prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: As of June 30, 2017, the UN had carried out 71 peacekeeping operations since 1948, and had 16 active UN peacekeeping operations worldwide  Eight of these UN peacekeeping operations were in sub-Saharan Africa (see fig  1)  In their earliest days, UN peacekeeping operations were primarily military in nature and limited to monitoring cease-fire agreements and stabilizing situations on the ground while political efforts were being made to resolve conflicts  Today, in response to increasingly complex situations in which conflicts may be internal, involve many parties, and include civilians as deliberate targets, UN peacekeeping operations are more commonly “multidimensional”—deploying civilian and police personnel in addition to military personnel  Multidimensional peacekeeping operations seek to create a secure and stable environment while working with national authorities and actors to make sure the peace agreement or political process is implemented  According to the UN, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are designed to protect civilians and often assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections; protect and promote human rights; and assist in restoring the rule of law  Figure 2 shows examples of UN peacekeepers serving in different capacities as part of MINUSCA in Bangui, CAR  Each UN peacekeeping operation, including its mandated size and tasks, is authorized through a UN Security Council resolution  The operation’s budget and resources are subject to General Assembly approval  The UN’s approved budget for global peacekeeping operations in UN fiscal year 2017 was about $7 9 billion  Individual operation budgets ranged from about $36 million for the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo to more than $1 2 billion for the peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see table 1)  The UN reported in June 2017 that it maintained 95,544 uniformed peacekeepers, 5,004 international civilians, 10,149 local civilians, and 1,597 UN volunteers in support of its operations around the world  According to UN documents, civilian peacekeeping personnel are generally recruited to peacekeeping operations as individuals, while police and military personnel are volunteered by member states to participate as part of their country’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations  The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations  From fiscal years 2014 to 2017, the United States contributed an average of about $2 1 billion per year to these operations  The UN General Assembly sets the assessment levels for UN member contributions to peacekeeping operations every 3 years  The United States’ assessment has averaged about 28 5 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget; however, Congress has authorized payment with appropriated funds at about 27 percent for U S  fiscal years 2014 through 2016, and 25 percent for U S  fiscal year 2017  In April 2014, UN Security Council Resolution 2149 established MINUSCA following escalating sectarian violence in CAR that resulted in the destruction of state institutions, thousands of deaths, and 2 5 million people—more than half of CAR’s entire population—in need of humanitarian aid, according to a UN report  The conflict also resulted in 174,000 people being internally displaced and over 400,000 fleeing to neighboring countries, according to the UN report  MINUSCA’s tasks include protecting civilians, given the security, humanitarian, human rights, and political crisis in CAR; supporting the implementation of the transition process, including efforts to extend state authority and preserve territorial integrity; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and promoting and protecting human rights; supporting justice and the rule of law; and facilitating the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation processes  On November 15, 2017, UN Security Council Resolution 2387 (2017) extended MINUSCA’s mandate for a fourth time, through November 15, 2018  MINUSCA’s approved personnel levels for UN fiscal year 2017 comprised 10,750 military personnel, 400 individual police officers, and 1,680 formed police unit personnel, as well as 790 international civilian and 696 national civilian personnel, 238 UN volunteers, and 40 government- provided personnel, according to a UN Secretary-General report  Table 2 shows average annual personnel deployment for MINUSCA and the number of authorized positions for the first 3 full fiscal years of the operation  Based on data and other input from the UN, DOD, and State, we estimate that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to MINUSCA, the ongoing UN operation in the Central African Republic (CAR)  In addition, the estimated cost of a U S  operation in CAR far exceeds U S  contributions to MINUSCA  Based on an estimate we developed in conjunction with DOD and State officials, a hypothetical, comparable U S  operation would likely cost nearly $5 7 billion, more than twice as much as MINUSCA, the ongoing UN operation in CAR  Our comparison covers the time from which MINUSCA was established in April 2014 through the end of UN fiscal year 2017, which ended on June 30, 2017—a total of 3 years and 3 months, the first 39 months of MINUSCA  Over this time period, UN costs for MINUSCA totaled approximately $2 4 billion  Using roughly the same basic parameters for MINUSCA, including similar deployment levels of military and civilian personnel over the same time period, in consultation with DOD and State officials, we estimate that a comparable, hypothetical U S  operation would likely cost nearly $5 7 billion, more than twice the UN cost for MINUSCA (see table 3 for a detailed comparison of estimated U S  costs and actual UN costs)  This estimate does not include, among other things, the cost for State diplomatic security and office space for civilian staff, the inclusion of which could further increase the total estimated U S  cost for such an operation  During the same time period, from April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017, the United States contributed approximately $700 million to the UN to support MINUSCA  Therefore, the estimated cost of a U S  operation (nearly $5 7 billion) would be almost eight times greater than the United States’ contribution to MINUSCA  See figure 3 for a comparison of these costs with the U S  estimate  Various factors contribute to the differences in costs between actual UN expenditures for MINUSCA from April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017— the first 39 months of MINUSCA—and a hypothetical, comparable U S  operation over the same time period, including disparities in the cost of sourcing and transporting equipment and supplies, staffing and compensating military and police personnel, and maintaining facilities and communications and intelligence systems  These disparities reflect operational, structural, and doctrinal differences in the way the United States likely would undertake a hypothetical, comparable operation, should such an operation be deemed in the U S  national interest  High U S  costs to source and transport supplies and equipment to the Central African Republic (CAR) contribute to the difference between our cost estimate for the hypothetical U S  peacekeeping operation and the UN’s actual costs for MINUSCA  In the hypothetical U S  operation, based on input from DOD and IDA officials and the output of the IDA cost estimating tool, the United States would fly in most of its consumable supplies from outside CAR  Specifically, materials such as water, ice, food, and other subsistence items would be airlifted into CAR from Italy, a supply location validated as reasonable by DOD and IDA officials given its proximity to the operation and because MINUSCA relies on a UN global service center there, one of two such UN centers in Europe  The estimated U S  cost of airlifting water alone over the 39-month time period for the hypothetical operation would total nearly $700 million  The United States would still deploy its equipment and personnel to CAR from the United States, at a cost of nearly $600 million  Transportation of equipment and supplies within CAR would cost an additional estimated $316 million  In contrast, the UN does not fly in water or consumables on the same scale as the United States would in the hypothetical operation  Instead, the UN relies on some in-country or local infrastructure and consumables  Military and formed police unit equipment is provided by the troop- and police-contributing countries  The UN reimburses these countries for equipment at set rates  The UN cost of reimbursing countries for deploying their equipment to CAR likely would be less than the amount the United States would spend on airlifting the equipment to CAR alone  For example, the UN cost of freight, deployment, and country reimbursements for military and formed police equipment was approximately $229 million over a 2-year period (July 2014 through June 2016), while in the hypothetical operation the U S  cost of deploying equipment alone would be over $382 million, which is about $154 million more than the UN cost over a similar 2-year period (September 2014 through August 2016)  The United States would staff and compensate its military and police personnel differently than the UN, leading to differences between the estimated U S  costs and actual UN costs  While neither the hypothetical U S  cost estimate nor UN expenditures include the cost of salaries for active duty personnel or troops contributed by other countries, respectively, the United States would bear the additional cost of salaries for the share of personnel drawn from military reserves  According to DOD officials, 10 percent of infantry unit personnel would have been reservist personnel in a hypothetical, comparable U S  operation, based on the average ratio of active to reserve personnel deployed by the United States in fiscal years 2015 through 2017, roughly the same time period as the first 39 months of MINUSCA  As a result, the total estimated cost of the hypothetical U S  operation reflects the additional U S  expense of paying full salaries and hardship duty pay for U S  reservist military personnel  The estimate also includes the incremental costs the United States would incur for deploying active duty military personnel, including hardship duty pay that is not incurred when those personnel are in the United States  For military troops deployed to MINUSCA, the UN pays a standard troop cost reimbursement to the troop-contributing countries, which is intended also to cover incremental expenses but not the cost of troops’ salaries  U S  costs for civilian police also are significantly higher than UN costs  The United States would pay over $167 million for U S  civilian police for the duration of the hypothetical operation, while the UN spent $41 million on its individual police officers over the same time frame  The U S  estimate includes the cost of police salaries and the additional costs of deployment, whereas UN costs for deploying individual police officers do not include salaries, which are borne by the police-contributing countries  Higher U S  standards for certain aspects of the hypothetical peacekeeping operation in CAR would contribute to costs that exceed those of MINUSCA  Facilities  The higher estimated U S  costs reflect higher U S  standards for facilities, according to State officials  The U S  cost estimate includes more than $1 1 billion for facilities and related costs, which include facility maintenance, food service, laundry, management and administration, and residential leases for civilian personnel  In contrast, the actual UN cost for facilities as part of MINUSCA totaled $292 million over the same time period  Communications and intelligence systems  The United States incurs costs associated with meeting U S  intelligence standards that are not part of UN operations, which lack comparable intelligence capabilities  The U S  cost estimate includes $140 million for the cost of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems, which represents additional operational costs to meet higher U S  standards for U S  communications and intelligence capabilities  Medical capability  Higher U S  standards for medical care and medical evacuation capability as compared to the UN are another factor that would contribute to higher U S  medical costs for a hypothetical operation, according to DOD and State officials  Some UN hospitals may not meet U S  minimum standards for medical care, according to DOD officials  Although medical costs do not constitute a significant portion of the U S  cost estimate, estimated U S  medical costs ($132 million) greatly exceed actual UN medical costs ($8 million) over the same time period  UN and U S  peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U S  and UN officials we met with  Relative strengths of UN peacekeeping operations include international and local acceptance, access to global expertise, and the ability to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks, according to these officials  Relative strengths of U S  peacekeeping operations would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities, according to U S  and UN officials  According to U S  and UN officials, UN peacekeeping operations benefit from greater international and local acceptance, access to global expertise, and the ability to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks  UN peacekeeping operations also provide indirect benefits to the military capacity of participating countries  International and local acceptance  As a multilateral organization, the UN benefits from greater international and local acceptance for its peacekeeping operations, according to State, DOD, and UN officials  These officials noted that the UN’s multinational character contributes to a reputation for local impartiality  Conversely, the United States acting alone may not be viewed as impartial and could face challenges gaining or maintaining international or local support for peacekeeping operations, according to State and DOD officials  Global expertise  UN officials noted that the UN has unmatched convening power and access to expertise and experience from across the globe to implement the objectives of multidimensional peacekeeping operations  The UN is able to bring in people with subject matter expertise, native language skills, and knowledge of local customs to work for these operations, according to U S  and UN officials  Leveraging multilateral assistance  U S  officials told us that the UN is better able to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and multilateral development banks to expand the scope of assistance provided in support of the goals of peacekeeping operations  For example, according to a UN report, MINUSCA is partnering with the UN Development Fund to provide capacity building related to elections, police, courts, and prisons  The report also noted that the UN, European Union, and World Bank supported the Central African Republic government in developing a “National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan” while harmonizing humanitarian and development funding to ensure complementarity with the UN peacekeeping operation  Developing international military capacity  U S  officials told us that UN peacekeeping operations provide an indirect benefit of helping to professionalize the military units from many developing countries that contribute troops to the UN  We have previously reported that building military capacity of foreign partners to address security-related threats is an important goal of U S  national security strategy and foreign policy  According to U S  and UN officials, the relative strengths of U S  peacekeeping operations would be faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities  Deployment speed  State, DOD, and UN officials highlighted the United States’ ability to deploy troops and police to peacekeeping operations more quickly than the UN  Unlike the U S  military, which can draw from a ready pool of military personnel, the UN must seek troops from UN member states, which takes time  UN officials told us that the UN faces a shortage of both troops and UN police, which slows deployment  Further, a 2015 report by the UN High-level Panel on Peacekeeping stated that the UN “has struggled to get sufficient forces on the