prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: According to the National Inventory of Dams, as of January 2016 there are approximately 90,500 dams in the United States and about 2 5 percent of these (approximately 2,100 dams) are associated with hydropower projects  Hydropower projects are owned and operated by both non-federal entities—such as private utility companies, municipalities, and state government agencies—or federal government agencies—primarily the U S  Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation  Collectively, these dams associated with hydropower projects account for about 8 percent of the total electric generating capacity in the United States  Hydropower projects generally consist of one or more dams and other key components associated with hydroelectric power generation and water storage, and are uniquely designed to accommodate watersheds, geology, and other natural conditions present at the time of construction  These components include both those that allow operators to adjust reservoir water levels, such as spillways and gates, as well as those that produce and distribute electricity, such as transmission lines and powerhouses, among others  (See fig  1 ) The Federal Power Act provides for FERC’s regulatory jurisdiction over a portfolio of about 1,000 non-federal hydropower projects comprising over 2,500 dams  While FERC does not construct, own, or operate dams, it licenses and provides oversight of non-federal hydropower projects to promote their safe operation  Licensees are responsible for the safety and liability of dams, pursuant to the Federal Power Act, and for their continuous upkeep and repair using sound and prudent engineering practices  FERC officials in each of the agency’s five regional offices work directly with licensees to help ensure these projects comply with licenses and meet federal guidelines for dam safety  In addition, stakeholder groups such as the Association of State Dam Safety Officials can assist licensees in staying current on federal and state dam laws and regulations, dam operations and maintenance practices, and emergency action planning, among other things  FERC’s regulations, supplemented by its Operating Manual and Engineering Guidelines, establish a framework for its dam safety oversight approach  FERC’s Operating Manual provides guidelines for the FERC staff performing inspections that are aimed at ensuring that structures are safe, are being properly maintained, and are being operated safely  FERC’s Engineering Guidelines provides FERC staff and licensees with procedures and criteria for the review and analysis of license applications, project modification proposals, technical studies, and dam designs  For example, one chapter presents guidelines for FERC staff to use to determine the appropriateness and level of geotechnical investigations and studies for dams  The Engineering Guidelines states that every dam is unique and that safety analysis of each dam require that engineers apply technical judgement based on their professional experience  As part of FERC’s safety oversight approach, it assigns a hazard classification to each dam in accordance with federal guidelines that consider the potential human or economic consequences of the dam’s failure  The hazard classification does not indicate the structural integrity of the dam itself, but rather the probable effects if a failure should occur  Depending on the hazard classification, the extent of and the frequency of safety oversight activities can vary  Low hazard dams are those where failure —an uncontrolled release of water from a water-retaining structure—would result in no probable loss of human life but could cause low economic and/or environmental losses  Significant hazard dams are those dams where failure would result in no probable loss of human life, but could cause economic loss, environmental damage, or other losses  High hazard dams are those dams where failure would probably cause loss of human life  FERC has designed a multi-layered oversight approach that involves both independent and coordinated actions with dam owners and independent consultants  Key elements of this approach include ensuring licensees have a safety program in place, conducting regular safety inspections, reviewing technical analyses, and analyzing safety as a part of project relicensing  (See fig  2 ) Licensee’s dam safety program  According to FERC guidance, licensees have the most important role in ensuring dam safety through continuous visual surveillance and ongoing monitoring to evaluate the health of the structure  Beyond this expectation for continuous oversight, FERC requires licensees of high and significant hazard dams to have an Owner’s Dam Safety Program  FERC dam safety inspection  The dam safety inspection, also called operation inspection, is a regularly-scheduled inspection conducted by a FERC regional office project engineer primarily addressing dam and public safety  FERC’s Operating Manual establishes the frequency that a FERC engineer conducts dam safety inspections  Independent consultant inspection and potential failure mode analysis  FERC requires licensees to hire a FERC-approved independent consulting engineer to inspect and evaluate high hazard dams and certain types of dams above a certain height or size and submit a report detailing the findings  Additionally, FERC requires the licensee of a high or significant hazard dam to conduct a potential failure mode analysis  A potential failure mode analysis is an exercise to identify and assess all potential failure modes under normal operating water levels and under extreme conditions caused by floods, earthquakes, and other events  FERC relicensing of projects  FERC issues hydropower licenses for the construction of new hydropower projects, and reissues licenses for existing projects when licenses expire  Licensees may submit applications for a new license for the continued operation of existing projects as part of a process known as relicensing  During relicensing, in addition to the power and development purposes for which FERC issues licenses, FERC must evaluate safety, environmental, recreational, cultural, and resource development among other factors when evaluating projects, according to its guidance  In addition, FERC requires licensees to conduct various engineering studies related to dam performance in accordance with FERC safety requirements  Required engineering studies focus on dam performance as affected by hydrology, seismicity, and dam stability  Licensees may also produce engineering studies, such as a focused spillway assessment, for their own operations or at the request of FERC  We found, based on our analysis of the 42 dam safety inspections we reviewed, that FERC staff generally conducted and collected information from these inspections consistent with guidance in its Operating Manual  According to FERC’s Operating Manual, staff’s approach to conducting these inspections and collecting information is to include preparing for the inspection by reviewing documents, conducting a field inspection of the dam and associated project components, and discussing inspection findings with licensees and with FERC supervisors  Preparation for inspection: We found that FERC staff generally met document review requirements in preparation for safety inspections of the 42 dams we reviewed  (See table 1 ) According to the Operating Manual, FERC staff are to review safety-related information contained in documents such as potential failure mode analyses and hazard potential classifications  For example, we found that staff documented their review of the most recent independent consultant inspection report and potential failure mode analysis for each of the 16 high hazard dams we reviewed  FERC staff told us that they generally used checklists when preparing for these inspections  For example, some of the staff told us they tailor the checklist included in the Operating Manual, based on the dam’s type, characteristics, and hazard classification  Additionally, for each of the dams in our sample, staff stated that they prepared for the inspection by reviewing prior inspection reports and recommendations  Field inspection: We found that FERC staff generally met requirements for reviewing project components and documenting their findings from field inspections of the 42 dams we reviewed  (See table 2 ) According to the Operating Manual, FERC staff are to conduct visual inspections of the dam, typically alongside the licensee, to assess the dam and project components by observing their condition and identifying any safety deficiency or maintenance requirement  Also during the inspection, FERC staff are to compare current conditions of the dam and project components to those described in prior inspection reports, and as applicable, collect information on the licensee’s progress towards resolving deficiencies and maintenance issues that can affect safety  To assess safety, FERC staff we interviewed stated that they primarily rely on their engineering judgment  Inspection findings: According to our interviews with FERC staff from selected projects, we found that staff generally followed FERC guidance in discussing inspection findings with licensees and supervisors prior to preparing inspection reports to document their findings  According to the Operating Manual, following the dam safety inspection, FERC staff are to discuss the inspection with the licensee, giving direction on how to address any findings  Additionally, upon returning to the office, staff are to discuss inspection findings with their supervisors who may suggest additional actions  FERC staff are then to develop a dam safety inspection report that documents observations and conclusions from their pre-inspection preparation and their field inspection and identifies follow-up actions for the licensee  We found that FERC staff prepared inspection reports to document findings from the 42 dam safety inspections we reviewed  In response to inspection findings, FERC requires licensees to submit a plan and schedule to remediate any deficiency, actions that FERC staff then reviews, approves, and monitors until the licensees have addressed the deficiency  While we found that FERC staff conducted inspections and collected inspection findings consistently in the files we reviewed, FERC’s approach to recording information varies across its regions, thus limiting the usefulness of the information  FERC’s approach to recording inspection information relies on multiple systems to record inspection information and affords broad discretion to its staff on how to characterize findings, such as whether to track inspection findings as maintenance issues or as safety deficiencies  As related to systems for recording inspection information, FERC staff use the Data and Management System (DAMS), the Office of Energy Projects-IT (OEP-IT) system, as well as spreadsheets  In particular, according to FERC staff: Four out of FERC’s five regional offices use DAMS—which is primarily a workload tracking tool—to track plans and schedules associated with safety investigations and modifications as well as inspection follow-up items  FERC staff stated that since the inspection information in DAMS is recorded as narrative text in a data field instead of as discrete categories, sorting or analysis of the information is difficult  One regional office uses OEP-IT to track safety deficiencies while the system is more widely used across FERC to track licensees’ compliance with the terms and conditions of their licenses  Three out of FERC’s five regional offices also use spreadsheets and other tools that are not integrated with DAMS or OEP-IT to track inspection information and licensee progress toward resolving safety deficiencies  FERC staff said that use of these different systems to record deficiencies identified during inspections limits their ability to analyze safety information  For example, according to FERC officials, OEP-IT was not designed to track safety deficiency information and is not compatible with DAMS for use in tracking information on a national level  Furthermore, because spreadsheets and other tools are specific to the regional office in which they are used, FERC staff does not use the information they contain for agency-wide analysis  Concerning decisions on how to characterize inspection findings, FERC staff relies on professional judgment, informed by their experience and the Engineering Guidelines, to determine whether to track inspection findings as a safety deficiency or as a maintenance item, according to FERC officials  With input from their supervisors, FERC staff also determines what information to record and how to track the status of the inspection finding  For example, staff assigned to a dam at a FERC- licensed project in New Hampshire observed concrete deterioration on several parts of the dam and its spillway and asked the licensee to monitor all concrete surfaces, making repairs as necessary  According to staff we interviewed, regional staff and supervisors decided not to identify this as a deficiency to be tracked in DAMS because concrete deterioration is normal and to be expected in consideration of the area’s harsh winter weather  In contrast, staff assigned to a dam at a FERC- licensed project in Minnesota observed concrete deterioration on several parts of the project, including the piers and the powerhouse walls, and entered the safety item in DAMS as requiring repair by the licensee  FERC officials stated they are comfortable with the use of professional judgement to classify and address inspection findings because it is important to allow for consideration of the characteristics unique to each situation and how they affect safety  FERC’s approach to recording inspection information is inconsistent because FERC has not provided standard language and procedures about how staff should record and track deficiencies including which system to use  Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should design an entity’s information system and related control activities to achieve objectives and control risks  In practice, this means that an agency would design control activities—such as policies and procedures—over the information technology infrastructure to support the completeness, accuracy, and validity of information processing by information technology  FERC officials acknowledged that there are inconsistent approaches in where and how staff record safety deficiency information, approaches that limit the information’s usefulness as an input to its oversight  While the agency has not developed guidance, officials stated that FERC plans to take steps to improve the consistency of recorded information by replacing the OEP-IT system with a new system, tentatively scheduled for September 2018, that will have a specific function to track dam safety requirements  However, this new system will not replace the functions of DAMS, which FERC will continue to use to store inspection information  The two will exist as parallel systems with the eventual goal of the two systems’ sharing information  By developing standard language and procedures to standardize the recording of information collected during inspections, FERC officials could help ensure that the information shared across these systems is comparable, steps that would allow FERC to identify the extent of and characteristics associated with common safety deficiencies across its entire portfolio of regulated dams  Moreover, with a consistent approach to recording information from individual dam safety inspections, FERC will be positioned to proactively identify comparable safety deficiencies across its portfolio and to tailor its inspections towards evaluating them  While FERC uses inspection information to monitor a licensee’s efforts to address a safety deficiency for an individual dam, FERC has not analyzed information collected from its dam safety inspections to evaluate safety risks across the entire regulated portfolio of dams  For example, FERC has not reviewed inspection information to identify common deficiencies among certain types of dams  Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to their objectives  These standards note that one method for management to identify risks is the consideration of deficiencies identified through audits and other assessments  Dam safety inspections are an example of such an assessment  As part of such an approach, the agency analyzes risks to estimate their significance, which provides a basis for responding to the risk through specific actions  Furthermore, in our previous work on federal facilities, we have identified that an advanced use of risk management involving the ability to gauge risk across a portfolio of facilities could allow stakeholders to comprehensively identify and prioritize risks at a national level and direct resources toward alleviating them  FERC officials stated that they have not conducted a portfolio-wide analysis in part due to the inconsistency of recorded inspection data and because such an evaluation has not been a priority compared to inspecting individual dams  According to officials, the FERC headquarters office collects and reviews information semi-annually from each of its five regional offices on the progress of outstanding dam investigations and modifications in those regions  FERC’s review is designed to monitor the status of investigations on each individual dam but does not analyze risks across the portfolio of dams at the regional or national level  For example, officials from the New York Regional Office stated they do not perform trend analysis across the regional portfolio of dams under their authority, but they compile year-to-year data for each separate dam to show any progression or changes from previous data collected from individual dams  A portfolio-wide analysis could help FERC proactively identify safety risks and prioritize them at a national level  FERC officials stated that a proactive analysis of its portfolio could be useful to determining how to focus its inspections to alleviate safety risks, but it was not an action that FERC had taken to date  The benefits of a proactive analysis, for example, could be similar to those FERC derived from the analysis it conducted in reaction to the Oroville Dam incident  To conduct this analysis, FERC required 184 project licensees, identified by FERC regional offices as having spillways similar to the failed spillway at the Oroville Dam, to assess the spillways’ safety and capacity  According to FERC officials, these assessments identified 27 dam spillways with varying degrees of safety concerns  They stated that FERC’s spillway assessment initiative was a success because they were able to target a specific subgroup of dams within the portfolio and identify these safety concerns at 27 dam spillways  FERC officials stated that they are working with the dam licensees to address these safety concerns  A similar and proactive approach based on analysis of common deficiencies across the portfolio of dams under FERC’s authority could also help to identify any safety risks that may not have been targeted during the inspections of individual dams and prior to a safety incident  As directed by FERC, licensees and their consultants develop and review, or update, various engineering studies related to dam performance to help ensure their dams meet FERC requirements and remain safe  FERC regulations and guidelines describe the types and frequency of studies and analyses required based on dams’ hazard classifications  For all high hazard and some significant hazard dams, existing studies are to be reviewed by each licensee’s consultants every 5 years, as part of the independent consultant inspection and accompanying potential failure mode analysis  According to FERC officials, for those significant hazard dams that do not require an independent consultant inspection and for low hazard dams, FERC’s regulations and guidelines do not require any studies, but in practice FERC directs many licensees to conduct them  FERC also may request engineering studies in response to dam safety incidents at other projects, or engage a board of consultants to oversee the completion of a study  For example, as previously noted, following the Oroville Dam incident in 2017, FERC requested a special assessment of all dams with spillways similar to the failed spillway at the Oroville Dam  To develop these studies, all six of the consultants we interviewed stated that they follow guidelines provided by FERC and other dam safety agencies  Specifically, they stated that they use FERC’s Engineering Guidelines, which provide engineering principles to guide the development and review of engineering studies  In recognition of the unique characteristics of each dam, including its construction, geography, and applicable loading conditions, the Guidelines provides consultants with flexibility to apply engineering judgment, and as a result, the approach that licensees and their consultants use and the focus of their reviews of engineering studies may vary across regions or projects  For example, one independent consultant we interviewed noted that seismicity studies are not highlighted during the independent consultant inspections for projects in the Upper Midwest in comparison to projects in other areas of the country because the region is not seismically active, but that inspections do look closely at ice loads during the winter months  To create these studies, we found that licensees and their consultants generally use data from other federal agencies and rely on available modeling tools developed by federal agencies