prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: As reported by the United Nations, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other organizations, wildlife trafficking networks span the globe  These organizations have attempted to measure the value of illegally traded wildlife, but available estimates are subject to uncertainty  In 2016, for example, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reported that various sources estimated the global scale of illegal wildlife trade to be from $7 billion to $23 billion annually  UNEP also estimated that the scale of wildlife crime has increased in recent years in part based on a rise in environmental crime  U S  trade in wildlife and related products includes a variety of species, such as live reptiles, birds, and mammals, as well as elephant ivory, according to law enforcement reports and government and nongovernmental officials  FWS and NOAA data on wildlife products seized at U S  ports provide examples of the diversity of illegally traded plants, fish, and wildlife imported into or exported from the United States  For example, from 2007 to 2016, the top 10 plant, fish, and wildlife shipments seized nationally by FWS were coral, crocodiles, conchs, deer, pythons, sea turtles, mollusks, ginseng, clams, and seahorses  During that time, FWS reported that more than one-third of the wildlife shipments it seized were confiscated while being imported from or exported to Mexico (14 percent), China (13 percent), or Canada (9 percent)  FWS and NOAA law enforcement offices are responsible for enforcing certain laws and treaties prohibiting wildlife trafficking  FWS Office of Law Enforcement  This office enforces certain U S  laws and regulations as well as treaties prohibiting the trafficking of terrestrial wildlife, freshwater species, and birds  Among other things, the office aims to prevent the unlawful import, export, and interstate commerce of foreign fish and wildlife, as well as to protect U S  plants, fish, and wildlife from unlawful exploitation  As of fiscal year 2016, the office had a budget of $74 7 million and employed 205 special agents to investigate wildlife crime, including international and domestic wildlife trafficking rings  Most of these special agents report to one of eight regional offices, which receive national oversight, support, training, and policy guidance from the FWS Office of Law Enforcement headquarters  The office’s headquarters houses a special investigative unit focused on conducting complex, large- scale criminal investigations of wildlife traffickers  In addition, the FWS Office of Law Enforcement has deployed special agents to serve as international attachés at seven U S  embassies  These attachés provide countertrafficking expertise to embassy staff, work with host government officials to build law enforcement capacity, and contribute directly to casework or criminal investigations of wildlife traffickers  According to FWS data, the FWS Office of Law Enforcement opened more than 7,000 investigations on wildlife trafficking and other illegal activities in fiscal year 2016, including nearly 5,000 cases involving Endangered Species Act violations and nearly 1,500 cases involving Lacey Act violations  FWS Office of Law Enforcement investigations have disrupted wildlife trafficking operations  For example, Operation Crash—an ongoing rhino horn and elephant ivory-trafficking investigation launched in 2011—has led to over 30 convictions and more than $2 million in fines  NOAA Office of Law Enforcement  This office enforces certain U S  laws and regulations as well as treaties prohibiting the trafficking of marine wildlife, including fish, as well as anadromous fish  Among other things, the office aims to prevent the illegal, unregulated, and unreported harvesting and trade of fish as well as the trafficking of protected marine wildlife  As of fiscal year 2016, the office had a budget of $68 6 million and employed 77 special agents to investigate wildlife crimes within its jurisdiction  These agents report to one of five regional offices, and those offices receive national oversight, support, and policy guidance from the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement headquarters  According to NOAA data, the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement initiated more than 5,000 investigations in fiscal year 2016  About half of those investigations involved violations of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, as amended, and some of the 5,000 investigations involved violations of the Endangered Species Act or the Lacey Act  NOAA Office of Law Enforcement investigations have disrupted wildlife trafficking operations  For example, in fiscal year 2016, a NOAA Office of Law Enforcement investigation led to the conviction of a company and five individuals for illegally trafficking whale bone carvings, walrus ivory carvings, black coral carvings, and other products derived from protected species into the United States  The FWS and NOAA law enforcement offices collaborate with other government agencies and organizations to combat wildlife trafficking  Both agencies work with other federal, state, and tribal law enforcement officers as well as their international counterparts as needed during wildlife trafficking investigations  For example, FWS and NOAA work with U S  Customs and Border Protection, U S  Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U S  Department of Agriculture to maintain import and export controls and interdict smuggled wildlife and related products at U S  ports of entry  In addition, FWS and NOAA collaborate with Department of Justice prosecutors on criminal cases that result from agency investigations  Both agencies also collaborate with nongovernmental organizations to combat wildlife trafficking  For example, FWS and NOAA officials said that nongovernmental organizations have, in some cases, offered financial rewards (in addition to rewards offered by FWS and NOAA) for information on a wildlife crime  In addition, some nongovernmental organizations proactively provide information to FWS and NOAA on wildlife trafficking activities in the United States or foreign countries that violate U S  laws  For example, in 2017, a nongovernmental organization created a website to collect tips on wildlife crime and to connect the sources of those tips with relevant U S  authorities for potential financial rewards  FWS may pay financial rewards from moneys in two accounts  Law Enforcement Reward Account  FWS may pay rewards under the Endangered Species Act, the Lacey Act, and the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act from moneys in the agency’s Law Enforcement Reward Account  The moneys in this account come from fines, penalties, and proceeds from forfeited property for violations of these three laws  According to FWS officials, these moneys are available until expended  These moneys can be used to (1) pay financial rewards to those who provide information that leads to an arrest, criminal conviction, civil penalty assessment, or forfeiture of property for any violation of the Endangered Species Act, the Lacey Act, or the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act or (2) provide temporary care for plants, fish, or wildlife that are the subject of a civil or criminal proceeding under the Endangered Species Act, Lacey Act, or the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act  As of the beginning of fiscal year 2017, the balance of the Law Enforcement Reward Account was about $7 million  Law Enforcement Special Funds Account  FWS may also pay rewards from moneys in its law enforcement office’s Special Funds Account  The moneys in this account come from an annual line item appropriation and are available until expended  Since fiscal year 1988, this appropriation has provided FWS up to $400,000 each year to pay for information, rewards, or evidence concerning violations of laws FWS administers, as well as miscellaneous and emergency expenses of enforcement activity that the Secretary of the Interior authorized or approved  NOAA generally pays rewards from moneys available in the Fisheries Enforcement Asset Forfeiture Fund  The moneys in this account come from fines, penalties, and proceeds from forfeited property for violations of marine resource laws that NOAA enforces, including the Magnuson- Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Lacey Act  According to NOAA officials, moneys are available until expended and can be used to pay certain enforcement- related expenses, including travel expenses, equipment purchases, and the payment of financial rewards  As of the beginning of fiscal year 2017, the Fisheries Enforcement Asset Forfeiture Fund had a balance of about $18 million  Academic literature on the use of financial rewards to combat illegal activities and stakeholders we interviewed identified several advantages and disadvantages of using financial rewards to obtain information on wildlife trafficking  Potential advantages of using financial rewards include the following: Providing incentives  The potential for a financial reward can motivate people with information to come forward when they otherwise might not do so  Increasing public awareness  Financial rewards may bring greater public attention to the problem of wildlife trafficking, including federal efforts to combat wildlife trafficking  Saving resources  Using financial rewards may save agency resources by enabling agents to get information sooner and at a lower cost than they could have through their own efforts  Potential disadvantages of using financial rewards include the following: Eliciting false or unproductive leads  Financial rewards may generate false or unproductive leads  Affecting witness credibility  Financial rewards may lead to a source’s credibility being challenged at trial by defense attorneys since sources receive compensation for the information they provide  Consuming resources  The potential for a financial reward may create a flood of tips that take agency time and resources to follow up on or corroborate  Outside of wildlife trafficking, multiple federal agencies and federal courts are authorized to pay financial rewards for information on illegal activities under certain circumstances  For example, U S  Customs and Border Protection—which controls, regulates, and facilitates the import and export of goods through U S  ports of entry—is authorized, under certain circumstances, to pay rewards for original information about violations of any laws that it enforces  The Department of State may also pay rewards under certain circumstances, including for information leading to the disruption of financial mechanisms of a transnational criminal group  Similarly, the U S  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may pay rewards for information about violations of federal securities laws and the underpayment of taxes, respectively, if certain conditions are met  Federal judges may award money to persons who give information leading to convictions for violating treaties, laws, and regulations that prohibit certain pollution from ships, including oil and garbage discharges  FWS and NOAA officials identified multiple laws, such as the Endangered Species Act and the Lacey Act, that authorize the payment of financial rewards to people who provide information on wildlife trafficking  FWS and NOAA reported paying few financial rewards under these laws from fiscal years 2007 through 2017  However, agency officials could not provide sufficient assurance that the reward information they provided to us represented all of their reward payments for this period  FWS and NOAA officials identified over 10 laws prohibiting wildlife trafficking—including the Endangered Species Act, Lacey Act, and Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act—that specifically authorize the payment of financial rewards in certain circumstances to people who provide information on violations of the law (see app  II for a complete list of the laws)  These laws provide discretion to the agencies to choose whether to pay rewards but have varying requirements for who is eligible to receive a reward and the payment amounts  For example, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act caps rewards at $2,500 for information that leads to a conviction  In contrast, the Endangered Species Act does not cap reward