prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: This report provides background information and issues for Congress on multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC), which are special contracting mechanisms that Congress permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to use for a limited number of defense acquisition programs  Compared to the standard or default approach of annual contracting, MYP and BBC have the potential for reducing weapon procurement costs by a few or several percent  Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used; whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP; and whether the Coast Guard should begin making use of MYP and BBC  Congress's decisions on these issues could affect defense acquisition practices, defense funding requirements, and the defense industrial base  A contract that the Air Force has for the procurement of Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Launch Services (ELS) has sometimes been referred to as a block buy, but it is not an example of block buy contracting as discussed in this report  The Air Force in this instance is using the term block buy to mean something different  This report does not discuss the ELS contract  (For additional discussion, see " Terminology Alert: Block Buy Contracting vs  Block Buys " below ) In discussing MYP, BBC, and incremental funding, it can be helpful to distinguish contracting mechanisms from funding approaches  The two are often mixed together in discussions of DOD acquisition, sometimes leading to confusion  Stated briefly Funding approaches are ways that Congress can appropriate funding for weapon procurement programs, so that DOD can then put them under contract  Examples of funding approaches include traditional full funding (the standard or default approach), incremental funding, and advance appropriations  Any of these funding approaches might make use of advance procurement (AP) funding  Contracting mechanisms are ways for DOD to contract for the procurement of weapons systems, once funding for those systems has been appropriated by Congress  Examples of contracting mechanisms include annual contracting (the standard or default DOD approach), MYP, and BBC  Contracting mechanisms can materially change the total procurement cost of a ship  The use of a particular funding approach in a defense acquisition program does not dictate the use of a particular contracting mechanism  Defense acquisition programs consequently can be implemented using various combinations of funding approaches and contracting mechanisms  Most DOD weapon acquisition programs use a combination of traditional full funding and annual contracting  A few programs, particularly certain Navy shipbuilding programs, use incremental funding as their funding approach  A limited number of DOD programs use MYP as their contracting approach, and to date three Navy shipbuilding programs have used BBC as their contracting approach  The situation is summarized in Table 1   This report focuses on the contracting approaches of MYP and BBC and how they compare to annual contracting  Other CRS reports discuss the funding approaches of traditional full funding, incremental funding, and advance appropriations  What is MYP, and how does it differ from annual contracting? MYP, also known as multiyear contracting, is an alternative to the standard or default DOD approach of annual contracting  Under annual contracting, DOD uses one or more contracts for each year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item  Under MYP, DOD instead uses a single contract for two to five years' worth of procurement of a given kind of item, without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year  DOD needs congressional approval for each use of MYP  To illustrate the basic difference between MYP and annual contracting, consider a hypothetical DOD program to procure 20 single-engine aircraft of a certain kind over the 5-year period FY2018-FY2022, at a rate of 4 aircraft per year: Under annual contracting , DOD would issue one or more contracts for each year's procurement of four aircraft  After Congress funds the procurement of the first four aircraft in FY2018, DOD would issue one or more contracts (or exercise a contract option) for those four aircraft  The next year, after Congress funds the procurement of the next four aircraft in FY2019, DOD would issue one or more contracts (or exercise a contract option) for those four aircraft, and so on  Under MYP , DOD would issue one contract covering all 20 aircraft to be procured during the 5-year period FY2018-FY2022  DOD would award this contract in FY2018, at the beginning of the five-year period, following congressional approval to use MYP for the program, and congressional appropriation of the FY2018 funding for the program  To continue the implementation of the contract over the next four years, DOD would request the FY2019 funding for the program as part of DOD's proposed FY2019 budget, the FY2020 funding as part of DOD's proposed FY2020 budget, and so on  How much can MYP save? Compared with estimated costs under annual contracting, estimated savings for programs being proposed for MYP have ranged from less than 5% to more than 15%, depending on the particulars of the program in question, with many estimates falling in the range of 5% to 10%  In practice, actual savings from using MYP rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify because of cost growth during the execution of the contract that was caused by developments independent of the use of MYP rather than annual contracting  A February 2012 briefing by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) states that "MYP savings analysis is difficult due to the lack of actual costs on the alternative acquisition path, i e , the path not taken " The briefing states that CAPE up to that point had assessed MYP savings for four aircraft procurement programs—F/A-18E/F strike fighters, H-60 helicopters, V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, and CH-47F helicopters—and that CAPE's assessed savings ranged from 2% to 8%  A 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that DOD does not have a formal mechanism for tracking multiyear results against original expectations and makes few efforts to validate whether actual savings were achieved by multiyear procurement  It does not maintain comprehensive central records and historical information that could be used to enhance oversight and knowledge about multiyear performance to inform and improve future multiyear procurement (MYP) candidates  DOD and defense research centers officials said it is difficult to assess results because of the lack of historical information on multiyear contracts, comparable annual costs, and the dynamic acquisition environment  How does MYP potentially save money? Compared to annual contracting, using MYP can in principle reduce the cost of the weapons being procured in two primary ways: Contractor optimization of workforce and production facilities   An MYP contract gives the contractor (e g , an airplane manufacturer or shipbuilder) confidence that a multiyear stream of business of a known volume will very likely materialize  This confidence can permit the contractor to make investments in the firm's workforce and production facilities that are intended to optimize the facility for the production of the items being procured under the contract  Such investments can include payments for retaining or training workers, or for building, expanding, or modernizing production facilities  Under annual contracting, the manufacturer might not have enough confidence about its future stream of business to make these kinds of investments, or might be unable to convince its parent firm to finance them  E conomic order quan tity (EOQ) purchases of selected long-leadtime components  Under an MYP contract, DOD is permitted to bring forward selected key components of the items to be procured under the contract and to purchase the components in batch form during the first year or two of the contract  In the hypothetical example introduced earlier, using MYP could permit DOD to purchase, say, the 20 engines for the 20 aircraft in the first year or two of the 5-year contract  Procuring selected components in this manner under an MYP contract is called an economic order quantity (EOQ) purchase  EOQ purchases can reduce the procurement cost of the weapons being procured under the MYP contract by allowing the manufacturers of components to take maximum advantage of production economies of scale that are possible with batch orders  What gives the contractor confidence that the multiyear stream of business will materialize? At least two things give the contractor confidence that DOD will not terminate an MYP contract and that the multiyear stream of business consequently will materialize: For a program to qualify for MYP, DOD must certify, among other things, that the minimum need for the items to be purchased is expected to remain substantially unchanged during the contract in terms of production rate, procurement rate, and total quantities  Perhaps more important to the contractor, MYP contracts include a cancellation penalty intended to reimburse a contractor for costs that the contractor has incurred (i e , investments the contractor has made) in anticipation of the work covered under the MYP contract  The undesirability of paying a cancellation penalty acts as a disincentive for the government against canceling the contract  (And if the contract is canceled, the cancellation penalty helps to make the contractor whole ) Is there a permanent statute governing MYP contracting? There is a permanent statute governing MYP contracting—10 U S C  2306b  The statute was created by Section 909 of the FY1982 Department of Defense Authorization Act ( S  815 / P L  97-86 of December 1, 1981), revised and reorganized by Section 1022 of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 ( S  1587 / P L  103-355 of October 13, 1994), and further amended on several occasions since  For the text of 10 U S C  2306b, see Appendix A   DOD's use of MYP contracting is further governed by DOD acquisition regulations  Under this statute, what criteria must a program meet to qualify for MYP? 10 U S C  2306b(a) states that to qualify for MYP, a program must meet several criteria, including the following: Significant savings  DOD must estimate that using an MYP contract would result in "significant savings" compared with using annual contracting  Realistic cost estimates   DOD's estimates of the cost of the MYP contract and the anticipated savings must be realistic  Stable need for the items  DOD must expect that its minimum need for the items will remain substantially unchanged during the contract in terms of production rate, procurement rate, and total quantities  Stable design for the items   The design for the items to be acquired must be stable, and the technical risks associated with the items must not be excessive  10 U S C  includes provisions requiring the Secretary of Defense or certain other DOD officials to find, determine, or certify that these and other statutory requirements for using MYP contracts have been met, and provisions requiring the heads of DOD agencies to provide written notifications of certain things to the congressional defense committees 30 days before awarding or initiating an MYP contract, or 10 days before terminating one  10 U S C  2306b also requires DOD MYP contracts to be fixed-price type contracts  What is meant by " significant savings"? The amount of savings required under 10 U S C  2306b to qualify for using an MYP contract has changed over time; the requirement was changed from "substantial savings" to "significant savings" by Section 811 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S  1356 / P L  114-92 of November 25, 2015)  The joint explanatory statement for the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act states the following regarding Section 811: Amendment relating to multiyear contract authority for acquisition of property (sec  811) The House bill contained a provision (sec  806) that would strike the existing requirement that the head of an agency must determine that substantial savings would be achieved before entering into a multiyear contract  The Senate amendment contained no similar provision  The Senate recedes with an amendment that would require that significant savings would be achieved before entering into a multiyear contract  The conferees agree that the government should seek to maximize savings whenever it pursues multiyear procurement  However, the conferees also agree that significant savings (estimated to be greater than $250 0 million), and other benefits, may be achieved even if it does not equate to a minimum of 10 percent savings over the cost of an annual contract  The conferees expect a request for authority to enter into a multiyear contract will include (1) the estimated cost savings, (2) the minimum quantity needed, (3) confirmation that the design is stable and the technical risks are not excessive, and (4) any other rationale for entering into such a contract  In addition, 10 U S C  2306b states the following: If for any fiscal year a multiyear contract to be entered into under this section is authorized by law for a particular procurement program and that authorization is subject to certain conditions established by law (including a condition as to cost savings to be achieved under the multiyear contract in comparison to specified other contracts) and if it appears (after negotiations with