and the private sector to evaluate dam performance  For example, many of the engineering studies we reviewed rely on data from the National Weather Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to estimate precipitation patterns and the U S  Geological Survey to estimate seismic activity  In addition, licensees and their consultants use modeling tools and simulations, such as those developed by the Corps to estimate hydrology, to develop engineering studies  FERC staff noted that the engineering studies developed by licensees and their consultants generally focus on the analysis of extreme events, such as earthquakes and floods  In reference to extreme events, FERC staff said that both actual past events and likely future events are considered in determining their magnitude  FERC staff noted the probable maximum flood—the flood that would be expected to result from the most extreme combination of reasonably possible meteorological and hydrological conditions—as an example of a dam design criterion that is based on application of analysis of extreme events  In describing the efficacy of probable maximum flood calculations, FERC officials stated that they had not observed a flood that exceeded the probable maximum flood calculated for any dam and noted that their Engineering Guidelines provides a conservative approach to estimating the probable maximum flood and other extreme events  FERC officials stated that requiring a conservative approach to estimating extreme events helps to mitigate the substantial uncertainty associated with these events, including in consideration of emerging data estimating the effects of climate change on extreme weather events  Once developed, engineering studies we reviewed often remained in effect for a number of years, until FERC or the licensee and its consultant determined an update was required  For example, we found that the hydrology studies were 20 years or older for 17 of the 42 dams in our review, including for 9 of the 16 high hazard dams in our sample  FERC’s Engineering Guidelines states that studies should be updated as appropriate  For example, FERC’s Engineering Guidelines on hydrology studies state that previously accepted flood studies are not required to be reevaluated unless it is determined that a re-analysis is warranted  The Guidelines notes that FERC or the consultant may consider reanalyzing the study for several reasons, including if they identify (1) significant errors in the original study; (2) new data that may significantly alter previous study results; or (3) significant changes in the conditions of the drainage basin  FERC staff and consultants we interviewed stated that age alone is not a primary criterion to update or replace studies and that studies should be updated as needed depending on several factors including age, new or additional data, and professional judgment  Consultants we interviewed identified some limitations that can affect their ability to develop engineering studies for a dam  For example, they noted that some dams may lack original design information, used prior to construction of the dam, which includes the assumptions and calculations used to determine the type and size of dam, the amount of water storage capacity, and information on the pre-construction site geology and earthquake potential  FERC officials estimated that for a large percentage of the dams they relicense, the original information is no longer available  For example, according to the report from the independent forensic team investigating the Oroville Dam incident and as previously noted, some design drawings and construction records for the dam’s spillway could not be located and some other documents that were available were not included in the most recent independent consultant inspection report submitted to FERC  To overcome the lack of original design information, FERC told us that licensees and their consultants may use teams of experts, advanced data collection techniques, and other modern methods, where feasible, to assess the dam’s ability to perform given current environmental conditions  In cases where design or other engineering information is incomplete, consultants stated that they generally recommend the licensee conduct additional studies based on the risk presented by the missing information but also noted that the financial resources of a licensee may affect its willingness and ability to conduct additional studies  However, FERC officials stated that FERC staff are ultimately responsible for making decisions on whether additional engineering studies are needed to evaluate a dam’s performance  FERC has established policies and procedures that use formal guidance, and permit the use of professional judgment, to evaluate and review engineering studies of dam performance submitted by licensees and their consultants  FERC officials in both the headquarters and regional offices emphasized that their role as the regulator is to review and validate engineering studies developed by the licensee and their consultants  FERC generally does not develop engineering studies as officials noted that dam safety, including the development of engineering studies, is primarily the licensee’s responsibility  To carry out their responsibility to ensure public safety, FERC staff stated they use procedures and criteria in the FERC Engineering Guidelines to review engineering studies and apply professional judgment to leverage their specialized knowledge, skills, and abilities to support their determinations of dam safety  FERC’s Engineering Guidelines provides a framework for the review of engineering studies, though the Guidelines recognizes that each dam is unique and allows for flexibility and exemptions in their use  Moreover, the Guidelines notes that analysis of data is useful when evaluating a dam’s performance, but should not be used as a substitute for judgment based on experience and common sense  Because FERC’s Engineering Guidelines allows for the application of professional judgment, the methods used to review these studies vary depending on the staff, the region, and individual dam characteristics  For example, FERC staff said that when they review consultants’ assumptions, methods, calculations and conclusions, in some cases they may decide to conduct a sensitivity analysis if—based on the staff’s judgment—they need to take additional steps to validate or confirm factors of safety for the project  FERC officials also stated that staff may conduct their own independent analyses, as appropriate, such as evaluating a major structural change to the dam or validating submitted studies  For example, as part of its 2016 review of the Union Valley Dam in California, FERC staff validated the submitted hydrology study by independently calculating key inputs, such as precipitation rates and peak floods, to evaluate the dam’s performance and verify the spillway’s reported capacity  In addition, FERC has established various controls to help ensure the quality of its review, including using a risk-based review process, assigning multiple staff to review the studies, and rotating staff responsibilities over time  We have previously found in our reporting on other regulatory agencies that practices such as rotating staff in key decision-making roles, and including at least two supervisory staff when conducting oversight reviews help reduce threats to independence and regulatory capture  Risk-based review process  FERC’s review approach is risk-based, as the frequency of staff’s review of these studies is based on the hazard classification of the dam as well as professional judgment  FERC relies on three primary engineering studies (hydrology, seismicity, and stability), and others as appropriate, which form the basis for determining if a dam is safe  In addition, FERC requires licensees to hire a FERC-approved independent consulting engineer at least every 5 years to inspect and evaluate high hazard and other applicable dams and submit a report detailing the findings as part of the independent consultant inspection process  In general, for the dams we reviewed, we found that FERC staff reviewed engineering studies for dams subject to independent consultant inspections (which are typically high or significant hazard dams) more frequently than those engineering studies associated with dams for which FERC does not require an independent consultant inspection (typically low hazard dams)  For example, we found FERC staff had reviewed the most recent hydrology studies for all 22 high and significant hazard dams in our sample subject to independent consultant inspections within the last 6 years and documented their analysis  According to FERC officials, for dams not subject to an independent consultant inspection, FERC staff review engineering studies on an as needed basis, depending on whether the underlying assumptions and information from the previous studies are still relevant  For example, for the 20 dams in our study not subject to an independent consultant inspection, we found that most (15) of these studies were reviewed by FERC within the past 10 years, usually during the project’s relicensing  Multiple levels of supervisory review  As part of FERC’s quality control and internal oversight process, multiple FERC staff are to review the studies produced by the licensee and its consultant, with the number of successive reviews proportional to the complexity or importance of the study, according to FERC officials  FERC’s Operating Manual establishes the general procedure for the review of engineering studies  To begin the review process, the staff assigned to a dam is to review the engineering study and prepares an internal memo on its findings; that memo is then to be reviewed for accuracy and completeness by both a regional office Branch Chief, and the Regional Engineer  If necessary, Washington, D C , headquarters office staff are to review and approve the final memo  Upon completion of review, FERC staff are to provide a letter to the licensee indicating any particular areas where additional information is needed or where more studies are needed to evaluate the dam’s performance  According to FERC officials, each level of review adds successive quality control steps performed by experienced staff  We have previously found in reporting on other regulatory agencies that additional levels of review increases transparency and accountability and diminishes the risk of regulatory capture  Rotation of FERC staff responsibilities  As part of an internal quality control program to help minimize the risk of missing important safety- related items, FERC officials told us they rotate staff assignments and responsibilities approximately every 3 to 4 years  According to FERC officials, this practice decreases the chance that a deficiency would be missed over time due to differences in areas of engineering expertise between or among staff  We have previously found in our reporting on other regulatory agencies that strategies such as more frequently rotating staff in key roles can help reduce the risk to supervisory independence and regulatory capture  Some FERC regional offices have developed practices to further enhance their review of these studies  For example, the New York Regional Office established a subject matter expert team that helps review dams with unusually complex hydrology issues  This team was created, in part, because FERC staff noted that some of the hydrology studies conducted in the 1990s and 2000s were not as thorough as they would have wanted, and warranted a re-examination  Currently, the New York Regional Office is reviewing the hydrology analysis associated with 12 dam break studies to determine if the hydrology data used in developing these studies were as rigorously developed and validated  According to the FERC staff in this office, utilizing a team of subject matter experts has reduced Regional Office review time and improved the hydrology studies’ accuracy  FERC staff in the New York Regional Office also told us that they are working with other regional offices on setting up similar technical teams  For example, FERC staff in the New York Regional Office have been working with the Portland Regional Office to set up a similar team  FERC procedures require the use of engineering studies at key points over the dam’s licensing period to inform components of its safety oversight approach, including during the potential failure mode analyses of individual dams as well as during relicensing  Potential failure mode analysis  The potential failure mode analysis is to occur during the recurring independent consultant inspection and is conducted by the licensee’s independent consultant along with other key dam safety stakeholders  As previously explained, the analysis incorporates the engineering studies and identifies events that could cause a dam to potentially fail  During the potential failure mode analysis, FERC, the licensee, the consultant, and other key dam safety stakeholders are to refer to the engineering studies to establish environmental conditions that inform dam failure scenarios, the risks associated with these failures, and their consequences for an individual dam  Further, according to a FERC white paper on risk analysis, FERC is beginning to use information related to potential failure modes as inputs to an analysis tool that quantifies risks at each dam  With this information, FERC expects to make relative risk estimates of dams within its inventory and establish priorities for further study or remediation of risks at individual dams, according to the white paper  Relicensing  During relicensing, FERC staff are to review the engineering studies as well as information such as historical hydrological data and extreme weather events, which also inform their safety evaluation of the licensee’s application  FERC officials also stated that as a result of their relicensing review, they might alter the articles of the new license before it is issued should their reviews indicate that environmental conditions affecting the dam’s safety have changed  We found that FERC generally met its requirement to evaluate dam safety during the relicensing process for the 42 dams we reviewed  During the relicensing process, we found that for the dams we reviewed, FERC staff review safety information such as the past reports, inspections, and studies conducted by FERC, the licensee, and independent consultants and determine whether or not a dam owner operated and maintained its dam safely  According to FERC staff, the safety review for relicensing is generally a summary of prior safety and inspection information, rather than an analysis of new safety information, unless the licensee proposes a change to the operation or structure  FERC’s review during relicensing for the high hazard and significant hazard dams we reviewed was generally consistent with its guidance and safety memo template, though the extent of its review of low hazard dams varied  (See fig  3 ) For example, for the 22 high and significant hazard dams we reviewed, the safety relicensing memos followed the template and nearly all included summaries of hydrology studies, stability analyses, prior FERC inspections, and applicable independent consultant reports  For the 20 low hazard dams, FERC staff noted that some requirements in the template are not applicable or have been exempted and therefore were not reviewed during relicensing  While low hazard dams were more inconsistently reviewed during relicensing, FERC staff also noted that there has been a recent emphasis to more closely review, replace, or conduct engineering studies, such as the stability study, for low hazard dams during relicensing  Moreover, FERC staff told us that the safety risks associated with these dams are minimal, as the failure of a low hazard dam, by definition, does not pose a threat to human life or economic activity  According to FERC staff, if a licensee proposed altering the dam or its operations in any way as part of its application for a new license, FERC staff would review the proposed change and may recommend adding articles to the new license prior to its issuance to ensure dam safety  FERC officials noted that, as part of their review, any structural or operational changes proposed by the licensee during relicensing are reviewed by FERC  These officials also noted that FERC generally recommends modifications to the licensees’ proposed changes prior to their approval and inclusion in the new license  However, FERC officials noted that, in some cases, additional information is needed prior to approving the structural or operational change to ensure there are no risks posed by the changes  In those instances, FERC may recommend that articles be added to the new license, that require the licensee to conduct additional engineering studies of the issue and submit them to FERC for review and approval  For example, during the relicensing of the Otter Creek project in Vermont in 2014, the licensee proposed changes to the project’s operation resulting from construction  As a result, FERC’s staff recommended adding a number of articles to the license, including that the licensee conduct studies to evaluate the effect of the change on safety and to ensure safety during construction  During relicensing, third parties—such as environmental organizations, nearby residents and communities, and other federal agencies, such as the U S  Fish and Wildlife Service—may provide input on various topics related to the project, including safety  However, FERC officials said that very few third parties file studies or comments related to dam safety during relicensing  FERC’s template and guidance do not specifically require the consideration of such analyses as part of its safety review, and we did not identify any safety studies submitted by third parties for dams or reviewed by FERC in our sample  According to FERC officials, when stakeholders submit comments during relicensing, the comments tend to focus on environmental aspects of the project, such as adding passages for fish migration  Further, FERC is not required under the Federal Power Act to respond to any comments, including those related to dam safety, from third parties, according to FERC officials  However, according to FERC officials, courts have held that the Administrative Procedure Act precludes an agency from arbitrarily and capriciously ignoring issues raised in comments  Furthermore, these officials stated that if a court determines that FERC did not sufficiently address issues raised during the relicensing process, its orders are subject to being reversed and remanded by applicable United States courts of appeals  Moreover, FERC officials noted that the information needed to develop third party safety studies, such as the dam design drawings and engineering studies, are property of the licensee, rather than FERC  In addition, this information may not be readily available to third parties or the public if FERC designates it as critical energy infrastructure information, which would preclude its release to the general public  FERC staff we interviewed stated that there have been no instances where the Commission denied a new license to a licensee as a result of its safety review during relicensing  FERC staff stated that given the frequency of other inspections, including the FERC staff inspections, and independent consultant inspections, it is unlikely staff would find a previously unknown major safety issue during relicensing  FERC staff told us that rather than deny a license for safety deficiencies, FERC will keep a dam owner under the terms of a FERC license to better ensure the licensee remedies existing safety deficiencies  Specifically, FERC staff noted that under a license, FERC can ensure dam safety by (1) closely monitoring the deficiency’s remediation progress through its inspection program, (2) adding license terms in the new license tailored to the specific safety deficiency, and (3), as necessary, pursuing compliance and enforcement actions, such as civil penalties or stop work orders, to enforce the terms and conditions of the license  For example, prior to and during the relicensing of a FERC-licensed project in Wisconsin in 2014, FERC’s review identified that the spillway capacity was inadequate  While the project was relicensed in 2017 without changes to the spillway, FERC officials stated that they have been overseeing the plans and studies of the remediation of the spillway through their ongoing inspection program  However, if an imminent safety threat is identified during the relicensing review, FERC officials stated that they will order that the licensee take actions to remedy the issue immediately  Moreover, FERC officials noted that, if necessary, a license can be revoked for failure to comply with the terms of its license  FERC designed a multi-layered safety approach—which uses inspections, studies, and other assessments of individual dams—to reduce exposure to safety risks  However, as the spillway failure at the Oroville Dam project in 2017 demonstrated, it is not possible to eliminate all uncertainties and risks  As part of a continuing effort to ensure dam safety at licensed projects, FERC could complement its approach to evaluating the safety of individual dams by enhancing its capability to assess and identify the risks across its portfolio of licensed dams  Specifically, while FERC has collected and stored a substantial amount of information from its individual dam safety inspections, FERC’s approach to recording this information is inconsistent due to a lack of standard language and procedures  By clarifying its approach to the recording of information collected during inspections, FERC officials could help ensure that the information recorded is comparable when shared across its regions  Moreover, the absence of standard language and procedures to consistently record inspection information impedes a broader, portfolio- wide analysis of the extent of and characteristics associated with common safety deficiencies identified during FERC inspections  While FERC has not yet conducted such an analysis, a proactive assessment of common safety inspection deficiencies across FERC’s portfolio of licensed dams— similar to its identification of dam spillways with safety concerns following the Oroville Dam incident—could help FERC and its licensees identify safety risks prior to a safety incident and to develop approaches to mitigate those risks  We are making the following two recommendations to FERC: FERC should provide standard language and procedures to its staff on how to record information collected during inspections, including how and where to record information about safety deficiencies, in order to facilitate analysis of safety deficiencies across FERC’s portfolio of regulated dams  (Recommendation 1) FERC should use information from its inspections to assess safety risks across its portfolio of regulated dams to identify and prioritize safety risks at a national level  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to FERC for review and comment  In its comments on the draft report, FERC said it generally agreed with the draft report’s findings and found the recommendations to be constructive  FERC said that it would direct staff to develop appropriate next steps to implement GAO’s recommendations  These comments are reproduced in appendix IV  In addition, FERC provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the Chairman of FERC and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at 202-512-2834 or vonaha@gao gov  Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V  FERC seeks to ensure licensees’ compliance with FERC regulations and license requirements, including remediating safety deficiencies, by using a mix of preventative strategies to help identify situations before they become problems and reactive strategies such as issuing penalties  As part of its efforts, FERC published a compliance handbook in 2015 that provides an overall guide to compliance and enforcement of a variety of license requirements, including dam safety  The handbook includes instructions for implementing FERC rules, regulations, policies, and programs designed to ensure effective compliance with license conditions, which include dam safety, to protect and enhance beneficial public uses of waterways  FERC developed a range of enforcement actions, that include holding workshops to encourage compliance and issuing guidance, that increase in severity depending on the non- compliance issue  (See fig  4 ) More broadly, FERC’s guidance directs officials to determine enforcement actions and time frames for those actions on a case-by-case basis, depending on the characteristics of the specific compliance issue  According to FERC officials, many of these safety compliance discussions are handled informally  In addition, their compliance approach emphasizes activities that assist, rather than force, licensees to achieve compliance, according to its guidance  These activities include facilitating open lines of communication with licensees, participating in technical workshops, and publishing brochures and guidance documents, among other efforts  Also, according to these officials, FERC works with licensees to provide guidance and warnings of possible non-compliance matters, in order to avoid usage of any enforcement tools, if possible  According to FERC officials, any safety issues that endanger the public will result in immediate penalty or removal of the dam from power generation, but this action is not lightly taken  Additionally, the length of time between when a safety deficiency is identified and is resolved varies substantially depending on the specific project  As stated earlier in this report, FERC works with licensees to determine a plan and schedule for investigating safety issues and making any needed modifications  However, FERC officials stated that the majority of safety compliance issues are resolved within a month  However, FERC officials stated that if a licensee repeatedly does not take steps to address a compliance issue, FERC will explore enforcement actions through a formal process  According to officials, FERC’s enforcement options are based on authorities provided under the Federal Power Act and such options are flexible because of the variation in hazards, consequences, and dams  According to FERC officials, to ensure compliance with safety regulations, if a settlement cannot be reached, FERC may, among other things, issue an order to show cause, issue civil penalties in the form of fines to licensees, impose stop work or cease power generation orders, revoke licenses, and seek injunctions in federal court  Nevertheless, FERC officials stated that there is no specific requirement for how quickly the compliance issues or deficiencies should be resolved and that some issues can take years to resolve  For example, in 2004, the current licensee of a hydroelectric project operating in Edenville, Michigan, acquired the project, which was found by FERC to be in a state of non-compliance at that time  FERC staff made numerous attempts to work with the licensee to resolve the compliance issues  However, they were unable to resolve these issues and as a result issued a cease generation order in 2017, followed in 2018 by a license revocation order  In practice, FERC’s use of these enforcement tools to resolve safety issues has been fairly limited, particularly in comparison to other license compliance issues, according to FERC officials  Since 2013, FERC has issued one civil penalty for a safety-related hydropower violation and has issued compliance orders on eight other projects for safety-related reasons, including orders to cease generation on three projects  For the 14 projects and 42 dams we reviewed, FERC licensees and their consultants used a variety of tools to develop engineering studies of dam performance (see table 3)  These tools included programs and modeling tools developed by government agencies, such as the U S  Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), as well as commercially available modeling tools  FERC officials stated that they also used a number of the same tools used by its licensees and consultants  Similarly, for the 14 projects and 42 dams we reviewed, FERC licensees and their consultants used a variety of datasets to develop engineering studies of dam performance (see table 4)  These datasets included data maintained and updated by various government agencies, including the United States Geological Survey and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  FERC officials stated that they also used a number of the same datasets used by its licensees and consultants  This report assesses: (1) how FERC collects information from its dam safety inspections and the extent to which FERC analyzes it; (2) how FERC evaluates engineering studies of dam performance to analyze safety, and (3) the extent to which FERC reviews dam safety information during relicensing and the information FERC considers  This report also includes information on FERC actions to ensure licensee compliance with license requirements related to dam safety (app  I) and selected models and data sets used to develop and evaluate engineering studies of dam performance (app  II)  For each of the objectives, we reviewed laws, regulations, FERC guidance, templates, and other documentation pertaining to FERC’s evaluation of dam safety  In addition, we reviewed an independent forensic team’s assessment of the causes of the Oroville Dam incident, including the report’s analysis of FERC’s approach to ensuring safety at the project, to understand any limitations of FERC’s approach identified by the report  We also reviewed dam safety documentation, including dam performance studies, FERC memorandums, the most recent completed inspection report, and other information, from a non-probability sample of 14 projects encompassing 42 dams relicensed from fiscal years 2014 through 2017  (See table 5 ) We selected these projects and dams to include ones that were geographically dispersed, had varying potential risks associated with their potential failure, and had differences in the length of their relicensing process  We developed a data collection instrument to collect information from the dam safety documentation and analyzed data from the sample to evaluate the extent to which FERC followed its dam safety guidance across the selected projects  To develop the data collection instrument, we reviewed and incorporated FERC oversight requirements from its regulations, guidance, and templates  We conducted three pre-tests of the instrument, and revised the instrument after each pre-test  To ensure consistency and accuracy in the collection of this information, for each dam in the sample, one analyst conducted an initial review of the dam safety documentation; a second analyst reviewed the information independently; and the two analysts reconciled any differences  Following our review of the information from the dam safety documentation, we conducted semi-structured interviews with FERC engineering staff associated with each of the 14 projects and 42 dams to obtain information about FERC’s inspections, review of dam performance studies, and analysis of safety during the relicensing of these projects  Our interviews with these FERC staff provided insight into FERC’s dam safety oversight approach and are not generalizable to all projects  We also interviewed FERC officials responsible for dam safety about dam safety practices  In addition, to review how FERC collects information from its dam safety inspections and the extent to which FERC analyzes it, we also reviewed inspection data from FERC’s information management systems from fiscal years 2014 through 2017  To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed guidance and interviewed FERC officials  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes  We compared FERC’s approach to collecting, recording and using safety information to federal internal control standards for the design of information systems and related control activities  We also reviewed our prior work on portfolio- level risk management  To evaluate how FERC evaluates engineering studies of dam performance to analyze dam safety, we reviewed FERC policies and guidance  We interviewed six independent consultants having experience inspecting and analyzing FERC-regulated dams to understand how engineering studies of dam performance are developed  We selected consultants who had submitted an inspection report to FERC recently (between December 2017 and February 2018) based on the geographic location of the project they reviewed and experience conducting these inspections, and the number of reports submitted to FERC over this time period  (See table 6 ) Our interviews with these consultants provided insight into FERC’s approach to conducting and reviewing studies and are not generalizable to all projects or consultants  To evaluate the extent to which FERC reviews dam safety information during relicensing and the information it considers, we reviewed templates developed by FERC to assess safety during the relicensing and analyzed the extent to which staff followed guidance in these templates for the 14 projects and 42 dams in our sample  We also interviewed stakeholders, including the National Hydropower Association and Friends of the River to obtain general perspectives on FERC’s relicensing approach  Our interviews with these stakeholders provided insight into FERC’s approach to relicensing, and these views are not generalizable across all stakeholders  To review actions to ensure licensee compliance with license requirements related to dam safety, we reviewed FERC’s guidance related to compliance and enforcement and interviewed FERC officials responsible for implementation of the guidance  To review information on models and datasets used to develop and evaluate engineering studies of dam performance, we reviewed dam safety documentation associated with the projects in our sample (described previously), reviewed FERC documentation, and interviewed FERC officials  We conducted this performance audit from July 2017 to October 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  Andrew Von Ah, (202) 512-2834 or vonaha@gao gov  In addition to the contact named above, Mike Armes (Assistant Director); Matt Voit (Analyst-in-Charge); David Blanding; Brian Chung; Geoff Hamilton; Vondalee Hunt; Rich Johnson; Jon Melhus; Monique Nasrallah; Madhav Panwar; Malika Rice; Sandra Sokol; and Michelle Weathers made key contributions to this report 


Report 2: Banks play a central role in the financial system by connecting borrowers to savers and allocating available funds across the economy  As a result, banking is vital to the U S  economy's health and growth  Nevertheless, banking is an inherently risky activity involving extending credit and undertaking liabilities  Therefore, banking can generate tremendous societal and economic benefits, but banking panics and failures can create devastating losses  Over time, a regulatory system designed to foster the benefits of banking while limiting risks has developed, and both banks and regulatio n have coevolved as market conditions have changed and different risks have emerged  For these reasons, Congress often considers policies related to the banking industry  The last decade has been a transformative period for banking  The 2007-2009 financial crisis threatened the total collapse of the financial system and the real economy  Many assert only huge and unprecedented government interventions staved off this collapse  Others argue that government interventions were unnecessary or potentially exacerbated the crisis  In addition, many argue the crisis revealed that the financial system was excessively risky and the regulatory regime governing the financial system had serious weaknesses  Policymakers responded to the perceived weaknesses in the pre-crisis financial regulatory regime by implementing numerous changes to financial regulation, including to bank regulation  Most notably, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P L  111-203 ) in 2010 with the intention of strengthening regulation and addressing risks  In addition, U S  bank regulators have implemented changes under their existing authorities, many of which generally adhere to the Basel III Accords—an international framework for bank regulation agreed to by U S  and international bank regulators—that called for making certain bank regulations more stringent  In the ensuing years, some observers raised concerns that the potential benefits of those regulatory changes (e g , better-managed risks, increased consumer protection, greater systemic stability, potentially higher economic growth over the long term) were outweighed by the potential costs (e g , compliance costs incurred by banks, reduced credit availability for consumers and businesses, potentially slower economic growth)  In response to these concerns, Congress passed the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCP Act; P L  115-174 )  Among other things, the law modified certain (1) regulations facing small banks; (2) regulations facing banks large enough to be subjected to Dodd-Frank enhanced regulation but still below the size thresholds exceeded by the very largest banks; and (3) mortgage regulations facing lenders including banks  In addition, federal banking regulatory agencies—the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)—have proposed further changes in regulation  Implementing the regulatory changes prescribed in the aftermath of the crisis and made pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act occurred over the course of years  In recent years—a period in which the leadership of the regulators has transferred from Obama Administration to Trump Administration appointees—the banking regulators have expressed the belief that, after having viewed the effects of the regulations, they now have the necessary information to determine which regulations may be ineffective or inefficient as currently implemented  Recently, these regulators have made of number of proposals with the aim of reducing regulatory burden  A key issue surrounding regulatory relief made pursuant to the EGRRCP Act and regulator-initiated changes is whether regulatory burden can be reduced without undermining the goals and effectiveness of the regulations  Meanwhile, market trends and economic conditions continue to affect the banking industry coincident with the implementation of new regulation  Some of the more notable conditions include the development of new technologies used in financial services (known as "fintech") and a rising interest rate environment following an extraordinarily long period of very low rates  This report provides a broad overview of selected banking-related issues, including issues related to "safety and soundness" regulation, consumer protection, community banks, large banks, what type of companies should be able to establish banks, and recent market and economic trends  This report is not an exhaustive look at all bank policy issues, nor is it a detailed examination of any one issue  Rather, it provides concise background and analyses of certain prominent issues that have been the subject of recent discussion and debate  In addition, this report provides a list of Congressional Research Service reports that examine specific issues  Banks face a number of regulations intended to increase the likelihood that banks are profitable without being excessively risky and prone to failures; decrease the likelihood that bank services are used to conceal the proceeds of criminal activities; and to protect banks and their customers' data from cyberattacks  This section provides background on these "safety and soundness" regulations and analyzes selected issues related to them, including prudential regulation related to capital requirements and the Volcker Rule (which restricts proprietary trading); requirements facing banks related to anti-money laundering laws, such as the Bank Secrecy Act (P L  91-508); and challenges related to cybersecurity  Bank failures can inflict large losses on stakeholders, including taxpayers via government "safety nets" such as deposit insurance and Federal Reserve lending facilities  Failures can cause systemic stress and sharp contraction in economic activity if they are large or widespread  To make such failures less likely—and to reduce losses when they do occur—regulators use prudential regulation designed to ensure banks are safely profitable and to reduce the likelihood of bank failure  In addition, banks are subject to regulations intended to reduce the prevalence of crime  Some of those are anti-money laundering measures aimed at stopping criminals from using the banking system to conduct or hide illegal operations  Others are cybersecurity regulations aimed at protecting banks and their customers from becoming victims of cybercrime, such as denial-of-service attacks or data theft  Banks profit in part because their assets are generally riskier, longer term, and more illiquid than their liabilities, which allows the banks to earn more interest on their assets than they pay on their liabilities  The practice is usually profitable, but does expose banks to risks that can potentially lead to failure  Failures can be reduced if (1) banks are better able to absorb losses or (2) they are less likely to experience unsustainably large losses  One tool regulators use to increase a bank's ability to absorb losses is to require banks to hold a minimum level of capital  Another tool regulators use to reduce the likelihood and size of potential losses is to prohibit banks from engaging in activities that could create excessive risks  For example, the Volcker Rule prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading —the buying and selling of securities that the bank itself owns with the aim of profiting from price changes  The EGRRCP Act mandated certain changes to these prudential regulations, and regulators have proposed changes under existing authorities  Regulators are to promulgate these changes through the rulemaking process in the coming months and years  In addition, whether policymakers have calibrated these regulations such that their benefits and costs are appropriately balanced is likely to be an area of ongoing debate  For these reasons, prudential regulation issues will likely continue to draw congressional attention  A bank's balance sheet is composed of assets, liabilities, and capital  Assets are largely the value of loans owed to the bank and securities owned by the bank  To make loans and buy securities, a bank secures funding by either issuing liabilities or raising capital  A bank's liabilities are largely the value of deposits and borrowings the bank owes savers and creditors  Capital is raised through various methods, including issuing equity to shareholders or special types of bonds that can be converted into equity  Banking is an inherently risky activity, because banks may suffer losses on assets but face rigid obligations on the liabilities owed to depositors and creditors  In contrast to liabilities, capital generally does not obligate the bank to repay or distribute a specified amount of money at a specified time  This