prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: This report provides an overview of the FY2019 budget request and appropriations for the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U S  International Trade Commission (USITC), and the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)  These three trade-related agencies are funded through the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations  This report also provides a review of these trade agencies' programs  When comparing the Administration's FY2019 request with FY2018 funding, one may want to consider that the Administration formulated its FY2019 budget request before full-year appropriations for FY2018 were enacted  In this report, FY2018 funding levels reflect the amounts appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P L  115-141 ), enacted on March 23, 2018  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, provided $482 0 million in direct funding for ITA, $93 7 million for USTIC, and a total of $72 6 million for USTR for FY2018  The FY2018 appropriation for the three CJS trade-related agencies totaled $648 3 million  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, provided $484 0 million in direct appropriations for ITA, $95 0 million in funding for USITC, and a total of $68 0 million for USTR  The FY2019 appropriations for three CJS trade-related agencies totaled $647 0 million, a 0 2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations  See the Appendix for enacted budget authority for the trade-related agencies for FY2009-FY2019  The President submitted his FY2019 budget request to Congress on February 12, 2018  In it, the Administration requested a total of $590 8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies (see Table 1 )  This request represented an 8 9% decrease in funding from the FY2018 appropriated amount  The request included reduced funding for all three trade agencies: $440 1 million in direct funding for ITA (an 8 7% decrease from the FY2018 appropriation), $87 6 million for USITC (a 6 5% decrease), and $63 0 million for USTR (a 13 2% decrease)  Despite the proposed overall decrease in funding for CJS trade-related agencies, the Administration proposed increasing some trade enforcement activities within ITA and USTR  For ITA, the Administration proposed increasing trade enforcement activities while reducing funding for certain export promotion activities  For USTR, the Administration requested funds to increase staffing; however, the request did not include a request for funding to be drawn from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund  (For a description of the " Trade Enforcement Trust Fund ," see section below ) The President's budget did not provide a rationale for requesting a decrease in funding for USITC  A more detailed overview of these agencies' FY2019 budget requests is provided below  The House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported their CJS appropriation bills in the spring of 2018  Both committees largely declined the budget cuts requested by the Administration for these three trade agencies  (See Table 1  ) The House Committee on Appropriations reported H R  5952 on May 17, 2018  The House committee bill included a total of $647 6 million for the three trade-related agencies, which was $56 8 million more (9 6%) than the Administration's request and $0 7 million less (-0 1%) than the FY2018-enacted amount  The House committee recommended $480 0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95 0 million for USTIC, and a total of $72 6 million for USTR  The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S  3072 on June 14, 2018  The Senate bill included a total of $655 6 million for the three agencies, which was $64 8 million (11 0%) more than the Administration's request and $7 3 million (1 1%) more than the FY2018-enacted appropriation  The Senate committee recommended $488 0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95 0 million for USITC, and a total of $72 6 million for USTR  Through February 15, 2019, the CJS trade-related agencies operated under continuing resolutions (CR)—with the exception of a three-week lapse in funding when agencies halted most operations  Congress passed final FY2019 appropriations in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), which was signed into law on February 15, 2019  The act included a total of $647 0 million in funding for the three trade-related agencies—a 0 2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations  For FY2019, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, included $484 0 million in direct appropriations for ITA (a 0 4% increase from the FY2018 appropriation), $95 0 million in funding for USITC (a 1 4% increase), and a total of $68 0 million for USTR (a 0 2% decrease)  Within the Department of Commerce, ITA's mission is to improve U S  prosperity by strengthening the competitiveness of U S  industry, promoting trade and investment, and ensuring compliance with trade laws and agreements  ITA provides export promotion services; works to enforce and ensure compliance with trade laws and agreements; administers trade remedies such as antidumping and countervailing duties; and provides analytical support for ongoing trade negotiations  ITA went through a major organizational change in October 2013 in which it consolidated four organizational units into three more functionally aligned units: (1) Global Markets; (2) Industry and Analysis; and (3) Enforcement and Compliance  ITA also has a fourth organizational unit, the Executive and Administrative Directorate, which is responsible for providing policy leadership, information technology support, and administration services for all of ITA  ( Table A-1 shows budget amounts for ITA by unit between FY2009 and FY2019 ) For FY2019, the Administration requested $440 1 million for ITA in direct funding, with an additional $11 0 million to be collected in user fees, for a total of $451 1 million in authorized spending  The request for direct funding represents a $41 9 million decrease (-8 7%) from the FY2018-enacted amount ($482 0 million)  According to ITA's budget justification, the Administration proposed increasing ITA's enforcement and compliance efforts in FY2019, while deemphasizing other initiatives, such as export promotion  The Administration specifically proposed closing some domestic and international offices of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service (US&FCS)  The House committee-reported H R  5952 proposed $480 0 million for ITA in direct funding, with an additional $11 0 million to be collected from user fees, for a total of $491 0 million in authorized spending  The amount in direct funding proposed by the House Committee on Appropriations was $39 9 million (9 1%) more than the Administration's request and $2 0 million less (-0 4%) than the FY2018-enacted amount  The Senate committee-reported S  3072 included $488 0 million in direct funding for ITA, with an additional $11 0 million in user fees, for a total of $499 0 million in authorized spending  The amount in direct funding proposed by the Senate Committee on Appropriations was $47 9 million (10 9%) more than the Administration's request and $6 0 million (1 2%) more than the FY2018-enacted amount  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ) provided $484 0 million in direct appropriations for ITA, with an additional $11 0 million to be collected in user fees, for a total of $495 0 in authorized spending  The act provided $2 million more (0 4%) in direct appropriations for ITA than the FY2018-enacted amount and $43 9 million more (10 0%) than the Administration's request  ITA's Global Markets (GM) unit is a combination of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service (US&FCS) unit, a program that provides export promotion services to U S  businesses, and SelectUSA, a program that works to attract foreign investment into the United States  Through US&FCS, GM promotes U S  exports by helping U S  exporters research foreign markets and identify opportunities abroad  GM's country and regional experts―in domestic and overseas offices—help to advise U S  companies on market access, local standards, and regulations  The unit also helps to make connections through business-to-business trade shows, fairs, and missions  GM is designed to advance U S  commercial interests by engaging with foreign governments and U S  businesses, identifying and resolving market barriers, and leading efforts that advocate for U S  firms with foreign governments  Through its SelectUSA program, the GM unit also promotes the United States as a destination for foreign investment  (For more on SelectUSA, see section below, " SelectUSA Program  ") For FY2019, the Administration proposed reducing funding for the Global Markets unit  The Administration requested $276 5 million for Global Markets in direct funding, a 13 4% decrease from the FY2018-enacted appropriation  In its FY2019 budget submission, ITA proposed "rescaling export promotion" activities in the GM unit by reducing staff and its domestic and overseas offices, with a total reduction of 133 positions  The budget submission did not indicate how many or which domestic and overseas offices it was proposing to close  The House and Senate Appropriation Committees did not adopt the proposed cuts  The House Appropriations Committee recommended $319 0 million for the Global Markets unit for FY2019  This was $42 5 million (15 4%) more than the Administration's request  According to the committee report, "the recommendation does not adopt the proposal to reduce U S  and Foreign Commercial Service staff or close overseas offices or U S  Export Assistance Centers " The Senate Appropriations Committee report did not provide an exact funding amount, but recommended that ITA "fund US&FCS, and its core mission of export promotion, at the highest possible level in fiscal year 2019, and at no less than the amount provided in fiscal year 2018 " Like the House committee, the Senate committee did not adopt the Administration's proposal to close offices  The Senate committee report specifically noted, "No offices shall be closed in fiscal year 2019 unless the Committee approves a reprogramming request to close such office or offices  Additionally, the Committee will not approve requests to close any domestic offices, called U S  Export Assistance Centers, if such Center is the only one located in a given State " According to the conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), the final agreement for FY2019 appropriations included "no less than $320 million" in funding for Global Markets and required ITA to report quarterly to the Committees on staffing levels within the US&FCS  ITA's Industry and Analysis unit brings together ITA's industry, trade, and economic experts to advance the competitiveness of U S  industries through the development and execution of international trade and investment policies, export promotion strategies, and investment promotion  It develops economic and international policy analysis to improve market access for U S  businesses, and designs and implements trade and investment promotion programs  The unit serves as the primary liaison between U S  industries and the federal government on trade and investment promotion  It administers programs that support small and medium-sized enterprises, such as the Market Development Cooperator Program  For FY2019, the Administration requested $52 3 million for Industry and Analysis  The request is $3 4 million less than the FY2018 funding level  The Administration proposed refocusing some of the unit's priorities away from export promotion and toward trade enforcement  Specifically, the Administration proposed reducing activities related to trade missions, the International Buyer Program, and certified trade fairs, and eliminating Market Development Cooperator Program grants  The House committee proposed $52 0 million for Industry and Analysis  This represented $0 3 million less (-0 5%) than the Administration's request  The Senate committee-reported bill did not include a specific recommendation for Industry and Analysis  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), did not provide