ground quickly enough and relies on under-resourced uniformed capabilities ” The report also stated that aviation, medical, and engineering specialists, among others, are difficult to mobilize in advance of infantry units  Command and control  State, DOD, and UN officials told us that U S  operations would enable the U S  military to have direct command and control, whereas UN operations, which are inherently multinational, face challenges with command and control over troops from several different countries  The UN High-level Panel report noted that UN peacekeeping operations’ weak command and control is a well-known constraint that limits the type of operations the UN can undertake  Logistics support  U S  and UN officials told us that U S  operations have superior logistics systems  U S  procurement likely would be faster than UN procurement, which lacks a standing supply chain and, therefore, relies on third-party vendors, according to UN officials  In addition, the UN High Level Panel report stated that UN peacekeeping operations’ logistics systems and structures in the field are under severe strain, which can limit the mobility of these operations  Intelligence capability  U S  and UN officials agreed that U S  operations would involve superior intelligence capability  The UN only recently established an intelligence policy—in May 2017—having recognized that some peacekeeping operations had been deployed in fragile political and security environments with asymmetrical and complex threats  However, UN officials acknowledged that the scope of UN intelligence capability remains limited  Counterterrorism capability  DOD officials told us that a U S  peacekeeping operation would have the capability to include a counterterrorism component and would not be constrained in the use of force, if needed, in response to terrorist threats  UN peacekeeping operations, on the other hand, lack the capabilities and specialized military preparation to engage in counterterrorism operations, according to the UN High-level Panel report  The UN report stated that counterterrorism should be undertaken by the host government, a capable regional force, or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the UN Security Council  According to the UN report, UN peacekeeping operations may engage in proactive and preemptive use of force to protect civilians and UN personnel from threats; however, offensive force to degrade, neutralize or defeat an opponent is a fundamentally different type of posture that should be authorized by the Security Council only under limited and exceptional circumstances  We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, and the UN for review and comment  DOD provided a letter, reproduced in appendix II, which stated that it had no comments  State did not provide comments  The UN provided technical comments, which we incorporated into our report as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Secretary- General of the United Nations  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  The objectives of this report were to (1) compare the reported costs of a specific United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identify factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations  To compare the reported costs of a specific UN peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we selected the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) as a case study  We compared the reported UN expenditures for MINUSCA, which included both military and civilian components, with estimated costs for a hypothetical U S  operation with a similar level of military and civilian personnel  Our comparison covers a total of 3 years and 3 months—from MINUSCA’s establishment in April 2014 through June 30, 2017, the end of UN fiscal year 2017  We selected MINUSCA because it is in sub-Saharan Africa, where most UN peacekeeping operations established since 2003 have taken place, and has a typical scope and budget compared to other UN peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa, according to U S  and UN officials  In addition, MINUSCA is one of the most recent UN peacekeeping operations; thus, initial expenditures for the operation are relatively current  Because the results of our cost comparison are based on a single case study, they cannot be generalized to all UN peacekeeping operations  To determine the UN’s costs for MINUSCA, we analyzed UN budget and expenditure data covering the initial start-up period (April 2014 to June 2014) and the first 3 UN fiscal years (July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2017)  We spoke with officials of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support, and Management at UN Headquarters in New York, New York, to better understand the characteristics of MINUSCA and the different costs affecting MINUSCA’s budget and expenditures  We assessed UN expenditure data through discussions with cognizant UN officials and a review of external audits of UN budgetary information and found them sufficiently reliable for our purposes  We also analyzed data on U S  contributions to UN peacekeeping operations for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 from the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Organization Affairs to determine total U S  contributions to MINUSCA, and UN peacekeeping operations overall  To estimate the costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we developed a hypothetical scenario for a U S  operation based on the MINUSCA budget and supporting documents, assuming deployment of the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel in the Central African Republic (CAR) over the same time period (April 2014 through June 2017)  To estimate the military portion of the operation, we interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) officials and staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a DOD-sponsored non-profit corporation involved in developing cost estimates for U S  contingency operations  The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller and IDA generated a cost estimate for the military components included in the hypothetical operation using the Contingency Operations Support Tool (cost estimating tool)  DOD uses this tool to develop cost estimates for all military contingency operations  The cost estimate included only the incremental costs of the operation—those directly attributable to the operation that would not be incurred if the operation did not take place  For example, the estimate produced by the cost estimating tool did not include the direct salaries of active duty personnel as those costs would be incurred by the United States regardless of a possible decision to undertake the hypothetical operation  We assessed the cost estimating tool’s applicability to developing a hypothetical cost estimate for the purposes of this report through discussions with DOD and IDA officials, and compared the tool to the accurate and comprehensive characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, as described in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide  While we found the DOD cost estimating tool generated a sufficiently reliable cost estimate for a hypothetical U S  peacekeeping operation, we did not assess the overall reliability of the tool or its capability to generate accurate or comprehensive estimates for future U S  operations  To generate our estimate of U S  military costs using the DOD’s estimating tool, we used UN military deployment numbers as a baseline for the scale of a hypothetical, comparable U S  peacekeeping operation, while using unit sizes and rotations in deployment that were considered appropriate for the U S  military, according to DOD and IDA officials  We based the hypothetical U S  operation, and hence the cost estimate, on the following assumptions, which correspond approximately with MINUSCA’s actual UN personnel deployments: Theater of operation: Central African Republic (CAR) Type of operation: military contingency Operation time frame: April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017 Military contingents: as of June 30, 2017, 11,495 total personnel Infantry: 10 units of 630-785 personnel per unit, approximately 90 percent active duty / 10 percent reserves Communication / signals: 1 unit, 124 personnel per unit Engineering: 4 units, 200 personnel per unit Military police: 1 unit, 120 personnel per unit Formed police units (military police): 12 units, 140 personnel per Hospital / medical: 1 level III hospital, 248 beds, 495 personnel Helicopter units: 2 UH-60 C3 units, 1 MH-60M Assault attack helicopter unit, 100 personnel per unit Quick reaction force: 1 unit, 160 personnel per unit Special forces: 1 tactical civilian affairs unit, 1 Marine special operations intelligence unit, 160 personnel per unit Unmanned aerial vehicle: 1 unit, 84 personnel Transportation: 1 heavy transport unit, 120 personnel per unit Operational tempo: 1 0 for all phases of operation and units, except aviation units (set at 1 5) Deployment schedule and phasing: phased deployment, including 14 days for predeployment (e g , training), 5 days for deployment, 180 days for active duty unit sustainment and 270 days for reserve unit sustainment, 5 days for redeployment, and 0 days for reconstitution Housing: contractor-provided semi-permanent housing Transportation: personnel and equipment transported by airlift from the United States (primarily Fort Hood, Texas), material (such as water, food, and other consumables) transported by airlift from Italy We obtained input on the operational design for the military portion of the cost estimate from DOD officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Policy, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, and IDA officials  However, the military portions of the scenario and their corresponding cost estimate have some limitations  As a result of rounding for some units, U S  military personnel numbers do not exactly match the MINUSCA deployment levels  In addition, based on input from DOD officials, we attempted to select military units that would provide an essential function per U S  common practices while keeping the overall personnel deployment level as close as possible to MINUSCA’s deployment level  An actual U S  military plan may differ significantly from the UN plan as a result of differences between U S  and UN military operations, structure, doctrine, and circumstances at the time of the operation  To estimate U S  civilian costs, we matched the number of U S  civilian police and personnel to the number serving in MINUSCA  We then estimated the costs of deploying these U S  civilian personnel in CAR for the same time period as MINUSCA  We did not attempt to determine how the U S  government would actually implement civilian components of a peacekeeping operation in CAR  To estimate U S  civilian police costs, we met with State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to identify State’s costs for civilian police contractors providing police training and technical assistance in sub-Saharan Africa  Based on INL’s input we assumed that the base salary of civilian police would be grade 13, step 5 on the Office of Personnel Management’s general schedule salary tables for federal employees  In addition to the average base salary, we identified other costs—with input from INL—including, among others, personal equipment, travel from the United States, and State’s published allowances specific to CAR for local cost of living, post hardship differential, danger pay, and living quarters  We applied the average cost per officer to the average number of UN civilian police officers deployed in MINUSCA  To estimate U S  civilian personnel costs, we met with State’s Bureau of Budget and Planning to identify the costs of State Foreign Service officers and locally employed staff, based on the number of UN international and national civilian staff deployed to MINUSCA, respectively  We matched the number of State Foreign Service officers for the U S  cost estimate to the number of UN international staff in MINUSCA, with input from State to align the grade levels  The estimated costs for Foreign Service officers include average salaries based on State’s Foreign Service salary tables and State’s allowances specific to CAR, including local cost of living, post hardship differential, and danger pay  We also met with State Bureau of Budget and Planning officials to estimate other costs for Foreign Service officers, which we included in our cost estimate, including post assignment travel, administrative support costs, residential furnishings, and residential guards, among others, but we did not assess the reliability of these additional costs provided by State  In addition, State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations provided the actual costs of residential leases for Foreign Service officers in CAR in fiscal year 2017, which we used to estimate the cost of housing Foreign Service officers in CAR  We also matched the number of State locally employed staff to the number of UN national staff deployed to MINUSCA and added their average salaries and other costs in CAR based on data provided by State’s Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services  While MINUSCA’s expenditures also included costs for sending an annual average of up to about 200 UN volunteers to CAR, State officials told us that the United States generally would not send volunteers through its assistance efforts to a high-risk post, such as CAR  Therefore, we did not include any costs related to volunteers in the cost estimate  We also did not include costs related to host-government-provided personnel serving in MINUSCA  In addition, UN expenditures included about $7 million for “quick-impact projects” to support local government infrastructure and civil society initiatives  We did not include comparable costs for quick-impact projects in our U S  cost estimate because we did not have a basis for matching these costs  To identify factors that affect cost differences between MINUSCA and a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we reviewed the U S  cost estimate generated in conjunction with DOD, IDA, and State officials, and identified significant areas of cost for the United States and the assumptions incorporated in the estimate or factors specified by U S  officials that drive those costs  We compared the U S  cost estimate, including these significant areas of cost, to UN costs to identify differences  We interviewed U S  and UN officials regarding U S  and UN standards and policies that explain differences between MINUSCA costs and the estimated costs of a U S  operation  To identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations, we reviewed UN reports on peacekeeping operations and interviewed UN, DOD, and State officials  In addition, we reviewed GAO’s 2006 report comparing the costs as well as the strengths of a UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti with those of a hypothetical U S  operation  We conducted our review from February 2017 through February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the individual named above, Drew Lindsey (Assistant Director), Howard Cott, Juan Pablo Avila-Tournut, Debbie Chung, Martin de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Jennifer Leotta, Caitlin Mitchell, Elizabeth Repko, and Alex Welsh made significant contributions to this report 


