prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: In March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations (hereinafter referred to as the Saudi-led coalition or the coalition) to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh  During 2014, the United States joined Saudi Arabia in demanding that Houthi forces reverse their campaign to occupy the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, but the rapid onset of hostilities in March 2015 forced the Obama Administration to react quickly  At the start of the Saudi-led intervention on March 25, 2015, the Administration announced that the United States would provide "logistical and intelligence support" to the coalition's operations without taking "direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort " Soon thereafter, a joint U S -Saudi planning cell was established to coordinate military and intelligence support for the campaign  At the United Nations Security Council, the United States supported the passage of Resolution 2216 (April 2015), which, among other things, required member states to impose an arms embargo against the Houthi-Saleh forces and demanded that the Houthis withdraw from all areas seized during the current conflict  Since the March 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, Congress has taken an active role in debating and overseeing U S  policy in the Arabian Peninsula  Members have considered legislative proposals seeking to reduce Yemeni civilian casualties resulting from the coalition's operations; improve deteriorating humanitarian conditions; end restrictions on the flow of goods and humanitarian aid; combat Iranian support for the Houthis; preserve maritime security in the Bab al Mandab Strait; and/or support continued Saudi-led coalition and U S  efforts to counter Al Qaeda and Islamic State forces in Yemen  Beyond Yemen, many Members have appeared to view the conflict through the prism of a broader regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the U S  effort to limit Iran's malign regional influence  Others lawmakers have viewed the Yemen conflict as indicative of what they perceive as problems in the U S -Saudi relationship, a concern that deepened after the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel in October 2018  Congress has considered but has not enacted proposals to curtail or condition U S  defense sales to Saudi Arabia  Responding to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen also appears to be reinvigorating some Members' interest in strengthening the role of Congress in foreign policy vis-à-vis the executive branch  Debate in Congress over Yemen has featured bipartisan statements of interest in asserting the prerogatives of the legislative branch to limit executive branch power, specifically using war powers legislation and the appropriations and authorization processes to curb U S  military involvement in support of coalition operations  Congressional scrutiny of U S  policy in Yemen also has led to legislative changes to global authorities, such as the Department of Defense's authority to enter into and use acquisition and cross servicing agreements with partner militaries  Congressional interest in the Yemen conflict has evolved and grown gradually and was not widespread at the outset of the coalition's March 2015 intervention in Yemen  In early to mid-2015, congressional interest in U S  foreign policy in the Middle East centered on the Iran nuclear deal and Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria  Several months after the March 2015 intervention, the Saudi-led coalition had not achieved a conclusive victory and what modest gains had been made on the ground were offset by mounting international criticism of growing civilian casualties from coalition air strikes  In Congress, several lawmakers began to express concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen  In late September 2015, Representative Ted W  Lieu wrote a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocating for a halt to U S  support for the Saudi-led coalition until it instituted safeguards to prevent civilian casualties  In October 2015, 10 Members of Congress wrote a letter to President Obama urging him to "work with our Saudi partners to limit civilian casualties to the fullest extent possible " In October 2015, Senator Markey stated that "I fear that our failure to strongly advocate diplomacy in Yemen over the past two years, coupled with our failure to urge restraint in the face of the crisis last spring, may put the viability of this critical [U S -Saudi] partnership at risk " By the fall of 2015, as the Obama Administration tried to balance its concern for adhering to the laws of armed conflict with its support for Gulf partners, lawmakers began to express their concern over U S  involvement in the coalition's intervention by scrutinizing U S  arms sales to Saudi Arabia  When the Administration informally notified Congress of a proposed sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia, some Senators sought to delay its formal notification  After the formal notification in November 2015, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) leaders jointly requested that the Administration notify Congress 30 days prior to associated shipments, marking the first use of this prior notification request authority  At that time, no related joint resolutions of disapproval on proposed sales of PGMs to the kingdom were introduced, but the delay and additional notification request demonstrated congressional concern  By the one-year anniversary of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, a more defined opposition to U S  support for the coalition had begun to coalesce amid repeated international documentation of human rights abuses and errant coalition airstrikes  In April 2016, legislation was introduced that sought to place conditions on future proposed sale notifications, previously approved sales, or transfers of PGMs to Saudi Arabia  Proposed amendments to FY2017 defense legislation would have added some similar conditions on the use of funds to implement sales of PGMs or prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia  The PGM amendment was not considered, but the cluster munitions amendment was narrowly defeated in a June 2016 House floor vote  In the spring and summer of 2016, the United Nations held multiple rounds of peace talks in Kuwait aimed at brokering an end to the conflict  From April 2016 to August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition had largely spared Yemen's capital Sanaa from aerial strikes as part of its commitment to the cessation of hostilities  When U N -mediated peace talks collapsed in August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition resumed bombing and the war intensified  During the summer of 2016, the Obama Administration reduced some U S  support for Saudi Arabia's air campaign in Yemen by withdrawing U S  personnel assigned to a joint U S -Saudi planning cell  Nevertheless, overall U S -Saudi cooperation continued and, in August 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of M1A2S tanks to Saudi Arabia  In response, some lawmakers wrote to request that President Obama withdraw the proposal, citing concerns about Yemen  In September 2016, joint resolutions of disapproval of the proposed tank sale were introduced in the Senate ( S J Res  39 ) and House ( H J Res  98 )  On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the SFRC from further consideration of S J Res  39 (71-27, Record Vote 145)  During debate over the motion, many Senators argued in favor of continued U S  support for Saudi Arabia, with Senator Lindsey Graham remarking "To those who want to vote today to suspend this aid to Saudi Arabia, people in Iran will cheer you on " In the wake of an October 2016 Saudi airstrike on a funeral hall in Sanaa that killed 140 people, the Obama Administration initiated a review of U S  security assistance to Saudi Arabia  Based on that review, it put a hold on a planned sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia and limited intelligence sharing, but maintained counterterrorism cooperation and refueling for coalition aircraft  In the final months of the Obama Administration, U S  Armed Forces briefly exchanged fire with forces party to the conflict  In October 2016, Houthi-Saleh forces launched anti-ship missiles at U S  Navy vessels on patrol off the coast of Yemen  The attacks against the U S  ships marked the first time U S  Armed Forces had come under direct fire in the war  The Obama Administration responded to the attacks against U S  naval vessels by directing the Armed Forces to fire cruise missiles against Houthi-Saleh radar installations  The Obama Administration described the U S  strikes as self-defense and indicated that it did not want to deepen its direct involvement in the conflict  In August and November 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry made several attempts to broker a peace initiative in Oman, but his efforts were rejected by the parties themselves  By the end of 114 th Congress, the war in Yemen was becoming a more significant foreign policy issue for lawmakers  While a growing number of Members were becoming critical of the U S  role in supporting the Saudi-led coalition amid a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen, more lawmakers still viewed the conflict through a regional lens rather than as a localized affair  Amid significant congressional opposition to the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), some Members viewed Iran's support for the Houthi movement and the broader conflict in Yemen as an example of Iran's malign regional activities not directly addressed by the JCPOA  As the Houthis targeted Gulf state infrastructure on land and vessels at sea, their behavior was touted as evidence of Iran's growing capabilities to threaten U S  and Gulf security  Just as some Members considered the Yemen conflict primarily a proxy war between the Iran-backed Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, others viewed it as a test of long-standing U S  commitments to supporting Saudi Arabian security  Supporters of the relationship, while acknowledging that Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war was at times problematic, argued that to curtail U S  arms sales or other defense support to the kingdom would weaken a vital partner that was under threat from a hostile nonstate actor on its southern border  Others lawmakers charged that continued U S  support for the coalition was not improving coalition behavior but damaging the U S  reputation for upholding commitments to international law and human rights  Legislation seeking to limit U S  arms sales to Saudi Arabia was not enacted in the 114 th Congress, but marked the beginning of the broader congressional debate that has continued  As the Trump Administration prepared to assume office, human rights organizations and aid groups were pressing Congress to become more attuned to the growing humanitarian crisis in Yemen  Though the Obama Administration had taken some steps, particularly in late 2016, to limit U S -coalition cooperation and restrict deliveries of PGMs to Saudi Arabia, nongovernmental groups deemed such action as insufficient  According to Human Rights Watch, "Whatever conditionality the Obama administration thought it had created—in holding up the transfer of precision munitions near the tail end of Obama's term and suspending cluster munition transfers earlier—ultimately did not have meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians " From the beginning of his Administration, President Donald Trump has signaled strong support for the Saudi-led coalition's operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference  He initiated a review of U S  policy toward Yemen, including President Obama's October 2016 restrictions on U S  arms sales and intelligence sharing to the coalition  On March 19, 2017, just prior to his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump notified Congress that he was proceeding with three proposed direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology deferred by the Obama Administration, subject to congressional review  In May 2017, the Administration officially notified Congress of its intention to proceed with proposed sales of precision guided munitions technologies that the Obama Administration had deferred, while announcing plans to increase training for Saudi Arabia's air force on both targeting and the Law of Armed Conflict  Congress debated another resolution of disapproval ( S J Res  42 ) of these proposed PGM sales in June 2017 (see below)  After completing the policy review in July 2017, President Trump directed his Administration "to focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity and commerce in the Red Sea " As President Trump entered office, the dynamics of the conflict in Yemen were changing, and the coalition launched a new offensive along Yemen's 280-mile western coastal plain ultimately aimed at taking the strategic Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah  In early 2017, the coalition's gradual advance toward Hudaydah, coupled with an ongoing deterioration in humanitarian conditions, sparked some Members of Congress to implore the Administration to improve aid access and negotiate a cease-fire  In March 2017, several House Members wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urging him to "use all U S  diplomatic tools to help open the Yemeni port of Hodeida [Hudaydah] to international humanitarian aid organizations " A month later, another group of House Members wrote to President Trump stating that Congress should approve any new U S  support to the coalition amid its offensive against Hudaydah  On June 13, 2017, the Senate debated another resolution ( S J Res  42 ) to disapprove of three direct commercial sales of PGMs to Saudi Arabia  During Senate floor consideration over the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S J Res  42 , Members once again weighed various issues, such as the U S -Saudi bilateral relationship, countering Iran, and limiting U S  involvement in the war in Yemen  Some lawmakers suggested that U S  arms sales and military support to the coalition had enabled alleged violations of international humanitarian law, while others argued that U S  support to the coalition improved its effectiveness and helps minimize civilian casualties  For example, during floor debate, Senator Graham argued that "If we are worried about collateral damage in Yemen, I understand the concern  Precision weapons would help that cause, not hurt it " Senator Murphy retorted, saying "What we are asking for is to hold off on selling these precision-guided munitions until we get some clear promise—some clear assurance—from the Saudis that they are going to use these munitions only for military purposes and that they are going to start taking steps—real steps, tangible steps—to address the humanitarian crisis " On June 13, 2017, the Senate voted to reject the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration (47-53, Record Vote 143), and a companion resolution was not taken up in the House ( H J Res  102 )  Representative Ro Khanna introduced a concurrent resolution ( H Con Res  81 ) pursuant to the War Powers Resolution ( P L  93-148 ) in a bid to end U S  support for the coalition's military intervention  After consultation between House leaders and supporters of the resolution on a compromise approach, the House agreed to delay expedited consideration of the resolution until after the November 2016 election and then adopted a nonbinding alternative ( H Res  599 , 366-30, 1 Present, Roll no  623)  In his first year in office, while President Trump sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, counter Iran, and increase U S  counterterrorism activity in Yemen, his Administration also at times took strong positions on the need for members of the coalition to improve humanitarian access, pursue a settlement to the conflict, and take measures to prevent civilian casualties  After a Houthi-fired missile with alleged Iranian origins landed deep inside Saudi Arabia in November 2017, the coalition instituted a full blockade of all of Yemen's ports, including the main port of Hudaydah, exacerbating the country's humanitarian crisis  The White House issued four press statements on the conflict between November 8 and December 8, including a statement on December 6 in which President Trump called on Saudi Arabia to "completely allow food, fuel, water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who desperately need it  This must be done for humanitarian reasons immediately " On December 20, 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would end its blockade of Hudaydah port for a 30-day period and permit the delivery of four U S -funded cranes to Yemen to increase the port's capability to off-load commercial and humanitarian goods  The next day, the White House issued a statement welcoming "Saudi Arabia's announcement of these humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict " As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate also proposed use of the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U S  support for the coalition's military intervention  On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S J Res  54 , a joint resolution to "direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress (except for those U S  forces engaged in counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces) " Efforts in the Senate followed a late 2017 attempt in the House (see Table 1 below), in which a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove U S  forces from Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed nonbinding resolution  Throughout 2018, between Congress and the Trump Administration and within Congress itself, there was disagreement as to whether U S  forces assisting the Saudi-led coalition have been introduced into active or imminent hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution  Some Members claimed that by providing support to the Saudi-led coalition, U S  forces have been introduced into a "situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated" based on the criteria of the War Powers Resolution  The Trump Administration disagreed  In February 2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the extent of current U S  support , and reported that "the United States provides the KSA-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties " On March 20, 2018, the Senate considered S J Res  54 on the floor  During debate, arguments centered on a number of issues, ranging from concern over exacerbating Yemen's humanitarian crisis to reasserting the role of Congress in authorizing the use of armed force abroad  After then-Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker promised to propose new legislation and hold hearings scrutinizing U S  policy in Yemen, a majority of Senators voted to table a motion to discharge the Foreign Relations committee from further consideration of S J Res  54   Senator Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker's approach, a view shared by some other Senators who voted to table the motion  The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Yemen a month later  In parallel testimony before Congress, U S  defense officials stated that while the United States refueled Saudi aircraft and provided advice on targeting techniques, CENTCOM did not track coalition aircraft after they were refueled and did not provide advice on specific targets  Then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert S  Karem testified that "It's correct that we do not monitor and track all of the Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen " During the same hearing, U S  officials acknowledged that pressure from Congress has altered how the Administration deals with the coalition over the Yemen conflict  Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield told Senator Todd Young and the SFRC the following: Senator, your efforts, the efforts of your colleagues in this body and on this Committee have been exceedingly helpful in allowing the Administration to send a message from whole of government regarding the very specific concerns we have over any limitations, restrictions, constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial goods specifically to include fuel to have unrestricted and expeditious entry into Yemen  And that messaging which comes from us, the Executive Branch, also comes from this body is extremely important  After the promised hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also proposed new legislation to place conditions on U S  assistance to the coalition  In May, the committee reported S J Res  58 to the Senate; it would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U S  funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained  The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the SFRC-reported text of S J Res  58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 ( S  2987 )  The provision was modified further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the FY2019 NDAA ( H R  5515 )  It was signed into law as P L  115-232 in mid-August, giving the Administration until mid-September 2018 to make certain certifications  In a statement accompanying the President's signing of P L  115-232 into law, President Trump objected to provisions such as Section 1290, stating the Administration's view that such provisions "encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is feasible and consistent" with "[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs " As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of 2018  On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched "Operation Golden Victory," aimed at retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah  As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could become widespread throughout northern Yemen  On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and then-Secretary of Defense Mattis saying, "We are concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical infrastructure  We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a near-term political resolution to the conflict " Several weeks later, Senator Robert Menendez, the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, placed a hold on a potential U S  sale of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates  In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said, I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective leverage to push back on Iran's actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own self-defense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates humanitarian suffering…  Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world's worst humanitarian crisis  On August 9, the coalition conducted an airstrike that hit a bus in a market near Dahyan, Yemen, in the northern Sa'ada governorate adjacent to the Saudi border  The strike reportedly killed 51 people, 40 of whom were children  The coalition claims that its airstrike was a "legitimate military operation" and conducted in response to a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi city of Jizan a day earlier that killed a Yemeni national in the kingdom  The U S  State Department called on the Saudi-led coalition to conduct a "thorough and transparent investigation into the incident " Several Members of Congress wrote to the Administration seeking additional information regarding U S  operations in the wake of the August 2018 coalition strike at Dahyan  Several Senators also submitted an amendment to the FY2019 Defense Department appropriations act ( H R  6157 ) that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to support the Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to Congress that the coalition air campaign "does not violate the principles of distinction and proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians " The provision did not apply to support for ongoing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Yemen  On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a certification that would allow the use of FY2019 defense funds to support in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft to continue, per the terms of Section 1290 (see discussion above) of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P L  115-232 )  Some Members of Congress criticized the Administration's actions, asserting that the coalition has not met the act's specified benchmarks for avoiding civilian casualties in Yemen  On September 26, several House Members introduced H Con Res  138 , which sought to direct the President to remove U S  Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, except for Armed Forces engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, within 30 days unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use has been enacted into law  In response to a similar initiative in the Senate, the Administration submitted a detailed argument expressing its view that U S  forces supporting Saudi-led coalition operations are not engaged in hostilities in Yemen  By late 2018, the prospect of widespread famine in Yemen coupled with international reprobation over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi pressured the Administration and the coalition to accelerate moves toward peace talks  On October 30, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for all parties to reach a cease-fire and resume negotiations  On November 9, Secretary Mattis further announced that effective immediately, the coalition would use its own military capabilities—rather than U S  capabilities—to conduct in-flight refueling in support of its operations in Yemen  Though fighting continued along several fronts, on December 13, 2018, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire centered on the besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah (Yemen's largest port)  As part of the U N -brokered deal (known as the Stockholm Agreement), the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside Hudaydah city and port  The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment  The international community praised the Stockholm Agreement as a first step toward broader de-escalation and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace settlement  Also on December 13, 2018, the Senate amended and passed S J Res  54 (56-41), which, among other things, directed the President to remove U S  forces from hostilities in Yemen, except U S  forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces  In the House, lawmakers twice narrowly approved rules resolutions containing provisions that made similar resolutions directing the President to remove U S  forces from hostilities in Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration ( H Res  1142 and H Res  1176 )  On December 13, the Senate also passed S J Res  69 , which, among other things, expresses the sense of the Senate that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is responsible for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and that there is no statutory authorization for United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war  The 115th Congress frequently debated the extent and terms of the United States' involvement in the ongoing conflict in Yemen  Lawmakers questioned the extent to which successive Administrations have adhered to existing law related to providing security assistance, including sales or transfers of defense goods and defense services, while upholding international human rights standards (e g , 22 U S C  §2754 or 22 U S C  §2304)  They also enacted new legislation that would condition or prohibit the use of U S  funds for some activities related to Yemen and extend legislative oversight over the executive branch's policy toward the war in Yemen  While the House and its Rules Committee voted to make resolutions with respect to war powers and Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration, the Senate passage of S J Res  54 at the conclusion of the 115 th Congress demonstrated growth in congressional opposition to U S  involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen relative to previous years  Over time, the balance of votes shifted in favor of measures that could be described as critical or restrictive of U S  support for Saudi-led coalition operations with regard to arms sales, oversight measures, and war powers measures  Nevertheless, after nearly four years of conflict, it remains difficult to identify the locus of congressional consensus about Yemen  Many in the House and Senate state that they seek to preserve cooperative U S -Saudi relations in broad terms and express concern about Iranian activities in Yemen, while also expressing support for expanded humanitarian access and efforts to bring the conflict to a close  Some lawmakers express opposition to the intervention and U S  involvement on moral grounds, citing errant coalition airstrikes and the prospect of a looming famine  Others argue the conflict's continuation creates opportunities for Iran and Sunni Islamist extremist groups to expand their influence and operations in Yemen  Still others may have come to oppose continued U S  support for the intervention based on factors not directly related to Yemen itself, including the opaque mechanisms used by the executive branch to support the coalition and/or anger with the Saudi government over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi  It remains to be seen whether recent congressional consideration of Yemen legislation is a harbinger of broader efforts by Members of Congress to reassert congressional prerogatives toward U S  foreign policy writ large  Measures to enhance oversight over U S  support to the Saudi-led coalition and U S  strategy toward Yemen have received broad bipartisan support, while proponents of other recently considered arms sales and war powers measures have used mechanisms to ensure privileged consideration of their proposals  The 116 th Congress may continue to debate U S  support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen  It is uncertain whether lawmakers may also broaden the scope of their oversight activities beyond the current conflict to more fully address the root causes of Yemen's chronic instability  Even if the United States is no longer an active supporter of coalition military efforts, Yemen itself has been devastated by years of war and remains the world's worst humanitarian crisis  Experts expect Yemen to require sustained international attention and financial assistance in order to help local actors reach and sustain a political settlement  This suggests that Congress may grapple with questions about the conduct of U S  diplomacy, the provision of U S  security support, and the investment of U S  assistance and defense funds for years to come 


Report 2: The U S  government engages with the governments of other countries in the Western Hemisphere through various inter-American organizations including the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH  According to State, the OAS is the primary inter-American political forum through which the United States engages with other countries in the Western Hemisphere to promote democracy, human rights, security, and development  PAHO serves as the Regional Office for the Americas of the World Health Organization, the United Nations agency on health  IICA supports agricultural development and rural well-being through technical cooperation and the execution of agricultural projects throughout the hemisphere  PAIGH specializes in regional cartography, geography, history, and geophysics and has facilitated the settlement of regional border disputes  According to U S  agency officials, the organizations’ regional knowledge and technical expertise make them effective implementing partners for projects serving U S  national interests and priorities throughout the hemisphere  Member states collectively finance these organizations by providing assessed and voluntary contributions (see table 1)  For each organization, its member states’ assessed contributions are intended to finance the organization’s regular budgets, which generally cover the organization’s day-to-day operating expenses, such as facilities and salaries  Member states also finance certain OAS, PAHO, and IICA activities and projects through voluntary contributions  According to U S  officials, the United States provides voluntary contributions to the OAS, PAHO, and IICA primarily through assistance agreements for specific projects from State, USAID, HHS, and USDA  The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) provides the framework for international organizations to oversee funds such as the assessed contributions provided by member states to OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH  The institute’s authoritative guidance, International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, includes mandatory performance standards that describe the nature of internal audit activities and provide criteria for evaluating these activities  Organizations are required to subscribe to these IIA standards, according to PAIGH officials and OAS, PAHO, and IICA documents  Assistance agreements are a critical tool the U S  government uses to achieve important national objectives  As we have previously reported, effective oversight and internal control are important to provide reasonable assurance to federal managers and taxpayers that assistance agreements are awarded properly, recipients are eligible, and federal funds are used as intended and in accordance with applicable laws and regulations  State, USAID, HHS, and USDA oversee funds provided to OAS, PAHO, and IICA through assistance agreements using monitoring activities such as financial and performance reports  Within each of these agencies, various bureaus and offices are responsible for awarding and managing assistance agreements to these inter-American organizations, including State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, USAID’s Office of U S  Foreign Disaster Assistance, HHS’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and its Food and Drug Administration, and USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service  The documentation of these monitoring activities as called for by federal standards for internal control enables the agencies to determine the effectiveness of the agreement activity  We found that the strategic goals of the four inter-American organizations are predominantly aligned with the high-level strategic goals for the Western Hemisphere documented by State, USAID, HHS, and USDA  According to officials, the agencies all consider U S  strategic goals when deciding which projects to fund at OAS, PAHO, and IICA  State, USAID, HHS, and USDA have goals for foreign assistance to the Western Hemisphere, as shown in table 2  For example, four of the five goals in State and USAID’s Joint Strategy correspond with goals at the OAS, IICA, and PAIGH  U S  agencies, on an ongoing basis, evaluate each inter- American organization to ensure U S  and organization goals are aligned  Officials from all four agencies provided examples of how they help to ensure alignment of U S  strategic goals when funding projects at OAS, PAHO, and IICA  State: According to State officials, State created an Annual Performance and Budget Review process in 2014 specifically to review entities, such as the OAS, that receive voluntary contributions funded through the International Organization and Programs account  This process examines performance of State-funded activities relative to those activities from the previous year and the extent to which the activities advance U S  priorities and objectives  State officials further noted that the Annual Performance and Budget Review helps inform State’s decision-making on what to include in the following year’s budget request  For example, during the 2016 review for the OAS Development Assistance Program, State reported the program’s significant activities, funds expended, and achievements such as training government officials on successful small business policies in the United States  USAID: According to USAID officials, USAID’s project design and approval policies and procedures ensure that all USAID-funded activities are linked to applicable U S  and USAID strategies  USAID’s agency guidance requires, at a minimum, that each project or activity must be formally approved in writing by the relevant Mission Director or Principal Officer for a given program  Officials stated that this approval memo and supporting documentation address a number of planning considerations, including how the proposed activity aligns with broader strategies  Furthermore, officials stated that USAID’s lawyers review project approval documentation prior to final approval and verify that the activity complies with all applicable statutes, regulations, and policies  HHS: According to HHS officials, HHS engages with PAHO on its Biennial Work Plans, which are operational planning instruments that PAHO uses to identify activities that it can implement within each of its member states  HHS officials noted that they use PAHO’s Biennial Work Plan to strengthen U S  approaches on issues of common concern and to advance U S  priorities within the region  According to HHS officials, proposals for technical cooperation projects are required to correspond to one of the technical priorities in PAHO’s strategic plan for 2014–2019 and to be aligned with the HHS global strategy and U S  priorities  USDA: USDA officials said that they compare the U S  strategic goals with IICA’s goals and objectives when they formulate project proposals with IICA to ensure that the projects are aligned with U S  priorities for the region  Additionally, USDA officials told us that USDA helped shape and influence IICA’s recent 10-year strategic plan, ensuring that IICA’s strategic objectives were closely aligned with U S  strategic goals  OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH have established mechanisms for overseeing their use of assessed and voluntary contributions, such as external auditors and internal audit boards as required by IIA standards  State and USDA have directly supported these oversight mechanisms  OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH have oversight mechanisms, as shown in table 3  The four organizations follow the internal control standards of the IIA, codified in the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, according to PAIGH officials and OAS, PAHO, and IICA documents  All four organizations have internal and external auditors, as required by these standards  Furthermore, OAS, PAHO, and IICA have additional oversight mechanisms, such as anti-fraud policies and program evaluation processes  The officials we interviewed from State, USAID, HHS, and USDA expressed confidence in the four organizations’ management of their assessed and voluntary contributions  All four organizations document the status of their financial and internal control activities in audit reports posted on their public websites  For example, the OAS Office of the Inspector General’s April 2017 Annual Report included an update on its five ongoing audits and investigations  The report also outlined progress made against prior recommendations  U S  agency officials support budget and administrative subcommittees in three of the four organizations and promote the participation of U S  experts on independent audit committees, as shown in table 4  For example, according to officials, State plays a significant role in promoting policies on oversight and accountability at the four organizations through formal engagement in deliberations and decision-making of each organization’s governing body and through informal engagement with other member states and the secretariat by recommending best practices in governance, management, and oversight  State and USDA are also directly involved in implementing some of the additional oversight mechanisms at the organizations  For example, a USDA official serves as a member of IICA’s Audit Review Committee  Additionally, an IICA official told us the United States was involved in defining IICA’s Convention and Rules of Procedure for its governing bodies, which established the requirement for internal and external auditing  According to State officials, the United States led efforts to strengthen oversight at several of the organizations under review in recent years, such as advocating for the creation of an ethics officer position at PAHO, proposing language to strengthen the authority and independence of the OAS’s Office of the Inspector General, and encouraging the creation of audit committees at both organizations  In addition, State has played a lead role in supporting the ongoing reform of the OAS administration, which includes improved oversight and accountability, according to officials from the OAS and the U S  Mission to the OAS  We reviewed 12 selected assistance agreements that the four U S  agencies awarded to OAS, PAHO, and IICA that were active during calendar years 2014 through 2016, and found that two agencies did not consistently include all key monitoring provisions in their agreements  While HHS and USAID implemented applicable guidance by including all key monitoring provisions in their agreements, USDA and State did not do so  USDA and State agency officials did not explain why USDA and State did not include these monitoring provisions in their agreements  However, State has since taken corrective action to ensure that they are included in future agreements, according to State officials  Applicable agency guidance calls for agencies to conduct monitoring activities as part of their oversight of their agreements  Each of the four agencies has established agency-specific guidance that outlines the monitoring activities for assistance agreements  In some cases, the agency-specific guidance may mandate additional monitoring activities beyond those called for in applicable federal regulations, such as risk assessments  For example, State’s guidance calls for the creation of a monitoring plan  Federal standards for internal control require that agencies include in agreements all key provisions delineating the parties’ responsibilities  For the 12 agreements we reviewed, the number of total key monitoring provisions per agreement varied—including within one agency—depending on when the agency issued and updated its guidance relative to when the agreements were approved  Federal standards for internal control call for agencies to document internal controls, transactions, and significant events  Specifically, internal control standards state that agency management should include internal control activities (e g , monitoring activities) in policies or directives for transactions such as assistance agreements  For the 12 assistance agreements we reviewed, USDA and State did not include provisions implementing 6 of the 55 total (11 percent) applicable monitoring activities required by applicable guidance to carry out required monitoring activities (see table 5)  State took corrective action in 2015 by issuing a standard operating procedure  USDA: USDA did not include 4 of the 13 key monitoring provisions implementing the applicable guidance for the three USDA agreements we reviewed (see table 6)  Two of the agreements and supporting documentation each included all four key applicable monitoring provisions  However, Agreement 2 in the table did not include 4 of the 5 monitoring provisions in the agreement or work plan, which documents the monitoring provisions  The agreement partially included performance goals, because it included objectives for the agreement’s activities, but did not include time frames to complete all of the activities  The USDA grant official did not explain why the work plan did not adhere to applicable federal regulations when it was drafted and approved  State: State did not include 2 of the 21 key monitoring provisions implementing the applicable guidance for the three State agreements we reviewed (see table 7)  Two of the agreements and supporting documentation we reviewed included the 7 monitoring provisions implementing the requirements in the applicable agency guidance  However, one agreement awarded in 2012 did not include 2 of the provisions: a risk assessment and a monitoring plan  That office that awarded this agreement took corrective action in 2015 by issuing a standard operating procedure requiring that risk assessments and monitoring plans accompany its grants and cooperative agreements  USAID: USAID included both key monitoring provisions implementing the applicable guidance for the three USAID agreements we reviewed (see table 8)  USAID’s Automated Directives System 308, Standard Provisions for Cost-Type Awards to Public International Organizations contains two key monitoring provisions for agreements  USAID incorporated the monitoring provisions nearly verbatim into the agreements we reviewed, using templates from this guidance for required terms and conditions  HHS: HHS included the 15 monitoring provisions implementing the applicable guidance for the three HHS agreements we reviewed (see table 9)  None of the agencies provided us with full documentation to demonstrate their adherence to the required monitoring activities called for in all of their agreements that we reviewed, including the previously mentioned key monitoring provisions that we reviewed  State and HHS have taken corrective actions to address the gaps we found in documentation for the agreements we reviewed  Agency officials told us that they use these monitoring documents, such as financial and progress reports, to inform future budgetary and programmatic decisions  Therefore, they may lack information needed to make such decisions if they do not have access to complete monitoring documentation  According to federal standards for internal control, each agency is to include key monitoring provisions as part of its agreements  In the individual assistance agreements, the agencies specify the requirements to fulfill these activities, such as requiring financial reports on a quarterly basis or including specific information in performance reports  Grants officers at times, if they deem it necessary or appropriate, include additional monitoring provisions requiring activities beyond those required by the applicable guidance, such as site visits  Federal standards for internal control call for agency management to design monitoring activities, such as financial and performance reporting, so that all transactions are completely and accurately recorded  Recording these activities maintains their relevance and value to management in controlling operations and making decisions  Without access to complete monitoring documentation, the agencies risk weakening the effectiveness of these controls  None of the four U S  agencies had full documentation of all of the monitoring activities required by their agreements we reviewed (see table 10)  The agencies did not have full documentation of monitoring activities for 9 of the 12 agreements we reviewed  For the 42 monitoring activities identified across all of the individual agreements, the four agencies did not have full documentation of 18 of the activities (43 percent)  However, State took corrective action in May 2017 to address its gaps in documentation, and according to HHS officials, the Food and Drug Administration addressed its gap in documentation by implementing its agreement monitoring program in fiscal year 2018  USDA did not have full documentation of any of the 10 monitoring activities we identified (see table 11)  USDA demonstrated that it had partially documented 2 of the 10 monitoring activities (20 percent) by providing us with some, but not all, quarterly performance reports  For one of the agreements, USDA had no documentation of the monitoring activities for that agreement

ground_truth: This product provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy toward the conflict in Yemen. Summary tables provide information on legislative proposals considered in the 115th and 116th Congresses. Various legislative proposals have reflected a range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including with regard to the authorization of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces related to the conflict; the extent of U.S. logistical, material, advisory, and intelligence support for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia; the approval, disapproval, or conditioning of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia; the appropriation of funds for U.S. operations in support of the Saudi-led coalition; the conduct of the Saudi-led coalition's air campaign and its adherence to international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict; the demand for greater humanitarian access to Yemen; the call for a wider government assessment of U.S. policy toward Yemen and U.S. support to parties to the conflict; the nature and extent of U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and border security cooperation; and the role of Iran in supplying missile technology and other weapons to the forces of the Houthi movement. The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; presently, the World Food Program reports that 20 million Yemenis face hunger in the absence of sustained food assistance. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid agencies to count the war's casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) suggest that 60,000 Yemenis have been killed since January 2016. The Trump Administration has opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to reject or condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen. Many in Congress have condemned the October 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel, and in general, the incident appears to have exacerbated existing congressional concerns about Saudi leaders and the pace, scope, and direction of change in the kingdom's policies. This product includes legislative proposals considered during the 115th and 116th Congresses. It does not include references to Yemen in Iran sanctions legislation, which are covered in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, please see the following CRS products. CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. CRS Insight IN10729, Yemen: Cholera Outbreak.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  For its other two agreements, USDA did not have full documentation of the required monitoring activities  USDA officials did not explain why they did not have full documentation  Without full documentation of the required monitoring activities, USDA may not have the information it needs to make appropriate budgetary and programmatic decisions  USAID did not have full documentation of 2 of the 11 total monitoring activities (18 percent) we identified across the three agreements we reviewed (see table 12)  USAID had partial documentation of those 2 monitoring activities  For example, USAID provided us with some, but not all, records such as financial reports required by the terms of the monitoring activities in the agreements  According to USAID officials, the agencies’ lack of complete monitoring documentation was in part due to agency officials not following some of their agency’s requirements for managing agreement documents, such as placing all documents in a shared document management system  For example, for one of the agreements we reviewed, USAID officials stated that they stored some agreement documentation electronically—such as modifications, correspondence with the agreement recipient, and quarterly financial reports—but primarily maintained paper files  USAID officials told us they use the monitoring documents of these agreements, such as financial and progress reports, to inform future budgetary and programmatic decisions  For example, according to USAID officials, USAID uses monitoring documents to identify and address potential project delays or other “red flags ” For one of the agreements we reviewed, USAID officials stated these monitoring reports also assist them in determining whether to award additional funds and establish new indicators in subsequent agreements  Without full documentation of the required monitoring activities, USAID may not have the information it needs to make appropriate budgetary and programmatic decisions  State did not have full documentation for 5 of the 16 monitoring activities (31 percent) we identified across the three agreements we reviewed (see table 13)  However, State had partial documentation of 4 of those 5 monitoring activities  For example, State had some, but not all, records such as standard reporting metrics, required by the terms of the monitoring activities in one of the agreements  State did not have documentation of one of the monitoring activities (site visits)  According to State officials, the agency’s lack of complete monitoring documentation was in part due to agency officials not following some of the agency’s requirements for managing agreement documents, such as placing all documents in a shared document management system  For example, according to State officials, for one of the agreements we reviewed, the grants officer mistakenly had saved site visit reports and similar documents to personal folders because the officer did not know how to use State’s grant document storage system  As a result, neither the current grants officer nor other State officials could retrieve these documents  In May 2017, after awarding the agreements we reviewed, State took corrective action by issuing the Federal Assistance Directive to establish internal guidance, policies, and procedures for all domestic and overseas grant-making bureaus, offices, and posts within the department when administering federal financial assistance  The directive notes that State implemented a grant management system for domestic and overseas grants to resolve its “significant deficiency in the management of Federal financial assistance ” In addition, the directive indicates that officials from State’s Bureau of Administration, Office of the Procurement Executive, Federal Assistance Division will evaluate compliance with risk assessment requirements and review documentation for selected agreements each fiscal year  One of the stated purposes of these reviews is to mitigate risk by strengthening management and oversight of awards, including grants  According to a State Office of Inspector General report, State should complete the full deployment of this system for overseas grants in fiscal year 2019  HHS did not have full documentation of 1 of the 5 applicable monitoring activities (20 percent) we identified across the three agreements we reviewed (see table 14)  HHS had partial documentation of the semiannual progress report activity for one of its agreements, required by the terms of its agreement  HHS officials did not explain why they did not have full documentation for this monitoring activity  HHS had full documentation of all applicable monitoring activities for the other two agreements we reviewed  According to agency officials, the Food and Drug Administration, which administered one of the HHS agreements we reviewed, has taken corrective action to evaluate its agreement documentation and address deficiencies  According to HHS officials, the Food and Drug Administration developed a pilot program intended to provide an additional layer of oversight to ensure adherence to the terms of each agreement  Under the pilot, officials said, a grant monitoring specialist reviews the agreement documentation and monitoring reports to identify agreements that need additional assistance  According to HHS officials, the Food and Drug Administration implemented this program in fiscal year 2018 and will eventually include all Food and Drug Administration agreements  U S  assistance agreements for projects with inter-American organizations further U S  strategic goals in the Western Hemisphere, but State, HHS, USAID, and USDA did not consistently include all key monitoring provisions as part of their assistance agreements or demonstrate that they had full documentation of monitoring activities for the agreements we reviewed  Of these four agencies, USAID and USDA have not taken corrective actions  Monitoring the implementation of U S  assistance agreements and fully documenting the results of such monitoring are key management controls to help ensure that U S  agreement recipients use federal funds appropriately and effectively  The agencies risk weakening the effectiveness of these controls by not including all key monitoring provisions called for by applicable agency guidance  Further, if the agencies do not have full documentation of the agreements’ required monitoring activities, they may not be able to effectively manage federally funded projects that support U S  strategic goals  In addition, agencies may not have all the information they need to make budgetary and programmatic decisions  We are making a total of three recommendations: one to USAID and two to USDA  The USAID Administrator should ensure that USAID officials have full documentation of required monitoring activities in agreements with inter- American organizations  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that USDA includes all key monitoring provisions specified by applicable guidance as part of agreements with inter-American organizations  (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that USDA officials have full documentation of required monitoring activities in agreements with inter- American organizations  (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report for comment to State, USAID, HHS, and USDA  USDA concurred with our recommendations in an e-mail  In its written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, USAID stated that it has policies, procedures, and training in place for the officials who manage these agreements  In response to our recommendations, USAID stated that it will issue an agency notice to remind all such officials of these responsibilities, including the requirement to maintain complete files for each agreement  State and HHS did not provide formal comments  They did provide technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the U S  Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Agriculture  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601, or melitot@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V  Congressional requesters asked us to review several issues related to the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH)  In this report, we (1) assess the extent to which the organizations’ strategic goals align with those of U S  agencies; (2) examine how the organizations oversee the use of their funds and the extent to which U S  agencies have supported those efforts; (3) assess the extent to which U S  agencies included key monitoring provisions as part of their assistance agreements; and (4) assess the extent to which U S  agencies had documentation of monitoring activities, including those called for by these provisions  To address the first objective, we gathered documentation and interviewed officials from the four U S  agencies and the four organizations to determine the U S  strategic goals for foreign assistance to the Western Hemisphere and the goals of the four organizations  According to Department of State (State) and U S  Agency for International Development (USAID) officials, the strategic document that underpins their foreign assistance priorities for the region is The Department of State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs’ and USAID’s Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs’ Joint Regional Strategy  Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officials said that HHS’s relevant strategic document is The Global Strategy of the U S  Department of Health and Human Services  U S  Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) strategic goals for foreign assistance, according to officials, are outlined in the United States Department of Agriculture Strategic Plan FY2015–2018  The OAS outlined its strategic goals in the Comprehensive Strategic Plan of the Organization, adopted on October 31, 2016  PAHO’s goals are laid out in Strategic Plan of the Pan American Health Organization 2014–2019  IICA’s strategic document is the IICA 2010–2020 Strategic Plan, which took effect in October 2010  PAIGH’s strategic document is the Declaration and Guide for the Pan American Agenda 2010-2020  We compared the strategic goals articulated by the four organizations against U S  strategic goals to assess the extent to which the organizations’ goals contribute to U S  interests in the region  We then interviewed officials from the four agencies and reviewed relevant documentation on efforts they undertake to ensure that U S -funded activities align with U S  strategic goals  To address the second objective, we reviewed documentation of the organizations’ internal control mechanisms and confirmed our findings with the organizations  We identified mechanisms to include policies, directives, rules, practices, and organizational structures that can have an oversight role in the use of the organizations’ funds  We also interviewed officials from State, USAID, HHS, and USDA to discuss their support of these mechanisms  To address the third objective, we identified 60 active assistance agreements that these agencies oversaw with OAS, PAHO, and IICA during calendar years 2014 through 2016 and selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 agreements, three each from State, USAID, HHS, and USDA  To determine which agreements we would review for each agency, we selected the three agreements with the lowest, median, and highest dollar value  If any of an agency’s agreements supported the same country or activity or were for one-time projects such as seminars, we selected the next appropriate agreement based on dollar value  For these selected agreements, we then identified the applicable agency guidance for monitoring activities in the agreements, which we define as all documents related to each agreement provided to us by the agencies, such as monitoring reports  The number of key monitoring provisions varied—even within each agency—depending on when agency guidance was issued and updated relative to when the agreements were approved  USDA did not have applicable internal agency-specific guidance for monitoring of assistance agreements at the time it awarded the agreements we reviewed; thus, with USDA’s input, we used the applicable sections of the Code of Federal Regulations, which together have five key monitoring provisions for agreements  However, USDA approved two of the agreements in 2012 and the third agreement in 2016, and this third agreement was subject to an amended version of the Code of Federal Regulations, which added an additional provision for performance goals  State’s four applicable grants policy directives have seven key monitoring provisions for agreements that were applicable at the time the agreements we reviewed were approved  USAID’s Standard Provisions for Cost-Type Awards to Public International Organizations (PIOs): A Mandatory Reference to ADS Chapter 308 has two key monitoring provisions for agreements: audits and records, and the organization’s adherence to their rules  HHS’s grants policy has five key monitoring provisions for grant documentation  We identified key monitoring provisions for agencies to include as part of agreements to ensure oversight of the use of funds, such as financial and progress reports  For the 12 agreements in our sample, we analyzed the assistance agreements from the four agencies, and then determined the extent to which the agencies’ agreements included key monitoring provisions implementing monitoring activities called for by applicable agency guidance  We did not include subsequent amendments to these 12 agreements in our review of key monitoring provisions  We interviewed officials from State, USAID, HHS, and USDA (1) to confirm we were applying the appropriate federal or agency guidance and (2) to discuss instances in which the agreements did not include key monitoring provisions  To address the fourth objective, we reviewed the 12 selected assistance agreements and guidance to identify specific required monitoring activities, such as financial and program reports, site visits, and other forms of oversight  The agreements specify the requirements for these activities such as requiring financial reports on a quarterly basis  For these 12 agreements, we reviewed all the documentation provided to us by the agencies, then determined the extent to which the agencies had full documentation of key monitoring activities as specified in the assistance agreements, including those called for by key monitoring provisions, as well as those called for by guidance when the monitoring provisions were absent  We did not include subsequent amendments to these 12 agreements in our review of monitoring activities  We interviewed officials from State, USAID, HHS, and USDA to discuss instances in which the agency did not have full documentation of key monitoring activities  We also discussed how State, USAID, and HHS agency officials manage their agreement documentation and use the information in the agreements’ required monitoring documentation  We conducted this performance audit from July 2016 to December 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  The Organization of American States (OAS), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute on Geography and History (PAIGH) have established mechanisms for overseeing their use of funds  Tables 15–18 show the mechanisms (oversight policies and oversight committees and organizations) for each of these inter-American organizations, as confirmed by the organizations’ officials  To oversee the execution of their agreements, the Department of State (State), the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and U S  Department of Agriculture (USDA) are to conduct monitoring activities called for by applicable federal regulations or agency guidance and document these provisions in assistance agreements as called for by federal standards for internal control  We identified key monitoring provisions implementing the applicable agency guidance for State, USAID, HHS, and the applicable regulations for USDA, as shown in table 19  For both the agency guidance and the federal regulations, those listed are the ones that were in effect when the agreements in our sample were approved  Some of the agency guidance and regulations have since been amended or superseded  In addition to the contact named above, Pierre Toureille (Assistant Director), Julia Jebo Grant (Analyst-in-Charge), Leslie Stubbs, and Paul Sturm, Alana Miller, and Shirley Min made key contributions to this report  In addition, David Dayton, Martin de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Jeff Isaacs, and Alex Welsh provided technical assistance 
Report 2:  We found the COBRA model to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and savings among alternatives  (See fig  3 ) As with any model, the quality of the output from COBRA was a direct function of the data DOD included in the model  Also, DOD’s COBRA model relied to a large extent on standard factors and averages and did not represent budget quality estimates that were developed once BRAC decisions were made and detailed implementation plans were developed  Nonetheless, the financial information provided important input into the selection process as decision makers weighed the financial implications—along with military value criteria and other considerations—in arriving at final decisions about the suitability of various closure and realignment options  Establish an organizational structure  The Office of the Secretary of Defense emphasized the need for joint cross-service groups to analyze common business-oriented functions  For the 2005 BRAC round, as for the 1993 and 1995 rounds, these joint cross-service groups performed analyses and developed closure and realignment options in addition to those developed by the military departments  Our evaluation of DOD’s 1995 BRAC round found that few cross- service recommendations were made, in part because of the lack of high-level leadership to encourage consolidations across the departments’ functions  In the 1995 BRAC round, the joint cross- service groups submitted options through the military services for approval, but few were approved  The number of approved recommendations that the joint cross-service groups developed significantly increased in the 2005 BRAC round  This increase was, in part, because high-level leadership ensured that the options were approved not by the military departments but rather by a DOD senior- level group, known as the Infrastructure Steering Group  As shown in figure 4, the Infrastructure Steering Group was placed organizationally on par with the military departments  Establish a common analytical framework  To ensure that the selection criteria were consistently applied, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, and the seven joint cross- service groups first performed a capacity analysis of facilities and functions  Before developing the candidate recommendations, DOD’s capacity analysis relied on data calls to hundreds of locations to obtain certified data to assess such factors as maximum potential capacity, current capacity, current usage, and excess capacity  Then, the military departments and joint cross-service groups performed a military value analysis for the facilities and functions based on primary military value criteria, which included a facility’s or function’s current and future mission capabilities, physical condition, ability to accommodate future needs, and cost of operations  Develop BRAC oversight mechanisms to improve accountability for implementation  In the 2005 BRAC round, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the first time required the military departments to develop business plans to better inform the Office of the Secretary of Defense of the status of implementation and financial details for each of the BRAC 2005 recommendations  These business plans included: (1) information such as a listing of all actions needed to implement each recommendation; (2) schedules for personnel relocations between installations; and (3) updated cost and savings estimates by DOD based on current information  This approach permitted senior-level intervention if warranted to ensure completion of the BRAC recommendations by the statutory completion date  Involve the audit community to better ensure data accuracy  The DOD Inspector General and military department audit agencies played key roles in identifying data limitations, pointing out needed corrections, and improving the accuracy of the data used in the process  In their oversight roles, the audit organizations, which had access to relevant information and officials as the process evolved, helped to improve the accuracy of the data used in the BRAC process and thus strengthened the quality and integrity of the data used to develop closure and realignment recommendations  For example, the auditors worked to ensure certified information was used for BRAC analysis and reviewed other facets of the process, including the various internal control plans, the COBRA model, and other modeling and analytical tools that were used in the development of recommendations  We identified two key challenges that affected DOD’s implementation of BRAC 2005 and would need to be addressed for VA to adopt a BRAC- like process for its asset and infrastructure review  Some transformational-type BRAC recommendations required sustained senior leadership attention and a high level of coordination among many stakeholders to complete by the required date  Implementation of some transformational BRAC recommendations—especially those where a multitude of organizations had roles to play to ensure the achievement of the goals of the recommendation—illustrated the need to involve key stakeholders and effective planning  For example, the Defense Logistics Agency committed sustained high-level leadership and included relevant stakeholders to address implementation challenges faced with the potential for disruptions to depot operations during implementation of the BRAC consolidation recommendation  To implement the BRAC recommendations, the agency had to develop strategic agreements with the services that ensured that all stakeholders agreed on its plans for implementation, and had to address certain human capital and information technology challenges  Large number of actions and interdependent recommendations complicated the implementation process  The large number and variety of BRAC actions presented challenges during implementation  The BRAC 2005 round had more individual actions (813) than the four prior rounds combined (387)  The executive staff of the Commission told us that it was more difficult to assess the costs and the amount of time for the savings to offset the implementation costs since many of the recommendations contained multiple interdependent actions, all of which needed to be reviewed  Specifically, many of the BRAC 2005 recommendations were interdependent and had to be completed in a sequential fashion within the statutory implementation period  In cases where interdependent recommendations required multiple relocations of large numbers of personnel, delays in completing one BRAC recommendation had a cascading effect on the implementation of other recommendations  Specifically, DOD had to synchronize the relocations of over 123,000 people with about $24 7 billion in new construction or renovation  Commission officials told us that in prior BRAC rounds each base was handled by a single integrated recommendation  However, in BRAC 2005, many installations were simultaneously affected by multiple interconnected BRAC recommendations  Given the complexity of interdependent recommendations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense required the military departments and defense agencies to provide periodic updates on implementation challenges and progress  Chairman Roe, Ranking Member Walz, and Members of the Committee, this concludes our prepared statement  We are happy to answer any questions related to our work on VA’s efforts to align its medical facilities and services or on DOD’s BRAC process  If you or your staff members have any questions concerning this testimony, please contact David Wise at (202) 512-2834 or wised@gao gov regarding federal real property, or Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao gov regarding the BRAC process  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Other individuals who made key contributions to this testimony include Keith Cunningham, Assistant Director; Gina Hoffman, Assistant Director; Tracy Barnes; Jeff Mayhew; Kevin Newak; Richard Powelson; Malika Rice; Jodie Sandel; Eric Schwab; Amelia M  Weathers; and Crystal Wesco  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 

ground_truth: The United States is a member of the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH, which promote democracy, health care, agricultural development, and scientific exchange. GAO was asked to review U.S. assistance to these four organizations. In this report, GAO (1) assesses the extent to which the organizations' strategic goals align with those of U.S. agencies; (2) examines how the organizations oversee the use of their funds and the extent to which U.S. agencies have supported those efforts; (3) assesses the extent to which U.S. agencies included key monitoring provisions as part of assistance agreements; and (4) assesses the extent to which U.S. agencies had documentation of monitoring activities, including those called for by these provisions. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from State, USAID, HHS, USDA, and the organizations. GAO also analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 12 of the 60 assistance agreements that were awarded by State, USAID, HHS, and USDA to OAS, PAHO, and IICA and were active during calendar years 2014 through 2016. For each agency, GAO selected three agreements with the lowest, median, and highest dollar value. GAO found that strategic goals of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH) are predominantly aligned with the strategic goals of the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). For example, IICA's strategic goals of a productive agricultural sector, enhancing agricultural development, and food security are aligned with USDA's foreign assistance goals. State, USAID, HHS, and USDA fund activities in the form of assistance agreements (e.g., grants and cooperative agreements) with OAS, PAHO, and IICA, which in 2016 totaled $32 million. According to agency officials, the agencies employ mechanisms to ensure that these agreements align with U.S. strategic goals. OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH have established mechanisms for overseeing their use of funds, such as external auditors, internal audit boards, and anti-fraud and ethics policies. State and USDA have directly supported these mechanisms. For example, State engaged in the selection process for OAS's Inspector General. GAO's review of 12 selected assistance agreements found that USDA included no financial or performance monitoring provisions in one of its agreements and that State did not include two key monitoring provisions in one of its agreements, called for by applicable guidance. GAO found that the remaining 10 agreements it reviewed contained all key monitoring provisions and that State has since taken corrective action. GAO found that U.S. agencies did not have full documentation of 18 of the 42 monitoring activities required by the 12 assistance agreements GAO reviewed (see table). For example, USDA did not have full documentation, such as for financial reports, of any of its 10 required monitoring activities and USDA officials did not explain their lack of documentation. USAID officials explained that their lack of full documentation was due, in part, to grant officers not always following their document management policies. State and HHS have since taken corrective action. If an agency does not have full documentation of monitoring activities, it may lack information needed to make appropriate budgetary and programmatic decisions. GAO recommends that (1) USDA ensure inclusion of all monitoring provisions as part of agreements and (2) USAID and USDA ensure full documentation of monitoring activities. USDA and USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations.