prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas  Matters of particular significance include the following: Israel's own capabilities for addressing threats, and its cooperation with the United States  Shared U S -Israel concerns about Iran, within the context of the U S  exit from the 2015 international nuclear agreement, and growing tension involving Iran and Hezbollah at Israel's northern border with Syria and Lebanon  Israeli-Palestinian issues, including those involving Jerusalem, Hamas and the Gaza Strip, funding for Palestinians, and a possible Trump Administration peace plan  Israeli domestic political issues, including probable corruption-related indictments against Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and closely contested elections that are scheduled for April 9, 2019  For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U S  Relations , by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U S  Foreign Aid to Israel , by Jeremy M  Sharp  Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence  These strengths include robust military and homeland security capabilities, as well as close cooperation with the United States  Israel maintains conventional military superiority relative to its neighbors and the Palestinians  Shifts in regional order and evolving asymmetric threats during this decade have led Israel to update its efforts to project military strength, deter attack, and defend its population and borders  Israel appears to have reduced some unconventional threats via missile defense systems, reported cyber defense and warfare capabilities, and other heightened security measures  Israel has a robust homeland security system featuring sophisticated early warning practices and thorough border and airport security controls; most of the country's buildings have reinforced rooms or shelters engineered to withstand explosions  Israel also has proposed and partially constructed a national border fence network of steel barricades (accompanied at various points by watch towers, patrol roads, intelligence centers, and military brigades) designed to minimize militant infiltration, illegal immigration, and smuggling from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip  Additionally, Israeli authorities have built a separation barrier in and around parts of the West Bank  Israel is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintains a policy of "nuclear opacity" or amimut   A 2017 report estimated that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal of around 80-85 warheads  The United States has countenanced Israel's nuclear ambiguity since 1969, when Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and U S  President Richard Nixon reportedly reached an accord whereby both sides agreed never to acknowledge Israel's nuclear arsenal in public  Israel might have nuclear weapons deployable via aircraft, submarine, and ground-based missiles  No other Middle Eastern country is generally thought to possess nuclear weapons  Israeli officials closely consult with U S  counterparts in an effort to influence U S  decisionmaking on key regional issues, and U S  law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel's "qualitative military edge," or QME  Additionally, a 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3 3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations  Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U S  interests  They also argue that Israel is a valuable U S  ally  The United States and Israel do not have a mutual defense treaty or agreement that provides formal U S  security guarantees  Iran remains of primary concern to Israeli officials largely because of (1) Iran's antipathy toward Israel, (2) Iran's broad regional influence, and (3) the probability that some constraints on Iran's nuclear program could loosen in the future  In recent years, Israel and Arab Gulf states have discreetly cultivated closer relations with one another in efforts to counter Iran  Prime Minister Netanyahu has sought to influence U S  decisions on the international agreement on Iran's nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA)  He argued against the JCPOA when it was negotiated in 2015—including in a speech to a joint session of Congress—and welcomed President Trump's May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U S  sanctions on Iran's core economic sectors  A few days before President Trump's May announcement, Netanyahu presented information that Israeli intelligence operatives apparently seized in early 2018 from an Iranian archive  He used the information to question Iran's credibility and highlight its potential to parlay existing know-how into nuclear-weapons breakthroughs after the JCPOA expires  In his September 2018 speech before the U N  General Assembly, Netanyahu claimed that Iran maintains a secret "atomic warehouse for storing massive amounts of equipment and materiel " An unnamed U S  intelligence official was quoted as saying in response, "so far as anyone knows, there is nothing in [the facility Netanyahu identified] that would allow Iran to break out of the JCPOA any faster than it otherwise could " After Netanyahu publicly exposed the Iranian nuclear archive, some former Israeli officials speculated about what action Israel might consider taking against Iranian nuclear facilities if Iran abrogates the JCPOA and expands nuclear activities currently restricted under the agreement  However, Netanyahu had said in an interview that he was not seeking a military confrontation with Iran  Israel and Iran have engaged in hostile action over Iran's presence in Syria  In the early years of the Syria conflict, Israel primarily employed air strikes to prevent Iranian weapons shipments destined for the Iran-backed group Hezbollah in Lebanon  Later, as the Syrian government regained control of large portions of the country with Iranian backing, Israeli leaders began pledging to prevent Iran from constructing and operating bases or advanced weapons manufacturing facilities in Syria  Since 2018, Israeli and Iranian forces have repeatedly targeted one another in and over Syrian- and Israeli-controlled areas  In January 2019, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel had targeted Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria "hundreds of times " Limited Israeli strikes to enforce "redlines" against Iran-backed forces could expand into wider conflict, particularly if there is a miscalculation by one or both sides  U S  involvement in Syria could be one factor in Israeli calculations on this issue  The U S  base at Al Tanf in southern Syria has reportedly "served as a bulwark against Iran's efforts to create a land route for weapons from Iran to Lebanon " Israeli officials favor continued U S  involvement in Syria, while also preparing for the possibility that they may need to take greater direct responsibility for countering Iran there  Russia's advanced air defense systems in Syria could make it more difficult for Israel to operate there  Since 2015, Russia has operated an S-400 system at Russia's Khmeimim air base in Lattakia, a city on Syria's Mediterranean coast  To date, however, Russia does not appear to have acted militarily to thwart Israeli air strikes against Iranian or Syrian targets, and Israel and Russia maintain communications aimed at deconflicting their operations  In addition to the S-400 that it owns and operates, Russia delivered an S-300 air defense system for Syria's military to Khmeimim airbase in October 2018  The delivery followed Syria's downing of a Russian military surveillance plane in September 2018 under disputed circumstances, shortly after an Israeli operation in the vicinity  According to an Israeli satellite imagery analysis company, three launchers appeared to be operational as of February 2019  It is unclear to what extent Russia has transferred the S-300 to Syrian military control, and how this might affect future Israeli military action in Syria  An Israeli journalist wrote that "Israel has the knowledge, experience and equipment to evade the S-300, but the fact that additional batteries, manned by Russian personnel, are on the ground, will necessitate greater care [when carrying out future operations against Iran-aligned targets in Syria] " Since the September 2018 incident, Israeli air strikes appear to have decreased somewhat  On March 25, 2019, President Trump signed a proclamation stating that the United States recognizes the Golan Heights (hereinafter, the Golan) to be part of the State of Israel  The proclamation stated that "any possible future peace agreement in the region must account for Israel's need to protect itself from Syria and other regional threats" —presumably including threats from Iran and the Iran-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah  Israel gained control of the Golan from Syria during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and effectively annexed it unilaterally by applying Israeli law to the region in 1981 (see Figure 2 )  President Trump's proclamation changed long-standing U S  policy on the Golan  Since 1967, successive U S
Report 2:  These centers, which can shelter as many as 20 youth, are generally supposed to be located in areas that are frequented or easily reached by runaway and homeless youth  BCP grantees must make efforts to contact the parents and relatives of runaway and homeless youth  Grantees are also required to establish relationships with law enforcement, health and mental health care, social service, welfare, and school district systems to coordinate services  Grantees maintain confidential statistical records of youth, including youth who are not referred to out-of-home shelter services  Further, grantees are required to submit an annual report to HHS detailing the program activities and the number of youth participating in such activities, as well as information about the operation of the centers  BCP grants are allocated directly to grantees for a three-year period  Funding is generally distributed to entities based on the proportion of the nation's youth under age 18 in the jurisdiction where the entities are located  The 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico each receive a minimum allotment of $200,000  Separately, the territories (currently, this includes American Samoa and Guam) each receive a minimum of $70,000  The amount of funding for each state or territory can further depend on whether grant applicants in that jurisdiction applied for funding, and if so, whether the applicant fulfilled the requirements in the authorizing law and grant application  For example, the authorizing law directs HHS to give priority to applicants who have demonstrated experience in providing services to runaway and homeless youth  HHS is to re-allot any funds designated for grantees in one state to grantees in other states that will not be obligated before the end of a fiscal year  See Table A-1 for the amount of funding allocated for each state in FY2017 and FY2018  The costs of the BCP are shared by the federal government (90%) and grantees (10%)  In FY2008, HHS began funding a three-year Rural Host Homes Demonstration Project , which was initiated to expand BCP shelter and support services to runaway and homeless youth who live in rural areas not served by shelter facilities  The project supported grantees that provided youth with shelter (via host home families who were recruited, screened, and trained) and preventive services, including transportation, counseling, educational assistance, and aftercare planning, among others  Over the course of the three years, the project served 781 youth, 411 of whom received shelter and 370 of whom received preventive services without shelter  Recognizing the difficulty that youth face in becoming self-sufficient adults, the Transitional Living Program provides longer-term shelter and assistance for youth ages 16 through 22 (or older if the youth entered the TLP prior to reaching age 22) who may leave their biological homes due to family conflict, or have left and are not expected to return home  Pregnant and/or parenting youth are eligible for TLP services  In FY2017, the TLP provided services to 3,517 youth  In FY2018, the program funded 229 organizations  Each TLP grantee may shelter up to 20 youth at various sites, such as host family homes, supervised apartments owned by a social service agency, scattered-site apartments, or single-occupancy apartments rented directly with the assistance of the grantee  Youth may remain at TLP sites for up to 540 days (18 months), or longer for youth under age 18  Youth ages 16 through 22 may remain in the program for a continuous period of 635 days (approximately 21 months) under "exceptional circumstances " This term means circumstances in which a youth would benefit to an unusual extent from additional time in the program  A youth in a TLP who has not reached age 18 on the last day of the 635-day period may, in exceptional circumstances and if otherwise qualified for the program, remain in the program until his or her 18 th birthday  Youth receive several types of services at TLP-funded programs: basic life-skills training, including consumer education and instruction in budgeting and the use of credit; parenting support and child care (as appropriate); building interpersonal skills; educational opportunities, such as GED courses and postsecondary training; assistance in job preparation and attainment; and mental and physical health care services  TLP grantees are required to develop a written plan designed to help youth transition to living independently or another appropriate living arrangement, and they are to refer youth to other systems that can help to meet their educational, health care, and social service needs  The grantees must also submit an annual report to HHS that includes information regarding the activities carried out with funds and the number and characteristics of the homeless youth  As part of the FY2002 budget request, the George W  Bush Administration proposed a $33 million initiative to fund maternity group homes—or centers that provide shelter to pregnant and parenting teens who are vulnerable to abuse and neglect—as a component of the TLP  Although the TLP authorized services for pregnant and parenting teens prior to FY2002, the Bush Administration sought funds specifically to serve this population  Increased funds were ultimately provided to enable these youth to access TLP services  The 2003 amendments to the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act ( P L  108-96 ) provided explicit authority to use TLP funds for this purpose  Since FY2004, funding for adult-supervised transitional living arrangements that serve pregnant or parenting women ages 16 to 21 and their children has been awarded to organizations that receive TLP grants  These organizations provide youth with parenting skills, including child development education, family budgeting, health and nutrition, and other skills to promote family well-being  TLP grants are distributed competitively by HHS to community-based public and private organizations throughout the country for a five-year period  Grantees must provide at least 10% of the total cost of the program  HHS is carrying out a study to learn more about the long-term outcomes of 1,250 youth who have used TLP services  The study seeks to describe the outcomes and to isolate and describe promising practices and other factors that may contribute to their successes or challenges  Of particular interest for the study is how services are delivered, the demographics of youth, and their socio-emotional wellness and life experiences  It involves both a process evaluation and impact evaluation, with youth randomly assigned to the treatment (i e , participation in the TLP) and control groups  The study seeks to address the following questions: (1) How do TLP programs operate, what types of program models are used to deliver services, and what services are delivered to homeless youth? (2) What are the long-term housing outcomes and protective factors for youth who participate in the TLP program immediately, six months, 12 months, and 18 months after exiting the program? (3) What interventions can be attributed to any positive outcomes experienced by youth who participate in the TLP? According to HHS, the pilot study revealed challenges "in collecting data from a large enough sample size of youth to detect any effects so that conclusions could be drawn about the impact of homeless youth served by TLPs " HHS is not certain how it will move forward with the study  In FY2016, HHS began the Transitional Living Program Special Population Demonstration project  The project funded nine grantees over a two-year period that tested approaches for serving populations that need additional support: LGBTQ runaway and homeless youth ages 16 to 21; and young adults who have left foster care because of emancipation  Grantees were expected to provide strategies that help youth build protective factors, such as connections with schools, employment, and appropriate family members and other caring adults  According to HHS, a process evaluation will assess how grantees are implementing the demonstration project  HHS separately funded a project from FY2012 through FY2014 to build the capacity of TLPs in serving LGBTQ youth  Known as the 3/40 Blueprint: Creating the Blueprint to Reduce LGBTQ Youth Homelessness , the purpose of the grant was develop information about serving the LGBTQ youth population experiencing homelessness, such as through efforts to identify innovative intervention strategies, determine culturally appropriate screening and assessment tools, and better understand the needs of LGBTQ youth served by RHY providers  The website developed by the grantee, the University of Illinois at Chicago, identifies promising practices that serve LGBTQ youth who are experiencing homelessness and publishes information about their challenges  In FY2009, HHS began the Support Systems for Rural Homeless Youth Demonstration Project   Six states received grants to support TLPs in rural communities in serving young adults who have few or no connections to a supportive family structure or community resources  The five-year project sought to provide services across three main areas: survival support, which includes housing, health care (including mental health), and substance abuse treatment and prevention; community, which includes community service, youth and adult partnerships, mentoring, and peer support groups; and education and employment, which includes high school or GED completion, postsecondary education, and job training and employment  The six states—Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Vermont—each received annual grants of $200,000  According to HHS, all of the sites engaged youth in positive youth development activities that included safe places for youth to go  In addition, they raised awareness about homelessness in rural areas and addressed some of the unique needs around employment, housing, and transportation  However, the sites also confirmed that there is a general lack of available housing for homeless youth and that transportation was the most critical impediment to serving these youth  The Street Outreach Program provides runaway and homeless youth living on the streets or in areas that increase their risk of using drugs or being subjected to sexual abuse, prostitution, sexual exploitation, and trafficking are eligible to receive services  The program's goal is to assist youth in transitioning to safe and appropriate living arrangements  SOP services include the following: treatment and counseling; crisis intervention; drug abuse and exploitation prevention and education activities; survival aid; street-based education and outreach; information and referrals; and follow-up support  Grants are awarded for a three-year period, and grantees must provide 10% of the funds to cover the cost of the program  In FY2018, 96 grantees were funded  In FY2017 grantees made contact with 24,366 youth  The Family and Youth Services Bureau initiated the Street Outreach Program Data Collection Project in 2012 to learn more about the lives and needs of homeless and runaway youth served by SOP grantees  The purpose of the project was to design services to better meet the needs of these youth  FYSB collected information through focus groups and computer-assisted personal interviews with 656 youth (ages 14 to 21 years) served by grantees in 11 cities  The project found that participants were homeless on average for nearly two years and had challenges with substance abuse, mental health, and exposure to trauma  Youth most identified that they were in need of job training or help finding a job, transportation assistance, and clothing  The top barriers to obtaining shelter were shelters being full, not knowing where to go for shelter, and lacking transportation to get to a shelter  The study researchers concluded that more emergency shelters could help prevent youth from sleeping on the street  Further, they noted that youth on the streets need more intensive case management (e g , careful assessment and treatment planning, linkages to community resources, etc ) and more intensive interventions  HHS funds the Runaway and Homeless Youth Training and Technical Assistance Center (RHYTTAC) to provide technical assistance to RHYP grantees  HHS awarded a five-year cooperative agreement, from September 30, 2017, through September 29, 2020, to National Safe Place to operate RHYTTAC  National Safe Place is a national youth outreach program that aims to educate young people about the dangers of running away or trying to resolve difficult, threatening situations on their own  RHYTTAC is designed to provide training and conference services to RHYP grantees that enhance and promote continuous quality improvement to services provided by RHYP grantees  Further, RHYTTAC offers resources and information through its website, tip sheets, a quarterly newsletter, toolkits, sample policies and procedures, and other resources  RHYTTAC also provides assistance to individual grantees in response to their questions or concerns, as well as concerns raised by HHS as part of the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program Monitoring System (see subsequent section)  A portion of the funds for the BCP, TLP, and related activities are allocated for a national communications system known as the National Runaway Safeline ("Safeline")  The Safeline is intended to help homeless and runaway youth (or youth who are contemplating running away) through counseling, referrals, and communicating with their families  Beginning with FY1974 and every year after, the Safeline, which until 2013 was called the National Runaway Switchboard, has been funded through the Basic Center Program grant or the Consolidated Runaway and Homeless Youth Program grant  The Safeline is located in Chicago and operates each day to provide services to youth and their families across the country  Services include (1) a channel through which runaway and homeless youth or their parents may leave messages; (2) 24-hour referrals to community resources, including shelter, community food banks, legal assistance, and social services agencies; and (3) crisis intervention counseling to youth  In calendar year 2017, the Safeline handled nearly 30,000 contacts with youth (via phone, computer, emails, and postings), of which nearly three-quarters were from youth and 9% were from parents; the other callers were relatives, friends, and others  Other services are also provided through the Safeline  Since 1995, the "Home Free" family reunification program has provided bus tickets for youth ages 12 to 21 to return home or to an alternative placement near their home through Home Free  HHS evaluates each RHYP grantee through the Runaway and Homeless Youth Monitoring System  Staff from regional ACF offices and other grant recipients (known as peer reviewers) inspect the program site, conduct interviews, review case files and other agency documents, and conduct entry and exit conferences  The monitoring team then prepares a written report that identifies the strengths of the program and areas that require corrective action  The Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act of 2008 required that within one year of its enactment (October 8, 2009), HHS was to issue rules that specified performance standards for public and nonprofit entities that receive BCP, TLP, and SOP grants  On April 14, 2014, HHS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for the new performance standards and other requirements for the Runaway and Homeless youth program grantees  On December 20, 2016, HHS implemented a final rule that was similar to the provisions in the NPRM  These standards are used to monitor individual grantee performance  The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) and the House Committee on Education and Labor have exercised jurisdiction over the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program  HHS must submit reports biennially to the committees on the status, activities, and accomplishments of program grant recipients and evaluations of the programs performed by HHS  The most recent report was submitted in January 2018, and covered FY2014 and FY2015  The 2003 reauthorization law ( P L  108-96 ) of the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act required that HHS, in consultation with the U S  Interagency Council on Homelessness, submit a report to Congress on the promising strategies to end youth homelessness within two years of the reauthorization, in October 2005  The report was submitted to Congress in June 2007  As mentioned above, the 2008 reauthorization law ( P L  110-378 ) required HHS, as of FY2010, to periodically submit to Congress an incidence and prevalence study of runaway and homeless youth ages 13 to 26, as well as the characteristics of a representative sample of these youth  As discussed, Congress appropriated funding to HUD for this purpose and the study, known as Voices of Youth Count , includes multiple publications about its findings  The 2008 law also directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to evaluate the process by which organizations apply for BCP, TLP, and SOP, including HHS's response to these applicants  GAO submitted a report to Congress in May 2010 on its findings  GAO found weaknesses in several of the procedures for reviewing grants, such as that peer reviewers for the grant did not always have expertise in runaway and homeless youth issues and feedback on grants was not provided in a permanent record  In addition, GAO found that HHS delayed telling successful grantees that the grant had been awarded to them  HHS has implemented the recommendations made in the report  Appendix A  Basic Center Program (BCP) Funding Appendix B  Additional Federal Support for Runaway and Homeless Youth Since the creation of the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program, other federal initiatives have also established services for such youth  Youth Homelessness Demonstration Program (YHDP): The omnibus appropriations laws for FY2016 through FY2018 enabled HUD to set aside up to $33 million (FY2016), $43 million (FY2017), and $80 million (FY2018) from the Homeless Assistance Grants account to implement projects that demonstrate how a "comprehensive approach" can "dramatically reduce" homelessness for youth through age 24  The appropriations laws each fiscal year direct this funding to up to 10 communities with the FY2016 funding; up to 11 communities with the FY2017 funding, including at least five rural communities; and up to 25 communities with the FY2018 funding, including at least eight rural communities  HUD has allocated $33 million to 10 communities for FY2016 and $43 million for FY2017  In addition, HUD is taking steps to evaluate the YHDP grantee communities in developing and carrying out a coordinated community approach to preventing and ending youth homelessness  100-Day Challenges to End Youth Homelessness : Since 2016, cities have partnered with public and private entities to accelerate efforts to prevent and end youth homelessness  A Way Home America and Rapid Results Institute, organizations that focus on pressing social problems, have provided support to the organizations  HHS provided training and technical assistance through RHYTTAC to the first three cities involved in the challenge: Los Angeles, CA; Cleveland, OH; and Austin, TX  In general, participating communities have housed homeless youth and have identified new housing options for this population  Youth with Child Welfare Involvement At-Risk of Homelessness (YAHR): HHS has funded grants to build evidence on what works to prevent homelessness among youth and young adults who have child welfare involvement  HHS awarded funds to 18 grantees for a two-year planning period (2013-2015)  Six of the grantees received additional funding to refine and test their service models during a second phase (2015-2018)  A subset of those grantees will then be selected to conduct a rigorous evaluation of their impact on homelessness  In school year 2016-2017, more than 1 3 million children and youth were homeless  Of these students, over 118,000 were homeless youth unaccompanied by their families  The Department of Education administers the Education for Homeless Children and Youth program, which was established under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 ( P L  100-77 ), as amended  This program assists state education agencies (SEAs) to ensure that all homeless children and youth have equal access to the same, appropriate education, including public preschool education, that is provided to other children and youth  Grants made by SEAs to local education agencies (LEAs) under this program must be used to facilitate the enrollment, attendance, and success in school of homeless children and youth  Program funds may be appropriated for activities such as tutoring, supplemental instruction, and referral services for homeless children and youth, as well as providing them with medical, dental, mental, and other health services  McKinney-Vento liaisons for homeless children and youth in each LEA is responsible for coordinating activities for these youth with other entities and agencies, including local Basic Center and Transitional Living Program grantees  States that receive McKinney-Vento funds are prohibited from segregating homeless students from non-homeless students, except for short periods of time for health and safety emergencies or to provide temporary, special, supplemental services  FY2019 funding for the program is $93 5 million  According to a 2017 survey of 43,000 college students at selected colleges and universities, 9% of those attending four-year universities and 12% of those attending community college had been homeless in the last year  In addition, 37% of university students and 46% of community college students were housing insecure in the past year, meaning that they had difficulty paying rent or lived with others beyond the expected capacity of the housing, among other scenarios  The Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes financial aid and support programs that target homeless students and other vulnerable populations  For purposes of applying for federal financial aid, a student's expected family contribution (EFC) is the amount that can be expected to be contributed by a student and the student's family toward his or her cost of education  Certain groups of students are considered "independent," meaning that only the income and assets of the student (and not their parents or guardians) are counted  Individuals under age 24 who have been verified during the school year as either (1) unaccompanied and homeless or (2) unaccompanied, self-supporting, and risk of homelessness  This verification can come from a McKinney-Vento liaison for homeless children and youth in the local education agency; the director (or designee) of a program funded under the Runaway and Homeless Youth program; the director (or designee) of an emergency shelter or transitional housing program funded by HUD; or a financial aid administrator  Separately, HEA provides that homeless children and youth are eligible for what are collectively called the federal TRIO programs  This includes the following TRIO programs: Talent Search, Upward Bound, Student Support Services, and Educational Opportunity Centers  The TRIO programs are designed to identify potential postsecondary students from disadvantaged backgrounds, prepare these students for higher education, provide certain support services to them while they are in college, and train individuals who provide these services  HEA directs the Department of Education (ED), which administers the programs, to (as appropriate) require applicants seeking TRIO funds to identify and make services available, including mentoring, tutoring, and other services, to these youth  TRIO funds are awarded by ED on a competitive basis  In addition, HEA authorizes services for homeless youth through TRIO Student Support Services—a program intended to improve the retention and graduation rates of disadvantaged college students—that include temporary housing during breaks in the academic year  In FY2019, TRIO appropriations are $1 1 billion  Separately, HEA allows additional uses of funds through the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education (FIPSE) to establish demonstration projects that provide comprehensive support services for students who are or were homeless at age 13 or older  FIPSE is a grant program that seeks to support the implementation of innovative educational reform ideas and evaluate how well they work  As specified in the law, the projects can provide housing to the youth when housing at an educational institution is closed or unavailable to other students  FY2019 appropriations for FIPSE are $5 million  Recently emancipated foster youth are vulnerable to becoming homeless  In FY2017, nearly 20,000 youth "aged out" of foster care  The Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP), created under the Chafee Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 ( P L  106-169 ), provides states with funding to support children and youth ages 14 to 21 who are in foster care and former foster youth ages 18 to 21 (and up to age 23 in states that extend foster care to age 21)  States are authorized to receive funds based on their share of the total number of children in foster care nationwide  However, the law's "hold harmless" clause precludes any state from receiving less than the amount of funds it received in FY1998 or $500,000, whichever is greater  The program specifies funding for transitional living services, and as much as 30% of the funds may be dedicated to room and board  The program is funded through mandatory spending, and as such $140 million ($143 million as of FY2020) is provided for the program each year through the annual appropriations process  The Family Violence Prevention and Services Act (FVPSA), Title III of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 ( P L  98-457 ), authorized funds for Family Violence Prevention and Service grants that work to prevent family violence, improve service delivery to address family violence, and increase knowledge and understanding of family violence  From FY2007 to FY2009, one of these projects focused on runaway and homeless youth in dating violence situations through HHS's Domestic Violence/Runaway and Homeless Youth Collaboration on the Prevention of Adolescent Dating Violence initiative  The initiative was created because many runaway and homeless youth come from homes where domestic violence occurs and may be at risk of abusing their partners or becoming victims of abuse  The initiative funded eight states and community-based organizations to address the issue of teen dating violence among runaway and homeless youth  The grants funded activities such as curriculum on dating violence, small groups for teens, and a sexual assault/dating violence reduction program  The initiative resulted in an online toolkit for advocates in the runaway and homeless youth and domestic and sexual assault fields to help programs better address relationship violence with runaway and homeless youth 

ground_truth: This report provides an overview and analysis of FY2019 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The primary focus of this report is on congressional direction and funding provided to DHS through the appropriations process. It includes an Appendix with definitions of key budget terms used throughout the suite of Congressional Research Service reports on homeland security appropriations. It also directs the reader to other reports providing context for specific component appropriations. As part of an overall DHS budget that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimated to be $74.88 billion, the Trump Administration requested $47.43 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority through the appropriations process for DHS for FY2018. The request amounted to a $0.29 billion (0.6%) decrease from the $47.72 billion in annual appropriations enacted for FY2018 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141, Division F). The Administration also requested discretionary funding for DHS components that does not count against discretionary spending limits and is not reflected in the adjusted net discretionary budget authority total. The Administration requested an additional $6.65 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25; BCA), and in the budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD), $165 million in Overseas Contingency Operations designated funding (OCO) from the Operations and Maintenance budget of the U.S. Navy. On June 21, 2018, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out S. 3109, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, accompanied by S.Rept. 115-283. Committee-reported S. 3109 included $48.33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2019. This was $901 million (1.9%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $611 million (1.3%) above the enacted level for FY2018. The Senate committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, and included the OCO funding in an appropriation to the Coast Guard, rather than as a transfer from the U.S. Navy. On July 26, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee marked up H.R. 6776, its version of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019. H.Rept. 115-948 was filed September 12, 2018. Committee-reported H.R. 6776 included $51.44 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority. The House committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, but unlike S. 3109, did not include the OCO funding for the Coast Guard. As some of the annual appropriations for FY2019 remained unfinished, a consolidated appropriations bill that included a continuing resolution was passed by Congress and signed into law on September 28, 2018. The resolution, which covered DHS along with several other departments and agencies, continued funding at a rate of operations equal to FY2018 with some exceptions. This continuing resolution was extended through December 21, 2018, after which point annual appropriations lapsed. A partial government shutdown ensued for 35 days until continuing appropriations were resumed January 25, 2019, by P.L. 116-5. P.L. 116-6, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, was passed by Congress on February 14, 2019, and signed into law the following day. Division A of the act included the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, which included $49.41 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, $12 billion designated for the costs of major disasters, and $165 million in OCO funding for the Coast Guard. This report will be updated in the event of FY2019 supplemental appropriations actions.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: This report describes and analyzes annual appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2019  It compares the enacted FY2018 appropriations for DHS, the Donald J  Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request, and the appropriations measures developed and considered by Congress in response to it  This report identifies additional informational resources, reports, and products on DHS appropriations that provide context for the discussion, and it provides a list of Congressional Research Service (CRS) policy experts with whom clients may consult on specific topics  The suite of CRS reports on homeland security appropriations tracks legislative action and congressional issues related to DHS appropriations, with particular attention paid to discretionary funding amounts  These reports do not provide in-depth analysis of specific issues related to mandatory funding—such as retirement pay—nor do they systematically follow other legislation related to the authorizing or amending of DHS programs, activities, or fee revenues  Discussion of appropriations legislation involves a variety of specialized budgetary concepts  The Appendix to this report explains several of these concepts, including budget authority, obligations, outlays, discretionary and mandatory spending, offsetting collections, allocations, and adjustments to the discretionary spending caps under the Budget Control Act (BCA; P L  112-25 )  A more complete discussion of those terms and the appropriations process in general can be found in CRS Report R42388, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction , coordinated by James V  Saturno, and the Government Accountability Office's A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process   All amounts contained in the suite of CRS reports on homeland security appropriations represent budget authority  For precision in percentages and totals, all calculations in these reports used unrounded data, which are presented in each report's tables  However, amounts in narrative discussions are rounded to the nearest million (or 10 million, in the case of numbers larger than 1 billion), unless noted otherwise  Data used in this report for FY2018 amounts are derived from the explanatory statement accompanying P L  115-141 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017—Division F of which is the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018  The explanatory statement also includes data on FY2018 supplemental appropriations for DHS enacted prior to the development of the consolidated appropriations act for FY2018  Data for the FY2019 requested levels and enacted levels are drawn from H Rept  116-9 , the explanatory statement accompanying P L  116-6   Data on the Senate Appropriations Committee recommendation are drawn from S Rept  115-283 , and data for the House Appropriations Committee recommendation are drawn from H Rept  115-948   Scoring methodology is consistent across this report, relying on data provided by the Appropriations Committees that has been developed with Congressional Budget Office (CBO) methodology  CRS does not attempt to compare this data with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) data because technical scoring differences do not allow precise comparisons  This section provides an overview of the process of enactment of appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for FY2019, from the Administration's initial request, through committee action in the House and Senate, continuing appropriations (and their lapse), and enactment of the consolidated appropriations bill that contained DHS annual appropriation  On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration released its budget request for FY2019  The enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ) three days before had established discretionary spending limits for FY2018 and FY2019, replacing the limits prescribed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P L  112-25 )  The Administration chose to submit an addendum to their request in a letter accompanying the formal request documentation, which included additional requests for resources for DHS and several other departments and agencies  The Trump Administration requested $47 43 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2019, as part of an overall budget that the Office of Management and Budget estimated to be $74 88 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not annually appropriated or does not score against discretionary budget limits)  The request amounted to a $0 29 billion (0 6%) decrease from the $47 72 billion in annual appropriations enacted for FY2018 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P L  115-141 , Division F)  The Trump Administration also requested discretionary funding for DHS components that does not count against discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act (BCA; P L  112-25 ) and is not reflected in the above totals  The Administration requested an additional $6 65 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the BCA, and in the budget request for the Department of Defense, $165 million in Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terror designated funding (OCO), to be transferred to the Coast Guard  On June 21, 2018, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out S  3109 , the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, accompanied by S Rept  115-283   Committee-reported S  3109 included $48 33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2019  This was $901 million (1 9%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $611 million (1 3%) above the enacted level for FY2018  The Senate committee-reported bill also included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, and $163 million in OCO-designated funding directly for the Coast Guard, as had been done in FY2018, rather than as a transfer, as had been requested by the Administration  This bill was never taken up for action on the Senate floor  On July 26, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee marked up H R  6776 , its version of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019  H Rept  115-948 was filed September 12, 2018  Committee-reported H R  6776 included $51 44 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority  The House committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, but unlike S  3109 , did not include the OCO funding for the Coast Guard  This bill did not see action on the House floor  As some of the annual appropriations for FY2019 remained unfinished, a consolidated appropriations bill that included a continuing resolution was passed by Congress and signed into law on September 28, 2018, as P L  115-245   The continuing resolution (Division C) continued funding for DHS at a rate of operations equal to that of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018, with some exceptions  The continuing resolution was extended through December 21, 2018, at which point it expired, and annual appropriations for DHS lapsed, resulting in a partial shutdown of DHS for 35 days  Continuing appropriations were restored at the FY2018 rate of operations with the enactment of P L  116-4 on January 25, 2019  On February 14, 2019, the House took up H J Res  31 , a consolidated appropriations bill that included eight annual appropriations bills  Division A, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, included $49 41 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, $1 69 billion (3 5%) more than had been provided for FY2018, and $2 04 billion more than had been requested by the Administration in February 2018  In addition to that total, the bill included $12 billion designated for the costs of major disasters—$5 35 billion (80 4%) more than had been requested, and the requested $165 million in OCO funding appropriated for the Coast Guard operating budget, rather than a transfer from the Navy  The bill passed the House by a vote of 300-128, and the Senate that same day by a vote of 83-16  The President signed it into law the next day  Generally, the homeland security appropriations bill includes all annual appropriations provided for DHS, allocating resources to every departmental component  Discretionary appropriations provide roughly two-thirds to three-fourths of the annual funding for DHS operations, depending how one accounts for disaster relief spending and funding for overseas contingency operations  The remainder of the budget is a mix of fee revenues, trust funds, and mandatory spending  Appropriations measures for DHS typically have been organized into five titles  The first four are thematic groupings of components, while the fifth provides general direction to the department, and sometimes includes provisions providing additional budget authority  Prior to the FY2017 act, the legislative language of many appropriations included directions to components or specific conditions on how the budget authority it provided could be used  Similarly, general provisions provided directions or conditions to one or more components  In the FY2017 act, a number of these provisions within appropriations and component-specific general provisions were grouped at the ends of the titles where their targeted components are funded, and identified as "administrative provisions " This practice has continued in subsequent years  When DHS was established in 2003, components of other agencies were brought together over a matter of months, in the midst of ongoing budget cycles  Rather than developing a new structure of appropriations for the entire department, Congress and the Administration continued to provide resources through existing account structures when possible  At the direction of Congress, in 2014 DHS began to work on a new Common Appropriations Structure (CAS), which would standardize the format of DHS appropriations across components  In an interim report in 2015, DHS noted that operating with "over 70 different appropriations and over 100 Programs, Projects, and Activities     has contributed to a lack of transparency, inhibited comparisons between programs, and complicated spending decisions and other managerial decision-making " After several years of work and negotiations with Congress, DHS made its first budget request in the CAS for FY2017, and implemented it while operating under the continuing resolutions funding the department in October 2016  For FY2017 and FY2018, all DHS components requested appropriations under the CAS except for the Coast Guard, due to constraints of its financial management system  For FY2019, all the components' requests generally conformed to the CAS  A visual representation of the FY2019 requested funding in this new structure follows in Figure 1   On the left, CAS appropriations categories are listed next to a black bar representing the total FY2018 funding levels requested for DHS for each category  A catch-all "other" category is included for budget authority associated with the legislation that does not fit the CAS categories  Colored lines flow to the DHS components listed on the right, showing how the amount of funding for each appropriations category is distributed across DHS components  Wider lines indicate greater funding levels, so it is possible to understand how components may be funded differently  For example, while Customs and Border Protection (CBP) gets most of its funding from Operations and Support appropriations, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) receives most of its discretionary funding from the Disaster Relief Fund appropriation  The following sections present textual and tabular comparisons among FY2018 enacted appropriations, FY2019 requested appropriations, the FY2019 appropriations bills developed by the appropriations committees, and the final enacted annual appropriation in Division A of the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P L  116-6 )  The structure of the appropriations reflects the organization outlined in the detail table of the explanatory statement accompanying the act ( H Rept  116-9 )  The tables summarize enacted appropriations for FY2018, and those requested by the Administration, and proposed in appropriations committee-developed legislation under development for FY2019  Only the formal request for FY2019 annual appropriations is reflected in the "Request" column  The tables include data on enacted annual and supplemental appropriations  Instances where appropriations are provided for a title's components in other parts of the bill (such as in general provisions or by transfer) are shown separately  Supplemental appropriations provided with an emergency designation for a given component in FY2018 are displayed after the subtotal of annual appropriations  Following the methodology used by the appropriations committees, totals of "appropriations" do not include resources provided by transfer or under adjustments to discretionary spending limits (i e , for emergency requirements, overseas contingency operations for the Coast Guard or the cost of major disasters under the Stafford Act for the Federal Emergency Management Agency)  Amounts covered by adjustments are included with discretionary appropriations in a separate total for "discretionary funding " A subtotal for each component of total estimated budgetary resources that would be available under the legislation and from other sources (such as fees, mandatory spending, and trust funds) for the given fiscal year is also provided at the end of each component section  Totals at the bottom of each table indicate the total net discretionary appropriation for the title on its own, the total net discretionary funding from the annual appropriations bill and any supplemental appropriations (when such were provided), and the projected total estimated budgetary resources for each phase in the appropriations process shown in the table  Title I, Departmental Management and Operations, the smallest of the component-specific titles, contains appropriations for the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management, the Management Directorate, Analysis and Operations (A&O), and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)  For FY2018, these components received $1 36 billion in net discretionary funding through the appropriations process, including $25 million in FY2018 supplemental appropriations  The Trump Administration requested $1 60 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for components included in this title  In addition, $24 million was requested as a transfer from the FY2019 appropriation for the Disaster Relief Fund to the OIG  Not including the transfer, the appropriations request was $241 million (17 7%) more than the amount provided for FY2018  Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S  3109 included $1 47 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $137 million (8 6%) less than requested by the Trump Administration and $103 million (7 6%) more than the amount provided for FY2018  S  3109 included $72 million in discretionary budget authority drawn from unobligated prior-year balances from the DRF, but did not include the proposed transfer of FY2019 DRF resources to the OIG  As a result, the gross budgetary resources provided to components funded in Title I was $89 million (5 5%) less than the request, and $176 million (12 9%) more than provided in FY2018  House Appropriations Committee-reported H R  6776 included $1 48 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $119 million (7 4%) less than requested by the Trump Administration and $122 million (8 9%) more than the amount provided for FY2018  H R  6776 , like the Senate committee-reported bill, did not include the proposed transfer of FY2019 DRF resources to the OIG  As a result, the gross budgetary resources provided to components funded in Title I were $143 million (8 8%) less than the request, and $122 million (8 9%) more than provided in FY2018  P L  116-6 included a total of $1 88 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This included $51 million in a general provision for financial systems modernization, controlled by the management directorate  The total was $513 million (37 7%) more than was provided in FY2018, and $248 million (15 2%) more than was requested by the Administration, if one included the Administration's proposed transfer of $24 million from the Disaster Relief Fund to the Office of the Inspector General  Table 1 shows these comparisons in greater detail  As resources were requested or provided for the Management Directorate and Office of the Inspector General in some cases from outside Title I, separate lines are included for each of those components showing a total for what is provided solely within Title I, then the individual items funded outside the title, followed by the total annual appropriation for the components  Title II, Security, Enforcement, and Investigations, contains appropriations for U S  Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Coast Guard (USCG), and the U S  Secret Service (USSS)  Title II funding represents the majority of DHS's budget, comprising roughly three-quarters of the funding appropriated annually for the department  For FY2018, these components received $39 52 billion in net discretionary funding, as part of $47 13 billion in projected total budget authority  This included $1 06 billion in supplemental appropriations  The Trump Administration formally requested $38 41 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for components included in this title, as part of a total budget request for these components of $47 08 billion for FY2019  The funding request was $45 million (0 1%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  Again setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations, the total resources proposed for FY2019 was $1 01 billion (2 