Report 2: T he unemployment insurance (UI) system has two primary objectives: (1) to provide temporary, partial wage replacement for involuntarily unemployed workers and (2) to stabilize the economy during recessions  In support of these goals, several UI programs provide benefits for eligible unemployed workers  In general, when eligible workers lose their jobs, the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program may provide up to 26 weeks of income support through regular UC benefit payments  UC benefits may be extended for up to 13 weeks or 20 weeks by the Extended Benefit (EB) program if certain economic situations exist within the state  As of the date of this publication, although both the UC and EB programs are authorized, no state is in an active EB period  For an overview of EB, see the Appendix   The Social Security Act of 1935 (P L  74-271) authorizes the joint federal-state UC program to provide unemployment benefits  Most states provide up to a maximum of 26 weeks of UC benefits  Former federal workers may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) program  Former U S  military servicemembers may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX) program  The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 ( P L  102-164 ) provides that ex-servicemembers be treated the same as other unemployed workers with respect to benefit levels, the waiting period for benefits, and benefit duration  Although federal laws and regulations provide broad guidelines on UC benefit coverage, eligibility, and determination, the specifics regarding UC benefits are determined by each state  This results in essentially 53 different programs  Generally, UC eligibility is based on attaining qualified wages and employment in covered work over a 12-month period (called a base period) prior to unemployment  All states require a worker to have earned a certain amount of wages or to have worked for a certain period of time (or both) within the base period to be eligible to receive any UC benefits  The methods states use to determine eligibility vary greatly  Most state benefit formulas replace approximately half of a claimant's average weekly wage up to a weekly maximum  Additionally, each state's UC law requires individuals to have lost their jobs through no fault of their own, and recipients must be able to work, available for work, and actively seeking work  These eligibility requirements help ensure that UC benefits are directed toward workers with significant labor market experience and who are unemployed because of economic conditions  The UC program is financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under each state's State Unemployment Tax Act (SUTA)  The 0 6% effective net FUTA tax paid by employers on the first $7,000 of each employee's earnings (equaling no more than $42 per worker per year) funds federal and state administrative costs, loans to insolvent state UC accounts, the federal share (50%) of EB payments, and state employment services  SUTA taxes on employers are limited by federal law to funding regular UC benefits and the state share (50%) of EB payments  Federal law requires that the state tax be on at least the first $7,000 of each employee's earnings and that the maximum state tax rate be at least 5 4%  Federal law also requires each employer's state tax rate to be based on the amount of UC paid to former employees (known as "experience rating")  Within these broad requirements, each state has great flexibility in determining its SUTA structure  Generally, the more UC benefits paid out to its former employees, the higher the tax rate of the employer, up to a maximum established by state law  Funds from FUTA and SUTA are deposited in the appropriate accounts within the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF)  The sequester order required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P L  112-25 ) and implemented on March 1, 2013 (after being delayed by P L  112-240 ), affected some but not all types of UI expenditures  Regular UC, UCX, and UCFE payments are not subject to the sequester reductions  EB and most forms of administrative funding are subject to the sequester reductions  The FY2019 sequestration order requires a 6 2% reduction in all nonexempt nondefense mandatory expenditures, but no sequestration reductions are applicable to discretionary programs, projects, and activities  As a result, EB expenditures are required to be reduced 6 2% (only on the federal share of EB benefits) for weeks of unemployment during FY2019  As of January 22, 2019, EB has not been activated in any state during FY2019  The lapse in federal appropriations that occurred from December 22, 2018, until January 25, 2019, caused a partial government shutdown  As a result, during this lapse in appropriations, agencies without funding furloughed federal employees, and many federal employees excepted from furlough were working without pay  Furloughed federal employees may be eligible for UCFE benefits  States are required to operate the UCFE program under the same terms and conditions that apply to regular state UC  Therefore, UCFE eligibility is determined under the laws of the state in which an individual's official duty station in federal civilian service is located  Federal employees who are in furlough status on account of a government shutdown are generally treated by state law as laid off with an expectation of recall  Depending on state laws and regulations, the state may have an option to not require federal employees to search for work given an expected recall  However, according to guidance from U S  Department of Labor (DOL), excepted federal employees who are performing services (but working without pay) would generally be ineligible for UCFE benefits based on states' definitions of "unemployment " Private-sector workers who are furloughed or laid off due to the partial government shutdown because they were employed by government contractors or other businesses may be eligible for regular UC benefits  UC eligibility for these workers would be based on the requirements set out under the state laws in the state where they had worked  In this climate, there has been congressional interest in assisting furloughed and excepted federal employees through the UI system  For example, as described below in the section on " Unemployment Compensation for Excepted Federal Employees During a Government Shutdown ," there are proposals to provide new authority to pay UCFE benefits to excepted federal workers who are working without pay  The most recent lapse in federal appropriations began December 22, 2018, and ended on January 25, 2019, with the enactment of H J Res  28   Because retroactive pay for furloughed and excepted federal employees was authorized under S  24 , the Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019 (enacted January 16, 2019), UCFE payments made to federal employee claimants during this lapse in appropriations may be deemed an overpayment, subject to state UC laws regarding overpayment recovery  According to guidance from the Office of Personnel Management on this issue The state UI agency will determine whether or not an overpayment exists and, generally, the recovery of the UCFE overpayment is a matter for state action under its law; however, some state UI laws require the employer to recover such overpayment by collecting the overpayment amount from the employee  The Federal and state agencies will need to coordinate to determine the required action in accordance with the individual state UI law  Federal agencies are encouraged to develop lists or spreadsheets that can be provided to the state(s) containing the employees' names, social security numbers, and the amounts and periods of time covered by the retroactive payment  If a recession is deep enough and if state unemployment tax (SUTA) revenue is inadequate for long periods of time, states may have insufficient funds to pay for UC benefits  Federal law, which requires states to pay these benefits, provides a loan mechanism within the UTF framework that an insolvent state may use to meet its UC benefit payment obligations  States must pay back these loans  If the loans are not paid back quickly (depending on the timing of the beginning of the loan period), states may face interest charges, and states' employers may face increased net FUTA rates until the loans are repaid  The U S  Virgin Islands is the only jurisdiction with an outstanding loan  As of January 18, 2019, it had an outstanding loan of $68 4 million from the federal accounts within the UTF  At the end of 2017, fewer than half of states (24) had accrued enough funds in their accounts to meet or exceed the minimally solvent standard of an average high cost multiple (AHCM) of 1 0 in order to be prepared for a recession  Beginning in FY2015, DOL funded state efforts "addressing individual reemployment needs of UI claimants, and working to prevent and detect UI overpayments" through the voluntary Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessment (RESEA) program  RESEA provides funding to states to conduct in-person interviews with selected UI claimants to (1) assure that claimants are complying with the eligibility