contractors) that such savings cannot be achieved, but that significant savings could nevertheless be achieved through the use of a multiyear contract rather than specified other contracts, the President may submit to Congress a request for relief from the specified cost savings that must be achieved through multiyear contracting for that program  Any such request by the President shall include details about the request for a multiyear contract, including details about the negotiated contract terms and conditions  What is meant by "stable design"? The term "stable design" is generally understood to mean that the design for the items to be procured is not expected to change substantially during the period of the contract  Having a stable design is generally demonstrated by having already built at least a few items to that design (or in the case of a shipbuilding program, at least one ship to that design) and concluding, through testing and operation of those items, that the design does not require any substantial changes during the period of the contract  What happens if Congress does not provide the annual funding requested by DOD to continue the implementation of the contract? If Congress does not provide the funding requested by DOD to continue the implementation of an MYP contract, DOD would be required to renegotiate, suspend, or terminate the contract  Terminating the contract could require the government to pay a cancellation penalty to the contractor  Renegotiating or suspending the contract could also have a financial impact  What effect does using MYP have on flexibility for making procurement changes? A principal potential disadvantage of using MYP is that it can reduce Congress's and DOD's flexibility for making changes (especially reductions) in procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances, at least without incurring cancellation penalties  In general, the greater the portion of DOD's procurement account that is executed under MYP contracts, the greater the potential loss of flexibility  The use of MYP for executing some portion of the DOD procurement account means that if policymakers in future years decide to reduce procurement spending below previously planned levels, the spending reduction might fall more heavily on procurement programs that do not use MYP, which in turn might result in a less-than-optimally balanced DOD procurement effort  How does Congress approve the use of MYP? Congress approves the use of MYP on a case-by-case basis, typically in response to requests by DOD  Congressional approval for DOD MYP contracts with a value of more than $500 million must occur in two places: an annual DOD appropriations act and an act other than the annual DOD appropriations act  In annual DOD appropriations acts, the provision permitting the use of MYP for one or more defense acquisition programs is typically included in the title containing general provisions, which typically is Title VIII  As shown in Table B-2 , since FY2011, it has been Section 8010  An annual national defense authorization act (NDAA) is usually the act other than an appropriations act in which provisions granting authority for using MYP contracting on individual defense acquisition programs are included  Such provisions typically occur in Title I of the NDAA, the title covering procurement programs  Provisions in which Congress approves the use of MYP for a particular defense acquisition program may include specific conditions for that program in addition to the requirements and conditions of 10 U S C  2306b  How often is MYP used? MYP is used for a limited number of DOD acquisition programs  As shown in the Appendix B , annual DOD appropriations acts since FY1990 typically have approved the use of MYP for zero to a few DOD programs each year  An August 28, 2017, press report states the following: The Pentagon's portfolio of active multiyear procurement contracts is on track to taper from $10 7 billion in fiscal year 2017—or more than 8 percent of DOD procurement spending—to $1 2 billion by FY-19, according to data recently compiled by the Pentagon comptroller for lawmakers  However, there are potential new block-buy deals in the works, including several large Navy deals  According to the Multiyear Procurement Contracts Report for FY-17, which includes data current as of June 27, seven major defense acquisition programs are being purchased through multiyear procurement contracts, collectively obligating the U S  government to spend $16 billion across the five-year spending plan with $14 5 billion of the commitments lashed to FY-17 and FY-18  In an interview published on January 13, 2014, Sean Stackley, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (i e , the Navy's acquisition executive), stated the following: What the industrial base clamors for is stability, so they can plan, invest, train their work force  It gives them the ability in working with say, the Street [Wall Street], to better predict their own performance, then meet expectations in the same fashion we try to meet our expectations with the Hill  It's emblematic of stability that we've got more multiyear programs in the Department of the Navy than the rest of the Department of Defense combined  We've been able to harvest from that significant savings, and that has been key to solving some of our budget problems  It's allowed us in certain cases to put the savings right back into other programs tied to requirements  A February 2012 briefing by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) shows that the total dollar value of DOD MYP contracts has remained more or less stable between FY2000 and FY2012 at roughly $7 billion to $13 billion per year  The briefing shows that since the total size of DOD's procurement budget has increased during this period, the portion of DOD's total procurement budget accounted for by programs using MYP contracts has declined from about 17% in FY2000 to less than 8% in FY2012  The briefing also shows that the Navy makes more use of MYP contracts than does the Army or Air Force, and that the Air Force made very little use of MYP in FY2010-FY2012  A 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated the following: Although DOD had been entering into multiyear contracts on a limited basis prior to the 1980s, the Department of Defense Authorization Act, [for fiscal year] 1982, codified the authority for DOD to procure on a multiyear basis major weapon systems that meet certain criteria  Since that time, DOD has annually submitted various weapon systems as multiyear procurement candidates for congressional authorization  Over the past 25 years, Congress has authorized the use of multiyear procurement for approximately 140 acquisition programs, including some systems approved more than once  What is BBC, and how does it compare to MYP? BBC is similar to MYP in that it permits DOD to use a single contract for more than one year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year  BBC is also similar to MYP in that DOD needs congressional approval for each use of BBC  BBC differs from MYP in the following ways: There is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC  There is no requirement that BBC be approved in both a DOD appropriations act and an act other than a DOD appropriations act  Programs being considered for BBC do not need to meet any legal criteria to qualify for BBC because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that establishes such criteria  A BBC contract can cover more than five years of planned procurements  The BBC contracts that were used by the Navy for procuring Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), for example, covered a period of seven years (FY2010-FY2016)  Economic order quantity (EOQ) authority does not come automatically as part of BBC authority because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that includes EOQ authority as an automatic feature  To provide EOQ authority as part of a BBC contract, the provision granting authority for using BBC in a program may need to state explicitly that the authority to use BBC includes the authority to use EOQ  BBC contracts are less likely to include cancellation penalties  Given the one key similarity between BBC and MYP (the use of a single contract for more than one year's worth of procurement), and the various differences between BBC and MYP, BBC might be thought of as a less formal stepchild of MYP  When and why was BBC invented? BBC was invented by Section 121(b) of the FY1998 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  1119 / P L  105-85 of November 18, 1997), which granted the Navy the authority to use a single contract for the procurement of the first four Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines  The 4 boats were scheduled to be procured during the 5-year period FY1998-FY2002 in annual quantities of 1-1-0-1-1  Congress provided the authority granted in Section 121(b) at least in part to reduce the combined procurement cost of the four submarines  Using MYP was not an option for the Virginia-class program at that time because the Navy had not even begun, let alone finished, construction of the first Virginia-class submarine, and consequently could not demonstrate that it had a stable design for the program  When Section 121(b) was enacted, there was no name for the contracting authority it provided  The term block buy contracting came into use later, when observers needed a term to refer to the kind of contracting authority that Congress authorized in Section 121(b)  As discussed in the next section, this can cause confusion, because the term block buy was already being used in discussions of DOD acquisition to refer to something else  What's the difference between block buy cont r acting and block buys? In discussions of defense procurement, the term "block buy" by itself (without "contracting" at the end) is sometimes used to refer to something quite different from block buy contracting—namely, the simple act of funding the procurement of more than one copy of an item in a single year, particularly when no more than one item of that kind might normally be funded in a single year  For example, when Congress funded the procurement of two aircraft carriers in FY1983, and another two in FY1988, these acts were each referred to as block buys, because aircraft carriers are normally procured one at a time, several years apart from one another  This alternate meaning of the term block buy predates by many years the emergence of the term block buy contracting  The term block buy is still used in this alternate manner, which can lead to confusion in discussions of defense procurement  For example, for FY2017, the Air Force requested funding for procuring five Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs) for its EELV Launch Services (ELS) program  At the same time, Navy officials sometimes refer to the use of block buy contracts for the first four Virginia-class submarines, and in the LCS program, as block buys, when they might be more specifically referred to as instances of block buy contract ing   How much can BBC save, compared with MYP? BBC can reduce the unit procurement costs of ships by amounts less than or perhaps comparable to those of MYP, if the authority granted for using BBC explicitly includes authority for making economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases of components  If the authority granted for using BBC does not explicitly include authority for making EOQ purchases, then the savings from BBC will be less  Potential savings under BBC might also be less than those under MYP if the BBC contract does not include a cancellation penalty, or includes one that is more limited than typically found in an MYP contract, because this might give the contractor less confidence than would be the case under an MYP contract that the future stream of business will materialize as planned, which in turn might reduce the amount of money the contractor invests to optimize its workforce and production facilities for producing the items to be procured under the contract  How frequently has BBC been used? Since its use at the start of the Virginia-class program, BBC has been used very rarely  The Navy did not use it again in a shipbuilding program until December 2010, when it awarded two block buy contracts, each covering 10 LCSs to be procured over the six-year period FY2010-FY2015, to the two LCS builders  (Each contract was later amended to include an 11 th ship in FY2016, making for a total of 22 ships under the two contracts ) A third example is the John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler program, in which the Navy is using a block buy contract to procure the first six ships in the program  A fourth example, arguably, is the Air Force's KC-46 aerial refueling tanker program, which is employing a fixed price incentive fee (FPIF) development contract that includes a "back end" commitment to procure certain minimum numbers of KC-46s in certain fiscal years  When might BBC be suitable as an alternative to MYP? BBC might be particularly suitable as an alternative to MYP in cases where using a multiyear contract can reduce costs, but the program in question cannot meet all the statutory criteria needed to qualify for MYP  As shown in the case of the first four Virginia-class boats, this can occur at or near the start of a procurement program, when design stability has not been demonstrated through the production of at least a few of the items to be procured (or, for a shipbuilding program, at least one ship)  What i s the difference between an MYP or