an exact funding guidance for Industry and Analysis  The mission of ITA's Enforcement and Compliance unit is to enforce U S  trade laws and ensure compliance with negotiated international trade agreements  It is responsible for enforcing U S  antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) laws; overseeing a variety of programs and policies regarding the enforcement and administration of U S  trade remedy laws; assisting U S  industry and businesses with unfair trade matters; and administering the Foreign Trade Zone program and other U S  import programs  For FY2019, the Administration requested $90 6 million for the Enforcement and Compliance unit, an increase of $3 1 million (3 6%) from the FY2018-enacted amount  For the requested increase in funding, ITA cited the unit's increasing number of AD/CVD investigations, its new focus on self-initiating AD/CVD cases, and the increased workload due to the tariffs and investigations initiated through Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962  The House Appropriations Committee proposed $85 5 million for Enforcement and Compliance  The House committee proposal represented $2 1 million less (-2 3%) than the Administration's request, and $1 0 million (1 1%) more than the FY2018-enacted amount   The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $91 5 million for Enforcement and Compliance  The Senate recommendation represented $0 9 million more than the Administration's request and $4 0 million more than the 2018-enacted amount  The Senate committee report noted that the committee was supportive of the Administration's request to self-initiate AD/CVD cases  For FY2019 appropriations, the conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), included $88 5 million for Enforcement and Compliance  This amount was $1 0 million more (1 1%) than the FY2018 funding, and $2 1 million less (-2 1%) than the Administration's request  USITC is an independent, quasi-judicial agency responsible for conducting trade-related investigations and providing independent technical advice related to U S  international trade policy to Congress, the President, and the USTR  The commission (1) investigates and determines whether imports injure a domestic industry or violate U S  intellectual property rights; (2) provides independent tariff, trade, and competitiveness-related analysis to the President and Congress; and (3) maintains the U S  tariff schedule  USITC also serves as a federal resource for trade data and other trade policy information  It makes most of its information and analyses available to the public to promote understanding of competitiveness, international trade issues, and the role that international trade plays in the U S  economy  In addition to the President's budget request for the commission, USITC also has bypass authority to submit its budget directly to Congress without revision by the President, pursuant to Section 175 of the Trade Act of 1975  For FY2019, the President requested $87 6 million for USITC, which represented a $6 1 million decrease (-6 5%) from the FY2018-enacted amount ($93 7 million)  While the President requested a decrease in funding for USITC, the commission's independent budget submission—sent directly to Congress without revision by the President—requested $97 5 million for FY2019, an increase of $3 8 million (4 0%) from the FY2018-enacted amount  USITC cited the increasing number of import injury cases in the previous five years and projected that the caseload would increase further in FY2019  Both the House and Senate committee-reported bills recommended $95 0 million for USITC  This amount was $7 4 million (8 4%) more than the President's request and $1 3 million (1 4%) more than the FY2018-enacted amount  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), provided $95 0 million for USITC, which was $7 4 million (8 4%) more than the President's request and $1 3 million (1 4%) more than the FY2018-enacted amount  USTR, located in the Executive Office of the President, is responsible for developing and coordinating U S  international trade and direct investment policies  USTR is the President's chief negotiator for international trade agreements, including commodity and direct investment negotiations  It negotiates directly with foreign governments to create trade agreements, resolve disputes, and participate in global trade policy organizations such as the World Trade Organization  It also meets with business groups, policymakers, and public interest groups on trade policy issues  In 2018, USTR led the negotiations for the modernization of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the investigations into Chinese intellectual property practices  In addition to direct appropriations for USTR, supplementary funding for the agency is available through the congressionally established Trade Enforcement Trust Fund  For more detail on the trust fund, see section " Trade Enforcement Trust Fund ," below  For FY2019, the Administration requested $63 0 million for USTR's salaries and expenses, and no additional funding from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund  The request represents a $9 6 million decrease (-13 2%) from the FY2018-enacted amounts ($72 6 million)  In the Administration's budget request, USTR outlined the Trump Administration's "aggressive trade agenda," and its goals of "(1) defending U S  national sovereignty over trade policy; (2) strictly enforcing U S  trade laws; (3) using all possible sources of leverage to encourage other countries to open their markets to U S  exports of goods and services, and protecting U S  intellectual property rights; and (4) negotiating better trade deals with countries in key markets around the world " Both the House and Senate committee-reported bills recommended a total of $72 6 million for USTR for FY2019  These proposals included $57 6 million for USTR's salaries and expenses and $15 0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for enforcement activities authorized in Section 611 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( P L  114-125 )  The total proposals were $9 6 million (15 2%) more than the Administration's request, and were equal to the FY2018-enacted amount  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), provided a total of $63 0 million for USTR, which included $53 0 million in salaries and expenses for USTR and an additional $15 0 million to be derived from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund  The total funding was $4 6 million less (-6 3%) than the FY2018 appropriated amount  Over the past decade, Congress has provided funding for specific trade-related programs, including (1) China trade enforcement and compliance activities; (2) trade promotion and attracting foreign direct investment to the United States through ITA's SelectUSA program; and (3) trade enforcement activities through the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund and the Interagency Center on Trade Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement (ICTIME, formerly the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center (ITEC))  Since 2004, Congress has dedicated some of ITA's funding to AD/CVD enforcement and compliance activities with respect to China and other nonmarket economies  ITA's Office of China Compliance was established by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004 ( P L  108-199 )  Its primary role has been to enforce U S  AD/CVD laws and to develop and implement other policies and programs aimed at countering unfair foreign trade practices in China  ITA's China Countervailing Duty Group was established in FY2009 to accommodate the workload that resulted from the application of countervailing duty law to imports from nonmarket economy countries  The Office of China Compliance is within the Enforcement and Compliance unit at ITA  ITA's FY2019 budget justification did not provide a breakdown of funding for its China AD/CVD activities  Both the House and Senate committee-reported bills included $16 4 million from ITA's funding for China AD/CVD enforcement and compliance activities for FY2019  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), provided $16 4 million from ITA's funding for China AD/CVD enforcement and compliance activities for FY2019  This amount was equal to the FY2018-enacted amount  SelectUSA was created in 2011 and is now part of ITA's Global Markets unit  It coordinates investment-related resources across more than 20 federal agencies to (1) promote the United States as an investment market and (2) address investor climate concerns that may impede investment in the United States  The program serves as an information resource for international investors and advocates for U S  cities, states, and regions as investment destinations  ITA's budget justification did not provide a breakdown for requested funding for SelectUSA  The House committee-reported bill did not propose a specific funding amount for SelectUSA  The Senate committee report recommended $10 0 million in funding for SelectUSA, an amount equal to the FY2018-enacted amount  The Senate Committee on Appropriation proposed making funding contingent on (1) SelectUSA updating its protocol to ensure that its programs did not encourage foreign investments by state-owned entities into the United States and (2) SelectUSA reporting its updated protocol to the committee within 30 days of enactment of the bill  According to the conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), the final agreement adopted the Senate committee report language regarding SelectUSA  ITA's Survey of International Air Travelers (SIAT) gathers statistics about air passenger travelers in the United States  These statistics are used across federal agencies, for a variety of purposes, such as to estimate the contribution of international travel to the economy, develop public policy on the travel industry, and forecast staffing needs at consulates and ports of entry  The Administration requested $5 0 million for FY2019 for SIAT to expand the survey and data collection  The Administration proposed that "$5 million in fee revenues collected from the surcharge on international travelers utilizing the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) be redirected to fully fund the SIAT " The House committee-reported bill did not include a specific recommendation for SIAT  According to the Senate committee report, the Senate Committee on Appropriations did not adopt the Administration's proposal to seek alternative funding sources for SIAT and "direct[ed] ITA to continue funding SIAT out of its base budget  Within funds provided, ITA [was] encouraged to increase the sample size for SIAT " The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), and the accompanying conference report did not provide specific language regarding SIAT  In order to provide additional funding for USTR's trade enforcement activities, Congress established the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund (TETF) in 2016  In Section 611 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( P L  114-125 ), Congress set up the trust fund and outlined authorized uses of the funds  According to Section 611(d), USTR can use funds from the TETF to monitor and enforce trade agreements and WTO commitments and to support trade capacity-building assistance to help partner countries meet their free-trade agreement obligations and commitments  USTR can also transfer funds to select federal agencies for trade enforcement activities authorized in Section 611(d) of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015  For FY2019, the Administration requested no funding to be derived from the TETF; the FY2018-enacted amount was $15 0 million  Both the House and Senate committee bills proposed $15 0 million from the TETF for enforcement activities authorized in Section 611 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015  These proposals were equal to the FY2018-enacted amount  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), provided $15 0 million to be derived from the TETF for USTR, for enforcement activities authorized in Section 611 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015  This amount is equal to the FY2018-enacted amount  ITEC was established by executive order in 2012 to take a "whole-of-government" approach to monitoring and enforcing U S  trade rights by using expertise from across the federal government  In 2016, the ITEC was succeeded by ICTIME, which Congress established through the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( P L  114-125 )  The executive-established ITEC received its funding through ITA; funding for ICTIME is now appropriated through USTR  ICTIME's purpose is to advance U S  trade policy through strengthened and coordinated enforcement of U S  trade rights  ICTIME investigates potential disputes under the auspices of the World Trade Organization; inspects potential disputes pursuant to bilateral and regional trade agreements to which the United States is a party; and carries out the functions of USTR with respect to the monitoring and enforcement of trade agreements to which the United States is a party  USTR and ITA work closely within the ICTIME to identify issues and develop information in areas of economic importance to U S  industries  The USTR's budget justification did not provide a breakdown for requested funding for ICTIME  The House and Senate committee-reported bills did not include a specific funding amount for ICTIME  The Senate committee report did note that the Senate committee supports ICTIME within the funds provided for USTR  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ) and the accompanying conference report also did not provide specific language regarding ICTIME 