amounts and authorizes rewards for information that leads to a conviction as well as to an arrest, civil penalty, or forfeiture of property  Table 1 identifies the laws that FWS and NOAA officials indicated they have used to pay financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, along with information on these laws’ requirements for payment of rewards  FWS and NOAA reported paying few financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, but agency officials could not provide sufficient assurance that this information was complete  Officials from both agencies said that their agencies have not prioritized the use of rewards, and they believed that the reward information they identified—such as the number, dollar amount, and year that rewards were paid—appropriately captured the few reward payments they made during this time frame  Based on the agencies’ reviews of their records, FWS reported paying 25 rewards for a total of $184,500 from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, and NOAA reported paying 2 rewards for a total of $21,000 during that same period (see table 2)  See appendix III for additional details on the cases where financial rewards were paid  FWS reported paying rewards in trafficking cases involving a variety of wildlife species, such as eagles, bears, reptiles, and mollusks, across the 11-year period  FWS officials said they generally paid rewards to thank sources who proactively provided information  For example, based on our review of a reward case, FWS paid a reward in 2010 because the source provided information that was crucial in uncovering an attempt to illegally traffic leopards into the United States from South Africa  FWS would not have known about this illegal activity if the source had not come forward with the information  In several cases we reviewed, FWS officials said that the sources did not know about the possibility of receiving a reward when they contacted the agency with information  The two rewards NOAA reported paying from fiscal years 2007 through 2017 involved the illegal trafficking of sea scallops and a green sea turtle  NOAA officials said that in both cases they paid a reward to thank the source who proactively provided information to law enforcement agents  For example, the agent who investigated the sea scallop case reported requesting the reward because the information the source proactively provided was timely, credible, and led to the criminal conviction of several individuals  FWS and NOAA officials could not provide sufficient assurance that the reward information they reported to us represented all of the rewards their agencies had paid from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, but they said the information was complete to the best of their knowledge  Specifically, FWS and NOAA officials said they track all their expenditures, including reward payments, in their financial databases  However, they are not able to readily identify reward payments because their financial systems do not include a unique identifier for such payments and their reward information is located in multiple databases and formats  As a result, FWS and NOAA officials said they identified the rewards they reported to us by manually reviewing their financial and law enforcement records  In particular, FWS officials said they reviewed their paper records to identify instances when the agency paid rewards and then retrieved additional information from their financial and law enforcement databases, such as final payment amounts  NOAA officials said they identified instances when the agency paid rewards by using a combination of paper and electronic records located at NOAA’s headquarters office  NOAA officials also contacted their regions to obtain additional information located at the regional offices to confirm information about the rewards NOAA had paid  Seventeen stakeholders we interviewed who had experience investigating wildlife trafficking or expertise in using financial rewards as a law enforcement tool said that it would be useful for FWS and NOAA to maintain comprehensive information on the rewards they paid  For example, two stakeholders said that maintaining comprehensive information and making that information available to law enforcement agents could motivate agents to make greater use of rewards as a law enforcement tool  Two other stakeholders said that maintaining information on and monitoring reward use would allow the agencies to make ongoing adjustments, such as adjusting payment amounts, to make the most effective use of rewards in combating wildlife trafficking  Federal internal control standards say that management should clearly document internal control and all transactions and other significant events in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination  Control activities can be implemented in either an automated or a manual manner, but automated control activities tend to be more reliable because they are less susceptible to human error and are typically more efficient  FWS and NOAA officials agreed that maintaining reward information so that complete information is easily retrievable may be beneficial  FWS officials said having clearly documented and readily available reward information could improve how they manage rewards and enable them to monitor and examine their use of rewards more holistically  The officials said they may analyze options for creating a single repository for reward information but did not commit to doing so  They said that creating a single repository for reward information may involve some drawbacks, such as duplicating some data entry in separate databases  Similarly, NOAA officials said having clearly documented and readily available reward information would provide agency management with easier and more consistent access to that information  As a result, they said that they are exploring modifications to their financial and law enforcement databases to better identify and track rewards  For example, NOAA officials said they may be able to create a unique identifier to flag payments that are for rewards in their financial system to enable them to identify payment amounts more easily  NOAA officials did not provide a time frame for completing modifications to their financial system  By tracking reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination, FWS and NOAA can better ensure that they have complete information on the rewards they have paid to help manage their use of rewards as a law enforcement tool  FWS and NOAA have policies to guide their law enforcement agents on the process for preparing and submitting a request to pay a financial reward  Specifically, both agencies’ policies call for agents to include a description of the case, the nature of the information that the source provided, a justification for providing a reward, and an explanation of how a proposed reward amount was developed  These policies also outline the general review and approval process, how payments are to be made upon approval of a request, and eligibility criteria to receive a reward  For example, FWS and NOAA policies prohibit paying rewards to foreign government officials as well as paying rewards to any person whose receipt of a reward would create a conflict of interest or the appearance of impropriety  NOAA’s policy explicitly states that the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement is to use statutorily authorized rewards as a tool to obtain information from the public on resource violations and that rewards can help promote compliance with marine resource laws  NOAA’s policy suggests that agents consider advertising reward offers to assist investigations, encourages press releases, and describes the process agents should follow to do so  Moreover, NOAA’s policy specifies factors that agents might include in their reward requests to support the proposed reward, such as (1) the benefit to the marine resources that was furthered by the information provided; (2) the risk, if any, the individual took in collecting and providing the information; (3) the probability that the investigation would have been successfully concluded without the information provided; and (4) the relationship between any fines or other collections and the information provided  FWS’s policy specifies that rewards may be provided in situations in which an individual furnishes essential information leading to an arrest, conviction, civil penalty, or forfeiture of property  However, it does not discuss the usefulness of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool or the types of circumstances when rewards should be used or advertised to the public  Further, FWS’s policy does not communicate necessary quality information internally that agents may need when deciding to request the payment of rewards  In particular, it does not specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts  Instead, the policy leaves it to the discretion of field and regional agents to develop proposed reward amounts within any limitations specified in law  Some FWS agents we interviewed said that they developed proposed reward amounts on a case-by-case basis and did not know whether their proposed amounts were enough, too little, or too much  In addition, some agents said that because FWS’s policy does not specify factors for agents to consider, the reward approval process is subjective and unclear and this has made it challenging for the agents to develop proposed reward amounts  For example, one agent we interviewed said he submitted a request to his supervisor to pay a $10,000 reward to a source who provided information on a major wildlife trafficker  But, for reasons unknown to the agent, his supervisor reduced the amount to $1,000  FWS headquarters officials said field agents submit reward requests to headquarters for approval, and these officials were not aware of instances of proposed reward amounts being changed or denied during the review process  Seven of the 20 stakeholders we interviewed suggested that FWS augment its reward policy to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts


Report 2:  For example, helpful factors to consider when developing a proposed reward amount may include (1) the number of hours the source dedicated to the case, (2) the risk the source took in providing the information, (3) the significance of the information provided by the source, and (4) the amount of fines or other penalties collected as a result of the information  Two stakeholders expressed concern that some of FWS’s reward payments were insufficient, especially when comparing the amount of time and effort or the risk a source faced in providing the information  A couple of stakeholders also said that without a policy that specifies factors for agents to consider, reward amounts may be subjective and could vary depending on which agent develops the reward proposal  Another stakeholder said that it was important to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts so that the agency has a reasonable and defensible basis for the reward amounts it pays across cases  According to federal standards for internal control, management should internally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve an agency’s objectives  For example, management communicates quality information down and across reporting lines to enable personnel to make key decisions  FWS officials said they believe that their reward policy is sound, indicating they believe that law enforcement agents have the information they need to develop proposals for reward amounts in cases where rewards are warranted  However, they also agreed that it may be helpful to review their policy but did not commit to doing so  By augmenting its policy to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts, FWS can better ensure that its agents have the necessary quality information to prepare defensible reward proposals  Based on our review of the agencies’ websites and other communications, we found that FWS and NOAA communicate little information to the public on financial rewards for reporting information on wildlife trafficking, such as the potential availability of rewards and eligibility criteria  Specifically, some FWS and NOAA law enforcement websites provided information to the public on ways to report violations of the laws that the agencies are responsible for enforcing, such as via tip