prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: Major disaster declarations can trigger a variety of federal response and recovery programs for government and nongovernmental entities, households, and individuals  FEMA’s Office of Response and Recovery manages the PA grant program, providing funds to states, territorial governments, local government agencies, Indian tribes, authorized tribal organizations, and certain private nonprofit organizations in response to presidentially declared disaster declarations to repair damaged public infrastructure such as roads, schools, and bridges  Figure 1 shows the total amount of PA funds obligated by county from January 2009 through February 2017 for federal disaster declarations  To implement the PA program, FEMA’s staff includes a mix of temporary, reservist, and permanent employees under two authorities, the Stafford Act and Title 5  Reservists make up the largest share of the PA workforce, which consisted of 1,852 employees––1,041 reservists, 634 full-time equivalents, and 177 temporary Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees––as of June 2017, according to PA officials  Figure 2 summarizes the key characteristics for each type of employee  After a disaster, FEMA sends PA program staff to the affected area to work with state and local officials to assess the damage prior to a disaster declaration  FEMA officials establish a temporary Joint Field Office (JFO) to house staff who will manage response and recovery functions after a declared disaster (including operations, emergency response and support teams, planning, administration, finance, and logistics)  Once the President has declared a disaster, PA staff work with grant applicants to help them document damages, identify eligible costs and work, and prepare requests for PA grant funds by developing project proposals  These proposals may include proposals for hazard mitigation if the hazard mitigation work is related to the repair of damaged facilities, referred to as permanent work projects  Immediate emergency measures, such as debris removal, are not eligible for hazard mitigation  Officials then review and obtain approval of the projects prior to FEMA obligating funds to state grantees  Figure 3 describes the process used to develop, review, and obligate PA projects  In addition to rebuilding and restoring infrastructure to its predisaster state, the PA program can be used to fund hazard mitigation measures that will reduce future risk to the infrastructure in conjunction with the repair of disaster-damaged facilities  There is no preset limit to the amount of PA funds a community may receive; however, PA hazard mitigation measures must be determined to be cost effective  Some examples of hazard mitigation measures that FEMA has predetermined to be cost effective, if they meet certain requirements, include installing shut-off valves on underground pipelines so that damaged sections can be isolated during or following a disaster; securing a roof using straps, clips, or other anchoring systems in locations subject to high winds; and installing shutters on windows or replacing glass with impact-resistant material  Applicants can also propose mitigation measures that are separate from the damaged portions of a facility, such as constructing floodwalls around damaged facilities to avoid future flooding  FEMA evaluates these proposals, considering how the proposed measure protects damaged portions of a facility and whether the measure is reasonable based on the extent of the damage, and determines eligibility on a case-by-case basis  FEMA’s Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA) deploys a cadre of mitigation staff to help coordinate and implement hazard mitigation activities during disaster recovery, including PA hazard mitigation  A primary task of these staff is to identify and assess opportunities to incorporate hazard mitigation into PA projects  Generally, if an applicant seeks to incorporate hazard mitigation measures into a PA project, FIMA’s hazard mitigation staff develop a hazard mitigation proposal  We, the DHS OIG, and others have reported past challenges with FEMA’s management of the PA program related to workforce management, information sharing, and hazard mitigation  For example, we reported in 2008 that the PA program had a shortage of experienced and knowledgeable staff, relied on temporary rotating staff, and provided limited training to their workforce, which impaired PA program delivery and delayed recovery efforts after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita  We found that staff turnover, coupled with information sharing challenges, delayed projects when applicants had to provide the same information each time FEMA assigned new staff and that poorly trained staff provided incomplete and inaccurate information during their initial meetings with applicants or made inaccurate eligibility determinations, which also caused processing delays  We recommended that FEMA strengthen continuity among staff involved in administering the PA program by developing protocols to improve information and document sharing among FEMA staff  In response, in 2013 FEMA instituted a PA Consistency Initiative, which included hiring new managers for FEMA regional offices, stakeholder training on PA program administration, and using a newly developed internal website to allow staff to post and share information to address continuity and knowledge sharing concerns during disaster operations  FEMA also developed the Public Assistance Program Delivery Transition Standard Operating Procedure to facilitate the transfer of responsibility for PA program activities during cases of staff turnover during recovery operations  Despite FEMA’s efforts to implement our recommendations, the DHS-OIG, in 2016, found continuing challenges after Hurricane Sandy with workforce levels, skills, and performance of reservists, who make up the majority of the PA workforce  Regarding information sharing, in 2008, we also identified difficulties sharing documents among federal, state, and local participants in the PA process and difficulties tracking the status of projects  We recommended that FEMA improve information sharing within the PA process by identifying and disseminating practices that facilitate more effective communication among federal, state, and local entities  In response, FEMA proceeded with the implementation of a grant tracking and management system, called EMMIE, which was used previously in 2007  However, in subsequent years we found weaknesses in how FEMA developed the system and the DHS-OIG found that information sharing problems similar to the ones identified in our 2008 report persisted  Regarding hazard mitigation, we reported in 2015 that state and local officials experienced challenges in using PA hazard mitigation during the Hurricane Sandy recovery efforts because PA officials did not consistently prioritize hazard mitigation, and in some cases discouraged mitigation projects during the PA grant application process, among other challenges  We recommended that FEMA assess the challenges state and local officials reported, including the extent to which they can be addressed, and implement corrective actions, as needed  In response to our recommendation, FEMA developed a corrective action plan that included actions and milestones for reviewing, updating, and implementing PA hazard mitigation policy  FEMA also identified the PA new delivery model as a solution for some of the challenges state and local officials reported  Previously, the OIG also reported that PA program officials did not consistently identify eligible PA hazard mitigation projects, and that PA officials did not prioritize the identification of PA hazard mitigation opportunities at the onset of recovery efforts after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes  See appendix I for a summary of findings and the status of our past recommendations on challenges with workforce management, information sharing, and hazard mitigation related to the PA program since our last review in December 2008  FEMA’s own internal reviews and outreach efforts have also identified similar challenges  For example, at FEMA’s request the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute assessed the effectiveness and efficiency of the PA program in 2011  The institute’s report outlined 3 key findings and 23 recommendations relating to the PA preaward process  For example, the report found that FEMA could enhance training programs to develop a skilled and experienced workforce; utilize technology and employ web-based tools to support centralized processing, transparency, and efficient decision making; and identify and address potential special considerations, such as hazard mitigation proposals, as early as possible in the preaward process to improve consistency  In 2014, PA program officials analyzed the PA grant process and used input from agency staff and officials involved in various aspects of the program to identify potential improvements  The resulting Public Assistance Program Realignment report found that challenges in workforce management, information sharing, and hazard mitigation continued, and included recommendations for improvement  For example, the report concluded that a shortage of qualified staff, high turnover, unclear organizational responsibilities, and inconsistent training were long-standing and continuing challenges that impaired the PA pre-award process  In addition, from January 2015 to April 2015, FEMA conducted extensive outreach with more than 260 stakeholders across FEMA headquarters, all 10 regions, 43 states, and 4 tribal nations to discuss challenges in the PA program and opportunities for improvement  For example, stakeholders identified challenges with ineffective information collection during the preaward process and suggested identifying special considerations, such as hazard mitigation, earlier in the PA process as an idea for improvement  In response, FEMA began redesigning the PA preaward process to operationalize the results of its 2014 report and address areas for improvement identified through its outreach efforts  FEMA awarded a contract for program support to help PA officials implement a redesigned PA program in 2015  This included a new process to develop and review grant applications, and obligate PA funds to states affected by disasters; new positions, such as a new program delivery manager who is the single point of contact throughout the grant application process; a new Consolidated Resource Center (CRC) to support field operations by supplementing project development, validation, and review of proposed PA project applications; and a new information system to maintain and share PA grant application documents  As part of the new process, PA program officials identified the need to ensure that staff emphasize special considerations, such as hazard mitigation, earlier in the process  Taken together, these efforts represent FEMA’s “new delivery model” for awarding PA program grants  Enhancements in the PA program under the new delivery model are presented in figure 4  Regarding the new delivery model process, FEMA introduced several changes to enhance outreach to applicants during the “exploratory call”— the first contact between FEMA and local officials—and during the first in- person meeting, called the “recovery scoping meeting ” FEMA also revised decision points during the process, when program officials can request more information from applicants, and applicants can review and approve the completion of project development steps  FEMA also incorporated special considerations, such as hazard mitigation, earlier in the new process during the exploratory calls and recovery scoping meetings  The changes and enhancements to the PA grant award process in the new delivery model are presented in figure 5  The new process divides proposed PA projects based on complexity and type of work into three categories—100 percent completed, standard, and specialized—that PA staff manage to expedite review or assign skilled staff to technical projects as needed  If the applicant has already completed work following a disaster, such as debris removal, it is considered “100 percent completed” and JFO staff collect the necessary documents and provide the information to the CRC staff who complete the development of project applications, validate the information, and complete all necessary reviews  Projects that require repairs and further assistance from PA program staff at the JFO include “standard” and “specialized” projects, which include a site inspection to document damages, before the JFO staff provide the information to the CRC  Further, PA program officials assign PA staff based on their skills and experience to standard projects, which are less technically complex to develop, and specialized projects, which are more technically complex and costly  We discuss the new workforce positions FEMA developed for JFOs and CRCs, the new information system FEMA developed to maintain and share PA grant documents with applicants, and FEMA’s efforts to incorporate hazard mitigation into PA projects later in this report  Since 2015, FEMA has invested almost $9 million to redesign the PA program through the reengineering and implementation of the new delivery model, including about $4 7 million for contract support for implementation, and $4 million for acquisition of the new information system  FEMA tested the new delivery model in a series of selected disasters, using a continuous process improvement approach to assess and improve the process, workforce changes, and information system requirements, prior to implementing the new model for all future disasters  For example, FEMA first tested the new process in Iowa in July 2015 and, in February 2016, PA program officials expanded their test to include all of the new staff positions  In October 2016, PA program officials added the new information system to achieve a comprehensive implementation of all of the elements of the new delivery model for the agency’s response to Hurricane Matthew in Georgia, two additional disasters in Georgia in January 2017, and in Missouri, North Dakota, Wyoming, Vermont, and two disasters in New Hampshire from June through August 2017  The timeline for PA’s implementation of the new delivery model is shown in figure 6  According to program officials, FEMA planned to implement the new model for all future disasters beginning in January 2018  However, historic disaster activity during the 2017 hurricane season accelerated full implementation  As a result, on September 12, 2017, FEMA officials announced that, unless officials determined it would be infeasible in an individual disaster, the program would use the new delivery model in all future disasters  According to FEMA’s 2014 PA Program Realignment report and other program documents, PA officials designed the new delivery model to respond to persistent workforce management challenges related to identifying the required number of staff and needed skills and training, among other things, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the PA preaward process  To address these challenges, PA program officials centralized much of the responsibility for processing PA projects in the CRCs, created additional new positions with specialized roles and responsibilities in JFOs, and established training and mentoring programs to help build the new staffs’ skills  In 2016, PA program officials centralized some of the project activities that otherwise were being carried out at individual JFOs at FEMA’s first new CRC in Denton, Texas  Officials did so by establishing 18 new positions, many of which directly correlated with positions that FEMA deployed to individual JFOs in the legacy PA delivery model  According to PA officials, centralizing positions will improve standardization in project processing, and result in a higher quality work product  As part of the new delivery model, PA program officials created a new hazard mitigation liaison position for PA program staff at the CRC that did not previously exist at individual JFOs  The other new positions that PA program officials either created or centralized at the CRC included two specialized positions responsible for costing and validating PA projects  Previously, the PA project specialist deployed to the JFO would complete these tasks and others; however, the consistency of project development varied across the regions and disasters  In contrast, CRC staff are full-time employees who receive training to specialize in completing standardized project development steps for PA projects from multiple disasters on an ongoing basis  Program officials anticipate that centralizing new specialized staff at the CRCs will also reduce PA administrative costs and staffing levels at the JFOs  For example, staff at the CRCs, such as the new hazard mitigation liaisons and insurance and costing specialists, could support project development for multiple disasters and regions simultaneously, whereas PA previously needed to deploy staff to each JFO to fulfill these roles  In addition, once JFOs operating under the new model send projects to the CRCs for processing and review, FEMA can