prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: Agencies generally acquire equipment from commercial vendors and through GSA, which contracts for the equipment from commercial vendors  In acquiring heavy equipment from a commercial vendor or GSA, agencies can purchase or lease the equipment  Generally, agencies use the term “lease” to refer to acquisitions that are time-limited and therefore distinct from purchases  The term “lease” is used to refer to both long-term and short-term leases  For example, the three agencies we reviewed in-depth use the term “rental” to refer to short-term leases of varying time periods  According to Air Force officials, they define rentals as leases that are less than 120 days while FWS and NPS officials said they generally use the term rental to refer to leases that are a year or less  For the purposes of this report, we use the term “rental” to refer to short-term leases defined as rentals by the agency and “long-term lease” to refer to a lease that is not considered a rental by the agency  (See fig  1 ) In 2013, GSA began offering heavy equipment through its Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part to eliminate ownership and maintenance cost for infrequently used heavy equipment  Under this program, agencies can request a short-term equipment rental (less than a year) from GSA, and GSA will work with a network of commercial vendors to provide the requested heavy equipment  Unlike for some other types of federal property, there are no central reporting requirements for agencies’ inventories of heavy equipment  However, each federal agency is required to maintain inventory controls for its property, which includes heavy equipment  Agencies maintain inventory data through the use of agency-specific databases, and each agency can set its own requirements for what data are required and how these data are maintained  For example, while an agency may choose to maintain data in a headquarters database, it could also choose to maintain data at the local level  As another example, an agency may decide to track and maintain data on the utilization of its heavy equipment (such as the hours used) or may choose not to have such data or require any particular utilization levels  The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) governs the acquisition process of executive branch agencies when acquiring certain goods and services, including heavy equipment  Under the FAR, agencies should consider whether to lease equipment instead of purchasing it based on several factors  Specifically, the FAR provides that agency officials should evaluate cost and other factors by conducting a “lease-versus-purchase” analysis before acquiring heavy equipment  Additionally, DOD’s regulations require its component agencies to prepare a justification supporting lease-versus-purchase decisions if the equipment is to be leased for more than 60 days  Twenty agencies reported data on their owned heavy equipment, including the (1) number, (2) types, (3) acquisition year, and (4) location of agencies’ owned heavy equipment in their inventories as of June 2017  The 20 agencies reported owning over 136,000 heavy equipment items  DOD reported owning most of this heavy equipment—over 100,000 items, about 74 percent  (See app  I for more information on agencies’ ownership of these items ) The Department of Agriculture reported owning the second highest number of heavy equipment items—almost 9,000 items, about 6 percent  (See fig  2 ) Four agencies—the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Agency for International Development—reported owning five or fewer heavy equipment items each  The 20 agencies reported owning various types of heavy equipment, such as cranes, backhoes, and road maintenance equipment in five categories: (1) construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance equipment; (2) airfield-specialized trucks and trailers; (3) self-propelled warehouse trucks and tractors; (4) tractors; and (5) soil preparation and harvesting equipment  Thirty-eight percent (almost 52,000 items) were in the construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance category (see fig  3)  Fifteen of the 20 agencies reported owning at least some items in this category  Twenty-four percent (over 33,000 items) were in the airfield- specialized trucks and trailers category, generally used to service and re-position aircraft on runways  DOD reported owning 99 percent (over 32,000) of these items, while 9 other agencies, including the Department of Labor and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, reported owning the other one percent (317 items)  Twenty-two percent (over 29,000 items) were in the self-propelled warehouse trucks and tractors category, which includes equipment such as forklift trucks  All 20 agencies reported owning at least one item in this category, and five agencies—the Agency for International Development, Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Office of Personnel Management—reported owning only items in this category  (For additional information on agencies’ ownership of heavy equipment in various categories, see app  I ) The twenty agencies reported acquiring their owned heavy equipment between 1944 and 2017, with an average of about 13 years since acquisition (see fig  4)  One heavy equipment manager we interviewed reported that a dump truck can last 10 to 15 years, whereas other types of equipment can last for decades if regularly used and well-maintained  The 20 agencies reported that over 117,000 heavy equipment items (86 percent) were located within the United States or its territories  Of these, about one-fifth (over 26,000) were located in California and Virginia, the two states with the most heavy equipment (see fig  5)  Of the equipment located outside of the United States and its territories, 94 percent was owned by the Department of Defense  The rest was owned by the Department of State (714 items in 141 countries from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe) and the National Science Foundation (237 items in areas such as Antarctica)  The twenty agencies reported spending over $7 4 billion in 2016 dollars to acquire the heavy equipment they own (see table 1)  However, actual spending was higher because this inflation-adjusted figure excludes over 37,000 heavy equipment items for which the agencies did not report acquisition cost or acquisition year, or both  Without this information, we could not determine the inflation-adjusted cost and therefore did not include the cost of these items in our calculation  The Army owns almost all of these items, having not reported acquisition cost or acquisition year, or both, for 36,589 heavy equipment items because, according to Army officials, the data were not available centrally but may have been available at individual Army units and would have been resource- intensive to obtain  The heavy equipment items reported by the 20 agencies ranged in acquisition cost from zero dollars to over $2 million in 2016 dollars, with an average acquisition cost in 2016 dollars of about $78,000, excluding assets with a reported acquisition cost of $0  Of the items which we adjusted to 2016 dollars and for which non-zero acquisition costs were provided: 94 percent cost less than $250,000 and accounted for 57 percent of the total adjusted acquisition costs (See fig  6 ) 6 percent of items cost more than $250,000 and accounted for 43 percent of the adjusted acquisition costs  (See fig  6 ) High-cost items included a $779,000 hydraulic crane acquired by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1997 ($1 2 million in 2016 dollars), a $1 4 million ultra-deep drilling simulator acquired by the Department of Energy in 2009 ($1 6 million in 2016 dollars), and several $2 2 million well-drilling machines acquired by the Air Force in 2013 ($2 3 million in 2016 dollars)  In calendar years 2012 through 2016, the Air Force, FWS, and NPS purchased almost 3,500 pieces of heavy equipment through GSA and private vendors at a total cost of about $360 million to support mission needs  (See table 2 ) These agencies also spent over $5 million on long- term leases and rentals during this time period  The Air Force spent over $300 million to purchase over 2,600 heavy equipment assets in calendar years 2012 through 2016 that were used to support and maintain its bases globally  For example, according to Air Force officials, heavy equipment is often used to maintain runways and service and reposition aircraft on runways  While the majority of Air Force heavy equipment purchased in this time period is located in the United States, 41 percent of this heavy equipment is located outside the United States and its territories in 17 foreign countries to support global military bases  The Air Force could not provide complete information on its heavy equipment leases for fiscal years 2012 through 2016  Specifically, the Air Force provided data on 33 commercial heavy equipment leases that were ongoing as of August 2017 but could not provide cost data for these leases because this information is not tracked centrally  Additionally, the Air Force could not provide any data on leases that occurred previously because, according to Air Force officials, lease records are removed from the Air Force database upon termination of the lease  Officials said that rentals are generally handled locally and obtaining complete data would require a data call to over 300 base contracting offices  Air Force officials stated that rentals are generally used in unique situations involving short- term needs such as responding to natural disasters  For example, following Hurricane Sandy, staff at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia used rental equipment to clean up and repair the base  Although Air Force did not provide complete information on rentals, data we obtained from GSA’s Short-Term Rental program indicated that Air Force rented heavy equipment in 46 transactions not reflected in the Air Force data we received totaling over $3 7 million since GSA began offering heavy equipment through its Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program in 2013  FWS spent over $32 million to purchase 348 heavy equipment assets from calendar years 2012 through 2016  FWS used its heavy equipment to maintain refuge areas throughout the United States and its territories, including maintaining roads and nature trails  FWS also used heavy equipment to respond to inclement weather and natural disasters  Most of the heavy equipment items purchased by FWS were in the construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance equipment category and include items such as excavators, which were used for moving soil, supplies, and other resources  FWS officials reported that they did not have any long-term leases for any heavy equipment in fiscal years 2012 through 2016 because they encourage equipment sharing and rentals to avoid long-term leases whenever possible  FWS officials provided data on 228 rentals for this time period with a total cost of over $1 million  Information regarding these rentals is contained in an Interior-wide property management system, the Financial Business Management System (FBMS)  FWS officials told us that they have not rented heavy equipment through GSA’s program because they have found lower prices through local equipment rental companies  NPS spent over $27 million to purchase 471 heavy equipment assets from calendar years 2012 through 2016  NPS uses heavy equipment— located throughout the United States and its territories—to maintain national parks and respond to inclement weather and natural disasters  For example, NPS used heavy equipment such as dump trucks, snow plows, road graders, and wheel loaders to clear and salt the George Washington Memorial Parkway in Washington, D C , following snow and ice storms  Most of the heavy equipment items purchased by NPS were in the construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance equipment category and include items such as excavators, which are used for moving soil, supplies, and other resources  NPS reported spending about $360,000 on 230 long-term leases and rentals in fiscal years 2012 through 2016, not including rentals through GSA’s Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program  As with FWS, NPS leases and rentals are contained in FBMS, which is Interior’s property management system  Data we obtained from GSA’s Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program indicated that NPS rented heavy equipment in 26 transactions totaling over $200,000 since GSA began offering heavy equipment through its Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program in 2013, for a potential total cost of over $560,000 for these long-term leases and rentals  As mentioned earlier, the FAR provides that executive branch agencies seeking to acquire equipment should consider whether it is more economical to lease equipment rather than purchase it and identifies factors agencies should consider in this analysis, such as estimated length of the period that the equipment is to be used, the extent of use in that time period, and maintenance costs  This analysis is commonly referred to as a lease-versus-purchase analysis  While the FAR does not specifically require that agencies document their lease-versus-purchase analyses, according to federal internal control standards, management should clearly document all transactions and other significant events in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination and also communicate quality information to enable staff to complete their responsibilities  As discussed below, we found that most acquisitions we reviewed from FWS, NPS, and the Air Force did not contain any documentation of a lease-versus-purchase analysis  Specifically, officials were unable to provide documentation of a lease-versus-purchase analysis for six of the eight acquisitions we reviewed  FWS officials were able to provide documentation for the other two  Officials told us that a lease-versus- purchase analysis was not conducted for five of the six acquisitions and did not know if such analysis was conducted for the other acquisition  According to agency officials, the main reason why analyses were not conducted or documented for these six acquisitions is that the circumstances in which such analyses were to be performed or documented were not always clear to FWS, NPS, and Air Force officials  In addition to the FAR, Interior has agency guidance stating that bureaus should conduct and document lease-versus-purchase analyses  This July 2013 guidance—that FWS and NPS are to follow—states that requesters of equipment valued at $15,000 or greater should perform a lease-versus- purchase analysis when requesting heavy equipment  According to the guidance, this analysis should address criteria in the FAR and include a discussion of the financial and operating advantages of alternate approaches that would help contracting officials determine the final appropriate acquisition method  At the time the guidance was issued, Interior also provided a lease-versus-purchase analysis tool to aid officials in conducting this analysis  Additionally, in April 2016, Interior issued a policy to implement the July 2013 guidance  The 2016 policy clarifies that program offices are required to complete Interior’s lease-versus-purchase analysis tool and provide the completed analysis to the relevant contracting officer  Within Interior, bureaus are responsible for ensuring that procurement requirements are met, including the requirements and directives outlined in Interior’s 2013 guidance and 2016 policy on lease-versus-purchase analyses, according to agency officials  Within FWS, local procurement specialists prepare procurement requests and ensure that procurement requirements are met and that all viable options have been considered  Regional equipment managers review these procurement requests, decide whether to purchase or lease the requested equipment, and prepare the lease-versus-purchase analysis tool if the procurement specialist has indicated that it is required  Within NPS, local procurement specialists are responsible for ensuring that all procurements adhere to relevant requirements and directives, including documenting the lease- versus-purchase analysis  Of the three FWS heavy equipment acquisitions we reviewed for which the 2013 Interior guidance was applicable, one included a completed lease-versus-purchase analysis tool; one documented the rationale for purchasing rather than leasing, although it did not include Interior’s lease- versus-purchase analysis tool; and one did not include any documentation related to a lease-versus-purchase analysis  (See table 3 ) Regarding the acquisition for which no documentation of a lease-versus- purchase analysis was provided—a 12-month lease of an excavator and associated labor costs for over $19,000—FWS officials initially told us that a lease-versus-purchase analysis was not required because the equipment lease was less than $15,000, and Interior’s guidance required a lease-versus-purchase analysis for procurements of equipment valued at $15,000 or greater  However, we found the guidance did not specify whether the $15,000 threshold includes the cost of labor  We also found that Interior’s guidance did not specify if a lease-versus-purchase analysis was required if the total cost of a rental is less than the purchase price  FWS officials acknowledged that Interior guidance is not clear and that it would be helpful for Interior to clarify whether these leases require a lease-versus-purchase analysis  NPS officials were unable to provide documentation of a lease-versus- purchase analysis for the single heavy equipment acquisition we reviewed—the purchase of a wheeled tractor in 2015 for $43,177  According to these officials, they could not do so because of personnel turnover in the contracting office that would have documented the analysis  In addition, they told us that they believe that such analyses are not always completed for heavy equipment acquisitions because responsibility for completing these analyses is unclear  Specifically, they told us that it was unclear whether the responsibility lies with the official requesting the equipment, the contracting personnel who facilitate the acquisition, or the property personnel who manage inventory data  However, when we discussed our findings with Interior and NPS officials, NPS officials were made aware of the 2016 Interior policy that specifically requires program offices—the officials requesting the equipment—to complete the lease-versus-purchase analysis and provide documentation of this analysis to the contracting officer  As a result, NPS officials told us at the end of our review that program office officials will now be required to complete the lease-versus-purchase analysis tool and document this analysis  According to Air Force officials responsible for managing heavy equipment, financial or budget personnel at individual bases are responsible for conducting lease-versus-purchase analyses, also called economic analyses, to support purchase and lease requests  Air Force fleet officials told us that they then review these requests from a fleet perspective, considering factors such as whether the cost information provided in the request is from a reputable source, expected maintenance costs, and whether a requesting base has the capability to maintain the requested equipment  However, they said they do not check to ensure that a lease-versus-purchase analysis was completed or review the analysis  Equipment rentals can be approved at individual bases  In our review of four Air Force heavy equipment acquisitions, we found no instances in which Air Force officials documented a lease-versus- purchase analysis (see table 4)  For the acquisitions that we reviewed, Air Force officials told us they did not believe a lease-versus-purchase analysis was required because the new equipment was either replacing old equipment that was previously approved or could be deployed  Accordingly, the Air Force purchased two forklifts in 2013 without conducting lease-versus-purchase analyses because the forklifts were replacing old forklifts that were authorized in 1997 and 2005  Furthermore, Air Force officials told us that both of these forklifts could be deployed and indicated that lease-versus-purchase analyses are not required for deployable equipment  However, the Air Force does not have guidance that describes the circumstances that require either a lease-versus-purchase analysis or documentation of the rationale for not completing such analysis  Although we identified several instances in which officials in the three selected agencies did not document lease-versus-purchase analyses, officials from these agencies stated that they consider mission needs and equipment availability, among other factors, when making these decisions  For example, Air Force officials told us following Hurricane Sandy, staff at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia used rental equipment to clean and repair the base because the equipment was needed immediately to ensure the base could meet its mission  Moreover, availability of heavy equipment for lease or rental, which can be affected by factors such as geography and competition for equipment, is a key consideration  For example, FWS officials told us that the specialized heavy equipment sometimes needed may not be available for long-term lease or rent in remote areas such as Alaska and the Midway Islands, so the agency purchases the equipment  In addition, some agency officials told us that they may purchase heavy equipment even if that equipment is needed only sporadically if there is likely to be high demand for rental equipment  For example, following inclement weather or a natural disaster, demand for certain heavy equipment rentals can be high and equipment may not be available to rent when it is needed  While we recognize that mission needs and other factors are important considerations, without greater clarity regarding when to conduct or document lease-versus-purchase analyses, officials at FWS, NPS, and Air Force may not be conducting such analyses when appropriate and may not always make the best acquisition decisions  These agencies could be overspending on leased equipment that would be more cost- effective if purchased or overspending to purchase equipment when it would be more cost-effective to lease or rent  Moreover, without documenting decisions on whether to purchase or lease equipment, they lack information that could be used to inform future acquisition decisions for similar types of equipment or projects  Air Force guidance requires that fleet managers collect utilization data for both vehicles and heavy equipment items, such as the number of hours used, miles traveled, and maintenance costs  The Air Force provided us with utilization data for over 18,000 heavy equipment items and uses such data to inform periodic base validations  Specifically, Air Force officials said that every 3 to 5 years each Air Force base reviews the on- base equipment to ensure that the installation has the appropriate heavy equipment to complete its mission and reviews utilization data to identify items that are underutilized  If heavy equipment is considered underutilized, the equipment is relocated—either moved to another location or sent to the Defense Logistics Agency for reuse or transfer to another agency  According to Air Force officials the Air Force has relocated over 700 heavy equipment items based on the results of the validation process and other factors such as replacing older items and agency needs since 2014  Similarly, FWS guidance for managing heavy equipment utilization sets forth minimum utilization hours for certain types of heavy equipment and describes requirements for reporting utilization data  FWS provided us with utilization data on over 3,000 heavy equipment items  According to officials, condition assessments of heavy equipment are required by FWS guidance every 3 to 5 years  According to FWS officials, condition assessments inform regional-level decision making about whether to move equipment to another FWS location or dispose of the equipment  In contrast, NPS does not require the collection of utilization data to evaluate heavy equipment use and does not have guidance for managing heavy equipment utilization  However, NPS officials told us that they recognize the need for such guidance  NPS officials shared with us draft guidance that they have developed, which would require collection of utilization data for heavy equipment such as hours or days of usage each month  According to NPS officials, they plan to send the guidance to the NPS policy office for final review in March 2018  Until this guidance is completed and published, NPS is taking interim actions to manage the utilization of its heavy equipment  For example, NPS officials stated that they have asked NPS locations to collect and post monthly utilization data, discussed the collection of utilization data at fleet meetings, and distributed job aids to support this effort  During the course of our review, NPS officials provided us with some utilization data for about 1,400 of the more than 2,400 NPS heavy equipment items  Specifically, for the 1,459 heavy equipment items for which NPS provided utilization data, 541 items had utilization data for each month  For the remaining 918 items, utilization data were reported for some, but not all months  The federal government has spent billions of dollars to acquire heavy equipment  There is no requirement that agencies report on the inventory of this equipment, as there is no standard definition of heavy equipment  When deciding how to acquire this equipment, agencies’ should conduct a lease-versus-purchase analysis as provided in the FAR, which is a critical mechanism to ensure agencies are acquiring the equipment in the most cost-effective manner  Because FWS, NPS and the Air Force were unclear when such an analysis was required, they did not consistently conduct or document analyses of whether it was more economical to purchase or lease heavy equipment
Report 2:  The processes for developing and updating estimates are designed to inform management about program progress and the use of program resources, supporting cost-driven planning efforts and well-informed decision making  Our work has identified a number of best practices for use in developing guidance related to cost estimation and analysis that are the basis of effective program cost estimating and should result in reliable and valid cost estimates that management can use for making informed decisions  In 2012 we reported that the Bureau had not yet established guidance for developing cost estimates  We recommended that the Bureau establish guidance, policies, and procedures for developing cost estimates that would meet best practice criteria  The Bureau agreed with the theme of the report but did not specifically agree with the recommendation  Moreover, in June 2016, we also reported that the cost estimation team did not record how and why it changed assumptions that were provided to it and did not document the sources of all data it used  The documentation of these changes to assumptions did not happen because the Bureau lacked written guidance and procedures for the cost estimation team to follow  During this review we found the Bureau has since established reliable guidance, processes, and policies for developing cost estimates and managing the cost estimation process  The following documents, shown in table 2, establish roles and responsibilities for oversight and approval of cost estimation processes, provide a detailed description of the steps taken to produce a high-quality cost estimate, and clarify the process for updating the cost estimate and associated documents over the life of a project  The Decennial Census Program’s Cost Estimate and Analysis Process, which provides a detailed description of the steps taken to produce a high-quality estimate, is reliable as it met the criteria for 8 steps and substantially met the criteria for 4 steps of the 12 best steps outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, as shown below in figure 8  To avoid cost overruns and to support high performance, it will be important for the Bureau to abide by their newly developed policies and guidance and continue to use the life-cycle cost estimate as a management tool  The 2017 life-cycle cost estimate includes significantly higher costs than those included in the 2015 estimate  In 2015, the Bureau estimated that they could conduct the operation at a cost of $12 3 billion in constant 2020 dollars  The Bureau’s latest cost estimate, announced in October 2017, reflects the same design, but at an expected cost of $15 6 billion  Figure 9 below shows the change in cost by WBS category for 2015 and 2017  The largest increases occurred in the Response, Managerial Contingency, and Census/Survey Engineering categories  Increased costs of $1 3 billion in the response category (costs related to collecting, maintaining, and processing survey response data) were in part due to reduced assumptions for self-response rates, leading to increases in the amount of data collected in the field, which is more costly to the Bureau  Contingency allocations increased overall from $1 35 billion in 2015 to $2 6 billion in 2017, as the Bureau gained a greater understanding of risks facing the 2020 Census  Increases of $838 million in the Census/Survey Engineering category were due mainly to the cost of an IT contract for integrating decennial survey systems that was not included in the 2015 cost estimate  Bureau officials attribute a decrease of $551 million in estimated costs for Program Management to changes in the categorization of costs associated with risks: In the 2017 version of the estimate, estimated costs related to program risks were allocated to their corresponding WBS element  More generally, factors that contributed to cost fluctuations between the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates include: changes in assumptions for census operations, improved ability to anticipate and quantify risk, an overall increase in IT costs, and more defined contract requirements  Several assumptions for the implementation of the 2020 Census have changed since the 2015 cost estimate  Some assumptions contributing to cost changes, mainly in the Response (related to collecting and processing response data) and Frame (the mapping and collecting addresses to frame enumeration activities) categories, include the following: Self-response rates  Changes in assumptions for expected self- response rates contributed to increases in the response category, as the assumed rate decreased from 63 5 percent in 2015 to 60 5 percent in 2017, thereby increasing the anticipated percentage and associated cost of nonresponse follow-up  When the Bureau does not receive responses by mail, phone, or Internet, census enumerators visit each nonresponding household to obtain data  Thus, reduced self-response rates lead to increases in the amount of data collected in the field, which is more costly to the Bureau  Bureau officials attributed this decrease to a forecasted reduction in Internet response due to added authentication steps at log in and the elimination of the function allowing users to save their responses and return later to complete the survey  Productivity rates  The productivity of enumerators collecting data for NRFU is another variable in the cost estimate that was updated, contributing to cost increases in the response category  Expected productivity rates for NRFU decreased from the 2015 estimate of 4 attempts per hour to 2 9  According to Bureau documentation, this more conservative estimate is based on historical data, rather than research and test data  In-office address canvassing rates  The Bureau will not go door-to- door to conduct in-field address canvassing across the country to update address and map information for every housing unit, as it has in prior decennial censuses  Rather, some areas would only need a review of their address and map information using computer imagery and third-party data sources—what the Bureau calls “in-office” address canvassing procedures  However, in March 2017, citing budget uncertainty the Bureau decided to discontinue one of the phases of in-office review address canvassing for the 2020 Census  The cancellation of that phase of in-office review is expected to increase the number of housing units canvassed in-field by 5 percent (from 25 to 30 percent of all canvassed housing units)  In-field canvassing is more labor intensive compared to in office procedures  The 2017 version of the cost estimate reflects this increase in workload for in-field address canvassing, though overall changes in estimated costs for the Frame category, of which Address Canvassing is a part, were minimal  Staffing  Updated analysis resulted in changes to several staffing assumptions, which resulted in decreases across WBS categories  Changes included reduced pay rates for field data collection staff based on current labor market conditions and reductions in the length of staff engagement  In general, contingency allocations increased overall from $1 35 billion in 2015 to $2 6 billion in 2017  This increase in contingency can be attributed, in part, to the Bureau gaining a clearer understanding of risk and uncertainty in the 2020 Census as it approaches  The Bureau developed some of its contingency based on proven risk management techniques, including Monte Carlo analysis and allocated funding for known risk scenarios  The 2017 estimate includes close to $1 4 billion in estimated costs for these risks, almost three times the amount included in the 2015 estimate  The basis of estimate contains detail on the various risks and the process for calculating the associated contingency  The 2017 version also includes a contingency amount of $1 2 billion for general risks, or unknown-unknowns, such as natural disasters and cyber-attacks  Contingency amounts were reallocated within the WBS to more closely reflect the nature of the risk: Bureau officials attribute a decrease from the 2015 estimate of $551 million in estimated costs for program management to changes in the categorization of costs associated with risks  Officials stated that, in 2015, discrete program risks were previously consolidated as program management costs  In 2017, these discrete costs were reallocated to associate risks with the appropriate WBS element  For example, contingency amounts related to the likelihood of achieving a certain response rate previously included in the program management work breakdown category are now a part of the “response” work breakdown category  Increases in IT costs, totaling $1 59 billion, represented almost 50 percent of the total cost increase from 2015 to 2017  The total share of IT costs as a percentage of total census costs increased from 28 percent in 2015 to 32 percent in 2017, or from $3 41 billion to approximately $5 billion  Increases in IT costs are spread across seven cost categories  Figure 10 shows the IT and non-IT cost by WBS for the 2017 cost estimate  IT costs in infrastructure, response data, and census/survey WBSs account for the majority of the approximately $5 billion  The Bureau’s October 2015 cost estimate included IT costs for, among other things, system engineering, test and evaluation, and infrastructure, as well as for a portion of the Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCaP) program  The 2017 estimated IT cost increases were due, in large part, to the Bureau (1) updating the cost estimate for CEDCaP; (2) including an estimate for technical integration services that contributed to increases in the Census and Survey Engineering category; and (3) updating costs related to other major contracts (such as mobile device as a service, field IT services, and payroll systems)  Bureau documents described an overall improvement in the Bureau’s ability to define and specify contract requirements  This resulted in updated estimates for several contracts, including for the Census Questionnaire Assistance (CQA) contract  Assumptions regarding call volume to the CQA were increased by 5 percent to account for expected response by phone after the elimination of the option to save Internet responses and return to complete the form later  The Bureau also cited updated cost data and the results of reconciliation with independent cost estimates as factors contributing to the increased costs of other major contracts, including for the procurement of data collection devices  The Secretary of Commerce provided comments on a draft of this report on August 2, 2018  The comments are reprinted in appendix II  The Department of Commerce generally agreed with our findings regarding the improvements the Census Bureau has made in its cost estimates  However, Commerce did not agree with our assessment that the Bureau’s 2017 lifecycle cost estimate is “not reliable ” Commerce noted that it had conducted two independent cost analyses and was satisfied that the cost estimate was reliable  The Bureau also provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate  We maintain that, to be considered reliable, a cost estimate must meet or substantially meet the criteria for each of the four characteristics outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide  These characteristics are derived from measures consistently applied by cost estimating organizations throughout the federal government and industry and are considered best practices for the development of reliable cost estimates  Without a reliable cost estimate, the Bureau is limited in its ability to make informed decisions about program resources and to effectively measure progress against operational objectives  Thus, while the Bureau has made considerable progress in all four of the characteristics, it has only partially met the criteria for the characteristic of being well-documented  Until the Bureau meets or substantially meets the criteria for this characteristic, the cost estimate cannot be considered reliable  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies of the report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Under Secretary of Economic Affairs, the Acting Director of the U S  Census Bureau, and other interested parties  In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  The purpose of our review was to evaluate the reliability of the Census Bureau’s (Bureau) life-cycle cost estimate using our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide  We reviewed (1) the extent to which the Bureau’s life-cycle cost estimate and associated guidance met our best practices for cost estimation using documentation and information obtained in discussions with the Bureau related to the 2020 life-cycle cost estimate and (2) compared the 2015 and 2017 life-cycle cost estimates to describe key drivers of cost growth  For both objectives we reviewed documentation from the Bureau on the 2020 life-cycle cost estimate and interviewed Bureau and Department of Commerce officials  For the first objective, we relied on our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide as criteria  Our cost specialists assessed measures consistently applied by cost-estimating organizations throughout the federal government and industry and considered best-practices for developing reliable cost estimates  We analyzed the cost estimating practices used by the Bureau against these best practices and evaluated them in four categories: comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible  Comprehensive  The cost estimate should include both government and contractor costs of the program over its full life-cycle, from inception of the program through design, development, deployment, and operation and maintenance to retirement of the program  It should also completely define the program, reflect the current schedule, and be technically reasonable  Comprehensive cost estimates should be structured in sufficient detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double counted  Specifically, the cost estimate should be based on a product-oriented work breakdown structure (WBS) that allows a program to track cost and schedule by defined deliverables, such as hardware or software components  Finally, where information is limited and judgments are made, the cost estimate should document all cost-influencing assumptions  Well-documented  A good cost estimate—while taking the form of a single number—is supported by detailed documentation that describes how it was derived and how the expected funding will be spent in order to achieve a given objective  Therefore, the documentation should capture in writing such things as the source data used, the calculations performed and their results, and the estimating methodology used to derive each WBS element’s cost  Moreover, this information should be captured in such a way that the data used to derive the estimate can be traced back to, and verified against, their sources so that the estimate can be easily replicated and updated  The documentation should also discuss the technical baseline description and how the data were normalized  Finally, the documentation should include evidence that the cost estimate was reviewed and accepted by management  Accurate  The cost estimate should provide for results that are unbiased, and it should not be overly conservative or optimistic  An estimate is accurate when it is based on an assessment of most likely costs; adjusted properly for inflation; and contains few, if any, minor mistakes  In addition, a cost estimate should be updated regularly to reflect significant changes in the program—such as when schedules or other assumptions change—and actual costs, so that it is always reflecting current status  During the update process, variances between planned and actual costs should be documented, explained, and reviewed  Among other things, the estimate should be grounded in a historical record of cost estimating and actual experiences on other comparable programs  Credible  The cost estimate should discuss any limitations of the analysis because of uncertainty or biases surrounding data or assumptions  Major assumptions should be varied, and other outcomes recomputed to determine how sensitive they are to changes in the assumptions  Risk and uncertainty analysis should be performed to determine the level of risk associated with the estimate  Further, the estimate’s cost drivers should be cross-checked, and an independent cost estimate conducted by a group outside the acquiring organization should be developed to determine whether other estimating methods produce similar results  If any of the characteristics are not met, minimally met, or partially met, then the cost estimate does not fully reflect the characteristics of a high- quality estimate and cannot be considered reliable  We also analyzed the Bureau’s cost estimation and analysis guidance and evaluated them against a 12-step process outlined in our Cost Estimation and Assessment Guide  A high-quality cost estimating process integrates the following: 1  Define estimate’s purpose  2  Develop estimating plan  3  Define program characteristics  4  Determine estimating structure  5  Identify ground rules and assumptions  6  Obtain data  7  Develop point estimate and compare it to an independent cost estimate  8  Conduct sensitivity analysis  9  Conduct risk and uncertainty analysis  10  Document the estimate  11  Present estimate to management for approval  12  Update the estimate to reflect actual costs and changes  These 12 steps, when followed correctly, should result in reliable and valid cost estimates that management can use for making informed decisions  If any of the steps in the Bureau’s process do not meet, minimally meet, or partially meet the 12 steps, then the cost estimate guidance does not fully reflect best practices for developing a high-quality estimate and cannot be considered reliable  Lastly, to describe key drivers of cost growth, we compared cost information included in the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates  We analyzed both summary and detailed cost information to assess key changes in totals overall, by WBS category, and by information technology (IT) vs  Non-IT costs  We used this analysis in conjunction with information received from the Bureau during interviews and through document transfers to describe overall changes in the cost estimate from 2015 to 2017  We conducted this performance audit from December 2017 to August 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the contact named above, Lisa Pearson (Assistant Director), Karen Cassidy (Analyst in Charge), Brian Bothwell, Jackie Chapin, Ann Czapiewski, Jason Lee, Ty Mitchell, Kayla Robinson, and Tim Wexler made significant contributions to this report 

ground_truth: Full implementation of GPRAMA could facilitate efforts to reform the federal government and make it more effective. GPRAMA includes a provision for GAO to review the act's implementation. This report assesses how GPRAMA implementation has affected the federal government's progress in resolving key governance challenges in (1) addressing cross-cutting issues, (2) ensuring performance information is useful and used, (3) aligning daily operations with results, and (4) building a more transparent and open government. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed statutory requirements, OMB guidance, and GAO's recent work related to GPRAMA implementation and the key governance challenges. GAO also interviewed OMB staff and surveyed a stratified random sample of 4,395 federal managers from 24 agencies on various performance and management topics. With a 67 percent response rate, the survey results are generalizable to the government-wide population of managers. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies have made some progress in more fully implementing the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA), but GAO's work and 2017 survey of federal managers highlight numerous areas where improvements are needed. Cross-cutting issues: Various GPRAMA provisions are aimed at addressing cross-cutting issues, such as cross-agency and agency priority goals and related data-driven reviews of progress towards those goals. To ensure alignment with the current administration's priorities, OMB's 2017 guidance removed the priority status of those goals, which stopped quarterly data-driven reviews and related public progress reports until new goals are published. OMB plans to resume implementation of these provisions in February 2018. GPRAMA also requires OMB and agencies to implement an inventory of federal programs, which could help decision makers better identify and manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. OMB and agencies implemented the inventory once, in May 2013. In October 2014, GAO found several issues limited the usefulness of that inventory. Since then, OMB has postponed updating the inventory, citing among other reasons the passage of subsequent laws. OMB has yet to develop a systematic approach for resuming implementation of the inventory and specific time frames for doing so. A systematic approach to developing the inventory could help ensure it provides useful information for decision makers and the public. Performance information: Survey results show federal managers generally reported no improvements in their use of performance information in decision making for various management activities, or practices that can enhance such use, since GAO's 2013 survey. For example, the use of performance information to streamline programs to reduce duplicative activities (an estimated 33 percent in 2017) is statistically significantly lower relative to 2013 (44 percent). In contrast, managers who were familiar with and whose programs were subject to quarterly data-driven reviews reported that those reviews were used to make progress toward agency priority goals. Identifying and sharing practices to expand the use of such reviews—for other performance goals and at lower levels within agencies—could lead to increased use of performance information. Daily operations: Agencies have made progress in developing results-oriented cultures but need to take additional actions. GAO's past work found that high-performing organizations use performance management systems to help individuals connect their daily activities to organizational goals. In 2017, about half of federal managers reported using performance information when setting expectations with employees (no change from GAO's last survey in 2013). Transparent and open government: GAO's past work identified a number of needed improvements to Performance.gov, the central government-wide website required by GPRAMA. The site is to provide quarterly updates on priority goals in effect through September 2017, but those updates stopped in December 2016. According to OMB, the existing information for cross-agency priority goals is the final update, and agencies should publish final updates on their priority goals in annual performance reports. Performance.gov does not provide users with this information, thereby limiting the transparency and accessibility of those results. In addition to following through on plans to resume implementation of key GPRAMA provisions, GAO recommends that OMB (1) consider a systematic approach to developing the program inventory, (2) revise guidance to provide specific time frames for inventory implementation, (3) identify and share practices for expanding the use of data-driven reviews, and (4) update Performance.gov to explain that reporting on priority goals was suspended and provide the location of final progress updates. OMB staff agreed with these recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: GPRAMA significantly enhances GPRA, the centerpiece of a statutory framework that Congress put in place during the 1990s to help resolve longstanding performance and management problems in the federal government and provide greater accountability for results  Congress passed GPRAMA in 2010 to address a number of persistent federal performance challenges, including focusing attention on crosscutting issues and enhancing the use and usefulness of performance information  OMB and agencies are to establish various government-wide and agency-specific performance goals, in line with GPRAMA requirements or OMB guidance  These include the following: Cross-agency priority (CAP) goals: CAP goals are crosscutting and include outcome-oriented goals covering a limited number of policy areas as well as goals for management improvements needed across the government  OMB is to coordinate with agencies to establish CAP goals at least every 4 years  OMB is also required to coordinate with agencies to develop annual federal government performance plans to, among other things, define the level of performance to be achieved toward the CAP goals  Strategic objectives: A strategic objective is the outcome or impact the agency is intending to achieve through its various programs and initiatives  Agencies establish strategic objectives in their strategic plans and may update the objectives during the annual update of performance plans  Agency priority goals (APG): At the agency level, every 2 years, GPRAMA requires that the heads of certain agencies, in consultation with OMB, identify a subset of agency performance goals as APGs  These goals are to reflect the agencies’ highest priorities  They should be informed by the CAP goals as well as consultations with relevant congressional committees and other interested parties  In a schedule established by GPRAMA, OMB and agencies are to develop and publish new CAP goals, APGs, and strategic plans (with updated strategic objectives) in February 2018  GPRAMA and related OMB guidance require agencies to regularly assess their progress in achieving goals and objectives through performance reviews  Data-driven reviews: Agency leaders and managers are to use regular meetings, at least quarterly, to review data and drive progress toward key performance goals and other management-improvement priorities  For each APG, GPRAMA requires agency leaders to conduct reviews at least quarterly to assess progress toward the goal, determine the risk of the goal not being met, and develop strategies to improve performance  Similarly, the Director of OMB, with relevant parties, is to review progress toward each CAP goal  Strategic reviews: OMB guidance directs agency leaders to annually assess progress toward achieving each strategic objective using a broad range of evidence  GPRAMA establishes certain senior leadership positions and a council, as described below  Chief Operating Officer (COO): The deputy agency head, or equivalent, is designated COO, with overall responsibility for improving agency management and performance  Performance Improvement Officer (PIO): Agency heads are to designate a senior executive within the agency as the PIO  The PIO reports directly to the COO and assists the agency head and COO with various performance management activities  Goal leaders: Goal leaders are responsible for developing strategies to achieve goals, managing execution, and regularly reviewing performance  GPRAMA requires goal leaders for CAP goals and agency performance goals, including APGs  OMB guidance directs agencies to designate goal leaders for strategic objectives  Performance Improvement Council (PIC): The PIC is charged with assisting OMB to improve the performance of the federal government and achieve the CAP goals  The PIC is chaired by the Deputy Director for Management at OMB and includes agency PIOs from each of the 24 CFO Act agencies as well as other PIOs and individuals designated by the chair  Among its responsibilities, the PIC is to work to resolve government-wide or crosscutting performance issues, and facilitate the exchange among agencies of practices that have led to performance improvements within specific programs, agencies, or across agencies  GPRAMA includes several provisions related to providing the public and Congress with information, as described below  Performance gov: GPRAMA calls for a single, government-wide performance website to communicate government-wide and agency performance information  Among other things, the website— implemented by OMB as Performance gov—is to include (1) quarterly progress updates on CAP goals and APGs; (2) an inventory of all federal programs; and (3) agency strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual performance reports  Reporting burden: GPRAMA establishes a process to reexamine the usefulness of certain existing congressional reporting requirements  Specifically, GPRAMA requires an annual review (including congressional consultation), based on OMB guidance, of agencies’ reporting requirements to Congress  Additionally, OMB is to include in the budget a list of plans and reports determined to be outdated or duplicative and may submit legislation to eliminate or consolidate such plans or reports  In early 2017, the administration announced several efforts that are intended to improve government performance  The 2018 Budget Blueprint states that the President’s Management Agenda will seek to improve the federal government’s effectiveness by using evidence-based approaches, balancing flexibility with accountability to better achieve results, improving mission support functions, and developing and monitoring critical performance measures  In addition, OMB issued several memoranda detailing the administration’s plans to improve government performance by reorganizing the government, reducing the federal workforce, and reducing federal agency burden  A number of these efforts, which are to leverage GPRAMA and our past work, have the potential to further progress in addressing key governance challenges  As part of reorganization efforts, OMB and agencies are developing government-wide and agency reform plans, respectively, that are to leverage various GPRAMA provisions  For example, an April 2017 memorandum states that OMB intends to monitor implementation of the reform plans using CAP goals, APGs, annual strategic reviews, and Performance gov  The government-wide plan also is to include crosscutting reform proposals, such as merging agencies or programs that have similar missions  To that end, the memorandum states agencies should consider our reports, including our work on fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, as well as inspectors general reports  Many of the meaningful results that the federal government seeks to achieve, such as those related to ensuring public health, providing homeland security, and promoting economic development, require the coordinated efforts of more than one federal agency, level of government, or sector  For more than 2 decades, we have reported on agencies’ missed opportunities for improved collaboration through the effective implementation of GPRA and, more recently, GPRAMA  Our reports also have demonstrated that collaboration across agencies is critical to address issues of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication as well as many of the areas on our High-Risk List  Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication: Since 2011, our annual reports have identified 133 crosscutting areas that require the coordinated effort of more than one federal organization, level of government, or sector  For instance, for the area of federal grant awards, we found in January 2017 that the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service, Food and Nutrition Service, and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had not established guidance and formal processes to ensure their grant-management staff review applications for potential duplication and overlap among grants in their agencies before awarding  We recommended that these agencies do so, and they agreed  As of August 2017, these agencies had taken several actions to address the recommendation  For example, the Department of the Interior (Interior) provided documentation showing that the Fish and Wildlife Service now requires discretionary grant applicants to provide a statement that addresses whether there is any overlap or duplication of proposed projects or activities to be funded by the grant  Fish and Wildlife also updated its guidance to grant awarding offices instructing them to perform a potential overlap and duplication review of all selected applicants prior to award  Our Action Tracker provides details on the status of actions from our annual reports  Within the 133 crosscutting areas, since 2011 we have identified 315 targeted actions where opportunities exist to better manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, including 29 new actions in our most recent report issued in April 2017  We found that the executive branch and Congress addressed 145 (46 percent) of the 315 actions  For example, in November 2014, we recommended that the U S  Coast Guard and Consumer Product Safety Commission establish a formal approach to coordination (such as a memorandum of understanding) to facilitate information sharing; better leverage their resources; and address challenges, including those related to fragmentation and overlap that we identified  In response to this recommendation, the two agencies signed a formal policy document to govern their coordination in May 2015  This policy document outlined procedures for determining jurisdictional authority for recreational boat-associated equipment and marine safety items  Specifically, the procedures clarified that upon receiving notice of a possible defect, the agency receiving such notice shall determine whether the item properly falls within its jurisdiction, and if not, initiate discussions to determine the appropriate jurisdiction  These new procedures should help the agencies share information and leverage each other’s resources so they can better ensure that recreational boat-associated equipment and marine safety items are fully regulated  However, more work is needed on the remaining 170 actions (54 percent) that have not been fully addressed  For example, in July 2016, we reported that four federal agencies—the Departments of Defense, Education, Health and Human Services, and Justice—manage at least 10 efforts to collect data on sexual violence, which differ in target population, terminology, measurements, and methodology  We found that data collection efforts use 23 different terms to describe sexual violence  Data collection efforts also differed in how they categorized particular acts of sexual violence, the context in which data were collected, data sources, units of measurement, and time frames  We recommended that OMB convene an interagency forum to better manage fragmentation of efforts to collect sexual violence data  In commenting on that report, OMB stated it would consider implementing the action in the future but did not believe it was the most effective use of resources at that time, in part because the agencies were not far enough along in their research  In response, we stated that given the number of federal data collection efforts, the range of differences across them, and the potential for causing confusion, it would be beneficial for agencies to discuss these differences and determine whether they are, in fact, necessary  As of July 2017, OMB had not provided an update on the status of this recommendation  High-Risk List: Since the early 1990s, our high-risk program has focused attention on government operations with greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or that are in need of transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges  As of February 2017, there were 34 high-risk areas covering a wide range of issues including human capital management, modernizing the U S  financial regulatory system, and ensuring the security of federal information systems and cyber critical infrastructure  Many of these high- risk areas require a coordinated response from more than one branch of government, agency, or sector  In the time between our 2015 and 2017 High-Risk Updates, many of these high-risk areas on our list demonstrated solid progress  During that period, 15 high-risk areas fully met at least one of the five criteria required for removal from the High-Risk List  In many cases, progress was possible through the joint efforts of Congress and leadership and staff in agencies  For example, Congress passed over a dozen laws following our 2015 High-Risk Update to help address high-risk issues  In addition, in 2017, we removed one high-risk area on managing terrorism-related information, because significant progress had been made to strengthen how intelligence on terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement is shared among federal, state, local, tribal, international, and private sector partners  Despite this progress, continued oversight and attention is also warranted given the issue’s direct relevance to homeland security as well as the constant evolution of terrorist threats and changing technology  Our February 2017 High-Risk Update also highlighted a number of long- standing high-risk areas that require additional attention  We also added three new crosscutting areas to incorporate the management of federal programs that serve tribes and their members, the government’s environmental liabilities, and the 2020 decennial census  Based on our body of work on federal programs that serve tribes and their members, we concluded that federal agencies had (1) ineffectively administered Indian education and health care programs and (2) inefficiently fulfilled their responsibilities for managing the development of Indian energy resources  For example, we identified numerous challenges facing Interior’s Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) and Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Indian Health Service (IHS), in administering education and health care services  We concluded that these challenges put the health and safety of American Indians served by these programs at risk  In May 2017, we issued two additional reports on accountability for school construction and safety at schools funded by BIE  Although these agencies have taken some actions to address recommendations we made related to Indian programs, about 50 recommendations have yet to be fully resolved  We are monitoring federal efforts to address the unresolved recommendations  We also are reviewing IHS’s workforce, and tribal nations’ management and use of their energy resources  Many of the crosscutting areas highlighted by our annual reports on fragmentation, overlap, and duplication and designated as high-risk would benefit from enhanced collaboration among the federal agencies involved in them  GPRAMA establishes a framework aimed at taking a more crosscutting and integrated approach to focusing on results and improving government performance  Our survey results and past work demonstrate that agencies continue to face difficulties when working together on crosscutting issues, but also that implementing certain GPRAMA requirements can have a positive effect on collaboration  An item related to coordination in our survey of federal managers is statistically significantly lower in 2017, relative to our previous survey in 2013 and our initial survey in 1997  In 2017, an estimated 43 percent of managers agreed that they use information obtained from performance measurement to a great or very great extent when coordinating program efforts with internal or external organizations (compared to an estimated 50 percent in 2013 and an estimated 57 percent in 1997)  Moreover, our past work has found that agencies face a variety of challenges when working across organizational boundaries to deliver programs and improve performance  For example, our work has found that interagency groups have, at times, encountered difficulty clarifying roles and responsibilities or developing shared outcomes and performance measures  In contrast, our past work demonstrates that implementing GPRAMA provisions can improve collaboration  For example, in May 2016, we found that OMB and the PIC updated the governance structure for CAP goals to include both agency-level and Executive Office of the President goal leaders and held regular, senior-level reviews on CAP goal progress  Moreover, CAP goal teams told us that the CAP goal designation increased leadership attention and improved interagency collaboration on their crosscutting issues  Furthermore, our prior work has found that priority goals and related data-driven reviews have also been used to help manage crosscutting issues and enhance collaboration  Various GPRAMA requirements are aimed at improving agencies’ coordination of efforts to address crosscutting issues  As with our 2013 survey, our 2017 survey continues to show that CAP goals, APGs, and related data-driven reviews—also called quarterly performance reviews (QPR)—are associated with reported higher levels of collaboration with internal and external stakeholders  For example, our 2017 survey data indicate that about half of federal managers (an estimated 54 percent) reported they were somewhat or very familiar with CAP goals  Among these individuals, those who viewed their programs as contributing to CAP goals to a great or very great extent (36 percent) were more likely to report collaborating outside their program to a great or very great extent to help achieve CAP goals (62 percent), as shown in figure 2  Our analysis shows a similar pattern exists for APGs and QPRs  Our past work also has highlighted ways in which OMB and agencies could better implement GPRAMA’s crosscutting provisions—many of which have been addressed  A continued focus on fully and effectively implementing these provisions will be important as OMB and agencies establish new CAP goals and APGs, and assess progress toward them through related QPRs  Cross-agency priority (CAP) goals: In May 2012 and June 2013, we found that OMB had not always identified relevant agencies and program activities as contributors to the initial set of CAP goals  OMB took actions in response to our recommendations to include relevant contributors  Our most recent review, in May 2016, found that all relevant contributors had been identified for a subsequent set of CAP goals  In that report, we also found that OMB and the PIC had improved implementation of the CAP goals, in part, by helping agencies build their capacity to contribute to implementing the goals  Appendix II summarizes our past recommendations related to GPRAMA and the actions agencies have taken to address them  Agency priority goals (APGs): In April 2013, we found that agencies did not fully explain the relationship between their APGs and crosscutting efforts  Identify contributors: Similar to OMB’s responsibilities with the CAP goals, agencies are to identify the various organizations and programs that contribute to each of their performance goals, including APGs  We found that agencies identified internal contributors for their APGs, but did not list external contributors in some cases  We recommended that the Director of OMB ensure that agencies adhere to OMB’s guidance for website updates by providing complete information about the organizations, program activities, regulations, tax expenditures, policies, and other activities—both within and external to the agency— that contribute to each APG  In response, in April 2015, OMB asked agencies to identify organizations, program activities, regulations, policies, tax expenditures, and other activities contributing to their 2014-2015 APGs  Based on an analysis of the final quarterly updates for those APGs, published in December 2015, we found that agencies made progress in identifying external organizations and programs for their APGs  Describe how agency goals contribute to CAP goals: Agencies generally did not identify how their APGs contributed to CAP goals  We recommended that OMB direct agencies to describe in their performance plans how the agency’s performance goals—including APGs—contribute to any of the CAP goals as required by GPRAMA  In response, in July 2013, OMB updated its guidance directing agencies to include a list of the CAP goals to which the agency contributes and explain the agency’s contribution to them in their strategic plans, performance plans, and performance reports  Data-driven reviews: For their data-driven reviews of agency priority goals, agencies are to include, as appropriate, relevant personnel within and outside the agency who contribute to the accomplishment of each goal  However, in February 2013, we found that most Performance Improvement Officers (PIO) we surveyed (16 of 24) indicated that there was little to no involvement in these reviews from external officials who contribute to achieving agency goals  We recommended that OMB and the PIC help agencies extend their QPRs to include, as relevant, representatives from outside organizations that contribute to achieving their APGs  OMB staff told us that they generally concurred with the recommendation, but believed it would not always be appropriate to regularly include external representatives in agencies’ data-driven reviews, which they considered to be internal management meetings  In a subsequent review, we found in July 2015 that PIOs at 21 of the 22 agencies we surveyed said that their data-driven reviews had a positive effect on collaboration among officials from different offices or programs within the agency  Despite the positive effects, most agency PIOs (17) indicated that there continued to be little to no involvement in the reviews from external officials who contribute to achieving agency goals  In May 2016, OMB and PIC staff reported that, in response to our earlier recommendation, they were working with agencies to identify examples where agencies included representatives from outside organizations in data-driven reviews, and to identify promising practices based on those experiences  PIC staff told us they would disseminate any promising practices identified through the PIC Internal Reviews Working Group and other venues  In August 2017, OMB staff told us they plan to hold a summit with agencies later in the year to discuss implementing various performance management requirements, which could include agencies highlighting experiences and promising practices related to involving external officials in their data-driven reviews  We continue to believe data- driven reviews should include any relevant contributors from outside organizations and will continue to monitor progress  Despite the important role priority goals and related reviews can play in addressing crosscutting issues and enhancing collaboration, OMB recently removed the priority status of the current sets of priority goals  According to OMB staff, removing the priority designation from CAP goals and APGs returned them to regular performance goals, which are not subject to quarterly data-driven reviews or updates on the results of those reviews on Performance gov  In a June 2017 memorandum, OMB stated that CAP goals and APGs are intended to focus efforts toward achieving the priorities of current political leadership, and therefore reporting on the priority goals of the previous administration on Performance gov was discontinued for the remainder of the period covered by the goals (through September 30, 2017, the end of fiscal year 2017)  The memorandum further noted that agencies and teams working on those goals should continue working on the current goals where they align with the priorities of the current administration  Moreover, the memorandum states that agencies have flexibility in structuring their data-driven reviews, but they should continue such reviews focused on agency priorities  When asked about these actions, OMB staff told us that they believed they were working in line with the intentions of GPRAMA, which realigned the timing of goal setting with presidential terms, to better take into account changes in priorities  This is the first presidential transition since GPRAMA was enacted, and OMB staff told us they thought the act was unclear on how to handle priority goals during the changes in administrations and priorities  They stated that it was not practical to continue reporting on the priority goals of the prior administration as agencies worked to develop new strategic plans and priority goals for publication in February 2018  Hence, they told us OMB ended the current round of CAP goals and directed agencies to remove the priority designation from the APGs, returning them to regular performance goals  OMB staff further told us that although the guidance was published in a June 2017 memorandum, these decisions had been made and previously communicated to agencies during the transition in administrations  Therefore, reporting on the fiscal year 2014-2017 CAP goals, fiscal year 2016-2017 APGs, and related reviews stopped much earlier in the year, well before goal cycles were planned to be completed on September 30, 2017  OMB staff further stated that although the goals no longer had priority designations, work towards them largely continued in 2017  For example, one of the prior administration’s CAP goals was to modernize the federal permitting and review process for major infrastructure projects  OMB staff told us that they and agencies have continued many of the activities intended to achieve that goal, but they are no longer subject to quarterly data-driven reviews or updates on the results of these reviews on Performance gov  Moreover, they expect most of this work will continue towards a new and refocused CAP goal on infrastructure permitting modernization  OMB staff reaffirmed to us their intentions to resume implementation of CAP goals, APGs, and related data-driven reviews when the new planning and reporting cycle begins in February 2018  This is in line with stated plans to leverage various GPRAMA provisions to track progress of proposed government-wide and agency-specific reforms, as outlined in OMB’s April 2017 memorandum on the reform plans  In addition, OMB’s July 2017 update to its guidance for implementing GPRAMA similarly focuses on continued implementation of the act  Additional aspects of GPRAMA implementation could similarly help improve the management of crosscutting issues  Strategic reviews: OMB’s 2012 guidance implementing GPRAMA established a process in which agencies, beginning in 2014, were to conduct leadership-driven, annual reviews of their progress toward achieving each strategic objective established in their strategic plans  As we found in July 2015, effectively implementing strategic reviews could help identify opportunities to reduce, eliminate, or better manage instances of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication  Under OMB’s guidance, agencies are to identify the various organizations, program activities, regulations, tax expenditures, policies, and other activities that contribute to each objective, both within and outside the agency  Where progress in achieving an objective is lagging, the reviews are intended to identify strategies for improvement, such as strengthening collaboration to better address crosscutting challenges, or using evidence to identify and implement more effective program designs  If successfully implemented in a way that is open, inclusive, and transparent—to Congress, delivery partners, and a full range of stakeholders—this approach could help decision makers assess the relative contributions of various programs to a given objective  Successful strategic reviews could also help decision makers identify and assess the interplay of public policy tools that are being used to ensure that those tools are effective and mutually reinforcing, and that results are being efficiently achieved  In July 2017, OMB released guidance which updated the status of the 2017 strategic reviews  Because agencies are currently developing new strategic goals and objectives, OMB stated that agencies may forego the reporting and categorization requirements for any current strategic objectives that an agency determines will be substantively different or no longer aligned with the current administration’s policy, legislative, regulatory, or budgetary priorities  In addition, OMB stated that while there will be no formal meetings between OMB and the agencies to discuss findings and related progress from the 2017 strategic reviews, it expects that agencies will continue to conduct strategic reviews or assess progress made toward strategic goals and objectives aligned with administration policy  Furthermore, OMB stated that during this transition year, updates of progress on agency strategic objectives will only be published in the agency’s annual performance report and will not be reported to Performance gov  Full reporting through Performance gov is to resume after new agency strategic plans are published in February 2018  Agencies are to include a progress update for strategic objectives as part of their progress update in their fiscal year 2017 annual performance reports  Agencies also must address next steps for performance improvement as part of their fiscal year 2019 annual performance plans  Program inventories: GPRAMA requires OMB to publish a list of all federal programs, along with related budget and performance information, on a central government-wide website  Such a list could help decision makers and the public fully understand what the federal government does, how it does it, and how well it is doing  An inventory of federal programs could also be a critical tool to help decision makers better identify and manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication across the federal government  Agencies developed initial program inventories in May 2013, but since then have not updated or more fully implemented these inventories  In October 2014, we found several issues limited the completeness, comparability, and usefulness of the May 2013 program inventories  OMB and agencies did not take a systematic approach to developing comprehensive inventories  For example, OMB’s guidance in Circular No  A-11 presented five possible approaches agencies could take to define their programs and noted that agencies could use one or more of those approaches in doing so  We found that because the agencies used inconsistent approaches to define their programs, the comparability of programs was limited within agencies as well as government-wide  In addition, we found that the inventories had limited usefulness for decision making, as they did not consistently provide the program and related budget and performance information required by GPRAMA  Moreover, we found that agencies did not solicit feedback on their inventories from external stakeholders—which can include Congress, state and local governments, third party service providers, and the public  Doing so would have provided OMB and agencies an opportunity to ensure they were presenting useful information for stakeholder decision making  We concluded that the ability to tag and sort information about programs through a more dynamic, web-based presentation could make the inventory more useful  In October 2014, we made several recommendations to OMB to update relevant guidance to help develop a more coherent picture of all federal programs and to better ensure relevant information is useful for decision makers  For example, we recommended that OMB revise its guidance to direct agencies to consult with relevant congressional committees and stakeholders on their approach to defining and identifying programs when developing or updating their inventories  OMB staff generally agreed with these recommendations, but have not yet taken any actions to implement them  OMB’s guidance for the program inventory has largely remained unchanged since 2014, when OMB postponed further development of the program inventory and eliminated portions of the guidance  For example, the guidance no longer describes, or provides directions for agencies to meet, GPRAMA’s requirements for presenting related budget or performance information for each program  OMB decided to postpone implementing a planned May 2014 update to the program inventory in order to coordinate with the implementation of the public spending reporting required by the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act)  OMB subsequently stated that it would not begin implementing the program inventory until after the DATA Act was implemented in May 2017, despite requirements for regular updates to the program inventory to reflect current budget and performance information  The DATA Act is now being implemented, but OMB has postponed resuming the development of the program inventory  In July 2017, OMB staff told us that they are now considering how to align GPRAMA’s program inventory provisions with future implementation of the Program Management Improvement Accountability Act (PMIAA)  This was reflected in OMB’s July 2017 update to its guidance, which states that OMB is working with agencies to determine the right strategy to merge the implementation of the DATA Act and PMIAA with GPRAMA’s program inventory requirements to the extent possible to avoid duplicating efforts  For example, PMIAA requires OMB to coordinate with agency Program Management Improvement Officers to conduct portfolio reviews of agency programs to assess the quality and effectiveness of program management  GPRAMA requires OMB to issue guidance for implementing the program inventory requirements, among other things  Moreover, federal internal control standards state that organizations should clearly define what is to be achieved, who is to achieve it, how it will be achieved, and the time frames for achievement  As described above, OMB’s current guidance for the program inventory lacks some of those details—such as describing and providing direction to meet GPRAMA’s requirements for budget and performance information—in part because OMB is working with agencies to determine a strategy for implementation  Ensuring all GPRAMA requirements are covered and taking action on our past recommendations would help OMB improve its guidance to more fully implement the program inventory and improve its usefulness  To that end, in a report issued earlier this month, we identified a series of iterative steps that OMB could use in directing agencies to develop a useful inventory, as described in figure 3  A useful inventory would consist of all programs identified, information about each program, and the organizational structure of the programs  Our work showed that the principles and practices of information architecture—a discipline focused on organizing and structuring information—offer an approach for developing such an inventory to support a variety of uses, including increased transparency for federal programs  Such a systematic approach to planning, organizing, and developing the inventory that centers on maximizing the use and usefulness of information could help OMB ensure the inventory is implemented in line with GPRAMA requirements and meets the needs of decision makers and the public, among others  OMB’s guidance also lacks specific time frames, with associated milestones for resuming implementation of the program inventory requirements  As part of PMIAA’s requirements, OMB is to issue standards, policies, and guidelines for program and project management for agencies by December 2017  OMB staff told us that, within a year after that, they expect to issue further guidance on moving forward with resuming the program inventory  However, that general time frame was not reflected in the July 2017 update to OMB’s guidance  Providing specific time frames and associated milestones would bring the program inventory guidance in line with other portions of OMB’s guidance for implementing GPRAMA requirements, which contains a timeline of various performance planning and reporting requirements, including specific dates for meeting those requirements and related descriptions of required actions  For example, OMB’s July 2017 guidance identifies over 30 actions agencies should take between June 2017 and December 2018 to implement various GPRAMA provision  More specific time frames and milestones related to the program inventory requirements would help agencies prepare for resumed implementation by allowing them to know what actions they would be expected to take and by when  Moreover, publicly disclosing planned implementation time frames and associated milestones also would help ensure that external stakeholders are prepared to engage with agencies as they develop and update their program inventories  Effectively implementing various GPRAMA tools could help inform assessments of the performance of tax expenditures, which are reductions in tax liabilities that result from preferential provisions (figure 4)  In fiscal year 2016, tax expenditures represented an estimated $1 4 trillion in forgone revenue, an amount greater than total discretionary spending that year  Despite the magnitude of these investments, our work has also shown that little has been done to determine how well specific tax expenditures work to achieve their stated purposes and how their benefits and costs compare to those of spending programs with similar goals  GPRAMA requires OMB to identify tax expenditures that contribute to the CAP goals  In addition, OMB guidance directs agencies to identify tax expenditures that contribute to their strategic objectives and APGs  However, our past work reviewing GPRAMA implementation found that OMB and agencies rarely identified tax expenditures as contributors to these goals  Fully implementing our recommendation to identify how tax expenditures contribute to various goals could help the federal government establish a process for evaluating the performance of tax expenditures  To that end, in May 2017, we provided the Director of OMB with three priority recommendations that require attention: Develop framework for reviewing performance: In June 1994, and again in September 2005, we recommended that OMB develop a framework for reviewing tax expenditure performance  We explained that the framework should (1) outline leadership responsibilities and coordination among agencies with related responsibilities, (2) set a review schedule, (3) identify review methods and ways to address the lack of credible tax expenditure performance information, and (4) identify resources needed for tax expenditure reviews  Since their initial efforts in 1997 and 1999 to outline a framework for evaluating tax expenditures and preliminary performance measures, OMB and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) have ceased to make progress and retreated from setting a schedule for evaluating tax expenditures  Inventory tax expenditures: In October 2014, we found that OMB had not included tax expenditures in the federal program inventory, and therefore was missing an opportunity to increase the transparency of tax expenditures and the outcomes to which they contribute  We recommended that OMB should designate tax expenditures as a program type in relevant guidance, and develop, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, a tax expenditure inventory that identifies each tax expenditure and provides a description of how the tax expenditure is defined, its purpose, and related budget and performance information  OMB staff said they neither agreed nor disagreed with these recommended actions  As noted earlier, OMB has not resumed updates to the program inventory  Therefore, OMB had not taken any actions in response to this recommendation, according to OMB staff as of July 2017  Identify contributions to agency goals: In July 2016, we found that agencies had made limited progress identifying tax expenditures’ contribution to agency goals, as directed by OMB guidance  As of January 2016, 7 of the 24 CFO Act agencies identified tax expenditures as contributing to their missions or goals  The 11 tax expenditure they identified—out of the 169 tax expenditures included in the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2017—represented approximately $31 9 billion of the $1 2 trillion in estimated forgone revenues for fiscal year 2015  (See figure 5 ) To help address this issue, we recommended that OMB, in collaboration with the Department of the Treasury, work with agencies to identify which tax expenditures contribute to their agency goals, as appropriate  In particular, we recommended that they identify which specific tax expenditures contribute to specific strategic objectives and APGs  In July 2017, OMB staff said they had taken no actions to address the recommendation  Our July 2016 report also identified options for policymakers to further incorporate tax expenditures into federal budgeting processes, several of which options align with the recommendations discussed above  These options could help achieve various benefits, but we also reported that policymakers would need to consider challenges and tradeoffs in deciding whether or how to implement them  For example, one option was to require that all tax expenditures, or some subset of them, expire after a finite period  This option could result in greater oversight, requiring policymakers to explicitly decide whether to extend more or all tax expenditures  One consideration with this option is that it could lead to frequent changes in the tax code, such as from extended or expired tax expenditures, which can create uncertainty and make tax planning more difficult  Our previous work has shown that using performance information in decision making is essential to improving results  Performance information can be used across a range of management activities, such as setting priorities, allocating resources, or identifying problems to be addressed  However, our work continues to show that agencies can better use performance information in decision making, as shown in the example in the text box below  Department of Justice (DOJ) Could Better Analyze Performance Information to Reduce Backlog in Immigration Courts In June 2017, we found that the case backlog—cases pending from previous years that remain open at the start of a new fiscal year—at DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) courts more than doubled from fiscal years 2006 through 2015  Stakeholders identified various factors that potentially contributed to the backlog, including continuances—temporary case adjournments until a different day or time  Our analysis of continuance records showed that the use of continuances increased by 23 percent from fiscal years 2006 through 2015  We found that EOIR collects continuance data but does not systematically assess them  Systematically analyzing the use of continuances could provide EOIR officials with valuable information about challenges the immigration courts may be experiencing, such as with operational issues like courtroom technology malfunctions, or areas that may merit additional guidance for immigration judges  Further, using this information to potentially address operational challenges could help that office meet its goals for completing cases in a timely manner  We recommended that the Director of EOIR systematically analyze immigration court continuance data to identify and address any operational challenges faced by courts or areas for additional guidance or training  EIOR agreed with this recommendation  EOIR stated that it supports conducting additional analysis of immigration court continuance data and recognizes that additional guidance or training regarding continuances may be beneficial to ensure that immigration judges use continuances appropriately in support of EOIR’s mission to adjudicate immigration cases in a careful and timely manner  We will monitor EOIR’s progress in taking these actions  Our 2017 survey of federal managers shows little change in their reported use of performance information  Using a set of survey questions, we previously developed an index that reflects the extent to which managers reported that their agencies used performance information for various management activities and decision making  The index suggests that government-wide use of performance information did not change significantly between 2013 and 2017, and it is statistically significantly lower relative to our 2007 survey, when we created the index  Figure 6 shows the questions included in the index and the government-wide results  In regard to individual survey items, in 2017 federal managers reported no changes or decreases in their use of performance information when compared to our last survey and when those survey items were first introduced  These results are generally consistent with our last few surveys  For example, in 2008 we found that there had been little change in federal managers’ reported use of performance information government-wide from 1997 to our 2007 survey  Citing those results, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs report accompanying the bill that would become GPRAMA stated that agencies were not consistently using performance information to improve their management and results  The report further stated that provisions in GPRAMA are intended to address those findings and increase the use of performance information to improve performance and results  However, five items that were highlighted in our 2008 statement on the 2007 survey results generally show no improvement when compared to the 2017 results, as shown in figure 7  The one exception is for managers’ reported use of performance information to refine program performance measures  While this item was statistically significantly higher in 2013 relative to 2007—an estimated 46 percent to 53 percent—the 2017 result (43 percent) is a statistically significant decrease relative to 2013 and is not statistically different from the 2007 results  Another item, the use of performance information to adopt new program approaches or change work processes, also was statistically significantly lower in 2017 (47 percent) when compared to 2007 and 2013 (53 and 54 percent, respectively)  This is of particular concern as agencies are developing their reform plans  Moreover, when compared to our 1997 survey, the 2017 results show four of the five items are statistically significantly lower, and the remaining item—allocating resources—has not changed  Similarly, we found there was no improvement in 2017 for more recent survey items on other uses of performance information compared to the years in which they were introduced, as shown in figure 8  Although one item, on the use of performance information to develop program strategy, was statistically significantly higher in 2013 relative to 2007 (an estimated 58 and 51 percent, respectively), the 2017 result (53 percent) does not represent a statistically significant change from either of those years  Another item, on the use of performance information to streamline programs to reduce duplicative activities, is statistically significantly lower relative to 2013, when it was introduced (from 44 to 33 percent in 2017)  This is especially concerning because streamlining and reducing duplication are to be key parts of agencies’ reform plans  There is one area in the survey where we saw improvement: an estimated 46 percent of managers agreed to a great or very great extent that employees who report to them pay attention to their agency’s use of performance information in management decision making  That is statistically significantly higher relative to 2013 (40 percent), as well as when compared to when the item was introduced in 2007 (37 percent)  For a new and related item in the 2017 survey that asked managers the amount of attention their employees pay to the use of performance information in decision making when compared to 3 years ago, we found an estimated 48 percent reported that employees pay about the same 33 percent reported that employees pay somewhat or a great deal more attention  In September 2005, we identified five practices that agencies can apply to enhance the use of performance information in their decision making and improve results: demonstrating management commitment; communicating performance information frequently and efficiently; improving the usefulness of performance information, such as by ensuring the accessibility of the information; developing the capacity to use performance information; and aligning agency-wide goals, objectives, and measures  Many of the requirements put in place by GPRAMA reinforce the importance of these practices  Our 2017 survey of federal managers includes a number of items related to these practices  However, the 2017 results suggest that managers have not effectively adopted them  In the following sections, we examine several of the practices to enhance the use of performance information and their related survey items further  In doing so, we also highlight a subset of six survey items related to these practices that, while separate from those in our use of performance information index, we found in September 2014 to have a statistically significant and positive relationship with it  The commitment of agency leaders to results-oriented management is critical to increased use of performance information for policy and program decisions  GPRAMA requires top leadership involvement in performance management, including leading data-driven performance reviews  However, we have previously reported that improvements are needed to strengthen leadership’s commitment to use performance information, as discussed in the text box below  Department of Defense Should Strengthen Leadership Responsibilities for Using Performance Information In January 2005, we designated the Department of Defense’s (DOD) approach to business transformation as high-risk because DOD had not taken the necessary steps to achieve and sustain business reform on a broad, strategic, department-wide, and integrated basis  In the February 2017 update to our High-Risk List, we found that DOD had taken some positive steps to improve its business transformation efforts continuing to hold business function leaders accountable for diagnosing performance problems and identifying strategies for improvement, and leading regular DOD performance reviews regarding transformation goals and associated metrics and ensuring that business function leaders attend these reviews to facilitate problem solving  In July 2017, DOD officials told us that the department’s performance reviews have been put on hold until after the new Agency Strategic Plan is issued  We will review DOD’s updated Agency Strategic Plan when it is issued (expected in February 2018, as required by GPRAMA) to see if it addresses continuing to hold business function leaders accountable for diagnosing performance problems and identifying strategies for improvement  We will continue to monitor the status of these actions  GAO, High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others, GAO-17-317 (Washington, D C : Feb  15, 2017)  Results from our 2017 survey show no statistically significant difference relative to 2013 in managers’ perceptions of leaders’ and supervisors’ attention and commitment to the use of performance information  (See figure 9 ) Three items are statistically significantly different from the years when they were introduced  Two items increased between 1997 and 2017: changes by management to my program(s) are based on results-oriented information (from an estimated 16 to 25 percent), and the individual I report to periodically reviews with me the outcomes of my program(s) (from 42 to 54 percent)  For the third item, top leadership demonstrates a strong commitment to using performance information to guide decision making, results decreased from 49 percent in 2007 to 42 percent in 2017  New items in the 2017 survey show some improvement in management commitment to the use of performance information in decision making  An estimated 36 percent of federal managers reported that, when compared to 3 years ago, the individual they report to pays somewhat or a great deal more attention to the use of performance information in decision making, while 46 percent said they pay about the same amount of attention  Additionally, an estimated 21 percent of federal managers said that, when compared to 3 years ago, the head of their agency pays somewhat or a great deal more attention to the use of performance information in decision making, while 33 percent said they pay about the same amount of attention  Communicating performance information frequently and effectively throughout an agency can help to achieve the agency’s goals  GPRAMA includes requirements for communicating performance information, such as reporting progress updates for APGs at least quarterly  However, our prior work has found that some agencies could continue to improve in the communication of performance information, as illustrated by the example in the text box below  Department of Education (Education) Could Better Share Effective Practices across States in Grant Program Education awards 21st Century Community Learning Centers grants to states, which in turn competitively award funds to local organizations that use them to offer academic enrichment and other