Report 2:  Federal internal control standards state that management should share quality information throughout an organization to enable personnel to perform key roles, and we have previously reported that by regularly sharing useful performance information with leaders at multiple levels of an organization, agencies can help leaders make informed decisions  Without this information, individual unit commanders or the commanders’ supervisors cannot determine whether Coast Guard servicemembers under their command completed TAP or identify whether there is a need for corrective actions to ensure they do so  As we mention earlier in this report, the Coast Guard plans to adopt DOD’s TAP-IT Enterprise System, which according to officials, could help the Coast Guard ensure eligible servicemembers participate in the program  According to a Coast Guard official, once the system is fully implemented by the Coast Guard, commanders will be required to verify and document whether Coast Guard servicemembers under their command completed TAP, potentially making commanders more vested in the process  We previously reported that a senior DOD official said that the TAP-IT Enterprise System may be able to generate unit- and installation-level reports for the four DOD-led military services by October 2018, and a Coast Guard official said he would work with DOD to identify whether this capability could also extend to the Coast Guard  Once data reliability improves, sharing installation and unit-level TAP performance information with Coast Guard commanders could support monitoring efforts  The performance measures tracked by the TAP interagency working group do not reflect TAP implementation broadly across all five military services, according to a Coast Guard official we interviewed  The Coast Guard does not currently share TAP data it collects with DOD or other members of the interagency performance working group  While the benefits of interagency data sharing cannot be realized without the Coast Guard first improving the quality and completeness of its TAP data, we have identified leading practices for interagency collaboration, including that members of interagency working groups identify and share relevant agency performance data  Moreover, federal internal control standards call for management to communicate quality information to external parties  Because the Coast Guard does not share TAP data, the performance measures tracked by the interagency group do not reflect Coast Guard servicemembers’ experiences and thus do not provide a complete picture of TAP implementation across the five military services  More specifically for the Coast Guard, without such data sharing, future TAP evaluations may not be able to assess the effectiveness of TAP delivery, hindering the Coast Guard’s ability to make program adjustments to better prepare its servicemembers to successfully transition to life after military service  Coast Guard officials said migrating to DOD’s TAP-IT Enterprise System will facilitate information sharing with interagency partners and that improving data completeness and reliability is a top priority for 2018  Given the sacrifices servicemembers have made to serve their country, it is imperative they are afforded every chance to adequately prepare for civilian life before leaving military service  In order to make a successful transition, servicemembers need to be well-positioned to get a job or make an informed decision about whether to pursue additional education or start a small business  As such, the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) serves a critically important function—to give servicemembers the tools and information they need to successfully transition to life outside the military  Federal law requires that the Coast Guard ensure all eligible servicemembers participate in the program, but thousands of Coast Guard servicemembers may have transitioned without the support provided by TAP  Reliably tracking participation has proven to be a challenge for the Coast Guard, in part because it lacks a current Commandant Instruction that defines the roles and responsibilities of staff responsible for implementing TAP and ensuring complete and reliable data are collected  In preparing to issue an updated Commandant Instruction, the Coast Guard has taken a positive step toward addressing the limitations of its current TAP data, and will be better positioned to ensure compliance with VOW Act requirements using reliable data  In addition to collecting reliable data, the Coast Guard could further demonstrate its commitment to meeting TAP requirements by establishing formal performance goals that measure the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP  By establishing interim performance goals, the agency would be able to show its progress towards achieving full compliance  Moreover, communicating performance goals to unit and installation commanders could enhance accountability and might spur progress toward meeting federal program requirements  By expanding its monitoring efforts beyond tracking participation in TAP’s required classes, the Coast Guard could enhance its ability to ensure other TAP requirements are met and that its servicemembers are able to access additional transition resources  Monitoring the timeliness of participation would help ensure Coast Guard servicemembers have adequate time to complete TAP before leaving the military  Further, by monitoring requests to participate in additional 2-day classes and 2-day class attendance, the Coast Guard would be in a better position to identify whether servicemembers who wish to attend the classes are able to do so, to determine whether more classes are needed, and to communicate this information to the interagency partners responsible for delivering these classes  Commanders can also play a key role in bolstering TAP participation  Having an up-to-date written Commandant Instruction that explicitly describes commanders’ roles and responsibilities could enhance commanders’ ability to ensure TAP’s proper implementation and compliance with VOW Act requirements  Moreover, once data quality improves, providing commanders a mechanism to readily determine whether servicemembers under their command have completed TAP could help them monitor the program to ensure that all TAP-eligible servicemembers receive the resources they need to successfully transition to civilian life  Finally, once more reliable data on Coast Guard servicemember participation are available, sharing this information with interagency partners could improve TAP implementation on a broader scale  Sharing reliable data, such as participation figures for the Coast Guard, would give TAP interagency partners a more complete picture of implementation across all five military services  Sharing such information would also enhance the interagency group’s ability to evaluate how well TAP serves the entire population of servicemembers  Improving the reliability of the Coast Guard’s TAP data will be essential for the benefits of data sharing to be realized  To ensure that all eligible Coast Guard servicemembers are provided the opportunity to complete the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), we recommend the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following seven actions: Issue an updated Commandant Instruction that establishes policies and procedures to improve the reliability and completeness of TAP data by including when and by whom data should be recorded and updated  (Recommendation 1) Establish a formal performance goal with a measurable target for participation rates in VOW Act-mandated portions of TAP  (Recommendation 2) Monitor the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP within prescribed time frames  (Recommendation 3) Monitor the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers who elect to participate in additional 2-day classes are afforded the opportunity to attend  (Recommendation 4) Issue an updated Commandant Instruction that defines the roles and responsibilities of the personnel who administer the program and ensure servicemembers’ participation  (Recommendation 5) Once reliable data are available by installation or unit, enable unit commanders and the higher-level commanders to whom they report to access TAP performance information specifically for the units they oversee so that they can monitor compliance with all TAP requirements  (Recommendation 6) Once reliable data are available, share TAP information with DOD and other interagency partners, such as data on participation in required TAP courses and additional 2-day classes  (Recommendation 7) We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Education, Labor, and Veterans Affairs, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Small Business Administration for their review and comment  The formal written response of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is reproduced in appendix II  In addition, DHS provided technical comments from Coast Guard officials that we incorporated into the report as appropriate  The other agencies did not provide any comments  In its written comments, DHS agreed with all seven of our recommendations  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or brownbarnesc@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  This report examines (1) what is known about the reliability of Transition Assistance Program (TAP) data on participation levels and the factors that affect Coast Guard servicemembers’ participation, and (2) the extent to which the Coast Guard measures TAP performance and monitors key areas of TAP implementation  To address these questions, we surveyed Coast Guard installations with full-time TAP operations; reviewed Coast Guard data on TAP participation for fiscal years 2012 to 2017; visited one Coast Guard installation and interviewed TAP managers from two additional Coast Guard installations selected for diversity in location, among other reasons; and interviewed Coast Guard officials responsible for overseeing TAP implementation for the Coast Guard  We also reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, policies, documents, and publications  Information in this report is current as of the date GAO received formal agency comments from DHS  Our survey of Coast Guard installations with full-time TAP operations asked about how TAP was being implemented  The survey included questions about the accessibility of TAP components, challenges Coast Guard servicemembers faced in attending the components, and the level of commander support for participation  Our survey targeted front-line TAP managers, who could draw on the expertise of TAP course facilitators, transition counselors, career counselors, and other key TAP staff as necessary  After drafting the survey questions, we pretested them with a TAP manager to ensure (1) the questions were clear and unambiguous, (2) terminology was used correctly, (3) the survey did not place an undue burden on agency officials, (4) the information could feasibly be obtained, and (5) the survey was comprehensive and unbiased  We revised the content and format of the survey based on the feedback we received  We initially sent the survey to TAP managers at all 13 Coast Guard installations at which TAP staff were located  We removed one installation when we later found that the TAP manager position was vacant and revised the total to 12 Coast Guard installations  The survey was accessible online from October 31, 2016, through January 18, 2017, through a secure server that recipients were able to access using unique usernames and passwords  We sent an email announcement to TAP staff at all 13 Coast Guard installations at which TAP staff are located on October 24, 2016  We sent a second email on October 31, 2016 to notify participants the survey was available online, and provided their unique passwords and usernames  We sent two follow-up e-mails (November 14, 2016 and November 28, 2016) to those who had not responded  Finally, we contacted all remaining nonrespondents by telephone starting December 5, 2016  The survey was available online until we reached a 100 percent response rate  To increase our understanding into how TAP was being implemented at installations and supplement our survey findings, we visited one Coast Guard installation and interviewed TAP managers from two additional installations  We selected the installations based on several factors, including the size of the installation, proximity to Department of Defense (DOD) installations, and diverse locations in the United States  (See table 1 ) At Coast Guard Base Elizabeth City in North Carolina, the installation we visited, we interviewed the TAP manager, uniformed career counselors, and senior installation leadership  During our interviews with TAP managers at all three installations, we asked about the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP’s required and additional 2-day classes, including whether the servicemembers attended classes online or in a classroom setting, challenges to ensuring Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP, and the extent to which they monitor Coast Guard servicemembers’ participation in TAP  At Coast Guard Base Elizabeth City, we also interviewed 25 Coast Guard servicemembers (both officers and enlisted personnel) to get their perspective on how well TAP worked and any challenges they had participating  To help guide the interviews with the Coast Guard servicemembers, we asked them to complete a short questionnaire that asked about their experiences with the TAP program  We also interviewed TAP staff at Coast Guard headquarters to learn about TAP policy, monitoring efforts, and performance measures for the service overall  For example, we asked what policies and procedures guide installations’ TAP implementation; what performance measures the Coast Guard uses to monitor TAP; how performance results are reported and shared with different levels of Coast Guard leadership; and to what extent the Coast Guard uses results from TAP participant satisfaction assessments  We also asked whether the Coast Guard plans to shift to DOD’s new TAP-IT Enterprise System and how using the new system could affect its monitoring efforts in the future  In evaluating the Coast Guard’s performance measures, we focused on measures related to servicemembers’ transition experiences before leaving the military  We did not gather information on post-program evaluations and outcomes because they were determined to be outside the scope of this review  We reviewed DHS data on TAP participation for fiscal years 2012 to 2017  To assess the reliability of the Coast Guard’s TAP participation data, we interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data  We determined these data were not sufficiently reliable due to limitations with the Coast Guard’s data collection system  Specifically, the system lacks adequate controls to ensure TAP data are complete and accurate  We conducted this performance audit from February 2016 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the contact named above, Meeta Engle (Assistant Director), Amy MacDonald (Analyst-in-Charge), James Bennett, Holly Dye, David Forgosh, Ying Long, Jonathan McMurray, Jean McSween, Andrew Sherrill, Benjamin Sinoff, and Timothy Young, made significant contributions to this report  Also contributing to this report were Susan Aschoff, Jessie Battle, Ramona Burton, Melinda Cordero, Elizabeth Curda, Dawn Hoff, Ben Licht, Serena Lo, Sheila McCoy, Almeta Spencer, Christopher Schmitt, James Whitcomb, and Jill Yost  Transitioning Veterans: DOD Needs to Improve Performance Reporting and Monitoring for the Transition Assistance Program, GAO-18-23  Washington, D C : November, 8, 2017  Transitioning Veterans: Improvements Needed in DOD’s Performance Reporting and Monitoring of the Transition Assistance Program, GAO-18-225T  Washington, D C : November 8, 2017  Department of Defense: Transition Assistance Program (TAP) for Military Personnel, GAO-16-302R  Washington, D C : December 17, 2015  Veterans’ Employment: Need for Further Workshops Should Be Considered before Making Decisions on Their Future, GAO-15-518  Washington, D C : July 16, 2015  Military and Veteran Support: DOD and VA Programs That Address the Effects of Combat and Transition to Civilian Life, GAO-15-24  Washington, D C : November 7, 2014  Veterans Affairs: Better Understanding Needed to Enhance Services to Veterans Readjusting to Civilian Life, GAO-14-676  Washington, D C : September 10, 2014  Transitioning Veterans: Improved Oversight Needed to Enhance Implementation of Transition Assistance Program, GAO-14-144  Washington, D C : March 5, 2014  Military and Veterans’ Benefits: Enhanced Services Could Improve Transition Assistance for Reserves and National Guard, GAO-05-544  Washington, D C : May 20, 2005  Military and Veterans’ Benefits: Observations on the Transition Assistance Program, GAO-02-914T (July 18, 2002) 

ground_truth: Developing independently capable ANDSF is a key component of U.S. and coalition efforts to create sustainable security and stability in Afghanistan under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support mission. The United States is the largest contributor of funding and personnel to Resolute Support, providing and maintaining ANDSF equipment, along with training, advising, and assistance to help the ANDSF effectively use and sustain the equipment in the future. House Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to review the ANDSF's capability and capacity to operate and sustain U.S.-purchased weapon systems and equipment. This report addresses (1) what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF's ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD and NATO reports and documents, examined three critical equipment types, and interviewed DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in September 2018. Information that DOD deemed sensitive has been omitted. Since the Resolute Support mission began in 2015, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have improved some fundamental capabilities, such as high-level operational planning, but continue to rely on U.S. and coalition support to fill several key capability gaps, according to Department of Defense (DOD) reporting. DOD has initiatives to address some ANDSF capability gaps, such as a country-wide vehicle maintenance and training effort, but DOD reports it does not expect the ANDSF to develop and sustain independent capabilities in some areas, such as logistics, for several years. While DOD has firsthand information on the abilities of the Afghan Air Force and Special Security Forces to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment, it has little reliable information on the equipment proficiency of conventional ANDSF units. U.S. and coalition advisors are embedded at the tactical level for the Air Force and Special Security Forces, enabling DOD to directly assess those forces' abilities. However, the advisors have little direct contact with conventional ANDSF units on the front lines. As a result, DOD relies on those units' self-assessments of tactical abilities, which, according to DOD officials, can be unreliable. GAO's analysis of three critical equipment types illustrated the varying degrees of DOD's information (see figure above). For example, DOD provided detailed information about the Air Force's ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters and the Special Security Forces' ability to operate and maintain Mobile Strike Force Vehicles; however, DOD had limited information about how conventional forces operate and maintain radios and Mobile Strike Force Vehicles. DOD's lack of reliable information on conventional forces' equipment operations and maintenance abilities adds to the uncertainty and risk in assessing the progress of DOD efforts in Afghanistan. GAO recommends that DOD develop options for collecting reliable information on conventional ANDSF units' ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. DOD concurred with this recommendation.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Since 2001, the United States has made a commitment to building Afghanistan’s security and governance in order to prevent the country from once again becoming a sanctuary for terrorists  To achieve its security objectives, the United States currently has two missions in Afghanistan: a counterterrorism mission that it leads and the NATO-led Resolute Support train, advise, and assist mission, which it participates in with other coalition nations  The objective of Resolute Support, according to DOD reporting, is to establish self-sustaining Afghan security ministries and forces that work together to maintain security in Afghanistan  The United States is conducting these missions within a challenging security environment that has deteriorated since the January 2015 transition to Afghan-led security  The United Nations reported nearly 24,000 security incidents in Afghanistan in 2017—the most ever recorded—and, despite a slight decrease in the overall number of security incidents in early 2018, the United Nations noted significant security challenges, including a spike in high-casualty attacks in urban areas and coordinated attacks by the insurgency on ANDSF checkpoints  DOD provides both personnel and funding to support its efforts in Afghanistan  DOD documents indicate that the United States contributes more troops to Resolute Support than any other coalition nation  As of May 2018, the United States was contributing 54 percent of Resolute Support military personnel, according to DOD reporting  Of the approximately 14,000 U S  military personnel in Afghanistan as of June 2018, about 8,500 were assigned to Resolute Support to train, advise, and assist the ANDSF, according to DOD reporting  For fiscal year 2018, Congress appropriated about $4 67 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund—the primary mechanism of U S  financial support for manning, training, and equipping the ANDSF  Other international donors provided about $800 million, and the Afghan government committed to providing about $500 million, according to DOD reporting  Under Resolute Support and the International Security Assistance Force mission that preceded it, CSTC-A is the DOD organization responsible for (1) overseeing efforts to equip and train the ANA and ANP; (2) validating requirements, including equipment requirements; (3) validating existing supply levels; (4) submitting requests to DOD components to contract for procurement of materiel for the ANDSF; and (5) ensuring that the Afghan government appropriately uses and accounts for U S  funds provided as direct contributions from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund  OSD-P is responsible for developing policy on and conducting oversight of the bilateral security relationship with Afghanistan focused on efforts to develop the Afghan security ministries and their forces  In August 2017, we reported that the United States had spent almost $18 billion on equipment and transportation for the ANDSF from fiscal years 2005 through April 2017, representing the second-largest expenditure category from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund  In that report, we identified six types of key equipment the United States funded for the ANDSF in fiscal years 2003 through 2016, including approximately: 600,000 weapons, such as rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, shotguns, and pistols; 163,000 tactical and nontactical radios, such as handheld radios and 76,000 vehicles, such as Humvees, trucks, recovery vehicles, and mine resistant ambush protected vehicles; 30,000 equipment items for detecting and disposing of explosives, such as bomb disposal robots and mine detectors; 16,000 equipment items for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, such as unmanned surveillance drones and night vision devices; and 208 aircraft, such as helicopters, light attack aircraft, and cargo airplanes  The Ministry of Defense oversees the ANA, and the Ministry of the Interior oversees the ANP  According to DOD reporting, the authorized force level for the ANDSF, excluding civilians, as of June 2018 was 352,000: 227,374 for the Ministry of Defense and 124,626 for the Ministry of Interior  The ANA includes the ANA corps, Afghan Air Force, Special Mission Wing, ANA Special Operations Command, and Ktah Khas (counterterrorism forces)  The ANP includes the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Anti-Crime Police, Afghan Border Police, Public Security Police, Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, and General Command of Police Special Units  The ANA Special Mission Wing, Ktah Khas, ANA Special Operations Command, and ANP General Command of Police Special Units are collectively referred to as the Afghan Special Security Forces  In this report, we refer to the Afghan Air Force and the Afghan Special Security Forces as specialized forces, and the other components of the ANDSF as conventional forces  According to DOD reporting, the combined authorized force level for the specialized forces as of June 2018 was approximately 34,500, or about 10 percent of the ANDSF’s total authorized force level of 352,000, compared with the conventional forces, which make up about 74 percent of the total authorized force level for the ANDSF  Figure 1 shows the ANDSF’s organization  U S  and coalition advisors from Resolute Support focus on capacity building at the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and ANDSF regional headquarters, according to DOD reporting  Ministerial advisors are located at Resolute Support headquarters in Kabul  At the ministerial level, advisors provide assistance to improve institutional capabilities, focusing on several functional areas  Table 1 summarizes the indicators of effectiveness that ministerial advisors are to use to measure ministerial progress in developing functioning systems that can effectively execute each of the functional areas  Regional Resolute Support advisors from seven advising centers located throughout Afghanistan provide support to nearby ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters personnel, according to DOD reporting  Some advisors are embedded with their ANDSF counterparts, providing a continuous coalition presence, while others provide less frequent support, based on proximity to and capability of their ANDSF counterparts  Regional advisors are to track ANDSF capability development by assessing the progress of the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters based on five capability pillars (see table 2)  DOD and other Resolute Support advisors are to document the results of these assessments each quarter in an ANDSF Assessment Report  According to DOD reporting, in addition to ministerial and regional advising, two tactical-level advisory commands provide continuous support for the ANDSF’s specialized forces: Train, Advise, and Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air) advises the Afghan Air Force down to the unit level, and NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) primarily provides tactical-level special operations advising for the Afghan Special Security Forces  TAAC-Air and NSOCC-A assess capabilities at the headquarters level based on the five capability pillars described above in table 2, and these assessments are included in the quarterly ANDSF Assessment Report  Figure 2 shows the levels of advising each Resolute Support advisory command type provides for the ANDSF conventional forces and specialized forces  Since Resolute Support began, the ANDSF have improved some capabilities related to the functional areas and capability pillars described above, but face several capability gaps that leave them reliant on coalition assistance, according to publicly available DOD reporting  DOD defines capability as the ability to execute a given task  A capability gap is the inability to execute a specified course of action, such as an ANDSF functional area or a capability pillar (see tables 1 and 2 above)  According to DOD guidance, a gap may occur because forces lack a materiel or non-materiel capability, lack proficiency or sufficiency in a capability, or need to replace an existing capability solution to prevent a future gap from occurring  According to DOD reporting on the Afghan security ministries, ANA corps, and ANP zones, the ANDSF generally have improved in some capability areas since Resolute Support began, with some components performing better than others  For example, DOD has reported that the Afghan ministries have improved in operational planning, strategic communications, and coordination between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense at the national level  In general, the ANA is more capable than the ANP, according to DOD reporting  According to DOD officials and SIGAR reporting, this is due, in part, to the ANA having more coalition advisors and monitoring than the ANP  DOD officials also noted that the Ministry of Interior, which oversees the ANP, and Afghanistan’s justice system are both underdeveloped, hindering the effectiveness of the ANP  Corruption, understaffing, and training shortfalls have also contributed to the ANP’s underdevelopment, according to DOD and SIGAR reporting  The Afghan Special Security Forces are the most capable within the ANDSF and can conduct the majority of their operations independently without coalition enablers, according to DOD reporting  DOD and SIGAR reports have attributed the Afghan Special Security Forces’ relative proficiency to factors such as low attrition rates, longer training, and close partnership with coalition forces  The Afghan Air Force is becoming increasingly capable, and can independently plan for and perform some operational tasks, such as armed overwatch and aerial escort missions, according to DOD reporting  However, DOD has reported that the ANDSF generally continue to need support in several key areas  For example, as of December 2017, DOD reported several ministerial capability gaps, including force management; logistics; and analyzing and integrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information  DOD also reported that, as of December 2017, the ANA and ANP continued to have capability gaps in several key areas, such as weapons and equipment sustainment and integrating fire from aerial and ground forces  The ANDSF rely on support from contractors and coalition forces to mitigate capability gaps in these key areas  For some capability areas, such as aircraft and vehicle maintenance and logistics, the ANDSF is not expected to be self- sufficient until at least 2023, according to DOD reporting  According to DOD officials and SIGAR reporting, coalition and contractor support helps mitigate ANDSF capability gaps in the immediate term but may make it challenging to assess the ANDSF’s capabilities and gaps independent of such support  For example, vehicle and aircraft maintenance contractors are responsible for sustaining specific operational readiness rates for the equipment they service  While this helps ensure that ANDSF personnel have working equipment to accomplish their mission, thereby closing an immediate capability gap, it may mask the ANDSF’s underlying capabilities and potentially prolong reliance on such support, according to DOD officials and SIGAR reporting  DOD and the ANDSF have begun implementing plans and initiatives that aim to strengthen ANDSF capabilities  These include the following, among others: ANDSF Roadmap  In 2017, the Afghan government began implementing the ANDSF Roadmap—a series of developmental initiatives that seek to strengthen the ANDSF and increase security and governance in Afghanistan, according to DOD reporting  The Roadmap is structured to span 4 years, but DOD has reported that its full implementation will likely take longer than that  According to DOD reporting, the Roadmap aims to improve four key elements: (1) fighting capabilities; (2) leadership development; (3) unity of command and effort; and (4) counter-corruption efforts  Under the Roadmap’s initiative to increase the ANDSF’s fighting capabilities, DOD and the ANDSF have begun implementing plans to increase the size of the specialized forces  Specifically, DOD reports that the ANDSF plans to nearly double the size of the Afghan Special Security Forces by 2020 as an effort to bolster the ANDSF’s offensive reach and effectiveness  The Afghan Special Security Forces are to become the ANDSF’s primary offensive force, the conventional ANA forces are to focus on consolidating gains and holding key terrain and infrastructure, and the conventional ANP forces are to focus on community policing efforts  In addition, to provide additional aerial fire and airlift capabilities, the ANDSF began implementing an aviation modernization plan in 2017  The aim is to increase personnel strength and the size of the Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing fleets by 2023  Enhanced vehicle maintenance efforts  To help improve the ANDSF’s vehicle maintenance abilities, DOD awarded a National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract, which, according to DOD officials, became fully operational in December 2017  The National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract consolidated five separate vehicle maintenance and training contracts into a single contract and contains provisions for building the capacity of ANDSF and Afghan contractors to incrementally take control of vehicle maintenance over a 5-year period  Additional U S  military personnel  As part of the South Asia strategy, the United States committed 3,500 additional military personnel to increase support to its missions in Afghanistan  According to DOD reporting, most of the additional personnel will support the Resolute Support mission, providing more advising and combat enabler support to the ANDSF  Additionally, in March 2018, the United States began deploying a Security Force Assistance Brigade—a new type of unit made up of U S  Army personnel with expertise in training foreign militaries—to Afghanistan  The Security Force Assistance Brigade will advise conventional and specialized forces at and below the corps and zone levels and will accompany and support ANA conventional forces at the battalion level in ground operations as needed, according to DOD and SIGAR reporting  DOD collects some reliable information about the operation and maintenance abilities of ANDSF specialized forces, in part because advisors are embedded at the tactical level with the specialized forces, according to DOD officials  Specifically, U S  and coalition forces advise specialized forces at the tactical level under Resolute Support because building ANDSF aviation and special operations abilities are considered particularly important, according to DOD reporting  DOD officials told us that since U S  and coalition forces are embedded at the tactical level for specialized forces, they can monitor, assess, and report on tactical abilities, including the ability to operate and maintain equipment  Our analysis of information provided by DOD about the Afghan Air Force’s ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters illustrates that DOD has some detailed information about specialized forces  TAAC-Air advisors help train Afghan pilots and maintainers and collect information on their tactical abilities  For example, TAAC-Air advisors track the percentage of maintenance performed by Afghan Air Force maintainers and aircraft operational readiness rates, according to DOD officials  According to DOD reporting and officials, as of December 2017, the Afghan Air Force could independently conduct MD-530 helicopter operations for short intervals without contractor support but relied on contractors to perform the majority of maintenance and sustainment activities  See appendix II for more information on the Afghan Air Force’s ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters  U S  and coalition forces perform high-level assessments of the ANDSF conventional forces’ capabilities at the corps and zone levels but do not assess their tactical abilities, such as the ability to operate and maintain equipment, according to DOD officials  For example, U S  and coalition forces assess the ANA and ANP conventional forces in quarterly ANDSF Assessment Reports, but these reports are at the corps and zone headquarters levels, and are not meant to provide an evaluation of the entire ANDSF, according to DOD reporting  DOD officials stated that other U S - and coalition-produced reports and assessments, such as DOD’s semiannual Section 1225 reports to Congress, semiannual periodic mission reviews, and annual Afghanistan Plans of Record, provide some information on the ANDSF’s high-level capabilities  However, according to DOD officials, these reports do not routinely assess the conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain equipment  According to DOD officials, DOD does not assess conventional forces’ tactical abilities because advisors have had little or no direct contact with conventional units below the corps and zone levels, and thus do not collect such information on conventional forces  Specifically, under Resolute Support, U S  and coalition forces have not embedded with the conventional forces below the corps and zone levels except in limited circumstances  Since U S  and coalition forces do not collect firsthand information on the conventional units’ tactical abilities, they rely on those units’ self-reporting for information on ANDSF abilities below the corps and zone levels, which, according to DOD officials, may be unreliable  ANDSF reporting is not verified by U S  officials and can be unreliable in its consistency, comprehensiveness, and credibility, according to DOD officials and SIGAR  For example, the ANDSF produce a monthly tracker on vehicle availability, maintenance backlog, repair times, and personnel productivity, but DOD officials told us that the trackers are of questionable accuracy  Our analysis of information provided by DOD about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain tactical and nontactical radios illustrates the limited amount of information DOD has on ANDSF conventional forces’ tactical abilities  Specifically, DOD officials could not say how well ANDSF personnel on the front lines operate radios in the field and had only limited information on the ANDSF’s ability to maintain radios  For example, the officials noted that the ANA conventional forces can perform some unit-level radio repairs but that complex ANA radio maintenance and all ANP radio maintenance is conducted by contractors  DOD officials at Resolute Support headquarters told us that they provide ministerial- level advising on how to manage ANDSF radio systems and do not provide tactical advising or inventory control for radios  See appendix III for more information on the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain radios  Our analysis of information provided by DOD about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV) highlights the limited amount of information DOD has on ANDSF conventional forces’ tactical abilities compared with specialized forces  DOD officials were able to provide operation and maintenance information for MSFVs that had transferred to the specialized forces as of January 2018 but were unable to provide operation and maintenance information for any other MSFVs  The ANDSF began transferring one of the ANDSF’s two MSFV brigades from the conventional to specialized forces in August 2017, according to DOD officials  As part of this transfer, NSOCC-A advisors—who provide tactical-level advising for the Afghan Special Security Forces—assumed oversight for the first brigade from Resolute Support headquarters advisors  DOD officials stated that the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain MSFVs in this brigade prior to the transfer was unknown, as neither Resolute Support headquarters nor the ANA had assessed this  The operation and maintenance abilities of the second brigade, which is still in the conventional forces, remains unknown  DOD officials at NSOCC-A were able to provide information such as inventory and mission capability rates for the MSFVs that had transferred, but only for the short period of time the vehicles had been under the control of the specialized forces  DOD officials told us that NSOCC-A plans to collect more information on the specialized forces’ ability to operate and maintain MSFVs as they are transferred  See appendix IV for more information on the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain MSFVs  In the absence of embedded advisors at the tactical level, DOD has not implemented alternative approaches to collect reliable information about the conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain equipment  Federal internal control standards state that U S  agencies should obtain and process reliable information to evaluate performance in achieving key objectives and assessing risks  DOD officials acknowledged that some of the plans described above that DOD and the ANDSF have begun implementing to address capability gaps may provide opportunities for DOD to collect more reliable information on the conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment  For example, the National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract requires that contractors regularly report the total work orders received, work in progress, and completed maintenance work performed by ANDSF personnel as well as vehicle availability rates, which may be more reliable than the ANDSF’s monthly report on vehicle availability  In addition, the Security Force Assistance Brigade may be able to collect and report on the tactical abilities of units they advise and accompany on missions since they are being deployed at or below the corps and zone levels  However, as of June 2018, DOD officials had not decided which, if any, of these options to pursue  Without reliable information on the equipment operation and maintenance abilities of ANDSF conventional forces, which represent nearly 75 percent of the ANDSF, DOD may be unable to fully evaluate the success of its train, advise, assist, and equip efforts in Afghanistan  The United States invested nearly $84 billion in Afghan security in the 17- year period spanning fiscal years 2002 through 2018, but DOD continues to face challenges to developing a self-sustaining ANDSF  While DOD has reported the ANDSF have improved in several capability areas, they continue to face critical capability gaps, impeding their ability to maintain security and stability in Afghanistan independent of U S  and coalition forces  Moreover, DOD lacks reliable information about the degree to which conventional forces—which make up about three-quarters of the ANDSF—are able to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment  This limits DOD’s ability to fully evaluate the success of its train, advise, assist, and equip efforts in Afghanistan  The Secretary of Defense should develop and, as appropriate, implement options for collecting reliable information on the ANDSF conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment  (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this report to DOD and State for comment  DOD declined to provide written comments specifically on this public version of the report, but DOD’s comments on the sensitive version of this report are reprinted in appendix V  The sensitive version of this report included two recommendations, which DOD cited in its comments on the draft of the sensitive report  One of those recommendations related to information that DOD deemed to be sensitive and that must be protected from public disclosure  Therefore, we have omitted that recommendation from DOD’s comment letter in appendix V  This omission did not have a material effect on the substance of DOD’s comments  In its comments, DOD concurred with the recommendation we made in this version of the report and stated it will take steps to implement it  DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  The Department of State had no comments  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff has any questions about this report please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or farbj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI  House Report 114-537 associated with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for us to review the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ (ANDSF) capability and capacity to operate and sustain U S -purchased weapon systems and equipment  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on September 20, 2018  Our September report included three objectives, including one on the extent to which DOD considers ANDSF input and meets their needs when identifying equipment requirements  DOD deemed the information related to that objective to be sensitive, which must be protected from public disclosure  Consequently, we removed that objective and a related recommendation from this public report  This version includes information on the other two objectives: (1) what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment  Although the information provided in this report is more limited, the report uses the same methodology for the two objectives as the sensitive report  To identify what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps, we reviewed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and DOD documents and reports, such as DOD’s semiannual Section 1225 reports to Congress, produced after the start of the NATO-led Resolute Support mission on January 1, 2015  To determine what steps DOD and NATO have taken to try to address gaps, we reviewed reports the Center for Naval Analyses produced for DOD, as well as DOD and NATO documents and reports produced after January 1, 2015, and reports from GAO, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and the DOD Inspector General  We also interviewed Center for Naval Analyses representatives and DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan, including DOD officials at the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-P) who helped create the DOD reporting we reviewed  To determine the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment, we reviewed DOD documents and reports and interviewed DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan, including DOD officials who advise the ANDSF  We also reviewed federal internal control standards to determine what responsibilities agencies have specifically related to information collection  To provide illustrative examples of information DOD has about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U S - purchased equipment and what that information indicates about the ANDSF’s abilities and challenges, we interviewed and analyzed written responses from DOD officials, including DOD officials who provide procurement and lifecycle management for some ANDSF aircraft and vehicles, about three equipment types—MD-530 helicopters, Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV), and radios  We selected these three equipment types from a list that we developed, for an August 2017 report, of key ANDSF equipment the United States purchased from fiscal years 2003 through 2016  We made our selections after reviewing DOD documentation and interviewing DOD officials regarding a number of considerations, such as (1) how critical the equipment is to the ANDSF’s ability to achieve its mission; (2) which ANDSF component uses the equipment (i e , Afghan National Police, Afghan National Army, or both); (3) whether DOD intends to continue procuring the equipment for the ANDSF; and (4) whether the equipment had been in use at least 5 years  We collected detailed information about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters, MSFVs, and radios, as well as other key statistics DOD provided about the equipment, such as inventory, average lifespan, average cost, role, and training  This information was based mainly on DOD responses collected from January 2018 to February 2018 as well as DOD documents and reports produced after January 1, 2015  The total amount of MD-530s and radios authorized for procurement was based on DOD data that we collected for our August 2017 report on key ANDSF equipment the United States purchased in fiscal years 2003 through 2016, which we supplemented with additional data DOD provided on U S -purchased equipment from October 1, 2016, through December, 31, 2017  The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from August 2016 to September 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We subsequently worked with DOD from September 2018 to October 2018 to prepare this public version of the original sensitive report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with those standards  Manufacturer: MD Helicopters, Inc  U S  Program Management Office: U S  Army, Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft Project Management Office Program Advising: Train Advise Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air) The United States originally procured 6 unarmed MD-530s for the AAF for rotary wing training in 2011  In 2014, the United States purchased 12 armed MD-530s and began retrofitting the 5 remaining trainer helicopters with armament for operational missions to address a close air attack gap  MD- 530s were chosen to fill the gap over other aircraft, in part because they could be delivered relatively quickly as the AAF awaited A-29 light attack aircraft that were experiencing procurement delays, according to Department of Defense (DOD) officials  The United States procured additional MD-530s in 2015, 2016, and 2017 because of the aircraft’s positive impact on the battlefield, according to DOD officials (see fig  3)  Key Statistics Variants: All can be armed with  50-cal machine gun pods and/or 2 75 inch rocket pods  Total Authorized for Procurement: 60 as of December 31, 2017 Inventory: 25 as of January 2018 (30 are scheduled for delivery; attrition of 5 due to crashes and enemy fire) Average Lifespan: Absent mishaps, and with good maintenance, there is no defined lifespan limit for MD-530s, according to DOD officials  National Army and Afghan National Police, depending on the mission, in all but one region of Afghanistan, which is supported by other aircraft  MD-530s are typically tasked two at a time for missions, according to DOD officials  An MD-530 crew consists of a pilot and co-pilot, according to DOD  Average cost: $6 3 million per aircraft, including all electronic devices, weapons management systems, and weapons (excluding ordnance), according to DOD officials  o Division of labor is based on the individual crew members' capabilities, with one pilot handling navigation and communication while the other identifies targets and operates the weapon systems  Army pilot advisors at Kandahar Air Field, according to DOD officials  o MD-530 pilot training takes about 3 years (see fig  4)  1  The GAO report number cited in DOD’s letter refers to a draft of the sensitive version of this report, which we issued on September 20, 2018  Prior to issuing that version, we changed its report number to GAO-18- 662SU to reflect its sensitive nature  That version of this report included two recommendations  The second recommendation has been omitted from DOD’s letter in this public version because it was related to information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  In addition to the contact named above, Joyee Dasgupta (Assistant Director), Kara Marshall, Katherine Forsyth, and Bridgette Savino made key contributions to this report  The team also benefitted from the expert advice and assistance of David Dayton, Neil Doherty, Justin Fisher, Ashley Alley, Cary Russell, Marie Mak, James Reynolds, Sally Williamson, Ji Byun, and J  Kristopher Keener 


Report 2:  Federal internal control standards state that management should share quality information throughout an organization to enable personnel to perform key roles, and we have previously reported that by regularly sharing useful performance information with leaders at multiple levels of an organization, agencies can help leaders make informed decisions  Without this information, individual unit commanders or the commanders’ supervisors cannot determine whether Coast Guard servicemembers under their command completed TAP or identify whether there is a need for corrective actions to ensure they do so  As we mention earlier in this report, the Coast Guard plans to adopt DOD’s TAP-IT Enterprise System, which according to officials, could help the Coast Guard ensure eligible servicemembers participate in the program  According to a Coast Guard official, once the system is fully implemented by the Coast Guard, commanders will be required to verify and document whether Coast Guard servicemembers under their command completed TAP, potentially making commanders more vested in the process  We previously reported that a senior DOD official said that the TAP-IT Enterprise System may be able to generate unit- and installation-level reports for the four DOD-led military services by October 2018, and a Coast Guard official said he would work with DOD to identify whether this capability could also extend to the Coast Guard  Once data reliability improves, sharing installation and unit-level TAP performance information with Coast Guard commanders could support monitoring efforts  The performance measures tracked by the TAP interagency working group do not reflect TAP implementation broadly across all five military services, according to a Coast Guard official we interviewed  The Coast Guard does not currently share TAP data it collects with DOD or other members of the interagency performance working group  While the benefits of interagency data sharing cannot be realized without the Coast Guard first improving the quality and completeness of its TAP data, we have identified leading practices for interagency collaboration, including that members of interagency working groups identify and share relevant agency performance data  Moreover, federal internal control standards call for management to communicate quality information to external parties  Because the Coast Guard does not share TAP data, the performance measures tracked by the interagency group do not reflect Coast Guard servicemembers’ experiences and thus do not provide a complete picture of TAP implementation across the five military services  More specifically for the Coast Guard, without such data sharing, future TAP evaluations may not be able to assess the effectiveness of TAP delivery, hindering the Coast Guard’s ability to make program adjustments to better prepare its servicemembers to successfully transition to life after military service  Coast Guard officials said migrating to DOD’s TAP-IT Enterprise System will facilitate information sharing with interagency partners and that improving data completeness and reliability is a top priority for 2018  Given the sacrifices servicemembers have made to serve their country, it is imperative they are afforded every chance to adequately prepare for civilian life before leaving military service  In order to make a successful transition, servicemembers need to be well-positioned to get a job or make an informed decision about whether to pursue additional education or start a small business  As such, the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) serves a critically important function—to give servicemembers the tools and information they need to successfully transition to life outside the military  Federal law requires that the Coast Guard ensure all eligible servicemembers participate in the program, but thousands of Coast Guard servicemembers may have transitioned without the support provided by TAP  Reliably tracking participation has proven to be a challenge for the Coast Guard, in part because it lacks a current Commandant Instruction that defines the roles and responsibilities of staff responsible for implementing TAP and ensuring complete and reliable data are collected  In preparing to issue an updated Commandant Instruction, the Coast Guard has taken a positive step toward addressing the limitations of its current TAP data, and will be better positioned to ensure compliance with VOW Act requirements using reliable data  In addition to collecting reliable data, the Coast Guard could further demonstrate its commitment to meeting TAP requirements by establishing formal performance goals that measure the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP  By establishing interim performance goals, the agency would be able to show its progress towards achieving full compliance  Moreover, communicating performance goals to unit and installation commanders could enhance accountability and might spur progress toward meeting federal program requirements  By expanding its monitoring efforts beyond tracking participation in TAP’s required classes, the Coast Guard could enhance its ability to ensure other TAP requirements are met and that its servicemembers are able to access additional transition resources  Monitoring the timeliness of participation would help ensure Coast Guard servicemembers have adequate time to complete TAP before leaving the military  Further, by monitoring requests to participate in additional 2-day classes and 2-day class attendance, the Coast Guard would be in a better position to identify whether servicemembers who wish to attend the classes are able to do so, to determine whether more classes are needed, and to communicate this information to the interagency partners responsible for delivering these classes  Commanders can also play a key role in bolstering TAP participation  Having an up-to-date written Commandant Instruction that explicitly describes commanders’ roles and responsibilities could enhance commanders’ ability to ensure TAP’s proper implementation and compliance with VOW Act requirements  Moreover, once data quality improves, providing commanders a mechanism to readily determine whether servicemembers under their command have completed TAP could help them monitor the program to ensure that all TAP-eligible servicemembers receive the resources they need to successfully transition to civilian life  Finally, once more reliable data on Coast Guard servicemember participation are available, sharing this information with interagency partners could improve TAP implementation on a broader scale  Sharing reliable data, such as participation figures for the Coast Guard, would give TAP interagency partners a more complete picture of implementation across all five military services  Sharing such information would also enhance the interagency group’s ability to evaluate how well TAP serves the entire population of servicemembers  Improving the reliability of the Coast Guard’s TAP data will be essential for the benefits of data sharing to be realized  To ensure that all eligible Coast Guard servicemembers are provided the opportunity to complete the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), we recommend the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following seven actions: Issue an updated Commandant Instruction that establishes policies and procedures to improve the reliability and completeness of TAP data by including when and by whom data should be recorded and updated  (Recommendation 1) Establish a formal performance goal with a measurable target for participation rates in VOW Act-mandated portions of TAP  (Recommendation 2) Monitor