block buy contract and a contract with options? The military services sometimes use contracts with options to procure multiple copies of an item that are procured over a period of several years  The Navy, for example, used a contract with options to procure Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class dry cargo ships that were procured over a period of several years  A contract with options can be viewed as somewhat similar to an MYP or block buy contract in that a single contract is used to procure several years' worth of procurement of a given kind of item  There is, however, a key difference between an MYP or block buy contract and a contract with options: In a contract with options, the service is under no obligation to exercise any of the options, and a service can choose to not exercise an option without having to make a penalty payment to the contractor  In contrast, in an MYP or block buy contract, the service is under an obligation to continue implementing the contract beyond the first year, provided that Congress appropriates the necessary funds  If the service chooses to terminate an MYP or block buy contract, and does so as a termination for government convenience rather than as a termination for contractor default, then the contractor can, under the contract's termination for convenience clause, seek a payment from the government for cost incurred for work that is complete or in process at the time of termination, and may include the cost of some of the investments made in anticipation of the MYP or block buy contract being fully implemented  The contractor can do this even if the MYP or block buy contract does not elsewhere include a provision for a cancellation penalty  As a result of this key difference, although a contract with options looks like a multiyear contract, it operates more like a series of annual contracts, and it cannot achieve the kinds of savings that are possible under MYP and BBC  Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used; and whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP  Should MYP and BBC in the future be used more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used? Supporters of using MYP and BBC more frequently in the future might argue the following: Since MYP and BBC can reduce procurement costs, making greater use of MYP and BBC can help DOD get more value out of its available procurement funding  This can be particularly important if DOD's budget in real (i e , inflation-adjusted) terms remains flat or declines in coming years, as many observers anticipate  The risks of using MYP have been reduced by Section 811 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  4986 / P L  110-181 of January 28, 2008), which amended 10 U S C  2306b to strengthen the process for ensuring that programs proposed for MYP meet certain criteria (see " Permanent Statute Governing MYP ")  Since the value of MYP contracts equated to less than 8% of DOD's procurement budget in FY2012, compared to about 17% of DOD's procurement budget in FY2000, MYP likely could be used more frequently without exceeding past experience regarding the share of DOD's procurement budget accounted for by MYP contracts  Supporters of using MYP and BBC less frequently in the future, or at least no more frequently than now, might argue the following: Using MYP and BBC more frequently would further reduce Congress's and DOD's flexibility for making changes in DOD procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances  The risks of reducing flexibility in this regard are increased now because of uncertainties in the current strategic environment and because efforts to reduce federal budget deficits could include reducing DOD spending, which could lead to a reassessment of U S  defense strategy and associated DOD acquisition programs  Since actual savings from using MYP and BBC rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify, it is not clear that the financial benefits of using MYP or BBC more frequently in the future would be worth the resulting further reduction in Congress's and DOD's flexibility for making changes in procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances  Should Congress create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute (10 U S C  2306b) that governs the use of MYP? Supporters of creating a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC might argue the following: Such a statute could encourage greater use of BBC, and thereby increase savings in DOD procurement programs by giving BBC contracting a formal legal standing and by establishing a clear process for DOD program managers to use in assessing whether their programs might be considered suitable for BBC  Such a statute could make BBC more advantageous by including a provision that automatically grants EOQ authority to programs using BBC, as well as provisions establishing qualifying criteria and other conditions intended to reduce the risks of using BBC  Opponents of creating a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC might argue the following: A key advantage of BBC is that it is not governed by a permanent statute  The lack of such a statute gives DOD and Congress full flexibility in determining when and how to use BBC for programs that may not qualify for MYP, but for which a multiyear contract of some kind might produce substantial savings  Such a statute could encourage DOD program managers to pursue their programs using BBC rather than MYP  This could reduce discipline in DOD multiyear contracting if the qualifying criteria in the BBC statute are less demanding than the qualifying criteria in 10 U S C  2306b  Should the Coast Guard should begin making use of MYP and BBC? Although the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Coast Guard is a military service and a branch of the U S  Armed Forces at all times (14 U S C  1), and 10 U S C  2306b provides authority for using MYP not only to DOD, but also to the Coast Guard (and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as well)  In addition, Section 311 of the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 ( S  140 / P L  115-282 of December 4, 2018) provides permanent authority for the Coast Guard to use block buy contracting with EOQ purchases of components in its major acquisition programs  The authority is now codified at 14 U S C  1137  As discussed earlier in this report, the Navy in recent years has made extensive use of MYP and BBC in its ship and aircraft acquisition programs, reducing the collective costs of those programs, the Navy estimates, by billions of dollars  The Coast Guard, like the Navy, procures ships and aircraft  In contrast to the Navy, however, the Coast Guard has never used MYP or BBC in its ship or aircraft acquisition programs  Instead, the Coast has tended to use contracts with options  As discussed earlier, although a contract with options looks like a multiyear contract, it operates more like a series of annual contracts, and it cannot achieve the kinds of savings that are possible under MYP and BBC  CRS in recent years has testified and reported on the possibility of using BBC or MYP in Coast Guard ship acquisition programs, particularly the Coast Guard's 25-ship Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program and the Coast Guard's three-ship polar icebreaker program  CRS estimates that using multiyear contracting rather than contracts with options for the entire 25-ship OPC program could reduce the cost of the OPC program by about $1 billion  The OPC program is the Coast Guard's top-priority acquisition program, and it represents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reduce the acquisition cost of a Coast Guard acquisition program by an estimated $1 billion  CRS also estimates that using BBC for a three-ship polar icebreaker program could reduce the cost of that program by upwards of $150 million  The Coast Guard has expressed some interest in using BBC in the polar icebreaker program, but its baseline acquisition strategy for that program, like its current acquisition strategy for the OPC program, is to use a contract with options  As part of its FY2020 budget submission, the Department of Defense is proposing continued funding for implementing several MYP contracts initiated in fiscal years prior to FY2020, but it has not highlighted any requests for authority for new MYP or block buy contracts for major acquisition programs that would begin in FY2020  Appendix A  Text of 10 U S C  2306b The text of 10 U S C  2306b as of April 29, 2019, is as follows: §2306b  Multiyear contracts: acquisition of property (a) In General -To the extent that funds are otherwise available for obligation, the head of an agency may enter into multiyear contracts for the purchase of property whenever the head of that agency finds each of the following: (1) That the use of such a contract will result in significant savings of the total anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts  (2) That the minimum need for the property to be purchased is expected to remain substantially unchanged during the contemplated contract period in terms of production rate, procurement rate, and total quantities  (3) That there is a reasonable expectation that throughout the contemplated contract period the head of the agency will request funding for the contract at the level required to avoid contract cancellation  (4) That there is a stable design for the property to be acquired and that the technical risks associated with such property are not excessive  (5) That the estimates of both the cost of the contract and the anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a multiyear contract are realistic  (6) In the case of a purchase by the Department of Defense, that the use of such a contract will promote the national security of the United States  (7) In the case of a contract in an amount equal to or greater than $500,000,000, that the conditions required by subparagraphs (C) through (F) of subsection (i)(3) will be met, in accordance with the Secretary's certification and determination under such subsection, by such contract  (b) Regulations -(1) Each official named in paragraph (2) shall prescribe acquisition regulations for the agency or agencies under the jurisdiction of such official to promote the use of multiyear contracting as authorized by subsection (a) in a manner that will allow the most efficient use of multiyear contracting  (2)(A) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the Department of Defense  (B) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the Coast Guard, except that the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense shall apply to the Coast Guard when it is operating as a service in the Navy  (C) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration  (c) Contract Cancellations -The regulations may provide for cancellation provisions in multiyear contracts to the extent that such provisions are necessary and in the best interests of the United States  The cancellation provisions may include consideration of both recurring and nonrecurring costs of the contractor associated with the production of the items to be delivered under the contract  (d) Participation by Subcontractors, Vendors, and Suppliers -In order to broaden the defense industrial base, the regulations shall provide that, to the extent practicable- (1) multiyear contracting under subsection (a) shall be used in such a manner as to seek, retain, and promote the use under such contracts of companies that are subcontractors, vendors, or suppliers; and (2) upon accrual of any payment or other benefit under such a multiyear contract to any subcontractor, vendor, or supplier company participating in such contract, such payment or benefit shall be delivered to such company in the most expeditious manner practicable  (e) Protection of Existing Authority -The regulations shall provide that, to the extent practicable, the administration of this section, and of the regulations prescribed under this section, shall not be carried out in a manner to preclude or curtail the existing ability of an agency- (1) to provide for competition in the production of items to be delivered under such a contract; or (2) to provide for termination of a prime contract the performance of which is deficient with respect to cost, quality, or schedule  (f) Cancellation or Termination for Insufficient Funding -In the event funds are not made available for the continuation of a contract made under this section into a subsequent fiscal year, the contract shall be canceled or terminated  The costs of cancellation or termination may be paid from- (1) appropriations originally available for the performance of the contract concerned; (2) appropriations currently available for procurement of the type of property concerned, and not otherwise obligated; or (3) funds appropriated for those payments  (g) Contract Cancellation Ceilings Exceeding $100,000,000 -(1) Before any contract described in subsection (a) that contains a clause setting forth a cancellation ceiling in excess of $100,000,000 may be awarded, the head of the agency concerned shall give written notification of the proposed contract and of the proposed cancellation ceiling for that contract to the congressional defense committees, and such contract may not then be awarded until the end of a period of 30 days beginning on the date of such notification  (2) In the case of a contract described in subsection (a) with a cancellation ceiling described in paragraph (1), if the budget for the contract does not include proposed funding for the costs of contract cancellation up to the cancellation ceiling established in the contract, the head of the agency concerned shall, as part of the certification required by subsection (i)(1)(A),1 give written notification to the congressional defense committees of- (A) the cancellation ceiling amounts planned for each program year in the proposed multiyear procurement contract, together with the reasons for the amounts planned; (B) the extent to which costs of contract cancellation are not included in the budget for the contract; and (C) a financial risk assessment of not including budgeting for costs of contract cancellation  (h) Defense Acquisitions of Weapon Systems -In the case of the Department of Defense, the authority under subsection (a) includes authority to enter into the following multiyear contracts in accordance with this section: (1) A multiyear contract for the purchase of a weapon system, items and services associated with a weapon system, and logistics support for a weapon system  (2) A multiyear contract for advance procurement of components, parts, and materials necessary to the manufacture of a weapon system, including a multiyear contract for such advance procurement that is entered into in order to achieve economic-lot purchases and more efficient production rates  (i) Defense Acquisitions Specifically Authorized by Law -(1) In the case of the Department of Defense, a multiyear contract in an amount equal to or greater than $500,000,000 may not be entered into under this section unless the contract is specifically authorized by law in an Act other than an appropriations Act  (2) In submitting a request for a specific authorization by law to carry out a defense acquisition program using multiyear contract authority under this section, the Secretary of Defense shall include in the request the following: (A) A report containing preliminary findings of the agency head required in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a), together with the basis for such findings  (B) Confirmation that the preliminary findings of the agency head under subparagraph (A) were supported by a preliminary cost analysis performed by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation  (3) A multiyear contract may not be entered into under this section for a defense acquisition program that has been specifically authorized by law to be carried out using multiyear contract authority unless the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing, not later than 30 days before entry into the contract, that each of the following conditions is satisfied: (A) The Secretary has determined that each of the requirements in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a) will be met by such contract and has provided the basis for such determination to the congressional defense committees  (B) The Secretary's determination under subparagraph (A) was made after completion of a cost analysis conducted on the basis of section 2334(e)(2) 1 of this title, and the analysis supports the determination  (C) The system being acquired pursuant to such contract has not been determined to have experienced cost growth in excess of the critical cost growth threshold pursuant to section 2433(d) of this title within 5 years prior to the date the Secretary anticipates such contract (or a contract for advance procurement entered into consistent with the authorization for such contract) will be awarded  (D) A sufficient number of end items of the system being acquired under such contract have been delivered at or within the most current estimates of the program acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost for such system to determine that current estimates of such unit costs are realistic  (E) During the fiscal year in which such contract is to be awarded, sufficient funds will be available to perform the contract in such fiscal year, and the future-years defense program for such fiscal year will include the funding required to execute the program without cancellation  (F) The contract is a fixed price type contract  (G) The proposed multiyear contract provides for production at not less than minimum economic rates given the existing tooling and facilities  (4) If for any fiscal year a multiyear contract to be entered into under this section is authorized by law for a particular procurement program and that authorization is subject to certain conditions established by law (including a condition as to cost savings to be achieved under the multiyear contract in comparison to specified other contracts) and if it appears (after negotiations with contractors) that such savings cannot be achieved, but that significant savings could nevertheless be achieved through the use of a multiyear contract rather than specified other contracts, the President may submit to Congress a request for relief from the specified cost savings that must be achieved through multiyear contracting for that program  Any such request by the President shall include details about the request for a multiyear contract, including details about the negotiated contract terms and conditions  (5)(A) The Secretary may obligate funds for procurement of an end item under a multiyear contract for the purchase of property only for procurement of a complete and usable end item  (B) The Secretary may obligate funds appropriated for any fiscal year for advance procurement under a contract for the purchase of property only for the procurement of those long-lead items necessary in order to meet a planned delivery schedule for complete major end items that are programmed under the contract to be acquired with funds appropriated for a subsequent fiscal year (including an economic order quantity of such long-lead items when authorized by law)  (6) The Secretary may make the certification under paragraph (3) notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the conditions of such certification are not met, if the Secretary determines that, due to exceptional circumstances, proceeding with a multiyear contract under this section is in the best interest of the Department of Defense and the Secretary provides the basis for such determination with the certification  (7) The Secretary may not delegate the authority to make the certification under paragraph (3) or the determination under paragraph (6) to an official below the level of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics  (j) Defense Contract Options for Varying Quantities -The Secretary of Defense may instruct the Secretary of the military department concerned to incorporate into a proposed multiyear contract negotiated priced options for varying the quantities of end items to be procured over the period of the contract  (k) Multiyear Contract Defined -For the purposes of this section, a multiyear contract is a contract for the purchase of property for more than one, but not more than five, program years  Such a contract may provide that performance under the contract during the second and subsequent years of the contract is contingent upon the appropriation of funds and (if it does so provide) may provide for a cancellation payment to be made to the contractor if such appropriations are not made  (l) Various Additional Requirements With Respect to Multiyear Defense Contracts -(1)(A) The head of an agency may not initiate a contract described in subparagraph (B) unless the congressional defense committees are notified of the proposed contract at least 30 days in advance of the award of the proposed contract  (B) Subparagraph (A) applies to the following contracts: (i) A multiyear contract- (I) that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of $20,000,000 in any one year of the contract; or (II) that includes an unfunded contingent liability in excess of $20,000,000  (ii) Any contract for advance procurement leading to a multiyear contract that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of $20,000,000 in any one year  (2) The head of an agency may not initiate a multiyear contract for which the economic order quantity advance procurement is not funded at least to the limits of the Government's liability  (3) The head of an agency may not initiate a multiyear procurement contract for any system (or component thereof) if the value of the multiyear contract would exceed $500,000,000 unless authority for the contract is specifically provided in an appropriations Act  (4) Each report required by paragraph (5) with respect to a contract (or contract extension) shall contain the following: (A) The amount of total obligational authority under the contract (or contract extension) and the percentage that such amount represents of- (i) the applicable procurement account; and (ii) the agency procurement total  (B) The amount of total obligational authority under all multiyear procurements of the agency concerned (determined without regard to the amount of the multiyear contract (or contract extension)) under multiyear contracts in effect at the time the report is submitted and the percentage that such amount represents of- (i) the applicable procurement account; and (ii) the agency procurement total  (C) The amount equal to the sum of the amounts under subparagraphs (A) and (B), and the percentage that such amount represents of- (i) the applicable procurement account; and (ii) the agency procurement total  (D) The amount of total obligational authority under all Department of Defense multiyear procurements (determined without regard to the amount of the multiyear contract (or contract extension)), including any multiyear contract (or contract extension) that has been authorized by the Congress but not yet entered into, and the percentage that such amount represents of the procurement accounts of the Department of Defense treated in the aggregate  (5) The head of an agency may not enter into a multiyear contract (or extend an existing multiyear contract), the value of which would exceed $500,000,000 (when entered into or when extended, as the case may be), until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a report containing the information described in paragraph (4) with respect to the contract (or contract extension)  (6) The head of an agency may not terminate a multiyear procurement contract until 10 days after the date on which notice of the proposed termination is provided to the congressional defense committees  (7) The execution of multiyear contracting authority shall require the use of a present value analysis to determine lowest cost compared to an annual procurement  (8) This subsection does not apply to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or to the Coast Guard  (9) In this subsection: (A) The term "applicable procurement account" means, with respect to a multiyear procurement contract (or contract extension), the appropriation account from which payments to execute the contract will be made  (B) The term "agency procurement total" means the procurement accounts of the agency entering into a multiyear procurement contract (or contract extension) treated in the aggregate  (m) Increased Funding and Reprogramming Requests -Any request for increased funding for the procurement of a major system under a multiyear contract authorized under this section shall be accompanied by an explanation of how the request for increased funding affects the determinations made by the Secretary under subsection (i)  Appendix B  Programs Approved for MYP in Annual DOD Appropriations Acts Since FY1990 This appendix presents, in two tables, programs approved for MYP in annual DOD appropriations acts since FY1990  Table B-1 covers FY2011 to the present, and Table B-2 covers FY1990 through FY2010 


