prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: T he federal government pays benefits to coal miners affected by coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP, commonly referred to as black lung disease) and other lung diseases linked to coal mining in cases where the responsible mine operators are not able to pay  Benefit payments and related administrative expenses are paid out of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  The primary source of revenue for the trust fund is an excise tax on coal produced and sold domestically  If excise tax revenue is not sufficient to finance Black Lung Program benefits, the trust fund may borrow from the general fund of the Treasury, which contains federal receipts not earmarked for a specific purpose  For 2018, the tax rates on coal were $1 10 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0 55 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 4 4% of the sales price  Starting in 2019, under current law, these tax rates are $0 50 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0 25 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 2% of the sales price  This decline in the excise tax rates will likely put additional financial strain on a trust fund that already borrows from the general fund to meet obligations  The decline in domestic coal production, recent increases in the rate of CWP, and bankruptcies in the coal sector also contribute to the financial strain on the trust fund  This report provides background information and policy options to help inform the debate surrounding the coal excise tax rate, and other considerations related to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  The report begins with an overview of the federal black lung program, providing information on black lung disease and benefits under the program  The report proceeds to examine Black Lung Disability Trust Fund revenues, focusing on the coal excise tax and its history  The report closes with a discussion of policy options, evaluating various revenue- and benefits-related policy options that could improve the fiscal outlook of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund is used to finance the payment of federal Black Lung Program benefits under Part C of the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) when a responsible coal operator does not meet its obligations under the law to pay benefits  Coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP, commonly referred to as black lung disease) is an interstitial lung disease caused by the inhalation of coal dust  Like in other types of pneumoconioses, the inhalation of coal dust results in the scarring of the lung tissue and affects the gas-exchanging ability of the lungs to remove carbon dioxide and take oxygen into the bloodstream  Exposure to coal dust over an extended period of time can lead to CWP and continued exposure can lead to the progression from the early stages of CWP referred to as "simple CWP," to more advanced stages of scarring referred to as "complicated CWP" or progressive massive fibrosis (PMF)  There is no cure for CWP and PMF  CWP can lead to loss of lung function, the need for lung transplantation, and premature death  CWP can be identified by observing light spots, or opacities, in x-ray images of the lungs and can be classified using guidelines established by the International Labour Organization (ILO)  Despite technological advances in mining dust control, mandatory chest x-rays for miners, free CWP surveillance offered to miners by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the enactment of numerous pieces of mine safety and health legislation, and the promulgation and enforcement of mine safety and health standards by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), CWP persists in American coal miners, especially those in the Appalachian region  After reductions in rates of PMF in the 1990s, this advanced form of CWP has recently been found in Central Appalachia at rates not seen since the early 1970s  In 2017 researchers discovered, among coal miners mostly living in Kentucky and Virginia and served by three federally funded Black Lung Clinics in Virginia, what may be the largest cluster of PMF ever recorded  This cluster of miners with PMF includes a relatively high number of miners with less than 20 years of mining experience as well as cases of PMF in current miners  The occurrence of this advanced stage of CWP in short-tenured and current miners is noteworthy since MSHA standards require that any miner with evidence of CWP be given the option, without loss of compensation or other penalty, to work in an area of the mining operation in which the average concentration of coal dust in the air is continuously maintained at or below an established level that is lower than the permissible exposure level for all miners with the goal of preventing the progression of CWP  The federal Black Lung Program was created in 1969 with the enactment of Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Coal Act, P L  91-173, later renamed the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 by P L  95-164 )  Section 401 of the Coal Act provides the congressional justification for the federal Black Lung Program and cites the lack of benefits for disability and death caused by CWP provided by existing state workers' compensation systems as justification for the creation of a federal program  This section also states that the program is intended to be a cooperative effort between the federal government and the states  The Coal Act also established mandatory safety and health standards for coal mines, including standards limiting exposure of miners to coal dust and giving miners with CWP the option of being moved, without loss of compensation or penalty, to an area of the mine with lower dust concentrations  The Coal Act was later amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 (BLBA, P L  92-303)  The Coal Act established Part B of the federal Black Lung Program to provide cash benefits to miners totally disabled due to CWP and to the survivors of miners who die from CWP  Part B only applies to cases filed on or before December 31, 1973  Part B benefits are paid out of general revenue and were initially administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA)  Today, with the exception of a small number of pending appellate cases, Part B benefits are administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP)  The Coal Act established Part C of the Federal Black Lung Program for cases filed after December 31, 1973, and was later amended by the BLBA  Under Part C of the BLBA, all claims for benefits for disability or death due to CWP are to be filed with each state's workers' compensation system, but only if such systems have been determined by DOL as providing benefits that are equivalent to or greater than the cash benefits provided by the federal government under Part B of the BLBA and the medical benefits provided to disabled longshore and harbor workers under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)  If a state's workers' compensation system is not determined by DOL to meet these standards, then Part C benefits are to be paid by the each miner's coal employer, or, if no such employer is available to pay benefits, by the federal government  In 1973, Maryland, Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia submitted their state workers' compensation laws to DOL for approval, but were denied  To date, no state workers' compensation system has been approved by DOL under Part C of the BLBA  Because no state's workers' compensation system has been determined to be sufficient to pay benefits under Part C, each operator of an underground coal mine is responsible for the payment of benefits to that operator's miners  Operators are required to provide for these benefits either by purchasing insurance for benefits or through self-insurance approved by DOL  A self-insured operator is required to purchase an indemnity bond or provide another form of security (such as a deposit of negotiable securities in a Federal Reserve Bank or the establishment of a trust) in an amount specified by DOL  In order to be approved for self-insurance, federal regulations require that a mine operator have been in business for at least the three previous years and have average assets over the previous three years that exceed current liabilities by the sum of expected benefit payments and annual premiums on the indemnity bond  When a claim for benefits is approved, benefits are to be paid by the "responsible" operator, which is generally the last coal operator to employ the miner  If a company has acquired the assets of a mine operator, then that company is considered a "successor operator" and is responsible for the payment of claims related to the original operator  The federal government pays benefits in cases in which the responsible operator no longer exists and has no successor operator, or is unable to pay benefits  The federal government pays benefits when an operator has not made payment within 30 days of a determination of eligibility or when benefits are otherwise due to be paid  Initially, under Part C of the Coal Act, these federal benefits were paid out of general revenue  However, pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977 ( P L  95-227 ), these benefits are now paid from the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund established by this law and primarily financed by an excise tax on coal  If a responsible operator can later be identified, the trust fund is authorized by law to seek to recover from this operator the amount of benefits paid by the trust fund and any interest earned on these amounts  The trust fund is also used for the following federal Black Lung Program-related expenses: the payment of benefits for miners whose last coal mine employment was before January 1, 1970; reimbursement to the Treasury for the costs of Part C benefits paid from general revenue before April 1, 1978, for periods of benefit eligibility after January 1, 1974; the repayment and payment of interest on advances made from the general fund to the trust fund; the payment of administrative expenses related to Part C of the BLBA and the coal excise tax incurred after March 1, 1978; and the reimbursement of coal operators who paid Part C benefits before April 1, 1978, for miners whose last coal mine employment ended before January 1, 1970  A miner is eligible for benefits if that miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment  The survivors of a miner are eligible for benefits if the miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment  Benefits are only available to miners and their survivors  The BLBA defines a miner as any individual who works or has worked in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility in the extraction or preparation of coal  Such term also includes an individual who works or has worked in coal mine construction or transportation in or around a coal mine, to the extent such individual was exposed to coal dust as a result of such employment  Thus, other workers who may be exposed to coal dust in their work, such as railroad workers or workers at coal-fired power plants are not eligible for benefits  Persons who live near coal mines or power plants are also not eligible for benefits even if they are exposed to coal dust  In addition, while a miner's family members may receive benefits as survivors and the number of family members can increase the amount of a miner's monthly benefits, family members may not claim benefits on their own due to exposure to coal dust in the home such as from cleaning the miner's soiled clothing  The BLBA defines pneumoconiosis for the purposes of benefit eligibility as "a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment " The BLBA directs the Secretary of Labor to develop, through regulations, standards for determining if a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or died due to pneumoconiosis  The federal Black Lung Program regulations provide that the definition of pneumoconiosis includes medical or "clinical" pneumoconiosis and statutory or "legal" pneumoconiosis  Clinical pneumoconiosis is defined as follows: "Clinical pneumoconiosis" consists of those diseases recognized by the medical community as pneumoconioses, i e , the conditions characterized by permanent deposition of substantial amounts of particulate matter in the lungs and the fibrotic reaction of the lung tissue to that deposition caused by dust exposure in coal mine employment  This definition includes, but is not limited to, coal workers' pneumoconiosis, anthracosilicosis, anthracosis, anthrosilicosis, massive pulmonary fibrosis, silicosis or silicotuberculosis, arising out of coal mine employment  Legal pneumoconiosis is defined as any chronic lung disease or impairment and its sequelae arising out of coal mine employment  This definition includes, but is not limited to, any chronic restrictive or obstructive pulmonary disease arising out of coal mine employment  Through these definitions, DOL has established that benefits are available not just to miners with CWP, but also to those miners with other respiratory diseases arising out of coal mine employment such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) even though these diseases are not pneumoconioses and may be linked to other factors unrelated to exposure to coal dust such as cigarette smoking  The BLBA contains five presumptions used to determine if a miner is eligible for black lung benefits  Three of these presumptions are "rebuttable," meaning that, in the absence of any contrary evidence, eligibility is presumed  One presumption is "irrebutable" and eligibility for Black Lung program benefits is established if the statutory requirements of the presumption are met  Three of these presumptions apply to current Black Lung Program claims while two apply only to cases filed before the end of 1981  Table 1 provides a summary of the following five presumptions provided by the BLBA  1  A rebuttable presumption that the pneumoconiosis of a miner who was employed in mining for at least 10 years was caused by his or her employment  2  A rebuttable presumption that the death of a miner who worked in mining for at least 10 years and who died of any respirable disease, was due to pneumoconiosis  This presumption does not apply to claims filed on or after January 1, 1982, the effective date of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981 ( P L  97-119 )  3  An irrebuttable presumption that a miner with any chronic lung disease which meets certain statutory tests or diagnoses is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or died due to pneumoconiosis  4  A rebuttable presumption that a miner employed in mining for at least 15 years, and who has a chest x-ray that is interpreted as negative with respect to certain statutory standards but who has other evidence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or died due to pneumoconiosis  This presumption may only be rebutted by the Secretary of Labor establishing that the miner does not or did not have pneumoconiosis or that the miner's respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of connection to mine employment  5  A presumption that a miner who died on or before March 1, 1978, and who was employed in mining for at least 25 years before June 30, 1971, died due to pneumoconiosis, unless it is established that at the time of the miner's death, he or she was not at least partially disabled due to pneumoconiosis  This presumption does not apply to claims filed on or after June 29, 1982, which is 180 days after the effective date of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981  This presumption is not listed in the law as either rebuttable or irrebuttable  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA), P L  111-148 ) included two provisions that amended the BLBA to reinstate one of the eligibility presumptions and a provision affecting survivors' benefits  The effect of these changes was to increase the opportunity to establish eligibility through the statutory presumptions and make it easier for certain survivors to receive benefits  Pursuant to Section 202(a) of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, the fourth presumption did not apply to cases filed on or after January 1, 1982  Section 1556(a) of the ACA removed the prohibition on applying the fourth presumption to cases filed on or after January 1, 1982  It is expected that this ACA provision will increase the number of miners eligible for benefits  The BLBA provides that, for Part C claims, the survivors of a miner who was determined to be eligible to receive benefits at the time of his or her death are not required to file new claims for benefits or revalidate any claim for benefits, thus permitting the payment of survivors' benefits in these cases even if the miner's death was not caused by pneumoconiosis  Pursuant to Section 203(a)(6) of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, this provision did not apply to claims filed on or after January 1, 1982  Section 1556(b) of the ACA removed from this provision the exception for claims filed on or after January 1, 1982  It is expected that this ACA provision will increase the number of survivors eligible for benefits  The amendments to the BLBA provided in Section 1556 of the ACA apply to any claims filed under Part B or C of the act after January 1, 2005, that were pending on or after March 23, 2010, the date of enactment of the ACA  Eligible miners receiving benefits under Parts B and C are entitled to medical coverage for their pneumoconiosis and related disability  This medical coverage is provided at no cost to the miner and can generally be obtained from the miner's choice of medical providers  Eligible miners are also entitled to cash disability benefits  The basic benefit rate is set at 37 5% of the basic pay rate at GS-2, Step 1, on the federal pay schedule without any locality adjustment  If the miner has one dependent (a spouse or minor child) the miner is eligible for a benefit of 150% of the basic benefit  A miner with two dependents is eligible for 175% of the basic benefit and a miner with three or more dependents is eligible for 200% of the basic benefit  Benefits may also be paid to the divorced spouse of a miner if the marriage lasted at least 10 years and the divorced spouse was dependent on the miner for at least half of the spouse's support at the time of the miner's disability  A child is considered a dependent until the child marries, or reaches age 18, unless the child is either disabled using the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) definition of disability or is under the age of 23 and a full-time student  The benefit rates are adjusted whenever there are changes to the federal employee pay schedules, but are not separately adjusted to reflect changes in the cost of living  Table 2 provides the benefit rates for 2019  Benefits are offset by state workers' compensation or other benefits paid on account of the miner's disability or death due to pneumoconiosis  Part C benefits, but not Part B benefits, are considered workers' compensation for the purposes of reducing a miner's SSDI benefits  The total amount paid in cash disability benefits has fallen over time, as illustrated in Figure 1   More is paid in cash disability benefits than is paid in medical benefits  Certain survivors of a miner whose death was due to pneumoconiosis are eligible for cash benefits  In the case of a surviving spouse or divorced spouse, the spouse's benefit is equal to what the miner would have received and is based on the number of dependents of the spouse as provided in Table 2   If there is no surviving spouse, then benefits are awarded to the surviving minor children in equal shares  If there are no surviving minor children, then benefits can be paid to the miner's dependent parents or dependent siblings  If there are no eligible survivors, no benefits are paid upon the miner's death and benefits do not go to the miner's estate or to any other person, including a person named by the miner in a will  The number of miners and survivors receiving benefits has declined over time, as illustrated in Figure 2   The primary revenue source for the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund is a per-ton excise tax on coal  Historically, the coal excise tax has not generated enough revenue to meet the trust fund's obligations  Thus, additional funds have been provided from the general fund of the Treasury  The general fund includes governmental receipts not earmarked for a specific purpose, the proceeds of general borrowing, and is used for general governmental expenditures  Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 4121 imposes the black lung excise tax (BLET) on sales or use of domestically mined coal  Generally, a producer that sells the coal is liable for the tax  Producers that use their own domestically mined coal, such as integrated utilities or steel companies, are also liable for the tax  The tax rate depends on how coal is mined  Effective January 1, 2019, the tax on underground-mined coal is the lesser of (1) $0 50 per ton, or (2) 2% of the sale price  The tax on surface-mined coal is the lesser of (1) $0 25 per ton, or (2) 2% of the sales price  Before 2019, the tax rates were $1 10 per ton for coal from underground mines or $0 55 per ton for coal from surface mines, with the tax being no more than 4 4% of the sale price  In FY2017, $229 million was collected on coal mined underground (see Figure 3 )  Nearly all of this coal was taxed at the $1 10 per ton rate  In FY2017, $200 million was collected on surface-mined coal  Just over half of this coal was taxed at the $0 55 per ton rate, with the rest subject to the 4 4% of sales price maximum tax  On January 1, 2019, the BLET rates declined to their current levels  The rates that took effect January 1, 2019, would also have taken effect if the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund had repaid, with interest, all amounts borrowed from the General Fund of the Treasury  The tax is imposed on "coal from mines located in the United States" and does not apply to imported coal  The tax is designed to support the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund for domestic miners  Very little domestically consumed coal is imported  The BLET also does not apply to exported coal under the Export Clause of the United States Constitution  A credit or refund can be claimed if coal is taxed before it is exported  Black lung excise tax collections have generally declined in recent years (see Figure 3 )  In FY2009, more than $650 million was collected from the BLET  In FY2017, collections were about $429 million  The decline in BLET collections follows the general decline in U S  coal production  As the price of coal rose in the 2000s, coal mined underground tended to pay the tax at a fixed rate of $1 10 per ton, as opposed to paying 4 4% of the sales price  In the years beyond 2018, coal excise tax receipts are expected to fall sharply, reflecting the decrease in the coal excise tax rate (see Figure 3 )  The excise tax on coal was established to help ensure the coal industry shared in the social costs imposed by black lung disease  Over time, the rate of the tax has been increased, in an effort to provide sufficient revenue to meet this objective  The Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977 ( P L  95-227 ) first imposed the Section 4121 excise tax on coal  When enacted, the tax was $0 50 per ton for coal from underground mines, and $0 25 per ton for coal from surface mines  The tax was limited to 2% of the sales price  The tax was effective for sales after March 31, 1978  Before P L  95-227 was enacted there was considerable debate surrounding how black lung benefits programs should be financed  Various mechanisms to shift the costs of the black lung benefits program to the coal industry and its customers were considered  These debates ultimately led to the establishment of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund and the related excise tax on coal  There was also debate about how to structure the proposed tax  Some suggested a graduated tax, with higher rates imposed on coal with a higher British thermal unit (Btu) content, as such coal was believed to be more likely to cause black lung disease  There were concerns, however, that such a tax could be difficult to administer  Other proposals suggested that coal be subject to a uniform rate, with coal mined from underground deposits subject to a higher rate than other coal (including lignite)  A concern with this approach was that coal prices vary substantially per ton for different types of coal (lignite is less expensive than anthracite), meaning that the tax as a percent of the sales price could differ substantially across different types of coal  One answer to this concern is to impose an ad valorem tax, or a tax based on the sales price  Another approach that was considered was to impose a "premium rate" at a level that would fully finance the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, giving authority to the Department of Labor to adjust the fee as necessary  The tax as enacted was the lesser of the per-unit price or the ad valorem rate of 2%  In the early 1980s, it was observed that coal excise tax revenues were not sufficient to meet the trust fund's obligations  The Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981 ( P L  97-119 ) doubled the excise tax rates to $1 00 per ton for coal from underground mines, and $0 50 per ton for coal from surface mines, not to exceed 4% of the sales price  The higher rates were effective January 1, 1982  The doubled rates were temporary, and scheduled to revert to the previous rates on January 1, 1996  Further, the rates could be reduced earlier if the trust fund repaid all advances and interest from the general fund of the Treasury  A stated goal of this legislation was to eliminate the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund's debt  The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ( P L  99-272 ) again increased the BLET rates to $1 10 for underground-mined coal, and $0 55 for surface-mined coal, not to exceed 4 4% of the sales price  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 ( P L  100-203 ) extended these rates through 2013  Increased excise tax rates on coal were again extended in 2008  Current-law rates were extended through 2018 as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P L  110-343 )  When extending the increased rates, Congress reiterated the original intent of establishing trust fund financing for black lung benefits, observing that it is "to reduce reliance on the Treasury and to recover costs from the mining industry " It was also observed that the program's expenses had continued to exceed revenues over time, and that the debt to the Treasury was not likely to be paid off by 2013  For these reasons, "the Congress believe[d] that it [was] appropriate to continue the tax on coal at the increased rates beyond the expiration date " When receipts of the trust fund are less than expenditures, advances are appropriated from the general fund of the Treasury to the trust fund  These advances are repayable, and interest charged on these advances is also payable to the general fund  The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ( P L  99-272 ) provided a five-year forgiveness of interest on debt owed to the Treasury's general fund  As a result, the principal amount of trust fund debt outstanding was relatively unchanged throughout the late 1980s  The moratorium on interest payments ended September 30, 1990  Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, the cumulative end-of-year debt of the trust fund grew, and the trust fund continued to receive repayable advances from the general fund to cover expenses  The trust fund was subject to financial restructuring when the current excise tax rate was extended until January 1, 2019, in EESA  The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund debt was restructured in FY2009  Essentially, the partial forgiveness and restructuring allowed the trust fund to refinance outstanding repayable advances and unpaid interest on those advances  As a result of the partial forgiveness and refinancing, the cumulative debt was reduced from $10 4 billion at the end of FY2008 to $6 2 billion by the end of FY2009  At the time of the restructuring it was expected that the trust fund's debt would be fully eliminated by FY2040  The trust fund's cumulative debt has trended downward since the restructuring (see Figure 4 )  However, coal excise tax revenue has been less than anticipated in recent years  As a result, current projections suggest that the trust fund debt will rise over time when considering annual borrowing as well as legacy debt  The trust fund's debt is therefore not on a path to be eliminated  By FY2050, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) projects the trust fund's debt will be $15 4 billion without any changes in current policy  In addition to revenue from the BLET and repayable general fund advances, the trust fund receives revenue from the collection of certain fines, penalties, and interest paid by coal operators and miners and reimbursements from responsible operators  Part C of the BLBA authorizes the following fines and penalties for violations of the act: a civil penalty of up to $1,000 per day for a mine operator's failure to secure benefits through insurance or approved self-insurance; a fine of up to $1,000 upon conviction of the misdemeanor offense of knowingly destroying or transferring property of a mine operator with the intent to avoid the payment of benefits for which the mine operator is responsible; a fine of up to $1,000 upon conviction of the misdemeanor offense of making a false or misleading statement or representation for the purposes of obtaining benefits; and a civil penalty of up to $500 for a mine operator's failure to file a report on miners who are or may be entitled to benefits as required by DOL  The amount of these penalties and fines, as well as interest assessed, is paid into the trust fund  In FY2017, trust fund receipts from fines, penalties, and interest totaled $1 2 million  This is a small source of trust fund revenue relative to the coal excise tax, which generated $428 7 million in trust fund revenues in FY2017  The trust fund is authorized to begin paying benefits within 30 days if no responsible operator has begun payment  If, after paying benefits, DOL is able to identify a responsible operator, the trust fund may seek to collect from that operator the costs of benefits already paid by the trust fund and interest assessed on this amount  The amount of these collections is paid into the trust fund  In FY2017, $19 9 million was collected from responsible mine operators  The amount collected from responsible mine operators has fluctuated over time, but has averaged about 1% of total receipts since 1995  Various factors have contributed to the ongoing situation of trust fund expenditures exceeding trust fund revenues  Throughout the 1980s, black lung benefit payments and administrative expenditures exceeded trust fund revenue  As a result, the trust fund accumulated debt  As discussed above, over time, various efforts have been made to improve the fiscal condition of the trust fund  However, as of the end of FY2017, the trust fund remains in debt  The trust fund's cumulative debt at the end of FY2017 was $3 1 billion  The trust fund also borrowed $1 3 billion from the general fund that same year  Projections suggest that borrowing from the general fund will increase over the next few years, even as cumulative (or legacy) debt is paid down  Under the current excise tax rates, benefit payments and administrative expenses will be approximately equal to trust fund revenues in FY2020 through FY2022 (see Figure 5 )  However, revenues are not projected to be sufficient to repay debt, and expenses are projected to rise over time when debt and interest expenses are included  Specifically, by FY2022, it is projected that the trust fund will borrow $2 6 billion in repayable advances from the general fund  There are various policy options that Congress might consider to improve the fiscal condition of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  Broadly, increasing taxes on the coal industry (or maintaining 2018 rates) would pass the costs associated with paying black lung benefits onto the coal industry  Alternatively, forgiving trust fund interest or debt or financing black lung benefits out of general fund revenues would pass the costs of federal black lung benefits onto taxpayers in general  Another option would be to reduce federal black lung benefits  Additional revenue would likely need to be provided to the trust fund if the trust fund is to pay for past black lung benefits and maintain current benefit levels  Additional revenue may be needed even if past debt is forgiven (or assumed by the general fund), as anticipated trust fund revenues are not likely to be sufficient to cover anticipated trust fund expenditures  As discussed above, in the past, Congress and the President have opted to increase the excise tax on coal to address shortfalls in the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  These increased rates have been temporary, and scheduled to revert back to the reduced rate if the trust fund's debt is eliminated  Congress has chosen to extend the increased rates beyond their scheduled expiration when the trust fund is in debt  One option would be to extend 2018 rates   The GAO projects that if 2018 coal excise tax rates are extended, the trust fund will have a debt of $4 5 billion in 2050 (see "GAO Options for Improving Trust Fund Finances" below)  GAO projections suggest that increasing 2018 tax rates by 25% would eliminate the trust fund's debt, leaving the trust fund with a surplus of $0 6 billion in 2050  An alternative way to raise revenue from the coal industry is to scale back or eliminate various tax expenditures, or tax preferences, from which the coal industry benefits  For example, coal producers benefit from being able to expense exploration and development costs and are able to recover costs using percentage depletion (depletion based on revenue from the sale of the mineral asset) instead of cost depletion (depletion based on the amount of the mineral asset exhausted and the amount invested in the asset)  The Obama Administration regularly proposed repealing these tax incentives as part of the Administration's annual budget  It could be difficult to assign the revenues raised via the repeal of tax benefits to the trust fund  With an excise tax, it is straightforward to identify the revenue generated by the tax and earmark the revenue for a trust fund  It is not as straightforward to determine the amount of revenue that is raised through the repeal of an income tax expenditure, or direct the additional revenue raised because a certain preference is no longer in the code to a trust fund  Repeal of coal-industry tax benefits could, however, be used to offset the cost of a one-time transfer from the general fund to the trust fund  Revenue from various sources, including the general fund, could be used to supplement trust fund revenue generated from current sources  General fund revenues are not earmarked for a specific purpose, and there is generally no direct link between the source of general fund revenue and the government good or service provided  Black lung benefits were paid out of general revenue before the trust fund was established in 1977  Trust funds are generally established when there is a link between the government benefits or services being provided and the revenue source funding those benefits or services  The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund was established because Congress believed that the costs of the part C black lung program should be borne by the coal industry  Financing black lung benefits with general fund revenue would weaken the link between the industry and black lung benefits, while reducing the burden on the industry associated with paying for black lung benefits  In the past the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund's fiscal outlook has been improved through interest and debt forgiveness  As discussed above, in the late 1990s, there was a five-year forgiveness of interest on debt owed to the Treasury's general fund  More recently, debt was forgiven as part of the 2008 restructuring of the trust fund's debt  The GAO projects that if all current debt were forgiven, the trust fund would accumulate $2 3 billion in new debt by 2050  If all interest were forgiven, the trust fund debt is projected to be $5 8 billion by 2050  Forgiving the trust fund's interest or debt obligations would shift the burden of paying for black lung disability benefits from the coal industry to general taxpayers  However, a one-time appropriation to forgive interest or debt is a transparent option for satisfying the trust fund's obligations to the general fund  The primary expenditures of the trust fund are for the payment of Part C benefits to miners in cases in which there is no responsible operator  In order to reduce expenditures and improve the long-term financial health of the trust fund, Congress could consider several options to reduce the generosity and scope of benefits or increase the ability of the federal government to ensure that coal operators, even those who are in the bankruptcy process, pay benefits for their miners  A reduction in the amount of Part C benefits would result in lower Part C expenditures from both responsible coal operators and the trust fund  However, as compared to other workers' compensation benefits, Part C benefits are relatively low  The basic Part C benefit rate for a single miner is equal to 37 5% of the base rate of pay for federal employees at the GS-2, Step 1 level  For 2019 this benefit is just over $660 per month, or under $8,000 per year  In the majority of state workers' compensation programs, the basic benefit rate is set at two-thirds of the worker's pre-disability wage, subject to statutory minimums and maximums  The other workers' compensation programs administered by DOL, the LHWCA, and the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) use two-thirds of a worker's pre-disability wage as the basis for their benefits  A federal worker with a spouse or dependent in the FECA program is entitled to 75% of his or her pre-disability wage  The minimum benefit for total disability or death in the FECA program, 75% of GS-2, Step 1, is twice the amount of the Part C benefit rate  In addition, unlike the other federal workers' compensation programs and many state programs, there is no automatic adjustment to Part C benefits to reflect increases in the cost of living  Part C benefits instead increase only when federal pay rates are increased  The eligibility of miners and survivors to Part C benefits could be restricted to reduce expenditures from responsible operators and the trust fund  In 1981, Congress enacted several eligibility restrictions to miners and survivors as part of the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, to address concerns about the financial insolvency of the trust fund  Specifically, this law removed the following three eligibility presumptions for new claims going forward: A rebuttable presumption that the death of a miner who worked in mining for at least 10 years and who died of any respirable disease, was due to pneumoconiosis (listed as presumption 2 in Table 1 )  A rebuttable presumption that a miner employed in mining for at least 15 years, and who has a chest x-ray that is interpreted as negative with respect to certain statutory standards but who has other evidence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or died due to pneumoconiosis  This presumption may only be rebutted by the Secretary of Labor establishing that the miner does not or did not have pneumoconiosis or that the miner's respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of connection to mine employment (presumption 4 in Table 1 )  A presumption that a miner who died on or before March 1, 1978, and who was employed in mining for at least 25 years before June 30, 1971, died due to pneumoconiosis, unless it is established that at the time of the miner's death, he or she was not at least partially disabled due to pneumoconiosis (presumption 5 in Table 1 )  In addition to removing three of the five existing eligibility presumptions, the 1981 law also removed the right of the survivors of a miner who is determined to be eligible for Part C benefits at the time of his or her death to receive survivors' benefits without filing a new claim, thus permitting the payment of survivors' benefits in the case of a current beneficiary, even if the beneficiary's death is not proven to be linked to pneumoconiosis  Two of the restrictions put in place by the 1981 legislation were later removed by the ACA  The ACA reinstated the fourth eligibility presumption and expanded rights for survivors' benefits, thus expanding eligibility for both miners and certain survivors  Under Part C of the BLBA, the federal government may recover the costs of benefits, and interest accrued on those benefits, paid by the trust fund from identified responsible operators  In addition, Part C allows the federal government to place a lien on the property and rights to property of an operator that refuses to pay the benefits and interest it owes to the trust fund  In the case of a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, this lien is to be treated in the same manner as a lien for taxes owed to the federal government  However, in a 2016 letter to the Comptroller General requesting a GAO review of the trust fund, Representatives Bobby Scott, Ranking Member of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, and Sander Levin, Ranking Member of the House Committee on Ways and Means, claimed that the number of current and potential bankruptcies among coal operators is placing stress on the trust fund  Representatives Scott and Levin cited the example of Patriot Coal which, according to their letter, transferred $62 million in Part C liabilities to the trust fund when it became insolvent  In addition, this letter claims that insolvent coal operators may be able to avoid trust fund liens by continuing to make benefit payments until after the court in their bankruptcy cases has approved the sale of their assets to another company  Because the original company was never in default of its payments, no lien was filed, and these assets were able to be purchased by another company without any lien or future liability to the trust fund  Congress may examine the issue of the impact of coal operator bankruptcies and the interaction of bankruptcy law and the BLBA's lien provisions, to strengthen both the federal government's ability to ensure that responsible operators are paying for benefits and reduce the benefit expenditures of the trust fund 
Report 2: S  Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2018  Table 4 provides information from the same report about states' contributions to the costs of maintaining and operating voting equipment  As GAO uses the terms in the survey, operation costs "include things such as poll worker labor to set up equipment, postage for mailing absentee or vote-by-mail ballots, paper and printing supplies for paper ballots or voter-verified paper trails, and electricity to operate equipment during elections " Maintenance costs "include things such as labor to conduct maintenance between elections of any equipment hardware and software as well as any required parts " Some states cover or contribute to the costs of training local election officials, and some share election-specific costs, such as printing ballots and transporting voting equipment  Box 3 uses five examples of cost-sharing arrangements for election-specific costs of federal elections to illustrate the range of approaches states have taken to such arrangements  The structures of the state and local systems that conduct federal elections vary both between and within states  Common variations include differences related to the leadership of the election system; relationship between local election officials and the state; and population size and density of the jurisdiction served by the system  This section describes these structural variations  The state and local election systems that conduct federal elections may be led by an individual, such as the state secretary of state or a town or county clerk; a group, such as a state elections commission or a county board of elections; or a combination of individuals or groups, such as a state secretary of state and state board of elections, or a city clerk and city registrar of voters  Election system leadership may be chosen by voters or appointed by an authority such as the governor or state legislature  The selection method—and the leaders themselves—may be partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan  Federal law requires states to designate a chief election official to carry out certain tasks  Table 5 lists the titles of chief state election officials, as reported to CRS by the EAC, and the methods of selecting them, as listed by the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) and the National Association of State Legislatures (NCSL)  The leadership types and selection methods of local election systems may vary within a state  Box 4 uses examples from Florida and Wisconsin to illustrate such variations  It describes the different causes of variation in the two states and a recent change in Florida to a more uniform selection process  The leadership structures of both state and local systems can also change over time  Box 5 uses the two states from Box 4 to illustrate the types of changes states might make, how they might make them, and how frequently they might make them  It describes one change that was approved by voters as a ballot measure and a number of others that were enacted legislatively  Another way in which the structures of election systems can vary is in the relationship between local election officials and the state  Some local election officials operate largely independently, whereas others rely on state officials or resources for some, most, or all basic functions  For example, as noted in " Funding ," states may provide some or all of the training for local election officials  As described in more detail in " Jurisdiction Size and Density ," local election officials who serve smaller or more rural jurisdictions may also depend on their states to provide specialized expertise, such as legal or technical know-how  States also have varying types and degrees of influence over local election officials  Choices about other structural features, such as the method used to select the leadership of local election systems, can shape this aspect of the state-local relationship  For example, in some states, state officials appoint and can remove local election officials  State officials in other states may have other options for influencing local officials  For example, state officials may have the power to initiate legal action against local officials, to provide or withhold funding for local election administration, or to certify and decertify voting systems  However, they tend to have less control over how local officials perform their election administration duties than state officials with appointment and removal authority  As described in more detail in " Compliance with Federal Requirements ," this dynamic may be especially pronounced for local officials who are popularly elected  Such officials are accountable primarily to voters rather than to the state  Other structural variations between election systems derive from differences in the population size and density of the jurisdictions they serve  Some election jurisdictions reported serving fewer than 100 eligible registered voters in the 2016 election, for example, whereas Los Angeles County reported serving 6 8 million  The eligible registered voters in that county alone reportedly outnumbered the eligible registrants in each of 40 other states  Election jurisdictions also differ in population density  For example, Los Angeles County is an urban center, and many small jurisdictions are rural  Jurisdictions with different population sizes and densities have different election administration advantages and face different administrative challenges  For example, voter registration list maintenance is typically more straightforward in small jurisdictions because their lists are shorter and election officials are more likely to know registrants personally  Meanwhile, large jurisdictions tend to have larger tax bases and more resources  Those differences between jurisdictions may be reflected in the internal structures of the election systems that serve them  One example of such a structural difference is the size and specialization of the system's staff  Larger jurisdictions, which typically have more personnel, may have much of the specialized expertise they need in-house  Smaller jurisdictions, which may have only one part-time employee dedicated to election administration, are more likely to rely on outside expertise  For example, according to law professors Steven F  Huefner, Daniel P  Tokaji, and Edward B  Foley, smaller jurisdictions in Illinois have looked to state attorneys for election law expertise and to voting equipment vendors for technical support  Another type of difference related to jurisdiction size and density is variation in the allocation of system resources  A study prepared for the U S  Election Assistance Commission in 2013 found that election officials in rural jurisdictions were more likely than their urban counterparts to use paid print advertising for voter outreach  Election officials in urban jurisdictions were more likely to use websites and social media  Small jurisdictions may also allocate a larger share of their resources to meeting state and federal requirements than larger jurisdictions because there are often fixed start-up costs to required changes, and smaller jurisdictions may be less equipped to capitalize on economies of scale  For example, political scientists Heather M  Creek and Kimberly A  Karnes report, "There is a minimum cost to the acquisition and maintenance of voting technology that applies whether the district is purchasing 5 or 500 machines " The duties and structures of state and local election systems can affect the implementation of federal election administration laws  Perhaps as a result, Congress has specified how states and localities should distribute certain election administration duties and structure certain elements of their election systems  Changes to the duties and structures of state and local election systems have sometimes also been side effects of other federal activity on election administration  This section provides examples of ways in which the distribution of election administration duties at the state and local levels and the structures of state and local election systems can affect the implementation of federal election administration law  These examples include federal efforts to affect the administration of elections through (1) requirements, (2) funding, and (3) information sharing  Congress can use requirements to regulate how states and localities administer certain aspects of federal elections  How well such requirements serve their intended purposes depends in part on how closely states and localities comply with them  How closely states and localities comply with federal requirements may, in turn, be affected by the duties and structures of the state and local election systems that implement them  For example, UOCAVA assigns responsibility for complying with some of its requirements to the states (52 U S C  §20302), but the tasks required for compliance are often handled by local officials  One scholar, law professor Justin Weinstein-Tull, indicates that this means that the officials who are held liable for compliance with UOCAVA requirements may differ from the officials who take or fail to take the actions needed to comply  Box 6 provides an illustration of this phenomenon as reported by state officials in Alabama  The federal government can provide funding for state and local election administration, which may be conditional on the adoption of certain election administration policies or practices  How well such funding serves its intended purposes may depend in part on how timely it is and how well-tailored it is to its objectives  Duties and structures of state and local election systems may affect how quickly federal funding is claimed and used and how well the uses to which it is put serve federal objectives  For example, HAVA has authorized payments to states to meet its requirements (52 U S C  §21007)  It has directed those payments to be disbursed to states (52 U S C  §21001(a)) and charged chief state election officials with overseeing decisions about how to spend them (52 U S C  §21005(a))  State election officials run federal elections in some states, but those states are the exception  As noted in " Implementation " and " Funding ," most states assign election administration implementation and funding duties to local officials  That means that the officials who receive HAVA funding and are charged with overseeing decisions about how to use it often differ from the officials who conduct and pay for the activities and resources it is intended to fund  That has had at least two reported consequences  First, in some cases, it has reportedly delayed access to or use of some HAVA funds  Directing HAVA funding to states introduces opportunities for state-level delays, such as decisions by state officials to wait to claim the funds or requirements in state law to obtain approval to do so  Second, some local officials have stated the view that their states' shares of HAVA funding were not put to what they considered the areas of greatest need  Box 7 provides examples of such consequences as described by state and local officials in Nevada, Minnesota, and Virginia  Congress can require or facilitate information sharing with states and localities by federal agencies  As with funding, the effectiveness of federal information sharing may depend in part on how timely it is  How quickly federal agencies share information with the appropriate state and local officials may be affected by the distribution of election administration duties at the state and federal levels  Box 8 provides an example of such an effect reported by NASS  Past federal action has resulted in both intentional and unintentional changes to state and local election systems  Some federal laws include provisions that are specifically designed to establish certain responsibilities for election administration at the state level  For example, the NVRA requires states to designate chief state election officials to coordinate state responsibilities under the act (52 U S C  §20509), and HAVA charges chief state election officials with implementing a statewide voter registration system (52 U S C  §21083(a)(1)(A))  Federal regulation has reportedly also had the side effect of shifting the distribution of other election administration duties  For example, the agency-based registration requirements in the NVRA divide voter registration responsibilities between traditional election offices and offices that had not historically been involved in election administration, such as motor vehicle and public assistance agencies (52 U S C  §20504; 52 U S C  §20506)  According to Hale, Montjoy, and Brown, "the need to pass implementing legislation and the complexity of legal and technical requirements" in federal laws such as HAVA and the NVRA has also "led many states to grant new or additional rule-making power" to their chief state election officials  Congress has considered legislation—some of which has been enacted and some of which has not—that would change election rules or the state and local systems that implement them  The interactions between the duties and structures of state and local election systems and past federal actions suggest some considerations that may be relevant to future congressional consideration of proposals that would affect the administration of federal elections  The following questions may be of interest to Members as they consider making changes to election administration or maintaining current rules and structures: How would any proposed change interact with the duties and structures of state and local election systems? Would the duties and structures of state and local election systems make a proposed change difficult to implement? Would the design of a proposed change need to be adjusted to accommodate variations between or within states? Which of the policy tools available to Congress is best suited to achieving the purpose of a proposed change? For example, would it be more effective to advance a proposed change with a federal requirement, or incentivize it via federal funding? How might the nature of the state and local system inform a proposed change? For example, if it is a federal requirement, who is charged with compliance; who is responsible for the tasks required for compliance; and what is the relationship between the two? If it is federal funding, to whom should it be distributed, and who should be involved in making decisions about how to use it? Would a proposed change have the effect, either intentionally or unintentionally, of altering the duties or structures of state or local election systems? If so, what are the advantages and disadvantages of such changes? Are there complications with a proposed change that are not specifically related to election administration? For example, could there be federalism-related issues with intervening in the relationships between states and their political subdivisions? 

ground_truth: Thousands of facilities have hazardous chemicals that could be targeted or used to inflict mass casualties or harm surrounding populations in the United States. In accordance with the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007, DHS established the CFATS program in 2007 to, among other things, identify and assess the security risk posed by chemical facilities. DHS inspects high-risk facilities after it approves facility security plans to ensure that the facilities are implementing required security measures and procedures. This statement summarizes progress and challenges related to DHS's CFATS program management. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from July 2012 through June 2017, along with updates conducted in June 2018 on DHS actions to address prior GAO recommendations. To conduct the prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and DHS policies for administering the CFATS program, how DHS assesses risk, and data on high-risk chemical facilities. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and reviewed information on DHS actions to implement its prior recommendations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress addressing challenges that GAO's past work identified to managing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The following summarizes progress made and challenges remaining in key aspects of the program. Identifying high-risk chemical facilities. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS used self-reported and unverified data to determine the risk of facilities holding toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released. GAO recommended that DHS should better verify the accuracy of facility-reported data. DHS implemented this recommendation by revising its methodology so it now calculates the risk of toxic release, rather than relying on facilities to do so. Assessing risk and prioritizing facilities. In April 2013, GAO reported weaknesses in multiple aspects of DHS's risk assessment and prioritization approach. GAO made two recommendations for DHS to review and improve this process, including that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. DHS launched a new risk assessment methodology in October 2016 and is currently gathering new or updated data from about 27,000 facilities to (1) determine which facilities should be categorized as high-risk because of the threat of sabotage, theft or diversion, or a toxic release and (2) assign those facilities deemed high risk to one of four risk-based tiers. GAO has ongoing work assessing these efforts and will report later this summer on the extent to which they fully address prior recommendations. Reviewing and approving facilities' site security plans . DHS is to review security plans and visit facilities to ensure their security measures meet DHS standards. In April 2013, GAO reported a 7 to 9 year backlog for these reviews and visits. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities. DHS has since taken additional action to expedite these activities and has eliminated this backlog. Inspecting facilities and ensuring compliance. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS conducted compliance inspections at 83 of the 1,727 facilities with approved security plans. GAO found that nearly half of the inspected facilities were not fully compliant with their approved security plans and that DHS did not have documented procedures for managing facilities' compliance. GAO recommended that DHS document procedures for managing compliance. As a result, DHS has developed an enforcement procedure and a draft compliance inspection procedure and expects to finalize the compliance inspection procedure by the end of fiscal year 2018. GAO has made various recommendations to strengthen DHS's management of the CFATS program, with which DHS has generally agreed. DHS has implemented or described planned actions to address most of these recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Our past work has identified progress and challenges in a number of areas related to DHS’s management of the CFATS program including (1) the process for identifying high risk chemical facilities; (2) how it assesses risk and prioritizes facilities; (3) reviewing and approving facility security plans; (4) how it conducts facility compliance inspections; and (5) efforts to conduct stakeholder outreach and gather feedback  DHS has made a number of programmatic changes to CFATS in recent years that may also impact its progress in addressing our open recommendations; these changes are included as part of our ongoing review of the program  In May 2014, we found that more than 1,300 facilities had reported having ammonium nitrate to DHS  However, based on our review of state data and records, there were more facilities with ammonium nitrate holdings than those that had reported to DHS under the CFATS program  Thus, we concluded that some facilities that were required to report may have failed to do so  We recommended that DHS work with other agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to develop and implement methods of improving data sharing among agencies and with states as members of a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group  DHS agreed with our recommendation and has since addressed it  Specifically, DHS compared DHS data with data from other federal agencies, such as EPA, as well as member states from the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group to identify potentially noncompliant facilities  As a result of this effort, in July 2015, DHS officials reported that they had identified about 1,000 additional facilities that should have reported information to comply with CFATS and subsequently contacted these facilities to ensure compliance  DHS officials told us that they continue to engage with states to identify potentially non-compliant facilities  For example, as of June 2018, DHS officials stated they have received 43 lists of potentially noncompliant facilities from 34 state governments, which are in various stages of review by DHS  DHS officials also told us that they recently hired an individual to serve as the lead staff member responsible for overseeing this effort  DHS has also taken action to strengthen the accuracy of data it uses to identify high risk facilities  In July 2015, we found that DHS used self- reported and unverified data to determine the risk categorization for facilities that held toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released  At the time, DHS required that facilities self- report the Distance of Concern—an area in which exposure to a toxic chemical cloud could cause serious injury or fatalities from short-term exposure—as part of its Top-Screen  We estimated that more than 2,700 facilities with a toxic release threat had misreported the Distance of Concern and therefore recommended that DHS (1) develop a plan to implement a new Top-Screen to address errors in the Distance of Concern submitted by facilities, and (2) identify potentially miscategorized facilities that could cause the greatest harm and verify that the Distance of Concern of these facilities report is accurate  DHS has fully addressed both of these recommendations  Specifically, DHS implemented an updated Top-Screen in October 2016 and now collects data from facilities and calculates the Distance of Concern itself, rather than relying on the facilities’ calculation  In response to our second recommendation, in November 2016, DHS officials stated they completed an assessment of all Top-Screens that reported threshold quantities of toxic release chemicals of interest and identified 158 facilities with the potential to cause the greatest harm  As of May 2017, according to ISCD officials, 156 of the 158 facilities submitted updated Top-Screens and 145 of the 156 Top-Screens had undergone a quality assurance review process  DHS has also taken actions to better assess regulated facilities’ risks in order to place the facilities into the appropriate risk tier  In April 2013, we reported that DHS’s risk assessment approach did not consider all of the elements of threat, vulnerability, and consequence associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals  Our work showed that DHS’s risk assessment was based primarily on consequences from human casualties, but did not consider economic consequences, as called for by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the CFATS regulation  We also found that (1) DHS’s approach was not consistent with the NIPP because it treated every facility as equally vulnerable to a terrorist attack regardless of location or on-site security and (2) DHS was not using threat data for 90 percent of the tiered facilities—those tiered for the risk of theft or diversion—and using 5-year-old threat data for the remaining 10 percent of those facilities that were tiered for the risks of release or sabotage  We recommended that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk and conduct a peer review after doing so  DHS agreed with our recommendations and has made progress towards addressing them  Specifically, with regard to our recommendation that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk, DHS worked with Sandia National Laboratories to develop a model to estimate the economic consequences of a chemical attack  In addition, DHS worked with Oak Ridge National Laboratory to devise a new tiering methodology, called the Second Generation Risk Engine  In so doing, DHS revised the CFATS threat, vulnerability, and consequence scoring methods to better cover the range of CFATS security issues  Additionally, with regard to our recommendation that DHS conduct a peer review after enhancing its risk assessment approach, DHS conducted peer reviews and technical reviews with government organizations and facility owners and operators, and worked with Sandia National Laboratories to verify and validate the new tiering approach  We are currently reviewing the reports and data that DHS has provided about its new tiering methodology as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of this work later this summer  To further enhance its risk assessment approach, in fall 2016, DHS also revised its Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT), which supports DHS efforts to gather information from facilities to assess their risk  According to DHS officials, the new tool—called CSAT 2 0—is intended to eliminate duplication and confusion associated with DHS’s original CSAT  DHS officials told us that they have improved the tool by revising some questions in the original CSAT to make them easier to understand; eliminating some questions; and pre-populating data from one part of the tool to another so that users do not have to retype the same information multiple times  DHS officials also told us that the facilities that have used the CSAT 2 0 have provided favorable feedback that the new tool is more efficient and less burdensome than the original CSAT  Finally, DHS officials told us that as of June 2018, DHS has completed all notifications and has processed tiering results for all but 226 facilities  DHS officials stated they are currently working to identify correct points of contact to update registration information for these remaining facilities  We are currently assessing DHS’s efforts to assess risk and prioritize facilities as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of this work in our report later this summer  DHS has also made progress reviewing and approving facility site security plans by reducing the time it takes to review these plans and eliminating the backlog of plans awaiting review  In April 2013, we reported that DHS revised its procedures for reviewing facilities’ security plans to address DHS managers’ concerns that the original process was slow, overly complicated, and caused bottlenecks in approving plans  We estimated that it could take DHS another 7 to 9 years to review the approximately 3,120 plans in its queue at that time  We also estimated that, given the additional time needed to do compliance inspections, the CFATS program would likely be implemented in 8 to 10 years  We did not make any recommendations for DHS to improve its procedures