prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: From its headwaters in Colorado and Wyoming to its terminus in the Gulf of California, the Colorado River Basin covers more than 246,000 square miles  The river runs through seven U S  states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California) and Mexico  Pursuant to federal law, the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation, part of the Department of the Interior [DOI]) plays a prominent role in the management of the basin's waters  In the Lower Basin (i e , Arizona, Nevada, and California), Reclamation also serves as water master on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior, a role that elevates the status of the federal government in basin water management  The federal role in the management of Colorado River water is magnified by the multiple federally owned and operated water storage and conveyance facilities in the basin, which provide low-cost water and hydropower supplies to water users  Colorado River water is used primarily for agricultural irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) purposes  The river's flow and stored water also are important for power production, fish and wildlife, and recreation, among other uses  A majority (70%) of basin water supplies are used to irrigate 5 5 million acres of land; basin waters also provide M&I water supplies to nearly 40 million people  Much of the area that depends on the river for water supplies is outside of the drainage area for the Colorado River Basin  Storage and conveyance facilities on the Colorado River provide trans-basin diversions that serve areas such as Cheyenne, WY; multiple cities in Colorado's Front Range (e g , Fort Collins, Denver, Boulder, and Colorado Springs, CO); Provo, UT; Albuquerque and Santa Fe, NM; and Los Angeles, San Diego, and the Imperial Valley in Southern California ( Figure 1 )  Colorado River hydropower facilities can provide up to 42 gigawatts of electrical power per year  The river also provides habitat for a wide range of species, including several federally endangered species  It flows through 7 national wildlife refuges and 11 National Park Service (NPS) units; these and other areas of the river support important recreational opportunities  Precipitation and runoff in the basin are highly variable  Water conditions on the river depend largely on snowmelt in the basin's northern areas  Observed data (1906-2018) show that natural flows in the Colorado River Basin in the 20 th century averaged about 14 8 million acre-feet (MAF) annually  Flows have dipped significantly during the current drought, which dates to 2000; natural flows from 2000 to 2018 averaged approximately 12 4 MAF per year   In 2018, Reclamation estimated that the 19-year period from 2000 to 2018 was the driest period in more than 100 years of record keeping  The dry conditions are consistent with prior droughts in the basin that were identified through tree ring studies; some of these droughts lasted for decades  Climate change impacts, including warmer temperatures and altered precipitation patterns, may further increase the likelihood of prolonged drought in the basin  Pursuant to the multiple compacts, federal laws, court decisions and decrees, contracts, and regulatory guidelines governing Colorado River operations (collectively known as the Law of the River ), Congress and the federal government play a prominent role in the management of the Colorado River  Specifically, Congress funds and oversees Reclamation's management of Colorado River Basin facilities, including facility operations and programs to protect and restore endangered species  Congress has also approved and continues to actively consider Indian water rights settlements involving Colorado River waters, and development of new and expanded water storage in the basin  In addition, Congress has approved funding to mitigate drought and stretch basin water supplies and has considered new authorities for Reclamation to combat drought and enter into agreements with states and Colorado River contractors  This report provides background on management of the Colorado River, including a discussion of trends and agreements since 2000  It also discusses the congressional role in the management of basin waters  In the latter part of the 19 th century, interested parties in the Colorado River Basin began to recognize that local interests alone could not solve the challenges associated with development of the Colorado River  Plans conceived by parties in California's Imperial Valley to divert water from the mainstream of the Colorado River were thwarted because these proposals were subject to the sovereignty of both the United States and Mexico  The river also presented engineering challenges, such as deep canyons and erratic water flows, and economic hurdles that prevented local or state groups from building the necessary storage facilities and canals to provide an adequate water supply  Because local or state groups could not resolve these "national problems," Congress considered ideas to control the Colorado River and resolve potential conflicts between the states  Thus, in an effort to resolve these conflicts and prevent litigation, Congress gave its consent for the states and Reclamation to enter into an agreement to apportion Colorado River water supplies in 1921  The below sections discuss the resulting agreement, the Colorado River Compact, and other documents and agreements that form the basis of the Law of the River, which governs Colorado River operations  The Colorado River Compact of 1922, negotiated by the seven basin states and the federal government, was signed by all but one basin state (Arizona)  Under the compact, the states established a framework to apportion the water supplies between the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, with the dividing line between the two basins at Lee Ferry, AZ, near the Utah border  Each basin was apportioned 7 5 MAF annually for beneficial consumptive use, and the Lower Basin was given the right to increase its beneficial consumptive use by an additional 1 MAF annually  The agreement also required Upper Basin states to deliver to the Lower Basin a total of 75 MAF over each 10-year period, thus allowing for averaging over time to make up for low-flow years  The compact did not address inter- or intrastate allocations of water (which it left to future agreements and legislation), nor did it address water to be made available to Mexico, the river's natural terminus; this matter was addressed in subsequent international agreements  The compact was not to become binding until it had been approved by the legislatures of each of the signatory states and by Congress  Congress approved and modified the Colorado River Compact in the Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA) of 1928  The act ratified the 1922 compact, authorized the construction of a federal facility to impound water in the Lower Basin (Boulder Dam, later renamed Hoover Dam) and related facilities to deliver water in Southern California (e g , the All-American Canal, which delivers Colorado River water to California's Imperial Valley), and apportioned the Lower Basin's 7 5 MAF per year among the three Lower Basin states  It provided 4 4 MAF per year to California, 2 8 MAF to Arizona, and 300,000 acre-feet (AF) to Nevada, with the states to divide any surplus waters among them  It also directed the Secretary of the Interior to serve as the sole contracting authority for Colorado River water use in the Lower Basin and authorized several storage projects for study in the Upper Basin  Congress's approval of the compact in the BCPA was conditioned on a number of factors, including ratification by California and five other states (thereby allowing the compact to become effective without Arizona's concurrence), and California agreeing by act of its legislature to limit its water use to 4 4 MAF per year and not more than half of any surplus waters  California met this requirement by passing the California Limitation Act of March 4, 1929  Arizona did not ratify the Colorado River Compact until 1944, at which time the state began to pursue a federal project to bring Colorado River water to its primary population centers in Phoenix and Tucson  California opposed the project, arguing that under the doctrine of prior appropriation, California's historical use of the river trumped Arizona's rights to the Arizona allotment  California also argued that Colorado River apportionments under the BCPA included water developed on Colorado River tributaries, whereas Arizona claimed, among other things, that these apportionments included the river's mainstream waters only  In 1952, Arizona filed suit in the U S  Supreme Court to settle the issue  Eleven years later, in the 1963 Arizona v  California decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Arizona, finding that Congress had intended to apportion the mainstream of the Colorado River and that California and Arizona each would receive one-half of surplus flows  The same Supreme Court decision held that Section 5 of the BCPA controlled the apportionment of waters among Lower Basin States, and that the BCPA (and not the law of prior appropriation) controlled the apportionment of water among Lower Basin states  The ruling was notable for its directive to forgo traditional Reclamation deference to state law under the Reclamation Act of 1902, and formed the basis for the Secretary of the Interior's unique role as water master for the Lower Basin  The decision also held that Native American reservations on the Colorado River were entitled to priority under the BCPA  Later decrees by the Supreme Court in 1964 and 1979 supplemented the 1963 decision  Following the Arizona v  California decision, Congress eventually authorized Arizona's conveyance project for Colorado River water, the Central Arizona Project (CAP), in the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968 (CRBPA)  As a condition for California's support of the project, Arizona agreed that, in the event of shortage conditions, California's 4 4 MAF has priority over CAP water supplies  In 1944, the United States signed a water treaty with Mexico (1944 U S -Mexico Water Treaty) to guide how the two countries share the waters of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande  The treaty established water allocations for the two countries and created a governance framework (the International Boundary and Water Commission) to resolve disputes arising from the treaty's execution  The treaty requires the United States to provide Mexico with 1 5 MAF of water annually, plus an additional 200,000 AF when a surplus is declared  During drought, the United States may reduce deliveries to Mexico in similar proportion to reductions of U S  consumptive uses  The treaty has been supplemented by additional agreements between the United States and Mexico, known as m inutes   Projects originally authorized for study in the Upper Basin under BCPA were not allowed to move forward until the Upper Basin states determined their individual water allocations, which they did under the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948  The Upper Basin Compact established Colorado (where the largest share of runoff to the river originates) as the largest entitlement holder in the Upper Basin, with rights to 51 75% of any Upper Basin flows after Colorado River Compact obligations to the Lower Basin have been met  Other states also received percentage-based allocations, including Wyoming (14%), New Mexico (11 25%), and Utah (23%)  Arizona was allocated 50,000 AF in addition to its Lower Basin apportionment, in recognition of the small portion of the state in the Upper Basin  Basin allocations by state following approval of the Upper Basin Compact (i e , the allocations that generally guide current water deliveries) are shown below in Figure 2   The Upper Basin Compact also established the Upper Colorado River Commission, which coordinates operations and positions among Upper Basin states  Subsequent federal legislation paved the way for development of Upper Basin allocations  The Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) Act of 1956 authorized storage reservoirs and dams in the Upper Basin, including the Glen Canyon, Flaming Gorge, Navajo, and Curecanti Dams  The act also established the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund, which receives revenues collected in connection with the projects, to be made available for defraying the project's costs of operation, maintenance, and emergency expenditures  In addition to the aforementioned authorization of CAP in Arizona, the 1968 CRBPA amended CRSP to authorize several additional Upper Basin projects (e g , the Animas La Plata and Central Utah projects) as CRSP participating projects  It also directed that the Secretary of the Interior propose operational criteria for Colorado River Storage Project units (including the releases of water from Lake Powell) that prioritize (1) Treaty Obligations to Mexico, (2) the Colorado River Compact requirement for the Upper Basin to deliver 75 MAF to Lower Basin states over any 10-year period, and (3) carryover storage to meet these needs  The CRBPA also established the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund and the Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund, both of which were authorized to utilize revenues from power generation from relevant Upper and Lower Basin facilities to fund certain expenses in the sub-basins  Due to the basin's large water storage projects, basin water users are able to store as much as 60 MAF, or about four times the Colorado River's annual flows  Thus, storage and operations in the basin receive considerable attention, particularly at the basin's two largest dams and their storage reservoirs: Glen Canyon Dam/Lake Powell in the Upper Basin (26 2 MAF of storage capacity) and Hoover Dam/Lake Mead in the Lower Basin (26 1 MAF)  The status of these projects is of interest to basin stakeholders and observers and is monitored closely by Reclamation  Glen Canyon Dam, completed in 1963, provides the linchpin for Upper Basin storage and regulates flows from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin, pursuant to the Colorado River Compact  It also generates approximately 5 billion kilowatt hours (KWh) of electricity per year, which the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) supplies to 5 8 million customers in Upper Basin States  Other significant storage in the Upper Basin includes the initial "units" of the CRSP: the Aspinall Unit in Colorado (including Blue Mesa, Crystal, and Morrow Point dams on the Gunnison River, with combined storage capacity of more than 1 MAF), the Flaming Gorge Unit in Utah (including Flaming Gorge Dam on the Green River, with a capacity of 3 78 MAF), and the Navajo Unit in New Mexico (including Navajo Dam on the San Juan River, with a capacity of 1 MAF)  The Upper Basin is also home to 16 "participating" projects which are authorized to use water for irrigation, municipal and industrial uses, and other purposes  In the Lower Basin, Hoover Dam, completed in 1936, provides the majority of the Lower Basin's storage and generates about 4 2 billion KWh of electricity per year for customers in California, Arizona, and Nevada  Also important for Lower Basin Operations are Davis Dam/Lake Mohave, which regulates flows to Mexico under the 1944 Treaty, and Parker Dam/Lake Havasu, which impounds water for diversion into the Colorado River Aqueduct (thereby allowing for deliveries to urban areas in southern California) and