Report 2: For over a decade, each of VA’s 170 medical centers used VHA’s legacy MSPV program to order medical supplies, such as bandages and scalpels  Many of those items were purchased using the Federal Supply Schedules, which provided medical centers with a great deal of flexibility  However, as we reported in 2016, this legacy program prevented VHA from standardizing items used across its medical centers and affected its ability to leverage its buying power to achieve greater cost avoidance  Standardization is a process of narrowing the range of items purchased to meet a given need, such as buying 10 varieties of bandages instead of 100, in order to improve buying power, simplify supply chain management, and provide clinical consistency  In part because of the legacy MSPV program’s limited standardization, VHA decided to transition to a new iteration, called MSPV-NG  The transition to MSPV-NG has been a major effort, involving the MSPV- NG program office, stakeholders from the VHA’s Procurement and Logistics Office and VA’s Strategic Acquisition Center (SAC)—a VA-wide contracting organization—and logistics and clinical personnel at every medical center  The program also includes hundreds of new contracts with individual supply vendors and a new set of prime vendor contracts to distribute the supplies  VA’s goals for the MSPV-NG program include (1) standardizing requirements for supply items for greater clinical consistency; (2) demonstrating cost avoidance by leveraging VA’s substantial buying power when making competitive awards; (3) achieving greater efficiency in ordering and supply chain management, including a metric of ordering 40 percent of medical centers’ supplies from the MSPV-NG formulary; and (4) involving clinicians in requirements development to ensure uniform clinical review of medical supplies  VHA launched the MSPV-NG program in December 2016, but allowed a 4-month transition period  After April 2017, medical centers could no longer use the legacy program  MSPV-NG now restricts ordering to a narrow formulary  VHA policy requires medical centers to use MSPV- NG—as opposed to other means such as open market purchase card transactions—when purchasing items that are available in the formulary  Leading hospital networks we spoke with have similar goals to VA in managing their supply chains, including clinical standardization and reduced costs  These hospital networks reported they analyze their spending to identify items purchased most frequently, and which ones would be the best candidates to standardize first to yield cost savings  The hospitals’ supply chain managers reported establishing consensus with clinicians through early and frequent collaboration, understanding that clinician involvement is critical to the success of any effort to standardize their medical supply chain  By following these practices, these hospital networks have reported they have achieved significant cost savings in some cases, and the potential for improved patient care, while maintaining buy-in from their clinicians  VHA’s implementation of the MSPV-NG program—from its initial work to identify a list of supply requirements in early 2015, through its roll-out of the formulary to medical centers in December 2016—was not executed in line with leading practices  Specifically, VHA lacked a documented program strategy, leadership stability, and workforce capacity for the transition that, if in place, could have facilitated buy-in for the change throughout the organization  Further, the initial requirements development process and tight time frames contributed to ineffective contracting processes  As a result, VHA developed an initial formulary that did not meet the needs of the medical centers and has yet to achieve utilization and cost avoidance goals  VA made some changes in the second phase of requirements development to address deficiencies identified in the initial roll out  Key among these was to increase the level of clinical involvement, that is, to obtain input from the doctors and nurses at VA’s individual medical facilities  Despite changes aimed at improving implementation, the agency continues to face challenges that prevent the program from fully achieving its goals  VA did not document a clear overall strategy for the MSPV-NG program at the start and has not done so to date  About 6 months after our initial requests for a strategy or plan, a VHA official provided us with an October 2015 plan focusing on the mechanics of establishing the MSPV-NG formulary  However, this plan was used only within the VHA Procurement and Logistics Office and had not been approved by VHA or VA leadership  Leading practices for organizational transformation state that agencies must have well-documented plans and strategies for major initiatives (such as MSPV-NG) and communicate them clearly and consistently to all involved—which included VHA headquarters, the SAC, and all 170 medical centers  Without such a strategy, VA could not reasonably ensure that all stakeholders understood VHA’s approach for MSPV-NG and worked together in a coordinated manner to achieve program goals  In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the Director of the MSPV-NG program office should, with input from SAC, develop, document, and communicate to stakeholders an overarching strategy for the program, including how the program office will prioritize categories of supplies for future phases of requirement development and contracting  VA agreed with this recommendation and reported it would have a strategy in place by December 2017  Leadership instability and workforce challenges also made it difficult for VA to execute its transition to MSPV-NG  Our work has shown that leadership buy-in is necessary to ensure that major programs like MSPV- NG have the resources and support they need to execute their missions  Due to a combination of budget and hiring constraints, and lack of prioritization within VA, the MSPV-NG program office has never been fully staffed and has experienced instability in its leadership  As of January 2017, 24 of the office’s 40 positions were filled, and program office officials stated that this lack of staff affected their ability to implement certain aspects of the program within the planned time frames  In addition, since the inception of MSPV-NG, the program office has had four directors, two of whom were acting and two of whom were fulfilling the director position while performing other collateral duties  For instance, one of the acting MSPV-NG program office directors was on detail from a regional health network to fulfill the position, but had to abruptly leave and return to her prior position due to a federal hiring freeze  In our November 2017 report, we recommended that VHA prioritize the hiring of a MSPV- NG program director on a permanent basis  VA agreed with this recommendation and indicated a vacancy announcement will be posted by the end of 2017  The MSPV-NG program office initially developed requirements for items to be included in the formulary based almost exclusively on prior supply purchases, with limited clinician involvement  The program office concluded in its October 2015 formulary plan that relying on data from previous clinician purchases would be a good representation of medical centers’ needs and that clinician input would not be required for identifying which items to include in the initial formulary  Further, rather than standardizing purchases of specific categories of supplies—such as bandages or scalpels—program officials told us they identified medical and surgical items on which VA had spent $16,000 or more annually and ordered at least 12 times per year, and made those items the basis for the formulary  Officials said this analysis initially yielded a list of about 18,000 items, which the program office further refined to about 6,000 items by removing duplicate items or those that were not considered consumable commodities, such as medical equipment  This approach to requirements development stood in sharp contrast to those of the leading hospital networks we met with, which rely heavily on clinician input to help drive the standardization process and focus on individual categories of supplies that provide the best opportunities for cost savings  Based on the requirements developed by the program office, SAC began to issue competitive solicitations for the 6,000 items on the initial formulary in June 2015  Medical supply companies had responded to about 30 percent of the solicitations as of January 2016  As a result, according to SAC officials, they conducted outreach and some of these companies responded that VHA’s requirements did not appear to be based on clinical input and instead consisted of manufacturer-specific requirements that favored particular products instead of broader descriptions  Furthermore, SAC did not solicit large groups of related items, but rather issued separate solicitations for small groups of supply items—consisting of three or fewer items  This is contrary to industry practices of soliciting large groups of related supplies together  Therefore, according to SAC officials, some medical supply companies told them that submitting responses to SAC’s solicitations required more time and resources than they were willing to commit  By its April 2016 deadline for having 6,000 items on the formulary, SAC had been working on the effort for over a year and had established competitive agreements for about 200 items, representing about 3 percent of the planned items  Without contracts for the items on the formulary in place, VA delayed the launch of the MSPV-NG program until December 2016 and SAC began establishing non-competitive agreements in the last few months before the launch of MSPV-NG  As shown in figure 1, these non-competitive agreements accounted for approximately 79 percent of the items on the January 2017 version of the formulary  While this approach enabled the MSPV-NG program office to establish the formulary more quickly, it did so at the expense of one of the primary goals of the MSPV-NG program—leveraging VA’s buying power to obtain cost avoidance through competition

ground_truth: Multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC) are special contracting mechanisms that Congress permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to use for a limited number of defense acquisition programs. Compared to the standard or default approach of annual contracting, MYP and BBC have the potential for reducing weapon procurement costs by a few or several percent. Under annual contracting, DOD uses one or more contracts for each year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item. Under MYP, DOD instead uses a single contract for two to five years' worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. DOD needs congressional approval for each use of MYP. There is a permanent statute governing MYP contracting—10 U.S.C. 2306b. Under this statute, a program must meet several criteria to qualify for MYP. Compared with estimated costs under annual contracting, estimated savings for programs being proposed for MYP have ranged from less than 5% to more than 15%, depending on the particulars of the program in question, with many estimates falling in the range of 5% to 10%. In practice, actual savings from using MYP rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify because of cost growth during the execution of the contract due to changes in the program independent of the use of MYP rather than annual contracting. BBC is similar to MYP in that it permits DOD to use a single contract for more than one year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. BBC is also similar to MYP in that DOD needs congressional approval for each use of BBC. BBC differs from MYP in the following ways: There is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC. There is no requirement that BBC be approved in both a DOD appropriations act and an act other than a DOD appropriations act. Programs being considered for BBC do not need to meet any legal criteria to qualify for BBC, because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that establishes such criteria. A BBC contract can cover more than five years of planned procurements. Economic order quantity (EOQ) authority—the authority to bring forward selected key components of the items to be procured under the contract and purchase the components in batch form during the first year or two of the contract—does not come automatically as part of BBC authority because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that includes EOQ authority as an automatic feature. BBC contracts are less likely to include cancellation penalties. Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used; whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP; and whether the Coast Guard should begin making use of MYP and BBC.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  Once VA’s MSPV-NG initial formulary was established in December 2016, each medical center was charged with implementing it  According to logistics officials we spoke with at selected medical centers, they had varying levels of success due, in part, to incomplete guidance from the program office  Without clear guidance, many medical centers reported they were unable to find direct matches or substitutes on the MSPV-NG formulary for a substantial number of items they routinely used, which negatively impacted utilization rates for the initial formulary  In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the Director of the MSPV- NG program office provide complete guidance to medical centers for matching equivalent supply items  VA agreed with this recommendation and indicated it would provide this guidance to medical centers by December 2017  According to SAC, as of June 2017, only about a third of the items on the initial version of the formulary were being ordered in any significant quantity by medical centers, indicating that many items on the formulary were not those that are needed by medical centers  Senior VHA acquisition officials attributed this mismatch to shortcomings in their initial requirements development process as well as with VA’s purchase data  VA had set a target that medical centers would order 40 percent of their supplies from the MSPV-NG formulary, but utilization rates were below this target with a nationwide average utilization rate across medical centers of about 24 percent as of May 2017  Specifically, Chief Supply Chain Officers—who are responsible for managing the ordering and stocking of medical supplies at six selected medical centers—told us that many items they needed were not included in the MSPV-NG formulary  As such, we found that these six medical centers generally fell below VA’s stated utilization target  As shown in figure 2, among the six selected medical centers we reviewed, one met the target, while the remaining five were below 25 percent utilization  Instead of fully using MSPV-NG, the selected medical centers are purchasing many items through other means, such as purchase cards or new contracts awarded by their local contracting office, in part, because they said the formulary does not meet their needs  These approaches run counter to the goals of the MSPV-NG program and contribute to VA not making the best use of taxpayer dollars  Greater utilization of MSPV-NG is essential to VA achieving the cost avoidance goal of $150 million for its supply chain transformation effort  Under the legacy MSPV program, the National Acquisition Center tracked