prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: T he Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program provides cash benefits to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers; firefighters; employees of emergency management agencies; and members of emergency medical services agencies who are killed or permanently and totally disabled as the result of personal injuries sustained in the line of duty  The Public Safety Officers' Educational Assistance (PSOEA) program, a component of the PSOB program, provides higher-education assistance to the children and spouses of public safety officers killed or permanently disabled in the line of duty  Both programs are administered by the PSOB Office of the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)  Congress appropriates funds for these programs in the annual Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act  For FY2019, the one-time lump-sum PSOB benefit is $359,316 and the monthly full-time attendance PSOEA assistance is $1,224  The PSOB and PSOEA benefit amounts are indexed to reflect changes in the cost of living  Table 1 shows PSOB and PSOEA claims and approvals as reported by DOJ  To be eligible for PSOB benefits for death or disability, a person must have served in one of the following categories of public safety officers: law enforcement officer, firefighter, or chaplain in a public agency; FEMA employee or a state, local, or tribal emergency management agency employee; or emergency medical services member  There is no minimum amount of time a person must have served to be eligible for benefits  To be eligible for PSOB benefits as a law enforcement officer, firefighter, or chaplain, a person must have served in a "public agency" in an official capacity, with or without compensation  For the purposes of PSOB eligibility, a public agency is defined as the federal government and any department, agency, or instrumentality of the federal government; and any state government, the District of Columbia government, and any U S  territory or possession; and any local government, department, agency, or instrumentality of a state, the District of Columbia, or any U S  territory or possession  For the purposes of PSOB eligibility, a law enforcement officer is defined as "an individual involved in crime and juvenile delinquency control or reduction, or enforcement of the criminal laws (including juvenile delinquency), including, but not limited to, police, corrections, probation, parole, and judicial officers " For the purposes of PSOB eligibility, the definition of firefighter includes both professional firefighters and persons serving as an "officially recognized or designated member of a legally organized volunteer fire department " A chaplain is eligible for PSOB benefits (1) if he or she is either an "officially recognized or designated member of a legally organized volunteer fire department or legally organized police department" or public employee of a police or fire department and (2) only if he or she was performing the duties of a chaplain in an official capacity while responding to a police, fire, or rescue emergency  Employees of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and state, local, or tribal emergency management agencies may be eligible for PSOB benefits under certain conditions provided in statute  A FEMA employee or an employee of a state, local, or tribal emergency management agency working with FEMA is eligible for PSOB benefits if he or she is performing official duties that are related to a major disaster or an emergency declared under the Robert T  Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) and that are considered hazardous by the FEMA Administrator or the head of the state, local, or tribal agency  A member, including a volunteer member, of a rescue squad or "ambulance crew" who is authorized or licensed by law and the applicable agency and is engaging in rescue services or providing emergency medical services may be eligible for PSOB benefits  The rescue squad or ambulance service may provide ground or air ambulance services and may be either a public agency or a nonprofit entity authorized to provide rescue or emergency medical services  By PSOB regulation, eligible emergency medical services workers include rescue workers, ambulance drivers, paramedics, health care responders, emergency medical technicians, or others who are trained in rescue activity or emergency medical services and have the legal authority and responsibility to provide such services  The PSOB program pays benefits if a public safety officer becomes permanently and totally disabled or dies "as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty " To qualify for coverage under the PSOB program, a public safety officer's disability or death must have been the result of a personal injury  The PSOB regulation defines an injury for the purposes of benefit eligibility as a traumatic physical wound (or a traumatized physical condition of the body) directly and proximately caused by external force (such as bullets, explosives, sharp instruments, blunt objects, or physical blows), chemicals, electricity, climatic conditions, infectious disease, radiation, virii, or bacteria     The regulation also provides that the definition of an injury does not include an occupational disease or a condition of the body caused by stress or strain, including psychological conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder  However, the PSOB statute specifically provides for deaths caused by certain cardiovascular conditions  The death of a public safety officer due to a heart attack, stroke, or vascular rupture shall be presumed to be a death from a personal injury for the purposes of PSOB eligibility if the officer engaged in nonroutine stressful or strenuous physical activity as part of an emergency response or training exercise; and if the condition began during the physical activity, while the officer remained on duty after the physical activity, or within 24 hours of the physical activity  The PSOB program covers a public safety officer's death or disability if it occurred as the result of an injury incurred in the line of duty  The PSOB regulations provide that an injury occurs in the line of duty if it (1) is the result of the public safety officer's authorized activities while on duty, (2) occurs while responding to an emergency or request for assistance, or (3) occurs while commuting to or from duty in an authorized department or personal vehicle  In addition, if there is convincing evidence that the injury was the result of the individual's status as a public safety officer, that injury is covered by the PSOB program  The lump-sum PSOB death and disability benefit for FY2019 is $359,316  The benefit amount is adjusted annually to reflect changes in the cost of living using the annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers (CPI-U) for the one-year period ending in the previous June  If a public safety officer receives a disability benefit and later dies from the same injury, the officer's survivors may not receive a PSOB death benefit  The payable benefit amount is based on the date of the public safety officer's death or the date of the injury that caused the disability, rather than on the date of application for benefits or disability determination  Thus, if a benefit increase occurs while an application is pending, the benefit is payable at the previous, lower, benefit level  Death and disability benefits are not subject to the federal income tax  In general, PSOB death and disability benefits are paid in addition to any other workers' compensation, life insurance, or other benefits paid for the death of a public safety officer  However, the PSOB death benefit is offset by the following benefits: benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) payable to state and local law enforcement officers injured or killed while enforcing federal law; benefits under the D C  Retirement and Disability Act of 1916 for certain police officers and firefighters in the District of Columbia; and payments from the September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund (VCF)  PSOB death benefits are payable to the eligible spouse and children of a public safety officer  A spouse is the person to whom the officer is legally married, even if physically separated, under the marriage laws of the jurisdiction where the marriage took place  Pursuant to regulations issued after the Supreme Court struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act in United States v  Windsor , the legally married spouse of a public safety office may be of the same sex as the officer  A child is defined as any "natural, illegitimate, adopted, or posthumous child or stepchild" of the public safety officer who, at the time of the public safety officer's fatal or catastrophic injury, is 18 years of age or under; between 18 and 23 years of age and a full-time student in high school or undergraduate higher education; or over 18 years of age and incapable of self-support because of physical or mental disability  PSOB death benefits are paid to eligible survivors in the following order: 1  if the officer is survived by only a spouse, 100% of the death benefits are payable to the spouse; 2  if the officer is survived by a spouse and children, 50% of the death benefits are payable to the spouse and the remaining 50% is distributed equally among the officer's children; 3  if the officer is survived by only children, the death benefits are equally distributed among the officer's children; 4  if the officer has no surviving spouse or children, the death benefits are paid to the individual or individuals designated by the officer in the most recently executed designation of beneficiary on file at the time of the officer's death; or if the officer does not have a designation of beneficiary on file, the benefits are paid to the individual or individuals designated by the officer in the most recently executed life insurance policy on file at the time of the officer's death; 5  if the officer has no surviving spouse or eligible children, and the officer does not have a life insurance policy, the death benefits are equally distributed between the officer's surviving parents; or 6  if the officer has no surviving spouse, eligible children, or parents, and the officer did not have a designation of beneficiary or a life insurance policy on file at the time of his or her death, the death benefits are payable to surviving adult, nondependent, children of the officer  PSOB disability benefits are paid only in cases of permanent and total disability  There are no benefits payable for partial or short-term disabilities  A disability is considered permanent for the purposes of PSOB eligibility if, given the current state of medicine in the United States, there is a degree of medical certainty that the condition will remain constant or deteriorate over the person's lifetime or that the public safety officer has reached maximum medical improvement  A public safety officer is considered to be totally disabled for the purposes of PSOB eligibility if given the current state of medicine in the United States, there is a degree of medical certainty that the officer is unable to perform any gainful work  PSOB regulation defines gainful work as "full- or part-time activity that is compensated or commonly compensated " Applications for PSOB death and disability benefits are filed with the PSOB office, which determines benefit eligibility and commences benefit payment  Unless extended for good cause, application deadlines must be met  Complete benefit applications must be filed no later than for death benefits: three years after the death; one year after the determination of the officer's employing agency to award or deny death benefits payable by that agency; or one year after certification by the officer's employing agency that the agency is not authorized to pay any death benefits; and for disability benefits: three years after the date of the injury; one year after the determination of the officer's employing agency to award or deny workers' compensation or disability benefits payable by that agency; or one year after certification by the officer's employing agency that the agency is not authorized to pay any workers' compensation or disability benefits  A lump-sum interim payment of up to $3,000 may be made if a PSOB death benefit will "probably be paid " The interim payment amount reduces the final PSOB payment amount  If the ultimate decision is to deny death benefits, the interim payment must be returned to the federal government, unless this repayment is waived because it would create a hardship for the beneficiary  Section 611 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act; P L  107-56 ) provides for expedited payment of PSOB death and disability benefits if the officer's injury occurred "in connection with prevention, investigation, rescue, or recovery efforts related to a terrorist attack " In such cases, PSOB benefits must be paid within 30 days of certification from the officer's employing agency that the officer's death or disability was related to terrorism  The Public Safety Officers' Education Assistance (PSOEA) program provides financial assistance with costs associated with higher education to the spouse or children of a public safety officer who is eligible for PSOB death or disability benefits  The spouse or child of a public safety officer who is eligible for PSOB death or disability benefits may be eligible for PSOEA benefits  To be eligible for PSOEA benefits, a spouse must have been married to an eligible public safety officer at the time of the officer's death or injury  A child is eligible for PSOEA benefits until the age of 27  This age limit can be extended by the Attorney General in extraordinary circumstances, or, pursuant to Section 3 of the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Improvement Act of 2017 ( P L  115-36 ), if there is a delay of more than one year in approving PSOB or PSOEA benefits  In addition, to be eligible for PSOEA benefits, the spouse or child must be enrolled at an eligible educational institution  For the purposes of PSOEA eligibility, an eligible education institution is one that meets the definition of an "institution of higher education" as provided by Section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and that is eligible for federal student aid  PSOEA benefits are payable to the claimant and may be used only to defray costs associated with higher education attendance, including tuition, room, board, book and supplies, and education-related fees  The monthly PSOEA benefit amount is equal to the monthly benefit amount payable under the GI Bill Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance (DEA) program, which is administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for spouses and dependents of veterans with disabilities or who died as a result of service-connected conditions  The PSOEA benefit amounts are adjusted annually to reflect changes in the cost of living in accordance with changes