CAP (allowing for diversion to users in Arizona)  Further downstream on the Arizona/California border, Imperial Dam (a diversion dam) diverts Colorado River water to the All-American Canal for use in California's Imperial and Coachella Valleys  Reclamation monitors Colorado River reservoir levels and projects them 24 months into the future in monthly studies (called 24-month studies )  The studies take into account forecasted hydrology, reservoir operations, and diversion and consumptive use schedules to model a single scenario of reservoir conditions  The studies inform operating decisions by Reclamation looking one to two years into the future  They express water storage conditions at Lake Mead and Lake Powell in terms of elevation, as feet above mean sea level (ft)  In addition to the 24-month studies, the CRBPA requires the Secretary to transmit to Congress and the governors of the basin states, by January 1 of each year, a report describing the actual operation for the preceding water year and the projected operation for the coming year  This report is commonly referred to as the annual operating plan (AOP)  The AOP's projected January 1 water conditions for the upcoming calendar year establish a baseline for future annual operations  Since the adoption of guidelines by Reclamation and basin states in 2007 (see below section, " 2007 Interim Guidelines "), operations of the Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams have been tied to specific pool elevations at Lake Mead and Lake Powell  For Lake Mead, the first level of shortage (1 st Tier Shortage Condition), under which Arizona and Nevada's allocations would be decreased, would be triggered if Lake Mead falls below 1,075 ft  For Lake Powell, releases under tiered operations are based on storage levels in both Lake Powell and Lake Mead (specific delivery curtailments based on lake levels similar to Lake Mead have not been adopted)  As of January 2019, Reclamation predicted that Lake Mead's 2019 elevation would remain above 1,075 ft (approximately 9 6 MAF of storage) and that Lake Powell would remain at its prior year level (i e , the Upper Elevation Balancing Tier) during 2019  However, Reclamation also projected that there was a 69% chance of a 1 st Tier Shortage Condition at Lake Mead beginning in January 2020  Reclamation predicted a small (3%) chance of Lake Powell dropping to 3,490 feet, or minimum power pool (i e , a level beyond which hydropower could not be generated) by 2020; the chance of this occurring by 2022 was greater (15%)  Improved hydrology for 2019 may decrease the likelihood of shortage in the immediate future  Construction of most of the Colorado River's water supply infrastructure predated major federal environmental protection statutes, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U S C  §§4321 et seq  ) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA; 87 Stat  884, 16 U S C  §§1531-1544)  Thus, many of the environmental impacts associated with the development of basin resources were not originally taken into account  Over time, multiple efforts have been initiated to mitigate these effects  Some of the highest-profile efforts have been associated with water quality (in particular, salinity control) and the effects of facility operations on endangered species  Salinity and water quality are long-standing issues in the Colorado River Basin  Parts of the Upper Basin are covered by salt-bearing shale (which increases salt content in water inflows), and salinity content increases as the river flows downstream due to both natural leaching and return flows from agricultural irrigation  The 1944 U S -Mexico Water Treaty did not set water quality or salinity standards in the Colorado River Basin  However, after years of dispute between the United States and Mexico regarding the salinity of the water reaching Mexico's border, the two countries reached an agreement on August 30, 1973, with the signing of Minute 242 of the International Boundary and Water Commission  The agreement guarantees Mexico that the average salinity of its treaty deliveries will be no more than 115 parts per million higher than the salt content of the water diverted to the All-American Canal at Imperial Dam in Southern California  To control the salinity of Colorado River water in accordance with this agreement, Congress passed the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act of 1974 ( P L  93-320 ), which authorized desalting and salinity control facilities to improve Colorado River water quality  The most prominent of these facilities is the Yuma Desalting Plant, which was largely completed in 1992 but has never operated at capacity  In 1974, the seven basin states also established water quality standards for salinity through the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum  Congress enacted the ESA in 1973  As basin species became listed in accordance with the act, federal agencies and nonfederal stakeholders consulted with the U S  Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to address the conservation of the listed species  As a result of these consultations, several major programs have been developed to protect and restore fish species on the Colorado River and its tributaries  Summaries of some of the key programs are below  The Upper Colorado Endangered Fish Recovery Program was established in 1988 to assist in the recovery of four species of endangered fish in the Upper Colorado River Basin  Congress authorized this program in P L  106-392   The program is implemented through several stakeholders under a cooperative agreement signed by the governors of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming; DOI; and the Administrator of WAPA  The recovery goals of the program are to reduce threats to species and improve their status so they are eventually delisted from the ESA  Some of the actions taken in the past include providing adequate instream flows for fish and their habitat, restoring habitat, reducing nonnative fish, augmenting fish populations with stocked fish, and conducting research and monitoring  Reclamation is the lead federal agency for the program and provides the majority of federal funds for implementation  It is also funded through a portion of Upper Basin hydropower revenues from WAPA; FWS; the states of Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah; and water users, among others  The San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program was established in 1992 to assist in the recovery of ESA-listed fish species on the San Juan River, the Colorado's largest tributary  The program is concerned with the recovery of the Razorback sucker ( Xyrauchen texanus ) and Colorado pikeminnow ( Ptychocheilus Lucius )  Congress authorized this program in P L  106-392 with the aim to protect the genetic integrity and population of listed species, conserve and restore habitat (including water quality), reduce nonnative species, and monitor species  The Recovery Program is coordinated by FWS  Reclamation is responsible for operating the Animas-La Plata Project and Navajo Dam on the San Juan River in a way that reduces effects on the fish populations  The program is funded by a portion of revenues from power generation, Reclamation, participating states, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs  Recovery efforts for listed fish are coordinated with the Upper Colorado River Program discussed above  The Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program was established in 1997 in response to a directive from Congress under the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 ( P L  102-575 ) to operate Glen Canyon Dam "in such a manner as to protect, mitigate adverse impacts to, and improve the values for which Grand Canyon National Park and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area were established " This program uses experiments to determine how water flows affect natural resources south of the dam  Reclamation is in charge of modifying flows for experiments, and the U S  Geological Survey conducts monitoring and other studies to evaluate the effects of the flows  The results are expected to better inform managers how to provide water deliveries and conserve species  The majority of program funding comes from hydropower revenues generated at Glen Canyon Dam  The MSCP is a multistakeholder initiative to conserve 27 species (8 listed under ESA) along the Lower Colorado River while maintaining water and power supplies for farmers, tribes, industries, and urban residents  The MSCP began in 2005 and is planned to last for at least 50 years  The MSCP was created through consultation under ESA  To achieve compliance under ESA, federal entities involved in managing water supplies in the Lower Colorado River met with resource agencies from Arizona, California, and Nevada; Native American Tribes; environmental groups; and recreation interests to develop a program to conserve species along a portion of the Colorado River  A biological opinion (BiOp) issued by the FWS in 1997 served as a basis for the program  Modifications to the 1997 BiOp were made in 2002, and in 2005, the BiOp was renewed for 50 years  Nonfederal entities received an incidental take permit under Section 10(a) of the ESA for their activities in 2005 and shortly thereafter implemented a habitat conservation plan  The objective of the MSCP is to create habitat for listed species, augment the populations of species listed under ESA, maintain current and future water diversions and power production, and abide by the incidental take authorizations for listed species under the ESA  The estimated total cost of the program over its lifetime is approximately $626 million in 2003 dollars ($882 million in 2018 dollars) and is to be split evenly between Reclamation (50%) and the states of California, Nevada, and Arizona (who collectively fund the remaining 50%)  The management and implementation of the MSCP is the responsibility of Reclamation, in consultation with a steering committee of stakeholders  Twenty-two federally recognized tribes in the Colorado River Basin have quantified water diversion rights that have been confirmed by court decree or final settlement  These tribes collectively possess rights to 2 9 MAF per year of Colorado River water  However, as of 2015, these tribes typically were using just over half of their quantified rights  Additionally, 13 other basin tribes have reserved water rights claims that have yet to be resolved  Increased water use by tribes with existing water rights, and/or future settlement of claims and additional consumptive use of basin waters by other tribes, is likely to exacerbate the competition for basin water resources  The potential for increased use of tribal water rights (which, once ratified, are counted toward state-specific allocations where the tribal reservation is located) has been studied in recent years  In 2014, Reclamation, working with a group of 10 tribes with significant reserved water rights claims on the Colorado River, initiated a study known as the 10 Tribes Study   The study, published in 2018, estimated that, cumulatively, the 10 tribes could have reserved water rights (including unresolved claims) to divert nearly 2 8 MAF per year  Of these water rights, approximately 2 MAF per year were decreed and an additional 785,273 AF (mostly in the Upper Basin) remained unresolved  The report estimated that, overall, the 10 tribes are diverting (i e , making use of) almost 1 5 MAF of their 2 8 MAF in resolved and unresolved claims  Table 1 shows these figures at the basin and sub-basin levels  According to the study, the majority of unresolved claims in the Upper Basin are associated with the Ute Tribe in Utah (370,370 AF per year), the Navajo Nation in Utah (314,926 AF), and the Navajo Nation in the Upper Basin in Arizona (77,049 AF)  When the Colorado River Compact was originally approved, it was assumed based on the historical record that average annual flows on the river were 16 4 MAF per year  According to Reclamation data, from 1906 to 2018, observed natural flows on the river at Lee Ferry, AZ—the common point of measurement for observed basin flows—averaged 14 8 MAF annually  Natural flows from 2000 to 2018 (i e , during the ongoing drought) averaged considerably less than that—12 4 MAF annually  While natural flows have trended down, consumptive use in the basin has grown and has regularly exceeded natural flows since 2000  From 1971 to 2015, average total consumptive use grew from 13 MAF to over 15 MAF annually  Combined, the two trends have caused a significant drawdown of basin storage levels ( Figure 3 )  From 2009 to 2015, the largest consumptive water use occurred in the Lower Basin (7 5 MAF per year), while Upper Basin consumptive use averaged about 3 8 MAF annually  Use of Treaty water by Mexico (1 5 MAF per year) and evaporative loss from reservoirs (approximately 2 MAF per year) in both basins also factored significantly into total basin consumptive use  Notably, consumptive use in the Lower Basin, combined with mandatory releases to Mexico, regularly exceeds the mandatory 8 23 MAF per year that must be released from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin and Mexico pursuant to Reclamation requirements  This imbalance between Lower Basin inflows and use, known as the structural deficit , causes additional stress on basin storage  The current drought in the basin has included some of the lowest flows on record  According to Reclamation, the 19-year period from 2000 to 2018 was the driest period in more than 100 years of record keeping  Observers have pointed out that flows in some recent years have been lower than would be expected given the amount of precipitation that has occurred, and have noted that warmer temperatures appear to be a significant contributor to these diminished flows  Based on these and other observations, some have argued that Colorado River flows are unlikely to return to 20 th century averages, and that future water supply risk is high  A 2012 study by Reclamation projected a long-term imbalance in supply and demand in the Colorado River Basin  In the study, Reclamation noted that the basin had thus far avoided serious impacts on water supplies due to the significant storage within the system, coupled with the fact that some Upper Basin states have yet to fully develop the use of their allocations  However, Reclamation projected that in the coming half century, flows would decrease by an average of 9% at Lee Ferry and drought would increase in frequency and duration  At the same time, Reclamation projected that demand for basin water supplies would increase, with annual consumptive use projected to rise from 15 MAF to 18 1-20 4 MAF by 2050, depending on population growth  A range of 64%-76% of the growth in demand was expected to come from increased M&I demand  Reclamation's 2012 study also posited several potential ways to alleviate future shortages in the basin, such as alternative water supplies, demand management, drought action plans, water banking, and water transfer/markets  Some of these options already are being pursued  In particular, some states have become increasingly active in banking unused Colorado River surface water supplies, including through groundwater banks or storage of unused surface waters in Lake Mead (see below section, " 2007 Interim Guidelines ")  Drought conditions throughout the basin have raised concerns about potential negative impacts on water supplies  Concerns center on uncertainty that might result if the Secretary of the Interior were to determine that a shortage condition exists in the Lower Basin, and that related curtailments were warranted  Some in Upper Basin States are also concerned about the potential for a c ompact call of Lower Basin states on Upper Basin states  Drought and other uncertainties related to water rights priorities (e g , potential tribal water rights claims) spurred the development of several efforts that generally attempted to relieve pressure on basin water supplies, stabilize storage levels, and provide assurances of available water supplies  Some of the most prominent developments since the year 2000 (i e , the beginning of the current drought) are discussed below  Prior to the 2003 QSA, California had been using approximately 5 2 MAF of Colorado River on average each year (with most of its excess water use attributed to urban areas)  Under the QSA, an agreement between several California water districts and DOI, California agreed to reduce its use to the required 4 4 MAF under the Law of the River  It sought to accomplish this aim by quantifying Colorado River entitlement levels of several water contractors; authorizing efforts to conserve additional water supplies (e g , the lining of the All-American Canal); and providing for several large-scale, long-term agriculture-to-urban water transfers  The QSA also committed the state to a path for restoration and mitigation related to the Salton Sea, a water body in Southern California that was historically sustained by Colorado River irrigation runoff from the Imperial and Coachella Valleys  A related agreement between Reclamation and the Lower Basin states, the Inadvertent Overrun and Payback Policy (IOPP), went into effect concurrently with the QSA in 2004  IOPP is an administrative mechanism that provides an accounting of inadvertent overruns in consumptive use compared to the annual entitlements of water users in the Lower Basin  These overruns must be "paid back" in the calendar year following the overruns, and the paybacks must be made only from "extraordinary conservation measures" above and beyond normal consumptive use  The 2004 Arizona Water Settlements Act ( P L  108-451 , AWSA) significantly altered the allocation of CAP water in Arizona and set the stage for some of the cutbacks in the state that are currently under discussion  It ratified three water rights settlements (one in each title) between the federal government and the State of Arizona, the Gila River Indian Community (GRIC), and the Tohono O'odham Nation, respectively  For the state and its CAP water users, the settlement resolved a final repayment cost for CAP by reducing the water users' reimbursable repayment obligation from about $2 3 billion to $1 65 billion  Additionally, Arizona agreed to new tribal and non-tribal allocations of CAP water so that approximately half of CAP's annual allotment would be available to Indian tribes in Arizona, at a higher priority than most other uses  The tribal communities were authorized to lease the water so long as the water remains within the state via the state's water banking authority  The act also authorized funds to cover the cost of infrastructure required to deliver the water to the Indian communities, much of it derived from power receipts accruing to the Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund  Another significant development in the basin was the 2007 adoption of the Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead (2007 Interim Guidelines)  Development of the agreement began in 2005, when, in response to drought in the Southwest and the decline in basin water storage (and a record low point in Lake Powell of 33% active capacity), the Secretary of the Interior instructed Reclamation to develop coordinated strategies for Colorado River reservoir operations during drought or shortages  The resulting guidelines included criteria for releases from Lakes Mead and Powell determined by "trigger levels" in both reservoirs, as well as a schedule of Lower Basin curtailments at different operational tiers ( Table 2 )  Under the guidelines, Arizona and Nevada, which have junior rights to California, would face reduced allocations if Lake Mead elevations dropped below 1,075 ft  At the time, it was thought that the 2007 Guidelines would significantly reduce the risk of Lake Mead falling to 1,025 feet  The guidelines are considered "interim" because they were scheduled to expire in 20 years (i e , at the end of 2026)  The 2007 agreement also included for the first time a mechanism by which parties in the Lower Basin were able to store conserved water in Lake Mead, known as Intentionally Created Surplus (ICS)  Reclamation accounts for this water annually, and the users storing the water may access the surplus in future years, in accordance with the Law of the River  From 2013 to 2017, the portion of Lake Mead water in storage that was classified as ICS ranged from a low of 711,864 AF in 2015 to a high of 1 261 MAF in 2017 ( Figure 4 )  In 2014, Reclamation and several major basin water supply agencies (Central Arizona Water Conservation District, Southern Nevada Water Authority, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, and Denver Water) executed a memorandum of understanding to provide funding for voluntary conservation projects and reductions of water use  These activities had the goal of developing new system water , to be applied toward storage in Lake Mead, by the end of 2019  Congress formally authorized federal participation in these efforts in the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P L  113-235 , Division D ), with an initial sunset date for the authority at the end of FY2018  The Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-244 , Division A ) extended the authority through the end of FY2022, with the stipulation that Upper Basin agreements could not proceed without the participation of the Upper Basin states through the Upper Colorado River Commission  As of mid-2018, Reclamation estimated that the program had resulted in a total of 194,000 AF of system water conserved  These savings were carried out through 64 projects conserving 47,000 AF in the Upper Basin and 11 projects conserving 147,000 AF in the Lower Basin  In 2017, the United States and Mexico signed Minute 323, which extended and replaced elements of a previous agreement, Minute 319, signed in 2012  Minute 323 included, among other things, options for Mexico to hold water in reserve in U S  reservoirs for emergencies and water conservation efforts, as well as U S  commitments for flows to support the ecological health of the Colorado River Delta  It also extended initial Mexican cutback commitments made under Minute 319 (which were similar in structure to the 2007 cutbacks negotiated for Lower Basin states) and established a Binational Water Scarcity Contingency Plan that included additional cutbacks that would be triggered if drought contingency plans (DCPs) are approved by U S  basin states (see following section, " 2019 Drought Contingency Plans ")  Ongoing drought conditions and the potential for water supply shortages prompted discussions and negotiations focused on how to conserve additional basin water supplies  After several years of negotiations, on March 19, 2019, Reclamation and the Colorado River Basin states finalized DCPs for both the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin  These plans required final authorization by Congress to be implemented  Following House and Senate hearings on the DCPs in early April, on April 16, 2019, Congress authorized the DCP agreements in the Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan Authorization Act ( P L  116-14 )  Each of the basin-level DCPs is discussed below in more detail  The Upper Basin DCP aims to protect against Lake Powell reaching critically low elevations; it also authorizes storage of conserved water in the Upper Basin that could help establish the foundation for a water use reduction effort (i e , a "Demand Management Program") that may be developed in the future  Under the Upper Basin DCP, the Upper Basin states agree to operate system units to keep the surface of Lake Powell above 3,525 ft, which is 35 ft above the minimum elevation needed to run the dam's hydroelectric plant  Other large Upper Basin reservoirs (e g , Navajo Reservoir, Blue Mesa Reservoir, and Flaming Gorge Reservoir) would be operated to protect the targeted Lake Powell elevation, potentially through drawdown of their own storage  If established by the states, an Upper Basin DCP Demand Management Program would likely entail willing seller/buyer agreements allowing for temporary paid reductions in water use that would provide for more storage volume in Lake Powell  Reclamation and other observers have stated their belief that these efforts will significantly decrease the risk of Lake Powell's elevation falling below 3,490 ft, an elevation at which significantly reduced hydropower generation is possible  The Lower Basin DCP is designed to require Arizona, California, and Nevada to curtail use and thereby contribute additional water to Lake Mead storage at predetermined "trigger" elevations, while also creating additional flexibility to incentivize voluntary conservation of water to be stored in Lake Mead, thereby increasing lake levels  Under the DCP, Nevada and Arizona (which were already set to have their supplies curtailed beginning at 1,075 ft under the 2007 Interim Guidelines) are to contribute additional supplies to maintain higher lake levels (i e , beyond previous commitments)  The reductions of supply would reach their maximums when reservoir levels drop below 1,045 ft  At the same time, the Lower Basin DCP would, for the first time, include commitments for delivery cutbacks by California  These cutbacks would begin with 200,000 AF (4 5%) in reductions at Lake Mead elevations of 1,040-1,045 ft, and would increase to as much as 350,000 AF (7 9%) at elevations of 1,025 ft or lower  The curtailments in the Lower Basin DCP are in addition to those agreed to under the 2007 Interim Guidelines and under Minute 323 with Mexico  Specific and cumulative reductions are shown in Table 2   In addition to the state-level reductions, under the Lower Basin DCP, Reclamation also would agree to pursue efforts to add 100,000 AF or more of system water within the basin  Some of the largest and most controversial reductions under the Lower Basin DCP would occur in Arizona, where pursuant to previous changes under the 2004 AWSA, a large group of agricultural users would face major cutbacks to their CAP water supplies  Reclamation has noted that the Lower Basin DCP significantly decreases the chance of Lake Mead elevations falling below 1,020 ft, which would be a critically low level  Some parties have pointed out that although the DCP is unlikely to prevent a shortage from being declared at 1,075 ft, it would slow the rate at which the lake recedes thereafter  Combined with the commitments from Mexico, total planned cutbacks under shortage scenarios (i e , all commitments to date, combined) would reduce Lower Basin consumptive use by 241,000 AF to 1 375 MAF per year, depending on Lake Mead's elevation  Although the DCPs and the related negotiations were widely praised, some expressed concerns related to the implementation of the DCPs as they relate to federal and state environmental laws  Most Colorado River contractors supported the agreements, but one major basin contractor, Imperial Irrigation District (IID, a major holder of Colorado River water rights in Southern California), did not approve the DCPs  IID has argued that the DCPs will further degrade the Salton Sea, a shrinking and ecologically degraded water body in southern California that relies on drainage flows from lands irrigated using Colorado River water  Following enactment of the DCPs, IID filed suit in state court alleging that state approval of the DCPs violated the California Environmental Quality Act  Others have questioned whether federal implementation of the DCPs without a new or supplemental Environmental Impact Statement might violate federal law, such as NEPA  The principal role of Congress as it relates to storage facilities on the Colorado River is funding and oversight of facility operations, construction, and programs to protect and restore endangered species (e g , Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program and the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Program)  In the Upper Basin, Colorado River facilities include the 17 active participating units in the Colorado River Storage Projects, as well as the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project  In the Lower Basin, major facilities include the Salt River Project and Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Hoover Dam and All-American Canal, Yuma and Gila Projects, Parker-Davis Project, Central Arizona Project, and Robert B  Griffith Project (now Southern Nevada Water System)  Congressional appropriations in support of Colorado River projects and programs typically account for a portion of overall project budgets  For example, the Lower Colorado Region's FY2017 operating budget was $517 million; $119 8 million of this total was provided by discretionary appropriations, and the remainder of funding came from power revenues (which are made available without further appropriation) and nonfederal partners  In recent years, Congress has also authorized and appropriated funding that has targeted the Colorado River Basin in general (i e , the Pilot System Conservation Plan)  Congress may choose to extend or amend these and other authorities specific to the basin  While discretionary appropriations for the Colorado River are of regular interest to Congress, Congress may also be asked to weigh in on Colorado River funding that is not subject to regular appropriations  For instance, in the coming years, the Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund is projected to face a decrease in revenues and may thus have less funding available for congressionally established funding priorities for the Development Fund  Congress has previously approved Indian water rights settlements associated with more than 2 MAF of tribal diversion rights on the Colorado River  Only a portion of this water has been developed  Congress likely will face the decision of whether to fund development of previously authorized infrastructure associated with Indian water rights settlements in the Colorado River Basin  For example, the ongoing Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project is being built to serve the Jicarilla Apache Nation, the Navajo Nation, and the City of Gallup, New Mexico  Congress may also be asked to consider new settlements that may result in tribal rights to more Colorado River water  For example, in the 116 th Congress, H R  244 would authorize the Navajo Nation Water Settlement in Utah  In addition to development of new tribal water supplies, some states in the Upper Basin have indicated their intent to further develop their Colorado River water entitlements  For example, in the 115 th Congress, Section 4310 of America's Water Infrastructure Act ( P L  115-270 ) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to enter into an agreement with the State of Wyoming whereby the state would fund a project to add erosion control to Fontenelle Reservoir in the Upper Basin  The project would allow the state to potentially utilize an additional 80,000 acre-feet of water storage on the Green River, a tributary of the Colorado River  Congress may remain interested in implementation of the DCPs, including their success or failure at stemming further Colorado River cutbacks and the extent to which the plans comply with federal environmental laws such as NEPA  Similarly, Congress may be interested in the overall hydrologic status of the Colorado River Basin, as well as future efforts to plan for increased demand in the basin and stretch limited basin water supplies 


Report 2: Many Members of Congress became actively engaged in foreign policy debates over U S  intervention in the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, "Bosnia")  Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response to the conflict through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative initiatives  Many observers contend that the United States is a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of the strong impact of U S  intervention on the postwar Bosnian state  Nearly 25 years after warring parties in Bosnia reached the Dayton Agreement (see below), Bosnia faces numerous internal and external challenges, and the country retains geopolitical importance to U S  interests in the Western Balkans  As Congress assesses ongoing and emerging security issues in the region, including resilience against malign external influence, renewed conflict, and radicalization, Bosnia's internal politics and its role in Balkan stability may merit further examination  Bosnia has existed in various forms throughout its history: a medieval kingdom, territory held by two major empires, a federal unit, and, since 1992, an independent state  Bosnia's present international borders are largely consistent with its administrative boundaries under later periods of Ottoman Turkish rule  After World War I, Bosnia became part of the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes  It was one of the six constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1945 until 1992  Bosnia's constitution stems from the U S -brokered Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the country's 1992-1995 war  It recognizes three "constituent peoples": Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs  All three groups are Slavic  Religious tradition is considered a marker of difference among the three ethnic identities: Bosniaks are predominantly Muslim, Serbs are largely Orthodox Christian, and Croats are mostly Catholic  Although Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian are recognized in Bosnia as distinct official languages, they are mutually intelligible  Bosniaks comprise approximately 50 1% of the population, Bosnian Serbs 30 8%, and Bosnian Croats 15 4%  In this report, Bosnian is used as a non-ethnic term for a person or institution from Bosnia  A Bosnian Serb is an ethnic Serb from Bosnia and a Bosnian Croat is an ethnic Croat from Bosnia  Bosniak refers to Slavic Muslims  Bosnia's religious and cultural diversity is one of its distinctive characteristics  Islam was introduced to part of Bosnia's population during the Ottoman period, although there were also large Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Jewish communities  Bosnia was the most heterogeneous Yugoslav republic and the only one where no ethnic group formed an absolute majority  During the 1990s, some popular accounts of Bosnia (and the former Yugoslavia) depicted its ethnic relations as "ancient hatreds," implying that the country's ethnic groups cannot peacefully coexist and that the 1992-1995 war was unavoidable  However, many experts on the region reject this thesis  Although Bosnia has experienced episodes of communal violence and bloodshed, most recently during World War II and the 1992-1995 war, its heterogeneous population also has lived in mixed communities for periods of peace  Many experts contend that ethnic conflict often was stoked by domestic leaders who manipulated historical memory and grievances to further their own agendas, or by external powers seeking to rule Bosnia or annex its territory  In the 1980s, Yugoslavia's escalating political and economic crises fueled nationalist movements  Nationalist leaders in Serbia and Croatia appealed to Bosnian Serbs and Croats as ethnic "kin " The party that ruled Croatia for most of the 1990s, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), established a sister party with the same name to mobilize Bosnian Croats and compete in Bosnia's elections  This gave Croatia an avenue of influence in Bosnian politics  Serbia, led by strongman Slobodan Milošević, likewise had influence over Bosnian Serb leaders  In Bosnia's November 1990 elections—the first competitive elections in decades—voters cast aside the ruling League of Communists party and elected ethnic parties that largely continue to dominate today  Bosnian voters backed independence in a 1992 referendum, following in the footsteps of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia  Bosnian Serbs, who did not want to separate from Yugoslavia, boycotted the referendum  Bosnian Serb forces seized more than two-thirds of Bosnia's territory, and a three-year conflict followed that pitted Serb, Croat, and Bosniak forces against one another  Bosnian Serb leaders declared a "Serb Republic" ( Republika Srpska) in March 1992, while Bosnian Croat leaders proclaimed the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosnia in July  Some Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb leaders advocated unification with Croatia and Serbia, respectively, where government factions—including their strongman leaders—likewise wanted to carve a Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia out of Bosnia's territory  Bosniak leaders opposed dismemberment of the state  Bosnia's war was one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since World War II  Bosnian Serb forces besieged Sarajevo for 44 months  More than 10,000 people, mostly civilians, died due to shelling, sniping, and blockade-related deprivation  Paramilitary factions from neighboring Croatia and Serbia—some of which reportedly had ties to the Croatian and Serbian government—fought alongside Bosnian Croats and Serbs  The Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army also aided Bosnian Serb forces, giving them a military advantage  In many areas, combatants from the three groups killed or expelled members of other ethnic groups to "purify" territory that they wanted to claim as their own  This "ethnic cleansing" changed Bosnia's demographic landscape  An estimated 100,000 or more Bosnians were killed in the conflict, and roughly half of its population displaced  In addition, an estimated 20,000 or more women and girls were victims of sexual violence  Hundreds of Bosnians have been prosecuted for war crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and in Bosnian courts  In 2016, the ICTY convicted wartime Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić of genocide and war crimes  In 2019, the tribunal rejected his appeal and increased his sentence from 40 years to life  Citizens of Croatia and Serbia have also been indicted for crimes committed in the Bosnian war  Highly publicized incidents in 1994 and 1995 underscored the war's human toll  Bosnian Serb forces bombarded a Sarajevo market in 1994 and 1995, resulting in over 100 civilian deaths  In July 1995, Serb forces commanded by Ratko Mladić seized and executed more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in a U N -designated safe area around the city of Srebrenica, an incident subsequently seen by some as a consequence of the international community's muddled, ineffectual response to the conflict  The International Court of Justice and ICTY subsequently ruled that the Srebrenica massacres constituted an act of genocide  Mladić was convicted of genocide and other crimes in 2017  These incidents increased pressure on U S  policymakers to take a stronger role in resolving a conflict that had largely been left to the EU and the United Nations  Under U S  command, NATO intervened in August and September 1995 with air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets, while allied Bosniak and Croat forces launched a simultaneous offensive in western Bosnia  The United States played a key role in brokering several agreements  The 1994 Washington Agreement ended the "war within a war" between Bosniaks and Croats  In November 1995, leaders from Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia met at the Wright-Patterson Air Force base in Dayton, OH, to negotiate a peace agreement  U S  diplomat Richard Holbrooke played a crucial role in brokering the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, more commonly known as the Dayton Peace Agreement  Bosnia's complex political system is a product of the Dayton Agreement; one of its annexes serves as Bosnia's constitution (Annex 4)  Its provisions partly reflect the situation on the ground in 1995, including the subdivision of Bosnia into two ethnoterritorial entities ( Figure 1 ): Republika Srpska ("RS"), which Bosnian Serb leaders had proclaimed in 1992, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("FBiH," predominantly populated by Bosniaks and Croats), which was created by the 1994 Washington Agreement  Entity borders were largely drawn to form ethnic majorities, even though they also reflected territorial seizure and ethnic cleansing  Many Bosniaks view the division of Bosnia into these roughly equal entities as awarding the spoils of war to Bosnian Serbs, whom they regard as the aggressors  Many Bosnian Serbs, however, view the Serb-majority entity as a protection against marginalization  The designation of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as Bosnia's three "constituent peoples" is a cornerstone of the Dayton system  Numerous government bodies have ethnic quotas requiring equal representation of the three groups  In these power-sharing institutions, delegates from each constituent group may veto measures that go against vital ethnic interests  While these arrangements make Bosnia's political system prone to gridlock, Dayton's negotiators viewed them as necessary to prevent any group from feeling marginalized in a context of low trust  Bosnia is a parliamentary republic with a high degree of decentralization  Its complex, tiered structure includes a central ("state-level") government, the two entities, the autonomous Brčko district, and cantonal and municipal governments  The central ("state-level") government covers the entirety of Bosnia  A three-member presidency is the head of state, and includes one Serb member who is elected by RS voters, and one Bosniak and one Croat member elected by FBiH voters  The Council of Ministers, led by a Chairperson, is roughly equivalent to a cabinet government and prime minister in other parliamentary systems  The Parliamentary Assembly is a state-level legislature with two chambers: a directly elected House of Representatives (42 members) and an indirectly elected House of Peoples (5 Serbs, 5 Croats, and 5 Bosniaks)  The state-level government is considered to be weak, despite some expansion of its functions in the 2000s  Its major responsibilities include foreign relations; trade, customs, and monetary policy; migration and asylum policy; defense; and intelligence  Bosnia is further subdivided into two ethnoterritorial entities: Republika Srpska (RS), where Serbs are the largest ethnic group (82%), and the Federation entity (FBiH), where Bosniaks (70%) and Croats (22%) are the largest groups  The two entities have broader policy jurisdiction than the state-level government  Governing functions that are not assigned to the state-level government fall to the entities  These include civilian policing, economic policy, fiscal policy, energy policy, and health and social policy, as well as other issues  Each entity has its own constitution, as well as a president, vice presidents, legislature, and cabinet government with a prime minister  Each entity may establish "special parallel relationships" with neighboring states (i e , Croatia and Serbia)  Numerous entity bodies also incorporate ethnic quotas  Brčko district, a border region in northeastern Bosnia, was initially administered by the international community to allay concerns about RS secession  Brčko's location interrupts RS's contiguity, and both entities initially claimed it  Brčko was later awarded to both entities, but remains a self-governing district whose population is a mix of all three constituent peoples  Some analysts believe it has been relatively more successful than the entities in passing reforms and reintegrating its divided population (e g , ethnically mixed schools with a common curriculum)  FBiH entity is further divided into ten cantons, many of which were drawn to form ethnic Bosniak or Croat majorities  The cantons have jurisdiction in many policy areas, including policing, housing, culture, and education  They also have their own constitutions—based on the FBiH constitution—as well as legislatures and cabinet-style governments  FBiH and RS are further divided into 79 and 64 municipalities, respectively  The Dayton Agreement established a strong oversight role for the international community  The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was created to monitor the implementation of civilian aspects of Dayton  The High Representative is supported by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), a group of 55 countries and agencies  A 1997 PIC conference empowered the High Representative to impose binding decisions and sanction politicians who obstruct Dayton  Until the mid-2000s, the High Representative used these powers to remove officials deemed to be obstructive to peace and to promote what are considered among the most constructive reforms since Dayton, including merging the entities' armed forces and intelligence services and putting them under new state-level ministries  However, the High Representative's proactive role has since decreased  This is partly due to criticism that the OHR lacks democratic legitimacy and accountability  Bosnian Serb politicians have claimed that the OHR's interventions support Bosniak leaders' preference for a more centralized state  At the same time, some U S  and EU policymakers believed that the attraction of EU membership could incentivize reforms in place of the OHR's more top-down approach  The international community also plays an ongoing security role  NATO led the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) that monitored security aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement  The initial deployment of NATO ground forces to Bosnia numbered nearly 60,000, of which the largest share (approximately one-third) was from the United States  The number of troops subsequently decreased  In 2004, NATO's peacekeeping role was transferred to the EU with the understanding that NATO would assist if necessary  The size of the EU operation (EUFOR Althea) decreased from 7,000 troops in 2004 to roughly 600 troops today  Many analysts contend that the Dayton Agreement helped hold Bosnia together after the war; they point to the absence of widespread violence since 1995 as an indicator of its success  However, observers also question whether Bosnia can function much longer under the Dayton system  They identify several key challenges: Critics claim that Bosnia's political system reinforces the country's ethnic divisions and makes ethnicity a core basis of political identity  The ethnic parties that have dominated politics since the war generally appeal to voters from their respective ethnic communities rather than all Bosnians  Critics accuse ethnic party leaders of inflaming nationalist tensions and manipulating historical memory to distract from corruption and win elections, thus aggravating rather than bridging the deep wounds that remain from the war  In some parts of Bosnia, divisions are further reproduced at the societal level through institutions like segregated schools, which separate schoolchildren from different ethnic groups and teach them different curriculum  Some analysts also contend that the system is too gridlock-prone to pass major political and economic reforms to be passed, even with the incentive of potential EU membership  Bosnia's fractured, overlapping institutions sometimes muddle policymaking jurisdiction and impede coordinated response  Furthermore, power-sharing arrangements create numerous veto points in the legislative process  Government coalitions are typically ideologically broad and unwieldy, creating a further source of potential dysfunction  One of the consequences of these barriers is that it is difficult to pass legislation  The previous state-level Parliament, for example, adopted twelve new laws over the course of its 2014-2018 term  Corruption in Bosnia has roots in the country's wartime economy  A 2000 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that "organized crime and corruption pervade Bosnia's national political parties, civil service, law enforcement and judicial systems  [Ethnic] parties control all aspects of the government, the judiciary, and the economy, and in so doing maintain the personal and financial power of their members " Many observers claim that the situation has improved little since then  In 2018, the High Representative warned that the rule of law has deteriorated, while the U S  State Department describes the rule of law as "an existential issue " Bosnia's major parties allegedly siphon from the state apparatus and public enterprises in their strongholds to amass wealth and power  Furthermore, parties in power reportedly politicize hiring in Bosnia's public sector, which employs an estimated third or more of the working population  For many Bosnians, satisfactory employment depends on having the right political connections, which creates a dependence that reportedly is exploited during elections  In 2018, the outgoing U S  ambassador to Bosnia decried the "[Bosnian] politicians who seek to destabilize the country in order to remain in power at all costs for personal profit and protection " Many analysts believe that Bosnia's entrenched ethnic parties benefit tremendously from the status quo and have little incentive to reform the system  Bosnia's MPs are among the best-paid in Europe relative to local incomes, commanding six to eight times the average Bosnian salary  Parties and politicians who gain office in the government or administration often find "a remarkably efficient path to personal enrichment " Politicians are skilled at using veto points to block legislation that threatens their position in Bosnia's patronage system  According to one analyst, Bosnia's patronage system is "the raison d'etre of the political elites and is the main cause of the state's dysfunctionality and resistance to reform " Bosnia's entrenched political class may also fear penalty if serious reforms are enacted and shine the spotlight on malfeasance  Criminal indictments against leaders in neighborhood countries like Romania, Croatia, and North Macedonia highlight this risk  Analysts believe these disincentives make entrenched politicians resistant to external pressure for reform  Several major rounds of U S - and EU-brokered constitutional reform efforts, including in 2006, 2008, and 2009, ultimately failed  Germany and the United Kingdom launched a major initiative in 2014 to shift the focus from difficult constitutional reforms to seemingly more feasible socioeconomic reforms that they hoped would improve Bosnia's economy and dismantle patronage networks  The 2015 "Reform Agenda" identified economic, administrative, and legal measures to be adopted by entity- and state-level governments  The process, which required the major parties to commit in writing to the reform framework, was supported by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group, and the United States  As an incentive for politicians to agree to the Agenda, the EU offered the entry into force of Bosnia's long-stalled Stabilization and Association Agreement, which marked the first step toward EU membership  However, most observers view the Reform Agenda as largely unsuccessful; many of its provisions failed when entrenched parties objected to measures that would undercut their dominance  While many officials recognize that Bosnia's political system needs reform, there is little consensus on how to change it or to generate the political will to find common ground so long as the dominant parties remain entrenched  Bosnian Serb leaders have expressed a desire to return to the "original" Dayton system, when the entities had greater competencies in security and justice  Milorad Dodik, who has dominated politics in Republika Srpska since the 2000s, has gone further by repeatedly threatening RS secession  Bosnian Croat leaders from the largest Croat party, the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia (HDZ-BiH), call for more autonomy for Croats, and have raised the prospect of splitting FBiH to create a third Croat-majority entity  By contrast, Bosniak leaders generally prefer more centralization and the removal of some of the institutional arrangements that they believe contribute to dysfunction and gridlock  Some Bosniak officials also have proposed dismantling the entities or eliminating FBiH's cantons  Survey research documents Bosnian citizens' anger toward the political class and their distrust of political institutions  In a 2018 International Republican Institute survey, 86% of respondents expressed belief that Bosnia is heading in the wrong direction  An estimated 170,000 individuals—disproportionately young and skilled—have emigrated since 2013  Dissatisfaction with education and healthcare, insecurity, and nepotism are cited as key motives to emigrate  Nevertheless, some analysts believe that periods of social discontent in 2014 and 2018, which challenged the system but appeared to transcend ethnic divides, suggest that strengthening Bosnian civil society could increase pressure for reform, and perhaps cultivate a new generation of party leaders  Other observers have put their hopes for reform in Bosnia's so-called "civic parties," which do not have nationalist platforms and typically mobilize voters on the basis of socioeconomic interests rather than ethnicity  While these parties have not matched the results of the ethnic parties, their electoral performance has improved in recent years  Bosnia's challenges came to the forefront during its most recent general election on October 7, 2018 (see Table 1 )  The Central Election Commission (CEC) registered 60 parties and over 3,500 candidates for state-level, entity, and cantonal offices  Observers noted that the campaign climate was more divisive and nationalist in tone than usual  Despite broad voter dissatisfaction, entrenched ethnic parties won the largest vote shares  Almost six months after the election, the parties are still negotiating over government formation at the state level and in FBiH; however, it appears that entrenched ethnic parties will continue to dominate  In March 2019, the leaders of the largest Bosniak, Croat, and Serb parties stated that they had agreed to a set of principles to guide forming the state-level government (the Council of Ministers)  Some observers viewed the improved result of civic parties (one-third of the vote in FBiH) as a positive development  Some of the most controversial outcomes concern the elections to the state-level presidency, composed of three members (one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb)  In a closely fought race, Šefik Džaferović, candidate of the ethnic Bosniak SDA party, narrowly defeated the candidate of the civic SDP party (36 6% and 33 5%, respectively), retaining the lock that the SDA has had on the Bosniak seat in most elections since 1996, but perhaps auguring a future victory by a civic party candidate  Prior to the election, some analysts expressed concern at the prospect of two of the three seats on the presidency being held by the nationalist Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik and his ally, the nationalist Bosnian Croat politician Dragan Čović  Both politicians have explicitly or implicitly challenged the legitimacy of Bosnian statehood and called for greater ethnoterritorial autonomy  However, to the surprise of some observers, Željko Komšić of the civic Democratic Front defeated incumbent Čović for the Croat seat with 53% of the vote  Komšić was previously elected as the Croat member of the presidency in 2006 and 2010, and is considered to be a moderate political figure who generally supports centralizing reforms  In contrast to HDZ-BiH leader Čović, he does not have strong ties to the Croatian government  Komšić's election as the Croat member of the presidency in 2006 and 2010 was mired in controversy amid complaints that he only won with the support of Bosniaks who voted in the election for the Croat member on the presidency rather than the Bosniak member  Komšić identifies as Croat but has been leader of several civic parties  He comes from central Bosnia, and not from the Croat-majority western regions that are the stronghold of the HDZ  Although it is not illegal for Bosniaks to vote for the Croat seat on the presidency rather than the Bosniak seat, some Croat leaders (especially HDZ-BiH and HDZ-1990) claim that it violates the spirit of Dayton and results in illegitimate representation of Croats  Similar accusations of ethnic cross-voting surfaced after Komšić's victory in 2018  Some analysts expect Komšić's victory to harden the HDZ-BiH position on electoral reform (see "Legal Challenges," above) and possibly embolden politicians who seek a separate entity  As most pre-election polls anticipated, RS strongman Milorad Dodik defeated the more moderate incumbent Serb member of the presidency with 54% of the vote  Dodik has dominated entity politics in RS since the mid-2000s as entity prime minister and president  Analysts note that RS's political environment grew more closed as Dodik consolidated power  Dodik has run afoul of the United States and the EU by frequently threatening to hold a referendum on RS secession, questioning the legitimacy of Bosnian statehood, and cultivating close ties to Russia (see below)  The U S  Treasury Department sanctioned him in 2017 for actively obstructing Dayton  Many analysts have expressed concern that Dodik will use his new position to obstruct the workings of the central government while continuing to dictate politics in RS through loyal allies  Shortly after the election he vowed to "work above all and only for the interests of Serbs " One of his first acts as head of state was to call for Bosnia to recognize Ukraine's Crimea region as Russian territory  In December 2018, the National Assembly of RS approved the creation of several new ministries, an act that some view as an attempt to wrest competencies from the state-level government  In early 2019, the RS parliament courted controversy when it passed legislation to create a new commission to reinvestigate the events of Srebrenica, which many view as an attempt to deny or downplay the massacres  Since the election, the formation of governments has proceeded piecemeal, and legal challenges to election law in FBiH (see above, "Legal Challenges") initially cast doubt over the formation of that entity's government  The RS National Assembly approved the new entity government in December 2018  Party leaders continue to negotiate over forming governments in FBiH and the state-level Council of Ministers  Because the FBiH government did not fix electoral legislation before the election, the Electoral Commission adopted a decision to assign delegates to the House of Peoples based on the 2013 census  (The Electoral Commission's actions reportedly came amid strong pressure from U S  and EU officials)  Several Bosniak parties challenged the decision before the Constitutional Court; however, the Court declined to take on the case  Bosnia is one of Europe's poorest countries  The 1992-1995 war caused an estimated $110 billion in damage, and Bosnia's economy contracted to one-eighth of its prewar level  Despite significant reconstruction and recovery since 1995, GDP per capita was $5,148 in 2017, well below the EU average ($33,715) and that of Bulgaria ($8,031), its lowest-ranking member  Nearly one in five Bosnians lives below the poverty level  Bosnia's unemployment rate was 18% in 2018, down from 28% in 2015  Youth unemployment also declined in recent years from 60% to 46%  Nevertheless, these rates are still high by European standards  Since 2015, annual GDP growth has averaged around 3%, but it is largely driven by consumption (much of which in turn is fueled by migrant remittances)  The IMF has urged Bosnia to privatize or restructure the nearly 550 state-owned enterprises that comprise roughly 20% of its economy; many of them are unprofitable but allegedly are used by politicians as "cash cows and workplaces for loyal cadres " Bosnia participates in several free trade schemes  In 2006, it joined the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) alongside other non-EU countries in the region, including other ex-Yugoslav neighbors  Bosnia's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union, which entered into force in 2015, provides for almost fully free trade  A free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) also entered into force in 2015  The EU is Bosnia's primary trade partner  Germany, Italy, Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria are Bosnia's key EU export markets, accounting for more than half of its exports in 2017  Serbia, another CEFTA signatory, is also an important export market  Bosnia's major exports include vehicle seats, raw materials, leather products, textiles, energy, and wood products  The EU is also Bosnia's primary source of foreign direct investment (FDI)  In 2016, 63% of Bosnia's FDI came from EU countries, with Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia the top sources  Serbia is also a significant source of FDI (16 3%)  However, Bosnia's fragmented legal and administrative structure create a challenging investment climate  Many relevant laws differ between the two entities  Corruption, entrenched economic interests, and political instability also deter investment  As a result, FDI amounts to just 2% of Bosnia's GDP, well below the Western Balkan average of 5%  Bosnia was the region's lowest-rated country in the World Bank's 2019 Ease of Doing Business Index  U S  and EU policymakers view the NATO and EU accession processes as a positive force for democratization and reform in the Western Balkans, including Bosnia  According to analysts, this assessment informed the United States' partial retreat from the region in the 2000s and 2010s  EU membership is one of the few policy issues for which there is relatively broad consensus among Bosnia's politicians and population  The EU's "fundamentals first" approach to enlargement in the Western Balkans frontloads the accession process with meeting the core requirements of having a democratic political system and functioning market economy; in Bosnia, the EU is currently focused on issues relating to the rule of law, public administration reform, and economic development  In 2016, Bosnia submitted its application to join the EU  Its current status is potential candidate , which entitles it to receive financial assistance from the EU's Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II (IPA II)  Between 2014 and 2020, Bosnia is expected to receive €552 million in IPA II allocations, making the EU Bosnia's largest source of foreign assistance  Many EU member states provide additional aid to Bosnia through domestic foreign assistance programs  Bosnia's EU membership prospects are uncertain  In a 2018 progress report, the European Commission (the EU's executive) flagged Bosnia's slow implementation of reforms, including the 2015 Reform Agenda (a flagship EU initiative in Bosnia) and numerous domestic and international court rulings (see "Legal Challenges," above)  Some analysts question whether Bosnia, under its current political system, would be capable of meeting the membership requirement of harmonizing domestic legislation with the many thousands of provisions in the acquis communautaire, the cumulative body of EU legislation, case law, and regulations  In comparison to EU membership, Bosnian leaders are more divided over the issue of joining NATO  These divisions largely fall along Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat/Bosniak lines  Bosnian Serb opposition is rooted in resentment over NATO's role in the Bosnian war, and may also reflect a desire to remain in lockstep with neighboring Serbia, which also does not seek NATO membership  Bosnia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 2006 and secured an Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2008  In 2010, NATO indicated that it would launch a Membership Action Plan (MAP)—a program to help aspiring members meet membership requirements—once Bosnia meets several conditions, the most challenging of which is the reregistration of permanent defense installations from entity to state-level government  RS officials have resisted ceding control over defense installations on entity territory  Although Bosnia does not yet meet these requirements, in December 2018 NATO foreign ministers invited Bosnia to activate its MAP by submitting its first Annual National Program  Some analysts interpreted this invitation as a gesture to generate reform momentum in Bosnia's fragile post-election period  The Bosniak and Croat members of the presidency responded positively, but Bosnian Serb leaders (and most Bosnian Serbs) do not want Bosnia to join NATO  In October 2017, the RS National Assembly passed a resolution supporting military neutrality  RS President Željka Cvijanović reiterated this stance after NATO's invitation, and Dodik—now a member of the state-level presidency—also has vowed to pursue military neutrality  Bosnia's relations with Croatia and Serbia are seen as an important component of regional stability  However, bilateral relations have often been fraught as a legacy of the Bosnian war, as well as sensitivities over Croatia and Serbia's relations with Bosnian Croats and Serbs  While democratic gains in Croatia and Serbia after 2000 contributed to improved relations with Bosnia, they remain reluctant to examine or acknowledge their role in the Bosnian war  At times, Bosnian leaders have objected to what they describe as Croatian and Serbian meddling in Bosnia's affairs  Ex-Bosnian Croat member of the presidency Dragan Čović and current Bosnian Serb member of the presidency Milorad Dodik draw support from leaders in Croatia and Serbia and reportedly hold Croatian and Serbian citizenship, respectively, alongside their Bosnian citizenship  The Croatian government financially and politically backed Čović in Bosnia's 2018 elections, and Croatian politicians have raised the issue of Bosnian Croats' constitutional challenges (see above, "Legal Challenges") in forums like the European Parliament, NATO, and the United Nations  These moves prompted three former High Representatives to Bosnia to issue a joint letter expressing alarm over Croatia's "meddling" in Bosnia's internal affairs  The Croatian government also challenged the legitimacy of Željko Komšić as the Croat member of the Bosnian presidency (see above, "2018 General Election")  Some parties in Croatia hold Croatian election campaign events on Bosnian territory to mobilize Bosnian Croat voters with dual citizenship to vote in Croatia's elections  The Serbian government likewise supports Dodik, who is a frequent visitor to Belgrade  Some Serbian politicians have made statements supporting convicted Bosnian Serb war criminals, inflaming an issue that remains highly sensitive in Bosnia  Bosnia and Serbia have an unresolved demarcation dispute over approximately 40 square kilometers of border area, including a railway segment and hydroelectric power stations  Bosnia has dual citizenship treaties with Croatia and Serbia, resulting in hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs acquiring dual citizenship  This has raised jurisdictional issues in cases in which indicted war criminals hold dual citizenship  Despite occasional tensions in their relations, Croatia and Serbia are important economic partners for Bosnia  Both countries are among Bosnia's top export markets and top sources of FDI  As part of its enlargement strategy in the Western Balkans, the EU has embraced a connectivity agenda to improve regional transportation, energy, and infrastructural linkages, reserving up to €1 billion in grants for projects for the period 2015-2020  Officials believe that improved connectivity could benefit bilateral relations and contribute to regional stability  Given its strategic location and relatively small, weak states, the Balkan region has long drawn in more powerful states  Many analysts maintain that as the United States and the European Union have both scaled back their presence in the Balkans to address other issues since the late 2000s, Russia, Turkey, and China partly filled the vacuum  U S  and EU officials have expressed concern over Russian influence in the Western Balkans, particularly after Russia occupied Ukraine's Crimea region in 2014  Many analysts maintain that Russia does not have a grand strategy in the Western Balkans, but rather aims to prevent Euro-Atlantic integration and shore up its claims to great power status by asserting itself in the EU's "inner courtyard " Analysts have identified several Russian tools in the region, including playing a "spoiler" role, projecting soft power, and leveraging energy dominance  Observers contend that Russia plays a "spoiler" role in Bosnia by exacerbating ethnic divisions, backing illiberal or anti-Western political factions, and helping to militarize RS  They claim that these actions help sustain the dysfunction and gridlock that undermine Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic reform efforts  Russia has supported Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat nationalist leaders Milorad Dodik and Dragan Čović  Dodik's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin just before Bosnia's October 7, 2018 general election was one of nearly ten meetings between the two over the past three years, signaling high-level Russian support  Many experts assert that Russia has been a key ally to Dodik in resisting Western pressure to cooperate on reforms  Moscow has also supported divisive RS policies  When Dodik violated a Bosnian Constitutional Court ruling in 2016 by holding a referendum to establish a controversial "Statehood Day," Russia stood apart from the High Representative and Western diplomats by supporting the initiative  More recently, Russia stated its support for RS's controversial Srebrenica commission (see above)  Analysts have also expressed concern at Russia's apparent support for Čović, who has advocated greater autonomy for Croats and the creation of a third Croat entity  Some analysts have expressed concern at Russia's role in RS's security sector  Russian forces have trained RS police special forces on counterterrorism and intelligence  Some observers believe that these exercises contribute to militarization in RS, potentially pushing the police force beyond its civilian law enforcement mandate  Analysts caution that militarization could increase the scale of violence in any confrontation between RS and the Bosnian government  Some Bosnian Serb ultranationalist and veterans groups have fought alongside pro-Russia combatants in Ukraine, and analysts believe they could be mobilized to support RS leaders as well  Russian soft power draws upon religious and cultural kinship with Bosnian Serbs, as well as Russia's history of support during the wars of Yugoslav disintegration  Kremlin-linked media, like Sputnik and RT , amplify existing anti-Western narratives and positively shape public opinion toward Russia  Some local media further propagate Sputnik and RT articles  A 2018 National Democratic Institute media study found that RS media stories about Russia were overwhelmingly positive, while the tone of most stories about the United States and NATO was negative  Pro-Russian media glorifies the Russian military, highlights cultural and religious links between Serbs and Russians, and documents high-level meetings between RS and Russian officials  Economic relations between Russia and RS have deepened in recent years  Russia is the largest source of FDI in RS, and it is largely concentrated in the energy sector  In 2007, Russian state-owned oil company Zarubezhneft bought RS's Bosanski Brod oil refinery, motor oil processing facilities in nearby Modrica, and retailer Banjaluka Petrol  Some analysts believe that these assets—which were purchased without an open tender—give Zarubezhneft influence in RS  In addition to being an important employer, Zarubezhneft is RS's biggest taxpayer; its value-added tax and excise duty contributions reportedly account for 25% of RS budget revenue  Bosnia depends upon Russian natural gas imports via Ukraine  Energy policy is vested in the entities, and Russian natural gas provider Gazprom reportedly has used its market dominance to pit the two entities against one another and undermine projects that would diversify supplies  Many analysts believe that Turkey's influence in Bosnia has increased over the last two decades due to Ankara's close relationship with Bosniak leaders  Some Turkish officials reportedly view Bosnia as a natural sphere of influence given geographic and historical connections  Observers note that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has at times invoked Ottoman-era ties to Bosnia and religious kinship with Bosniaks as soft power tools  Turkish influence in Bosnia has expanded since Yugoslavia's collapse  During the 1992-1995 war, Turkey gained prestige among Bosniaks by condemning the international arms embargo against Bosnia, arguing that it prevented Bosniaks from defending themselves  Turkey, as well as other predominantly Muslim countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, reportedly supplied Bosniak forces with arms  Turkish influence has continued since the war's end  Bosnia is one of the top recipients of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency assistance; much of this support is earmarked for projects to restore Ottoman-era buildings and monuments  A Turkish Cultural Center was established in Bosnia in 2003, and in 2009 the Yunus Emre Foundation, an NGO founded by the Turkish government, opened an office in Sarajevo to promote Turkish language and culture  Turkey has popular support among Bosniaks  In a 2018 International Republican Institute survey, 76% of Bosniak respondents had positive views of Turkey—the strongest support among Bosniaks for any foreign state  Many Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs look to Croatia and Serbia as external protectors, and some analysts believe that Turkey has attempted to establish a similar role for itself vis-à-vis Bosniaks  Observers contend that Erdogan's ruling party has particularly strong ties to the largest Bosniak ethnic party, the SDA  Erdogan and Turkish state-owned media openly supported SDA candidate Bakir Izetbegović in his bid for the Bosniak seat on the presidency in 2014  Some observers believe that Izetbegović's clout within the SDA rests in part on his support from Erdogan  Economic relations between Bosnia and Turkey have deepened in recent years  Turkish FDI in Bosnia accounted for 5 6% of FDI flows in 2016  One notable project is a highway to connect Sarajevo to Belgrade, Serbia  After years of disagreement, Bosnian officials approved the route in February 2019  Turkey is expected to provide funding for some of the expected €3 billion in costs, although the terms of the contract are not yet resolved  Some officials, including French President Emmanuel Macron, have expressed concern over Turkey's alleged ambitions as part of broader EU concern over external influence in the Balkans  However, analysts caution that Turkey's ambitions and capabilities in the Balkans may be overstated  They note that the scope of Turkish investment is sometimes exaggerated in the media, and that proposed projects do not always come to fruition  While Russian and Turkish influence in Bosnia relies in part on soft power, China's presence in Bosnia is primarily economic  Between 2011 and 2019, Chinese investments in Bosnia amounted to an estimated $3 6 billion, primarily in the form of direct lending for energy and transportation projects  Chinese firms have contracts to construct or expand energy plants, including a €350 million loan to construct a coal-fired plant in Stanari, RS  A €1 4 billion deal was signed to construct a highway between Banja Luka and Mlinište  In March 2019, the EU Energy Community criticized the FBiH entity government's decision to guarantee a €600 million loan from China's Exim Bank to build a coal-fired power plant in Tuzla  However, some analysts caution that China's economic influence in Bosnia may be overstated at present  While China's pledged investments in high-visibility projects garner media attention, the actual amount of Chinese FDI is far less than that of the EU  Moreover, many pledged projects do not come to fruition  Nevertheless, EU and U S  officials have voiced concern over the scope of China's investments in the Balkans, as well as Chinese lending practices  Chinese loans often require recipient state governments to assume the loan burden, potentially leading to high external debt  The EU has also raised concerns that Chinese lending practices violate EU rules in public procurement because they frequently require use of Chinese contractors, laborers, or supplies  In contrast to EU funds, which are partly designed to spur reform, Chinese loans have few conditions and rules linked to transparency or reform  Finally, EU officials have expressed concern that China's economic might could be a source of leverage over recipient states that are candidates or potential candidates for EU membership and thus impede the EU's ability to speak with one voice on relations with China if they do become members  Bosnia was not a core transit country in the "Balkan Route" that hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees followed in an attempt to reach the EU during heightened flows in 2015 and early 2016  However, recent route shifts have brought more migrant and refugee traffic through Bosnia  Since early 2018, an estimated 23,000 migrants and refugees have entered Bosnia; approximately 25% of them remain in the country  Most of them hope to enter EU territory via Bosnia's neighbor, Croatia, and from there move on and enter the EU's visa- and passport-free Schengen Area  However, the Croatian government has expanded border policing, and apprehended individuals are sent back to Bosnia  The EU provided €2 million in 2018 to help Bosnia respond to the crisis and provide shelter to migrants and refugees who are effectively stranded in Bosnia  The migration crisis has triggered a backlash from some Bosnians, particularly in Una-Sana Canton, which borders Croatia and has the highest concentration of migrants and refugees  Some residents of Bihać, Una-Sana's administrative center, protested against camps situated in their municipality in October 2018, while local authorities in Velika Kladuša, another city in the canton, reportedly obstructed the Ministry of Security's plans to house migrants in a local building  The incident illustrates local backlash as well as the state-level government's difficulty enforcing its decisions, even when it has jurisdiction  Islam was introduced to part of Bosnia's population during Ottoman rule  In socialist Yugoslavia, the semi-official Islamic Religious Community played a key role in religious affairs, including legal rulings and religious education  It was renamed the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, and remains an important religious institution  Islamic tradition in the Balkans, including Bosnia, is generally moderate and secular  The majority of Bosnia's practicing Muslims follow the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam  However, some analysts have expressed concern over the emergence of groups influenced or funded by state and non-state entities in the Arab Gulf states, where more conservative Hanbali Sunni practices are common  Aid workers, missionaries, and "mujahedeen" fighters from the Gulf States promoted transnational Islamist militancy and Salafist Hanbali religious doctrine during Bosnia's 1992-1995 war; Iran's government also supported Bosniak leaders and forces  After the war, Saudi Arabia provided an estimated $600 million in aid to repair and build hundreds of mosques and establish schools and cultural centers that promote socially conservative Sunni views  Iran has also maintained active cultural outreach and other ties to some Bosnian Muslims  Many analysts contend that Salafi groups have limited support in Bosnia because of the traditionally high level of secularism among Bosnian Muslims  They also note that few Bosnian Muslims who subscribe to Salafist ideas and practices have violent intentions, and many of them live in remote rural communities  While most of these groups were not originally affiliated with official religious organizations in Bosnia, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia's Islamic Community exerted pressure on them to acknowledge his authority and his right to monitor religious content  As a result, an estimated 90% of Salafi groups were brought under official structures  Nevertheless, some experts caution that radicalized groups and individuals may pose a terrorist threat despite their small numbers  Radicalized Muslims were implicated in the bombing of a police station in Bugojno in 2010 and a lone-gunman attack on the U S  Embassy in Sarajevo in 2011  The Islamic State (IS) and Nusra Front's gains in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s altered the dynamic of the terrorism threat in Bosnia and broadened the use of social media in recruitment  Between 2012 and 2017, an estimated 350 Bosnian citizens traveled from Bosnia or Bosnian diaspora communities to fight with armed groups in Iraq and Syria  More recently, returned foreign fighters are seen as a potential threat as the position of the IS and other armed groups has weakened  Bosnia's stock of illegal weapons, mines, and explosives may exacerbate the risk posed by returnees  As of December 2017, officials believed that just over 100 Bosnians remained in Syria (including women and children), roughly 50 had returned to Bosnia, and 70 had been killed in the conflict  In 2014, the Bosnian government introduced new criminal offenses to prosecute foreign terrorist fighters and recruiters  Several dozen returned fighters and domestic recruiters have been convicted of these offenses  While the U S  State Department describes Bosnia as a "cooperative counterterrorism partner," it warns that Bosnia's political fragmentation and dysfunction could undermine counterterrorism efforts  For example, in 2017 several ministries proposed new measures to tighten counterterrorism efforts; however, they were not enacted due to political gridlock in state-level and FBiH governments  Initially viewed as a "European problem," the Bosnian conflict eventually helped shape the post-Cold War role of the United States and NATO in European security  When the United States assumed greater responsibilities in resolving the conflict, its role was considerable: leading NATO airstrikes, garnering diplomatic support from Russia and European allies, persuading warring parties to agree to a ceasefire, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement, and deploying 20,000 troops to Bosnia  According to Richard Holbrooke, the U S  official who brokered the talks, the Bosnian war was a pivotal period in U S  foreign policy in Europe: "The three main pillars of [policy]—U S -Russian relations, NATO enlargement into Central Europe, and Bosnia—had often worked against each other  Now they reinforced each other: NATO sent its forces out of area for the first time in its history, and Russian troops, under an American commander, were deployed alongside them " Some analysts and policymakers believe that the United States' strong hand in resolving the conflict and in shaping Bosnia's political system have made it a stakeholder in Bosnia's future  U S  officials, often in cooperation with the EU, have intervened to defuse crises and broker reform talks  The United States also has imposed sanctions against Bosnian officials: in addition to Dodik (see above), the U S  State Department publicly designated Bosnian Serb politician Nikola Špirić (Dodik's associate) for "significant corruption or gross violation of human rights " U S  policymakers attach strategic importance to Bosnia's stability; many analysts believe turbulence in Bosnia could reverberate in the Balkans and potentially draw in Croatia and Serbia, while instability in other parts of the region could spill over into Bosnia  When the Trump Administration indicated in 2018 that it would consider supporting a potential Serbia-Kosovo agreement to "adjust borders" between the two—a major break with the long-standing EU and U S  policy to oppose redrawing borders in the Balkans along ethnic lines—some analysts expressed concern that the Administration could reshape long-standing U S  policy toward Bosnia  However, the new U S  Ambassador to Bosnia stated in February 2019 that the U S  will continue to be "guarantor of Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty and territorial integrity " On the other hand, many observers also note that U S  engagement in Bosnia (and the Western Balkans) decreased under the administrations of President George W  Bush and President Barack Obama  During this time U S  policymakers turned their focus to geopolitical crises and challenges in other parts of the globe while ceding the regional lead to the EU  Indeed, some analysts have urged the United States to assume a greater role in Bosnia, arguing that Bosnia's current crises warrant it, and that the EU and the United States are more effective in the region when they work together  Congressional interest in Bosnia dates back to the 1992-1995 war  Many Members featured prominently in foreign policy debates over U S  intervention in the conflict  In 2015, the House passed a resolution describing the Srebrenica massacres as a genocide and urging the United States to continue to support Bosnia's territorial integrity ( H Res  310 , 114 th Congress)  In the 114 th and 115 th Congresses, a bill was introduced in the Senate to establish an enterprise fund to promote economic development and the private sector in Bosnia ( S  2307 and S  864 )  In April 2018, the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats held a hearing on Bosnia's prospects ahead of its October 2018 elections  Congress's engagement with Bosnia also continues within the broader context of policy concern over the external influence of China, Turkey, and Russia in the Western Balkans and energy security  As a potential candidate for EU membership and NATO partner, Bosnia is eligible for assistance through the Countering Russian Influence Funds under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) enacted in 2017 ( P L  115-44 )  Through congressionally approved (and sometimes expanded) foreign assistance appropriations, Bosnia has received more than $2 billion in aid since 1995  Between 1996 and 1999, the United States pledged $1 billion of the $4 billion international commitment to implementing Dayton's civilian provisions and helping to rebuild Bosnia  The cost of U S  military operations in Bosnia since 1992 is estimated at more than $10 billion ( Appendix I )  Bosnia continues to receive U S  foreign assistance, although the amount has decreased in recent years  Assistance to Bosnia in FY2015 and FY2016 was approximately $33 million each year  In FY2017, it was $53 5 million, and $41 5 million in FY2018  The Administration requested $21 million for FY2019 and $16 9 million for FY2020  Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia faces many challenges  In considering U S  relations with Bosnia, Members of Congress may consider the following questions: How can the United States encourage Bosnia's government to incorporate the legal rulings of the Bosnian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights into election legislation and the constitution? How can U S  foreign assistance be used to counter Russian influence in Republika Srpska, in particular Russia's close ties to Bosnian Serb politicians and its use of local media and Sputnik to amplify anti-U S  narratives and project pro-Russia soft power? What are the implications of potential militarization in Republika Srpska? How can the United States effectively address this alleged trend? How can the United States support a successful reform initiative that secures transparency and accountability, and facilitates a political community in which politicians and voters are committed to the Bosnian state and socioeconomic challenges that transcend all three ethnic groups? Can the Germany-U K  initiative from 2015 be revived, or is it better to start from scratch? Are the approximately 600 troops in the European Union Force mission in Bosnia sufficient to stabilize Bosnia if violence breaks out? If Serbia and Kosovo agree to normalize relations by redrawing their borders, how can U S  policymakers prevent this development from destabilizing Bosnia, particularly given Milorad Dodik's threats to seek RS secession if Kosovo is "partitioned"? How can the United States encourage Croatia and Serbia to engage in Bosnia in a manner that helps bridge ethnic divisions and contributes to Bosnia's territorial integrity and sovereignty? Given the pervasiveness of corruption in Bosnia, how can U S  assistance most effectively be used to counter it? Does foreign assistance contribute to civic groups and independent media that could serve as a check against corruption? 

ground_truth: The Colorado River Basin covers more than 246,000 square miles in seven U.S. states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California) and Mexico. Pursuant to federal law, the Bureau of Reclamation (part of the Department of the Interior) manages much of the basin's water supplies. Colorado River water is used primarily for agricultural irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) uses, but it also is important for power production, fish and wildlife, and recreational uses. In recent years, consumptive uses of Colorado River water have exceeded natural flows. This causes an imbalance in the basin's available supplies and competing demands. A drought in the basin dating to 2000 has raised the prospect of water delivery curtailments and decreased hydropower production, among other things. In the future, observers expect that increasing demand for supplies, coupled with the effects of climate change, will further increase the strain on the basin's limited water supplies. River Management The Law of the River is the commonly used shorthand for the multiple laws, court decisions, and other documents governing Colorado River operations. The foundational document of the Law of the River is the Colorado River Compact of 1922. Pursuant to the compact, the basin states established a framework to apportion the water supplies between the Upper and Lower Basins of the Colorado River, with the dividing line between the two basins at Lee Ferry, AZ (near the Utah border). The Upper and Lower Basins each were allocated 7.5 million acre-feet (MAF) annually under the Colorado River Compact; an additional 1.5 MAF in annual flows was made available to Mexico under a 1944 treaty. Future agreements and court decisions addressed numerous other issues (including intrastate allocations of flows), and subsequent federal legislation provided authority and funding for federal facilities that allowed users to develop their allocations. A Supreme Court ruling also confirmed that Congress designated the Secretary of the Interior as the water master for the Lower Basin, a role in which the federal government manages the delivery of all water below Hoover Dam. Reclamation and basin stakeholders closely track the status of two large reservoirs—Lake Powell in the Upper Basin and Lake Mead in the Lower Basin—as an indicator of basin storage conditions. Under recent guidelines, dam releases from these facilities are tied to specific water storage levels. For Lake Mead, the first tier of "shortage," under which Arizona's and Nevada's allocations would be decreased, would be triggered if Lake Mead's January 1 elevation is expected to fall below 1,075 feet above mean sea level. As of early 2019, Reclamation projected that there was a 69% chance of a shortage condition at Lake Mead in 2020; there was also a lesser chance of Lake Powell reaching critically low levels. Improved hydrology in early 2019 may decrease the chances of shortage in the immediate future. Drought Contingency Plans Despite previous efforts to alleviate future shortages, the basin's hydrological outlook has generally worsened in recent years. After several years of negotiations, in early 2019 Reclamation and the basin states transmitted to Congress additional plans to alleviate stress on basin water supplies. These plans, known as the drought contingency plans (DCPs) for the Upper and Lower Basins, were authorized by Congress in April 2019 in the Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan Authorization Act (P.L. 116-14). The DCPs among other things obligate Lower Basin states to additional water supply cutbacks at specified storage levels (i.e., cutbacks beyond previous curtailment plans), commit Reclamation to additional water conservation efforts, and coordinate Upper Basin operations to protect Lake Powell storage levels and hydropower generation. Congressional Role Congress plays a multifaceted role in federal management of the Colorado River basin. Congress funds and oversees management of basin facilities, including operations and programs to protect and restore endangered species. It has also enacted and continues to consider Indian water rights settlements involving Colorado River waters and development of new water storage facilities in the basin. In addition, Congress has approved funding to mitigate water shortages and conserve basin water supplies and has enacted new authorities to combat drought and its effects on basin water users (i.e., the DCPs and other related efforts).

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Section 420 of the Robert T  Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( P L  93-288 , hereinafter the Stafford Act) authorizes the President to "declare" a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG)  The current FMAG system was established by regulation in October of 2001  These grants provide federal assistance for fire suppression activities  This authority has been delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Regional Administrators  Once issued, the FMAG declaration authorizes various forms of federal assistance such as the provision of equipment, personnel, and grants to state, local, and tribal governments for the control, management, and mitigation of any fire on certain public or private forest land or grassland that might become a major disaster  This federal assistance requires a cost-sharing component such that state, local, and tribal governments are responsible for 25% of the expenses  This report discusses the most frequently asked questions received by the Congressional Research Service on FMAGs  It addresses questions regarding how FMAGs are requested, how requests are evaluated using thresholds, and the types of assistance provided under an FMAG declaration  FMAGs can be requested by a state when the governor determines that a fire is burning out of control and threatens to become a major disaster  At that point, a request for assistance can be submitted to FEMA  Typically, requests are submitted to the FEMA Regional Administrator  Requests can be submitted any time—day or night—and can be submitted by telephone to expedite the process  Telephone requests must be followed by written confirmation within 14 days of the phone request  Under the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA, Division B of P L  113-2 ), tribes are equivalent to states in their ability to request a major disaster declaration, an emergency declaration, or a request for an FMAG declaration  Note that some tribal land holdings are administered by the federal government and, therefore, receive fire suppression support through the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC)  The NIFC supports interagency "wildland" firefighting efforts on federal lands by the U S  Forest Service, National Weather Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), U S  Fish and Wildlife Service and FEMA's U S  Fire Administration  Unlike FMAGs, such support generally does not require tribes to reimburse firefighting costs (FMAGs require the state to pay a 25% cost-share)  In addition, tribes with their own fire suppression resources may receive reimbursement from BIA for their costs related to fire suppression on tribal lands  The FMAG request should include cost estimates to support the request as well as information about the fire including the size of the fire(s) in acres or square miles, the population of the community (or communities) threatened, the number of persons evacuated (if applicable), weather conditions, and the degree to which state and local resources are committed to this fire and other fires in federal, state, and/or local jurisdictions  The verbal request must be followed up with a completed "Request for Fire Management Assistance Declaration" (FEMA form 078-0-1) and the "Principal Advisor's Report" (FEMA form 078-0-2)  The following criteria are used to evaluate wildfires and make a determination whether to issue an FMAG: the threat to lives and property including critical facilities, infrastructures, and watershed areas; the availability of state and local fire resources; high fire danger conditions based on nationally accepted indices such as the National Fire Danger Ratings System; and the potential economic impacts of the fire  In addition, FEMA has developed fire cost thresholds that are typically updated on an annual basis  There are two types of fire cost thresholds used to help determine if a state or tribal nation is eligible for fire assistance: (1) individual thresholds for a single fire, and (2) cumulative thresholds for multiple fires  Cumulative thresholds are applied to multiple fires burning simultaneously, or the accumulation of multiple fires in a single fire season  Threshold amounts vary by state (see Table 1 )  Taking Pennsylvania as an example, generally, a single fire would need to meet or exceed $927,274 in damages for Pennsylvania to be eligible for an FMAG declaration  In contrast, the formula for the cumulative fire threshold for a given state is one of two amounts—$500,000 or the amount of that state's individual fire threshold multiplied by three, whichever is greater  Returning to the Pennsylvania example, the sum of three individual fire thresholds equals $2,781,822  Since that amount is larger than $500,000, cumulative fire damages in Pennsylvania must meet or exceed $2,781,822 to be eligible for assistance  In contrast, the individual fire threshold for Alaska is $100,000, but the cumulative threshold is $500,000, not the sum of three individual fire thresholds ($300,000)  If FEMA denies the request for assistance, the state has one opportunity to appeal the denial  The appeal must be submitted in writing to the Regional Administrator no later than 30 days from the date of the denial letter  The appeal should contain any additional information that strengthens the original request for assistance  The Regional Administrator will review the appeal, prepare a recommendation, and forward the appeal package to the FEMA Headquarters Office  The FEMA Headquarters Office will notify the state of its determination in writing within 90 days of receipt of the appeal (or receipt of additional requested information)  The state may request a time extension to submit the appeal  The request for an extension must be submitted in writing to the Regional Administrator no later than 30 days from the date of the denial letter  The request for an extension must include a justification for the need for an extension  The FEMA Headquarters Office will notify the state in writing whether the extension request is granted or denied  No, an emergency or major disaster can be declared after an FMAG declaration has been issued  However, the emergency or major disaster declaration must be initiated by a separate request for assistance by the state or tribal government


Report 2:  FMAGs are funded through FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), the main account FEMA uses to provide disaster assistance  The DRF is a no-year account—unused funds from the previous fiscal year are carried over to the next fiscal year  Funds in the DRF fall into two categories  The first category is for disaster relief costs associated with major disasters under the Stafford Act  This category reflects the impact of the Budget Control Act ( P L  112-25 , BCA), which allows appropriations to cover the costs incurred as a result of major disasters to be paid through an "allowable adjustment" to the discretionary spending limits  The second category is colloquially known as "base funding " Base funding includes activities not tied to major disasters under the Stafford Act  Base funding is scored as discretionary spending that counts against the discretionary spending limits, whereas FMAGs are funded through the DRF's base funding category  The decision to issue a FMAG declaration is not contingent on the DRF balance  Similarly, FMAGs do not reduce the amount of funding available for major disasters  When the DRF balance was low in the past, FEMA used its "immediate needs funding" (INF) policy until supplemental appropriations were passed to replenish the DRF  Under INF, long-term projects (such as mitigation work) are put on hold and only activities deemed urgent are funded  FMAGs would most likely fall into the category of events with an "urgent" need  Under the INF policy, FEMA also delays interagency reimbursements, and recovers funds from previous years in order to stretch its available funds  As with many other Stafford Act disaster assistance grant programs (Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation Grant assistance, Other Needs Assistance) the cost-share for FMAGs is based on a federal share of 75% of eligible expenses  The grantee (the state) and subgrantees (local communities) assume the remaining 25% of eligible costs  Under the FMAG process, FEMA reimburses grantees for eligible activities they have undertaken  The state application for specific grant funds must be submitted within 90 days after the FMAG is granted  That time frame permits the state to gather all information and supporting data on potentially eligible spending to include in their grant application package  The package must also stipulate that the fire cost threshold was met  Following submission of the grant application FEMA has 45 days to approve or deny the application  FMAG assistance is similar in some basic respects to other FEMA assistance  For example, FMAGs will not replicate or displace the work of other federal agencies, nor will FEMA pay straight-time salaries for public safety forces, though it will reimburse overtime expenses for the event  Other eligible expenses can include costs for equipment and supplies (less insurance proceeds); mobilization and demobilization; emergency work (evacuations and sheltering, police barricading and traffic control, arson investigation); prepositioning federal, out-of-state, and international resources for up to 21 days when approved by the FEMA Regional Administrator; personal comfort and safety items for firefighter health and safety; field camps and meals in lieu of per diem; and/or the mitigation, management, and control of declared fires burning on comingled federal land, when such costs are not reimbursable by another federal agency  Until recently, only major disaster declarations made statewide hazard mitigation grants available  Division D of P L  115-254 (Disaster Recovery Reform Act, hereinafter DRRA) amended the Stafford Act to make hazard mitigation available for FMAG declarations as well  Under Section 404 of the Stafford Act as amended by DRRA, mitigation grants from the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) are provided to states and tribes on a sliding scale based on the percentage of funds spent for FMAG assistance  For states and federally recognized tribes with a FEMA-approved Standard State or Tribal Mitigation Plan, the formula provides for up to 15% of the first $2 billion of estimated aggregate amounts of disaster assistance, up to 10% for amounts between $2 billion and $10 billion, and 7 5% for amounts between $10 billion and $35 333 billion  FEMA assistance through FMAGs is a direct relationship with the states to assist the state in fighting the fire on state lands  FMAGs are employed so a disaster declaration may not be necessary  The Forest Service and other federal agencies do provide other types of assistance related to wildfire management, such as postfire recovery assistance, or assistance planning and mitigating the potential risk from future wildfires  Most of these programs provide financial and technical assistance to state partners  In addition, other USDA agencies administer various other programs to provide disaster recovery assistance to nonfederal forest landowners, including the Emergency Forest Restoration Program and the Emergency Watershed Program  This depends on the type of assistance being provided by the Forest Service  FMAG assistance is not generally available in conjunction with emergency suppression assistance from the Forest Service, or any other federal agency engaged in suppression operations  FMAGs provide assistance for suppression operations on nonfederal lands, whereas suppression operations on federal lands are the responsibility of the federal agency with jurisdiction  Limited exceptions may occur for declared fires on lands in which the ownership is comingled federal and nonfederal, and the costs incurred by the eligible entity are not entitled to any other type of federal reimbursement  However, FMAGs may be provided in conjunction with other Forest Service assistance programs, such as any technical and financial assistance provided through the agency's state and volunteer fire assistance programs or state and private forestry office  FMAG and other federal assistance may potentially occur in conjunction when there is a cooperative agreement between federal, state, and other governmental or tribal partners to coordinate emergency wildfire protection and response activities  The cooperative agreement often delineates different geographic areas where the state government is responsible for initial suppression operations, regardless of land ownership, and vice versa, where the federal government may be responsible for providing suppression operations in lands under nonfederal ownership  The cooperative agreements (sometimes referred to as "fire compacts") specify how costs are to be apportioned among the partners, including provisions allowing for reimbursement, in accordance with applicable federal and state statutes  In the circumstance where a state (or other eligible entity) conducted suppression operations on federal land and the costs were not reimbursable, an FMAG may potentially be applied for and used to cover eligible costs  No, most fires that begin on federal land are the responsibility of the federal agency that owns or manages the land, and are not eligible to receive FMAG assistance  There are some exceptions, however  For example, FMAGs may be available to assist with declared fires that occur in areas with a mix of federal and nonfederal land, if the state has a responsibility for suppression activities under a cooperative agreement with the applicable federal agency, and those costs are not reimbursable under another federal statute 

ground_truth: Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, "Bosnia") drew heavily on U.S. support after gaining independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. The United States helped end the Bosnian war (1992-1995), one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since the Second World War, by leading NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, and deploying 20,000 U.S. troops. Some Members of Congress became involved in policy debates over these measures, and Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative proposals. Since 1995, the United States has been a major source of aid to Bosnia and firmly supports its territorial integrity. The United States also supports Bosnia's aspirations for NATO and European Union (EU) membership. Today, Bosnia faces serious challenges. Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia continues to use part of the Agreement as its constitution, which divides the country into two ethnoterritorial entities. Critics charge that Bosnia's political system is too decentralized to enact the reforms required for NATO and EU membership. They also contend that the ethnic power-sharing arrangements and veto points embedded in numerous government bodies are sources of gridlock. Domestic and international courts have ruled against several aspects of Bosnia's constitution, yet the Bosnian government thus far has failed to implement these rulings. Since Bosnia's independence, its politics has been dominated by ethnic parties representing the country's three main groups: Bosniaks (Slavic Muslims), Croats, and Serbs. These parties have prospered under a system that critics charge lacks transparency and accountability. Critics also maintain that ethnic party leaders use divisive nationalist rhetoric to distract from serious issues affecting the country as a whole, including poverty, unemployment, and stalled political reforms. The Bosnian population exhibits low trust in political parties and the government, and disaffection toward the country's elite. U.S. and EU officials brokered several ultimately unsuccessful rounds of constitutional reform negotiations, and continue to call on Bosnia's leaders to implement reforms to make governance more efficient and effective, dismantle patronage networks, and bring Bosnia closer to EU and NATO membership. However, there is little consensus among the country's leaders on how the country should be reformed. Bosnian Serb leaders from the Serb-majority entity (Republika Srpska) have called for greater autonomy and even secession from Bosnia. Some Bosnian Croat leaders have called for partitioning Bosnia's other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to create a separate Croat-majority entity. Bosniak leaders, by contrast, generally prefer a more centralized state. Many analysts caution that any move to partition the country could lead to renewed violence, while greater decentralization could make Bosnia's government less functional. U.S. policy has long been oriented toward preserving Bosnia's statehood. Bosnia's 2018 general elections largely returned to power the same entrenched ethnic parties. Of particular concern is the election of Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik to Bosnia's collective presidency. Dodik, a sharp critic of the United States and NATO, has periodically called for a referendum on Republika Srpska's secession. He is under U.S. sanctions for obstructing the Dayton Agreement. In addition to these internal challenges, U.S. and EU officials have expressed concern over external influence in the region. Russia reportedly relies on soft power, energy leverage, and "spoiler" tactics to influence Bosnia, particularly in the Serb-majority entity. Turkish soft power draws on Bosnia's Ottoman-era heritage and Turkey's shared religious tradition with Bosniaks. China is a more recent presence in the region, but its heavy investments and lending have prompted concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Policymakers have also expressed concern at the challenges posed by the return of Bosnians who fought with the Islamic State and Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq. Many observers contend that the United States remains a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of its central role in resolving the conflict and shaping the postwar Bosnian state. Given the history of U.S. involvement in Bosnia, Bosnia's importance to regional stability in the Balkans, and concerns over Russian and Chinese influence in Bosnia, Members of Congress may be interested in monitoring how the country navigates its internal and external challenges. Congress may also consider future U.S. aid levels to Bosnia and the degree to which such assistance supports the long-standing U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia of territorial integrity, NATO and EU integration, energy security, and resilience against malign influence.