rules, (2) determine if reemployment services are needed for the claimant to secure future employment, (3) refer the individual to reemployment services as necessary, and (4) provide labor market information that addresses the claimant's specific needs  Section 30206 of P L  115-123 codified the authority for DOL to administer a RESEA program  It also set out various requirements for states to use certain types of evidence-based interventions for UI claimants under RESEA and allocated discretionary funding for RESEA across three categories (base funding, outcome payments, and research and technical assistance)  State RESEA programs must include reasonable notice and accommodations to participating UI beneficiaries  On April 4, 2019, DOL published a proposed methodology to allocate base RESEA funds and outcome payments  DOL requested state and public comments on this proposal by May 6, 2019  The President's budget for FY2020 proposes changes to several aspects of the UI system  It would create a new required standard for state account balances within the UTF and a new benefit entitlement for paid parental leave financed through state unemployment taxes  The President's FY2020 budget also proposes a set of additional integrity measures, including the required use of certain databases to confirm UC eligibility and requiring Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits offset UI benefits  The President's budget proposal for FY2020 would require states to maintain a minimum level of solvency in their UTF account balances to be at least half (0 5) of the state's AHCM  The proposal would alter the rules for calculating the net FUTA rate, requiring a higher net FUTA rate on a state's employers if that state maintained an AHCM of less than 0 5 on January 1 of two or more consecutive years  The additional FUTA revenue would be deposited into the state UTF account and would be terminated once the state met the 0 5 AHCM criteria  The President's budget proposal for FY2020 would require states to establish a paid parental leave benefit by 2020, using the UC program as its base for an administrative framework  States would be required to provide six weeks of benefits to a worker on leave or otherwise absent from work for the birth or adoption of the worker's child  States would have discretion to determine the parameters of eligibility and financing for this new paid parental leave benefit  The President's 2020 budget would require states to use three specific data sources to confirm an individual's eligibility for UC benefits: the State Information Data Exchange System (SIDES, administered by Information Technology Support Center [ITSC] and DOL); the National Directory for New Hires (NDNH, administered by the Department of Health and Human Services); and the Prisoner Update Processing System (PUPS, administered by the Social Security Administration)  The proposal would create several additional integrity measures, including giving the Secretary of Labor the authority to implement new corrective action measures in response to poor state administrative performance within the program; allowing states to retain a percentage of UC overpayments for program integrity use; requiring states to deposit all UC penalty and interest payments into a special state fund, with these funds required to be used for improving state UI administration as well as providing reemployment services for UI claimants; and offsetting SSDI benefits to account for concurrent receipt of UI benefits  Section 2105 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P L  112-96 ; February 22, 2012) amended federal law to allow states to conduct two types of drug testing  First, it expanded the long-standing state option to disqualify UC applicants who were discharged from employment with their most recent employer (as defined under state law) for unlawful drug use by allowing states to drug test these applicants to determine UC benefit eligibility or disqualification

ground_truth: To promote international peace and security, the UN had 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations worldwide as of June 30, 2017, with a total budget of almost $8 billion in UN fiscal year 2017 and contributions of over 100,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from more than 120 countries. The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, providing an average of about 28 percent of total funding annually. The Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, includes a provision for GAO to compare the costs, strengths, and limitations of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. This report (1) compares the reported costs of a specific UN operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identifies factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identifies stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. GAO worked with the UN, DOD, and State to generate a cost estimate of a hypothetical U.S.-led operation in the Central African Republic comparable to MINUSCA. GAO developed this estimate using DOD's cost estimating tool for contingency operations and State data on civilian costs, assuming a U.S. operation using roughly the same levels of military and civilian personnel as MINUSCA. The cost estimate should not be construed as suggesting that the United States would likely implement such an operation in the Central African Republic or that it would implement such an operation in the same way. GAO is making no recommendations. Based on United Nations (UN) and Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) data, GAO estimates that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). MINUSCA cost the UN approximately $2.4 billion for the first 39 months of the operation. GAO estimates that a hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic of roughly the same size and duration would cost nearly $5.7 billion—almost eight times more than the $700 million the United States contributed to MINUSCA over the same time period. Various factors affect differences between the actual cost of MINUSCA and the estimated cost of a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation in the Central African Republic. The United States and the UN would source and transport some supplies and equipment differently, affecting the cost of both operations; for example, the United States would airlift water into the Central African Republic, while the UN does not do so to the same extent. The United States also would incur the cost of civilian police and military reservist salaries, while the UN does not pay any troop or police salaries. Finally, some higher standards for facilities, intelligence, and medical services increase the U.S. cost estimate relative to UN costs for similar operational elements. UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U.S. and UN officials. These officials said that, because the UN is a multilateral organization, UN peacekeeping operations have international acceptance and are more likely to be viewed as impartial. Officials also said that the UN enjoys global access to expertise and experience, and can leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks. Relative strengths of a U.S. peacekeeping operation would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capability, according to U.S. and UN officials.