characteristic means that, in the event a bank suffers losses, capital gives the bank the ability to absorb some amount of losses while meeting its obligations  Thus, banks can avoid failures if they hold sufficient capital  Banks are required to satisfy several requirements to ensure they hold enough capital  In the United States, these requirements are generally aligned with the Basel III standards developed as part of a nonbinding agreement between international bank regulators  In general, these are expressed as minimum ratios between certain balance sheet items that banks must maintain  A detailed examination of how these ratios are calculated and what levels must be met is beyond the scope of this report  This examination of policy issues only requires noting that capital ratios fall into one of two main types—a leverage ratio or a risk-weighted ratio  A leverage ratio treats all assets the same, requiring banks to hold the same amount of capital against assets regardless of how risky each asset is  A risk-weighted ratio assigns a risk weight—a percentage based on the riskiness of the asset that the asset value is multiplied by—to account for the fact that some assets are more likely to lose value than others  Riskier assets receive a higher risk weight, which requires banks to hold more capital to meet the ratio requirement  Whether the benefits of capital requirements (e g , increased bank and financial system stability) are generally outweighed by the potential costs (e g , reduced credit availability) is an issue subject to debate  Capital is typically a more expensive source of funding for banks than liabilities  Thus, requiring banks to hold higher levels of capital may make funding more expensive, and so banks may choose to reduce the amount of credit available  Some studies indicate this could slow economic growth  However, no economic consensus exists on this issue, because a more stable banking system with fewer crises and failures may lead to higher long-run economic growth  In addition, estimating the value of regulatory costs and benefits is subject to considerable uncertainty, due to difficulties and assumptions involved in complex economic modeling and estimation  Lack of consensus also surrounds questions over whether or under what circumstances risk-weighted ratios are necessary, effective, and efficient  Proponents of risk-based measures assert that it is important to use both risk-weighted and leverage ratios because each addresses weaknesses of the other  For example, riskier assets generally offer a greater rate of return to compensate the investor for bearing more risk  Without risk weighting, banks would have an incentive to hold riskier assets because the same amount of capital must be held against risky and safe assets  However, the use of risk-weighted ratios could be problematic for a number of reasons  Risk weights assigned to particular classes of assets could potentially be an inaccurate estimation of some assets' true risk, which could incent banks to misallocate available resources across asset classes  For example, banks held a high level of seemingly low-risk, mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) before the crisis, in part because those assets offered a higher rate of return than other assets with the same risk weight  MBSs then suffered unexpectedly large losses during the crisis  Another criticism is that the risk-weighted requirements involve "needless complexity" and their use is an example of regulatory micromanagement  The complexity could benefit the largest banks that have the resources to absorb the added regulatory cost compared with small banks that could find compliance costs more burdensome  (Small or "community" bank compliance issues will be covered in more detail in the " Regulatory Burden on Community Banks " section later in the report ) Section 201 of the EGRRCP Act is aimed at addressing concerns over the complexity of risk-weighted ratios and the costs they impose on community banks  This provision created an option for banks with less than $10 billion in assets to meet a higher leverage ratio—the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR)—in order to be exempt from having to meet the risk-based ratios described above  Bank regulators have issued a proposal to implement this provision wherein banks (1) below the threshold that (2) meet at least a 9% leverage ratio measure of equity and certain retained earnings to assets and (3) had limited off-balance sheet exposures and limited securities trading activity (among other requirements) would qualify for the exemption  The FDIC estimates that more than 80% of community banks will be eligible for the CBLR  However, this new optional exemption does not entirely settle the issue  One bank industry group has argued that 9% is set higher than is necessary, excluding deserving banks from the exemption  In addition, bills in the 115 th Congress, notably H R  10 , proposed a high-leverage-ratio option be available to banks regardless of size that would exempt qualifying banks from a wider range of prudential regulations  There are also specific policy issues relating to capital requirements for large banks, which are discussed in the " Regulator Proposals Related to Large Bank Capital Requirements " section below  Section 619 of Dodd-Frank—often referred to as the Volcker Rule—generally prohibits depository banks from engaging in proprietary trading or sponsoring a hedge fund or private equity fund  Proprietary trading refers to owning and trading securities for a bank's own portfolio with the aim of profiting from price changes  Put simply, if a bank is engaged in proprietary trading, it is itself an investor in stocks, bonds, and derivatives, which is commonly characterized as "playing the market" or "speculating " The rule includes exceptions for when bank trading is deemed appropriate—such as (1) when a bank is hedging against risks the bank has assumed as a part of its traditional business and (2) market-making (i e , buying available securities with the intention of quickly selling them to meet market demand)  Proprietary trading is an inherently risky activity, and banks have faced varying degrees of restrictions over engaging in this activity for a number of decades  Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933 (P L  73-66)—commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act—generally prohibited certain deposit-taking banks from engaging in certain securities markets activities  Over time, regulator interpretation of Glass-Steagall and legislative changes expanded permissible activities for certain banks, allowing them to make certain securities investments and authorizing bank-holding companies to own depositories and securities firms within the same organization  The financial crisis increased debate over whether banks were engaging in unnecessarily risky activities  Ultimately, certain provisions in Dodd-Frank placed restrictions on permissible activities to reduce banks' riskiness, and the Volcker Rule was designed to prohibit proprietary trading by depository banking organizations  One of the Volcker Rule's proponents' main rationales for the separation of deposit-taking and certain securities investments is that when banks analyze and assume risks, they may be subject to moral hazard —the willingness to take on excessive risk due to some outside protection from losses  Deposits are an important source of bank funding and insured (up to a limit on each account) by the government  This arguably reduces depositors' incentive to monitor their banks' riskiness  Thus, a bank could potentially take on excessive risk without concern about losing this funding because, in the event of large losses that lead to failure, at least part of the losses will be borne by the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund (which is backed by the full faith and credit of the U S  government and so ultimately the taxpayer)  Thus, supporters of the Volcker Rule have characterized it as preventing banks from "gambling" in securities markets with taxpayer-backed deposits  However, critics of the Volcker Rule doubt its necessity and efficiency  In regard to necessity, they assert that proprietary trading at commercial banks did not play a substantive role in the financial crisis  They note the rule would not have prevented a number of the major events that played a direct role in the crisis—including failures or bailouts of large investment banks and insurers and losses on loans held by commercial banks  On this point, they also argue that proprietary trading risks are no greater than those posed by "traditional" banking activities, such as mortgage lending, and allowing banks to take on risks in different markets might diversify their risk profiles, making them less likely to fail  Debates relating to the efficiency of the Volcker Rule involve its complexity, compliance burden, and potential to lead banks to reduce their engagement in beneficial market activities  Recall that the Volcker Rule is not a ban on all trading, as banks are still allowed to trade to hedge risks or make markets  This poses practical supervisory problems  For example, how can regulators determine whether a broker-dealer is holding a security for market-making, as a hedge against another risk, or as a speculative investment? Differentiating among these motives creates the aforementioned complexity and compliance costs that could affect banks' trading behavior, and so could reduce financial market efficiency  Another criticism of the Volcker Rule in its original form was that it unnecessarily subjected all banks to the rule and their associated compliance costs  Critics of this aspect asserted that the vast majority of community banks are not involved in complex trading activity, but nevertheless must incur costs in evaluating the rule to ensure they are in compliance  Both Congress and regulators have recently taken actions in response to concerns over the complexity of the Volcker Rule and its compliance burden for small banks  Section 203 of the EGRRCP Act exempted banks with less than $10 billion in assets that fell below certain trading activity limits from the rule  Independent of that mandate, the agencies that implemented and enforced the Volcker Rule released and called for public comment on a proposal to simplify the rule in May 2018  Under the proposal, the agencies would clarify certain of the rule's definitions and criteria in an effort to reduce or eliminate uncertainties related to how certain trading activity can qualify for exemption  The proposal would also further tailor the compliance requirements facing banks based on the size of an institution's trading activity  Proponents of the Volcker Rule are generally wary of size-based exemptions  They contend that community banks typically do not face compliance obligations under the rule and do not face an excessive burden by being subject to it  They argue that community banks that are subject to compliance requirements can comply by having clear policies and procedures in place for review during the normal examination process  In addition, Volcker Rule supporters are generally critical of the regulators' proposal, asserting that the changes would undermine "the effective supervision and enforcement" of the rule  Anti-money laundering (AML) regulation refers to efforts to prevent criminal exploitation of financial systems to conceal the location, ownership, source, nature, or control of illicit proceeds  The U S  Department of the Treasury estimates domestic financial crime, excluding tax evasion, generates $300 billion in illicit proceeds that might involve money laundering  Despite robust AML efforts in the United States, the ability to counter money laundering effectively remains challenged by factors including (1) the diversity of illicit methods to move and store ill-gotten proceeds through the international financial system; (2) the introduction of new and emerging threats such as cyber-related financial crimes; (3) gaps in legal, regulatory, and enforcement regimes; and (4) the costs associated with financial institution compliance with global AML guidance and national laws  In the United States, the statutory foundation for domestic AML originated in 1970 with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA; P L  91-508) and its major component, the Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act  Amendments to the BSA and related provisions in the 1980s and 1990s expanded AML policy tools available to combat crime, particularly drug trafficking, and prevent criminals from laundering their illicitly derived profits  Key elements to the BSA/AML legal framework include requirements for customer identification, recordkeeping, reporting, and compliance programs intended to identify and prevent money laundering abuses  In general, banking regulators examine institutions for compliance with BSA/AML  When a regulator finds BSA violations or deficiencies in AML compliance programs, it may take informal or formal enforcement action, including possible civil fines  The BSA/AML policy framework is premised on banks and other covered financial entities filing a range of reports with the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), when their clients either engage in suspicious financial transactions, large cash transactions, or certain other transactions  For example, a bank generally must file a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) if, among other reasons, it conducts a transaction of $5,000 or more that the bank suspects involves money laundering or other criminal activity  A bank must file a Currency Transaction Report (CTR) if it conducts a currency (i e , cash) transaction of $10,000 or more as to which it has the same suspicions  The accurate, timely, and complete reporting of such activity to FinCEN flags situations that may warrant further investigation for law enforcement  Whether this regulatory framework adequately hinders criminals from using the banking system to launder their criminal proceeds and whether it does so efficiently without unduly burdening banks are debated issues  One aspect of this debate is whether current reporting requirements are inefficient and overly costly to the banking industry  Some industry observers—including officials from the OCC—have indicated that they believe certain areas of the current framework could be reformed in a way that reduces compliance costs without unduly weakening the ability to prevent money laundering  In contrast, officials from other agencies involved in AML and law enforcement—including FinCEN and the FBI—have stressed the importance of the information gathered under the current reporting requirements in combating money laundering  Another area of concern involves beneficial owners —that is, the natural person(s) who own or control a legal entity, such as a corporation or limited liability company  When such entities are set up without physical operations or assets, they are often referred to as shell companies   Shell companies can be used to conceal beneficial ownership and facilitate anonymous financial transactions  In recent years, policymakers have become increasingly concerned regarding potential risks posed by shell companies whose beneficial ownership is not transparent  This is due in part to a series of leaks to the media regarding the use of shell companies to facilitate criminal activity (such as "the Panama Papers") and sustained multilateral criticism of current U S  practices by the Financial Action Task Force, an international standard-setting body  In May 2018, a new FinCEN regulation came into effect that increased the requirements for banks to conduct customer due diligence (CDD) and ascertain the identity of beneficial owners in certain cases  Central to the CDD rule is a requirement for financial institutions to establish and maintain procedures to identify and verify beneficial owners of a legal entity opening a new account  If Congress decides that reporting requirements facing banks are not appropriately calibrated, it could pass legislation amending those requirements  For example, Congress could change the CTR or SAR reporting threshold or index the threshold levels to inflation  Certain bills introduced in the 115 th Congress would have increased financial transparency and reporting requirements for beneficial owners in other nonbank fields, such as real estate, but could potentially indirectly impact the banking industry as well  Cybersecurity is a major concern of banks, other financial services providers, and federal regulators  In many ways, it is an important extension of physical security  For example, banks are concerned about both physical and electronic theft of money and other assets, and they do not want their businesses shut down by weather events or electronic denial-of-service attacks  Maintaining the confidentiality, security, and integrity of physical records and electronic data held by banks is critical to sustaining the level of trust that allows businesses and consumers to rely on the banking industry to supply services on which they depend  The federal government has increasingly recognized the importance of cybersecurity in the financial services industry, as evidenced by the inclusion of financial services in the government's list of critical infrastructure sectors  The basic authority that federal regulators use to establish cybersecurity standards emanates from the organic legislation that established the agencies and delineated the scope of their authority and functions  As previously discussed, federal banking regulators are required to promulgate safety and soundness standards for all federally insured depository institutions to protect the stability of the nation's banking system  Some of these standards pertain to cybersecurity issues, including information security, data breaches, and destruction or theft of business records  In addition, certain laws (at both the state and federal levels) have provisions related to cybersecurity of financial services that are often performed by banks, including the Dodd-Frank Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA; P L  106-102 ), and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ( P L  107-204 )  For example, Section 501 of GLBA imposes obligations on financial institutions to "respect the privacy of     [their] customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic personal information " Federal banking regulators require the entities that they regulate to protect customer privacy of physical and electronic records as mandated by the privacy title of GLBA  Federal bank regulators also issue guidance in a variety of forms designed to help banks evaluate their risks and comply with cybersecurity regulations  Regulators bring adjudicatory enforcement actions on a case-by-case basis related to banks' violations of cybersecurity protocols  Banks often view these actions as signaling how an agency interprets aspects of its regulatory authority  For example, a number of recent consent orders issued by the FDIC have directed banks to perform assessments or audits of information technology programs and management to identify risks and ensure compliance with cybersecurity requirements  Thus, oversight of financial services and bank cybersecurity reflects a complex and sometimes overlapping array of state and federal laws, regulators, regulations, and guidance  However, whether this framework is effective and efficient, resulting in adequate protection against cyberattacks without imposing undue cost burdens on banks, is an open question  The occurrence of successful hacks of banks and other financial institutions, wherein huge amounts of individuals' personal information are stolen or compromised, highlights the importance of ensuring bank cybersecurity  For example, in 2014, JPMorgan Chase, the largest U S  bank, experienced a data breach that exposed financial records of 76 million households  However, no consensus exists on how best to reduce the occurrence of such incidents  Financial products can be complex and potentially difficult for consumers to fully understand  Consumers seeking loans or financial services could be vulnerable to deceptive or unfair practices  To reduce the occurrence of bad outcomes, laws and regulations have been put in place to protect consumers  This section provides background on consumer financial protection and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection's (CFPB) authority  The section also analyzes related issues, including whether the CFPB has used its authorities and regulations of banking institutions appropriately; concerns relating to the lack of consumer access to banking services; and whether the Community Reinvestment Act as currently implemented is effectively and efficiently meeting its goal of ensuring banks provide credit to the areas in which they operate  Banks are subject to consumer compliance regulation, intended to ensure that banks are in compliance with relevant consumer-protection and fair-lending laws  Federal laws and regulations in this area take a variety of approaches and address different areas of concern  Certain laws provide disclosure requirements intended to ensure consumers adequately understand the costs and other features and terms of financial products  Other laws prohibit unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices  Fair lending laws prohibit discrimination in credit transactions based upon certain borrower characteristics, including sex, race, religion, or age, among others  The financial crisis raised concerns among policymakers that regulators' mandates lacked sufficient focus on consumer protection  In response, the Dodd-Frank Act established the CFPB with the single mandate to implement and enforce federal consumer financial law, while ensuring consumers can access financial products and services  The CFPB also seeks to ensure the markets for consumer financial services and products are fair, transparent, and competitive  For banks with more than $10 billion in assets, the CFPB is the primary regulator for consumer compliance, whereas safety and soundness regulation continues to be performed by the prudential regulator  As a regulator of larger banks, the CFPB has rulemaking, supervisory, and enforcement authorities  A large bank, therefore, has different regulators for consumer protection and safety and soundness  For banks with $10 billion or less in assets, the rulemaking, supervisory, and enforcement authorities for consumer protection are divided between the CFPB and a prudential regulator  The CFPB may issue rules that apply to smaller banks, but the prudential regulators maintain primary supervisory and enforcement authority for consumer protection  The CFPB has limited supervisory and enforcement powers over small banks  Consumer protection and fair lending compliance continue to be important issues for banks for numerous reasons  Noncompliance can result in regulators taking enforcement actions that may involve substantial penalties  In addition, even in the absence of enforcement actions, an institution faces reputational risks if it comes to be perceived as dealing badly with customers  For example, the CFPB maintains a consumer complaints database that makes public consumer complaints against individual companies readily available, potentially affecting prospective customers' decisions on which companies to use for financial services  The recent public reaction to and enforcement actions pertaining to Wells Fargo's unauthorized opening of customer accounts show the importance of strong consumer protection compliance  Recently, banks and other nonbank financial institutions that provide financial products to consumers (e g , mortgages, credit cards, and deposit accounts) have been affected by the implementation of new CFPB regulations  For example, banks and other lenders have begun to comply with major new mortgage rules such as the Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Rule (ATR/QM) and Truth in Lending Act/Real Estate Settlement Act Integrated Disclosure Rule (TRID)  The ATR/QM encourages lenders to gather more information on prospective borrowers than they otherwise might have in order to reduce the likelihood that a borrower would receive an inappropriate loan  TRID requires lenders to provide borrowers with certain information about the mortgages for which they are applying  In addition to these and other new regulations, the CFPB also provides information on its supervisory activities related to banks, such as instances where its examiners found that certain financial institutions misrepresented service fees associated with deposit and checking accounts  Compliance with these new rules has increased banks' operational costs, which some argue potentially leads to higher costs for consumers in certain markets or a reduction in the availability of credit  Others stress that CFPB's regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement efforts reduce the likelihood of consumer harm in financial markets  Debates about how best to achieve the appropriate balance between consumer protection, credit access, and industry costs are unlikely to be resolved easily, and thus may continue to be an area of congressional interest  The banking sector provides valuable financial services for households that allow them to save, make payments, and access credit  Safe and affordable financial services allow households to avoid financial hardship, build assets, and achieve financial security  However, many U S  households (often those with low incomes, lack of credit histories, or credit histories marked with missed debt payments) do not use banking services  According to the FDIC's National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, in 2017, 6 5% of households in the United States were unbanked (i e , did not have an account at an insured institution) and 18 7% of households were underbanked (i e , obtained financial products and services outside of the banking system in the past year)  Lack of bank access leads some households to rely on alternative financial service providers and consumer credit products outside of the formal banking sector, such as payday or auto title loans  According to an FDIC estimate, 12 9% of households had unmet demand for mainstream small-dollar credit  Certain observers believe that financial outcomes for the unbanked and underbanked would be improved if banks—which may be more likely to be a stable source of relatively inexpensive financial services relative to certain alternatives—were more active in meeting this demand  For this reason, prudential regulators, like the OCC and the FDIC, are currently exploring ways to encourage banks to offer small-dollar credit products to consumers, and other policymakers and observers will likely continue to explore ways to make banking more accessible to a greater portion of the population  The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA; P L  95-128 ) addresses how banking institutions meet the credit needs of the areas they serve, notably in low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods  The federal prudential banking regulators (the Fed, the OCC, and the FDIC) conduct examinations to evaluate how banks are fulfilling the objectives of the CRA  The regulators issue CRA credits, or points, where banks engage in qualifying activities—such as mortgage, consumer, and business lending; community investments; and low-cost services that would benefit LMI areas and entities—that occur within an assigned assessment area   These credits are then used to issue each bank a performance rating, from Outstanding to Substantial Noncompliance  The CRA requires regulators to take these ratings into account when banks request to merge with other banking institutions or otherwise expand their operations into new areas  Whether regulations as currently implemented are effectively and efficiently meeting the CRA's goals has been the subject of debate  The banking industry and other observers assert that CRA regulations can be altered in a way that would reduce regulatory burden while still meeting the law's goals  Recently, the OCC and Treasury have made proposals to address those concerns  However, consumer and community advocates argue that efforts to provide relief to banks may potentially be at the expense of communities that the CRA is intended to help  Treasury made a number of recommendations to the bank regulators for changes to CRA regulations in a memorandum it sent to those agencies in April 2018  Regarding the need for modernization, the memorandum recommends revisiting the approach for determining banks' assessment areas, given that geographically defined areas arguably may not fully reflect the community served by a bank because of technology developments  Treasury also recommends establishing clearer standards for CRA-eligible activities that provide flexibility and expand the types of loans, investments, and services that are eligible for CRA credit  Regarding aspects of CRA compliance that may be unnecessarily burdensome, Treasury recommends increasing the timeliness of the CRA performance examination process  Regarding improving the outcomes that the CRA was intended to encourage, such as increasing the availability of credit to LMI neighborhoods, Treasury recommendations include incorporating performance incentives that might result in more efficient lending activities  In September 2018, the OCC published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) seeking public comment on 31 questions pertaining to issues to consider and possible changes to CRA regulation  The OCC's ANPR does not propose specific changes, but its content and the questions posed suggest that the OCC is exploring the possibility of adopting a quantitative metric-based approach to CRA performance evaluation, changing how assessment areas are defined, expanding CRA-qualifying activities, and reducing the complexity, ambiguity, and burden of the regulations on the bank industry  The OCC received more than 1,300 comment letters in response to the ANPR that were alternatively supportive or critical of the various possible alterations to CRA regulation  Although some banks hold a very large amount of assets, are complex, and operate on a national or international scale, the vast majority of U S  banks are relatively small, have simple business models, and operate within a local area  This section provides background on these simpler banks—often called community bank s —and analyzes issues related to them, including regulatory relief for community banks and the long-term decline in the number of community banks  Although there is no official definition of a community bank, policymakers and the public generally recognize that the vast majority of U S  banks differ substantially from a relatively small number of very large and complex banking organizations in a number of ways  Community banks tend to hold a relatively small amount of assets (although asset size alone need not be a determining factor); be more concentrated in core bank businesses of making loans and taking deposits and less involved in other, more complex activities; and operate within a smaller geographic area, making them generally more likely to practice relationship lending wherein loan officers and other bank employees have a longer standing and perhaps more personal relationship with borrowers  Therefore, community banks may serve as particularly important credit sources for local communities and underserved groups of which large banks may have little familiarity  In addition, relative to large banks, community banks generally have fewer employees, less resources to dedicate to regulatory compliance, and individually pose less of a systemic risk to the broader financial system  Congress often faces policy issue questions related to community banks  Community bank advocates often assert the tailoring of regulations currently in place does not adequately balance the benefits and costs of the regulations when applied to community banks  Concerns have also been raised about the three-decade decline in the number and market presence of these institutions, and the predominant cause of that decline is a matter of debate  In recent decades, community banks, under almost any common definition, have seen their numbers decline and their collective share of banking industry assets fall in the United States  Overall, the number of FDIC-insured institutions fell from a peak of 18,083 in 1986 to 5,477 in 2018  The number of institutions with less than $1 billion in assets fell from 17,514 to 4,704 during that time period, and the share of industry assets held by those banks fell from 37% to 7%  Meanwhile, the number of banks with more than $10 billion in assets rose from 38 to 138, and the share of total banking industry assets held by those banks increased from 28% to 84%  The decrease in the number of community banks occurred mainly through three methods: mergers, failures, and lack of new banks  Most of the decline in the number of institutions in the past 30 years was due to mergers, which averaged more than 400 a year from 1990 to 2016  Failures were minimal from 1999 to 2007, but played a larger role in the decline during the late 1980s and following the 2007-2009 financial crisis and subsequent recession  As economic conditions have improved, failures have declined, but the number of n ew r eporters —new chartered institutions providing information to the FDIC for the first time—has been extraordinarily small in recent years  For example, in the 1990s, an average of 130 new banks reported data to the FDIC per year  Through September 30, five new banks reported data to the FDIC in 2018  Observers have cited several possible causes for this industry consolidation  Some observers argue the decline indicates that the regulatory burden on community banks is too onerous, driving smaller banks to merge to create or join larger institutions, an argument covered in more detail in the following section, " Regulatory Burden on Community Banks  " However, mergers—the largest factor in consolidation—could occur for a variety of reasons  For example, a bank that is struggling financially may look to merge with a stronger bank to stay in business  Alternatively, a community bank that has been outperforming its peers may be bought by a larger bank that wants to benefit from its success  In addition, other fundamental changes besides regulatory burden in the banking system could be driving consolidation, making it difficult to isolate the effects of regulation  Through much of the 20 th century, federal and state laws restricted banks' ability to open new branches and banking across state lines was restricted  Thus, many more banks were needed to serve every community  Branching and banking across state lines was not substantially deregulated at the federal level until 1997 through the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 ( P L  103-328 )  When these restrictions were relaxed, it became easier for community banks to consolidate or for mid-size and large banks to spread operations to other markets  In addition, there may be economies of scale, not only in compliance, but in the business of banking in general  Furthermore, the economies of scale may be growing over time, which would also drive industry consolidation  For example, information technology has become more important in banking (e g , cybersecurity and mobile banking), and certain information technology systems may be subject to economies of scale  Finally, the slow growth coming out of the most recent recession, and macroeconomic conditions more generally (such as low interest rates), may make it less appealing for new firms to enter the banking market  Community banks receive special regulatory consideration to minimize their regulatory burden  For example, many regulations—including a number of regulations implemented pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act—include exemptions for community banks or are otherwise tailored to reduce compliance costs for community banks  Title I and Title II of the EGRRCP Act contained numerous provisions that provided new exemptions to community banks or raised the thresholds for existing exemptions, such as the Community Bank Leverage Ratio and Volcker Rule exemptions discussed above in the " Prudential Regulation " section  In addition, bank regulators are required to consider the effect of rules on community banks during the rulemaking process pursuant to provisions in the Regulatory Flexibility Act ( P L  96-354 ) and the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act ( P L  103-325 )  Supervision is also structured to pose less of a burden on small banks than larger banks, such as by requiring less-frequent bank examinations for certain small banks and less intensive reporting requirements  However, Congress often faces questions related to whether tailoring in general or tailoring provided in specific regulations is sufficient to ensure that an appropriate trade-off has been struck between the benefits and costs of regulations facing community banks  Advocates for further regulatory relief argue that certain realized benefits are likely to be relatively small, whereas certain realized costs are likely to be relatively large  One area where the benefits of regulation may be relatively small for community banks relative to large banks is regulations aimed at improving systemic stability, because community banks individually pose less of a risk to the financial system as a whole than a large, complex, interconnected bank  Many recent banking regulations were implemented at least in part in response to the systemic nature of the 2007-2009 crisis  Some community bank proponents argue that because small banks did not cause the crisis and pose less systemic risk, they need not be subject to new regulations made in response to the crisis  Opponents of these arguments note that systemic risk is only one of the goals of regulation, along with prudential regulation and consumer protection, and that community banks are exempted from many of the regulations aimed at systemic risk  They note that hundreds of small banks failed during and after the crisis, suggesting the prudential regulation in place prior to the crisis was not stringent enough  Another potential rationale for easing regulations on community banks would be if there are economies of scale to regulatory compliance costs, meaning that regulatory compliance costs may increase as bank size does but decrease as a percentage of overall costs or revenues  Put another way, as regulatory complexity increases, compliance may become relatively more costly for small institutions  Empirical evidence on whether compliance costs are subject to economies of scale is mixed, thus consider this illustrative example to show the logic behind the argument  Imagine a bank with $100 million in assets and 25 employees and a bank with $10 billion in assets and 1,250 employees each determine they must hire an extra employee to ensure compliance with new regulations  The relative burden is larger on the small institution that expands its workforce by 4% than on the large bank that expands by less than 0 1%  From a cost-benefit perspective, if regulatory compliance costs are subject to economies of scale, then the balance of costs and benefits of a particular regulation will differ depending on the size of the bank  For the same regulatory proposal, economies of scale could potentially result in costs outweighing benefits for smaller banks  Due to a lack of empirical evidence of the exact benefits and costs of each individual regulation at each individual bank (and even lack of consensus over which banks should qualify as community banks), debates over the appropriate level of tailoring of regulations is a debate over calibration involving qualitative assessments  Where should the lines be drawn? Should exemption thresholds be set high so that regulations apply only to the very largest, most complex banks? Should thresholds be set relatively low, so that only very small banks are exempt? At what point does a bank cease to have the characteristics associated with community banks? Often at issue in this debate are the so-called regional banks —banks that are larger and operate across a greater geographic market than the community banks but are also smaller and less complex than the largest, most complex organizations with hundreds of billions or trillions of dollars in assets  Should regulators provide regional banks the same exemptions as those provided to community banks? Policymakers, in the 116 th Congress, continue to face these and other questions concerning community banks  Along with the thousands of relatively small banks operating in the United States, there are a handful of banks with hundreds of billions of dollars of assets  The 2007-2009 financial crisis highlighted the problem of "too big to fail" (TBTF) financial institutions—the concept that the failure of a large financial firm could trigger financial instability, which in several cases prompted extraordinary federal assistance to prevent the failure of certain of these institutions  In response to the crisis, policymakers took a number of steps through the Dodd-Frank Act and the Basel III Accords to eliminate the TBTF problem, including subjecting the largest banks to enhanced prudential regulations, a new resolution regime to unwind these banks in the event of failure, and higher capital requirements  This section provides background on these large banks and examines issues related to them, including reductions in the application of enhanced prudential regulations facing certain large banks made pursuant to P L  115-174 and changes to capital requirements proposed by regulators that would reduce the amount of capital certain large banks would have to hold  As regulators implement these statutory changes and their proposed rules move forward, Congress faces questions about whether relaxing these regulations appropriately eases overly stringent requirements or unnecessarily increases the likelihood that large banks take on excessive risks  Some bank holding companies (BHCs) have hundreds of billions or trillions of dollars in assets and are deeply interconnected with other financial institutions  A bank may be so large that its leadership and market participants may believe that the government would save it if it became distressed  This belief could arise from the determination that the institution is so important to the country's financial system—and that its failure would be so costly to the economy and society—that the government would feel compelled to avoid that outcome  An institution of this size and complexity is said to be TBTF  In addition to fairness issues, economic theory suggests that expectations that a firm will not be allowed to fail creates moral hazard —if the creditors and counterparties of a TBTF firm believe that the government will protect them from losses, they have less incentive to monitor the firm's riskiness because they are shielded from the negative consequences of those risks  As a result, TBTF institutions may have incentives to be excessively risky, gain unfair advantages in the market for funding, and expose taxpayers to losses  Several market forces likely drive banks and other financial institutions to grow in size and complexity, thereby potentially increasing efficiency and improving financial and economic outcomes  For example, marginal costs can be reduced through economies of scale; risk can be diversified by spreading exposures over multiple business lines and geographic markets; and a greater array of financial products could be offered to customers allowing a bank to potentially attract new customers or strengthen relationships with existing ones  These market forces and the relaxation of certain interstate banking and branching regulations described in the " Reduction in Community Banks " section may have driven some banks to become very large and complex in the years preceding the crisis  At the end of 1997, two insured depository institutions held more than $250 billion in assets, and together accounted for about 9 3% of total industry assets  By the end of 2007, six banks held more than $250 billion in assets, accounting for 40 9% of industry assets  The trend has generally continued, and as of the third quarter of 2018, nine banks held more than $250 billion in assets, accounting for 49 5% of industry assets  Many assert that the worsening of the financial crisis in fall 2008 was a demonstration of TBTF-related problems  Large institutions had taken on risks that resulted in large losses, causing the institutions to come under threat of failure  In some cases, the U S  government took actions to stabilize the financial system and individual institutions  Wachovia and Washington Mutual were large institutions that were acquired by other institutions to avoid their failure during the crisis  Bank of America and Citigroup received extraordinary assistance through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to address financial difficulties  Other large (and small) banks participated in emergency government programs offered by the Treasury (TARP), the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC  In response, the Dodd-Frank Act attempted to end TBTF through (1) a new regulatory regime to reduce the likelihood that large banks would fail; (2) a new resolution regime to make it easier to safely wind down large bank holding companies that are at risk of failing; and (3) new restrictions on regulators' use of emergency authority to prevent "bail outs" of failing large banks  In addition, the Federal Reserve imposed additional capital requirements on the largest banks that largely aligned with proposed standards set out by the Basel III Accords, with some exceptions  To make it less likely that large banks would fail, certain large banks are now subject to an enhanced prudential regulatory regime administered by the Federal Reserve  Under this regime, large banks are subject to more stringent safety and soundness standards than other banks  They must comply with higher capital and liquidity requirements, undergo stress tests, produce living wills and capital plans, and comply with counterparty limits and risk management requirements  To make it easier to wind down complex BHCs with nonbank subsidiaries, the Dodd-Frank Act created the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), a resolution regime administered by the FDIC that is similar to how the FDIC resolves bank subsidiaries  This replaced the bankruptcy process, focused on the rights of creditors, with an administrative process, focused on financial stability, for winding down such firms  To date, OLA has never been used  The Dodd-Frank Act initially applied enhanced prudential regulation requirements to all BHCs with more than $50 billion in assets, although more stringent standards were limited to banks with more than $250 billion in assets or $10 billion in foreign exposure, and the most stringent standards were limited to U S  globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs), the eight most complex U S  banks  Subsequent to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, critics of the $50 billion asset threshold argued that many banks above that size are not systemically important and that Congress should raise the threshold  In particular, critics distinguished between regional banks (which tend to be at the lower end of the asset range and, some claim, have a traditional banking business model comparable to community banks) and Wall Street banks ( a term applied to the largest, most complex organizations that tend to have significant nonbank financial activities)  Opponents of raising the threshold disputed this characterization, arguing that some regional banks are involved in sophisticated activities, such as being swap dealers, and have large off-balance-sheet exposures  In response to concerns that the enhanced prudential regulation threshold was set too low, P L  115-174 exempted banks with between $50 billion and $100 billion in assets from enhanced prudential regulation, leaving them to be regulated in general like any other bank  Under the proposed rule implementing the P L  115-174 changes, the Fed has increased the tiering of enhanced regulation for banks with more than $100 billion in assets  The proposed rule would create four categories of banks based on size and complexity, and impose increasingly stringent requirements on each category  From most to least stringent, Category I would currently include the eight G-SIBs, Category II would include one bank, Category III would include four banks, and Category IV would include 11 banks  Compared with current policy, banks in all categories would face reduced regulatory requirements under this rule, other proposed rules, and forthcoming rules required by Section 402 of P L  115-174 , if finalized  In addition, P L  115-174 created new size-based exemptions from various regulations, increasing the tendency to subject larger banks to more stringent requirements than smaller banks  These changes include exemptions from the Volcker Rule and risk-weighted capital requirements for banks with less than $10 billion in assets (meeting certain criteria)  Proponents of the changes assert they provide necessary and targeted regulatory relief  Opponents argue they needlessly pare back important Dodd-Frank protections to the benefit of large and profitable banks  As discussed in the " Capital Requirements " section, all banks must hold enough capital to meet certain capital ratio requirements  Broadly, those requirements take two forms—risk-weighted requirements and unweighted leverage requirements  In addition, a small subset of very large and very complex banks also face additional capital ratio requirements implemented by the U S  federal bank regulators  The Federal Reserve has made two proposals to simplify and relax certain aspects of these additional requirements, and these proposals are subject to debate  All banks must hold additional high-quality capital on top of the minimum required levels—called the capital conservation buffer (CCB)—to avoid limitations on their capital distributions, such as dividend payments  In addition, certain large banks are subject to the Federal Reserve's stress tests, the results of which can lead to restrictions on the bank's capital distributions  Stress tests are intended to ensure that banks hold enough capital to withstand a hypothetical market stress scenario, but arguably have the effect of acting as additional capital requirements with which banks must comply  Advanced approaches banks must maintain a fixed minimum supplementary leverage ratio (SLR), an unweighted capital requirement that is more stringent than the leverage ratio facing smaller banks because it incorporates off-balance sheet exposures  A Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of large holding companies' regulatory filings indicates that, currently, 19 large and complex U S  bank or thrift holding companies are classified as advanced approaches banks  G-SIBs must meet fixed enhanced SLR (eSLR) requirements, which sets the SLR higher for these banks  In addition, the G-SIBs are subject to an additional risk-weighted capital surcharge (on top of other risk-weighted capital requirements that all banks must meet) of between 1% and 4 5% based on the systemic importance of the institution  Whether these requirements are appropriately calibrated is a debated issue  Proponents of recalibrating some of these capital requirements argue that those requirements set at a fixed number—including the CCB and eSLR—are inefficient, because they do not reflect varying levels of risk posed by individual banks  Recalibration proponents also argue that compiling with these requirements in addition to stress test requirements is unnecessarily burdensome for banks  Opponents of proposals to relax current capital requirements facing large and profitable banks assert that doing so needlessly pares back important safeguards against bank failures and systemic instability  In response to concerns that fixed requirements do not adequately account for risk differences between institutions, the Fed has issued two proposals for public comment that would link individual large banks' requirements with other risk measures  One proposal would make bank CCB requirements a function of their stress tests results, and the other proposal would link large banks' eSLR requirements with individual G-SIB systemic importance scores  The Fed estimates that the new CCB requirement would generally reduce the amount of capital large banks would have to hold, but that some G-SIBs would see their required capital levels increase  The Fed estimates that the new eSLR requirement would generally reduce the amount of capital held by G-SIB parent companies by $400 million and the amount held by insured depository subsidiaries by $121 billion  To legally operate as a bank and perform the relevant activities, an institution generally must have a charter granted by either the OCC at the federal level or a state-level authority  In addition, to engage in certain activities, the institution must have federal deposit insurance granted by the FDIC  Currently, these requirements raise a number of policy questions, including whether companies established primarily as financial technology companies should be able to receive a national bank charter, as has been offered by the OCC; and whether the application process and determinations made by the FDIC as they relate to institutions seeking a specific type of state charter, called an industrial loan company (ILC) charter, is overly restrictive  An institution that makes loans and takes deposits—the core activities of traditional commercial banking—must have a government issued charter  Numerous types of charters exist, including national bank charters; state bank charters; federal savings association charters, and state savings association charters (saving associations are also referred to as thrifts )  Each charter type determines what activities are permissible for the institution, what activities are restricted, and which agency will be the institution's primary federal regulator (see Table 1 )  One of the main rationales for this system is that it gives institutions with different business models and ownership arrangements the ability to choose a regulatory regime appropriately suited to the institution's business needs and risks  The differences between institution business models and the attendant regulations are numerous, varied, and beyond the scope of this report  The issues examined in this section arise from each charter's granting an institution the right to engage in certain banking related activities, and thus generating the potential benefits and risks of those activities  Broadly, these issues relate to questions over whether companies that differ from traditional banks should be allowed to engage in traditional banking activities given the types and magnitudes of benefits and risks the companies might present  Recent advances in technology, including the proliferation of available data and internet access, have altered the way financial activities are performed in many ways  These innovations in financial technology, or fintech, have created the opportunity for certain activities that have traditionally been the business of banks to instead be performed by technology-focused, nonbank companies  Lending and payment processing are prominent examples  This development has raised questions over how these fintech companies should be regulated, and the appropriate federal and state roles in that regulation  One possible, though contested, proposal for addressing a number of these questions would be to make an OCC national bank charter available to certain fintech companies  Many nonbank fintech companies performing bank-like activities are regulated largely at the state level  They may have to obtain lending licenses or register as money transmitters in every state they operate and may be subject to the consumer protection laws of that state, such as interest rate limits  Proponents of fintech companies argue that subjecting certain technology companies to 50 different state level regulatory regimes is unnecessarily burdensome and hinders companies that hope to achieve nationwide operations quickly using the internet  In addition, a degree of uncertainty surrounding the applicability of certain laws and regulations to certain fintech firms and activities has arisen  For example, whether federal preemption of state interest rate limits apply to loans made through a marketplace lender —that is, online-only lenders that exclusively use automated, algorithmic underwriting—but originated by a bank faces legal uncertainty due to certain court decisions, including Madden v Midlands   One possible avenue to ease the state-by-state regulatory burdens and resolve the uncertainties facing some fintech firms would be to allow those firms that perform bank-like activities to apply for and (provided they meet necessary requirements) to grant them national bank charters  First proposed in 2016 by then-Comptroller of the Currency Thomas Curry, and following subsequent examination of the issue and review of public comments, the OCC announced in July 2018 that it would consider "applications for special purpose bank charters from financial technology (fintech) companies that are engaged in the business of banking but do not take deposits " OCC argues that companies with such a charter would be explicitly subject to all laws and regulations (including those that preempt state law, a contentious issue addressed below) applicable to national banks  The OCC stated that fintech firms granted the charter "will be subject to the same high standards of safety and soundness and fairness that all federally chartered banks must meet," and also that the OCC "may need to account for differences in business models and activities, risks, and the inapplicability of certain laws resulting from the uninsured status of the bank " Thus, the argument goes, establishing a fintech charter would mean a new set of innovative companies would no longer face regulatory uncertainty and could safely and efficiently provide beneficial financial services, perhaps to populations and market-niches that banks with traditional cost structures do not find cost-effective to serve  Until the OCC actually grants such charters and fintech firms operate under the national bank regime for some amount of time, how well this policy fosters potential innovations and benefits while guarding against risks is the subject of debate  Proponents of the idea generally view the charter as a mechanism for freeing companies from what they assert is the unnecessarily onerous regulatory burden of being subject to numerous state regulatory regimes  They further argue that this would be achieved without overly relaxing regulations, as the companies would become subject to the OCC's national bank regulatory regime and its rulemaking, supervisory, and enforcement authorities  Opponents generally assert both that the OCC does not have the authority to charter these types of companies, as discussed below, and that doing so would inappropriately allow marketplace lenders to circumvent important state-level consumer protections  The OCC's assertion that it has the authority to grant such charters has been challenged  Shortly after the initial 2016 announcements that the OCC was examining the possibility of granting the charters, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the New York State Department of Financial Services sued the OCC to prevent it from issuing the charters on the grounds that it lacked the authority to do so  A federal district court dismissed the case after concluding that because the OCC had not yet issued charters to nonbanks, the plaintiffs (1) lacked standing to challenge the OCC's purported decision to move forward with chartering nonbanks, and (2) had alleged claims that were not ripe for adjudication  Subsequent to the OCC's July 2018 announcement, state regulators have again filed lawsuits  Industrial loan companies (ILCs) hold a particular type of charter offered by some states that generally allows ILCs to engage in certain banking activities  Depending on the state, those activities can include deposit-taking, but only if they are granted deposit insurance by the FDIC  Thus, ILCs that take deposits are state regulated with the FDIC acting as the primary federal regulator  Importantly, a parent company that owns an ILC that meets certain criteria is not necessarily considered a BHC for legal and regulatory purposes  This means ILC charters create an avenue for commercial firms (i e , companies not primarily focused on the financial industry, such as manufacturers, retailers, or possibly technology companies) to own a bank  Nonfinancial parent companies of ILCs generally are not subject to Fed supervision and other regulations pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (P L  84-511)  A commercial firm may want to own a bank for a number of economic reasons  For example, an ILC can provide financing to the parent company's customers and clients and thus increase sales for the parent  In recent decades, household-name manufacturers have owned ILCs, including but not limited to General Motors, Toyota, Harley Davidson, and General Electric  However, while they can generate profits and potentially increase credit availability, ILCs pose a number of potential risks  The United States has historically adopted policies to generally separate commerce and banking, because allowing a single company to be involved in both activities could potentially result in a number of bad outcomes  A mixed organization's banking subsidiary could make decisions based on the interests of the larger organization, such as making overly risky loans to customers of a commerce subsidiary or providing funding to save a failing commerce subsidiary  Such conflicts of interest could threaten the safety and soundness of the bank  Relatedly, some have argued that having a federally insured bank within a commercial organization is an inappropriate expansion of federal banking safety nets (such as deposit insurance)  Certain observers, including community banks, have concerns over whether purely commercial or purely banking organizations would be able to compete with combined organizations that could potentially use economies of scale and funding advantages to exercise market power  These arguments played a prominent role in the public debate that was sparked when Walmart and Home Depot made unsuccessful efforts to secure an ILC charter between 2005 and 2008  Amid this debate, the FDIC imposed a moratorium in 2006 on the acceptance, approval, or denial of ILC applications for deposit insurance while the agency reexamined its policies related to these companies  That moratorium ended in January 2008  Subsequently, concerns over ILCs led Congress to mandate another moratorium (this one lasting three years, ending in July 2013) on granting new ILCs deposit insurance in the Dodd-Frank Act  No consensus has been reached on the magnitude of these risks and validity of the concerns surrounding deposit-taking ILCs  Recently, two financial technology companies, Square and SoFi, have applied for ILC charters and renewed debates over ILCs  Even though the moratoriums on granting ILCs deposit insurance have expired, the FDIC has not approved any new ILC applications since the 2013 expiration  However, since becoming FDIC chairman in June 2018, Jelena McWilliams has made statements indicating that under her leadership the FDIC will again consider ILC applications  Given the interest in and debate surrounding this charter type, policymakers will likely examine questions over the extent to which ILCs create innovative sources of credit and financial services subject to appropriate safeguards or inadvisably allow commercial organizations to act as banks with federal safety nets while exempting them from certain bank regulation and supervision  In addition to regulation issues, market and economic conditions and trends continually affect the banking industry  This section analyzes such trends that may affect banks, including migration of financial activity from banks into nonbanks or the "shadow banking" system; increasing capabilities and market presence of financial technology or fintech; and a higher interest rate environment following a long period of extraordinarily low rates  Credit intermediation is a core banking activity and involves transforming short-term, liquid, safe liabilities into relatively long-term, illiquid, higher-risk assets  In the context of traditional banking, credit intermediation is performed by taking deposits from savers and using them to fund loans to borrowers  Nonbank institutions can also perform similar credit intermediation to banks—sometimes called shadow banking —using certain instruments such as money market mutual funds, short-term debt instruments, and securitized pools of loans  When illiquid assets are funded by liquid liabilities, an otherwise-solvent bank or nonbank might experience difficulty meeting short-term obligations without having to sell assets, possibly at "fire sale" prices  If depositors or other funding providers feel their money is not safe with an institution, many of them may withdraw their funds at the same time  Such a "run" could cause an institution to fail  Long-established government programs mitigate liquidity- and run-risk in the banking industry  The Federal Reserve is authorized to act as a "lender of last resort" for a bank experiencing liquidity problems, and the FDIC insures depositors against losses  Banks are also subject to prudential regulation—as discussed in the " Prudential Regulation " section  However, nonbank intermediation is performed without the government safety nets available to banks or the prudential regulation required of them  The lack of an explicit government safety net in shadow banking means that taxpayers are less explicitly or directly exposed to risk, but it also means that shadow banking may be more vulnerable to a panic that could trigger a financial crisis  Some argue that the increased regulatory burden placed on banks in response to the financial crisis—such as the changes in bank regulation mandated by Dodd-Frank or agreed to in Basel III—could result in a decreased role for banks in credit intermediation and an increased role for relatively lightly regulated nonbanks  Many contend the financial crisis demonstrated how risks to deposit-like financial instruments in the shadow banking sector—such as money market mutual funds and repurchase agreements—can create or exacerbate systemic distress  Money market mutual funds are deposit-like instruments that are managed with the goal of never losing principal and that investors can convert to cash on demand  Institutions can also access deposit-like funding by borrowing through short-term funding markets—such as by issuing commercial paper and entering repurchase agreements  These instruments can be continually rolled over as long as funding providers have confidence in the borrowers' solvency  During the crisis, all these instruments—which investors had previously viewed as safe and unlikely to suffer losses—experienced run-like events as funding providers withdrew from markets  Moreover, nonbanks can take on exposure to long-term loans through investing in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) or other asset-backed securities (ABS)  During the crisis, as firms faced liquidity problems, the value of these assets decreased quickly, possibly in part as a result of fire sales  Since the crisis, many regulatory changes have been made related to certain money market, commercial paper, and repurchase agreement markets and practices  For example, in the United States, certain money market mutual funds now must have a floating net asset value   Among other benefits, this may signal to fund investors that a loss of principal is possible and thus reduce the likelihood that investors would "run" at the first sign of possible small losses  However, some observers are still concerned that shadow banking poses risks, because the funding of relatively long-term assets with relatively short-term liabilities will inherently introduce run-risk absent certain safeguards  As discussed above, f intech usually refers to technologies with the potential to alter the way certain financial services are performed  Banks are affected by technological developments in two ways: (1) they face choices over how much to invest in emerging technologies and to what extent they want to alter their business models in adopting technologies, and (2) they potentially face new competition from new technology-focused companies  Such technologies include online marketplace lending, crowdfunding, blockchain and distributed ledgers, and robo-advising, among many others  Certain financial innovations may create opportunities to improve social and economic outcomes, but there is also potential to create risks or unexpected financial losses  Potential benefits from fintech are greater efficiency in financial markets that creates lower prices and increased customer and small business access to financial services  These can be achieved if innovative technology replaces traditional processes that are outdated or inefficient  For example, automation may be able to replace employees, and digital technology can replace physical systems and infrastructure  Cost savings from removing inefficiencies may lead to reduced prices, making certain services affordable to new customers  Some customers who previously did not have access to services—due to such things as the lack of information about creditworthiness or geographic remoteness—could also potentially gain access  Increased accessibility may be especially beneficial to traditionally underserved groups, such as low-income, minority, and rural populations  Fintech could also create or increase risks  Many fintech products have only a brief history of operation, so it can be difficult to predict outcomes and assess risk  It is possible certain technologies may not in the end function as efficiently and accurately as intended  Also, the stated aim of a new technology is often to bring a product directly to consumers and eliminate a "middle-man " However, that middle-man could be an experienced financial institution or professional that can advise consumers on financial products and their risks  In these ways, fintech could increase the likelihood that consumers engage in a financial activity and take on risks that they do not fully understand  Policymakers debate whether (and which) innovations can be integrated into the financial system without additional regulatory or policy action  Technology in finance largely involves reducing the costs or time involved in providing existing products and services, and the existing regulatory structure was developed to address risks from these financial products and activities  Existing regulation may be able to accommodate new technologies while adequately protecting against risks  However, there are two other possibilities  One is that some regulations may be stifling beneficial innovation  Another is that existing regulation does not adequately address risks created by new technologies  Some observers argue that regulation could potentially impede the development and introduction of beneficial innovation  For example, companies incur costs to comply with regulations  In addition, companies are sometimes unsure how regulators will treat the innovation once it is brought to market  A potential solution being used in other countries is to establish a regulatory "sandbox" or "greenhouse" wherein companies that meet certain requirements work with regulators as products are brought to market under a less onerous regulatory framework  In the United States, the CFPB has recently introduced a sandbox wherein companies can experiment with disclosure forms  Some are concerned that existing regulations may not adequately address certain risks posed by new technologies  Regulatory arbitrage—conducting business in a way that circumvents unfavorable regulations—may be a concern in this area  Fintech potentially could provide an opportunity for companies to claim they are not subject to certain regulations because of a superficial difference between how they operate compared with traditional banks  Another group of issues posed by fintech relates to cybersecurity (for general issues related to cybersecurity, see the " Cybersecurity " section above)  As financial activity increasingly uses digital technology, sensitive data are generated  Data can be used to accurately assess risks and ensure customers receive the best products and services  However, data can be stolen and used inappropriately, and there are concerns over privacy issues  This raises questions over ownership and control of the data—including the rights of consumers and the responsibilities of companies in accessing and using data—and whether companies that use and collect data face appropriate cybersecurity requirements  The Federal Reserve's monetary policy response to the financial crisis, the ensuing recession, and subsequent slow economic growth was to keep interest rates unusually low for an extraordinarily long time  It accomplished this in part using unprecedented monetary policy tools such as quantitative easing —large-scale asset purchases that significantly increased the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet  Recently, as economic conditions improved, the Federal Reserve took steps to normalize monetary policy such as raising its target interest rate and reducing the size of its balance sheet  A rising interest rate environment—especially following an extended period of unusually low rates achieved with unprecedented monetary policy tools—is an issue for banks because they are exposed to interest rate risk   A portion of bank assets have fixed interest rates with long terms until maturity, such as mortgages, and the rates of return on these assets do not increase as current market rates do  However, many bank liabilities are short term, such as deposits, and can be repriced quickly  So although certain interest revenue being collected by banks is slow to rise, the interest costs paid out by banks can rise quickly  In addition to putting stress on net income, rising interest rates can cause the market value of fixed-rate assets to fall  Finally, banks incur an opportunity cost when resources are tied up in long-term assets with low interest rates rather than being used to make new loans at higher interest rates  The magnitude of interest rate risks should not be overstated, as rising rates can potentially increase bank profitability if they result in a greater difference between long-term rates banks receive and short-term rates they pay—referred to as net interest margin   However, thus far into the Federal Reserve interest rate normalization process, this has not materialized  During 2018, the difference between long-term rates and short-term rates has generally decreased (known as a flattening of the yield curve )  Whatever changes may occur to various interest rates in the coming months and years, banks and regulators typically recognize the importance of managing interest rate risk, carefully examine the composition of bank balance sheets, and plan for different interest rate change scenarios  While banks are well-practiced at interest rate risk management through normal economic and monetary policy cycles, managing bank risk through a period of interest rate growth could be more challenging because rates have been so low for so long and achieved through unprecedented monetary policy tools  Because rates have been low for so long, many loans made in different interest rate environments that preceded the crisis have matured  Meanwhile, all new loans made in the past 10 years were made in a low interest rate environment  This presents challenges to banks seeking to hold a mix of loans with different rates  In addition, because the Federal Reserve has used new monetary policy tools and grown its balance sheet to unprecedented levels, accurately controlling the pace of interest rate growth may be challenging  

ground_truth: In February 2017, components of California's Oroville Dam failed, leading to the evacuation of nearly 200,000 nearby residents. FERC is the federal regulator of the Oroville Dam and over 2,500 other dams associated with nonfederal hydropower projects nationwide. FERC issues and renews licenses—which can last up to 50 years—to dam operators and promotes safe dam operation by conducting safety inspections and reviewing technical engineering studies, among other actions. GAO was asked to review FERC's approach to overseeing dam safety. This report examines: (1) how FERC collects information from its dam safety inspections and the extent of its analysis, and (2) how FERC evaluates engineering studies of dam performance to analyze safety, among other objectives. GAO analyzed documentation on a non-generalizable sample of 42 dams associated with projects relicensed from fiscal years 2014 through 2017, selected based on geography and hazard classifications, among other factors. GAO also reviewed FERC regulations and documents; and interviewed FERC staff associated with the selected projects and technical consultants, selected based on the frequency and timing of their reviews. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) staff generally followed established guidance in collecting safety information from dam inspections for the dams GAO reviewed, but FERC has not used this information to analyze dam safety portfolio-wide. For these 42 dams, GAO found that FERC staff generally followed guidance in collecting safety information during inspections of individual dams and key structures associated with those dams. (See figure.) However, FERC lacks standard procedures that specify how and where staff should record safety deficiencies identified. As a result, FERC staff use multiple systems to record inspection findings, thereby creating information that cannot be easily analyzed. Further, while FERC officials said inspections help oversee individual dam's safety, FERC has not analyzed this information to identify any safety risks across its portfolio. GAO's prior work has highlighted the importance of evaluating risks across a portfolio. FERC officials stated that they have not conducted portfolio-wide analyses because officials prioritize the individual dam inspections and response to urgent dam safety incidents. However, following the Oroville incident, a FERC-led initiative to examine dam structures comparable to those at Oroville identified 27 dam spillways with varying degrees of safety concerns, on which FERC officials stated they are working with dam licensees to address. A similar and proactive portfolio-wide approach, based on analysis of common inspection deficiencies across the portfolio of dams under FERC's authority, could help FERC identify safety risks prior to a safety incident. Guidelines recognize that each dam is unique and allow for flexibility and exemptions in its use. FERC staff use the studies to inform other components of their safety approach, including the analysis of dam failure scenarios and their review of safety to determine whether to renew a license. GAO recommends that FERC: (1) develop standard procedures for recording information collected as part of its inspections, and (2) use inspection information to assess safety risks across FERC's portfolio of dams. FERC agreed with GAO's recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The Navy currently has 51 attack submarines—comprising 33 Los Angeles class, 3 Seawolf class, and 15 Virginia class submarines (see fig  1)  Attack submarines are homeported at bases in the United States: in New London, Connecticut; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Norfolk, Virginia; San Diego, California; and Bangor, Washington; 4 are homeported overseas, in the U S  territory of Guam  Submarine Safety Controls and Culture On April 10, 1963, the USS Thresher (SSN 593) sank during deep submergence tests off the coast of New England  One hundred and twelve officers and enlisted sailors and 17 civilians perished in the tragedy  The accident investigation concluded that the Navy did not have adequate procedures in place to prevent and respond to a catastrophic flooding incident  time, and that maintenance delays reduce the amount of time during which ships and submarines are available for training and operations  Submarine fleet and squadron officials emphasized the strict safety culture that permeates the submarine community  This emphasis on meeting safety certification criteria means that the Navy operates a supply-based submarine force that does not compromise on adherence to training and maintenance standards to meet combatant commander demands, according to these officials (see sidebar)  Officials added that the Navy will delay deployment dates if necessary to ensure that these standards are met  As a result, deployed readiness is high and attack submarines are in excellent materiel condition as compared with the rest of the Navy fleet  The loss of the USS Thresher and its crew spurred the Navy to establish stringent safety requirements for submarines to prevent another loss at sea  Following the accident, the Navy established submarine safety certification criteria to provide maximum reasonable assurance that critical systems would protect the crew from flooding and allow the submarine to conduct an emergency surfacing should flooding occur  This program, known as SUBSAFE, is still in use today, to ensure that these critical systems receive a high quality of work and that all work is properly documented  According to the Navy, the SUBSAFE certification status of a submarine is fundamental to its mission capability, as it provides a thorough and systematic approach to quality, and to a culture that permeates the entire submarine community  According to Navy officials, since the SUBSAFE program was established in 1963, no SUBSAFE-certified submarine has ever been lost  The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and support cost expenditures  Our analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between fiscal year 2008 and the end of fiscal year 2018, attack submarines will have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards  Our analysis found that the primary driver affecting attack submarines are delays in completing depot maintenance  For example, of the 10,363 total days of lost time since fiscal year 2008, 8,472 (82 percent) were due to depot maintenance delays  As we previously reported, completing ship and submarine maintenance on time is essential to Navy readiness, as maintenance periods lasting longer than planned could reduce the number of days during which ships and crews are available for training or operations  Attack submarines also face delays in beginning maintenance when the public shipyards have no available capacity, in some cases forcing submarines to idle pierside because they are no longer certified to conduct normal operations  According to Navy officials, the SUBSAFE program—its program to ensure and certify submarine safety—requires submarines to adhere to strict maintenance schedules and pass materiel condition assessments before they are allowed to submerge  Attack submarines that go too long without receiving required maintenance are at risk of having their materiel certification expire  Should this certification expire, these submarines are restricted to sitting idle, pierside, while they wait until a shipyard has the capacity to begin their maintenance period (see fig  2)  We found that since fiscal year 2008, 14 attack submarines have spent a combined 61 months (1,891 days) idling while waiting to enter shipyards for maintenance  Idle time incurred while waiting to begin a maintenance period is often coupled with maintenance delays while at the shipyards, thus compounding total delays  We also found that the Navy incurs significant costs in operating and supporting submarines that are experiencing maintenance delays and idle time  We analyzed the operating and support costs the Navy incurs on average to estimate the costs of crewing, maintaining, and supporting attack submarines that are delayed in getting into and out of the shipyards  Using historical daily cost data the Navy adjusted for inflation, we estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has spent more than $1 5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars on attack submarines sitting idle while waiting to enter the shipyards, and on those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards (see table 1)  While the Navy would incur these costs regardless of whether the submarine was delayed, idled, or deployed, our estimate of $1 5 billion represents costs incurred from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2018 for attack submarines without receiving any operational capability in return  While acknowledging the magnitude of these costs, Navy officials stated that there may be some benefits that could be realized from these operating and support costs since crews on idle attack submarines can conduct some limited training  Operating and support costs include payment of crew salaries, purchasing of spare parts, and conducting of maintenance, among other things, but they do not represent the full operational impact incurred by the Navy from the idle time and maintenance delays  For example, attack submarine depot-level maintenance requires the use of a drydock, and officials from the three public shipyards we visited told us that their drydock capacity was limited  A delayed attack submarine maintenance period can restrict the use of a drydock for much longer than originally anticipated, thereby preventing the shipyard from using that drydock to maintain other vessels, including other types of ships, or to conduct necessary repairs on the facilities  The Navy has started to address workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards  These efforts to address the Navy’s maintenance challenges are important steps, but they will require several years of sustained management attention to reach fruition  As we reported in September 2017, maintenance on ships and submarines may be delayed for numerous reasons, including workforce gaps and inexperience, the poor condition of facilities and equipment, parts shortages, changes in planned maintenance work, and weather  According to Navy officials, all of these issues continue to affect the Navy’s ability to complete attack submarine maintenance on time  According to officials, the Navy has begun to address some of these challenges  For example: The public shipyards have been hiring to address workforce shortages  The number of civilian full-time employees at the shipyards increased from 25,087 in 2007 to 34,160 in 2017, with a goal to reach 36,100 by 2020  Navy officials cautioned that this newly hired workforce is largely inexperienced and will require time to attain full proficiency  The Navy has released a plan to guide public shipyard capital investments  In September 2017 we reported that the Navy projected an inability to support 50 planned submarine maintenance periods over the ensuing 23 years, due to capacity and capability shortfalls at the public shipyards  We recommended that the Navy develop a comprehensive plan for shipyard capital investment  In February 2018 the Navy published its shipyard optimization plan, outlining an estimated $21 billion investment needed to address shipyard facility and equipment needs over 20 years to meet the operational needs of the current Navy fleet, but not the larger fleet size planned for the future  While the public shipyards have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing  The Navy expects the maintenance backlogs at the public shipyards to continue  We estimate that, as a result of these backlogs, the Navy will incur approximately $266 million in operating and support costs in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars for idle submarines from fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year 2023, as well as additional depot maintenance delays  The Navy may have options to mitigate idle time and maintenance delays  For example, officials at the private shipyards—General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News Shipbuilding—told us that they will have available capacity for repair work for at least the next 5 years  Although the Navy has shifted about 8 million man-hours in attack submarine maintenance to private shipyards over the past 5 years, it has done so sporadically, having decided to do so in some cases only after experiencing lengthy periods of idle time  According to private shipyard officials, the sporadic shifts in workload have resulted in repair workload gaps that have disrupted private shipyard workforce, performance, and capital investment—creating costs that are ultimately borne in part by the Navy  We believe that the Navy has not fully mitigated this challenge because it has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards, and to proactively minimize attack submarine idle time and maintenance delays  Such an analysis would help the Navy better assess private shipyard capacity to perform attack submarine maintenance and would help it incorporate a complete accounting of all costs, benefits, and risks, including: the large operating and support costs of having attack submarines sitting idle; the qualitative benefits associated with providing additional availability to the combatant commanders; and the potential for additional work at private shipyards to reduce schedule risk to submarine construction programs by allowing the yards to build and maintain a stable shipyard workforce  The April 2011 DOD Product Support Business Case Analysis Guidebook provides standards for DOD’s process for conducting analyses of costs, benefits, and risks  It states that data sources used to conduct a business case analysis should be comprehensive and should include both quantitative and qualitative values  It notes that benefits, such as the availability of a weapon system, may be qualitative in nature, and that DOD should evaluate all possible support options, to include government- and contractor-provided maintenance  Navy leadership has acknowledged that they need to be more proactive in leveraging private shipyard repair capacity, but officials cautioned that maintenance could cost more at a private shipyard than at a public shipyard  However, without a complete accounting of all costs, benefits, and risks, the Navy will remain unable to determine whether the cost of performing a maintenance period at a private shipyard would outweigh the mission benefits of having reduced idle time, additional operational availability, and the potential for reduced risk to submarine construction programs  The nation’s investment in attack submarines provides the United States an asymmetric advantage to gather intelligence undetected, attack enemy targets, and insert special forces, among other capabilities  However, the Navy’s attack submarine fleet has suffered from persistent and costly maintenance delays  Although the Navy has several activities underway to reduce maintenance delays for the attack submarine fleet, it has not yet taken additional steps to maximize attack submarine readiness that fully address challenges such as the allocation of maintenance periods between public and private shipyards  Without addressing this challenge, the Navy will not achieve the full benefit of the nation’s investment in its attack submarines, and it risks continued expenditure of operating and support funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance  The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Chief of Naval Operations conducts a business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards; this analysis should include an assessment of private shipyard capacity to perform attack submarine maintenance, and should incorporate a complete accounting of both (a) the costs and risks associated with attack submarines sitting idle, and (b) the qualitative benefits associated with having the potential to both mitigate risk in new submarine construction and provide additional availability to the combatant commanders  We provided a draft of the classified version of the report to DOD for review and comment  That draft contained the same recommendation as this unclassified version as well as three additional recommendations DOD deemed sensitive  In written comments provided by DOD (reprinted in appendix II), DOD concurred with our recommendation stating that it has taken the first steps to take a more holistic view of submarine maintenance requirements and impacts across both the public and private shipyards  The Navy also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy, and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  To assess the extent to which the Navy has experienced maintenance delays in its attack submarine fleet, we analyzed attack submarine maintenance delay and idle time data from Naval Sea Systems Command, and we reviewed prior GAO work on shipyard maintenance delays  The Navy determines depot maintenance delays by counting each day in which a submarine maintenance period extends beyond the planned completion date  Two Navy offices within Naval Sea Systems Command—that is, the Logistics, Maintenance, and Industrial Operations office and Program Executive Office Submarines—track days incurred from depot-level maintenance delays and idle time  To determine the total number of days of maintenance delays for each fiscal year within our scope, we subtracted the planned completion date from the actual completion date to produce the number of days of maintenance delays for each maintenance period for each submarine  We added together the days of maintenance delays across all attack submarines for each fiscal year, and then added the fiscal year totals to produce the overall total


Report 2:  Although the data included some maintenance periods that began before fiscal year 2008, we counted days of maintenance delays only from periods that were incurred in fiscal years 2008 through 2018  We also tracked the total number of days that the Navy completed maintenance periods ahead of schedule—that is, 153—but we noted these separately instead of subtracting them from the total number of days of maintenance delays  To estimate costs associated with these delays, we analyzed annual data from fiscal years 2011 through 2017 (the most current data available at the time of our review) from the Navy’s Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs system  We also reviewed prior work on determining the operating and support costs of Navy ships  The Navy calculates total operating and support expenditures for each attack submarine on an annual basis, as well as the yearly average expenditure for each attack submarine class, including Los Angeles class, Seawolf class, and Virginia class blocks one and two  For each class, we converted the Navy’s annual class averages into daily average costs by adding the annual class averages together for each year that data were available, fiscal years 2011 through 2017, then dividing that number by the total number of days  We then multiplied the daily class average by the total number of days of maintenance delays and idle time incurred by submarines within that class, according to our calculations outlined above, between fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2018, and we added these totals together to produce the total estimated operating and support cost for days of maintenance delays and idle time incurred during this period  The data did not include annual class average costs for fiscal years 2008, 2009, 2010, or 2018  However, the annual class averages for fiscal years 2011 through 2017 did not show significant variation, so we applied these averages to 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2018  To assess the extent to which the Navy has addressed any challenges and developed mitigation plans for any maintenance delays, we reviewed the Navy’s plans to address attack submarine maintenance delays and interviewed Navy headquarters, fleet, and squadron officials, attack submarine crews, and public and private shipyard officials to understand any plans to address attack submarine maintenance delays and idle time  We analyzed data on factors contributing to attack submarine maintenance delays, such as cannibalization rates  We visited three of the four public shipyards, including Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and Norfolk Naval Shipyard, to observe operations, training, and the condition of the facilities and equipment, and to interview officials about challenges affecting operational efficiency and performance  We also met with Navy maintainers at Naval Station Norfolk and Naval Submarine Base New London, and with the crew of the submarine tenders USS Frank Cable (AS-40) and USS Emory S  Land (AS-39) in Guam  We toured the two private shipyards that conduct attack submarine repair work—General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News Shipbuilding—and interviewed executives at both locations  We also toured attack submarines and met with crew leadership, selected according to which submarines and crews were available for tours at each of the sites we visited  We visited the USS Boise (SSN 764) at Naval Station Norfolk and four attack submarines in depot-level maintenance: the USS Albany (SSN 753), the USS Jefferson City (SSN 759), the USS New Mexico (SSN 779), and the USS Springfield (SSN 761)  We met with the crews of two attack submarines assigned to the operating forces at the time of our visit, the USS Missouri (SSN 780) and the USS North Dakota (SSN 784)  We evaluated the Navy’s plans to address any challenges against criteria in federal standards for internal control, which state that agencies should evaluate performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks; the Department of Defense’s business case analysis guidebook, which provides standards for the process used to conduct analyses of costs, benefits, and risks; the Project Management Book of Knowledge, which provides best practices for project management; and the Secretary of the Navy’s December 2017 Strategic Readiness Review, which calls for the early identification of systemic risks before problems occur  To assess the reliability of the data sources for conducting analyses to address all of the objectives in this report, we reviewed systems documentation and interviewed officials to understand system operating procedures, organizational roles and responsibilities, and error-checking mechanisms  We selected the time frames for each of the data series above after assessing their availability and reliability, to maximize the amount of data available for us to make meaningful comparisons  We assessed the reliability of each of the data sources  The Navy provided information based on our questions regarding data reliability, including information on an overview of the data, data-collection processes and procedures, data quality controls, and overall perceptions of data quality  The Navy provided documentation of how the systems are structured and what written procedures are in place to help ensure that the appropriate information is collected and properly categorized  Additionally, we interviewed Navy officials to obtain further clarification on data reliability, discuss how the data were collected and reported, and explain how we planned to use the data  We also conducted our own error checks to look for inaccurate or questionable data, and we discussed with officials any data irregularities we found  We conducted these assessments on the following data for attack submarines: Navy deployed and surge-ready submarines from fiscal years 2011 through 2018; maintenance timeliness from fiscal years 2000 through 2018; idle time from fiscal years 2008 through 2018; operating and support costs from fiscal years 2011 through 2017; and cannibalization rates from 2012 through 2017  Some of these data were used in prior reports, and their reliability had previously been assessed  After further assessing any data that we had not recently used, we determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of summarizing attack submarine readiness trends and related information  We interviewed officials, and where appropriate obtained documentation, at the following locations: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Undersea Warfare Division (N97) Warfare Integration Division (N83) U S  Fleet Forces Command Commander, Submarine Force, U S  Atlantic Fleet Commander, Submarine Squadron 4 Commander, Regional Support Group Groton Commander, Submarine Force, U S  Pacific Fleet Commander, Submarine Squadron 1 Commander, Submarine Squadron 7 Commander, Submarine Squadron 15 Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Logistics, Maintenance, and Industrial Operations (NAVSEA 04) Program Executive Office, Submarines Attack Submarine Program Office (PMS 392) Submarine Maintenance Engineering, Planning, and Procurement (SUBMEPP) Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP) Newport News, Virginia Navy Education and Training Command Submarine Learning Facility Norfolk Navy Board of Inspection and Survey Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine Newport News Shipbuilding, Virginia, operated by Huntington Ingalls Industries Electric Boat, Groton, Connecticut, operated by General Dynamics The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from August 2017 to October 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We worked with DOD to prepare this unclassified version of the report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards  Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are Classified  Classified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances and need to know, upon request  Columbia Class Submarine: Immature Technologies Present Risks to Achieving Cost Schedule and Performance Goals  GAO-18-158  Washington, D C : Dec  21, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Affecting the Fleet  GAO-17-809T  Washington, D C : Sept  19, 2017  Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions that Affect Operations  GAO-17-548  Washington, D C : Sept  12, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-798T  Washington, D C : Sept  7, 2017  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-841  Washington, D C : Sept  7, 2016  Navy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness  GAO-16-481RC  Washington, D C : May 25, 2016  (SECRET//NOFORN) Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan  GAO-16-466R  Washington, D C : May 2, 2016  Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports  GAO-15-329  Washington, D C : May 29, 2015  In addition to the contact named above, Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Chris Watson, Analyst in Charge; Herb Bowsher; Chris Cronin; Ally Gonzalez; Cynthia Grant; Carol Petersen; Amber Sinclair; and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: Regulation of the banking industry has undergone substantial changes over the past decade. In response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, many new bank regulations were implemented pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) or under the existing authorities of bank regulators to address apparent weaknesses in the regulatory regime. While some observers view those changes as necessary and effective, others argued that certain regulations were unjustifiably burdensome. To address those concerns, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-174) relaxed certain regulations. Opponents of that legislation argue it unnecessarily pared back important safeguards, but proponents of deregulation argue additional pare backs are needed. Meanwhile, a variety of economic and technological trends continue to affect banks. As a result, the 116th Congress faces many issues related to banking, including the following: Safety and Soundness. Banks are subject to regulations designed to reduce the likelihood of bank failures. Examples include requirements to hold a certain amount of capital (which enables a bank to absorb losses without failing) and the so-called Volcker Rule (a ban on banks' proprietary trading). In addition, anti-money laundering requirements aim to reduce the likelihood banks will execute transactions involving criminal proceeds. Banks are also required to take steps to avoid becoming victims of cyberattacks. The extent to which these regulations (i) are effective, and (ii) appropriately balance benefits and costs is a matter of debate. Consumer Protection, Fair Lending, and Access to Banking. Certain laws are designed to protect consumers and ensure that lenders use fair lending practices. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has authorities to regulate for consumer protection. No consensus exists on whether current regulations strike an appropriate balance between protecting consumers while ensuring access to credit and justifiable compliance costs. In addition, whether Community Reinvestment Act regulations as currently implemented effectively and efficiently encourage banks to provide services in their areas of operation is an open question. Large Banks and "Too Big To Fail." Regulators also regulate for systemic risks, such as those associated with very large and complex financial institutions that may contribute to systemic instability. Dodd-Frank Act provisions include enhanced prudential regulation for certain large banks and changes to resolution processes in the event one fails. In addition, bank regulators imposed additional capital requirements on certain large, complex banks. Subsequently, some argued that certain of these additional regulations were too broadly applied and overly stringent. In response, Congress reduced the applicability of the Dodd-Frank measures and regulators have proposed changes to the capital rules. Whether relaxing these rules will provide needed relief to these banks or unnecessarily pare back important safeguards is a debated issue. Community Banks. The number of small or "community" banks has declined substantially in recent decades. No consensus exists on the degree to which regulatory burden, market forces, and the removal of regulatory barriers to interstate branching and banking are causing the decline. What Companies Should Be Eligible for Bank Charters. To operate legally as a bank, an institution must hold a charter granted by a state or federal government. Traditionally, these are held by companies generally focused on and led by people with experience in finance. However, recently companies with a focus on technology are interested in having legal status as a bank, either through a charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or a state-level industrial loan company charter. Policymakers disagree over whether allowing these companies to operate as banks would create appropriately regulated providers of financial services or inappropriately extend government-backed bank safety nets and disadvantage existing banks. Recent Market and Economic Trends. Changing economic forces also pose issues for the banking industry. Some observers argue that increases in regulation could drive certain financial activities into a relatively lightly regulated "shadow banking" sector. Innovative financial technology may alter the way certain financial services are delivered. If interest rates rise, it could create opportunities and risks. Such trends could have implications for how the financial system performs and influence debates over appropriate banking regulations.