prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: U S  Code, Title 10, Section 5063, United States Marine Corps: Composition and Functions, dated October 1, 1986, states the following: The Marine Corps will be organized, trained and equipped to provide an amphibious and land operations capability to seize advanced naval bases and to conduct naval land campaigns  In this regard, the Marines are required by law to have the necessary equipment to conduct amphibious operations and land operations  The ACV and MPC were considered integral systems by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Marine Corps to meet this legal requirement, as well as providing critical capabilities to execute the nation's military strategy  On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps—with "encouragement" from DOD—cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program  The EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), which currently transports Marines from ships to shore under hostile conditions  The Marine Corps cancelled the EFV due to excessive cost growth and poor performance in operational testing  Recognizing the need to replace the AAV, the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a "more affordable and sustainable" vehicle to take the place of the EFV  The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner  In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore  At present, the Marines do not have a wheeled armored fighting vehicle that can operate as a dedicated infantry carrier with Marine maneuver forces inland  The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals  Because of a perceived amphibious "redundancy," some have questioned the need for both the ACV and MPC  In June 2013, citing budgetary pressures, the Marines reportedly put the MPC program "on ice" and suggested that it might not be resurrected for about 10 years  Although some have questioned why the Marines cannot simply "adopt" a U S  Army personnel carrier, Marine requirements for a personnel carrier reflect the need for this vehicle to be compatible with amphibious assault craft, as well as to have an enhanced amphibious capability, which is not necessarily an Army requirement  With the Marines involved in decades-long land conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and proliferating anti-access technologies such as guided missiles, some analysts questioned whether the Marines would ever again be called on to conduct a large-scale amphibious assault operation  In response to these questions and the perceived need to examine the post-Iraq and Afghanistan Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy and DOD studied the requirement to conduct large-scale amphibious operations and in early 2012 released a strategic vision for how amphibious operations will be conducted in the future  The primary assertion of this study is that the Marine Corps' and Navy's amphibious capabilities serve a central role in the defense of the global interests of a maritime nation  The need to maintain an amphibious assault capability is viewed by Marine Corps leadership as establishing the requirement for the ACV and MPC (as discussed in greater detail below)  Congress is responsible for authorizing and appropriating funds for all weapon systems programs, including the ACV  In its oversight role, Congress could be concerned about how the ACV enables the Marines to conduct not only amphibious operations but also operations ashore  Another possible congressional concern is to what extent a robust amphibious assault capability is a necessary component of U S  national security  Cost is another issue of interest to Congress  At present, the Marines use the AAV-7A1 series amphibious assault vehicle to move Marines from ship to shore  The Marines have used the AAV since 1971 and expect to continue to use it until replaced by the ACV or a similar vehicle  Over the years, the Marines have claimed the AAV has become increasingly difficult to operate, maintain, and sustain  As weapons technology and threat capabilities have evolved since the early 1970s, the AAV—despite upgrades—is viewed as having capabilities shortfalls in the areas of water and land mobility performance, lethality, protection, and network capability  The AAV's two-mile ship-to-shore range is viewed by many as a significant survivability issue not only for the vehicle itself but also for naval amphibious forces  Although the AAV has some armor protection and can operate inland to a limited extent, it is not intended for use as an infantry combat vehicle  The Marines do have the LAV-25, Light Armored Vehicle-25, an eight-wheeled armored vehicle that carries a crew of three and six additional marines  The LAV-25 is armed with a 25 mm chain gun and a 7 62 mm machine gun but is not fully amphibious, as it cannot cross a surf zone and would get to the beach via some type of connector such as the Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC)  The LAV-25 has been in service since 1983  According to the Marine Program Executive Office (PEO) Land Systems, the LAV is not employed as an armored personnel carrier and usually carries a four-person Marine scout/reconnaissance team in addition to its crew  In this regard, the MPC was viewed as necessary by Marine leadership for the transport and enhanced armor protection of Marine infantry forces  The Marines' 2011 Request for Information (RFI) to industry provides an overview of the operational requirements for the ACV  These requirements include the following: The proposed vehicle must be able to self-deploy from amphibious shipping and deliver a reinforced Marine infantry squad (17 marines) from a launch distance at or beyond 12 miles with a speed of not less than 8 knots in seas with 1-foot significant wave height and must be able to operate in seas up to 3-foot significant wave height  The vehicle must be able to maneuver with the mechanized task force for sustained operations ashore in all types of terrain  The vehicle's road and cross-country speed as well as its range should be greater than or equal to the M-1A1  The vehicle's protection characteristics should be able to protect against direct and indirect fire and mines and improvised explosive device (IED) threats  The vehicle should be able to accommodate command and control (C2) systems that permit it to operate both at sea and on land  The vehicle, at a minimum, should have a stabilized machine gun in order to engage enemy infantry and light vehicles  The Marine Corps' 2011 Request for Information (RFI) to industry provided an overview of the operational requirements for the MPC  These requirements included the following: The vehicle must accommodate nine marines and two crew members and have a "robust tactical swim capability (shore-to-shore [not designed to embark from an amphibious ship]) and be capable of operating at 6 knots in a fully developed sea " The vehicle must be able to operate on land with M-1A1s in mechanized task forces across the Marine Corps' mission profile  The vehicle shall provide protection for the occupants from the blasts, fragments, and incapacitating effects of attack from kinetic threats, indirect fire, and improvised explosive devices and mines  The vehicle shall be capable of firing existing Marine anti-structure and anti-armor missiles and should be able to accommodate existing command and control (C2) systems  Defense officials have noted the Marine Corps is "not currently organized, trained and equipped to face a peer adversary in the year 2025" and enemies with advanced air and shore defense will make amphibious operations even riskier  To counter this, the Navy is developing the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) operational concept to address these concerns  EABO is described as follows: Expeditionary Advance Base Operations is a naval operational concept that anticipates the requirements of the next paradigm of US Joint expeditionary operations  The concept is adversary based, cost informed and advantage focused  EABO calls for an alternative, difficult to target forward basing infrastructure that will enable US naval and joint forces to create a more resilient forward based posture to persist, partner and operate within range of adversary long range precision fires  The alternative forward posture enabled by Expeditionary Advance Bases (EABs) is designed to mitigate the growing threat posed by the abundant quantity, expanded range and enhanced precision of potential adversary weaponry—particularly ballistic and cruise missiles designed to attack critical joint fixed forward infrastructure and large platforms  EABs provide a dispersed and largely mobile forward basing infrastructure that enables a persistent alternative force capability set that is similarly designed to be difficult to target and inherently resilient  The resilient, reduced signature infrastructure of EABs, combined with naval forces designed and structured to persist and operate within the arc of adversary anti-access/aerial denial (A2AD) capabilities enables naval commanders to conduct Expeditionary Advance Base Operations to support Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), and Fleet Commanders in the fight for sea control, by exploiting the opportunities afforded by key maritime terrain, particularly in close and confined seas  EABO advances, sustains and maintains the naval and joint sensor, shooter and sustainment capabilities of dispersed forces to leverage the decisive massed capabilities of the larger joint force with enhanced situational awareness, augmented fires and logistical support  The EABO Concept enables US naval forces to exercise 21 st Century naval operational art, meet new enemy A2AD threats with new capabilities and operate and thrive in and around close and confined seas  In terms of Marine Corps amphibious assault operations, the adoption of EABO could reportedly result in "an entirely different approach to amphibious assaults as well as new weapon systems " Noting that "missiles can now hit ships and landing craft while they are hundreds of miles from shore, making it far too dangerous for Marines to storm a beach with current capabilities," Marine officials are reportedly exploring ways to create temporary "bubbles" where Marines can get ashore  In response to these challenges, current and planned weapons systems might need to be modified to accommodate EABO operational concepts  As previously noted, in June 2013, citing budgetary pressures, the Marines reportedly put the MPC program "on ice" and suggested it might not be resurrected for about 10 years  At the time of the decision, the Marines' acquisition priorities were refocused to the ACV as well as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)  Although the Marines refocused budgetary resources to the ACV, difficulties in developing an affordable high water speed capability for the ACV continued to confront Marine leadership  In what was described as a "drastic shift," the Marines decided in March 2014 to "resurrect" the MPC and designate it as ACV Increment 1 1 and initially acquire about 200 vehicles  The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1 2, a tracked version, and to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study  Although ACV Increment 1 1 will have a swim capability, a connector will be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore  Plans called for ACV Increment 1 1 to enter the acquisition cycle at Milestone B (Engineering and Manufacturing Development) in FY2016, award prototype contracts leading to a down select to one vendor in FY2018, and enter low-rate initial production  On April 23, 2014, the Marines released an RFI for ACV Increment 1 1  Some of the required capabilities included the following:     operate in a significant wave height of two feet and sufficient reserve buoyancy to enable safe operations; a high level of survivability and force protection; operate in four to six feet plunging surf with ship-to-shore operations and launch from amphibious ships as an objective; land mobility, operate on 30 percent improved surfaces and 70 percent unimproved surfaces; ability to integrate a  50 calibre remote weapon station (RWS) with growth potential to a dual mount 40 mm/ 50 calibre RWS or a 30 mm cannon RWS; carrying capacity to include three crew and 10 embarked troops as the threshold, 13 embarked troops as the objective, carry mission essential equipment and vehicle ammunition; and the ability to integrate a command, control and communications suite provided as government furnished equipment     The RFI included a requirement for industry to deliver 16 prototype vehicles nine months after contract award in April 2016 at a rate of 4 vehicles per month  The Marines estimated ACV Increment 1 1 would cost about $5 million to $6 million per vehicle, about $10 million less than what the previous ACV version was expected to cost  On November 5, 2014, the Marines reportedly released a draft RFP for ACV Increment 1 1  The Marines were looking for information from industry regarding program milestones, delivery schedules, and where in the program cost savings could be achieved  Plans were for two companies to build 16 prototype vehicles each for testing  Companies who competed for the two contracts included BAE Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), Lockheed Martin, and Scientific Applications International Corporation (SAIC)  Under the provisions of the RFP, the ACV 1 1 was envisioned as an eight-wheeled vehicle capable of carrying 10 Marines and a crew of 3 that would cost between $4 million to $7 5 million per copy—a change from the RFI estimate of $5 million to $6 million per vehicle  In terms of mobility, the ACV 1 1 would need to be able to travel at least 3 nautical miles from ship to shore, negotiate waves up to at least 2 feet, travel 5 to 6 knots in calm seas, and be able to keep up with the M-1 Abrams tank once ashore  Proposals were due in April 2016 and the Marines reportedly planned to award two EMD contracts for 16 vehicles each to be delivered in November 2016  In 2018, the Marines would then down select to one vendor and start full production  The Marines reportedly plan to acquire 204 ACV 1 1s, to be allocated as follows: 1 st Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, CA— 67 ; 2 nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, NC— 46 ; 3 rd Marine Expeditionary Force, Okinawa, Japan— 21 ; Assault Amphibian School, Camp Pendleton, CA— 25 ; Exercise Support Division, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twenty Nine Palms, CA— 25 ; and Program Manager, Quantico, VA, and Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch, Camp Pendleton, CA— 20   In April 2016 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration testified that the Marines' Acquisition Objective for the ACV 1 1 remained at 204 vehicles, which would provide lift for two infantry battalions  Full Operational Capability (FOC) for ACV 1 1 is planned for FY2020  On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1
Report 2:  FAA data from 2010 through 2016 show that FAA has assessed its 55 higher-level facilities at least once every 3 years  FAA policy requires that specialists schedule assessments of higher-level facilities every 12– 18 months depending on whether the facility has met FAA physical security standards  The ISC Standard states that to make appropriate resource decisions, agencies need information, such as what is being accomplished, what needs management attention, and what is performing at expected levels  We found that agencies’ methods of collecting and storing security information had limitations that affected agency and facility officials’ oversight of the physical security of their facilities (see table 3)  Without having long-term, agency-wide information to monitor whether assessments are conducted on schedule, ARS and the Forest Service may not meet the ISC Standard, resulting in not adequately protecting their facilities and employees  The ISC Standard also states that agencies should measure their security program’s capabilities and effectiveness to demonstrate the need to fund facility security and to make appropriate decisions for allocating resources  However, the agencies in our review were unable to demonstrate appropriate oversight of their physical security programs because: CBP’s handbook does not include requirements for data collection and analysis for monitoring physical-security program activities  Facility managers and security officials do not enter assessment results, such as the countermeasures recommended for facilities, in the real property database  Consequently, they do not have comprehensive data to manage their security program, assess overall performance, and take any necessary corrective actions  A CBP official told us that a comprehensive database would allow CBP to set priorities for addressing countermeasures  Without including data collection and analysis requirements in its updated handbook, CBP may be unable to monitor the performance of its physical security program  FAA’s policy does not require ongoing monitoring of physical security information, such as the status of recommended countermeasures or assessment schedules  As a result, FAA officials do not proactively use physical security information to assess the overall performance of its physical security program and take corrective actions before an incident occurs  Without a policy requiring ongoing monitoring of information—an internal control activity, FAA may be unable to assess the overall performance of its security program and take necessary corrective actions  USDA has a decentralized security program and places the responsibility on agencies to create their physical security programs  Security officials from ARS and the Forest Service told us that USDA does not have a policy for collecting and managing agency-wide information; however, they said that USDA is drafting a new departmental regulation and manual that will specify (1) the roles and responsibilities of agency and facility managers and (2) electronic- data-reporting requirements for monitoring the performance of the physical security program  USDA officials provided a draft of USDA’s regulation and manual for our review  The draft regulation did not mention data reporting and monitoring, while the draft manual only contained a table of contents that included a section entitled “Facility Tracking Database ” USDA officials expect to issue new policies sometime between October 2017 and April 2018  In the absence of new departmental regulation and manual, USDA and Forest Service officials told us that they have begun to develop a Forest Service system for storing electronic copies of agency-wide assessments and that they plan to expand the use of this system to track site specific assessment dates and status of recommended countermeasures  Forest Service officials provided milestone dates and described the capabilities for a future information system, which they expect to complete in September 2017  However, we could not determine whether the manual will have information system requirements to monitor agencies’ physical security program, an internal control activity  Without USDA’s including data collection and analysis requirements in its manual, its agencies may not be able to monitor the performance of their physical security programs  Without agencies having information to monitor security activities, they were unable to provide us information on the status of countermeasures across their entire portfolio  In order to better understand the status of countermeasures implemented and facilities’ experiences when implementing countermeasures, we determined the status of countermeasures at 13 facilities we visited  As previously noted, risk management, as it pertains to physical security, involves agency officials monitoring their physical security programs  During our visits to 13 selected facilities, we found the four agencies differed in the number of countermeasures that they had not implemented  Facility officials provided us with some information on why countermeasures had not been implemented, specifically: CBP had a significant number of recommended countermeasures from 2010 through 2016 that remained open at the eight selected CBP facilities  CBP facility officials gave reasons why recommended countermeasures had not been implemented  At one facility, officials did not know about the recommended countermeasures from its last 2010 assessment because the individuals previously knowledgeable about the assessments left the organization without communicating the results  By taking action to improve facility security, they implemented some needed countermeasures  However, at the time of our review, a large number of the recommendations remained open  At another facility, officials told us that they too had not known (for the same reason mentioned above) of their 2010 assessment, which contained recommended countermeasures  However, these officials told us that they submitted a funding request a few weeks before our visit to address all except one of the open countermeasures  In other cases, facilities have not implemented needed countermeasures due to resource constraints or physical site limitations  FAA had a large number of recommended countermeasures from 2010 through 2016 that remained open at the time of our review for the two FAA facilities visited  In this case, the most recent security assessment, completed in late 2016, resulted in one facility’s having little time to implement countermeasures by the time we conducted our analysis  While ARS had closed almost all recommended countermeasures at two facilities at the time of our review, one Forest Service facility had not yet implemented a recommendation (to secure its entrance doors) that was identified in a 2013 security assessment (see bottom center photo, fig  3)  This countermeasure remained open because facility officials said they continued to explore alternatives to address the recommendation  Figure 3 shows examples of countermeasures not fully implemented at selected facilities we visited  During our site visits and discussions with facility staff, we found that physical site limitations or other priorities can make it difficult for facility managers to implement countermeasures  For example, a countermeasure might involve correcting a clear zone violation—that is, moving an object (such as a brick wall) a certain distance away from the facility’s perimeter fence to prevent a potential intruder from using the object to climb over the fence  However, when the object near the fence is a building and the property outside of the fence is not federally owned (see bottom right photo, fig  3), it may not be cost effective to correct the clear zone violation  In this situation, the agency bears the responsibility for exploring ways to address the vulnerability  In following the ISC Standard, as previously noted, managers are required to justify and document why they could not implement recommended countermeasures—what the ISC calls risk acceptance  Selected agencies carry a great responsibility for protecting facilities that support border protection activities, provide safe and efficient air traffic around the country, and protect the quality of the nation’s food supply  With this responsibility comes the need to appropriately assess risk to ensure the security of these agencies’ facilities  However, 7 years after the ISC issued its initial risk-management process standard, each of four selected agencies continued to use assessment methodologies that did not fully align with this standard  During our review, agencies improved their methodologies to better align with the ISC Standard, but the agencies had not yet incorporated the methodologies into their policies and procedures  Without updated policies and procedures requiring a methodology that adheres to the ISC Standard (including all 33 undesirable events now identified in the November 2016 revision to the ISC Standard), agencies may not collect the information needed to assess risk and determine priorities for improved security  This situation could hamper the agencies’ ability to make informed resource allocation decisions or to recommend countermeasures commensurate to the needs at specific facilities  To address challenges in conducting timely assessments, agencies that had a backlog developed plans to address them, but the assumptions used in CBP’s plans and time frames did not appear to fully reflect the agency’s competing priorities and actual experience  Additionally, ARS and Forest Service have not implemented a long-term assessment schedule with key milestones to ensure that higher-level facilities are reassessed at least once every 3 years  Further, in cases where the agencies may have had risk assessment information, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service lack the means to collect, store, and analyze this information in order to monitor the status of a facility’s security  Without these key aspects of a comprehensive security program—a methodology that meets the standard, policies, and procedures that incorporate that methodology; the ability to complete assessments on time; and information to perform monitoring—agencies remain vulnerable to substantial security risks  To improve agencies’ physical security programs’ alignment with the ISC Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government for information and monitoring, we recommend that the Commissioner of U S  Customs and Border Protection take the following three actions: with regard to the updated Security Policy and Procedures Handbook, the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities requirement to assess all undesirable events, consider all three factors of risk, and document deviations from the standard, and data collection and analysis requirements for monitoring the performance of CBP’s physical security program  revise the assumptions used in the plan to address the backlog to balance assessments with competing priorities, such as updating the policy manual and reviewing new construction design, to develop a feasible time frame for completing the assessment backlog  Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following three actions: develop a plan that provides sufficient details on the activities needed and time frames within the date when FAA will implement an improved methodology; update FAA’s policy to require the use of a methodology that fully aligns with the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities for assessing all undesirable events, considering all three factors of risk, and documenting all deviations from the standard countermeasures; and update FAA’s policy to include ongoing monitoring of physical security information  Secretary of Agriculture take the following two actions: include data collection and analysis requirements for monitoring the performance of agencies’ physical security programs, in the department’s revised physical-security manual, and direct the Administrator of the Agricultural Research Service and the Chief of the Forest Service to implement and monitor a long-term assessment schedule with key milestones to ensure that higher-level facilities are reassessed at least once every 3 years  We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, Transportation, and Agriculture for review and comment  All three departments agreed with the findings and recommendations for their respective agencies  DHS agreed with our recommendations and provided actions and timeframes for completion  With regard to our recommendation to update the Security Policy and Procedures Handbook, DHS stated that CBP is updating the handbook to include: (1) a discussion and diagram of the ISC risk management process and its application within CBP’s assessment processes; (2) specific guidance for conducting risk assessments in accordance with the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities; and (3) a requirement and guidance for data collection and analysis in support of a robust physical security program  With regard to our recommendation to revise the assumptions used in the plan to address the assessment backlog, DHS stated that CBP has reevaluated current priorities and believes the current plan to eliminate the risk assessment backlog by the end of fiscal year 2018 is achievable  DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  DHS’s official written response is reprinted in appendix IV  DOT also agreed with our recommendations and by e-mail requested that we publish the response to the sensitive version of this report  DOT stated that FAA continues to refine its policy and develop processes that address the ISC threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences  Further, DOT stated that FAA would either validate that current mitigation strategies address those risks or apply additional appropriate countermeasures  DOT stated that it will provide a detailed response to each recommendation within 60 days from the date of this report  DOT’s official written response is reprinted in appendix V  USDA agreed with our recommendations and provided the agency-wide actions for completion  USDA provided a plan to ensure compliance with the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities by development of a standard physical-security assessment process and by initiation of a compliance program to track assessments and monitor the installation of countermeasures  In an e-mail, USDA provided milestone dates and planned completion by January 2019  USDA’s official written response is reprinted in appendix VI  If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or RectanusL@gao gov  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI  This report examines: (1) how selected agencies’ assessment methodologies align with the Interagency Security Committee’s (ISC) risk management standard for identifying necessary countermeasures and (2) what management challenges, if any, selected agencies reported facing in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring the results  To determine how selected agencies’ assessment methodologies align with ISC standards for identifying the necessary countermeasures, we identified federal executive branch departments and agencies reported by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to have received delegations of authority to protect their own buildings  We reviewed the Federal Real Property Council’s data on the Federal Real Property Profile to identify federally owned and agency-controlled buildings  We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our reporting objectives based upon our recent report that reviewed these data fields  We selected four agencies based upon their large quantity of reported federally owned and agency-controlled buildings: DHS, U S  Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and USDA’s United States Forest Service (Forest Service)  This methodology purposely does not include federal buildings protected by FPS and under the control of the General Services Administration as well as other agencies that we reported on in our previous work  We obtained and reviewed one particular ISC standard, The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities (the ISC Standard) and its related appendices for assessing physical security and providing recommended countermeasures at federal facilities  We obtained and analyzed the selected departments’ and agencies’ facility-security policies and procedures for a risk assessment methodology  According to the ISC Standard, agencies’ risk assessment methodologies must: consider all of the undesirable events identified in the ISC Standard as possible risks to federal facilities as listed in appendix III; assess the threat, consequences, and vulnerability to specific produce similar or identical results when applied by various security provide sufficient justification for deviations from the ISC-defined security baseline  We limited the scope of this review to the first two standards above because agencies’ adherence to these standards could be objectively verified by reviewing and analyzing agency documentation and interviewing agency officials, and their adherence to the two additional standards could not be verified in this manner  We did not conduct risk assessments with independent security professionals to evaluate: 1) the results from prior agency evaluations and 2) the sufficiency of justifications for deviations from the ISC-defined security baseline, as both evaluations were outside of the scope of the engagement  Therefore, for the purposes of this report, risk assessment policies, procedures and resulting methodology that align with ISC standards are those that consider all of the undesirable events and assess the threats, consequences, and vulnerabilities to specific undesirable events  We reviewed and analyzed information to answer the following five questions: 1  Do the policies and procedures mention the ISC standards? 2  Do the policies and procedures consider all of the undesirable events? 3  Do the policies and procedures assess the threat of specific undesirable events? 4  Do the policies and procedures assess the consequences of specific undesirable events? 5  Do the policies and procedures assess the vulnerability to specific undesirable events? We answered each of these questions as either a “Yes” or “No” for our selected agencies  The “No” answer to questions 3, 4, and 5 includes the following two possibilities: (a) the agency’s threat, consequence, or vulnerability ratings are not tied to specific undesirable events, or (b) the agency does not have a framework or formalized steps within which it collects and analyzes threat-, consequence-, or vulnerability-related information  If the answer to each of the five questions was “Yes,” then the agency’s overall risk assessment methodology aligns with ISC risk assessment standards for the purposes of this report  If the answer to one or more of the five questions was “No”, then the agency’s methodology does not to align with ISC standards for the purposes of this report  We interviewed security officials at ISC; three departments (DHS, DOT, and USDA); and four agencies (CBP, FAA, ARS, and the Forest Service)  We obtained and analyzed agency guidance on prioritizing physical security needs and interviewed agencies’ facility maintenance and budget officials  We reviewed the ISC’s best practices for planning for physical security resources within an agency budget process  Additionally, we reviewed the Office of Management and Budget’s and our leading practices in capital decision-making that provide agencies with guidance for prioritizing budget decisions such as “countermeasure projects ” We also reviewed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government because internal controls play a significant role in helping agencies achieve their mission-related responsibilities  Our findings from our review of the selected agencies are not generalizable to all ISC member agencies, but provide insight into and illustrative examples about selected agencies’ facility risk-assessment methodologies  To determine what management challenges selected agencies reported facing in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring results, we interviewed agencies’ security, maintenance, and budget officials  We requested agency security officials to provide portfolio- wide data on facility security assessments for our review in order to select sites to visit and analyze data for dates of assessments and the status of findings  We assessed the reliability of this data through interviews with knowledgeable agency staff and a review for completeness and any unexpected values  We compiled information from physical security assessments when no portfolio-wide agency data were available  We determined that these data were sufficient for the purpose of our reporting objectives and selected geographically dispersed sites with buildings with higher reported security levels per the ISC Standard, as these higher security levels have greater requirements and therefore the potential for greater resource needs  See appendix II for the 13 sites we selected  For these selected sites, we interviewed agency staff concerning the assessment process, site-specific findings, recommendations, justification for deviations from ISC’s baseline standards, and management challenges faced in addressing physical security needs  We observed and photographed the status of the findings from the site physical security assessments  We did not independently determine what constitutes a management challenge or a physical security finding  Rather, we relied on these stakeholders to determine these physical security concerns as defined in their own standards and guidance  The information from our selected sites is illustrative and cannot be generalized to sites agency- wide  The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from June 2016 to August 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We subsequently worked with DHS, DOT and USDA from August 2017 to October 2017 to prepare this version of the original report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards  Error! No text of specified style in document  Error! No text of specified style in document  Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Error! No text of specified style in document  In addition to the contact named above, Amelia Shachoy (Assistant Director), Steve Martinez (Analyst-in-Charge), Jennifer Clayborne, George Depaoli, Geoffrey Hamilton, Joshua Ormond, Alison Snyder, Amelia Michelle Weathers, and Elizabeth Wood made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The Navy began procuring John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers in FY2016, and a total of four have been procured through FY2019, including two in FY2019. The first six ships are being procured under a block buy contract that was authorized by Section 127 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015). The Navy wants to procure a total of 20 TAO-205s. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the procurement of the fifth and sixth ships in the program. The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two ships at $1,056.3 million, or an average of $528.1 million each. The two ships have received $75.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $981.2 million in procurement funding needed to complete the two ships' estimated combined procurement cost. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget also requests $73.0 million in AP funding for TAO-205s to be procured in future fiscal years, and $3.7 million in cost-to-complete procurement funding to cover cost growth on TAO-205s procured in prior fiscal years, bringing the total FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program (aside from outfitting and post-delivery costs) to $1,057.9 million. Issues for Congress include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program; the number of oilers the Navy will require in coming years to support its operations; and whether to encourage or direct the Navy to build TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler shipbuilding program, a program to build a new class of 20 fleet oilers for the Navy  The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the procurement of the fifth and sixth ships in the program  Issues for Congress regarding the TAO-205 program include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the program; the number of oilers the Navy will require in coming years to support its operations; and whether to encourage or direct the Navy to build TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy  Decisions that Congress makes regarding the program could affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the U S  shipbuilding industrial base  For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the TAO-205 program and other Navy shipbuilding programs may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  The primary role of Navy fleet oilers is to transfer fuel to Navy surface ships that are operating at sea, so as to extend the operating endurance of these surface ships and their embarked aircraft  Fleet oilers also provide other surface ships with lubricants, fresh water, and small amounts of dry cargo  Fleet oilers transfer fuel and other supplies to other surface ships in operations called underway replenishments (UNREPs)  During an UNREP, an oiler steams next to the receiving ship and transfers fuel by hose (see Figure 1 , Figure 2 , and Figure 3 )  Oilers are one kind of Navy UNREP ship; other Navy UNREP ships include ammunition ships, dry cargo ships, and multiproduct replenishment ships  The Navy's UNREP ships are known more formally as the Navy's combat logistics force (CLF)  Most of the Navy's CLF ships are operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC)  Navy oilers carry the designation TAO (sometimes written as T-AO)  The T means that the ships are operated by MSC with a mostly civilian crew; the A means it is an auxiliary ship of some kind; and the O means that it is, specifically, an oiler  Although the role of fleet oilers might not be considered as glamorous as that of other Navy ships, fleet oilers are critical to the Navy's ability to operate in forward-deployed areas around the world on a sustained basis  The U S  Navy's ability to perform UNREP operations in a safe and efficient manner on a routine basis is a skill that many other navies lack  An absence of fleet oilers would significantly complicate the Navy's ability to operate at sea on a sustained basis in areas such as the Western Pacific or the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region  The Navy states that the ability to rearm, refuel and re-provision our ships at sea, independent of any restrictions placed on it by a foreign country, is critical to the Navy's ability to project warfighting power from the sea  As the lifeline of resupply to Navy operating forces underway, the ships of the Navy's Combat Logistic Force (CLF) enable Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups to operate forward and remain on station during peacetime and war, with minimal reliance on host nation support  The Navy's existing force of fleet oilers consists of 15 Henry J  Kaiser (TAO-187) class ships ( Figure 4 )  These ships were procured between FY1982 and FY1989 and entered service between 1986 and 1996  They have an expected service life of 35 years; the first ship in the class will reach that age in 2021  The ships are about 677 feet long and have a full load displacement of about 41,000 tons, including about 26,500 tons of fuel and other cargo  The ships were built by Avondale Shipyards of New Orleans, LA, a shipyard that eventually became part of the shipbuilding firm Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII)  HII subsequently wound down Navy shipbuilding operations at Avondale, and the facility no longer builds ships  (HII continues to operate two other shipyards that build Navy ships ) The TAO-205 class program was originally called the TAO(X) program, with the (X) meaning that the exact design of the ship had not yet been determined  On January 6, 2015, then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that ships in the class will be named for "people who fought for civil rights and human rights," and that the first ship in the class, TAO-205, which was procured in FY2016, will be named for Representative John Lewis  The class consequently is now known as the John Lewis (TAO-205) class  As part of its goal for achieving a fleet of 355 ships, the Navy wants to procure a total of 20 TAO-205 class ships  The required number of oilers largely depends on the numbers and types of other surface ships (and their embarked aircraft) to be refueled, and the projected operational patterns for these ships and aircraft  The first TAO-205 class ship was procured in FY2016, the second in FY2018, and the third and fourth in FY2019  The Navy's FY2020 five-year (FY2020-FY2023) shipbuilding plan calls for procuring the next seven ships in the class in annual quantities of 2-1-1-2-1  The Navy's FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan calls for procuring the remaining nine ships in the program at a rate of one per year starting in FY2025  The first TAO-205 is scheduled for delivery in November 2020  Table 1 shows procurement funding for the TAO-205 program in the Navy's FY2020 budget submission  The Navy's FY2020 budget submission estimates the total procurement cost of the 20 planned TAO-205s at $12,196 1 million (i e , about 12 2 billion) in then-year dollars, or an average of $609 8 million each  Since the figure of $12,196 1 million is in then-year dollars, it incorporates estimated annual inflation rates for TAO-205s to be procured out to FY2033  The TAO-205 class design ( Figure 5 ) will have capabilities similar to those of the Kaiser-class ships, and will rely on existing technologies rather than new technologies  To guard against oil spills, TAO-205s are to be double-hulled, like modern commercial oil tankers, with a space between the two hulls to protect the inner hull against events that puncture the outer hull  (The final Kaiser-class ships are double-hulled, but earlier ships in the class are single-hulled ) TAO-205s are being built by General Dynamics/National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (GD/NASSCO) of San Diego, CA, a shipyard that builds Navy auxiliaries and DOD sealift ships  On June 25, 2015, the Navy, as part of its acquisition strategy for TAO-205 program, issued a combined solicitation consisting of separate Requests for Proposals (RFPs) for the detailed design and construction (DD&C) of the first six TAO-205s; the DD&C in FY2017 (and also procurement of long lead-time materials in FY2016) for an amphibious assault ship called LHA-8 that the Navy procured in FY2017; and contract design support for the LPD-17 Flight II program (previously called the LX[R] program), a program to procure a new class of 13 amphibious ships  The Navy limited bidding in this combined solicitation to two bidders—Ingalls Shipbuilding of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII/Ingalls) and GD/NASSCO—on the grounds that these are the only two shipbuilders that have the capability to build both TAO-205s and LHA-8  Under the Navy's plan for the combined solicitation, one of these two yards was to be awarded the DD&C contract for the first six TAO-205s, the other yard was to be awarded the DD&C contract (and procurement of long lead-time materials) for LHA-8, and the shipyard with the lowest combined evaluated price was to receive a higher profit on its DD&C contract and was to be awarded the majority of the LPD-17 Flight II contract design engineering man-hours  On June 30, 2016, the Navy announced its awards in the above-described combined solicitation, awarding a fixed price incentive block buy contract for the DD&C of the first six TAO-205s to GD/NASSCO  (The Navy awarded the contract for the DD&C of LHA-8 to HII/Ingalls  HII/Ingalls was also awarded the majority of the LPD-17 Flight II contract design engineering man-hours ) The Navy was granted authority for using a block buy contract to procure the first six TAO-205s by Section 127 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S  1356 / P L  114-92 of November 25, 2015)  It was earlier estimated that the block buy contract would reduce the procurement cost of the second through sixth TAO-205s by an average of about $45 million each, compared to costs under the standard or default DOD approach of annual contracting  The Navy states that about $35 million of the $45 million in per-ship savings will come from using advance procurement (AP) funding for batch-ordering TAO-205 components  The Navy states that this use of AP funding could have occurred under annual contracting, and that the savings that are intrinsic to the block buy contract are thus about $10 million per ship  Section 8117 of the FY2019 Appropriations Act (Division A of H R  6157 / P L  115-245 of September 28, 2018) states the following: Sec  8117  None of the funds provided in this Act for the TAO Fleet Oiler program shall be used to award a new contract that provides for the acquisition of the following components unless those components are manufactured in the United States: Auxiliary equipment (including pumps) for shipboard services; propulsion equipment (including engines, reduction gears, and propellers); shipboard cranes; and spreaders for shipboard cranes  The Appendix presents the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) assessment of the TAO-205 class program from GAO's annual report surveying DOD major acquisition programs  The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the procurement of the 5th and 6th ships in the program  The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two ships at $1,056 3 million, or an average of $528 1 million each  The two ships have received $75 0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $981 2 million in procurement funding needed to complete the two ships' estimated combined procurement cost  The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget also requests $73 0 million in AP funding for TAO-205s to be procured in future fiscal years, and $3 7 million in cost-to-complete procurement funding to cover cost growth on TAO-205s procured in prior fiscal years, bringing the total FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program (aside from outfitting and post-delivery costs) to $1,057 9 million  One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program  In assessing this issue, Congress may consider, among other things, whether the Navy has accurately priced the work that it is requesting to fund in FY2020  Another issue for Congress concerns the number of oilers the Navy will require in coming years to support its operations  The Navy is implementing a new operational concept, called Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), that could lead to the development of a fleet with larger numbers of individually smaller ships, and to more-widely dispersed Navy operations  DMO could affect requirements for Navy logistics, including oilers  The Navy states that Recapitalizing the auxiliary and sealift fleet in support of DMO has become a top priority  The initial reviews of the requirements to support this operational maritime concept indicate potential growth across the five lines of effort: refuel, rearm, resupply, repair, and revive  Coincident is the review of the level of effort needed to distribute logistics into a contested maritime environment following safe transfer by the logistics fleet—smaller, faster, multi-mission transports likely resident within the future battle force  The work to fully flesh out the requirement is ongoing, but the aggregate is expected to be no less than the current requirement, reinforcing the urgency to recapitalize the current fleet  An August 2017 GAO report states the following: The readiness of the surge sealift and combat logistics fleets has trended downward since 2012  For example, GAO found that mission-limiting equipment casualties—incidents of degraded or out-of-service equipment—have increased over the past 5 years, and maintenance periods are running longer than planned, indicating declining materiel readiness across both fleets     The Navy has not assessed the effects of widely distributed operations, which could affect the required number and type of combat logistics ships  The Navy released its new operational concept of more widely distributed operations—ships traveling farther distances and operating more days to support a more distributed fleet—in 2017  The Navy has not assessed the effects that implementing this concept will have on the required number and type of combat logistics ships  These effects could be exacerbated in the event that the Navy is less able to rely on in-port refueling—which has comprised about 30 percent of all refuelings over the past 3 years—placing greater demand on the combat logistics fleet  Given the fleet's dependence on the combat logistics force, waiting until 2019 or 2020 to conduct an assessment, as planned, could result in poor investment decisions as the Navy continues to build and modernize its fleet  Furthermore, without assessing the effects of widely distributed operations on logistics force requirements and modifying its force structure plans accordingly, the Navy risks being unprepared to provide required fuel and other supplies  Another issue for Congress is whether to encourage or direct the Navy to build TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy  The issue relates to how changes in the international security environment might affect how the Navy operates and equips its underway replenishment ships  During the Cold War, the Navy procured underway replenishment ships to support a two-stage approach to underway replenishment in which single-product "shuttle" ships (such as oilers, ammunition ships, and dry stores ships) would take their supplies from secure ports to relatively safe midocean areas, where they would then transfer them to multiproduct "station" ships called TAOEs and AORs  The TAOEs and AORs would then travel to Navy carrier strike groups operating in higher-threat areas and transfer their combined supplies to the carrier strike group ships  As a result, single-product shuttle ships were equipped with lesser amounts of ship self-defense equipment, and TAOEs and AORs were equipped with greater amounts of such equipment  When the Cold War ended and transitioned to the post-Cold War era, threats to U S  Navy ships operating at sea were substantially reduced  As a consequence, the amount of ship self-defense equipment on the TAOEs and AORs was reduced, and a single-stage approach to underway replenishment, in which oilers and dry stores ships took supplies from secure ports all the way to carrier strike group ships, was sometimes used  Now that the post-Cold War era has transitioned to a new strategic environment featuring renewed great power competition with countries like China and Russia, and a consequent renewal of potential threats to U S  Navy ships operating at sea, the question is whether TAO-205s should be equipped with lesser amounts of ship self-defense equipment, like oilers were during both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, or with greater amounts of ship self-defense equipment, like TAOEs and AORs were during the Cold War  Building TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy could increase TAO-205 procurement costs by tens of millions of dollars per ship, depending on the amount of additional ship self-defense equipment  Section 1026 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S  1356 / P L  114-92 of November 25, 2015) required an independent assessment of the Navy's combat logistics force ships  The report was delivered to Congress in February 2016  A copy of the report was posted by the media outlet Politico on March 11, 2016  The report states the following: The T-AO(X) will only have a limited capability to defeat a submarine launched torpedo attack and no capability to defeat a missile attack  When delivered, the TAO(X) will have: —[the] NIXIE Torpedo Countermeasure System [for decoying certain types of torpedoes] —[the] Advanced Degaussing System (Anti-Mine) [for reducing the ship's magnetic signature, so as to reduce the likelihood of attack by magnetically fused mines] When required, the T-AO(X) will also have ability to embark Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Expeditionary Security Teams (EST)  The ESTs will embark with several crew served weapons and are designed to provide limited self-defense against a small boat attack  The T-AO(X) will have Space, Weight, Power and Cooling (SWAP-C) margins for future installations of the following systems: —[the] Close In Weapon System (CIWS) or SeaRAM (Rolling Airframe Missile) [for defense against missile attack] —[the] Anti-Torpedo Torpedo Defense System (ATTDS) [for destroying torpedoes] Even after the installation of a CIWS or ATTDS, if the T-AO(X) was to operate in anything other than a benign environment, the ship will require both air and surface escorts  The decision to rely on [other] Fleet assets to provide force protection [i e , defense against attacks] for the T-AO(X) was validated by the JROC [in June 2015]  Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the Navy's request for FY2020 procurement funding for the TAO-205 program  A May 2019 GAO report—the 2019 edition of GAO's annual report surveying DOD major acquisition programs—stated the following regarding the TAO-205 program: Technology Maturity and Design Stability The Navy has matured all Lewis class critical technologies and stabilized the ships' design  In 2014, the Navy identified three critical technologies for the Lewis class, all of which involved a new system for transferring cargo at sea  Prior to initiating detail design activities in June 2016, the Navy completed prototype tests of the critical technologies and found that they were fully mature—an approach consistent with shipbuilding best practices  In 2017, the Navy removed one critical technology—the Heavy e-STREAM cargo delivery system—from the Lewis class design  The Navy had intended to use this system to deliver F-35 Lightning II power modules  The Navy subsequently decided to deliver these by air, which precluded any need for the Heavy system  Lead ship construction began in September 2018 with 95 percent of the ship's total design effort complete  Program officials stated that this figure meant that 100 percent of the ship's basic and functional design were by then complete—an approach consistent with best practices  Throughout detail design and now into construction, the Navy has not changed the Lewis class program's performance requirements  The Navy also leveraged commercial vessel designs to minimize design and construction risks  The Lewis class features a modern double-hull construction, an environmental-based design standard for commercial tankers, to ensure the ships can dock at ports-of-call  This design was included in the final three Kaiser class oilers  Production Readiness The program office has largely kept to its construction schedule to date for the first ship, but a flooding incident at a NASSCO graving dock in July 2018 has affected the delivery of future ships  The program office stated that this incident has not affected current ship fabrication activities  However, the dock's unavailability while repairs are planned and implemented has disrupted the contractor's schedule for future ships  According to the program office, the incident has resulted in some delays to certain delivery dates for ships two through six  Other Program Issues As part of the Navy's plan to expand the fleet, the Navy concluded that it would need an additional three Lewis class ships  The Navy's budget request for fiscal year 2019 increased its planned one-ship-per-year buy to two for fiscal years 2019, 2021, and 2023  The Congress provided appropriations for the additional fiscal year 2019 ship in support of the Navy's request  To account for the additional ships in fiscal years 2019 and 2021, the Navy plans to add two more ships to the low-rate initial production phase  Subsequently, program officials stated that they plan to compete a new contract for the remaining 12 ships using the construction knowledge gained from efforts under the existing contract  Program Office Comments We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment  The program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate  The program office stated that it continues to follow GAO shipbuilding best practices and has leveraged commercial vessel design practices to minimize risk  The program office also stated that it is currently revising its acquisition baseline to reflect the update in total quantities to 20 ships  In addition, the program office noted that, in fiscal year 2019, it fully funded the third and fourth ships and funded advance procurement for the fifth ship 


Report 2: 1 prototypes for evaluation  BAE's contract was for $103 8 million and SAIC's for $121 5 million, and each company is to build 16 prototypes  The Marines expect to down select to a single vendor in 2018  Initial operational capability (IOC) was expected by the end of 2020, and all ACV 1 1 vehicles are planned to be fielded by summer 2023  Plans are to equip six battalions with ACV 1 1s and 392 existing upgraded AAVs  Both BAE and SAIC reportedly have a long history related to amphibious vehicles, as BAE built the Marines' original AAV and SAIC has built hundreds of Terrex 1 vehicles used by Singapore, and both companies had Marine Corps contracts to modernize AAVs  ACV 1 1 is intended to have some amphibious capability but would rely on ship-to-shore connectors  ACV 1 2 is intended to have greater amphibious capability, including greater water speed and the ability to self-deploy from amphibious ships  BAE planned to team with Italian manufacturer Iveco (which owns Chrysler and Ferrari)  BAE's prototype would accommodate 13 Marines and travel 11 5 miles at about 7 miles per hour (mph) in surf and 65 mph on land  BAE's version would incorporate a V hull design intended to protect passengers from underside blasts and have external fuel tanks for increased safety  BAE intends to produce its prototypes at its York, PA, facility  SAIC planned to team with Singapore Technology Kinetics to develop its prototype based on an existing design called Terrex  SAIC's version is said to travel 7 mph in water and incorporates a V hull design as well as blast-mitigating seats  It would carry a crew of 3 and can accommodate 11 Marines  SAIC's version plans for a Common Remote Weapons System (CROWS) ( 50 calibre machine gun and a 30 mm cannon), which could be operated from inside the vehicle while buttoned up, therefore not exposing crewmen to hostile fire  On December 7, 2015, it was reported that GDLS would protest the award of the ACV 1 1 contract to BAE and SAIC, claiming the Marines asked for particular capabilities and then evaluated vendors by a different set of standards  On March 15, 2016, GAO denied GDLS's protest, noting that "the Marine Corps' evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the evaluation scheme identified in the solicitation " The Marines reportedly stated that the protest put the ACV 1 1 program about 45 days behind schedule but anticipated the ACV 1 1 would still be fielded on time  BAE and SAIC reportedly delivered their ACV 1 1 prototypes, with BAE delivering its first prototype in December 2016 and SAIC delivering its prototype in February 2017  This early delivery could potentially result in an unspecified incentive fee award for both companies  EMD testing began the week of March 13 and was scheduled to last eight months  In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1 1 down select request for proposals to BAE and SAIC  Plans called for operational testing to start in January 2018, with the Marines anticipating announcing a contract winner in June 2018 for the delivery of 204 ACV 1 1s over a four-year period  In accordance with the provisions of the FY2014 National Defence Authorization Act ( P L  113-66 ) Section 251, GAO submitted its annual report to Congress on the ACV program in April 2018  GAO reviewed program cost estimates, updated schedules, and program assessments of test results and production readiness, and compared ACV acquisition efforts to DOD guidance and GAO-identified best practices  GAO found the following: The first version of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV 1 1) is on track to meet development cost goals with no additional anticipated delays for major acquisition milestones  With regard to costs, the development phase of ACV 1 1 is on pace to not exceed cost goals that were established at the start of development, based on a recent Navy estimate, the ACV program office, and reporting from the contractors  GAO recommended that the Marine Corps (1) not enter the second year of low rate production for ACV 1 1 until after the contractor has achieved an overall Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL) of 8 and (2) not enter full-rate production until achieving an overall MRL of 9  DOD partially concurred with this recommendation but noted that it was "reasonable to proceed at lower MRL levels if steps are taken to mitigate risks " On June 19, 2018, the Marine Corps selected BAE Systems to produce the ACV  Reportedly, the initial contract—valued at $198 million—will be for low-rate production of 30 vehicles to be delivered by the autumn of 2019  Eventually, 204 vehicles are to be delivered under the ACV 1 1 phase of the project  BAE will also produce the ACV 1 2 variant and, all told, the entire ACV 1 1 and 1 2 project is expected to deliver 700 vehicles, and, if all options are exercised, the total contract will reportedly be worth $1 2 billion  In December 2018, the Navy reportedly awarded BAE Systems a $140 million contract modification to build 30 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) ACVs as part of Lot 2, with the first vehicles expected to be delivered in the summer of 2020  Lot 1 is reportedly still scheduled to start delivery in the summer of 2019  In DOT&E's December 2018 FY2018 Annual Report, it was noted During the operational evaluation (OA), the ACV-equipped unit demonstrated the ability to maneuver to an objective, conduct immediate action drills, and provide suppressive fires in support of dismounted infantry maneuver in a desert environment  The ACV-equipped unit was able to maneuver in the littorals; embark aboard a landing craft air cushioned (LCAC), transit the open ocean and surf zone, and debark from the LCAC  The ACV demonstrated water mobility and the ability to self-deploy from the beach, cross the surf zone, enter the ocean, swim, and return to the beach  Based on data from the OA, reliability is below the program reliability growth curve (58 hours Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failures [MTBOMF])  BAE vehicles demonstrated 24 9 hours MTBOMF  There were no systemic problems identified that indicate a major redesign is required  The ACV section was successful in 15 of 16 missions and demonstrated the capability to negotiate terrain in the desert and littorals, operate with tanks and light armored vehicles, and maneuver to achieve tactical advantage over the opposing threat force  ACV crews, supported infantry, and the opposing force noted that the vehicles performed better than the legacy vehicle in a wide variety of areas  In terms of recommendations, DOT&E noted the Program Manager, Advanced Amphibious Assault should do the following: Modify the infantry troop commander's station to make it easier to move between the hatch and seat  Assess the capability of all existing Marine Corps recovery assets to recover the ACV  Investigate options for preventing damage to steering/suspension when encountering battlefield debris, such as concertina wire  According to reports, the Marines envisioned that the successor to ACV 1 1—the ACV 1 2—would have a threshold requirement of 12 miles from ship-to-shore  If this threshold can be achieved, it could help to reduce the vulnerability of U S  naval vessels supporting Marine amphibious operations to enemy shore fire  On April 10, 2019, during testimony to the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Navy and Marine Corps leadership noted During the fall of 2018, ACV 1 1 prototypes demonstrated satisfactory water mobility performance in high surf conditions, and in doing so met the full water mobility transition requirement for ACV 1 2 capability  Subsequently, the Milestone Decision Authority Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)) approved the consolidation of increments one and two into a single program to enable continuous production of ACVs to completely replace the AAV  The next key acquisition event is the Full Rate Production decision scheduled for the third quarter of FY 2020 following Initial Operational Test & Evaluation  ACV remains on schedule to achieve Initial Operational Capability in the fourth quarter of FY 2020  With the consolidation of ACV variants into a single variant, there will likely be a number of programmatic changes and potential ramifications for the ACV and ACV 2 0 programs  Reportedly, the Marines plan to develop an ACV 2 0, capable of carrying 10 to 13 Marines plus crew, capable of high water speeds and deployment from ships far from the coast  ACV 2 0 is planned to be capable of operating on land alongside tanks and light armored vehicles  According to the Marines ACV 2 0 serves as a conceptual placeholder for a future Decision Point (~ 2025, or sooner) at which time knowledge gained in the fielding and employment of the first phase of ACV (1 1 and 1 2), the state of the naval connector strategy, and science & technology work towards a high water speed capable self-deploying vehicle will support an informed decision  The FY2020 presidential budget request includes RDT&E and Procurement funding requests in the Base Budget, as well as FY2020 requested quantities  The Marines did not request ACV Overseas Contingency operations (OCO) funding in FY2020  According to DOD, the FY2020 ACV budget request will fund The ACV 1 1 Full Rate Production (FRP) Lot 3 of 56 vehicles, plus procurement of related items such as production support, systems engineering, program management, Engineering Change Orders (ECOs), Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), and integrated logistics support  Research and Development efforts include the procurement of ACV 1 2 MRV test articles, associated GFE, and initiation of a Vehicle Protective System trade study and integration efforts  While from an overall programmatic perspective, the consolidation of the ACV 1 1 and ACV 1 2 variants could be viewed as a favourable programmatic outcome, there are likely ramifications that might be of interest to policymakers  Potential issues include the following: Will the consolidation of ACV 1 1 and ACV 1 2 result in an overall cost savings? Will this consolidation permit the acquisition of additional ACVs because of potential cost savings? With the consolidation and the stated intent to replace AAVs, what is the revised timeline for the replacement of AAVs and will this result in cost savings from not having to upgrade and maintain AAVs longer than previously intended? How will the consolidation of ACV 1 1 and ACV 1 2 affect the ACV 2 0 program? If the Navy and Marine Corps decide to adopt Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) as an operational concept, it could possibly have implications for the ACV program, including the following: At the weapon systems level, would EABO require any changes to the vehicles themselves, such as enhanced survivability, lethality, or Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) features? If changes are required to facilitate EABO, how would this affect the program's overall acquisition timeline and cost? If EABO does not require any technical changes in the ACV program, would the adoption of EABO modify the Marines' current procurement quantities of ACVs? If EABO requires different procurement quantities for the different ACV versions (more or fewer), how might this affect program timelines and program costs?

ground_truth: On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a "more affordable and sustainable" vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles were intended to play central roles in future Marine amphibious operations. On June 14, 2013, Marine leadership put the MPC program "on ice" due to budgetary pressures but suggested the program might be resurrected some 10 years down the road when budgetary resources might be more favorable. In what was described as a "drastic shift," the Marines decided to "resurrect" the MPC in March 2014. The Marines designated the MPC as ACV Increment 1.1 and planned to acquire about 200 vehicles. The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1.2, a tracked, fully amphibious version, and at the time planned to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study. Although ACV Increment 1.1 is to have a swim capability, another mode of transport (ship or aircraft) would be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore. The Marines are reportedly exploring the possibility of developing a high water speed ACV 2.0, which could accompany tanks and light armored vehicles into combat. On November 5, 2014, the Marines released a draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for ACV Increment 1.1. On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1.1 prototypes for evaluation. BAE's contract was for $103.8 million and SAIC's for $121.5 million, and each company was to build 16 prototypes to be tested over the next two years. Both BAE and SAIC delivered their prototypes early, and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) testing began mid-March 2017. In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1.1 down select request for proposals to BAE and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). On June 19, 2018, the Marine Corps selected BAE Systems to produce the ACV. The initial contract—valued at $198 million—was for low-rate production of 30 vehicles to be delivered by the autumn of 2019. On April 10, 2019, during testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Navy and Marine Corps leadership announced that during the fall of 2018, ACV 1.1 prototypes demonstrated satisfactory water mobility performance in high surf conditions and, in doing so, met the full water mobility transition requirement for ACV 1.2 capability. As a result, ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 were to be consolidated into a single variant—the ACV—which is intended to replace all AAVs. Potential issues for Congress include the potential ramifications of the consolidation of the ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 programs and how the possible adoption of the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) operational concept could affect the ACV program.