activities to improve students’ academic and behavioral outcomes  In April 2017, we found that states are experiencing substantial difficulty in sustaining their programs after 21st Century funding ends  We further found that Education was missing opportunities in its monitoring efforts to collect information on states’ strategies and practices for program sustainability—information that could be useful for sharing promising practices across states  We recommended that Education use the information it collects from its monitoring visits and ongoing interactions with states to share effective practices across states for sustaining their 21st Century programs once program funding ends  Education neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation but outlined steps it is taking to address it  We will continue to monitor progress on the implementation of this recommendation  There is no difference for two survey items on federal managers communicating performance information relative to 2013 or since those items were introduced in 2007  In 2017, we estimate that 44 percent of federal managers agreed to a great or very great extent that agency managers at their level effectively communicate performance information on a routine basis  In addition, 34 percent agreed to a great or very great extent that managers at their level use performance information to share effective program approaches with others  Our 2017 survey data also indicate that agencies may not be effectively communicating to their employees about contributions to CAP goals or progress toward achieving APGs  Of the estimated 54 percent of federal managers who indicated they were familiar with CAP goals, 23 percent reported that their agency has communicated to its employees on those goals to a great or very great extent  Of the 74 percent of federal managers who indicated familiarity with APGs, 44 percent reported that their agency has communicated on progress toward achieving those goals to great or very great extent  Our prior work has shown that agencies should consider users’ differing needs—for accessibility, accuracy, completeness, consistency, ease of use, timeliness, and validity, among others things—to ensure that performance information will be both useful and used  GPRAMA introduced several requirements that could help to address aspects of usefulness, such as requiring agencies to disclose more information about the accuracy and validity of their performance data and actions to address limitations to the data  However, agencies face challenges in ensuring their performance information is useful, with one instance from our past work described in the text box below  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Could Improve Usefulness of Information in Planned Grantee Portal EPA monitors performance reports and program-specific data from grantees to ensure that grants achieve environmental and other program results  However, in July 2016, we found that EPA’s 2014 internal analysis of its grants management business processes identified improvements that, if implemented into EPA’s planned web-based portal, could improve the accessibility and usefulness of information in grantee performance reports for EPA, grantees, and other users  We recommended, among other actions, that EPA incorporate expanded search capability features, such as keyword searches, into its proposed web- based portal for collecting and accessing performance reports to improve their accessibility  EPA agreed with our recommendation but stated that it is a long- term initiative, subject to the agency’s budget process and replacement of its existing grants management system  As of May 2017, EPA officials said that they have not begun work on the web-based portal project, which is subject to the availability of funds  Federal managers generally responded similarly in 2017 on a variety of survey items related to usefulness, relative to earlier surveys  On a broadly worded item, less than half of managers agreed to a great or very great extent that agency managers at their level take steps to ensure that performance information is useful and appropriate  At an estimated 43 percent in 2017, this represents no statistically significant change compared to our last surveys in 2013 or 2007, when the item was introduced  Responses to four survey items indicate no changes in hindrances related to the usefulness of performance information  There is no statistically significant change in managers reporting hindrances compared to 1997 or 2013, as shown in figure 10  In addition, there was a statistically significant increase when compared to 2013 on only one of six items about managers’ views on the usefulness of performance information, as shown in figure 11  As the figure shows, approximately one-third to half of managers agreed to a great or very great extent on each item related to the usefulness of performance information  Although less than half of managers reported having sufficient information on validity of performance data used to make decisions, this represents a statistically significant increase to an estimated 42 percent in 2017 compared to 36 percent in 2013, and from 28 percent in 2000, when this item was introduced  This is a notable improvement because our September 2014 report found that the strongest driver of the use of performance information was whether federal managers had confidence in its validity  Our analysis suggests that easy access to performance information is related to the effective communication of performance information  Of the estimated 49 percent of federal managers in 2017 who agreed to a great or very great extent that performance information is easily accessible to managers at their level, 63 percent also agreed that agency managers at their level effectively communicate performance information on a routine basis to a great or very great extent  Conversely, of the 20 percent that agreed to a small or no extent that performance information is easily accessible to managers at their level, 12 percent also agreed that agency managers at their level effectively communicate performance information on a routine basis to a great or very great extent  Our prior work has shown that building capacity—including analytical tools and staff expertise—is critical to using performance information in a meaningful manner  GPRAMA lays out specific requirements that reinforce the importance of staff capacity to use performance information  GPRAMA directed the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to take certain actions to support agency hiring and training of performance management staff  Specifically, by January 2012, OPM was to identify skills and competencies needed by government personnel for setting goals, evaluating programs, and analyzing and using performance information for improving government efficiency and effectiveness  By January 2013, OPM was to incorporate these skills and competencies into relevant position classifications and to work with each agency to incorporate the identified skills into employee training  In April 2013, we found that OPM had completed its work on the first two responsibilities and taken steps to work with agencies to incorporate performance management staff competencies into training  However, OPM did not assess competency gaps among agency performance management staff to inform its work  Without this information, OPM, working with the PIC, was not well-positioned to focus on the most- needed resources and help other agencies use them  We recommended that the Director of OPM, in coordination with the PIC and the Chief Learning Officer Council, work with agencies to take the following three actions: 1  Identify competency areas needing improvement within agencies  2  Identify agency training that focuses on needed performance management competencies  3  Share information about available agency training on competency areas needing improvement  In July 2017, PIC staff stated they have not focused on identifying competency areas because the competencies do not resonate strongly with the performance community  Instead, staff said they identified a need for introductory training on performance management, which they have developed and piloted  They said that they are not sure when they will implement the training, since the PIC is reviewing priorities with its new executive director  We continue to believe that identifying the competency areas would be useful, and will monitor the PIC’s efforts to identify and share training  The need for performance management training is further highlighted by our survey results  Our 2017 survey shows no statistically significant change in managers’ responses about the availability of training on various performance management activities relative to 2013, including the use of performance information to make decisions  However, the response to each of the six questions related to specific training is statistically significantly higher relative to the year in which it was introduced, as shown in figure 12  Similarly, in 2017 there was no statistically significant change on four survey items related to agencies’ analysis and evaluation tools and staff’s skills and competencies when compared to 2013 or when these items were introduced  We estimate that in 2017 29 percent of managers agreed to a great or very great extent that their agencies were investing in resources to improve the agencies’ capacity to use performance information; 28 percent of managers agreed to a great or very great extent that their agencies were investing the resources needed to ensure that performance data are of sufficient quality; 33 percent of managers reported that they agreed to a great or very great extent that their agencies have sufficient analytical tools for managers at their levels to collect, analyze, and use performance information; and 33 percent of managers reported that they agree to a great or very great extent that the programs they are involved with have sufficient staff with the knowledge and skills needed to analyze performance information  Performance reviews can serve as a strategy to bring leadership and other responsible parties together to review performance information and identify important opportunities to drive performance improvements  Our prior work has examined how different types of performance reviews—strategic reviews, data-driven reviews, and retrospective regulatory reviews—can contribute to agencies assessing progress toward desired results  Strategic reviews: As previously mentioned, in implementing GPRAMA, OMB established a review process in which agencies are to annually assess their progress in achieving each strategic objective in their strategic plans, known as strategic reviews  Given the long-term and complex nature of many outcomes, the strategic review should be informed by a variety of evidence regarding the implementation of strategies and their effectiveness in achieving outcomes  OMB’s guidance states that the strategic review process should consider multiple perspectives and sources of evidence to understand the progress made on each strategic objective  It further states that the results of these reviews should inform many of the decision-making processes at the agency, as well as decision making by the agency’s stakeholders, in areas such as long-term strategy, budget formulation, and risk management  In 2017, agencies are completing their fourth round of these reviews  Our prior work has identified ways in which agencies can effectively conduct these reviews and leverage the results that come from them  In July 2015, we identified seven practices federal agencies can employ to facilitate effective strategic reviews  (See sidebar ) In addition, earlier this month we reported on selected agencies’ experiences in implementing these reviews  Specifically, we found that (1) strategic reviews helped direct leadership attention to progress on strategic objectives, (2) agencies used existing management and performance processes to conduct the reviews, and (3) agencies refined their reviews by capturing lessons learned  Data-driven reviews: GPRAMA requires agencies to review progress toward APGs at least once a quarter  The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs report accompanying the bill that would become GPRAMA stated that this approach is aimed at increasing the use of performance information to improve performance and results  In February 2013, we identified nine leading practices to promote successful data-driven performance reviews in the federal government  (See sidebar ) In July 2015, we found that most of the 24 CFO Act agencies were conducting their reviews in line with GPRAMA requirements and our leading practices  Moreover, agencies reported that their data-driven performance reviews had positive effects on progress toward agency goals, collaboration between agency officials, the ability to hold officials accountable for progress, and efforts to improve the efficiency of operations  Our 2017 survey shows that federal managers remain largely unfamiliar with their agency’s data-driven performance reviews, also known as quarterly performance reviews (QPRs)  An estimated 35 percent of managers reported familiarity with their agency’s QPRs  Survey results show that a greater percentage of Senior Executive Service (SES) managers than non-SES managers reported that they were familiar with QPRs  Approximately 50 percent of SES managers reported being somewhat or very familiar with QPRs; 34 percent of non-SES reported the same  However, for the estimated 35 percent of managers who reported familiarity with QPRs, the more they viewed their programs being subject to a QPR, the more likely they were to report their agency’s QPRs were driving results and conducted in line with our leading practices  Figure 13 shows several illustrative examples of these survey items  For example, of the estimated 48 percent of federal managers who reported their programs being subject to QPRs to a great or very great extent, 83 percent also reported their agencies use QPRs to identify problems or opportunities associated with agency performance goals  Conversely, for the 24 percent of managers who reported their programs were subject to QPRs to a small or no extent, 22 percent also reported the reviews were used for these purposes to a great or very great extent  Being subject to a QPR is also positively related to viewing QPRs as having led to similar meetings at lower levels  An estimated 62 percent of federal managers who reported being subject to QPRs to a great or very great extent also reported their agencies have similar meetings at lower levels to a great or very great extent  An estimated 16 percent of federal managers subject to QPRs to a small or no extent reported the same  Despite the reported benefits of and results achieved through QPRs, as found by our past work and survey data, these reviews are not necessarily widespread  GPRAMA requires agencies to conduct QPRs for APGs, which represent a small subset of goals—generally 2 to 8 priority goals at each designated agency, with approximately 100 total government-wide  Moreover, these required reviews are at the department (or major independent agency) level  These reasons may explain why most managers reported they were not familiar with the reviews  As was described previously, our 2017 survey data show that the reported use of performance information in decision making generally has not improved and in some cases is lower than it was 20 years ago  Survey data also show that managers generally have not reported increases in their employment of practices that further promote the use of performance information in decision making  This suggests that agencies could increase the use of performance information in decision making and the likelihood of achieving desired results by going beyond the specific GPRAMA requirements and expanding their use of data-driven performance reviews—in line with leading practices—to more broadly cover other agency-wide performance goals, as well as goals at lower levels within the agency  For example, such reviews at the program level could help inform the previously mentioned portfolio reviews required by the Program Management Improvement Accountability Act (PMIAA)  We have already suggested expanding reviews to other performance goals  Our management agenda for the presidential and congressional transition includes a key action to expand the use of data-driven performance reviews to assess progress toward meeting agency performance goals  Our prior work has stated that although GPRAMA’s requirements apply at the agency-wide level, they can also serve as leading practices at other organizational levels, such as component agencies, offices, programs, and projects  In addition, federal internal control standards call for the design of appropriate control activities, such as top-level reviews of actual performance and reviews by management at the functional or activity level  The standards also recommend that management design control activities at the appropriate levels in the organizational structure  The July 2017 update to OMB’s guidance states that agency leaders, including various chief officer positions, are to conduct frequent data- driven reviews to drive improvements on various management functions  For example, the agency Chief Human Capital Officer is to conduct quarterly data-driven reviews (known as HRStat) to monitor the progress of human capital goals and measures contained in the human capital operating plan  Beyond these management areas, OMB’s guidance also states that agencies may expand quarterly progress reviews beyond APGs to include other goals and priorities  However, OMB’s guidance does not identify practices for agencies to expand the use of these reviews to other goals, such as other agency-wide performance goals or those at lower levels within the agency  As mentioned previously, one of the responsibilities of the Performance Improvement Council (PIC) is to facilitate the exchange among agencies of practices that have led to performance improvements within specific programs, agencies, or across agencies  By working with the PIC to identify and share among agencies practices to expand the use of data- driven reviews, OMB could help agencies increase the use of performance information in decision making and achieve results  Retrospective regulatory reviews: In retrospective reviews, agencies evaluate how existing regulations are working in practice and whether they are achieving expected outcomes  GPRAMA requires agencies to identify and assess how their various program activities and other activities, including regulations, contribute to APGs  However, in April 2014, we found that agencies reported mixed experiences linking retrospective analyses to APGs  We recommended that OMB strengthen these reviews by issuing guidance for agencies to take actions to ensure that contributions made by regulations toward achieving APGs are properly considered, and improve how retrospective regulatory reviews can be used to help inform assessments of progress toward these APGs  OMB staff agreed with this recommendation and stated that the agency was working on strategies to help facilitate agencies’ ability to use retrospective reviews to inform APGs  To that end, in April 2017, OMB issued guidance to agencies that, among other things, emphasized the importance of performance measures related to evaluating and improving the net benefits of their respective regulatory programs  OMB included explicit references to section 6 of Executive Order 13563, which directed agencies’ efforts to conduct retrospective regulatory reviews  Specifically, the updated guidance encourages agencies to establish and report “meaningful performance indicators and goals for the purpose of evaluating and improving the net benefits of their respective regulatory programs ” The guidance further states that agencies’ efforts to improve such net benefits may be conducted as part of developing agency strategic and performance plans and priority goals  In July 2017, OMB confirmed that the updated guidance was issued, in part, to address our April 2014 recommendation  For several years, OMB has encouraged agencies to expand their use of evidence—performance measures, program evaluation results, and other relevant data analytics and research studies—in budget, management, and policy decisions with the goal of improving government effectiveness  In particular, OMB has encouraged agencies to strengthen their program evaluations—systematic studies that use research methods to address specific questions about program performance  Evaluation is closely related to performance measurement and reporting  Evaluations can be designed to better isolate the causal impact of programs from other external economic or environmental conditions in order to assess a program’s effectiveness  Thus, an evaluation study can provide a valuable supplement to ongoing performance reporting by measuring results that are too difficult or expensive to assess annually, explaining the reasons why performance goals were not met, or assessing whether one approach is more effective than another  Despite the valuable insights and information that program evaluations can provide, we continue to find that most federal managers lack access to or awareness of such studies  Our 2017 survey shows that an estimated 40 percent of managers reported that an evaluation had been completed within the past 5 years of any program, operation, or project in which they were involved—comparable to the results in our 2013 survey, when questions about program evaluations were added  In recent years, OMB has encouraged agencies to explore evidence-based tools to strengthen agency and grantee evaluation capacity, consider the effectiveness of their programs, and foster innovation rooted in research and rigorous evaluation  During the past 2 years, we examined several of those tools, as described below  Pay for success: Also known as social impact bonds, pay for success is a contracting mechanism under which investors provide the capital the government uses to provide a social service  The government specifies performance outcomes in pay for success contracts and generally includes a requirement that a program’s impact be independently evaluated  The evaluators also are to regularly review performance data, while those managing and investing in a project focus on performance and accountability, as shown in the figure 14  In September 2015, we found that the federal government’s involvement in pay for success had been limited  In addition, a formal mechanism for federal agencies to collaborate on pay for success did not exist  We concluded that, given the evolving nature of pay for success, a mechanism for federal agencies to collaborate would increase access to leading practices  We therefore recommended that OMB establish a formal means for federal agencies to collaborate on pay for success  OMB concurred and, in February 2016, announced that it had developed the Pay for Success Interagency Learning Network with representatives from 10 federal agencies to share lessons, hone policy, and strengthen implementation  Tiered evidence grants: Tiered evidence grants seek to incorporate evidence of effectiveness into grant making  Federal agencies establish tiers of grant funding based on the level of evidence grantees provide on their approaches to deliver social, educational, health, or other services  (See figure 15 ) Smaller awards are used to test new and innovative approaches, while larger awards are used to scale up approaches that have strong evidence of effectiveness  This creates incentives for grantees to use approaches supported by evidence and helps them build the capacity to conduct evaluations  In September 2016, we found that interagency collaboration had helped federal agencies that administer tiered evidence grants address challenges and share lessons learned  At that time, such collaborative efforts relied on informal networks  We recommended that OMB establish a formal means for agencies to collaborate on tiered evidence grants  OMB had no comment on the recommendation  In July 2017, OMB staff told us that they had established an interagency working group and other mechanisms to facilitate collaboration and disseminate information on tiered evidence grants  Performance partnerships: Performance partnerships allow federal agencies to provide grant recipients flexibility in how they use funding across two or more programs along with additional flexibilities  In exchange, the recipient commits to improve and assess progress toward agreed-upon outcomes  Figure 16 provides an overview of the performance partnership model  In April 2017, we examined two performance partnership initiatives authorized by Congress: the Environmental Protection Agency’s Performance Partnership Grants and the Performance Partnership Pilots for Disconnected Youth, which allows funding from multiple programs across multiple agencies to be combined into pilot programs serving disconnected youth  For the Performance Partnership Pilots for Disconnected Youth, we found that the agencies involved in the initiative had not fully identified the key financial and staff resources each agency would need to contribute over the lifetime of the initiative in line with leading practices for interagency collaboration  This was because agencies primarily had been focused on meeting near-term needs to support design and implementation  We also found that agencies had not developed criteria to help determine whether, how, and when to implement the flexibilities tested by the pilots in a broader context  (This is known as scalability ) Officials involved in the pilots told us it was too early in pilot implementation to determine