prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: According to international and U S  government sources, climate change poses serious risks to many of the physical and ecological systems upon which society depends, although the exact details of these impacts are uncertain  Climate change may intensify slow-onset disasters, such as drought, crop failure, and sea level rise  Climate change is also increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, including sudden- onset disasters, such as floods, according to key scientific assessments  These effects of climate change may alter existing migration trends across the globe, according to IOM  (See appendix II for further discussion of climate change as a driver of migration in seven geographic regions ) For example, sea level rise, a slow-onset disaster, may result in the salinization of soil and drinking water, thereby undermining a country or community’s ability to sustain livelihoods and maintain critical services, which could cause some people to migrate  Sudden-onset disasters may also contribute to migration as people flee natural disasters, in most cases leading to temporary displacement  For example, people may either voluntarily migrate, or be forced to migrate, to earn money needed to rebuild damaged homes after flooding, especially as extreme weather events increase in intensity and number  If unable or unwilling to migrate, people may find themselves trapped or choosing to stay in deteriorating conditions  Sources agree that the effects of climate change generally impact internal migration, while migration across international borders due to climate change is less common  In deciding whether to migrate, people weigh multiple factors including economic and political factors, social or personal motives, or demographic pressures  The effects of climate change add another layer of complexity to this decision, but there is debate about the role climate change plays in migration  Figure 1 depicts how climate change may influence other factors that drive the decision to migrate or stay  There are limitations to reliably estimating the number of people displaced by climate change because there are no reliable global estimates for those migrating due to slow-onset disasters, and estimates for those migrating due to sudden-onset disasters are based on limited data, according to IOM  The lack of reliable data is due in part to the multi- causal nature of migration  Further, IOM notes that forecasts for the number of environmental migrants by 2050 vary from 25 million to 1 billion  They and others have questioned the methodologies used to arrive at even these broad estimates  Migration, potentially driven by climate change, may contribute to instability and result in national security challenges, according to some international organizations and national governments  For example, an influx of migrants to a city may put pressure on existing resources, resulting in tensions between new migrants and residents, or between the population and its government  The U S  Global Change Research Program has also stated that migration, such as displacement resulting from extreme weather events, is a potential national security issue  At different times, the United Nations General Assembly and, in 2014, DOD have deemed climate change to be a threat multiplier, as the effects of climate change could increase competition for resources, reduce government capacity, and threaten livelihoods, thereby causing instability and migration  Further, the U S  intelligence community considers climate change to increase the risks of humanitarian disasters, conflict, and migration  Identifying the cause of a conflict, however, is complicated, and experts debate the connections linking climate, migration, and national security  For example, IOM has reported that existing evidence on climate migration and instability must be considered with caution  Further, some studies stress that other factors can mitigate the effects of climate change on migration and stability, including governance and community resilience, as the World Bank has reported  State, USAID, and DOD are among the U S  government agencies with a role in responding to issues related to climate change, including as a driver of migration  State interacts with foreign governments and international organizations focused on climate change and migration primarily through the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (State/OES) and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM)  USAID supports a range of development programs that help to mitigate the effects of climate change through the Bureaus for Economic Growth, Education and Environment; Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance; Food Security; Asia; and Africa; and individual USAID missions  Additionally, USAID’s Offices of U S  Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) and Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) lead and coordinate the U S  government’s emergency responses to sudden- and slow-onset disasters, and complex emergencies overseas  DOD assists in the United States’ humanitarian response to sudden- onset disasters abroad through its six geographic combatant commands, with support from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Joint Staff’s Office of Humanitarian Engagement  Climate change as a driver of migration was not a focus of the policy documents we reviewed for either the current or previous administrations during fiscal years 2014 through 2018  Our review of executive actions, budget requests, and executive branch strategies that affected State, USAID, and DOD found only brief mentions of climate change as a driver of migration  None of the documents we reviewed reflected a priority for assessing or addressing climate change as a driver of migration, although these documents reflect a shift in administrations’ climate change priorities more generally  The previous administration issued two executive orders and a presidential memorandum related to climate change  These executive actions had a policy of improving climate preparedness and resilience, factoring climate-resilience considerations into agencies’ international development decisions, and creating forums for interagency coordination  In March 2017, the current administration issued a subsequent executive order revoking some of the previous executive actions related to climate change  See figure 2 for a timeline of these executive actions  The previous administration issued three executive actions related to climate change, which included requirements focused on agencies’ considerations of the impacts of climate change and established forums for interagency coordination  The current administration issued an executive action related to energy independence and climate change  Executive Order 13653: Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change  Executive Order 13653 stated that agencies—including State, USAID, and DOD—shall, among other things, develop, implement, and update comprehensive Agency Adaptation Plans that integrate consideration of climate change into agency operations and overall mission objectives  Executive Order 13653 also established the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience  Executive Order 13677: Climate-Resilient International Development  Executive Order 13677 requires State, USAID, and other U S  government agencies with direct international development programs and investments to incorporate climate-resilience considerations into decision making by assessing climate-related risks to agency strategies, and to adjust relevant strategies as appropriate, among other things  Executive Order 13677 also established the Working Group on Climate-Resilient International Development as part of the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience  2016 Presidential Memorandum on Climate Change and National Security  The 2016 presidential memorandum required, among other things, that agencies, including State, USAID, and DOD, develop an agency-specific approach to address climate-related threats to national security  It also required agencies to develop implementation plans that would describe how they would identify the potential impact of climate change on human mobility, including migration and displacement, and the resulting impacts on national security, among other requirements, and stated that the effects of climate change can lead to population migration within and across international borders, spur crises, and amplify or accelerate conflict in countries or regions already facing instability  The 2016 memorandum also established the Climate and National Security Working Group  Executive Order 13783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth  Executive Order 13783 revoked Executive Order 13653 and the 2016 presidential memorandum, among other things, as seen in figure 2  Priorities related to climate change shifted between the past two administrations as reflected in a recent budget request that reduced some climate change funding affecting U S  foreign assistance  2017 Presidential Budget Request  The previous administration stated in its fiscal year 2017 budget request that “the challenge of climate change will define the contours of this century more dramatically than any other” and that “it is imperative for the United States to couple action on climate change at home with leadership internationally ” The fiscal year 2017 budget request sought $1 3 billion in discretionary funding to advance the goals of the Global Climate Change Initiative, which was established in 2010 and aimed to promote resilient, low-emission development, and integrate climate change considerations into U S  foreign assistance  The $1 3 billion in requested funding included $750 million in U S  funding for the Green Climate Fund, a multilateral trust fund designed to foster resilient low-emission development in developing countries  2018 Presidential Budget Request  The current administration, in its fiscal year 2018 budget request, did not include any funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative  In addition, the current administration’s budget request stated that it “Eliminate the Global Climate Change Initiative and fulfill the President’s pledge to cease payments to United Nations’ (UN) climate change programs by eliminating U S  funding related to the Green Climate Fund     ” Some strategies from the current and previous administrations that affect State, USAID, and DOD, among other agencies, reflect a shift in priorities related to climate change  For example, the previous administration cited climate change as a “top strategic risk” in its 2015 National Security Strategy and stated that climate change is an urgent and growing threat to U S  national security, contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like food and water  The current administration does not discuss climate change in its 2017 National Security Strategy  Additionally, State and USAID have a Joint Strategic Plan to help the agencies achieve the objectives of the National Security Strategy  The previous State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan included a strategic goal on “promoting the transition to a low-emission, climate-resilient world” that proposed leading international actions to combat climate change  The current State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan does not have a climate change goal  State, USAID, and DOD were required by executive orders to assess climate change-related risks to their missions and, for State and USAID, to their strategies, among other things  In response to Executive Order 13653, which has since been revoked, the agencies completed adaptation plans that integrated considerations of climate change into agency operations and overall mission objectives  In response to Executive Order 13677, which has not been revoked, State and USAID developed processes for climate change risk assessments for their country and regional planning documents  Although these executive orders did not require a specific assessment of climate change as a driver of migration, all three agencies have discussed the effects of climate change on migration in their adaptation plans and risk assessments  However, State lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change-related risks to its integrated country strategies  State, USAID, and DOD each completed adaptation plans in 2014 that included limited discussions of migration as one potential effect of climate change  Executive Order 13653 directed the agencies to develop or continue to develop, implement, and update comprehensive Agency Adaptation Plans that integrate consideration of climate change into agency operations and overall mission objectives  Each adaptation plan was to include, among other things, a description of how the agency would consider the need to improve climate adaptation and resilience  State  In its 2014 adaptation plan, State included a brief discussion of climate change as one of multiple factors that potentially will drive migration and impact its mission  State reported that the specific impacts of climate change on the ability of the department to promote peace and stability in regions of vital interest to the United States were unknown  For example, according to the plan, an increase in heavy precipitation events around the world could damage the electric grid and transportation and energy water infrastructure, upon which State depends, making it difficult to maintain operations and diplomatic relations  In its plan, State reported that climate change impacts may threaten international peace, civil stability, and economic growth through aggravating existing problems related to poverty and environmental degradation  Further, environmental and poverty- related issues and regional instability could stress relationships with some foreign governments  However, the plan noted that specific impacts of climate change on conflict, migration, terrorism, and complex disasters were still unknown  USAID  In its 2014 adaptation plan, USAID included a brief discussion of migration as one potential effect of climate change that could also impact security  USAID stated that the impact of climate change on its programs and operations, if left unaddressed, could compromise the agency’s ability to achieve its mission  Further, USAID’s plan referred to increased migration as a potential risk of climate change  Flooding and other extreme climate events can result in increased migration, among other impacts, that could affect existing and planned USAID programming  In particular, programs in areas like agriculture and food security, global health, water and sanitation, infrastructure, and disaster readiness and humanitarian response are vulnerable to climate change, according to USAID  In the infrastructure area, climate change may necessitate new protective measures for coastal homes and infrastructure, and in some cases even mass evacuations or permanent migration  USAID stated that climate change could further reduce or alter the distribution of already limited resources like food and water, or force temporary or permanent migration of communities  According to the plan, in areas with high risk factors for conflict, climate change stresses can aggravate tensions and contribute to conflict  DOD  In its 2014 adaptation roadmap, DOD included a brief discussion of migration as one of multiple potential effects of climate change that could impact national security  DOD referred to climate change as a threat multiplier that can aggravate other risks around the world, with migration being one effect that could increase requests for DOD to provide assistance  The roadmap stated that as climate change affects the availability of food and water, human migration, and competition for natural resources, the department’s unique capability to provide logistical, material, and security assistance on a massive scale or in rapid fashion may be called upon with increasing frequency  Furthermore, DOD stated that the impacts of climate change may cause instability in other countries by, among other things, impairing access to food and water, damaging infrastructure, uprooting and displacing large numbers of people, and compelling mass migration  These developments, according to the department, could undermine already fragile governments that are unable to respond effectively, or challenge currently stable governments, as well as increase competition and tension between countries vying for limited resources  In response to Executive Order 13677, State and USAID developed processes for climate change risk assessments for their country and regional planning documents  Though these assessments are not specific to migration, a few of the assessments identified the nexus of climate change and migration  State  State required climate change risk assessments for all new integrated country strategies drafted in 2016 or later  We reviewed 10 integrated country strategies from the two regions that were the first to implement the climate change risk assessment requirement— Africa, and East Asia and the Pacific  All 10 of the strategies included climate change risk assessments, one of which—Cambodia— identified migration as a risk for the country  The Cambodia strategy states that internal migration due to climate change hinders access to health care and the prevention of infectious diseases like malaria  We also reviewed 10 strategies from State’s functional and regional bureaus for assessments of climate-related risks, including 3 functional bureau strategies (State/PRM, State/OES, and State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs) and 7 regional bureau strategies  All of the functional bureau strategies we reviewed identified climate change as a risk and State/PRM cited the impact of climate change on migration  Of the regional bureau strategies we reviewed, we found that one, the Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, identified climate change as a driver of migration as a challenge or risk in its region  For example, the strategy states that climate change is becoming increasingly disruptive, potentially increasing migration due to rising sea levels  None of the other six regional bureau strategies we reviewed identified the nexus of climate change and migration as a risk or challenge  However, five regional bureaus identified climate change as a risk or challenge and one identified migration as a risk or challenge  USAID  USAID also requires the integration of climate risk management into all country or regional development cooperation strategies drafted since October 1, 2015  Missions must document in a climate change appendix to the strategy any climate risks they identified and how they considered climate change in their strategy  As of August 2018, USAID had completed five country or regional development cooperation strategy updates initiated since October 1, 2015—Uganda, Tunisia, East Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe—and all five included the required appendix  Of the five updated strategies, three—Uganda, Tunisia, and East Africa—discuss the indirect effect of climate change on migration, among other issues  For example, Uganda’s 2016-2021 country strategy states that increased frequency and duration of droughts is likely to be the most significant climate‐related change in Uganda  The strategy also notes that droughts have affected, and will continue to affect, water resources, hydroelectricity production, and agriculture, among other sectors  As agriculture, forestry, and fisheries decline in Uganda, the strategy asserts that people will migrate to urban areas, leading to the formation of slums  We also reviewed USAID’s nine regional development cooperation strategies, one of which—East Africa—had been updated since the requirement to include climate risk management  Of the other eight strategies that have yet to be updated, seven identified climate change as a challenge or risk and three identified climate change as a driver of migration as a challenge or risk  For example, the Southern Africa regional development cooperation strategy states that water scarcity, natural disasters, and other climate change related events will most likely increase migration throughout the region  Additionally, the Asia regional development cooperation strategy discusses the risks of climate change in urban areas  In Asia, the number of migrants seeking economic opportunities in urban centers is likely to increase  According to the strategy, migrants are moving into hazard-prone areas located along coastlines, flood plains, and other low-lying areas in many Asian primary and secondary cities—areas that experts predict will experience more frequent and intense storm surges, floods, and coastal erosion as a result of climate change  The requirement in Executive Order 13677 to assess climate change- related risks to agency strategies remains unchanged; however, State now lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change- related risks to its integrated country strategies  Specifically, State’s 2016 guidance for developing integrated country strategies stated that all missions should assess the risk of climate change on their strategies’ goals and objectives and included reference to the climate risk screening tool—a method that missions could use to assess climate change risks  State issued new guidance to its missions in 2018, but this guidance does not include information on the process for assessing climate change-related risks to agency strategies  According to State officials, the 2018 guidance for integrated country strategies does not reference climate change risk assessments because, in September 2017, State decided that the strategies should not single out climate change risks in a separate appendix  State officials said this decision resulted, in part, from the new administration’s shift in priorities on climate change  Officials also said that this decision reflects a new approach to risk management by State and that the missions could choose to include climate change and other potential risks in the general risk discussion section of their strategies  Officials from State’s Office of U S  Foreign Assistance Resources said that it is now up to each mission to decide whether a strategic objective may have a climate challenge  However, those missions that choose to include an assessment of climate change risks are not provided guidance on the process for doing so and there is no reference to the climate risk screening tool—or to climate change at all—in the 2018 guidance  Executive Order 13677 directed State to incorporate climate-resilience considerations into decision making by assessing climate-related risks to agency strategies, among other things  Subsequently, a State cable from September 2016 further explained that State would implement the executive order’s requirement by screening for climate risks as part of the process for drafting all new integrated country strategies  Additionally, the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that documentation is a necessary part of an effective internal control system  If management determines that a principle is not relevant, management must support that determination with documentation that includes the rationale of how, in the absence of that principle, the associated component could be designed, implemented, and operated effectively  Because State lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change-related risks to its integrated country strategies, it is less likely that the current round of strategies will include the assessment of climate- related risks  It is also possible that those missions that choose to conduct climate change risk assessments will not do so in a consistent manner  Such assessments might identify climate change as a driver of migration, as at least one previous assessment did under the 2016 guidance  Thus, without clear guidance, missions may not examine climate change as a risk to their strategic objectives and could miss opportunities to improve the climate resilience of foreign assistance activities  For fiscal years 2014 through 2017, State, USAID, and DOD had some activities that could potentially address climate change as a driver of migration, although none of these activities specifically focused on the issue  For example, USAID has climate change adaptation activities, but to date migration has not been a focus of this programming  With the shift in priorities related to climate change in fiscal year 2017, agencies have reduced some of these activities  State’s offices that are focused on the issues of climate change (State/OES) and migration (State/PRM) have participated in multilateral activities related to climate change as a driver of migration and funded adaptation and other activities related to the issue  State officials said that the agency does not, however, have any activities that specifically address migration due to climate change or environmental factors  State has participated in multilateral activities related to climate change and migration  With the shift in priorities related to climate change in fiscal year 2017, the United States has disengaged from some of these multilateral activities (see table 1)  In addition to State’s participation in the multilateral activities described in table 2, State has provided funding for activities related to climate change and capacity building that address natural disasters  These activities may involve efforts potentially related to migration  For example, according to State: State provided about $2 million per year, between fiscal years 2014 and 2016, to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which analyzed the impacts of climate change on migration in its most recent assessment report  State/PRM provided about $4 million, between fiscal years 2014 through 2018, for IOM’s Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative, which provides guidelines to protect migrants in countries experiencing conflict or natural disasters  IOM provides training to countries on these guidelines  State/PRM officials said that this initiative is not specifically related to climate change and does not focus on specific types of disasters but does mention sudden-onset disasters  Officials also said that IOM tries to promote a climate change perspective in its trainings  State/OES provided about $78 million in adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative to eight projects during fiscal years 2014 through 2017  (See appendix III for a description of all eight projects ) State/OES officials said that these projects help countries prepare for the impacts of climate change, potentially reducing the pressure to migrate  However, to these officials’ knowledge, none of these projects directly supported activities related to migration  For example, State/OES provided a $4 million grant to the National Adaptation Plans Global Network  This network focuses on increasing the capacity of governments to identify and assess climate risks, integrate these risks in planning, develop a pipeline of projects to address these risks, identify and secure funding for projects, and track progress toward resilience targets  Adaptation activities occurred in over 35 countries  With the shift in priorities related to climate change in fiscal year 2017, State discontinued some of these efforts  For example, funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative was not included in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2018  State/OES officials said that the agency does not plan to fund additional adaptation activities and has not requested additional funding for the activities  According to a State official, PRM had been in discussion with IOM to develop a project proposal that would have assisted the governments of Small Island Developing States in adapting their migration policies to account for challenges and opportunities associated with environmental degradation, ecosystem loss, climate change impacts, and natural disasters  State/PRM stopped further development of the proposal following the change in administrations  Additionally, according to a State official, the department made some efforts at the end of the previous administration to develop a formal position on the topic of climate change as a driver of migration  For example, State drafted an internal document to help clarify its role in responding to the humanitarian aspects of sudden-onset and slow-onset climate events  This initial work stopped under the current administration  USAID officials said that, with respect to the agency’s climate-related programming, its climate change adaptation programming was the most likely to include activities related to migration or displacement, although a broad swath of USAID development programming has the potential to build host country resilience  Officials stated that, to date, migration has not been a primary motivation for the agency’s climate-related or disaster assistance programming  However, officials said that, in a humanitarian crisis or under some economic conditions, development programming can reduce displacement or the pressure to migrate—such as by fostering greater resilience to drought or other adverse conditions—and that this is also true of climate-related programming  USAID also provides humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters that displace people  Officials said that USAID recognizes the links between displacement and natural disasters, but that the agency does not have specific programs linking disaster assistance, migration, and climate change  USAID identified about 250 activities that received adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative during fiscal years 2014 through 2016  Our analysis of the descriptions of these activities determined that none directly mentioned any efforts specifically related to migration  Officials emphasized that the connection between climate change and migration tends to be indirect and shaped by other more immediate factors  USAID’s data on activities that received adaptation funding identified 38 beneficiary countries, as well as activities described generally as implemented at the regional or global level  For activities where USAID’s data identified a specific region, most activities were located in Africa followed by Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean  Examples of the types of activities that received adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 include: The Mali Climate Change Adaptation Activity, which aims to build resilience to current climate variability and increase resilience to longer-term climate change effects  This activity is also working to strengthen the capacity of Mali’s meteorological agency to provide improved climate information as well as to incorporate climate considerations into local-level planning  The total estimated cost is about $13 million over 5 years  The activity for Climate-Resilient Ecosystems and Livelihoods, which ended in September 2018, aimed to increase Bangladesh’s resilience to natural hazards by working with community-based organizations, government ministries, and technical agencies  This activity provided technical assistance to the Government of Bangladesh and local communities to improve ecosystem conservation and resilience capacity  The total estimated cost was about $33 million in funding over 6 years  The activity for Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion, which aims to support pastoralists in Ethiopia via expansion of markets and long-term behavior change (see fig  3)  USAID officials cited this activity as an example of adaptation efforts that indirectly address the issue of climate change as a driver of migration  The activity has three interrelated objectives: increasing household incomes, enhancing resilience, and bolstering adaptive capacity to climate change among pastoral people in Ethiopia  An evaluation of the activity found that migration is a coping strategy for dealing with climate shocks, although participants said that drought is becoming more frequent, placing a severe strain on traditional coping mechanisms, such as migration and selling cattle, and that permanent migration is not a preferred strategy  The total estimated cost is about $60 million in funding over 6 years  With the shift in priorities related to climate change, funding for USAID’s climate change adaptation activities has decreased  Missions may continue to fund their adaptation activities with discretionary funds or other earmarked, sector funding, provided the activities further the funding source’s objective, according to USAID  For example, in some cases, missions are using Water sector funding to continue some of their adaptation work  USAID also said that among the agency’s goals are to increase the resilience of USAID partner countries to recurrent crises, including climate variability and change  In addition to USAID’s climate change adaptation programming, USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP provide emergency humanitarian assistance to people affected by sudden-onset disasters—such as hurricanes and floods—and slow-onset and extended disasters, including droughts and conflicts  Some of this assistance helps people who have been displaced by disaster  USAID officials stated that although disasters cause mainly temporary displacement, the relationship among humanitarian assistance, climate change, and migration is very complex and depends on both climatic and non-climatic factors  USAID/OFDA responded to 267 disasters from fiscal year 2014 through June 2018, according to agency data  For example, USAID/OFDA responded to the effects of Hurricane Matthew in Haiti in October 2016, as seen in figure 4, including helping temporarily displaced people  DOD assists in the U S  government response to overseas disasters, including helping people displaced by such disasters, regardless of the cause of the disaster  These efforts are not specific to climate change as a driver of migration  For example, officials from DOD’s geographic combatant commands said that, to the extent they address climate change, migration is not a focus of those efforts and they view migration as caused by security and economic issues  Between fiscal years 2014 and 2018, Congress has appropriated to DOD between $103 and $130 million per year for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid  Officials said that the geographic combatant commands use most of this funding for steady state humanitarian assistance related to health, education, basic infrastructure, and disaster preparedness with a smaller amount set aside for immediate disaster assistance although that varies based on emergency requirements  DOD officials said that they have not seen any changes to this funding or associated activities with the change of administrations in fiscal year 2017  DOD officials we spoke with also emphasized that USAID/OFDA is the lead agency for the U S  government’s response to disasters overseas  USAID/OFDA formally requested DOD support on about 10 percent of the foreign disaster assistance provided by USAID/OFDA, according to USAID data for fiscal year 2014 through June 2018 and DOD officials  DOD assistance is typically provided for the largest, most complex disasters, according to agency officials  According to a July 2015 assessment conducted by the geographic combatant commands, while their activities vary, each command works with partner nations to increase their abilities to reduce the risks and effects from environmental impacts and climate-related events, including severe weather and other hazards  For example, in the report, U S  Southern Command stated that it had requested funding to pre-position assets for when a severe storm threatens Haiti to be able to respond immediately to a potential disaster  U S  Southern Command officials said that they work with partner nations to encourage residents experiencing extreme weather to remain where they are because it is easier to provide help to people who stay in one place  Officials from U S  Southern Command and U S  Africa Command also said that the major factors driving migration in their regions are security and economic issues  State, USAID, and DOD have participated in interagency forums regarding climate change, which may have addressed its effects on migration  With changes to priorities regarding climate change in fiscal year 2017, these forums have been disbanded or are not meeting  The Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience  The Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience, of which State, USAID, and DOD were members, was established to facilitate the integration of climate science in policies and planning of government agencies, including by promoting the development of climate change related information, data, and tools, among other things  Additionally, the council was to develop, recommend, and coordinate interagency efforts on priority federal government actions related to climate preparedness and resilience  According to State officials, the council began working with the National Security Council and other agencies to facilitate greater interagency cooperation on adaptation  In addition, a task force on the council was discussing the federal role in addressing displacement related to climate change  The council was disbanded when Executive Order 13783 revoked Executive Order 13653, which had established the council  The Working Group on Climate-Resilient International Development  The Working Group on Climate-Resilient International Development, of which State and USAID were members, was established by Executive Order 13677 and placed under the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience  The working group’s mission includes developing guidelines for integrating considerations of climate-change risks and climate resilience into agency strategies, plans, programs, projects, investments, and related funding decisions, among other things  Additionally, the working group was tasked with facilitating the exchange of knowledge and lessons learned in assessing climate risks to agency strategies, among other things  USAID officials said that the working group had not discussed climate change as a driver of migration  While the working group has not been formally disbanded, it has not met since at least November 2017 according to USAID  The Climate and National Security Working Group  The Climate and National Security Working Group, of which State, USAID, and DOD were members, was established by the 2016 presidential memorandum  The chairs of the working group were to coordinate the development of a strategic approach to identify, assess, and share information on current and projected climate-related impacts on national security interests and to inform the development of national security doctrine, policies, and plans, among other things  According to the memorandum, the working group was to provide a venue for enhancing the understanding of the links between climate change- related impacts and national security interests and for discussing opportunities for climate mitigation and adaptation activities to address national security issues  This working group was disbanded when Executive Order 13783 revoked the 2016 presidential memorandum, which had established the working group  State, USAID, and DOD assessments and activities have not focused specifically on the nexus of climate change and migration  State did identify migration as a risk of climate change in at least one of its climate change risk assessments for the department’s country strategies  However, State now lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change-related risks to its integrated country strategies  State’s current guidance for these country strategies no longer mentions a climate change risk assessment and does not provide missions with information about the climate risk screening tool that can be used to conduct such an assessment  As such, missions are less likely to examine climate change as a risk to their strategic objectives, or to do so in a consistent manner, and thus may not have the information they would need to identify migration as a risk of climate change  By clearly documenting and providing guidance on how to assess the risk of climate change, State would ensure that the department examines the potential risks of climate change on its foreign assistance activities  We are making the following recommendation to State: The Secretary of State should ensure that the Director of the Office of U S  Foreign Assistance Resources provides missions with guidance that clearly documents the department’s process for climate change risk assessments for integrated country strategies  (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this product to State, USAID, and DOD for review and comment  State provided written comments, which we have reprinted in appendix IV  In its comments, State did not oppose the recommendation and noted that the agency will update its integrated country strategy guidance by June 30, 2019 to inform missions that they have the option to include an annex on climate resilience, as well as other topics  However, State also indicated that the agency will begin working with stakeholders to consider whether to recommend that the Secretary of State ask the President to rescind Executive Order 13677: Climate- Resilient International Development  USAID also provided written comments, which we have reprinted in appendix V  In its letter, USAID provided some additional information about its programs and its proposed transformation effort  USAID and DOD provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional requesters, Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, and the Secretary of Defense  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao gov, or Brian J  Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI  This report (1) describes executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018; (2) examines the extent to which the Department of State (State), the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD) have discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in their plans and risk assessments; and (3) describes State, USAID, and DOD activities, if any, that are related to climate change and global migration  We chose fiscal years 2014 through 2018 as our time frame based on our review of recent executive orders related to climate change  We selected State, USAID, and DOD because the agencies’ missions of diplomacy, development, and defense provide the foundation for promoting and protecting U S  interests abroad  To describe executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018, we reviewed documents that reflect priorities of the previous and current administrations  Specifically, we reviewed budget requests and enacted appropriations between fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for funding priorities related to climate change and U S  foreign assistance  In addition, we reviewed executive actions and executive branch strategies that applied to State, USAID, and DOD between fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for executive and national security priorities related to climate change  For example, we reviewed the current and previous national security strategies  strategies and seven regional bureau strategies  For USAID, we examined the five country and regional strategies that were required to include a climate risk assessment at the time of our review: Uganda, Tunisia, East Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe  We also reviewed all nine USAID regional strategies  For both State and USAID, we reviewed the selected strategies by searching for information related to migration and climate change  To determine whether State clearly documents the department’s current climate risk assessment process for integrated country strategies, we compared State’s 2018 guidance for developing integrated country strategies with standards related to documentation in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and previous State guidance issued in 2016, which was created in response to Executive Order 13677’s requirements to assess climate change risks to strategies, among other things  to these issues  The agency then provided us with data for about 250 activities from its annual operational plans for fiscal years 2014 through 2016, the 3 years during the period we reviewed in which it received adaptation funding  USAID identified these activities based on whether the agency had tagged them in its plans as having an “adaptation key issue ” USAID excluded projects that had planned attributions to the adaptation key issue of less than $250,000 in a given fiscal year, as well as certain other activities such as those that focused on project support  We then conducted an automated review of the activity description fields provided by USAID for terms related to migration and other descriptive information such as locations of activities  Because no USAID adaptation activities specifically mentioned migration, for the purposes of this report we chose illustrative examples to provide context for the types of activities the agency has funded  DOD officials we met with did not identify any specific activities related to climate change as a driver of migration  DOD officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the geographic combatant commands generally discussed DOD activities related to humanitarian assistance and disaster response as most relevant to our inquiry  Because DOD works in coordination with USAID’s Office of U S  Foreign Disaster Assistance on disaster assistance we also reviewed USAID data on its disaster response activities during this period  We determined that the USAID and State adaptation project data and USAID disaster assistance data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing these efforts  State, USAID, and DOD to obtain information on whether changes in government priorities related to climate change affected their activities  We conducted this performance audit from October 2017 to January 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  This appendix provides a review by region of observed and projected climate change effects, migration trends, and challenges in stability and security  Multiple sources we used for this overview make a connection between climate change and such events as rising sea levels, higher temperatures, and an increase in the number and severity of extreme weather events  The following regions are discussed: Asia, South America, the Arctic, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Oceania, and Central America and the Caribbean  We have provided an overview for each region and a focus on one country or territory in the region  international and regional organizations, including a variety of organizations within the United Nations, the World Bank, regional development banks, the European Union, and others  Third, we reviewed relevant public documents from U S  government agencies, including the Department of Defense, the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)  Fourth, we reviewed academic sources, research institutions, and documents from the relevant country’s national government  population  Economic conditions may be a factor for people deciding whether to migrate or stay in their country of origin  Remittances as Percent of GDP: The money international migrants transfer to recipients in their country of origin, expressed as a percentage of the origin country’s GDP  Sources agree that remittances support resilience in origin countries  Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry as Percent of GDP: A measure of the value added to an economy from the agricultural sector, which includes forestry, hunting, fishing, and the cultivation of crops and livestock, expressed as a percentage of the country’s GDP  Countries that depend on the agricultural sector may be vulnerable to the effects of climate change, according to the World Bank  Percent of Population in Cities: The population living in areas classified as urban according to criteria each country uses  Today, more than half of the global population lives in cities  Migration, in some cases due to climate change, is an important driver of urban growth, according to IOM  Cities are also expected to face increasing risks from rising sea levels, flooding, storms, and other climate change effects  Net Migration Rate: A measure of the number of people leaving a country compared to the number of people entering a country, expressed as a number per 1,000 people  The effects of climate change in Asia may impact migration and stability according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)  In coastal areas, effects of climate change include rising sea levels, storm surges, and others  Receding glaciers in mountanous areas may also cause flooding, and monsoons in a warmer climate may be more severe  Heat extremes and more rainfall are a particular concern in Southeast Asia  Changes in precipitation and drought in Asia may exacerbate food security challenges, and contribute to people deciding to migrate  Increases in migration, partly stemming from the effects of climate change in surrounding rural areas, may put pressure on existing urban infrastructure  Rural migrants may settle in informal communities on the outskirts of cities, areas that have little resilience to natural disasters  Although the World Bank and others agree that climate change largely causes internal migration, some evidence shows that the impact of climate change contributes to cross-border migration in Asia  Large numbers of migrants, along with other destabilizing factors, may contribute to instability and conflict, according to the IPCC  The effects of climate change on livelihoods, for example, could increase migration, strain governance, and contribute to conflict as a result  Bangladesh is one example where decreased yields from agriculture and fisheries have contributed to migration to the country’s coastal cities, which face their own climate change challenges  Bangladesh’s high population density and geography make the country susceptible to the effects of climate change, according to the World Bank, and others  Bangladesh’s coasts and river banks are vulnerable to sudden-onset events such as tropical cyclones and flooding  Cyclone Aila in 2009, for example, caused widespread flooding in the southern coastal areas of Bangladesh and impacted millions of people  The storm washed away embankments that protected coastlines and caused severe damage to crops and livelihoods  Tropical Cyclone Mora in 2017 damaged thousands of homes and displaced an estimated 200,000 people  Increases in the number and intensity of tropical cyclones, which some predict will occur in a warmer climate, could have severe impacts on homes, livelihoods, and food security  Bangladesh also experiences many slow-onset climate change events, such as rising sea levels and increasingly severe droughts, which are projected to intensify with climate change  Bangladesh would lose an estimated 17 5 percent of its land if the sea level rose 1 meter, as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has reported  Projected changes in precipitation levels could cause drought and food insecurity in the northwest and salt-water intrusion could reduce crop yields in the southwest  Migration is a common adaptation strategy to climate change in Bangladesh, according to the ADB  For example, some farmers have adapted to salt water intrusion and destroyed crops by switching to salt- tolerant rice production or shrimp cultivation  Others have migrated, often to Bangladesh’s cities to find work less dependent on agriculture  Many new migrants to Bangladesh’s cities live in informal settlements that lack the resilience to withstand sudden-onset climate events  The capital city, Dhaka, is a common destination for migrants displaced by salt-water intrusion, flooding, and river erosion, according to IOM  Dhaka, like many coastal cities in South Asia, is located on a low-lying riverbank and faces increasing risks of extreme flooding  For example, past floods in Dhaka have destroyed homes and contaminated drinking water, creating significant health hazards  In some cases, individuals migrate to cities temporarily for work and return home after the agricultural off season ends  Bangladeshis also provide a significant number of labor migrants to the Gulf States and Malaysia  Remittances from international migrants represent 5 4 percent of the country’s GDP, and may help to support resilience to climate change, according to IOM, and others  These migration trends may intensify in the future  One study estimates 9 6 million people will migrate from 2011 to 2050 due to the effects of climate change  Challenges in Stability and Security Migration due to climate change is cited as a potential destabilizing factor in Bangladesh by ADB, and others  The low-income population in Bangladesh is dependent on agriculture, making the effects of climate change—including impacts on food security—a particular concern  By 2030, these effects on livelihoods and food security could increase the poverty rate in Bangladesh by 15 percent, as the IPCC has reported  Given the proximity of Bangladesh to India, some individuals may also choose to cross the border  Increased migration to India is a potential concern, according to some sources, as India may not have the resources to absorb large numbers of Bangladeshi migrants  The CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: 2007); and Population Council, “Effects of Future Climate Change on Cross-Border Migration in North Africa and India,” Population and Development Review, Vol  36, No  2 (2010)  The effects of climate change in South America vary by region, according to the the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as potentially impacting migration and stability  On the coast, risks include sea level rise, depletion of fisheries, and coral reef bleaching, according to IOM  Coastal cities with growing populations are particularly vulnerable  Melting glaciers in the Andean mountain region, and increased rainfall are expected to change the distribution of water resources, and impact food production as global demand for food is growing  Desertification and land degradation, complicated by the effects of climate change, are contributing to migration from rural areas to cities in South America, as IOM has reported  An estimated 77 percent of people living in high risk areas in South America are located in cities, according to IOM  IOM predicts that as these people feel the effects of sea level rise and water scarcity, they will migrate from the large coastal cities to smaller urban areas  While South America has experienced economic growth in the last decade, poverty rates remain high, and the effects of climate change, including possible migration, may exacerbate inequalities, putting further pressure on cities to meet the needs of their populations  Water security in particular is expected to disproportionaly impact low-income communities, according to the IPCC  For example, in Brazil, drought in the northeast may increase migration to southern cities that are facing rising sea levels and landslides, with consequences for food, water, and energy security  Observed and Projected Effects of Climate Change Brazil’s cities and rural regions may encounter a range of climate change effects, according to the IPCC and IOM  Rural areas, particularly in the northeast, could experience significant impacts from climate change partly due to poverty rates, and historical vulnerability to drought  Higher temperatures are expected to affect crop yields and household incomes, especially for low-income communities  In northeastern Brazil, temperatures are expected to increase and rainfall to decrease  The northeast could see a 22 percent reduction in precipitation by 2100, according to IPCC projections  Brazil’s coastal areas, including cities, are also vulnerable to rising sea levels, heavy precipitation, flooding, and landslides  The vast majority of Brazil’s population, about 86 percent, lives in cities, many in coastal areas, according to the United Nations Development Program  As their populations have grown, urban areas have extended out  This urban growth in Brazil’s megacities has caused further increases in temperature, rainfall, and landslides  For example, current levels of urbanization in the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo may already be responsible for the 2°C warming observed in the city over the last 50 years, as well as the rise in extreme rainfall, according to the IPCC  The metropolitan area is expected to extend its area 38 percent by 2030  Multiple studies of the effects of urbanization on Sao Paulo’s climate suggest higher temperatures affect convective rainfall, which occurs when warm air rises, condenses to form clouds, and produces extreme rain  Other concerns are the depletion of coral reefs and mangrove forests on Brazil’s coastlines, and decreases in biodiversity  Migration from drought in northeastern Brazil to cities has increased urban populations, putting more people at risk of displacement from flooding and landslides  Migration from the northeast is a historical trend in Brazil, as economic migrants have sought seasonal jobs in more productive agricultural regions, or moved permanently to southern cities  Projected declines in rainfall have led some to predict further increases in migration in northeastern Brazil, as the IPCC has reported  However, remittances from family members who leave Brazil’s northeast support resilience for those who remain and may help to reduce migration  Already environmental factors contribute to migration to cities, including to favelas, informal settlements often constructed in hilly areas and floodplains outside of Brazilian cities  A significant number of the favela residents in Rio de Janeiro are migrants from northeastern Brazil, according to IOM  These new migrants may be at risk of further displacement if heavy rainfall, flooding, and other climate change effects destroy their vulnerable homes  For example, heavy rainfall in April 2010 resulted in landslides across Rio de Janeiro, displacing an estimated 5,000 people, according to a report from the World Bank  Brazil is also a destination for migrants from other countries in the region  Migrants from Venezuela searching for jobs and improved food security have come in growing numbers in recent years, as have migrants from Haiti fleeing a series of natural disasters, as IOM has reported  Challenges in Stability and Security Although Brazil ranks 106th out of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index, the effects of climate change may contribute to challenges with water, food, and energy access according to the IPCC  Decreased rainfall could decrease agricultural productivity, with potential health impacts for poor populations  These conditions are of particular concern in northeastern Brazil, as extreme weather and low crop yields are associated with more violence, according to the IPCC  Brazil also receives about 70 percent of its electricity from hydroelectric power, according the United Nations Environment Programme, and recent droughts caused power cuts across many major cities  Although not linked to the effects of climate change, absorbing a growing number of migrants fleeing political and economic instability in Venezuela may impact the broader region, according to the U S  Department of Defense and the National Intelligence Council  Neighboring countries, including Brazil, may struggle to absorb the influx of migrants  On average, 800 Venezuelans are crossing the border to Brazil every day in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, according to the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency  The effects of climate change in the Arctic, including higher temperatures and melting ice, have contributed to shifts in migration across the Arctic, and may have security implications  Increasing temperatures may have a variety of impacts in the Arctic, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  The effects of rising temperatures are disrupting livelihoods and food security, especially for indigenous communities, and opening up untapped natural resources to extraction  Both trends have impacted migration flows in the Arctic  Rising temperatures and melting ice have opened up previously inaccessible waterways in the Arctic, with implications for national security, according to the Department of Defense and others  Greenland, located in the Arctic and considered part of Kingdom of Denmark, exhibits many of these trends  Greenland is experiencing the effects of climate change, including glacial and ice melt, shifts in wildlife distribution, and newly available oil and mineral deposits, among others  The Greenland Ice Sheet covers approximately 80 percent of Greenland’s land mass  The ice sheet’s melting rate is slow, but uncertain  Increases in temperature greater than 1°C may result in the near loss of the entire ice sheet over a millennium and significant sea level rise, according to the IPCC  In the short term, predicting the ice sheet’s melting rate is a challenge as predictions vary in the scientific community  Accurate predictions would support mitigation and adaptation efforts in vulnerable areas  Rising temperatures and shrinking ice cover have shifted the distribution and migration patterns of marine mammals and fish, and impacted food security according to the IPCC and the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum for Arctic states  For example, the economy in Paamiut, Greenland, depended primarily on cod fisheries until changing climate conditions caused cod to disappear, and the town was slow to adapt to newly available shrimp  Similarly, fisheries in Disko Bay, Greenland, have struggled to adapt to new conditions  Rising temperatures and the resulting reduction in ice cover have required a shift to fishing from boats in open water instead of hunting and fishing over ice cover  Lastly, warming and ice melt may make significant oil and mineral deposits accessible for extraction in the future  The potential expansion of extraction industries makes environmental sustainability another possible concern  For example, an estimated 31 billion barrels of oil and gas may exist off the coast of Northeast Greenland, according to the Kingdom of Denmark’s 2011-2020 Arctic Strategy  The strategy stresses the importance of assessing and reducing risks to the environment resulting from the exploration and extraction of oil and gas  The effects of climate change are predicted to contribute to internal and external migration in Greenland  For example, young people are increasingly leaving indigenous communities in rural areas for cities in Greenland in search of work, as traditional livelihoods become unsustainable  Greenland is home to a majority indigenous population, primarily Inuit, whose traditional hunting and fishing practices require travel across ice  In the past, people adapted to seasonal changes to support livelihoods by migrating, and the practice was embedded into indigenous social structures  With reduced ice cover, however, migrating to hunt, fish, and maintain connections to community is more dangerous or restricted  Government policies promoting centralized services, such as health care and education, have also played a role in the shift away from migration as a way of life  As a result, indigenous livelihoods are more difficult to maintain, and young people often migrate to towns and cities in Greenland, or to Denmark, for education  At the same time, warmer temperatures have made mineral extraction feasible  As the extraction industry grows, new jobs may draw migrants from outside the Arctic region  In 2011 companies spent $100 million on the exploration of minerals in the Artic, and the estimated number of new mines is expected to require more workers than now live in the region 17 79Currently, more people leave than migrate to Greenland  The local Inuit population in Uummannaq, Greenland relies heavily on ice coverage for fishing and travel by traditional dog-sled  Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, A Complex Constellation: Displacement, Climate Change and Arctic Peoples (January 30, 2013)  Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement  The effects of climate change on Sub-Saharan Africa vary depending on the region and have impacts on migration and security, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)  Coastal areas, for example, in West and East Africa are at risk from sea level rise that could affect major cities  Drought and the risk of desertification in the Sahel is cited as a concern, as is increased rainfall in parts of Central Africa accompanied by lower agricultural yields  As desertification threatens the livelihoods of farmers and herders, and drought makes fishing more challenging, rural dwellers may be more likely to migrate to cities, according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)  Urbanization and population growth across Sub-Saharan Africa is already making densely populated cities vulnerable to flooding, storms, and erosion, increasing the number of people at risk of displacement by sudden-onset disasters  Climate change effects and changing migration flows across Sub-Saharan Africa may impact access to natural resources and contribute to existing tensions and conflicts, according to UNEP and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  In Nigeria, the effects of climate change may effect a variety of livelihoods and increase migration south, while also exacerbating existing conflicts  The effects of climate change on Nigeria may impact the country’s agriculture and economy, according to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)  Higher temperatures and decreased rainfall have contributed to drought in northern Nigeria  Desertification is also a concern  Some regions in northern Nigeria have less than 10 inches of rain a year, an amount that has decreased by 25 percent since the 1980’s, according to USIP  In other areas across Nigeria flooding has resulted in major crop losses, according to UNEP  Rising sea level, water inundation, and erosion are concerns in Nigeria’s coastal areas  Rising sea level is predicted to pose medium to very high risks to Africa’s coastal areas by 2100, according to the IPCC  Future sea level rise could result in the inundation of over 70 percent of the Nigerian coast  A rise of 0 2 meters in sea level could risk billions of dollars in assets, including oil wells near the coast  Even without a rapid rise in sea level, Nigeria’s coastal areas could experience erosion and significant land loss by 2100, as the IPCC has reported  The effects of climate change on livelihoods in northern Nigeria may contribute to migration to the south according to UNEP, while conflict in the north drives separate migration trends  As the effects of climate change make farming and fishing more challenging elsewhere in Nigeria, migration to southern coastal cities may increase  Traditionally, farmers, herders, and fishery workers migrated for temporary employment during the off season, including migration to Nigeria’s cities to work in the oil industry  Permanent migration south as well as to cities may become more common if land suitable for farming decreases  As fish habitats like Lake Chad dry up, fishery workers may also migrate  Larger urban populations on the coast will put more people at risk of sea level rise, water inundation, and erosion, according to the IPCC  A rise in sea level of 1 meter could put over 3 million people at risk of displacement as the IPCC has reported  Herders have also moved further south due to increased drought in northern Nigeria, as UNEP and USIP have reported  A 2010 survey of herdsmen in Nigeria, for example, found that nearly one-third of them had migrated southeast as a result of changes in the natural environment, according to the UNEP  The ongoing conflict with Boko Haram, while not caused by climate change, has further resulted in millions of displaced people across the Lake Chad region, including many Nigerians who have fled to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger  Nigerian refugees at the Minawao camp in Cameroon  Challenges in Stability and Security The effects of climate change, migration, and conflict are interconnected in Nigeria, as USIP has reported  The country is ranked 14th of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index  Events in northwest Africa, including Boko Haram’s attacks in Nigeria, have underscored concerns about the region’s vulnerability to the spread of violent extremism  The effects of climate change may exacerbate these concerns, according to USIP  Nigerians fleeing attacks from Boko Haram in the north have gone to communities in neighboring Chad, Cameroon, and Niger that are already experiencing food shortages due in part to climate change  These neighboring countries as a result have fewer resources to support both their own residents and the newer refugees  Non-state actors may also take advantage of government inaction on the effects of climate change  Boko Haram, for example, has justified its acts of violence by pointing to government failures, according to the USIP  Separately, increased drought in the north may aggravate historic tensions over land and water use between farmers in the south and herders migrating from the north, according to UNEP  Nigeria’s oil fields on the coast, which represent a significant part of the economy, are also at risk from sea level rise  Potential losses in oil revenue could impact Nigeria’s ability to respond to humanitarian crises and conflict at home  Increased violence within its borders could also affect Nigeria’s ability to support regional peacekeeping missions, such as the United Nations Mission in Liberia from 2003 to 2018, where Nigerian troops worked to restore security after a civil war  The effects of climate change in the Middle East and North Africa, including on its desert regions, may impact water access and compound migration and stability challenges, according to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)  Over 60 percent of the population already experiences high or very high water stress, according to the World Bank  Coupled with unsustainable water use, climate change may further exacerbate challenges with water security  The region continues to experience rising temperatures and declining annual rainfall, trends that contribute to the severity and length of drought, land degradation, and desertification  Decreased water security affects the livelihood and quality of life of farmers in the region, contributing to an increase in their migration to the cities and more urbanization, according to the World Bank  In contrast, many people are expected to migrate away from coastal cities as a result of sea level rise, according to UNEP  These potential migrations would be taking place in a region that already hosts large numbers of migrants such as those displaced by conflict and violence, including 18 percent of the world’s refugees, according to the International Organization for Migration  Challenges in water security may put greater pressure on unstable governments in the region, by intensifying existing tensions and conflicts between populations and their governments as well as between countries that share sources of water  The conflict in Syria illustrates the complex nature of climate change, migration, and conflict in the region, and the challenges to accurately assessing the links among the three, as noted in a technical paper commissioned by the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID)  Rising temperatures and declining rainfall have contributed to recent droughts in Syria, a trend that may continue  The country underwent an extended drought from about 2006 until 2011  During the drought an estimated 60 percent of Syria experienced severe crop failure, and accompanying impacts on food security  Some studies have linked the length and severity of the drought in Syria to climate change, as USAID has reported  Others, however, have pointed to government land and water use policies, combined with the effects of climate change, as responsible for the severity of the drought  Agricultural policies, for example, encouraged farmers to grow water intensive crops like wheat, and supported inefficient irrigation practices, policies which further depleted ground water and made the region more vulnerable to decreases in rainfall linked to climate change  Across the Middle East, the rising temperatures and declining rainfalls of recent decades may worsen, according to the World Bank  If these trends continue, countries in the Middle East, including Syria, could continue to experience periods of severe drought and reduced crop yields  Migration Trends The ongoing conflict in Syria, in which migration due to climate change may have been a contributing factor, has caused large-scale migration to neighboring countries in the Middle East and to Europe  Leading up to the civil war, prolonged drought, among other factors, had increased migration to Syrian cities  Because of the drought, in 2009, over 800,000 Syrians lost their livelihoods in the agricultural sector, while nearly 1 million experienced food insecurity  In 2010, an estimated 200,000 people migrated from farms in rural areas to cities, according to a UN report  The conflict in Syria, which began in 2011, has further displaced large numbers of people within the country and across the Middle East, as we have previously reported At the beginning of the conflict, Syrians, as well as Iraqi and Palestinian refugees who had been residing in Syria, fled mainly to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey  As the conflict persisted, refugees fled in larger numbers to Turkey, with the UNHCR reporting that nearly 1 million Syrians sought protection in that country in 2015  Starting that year, a growing number of Syrians risked dangerous sea voyages to reach countries in Europe, such as Greece, Germany, and Sweden  As of June 2017, more than 5 million registered Syrian refugees were living in neighboring countries, including more than 3 million in Turkey, and more than 1 million in Lebanon  Challenges in Stability and Security Sources agree that the Syrian conflict is a significant security challenge that has resulted in large scale migration across the Middle East and to Europe  Yet the link between prolonged drought, rural to urban migration, and the current conflict in Syria is uncertain  Some academic sources argue that the increased strain on urban infrastructure and resources due to the rural to urban migration played a role in Syria’s growing instability  Others highlight the complex nature of the Syrian conflict, pointing to broader political factors that exacerbated resource scarcity and inequality  For example, as the drought intensified, the Syrian government downplayed the severity of the humanitarian crisis, as described in research cited in a technical report commissioned by USAID result, appeals to the international community for emergency aid received minimal support  Combined with existing sectarian divisions, ongoing revolutions across the Middle East, and other factors, the government’s response to the drought may have contributed to the current conflict  Migration and displacement are a concern in the region, according to the Department of Defense and others  The U S  government has provided significant humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees in the Middle East, including in Lebanon and Jordan, as we have previously reported However, a technical report commissioned by USAID has cautioned that the ongoing conflict in Syria makes it difficult to conduct research and draw conclusions related to climate, migration and conflict  As a The effects of climate change on Oceania, particularly rising seas, may significantly impact coastal populations and increase migration in the future, as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have reported  Rising temperatures and declining rainfall may also contribute to lower yields from fisheries and agriculture, and a significant decrease in coral reef cover  Extreme weather events, including higher temperatures, wind, and rainfall, have already increased in number and intensity across the region  In the majority of Pacific island nations, of those who migrate, more people leave than come, according to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Observatory on Migration  The majority of migration in the region is economically driven  In the future, climate change may further impact these migration patterns across the region, according to the IPCC  Climate change has already exacerbated challenges that aid-dependent nations in the region face, restricting livelihoods and resources and contributing to pressures to migrate  The costs of climate change, including a decline in crop yields, a rise in energy demands, and a loss of coastal land, are predicted to be significant  The ADB estimates these costs will reach 12 7 percent of the Pacific regions’ GDP by 2100  Increased migration may also impact political stability and play a role in geopolitical rivalries within the region, according to the IPCC  The effects of climate change, especially rising sea levels, may result in forced migration from the Republic of the Marshall Islands (the Marshall Islands) and have additional impacts on the U S  defense infrastructure on the islands  Observed and Projected Effects of Climate Change Rising sea levels are a grave threat to the Marshall Islands The country consists of islands, low-lying atolls—coral caps sitting on top of submerged volcanoes—making it particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels  On average, the Marshall Islands are 2 meters above sea level  In Majuro, the country’s most populous atoll, observed rates of sea level rise are already twice as fast as the global average  Population centers experience significant flooding, with damage to roads, houses, and infrastructure, especially during La Niña years, which are significantly wetter and more prone to extreme rainfall  Flooding is expected to worsen with rising sea levels, with consequences for the availabity of drinking water  On Roi-Namur island, for example, a 0 4 meter rise in sea level combined with wave-driven flooding is predicted to make groundwater undrinkable year round as early as 2055  This salt water inundation may contaminate already limited groundwater across the Marshall Islands  Lastly, during the 1940s and 1950s, the Marshall Islands was the site of 67 U S  nuclear weapons tests on or near Bikini and Enewetak Atolls  Projected increases in frequency of flooding may negatively impact efforts to contain radioactive material stored on Runit Island  A number of factors have increased migration from the Marshall Islands, including to the United States  In 1986, the United States entered into a compact of free association with the country that allowed its citizens to migrate to the United States, as we have previously reported  As a result, more than 20,000 Marshallese now live in the United States People are more likely to migrate abroad as the effects of climate change on the Marshall Islands—including rising sea levels—increasingly impact livelihoods The threat of mass displacement and forced migration is also a concern, as the International Organization for Migration has reported  However, Marshallese culture has a strong connection to the land, which means that many view migration as a last resort  For people still living in the Marshall Islands, they face overpopulation in urban centers and displacement by sudden-onset disasters like cyclones and flooding  Factors influencing people deciding to move abroad include displacement, lack of economic opportunity—sometimes exacerbated by climate change—and limited access to health care  Climate change is likely to increase risks to public health in the country Increased rainfall, for instance, may expand mosquito breeding grounds, raising the risk of diseases like dengue fever  The country’s limited health care system may further contribute to migration from the islands  Challenges in Stability and Security In the future, the Marshall Islands may become uninhabitable  This prospect threatens the existence of the Marshall Islands as a sovereign state, as well as the United States defense facilities located on the islands  The total loss of land could result in the Marshall Islands being uninhabitable, which raises problems of migration, resettlement, cultural survival, and sovereignty  Relocation of the population of the Marshall Islands, and of other Pacific Island nations at risk of rising seas, could cause significant geopolitical challenges The Marshall Islands are also of strategic importance for the United States  Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States has permission to use several islands— including Kwajalein Atoll, the location of the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Range—until 2066  The country’s proximity to the equator makes the Marshall Islands ideal for missile defense and space work  Yet the island’s defense infrastructure and operations are at significant risk due to rising sea levels, flooding, and diminishing supplies of potable water  As the Department of Defense has noted, climate change will have serious implications for the department’s ability to maintain its infrastructure and ensure military readiness in the future  DOD, 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap (Alexandria, VA: June 2014)  The effects of climate change on Central America and the Caribbean may increase migration and exacerbate poverty rates, as the National Intelligence Council has reported  The climate in Central America and the Caribbean is predicted to be warmer and dryer  The Caribbean’s extensive coastlines and low-lying areas are vulnerable to sea level rise and an increase in sudden-onset disasters, including hurricanes and storm surges  Drought is a particular concern in Central America, where declines in rainfall have reduced crop yields and threatened livelihoods in recent years  Some evidence shows that drought in parts of Central America has contributed to migration north, including to the United States  Population growth, especially in coastal cities, has increased the number of people at risk during hurricane season, and the number and intensity of hurricanes have grown in recent years  Some attribute the increase in intensity to higher sea surface temperatures caused by climate change  However, there remains debate about long term hurricane trends  Recent hurricanes have caused displacement, and significant losses and damages—including to infrastructure—across the region  The depletion of coral reefs and mangrove trees, natural barriers to coastal erosion and flooding, has exacerbated vulnerability to storms in coastal areas  Climate change is likely to have negative impacts on tourism in the Caribbean, where the industry is an important part of the economy, according to Inter-American Development Bank  Climate change impacts on the economy may make it increasingly difficult for governments to reduce poverty and move towards environmental sustainability  Haiti’s geography, location, and high poverty rates make the country especially vulnerable  Haiti is highly vulnerable to climate change effects, partly due to its long coastline Hurricanes routinely make landfall in the country, and increases in rainfall and wind speeds associated with hurricanes are likely  Severe hurricanes, including Hurricane Matthew in September 2016, have hit Haiti in recent years  Hurricane Matthew was the first category 4 storm in Haiti since 1964  Damage from severe flooding and severe winds during the hurricane affected over 2 million people and created significant food security and public health challenges  Significant deforestation has further exacerbated Haiti’s vulnerability to hurricanes, as trees previously provided a natural barrier to the erosion that strong winds and more rainfall can cause  Rising temperature and highly variable rainfall have led to extreme drought and flash flooding, according to the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID) 32 2 These trends decrease crop yields, affecting the livelihoods of farmers, and threaten water access  Projected increase in temperature and decreases in rainfall are likely to intensify drought in Haiti’s interior  USAID, Haiti: Environment and Climate Change Fact Sheet (January 2016)  Migration Trends Slow-onset climate events, such as drought, and rising sea levels, and sudden-onset events, including earthquakes, affect Haiti, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)  Haiti is also particularly exposed to extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, which can lead to displacement  In January 2010, a catastrophic earthquake in Haiti killed an estimated 230,000 people and left close to 1 5 million people homeless  According to IOM, the recurrence of environmental disruptions increases risks and vulnerabilities  When Hurricane Sandy struck Haiti in October 2012, the country had still not recovered from the 2010 earthquake  The worsening of climate change effects around the world, particularly in low-income countries, may increase the number of people wanting to immigrate to the United States, where approximately 700,000 Haitians live today Remittances from family members living outside Haiti make up a significant portion of the economy, at 24 7 percent of GDP  The majority of these remittances come from the United States, as we have previously reported 34 4Remittances may support resilience to climate change effects as migrants send money home for disaster recovery and adaptation  Challenges in Stability and Security Haiti, the poorest country in the western hemisphere, has experienced political instability for most of its history, and ranks 12th of 178 on the Fragile States Index  The government has a low capacity to respond to additional challenges like those related to climate change, according to USAID  The Ministry of Environment, for example, is a relatively new organization within the Haitian government, and local and regional governments have a limited ability to enforce environmental laws and regulations  The United States has provided substantial aid to Haiti, both in disaster response and broader development projects  Official development assistance for Haiti in 2015, for instance, totaled slightly more than $1 billion  According to a January 2018 UN report, 2 8 million people were still in need of humanitarian assistance  GAO, Remittances To Fragile Countries: Treasury Should Assess Risks from Shifts to Non-Banking Channels, GAO-18-313 (Washington, D C , March 8, 2018)  The Department of State’s Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (State/OES) provided about $78 million in adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative for eight projects for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 (see table 2)  The Global Climate Change Initiative was established in 2010 to promote resilient, low- emission development, and integrate climate change considerations into U S  foreign assistance and was divided into three main programmatic initiatives: (1) Adaptation assistance, (2) Clean Energy assistance, and (3) Sustainable Landscapes assistance  The primary purpose of these contributions to the LDCF was to address the adaptation needs of the least developed countries, which are especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change  The LDCF financed the preparation and implementation of National Adaptation Programs of Action, which identify a country’s priorities for adaptation actions  Initial grant to the National Adaptation Plans Global Network  The network is focused on increasing the capacity of national and subnational governments to identify and assess climate risks, integrate these risk considerations in sector planning, develop a pipeline of projects to address risks, identify and secure funding for projects, and track progress toward resilience targets  Colombia, East Caribbean (Guyana, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Ethiopia, Peru, South Africa, Uganda, West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Togo) and, under current consideration, East Caribbean (Dominica, Suriname), and Pacific (Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu) The cost amendment intensified the technical support on National Adaptation Plans to select countries dependent upon specific country adaption needs  In addition, the cost amendment continued the learning and progress from the initial grant  Implemented through the Department of Treasury, this funding supported a Treasury grant to the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative Multi Donor Trust Fund at the World Bank  This activity established the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Foundation and the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Company, among other things  The goal of PIER is to increase private sector investment in resilience to climate change in eight developing countries  The first phase of the project will assess and identify opportunities for private investment in resilience, as well as build public and private capacity for climate risk assessment in all the countries  In the second phase, public and private sector partners will develop and pilot climate risk-reduction investment models in four of the countries  The third phase will publicize the piloted investment models and lessons learned among the eight countries  Implemented through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, this activity aims to implement a capacity-building partnership with India to promote effective climate resilient decision making at national, state, and local levels  In addition to the contacts named above, the following individuals made key contributions to this report: Miriam Carroll Fenton (Assistant Director), Kristy Williams (Assistant Director), Rachel Girshick (Analyst-in-Charge), Nancy Santucci, Miranda Cohen, Aldo Salerno, Neil Doherty, and Judith Williams  Alexander Welsh, Justin Fisher, and Joseph Thompson provided technical and other support  Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Needs to Better Incorporate Adaptation into Planning and Collaboration at Overseas Installations  GAO-18-206  Washington, D C : November 13, 2017  Compacts Of Free Association: Actions Needed to Prepare for The Transition of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands to Trust Fund Income  GAO-18-415  Washington, D C : May 17, 2018  Remittances to Fragile Countries: Treasury Should Assess Risks from Shifts to Non-Banking Channels  GAO-18-313  Washington, D C : March 8, 2018  Syrian Refugees: U S  Agencies Conduct Financial Oversight Activities for Humanitarian Assistance but Should Strengthen Monitoring  GAO-18-58  Washington, D C : October 31, 2017  International Food Assistance: Agencies Should Ensure Timely Documentation of Required Market Analyses and Assess Local Markets for Program Effects  GAO-17-640  Washington, D C : July 13, 2017  High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others  GAO-17-317  Washington, D C : February 15, 2017  Federal Disaster Assistance: Federal Departments and Agencies Obligated at Least $277 6 Billion during Fiscal Years 2005 through 2014  GAO-16-797  Washington, D C : September 22, 2016  Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy Is Underway, but Agency Could Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps  GAO-16-453  Washington, D C : July 12, 2016  Climate Information: A National System Could Help Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Decision Makers Use Climate Information  GAO-16-37  Washington, D C : November 23, 2015  Hurricane Sandy: An Investment Strategy Could Help the Federal Government Enhance National Resilience for Future Disasters  GAO-15-515  Washington, D C : July 30, 2015  High-Risk Series: An Update  GAO-15-290  Washington, D C : February 11, 2015  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  GAO-14-704G  Washington, D C : September 10, 2014  Combating Terrorism: U S  Efforts in Northwest Africa Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management  GAO-14-518  Washington, D C : June 24, 2014  Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Can Improve Infrastructure Planning and Processes to Better Account for Potential Impacts  GAO-14-446  Washington, D C : May 30, 2014  Extreme Weather Events: Limiting Federal Fiscal Exposure and Increasing the Nation’s Resilience  GAO-14-364T  Washington, D C : February 12, 2014  Climate Change: State Should Further Improve Its Reporting on Financial Support to Developing Countries to Meet Future Requirements and Guidelines  GAO-13-829  Washington, D C : September 19, 2013  High-Risk Series: An Update  GAO-13-283  Washington, D C : February 14, 2013  International Climate Change Assessments: Federal Agencies Should Improve Reporting and Oversight of U S  Funding  GAO-12-43  Washington, D C : November 17, 2011  Climate Change Adaptation: Federal Efforts to Provide Information Could Help Government Decision Making  GAO-12-238T  Washington, D C : November 16, 2011  Foreign Relation: Kwajalein Atoll Is the Key U S  Defense Interest in Two Micronesian Nations, GAO-02-119  Washington D C : January 22, 2002 


Report 2: S  Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2018  Table 4 provides information from the same report about states' contributions to the costs of maintaining and operating voting equipment  As GAO uses the terms in the survey, operation costs "include things such as poll worker labor to set up equipment, postage for mailing absentee or vote-by-mail ballots, paper and printing supplies for paper ballots or voter-verified paper trails, and electricity to operate equipment during elections " Maintenance costs "include things such as labor to conduct maintenance between elections of any equipment hardware and software as well as any required parts " Some states cover or contribute to the costs of training local election officials, and some share election-specific costs, such as printing ballots and transporting voting equipment  Box 3 uses five examples of cost-sharing arrangements for election-specific costs of federal elections to illustrate the range of approaches states have taken to such arrangements  The structures of the state and local systems that conduct federal elections vary both between and within states  Common variations include differences related to the leadership of the election system; relationship between local election officials and the state; and population size and density of the jurisdiction served by the system  This section describes these structural variations  The state and local election systems that conduct federal elections may be led by an individual, such as the state secretary of state or a town or county clerk; a group, such as a state elections commission or a county board of elections; or a combination of individuals or groups, such as a state secretary of state and state board of elections, or a city clerk and city registrar of voters  Election system leadership may be chosen by voters or appointed by an authority such as the governor or state legislature  The selection method—and the leaders themselves—may be partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan  Federal law requires states to designate a chief election official to carry out certain tasks  Table 5 lists the titles of chief state election officials, as reported to CRS by the EAC, and the methods of selecting them, as listed by the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) and the National Association of State Legislatures (NCSL)  The leadership types and selection methods of local election systems may vary within a state  Box 4 uses examples from Florida and Wisconsin to illustrate such variations  It describes the different causes of variation in the two states and a recent change in Florida to a more uniform selection process  The leadership structures of both state and local systems can also change over time  Box 5 uses the two states from Box 4 to illustrate the types of changes states might make, how they might make them, and how frequently they might make them  It describes one change that was approved by voters as a ballot measure and a number of others that were enacted legislatively  Another way in which the structures of election systems can vary is in the relationship between local election officials and the state  Some local election officials operate largely independently, whereas others rely on state officials or resources for some, most, or all basic functions  For example, as noted in " Funding ," states may provide some or all of the training for local election officials  As described in more detail in " Jurisdiction Size and Density ," local election officials who serve smaller or more rural jurisdictions may also depend on their states to provide specialized expertise, such as legal or technical know-how  States also have varying types and degrees of influence over local election officials  Choices about other structural features, such as the method used to select the leadership of local election systems, can shape this aspect of the state-local relationship  For example, in some states, state officials appoint and can remove local election officials  State officials in other states may have other options for influencing local officials  For example, state officials may have the power to initiate legal action against local officials, to provide or withhold funding for local election administration, or to certify and decertify voting systems  However, they tend to have less control over how local officials perform their election administration duties than state officials with appointment and removal authority  As described in more detail in " Compliance with Federal Requirements ," this dynamic may be especially pronounced for local officials who are popularly elected  Such officials are accountable primarily to voters rather than to the state  Other structural variations between election systems derive from differences in the population size and density of the jurisdictions they serve  Some election jurisdictions reported serving fewer than 100 eligible registered voters in the 2016 election, for example, whereas Los Angeles County reported serving 6 8 million  The eligible registered voters in that county alone reportedly outnumbered the eligible registrants in each of 40 other states  Election jurisdictions also differ in population density  For example, Los Angeles County is an urban center, and many small jurisdictions are rural  Jurisdictions with different population sizes and densities have different election administration advantages and face different administrative challenges  For example, voter registration list maintenance is typically more straightforward in small jurisdictions because their lists are shorter and election officials are more likely to know registrants personally  Meanwhile, large jurisdictions tend to have larger tax bases and more resources  Those differences between jurisdictions may be reflected in the internal structures of the election systems that serve them  One example of such a structural difference is the size and specialization of the system's staff  Larger jurisdictions, which typically have more personnel, may have much of the specialized expertise they need in-house  Smaller jurisdictions, which may have only one part-time employee dedicated to election administration, are more likely to rely on outside expertise  For example, according to law professors Steven F  Huefner, Daniel P  Tokaji, and Edward B  Foley, smaller jurisdictions in Illinois have looked to state attorneys for election law expertise and to voting equipment vendors for technical support  Another type of difference related to jurisdiction size and density is variation in the allocation of system resources  A study prepared for the U S  Election Assistance Commission in 2013 found that election officials in rural jurisdictions were more likely than their urban counterparts to use paid print advertising for voter outreach  Election officials in urban jurisdictions were more likely to use websites and social media  Small jurisdictions may also allocate a larger share of their resources to meeting state and federal requirements than larger jurisdictions because there are often fixed start-up costs to required changes, and smaller jurisdictions may be less equipped to capitalize on economies of scale  For example, political scientists Heather M  Creek and Kimberly A  Karnes report, "There is a minimum cost to the acquisition and maintenance of voting technology that applies whether the district is purchasing 5 or 500 machines " The duties and structures of state and local election systems can affect the implementation of federal election administration laws  Perhaps as a result, Congress has specified how states and localities should distribute certain election administration duties and structure certain elements of their election systems  Changes to the duties and structures of state and local election systems have sometimes also been side effects of other federal activity on election administration  This section provides examples of ways in which the distribution of election administration duties at the state and local levels and the structures of state and local election systems can affect the implementation of federal election administration law  These examples include federal efforts to affect the administration of elections through (1) requirements, (2) funding, and (3) information sharing  Congress can use requirements to regulate how states and localities administer certain aspects of federal elections  How well such requirements serve their intended purposes depends in part on how closely states and localities comply with them  How closely states and localities comply with federal requirements may, in turn, be affected by the duties and structures of the state and local election systems that implement them  For example, UOCAVA assigns responsibility for complying with some of its requirements to the states (52 U S C  §20302), but the tasks required for compliance are often handled by local officials  One scholar, law professor Justin Weinstein-Tull, indicates that this means that the officials who are held liable for compliance with UOCAVA requirements may differ from the officials who take or fail to take the actions needed to comply  Box 6 provides an illustration of this phenomenon as reported by state officials in Alabama  The federal government can provide funding for state and local election administration, which may be conditional on the adoption of certain election administration policies or practices  How well such funding serves its intended purposes may depend in part on how timely it is and how well-tailored it is to its objectives  Duties and structures of state and local election systems may affect how quickly federal funding is claimed and used and how well the uses to which it is put serve federal objectives  For example, HAVA has authorized payments to states to meet its requirements (52 U S C  §21007)  It has directed those payments to be disbursed to states (52 U S C  §21001(a)) and charged chief state election officials with overseeing decisions about how to spend them (52 U S C  §21005(a))  State election officials run federal elections in some states, but those states are the exception  As noted in " Implementation " and " Funding ," most states assign election administration implementation and funding duties to local officials  That means that the officials who receive HAVA funding and are charged with overseeing decisions about how to use it often differ from the officials who conduct and pay for the activities and resources it is intended to fund  That has had at least two reported consequences  First, in some cases, it has reportedly delayed access to or use of some HAVA funds  Directing HAVA funding to states introduces opportunities for state-level delays, such as decisions by state officials to wait to claim the funds or requirements in state law to obtain approval to do so  Second, some local officials have stated the view that their states' shares of HAVA funding were not put to what they considered the areas of greatest need  Box 7 provides examples of such consequences as described by state and local officials in Nevada, Minnesota, and Virginia  Congress can require or facilitate information sharing with states and localities by federal agencies  As with funding, the effectiveness of federal information sharing may depend in part on how timely it is  How quickly federal agencies share information with the appropriate state and local officials may be affected by the distribution of election administration duties at the state and federal levels  Box 8 provides an example of such an effect reported by NASS  Past federal action has resulted in both intentional and unintentional changes to state and local election systems  Some federal laws include provisions that are specifically designed to establish certain responsibilities for election administration at the state level  For example, the NVRA requires states to designate chief state election officials to coordinate state responsibilities under the act (52 U S C  §20509), and HAVA charges chief state election officials with implementing a statewide voter registration system (52 U S C  §21083(a)(1)(A))  Federal regulation has reportedly also had the side effect of shifting the distribution of other election administration duties  For example, the agency-based registration requirements in the NVRA divide voter registration responsibilities between traditional election offices and offices that had not historically been involved in election administration, such as motor vehicle and public assistance agencies (52 U S C  §20504; 52 U S C  §20506)  According to Hale, Montjoy, and Brown, "the need to pass implementing legislation and the complexity of legal and technical requirements" in federal laws such as HAVA and the NVRA has also "led many states to grant new or additional rule-making power" to their chief state election officials  Congress has considered legislation—some of which has been enacted and some of which has not—that would change election rules or the state and local systems that implement them  The interactions between the duties and structures of state and local election systems and past federal actions suggest some considerations that may be relevant to future congressional consideration of proposals that would affect the administration of federal elections  The following questions may be of interest to Members as they consider making changes to election administration or maintaining current rules and structures: How would any proposed change interact with the duties and structures of state and local election systems? Would the duties and structures of state and local election systems make a proposed change difficult to implement? Would the design of a proposed change need to be adjusted to accommodate variations between or within states? Which of the policy tools available to Congress is best suited to achieving the purpose of a proposed change? For example, would it be more effective to advance a proposed change with a federal requirement, or incentivize it via federal funding? How might the nature of the state and local system inform a proposed change? For example, if it is a federal requirement, who is charged with compliance; who is responsible for the tasks required for compliance; and what is the relationship between the two? If it is federal funding, to whom should it be distributed, and who should be involved in making decisions about how to use it? Would a proposed change have the effect, either intentionally or unintentionally, of altering the duties or structures of state or local election systems? If so, what are the advantages and disadvantages of such changes? Are there complications with a proposed change that are not specifically related to election administration? For example, could there be federalism-related issues with intervening in the relationships between states and their political subdivisions? 

ground_truth: The effects of climate change, combined with other factors, may alter human migration trends across the globe, according to the International Organization for Migration. For example, climate change can increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters, causing populations to move from an area. Climate change can also intensify slow-onset disasters, such as drought, crop failure, or sea level rise, potentially altering longer-term migration trends. GAO was asked to review how U.S. agencies address climate change as a potential driver of global migration. For State, USAID, and DOD, this report (1) describes executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018; (2) examines the extent to which the agencies discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in their plans and risk assessments; and (3) describes agency activities on the issue. GAO analyzed documents on administration priorities; reviewed agency plans, risk assessments, and documentation of agency activities; and interviewed agency officials. From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, a variety of executive branch actions related to climate change—such as executive orders and strategies—affected the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD), including their activities that could potentially address the nexus of climate change and migration. For example, a fiscal year 2016 presidential memorandum—rescinded in 2017—required agencies to develop implementation plans to identify the potential impact of climate change on human mobility, among other things. In general, however, climate change as a driver of migration was not a focus of the executive branch actions. For example, a fiscal year 2014 executive order—also rescinded in 2017—requiring agencies to prepare for the impacts of climate change did not highlight migration as a particular concern. State, USAID, and DOD have discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in agency plans and risk assessments. For example, State and USAID required climate change risk assessments when developing country and regional strategies, and a few of the strategies reviewed by GAO identified the nexus of climate change and migration as a risk. However, State changed its approach in 2017, no longer providing missions with guidance on whether and how to include climate change risks in their integrated country strategies. In doing so, State did not include in its 2018 guidance to the missions any information on how to include climate change risks, should the missions choose to do so. Without clear guidance, State may miss opportunities to identify and address issues related to climate change as a potential driver of migration. The three agencies have been involved in climate change related activities but none were specifically focused on the nexus with global migration. For example, USAID officials said that the agency's adaptation efforts, such as its Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion project in Ethiopia, were the most likely to include activities, such as enhancing resilience, that can indirectly address the issue of climate change as a driver of migration. GAO recommends that State provide missions with guidance that clearly documents its process for climate change risk assessments for country strategies. In commenting on a draft of this report, State indicated that it would update its integrated country strategy guidance and will specifically note that missions have the option to provide additional information on climate resilience and related topics.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: Beginning the summer 2013 through 2016, there were numerous reports in the media on sexual assault incidents in the U S  armed services  In many cases, such reports were followed by questions on what actions were taken by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Obama Administration, and Congress to address the issue  This report lists a comprehensive chronology of official activities in response to incidents of military sexual assault, as well as legislative action on the issue  The report is divided into three sections: the DOD and the Obama Administration's actions, congressional action, and legislation in the 113 th (2013-2014) and 114 th (2015-2016) Congresses  Also included is a resources section with related articles, hearings, and reports  Information in this report was compiled from the official government websites of DOD, the Obama White House and Congress gov for historical background and will not be updated  June 13, 2012 – DOD announced Army Major General Gary S  Patton as the new director of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO)  September 25, 2012 – As part of the DOD's efforts to confront the crime of sexual assault in the military, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced improvements to prospective commander and senior enlisted training and a review of the initial military training environment in every service  December 21, 2012 – DOD released key findings from the Academic Program Year (APY) 2011-2012 Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the United States Military Service Academies  According to this report, the overall prevalence rate of unwanted sexual contact increased in all three military academies  From 2011 to 2012, the Air Force Academy in Colorado showed the largest increase in reported sexual assaults from 33 to 52 incidents  Sexual assaults at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD, increased from 11 to 15, and were up at the U S  Military Academy in West Point, NY, from 10 to 13  January 18, 2013 – DOD announced the release of the 2012 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Reserve Component Members   This report included rates of unwanted sexual contact, unwanted gender-related behaviors (i e , sexual harassment and sexist behavior), and gender discriminatory behaviors and sex discrimination reported by survey respondents during the past 12 months  March 7, 2013 – Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, in a letter responding to Members of Congress, wrote that an internal review was being conducted of a decision by a senior Air Force commander, Lt  Gen  Craig Franklin, to overturn the sexual assault conviction of an Air Force fighter pilot, Lt  Col  James Wilkerson  Colonel Wilkerson was found guilty in November 2012 of aggravated sexual assault and was sentenced to one year in military prison  Lt  General Franklin's decision to overturn the findings of the court-martial freed Colonel Wilkerson, and allowed him to be reinstated in the Air Force  In his letter, Hagel said that while General Franklin's decision could not be overturned, he had asked Pentagon lawyers and the Secretary of the Air Force to review the way in which General Franklin decided the case  He also said he wanted a review of whether the military should change the way it handles sexual assault cases  April 2, 2013 – Secretary Chuck Hagel stated in a message to all DOD personnel on Sexual Assault Awareness and Prevention Month that, "Together, we must work every day to instill a climate that does not tolerate or ignore sexist behavior, sexual harassment, or sexual assault  These have no place in the United States military and violate everything we stand for and the values we defend " April 8, 2013 – Secretary Hagel announced that DOD's Office of General Counsel will review Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) after an Air Force officer's court-martial conviction for sexual assault was dismissed using the authority provided by Article 60  May 6, 2013 – The Office of the Secretary of Defense released a 24-page memorandum from Secretary Hagel to all heads of the military services regarding DOD's 2013 Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Strategy, and the release of the Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 2012 (2 volumes)  According to this report, in FY2012 (October 1, 2011, through September 30, 2012), the number of sexual assaults reported by members of the military rose 6% to 3,374  An anonymous survey of military personnel showed the number of service members who had experienced unwanted sexual contact could be as many as 26,000 but most never reported the incidents  That number is an increase over the 19,000 estimated assaults in 2011  These reports involved offenses ranging from abusive sexual contact to rape  May 7, 2013 – In a DOD press briefing, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Major General Gary Patton, director of SAPRO, announced new series of actions to further DOD's sexual assault and prevention efforts  Hagel directed service chiefs to develop methods to hold all military commanders accountable for establishing command climates of dignity and respect in incorporating sexual assault prevention and victim care principles in their commands  May 7, 2013 – DOD announced the establishment of the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel consisting of nine selected appointees  Secretary of Defense Hagel appointed five members to serve on the response systems panel, who joined four members appointed by the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the chairman and ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee  May 14, 2013 – The Army announced that an Army Sergeant First Class assigned to III Corps, Fort Hood, TX, was under investigation for pandering, abusive sexual contact, assault, and maltreatment of subordinates  May 15, 2013 – Returning from NATO meetings in Brussels, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen  Martin E  Dempsey, told reporters that sexual assault in the Armed Forces constitutes a crisis in the military  He further stated that "We're losing the confidence of the women who serve that we can solve this problem, and that's a crisis " May 16, 2013 – At the White House, President Obama met with senior military leaders on the issue of sexual assault in the U S  Armed Forces  The President stated that not only is it "shameful and disgraceful" but also "dangerous to our national security " May 17, 2013 – During a press briefing, Defense Secretary Hagel and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army Gen  Martin Dempsey discussed their meeting with President Obama, Vice President Biden, and senior enlisted and officer leadership in the U S  military  Dempsey told the Armed Forces Press Service that he believes that the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may be factors in the growing incidents of sexual assault  He also stated that: "If a perpetrator shows up at a court-martial with a rack of ribbons and has four deployments and a Purple Heart, there is certainly a risk that we might be a little too forgiving of that particular crime " May 17, 2013 – In an interview, Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen  Mark Walsh, said that sexual assaults in his branch of the military typically involve alcohol use and can be traced to a lack of respect for women  "We have a problem with respect for women that leads to many of the situations that result in sexual assault in our Air Force," he told reporters in his Pentagon office  Walsh further stated that combatting the crisis is his top priority and that he reviews every reported case of sexual assault  May 22, 2013 – The Pentagon announced that DOD's sexual assault prevention staff would be exempt from furloughs  According to Pentagon spokeswoman, Cynthia O  Smith, "The full-time civilians working these programs and implementing policies will not be furloughed  This will ensure responsive victim care and ensure all the programs recently directed by Secretary Hagel are implemented swiftly and efficiently " May 24, 2013 – President Obama addressed graduates of the U S  Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD, and noted in his commencement speech that the misconduct of some in the military can endanger U S  forces and undermine U S  efforts to achieve security and peace worldwide  He further stated that those who commit sexual assault are not only committing a crime, they also "threaten the trust and discipline that make our military strong " May 25, 2013 – In a commencement speech at the U S  Military Academy at West Point, NY, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel told graduates that they must be the generation of leaders that will commit to building a culture of respect for every member of the military  He stated that sexual harassment and sexual assault in the military "are a profound betrayal of sacred oaths and sacred trusts " He also quoted President Obama's remarks at the Naval Academy when he said, "these crimes have no place in the greatest military on earth " May 30, 2013 – Pentagon officials reaffirmed DOD's commitment to fighting sexual assault by launching the Safe HelpRoom at http://SafeHelpline org , a Sexual Assault Support Service for the DOD community  This new service allows victims to participate in moderated group chat sessions to connect with and support one another in a secure online environment  The Safe HelpRoom is in response to a need for peer support services identified by users of DOD's Safe Helpline for sexual assault victims  June 6, 2013 – In a speech at the 2013 Joint Women's Leadership Symposium, Navy Adm  James A  Winnefeld Jr , vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said plans to combat and eliminate sexual assault include a greater investment in specially trained sexual assault investigators and a push for more psychological, medical, and legal assistance for victims  The vice chairman also said officials will examine the scientific roots of behavioral factors associated with potential predators, which will assist sexual assault prevention efforts  June 7, 2013 – The Pentagon released a statement that Maj  Gen  Michael T  Harrison was suspended of his duties as the Commanding General of United States Army Japan and I Corps for failing in his duties as a commander to report or investigate an allegation of sexual assault  June 7, 2013 – Air Force officials announced Maj  Gen  Margaret H  Woodward has been assigned to direct the Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to replace Lt  Col  Jeffrey Krusinski, the former chief of the Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program  He was arrested and charged by Arlington County, VA, police for allegedly being drunk and groping a woman in a parking lot one mile from the Pentagon  In the previous year, Maj  Gen  Woodward led the investigation of Air Force training in the wake of a sexual assault scandal centered at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas  June 27, 2013 – Defense Secretary Hagel met in person with the Sexual Assault Response Systems Review Panel for the first time  According to the Pentagon, "the panel will conduct an independent review and assessment of the systems used to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate crimes involving sexual assault and related offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and will develop recommendations to improve the effectiveness of those systems " DOD established the panel in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 ( P L  112-239 , Section 576 (a))  Previously, Hagel held a teleconference with panel members  July 3, 2013 – The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Army Gen  Frank J  Grass, launched a comprehensive campaign designed to assist National Guard units in combating sexual assault as part of a military-wide effort to protect victims and eradicate the crime from the ranks  July 9, 2013 – DOD Inspector General (IG) released its report, Joint Warfighting and Readiness Evaluation of the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations Sexual Assault Investigations   The report evaluated the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations' (MCIOs') sexual assault investigations in 2010 to determine whether they were adequately investigated  The report found most MCIO investigations (89%) met or exceeded the investigative standards and returned only cases with significant deficiencies (11%) to the MCIOs for corrective action  July 18, 2013 – The Air Force adopted two new measures to eliminate sexual assault from within the ranks, including requiring mandatory discharge for airmen, officer or enlisted, who commit sexual assault, and requiring the Air Force's most senior commanders to review actions taken on these cases  In addition, the Air Force Academy is reviewing the results of a survey on sexual assault taken on June 24, 2013  Suggestions from survey respondents ranged from involving faculty with character coaching to a complete revamping of how the Air Force Academy trains its freshmen  July 18, 2013 – Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced additional resources for investigators and a new initiative designed to enhance accountability and transparency across the Navy  Mabus approved nearly $10 million to hire more than 50 additional Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Family and Sexual Violence Program personnel to shorten investigation times, and directed the Navy and Marine Corps to regularly publish online the results of each service's courts- martial  July 18, 2013 – The Air Force announced that airmen who commit sexual assaults will be discharged, and senior commanders must review actions taken on sexual assault cases under new Air Force initiatives as of July 2, 2013  August 15, 2013 – Defense Secretary Hagel announced seven new anti-sexual assault initiatives in a memo detailing "    absolute and sustained commitment to providing a safe environment in which every service member and DOD civilian is free from the threat of sexual harassment and assault," he wrote in a statement  "Our success depends on a dynamic and responsive approach  We, therefore, must continually assess and strive to improve our prevention and response programs " October 3, 2013 – Air Force Col  Alan R  Metzler, the deputy director for SAPRO, emphasized that the first step to stopping sexual assault in the military is through prevention but when prevention fails, new measures to improve victims' confidence and combat underreporting were needed  Metzler outlined the DOD Sexual Assault Advocate Certification Program (D-SAACP) and the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID), two initiatives set to improve the advocacy services provided to victims of sexual assault  November 9, 2013 – Army Maj  Gen  Gary S  Patton, director of DOD's SAPRO, reported on DOD's recent prevention and awareness successes before the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel  He testified that new DOD initiatives to combat sexual assault helped create a 46% jump in victims reporting compared to the previous year  December 20, 2013 – President Obama instructed Defense Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey to continue their efforts to make substantial improvements with respect to sexual assault prevention and response, including to the military justice system  He also directed that they report back with a full-scale review of their progress, by December 1, 2014  January 10, 2014 – Army Maj  Gen  Jeffrey J  Snow, the new SAPRO chief announced the release of the Annual Report to Congress on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies   The report covered the 2012-13 academic year, and found in 2013, reports of sexual assault decreased at the U S  Military Academy at West Point, New York and the U S  Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado  The number of reported incidents went up at the U S  Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland  January 30, 2014 – The independent Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel accepted a subcommittee recommendation that senior military commanders retain authority for referring these crimes to courts-martial  May 1, 2014 – DOD released the 2013 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military   The report covered the period from Oct  1, 2012, through Sept  30, 2013, and revealed 5,061 reports of sexual assault in the Defense Department, a 50 percent jump from the previous year  More than 70 percent of all cases that the military had jurisdiction resulted in criminal charges  July 17, 2014 – DOD collaborated with the Justice Department's Office for Victims of Crime to develop a curriculum that expands on the skills learned in initial sexual assault response coordinator and sexual assault prevention and response victim advocate training  December 4, 2014 – Secretary Hagel released DOD's Report to the President of the United States on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response on its progress in addressing sexual assault in the military, and announced four directives to further strengthen the department's prevention and response program  According to this report, based on survey data, servicemembers experienced fewer sexual assaults in FY2014 than in FY2012, an estimated 19,000, down from 26,000  January 16, 2015 – Secretary Hagel at the Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Summit remarked that the fight to end sexual assault in the military must be "personal " He cited "encouraging progress" over the last year, but acknowledged more can be done, notably in areas such as social retaliation, which he said stems from the overall environment  February 11, 2015 – The annual report on sexual harassment and violence at the military service academies estimated that overall rates of unwanted sexual contact at the military service academies declined in Academic Program Year (APY) 2013-2014, decreased for both men and women, indicating that fewer sexual assaults occurred at the academies in APY 13-14 than in APY 11-12  February 19, 2015 – Health and criminal investigation experts spoke at the Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response Program Summit on the underreporting of male victims of sexual assault in the military due to factors such as shame and fear of being ostracized  March 26, 2015 – SAPRO head Army Maj  Gen  Jeffrey Snow monitored 50 initiatives put in place by past Defense secretaries Leon Panetta and Chuck Hagel  According to Snow, the most recent data, gathered last year, shows the past-year prevalence of sexual assault is down significantly, Snow said  Estimates indicate there were 6,000 to 7,000 fewer sexual assaults in 2014 than in 2012  May 1, 2015 – According to the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Stud y, "the percentage of active duty women who experienced unwanted sexual contact over the past year declined from 6 1% in 2012 to an estimated 4 3% in 2014  For active duty men, the estimated prevalence rate dropped from 1 2% in 2012 to 0 9% in 2014  Based on these rates, an estimated 18,900 service members experienced unwanted sexual contact in 2014, down from around 26,000 in 2012 " May 22, 2015 – Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced Army Maj  Gen  Camille M  Nichols will assume duties as director of SAPRO effective June 8, 2015  January 8, 2016 – DOD announced the release of the Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies for A cademic P rogram Y ear 2014-2015   Data in the report indicated the academies received 91 sexual assault reports during the academic year, an increase of 32 reports over the previous year  April 2 8 , 2016 – Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced a sexual assault retaliation prevention and response strategy aimed at how the department supports servicemembers who experience retaliation, while aligning prevention and response efforts across the services  May 5, 2016 – The annual report of the Defense Department's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program indicated that DOD's efforts are having an impact  In FY2015, service members made 6,083 reports of sexual assault – the same rate as the previous fiscal year, with four in 1,000 servicemembers reporting sexual assault despite a smaller active force size  In addition, 21 percent of those making restricted reports in fiscal 2015 chose to convert to unrestricted reports, enabling them to participate in the military justice process  September 19 , 2016 – The Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD, hosted an all-day training event to strengthen how military and civilian communities work together to support servicemembers who report sexual assault in a joint program between DOD and the Justice Department  October 19, 2016 – DOD released the 2016 Military Investigation and Justice Experience Survey that allowed servicemembers who have experienced sexual assault and elected to participate in the military justice process the opportunity to provide DOD with direct feedback on their experiences; and to improve the services and support servicemembers reporting sexual assault  December 15, 2016 – Defense Department officials announced the release of the "DOD Plan to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Assault of Military Men," designed to enhance outreach to military men and increase efforts to help them recover  The following information was compiled using Congress gov, Congressional Quarterly (CQ com), House gov, Senate gov, and Roll Call  See the section "Resources" for a list of congressional hearings, reports and other documents  January 23, 2013 – The House Armed Services Committee held a hearing on sexual misconduct at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, TX  January 25, 2013 – H R  430 , Protect Our Military Trainees Act, was introduced  This legislation would have amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice to protect new members of the Armed Forces who are undergoing basic training from the sexual advances of the members of the Armed Forces responsible for their instruction  It also requires that violators be punished as a court-martial may direct  March 5, 2013 – H R  975 , the Servicemember Mental Health Review Act, was introduced  This bill would have amended Title 10, United States Code, to extend the duration of the Physical Disability Board of Review and to the expand the authority of such Board to review the separation of members of the Armed Forces on the basis of a mental condition not amounting to disability, including separation on the basis of a personality or adjustment disorder  This would have included a review of those victims who have suffered military sexual trauma  March 13, 2013 – S  548 , Military Sexual Assault Prevention Act of 2013, was introduced, read twice, and referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee  This legislation aimed to amend Title 10, United States Code, and to improve capabilities of the Armed Forces to prevent and respond to sexual assault and sexual harassment in the Armed Forces  March 13, 2013 – Victims of sexual assault in the military testified before a Senate panel examining the military's handling of sexual assault cases and stated that the "military justice system is broken " They urged Congress to make changes in the law that would stem the rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment that they said are pervasive in the service branches  Several male Navy veterans testified before the Senate Armed Service Committee's military personnel panel investigating sexual assaults in the military  One recounted that he was raped in 2000 by a higher-ranking petty officer aboard a submarine  He told the committee that he carries permanent shame not for the sexual assault but over how the Navy forced him to leave  He stated in his testimony, "I carry my discharge as an official and permanent symbol of shame, on top of the trauma of the physical attack, the retaliation and its aftermath " March 20, 2013 – S  628 , Servicemember Mental Health Review Act, was introduced, read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  Related to H R  975 , this bill would have amended Title 10, United States Code, to extend the duration of the Physical Disability Board of Review and to the expand the authority of such board to review the separation of members of the Armed Forces on the basis of a mental condition not amounting to disability, including separation on the basis of a personality or adjustment disorder  This would have included a review of those victims who may have suffered military sexual trauma  April 17, 2013 – H R  1593 , Sexual Assault Training Oversight and Prevention (STOP) Act, was introduced  This bill seeks to amend Title 10, United States Code, by establishing a Sexual Assault Oversight and Response Council and an enhanced Sexual Assault Oversight and Response Office "to improve the prevention of and response to sexual assault in the Armed Forces, and by requiring the appointment of a Director of Military Prosecutions for sexual-related offenses committed by a member of the Armed Forces " April 26, 2013 – A U S  senator reportedly put a hold on the nomination of Air Force Lt  Gen  Susan Helms, nominated to serve as vice commander of the U S  Space Command  Earlier in February 2012, Gen  Helms rejected the recommendation of legal counsel and overturned the conviction of an Air Force captain who had been found guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a female lieutenant  May 7, 2013 – S  871 , Combating Military Sexual Assault Act of 2013, was introduced, read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  This legislation would have aimed to provide any victim with a special military lawyer who would assist them throughout the process, prohibit sexual contact between instructors and trainees during and within 30 days of completion of basic training or its equivalent, and ensure that sexual assault response coordinators are available to help members of the National Guard and Reserve  May 7, 2013 – H R  1864 , to amend Title 10, United States Code, would have required an Inspector General investigation of allegations of retaliatory personnel actions taken in response to making protected communications regarding sexual assault, was introduced and referred to the House Armed Services Committee  This bill would have required the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with respect to the Coast Guard, or any of the military departments to investigate allegations of retaliatory personnel actions taken in response to making protected communications regarding alleged instances of rape, sexual assault, or other forms of sexual misconduct in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice  May 7, 2013 – At the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Personnel hearing Gen  Mark Welsh, the Air Force's Chief of Staff, told the committee that he and Air Force Secretary Michael Donley were "appalled" by the charges against Lt  Col  Jeffrey Krusinski, branch chief of the Air Force's Sexual Assault and Prevention Office  He was arrested and charged by Arlington County, VA, police for allegedly being drunk and groping a woman in a parking lot one mile from the Pentagon  "Sexual assault prevention and response efforts are critically important to us," Welsh said  "It is unacceptable that this occurs anywhere, at any time, in our Air Force " May 8, 2013 – H R  1867 , the Better Enforcement for Sexual Assault Free Environments (BE SAFE) Act of 2013, was introduced, read twice, and referred to the House Armed Services Committee  This bill would have amended Title 10, United States Code, "to require an Inspector General investigation of allegations of retaliatory personnel actions taken in response to making protected communications regarding sexual assault " This bill would ensure those found guilty of rape, sexual assault, sodomy, or an attempt to commit any of those crimes, are—at a minimum—dismissed or dishonorably discharged from the military  The five-year statute of limitations within the military's justice system for sexual assault cases would be eliminated, and legal assistance services available to victims would be expanded  May 8, 2013 – In a hearing of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, senators questioned the Air Force's top leaders over rising sexual assaults in the military  Some senators cited DOD statistics from the Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 2012 on the number of incidents of sexual assaults the same week Lt  Col  Jeffrey Krusinski, Chief of the Air Force's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Branch, was arrested and charged with sexual battery  May 9, 2013 – A hearing of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on the Air Force budget was held  Witnesses included Michael Donley, Secretary of the Air Force, and General Mark Welsh, Air Force Chief of Staff  Members of the committee questioned them on Defense Secretary Hagel's review of the decision by Lt  Gen  Craig Franklin to dismiss Lt  Col  James Wilkerson's sexual assault conviction  May 14, 2013 – H Res  213 , a resolution to establish the "Special Committee on Sexual Assault and Abuse in the Armed Forces" was introduced  A "Dear Colleague" memorandum urged support of this legislation referencing Gen  Martin Dempsey's denouncement of military sexual assault as a "crisis" and the need for Congress to address this problem in a "deeper, more comprehensive manner " This Special Committee would have included 19 members appointed by the Speaker and Minority Leader, as well as chairman and ranking members of the committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, Judiciary, and Oversight and Government Reform  May 14, 2013 – H R  1960 , a bill to authorize appropriations for FY2014 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes, was introduced  The FY2014 NDAA addressed the issue of sexual assault in the military by establishing minimum sentencing guidelines for any service members found guilty of sexual assault as well as other provisions  May 15, 2013 – H R  1986 , Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) Deployment Act, was introduced  This bill would have provided for the assignment of Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners-Adult/Adolescent to brigades and equivalent units of the Armed Forces  May 15, 2013 – H R  2002 , Combating Military Sexual Assault Act of 2013, was introduced and referred to the House Committee on Armed Services  This bill was related to S  871 , and would have provided any sexual assault victim with a special military lawyer who would assist them throughout the process, prohibit sexual contact between instructors and trainees during and within 30 days of completion of basic training or its equivalent, and ensure that sexual assault response coordinators (SARCs) are available to help members of the National Guard and Reserve  May 16, 2013 – H R  2016 , Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013, was introduced and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  This bill would have required "a commanding officer who receives a report of a sexual-related offense involving a member in such officer's chain of command to act immediately upon such report by way of referral to the appropriate criminal investigative office or service " This bill was related to S  538 , Military Sexual Assault Prevention Act of 2013, and S  967 , Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013  May 16, 2013 – S  967 , Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013, was introduced, read twice, and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  This bill would have required a commanding officer who receives a report of a sex-related offense involving a member in such officer's chain of command to act immediately upon such report by way of referral to the appropriate criminal investigative office or service  May 21, 2013 – S  992 , a bill to provide for offices on sexual assault prevention and response under the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, to require reports on additional offices and selection of sexual assault prevention and response personnel, and for other purposes  This bill was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  May 22, 2013 – A House panel passed a number of changes in sexual assault prevention programs that limited commander discretion in reducing or dismissing rape and assault charges and expanded support services for victims  The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel approved the personnel issues as part of H R  1960 , the FY2014 NDAA bill  May 22, 2013 – The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense held a hearing on the Army's FY 2014 Budget Request  Witnesses included Secretary of the Army, John McHugh and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond T  Odierno  Army Secretary McHugh announced at this hearing that the service will soon require soldiers being considered for sexual assault prevention jobs to undergo behavioral-health evaluations as a way of screening out potential sex offenders from these high-profile positions  This was in response to a senator's question about the criteria for sexual assault prevention jobs  McHugh said that service record and availability are the only criteria commanders are using to fill these jobs since sexual-assault prevention positions do not fall under any military occupational specialty and lack career incentives  May 23, 2013 – S  1032 , Better Enforcement for Sexual Assault Free Environments Act of 2013, was introduced, read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  This bill would amend Title 10, United States Code, to make certain improvements in the Uniform Code of Military Justice related to sex-related offenses committed by members of the Armed Forces  June 4, 2013 – The uniformed chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard appeared before a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Personnel  These military leaders acknowledged that despite a "zero tolerance" for sexual abuse, they had neglected the "epidemic" in the ranks by not always monitoring subordinate commanders  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen  Martin Dempsey pointed to competing demands and pressures of fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as a justification for lack of adequate monitoring  The Service Chiefs voiced support for legislative changes that would take tougher action against offenders and provide more support for victims of military sexual assault  They opposed a legislative proposal that would remove unit commanders' legal power to oversee major criminal cases and transfer that authority to uniformed prosecutors  The Army Chief of Staff, Gen  Ray Odierno, noted that taking away commanders' authority in matters of military justice would adversely impact discipline and that "we cannot, however, simply 'prosecute' our way out of this problem  At its heart, sexual assault is a discipline issue that requires a culture change " June 4, 2013 – S  1092 was introduced, read twice, and referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee  This bill would have amended Title 10, United States Code, to require an Inspector General investigation of allegations of retaliatory personnel actions taken in response to making protected communications regarding sexual assault  June 6, 2013 –would allow victims of sexual assault to apply for a permanent change The House Armed Services Committee passed H R  1960 , the NDAA for FY2014, by a vote of 59-2  According to the Committee's Fact Sheet, "the FY14 NDAA of station or unit transfer, while authorizing the Secretary of Defense to inform commanders of their authority to remove or temporarily reassign service members who are the alleged perpetrators of sexual assault  It also requires the provision of victims' counsels, qualified and specially trained lawyers in each of the services, to be made available to provide legal assistance to the victims of sex-related offenses  The FY14 NDAA adds rape, sexual assault, or other sexual misconduct to the protected communications of service members with a Member of Congress or an Inspector General " June 14, 2013 – The House passed H R  1960 , the NDAA for FY2014 by a vote of 315 to 108 (Roll no  244)  This bill includes a provision protecting victims of sexual assault in the Armed Forces as protected communications under military whistle-blower laws, to shield victims against retaliatory actions  The measure seeks to encourage more victims to report assaults, rape and other forms of sexual misconduct  June 17, 2013 – H R  2397 , "Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014," was introduced and referred to the House Committee on Appropriations  It was reported as an original measure, H Rept  113-113   Lawmakers wrote in this committee report that they were "outraged by the pervasive problem of sexual assault in the Armed Forces  Sexual assault is not just an issue in the military; it is an epidemic  To address it, the Committee believes that there must be a culture change at every level of the military, from the most senior leadership to the most junior ranks " Included was a measure that would provide $182 million for the Pentagon's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) and for an expansion of a victim's counseling program  For FY2013, the programs received $95 million  The bill included $25 million that was not requested by the administration in a transfer account to expand assistance across the Defense Department  June 20, 2013 – S  1197 , NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014, was introduced in the Senate  This bill would have authorized "appropriations for fiscal year 2014 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes," and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  The original measure was reported to the Senate in Report No  113-44 and placed on the Legislative Calendar under General Orders (Calendar No  91)  Included in this bill was Title V—Military Personnel Policy, Subtitle E—Sexual Assault Prevention and Response and Military Justice  June 27, 2013 – H R  1864 , a bill "To amend Title 10, United States Code, to require an Inspector General investigation of allegations of retaliatory personnel actions taken in response to making protected communications regarding sexual assault," was agreed to/passed in the House, 423-0 (Roll no  294)  July 18, 2013 – Army Gen  Martin E  Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Navy Adm  James A  Winnefeld Jr , the vice chairman, in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee said that commanders should retain responsibility for prosecuting service members accused of sexual assault, and taking that authority away could harm good order and discipline  July 2 2 , 2013 – H R  2777 , Stop Pay for Violent Offenders Act, was introduced "to amend Title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to suspend the pay and allowances of a member of the Armed Forces who is held in confinement pending trial by court-martial or by civil authority for any sex-related offense or capital offense " July 24, 2013 – H Amdt  408 to H R  2397 , an amendment to provide funds to identify individuals who were separated from the military on the grounds of a disorder subsequent to reporting a sexual assault and, if appropriate, correcting their record  This amendment (A065) was agreed to by voice vote  July 24, 2013 – H R  2397 , "Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014," was passed/agreed to in House, 315 - 109 (Roll no  414)  October 22, 2013 – H R  3304 , the NDAA for FY2014, was introduced in the House  As introduced, the bill would have provided for a defense counsel interview of victim of an alleged sex-related offense in presence of trial counsel, counsel for the victim, or a Sexual Assault Victim Advocate, prohibition on service in the Armed Forces by individuals who have been convicted of certain sexual offenses, Coast Guard regulations regarding request for permanent change of station or unit transfer by victim of sexual assault, temporary administrative reassignment or removal of an active duty member accused of committing a sexual assault, Inspector General investigation of allegations of retaliatory personnel actions taken in response to making protected communications regarding sexual assault, compliance tracking of commanding officers in conducting organizational climate assessments for purposes of preventing and responding to sexual assaults, advancement of submittal deadline for report of independent panel on assessment of military response systems to sexual assault, retention of certain forms on sexual assault, timely access to Sexual Assault Response Coordinators by the National Guard and Reserves, and qualifications and selection of Department of Defense sexual assault prevention and response personnel and required availability of Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners  It also would establish commanding officer actions regarding sexual assault reports, an eight-day incident reporting requirement in response to unrestricted report of sexual assault in which the victim is a member of the Armed Forces, and curricula that addresses the prevention of sexual assault at the military service academies  December 26, 2013 – H R  3304 , the NDAA for FY2014 became P L  113-66   As enacted, the bill included more than two dozen provisions to address an epidemic of sexual assault in the military in Title XVII—Sexual Assault Prevention and Response and Related Reforms, Subtitle A—Reform of Uniform Code of Military Justice  February 26, 2014 – Dr  Karen S  Guice, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, and other Defense Department officials testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee's personnel subcommittee on the relationship between military sexual assault survivors and the subsequent development of suicide and post-traumatic stress disorder  April 9, 2014 – H R  4435 , the Howard P  "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, was introduced in the House  The bill would have applied Title XVII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 ( P L  113-66 ; 127 Stat  950) to the military service academies, consulted with victims of sexual assault regarding victims' preference for prosecution of offense by court-martial or civilian court, created a confidential review of characterization of terms of discharge for victims of sexual offenses, revised requirements relating to DOD policy on retention of evidence in a sexual assault case to allow return of personal property upon completion of related proceedings, required the DOD Inspector General to review separation of members who made unrestricted reports of sexual assault, and would have created a deadline for submission of report containing results of review of Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity role in sexual harassment cases  Prior to passing in the House, the House Armed Services Committee rejected an amendment from Congresswoman Speier that would have removed the military chain of command from decisions to prosecute sexual assault cases and other major crimes, except offenses that are unique to the military  She offered an alternative proposal, which would have only removed commanding officers' prosecutorial discretion for instances of sexual assault, that was also rejected by a 28-34 vote  It was received in the Senate, read twice, and placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders  Calendar No  425  June 2, 2014 — S  2410 , the Carl Levin National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, was introduced in the Senate  It was placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders  Calendar No  402  The bill included measures on military justice such as enhancing sexual assault prevention and response, the application of P L  113-66 , Title XVII to military academies, and the collaboration between the Departments of Justice and Defense  December 19 , 2014 — H R  3979 , the Carl Levin and Howard P  "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, was signed as P L  113-291   Subtitle D—Military Justice, Including Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Prevention and Response addressed the following: modification of DOD policy on retention of evidence in a sexual assault cases to permit return of personal property upon completion of related proceedings; requirements relating to Sexual Assault Forensic Examiner; analysis and assessment of disposition of most serious offenses; a plan for limited use of certain information on sexual assaults in restricted reports by military criminal investigative organizations; the establishment of a Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces; confidential review of the terms of discharge of sexual assault survivors; deadline for submission of report containing results of review of Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity role in sexual harassment cases; and applied Title XVII of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 ( P L  113-66 ; 127 Stat  950) to the military service academies  January 13, 2015 — S  178 , the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 was introduced in the Senate  Title V of this bill "Military Sex Offender Reporting" stipulates that the Secretary of Defense shall provide the Attorney General information about sex offenders in the military to be included in the National Sex Offender Registry and the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website  It became P L  114-22 on May 29, 2015  February 3, 2015 — H R  677 , American Heroes COLA Act of 2015, was introduced in the House, passed on February 9, and the next day was received in the Senate, read twice, and referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs  Section 6 proposed that veterans whose claims were being reviewed again in relation to a previously denied claim relating to military sexual trauma be given priority, among other claims  February 12, 2015 — H R  956 , the Military Track, Register and Alert Communities Act of 2015 (Military TRAC Act) was introduced in the House and referred to the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Military Personnel on November 23  This bill intended to require DOD to maintain a sex offender registry of individuals convicted of certain sex offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or of other military offenses appropriate for sex offender registration purposes  April 13, 2015 — H R  1735 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, was introduced in the House  Subtitle D addressed military justice, including sexual assault and domestic violence prevention and response  April 24, 2015 — H R  2029 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 was introduced in the House and later became P L  114-113   Section 8057 specified that "$25,000,000 shall be for continued implementation and expansion of the Sexual Assault Special Victims' Counsel Program " May 14, 2015 — S  1356 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 was introduced in the Senate and later became P L  114-92 on November 25, 2015  Subtitle D "Military Justice, Including Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Prevention and Response" amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice, authorized Special Victims' Counsel for civilian DOD employees, required the DOD to develop a policy to standardize the training for Special Victims' Counsel, required the establishment of Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces within 90 days, required the development of a plan to improve prevention and response to sexual assaults of male members of the Armed Forces, required the establishment of a strategy to prevent retaliation against Armed Forces members who report or intervene on behalf of sexual assault victims, and authorized the President to modify Rule 304(c) of the Military Rules of Evidence to conform to the rules governing the admissibility of the corroboration of admissions and confessions in the trial of criminal cases in the U S  district courts  June 11, 2015 — S  1558 , Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2016, was introduced in the Senate  The bill would have required specified O&M funds to be used for continued implementation and expansion of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program  June 11, 2015 — S  1567 , a bill to amend Title 10, United States Code, to provide for a review of the characterization or terms of discharge from the Armed Forces of individuals with mental health disorders alleged to affect terms of discharge, was introduced in the Senate  The bill proposed to address medical evidence reviews for former members applying for relief from the terms of their discharge due to military sexual trauma among other conditions  June 11, 2015 — S Amdt  1578 to S Amdt  1463 in H R  1735 , National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, was proposed in the Senate and later considered and defeated on June 16  This bill was intended to reform procedures for determinations to proceed to trial by court-martial for certain offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice  It did not achieve 60 votes in the Senate by Yea-Nay Vote  The final vote was 50 - 49  April 12, 2016 — H R  4909 , the NDAA for FY2017, was introduced in the House where it passed on May 18  On May 26, it was received in the Senate, read twice, and placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders  Calendar No  502  April 18, 2016 — H R  4991 , the Prevent Retaliation and Open up Transparency to Expand Care for Troops (PROTECT) Act of 2016, was introduced in the House and later referred to the House Armed Services' Subcommittee on Military Personnel  The bill intended to amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice to establish the offense of retaliation with provisions that would permit any person intent on retaliating against anyone for reporting or planning to report a criminal offense to be punished as a court-martial may direct  May 18, 2016 — S  2943 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, was introduced in the Senate and became P L  114-328 on December 23  Subtitle D specified requirements for the review by a discharge review board of claims by former members asserting post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or traumatic brain injury (TBI) in connection with combat or sexual trauma  Subtitle E "Military Justice and Legal Assistance Matters" required an annual report on sexual assault and response efforts, required Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to establish evaluation metrics and best practices in the prevention of and response to retaliation, and modified the definition of sexual harassment for the purposes of investigations of complaints of harassment by commanding officers  Title XXXV "Maritime Matters" established requirements for policies and training regarding sexual harassment and sexual assault prevention and response at the U S  Merchant Marine Academy and required the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation to submit a report to Congress about the sexual harassment and sexual assault prevention and response program at the U S  Merchant Marine Academy  Title LIV "Court-Martial Jurisdiction" specified the sexual offenses over which general courts-martial have exclusive jurisdiction  Title LX "Punitive Articles" created a new section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice addressing accountability for sexual misconduct committed by recruiters and trainers during the various phases within the recruiting and basic military training environments, revised the definition of ''sexual act'' with respect to the offenses of rape and sexual assault  May 19, 2016 — H R  5293 , Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017, was introduced in the House, passed on June 16, received in the Senate the next day, where it received a motion to proceed to consideration  The bill would have required O&M funds to be used for continued implementation and expansion of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program  May 26, 2016 — S  3000 , Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017, was introduced in the Senate and placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders  Calendar No  500  The Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense held several hearings prior from February-April  The bill would have required specified O&M funds to be used for continued implementation and expansion of the SAPR Program  DOD Directive No  6495 01  "Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program," January 23, 2012, Incorporating Change 3, April 11, 2017, at http://www esd whs mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/649501p pdf DOD Directive No  6495 02  "Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures," March 28, 2013, Incorporating Change 3, May 24, 2017, at https://www esd whs mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/649502p pdf DOD Inspector General (IG)  E valuation of the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations Sexual Assault Investigations, DODIG-2013-091, July 9, 2013, 104 p   at http://www dodig mil/reports html/Article/1118941/evaluation-of-the-military-criminal-investigative-organizations-sexual-assault/ Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) at https://www sapr mil/ Includes the full text of DOD Annual Reports, FY2004 - FY2016, and reports on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the U S  Military Service Academies, Academic Program Years (APY) 2005-2018  "Final 2014–2015 Academic Program Year Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault at the United States Merchant Marine Academy," Maritime Administration, undetermined date, at https://www marad dot gov/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Final-2014-2015-SASH-Report pdf "Department of Transportation U S  Merchant Marine Academy Culture Audit, Deliverable 4  Final Report," U S  Merchant Marine Academy, December 2016, at https://cms dot gov/sites/dot gov/files/docs/mission/civil-rights/263966/dot-usmma-report pdf "Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program," United States Coast Guard, LMI, December 2016, at https://media defense gov/2017/Mar/29/2001723560/-1/-1/0/CIM_1754_10E PDF "Preliminary 2015-2016 Academic Year Biennial Survey and Report on Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault at the United States Merchant Marine Academy," Maritime Administration, January 12, 2017, at https://www marad dot gov/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Preliminary-2015-2016-SASH-Report pdf Military Justice: Oversight and Better Collaboration Needed for Sexual Assault Investigations and Adjudications , GAO-11-579, Jun 22, 2011, 42 p  http://www gao gov/products/GAO-11-579 Preventing Sexual Harassment: DOD Needs Greater Leadership Commitment and an Oversight Framework , GAO-11-809, Sep 21, 2011, 47 p  http://www gao gov/assets/590/585344 pdf Prior GAO Work on DOD's Actions to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Assault in the Military , GAO-12-571R, Mar 30, 2012, 40 p  http://www gao gov/assets/590/589780 pdf DOD Has Taken Steps to Meet the Health Needs of Deployed Servicewomen, but Actions Are Needed to Enhance Care for Sexual Assault Victims, GAO-13-182, January 29, 2013, 40 p  http://www gao gov/assets/660/651624 pdf Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Address Sexual Assaults of Male Servicemembers, Report to the Committee on Armed Services , GAO-15-284, March 19, 2015, 86 p  http://www gao gov/products/GAO-15-284 Sexual Assault: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Prevention Strategy and to Help Ensure It Is Effectively Implemented, GAO-16-61, November 4, 2015, 59 p  http://www gao gov/products/GAO-16-61 DOD and Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Increase Oversight and Management Information on Hazing Incidents Involving Servicemembers, GAO-16-226, Feb 9, 2016, 74 p  http://www gao gov/products/GAO-16-226 The following news sources are listed in chronological order to make it easier to follow the numerous incidents of wide-spread misconduct reported in the media  Military com has ongoing news on military sexual assault at http://www military com/topics/sexual-assault   Montgomery, Nancy  "Johnson Found Guilty of Last Two Counts; Awaits Sentencing " Stars and Stripes , June 13, 2012, at http://www stripes com/news/johnson-found-guilty-of-last-two-counts-awaits-sentencing-1 180204 Carroll, Chris  "Air Force has Identified 31 Alleged Victims in Lackland Sex Abuse Scandal," Stars and Stripes, June 28, 2012, at http://www stripes com/news/air-force-has-identified-31-alleged-victims-in-lackland-sex-abuse-scandal-1 181597 Dao, James  "Instructor for Air Force Is Convicted in Sex Assaults," New York Times , July 20, 2012, at http://www nytimes com/2012/07/21/us/lackland-air-force-base-instructor-guilty-of-sex-assaults html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Blansett, Susan and Hoffman, Michael  "Sexual Assault Cases Flood Military Courts," Military com, August 13, 2012, at http://www military com/daily-news/2012/08/13/sex-assault-cases-flood-military-courts html Risen, James  "Honor Betrayed: Attacked at 19 by an Air Force Trainer, and Speaking Out," New York Times , February 26, 2013, at http://www nytimes com/2013/02/27/us/former-air-force-recruit-speaks-out-about-rape-by-her-sergeant-at-lackland html?pagewanted=all Mulrine, Anne  "Seeking the Sex-Assault Solution," Air Force Magazine , April 2013, at http://www airforcemag com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2013/April%202013/0413solution aspx "5 Former Lackland Commanders Disciplined," Military com, May 2, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/05/02/5-former-lackland-commanders-disciplined html Kime, Patricia  "Lawmakers Act Fast with New Legislation on Military Sexual Assault " Army Times , May 7, 2013  Shapira, Ian  "July Trial Set for Jeffrey Krusinski, Air Force Officer Accused of Sexual Battery " Washington Post , May 9, 2013, at https://www washingtonpost com/local/july-trial-set-for-air-force-officer-accused-of-sexual-battery/2013/05/09/8a21eb92-b8d9-11e2-92f3-f291801936b8_story html?utm_term= e0d4951e6573 Steinhauer, Jennifer  "Lawmakers, at White House, Discuss Sex Abuse in Military " New York Times , May 9, 2013, at http://www nytimes com/2013/05/10/us/politics/lawmakers-huddle-at-white-house-on-sex-abuse-in-military html?_r=0 Whitlock, Craig  "Pentagon Grapples with Sex Crimes by Military Recruiters," Washington Post , May 12, 2013, at http://articles washingtonpost com/2013-05-12/world/39210853_1_military-recruiters-sexual-abuse-army-reserve Sisk, Richard  "Assault Prevention NCO Investigated for Sex Crimes " Military com, May 15, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/05/15/assault-prevention-nco-investigated-for-sex-crimes html Whitlock, Craig  "Some in Congress want Changes in Military Law as a Result of Sex Crimes," Washington Post , May 15, 2013, at http://www washingtonpost com/world/national-security/some-in-congress-want-changes-in-military-law-as-result-of-sex-crimes/2013/05/15/672a2a8a-bd8b-11e2-a31d-a41b2414d001_story html Sisk, Richard  "Sex Assault Crisis Pushes Senate to Overhaul UCMJ," Military com, May 16, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/05/16/sex-assault-crisis-pushes-senate-to-overhaul-ucmj html Tilghman, Andrew  "Dempsey: DOD May Have Become 'Too Forgiving' of Sexual Assault," Army Times , May 17, 2013  Brady, Gen  Roger Brady (ret )  "Commentary: Telling Truths about Sexual Assault is Risky," Air Force Times , May  21, 2013  Salcedo, Michele  "Senator: Fire Commanders Allowing Sex Assault," Army Times, May 26, 2013  Tucker, Eric  "More Details Released on Annapolis Sex Assault Investigation: Allegations Made Against Three Football Players," Navy Times , May 30, 2013  Lardner, Richard  "Brass Seeks to Temper Military Justice Overhaul," Associated Press, June 3, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/06/03/brass-seeks-to-temper-military-justice-overhaul html Cassata, Donna and Richard Lardner  "Sexual Assaults Force Changes to Military Justice," Associated Press, June 4, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/06/04/sexual-assaults-force-changes-to-military-justice html Zengerle, Patricia  "U S  Lawmakers Act to Limit Military Authority in Sex Assault Cases," Reuters, June 5, 2013, at http://www reuters com/article/2013/06/05/us-usa-military-sexassault-congress-idUSBRE9541IG20130605 Cassata, Donna and Richard Lardner  " House OKs 2-Yr Jail Term for Military Sex Assault ," Associated Press, June 14, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/06/14/house-oks-2-year-jail-term-for-military-sex-assault html Montgomery, Nancy  " After 2 decades of sexual assault in military, no real change in message ," Stars and Stripes , July 7, 2013, at https://www stripes com/news/after-2-decades-of-sexual-assault-in-military-no-real-change-in-message-1 229091 Steinhauer, Jennifer  "Complex Fight in Senate over Curbing Military Sex Assaults," New York Times , June 14, 2013, at http://www nytimes com/2013/06/15/us/politics/in-senate-complex-fight-over-curbing-sexual-military-assaults html?pagewanted=all Dao, James  "In Debate over Military Sexual Assault, Men Are Overlooked Victims," New York Times , June 23, 2013, at http://www nytimes com/2013/06/24/us/in-debate-over-military-sexual-assault-men-are-overlooked-victims html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Sisk, Richard  "Military Tries to Sever Booze, Sex Assault Link," Military com, July 8, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/07/08/military-tries-to-sever-booze-sex-assault-link html Watson, Julie  "Military Works to Change Culture to Combat Rape," Associated Press, July 15, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/07/15/military-works-to-change-culture-to-combat-rape html Olson, Wyatt  "IG Review Finds Deficiencies in Sex Assault Cases," Stars and Stripes, July 16, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/07/16/ig-review-finds-deficiencies-in-sex-assault-cases html Shanker, Thom  "New Support for Military in Sex Cases," New York Times , July 24, 2013, at http://www nytimes com/2013/07/25/us/politics/new-support-for-military-in-sex-cases html Taranto, James  "A Strange Sort of Justice at West Point," The Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2013, at https://www wsj com/articles/a-strange-sort-of-justice-at-west-point-1376453937 Cassata, Donna, "Senator Targets Military Law over Sexual Assault," Associated Press, July 29, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/07/29/senator-targets-military-law-over-sexual-assault html?comp=7000023317843&rank=3 Groer, Annie  " Military brass claim progress in pursuing sexual assault cases ," Washington Post, August 1, 2013, at https://www washingtonpost com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2013/08/01/military-brass-claim-progress-in-pursing-sexual-assault-cases/?utm_term= 72e55e7e218c Jennifer Koons  "Sexual Assault in the Military: Can the Pentagon stem the rise in incidents?" CQ Researcher , vol  23, no  29 (A ugust 9, 2013 ), p p  693-716   Laird, Lorelei  " Military lawyers confront changes as sexual assault becomes big news ," ABA (American Bar Association) Journal , September 2013, at http://www abajournal com/magazine/article/military_lawyers_confront_changes_as_sexual_assault_becomes_big_news/ Jelinek, Pauline  " Pentagon: Reports of Sexual Assault Up 46 Percent ," Associated Press, November 8, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/11/08/pentagon-reports-of-sexual-assault-up-46-percent html Matthews, Michael F  " The Untold Story of Military Sexual Assault ," The New York Times, November 24, 2013, at http://www nytimes com/2013/11/25/opinion/the-untold-story-of-military-sexual-assault html " Men Sexually Assaulted in the Military Speak Out ," Baltimore Sun, December 20, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/12/20/men-sexually-assaulted-in-the-military-speak-out html Kageyama, Yuri and Richard Lardner  "Documents Reveal Chaotic Military Sex-Abuse Record," Associated Press, February 10, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/02/10/documents-reveal-chaotic-military-sex-abuse-record html Montgomery, Nancy  "AF Program Rare Bright Spot in Sex Assault Fight," Stars and Stripes , February 27, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/02/27/air-force-program-rare-bright-spot-in-sex-assault-fight html Cox, Matthew  "Alcohol Policies Reviewed as Sex Assault Rises," Military com, May 1, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/05/01/alcohol-policies-reviewed-as-sex-assault-rises html Burns, Robert  "Army Knocks 2-Star Down to 1-Star Rank," Associated Press, August 27, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/08/27/army-knocks-2-star-down-to-1-star-rank html Milham, Matt  "Army: It's Good News That Sexual Assault Reports Are Up," Stars and Stripes , September 26, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/09/26/army-its-good-news-that-sexual-assault-reports-are-up html Draper, Robert  The Military's Rough Justice on Sexual Assault," New York Times , November 26, 2014, at https://www nytimes com/2014/11/30/magazine/the-militarys-rough-justice-on-sexual-assault html Sisk, Richard  "Sexual Assault Reports Increase 8%, Pentagon Cites Progress," Military com, December 4, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/12/04/sexual-assault-reports-increase-8-pentagon-cites-progress html Baldor, Lolita C  "Male Military Sex Assault Victims Slow to Complain," Associated Press, December 9, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/12/09/male-military-sex-assault-victims-slow-to-complain html Roulo, Claudette  "Sexual Assault Rates Decrease at Military Service Academies," DOD News, Defense Media Activity, February 11, 2015, at http://archive defense gov/news/newsarticle aspx?id=128158 Pellerin, Cheryl  "DOD Honors Sexual Assault Response Coordinators," DOD News, April 23, 2015, at https://www defense gov/News/Article/Article/604510/ Rowe, Major Derek  "General courts-martial for sexual assault: How do they work?" Air Force News , April 28, 2015, at http://www af mil/News/Commentaries/Display/Article/586763/general-courts-martial-for-sexual-assault-how-do-they-work/ Sisk, Richard  "Military Sexual Assault Reports Increased 11 Percent Last Year," Military com, May 1, 2015, at http://www military com/daily-news/2015/05/01/military-sexual-assault-reports-increased-11-percent-last-year html Johnson, Lieutenant General Michelle D , U S  Air Force Academy superintendent; Vice Admiral Walter E  "Ted" Carter Jr , superintendent, U S  Naval Academy; Lieutenant General Robert L  Caslen, superintendent, U S  Military Academy; Rear Admiral James A  Helis, superintendent, U S  Merchant Marine Academy; Rear Admiral Sandra L  Stosz, superintendent, U S  Coast Guard Academy  "Lessons to Share: The five superintendents of federal service academies discuss how their institutions -- which faced scrutiny over sexual assault before many other colleges attracted such attention -- have responded to the issue," Inside Higher Ed, May 7, 2015, at https://www insidehighered com/views/2015/05/07/essay-how-federal-service-academics-prevent-and-punish-sexual-assault Tilghman, Andrew  "Military sexual assault claims: 1 in 20 lead to jail time," Military Times, May 13, 2015, at https://www militarytimes com/2015/05/13/military-sexual-assault-claims-1-in-20-lead-to-jail-time/ Schogol, Jeff  "Defense seeks dismissal of sexual assault case transferred to Washington," Air Force Times, October 17, 2015, at https://www airforcetimes com/news/your-air-force/2015/10/17/defense-seeks-dismissal-of-sexual-assault-case-transferred-to-washington/ Whitlock, Craig  "In the war against sexual assault, the Army keeps shooting itself in the foot," Washington Post, December 19, 2015, at https://www washingtonpost com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/12/19/in-the-war-against-sexual-assault-the-army-keeps-shooting-itself-in-the-foot/?utm_term= d856136e939b Defense Media Activity  "Defense Department Proposes UCMJ Changes," DOD News, December 28, 2015, at https://www defense gov/News/Article/Article/638108/defense-department-proposes-ucmj-changes/ Losey, Stephen  "USAF launches new strategy to curb sexual assault," Air Force Times, December 30, 2015, at https://www airforcetimes com/news/your-air-force/2015/12/30/usaf-launches-new-strategy-to-curb-sexual-assault/ Kime, Patricia  "Sexual assault reporting rises at U S  service academies," Military Times , January 8, 2016, at https://www militarytimes com/news/your-military/2016/01/08/sexual-assault-reporting-rises-at-u-s-service-academies/ Larter, David B  "Navy sex assault victims may be eligible for early separation," Navy Times, January 20, 2016, at https://www navytimes com/news/your-navy/2016/01/20/navy-sex-assault-victims-may-be-eligible-for-early-separation/ Cox, John Woodrow  "Why sex assault reports have spiked at the Naval Academy, West Point and the Air Force Academy, Washington Post , March 11, 2016, at https://www washingtonpost com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/11/why-sex-assault-reports-have-spiked-at-the-naval-academy-west-point-and-the-air-force-academy/?utm_term= a5e15f2f16f1 Whitlock, Craig, Thomas Gibbons-Neff  "Military bringing more charges against ofﬁcers for sexual assault," Washington Post, March 20, 2016, at https://www stripes com/news/us/military-bringing-more-charges-against-of%EF%AC%81cers-for-sexual-assault-1 400140# WeTFNOFRXUc Lardner, Richard  "Pentagon misled lawmakers on military sexual assault cases," Associated Press , April 18, 2016, at https://apnews com/23aed8a571f64a9d9c81271f0c6ae2fa/pentagon-misled-lawmakers-military-sexual-assault-cases Kheel, Rebecca  "Senators ask Obama to investigate whether Pentagon misled Congress," The Hill, April 19, 2016, at http://thehill com/policy/defense/276832-senators-ask-obama-to-investigate-pentagons-sexual-assault-comments Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs  "Air Force report on sexual assault highlights program's progress," Air Force News , May 05, 2016, at http://www af mil/News/Article-Display/Article/752653/air-force-report-on-sexual-assault-highlights-programs-progress/ Tilghman, Andrew  "Military sex assault: Just 4 percent of complaints result in convictions," Military Times , May 5, 2016, at https://www militarytimes com/veterans/2016/05/05/military-sex-assault-just-4-percent-of-complaints-result-in-convictions/ Montgomery, Nancy  "US Military Court Addresses 'Incapable of Consent' to Sex Issue," Stars and Stripes , May 18, 2016, at http://www military com/daily-news/2016/05/18/us-military-court-addresses-incapable-of-consent-to-sex-issue html Losey, Stephen  "Military must do right by wrongly-discharged sexual assault victims, advocates say," Air Force Times , May 19, 2016, at https://www airforcetimes com/news/your-air-force/2016/05/19/military-must-do-right-by-wrongly-discharged-sexual-assault-victims-advocates-say/ Lyle, Amaani  "DoD Safe Helpline Offers Specialized Support to Sexual Assault Victims," DOD News, July 15, 2016, at https://dod defense gov/News/Article/Article/841166/dod-safe-helpline-offers-specialized-support-to-sexual-assault-victims/ Rein, Lisa  "Merchant Marine Academy under fire for sexual assault allegations," Stars and Stripes, August 12, 2016, at https://www stripes com/news/us/merchant-marine-academy-under-fire-for-sexual-assault-allegations-1 423595 Lyle, Amaani  "DoD Unveils Plan to Broaden Sexual Assault Support to Men," DOD News, Defense Media Activity, December 15, 2016, at https://www defense gov/News/Article/Article/1030795/dod-unveils-plan-to-broaden-sexual-assault-support-to-men/ The following sources are listed in alphabetical order by author  Burgess, Ann W , Donna M  Slattery, and Patricia A  Herlihy  "Military Sexual Trauma: A Silent Syndrome " Journal of Psychosocial Nursing & Mental Health Services 51, no  2 (2013): 20-6  D'Ambrosio-Woodward, Tricia  "Military Sexual Assault: A Comparative Legal Analysis of the 2012 Department of Defense Report on Sexual Assault in the Military: What It Tells Us, What It Doesn't Tell Us, and How Inconsistent Statistic Gathering Inhibits Winning the 'Invisible War '" Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender & Society 29, no  2 (2014): 173-211  Farris, Coreen, Terry L  Schell and Terri Tanielian  Physical and Psychological Health Following Military Sexual Assault: Recommendations for Care, Research, and Policy   Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013  http://www rand org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP382 Firestone, Juanita M , J  M  Miller, and Richard Harris  "Implications for Criminal Justice from the 2002 and 2006 Department of Defense Gender Relations and Sexual Harassment Surveys " American Journal of Criminal Justice : AJCJ 37, no  3 (2012): 432-451  Gibson, Carolyn J , Kristen E  Gray, Jodie G  Katon, Tracy L  Simpson, and Keren Lehavot  "Sexual Assault, Sexual Harassment, and Physical Victimization during Military Service across Age Cohorts of Women Veterans " Women's Health Issues 26, no  2 (2016): 225-231  Harrell, Margaret C , Laura Werber, Marisa Adelson, Sarah J  Gaillot, Charlotte Lynch and Amanda Pomeroy  A Compendium of Sexual Assault Research   Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009  http://www rand org/pubs/technical_reports/TR617 Holland, Kathryn, Rabelo, Verónica, and Cortina, Lilia  Sexual Assault Training in the Military: Evaluating Efforts to End the 'Invisible War ' American Journal of Community Psychology 54, no  3/4 (2014): 289-303  Morral, Andrew R , Kristie Gore, and Terry L  Schell  Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment in the U S  Military, Volume 1  Design of the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study   Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, 2014  https://www rand org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9841 html Morral, Andrew R , Kristie Gore, and Terry L  Schell  Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment in the U S  military: Volume 2  Estimates for Department of Defense Service members from the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study   Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, 2015  https://www rand org/pubs/research_reports/RR870z2-1 html O'Brien, Carol, Jessica Keith, and Lisa Shoemaker  "Don't Tell: Military Culture and Male Rape " Psychological Services 12, no  4 (2015): 357-365  Stander, Valeria A  and Cynthia J  Thomsen  "Sexual Harassment and Assault in the U S  Military: A Review of Policy and Research Trends " AMSUS Military Medicine (Association of Military Surgeons of the United States) 181, no  1S (2016): 20-27  This chronological list of hearings was compiled from Congress gov and CQ com  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee, A Review of Sexual Misconduct by Basic Training Instructors at Lackland Air Force Base , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , January 23, 2013, H A S C  No  113-2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 2014 , Part 1, 113th Cong , 1 st sess , February 26, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Personnel, Testimony on Sexual Assault in the Military, 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , March 13, 2013, S  Hrg  113-303 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2014 , 113th Cong , 1 st sess , April 17, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 2014, Part 2 , 113th Cong , 1 st sess , April 24, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2014 , 113th Cong , 1 st sess , April 24, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, President Obama's Fiscal 2014 Budget Proposal for the U S  Navy and Marine Corps , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , May 7, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, D epartment of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2014 and the Future Years Defense Program , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , May 7, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, President Obama's Fiscal 2014 Budget Proposal for the U S  Army , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , May 8, 2013  (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, President Obama's Fiscal 2014 Budget Proposal for the U S  Air Force , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , May 8, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, President Obama's Fiscal 2014 Budget Proposal for the U S  Air Force , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , May 9, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2014 , 113th Cong , 1 st sess , May 22, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Pending Legislation Regarding Sexual Assaults in the Military , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , June 4, 2013, S  Hrg  113–320 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Personnel, Markup of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , June 11, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2014 , 113th Cong , 1 st sess , June 11, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Women in Service Review s , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , July 24, 2013, H A S C  No  113–50 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress , Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Personnel, The Relationships Between Military Sexual Assault, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Suicide, and on Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Treatment and Management of Victims of Sexual Trauma , 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , February 26, 2014, S  Hrg  113-480 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)   U S  Congress, Armed Services Committee , Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of Defense , 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , March 6 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Navy , 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , March 12 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 2015, Part 1 , 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , March 13, 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee , Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Air Force , 113 th Cong  , 2 nd sess , March 14, 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee , Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Army , 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , March 25 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense , Department of Defense Appropriations for 2015 , 113th Cong , 2 nd sess , March 26 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee , Department of Defense Appropriations for 2015 , Part 2, 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , April 2, 2014, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense , Department of Defense Appropriations for 2015 , 113th Cong , 2 nd sess , April 2 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee , National Defense Priorities from the Members for the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act , 113 th Cong  , 2 nd sess , April 9 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015 , 113th Cong , 2 nd sess , April 9, 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015 , 113th Cong , 2 nd sess , April 30, 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense , Department of Defense Appropriations for 2015 , 113th Cong , 2 nd sess , June 18 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee , Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2016 and the Future Years Defense Program , Part 1 , 114th Cong , 1 st sess , March 3 , 10 , 12 , 18 , 19, 26, April 4, 30 , 2015 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services , Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2016 and the Future Years Defense Program , Part 7 Strategic Forces, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , March 4, 25, April 15, 22, 29 , 2015 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2016 and the Future Years Defense Program , Part 3 Readiness and Management Support, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , March 11, 25, April 22, 2015 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, The Current State of Readiness of U S  Forces in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2016 and the Future Years Defense Program , 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , March 25, 2015 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2017 and the Future Years Defense Program , Part 1 , 114 th Cong , 2 nd sess , February 11, 23, March 3, 10, 15, 17, April 5, 7, 26, 2016 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee, The Fiscal Year 2017 Na tional Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of Defense , 114 th Cong , 2 nd sess , March 22, 2016 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, The Current State of Research, Diagnosis, and Treatment for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury , 114 th Cong , 2 nd sess , April 20, 2016 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 on H R 1960 with Additional and Dissenting Views, 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , H  Rept  113-102 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2014 to Accompany H R  2397 together with Additional Views, 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , H  Rept  113-113 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 to accompany S  1197, 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , S  Rept  113-44 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2014 to accompany S 1429, 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , S  Rept  113-85 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, First Annual Report on the Activities of the Committee on Armed Services for the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , H  Rept  113-309 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Howard P  "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 to accompany H R 4435, 113 th Cong, 2 nd sess , H  Rept  113-446 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Howard P  "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 supplemental report to accompany H R 4435, 113 th Cong  2 nd sess , H  Rept  113-446 part 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Carl Levin National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 to accompany S 2410, 113 th Cong, 2 nd sess , S  Rept  113-176 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2015 to accompany H R 4870, 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , H  Rept  113-473 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2015 to accompany H R 4870, 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , S  Rept  113-211 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Armed Service, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 to accompany H R 1735, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , H  Rept  114-102 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 to accompany S 1376, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , S  Rept  114-49 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016 to accompany H R 2685, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , H  Rept  114-139 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016 to accompany S 1558, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , S  Rept  114-63 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, House Conference Report, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 to accompany H R 1735, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , H  Rept  114-270 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 on H R 4909, 114 th Cong , 2 nd sess , H  Rept  114-537 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 to accompany S 2943, 114 th Cong, 2 nd sess , S  Rept  114-255 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2017 to accompany H R 5293, 114 th Cong , 2 nd sess , H  Rept  114-577 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2017 to accompany S 3000, 114 th Cong , 2 nd sess , S  Rept  114-263 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, House Conference Report, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 to accompany S  2943, 114 th Cong, 2 nd sess , H  Rept  114-840 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016) 
Report 2: S  Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2018  Table 4 provides information from the same report about states' contributions to the costs of maintaining and operating voting equipment  As GAO uses the terms in the survey, operation costs "include things such as poll worker labor to set up equipment, postage for mailing absentee or vote-by-mail ballots, paper and printing supplies for paper ballots or voter-verified paper trails, and electricity to operate equipment during elections " Maintenance costs "include things such as labor to conduct maintenance between elections of any equipment hardware and software as well as any required parts " Some states cover or contribute to the costs of training local election officials, and some share election-specific costs, such as printing ballots and transporting voting equipment  Box 3 uses five examples of cost-sharing arrangements for election-specific costs of federal elections to illustrate the range of approaches states have taken to such arrangements  The structures of the state and local systems that conduct federal elections vary both between and within states  Common variations include differences related to the leadership of the election system; relationship between local election officials and the state; and population size and density of the jurisdiction served by the system  This section describes these structural variations  The state and local election systems that conduct federal elections may be led by an individual, such as the state secretary of state or a town or county clerk; a group, such as a state elections commission or a county board of elections; or a combination of individuals or groups, such as a state secretary of state and state board of elections, or a city clerk and city registrar of voters  Election system leadership may be chosen by voters or appointed by an authority such as the governor or state legislature  The selection method—and the leaders themselves—may be partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan  Federal law requires states to designate a chief election official to carry out certain tasks  Table 5 lists the titles of chief state election officials, as reported to CRS by the EAC, and the methods of selecting them, as listed by the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) and the National Association of State Legislatures (NCSL)  The leadership types and selection methods of local election systems may vary within a state  Box 4 uses examples from Florida and Wisconsin to illustrate such variations  It describes the different causes of variation in the two states and a recent change in Florida to a more uniform selection process  The leadership structures of both state and local systems can also change over time  Box 5 uses the two states from Box 4 to illustrate the types of changes states might make, how they might make them, and how frequently they might make them  It describes one change that was approved by voters as a ballot measure and a number of others that were enacted legislatively  Another way in which the structures of election systems can vary is in the relationship between local election officials and the state  Some local election officials operate largely independently, whereas others rely on state officials or resources for some, most, or all basic functions  For example, as noted in " Funding ," states may provide some or all of the training for local election officials  As described in more detail in " Jurisdiction Size and Density ," local election officials who serve smaller or more rural jurisdictions may also depend on their states to provide specialized expertise, such as legal or technical know-how  States also have varying types and degrees of influence over local election officials  Choices about other structural features, such as the method used to select the leadership of local election systems, can shape this aspect of the state-local relationship  For example, in some states, state officials appoint and can remove local election officials  State officials in other states may have other options for influencing local officials  For example, state officials may have the power to initiate legal action against local officials, to provide or withhold funding for local election administration, or to certify and decertify voting systems  However, they tend to have less control over how local officials perform their election administration duties than state officials with appointment and removal authority  As described in more detail in " Compliance with Federal Requirements ," this dynamic may be especially pronounced for local officials who are popularly elected  Such officials are accountable primarily to voters rather than to the state  Other structural variations between election systems derive from differences in the population size and density of the jurisdictions they serve  Some election jurisdictions reported serving fewer than 100 eligible registered voters in the 2016 election, for example, whereas Los Angeles County reported serving 6 8 million  The eligible registered voters in that county alone reportedly outnumbered the eligible registrants in each of 40 other states  Election jurisdictions also differ in population density  For example, Los Angeles County is an urban center, and many small jurisdictions are rural  Jurisdictions with different population sizes and densities have different election administration advantages and face different administrative challenges  For example, voter registration list maintenance is typically more straightforward in small jurisdictions because their lists are shorter and election officials are more likely to know registrants personally  Meanwhile, large jurisdictions tend to have larger tax bases and more resources  Those differences between jurisdictions may be reflected in the internal structures of the election systems that serve them  One example of such a structural difference is the size and specialization of the system's staff  Larger jurisdictions, which typically have more personnel, may have much of the specialized expertise they need in-house  Smaller jurisdictions, which may have only one part-time employee dedicated to election administration, are more likely to rely on outside expertise  For example, according to law professors Steven F  Huefner, Daniel P  Tokaji, and Edward B  Foley, smaller jurisdictions in Illinois have looked to state attorneys for election law expertise and to voting equipment vendors for technical support  Another type of difference related to jurisdiction size and density is variation in the allocation of system resources  A study prepared for the U S  Election Assistance Commission in 2013 found that election officials in rural jurisdictions were more likely than their urban counterparts to use paid print advertising for voter outreach  Election officials in urban jurisdictions were more likely to use websites and social media  Small jurisdictions may also allocate a larger share of their resources to meeting state and federal requirements than larger jurisdictions because there are often fixed start-up costs to required changes, and smaller jurisdictions may be less equipped to capitalize on economies of scale  For example, political scientists Heather M  Creek and Kimberly A  Karnes report, "There is a minimum cost to the acquisition and maintenance of voting technology that applies whether the district is purchasing 5 or 500 machines " The duties and structures of state and local election systems can affect the implementation of federal election administration laws  Perhaps as a result, Congress has specified how states and localities should distribute certain election administration duties and structure certain elements of their election systems  Changes to the duties and structures of state and local election systems have sometimes also been side effects of other federal activity on election administration  This section provides examples of ways in which the distribution of election administration duties at the state and local levels and the structures of state and local election systems can affect the implementation of federal election administration law  These examples include federal efforts to affect the administration of elections through (1) requirements, (2) funding, and (3) information sharing  Congress can use requirements to regulate how states and localities administer certain aspects of federal elections  How well such requirements serve their intended purposes depends in part on how closely states and localities comply with them  How closely states and localities comply with federal requirements may, in turn, be affected by the duties and structures of the state and local election systems that implement them  For example, UOCAVA assigns responsibility for complying with some of its requirements to the states (52 U S C  §20302), but the tasks required for compliance are often handled by local officials  One scholar, law professor Justin Weinstein-Tull, indicates that this means that the officials who are held liable for compliance with UOCAVA requirements may differ from the officials who take or fail to take the actions needed to comply  Box 6 provides an illustration of this phenomenon as reported by state officials in Alabama  The federal government can provide funding for state and local election administration, which may be conditional on the adoption of certain election administration policies or practices  How well such funding serves its intended purposes may depend in part on how timely it is and how well-tailored it is to its objectives  Duties and structures of state and local election systems may affect how quickly federal funding is claimed and used and how well the uses to which it is put serve federal objectives  For example, HAVA has authorized payments to states to meet its requirements (52 U S C  §21007)  It has directed those payments to be disbursed to states (52 U S C  §21001(a)) and charged chief state election officials with overseeing decisions about how to spend them (52 U S C  §21005(a))  State election officials run federal elections in some states, but those states are the exception  As noted in " Implementation " and " Funding ," most states assign election administration implementation and funding duties to local officials  That means that the officials who receive HAVA funding and are charged with overseeing decisions about how to use it often differ from the officials who conduct and pay for the activities and resources it is intended to fund  That has had at least two reported consequences  First, in some cases, it has reportedly delayed access to or use of some HAVA funds  Directing HAVA funding to states introduces opportunities for state-level delays, such as decisions by state officials to wait to claim the funds or requirements in state law to obtain approval to do so  Second, some local officials have stated the view that their states' shares of HAVA funding were not put to what they considered the areas of greatest need  Box 7 provides examples of such consequences as described by state and local officials in Nevada, Minnesota, and Virginia  Congress can require or facilitate information sharing with states and localities by federal agencies  As with funding, the effectiveness of federal information sharing may depend in part on how timely it is  How quickly federal agencies share information with the appropriate state and local officials may be affected by the distribution of election administration duties at the state and federal levels  Box 8 provides an example of such an effect reported by NASS  Past federal action has resulted in both intentional and unintentional changes to state and local election systems  Some federal laws include provisions that are specifically designed to establish certain responsibilities for election administration at the state level  For example, the NVRA requires states to designate chief state election officials to coordinate state responsibilities under the act (52 U S C  §20509), and HAVA charges chief state election officials with implementing a statewide voter registration system (52 U S C  §21083(a)(1)(A))  Federal regulation has reportedly also had the side effect of shifting the distribution of other election administration duties  For example, the agency-based registration requirements in the NVRA divide voter registration responsibilities between traditional election offices and offices that had not historically been involved in election administration, such as motor vehicle and public assistance agencies (52 U S C  §20504; 52 U S C  §20506)  According to Hale, Montjoy, and Brown, "the need to pass implementing legislation and the complexity of legal and technical requirements" in federal laws such as HAVA and the NVRA has also "led many states to grant new or additional rule-making power" to their chief state election officials  Congress has considered legislation—some of which has been enacted and some of which has not—that would change election rules or the state and local systems that implement them  The interactions between the duties and structures of state and local election systems and past federal actions suggest some considerations that may be relevant to future congressional consideration of proposals that would affect the administration of federal elections  The following questions may be of interest to Members as they consider making changes to election administration or maintaining current rules and structures: How would any proposed change interact with the duties and structures of state and local election systems? Would the duties and structures of state and local election systems make a proposed change difficult to implement? Would the design of a proposed change need to be adjusted to accommodate variations between or within states? Which of the policy tools available to Congress is best suited to achieving the purpose of a proposed change? For example, would it be more effective to advance a proposed change with a federal requirement, or incentivize it via federal funding? How might the nature of the state and local system inform a proposed change? For example, if it is a federal requirement, who is charged with compliance; who is responsible for the tasks required for compliance; and what is the relationship between the two? If it is federal funding, to whom should it be distributed, and who should be involved in making decisions about how to use it? Would a proposed change have the effect, either intentionally or unintentionally, of altering the duties or structures of state or local election systems? If so, what are the advantages and disadvantages of such changes? Are there complications with a proposed change that are not specifically related to election administration? For example, could there be federalism-related issues with intervening in the relationships between states and their political subdivisions? 

ground_truth: This report focuses on previous activity in Congress regarding high profile incidents of sexual assault in the military during the summer 2013 through 2016. Included are separate sections on the official responses related to these incidents by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Obama Administration, and Congress including legislation during the 113th (2013-2014) Congress and 114th Congress (2015-2016). The last section is a resource guide for sources in this report and related materials on sexual assault and prevention during this period. This report will not be updated and supersedes CRS Report R43168, Military Sexual Assault: Chronology of Activity in Congress and Related Resources. For current information regarding Congress and issues on sexual assault in the military, see CRS Report R44944, Military Sexual Assault: A Framework for Congressional Oversight, by Kristy N. Kamarck and Barbara Salazar Torreon. For legislative initiatives in the 115th Congress, see CRS Report R44923, FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, by Kristy N. Kamarck, Lawrence Kapp, and Barbara Salazar Torreon and CRS Report R45343, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, by Bryce H. P. Mendez et al.