more rapidly close its JFOs, reducing associated administrative costs  For example, following Hurricane Matthew, FEMA credited the new delivery model, in part, with its ability to close the JFO in Georgia sooner than several other JFOs in neighboring states not involved in the implementation of the new delivery model  PA program officials created new positions with more specialized roles and responsibilities to help PA staff at JFOs provide more consistency in the project development process and guidance to applicants  Program officials split the broad responsibilities previously managed at the JFOs by PA crew leaders and project specialists, into two new, specialized positions—the program delivery manager and site inspector  The program delivery manager serves as the applicant’s single point-of-contact throughout the preaward process, manages communication with the applicant, and oversees document collection  All three PA grant applicants we spoke to following Hurricane Matthew in Georgia greatly appreciated the knowledge and assistance provided by their program delivery managers  Site inspectors are responsible for conducting the site inspection to document all disaster-related damages; determining the applicant’s plans for recovery, coordinating with other specialists, and verifying the information collected with the applicant  Officials expect deployed staff at JFOs can complete the fieldwork faster and provide greater continuity of service to applicants  Further, program officials believe that specializing roles will enable them to provide more targeted training, and improve employee satisfaction  Site inspection, hazard mitigation, and environmental and historic preservation specialists, along with a new Public Assistance program mentor, conduct a site inspection with the applicant to document damages to a historic cemetery in Savannah, Georgia, following Hurricane Matthew in 2016  PA program officials designed new training and mentoring programs for the new positions at the CRCs and JFOs and used a continuous feedback process to update and improve the training, position guides, and task books throughout the implementation of the new delivery model, according to PA officials  According to a June 2017 update of the PA Cadre Training Plan, training for the new model has five major focuses: required training and skills for position qualification; on-site refresher training; mentor training; regional-based state, local, tribal, and territorial training; and training on the new information system  Specifically, officials developed six new training courses, and identified which are required for each position under the new delivery model  For example, a program delivery manager at the JFO is required to complete both the program delivery manager and site inspector specialist courses  As of June 2017, PA program officials had provided at least one new model training course to 93 percent of their cadre (including program delivery manager training to 366 individuals and site inspector training to 1,172 individuals) and planned to provide 28 additional courses through September 2017 to the PA cadre  According to regional and CRC officials, the training courses and mentoring from experienced staff helped maximize new staff’s capabilities in the new process  Throughout the third implementation of the new delivery model, JFO and CRC staff, as well as regional PA staff, stakeholders, and applicants, identified staff skills and training as a key area that needed more attention for full implementation of the new delivery model  Our work and FEMA’s after-action reports from the third test in Georgia identified problems with site inspector skills, which affected the timeliness and accuracy of projects  Specialists and managers at the CRC noted that poorly trained site inspectors did not consistently provide the necessary information from the field, which resulted in delays for the CRC staff to process projects, and after-action reports also identified challenges with site inspector skills  According to a PA applicant in Georgia, the inconsistency of skills and experience of their site inspector resulted in the need to conduct a “do-over” site inspection on one of the applicant’s projects, causing delays  PA staff and state officials attribute much of the site inspectors’ skill gaps to their lack of training and experience in the program  According to PA Region officials, providing timely training will be a resource-intensive challenge for implementing the new delivery model for all future disasters  For example, it can be difficult to train reservists before FEMA deploys them to disasters, and many of the program’s experienced reservists have retired or resigned, resulting in few mentors for the program and a high need to provide training to inexperienced and newly hired staff  PA officials and stakeholders also emphasized the need for FEMA to provide additional training for state and local officials to build capacity and support the goals of the new delivery model  For example, according to JFO officials at the third implementation, the new delivery model increases responsibilities for applicants, who will require more applicant training than FEMA currently provides  According to state officials, applicant capabilities vary, and FEMA should provide training to state and local officials on the new delivery model and the information system before a disaster  Skill gaps among applicants could result in inconsistent implementation of the new process, according to PA staff and stakeholders, and PA staff said that training was important to prevent applicants from reverting back to the legacy PA grant application process  To support full implementation of the new delivery model for all disasters, PA program officials have updated training courses for PA staff and applicants, and planned additional training to address these challenges and other lessons learned through the test implementation  For example, PA officials told us they updated the site inspector training program in May 2017 and scheduled a new site inspector training session in August 2017 to include more hands-on training to help address the skill gaps identified for site inspectors  PA officials created a new training course for FEMA’s regional offices, in part to enable regional PA staff to provide new delivery model training to state and local officials  PA officials also planned to develop a self-paced, online course for state and local officials by the end of 2017  PA officials have not fully assessed the workforce needed for JFO field operations, CRC staff, or FIMA’s hazard mitigation staff to support implementation of the new delivery model for all future disasters  PA program officials developed an initial assessment of the total number of staff needed in the field and the CRCs in 2016 to estimate cost savings associated with consolidating and specializing positions at the CRCs and deploying fewer staff to JFOs  However, the assessment did not identify the number of staff required to fill specific positions, including program delivery managers and hazard mitigation specialists, needed to support the new delivery model for full implementation  In reviewing the test implementations of the new delivery model, we found that inadequate staffing levels at the JFOs and CRCs, and with FIMA’s hazard mitigation staff, affected staffs’ ability to achieve the goals of the new delivery model  Staff levels at the JFO  We identified challenges with having the right number of program delivery managers and site inspection specialists to achieve program goals for customer satisfaction, efficiency, and quality in test implementations of the new delivery model  For example, in the second test implementation of the new delivery model in Oregon in 2016, PA did not deploy enough program delivery managers to the disaster, which resulted in unmanageable caseloads for program delivery managers, according to state and PA officials  PA program officials assigned program delivery managers an average caseload of 12 PA applicants, which was more than they could effectively manage, according to PA staff, and program officials aim for a caseload of 8 to 10 applicants  According to state officials, local officials reported they did not always receive the support they needed from program delivery managers who managed caseloads consisting of dozens of projects at multiple sites for each applicant during the Oregon implementation  As a result of overwhelmed program delivery managers, local officials faced challenges understanding their responsibilities, such as recognizing when they needed to provide information for the project development to proceed, according to state officials  PA staff involved with the third test implementation in Georgia in 2016 and 2017 said there were not enough site inspectors or program delivery managers to fully manage the workload at the JFO  Because of the specialization of roles, projects could not move forward when there were not enough staff to execute the next step in the process  For example, PA staff at the JFO said program delivery managers completed recovery scoping meetings rapidly, but faced a bottleneck in scheduling site inspections because there were more applicants awaiting site inspections than could be fulfilled by the number of site inspection specialists available  Staff levels at the CRC  Staff at the CRC reported challenges with staffing levels during the Oregon and Georgia test implementations, and expressed concerns about when PA officials will staff the CRCs to support full implementation of the new model for all disasters  During the Oregon test implementation, a CRC specialist said there were not enough technical specialists to manage the workload and, as a result, PA program officials had to redeploy site inspectors from their JFO field operations to the CRC to complete costing estimates  During the third test in Georgia, quality assurance specialists said that their workload resulted in added stress trying to complete the work in time while adhering to quality standards  According to CRC specialists in Denton, Texas, PA officials had not determined required staff levels for full implementation, but agreed that workload was too high and program officials needed to determine the appropriate staff levels for each CRC to support full implementation  PA officials were still evaluating CRC processing times and workload management from the Oregon and Georgia test implementations to determine staffing needs, according to PA officials  Further, PA program officials plan to establish a second CRC in Winchester, Virginia, before the end of 2017, but have not determined the number of additional permanent full-time staff needed to support the CRCs for full implementation of the new delivery model  Staff levels for the hazard mitigation specialists  PA officials have not identified the number of hazard mitigation specialists in FIMA’s hazard mitigation cadre needed for full implementation of the new delivery model  According to JFO staff, current hazard mitigation staff levels are insufficient to provide the desired in-person participation of hazard mitigation staff on all recovery scoping meetings to share information on hazard mitigation with applicants and help them identify potential mitigation opportunities  A PA program official said officials missed opportunities to pursue hazard mitigation during the test implementation after Hurricane Matthew in Georgia due to lack of hazard mitigation specialists  In addition, for the test implementation in Oregon, there were not enough hazard mitigation specialists to cover all site inspections and implement their new delivery model responsibilities, according to FEMA’s after-action reports  The absence of hazard mitigation specialists in the early stages of PA project development may cause delays in officials’ identifying hazard mitigation opportunities, according to a FIMA official  PA program officials said they did not work with FIMA to determine the appropriate levels of hazard mitigation staff under the new delivery model because they were refining the new process, but as of June 2017 were working with FIMA to do so  One of the key implementation activities in our Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide includes addressing workforce management issues  Specifically, this includes identifying how many and which employees will be affected by the position changes and retraining  Further, our prior work has found that high-performing organizations identify their current and future workforce needs—including the appropriate number and deployment of staff across the organization— and address workforce gaps, to improve the contribution of critical skills and competencies needed for mission success  According to a PA program official, their initial workforce assessment was not comprehensive because they were still collecting data required to make informed decisions  PA officials agreed that updating their workforce assessments prior to full implementation could be helpful, and acknowledged that program officials needed to be more proactive applying the lessons learned as they pivot from testing to full implementation of the new delivery model in 2018  FEMA also conducts a standard agency wide workforce structure review every 2 to 3 years, which helps officials determine the appropriate disaster workforce levels  As of June 2017, PA officials were working with other offices within FEMA to expedite the agency-wide assessment of the PA and FIMA hazard mitigation cadres, but did not know when they would complete the assessment  PA officials also acknowledged that they faced an aggressive schedule to complete various planned activities for workforce management, training, and other efforts, in support of full implementation, and that they may not be able to complete all efforts as thoroughly as they would like in order to expedite the transition of the PA program to the new delivery model  The gaps in PA workforce assessment in the JFOs, CRCs, and for FIMA’s hazard mitigation cadre present a risk that PA program managers will not have a sufficient workforce to support the goals of the new delivery model  In addition, the timing and implementation of the hiring and training activities for new PA program staff could take multiple months, and program officials will need to know what staff levels are necessary for full implementation of the new delivery model to inform resource decisions for the program in coordination with other agency offices  According to PA program officials, workforce assessment efforts have been delayed as a result of disaster response and recovery efforts related to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria  Completing a workforce assessment will help program officials identify gaps in their workforce and skills, which could help PA program officials minimize the effects of long- standing workforce staffing and training challenges on the PA program delivery and inform full implementation for all disasters  costs  For example, EMMIE does not collect information on all of the preaward activities that are part of the PA grant application process  As a result, PA program officials said they, and applicants, must use ad hoc reports and personal tracking documents to manage and monitor the progress of grant applications  PA officials added that EMMIE is not user- friendly and applicants often struggle to access the system  In response to these ongoing challenges, PA program officials developed FAC-Trax— a separate information system from EMMIE—with new capabilities designed to improve transparency, efficiency, and management of the PA program  Specifically, FAC-Trax allows FEMA staff (PA Grants Manager) and applicants (PA Grants Portal), to review, manage, and track current PA project status and documentation  For example, applicants can use FAC- Trax to submit requests for public assistance, upload required project documentation, approve grant application items, and send and receive notifications on grant progress and activities  In addition, the FAC-Trax system includes standardized forms, as well as required fields and tasks that PA program staff and applicants must complete before moving on to the next steps in the PA preaward process  According to PA officials, these capabilities increase transparency, encourage greater applicant involvement, and enhance collaboration and communication between FEMA and grant applicants, to improve efficiency in processing and awarding grant applications and enhance the quality of project development  Further, PA officials said that FAC-Trax could reduce challenges associated with staff turnover during the project development process because the system stores and maintains applicant information and project documentation, making it easier for transitioning staff to assist an applicant  They also said they use FAC-Trax to gather and analyze data that supports management of the PA process, including measuring the timeliness of the grant application process  For example, during the test implementation of the new delivery model in Georgia following Hurricane Matthew, officials were able to document that, on average, program delivery managers took 5 days to conduct the exploratory call and 14 days to hold the recovery scoping meeting with applicants, and CRC officials took 33 days to develop and review grant proposals  Managers use this data to assess staffing needs and identify bottlenecks in the PA process, according to PA officials  FAC-Trax is critical to the new PA delivery model and will be a primary means of sharing grant application documents, tracking ongoing PA projects, and ensuring that FEMA staff and applicants follow PA grant policies and procedures  Given the importance of developing and testing this new information sharing system, we evaluated its development against four key IT management controls—(1) project planning; (2) risk management; (3) requirements development; and (4) systems testing and integration  When implemented effectively, these controls provide assurance that IT systems will be delivered within cost and schedule and meet the capabilities needed by its users  We found that FEMA’s development of FAC-Trax fully satisfied best practices for project planning and risk management, but additional steps are needed to fully satisfy the areas of requirements development and systems testing and integration, as discussed below  See appendix II for the full assessment of each IT management control  PA program officials fully satisfied all five practices in the project planning control area, according to our assessment  Key project planning practices are (1) establishing and maintaining the program’s acquisition strategy, (2) developing and maintaining the overall project plan and obtaining commitment from relevant stakeholders, (3) developing and maintaining the program’s cost estimate, (4) establishing and maintaining the program’s schedule estimate, and (5) identifying the necessary knowledge and skills needed to carry out the program  To address the first and second practices, program officials established detailed plans that describe the acquisition strategy and objectives, the program’s scope, and its framework for using an Agile software development approach, among other key actions  Agile is a method of software development that utilizes an iterative process and constantly improves software based on user needs and feedback  Program officials also developed a plan detailing the program’s approach to deploy and maintain FAC-Trax and established stakeholder groups and an integrated product team to support and oversee the development of FAC-Trax  To address the third and fourth practices, they developed and maintained a master schedule of all implementation tasks and milestones through project completion, and developed a life-cycle cost estimate of over $19 million  Additionally, FAC-Trax’s acquisition performance baseline describes the system’s minimum acceptable and desired baselines for performance, schedule, and cost  Lastly, in regards to the fifth practice, program officials identified the knowledge and skills needed to carry out the program in the FAC-Trax Request for Proposal and FAC-Trax Capability Development Plan  PA program officials fully satisfied all four practices in the risk management control area, according to our assessment  Key risk management practices are (1) identifying risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively affect work efforts, (2) evaluating and categorizing each identified risk using defined risk categories and parameters, (3) developing risk mitigation plans for selected risks, and (4) monitoring the status of each risk periodically and implementing the risk mitigation plan as appropriate  To address the first and second practices, program officials identified key risks that could negatively affect FAC-Trax in a “risk register”—an online site used to track risks, issues, and mitigating actions  As of May 2017, officials had identified 13 risks in the risk register—four open and nine closed—and evaluated and categorized the identified risks based on the probability of occurrence and scope, schedule, and cost impacts  For example, program officials reported that two of its open risks have a “medium” risk rating—meaning the risk has the potential to slightly affect project cost, schedule, or performance  To address the third and fourth practices, program officials developed and documented risk mitigation plans for all identified risks  For example, program officials planned to mitigate the risk of limited engagement of subject matter experts by identifying and engaging with appropriate experts through workshops, and monitoring the capability development process to identify any issues that may cause project delays  In addition, PA program officials documented the responsible officials, reevaluation date, and risk status, among other things, for each risk in the register, and reviewed and updated risks during weekly and monthly program reviews with stakeholders throughout FEMA  PA program officials fully satisfied four out of five practices in the requirements development control area, according to our assessment  Key requirements development practices are (1) eliciting stakeholder needs, expectations, and constraints, and transforming them into prioritized customer requirements; (2) developing and reviewing operational concepts and scenarios to refine and discover requirements; (3) analyzing requirements to ensure that they are complete, feasible, and verifiable; (4) analyzing requirements to balance stakeholder needs and constraints; and (5) testing and validating the system as it is being developed  To address the first and second practices, program officials developed a requirements management plan outlining how officials capture, assess, and plan for FAC-Trax enhancements, and established a change control process to review, prioritize, and verify user requests for changes to the system and feedback  As of May 2017, the PA program office received 734 change requests related to FAC-Trax, of which program officials completed 420 changes and planned to address an additional 277 entries  Program officials also developed a functional requirements document outlining the high-level requirements for FAC- Trax and detailed operational concepts and scenarios for each phase of the preaward process in the system’s concept of operations  To address the fourth practice, program officials created a standard template to analyze and document the user needs and acceptance criteria for planned system capabilities in March 2017  In addition, PA program officials identified risks and dependencies for recommended changes to FAC-Trax, and balanced the cost and priority of system enhancements as part of the change control process  Lastly, regarding the fifth practice, program officials tested and evaluated FAC-Trax during development, which included validating system enhancements through user acceptance testing  However, program officials did not fully address the third practice— analyzing requirements to ensure they are complete, feasible, and verifiable—because they did not ensure detailed user requirements were necessary and sufficient by tracking them back to higher-level requirements  For example, although program officials reviewed change requests for completeness and followed up with users to verify requirements, officials did not track system enhancements, made in response to detailed user requirements (e g
Report 2:  In 1952, coverage was extended to civilian employees of nonappropriated fund instrumentalities of the armed forces , such as service clubs and post exchanges  Coverage was extended in 1953 to employees working on the Outer Continental Shelf in the exploration and the development of natural resources , such as workers on offshore oil platforms  Employers required by the LHWCA to provide workers' compensation coverage to their employees may either purchase private insurance or self-insure  The DOL is responsible for authorizing insurance carriers to provide coverage under the LHWCA program and for authorizing companies to self-insure  However, the DOL does not set or regulate insurance premiums  These insurance arrangements are the primary means of providing LHWCA benefits to injured, sick, and deceased workers and their families  General revenue is not used to pay any LHWCA benefits  The DOL operates the Special Fund to provide LHWCA benefits in cases in which the responsible employer or insurance carrier cannot pay or in which benefits must be paid for a second injury under Section 8(f) of the LHWCA  The Special Fund is financed through an annual assessment charged to employers and insurance carriers based on the previous year's claims, payments required when an employee dies without any survivors, disability payments due to an employee without survivors after his or her death, and penalties and fines assessed for noncompliance with LHWCA program rules  The administrative costs associated with the LHWCA are largely provided by general revenue  General revenue is used to pay for most oversight functions associated with the LHWCA and the processing of LHWCA claims  General revenue is also used to pay legal and investigative costs associated with the DOL Office of the Solicitor and Office of the Inspector General  Revenue from the Special Fund is used to finance oversight activities related to the Special Fund and the program's vocational rehabilitation activities  In 2016, total administrative costs associated with the LHWCA were approximately $15 8 million, of which $13 6 million, or 86%, was paid by general revenue and $2 2 million, or 14%, was paid by the Special Fund  The LHWCA provides medical benefits for covered injuries and illnesses and disability benefits to partially cover wages lost due to covered injuries or illnesses, and it provides survivors benefits to the families of workers who die on the job  The LHWCA provides medical benefits to fully cover the cost of any medical treatment associated with a covered injury or illness  These medical benefits are provided without any deductibles, copayments, or costs paid by the injured worker  Prescription drugs and medical procedures are fully covered, as are costs associated with travelling to and from medical appointments  A covered worker may select his or her own treating physician, provided the physician has not been debarred from the LHWCA program for violating program rules  Covered workers are entitled to vocational rehabilitation services provided under the LHWCA  Vocational rehabilitation services are designed to assist the covered worker in returning to employment  There is no cost to the covered worker for vocational rehabilitation and workers actively participating in a rehabilitation program are entitled to an additional benefit of $25 per week  All costs associated with vocational rehabilitation under the LHWCA are paid out of the Special Fund  Vocational rehabilitation services may be provided by public or private rehabilitation agencies  The LHWCA provides disability benefits to covered workers to partially cover wages lost due to the inability to work because of a covered injury or illness  The amount of disability benefits is based on the worker's pre-disability wage, subject to maximum and minimum benefits based on the National Average Weekly Wage (NAWW) as determined by the DOL  The NAWW is updated October 1 of each year and is based on average wages across the United States for the three calendar quarters ending on June 30 of that year  The minimum weekly benefit that can be paid to a covered employee is equal to 50% of the NAWW and the maximum weekly benefit that can be paid is equal to 200% of the NAWW  Disability benefits under the LHWCA, like all workers' compensation benefits, are not subject to federal income taxes  Unlike most state workers' compensation benefits, however, LHWCA benefits are adjusted based on wage inflation rather than price inflation  Benefits are adjusted annually each October 1 to reflect the change in the NAWW from the previous year, up to a maximum increase of 5%  The LHWCA provides benefits in cases of total disability  Under the LHWCA, a worker is considered totally disabled if he or she is unable to earn his or her pre-injury wage because of a covered injury or illness  In addition, a worker is also considered totally disabled if he or she loses both hands, arms, feet, legs, or eyes, or any two of these body systems, such as the loss of one arm and one leg  Total disability benefits under the LHWCA are equal to two-thirds of the covered worker's wage at the time of the injury or illness  Total disability benefits continue until the worker is no longer totally disabled or dies  If a covered worker is able to partially return to work or return to work at a wage level less than his or her wage at the time of injury, then he or she is considered partially disabled  In cases of temporary partial disability, the LHWCA benefit is equal to two-thirds of the difference between the workers' pre-injury wage and his or her current earning capacity or actual earnings  Section 8(c) of the LHWCA provides a schedule of benefits to be paid in cases of permanent partial disability (PPD), such as the loss of a limb  The benefit schedule provides the number of weeks of compensation, at two-thirds of the pre-injury wage, for each type of PPD  For example, the LHWCA schedule provides that a worker who loses an arm is entitled to 312 weeks of compensation  Benefits in cases not listed on the schedule are paid at two-thirds of the difference between the pre-injury wage and current earning capacity for the duration of the disability  Schedule benefits for PPD are paid regardless of the current work status or earnings capacity of the employee  Thus, an employee with a PPD can fully return to work and earn his or her wage in addition to the PPD compensation  A copy of the LHWCA PPD schedule can be found in the Appendix to this report  If a worker has an illness that was caused by his or her covered employment but did not manifest itself until after his or her retirement, then he or she is entitled to disability benefits equal to two-thirds of the NAWW multiplied by the percentage of his or her impairment  The percentage of impairment is determined using the current edition of the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides ), or another professionally recognized source if the condition is not listed in the AMA Guides  The LHWCA provides cash benefits to the surviving spouses and minor children of workers killed on the job  Benefits for a surviving spouse end when the spouse remarries or dies and benefits for surviving children continue until the children reach the age of 18, age 23 if a full-time student, or for the life a child with a disability  A surviving spouse with no eligible children is entitled to one-half of the deceased worker's wage at the time of death under the LHWCA  A surviving spouse with one or more eligible children is entitled to two-thirds of the deceased worker's wage at the time of death  Once all children become ineligible for benefits because of their ages, the surviving spouse's benefit is reduced to the level of a spouse without any eligible children  If an eligible spouse becomes ineligible for benefits because of death or remarriage, or if there is no surviving spouse, benefits are still paid to any surviving children  Under the LHWCA, a single surviving eligible child is entitled to one-half of the deceased worker's wage at the time of death, and two or more surviving children are eligible for a combined two-thirds of the wage at the time of death  The survivors of a covered worker killed on the job are entitled under the LHWCA to a cash payment to provide for the burial and funeral of the deceased  The burial and funeral allowance is capped by Section 9(a) of the LHWCA at $3,000, and this cap not adjusted to reflect changes in prices or wages  If a covered worker who is receiving scheduled PPD benefits dies of a cause unrelated to his or her illness or injury, then the balance of any remaining PPD benefits is paid to his or her survivors  If a covered worker who dies on the job leaves no survivors, his or her employer or the employer's insurance carrier is required to pay $5,000 into the Special Fund  Although the responsibility for the payment of benefits under the LHWCA rests with the employer or the employer's insurance company, decisions on benefit eligibility and the amount of benefits are made by the DOL  Upon the report of an injury, illness, or death, the LHWCA claims process begins  If the employer or insurance carrier does not controvert the claim, then arrangements are made by the DOL for the claim to be paid  If, however, the employer controverts any part of the claim, then the DOL sets up an informal conference, either in person or by phone, between the employer or insurance carrier and worker with the goal of resolving any disputes over the claim  If this informal conference fails to resolve all outstanding disputes, then a formal hearing before a DOL administrative law judge (ALJ) is scheduled  If the employer or insurance carrier or the worker is dissatisfied with the decision of the ALJ, then this decision may be appealed to the Benefits Review Board (BRB)  The BRB is made up of five members appointed by the Secretary of Labor  Either party dissatisfied with the decision of the BRB may file a petition with the U S  Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred praying that the BRB's decision be set aside or modified  If an employer or insurance carrier fails to pay compensation in accordance with a final decision on a claim, the covered worker or the DOL may request that the U S  District Court order that payment be made 

ground_truth: Thousands of Coast Guard servicemembers have left the military and transitioned into civilian life, and some of these new veterans may face significant challenges, such as finding and maintaining employment. To help them prepare, federal law mandated that DHS provide separating Coast Guard servicemembers with counseling, employment assistance, and information on veterans' benefits through TAP. GAO was asked to examine TAP implementation. This review analyzes (1) the reliability of TAP data on participation levels for Coast Guard servicemembers and the factors that affect participation, and (2) the Coast Guard's performance measures and monitoring efforts related to TAP. GAO interviewed Coast Guard headquarters staff; surveyed 12 Coast Guard installations that conduct TAP (100 percent response rate); collected and reviewed participation data for reliability; and interviewed TAP managers from three installations selected for size and location, and 25 Coast Guard servicemembers at one location. (For a companion report on TAP implementation for separating and retiring servicemembers in other military services, see GAO-18-23 .) The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), which is overseen by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), lacks complete or reliable data on participation in the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), designed to assist servicemembers returning to civilian life. According to senior Coast Guard officials, a major reason why data are not reliable is the lack of an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that specifies when to record TAP participation data. Consequently, the data are updated on an ad-hoc basis and may not be timely or complete, according to officials. Federal internal control standards call for management to use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Until the Coast Guard issues an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that establishes policies and procedures to improve the reliability and completeness of TAP data, it will lack quality information to gauge the extent to which it is meeting TAP participation requirements in the VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011. According to GAO's survey of Coast Guard installations, various factors affected participation, such as servicemembers serving at geographically remote locations or separating from the Coast Guard rapidly. TAP officials and Coast Guard servicemembers GAO interviewed said commanders and direct supervisors sometimes pulled servicemembers out of TAP class or postponed participation because of mission priorities. TAP managers also said they rely on delivering TAP online because many Coast Guard servicemembers are stationed remotely. The Coast Guard cannot effectively measure performance to ensure key TAP requirements are met because it lacks reliable data and does not monitor compliance with several TAP requirements. Further, the Coast Guard has not established a formal performance goal against which it can measure progress, although federal internal control standards stipulate that management should consider external requirements—such as the laws with which the entity is required to comply—to clearly define objectives in specific and measurable terms. Establishing a goal could help the Coast Guard define expected performance. In addition, the Coast Guard does not monitor TAP requirements regarding the timeliness of servicemembers' TAP participation or their access to additional 2-day classes. Consequently, it cannot know whether servicemembers are starting TAP early enough to complete the program or those who elected to attend additional 2-day classes were able to do so before separation or retirement, as required by the Act. Finally, the Coast Guard lacks an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that establishes the roles and responsibilities of Coast Guard staff in implementing TAP. Federal internal control standards stipulate that management should assign responsibility and delegate authority to key roles throughout the entity. Issuing an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that defines roles and responsibilities would clarify who is ultimately responsible for ensuring Coast Guard servicemembers attend TAP, thereby facilitating accountability. GAO is making seven recommendations, including that the Coast Guard issue a new Commandant Instruction establishing data collection policies, set TAP performance goals, monitor timeliness and access, and define roles and responsibilities. DHS agreed with all of GAO's recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Coast Guard staffing for the TAP program reflects the organizational structure of its Health, Safety, and Work-Life Directorate, which oversees TAP policy  The Coast Guard’s TAP managers are assigned to 13 installations where Health, Safety, and Work-Life offices are located  One or two TAP managers are assigned to each of the Coast Guard’s nine districts, which often span multiple states and territories, and these TAP managers oversee operations both for the installation where they work and for units stationed throughout the region (see fig  1)  For example, the TAP manager assigned to Coast Guard Base Cleveland oversees TAP implementation both for that installation and for Coast Guard units serving in Coast Guard District 9—a region that encompasses portions of eight states and the Great Lakes area  The program manager in Coast Guard Headquarters manages Coast Guard’s Transition Assistance Program  The Coast Guard protects and defends over 100,000 miles of U S  coastline and inland waterways, and consequently, TAP-eligible Coast Guard servicemembers sometimes work in small, widely dispersed units assigned to remote locations, including on Coast Guard vessels  One aspect of the Coast Guard’s mission—a first responder for maritime search and rescue in United States waters—can require Coast Guard servicemembers to respond to emergency situations at a moment’s notice  The Coast Guard, which is overseen by DHS, not DOD, generally oversees TAP implementation for its servicemembers  Federal law requires DOD and DHS to require eligible servicemembers under their respective command to participate in TAP, with some exceptions  In response to this statutory requirement, DOD has promulgated regulations and developed issuances which require that servicemembers complete the component parts of the TAP program, and that commanding officers ensure that servicemembers under their command complete these parts, with some exceptions  In contrast, according to Coast Guard officials, Coast Guard has not promulgated any regulations to implement TAP  Further, Coast Guard issued its most recent Commandant Instruction in 2003, approximately 8 years prior to TAP redesign in 2011  However, Coast Guard issued policy guidance in 2014 that made some limited updates to the Commandant Instruction  Coast Guard officials also said the Coast Guard plans to issue a new TAP Commandant Instruction in May 2018  Under the redesigned TAP, Coast Guard servicemembers—like their DOD counterparts—begin TAP by attending pre-separation or transition counseling where they are briefed on TAP requirements and available transition resources  Pre-separation or transition counseling can be delivered by TAP managers, uniformed career counselors, or online (see fig  2)  Coast Guard servicemembers are able to participate in TAP either through the Coast Guard or at a DOD installation, if space is available  During or at the end of pre-separation or transition counseling, participants register for and attend TAP courses  The core curriculum includes three required courses—the Department of Labor (DOL) Employment Workshop, unless exempt, and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Benefits Briefings I and II—and other courses that focus on aspects such as translating military skills and experiences into credentialing for civilian jobs and preparing a financial plan  Participants may also elect to attend additional 2-day classes either at a Coast Guard or DOD installation or online through the Joint Knowledge Online platform, according to agency officials  These additional 2-day classes include Accessing Higher Education, Career Technical Training, and Entrepreneurship  Federal law requires the Coast Guard to permit servicemembers who elect to take these additional 2-day classes to receive them  Federal law establishes a time frame within which servicemembers with anticipated separation or retirement dates should begin the program  According to federal law, retirees with anticipated separation dates are expected to begin TAP as soon as possible during the 24-month period preceding that date, but not later than 90 days before separation  Similarly, servicemembers with anticipated separation dates who are not retiring are expected to begin as soon as possible during the 12-month period preceding that date, but not later than 90 days before separation  Servicemembers who learn that they will separate or retire from the military fewer than 90 days before their anticipated separation or retirement date are expected to begin TAP as soon as possible within their remaining period of service  As we previously reported, officials from multiple federal agencies collaborate to deliver and assess TAP  The TAP interagency governance structure includes senior officials from DOD, VA, DOL, DHS, the Department of Education, the U S  Office of Personnel Management, and the Small Business Administration (SBA), who participate in TAP Senior Steering Group meetings at least every month and TAP Executive Council meetings each quarter  Further, officials tasked to particular interagency working groups focus on specific elements of TAP (e g , curriculum or performance measures), meet more frequently (typically at least once a month), and generally communicate weekly, according to agency officials  The TAP program manager for the Coast Guard told us that he participates in several of the working groups  One such working group is the performance management working group that oversees the interagency TAP evaluation plan, which includes monitoring performance measures related to TAP requirements, indicators of post-program outcomes, and formal evaluations sponsored by interagency partners  While DOD tracks TAP-specific performance measures, other interagency partners track indicators of how well veterans fare after leaving military service  For example, DOD tracks performance measures prior to servicemembers’ separation, such as TAP participation and credential attainment rates, while other agencies track post-separation indicators, such as unemployment rates among veterans ages 18 to 24  The performance management working group also reviews the formal evaluation efforts led by individual agencies and provides feedback to help shape their efforts in accordance with the TAP Evaluation Plan  The Coast Guard does not have complete or reliable data on participation levels in TAP  According to Coast Guard officials, a major reason why the data are not reliable is that the Coast Guard lacks an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that specifies when to record TAP participation data  Consequently, the data are updated on an ad-hoc basis, according to agency officials, and may not be timely or complete  For example, one TAP manager said she updates the list of TAP participants for her installation only once every few months because of her other duties  According to federal internal control standards, management should use quality information—including current and timely information— to achieve the entity’s objectives and to communicate quality information to external parties  Given the lack of timely and complete data, we determined the Coast Guard’s TAP data were not sufficiently reliable for an analysis of participation in TAP classes  Because it lacks policies and procedures governing reliable data collection, including when data should be entered and by whom, the Coast Guard cannot determine to what extent its servicemembers attend TAP, although federal law mandates that DHS ensure all TAP-eligible servicemembers participate in the program  In addition, the data collection system currently used to track TAP participation is not sufficient to ensure reliable data  For example, according to Coast Guard staff, TAP staff enter TAP participation data into a shared spreadsheet that all TAP managers can edit  Specifically, staff record the names of servicemembers they identify as TAP-eligible and whether these individuals completed required portions of TAP  Coast Guard officials said they are in the process of adopting a new data system, in October 2018, to more reliably track TAP participation and that they expect to fully adopt this system–DOD’s TAP-IT Enterprise System—after a new Commandant Instruction is finalized, in May 2018  In November 2016, DOD launched the new system to collect TAP-related data for servicemembers in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps  In addition to standardizing data collection and improving data completeness and accuracy, the TAP-IT Enterprise System is expected to track information related to the time frames of servicemembers’ participation  According to a senior DOD official, the military services will not be able to use the system to generate unit-level or installation-level reports until October 2018  According to our survey, the most common factor affecting TAP participation, cited at 11 of the 12 Coast Guard installations we surveyed, pertained to servicemembers assigned to geographically remote locations  The next three most commonly cited factors–each cited by 7 of the 12 installations surveyed—relate to the timing of TAP participation: rapid separation from the military, not being sufficiently aware of the need to attend TAP, and starting the transition process too late to attend  (See fig  3 ) Headquarters-based TAP officials identified additional factors that may affect servicemember participation, such as separating from the Coast Guard Reserves or retiring with no plans to work after leaving the military  However, the Coast Guard lacks participation data to verify whether participation rates for these groups are in fact lower than for other Coast Guard servicemembers  Coast Guard installations we surveyed did not indicate that unit commanders or direct supervisors affected participation in TAP’s required courses or additional 2-day classes  However, Coast Guard servicemembers and TAP officials we spoke with said unit commanders or direct supervisors sometimes prevented participation  All three TAP managers we spoke with (of 12 nationwide) told us that while commanders generally allowed servicemembers to register for TAP courses, they occasionally required them to return to their duties before completing the courses  We observed this during a TAP class at a Coast Guard installation we visited when a servicemember’s commander ordered her to return to the unit during TAP training and she missed a briefing she wanted to attend  Two of three TAP managers we interviewed also said commanders sometimes required servicemembers under their command to wait to take TAP classes until close to their separation date because of mission priorities  Two of three TAP managers interviewed said that commanders in the Coast Guard face unique challenges in ensuring TAP participation  They said commanders in all branches of the military must balance competing demands, including their primary mission and the training needs of the personnel they oversee  They said it can be particularly difficult for Coast Guard commanders to juggle these priorities because Coast Guard servicemembers are sometimes assigned to very small units or called to return to duty for emergency situations during scheduled TAP classes  One TAP manager said that a commander in a remote location had collaborated with her to provide a classroom-based TAP class for transitioning Coast Guard servicemembers within the commander’s unit, but rescue efforts occurred during the class which resulted in most of those servicemembers returning to their vessel to respond to the emergency  In addition, all three TAP managers we spoke with said there are limited resources for holding TAP in a classroom setting  Consequently, classroom-based TAP may not be offered frequently in remote locations, making rescheduling difficult  One TAP manager said that her installation typically offers three or four TAP classes a year and because classes are so infrequent, servicemembers are encouraged to start TAP as soon as possible prior to separation  Coast Guard staff we interviewed said that juggling competing priorities affected the Coast Guard’s ability to implement TAP  Both the frontline and headquarters staff who oversee TAP implementation said they oversee at least three other programs in addition to TAP at their installation and throughout their regions, including the Coast Guard’s relocation and spousal employment programs  The Coast Guard relies on online delivery of TAP information and classes for servicemembers who are rapidly separating and assigned to remote and geographically dispersed units, according to our survey results and several Coast Guard staff we interviewed  For example, all 12 installations we surveyed cited servicemembers facing rapid separations as a reason for accessing TAP training online, and 11 cited servicemembers being remotely stationed as a reason  Coast Guard staff also said online TAP was used for servicemembers interested in attending additional 2-day classes  The three TAP managers we interviewed also identified several reasons why installations had to rely on online TAP classes  For example, one manager corroborated our survey results, saying that many Coast Guard servicemembers worked in small units assigned to remote and geographically dispersed locations, making it difficult to convene a sufficient number of transitioning Coast Guard servicemembers to meet minimum class size requirements  In addition, all three managers said they used the online version of TAP for remotely stationed Coast Guard servicemembers because the Coast Guard lacked the resources for them to attend classes in person  Although they preferred that servicemembers participate in live, classroom-based TAP classes, all of the managers acknowledged that the online version of TAP played an integral role in ensuring that more servicemembers could participate in the program  However, two of them noted that while classroom delivery of TAP classes provided an interactive learning environment that allowed participants to ask questions and learn from their peers, online participants generally clicked quickly through the slides and had difficulty understanding the information being presented  Two managers told us that they regularly used the online version to deliver parts of the TAP curriculum  For example, one TAP manager said she required participants to complete the crosswalk of military and civilian occupations class online before attending required classes in person  Two managers noted that additional 2-day classes were available online, and one noted that some servicemembers attended these classes in a classroom setting either on a Coast Guard base or a DOD installation  Finally, all three TAP managers said that many participants in online TAP classes would benefit from participating in a real-time virtual version of TAP led by live facilitators  Two managers told us that having a remote facilitator delivering TAP in real time would give participants more opportunity to ask questions and better understand and absorb class content  Despite these challenges, TAP managers and separating Coast Guard servicemembers we interviewed provided generally positive feedback about the TAP program  All of the 25 Coast Guard servicemembers we spoke with said that the information they received during the courses was useful and they liked the instructors  One Coast Guard servicemember praised the classroom courses for being interactive, and several Coast Guard servicemembers said they wanted the opportunity to retake TAP before or shortly after they separated from the Coast Guard  However, many said the volume of information presented in a short period of time could be overwhelming and was like “trying to drink from a firehose ” The Coast Guard has not set a formal performance goal for TAP participation, according to a Coast Guard official, and as previously discussed, does not have complete, reliable data  Without reliable information, the Coast Guard cannot effectively monitor TAP implementation or measure program performance  DHS is mandated to ensure that all TAP- eligible servicemembers of the Coast Guard participate in TAP before leaving military service  However, without effective monitoring of program participation, the Coast Guard cannot know to what extent its servicemembers receive the required training they need to prepare for civilian life  According to federal internal control standards, management should consider external requirements—such as the laws with which the entity is required to comply—to clearly define objectives in specific and measurable terms  In addition, establishing goals can help agencies define expected performance and articulate results  A Coast Guard official said the Coast Guard’s long-term goal is for full compliance with TAP requirements, but in the interim, the Coast Guard uses DOD’s 85 percent VOW compliance goal as an informal benchmark against which to gauge the Coast Guard’s TAP performance  However, the Coast Guard has not communicated a specific, measurable goal to TAP staff implementing the program, or to Coast Guard commanders who oversee separating and retiring Coast Guard servicemembers, according to a Coast Guard official  Establishing and communicating a formal goal could help the Coast Guard define expected performance  The official also told us that, like DOD, the Coast Guard tracks the elements of TAP mandated under the VOW Act— transition or pre-separation counseling, VA Benefits I and II, and the DOL Employment Workshop  The Coast Guard does not monitor the (1) timeliness of participation in TAP, and (2) access to additional 2-day classes  A Coast Guard official said the Coast Guard does not currently monitor TAP beyond tracking whether separating servicemembers participate in the required courses, and currently lacks the capacity to undertake additional monitoring efforts  However, he said additional monitoring would be possible once the Coast Guard completed the move to the DOD TAP-IT Enterprise data system  According to a Coast Guard official, the Coast Guard does not currently monitor the timeliness of TAP participation although federal law prescribes time frames for servicemembers to begin TAP participation  Generally, separating servicemembers who are not retiring are to begin TAP participation no later than 90 days before their separation date  Without a systematic method for monitoring timeliness, the Coast Guard cannot know whether its servicemembers begin the program on time or account for the timeliness of TAP participation  As a result, the Coast Guard cannot know whether its servicemembers are starting TAP early enough to complete the training they need to adequately prepare for their transition to civilian life  The Coast Guard does not track which of its servicemembers participate in the additional 2-day classes, according to a Coast Guard official we interviewed, even though federal law requires that DHS ensure those who elect to participate are able to receive the training  By not tracking which Coast Guard servicemembers participate in 2-day classes or requiring transition staff to document when servicemembers ask to attend, the Coast Guard cannot determine the extent to which servicemembers who wished to attend these courses were able to do so, as required by law  Coast Guard commanders and TAP managers do not have clearly defined roles and responsibilities in implementing TAP because of the lack of an up-to-date Commandant Instruction, according to TAP staff we interviewed  As previously discussed, the Coast Guard’s last Commandant Instruction on TAP was issued in 2003, approximately 8 years prior to TAP’s redesign  According to federal internal control standards, to achieve the entity’s objectives, management should assign responsibility and delegate authority to key roles throughout the entity  Without an up-to-date Commandant Instruction, TAP managers and commanders may be unclear on who is ultimately responsible for ensuring servicemembers attend TAP  Moreover, two TAP managers also told us that an up-to-date Commandant Instruction might lead some commanders to place higher priority on ensuring TAP participation  Coast Guard officials said the Coast Guard was in the process of revising the TAP Commandant Instruction and anticipated issuing the new instruction in May 2018  The Coast Guard lacks the ability to share data with commanders, limiting its ability to monitor TAP participation and ensure servicemembers attend the program  According to a Coast Guard official, the Coast Guard’s current data collection system also cannot generate installation or unit- level participation rates to share with commanders who oversee transitioning and retiring servicemembers  Federal internal control standards state that management should share quality information throughout an organization to enable personnel to perform key roles, and we have previously reported that by regularly sharing useful performance information with leaders at multiple levels of an organization, agencies can help leaders make informed decisions  Without this information, individual unit commanders or the commanders’ supervisors cannot determine whether Coast Guard servicemembers under their command completed TAP or identify whether there is a need for corrective actions to ensure they do so  As we mention earlier in this report, the Coast Guard plans to adopt DOD’s TAP-IT Enterprise System, which according to officials, could help the Coast Guard ensure eligible servicemembers participate in the program  According to a Coast Guard official, once the system is fully implemented by the Coast Guard, commanders will be required to verify and document whether Coast Guard servicemembers under their command completed TAP, potentially making commanders more vested in the process  We previously reported that a senior DOD official said that the TAP-IT Enterprise System may be able to generate unit- and installation-level reports for the four DOD-led military services by October 2018, and a Coast Guard official said he would work with DOD to identify whether this capability could also extend to the Coast Guard  Once data reliability improves, sharing installation and unit-level TAP performance information with Coast Guard commanders could support monitoring efforts  The performance measures tracked by the TAP interagency working group do not reflect TAP implementation broadly across all five military services, according to a Coast Guard official we interviewed  The Coast Guard does not currently share TAP data it collects with DOD or other members of the interagency performance working group  While the benefits of interagency data sharing cannot be realized without the Coast Guard first improving the quality and completeness of its TAP data, we have identified leading practices for interagency collaboration, including that members of interagency working groups identify and share relevant agency performance data  Moreover, federal internal control standards call for management to communicate quality information to external parties  Because the Coast Guard does not share TAP data, the performance measures tracked by the interagency group do not reflect Coast Guard servicemembers’ experiences and thus do not provide a complete picture of TAP implementation across the five military services  More specifically for the Coast Guard, without such data sharing, future TAP evaluations may not be able to assess the effectiveness of TAP delivery, hindering the Coast Guard’s ability to make program adjustments to better prepare its servicemembers to successfully transition to life after military service  Coast Guard officials said migrating to DOD’s TAP-IT Enterprise System will facilitate information sharing with interagency partners and that improving data completeness and reliability is a top priority for 2018  Given the sacrifices servicemembers have made to serve their country, it is imperative they are afforded every chance to adequately prepare for civilian life before leaving military service  In order to make a successful transition, servicemembers need to be well-positioned to get a job or make an informed decision about whether to pursue additional education or start a small business  As such, the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) serves a critically important function—to give servicemembers the tools and information they need to successfully transition to life outside the military  Federal law requires that the Coast Guard ensure all eligible servicemembers participate in the program, but thousands of Coast Guard servicemembers may have transitioned without the support provided by TAP  Reliably tracking participation has proven to be a challenge for the Coast Guard, in part because it lacks a current Commandant Instruction that defines the roles and responsibilities of staff responsible for implementing TAP and ensuring complete and reliable data are collected  In preparing to issue an updated Commandant Instruction, the Coast Guard has taken a positive step toward addressing the limitations of its current TAP data, and will be better positioned to ensure compliance with VOW Act requirements using reliable data  In addition to collecting reliable data, the Coast Guard could further demonstrate its commitment to meeting TAP requirements by establishing formal performance goals that measure the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP  By establishing interim performance goals, the agency would be able to show its progress towards achieving full compliance  Moreover, communicating performance goals to unit and installation commanders could enhance accountability and might spur progress toward meeting federal program requirements  By expanding its monitoring efforts beyond tracking participation in TAP’s required classes, the Coast Guard could enhance its ability to ensure other TAP requirements are met and that its servicemembers are able to access additional transition resources  Monitoring the timeliness of participation would help ensure Coast Guard servicemembers have adequate time to complete TAP before leaving the military  Further, by monitoring requests to participate in additional 2-day classes and 2-day class attendance, the Coast Guard would be in a better position to identify whether servicemembers who wish to attend the classes are able to do so, to determine whether more classes are needed, and to communicate this information to the interagency partners responsible for delivering these classes  Commanders can also play a key role in bolstering TAP participation  Having an up-to-date written Commandant Instruction that explicitly describes commanders’ roles and responsibilities could enhance commanders’ ability to ensure TAP’s proper implementation and compliance with VOW Act requirements  Moreover, once data quality improves, providing commanders a mechanism to readily determine whether servicemembers under their command have completed TAP could help them monitor the program to ensure that all TAP-eligible servicemembers receive the resources they need to successfully transition to civilian life  Finally, once more reliable data on Coast Guard servicemember participation are available, sharing this information with interagency partners could improve TAP implementation on a broader scale  Sharing reliable data, such as participation figures for the Coast Guard, would give TAP interagency partners a more complete picture of implementation across all five military services  Sharing such information would also enhance the interagency group’s ability to evaluate how well TAP serves the entire population of servicemembers  Improving the reliability of the Coast Guard’s TAP data will be essential for the benefits of data sharing to be realized  To ensure that all eligible Coast Guard servicemembers are provided the opportunity to complete the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), we recommend the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following seven actions: Issue an updated Commandant Instruction that establishes policies and procedures to improve the reliability and completeness of TAP data by including when and by whom data should be recorded and updated  (Recommendation 1) Establish a formal performance goal with a measurable target for participation rates in VOW Act-mandated portions of TAP  (Recommendation 2) Monitor the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP within prescribed time frames  (Recommendation 3) Monitor the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers who elect to participate in additional 2-day classes are afforded the opportunity to attend  (Recommendation 4) Issue an updated Commandant Instruction that defines the roles and responsibilities of the personnel who administer the program and ensure servicemembers’ participation  (Recommendation 5) Once reliable data are available by installation or unit, enable unit commanders and the higher-level commanders to whom they report to access TAP performance information specifically for the units they oversee so that they can monitor compliance with all TAP requirements  (Recommendation 6) Once reliable data are available, share TAP information with DOD and other interagency partners, such as data on participation in required TAP courses and additional 2-day classes  (Recommendation 7) We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Education, Labor, and Veterans Affairs, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Small Business Administration for their review and comment  The formal written response of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is reproduced in appendix II  In addition, DHS provided technical comments from Coast Guard officials that we incorporated into the report as appropriate  The other agencies did not provide any comments  In its written comments, DHS agreed with all seven of our recommendations  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or brownbarnesc@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  This report examines (1) what is known about the reliability of Transition Assistance Program (TAP) data on participation levels and the factors that affect Coast Guard servicemembers’ participation, and (2) the extent to which the Coast Guard measures TAP performance and monitors key areas of TAP implementation  To address these questions, we surveyed Coast Guard installations with full-time TAP operations; reviewed Coast Guard data on TAP participation for fiscal years 2012 to 2017; visited one Coast Guard installation and interviewed TAP managers from two additional Coast Guard installations selected for diversity in location, among other reasons; and interviewed Coast Guard officials responsible for overseeing TAP implementation for the Coast Guard  We also reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, policies, documents, and publications  Information in this report is current as of the date GAO received formal agency comments from DHS  Our survey of Coast Guard installations with full-time TAP operations asked about how TAP was being implemented  The survey included questions about the accessibility of TAP components, challenges Coast Guard servicemembers faced in attending the components, and the level of commander support for participation  Our survey targeted front-line TAP managers, who could draw on the expertise of TAP course facilitators, transition counselors, career counselors, and other key TAP staff as necessary  After drafting the survey questions, we pretested them with a TAP manager to ensure (1) the questions were clear and unambiguous, (2) terminology was used correctly, (3) the survey did not place an undue burden on agency officials, (4) the information could feasibly be obtained, and (5) the survey was comprehensive and unbiased  We revised the content and format of the survey based on the feedback we received  We initially sent the survey to TAP managers at all 13 Coast Guard installations at which TAP staff were located  We removed one installation when we later found that the TAP manager position was vacant and revised the total to 12 Coast Guard installations  The survey was accessible online from October 31, 2016, through January 18, 2017, through a secure server that recipients were able to access using unique usernames and passwords  We sent an email announcement to TAP staff at all 13 Coast Guard installations at which TAP staff are located on October 24, 2016  We sent a second email on October 31, 2016 to notify participants the survey was available online, and provided their unique passwords and usernames  We sent two follow-up e-mails (November 14, 2016 and November 28, 2016) to those who had not responded  Finally, we contacted all remaining nonrespondents by telephone starting December 5, 2016  The survey was available online until we reached a 100 percent response rate  To increase our understanding into how TAP was being implemented at installations and supplement our survey findings, we visited one Coast Guard installation and interviewed TAP managers from two additional installations  We selected the installations based on several factors, including the size of the installation, proximity to Department of Defense (DOD) installations, and diverse locations in the United States  (See table 1 ) At Coast Guard Base Elizabeth City in North Carolina, the installation we visited, we interviewed the TAP manager, uniformed career counselors, and senior installation leadership  During our interviews with TAP managers at all three installations, we asked about the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP’s required and additional 2-day classes, including whether the servicemembers attended classes online or in a classroom setting, challenges to ensuring Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP, and the extent to which they monitor Coast Guard servicemembers’ participation in TAP  At Coast Guard Base Elizabeth City, we also interviewed 25 Coast Guard servicemembers (both officers and enlisted personnel) to get their perspective on how well TAP worked and any challenges they had participating  To help guide the interviews with the Coast Guard servicemembers, we asked them to complete a short questionnaire that asked about their experiences with the TAP program  We also interviewed TAP staff at Coast Guard headquarters to learn about TAP policy, monitoring efforts, and performance measures for the service overall  For example, we asked what policies and procedures guide installations’ TAP implementation; what performance measures the Coast Guard uses to monitor TAP; how performance results are reported and shared with different levels of Coast Guard leadership; and to what extent the Coast Guard uses results from TAP participant satisfaction assessments  We also asked whether the Coast Guard plans to shift to DOD’s new TAP-IT Enterprise System and how using the new system could affect its monitoring efforts in the future  In evaluating the Coast Guard’s performance measures, we focused on measures related to servicemembers’ transition experiences before leaving the military  We did not gather information on post-program evaluations and outcomes because they were determined to be outside the scope of this review  We reviewed DHS data on TAP participation for fiscal years 2012 to 2017  To assess the reliability of the Coast Guard’s TAP participation data, we interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data  We determined these data were not sufficiently reliable due to limitations with the Coast Guard’s data collection system  Specifically, the system lacks adequate controls to ensure TAP data are complete and accurate  We conducted this performance audit from February 2016 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the contact named above, Meeta Engle (Assistant Director), Amy MacDonald (Analyst-in-Charge), James Bennett, Holly Dye, David Forgosh, Ying Long, Jonathan McMurray, Jean McSween, Andrew Sherrill, Benjamin Sinoff, and Timothy Young, made significant contributions to this report  Also contributing to this report were Susan Aschoff, Jessie Battle, Ramona Burton, Melinda Cordero, Elizabeth Curda, Dawn Hoff, Ben Licht, Serena Lo, Sheila McCoy, Almeta Spencer, Christopher Schmitt, James Whitcomb, and Jill Yost  Transitioning Veterans: DOD Needs to Improve Performance Reporting and Monitoring for the Transition Assistance Program, GAO-18-23  Washington, D C : November, 8, 2017  Transitioning Veterans: Improvements Needed in DOD’s Performance Reporting and Monitoring of the Transition Assistance Program, GAO-18-225T  Washington, D C : November 8, 2017  Department of Defense: Transition Assistance Program (TAP) for Military Personnel, GAO-16-302R  Washington, D C : December 17, 2015  Veterans’ Employment: Need for Further Workshops Should Be Considered before Making Decisions on Their Future, GAO-15-518  Washington, D C : July 16, 2015  Military and Veteran Support: DOD and VA Programs That Address the Effects of Combat and Transition to Civilian Life, GAO-15-24  Washington, D C : November 7, 2014  Veterans Affairs: Better Understanding Needed to Enhance Services to Veterans Readjusting to Civilian Life, GAO-14-676  Washington, D C : September 10, 2014  Transitioning Veterans: Improved Oversight Needed to Enhance Implementation of Transition Assistance Program, GAO-14-144  Washington, D C : March 5, 2014  Military and Veterans’ Benefits: Enhanced Services Could Improve Transition Assistance for Reserves and National Guard, GAO-05-544  Washington, D C : May 20, 2005  Military and Veterans’ Benefits: Observations on the Transition Assistance Program, GAO-02-914T (July 18, 2002) 


Report 2: , allowing users to search PA projects by project number), back to the high-level requirements (e g , storing data and information provided by the applicant) identified in the FAC-Trax functional requirements document and performance work statement  Officials did not track system enhancements back to high-level requirements because they did not have a complete understanding of basic user needs and system requirements at the beginning of the FAC- Trax effort, according to the PA program manager  A PA official also said the change control process was a way to identify the basic capabilities FAC-Trax needed to have and that tracking enhancements back to high- level requirements could have made the change control process more difficult to manage, and reduced user participation if, for example, users needed to understand how their change requests related to high-level requirements  However, program officials could have tracked enhancements back to high-level requirements themselves using the change control process without putting any additional burden on users  Despite not having a complete understanding of user needs and system requirements at the beginning of the FAC-Trax effort, analyzing whether users’ change requests satisfy higher-level requirements identified in key design and planning documents would have provided officials with a basis for more detailed and precise requirements throughout project development and helped them better manage the project, according to IT management controls  Further, according to the PMBOK® Guide, tracking or measuring system capabilities against approved requirements is a key process for managing a project’s scope, measuring project completion, and ensuring the project meets user needs and expectations  Program officials acknowledged the importance of tracking system enhancements back to documented system requirements  Ensuring that FAC-Trax meets user needs and expectations is especially important because the information system is key to the success of the new delivery model, according to PA officials  By analyzing progress made on documented, high-level requirements, a step that reflects a key IT management control for requirements development, the PA program will have greater assurance that FAC-Trax will provide functionality that meets user needs and expectations  PA program officials did not fully satisfy either of the two practices in the systems testing and integration control area, according to our assessment  Key systems testing and integration practices are (1) developing test plans and test cases, which include a description of the overall approach for system testing, the set of tasks necessary to prepare for and perform testing, the roles and responsibilities for individuals or groups responsible for testing, and criteria to determine whether the system has passed or failed testing; and (2) developing a systems integration plan to identify all systems to be integrated, describe how integration problems are to be documented and resolved, define roles and responsibilities of all relevant participants, and establish a sequence and schedule for every integration step  In regards to the first practice, PA program officials and the FAC-Trax contractor established a test plan that identifies the method and strategy to perform testing, including the necessary tasks, such as responding to user feedback and testing errors, and incorporating necessary resolutions into future work, testing parameters, and the roles and responsibilities of the individuals responsible for testing  However, program officials have not developed system testing criteria to evaluate FAC-Trax, which would align with the practice described above of using criteria to determine whether the system has passed or failed testing  A key feature of Agile software development is the “definition of done”—a set of clear, comprehensive, and objective criteria, that the government should use to evaluate software after each iteration of development  PA program officials said they did not establish a definition of done because officials initially managing the FAC-Trax effort lacked familiarity with system development in the Agile environment  Officials acknowledged the importance of establishing a definition of done and said they are planning to develop one, but have not identified how or when to incorporate it into the development process  According to the TechFAR—the government’s handbook for procuring digital services using Agile processes—the government and vendor should establish this definition after contract award at the beginning of each cycle of software development  By establishing criteria, such as a definition of done, to evaluate the system—a step that reflects a key IT management control for system testing and is an effective practice for applying Agile to software development—the PA program will have greater assurance that FAC- Trax is usable and responsive to specified requirements  In regards to the second practice, PA program officials developed a systems integration plan in June 2017 that identified the potential for integration of FAC-Trax with four FEMA systems, including EMMIE  In addition, program officials included a description of how staff should document integration problems and the resolution of problems in FAC- Trax development and test plans  However, the systems integration plan does not define roles and responsibilities of all participants for system integration activities or establish a sequence and schedule for every integration step for the four FEMA systems  PA officials said that system integration planning for FAC-Trax is in the early stages, but acknowledged the importance of these elements of system integration planning  Officials plan to define roles and responsibilities of all participants for system integration activities and develop the sequence and schedule for every integration step as they add new systems to the FAC-Trax development plan and obtain funding needed for their integration  Nonetheless, FEMA has used FAC-Trax for selected PA disasters since October 2016 and plans to use FAC-Trax for all future disasters  According to IT management controls, agencies should establish the systems integration plan early in the project and revise it to reflect evolving and emerging user needs  By ensuring that the FAC- Trax systems integration plan defines the roles and responsibilities of relevant participants for all integration relationships and establishes a sequence and schedule for every integration step, the PA program will have greater assurance that FAC-Trax functions properly with other systems and meets user needs  FEMA’s new delivery model enhances participation of hazard mitigation staff with the goal of identifying opportunities for mitigation earlier in the PA preaward process, according to PA officials  Two key changes related to hazard mitigation under the new model include (1) an emphasis on engaging with hazard mitigation specialists at the JFO earlier in the PA process and involving them in specific PA preaward activities and (2) the establishment of the PA program’s hazard mitigation liaison at the CRC  For example, position guides direct program delivery managers to coordinate with FIMA’s hazard mitigation specialists prior to recovery scoping meetings, and site inspectors to coordinate with hazard mitigation specialists prior to site inspections to discuss a PA grant applicant’s damages and any potential mitigation opportunities  PA program officials also developed guidance for conducting the exploratory call and the recovery scoping meeting with applicants, which include questions for PA staff to ask on the applicant’s interest in or plans for incorporating hazard mitigation into potential projects  In addition, a new hazard mitigation liaison at the CRC is responsible for reviewing PA projects for hazard mitigation opportunities and serving as a mitigation subject matter expert for the PA program  According to data provided by FEMA, PA grant applicants incorporated hazard mitigation into approximately 18 percent of permanent work projects for all disasters nationwide from 2012 to 2015  During test implementation of the new delivery model, state, PA, and FIMA officials all reported an increase in the number of hazard mitigation activities on PA permanent work projects  For example, state officials who participated in the second new model test in Oregon said that effective communication and coordination between PA and hazard mitigation staff resulted in applicants incorporating hazard mitigation into over 60 percent of permanent work projects  Furthermore, PA officials reported an increase in hazard mitigation during the third test implementation of the new model in Georgia following Hurricane Matthew, where approximately 16 percent of permanent work projects included mitigation, as of June 2017  This represents an increase compared to the PA program’s estimate for the proportion of projects that incorporate hazard mitigation among previous PA hurricane disasters in Georgia, which was about 3 percent, according to PA officials  While PA officials are trying to increase hazard mitigation through the new delivery model, not all disasters present the same number of opportunities to incorporate hazard mitigation  First, the PA program only incorporates hazard mitigation measures for permanent work projects, such as repairs to roads, bridges, and buildings  For example, as of June 2017, approximately 60 percent of the projects FEMA funded in Georgia for the third test implementation after Hurricane Matthew were for emergency work, which is not eligible for hazard mitigation measures  Second, the PA program only funds mitigation measures that officials determine to be cost-effective  In addition, we have previously reported on other factors that affect whether applicants incorporate hazard mitigation into PA projects, such as their capacity to manage and ability to fund hazard mitigation projects  National Planning for Hazard Mitigation In our 2015 report on disaster resilience following Hurricane Sandy, we noted that disaster affected areas have different threats and vulnerabilities, and local stakeholders make the ultimate determination whether or not to incorporate hazard mitigation into a project  Further, without a strategic approach to making disaster resilience investments, the federal government and its nonfederal partners may be unable to fully capitalize on opportunities for mitigation on the greatest known threats and hazards  We recommended that the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group develop an investment strategy to help ensure that federal funds expended to enhance disaster resilience achieve the goal of reducing the nation’s fiscal exposure because of climate change and the rise in the number of federal major disaster declarations as effectively and efficiently as possible  In response, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) plans to issue a final National Mitigation Investment Strategy in 2018  The goals of this strategy include increasing the effectiveness of investments in reducing disaster losses and increasing resilience, and improving coordination of disaster risk management among federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private entities  Although the new model establishes hazard mitigation activities for PA and FIMA staff in the preaward process, it does not standardize and prioritize hazard mitigation planning at JFOs in the way FEMA has done with prior PA program policy  Specifically, FEMA’s 2007 PA program policy standardized planning for hazard mitigation across PA recovery efforts by stating that agency and state officials should issue a memorandum of understanding (MOU) early in the disaster, outlining how PA hazard mitigation will be addressed for the disaster, including what mitigation measures will be emphasized, and identifying applicable codes and standards, and any potential integration with other mitigation grant programs  However, PA program officials did not include guidance that standardizes planning for hazard mitigation, such as encouraging the use of an MOU, in FEMA’s 2010 PA program policy, the most recent update to the Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide in April 2017, or the New Delivery Model Operations Manual  As a result, FIMA officials said FEMA and state officials do not consistently issue MOUs that outline how FEMA and the state plan to promote PA hazard mitigation during the recovery effort, explaining that the use of the MOU is based on the preferences and priorities of the FEMA officials involved  When not issuing an MOU, FIMA hazard mitigation staff and PA officials at the JFO meet to determine the extent which hazard mitigation staff interact directly with applicants regarding PA hazard mitigation during the recovery process, according to a FIMA official  Having a consistent approach to planning for and prioritizing hazard mitigation across all disasters is important for FEMA, given that FEMA experienced challenges consistently prioritizing and integrating hazard mitigation across PA recovery efforts, according to GAO and others  For example, in our 2015 report on resilience in the Hurricane Sandy recovery, we found that state and local officials experienced challenges maximizing disaster resilience in the recovery effort because PA officials did not consistently prioritize hazard mitigation during project development  According to FEMA’s National Mitigation Framework, planning is vital for mitigation efforts during disaster recovery, and federal, state, and local officials should establish procedures that emphasize a coordinated delivery of mitigation activities and capitalize on opportunities to reduce future disaster losses  Similarly, the Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plan, which supports FEMA’s National Disaster Recovery Framework, identifies planning as a key task for identifying mitigation opportunities and integrating risk reduction considerations into decisions and investments during the recovery process  FIMA officials agreed that including the development of a formal plan, such as the historical 2007 PA program policy regarding the use of MOUs, for PA hazard mitigation in operations guidance would help program officials plan for and prioritize hazard mitigation  They noted that FIMA’s hazard mitigation field operations guide includes procedures for implementing proposed MOUs to achieve mitigation goals  PA program officials said that, in light of changes to the PA process under the new model and subsequent updates to program policies, the MOU policy from the 2007 PA program policy was outdated  But officials agreed that planning for and prioritizing hazard mitigation at the operational level is important and said they were examining additional ways to incorporate these activities early in the PA process  As FEMA continues to implement the new model, establishing procedures to standardize hazard mitigation planning for each disaster, as it did through prior policy, could improve the prioritization of hazard mitigation in PA recovery efforts and increase the effectiveness of mitigation for reducing disaster losses and increasing resilience  PA program officials developed performance objectives and measures for hazard mitigation in the new delivery model, but could add measures to better align performance assessment for the PA program with FEMA’s broader strategic goals for hazard mitigation  In its strategic plan for 2014–2018, FEMA established an agency-wide goal to increase the percentage of FEMA-funded disaster projects, such as those under the PA program, that provide mitigation above local, state, and federal building code requirements by 5 percentage points by the end of fiscal year 2018  For example, local building codes may require measures for new construction to mitigate against future damage  To align with FEMA’s strategic goal, PA officials would also need to measure the number of PA projects that included mitigation measures that bring any repaired infrastructure to a level above applicable building codes  However, under the new model, FEMA officials developed performance objectives (and associated measures) to increase the number of projects that include hazard mitigation by 5 percent, and increase the total dollars spent on hazard mitigation by 2 percent  While these measures could help to incentivize mitigation, they are not tied to building codes and do not include specific information that FEMA could use to continually assess the PA program’s contributions to meeting the agency’s strategic goal  According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, agency management should design control activities, such as establishing and reviewing performance measures, to achieve the agency’s objectives  In addition, our work on leading public sector organizations has found that such organizations assess the extent to which their programs and activities contribute to meeting their mission and desired outcomes, and strive to establish clear hierarchies of performance goals and measures  A clear connection between performance measures and program offices helps to both reinforce accountability and ensure that, in their day-to-day activities, managers keep in mind the outcomes their organization is striving to achieve  FEMA’s ability to evaluate and report on PA hazard mitigation data is constrained, but officials are addressing this challenge through the development of data reporting and analytics capabilities for the PA program’s new information system, according to PA officials  PA program officials developed measures they could use to evaluate the new model during test implementation and compare new model performance to the legacy PA process, and agreed that aligning PA program hazard mitigation goals with FEMA’s agency-wide strategic goals would be helpful  As FEMA continues to develop and implement the new model, developing performance measures and objectives to better inform and support the agency’s broader strategic goals could help to ensure that FEMA capitalizes on hazard mitigation opportunities in PA recovery efforts  FEMA’s Public Assistance grant program is a complicated, multi-billion dollar program that is critical to helping state and local communities rebuild and recover after a major disaster  In recent years, FEMA has undertaken a major reengineering effort to make the PA preaward process simpler and more efficient for applicants and to address challenges encountered during recovery from past disasters  FEMA’s new delivery model represents a significant opportunity to strengthen the PA program and address these past challenges, and growing pains are to be expected when implementing any large reengineering effort  Further, FEMA officials work to implement these changes while supporting response and recovery following disasters, including the catastrophic flooding from Hurricane Harvey in August 2017 and widespread damages from Hurricanes Irma and Maria in September 2017  As such, it is critical that feedback obtained and lessons learned while testing the new model inform decisions and actions as FEMA proceeds with full implementation for all disasters, including the complex recovery efforts in the states and territories affected by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria  FEMA has redesigned the PA delivery model to address various challenges related to workforce management, information sharing with state and local grantees, and incorporating hazard mitigation into PA projects  FEMA has developed new workforce processes, training, and positions to address past challenges, but completing a workforce assessment that identifies the number of staff needed will inform workforce management and resource allocation decisions to help FEMA ensure a more successful implementation  This is particularly important as FEMA is using the new model for the long-term recovery from the 2017 hurricanes, and FEMA faces capacity challenges as its workforce is stretched thin  Further, FEMA’s new FAC-Trax information sharing system provides FEMA and state and local applicants and grantees with better capabilities to address past challenges in managing and tracking PA projects  In developing FAC-Trax, FEMA implemented many of the key IT management controls that can help ensure that new IT systems are implemented effectively  However, additional steps are needed to fully satisfy the areas of requirements development and systems testing and integration  Finally, FEMA has taken some actions to better promote hazard mitigation as part of its new PA model  However, more consistent planning for hazard mitigation following a PA disaster and developing specific performance measures and objectives that better align with and support the agency’s broader strategic goals related to hazard mitigation could help to ensure that mitigation is incorporated into recovery efforts, which presents an opportunity to encourage disaster resilience and reduce federal fiscal exposure from recurring catastrophic natural disasters  We are making the following five recommendations to FEMA’s Assistant Administrator for Recovery: The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery should complete a workforce staffing assessment that identifies the appropriate number of staff needed at joint field offices, Consolidated Resource Centers, and in FIMA’s hazard mitigation cadre to implement the new delivery model nationwide  (Recommendation 1) The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery should establish controls for tracking FAC-Trax capabilities to the system’s functional and operational requirements to more fully satisfy requirements development controls and ensure that the new information system provides capabilities that meets users’ needs and expectations  (Recommendation 2) The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery should establish system testing criteria, such as a “definition of done,” to assess FAC- Trax as it is developed; define the roles and responsibilities of all participants; and develop the sequence and schedule for integration of other systems with FAC-Trax to more fully satisfy systems testing and integration controls  (Recommendation 3) The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery, in coordination with the Associate Administrator of the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, should implement procedures to standardize planning for addressing PA hazard mitigation at the joint field offices, for example, by requiring FEMA and state officials to develop a memorandum of understanding outlining how they will prioritize and address hazard mitigation following a disaster as it did through prior policy  (Recommendation 4) The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery, in coordination with the Associate Administrator of the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, should develop performance measures and associated objectives for the new delivery model to better align with FEMA’s strategic goal for hazard mitigation in the recovery process  (Recommendation 5) We provided a draft of this report to DHS and FEMA for review and comment  DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III  In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendations and described actions planned to address them  FEMA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  With regard to our first recommendation, that FEMA complete a workforce staffing assessment that identifies the number of staff needed at joint field offices, Consolidated Resource Centers, and FIMA’s hazard mitigation cadre, DHS stated that PA, in coordination with the Field Operations Directorate and FIMA, will continue to refine and evaluate staffing needs and update the cadre force structures under the new delivery model  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by June 28, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our second recommendation, that FEMA establish controls for tracking FAC-Trax capabilities to ensure the new information system meets users’ needs, DHS stated that Recovery program managers will update the FAC-Trax Requirements Management Plan and the FAC-Trax Release Plan to ensure the tracking and traceability of FAC-Trax functional and operational requirements  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by January 31, 2018  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our third recommendation, that FEMA establish systems testing criteria to assess the development of FAC-Trax; and define the roles and responsibilities, and sequence and schedule for system integration, DHS stated that Recovery program managers will update the FAC-Trax System Integration Plan to include integration with the Deployment Tracking System, Enterprise Data Warehouse, Preliminary Damage Assessment interface, and State Grants Management system interface  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by June 29, 2018  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our fourth recommendation, that FEMA implement procedures to standardize planning for addressing PA hazard mitigation at the JFO, DHS stated that PA will update current process documents or develop new documents to better incorporate mitigation into the operational planning phase of the new delivery model  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by July 31, 2018  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our fifth recommendation, that PA coordinate with FIMA to develop performance measures and associated objectives for the new delivery model that better align with FEMA’s strategic goals for hazard mitigation in the recovery process, DHS stated that PA will reconvene the PA-Mitigation working group to develop and refine PA related hazard mitigation performance measures  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by June 29, 2018  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and interested congressional committees  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  Appendix II: Assessment of Information Technology Management Controls for the FEMA Applicant Case Tracker (FAC-Trax) Table 2 shows details on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Public Assistance (PA) program office’s implementation of key practices across four information technology (IT) management control areas for its new information system, the FEMA Applicant Case Tracker (FAC-Trax)  PA developed FAC-Trax as a web-based project tracking and case management system to supplement the Emergency Management Mission Integrated Environment (EMMIE) and help resolve long-standing information sharing challenges  To determine the extent to which the FAC-Trax program office implemented IT management controls, we reviewed documentation from the FAC-Trax program and compared it to key management best practices, including the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition and Development, the Project Management Institute’s Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ Standard for Software and System Test Documentation  We assessed the program as having fully implemented a practice if the agency provided evidence that it fully addressed the practice; partially implemented if the agency provided evidence that it addressed some, but not all, portions of the practice; and not implemented if the agency did not provide any evidence that it addressed the practice  Table 2  Public Assistance (PA) Program Office’s Implementation of Key Information Technology Management Controls for FAC-Trax PA program officials developed an acquisition plan for FAC-Trax identifying the capabilities the system is intended to deliver, the acquisition approach, and acquisition objectives  Additionally, program officials developed a capability development plan outlining a strategy for the program to obtain approval to acquire FAC-Trax  Lastly, program officials developed a systems engineering plan describing the program’s scope and its framework for using an Agile development approach, as well as a deployment, support, and maintenance plan for FAC-Trax  PA program officials developed an acquisition program baseline detailing FAC-Trax’s cost parameters and a life-cycle cost estimate for the system  As of May 2017, the life- cycle cost estimate for FAC-Trax through fiscal year (FY) 2023 is approximately $19 3 million  PA program officials updated the life-cycle cost estimate for FYs 2016 and 2017 after price negotiations with the FAC-Trax contractor, and will continue to update the estimate as annual budgets are approved, according to the Integrated Logistic Support Plan  The contracting officer’s representative for FAC-Trax performs a cost review at the end of each month, according to program officials  Furthermore, the contractor’s weekly status report includes information on the number of hours worked and the percent of contract value spent  Program officials also review program costs with Office of Response and Recovery, PA, Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), and other program office stakeholders during a weekly program review  PA program officials developed an acquisition program baseline detailing FAC-Trax’s schedule parameters, as well as an integrated master schedule for the system  The integrated master schedule identifies tasks, major milestones, and task dependencies  The PA program manager reviews and updates the integrated master schedule on a weekly basis  Program officials also review FAC-Trax’s schedule with Office of Response and Recovery, PA, OCIO, and other program office stakeholders during a weekly program review  PA program officials identified the knowledge and skills needed to carry out the program in FAC-Trax contract documentation and the capability development plan  Specifically, program officials included an attachment to the FAC-Trax contract listing the required labor categories and corresponding functional position descriptions  Program officials also described the role, position type, minimum grade, and minimum certification for required personnel resources for the acquisition, development, and implementation of FAC-Trax  PA program officials developed, reviewed, and maintained project planning documents and obtained commitment from relevant stakeholders  For example, program officials reviewed and updated the integrated master schedule and costs on a weekly and monthly basis, respectively  Further, program officials reviewed the status of project elements, such as the schedule, quality and technical issues, stakeholders, staffing, cost, and risks, with Office of Response and Recovery, PA, OCIO, and other program office stakeholders during a weekly program review  PA program officials also established tactical, functional, and stakeholder groups, as well as an Integrated Product Team to support and oversee the development of FAC-Trax  FEMA’s Recovery Technology Programs Division (RTPD) has a division-level risk management plan that serves as guidance for all Recovery systems, including FAC- Trax  Program officials identified key risks that could negatively affect FAC-Trax work efforts in RTPD’s “risk register”—an online site used to track risks, issues, and mitigating actions for the division and each program office  Program officials also identified five technical, cost, and schedule risks in the FAC-Trax acquisition plan  Program officials included one of these risks in the risk register, while the remaining four were managed outside of the register  As of May 2017, program officials had identified 13 risks in its risk register—four open and nine closed  The four open risks were (1) limited subject matter expert engagement during requirements development, (2) vacancies in program management office support positions, (3) unresolved service level agreement support and funding issues, and (4) the loss of the authority to operate due to a Trusted Internet Connection that is not compliant with Department of Homeland Security security policy  Program officials evaluated and categorized the identified risks based on the probability of occurrence and scope, schedule, and cost impacts  These four points of measurement are used to calculate an overall risk score  The risk score helps program officials determine a risk’s risk rating—low, medium, or high  For example, program officials reported that two of its open risks have a “medium” risk rating—meaning the risk has the potential to slightly impact project cost, schedule, or performance  In addition, program officials detailed the risk category, probability, and impact for the five risks identified in the FAC-Trax acquisition plan  Program officials developed risk mitigation and contingency plans for each risk in the risk register  For example, program officials planned to mitigate the open risk concerning subject matter expert engagement, by identifying and engaging with appropriate subject matter experts through requirements development workshops scheduled in advance of the sprint they are to support, and monitoring the development of user stories to identify any issues that may cause delays  In addition, program officials described the risk management plan and responsible officials for the five risks identified in the FAC-Trax acquisition plan  PA program officials review and update program risks during a monthly program meeting  Program officials also review program risks with Office of Response and Recovery, PA, OCIO, and other program office stakeholders during a weekly program review  Furthermore, the FAC-Trax contractor provides a weekly status update which includes a section on identified risks  Program officials established re-evaluation dates and recorded updates, including any actions taken, for each risk in the risk register  In addition, program officials were able to provide updates on the four risks identified in the FAC-Trax acquisition plan and managed outside of the register  According to PA officials, these risks were addressed and closed by the approval of program planning documents, such as the mission needs statement, concept of operations, and operational requirements document, following the solutions engineering review, which demonstrates the readiness of the program to proceed with the procurement, in September 2016  Program officials established a requirements management plan outlining how it captures, assesses, and plans for FAC-Trax enhancements, and established a change control process to review, prioritize, and verify user requests for changes to the system and feedback  As of May 2017, the PA program office received 734 change requests related to FAC-Trax, of which program officials completed 420 changes and planned to address an additional 277 entries  PA program officials also facilitated workshops to gather requirements for specific user groups and obtained additional requirements for FAC-Trax through customer feedback on a temporary technology tool— an Access database referred to as the Public Assistance Recovery Information System—used to support an early stage of the new model implementation  Further, program officials developed a functional requirements document outlining the high-level functional and operational requirements for FAC-Trax  PA program officials developed a concept of operations for FAC-Trax detailing operating concepts and scenarios for each phase of the PA preaward process  Program officials also detailed the workflow, phases, business functions, and data inputs and outputs for the re-engineered PA process in FAC-Trax’s functional requirements document  In March 2017, program officials developed a standard template to describe the process, tasks, and data inputs and outputs for specific system capabilities  As part of the change control process, PA program officials meet three times a week to discuss and prioritize change requests  Specifically, program officials review submissions to the change control form to ensure completeness, validate impacts and root cause, and research details for incoming requests  PA program officials also follow up with users to understand and verify requirements  In March 2017, program officials developed a standard template to capture acceptance criteria for specific requirements  However, PA program officials do not track system enhancements back to the high-level requirements identified in FAC-Trax’s operational and functional requirements documentation and performance work statement  PA program officials identified system requirements and constraints in the FAC-Trax concept of operations and functional and operational requirements documents  Further, through its change control process, program officials collect suggestions, issues, and feedback on FAC-Trax and system enhancements from stakeholders, identify risks for change requests, and balance prioritized requirements and estimated level of efforts with projected costs prior to each sprint  In March 2017, program officials developed a standard template to analyze and document the urgency and need for specific requirements  PA program officials and the FAC-Trax contractor established a testing and evaluation plan for the system, developed acceptance criteria for user stories, and obtained feedback from users during and after testing  The testing process concludes with user acceptance testing (UAT)  If a change request fails during UAT or a new requirement is discovered during development, the PA program will capture the failed request or new requirement in the product backlog for implementation in a future product release  Key practices Systems testing and integration Developing test plans and test cases PA program officials and the FAC-Trax contractor tested and evaluated the system during development  The FAC-Trax test plan identifies the method and strategy to perform the testing, including the necessary tasks, testing parameters, and the roles and responsibilities of the individuals responsible for testing  However, program officials did not develop system testing criteria to evaluate FAC-Trax  A key feature of Agile software development is the “definition of done”—a set of clear, comprehensive, and objective criteria, that the government should use to evaluate software after each iteration of development  PA program officials developed a systems integration plan in June 2017 that identifies potential integration of FAC-Trax and four FEMA systems, including the Emergency Management Mission Integrated Environment  Specifically, the plan includes data requirements and standards; descriptions of the four systems FEMA plans to integrate with FAC-Trax and the proposed relationship for each connection; and security and access management requirements  In addition, program officials included a description of how integration problems are to be documented and resolved in FAC-Trax development and test plans  However, the systems integration plan does not define roles and responsibilities of all participants for system integration activities or establish a sequence and schedule for every integration step for the four FEMA systems  ● Fully implemented: The agency provided evidence that it fully addressed this practice  ◐ Partially implemented: The agency provided evidence that it addressed some, but not all, portions of this practice  ◌ Not implemented: The agency did not provide any evidence that it addressed this practice  In addition to the contact named above, Chris Keisling (Assistant Director), Amanda R  Parker (Analyst-in-Charge), Mathew Bader, Allison Bawden, Anthony Bova, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Rianna Jansen, Justin Jaynes, Tracey King, Matthew T  Lowney, Heidi Nielson, Claire Peachey, Brenda Rabinowitz, Ryan Siegel, Martin Skorczynski, Niti Tandon, Walter K  Vance, James T  Williams, and Eric Winter made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: FEMA, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has obligated more than $36 billion in PA grants to state, local, and tribal governments to help communities recover and rebuild after major disasters since 2009. Further, costs are rising with disasters, such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017. FEMA recently redesigned how the PA program delivers assistance to state and local grantees to improve operations and address past challenges identified by GAO and others. FEMA tested the new delivery model in selected disasters and announced implementation in September 2017. GAO was asked to assess the redesigned PA program. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which FEMA's new delivery model addresses (1) past workforce management challenges and assesses future workforce needs; and (2) past information sharing challenges and key IT management controls. GAO reviewed FEMA policy, strategy, and implementation documents; interviewed FEMA and state officials, PA program applicants, and other stakeholders; and observed implementation of the new model at one test location following Hurricane Matthew in 2016. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) redesigned the Public Assistance (PA) grant program delivery model to address past challenges in workforce management, but has not fully assessed future workforce staffing needs. GAO and others have previously identified challenges related to shortages in experienced and trained FEMA PA staff and high turnover among these staff. These challenges often led to applicants receiving inconsistent guidance and to PA project delays. As part of its new model, FEMA is creating consolidated resource centers to standardize and centralize PA staff responsible for managing grant applications, and new specialized positions, such as hazard mitigation liaisons, program delivery managers, and site inspectors, to ensure more consistent guidance to applicants. However, FEMA has not assessed the workforce needed to fully implement the new model, such as the number of staff needed to fill certain new positions, or to achieve staffing goals for supporting hazard mitigation on PA projects. Fully assessing workforce needs will help to ensure that FEMA has the people and the skills needed to fully implement the new PA model and help to avoid the long-standing workforce challenges the program encountered in the past. FEMA designed a new PA information and case management system—called the FEMA Applicant Case Tracker (FAC-Trax)—to address past information sharing challenges, such as difficulties in sharing grant documentation among FEMA, state, and local officials and tracking the status of PA projects, but additional actions could better ensure effective implementation. Both FEMA and state officials involved in testing of the new model stated that the new information system allows them to better manage and track PA applications and documentation, which could lead to greater transparency and efficiencies in the program. Further, GAO found that this new system fully addresses two of four key information technology (IT) management controls—project planning and risk management—that are necessary to ensure systems work effectively and meet user needs. However, GAO found that FEMA has not fully addressed the other two controls—requirements development and systems testing and integration. By better analyzing progress on high-level user requirements, for example, FEMA will have greater assurance that FAC-Trax will meet user needs and achieve the goals of the new delivery model. GAO is making five recommendations, including that FEMA assess the workforce needed for the new delivery model and improve key IT management controls for its new information sharing and case management system, FAC-Trax. DHS concurred with all recommendations.