cost avoidance achieved by comparing prices for competitively-awarded MSPV supply contracts with prices available elsewhere  However, VHA officials stated that they are not currently tracking cost avoidance related specifically to MSPV-NG  In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the VHA Chief Procurement and Logistics Officer, in coordination with SAC, should calculate cost avoidance achieved by MSPV-NG on an ongoing basis  VA agreed with this recommendation and reported it would develop a new metric to measure cost avoidance by June 2018  In Phase 2 of MSPV-NG, the program office has taken some steps to incorporate greater clinical involvement in subsequent requirements development, but both its requirements development and SAC’s contracting efforts have been hampered by staffing and schedule constraints  In the fall of 2016, the program office began to establish panels of clinicians to serve on MSPV-NG integrated product teams (IPT) assigned to the task of developing updated requirements for the second phase of the formulary  Program officials said they had difficulty recruiting clinicians to participate  We found that slightly more than half (20 of the 38) of the IPTs had begun their work to review items and develop updated requirements by the time the MSPV-NG program launched in December 2016  Staff on the IPTs had to complete their responsibilities by the end of March 2017 while simultaneously managing their regular workload as physicians, surgeons, or nurses  By early March 2017, the IPTs still had about 4,200 items to review  Faced with meeting this unrealistic time frame, the MSPV-NG program office had 9 IPT members travel to one location—with an additional 10 members participating virtually—to meet for 5 days to review the remaining items  Members told us that this time pressure limited the extent to which they were able to pursue the goal of standardizing supplies, and that their review ended up being more of a data validation exercise than a standardization review  VHA ultimately met this compressed timeline, but in a rushed manner that limited the impact of clinician involvement  In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the VHA Chief Procurement and Logistics Officer use input from national clinical program offices to prioritize its requirements development and standardization efforts beyond Phase 2 to focus on supply categories that offer the best opportunity for standardization and cost avoidance  VA agreed with this recommendation and stated it is in the process of finalizing guidance that will detail the importance of involving the national clinical program offices in MSPV-NG requirements development and standardization efforts  The SAC plans to replace the existing Phase 1 non-competitive agreements with competitive awards based on the Phase 2 requirements generated by the IPTs, but it may not be able to keep up with expiring agreements due to an unrealistic schedule  Because they were made on a non-competitive basis, the Phase 1 agreements were established for a period of 1 year  In order to keep the full formulary available, the SAC director said the staff must award 200 to 250 contracts before the Phase 1 agreements expire later this year  SAC officials acknowledged that it is unlikely that they will be able to award the contracts by the time the existing agreements expire  According to SAC officials, they are in the process of hiring more staff to deal with the increased workload  Further, the SAC division director told us that they canceled all outstanding Phase 2 solicitations in September 2017 due to low response rates, protests from service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses, and changes in overall MSPV-NG strategy  In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the MSPV-NG program office and SAC should establish a plan for how to mitigate the potential risk of gaps in contract coverage while SAC is still working to make competitive Phase 2 awards, which could include prioritizing supply categories that are most likely to yield cost avoidance  VA agreed with this recommendation and indicated it has developed a plan to mitigate the risk of gaps in contract coverage with short- and mid-term procurement strategies to ensure continued provision of medical and surgical supplies to VHA facilities  The department also stated that it plans to replace the current MSPV-NG contract and formulary process with a new approach where the prime vendor would develop the formulary  However, VA will likely face challenges in this new approach until it fully addresses the existing shortcomings in the MSPV-NG program  Chairman Roe, Ranking Member Walz, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time  If you or your staff have any questions about this statement, please contact Shelby S  Oakley at 202-512-4841 or OakleyS@gao gov  In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Individuals who made key contributions to the report on which this testimony is based are Lisa Gardner, Assistant Director; Emily Bond; Matthew T  Crosby; Lorraine Ettaro; Michael Grogan; Jeff Hartnett; Katherine Lenane; Teague Lyons; Roxanna Sun; and Colleen Taylor  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 
Report 2: 1 billion in emergency and OCO/GWOT appropriations enacted to date for State/USAID includes major non-war-related programs, such as aid for the 2004 tsunami along Indian Ocean coasts, 2010 earthquake in Haiti, 2013 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, and 2015 worldwide outbreak of the Zika virus; as well as diplomatic operations (e g , paying staff, providing security, and building and maintaining embassies)  OCO/GWOT has also funded a variety of foreign aid programs, ranging from the Economic Support Fund to counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, among other activities in other countries  Figure 8 depicts the emergency or OCO appropriations for foreign affairs activities  Since 2012, when the OCO designation was first used for foreign affairs, more OCO funds have been appropriated than were requested each year, and those have also been authorized to be used in additional countries  Since January 2002, approximately $3 billion of post-9/11 emergency and OCO-designated funding has been provided to the U S  Coast Guard (USCG) for its traditional homeland security missions and for USCG operations in support of U S  Navy activities  This funding has been provided at various times as either an appropriation to the Coast Guard's operating expenses accounts, or as a transfer from Navy accounts to the Coast Guard  Open-source information on the use of those funds has varied  One FY2009 supplemental appropriations request included funding as a transfer, with the intent of funding "Coast Guard operations in support of OIF and OEF, as well as other classified activities " The FY2017 OCO request for annual appropriations for Navy Operations and Maintenance included $163 million for Coast Guard operational support for the deployment of patrol boats to the Northern Arabian Gulf and a port security unit to Guantanamo Bay, among other pay and equipment expenses  The Trump Administration initially requested a total of $89 billion in OCO funding for FY2019  All the funding was requested by DOD  In an amendment to the budget after Congress raised the BCA spending caps as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P L  115-123 ), the Administration removed the OCO designation from $20 billion of the funding, in effect, shifting that amount into the DOD base budget request  In a statement on the budget amendment, Mulvaney said the request fixes "long-time budget gimmicks" in which OCO funding has been used for base budget requirements  Beginning in FY2020, "the Administration proposes returning to OCO's original purpose by shifting certain costs funded in OCO to the base budget where they belong," he wrote  Of the revised amount of $69 billion requested for DOD OCO funding in FY2019: $46 3 billion (67%) was for Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS) in Afghanistan and related missions; $13 billion (22%) for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq and Syria and related missions; $4 8 billion (9%) for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to boost the U S  military presence in eastern Europe to deter Russian military aggression; and $0 9 billion (1%) for security cooperation (see Figure 9 )  The FY2019 OCO budget assumes a total force level (average annual troop strength) of 93,796 personnel  That figure includes: 11,958 primarily in Afghanistan (OFS); 5,765 primarily in Iraq and Syria (OIR); 59,463 for in-theater support; and 16,610 primarily in the continental United States (CONUS) or otherwise mobilized (see Figure 10 )  The number of personnel actually in-country or in-theater at any given time may exceed or fall below those assumed levels  The FY2019 force level assumes an increase of 3,153 personnel (3 5%) from the FY2018 assumed level, all of which is assumed for in-theater support  (For analysis of troop level and budget trends, see the section, " Trends in OCO Funding and Troop Levels ," earlier in this report ) As previously discussed, DOD acknowledges "OCO funding has not declined at the same rate as the in-country troop strength … due to the fixed, and often inelastic, costs of infrastructure, support requirements, and in-theater presence to support contingency operations " The departments lists the following as OCO cost drivers: In-theater support, including infrastructure costs like command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and base operations for U S  Central Command (CENTCOM) locations; Persistent demand for combat support such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets used to enhance force protection; Equipment reset, which lags troop level changes and procurement of contingency-focused assets like munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles and force protection capabilities that may not be linked directly to in-country operations; and International programs and deterrence activities, which are linked to U S  engagement in contingency operations and support U S  interests but are not directly proportional to U S  troop presence  DOD also breaks down the FY2019 OCO budget request by functional category (see Table 3 )  By this measure, the largest portion of OCO funding was $20 billion for in-theater support, followed by operations and force protection (including the incremental cost of military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries), at $14 7 billion; and unspecified classified programs, at $9 9 billion  According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), approximately $47 billion (68%) of the FY2019 OCO budget request consists of enduring activities—that is, "those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts"—that could be funded in the DOD base budget  CBO associates enduring activities with the following DOD functional categories: in-theater support, classified programs, equipment reset and readiness, European Deterrence Initiative, security cooperation, and joint improvised-threat defeat  Executive Branch budget documents for FY2019 show differing projections for how much OCO would be apportioned over the Future Years Defense Program (also known as the FYDP, pronounced "fiddip," the five-year period from FY2019 through FY2023)  For example, Table 1-11 in DOD's National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, citing OMB data, projects five-year OCO funding at $359 billion  However, Table 1-9 of the same document puts the figure at $149 billion after assuming a higher amount of OCO funding shifting into the base budget  According to OMB, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected increasing caps on defense discretionary base budget authority by $84 billion (15%) to $660 billion in FY2020 and by $87 billion (15%) to $677 billion in FY2021  It also projected defense funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) totaling $73 billion in FY2020 and $66 billion in FY2021  Thus, projected defense discretionary funding would total $733 billion in FY2020 and $743 billion in FY2021  FY2019 DOD budget documents show the same defense discretionary topline for FY2020 and FY2021  But they list an "Outyears Placeholder for OCO" of $20 billion in fiscal years FY2020-FY2023, and an "OCO to Base" amount of $53 billion in FY2020 and $45 8 billion in each year from FY2021-FY2023  The documents do not break down what accounts or activities are included in these amounts  The emergence of any new contingencies or conflicts would likely change DOD assumptions about OCO needs  Congress has appropriated a total of $68 8 billion for DOD OCO funding in FY2019, including the following amounts: $67 9 billion in defense funds provided in the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-245 ), which Congress passed on September 26, 2018; and $921 million in defense funds provided in the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-244 ), which Congress passed on September, 21, 2018  For the Department of State and USAID, as well as the Department of Homeland Security and U S  Coast Guard, FY2019 OCO levels have not yet been determined  They remain at prorated FY2018 levels because of continuing resolutions (CR) to fund certain agencies through December 21, 2018  The FY2019 House and Senate SFOPS bills ( H R  6385 and S  3108 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated approximately $8 billion in OCO-designated funding for various priorities  The House committee-reported version of the Homeland Security appropriations bill ( H R  6776 , 115 th Congress) would not have appropriated any OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard, while the Senate committee-reported version of the bill ( S  3109 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated $165 million for OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard  Any decision by the 116 th Congress to change discretionary defense and nondefense spending limits that remain in effect for FY2020 and FY2021 under the Budget Control Act (BCA; P L  112-25 ) could impact future OCO funding levels  Lawmakers may consider the following questions: Will Congress keep the BCA as is and rely on OCO funding that is not subject to the caps to meet agency requirements? Will Congress repeal the BCA and use less OCO funding? Will Congress amend the BCA limits for future years and continue to use OCO funding, as it has in the past? Will Congress significantly reduce DOD and international affairs funding to stay within the BCA caps and not use OCO funding? In a November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission, a bipartisan panel created by Congress, issued recommendations related to OCO and the BCA  Recommendation No  24 states, "Congress should eliminate the final two years of caps under the BCA " Recommendation 29 states, "To better prepare for major-power competition, Congress should gradually integrate OCO spending back into the base Pentagon budget  This also requires a dollar-for-dollar increase in the BCA spending caps, should they remain in force, so that this transfer does not result in an overall spending cut " Both House and Senate FY2019 committee-reported appropriations bills from the 115 th Congress included about $8 billion in OCO funding for State/USAID  It remains to be seen if the 116 th Congress will pass this OCO level as requested or extend the continuing resolution  Congress could enact legislation to authorize and appropriate a level of base and OCO spending to meet current or revised discretionary defense spending caps in any number of ways  In FY2019 budget documents from OMB and DOD, the Trump Administration projected increasing defense spending in FY2020 and FY2021 beyond the statutory limits of the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P L  112-25 ), but by differing amounts based on differing OCO projections  These figures serve as possible scenarios or options for Congress to consider  According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $660 billion (which assumes an $84 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO defense budget of $73 billion (see Figure 11 )  According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $713 billion (which assumes a $137 billion, or 24%, increase in the BCA defense cap—what would be the largest increase to the BCA defense caps yet—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion  Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $733 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $576 billion and designate an additional $157 billion for OCO  According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $677 billion (which assumes an $87 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $66 billion (see Figure 11 )  According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $723 billion (which assumes a $133 billion, or 23%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion  Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $743 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $590 billion and designate an additional $153 billion for OCO  As previously discussed, these figures would change with different toplines for the national defense budget function (050)  Former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and the National Defense Strategy Commission have recommended that Congress increase the defense budget between 3% and 5% a year above inflation ("real growth") to meet U S  strategic goals  President Donald Trump has said the discretionary defense spending request would total $700 billion in FY2020, a decrease of 2% in nominal terms from FY2019  Trump said, "We know what the budget—the new budget is for the Defense Department  It will probably be $700 billion " However, some media outlets have since reported that the President intends to request a discretionary defense budget of $750 billion in FY2020  Senator James Inhofe, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Representative Mac Thornberry, ranking member of the House Armed Services Committees in the 116 th Congress, have argued, "Any cut in the defense budget would be a senseless step backward " Thornberry has also said transferring recurring OCO costs into the regular budget "makes sense … it makes for more predictable budgeting, but it's all about what happens on the topline " Representative Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in the 116 th Congress, has said of the defense budget: "I think the number is too high, and it's certainly not going to be there in the future … We've got a debt, we've got a deficit, we've got infrastructure problems, we've got healthcare, education—there's a whole lot that is necessary to make our country safe, secure, and prosperous " Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan has talked about a flat topline for national defense: "When you look at the $700 billion, it's not just for one year drop down, [or] a phase, it's a drop and then held constant" over the FYDP  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer David Norquist, who is also performing the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, at one time was reportedly preparing two budgets for FY2020—one assuming $733 billion for national defense and another assuming $700 billion  An analyst has noted "returning enduring OCO costs to the base budget, particularly a vast majority of those enduring costs over a short period as DOD has outlined, could significantly complicate an agreement between congressional Democrats and Republicans to increase both the defense and nondefense BCA budget caps for FY2020 and FY2021 " As analyst noted, "OCO has become an even less-defined pot of money … Congress needs to properly question the DOD budget planners on the future of OCO " In a January 2017 report, GAO concluded, "Without a reliable estimate of DOD's enduring OCO costs, decision makers will not have a complete picture of the department's future funding needs or be able to make informed choices and trade-offs in budget formulation and decision making " The department states it has not fully estimated those costs in part because of the BCA  In a response to GAO, DOD wrote, "Developing reliable estimates of enduring OCO costs is an important first step to any future effort to transition enduring OCO costs to the base budget  In the context of such an effort, the Department would consider developing and reporting formal estimates of those costs  However, until there is sufficient relief from the budgetary caps established in the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Department will need OCO to finance counterterrorism operations, in particular [OFS] and [OIR] " In an October 2018 report, the Congressional Budget Office estimated OCO funding for DOD enduring activities—that is, those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts—totaled more than $50 billion a year (in 2019 dollars) from 2006 to 2018—and are projected to total about $47 billion a year starting in FY2020  This figure appears to be consistent with projections published by DOD  According to the department's FY2019 budget documents, DOD projected $53 billion for "OCO to Base" in FY2020 and $45 8 billion for "OCO to Base" for FY2021 through FY2023  Some analysts have concluded: Uncertainty created by current reliance on OCO, particularly to fund base budget needs, could be detrimental to national security on three levels: (a) by undermining budget controls and contributing thereby to larger deficits, (b) by generating insecurity in the defense workforce and in defense suppliers, and (c) by creating long-term uncertainty in defense planning  The alternative, transitioning longer-term OCO expenses to the base budget, could be achieved through a combination of increased budget caps, targeted cuts in inefficient Defense programs, and increased revenues  For example, a potential enduring activity in the OCO budget is the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)  It was previously known as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), an effort that began in June 2014 to increase the number of U S  military personnel and prepositioned equipment in Central and Eastern Europe intended in part to reassure NATO allies after Russia's military seized Crimea  As some analysts have noted, "Because it is in the OCO part of the budget request, EDI funding does not include a projection for how much funding will be allocated in future years, which can create uncertainty in the minds of allies and adversaries alike about the U S  military's commitment to the program " On the other hand, some contend that it is precisely EDI's flexibility that allows the commander of European Command to quickly respond to changing security and posture needs in Europe, and ensure that monies intended for European deterrence will not be redirected to other DOD priorities  In its November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission quoted the late military strategist Bernard Brodie, who wrote "strategy wears a dollar sign " The panel concluded that relying on OCO funding to increase the defense budget "is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources" for the type of great power competition outlined in the Secretary of Defense's 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which calls for the United States to bolster its competitive military advantage relative to threats posed by China and Russia: Because of budgetary constraints imposed by the BCA, lawmakers and the Department of Defense have increasingly relied upon the overseas contingency operations (OCO) fund to pay for warfighting operations in the greater Middle East, as well as other activities and initiatives  Yet this approach to resourcing has produced problems and distortions of its own  For one thing, the amount of money devoted to OCO since the BCA was enacted no longer corresponds to warfighting operations in the greater Middle East  Furthermore, such operations are no longer a top priority as articulated in the NDS  Finally, reorienting the military toward high-end competition and conflict will require new capabilities beyond the current program of record  OCO is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources for such a long-term endeavor, given its lack of predictability and the limitations on what OCO funds can be used to buy " Appendix A  Statutes, Guidance, and Regulations The designation of funding as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) is governed by several statues as well as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and the Department of Defense (DOD) Financial Management Regulation (FMR)  The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA) of 1985 BBEDCA, as amended, includes the statutory definitions of emergency and unanticipated as they relate to budget enforcement through sequestration  The act also allows for appropriations to be designated by Congress and the President as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism   Such appropriations are effectively exempt from the statutory discretionary spending limits  Title 10, United States Code—Armed Forces 10 U S C  101—Definitions Section 101 provides definitions of terms applicable to Title 10  While it does not define overseas contingency operations, it does include a definition of a contingency operations   Administration and Internal Guidance In addition to statutory requirements, the DOD and the Department of State are subject to guidance on OCO spending from the Administration  In October 2006 , under the Bush Administration, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directed the services to break with long-standing DOD regulatory policies and expand their request for supplemental funding to reflect incremental costs related to the "longer war on terror " There was no specific definition for the "longer war on terror," now one of the core missions of the DOD  In February 2009, at the beginning of the Obama Administration, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued updated budget guidance that required DOD to move some OCO costs back into the base budget  However, within six months of issuing the new criteria, officials waived restrictions related to pay and that would have prohibited end-strength growth  In a letter from OMB to the then-Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert Hale, the agency characterized its 2009 criteria as "very successful" for delineating base and OCO spending but stated, "This update clarifies language, eliminates areas of confusion and provides guidance for areas previously unanticipated " GAO subsequently reported that the revised guidance significantly changed the criteria used to build the fiscal year 2010 OCO funding request by: specifying stricter definitions for repair and procurement of equipment; limiting applicability of OCO funds for RDT&E; excluding pay and allowances for end-strength above the level requested in the budget; excluding enduring family support initiatives; and excluding base realignment and closures (BRAC) amounts  OMB again