for reviewing facilities’ security plans because DHS officials reported that they were exploring ways to expedite the process, such as reprioritizing resources and streamlining inspection requirements  In July 2015, we reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities  DHS officials attributed the increased approval rate to efficiencies in DHS’s review process, updated guidance, and a new case management system  Subsequently, DHS reported in its December 2016 semi-annual report to Congress that it had eliminated its approval backlog  Finally, we found in our 2017review that DHS also took action to implement an Expedited Approval Program (EAP)  The CFATS Act of 2014 required that DHS create the EAP as another option that tier 3 and tier 4 chemical facilities may use to develop and submit security plans to DHS  Under the program, facilities may develop a security plan based on specific standards published by DHS (as opposed to the more flexible performance standards using the standard, non-expedited process)  DHS issued guidance intended to help facilities prepare and submit their EAP security plans to DHS, which includes an example that identifies prescriptive security measures that facilities are to have in place  According to committee report language, the EAP was expected to reduce the regulatory burden on smaller chemical companies, which may lack the compliance infrastructure and the resources of large chemical facilities, and help DHS to process security plans more quickly  If a tier 3 or 4 facility chooses to use the expedited option, DHS is to review the plan to determine if it is facially deficient, pursuant to the reporting requirements of the CFATS Act of 2014  If DHS approves the EAP site security plan, it is to subsequently conduct a compliance inspection  In 2017, we found that DHS had implemented the EAP and had reported to Congress on the program, as required by the CFATS Act of 2014  In addition, as of June 2018 according to DHS officials, only 18 of the 3,152 facilities eligible to use the EAP opted to use it  DHS officials we interviewed attributed the low participation to several possible factors including: DHS had implemented the expedited program after most eligible facilities already submitted standard (non-expedited) security plans to DHS; facilities may consider the expedited program’s security measures to be too strict and prescriptive, not providing facilities the flexibility of the standard process; and the lack of an authorization inspection may discourage some facilities from using the expedited program because this inspection provides useful information about a facility’s security  We also found in 2017 that recent changes made to the CFATS program could affect the future use of the expedited program  As discussed previously, DHS has revised its methodology for determining the level of each facility’s security risk, which could affect a facility’s eligibility to participate in the EAP  DHS continues to apply the revised methodology to facilities regulated under the CFATS program and but it is too early to assess the impact on participation in the EAP  In our July 2015 report, we found that DHS began conducting compliance inspections in September 2013, and by April 2015, had conducted inspections of 83 of the 1,727 facilities that had approved security plans  Our analysis showed that nearly half of the facilities were not fully compliant with their approved site security plans and that DHS had not used its authority to issue penalties because DHS officials found it more productive to work with facilities to bring them in compliance  We also found that DHS did not have documented processes and procedures for managing the compliance of facilities that had not implemented planned measures by the deadlines outlined in the plans  We recommended that DHS document processes and procedures for managing compliance to provide more reasonable assurance that facilities implement planned measures and address security gaps  DHS agreed and has taken steps toward implementing this recommendation  DHS updated its CFATS Enforcement Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and has made progress on the new CFATS Inspections SOP  Once completed these two documents collectively are expected to formally document the processes and procedures currently being used to track noncompliant facilities and ensure they implement planned measures as outlined in their approved site security plans, according to ISCD officials  DHS officials stated they expect to finalize these procedures by the end of fiscal year 2018  We are examining compliance inspections as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of our work in our report later this summer  In April 2013, we reported that DHS took various actions to work with facility owners and operators, including increasing the number of visits to facilities to discuss enhancing security plans, but that some trade associations had mixed views on the effectiveness of DHS’s outreach  We found that DHS solicited informal feedback from facility owners and operators in its efforts to communicate and work with them, but did not have an approach for obtaining systematic feedback on its outreach activities  We recommended that DHS take action to solicit and document feedback on facility outreach consistent with DHS efforts to develop a strategic communication plan  DHS agreed and implemented this recommendation by developing a questionnaire to solicit feedback on outreach with industry stakeholders and began using the questionnaire in October 2016  Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member Tonko, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time  If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Other individuals making key contributions to this work include John Mortin, Assistant Director; and Brandon Jones, Analyst-in-Charge; Michael Lennington, Ben Emmel, and Hugh Paquette  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2: S  Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2018  Table 4 provides information from the same report about states' contributions to the costs of maintaining and operating voting equipment  As GAO uses the terms in the survey, operation costs "include things such as poll worker labor to set up equipment, postage for mailing absentee or vote-by-mail ballots, paper and printing supplies for paper ballots or voter-verified paper trails, and electricity to operate equipment during elections " Maintenance costs "include things such as labor to conduct maintenance between elections of any equipment hardware and software as well as any required parts " Some states cover or contribute to the costs of training local election officials, and some share election-specific costs, such as printing ballots and transporting voting equipment  Box 3 uses five examples of cost-sharing arrangements for election-specific costs of federal elections to illustrate the range of approaches states have taken to such arrangements  The structures of the state and local systems that conduct federal elections vary both between and within states  Common variations include differences related to the leadership of the election system; relationship between local election officials and the state; and population size and density of the jurisdiction served by the system  This section describes these structural variations  The state and local election systems that conduct federal elections may be led by an individual, such as the state secretary of state or a town or county clerk; a group, such as a state elections commission or a county board of elections; or a combination of individuals or groups, such as a state secretary of state and state board of elections, or a city clerk and city registrar of voters  Election system leadership may be chosen by voters or appointed by an authority such as the governor or state legislature  The selection method—and the leaders themselves—may be partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan  Federal law requires states to designate a chief election official to carry out certain tasks  Table 5 lists the titles of chief state election officials, as reported to CRS by the EAC, and the methods of selecting them, as listed by the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) and the National Association of State Legislatures (NCSL)  The leadership types and selection methods of local election systems may vary within a state  Box 4 uses examples from Florida and Wisconsin to illustrate such variations  It describes the different causes of variation in the two states and a recent change in Florida to a more uniform selection process  The leadership structures of both state and local systems can also change over time  Box 5 uses the two states from Box 4 to illustrate the types of changes states might make, how they might make them, and how frequently they might make them  It describes one change that was approved by voters as a ballot measure and a number of others that were enacted legislatively  Another way in which the structures of election systems can vary is in the relationship between local election officials and the state  Some local election officials operate largely independently, whereas others rely on state officials or resources for some, most, or all basic functions  For example, as noted in " Funding ," states may provide some or all of the training for local election officials  As described in more detail in " Jurisdiction Size and Density ," local election officials who serve smaller or more rural jurisdictions may also depend on their states to provide specialized expertise, such as legal or technical know-how  States also have varying types and degrees of influence over local election officials  Choices about other structural features, such as the method used to select the leadership of local election systems, can shape this aspect of the state-local relationship  For example, in some states, state officials appoint and can remove local election officials  State officials in other states may have other options for influencing local officials  For example, state officials may have the power to initiate legal action against local officials, to provide or withhold funding for local election administration, or to certify and decertify voting systems  However, they tend to have less control over how local officials perform their election administration duties than state officials with appointment and removal authority  As described in more detail in " Compliance with Federal Requirements ," this dynamic may be especially pronounced for local officials who are popularly elected  Such officials are accountable primarily to voters rather than to the state  Other structural variations between election systems derive from differences in the population size and density of the jurisdictions they serve  Some election jurisdictions reported serving fewer than 100 eligible registered voters in the 2016 election, for example, whereas Los Angeles County reported serving 6 8 million  The eligible registered voters in that county alone reportedly outnumbered the eligible registrants in each of 40 other states  Election jurisdictions also differ in population density  For example, Los Angeles County is an urban center, and many small jurisdictions are rural  Jurisdictions with different population sizes and densities have different election administration advantages and face different administrative challenges  For example, voter registration list maintenance is typically more straightforward in small jurisdictions because their lists are shorter and election officials are more likely to know registrants personally  Meanwhile, large jurisdictions tend to have larger tax bases and more resources  Those differences between jurisdictions may be reflected in the internal structures of the election systems that serve them  One example of such a structural difference is the size and specialization of the system's staff  Larger jurisdictions, which typically have more personnel, may have much of the specialized expertise they need in-house  Smaller jurisdictions, which may have only one part-time employee dedicated to election administration, are more likely to rely on outside expertise  For example, according to law professors Steven F  Huefner, Daniel P  Tokaji, and Edward B  Foley, smaller jurisdictions in Illinois have looked to state attorneys for election law expertise and to voting equipment vendors for technical support  Another type of difference related to jurisdiction size and density is variation in the allocation of system resources  A study prepared for the U S  Election Assistance Commission in 2013 found that election officials in rural jurisdictions were more likely than their urban counterparts to use paid print advertising for voter outreach  Election officials in urban jurisdictions were more likely to use websites and social media  Small jurisdictions may also allocate a larger share of their resources to meeting state and federal requirements than larger jurisdictions because there are often fixed start-up costs to required changes, and smaller jurisdictions may be less equipped to capitalize on economies of scale  For example, political scientists Heather M  Creek and Kimberly A  Karnes report, "There is a minimum cost to the acquisition and maintenance of voting technology that applies whether the district is purchasing 5 or 500 machines " The duties and structures of state and local election systems can affect the implementation of federal election administration laws  Perhaps as a result, Congress has specified how states and localities should distribute certain election administration duties and structure certain elements of their election systems  Changes to the duties and structures of state and local election systems have sometimes also been side effects of other federal activity on election administration  This section provides examples of ways in which the distribution of election administration duties at the state and local levels and the structures of state and local election systems can affect the implementation of federal election administration law  These examples include federal efforts to affect the administration of elections through (1) requirements, (2) funding, and (3) information sharing  Congress can use requirements to regulate how states and localities administer certain aspects of federal elections  How well such requirements serve their intended purposes depends in part on how closely states and localities comply with them  How closely states and localities comply with federal requirements may, in turn, be affected by the duties and structures of the state and local election systems that implement them  For example, UOCAVA assigns responsibility for complying with some of its requirements to the states (52 U S C  §20302), but the tasks required for compliance are often handled by local officials  One scholar, law professor Justin Weinstein-Tull, indicates that this means that the officials who are held liable for compliance with UOCAVA requirements may differ from the officials who take or fail to take the actions needed to comply  Box 6 provides an illustration of this phenomenon as reported by state officials in Alabama  The federal government can provide funding for state and local election administration, which may be conditional on the adoption of certain election administration policies or practices  How well such funding serves its intended purposes may depend in part on how timely it is and how well-tailored it is to its objectives  Duties and structures of state and local election systems may affect how quickly federal funding is claimed and used and how well the uses to which it is put serve federal objectives  For example, HAVA has authorized payments to states to meet its requirements (52 U S C  §21007)  It has directed those payments to be disbursed to states (52 U S C  §21001(a)) and charged chief state election officials with overseeing decisions about how to spend them (52 U S C  §21005(a))  State election officials run federal elections in some states, but those states are the exception  As noted in " Implementation " and " Funding ," most states assign election administration implementation and funding duties to local officials  That means that the officials who receive HAVA funding and are charged with overseeing decisions about how to use it often differ from the officials who conduct and pay for the activities and resources it is intended to fund  That has had at least two reported consequences  First, in some cases, it has reportedly delayed access to or use of some HAVA funds  Directing HAVA funding to states introduces opportunities for state-level delays, such as decisions by state officials to wait to claim the funds or requirements in state law to obtain approval to do so  Second, some local officials have stated the view that their states' shares of HAVA funding were not put to what they considered the areas of greatest need  Box 7 provides examples of such consequences as described by state and local officials in Nevada, Minnesota, and Virginia  Congress can require or facilitate information sharing with states and localities by federal agencies  As with funding, the effectiveness of federal information sharing may depend in part on how timely it is  How quickly federal agencies share information with the appropriate state and local officials may be affected by the distribution of election administration duties at the state and federal levels  Box 8 provides an example of such an effect reported by NASS  Past federal action has resulted in both intentional and unintentional changes to state and local election systems  Some federal laws include provisions that are specifically designed to establish certain responsibilities for election administration at the state level  For example, the NVRA requires states to designate chief state election officials to coordinate state responsibilities under the act (52 U S C  §20509), and HAVA charges chief state election officials with implementing a statewide voter registration system (52 U S C  §21083(a)(1)(A))  Federal regulation has reportedly also had the side effect of shifting the distribution of other election administration duties  For example, the agency-based registration requirements in the NVRA divide voter registration responsibilities between traditional election offices and offices that had not historically been involved in election administration, such as motor vehicle and public assistance agencies (52 U S C  §20504; 52 U S C  §20506)  According to Hale, Montjoy, and Brown, "the need to pass implementing legislation and the complexity of legal and technical requirements" in federal laws such as HAVA and the NVRA has also "led many states to grant new or additional rule-making power" to their chief state election officials  Congress has considered legislation—some of which has been enacted and some of which has not—that would change election rules or the state and local systems that implement them  The interactions between the duties and structures of state and local election systems and past federal actions suggest some considerations that may be relevant to future congressional consideration of proposals that would affect the administration of federal elections  The following questions may be of interest to Members as they consider making changes to election administration or maintaining current rules and structures: How would any proposed change interact with the duties and structures of state and local election systems? Would the duties and structures of state and local election systems make a proposed change difficult to implement? Would the design of a proposed change need to be adjusted to accommodate variations between or within states? Which of the policy tools available to Congress is best suited to achieving the purpose of a proposed change? For example, would it be more effective to advance a proposed change with a federal requirement, or incentivize it via federal funding? How might the nature of the state and local system inform a proposed change? For example, if it is a federal requirement, who is charged with compliance; who is responsible for the tasks required for compliance; and what is the relationship between the two? If it is federal funding, to whom should it be distributed, and who should be involved in making decisions about how to use it? Would a proposed change have the effect, either intentionally or unintentionally, of altering the duties or structures of state or local election systems? If so, what are the advantages and disadvantages of such changes? Are there complications with a proposed change that are not specifically related to election administration? For example, could there be federalism-related issues with intervening in the relationships between states and their political subdivisions? 

ground_truth: The federal government pays benefits to coal miners affected by coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP, commonly referred to as black lung disease) and other lung diseases linked to coal mining in cases where responsible mine operators are not able to pay. In 2019, the monthly benefit for a miner with no dependents is $660.10. Benefits can be as much as $1,320.10 per month for miners with three or more dependents. Medical benefits are provided separately from disability benefits. Benefit payments and related administrative expenses in cases in which the responsible operators do not pay are paid out of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. The primary source of revenue for the trust fund is an excise tax on coal produced and sold domestically. If excise tax revenue is not sufficient to finance Black Lung Program benefits, the trust fund may borrow from the general fund of the Treasury. For 2018, the tax rates on coal were $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 4.4% of the sales price. These rates were established in 1986. Starting in 2019, under current law, these tax rates are $0.50 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.25 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 2% of the sales price. These are the rates that were set when the trust fund was established in 1977. The decline in the excise tax rates will likely put additional financial strain on a trust fund that already borrows from the general fund to meet obligations. The decline in domestic coal production, recent increases in the rate of CWP, and bankruptcies in the coal sector also contribute to the financial strain on the trust fund. The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund and associated excise tax on coal were established so that the coal industry, as opposed to taxpayers in general, would bear the burden associated with providing black lung benefits. Throughout its history, the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund has not raised revenues sufficient to meet obligations. As a result, at various points in time, Congress and the President have acted to increase the excise tax on coal, forgive or refinance trust fund debt, and modify black lung benefits eligibility. With the rate of the excise tax on coal reduced in 2019, the 116th Congress may again evaluate options for improving the fiscal condition of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, or other issues related to providing federal benefits to miners with black lung disease.