prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: Since its founding in 2006, the National Popular Vote (NPV) initiative has promoted an agreement among the states, an interstate compact that would effectively establish direct popular election of the President and Vice President without a constitutional amendment, while retaining the structure of the electoral college system  The United States is unique among "presidential" republics by providing an indirect election to choose its chief executive  The President and Vice President of the United States are selected not by registered voters, but by the electoral college, electors appointed in the states "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct     " Alexander Hamilton, who was "present at the creation" of the Constitution in 1787, commented favorably on the electoral college system in The Federalist : The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents     I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent  It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages the union of which was to be wished for  Notwithstanding Hamilton's endorsement, the first proposal to change the electoral college system by constitutional amendment was introduced as early as 1800, and since that time more than 700 proposals to reform or eliminate the college have been introduced in Congress  Reform advocates have long focused on the fact that it does not provide for direct democratic election, that less-populous states are afforded an arithmetical advantage due to the assignment of two electors to each state, regardless of population, and that the winner-take-all system makes it possible for candidates to win an electoral college majority and the presidency, while gaining fewer votes than their principal opponents in the popular election  Between 1949 and 1979, Congress considered amendments to reform the electoral college, or replace it with direct popular election, in committee and on the floor of both chambers  Proposed amendments must, however, meet the requirements of the Constitution's Article V, which calls for two-thirds approval by both houses of Congress, and ratification by three-fourths of the states; to date, no electoral college reform proposal has met these requirements  Proponents of the National Popular Vote initiative contend that their plan will achieve direct popular election while circumventing the requirements of Article V, and will guarantee that the popular vote winners will always be elected President and Vice President  The fundamentals of the electoral college system were established by Article II, Section 1 of the U S  Constitution, and subsequently revised by the Twelfth Amendment  The Constitution's minimal provisions have been complemented over the past two centuries by a range of federal and state laws, political party procedures, and enduring political traditions, leading to the system as it exists today  The salient features of the contemporary system are detailed below  The electors are collectively known as the electoral college; although this phrase does not appear in the Constitution, it gained currency in the early days of the republic, and was recognized in federal law in 1845  The electoral college has no continuing existence; its sole purpose is to elect the President and Vice President  Each state is allocated a number of electors equal to the combined total of its U S  Senate and House of Representatives delegations  The District of Columbia is also allocated three electors  At present, the total is 538, reflecting the combined size of the Senate (100 Members), the House (435 Members), and the District of Columbia electors  Any person may serve as an elector, except Senators and Representatives, or any other person holding an office of "trust or profit" under the United States  Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution empowers the states to "appoint [electors], in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct     " This grant of authority provides the constitutional basis claimed for the NPV initiative  In practice, all states currently provide for popular election of their electoral college delegations  Candidates for the office of elector are nominated by political parties and other groups on the presidential ballot in each state  In most cases, the candidates for the office of elector are nominated by the state party committee or the party's statewide convention  The winning presidential nominees must gain a national majority of 270 or more electoral votes, out of the 538 total, in order to be elected  If no ticket of candidates attains a majority, then the House of Representatives elects the President, and the Senate the Vice President, in a procedure known as contingent election  Candidates for the office of elector are selected by their respective political parties  They are expected to vote for the presidential and vice presidential candidates to whom they are pledged  Some states seek to require them to so vote by law or other means, but most constitutional scholars hold that the electors remain free agents under the Constitution, and that they may vote for any person they choose  On rare occasions, an elector will vote for a different candidate, or abstain from casting a vote for any candidate; he or she is known as a "faithless elector " The goal of presidential campaigns under the existing system is to win by carrying states that collectively cast a majority of electoral votes  Political parties and presidential campaigns tend to focus on states that are closely contested (widely referred to as "battleground" states), or that have large delegations of electoral votes, or both  Winning a majority of the more populous and/or battleground states is considered crucial to obtaining the necessary electoral vote majority  In 48 states and the District of Columbia, the presidential/vice presidential ticket winning the most popular votes (a plurality or more) in that state is awarded all its electoral votes  That is to say, the winning party's entire ticket of electors is elected  This is referred to as the "winner-take-all" or "general ticket" system  Presidential Election Day is set by law for Tuesday after the first Monday in November every fourth year succeeding the election of President and Vice President  On Presidential Election Day, voters cast one vote for the candidates they support  They are, however, actually voting for the state political party "ticket" of electors supporting those presidential and vice presidential candidates  Presidential electors assemble on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December following the general election  They meet in their respective states, not collectively, and cast separate votes by ballot for the President and Vice President  After the electors vote, the results are sent by the states to Congress and various other federal authorities  On January 6 of the year following a presidential election, Congress meets in a joint session to count the electoral votes and make a formal declaration of which candidates have been elected President and Vice President  A range of factors contributed to the emergence of the National Popular Vote initiative in the first decade of the 21 st century  A major source was frustration by reform advocates after three decades of failed attempts to secure congressional approval for a direct popular election amendment  A more immediate spur was the contentious and disputed presidential election of 2000, which is regarded as having been a major factor contributing to the development of the NPV proposal  One of the factors cited for the emergence of the NPV initiative has been the exacting requirements set by the Constitution for amendments, in this case, a direct popular election constitutional amendment  As noted previously, approval by two-thirds of Members present and voting is required in both houses when Congress proposes an amendment, followed by ratification by three-fourths of the states, 38 at present, usually within a seven-year period specified by Congress  Between 1948 and 1979, Congress debated electoral college reform at length; throughout this time, hundreds of reform proposals were introduced in both chambers  They generally centered on one of two courses: "end it" by eliminating the entire electoral college system and establishing direct popular election, or "mend it" by reforming its more controversial provisions  Between 1948 and 1979, proposed amendments were the subject of hearings in the Senate and House Judiciary Committees on 17 different occasions, while electoral college reform was debated in the Senate on five occasions and twice in the House during this period  Proposals were approved by the necessary two-thirds majority twice in the Senate and once in the House, but never in the same Congress  Following the 1979 defeat of a direct popular election amendment on the Senate floor, and the retirement or defeat of prominent congressional advocates, the question of electoral college reform largely disappeared from public attention and Congress's legislative agenda  Although Senators and Representatives continued to introduce reform proposals, few received action beyond routine committee referral, and in time, the number of measures introduced dropped to zero  Even after the presidential elections of 2000 and 2016, in which the winner of the electoral vote won fewer popular votes than his opponent (a so-called "misfire") , there was little evidence that Congress was prepared to consider an electoral college reform amendment  Proposals to replace the electoral college system with direct popular election continued to be introduced, but in dwindling numbers as the years passed  No proposal for direct popular election was introduced in the 113 th Congress  By comparison, 41 direct popular election or electoral college reform amendments were proposed in the 95 th Congress (1977-1978)  Following the 2016 election, however, four constitutional amendments introduced late in the 114 th Congress proposed eliminating the electoral college and replacing it with direct election  To date in the 116 th Congress, three amendments to establish direct popular election by constitutional amendment have been introduced, but no action beyond committee referral has been taken on them  Until recently, survey research findings showed public support for presidential election reform through direct popular election by sizable margins  As early as 1967, the Gallup Poll reported that 58% of respondents supported direct election, compared with 22% who favored retaining the electoral college  More recently, Gallup's 2013 survey recorded that 63% of respondents favored an amendment providing for direct election, while 29% favored retention of the electoral college  Following the 2016 election, however, overall support for direct election was measured at 49% in favor to 47% opposed  It is arguable that the change in public attitudes was influenced by the 2016 election results, in which the Republican nominees won the election with a majority of electoral votes, but fewer popular votes than their Democratic opponents  For instance, Gallup reported a shift to greater support for the electoral college system by respondents who identified themselves as "Republican" or "Lean Republican " Conversely, already high levels of support for direct popular election among respondents who identified themselves as "Democratic" or "Lean Democratic" rose still further in the post-2016 election Gallup Poll  To date, CRS has identified one survey that was specifically designed to measure public commitment to the NPV initiative  A March 27, 2019, Politico/Morning Consult poll posed relevant questions on the presidential election process and the NPV compact  The first question, which presented a general outline of the existing electoral college system and the generic alternative of direct popular election, reported that respondents preferred direct election by 50% to 34% for retaining the electoral college, and 16% reporting "Don't know/No opinion " The next question explained the proposed NPV compact and asked respondents' preference for NPV or the electoral college method  Although the level of support for NPV was lower than that measured for generic direct popular election, a plurality of respondents to this question favored the "National Popular Vote Interstate Compact" by a plurality of 43% in favor, to 33% opposed and 23% who reported "Don't know/No opinion " The disputed presidential election of 2000 was arguably a catalyst for new thinking on electoral college reform   Following a closely contested campaign, Republican candidates George W  Bush and Richard Cheney were elected over Democratic nominees Al Gore Jr  and Joseph Lieberman following a bitter dispute over election results in Florida tha t was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court   The high court's decision left Bush and Cheney with a narrow plurality in Florida of 537 popular votes and a similarly narrow electoral college majority of 30 states with 271 electoral votes, while their Democratic opponents took 20 states and the District of Columbia with 266 electoral votes (one District of Columbia elector cast a blank ballot in protest against the outcome)   It was the first election since 1888 in which the candidates elected uncontestably won fewer popular votes than their principal opponents : the Gore / Lieberman Democratic ticket gained 50,992,335 popular votes to 50,455,156 for Bush / Cheney  The se election results generated considerable discontent with the system  Some critics argued for a constitutional amendment, but the 107 th Congress faced a heavy legislative workload throughout this period, which initially included enactment of President George W  Bush's legislative program and was later expanded to urgent responses to the terrorist attacks of September 1 1, 2001   Rather than focus on the lengthy process associated with consideration of a constitutional amendment, Congress focused on legislati ve remedies  The Help America Vote Act of 2002, passed in response to the numerous irregularities in voting systems and procedures revealed by the 2000 election, mandated election administration reforms and v oting system technology enhancements (funded in part by federal grants to the states) intended to ensure accurate and timely voting and vote tabulation in future elections  In 2016, the presidential election was again won by nominees who gained a majority of electoral votes but fewer popular votes than their major party opponents  Although proposals to amend the Constitution to provide direct popular election were introduced in response to this occurrence late in the 114 th Congress , and again in the 115 th Congress, the 2016 results did not result in the degree of c ontroversy a nd activism that followed the electoral college "misfire " of 2000  T he following factor may have contributed to this situation : i n 2000, a shift in Florida's electoral votes from Bush/Cheney to Gore/Lieberman would have changed the election result; by comparison, in 2016, a shift in the state with the closest vote margin, Michigan , would not have altered the election  While the 2000 election's "misfire" did not result in consideration of a constitutional amendment, it did prompt considerable study and investigation into new approaches to electoral reform among scholars of the presidential election process and political activists  Law professors Robert W  Bennett of Northwestern University, Vikram Amar of the University of California-Davis, and Akhil Amar of Yale University School of Law are generally credited as the intellectual godparents of the concept that ultimately evolved into the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, which relies on the Constitution's broad grant of power to each state to "appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct [emphasis added], a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress " Project FairVote, an issue advocacy group self-described as a nonprofit, nonpartisan "501(c)(4)" organization, appears to have been an incubator of the NPV concept  FairVote has supported NPV for "over a decade," and was an early supporter of National Popular Vote Inc , the plan's official advocacy group; moreover, longtime FairVote board members Robert Richie and the late Representative John B  Anderson were early supporters of the National Popular Vote initiative and contributors to its manifesto, Every Vote Equal   As noted previously, the NPV initiative was the ultimate result of the various studies and proposals offered following the presidential election of 2000  The NPV initiative seeks to establish direct popular election of the President and Vice President through an interstate compact, rather than by constitutional amendment  Ideally, under the compact's provisions, legislatures of the 50 states and the District of Columbia would pass legislation binding the signatories to appoint presidential electors committed to the presidential/vice presidential ticket that gained the most votes nationwide   If all 50 states and the District of Columbia were compact members, this would deliver a unanimous electoral college decision for the candidates winning a plurality of the popular vote  Specifically, the plan calls for an agreement among the states, an interstate compact effected through state legislation, in which the legislature in each of the participating states agrees to appoint electors pledged to the candidates who won the nationwide popular vote   State election authorities would count and certify the popular vote in each state, which would be aggregated and certified as the "nationwide popular vote " The participating state legislatures would then choose the slate of electors pledged to the "nationwide popular vote winner," notwithstanding the results within their particular state s   To ensure success, the initiative would come into effect only if states whose total electoral votes equal or exceed the constitutional majority of 270 were to approve the plan  If the nationwide popular vote were effectively tied, the states would be released from their commitment under the compact, and could choose electors who represented the presidential ticket that gained the most votes in each particular state  One novel NPV provision would enable the presidential candidate who won the national popular vote to fill any vacancies in the electoral college with electors of his or her own choice  States would retain the right to withdraw from the compact, but if a state chose to withdraw within six months of the end of a presidential term, the withdrawal would not be effective until after the succeeding President and Vice President had been elected  The NPV advocacy effort is managed by National Popular Vote Inc , a "501(c)(4)" nonprofit corporation established in California in 2006 by Barry Fadem, an attorney specializing in initiative and referendum law, and John R  Koza, Ph D , an automated systems scientist and entrepreneur  As a 501(c)(4) entity, it is permitted to engage in political activity in furtherance of its goal, without forfeiting its tax-exempt status, so long as this is not its primary activity  NPV states on its website that its "specific purpose is to study, analyze and educate the public regarding its proposal to implement a nationwide popular election of the President of the United States " Dr  Koza serves as chairman of NPV Inc , and Mr  Fadem serves as president  NPV's advisory board includes former Senators and Representatives of both major political parties  In 2006, National Popular Vote Inc  published a detailed handbook, Every Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan for Electing the President by National Popular Vote   This publication, in its fourth edition at the time of this writing, provides a detailed account of various issues related to the NPV initiative, including the electoral college, earlier reform efforts, interstate compacts, the text of the proposed compact, a strategy for advancing the initiative, and a 340-page section addressing "myths about the National Popular Vote Compact " National Popular Vote Inc  maintains an office in Mountain View, CA  Supporters in various state legislatures began to introduce measures to adopt the interstate compact shortly after NPV's inaugural press conference on February 23, 2006  The NPV Compact has been introduced at various sessions in the legislatures of all 50 states and the Council of the District of Columbia, which performs the functions of a state legislature in the nation's capital, and has received some form of active consideration in 38 states and the D C  Council  Among other activities, NPV maintains a regular communications program of email newsletters announcing activities and soliciting readers to petition governors and state legislators to support the compact  At the time of this writing, NPV claims that 3,112 state legislators have either sponsored or cast a recorded vote in their respective legislatures for the compact  NPV also claims endorsements from legislators and endorsements by the New York Times , Los Angeles Times , Chicago Sun-Times , Minneapolis Star Tribune , Boston Globe , Miami Herald , and other newspapers  NPV also advocates use of the citizen initiative process where available to enact state adherence to the compact; it asserts that when Article II, Section 1, clause 2 grants authority to the states to appoint "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," the authority extends to the states' entire lawmaking process, which in some states includes the proposal and passage of legislation and constitutional amendments through citizen initiative  The citizen initiative approach to the interstate compact, however, has yet to be used at the time of this writing  At the time of this writing, in May 2019, the following 14 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the National Popular Vote Compact  Collectively, they are assigned a total of 189 electoral votes  The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact has been introduced since its inception in all 50 states and the District of Columbia  States that have adopted NPV at the time of this writing are listed in chronological order, by year of adoption, as follows: Hawaii (4 electoral votes), 2008; Illinois (20 electoral votes), 2008; Maryland (10 electoral votes), 2008; New Jersey (14 electoral votes), 2008; Washington (12 electoral votes), 2009; Massachusetts (11 electoral votes), 2010; District of Columbia (3 electoral votes), 2010; Vermont (3 electoral votes), 2011; California (55 electoral votes), 2011; Rhode Island (4 electoral votes), 2013; New York (29 electoral votes), 2014; Connecticut (7 electoral votes), 2018; Colorado (9 electoral votes), 2019; Delaware (3 electoral votes), 2019; and New Mexico (5 electoral votes), 2019  After initial momentum in 2008, when four states joined the compact in one year, NPV made slower progress toward its goal of approval by states accounting for 270 electoral votes  Highlights were California's approval in 2011, which added 55 electoral votes to the tally, and New York's accession to the compact in 2014  Beginning with Connecticut's approval in 2018, followed in 2019 by Colorado, Delaware, and New Mexico, 24 additional electoral votes were added to the NVP count, bringing the total to 189, 70% of the 270 votes needed for NPV to go into effect  By early May 2019, legislation to join the NPV had been introduced in the current session of at least one chamber of the legislature in 14 states that controlled a combined total of 150 electoral votes  As of April 17, the compact had been approved in Nevada by the Assembly (lower chamber of the legislature) and in Oregon by the Senate  Accession by these two states would raise the NPV member total to 202 electoral votes  Conversely, proposals to rescind approval of the NPV Interstate Compact have been introduced in the legislatures of Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Washington, to date; none has been approved  Some observers note that, despite NPV's assertion of bipartisan support, all the jurisdictions that have joined the compact to date could be identified as "leaning" Democratic or "solid" Democratic in their support of the Democratic Party, as classified by a recent Gallup survey  For instance, 11 of the 14, including California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Vermont, were found by Gallup to be among the "most solidly Democratic states in 2017 " Alluding to this fact, one commentator observed that [a]ll the states to have joined so far are very blue  Until some purple states and red states sign on, the compact has little in the way of territory to conquer     The seven states where President Obama won [in 2012] by the widest margins, along with D C , have joined  So have three others—New Jersey, Illinois and Washington—where Obama won by at least 15 percentage points  But none below that threshold have done so  The 2016 presidential election results in Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, and New Mexico, the most recent adherents to the NPV compact, arguably confirm this observation—the Democratic candidates won the popular vote in all four states, by margins of between 4 9% in Colorado to 13 7% in Connecticut  On the other hand, several states where the NPV remained under active consideration in 2019—Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, and South Carolina—were carried by the Republican presidential ticket in 2016  As the NPV campaign developed momentum in the states, particularly between 2008 and 2011, defenders of the existing arrangements and the electoral college announced measures to promote retention of the electoral college system  In October 2011, the Heritage Foundation, a conservative public policy institute, released a report opposing the NPV compact  That same month, Roll Call reported that the State Government Leadership Foundation, a project of the Republican State Leadership Committee, would begin a campaign to defend the electoral college and counter recent NPV gains  Further activity, however, does not appear to have been undertaken by these groups by the time of this writing  Arguments in support of and opposed to the National Popular Vote proposal resemble those advanced in favor of and against direct popular election of the President  The central issue turns on the question of the asserted simplicity and democratic attractiveness of the direct election idea as compared to a more complex array of factors cited by supporters of the electoral college system  Proponents of the NPV initiative arguably share the philosophical criticism voiced by proponents of direct popular election, who maintain that the electoral college system is intrinsically undemocratic—it provides for "indirect" election of the President and Vice President  This, they assert, is an 18 th century anachronism, dating from a time when communications were poor, the literacy rate was much lower, and the nation had yet to develop the durable, sophisticated, and inclusive democratic political system it now enjoys  They maintain that only direct popular election of the President and Vice President is consistent with modern democratic values and practice  Beyond this fundamental challenge, critics cite what they identify as a wide range of technical failings of the electoral college arrangement  Perhaps the most prominent of these is that the electoral college system can result in the election of a President and Vice President who have won the electoral vote, but gained fewer popular votes than their major opponent  This condition results at least in part from the nearly universal reliance on the "winner-take-all" or general ticket system of awarding electoral votes in the states, which is also criticized by NPV advocates  Under the general ticket system, the candidates winning the most popular votes in a state (a plurality is sufficient) are awarded all that state's electors and electoral votes; under these circumstances, a presidential ticket can gain all of a state's electoral votes on even a slim margin of popular votes  Presidents were elected in 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016 who received fewer popular votes than their major party opponents, while the runner-up in both popular and electoral votes was elected by the House of Representatives when four candidates split the vote in the presidential election of 1824  NPV supporters advocate the compact on the grounds of fairness and respect for the voters' choice  At the core of their arguments, they assert that the process would be simple, national, and democratic; the NPV interstate compact would provide de facto for a single, democratic choice, allowing all the nation's voters to choose the President and Vice President directly, with no intermediaries  The "people's choice," they assert, would win in every election, and every vote would carry the same weight in the election, no matter where in the nation it was cast  No state would be advantaged, nor would any be disadvantaged  According to NPV, the central argument in favor is that the compact "would guarantee the Presidency to the candidate who receives the most popular votes [or at least a plurality] in all 50 states (and the District of Columbia) " According to NPV, there would never again be a presidential election "misfire" or another "wrong winner " Other elements of the electoral college system criticized by NPV advocates (and other electoral college reformers) would arguably disappear or be rendered irrelevant  These include the faithless elector phenomenon, the general ticket system's asserted "disfranchisement" of voters who backed the losing candidates, and various asserted "voting power" advantages attributed to large (populous) states, small states, states with large populations of noncitizens, states with low rates of voter participation, and populous states with concentrations of minority-group voters  In addition, the NPV compact would almost certainly eliminate the need for contingent election of the President and Vice President under the Twelfth Amendment  NPV advocates also assert the compact would provide a practical benefit to states that tend to be noncompetitive in presidential elections and which therefore receive fewer campaign visits by major party candidates  With "every vote equal," NPV maintains that presidential and vice presidential nominees and their organizations would need to spread their presence and resources more evenly as they campaigned for every vote nationwide, rather than concentrate on winning key "battleground" states  They assert that, under the present system candidates have no reason to poll, visit, organize, campaign, or worry about the concerns of voters of states that they cannot possibly win or lose  This means that voters in two thirds of the states are effectively disenfranchised in presidential elections because candidates concentrate their attention on a small handful of "battleground" states  In 2004, candidates concentrated over two-thirds of their money and campaign visits in just five states; over 80% in nine states, and over 99% of their money in just 16 states  For instance, NPV notes that California voters seldom see the presidential or vice presidential nominees or benefit from campaign spending because the Golden State, having voted Democratic since 1988, is considered to be reliably "blue," and Democratic Party candidates are said to take its 55 electoral votes for granted  They also note that Republican candidates make few California appearances, but, NPV asserts, for the opposite reason: why spend time and resources in support of an apparently hopeless cause? Similar arguments made by NPV on the Republican side apply to Texas, a state that has voted for Republican presidential nominees since 1980  In 2016 for instance, NPV claims that no Democratic nominee participated in a general election campaign event in California or Texas, while a Republican nominee appeared in only one campaign event in each of those states  By comparison, according to their calculations, the hotly contested battleground states of Florida, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania received, respectively, 71, 55, and 54 candidate appearances  According to NPV's analysis of campaign appearances, the 2016 major party candidates for President and Vice President appeared at a total of 375 campaign events during the general election campaign, but they visited only 12 states; by NPV's calculation, 38 states and the District of Columbia were bypassed during the campaign  NPV advocates also maintain that the concentration of campaign resources, advertising, and candidate appearances in battleground states depresses turnout in "flyover" states, where candidates make few campaign appearances  The U S  Elections Project report, America Goes to the Polls, 2016 , appears to offer statistics consistent with this assertion, finding that the participation rate of the population eligible to vote in 14 battleground states was 65% in the 2016 presidential election, as opposed to comparable nationwide turnout of 60%  It also reports findings similar to those advanced by NPV: 95% of campaign visits during the 2016 campaign were made in battleground states, as was 99% of "ad spending " The NPV manifesto also cites a Brookings Institution study of the 2004 presidential election in support of its argument, stating, "Because the electoral college has effectively narrowed elections like the last one to a quadrennial contest for the votes of a relatively small number of states, people elsewhere are likely to feel that their votes don't matter " It should be noted, however, that a range of other political, social, cultural, and economic factors may also contribute to the disparity in turnout between battleground and non-battleground states  NPV further suggests that the disparity in participation may ultimately damage the ability to govern on the state and local levels and could have a negative impact on the legitimacy of public institutions: Diminished voter turnout in presidential races in non-battleground states weakens down-ballot candidates, thereby making the state even less competitive in the future  Governance—not just electioneering—is affected by the winner-take-all rule  National Popular Vote opponents oppose the compact on various grounds  Some argue that it is unconstitutional or "anticonstitutional," that is, contrary to the Founders' intentions and the spirit of the nation's fundamental charter  It is also asserted that NPV would solve few of the electoral college system's alleged problem issues and would create some of its own  Finally, some observers note that the NPV compact is an interstate compact as defined in Article I, Section 10, clause 3 of the Constitution, and as such would be subject to congressional approval  This issue is examined in greater detail in a separate section of this report  On the most fundamental philosophical basis, opponents might argue that the NPV compact violates one of the basic principles of majoritarian democracy: it does not require that candidates win a majority of the popular vote in order to gain the presidency  Rather, it would anoint as winner the ticket that gains more popular votes than any other  A majoritarian democracy, it may be argued, should require a majority in order to elect; it may be further noted that the existing system, by comparison, requires a majority in the electoral college  As one commentary noted only the strictest of majoritarians desire a purely majoritarian presidential election system, and those individuals should be deeply troubled by the prospect of plurality presidencies, which the NPVC [sic] expressly countenances  Indeed, the NPVC promises to create more difficulties and "misfires" in its own way than the Electoral College system its proponents so earnestly seek to replace  Further, opponents might ask how the NPV compact would function in the event of a multicandidate election, a phenomenon that recurs from time to time in U S  presidential elections  One commentator posited the following problematic scenario under such circumstances: Under the compact, one can easily imagine a multi-candidate race in which a candidate would win, say, a thirty-four percent plurality of the popular vote nationwide while losing in every state and D C  If all of the states and D C  were signatories to the compact, all the electoral votes in such a hypothetical race would be awarded contrary to the will of voters choosing electors (still not voting directly for President under this plan)  Would the United States accept a President who wasn't the choice of sixty-six percent of those voting, nor even the choice of a single state? The existing electoral college system, NPV skeptics might also assert, is a fundamental element in the federal constitutional arrangements established by the Constitution  Fearing "the tyranny of the majority," the Founders established a system of government that provides checks and balances designed to restrain the majority and secure minority rights  These principles are also embedded in the structure of federal elections: the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the presidency were deliberately provided with different terms of office and different electorates, and the states were given an important role in the federal election process  In particular, through the electoral college the United States elects its national Presidents and Vice Presidents in a state-based federal election  Successful nominees are compelled under this system to present a broad political vision that commands nation-spanning "concurrent majorities" and appeals to the great variety of Americans  As in the case of the Senate, less populous states are accorded a small numerical advantage by assignment of two at-large electors reflecting the Constitution's equal apportionment of Senators to each state regardless of its population  The NPV initiative, they could claim, would discard the Founders' intentions in favor of what they consider to be a flawed "majoritarian" presidency that would ill-serve a continent-spanning and profoundly diverse republic  Another criticism centers on the use of the NPV compact to effect a fundamental change in the presidential election process and a de facto amendment to the Constitution, but without following the procedures set out in Article V  Critics may note that NPV's founders admit their plan is an "end run" around the Constitution  Proponents might counter with the argument that Article V presents too high a hurdle for what they consider a necessary reform of the system  Opponents, however, could respond that the Founders intended the various supermajority requirements in Congress and the states to ensure that successful constitutional amendments enjoy broad national support  The bare majority of electoral votes required to implement NPV, they might note, meets none of these supermajority requirements  As one study critical of the NPV initiative concluded, because the use of an interstate compact "does not conform to the constitutional means of changing the original decisions of the Framers, NPV could not [therefore] be a legitimate innovation " A final argument on this line might be that one "end run" around the amendment process might lead to others, setting a dangerous precedent for similar efforts in the future  Opponents might note that the NPV would eliminate the electoral college system's multiplier effect generated by the winner-take-all or general ticket system used in 48 states and the District of Columbia, which tends to magnify the winning ticket's margin of victory, and is said to confer greater legitimacy to the victors  For instance, in 2016, Republican nominee Donald Trump's clear electoral vote majority of 304 votes (56 5% of the total), compared with Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton's 227 (42 2% of the total) could be said to reinforce and confirm his victory, notwithstanding Clinton's plurality of the popular vote (48 2%), compared with Trump's 46 1%  From a practical standpoint, NPV opponents might argue that the NPV would actually lead to an increase in contested election results and legal challenges in the states, as the political parties maneuver to claim every possible vote  They assert that the existing tabulation of popular votes within each state reduces contested results and recounts  Under NPV, the incentive to gain every vote would arguably lead to far broader disputes and widespread recounts at every level of election administration  As a Heritage Foundation study concluded Under the NPV … any suspicions necessitating a recount in even a single district would be an incentive for a national recount     The prospect of a candidate challenging "every precinct, in every county, in every state of the Union" should be abhorrent to anyone who witnessed the drama, cost, delay, and undue litigation sparked by the Florida recount of 2000  Opponents might also assert that the increased incidence of recounts would be further complicated by wide-ranging disparities in state procedures, potentially leading to prolonged periods of uncertainty following close presidential elections  Critics may also note that the NPV plan contains no "statute of limitations," unlike proposed constitutional amendments, for which Congress typically sets a seven-year ratification period  Where, critics may ask, is a similar time limit that would "sunset" the NPV compact, after which it would expire or return to "square one"? According to its website, NPV was launched on February 23, 2006; if it were a constitutional amendment proposed by Congress, it would have expired on February 23, 2013, since by the end of the customary seven-year deadline it was "ratified" by only eight states and the District of Columbia  By what reasoning, they might ask, should the NPV be exempt from the standards of timeliness and contemporaneity Congress customarily sets for constitutional amendments? Opponents might reject claims that, under NPV, campaign spending and candidate appearances would be spread and scheduled more widely, beyond the current concentration of time and resources in battleground states  They might argue that spreading campaign resources and candidate events in non-battleground states is a questionable argument to justify a fundamental change in the presidential election process  Campaign appearances and spending, they could assert, should not be considered to be a local economic stimulus package, nor are the amounts in question sufficient to make much of a difference in the economic condition of most states  As one critical analysis notes, "    the nation does not hold presidential elections to foster local economic development " Moreover, they might continue, it is equally dubious to assert that nominees will slight the concerns of citizens of the non-battleground states from which they draw their greatest support, or that concentrated campaigning in the battleground states somehow "disenfranchises" voters in others  In the modern era, a small percentage of voters actually attends an in-person presidential or vice presidential candidate appearance  Television (especially broadcast and cable TV news networks), social media, the internet, and newspapers—not the traditional rallies, torchlight parades, and handbills—dominate presidential election campaigns in the 21 st century  In addition to policy issues discussed previously, some observers have also raised questions related to the NPV initiative based on the fact that it is an interstate compact as defined in the Constitution  Others have questioned whether NPV might conflict with some provisions of the Voting Rights Act  The NPV initiative has been described by its supporters variously as a bill, a state-level statute, and an interstate compact  The latter reference necessitates an analysis of whether the initiative complies with the Compact Clause of the Constitution  An interstate compact—under the broadest understanding—is a contract between two or more consenting states  The Supreme Court has further suggested that an interstate compact often requires reciprocal commitments between the governments of two or more states, such that one state's commitment is conditioned on the action of another state and no state can unilaterally repeal its commitment  The use of interstate compacts predates the Constitution, as the Articles of Confederation contained a similar Compact Clause that provided a qualified prohibition on states entering into any agreements between them without the consent of Congress  The chaos resulting from the disunity created by the Articles of Confederation prompted the Framers of the Constitution generally to "impose more uniformity" among the states, resulting in a Constitution that wholly prohibits states from entering into any treaties, alliances, and federations  Nonetheless, the Constitution maintained the Articles of Confederation's qualified prohibition on interstate compacts and agreements, allowing states to enter into an interstate compact so long as the participating states seek the consent of Congress  Specifically, the Compact Clause provides that "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress     enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State     " While the historical rationale for Article I's qualified prohibition on interstate compacts is unclear, the Compact Clause generally reflects the view of the Framers that states should be able to work cooperatively together, as well as the concern that unchecked interstate alliances might threaten the harmony of the Union or the authority vested by the Constitution in the federal government  As the Supreme Court noted in Cuyler v  Adams , "By vesting in Congress the power to grant or withhold consent, or to condition consent on the states' compliance with specified conditions, the Framers sought to ensure that Congress would maintain ultimate supervisory power over cooperative state action that might otherwise interfere with the full and free exercise of federal authority " The Compact Clause places no limits on what might be done through an interstate compact other than the requirement of congressional consent  In the early years of government under the Constitution, compacts were used almost exclusively to settle boundary disputes  Beginning with the establishment of the Port of New York Authority in 1921, however, compacts began to be used to address more complex, regional issues requiring intergovernmental cooperation  Some compacts are merely advisory in form, but others may be regulatory, with significant powers granted to multistate commissions  More recently, compacts have addressed such wide-ranging concerns as mental health treatment, law enforcement and crime control, education, driver licensing and enforcement, environmental conservation, energy, nuclear waste control, facilities operations, transportation, economic development, insurance regulation, placement of children and juveniles, disaster assistance, and pollution control  Approximately 200 interstate compacts are in effect today  Accordingly, the central legal issue with respect to the Compact Clause is whether a given interstate compact requires the consent of Congress  While a "literal" reading of the Compact Clause "would require the States to obtain congressional approval before entering into any agreement among themselves, irrespective of form, subject, duration, or interest to the United States [emphasis added]," the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected such a reading  In 1893, in Virginia v  Tenness e e , Justice Stephen Field, writing for the Court, contended that a broad reading of the Compact Clause would "embrace all forms of stipulation, written or verbal, and relating to all kinds of subjects[,]" requiring congressional consent to agreements "which the United States can have no possible objection or have any interest in interfering with," as well as those that "may tend to increase     the political influence of the contracting states, so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States     " Surmising that the Compact Clause could not have been intended to have such a broad reach, Justice Field concluded that the Clause prohibits states from entering into compacts without congressional consent only when the underlying compact is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States " The Supreme Court has subsequently reaffirmed Justice Field's "functional view of the Compact Clause," and, accordingly, generally where an agreement does not fall within the scope of the Compact Clause as envisioned by the Court in Virginia v  Tennessee , the agreement "will not be invalidated for lack of congressional consent " Whether the NPV initiative requires congressional consent under the Compact Clause first requires a determination as to whether NPV even constitutes an interstate compact  At times, its supporters have resisted framing the initiative as an interstate compact, arguably out of concern for running afoul of the Compact Clause's provisions  For example, Professor Akhil Amar has argued that because the initiative does not create a "new interstate governmental apparatus," the NPV should not be considered an interstate compact, as NPV compact signatory states are merely exercising power collectively that each state could exercise on its own  It is unclear, however, whether the creation of a new interstate governmental entity formed out of an agreement between two or more states is necessary, as opposed to sufficient, in order to deem an agreement as being an interstate compact subject to the Compact Clause  While the Supreme Court, in Northeast Bancorp , suggested that a "joint organization or body" formed out of an interstate agreement is a "classic indic[ium] of a compact," the Court has never adopted a definition of an interstate compact that solely rests on the existence of an interstate governmental body  Instead, the Court appears to have adopted a broader definition of what an interstate compact can entail  For example, in Virginia v  Tennessee , the Court noted that the words "compacts" and "agreements" are synonymous and "cover all stipulations affecting the conduct or claims of the parties " In other words, when two or more states enter into a stipulated agreement whereby one state agrees to perform an act in consideration for a reciprocal act by the other state(s), that agreement can be considered an interstate compact  This broad definition of a compact appears to encompass the NPV compact, as the initiative requires signatory states to agree mutually to appoint their electors to the winner of the national popular vote  Moreover, NPV binds each assenting state, as no member state can withdraw from it within six months or less of the end of a President's term  Because NPV prohibits states from freely "modify[ing] or repeal[ing] [the agreement] unilaterally" and requires "reciprocation" of mutual obligations, it appears that the initiative can be described as an interstate compact  Assuming the NPV initiative is an interstate compact, the question remains whether it is one that implicates the Compact Clause  The answer to that question primarily depends on whether NPV is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States  " In other words, the "test" for whether a particular interstate compact requires congressional consent is centrally concerned with vertical balances of power between the federal government and the states; namely, "whether the Compact enhances state power quoad the National Government " While the NPV arguably increases the political power of the states that have consented to it by ensuring that those states' desired outcome for the presidential election—the awarding of the majority of electoral votes to the presidential candidate supported by the majority of the voting populace—it is unclear how that increase in political power would be at the expense of the power of the federal government  After all, the Constitution provides the federal government with no role in determining the members of the electoral college  One scholar has suggested that the NPV initiative would lead to a vertical alteration of power by eliminating the possibility that the House of Representatives would resolve a presidential election in the absence of an electoral majority for a single candidate because it is premised on a majority of electoral votes going to a single candidate  The House of Representatives, however, has decided only two presidential elections in American history, and whether such an arguably hypothetical and de minimis diminishment of federal power through the NPV would be sufficient to require congressional consent under the Compact Clause is simply unresolved by the relevant case law  While the Supreme Court's case law interpreting the Compact Clause is centrally concerned with vertical federalism concerns (i e , the balance of power between the state and federal governments), the Court has recognized a potential secondary rationale suggested for the Compact Clause: to preserve the horizontal balance of powers among the various states  And horizontal federalism concerns could very well be implicated by the Compact Clause, as the provision appears to have been included in the Constitution out of concern both for the supremacy of the federal government and unity among the various states  Whether the NPV compact threatens the powers of nonconsenting states has been the subject of much debate among academics  Those in support of the initiative have contended that the nonconsenting states do not lose any power as a result of the NPV  According to this line of argumentation, even under the NPV, all states would retain their right to select the electors of their choosing, as nonmember state electors would still be counted in the electoral vote  Others, however, have pointed to the underlying premise of the NPV—to enhance the political power of more populous states in presidential elections—as evidence that the initiative diminishes the power of nonconsenting states  In other words, while non-compacting states would still retain the power to appoint electors, the influence that comes with that power would arguably be diminished because a state's role in the national election would be defined by its percentage of the popular vote and not by its percentage of electors, warranting congressional interest in approving a compact that effectuated such a change in national elections  Ultimately, however, whether the NPV actually threatens the power of nonconsenting states is a debate that remains active within academia but would likely be the source of considerable litigation if the initiative ever became effective  If congressional consent is needed for the NPV, that consent can take various forms  Usually congressional consent to an interstate compact takes the form of a joint resolution or act of Congress specifying its approval of the text of the compact and adding any conditions or provisions it deems necessary, often embodying the compact document  As with most congressional actions, consent to an interstate compact must occur with the approval of both houses and must be signed by the President before it becomes law  Rarely has the President vetoed or threatened to veto consent legislation by Congress  While congressional consent to an interstate compact is most often explicit, consent by Congress may also be implied by subsequent acts of Congress as "[a]n inference clear and satisfactory that Congress     intended to consent" to a compact may be sufficient  Congress may also delegate its power to approve a compact to a federal official so long as an "intelligible principle" against which approval can be measured is apparent  Ultimately, if congressional consent is truly needed for NPV to be effective, the initiative might have difficulty ever being enacted because the approval of both houses of Congress and the President would likely necessitate additional hurdles beyond the already challenging task of amassing support at the state level for the NPV  Beyond the legal issues raised with respect to the Compact Clause, the NPV initiative also potentially raises other broader constitutional concerns, including whether the states can functionally obviate the role of the electoral college through the NPV  Article II of the Constitution establishes that the election of the President should occur indirectly through the election by the electoral college  The choice of an indirect election for the President was a deliberate one by the Framers of the Constitution, because, while noting the importance that the "sense of the people" should influence the choice for President, they found it "equally desirable" for the "immediate election" of the President to be made by a body representative of distinct state interests and removed from the threat of unchecked majoritarianism  The result was that the Constitution established a presidential election process that was "manifestly nonmajoritarian," with the electoral college, a body established to represent the distinct views of each state, as the centerpiece of the election process  The central constitutional issue presented by the NPV, therefore, is whether the states, through an interstate compact, can functionally transform the presidential election system enshrined in the Constitution into a more majoritarian process  Supporters of the NPV argue that the Constitution provides the legal means for states to transform the presidential election system into one where the President is elected based solely on the result of the national popular vote  Specifically, clause 2 of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution provides the states with the power to "appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," the electors who represent the state in the electoral college  Facially, the Constitution's primary limitation on the power of a state to select its electors is the final number of electors awarded to each state  While perhaps an argument can be made that the structure, logic, and history of the Constitution place limits on the manner or method in which a state chooses its electors, the text of the Constitution simply does not impose any such limits  Supreme Court case law also supports reading Article II of the Constitution to broadly provide states with wide discretion as to the manner in which its electors are selected  Specifically, in 1892 in McPherson v  Blacker, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld a Michigan law providing for the election by individual congressional district of presidential electors against a challenge that the law violated Article II of the Constitution  In so holding, the Court placed great emphasis on a number of state laws that existed shortly after the ratification that provided a variety of "modes of choosing the electors," including selection by the legislature itself, by a "vote of the people for a general ticket," "by vote of the people in districts," or by some permutation of those methods  Viewing this evidence together with the text of Article II and the historical evidence from the Constitutional Convention led the Court to broadly conclude state legislatures have "conceded plenary power     in the matter of the appointment of electors," allowing the Michigan law to stand  Applying McPherson to the case of the NPV, the argument can and has been made that if the states have plenary power with respect to the manner of how electors are appointed, the power necessarily allows states to select electors in line with the results of the national popular vote  More recently, supporters of the NPV have relied on the Supreme Court's 2015 ruling in Arizona Legislature v  Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC) —which held that the State of Arizona had wide discretion under the Elections Clause of the Constitution to select the method by which the state provided for redistricting —to argue that the states retain broad discretion in selecting electors under Article II, which uses similar language to the provision interpreted in AIRC  Others have argued that the structure of the Constitution and historical evidence suggest that the states do not have such vast discretion in appointing electors as to functionally transform the election for President into a national popular referendum  As noted elsewhere in this report, the electoral college was created by the Framers to ensure that states with the least population retained power in the selection of the President, providing a check against domination by the most populous states  The electoral college, being a product of the choices of individual state legislatures, was envisioned by the Framers as a body that would represent the specific interests of a given state, as opposed to the undifferentiated nation at large  Accordingly, it may be argued that allowing the most populous states to collude to ensure that the national popular vote, as opposed to the wishes of an individual state, dictates the results of a state's slate of electors, could arguably be irreconcilable with the Framers' intentions with respect to the electoral college  As such, for those who find the NPV compact constitutionally suspect under Article II, McPherson 's broad pronouncements about the nature of a state's power to appoint electors should be viewed in the context of that particular case, where the state of Michigan was attempting to appoint its electors based on the votes of an individual district in the state, as opposed to the state as a whole  In contrast to the law at issue in McPherson , with NPV, there appears to be no evidence contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution of a state selecting its electors in accordance with the results of the national popular vote  Unlike the State of Michigan in McPherson , an NPV state's electors might not be a product of the views of the state at the time of the election, but instead would reflect national popular sentiment about who should be the President  Moreover, the Supreme Court, in interpreting arguably analogous language from Article I of the Constitution allowing states to regulate the manner of the selection of the Members of the House of Representatives and Senate, concluded that the states cannot exercise their delegated authority in a way that would "effect a fundamental change in the constitutional structure " The question that remains is whether the Court in a future case challenging the NPV compact would interpret the states' authority under Article II to appoint electors to be broad enough to allow the President to be selected as a result of the national popular vote, a question that, given the lack of any precise precedent respecting the constitutionality of the NPV compact under Article II, will likely remain unresolved until such time  Other critics claim the NPV compact might violate Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)  Writing in Columbia Law Review , David Gringer invokes the voting power theory  He argues that the plan conflicts with Section 2 of the VRA because moving from "a state-based [vote] to a national popular vote dilutes the voting strength of a given state's minority population by reducing its ability [voting power] to influence the outcome of presidential elections " Gringer also asserts that the NPV compact may violate Section 5 of the act  In 2013, however, the U S  Supreme Court invalidated Section 4(b) of the VRA, which contained a formula prescribing which states and jurisdictions with a history of discrimination were required to obtain prior approval or "preclearance" under Section 5 before changing any voting standard, practice, or procedure  Although the Court invalidated only the coverage formula in Section 4, by extension, Section 5 has been rendered currently inoperable  Prior to the Supreme Court ruling, Gringer argued that the NPV compact would qualify as a covered practice under Section 5, and that the legislatures of all the "covered" states would have been required to obtain preclearance before implementing the compact  Responding to this point, National Popular Vote Inc  noted the following: The National Popular Vote bill manifestly would make every person's vote for President equal throughout the United States in an election to fill a single office (the Presidency)  It is entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act  There have been court cases under the Voting Rights Act concerning contemplated changes in voting methods for various representative legislative bodies     However, these cases do not bear on elections to fill a single office (i e , the Presidency)  In 2012, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division specifically declined to challenge California's accession to the NPV compact on VRA grounds  The states' authority to appoint electors by any method their legislatures choose is not absolute  Federal court decisions have struck down state laws concerning appointment of electors that were found to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection: Although Clause 2 (of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution) seemingly vests complete discretion in the states, certain older cases had recognized a federal interest in protecting the integrity of the process  Thus, the Court upheld the power of Congress to protect the right of all citizens who are entitled to vote to lend aid and support in any legal manner to the election of any legally qualified person as a presidential elector     [I]n Oregon v  Mitchell (42 U S  112 (1970)), the Court upheld the power of Congress to reduce the voting age in presidential elections and to set a thirty-day durational residency period as a qualification for voting in presidential elections  Although the Justices were divided on the reasons, the rationale emerging from this case, considered with Williams v  Rhodes , (393 U S  20 1968)) is that the Fourteenth Amendment limits state discretion in prescribing the manner of selecting electors and that Congress in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment may override state practices that violate that Amendment and may substitute standards of its own  Critics of the electoral college system have sought direct election of the President and Vice President without success for more than two centuries  The NPV initiative represents a novel effort to achieve this goal by use of an interstate compact that would circumvent the stringent requirements necessary for the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments  Since its inception in 2006, NPV has achieved a degree of success: 14 states and the District of Columbia, controlling a total of 189 electoral votes, have joined the compact since 2008  Progress has arguably been sporadic, however, notwithstanding active campaigning by National Popular Vote Inc  Over the course of more than a decade, NPV has heretofore failed to develop a sustained momentum toward its stated goal of states controlling 270 electoral votes  The action of three states in joining NPV to date in 2019 marks the most activity in a single year since 2008; it remains to be seen whether this trend will continue  To date, certain Democratic-leaning states have joined the compact  The arguable lack of support in Republican-controlled state legislatures raises questions about further accessions to the compact in the immediate future, particularly given the fact that the GOP controlled both legislative chambers in 30 states following the 2018 elections  To date, while the NPV initiative has generated interest among supporters of direct popular election of the President, it does not appear to have gained widespread awareness among the public at large  The findings of the March 27, 2019, Politico/Morning Consult survey cited earlier in this report arguably suggest that greater public knowledge of NPV might spur popular support for the compact  This might then contribute to further momentum if additional states were to join, particularly populous ones like Florida (29 electoral votes), Georgia (16 electoral votes), and Ohio (18 electoral votes) where the compact was under active consideration in 2019  Under these circumstances, proponents might be energized and encouraged by a sense of progress for the initiative  At the same time, NPV opponents could be expected to coalesce around the issues identified earlier in this report, and renew and increase their efforts in defense of the electoral college system  The activities of both might ultimately bring the NPV initiative to the more immediate attention of Congress 
Report 2: 0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $981 2 million in procurement funding needed to complete the two ships' estimated combined procurement cost  The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget also requests $73 0 million in AP funding for TAO-205s to be procured in future fiscal years, and $3 7 million in cost-to-complete procurement funding to cover cost growth on TAO-205s procured in prior fiscal years, bringing the total FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program (aside from outfitting and post-delivery costs) to $1,057 9 million  One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program  In assessing this issue, Congress may consider, among other things, whether the Navy has accurately priced the work that it is requesting to fund in FY2020  Another issue for Congress concerns the number of oilers the Navy will require in coming years to support its operations  The Navy is implementing a new operational concept, called Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), that could lead to the development of a fleet with larger numbers of individually smaller ships, and to more-widely dispersed Navy operations  DMO could affect requirements for Navy logistics, including oilers  The Navy states that Recapitalizing the auxiliary and sealift fleet in support of DMO has become a top priority  The initial reviews of the requirements to support this operational maritime concept indicate potential growth across the five lines of effort: refuel, rearm, resupply, repair, and revive  Coincident is the review of the level of effort needed to distribute logistics into a contested maritime environment following safe transfer by the logistics fleet—smaller, faster, multi-mission transports likely resident within the future battle force  The work to fully flesh out the requirement is ongoing, but the aggregate is expected to be no less than the current requirement, reinforcing the urgency to recapitalize the current fleet  An August 2017 GAO report states the following: The readiness of the surge sealift and combat logistics fleets has trended downward since 2012  For example, GAO found that mission-limiting equipment casualties—incidents of degraded or out-of-service equipment—have increased over the past 5 years, and maintenance periods are running longer than planned, indicating declining materiel readiness across both fleets     The Navy has not assessed the effects of widely distributed operations, which could affect the required number and type of combat logistics ships  The Navy released its new operational concept of more widely distributed operations—ships traveling farther distances and operating more days to support a more distributed fleet—in 2017  The Navy has not assessed the effects that implementing this concept will have on the required number and type of combat logistics ships  These effects could be exacerbated in the event that the Navy is less able to rely on in-port refueling—which has comprised about 30 percent of all refuelings over the past 3 years—placing greater demand on the combat logistics fleet  Given the fleet's dependence on the combat logistics force, waiting until 2019 or 2020 to conduct an assessment, as planned, could result in poor investment decisions as the Navy continues to build and modernize its fleet  Furthermore, without assessing the effects of widely distributed operations on logistics force requirements and modifying its force structure plans accordingly, the Navy risks being unprepared to provide required fuel and other supplies  Another issue for Congress is whether to encourage or direct the Navy to build TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy  The issue relates to how changes in the international security environment might affect how the Navy operates and equips its underway replenishment ships  During the Cold War, the Navy procured underway replenishment ships to support a two-stage approach to underway replenishment in which single-product "shuttle" ships (such as oilers, ammunition ships, and dry stores ships) would take their supplies from secure ports to relatively safe midocean areas, where they would then transfer them to multiproduct "station" ships called TAOEs and AORs  The TAOEs and AORs would then travel to Navy carrier strike groups operating in higher-threat areas and transfer their combined supplies to the carrier strike group ships  As a result, single-product shuttle ships were equipped with lesser amounts of ship self-defense equipment, and TAOEs and AORs were equipped with greater amounts of such equipment  When the Cold War ended and transitioned to the post-Cold War era, threats to U S  Navy ships operating at sea were substantially reduced  As a consequence, the amount of ship self-defense equipment on the TAOEs and AORs was reduced, and a single-stage approach to underway replenishment, in which oilers and dry stores ships took supplies from secure ports all the way to carrier strike group ships, was sometimes used  Now that the post-Cold War era has transitioned to a new strategic environment featuring renewed great power competition with countries like China and Russia, and a consequent renewal of potential threats to U S  Navy ships operating at sea, the question is whether TAO-205s should be equipped with lesser amounts of ship self-defense equipment, like oilers were during both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, or with greater amounts of ship self-defense equipment, like TAOEs and AORs were during the Cold War  Building TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy could increase TAO-205 procurement costs by tens of millions of dollars per ship, depending on the amount of additional ship self-defense equipment  Section 1026 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S  1356 / P L  114-92 of November 25, 2015) required an independent assessment of the Navy's combat logistics force ships  The report was delivered to Congress in February 2016  A copy of the report was posted by the media outlet Politico on March 11, 2016  The report states the following: The T-AO(X) will only have a limited capability to defeat a submarine launched torpedo attack and no capability to defeat a missile attack  When delivered, the TAO(X) will have: —[the] NIXIE Torpedo Countermeasure System [for decoying certain types of torpedoes] —[the] Advanced Degaussing System (Anti-Mine) [for reducing the ship's magnetic signature, so as to reduce the likelihood of attack by magnetically fused mines] When required, the T-AO(X) will also have ability to embark Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Expeditionary Security Teams (EST)  The ESTs will embark with several crew served weapons and are designed to provide limited self-defense against a small boat attack  The T-AO(X) will have Space, Weight, Power and Cooling (SWAP-C) margins for future installations of the following systems: —[the] Close In Weapon System (CIWS) or SeaRAM (Rolling Airframe Missile) [for defense against missile attack] —[the] Anti-Torpedo Torpedo Defense System (ATTDS) [for destroying torpedoes] Even after the installation of a CIWS or ATTDS, if the T-AO(X) was to operate in anything other than a benign environment, the ship will require both air and surface escorts  The decision to rely on [other] Fleet assets to provide force protection [i e , defense against attacks] for the T-AO(X) was validated by the JROC [in June 2015]  Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the Navy's request for FY2020 procurement funding for the TAO-205 program  A May 2019 GAO report—the 2019 edition of GAO's annual report surveying DOD major acquisition programs—stated the following regarding the TAO-205 program: Technology Maturity and Design Stability The Navy has matured all Lewis class critical technologies and stabilized the ships' design  In 2014, the Navy identified three critical technologies for the Lewis class, all of which involved a new system for transferring cargo at sea  Prior to initiating detail design activities in June 2016, the Navy completed prototype tests of the critical technologies and found that they were fully mature—an approach consistent with shipbuilding best practices  In 2017, the Navy removed one critical technology—the Heavy e-STREAM cargo delivery system—from the Lewis class design  The Navy had intended to use this system to deliver F-35 Lightning II power modules  The Navy subsequently decided to deliver these by air, which precluded any need for the Heavy system  Lead ship construction began in September 2018 with 95 percent of the ship's total design effort complete  Program officials stated that this figure meant that 100 percent of the ship's basic and functional design were by then complete—an approach consistent with best practices  Throughout detail design and now into construction, the Navy has not changed the Lewis class program's performance requirements  The Navy also leveraged commercial vessel designs to minimize design and construction risks  The Lewis class features a modern double-hull construction, an environmental-based design standard for commercial tankers, to ensure the ships can dock at ports-of-call  This design was included in the final three Kaiser class oilers  Production Readiness The program office has largely kept to its construction schedule to date for the first ship, but a flooding incident at a NASSCO graving dock in July 2018 has affected the delivery of future ships  The program office stated that this incident has not affected current ship fabrication activities  However, the dock's unavailability while repairs are planned and implemented has disrupted the contractor's schedule for future ships  According to the program office, the incident has resulted in some delays to certain delivery dates for ships two through six  Other Program Issues As part of the Navy's plan to expand the fleet, the Navy concluded that it would need an additional three Lewis class ships  The Navy's budget request for fiscal year 2019 increased its planned one-ship-per-year buy to two for fiscal years 2019, 2021, and 2023  The Congress provided appropriations for the additional fiscal year 2019 ship in support of the Navy's request  To account for the additional ships in fiscal years 2019 and 2021, the Navy plans to add two more ships to the low-rate initial production phase  Subsequently, program officials stated that they plan to compete a new contract for the remaining 12 ships using the construction knowledge gained from efforts under the existing contract  Program Office Comments We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment  The program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate  The program office stated that it continues to follow GAO shipbuilding best practices and has leveraged commercial vessel design practices to minimize risk  The program office also stated that it is currently revising its acquisition baseline to reflect the update in total quantities to 20 ships  In addition, the program office noted that, in fiscal year 2019, it fully funded the third and fourth ships and funded advance procurement for the fifth ship 

ground_truth: CVN-78, CVN-79, CVN-80, and CVN-81 are the first four ships in the Navy's new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). CVN-78 (Gerald R. Ford) was procured in FY2008. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $13,084.0 million (i.e., about $13.1 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received advance procurement (AP) funding in FY2001-FY2007 and was fully funded in FY2008-FY2011 using congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding. To help cover cost growth on the ship, the ship received an additional $1,394.9 million in FY2014-FY2016 and FY2018 cost-to-complete procurement funding. The ship was delivered to the Navy on May 31, 2017, and was commissioned into service on July 22, 2017. The Navy is currently working to complete construction, testing, and certification of the ship's 11 weapons elevators. CVN-79 (John F. Kennedy) was procured in FY2013. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $11,327.4 million (i.e., about $11.3 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received AP funding in FY2007-FY2012, and was fully funded in FY2013-FY2018 using congressionally authorized six-year incremental funding. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in September 2024. CVN-80 (Enterprise) and CVN-81 (not yet named) are being procured under a two-ship block buy contract that was authorized by Section 121(a)(2) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232 of August 13, 2018). The provision permitted the Navy to add CVN-81 to the existing contract for building CVN-80 after the Department of Defense (DOD) made certain certifications to Congress. DOD made the certifications on December 31, 2018, and the Navy announced the award of the contract on January 31, 2019. Compared to the estimated procurement costs for CVN-80 and CVN-81 in the Navy's FY2019 budget submission, the Navy estimates under its FY2020 budget submission that the two-ship block buy contract will reduce the cost of CVN-80 by $246.6 million and the cost of CVN-81 by $2,637.3 million, for a combined reduction of $2,883.9 million (i.e., about $2.9 billion). Using higher estimated baseline costs for CVN-80 and CVN-81 taken from a December 2017 Navy business case analysis, the Navy estimates under its FY2020 budget submission that the two-ship contract will reduce the cost of CVN-80 by $770.9 million and the cost of CVN-81 by $3,086.3 million, for a combined reduction of $3,857.2 million (i.e., about $3.9 billion). CVN-80 was procured in FY2018. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,335.1 million (i.e., about $12.3 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received AP funding in FY2016 and FY2017, and the Navy plans to fully fund the ship in FY2018-FY2025 using incremental funding authorized by Section 121(c) of P.L. 115-232. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,062.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in March 2028. Prior to the awarding of the two-ship block buy contract, CVN-81 was scheduled to be procured in FY2023. Following the awarding of the two-ship block buy contract, the Navy has chosen to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship to be procured in FY2020 (as opposed to a ship that was procured in FY2019). The Navy's FY2020 budget submission estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,450.7 million (i.e., about $12.5 billion) in then-year dollars. The Navy plans to fully fund the ship beginning in FY2019 and extending beyond FY2026 using incremental funding authorized by Section 121(c) of P.L. 115-232. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,285.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in February 2032. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission proposed to not fund the mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul (called a Refueling Complex Overhaul, or RCOH) for the aircraft carrier CVN-75 (Harry S. Truman), and to instead retire the ship around FY2024 and also deactivate one of the Navy's carrier air wings at about the same time. On April 30, 2019, however, the Administration announced that it was effectively withdrawing this proposal from the Navy's FY2020 budget submission. The Administration now supports funding the CVN-75 RCOH and keeping CVN-75 (and by implication its associated air wing) in service past FY2024. Oversight issues for Congress for the CVN-78 program include the following: DOD's decision to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship to be procured in FY2020, instead of a ship that was procured in FY2019; the Navy's decision, as part of its FY2020 budget submission, to not accelerate the scheduled procurement of CVN-82 from FY2028 to an earlier fiscal year; whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the CVN-78 program; the date for achieving the Navy's 12-ship force-level goal for aircraft carriers; cost growth in the CVN-78 program, Navy efforts to stem that growth, and Navy efforts to manage costs so as to stay within the program's cost caps; Navy efforts to complete the construction, testing, and certification of the weapons elevators on CVN-78; additional CVN-78 program issues that were raised in a December 2018 report from the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E); additional CVN-78 program issues that were raised in a May 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on DOD weapon systems; whether the Navy should shift at some point from procuring large-deck, nuclear-powered carriers like the CVN-78 class to procuring smaller aircraft carriers.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: This report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the Gerald R  Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier program  The Navy's proposed FY2019 budget requests a total of $2,347 million (i e , about $2 3 billion) in procurement funding for the CVN-78 program  Congress's decisions on the CVN-78 program could substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the shipbuilding industrial base  The Navy's FY2020 budget submission also proposed to not fund the mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul (called a Refueling Complex Overhaul, or RCOH) for the aircraft carrier CVN-75 ( Harry S  Truman ), and to instead retire the ship around FY2024 and also deactivate one of the Navy's carrier air wings at about the same time  On April 30, 2019, however, the Administration announced that it was effectively withdrawing this proposal from the Navy's FY2020 budget submission  The Administration now supports funding the CVN-75 RCOH and keeping CVN-75 (and by implication its associated air wing) in service past FY2024  For additional discussion of this withdrawn budget proposal, see Appendix A   For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the CVN-78 class program and other Navy shipbuilding programs may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  The Navy's current aircraft carrier force consists of 11 nuclear-powered ships, including 10 Nimitz-class ships (CVNs 68 through 77) that entered service between 1975 and 2009, and one Gerald R  Ford (CVN-78) class ship that was commissioned into service on July 22, 2017  10 U S C  8062(b) requires the Navy to maintain a force of not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers  The requirement for the Navy to maintain not less than a certain number of operational aircraft carriers was established by Section 126 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  1815 / P L  109-163 of January 6, 2006), which set the number at 12 carriers  The requirement was changed from 12 carriers to 11 carriers by Section 1011(a) of the FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  5122 / P L  109-364 of October 17, 2006)  10 U S C  8062(e), which was added by Section 1042 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act ( S  2943 / P L  114-328 of December 23, 2016), requires the Navy to maintain a minimum of nine carrier air wings  In December 2016, the Navy released a force-level goal for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships, including 12 aircraft carriers —one more than the minimum of 11 carriers required by 10 U S C  8062(b)  This was the first Navy force-level goal to call for 12 (rather than 11) carriers since a 2002-2004 Navy force-level goal for a fleet of 375 ships  Given the time needed to build a carrier and the projected retirement dates of existing carriers, increasing the carrier force from 11 ships to 12 ships on a sustained basis would take a number of years: Procuring carriers on 3-year centers—that is, procuring one carrier every three years—would achieve a 12-carrier force on a sustained basis by about 2030, unless the service lives of one or more existing carriers were substantially extended  Procuring carriers on 3 5-year centers (i e , a combination of 3- and 4-year centers) would achieve a 12-carrier force on a sustained basis no earlier than about 2034, unless the service lives of one or more existing carriers were substantially extended  Procuring carriers on 4-year centers would achieve a 12-carrier force on a sustained basis by about 2063—almost 30 years later than under 3 5-year centers—unless the service lives of one or more existing carriers were substantially extended  Under the Navy's FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan, as under the Navy's FY2019 30-year shipbuilding plan, carrier procurement would shift from 5-year centers to 4-year centers after the procurement of CVN-82 in FY2028, and a 12-carrier force would be achieved on a sustained basis in the 2060s  The projected size of the carrier force in the Navy's FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan reflected the Navy's now-withdrawn FY2020 budget proposal to not fund the RCOH for the aircraft carrier CVN-75 ( Harry S  Truman ), and to instead retire the ship around FY2024  With the withdrawal of this budget proposal, the projected size of the carrier force is now, for the period FY2022-FY2047, one ship higher than what is shown in the Navy's FY2020 budget submission  The newly adjusted force-level projection, reflecting the withdrawal of the proposal to retire CVN-75 around FY2024, is as follows: The force is projected to include 11 ships in FY2020-FY2021, 12 ships in FY2022-FY2024, 11 ships in FY2025-FY2026, 10 ships in FY2027, 11 ships in FY2028-FY2039, 10 ships in FY2040, 11 ships in FY2041, 10 ships in FY2042-FY2044, 11 ships in FY2045, 10 ships in FY2046-FY2047, 9 ships in FY2048, and 10 ships in FY2049  Under incremental funding, some of the funding needed to fully fund a ship is provided in one or more years after the year in which the ship is procured  In recent years, Congress has authorized DOD to use incremental funding for procuring certain Navy ships, most notably aircraft carriers: Section 121 of the FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  5122 / P L  109-364 of October 17, 2006) granted the Navy the authority to use four-year incremental funding for CVNs 78, 79, and 80  Under this authority, the Navy could fully fund each of these ships over a four-year period that includes the ship's year of procurement and three subsequent years  Section 124 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  1540 / P L  112-81 of December 31, 2011) amended Section 121 of P L  109-364 to grant the Navy the authority to use five-year incremental funding for CVNs 78, 79, and 80  Since CVN-78 was fully funded in FY2008-FY2011, the provision in practice applied to CVNs 79 and 80  Section 121 of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  4310 / P L  112-239 of January 2, 2013) amended Section 121 of P L  109-364 to grant the Navy the authority to use six-year incremental funding for CVNs 78, 79, and 80  Since CVN-78 was fully funded in FY2008-FY2011, the provision in practice applies to CVNs 79 and 80  Section 121(c) of the John S  McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H R  5515 / P L  115-232 of August 13, 2018) authorized incremental funding to be used for making payments under the two-ship block buy contract for the construction of CVN-80 and CVN-81  This provision does not limit the total number of years across which incremental funding may be used to procure either ship  All U S  aircraft carriers procured since FY1958 have been built by Huntington Ingalls Industries/Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), of Newport News, VA  HII/NNS is the only U S  shipyard that can build large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers  The aircraft carrier construction industrial base also includes roughly 2,000 supplier firms in 46 states  The Gerald R  Ford (CVN-78) class carrier design ( Figure 1 ) is the successor to the Nimitz -class carrier design  The Ford -class design uses the basic Nimitz -class hull form but incorporates several improvements, including features permitting the ship to generate more aircraft sorties per day, more electrical power for supporting ship systems, and features permitting the ship to be operated by several hundred fewer sailors than a Nimitz -class ship, reducing 50-year life-cycle operating and support (O&S) costs for each ship by about $4 billion compared to the Nimitz -class design, the Navy estimates  Navy plans call for procuring at least four Ford-class carriers—CVN-78, CVN-79, CVN-80, and CVN-81  CVN-78, which was named Gerald R  Ford in 2007, was procured in FY2008  The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $13,084 0 million (i e , about $13 1 billion) in then-year dollars  The ship received advance procurement (AP) funding in FY2001-FY2007 and was fully funded in FY2008-FY2011 using congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding  To help cover cost growth on the ship, the ship received an additional $1,394 9 million in FY2014-FY2016 and FY2018 cost-to-complete procurement funding  (This $1,394 9 million is included in the above-mentioned estimated procurement cost of $13,084 0 million ) The ship was delivered to the Navy on May 31, 2017, and was commissioned into service on July 22, 2017  The Navy is currently working to complete construction, testing, and certification of the ship's 11 weapons elevators  CVN-79, which was named John F  Kennedy on May 29, 2011, was procured in FY2013  The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $11,327 4 million (i e , about $11 3 billion) in then-year dollars  The ship received AP funding in FY2007-FY2012, and was fully funded in FY2013-FY2018 using congressionally authorized six-year incremental funding  The ship is being built with an improved shipyard fabrication and assembly process that incorporates lessons learned from the construction of CVN-78  A key aim of this improved process is to substantially reduce the real (i e , inflation-adjusted) construction cost of CVN-79 compared to that of CVN-78  CVN-79 is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in September 2024  CVN-80 ( Enterprise ) and CVN-81 (not yet named) are being procured under a two-ship block buy contract that was authorized by Section 121(a)(2) of the John S  McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H R  5515 / P L  115-232 of August 13, 2018)  The provision permitted the Navy to add CVN-81 to the existing contract for building CVN-80 after the Department of Defense (DOD) made certain certifications to Congress  DOD made the certifications on December 31, 2018, and the Navy announced the award of the contract on January 31, 2019  Compared to the estimated procurement costs for CVN-80 and CVN-81 in the Navy's FY2019 budget submission, the Navy estimates under its FY2020 budget submission that the two-ship block buy contract will reduce the cost of CVN-80 by $246 6 million and the cost of CVN-81 by $2,637 3 million, for a combined reduction of $2,883 9 million (i e , about $2 9 billion)  (DOD characterizes the combined reduction as "nearly $3 billion " ) Using higher estimated baseline costs for CVN-80 and CVN-81 taken from a December 2017 Navy business case analysis, the Navy estimates under its FY2020 budget submission that the two-ship contract will reduce the cost of CVN-80 by $770 9 million and the cost of CVN-81 by $3,086 3 million, for a combined reduction of $3,857 2 million (i e , about $3 9 billion)  (DOD characterizes the combined reduction as $4 billion ) These figures are all expressed in then-year dollars, meaning dollars that are not adjusted for inflation  Regarding the difference between a savings of about $2 9 billion from the figures in the Navy's FY2019 budget submission and a savings of about $3 9 billion from the December 2017 Navy business case analysis, a February 5, 2019, press report quoted a Navy spokesman as stating that the Navy's FY2019 budget submission "already accounted for at least $1B [$1 billion] of potential savings, a two-CVN buy would save an additional $3B [$3 billion] " This suggests that the Navy, in preparing its FY2019 budget submission, may have anticipated that it would receive from Congress authority for implementing some kind of combined purchase (such as, perhaps, a combined purchase of materials) for CVN-80 and CVN-81  For additional background information on the two-ship block buy contract, see Appendix B   CVN-80, which was named Enterprise on December 1, 2012, was procured in FY2018  The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,335 1 million (i e , about $12 3 billion) in then-year dollars  The ship received AP funding in FY2016 and FY2017, and the Navy plans to fully fund the ship in FY2018-FY2025 using incremental funding authorized by Section 121(c) of P L  115-232   The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,062 0 million in procurement funding for the ship  The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in March 2028  Prior to the awarding of the two-ship block buy contract, CVN-81, which has not yet been named, was scheduled to be procured in FY2023  Following the awarding of the two-ship block buy contract, the Navy has chosen to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship to be procured in FY2020 (as opposed to a ship that was procured in FY2019)  The Navy's FY2020 budget submission estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,450 7 million (i e , about $12 5 billion) in then-year dollars  The Navy plans to fully fund the ship beginning in FY2019 and extending beyond FY2026 using incremental funding authorized by Section 121(c) of P L  115-232   The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,285 0 million in procurement funding for the ship  The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in February 2032  Table 1 shows procurement funding for CVNs 78, 79, 80, and 81 through FY2026+ (meaning FY2026 and some number of years after FY2026)  Congress has established procurement cost caps for CVN-78 class aircraft carriers: Section 122 of the FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  5122 / P L  109-364 of October 17, 2006) established a procurement cost cap for CVN-78 of $10 5 billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors, and a procurement cost cap for subsequent Ford-class carriers of $8 1 billion each, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors  The conference report ( H Rept  109-702 of September 29, 2006) on P L  109-364 discusses Section 122 on pages 551-552  Section 121 of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  3304 / P L  113-66 of December 26, 2013) amended the procurement cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $12,887 0 million for CVN-78 and a revised cap of $11,498 0 million for each follow-on ship in the program, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors (including an additional factor not included in original cost cap)  Section 122 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S  1356 / P L  114-92 of November 25, 2015) further amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $11,398 0 million for each follow-on ship in the program, plus adjustment for inflation and other factors, and with a new provision stating that, if during construction of CVN-79, the Chief of Naval Operations determines that measures required to complete the ship within the revised cost cap shall result in an unacceptable reduction to the ship's operational capability, the Secretary of the Navy may increase the CVN-79 cost cap by up to $100 million (i e , to $11 498 billion)  If such an action is taken, the Navy is to adhere to the notification requirements specified in the cost cap legislation  Section 121(a) of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  2810 / P L  115-91 of December 12, 2017) further amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $12,568 0 million for CVN-80 and subsequent ships in the program, plus adjustment for inflation and other factors  (The cap for CVN-79 was kept at $11,398 0 million, plus adjustment for inflation and other factors ) The provision also amended the basis for adjusting the caps for inflation, and excluded certain costs from being counted against the caps  In an August 2, 2017, letter to the congressional defense committees, then-Acting Secretary of the Navy Sean Stackley notified the committees that under subsection (b)(7) of Section 122 of P L  114-92 as amended by Section 121 of P L  113-66 —a subsection allowing increases to the cost cap for CVN-78 for "the amounts of increases or decreases in costs of that ship that are attributable solely to an urgent and unforeseen requirement identified as a result of the shipboard test program"—he had increased the cost cap for CVN-78 by $20 million, to $12,907 0 million  In a May 8, 2018, letter to the congressional defense committees, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer notified the committees that under subsections (b)(6) and (b)(7) of Section 122 of P L  114-92 as amended by Section 121 of P L  113-66 —subsections allowing increases to the cost cap for CVN-78 for "the amounts of increases or decreases to cost required to correct deficiencies that may affect the safety of the ship and personnel or otherwise preclude the ship from safe operation and crew certification" and for "the amounts of increases or decreases in costs of CVN 78 that are attributable solely to an urgent and unforeseen requirement identified as a result of the shipboard test program," respectively—he had increased the cost cap for CVN-78 by $120 million, to $13,027 million  Table 2 shows changes in the estimated procurement costs of CVNs 78, 79, 80, and 81 since the budget submission for FY2008—the year of procurement for CVN-78  The Navy's FY2020 budget submission proposed to not fund the mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul (called a Refueling Complex Overhaul, or RCOH) for the aircraft carrier CVN-75 ( Harry S  Truman ), and to instead retire the ship around FY2024 and also deactivate one of the Navy's carrier air wings at about the same time  On April 30, 2019, however, the Administration announced that it was effectively withdrawing this proposal from the Navy's FY2020 budget submission  The Administration now supports funding the CVN-75 RCOH and keeping CVN-75 (and by implication its associated air wing) in service past FY2024  For additional discussion of this withdrawn budget proposal, see Appendix A   One issue for Congress concerns DOD's decision to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship to be procured in FY2020, instead of a ship that was procured in FY2019  Grounds for showing CVN-81 as a ship that was procured in FY2019 would include the following: Within Section 121 of the John S  McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H R  5515 / P L  115-232 of August 13, 2018)—the provision that authorized the two-ship block buy contract for CVN-80 and CVN-81—subsection (a)(1) specifically authorizes a contract for the procurement of CVN-81 "beginning with the fiscal year 2019 program year " The header for subsection (a)(1) is "Procurement Authorized " Consistent with Section 121(a)(1), the funding table for the Navy's shipbuilding account in the conference report ( H Rept  115-874 of July 25, 2018) on H R  5515 shows a quantity of "1" in line 002 of the FY2019 SCN (Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy) appropriation account  Line 002 is the line item for procurement (not advance procurement [AP]) funding for the CVN-78 program  A notation in the table for line 002 states that the procurement funding authorized for this line item is for "Authorize CVN81—One ship " The funding table does not authorize any funding for line 003 of the FY2019 SCN account—the line item for AP funding for the CVN-78 program  (AP funding is funding for the procurement of a ship to be procured in a future fiscal year ) Consistent with the two above points, the paragraph in the FY2019 DOD appropriations act (Division A of H R  6157 / P L  115-245 of September 28, 2018) that makes appropriations for the SCN account makes procurement (not AP) appropriations for the CVN-78 program  This paragraph also states that "the funds made available by this Act for the Carrier Replacement Program (CVN-80) may be available to modify or enter into a new contract for the procurement of a Ford-class aircraft carrier designated CVN–81 pursuant to section 121 of the John S  McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 " Consistent with this bill language, the funding table for the SCN account in the joint explanatory statement for H R  6157 shows that this funding was provided for line 2 of the FY2019 SCN account (CVN-78 program procurement funding), not line 3 of the FY2019 SCN account (CVN-78 program AP funding)  Consistent with all of the above points (and as reflected in Table 1 of this CRS report), the Navy's FY2020 budget submission shows the $618 million in FY2019 funding for CVN-81 as full funding (meaning funding for a procured ship), rather than AP funding (meaning funding for a ship to be procured in a future fiscal year)  DOD's decision to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship to be procured in FY2020, instead of a ship that was procured in FY2019, affects the comparison of numbers of ships procured in FY2019 and FY2020  If DOD had decided to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship that was procured in FY2019, then the total number of ships procured in FY2019 would be 14, and the total number requested for FY2020 would be 11—3 ships, or 21%, fewer than the FY2019 total of 14  Showing CVN-81 in the FY2020 budget submission as an FY2020 ship changes the FY2019 and FY2020 totals to 13 ships and 12 ships, respectively, making number FY2020 closer to the FY2019 number  DOD's decision to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship to be procured in FY2020, instead of a ship that was procured in FY2019, also affects the aircraft carrier procurement profile shown in the Navy's FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) 30-year shipbuilding plan  If DOD had decided to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship that was procured in FY2019, the ship-procurement table in the 30-year plan would show the procurement of no carriers for the first eight years (FY2020-FY2027) of the 30-year period  Showing CVN-81 in the FY2020 budget submission as an FY2020 ship changes the presentation to show the procurement of an aircraft carrier in the first year of the 30-year period  Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: Compliance with c ongressional intent   Is DOD's decision to show CVN-81 as a ship to be procured in FY2020, rather than as a ship that was procured in FY2019, consistent with congressional intent as shown in bill and report language for P L  115-232 and P L  115-245 ? Can DOD's decision be viewed as a challenge to Congress's Article 1 power to authorize and appropriate funds for the construction of Navy ships? If DOD's decision regarding the year of procurement for CVN-81 is accepted, would this set a precedent for the executive branch regarding its future compliance with Congressional decisions for authorizing and funding of other federal programs? Executability of FY2019 procurement funds for CVN-81  FY2019 SCN-account funding for the CVN-78 program was appropriated by Congress, and shows in the Navy's FY2020 budget-justification books, as procurement funding (meaning funding for one or more procured ships) rather than AP funding (meaning funding for one or more ships to be procured in a future fiscal year)  If CVN-81 is accepted as a ship to be procured in FY2020, what implications, if any, might that have for the executability of the $618 million in FY2019 procurement (as opposed to AP) funds for CVN-81 shown in the Navy's FY2020 budget submission (as reflected in Table 1 of this CRS report)? Executability of CVN-81 during portion of FY2020 under a CR  Navy officials have testified that if the Navy operates under a continuing resolution (CR) for some part of FY2020, then absent a special legislative provision in the CR known as an anomaly, the Navy during that period likely would not be able to proceed with CVN-81, because CRs typically prevent year-to-year quantity increases in procurement programs, and treating CVN-81 as a ship to be procured in FY2020 would mean that the CVN-78 program would have a year-to-year quantity increase of zero ships in FY2019 followed by one ship in FY2020  If work on CVN-81 were to not proceed for some part of FY2020 because the Navy during that period were to operate under a CR, what impact would that have on the implementation and status of the two-ship contract for building CVN-80 and CVN-81? FY2019 and FY2020 numbers of ships procured and 30-year shipbuilding plan  What effect, if any, did considerations regarding the comparison of numbers of ships procured in FY2019 and FY2020 and the aircraft carrier procurement profile during the initial years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan have on DOD's decision to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship to be procured in FY2020, instead of a ship that was procured in FY2019? Treatment in FY2020 legislation  Since P L  115-232 shows CVN-81 as authorized in FY2019, how should the House and Senate Armed Services committees act on the request in the Navy's FY2020 budget submission to authorize an aircraft carrier in FY2020? If the FY2020 national defense authorization act authorizes the procurement of an aircraft carrier in FY2020, and the authorization for the procurement of an aircraft carrier in FY2019 were not rescinded, would that create confusion as to whether the ship being authorized in FY2020 was CVN-81 or CVN-82, the latter being a ship currently planned for procurement in FY2028? If the FY2019 authorization for CVN-81 were rescinded, what implications, if any, would that have for the implementation of Section 121 of P L  115-232 , including the award of the two-carrier contract on January 31, 2019 (i e , during FY2019)? Another issue for Congress concerns the Navy's decision, as part of its FY2020 budget submission, to not accelerate the scheduled procurement of CVN-82 from FY2028 to an earlier fiscal year  The Navy's FY2020 budget submission shows that, as a result of the two-carrier contract, the scheduled delivery date for CVN-81 has been accelerated by seven months, to February 2032, compared to September 2032 in the Navy's FY2019 budget submission  The scheduled year of procurement for CVN-82 has not been changed—in the Navy's FY2020 budget submission, it shows as a ship to be procured in FY2028, as it did in the Navy's FY2019 budget submission  The accelerated delivery date for CVN-81, combined with the unchanged year of procurement for CVN-82, suggests that the interval between the construction of CVN-81 and construction of CVN-82 has been increased by something like seven months  Other things held equal, this increased interval could result in increased loss of learning in shifting from construction of CVN-81 to construction of CVN-82, and possibly in reduced spreading of shipyard fixed overhead costs during the construction of CVN-82  Both of these effects could increase the procurement cost of CVN-82  Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: What impact, if any, will the accelerated delivery of CVN-81 under the two-carrier contract, combined with the unchanged year of procurement for CVN-82, have on the procurement cost of CVN-82? How might the procurement cost of CVN-82 change in real (i e , inflation-adjusted) terms if its year of procurement were accelerated to an earlier year, such as FY2027? Another issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding requests for CVN-78 program  In assessing this question, Congress could consider various factors, including whether the Navy has properly scheduled and accurately priced the work it is proposing to do on the CVN-78 program in FY2020, particularly in the context of implementing the two-carrier contract for CVN-80 and CVN-81  Another issue for Congress concerns the date for achieving the Navy's 12-ship force-level goal for aircraft carriers  As noted earlier, under the Navy's FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan, carrier procurement would shift from 5-year centers to 4-year centers after the procurement of CVN-82 in FY2028, and a 12-carrier force would be achieved on a sustained basis in the 2060s  As also noted earlier, shifting carrier procurement to 3- or 3 5-year centers could achieve a 12-carrier fleet as soon as the 2030s, unless the service lives of one or more existing carriers were substantially extended  Other things held equal, procuring carriers on 3- or 3 5-year centers rather than 4-year centers would increase Navy funding requirements during the period of the 30-year shipbuilding plan for procuring aircraft carriers and for operating and supporting a 12-carrier force rather than a force of 11 or fewer carriers  For the past several years, cost growth in the CVN-78 program, Navy efforts to stem that growth, and Navy efforts to manage costs so as to stay within the program's cost caps have been continuing oversight issues for Congress on the CVN-78 program  As shown in Table 2 , the estimated procurement costs of CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80 have grown 24 7%, 23 2%, and 15 1%, respectively, since the submission of the FY2008 budget  Cost growth on CVN-78 required the Navy to program $1,394 9 million in cost-to-complete procurement funding for the ship in FY2014-FY2016 and FY2018 (see Table 1 )  As also shown in Table 2 , however, cost growth on CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80 more or less stopped in FY2013 and FY2014: while the estimated cost of CVN-78 grew considerably between the FY2008 budget (the budget in which CVN-78 was procured) and the FY2014 budget, since the FY2014 budget, it has grown by only a small amount (about 2%); while the estimated cost of CVN-79 grew considerably between the FY2008 budget and the FY2013 budget (in part because the procurement date for the ship was deferred by one year in the FY2010 budget), since the FY2013 budget it has declined by a small amount (less than 1%); and while the estimated cost of CVN-80 grew considerably between the FY2008 budget and the FY2013 budget (in part because the procurement date for the ship was deferred by two years in the FY2010 budget), since the FY2013 budget it has declined by about 11%  Section 128 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S  1356 / P L  114-92 of November 25, 2015) states the following: SEC  128  Limitation on availability of funds for U S S  John F  Kennedy (CVN–79)  (a) Limitation —Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2016 for procurement for the U S S  John F  Kennedy (CVN–79), $100,000,000 may not be obligated or expended until the date on which the Secretary of the Navy submits to the congressional defense committees the certification under subsection (b)(1) or the notification under paragraph (2) of such subsection, as the case may be, and the reports under subsections (c) and (d)     (c) Report on costs relating to CVN–79 and CVN–80 — (1) IN GENERAL —Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that evaluates cost issues related to the U S S  John F  Kennedy (CVN–79) and the U S S  Enterprise (CVN–80)  (2) ELEMENTS —The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) Options to achieve ship end cost of no more than $10,000,000,000  (B) Options to freeze the design of CVN–79 for CVN–80, with exceptions only for changes due to full ship shock trials or other significant test and evaluation results  (C) Options to reduce the plans cost for CVN–80 to less than 50 percent of the CVN–79 plans cost  (D) Options to transition all non-nuclear Government-furnished equipment, including launch and arresting equipment, to contractor-furnished equipment  (E) Options to build the ships at the most economic pace, such as four years between ships  (F) A business case analysis for the Enterprise Air Search Radar modification to CVN–79 and CVN–80  (G) A business case analysis for the two-phase CVN–79 delivery proposal and impact on fleet deployments  Section 126 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act ( S  2943 / P L  114-328 of December 23, 2016) states the following: SEC  126  Limitation on availability of funds for procurement of U S S  Enterprise (CVN–80)  (a) Limitation —Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2017 for advance procurement or procurement for the U S S  Enterprise (CVN–80), not more than 25 percent may be obligated or expended until the date on which the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations jointly submit to the congressional defense committees the report under subsection (b)  (b) Initial report on CVN–79 and CVN–80 —Not later than December 1, 2016, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations shall jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes a description of actions that may be carried out (including de-scoping requirements, if necessary) to achieve a ship end cost of— (1) not more than $12,000,000,000 for the CVN–80; and (2) not more than $11,000,000,000 for the U S S  John F  Kennedy (CVN–79)  (c) Annual report on CVN–79 and CVN–80 — (1) IN GENERAL —Together with the budget of the President for each fiscal year through fiscal year 2021 (as submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code) the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations shall submit a report on the efforts of the Navy to achieve the ship end costs described in subsection (b) for the CVN–79 and CVN–80  (2) ELEMENTS —The report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the procurement of the CVN–79 and the CVN–80, the following: (A) A description of the progress made toward achieving the ship end costs described in subsection (b), including realized cost savings  (B) A description of low value-added or unnecessary elements of program cost that have been reduced or eliminated  (C) Cost savings estimates for current and planned initiatives  (D) A schedule that includes— (i) a plan for spending with phasing of key obligations and outlays; (ii) decision points describing when savings may be realized; and (iii) key events that must occur to execute initiatives and achieve savings  (E) Instances of lower Government estimates used in contract negotiations  (F) A description of risks that may result from achieving the procurement end costs specified in subsection (b)  (G) A description of incentives or rewards provided or planned to be provided to prime contractors for meeting the procurement end costs specified in subsection (b)  Section 121(b) of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  2810 / P L  115-91 of December 12, 2017) states the following: SEC  121  Aircraft carriers      (b) Waiver on limitation of availability of funds for CVN–79 —The Secretary of Defense may waive subsections (a) and (b) of section 128 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat  751) after a period of 60 days has elapsed following the date on which the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a written notification of the intent of the Secretary to issue such a waiver  The Secretary shall include in any such notification the following: (1) The rationale of the Secretary for issuing the waiver  (2) The revised test and evaluation master plan that describes when full ship shock trials will be held on Ford-class aircraft carriers  (3) A certification that the Secretary has analyzed and accepted the operational risk of the U S S  Gerald R  Ford deploying without having conducted full ship shock trials, and that the Secretary has not delegated the decision to issue such waiver  Sources of risk of cost growth on CVN-78 included, among other things, certain new systems to be installed on CVN-78 whose development, if delayed, could delay the completion of the ship  These systems included a new type of aircraft catapult called the Electromagnetic Launch System (EMALS), a new aircraft arresting system called the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), and the ship's primary radar, called the Dual Band Radar (DBR)  Congress has followed these and other sources of risk of cost growth for years  In July 2016, the DOD Inspector General issued a report critical of the Navy's management of the AAG development effort  In January 2017, it was reported that after conducting a review of potential alternative systems, the Navy had decided to continue stay with its plan to install EMALs and AAG on the first three Ford-class carriers  Section 125 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act ( S  2943 / P L  114-328 of December 23, 2016) limited the availability of funds for the AAG program until certain conditions are met  Navy officials have stated that they are working to control the cost of CVN-79 by equipping the ship with a less expensive primary radar, by turning down opportunities to add features to the ship that would have made the ship more capable than CVN-78 but would also have increased CVN-79's cost, and by using a build strategy for the ship that incorporates improvements over the build strategy that was used for CVN-78  These build-strategy improvements, Navy officials have said, include the following items, among others: achieving a higher percentage of outfitting of ship modules before modules are stacked together to form the ship; achieving "learning inside the ship," which means producing similar-looking ship modules in an assembly line-like series, so as to achieve improved production learning curve benefits in the production of these modules; and more economical ordering of parts and materials including greater use of batch ordering of parts and materials, as opposed to ordering parts and materials on an individual basis as each is needed  For additional background information on cost growth in the CVN-78 program, Navy efforts to stem that growth, and Navy efforts to manage costs so as to stay within the program's cost caps, see Appendix C and Appendix D   Another oversight issue for Congress concerns Navy efforts to complete the construction, testing, and certification of the weapons elevators on CVN-78  (The ship's weapons elevators transport missiles and bombs from the ship's weapon magazines to the ship's flight deck, so that they can be loaded onto aircraft that are getting ready to take off from the ship ) A November 2, 2018, press report states the following: The $13 billion Gerald R  Ford aircraft carrier, the U S  Navy's costliest warship, was delivered last year without elevators needed to lift bombs from below deck magazines for loading on fighter jets  Previously undisclosed problems with the 11 elevators for the ship built by Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc  add to long-standing reliability and technical problems with two other core systems—the electromagnetic system to launch planes and the arresting gear to catch them when they land  The Advanced Weapons Elevators, which are moved by magnets rather than cables, were supposed to be installed by the vessel's original delivery date in May 2017  Instead, final installation was delayed by problems including four instances of unsafe "uncommanded movements" since 2015, according to the Navy  While progress was being made on the carrier's other flawed systems, the elevator is "our Achilles heel," Navy Secretary Richard Spencer told reporters in August without providing details     The Navy says that the first carrier will be fully combat-capable, including the elevators, by July—the end of its current 12-month pier-side shakedown period in Virginia  Navy weapons buyer James Geurts cited what he called "considerable progress" on the Ford, including on the elevators, in a July 6 memo to Pentagon acquisition head Ellen Lord  The Navy in May requested permission from Congress in May to increase the Ford's cost cap by $120 million, partly to fix elevator issues "to preclude any effect on the safety of the ship and personnel " The safety issues related to the uncommanded movements, the Navy said in an email     Beci Brenton, a spokeswoman for Newport News, Virginia-based Huntington Ingalls, said "all the elevators are installed " She said the weapons elevator is among "the most advanced technologies being incorporated into" the carrier and "its completion has been delayed due to a number of first-in-class issues," Brenton said  "We are committed to working through the remaining technical challenges," she said  William Couch, a spokesman for the Naval Sea Systems Command, said the elevators are "in varying levels of construction and testing " Six are far enough along to be operated by the shipbuilder, and testing has started on two of those, he said  All 11 "should have been completed and delivered with the ship delivery," according to Couch  He said the contractor has corrected "all issues," including the "four uncommanded movements over the last three years that were discovered during the building, operational grooming, or testing phases "    A November 2010 program on PBS's "Nova" science series extolled the "Elevator of Tomorrow" being developed by Federal Equipment Co , a Cincinnati-based subcontractor to Huntington Ingalls  Doug Ridenour, president of Federal Equipment Co , said the elevator's key technologies "have been consistently demonstrated for years" in a test unit in the company's plant and any programming or software-related issues have been fixed  But "shipboard integration involves many other technology insertions not controlled by" his company, he said  At a November 27, 2018, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred: SENATOR TIM KAINE (continuing): There have been challenges with the advanced weapons elevators on the CVN, some of the technical difficult[ies] seem similar to those that were experienced earlier on both the [aircraft] launch and arresting systems  I think that the Navy put together independent review teams to tackle those issues and provide solutions  Are we at a point where that may be needed on the weapons elevators or are we in a position where we think the progress on the weapons elevators is satisfactory? JAMES F  GEURTS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION: Yes, sir  So there are 11 weapons elevators [and] each one of them we have to produce, test and then certify  The first two of those have been produced, the first one's been through test and certification  The second one is about 94 percent through test  We are making progress to get through all of the elevators during this availability  I am likely to do an independent review team not on the immediate construction for CVN-78 but looking at the longer-term sustainability, resilience, reliability to make sure we are in a position to support those elevators for the long term, that we've got all of the training and all of the reliability built into those  We've done so many independent reviews for the [CVN-]78 elevator design as they are so we won't do one on the current efforts on [CVN-]78  We've got a dedicated team working our way through those issues  KAINE: And is your timing on that testing and certification on [CVN-]78—you have this 12-month period where you are testing—[do] you think you will get through the testing and certification of all of the 11 elevators in that year one? GEURTS: My current assessment is we will get through all of the production and much of the testing  We may have some of the certification issues to go  I am watching it very closely and we will keep you and your staff informed on progress there  A December 5, 2018, press report stated the following: The Navy plans to complete installation and testing of the 11 elevators before the Ford completes its post-delivery shakedown phase in July, Captain Danny Hernandez, a Navy spokesman, said in an email  Six will also be certified for use by then, but five won't be completed until after July, he said  "A dedicated team is engaged on these efforts and will accelerate this certification work and schedule where feasible," he said  Huntington spokeswoman Beci Brenton said via email that company officials had a "very productive meeting" with Inhofe that included both the elevators and benefits of a two-carrier contract  The elevator's completion "has been delayed due to a number of first-in-class issues associated with the first-time installation, integration and test of this new technology," she said  "However, we are making substantial substantial progress in resolving the remaining technical challenges " A January 6, 2019, press report stated the following: The Navy Secretary has committed that the service and its industry partners will have working weapons elevators on aircraft carrier USS Gerald R  Ford (CVN-78) by the end of the summer—and the secretary's job is now on the line over that issue  The Navy accepted delivery of the first-in-class carrier and commissioned it into the fleet without any functioning weapons elevators  The carrier is now in its post-shakedown availability at builder Newport News Shipbuilding, after spending a year at sea running the ship to discover any potential flaws  Though the Navy already said the elevators would be addressed during this PSA period, the stakes are now higher: Navy Secretary Richard V  Spencer told President Donald Trump that the elevators would be installed and working by the time the carrier returns to sea, or else the president can use his famous "you're fired" line on the service secretary  Spencer said this morning at an event hosted by the Center for a New American Security that he spoke to Trump at length last month at the Army-Navy football game in Philadelphia  "I asked him to stick his hand out; he stuck his hand out  I said, let's do this like corporate America  I shook his hand and said, the elevators will be ready to go when she pulls out or you can fire me," Spencer said, adding that someone had to take accountability over the ongoing elevator challenges  "We're going to get it done  I know I'm going to get it done  I haven't been fired yet by anyone; being fired by the president really isn't on the top of my list "    The elevator issue has plagued the carrier for years, even if it garnered less attention than other high-profile new technologies on the carrier, such as the new Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and the Advanced Arresting Gear, both of which had their own fair share of technical problems  In 2016, the late Sen  John McCain (R-Ariz ), who then chaired the Senate Armed Services Committee, railed against the Ford-class program, noting that Ford was already overdue to be delivered to the Navy and still was facing ongoing technical difficulties  "The Navy's announcement of another two-month delay in the delivery of CVN-78 further demonstrates that key systems still have not demonstrated expected performance  The advanced arresting gear (AAG) cannot recover airplanes  Advanced weapons elevators cannot lift munitions  The dual-band radar cannot integrate two radar bands  Even if everything goes according to the Navy's plan, CVN-78 will be delivered with multiple systems unproven," McCain said in a July 2016 hearing  A month later the Pentagon announced a 60-day review of the Ford program, with a specific focus on five technology areas, including the elevators  Ford ultimately delivered to the Navy in June 2017 and commissioned a month later, still without working weapons elevators  In July 2018, when Ford entered PSA, the Navy said the maintenance availability had been extended from a planned eight months to a full year, to accommodate both the typical work that arises in PSA but also deferred work such as the construction and installation of weapons elevators and an upgrade to the AAG, whose technical challenges greatly contributed to the delayed delivery and commissioning of the ship  A January 16, 2019, press report stated the following: The Navy's newest aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R  Ford (CVN 78), closed out 2018 on a high note with the acceptance of the ship's first advanced weapons elevator (AWE), setting the tone for more positive developments in the year ahead  AWE Upper Stage #1 was turned over to the ship on Dec  21, following testing and certification by engineers at Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News Shipbuilding, where the ship is currently working through its post-shakedown availability (PSA)  The acceptance marks a major milestone for the ship and the Ford-class of aircraft carriers to follow     Though the first elevator has been accepted, work still remains on the remaining 10  Currently, all shipboard installation and testing activities of the AWEs are due to be completed prior to the end of Ford's PSA, scheduled for July  However, some remaining certification documentation will be performed for five of the 11 elevators after PSA completion  A March 6, 2019, press report stated the following: Nearly one month following the acceptance of its first advanced weapons elevator (AWE), the Navy's newest aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R  Ford (CVN 78), has accepted its second  AWE Upper Stage #3 was turned over to the ship February 14, following testing and certification by engineers at Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS), where the ship is currently working through its post-shakedown availability (PSA)  According to Ford's Weapons Officer, Cmdr  Joe Thompson, acceptance of the second AWE offers an opportunity for Ford Sailors to become acquainted with the equipment during the PSA  "This gives us more time to learn and become subject matter experts," explained Thompson  "All of us are learning on brand new systems and brand new concepts  This acceptance gives us the opportunity to have that 'run time' on the physical aspects of the elevator, but also in evaluating the technical manuals, and learning the maintenance required to keep them operational " With two elevators in hand, Thompson explained that Sailors training on these new systems will be able to apply the lessons learned from the first elevator, Upper Stage #1, and apply them to Upper Stage #3, thereby streamlining the learning process and lessening the learning curve  "This is going to allow us to progress faster," he explained  "As we get smarter on one, we move on to the next and apply the lessons learned not only with regard to elevator operation, but also in the testing and certification, and maintenance processes "… Acceptance of the elevator was accelerated due to a merging of the test programs between NNS and the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), which removed redundant steps and moved certification up by 10 days  The team has identified other areas where redundancy can be removed to make the acceptance timelines more efficient  Another oversight issue for Congress concerns CVN-78 program issues raised in a December 2018 report from DOD's Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—DOT&E's annual report for FY2018  Regarding the CVN-78 program, the report stated the following in part: Assessment • The delays in the ship development and initial trials pushed both phases of initial operational testing until FY21 and FY22  The delay in the ship's delivery and development added approximately 2 years to the timeline  As noted in previous annual reports, the CVN 78 test schedule has been aggressive, and the development of EMALS [Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System], AAG [Advanced Arresting gear], AWE [Advanced Weapons Elevator], DBR [Dual Band Radar], and the Integrated Warfare System delayed the ship's first deployment to FY22  Reliability • Four of CVN 78's new systems stand out as being critical to flight operations: EMALS, AAG, DBR, and AWEs  Overall, the poor reliability demonstrated by AAG and EMALS and the uncertain reliability of DBR and AWEs could delay CVN 78 IOT&E [Initial Operational Test and Evaluation]  The Navy continues to test all four of these systems in their shipboard configurations aboard CVN 78  Reliability estimates derived from test data for EMALS and AAG are discussed in following subsections  For DBR and AWE, only engineering reliability estimates have been provided  EMALS • Testing to date involved 747 shipboard launches and demonstrated EMALS capability to launch aircraft planned for the CVN 78 Air Wing  • Through the first 747 shipboard launches, EMALS suffered 10 critical failures  This is well below the requirement of 4,166 Mean Cycles Between Critical Failures, where a cycle represents the launch of one aircraft  • The reliability concerns are exacerbated by the fact that the crew cannot readily electrically isolate EMALS components during flight operations due to the shared nature of the Energy Storage Groups and Power Conversion Subsystem inverters onboard CVN 78  The process for electrically isolating equipment is time-consuming; spinning down the EMALS motor/generators takes 1 5 hours by itself  The inability to readily electrically isolate equipment precludes EMALS maintenance during flight operations  AAG • Testing to date included 763 attempted shipboard landings and demonstrated AAG capability to recover aircraft planned for the CVN 78 air wing  • The Program Office redesigned major components that did not meet system specifications during land-based testing  Through the first 763 attempted shipboard landings, AAG suffered 10 operational mission failures (which includes one failure of the barricade system)  This reliability estimate falls well below the re-baselined reliability growth curve and well below the requirement of 16,500 Mean Cycles Between Operational Mission Failures, where a cycle represents the recovery of one aircraft  • The reliability concerns are magnified by the current AAG design that does not allow electrical isolation of the Power Conditioning Subsystem equipment from high power buses, limiting corrective maintenance on below-deck equipment during flight operations  Combat System • Results of SBDT [sea-based developmental testing] events indicate good SSDS [ship self-defense system] performance in scheduling and launching simulated RAMs [Rolling Airframe Missiles] and ESSMs [Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles], as well as scheduling DBR directives for ESSM acquisition and target illumination  Insufficient interoperability testing with a CEC [Cooperative Engagement Capability] network and Link 16 prevents an estimate of performance in this area  It is unknown if the integration problems between SSDS and Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 identified during engineering testing at Wallops Island have been resolved because SEWIP Block 2 was not installed on the ship during these SBDT events  • CVN 78's combat system testing on the SDTS [self-defense test ship] is at risk due to schedule constraints, lack of funding, and insufficient planned developmental testing  DBR • Throughout the five CVN 78 SBDTs, DBR was plagued by extraneous false and close-in dual tracks adversely affecting its performance  • Integration of the DBR electronic protection capabilities remains incomplete and unfunded  With modern threats, a lack of electronic protection places the ship in a high-risk scenario if deployed to combat  • The Navy analysis noted that DBR performance needs to be improved to support carrier air traffic control center certification  Sortie Generation Rate • CVN 78 is unlikely to achieve its SGR [sortie generation rate] requirement  The target threshold is based on unrealistic assumptions including fair weather and unlimited visibility, and that aircraft emergencies, failures of shipboard equipment, ship maneuvers, and manning shortfalls will not affect flight operations  During the 2013 operational assessment, DOT&E conducted an analysis of past aircraft carrier operations in major conflicts  The analysis concludes that the CVN 78 SGR requirement is well above historical levels  • DOT&E plans to assess CVN 78 performance during IOT&E by comparing it to the SGR requirement as well as to the demonstrated performance of the Nimitz-class carriers  • Poor reliability of key systems that support sortie generation on CVN 78 could cause a cascading series of delays during flight operations that would affect CVN 78's ability to generate sorties  The poor or unknown reliability of these critical subsystems represents the most risk to the successful completion of CVN 78 IOT&E  Manning • Based on current expected manning, the berthing capacity for officers and enlisted will be exceeded by approximately 100 personnel with some variability in the estimates  This also leaves no room for extra personnel during inspections, exercises, or routine face-to-face turnovers  • Planned ship manning requires filling 100 percent of the billets  This is not the Navy's standard practice on other ships, and the personnel and training systems may not be able to support 100 percent manning  Additionally, workload estimates for the many new technologies such as catapults, arresting gear, radar, and weapons and aircraft elevators are not yet well understood  Electromagnetic Compatibility • Developmental testing identified significant EMI [electromagnetic interference] and radiation hazard problems  The Navy continues to characterize and develop mitigation plans for the problems, but some operational limitations and restrictions are expected to persist into IOT&E and deployment  The Navy will need to develop capability assessments at differring levels of system utilization in order for commanders to make informed decisions on system employment  Live Fire Test & Evaluation • The vulnerability of CVN 78's many new critical systems to underwater threat-induced shock is unknown  The program plans to complete shock testing on EMALS, AAG, and the AWE components during CY19, but because of a scarcity of systems, shock testing of DBR components lags and will likely not be completed before the FSSTs [full ship shock trials]  • The Vulnerability Assessment Report provides an assessment of the ship's survivability to air-delivered threat engagements  The classified findings in the report identify the specific equipment that most frequently would lead to mission capability loss  In FY19, the Navy is scheduled to deliver additional report volumes that will assess vulnerability to underwater threats and compliance with Operational Requirements Document survivability criteria  Recommendations The Navy should: 1  Provide schedule, funding, and an execution strategy for assessing SGR  This strategy should specify which testing will be accomplished live, a process for accrediting the Seabasing/Seastrike Aviation Model for operational testing, and a method for comparing CVN 78 performance with that of the Nimitz class  2  Continue to characterize the electromagnetic environment onboard CVN 78 and develop operating procedures to maximize system effectiveness and maintain safety  As applicable, the Navy should utilize the lessons learned from CVN 78 to inform design modifications for CVN 79 and future carriers  3  Develop and implement DBR electronic protection to enhance ship survivability against modern threats  4  Submit an updated TEMP  Another oversight issue for Congress concerns CVN-78 program issues raised in the 2019 edition of the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) annual report surveying selected DOD weapon acquisition programs  Some of these issues raised by GAO overlap with issues discussed in previous sections of this CRS report  Regarding the CVN-78 program, the report stated the following: Technology Maturity, Design Stability, and Production Readiness The Navy accepted delivery of the lead ship, CVN 78, in May 2017 despite challenges related to immature technologies and struggles to demonstrate the reliability of mature systems  The Navy reports that 10 of the Ford Class's 12 critical technologies are fully mature—the advanced arresting gear (AAG) and one of the ship's missile systems are not yet mature  The advanced weapons elevators are among the systems deemed mature by the Navy; however, according to Navy officials, only 2 of the 11 elevators installed on the ship can bring munitions to the flight deck—a key element of operational flights  The shipbuilder is working to correct the system during its first post-delivery maintenance period, now scheduled to end in October 2019, and the Navy plans to create a land-based site to test the elevators, which will come at an additional cost  Shipboard testing is ongoing for several critical systems and could delay future operational testing  Those systems include the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), AAG, and dual band radar (DBR)  Although the Navy is testing EMALS and AAG on the ship with aircraft, the reliability of those systems remains a concern  If these systems cannot function safely, CVN 78 will not demonstrate it can rapidly deploy aircraft—a key requirement for these carriers  Recent shipboard testing revealed that the Navy is struggling to get DBR to operate as planned  Moreover, DBR poses a greater radiation hazard to personnel and systems on an aircraft carrier than the Navy anticipated, which could restrict certain types of flight operations  The remaining challenges the Navy faces in maturing CVN 78's critical technologies could lead to their redesign or replacement on later ships  This would include CVN 79, which is currently 55 percent complete, as well as the third and fourth ships, CVNs 80 and 81  CVN 79 repeats the CVN 78 design with some modifications and replaces DBR with the Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR), which is in development  The Navy does not identify this new system as a critical technology in the Ford Class program because it derives from the pre-existing Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) program  However, EASR is a different size and performs a different mission than the AMDR systems, which are designed for destroyers  Therefore, EASR may still require design and development efforts to function on the carrier  The Navy plans to procure two EASR units for CVNs 79 and 80 and install the CVN 79 unit during that ship's second phase of delivery  CVNs 80 and 81 will repeat the design of CVN 79  Other Program Issues CVN 78's procurement costs increased by 23 percent over its initial cost cap and as a result of continuing technical deficiencies, the Navy may still require more funding to complete this ship  The Navy increased the current $12 9 billion cost cap for CVN 78 by $120 million in May 2018 to account for additional post-delivery work, but added work and cost changes may result in an additional cost increase  Costs for CVN 79 are also likely to increase as a result of optimistic cost and labor targets, putting the ship at risk of exceeding its $11 4 billion cost cap  The CVN 79 cost estimate assumes unprecedented construction efficiency—labor hours will be 18 percent lower than CVN 78  However, our analysis shows the shipbuilder is not meeting this goal and is unlikely to improve performance enough to meet cost and labor targets  Congress raised the cost cap for CVN 80 and later ships to $12 6 billion and approved the Navy's plans to buy two carriers—CVNs 80 and 81—at the same time, based on the shipbuilder's estimate that this strategy will save the Navy over $2 billion  However, it is unclear whether the Navy can meet this cost cap, even with the estimated savings from a two-ship buy, because it assumes further reductions in subsystem costs, construction change orders, and labor hours  The Navy projects a further reduction in labor hours compared to CVN 79—about 25 percent fewer labor hours than CVN 78—will contribute to cost savings for these ships  The program office indicated that it does not separately track or report information on software development to integrate the various subsystems of the ship  These subsystems include CVN 78's combat control systems, which rely on integrating systems through software intensive development  Program Office Comments We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment  The program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate  The program office stated that, in July 2018, CVN 78 entered a year-long maintenance period  It also said that, as of February 2019, two advanced weapons elevators are operating, and it continues to improve developmental system reliability  The program also stated that, with CVN 79 construction 55 percent complete, shipbuilder cost performance remains stable, but slightly below the level needed to achieve production labor hour reduction targets  The program stated that the shipbuilder continues to work through the effects of material shortfalls that disrupted performance  The program said that the Navy plans to deliver a complete, deployable ship as scheduled and within the cost cap to maintain an 11-carrier fleet  The program office also stated that the Navy awarded the CVN 80/81 procurement contract in January 2019 and expects to save $4 billion, compared to if it had purchased each ship individually  According to the program, the contract limits the Navy's liability and incentivizes the shipyard's best performance  Another oversight issue for Congress is whether the Navy should shift at some point from procuring large-deck, nuclear-powered carriers like the CVN-78 class to procuring smaller aircraft carriers  The issue has been studied periodically by the Navy and other observers over the years  To cite one example, the Navy studied the question in deciding on the aircraft carrier design that would follow the Nimitz (CVN-68) class  Advocates of smaller carriers argue that they are individually less expensive to procure, that the Navy might be able to employ competition between shipyards in their procurement (something that the Navy cannot do with large-deck, nuclear-powered carriers like the CVN-78 class, because only one U S  shipyard, HII/NNS, can build aircraft carriers of that size), and that today's aircraft carriers concentrate much of the Navy's striking power into a relatively small number of expensive platforms that adversaries could focus on attacking in time of war  Supporters of large-deck, nuclear-powered carriers argue that smaller carriers, though individually less expensive to procure, are less cost-effective in terms of dollars spent per aircraft embarked or aircraft sorties that can be generated, that it might be possible to use competition in procuring certain materials and components for large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and that smaller carriers, though perhaps affordable in larger numbers, would be individually less survivable in time of war than large-deck, nuclear-powered carriers  At a March 18, 2015, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Navy testified that it had initiated a new study on the question  At the hearing, the following exchange occurred: SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, ATTENDING EX OFFICIO: And you are looking at additional options to the large aircraft carrier as we know it  SEAN STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,AND ACQUISITION: We've initiated a study and I think you've discussed this with the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] and that's with the frontend of that study  Yes, sir  Later in the hearing, the following exchange occurred: SENATOR ROGER WICKER, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER SUBCOMMITTEE: Well, Senator McCain expressed concern about competition [in Navy shipbuilding programs]  And I think that was with, in regard to aircraft carriers  SEAN J  STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,AND ACQUISITION: Yes, Sir  WICKER: Would you care to respond to that? STACKLEY: He made a generic comment that we need competition to help control cost in our programs and we are absolutely in agreement there  With specific regards to the aircraft carrier, we have been asked and we are following suit to conduct a study to look at alternatives to the Nimitz and Ford class size and type of aircraft carriers, to see if it make sense  We've done this in the past  We're not going to simply break out prior studies, dust them off and resubmit it  We're taking a hard look to see is there—is there a sweet spot, something different other than today's 100,000 ton carrier that would make sense to provide the power projection that we need, that we get today from our aircraft carriers, but at the same time put us in a more affordable position for providing that capability  WICKER: OK  But right now, he's—he's made a correct factual statement with regard to the lack of competition  STACKLEY: Yes, Sir  There is—yes, there is no other shipyard in the world that has the ability to construct a Ford or a Nimitz nuclear aircraft carrier other than what we have in Newport News and the capital investment to do that is prohibitive to set up a second source, so obviously we are—we are content, not with the lack of competition, but we are content with knowing that we're only going to have one builder for our aircraft carriers  On March 20, 2015, the Navy provided the following additional statement to the press: As indicated in testimony, the Navy has an ongoing study to explore the possible composition of our future large deck aviation ship force, including carriers  There is a historical precedent for these type[s] of exploratory studies as we look for efficiencies and ways to improve our war fighting capabilities  This study will reflect our continued commitment to reducing costs across all platforms by matching capabilities to projected threats and Also [sic] seeks to identify acquisition strategies that promote competition in naval ship construction  While I can't comment on an ongoing study, what I can tell you is that the results will be used to inform future shipbuilding budget submissions and efforts, beyond what is currently planned  Section 128 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S  1356 / P L  114-92 of November 25, 2015) states the following: SEC  128  Limitation on availability of funds for U S S  John F  Kennedy (CVN–79)  (a) Limitation —Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2016 for procurement for the U S S  John F  Kennedy (CVN–79), $100,000,000 may not be obligated or expended until the date on which the Secretary of the Navy submits to the congressional defense committees the certification under subsection (b)(1) or the notification under paragraph (2) of such subsection, as the case may be, and the reports under subsections (c) and (d)     (d) Report on future development — (1) IN GENERAL —Not later than April 1, 2016, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on potential requirements, capabilities, and alternatives for the future development of aircraft carriers that would replace or supplement the CVN–78 class aircraft carrier  (2) ELEMENTS —The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) A description of fleet, sea-based tactical aviation capability requirements for a range of operational scenarios beginning in the 2025 timeframe  (B) A description of alternative aircraft carrier designs that meet the requirements described under subparagraph (A)  (C) A description of nuclear and non-nuclear propulsion options  (D) A description of tonnage options ranging from less than 20,000 tons to greater than 100,000 tons  (E) Requirements for unmanned systems integration from inception  (F) Developmental, procurement, and lifecycle cost assessment of alternatives  (G) A notional acquisition strategy for the development and construction of alternatives  (H) A description of shipbuilding industrial base considerations and a plan to ensure opportunity for competition among alternatives  (I) A description of funding and timing considerations related to developing the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels required under section 231 of title 10, United States Code  The report required by Section 128(d) of P L  114-92 , which was conducted for the Navy by the RAND Corporation, was delivered to the congressional defense committees in classified form in July 2016  An unclassified version of the report was then prepared and issued in 2017 as a publicly released RAND report  The executive summary of that report states the following (emphasis as in original): We analyzed the feasibility of adopting four aircraft carrier concept variants as follow-ons to the Ford-class carrier following USS Enterprise (CVN 80) or the as-yet-unnamed CVN 81  Among these options are two large-deck carrier platforms that would retain the capability to launch and recover fixed-wing aircraft using an on-deck catapult and arresting gear system and two smaller carrier platforms capable of supporting only short takeoff and vertical landing (STVOL) aircraft  Specifically, the four concept variants are as follows: • a follow-on variant continuing the current 100,000-ton Ford-class carrier but with two life-of-the-ship reactors and other equipment and system changes to reduce cost (we refer to this design concept as CVN 8X) • a 70,000-ton USS Forrestal–size carrier with an updated flight deck and hybrid nuclear-powered integrated propulsion plant with capability to embark the current large integrated air wing but with reduced sortie generation capability, survivability, and endurance compared with the Ford class (we refer to this design concept as CVN LX) • a 43,000-ton variant of the USS America–class, fossil fuel–powered and arranged to support only STOVL operations but at a higher tempo than the current LHA 6 (USS America) (we refer to this design concept as CV LX)  This variant would incorporate the larger ship's beam excursion the Navy examined in the LHA 8–class flight 1 studies  • a 20,000-ton variant that will resemble escort carriers that some allied navies currently operate (we refer to this design concept as CV EX)  Similar to the 43,000-ton variant, it will be conventionally powered and will operate STOVL aircraft     Our analyses of the carrier variants illuminated capability shortfalls in some instances  Our overall findings are as follows: • The CVN 8X, the descoped Ford-class carrier, offers similar warfighting capability to that of the Ford-class carrier today  There might be opportunities to reduce costs by eliminating costly features that only marginally improve capability, but similar tradeoffs are likely to be made in the current program as well  • The CVN LX concept variant offers an integrated, current air wing with capabilities near current levels but with less organic mission endurance for weapons and aviation fuel  It will not generate the same SGR as the Ford-class carrier, but this is not a significant limitation for stressing warfighting scenarios  It will be less survivable in some environments and have less redundancy than the Ford program-of-record ship, and these factors might drive different operation concepts  Although we do not characterize the impact of decreased survivability, this is an important limitation that will have to be weighed against the potential cost savings  The major means of reducing cost is through engineering redundancy, speed, and air wing fuel capacity, and these could affect mobility and theater closure  • The concept variant CV LX, which is a version of the LHA 6 platforms, might be a low-risk, alternative pathway for the Navy to reduce carrier costs if such a variant were procured in greater numbers than the current carrier shipbuilding plan; our analysis suggests a two-to-one replacement  Over the long term, however, as the current carrier force is retired, the CV LX would not be a viable option for the eventual carrier force unless displaced capabilities were reassigned to new aircraft or platforms in the joint force, which would be costly  This platform would be feasible for a subset of carrier missions but, even for those missions, could require an increase in the number of platforms  This concept variant might, if procured in sufficient numbers, eventually enable the Navy to reduce the number of Ford-class carriers in the overall force structure, but more-extensive analysis of missions, operations, and basing of such a variant and the supported air combat element is required  • The smallest concept variants reviewed, the CV EX 20,000-ton sea-based platforms, do not provide either a significant capacity or an integrated air wing and, thus, force reliance on other legacy platforms or land-based assets to provide key elements of capability—in particular, AEW  As a result, this concept variant is not really a replacement for current aircraft carrier capability and would require other platforms, aircraft, weapons, and capabilities in the joint force  These platforms would be a viable pathway only in broad fleet architecture transformation providing a narrow mission set, perhaps regionally, and would require extensive analysis  Given that such a concept variant is not a viable replacement for an aircraft carrier, such analysis would be required to see whether any adjustment on the current aircraft carrier program would be feasible     The overall results of our cost comparison are as follows: • The descoped Ford-class carrier, the CVN 8X, might generate fewer sorties than the current key performance parameter values for the Ford class and might have only incremental reduction in overall platform cost   The analysis examining cost reduction with transition to a life-of-the-ship reactor, such that being done on submarine programs, does not appear to be cost effective  Between the developmental costs and a reduced service life, there is little cost advantage in this variant  • The CVN LX concept would allow considerable savings across the ship's service life and appears to be a viable alternative to consider for further concept exploration   Construction costs would be lower; design changes and life-cycle costs would reflect the lessons already applied in the Ford class  The reliance on hybrid drive with fewer mechanical parts than legacy platforms is likely to further reduce maintenance cost  However, CVN LX would be a new design that would require a significant investment in nonrecurring engineering in the near term to allow timely delivery in the 2030s  • CV LX, although it requires a larger force structure to maintain air capabilities, might still reduce overall construction costs if large carrier numbers were reduced  But, as described in the report, reducing carrier numbers with the resulting loss of capability should not be pursued without extensive further analysis for all displaced missions in the joint force execution of warfighting scenarios and, potentially, regional basing and narrowly focused missions for these platforms  Any cost savings would likely be offset to an unknown degree by requirements for additional systems to mitigate loss of capability associated with this variant  • CV EX, the smallest variant, is not a practical variant at all without considerable revision of the Navy warfighting concept of operations  Although the same is to a degree true with CV LX, the impact of an even larger number of low-sortie ships with small and limited air wings is even more pronounced with this variant  CV EX has all of the shortfalls of CV LX and will pose even greater issues of mutual support and logistics sustainment     Conclusions Our analysis points to potential options for replacing the Nimitz-class carrier as these ships reach expected service life that have lower procurement costs than the Ford-class carriers  However, most of these options come with reduced capability that might require changes in the concept of operations to deliver sea-based aircraft capability comparable to that of carriers in the fleet today  If a new platform is introduced in the mid-2030s, the Navy's force structure will still contain a large legacy force of Nimitz- and Ford-class carriers, at least until the mid-2050 time frame, which might lower the risks of introducing a new carrier for some period of time  But, ultimately, if a new carrier variant is selected, it will define the carrier force and constitute the supported capability available to the Navy  Capability shortfalls can be mitigated, to some degree, with changes in operational concepts or by adding additional platforms to the force structure—which introduces additional cost that might offset anticipated cost savings  In addition, if the Navy stops procuring large-deck nuclear carriers, the ability to reconstitute the industrial base at some time in the future comes with substantial risk  Although SGR [sortie generation rate] was a central variable in comparing the carrier variants, our analysis suggests that there is room to make trade-offs in aircraft sortie rate capacity between the Ford-class carrier and a lower-cost platform  However, it is important to consider that, whatever threats complicate carrier operations, they might even more significantly affect land-based tactical air operations  Carriers can move; have defensive support from escorts; can readily replenish; and might, in fact, be more survivable than their land-based counterparts  This is an important factor for Congress and the Department of Defense to consider before a trade-off is made to give up the supported air wing sortie generation capacity in the overall sea-based force  The question of whether to shift to smaller aircraft carriers was also addressed in three studies on future fleet architecture that were required by Section 1067 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S  1356 / P L  114-92 of November 25, 2015)  These three studies are discussed in more detail in another CRS report  A February 15, 2019, press report stated the following: Under Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly said now that the Navy found a way to build two new Gerald R  Ford-class aircraft carriers while saving money it is starting to look at future carrier procurement, which might be very different … Modly said Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer sees $13 billion carriers as not sustainable going forward and the service will be looking at ways to further reduce costs or keep the carrier capabilities more affordable in future ship procurements  "There was general conclusion that those two for sure would be built" and once that was determined "that was going to happen," Modly said during the AFCEA West 2019 conference here [in San Diego] … After the CVN-80 and -81 [procurement] decision was made, "I think a lot of derivative decisions still need to be made  So the secretary [Spencer] would like to take a look at 'O K  now that we made that decision, and that second one that comes will be in quite a few years from now, we need to start thinking now about what's the next one look like '" Modly told reporters they are asking questions like "Is it going to be advanced as this one? Or is it going to be smaller or are we going to buy two smaller ones or maybe shift air power to other forms of delivery  And we don't know the answers of that but we're looking at this " An earlier oversight issue for Congress for the CVN-78 program was whether to conduct the shock trial for the CVN-78 class in the near term, on the lead ship in the class, or years later, on the second ship in the class  For background information on that issue, see Appendix E   Table 3 summarizes congressional action on the FY2020 procurement funding request for the CVN-78 program  As shown in Table 1 , of the $2,347 0 million requested for FY2020, $1,062 million is for CVN-80 and $1,285 million is for CVN-81  Appendix A  Withdrawn Proposal to Not Fund CVN-75 RCOH The Navy's FY2020 budget submission proposed to not fund the mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul (called a Refueling Complex Overhaul, or RCOH) for the aircraft carrier CVN-75 ( Harry S  Truman ), and to instead retire the ship around FY2024 and also deactivate one of the Navy's carrier air wings at about the same time  On April 30, 2019, however, the Administration announced that it was effectively withdrawing this proposal from the Navy's FY2020 budget submission  The Administration now supports funding the CVN-75 RCOH and keeping CVN-75 (and by implication its associated air wing) in service past FY2024  This appendix presents, for reference purposes, additional background information on this withdrawn budget proposal  Following the Administration's April 30 withdrawal of its proposal to not fund the CVN-75 RCOH, the Navy states that the CVN-75 RCOH can no longer begin in FY2024, as planned prior to the Navy's FY2020 budget submission, because the Navy spent the months prior to April 30 planning for the ship's deactivation rather than for giving it an RCOH  As a result, the Navy states, the CVN-75 will now begin a year later, in FY2025  As a consequence of this one-year shift in the schedule for the RCOH, the Navy states, the funding stream for the CVN-75 shown in Table A-1 will also now shift one year to the right, and the CVN-75 RCOH can be reinstated without any funding in FY2020, because FY2020 is now effectively the same as FY2019 in Table A-1   Performing an RCOH on a carrier is needed for the carrier to be able to operate for the second half of its intended 50-year service life  Not performing an RCOH on CVN-75 would mean that, instead of remaining in service for the second half of its intended 50-year service life, the ship would be decommissioned, permanently removed from service, and eventually dismantled  (CVN-75 was commissioned into service on July 25, 1998, and will be 26 years old in 2024 ) The Navy's FY2020 budget submission shows that, for the period FY2022-FY2047, this would have reduced the size of the carrier force by one ship compared to what it would otherwise be  More specifically, the Navy's FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan, reflecting the proposal to not fund the CVN-75 RCOH, projected that the carrier force would remain at 11 ships through FY2024, decline to 10 ships in FY2025, and remain at 10 ships for the remainder of the 30-year period, except for a few years (FY2027, FY2040, FY2042-FY2044, and FY2046-FY2048) when it would temporarily decline to 9 ships  Consequently, beginning in FY2025 and extending through the end of the 30-year period, the carrier force would not be in compliance with the requirement under 10 U S C  8062(b) for the Navy to maintain a force of not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers  As an associated action, the Navy's FY2020 budget submission also proposed deactivating one of the Navy's carrier air wings around FY2024  This would reduce the number of carrier air wings from nine to eight, meaning that the Navy beginning around FY2024 would no longer be in compliance with the requirement under 10 U S C  8062(e) to maintain a minimum of nine carrier air wings  Table A-1 shows funding for the CVN-75 RCOH in the Navy's FY2019 budget submission  As shown in the table, the estimated total cost of the CVN-75 RCOH in the FY2019 budget submission was $5,578 million (i e , about $5 6 billion)  The figure of about $5 6 billion shown in Table A-1 does not include the cost of the two nuclear fuel cores that would be installed as part of the RCOH  (CVN-75, like all Nimitz-class carriers, has two nuclear reactors, each of which would receive a new fuel core as part of an RCOH ) Fuel cores for aircraft carrier RCOHs are procured through the Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) appropriation account  The Navy states that it procured the cores for the CVN-75 RCOH—one of them in FY2008 and the other in FY2011—for a total cost of about $538 million  Adding this $538 million cost to the total cost shown in Table A-1 would increase the total estimated cost of the CVN-75 RCOH to about $6 1 billion  The fuel cores for the planned future RCOHs for CVN-76 and CVN-77 (the final two Nimitz-class carriers) have also been procured—the CVN-76 RCOH cores were funded in FY2012 and FY2013, and the CVN-77 RCOH cores were funded in FY2015 and FY2019  Thus, if CVN-75 were to not receive an RCOH, and if it were not possible or cost effective to rescind the funding for the core funded in FY2019, then two of the six Nimitz-class fuel cores that have been procured since FY2008 for anticipated use in RCOHs would not in the end be used in an RCOH and would in effect become surplus to the RCOH effort  The Navy indicated that if that were to occur, these two cores would be placed in storage for potential future use as emergency replacement cores for a Nimitz-class ship until all Nimitz-class ships complete their service lives  If CVN-75 were to not receive an RCOH and is instead be decommissioned, the savings from not funding the RCOH would be partially offset by the cost to deactivate and dismantle CVN-75  The Navy estimated the cost to deactivate and dismantle CVN-75 at about $1 5 billion  The initial increments of this approximate $1 5-billion cost would have occurred in FY2023 ($130 3 million) and FY2024 ($247 2 million)  The estimated net savings from not funding the RCOH and instead deactivating and dismantling the ship would thus have been about $4 1 billion (i e , about $5 6 billion less about $1 5 billion)  The Navy stated that there would also be 20 to 25 years of additional annual savings of about $1 billion per year in the form of avoided annual operation and support (O&S) costs for CVN-75 and the deactivated carrier air wing  DOD officials reportedly wanted to redirect the estimated net RCOH-related savings of about $4 1 billion and the estimated recurring savings of about $1 billion per year to Navy investments for technologies that will add to future Navy capabilities  RCOHs are done primarily by Huntington Ingalls Industries/Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS) in Newport News, VA, and form a significant part of HII/NNS's business base, along with construction of new nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and construction of new nuclear-powered submarines  RCOHs in recent years have been scheduled in a more-or-less heel-to-toe fashion at HII/NNS—when one RCOH is done, the next one is scheduled to begin soon thereafter  RCOHs are done in a particular dry dock at HII/NNS, so a carrier undergoing an RCOH in that dry dock must be ready to depart the dry dock before the following carrier can be moved into the dry dock for its RCOH  Until it was withdrawn, the proposal in the Navy's FY2020 budget submission to not fund CVN-75's RCOH and instead decommission the ship (and a carrier air wing) raised a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following: Compliance with congressional direction  The central purposes of 10 U S C  8062(b) and 8062(e) are to act as mandates to the executive branch to support a force of not less than 11 carriers and a minimum of 9 carrier air wings in executive branch planning  They represent directions from Congress for the Navy to provide the funding needed to maintain an 11-carrier, 9-carrier-air-wing force, regardless of limitations on the Navy's overall budget or other considerations  A proposed budget from the Navy that is inconsistent with these provisions might thus be viewed as a challenge to Congress's Article 1 power to set policy and to determine the composition of federal spending (i e , Congress's constitutional power of the purse)  If DOD were to treat the requirements in 10 U S C  8062(b) and 8062(e) as optional matters rather than mandates, would this create a precedent for the executive branch to treat similar provisions in the U S  Code as optional matters rather than mandates? For example, would it create a precedent for DOD, if it so desired, to begin treating as an optional matter the long-standing requirement in 10 U S C  8063(a) that the Marine Corps "shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein?" If the executive branch were to begin treating statutory provisions like 10 U S C  8062(b) and 8062(e) as optional matters rather than mandates, what implications might this have for policy and program execution, for Congress's power to legislatively establish policy and program goals, and for Congress's power of the purse? Alternative capabilities to be funded ; net impact on Navy capabilities   What were OSD's plans for redirecting the savings associated with deactivating CVN-75 and a carrier air wing around FY2024? What types of capabilities would have been created or maintained by these redirected funds? How would these capabilities compare in nature and timing to the capabilities that are to be provided by the continued operation of CVN-75 and the carrier air wing? Taking these factors into account, what would have been the net operational impact for the Navy of deactivating CVN-75 and a carrier air wing around FY2024 and redirecting the resulting savings toward these other investments? Requirement for 12-carrier force  The Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) led to a Navy force-level requirement for a fleet of 355 ships that includes 12 aircraft carriers  OSD allowed the Navy to present that FSA to the Congress, and to program shipbuilding and other actions in support of achieving the 355-ship force-level goal  OSD did not publicly object to the FSA's 12-carrier requirement (or any other part of the 355-ship force-level goal)  What was the analytical basis for an action that would reduce the size of the carrier from 11 to 10, instead of helping it to eventually increase from 11 to 12? Next Force Structure Assessment (FSA)  The Navy states that it is currently conducting a new FSA as the successor to the 2016 FSA, and that this new FSA is to be completed by the end of 2019  This new FSA could change the 355-ship figure, the planned mix of ships, or both  Did the Navy's proposal to not fund the CVN-75 RCOH, and thereby reduce the carrier force from 11 ships to 10 ships, prejudge the outcome of the new FSA? Would the new FSA be tainted by the knowledge that the Navy had already proposed reducing the carrier force to 10 ships? How well could the analysts performing the new FSA have avoided being influenced by the Navy's proposed action? Was the Navy prepared to go ahead with the CVN-75 RCOH if the new FSA concludes that there is a requirement for 11 or more carriers? Likelihood of need for emergency replacement cores  How likely was it that the Nimitz-class program would need to use an emergency replacement set of fuel cores during the remainder of the Nimitz-class life cycle? What set of circumstances might lead to a need for an emergency replacement set of fuel cores? How often have such circumstances previously arisen for a nuclear-powered U S  Navy ship whose fuel cores are intended to be sufficient for powering the ship for at least one-half of its expected service life? Given the assessed likelihood of the Nimitz-class program needing to use an emergency replacement set of fuel cores during the remainder of the Nimitz-class life cycle, what would have been the government's resulting return on investment of the several hundred million dollars used to procure the two fuel cores that would be placed in storage? Acting Secretary of Defense  The proposal to not fund the CVN-75 RCOH and to deactivate a carrier air wing represented a notable change from prior DOD force-structure planning and budgeting  Was it appropriate for such a change to be proposed by DOD during a time when DOD has an acting Secretary of Defense rather than a Secretary who was confirmed specifically for that position? Impact on industrial base and cost of other work  What would have been the impact on HII/NNS and the other parts of the aircraft carrier industrial base if CVN-75 were inactivated rather than given an RCOH? What impact, if any, would this have had on the cost of other work performed at HII/NNS and other parts of the aircraft carrier industrial base during these years, and on the eventual cost of the CVN-76 RCOH? For further reference, it can be noted that the Navy's FY2015 budget submission proposed not funding the RCOH for the aircraft carrier CVN-73 ( George Washington )  The proposal raised oversight issues for Congress broadly similar to those listed above  Congress, in acting on the Navy's proposed FY2015 budget, rejected the proposal to not fund CVN-73's RCOH  The RCOH was funded and is currently underway  Appendix B  Background Information on Two-Ship Block Buy for CVN-80 and CVN-81 This appendix presents additional background information on the two-ship block buy contract for CVN-80 and CVN-81  The option for procuring two CVN-78 class carriers under a two-ship block buy contract had been discussed in this CRS report since April 2012  In earlier years, the discussion focused on the option of using a block buy contract for procuring CVN-79 and CVN-80  In more recent years, interest among policymakers focused on the option of using a block buy contract for procuring CVN-80 and CVN-81  On March 19, 2018, the Navy released a request for proposal (RFP) to Huntington Ingalls Industries/Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS) regarding a two-ship buy of some kind for CVN-80 and CVN-81  A March 20, 2018, Navy News Service report stated the following: The Navy released a CVN 80/81 two-ship buy Request for Proposal (RFP) to Huntington Ingalls Industries—Newport News Shipbuilding (HII-NNS) March 19 to further define the cost savings achievable with a two-ship buy  With lethality and affordability a top priority, the Navy has been working with HII-NNS over the last several months to estimate the total savings associated with procuring CVN 80 and CVN 81 as a two-ship buy  "In keeping with the National Defense Strategy, the Navy developed an acquisition strategy to combine the CVN 80 and CVN 81 procurements to better achieve the Department's objectives of building a more lethal force with greater performance and affordability," said James F  Geurts, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research Development and Acquisition  "This opportunity for a two-ship contract is dependent on significant savings that the shipbuilding industry and government must demonstrate  The Navy is requesting a proposal from HII-NNS in order to evaluate whether we can achieve significant savings " The two-ship buy is a contracting strategy the Navy has effectively used in the 1980s to procure Nimitz-class aircraft carriers and achieved significant acquisition cost savings compared to contracting for the ships individually  While the CVN 80/81 two-ship buy negotiations transpire, the Navy is pursuing contracting actions necessary to continue CVN 80 fabrication in fiscal year (FY) 2018 and preserve the current schedule  The Navy plans to award the CVN 80 construction contract in early FY 2019 as a two-ship buy pending Congressional approval and achieving significant savings  Section 121(a)(2) of the John S  McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H R  5515 / P L  115-232 of August 13, 2018) permitted the Navy, after the Department of Defense (DOD) made certain certifications to Congress, to add CVN-81 to the existing contract for building CVN-80  DOD provided the required certification on December 31, 2018  On January 31, 2019, the Navy announced that it had awarded a two-ship fixed-price incentive (firm target) (FPIF) contract for CVN-80 and CVN-81 to HII/NNS  The two-ship contract for CVN-80 and CVN-81 can be viewed as a block buy contract because the two ships are being procured in different fiscal years (CVN-80 was procured in FY2018 and CVN-81 is shown in the Navy's FY2020 budget submission as a ship procured in FY2020)  The Navy's previous two-ship aircraft carrier procurements occurred in FY1983 (for CVN-72 and CVN-73) and FY1988 (for CVN-74 and CVN-75)  In each of those two earlier cases, however, the two ships were fully funded within a single fiscal year, making each of these cases a simple two-ship purchase (akin, for example, to procuring two Virginia-class attack submarines or two DDG-51 class destroyers in a given fiscal year) rather than a two-ship block buy (i e , a contract spanning the procurement of end items procured across more than one fiscal year)  Compared to DOD's estimate that the two-ship block buy contract for CVN-80 and CVN-81 would produce savings of $3 9 billion (as measured from estimated costs for the two ships in the December 2017 Navy business case analysis), DOD states that "the Department of Defense's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) developed an Independent Estimate of Savings for the two-ship procurement and forecast savings of $3 1 billion ([in] Then-Year [dollars]), or approximately 11 percent     The primary differences between [the] CAPE and Navy estimates of savings are in Government Furnished Equipment and production change orders " Within the total estimated combined reduction in cost, HII/NNS reportedly expects to save up to $1 6 billion in contractor-furnished equipment  A November 2018 DOD report to Congress that was submitted as an attachment to DOD's December 31, 2018, certification stated the following regarding the sources of cost reduction for the two-ship contract: The CVN 80 and CVN 81 two-ship buy expands and improves upon the affordability initiatives identified in the Annual Report on Cost Reduction Efforts for JOHN F  KENNEDY (CVN 79) and ENTERPRISE (CVN 80) as required by section 126(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 ( P L  114-328 )  Production saving initiatives for single-ship buys included use of unit families in construction, pre-outfitting and complex assemblies which move work to a more efficient workspace environment, reduction in the number of superlifts, and facility investments which improve the shipbuilder trade effectiveness  A two-ship buy assumes four years between ship deliveries which allows more schedule overlap, and therefore more shop-level and assembly-level production efficiencies than two single-ship buys  Procuring two ships to a single technical baseline reduces the requirement for engineering labor hours when compared to single-ship estimates  The ability to rollover production support engineering and planning products maximizes savings while recognizing the minimum amount of engineering labor necessary to address obsolescence and regulatory changes on CVN 81  The two-ship agreement with the shipbuilder achieves a 55 percent reduction in construction support engineering hours on CVN 81 and greater than 18 percent reduction in production support and planning hours compared to single ship procurements  The two-ship procurement strategy allows for serial production opportunities that promote tangible learning and reduced shop and machine set-up times  It allows for efficient use of production facilities, re-use of production jigs and fixtures, and level loading of key trades  The continuity of work allows for reductions in supervision, services and support costs  The result of these efficiencies is a production man-hours step down that is equivalent to an 82 percent learning curve since CVN 79  Key to achieving these production efficiencies is Integrated Digital Shipbuilding (iDS)  The Navy's Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and the shipbuilder's investment in iDS, totaling $631 million, will reduce the amount of production effort required to build FORD Class carriers  The two-ship buy will accelerate the benefits of this approach  The ability to immediately use the capability on CVN 81 would lead to a further reduction in touch labor and services in affected value streams  The two-ship agreement with the shipbuilder represents a production man-hours reduction of over seven percent based on iDS efficiencies  Contractual authority for two ships allows the shipbuilder to maximize economic order quantity material procurement  This allows more efficient ordering and scheduling of material deliveries and will promote efficiencies through earlier ordering, single negotiations, vendor quotes, and cross program purchase orders  These efficiencies are expected to reduce material costs by about six percent more when compared to single-ship estimates  Improved material management and flexibility will prevent costly production delays  Furthermore, this provides stability within the nuclear industrial base, de-risking the COLUMBIA and VIRGINIA Class programs  The two-ship buy would provide economic stability to approximately 130,000 workers across 46 States within the industrial base  Change order requirements are likewise reduced as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) providers will employ planning and procurement strategies based on the common technical baseline that minimize configuration changes that must be incorporated on the follow ship  Change order budget allocations have been reduced over 25 percent based on two-ship strategies  In addition to the discrete savings achieved with the shipbuilder, the two-ship procurement authority provides our partner GFE providers a similar opportunity to negotiate economic order quantity savings and achieve cross program savings when compared to single-ship estimates  An April 16, 2018, press report stated the following: If the Navy decides to buy aircraft carriers CVN-80 and 81 together, Newport News Shipbuilding will be able to maintain a steady workload that supports between 23,000 and 25,000 workers at the Virginia yard for the next decade or so, the shipyard president told reporters last week  Part of the appeal of buying the two carriers together is that the Navy would also buy them a bit closer together: the ships would be centered about three-and-a-half or four years apart, instead of the five-year centers for recent carrier acquisition, Newport News Shipbuilding President Jennifer Boykin told reporters  Boykin said the closer ship construction centers would allow her to avoid a "labor valley" where the workforce levels would dip down after one ship and then have to come back up, which is disruptive for employees and costly for the company  If this two-carrier buy goes through, the company would avoid the labor valley altogether and ensure stability in its workforce, Boykin said in a company media briefing at the Navy League's Sea Air Space 2018 symposium  That workforce stability contributes to an expected $1 6 billion in savings on the two-carrier buy from Newport News Shipbuilding's portion of the work alone, not including government-furnished equipment     Boykin said four main things contribute to the expected $1 6 billion in savings from the two-carrier buy  First, "if you don't have the workforce valley, there's a labor efficiency that represents savings " Second, "if you buy two at once, my engineering team doesn't have to produce two technical baselines, two sets of technical products; they only have to produce one, and the applicability is to both, so there's savings there  When we come through the planning, the build plan of how we plan to build the ship, the planning organization only has to put out one plan and the applicability is to both, so there's savings there " The third savings is a value of money over time issue, she said, and fourth is economic order quantity savings throughout the entire supply chain  Discussions of the option of using a block buy contract for procuring carriers have focused on using it to procure two carriers in part because carriers have been procured on five-year centers, meaning that two carriers could be included in a block-buy contract spanning six years—the same number of years originally planned for the two block buy contracts that were used to procure mnay of the Navy's Littoral Combat Ships  It can be noted, however, that there is no statutory limit on the number of years that a block buy contract can cover, and that the LCS block buy contracts were subsequently amended to cover LCSs procured in a seventh year  This, and the possibility of procuring carriers on 3- or 3 5-year centers, raises the possibility of using a block buy contract to procure three aircraft carriers: For example, if procurement of aircraft carriers were shifted to 3- or 3 5-year centers, a block buy contract for procuring CVN-80, CVN-81, and CVN-82 could span seven years (with the first ship procured in FY2018, and the third ship procured in FY2024) or eight years (with the first ship procured in FY2018 and the third ship procured in FY2025)  The percentage cost reduction possible under a three-ship block buy contract could be greater than that possible under a two-ship block buy contract, but the offsetting issue of reducing congressional flexibility for changing aircraft carrier procurement plans in coming years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances could also be greater  Appendix C  Cost Growth and Managing Costs Within Program Cost Caps This appendix presents additional background information on cost growth in the CVN-78 program, Navy efforts to stem that growth, and Navy efforts to manage costs so as to stay within the program's cost caps  October 2018 CBO Report An October 2018 CBO report on the potential cost of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan states the following regarding the CVN-78 program: The Navy's current estimate of the total cost of the Gerald R  Ford , the lead ship of the CVN-78 class, is $13 0 billion in nominal dollars appropriated over the period from 2001 to 2018, an amount that is equal to the cost cap set in law  CBO used the Navy's inflation index for naval shipbuilding to convert that figure to $15 5 billion in 2018 dollars, or 23 percent more than the corresponding estimate when the ship was first authorized in 2008  Neither the Navy's nor CBO's estimate includes the $5 billion in research and development costs that apply to the entire class  Because construction of the lead ship is finished, CBO used the Navy's estimate for that ship to estimate the cost of successive ships in the class  But not all of the cost risk has been eliminated; in particular, the ship's power systems and advanced arresting gear (the system used to recover fixed-wing aircraft landing on the ship) are not yet working properly  It is not clear how much those problems will cost to fix, but current Navy estimates suggest that it will be several tens of millions of dollars or more  CBO does not have enough information to estimate those final repair costs  The next carrier after the CVN-78 will be the CVN-79, the John F  Kennedy   Funding for that ship began in 2007, the Congress officially authorized its construction in 2013, and the planned appropriations for it were completed in 2018  The shipbuilder expects to complete construction of the CVN-79 in 2024 and deploy it for the first time in 2026  The Navy estimates that the ship will cost $11 3 billion in nominal dollars (or $11 6 billion in 2018 dollars)  The Navy's selected acquisition report on the CVN-79 states that "the Navy and shipbuilder have made fundamental changes in the manner in which the CVN 79 will be built to incorporate lessons learned from CVN 78 and eliminate the key contributors to cost performance challenges realized in the construction of CVN 78 " Nevertheless, the Navy informed CBO that there is a greater than 60 percent chance that the ship's final cost will be more than the current estimate  Although CBO expects the Navy to achieve a considerable cost reduction in the CVN-79 compared with the CVN-78, as is typical with the second ship of a class, CBO's estimate is higher than the Navy's  Specifically, CBO estimates that the ship will cost $11 7 billion in nominal dollars (or $12 0 billion in 2018 dollars), about 4 percent more than the Navy's estimate  In 2018, the Congress authorized the third carrier of the class, the Enterprise (CVN-80)  Appropriations for that ship began in 2016 and are expected to be complete by 2023  The Navy estimates that the ship will cost $12 6 billion in nominal dollars (or $11 5 billion in 2018 dollars)  However, as with CVN-79, the Navy told CBO that there is a greater than 60 percent chance that the ship's final cost will be more than the current estimate  CBO estimates that the ship will cost $13 0 billion in nominal dollars (or $11 8 billion in 2018 dollars), about 3 percent more than the Navy's estimate  The Navy estimates an average cost of $12 4 billion (in 2018 dollars) for the 7 carriers (CVN-81 through CVN-87) in the 2019 shipbuilding plan  CBO's estimate is $12 8 billion per ship     The gap between the estimates has narrowed since the 2017 plan: The Navy's has increased by $500 million per ship, and CBO's has dropped by $200 million per ship  It is not clear why the Navy's estimates increased, but CBO's estimates fell mainly because the agency projects somewhat less growth in real costs of the shipbuilding industry in future years  August 2018 Press Report An August 17, 2018, press report states the following: Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc , the sole U S  builder of aircraft carriers, continues to fall short of the Navy's demand to cut labor expenses to stay within an $11 39 billion cost cap mandated by Congress on the second in a new class of warships  With about 47 percent of construction complete on the USS John F  Kennedy, Navy figures show the contractor isn't yet meeting the goal it negotiated with the service: reducing labor hours by 18 percent from the first carrier, the USS Gerald Ford     It took about 49 million hours of labor to build the Ford, according to the U S  Government Accountability Office  The Navy's goal for the Kennedy is to reduce that to about 40 million hours  Huntington Ingalls's performance "remains stable at approximately 16 percent" less, William Couch, spokesman for the Naval Sea Systems Command, said in an email  He said "key production milestones and the ship's preliminary acceptance date remain on track" and there are "ample opportunities" for improvement "with nearly four years until contract delivery and over 70 percent of assembly work" remaining on the vessel's superstructure  But the Pentagon's naval warfare division, which reports to Ellen Lord, the Defense Department's chief weapons buyer, is less sanguine  It said in a July assessment that Huntington Ingalls "is unlikely to fully recover the needed 18 percent" reduction     On the effort to meet the 18 percent labor-hour reduction for the Kennedy, the Navy's program manager "assesses that although difficult, the shipbuilder can still attain" it, Couch said  Beci Brenton, a spokeswoman for Newport News, Virginia-based Huntington Ingalls, said "we are seeing the benefits associated with significant build strategy changes and incorporation of lessons learned" from the first vessel  Brenton said "the current production performance" is 16 percent less than the Ford's estimate at the time of contract award for the second vessel but the reduction is 17 percent when compared with the first vessel's current cost     But Shelby Oakley, a director with the GAO who monitors Navy shipbuilding, said "with so much of the program underway, it is unlikely that the Navy will regain efficiency " In later phases of a shipbuilding contract, she said, "performance typically degrades, not improves " It's also "unclear how the lessons learned" from the first ship "could help regain efficiency when they are already baked in to the Navy's overly optimistic estimate for the program," she said  June 2018 Press Report A June 19, 2018, press report stated the following: Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc  is asking General Electric Co  to compensate it for damage caused by flawed workmanship during installation of propulsion system components on the U S  Navy's $13 billion aircraft carrier Gerald R  Ford  The problem, which forced the most expensive U S  warship back to port in January, has yet to be fully resolved although the carrier is once again at sea     Huntington Ingalls, a shipbuilder based in Newport News, Virginia, "has notified the original manufacturer of the shipyard's intent to seek compensation," Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman William Couch said in an email  Beci Brenton, a spokeswoman for Huntington said, "We continue to work with appropriate stakeholders to support resolution of this situation " Perry Bradley, a spokesman for Boston-based GE, said "we're not going to comment on specifics other than to say" that "GE is working closely with" Huntington's Newport News Shipyard unit and "the U S  Navy to resolve the issue "    The episode in January was the second failure in less than a year with a "main thrust bearing" that's part of the carrier's propulsion system  The first occurred in April 2017, during sea trials a month before the vessel's delivery  The ship has been sailing in a shakedown period to test systems and work out bugs  It's now scheduled to be ready for initial combat duty in 2022  The Navy's carrier program office said in an assessment that an inspection of the carrier's four main thrust bearings after the January failure revealed "machining errors" by GE workers at a Lynn, Massachusetts, facility during the original manufacturing as "the actual root cause " The bearing overheated, the Navy said in a March 8 memo to Congress, and "after securing the equipment to prevent damage, the ship safely returned to port " A failure review board is identifying "modifications required to preclude recurrence," it said  The bearing is one of four that transfers thrust from the ship's four propeller shafts  "The costs associated with repairing" the thrust bearings "are currently being assessed" and "this will include recovery of costs from the manufacturer of the Main Reduction Gear, General Electric (Lynn), as appropriate," the Navy said in the memo  Couch said the Navy doesn't expect similar propulsion problems with the next vessel in the class, the John F  Kennedy, because a different manufacturer made that carrier's propulsion train components  "Any propulsion train deficiencies identified" with the Ford "will be corrected and implemented" in "future ships of the class as necessary," he said  May 2018 Press Report A May 11, 2018, press report stated the following: The Navy's costliest vessel ever just got pricer, breaching a $12 9 billion cap set by Congress by $120 million, the service told lawmakers this week  The extra money for the U S S  Gerald R  Ford built by Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc  is needed to replace faulty propulsion components damaged in a January failure, extend the vessel's post-delivery repair phase to 12 months from the original eight months and correct deficiencies with the "Advanced Weapons Elevators" used to move munitions from deep in the ship to the deck  The elevators on the ship, designated CVN 78, need to be fixed "to preclude any effect on the safety of the ship and personnel," the Naval Sea Systems Command said in a statement to Bloomberg News on Friday  "Once the adjustment is executed, the cost for CVN 78 will stand at $13 027" billion, the Navy said  In addition to informing Congress that the spending lid has been breached, the Navy will have to let lawmakers know how it will shift funds to make up the difference  Navy officials didn't disclose the propulsion failure or elevator problems during budget hearings before Congress in recent weeks, and House and Senate lawmakers didn't ask about it     The Ford's propulsion system and elevator flaws are separate from reliability issues on its troubled aircraft launch and recovery systems  After its delivery last May, the ship operated for 70 days and completed 747 shipboard aircraft launches and recoveries, exceeding the goal of about 400, the Navy said  None of the 11 weapons elevators are operational but at least two are being used for testing "to identify many of the remaining developmental issues for this first-of-class system," the Navy has said  The command said all 11 elevators "should have been complete and delivered with the ship delivery" in May 2017  April 2018 Press Report An April 16, 2018, press report stated the following: Huntington Ingalls Industries' Newport News Shipbuilding President Jennifer Boykin provided an update on the various stages of construction on several major Navy shipbuilding programs during the Navy League's Sea Air Space Expo last week  The future USS John F  Kennedy (CVN-79) is about 43 percent complete, with launch planned for the fourth quarter of 2019 and delivery set for 2022  Boykin said the company has achieved about 75 percent of the ship erected and they are on track for an 18 percent man-hour budget reduction  Boykin provided these updates during a press briefing at the conference  Boykin revealed that undocking of CVN-79 in the fourth quarter of 2019 will occur three months earlier than originally planned  September 2017 Press Report A September 26, 2017, press report states the following: Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc  is falling short of a U S  Navy goal to reduce hours of labor on the second ship in the new Ford class of aircraft carriers in a drive to reduce costs, according to service documents  With 34 percent of construction complete on the USS John F  Kennedy, Huntington Ingalls estimates it will be able to reduce labor hours by 16 percent from the hours needed to construct the first vessel, the Gerald R  Ford  That's less than the 17 percent reduction reported at the end of last year and the 18 percent goal the Navy negotiated in the primary construction contract for the carrier  The "recent degradation in cost performance stems largely from the delayed availability of certain categories of material," such as pipe fittings, controllers, actuators and valves, according to the Navy's annual report on the program and updated figures obtained by Bloomberg News     "We acknowledge that the cost reduction target for CVN-79," relative to the first carrier, "is challenging," Huntington Ingalls spokeswoman Beci Brenton said in an email, referring to the Kennedy by its Navy designation  "While it is still early in the ship's schedule, we are seeing positive results from" new initiatives to keep costs in check, she said     Navy Secretary Richard Spencer told reporters last week that he will stay involved in monitoring the CVN-79's construction trends  "This is my personal approach—the CEO has to be involved " A close watch is required "because there are so many moving parts and so many opportunities to do things in a more efficient manner," Spencer said  The Navy has been working with the contractors "to mitigate technical risks and impacts of late material," Navy spokesman Victor Chen in an email  "The overall volume of late material items and associated impact to construction performance is declining  The Navy has hired third-party experts who are working collaboratively with the shipbuilder to identify manufacturing opportunities for efficiency gains" and to assist in implementing improvements     The 18 percent reduction in labor hours was "quite optimistic" from the start, Michele Mackin, a Government Accountability Office director who oversees its shipbuilding assessments, said in an email  "Even based on that assumption, the $11 4 billion cost cap was unlikely to be met," she said  "If those labor-hour efficiencies are in fact not materializing, costs will go higher  Also, "with the ship being over 30 percent complete, it's unlikely the shipbuilder can get back enough efficiencies to further reduce labor hours—the more complicated work is yet to come," she said  June 2017 Navy Testimony At a June 15, 2017, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Department of the Navy's proposed FY2018 budget, the following exchange occurred: SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN (CHAIRMAN) (continuing): Secretary Stackley, the Navy broached a cost cap for CVN-78  Do you believe that it has? SEAN STACKLEY, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY: Sir, right now our estimate for CVN-78, we're trying to hold it within the $12 887 billion number that was established several years ago  We have included a $20 million [procurement funding] request in this budget pending our determination regarding repairs that required for the    MCCAIN: Is that a breach of Nunn-McCurdy? STACKLEY: Not at this point in time, sir, we're continuing to evaluate whether that additional funding will be required  We're doing everything we can to stay within the existing cap and we'll keep Congress informed as we complete our post-delivery assessment  MCCAIN: Problem is we haven't been informed  So either you bust the cap and breach Nunn-McCurdy—Nunn-McCurdy or you notify us  You haven't done either one  STACKLEY: Sir, we've been submitting monthly reports regarding the carrier, we've alerted the concern regarding the repairs that are being required for the motor turbine generator set and we've acknowledged the risk associated with those repairs  However, what we're trying to do is not incur those costs, avoid cost by other means, and as of right now we're not ready to trip that cost cap  MCCAIN: Well, it's either not allowable or it's allowable  It's not allowable, then you take a certain course of action  If it's allowable then you're required to notify Congress  You have done neither  STACKLEY: If we need to incur those costs, they will be allowable costs  We're trying to avoid that at this stage of time, sir  MCCAIN: I agree, but we were supposed to be notified—OK  I can tell you that you are either in violation of Nunn-McCurdy or you are in violation of the requirement that we be notified  You have done neither  There's two scenarios  STACKLEY: Sir, we have not broached the cost cap  If it becomes apparent that we'll need to go above the cost cap, we will notify Congress within—within the terms that you all have established  MCCAIN: OK  Well, I'll get it to you in writing but you still haven't answered the question because when there's a $20 million cost overrun, it's either allowable and then we have to be notified in one way  If it's not allowable, Nunn-McCurdy is—is reached  But anyway, maybe you can give us a more satisfactory explanation in writing, Mr  Secretary  June 2017 GAO Report A June 2017 GAO report states the following: The cost estimate for the second Ford-Class aircraft carrier, CVN 79, is not reliable and does not address lessons learned from the performance of the lead ship, CVN 78  As a result, the estimate does not demonstrate that the program can meet its $11 4 billion cost cap  Cost growth for the lead ship was driven by challenges with technology development, design, and construction, compounded by an optimistic budget estimate  Instead of learning from the mistakes of CVN 78, the Navy developed an estimate for CVN 79 that assumes a reduction in labor hours needed to construct the ship that is unprecedented in the past 50 years of aircraft carrier construction     After developing the program estimate, the Navy negotiated 18 percent fewer labor hours for CVN 79 than were required for CVN 78  CVN 79's estimate is optimistic compared to the labor hour reductions calculated in independent cost reviews conducted in 2015 by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis and the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation  Navy analysis shows that the CVN 79 cost estimate may not sufficiently account for program risks, with the current budget likely insufficient to complete ship construction  The Navy's current reporting mechanisms, such as budget requests and annual acquisition reports to Congress, provide limited insight into the overall Ford Class program and individual ship costs  For example, the program requests funding for each ship before that ship obtains an independent cost estimate  During an 11-year period prior to 2015, no independent cost estimate was conducted for any of the Ford class ships; however, the program received over $15 billion in funding  In addition, the program's Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR)—annual cost, status, and performance reports to Congress—provide only aggregate program cost for all three ships currently in the class, a practice that limits transparency into individual ship costs  As a result, Congress has diminished ability to oversee one of the most expensive programs in the defense portfolio  February 2016 Navy Testimony The Navy testified in 2016 that The Navy is committed to delivering the lead ship of the class, Gerald R Ford (CVN 78) within the $12 887 billion congressional cost cap  Sustained efforts to identify cost reductions and drive improved cost and schedule performance on this first-of-class aircraft carrier have resulted in highly stable cost performance since 2011  Based on lessons learned on CVN 78, the approach to carrier construction has undergone an extensive affordability review and the Navy and the shipbuilder have made significant changes on CVN 79 to reduce the cost to build the ship  The benefits of these changes in build strategy and resolution of first-of-class impacts experienced on CVN 78 are evident in early production labor metrics on CVN 79  These efforts are ongoing and additional process improvements continue to be identified  Alongside the Navy's efforts to reduce the cost to build CVN 79, the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act reduced the cost cap for follow ships in the CVN 78 class from $11,498 million to $11,398 million  To this end, the Navy has further emphasized stability in requirements, design, schedule, and budget, in order to drive further improvement to CVN 79 cost  The FY 2017 President's Budget requests funding for the most efficient build strategy for this ship and we look for Congress' full support of this request to enable CVN 79 procurement at the lowest possible cost         The Navy will deliver the CVN 79 within the cost cap using a two-phased strategy wherein select ship systems and compartments that are more efficiently completed at a later stage of construction - to avoid obsolescence or to leverage competition or the use of experienced installation teams - will be scheduled for completion in the ship's second phase of production and test  Enterprise (CVN 80) began construction planning and long lead time material procurement in January 2016 and construction is scheduled to begin in 2018  The FY 2017 President's Budget request re-phases CVN 80 funding to support a more efficient production profile, critical to performance, below the cost cap  CVN 80 planning and construction will continue to leverage class lessons learned to achieve cost and risk reduction, including efforts to accelerate production work to earlier phases of construction, where work is more cost efficient  October 2015 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing Cost growth and other issues in the CVN-78 program were reviewed at an October 1, 2015, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee  Below are excerpts from the prepared statements of the witnesses at the hearing  OSD ASD Testimony The prepared statement of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) states the following in part: By 2000, the CVN(X) Acquisition Strategy that had been proposed by the Navy was an evolutionary, three-step development of the capabilities planned for the CVN  This evolutionary strategy intending to mature technology and align risk with affordability originally involved using the last ship of the CVN 68 NIMITZ Class, USS GEORGE H  W  BUSH (CVN 77), as the starting point for insertion of some near term technology improvements including information network technology and the new Dual Band Radar (DBR) system from the DD(X) (now DDG 1000) program, to create an integrated warfare system that combined the ship's combat system and air wing mission planning functions  However, the then incoming Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2002 directed re-examination of the CVN program, among others, to reduce the overall spend of the department and increase the speed of delivery to the warfighters  As a result of the SECDEF's direction, the Navy proposed to remove the evolutionary approach and included a new and enlarged flight deck, an increased allowance for future technologies (including electric weapons), and an additional manpower reduction of 500 to 800 fewer sailors to operate  On December 12, 2002, a Program Decision Memorandum approved by then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz codified this Navy proposal and gave this direction back to the DOD enterprise  The ship was renamed the CVN-21 to highlight these changes  By Milestone B in April 2004, the Navy had evaluated the technologies intended for three ships, removed some of them, and consolidated the remaining ones into a single step of capability improvement on the lead ship  The new plan acknowledged technological, cost, and schedule challenges were being put on a single ship, but assessed this was achievable  The Acting USD AT&L (Michael Wynne) at that milestone also directed the Navy to use a hybrid of the Service Cost Position and Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) to baseline the program funding in lieu of the ICE, (although one can easily argue even the ICE was optimistic given these imposed circumstances)  By 2004, DOD and Congressional leadership had lost confidence in the acquisition system, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England established the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) panel to conduct a sweeping and integrated assessment of "every aspect" of acquisition  The result was the discovery that the Industrial Base had consolidated, that excessive oversight and complex acquisition processes were cost and schedule drivers, and a focus on requirements stability was key to containing costs  From this, a review of the requirements of the CVN resulted in a revised and solidified "single ship" Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the FORD Class as defined today, with the CVN 78 as lead ship  On the heels of a delay because of the budgetary constraints in 2006, the start of the construction of CVN 78 was delayed until 2008, but the schedule for delivery was held constant, further compounding risks and costs  The Navy's testimony covers these technical and schedule risks and concurrency challenges well  By 2009, this Committee had issued a floor statement in support of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA)  Congress was now united in its pursuit of acquisition reform and, in concert, USD AT&L re-issued and updated the Department of Defense's acquisition instruction (DoDI 5000 2) in 2008  WSARA included strengthening of the 'Nunn-McCurdy" process with requires DOD to report to Congress when cost growth on a major program breaches a critical cost growth threshold  This legislation required a root-cause assessment of the program and assumed program termination within 60 days of notification unless DOD certified in writing that the program remained essential to national security  WSARA had real impact on the CVN 78, as by 2008 and 2009 the results of all the previous decisions were instantiated in growth of cost and schedule  Then USD AT&L John Young required the Navy to provide a list of descoping efforts and directed the Navy to have an off-ramp back to steam catapults if the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS) remained a problem for the program  He also directed an independent review of all of the CVN 78 technologies by a Defense Support Team (DST)  Prior to the DST, the Navy had chartered a Program Assessment Review (PAR) with USD (AT&L) participation of EMALS/Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) versus steam  One of the key PAR findings was converting the EMALS and AAG production contracts to firm, fixed price contracts to cap cost growth and imposed negative incentives for late delivery  The Dual Band Radar (DBR) cost and risk growth was a decision by-product of the DDG 1000 program Nunn-McCurdy critical unit cost breach in 2010  Faced with a need to reduce cost on the DDG 1000 program and the resultant curtailment of the program, the expectation of development costs being borne by the DDG 1000 program was no longer the case and all of the costs associated with the S-band element development and a higher share of the X-band element then had to be supported by the CVN 78 program  The design problems encountered with AAG development have had the most deleterious effects on CVN 78 construction of any of the three major advanced technologies including EMALS and DBR  Our view of AAG is that these engineering design problems are now in the past and although delivery of several critical components have been delayed, the system will achieve its needed capabilities before undergoing final operational testing prior to deployment of the ship  Again, reliability growth is a concern, but this cannot be improved until a fully functional system is installed and operating at the Lakehurst, New Jersey land based test site, and on board CVN 78  With the 2010 introduction by then USD AT&L Ashton Carter (now in its third iteration by under USD AT&L Frank Kendall) of the continuous process improvement initiative that was founded in best business practices and WSARA called "Better Buying Power," the CVN underwent affordability, "Should Cost," and requirements assessment  Navy's use of the "Gate" process has stabilized the cost growth and reset good business practices  However, there is still much to do  We are in the testing phase of program execution prior to deployment and we had been concerned about the timing of the Full Ship Shock Trial (FSST)  After balancing the operational and technical risks, the Department decided to execute FSST on CVN 78 prior to deployment  EMALS and AAG are also a concern with regard to final operational testing stemming from the development difficulties that each experienced  The Navy still needs to complete a significant amount of land-based testing to enable certification of the systems to launch and recover the full range of aircraft that it is required to operate under both normal and emergency conditions  This land-based testing is planned to complete before the final at-sea operational testing for these systems begins     USD AT&L continues to work with Navy to tailor the program and ensure appropriate oversight at both the Navy Staff level as well as OSD  Our review of the Navy's plan for maintaining control of the cost for CVN 79 included an understanding of the application of lessons learned from the construction of CVN 78 along with the application of a more efficient construction plan for the ship including introduction of competition where possible  We have established an excellent relationship with the Navy to work together to change process and policies that have impacted the ability of the program to succeed, to include revitalizing the acquisition workforce and their skills  We are confident in the Navy's plan for CVN 79 and CVN 80 and, as such, Under Secretary Kendall recently authorized the Navy to enter into the detail design and construction phase for CVN 79 and to enter into advanced procurement for long lead time materials for CVN 80 construction  OSD and the Navy are committed to delivering CVN 79 within the limits of the cost cap legislated for this ship  OSD DOT&E Testimony The prepared statement of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E), within OSD states the following in part: The Navy intends to deliver CVN 78 early in calendar year 2016, and to begin initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) in late calendar year 2017  However, the Navy is in the process of developing a new schedule, so some dates may change  Based on the current schedule, between now and the beginning of IOT&E, the CVN 78 program is proceeding on an aggressive schedule to finish development, testing, troubleshooting, and correction of deficiencies for a number of new, complex systems critical to the warfighting capabilities of the ship  Low or unknown reliability and performance of the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), the Dual Band Radar (DBR), and the Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE) are significant risks to a successful IOT&E and first deployment, as well as to achieving the life-cycle cost reductions the Navy has estimated will accrue for the Ford-class carriers  The maturity of these systems is generally not at the level that would be desired at this stage in the program; for example, the CVN 78 test program is revealing problems with the DBR typical of discoveries in early developmental testing  Nonetheless, AAG, EMALS, DBR, and AWE equipment is being installed on CVN 78, and in some cases, is undergoing shipboard checkout  Consequently, any significant issues that testing discovers before CVN 78's schedule-driven IOT&E and deployment will be difficult, or perhaps impossible, to address  Resolving the uncertainties in the reliability and performance of these systems is critical to CVN 78's primary function of conducting combat operations  CVN 78 has design features intended to enhance its ability to launch, recover, and service aircraft  EMALS and AAG are key systems planned to provide new capabilities for launching and recovering aircraft that are heavier and lighter than typically operated on Nimitz-class carriers  DBR is intended to enhance radar coverage on CVN 78 in support of air traffic control and ship self-defense  DBR is planned to reduce some of the known sensor limitations on Nimitz-class carriers that utilize legacy radars  The data currently available to my office indicate EMALS is unlikely to achieve the Navy's reliability requirements  (The Navy indicates EMALS reliability is above its current growth curve, which is true; however, that growth curve was revised in 2013, based on poor demonstrated performance, to achieve EMALS reliability on CVN 78 a factor of 15 below the Navy's goal ) I have no current data regarding DBR or AWE reliability, and data regarding the reliability of the re-designed AAG are also not available  (Poor AAG reliability in developmental testing led to the need to re-design components of that system ) In addition, performance problems with these systems are continuing to be discovered  If the current schedule for conducting the ship's IOT&E and first deployment remain unchanged, reliability and performance shortfalls could degrade CVN 78's ability to conduct flight operations  Due to known problems with current aircraft carrier combat systems, there is significant risk CVN 78 will not achieve its self-defense requirements  Although the CVN 78 design incorporates several combat system improvements relative to the Nimitz-class, these improvements (if achieved) are unlikely to correct all of the known shortfalls  Testing on other ships with similar combat systems has highlighted deficiencies in weapon employment timelines, sensor coverage, system track management, and deficiencies with the recommended engagement tactics  Most of these limitations are likely to affect CVN 78 and I continue to view this as a significant risk to the CVN 78's ability to defend itself against attacks by the challenging anti-ship cruise missile and other threats proliferating worldwide  The Navy's previous decision to renege on its original commitment to conduct the Full Ship Shock Trial (FSST) on CVN 78 before her first deployment would have put CVN 78 at risk in combat operations  This decision was reversed in August 2015 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense  Historically, FSSTs for new ship classes have identified for the first time numerous mission-critical failures the Navy had to address to ensure the new ships were survivable in combat  We can expect that CVN 78's FSST results will have significant and substantial implications on future carriers in the Ford-class and any subsequent new class of carriers  I also have concerns with manning and berthing on CVN 78  The Navy designed CVN 78 to have reduced manning to reduce life-cycle costs, but Navy analyses of manning on CVN 78 have identified problems in manning and berthing  These problems are similar to those seen on other recent ship classes such as DDG 1000 and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)     There are significant risks to the successful completion of the CVN 78 IOT&E and the ship's subsequent deployment due to known performance problems and the low or unknown reliability of key systems  For AAG, EMALS, AWE and DBR, systems that are essential to the primary missions of the ship, these problems, if uncorrected, are likely to affect CVN 78's ability to conduct effective flight operations and to defend itself in combat  The CVN 78 test schedule leaves little or no time to fix problems discovered in developmental testing before IOT&E begins that could cause program delays  In the current program schedule, major developmental test events overlap IOT&E  This overlap increases the likelihood problems will be discovered during CVN 78's IOT&E, with the attendant risk to the successful completion of that testing and to the ship's first deployment  The inevitable lessons we will learn from the CVN 78 FSST will have significant implications for CVN 78 combat operations, as well as for the construction of future carriers incorporating the ship's advanced systems; therefore, the FSST should be conducted on CVN 78 as soon as it is feasible to do so  Navy Testimony The prepared statement of the Navy witnesses at the hearing states the following in part: In June 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD) approved a three-ship evolutionary acquisition approach starting with the last NIMITZ Class carrier (CVN 77) and the next two carriers CVNX1 (later CVN 78) and CVNX2 (later CVN 79)  This approach recognized the significant risk of concurrently developing and integrating new technologies into a new ship design incrementally as follows: • The design focus for the evolutionary CVN 77 was to combine information network technology with a new suite of multifunction radars from the DDG 1000 program to transform the ship's combat systems and the air wing's mission planning process into an integrated warfare system  • The design focus for the evolutionary CVNX1 (future CVN 78) was a new Hull, Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) architecture within a NIMITZ Class hull that included a new reactor plant design, increased electrical generating capacity, new zonal electrical distribution, and new electrical systems to replace steam auxiliaries under a redesigned flight deck employing new Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) catapults together with aircraft ordnance and fueling "pit-stops"  Design goals for achieving reduced manning and improved maintainability were also defined  • The design focus for the evolutionary CVNX2 (future CVN 79) was a potential "clean-sheet" design to "open the aperture" for capturing new but immature technologies such as the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) and Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE) that would be ready in time for the third ship in the series; and thereby permit the experience gained from design and construction of the first two ships (CVN 77 and CVN 78) to be applied to the third ship (CVN 79)  Early in the last decade, however, a significant push was made within DOD for a more transformational approach to delivering warfighting capability  As a result, in 2002, DOD altered the program acquisition strategy by transitioning to the new aircraft carrier class in a single transformational leap vice an incremental three ship strategy  Under the revised strategy, CVN 77 reverted back to a "modified-repeat" NIMITZ Class design to minimize risk and construction costs, while delaying the integrated warfare system to CVN 78  Further, due to budget constraints, CVN 78 would start construction a year later (in 2007) with a NIMITZ Class hull form but would entail a major re-design to accommodate all the new technologies from the three ship evolutionary technology insertion plan  This leap ahead in a single ship was captured in a revised Operational Requirements Document (ORD) in 2004, which defined a new baseline that is the FORD Class today, with CVN 78 as the lead ship  The program entered system development and demonstration, containing the shift to a single ship acquisition strategy  The start of CVN 78 construction was then delayed by an additional year until 2008 due to budget constraints  As a result, the traditional serial evolution of technology development, ship concept design, detail design, and construction – including a total of 23 developmental systems incorporating new technologies originally planned across CVN 77, CVNX1, CVNX2 - were compressed and overlapped within the program baseline for the CVN 78  Today, the Navy is confronting the impacts of this compression and concurrency, as well as changes to assumptions made in the program planning more than a decade ago     Given the lengthy design, development, and build span associated with major warships, there is a certain amount of overlap or concurrency that occurs between the development of new systems to be delivered with the first ship, the design information for those new systems, and actual construction  Since this overlap poses cost and schedule risk for the lead ship of the class, program management activities are directed at mitigating this overlap to the maximum extent practicable  In the case of the FORD Class, the incorporation of 23 developmental systems at various levels of technical maturity (including EMALS, AAG, DBR, AWE, new propulsion plant, integrated control systems) significantly compounded the inherent challenges associated with accomplishing the first new aircraft carrier design in 40-years  The cumulative impact of this high degree of concurrency significantly exceeded the risk attributed to any single new system or risk issue and ultimately manifested itself in terms of delay and cost growth in each element of program execution; development, design, material procurement (government and contractor), and construction     Shipbuilder actions to resolve first-of-class issues retired much of the schedule risks to launch, but at an unstable cost  First-of-class construction and material delays led the Navy to revise the launch date in March 2013 from July 2013 to November 2013  Nevertheless, the four-month delay in launch allowed increased outfitting and ship construction that were most economically done prior to ship launch, such as completion of blasting and coating operations for all tanks and voids, installation of the six DBR arrays, and increased installations of cable piping, ventilation, electrical boxes, bulkheads and equipment foundations  As a result, CVN 78 launched at 70 percent complete and 77,000 tons displacement – the highest levels yet achieved in aircraft carrier construction  This high state of completion at launch enabled improved outfitting, compartment completion, an efficient transition into the shipboard test program, and the on-time completion of key milestones such as crew move aboard  With the advent of the shipboard test program, first time energization and grooming of new systems have required more time than originally planned  As a result, the Navy expects the sea trial schedule to be delayed about six to eight weeks  The exact impact on ship delivery will be determined based on the results of these trials  The Navy expects no schedule delays to CVN 78 operational testing and deployability due to the sea trials delay and is managing schedule delays within the $12 887 billion cost cap  Additionally, at delivery, AAG will not have completed its shipboard test program  The program has not been able to fully mitigate the effect of a two-year delay in AAG equipment deliveries to the ship  All AAG equipment has been delivered to the ship and will be fully installed on CVN 78 at delivery  The AAG shipboard test and certification program will complete in time to support aircraft launch and recovery operations in summer 2016     The Navy, in coordination with the shipbuilder and major component providers, implemented a series of actions and initiatives in the management and oversight of CVN 78 that crossed the full span of contracting, design, material procurement, GFE, production planning, production management and oversight  The Secretary of the Navy directed a detailed review of the CVN 78 program build plan to improve end-to-end aircraft carrier design, material procurement, production planning, build and test, the results of which are providing benefit across all carriers  These corrective measures include: • CVN 78 design was converted from a 'level of effort, fixed fee' contract to a completion contract with a firm target and incentive fee  Shipbuilder cost performance has been on-target or better since this contract change  • CVN 78 construction fee was reduced, consistent with contract provisions  However, the shipbuilder remains incentivized by the contract shareline to improve upon current cost performance  • Contract design changes are under strict control; authorized only for safety, damage control, and mission-degrading deficiencies  • Following a detailed "Nunn-McCurdy-like" review in 2008-2009, the Navy converted the EMALS and AAG production contract to a firm, fixed price contract, capping cost growth to each system  • In 2011, Naval Sea Systems Command completed a review of carrier specifications with the shipbuilder, removing or improving upon overly burdensome or unneeded specifications that impose unnecessary cost on the program  Periodic reviews continue  Much of the impact to cost performance was attributable to shipbuilder and government material cost overruns  The Navy and shipbuilder have made significant improvements upon material ordering and delivery to the shipyard to mitigate the significant impact of material delays on production performance  These actions include: • The Navy and shipbuilder instituted optimal material procurement strategies and best practices (structuring procurements to achieve quantity discounts, dual-sourcing to improve schedule performance and leveraging competitive opportunities) from outside supply chain management experts  • The shipbuilder assigned engineering and material sourcing personnel to each of their key vendors to expedite component qualifications and delivery to the shipyard  • The shipbuilder inventoried all excess material procured on CVN 78 for transfer to CVN 79  • The Program Executive Officer (Carriers) has conducted quarterly Flag-level GFE summits to drive cost reduction opportunities and ensure on-time delivery of required equipment and design information to the shipbuilder  The CVN 78 build plan, consistent with the NIMITZ Class, had focused foremost on completion of structural and critical path work to support launching the ship on-schedule  Achieving the program's cost improvement targets required that CVN 78 increase its level of completion at launch, from 60 percent to 70 percent  To achieve this and drive greater focus on system completion: • The Navy fostered a collaborative build process review by the shipbuilder with other Tier 1 private shipyards in order to benchmark its performance and identify fundamental changes that are yielding marked improvement  • The shipbuilder established specific launch metrics by system and increased staffing for waterfront engineering and material expediters to support meeting those metrics  This ultimately delayed launch, but drove up pre-outfitting to the highest levels for CVN new construction which has helped stabilize cost and improve test program and compartment completion performance relative to CVN 77  • The shipbuilder linked all of these processes within a detailed integrated master schedule that has provided greater visibility to performance and greater ability to control cost and schedule performance across the shipbuilding disciplines  These initiatives, which summarize a more detailed list of actions being implemented and tracked as a result of the end-to-end review, were accompanied by important management changes  • In 2011, the Navy assigned a second tour Flag Officer with considerable carrier operations, construction, and program management experience as the new Program Executive Officer (PEO)  • The new PEO established a separate Program Office, PMS 379, to focus exclusively on CVN 79 and CVN 80, which enables the lead ship Program Office, PMS 378, to focus on cost control, schedule performance and the delivery of CVN 78  • In 2012, the shipbuilder assigned a new Vice President in charge of CVN 78, a new Vice President in charge of material management and purchasing, and a number of new general ship foremen to strengthen CVN 78 performance  • The new PEO and shipyard president began conducting bi-weekly launch readiness reviews focused on cost performance, critical path issues and accomplishment of the targets for launch completion  These bi-weekly reviews will continue through delivery  • Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) (ASN (RD&A)) conducts quarterly reviews of program progress and performance with the PEO and shipbuilder to ensure that all that can be done to improve on cost performance is being done  The series of actions taken by the Navy and the shipbuilder are achieving the desired effect of arresting cost growth, establishing stability, and have resulted in no changes in the Government's estimate at completion over the past four years  The Department of the Navy is continuing efforts to identify cost reductions, drive improved cost and schedule performance, and manage change  The Navy has established a rigorous process with the shipbuilder that analyzes each contract change request to approve only those change categories allowed within the 2010 ASN(RD&A) change order management guidance  This guidance only allows changes for safety, contractual defects, testing and trial deficiencies, statutory and regulatory changes that are accompanied by funding and value engineering change proposals with instant contract savings  While the historical average for contractual change level is approximately 10 percent of the construction cost for the lead ship of a new class, CVN 78 has maintained a change order budget of less than four percent to date despite the high degree of concurrent design and development  Finally, the Navy has identified certain areas of the ship whose completion is not required for delivery, such as berthing spaces for the aviation detachment, and has removed this work from the shipbuilder's contract  This deferred work will be completed within the ship's budgeted end cost and is included within the $12,887 million cost estimate  By performing this deferred work in the post-delivery period using CVN 78 end cost funding, it can be competed and accomplished at lower cost and risk to the overall ship delivery schedule     The CVN 79 cost cap was established in 2006 and adjusted by the Secretary of the Navy in 2013, primarily to address inflation between 2006 and 2013 plus $325 million of the allowed increase for non-recurring engineering to incorporate design improvements for the CVN 78 Class construction  The Navy and the shipbuilder conducted an extensive affordability review of carrier construction and made significant changes to deliver CVN 79 at the lowest possible cost  These changes are focused on eliminating the largest impacts to cost performance identified during the construction of CVN 78 as well as furthering improvements in future carrier construction  The Navy outlined cost savings initiatives in its Report to Congress in May, 2013, and is executing according to plan  Stability in requirements, design, schedule, and budget, are essential to controlling and improving CVN 79 cost, and therefore is of highest priority for the program  Requirements for CVN 79 were "locked down" prior to the commencement of CVN 79 construction  The technical baseline and allocated budget for these requirements were agreed to by the Chief of Naval Operations and ASN(RD&A) and further changes to the baseline require their approval, which ensures design stability and increases effectiveness during production  At the time of construction contract award, CVN 79 has 100 percent of the design product model complete (compared to 65 percent for CVN 78) and 80 percent of initial drawings released  Further, CVN 79 construction benefits from the maturation of virtually all new technologies inserted on CVN 78  In the case of EMALS and AAG, the system design and procurement costs are understood, and CVN 79 leverages CVN 78 lessons learned     A completed FORD Class design enabled the shipbuilder to fully understand the "whole ship" bill of materials for CVN 79 construction and to more effectively manage the procurement of those materials with the knowledge of material lead times and qualified sources accrued from CVN 78 construction  The shipbuilder is able to order ship-set quantities of material, with attendant cost benefits, and to ensure CVN 79 material will arrive on time to support construction need  Extensive improvements have been put in place for CVN 79 material procurement to drive both cost reductions associated with more efficient procurement strategies and production labor improvements associated with improved material availability  Improved material availability is also a critical enabler to many construction efficiency improvements in CVN 79  The shipbuilder has developed an entirely new material procurement and management strategy for CVN 79  This new strategy consists of eight separate initiatives     The shipbuilder and the Navy have performed a comprehensive review of the build strategy and processes used in construction of CVN 78 Class aircraft carriers as well as consulted with other Navy shipbuilders on best practices  As a result, the shipbuilder has identified and implemented a number of changes in the way they build aircraft carriers, with a dedicated focus on executing construction activities where they can most efficiently be performed  The CVN 79 build sequence installs 20 percent more parts in shop, and 30 percent more parts on the final assembly platen, as compared to CVN 78  This work will result in an increase in pre-outfitting and work being pulled to earlier stages in the construction process where it is most efficiently accomplished     In conjunction with the Navy and the shipbuilder's comprehensive review of the build strategy and processes used in construction of CVN 78 Class aircraft carriers, a number of design changes were identified that would result in more affordable construction  Some of these design changes were derived from lessons learned in the construction of CVN 78 and others seek to further simplify the construction process and drive cost down     In addition to the major focus discussed above, the shipbuilder continues to implement capital improvements to facilities that serve to reduce risk and improve productivity     To enhance CVN 79 build efficiency and affordability, the Navy is implementing a two-phase delivery plan  The two-phase strategy will allow the basic ship to be constructed and tested in the most efficient manner by the shipbuilder (Phase I) while enabling select ship systems and compartments to be completed in Phase II, where the work can be completed more affordably through competition or the use of skilled installation teams     The CVN 80 planning and construction will continue to leverage class lessons learned in the effort to achieve cost and risk reduction for remaining FORD Class ships  The CVN 80 strategy seeks to improve on CVN 79 efforts to frontload as much work as possible to the earliest phases of construction, where work is both predictable and more cost efficient     While delivery of the first-of-class FORD has involved challenges, those challenges are being addressed and this aircraft carrier class will provide great value to our Nation with unprecedented and greatly needed warfighting capability at overall lower total ownership cost than a NIMITZ Class CVN  The Navy has taken major steps to stem the tide of increasing costs and drive affordability into carrier acquisition  GAO Testimony The prepared statement of the GAO witness at the hearing states the following in part: The Ford-class aircraft carrier's lead ship began construction with an unrealistic business case  A sound business case balances the necessary resources and knowledge needed to transform a chosen concept into a product  Yet in 2007, GAO found that CVN 78 costs were underestimated and critical technologies were immature—key risks that would impair delivering CVN 78 at cost, on-time, and with its planned capabilities  The ship and its business case were nonetheless approved  Over the past 8 years, the business case has predictably decayed in the form of cost growth, testing delays, and reduced capability—in essence, getting less for more  Today, CVN 78 is more than $2 billion over its initial budget  Land-based tests of key technologies have been deferred by years while the ship's construction schedule has largely held fast  The CVN 78 is unlikely to achieve promised aircraft launch and recovery rates as key systems are unreliable  The ship must complete its final, more complex, construction phase concurrent with key test events  While problems are likely to be encountered, there is no margin for the unexpected  Additional costs are likely  Similarly, the business case for CVN 79 is not realistic  The Navy recently awarded a construction contract for CVN 79 which it believes will allow the program to achieve the current $11 5 billion legislative cost cap  Clearly, CVN 79 should cost less than CVN 78, as it will incorporate lessons learned on construction sequencing and other efficiencies  While it may cost less than its predecessor, CVN 79 is likely to cost more than estimated  As GAO found in November 2014, the Navy's strategy to achieve the cost cap relies on optimistic assumptions of construction efficiencies and cost savings—including unprecedented reductions in labor hours, shifting work until after ship delivery, and delivering the ship with the same baseline capability as CVN 78 by postponing planned mission system upgrades and modernizations until future maintenance periods  Today, with CVN 78 over 92 percent complete as it reaches delivery in May 2016, and the CVN 79 on contract, the ability to exercise oversight and make course corrections is limited  Yet, it is not too late to examine the carrier's acquisition history to illustrate the dynamics of shipbuilding—and weapon system—acquisition and the challenges they pose to acquisition reform  The carrier's problems are by no means unique; rather, they are quite typical of weapon systems  Such outcomes persist despite acquisition reforms the Department of Defense and Congress have put forward—such as realistic estimating and "fly before buy " Competition with other programs for funding creates pressures to overpromise performance at unrealistic costs and schedules  These incentives are more powerful than policies to follow best acquisition practices and oversight tools  Moreover, the budget process provides incentives for programs to be funded before sufficient knowledge is available to make key decisions  Complementing these incentives is a marketplace characterized by a single buyer, low volume, and limited number of major sources  The decades-old culture of undue optimism when starting programs is not the consequence of a broken process, but rather of a process in equilibrium that rewards unrealistic business cases and, thus, devalues sound practices  July 2015 Press Report A July 2, 2015, press report states the following: The Navy plans to spend $25 million per year beginning in 2017 as a way to invest in lowering the cost of building the services' new Ford-class aircraft carriers, service officials said  "We will use this design for affordability to make new improvements in cost cutting technologies that will go into our ships," said Rear Adm  Michael Manazir, Director, Air Warfare     "We just awarded a contract to buy long lead item materials [for CVN-79] and lay out an allocated budget for each of the components of that ship  We want to build the ship in the most efficient manner possible," Rear Adm  Thomas Moore, Program Executive Officer, Carriers, said  Navy leaders say the service is making positive strides regarding the cost of construction for the USS Kennedy and plans to stay within the congressional cost cap of $11 498 billion     The $25 million design for affordability initiative is aimed at helping to uncover innovative shipbuilding techniques and strategies that will accomplish this and lower costs  Moore said the goal of the program is to, among other things, remove $500 million from the cost of the third Ford-class carrier, the USS Enterprise, CVN 80  "It is finding a million here and a million there and eventually that is how you get a billion dollars out of the ship from (CVN) 78 to (CVN) 79  The goal is to get another $500 million out of CVN 80  The $25 million dollars is a pretty prudent investment if we can continue to drive the cost of this class of ship down," Moore told reporters recently  Moore explained that part of the goal is to get to the point where a Ford-class carrier can be built for the same amount of man-hours it took to build their predecessor ships, the Nimitz-class carriers  "We want to get back to the goal of being able to build it for historical Nimitz class levels in terms of man hours for a ship that is significantly more capable and more complex to build," Moore added  The money will invest in new approaches and explore the processes that a shipyard can use to build the ship, Moore added  "They've made a significant investment in these new welding machines  These new welding machines allow the welder to use different configurations  This has significantly improved the throughput that the shipyard has," Moore said, citing an example of the kind of thing the funds would be used for  The funds will also look into whether new coatings for the ship or welding techniques can be used and whether millions of feet of electrical cabling can be installed in a more efficient manner, Moore added  Other cost saving efforts assisted by the funding include the increased use of complex assemblies, common integrated work packages, automated plate marking, weapons elevator door re-design and vertical build strategies, Navy officials said  Shipbuilders could also use a new strategy of having work crews stay on the same kind of work for several weeks at a time in order to increase efficiency, Moore said  Also, some of the construction work done on the USS Ford while it was in dry dock is now being done in workshops and other areas to improve the building process, he added  June 2015 Press Reports A June 29, 2015, press report states the following: Newport News Shipbuilding will see cost reduction on the order of 18 percent fewer man hours overall from the first Ford-class aircraft carrier to the second, according to a company representative  Ken Mahler, Newport News vice president of Navy programs, touted the shipyard's cost savings on the John F  Kennedy (CVN-79) during a June 15 interview with Inside the Navy   This reduction was facilitated by the investments the shipyard is making in carrier construction, as well as lessons learned from the first ship, the Gerald R  Ford (CVN-78), which will deliver next year  A June 23, 2015, press report states the following: The Pentagon's cost-assessment office now says the Navy's second aircraft carrier in a new class will exceed a congressionally mandated cost cap by $235 million  That's down from an April estimate that the USS John F  Kennedy, the second warship in the new Ford class, would bust a $11 498 billion cap set by lawmakers by $370 million  The Navy maintains that it can deliver the ship within the congressional limit  "The original figure was a draft based on preliminary information," Navy Commander Bill Urban, a spokesman for the Pentagon's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office, said in an e-mail  As better information, such as updated labor rates, became available, the office "revised its estimate to a more accurate number," he said  A June 15, 2015, press report states the following: [Rear Admiral Tom] Moore [program executive officer for aircraft carriers]  said the program would save a billion dollars by decreasing the man hours needed to construct the ship by 18 percent from CVN-78 to 79—down to about 44 million manhours  He said this reduction is only a first step in taking cost ouot of the carrier program  The future Enterprise (CVN-80) will take about 4 million manhours out, or another 10 percent reduction, for a savings of about $500 million  But beyond seeking ways to take cost out, the contract itself reduces the risk to the government, Moore said  "The main construction of the ship is now in a fixed price environment, so that switchover really limits the government's liability," he said  Without getting into specific dollar amounts due to business sensitivities, Moore explained that "this is the lowest target fee we've ever had on any CVN new construction  Look at tghe shape of the share [government-contractor cost] share lines, because the share lines at the end of the day are a measure of risk  So where we'd like to get quickly to [a] 50/50 [share line], in past carrier contracts we've been out at 85/15, 90/10—which basically means for every dollar over [the target cost figure, up to the ceiling cost figure], the government picks up 85 cents on the dollar  And this contract very quickly gets to 50/50  The other thing is ceiling price—on a fixed-price contract, the ceiling price is the government's maximum liability  And on this particular contract, again, it is the lowest ceiling price we've ever had [for a CVN] " February 2015 Navy Testimony At a February 25, 2015, hearing on Department of the Navy acquisition programs, Department of the Navy officials testified the following: The Navy is committed to delivering CVN 78 within the $12 887 billion Congressional cost cap  Sustained efforts to identify cost reductions and drive improved cost and schedule on this first-of-class aircraft carrier have resulted in highly stable performance since 2011  Parallel efforts by the Navy and shipbuilder are driving down and stabilizing aircraft carrier construction costs for the future John F Kennedy (CVN 79) and estimates for the future Enterprise (CVN 80)  As a result of the lessons learned on CVN 78, the approach to carrier construction has undergone an extensive affordability review  The Navy and the shipbuilder have made significant changes on CVN 79 to reduce the cost to build the ship as detailed in the 2013 CVN 79 report to Congress  The benefits of these changes in build strategy and resolution of first-of-class impacts on CVN 79 are evident in metrics showing significantly reduced man-hours for completed work from CVN 78  These efforts are ongoing and additional process improvements continue to be identified  The Navy extended the CVN 79 construction preparation contract into 2015 to enable continuation of ongoing planning, construction, and material procurement while capturing lessons learned associated with lead ship construction and early test results  The continued negotiations of the detail design and construction (DD&C) contract afford an opportunity to incorporate further construction process improvements and cost reduction efforts  Award of the DD&C contract is expected in third quarter FY 2015  This will be a fixed price-type contract  Additionally, the Navy will deliver the CVN 79 using a two-phased strategy  This enables select ship systems and compartments to be completed in a second phase, wherein the work can be completed more efficiently through competition or the use of skilled installation teams responsible for these activities  This approach, key to delivering CVN 79 at the lowest cost, also enables the Navy to procure and install shipboard electronic systems at the latest date possible  The FY 2014 NDAA adjusted the CVN 79 and follow ships cost cap to $11,498 million to account for economic inflation and non-recurring engineering for incorporation of lead ship lessons learned and design changes to improve affordability  In transitioning from first-of-class to first follow ships, the Navy has maintained Ford class requirements and the design is highly stable  Similarly, we have imposed strict interval controls to drive changes to the way we do business in order to ensure CVN 79 is delivered below the cost cap  To this same end, the FY 2016 President's Budget request aligns funding to the most efficient build strategy for this ship and we look for Congress' full support of this request to enable CVN 79 to be procured at the lowest possible cost  Enterprise (CVN 80) will begin long lead time material procurement in FY 2016  The FY 2016 request re-phases CVN 80 closer to the optimal profile, therefore reducing the overall ship cost  The Navy will continue to investigate and will incorporate further cost reduction initiatives, engineering efficiencies, and lessons learned from CVN 78 and CVN 79  Future cost estimates for CVN 80 will be updated for these future efficiencies as they are identified  May 2013 Navy Testimony In its prepared statement for a May 8, 2013, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Navy stated that In 2011, the Navy identified spiraling cost growth [on CVN-78] associated with first of class non-recurring design, contractor and government furnished equipment, and ship production issues on the lead ship  The Navy completed an end-to-end review of CVN 78 construction in December 2011 and, with the shipbuilder, implemented a series of corrective actions to stem, and to the extent possible, reverse these trends  While cost performance has stabilized, incurred cost growth is irreversible     As a result of lessons learned on CVN 78, the approach to carrier construction has undergone an extensive affordability review; and the Navy and the shipbuilder have made significant changes on CVN 79 that will reduce the cost to build the ship  CVN 79 construction will start with a complete design, firm requirements, and material economically procured and on hand in support of production need  The ship's build schedule also provides for increased completion levels at each stage of construction with resulting improved production efficiencies     Inarguably, this new class of aircraft carrier brings forward tremendous capability and life-cycle cost advantages compared to the NIMITZ-class it will replace  However, the design, development and construction efforts required to overcome the technical challenges inherent to these advanced capabilities have significantly impacted cost performance on the lead ship  The Navy continues implementing actions from the 2012 detailed review of the FORD-Class build plan to control cost and improve performance across lead and follow ship contracts  This effort, taken in conjunction with a series of corrective actions with the shipbuilder on the lead ship, will not recover costs to original targets for GERALD R  FORD [CVN-78], but should improve performance on the lead ship while fully benefitting CVN 79 and following ships of the class  In the discussion portion of the hearing, Sean Stackley, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (i e , the Navy's acquisition executive), testified that First, the cost growth on the CVN-78 is unacceptable  The cost growth dates back in time to the very basic concepts that went into take in the Nimitz-class and doing a total redesign of the Nimitz class to get to a level of capability and to reduce operating and support cost for the future carrier  Far too much risk was carried into the design of the first of the Ford-class  Cost growth stems to the design was moving at the time production started  The vendor base that was responsible for delivering new components and material to support the ship production was (inaudible) with new developments in the vendor base and production plan do not account for the material ordering difficulties, the material delivery difficulties and some of the challenges associated with building a whole new design compared to the Nimitz     Sir, for CVN-79, we have—we have held up the expenditures on CVN-79 as we go through the details of—one, ensuring that the design of the 78 is complete and repeated for the 79s [sic] that we start with a clean design  Two, we're going through the material procurement  We brought a third party into assessment material-buying practices at Newport News to bring down the cost of material  And we're metering out the dollars for buying material until it hits the objectives that we're setting for CVN-79 through rewriting the build plan on CVN-79  If you take a look at how the 78 is being constructed, far too much work is being accomplished late in the build cycle  So we are rewriting the build plan for CVN-79, do more work in the shops where it's more efficient, more work in the buildings where it's more efficient, less work in the dry dock, less work on the water  And then we're going after the rates—the labor rates and the investments needed by the shipbuilder to achieve these efficiencies  Later in the hearing, Stackley testified that the history in shipbuilding is since you don't have a prototype for a new ship, the first of class referred to as the lead ship is your prototype  And so you carry a lot of risk into the construction of that first of class  Also, given the nature that there's a lengthy design development and build span associated with ships, so there is a certain amount of overlap or concurrency that occurs between the development of new systems that need to be delivered with the first ship, the incorporation of the design of those new systems and the actual construction  And so to the extent that there is change in a new ship class then the risk goes up accordingly  In the case of the CVN-78, the degree of change compared to the Nimitz was fairly extraordinary all for good reasons, good intentions, increased capability, increased survivability, significant reduction in operating and support