to the GI Bill DEA benefit amounts  For FY2019, the PSOEA monthly benefit for a student attending an educational institution full-time is $1,224  The PSOEA benefit rates are prorated for less than full-time attendance  The maximum duration of PSOEA benefits for any person is 45 months of full-time education or a proportionate duration of part-time education  A person is ineligible for PSOEA if he or she is in default on a federal student loan or is ineligible for federal benefits due to a drug trafficking or drug possession conviction  In addition, the Attorney General may discontinue PSOEA benefits for a student that fails to make satisfactory progress in his or her course of study as defined by Section 484(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965  A claimant who is dissatisfied with a PSOB disability benefit denial may request a reconsideration  There is no reconsideration offered for denials of PSOB death or PSOEA benefits  A claimant who is dissatisfied with a PSOB or PSOEA benefit denial may request a de novo hearing before a hearing officer assigned by the director of the DOJ PSOB Office  The determination of a hearing officer may be appealed to the PSOB Office director  The director's determination is considered the final agency determination and is not subject to any further agency administrative review or appeal  However, provided all administrative appeals remedies have been exhausted, the PSOB Office director's determination may be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit  The PSOB statute authorizes the BJA to prescribe the maximum fee that an attorney or other representative may charge a claimant for services rendered in connection with a claim, with attorney fees generally limited to between 3% and 6% of the total benefit paid, depending on the level in the administrative appeals process the claim is approved  Program regulation prohibits stipulated-fee and contingency-fee arrangements for PSOB representation  Congress provides funding for PSOB and PSOE benefits and associated administrative expenses in the annual Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act  Funding for PSOB death benefits and associated administrative expenses is considered mandatory spending and Congress appropriates "such sums as may be necessary" for the payment of these benefits  Funding for PSOB disability and PSOEA benefits is considered discretionary and is subject to specific congressional appropriations  Annual appropriations language grants the Attorney General the authority to transfer from any available appropriations to the DOJ the funds necessary to respond to emergent circumstances that require additional funding for PSOB disability benefits and PSOEA benefits  


Report 2: Many Members of Congress became actively engaged in foreign policy debates over U S  intervention in the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, "Bosnia")  Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response to the conflict through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative initiatives  Many observers contend that the United States is a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of the strong impact of U S  intervention on the postwar Bosnian state  Nearly 25 years after warring parties in Bosnia reached the Dayton Agreement (see below), Bosnia faces numerous internal and external challenges, and the country retains geopolitical importance to U S  interests in the Western Balkans  As Congress assesses ongoing and emerging security issues in the region, including resilience against malign external influence, renewed conflict, and radicalization, Bosnia's internal politics and its role in Balkan stability may merit further examination  Bosnia has existed in various forms throughout its history: a medieval kingdom, territory held by two major empires, a federal unit, and, since 1992, an independent state  Bosnia's present international borders are largely consistent with its administrative boundaries under later periods of Ottoman Turkish rule  After World War I, Bosnia became part of the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes  It was one of the six constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1945 until 1992  Bosnia's constitution stems from the U S -brokered Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the country's 1992-1995 war  It recognizes three "constituent peoples": Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs  All three groups are Slavic  Religious tradition is considered a marker of difference among the three ethnic identities: Bosniaks are predominantly Muslim, Serbs are largely Orthodox Christian, and Croats are mostly Catholic  Although Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian are recognized in Bosnia as distinct official languages, they are mutually intelligible  Bosniaks comprise approximately 50 1% of the population, Bosnian Serbs 30 8%, and Bosnian Croats 15 4%  In this report, Bosnian is used as a non-ethnic term for a person or institution from Bosnia  A Bosnian Serb is an ethnic Serb from Bosnia and a Bosnian Croat is an ethnic Croat from Bosnia  Bosniak refers to Slavic Muslims  Bosnia's religious and cultural diversity is one of its distinctive characteristics  Islam was introduced to part of Bosnia's population during the Ottoman period, although there were also large Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Jewish communities  Bosnia was the most heterogeneous Yugoslav republic and the only one where no ethnic group formed an absolute majority  During the 1990s, some popular accounts of Bosnia (and the former Yugoslavia) depicted its ethnic relations as "ancient hatreds," implying that the country's ethnic groups cannot peacefully coexist and that the 1992-1995 war was unavoidable  However, many experts on the region reject this thesis  Although Bosnia has experienced episodes of communal violence and bloodshed, most recently during World War II and the 1992-1995 war, its heterogeneous population also has lived in mixed communities for periods of peace  Many experts contend that ethnic conflict often was stoked by domestic leaders who manipulated historical memory and grievances to further their own agendas, or by external powers seeking to rule Bosnia or annex its territory  In the 1980s, Yugoslavia's escalating political and economic crises fueled nationalist movements  Nationalist leaders in Serbia and Croatia appealed to Bosnian Serbs and Croats as ethnic "kin " The party that ruled Croatia for most of the 1990s, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), established a sister party with the same name to mobilize Bosnian Croats and compete in Bosnia's elections  This gave Croatia an avenue of influence in Bosnian politics  Serbia, led by strongman Slobodan Milošević, likewise had influence over Bosnian Serb leaders  In Bosnia's November 1990 elections—the first competitive elections in decades—voters cast aside the ruling League of Communists party and elected ethnic parties that largely continue to dominate today  Bosnian voters backed independence in a 1992 referendum, following in the footsteps of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia  Bosnian Serbs, who did not want to separate from Yugoslavia, boycotted the referendum  Bosnian Serb forces seized more than two-thirds of Bosnia's territory, and a three-year conflict followed that pitted Serb, Croat, and Bosniak forces against one another  Bosnian Serb leaders declared a "Serb Republic" ( Republika Srpska) in March 1992, while Bosnian Croat leaders proclaimed the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosnia in July  Some Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb leaders advocated unification with Croatia and Serbia, respectively, where government factions—including their strongman leaders—likewise wanted to carve a Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia out of Bosnia's territory  Bosniak leaders opposed dismemberment of the state  Bosnia's war was one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since World War II  Bosnian Serb forces besieged Sarajevo for 44 months  More than 10,000 people, mostly civilians, died due to shelling, sniping, and blockade-related deprivation  Paramilitary factions from neighboring Croatia and Serbia—some of which reportedly had ties to the Croatian and Serbian government—fought alongside Bosnian Croats and Serbs  The Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army also aided Bosnian Serb forces, giving them a military advantage  In many areas, combatants from the three groups killed or expelled members of other ethnic groups to "purify" territory that they wanted to claim as their own  This "ethnic cleansing" changed Bosnia's demographic landscape  An estimated 100,000 or more Bosnians were killed in the conflict, and roughly half of its population displaced  In addition, an estimated 20,000 or more women and girls were victims of sexual violence  Hundreds of Bosnians have been prosecuted for war crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and in Bosnian courts  In 2016, the ICTY convicted wartime Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić of genocide and war crimes  In 2019, the tribunal rejected his appeal and increased his sentence from 40 years to life  Citizens of Croatia and Serbia have also been indicted for crimes committed in the Bosnian war  Highly publicized incidents in 1994 and 1995 underscored the war's human toll  Bosnian Serb forces bombarded a Sarajevo market in 1994 and 1995, resulting in over 100 civilian deaths  In July 1995, Serb forces commanded by Ratko Mladić seized and executed more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in a U N -designated safe area around the city of Srebrenica, an incident subsequently seen by some as a consequence of the international community's muddled, ineffectual response to the conflict  The International Court of Justice and ICTY subsequently ruled that the Srebrenica massacres constituted an act of genocide  Mladić was convicted of genocide and other crimes in 2017  These incidents increased pressure on U S  policymakers to take a stronger role in resolving a conflict that had largely been left to the EU and the United Nations  Under U S  command, NATO intervened in August and September 1995 with air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets, while allied Bosniak and Croat forces launched a simultaneous offensive in western Bosnia  The United States played a key role in brokering several agreements  The 1994 Washington Agreement ended the "war within a war" between Bosniaks and Croats  In November 1995, leaders from Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia met at the Wright-Patterson Air Force base in Dayton, OH, to negotiate a peace agreement  U S  diplomat Richard Holbrooke played a crucial role in brokering the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, more commonly known as the Dayton Peace Agreement  Bosnia's complex political system is a product of the Dayton Agreement; one of its annexes serves as Bosnia's constitution (Annex 4)  Its provisions partly reflect the situation on the ground in 1995, including the subdivision of Bosnia into two ethnoterritorial entities ( Figure 1 ): Republika Srpska ("RS"), which Bosnian Serb leaders had proclaimed in 1992, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("FBiH," predominantly populated by Bosniaks and Croats), which was created by the 1994 Washington Agreement  Entity borders were largely drawn to form ethnic majorities, even though they also reflected territorial seizure and ethnic cleansing  Many Bosniaks view the division of Bosnia into these roughly equal entities as awarding the spoils of war to Bosnian Serbs, whom they regard as the aggressors  Many Bosnian Serbs, however, view the Serb-majority entity as a protection against marginalization  The designation of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as Bosnia's three "constituent peoples" is a cornerstone of the Dayton system  Numerous government bodies have ethnic quotas requiring equal representation of the three groups  In these power-sharing institutions, delegates from each constituent group may veto measures that go against vital ethnic interests  While these arrangements make Bosnia's political system prone to gridlock, Dayton's negotiators viewed them as necessary to prevent any group from feeling marginalized in a context of low trust  Bosnia is a parliamentary republic with a high degree of decentralization  Its complex, tiered structure includes a central ("state-level") government, the two entities, the autonomous Brčko district, and cantonal and municipal governments  The central ("state-level") government covers the entirety of Bosnia  A three-member presidency is the head of state, and includes one Serb member who is elected by RS voters, and one Bosniak and one Croat member elected by FBiH voters  The Council of Ministers, led by a Chairperson, is roughly equivalent to a cabinet government and prime minister in other parliamentary systems  The Parliamentary Assembly is a state-level legislature with two chambers: a directly elected House of Representatives (42 members) and an indirectly elected House of Peoples (5 Serbs, 5 Croats, and 5 Bosniaks)  The state-level government is considered to be weak, despite some expansion of its functions in the 2000s  Its major responsibilities include foreign relations; trade, customs, and monetary policy; migration and asylum policy; defense; and intelligence  Bosnia is further subdivided into two ethnoterritorial entities: Republika Srpska (RS), where Serbs are the largest ethnic group (82%), and the Federation entity (FBiH), where Bosniaks (70%) and Croats (22%) are the largest groups  The two entities have broader policy jurisdiction than the state-level government  Governing functions that are not assigned to the state-level government fall to the entities  These include civilian policing, economic policy, fiscal policy, energy policy, and health and social policy, as well as other issues  Each entity has its own constitution, as well as a president, vice presidents, legislature, and cabinet government with a prime minister  Each entity may establish "special parallel relationships" with neighboring states (i e , Croatia and Serbia)  Numerous entity bodies also incorporate ethnic quotas  Brčko district, a border region in northeastern Bosnia, was initially administered by the international community to allay concerns about RS secession  Brčko's location interrupts RS's contiguity, and both entities initially claimed it  Brčko was later awarded to both entities, but remains a self-governing district whose population is a mix of all three constituent peoples  Some analysts believe it has been relatively more successful than the entities in passing reforms and reintegrating its divided population (e g , ethnically mixed schools with a common curriculum)  FBiH entity is further divided into ten cantons, many of which were drawn to form ethnic Bosniak or Croat majorities  The cantons have jurisdiction in many policy areas, including policing, housing, culture, and education  They also have their own constitutions—based on the FBiH constitution—as well as legislatures and cabinet-style governments  FBiH and RS are further divided into 79 and 64 municipalities, respectively  The Dayton Agreement established a strong oversight role for the international community  The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was created to monitor the implementation of civilian aspects of Dayton  The High Representative is supported by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), a group of 55 countries and agencies  A 1997 PIC conference empowered the High Representative to impose binding decisions and sanction politicians who obstruct Dayton  Until the mid-2000s, the High Representative used these powers to remove officials deemed to be obstructive to peace and to promote what are considered among the most constructive reforms since Dayton, including merging the entities' armed forces and intelligence services and putting them under new state-level ministries  However, the High Representative's proactive role has since decreased  This is partly due to criticism that the OHR lacks democratic legitimacy and accountability  Bosnian Serb politicians have claimed that the OHR's interventions support Bosniak leaders' preference for a more centralized state  At the same time, some U S  and EU policymakers believed that the attraction of EU membership could incentivize reforms in place of the OHR's more top-down approach  The international community also plays an ongoing security role  NATO led the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) that monitored security aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement  The initial deployment of NATO ground forces to Bosnia numbered nearly 60,000, of which the largest share (approximately one-third) was from the United States  The number of troops subsequently decreased  In 2004, NATO's peacekeeping role was transferred to the EU with the understanding that NATO would assist if necessary  The size of the EU operation (EUFOR Althea) decreased from 7,000 troops in 2004 to roughly 600 troops today  Many analysts contend that the Dayton Agreement helped hold Bosnia together after the war; they point to the absence of widespread violence since 1995 as an indicator of its success  However, observers also question whether Bosnia can function much longer under the Dayton system  They identify several key challenges: Critics claim that Bosnia's political system reinforces the country's ethnic divisions and makes ethnicity a core basis of political identity  The ethnic parties that have dominated politics since the war generally appeal to voters from their respective ethnic communities rather than all Bosnians  Critics accuse ethnic party leaders of inflaming nationalist tensions and manipulating historical memory to distract from corruption and win elections, thus aggravating rather than bridging the deep wounds that remain from the war  In some parts of Bosnia, divisions are further reproduced at the societal level through institutions like segregated schools, which separate schoolchildren from different ethnic groups and teach them different curriculum  Some analysts also contend that the system is too gridlock-prone to pass major political and economic reforms to be passed, even with the incentive of potential EU membership  Bosnia's fractured, overlapping institutions sometimes muddle policymaking jurisdiction and impede coordinated response  Furthermore, power-sharing arrangements create numerous veto points in the legislative process  Government coalitions are typically ideologically broad and unwieldy, creating a further source of potential dysfunction  One of the consequences of these barriers is that it is difficult to pass legislation  The previous state-level Parliament, for example, adopted twelve new laws over the course of its 2014-2018 term  Corruption in Bosnia has roots in the country's wartime economy  A 2000 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that "organized crime and corruption pervade Bosnia's national political parties, civil service, law enforcement and judicial systems  [Ethnic] parties control all aspects of the government, the judiciary, and the economy, and in so doing maintain the personal and financial power of their members " Many observers claim that the situation has improved little since then  In 2018, the High Representative warned that the rule of law has deteriorated, while the U S  State Department describes the rule of law as "an existential issue " Bosnia's major parties allegedly siphon from the state apparatus and public enterprises in their strongholds to amass wealth and power  Furthermore, parties in power reportedly politicize hiring in Bosnia's public sector, which employs an estimated third or more of the working population  For many Bosnians, satisfactory employment depends on having the right political connections, which creates a dependence that reportedly is exploited during elections  In 2018, the outgoing U S  ambassador to Bosnia decried the "[Bosnian] politicians who seek to destabilize the country in order to remain in power at all costs for personal profit and protection " Many analysts believe that Bosnia's entrenched ethnic parties benefit tremendously from the status quo and have little incentive to reform the system  Bosnia's MPs are among the best-paid in Europe relative to local incomes, commanding six to eight times the average Bosnian salary  Parties and politicians who gain office in the government or administration often find "a remarkably efficient path to personal enrichment " Politicians are skilled at using veto points to block legislation that threatens their position in Bosnia's patronage system  According to one analyst, Bosnia's patronage system is "the raison d'etre of the political elites and is the main cause of the state's dysfunctionality and resistance to reform " Bosnia's entrenched political class may also fear penalty if serious reforms are enacted and shine the spotlight on malfeasance  Criminal indictments against leaders in neighborhood countries like Romania, Croatia, and North Macedonia highlight this risk  Analysts believe these disincentives make entrenched politicians resistant to external pressure for reform  Several major rounds of U S - and EU-brokered constitutional reform efforts, including in 2006, 2008, and 2009, ultimately failed  Germany and the United Kingdom launched a major initiative in 2014 to shift the focus from difficult constitutional reforms to seemingly more feasible socioeconomic reforms that they hoped would improve Bosnia's economy and dismantle patronage networks  The 2015 "Reform Agenda" identified economic, administrative, and legal measures to be adopted by entity- and state-level governments  The process, which required the major parties to commit in writing to the reform framework, was supported by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group, and the United States  As an incentive for politicians to agree to the Agenda, the EU offered the entry into force of Bosnia's long-stalled Stabilization and Association Agreement, which marked the first step toward EU membership  However, most observers view the Reform Agenda as largely unsuccessful; many of its provisions failed when entrenched parties objected to measures that would undercut their dominance  While many officials recognize that Bosnia's political system needs reform, there is little consensus on how to change it or to generate the political will to find common ground so long as the dominant parties remain entrenched  Bosnian Serb leaders have expressed a desire to return to the "original" Dayton system, when the entities had greater competencies in security and justice  Milorad Dodik, who has dominated politics in Republika Srpska since the 2000s, has gone further by repeatedly threatening RS secession  Bosnian Croat leaders from the largest Croat party, the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia (HDZ-BiH), call for more autonomy for Croats, and have raised the prospect of splitting FBiH to create a third Croat-majority entity  By contrast, Bosniak leaders generally prefer more centralization and the removal of some of the institutional arrangements that they believe contribute to dysfunction and gridlock  Some Bosniak officials also have proposed dismantling the entities or eliminating FBiH's cantons  Survey research documents Bosnian citizens' anger toward the political class and their distrust of political institutions  In a 2018 International Republican Institute survey, 86% of respondents expressed belief that Bosnia is heading in the wrong direction  An estimated 170,000 individuals—disproportionately young and skilled—have emigrated since 2013  Dissatisfaction with education and healthcare, insecurity, and nepotism are cited as key motives to emigrate  Nevertheless, some analysts believe that periods of social discontent in 2014 and 2018, which challenged the system but appeared to transcend ethnic divides, suggest that strengthening Bosnian civil society could increase pressure for reform, and perhaps cultivate a new generation of party leaders  Other observers have put their hopes for reform in Bosnia's so-called "civic parties," which do not have nationalist platforms and typically mobilize voters on the basis of socioeconomic interests rather than ethnicity  While these parties have not matched the results of the ethnic parties, their electoral performance has improved in recent years  Bosnia's challenges came to the forefront during its most recent general election on October 7, 2018 (see Table 1 )  The Central Election Commission (CEC) registered 60 parties and over 3,500 candidates for state-level, entity, and cantonal offices  Observers noted that the campaign climate was more divisive and nationalist in tone than usual  Despite broad voter dissatisfaction, entrenched ethnic parties won the largest vote shares  Almost six months after the election, the parties are still negotiating over government formation at the state level and in FBiH; however, it appears that entrenched ethnic parties will continue to dominate  In March 2019, the leaders of the largest Bosniak, Croat, and Serb parties stated that they had agreed to a set of principles to guide forming the state-level government (the Council of Ministers)  Some observers viewed the improved result of civic parties (one-third of the vote in FBiH) as a positive development  Some of the most controversial outcomes concern the elections to the state-level presidency, composed of three members (one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb)  In a closely fought race, Šefik Džaferović, candidate of the ethnic Bosniak SDA party, narrowly defeated the candidate of the civic SDP party (36 6% and 33 5%, respectively), retaining the lock that the SDA has had on the Bosniak seat in most elections since 1996, but perhaps auguring a future victory by a civic party candidate  Prior to the election, some analysts expressed concern at the prospect of two of the three seats on the presidency being held by the nationalist Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik and his ally, the nationalist Bosnian Croat politician Dragan Čović  Both politicians have explicitly or implicitly challenged the legitimacy of Bosnian statehood and called for greater ethnoterritorial autonomy  However, to the surprise of some observers, Željko Komšić of the civic Democratic Front defeated incumbent Čović for the Croat seat with 53% of the vote  Komšić was previously elected as the Croat member of the presidency in 2006 and 2010, and is considered to be a moderate political figure who generally supports centralizing reforms  In contrast to HDZ-BiH leader Čović, he does not have strong ties to the Croatian government  Komšić's election as the Croat member of the presidency in 2006 and 2010 was mired in controversy amid complaints that he only won with the support of Bosniaks who voted in the election for the Croat member on the presidency rather than the Bosniak member  Komšić identifies as Croat but has been leader of several civic parties  He comes from central Bosnia, and not from the Croat-majority western regions that are the stronghold of the HDZ  Although it is not illegal for Bosniaks to vote for the Croat seat on the presidency rather than the Bosniak seat, some Croat leaders (especially HDZ-BiH and HDZ-1990) claim that it violates the spirit of Dayton and results in illegitimate representation of Croats  Similar accusations of ethnic cross-voting surfaced after Komšić's victory in 2018  Some analysts expect Komšić's victory to harden the HDZ-BiH position on electoral reform (see "Legal Challenges," above) and possibly embolden politicians who seek a separate entity  As most pre-election polls anticipated, RS strongman Milorad Dodik defeated the more moderate incumbent Serb member of the presidency with 54% of the vote  Dodik has dominated entity politics in RS since the mid-2000s as entity prime minister and president  Analysts note that RS's political environment grew more closed as Dodik consolidated power  Dodik has run afoul of the United States and the EU by frequently threatening to hold a referendum on RS secession, questioning the legitimacy of Bosnian statehood, and cultivating close ties to Russia (see below)  The U S  Treasury Department sanctioned him in 2017 for actively obstructing Dayton  Many analysts have expressed concern that Dodik will use his new position to obstruct the workings of the central government while continuing to dictate politics in RS through loyal allies  Shortly after the election he vowed to "work above all and only for the interests of Serbs " One of his first acts as head of state was to call for Bosnia to recognize Ukraine's Crimea region as Russian territory  In December 2018, the National Assembly of RS approved the creation of several new ministries, an act that some view as an attempt to wrest competencies from the state-level government  In early 2019, the RS parliament courted controversy when it passed legislation to create a new commission to reinvestigate the events of Srebrenica, which many view as an attempt to deny or downplay the massacres  Since the election, the formation of governments has proceeded piecemeal, and legal challenges to election law in FBiH (see above, "Legal Challenges") initially cast doubt over the formation of that entity's government  The RS National Assembly approved the new entity government in December 2018  Party leaders continue to negotiate over forming governments in FBiH and the state-level Council of Ministers  Because the FBiH government did not fix electoral legislation before the election, the Electoral Commission adopted a decision to assign delegates to the House of Peoples based on the 2013 census  (The Electoral Commission's actions reportedly came amid strong pressure from U S  and EU officials)  Several Bosniak parties challenged the decision before the Constitutional Court; however, the Court declined to take on the case  Bosnia is one of Europe's poorest countries  The 1992-1995 war caused an estimated $110 billion in damage, and Bosnia's economy contracted to one-eighth of its prewar level  Despite significant reconstruction and recovery since 1995, GDP per capita was $5,148 in 2017, well below the EU average ($33,715) and that of Bulgaria ($8,031), its lowest-ranking member  Nearly one in five Bosnians lives below the poverty level  Bosnia's unemployment rate was 18% in 2018, down from 28% in 2015  Youth unemployment also declined in recent years from 60% to 46%  Nevertheless, these rates are still high by European standards  Since 2015, annual GDP growth has averaged around 3%, but it is largely driven by consumption (much of which in turn is fueled by migrant remittances)  The IMF has urged Bosnia to privatize or restructure the nearly 550 state-owned enterprises that comprise roughly 20% of its economy; many of them are unprofitable but allegedly are used by politicians as "cash cows and workplaces for loyal cadres " Bosnia participates in several free trade schemes  In 2006, it joined the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) alongside other non-EU countries in the region, including other ex-Yugoslav neighbors  Bosnia's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union, which entered into force in 2015, provides for almost fully free trade  A free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) also entered into force in 2015  The EU is Bosnia's primary trade partner  Germany, Italy, Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria are Bosnia's key EU export markets, accounting for more than half of its exports in 2017  Serbia, another CEFTA signatory, is also an important export market  Bosnia's major exports include vehicle seats, raw materials, leather products, textiles, energy, and wood products  The EU is also Bosnia's primary source of foreign direct investment (FDI)  In 2016, 63% of Bosnia's FDI came from EU countries, with Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia the top sources  Serbia is also a significant source of FDI (16 3%)  However, Bosnia's fragmented legal and administrative structure create a challenging investment climate  Many relevant laws differ between the two entities  Corruption, entrenched economic interests, and political instability also deter investment  As a result, FDI amounts to just 2% of Bosnia's GDP, well below the Western Balkan average of 5%  Bosnia was the region's lowest-rated country in the World Bank's 2019 Ease of Doing Business Index  U S  and EU policymakers view the NATO and EU accession processes as a positive force for democratization and reform in the Western Balkans, including Bosnia  According to analysts, this assessment informed the United States' partial retreat from the region in the 2000s and 2010s  EU membership is one of the few policy issues for which there is relatively broad consensus among Bosnia's politicians and population  The EU's "fundamentals first" approach to enlargement in the Western Balkans frontloads the accession process with meeting the core requirements of having a democratic political system and functioning market economy; in Bosnia, the EU is currently focused on issues relating to the rule of law, public administration reform, and economic development  In 2016, Bosnia submitted its application to join the EU  Its current status is potential candidate , which entitles it to receive financial assistance from the EU's Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II (IPA II)  Between 2014 and 2020, Bosnia is expected to receive €552 million in IPA II allocations, making the EU Bosnia's largest source of foreign assistance  Many EU member states provide additional aid to Bosnia through domestic foreign assistance programs  Bosnia's EU membership prospects are uncertain  In a 2018 progress report, the European Commission (the EU's executive) flagged Bosnia's slow implementation of reforms, including the 2015 Reform Agenda (a flagship EU initiative in Bosnia) and numerous domestic and international court rulings (see "Legal Challenges," above)  Some analysts question whether Bosnia, under its current political system, would be capable of meeting the membership requirement of harmonizing domestic legislation with the many thousands of provisions in the acquis communautaire, the cumulative body of EU legislation, case law, and regulations  In comparison to EU membership, Bosnian leaders are more divided over the issue of joining NATO  These divisions largely fall along Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat/Bosniak lines  Bosnian Serb opposition is rooted in resentment over NATO's role in the Bosnian war, and may also reflect a desire to remain in lockstep with neighboring Serbia, which also does not seek NATO membership  Bosnia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 2006 and secured an Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2008  In 2010, NATO indicated that it would launch a Membership Action Plan (MAP)—a program to help aspiring members meet membership requirements—once Bosnia meets several conditions, the most challenging of which is the reregistration of permanent defense installations from entity to state-level government  RS officials have resisted ceding control over defense installations on entity territory  Although Bosnia does not yet meet these requirements, in December 2018 NATO foreign ministers invited Bosnia to activate its MAP by submitting its first Annual National Program  Some analysts interpreted this invitation as a gesture to generate reform momentum in Bosnia's fragile post-election period  The Bosniak and Croat members of the presidency responded positively, but Bosnian Serb leaders (and most Bosnian Serbs) do not want Bosnia to join NATO  In October 2017, the RS National Assembly passed a resolution supporting military neutrality  RS President Željka Cvijanović reiterated this stance after NATO's invitation, and Dodik—now a member of the state-level presidency—also has vowed to pursue military neutrality  Bosnia's relations with Croatia and Serbia are seen as an important component of regional stability  However, bilateral relations have often been fraught as a legacy of the Bosnian war, as well as sensitivities over Croatia and Serbia's relations with Bosnian Croats and Serbs  While democratic gains in Croatia and Serbia after 2000 contributed to improved relations with Bosnia, they remain reluctant to examine or acknowledge their role in the Bosnian war  At times, Bosnian leaders have objected to what they describe as Croatian and Serbian meddling in Bosnia's affairs  Ex-Bosnian Croat member of the presidency Dragan Čović and current Bosnian Serb member of the presidency Milorad Dodik draw support from leaders in Croatia and Serbia and reportedly hold Croatian and Serbian citizenship, respectively, alongside their Bosnian citizenship  The Croatian government financially and politically backed Čović in Bosnia's 2018 elections, and Croatian politicians have raised the issue of Bosnian Croats' constitutional challenges (see above, "Legal Challenges") in forums like the European Parliament, NATO, and the United Nations  These moves prompted three former High Representatives to Bosnia to issue a joint letter expressing alarm over Croatia's "meddling" in Bosnia's internal affairs  The Croatian government also challenged the legitimacy of Željko Komšić as the Croat member of the Bosnian presidency (see above, "2018 General Election")  Some parties in Croatia hold Croatian election campaign events on Bosnian territory to mobilize Bosnian Croat voters with dual citizenship to vote in Croatia's elections  The Serbian government likewise supports Dodik, who is a frequent visitor to Belgrade  Some Serbian politicians have made statements supporting convicted Bosnian Serb war criminals, inflaming an issue that remains highly sensitive in Bosnia  Bosnia and Serbia have an unresolved demarcation dispute over approximately 40 square kilometers of border area, including a railway segment and hydroelectric power stations  Bosnia has dual citizenship treaties with Croatia and Serbia, resulting in hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs acquiring dual citizenship  This has raised jurisdictional issues in cases in which indicted war criminals hold dual citizenship  Despite occasional tensions in their relations, Croatia and Serbia are important economic partners for Bosnia  Both countries are among Bosnia's top export markets and top sources of FDI  As part of its enlargement strategy in the Western Balkans, the EU has embraced a connectivity agenda to improve regional transportation, energy, and infrastructural linkages, reserving up to €1 billion in grants for projects for the period 2015-2020  Officials believe that improved connectivity could benefit bilateral relations and contribute to regional stability  Given its strategic location and relatively small, weak states, the Balkan region has long drawn in more powerful states  Many analysts maintain that as the United States and the European Union have both scaled back their presence in the Balkans to address other issues since the late 2000s, Russia, Turkey, and China partly filled the vacuum  U S  and EU officials have expressed concern over Russian influence in the Western Balkans, particularly after Russia occupied Ukraine's Crimea region in 2014  Many analysts maintain that Russia does not have a grand strategy in the Western Balkans, but rather aims to prevent Euro-Atlantic integration and shore up its claims to great power status by asserting itself in the EU's "inner courtyard " Analysts have identified several Russian tools in the region, including playing a "spoiler" role, projecting soft power, and leveraging energy dominance  Observers contend that Russia plays a "spoiler" role in Bosnia by exacerbating ethnic divisions, backing illiberal or anti-Western political factions, and helping to militarize RS  They claim that these actions help sustain the dysfunction and gridlock that undermine Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic reform efforts  Russia has supported Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat nationalist leaders Milorad Dodik and Dragan Čović  Dodik's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin just before Bosnia's October 7, 2018 general election was one of nearly ten meetings between the two over the past three years, signaling high-level Russian support  Many experts assert that Russia has been a key ally to Dodik in resisting Western pressure to cooperate on reforms  Moscow has also supported divisive RS policies  When Dodik violated a Bosnian Constitutional Court ruling in 2016 by holding a referendum to establish a controversial "Statehood Day," Russia stood apart from the High Representative and Western diplomats by supporting the initiative  More recently, Russia stated its support for RS's controversial Srebrenica commission (see above)  Analysts have also expressed concern at Russia's apparent support for Čović, who has advocated greater autonomy for Croats and the creation of a third Croat entity  Some analysts have expressed concern at Russia's role in RS's security sector  Russian forces have trained RS police special forces on counterterrorism and intelligence  Some observers believe that these exercises contribute to militarization in RS, potentially pushing the police force beyond its civilian law enforcement mandate  Analysts caution that militarization could increase the scale of violence in any confrontation between RS and the Bosnian government  Some Bosnian Serb ultranationalist and veterans groups have fought alongside pro-Russia combatants in Ukraine, and analysts believe they could be mobilized to support RS leaders as well  Russian soft power draws upon religious and cultural kinship with Bosnian Serbs, as well as Russia's history of support during the wars of Yugoslav disintegration  Kremlin-linked media, like Sputnik and RT , amplify existing anti-Western narratives and positively shape public opinion toward Russia  Some local media further propagate Sputnik and RT articles  A 2018 National Democratic Institute media study found that RS media stories about Russia were overwhelmingly positive, while the tone of most stories about the United States and NATO was negative  Pro-Russian media glorifies the Russian military, highlights cultural and religious links between Serbs and Russians, and documents high-level meetings between RS and Russian officials  Economic relations between Russia and RS have deepened in recent years  Russia is the largest source of FDI in RS, and it is largely concentrated in the energy sector  In 2007, Russian state-owned oil company Zarubezhneft bought RS's Bosanski Brod oil refinery, motor oil processing facilities in nearby Modrica, and retailer Banjaluka Petrol  Some analysts believe that these assets—which were purchased without an open tender—give Zarubezhneft influence in RS  In addition to being an important employer, Zarubezhneft is RS's biggest taxpayer; its value-added tax and excise duty contributions reportedly account for 25% of RS budget revenue  Bosnia depends upon Russian natural gas imports via Ukraine  Energy policy is vested in the entities, and Russian natural gas provider Gazprom reportedly has used its market dominance to pit the two entities against one another and undermine projects that would diversify supplies  Many analysts believe that Turkey's influence in Bosnia has increased over the last two decades due to Ankara's close relationship with Bosniak leaders  Some Turkish officials reportedly view Bosnia as a natural sphere of influence given geographic and historical connections  Observers note that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has at times invoked Ottoman-era ties to Bosnia and religious kinship with Bosniaks as soft power tools  Turkish influence in Bosnia has expanded since Yugoslavia's collapse  During the 1992-1995 war, Turkey gained prestige among Bosniaks by condemning the international arms embargo against Bosnia, arguing that it prevented Bosniaks from defending themselves  Turkey, as well as other predominantly Muslim countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, reportedly supplied Bosniak forces with arms  Turkish influence has continued since the war's end  Bosnia is one of the top recipients of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency assistance; much of this support is earmarked for projects to restore Ottoman-era buildings and monuments  A Turkish Cultural Center was established in Bosnia in 2003, and in 2009 the Yunus Emre Foundation, an NGO founded by the Turkish government, opened an office in Sarajevo to promote Turkish language and culture  Turkey has popular support among Bosniaks  In a 2018 International Republican Institute survey, 76% of Bosniak respondents had positive views of Turkey—the strongest support among Bosniaks for any foreign state  Many Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs look to Croatia and Serbia as external protectors, and some analysts believe that Turkey has attempted to establish a similar role for itself vis-à-vis Bosniaks  Observers contend that Erdogan's ruling party has particularly strong ties to the largest Bosniak ethnic party, the SDA  Erdogan and Turkish state-owned media openly supported SDA candidate Bakir Izetbegović in his bid for the Bosniak seat on the presidency in 2014  Some observers believe that Izetbegović's clout within the SDA rests in part on his support from Erdogan  Economic relations between Bosnia and Turkey have deepened in recent years  Turkish FDI in Bosnia accounted for 5 6% of FDI flows in 2016  One notable project is a highway to connect Sarajevo to Belgrade, Serbia  After years of disagreement, Bosnian officials approved the route in February 2019  Turkey is expected to provide funding for some of the expected €3 billion in costs, although the terms of the contract are not yet resolved  Some officials, including French President Emmanuel Macron, have expressed concern over Turkey's alleged ambitions as part of broader EU concern over external influence in the Balkans  However, analysts caution that Turkey's ambitions and capabilities in the Balkans may be overstated  They note that the scope of Turkish investment is sometimes exaggerated in the media, and that proposed projects do not always come to fruition  While Russian and Turkish influence in Bosnia relies in part on soft power, China's presence in Bosnia is primarily economic  Between 2011 and 2019, Chinese investments in Bosnia amounted to an estimated $3 6 billion, primarily in the form of direct lending for energy and transportation projects  Chinese firms have contracts to construct or expand energy plants, including a €350 million loan to construct a coal-fired plant in Stanari, RS  A €1 4 billion deal was signed to construct a highway between Banja Luka and Mlinište  In March 2019, the EU Energy Community criticized the FBiH entity government's decision to guarantee a €600 million loan from China's Exim Bank to build a coal-fired power plant in Tuzla  However, some analysts caution that China's economic influence in Bosnia may be overstated at present  While China's pledged investments in high-visibility projects garner media attention, the actual amount of Chinese FDI is far less than that of the EU  Moreover, many pledged projects do not come to fruition  Nevertheless, EU and U S  officials have voiced concern over the scope of China's investments in the Balkans, as well as Chinese lending practices  Chinese loans often require recipient state governments to assume the loan burden, potentially leading to high external debt  The EU has also raised concerns that Chinese lending practices violate EU rules in public procurement because they frequently require use of Chinese contractors, laborers, or supplies  In contrast to EU funds, which are partly designed to spur reform, Chinese loans have few conditions and rules linked to transparency or reform  Finally, EU officials have expressed concern that China's economic might could be a source of leverage over recipient states that are candidates or potential candidates for EU membership and thus impede the EU's ability to speak with one voice on relations with China if they do become members  Bosnia was not a core transit country in the "Balkan Route" that hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees followed in an attempt to reach the EU during heightened flows in 2015 and early 2016  However, recent route shifts have brought more migrant and refugee traffic through Bosnia  Since early 2018, an estimated 23,000 migrants and refugees have entered Bosnia; approximately 25% of them remain in the country  Most of them hope to enter EU territory via Bosnia's neighbor, Croatia, and from there move on and enter the EU's visa- and passport-free Schengen Area  However, the Croatian government has expanded border policing, and apprehended individuals are sent back to Bosnia  The EU provided €2 million in 2018 to help Bosnia respond to the crisis and provide shelter to migrants and refugees who are effectively stranded in Bosnia  The migration crisis has triggered a backlash from some Bosnians, particularly in Una-Sana Canton, which borders Croatia and has the highest concentration of migrants and refugees  Some residents of Bihać, Una-Sana's administrative center, protested against camps situated in their municipality in October 2018, while local authorities in Velika Kladuša, another city in the canton, reportedly obstructed the Ministry of Security's plans to house migrants in a local building  The incident illustrates local backlash as well as the state-level government's difficulty enforcing its decisions, even when it has jurisdiction  Islam was introduced to part of Bosnia's population during Ottoman rule  In socialist Yugoslavia, the semi-official Islamic Religious Community played a key role in religious affairs, including legal rulings and religious education  It was renamed the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, and remains an important religious institution  Islamic tradition in the Balkans, including Bosnia, is generally moderate and secular  The majority of Bosnia's practicing Muslims follow the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam  However, some analysts have expressed concern over the emergence of groups influenced or funded by state and non-state entities in the Arab Gulf states, where more conservative Hanbali Sunni practices are common  Aid workers, missionaries, and "mujahedeen" fighters from the Gulf States promoted transnational Islamist militancy and Salafist Hanbali religious doctrine during Bosnia's 1992-1995 war; Iran's government also supported Bosniak leaders and forces  After the war, Saudi Arabia provided an estimated $600 million in aid to repair and build hundreds of mosques and establish schools and cultural centers that promote socially conservative Sunni views  Iran has also maintained active cultural outreach and other ties to some Bosnian Muslims  Many analysts contend that Salafi groups have limited support in Bosnia because of the traditionally high level of secularism among Bosnian Muslims  They also note that few Bosnian Muslims who subscribe to Salafist ideas and practices have violent intentions, and many of them live in remote rural communities  While most of these groups were not originally affiliated with official religious organizations in Bosnia, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia's Islamic Community exerted pressure on them to acknowledge his authority and his right to monitor religious content  As a result, an estimated 90% of Salafi groups were brought under official structures  Nevertheless, some experts caution that radicalized groups and individuals may pose a terrorist threat despite their small numbers  Radicalized Muslims were implicated in the bombing of a police station in Bugojno in 2010 and a lone-gunman attack on the U S  Embassy in Sarajevo in 2011  The Islamic State (IS) and Nusra Front's gains in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s altered the dynamic of the terrorism threat in Bosnia and broadened the use of social media in recruitment  Between 2012 and 2017, an estimated 350 Bosnian citizens traveled from Bosnia or Bosnian diaspora communities to fight with armed groups in Iraq and Syria  More recently, returned foreign fighters are seen as a potential threat as the position of the IS and other armed groups has weakened  Bosnia's stock of illegal weapons, mines, and explosives may exacerbate the risk posed by returnees  As of December 2017, officials believed that just over 100 Bosnians remained in Syria (including women and children), roughly 50 had returned to Bosnia, and 70 had been killed in the conflict  In 2014, the Bosnian government introduced new criminal offenses to prosecute foreign terrorist fighters and recruiters  Several dozen returned fighters and domestic recruiters have been convicted of these offenses  While the U S  State Department describes Bosnia as a "cooperative counterterrorism partner," it warns that Bosnia's political fragmentation and dysfunction could undermine counterterrorism efforts  For example, in 2017 several ministries proposed new measures to tighten counterterrorism efforts; however, they were not enacted due to political gridlock in state-level and FBiH governments  Initially viewed as a "European problem," the Bosnian conflict eventually helped shape the post-Cold War role of the United States and NATO in European security  When the United States assumed greater responsibilities in resolving the conflict, its role was considerable: leading NATO airstrikes, garnering diplomatic support from Russia and European allies, persuading warring parties to agree to a ceasefire, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement, and deploying 20,000 troops to Bosnia  According to Richard Holbrooke, the U S  official who brokered the talks, the Bosnian war was a pivotal period in U S  foreign policy in Europe: "The three main pillars of [policy]—U S -Russian relations, NATO enlargement into Central Europe, and Bosnia—had often worked against each other  Now they reinforced each other: NATO sent its forces out of area for the first time in its history, and Russian troops, under an American commander, were deployed alongside them " Some analysts and policymakers believe that the United States' strong hand in resolving the conflict and in shaping Bosnia's political system have made it a stakeholder in Bosnia's future  U S  officials, often in cooperation with the EU, have intervened to defuse crises and broker reform talks  The United States also has imposed sanctions against Bosnian officials: in addition to Dodik (see above), the U S  State Department publicly designated Bosnian Serb politician Nikola Špirić (Dodik's associate) for "significant corruption or gross violation of human rights " U S  policymakers attach strategic importance to Bosnia's stability; many analysts believe turbulence in Bosnia could reverberate in the Balkans and potentially draw in Croatia and Serbia, while instability in other parts of the region could spill over into Bosnia  When the Trump Administration indicated in 2018 that it would consider supporting a potential Serbia-Kosovo agreement to "adjust borders" between the two—a major break with the long-standing EU and U S  policy to oppose redrawing borders in the Balkans along ethnic lines—some analysts expressed concern that the Administration could reshape long-standing U S  policy toward Bosnia  However, the new U S  Ambassador to Bosnia stated in February 2019 that the U S  will continue to be "guarantor of Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty and territorial integrity " On the other hand, many observers also note that U S  engagement in Bosnia (and the Western Balkans) decreased under the administrations of President George W  Bush and President Barack Obama  During this time U S  policymakers turned their focus to geopolitical crises and challenges in other parts of the globe while ceding the regional lead to the EU  Indeed, some analysts have urged the United States to assume a greater role in Bosnia, arguing that Bosnia's current crises warrant it, and that the EU and the United States are more effective in the region when they work together  Congressional interest in Bosnia dates back to the 1992-1995 war  Many Members featured prominently in foreign policy debates over U S  intervention in the conflict  In 2015, the House passed a resolution describing the Srebrenica massacres as a genocide and urging the United States to continue to support Bosnia's territorial integrity ( H Res  310 , 114 th Congress)  In the 114 th and 115 th Congresses, a bill was introduced in the Senate to establish an enterprise fund to promote economic development and the private sector in Bosnia ( S  2307 and S  864 )  In April 2018, the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats held a hearing on Bosnia's prospects ahead of its October 2018 elections  Congress's engagement with Bosnia also continues within the broader context of policy concern over the external influence of China, Turkey, and Russia in the Western Balkans and energy security  As a potential candidate for EU membership and NATO partner, Bosnia is eligible for assistance through the Countering Russian Influence Funds under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) enacted in 2017 ( P L  115-44 )  Through congressionally approved (and sometimes expanded) foreign assistance appropriations, Bosnia has received more than $2 billion in aid since 1995  Between 1996 and 1999, the United States pledged $1 billion of the $4 billion international commitment to implementing Dayton's civilian provisions and helping to rebuild Bosnia  The cost of U S  military operations in Bosnia since 1992 is estimated at more than $10 billion ( Appendix I )  Bosnia continues to receive U S  foreign assistance, although the amount has decreased in recent years  Assistance to Bosnia in FY2015 and FY2016 was approximately $33 million each year  In FY2017, it was $53 5 million, and $41 5 million in FY2018  The Administration requested $21 million for FY2019 and $16 9 million for FY2020  Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia faces many challenges  In considering U S  relations with Bosnia, Members of Congress may consider the following questions: How can the United States encourage Bosnia's government to incorporate the legal rulings of the Bosnian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights into election legislation and the constitution? How can U S  foreign assistance be used to counter Russian influence in Republika Srpska, in particular Russia's close ties to Bosnian Serb politicians and its use of local media and Sputnik to amplify anti-U S  narratives and project pro-Russia soft power? What are the implications of potential militarization in Republika Srpska? How can the United States effectively address this alleged trend? How can the United States support a successful reform initiative that secures transparency and accountability, and facilitates a political community in which politicians and voters are committed to the Bosnian state and socioeconomic challenges that transcend all three ethnic groups? Can the Germany-U K  initiative from 2015 be revived, or is it better to start from scratch? Are the approximately 600 troops in the European Union Force mission in Bosnia sufficient to stabilize Bosnia if violence breaks out? If Serbia and Kosovo agree to normalize relations by redrawing their borders, how can U S  policymakers prevent this development from destabilizing Bosnia, particularly given Milorad Dodik's threats to seek RS secession if Kosovo is "partitioned"? How can the United States encourage Croatia and Serbia to engage in Bosnia in a manner that helps bridge ethnic divisions and contributes to Bosnia's territorial integrity and sovereignty? Given the pervasiveness of corruption in Bosnia, how can U S  assistance most effectively be used to counter it? Does foreign assistance contribute to civic groups and independent media that could serve as a check against corruption? 

ground_truth: The Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program provides cash benefits to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers; firefighters; employees of emergency management agencies; and members of emergency medical services agencies who are killed or permanently and totally disabled as the result of personal injuries sustained in the line of duty. The Public Safety Officers' Educational Assistance (PSOEA) program, a component of the PSOB program, provides higher-education assistance to the children and spouses of public safety officers killed or permanently disabled in the line of duty. The PSOB and PSOEA programs are administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). However, claimants dissatisfied with denials of benefits may pursue administrative appeals within DOJ and may seek judicial review before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Each year, Congress appropriates funding for PSOB death benefits, which is considered mandatory spending, and for PSOB disability benefits and PSOEA benefits, which is subject to annual appropriations. For FY2019, the one-time lump-sum PSOB death and disability benefit is $359,316 and the PSOEA monthly benefit for a student attending an educational institution full-time is $1,224. In FY2017, the DOJ approved 399 claims for PSOB death benefits, 82 claims for PSOB disability benefits, and 601 claims for PSOEA benefits.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: With the passage of the NDAA in December 2016, PLCY is to be led by an Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans, who is appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate  The Under Secretary is to report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security  Prior to the NDAA, the office was headed by an assistant secretary  Since the passage of the act, the undersecretary position has been vacant, and as of June 5, 2018, the President had not nominated an individual to fill the position  According to PLCY officials, elevating the head of the office to an undersecretary was important because it equalizes PLCY with other DHS management offices and DHS headquarters components  The NDAA further authorizes, but does not require, the Secretary to establish a position of deputy undersecretary within PLCY  If the position is established, the NDAA provides that the Secretary may appoint a career employee to the position (i e , not a political appointee)  In March 2018, the Secretary named a Deputy Under Secretary, who has been performing the duties of the Deputy Under Secretary and the Under Secretary since then  As shown in figure 1, PLCY is divided into five sub- offices, each with a different focus area  As of June 5, 2018, the top position in these sub-offices was an assistant secretary and two of the five positions were vacant  As of June 5, 2018, 6 of PLCY’s 12 deputy assistant secretary positions were vacant or filled by acting staff temporarily performing the duties in the absence of permanent staff placement  The NDAA codified many of the functions and responsibilities that PLCY had been carrying out prior to the act’s enactment and, with a few exceptions as discussed later in this report, were largely consistent with the duties the office was already pursuing  According to the act and PLCY officials, one of the office’s fundamental responsibilities is to lead, conduct, and coordinate departmentwide policy development and implementation, and strategic planning  According to PLCY officials, there are four categories of policy and strategy efforts that PLCY leads, conducts, or coordinates: Statutory responsibilities: among others, the Homeland Security Act, as amended by the NDAA, includes such responsibilities as establishing standards of validity and reliability for statistical data collected by the department, conducting or overseeing analysis and reporting of such data, and maintaining all immigration statistical information of U S  Customs and Border Protection, U S  Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U S  Citizenship and Immigration Services; the Immigration and Nationality Act includes such responsibilities as providing for a system for collection and dissemination to Congress and the public of information useful in evaluating the social, economic, environmental, and demographic impact of immigration laws, and reporting annually on trends in lawful immigration flows, naturalizations, and enforcement actions, Representing DHS in interagency efforts: coordinating or representing departmental policy and strategy positions for larger interagency efforts (e g , interagency policy committees convened by the White House), Secretary’s priorities: leading or coordinating efforts that correspond to the Secretary of Homeland Security’s priorities (e g , certain immigration or law-enforcement related issues), and Self-initiated activities: opportunities to better harmonize policy and strategy or create additional efficiencies given PLCY’s ability to see across the department  For example, PLCY officials said that DHS observed an increase in e-commerce and small businesses shipping items via carriers other than the U S  Postal Service, thus exploiting a gap in DHS monitoring, which covers the U S  Postal Service and other traditional shipping entities  PLCY officials noted that DHS’s interest in addressing e-commerce issues occurred just before opioids and other controlled substances were being mailed through small businesses and the U S  Postal Service  As a result, PLCY developed an e-commerce strategy for, among other things, the shipping of illegal items and how to provide information to U S  Customs and Border Protection before parcels are shipped to the United States from abroad  In accordance with the NDAA, as PLCY leads, conducts, and coordinates policy and strategy, it is to do so in a manner that promotes and ensures quality, consistency, and integration across DHS and applies risk-based analysis and planning to departmentwide strategic planning efforts  The NDAA further provides that all component heads are to coordinate with PLCY when establishing or modifying policies or strategic planning guidance to ensure consistency with DHS’s policy priorities  In addition to the roles PLCY plays that are directly related to leading, conducting, and coordinating policy and strategy, the office is responsible for select operational functions  For example, PLCY is charged with operating the REAL ID and Visa Waiver Programs  The NDAA also conferred responsibilities to PLCY that had not been responsibilities of the DHS Office of Policy prior to the NDAA’s enactment  Among other things, the NDAA charged PLCY with responsibility for establishing standards of reliability and validity for statistical data collected and analyzed by the department, and ensuring the accuracy of metrics and statistical data provided to Congress  In conferring this responsibility, the act also transferred to PLCY the maintenance of all immigration statistical information of the U S  Customs and Border Protection, U S  Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U S  Citizenship and Immigration Services  PLCY has established five performance goals: build departmental policy-making capacity, coordination, and foster the Unity of Effort, mature the office as a mission-oriented, component-focused organization that is responsive to DHS leadership, effectively engage and leverage stakeholders, enhance productivity and effectiveness of policy personnel through appropriate alignment of knowledge, skills, and abilities, and accountability, transparency, and leadership  PLCY officials stated that the office established the performance goals in fiscal year 2015 and they were still in effect as of fiscal year 2018  As previously discussed, DHS has eight operational components  DHS also has six support components  Although each one has a distinct role to play in helping to secure the homeland, there are operational and support functions that cut across mission areas  For example, nearly every operational component has, as part of its security operations, a need for screening, vetting, and credentialing procedures and risk- targeting mechanisms  Likewise, nearly all operational components have some form of international engagement, deploying staff abroad to help secure the homeland before threats reach U S  borders  Finally, as shown in figure 2, different aspects of broad mission areas fall under the purview of more than one DHS operational component  PLCY is responsible for coordinating three key DHS strategic efforts: the QHSR, the DHS Strategic Plan, and the Resource Planning Guidance  The QHSR is a comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of the nation that is to occur every 4 years and include recommendations regarding the long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security of the nation and guidance on the programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of DHS  The QHSR is to be conducted in consultation with the heads of other federal agencies, key DHS officials (including the Under Secretary, PLCY), and key officials from other relevant governmental and nongovernmental entities  The DHS Strategic Plan describes how DHS can accomplish the missions it identifies in the QHSR report, identifies high-priority mission areas within DHS, and lays the foundation for DHS to accomplish its Unity of Effort Initiative as well as various cross-agency priority goals in the strategic plan, such as cybersecurity  The Resource Planning Guidance describes DHS’s annual resource allocation process in order to execute the missions and goals of the QHSR and DHS Strategic Plan  The Resource Planning Guidance contains guidance over a 5-year period and informs several forward- looking reports to Congress, including the annual fiscal year Congressional Budget Justification as well as the Future Years Homeland Security Program Report  Although PLCY has effectively carried out key coordination functions at the senior level related to strategy, PLCY’s ability to lead and coordinate policy have been limited due to ambiguous roles and responsibilities and a lack of predictable, accountable, and repeatable procedures  According to our analysis and interviews with operational components, PLCY’s efforts to lead and coordinate departmentwide and crosscutting strategies—a key organizational objective—have been effective in providing opportunities for all relevant stakeholders to learn about and contribute to departmentwide or crosscutting strategy development  In this role, PLCY routinely serves as the executive agent for the Deputies Management Action Group and the Senior Leaders Council, which involve analytical and coordination support  PLCY also provides support for deputy- and principal-level decision making  For example, the Strategy and Policy Executive Steering Committee (S&P ESC) meetings have been used to discuss components’ implementation plans for crosscutting strategies, PLCY’s requests for information from components for an upcoming strategy, and updates on departmentwide strategic planning initiatives  According to PLCY and operational component officials, PLCY also provides leadership for the Resource Planning Guidance and Winter Studies, both of which help inform departmentwide resource decision- making  For example, officials from one operational component stated that PLCY’s leadership of the Resource Planning Guidance is a helpful practice for coordination and collaboration on departmentwide or crosscutting strategies  The officials stated that PLCY reaches out to ensure that the component is covering the Secretary’s priorities and this helps the component to ensure that its budget includes them  Furthermore, PLCY develops and coordinates policy options and opinions for the Secretary to present at the National Security Council and other White House-level meetings  For example, PLCY officials told us that, in light of allegations of Russian involvement in using poisonous nerve agents on two civilians in Great Britain, PLCY coordinated the collection of information to develop a policy recommendation for the Secretary to present at a National Security Council meeting  PLCY has encountered challenges leading and coordinating efforts to develop, update, or harmonize policy—also a key organizational objective—because it does not have clearly-defined roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms to implement these responsibilities in a predictable, repeatable, and accountable way  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should establish an organizational structure, assign responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve the entity’s objectives  As such, an organization’s management should develop an organizational structure with an understanding of the overall responsibilities and assign these responsibilities to discrete units to enable the organization to operate in an efficient and effective manner  An organization’s management should also implement control activities through policies  It is important that an organization’s management document and define policies and communicate those policies and procedures to personnel, so they can implement control activities for their assigned responsibilities  In addition, leading collaboration practices we have identified in our prior work include defining and articulating a common outcome, clarifying roles and responsibilities, and establishing mutually-reinforcing or joint strategies to enhance and sustain collaboration, such as the work that PLCY and the components need to do together to ensure that departmentwide and crosscutting policy is effective for all relevant parties  According to PLCY officials, in general, PLCY is responsible for leading the development of a policy when it crosses multiple components or if there is a national implication, including White House interest in the policy  However, PLCY officials acknowledged that this practice does not always make them the lead and there are no established criteria that define the circumstances under which PLCY (or another organizational unit) should lead development of policies that cut across organizational boundaries  PLCY officials said the lead entity for a policy is often announced in an email from the Secretary’s office, on a case-by-case basis  According to PLCY officials, once components have been assigned responsibility for a policy, they have generally tended to retain it, and PLCY may not have oversight for crosscutting policies that are maintained by operational components  Therefore, there is no established, coordinated system of oversight to periodically monitor the need for policy harmonization, revision, or rescission  In the absence of clear roles and responsibilities, and processes and procedures to support them, PLCY and officials in 5 of the 8 components have encountered challenges in coordinating with each other  Although PLCY and most component officials we interviewed described overall positive experiences in coordinating with each other, we identified multiple instances of (1) confusion about which parties should lead and engage in policy efforts, (2) not engaging components at the right times, (3) incompatible expectations around timelines, and (4) uncertainty about PLCY’s role and the extent to which it can and should identify and drive policy in support of a more cohesive DHS  Confusion about who should lead and engage  Officials from one operational component told us that they were tasked with leading a departmentwide policy development effort they believed was outside their area of responsibility and expertise  Officials in another operational component stated that components sometimes end up coordinating among themselves, but that policy development could be more effective and efficient if PLCY took the role of convener and facilitator to ensure the departmentwide perspective is present and all relevant stakeholders participate  Officials from a third component stated that they spent significant time and resources to develop a policy directly related to their component’s mission  As the component got ready to implement the policy, PLCY became aware of it and asked the component to stop working on the policy, so PLCY could develop a departmentwide policy  According to component officials, while they were supportive of a departmentwide policy, PLCY’s timing delayed implementation of the policy the component had developed and wasted the resources it had invested  Moreover, officials from four operational components told us that sometimes counselors from outside PLCY, such as the Secretary’s office, have led policy efforts that seem like they should be PLCY’s responsibility, which created more confusion about what PLCY’s ongoing role should be  PLCY officials agreed that, at times, it has been challenging to define PLCY’s role relative to counselors for the Secretary, and acknowledged that clear guidance to define who is leading which types of policy development and coordination would be helpful  Not engaging components at the right times  Officials from 5 of 8 operational components told us that they had not always been engaged at the right times by PLCY in departmentwide or crosscutting policies that affected their missions  For example, officials from an operational component described a crosscutting policy that had significant implications for some of its key operational resources, but the component was not made aware of the policy until it was about to be presented at the White House  Officials from another component stated that they learned of a new policy after it was in place and had to find significant training and software resources to implement it even though they viewed the policy as unnecessary for their mission  PLCY officials stated that, while they intend to identify all components that should be involved in a policy, there are times when PLCY is unaware a component is developing a policy that affects other components  PLCY officials said they will involve other components when PLCY becomes aware that a component is developing such a policy  PLCY officials stated that it would be helpful to have a process and procedures for cross-component coordination on policies to help guide engagement regardless of who is developing the policy  Incompatible expectations around timelines  Officials at 4 of 8 operational components stated that short timelines from PLCY to provide input and feedback can prevent PLCY from obtaining thoughtful and complete information from components  For example, officials from one component stated that PLCY asked them to perform an analysis that would inform major, departmental decision-making and quickly provide the analysis  Component officials told us that they did not understand why PLCY needed the analysis on such an accelerated timeline, which seemed inappropriate given the level of importance and purpose of the analysis  Officials from another component told us that PLCY had not always provided enough time to provide thoughtful feedback; therefore, component officials were not sure if PLCY really wanted their feedback  Officials from a third component stated that sometimes PLCY did not provide sufficient time for thoughtful input or feedback that had cleared the component’s legal review, so component officials elected to miss PLCY’s deadline and provide late feedback  PLCY officials told us that, frequently, timelines are not within their control, a situation that some component officials also noted during our interviews with them  However, PLCY officials agreed that a documented, predictable, and repeatable process and procedures for policies may help ensure PLCY provides sufficient comment time when in its control and may provide a basis to help negotiate timelines with DHS leadership in other situations  PLCY officials stated that, even with a documented process and procedures, there would still be circumstances when short timelines are unavoidable  Uncertainty about PLCY’s role in driving policy harmonization  Policy officials at 6 of 8 operational components told us that they were unsure or not aware of PLCY’s role in harmonizing policy across the department, and stated a desire for PLCY to be more involved in harmonizing or enhancing departmentwide and crosscutting policy or for greater clarity about PLCY’s responsibility to play this role  As previously discussed, PLCY’s policy and strategy efforts fall into four categories—statutory responsibilities, interagency efforts, Secretary’s priorities, and self- initiated activities; these activities include efforts to better harmonize policies and strategies  According to PLCY officials, the category with the lowest priority is self-initiated activities


Report 2:  PLCY officials stated that PLCY makes tradeoffs and rarely chooses to work on self-initiated projects over its other three categories of effort  According to the officials, PLCY’s work on the other three higher-priority categories is sufficient to ensure that the office is effectively leading, conducting, and coordinating strategy and policy across the department  Given its organizational position and strategic priorities, PLCY is uniquely situated to identify opportunities to better harmonize or enhance departmentwide and crosscutting policy, a role that is in line with its strategic priority to build departmental policymaking capacity and foster Unity of Effort  In the absence of clear articulation of the department’s expectations for PLCY in this role, it is difficult for PLCY and DHS leadership to make completely informed and deliberate decisions about the tradeoffs they make across any available resources  In addition to statutory authority that PLCY received in the NDAA, PLCY officials stated that a separate, clear delegation of authority—a mechanism by which the Secretary delegates responsibilities to other organizational units within DHS—is needed to help confront the ambiguous roles it has experienced in the past  PLCY officials stated that past efforts to finalize a delegation of authority have stalled during leadership changes and that the initiative has been a lower priority, in part, due to where PLCY is in its maturation process and DHS is in its evolution into a more cohesive department under the Unity of Effort  As of May 2018, the effort had been revived, but it is not clear whether and when DHS will finalize it  According to a senior official in the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, a delegation of authority is important for PLCY  He described the creation of a delegation of authority as a process that does more than simply delegate the Secretary’s authority  He noted that defining PLCY’s roles and responsibilities in relation to other organizational units presents an opportunity to engage all relevant components and agree on appropriate roles  He said that, earlier in the organizational life of the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, it went through a process like this, which has been vital in it being able to carry out its mission  He said now that PLCY has a deputy undersecretary in place, this is a good time to restart the process to develop the delegation of authority  Until the delegation or a similar process clearly and fully articulates PLCY’s roles and responsibilities, PLCY and the operational components are likely to continue to experience limitations in collaboration on crosscutting and departmentwide policy  PLCY determines its workforce needs through the annual budget process, but systematic identification of workforce demand, capacity gaps, and strategies to address them could help ensure that PLCY’s workforce aligns with its and DHS’s priorities and goals  To determine its workforce needs each year, PLCY officials told us that, as part of the annual budget cycle, they work with PLCY staff and operational components to determine the scope of activities required for each PLCY area of responsibility and the associated staffing needs  PLCY officials said there are three skill sets needed to carry out the office’s responsibilities: policy analysis, social science analysis, and regional affairs analysis  PLCY officials explained that the office’s priorities can change rapidly as events occur and the Secretary’s and administration’s priorities shift  Therefore, according to PLCY officials, their staffing model must be flexible  They said that, rather than a defined system of full-time equivalents with set position types and levels, PLCY officials start with their budget allotment and consider current and potential emerging needs to set position types and levels, which may fluctuate significantly from year to year  In addition, PLCY officials stated that PLCY staff are primarily generalists and, given the versatility in skill sets of their workforce, PLCY has a lot of flexibility to move staff around if there is an emerging need  For example, if there is an emerging law enforcement issue that affects all law enforcement agencies, PLCY may be tasked with developing a policy to ensure the issue is addressed quickly and that the resulting policy is harmonized across the department and with other law enforcement agencies, such as the Department of Justice  While PLCY completes some workforce planning activities as part of its annual budgeting process, PLCY does not systematically address several aspects of the DHS Workforce Planning Guide that may create more efficient operations and greater alignment with DHS priorities  According to the DHS Workforce Planning Guide, workforce planning is a process that ensures the right number of people with the right skills are in the right jobs at the right time for DHS to achieve the mission  This process provides a framework to: align workforce planning to the department’s mission and goals, predict, then assess how evolving missions, new processes, or environmental conditions may impact the way that work will be performed at DHS in the future, identify gaps in capacity, develop and implement strategies and action plans to address capacity and capability gaps, and continuously monitor the effectiveness of action plans and modify, as necessary  The DHS Workforce Planning Guide stipulates that an organization’s management should not only lead and show support during the workforce planning process, but ensure alignment with the strategic direction of the agency  Moreover, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives  For example, management uses an entity’s operational processes to make informed decisions and evaluate the entity’s performance in achieving key agency objectives  According to PLCY officials, the current staffing paradigm involves shifting the office’s staff when new and urgent issues arise from the Secretary or White House, and adding these unexpected tasks to staff’s existing responsibilities  However, this means that tradeoffs are made, resulting in some priority items taking longer to address or not getting attention at all  PLCY officials stated that they have been caught off-guard at times by changes in demands placed on PLCY and had to scramble to address the new needs  Additionally, PLCY officials said they have a number of vacancies, which hamper the office’s ability to meet certain aspects of its mission  For example, PLCY’s Office of Cyber, Infrastructure, and Resilience was created in 2015  According to PLCY officials, PLCY has had some resources to address cyber issues, however, there has not been funding to staff this office and an assistant secretary has not been appointed to lead it  Therefore, PLCY officials stated that PLCY has not been able to address its responsibilities for infrastructure resilience  Similarly, PLCY has limited capacity for risk analysis  A provision of the NDAA provides that PLCY is to: develop and coordinate strategic plans and long-term goals of the department with risk-based analysis and planning to improve operational mission effectiveness, including consultation with the Secretary regarding the quadrennial homeland security review under section 707 [6 U S C  § 347]  However, PLCY officials acknowledged that their focus on identifying needs for risk analyses and conducting them has been limited, in part, because DHS disbanded the risk management office  Officials from one component told us that they contribute to a report that PLCY coordinates, called Homeland Security National Risk Characteristics, which is prepared as a precursor to the DHS Strategic Plan  PLCY officials stated that, outside of these foundational documents and some risk-based analyses completed as part of specific policy development efforts, PLCY does not have the capacity to complete any additional risk analysis activities  Although PLCY officials said they conduct some analysis of potential demands as a starting point for how to allocate PLCY’s annual staffing budget, these efforts are largely informal and internal and have not resulted in a systematic analysis that provides PLCY and DHS management with the information they need to understand the effects of resource tradeoffs  Also, PLCY officials said they track accomplishments toward PLCY’s strategic priorities as part of a weekly meeting and report, however, officials acknowledged they do not analyze what role workforce decisions have played in achieving or not achieving strategic priorities  Moreover, although PLCY officials stated that they have intermittent, in- person, informal communication about resource use, they have not used the principles outlined in the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to systematically identify and communicate workforce demands, capacity gaps, and strategies to address workforce issues  According to PLCY officials, they have not conducted such analysis, in part, because the Secretary’s office has not requested it of them or the other DHS offices that are funded in the same part of the DHS budget  Regardless of whether the Secretary expects workforce analysis as part of the budgeting process, the DHS Workforce Planning Guide could be used within and outside of the budgeting process to help inform resource decision making throughout the year  PLCY officials stated that at the PLCY Deputy Under Secretary’s initiative, they recently began a review of all relevant statutory authorities, which they will map against the current organizational structure and day- to-day operations  The Deputy Under Secretary plans to use the results of the review to enhance PLCY’s efficiency and effectiveness, and the results could serve as a foundation for a more holistic and systematic analysis of workforce demand, any capacity gaps, and strategies to address them  Employing workforce planning principles—in particular, systematic identification of workforce demand, capacity gaps, and strategies to address them—consistent with the DHS Workforce Planning Guide could better position PLCY to use its workforce as effectively as possible under uncertain conditions  Moreover, using the DHS guide would help PLCY to systematically communicate information about any workforce gaps to DHS leadership, so there is transparency about how workforce tradeoffs affect PLCY’s ability to support DHS goals  As discussed earlier, officials from PLCY and DHS operational components praised existing mechanisms to coordinate and communicate at the senior level, especially about strategy  However, component officials identified opportunities for PLCY to better connect at the staff level to identify and respond to emerging policy and strategy needs  Leading practices for collaboration that we have identified in our prior work state that it is important to ensure that all relevant participants have been included in a collaborative effort, and positive working relationships among participants from different agencies or offices can bridge organizational cultures  These relationships build trust and foster communication, which facilitate collaboration  Also, as previously stated, PLCY has mechanisms like the S&P ESC to communicate and coordinate with operational components and other DHS stakeholders at the senior level (e g , Senior Executive Service officials)  However, PLCY does not have a mechanism to effectively engage in routine communication and collaboration at the staff level (e g , program and policy specialists working at operational components to oversee or implement policy and strategy functions)  Specifically, officials with responsibility for policy and strategy at 6 of 8 operational components told us that they did not have regular contact with or know who to contact at PLCY for questions about policies or strategies, or that the reason they knew who to contact was because of existing working relationships, not because of efforts PLCY had undertaken to facilitate such contacts  In addition, some component officials noted that, when they tried to use the PLCY website to coordinate, they found it to be out of date and lacking sufficient information  PLCY officials acknowledged that the website needs improvement  They stated that the office has developed improved content for the website, but does not have the necessary staff to update the website  According to the officials, the needed staff should be hired soon and improved content should be on the website by the end of summer 2018  Although officials at 5 of the 8 operational components we interviewed stated that the quality of PLCY’s coordination and collaboration has improved in the past 2 years or so, component officials offered several suggestions to enhance PLCY’s coordination and collaboration, especially at the staff level  Among these were: conduct routine information sharing meetings with staff-level officials who have policy and strategy responsibilities at each operational component, clearly articulate points of contact, their contact information, and their portfolios at PLCY as well as at other policy and strategy stakeholders, ensure the PLCY website is up-to-date with contact information for PLCY and components that work in strategy and policy areas, and with relevant information about crosscutting strategy and policy initiatives underway, host a forum—such as an annual conference—to bring together policy and strategy officials from PLCY and DHS components to share ideas and make contacts, and prepare a standard briefing for component officials with strategy and policy responsibilities to help ensure that staff at all levels understand what PLCY does, how it works, and opportunities for engagement on emerging policy and strategy needs or identified harmonization opportunities  For example, officials from one component told us that they would like PLCY officials to have in-person meetings with component staff to discuss what PLCY does, who to contact in PLCY, where to find information about policies and strategies, and other relevant information to ensure a smooth working relationship between the component and PLCY  According to PLCY officials, the office recognizes the value of creating mechanisms to connect staff, who work on policy and strategy at all levels in DHS  PLCY officials said they have historically done a better job in coordinating at the senior level, but are interested in expanding opportunities to connect other staff with policy and strategy responsibilities  PLCY officials stated that they are considering creating a working group structure that mirrors existing organizational mechanisms to coordinate at the senior level, but have not taken steps to do so  Routine collaboration among PLCY, operational components, and other DHS offices at the staff level is important to ensure that PLCY is able to carry out its functions under the NDAA, including the effective coordination of policies and strategies  A positive working relationship among these stakeholders can build trust, foster communication, and facilitate collaboration  Such enhanced communication and collaboration across PLCY and among component officials with policy and strategy responsibility could help the department more quickly and completely identify emerging, crosscutting strategy and policy needs and opportunities to enhance policy harmonization  PLCY’s efforts to lead, conduct, and coordinate departmentwide and crosscutting policies have sometimes been hampered by the lack of clearly-defined roles and responsibilities  In addition, PLCY does not have a consistent process and procedures for its strategy development and policymaking efforts  Without a delegation of authority or similar documentation from DHS leadership clearly articulating PLCY’s missions, roles, and responsibilities—along with defined processes and procedures to carry them out in a predictable and repeatable manner—there is continuing risk that confusion and uncertainty about PLCY’s authority, missions, roles, and responsibilities will limit its effectiveness  PLCY employs some workforce planning, but does not systematically apply key principles of the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help predict workforce demand, and identify any workforce gaps and design strategies to address them  Without this analysis, PLCY faces limitations in ensuring that its workforce is aligned with its and DHS’s priorities and goals  Moreover, the results of this analysis would better position PLCY to communicate to DHS leadership any potential tradeoffs in workforce allocation that would affect PLCY’s ability to meet priorities and goals  PLCY could enhance its use of mechanisms for collaboration and communication with DHS stakeholders at the staff level  Implementation of additional mechanisms at the staff level for regular communication and coordination, including providing up-to-date information to stakeholders about the office, could help PLCY and operational components to better connect in order to identify and address emerging policy and strategy needs  We are making the following four recommendations to DHS: The Secretary of Homeland Security should finalize a delegation of authority or similar document that clearly defines PLCY’s mission, roles, and responsibilities relative to DHS’s operational and support components  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Homeland Security should create corresponding processes and procedures to help implement the mission, roles, and responsibilities defined in the delegation of authority or similar document to help ensure predictability, repeatability, and accountability in departmentwide and crosscutting strategy and policy efforts  (Recommendation 2) The Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans should use the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help identify and analyze any gaps in PLCY’s workforce, design strategies to address any gaps, and communicate this information to DHS leadership  (Recommendation 3) The Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans should enhance the use of collaboration and communication mechanisms to connect with staff in the components with responsibilities for policy and strategy to better identify and address emerging needs  (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DHS  DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I  DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate  DHS concurred with three of our recommendations and described actions planned to address them  DHS did not concur with one recommendation  Specifically, DHS did not concur with our recommendation that PLCY should use the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help identify and analyze any gaps in PLCY’s workforce, design strategies to address any gaps, and communicate this information to DHS leadership  The letter described a number of actions, including actions that are also described in the report, which PLCY takes to help ensure alignment of its staff with organizational needs  In the letter, PLCY officials pointed to the workforce activities PLCY undertakes as part of the annual budgeting cycle  We acknowledge that the actions described to predict upcoming priorities and resource needs as part of the annual budgeting cycle are in line with the DHS workforce planning principles  However, as we noted, there are opportunities to apply the workforce planning principles outside the annual budgeting cycle to provide greater visibility and awareness of resource tradeoffs to management inside PLCY and in the Secretary’s office  In the letter, PLCY officials made note of the dynamic and changing nature of its operational environment, stating that it often required them to shift resources and priorities on a more frequent or ad hoc basis than many organizations  We acknowledged in the report that PLCY’s operating environment requires it to maintain flexibility in its staffing approach  However, PLCY has a number of important duties, including helping foster Unity of Effort throughout the department and helping to ensure the availability of risk information for departmental decision making, that require longer-term, sustained attention and strategic management  During interviews, PLCY officials acknowledged that striking a balance between these needs has been difficult and at times they have faced significant struggles  The report describes some areas where, during the time we were conducting our work, it was clear that some tasks and functions, such as risk analyses, lacked the resources or focus necessary to ensure they received sustained institutional attention  It is because of PLCY’s dynamic operating environment, coupled with the need for sustained institutional attention to other key responsibilities, that we recommended PLCY undertake workforce planning activities that would help generate better information for PLCY and DHS management to have full visibility and awareness of gaps and resource tradeoffs  Finally, the letter stated that because PLCY is a very small and flat organization, it is able to identify capacity gaps and develop action plans without obtaining all of the data collected through each recommended element, worksheet, form, and template of the model proposed in the DHS Workforce Planning Guide  We acknowledge that it would be counterproductive for PLCY to engage in data collection and analysis that are significantly more elaborate than its planning needs  Nevertheless, we continue to believe that PLCY could use the principles more robustly, outside the annual budgeting process, to help ensure that it identifies and communicates the effect that resource tradeoffs have on its ability to accomplish its multifaceted mission  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of Homeland Security  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in Appendix II  In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Godfrey (Assistant Director), Joseph E  Dewechter (Analyst-in-Charge), Michelle Loutoo Wilson, Ricki Gaber, Dominick Dale, Thomas Lombardi, Ned Malone, David Alexander, Sarah Veale, and Michael Hansen made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, "Bosnia") drew heavily on U.S. support after gaining independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. The United States helped end the Bosnian war (1992-1995), one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since the Second World War, by leading NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, and deploying 20,000 U.S. troops. Some Members of Congress became involved in policy debates over these measures, and Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative proposals. Since 1995, the United States has been a major source of aid to Bosnia and firmly supports its territorial integrity. The United States also supports Bosnia's aspirations for NATO and European Union (EU) membership. Today, Bosnia faces serious challenges. Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia continues to use part of the Agreement as its constitution, which divides the country into two ethnoterritorial entities. Critics charge that Bosnia's political system is too decentralized to enact the reforms required for NATO and EU membership. They also contend that the ethnic power-sharing arrangements and veto points embedded in numerous government bodies are sources of gridlock. Domestic and international courts have ruled against several aspects of Bosnia's constitution, yet the Bosnian government thus far has failed to implement these rulings. Since Bosnia's independence, its politics has been dominated by ethnic parties representing the country's three main groups: Bosniaks (Slavic Muslims), Croats, and Serbs. These parties have prospered under a system that critics charge lacks transparency and accountability. Critics also maintain that ethnic party leaders use divisive nationalist rhetoric to distract from serious issues affecting the country as a whole, including poverty, unemployment, and stalled political reforms. The Bosnian population exhibits low trust in political parties and the government, and disaffection toward the country's elite. U.S. and EU officials brokered several ultimately unsuccessful rounds of constitutional reform negotiations, and continue to call on Bosnia's leaders to implement reforms to make governance more efficient and effective, dismantle patronage networks, and bring Bosnia closer to EU and NATO membership. However, there is little consensus among the country's leaders on how the country should be reformed. Bosnian Serb leaders from the Serb-majority entity (Republika Srpska) have called for greater autonomy and even secession from Bosnia. Some Bosnian Croat leaders have called for partitioning Bosnia's other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to create a separate Croat-majority entity. Bosniak leaders, by contrast, generally prefer a more centralized state. Many analysts caution that any move to partition the country could lead to renewed violence, while greater decentralization could make Bosnia's government less functional. U.S. policy has long been oriented toward preserving Bosnia's statehood. Bosnia's 2018 general elections largely returned to power the same entrenched ethnic parties. Of particular concern is the election of Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik to Bosnia's collective presidency. Dodik, a sharp critic of the United States and NATO, has periodically called for a referendum on Republika Srpska's secession. He is under U.S. sanctions for obstructing the Dayton Agreement. In addition to these internal challenges, U.S. and EU officials have expressed concern over external influence in the region. Russia reportedly relies on soft power, energy leverage, and "spoiler" tactics to influence Bosnia, particularly in the Serb-majority entity. Turkish soft power draws on Bosnia's Ottoman-era heritage and Turkey's shared religious tradition with Bosniaks. China is a more recent presence in the region, but its heavy investments and lending have prompted concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Policymakers have also expressed concern at the challenges posed by the return of Bosnians who fought with the Islamic State and Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq. Many observers contend that the United States remains a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of its central role in resolving the conflict and shaping the postwar Bosnian state. Given the history of U.S. involvement in Bosnia, Bosnia's importance to regional stability in the Balkans, and concerns over Russian and Chinese influence in Bosnia, Members of Congress may be interested in monitoring how the country navigates its internal and external challenges. Congress may also consider future U.S. aid levels to Bosnia and the degree to which such assistance supports the long-standing U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia of territorial integrity, NATO and EU integration, energy security, and resilience against malign influence.