the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP within prescribed time frames  (Recommendation 3) Monitor the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers who elect to participate in additional 2-day classes are afforded the opportunity to attend  (Recommendation 4) Issue an updated Commandant Instruction that defines the roles and responsibilities of the personnel who administer the program and ensure servicemembers’ participation  (Recommendation 5) Once reliable data are available by installation or unit, enable unit commanders and the higher-level commanders to whom they report to access TAP performance information specifically for the units they oversee so that they can monitor compliance with all TAP requirements  (Recommendation 6) Once reliable data are available, share TAP information with DOD and other interagency partners, such as data on participation in required TAP courses and additional 2-day classes  (Recommendation 7) We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Education, Labor, and Veterans Affairs, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Small Business Administration for their review and comment  The formal written response of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is reproduced in appendix II  In addition, DHS provided technical comments from Coast Guard officials that we incorporated into the report as appropriate  The other agencies did not provide any comments  In its written comments, DHS agreed with all seven of our recommendations  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or brownbarnesc@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  This report examines (1) what is known about the reliability of Transition Assistance Program (TAP) data on participation levels and the factors that affect Coast Guard servicemembers’ participation, and (2) the extent to which the Coast Guard measures TAP performance and monitors key areas of TAP implementation  To address these questions, we surveyed Coast Guard installations with full-time TAP operations; reviewed Coast Guard data on TAP participation for fiscal years 2012 to 2017; visited one Coast Guard installation and interviewed TAP managers from two additional Coast Guard installations selected for diversity in location, among other reasons; and interviewed Coast Guard officials responsible for overseeing TAP implementation for the Coast Guard  We also reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, policies, documents, and publications  Information in this report is current as of the date GAO received formal agency comments from DHS  Our survey of Coast Guard installations with full-time TAP operations asked about how TAP was being implemented  The survey included questions about the accessibility of TAP components, challenges Coast Guard servicemembers faced in attending the components, and the level of commander support for participation  Our survey targeted front-line TAP managers, who could draw on the expertise of TAP course facilitators, transition counselors, career counselors, and other key TAP staff as necessary  After drafting the survey questions, we pretested them with a TAP manager to ensure (1) the questions were clear and unambiguous, (2) terminology was used correctly, (3) the survey did not place an undue burden on agency officials, (4) the information could feasibly be obtained, and (5) the survey was comprehensive and unbiased  We revised the content and format of the survey based on the feedback we received  We initially sent the survey to TAP managers at all 13 Coast Guard installations at which TAP staff were located  We removed one installation when we later found that the TAP manager position was vacant and revised the total to 12 Coast Guard installations  The survey was accessible online from October 31, 2016, through January 18, 2017, through a secure server that recipients were able to access using unique usernames and passwords  We sent an email announcement to TAP staff at all 13 Coast Guard installations at which TAP staff are located on October 24, 2016  We sent a second email on October 31, 2016 to notify participants the survey was available online, and provided their unique passwords and usernames  We sent two follow-up e-mails (November 14, 2016 and November 28, 2016) to those who had not responded  Finally, we contacted all remaining nonrespondents by telephone starting December 5, 2016  The survey was available online until we reached a 100 percent response rate  To increase our understanding into how TAP was being implemented at installations and supplement our survey findings, we visited one Coast Guard installation and interviewed TAP managers from two additional installations  We selected the installations based on several factors, including the size of the installation, proximity to Department of Defense (DOD) installations, and diverse locations in the United States  (See table 1 ) At Coast Guard Base Elizabeth City in North Carolina, the installation we visited, we interviewed the TAP manager, uniformed career counselors, and senior installation leadership  During our interviews with TAP managers at all three installations, we asked about the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP’s required and additional 2-day classes, including whether the servicemembers attended classes online or in a classroom setting, challenges to ensuring Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP, and the extent to which they monitor Coast Guard servicemembers’ participation in TAP  At Coast Guard Base Elizabeth City, we also interviewed 25 Coast Guard servicemembers (both officers and enlisted personnel) to get their perspective on how well TAP worked and any challenges they had participating  To help guide the interviews with the Coast Guard servicemembers, we asked them to complete a short questionnaire that asked about their experiences with the TAP program  We also interviewed TAP staff at Coast Guard headquarters to learn about TAP policy, monitoring efforts, and performance measures for the service overall  For example, we asked what policies and procedures guide installations’ TAP implementation; what performance measures the Coast Guard uses to monitor TAP; how performance results are reported and shared with different levels of Coast Guard leadership; and to what extent the Coast Guard uses results from TAP participant satisfaction assessments  We also asked whether the Coast Guard plans to shift to DOD’s new TAP-IT Enterprise System and how using the new system could affect its monitoring efforts in the future  In evaluating the Coast Guard’s performance measures, we focused on measures related to servicemembers’ transition experiences before leaving the military  We did not gather information on post-program evaluations and outcomes because they were determined to be outside the scope of this review  We reviewed DHS data on TAP participation for fiscal years 2012 to 2017  To assess the reliability of the Coast Guard’s TAP participation data, we interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data  We determined these data were not sufficiently reliable due to limitations with the Coast Guard’s data collection system  Specifically, the system lacks adequate controls to ensure TAP data are complete and accurate  We conducted this performance audit from February 2016 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the contact named above, Meeta Engle (Assistant Director), Amy MacDonald (Analyst-in-Charge), James Bennett, Holly Dye, David Forgosh, Ying Long, Jonathan McMurray, Jean McSween, Andrew Sherrill, Benjamin Sinoff, and Timothy Young, made significant contributions to this report  Also contributing to this report were Susan Aschoff, Jessie Battle, Ramona Burton, Melinda Cordero, Elizabeth Curda, Dawn Hoff, Ben Licht, Serena Lo, Sheila McCoy, Almeta Spencer, Christopher Schmitt, James Whitcomb, and Jill Yost  Transitioning Veterans: DOD Needs to Improve Performance Reporting and Monitoring for the Transition Assistance Program, GAO-18-23  Washington, D C : November, 8, 2017  Transitioning Veterans: Improvements Needed in DOD’s Performance Reporting and Monitoring of the Transition Assistance Program, GAO-18-225T  Washington, D C : November 8, 2017  Department of Defense: Transition Assistance Program (TAP) for Military Personnel, GAO-16-302R  Washington, D C : December 17, 2015  Veterans’ Employment: Need for Further Workshops Should Be Considered before Making Decisions on Their Future, GAO-15-518  Washington, D C : July 16, 2015  Military and Veteran Support: DOD and VA Programs That Address the Effects of Combat and Transition to Civilian Life, GAO-15-24  Washington, D C : November 7, 2014  Veterans Affairs: Better Understanding Needed to Enhance Services to Veterans Readjusting to Civilian Life, GAO-14-676  Washington, D C : September 10, 2014  Transitioning Veterans: Improved Oversight Needed to Enhance Implementation of Transition Assistance Program, GAO-14-144  Washington, D C : March 5, 2014  Military and Veterans’ Benefits: Enhanced Services Could Improve Transition Assistance for Reserves and National Guard, GAO-05-544  Washington, D C : May 20, 2005  Military and Veterans’ Benefits: Observations on the Transition Assistance Program, GAO-02-914T (July 18, 2002) 

ground_truth: The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for three trade-related agencies under the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies (CJS) account—the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). This represents a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations. For FY2019, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, included $484.0 million in direct appropriations for ITA (a 0.4% increase from the FY2018 appropriation), $95.0 million in funding for USITC (a 1.4% increase), and a total of $68.0 million for USTR (a 0.2% decrease). The Administration's Request On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted its FY2019 budget request to Congress. The FY2019 proposal included a total of $590.8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies, an 8.9% decrease from FY2018 total appropriated amounts for these agencies. The Administration requested reducing funding for all three trade-related agencies. For FY2019, the request included $440.1 million in direct funding for ITA (an 8.7% decrease from the FY2018 appropriation), $87.6 million for USITC (a 6.5% decrease), and $63.0 million for USTR (a 13.2% decrease). Congressional Actions In the spring of 2018, the House and Senate reported FY2019 CJS appropriations bills, which included proposed funding for ITA, USITC, and USTR. The reported bills did not adopt many of the Administration's budget reductions, and instead proposed funding levels that were more similar to the FY2018-enacted amounts. The House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 5952 on May 17, 2018. The House proposal recommended a total of $647.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This proposal was $56.8 million more (9.6%) than the Administration's request, and $0.7 million less (-0.1%) than the FY2018-enacted legislation. The House committee proposed $480.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95.0 million for USTIC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities as authorized by the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125). The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 3072 on June 14, 2018. The Senate committee-reported proposal recommended a total of $655.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This is $64.8 million (11.0%) more than the Administration's request and $7.3 million (1.1%) more than the FY2018-enacted appropriations. The Senate committee proposed $488.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95 million for USITC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities. After three continuing resolutions and a three-week lapse in funding, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act. 2019 (P.L. 116-6), which was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for the three trade-related agencies, which represented a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 funding levels.