lines  Some of the websites also provided examples of the types of information the public can report, such as photos or other documentation of illegal activities  However, most of the agencies’ websites did not indicate that providing information on illegal activities could result in a reward  In contrast, the FWS Alaska regional office’s website provided information on the potential availability of rewards and ways the public may submit information for a potential reward  For example, this website provided phone numbers and an e-mail address for the public to use when submitting information  Figure 1 shows the information available on FWS’s and NOAA’s national and regional websites relevant to reporting violations of the laws the agencies enforce in general and on receiving rewards in particular  In addition, FWS and NOAA headquarters officials said their field agents have used other means to communicate the potential availability of rewards in specific cases when the agents had no other information that could help solve those cases  For example, a FWS field official said that the agency advertised a reward offer for information on a case of bald eagle killings by distributing reward posters and posting news releases in the vicinity where the killings occurred  Similarly, NOAA officials said they have advertised reward offers through various means, including circulating reward posters in specific geographic areas after an illegal activity has occurred  Figure 2 shows a reward poster that NOAA distributed in Guam in 2017 advertising a $1,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of sea turtle poachers  Instead of having a plan for communicating general information to the public on rewards, FWS and NOAA grant discretion to their regional offices and law enforcement agents to determine the type and level of communication to provide, according to FWS and NOAA policies  FWS officials explained that because they typically use financial rewards to thank individuals who come forward on their own accord—rather than using rewards to incentivize individuals with information to come forward—they have not seen the need to communicate more information to the public on the potential availability of rewards  NOAA officials said they have targeted their communications on rewards by publicizing reward offers for specific cases where they do not have leads  They added that they want to receive quality information and already receive a substantial amount of information from sources who reach out to them proactively, so NOAA has not seen the need to communicate more information to the public on the potential availability of rewards  Sixteen of the 20 stakeholders we interviewed said that it would be useful for FWS and NOAA to advertise the potential availability of financial rewards  Several stakeholders said that if the public does not know about the possibility for rewards, then some people with information may not be incentivized to come forward  Two stakeholders added that agencies should carefully consider how and which reward information to communicate to the public so that people who are most likely to have information on illegal wildlife trafficking learn about the potential for rewards  For example, one stakeholder suggested advertising rewards at ports where international shipments are offloaded or placing advertisements at wildlife trafficking nodes, such as entrances to African wildlife refuges  This stakeholder suggested advertising rewards along with wildlife trafficking awareness-raising posters that nongovernment organizations place in some airports  In addition, 14 stakeholders suggested that it would be useful for FWS and NOAA to provide information to the public on the process for submitting information to potentially receive rewards  Several other stakeholders said that it is important for the public to understand whether they may be eligible for a reward, how to submit information, and whether or to what extent their confidentiality will be protected  Another stakeholder provided examples of how other agencies provide information about their reward programs on their websites  SEC and IRS, for instance, use their websites to communicate information to the public on the process for reporting illegal activity for financial rewards  This information includes the types of information to report, confidentiality rules, eligibility criteria, and the process for submitting information to obtain a reward  In addition, the Department of State posts instructions on its websites on how to submit information on an illegal activity and potentially receive a reward  Federal internal control standards say that management should externally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve an agency’s objectives  For example, using appropriate methods to communicate, management communicates quality information so that external parties, such as the public, can help the agency achieve its objectives  This could include communicating information to the public on the types of information and eligibility requirements for potentially receiving rewards for reporting information on wildlife trafficking  FWS officials said that making more reward information available could lead to a significant increase in the amount of information the agency receives, which, in turn, could strain FWS’s resources in following up on that information  However, FWS officials also agreed that it was reasonable to consider making more reward information available to relevant members of the public, particularly in targeted circumstances, but did not commit to doing so  Similarly, NOAA officials said they had some concerns about the additional resources it might take to investigate potentially unreliable or false tips that may result if they make reward information broadly available to the public, but they agreed that it would be reasonable for the agency to consider doing so  NOAA officials also said they may consider making more reward information publicly available at the conclusion of our audit but provided no plans for doing so  By determining the types of additional information to communicate to the public on rewards—such as providing information on the agency’s website on the potential availability of rewards—and then developing and implementing plans to do so, FWS and NOAA can improve their chances of obtaining information on wildlife trafficking activities that they otherwise might not receive  FWS and NOAA have not reviewed the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards or considered whether any changes might improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking  FWS officials said their agency has not reviewed or considered changes to its use of rewards because the agency has not prioritized the use of rewards  NOAA officials said their agency has not focused on using rewards or identified the need to review its use of this tool, particularly in light of other, higher mission priorities  Nine of the 20 stakeholders we interviewed said that FWS and NOAA should review the effectiveness of their use of rewards and consider potential improvements  Several stakeholders said that it would be useful for FWS and NOAA to compare their respective approaches to those of federal agencies that use rewards in contexts outside of wildlife trafficking to identify best practices or lessons learned that might be applicable in the context of combating wildlife trafficking  For example, one stakeholder said that SEC has an effective whistleblower program and may have lessons learned that are relevant for FWS and NOAA to consider  Another stakeholder we interviewed separately indicated that in 2010, before SEC had a whistleblower program that publicized rewards and provided detailed instructions on how members of the public could report information on illegal activities, SEC received few tips  Once SEC implemented a whistleblower program that publicized rewards and provided detailed instructions on its public website, the agency’s use of the program grew substantially, according to the stakeholder  Other stakeholders said it would be useful for the agencies to consider potential improvements to their use of rewards, such as making a standing reward offer for information on wildlife trafficking targeted at high-priority endangered species or particular criminal networks  Two of these stakeholders said such an offer might improve FWS’s and NOAA’s use of rewards by generating more tips than reward offers focused on individual cases  At the same time, they said such an offer would likely filter out some of the false or unproductive tips that the agencies might receive if they made an untargeted standing reward offer  Federal internal control standards state that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks by, for example, conducting reviews at the functional or activity level by comparing actual performance to planned or expected results and analyzing significant differences  Further, under the standards, management should periodically review policies, procedures, and related control activities for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving an agency’s objectives or addressing related risks  FWS and NOAA officials agreed that reviewing the effectiveness of their use of rewards would be worthwhile  Specifically, FWS officials said that it would be useful to compare their approach to those of other federal agencies that use rewards in investigating crimes that involve interstate and foreign smuggling of goods  Similarly, NOAA officials said that reviewing the agency’s use of financial rewards would be worthwhile but cautioned that such a review would need to be balanced against the agency’s constrained resources and many mission requirements  FWS and NOAA officials said they may consider conducting such a review at the conclusion of our audit but provided no plans for doing so  By reviewing the effectiveness of their use of rewards, FWS and NOAA can identify opportunities to improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking  Wildlife trafficking is a large and growing transnational criminal activity, with global environmental, security, and economic consequences  The federal government has emphasized strengthening law enforcement efforts to combat wildlife trafficking, and using financial rewards to obtain information on illegal activities is one tool that some federal agencies have used  However, to date, FWS and NOAA have not prioritized the use of rewards and were unable to provide sufficient assurance that the 27 rewards they paid during fiscal years 2007 through 2017 represented all of the rewards they provided during that period  By tracking reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination, FWS and NOAA can better ensure that they have complete information on the rewards they have paid to help manage their use of rewards as a law enforcement tool  Additionally, FWS and NOAA have policies outlining the processes their law enforcement agents are to use in making reward payments, and NOAA’s policy specifies factors for its agents to consider in developing proposed reward amounts, such as the risk the individual took in collecting the information  FWS’s policy does not specify such factors that could inform agents in achieving the agency’s objectives, which is not consistent with federal internal control standards  By augmenting its policy to specify factors for its agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts, FWS can better ensure that its agents have the necessary quality information to prepare defensible reward proposals  Both agencies have also advertised the potential for rewards in specific cases when agents had no other information, but FWS and NOAA have otherwise communicated little information to the public on the potential availability of rewards  If the public does not know about the possibility of rewards, then some people with information may not be incentivized to come forward  By determining the types of additional information to communicate to the public on rewards—such as providing information on the agency’s website about the potential availability of rewards—and then developing and implementing plans to do so, FWS and NOAA can improve their chances of obtaining information on wildlife trafficking activities that they otherwise might not receive  Finally, FWS and NOAA have not reviewed the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards or considered whether any changes might improve the usefulness of rewards as a law enforcement tool  By undertaking such reviews, the agencies can identify opportunities to improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking  We are making a total of seven recommendations, including four to FWS and three to NOAA  Specifically: The Assistant Director of the FWS Office of Law Enforcement should track financial reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination  (Recommendation 1) The Director of the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement should track financial reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination  (Recommendation 2) The Assistant Director of the FWS Office of Law Enforcement should augment FWS’s financial reward policy to specify factors law enforcement agents are to consider when developing proposed reward amounts  (Recommendation 3) The Assistant Director of the FWS Office of Law Enforcement should determine the types of additional information to communicate to the public on financial rewards and then develop and implement a plan for communicating that information  (Recommendation 4) The Director of the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement should determine the types of additional information to communicate to the public on financial rewards and then develop and implement a plan for communicating that information  (Recommendation 5) The Assistant Director of the FWS Office of Law Enforcement should review the effectiveness of the agency’s use of financial rewards and implement any changes that the agency determines would improve the usefulness of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool  (Recommendation 6) The Director of the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement should review the effectiveness of the agency’s use of financial rewards and implement any changes that the agency determines would improve the usefulness of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool  (Recommendation 7) We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Departments of Commerce and the Interior  The departments transmitted written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes IV and V of this report  The Department of Commerce concurred with the three recommendations directed to NOAA and stated that NOAA is developing procedures to ensure that its rewards are closely tracked, clearly documented, and better communicated  In written comments from NOAA, NOAA stated the report fairly and thoroughly reviews NOAA’s use of financial rewards  NOAA outlined the steps it plans to take in response to our recommendations, including developing a procedure to track financial reward information, reviewing information currently disseminated to the public and evaluating whether additional information may be useful, and reviewing the agency’s reward policy to determine whether changes are needed to enhance reward effectiveness  In its written comments, the Department of the Interior concurred with the four recommendations directed to FWS  Interior stated that it appreciated our review of the challenges faced by FWS’s Office of Law Enforcement in combating wildlife trafficking and identifying areas where FWS and NOAA can improve the use of financial rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking  Interior also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and of Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI  The objectives of our review were to (1) identify laws that authorize the U S  Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to pay financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking and the extent to which these agencies paid such rewards from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, (2) evaluate FWS’s and NOAA’s policies on financial rewards, (3) evaluate the information available to the public on financial rewards, and (4) determine the extent to which FWS and NOAA reviewed the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards in combating wildlife trafficking  To address these objectives, we reviewed academic literature on the use of financial rewards to combat illegal activities and United Nations Environment Programme reports on the scope and scale of wildlife trafficking  We also interviewed officials from federal agencies that play a role in combating wildlife trafficking or manage programs that pay financial rewards for information on illegal activities  Specifically, we interviewed officials from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, the Interior, Justice, and State, as well as officials from the Internal Revenue Service, the U S  Securities and Exchange Commission, and the U S  Agency for International Development  In addition, we reviewed documentation that the Department of the Treasury provided on its role in paying financial rewards  We did not compare FWS’s and NOAA’s use of financial rewards in combating wildlife trafficking to federal agencies’ use of financial rewards in other contexts because the different contexts are not directly comparable  However, we reviewed information on other federal agencies’ use of financial rewards as examples of how financial rewards are used in contexts outside of wildlife trafficking  In addition, we interviewed representatives of six nongovernmental organizations that we selected based on those organizations’ knowledge or experience in combating wildlife trafficking  Specifically, we interviewed representatives from the Elephant Action League, the Environmental Investigation Agency, the National Association of Conservation Law Enforcement Chiefs, the National Whistleblower Center, TRAFFIC, and the World Wildlife Fund  To identify laws that authorize FWS and NOAA to pay financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking, we asked FWS and NOAA attorneys to compile a list of laws that each of their agencies implements or enforces that prohibit wildlife trafficking and authorize the agency to pay rewards for providing information about trafficking  We then compared that list to the results of our search of the United States Code for such laws  We also reviewed FWS and NOAA documentation for accounts where the fines, penalties, and proceeds from forfeited property that are used to pay rewards are deposited as well as the accounts where appropriations available to pay rewards were deposited  To identify the extent to which FWS and NOAA have paid financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking, we analyzed FWS and NOAA data on financial rewards the agencies reported paying from fiscal years 2007 through 2017  The data included information on, among other things, the fiscal years in which rewards were paid, laws under which rewards were paid, types of wildlife involved in those cases, the amounts of civil penalties or criminal fines imposed in those cases, the numbers of arrests and convictions as a result of those cases, and whether reward recipients were individuals or groups and U S  or foreign citizens  To assess the reliability of the data FWS and NOAA provided on financial rewards, we interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data and compared the data to case records the agencies provided  Specifically, FWS and NOAA officials said they track all expenditures, including reward payments, in their financial databases, but they are not able to readily identify reward payments because their financial systems do not include a unique identifier for such payments and their reward information is located in multiple databases and formats  As a result, FWS and NOAA officials said they identified the rewards that they reported to us by manually reviewing their financial and law enforcement records, and officials said the information was complete to the best of their knowledge  Based on these steps, we found the data that the agencies provided to us to be sufficiently reliable for reporting information on the rewards the agencies reported paying  However, as we discuss in the report, FWS and NOAA officials could not provide sufficient assurance that the data included all the financial rewards that they had paid from fiscal years 2007 through 2017  To obtain additional detail about cases where financial rewards were paid, we reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 10 wildlife trafficking cases  We selected these cases based on the agency that investigated the case (to include both FWS and NOAA cases), the amount of the reward paid in the case (to reflect both low and high amounts), the year in which the reward was paid (to include rewards paid more recently), and the type of wildlife trafficked in the case (to include both fish and wildlife cases—there were no plant trafficking cases to select)  While the findings from our review cannot be generalized to cases we did not select and review, they illustrate how FWS and NOAA have used financial rewards in wildlife trafficking cases  To evaluate FWS and NOAA policies on financial rewards, we reviewed relevant FWS and NOAA policies and compared them to each other; interviewed FWS and NOAA officials about those policies; and compared the information in the policies with federal internal control standards on information and communication  To evaluate information available to the public on rewards, we reviewed relevant FWS and NOAA publications and examples of communications to the public on the availability of rewards in specific cases and interviewed FWS and NOAA officials  We also reviewed information available on FWS’s and NOAA’s national and regional websites as of December 2017 and January 2018, respectively, relevant to reporting violations of the laws that the agencies enforce in general and on receiving rewards in particular  We compared the agencies’ public communications on rewards with federal internal control standards on information and communication  To evaluate the extent to which FWS and NOAA reviewed the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards in combating wildlife trafficking, we interviewed FWS and NOAA officials and requested any reviews the agencies had conducted regarding their use of financial rewards to compare with federal internal control standards on control activities  FWS and NOAA did not have any such reviews to provide  In addition, for all four objectives, we interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 20 stakeholders who had experience investigating wildlife trafficking or expertise in the use of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool  To select stakeholders to interview, we first identified a list of stakeholders by reviewing (1) FWS and NOAA data on law enforcement agents with at least 5 years of experience who had investigated wildlife trafficking cases and used financial rewards, (2) Department of Justice data on federal prosecutors who had prosecuted wildlife trafficking cases since fiscal year 2014, (3) literature search results identifying academics with expertise in the use of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool and federal programs that use financial rewards to combat illegal activities in contexts outside of wildlife trafficking, (4) the biographies of members of the federal Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking, and (5) recommendations from stakeholders we interviewed  From this list, we then used a multistep process to select the 20 stakeholders to interview  To ensure coverage and a range of perspectives, we selected stakeholders from the following groups: FWS and NOAA law enforcement agents, including field and federal prosecutors responsible for prosecuting wildlife trafficking cases; federal officials responsible for programs that use financial rewards to combat illegal activities in contexts outside of wildlife trafficking; academics with expertise in the use of financial rewards as a law members of the federal Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking; and representatives of nongovernmental organizations that investigate wildlife trafficking  We conducted semistructured interviews with the 20 selected stakeholders using a standard set of questions  We asked questions about stakeholder views on the usefulness of financial rewards in combating wildlife trafficking; the strength and weaknesses of the statutory provisions that authorize federal agencies to pay financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking; FWS’s and NOAA’s use of financial rewards to combat wildlife trafficking; and how, if at all, the two agencies could improve their use of financial rewards to combat wildlife trafficking  We analyzed the stakeholders’ responses to our questions, grouping the responses into overall themes  We summarized the results of our analysis and then shared the summary with relevant FWS and NOAA officials to obtain their views  Views from these stakeholders cannot be generalized to those whom we did not select and interview  We conducted this performance audit from February 2017 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  The Department of the Interior’s U S  Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) implement or enforce multiple laws that specifically authorize the payment, under specified circumstances, of financial rewards to persons for information about violations of laws that prohibit wildlife trafficking  The laws that FWS officials identified are listed and summarized in table 3, and the laws that NOAA officials identified are listed and summarized in table 4  In addition, as noted above, the reward provisions in the Magnuson- Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act as amended and the Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act as amended authorize the payment of rewards for information about violations of multiple laws  Specifically, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act as amended authorizes the payment of rewards for information about violations of the act as well as any other marine resource law that the Secretary of Commerce enforces  Further, the Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act as amended authorizes the payment of rewards for information about violations of any law administered by NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service relating to plants, fish, or wildlife  NOAA officials identified 14 such laws that prohibit wildlife trafficking (see table 5)  If a violation of the laws listed in table 5 occurs, NOAA officials said they could use the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act or Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act reward provision to pay a reward for information on the violation  None of the laws listed in table 5 specifically authorize the payment of financial rewards  Table 6 provides information on U S  Fish and Wildlife Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration cases where these agencies reported paying rewards for information on wildlife trafficking from fiscal years 2007 through 2017  In addition to the contact named above, Alyssa M  Hundrup (Assistant Director), David Marroni (Analyst-in-Charge), Cindy Gilbert, Keesha Luebke, Jeanette Soares, Sheryl Stein, Sara Sullivan, and Judith Williams made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's January 2018 report, entitled Intellectual Property: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Address Risks Posed by Changing Counterfeits Market , ( GAO-18-216 ). Changes in the market for counterfeit goods entering the United States pose new challenges for consumers, the private sector, and U.S. agencies that enforce intellectual property rights (IPR). Specifically, growth in e-commerce has contributed to a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods in the United States, with consumers increasingly purchasing goods online and counterfeiters producing a wider variety of goods that may be sold on websites alongside authentic products. For example, 20 of 47 items GAO purchased from third-party sellers on popular consumer websites were counterfeit, according to testing by the products' rights holders (see table), highlighting potential risks to consumers. The changes in the market for counterfeit goods can also pose challenges to the private sector—for example, the challenge of distinguishing counterfeit from authentic goods listed for sale online—and complicate the enforcement efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). CBP and ICE engage in a number of activities to enhance IPR enforcement; however, while ICE has assessed some of its efforts, CBP has taken limited steps to do so. CBP's and ICE's IPR enforcement activities broadly include detecting imports of potentially IPR-infringing goods, conducting special operations at U.S. ports, engaging with international partners, and undertaking localized pilot programs or port-led initiatives. CBP and ICE have collected some performance data for each of the eight activities GAO reviewed, and ICE has taken some steps to understand the impact of its efforts. However, CBP has conducted limited evaluation of its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement. Consequently, CBP may lack information needed to ensure it is investing its resources in the most efficient and effective activities. CBP and ICE generally collaborate on IPR enforcement, but according to private sector representatives, restrictions on CBP's information sharing limit private sector enforcement efforts. GAO found that CBP and ICE have undertaken efforts that align with selected key practices for interagency collaboration, such as participating in developing a national IPR enforcement strategy and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. However, sharing additional information about seized items with rights-holding companies and e-commerce websites could improve enforcement, according to private sector representatives. CBP officials said they share information to the extent allowed under current regulations, but CBP has not completed an assessment of what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with private sector entities. Without such an assessment, CBP will not know if sharing additional information requires regulatory or legal changes.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The rise of e-commerce has contributed to a fundamental change in the market for counterfeit goods, according to our analysis of documents from CBP, ICE, and international organizations and our interviews with CBP and ICE officials  U S  agencies and international organizations have observed a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods from “underground” or secondary markets, such as flea markets or sidewalk vendors, to primary markets, including e-commerce websites, corporate and government supply chains, and traditional retail stores  Whereas secondary markets are often characterized by consumers who are knowingly purchasing counterfeits, primary markets involve counterfeiters who try to deceive consumers into purchasing goods they believe are authentic  This shift has been accompanied by changes in the ways in which counterfeit goods are sold  In the past, consumers could often rely on indicators such as the location of sale or the goods’ appearance or price to identify counterfeit goods in the marketplace  However, counterfeiters have now adopted new ways to deceive consumers  For example, as consumers increasingly purchase goods online, counterfeiters may exploit third-party online marketplaces to gain an appearance of legitimacy and access to consumers  When selling online, counterfeiters may post pictures of authentic goods on the websites where they are selling counterfeits and may post pseudonymous reviews of their products or businesses in order to appear legitimate  Additionally, by setting the price of a counterfeit at, or close to, the retail price of a genuine good, counterfeiters may deceive consumers, who will pay the higher price because they believe the goods are real or who believe that they are getting a slight bargain on genuine goods  According to CBP seizure data and CBP officials, the volume, variety, and methods of shipment of counterfeit goods seized by CBP and ICE have changed in recent years  CBP reports indicate that the number of IPR seizures increased by 38 percent in fiscal years 2012 through 2016  According to CBP data, approximately 88 percent of IPR seizures made during this period were shipped from China and Hong Kong  The variety of products being counterfeited has also increased, according to CBP officials  CBP and ICE officials noted that, while many consumers may think of luxury handbags or watches as the most commonly counterfeited goods, counterfeiting occurs in nearly every industry and across a broad range of products  In addition, according to CBP data we reviewed and officials we spoke to, the methods of importing counterfeit goods into the United States have changed in recent years  Specifically, express carriers and international mail have become the predominant form of transportation for IPR-infringing goods entering the United States, constituting approximately 90 percent of all IPR seizures in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, according to CBP data  In an attempt to illustrate the risk that consumers may unknowingly encounter counterfeit products online, we purchased a nongeneralizable sample of four types of consumer products—shoes, travel mugs, cosmetics, and phone chargers—from third-party sellers on five popular e-commerce websites  According to CBP data we reviewed and officials we spoke to, CBP often seizes IPR-infringing counterfeits of these types of products  As table 1 shows, the rights holders for the four selected products we purchased determined that 20 of the 47 items were counterfeit  We did not identify any clear reasons for the variation among the counterfeit and authentic items that we purchased based on the products that they represented, the e-commerce websites where we bought the items, or the third-party sellers from whom we bought them  For three of the four product types, at least one item we purchased was determined to be counterfeit, with results varying considerably by product  Representatives of the rights holders also could not provide a specific explanation for the variation among authentic and counterfeit goods that we received  They noted that the results of covert test purchases can fluctuate depending on enforcement activities and the variety of goods and sellers on a particular website on a given day  Rights-holder testing also showed that we purchased at least one counterfeit item and one authentic item from each of the five e-commerce websites  In addition, our analysis of the customer ratings of third-party sellers from whom we bought the items did not provide any clear indications that could warn consumers that a product marketed online may be counterfeit  For example, we received both counterfeit and authentic items from third- party sellers with ratings that were less than 70 percent positive as well as sellers with ratings that were up to 100 percent positive  Rights holders were able to determine that items we purchased were not authentic on the basis of inferior quality, incorrect markings or construction, and incorrect labeling  Some counterfeit items we purchased were easily identifiable as likely counterfeit once we received them  For example, one item contained misspellings of “Austin, TX” and “Made in China ” Other items could be more difficult for a typical consumer to identify as counterfeit  For example, the rights holder for a cosmetic product we purchased identified one counterfeit item on the basis of discrepancies in the color, composition, and design of the authentic and counterfeit items’ packaging  Counterfeit goods may also lack key elements of certification markings and other identifiers  For example, on a counterfeit phone charger we purchased, the UL certification mark did not include all components of the authentic mark  Figure 1 shows examples of these counterfeit items  The risks associated with the types of counterfeit goods we purchased can extend beyond the infringement of a company’s IPR  For example, a UL investigation of counterfeit iPhone adapters found a 99 percent failure rate in 400 counterfeit adapters tested for safety, fire, and shock hazards and found that 12 of the adapters tested posed a risk of lethal electrocution to the user  Similarly, according to a rights holder representative, counterfeits of common consumer goods, such as Yeti travel mugs, may contain higher-than-approved concentrations of dangerous chemicals such as lead, posing health risks to consumers  According to ICE, seized counterfeit cosmetics have been found to contain hazardous substances, including cyanide, arsenic, mercury, lead, urine, and rat droppings  Representatives of rights holders and e-commerce websites whom we interviewed reported taking independent action to try to protect IPR within their areas of responsibility  For example, both rights holders and e- commerce websites maintain IPR protection teams that work with one another and with law enforcement to address infringement issues  E- commerce websites may also take a variety of steps to block and remove counterfeit items listed by third-party sellers  These efforts rely on data collected through a variety of means, including consumer reporting of counterfeits, rights-holder notifications of IPR infringement, and corporate efforts to vet potential third-party sellers, according to private sector representatives  Our January 2018 report includes information on steps that consumer protection organizations and government agencies recommend consumers take to limit the risk of purchasing counterfeits online  These steps include, for example, buying only from authorized retailers online, avoiding prices that look “too good to be true,” and reporting counterfeit purchases  We identified a number of key challenges that the changes in the market for counterfeit goods can pose to CBP and ICE as well as to the private sector  First, the increasing sophistication of counterfeits can make it difficult for law enforcement officers to distinguish between legitimate and counterfeit goods  Second, as the range of counterfeit goods expands, CBP has a wider variety of goods to screen, which requires CBP officials to have in-depth knowledge of a broad range of products and of how to identify counterfeits  Third, counterfeiters may break up large shipments into multiple smaller express carrier or mail packages to decrease the risk of losing significant quantities of merchandise to a single seizure  This shift toward smaller express shipments of counterfeit goods to the United States poses challenges to CBP and ICE because, according to CBP officials, seizure processing requires roughly the same amount of time and resources regardless of shipment size or value  The changing marketplace also presents challenges to the private sector, according to representatives from rights holders and e-commerce websites  For example, it is more difficult for rights holders and e- commerce websites to identify and investigate individual counterfeit cases, because e-commerce websites face a growing inventory from a larger registry of sellers  Tracking goods from known counterfeiters through various website fulfillment and delivery mechanisms is also a significant challenge for the private sector  Furthermore, the growth of e- commerce has accelerated the pace at which counterfeiters can gain access to consumers or reinvent themselves if shut down  CBP and ICE engage in a number of activities to enhance IPR enforcement; however, while ICE has assessed some of its efforts, CBP has taken limited steps to do so  CBP’s and ICE’s IPR enforcement activities broadly include detecting imports of potentially IPR-infringing goods, conducting special operations at U S  ports, engaging with international partners, and undertaking localized pilot programs or port- led initiatives  CBP and ICE have collected some performance data on activities we reviewed, and ICE has taken some steps to better understand the impact of its efforts, such as creating a process to track cases it deems significant  However, we found that CBP has conducted limited evaluation of its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement  Consequently, we concluded that CBP may lack information needed to ensure it is investing its resources in the most efficient and effective activities  We recommended in our report that CBP take steps to evaluate the effectiveness of its IPR enforcement efforts; CBP concurred with this recommendation  Our analysis showed that CBP and ICE interagency collaboration on IPR enforcement is generally consistent with the following selected key practices for effective interagency collaboration: (1) define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; and (5) establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries  For example, the agencies may leverage resources by collocating staff or sharing their expertise  CBP and ICE have also issued guidance and developed standard operating procedures to clarify roles and responsibilities  CBP and ICE also coordinate with the private sector in a variety of ways, such as obtaining private sector assistance to determine whether detained goods are authentic and to conduct training  Representatives of rights holders and e-commerce websites noted that information shared by law enforcement entities is critical to private sector IPR enforcement, such as pursuing civil action against a counterfeiter or removing counterfeit items from websites  In the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Congress provided CBP with explicit authority to share certain information with trademark and copyright owners before completing a seizure  CBP officials stated that they share information about identified counterfeits with e-commerce websites and rights holders to the extent possible under current regulations  However, according to private sector representatives we spoke to, restrictions on the amount and type of information about seized items shared by CBP limit the ability of rights holders and e-commerce websites to protect IPR  CBP officials noted that there are legal limitations to the amount and type of information they can share, particularly if the e-commerce website is not listed as the importer on forms submitted to CBP  Several private sector representatives stated that receiving additional information from CBP would enhance their ability to protect IPR  Representatives of one website noted that information on the exterior of seized packages, such as business identifiers on packages destined for distribution centers, would be helpful for identifying groups of counterfeit merchandise from the same seller  However, according to CBP officials, CBP cannot provide such information to e-commerce websites  Representatives of one e-commerce website noted that ICE sometimes shares information related to an investigation, but that ICE’s involvement in the enforcement process begins only after CBP has identified and seized counterfeit items  Representatives of two e-commerce websites stated that, because of the limited information shared by CBP, they may not be aware of IPR-infringing goods offered for sale on their websites, even if CBP has seized related items from the same seller  According to CBP officials, CBP is reviewing options for sharing additional information with rights holders and e-commerce websites and is assessing what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with private sector entities  CBP officials stated that they have not yet determined whether changes to the amount and types of information provided to e-commerce websites would require regulatory changes or additional legal authorities  These officials also said that they have discussed differences in CBP’s and ICE’s information sharing with ICE officials  In our report, we recommended that CBP, in consultation with ICE, assess what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with the private sector and, as appropriate, take action to enhance information sharing where possible  CBP concurred with this recommendation  Chairman Hatch, Ranking Member Wyden, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time  If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Kimberly Gianopoulos, Director, International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Joyee Dasgupta, Kara Marshall, Katie Bassion, Kristen Timko, Reid Lowe, Sarah Collins, Neil Doherty, Ramon Rodriguez, Helina Wong, Julie Spetz, Kevin Loh, Wayne McElrath, Grace Lui, James Murphy, Mary Moutsos, Justin Fisher, Rachel Stoiko, and Sarah Veale  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2: U S  Code, Title 10, Section 5063, United States Marine Corps: Composition and Functions, dated October 1, 1986, states the following: The Marine Corps will be organized, trained and equipped to provide an amphibious and land operations capability to seize advanced naval bases and to conduct naval land campaigns  In this regard, the Marines are required by law to have the necessary equipment to conduct amphibious operations and land operations  The ACV and MPC were considered integral systems by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Marine Corps to meet this legal requirement, as well as providing critical capabilities to execute the nation's military strategy  On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps—with "encouragement" from DOD—cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program  The EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), which currently transports Marines from ships to shore under hostile conditions  The Marine Corps cancelled the EFV due to excessive cost growth and poor performance in operational testing  Recognizing the need to replace the AAV, the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a "more affordable and sustainable" vehicle to take the place of the EFV  The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner  In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore  At present, the Marines do not have a wheeled armored fighting vehicle that can operate as a dedicated infantry carrier with Marine maneuver forces inland  The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals  Because of a perceived amphibious "redundancy," some have questioned the need for both the ACV and MPC  In June 2013, citing budgetary pressures, the Marines reportedly put the MPC program "on ice" and suggested that it might not be resurrected for about 10 years  Although some have questioned why the Marines cannot simply "adopt" a U S  Army personnel carrier, Marine requirements for a personnel carrier reflect the need for this vehicle to be compatible with amphibious assault craft, as well as to have an enhanced amphibious capability, which is not necessarily an Army requirement  With the Marines involved in decades-long land conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and proliferating anti-access technologies such as guided missiles, some analysts questioned whether the Marines would ever again be called on to conduct a large-scale amphibious assault operation  In response to these questions and the perceived need to examine the post-Iraq and Afghanistan Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy and DOD studied the requirement to conduct large-scale amphibious operations and in early 2012 released a strategic vision for how amphibious operations will be conducted in the future  The primary assertion of this study is that the Marine Corps' and Navy's amphibious capabilities serve a central role in the defense of the global interests of a maritime nation  The need to maintain an amphibious assault capability is viewed by Marine Corps leadership as establishing the requirement for the ACV and MPC (as discussed in greater detail below)  Congress is responsible for authorizing and appropriating funds for all weapon systems programs, including the ACV  In its oversight role, Congress could be concerned about how the ACV enables the Marines to conduct not only amphibious operations but also operations ashore  Another possible congressional concern is to what extent a robust amphibious assault capability is a necessary component of U S  national security  Cost is another issue of interest to Congress  At present, the Marines use the AAV-7A1 series amphibious assault vehicle to move Marines from ship to shore  The Marines have used the AAV since 1971 and expect to continue to use it until replaced by the ACV or a similar vehicle  Over the years, the Marines have claimed the AAV has become increasingly difficult to operate, maintain, and sustain  As weapons technology and threat capabilities have evolved since the early 1970s, the AAV—despite upgrades—is viewed as having capabilities shortfalls in the areas of water and land mobility performance, lethality, protection, and network capability  The AAV's two-mile ship-to-shore range is viewed by many as a significant survivability issue not only for the vehicle itself but also for naval amphibious forces  Although the AAV has some armor protection and can operate inland to a limited extent, it is not intended for use as an infantry combat vehicle  The Marines do have the LAV-25, Light Armored Vehicle-25, an eight-wheeled armored vehicle that carries a crew of three and six additional marines  The LAV-25 is armed with a 25 mm chain gun and a 7 62 mm machine gun but is not fully amphibious, as it cannot cross a surf zone and would get to the beach via some type of connector such as the Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC)  The LAV-25 has been in service since 1983  According to the Marine Program Executive Office (PEO) Land Systems, the LAV is not employed as an armored personnel carrier and usually carries a four-person Marine scout/reconnaissance team in addition to its crew  In this regard, the MPC was viewed as necessary by Marine leadership for the transport and enhanced armor protection of Marine infantry forces  The Marines' 2011 Request for Information (RFI) to industry provides an overview of the operational requirements for the ACV  These requirements include the following: The proposed vehicle must be able to self-deploy from amphibious shipping and deliver a reinforced Marine infantry squad (17 marines) from a launch distance at or beyond 12 miles with a speed of not less than 8 knots in seas with 1-foot significant wave height and must be able to operate in seas up to 3-foot significant wave height  The vehicle must be able to maneuver with the mechanized task force for sustained operations ashore in all types of terrain  The vehicle's road and cross-country speed as well as its range should be greater than or equal to the M-1A1  The vehicle's protection characteristics should be able to protect against direct and indirect fire and mines and improvised explosive device (IED) threats  The vehicle should be able to accommodate command and control (C2) systems that permit it to operate both at sea and on land  The vehicle, at a minimum, should have a stabilized machine gun in order to engage enemy infantry and light vehicles  The Marine Corps' 2011 Request for Information (RFI) to industry provided an overview of the operational requirements for the MPC  These requirements included the following: The vehicle must accommodate nine marines and two crew members and have a "robust tactical swim capability (shore-to-shore [not designed to embark from an amphibious ship]) and be capable of operating at 6 knots in a fully developed sea " The vehicle must be able to operate on land with M-1A1s in mechanized task forces across the Marine Corps' mission profile  The vehicle shall provide protection for the occupants from the blasts, fragments, and incapacitating effects of attack from kinetic threats, indirect fire, and improvised explosive devices and mines  The vehicle shall be capable of firing existing Marine anti-structure and anti-armor missiles and should be able to accommodate existing command and control (C2) systems  Defense officials have noted the Marine Corps is "not currently organized, trained and equipped to face a peer adversary in the year 2025" and enemies with advanced air and shore defense will make amphibious operations even riskier  To counter this, the Navy is developing the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) operational concept to address these concerns  EABO is described as follows: Expeditionary Advance Base Operations is a naval operational concept that anticipates the requirements of the next paradigm of US Joint expeditionary operations  The concept is adversary based, cost informed and advantage focused  EABO calls for an alternative, difficult to target forward basing infrastructure that will enable US naval and joint forces to create a more resilient forward based posture to persist, partner and operate within range of adversary long range precision fires  The alternative forward posture enabled by Expeditionary Advance Bases (EABs) is designed to mitigate the growing threat posed by the abundant quantity, expanded range and enhanced precision of potential adversary weaponry—particularly ballistic and cruise missiles designed to attack critical joint fixed forward infrastructure and large platforms  EABs provide a dispersed and largely mobile forward basing infrastructure that enables a persistent alternative force capability set that is similarly designed to be difficult to target and inherently resilient  The resilient, reduced signature infrastructure of EABs, combined with naval forces designed and structured to persist and operate within the arc of adversary anti-access/aerial denial (A2AD) capabilities enables naval commanders to conduct Expeditionary Advance Base Operations to support Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), and Fleet Commanders in the fight for sea control, by exploiting the opportunities afforded by key maritime terrain, particularly in close and confined seas  EABO advances, sustains and maintains the naval and joint sensor, shooter and sustainment capabilities of dispersed forces to leverage the decisive massed capabilities of the larger joint force with enhanced situational awareness, augmented fires and logistical support  The EABO Concept enables US naval forces to exercise 21 st Century naval operational art, meet new enemy A2AD threats with new capabilities and operate and thrive in and around close and confined seas  In terms of Marine Corps amphibious assault operations, the adoption of EABO could reportedly result in "an entirely different approach to amphibious assaults as well as new weapon systems " Noting that "missiles can now hit ships and landing craft while they are hundreds of miles from shore, making it far too dangerous for Marines to storm a beach with current capabilities," Marine officials are reportedly exploring ways to create temporary "bubbles" where Marines can get ashore  In response to these challenges, current and planned weapons systems might need to be modified to accommodate EABO operational concepts  As previously noted, in June 2013, citing budgetary pressures, the Marines reportedly put the MPC program "on ice" and suggested it might not be resurrected for about 10 years  At the time of the decision, the Marines' acquisition priorities were refocused to the ACV as well as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)  Although the Marines refocused budgetary resources to the ACV, difficulties in developing an affordable high water speed capability for the ACV continued to confront Marine leadership  In what was described as a "drastic shift," the Marines decided in March 2014 to "resurrect" the MPC and designate it as ACV Increment 1 1 and initially acquire about 200 vehicles  The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1 2, a tracked version, and to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study  Although ACV Increment 1 1 will have a swim capability, a connector will be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore  Plans called for ACV Increment 1 1 to enter the acquisition cycle at Milestone B (Engineering and Manufacturing Development) in FY2016, award prototype contracts leading to a down select to one vendor in FY2018, and enter low-rate initial production  On April 23, 2014, the Marines released an RFI for ACV Increment 1 1  Some of the required capabilities included the following:     operate in a significant wave height of two feet and sufficient reserve buoyancy to enable safe operations; a high level of survivability and force protection; operate in four to six feet plunging surf with ship-to-shore operations and launch from amphibious ships as an objective; land mobility, operate on 30 percent improved surfaces and 70 percent unimproved surfaces; ability to integrate a  50 calibre remote weapon station (RWS) with growth potential to a dual mount 40 mm/ 50 calibre RWS or a 30 mm cannon RWS; carrying capacity to include three crew and 10 embarked troops as the threshold, 13 embarked troops as the objective, carry mission essential equipment and vehicle ammunition; and the ability to integrate a command, control and communications suite provided as government furnished equipment     The RFI included a requirement for industry to deliver 16 prototype vehicles nine months after contract award in April 2016 at a rate of 4 vehicles per month  The Marines estimated ACV Increment 1 1 would cost about $5 million to $6 million per vehicle, about $10 million less than what the previous ACV version was expected to cost  On November 5, 2014, the Marines reportedly released a draft RFP for ACV Increment 1 1  The Marines were looking for information from industry regarding program milestones, delivery schedules, and where in the program cost savings could be achieved  Plans were for two companies to build 16 prototype vehicles each for testing  Companies who competed for the two contracts included BAE Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), Lockheed Martin, and Scientific Applications International Corporation (SAIC)  Under the provisions of the RFP, the ACV 1 1 was envisioned as an eight-wheeled vehicle capable of carrying 10 Marines and a crew of 3 that would cost between $4 million to $7 5 million per copy—a change from the RFI estimate of $5 million to $6 million per vehicle  In terms of mobility, the ACV 1 1 would need to be able to travel at least 3 nautical miles from ship to shore, negotiate waves up to at least 2 feet, travel 5 to 6 knots in calm seas, and be able to keep up with the M-1 Abrams tank once ashore  Proposals were due in April 2016 and the Marines reportedly planned to award two EMD contracts for 16 vehicles each to be delivered in November 2016  In 2018, the Marines would then down select to one vendor and start full production  The Marines reportedly plan to acquire 204 ACV 1 1s, to be allocated as follows: 1 st Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, CA— 67 ; 2 nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, NC— 46 ; 3 rd Marine Expeditionary Force, Okinawa, Japan— 21 ; Assault Amphibian School, Camp Pendleton, CA— 25 ; Exercise Support Division, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twenty Nine Palms, CA— 25 ; and Program Manager, Quantico, VA, and Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch, Camp Pendleton, CA— 20   In April 2016 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration testified that the Marines' Acquisition Objective for the ACV 1 1 remained at 204 vehicles, which would provide lift for two infantry battalions  Full Operational Capability (FOC) for ACV 1 1 is planned for FY2020  On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1 1 prototypes for evaluation  BAE's contract was for $103 8 million and SAIC's for $121 5 million, and each company is to build 16 prototypes  The Marines expect to down select to a single vendor in 2018  Initial operational capability (IOC) was expected by the end of 2020, and all ACV 1 1 vehicles are planned to be fielded by summer 2023  Plans are to equip six battalions with ACV 1 1s and 392 existing upgraded AAVs  Both BAE and SAIC reportedly have a long history related to amphibious vehicles, as BAE built the Marines' original AAV and SAIC has built hundreds of Terrex 1 vehicles used by Singapore, and both companies had Marine Corps contracts to modernize AAVs  ACV 1 1 is intended to have some amphibious capability but would rely on ship-to-shore connectors  ACV 1 2 is intended to have greater amphibious capability, including greater water speed and the ability to self-deploy from amphibious ships  BAE planned to team with Italian manufacturer Iveco (which owns Chrysler and Ferrari)  BAE's prototype would accommodate 13 Marines and travel 11 5 miles at about 7 miles per hour (mph) in surf and 65 mph on land  BAE's version would incorporate a V hull design intended to protect passengers from underside blasts and have external fuel tanks for increased safety  BAE intends to produce its prototypes at its York, PA, facility  SAIC planned to team with Singapore Technology Kinetics to develop its prototype based on an existing design called Terrex  SAIC's version is said to travel 7 mph in water and incorporates a V hull design as well as blast-mitigating seats  It would carry a crew of 3 and can accommodate 11 Marines  SAIC's version plans for a Common Remote Weapons System (CROWS) ( 50 calibre machine gun and a 30 mm cannon), which could be operated from inside the vehicle while buttoned up, therefore not exposing crewmen to hostile fire  On December 7, 2015, it was reported that GDLS would protest the award of the ACV 1 1 contract to BAE and SAIC, claiming the Marines asked for particular capabilities and then evaluated vendors by a different set of standards  On March 15, 2016, GAO denied GDLS's protest, noting that "the Marine Corps' evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the evaluation scheme identified in the solicitation " The Marines reportedly stated that the protest put the ACV 1 1 program about 45 days behind schedule but anticipated the ACV 1 1 would still be fielded on time  BAE and SAIC reportedly delivered their ACV 1 1 prototypes, with BAE delivering its first prototype in December 2016 and SAIC delivering its prototype in February 2017  This early delivery could potentially result in an unspecified incentive fee award for both companies  EMD testing began the week of March 13 and was scheduled to last eight months  In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1 1 down select request for proposals to BAE and SAIC  Plans called for operational testing to start in January 2018, with the Marines anticipating announcing a contract winner in June 2018 for the delivery of 204 ACV 1 1s over a four-year period  In accordance with the provisions of the FY2014 National Defence Authorization Act ( P L  113-66 ) Section 251, GAO submitted its annual report to Congress on the ACV program in April 2018  GAO reviewed program cost estimates, updated schedules, and program assessments of test results and production readiness, and compared ACV acquisition efforts to DOD guidance and GAO-identified best practices  GAO found the following: The first version of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV 1 1) is on track to meet development cost goals with no additional anticipated delays for major acquisition milestones  With regard to costs, the development phase of ACV 1 1 is on pace to not exceed cost goals that were established at the start of development, based on a recent Navy estimate, the ACV program office, and reporting from the contractors  GAO recommended that the Marine Corps (1) not enter the second year of low rate production for ACV 1 1 until after the contractor has achieved an overall Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL) of 8 and (2) not enter full-rate production until achieving an overall MRL of 9  DOD partially concurred with this recommendation but noted that it was "reasonable to proceed at lower MRL levels if steps are taken to mitigate risks " On June 19, 2018, the Marine Corps selected BAE Systems to produce the ACV  Reportedly, the initial contract—valued at $198 million—will be for low-rate production of 30 vehicles to be delivered by the autumn of 2019  Eventually, 204 vehicles are to be delivered under the ACV 1 1 phase of the project  BAE will also produce the ACV 1 2 variant and, all told, the entire ACV 1 1 and 1 2 project is expected to deliver 700 vehicles, and, if all options are exercised, the total contract will reportedly be worth $1 2 billion  In December 2018, the Navy reportedly awarded BAE Systems a $140 million contract modification to build 30 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) ACVs as part of Lot 2, with the first vehicles expected to be delivered in the summer of 2020  Lot 1 is reportedly still scheduled to start delivery in the summer of 2019  In DOT&E's December 2018 FY2018 Annual Report, it was noted During the operational evaluation (OA), the ACV-equipped unit demonstrated the ability to maneuver to an objective, conduct immediate action drills, and provide suppressive fires in support of dismounted infantry maneuver in a desert environment  The ACV-equipped unit was able to maneuver in the littorals; embark aboard a landing craft air cushioned (LCAC), transit the open ocean and surf zone, and debark from the LCAC  The ACV demonstrated water mobility and the ability to self-deploy from the beach, cross the surf zone, enter the ocean, swim, and return to the beach  Based on data from the OA, reliability is below the program reliability growth curve (58 hours Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failures [MTBOMF])  BAE vehicles demonstrated 24 9 hours MTBOMF  There were no systemic problems identified that indicate a major redesign is required  The ACV section was successful in 15 of 16 missions and demonstrated the capability to negotiate terrain in the desert and littorals, operate with tanks and light armored vehicles, and maneuver to achieve tactical advantage over the opposing threat force  ACV crews, supported infantry, and the opposing force noted that the vehicles performed better than the legacy vehicle in a wide variety of areas  In terms of recommendations, DOT&E noted the Program Manager, Advanced Amphibious Assault should do the following: Modify the infantry troop commander's station to make it easier to move between the hatch and seat  Assess the capability of all existing Marine Corps recovery assets to recover the ACV  Investigate options for preventing damage to steering/suspension when encountering battlefield debris, such as concertina wire  According to reports, the Marines envisioned that the successor to ACV 1 1—the ACV 1 2—would have a threshold requirement of 12 miles from ship-to-shore  If this threshold can be achieved, it could help to reduce the vulnerability of U S  naval vessels supporting Marine amphibious operations to enemy shore fire  On April 10, 2019, during testimony to the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Navy and Marine Corps leadership noted During the fall of 2018, ACV 1 1 prototypes demonstrated satisfactory water mobility performance in high surf conditions, and in doing so met the full water mobility transition requirement for ACV 1 2 capability  Subsequently, the Milestone Decision Authority Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)) approved the consolidation of increments one and two into a single program to enable continuous production of ACVs to completely replace the AAV  The next key acquisition event is the Full Rate Production decision scheduled for the third quarter of FY 2020 following Initial Operational Test & Evaluation  ACV remains on schedule to achieve Initial Operational Capability in the fourth quarter of FY 2020  With the consolidation of ACV variants into a single variant, there will likely be a number of programmatic changes and potential ramifications for the ACV and ACV 2 0 programs  Reportedly, the Marines plan to develop an ACV 2 0, capable of carrying 10 to 13 Marines plus crew, capable of high water speeds and deployment from ships far from the coast  ACV 2 0 is planned to be capable of operating on land alongside tanks and light armored vehicles  According to the Marines ACV 2 0 serves as a conceptual placeholder for a future Decision Point (~ 2025, or sooner) at which time knowledge gained in the fielding and employment of the first phase of ACV (1 1 and 1 2), the state of the naval connector strategy, and science & technology work towards a high water speed capable self-deploying vehicle will support an informed decision  The FY2020 presidential budget request includes RDT&E and Procurement funding requests in the Base Budget, as well as FY2020 requested quantities  The Marines did not request ACV Overseas Contingency operations (OCO) funding in FY2020  According to DOD, the FY2020 ACV budget request will fund The ACV 1 1 Full Rate Production (FRP) Lot 3 of 56 vehicles, plus procurement of related items such as production support, systems engineering, program management, Engineering Change Orders (ECOs), Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), and integrated logistics support  Research and Development efforts include the procurement of ACV 1 2 MRV test articles, associated GFE, and initiation of a Vehicle Protective System trade study and integration efforts  While from an overall programmatic perspective, the consolidation of the ACV 1 1 and ACV 1 2 variants could be viewed as a favourable programmatic outcome, there are likely ramifications that might be of interest to policymakers  Potential issues include the following: Will the consolidation of ACV 1 1 and ACV 1 2 result in an overall cost savings? Will this consolidation permit the acquisition of additional ACVs because of potential cost savings? With the consolidation and the stated intent to replace AAVs, what is the revised timeline for the replacement of AAVs and will this result in cost savings from not having to upgrade and maintain AAVs longer than previously intended? How will the consolidation of ACV 1 1 and ACV 1 2 affect the ACV 2 0 program? If the Navy and Marine Corps decide to adopt Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) as an operational concept, it could possibly have implications for the ACV program, including the following: At the weapon systems level, would EABO require any changes to the vehicles themselves, such as enhanced survivability, lethality, or Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) features? If changes are required to facilitate EABO, how would this affect the program's overall acquisition timeline and cost? If EABO does not require any technical changes in the ACV program, would the adoption of EABO modify the Marines' current procurement quantities of ACVs? If EABO requires different procurement quantities for the different ACV versions (more or fewer), how might this affect program timelines and program costs?

ground_truth: On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a "more affordable and sustainable" vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles were intended to play central roles in future Marine amphibious operations. On June 14, 2013, Marine leadership put the MPC program "on ice" due to budgetary pressures but suggested the program might be resurrected some 10 years down the road when budgetary resources might be more favorable. In what was described as a "drastic shift," the Marines decided to "resurrect" the MPC in March 2014. The Marines designated the MPC as ACV Increment 1.1 and planned to acquire about 200 vehicles. The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1.2, a tracked, fully amphibious version, and at the time planned to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study. Although ACV Increment 1.1 is to have a swim capability, another mode of transport (ship or aircraft) would be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore. The Marines are reportedly exploring the possibility of developing a high water speed ACV 2.0, which could accompany tanks and light armored vehicles into combat. On November 5, 2014, the Marines released a draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for ACV Increment 1.1. On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1.1 prototypes for evaluation. BAE's contract was for $103.8 million and SAIC's for $121.5 million, and each company was to build 16 prototypes to be tested over the next two years. Both BAE and SAIC delivered their prototypes early, and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) testing began mid-March 2017. In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1.1 down select request for proposals to BAE and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). On June 19, 2018, the Marine Corps selected BAE Systems to produce the ACV. The initial contract—valued at $198 million—was for low-rate production of 30 vehicles to be delivered by the autumn of 2019. On April 10, 2019, during testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Navy and Marine Corps leadership announced that during the fall of 2018, ACV 1.1 prototypes demonstrated satisfactory water mobility performance in high surf conditions and, in doing so, met the full water mobility transition requirement for ACV 1.2 capability. As a result, ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 were to be consolidated into a single variant—the ACV—which is intended to replace all AAVs. Potential issues for Congress include the potential ramifications of the consolidation of the ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 programs and how the possible adoption of the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) operational concept could affect the ACV program.