to provide coverage under the LHWCA program and for authorizing companies to self-insure  However, the DOL does not set or regulate insurance premiums  These insurance arrangements are the primary means of providing LHWCA benefits to injured, sick, and deceased workers and their families  General revenue is not used to pay any LHWCA benefits  The DOL operates the Special Fund to provide LHWCA benefits in cases in which the responsible employer or insurance carrier cannot pay or in which benefits must be paid for a second injury under Section 8(f) of the LHWCA  The Special Fund is financed through an annual assessment charged to employers and insurance carriers based on the previous year's claims, payments required when an employee dies without any survivors, disability payments due to an employee without survivors after his or her death, and penalties and fines assessed for noncompliance with LHWCA program rules  The administrative costs associated with the LHWCA are largely provided by general revenue  General revenue is used to pay for most oversight functions associated with the LHWCA and the processing of LHWCA claims  General revenue is also used to pay legal and investigative costs associated with the DOL Office of the Solicitor and Office of the Inspector General  Revenue from the Special Fund is used to finance oversight activities related to the Special Fund and the program's vocational rehabilitation activities  In 2016, total administrative costs associated with the LHWCA were approximately $15 8 million, of which $13 6 million, or 86%, was paid by general revenue and $2 2 million, or 14%, was paid by the Special Fund  The LHWCA provides medical benefits for covered injuries and illnesses and disability benefits to partially cover wages lost due to covered injuries or illnesses, and it provides survivors benefits to the families of workers who die on the job  The LHWCA provides medical benefits to fully cover the cost of any medical treatment associated with a covered injury or illness  These medical benefits are provided without any deductibles, copayments, or costs paid by the injured worker  Prescription drugs and medical procedures are fully covered, as are costs associated with travelling to and from medical appointments  A covered worker may select his or her own treating physician, provided the physician has not been debarred from the LHWCA program for violating program rules  Covered workers are entitled to vocational rehabilitation services provided under the LHWCA  Vocational rehabilitation services are designed to assist the covered worker in returning to employment  There is no cost to the covered worker for vocational rehabilitation and workers actively participating in a rehabilitation program are entitled to an additional benefit of $25 per week  All costs associated with vocational rehabilitation under the LHWCA are paid out of the Special Fund  Vocational rehabilitation services may be provided by public or private rehabilitation agencies  The LHWCA provides disability benefits to covered workers to partially cover wages lost due to the inability to work because of a covered injury or illness  The amount of disability benefits is based on the worker's pre-disability wage, subject to maximum and minimum benefits based on the National Average Weekly Wage (NAWW) as determined by the DOL  The NAWW is updated October 1 of each year and is based on average wages across the United States for the three calendar quarters ending on June 30 of that year  The minimum weekly benefit that can be paid to a covered employee is equal to 50% of the NAWW and the maximum weekly benefit that can be paid is equal to 200% of the NAWW  Disability benefits under the LHWCA, like all workers' compensation benefits, are not subject to federal income taxes  Unlike most state workers' compensation benefits, however, LHWCA benefits are adjusted based on wage inflation rather than price inflation  Benefits are adjusted annually each October 1 to reflect the change in the NAWW from the previous year, up to a maximum increase of 5%  The LHWCA provides benefits in cases of total disability  Under the LHWCA, a worker is considered totally disabled if he or she is unable to earn his or her pre-injury wage because of a covered injury or illness  In addition, a worker is also considered totally disabled if he or she loses both hands, arms, feet, legs, or eyes, or any two of these body systems, such as the loss of one arm and one leg  Total disability benefits under the LHWCA are equal to two-thirds of the covered worker's wage at the time of the injury or illness  Total disability benefits continue until the worker is no longer totally disabled or dies  If a covered worker is able to partially return to work or return to work at a wage level less than his or her wage at the time of injury, then he or she is considered partially disabled  In cases of temporary partial disability, the LHWCA benefit is equal to two-thirds of the difference between the workers' pre-injury wage and his or her current earning capacity or actual earnings  Section 8(c) of the LHWCA provides a schedule of benefits to be paid in cases of permanent partial disability (PPD), such as the loss of a limb  The benefit schedule provides the number of weeks of compensation, at two-thirds of the pre-injury wage, for each type of PPD  For example, the LHWCA schedule provides that a worker who loses an arm is entitled to 312 weeks of compensation  Benefits in cases not listed on the schedule are paid at two-thirds of the difference between the pre-injury wage and current earning capacity for the duration of the disability  Schedule benefits for PPD are paid regardless of the current work status or earnings capacity of the employee  Thus, an employee with a PPD can fully return to work and earn his or her wage in addition to the PPD compensation  A copy of the LHWCA PPD schedule can be found in the Appendix to this report  If a worker has an illness that was caused by his or her covered employment but did not manifest itself until after his or her retirement, then he or she is entitled to disability benefits equal to two-thirds of the NAWW multiplied by the percentage of his or her impairment  The percentage of impairment is determined using the current edition of the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides ), or another professionally recognized source if the condition is not listed in the AMA Guides  The LHWCA provides cash benefits to the surviving spouses and minor children of workers killed on the job  Benefits for a surviving spouse end when the spouse remarries or dies and benefits for surviving children continue until the children reach the age of 18, age 23 if a full-time student, or for the life a child with a disability  A surviving spouse with no eligible children is entitled to one-half of the deceased worker's wage at the time of death under the LHWCA  A surviving spouse with one or more eligible children is entitled to two-thirds of the deceased worker's wage at the time of death  Once all children become ineligible for benefits because of their ages, the surviving spouse's benefit is reduced to the level of a spouse without any eligible children  If an eligible spouse becomes ineligible for benefits because of death or remarriage, or if there is no surviving spouse, benefits are still paid to any surviving children  Under the LHWCA, a single surviving eligible child is entitled to one-half of the deceased worker's wage at the time of death, and two or more surviving children are eligible for a combined two-thirds of the wage at the time of death  The survivors of a covered worker killed on the job are entitled under the LHWCA to a cash payment to provide for the burial and funeral of the deceased  The burial and funeral allowance is capped by Section 9(a) of the LHWCA at $3,000, and this cap not adjusted to reflect changes in prices or wages  If a covered worker who is receiving scheduled PPD benefits dies of a cause unrelated to his or her illness or injury, then the balance of any remaining PPD benefits is paid to his or her survivors  If a covered worker who dies on the job leaves no survivors, his or her employer or the employer's insurance carrier is required to pay $5,000 into the Special Fund  Although the responsibility for the payment of benefits under the LHWCA rests with the employer or the employer's insurance company, decisions on benefit eligibility and the amount of benefits are made by the DOL  Upon the report of an injury, illness, or death, the LHWCA claims process begins  If the employer or insurance carrier does not controvert the claim, then arrangements are made by the DOL for the claim to be paid  If, however, the employer controverts any part of the claim, then the DOL sets up an informal conference, either in person or by phone, between the employer or insurance carrier and worker with the goal of resolving any disputes over the claim  If this informal conference fails to resolve all outstanding disputes, then a formal hearing before a DOL administrative law judge (ALJ) is scheduled  If the employer or insurance carrier or the worker is dissatisfied with the decision of the ALJ, then this decision may be appealed to the Benefits Review Board (BRB)  The BRB is made up of five members appointed by the Secretary of Labor  Either party dissatisfied with the decision of the BRB may file a petition with the U S  Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred praying that the BRB's decision be set aside or modified  If an employer or insurance carrier fails to pay compensation in accordance with a final decision on a claim, the covered worker or the DOL may request that the U S  District Court order that payment be made 


Report 2: The Secret Service plays a critical role in protecting the President, Vice President, their immediate families, and national leaders, among others  In addition, the component is responsible for safeguarding the nation’s currency and financial payment systems  To accomplish its mission, Secret Service officials reported that, as of June 2018, the component had approximately 7,100 employees (including the Uniformed Division, special agents, and administrative, professional, and technical staff)  These employees were assigned to the component’s headquarters in Washington, D C , and 133 field offices located throughout the world (including 115 domestic offices and 18 international offices)  The Secret Service’s employees are heavily dependent on the component’s IT infrastructure and communications systems to perform their daily duties  According to data reported on the Office of Management and Budget’s IT Dashboard, the component planned to spend approximately $104 8 million in fiscal year 2018 to modernize and maintain its IT environment  To manage this IT environment, the Secret Service hired a full-time CIO in November 2015  In addition, in an effort to improve its management structure, the component consolidated all IT staff and assets under this new CIO in March 2017  OCIO officials stated that these staff include the government employees who provide direct and indirect support of the day-to-day operations of the Secret Service’s enterprise systems and services  According to Secret Service officials, the component’s IT workforce included 190 staff, as of July 2018  These officials stated that 166 of these employees were located in the component’s headquarters in Washington, D C , and 24 were located in domestic field offices  The officials also reported that these July 2018 staffing levels were below their current approved staffing level of 220 staff (which included 44 positions in domestic field offices)  Secret Service IT staff also deploy to other locations, as necessary, to provide support for certain security activities  For example, the Secret Service reported that, in 2017, OCIO deployed over 79 staff to New York, N Y , to provide communications support during the United Nations General Assembly  As a component of DHS, the Secret Service must follow the department’s policies and processes for managing acquisitions, including IT acquisitions  DHS categorizes its acquisition programs according to three levels that are determined by the life cycle costs of the programs  These levels then determine the extent of required program and project management and the acquisition decision authority (the individual responsible for management and oversight of the acquisition)  The department also categorizes its acquisition programs as major or non- major based on expected cost  Table 1 describes the levels of DHS’s acquisition programs and their associated acquisition decision authorities  DHS’s policies and processes for managing major acquisition programs are primarily set forth in its Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 and Acquisition Management Instruction 102-01-001  In particular, these policies establish that a major acquisition program’s decision authority is to review the program at a series of predetermined acquisition decision events to assess whether the program is ready to proceed through the acquisition life cycle phases  Figure 1 depicts the acquisition life cycle established in DHS acquisition management policy  DHS’s Acquisition Management Directive and Instruction do not establish an acquisition life cycle framework for the department’s non-major acquisition programs  Instead, according to the Instruction, Component Acquisition Executives (i e , the senior acquisition official within a component that is responsible for implementation, management, and oversight of the component’s acquisition process) are required to establish component-specific non-major acquisition policies and guidance that support the “spirit and intent” of the department’s acquisition policies  To that end, the Secret Service developed a policy that establishes an acquisition life cycle framework for its non-major acquisition programs  This acquisition framework for the component’s non-major acquisition programs is consistent with the acquisition framework that DHS established for its major acquisition programs  In particular, the Secret Service’s framework includes the same phases and decision events as DHS’s framework (e g , acquisition decision event 2A, the point at which the acquisition decision authority determines whether a program may proceed into the obtain phase)  In addition, DHS’s Systems Engineering Life Cycle Instruction and Guidebook outline a framework of major systems engineering activities and technical reviews that are to be conducted by all DHS programs and projects, both major and non-major  This framework is intended to ensure that appropriate systems engineering activities are planned and implemented, and that a program’s development effort is meeting the business need  In particular, the systems engineering life cycle framework consists of nine major activities (e g , requirements definition, integration, and testing) and a set of related technical reviews (e g , preliminary design review) and artifacts (e g , requirements documents)  DHS policy allows programs to tailor these activities, technical reviews, and artifacts based on the unique characteristics of the program (e g , scope, complexity, and risk)  For example, a program may combine systems engineering technical reviews and artifacts, or add additional reviews  This tailored approach must be documented in a program’s systems engineering life cycle tailoring plan  The systems engineering technical reviews are intended to provide DHS the opportunity to determine how well a program has completed the necessary systems engineering activities  Each technical review includes a minimum set of exit criteria that must be satisfied before a program may move on to the next systems engineering activity  At the end of the technical review, the program manager must develop a technical review completion letter that documents the outcome of the review, including stakeholder concurrence that the exit criteria were satisfied  Moreover, DHS’s agile instruction, which was first issued in April 2016 and updated in April 2018, identifies agile as the preferred development approach for the department’s IT programs and projects  Agile is a type of incremental (i e , modular) development, which calls for the rapid delivery of software in small, short increments rather than in the typically long, sequential phases of a traditional waterfall approach  DHS’s agile instruction also states that component CIOs are to set modular (i e , incremental) outcomes and target measures to monitor progress in achieving agile implementation for IT programs and projects  To that end, the department identified core metrics that its agile IT programs are to use to monitor progress, including the number of story points completed per release and the number of releases per quarter  Further, DHS policy and guidance have established an acquisition (i e , contract) review process that is intended to enable the DHS CIO to review and effectively guide the department’s IT expenditures  According to the department’s IT acquisition review guidance, DHS components with a CIO (which includes the Secret Service) are to submit to DHS OCIO for review, IT acquisitions that (1) have total estimated procurement values of $2 5 million or more; and (2) are funded by a level 1, 2, or 3 program with a life cycle cost estimate of at least $50 million (i e , a major investment, as defined by DHS’s capital planning and investment control guidance)  DHS policies and guidance also establish numerous responsibilities for the department’s component-level CIOs that are aimed at ensuring proper oversight and management of the components’ IT investments  Among other things, these component-level CIO responsibilities relate to topics such as IT budgeting, portfolio management, and oversight of programs’ systems engineering life cycles  Table 2 identifies 14 selected IT oversight responsibilities for DHS’s component CIOs  The Secret Service acquires IT infrastructure and services that are intended to improve its ability to execute its investigation and protection missions  According to data reported on the Office of Management and Budget’s IT Dashboard, the Secret Service planned to spend about $104 8 million on IT in fiscal year 2018, which included approximately $34 6 million for the development and modernization of its IT infrastructure and services, and about $70 2 million for the operations and maintenance of this infrastructure (including 21 existing IT systems)  Also according to data reported on the IT Dashboard, as of April 2018, the Secret Service had one major IT investment (called the Information Integration and Technology Transformation and discussed in more detail later in this report), seven non-major IT investments, and one non- standard infrastructure investment  Figure 2 depicts the Secret Service’s planned IT spending for fiscal year 2018  The Secret Service has faced long-standing challenges in managing its IT infrastructure  For example, A National Security Agency audit of the Secret Service’s IT environment in 2008 identified network and system vulnerabilities that needed immediate remediation to protect the component’s systems and electronic information  The Secret Service determined in 2010 that it had IT capability gaps associated with three key areas: network security, information sharing and situational awareness, and operational communications  The component reported that it required a significant IT modernization effort with sustained investment of resources to replace dated and restrictive network and communications capabilities  The Secret Service also reported in 2010 that it had 42 mission- support applications that were operating on a 1980’s mainframe that lacked multi-level security (i e , the ability to view classified information from two security levels, such as secret and top secret, at the same time), was beyond its equipment life cycle, and was at risk of failing  Further, in 2011, DHS’s Office of Inspector General reported that the Secret Service’s existing infrastructure did not meet current operational requirements  According to the Secret Service, this dated infrastructure was unable to support newer technologies (e g , Internet protocol), share common DHS enterprise services, or migrate to the department’s consolidated data centers  To address challenges with its IT environment, in 2009, the Secret Service initiated the IITT investment, which is intended to modernize and enhance the component’s infrastructure, communications systems, applications, and processes  In particular, IITT is a portfolio of programs and projects that are meant to, among other things, improve systems availability in support of the Secret Service’s business operations, increase interoperability with other government systems and networks, enhance the component’s system and network security, and enable scalability to support growth  From 2010 to July 2018, according to OCIO officials, the Secret Service spent approximately $392 million on IITT  In fiscal year 2018, the component had planned to spend approximately $42 7 million on IITT (i e , about 40 percent of its total planned IT spending for the fiscal year), according to data reported on the Office of Management and Budget’s IT Dashboard  In total, the planned life cycle cost estimate for IITT is at least $811 million  As of June 2018, IITT was a major investment comprised of two programs (one of which included three projects) and one standalone project (i e , it was not part of another program) that had capabilities that were in planning or development and modernization  These programs and project were the Enabling Capabilities program, Enterprise Resource Management System program (which included three projects that were each being implemented using an agile methodology: Uniformed Division Resource Management System, Events Management, and Enterprise-wide Scheduling), and the Multi-Level Security project  Table 3 describes the IITT programs and projects that had capabilities that were in planning or development and modernization, as of June 2018  The table also includes the associated level, acquisition decision authority, estimated life cycle costs, and planned or actual dates of operational capability for each of the programs and projects  (Appendix II also provides additional information on these programs and projects ) The Enabling Capabilities program within IITT is designated as a major acquisition program  As such, its acquisition decision authority is the DHS Under Secretary for Management, and both DHS and the Secret Service provide oversight to this program  IITT’s other program and project—the Enterprise Resource Management System program (which includes three projects, as discussed earlier) and Multi-Level Security project—are designated non-major acquisition programs  In June 2011, DHS’s Under Secretary for Management delegated acquisition decision authority for this non-major program and project to the Secret Service Component Acquisition Executive  As such, oversight of the Enterprise Resource Management System program (including its three projects) and the Multi- Level Security project is conducted primarily at the component level  The Secret Service also implemented other capabilities that are now in operations and maintenance (i e , the capabilities have been fielded and are operational) as part of the IITT investment, such as a capability to move data between systems in separate classification levels (e g , top secret and secret) and communications interoperability  Table 4 describes IITT capabilities that are in operations and maintenance  DHS, including the Secret Service, has faced long-standing challenges in effectively managing its workforce  In January 2003, we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk, including its management of human capital, because it had to transform 22 agencies—several with major management challenges—into one department  This represented an enormous and complex undertaking that would require time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner  Since that time, the department has made important progress in strengthening and integrating its management functions  Nevertheless, we have continued to report that significant work remains for DHS to improve these management functions  Among other things, we previously reported that the department had lower average employee morale than the average for the rest of the federal government  We also reported that, in 2011, based on employee responses to the Office of Personnel Management’s Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey—a tool that measures employees’ perceptions of whether and to what extent conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their agency—DHS was ranked 31st out of 33 large agencies on the Partnership for Public Service’s Best Places to Work in the Federal Government rankings  The most recent results of these surveys in 2017 showed that DHS continues to maintain its low rankings  DHS’s Office of Inspector General has reported on challenges that the Secret Service has faced in managing its IT workforce  Specifically, in October 2016, the Inspector General reported that the Secret Service CIO did not have oversight of, or authority over, all IT resources, including the workforce; in particular, almost all of the component’s IT employees were located in a division outside of OCIO; and the Secret Service had vacancies in key positions responsible for managing IT, including not having a full-time CIO from December 2014 through November 2015  As previously discussed, the Secret Service has taken actions to address these two issues with the management of its IT workforce  These actions included hiring its full-time CIO in November 2015 and consolidating the workforce and all IT assets under this CIO in March 2017  Of the 14 selected responsibilities established for component-level CIOs in DHS’s IT management policies, the Secret Service CIO had fully implemented 11 responsibilities and had partially implemented 3 responsibilities  Table 5 summarizes the extent to which the Secret Service CIO had implemented each of the 14 responsibilities  The Secret Service CIO fully implemented 11 of the 14 selected component-level CIO responsibilities  Examples of the responsibilities that the CIO fully implemented are as follows: Develop, implement, and maintain a detailed IT strategic plan  Consistent with DHS’s IT Integration and Management directive, in January 2017, the Secret Service CIO developed an IT strategic plan that outlined the CIO’s strategic IT goals and objectives, as well as tasks intended to meet the goals and objectives  The CIO maintained this strategic plan, to include updating it in January 2018  The CIO also took steps to implement the tasks identified within the strategic plan, such as working to develop an IT training program  In particular, as part of this effort to develop an IT training program, OCIO identified recommended training for the office’s various IT workforce groups (discussed in more detail later in this report)  Concur with each program’s and/or project’s systems engineering life cycle tailoring plan  In accordance with DHS’s Systems Engineering Life Cycle instruction, the Secret Service CIO concurred with the systems engineering life cycle tailoring plan for one program and three projects included in the Secret Service’s IITT investment  Specifically, the CIO documented his approval via his signature on the tailoring plans for IITT’s Enabling Capabilities program, and Multi-Level Security, Uniformed Division Resource Management System, and Events Management projects  Participate on DHS’s CIO Council, Enterprise Architecture Board, or other councils/boards as appropriate, and appoint employees to serve when necessary  As required by DHS’s IT Integration and Management directive, the Secret Service CIO participated on two required DHS-level councils/boards, and appointed a delegate to serve in his place, when necessary  Specifically, the Secret Service CIO or the CIO’s delegate—the Deputy CIO—attended bi-monthly meetings of the DHS CIO Council  In addition, another Secret Service CIO appointee—the component’s Chief Architect—attended an ad hoc meeting of the Enterprise Architecture Board in June 2017  In addition, the Secret Service CIO had partially implemented three component-level CIO responsibilities, as follows  Manage the component IT investment portfolio, including establishing a component-level IT acquisition review process that enables component and DHS review of component acquisitions (i e , contracts) that contain IT  As directed in DHS’s Capital Planning and Investment Control directive and guidebook, the Secret Service CIO took steps to manage the component’s IT investment portfolio, including reviewing certain contracts containing IT  For example, among our random sample of 33 IT contracts that the Secret Service awarded between October 1, 2016, and June 30, 2017, we found that the CIO or the CIO’s delegate had reviewed 31 of these contracts  However, the CIO had not established and documented a defined process for reviewing contracts containing IT, which may have contributed to why the CIO or the CIO’s delegate did not review 2 of the 33 contracts in our sample  OCIO officials were unable to explain why neither of these officials reviewed the 2 contracts, which had a combined planned total procurement value of approximately $1 75 million  In particular, one of the contracts, with a planned total procurement value of about $1,122,934, was to provide credentialing services for the 2017 Presidential Inauguration  The other contract, with a planned total procurement value of about $629,337, was to provide maintenance support for a logistics system  The OCIO officials acknowledged that both contracts should have been approved by one of these officials  Without establishing and documenting an IT acquisition review process that ensures that the CIO or the CIO’s delegate reviews all contracts containing IT, as appropriate, the CIO’s ability to analyze the contracts to ensure that they are a cost-effective use of resources and are aligned with the component’s missions and goals is limited  Ensure all component IT policies are in compliance and alignment with DHS IT directives and instructions  As required by DHS’s IT Integration and Management directive, the Secret Service CIO had ensured that certain component IT policies were in compliance and alignment with DHS IT directives and instructions  For example, in alignment with the department’s IT Integration and Management directive, the Secret Service’s Investment Governance for IT policy specifies that the component CIO (in conjunction with each Secret Service Office) is responsible for developing the component IT spend plan, as well as developing and maintaining an IT strategic plan  However, the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy was not in compliance with DHS’s IT Integration and Management directive  Specifically, while the department’s policy states that the Secret Service CIO is responsible for developing and reviewing the component’s IT budget formulation and execution, the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy does not specify this as the CIO’s responsibility  According to OCIO officials, the Secret Service CIO participates in the development and review of the IT budget formulation and execution as a member of the Executive Resources Board (the Secret Service’s highest-level governing body, which has the final decision authority and responsibility for enterprise governance), and the Secret Service Deputy CIO is a voting member of the Enterprise Governance Council (the Secret Service’s second-level governance body and advisory council to the Executive Resources Board)  However, the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy has not been updated to reflect these roles  The Secret Service did not update its enterprise governance policy to properly reflect the CIO’s and Deputy CIO’s roles on the Executive Resources Board or Enterprise Governance Council because OCIO officials were not aware that these roles were not properly documented in the component’s policy until we identified this issue during our review  Further compounding the issue of the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy not properly reflecting the CIO’s and Deputy CIO’s roles and responsibilities on the component’s governance boards is that the Secret Service has not developed a charter for its Executive Resources Board  We have previously reported that a best practice for effective investment management is to define and document the board’s membership, roles, and responsibilities  One such way to do so is via a charter  According to Secret Service officials, the component does not have a charter for the board because, while the Secret Service has established the board pursuant to law, there is little statutory guidance on how the board must be formalized, including whether a charter is required  The officials acknowledged that development of a board charter is a best practice  They stated that, in response to our review, the component has begun efforts to develop a charter for the Executive Resources Board, but they did not know when it would be completed  Until the Secret Service updates its enterprise governance policy to specify (1) the CIO’s current role and responsibilities on the Executive Resources Board, to include developing and reviewing the IT budget formulation and execution, and (2) the Deputy CIO’s role and responsibilities on the Enterprise Governance Council, the CIO’s ability to develop and review the component’s IT budget may be limited  Further, until the Secret Service develops a charter for its Executive Resources Board that specifies the roles and responsibilities of all board members, including the CIO, the Secret Service will not be effectively positioned to ensure that all members understand their roles and responsibilities on the board and will perform them as expected  Set modular outcomes and target measures to monitor the progress in achieving agile implementation for IT programs and/or projects within their component  Consistent with DHS policy, the Secret Service CIO has set modular outcomes and target measures to monitor the progress of two IITT projects that the component is implementing using an agile methodology—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management  For example, the modular outcomes set for these projects included measuring planned and actual burndown (i e , the number of user stories completed)  In addition, the projects were to measure their velocity (i e , the rate of work completed) for each sprint (i e , a set period of time during which the development team is expected to complete tasks related to developing a piece of working software)  However, the modular outcomes and target measures did not include product quality or post-deployment user satisfaction, although such measures are leading practices for managing agile projects  According to Secret Service OCIO officials, the component does not mandate the specific metrics that its agile projects are to use; instead, each project is to determine the metrics based on stakeholder requirements and unique project characteristics  The officials further stated that these metrics are to be documented in an acquisition program baseline and program management plan; this baseline and program management plan are then to be approved by the CIO  To its credit, the component’s one agile project that, as of May 2018, had deployed its system to users—the Uniformed Division Resource Management System—did measure product quality  OCIO officials also stated that they regularly receive verbal, undocumented feedback from users on the system and they plan to conduct a documented user satisfaction survey on this system by September 2018  Nevertheless, without ensuring that product quality and post- deployment user satisfaction metrics are included in the modular outcomes and target measures that the CIO sets for monitoring agile projects, the Secret Service lacks assurance that the Events Management project or other future agile projects will measure product quality or post-deployment user satisfaction  Without guidance specifying that agile projects track these metrics, the projects may not do so and the CIO may be limited in his knowledge of the progress being made on these projects  Workforce planning and management is essential for ensuring that federal agencies have the talent, skill, and experience mix they need to execute their missions and program goals  To help agencies effectively conduct workforce planning and management, the Office of Personnel Management, the Chief Human Capital Officers Council, DHS, the Secret Service, and we have identified numerous leading practices related to five workforce areas: strategic planning, recruitment and hiring, training and development, employee morale, and performance management  Table 6 identifies the five workforce areas and 15 selected leading practices associated with these areas (3 practices within each area)  Of the five selected workforce planning and management areas, the Secret Service had substantially implemented two of the areas and minimally implemented three of the areas for its IT workforce  In addition, of the 15 selected leading practices associated with these workforce planning and management areas, the Secret Service had fully implemented 3 practices, partly implemented 8 practices, and did not implement any aspects of 4 practices  Table 7 summarizes the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented for its IT workforce the five selected workforce planning and management areas and 15 selected leading practices associated with those areas, as of June 2018  Strategic workforce planning is an essential activity that an agency needs to conduct to ensure that its human capital program aligns with its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals, and that the agency is able to meet its future needs  We previously identified numerous leading practices related to IT strategic workforce planning, including that an organization should (1) establish and maintain a strategic workforce planning process, including developing all competency and staffing needs; (2) regularly assess competency and staffing needs, and analyze the IT workforce to identify gaps in those areas; and (3) develop strategies and plans to address gaps in competencies and staffing  The Secret Service minimally implemented the three selected leading practices associated with the IT strategic workforce planning area  Specifically, the component partly implemented two of the practices and did not implement one practice  Table 8 lists these selected leading practices and provides our assessment of the Secret Service’s implementation of the practices  Establish and maintain a strategic workforce planning process, including developing all competency and staffing needs—partly implemented  The Secret Service took steps to establish a strategic workforce planning process for its IT workforce  For example, the Secret Service CIO developed and maintained a plan that identified strategic workforce planning tasks, to include analyzing the staffing requirements of the IT workforce  In addition, the Secret Service defined general core competencies (e g , communication and customer service) for its workforce, including IT staff  However, OCIO did not identify all required knowledge and skills needed to support this office’s functions  In particular, while OCIO identified certain technical competencies that its IT workforce needs, such as cybersecurity, the office did not identify and document all of the technical competencies that it needs  OCIO officials stated that they did not identify and document the technical competencies that the office needs because the Secret Service was focused on reorganizing the IT workforce under a single, centralized reporting chain within the CIO’s office  Consequently, the officials stated that they had not completed the work to identify all required IT knowledge and skills necessary to support the office  Yet, the Secret Service completed the IT workforce reorganization effort over a year ago, in March 2017 and, since then, OCIO has not identified all of the required IT knowledge and skills that the office needs  OCIO officials told us that they plan to identify all of the technical competency needs for the IT workforce, but they were unable to specify a time frame for when these needs would be fully identified  Until OCIO identifies all of the required knowledge and skills for the IT workforce, the office will be limited in its ability to identify and address any competency gaps associated with this workforce  In addition, the Secret Service did not reliably determine the number of IT staff that it needs in order to support OCIO’s functions  Specifically, in January 2017, an independent review of the staffing model that the component used to identify its IT workforce staffing needs found that the model was not based on any verifiable underlying data  In late August 2018, Office of Human Resources officials reported that they had hired a contractor in early August 2018 to update the staffing model to improve the quality of the data  These officials expected the contractor to finish updating the model by August 2019  The officials plan to use the updated model to identify the Secret Service’s IT workforce staffing needs for fiscal year 2021  Updating the staffing model to incorporate verifiable workload data should increase the likelihood that the Secret Service is able to appropriately identify its staffing needs for its IT workforce  Regularly assess competency and staffing needs, and analyze the IT workforce to identify gaps in those areas—not implemented  The Secret Service regularly assessed the competency and staffing needs for 1 of the occupational series within its IT workforce (i e , the 2210 IT Specialist series)  However, it did not regularly assess the competency and staffing needs for the remaining 11 occupational series that are associated with the component’s IT workforce, nor identify any gaps that it had in those areas  OCIO officials stated that they had not assessed these needs or identified competency or staffing gaps because, among other things, the Secret Service was focused on reorganizing the IT