2%) more than projected for FY2018  The Administration reportedly sought additional funding in this title for construction of border barriers, above the formally requested level  In January 2019, the acting director of the Office of Management and Budget sent a letter to congressional leaders officially seeking an additional $4 1 billion  Those amounts are not included in these comparative calculations or in the table below  Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S  3109 included $38 68 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $271 million (0 7%) more than formally requested by the Trump Administration and $227 million (0 6%) more than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  The total budgetary resources projected under S  3109 were $614 million (1 3%) less than the Administration's request (largely due to rejection of a proposed TSA fee increase), but $391 million (0 8%) more than projected for FY2018, again setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  House Appropriations Committee-reported H R  6776 included $41 28 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $2 87 billion (7 5%) more than formally requested by the Trump Administration and $2 82 billion (7 3%) more than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  The total budgetary resources projected under H R  6776 were $2 08 billion (4 4%) more than formally requested by the Administration and $3 12 billion (6 8%) more than projected for FY2018, again setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  H R  6776 would have provided $2 59 billion (6 7%) more than S  3019 , largely due to the House Appropriations Committee recommending $3 35 billion more than its Senate counterpart for CBP's Border Security Assets and Infrastructure activity  P L  116-6 included $40 00 billion in net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  The enacted annual appropriations were $1 59 billion (4 1%) more than requested, and $486 million (1 2%) more than the amount provided in FY2018  Setting aside FY2018 supplemental funding, FY2019 enacted net discretionary funding exceeded FY2018 levels by $1 55 billion (4 0%)  The total budgetary resources projected for components funded in this title were $47 82 billion, $704 million (1 5%) more than was formally requested by the Administration, and $1 75 billion (3 8%) more than was provided in FY2018, setting aside the FY2018 supplemental funding  Table 2 shows these comparisons in greater detail  Title III, Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, contains appropriations for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)  It is the second largest of the component-specific titles  For FY2018, these components received $7 22 billion in net discretionary appropriations and $7 37 billion in specially designated funding for disaster relief through the annual appropriations process  In addition to that annual funding, $58 23 billion was provided for FEMA in emergency supplemental appropriations in FY2018  Incorporating all these elements, the total net discretionary funding level for all Title III components was $72 61 billion for FY2018  The Trump Administration requested $6 19 billion in FY2019 net discretionary appropriations for components included in this title, and $6 65 billion in specially designated funding for disaster relief as part of a total net discretionary funding level for these components of $12 84 billion for FY2019  Setting aside the $58 23 billion in FY2018 supplemental appropriations, the appropriations request was $1 54 billion (10 7%) less than the amount provided for FY2018 in net discretionary funding  Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S  3109 included $13 54 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $694 million (5 4%) more than requested by the Trump Administration and $847 million (5 9%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  The total budgetary resources projected would be $718 million (3 8%) more than the Administration's request, but $1 29 billion (6 2%) less than projected for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  The Senate committee-reported bill included within these totals the requested disaster relief funding of $6 65 billion, and offset $228 million in its Federal Assistance appropriation from unobligated DRF balances  House Appropriations Committee-reported H R  6776 included $13 70 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $861 million (6 7%) more than requested by the Trump Administration and $681 million (4 7%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  The total budgetary resources projected would be $885 million (4 7%) more than the Administration's request, but $1 13 billion (5 4%) less than projected for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  The House committee-reported bill included within these totals the requested disaster relief funding of $6 65 billion  P L  116-6 included $18 27 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  The enacted discretionary funding level was $5 43 billion (42 3%) more than requested, and $3 89 billion (27 1%) more than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside the historically high level of supplemental appropriations  The total budgetary resources projected for FY2019 was $5 46 billion (29 0%) more than was requested, and $3 44 billion (16 5%) more than was projected for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental funding  Table 3 shows these comparisons in greater detail  As some annually appropriated resources were provided for FEMA from outside Title III in FY2018, a separate line is included for FEMA showing a total for what is provided solely within Title III, then the non-Title III appropriation, followed by the total annual appropriation for FEMA  Title IV, Research and Development, Training, and Services, the second smallest of the component-specific titles, contains appropriations for the U S  Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)  In FY2018, these components received $1 57 billion in net discretionary funding, as part of a projected total budget of $5 92 billion  This included $10 million in supplemental appropriations for FLETC  The Trump Administration requested $1 53 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for components included in this title, as part of a total budget for these components of $6 11 billion for FY2018  The funding request was $36 million (2 3%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside supplemental appropriations, although the overall budget request was $201 million (3 3%) higher than the annual budget projected for FY2018 (again, setting aside supplemental funding)  This is due to changes in anticipated fee collections for USCIS and reorganization of most of the Office of Health Affairs and DNDO into the new CWMD component reflected in the request  Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S  3109 included $1 53 billion in net discretionary funding for components included in this title, as part of a projected total budget of $6 23 billion  This was $115 million (7 5%) more than requested, and $79 million (5 0%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, not including supplemental funding  The total budgetary resources projected under S  3109 would have been $115 million (1 9%) more than the Administration's request, and $316 million (5 3%) more than projected for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  House Appropriations Committee-reported H R  6776 included $1 64 billion in net discretionary funding for components included in this title, as part of a projected total budget of $6 21 billion  This was $97 million (6 3%) more than requested, and $60 million (3 9%) more than the amount provided for FY2018, not including supplemental funding  The total budgetary resources projected under H R  6776 would have been $97 million (1 6%) more than the Administration's request, and $297 million (5 0%) more than projected for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  P L  116-6 included $1 62 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  Enacted FY2019 appropriations were $199 million (3 3%) more than was requested by the Administration, and $163 million (10 4%) more than was provided in FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental funding  Total budgetary resources projected for FY2019 are $199 million (3 3%) more than were requested by the Administration, and $400 million (6 8%) more than was projected for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental funding  Table 4 shows these comparisons in greater detail  As noted above, the fifth title of the FY2019 DHS appropriations act contains general provisions, the impact of which may reach across the entire department, affect multiple components, or focus on a single activity  Rescissions of prior-year appropriations—cancellations of budget authority that reduce the net funding level in the bill—are found in this title  For FY2018, Division F of P L  115-141 included $489 million in rescissions  For FY2019, the Administration proposed rescinding $300 million in prior-year funding from the DRF  S  3109 included $137 million in rescissions from other appropriations, but specifically directed the $300 million the Administration had proposed rescinding from the DRF to other activities within DHS  H R  6776 did not include any rescissions, although an amendment from Representative Palazzo was passed in full committee markup on a voice vote redirecting unobligated balances from the Science and Technology Directorate to the Coast Guard  Division A of P L  116-6 included $303 million in rescissions, and a provision directing that $300 million of DRF unobligated balances be used to offset new DRF appropriations  In FY2018, funding was also included in Title V for the Financial Systems Modernization initiative and a grant program for Presidential Residence Protection costs, which are reflected in the tables for Title I and Title III, respectively, as those titles fund the components that manage these resources  For FY2019, Title V of S  3109 only funded the Financial Systems Modernization initiative, and Title V of H R  6776 only funded Presidential Residence Protection costs  Title V of P L  116-6 , Division A, included funding for both the Financial Systems Modernization initiative and Presidential Residence Protection costs  The detail table in the back of H Rept  115-948 also notes the discretionary cost of several policy changes in H R  6776   Four amendments adopted in House Appropriations Committee markup resulted in a net $13 million increase in the score of the bill, which is reflected in the detail table, but not in the tables of this report  No such costs are reflected in the detail table of H Rept  116-9   For additional perspectives on FY2019 DHS appropriations, see the following: CRS Report R44604, Trends in the Timing and Size of DHS Appropriations: In Brief ; CRS Report R44052, DHS Budget v  DHS Appropriations: Fact Sheet ; and CRS Report R45262, Comparing DHS Component Funding, FY2019: In Brief   Congressional clients also may wish to consult CRS's experts directly  The following table lists CRS analysts and specialists who have expertise in policy areas linked to DHS appropriations  Budget Authority, Obligations, and Outlays Federal government spending involves a multistep process that begins with the enactment of budget authority by Congress  Federal agencies then obligate funds from enacted budget authority to pay for their activities  Finally, payments are made to liquidate those obligations; the actual payment amounts are reflected in the budget as outlays  Budget authority is established through appropriations acts or direct spending legislation and determines the amounts that are available for federal agencies to spend  The Antideficiency Act prohibits federal agencies from obligating more funds than the budget authority enacted by Congress  Budget authority also may be indefinite in amount, as when Congress enacts language providing "such sums as may be necessary" to complete a project or purpose  Budget authority may be available on a one-year, multiyear, or no-year basis  One-year budget authority is available for obligation only during a specific fiscal year; any unobligated funds at the end of that year are no longer available for spending  Multiyear budget authority specifies a range of time during which funds may be obligated for spending, and no-year budget authority is available for obligation for an indefinite period of time  Obligations are incurred when federal agencies employ personnel, enter into contracts, receive services, and engage in similar transactions in a given fiscal year—which create a legal requirement for the government to pay  Outlays are the funds that are actually spent during the fiscal year  Because multiyear and no-year budget authorities may be obligated over a number of years, outlays do not always match the budget authority enacted in a given year  Additionally, budget authority may be obligated in one fiscal year but spent in a future fiscal year, especially with certain contracts  In sum, budget authority allows federal agencies to incur obligations and authorizes payments, or outlays, to be made from the Treasury  Discretionary funded agencies and programs, and appropriated entitlement programs, are funded each year in appropriations acts  Discretionary and Mandatory Spending Gross budget authority , or the total funds available for spending by a federal agency, may be composed of discretionary and mandatory spending  Discretionary spending is not mandated by existing law and is thus appropriated yearly by Congress through appropriations acts  The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 defines discretionary appropriations as budget authority provided in annual appropriations acts and the outlays derived from that authority, but it excludes appropriations for entitlements  Mandatory spending , also known as direct spending , consists of budget authority and resulting outlays provided in laws other than appropriations acts and is typically not appropriated each year  Some mandatory entitlement programs, however, must be appropriated each year and are included in appropriations acts  Within DHS, Coast Guard retirement pay is an example of appropriated mandatory spending  Offsetting Collections Offsetting funds are collected by the federal government, either from government accounts or the public, as part of a business-type transaction such as collection of a fee  These funds are not considered federal revenue  Instead, they are counted as negative outlays  DHS net discretionary budget authority , or the total funds appropriated by Congress each year, is composed of discretionary spending minus any fee or fund collections that offset discretionary spending  Some collections offset a portion of an agency's discretionary budget authority  Other collections offset an agency's mandatory spending  These mandatory spending elements are typically entitlement programs under which individuals, businesses, or units of government that meet the requirements or qualifications established by law are entitled to receive certain payments if they establish eligibility  The DHS budget features two mandatory entitlement programs: the Secret Service and the Coast Guard retired pay accounts (pensions)  Some entitlements are funded by permanent appropriations, and others are funded by annual appropriations  Secret Service retirement pay is a permanent appropriation and, as such, is not annually appropriated  In contrast, Coast Guard retirement pay is annually appropriated  In addition to these entitlements, the DHS budget contains offsetting Trust and Public Enterprise Funds  These funds are not appropriated by Congress  They are available for obligation and included in the President's budget to calculate the gross budget authority  302(a) and 302(b) Allocations In general practice, the maximum budget authority for annual appropriations (including DHS) is determined through a two-stage congressional budget process  In the first stage, Congress sets overall spending totals in the annual concurrent resolution on the budget  Subsequently, these totals are allocated among the appropriations committees, usually through the statement of managers for the conference report on the budget resolution  These amounts are known as the 302(a) allocations   They include discretionary totals available to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations for enactment in annual appropriations bills through the subcommittees responsible for the development of the bills  In the second stage of the process, the appropriations committees allocate the 302(a) discretionary funds among their subcommittees for each of the appropriations bills  These amounts are known as the 302(b) allocations   These allocations must add up to no more than the 302(a) discretionary allocation and form the basis for enforcing budget discipline, since any bill reported with a total above the ceiling is subject to a point of order  The 302(b) allocations may be adjusted during the year by the respective appropriations committee issuing a report delineating the revised suballocations as the various appropriations bills progress toward final enactment  No subcommittee allocations are developed for conference reports or enacted appropriations bills  Table A-1 shows comparable figures for the 302(b) allocation for FY2018, based on the adjusted net discretionary budget authority included in Division F of P L  115-141 , the President's request for FY2019, and the House and Senate subcommittee allocations for the Homeland Security appropriations bills for FY2019  The Budget Control Act, Discretionary Spending Caps, and Adjustments The Budget Control Act established enforceable discretionary limits, or caps, for defense and nondefense spending for each fiscal year from FY2012 through FY2021  Subsequent legislation, including the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, amended those caps  Most of the budget for DHS is considered nondefense spending  In addition, the Budget Control Act allows for adjustments that would raise the statutory caps to cover funding for overseas contingency operations/Global War on Terror, emergency spending, and, to a limited extent, disaster relief and appropriations for continuing disability reviews and control of health care fraud and abuse  Three of the four justifications outlined in the Budget Control Act for adjusting the caps on discretionary budget authority have played a role in DHS's appropriations process  Two of these—emergency spending and overseas contingency operations/Global War on Terror—are not limited  The third justification—disaster relief—is limited  Under the Budget Control Act, the allowable adjustment for disaster relief was determined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), using the following formula until FY2019: Limit on disaster relief cap adjustment for the fiscal year = Rolling average of the disaster relief spending over the last ten fiscal years (throwing out the high and low years) + the unused amount of the potential adjustment for disaster relief from the previous fiscal year  The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 amended the above formula, increasing the allowable size of the adjustment by adding 5% of the amount of emergency-designated funding for major disasters under the Stafford Act, calculated by OMB as $6 296 billion  The act also extended the availability of unused adjustment capacity  In August 2018, OMB released a sequestration update report for FY2019 that provided a preview estimate of the allowable adjustment for FY2019 of $14 965 billion —the second-largest allowable adjustment for disaster relief in the history of the mechanism  $12 billion of that adjustment was exercised in P L  116-6 , Division A, in appropriations for the Disaster Relief Fund  No other annual appropriations used the disaster relief adjustment for FY2019  


Report 2:  Administrations supported the general international stance that the Golan is Syrian territory occupied by Israel, with its final status subject to negotiation  In reaction to the U S  proclamation, others in the international community have insisted that the Golan's status has not changed  In Congress, Senate and House bills introduced in February 2019 ( S  567 and H R  1372 ) support Israeli sovereignty claims to the Golan, and would treat the Golan as part of Israel in any existing or future law "relating to appropriations or foreign commerce " For decades after 1967, various Israeli leaders, reportedly including Prime Minister Netanyahu as late as 2011, had entered into indirect talks with Syria aimed at returning some portion of the Golan as part of a lasting peace agreement  However, the effect of civil war on Syria and the surrounding region, including an increase in Iran's presence, may have influenced Netanyahu to shift focus from negotiating with Syria on a "land for peace" basis to obtaining international support for Israel's claims of sovereignty  As part of the periodic conflict in Syria between Israel and Iran , some Iranian missiles have targeted Israeli positions in the Golan  The Syrian government has denounced the U S  policy change as an illegal violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and insisted that Syria is determined to recover the Golan  Additionally, observers have argued that the policy change could unintentionally bolster Syrian President Bashar al Asad within Syria by rallying Syrian nationalistic sentiment in opposition to Israel's claims to the Golan and deflecting attention from Iran's activities inside Syria  Since 1974, the U N  Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled an area of the Golan Heights between the regions controlled by Israel and Syria, with about 880 troops from five countries stationed there as of January 2019  During that time, Israel's forces in the Golan have not faced serious military resistance to their continued deployment, despite some security threats and diplomatic challenges  Periodic resolutions by the U N  General Assembly have criticized Israel's occupation as hindering regional peace and Israel's settlement and de facto annexation of the Golan as illegal  Hezbollah's forces and Israel's military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader conflict  Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional implications  Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah's buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds  Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran over Iran's presence in Syria raises questions about the potential for Hezbollah's forces in Lebanon to open another front against Israel  After the September 2018 incident leading to Russia's installation of an S-300 system in Syria (discussed above), Iran reportedly began directly transferring weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon while reducing Syria's use as a transshipment hub  One Israeli media account warned that Hezbollah's threat to Israel is increasing because of initiatives to build precision-weapons factories in Lebanon and to set up a military infrastructure in southern Syria  In late 2018 and early 2019, Israel's military undertook an effort—dubbed "Operation Northern Shield"—to seal six Hezbollah attack tunnels to prevent them from crossing into Israel  Israeli officials claim that they do not want another war, while at the same time taking measures aimed at constraining and deterring Hezbollah, including through consultation with the U N  Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)  President Trump has expressed interest in brokering a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and his Administration has supposedly prepared a proposal to facilitate negotiations, but the Administration has repeatedly postponed releasing the proposal  Many factors may account for the delays, including recent U S  actions regarding Jerusalem, tension in and around the Gaza Strip, reduced funding for the Palestinians, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and political jockeying and domestic constraints among Israelis and Palestinians  The U S  decision—announced in December 2017—to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the U S  embassy there has fed U S -Palestinian tensions  Israeli leaders generally celebrated the change, but Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas strongly objected  Many other countries opposed President Trump's actions on Jerusalem, as reflected in action at the United Nations  Claiming U S  bias favoring Israel, Palestinian leaders broke off high-level political contacts with the United States shortly after the December 2017 announcement and have made efforts to advance Palestinian national claims in international fora  However, the PA continues security coordination with Israel in the West Bank  U S -Palestinian tensions appear to have influenced Administration decisions to cut off various types of U S  funding to the Palestinians, and arguably have dimmed prospects for restarting Israeli-Palestinian talks  In a September 2018 address before the U N  General Assembly, PLO Chairman/PA President Abbas denounced Administration actions that he characterized as taking disputed Israeli-Palestinian issues—such as Jerusalem's status and Palestinian refugee claims—off the negotiating table  Funding for economic and humanitarian needs in the West Bank and Gaza could become even scarcer  In February 2019, Israel announced that it would withhold a portion of the tax revenue it collects for the PA because—pursuant to a law passed by the Knesset in 2018—Israel had determined that amount represented PLO/PA payments made on behalf of individuals allegedly involved in terrorist acts  In response, Abbas announced that the PA would completely reject monthly revenue transfers from Israel if it withheld any amount, even though the transfers comprise approximately 65% of the PA budget  For February, Israel withheld approximately $11 million from the $193 million due to the PA, with the PA rejecting the entire amount as a result  The PA is reportedly seeking temporary financial support from the private sector and local banks, and also asking the Arab League to follow through on its 2010 decision to provide $100 million per month as a "financial safety net" for the PA  At the end of January 2019, U S  bilateral aid to the Palestinians—including nonlethal security assistance that Israel generally supports—ended completely due to the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA, P L  115-253 ), which became law on October 3, 2018  Two months after the law's enactment, PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah informed Secretary of State Michael Pompeo that the PA would not accept aid that subjected it to federal court jurisdiction  Apparently, U S  aid will not resume unless Congress amends or repeals the ATCA, or the Administration channels the aid differently  Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor Jared Kushner has stated that the Administration will publicly release a peace plan sometime after Israeli national elections, which are set to occur on April 9, 2019  According to Kushner, the peace plan contains detailed proposals on the various issues that divide Israel and the PLO  Many observers express skepticism about the prospect that these proposals can serve as a basis for the serious resumption of bilateral talks, but Kushner has reportedly said that the Administration is focusing on formulating "realistic solutions," and that "privately, people are more flexible " U S  officials hope to surmount potential obstacles to the peace plan in the Israeli and Palestinian domestic arenas by obtaining political and economic support for the U S  initiative from key Arab states in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Egypt  A number of Arab states share common interests in working behind the scenes with Israel to counter Iranian regional influence  While some diplomatic developments have fed speculation about warming Arab-Israeli ties, reports suggest that key Arab Gulf states remain reluctant to embrace more formal relations with Israel without a resolution of the Palestinian issue  Saudi Arabia's press agency responded to the U S  recognition of Israel's claims to sovereignty in the Golan Heights by saying that it "will have significant negative effects on the peace process in the Middle East and the security and stability of the region " In a statement with implications both for domestic and international audiences, Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly said that the March 2019 change in U S  policy on the Golan proves that countries can retain territory captured in a defensive war  His statement prompted speculation over the possibility that Israeli leaders might consider annexing part of the West Bank and whether the situation in the Golan is sufficiently similar to invite comparison  Days before the April elections, Netanyahu asserted that if he were to lead the next government, he would apply Israeli law to West Bank settlements  The closely contested Israeli national elections—scheduled for April 9, 2019—and the subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for the country's leadership and future policies  Prime Minister Netanyahu faces a challenge from the centrist Blue and White party under the combined leadership of former top general Benny Gantz and former Finance Minister Yair Lapid  Some setbacks for Netanyahu during the campaign have included the attorney general's announcement of probable corruption-related indictments against Netanyahu, new media allegations of possible misconduct relating to Israel's procurement of German submarines, and questions about some individuals or groups possibly spreading rumors against Netanyahu's opponents via social media  Yet, some observers calculate that Netanyahu's Likud could possibly get fewer Knesset seats than Blue and White and still form the next coalition  For more information on the actors involved in the elections, see CRS Insight IN11068, Israel: April 2019 Elections and Probable Indictments Against Prime Minister Netanyahu , by Jim Zanotti and this report's Appendix   In July 2018, the Knesset passed a Basic Law defining Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people  Some observers have expressed concern that the law might further undermine the place of Arabs in Israeli society, while others view its effect as mainly symbolic  In March 2019, Netanyahu said that Israel is a Jewish, democratic state with equal rights for all its citizens, and "the nation-state not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people," reviving domestic debate about the 2018 law and perhaps seeking support during the election campaign from sympathetic voter groups 

ground_truth: Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas. Matters of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations include Israel's ability to address the threats it faces in its region. Shared U.S.-Israel concerns about Iran and its allies on the nuclear issue and in Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Palestinian issues. Israeli domestic political issues, including elections scheduled for 2019. Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence. It maintains conventional military superiority relative to neighboring states and the Palestinians. It also takes measures to deter attack and defend its population and borders from evolving asymmetric threats such as rockets and missiles, cross-border tunneling, drones, and cyberattacks. Additionally, Israel has an undeclared but presumed nuclear weapons capability. Against a backdrop of strong bilateral cooperation, Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually from FY2019 to FY2028, along with additional amounts from Defense Department accounts for missile defense. All of these amounts remain subject to congressional appropriations. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu released new Israeli intelligence on Iran's nuclear program in April 2018, days before President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that constrains Iran's nuclear activities. It is unclear whether Israel might take future military action in Iran if Iranian nuclear activities resume. Since 2018, Israel has conducted a number of military operations in Syria against Iran and its allies, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel and Iran also appear to be competing for military advantage over each other at the Israel-Lebanon border. Amid uncertainty in the area, in March 2019 President Trump recognized Israel's claim to sovereignty over the Golan Heights, changing long-standing U.S. policy that held—in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 497 from 1981—the Golan was occupied Syrian territory whose final status was subject to Israel-Syria negotiation. The prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process are complicated by many factors. Palestinian leaders cut off high-level political contacts with the Trump Administration after it recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017. U.S.-Palestinian tensions have since worsened amid U.S. cutoffs of funding to the Palestinians and diplomatic moves—including the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Palestinian leaders interpreted these actions as prejudicing their claims to a capital in Jerusalem and to a just resolution of Palestinian refugee claims. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has welcomed these U.S. actions. The Trump Administration has suggested that it will release a proposed peace plan after Israeli elections, which are scheduled for April 9, 2019. Speculation continues about how warming ties between Israel and Arab Gulf states may affect Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, though Saudi Arabia said that the U.S. policy change on the Golan Heights would negatively affect the peace process. Bouts of tension and violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza have continued—reportedly accompanied by indirect talks between the two parties that are being brokered by Egypt and aim for a long-term cease-fire. Domestically, Israel is preparing for the April 9 elections, which are closely contested. Former top general Benny Gantz is combining with former Finance Minister Yair Lapid to challenge Netanyahu, whom the attorney general has recommended be indicted for corruption in three separate cases. The elections and subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for Israel's future leadership and policies.