revised its guidance in September 2010 following a number of GAO reports that had concluded DOD reporting on OCO costs was of "questionable reliability," due in part to imprecisely defined financial management regulations related to OCO spending  (as of September 9, 2010) Source: Letter from Steven M  Kosiak, Associate Director for Defense and Foreign Affairs, OMB, to Robert Hale, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, "Revised War Funding Criteria," September 9, 2010  DOD Financial Management Regulations DOD incorporated the September 2010 OMB criteria for war costs into the Financial Management Regulation  Table 1 includes the general cost categories DOD uses in accounting for costs of contingency operations  Appendix B  Transfer Authorities, Special Purpose Accounts In addition to the supplemental appropriations and emergency or OCO/GWOT designation, the Department of Defense and the Department of State also have the authority to shift funds from one budget account to another in response to operational needs  For DOD, these transfers (sometimes called reprogramings ) are statutorily authorized by 10 U S C  2214—Transfer of funds: procedures and limitations  This authority allows the Secretary of Defense to reallocate funds for higher priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements, after receiving written approval from the four congressional defense committees  DOD may also reprogram funds within an account from one activity to another, as long as the general purpose for the use of those funds remains unchanged  Specific limits to transfer or reprogramming authorities have also been added to these general authorities through provisions in annual defense authorization and appropriation acts  The FY2019 defense appropriations bill sets the base budget transfer cap at $4 billion and the OCO transfer cap at $2 billion  The Department of State's OCO transfer authority has been provided in appropriations acts and has specifically authorized the Administration to transfer OCO funds only to other OCO funds within Title VIII SFOPS appropriations, not between OCO and base accounts  The transfer authority is capped, specified by account, and requires regular congressional notification procedures  Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) The OCOTF was established for DOD in FY1997 as a no year transfer account (meaning amounts are available until expended) in order to provide additional flexibility to meet operational requirements  Transfers from the OCOTF are processed using existing reprogramming procedures  A quarterly report is submitted to the congressional oversight committees, documenting all transfers from the OCOTF to DOD components base budget accounts  Beginning in FY2002, funds to support Southwest Asia, Kosovo, and Bosnia contingency requirements were appropriated directly to DOD components' Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel accounts rather than to the OCOTF for later disbursement  FY2014 was the last year the Administration requested a direct appropriation to the OCOTF  Contingency Operations Funded in the DOD Base Budget As first mandated by section 8091 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P L  110-116 ), Congress has required DOD to provide separate annual budget justification documents detailing the costs of U S  armed forces' participation in all named contingency operations where the total cost of the operation exceeds $100 million or is staffed by more than 1,000 U S  military personnel  Funding for certain DOD contingency operations has been moved to the base budget request, and is no longer designated as emergency or OCO/GWOT requirements  This movement of funding from the OCO request to the base budget request typically occurs as the operational activities of an enduring contingency operation evolve over time and DOD determines that certain elements of the associated military operations have become stable enough to be planned, financed, and executed within the base budget  For example, funding for Operation Noble Eagle, which provides fighter aircraft on 24/7 alert at several U S  military bases, was moved from the GWOT request to the base budget request in 2005  Contingency operations and other activities funded wholly or in part through DOD's base budget have included: NATO Operations in the Balkans   The U S  Army and U S  Air Force provide support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led operations in the Balkans region  Most U S  forces are deployed to Kosovo in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)  A small number of U S  personnel are deployed to the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Joint Task Force - Bravo   U S  forces support this task force, which operates from Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras and supports joint, combined, and interagency exercises and operations in Central America to counter the influence of transnational organized crime; carry out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and build military capacity with regional partners and allied nations to promote regional cooperation and security; Operation Juniper Shield  Previously known as Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), this operation supports efforts to defeat violent extremist organizations in East Africa  This operation also provides military-to-military engagement with partner African countries, as well as readiness for crisis response and evacuation of U S  military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel; Operation Noble Eagle   This operation funds the continuing efforts to defend the United States from airborne attacks, maintain the sovereignty of the United States airspace, and defend critical U S  facilities from potentially hostile threats or unconventional attacks; Operation Enduring Freedom- Horn of Africa   This operation was established to support efforts to defeat violent extremist organizations in East Africa; provide military-to-military engagement with partner African countries, as well as readiness for crisis response and evacuation of U S  military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel throughout East Africa; Operation Enduring Freedom- Caribbean and Central America   A U S  regional military operation initiated in 2008, under the operational control of Special Operations Command-South, this operation was established to focus on counterterrorism to support DOD's overall military objectives and the larger fight against terrorism  Operation Observant Compass   This operation was established to support the deployment of approximately 100 U S  military personnel assisting the Ugandan People's Defense Force and neighboring partner African countries in countering the Lord's Resistance Army operations  Operation Spartan Shield  This operation was established to support ongoing U S  Central Command missions  Other Congressionally Authorized Funds or Programs Through the OCO authorization and appropriation process, Congress has created numerous funds and programs that are designed to finance specific overseas contingency operations-related activities that do not fit into traditional budgetary accounts  Many of these funds and programs are supplied with amounts that are available until expended—however, authorization for the specified fund or program has an expiration date, thereby requiring further congressional action for reauthorization of affected funds or programs  Congress has also provided increased transfer authority to provide greater flexibility for U S  government activities in situations that are typically unpredictable  Examples of these types of congressionally authorized OCO programs or funds have included: Afghan istan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)   These funds were established to provide funding and support for the training, equipping, and expansion of selected military and security forces in support of U S  objectives; Counterterrorism Partnership s Fund   This fund was established to provide funding and support to partner nations engaged in counterterrorism and crisis response activities; Command er's Emergency Response Program  This program was established to support infrastructure improvements, such as road repair and construction and enable military commanders on the ground to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs by undertaking activities that will immediately aid local populations and assist U S  forces in maintaining security gains; Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) Defeat Fund   This fund was established to coordinate and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing research and development, throughout DOD  Due to the enduring nature of the threat, DOD began moving associated funding to the base budget in FY2010; Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) Fund   This fund was intended to expedite the procurement and deployment of MRAPs to Iraq and Afghanistan; European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)   Initially the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), this effort was established to provide funding and support to NATO allies and partners to "reassure allies of the U S  commitment to their security and territorial integrity as members of the NATO Alliance, provide near-term flexibility and responsiveness to the evolving concerns of our allies and partners in Europe, especially Central and Eastern Europe, and help increase the capability and readiness of U S  allies and partners;" Global Security Contingency Fund   This fund was established to provide funding for the Department of State and the Department of Defense "to facilitate an interagency approach to confronting security challenges;" Complex Crise s Fund   This fund was established to provide funding through the State Department and USAID "to help prevent crises and promote recovery in post-conflict situations during unforeseen political, social, or economic challenges that threaten regional security;" Migration and Refugee Assistance Fund   This fund was established to provide funding to respond to refugee crises in Africa, the Near East, South and Central Asia, and Europe and Eurasia; and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative   This initiative was established to provide assistance, including training, equipment, lethal weapons, of a defensive nature; logistics support; supplies and services; sustainment; and intelligence support to the military and national security forces of Ukraine  This is an update to a report originally co-authored by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in Defense Readiness and Infrastructure  It references research previously compiled by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in U S  Defense Policy and Budget; Christopher Mann, Analyst in Defense Policy and Trade; [author name scrubbed], Analyst in U S  Defense Acquisition Policy; [author name scrubbed], CRS Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process; and [author name scrubbed], CRS Analyst in Public Finance  [author name scrubbed], Research Assistant, helped compile the graphics 

ground_truth: VA spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually on medical supplies to meet the health care needs of about 7 million veterans. To provide a more efficient, cost-effective way for its medical centers to order supplies, the VA established the MSPV-NG program. The program's goals include involving clinicians in requirements development, leveraging buying power when making competitive awards, and consolidating supplies used across medical centers. VA began developing requirements in early 2015 and launched the program in December 2016. This testimony summarizes key information contained in GAO's November 2017 report, GAO-18-34 . Specifically, it addresses the extent to which VA's implementation of MSPV-NG has been effective in meeting program goals. GAO analyzed VA's requirements development and contracting processes, and identified key supply chain practices cited by four leading hospital networks. GAO also met with contracting and clinical officials at six medical centers, selected based on high dollar contract obligations in fiscal years 2014-2016 and geographic representation. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) established the Medical Surgical Prime Vendor-Next Generation (MSPV-NG) program to provide an efficient, cost-effective way for its facilities to order supplies, but its initial implementation did not have an overarching strategy, stable leadership, and workforce capacity that could have facilitated medical center buy-in for the change. VA also developed requirements for a broad range of MSPV-NG items with limited clinical input. Further, starting in June 2015, VA planned to award competitive contracts, but instead, 79 percent of the items available for purchase under MSPV-NG were added through non-competitive agreements. (See figure). As a result, the program did not meet the needs of medical centers, and usage remained below VA's 40 percent target. (See figure.) VA has taken steps to address some deficiencies and is developing a new approach to the program. However, VA will likely continue to face challenges in meeting its goals until it fully addresses these existing shortcomings. GAO made 10 recommendations in its November 2017 report, including that VA develop an overarching strategy, expand clinician input in requirements development, and establish a plan for awarding future competitive contracts. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations.