prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: Our past work has identified progress and challenges in a number of areas related to DHS’s management of the CFATS program including (1) the process for identifying high risk chemical facilities; (2) how it assesses risk and prioritizes facilities; (3) reviewing and approving facility security plans; (4) how it conducts facility compliance inspections; and (5) efforts to conduct stakeholder outreach and gather feedback  DHS has made a number of programmatic changes to CFATS in recent years that may also impact its progress in addressing our open recommendations; these changes are included as part of our ongoing review of the program  In May 2014, we found that more than 1,300 facilities had reported having ammonium nitrate to DHS  However, based on our review of state data and records, there were more facilities with ammonium nitrate holdings than those that had reported to DHS under the CFATS program  Thus, we concluded that some facilities that were required to report may have failed to do so  We recommended that DHS work with other agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to develop and implement methods of improving data sharing among agencies and with states as members of a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group  DHS agreed with our recommendation and has since addressed it  Specifically, DHS compared DHS data with data from other federal agencies, such as EPA, as well as member states from the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group to identify potentially noncompliant facilities  As a result of this effort, in July 2015, DHS officials reported that they had identified about 1,000 additional facilities that should have reported information to comply with CFATS and subsequently contacted these facilities to ensure compliance  DHS officials told us that they continue to engage with states to identify potentially non-compliant facilities  For example, as of June 2018, DHS officials stated they have received 43 lists of potentially noncompliant facilities from 34 state governments, which are in various stages of review by DHS  DHS officials also told us that they recently hired an individual to serve as the lead staff member responsible for overseeing this effort  DHS has also taken action to strengthen the accuracy of data it uses to identify high risk facilities  In July 2015, we found that DHS used self- reported and unverified data to determine the risk categorization for facilities that held toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released  At the time, DHS required that facilities self- report the Distance of Concern—an area in which exposure to a toxic chemical cloud could cause serious injury or fatalities from short-term exposure—as part of its Top-Screen  We estimated that more than 2,700 facilities with a toxic release threat had misreported the Distance of Concern and therefore recommended that DHS (1) develop a plan to implement a new Top-Screen to address errors in the Distance of Concern submitted by facilities, and (2) identify potentially miscategorized facilities that could cause the greatest harm and verify that the Distance of Concern of these facilities report is accurate  DHS has fully addressed both of these recommendations  Specifically, DHS implemented an updated Top-Screen in October 2016 and now collects data from facilities and calculates the Distance of Concern itself, rather than relying on the facilities’ calculation  In response to our second recommendation, in November 2016, DHS officials stated they completed an assessment of all Top-Screens that reported threshold quantities of toxic release chemicals of interest and identified 158 facilities with the potential to cause the greatest harm  As of May 2017, according to ISCD officials, 156 of the 158 facilities submitted updated Top-Screens and 145 of the 156 Top-Screens had undergone a quality assurance review process  DHS has also taken actions to better assess regulated facilities’ risks in order to place the facilities into the appropriate risk tier  In April 2013, we reported that DHS’s risk assessment approach did not consider all of the elements of threat, vulnerability, and consequence associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals  Our work showed that DHS’s risk assessment was based primarily on consequences from human casualties, but did not consider economic consequences, as called for by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the CFATS regulation  We also found that (1) DHS’s approach was not consistent with the NIPP because it treated every facility as equally vulnerable to a terrorist attack regardless of location or on-site security and (2) DHS was not using threat data for 90 percent of the tiered facilities—those tiered for the risk of theft or diversion—and using 5-year-old threat data for the remaining 10 percent of those facilities that were tiered for the risks of release or sabotage  We recommended that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk and conduct a peer review after doing so  DHS agreed with our recommendations and has made progress towards addressing them  Specifically, with regard to our recommendation that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk, DHS worked with Sandia National Laboratories to develop a model to estimate the economic consequences of a chemical attack  In addition, DHS worked with Oak Ridge National Laboratory to devise a new tiering methodology, called the Second Generation Risk Engine  In so doing, DHS revised the CFATS threat, vulnerability, and consequence scoring methods to better cover the range of CFATS security issues  Additionally, with regard to our recommendation that DHS conduct a peer review after enhancing its risk assessment approach, DHS conducted peer reviews and technical reviews with government organizations and facility owners and operators, and worked with Sandia National Laboratories to verify and validate the new tiering approach  We are currently reviewing the reports and data that DHS has provided about its new tiering methodology as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of this work later this summer  To further enhance its risk assessment approach, in fall 2016, DHS also revised its Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT), which supports DHS efforts to gather information from facilities to assess their risk  According to DHS officials, the new tool—called CSAT 2 0—is intended to eliminate duplication and confusion associated with DHS’s original CSAT  DHS officials told us that they have improved the tool by revising some questions in the original CSAT to make them easier to understand; eliminating some questions; and pre-populating data from one part of the tool to another so that users do not have to retype the same information multiple times  DHS officials also told us that the facilities that have used the CSAT 2 0 have provided favorable feedback that the new tool is more efficient and less burdensome than the original CSAT  Finally, DHS officials told us that as of June 2018, DHS has completed all notifications and has processed tiering results for all but 226 facilities  DHS officials stated they are currently working to identify correct points of contact to update registration information for these remaining facilities  We are currently assessing DHS’s efforts to assess risk and prioritize facilities as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of this work in our report later this summer  DHS has also made progress reviewing and approving facility site security plans by reducing the time it takes to review these plans and eliminating the backlog of plans awaiting review  In April 2013, we reported that DHS revised its procedures for reviewing facilities’ security plans to address DHS managers’ concerns that the original process was slow, overly complicated, and caused bottlenecks in approving plans  We estimated that it could take DHS another 7 to 9 years to review the approximately 3,120 plans in its queue at that time
Report 2:  Previous appropriations and recommendations for FY2020 are shown in Table 5   The Energy and Water Development bill has funded all DOE programs since FY2005  Major DOE activities include (1) research and development (R&D) on renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear power, fossil energy, and electricity; (2) the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; (3) energy statistics; (4) general science; (5) environmental cleanup; and (6) nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs  Table 6 provides the recent funding history for DOE programs, which are briefly described further below  DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) conducts research and development on transportation energy technology, energy efficiency in buildings and manufacturing processes, and the production of solar, wind, geothermal, and other renewable energy  EERE also administers formula grants to states for making energy efficiency improvements to low-income housing units and for state energy planning  The Sustainable Transportation program area includes electric vehicles, vehicle efficiency, and alternative fuels  DOE's electric vehicle program aims to "reduce the cost of electric vehicle batteries by more than half, to less than $100/kWh [kilowatt-hour] (ultimate goal is $80/kWh), increase range to 300 miles, and decrease charge time to 15 minutes or less " DOE's vehicle fuel cell program is focusing on the costs of fuel cells and their hydrogen fuel  According to the FY2020 budget request, "To be cost competitive with gasoline-powered internal combustion engines on a cents-per-mile driven basis, the cost of hydrogen delivered and dispensed needs to be less than $4/gge [gasoline gallon equivalent] (untaxed), and the cost of a durable fuel cell system to be less than $40/kW " Bioenergy goals include the development of "drop-in" fuels—fuels that would be largely compatible with existing energy infrastructure and vehicles, with a goal of $3/gge  Renewable power programs focus on electricity generation from solar, wind, water, and geothermal sources  The solar energy program has a goal of achieving, by 2030, costs of 3 cents per kWh for unsubsidized, utility-scale photovoltaics (PV)  Wind R&D is to focus on early-stage research and testing to reduce costs and improve performance and reliability  The geothermal program is to focus on developing "enhanced geothermal systems" with an electricity generation cost target of 20 8 cents/kWh by 2022  In the energy efficiency program area, the advanced manufacturing program focuses on improving the energy efficiency of manufacturing processes and on the manufacturing of energy-related products  The building technologies program includes R&D on lighting, space conditioning, windows, and control technologies to reduce building energy-use intensity  The energy efficiency program also provides weatherization grants to states for improving the energy efficiency of low-income housing units and state energy planning grants  For more details, see CRS Report R44980, DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE): Appropriations Status , by Corrie E  Clark  The Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) was created from programs that were previously part of the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability  The programs that were not moved into CESER became part of the DOE Office of Electricity (OE)  OE's mission is to lead DOE efforts "to strengthen, transform, and improve energy infrastructure so that consumers have access to secure and resilient sources of energy " Major priorities of OE are developing a model of North American energy vulnerabilities, pursuing megawatt-scale electricity storage, integrating electric power system sensing technology, and analyzing electricity policy issues  The office also includes the DOE power marketing administrations, which are funded from separate appropriations accounts  CESER is the federal government's lead entity for energy sector-specific responses to energy security emergencies—whether caused by physical infrastructure problems or by cybersecurity issues  The office conducts R&D on energy infrastructure security technology; provides energy sector security guidelines, training, and technical assistance; and enhances energy sector emergency preparedness and response  DOE's Multiyear Plan for Energy Sector Cybersecurity describes the department's strategy to "strengthen today's energy delivery systems by working with our partners to address growing threats and promote continuous improvement, and develop game-changing solutions that will create inherently secure, resilient, and self-defending energy systems for tomorrow " The plan includes three goals that DOE has established for energy sector cybersecurity: strengthen energy sector cybersecurity preparedness; coordinate cyber incident response and recovery; and accelerate game-changing research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) of resilient energy delivery systems  DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) "focuses on three major mission areas: the nation's existing nuclear fleet, the development of advanced nuclear reactor concepts, and fuel cycle technologies," according to DOE's FY2020 budget justification  It calls nuclear energy "a key element of United States energy independence, energy dominance, electricity grid resiliency, national security, and clean baseload power " The Reactor Concepts program area includes research on advanced reactors, including advanced small modular reactors, and research to enhance the "sustainability" of existing commercial light water reactors  Advanced reactor research focuses on "Generation IV" reactors, as opposed to the existing fleet of commercial light water reactors, which are generally classified as generations II and III  R&D under this program focuses on advanced coolants, fuels, materials, and other technology areas that could apply to a variety of advanced reactors  To help develop those technologies, the Reactor Concepts program is developing a Versatile Test Reactor that would allow fuels and materials to be tested in a fast neutron environment (in which neutrons would not be slowed by water, graphite, or other "moderators")  Research on extending the life of existing commercial light water reactors beyond 60 years, the maximum operating period currently licensed by NRC, is being conducted by this program with industry cost-sharing  The Fuel Cycle Research and Development program includes generic research on nuclear waste management and disposal  One of the program's primary activities is the development of technologies to separate the radioactive constituents of spent fuel for reuse or solidifying into stable waste forms  Other major research areas in the Fuel Cycle R&D program include the development of accident-tolerant fuels for existing commercial reactors, evaluation of fuel cycle options, and development of improved technologies to prevent diversion of nuclear materials for weapons  The program is also developing sources of high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU), in which uranium is enriched to between 5% and 20% in the fissile isotope U-235, for potential use in advanced reactors  For more information, see CRS Report R45706, Advanced Nuclear Reactors: Technology Overview and Current Issues , by Danielle A  Arostegui and Mark Holt  Much of DOE's Fossil Energy R&D Program focuses on carbon capture and storage for power plants fueled by coal and natural gas  Major activities include Advanced Coal Energy Systems and Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS); Natural Gas Technologies; and Unconventional Fossil Energy Technologies from Petroleum—Oil Technologies  Advanced Coal Energy Systems includes R&D on modular coal-gasification systems, advanced turbines, solid oxide fuel cells, advanced sensors and controls, and power generation efficiency  Elements of the CCUS program include the following: Carbon Capture subprogram for separating CO 2 in both precombustion and postcombustion systems; Carbon Utilization subprogram for R&D on technologies to convert carbon to marketable products, such as chemicals and polymers; and Carbon Storage subprogram on long-term geologic storage of CO 2 , focusing on saline formations, oil and natural gas reservoirs, unmineable coal seams, basalts, and organic shales  For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10589, FY2019 Funding for CCS and Other DOE Fossil Energy R&D , by Peter Folger, and CRS Report R44472, Funding for Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) at DOE: In Brief , by Peter Folger  The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), authorized by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act ( P L  94-163 ) in 1975, consists of caverns built within naturally occurring salt domes in Louisiana and Texas  The SPR provides strategic and economic security against foreign and domestic disruptions in U S  oil supplies via an emergency stockpile of crude oil  The program fulfills U S  obligations under the International Energy Program, which avails the United States of International Energy Agency (IEA) assistance through its coordinated energy emergency response plans, and provides a deterrent against energy supply disruptions  DOE has been conducting a major maintenance program to address aging infrastructure and a deferred maintenance backlog at SPR facilities  The federal government has not purchased oil for the SPR since 1994  Beginning in 2000, additions to the SPR were made with royalty-in-kind (RIK) oil acquired by DOE in lieu of cash royalties paid on production from federal offshore leases  In September 2009, the Secretary of the Interior announced a phaseout of the RIK Program  By early 2010, the SPR's capacity reached 727 million barrels  A series of oil sales and purchases since then have resulted in a net reduction of the SPR inventory  Currently, the SPR contains about 649 million barrels  Congress has enacted several laws since 2015 that mandate sales of SPR oil, including the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P L  114-74 ), the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act ( P L  114-94 ), the 21 st Century Cures Act of 2016 ( P L  114-255 ), the 2017 Tax Revision ( P L  115-97 ), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ), and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018  Broadly considered, this legislation requires oil to be sold from the reserve over the period FY2017 through FY2027, totaling 266 million barrels  For more information, see CRS Report R45577, Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Mandated Sales and Reform , by Robert Pirog, and CRS In Focus IF10869, Reconsidering the Strategic Petroleum Reserve , by Robert Pirog  The DOE Office of Science conducts basic research in six program areas: advanced scientific computing research, basic energy sciences, biological and environmental research, fusion energy sciences, high-energy physics, and nuclear physics  According to DOE's FY2020 budget justification, the Office of Science "is the Nation's largest Federal sponsor of basic research in the physical sciences and the lead Federal agency supporting fundamental scientific research for our Nation's energy future " DOE's Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) program focuses on developing and maintaining computing and networking capabilities for science and research in applied mathematics, computer science, and advanced networking  The program plays a key role in the DOE-wide effort to advance the development of exascale computing, which seeks to build a computer that can solve scientific problems 1,000 times faster than today's best machines  DOE has asserted that the department is on a path to have a capable exascale machine by the early 2020s  Basic Energy Sciences (BES), the largest program area in the Office of Science, focuses on understanding, predicting, and ultimately controlling matter and energy at the electronic, atomic, and molecular levels  The program supports research in disciplines such as condensed matter and materials physics, chemistry, and geosciences  BES also provides funding for scientific user facilities (e g , the National Synchrotron Light Source II, and the Linac Coherent Light Source-II), and certain DOE research centers and hubs (e g , Energy Frontier Research Centers, as well as the Batteries and Energy Storage and Fuels from Sunlight Energy Innovation Hubs)  Biological and Environmental Research (BER) seeks a predictive understanding of complex biological, climate, and environmental systems across a continuum from the small scale (e g , genomic research) to the large (e g , Earth systems and climate)  Within BER, Biological Systems Science focuses on plant and microbial systems, while Biological and Environmental Research supports climate-relevant atmospheric and ecosystem modeling and research  BER facilities and centers include four Bioenergy Research Centers and the Environmental Molecular Science Laboratory at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory  Fusion Energy Sciences (FES) seeks to increase understanding of the behavior of matter at very high temperatures and to establish the science needed to develop a fusion energy source  FES provides funding for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, a multinational effort to design and build an experimental fusion reactor  According to DOE, ITER "aims to provide fusion power output approaching reactor levels of hundreds of megawatts, for hundreds of seconds " However, many U S  analysts have expressed concern about ITER's cost, schedule, and management, as well as the budgetary impact on domestic fusion research  The High Energy Physics (HEP) program conducts research on the fundamental constituents of matter and energy, including studies of dark energy and the search for dark matter  Nuclear Physics supports research on the nature of matter, including its basic constituents and their interactions  A major project in the Nuclear Physics program is the construction of the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams at Michigan State University  A separate DOE office, the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E), was authorized by the America COMPETES Act ( P L  110-69 ) to support transformational energy technology research projects  DOE budget documents describe ARPA-E's mission as overcoming long-term, high-risk technological barriers to the development of energy technologies  For more details, see CRS Report R45150, Federal Research and Development (R&D) Funding: FY2019 , coordinated by John F  Sargent Jr  DOE's Loan Programs Office provides loan guarantees for projects that deploy specified energy technologies, as authorized by Title 17 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P L  109-58 ), direct loans for advanced vehicle manufacturing technologies, and loan guarantees for tribal energy projects  Section 1703 of the act authorizes loan guarantees for advanced energy technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and Section 1705 established a temporary program for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects  Title 17 allows DOE to provide loan guarantees for up to 80% of construction costs for eligible energy projects  Successful applicants must pay an up-front fee, or "subsidy cost," to cover potential losses under the loan guarantee program  Under the loan guarantee agreements, the federal government would repay all covered loans if the borrower defaulted  Such guarantees would reduce the risk to lenders and allow them to provide financing at below-market interest rates  The following is a summary of loan guarantee amounts that have been authorized (loan guarantee ceilings) for various technologies: $8 3 billion for nonnuclear technologies under Section 1703; $2 0 billion for unspecified projects from FY2007 under Section 1703; $18 5 billion for nuclear power plants ($12 0 billion committed); $4 billion for loan guarantees for uranium enrichment plants; $1 18 billion for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects under Section 1703, in addition to other loan guarantee ceilings, which can include applications that were pending under Section 1705 before it expired; and In addition to the loan guarantee ceilings above, an appropriation of $161 million was provided for subsidy costs for renewable energy and energy efficiency loan guarantees under Section 1703  If the subsidy costs averaged 10% of the loan guarantees, this funding could leverage loan guarantees totaling about $1 6 billion  The only loan guarantees under Section 1703 were $8 3 billion in guarantees provided to the consortium building two new reactors at the Vogtle plant in Georgia  DOE committed an additional $3 7 billion in loan guarantees for the Vogtle project on March 22, 2019  Another nuclear loan guarantee is being sought by NuScale Power to build a small modular reactor in Idaho  In the absence of explosive testing of nuclear weapons, the United States has adopted a science-based program to maintain and sustain confidence in the reliability of the U S  nuclear stockpile  Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 ( P L  103-160 )  The goal of the program, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 ( P L  111-84 , §3111), is to ensure "that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of underground nuclear weapons testing " The program is operated by NNSA, a semiautonomous agency within DOE established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 ( P L  106-65 , Title XXXII)  NNSA implements the Stockpile Stewardship Program through the activities funded by the Weapons Activities account in the NNSA budget  Most of NNSA's weapons activities take place at the nuclear weapons complex, which consists of three laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, CA; and Sandia National Laboratories, NM and CA); four production sites (Kansas City National Security Campus, MO; Pantex Plant, TX; Savannah River Site, SC; and Y-12 National Security Complex, TN); and the Nevada National Security Site (formerly the Nevada Test Site)  NNSA manages and sets policy for the weapons complex; contractors to NNSA operate the eight sites  Radiological activities at these sites are subject to oversight and recommendations by the independent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, funded by Title IV of the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill  There are three major program areas in the Weapons Activities account  Directed Stockpile Work includes the life extension programs (LEPs) on existing warheads and stockpile services programs that monitor their condition; and maintaining warheads through repairs, refurbishment, and modifications  It also includes funding for research and development in support of specific warheads, and dismantlement of warheads that have been removed from the stockpile  This last activity received more significant funding as the number of warheads in the U S  stockpile declined after the Cold War; it also provides a source for critical components for warheads remaining in the stockpile  Directed Stockpile Work also involves programs that work on the materials needed for nuclear warheads, including the plutonium pits that are the core of the weapons  Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) includes five programs that focus on "efforts to develop and maintain critical capabilities, tools, and processes needed to support science based stockpile stewardship, refurbishment, and continued certification of the stockpile over the long-term in the absence of underground nuclear testing " This area includes operation of some large experimental facilities, such as the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory  Infrastructure and Operations has, as its main funding elements, material recycle and recovery, recapitalization of facilities, and construction of facilities  The latter include two major projects that have generated congressional controversy: the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project, which deals with plutonium, at Los Alamos National Laboratory  Nuclear Weapons Activities also has several smaller programs, including the following: Secure Transportation Asset, providing for safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons, components, and materials; Defense Nuclear Security, providing operations, maintenance, and construction funds for protective forces, physical security systems, personnel security, and related activities; and Information Technology and Cybersecurity, whose elements include cybersecurity, secure enterprise computing, and Federal Unclassified Information Technology  For more information, see CRS Report R44442, Energy and Water Development Appropriations: Nuclear Weapons Activities , by Amy F  Woolf, and CRS Report R45306, The U S  Nuclear Weapons Complex: Overview of Department of Energy Sites , by Amy F  Woolf and James D  Werner  DOE's nonproliferation and national security programs provide technical capabilities to support U S  efforts to prevent, detect, and counter the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide  These programs are administered by NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation  The Materials Management and Minimization program conducts activities to minimize and, where possible, eliminate stockpiles of weapons-useable material around the world  Major activities include conversion of reactors that use highly enriched uranium (useable for weapons) to low-enriched uranium, removal and consolidation of nuclear material stockpiles, and disposition of excess nuclear materials  Global Materials Security has three major program elements  International Nuclear Security focuses on increasing the security of vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear material in other countries  Radiological Security promotes the worldwide reduction and security of radioactive sources, including the removal of surplus sources and substitution of technologies that do not use radioactive materials  Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence works to improve the capability of other countries to halt illicit trafficking of nuclear materials  Nonproliferation and Arms Control works to "to support U S  nonproliferation and arms control objectives to prevent proliferation, ensure peaceful nuclear uses, and enable verifiable nuclear reductions," according to the FY2020 DOE justification  This program conducts reviews of nuclear export applications and technology transfer authorizations, implements treaty obligations, and analyzes nonproliferation policies and proposals  Other programs under Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation include research and development and construction, which advances nuclear detection and nuclear forensics technologies  Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response provides "interagency policy, contingency planning, training, and capacity building" to counter nuclear terrorism and strengthen incident response capabilities, according to the FY2020 budget justification  The development and production of nuclear weapons during half a century since the beginning of the Manhattan Project resulted in a waste and contamination legacy managed by DOE that continues to present substantial challenges today  DOE also manages legacy environmental contamination at sites used for nondefense nuclear research  In 1989, DOE established the Office of Environmental Management primarily to consolidate its responsibilities for the cleanup of former nuclear weapons production sites that had been administered under multiple offices  DOE's nuclear cleanup efforts are broad in scope and include the disposal of large quantities of radioactive and other hazardous wastes generated over decades; management and disposal of surplus nuclear materials; remediation of extensive contamination in soil and groundwater; decontamination and decommissioning of excess buildings and facilities; and safeguarding, securing, and maintaining facilities while cleanup is underway  DOE's cleanup of nuclear research sites adds a nondefense component to the EM's mission, albeit smaller in terms of the scope of their cleanup and associated funding  DOE has identified more than 100 separate sites in over 30 states that historically were involved in the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy research for civilian purposes  The geographic scope of these sites is substantial, collectively encompassing a land area of approximately 2 million acres  Cleanup remedies are in place and operational at the majority of these sites  Responsibility for the long-term stewardship of them has been transferred to the Office of Legacy Management and other offices within DOE for the operation and maintenance of cleanup remedies and monitoring  Some of the smaller sites for which DOE initially was responsible were transferred to the Army Corps of Engineers in 1997 under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP)  Once USACE completes the cleanup of a FUSRAP site, it is transferred back to DOE for long-term stewardship under the Office of Legacy Management, which is separate from EM and has its own funding account  Three appropriations accounts fund the Office of Environmental Management  The Defense Environmental Cleanup account is the largest in terms of funding, and it finances the cleanup of former nuclear weapons production sites  The Non-Defense Environmental Cleanup account funds the cleanup of federal nuclear energy research sites  Title XI of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ( P L  102-486 ) established the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund to pay for the cleanup of three federal facilities that enriched uranium for national defense and civilian purposes  Those facilities are located near Paducah, KY; Piketon, OH (Portsmouth plant); and Oak Ridge, TN  Title X of P L  102-486 authorized the reimbursement of uranium and thorium producers for their costs of cleaning up contamination attributable to uranium and thorium sold to the federal government  The adequacy of funding for the Office of Environmental Management to attain cleanup milestones across the entire site inventory has been a recurring issue  Cleanup milestones are enforceable measures incorporated into compliance agreements negotiated among DOE, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the states  These milestones establish time frames for the completion of specific actions to satisfy applicable requirements at individual sites  DOE's four Power Marketing Administrations were established to sell the power generated by the dams operated by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers  Preference in the sale of power is given to publicly owned and cooperatively owned utilities  The PMAs operate in 34 states; their assets consist primarily of transmission infrastructure in the form of more than 33,000 miles of high voltage transmission lines and 587 substations  PMA customers are responsible for repaying all power program expenses, plus the interest on capital projects  Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i e , receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority  Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress  For more information, see CRS Report R45548, The Power Marketing Administrations: Background and Current Issues , by Richard J  Campbell  Independent agencies that receive funding in Title IV of the Energy and Water Development bill include the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board  NRC is by far the largest of the independent agencies, with a total budget of more than $900 million  However, as noted in the description of NRC below, about 90% of NRC's budget is offset by fees, so that the agency's net appropriation is less than half of the total funding in Title IV  The recent appropriations history for all the Title IV agencies is shown in Table 7   Established in 1965, the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) is a regional economic development agency  It awards grants and contracts to state and local governments and nonprofit organizations to foster economic opportunities, improve workforce skills, build critical infrastructure, strengthen natural and cultural assets, and improve leadership skills and capacity in the region  ARC's authorizing statute defines the Appalachian Region as including all of West Virginia and parts of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia  More than 25 million people currently live in the region as defined  ARC provides funding to several hundred projects each year, with particular focus on the region's most economically distressed counties  Major areas of infrastructure support broadband communication systems, transportation, and water and wastewater systems  ARC has supported development of the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS), a planned 3,000-mile system of highways that connect with the U S  Interstate Highway System  According to ARC, 90 5% of ADHS is currently "complete, open to traffic, or under construction " NRC is an independent agency that establishes and enforces safety and security standards for nuclear power plants and users of nuclear materials  Major appropriations categories for NRC are shown in Table 8   Nuclear Reactor Safety is NRC's largest program and is responsible for licensing and regulating the U S  fleet of 98 power reactors, plus two under construction  NRC is also responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear waste facilities, such as the proposed underground nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV  NRC is required by law to offset about 90% of its total budget, excluding specified items, through fees charged to nuclear reactor owners and other holders of NRC licenses  As a result, NRC's net appropriation can be as low as 10% of its total funding level, depending on the activities that Congress excludes from fee recovery  For example, excluded items in NRC's FY2019 enacted appropriation are prior-year balances, development of advanced reactor regulations, and international activities  The following hearings have been held by the Energy and Water Development subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on the FY2020 budget request  Testimony and opening statements are posted on most of the web pages cited for each hearing, along with webcasts in many cases  Department of Energy , March 26, 2019, https://appropriations house gov/legislation/hearings/budget-department-of-energy   Corps of Engineers (Civil Works) and the Bureau of Reclamation , March 27, 2019, https://appropriations house gov/legislation/hearings/budget-us-army-corps-of-engineers-and-bureau-of-reclamation   National Nuclear Security Administration , April 2, 2019, https://appropriations house gov/legislation/hearings/budget-department-of-energy-national-nuclear-security-administration  DOE Science, Energy, and Environmental Management Programs , April 3, 2019, https://appropriations house gov/legislation/hearings/budget-science-energy-and-environmental-management-programs  Department of Energy , March 27, 2019, https://www appropriations senate gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-request-for-the-us-department-of-energy   National Nuclear Security Administration , April 3, 2019, https://www appropriations senate gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-request-for-the-national-nuclear-security-administration   U S  Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation , April 10, 2019, https://www appropriations senate gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-requests-for-army-corps-of-engineers-and-bureau-of-reclamation  

ground_truth: This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's January 2018 report, entitled Intellectual Property: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Address Risks Posed by Changing Counterfeits Market , ( GAO-18-216 ). Changes in the market for counterfeit goods entering the United States pose new challenges for consumers, the private sector, and U.S. agencies that enforce intellectual property rights (IPR). Specifically, growth in e-commerce has contributed to a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods in the United States, with consumers increasingly purchasing goods online and counterfeiters producing a wider variety of goods that may be sold on websites alongside authentic products. For example, 20 of 47 items GAO purchased from third-party sellers on popular consumer websites were counterfeit, according to testing by the products' rights holders (see table), highlighting potential risks to consumers. The changes in the market for counterfeit goods can also pose challenges to the private sector—for example, the challenge of distinguishing counterfeit from authentic goods listed for sale online—and complicate the enforcement efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). CBP and ICE engage in a number of activities to enhance IPR enforcement; however, while ICE has assessed some of its efforts, CBP has taken limited steps to do so. CBP's and ICE's IPR enforcement activities broadly include detecting imports of potentially IPR-infringing goods, conducting special operations at U.S. ports, engaging with international partners, and undertaking localized pilot programs or port-led initiatives. CBP and ICE have collected some performance data for each of the eight activities GAO reviewed, and ICE has taken some steps to understand the impact of its efforts. However, CBP has conducted limited evaluation of its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement. Consequently, CBP may lack information needed to ensure it is investing its resources in the most efficient and effective activities. CBP and ICE generally collaborate on IPR enforcement, but according to private sector representatives, restrictions on CBP's information sharing limit private sector enforcement efforts. GAO found that CBP and ICE have undertaken efforts that align with selected key practices for interagency collaboration, such as participating in developing a national IPR enforcement strategy and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. However, sharing additional information about seized items with rights-holding companies and e-commerce websites could improve enforcement, according to private sector representatives. CBP officials said they share information to the extent allowed under current regulations, but CBP has not completed an assessment of what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with private sector entities. Without such an assessment, CBP will not know if sharing additional information requires regulatory or legal changes.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The rise of e-commerce has contributed to a fundamental change in the market for counterfeit goods, according to our analysis of documents from CBP, ICE, and international organizations and our interviews with CBP and ICE officials  U S  agencies and international organizations have observed a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods from “underground” or secondary markets, such as flea markets or sidewalk vendors, to primary markets, including e-commerce websites, corporate and government supply chains, and traditional retail stores  Whereas secondary markets are often characterized by consumers who are knowingly purchasing counterfeits, primary markets involve counterfeiters who try to deceive consumers into purchasing goods they believe are authentic  This shift has been accompanied by changes in the ways in which counterfeit goods are sold  In the past, consumers could often rely on indicators such as the location of sale or the goods’ appearance or price to identify counterfeit goods in the marketplace  However, counterfeiters have now adopted new ways to deceive consumers  For example, as consumers increasingly purchase goods online, counterfeiters may exploit third-party online marketplaces to gain an appearance of legitimacy and access to consumers  When selling online, counterfeiters may post pictures of authentic goods on the websites where they are selling counterfeits and may post pseudonymous reviews of their products or businesses in order to appear legitimate  Additionally, by setting the price of a counterfeit at, or close to, the retail price of a genuine good, counterfeiters may deceive consumers, who will pay the higher price because they believe the goods are real or who believe that they are getting a slight bargain on genuine goods  According to CBP seizure data and CBP officials, the volume, variety, and methods of shipment of counterfeit goods seized by CBP and ICE have changed in recent years  CBP reports indicate that the number of IPR seizures increased by 38 percent in fiscal years 2012 through 2016  According to CBP data, approximately 88 percent of IPR seizures made during this period were shipped from China and Hong Kong  The variety of products being counterfeited has also increased, according to CBP officials  CBP and ICE officials noted that, while many consumers may think of luxury handbags or watches as the most commonly counterfeited goods, counterfeiting occurs in nearly every industry and across a broad range of products  In addition, according to CBP data we reviewed and officials we spoke to, the methods of importing counterfeit goods into the United States have changed in recent years  Specifically, express carriers and international mail have become the predominant form of transportation for IPR-infringing goods entering the United States, constituting approximately 90 percent of all IPR seizures in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, according to CBP data  In an attempt to illustrate the risk that consumers may unknowingly encounter counterfeit products online, we purchased a nongeneralizable sample of four types of consumer products—shoes, travel mugs, cosmetics, and phone chargers—from third-party sellers on five popular e-commerce websites  According to CBP data we reviewed and officials we spoke to, CBP often seizes IPR-infringing counterfeits of these types of products  As table 1 shows, the rights holders for the four selected products we purchased determined that 20 of the 47 items were counterfeit  We did not identify any clear reasons for the variation among the counterfeit and authentic items that we purchased based on the products that they represented, the e-commerce websites where we bought the items, or the third-party sellers from whom we bought them  For three of the four product types, at least one item we purchased was determined to be counterfeit, with results varying considerably by product  Representatives of the rights holders also could not provide a specific explanation for the variation among authentic and counterfeit goods that we received  They noted that the results of covert test purchases can fluctuate depending on enforcement activities and the variety of goods and sellers on a particular website on a given day  Rights-holder testing also showed that we purchased at least one counterfeit item and one authentic item from each of the five e-commerce websites  In addition, our analysis of the customer ratings of third-party sellers from whom we bought the items did not provide any clear indications that could warn consumers that a product marketed online may be counterfeit  For example, we received both counterfeit and authentic items from third- party sellers with ratings that were less than 70 percent positive as well as sellers with ratings that were up to 100 percent positive  Rights holders were able to determine that items we purchased were not authentic on the basis of inferior quality, incorrect markings or construction, and incorrect labeling  Some counterfeit items we purchased were easily identifiable as likely counterfeit once we received them  For example, one item contained misspellings of “Austin, TX” and “Made in China ” Other items could be more difficult for a typical consumer to identify as counterfeit  For example, the rights holder for a cosmetic product we purchased identified one counterfeit item on the basis of discrepancies in the color, composition, and design of the authentic and counterfeit items’ packaging  Counterfeit goods may also lack key elements of certification markings and other identifiers  For example, on a counterfeit phone charger we purchased, the UL certification mark did not include all components of the authentic mark  Figure 1 shows examples of these counterfeit items  The risks associated with the types of counterfeit goods we purchased can extend beyond the infringement of a company’s IPR  For example, a UL investigation of counterfeit iPhone adapters found a 99 percent failure rate in 400 counterfeit adapters tested for safety, fire, and shock hazards and found that 12 of the adapters tested posed a risk of lethal electrocution to the user  Similarly, according to a rights holder representative, counterfeits of common consumer goods, such as Yeti travel mugs, may contain higher-than-approved concentrations of dangerous chemicals such as lead, posing health risks to consumers  According to ICE, seized counterfeit cosmetics have been found to contain hazardous substances, including cyanide, arsenic, mercury, lead, urine, and rat droppings  Representatives of rights holders and e-commerce websites whom we interviewed reported taking independent action to try to protect IPR within their areas of responsibility  For example, both rights holders and e- commerce websites maintain IPR protection teams that work with one another and with law enforcement to address infringement issues  E- commerce websites may also take a variety of steps to block and remove counterfeit items listed by third-party sellers  These efforts rely on data collected through a variety of means, including consumer reporting of counterfeits, rights-holder notifications of IPR infringement, and corporate efforts to vet potential third-party sellers, according to private sector representatives  Our January 2018 report includes information on steps that consumer protection organizations and government agencies recommend consumers take to limit the risk of purchasing counterfeits online  These steps include, for example, buying only from authorized retailers online, avoiding prices that look “too good to be true,” and reporting counterfeit purchases  We identified a number of key challenges that the changes in the market for counterfeit goods can pose to CBP and ICE as well as to the private sector  First, the increasing sophistication of counterfeits can make it difficult for law enforcement officers to distinguish between legitimate and counterfeit goods  Second, as the range of counterfeit goods expands, CBP has a wider variety of goods to screen, which requires CBP officials to have in-depth knowledge of a broad range of products and of how to identify counterfeits  Third, counterfeiters may break up large shipments into multiple smaller express carrier or mail packages to decrease the risk of losing significant quantities of merchandise to a single seizure  This shift toward smaller express shipments of counterfeit goods to the United States poses challenges to CBP and ICE because, according to CBP officials, seizure processing requires roughly the same amount of time and resources regardless of shipment size or value  The changing marketplace also presents challenges to the private sector, according to representatives from rights holders and e-commerce websites  For example, it is more difficult for rights holders and e- commerce websites to identify and investigate individual counterfeit cases, because e-commerce websites face a growing inventory from a larger registry of sellers  Tracking goods from known counterfeiters through various website fulfillment and delivery mechanisms is also a significant challenge for the private sector  Furthermore, the growth of e- commerce has accelerated the pace at which counterfeiters can gain access to consumers or reinvent themselves if shut down  CBP and ICE engage in a number of activities to enhance IPR enforcement; however, while ICE has assessed some of its efforts, CBP has taken limited steps to do so  CBP’s and ICE’s IPR enforcement activities broadly include detecting imports of potentially IPR-infringing goods, conducting special operations at U S  ports, engaging with international partners, and undertaking localized pilot programs or port- led initiatives  CBP and ICE have collected some performance data on activities we reviewed, and ICE has taken some steps to better understand the impact of its efforts, such as creating a process to track cases it deems significant  However, we found that CBP has conducted limited evaluation of its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement  Consequently, we concluded that CBP may lack information needed to ensure it is investing its resources in the most efficient and effective activities  We recommended in our report that CBP take steps to evaluate the effectiveness of its IPR enforcement efforts; CBP concurred with this recommendation  Our analysis showed that CBP and ICE interagency collaboration on IPR enforcement is generally consistent with the following selected key practices for effective interagency collaboration: (1) define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; and (5) establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries  For example, the agencies may leverage resources by collocating staff or sharing their expertise  CBP and ICE have also issued guidance and developed standard operating procedures to clarify roles and responsibilities  CBP and ICE also coordinate with the private sector in a variety of ways, such as obtaining private sector assistance to determine whether detained goods are authentic and to conduct training  Representatives of rights holders and e-commerce websites noted that information shared by law enforcement entities is critical to private sector IPR enforcement, such as pursuing civil action against a counterfeiter or removing counterfeit items from websites  In the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Congress provided CBP with explicit authority to share certain information with trademark and copyright owners before completing a seizure  CBP officials stated that they share information about identified counterfeits with e-commerce websites and rights holders to the extent possible under current regulations  However, according to private sector representatives we spoke to, restrictions on the amount and type of information about seized items shared by CBP limit the ability of rights holders and e-commerce websites to protect IPR  CBP officials noted that there are legal limitations to the amount and type of information they can share, particularly if the e-commerce website is not listed as the importer on forms submitted to CBP  Several private sector representatives stated that receiving additional information from CBP would enhance their ability to protect IPR  Representatives of one website noted that information on the exterior of seized packages, such as business identifiers on packages destined for distribution centers, would be helpful for identifying groups of counterfeit merchandise from the same seller  However, according to CBP officials, CBP cannot provide such information to e-commerce websites  Representatives of one e-commerce website noted that ICE sometimes shares information related to an investigation, but that ICE’s involvement in the enforcement process begins only after CBP has identified and seized counterfeit items  Representatives of two e-commerce websites stated that, because of the limited information shared by CBP, they may not be aware of IPR-infringing goods offered for sale on their websites, even if CBP has seized related items from the same seller  According to CBP officials, CBP is reviewing options for sharing additional information with rights holders and e-commerce websites and is assessing what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with private sector entities  CBP officials stated that they have not yet determined whether changes to the amount and types of information provided to e-commerce websites would require regulatory changes or additional legal authorities  These officials also said that they have discussed differences in CBP’s and ICE’s information sharing with ICE officials  In our report, we recommended that CBP, in consultation with ICE, assess what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with the private sector and, as appropriate, take action to enhance information sharing where possible  CBP concurred with this recommendation  Chairman Hatch, Ranking Member Wyden, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time  If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Kimberly Gianopoulos, Director, International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Joyee Dasgupta, Kara Marshall, Katie Bassion, Kristen Timko, Reid Lowe, Sarah Collins, Neil Doherty, Ramon Rodriguez, Helina Wong, Julie Spetz, Kevin Loh, Wayne McElrath, Grace Lui, James Murphy, Mary Moutsos, Justin Fisher, Rachel Stoiko, and Sarah Veale  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2:  We also estimated that, given the additional time needed to do compliance inspections, the CFATS program would likely be implemented in 8 to 10 years  We did not make any recommendations for DHS to improve its procedures for reviewing facilities’ security plans because DHS officials reported that they were exploring ways to expedite the process, such as reprioritizing resources and streamlining inspection requirements  In July 2015, we reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities  DHS officials attributed the increased approval rate to efficiencies in DHS’s review process, updated guidance, and a new case management system  Subsequently, DHS reported in its December 2016 semi-annual report to Congress that it had eliminated its approval backlog  Finally, we found in our 2017review that DHS also took action to implement an Expedited Approval Program (EAP)  The CFATS Act of 2014 required that DHS create the EAP as another option that tier 3 and tier 4 chemical facilities may use to develop and submit security plans to DHS  Under the program, facilities may develop a security plan based on specific standards published by DHS (as opposed to the more flexible performance standards using the standard, non-expedited process)  DHS issued guidance intended to help facilities prepare and submit their EAP security plans to DHS, which includes an example that identifies prescriptive security measures that facilities are to have in place  According to committee report language, the EAP was expected to reduce the regulatory burden on smaller chemical companies, which may lack the compliance infrastructure and the resources of large chemical facilities, and help DHS to process security plans more quickly  If a tier 3 or 4 facility chooses to use the expedited option, DHS is to review the plan to determine if it is facially deficient, pursuant to the reporting requirements of the CFATS Act of 2014  If DHS approves the EAP site security plan, it is to subsequently conduct a compliance inspection  In 2017, we found that DHS had implemented the EAP and had reported to Congress on the program, as required by the CFATS Act of 2014  In addition, as of June 2018 according to DHS officials, only 18 of the 3,152 facilities eligible to use the EAP opted to use it  DHS officials we interviewed attributed the low participation to several possible factors including: DHS had implemented the expedited program after most eligible facilities already submitted standard (non-expedited) security plans to DHS; facilities may consider the expedited program’s security measures to be too strict and prescriptive, not providing facilities the flexibility of the standard process; and the lack of an authorization inspection may discourage some facilities from using the expedited program because this inspection provides useful information about a facility’s security  We also found in 2017 that recent changes made to the CFATS program could affect the future use of the expedited program  As discussed previously, DHS has revised its methodology for determining the level of each facility’s security risk, which could affect a facility’s eligibility to participate in the EAP  DHS continues to apply the revised methodology to facilities regulated under the CFATS program and but it is too early to assess the impact on participation in the EAP  In our July 2015 report, we found that DHS began conducting compliance inspections in September 2013, and by April 2015, had conducted inspections of 83 of the 1,727 facilities that had approved security plans  Our analysis showed that nearly half of the facilities were not fully compliant with their approved site security plans and that DHS had not used its authority to issue penalties because DHS officials found it more productive to work with facilities to bring them in compliance  We also found that DHS did not have documented processes and procedures for managing the compliance of facilities that had not implemented planned measures by the deadlines outlined in the plans  We recommended that DHS document processes and procedures for managing compliance to provide more reasonable assurance that facilities implement planned measures and address security gaps  DHS agreed and has taken steps toward implementing this recommendation  DHS updated its CFATS Enforcement Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and has made progress on the new CFATS Inspections SOP  Once completed these two documents collectively are expected to formally document the processes and procedures currently being used to track noncompliant facilities and ensure they implement planned measures as outlined in their approved site security plans, according to ISCD officials  DHS officials stated they expect to finalize these procedures by the end of fiscal year 2018  We are examining compliance inspections as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of our work in our report later this summer  In April 2013, we reported that DHS took various actions to work with facility owners and operators, including increasing the number of visits to facilities to discuss enhancing security plans, but that some trade associations had mixed views on the effectiveness of DHS’s outreach  We found that DHS solicited informal feedback from facility owners and operators in its efforts to communicate and work with them, but did not have an approach for obtaining systematic feedback on its outreach activities  We recommended that DHS take action to solicit and document feedback on facility outreach consistent with DHS efforts to develop a strategic communication plan  DHS agreed and implemented this recommendation by developing a questionnaire to solicit feedback on outreach with industry stakeholders and began using the questionnaire in October 2016  Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member Tonko, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time  If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Other individuals making key contributions to this work include John Mortin, Assistant Director; and Brandon Jones, Analyst-in-Charge; Michael Lennington, Ben Emmel, and Hugh Paquette  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 

ground_truth: Thousands of facilities have hazardous chemicals that could be targeted or used to inflict mass casualties or harm surrounding populations in the United States. In accordance with the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007, DHS established the CFATS program in 2007 to, among other things, identify and assess the security risk posed by chemical facilities. DHS inspects high-risk facilities after it approves facility security plans to ensure that the facilities are implementing required security measures and procedures. This statement summarizes progress and challenges related to DHS's CFATS program management. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from July 2012 through June 2017, along with updates conducted in June 2018 on DHS actions to address prior GAO recommendations. To conduct the prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and DHS policies for administering the CFATS program, how DHS assesses risk, and data on high-risk chemical facilities. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and reviewed information on DHS actions to implement its prior recommendations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress addressing challenges that GAO's past work identified to managing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The following summarizes progress made and challenges remaining in key aspects of the program. Identifying high-risk chemical facilities. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS used self-reported and unverified data to determine the risk of facilities holding toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released. GAO recommended that DHS should better verify the accuracy of facility-reported data. DHS implemented this recommendation by revising its methodology so it now calculates the risk of toxic release, rather than relying on facilities to do so. Assessing risk and prioritizing facilities. In April 2013, GAO reported weaknesses in multiple aspects of DHS's risk assessment and prioritization approach. GAO made two recommendations for DHS to review and improve this process, including that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. DHS launched a new risk assessment methodology in October 2016 and is currently gathering new or updated data from about 27,000 facilities to (1) determine which facilities should be categorized as high-risk because of the threat of sabotage, theft or diversion, or a toxic release and (2) assign those facilities deemed high risk to one of four risk-based tiers. GAO has ongoing work assessing these efforts and will report later this summer on the extent to which they fully address prior recommendations. Reviewing and approving facilities' site security plans . DHS is to review security plans and visit facilities to ensure their security measures meet DHS standards. In April 2013, GAO reported a 7 to 9 year backlog for these reviews and visits. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities. DHS has since taken additional action to expedite these activities and has eliminated this backlog. Inspecting facilities and ensuring compliance. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS conducted compliance inspections at 83 of the 1,727 facilities with approved security plans. GAO found that nearly half of the inspected facilities were not fully compliant with their approved security plans and that DHS did not have documented procedures for managing facilities' compliance. GAO recommended that DHS document procedures for managing compliance. As a result, DHS has developed an enforcement procedure and a draft compliance inspection procedure and expects to finalize the compliance inspection procedure by the end of fiscal year 2018. GAO has made various recommendations to strengthen DHS's management of the CFATS program, with which DHS has generally agreed. DHS has implemented or described planned actions to address most of these recommendations.