workforce under a single, centralized reporting chain within the CIO’s office  However, as previously mentioned, the component completed this effort in March 2017, but OCIO did not subsequently assess its competency and staffing needs, nor identify gaps in those areas  OCIO officials reported that they plan to assess the competencies of the IT workforce to identify any gaps that may exist; however, they were unable to identify a specific date by which they expect to have the capacity to complete this assessment  Until OCIO regularly analyzes the IT workforce to identify its competency needs and any gaps it may have, OCIO will be limited in its ability to determine whether its IT workforce has the necessary knowledge and skills to meet its mission and goals  Further, Office of Human Resources officials reported that they plan to update the staffing model that they use to identify their IT staffing needs to include more reliable workload data  However, as discussed earlier, the Secret Service had not yet developed that updated model to determine its IT staffing needs  Office of Human Resources officials reported that once they update the staffing model they plan to re- evaluate the Secret Service’s IT staffing needs  The officials also stated that, going forward, they plan to reassess these needs each year as part of the annual budget cycle  Regular assessments of the IT workforce’s staffing needs should increase the likelihood that the Secret Service is able to appropriately identify the number of IT staff it needs to meet its mission and programmatic goals  Develop strategies and plans to address gaps in competencies and staffing—partly implemented  The Secret Service developed recruiting and hiring strategies to address certain competency and staffing needs (e g , cybersecurity) for its IT workforce  These strategies included, among other things, participating in DHS-wide recruiting events and using special hiring authorities  However, because OCIO did not identify all of its IT competency and staffing needs, and lacked a current analysis of its entire IT workforce, the Secret Service could not provide assurance that the recruiting and hiring strategies it developed were specifically targeted towards addressing current OCIO competency and staffing gaps  For example, without an analysis of the IT workforce’s skills, OCIO did not know the extent to which it had gaps in areas such as device management and cloud computing  As a result, the Secret Service’s recruiting strategies may not have been targeted to address any gaps in those areas  Until the Secret Service updates its recruiting and hiring strategies and plans to address all IT competency and staffing gaps identified (after OCIO completes its analysis of the entire IT workforce, as discussed earlier), the Secret Service will be limited in its ability to effectively recruit and hire staff to fill those gaps  According to the Office of Personnel Management, the Chief Human Capital Officers Council, and our prior work, once an agency has determined the critical skills and competencies that it needs to achieve programmatic goals, and identifies any competency or staffing gaps in its current workforce, the agency should be positioned to build effective recruiting and hiring programs  It is important that an agency has these programs in place to ensure that it can effectively recruit and hire employees with the appropriate skills to meet its various mission requirements  The Office of Personnel Management, the Chief Human Capital Officers Council, and we have also identified numerous leading practices associated with effective recruitment and hiring programs  Among these practices, an agency should (1) implement recruiting and hiring activities to address skill and staffing gaps by using the strategies and plans developed during the strategic workforce planning process; (2) establish and track metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the recruitment program and hiring process, including their effectiveness at addressing skill and staffing gaps, and report to agency leadership on progress addressing those gaps; and (3) adjust recruitment plans and hiring activities based on recruitment and hiring effectiveness metrics  The Secret Service minimally implemented the selected three leading practices associated with the recruitment and hiring workforce area  Specifically, the component partly implemented one of the three practices and did not implement the other two practices  Table 9 lists these selected practices and provides our assessment of the Secret Service’s implementation of the practices  Implement recruiting and hiring activities to address skill and staffing gaps by using the strategies and plans developed during the strategic workforce planning process—partly implemented  OCIO officials implemented the activities identified in the Secret Service’s recruiting and hiring plans  For example, as identified in its recruiting plan, OCIO participated in a February 2017 career fair to recruit job applicants at a technology conference  In addition, in August 2017, OCIO participated in a DHS-wide recruiting event  Secret Service officials reported that, during this event, they conducted four interviews for positions in OCIO  However, as previously discussed, OCIO did not identify all of its IT competency and staffing needs, and lacked a current analysis of its entire IT workforce  Without complete knowledge of its current IT competency and staffing gaps, the Secret Service could not provide assurance that the recruiting and hiring strategies that it had implemented fully addressed these gaps  Establish and track metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the recruitment program and hiring process, including their effectiveness at addressing skill and staffing gaps, and report to agency leadership on progress addressing those gaps—not implemented  The Secret Service had not established and tracked metrics for monitoring the effectiveness of its recruitment and hiring activities for the IT workforce  Officials in the Office of Human Resources attributed this to staffing constraints and said their priority was to address existing staffing gaps associated with the Secret Service’s law enforcement groups  In June 2018, Office of Human Resources officials stated that they plan to implement metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the hiring process for the IT workforce by October 2018  The officials also stated that they were in the process of determining (1) the metrics that are to be used to monitor the effectiveness of their workforce recruiting efforts and (2) whether they need to acquire new technology to support this effort  However, the officials did not know when they would implement the metrics for assessing the effectiveness of the recruitment activities and whether they would report the results to leadership  Until the Office of Human Resources (1) develops and tracks metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the Secret Service’s recruitment activities for the IT workforce, including their effectiveness at addressing skill and staffing gaps; and (2) reports to component leadership on those metrics, the Secret Service and the Office of Human Resources will be limited in their ability to analyze the recruitment program to determine whether the program is effectively addressing IT skill and staffing gaps  Further, Secret Service leadership will lack the information necessary to make effective recruitment decisions  Adjust recruitment plans and hiring activities based on recruitment and hiring effectiveness metrics—not implemented  While the Secret Service CIO stated in June 2018 that he planned to adjust the office’s recruiting and hiring strategies to focus on entry- level staff rather than mid-career employees, this planned adjustment was not based on metrics that the Secret Service was tracking  Instead, the CIO stated that he planned to make this change because his office determined that previous mid-career applicants were often unwilling or unable to wait for the Secret Service’s lengthy, required background investigation process to be completed  However, as previously mentioned, the Secret Service did not develop and implement any metrics for assessing the effectiveness of the recruitment and hiring activities for the IT workforce  As a result, the Office of Human Resources and OCIO were not able to use such metrics to inform adjustments to their recruiting and hiring plan and activities, thus, reducing their ability to target potential candidates for hiring  Until the Office of Human Resources and OCIO adjust their recruitment and hiring plans and activities as necessary, after establishing and tracking metrics for assessing the effectiveness of these activities for the IT workforce, the Secret Service will be limited in its ability to ensure that its recruiting plans and activities are appropriately targeted to potential candidates  In addition, the component will lack assurance that these plans and activities will effectively address skill and staffing gaps within its IT workforce  An organization should invest in training and developing its employees to help ensure that its workforce has the information, skills, and competencies that it needs to work effectively  In addition, training and development programs are an integral part of a learning environment that can enhance an organization’s ability to attract and retain employees with the skills and competencies needed to achieve cost-effective and timely results  DHS, the Secret Service, and we have previously identified numerous leading training and development-related practices  Among those practices, an organization should (1) establish a training and development program to assist the agency in achieving its mission and goals; (2) use tracking and other control mechanisms to ensure that employees receive appropriate training and meet certification requirements, when applicable; and (3) collect and assess performance data (including qualitative or quantitative measures, as appropriate) to determine how the training program contributes to improved performance and results  The Secret Service minimally implemented the selected three leading practices associated with the training and development workforce area  Specifically, the component partly implemented two of the three practices and did not implement one practice  Table 10 lists these selected leading practices and provides our assessment of the Secret Service’s implementation of the practices  Establish a training and development program to assist the agency in achieving its mission and goals—partly implemented  OCIO was in the process of developing a training program for its IT workforce  For example, OCIO developed a draft training plan that identified recommended training for the office’s various IT workforce groups (e g , voice communications employees)  However, the office had not defined the required training for each IT workforce group  In addition, OCIO officials had not yet determined which activities they would implement as part of the training program (e g , soliciting employee feedback after training is completed and evaluating the effectiveness of specific training courses), nor did they implement those activities  OCIO officials stated that they had not yet fully implemented a training program because their annual training budget for fiscal year 2018 was not sufficient to implement such a program  However, resource constrained programs especially benefit from identifying and prioritizing training activities to inform training budget decisions  Until OCIO (1) defines the required training for each IT workforce group, (2) determines the activities that it will include in its IT workforce training and development program based on its available training budget, and (3) implements those activities, the office may be limited in its ability to ensure that the IT workforce has the necessary knowledge and skills for their respective positions  Use tracking and other control mechanisms to ensure that employees receive appropriate training and meet certification requirements, when applicable—partly implemented  OCIO used a training system to track that the managers for IITT’s programs had met certain certification requirements for their respective positions  In addition, OCIO manually tracked the technical training that certain IT staff took  However, as discussed earlier, OCIO did not define the required training for each IT workforce group  As such, the office was unable to ensure that IT staff received the appropriate training relevant to their respective positions  Until it ensures that IT staff complete training specific to their positions (after defining the training required for each workforce group), OCIO will have limited assurance that the workforce has the necessary knowledge and skills  Collect and assess performance data (including qualitative or quantitative measures, as appropriate) to determine how the training program contributes to improved performance and results—not implemented  As previously discussed, OCIO did not fully implement a training program for the IT workforce; as such, the office was unable to collect and assess performance data related to such a program  OCIO officials stated that, once they fully implement a training program, they intend to collect and assess data on how this program contributes to improved performance  However, the officials were unable to specify a time frame for when they would do so  Until OCIO collects and assesses performance data (including qualitative or quantitative measures, as appropriate) to determine how the IT training program contributes to improved performance and results (once the training program is implemented), the office may be limited in its knowledge of whether the training program is contributing to improved performance and results  Employee morale is important to organizational performance and an organization’s ability to retain talent to perform its mission  We have previously identified numerous leading practices for improving employee morale  Among other things, we have found that an organization should (1) determine root causes of employee morale problems by analyzing employee survey results using techniques such as comparing demographic groups, benchmarking against similar organizations, and linking root cause findings to action plans; and develop and implement action plans to improve employee morale; (2) establish and track metrics of success for improving employee morale, and report to agency leadership on progress improving morale; and (3) maintain leadership support and commitment to ensure continued progress in improving employee morale, and demonstrate sustained improvement in morale  With regard to its IT workforce, the Secret Service substantially implemented the selected three practices associated with the employee morale workforce area  Specifically, the component fully implemented two of the selected practices and partly implemented one practice  Table 11 lists these selected practices and provides our assessment of the Secret Service’s implementation of the practices  Determine root causes of employee morale problems by analyzing employee survey results using techniques such as comparing demographic groups, benchmarking against similar organizations, and linking root cause findings to action plans  Develop and implement action plans to improve employee morale—fully implemented  The Secret Service used survey analysis techniques to determine the root causes of its low employee morale, on which we have previously reported  For example, the component conducted a benchmarking exercise where it compared the morale of the Secret Service’s employees, including IT staff, to data on the morale of employees at other agencies, including the U S  Capitol Police, U S  Coast Guard, and the Drug Enforcement Administration  As part of this exercise, the Secret Service also compared its employee work-life offerings (e g , on-site childcare and telework program) to those available at other agencies  In addition, the Secret Service developed and implemented action plans for improving employee morale  Among these action plans, for example, the component implemented a student loan repayment program and expanded its tuition assistance program’s eligibility requirements  Establish and track metrics of success for improving employee morale, and report to agency leadership on progress improving morale—fully implemented  The Secret Service tracked metrics for improving employee morale and reported the results to leadership  For example, the component tracked metrics on the percentage of the workforce, including IT staff, that participated in the student loan repayment and tuition assistance programs  In addition, the Chief Strategy Officer reported to the Chief Operating Officer the results related to meeting those metrics  Maintain leadership support and commitment to ensure continued progress in improving employee morale, and demonstrate sustained improvement in morale—partly implemented  Secret Service leadership developed and implemented initiatives that demonstrated their commitment to improving the morale of the Secret Service’s workforce  For example, since 2014, the Secret Service had worked with a contractor to identify ways to improve the morale of its entire workforce, including IT staff  However, as of June 2018, the Secret Service was unable to demonstrate that it had sustained improvement in the morale of the component’s IT staff  In particular, the component was only able to provide IT workforce-specific results from one employee morale assessment that was conducted subsequent to the consolidation of this workforce into OCIO in March 2017  These results were from an assessment conducted by the component’s Inspection Division in December 2017 (the assessment found that the majority of the Secret Service’s IT employees rated their morale as “very good” or “excellent ”) While the component also provided certain employee morale results from the Office of Personnel Management’s Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey in 2017, these results were not specific to the IT workforce  Instead, this workforce’s results were combined with those from staff in another Secret Service division  According to OCIO officials, the results were combined because, at the time of the survey, the IT workforce was administratively identified as being part of that other division  OCIO officials stated that, going forward, they plan to continue to assess the morale of the IT workforce on an annual basis as part of the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey  In addition, the officials stated that OCIO-specific results may be available as part of the 2018 survey results, which the officials expect to receive by September 2018  By measuring employee satisfaction on an annual basis, the Secret Service should have increased knowledge of whether its initiatives that are aimed at improving employee morale are in fact increasing employee satisfaction  Agencies can use performance management systems as a tool to foster a results-oriented organizational culture that links individual performance to organizational goals  We have previously identified numerous leading practices related to performance management that are intended to enhance performance and ensure individual accountability  Among the performance management practices, agencies should (1) establish a performance management system that differentiates levels of staff performance and defines competencies in order to provide a fuller assessment of performance, (2) explicitly align individual performance expectations with organizational goals to help individuals see the connection between their daily activities and organizational goals, and (3) periodically provide individuals with regular performance feedback  The Secret Service substantially implemented the selected three leading practices associated with the performance management workforce area  Specifically, the component fully implemented one of the three practices and partly implemented the other two practices  Table 12 lists these selected leading practices and provides our assessment of the Secret Service’s implementation of the practices  Establish a performance management system that differentiates levels of staff performance and defines competencies in order to provide a fuller assessment of performance—partly implemented  The Secret Service’s performance management process requires leadership to make meaningful distinctions between levels of staff performance  In particular, the component’s performance plans for IT staff, which are developed by the Office of Human Resources and tailored by OCIO, as necessary, specify the criteria that leadership use to determine if an individual has met or exceeded the expectations associated with each competency identified in their respective performance plan  The performance plans include pre-established, department-wide competencies that are set by DHS, as well as occupational series-specific goals that may be updated by the Secret Service  However, because OCIO did not fully define and document all of its technical competency needs for the IT workforce, as discussed earlier, the Secret Service’s performance plans for IT staff did not include performance expectations related to the full set of technical competencies required for their respective positions  In addition, because OCIO officials were unable to specify a time frame for when they will identify all of the technical competency needs for the IT workforce (as previously discussed), the officials were also unable to specify a time frame for when they would update the IT workforce’s performance plans to include those relevant technical competencies  Until OCIO updates the performance plans for each occupational series within the IT workforce to include the relevant technical competencies, once identified, against which IT staff performance should be assessed, the office will be limited in its ability to provide IT staff with a complete assessment of their performance  In addition, Secret Service management will have limited knowledge of the extent to which IT staff are meeting all relevant technical competencies  Explicitly align individual performance expectations with organizational goals to help individuals see the connection between their daily activities and organizational goals—partly implemented  The Secret Service’s performance plans for IT staff identified certain goals that appeared to be related to organizational goals and objectives  For example, the performance plan for the Telecommunications Specialist occupational series (which is one of the series included in OCIO’s IT workforce) identified a goal for staff to support the voice, wireless, radio, satellite, and video systems serving the Secret Service’s protective and investigative mission  This performance plan goal appeared to be related to the component’s strategic goal on Advanced Technology, which included an objective to create the infrastructure needed to fulfill mission responsibilities  However, the Secret Service was unable to provide documentation that explicitly showed how individual employee performance links to organizational goals, such as a mapping of the goals identified in employee performance plans to organizational goals  Specifically, while Office of Human Resources officials stated that each Secret Service directorate is responsible for ensuring that employee goals map to high-level organizational goals, OCIO officials stated that they did not complete this mapping  The officials were unable to explain why they did not align the goals in their employees’ performance plans to the component’s high-level goals  According to the officials, the Secret Service is in the process of implementing a new automated tool that will require each office to explicitly align individual performance expectations to organizational goals  The officials stated that OCIO plans to use this tool to create employees’ fiscal year 2019 performance plans  By explicitly demonstrating how individual performance expectations align with organizational goals, the Secret Service’s IT staff should have a better understanding of how their daily activities contribute towards achieving the Secret Service’s goals  Periodically provide individuals with regular performance feedback—fully implemented  Secret Service leadership periodically provided their IT staff with performance feedback  Specifically, on an annual basis, OCIO staff received feedback during a mid-year and end-of-year performance feedback assessment  In our prior work, we have stressed that candid and constructive feedback can help individuals maximize their contribution and potential for understanding and realizing the goals and objectives of an organization  Further, this feedback is one of the strongest drivers of employee engagement  According to leading practices of the Software Engineering Institute, effective program oversight includes monitoring program performance and conducting reviews at predetermined checkpoints or milestones  This is done by, among other things, comparing actual cost, schedule, and performance data with estimates in the program plan and identifying significant deviations from established targets or thresholds for acceptable performance levels  In addition, the Software Engineering Institute previously identified leading practices for effectively monitoring the performance of agile projects  According to the Institute, agile development methods focus on delivering usable, working software frequently; as such, it is important to measure the value delivered during each iteration of these projects  To that end, the Institute reported that agile projects should be measured on velocity (i e , number of story points completed per sprint or release), development progression (e g , the number of user stories planned and accepted), product quality (e g , number of defects), and post-deployment user satisfaction  DHS and the Secret Service had fully implemented the selected leading practice for monitoring the performance of one program and three projects within the IITT investment, and conducting reviews of this program and these projects at predetermined checkpoints  In addition, with regard to the selected leading practice for monitoring agile projects, the Secret Service had fully implemented this practice for one of its two projects being implemented using agile and had partially implemented this practice for the other project  Table 13 provides a summary of DHS’s and the Secret Service’s implementation of these leading practices, as relevant for one program and three projects within IITT  Monitor program performance and conduct reviews at predetermined checkpoints or milestones  Consistent with leading practices, DHS and the Secret Service monitored the performance of IITT’s program and projects by comparing actual cost, schedule, and performance information against planned targets and conducting reviews at predetermined checkpoints  For example, within the Secret Service: The Enabling Capabilities program and Multi-Level Security project monitored their contractors’ costs spent to-date on a monthly basis and compared them to the total contract amounts  OCIO used integrated master schedules to monitor the schedule performance of the Enabling Capabilities program and Multi-Level Security project  OCIO also monitored the cost, schedule, and performance of the Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management projects during monthly status reviews  In addition, DHS and the Secret Service conducted acquisition decision event reviews and systems engineering life cycle technical reviews of IITT’s program and projects at predetermined checkpoints and, when applicable, identified deviations from established cost, schedule, and performance targets  For example: Secret Service OCIO met with DHS’s Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management in February 2017, and with DHS’s Acting Under Secretary for Management in June 2017, to discuss a schedule breach for the Enabling Capabilities program  In particular, the Enabling Capabilities program informed DHS that the program needed to change the planned date for acquisition decision event 3 (the point at which a decision is made to fully deploy the system) in order to conduct tests in an operational environment prior to that decision event  This delay was due to the Secret Service misunderstanding the tests that it was required to conduct prior to that decision event  Specifically, the Enabling Capabilities program had conducted tests on “production representative” systems, but these tests were not sufficient to meet the requirements for acquisition decision event 3  The project team for Multi-Level Security identified that certain technical issues they had experienced would delay system deployment and full operational capability (the point at which an investment becomes fully operational)  As such, in October 2017, the project notified the Secret Service Component Acquisition Executive of these expected delays  In particular, the web browser that was intended to provide users on “Sensitive But Unclassified” workstations the ability to view information from different security levels, experienced technical delays in meeting personal identity verification requirements  The project team also described for the executive how the schedule delay would affect the project’s performance metrics and funding, and subsequently updated the project plan accordingly  Measure and monitor agile projects on, among other things, velocity (i e , number of story points completed per sprint or release), development progression (e g , the number of features and user stories planned and accepted), product quality (e g , number of defects), and post-deployment user satisfaction  Secret Service OCIO measured its two agile projects—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management— using certain agile metrics  In particular, OCIO officials measured the Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management projects using key metrics related to velocity and development progression  For example, the officials measured development progression for both projects on a daily basis  In addition, OCIO officials monitored each project’s progress against these metrics during bi-weekly reviews that they conducted with each project team  The OCIO officials also tracked product quality metrics for the Uniformed Division Resource Management System  For example, on a monthly basis, the officials tracked the number of helpdesk tickets that had been resolved related to the system  In addition, on a quarterly basis, they tracked the number of Uniformed Division Resource Management System defects that (1) had been fixed and (2) were in the backlog  However, while OCIO officials received certain post-deployment user satisfaction information from end-users of the Uniformed Division Resource Management System by, among other things, tracking the number of helpdesk tickets related to the system and via daily verbal, undocumented feedback from certain Uniformed Division officers, OCIO officials had not fully measured and documented post- deployment user satisfaction with the system, such as via a survey of employees who use the system  The officials stated that they had not conducted and documented a survey because they were focused on (1) addressing software performance issues that occurred after they deployed the system to a limited number of users, and (2) continuing system deployment to the remaining users after they addressed the performance issues  OCIO officials stated that they plan to conduct such a documented survey by the end of September 2018  The results of the user satisfaction survey should provide OCIO with important information on whether the Uniformed Division Resource Management System is meeting users’ needs  The Secret Service’s full implementation of 11 of 14 component-level CIO responsibilities constitutes a significant effort to establish CIO oversight for the component’s IT portfolio  Additional efforts to fully implement the remaining 3 responsibilities, including ensuring that all IT contracts are reviewed, as appropriate; ensuring that the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy appropriately specifies the CIO’s role in developing and reviewing the component’s IT budget formulation and execution; and ensuring agile projects measure product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction, will further position the CIO to effectively manage the Secret Service’s IT portfolio  When effectively implemented, IT workforce planning and management activities can facilitate the successful accomplishment of an agency’s mission  However, the Secret Service had not fully implemented all of the 15 selected practices for its IT workforce for any of the five areas— strategic planning, recruitment and hiring, training and development, employee morale, and performance management  The Secret Service’s lack of (1) a strategic workforce planning process, including the identification of all required knowledge and skills, assessment of competency gaps, and targeted strategies to address specific gaps in competencies and staffing; (2) targeted recruiting activities, including metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the recruitment program and adjustment of the recruitment program and hiring efforts based on metrics; (3) a training program, including the identification of required training for IT staff, ensuring that staff take required training, and assessment of performance data regarding the training program; and (4) a performance management system that includes all relevant technical competencies, greatly limits its ability to ensure the timely and effective acquisition and maintenance of the Secret Service’s IT infrastructure and services  On the other hand, by monitoring program performance and conducting reviews at predetermined checkpoints for one program and three projects associated with the IITT investment, in accordance with leading practices, the Secret Service and DHS provided important oversight needed to guide that program and those projects  Measuring projects on leading agile metrics also provided the Secret Service CIO with important information on project performance  We are making the following 13 recommendations to the Director of the Secret Service: The Director should ensure that the CIO establishes and documents an IT acquisition review process that ensures the CIO or the CIO’s delegate reviews all contracts containing IT, as appropriate  (Recommendation 1) The Director should update the enterprise governance policy to specify (1) the CIO’s current role and responsibilities on the Executive Resources Board, to include developing and reviewing the IT budget formulation and execution; and (2) the Deputy CIO’s role and responsibilities on the Enterprise Governance Council  (Recommendation 2) The Director should ensure that the Secret Service develops a charter for its Executive Resources Board that specifies the roles and responsibilities of all board members, including the CIO  (Recommendation 3) The Director should ensure that the CIO includes product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction metrics in the modular outcomes and target measures that the CIO sets for monitoring agile projects  (Recommendation 4) The Director should ensure that the CIO identifies all of the required knowledge and skills for the IT workforce  (Recommendation 5) The Director should ensure that the CIO regularly analyzes the IT workforce to identify its competency needs and any gaps it may have  (Recommendation 6) The Director should ensure that, after OCIO completes an analysis of the IT workforce to identify any competency and staffing gaps it may have, the Secret Service updates its recruiting and hiring strategies and plans to address those gaps, as necessary  (Recommendation 7) The Director should ensure that the Office of Human Resources (1) develops and tracks metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the Secret Service’s recruitment activities for the IT workforce, including their effectiveness at addressing skill and staffing gaps; and (2) reports to component leadership on those metrics  (Recommendation 8) The Director should ensure that the Office of Human Resources and OCIO adjust their recruitment and hiring plans and activities, as necessary, after establishing and tracking metrics for assessing the effectiveness of these activities for the IT workforce  (Recommendation 9) The Director should ensure that the CIO (1) defines the required training for each IT workforce group, (2) determines the activities that OCIO will include in its IT workforce training and development program based on its available training budget, and (3) implements those activities  (Recommendation 10) The Director should ensure that the CIO ensures that the IT workforce completes training specific to their positions (after defining the training required for each workforce group)  (Recommendation 11) The Director should ensure that the CIO collects and assesses performance data (including qualitative or quantitative measures, as appropriate) to determine how the IT training program contributes to improved performance and results (once the training program is implemented)  (Recommendation 12) The Director should ensure that the CIO updates the performance plans for each occupational series within the IT workforce to include the relevant technical competencies, once identified, against which IT staff performance should be assessed  (Recommendation 13) DHS provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendix III  In its comments, the department concurred with all 13 of our recommendations and provided estimated completion dates for implementing each of them  For example, with regard to recommendation 2, the department stated that the Secret Service would update its enterprise governance policy and related policies to outline the roles and responsibilities of the CIO and Deputy CIO, among others, by March 31, 2019  In addition, for recommendation 13, the department stated that the Secret Service OCIO will include relevant technical competencies in performance plans, as appropriate, in the next performance cycle that starts in July 2019  If implemented effectively, these actions should address the weaknesses we identified  The department also identified a number of other actions that it said had been taken to address our recommendations  For example, in response to recommendation 8, which calls for the Office of Human Resources to (1) develop and track metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the Secret Service’s recruitment activities for the IT workforce and (2) report to component leadership on those metrics, DHS stated that the Secret Service’s Office of Human Resources’ Outreach Branch provides to the department metrics on recruitment efforts toward designated priority mission-critical occupations  However, for fiscal year 2017, only 1 of the 12 occupational series associated with the Secret Service’s IT workforce was designated as a mission-critical occupation for the component (i e , the 2210 IT Specialist series)  The 11 other occupational series were not designated as mission- critical occupations  In addition, for fiscal year 2018, none of these 12 occupational series were designated as mission-critical occupations  As such, metrics on recruiting for these IT series may not have been reported to DHS leadership  Moreover, while we requested documentation of the recruiting metrics for the Secret Service’s IT workforce and, during the course of our review, had multiple subsequent discussions with the Secret Service regarding such metrics, the component did not provide documentation that demonstrated it had established recruiting metrics for its IT workforce  Tracking such metrics and reporting the results to Secret Service leadership, as we recommended, would provide management with important information necessary to make effective recruitment decisions  Further, in response to recommendation 10, which among other things, calls for the CIO to define the required training for each IT workforce group, the department stated that the Secret Service OCIO recently developed training requirements for each workforce group, which were issued during our audit  However, while during our audit OCIO provided a list of recommended training courses, the office did not identify them as being required courses  Defining training that is required for each IT workforce group, as we recommended, would inform OCIO of the necessary training for each position and enable the office to prioritize this training, to ensure that its staff have the needed knowledge and skills  In addition to the aforementioned comments, we received technical comments from DHS and Secret Service officials, which we incorporated, as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Secret Service, and other interested parties  In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  Should you or your staffs have any questions on information discussed in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4456 or HarrisCC@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  Our objectives were to evaluate the extent to which: (1) the U S  Secret Service (Secret Service) Chief Information Officer (CIO) has implemented selected information technology (IT) oversight responsibilities, (2) the Secret Service has implemented leading workforce planning and management practices for its IT workforce, and (3) the Secret Service and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have implemented selected performance and progress monitoring practices for the Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment  To address the first objective, we analyzed DHS’s policies and guidance on IT management to identify the responsibilities that were to be implemented by the component-level CIO related to overseeing the Secret Service’s IT portfolio, including existing systems, acquisitions, and investments  From the list of 33 responsibilities that we identified, we then excluded the responsibility that was associated with information security, which is expected to be addressed as part of a separate, subsequent GAO review  We also excluded those responsibilities that were significantly large in scope (e g , implement an enterprise architecture) or that, in our professional judgment, lacked specificity (e g , provide timely delivery of mission IT services)  As a result, we excluded from consideration for this review a total of 10 CIO responsibilities  For the 23 that remained, we then combined certain responsibilities that overlapped with other related responsibilities  For example, we combined related responsibilities on the component CIO’s review of IT contracts  As a result, we identified 14 responsibilities for review  We validated with the acting DHS CIO that these responsibilities were key responsibilities for the department’s component-level CIOs  We then included all 14 of the responsibilities in our review  The 14 selected component-level CIO responsibilities were: 1  Develop and review the component IT budget formulation and execution  2  Manage the component IT investment portfolio, including establishing an IT acquisition review process that enables component and DHS review of component acquisitions (i e , contracts) that contain IT  3  Develop, implement, and maintain a detailed IT strategic plan  4  Ensure all component IT policies are in compliance and alignment with DHS IT directives and instructions  5  Concur with each program’s and/or project’s systems engineering life cycle tailoring plan  6  Support the Component Acquisition Executive to ensure processes are established that enable systems engineering life cycle technical reviews and that they are adhered to by programs and/or projects  7  Ensure that all systems engineering life cycle technical review exit criteria are satisfied for each of the component’s IT programs and/or projects  8  Ensure the necessary systems engineering life cycle activities have been satisfactorily completed as planned for each of the component’s IT programs and/or projects  9  Concur with the systems engineering life cycle technical review completion letter for each of the component’s IT programs and/or projects  10  Maintain oversight of their component’s agile development approach for IT by appointing the responsible personnel, identifying investments for adoption, and reviewing artifacts  11  With Component Acquisition Executives, evaluate and approve the application of agile development for IT programs consistent with the component’s agile development approach  12  Set modular outcomes and target measures to monitor the progress in achieving agile implementation for IT programs and/or projects within their component  13  Participate on DHS’s CIO Council, Enterprise Architecture Board, or other councils/boards as appropriate, and appoint employees to serve when necessary  14  Meet the IT competency requirements established by the DHS CIO, as required in the component CIO’s performance plan  To determine the extent to which the Secret Service CIO has implemented these responsibilities, we obtained and assessed relevant component documentation and compared it to the responsibilities  Specifically, we obtained and analyzed documentation including evidence of the CIO’s participation on the Secret Service governance board that has final decision authority and responsibility for enterprise governance, including the IT budget; monthly program management reports showing the CIO’s oversight of IT programs, projects, and systems; monthly status reports on program spending; the Secret Service’s IT strategic plan; the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy; meeting minutes from the DHS board and council on which the CIO participated (i e , the CIO Council and Enterprise Architecture Board); and documentation demonstrating whether the CIO met the IT competency requirements  In addition, we obtained and analyzed relevant documentation related to the CIO’s oversight of the major IT investments on which the Secret Service was spending development, modernization, and enhancement funds during fiscal year 2017  As of July 2017, the component had one investment—IITT—that met this criterion  IITT is a portfolio investment that, as of July 2017, included two programs (one of which included three projects) and one standalone project (i e , it was not part of another program) that had capabilities that were in planning or development and modernization: the Enabling Capabilities program, Enterprise Resource Management System program (which included three projects, called Uniformed Division Resource Management System, Events Management, and Enterprise-wide Scheduling), and Multi-Level Security project  In particular, we obtained and analyzed documentation related to the CIO’s oversight of the systems engineering life cycles for IITT’s Enabling Capabilities program and the Uniformed Division Resource Management System, Events Management, and Multi-Level Security projects  This documentation included acquisition program baselines, systems engineering life cycle tailoring plans, and systems engineering life cycle technical review briefings and completion letters  We then compared the documentation against the five selected systems engineering life cycle oversight responsibilities (responsibilities 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9)  We also obtained and analyzed documentation related to the CIO’s oversight of two projects that the Secret Service was implementing using an agile methodology—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management  Specifically, we obtained and assessed documentation of (1) the CIO’s approval for these projects to be implemented using an agile methodology and (2) the agile development metrics that the CIO established for each of these projects  We then compared this documentation to the three agile development-related component-level CIO responsibilities (responsibilities 10, 11, and 12)  Further, to determine the extent to which the Secret Service CIO had established an IT acquisition (i e , contract) review process that enabled component and DHS review of component contracts that contain IT (which is part of responsibility 2), we first asked Secret Service officials to provide us with a list of all new, unclassified IT contracts that the component awarded between October 1, 2016, and June 30, 2017  The Secret Service officials provided a list of 54 contracts  We validated that these were contracts for IT or IT services by: (1) searching for them in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation; (2) identifying their associated product or service codes, as reported in that system; and (3) determining whether those codes were included in the universe of 79 IT product or service codes identified by the Category Management Leadership Council  In validating the list of 54 contracts provided by the Secret Service, we determined that 5 of the contracts were not associated with an IT product or service code  As such, we removed those contracts from the list  In addition, we found that three other items identified by the component were not in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation  Secret Service officials subsequently confirmed that these three items were not contracts  We therefore removed these three items from the list  As such, the final list of validated contracts identified by the Secret Service included 46 IT contracts  In addition, to identify any IT contracts that were not included in the list provided by the Secret Service, we conducted a search of the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation to identify all unclassified contracts that (1) the component awarded between October 1, 2016, and June 30, 2017; (2) were not a modification of a contract; and (3) were associated with 1 of the 79 IT product or service codes identified by the Category Management Leadership Council  Based on these criteria, we identified 144 Secret Service IT contracts in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation (these 144 contracts included the 46 contracts previously identified by Secret Service officials)  We then asked Secret Service officials to validate the accuracy, completeness, and reliability of these data, which they did  From each of these two lists of IT contracts (i e , the list of 46 IT contracts identified by the Secret Service and the list of 144 IT contracts that we identified from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation), we then selected random, non-generalizable samples of contracts, as described below  First, from the list of 46 IT contracts identified by Secret Service officials, we removed 4 contracts that had total values of less than $10,000  To ensure that we selected across all contract sizes, we randomly selected 12 contracts from the remaining list of 42 contracts, using the following cost ranges: $10,000 to $50,000 (4 contracts), more than $50,000 to less than $250,000 (4 contracts), and more than $250,000 (4 contracts)  Second, from our list of 144 IT contracts that we identified from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation, we removed the 46 contracts identified by Secret Service officials  We also removed 12 contracts that had total values of less than $10,000  To ensure that we selected across all contract sizes, we randomly selected 21 contracts from the remaining list of 86 contracts, using the following cost ranges: $10,000 to $50,000 (7 contracts), more than $50,000 to less than $250,000 (7 contracts), and more than $250,000 (7 contracts)  In total, we selected 33 IT contracts for review  We separated the contracts into the three cost ranges identified above in order to ensure that contracts of different value levels had been selected  This enabled us to determine the extent to which the CIO appropriately reviewed contracts of all values  To determine the extent to which the CIO had established an IT contract approval process that enabled the Secret Service and DHS, as appropriate, to review IT contracts, we first asked Secret Service Office of the CIO (OCIO) officials for documentation of their IT contract approval process  These officials were unable to provide such documentation  Instead, the officials stated that the Secret Service CIO or the CIO’s delegate approves all IT contracts prior to award  The officials also provided documentation that identified four staff to whom the CIO had delegated his approval authority  Further, the officials stated that, in accordance with DHS’s October 2016 IT acquisition review guidance, they submitted to DHS OCIO for approval any IT contracts that met DHS’s thresholds for review, including those that (1) had total estimated procurement values of $2 5 million or more, and (2) were associated with a major investment  Based on the IT acquisition review process that Secret Service OCIO officials described, we then obtained and analyzed each of the 33 selected IT contracts and associated approval documentation to determine whether or not the Secret Service CIO or the CIO’s delegate had approved each of the contracts  In particular, we (1) reviewed the name of the contract approver on the approval documentation, and (2) compared the signature dates that were on the contracts to the signature dates that were identified on the associated approval documentation  In addition, to determine whether or not the Secret Service CIO submitted to DHS OCIO for approval the IT contracts that (1) had total estimated procurement values of $2 5 million or more, and (2) were associated with major investments, we first analyzed the 144 Secret Service IT contracts that we had previously pulled from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation to determine which contracts met the $2 5 million threshold  We identified 4 contracts that met this threshold  We then requested that OCIO identify the levels (i e , major or non-major) of the investments associated with these contracts  According to OCIO officials, 3 of the 4 contracts were associated with non-major investments and 1 was not associated with an investment  As such, based on DHS’s October 2016 IT acquisition review guidance, none of these contracts needed to be submitted to DHS OCIO for review  We also interviewed Secret Service officials, including the CIO and Deputy CIO, regarding the CIO’s implementation of the 14 selected component-level responsibilities  We assessed the evidence against the selected responsibilities to determine the extent to which the CIO had implemented them  To address the second objective—determining the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented leading workforce planning and management practices for its IT workforce—we first identified seven topic areas associated with human capital management based on the following sources: The Office of Personnel Management’s Human Capital Framework  Office of Personnel Management and the Chief Human Capital Officers Council Subcommittee for Hiring and Succession Planning, End-to-End Hiring Initiative  GAO, High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others  GAO, IT Workforce: Key Practices Help Ensure Strong Integrated Program Teams; Selected Departments Need to Assess Skill Gaps  GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Taking Further Action to Better Determine Causes of Morale Problems Would Assist in Targeting Action Plans  GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government  GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Creating a Clear Linkage between Individual Performance and Organizational Success  DHS acquisition guidance  Secret Service acquisition guidance  Among these topic areas, we then selected five areas that, in our professional judgment, were of particular importance to successful workforce planning and management  They were also previously identified as part of our high-risk and key issues work on human capital management  These areas include: (1) strategic planning, (2) recruitment and hiring, (3) training and development, (4) employee morale, and (5) performance management  We also reviewed these same sources and identified numerous leading practices associated with the five topic areas  Among these leading practices, we then selected three leading practices within each of the five areas (for a total of 15 selected practices)  The selected practices were foundational practices that, in our professional judgment, were of particular importance to successful workforce planning and management  Table 14 identifies the five selected workforce areas and 15 selected associated practices  To determine the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented the selected leading workforce planning and management practices for its IT workforce, we obtained and assessed documentation and compared it against the 15 selected practices  In particular, we analyzed the Secret Service’s human capital strategic plan, human capital staffing plan, IT strategic plan, documentation of the component’s staffing model that it used to determine the number of IT staff needed, an independent verification and validation report on the component’s staffing models, documentation of the current number of IT staff, the Secret Service’s recruitment and outreach plans, documentation of DHS’s hiring authorities (which are applicable to the Secret Service), the Secret Service’s training strategic plan, IT workforce training plan, action plans for improving employee morale, and templates used for measuring and reporting employee performance  We also interviewed Secret Service officials—including the CIO, Deputy CIO, and workforce planning staff—about the component’s workforce- related policies and documentation  Further, we discussed with the officials the Secret Service’s efforts to implement the selected workforce practices for its IT workforce  Regarding our assessments of the Secret Service’s implementation of the 15 selected workforce planning and management practices, we assessed a practice as being fully implemented if component officials provided supporting documentation that demonstrated all aspects of the practice  We assessed a practice as not implemented if the officials did not provide any supporting documentation for that practice, or if the documentation provided did not demonstrate any aspect of the practice  We assessed a practice as being partly implemented if the officials provided supporting documentation that demonstrated some, but not all, aspects of the selected practice  In addition, related to our assessments of the Secret Service’s implementation of the five selected overall workforce areas, we assessed each area as follows, based on the implementation of the three selected practices within each area: Fully implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it had fully implemented all three of the selected practices within the workforce area; Substantially implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it had either fully implemented two selected practices and partly implemented the remaining one selected practice within the workforce area, or fully implemented one selected practice and partly implemented the remaining two selected practices within the workforce area; Partially implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it had partly implemented each of the three selected practices within the workforce area; Minimally implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it partly implemented two selected practices and not implemented the remaining one selected practice within the workforce area, or partly implemented one selected practice and not implemented the remaining two selected practices within the workforce area; or Not implemented: The Secret Service did not provide evidence that it had implemented any of the three selected practices within the workforce area  To address the third objective—determining the extent to which the Secret Service and DHS have implemented selected performance and progress monitoring practices for IITT—we reviewed leading project monitoring practices and guidance from the Software Engineering Institute  First, we reviewed the practices within the Project Monitoring and Control process area of the Institute’s Capability Maturity Model Integration® for Acquisition  Based on our review, we identified four practices associated with monitoring program performance and progress  In our professional judgment, all four of these practices were of significance to managing the IITT investment given the phase of the life cycle that the investment was in  As such, we elected to include all four of these practices in our review, and combined them into one practice, as follows: Monitor program performance and conduct reviews at predetermined checkpoints or milestones by, among other things, comparing actual cost, schedule, and performance data with estimates in the program plan and identifying significant deviations from established targets or thresholds for acceptable performance levels  Next, given the agile development methodology that the Secret Service was using for certain projects within IITT, we reviewed the Software Engineering Institute’s technical note on the progress monitoring of agile contractors  Based on our review, and in consultation with an internal expert, we selected four agile metrics that the Institute identified as important for successful agile implementations and that, in our professional judgment, were of most significance to monitoring the performance of IITT’s agile projects  We then combined these four metrics into one practice, as follows: Measure and monitor agile projects on velocity (i e , number of story points completed per sprint or release), development progression (e g , the number of features and user stories planned and accepted), product quality (e g , number of defects), and post-deployment user satisfaction  To determine the extent to which DHS and the Secret Service had implemented the first selected practice, we analyzed relevant program management and governance documentation for IITT’s Enabling Capabilities program, and Multi-Level Security, Uniformed Division Resource Management System, and Events Management projects  In particular, we analyzed acquisition program baselines, DHS acquisition decision event memorandums, artifacts from DHS and Secret Service program oversight reviews, cost monitoring reports, program integrated master schedules, and program status briefings, and compared this documentation to the selected practice  We also interviewed Secret Service OCIO officials regarding the Secret Service’s and DHS’s efforts to monitor the IITT investment’s performance and progress  To determine the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented the second selected practice related to measuring and monitoring agile projects on agile metrics (i e , velocity, development progression, product quality, and post-deployment user satisfaction), we obtained and analyzed agile-related documentation for the two projects that the Secret Service was implementing using an agile methodology—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management  Specifically, to determine the extent to which the Secret Service was measuring and monitoring these two projects on metrics for velocity and development progression, we obtained and analyzed documentation, such as sprint burndown charts and monthly program status reports, and compared it to the selected practice  In addition, the agile metrics for product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction were only applicable to projects that had been deployed to users  As such, these metrics were applicable to the Uniformed Division Resource Management System (which the Secret Service had deployed to users) and were not applicable to Events Management (which the Secret Service had not yet deployed to users, as of early May 2018)  We therefore obtained and analyzed documentation demonstrating that Secret Service OCIO measured product defects for the Uniformed Division Resource Management System  We also requested documentation demonstrating that OCIO had measured and monitored post-deployment user satisfaction for this project, including via a survey  OCIO officials stated that they had not conducted such a survey and were unable to provide documentation demonstrating they had measured post- deployment user satisfaction for the Uniformed Division Resource Management System  To assess the reliability of the cost, schedule, and agile-related data that were in DHS and the Secret Service’s program management and governance documentation for the IITT investment, we (1) analyzed related documentation and assessed the data against existing agency records to identify consistency in the information, and (2) examined the data for obvious outliers, incomplete, or unusual entries  We determined that the data in these documents were sufficiently reliable for our purpose, which was to evaluate the extent to which DHS and the Secret Service had implemented processes for monitoring the IITT investment’s performance and progress  We conducted this performance audit from May 2017 to November 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  As of June 2018, the Secret Service’s Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment included two programs (one of which included three projects) and one project that had capabilities that were in planning or development and modernization, as described below: Enabling Capabilities  This program is intended to, among other things, (1) modernize and enhance the Secret Service’s information technology (IT) network infrastructure, including increasing bandwidth and improving the speed and reliability of the Secret Service’s IT system performance; (2) enhance cybersecurity to protect against potential intrusions and viruses; and (3) provide counterintelligence and data mining capabilities to improve officials’ ability to perform the Secret Service’s investigative mission  Enterprise Resource Management System  This program comprises three projects that are intended to provide: a system that will enable the Secret Service’s Uniformed Division to efficiently and effectively plan, provision, and schedule missions (this project is referred to as Uniformed Division Resource Management System), a system that will unify the logistical actions (e g , assigning personnel) surrounding special events that Secret Service agents need to protect, such as the United Nations General Assembly (this project is referred to as Events Management), and a capability for creating schedules for Secret Service agents and administrative, professional, and technical staff, as well as the ability to generate reports on information such as monthly hours worked (this project is referred to as Enterprise-wide Scheduling)  Multi-Level Security  This project is intended to enable authorized Secret Service users to view two levels of classified information on a single workstation  Previously, data at various security levels were contained and used in multiple disparate systems  Multi-Level Security is intended to streamline users’ access to information at different security levels in order to enable them to more quickly and effectively perform their duties  Table 15 provides the planned life cycle cost and schedule estimates (threshold values) for each IITT program and project that had capabilities in planning or development and modernization, as of June 2018  In addition, the table describes any changes in those cost and schedule estimates, as well as the key reasons for any changes, as identified by officials from the Secret Service’s Office of the Chief Information Officer  In addition to the contact named above, the following staff made key contributions to this report: Shannin O’Neill (Assistant Director), Emily Kuhn (Analyst-in-Charge), Quintin Dorsey, Rebecca Eyler, Javier Irizarry, and Paige Teigen 

ground_truth: The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) is a federal workers' compensation program that covers certain private-sector maritime workers. Firms that employ these workers are required to purchase workers' compensation or self-insure and are responsible for providing medical and disability benefits to covered workers who are injured or become ill on the job and survivors benefits to the families of covered workers who die on the job. The LHWCA is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), and all benefit costs are paid by employers and their insurance carriers. In 2016, more than $1.4 billion in LHWCA benefits were paid to beneficiaries. Congress has extended the LHWCA provisions to cover workers outside of the maritime industry, such as overseas government contractors and civilian employees of military post exchanges. As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), persons who repair recreational vessels of any size were added to the LHWCA exemption list. In 2011, the DOL implemented this provision; since then, those regulations have proven controversial and numerous bills have been introduced to modify the regulatory definition to increase the number of workers exempted from the LHWCA. The LHWCA pays for all medical care associated with a covered injury or illness. Disability benefits are based on a worker's pre-injury wage, and, unlike comparable state workers' compensation benefits, are adjusted annually to reflect national wage growth.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Running away from home is not a recent phenomenon  Folkloric heroes Huckleberry Finn and Davy Crockett fled their abusive fathers to find adventure and employment  Although some youth today also leave home due to abuse and neglect, they often endure far more negative outcomes than their romanticized counterparts from an earlier era  Without adequate and safe shelter, runaway and homeless youth are vulnerable to engaging in high-risk behaviors and further victimization  Youth who live away from home for extended periods may become removed from school and systems of support  Runaway and homeless youth are vulnerable to multiple problems while they are away from a permanent home, including untreated mental health disorders, drug use, and sexual exploitation  They also report other challenges including poor health and the lack of basic provisions  Congress began to hear concerns about the vulnerabilities of the runaway population in the 1970s due to increased awareness about these youth and the establishment of runaway shelters to assist them in returning home  Congress and the President went on to enact the Runaway Youth Act of 1974 as Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ( P L  93-415 ) to assist runaways through services specifically for this population  Since that time, the law has been updated to authorize services to provide support for runaway and homeless youth outside of the juvenile justice, mental health, and child welfare systems  The Runaway Youth Act—now known as the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act—authorized federal funding to be provided through annual appropriations for three programs that assist runaway and homeless youth: the Basic Center Program (BCP), Transitional Living Program (TLP), and Street Outreach Program (SOP)  Together, the programs make up the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program (RHYP), administered by the Family and Youth Services Bureau (FYSB) in the U S  Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF)  Basic Center Program: Provides funding to community-based organizations for crisis intervention, temporary shelter, counseling, family unification, and after care services to runaway and homeless youth under age 18 and their families  In some cases, BCP-funded programs may serve older youth  Over 31,000 youth participated in FY2016, the most recent year for which data are available  Transitional Living Program: Supports community-based organizations that provide homeless youth ages 16 through 22 with stable, safe, longer-term residential services up to 18 months (or longer under certain circumstances), including counseling in basic life skills, building interpersonal skills, educational advancement, job attainment skills, and physical and mental health care  Over 6,000 youth participated in FY2016  Street Outreach Program: Provides funding to community-based organizations for street-based outreach and education, including treatment, counseling, provision of information, and referrals for runaway, homeless, and street youth who have been subjected to, or are at risk of being subjected to, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, prostitution, and trafficking  SOP grantees made contact with more than 36,000 youth in FY2016  This report begins with an overview of the runaway and homeless youth population  It then describes the challenges in defining and counting this population, as well as the factors that influence homelessness and leaving home  The report also provides background on federal efforts to support runaway and homeless youth, including the evolution of federal policies to respond to these youth, with a focus on the period from the Runaway Youth Act of 1974 to the present time  The report then describes the administration and funding of the Basic Center, Transitional Living, and Street Outreach programs that were created from authorizations in the act  The appendixes include funding information for the BCP program and discuss other federal programs that may be used to assist runaway and homeless youth  There is no single federal definition of the terms "homeless youth" or "runaway youth " However, HHS relies on definitions from the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act in administering the Runaway and Homeless Youth program: The act includes the following definitions: "Homeless youth," for purposes of the BCP, includes individuals under age 18 (or some older age if permitted by state or local law) for whom it is not possible to live in a safe environment with a relative and who lack safe alternative living arrangements  "Homeless youth," for purposes of the TLP, includes individuals ages 16 through 22 for whom it is not possible to live in a safe environment with a relative and who lack safe alternative living arrangements  Youth older than age 22 may participate if they entered the program before age 22 and meet other requirements  "Runaway youth" includes individuals under age 18 who absent themselves from their home or legal residence at least overnight without the permission of their parents or legal guardians  Separately, the McKinney-Vento Act authorizes several federal programs for homeless individuals that are administered by the U S  Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)  The definition of "homeless individual" in McKinney-Vento refers to "unaccompanied youth," which applies to selected homelessness programs  HUD's related regulation defines an "unaccompanied youth" as someone under age 25 who meets the definition of "homeless" in the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act or other specified federal laws  The regulation also provides additional criteria, including that they have lived independently without permanent housing for at least 60 days  The research literature discusses definitions of runaway and homeless youth  While studies have often categorized young people based on their status as runaways , homeless, or street youth , a 2011 report suggests that overlap exists between these categories  The authors of the study note that these "typologies," or classifications, are too narrowly defined by the youth's housing status and reasons for homelessness, among other factors  The authors explain that typologies based on mental health status or age cohort are promising, but they suggest further research in this area to ensure that the typologies are accurate  The precise number of homeless and runaway youth is unknown due to their residential mobility  These youth often eschew the shelter system for locations or areas that are not easily accessible to shelter workers and others who count the homeless and runaways  Youth who come into contact with census takers may also be reluctant to report that they have left home or are homeless  Determining the number of homeless and runaway youth is further complicated by the lack of a standardized methodology for counting the population and inconsistent definitions of what it means to be homeless or a runaway  Differences in methodology for collecting data on homeless populations may also influence how the characteristics of the runaway and homeless youth population are reported  Some studies have relied on point prevalence estimates that report whether youth have experienced homelessness at a given point in time, such as on a particular day  According to researchers that study the characteristics of runaway and homeless youth, these studies appear to be biased toward describing individuals who experience longer periods of homelessness  HUD requires communities receiving certain HUD funding to conduct annual point-in-time (PIT) counts of people experiencing homelessness, including homeless youth  The PIT counts include people living in emergency shelter, transitional housing, and on the street or other places not meant for human habitation  It does not include people who are temporarily living with family or friends  In the 2018 PIT count, communities identified 36,361 unaccompanied youth under age 25 (versus 40,799 in 2017) and another 8,724 under age 25 who were homeless parents (versus 9,434 in 2017)  While PIT counts do not provide a confident estimate of youth experiencing homelessness across the country, they provide some information to communities about the potential scope of youth homelessness  The Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act ( P L  110-378 ), which renewed authorization of appropriations for the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program through FY2013, also authorized funding for HHS to conduct periodic studies of the incidence and prevalence of youth who have run away or are homeless  Separately, the accompanying conference report to the FY2016 appropriations law ( P L  114-113 ) directed HUD to use $2 million to conduct a national incidence and prevalence study of homeless youth as authorized under the Runaway and Homeless Youth program  HUD provided these funds to Chapin Hall at the University of Chicago to carry out the study  The study, known as Voices of Youth Count , used a nationally representative phone survey to derive national estimates and conducted brief surveys of youth and in-depth interviews of youth who had experiences of homelessness  The phone survey involved interviews with adults whose households had youth and young adults ages 13 to 25 and with adults ages 18 to 25  Voices of Youth Count estimated that approximately 700,000 youth ages 13 to 17 and 3 5 million young adults ages 18 to 25 had experienced homelessness within a one-year period, meaning they were sleeping in places not meant for human habitation, staying in shelters, or temporarily staying with others while lacking a safe and stable alternative living arrangement  This differs from the PIT counts because it includes individuals who are staying with others  The study also found that youth homelessness affected youth in rural and urban areas at similar levels  A 2010 study on the lifetime prevalence of running away used longitudinal survey data of young people who were 12 to 18 years old when they were first interviewed about whether they had run away—defined as staying away at least one night without their parents' prior knowledge or permission—along with other behaviors  In subsequent years, youth who were under age 17 at their previous interview were asked if they had run away since their last interview  Youth who had ever run away were asked how many times they had done so and the age at which they first did  The study found that 19% of those who ran away did so before turning 18; females were more likely than males to run away; and among white, black, and Hispanic youth, black youth have the highest rate of ever running away  Youth who ran away reported that they did so about three times on average; however, about half of runaways had only run away once  Approximately half of the youth had run away before age 14  A subset of runaway youth is those in foster care  In FY2017, over 500 children in the United States had run away from their foster care home or other placement  While this represents less than 1% of all children in foster care, running away is more prevalent among older youth in care  A study of over 50,000 youth ages 13 through 17 in 21 states indicated that 17% ran away at least once during their first time in foster care  The study found that female, black, and Hispanic youth were more likely to run away than male and white youth in care  The study further found that youth were more likely to run away from congregate care (i e , group care) settings compared to other settings, such as living with a relative or in a foster family home  Youth were also more likely to run away from care if they lived in the most socioeconomically disadvantaged counties or lived in a state that lacked a process to screen youth on the risk of running away  States report on the characteristics and experiences of certain current and former foster youth through the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD)  Among other information, states must report data on cohorts of foster youth beginning when they are age 17, and later at ages 19 and 21  Among youth surveyed in FY2015 at age 21, about 43% reported having experienced homelessness  Youth most often cite family conflict as the major reason for their homelessness or episodes of running away  According to the research literature, a youth's poor family dynamics, sexual activity, sexual orientation, pregnancy, school problems, and alcohol and drug use are strong predictors of family discord  One-third of callers who used the National Runaway Safeline in 2017—a crisis call center funded under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program for youth and their relatives involved in runaway incidents—gave family dynamics (not defined) as the reason for their call  Further, a longitudinal survey of middle school and high school youth examined the effects of family instability (e g , child maltreatment, lack of parental warmth, and parent rejection) and other factors on the likelihood of running away from home approximately two to six years after youth were initially surveyed  Researchers found that youth with family instability were more likely to run away  Family instability also influenced problem behaviors, such as illicit drug use, which, in turn, were associated with running away  Researchers further determined that certain other effects (e g , school engagement, neighborhood cohesiveness, physical victimization, and friends' support) were not strong predicators of whether youth in the sample ran away  In a study of youth who ran away from foster care between 1993 and 2003, the youth cited three primary reasons why they ran from foster care: to connect with their biological families, express their autonomy and find normalcy, and maintain relationships with nonfamily members  The Voices of Youth Count study found that certain youth ages 18 to 25 were at heightened risk of experiencing homelessness  This included youth with less than a high school diploma or GED; who were Hispanic or black; who were parenting and unmarried; or identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or questioning (LGBTQ)  Gay and lesbian youth appear to be at greater risk for homelessness and are overrepresented in the homeless population, due often to experiencing negative reactions from their parents when they come out about their sexuality  The Voices of Youth Count study found that LGBTQ young adults ages 18 to 25 had more than twice the risk of being homeless than their heterosexual peers  LGBTQ youth made up about 20% of young adults who reported homelessness  In addition, a study involving LGBTQ young adults in seven cities found that the most common reason youth became homeless was due to being kicked out or asked to leave the home of a parent, relative, foster home, or group home  Under an HHS grant, Youth with Child Welfare Involvement at Risk of Homelessness , the 18 grantees (state, local, and tribal child welfare agencies or community-based organizations) evaluated multiple risk factors for homelessness among child welfare-involved populations: which include those who have had numerous foster care placements, run away from foster care, been placed in a group home, had a history of mental health or behavioral health diagnoses, had juvenile justice involvement, had a history of substance abuse, been emancipated from foster care, and been parenting or fathered a child  Runaway and homeless youth are vulnerable to multiple problems while they are away from a permanent home, including untreated mental health disorders, drug use, and sexual exploitation  Studies of homeless youth indicate that they are more likely to experience mental health and substance abuse disorders than their counterparts in the general population  A literature review of studies on psychiatric disorders among homeless youth found high prevalence of conduct disorders, major depression, psychosis, and other disorders  A study of participants in the Street Outreach Program found that about 6 out of 10 reported symptoms associated with depression and almost three-fourths reported that they had experienced major trauma, such as physical or sexual abuse or witnessing or being a victim of violence  Substance abuse is more prevalent among youth who live on the street, compared to homeless youth who are in shelters  Still, both groups of youth use alcohol or drugs at higher rates than their peers who live in family households, even after researchers control for demographic differences  While away from a permanent home, runaway and homeless youth are also vulnerable to sexual exploitation; sex and labor trafficking; and other victimization such as being beaten up, robbed, or otherwise assaulted  Some youth resort to illegal activity including stealing, exchanging sex for food or a place to stay, and selling drugs for survival  Runaway and homeless youth report other challenges including poor health and a lack of basic provisions  Prior to the enactment of the Runaway Youth Act of 1974 (Title III, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, P L  93-415 ), federal policy provided limited services to runaway and homeless youth  If they received any services, most of these youth were served through the local child welfare agency, juvenile justice court system, or both  The 1970s marked a shift to a more rehabilitative model for assisting youth who had run afoul of the law, including those who committed status offenses such as running away  During this period, Congress focused increasing attention on runaways and other vulnerable youth due, in part, to emerging sociological models to explain why youth engaged in deviant behavior  The first runaway shelters were created in the late 1960s and 1970s to assist them in returning home  The landmark Runaway Youth Act of 1974 decriminalized runaway youth and authorized funding for programs to provide shelter, counseling, and other services  Since the law's enactment, Congress and the President have expanded the services available to both runaway youth and homeless youth under what is now referred to as the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program  In more recent years, other federal entities have been involved in responding to the challenges facing runaway and homeless youth  These efforts are coordinated through the U S  Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH)  Figure 1 traces the evolution of federal policy in this area  The Runaway and Homeless Youth Program is a major part of recent federal efforts to end youth homelessness through the U S  Interagency Council on Homelessness  The USICH, established under the 1987 Stewart B  McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, is made up of several federal agencies, including HHS and HUD  The HEARTH Act, enacted in 2009 as part of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act ( P L  111-22 ), charged USICH with developing a National Strategic Plan to End Homelessness  In June 2010, USICH released this plan, entitled Opening Doors   The plan set out goals for ending homelessness, including (1) ending chronic homelessness by 2015; (2) preventing and ending homelessness among veterans by 2015; (3) preventing and ending homelessness for families, youth, and children by 2020; and (4) setting a path to ending all types of homelessness  In 2012, USICH amended Opening Doors to specifically address strategies for improving the educational outcomes for children and youth and assisting unaccompanied homeless youth  USICH outlined its intention to improve outcomes for youth in four areas: stable housing, permanent connections, education or employment options, and socio-emotional well-being  In 2013, a USICH working group developed a guiding document for ending youth homelessness by 2020  Known as the Framework to End Youth Homelessness , the document outlines a data strategy to collect better data on the number and characteristics of youth experiencing homelessness  This data strategy includes coordinating the former data collection system for the Runaway and Homeless Youth program—referred to as RHYMIS—with HUD's Homeless Management Information Systems (HMIS)  RHYMIS was a data system administered by HHS for previous RHYP grantees to upload demographic and other data for the youth they served  HMIS is a locally administered data system used to record and analyze client, service, and housing data for individuals and families who are homeless or at risk of homelessness in a given community  As of FY2015, RHYP grantees stopped reporting to RHYMIS and instead report to HMIS  Grantees reported to RHYMIS on the basic demographics of the youth, the services they received, and the status of the youth upon exiting the programs  RHY grantees are now required to report this same (and new information) to HMIS  According to HHS, some grantees have had have encountered inaccurate software programming for their data standards or have had issues with successfully extracting their data to submit to HHS  The data strategy outlined in the framework also involves, if funding is available, designing and implementing a national study to estimate the number, needs, and characteristics of youth experiencing homelessness  This is consistent with the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act's directive for HHS to conduct a study of youth homelessness  As noted, this study— Voices of Youth Count —received funding from FY2016 HUD appropriations  In addition, HHS has supported other research on homeless youth, including factors associated with prolonged homelessness and risk factors for homelessness among children and youth with involvement in child welfare  In 2018, the USICH issued a brief that outlines continued gaps in data on the homeless youth population, citing the need for greater understanding about the causes of youth homelessness and how youth enter and exit homelessness  Separately, the framework also outlined a strategy to strengthen and coordinate the capacity of federal, state, and local systems to work toward ending youth homelessness  USICH has provided guidance to communities, including by establishing community-level criteria for ending homelessness and accompanying benchmarks to assess whether they have achieved an end to youth homelessness  Still, the 2018 USICH brief called for greater evidence regarding the impact of housing and service interventions in helping youth exit homelessness  As mentioned, the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program is administered by the Family and Youth Services Bureau (FYSB) within HHS's Administration for Children and Families (ACF)  The Runaway and Homeless Youth Act includes three authorizations of appropriations  The authorization of appropriations for the Basic Center Program and Transitional Living program is $127 4 million for each of FY2019 and FY2020  Under the law, 90% of the federal funds appropriated under the two programs must be used for the BCP and TLP (together, the programs and their related activities are known as the Consolidated Runaway and Homeless Youth program)  Of this amount, 45% is reserved for the BCP and no more than 55% is reserved for the TLP  The remaining share of consolidated funding is allocated for (1) a national communication system to facilitate communication between service providers, runaway youth, and their families (National Safeline); (2) training and technical support for grantees; (3) evaluations of the programs; (4) federal coordination efforts on matters relating to the health, education, employment, and housing of these youth; and (5) studies of runaway and homeless youth  The authorization of appropriations for the Street Outreach program is $25 million for each of FY2019 and FY2020  Although the SOP is a separately funded component, SOP services are coordinated with those provided under the BCP and TLP  The authorization of appropriations for the periodic estimate of incidence and prevalence of youth homelessness is such sums as may be necessary for FY2019 and FY2020  Funding has not been provided by HHS under this authority, and as noted, funds appropriated to HUD for this purpose have been used to support Voices of Youth Count  Table 1 shows funding levels for the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program from FY2006 through FY2019  Over this period, funding has increased notably for the program three times, most recently from FY2017 to FY2018  Congress has provided some guidance on how the additional funds are to be spent  In the conference report to accompany the FY2019 consolidated appropriations act, Congress stated that the increase should be provided to current TLP grantees whose awards end on March 31, 2019  The funding is to be used to continue services until new awards are made to those grantees, or for those grantees that did not receive a new grant, to provide services until the end of FY2019  Funding may then be used for additional new awards  The Basic Center Program is intended to provide short-term shelter and services for youth and their families at centers operated by BCP grantees, which are public and private community-based organizations  Youth eligible to receive BCP services include those youth who are at risk of running away or becoming homeless (and may live at home with their parents), or have already left home, either voluntarily or involuntarily  To stay at the shelter, youth must be under age 18, or an older age if the BCP center is located in a state or locality that permits this higher age  Some centers may serve homeless youth through street-based services, home-based services, and drug abuse education and prevention services  Grantees seek to connect youth with their families, whenever possible, or to locate appropriate alternative placements  They also provide individual or group and family counseling, health care, education, and employment assistance  As specified in the law, BCP grantees or centers are intended to provide services as an alternative to involving runaway and homeless youth in the law enforcement, juvenile justice, child welfare, and mental health systems  Youth may stay in a center continuously up to 21 days  In FY2017, the program served 23,288 youth, and in FY2018 it funded 280 BCP shelters (most recent figures available)


Report 2:  These centers, which can shelter as many as 20 youth, are generally supposed to be located in areas that are frequented or easily reached by runaway and homeless youth  BCP grantees must make efforts to contact the parents and relatives of runaway and homeless youth  Grantees are also required to establish relationships with law enforcement, health and mental health care, social service, welfare, and school district systems to coordinate services  Grantees maintain confidential statistical records of youth, including youth who are not referred to out-of-home shelter services  Further, grantees are required to submit an annual report to HHS detailing the program activities and the number of youth participating in such activities, as well as information about the operation of the centers  BCP grants are allocated directly to grantees for a three-year period  Funding is generally distributed to entities based on the proportion of the nation's youth under age 18 in the jurisdiction where the entities are located  The 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico each receive a minimum allotment of $200,000  Separately, the territories (currently, this includes American Samoa and Guam) each receive a minimum of $70,000  The amount of funding for each state or territory can further depend on whether grant applicants in that jurisdiction applied for funding, and if so, whether the applicant fulfilled the requirements in the authorizing law and grant application  For example, the authorizing law directs HHS to give priority to applicants who have demonstrated experience in providing services to runaway and homeless youth  HHS is to re-allot any funds designated for grantees in one state to grantees in other states that will not be obligated before the end of a fiscal year  See Table A-1 for the amount of funding allocated for each state in FY2017 and FY2018  The costs of the BCP are shared by the federal government (90%) and grantees (10%)  In FY2008, HHS began funding a three-year Rural Host Homes Demonstration Project , which was initiated to expand BCP shelter and support services to runaway and homeless youth who live in rural areas not served by shelter facilities  The project supported grantees that provided youth with shelter (via host home families who were recruited, screened, and trained) and preventive services, including transportation, counseling, educational assistance, and aftercare planning, among others  Over the course of the three years, the project served 781 youth, 411 of whom received shelter and 370 of whom received preventive services without shelter  Recognizing the difficulty that youth face in becoming self-sufficient adults, the Transitional Living Program provides longer-term shelter and assistance for youth ages 16 through 22 (or older if the youth entered the TLP prior to reaching age 22) who may leave their biological homes due to family conflict, or have left and are not expected to return home  Pregnant and/or parenting youth are eligible for TLP services  In FY2017, the TLP provided services to 3,517 youth  In FY2018, the program funded 229 organizations  Each TLP grantee may shelter up to 20 youth at various sites, such as host family homes, supervised apartments owned by a social service agency, scattered-site apartments, or single-occupancy apartments rented directly with the assistance of the grantee  Youth may remain at TLP sites for up to 540 days (18 months), or longer for youth under age 18  Youth ages 16 through 22 may remain in the program for a continuous period of 635 days (approximately 21 months) under "exceptional circumstances " This term means circumstances in which a youth would benefit to an unusual extent from additional time in the program  A youth in a TLP who has not reached age 18 on the last day of the 635-day period may, in exceptional circumstances and if otherwise qualified for the program, remain in the program until his or her 18 th birthday  Youth receive several types of services at TLP-funded programs: basic life-skills training, including consumer education and instruction in budgeting and the use of credit; parenting support and child care (as appropriate); building interpersonal skills; educational opportunities, such as GED courses and postsecondary training; assistance in job preparation and attainment; and mental and physical health care services  TLP grantees are required to develop a written plan designed to help youth transition to living independently or another appropriate living arrangement, and they are to refer youth to other systems that can help to meet their educational, health care, and social service needs  The grantees must also submit an annual report to HHS that includes information regarding the activities carried out with funds and the number and characteristics of the homeless youth  As part of the FY2002 budget request, the George W  Bush Administration proposed a $33 million initiative to fund maternity group homes—or centers that provide shelter to pregnant and parenting teens who are vulnerable to abuse and neglect—as a component of the TLP  Although the TLP authorized services for pregnant and parenting teens prior to FY2002, the Bush Administration sought funds specifically to serve this population  Increased funds were ultimately provided to enable these youth to access TLP services  The 2003 amendments to the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act ( P L  108-96 ) provided explicit authority to use TLP funds for this purpose  Since FY2004, funding for adult-supervised transitional living arrangements that serve pregnant or parenting women ages 16 to 21 and their children has been awarded to organizations that receive TLP grants  These organizations provide youth with parenting skills, including child development education, family budgeting, health and nutrition, and other skills to promote family well-being  TLP grants are distributed competitively by HHS to community-based public and private organizations throughout the country for a five-year period  Grantees must provide at least 10% of the total cost of the program  HHS is carrying out a study to learn more about the long-term outcomes of 1,250 youth who have used TLP services  The study seeks to describe the outcomes and to isolate and describe promising practices and other factors that may contribute to their successes or challenges  Of particular interest for the study is how services are delivered, the demographics of youth, and their socio-emotional wellness and life experiences  It involves both a process evaluation and impact evaluation, with youth randomly assigned to the treatment (i e , participation in the TLP) and control groups  The study seeks to address the following questions: (1) How do TLP programs operate, what types of program models are used to deliver services, and what services are delivered to homeless youth? (2) What are the long-term housing outcomes and protective factors for youth who participate in the TLP program immediately, six months, 12 months, and 18 months after exiting the program? (3) What interventions can be attributed to any positive outcomes experienced by youth who participate in the TLP? According to HHS, the pilot study revealed challenges "in collecting data from a large enough sample size of youth to detect any effects so that conclusions could be drawn about the impact of homeless youth served by TLPs " HHS is not certain how it will move forward with the study  In FY2016, HHS began the Transitional Living Program Special Population Demonstration project  The project funded nine grantees over a two-year period that tested approaches for serving populations that need additional support: LGBTQ runaway and homeless youth ages 16 to 21; and young adults who have left foster care because of emancipation  Grantees were expected to provide strategies that help youth build protective factors, such as connections with schools, employment, and appropriate family members and other caring adults  According to HHS, a process evaluation will assess how grantees are implementing the demonstration project  HHS separately funded a project from FY2012 through FY2014 to build the capacity of TLPs in serving LGBTQ youth  Known as the 3/40 Blueprint: Creating the Blueprint to Reduce LGBTQ Youth Homelessness , the purpose of the grant was develop information about serving the LGBTQ youth population experiencing homelessness, such as through efforts to identify innovative intervention strategies, determine culturally appropriate screening and assessment tools, and better understand the needs of LGBTQ youth served by RHY providers  The website developed by the grantee, the University of Illinois at Chicago, identifies promising practices that serve LGBTQ youth who are experiencing homelessness and publishes information about their challenges  In FY2009, HHS began the Support Systems for Rural Homeless Youth Demonstration Project   Six states received grants to support TLPs in rural communities in serving young adults who have few or no connections to a supportive family structure or community resources  The five-year project sought to provide services across three main areas: survival support, which includes housing, health care (including mental health), and substance abuse treatment and prevention; community, which includes community service, youth and adult partnerships, mentoring, and peer support groups; and education and employment, which includes high school or GED completion, postsecondary education, and job training and employment  The six states—Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Vermont—each received annual grants of $200,000  According to HHS, all of the sites engaged youth in positive youth development activities that included safe places for youth to go  In addition, they raised awareness about homelessness in rural areas and addressed some of the unique needs around employment, housing, and transportation  However, the sites also confirmed that there is a general lack of available housing for homeless youth and that transportation was the most critical impediment to serving these youth  The Street Outreach Program provides runaway and homeless youth living on the streets or in areas that increase their risk of using drugs or being subjected to sexual abuse, prostitution, sexual exploitation, and trafficking are eligible to receive services  The program's goal is to assist youth in transitioning to safe and appropriate living arrangements  SOP services include the following: treatment and counseling; crisis intervention; drug abuse and exploitation prevention and education activities; survival aid; street-based education and outreach; information and referrals; and follow-up support  Grants are awarded for a three-year period, and grantees must provide 10% of the funds to cover the cost of the program  In FY2018, 96 grantees were funded  In FY2017 grantees made contact with 24,366 youth  The Family and Youth Services Bureau initiated the Street Outreach Program Data Collection Project in 2012 to learn more about the lives and needs of homeless and runaway youth served by SOP grantees  The purpose of the project was to design services to better meet the needs of these youth  FYSB collected information through focus groups and computer-assisted personal interviews with 656 youth (ages 14 to 21 years) served by grantees in 11 cities  The project found that participants were homeless on average for nearly two years and had challenges with substance abuse, mental health, and exposure to trauma  Youth most identified that they were in need of job training or help finding a job, transportation assistance, and clothing  The top barriers to obtaining shelter were shelters being full, not knowing where to go for shelter, and lacking transportation to get to a shelter  The study researchers concluded that more emergency shelters could help prevent youth from sleeping on the street  Further, they noted that youth on the streets need more intensive case management (e g , careful assessment and treatment planning, linkages to community resources, etc ) and more intensive interventions  HHS funds the Runaway and Homeless Youth Training and Technical Assistance Center (RHYTTAC) to provide technical assistance to RHYP grantees  HHS awarded a five-year cooperative agreement, from September 30, 2017, through September 29, 2020, to National Safe Place to operate RHYTTAC  National Safe Place is a national youth outreach program that aims to educate young people about the dangers of running away or trying to resolve difficult, threatening situations on their own  RHYTTAC is designed to provide training and conference services to RHYP grantees that enhance and promote continuous quality improvement to services provided by RHYP grantees  Further, RHYTTAC offers resources and information through its website, tip sheets, a quarterly newsletter, toolkits, sample policies and procedures, and other resources  RHYTTAC also provides assistance to individual grantees in response to their questions or concerns, as well as concerns raised by HHS as part of the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program Monitoring System (see subsequent section)  A portion of the funds for the BCP, TLP, and related activities are allocated for a national communications system known as the National Runaway Safeline ("Safeline")  The Safeline is intended to help homeless and runaway youth (or youth who are contemplating running away) through counseling, referrals, and communicating with their families  Beginning with FY1974 and every year after, the Safeline, which until 2013 was called the National Runaway Switchboard, has been funded through the Basic Center Program grant or the Consolidated Runaway and Homeless Youth Program grant  The Safeline is located in Chicago and operates each day to provide services to youth and their families across the country  Services include (1) a channel through which runaway and homeless youth or their parents may leave messages; (2) 24-hour referrals to community resources, including shelter, community food banks, legal assistance, and social services agencies; and (3) crisis intervention counseling to youth  In calendar year 2017, the Safeline handled nearly 30,000 contacts with youth (via phone, computer, emails, and postings), of which nearly three-quarters were from youth and 9% were from parents; the other callers were relatives, friends, and others  Other services are also provided through the Safeline  Since 1995, the "Home Free" family reunification program has provided bus tickets for youth ages 12 to 21 to return home or to an alternative placement near their home through Home Free  HHS evaluates each RHYP grantee through the Runaway and Homeless Youth Monitoring System  Staff from regional ACF offices and other grant recipients (known as peer reviewers) inspect the program site, conduct interviews, review case files and other agency documents, and conduct entry and exit conferences  The monitoring team then prepares a written report that identifies the strengths of the program and areas that require corrective action  The Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act of 2008 required that within one year of its enactment (October 8, 2009), HHS was to issue rules that specified performance standards for public and nonprofit entities that receive BCP, TLP, and SOP grants  On April 14, 2014, HHS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for the new performance standards and other requirements for the Runaway and Homeless youth program grantees  On December 20, 2016, HHS implemented a final rule that was similar to the provisions in the NPRM  These standards are used to monitor individual grantee performance  The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) and the House Committee on Education and Labor have exercised jurisdiction over the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program  HHS must submit reports biennially to the committees on the status, activities, and accomplishments of program grant recipients and evaluations of the programs performed by HHS  The most recent report was submitted in January 2018, and covered FY2014 and FY2015  The 2003 reauthorization law ( P L  108-96 ) of the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act required that HHS, in consultation with the U S  Interagency Council on Homelessness, submit a report to Congress on the promising strategies to end youth homelessness within two years of the reauthorization, in October 2005  The report was submitted to Congress in June 2007  As mentioned above, the 2008 reauthorization law ( P L  110-378 ) required HHS, as of FY2010, to periodically submit to Congress an incidence and prevalence study of runaway and homeless youth ages 13 to 26, as well as the characteristics of a representative sample of these youth  As discussed, Congress appropriated funding to HUD for this purpose and the study, known as Voices of Youth Count , includes multiple publications about its findings  The 2008 law also directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to evaluate the process by which organizations apply for BCP, TLP, and SOP, including HHS's response to these applicants  GAO submitted a report to Congress in May 2010 on its findings  GAO found weaknesses in several of the procedures for reviewing grants, such as that peer reviewers for the grant did not always have expertise in runaway and homeless youth issues and feedback on grants was not provided in a permanent record  In addition, GAO found that HHS delayed telling successful grantees that the grant had been awarded to them  HHS has implemented the recommendations made in the report  Appendix A  Basic Center Program (BCP) Funding Appendix B  Additional Federal Support for Runaway and Homeless Youth Since the creation of the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program, other federal initiatives have also established services for such youth  Youth Homelessness Demonstration Program (YHDP): The omnibus appropriations laws for FY2016 through FY2018 enabled HUD to set aside up to $33 million (FY2016), $43 million (FY2017), and $80 million (FY2018) from the Homeless Assistance Grants account to implement projects that demonstrate how a "comprehensive approach" can "dramatically reduce" homelessness for youth through age 24  The appropriations laws each fiscal year direct this funding to up to 10 communities with the FY2016 funding; up to 11 communities with the FY2017 funding, including at least five rural communities; and up to 25 communities with the FY2018 funding, including at least eight rural communities  HUD has allocated $33 million to 10 communities for FY2016 and $43 million for FY2017  In addition, HUD is taking steps to evaluate the YHDP grantee communities in developing and carrying out a coordinated community approach to preventing and ending youth homelessness  100-Day Challenges to End Youth Homelessness : Since 2016, cities have partnered with public and private entities to accelerate efforts to prevent and end youth homelessness  A Way Home America and Rapid Results Institute, organizations that focus on pressing social problems, have provided support to the organizations  HHS provided training and technical assistance through RHYTTAC to the first three cities involved in the challenge: Los Angeles, CA; Cleveland, OH; and Austin, TX  In general, participating communities have housed homeless youth and have identified new housing options for this population  Youth with Child Welfare Involvement At-Risk of Homelessness (YAHR): HHS has funded grants to build evidence on what works to prevent homelessness among youth and young adults who have child welfare involvement  HHS awarded funds to 18 grantees for a two-year planning period (2013-2015)  Six of the grantees received additional funding to refine and test their service models during a second phase (2015-2018)  A subset of those grantees will then be selected to conduct a rigorous evaluation of their impact on homelessness  In school year 2016-2017, more than 1 3 million children and youth were homeless  Of these students, over 118,000 were homeless youth unaccompanied by their families  The Department of Education administers the Education for Homeless Children and Youth program, which was established under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 ( P L  100-77 ), as amended  This program assists state education agencies (SEAs) to ensure that all homeless children and youth have equal access to the same, appropriate education, including public preschool education, that is provided to other children and youth  Grants made by SEAs to local education agencies (LEAs) under this program must be used to facilitate the enrollment, attendance, and success in school of homeless children and youth  Program funds may be appropriated for activities such as tutoring, supplemental instruction, and referral services for homeless children and youth, as well as providing them with medical, dental, mental, and other health services  McKinney-Vento liaisons for homeless children and youth in each LEA is responsible for coordinating activities for these youth with other entities and agencies, including local Basic Center and Transitional Living Program grantees  States that receive McKinney-Vento funds are prohibited from segregating homeless students from non-homeless students, except for short periods of time for health and safety emergencies or to provide temporary, special, supplemental services  FY2019 funding for the program is $93 5 million  According to a 2017 survey of 43,000 college students at selected colleges and universities, 9% of those attending four-year universities and 12% of those attending community college had been homeless in the last year  In addition, 37% of university students and 46% of community college students were housing insecure in the past year, meaning that they had difficulty paying rent or lived with others beyond the expected capacity of the housing, among other scenarios  The Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes financial aid and support programs that target homeless students and other vulnerable populations  For purposes of applying for federal financial aid, a student's expected family contribution (EFC) is the amount that can be expected to be contributed by a student and the student's family toward his or her cost of education  Certain groups of students are considered "independent," meaning that only the income and assets of the student (and not their parents or guardians) are counted  Individuals under age 24 who have been verified during the school year as either (1) unaccompanied and homeless or (2) unaccompanied, self-supporting, and risk of homelessness  This verification can come from a McKinney-Vento liaison for homeless children and youth in the local education agency; the director (or designee) of a program funded under the Runaway and Homeless Youth program; the director (or designee) of an emergency shelter or transitional housing program funded by HUD; or a financial aid administrator  Separately, HEA provides that homeless children and youth are eligible for what are collectively called the federal TRIO programs  This includes the following TRIO programs: Talent Search, Upward Bound, Student Support Services, and Educational Opportunity Centers  The TRIO programs are designed to identify potential postsecondary students from disadvantaged backgrounds, prepare these students for higher education, provide certain support services to them while they are in college, and train individuals who provide these services  HEA directs the Department of Education (ED), which administers the programs, to (as appropriate) require applicants seeking TRIO funds to identify and make services available, including mentoring, tutoring, and other services, to these youth  TRIO funds are awarded by ED on a competitive basis  In addition, HEA authorizes services for homeless youth through TRIO Student Support Services—a program intended to improve the retention and graduation rates of disadvantaged college students—that include temporary housing during breaks in the academic year  In FY2019, TRIO appropriations are $1 1 billion  Separately, HEA allows additional uses of funds through the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education (FIPSE) to establish demonstration projects that provide comprehensive support services for students who are or were homeless at age 13 or older  FIPSE is a grant program that seeks to support the implementation of innovative educational reform ideas and evaluate how well they work  As specified in the law, the projects can provide housing to the youth when housing at an educational institution is closed or unavailable to other students  FY2019 appropriations for FIPSE are $5 million  Recently emancipated foster youth are vulnerable to becoming homeless  In FY2017, nearly 20,000 youth "aged out" of foster care  The Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP), created under the Chafee Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 ( P L  106-169 ), provides states with funding to support children and youth ages 14 to 21 who are in foster care and former foster youth ages 18 to 21 (and up to age 23 in states that extend foster care to age 21)  States are authorized to receive funds based on their share of the total number of children in foster care nationwide  However, the law's "hold harmless" clause precludes any state from receiving less than the amount of funds it received in FY1998 or $500,000, whichever is greater  The program specifies funding for transitional living services, and as much as 30% of the funds may be dedicated to room and board  The program is funded through mandatory spending, and as such $140 million ($143 million as of FY2020) is provided for the program each year through the annual appropriations process  The Family Violence Prevention and Services Act (FVPSA), Title III of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 ( P L  98-457 ), authorized funds for Family Violence Prevention and Service grants that work to prevent family violence, improve service delivery to address family violence, and increase knowledge and understanding of family violence  From FY2007 to FY2009, one of these projects focused on runaway and homeless youth in dating violence situations through HHS's Domestic Violence/Runaway and Homeless Youth Collaboration on the Prevention of Adolescent Dating Violence initiative  The initiative was created because many runaway and homeless youth come from homes where domestic violence occurs and may be at risk of abusing their partners or becoming victims of abuse  The initiative funded eight states and community-based organizations to address the issue of teen dating violence among runaway and homeless youth  The grants funded activities such as curriculum on dating violence, small groups for teens, and a sexual assault/dating violence reduction program  The initiative resulted in an online toolkit for advocates in the runaway and homeless youth and domestic and sexual assault fields to help programs better address relationship violence with runaway and homeless youth 

ground_truth: Commonly known for protecting the President, the Secret Service also plays a leading role in investigating and preventing financial and electronic crimes. To accomplish its mission, the Secret Service relies heavily on the use of IT infrastructure and systems. In 2009, the component initiated the IITT investment—a portfolio of programs and projects that are intended to, among other things, improve systems availability and security in support of the component's business operations. GAO was asked to review the Secret Service's oversight of its IT portfolio and workforce. This report discusses the extent to which the (1) CIO implemented selected IT oversight responsibilities, (2) Secret Service implemented leading IT workforce planning and management practices, and (3) Secret Service and DHS implemented selected performance monitoring practices for IITT. GAO assessed agency documentation against 14 selected component CIO responsibilities established in DHS policy; 15 selected leading workforce planning and management practices within 5 topic areas; and two selected leading industry project monitoring practices that, among other things, were, in GAO's professional judgment, of most significance to managing IITT. The U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) Chief Information Officer (CIO) fully implemented 11 of 14 selected information technology (IT) oversight responsibilities, and partially implemented the remaining 3. The CIO partially implemented the responsibilities to establish a process that ensures the Secret Service reviews IT contracts; ensure that the component's IT policies align with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) policies; and set incremental targets to monitor program progress. Additional efforts to fully implement these 3 responsibilities will further position the CIO to effectively manage the IT portfolio. Of the 15 selected practices within the 5 workforce planning and management areas, the Secret Service fully implemented 3 practices, partly implemented 8, and did not implement 4 (see table). Within the strategic planning area, the component partly implemented the practice to, among other things, develop IT competency needs. While the Secret Service had defined general core competencies for its workforce, the Office of the CIO (OCIO) did not identify all of the technical competencies needed to support its functions. As a result, the office was limited in its ability to address any IT competency gaps that may exist. Also, while work remains to improve morale across the component, the Secret Service substantially implemented the employee morale practices for its IT staff. Secret Service officials said the gaps in implementing the workforce practices were due to, among other things, their focus on reorganizing the IT workforce within OCIO. Until the Secret Service fully implements these practices for its IT workforce, it may be limited in its ability to ensure the timely and effective acquisition and maintenance of the component's IT infrastructure and services. Of the two selected IT project monitoring practices, DHS and the Secret Service fully implemented the first practice to monitor the performance of the Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment. In addition, for the second practice—to monitor projects on incremental development metrics—the Secret Service fully implemented the practice on one of IITT's projects and partially implemented it on another. In particular, OCIO did not fully measure post-deployment user satisfaction with the system on one project. OCIO plans to conduct a user satisfaction survey of the system by September 2018, which should inform the office on whether the system is meeting users' needs. GAO is making 13 recommendations, including that the Secret Service establish a process that ensures the CIO reviews all IT contracts, as appropriate; and identify the skills needed for its IT workforce. DHS concurred with all recommendations and provided estimated dates for implementing each of them.