such criteria  However, by not identifying these criteria while designing the pilots, they were risking not collecting needed data during pilot implementation  We recommended that OMB coordinate with federal agencies to identify (1) agency resource contributions needed for the lifetime of the pilots and (2) criteria and related data for assessing scalability  OMB neither agreed nor disagreed with these recommendations  We continue to monitor progress on these recommendations  In 2003, we identified nine key practices for effective performance management that collectively create a “line of sight” between individual performance and organizational success  (See sidebar on next page ) Our recent work and the results of our 2017 survey of federal managers highlight areas where agencies have made progress but could take additional action to better reflect several of these practices, thereby better instilling results-oriented cultures  Align individual performance expectations with organizational goals: Our 2003 report found that high-performing organizations use their performance management systems to help individuals see the connection between their daily activities and organizational goals  The executive branch has taken several steps to link individual and organizational results  For example, in October 2000, OPM issued guidance to link SES performance expectations with GPRA-required goals  In January 2012, OPM and OMB released a government-wide SES performance appraisal system that provided agencies with a standard framework to manage the performance of SES members  However, our work continues to identify areas for improvement  Goal leaders and deputy goal leaders are responsible for achieving APGs, but our July 2014 review found that the performance plans for a sample of goal and deputy goal leaders generally did not link their individual performance and the broader goal  We recommended that OMB ensure that those plans demonstrate a clear connection with APGs  OMB staff generally agreed with our recommendation  In July 2017, OMB staff stated that components of both OMB and OPM guidance support accountability for agency priority goals  Despite this, we continue to believe that ensuring an explicit connection in performance plans to APGs will improve accountability, and that additional action is needed to do so  In May 2016, we found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had not aligned Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinators’ performance expectations with its organizational goals for implementing the National Disaster Recovery Framework  We concluded that without this linkage, FEMA could not evaluate how effectively the coordinators performed in implementing the framework  We recommended that FEMA align performance expectations consistent with leading practices  The Department of Homeland Security concurred with our recommendation  In July 2017, FEMA stated that it is preparing the Field Leader Manual, which will define the core competencies and duties of coordinators  We will continue to monitor FEMA’s actions to implement this recommendation  Our 2017 survey also shows that this linkage could be improved for other federal employees  An estimated 58 percent of federal managers reported using performance information to a great or very great extent in setting expectations for employees they manage or supervise  The 2017 responses do not represent a statistically significant change when compared to our last survey in 2013 (62 percent) or to 1997 (61 percent), the year this survey item was introduced  Address organizational priorities: Our prior work showed that, by requiring and tracking follow-up actions on performance gaps, high- performing organizations underscore the importance of holding individuals accountable for making progress on their priorities  Our past and 2017 surveys have identified differences in responses between SES and non-SES managers reporting being held accountable for results  For example, in 2017, our survey results indicate that there was a statistically significant difference between SES and non-SES managers reporting to a great or very great extent that they were held accountable for results of the programs for which they are responsible  However, our 2017 survey shows no change compared to our last survey in either SES or non-SES managers reporting they were held accountable for results  There are statistically significant increases when compared to 1997, when these survey items were introduced  For example, an estimated 79 percent of SES managers and 64 percent of non-SES managers reported being held accountable to a great or very great extent for results of the programs for which they are responsible in 2017  This does not represent a statistically significant change from our 2013 survey (80 percent and 67 percent, respectively), but it is statistically significantly higher than the 62 percent of SES managers and 54 percent of non-SES managers in 1997  (See figure 17 ) Similarly, as shown in figure 18, an estimated 71 percent of SES managers reported being held accountable to a great or very great extent for accomplishing agency strategic goals in 2017  This represents no statistical change since 2013 (73 percent), but it is a statistically significant increase compared to when this item was introduced in 2003 (61 percent)  Additionally, as figure 18 shows, a gap between being held accountable for strategic goals and having the decision-making authority needed to help accomplish those goals has nearly closed, due to an increase in the latter survey item  The estimated 69 percent of SES managers who reported having such authority to a great or very great extent in 2017 is a statistically significant increase relative to both 2013 (61 percent) and 1997 (51 percent)  As noted earlier, GPRAMA requires goal leaders for CAP goals and APGs  Our past work has generally found that they are in place  GPRAMA also requires agencies to identify an agency official responsible for resolving major management challenges, which can help ensure accountability  (See sidebar ) However, in June 2016 we found that 17 of the 24 CFO Act agencies had not identified an agency official responsible for resolving each of their challenges, partly because OMB guidance was not clear that major management challenges should be identified in agency performance plans  We recommended that the 17 agencies identify such officials in their performance plans, and that OMB clarify its guidance  OMB revised its guidance accordingly in July 2016, and, as of July 2017, 7 of the 17 agencies had identified officials responsible for resolving major management challenges  Link pay to individual and organizational performance: High- performing organizations seek to create pay, incentive, and reward systems that clearly link employee knowledge, skills, and contributions to organizational results  Our work has found that agencies have made progress in this area  For example, in July 2013, we found that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) lacked mechanisms to monitor how supervisors used its performance management system to recognize and reward performance  To help enhance the credibility of SEC’s performance management system, we recommended that it create mechanisms to monitor how supervisors use the performance management system  In a subsequent (December 2016) report, we found that, in response to our recommendation, SEC began monitoring how supervisors provide feedback, recognize and reward staff, and address poor performance  However, federal managers generally reported no change on three items related to recognizing and rewarding employee performance since our last survey in 2013 (figure 19)  One of those items—managers agreeing to a great or very great extent that employees in their agency receive positive recognition for helping the agency to accomplish its strategic goals—had a statistically significant increase between 1997 and 2017 (from an estimated 26 percent to 46 percent)  Make meaningful distinctions in performance: Effective performance management requires the organization’s leadership to meaningfully distinguish between acceptable and outstanding performance of individuals and to appropriately reward those who perform at the highest level  For example, in January 2015, we found disparities in performance ratings for SES among agencies  Across the 24 CFO Act agencies, the percent of SES rated at the highest level ranged from about 22 percent to 95 percent in fiscal year 2013  To help address these disparities, we recommended that the Director of OPM consider the need to refine the performance certifications guidelines addressing distinctions in performance  To address this recommendation, OPM informed us, in June 2015, that it had convened a cross-agency working group that developed a standard template for agencies to complete and post on a website to more transparently justify their SES ratings distributions  In May 2016, we found that about 74 percent of non-SES employees under a five-level appraisal system—the most commonly used system— were rated in the top two of five performance categories in 2013  We explored this issue further in our December 2016 review of human capital challenges at the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), which illustrates the importance of making meaningful distinctions in performance for non- SES employees  We found that in fiscal year 2014, about 73 percent of VHA employees were rated in the top two of five performance categories  This may have been due, in part, to a policy that did not require standards to be defined for each level of performance  We recommended that VHA ensure that meaningful distinctions are being made in employee performance ratings by reviewing and revising performance management policies consistent with leading practices, among other actions  The Department of Veterans Affairs partially concurred with our recommendation  In May 2017, the department stated that it had begun piloting a new performance management process and would analyze results at the end of fiscal year 2017  One key aspect of connecting daily operations to results is aligning program performance measures to agency-wide goals and objectives  However, in 2017, an estimated 50 percent of federal managers agreed to a great or very great extent that managers at their level took steps to create such an alignment  There has been no statistically significant change since this item was introduced in 2007  In addition, GPRAMA calls for agencies to develop a balanced set of performance measures, which reinforces the need for agencies to have a variety of measures across program areas  Our 2017 survey shows that managers have not reported any difference in the availability of performance measures for their programs when compared to the 2013 results  However, the 2017 result (an estimated 87 percent) represents a statistically significant increase when compared to 1997 (76 percent)  When asked about the availability of certain types of performance measures, three of the five types (outcome, output, and efficiency) were statistically significantly higher in 2017 when compared to our initial 1997 survey  However, when comparing 2017 results to those in 2013, two of the five types (output and quality) showed a statistically significant decrease, and the other types did not change  These are illustrated in figure 20  Beyond the survey results, our work has found that some agencies had not developed or used outcome measures, but have taken steps to do so  Agencies have been responsible for measuring program outcomes since GPRA was enacted in 1993  The text box below describes two illustrative examples from our past work  Examples of Agencies That Did Not Develop or Use Outcome Measures Patient access to electronic health information: In March 2017, we found that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had invested over $35 billion since 2009 to enhance patient access to electronic health information, among other things  HHS had not developed outcome measures to gauge the effectiveness of these efforts, which meant the department did not have information to determine whether the efforts were contributing to its overall goals  We recommended that HHS develop relevant outcome measures and HHS concurred  Safety interventions: According to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), between 2011 and 2015, over 4,000 people died in crashes involving motor carriers each year  GAO, Motor Carriers: Better Information Needed to Assess Effectiveness and Efficiency of Safety Interventions, GAO-17-49 (Washington, D C : Oct  27, 2016)  Further OMB actions could also help agencies make progress in measuring the performance of different program types  In our June 2013 report on initial GPRAMA implementation, we found that agencies experienced common issues in measuring the performance of various types of programs, such as contracts and grants  We recommended that OMB work with the PIC to develop a detailed approach to examine those difficulties  Although they took some actions, OMB and the PIC have not yet developed a comprehensive and detailed approach to address these issues  We concluded that, without such an approach, it would be difficult for the PIC and agencies to fully understand these measurement issues and develop a crosscutting approach to help address them  In August 2017, OMB staff stated that efforts related to the future implementation of the Program Management Improvement Accountability Act (PMIAA) could help address this recommendation  As highlighted in table 1, our work continues to show why it is important for OMB and the PIC to take actions to more fully address our recommendation  Congress has passed legislation to increase the transparency and accessibility of federal performance and financial data  For example, GPRAMA modernized agency reporting requirements to ensure that they make timely, relevant data available to inform decision making by Congress and agency officials as well as improve transparency for the public  Results of our 2017 survey, however, show the need for improvements in the public availability of agency performance information  An estimated 17 percent of managers reported that their agency’s performance information is easily accessible to the public to a great or very great extent, the same percentage as in 2013  Moreover, of the 87 percent of managers that reported there are performance measures for the programs they are involved in, 25 percent reported that they use information obtained from performance measurement when informing the public about how programs are performing to a great or very great extent  This is not statistically different from the 30 percent estimated in 2013  The DATA Act, enacted in 2014, built on previous transparency legislation by expanding what federal agencies are required to report regarding their spending  The act significantly increases the types of data that must be reported, requires government-wide data standards, and regular reviews of data quality to help improve the transparency and accountability of federal spending data  OMB provides websites and guidance to make agency performance and financial information available to the public; however, our prior work has identified a number of areas related to Performance gov and the DATA Act where OMB action is needed to improve the transparency and accessibility of this information  Performance gov: Since 2013, our work has identified a number of issues with Performance gov, the website intended to serve as a central source of information on the federal government’s goals and performance  Over time, we have recommended that OMB take a number of specific actions to improve the website  For example, in June 2013, we found that the website offered an inconsistent user experience and presented accessibility and navigation challenges  To clarify the purpose of the website and enhance its usability, we recommended that OMB take steps to systematically collect customer input  In August 2016, we reported that OMB was not meeting all of the reporting requirements for Performance gov, and did not have a plan to develop and improve the website  We recommended that OMB ensure that information presented on Performance gov consistently complies with reporting requirements and develop a plan for the website that includes, among other things, a customer outreach plan  OMB agreed with these recommendations and, in July 2017, OMB staff informed us that they will be partnering with a vendor to redesign Performance gov to improve the accessibility of information on the website  To inform this redesign, OMB staff said that they will consider our previous recommendations and plan to engage a wide group of stakeholders, including Congress, agency staff, and interested members of the public and outside organizations  OMB staff anticipated releasing updated agency reporting guidance in the fall of 2017 and the redesigned website in February 2018  Under GPRAMA, OMB is required to make available, through Performance gov, quarterly updates on progress toward CAP goals and APGs  As described earlier, in June 2017 OMB announced that reporting to Performance gov has been discontinued through the end of fiscal year 2017 as agencies develop new priority goals  However, Performance gov does not state that it will not be updated, nor does it provide the location of the final progress updates for these goals  OMB’s guidance states that agencies should report the results of progress on their previous APGs in their annual performance reports for fiscal year 2017  Moreover, OMB staff told us that the existing updates on Performance gov for CAP goals, last updated in December 2016, represent the final updates on those goals, although they are not labeled as such on the website  As a result, those interested in progress updates and reported results for the previous priority goals may not know where they will be able to find this information, limiting the transparency and accessibility of those results for decision makers and the public  DATA Act: The DATA Act requires federal agencies to disclose their spending and link this to program activities so that policymakers and the public can more effectively track federal spending  The act has the potential to improve the accuracy and transparency of federal spending information and increase its usefulness for government decision making and oversight  Since the DATA Act became law, OMB and Treasury have taken significant steps to make more complete and accurate federal spending data available  These have included standardizing data element definitions to make it easier to compare different federal agencies’ financial information, and issuing guidance to help agencies submit required data  In May 2017, federal agencies started to report data under the standardized definitions developed under the act  We have made a number of recommendations to address challenges that could affect the consistency and quality of the data  Addressing these recommendations could help ensure that financial data are provided to the public in a transparent and useful manner  For example, in January 2016, we found some standardized data element definitions were imprecise or ambiguous, which could result in inconsistent or potentially misleading reporting  We recommended that OMB provide agencies with additional guidance to address potential issues with the clarity, consistency, and quality of reported data  OMB released guidance in May and November 2016, but in April 2017 we found that additional guidance was needed to help agencies implement certain data definitions to produce data that would be consistent and comparable across agencies  We are in the process of examining the quality of the data that was submitted by agencies in May 2017 and was made available to the public on an early version of the USAspending gov website  We expect to issue the results of this work in fall 2017  Our past work also identified a number of actions agencies need to take to make performance information more transparent  Increasing the accessibility of this information could enhance oversight and accountability of agency performance and results  CAP goals: In May 2016, we found that while selected CAP goal teams were working to develop performance measures to track progress, they were not consistently reporting on their efforts to develop these measures  We recommended that OMB report on Performance gov the actions that CAP goal teams are taking to develop performance measures and quarterly targets to help ensure that measures are aligned with major activities, and ensure that it is possible to track teams’ progress toward establishing measures  While OMB agreed with this recommendation, it did not address it before reporting on the CAP goals was discontinued, as discussed earlier  Customer service standards: As we described earlier, in 2017, an estimated 48 percent of federal managers that indicated they have performance measures for the programs they are involved in also agreed to a great or very great extent that they have customer service performance measures  There has been no statistically significant change relative to our last survey in 2013, or the initial survey in 1997  Relatedly, in October 2014, we reviewed customer service standards at five federal agencies  Customer service standards inform customers about what they have a right to expect when they request services, and the standards should include goals for the quality and timeliness of a service an agency provides to its customers  They should also be easily available to the public so that customers know what to expect, when to expect it, and from whom  In our review of standards at five agencies, however, we found that only Customs and Border Protection had standards that were easily available to the public  We recommended the other four agencies—the United States Forest Service, Federal Student Aid, the National Park Service (NPS), and the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA)—make their standards more easily accessible to the public  As of July 2017, only VBA had done so  Major management challenges: In June 2016, we found that 14 of the 24 CFO Act agencies did not describe their major management challenges in their performance plans, as required by GPRAMA  Furthermore, 22 of the 24 agencies reviewed did not report complete performance information for each of their major management challenges, including performance goals, milestones, indicators, and planned actions that they have developed to address such challenges  As a result, it was not always transparent what these agencies considered to be their major management challenges or how they planned to resolve these challenges  We recommended that the 22 agencies describe their major management challenges in their agency performance plans and include goals, measures, milestones, and information on planned actions and responsible officials  As of August 2017, 8 agencies—the U S  Agency for International Development, Small Business Administration, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, OPM, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Departments of Education, State, and Veterans Affairs—had fully implemented our recommendations; the other 14 agencies had not  Quality of performance information: In September 2015, we found that six selected agencies reported limited information on the actions they are taking to ensure the quality of their performance information for selected APGs, as required by GPRAMA  We recommended that all six of the agencies work with OMB to fully report this information  In response, the Department of Homeland Security and NASA described how they ensure reliable performance information is reported to external audiences  As of June 2017, the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, the Interior, and Labor had not yet taken actions to address this recommendation by providing more specific explanations of how they ensure reliable performance information is reported for their APGs  Unnecessary reports: GPRAMA requires that OMB guide an annual review of agencies’ plans and reports for Congress and include in the President’s budget a list of those plans and reports determined to be outdated or duplicative  However, in July 2017, we found that OMB did not implement the report review process on an annual basis, as required  We also found that OMB published the list of agency plans and reports on Performance gov, rather than in the President’s annual budget, where they may be more visible and useful to congressional decision makers and others  Therefore, we recommended that OMB instruct agencies to identify outdated or duplicative reports on an annual basis and submit or reference the list of identified plans and reports with the President’s annual budget  OMB agreed with these recommendations  In July 2017, OMB stated it would include a list of report modification proposals in the President’s fiscal year 2019 budget as required by GPRAMA  For all of the unimplemented recommendations described above, we will continue to monitor agencies’ actions  In addition to providing access to performance and financial information, federal agencies can directly engage and collaborate with citizens, nonprofits, academic institutions, and other levels of government using open innovation strategies  Open innovation involves using various tools and approaches to harness the ideas, expertise, and resources of those outside an organization to address an issue or achieve specific goals  In October 2016, we found that in recent years agencies had frequently used five open innovation strategies—singularly or in combination—to collaborate with citizens and encourage their participation in agency initiatives  (See figure 21 ) Our October 2016 report found that agencies can use these strategies for a variety of purposes  To develop new ideas, solutions to specific problems, or new products: For example, from April 2015 to November 2016, the Department of Energy held a prize competition to create more efficient devices that would double the energy captured from ocean waves  According to the competition’s website, the winning team achieved a five-fold improvement  To enhance collaboration and agency capacity by leveraging external resources, knowledge, and expertise: For example, every 2 years since 2009, the Federal Highway Administration has regularly engaged stakeholders to identify and implement innovative ideas that have measurably improved the execution of highway construction projects  To collect the perspectives and preferences of a broad group of citizens and external stakeholders: For example, the Food and Drug Administration used in-person and online dialogue to engage outside stakeholders in the development of an online platform designed to make key datasets easily accessible to the public  Subsequently, in June 2017, we found that OMB, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and the General Services Administration (GSA) developed resources to support the use of open innovation strategies by federal agencies  These resources included guidance, staff to assist agencies in implementing initiatives, and websites to improve access to relevant information  For example, GSA developed a step-by-step implementation guide, program management team, and website to help agency staff carry out prize competitions and challenges  Agencies have also developed their own resources, including guidance, staff positions, and websites, to reach specific audiences and to provide tailored support for open innovation strategies they use frequently  For example, NASA’s Solve website provides a central location for the public to find the agency’s challenges and citizen science projects, as well as links to relevant resources  We also evaluated key government-wide guidance for the five strategies listed above to determine the extent to which the guidance reflects leading practices for effectively implementing open innovation initiatives  We identified these practices in our October 2016 report  We found that the guidance for each strategy reflected these practices to differing extents, as shown in figure 22  We made 22 recommendations to GSA, OMB, and OSTP to enhance the guidance  GSA and OMB generally agreed with these recommendations and OSTP neither agreed nor disagreed  We will monitor their progress toward implementing these recommendations  GPRAMA provides important tools that can help decision makers better achieve results and address the federal government’s significant and long-standing governance challenges  Although OMB and agencies have made progress in improving implementation of the act over the years, our work has highlighted numerous opportunities for further improvements  In 2017, OMB removed the priority designation of CAP goals and APGs  For those goals, this action stopped related data-driven reviews and quarterly updates of progress on Performance gov until new priority goals are published next year  What OMB considers to be the final results of CAP goals for fiscal years 2014 to 2017 already are on Performance gov (although not labeled as such)  In addition, agencies may report on their former APGs in their annual fiscal year 2017 performance reports  However, Performance gov does not state that it will not be updated or provide the location of the final progress updates for these goals, limiting transparency and its value to the public  OMB has stated its plans to restart implementation of those provisions in February 2018, with the start of a new goal cycle  We believe it is critical for OMB to do so, given the important role those tools play in addressing key governance challenges and the results we have seen in better managing crosscutting areas and driving performance improvements across the government  In addition, OMB has postponed implementation of the federal program inventory  To date, the inventory has only been developed once, in 2013, despite requirements for regular updates to reflect current budget and performance information  OMB has given a variety of reasons for the delays over the past 4 years—most recently, to determine the right strategy to merge implementation of the DATA Act and PMIAA with GPRAMA’s program inventory requirements  Although OMB staff told us that they expect to issue guidance by the end of 2018 to resume implementation of the program inventory requirements, they have not provided more specific time frames and milestones related to the program inventory requirements  Doing so would help agencies prepare for resumed implementation  Moreover, publicly disclosing planned implementation time frames and associated milestones would help ensure that interested stakeholders, such as federal decision makers and the public, are prepared to engage with agencies as they develop and update their program inventories, which in turn could help ensure the inventories meet stakeholders’ needs  A well-developed inventory would provide key program, budget, and performance information in one place to help federal decision makers better understand the federal investment and results in given policy areas, and better identify and manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication  Information architecture offers one approach to developing an inventory  As OMB determines a strategy for implementing the program inventory and develops its guidance, considering such a systematic approach to planning, organizing, and developing the inventory that centers on maximizing the use and usefulness of information could help it ensure the inventory meets GPRAMA requirements as well as the needs of decision makers and the public  Moreover, such an approach could also help OMB implement our past recommendations related to the program inventory, which are intended to ensure the inventory provides more complete information and is useful to various stakeholders  Our survey of federal managers continues to generally show no improvement in their reported use of performance information in decision making, nor in the employment of practices that can enhance such use  One area where our survey data and past work show promise is through the use of regular, leadership-driven reviews of performance data at agencies, especially when conducted in line with related leading practices  However, GPRAMA only requires these data-driven reviews for APGs, which represent a small subset of goals, both within individual agencies as well as across the government  This is probably why most federal managers were not familiar with the reviews  Identifying and sharing practices for expanding the use of those reviews—such as for additional agency-wide performance goals and at lower levels within agencies—could significantly enhance the use of performance information and drive to better and greater results  We are making the following four recommendations to OMB: The Director of OMB should update Performance gov to explain that quarterly reporting on the fiscal year 2014 through 2017 CAP goals and fiscal year 2016 and 2017 APGs was suspended, and provide the location of final progress updates for these goals  (Recommendation 1) The Director of OMB should revise and publicly issue OMB guidance— through an update to its Circular No  A-11, a memorandum, or other means—to provide time frames and associated milestones for implementing the federal program inventory  (Recommendation 2) The Director of OMB should consider—as OMB determines its strategy for resumed implementation of the federal program inventory—using a systematic approach, such as the information architecture framework, to help ensure that GPRAMA requirements and our past recommendations for the inventory are addressed  (Recommendation 3) The Director of OMB should work with the Performance Improvement Council to identify and share among agencies practices for expanding the use of data-driven performance reviews beyond APGs, such as for other performance goals and at lower levels within agencies, that have led to performance improvements  (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget for review and comment  In comments provided orally and via email, OMB staff agreed with the recommendations in this report  OMB staff also asked us to (1) consider revising the draft title of the report, to better reflect progress in GPRAMA implementation, and (2) clarify our recommendations on issuing guidance for implementing the federal program inventory and expanding the use of data-driven performance reviews, by describing possible actions that could be taken to implement them  We agreed and made revisions accordingly  We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties  This report will also be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6806 or mihmj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of our report  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III  The GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) includes a statutory provision for us to periodically evaluate implementation of the act  Since 2012, we have issued over 30 products in response to this provision; this is the third summary report  This report assesses how implementation of GPRAMA has affected the federal government’s progress in resolving key governance challenges in (1) addressing crosscutting issues, (2) ensuring performance information is useful and used in decision making, (3) aligning daily operations with results, and (4) building a more transparent and open government  We reviewed relevant statutory requirements, related Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, and our recent work related to GPRAMA implementation and the four key governance challenges included in our reporting objectives  Specifically, since our last summary report in September 2015, we examined various aspects of GPRAMA implementation in 12 products that covered 35 agencies, including the 24 agencies covered under the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990, as amended (identified in table 2)  We interviewed OMB and Performance Improvement Council staff to obtain (1) their perspectives on GPRAMA implementation and progress on the four governance challenges, and (2) updates on the status of our past recommendations  We also received updates from other agencies on the status of our past recommendations to them related to GPRAMA implementation  To supplement this review, we administered our periodic survey of federal managers on organizational performance and management issues from November 2016 through March 2017  This survey is comparable to five previous surveys we conducted in 1997, 2000, 2003, 2007, and 2013  We selected a stratified random sample of 4,395 people from a population of approximately 153,779 mid-level and upper-level civilian managers and supervisors working in the 24 executive branch agencies covered by the CFO Act, as shown in table 2  We obtained the sample from the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Enterprise Human Resources Integration (EHRI) database as of September 30, 2015, which was the most recent fiscal year data available at the time  We used file designators indicating performance of managerial and supervisory functions  In reporting survey data, we use the term “government-wide” and the phrases “across the government” or “overall” to refer to the 24 CFO Act executive branch agencies  We use the terms “federal managers” and “managers” to collectively refer to both managers and supervisors  We designed the questionnaire to obtain the observations and perceptions of respondents on various aspects of results-oriented management topics  These topics include the presence and use of performance measures, any hindrances to measuring performance and using performance information, agency climate, and program evaluation use  To assess implementation of GPRAMA, the questionnaire included questions to collect respondents’ views on various provisions of GPRAMA, such as cross-agency priority goals, agency priority goals, and related quarterly performance reviews  Similar to the five previous surveys, the sample was stratified by agency and by whether the manager or supervisor was a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES)  The management levels covered general schedule (GS) or equivalent schedules at levels comparable to GS-13 through GS-15 and career SES or equivalent  Stratifying the sample in this way ensured that the population from which we sampled covered at least 90 percent of all mid- to upper-level managers and supervisors at the departments and agencies we surveyed  Most of the items on the questionnaire were closed-ended, meaning that depending on the particular item, respondents could choose one or more response categories or rate the strength of their perception on a 5-point extent scale ranging from “no extent” to “very great extent ” On most items, respondents also had an option of choosing the response category “no basis to judge/not applicable ” A few items had other options, such as “yes,” “no,” or “do not know,” or a 3-point familiarity scale (“not familiar,” “somewhat familiar,” and “very familiar”)  We asked many of the items on the questionnaire in our earlier surveys, though we introduced a number of new items in 2013, including the sections about GPRAMA and program evaluations  For 2017, we added a new question on use of performance information (question 12) and a new question on program evaluation (question 24)  Before administering the survey, questions were reviewed by our staff, including subject matter experts, a survey specialist, and a research methodologist  We also conducted pretests of the new questions with federal managers in several of the 24 CFO Act agencies  We changed the wording of subquestions or added clarifying examples based on pretester feedback  To administer the survey, we e-mailed managers in the sample to notify them of the survey’s availability on our website and we included instructions on how to access and complete the survey  To follow up with managers in the sample who did not respond to the initial notice, we emailed or called multiple times to encourage survey participation or provide technical assistance, as appropriate  Similar to our last survey, we worked with OPM to obtain the names of the managers and supervisors in our sample, except for those within selected subcomponents whose names were withheld from the EHRI database  Since Foreign Service officials from the Department of State (State) are not in the EHRI database, we drew a sample for that group with the assistance from State  We worked with officials at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to gain access to these individuals to maintain continuity of the population of managers surveyed from previous years  The Department of Justice (DOJ) was concerned about providing identifying information (e g , names, e-mail addresses, and phone numbers) of federal agents to us, so we administered the current survey to DOJ managers in our sample through DOJ officials  To identify the sample of managers whose names were withheld from the EHRI database, we provided DOJ with the last four digits of Social Security numbers, the subcomponent, duty location, and pay grade information  To ensure that DOJ managers received the same survey administration process as the rest of the managers in our sample to the extent possible, we provided DOJ with text for the survey activation and reminder e-mails similar to ones we emailed to managers at other agencies  DOJ administered the survey to these managers and emailed them one reminder to complete the survey  To help determine the reliability and accuracy of the EHRI data elements used to draw our sample of federal managers, we checked the data for reasonableness and the presence of any obvious or potential errors in accuracy and completeness and reviewed past analyses of the reliability of this database  For example, we identified cases where the managers’ names were withheld and contacted OPM to discuss this issue  We also checked the names of the managers in our selected sample provided by OPM with the applicable agency contacts to verify these managers were still employed with the agency  We noted discrepancies when they occurred and excluded them from our population of interest, as applicable  On the basis of these procedures, we believe the data we used from the EHRI database are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of the survey  Of the 4,395 managers selected for the 2017 survey, we found that 388 of the sampled managers had retired, separated, or otherwise left the agency or had some other reason that excluded them from the population of interest  These exclusions included managers that the agency could not locate, and therefore we were unable to request that they participate in the survey  We received usable questionnaires from 2,726 sample respondents, for a weighted response rate of about 67 percent of the remaining eligible sample  The weighted response rate across 23 of the 24 agencies ranged from 57 percent to 82 percent, while DOJ had a weighted response rate of 36 percent  See the supplemental material for each agency’s response rate  We conducted a nonresponse bias analysis using information from the survey and sampling frame as available  The analysis confirmed discrepancies in the tendency to respond to the survey related to agency and SES status  The analysis also revealed some differences in response propensity by age and GS level; however, the direction and magnitude of the differences on these factors were not consistent across agencies or strata  Our data may be subject to bias from unmeasured sources for which we cannot control  Results, and in particular estimates from agencies with low response rates such as DOJ, should be interpreted with caution because these estimates are associated with a higher level of uncertainty  The overall survey results are generalizable to the government-wide population of managers as described above  The responses of each eligible sample member who provided a usable questionnaire were weighted in the analyses to statistically account for all members of the population  All results are subject to some uncertainty or sampling error as well as nonsampling error, including the potential for nonresponse bias as noted above  Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn  The magnitude of sampling error will vary across the particular surveys, groups, or items being compared because we (1) used complex survey designs that differed in the underlying sample sizes, usable sample respondents, and associated variances of estimates, and (2) conducted different types of statistical analyses  For example, the 2000 and 2007 surveys were designed to produce agency-level estimates and had effective sample sizes of 2,510 and 2,943, respectively  However, the 1997 and 2003 surveys were designed to obtain government-wide estimates only, and their sample sizes were 905 and 503, respectively  Consequently, in some instances, a difference of a certain magnitude may be statistically significant  In other instances, depending on the nature of the comparison being made, a difference of equal or even greater magnitude may not achieve statistical significance  Because each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval  This is the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn  The percentage estimates presented in this report based on our sample for the 2017 survey have 95 percent confidence intervals within plus or minus 5 5 percentage points of the estimate itself, unless otherwise noted  We also note in this report when we are 95 percent confident that changes from 1997 or 2013 relative to 2017 are statistically significant  Online supplemental material shows the questions asked on the survey along with the percentage estimates and associated 95 percent confidence intervals for each item for each agency and government-wide  In a few instances, we report estimates with larger margins of error because we deemed them reliable representations of given findings due to the statistical significance of larger differences between comparison groups  In all cases, we report the applicable margins of error  In addition to sampling errors, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may also introduce other types of errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors  For example, difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the sources of information available to respondents, or in how the data were entered into a database or analyzed can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results  With this survey, we took a number of steps to minimize these nonsampling errors  For example, our staff with subject matter expertise designed the questionnaire in collaboration with our survey specialists  As noted earlier, the new questions added to the survey were pretested to ensure they were relevant and clearly stated  When the data were analyzed, a second independent analyst on our staff verified the analysis programs to ensure the accuracy of the code and the appropriateness of the methods used for the computer-generated analysis  Since this was a web-based survey, respondents entered their answers directly into the electronic questionnaire, thereby eliminating the need to have the data keyed into a database, thus avoiding a source of data entry error  To supplement descriptive analysis of the survey questions, we generated an index to gauge government-wide use of performance information  The index, which was identical to one we reported in 2014, averaged manager’s responses to 11 questions deemed to relate to the concept of performance information use  The index runs from 1 (corresponding to an average value of “to no extent”) to 5 (corresponding to an average value of “to a very great extent”)  We used Cronbach’s alpha to assess the internal consistency of the scale  Our government- wide index score weights each agency’s contribution equally, and provides a relative measure of the use of performance information over time rather than an absolute indicator of the government-wide level of use of performance information  We conducted this performance audit from January 2016 to September 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies have taken some actions to address our recommendations related to implementation of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA); however, the majority of recommendations remain open  Since GPRAMA was enacted in January 2011, we have made 100 recommendations in 18 reports to OMB and agencies aimed at improving the act’s implementation (table 3)  Of those 100, OMB and the agencies have implemented 42 recommendations  Fifty-eight recommendations require additional action  Nearly half (47) of our recommendations are directed to OMB  For the 23 recommendations that OMB has implemented, many represent revisions to guidance to better reflect GPRAMA’s requirements or to enhance implementation  Many of the 24 recommendations to OMB that are not implemented deal with long-standing or complex challenges, on which OMB has taken limited action to date  Of those, we have designated 3 as priorities for OMB to address  Agencies have also taken some action on our recommendations, implementing 19 of the 53 recommendations we have made  The following tables present each of the 100 recommendations along with a summary of actions taken to address it  Tables 4 and 5 provide information about our recommendations to OMB that are implemented and not implemented, respectively  Tables 6 and 7 provide information about our recommendations to other agencies that are implemented and not implemented, respectively  In addition to the above contact, Benjamin T  Licht (Assistant Director) and Shannon Finnegan (Assistant Director) supervised this review and the development of the resulting report  Leah Q  Nash (Assistant Director), Elizabeth Fan (Analyst-in-Charge), and Adam Miles (Analyst-in- Charge) supervised the development and administration of the Federal Managers Survey and the resulting supplemental material  Peter Beck, Valerie Caracelli, Karin Fangman, Steven Flint, Robert Gebhart, Ricky Harrison Jr , John Hussey, Jill Lacey, Won Lee, Krista Loose, Meredith Moles, Anna Maria Ortiz, Steven Putansu, Alan Rozzi, Cindy Saunders, Stephanie Shipman, Shane Spencer, Andrew J  Stephens, and Brian Wanlass also made key contributions  Ann Czapiewski and Donna Miller developed the graphics for this report  John Ahern, Divya Bali, Jeff DeMarco, Alexandra Edwards, Ellen Grady, Jyoti Gupta, Erinn L  Sauer, and Katherine Wulff verified the information presented in this report  Managing for Results: Implementation of GPRA Modernization Act Has Yielded Mixed Progress in Addressing Pressing Governance Challenges  GAO-15-819  Washington, D C : September 30, 2015  Managing For Results: Executive Branch Should More Fully Implement the GPRA Modernization Act to Address Pressing Governance Challenges  GAO-13-518  Washington, D C : June 26, 2013  Supplemental Material for GAO-17-775: 2017 Survey of Federal Managers on Organizational Performance and Management Issues  GAO-17-776SP  Washington, D C : September 29, 2017  Program Evaluation: Annual Agency-wide Plans Could Enhance Leadership Support for Program Evaluations  GAO-17-743  Washington, D C : September 29, 2017  Managing for Results: Agencies’ Trends in the Use of Performance Information to Make Decisions  GAO-14-747  Washington, D C : September 26, 2014  Managing for Results: Executive Branch Should More Fully Implement the GPRA Modernization Act to Address Pressing Governance Challenges  GAO-13-518  Washington, D C : June 26, 2013  Managing for Results: 2013 Federal Managers Survey on Organizational Performance and Management Issues, an E-supplement to GAO-13-518  GAO-13-519SP  Washington, D C : June 26, 2013  Program Evaluation: Strategies to Facilitate Agencies’ Use of Evaluation in Program Management and Policy Making  GAO-13-570  Washington, D C : June 26, 2013  Government Performance: Lessons Learned for the Next Administration on Using Performance Information to Improve Results  GAO-08-1026T  Washington, D C : July 24, 2008  Government Performance: 2007 Federal Managers Survey on Performance and Management Issues, an E-supplement to GAO-08-1026T  GAO-08-1036SP  Washington, D C : July 24, 2008  Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results  GAO-04-38  Washington, D C : March 10, 2004  Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views on Key Management Issues Vary Widely Across Agencies  GAO-01-592  Washington, D C : May 25, 2001  Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views Show Need for Ensuring Top Leadership Skills  GAO-01-127  Washington, D C : October 20, 2000  The Government Performance and Results Act: 1997 Governmentwide Implementation Will Be Uneven  GAO/GGD-97-109  Washington, D C : June 2, 1997  Federal Programs: Information Architecture Offers a Potential Approach for Inventory Development  GAO-17-739  Washington, D C : September 28, 2017  Managing for Results: Selected Agencies’ Experiences in Implementing Strategic Reviews  GAO-17-740R  Washington, D C : September 7, 2017  Federal Reports: OMB and Agencies Should More Fully Implement the Process to Streamline Reporting Requirements  GAO-17-616  Washington, D C : July 14, 2017  Open Innovation: Executive Branch Developed Resources to Support Implementation, but Guidance Could Better Reflect Leading Practices  GAO-17-507  Washington, D C : June 8, 2017  Performance Partnerships: Agencies Need to Better Identify Resource Contributions to Sustain Disconnected Youth Pilot Programs and Data to Assess Pilot Results  GAO-17-208  Washington, D C : April 18, 2017  Open Innovation: Practices to Engage Citizens and Effectively Implement Federal Initiatives  GAO-17-14  Washington, D C : October 13, 2016  Tiered Evidence Grants: Opportunities Exist to Share Lessons from Early Implementation and Inform Future Federal Efforts  GAO-16-818  Washington, D C : September 21, 2016  Performance gov: Long-Term Strategy Needed to Improve Website Usability  GAO-16-693  Washington, D C : August 30, 2016  Tax Expenditures: Opportunities Exist to Use Budgeting and Agency Performance Processes to Increase Oversight  GAO-16-622  Washington, D C : July 7, 2016  Managing for Results: Agencies Need to Fully Identify and Report Major Management Challenges and Actions to Resolve them in their Agency Performance Plans  GAO-16-510  Washington, D C : June 15, 2016  Managing for Results: OMB Improved Implementation of Cross-Agency Priority Goals, But Could Be More Transparent About Measuring Progress  GAO-16-509  Washington, D C : May 20, 2016  Managing for Results: Greater Transparency Needed in Public Reporting on the Quality of Performance Information for Selected Agencies’ Priority Goals  GAO-15-788  Washington, D C : September 10, 2015  Pay for Success: Collaboration among Federal Agencies Would Be Helpful as Governments Explore New Financing Mechanisms  GAO-15-646  Washington, D C : September 9, 2015  Managing for Results: Practices for Effective Agency Strategic Reviews  GAO-15-602  Washington, D C : July 29, 2015  Managing for Results: Agencies Report Positive Effects of Data-Driven Reviews on Performance but Some Should Strengthen Practices  GAO-15-579  Washington, D C : July 7, 2015  Program Evaluation: Some Agencies Reported that Networking, Hiring, and Involving Program Staff Help Build Capacity  GAO-15-25  Washington, D C : November 13, 2014  Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Inconsistent Definitions and Information Limit the Usefulness of Federal Program Inventories  GAO-15-83  Washington, D C : October 31, 2014  Managing for Results: Selected Agencies Need to Take Additional Efforts to Improve Customer Service  GAO-15-84  Washington, D C : October 24, 2014  Managing for Results: Enhanced Goal Leader Accountability and Collaboration Could Further Improve Agency Performance  GAO-14-639  Washington, D C : July 22, 2014  Managing for Results: OMB Should Strengthen Reviews of Cross-Agency Goals  GAO-14-526  Washington, D C : June 10, 2014  Managing for Results: Implementation Approaches Used to Enhance Collaboration in Interagency Groups  GAO-14-220  Washington, D C : February 14, 2014  Managing for Results: Leading Practices Should Guide the Continued Development of Performance gov  GAO-13-517  Washington, D C : June 6, 2013  Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals under the GPRA Modernization Act  GAO-13-174  Washington, D C : April 19, 2013  Managing for Results: Agencies Have Elevated Performance Management Roles, but Additional Training Is Needed  GAO-13-356  Washington, D C : April 16, 2013  Managing for Results: Data-Driven Performance Reviews Show Promise But Agencies Should Explore How to Involve Other Relevant Agencies  GAO-13-228  Washington, D C : February 27, 2013  Managing for Results: A Guide for Using the GPRA Modernization Act to Help Inform Congressional Decision Making  GAO-12-621SP  Washington, D C : June 15, 2012  Managing for Results: GAO’s Work Related to the Interim Crosscutting Priority Goals under the GPRA Modernization Act  GAO-12-620R  Washington, D C : May 31, 2012  Managing for Results: Opportunities for Congress to Address Government Performance Issues  GAO-12-215R  Washington, D C : December 9, 2011 


Report 2:  In the absence of clarity on the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchase analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented, the agencies may not be spending funds on heavy equipment cost- effectively  We are making two recommendations—one to the Air Force and one to the Department of the Interior  The Secretary of the Air Force should develop guidance to clarify the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchase analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of the Interior should further clarify in guidance the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchase analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Justice, Labor, State, and Veterans Affairs; General Services Administration; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; National Science Foundation; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Personnel Management; and U S  Agency for International Development  The departments of Agriculture, Energy, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, State and Veterans Affairs, as well as the General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management; and U S  Agency for International Development did not have comments  The Department of Labor provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  In written comments, reproduced in appendix III, the Department of Defense stated that it concurred with our recommendation and plans to issue a bulletin to Air Force contracting officials  In written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, the Department of the Interior stated that it concurred with our recommendation and plans to implement it  If you or members of your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or RectanusL@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V  Specialized Trucks and Trailers 37   Self-Propelled Warehouse Trucks and Tractors 1,733 3                                       Specialized Trucks and Trailers 7   Self-Propelled Warehouse Trucks and Tractors 2,925 134                                     Specialized Trucks and Trailers   Self-Propelled Warehouse Trucks and Tractors 146             7       - 109       Self-Propelled Warehouse Trucks and Tractors 575 64 40                       4                   Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Personnel Management Social Security Administration United States Agency for International Development Grand Total         This report addresses: (1) the number, type, and cost of heavy equipment items that are owned by the 24 CFO Act agencies; (2) the heavy equipment items selected agencies have recently acquired and how selected agencies decided to purchase or lease this equipment; and (3) how selected agencies manage the utilization of their heavy equipment  To identify the number, type, and cost of heavy equipment owned by federal agencies, we first interviewed officials at the General Services Administration to determine whether there were government-wide reporting requirements for owned heavy equipment and learned that there are no such requirements  We then obtained and analyzed data on agencies’ spending on equipment purchases and leases from the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS-NG), which contains government-wide data on agencies’ contracts  However, in reviewing the data available and identifying issues with the reliability of the data, we determined that data on contracts would not be sufficient to answer the question of what heavy equipment the 24 CFO Act agencies own  We therefore conducted a data collection effort to obtain heavy equipment inventory information from the 24 CFO Act agencies, which are the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs; Environmental Protection Agency; General Services Administration; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; National Science Foundation; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Personnel Management; Small Business Administration; Social Security Administration; and Agency for International Development  Because there is no generally accepted definition of heavy equipment, we identified 12 federal supply classes in which the majority of items are self- propelled equipment but not passenger vehicles or items that are specific to combat and tactical purposes, as these items are generally not considered to be heavy equipment  (See table 5 ) We then vetted the appropriateness of these selected supply classes with Interior, FWS, NPS, and Air Force agency officials, as well as with representatives from a fleet management consultancy and a rental company, and they generally agreed that items in selected federal supply classes are considered heavy equipment  Federal supply classes are used in FPDS- NG and are widely used in agencies’ inventory systems  Overall, about 90 percent of the heavy equipment items that agencies reported were assigned a federal supply class in the agency’s inventory data  In discussing heavy equipment categories in the report, we use the category titles below  To identify points of contact at the 24 CFO Act agencies, we obtained GSA’s list of contact information for agencies’ national utilization officers, who are agency property officers who coordinate with GSA  As a preliminary step, we contacted these individuals at each of the 24 CFO Act agencies and asked them to either confirm that they were the appropriate contacts or provide contact information for the appropriate contact and to inform us if they do not own heavy equipment  Officials at 4 agencies—Department of Education, Department of the Treasury, General Services Administration, and Small Business Administration— indicated that the agency did not own any items in the relevant federal supply classes  Officials at 16 of these agencies indicated that they would be able to respond on a departmental level because the relevant inventory data are maintained centrally, while officials at 4 agencies indicated that we would need to obtain responses from officials at some other level because the relevant inventory data are not maintained centrally  (See table 7 for a list of organizations within the 20 CFO Act agencies that indicated they own relevant equipment and responded to our data collection effort ) After identifying contacts responsible for agencies’ heavy-equipment inventory data, we prepared data collection instruments for requesting information on heavy equipment and tested these documents with representatives from 4 of the 20 CFO Act agencies that indicated they own heavy equipment to ensure that the documents were clear and logical and that respondents would be able to provide the requested data and answer the questions without undue burden  These agency representatives were selected to provide a variety of spending on federal supply group 38 equipment as reported in FPDS-NG, civilian and military agencies, and different levels at which the agency would be responding to the data collection effort (e g , at the departmental level or at a sub- departmental level)  Our data collection instrument requested the following data on respondent organizations’ owned assets in 12 federal supply classes as of June 2017: Respondents provided data on original acquisition costs in nominal terms, with some acquisitions occurring over 50 years ago  In order to provide a fixed point of reference for appropriate comparison, we present in our report inflation-adjusted acquisition costs using calendar year 2016 as the reference  To adjust these dollar amounts for inflation, we used the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Producer Price Index by Commodity for Machinery and Equipment: Construction Machinery and Equipment (WPU112), compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of St  Louis  We conducted the data collection effort from July 2017 through October 2017 and received responses from all 20 agencies that indicated they own heavy equipment  In order to assess the reliability of agencies’ reported data, we collected and reviewed agencies’ responses regarding descriptions of their inventory systems, frequency of data entry, agency uses of the data, and agencies’ opinions on potential limitations of the use of their data in our analysis  We conducted some data cleaning, which included examining the data for obvious errors and eliminating outliers  We did not verify the data or responses received; the results of our data collection effort are used only for descriptive purposes and are not generalizable beyond the 24 CFO Act agencies  Based on the steps we took, we found these data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes  To determine the heavy equipment items that selected agencies recently acquired and how these agencies decided whether to purchase or lease this equipment, we first used data from the FPDS-NG to identify agencies that appeared to have the highest obligations for construction or heavy equipment, or both, and used this information, along with other factors, to select DOD and Interior  At the time, in the absence of a generally accepted definition of heavy equipment, we reviewed data related to federal supply group 38—construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance equipment—because (1) we had not yet defined heavy equipment for the purposes of our review; (2) agency officials had told us that most of what could be considered heavy equipment was in this federal supply group; and (3) our analysis of data from usaspending gov showed that about 80 percent of spending on items that may be considered heavy equipment were in this federal supply group  In meeting with officials at these departments, we learned that agencies within each department manage heavy equipment independently, so we requested current inventory data for Interior bureaus and the DOD military departments and selected three agencies that had among the largest inventories of construction and/or heavy equipment at the time, among other criteria: the U S  Air Force (Air Force); the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); and the National Park Service (NPS)  We then used information from our data collection effort—which included the number, type, cost, acquisition year and other data elements—to determine heavy equipment items that these agencies acquired during 2012 through 2016  We interviewed agency officials to determine what lease data were available from the three selected agencies  We assessed the reliability of these data with agency official interviews and reviewed the data for completeness and potential outliers  We determined that the data provided were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of documenting leased and rental heavy equipment  We also obtained data from GSA’s Short- Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program for August 2012, when the first item was rented under this program, to February 2017, when GSA provided the data  We used these data to identify selected agencies’ rentals of heavy equipment through GSA’s Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program and associated costs  We interviewed officials from GSA’s Short-Term Rental program to discuss the program history as well as the reliability of their data on these rented heavy equipment items  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes  To determine how the three selected agencies decide whether to purchase or lease heavy equipment, we interviewed fleet and property managers at these selected agencies and asked them to describe their process for making these decisions as well as to identify relevant federal and agency regulations and guidance  We reviewed relevant federal and agency regulations and guidance regarding how agencies should make these decisions, including: Federal Acquisition Regulation, Office of Management Budget’s A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit- Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Air Force Manual 65-506, Air Force Guidance Memorandum to Air Force Instruction 65-501, and Interior’s Guidance On Lease Versus Purchase Analysis and Capital Lease Determination for Equipment Leases  We also reviewed the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government for guidance on documentation as well as past GAO work that reviewed agencies’ lease-versus-purchase analyses  To determine whether the three selected federal agencies documented lease-versus-purchase decisions for selected acquisitions and adhered to relevant agency guidance, we selected and reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 10 heavy equipment acquisitions—two purchases each from the Air Force, FWS, and NPS, and two leases each from the Air Force and FWS  Specifically, we used inventory data obtained through our data collection effort, described above, to randomly select two heavy equipment purchases from each selected agency using the following criteria: calendar years 2012 through 2016; the two federal supply classes most prevalent in each selected agency’s heavy equipment inventory, as determined by the data collection effort described above; and for NPS and FWS, acquisition costs of over $15,000  In addition, we used lease data provided by the Air Force and FWS to randomly selected two heavy equipment leases per agency  Because NPS could not provide data on heavy equipment leases, we did not select or review any NPS lease decisions  To select the Air Force and FWS leases we used the following criteria: fiscal years 2012 through 2016; for the Air Force, which included federal supply classes in the lease data provided, the two federal supply classes most prevalent in the lease data and for FWS, which did not include federal supply class in the lease data provided, the two federal supply classes most prevalent in the purchase data; and for FWS, leases over $15,000  After selecting these acquisitions, we determined that one FWS lease and one NPS purchase we selected pre-dated Interior’s 2013 guidance on lease-versus-purchase analysis and excluded these acquisitions from our analysis for a total of eight acquisitions  In reviewing agencies’ documentation related to these acquisitions, we developed a data collection instrument to assess the extent to which agencies documented lease-versus-purchase analyses and, in the case of FWS and NPS, adhered to relevant Interior guidance  We supplemented our review of these acquisition decisions with additional information by interviewing officials at the three selected agencies and requesting additional information to understand specific circumstances surrounding each procurement  Our findings are not generalizable across the federal government or within each selected department  To determine how selected agencies manage heavy equipment utilization, we interviewed officials at the three selected agencies to identify departmental and agency-specific guidance and policies and to determine whether utilization requirements exist  We reviewed guidance identified by these officials, including Interior and Air Force vehicle guidance, both of which apply to heavy equipment, and FWS’s Heavy Equipment Utilization and Replacement Handbook  We also compared their practices to relevant Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  For the selected agencies with guidance for managing heavy equipment—Air Force and FWS—we reviewed the guidance to determine if and how selected agencies measured and documented heavy equipment utilization  For example, we reviewed whether selected agencies developed reports for managing heavy equipment utilization such as Air Force validation reports and FWS conditional assessment reports  We also reviewed Air Force, FWS, and NPS utilization data for heavy equipment but we did not independently calculate or verify the utilization rate for individual heavy equipment items because each heavy equipment item (backhoe, forklift, tractor, etc ,) has different utilization requirements depending on various factors such as the brand, model, or age of equipment  However, we did request information about agency procedures to develop and verify utilization rates  We assessed the reliability of the utilization data with agency official interviews and a review of the data for completeness and potential outliers  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing evidence of utilization data collection for heavy equipment assets  We also visited the NPS George Washington Memorial Parkway to interview equipment maintenance officials regarding the procurement and management of heavy equipment and to document photos of heavy equipment  We selected this site because of its range of heavy equipment and close proximity to the Capital region  We conducted this performance audit from October 2016 to February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the individual named above, John W  Shumann (Assistant Director), Rebecca Rygg (Analyst in Charge), Nelsie Alcoser, Melissa Bodeau, Terence Lam, Ying Long, Josh Ormond, Kelly Rubin, Crystal Wesco, and Elizabeth Wood made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: Federal agencies use heavy equipment such as cranes and forklifts to carry out their missions, but there is no government-wide data on federal agencies' acquisition or management of this equipment. GAO was asked to review federal agencies' management of heavy equipment. This report, among other objectives, examines: (1) the number, type, and costs of heavy equipment items that are owned by 20 federal agencies and (2) the heavy equipment that selected agencies recently acquired as well as how they decided whether to purchase or lease this equipment. GAO collected heavy equipment inventory data as of June 2017 from the 24 agencies that have chief financial officers responsible for overseeing financial management. GAO also selected three agencies (using factors such as the heavy equipment fleet's size) and reviewed their acquisitions of and guidance on heavy equipment. These agencies' practices are not generalizable to all acquisitions but provide insight into what efforts these agencies take to acquire thousands of heavy equipment items. GAO also interviewed officials at the three selected agencies. Of the 24 agencies GAO reviewed, 20 reported owning over 136,000 heavy equipment items such as cranes, backhoes, and forklifts, and spending over $7.4 billion (in 2016 dollars) to acquire this equipment. The remaining 4 agencies reported that they do not own any heavy equipment. The three selected agencies GAO reviewed in-depth—the Air Force within the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service within the Department of the Interior (Interior)—spent about $360 million to purchase about 3,500 heavy equipment assets in calendar years 2012 through 2016 and over $5 million to lease heavy equipment from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Officials from all three agencies stated that they consider mission needs and the availability of equipment leases when deciding whether to lease or purchase heavy equipment. Federal regulations provide that agencies should consider whether it is more economical to lease or purchase equipment when acquiring heavy equipment, and federal internal control standards require that management clearly document all transactions in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination. However, in reviewing selected leases and purchases of heavy equipment from these three agencies, GAO found that officials did not consistently conduct or document lease-versus-purchase analyses. Officials at the Air Force and Interior said that there was a lack of clarity in agency policies about when they were required to conduct and document such analyses. Without greater clarity on when lease-versus-purchase analyses should be conducted and documented, these agencies may not be spending funds on heavy equipment effectively. The Department of the Interior and the Air Force should clarify the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchases analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented. The Departments of the Interior and Defense concurred with these recommendations.