costs  So there was a determination that will take on this risk in order to get those benefits, and the case of the CVN-78, those risks are driving a lot of the cost growth on the lead ship  When you think about the follow ships, now you've got a stable design, now your vendor base has got a production line going to support the production  Now you've got a build plan and a workforce that has climbed up on the learning curve to drive cost down  So you can look at—you can look at virtually every shipbuilding program and you'll see a significant drop-off in cost from that first of class to the follow ships  And then you look for a stable learning curve to take over in the longer term production of a ship class  Carriers are unique for a number of reasons, one of which we don't have an annual procurement of carriers  They're spread out over a five and, in fact, in the case of 78 as much as seven-year period  So in order to achieve that learning, there are additional challenges associated with achieving that learning  And so we're going at it very deliberately on the CVN-79 through the build plan with the shipbuilder to hit the line that we've got to have—the cost reductions that we've got to have on the follow ships of the class  March 2013 Navy Report A March 2013 report to Congress on the Navy's plan for building CVN-79 that was released to the public on May 16, 2013, states the following in its executive summary: As a result of the lessons learned on CVN 78, the approach to carrier construction has undergone an extensive affordability review and the Navy and the shipbuilder have made significant changes on CVN 79 that will significantly reduce the cost to build the ship  These include four key construction areas: —CVN 79 construction will start with a complete design and a complete bill of material —CVN 79 construction will start with a firm set of stable requirements —CVN 79 construction will start with the development complete on a host of new technologies inserted on CVN 78 ranging from the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), the Dual Band Radar, and the reactor plant, to key valves in systems throughout the ship —CVN 79 construction will start with an 'optimal build' plan that emphasizes the completion of work and ship outfitting as early as possible in the construction process to optimize cost and ultimately schedule performance  In addition to these fundamentals, the Navy and the shipbuilder are tackling cost through a series of other changes that when taken over the entire carrier will have a significant impact on construction costs  The Navy has also imposed cost targets and is aggressively pursuing cost reduction initiatives in its government furnished systems  A detailed accounting of these actions is included in this report  The actions discussed in this report are expected to reduce the material cost of CVN 79 by 10-20% in real terms from CVN 78, to reduce the number of man-hours required to build the CVN 79 by 15-25% from CVN 78, and to reduce the cost of government furnished systems by 5-10% in real terms from CVN 78  For the full text of the Navy's report, see the Appendix D   March 2012 Navy Letter to Senator McCain Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, in a letter with attachment sent in late March 2012 to Senator John McCain on controlling cost growth in CVN-78, stated the following: Dear Senator McCain: Thank you for your letter of March 21, 2012, regarding the first-of-class aircraft carrier, GERALD R  FORD (CVN 78)  Few major programs carry greater importance or greater impact on national security, and no other major program comprises greater scale and complexity than the Navy's nuclear aircraft carrier program  Accordingly, successful execution of this program carries the highest priority within the Department of the Navy  I have shared in the past my concern when I took office and learned the full magnitude of new technologies and design change being brought to the FORD  Requirements drawn up more than a decade prior for this capital ship drove development of a new reactor plant, propulsion system, electric plant and power distribution system, first of kind electromagnetic aircraft launching system, advanced arresting gear, integrated warfare system including a new radar and communications suite, air conditioning plant, weapons elevators, topside design, survivability improvements, and all new interior arrangements  CVN 78 is a near-total redesign of the NIMITZ Class she replaces  Further, these major developments, which were to be incrementally introduced in the program, were directed in 2002 to be integrated into CVN 78 in a single step  Today we are confronting the cost impacts of these decisions made more than a decade ago  In my August 29, 2011 letter, I provided details regarding these cost impacts  At that time, I reported the current estimate for the Navy's share of the shipbuilder's construction overrun, $690 million, and described that I had directed an end-to-end review to identify the changes necessary to improve cost for carrier design, material procurement, planning, build and test  The attached white paper provides the findings of that review and the steps we are taking to drive affordability into the remaining CVN 78 construction effort  Pending the results of these efforts, the Navy has included the 'fact of life' portion of the stated overrun in the Fiscal Year 2013 President's Budget request  The review also highlighted the compounding effects of applying traditional carrier build planning to a radically new design; the challenges inherent to low-rate, sole-source carrier procurement; and the impact of external economic factors accrued over 15 years of CVN 78 procurement—all within the framework of cost-plus contracts  The outlined approach for ensuring CVN 79 and follow ship affordability focuses equally upon tackling these issues while applying the many lessons learned in the course of CVN 78 procurement  As always, if I may be of further assistance, please let me know  Sincerely, [signed] Ray Mabus Attachment: As stated Copy to: The Honorable Carl Levin, Chairman [Attachment] Improving Cost Performance on CVN 78 CVN 78 is nearing 40 percent completion  Cost growth to-date is attributable to increases in design, contractor furnished material, government furnished material (notably, the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS), Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), and the Dual Band Radar (DBR)), and production labor performance  To achieve the best case outcome, the program must execute with zero additional cost growth in design and material procurement, and must improve production performance  The Navy and the shipbuilder have implemented a series of actions and initiatives in the management and oversight of CVN 78 that cross the full span of contracting, design, material procurement, government furnished equipment, production planning, production, management and oversight  CVN 78 is being procured within a framework of cost-plus contracts  Within this framework, however, the recent series of action taken by the Navy to improve contract effectiveness are achieving the desired effect of incentivizing improved cost performance and reducing government exposure to further cost growth  CVN 78 design has been converted from a 'level of effort, fixed fee' contract to a completion contract with a firm target and incentive fee  Shipbuilder cost performance has been on-target or better since this contract was changed  CVN 78 construction fee has been retracted, consistent with contract performance  However, the shipbuilder is incentivized by the contract shareline to improve upon current performance to meet agreed-to cost goals  Contract design changes are under strict control; authorized only for safety, damage control, mission-degrading deficiencies, or similar  Adjudicated changes have been contained to less than 1 percent of contract target price  The Navy converted the EMALS and AAG production contract to a firm, fixed price contract, capping cost growth to that system and imposing negative incentives for late delivery  Naval Sea Systems Command is performing a review of carrier specifications with the shipbuilder, removing or improving upon overly burdensome or unneeded specifications that impose unnecessary cost on the program  The single largest impact to cost performance to-date has been contractor and government material cost overruns  These issues trace to lead ship complexity and CVN 78 concurrency, but they also point to inadequate accountability for carrier material procurement, primarily during the ship's advance procurement period (2002-2008)  These effects cannot be reversed on CVN 78, but it is essential to improve upon material delivery to the shipyard to mitigate the significant impact of material delays on production performance  Equally important, the systemic material procurement deficiencies must be corrected for CVN 79  To this end, the Navy and shipbuilder have taken the following actions  The Navy has employed outside supply chain management experts to develop optimal material procurement strategies  The Navy and the shipbuilder are reviewing remaining material requirements to employ these best practices (structuring procurements to achieve quantity discounts, dual-sourcing to improve schedule performance and leverage competitive opportunities, etc )  The shipbuilder has assigned engineering and material sourcing personnel to each of their key vendors to expedite component qualifications and delivery to the shipyard  The shipbuilder is inventorying all excess material procured on CVN 78 for transfer to CVN 79 (cost reduction to CVN 78), as applicable  The Program Executive Officer (Carriers) is conducting quarterly flag-level government furnished equipment summits to drive cost reduction opportunities and ensure on-time delivery of required equipment and design information to the shipbuilder  The most important finding regarding CVN 78 remaining cost is that the CVN 78 build plan, consistent with the NIMITZ class, focuses foremost on completion of structural and critical path work to support launching the ship on-schedule  This emphasis on structure comes at the expense of completing ship systems, outfitting, and furnishing early in the build process and results in costly, labor-intensive system completion activity during later; more costly stages of production  Achieving the program's cost improvement targets will require that CVN 78 increase its level of completion at launch, from current estimate of 60 percent to no less than 65 percent  To achieve this goal and drive greater focus on system completion: the Navy fostered a collaborative build process review by the shipbuilder with other Tier 1 private shipyards in order to benchmark its performance arid identify fundamental changes that would yield marked improvement; the shipbuilder has established specific launch metrics by system (foundations, machinery, piping, power panels, vent duct, lighting, etc ) and increased staffing for waterfront engineering and material expediters to support meeting these metrics; the shipbuilder has linked all of these processes within a detailed integrated master schedule, providing greater visibility to current performance and greater ability to control future cost and schedule performance across the shipbuilding disciplines; the Navy and shipbuilder are conducting Unit Readiness Reviews of CVN 78 erection units to ensure that the outfitted condition of each hull unit being lifted into the dry-dock contains the proper level of outfitting  These initiatives, which summarize a more detailed list of actions being implemented and tracked as result of the end-to-end review, are accompanied by important management changes  The shipbuilder has assigned a new Vice President in charge of CVN 78, a new Vice President in charge of material management and purchasing, and a number of new general shop foreman to strengthen CVN 78 performance  The Navy has assigned a second tour Flag Officer with considerable carrier operations, construction, and program management experience as the new Program-Executive Officer (PEO)  The PEO and shipyard president conduct bi-weekly launch readiness reviews focusing on cost performance, critical path issues and accomplishment of the target for launch completion  The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) conducts a monthly review of program progress and performance with the PEO and shipbuilder, bringing to bear the full weight of the Department, as needed, to ensure that all that can be done to improve on cost performance is being done  Early production performance improvements can be traced directly to these actions, however, significant further improvement is required  To this end, the Navy is conducting a line-by-line review of all 'cost to-go' on CVN 78 to identify further opportunity to reduce cost and to mitigate risk  Improving Cost Performance on CVN 79 CVN 79 Advance Procurement commenced in 2007 with early construction activities following in 2011  Authorization for CVN 79 procurement is requested in Fiscal Year 2013 President's Budget request with the first year of incremental funding  Two years have been added to the CVN 79 production schedule in this budget request, afforded by the fact that CVN 79 will replace CVN 68 when she inactivates  To improve affordability for CVN 79, the Navy plans to leverage this added time by introducing a fundamental change to the carrier procurement approach and a corresponding shift to the carrier build plan, while incorporating CVN 78 lessons learned  The two principal 'documents' which the Navy and shipbuilder must ensure are correct and complete at the outset of CVN 79 procurement are the design and the build plan  Design is governed by rules in place that no changes will be considered for the follow ship except changes necessary to correct design deficiencies on the lead ship, fact of life changes to correct obsolescence issues, or changes that will result in reduced cost for the follow ship  Exceptions to these rules must be approved by the JROC, or designee  Accordingly, the Navy is requesting procurement authority for CVN 79 with the Design Product Model complete and construction drawings approximately 95 percent complete (compared to approximately 30 percent complete at time of lead ship authorization)  As well, first article testing and certification will be complete for virtually all major new equipments introduced in the FORD Class  At this point in time, the shipbuilder has developed a complete bill of material for CVN 79  The Navy is working with the shipbuilder to ensure that the contractor's material estimates are in-line with Navy 'should cost' estimates; eliminating non-recurring costs embedded in lead ship material, validating quantities, validating escalation indices, incorporating lead ship lessons learned  The Navy has increased its oversight of contractor furnished material procurement, ensuring that material procurement is competed (where competition is available); that it is fixed priced; that commodities are bundled to leverage economic order quantity opportunities; and that the vendor base capacity and schedule for receipt supports the optimal build plan being developed for production  In total, the high level of design maturity and material certification provides a stable technical baseline for material procurement cost and schedule performance, which are critical to developing and executing an improved, reliable build plan  In order to significantly improve production labor performance, based on timely receipt of design and material, the Navy and shipbuilder are reviewing and implementing changes to the CVN 79 build plan and affected facilities  The guiding principles are: maximize planned work in the shops and early stages of construction; revise sequence of structural unit construction to maximize learning curve performance through 'families of units' and work cells; incorporate design changes to improve FORD Class producibility; increase the size of erection units to eliminate disruptive unit breaks and improve unit alignment and fairness; increase outfitting levels for assembled units prior to erection in the dry-dock; increase overall ship completion levels at each key event  The shipbuilder is working on detailed plans for facility improvements that will improve productivity, and the Navy will consider incentives for capital improvements that would provide targeted return on investment, such as: increasing the amount of temporary and permanent covered work areas; adding ramps and service towers for improved access to work sites and the dry-dock; increasing lift capacity to enable construction of larger, more fully outfitted super-lifts: An incremental improvement to carrier construction cost will fall short of the improvement necessary to ensure affordability for CVN 79 and follow ships  Accordingly, the shipbuilder has established aggressive targets for CVN 79 to drive the game-changing improvements needed for carrier construction  These targets include: 75 percent Complete at Launch (15 percent> [i e , 15 percent greater than] FORD); 85-90 percent of cable pulled prior to Launch (25-30 percent> FORD); 30 percent increase in front-end shop work (piping details, foundations, etc); All structural unit hot work complete prior to blast and paint; 25 percent increase to work package throughput; 100 percent of material available for all work packages in accordance with the integrated master schedule; zero delinquent engineering and planning products; resolution of engineering problems in < 8 [i e , less than 8] hours  In parallel with efforts to improve shipbuilder costs, the PEO is establishing equally aggressive targets to reduce the cost of government furnished equipment for CVN 79; working equipment item by equipment item with an objective to reduce overall GFE costs by ~$500 million  Likewise, the Naval Sea Systems Command is committed to continuing its ongoing effort to identify specification changes that could significantly reduce cost without compromising safety and technical rigor  The output of these efforts comprises the optimal build plan for CVN 79 and follow, and will be incorporated in the detail design and construction baseline for CVN 79  CVN 79 will be procured using a fixed price incentive contract  Appendix D  March 2013 Navy Report to Congress on Construction Plan for CVN-79 This appendix reprints a March 2013 Navy report to Congress on the Navy's construction plan for CVN-79  Appendix E  Shock Trial An earlier oversight issue for Congress for the CVN-78 program was whether to conduct the shock trial for the CVN-78 class in the near term, on the lead ship in the class, or years later, on the second ship in the class  This appendix presents background information on that issue  A shock trial, known formally as a full ship shock trial (FSST) and sometimes called a shock test, is a test of the combat survivability of the design of a new class of ships  A shock trial involves setting off one or more controlled underwater charges near the ship being tested, and then measuring the ship's response to the underwater shock caused by the explosions  The test is intended to verify the ability of the ship's structure and internal systems to withstand shocks caused by enemy weapons, and to reveal any changes that need to be made to the design of the ship's structure or its internal systems to meet the ship's intended survivability standard  Shock trials are nominally to be performed on the lead ship in a new class of ships, but there have also been cases where the shock trial for a new class was done on one of the subsequent ships in the class  The question of whether to conduct the shock trial for the CVN-78 class in the near term, on the lead ship in the class, or years later, on the second ship in the class, has been a matter of disagreement at times between the Navy and the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)  The Navy has wanted to perform the shock trial on the second ship in the class, because performing it on the lead ship in the class, the Navy has argued, will cause a significant delay in the first deployment of the lead ship, effectively delaying the return of the carrier force to an 11-ship force level and increasing the operational strain on the other 10 carriers  The Navy has argued that the risks of delaying the shock trial on the CVN-78 to the second ship in the class are acceptable, because the CVN-78 class hull design is based on the Nimitz (CVN-68) class aircraft carrier hull design, whose survivability against shocks is understood, because systems incorporated into the CVN-78 design have been shock tested at the individual component level, and because computer modeling can simulate how the CVN-78 design as a whole will respond to shocks  OSD has argued that the risks of delaying the CVN-78 class shock trial to the second ship in the class are not acceptable, because the CVN-78 design is the first new U S  aircraft carrier design in four decades; because the CVN-78 design has many internal design differences compared to the CVN-68 design, including new systems not present in the CVN-68 class design; and because computer modeling can only do so much to confirm how a complex new platform, such as an aircraft carrier and all its internal systems, will respond to shocks  The risk of delaying the shock trial, OSD has argued, outweighs the desire to avoid a delay in the first deployment of the lead ship in the class  OSD in 2015 directed the Navy to plan for conducting a shock trial on the lead ship  The Navy complied with this direction but has also sought to revisit the issue with OSD  The issue of the shock trial for the CVN-78 class has been a matter of legislative activity—see the provisions shown earlier in " Recent Related Legislative Provisions ," particularly the most recent such provision, Section 121(b) of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  2810 / P L  115-91 of December 12, 2017)  An April 5, 2018, press report states the following: The Pentagon's No  2 civilian has said the Navy should perform shock-testing soon to determine how well its new $12 9 billion aircraft carrier—the costliest warship ever—could withstand an attack, affirming the service's recent decision to back down from a plan for delay  "We agree with your view that a test in normal sequence is more prudent and pragmatic," Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan said in a newly released March 26 letter to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain  The Arizona Republican and Senator Jack Reed, the panel's top Democrat, pressed for the shock-testing to go ahead as originally planned  James Guerts, the Navy's chiefs weapons buyer, told reporters last month that the Navy was acquiescing to the testing after initially asking Defense Secretary James Mattis to delay it for at least six years  In its push to maintain an 11-carrier fleet, the Navy wanted to wait and perform the test on a second carrier in the class rather than on the USS Gerald Ford 


Report 2: 0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $981 2 million in procurement funding needed to complete the two ships' estimated combined procurement cost  The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget also requests $73 0 million in AP funding for TAO-205s to be procured in future fiscal years, and $3 7 million in cost-to-complete procurement funding to cover cost growth on TAO-205s procured in prior fiscal years, bringing the total FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program (aside from outfitting and post-delivery costs) to $1,057 9 million  One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program  In assessing this issue, Congress may consider, among other things, whether the Navy has accurately priced the work that it is requesting to fund in FY2020  Another issue for Congress concerns the number of oilers the Navy will require in coming years to support its operations  The Navy is implementing a new operational concept, called Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), that could lead to the development of a fleet with larger numbers of individually smaller ships, and to more-widely dispersed Navy operations  DMO could affect requirements for Navy logistics, including oilers  The Navy states that Recapitalizing the auxiliary and sealift fleet in support of DMO has become a top priority  The initial reviews of the requirements to support this operational maritime concept indicate potential growth across the five lines of effort: refuel, rearm, resupply, repair, and revive  Coincident is the review of the level of effort needed to distribute logistics into a contested maritime environment following safe transfer by the logistics fleet—smaller, faster, multi-mission transports likely resident within the future battle force  The work to fully flesh out the requirement is ongoing, but the aggregate is expected to be no less than the current requirement, reinforcing the urgency to recapitalize the current fleet  An August 2017 GAO report states the following: The readiness of the surge sealift and combat logistics fleets has trended downward since 2012  For example, GAO found that mission-limiting equipment casualties—incidents of degraded or out-of-service equipment—have increased over the past 5 years, and maintenance periods are running longer than planned, indicating declining materiel readiness across both fleets     The Navy has not assessed the effects of widely distributed operations, which could affect the required number and type of combat logistics ships  The Navy released its new operational concept of more widely distributed operations—ships traveling farther distances and operating more days to support a more distributed fleet—in 2017  The Navy has not assessed the effects that implementing this concept will have on the required number and type of combat logistics ships  These effects could be exacerbated in the event that the Navy is less able to rely on in-port refueling—which has comprised about 30 percent of all refuelings over the past 3 years—placing greater demand on the combat logistics fleet  Given the fleet's dependence on the combat logistics force, waiting until 2019 or 2020 to conduct an assessment, as planned, could result in poor investment decisions as the Navy continues to build and modernize its fleet  Furthermore, without assessing the effects of widely distributed operations on logistics force requirements and modifying its force structure plans accordingly, the Navy risks being unprepared to provide required fuel and other supplies  Another issue for Congress is whether to encourage or direct the Navy to build TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy  The issue relates to how changes in the international security environment might affect how the Navy operates and equips its underway replenishment ships  During the Cold War, the Navy procured underway replenishment ships to support a two-stage approach to underway replenishment in which single-product "shuttle" ships (such as oilers, ammunition ships, and dry stores ships) would take their supplies from secure ports to relatively safe midocean areas, where they would then transfer them to multiproduct "station" ships called TAOEs and AORs  The TAOEs and AORs would then travel to Navy carrier strike groups operating in higher-threat areas and transfer their combined supplies to the carrier strike group ships  As a result, single-product shuttle ships were equipped with lesser amounts of ship self-defense equipment, and TAOEs and AORs were equipped with greater amounts of such equipment  When the Cold War ended and transitioned to the post-Cold War era, threats to U S  Navy ships operating at sea were substantially reduced  As a consequence, the amount of ship self-defense equipment on the TAOEs and AORs was reduced, and a single-stage approach to underway replenishment, in which oilers and dry stores ships took supplies from secure ports all the way to carrier strike group ships, was sometimes used  Now that the post-Cold War era has transitioned to a new strategic environment featuring renewed great power competition with countries like China and Russia, and a consequent renewal of potential threats to U S  Navy ships operating at sea, the question is whether TAO-205s should be equipped with lesser amounts of ship self-defense equipment, like oilers were during both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, or with greater amounts of ship self-defense equipment, like TAOEs and AORs were during the Cold War  Building TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy could increase TAO-205 procurement costs by tens of millions of dollars per ship, depending on the amount of additional ship self-defense equipment  Section 1026 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S  1356 / P L  114-92 of November 25, 2015) required an independent assessment of the Navy's combat logistics force ships  The report was delivered to Congress in February 2016  A copy of the report was posted by the media outlet Politico on March 11, 2016  The report states the following: The T-AO(X) will only have a limited capability to defeat a submarine launched torpedo attack and no capability to defeat a missile attack  When delivered, the TAO(X) will have: —[the] NIXIE Torpedo Countermeasure System [for decoying certain types of torpedoes] —[the] Advanced Degaussing System (Anti-Mine) [for reducing the ship's magnetic signature, so as to reduce the likelihood of attack by magnetically fused mines] When required, the T-AO(X) will also have ability to embark Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Expeditionary Security Teams (EST)  The ESTs will embark with several crew served weapons and are designed to provide limited self-defense against a small boat attack  The T-AO(X) will have Space, Weight, Power and Cooling (SWAP-C) margins for future installations of the following systems: —[the] Close In Weapon System (CIWS) or SeaRAM (Rolling Airframe Missile) [for defense against missile attack] —[the] Anti-Torpedo Torpedo Defense System (ATTDS) [for destroying torpedoes] Even after the installation of a CIWS or ATTDS, if the T-AO(X) was to operate in anything other than a benign environment, the ship will require both air and surface escorts  The decision to rely on [other] Fleet assets to provide force protection [i e , defense against attacks] for the T-AO(X) was validated by the JROC [in June 2015]  Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the Navy's request for FY2020 procurement funding for the TAO-205 program  A May 2019 GAO report—the 2019 edition of GAO's annual report surveying DOD major acquisition programs—stated the following regarding the TAO-205 program: Technology Maturity and Design Stability The Navy has matured all Lewis class critical technologies and stabilized the ships' design  In 2014, the Navy identified three critical technologies for the Lewis class, all of which involved a new system for transferring cargo at sea  Prior to initiating detail design activities in June 2016, the Navy completed prototype tests of the critical technologies and found that they were fully mature—an approach consistent with shipbuilding best practices  In 2017, the Navy removed one critical technology—the Heavy e-STREAM cargo delivery system—from the Lewis class design  The Navy had intended to use this system to deliver F-35 Lightning II power modules  The Navy subsequently decided to deliver these by air, which precluded any need for the Heavy system  Lead ship construction began in September 2018 with 95 percent of the ship's total design effort complete  Program officials stated that this figure meant that 100 percent of the ship's basic and functional design were by then complete—an approach consistent with best practices  Throughout detail design and now into construction, the Navy has not changed the Lewis class program's performance requirements  The Navy also leveraged commercial vessel designs to minimize design and construction risks  The Lewis class features a modern double-hull construction, an environmental-based design standard for commercial tankers, to ensure the ships can dock at ports-of-call  This design was included in the final three Kaiser class oilers  Production Readiness The program office has largely kept to its construction schedule to date for the first ship, but a flooding incident at a NASSCO graving dock in July 2018 has affected the delivery of future ships  The program office stated that this incident has not affected current ship fabrication activities  However, the dock's unavailability while repairs are planned and implemented has disrupted the contractor's schedule for future ships  According to the program office, the incident has resulted in some delays to certain delivery dates for ships two through six  Other Program Issues As part of the Navy's plan to expand the fleet, the Navy concluded that it would need an additional three Lewis class ships  The Navy's budget request for fiscal year 2019 increased its planned one-ship-per-year buy to two for fiscal years 2019, 2021, and 2023  The Congress provided appropriations for the additional fiscal year 2019 ship in support of the Navy's request  To account for the additional ships in fiscal years 2019 and 2021, the Navy plans to add two more ships to the low-rate initial production phase  Subsequently, program officials stated that they plan to compete a new contract for the remaining 12 ships using the construction knowledge gained from efforts under the existing contract  Program Office Comments We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment  The program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate  The program office stated that it continues to follow GAO shipbuilding best practices and has leveraged commercial vessel design practices to minimize risk  The program office also stated that it is currently revising its acquisition baseline to reflect the update in total quantities to 20 ships  In addition, the program office noted that, in fiscal year 2019, it fully funded the third and fourth ships and funded advance procurement for the fifth ship 

ground_truth: The National Popular Vote (NPV) initiative proposes an agreement among the states, an interstate compact that would effectively achieve direct popular election of the President and Vice President without a constitutional amendment. It relies on the Constitution's grant of authority to the states in Article II, Section 1 to appoint presidential electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.... " Any state that joins the NPV compact pledges that if the compact comes into effect, its legislature will award all the state's electoral votes to the presidential ticket that wins the most popular votes nationwide, regardless of who wins in that particular state. The compact would, however, come into effect only if its success has been assured; that is, only if states controlling a majority of electoral votes (270 or more) join the compact. By early May 2019, 14 states and the District of Columbia had joined the compact. After early momentum—eight states and the District of Columbia joined the NPV Compact between 2007 and 2011—the pace of state accessions slowed through 2018. Since then, four additional states joined, bringing the total number of electoral votes controlled by NPV member states to 189. During the same period, legislation to join the compact had been introduced during the current session in at least one chamber of the legislature in 14 additional states that control an additional 150 electors. The NPV initiative emerged following the presidential election of 2000, in which one ticket gained an electoral vote majority, winning the presidency, but received fewer popular votes than its opponents. NPV grew out of subsequent discussions among scholars and activists about how to avoid similar outcomes in the future and to achieve direct popular election. Proponents of NPV assert that it would guarantee the presidential candidates who win the most popular votes nationwide will always win the presidency; that it would end the inequities of the general ticket/winner-take-all system of awarding electoral votes; and that candidates would extend their focus beyond winning the "battleground states," campaigning more widely and devoting greater attention to issues of concern to other parts of the country. They further assert that NPV would accomplish this while avoiding the exacting standards set for the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments. Opponents argue that NPV would undermine the authority of states under the Constitution and the Founders' intention that presidential elections should be both national and federal contests; that it is an admitted "end run" around the Constitution that would circumvent the amendment process; and that it might actually lead to more disputed presidential elections characterized by politically contentious state recounts. The NPV has also been debated on legal grounds. Some observers maintain that it must be approved by Congress, because it is an interstate compact that would affect key provisions of constitutional presidential election procedures. NPV Inc., the organization managing the initiative's advocacy campaign, responds that congressional approval is not necessary because NPV concerns the appointment of electors, a subject that falls within state constitutional authority, and that the Supreme Court has previously rejected arguments that similar compacts would impair the rights of nonmember states. Other critics claim that NPV might violate the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority voter influence and avoiding the recently invalidated preclearance requirement for election procedure changes in covered jurisdictions. In response, NPV Inc. has asserted that the compact is "entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act." This report monitors the NPV's progress in the states and will identify and analyze further developments as warranted.