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  Second, it allowed states to drug test UC applicants for whom suitable work (as defined under state law) is available only in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing, to be determined under new regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor  As required by  P L  112-96 , on August 1, 2016, DOL promulgated  20 C F R  Part 620 ,  a new rule to implement the provisions of the law relating to the drug testing of UC applicants for whom suitable work (as defined under state law) is available only in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing  Amid concerns voiced by stakeholders about the 2016 DOL rule, Congress repealed this UC drug testing rule using the Congressional Review Act (CRA) via H J Res  42 / P L  115-17   On November 5, 2018, DOL published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to reissue the rule identifying occupations that regularly conduct drug testing for purposes of Section 2105 of  P L  112-96   The CRA prohibits an agency from reissuing the rule in "substantially the same form" or issuing a "new rule that is substantially the same" as the disapproved rule, "unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule " Notably, this is the first time an agency has proposed to reissue a rule after the original version was disapproved under the CRA  According to the 2018 NPRM, DOL has addressed the reissue requirements of the CRA by proposing a substantially different and more flexible approach to the statutory requirements than the 2016 Rule, enabling states to enact legislation to require drug testing for a far larger group of UC applicants than the previous rule permitted  This flexibility is intended to respect the diversity of states' economies and the different roles played by employment drug testing in those economies  Comments on the proposed 2018 rule were required to be submitted by January 4, 2019  On January 16, 2019, Senator Richard Blumenthal introduced S  165 , the Federal Unemployment Compensation Equity Act of 2019  This proposal would amend UCFE law and create a new permanent UCFE eligibility category for excepted federal employees who are unpaid but required to work during a government shutdown due to a lapse in appropriations  During any shutdown beginning on or after December 22, 2018, all excepted federal workers would be deemed eligible for UCFE benefits  Additionally, these employees would not be subject to a one-week waiting period (otherwise often required under state laws) before UCFE benefits were to be paid  On January 23, 2019, Representative Debbie Dingell introduced H R  725 , the Pay Federal Workers Act  This proposal would also provide UCFE benefits in a similar manner to S  165 , including permanently amending 5 U S C  Chapter 85 to provide federal authority for these benefits  On January 23, 2019, Representative Anthony Brown introduced H R  720   This proposal would deem excepted federal employees during a government shutdown to be eligible for UCFE during FY2019  The authority to provide UCFE to these excepted workers would expire at the end of FY2019  On February 8, 2019, Representative Katie Hill introduced H R  1117 , the Shutdown Fairness Act of 2019  This proposal would deem excepted federal employees and unpaid military servicemembers during a government shutdown to be eligible for UCFE or UCX during FY2019  The authority to provide UCFE to these excepted workers would expire at the end of FY2019  On January 15, 2019, Senator Ron Wyden and Representative Danny Davis introduced S  136 and H R  556 , the Economic Ladders to End Volatility and Advance Training and Employment Act of 2019 (the ELEVATE Act)   Among other provisions, this proposal would establish new self-employment and relocation assistance benefits for unemployed workers to be administered by the Social Security Administration, in consultation with DOL  The self-employment assistance benefits would provide weekly income replacement (half of prior earnings up to the maximum weekly benefit amount in the state) for up to of 26 weeks to individuals  They would be available to individuals who are (1) eligible for any type of UI benefit; or ineligible for any type of UI benefit, but became involuntarily unemployed over the previous 12 weeks; or were previously self-employed, but lost a hiring contract, and (2) have a viable business plan approved by their state department of labor, workforce board, or the Small Business Administration  Additionally, Section 3 of S  136 and H R  556 would provide up to $2,000 (or more, depending on family size) to fund to up to 90% of certain relocation expenses for eligible individuals and their families  In order to be eligible for this relocation assistance, an individual must be a (1) dislocated worker, (2) long-term unemployed individual, or (3) underemployed individual and also have filed a claim for relocation assistance and obtained suitable work with an expectation of obtaining such work in a new geographic region  On March 7, 2019, Representative Karen Bass introduced H R  1585 , the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019  Among many other provisions, Section 703 of H R  1585 would require states to consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits  The House passed H R  1585 on April 4, 2019  On March 14, 2019, Representative Stephanie Murphy introduced H R  1759 , the Building on Reemployment Improvements to Deliver Good Employment (BRIDGE) for Workers Act  This proposal would extend eligibility to any claimant of unemployment benefits, including those profiled as likely to exhaust benefits (rather than limiting eligibility to those who were profiled as likely to exhaust benefits)  The House passed H R  1759 on April 9, 2019  The Extended Benefit (EB) program was established by the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (EUCA; P L  91-373) (26 U S C  §3304, note)  EUCA may extend receipt of unemployment benefits (extended benefits) at the state level if certain economic conditions exist within the state  As of the date of this publication, EB is not active in any state  Extended Benefit Triggers The EB program is triggered when a state's insured unemployment rate (IUR) or total unemployment rate (TUR) reaches certain levels  All states must pay up to 13 weeks of EB if the IUR for the previous 13 weeks is at least 5% and is 120% of the average of the rates for the same 13-week period in each of the two previous years  States may choose to enact two other optional thresholds  (States may choose one, two, or none ) If the state has chosen one or more of the EB trigger options, it would provide the following: Option 1—up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's IUR is at least 6%, regardless of previous years' averages  Option 2—up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's TUR is at least 6 5% and is at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years; up to an additional 20 weeks of benefits if the state's TUR is at least 8% and is at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years  EB benefits are not "grandfathered" (phased out) when a state triggers "off" the program  When a state triggers "off" of an EB period, all EB benefit payments in the state cease immediately regardless of individual entitlement  The EB benefit amount is equal to the eligible individual's weekly regular UC benefits  Under permanent law, FUTA finances half (50%) of the EB payments and 100% of EB administrative costs  States fund the other half (50%) of EB benefit costs through their SUTA  On March 7, 2019, Representative Karen Bass introduced H R  1585 , the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019  Among many other provisions, Section 703 of H R  1585 would require states to consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits  The House passed H R  1585 on April 4, 2019  On March 14, 2019, Representative Stephanie Murphy introduced H R  1759 , the Building on Reemployment Improvements to Deliver Good Employment (BRIDGE) for Workers Act  This proposal would extend eligibility to any claimant of unemployment benefits, including those profiled as likely to exhaust benefits (rather than limiting eligibility to those who were profiled as likely to exhaust benefits)  The House passed H R  1759 on April 9, 2019 
Report 2: 86 billion to clear the backlog of restoration and modernization projects at the shipyards  Furthermore, this estimate does not include the $9 billion that the Navy estimates it will need for capacity and capability upgrades over the next 12 years to support maintenance operations for the current fleet  In September 2016, we found that although DOD has stated that readiness rebuilding is a priority, implementation and oversight of department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts did not fully include key elements of sound planning, and the lack of these elements puts the overall rebuilding efforts at risk  The Navy states that its overall goal for readiness recovery is to reach a predictable and sustainable level of global presence and surge capacity from year to year  The Navy identified carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups as key force elements in its plan for readiness recovery and had set 2020 for reaching a predictable and sustainable level of global presence and surge capacity by implementing the optimized fleet response plan  However, we found in 2016 that the Navy faced significant challenges, such as delays in completing maintenance and emerging demands, in achieving its readiness recovery goals for carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups, and projections show that the Navy will not meet its time frames for achieving readiness recovery  As a result, we recommended that DOD and the services establish comprehensive readiness goals, strategies for implementing them, and associated metrics that can be used to evaluate whether readiness recovery efforts are achieving intended outcomes  DOD generally concurred with our recommendations and, in November 2016, issued limited guidance to the military services on rebuilding readiness; it has also started to design a framework to guide the military services in achieving readiness recovery but has not yet implemented our recommendations  The Navy has since extended its time frame for readiness recovery to at least 2021, but it still has not developed specific benchmarks or interim goals for tracking and reporting on readiness recovery  Navy officials cited several challenges to rebuilding readiness, chief among them the continued high demand for its forces, the unpredictability of funding, and the current difficulty with beginning and completing ship maintenance on time  In January 2017, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a readiness review and identify actions that can be implemented in fiscal year 2017 to improve readiness  DOD and Navy officials told us that, as part of this readiness review, the Navy prioritized immediate readiness gaps and shortfalls  These officials added that this review would guide the Navy’s investment decisions in future budget cycles, with the intention to rebuild readiness and prepare the force for future conflicts  However, high demand for naval presence will continue to put pressure on a fleet that is already stretched thin across the globe  Looking to the future, the Navy has plans to grow its fleet by as much as 30 percent, but it has not yet shown the ability to adequately man, maintain, and operate the current fleet  These readiness problems need to be addressed and will require the Navy to implement our recommendations—particularly in the areas of assessing the risks associated with overseas basing, reassessing sailor workload and the factors used to size ship crews, managing investments in its shipyards, and applying sound planning and sustained management attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts  In addition, continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and other challenges  Chairmen McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time  If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact John Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao gov  Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Steven Banovac, Chris Cronin, Kerri Eisenbach, Joanne Landesman, Amie Lesser, Felicia Lopez, Tobin McMurdie, Shari Nikoo, Cody Raysinger, Michael Silver, Grant Sutton, and Chris Watson  Over the past three years, we issued several reports related to Navy readiness cited in this statement  Table 1 summarizes the status of recommendations made in these reports, which contained a total of 14 recommendations  The Department of Defense generally concurred with all of these recommendations but has implemented only one of them to date  For each of the reports, the specific recommendations and their implementation status are summarized in tables 2 through 5  The Navy defines a class A mishap as one that results in $2 million or more in damages to government or other property, or a mishap that resulted in a fatality or permanent total disability  We analyzed data compiled by the Naval Safety Center for fiscal years 2009 through 2017 to provide a summary of major Navy mishaps at sea (see table 6)  Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are Classified  Classified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances and need to know, upon request  Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions that Affect Operation  GAO-17-548  Washington, D C : September 12, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-798T  Washington, D C : September 7, 2017  Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges  GAO-17-369  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  Military Readiness: Coastal Riverine Force Challenges  GAO-17-462C  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  (SECRET) Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and Composition of Ship Crews  GAO-17-413  Washington, D C : May 18, 2017  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-841  Washington, D C : September 7, 2016  Navy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness  GAO-16-481RC  Washington, D C : May 25, 2016  (SECRET//NOFORN) Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan  GAO-16-466R  Washington, D C : May 2, 2016  Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports  GAO-15-329  Washington, D C : May 29, 2015  Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Assess Risks to Its Strategy to Improve Ship Readiness  GAO-12-887  Washington, D C : September 21, 2012  Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions  GAO-12-711  Washington, D C : June 6, 2012  Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and Assumptions for Ship Crewing Requirements and Training  GAO-10-592  Washington, D C : June 9, 2010  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 

ground_truth: The 116th Congress has begun to consider several issues related to two programs in the unemployment insurance (UI) system: Unemployment Compensation (UC) and Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE). The lapse in federal appropriations that occurred from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019, created a partial government shutdown. As a result, agencies without funding furloughed many federal employees, and many federal employees excepted from furlough were working without pay during the lapse in appropriations. Furloughed federal employees may be eligible for UCFE benefits. Private-sector workers who are furloughed or laid off due to the partial government shutdown because they were employed by government contractors may be eligible for regular UC benefits. But, according to guidance from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), excepted federal employees who are performing services (without pay) would generally be ineligible for UCFE benefits based on states' definitions of "unemployment." In this climate, there has been congressional interest in assisting furloughed and excepted federal employees through the UI system. UI legislative issues currently facing the 116th Congress include the following: the effects of the FY2019 sequester order on UI programs and benefits, the role of UI in providing temporary income replacement during a government shutdown, state fiscal concerns related to financing UC benefits, reemployment services and eligibility assessments (RESEA), potential consideration of the UI proposals included in the President's FY2020 budget, and congressional oversight related to a proposed UC drug testing rule reissued by DOL after previously being disapproved using the Congressional Review Act. In the 116th Congress, policymakers have introduced legislation related to UCFE benefits in response to the recent partial government shutdown (S. 165, H.R. 720, H.R. 725, and H.R. 1117), legislation to provide self-employment and relocation assistance benefits (S. 136 and H.R. 556), legislation to require that states consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits (H.R. 1585), and legislation to amend Title III of the Social Security Act to extend RESEA to all UC claimants (H.R. 1759). For a brief overview of UC, see CRS In Focus IF10336, The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation.