prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: The Buy American Act of 1933 was enacted during the Great Depression when there was a need to create and preserve jobs for American workers, and it established a preference for the federal government to buy domestic end products  Many of the products the federal government buys—including aircraft engines and medical supplies—are end products that may be subject to the requirements of the Buy American Act  Further, the Buy American Act does not apply to products that are purchased for use outside the United States or obtained through contracts under the micro-purchase threshold, which was generally $3,500 in fiscal year 2017  end products manufactured in the United States provided that (a) the product is a commercially available off-the-shelf item; or (b) the cost of the components mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50 percent of the total cost of all components  End products that are not considered domestic under the Buy American Act are treated as foreign  This characterization is based on the origin of the end product—that is, where the product is manufactured or produced—and not the vendor’s location  For example, a vendor located in Finland may supply end products manufactured in the United States, in which case these products would be treated as domestic products  Conversely, a vendor located in the United States may supply end products manufactured in Finland  In this case, the end products would be considered foreign  Although the Buy American Act establishes a preference for domestic end products, there are situations in which agencies can procure foreign end products through established exceptions to the Buy American requirements  In addition, under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the United States has waived domestic purchasing requirements—including the Buy American Act—for certain acquisitions of foreign end products from countries that are party to international trade agreements or are considered designated countries by the U S  Trade Representative  In implementing the Buy American Act, the FAR sets forth several exceptions that permit federal agencies to buy foreign end products  These include situations when a domestic end product is not produced in sufficient quantities or cases where the cost would be unreasonable to buy a domestic end product  The steps that contracting officers must take to determine or document an exception will vary depending on the circumstances of the acquisition  For example, a written determination from the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) or a delegate may be necessary to determine non-availability in some cases  However, a written determination may not be required when an acquisition is conducted through full and open competition, is synopsized, and no domestic offer is received  Other exceptions to the Buy American Act restrictions on the purchase of foreign products, such as the exception for commercial information technology, are blanket exceptions that do not require a written determination  In addition, some agencies have specified additional considerations that must precede a determination and what level of authority is appropriate for certain determinations  The five Buy American Act exceptions that apply government-wide and the corresponding determination standards in the FAR are listed in Table 1  Individual federal agencies may make blanket determinations of situations in which the Act’s restrictions should not apply to that agency’s procurements, when it is not in the public interest to restrict the purchase of foreign end products  For example, over the years, DOD has entered into reciprocal procurement agreements with 27 foreign counterparts  DOD determined that it would be inconsistent with the public interest to apply the Buy American Act restrictions on products from these 27 qualifying countries  Thus, if an offer includes end products from a qualifying country, those products are not restricted by the Buy American Act and the acquisition of qualifying country end products does not require higher approval  This public interest exception for qualifying countries applies only to contracts awarded by DOD  Federal agencies can purchase eligible foreign end products from designated countries when the Buy American Act’s requirements are waived because of the terms of an international trade agreement or other criteria, such as a designation by the U S  Trade Representative as a least developed country  In accordance with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the president has the authority to waive the Buy American Act  For eligible products that come from countries covered by the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement, Free Trade Agreements, and the Israeli Trade Act, the Buy American Act has been waived so that these items receive nondiscriminatory consideration and are on equal footing with domestic end products  In total, these agreements cover approximately 60 countries—overlapping with all but two of the DOD qualifying countries  Appendix II highlights the overlap  Unlike DOD’s blanket public interest exception for qualifying countries, the Buy American Act requirements are only waived under a trade agreement if the acquisition is of a certain value set by the U S  Trade Representative  Current trade agreement thresholds, at or above which the requirements are waived, range from $25,000 for contracts for eligible products from Canada to $180,000 for the 45 other parties to the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement  Table 2 lists the parties eligible for trade agreements and the associated threshold for supply contracts  The FAR specifies certain conditions in which trade agreements do not apply, even if the acquisition is above the requisite threshold value set by the U S  Trade Representative  In these cases, the Buy American Act would apply  These conditions include, but are not limited to: acquisitions that do not use full and open competition, when the limitation of competition would preclude the procedures applicable to acquisitions covered by trade agreements; certain sole-source acquisitions for commercial items using simplified acquisition procedures; acquisitions set aside for small businesses; acquisition of ammunition, arms, or war materials, or for purchases indispensable for national security or national defense purposes; and acquisitions from federal prison industries or nonprofit agencies employing people who are blind or severely disabled  If the contracting officer determines that a trade agreement applies to a particular acquisition, which waives the Buy American restrictions, that determination does not require additional review at a higher level  This is similar to other circumstances where Buy American Act restrictions do not apply, such as for the acquisition of products for use outside the United States or contracts valued below the micro-purchase threshold  The Buy American Act’s applicability is based on the country of origin of the product being supplied, rather than the country of the vendor offering the product to the government  Vendors who propose to do business with the U S  government are required to certify as to where their products are manufactured or produced—whether in the United States or in a designated country covered by the Trade Agreements Act  Vendors can provide an annual certification applicable to all of their contracts through the federal government’s contractor registry, known as the System for Award Management (SAM)  Through SAM, a vendor identifies the country of origin for foreign products associated with a broad category of products  For example, a vendor could state that it provides aircraft components that originate in France and Mexico  Vendors also have the option not to certify the origin of their products in SAM, but instead provide information about foreign end products in their individual offers for contracts  Contracting officials include the relevant clauses in solicitations and contracts in accordance with regulation to require vendor certification  For example, the clause at FAR 52 225-2, Buy American Certificate, requires the offeror to certify that each end product is a domestic end product, or list any foreign end products and their country of origin  Once a contract is awarded, the awarding agency must enter certain information into FPDS-NG, a government-wide database for contract awards and obligations  The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) within the Office of Management and Budget provides the overall direction for FPDS-NG, which is managed by the General Services Administration  FPDS-NG data can be populated through the individual systems agencies use to develop contracts  Agencies are responsible for the quality of the information transmitted to FPDS-NG, including data captured on the contract value and whether the foreign product acquisition is authorized by one of the Buy American Act exceptions or a trade agreement  This information is recorded at the contract level, or at the delivery order level for orders from indefinite delivery contracts  For certain product categories—essentially those that represent end products—FPDS-NG requires that contracting staff enter information in the “Place of Manufacture” drop-down data field, as shown in Figure 1  This field must be populated for all reported manufactured end products, including those valued under the micro-purchase threshold, which at the time of our review was generally $3,500  Options in this field include indicating that the product is made in the United States, or that it is made outside the United States and qualifies under one of the Buy American Act exceptions, or that it is subject to the requirements of a trade agreement instead of the Buy American Act requirements  In 2018, FPDS-NG data on agencies’ historical reporting of the use of Buy American exceptions were added to the website on which agencies post contracting opportunities (www fbo gov)  According to OFPP, this allows vendors selling domestic products to more easily see how agencies acquire foreign goods pursuant to Buy American Act exceptions  In fiscal year 2017, the federal government obligated approximately $7 8 billion for the acquisition of foreign end products, which accounts for less than 5 percent of total federal contract obligations for end products in that year  We observed differences in how civilian agencies and DOD apply Buy American Act exceptions and waivers  In our review of 38 contracts and orders from four agencies—DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA—we found 6 instances where the place of manufacture information was misreported in FPDS-NG  We further identified system limitations in how FPDS-NG captures information  Based on our analysis of FPDS-NG data, almost 40 percent of federal contract obligations in fiscal year 2017—totaling approximately $196 billion—were for domestic and foreign end products, such as aircraft parts, that may be subject to the Buy American Act  Less than 5 percent of these obligations—approximately $7 8 billion—were reported as foreign end products  This is consistent with the information agencies reported in FPDS-NG in the previous 4 years, with foreign end products accounting for approximately 3 to 8 percent of goods subject to Buy American Act restrictions between fiscal years 2013 through 2016  The foreign end products in fiscal year 2017 primarily came from South Korea, the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Canada, Mexico, and the United Arab Emirates, which together accounted for almost half of the total foreign end products reported  Appendix III shows the federal government’s obligations for foreign end products from various countries for fiscal year 2017  The procurement of foreign end products is permitted by the flexibilities available under the Buy American Act’s exceptions and waivers  Agencies also procured foreign end products through means separate from the exceptions allowed under the Buy American Act, primarily in cases where the Act would not apply  Agencies reported obligating more than $700 million to procure foreign end products by applying one of the five government-wide Buy American Act exceptions—such as domestic non-availability or unreasonable cost—in FPDS-NG for fiscal year 2017  Agencies reported obligating approximately $550 million to procure foreign end products as permitted by the Trade Agreements Act, which waives the Buy American Act’s domestic preference requirements for US trading partners when eligible products are covered by trade agreements and are above certain dollar thresholds  DOD also obligated nearly $2 9 billion to procure foreign products from countries with which it has reciprocal procurement agreements, using what is referred to as the DOD qualifying country exception  This is an exercise of the authority available to agencies under the Buy American Act’s public interest exception  DOD determined that it is not in the public interest to restrict the purchase of foreign end products from 27 countries  All but two of these qualifying countries are also US trading partners, so some of these awards for eligible products may be authorized by a trade agreement  However, the qualifying country exception allows DOD to procure foreign end products without regard to dollar thresholds or other trade agreement eligibility limitations  Agencies also procured foreign end products, such as fuel, to be used outside the United States, in which circumstance the Buy American Act’s requirements do not apply  For fiscal year 2017, these obligations accounted for almost $3 7 billion—about 47 percent of all dollars obligated for foreign end products, as reported in FPDS-NG  Figure 2 highlights fiscal year 2017 obligations, including agencies’ reported spending on foreign end products under the Buy American Act exceptions and other means  DOD accounted for more than 80 percent—roughly $6 4 billion—of the total obligations for foreign end products in fiscal year 2017  Almost all of DOD purchases were either for use outside of the United States, so were not subject to Buy American Act restrictions, or were reported under the public interest exception for DOD qualifying countries  In contrast, civilian agencies report a more varied mix of the exceptions and waivers of the Buy American Act  The civilian agencies—which are unable to apply DOD’s qualifying country exception—were more likely to report buying foreign end products based on trade agreements or another exception to the Buy American Act requirements  Figure 3 shows how DOD and the civilian agencies acquired foreign end products authorized by the various exceptions and waivers of the Buy American Act  From our review of FPDS-NG data, the civilian agencies are more likely to cite one of the five Buy American Act exceptions or a trade agreement waiver when buying foreign end products, and thus take corresponding actions to document or approve the authority cited  For example, in our review of contracts from four agencies, VA obligated $71,000 for medical imaging equipment from Canada, and had to consider whether a trade agreement waiver applied  The manufacturer was determined to be the only source available and the contracting officer determined the acquisition was authorized by a Buy American exception based on domestic non-availability, which can require additional review  In contrast, DOD may make a similar contract award for equipment from Canada based on the qualifying countries exception  DOD acquisitions, then, may be authorized by exceptions such as domestic non-availability when a required item does not come from a qualifying country  For example, we reviewed a $744,000 DOD award for vehicle equipment that was only available from South Africa—which is not one of the DOD qualifying countries and not covered by any of the trade agreements—so the acquisition was authorized by the domestic non-availability exception  In addition, the civilian agencies also reported buying foreign end products for use outside the United States but to a lesser extent than DOD  For example, this included one of the contracts we reviewed, an HHS award for Ebola vaccines manufactured in the Netherlands, with $44 7 million obligated in fiscal year 2017  This contract was reported as used outside the United States because it is primarily stored overseas  FPDS-NG is the primary means for capturing procurement data regarding the Buy American Act, but we found that agencies may not always input reliable information on the extent to which exceptions or waivers authorized the acquisition of foreign end products  In addition, some aspects of how FPDS-NG is structured could lead to additional data reporting errors  In the non-generalizable sample of 38 contracts and orders we examined from DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA, we found 6 awards where information related to the Buy American Act was incorrectly reported in FPDS-NG  In three of the six contracts, agencies recorded the wrong exception or waiver, most often because of an error when reporting the place of manufacture in FPDS-NG  For example, DOD reported a $22,000 contract for vehicle equipment from South Africa as a Buy American Act exception due to unreasonable cost  But the contract file indicated that the exception that applied was domestic non-availability  DOD officials acknowledged the error and corrected it in FPDS-NG during the course of our review  In the three remaining contracts, agencies misreported whether an end product came from the United States or another country  For example, DHS incorrectly recorded that an $18 million contract was for aircraft accessories and other parts manufactured in the United States, even though file documentation showed the contract was for Italian-produced spare parts from the original equipment manufacturer  The Italian- produced spare parts were available from existing inventory maintained by the manufacturer and were needed immediately to meet a mandatory operational requirement  Officials from DHS acknowledged the recording oversight, attributed it to a mistake when entering information in FPDS- NG, and have since corrected the error in response to our observation  Additionally, FPDS-NG has system limitations that could hinder complete and accurate reporting of Buy American Act information: DOD Qualifying Country Exceptions and Trade Agreement Waivers  FPDS-NG requires that information on the type of Buy American Act exception or waiver applied be provided when end products are reported as foreign  But FPDS-NG does not identify errors associated with this process  For example, we reviewed an $8 3 million DHS contract for engines manufactured in Germany that was recorded as a DOD qualifying country exception in FPDS-NG, although this exception is not available to civilian agencies  Contracting officials corrected the data in FPDS-NG during the course of our review  Further, FPDS-NG does not prevent agencies from reporting trade agreement waivers when the contracts are valued below applicable thresholds or waivers do not apply, such as for small business set asides  For example, in the fiscal year 2017 data we reviewed, more than 5 percent of contract obligations reported for trade agreement waivers were for awards set-aside for small businesses, which would not be eligible under the Trade Agreements Act  OFPP officials noted that because of the various dollar thresholds applicable to different trade agreements, adding automatic thresholds in FPDS-NG to guide contracting staff in reporting an applicable trade agreement could lead to additional data errors in the procurement database  Awards under the Micro-purchase Threshold  Although the Buy American Act requirements do not apply to contract awards valued below the micro-purchase threshold—generally $3,500 in fiscal year 2017—the FPDS-NG ‘Place of Manufacture’ field does not have an option to indicate whether a contract is under the threshold  Instead, contracting officers entering information for awards under the micro- purchase amount must still state whether the product is domestic or foreign  If the product is foreign, the officials must select a Buy American Act exception authorizing the purchase, even though no exception is needed at these dollar levels  As a result, when agencies report in FPDS-NG that a Buy American Act exception or waiver applied for a procurement valued at less than $3,500, that information would not be accurate  Based on our review, this may have involved about $16 million in fiscal year 2017 obligations  Awards for both Foreign and Domestic Products  When reporting data for contracts that include multiple end products from both the United States and a foreign country, FPDS-NG only allows for one country of origin to be identified  Contracting officers told us that they typically will report a foreign end product in FPDS-NG when the foreign products account for the preponderance of the contract value  Thus, in cases where a contract includes foreign end products that do not account for the preponderance of the contract’s value, the value of these foreign end products would not be reported in FPDS-NG  We have previously reported that FPDS-NG has similar limitations in other fields, such the type of product or service provided, which prevent contracting officers from identifying more than one condition  According to OFPP, a recent change in the FAR requiring contract reporting at the line item level should provide greater transparency of all products included in a contract  Buy American Act Exceptions and Waivers under Indefinite Delivery Contracts  The way FPDS-NG captures data for Buy American Act exceptions and waivers for some indefinite-delivery contracts results in inaccurate data reporting  When an indefinite- delivery contract is initially awarded, FPDS-NG functionality does not give contracting staff the option to enter information for the ‘Place of Manufacture’ field  Instead, this information is typically captured once an order is placed on the contract  In our review of FPDS-NG data across the four agencies, however, we found that in some cases obligations are reported on the initial indefinite delivery contract so the Buy American Act exceptions or waivers are not recorded  This occurred with multiple agencies, but particularly at HHS, where information for almost 28 percent of HHS obligations for end products in fiscal year 2017 was not captured in FPDS-NG because the obligations were reported in the system through the initial contracts rather than orders  As a result, the applicability of the Buy American Act for HHS contracts totaling almost $1 9 billion in fiscal year 2017 was unreported in FPDS-NG  DOD, DHS, and VA officials told us they identified FPDS-NG reporting as an area of concern  GAO Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government state that management should use quality information to support objectives, and that such data should be complete and accurate  In response to the 2017 Executive Order calling for federal agencies to assess their implementation of the Buy American Act requirement, OFPP officials told us they are identifying potential strategies for improving the information agencies submit to FPDS-NG  As OFPP weighs potential options for FPDS-NG reporting, implementing enhancements to reduce data entry errors and ensure that the data collected are complete and accurate would help enable the system to provide the most useful information possible  Ensuring information is correctly reported in FPDS- NG is critical because the data are used to inform procurement policy decisions and facilitate congressional oversight  The four agencies we reviewed—DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA—took different approaches to provide training and guidance for the Buy American Act requirements  Contracting officers faced challenges when procuring products subject to the Buy American Act  For example, we found instances in which contracting officers applied a waiver or exception to contracts where the waiver did not apply and did not have complete guidance for required determinations or reviews  There also were challenges in confirming product origin information when vendors did not provide consistent information  The four agencies we reviewed varied in the mix of training and guidance provided to aid contracting officers in implementing the requirements of the Buy American Act  Three of the four agencies—DOD, DHS and VA— supplemented the federal acquisition regulation, which implements the requirements of the Buy American Act and Trade Agreements Act, with their own acquisition regulations  In addition, DHS and DOD have recently updated existing training or added new training and guidance  VA issued policy memoranda in 2017, emphasizing the importance of meeting Buy American Act requirements, but has not added training or provided specific guidance  HHS does not provide department-level training or guidance related to the Buy American Act  Most of the DHS and DOD contracting officers we spoke to reported that they had attended training and several found the guidance provided by the training to be helpful  HHS and VA contracting officials described confusion due to the lack of resources available at their respective agencies  In 2017, in response to a series of recommendations from the DOD Inspector General to re-emphasize Buy American Act training and guidance, the Defense Acquisition University introduced an updated training course that specifically focuses on the requirements and implementation of the Buy American Act  While not mandatory, a June 2017 memo notified all DOD services and the defense agencies that members of their contracting workforce should complete this training as part of their professional development  At the current pace of enrollment, DOD officials anticipate approximately 18,000 people will have taken this course by the end of September 2018, which is a seven-fold increase over previous graduation rates  Incorporated into these trainings were supplemental on-the-job tools to assist contracting officers when awarding contracts for end products subject to the Buy American Act requirements  One such tool is a flowchart outlining applicable solicitation provisions or contract clauses based upon the awarded contract’s total dollar value  DOD contracting officials we interviewed from Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) Land and Maritime division had completed the agency-level Buy American Act training and said it served as a good refresher, with some noting that most of the training they had received on the subject came when they were first hired  DOD provides regulations and guidance on Buy American Act requirements through both the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and the accompanying Procedures, Guidance and Information  DOD contracting officers use the provisions and clauses in DFARS to address the public interest exception for DOD qualifying countries  In addition, as a part of the updated training, the Defense Pricing and Contracting Office developed two documents to provide additional Buy American Act guidance  One outlines a step-by-step approach contracting officers can follow to determine whether the Buy American Act applies to their particular procurement and, if so, whether the use of an exception or waiver is appropriate  The second assists contracting officers with evaluating all offers—foreign and domestic— when price is the determining factor  In addition, we found that DLA supplements the available Defense Acquisition University training and guidance with a robust level of support, including annual training and subject matter expertise  DLA contracting officers told us that while they found the updated training helpful, they also appreciated the training course internal to their agency, as it addresses the types of procurements they typically handle in their day-to- day work, such as buying spare parts  Further, DLA contracting officers noted that they use the job aid provided through the local training  DHS introduced training courses in 2017 that specifically focus on the requirements and implementation of the Buy American Act, including a mandatory training course for DHS contracting officers  DHS reported that 94 percent of contracting staff had taken the required course as of April 2018  DHS developed these courses in response to the 2017 Executive Order to ensure its staff was familiar with the Buy American Act requirements  Incorporated into these training courses are supplemental on-the-job tools to assist contracting officers when awarding contracts for end products subject to the Buy American Act requirements, such as a flowchart outlining applicable solicitation provisions or contract clauses based upon contract dollar value


Report 2:  Contracting officials generally view the training and tools they received as beneficial  For example, several DHS contracting officials we interviewed said that the agency’s new course provided a helpful review on the topic, while one contracting officer specifically noted that the course materials are useful to new staff, to help them understand the Act’s waivers and exceptions  DHS also revised its acquisition manual in December 2017 to add further detail regarding the Buy American Act requirements  Specifically, DHS updated its acquisition manual to provide contracting officers more explicit FPDS-NG reporting instructions for procurements subject to the Buy American Act, as well as discretion to purchase domestic end products at or below the micro-purchase threshold  Additional changes include increasing the documentation and level of managerial review required to use several of the exceptions to the Buy American Act  For example, prior to 2018—which includes the time period in which the DHS contracts and orders we reviewed were awarded—the head of individual contracting offices had the authority to approve domestic non-availability and unreasonable cost exceptions, with a notification made to the DHS Chief Procurement Officer  But under the new policy, the use of these exceptions must have the concurrence of the HCA—who is responsible for contracting activities within individual DHS components—and be approved by the department’s Chief Procurement Officer  Table 3 outlines these changes  In September 2017, VA issued guidance to reinforce existing Buy American Act requirements  The policy memorandum encourages the HCAs within VA to institute reviews of awarded contracts subject to the Buy American Act to ensure compliance  As of September 2018, policy officials did not know how many HCAs had taken this step  Further, the guidance emphasizes the importance of Buy American Act training for its acquisition workforce  VA policy officials explained that the Buy American Act is introduced in several VA training courses, but the agency does not have a specific course on implementing the Buy American Act requirements or provide additional instruction or tools  During the course of our review, VA officials said that some of the HCAs had added internal training on the Buy American Act  In addition, VA contracting staff has the option of taking training offered outside the agency, such as the updated Defense Acquisition University course on the Buy American Act  This training is not required  Contracting officials we spoke to at VA said they struggled with the details of awarding contracts subject to Buy American Act requirements because they are not provided sufficient agency-specific training and guidance on the topic  Moreover, several contracting staff noted an increased need for training due to recent changes in VA contracting practices  Specifically, in response to a 2016 Supreme Court decision, VA has increased contracting efforts with veteran-owned small businesses through the Veterans First Contracting Program  As a result, contracting officials explained they have reduced their use of schedule contracts, in which the determinations related to the Buy American Act requirements were made with the initial awards  As one contracting officer explained, prior to this change, more than 90 percent of her division’s procurements were through VA schedule contracts in which Buy American Act applicability had already been established  However, this shift in contracting practices means contracting officers will more frequently need to consider the applicability of the Buy American Act, but contracting officers have not received specific guidance or training to do so  Noting the significance of this change, one contracting officer stated she approached VA management to obtain Buy American Act training for her division, but such training was not available  Federal internal controls state that agencies should ensure that training is aimed at developing and retaining employee knowledge, skills, and abilities to meet changing organizational needs  In September 2018, we reported that VA was experiencing difficulties implementing multiple aspects of the Veterans First policy, and we recommended that VA provide more targeted implementation training  As VA moves forward to implement this training, incorporating the Buy American Act requirements will be important to provide greater assurance that staff has the knowledge and skills needed to navigate the changing procurement environment  HHS does not have agency-level Buy American training or guidance  The HHS Acquisition Regulation Supplement does not address foreign acquisitions  HHS officials told us that efforts to develop guidance that would address Buy American Act requirements are underway, but they do not know when they will be finalized and made available to contracting officers, and could not describe the extent to which they will address Buy American Act implementation  The HHS contracting officers we interviewed discussed informal Buy American Act training their divisions had developed because department-level training was not available  For example, at HHS’ National Institutes of Health, a contracting official told us about a training course she recently developed because her office was taking on the administration of additional contracts for which the Buy American Act requirements would apply  Contracting officers at HHS’ Office of Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority described informal training on the agency’s contract writing system— included as part of their weekly internal staff meetings—that provides additional guidance on how to appropriately complete certain data fields relevant to the Buy American Act  In our analysis of 38 contracts from across the four agencies, we found that agencies faced various levels of challenge in applying the Trade Agreements Act waivers and Buy American Act exceptions to acquire foreign end products  This was particularly apparent in cases where contracting officers had to determine if a trade agreement applied or cases which required a determination that a domestic end product was not sufficiently available, in accordance with the domestic non-availability exception to the Buy American Act requirements  Contracting staff also had difficulty determining the origin of products in light of incomplete or conflicting information  Of the six contracts we reviewed reporting that a trade agreement applied to the foreign end products purchased, we found two cases in which this waiver did not apply to the contracts in question  The value of the contract is one determining factor for whether a trade agreement waives the Buy American Act requirements, although the FAR also states additional factors that would affect applicability under a trade agreement  The two contracts we found, both from VA, had total dollar values at award— $8,435 and $11,950, respectively—that were less than any of the thresholds at which trade agreement waivers of the Buy American Act are applicable  Both contracts were for products from countries that are party to the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement, so the value of the acquisition would have to be equal to or exceed $191,000—the threshold that was in effect at the time of award—for waivers from Buy American requirements to apply  Contracting officials in both cases were generally unaware that the applicable threshold was not met, making the trade agreement waiver inapplicable  Although VA has added Buy American Act guidance since these contracts were awarded early in fiscal year 2017, the information currently available does not provide sufficient detail to assist contracting officers when awarding contracts in these situations  For example, the guidance VA provided contracting officers in September 2017 does not emphasize consideration of the applicable trade agreement thresholds or include information on how contracting officers should determine the applicable waiver or exception  When contracting officers procure foreign end products, the type of waiver or exception used to support the purchase matters—particularly when required additional steps and review are not completed because the wrong waiver or exception was applied  We found that the two VA contracts with foreign end products were incorrectly reported as the Trade Agreements Act waiver having applied  If one of the other Buy American Act exceptions permitting purchases of foreign end products had applied, contracting officers may have been required to obtain higher-level review or complete a written determination  In addition, we reviewed contracts that show some of the complexities contracting officers face beyond applying the dollar thresholds when determining if an award for foreign end products is eligible under the Trade Agreements Act waiver of the Buy American Act  Specifically, we found instances where DHS contracting officials took different approaches for non-competed awards for similar foreign-manufactured products  For example, we reviewed a non-competed $58 million DHS award for acquiring spare aircraft parts from an original equipment manufacturer located in a foreign country that is party to the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement  DHS reported in FPDS-NG that the procurement was waived by the Trade Agreements Act  However, we also reviewed two other sole-source awards from DHS for similar products—spare aircraft parts from two separate manufacturers in foreign countries that are also party to the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement—that were instead reported as subject to the Buy American Act, but excepted due to the non-availability of domestic products  Contracting officers may come to different conclusions for similar products, in part, because of the multiple factors that have to be considered when determining whether an acquisition is subject to the Buy American Act and whether any waivers or exceptions apply  However, available guidance does not always address these complexities  For example, agencies need to decide if other conditions, such as the procurement of products deemed indispensable for national security or national defense purposes apply to an acquisition that would make a trade agreement inapplicable  Further, if the product’s country of origin is considered a designated country under the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement, officials need to determine that the product is eligible under that agreement  DHS updated its training and guidance for the Buy American Act, which includes a job aid outlining at what dollar values solicitation provisions and contract clauses under a trade agreement waiver are applicable  However, it does not address other situations in which contracts may not be eligible under the Trade Agreements Act, such as non-eligible products or products for national defense purposes  For the other agencies in our review, we found that DOD’s updated Buy American Act training and its acquisition supplement both address trade agreement eligibility, but HHS does not yet have Buy American guidance to address this topic  Federal internal control standards state that agencies should communicate quality information internally to achieve their objectives and that they should select the appropriate methods of communication  When written guidance is not available, agencies may miss opportunities to ensure appropriate steps are taken to meet Buy American Act requirements  Our review of 38 contracts also included 8 contracts for foreign end products pursuant to the domestic non-availability exception  In certain situations, such as when contracts are awarded without full and open competition, this exception requires an approved written determination  The FAR establishes requirements for domestic non-availability determinations, but agencies can delegate the level of review required or specify information to be included in the determination  Three of the agencies we reviewed—DOD, DHS, and VA—provide supplemental guidance on the process for making determinations, including who must make the determination when applying a domestic non-availability exception  However, DHS policy officials told us that when the agency uses the domestic non-availability exception for a sole-source acquisition, the written justification that the FAR requires for non- competed awards should suffice as the documentation to support the non-availability determination as well  The practice of using sole-source justifications to support Buy American determinations is not addressed in DHS guidance  According to DHS policy updated in 2018, determinations of domestic non-availability must be concurred with by the HCA and approved by the Chief Procurement Officer  Federal and DHS acquisition regulations, however, state that some justifications can be approved at a lower level  In the absence of further guidance, this difference in approval levels could result in inconsistent application within the department  In addition, as previously noted HHS does not yet have Buy American Act guidance so the department does not provide information on how to make determinations  According to federal internal control standards, agencies should communicate quality information internally to achieve their objectives and that they should select appropriate communication methods  When written guidance is not available, agencies may miss opportunities to ensure that contracting officers take the steps needed to meet requirements when applying a domestic non-availability exception  Knowing the country of origin of the products the federal government buys is necessary to implement the Buy American Act, but contracting officers do not always have access to accurate information on originating countries  The FAR and the DFARS provide various clauses which, when incorporated into contracts, require vendors to certify that the end products they provide to the government are domestic and, if necessary, declare the foreign countries from which they provide products  Vendors frequently certify this information through the System for Award Management (SAM), the government-wide system used to collect vendors’ annual representations and certifications  Contracting officers may rely on the information vendors provide about their product origins, but they are generally expected to take actions to verify incomplete or conflicting information when they have reason to believe that a vendor will be providing a non-compliant product  We found that SAM certifications and offers did not always include accurate information on end products from foreign countries  In 6 of the 38 contracts that we reviewed—from DHS, HHS, and VA—the vendors certified that they only provided domestic end products although the end products provided were foreign  In all of these cases, the contracting officers knew that the acquisitions included foreign end products  For example, we reviewed two DHS awards for spare aircraft parts from an Italian-based company, one of which was reported in FPDS-NG under the domestic non-availability exception to the Buy American Act, and the other which was incorrectly reported as being manufactured in the United States but has since been corrected  Contracting officials said they knew the parts were made in Italy based on extensive experience contracting with the company and, in part, because they had visited the production location  Contracting officials—including some at HHS and VA—said they use SAM as their primary source to determine whether the vendor is offering domestic end products  Others reported some awareness of the limitations of SAM certifications  At all four agencies, contracting officials emphasized that it is important to ask questions when end product origin information is not readily available—or if there is conflicting information—but agency guidance that we reviewed does not address this need or provide information on how to do so  Only the local training offered by DOD’s DLA addresses other sources of information, which officials said was helpful because it is specific to the industries with which they work  Instead, some officials described how they rely on their experience to know how to verify products’ origins but this can be problematic, particularly with newer staff  For example, in one contract we reviewed VA contracting officials acknowledged that a new contracting specialist at VA did not follow-up when the product origin certification was not provided and assumed all of the items procured were domestic  During the course of our review, the contracting specialist’s supervisor said that she contacted the vendor and learned that some of the items provided were in fact foreign end products  The foreign products were not considered to account for the preponderance of the contract so were not reported in FPDS-NG, but the contracting officer was acting with incomplete information at the time of award  Further, in 4 of the 38 contracts that we reviewed, it is not clear how contracting staff took steps to obtain product origin information in situations where it was not provided in SAM  In these cases—which include contracts for both domestic and foreign end products—the vendors had opted not to certify their product origins in SAM, but instead said that they would provide the information with their individual proposals  However, based on the information in the contract files, the proposals did not include this information  For example: Three of the contracts we reviewed from HHS—all reported as purchasing end items manufactured in the United States—did not certify product origin in SAM  The supervising contracting officer for two of the awards explained that his contracting staff regularly check the vendor’s written representations and certifications provided in the offer, because the SAM certifications are general and do not always apply to the specific equipment they buy  However, the three contract files we reviewed did not include manufacturing or origin information  The vendor for a DHS contract that was reported as manufactured in the United States did not certify this information in SAM  The contracting officer said that he checks SAM for product origin information, but in the documents we reviewed there is no evidence of the information in the contract file  Federal internal control standards state that agencies should communicate the necessary quality information needed to achieve the agency’s objectives, thereby enabling personnel to address risks  Providing guidance regarding the situations in which contracting officers should verify product origin information with vendors may help agencies better meet the requirements of the Buy American Act  Although purchases for foreign end products account for less than 5 percent of federal procurement spending in fiscal year 2017, it is important that these purchases be consistent with the domestic- purchasing restrictions in the Buy American Act  This requires that Buy American Act exceptions and trade agreement waivers be used only when applicable, and that agencies report accurate data on the extent to which they are used  However, data reporting errors by contracting staff and FPDS-NG limitations mean that data on the use of exceptions and waivers are not fully captured  The federal agencies all have responsibilities to ensure Buy American Act data are accurate and complete  The lack of good data can hinder congressional oversight of the extent to which foreign end products are procured as authorized by one of the exceptions or waivers of the Buy American Act  Agencies have taken varied approaches for providing information to contracting officers that navigate the complexities and nuances associated with applying the different Buy American Act exceptions or trade agreement waivers  DOD has added such detailed information through its revised training course and policy guidance  Adding these types of targeted information to address challenging areas would help contracting officers at other agencies implement the Buy American Act’s domestic preferences, as well as related exceptions and waivers  Further, to accurately determine how exceptions and waivers apply requires complete product origin information  Although the responsibility to certify the origins of products supplied to the federal government rests with the contractors, contracting officers would benefit from resources that help them identify information that may be inconsistent, to ensure that accurate information is available  We are making four recommendations, one each to the Office of Management and Budget, DHS, VA, and HHS  The Director of the Office of Management and Budget should instruct the Office of Federal Procurement Policy: To facilitate additional training to improve the understanding of the contracting workforce regarding the Buy American Act requirements; and To facilitate clarifying revisions to FPDS-NG, where needed, and provide training and guidance for recording Buy American Act information in FPDS-NG to improve the accuracy of the Buy American data  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Homeland Security should clarify existing guidance in the Homeland Security Acquisition Manual or update training to help contracting officials: Identify the factors that should be considered in order to determine the applicability of the Trade Agreements Act and waiver of the Buy American Act; Document determinations of the use of Buy American exception for domestic non-availability and ensure the required approvals are obtained, particularly when such determinations are evidenced through justifications for other than full and open competition; and Identify sources of information available for determining product origin and the steps they should take to verify information that is inconsistent  (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should clarify existing guidance, or provide training or other instruction, to help contracting officials: Address the applicability of the Buy American Act requirements and provide instruction on how to implement the requirements, including in any training developed to implement the Veterans First policy; Identify the factors that should be considered in order to determine the applicability of the Trade Agreements Act and waiver of the Buy American Act; and Identify sources of information available for determining products’ origins and the steps they should take to verify information that is inconsistent  (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Health and Human Services should provide guidance, training, or other instruction to help contracting officials: Identify the factors that should be considered in order to determine the applicability of the Trade Agreements Act and waiver of the Buy American Act; Document determinations of the use of Buy American exceptions for domestic non-availability and ensure the required approvals are obtained; and Identify sources of information available for determining products’ origins and the steps they should take to verify information that is inconsistent  (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOD, HHS, DHS, VA, and the Office of Management and Budget for review and comment  DOD reviewed the report, but did not offer comments  HHS, DHS, and VA provided written responses, which are reproduced in Appendices IV, V, and VI of this report, respectively  A senior official within the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) at the Office of Management and Budget provided a response via email  In addition, HHS, DHS, and OFPP provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report where appropriate  In their responses, HHS, DHS, VA agreed, and OFPP generally agreed, with our findings and recommendations  The written response from HHS and DHS included information on the steps each agency plans to take to address the recommendations  Specifically, HHS stated that the agency will evaluate ways to provide additional training and guidance to contracting officials  DHS stated that it will provide guidance on the applicability of the Buy American Act and the Trade Agreements Act in certain situations and the documentation and approvals required when awarding non-competed contracts that require an exception  Additionally, DHS plans to update training regarding actions contracting officers should take when there are discrepancies in product origin information  VA concurred with our three-part recommendation and described some of the actions the agency plans to take in response  However, VA’s comments do not fully address our recommendation  Specifically, we recommended that VA clarify guidance or provide training to identify factors that could help contracting officers determine the applicability of Trade Agreements Act waivers of the Buy American Act  The comments from VA, however, only restate the existing Buy American Act exceptions and make no mention of Trade Agreements Act waivers  Further, we recommended that VA identify sources of information regarding product origin and the steps to be taken to verify inconsistent product origin information  VA’s response only noted that contracting officers are responsible for conducting market research and ensuring that all product origin requirements are met  VA did not outline any additional steps the agency would take to help contracting officers navigate the complexities inherent in this area  Going forward, VA will need to develop a more robust and responsive approach in order to fully implement our recommendation  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or woodsw@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII  The objectives of this report are to assess the extent to which (1) the federal government procures foreign products through Buy American Act exceptions and waivers; and (2) selected agencies provide training and guidance to implement the Buy American Act requirements  To address both of these objectives, we reviewed relevant laws and policies, such as sections of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR); the Buy American Act as amended; the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 as amended; federal acquisition regulation supplements from audited agencies such as the Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS); the Executive Order “Buy American, Hire American” of 2017; the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement; and memorandums, policy, guidance, and instructions related to the Buy American Act  To assess the federal government procurement of foreign products, including those procured through citing exceptions and waivers of the Buy American Act, we analyzed data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) for fiscal year 2017, which was the most recent and complete data available at the time of our review  We analyzed procurement data in FPDS-NG across the federal government in fields relevant to the Buy American Act’s domestic preference requirements, including the product service code, country of product origin, and place of manufacture, in addition to fields such as the contract value and dollars obligated  We reviewed the place of manufacture field in particular as it contains information on how the Buy American Act applies to the contract, including whether the preponderance of the obligations is for manufactured end products and, if so, whether they are manufactured in or outside of the United States  When manufactured outside of the United States, this field also captures the reason the purchase was permissible, which we analyzed to assess the dollar obligations associated with the various Buy American exceptions or trade agreement waiver reported, as well as when products were used outside of the United States  We also analyzed data from FPDS-NG to identify the countries where foreign end products were reported to be manufactured and the associated dollars obligated in fiscal year 2017  In addition, we met with officials from the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal Procurement Policy to better understand ongoing reviews of the data in FPDS-NG that pertains to the Buy American Act  In our analysis of FPDS-NG data, we took steps to minimize issues that might affect data reliability  Specifically, we analyzed FPDS-NG data to identify potential errors and inconsistencies, such as non-eligible agencies reporting the use of exceptions for DOD qualifying countries, or reporting trade agreement waivers for contracts valued less than minimum thresholds for trade agreements  We made minor adjustments to minimize potential data reporting issues, including aggregating the exceptions reported, and where appropriate, limiting our analysis to one year of data, fiscal year 2017  Based on these steps, we determined that FPDS-NG data were sufficiently reliable to allow us to calculate the approximate extent of obligations for foreign end products and the use of the Buy American Act exceptions and the Trade Agreements Act waiver  However, we are unable to precisely determine the amount spent on foreign end products through the use of exceptions and waivers because of the reporting errors and data system limitations we identified in this report  Using FPDS-ND data, we identified four agencies—the Departments of Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and Veterans Affairs (VA)—that had the highest fiscal year 2017 obligations in the product codes for manufactured products, which are potentially subject to the Buy American Act restrictions  In addition, to identify trends and determine if there were variations in reported obligations for foreign end products in the past, we reviewed FPDS-NG data on the Buy American exceptions and trade agreement waivers in fiscal years 2013 through 2017  To assess the extent to which selected agencies are providing training and guidance to implement the requirements of the Buy American Act, we reviewed training course materials and regulations, policies, and other guidance available at the four agencies in our review—DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA—to determine the extent to which they address the Buy American Act requirements  In addition, we reviewed training materials available to government employees through sources such as the Federal Acquisition Institute  We interviewed policy officials from the four agencies to understand how training and guidance had been implemented  We further reviewed relevant inspector general reports from the DOD Inspector General issued between 2015 and 2018, which made several recommendations to improve compliance with the Buy American Act, among other requirements  Within the four agencies, we selected contracting offices that reported obligating fiscal year 2017 dollars for awards with foreign end products and awards with US-manufactured end products  We specifically focused on offices that reported a sufficient amount of foreign end product obligations and a sufficient number of contract awards to allow us to select multiple contracts  We also considered offices with a variety of Buy American exceptions and waiver types reported, in order to select a mix of contracts  The contracting offices selected were as follows: DOD: Defense Logistics Agency, Land and Maritime HHS: National Institutes of Health and the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response DHS: United States Coast Guard VA: Veterans Health Administration From these offices, we selected a non-generalizable sample of 38 contracts and delivery orders awarded in fiscal year 2017  At each agency, we selected awards to include a mix of end items produced by domestic and foreign manufacturers and, when products were reported as foreign manufactured, a mix of the various exceptions and waivers cited  We also include awards across a range of value for dollars obligated above the micro purchase threshold—ranging from approximately $5,000 to more than $100 million—to ensure we reviewed awards both above and below the various thresholds at which the Trade Agreements Act waiver might apply  Additionally, our sample included awards for similar types of end products across agencies, including aircraft parts at DOD and DHS and medical supplies at HHS and VA, to compare practices in different agencies  We originally selected 40 awards for review—10 from each agency—but removed two awards from our sample  One was an HHS award that we determined was awarded using Other Transaction Authority and was not subject to the Buy American Act  The second excluded contract was from DHS, which was modified after award to reflect that it was an information technology service rather than a product  As a service, it would not be subject to the Buy American Act  We reviewed the contract files for each of the 38 awards in our sample, including documentation such as the contract and task order award, solicitations, vendors’ offers or response to proposals, determination and finding memos, and FPDS-NG output documents  In addition, we reviewed the certifications each vendor provided in the System for Award Management (SAM) at the time of contract award  We interviewed contracting officials responsible for each of the 38 contracts and task orders to understand how they addressed the Buy American Act requirements, including how they determined exception or waiver applicability and product origin  We also reviewed any agency-specific or local training and guidance, tools, or job aids available to assist contracting officers in implementing the Act’s requirements We conducted this performance audit from October 2017 to December 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on audit objectives  The United States maintains trade relationships with other countries whose specific negotiated terms results in different levels and types of applicability for waivers and exceptions to the Buy American Act  Figure 4 depicts the range of relationships that the United States maintains with other nations that allow for less restrictive purchasing of foreign end products by the federal government  The federal government purchases foreign end products from various countries  Figure 5 highlights the different amounts of contract obligations for foreign end products from these countries for fiscal year 2017  The highest category, over $500 million, includes 4 countries that account for almost 40 percent of all federal procurement of foreign end products  Countries where the federal government obligated less than $5 million for the procurement of foreign end products are not included  In addition to the contact named above, Candice Wright, Assistant Director; and Jennifer Dougherty, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this review  Skip McClinton; Erin Stockdale; Adam Cowles; Stephanie Gustafson; Julia Kennon; Anne Louise Taylor; and Robin Wilson made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: Congressional interest in small business access to capital has increased in recent years because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs. Some have argued that the federal government should provide additional resources to assist small businesses. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses and create jobs. Several laws were enacted during the 111th Congress to enhance small business access to capital. For example, P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the Small Business Administration (SBA) an additional $730 million, including funding to temporarily subsidize SBA fees and increase the 7(a) loan guaranty program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90%. P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF), in which $4.0 billion was issued, to encourage community banks with less than $10 billion in assets to increase their lending to small businesses. It also authorized a $1.5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide funding to participating states with small business capital access programs, numerous changes to the SBA's loan guaranty and contracting programs, funding to continue the SBA's fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through December 31, 2010, and about $12 billion in tax relief for small businesses. P.L. 111-322, the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, authorized the SBA to continue its fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until available funding was exhausted, which occurred on January 3, 2011. This report focuses on the SBLF. It opens with a discussion of the supply and demand for small business loans. The SBLF's advocates claimed the SBLF was needed to enhance the supply of small business loans. The report then examines other arguments presented both for and against the program. Advocates argued that the SBLF would increase lending to small businesses and, in turn, create jobs. Opponents contended that the SBLF could lose money, lacked sufficient oversight provisions, did not require lenders to increase their lending to small businesses, could serve as a vehicle for Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients to effectively refinance their TARP loans on more favorable terms with little or no resulting benefit for small businesses, and could encourage a failing lender to make even riskier loans to avoid higher dividend payments. The report concludes with an examination of the program's implementation and a discussion of bills introduced to amend the SBLF. For example, during the 112th Congress, S. 681, the Greater Accountability in the Lending Fund Act of 2011, would have limited the program's authority to 15 years from enactment and prohibited TARP recipients from participating in the program. H.R. 2807, the Small Business Leg-Up Act of 2011, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund "to increase the availability of credit for small businesses." H.R. 3147, the Small Business Lending Extension Act, would have extended the Department of the Treasury's investment authority from one year to two years. During the 113th Congress, H.R. 2474, the Community Lending and Small Business Jobs Act of 2013, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Congressional interest in small business access to capital has increased in recent years because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs  Small businesses have played an important role in net job growth during previous economic recoveries, particularly in the construction, housing, and retail sectors  For example, after the eight-month recession that began in July 1990 and ended in March 1991, small businesses (defined for this purpose as having fewer than 500 employees) increased their net employment in the first year after the recession, whereas larger businesses continued to experience declines in employment  During the most recent recession (December 2007-June 2009), small businesses accounted for almost 60% of net job losses  From the end of the recession through the end of FY2012, small businesses accounted for about 63% of net new jobs, close to their historical average share of net new job creation  Since then, small businesses have added about 65% of net new jobs  Some have argued that the federal government should provide additional resources to assist small businesses  Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit  They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses and create jobs  Several laws were enacted during the 111 th Congress to enhance small business access to capital  For example, P L  111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the Small Business Administration (SBA) an additional $730 million, including $375 million to temporarily subsidize SBA fees and increase the 7(a) loan guaranty program's maximum loan guaranty percentage from 85% on loans of $150,000 or less and 75% on loans exceeding $150,000 to 90% for all regular 7(a) loans  P L  111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) ($4 0 billion was issued) to encourage community banks with less than $10 billion in assets to increase their lending to small businesses  It also authorized a $1 5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide funding to participating states with small business capital access programs, numerous changes to the SBA's loan guaranty and contracting programs, funding to continue the SBA's fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through December 31, 2010, and about $12 billion in tax relief for small businesses  P L  111-322 , the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, authorized the SBA to continue its fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until available funding was exhausted, which occurred on January 3, 2011  According to the SBA, the temporary fee subsidies and 90% maximum loan guaranty for the 7(a) program "engineered a significant turnaround in SBA lending     The end result is that the agency helped put more than $42 billion in the hands of small businesses through the Recovery Act and Jobs Act combined " This report focuses on the SBLF  It begins with a discussion of the supply and demand for small business loans  The SBLF's advocates argued that the fund was an important part of a larger effort to enhance the supply of small business loans  After describing the program's structure, the report then examines other arguments that were presented both for and against the program's enactment  Advocates claimed the SBLF would increase lending to small businesses and, in turn, create jobs  Opponents contended that the SBLF could lose money, lacked sufficient oversight provisions, did not require lenders to increase their lending to small businesses, could serve as a vehicle for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients to effectively refinance their TARP loans on more favorable terms with little or no resulting benefit for small businesses, and could encourage a failing lender to make even riskier loans to avoid higher dividend payments  The report concludes with an examination of the SBLF's implementation by the Department of the Treasury and a discussion of bills introduced during recent Congresses to amend the SBLF  For example, during the 112 th Congress, S  681 , the Greater Accountability in the Lending Fund Act of 2011, would have, among other provisions, limited the program's authority to 15 years from enactment and prohibited TARP recipients from participating in the program  H R  2807 , the Small Business Leg-Up Act of 2011, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF when its investment authority expired on September 27, 2011, to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund "to continue the program of making capital investments in eligible community development financial institutions in order to increase the availability of credit for small businesses " H R  3147 , the Small Business Lending Extension Act, would have, among other provisions, extended the Department of the Treasury's investment authority from one year following the date of enactment to two years  During the 113 th Congress, H R  2474 , the Community Lending and Small Business Jobs Act of 2013, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund  Each quarter, the Federal Reserve Board surveys senior loan officers concerning their bank's lending practices  The survey includes questions about both the supply and demand for small business loans  For example, the survey includes a question concerning their bank's credit standards for small business loans: "Over the past three months, how have your bank's credit standards for approving applications for C&I [commercial and industrial] loans or credit lines—other than those to be used to finance mergers and acquisitions—for small firms (defined as having annual sales of less than $50 million) changed?" The senior loan officers are asked to indicate if their bank's credit standards have "Tightened considerably," "Tightened somewhat," "Remained basically unchanged," "Eased somewhat," or "Eased considerably " Subtracting the percentage of respondents reporting "Eased somewhat" and "Eased considerably" from the percentage of respondents reporting "Tightened considerably" and "Tightened somewhat" provides an indication of the market's supply of small business loans  As shown in Figure 1 , senior loan officers reported that they generally tightened small business loan credit standards from 2007 through late 2009  Since 2009, small business credit markets have generally improved, with some tightening in 2016 and the end of 2018  The survey also includes a question concerning the demand for small business loans: "Apart from normal seasonal variation, how has demand for C&I loans changed over the past three months for small firms (annual sales of less than $50 million)?" Senior loan officers are asked to indicate if demand was "Substantially stronger," "Moderately stronger," "About the same," "Moderately weaker," or "Substantially weaker " Subtracting the percentage of respondents reporting "Moderately weaker" and "Substantially weaker" from the percentage of respondents reporting "Substantially stronger" and "Moderately stronger" provides an indication of the market's demand for small business loans  As shown in Figure 1 , senior loan officers reported that the demand for small business loans declined somewhat in 2007 and 2008, and declined significantly in 2009  Demand then leveled off (at a relatively reduced level) during 2010, increased somewhat during the first half of 2011, declined during the latter half of 2011, generally increased from 2012 through 2015, and has varied somewhat, increasing in some quarters and declining in others, since then  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has maintained comparable small business lending data for the second quarter (June 30) of each year since 2002  Figure 2 shows the amount of outstanding small business loans (defined by the FDIC as commercial and industrial loans of $1 million or less) for nonagricultural purposes as of June 30 of each year from 2006 to 2018  As shown in Figure 2 , the amount of outstanding small business loans for nonagricultural purposes increased at a relatively steady pace from June 30, 2006, to June 30, 2008, declined over the next several years, and has increased each year since June 30, 2013  Although changes in small business outstanding debt are not necessarily a result of changes in the supply of small business loans, many, including the SBA, view a decline in small business outstanding debt as a signal that small businesses might be experiencing difficulty accessing sufficient capital to enable them to lead job growth  According to an SBA-sponsored study of small business lending, several factors contributed to the decline in small business lending from 2007 to 2010  The report's authors noted that the 30% decline in home prices from their peak in 2006 to 2010 diminished the value of collateral for many small business borrowers, some of whom had relied on home equity loans to finance their small businesses during the real estate boom  The authors concluded that the absence of this additional source of collateral may have contributed to a decline in lending to small businesses  They also argued that many small businesses found it increasingly difficult to renew existing lines of credit as lenders became more cautious as a result of slow economic growth and an increasing risk of loan defaults, especially among small business start-ups, which are generally considered among the most risky investments  The authors argued that in this newly regulated market, smaller lenders are likely to be less profitable because they have fewer sales of products and services to spread out over the higher auditing and FDIC costs  Hence, they have less money to lend to small businesses and others; and the relative difficulty in assessing creditworthiness due to the lack of information about potential financial performance is very high in small business lending, especially in financial markets driven by factor—rather than relationship—lending  Therefore, one would expect the small business loan market to recover more slowly than other financial markets  The authors also noted that FDIC data indicated that small business lending had not only declined in absolute terms (the total amount of dollars borrowed and the total number of small business loans issued), but in relative terms as well (the market share of business loans): Over the eight years from 2003 through 2010, small business loans as a share of total business loans declined by more than 12 percentage points, from 81 7% in 2003 to 68 9% in 2010  Perhaps of most concern is the further decline in the ratios of small business loans to total assets and small business loans to total business loans  Small business loans constituted about 16 8% of total assets in 2005, but only 15 3% in 2010; hence, small business lending is becoming less significant for these lenders  Small business lending is also losing market share in the business loan market  In the eight-year period from 2003 to 2010, small business loans as a share of total business loans declined more than 10 percentage points from 81 7% in 2003 to 68 9% in 2010  According to the previously mentioned SBA-sponsored study of small business lending, the demand for small business loans fell during the recession primarily because many small businesses experienced a decline in sales and many small business owners had a heightened level of uncertainty concerning future sales  The study's authors argued that given small business owners' lack of confidence in the demand for their goods and services, many small business owners decided to save capital instead of hiring additional employees and borrowing capital to invest in business expansions and inventory  The responses of small business owners to a monthly survey by the National Federation of Independent Business Research Foundation (NFIB) concerning small business owners' views of the economy support the argument that declining sales contributed to the reduced demand for small business loans  From 2008 through 2011, small business owners responding to the NFIB surveys identified poor sales as their number-one problem  Prior to 2008, taxes had been reported as their number-one problem in nearly every survey since the monthly surveys began in 1986  Also, employment data suggest that small businesses were particularly hard hit by the recession  As mentioned previously, small businesses accounted for almost 60% of the net job losses during the December 2007-June 2009 recession  According to testimony by the Secretary of the Treasury before the House Small Business Committee on June 22, 2011, small businesses were especially hard hit by the recession because [s]mall businesses are concentrated in sectors that were especially hard hit by the recession and the bursting of the housing bubble: construction and real estate  More than one-third of all construction workers are employed by firms with less than 20 workers, and an additional third are employed by businesses with fewer than 100 employees  Just over half of those employed in the real estate, rental, and leasing sectors work for businesses with less than 100 workers on their payrolls  More broadly, the rate of job losses was almost twice as high in small businesses as it was in larger firms during the depths of the crisis  During the 111 th Congress, legislation designed to increase both the supply and demand for small business loans was adopted  For example, Congress provided more than $1 1 billion to temporarily subsidize fees for the SBA's 7(a) and 504/Certified Development Company (504/CDC) loan guaranty programs and to increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage from 85% on loans of $150,000 or less and 75% on loans exceeding $150,000 to 90% for all regular 7(a) loans (funding was exhausted on January 3, 2011)  The fee subsidies were designed to increase the demand for small business loans by reducing the cost of borrowing  The 90% loan guarantee was designed to increase the supply of small business loans by reducing the risk of lending  Congress also provided the SBA additional resources to expand its lending to small businesses  For example, ARRA included a $255 million temporary, two-year small business stabilization program to guarantee loans of $35,000 or less to small businesses for qualified debt consolidation, later named the America's Recovery Capital (ARC) Loan program (the program ceased issuing new loan guarantees on September 30, 2010); an additional $15 million for the SBA's surety bond program and a temporary increase in that program's maximum bond amount from $2 million to $5 million and up to $10 million under certain conditions (the higher maximum bond amounts ended on September 30, 2010); an additional $6 million for the SBA's Microloan program's lending program and an additional $24 million for the Microloan program's technical assistance program; and increased the funds ( leverage ) available to SBA-licensed Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) to no more than 300% of the company's private capital or $150 million, whichever is less  Several other programs were also enacted during the 111 th Congress to increase the supply of small business loans  For example, ARRA authorized the SBA to establish a temporary secondary market guarantee authority to provide a federal guarantee for pools of first lien 504/CDC program loans that are to be sold to third-party investors  ARRA also authorized the SBA to make below-market interest rate direct loans to SBA-designated "Systemically Important Secondary Market (SISM) Broker-Dealers" that would use the loan funds to purchase SBA-guaranteed loans from commercial lenders, assemble them into pools, and sell them to investors in the secondary loan market  P L  111-240 extended the SBA's secondary market guarantee authority from two years after the date of ARRA's enactment to two years after the date of the program's first sale of a pool of first lien position 504/CDC loans to a third-party investor (which took place on September 24, 2010)  The act also increased the loan guarantee limits for the SBA's 7(a) program from $2 million to $5 million, and for the 504/CDC program from $1 5 million to $5 million for "regular" borrowers, from $2 million to $5 million if the loan proceeds are directed toward one or more specified public policy goals, and from $4 million to $5 5 million for manufacturers  It also increased the SBA's Microloan program's loan limit for borrowers from $35,000 to $50,000 and for microlender intermediaries after their first year in the program from $3 5 million to $5 million  In addition, it temporarily increased for one year (through September 26, 2011) the SBA 7(a) Express Program's loan limit from $350,000 to $1 million  The act also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish the $30 billion SBLF and a $1 5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide funding to participating states with small business capital access programs  The SBLF was designed "to address the ongoing effects of the financial crisis on small businesses by providing temporary authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to make capital investments in eligible institutions in order to increase the availability of credit for small businesses " The SBLF's legislative history, including differences in the House- and Senate-passed versions of the program, appears in the Appendix   P L  111-240 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to make up to $30 billion in capital investments in eligible institutions with total assets equal to or less than $1 billion or $10 billion (as of the end of the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009)  The authority to make capital investments in eligible institutions was limited to one year after enactment  Eligible financial institutions with total assets equal to or less than $1 billion as of the end of the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009 could apply to receive a capital investment from the SBLF in an amount not exceeding 5% of risk-weighted assets, as reported in the FDIC call report immediately preceding the date of application  During the fourth quarter of 2009, 7,340 FDIC-insured lending institutions reported having assets amounting to less than $1 billion  Eligible financial institutions with total assets of $10 billion or less as of the end of the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009 could apply to receive a capital investment from the fund in an amount not exceeding 3% of risk-weighted assets, as reported in the FDIC call report immediately preceding the date of application  During the fourth quarter of 2009, 565 FDIC-insured lending institutions reported having assets of $1 billion to $10 billion  Risk-weighted assets are assets such as cash, loans, investments, and other financial institution assets that have different risks associated with them  FDIC regulations (12 C F R  §567 6) establish that cash and government bonds have a 0% risk-weighting; residential mortgage loans have a 50% risk-weighting; and other types of assets (such as small business loans) have a higher risk-weighting  Lending institutions on the FDIC problem bank list or institutions that have been removed from the FDIC problem bank list for less than 90 days are ineligible to participate in the program  A lending institution can refinance securities issued through the Treasury Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and the Community Development Capital Incentive (CDCI) program under TARP, but only if that institution had not missed more than one dividend payment due under those programs  Participating banks (C corporations and savings associations) are charged a dividend rate of no more than 5% per annum initially, with reduced rates available if the bank increases its small business lending by specified amounts  For example, during any calendar quarter in the initial two years of the capital investments under the program, the bank's dividend rate is lowered if it increases its small business lending, as reported in its FDIC call reports, compared with the average small business lending it made in the four previous quarters immediately preceding the law's enactment, minus some allowable adjustments  Table 1 shows the dividend rates associated with small business lending increases by C corporation banks and savings associations  Table 2 shows the dividend rates associated with small business lending increases by participating S corporation banks and mutual lending institutions  These rates are slightly higher than those for C corporation banks and savings associations "to reflect after-tax effective rates equivalent to the dividend rate paid by other classes of institutions participating in the Fund through the issuance of preferred stock " As will be discussed later, an S corporation does not pay federal taxes at the corporate level  Any business income or loss is "passed through" to shareholders who report it on their personal income tax returns  Community Development Financial Institutions (CFDIs) are provided funding for an initial eight years with an automatic rollover for two additional years at the issuer's option  On the 10 th anniversary of the investment date the issuer repays the principal amount, together with all accrued and unpaid interest  Additionally, the dividend rate is 2% per annum for the first eight years from the investment date (payable quarterly in arrears on January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1 of each year) and 9% thereafter  SBLF applicants are required to submit a small business lending plan to the appropriate federal banking agency and, for applicants that are state-chartered banks, to the appropriate state banking regulator  The plan must describe how the applicant's business strategy and operating goals will allow it to address the needs of small businesses in the areas it serves, as well as a plan to provide linguistically and culturally appropriate outreach, where appropriate  The plan is treated as confidential supervisory information  The Secretary of the Treasury is required to consult with the appropriate federal banking agency or, in the case of an eligible institution that is a nondepository community development financial institution, the Community Development Financial Institution Fund, before determining if the eligible institution may participate in the program  The act directed that all funds received by the Secretary of the Treasury in connection with purchases made by the SBLF, "including interest payments, dividend payments, and proceeds from the sale of any financial instrument, shall be paid into the general fund of the Treasury for reduction of the public debt " The SBLF's advocates argued that it would create jobs by encouraging lenders, especially those experiencing liquidity problems (access to cash and easily tradable assets), to increase their lending to small businesses  For example, the House report accompanying H R  5297 , the Small Business Lending Fund Act of 2010, argued that the SBLF was needed to enhance small business's access to capital, which, in turn, was necessary to enable those businesses to create jobs and assist in the economic recovery: There has been a dramatic decrease in the amount of bank lending in the past several quarters  On May 20, 2010, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) released its Quarterly Banking Profile for the first quarter of 2010  The report shows that commercial and industrial loans declined for the seventh straight quarter, down more than 17% from the year before  Many companies, particularly small businesses, claim that it is becoming harder to get new loans to keep their business operating and that banks are tightening requirements or cutting off existing lines of credit even when the businesses are up to date on their loan repayments  Treasury Secretary Timothy F  Geithner recently acknowledged the problem encountered by some banks, both healthy and troubled, which have been told to maintain capital levels in excess of those required to be considered well capitalized  Some banks say they have little choice but to scale back lending, even to creditworthy borrowers, and the most recent Federal Reserve data shows banks are continuing to tighten lending terms for small businesses  A dissenting view, endorsed by the House Committee on Financial Services' minority members, was included in the report  This view argued that the SBLF does not properly deal with the lack of financing for small businesses: Instead of addressing the problem by stimulating demand for credit by small businesses, H R  5297 injects capital into banks with no guarantees that they will actually lend  The bill allows a qualifying bank to obtain a capital infusion from the government without even requiring the bank to make a loan for two years  In fact, if a bank reduces or fails to increase lending to small business during those first two years, it would not face any penalty  It defies logic that the Majority would support a bill to increase lending that does not actually require increased lending  A more effective response to the challenges facing America's small businesses was offered by Representatives Biggert, Paulsen, Castle, Gerlach, and King, whose amendment would have extended a series of small business tax credits before implementing the Small Business Lending Fund  Advocates also argued that even if the SBLF were authorized "the program probably would not be fully operational for months; banks could shun the program for fear of being stigmatized by its association with TARP; and many banks would avoid taking on new liabilities when their existing assets are troubled " They contended that the bill did not provide sufficient oversight for effectively monitoring the program because the Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury, who was given that oversight responsibility under the bill, "might not be able to direct sufficient attention to this task given its other responsibilities " They argued that the Special Inspector General of TARP would be in a better position to provide effective oversight of the program  These, and other, arguments were presented during House floor debate on the bill  For example, Representative Melissa Bean advocated the bill's passage, arguing that the SBLF builds on the effective financial stabilization measures Congress has previously taken by establishing a new $30 billion small business loan fund to provide additional capital to community banks that increase lending to small businesses  This $30 billion investment on which the government will be collecting dividends and earning a profit per the CBO [Congressional Budget Office] estimates can be leveraged by banks into over $300 billion in new small business loans  This is an important investment by the Federal Government in our small business that brings tremendous returns  The terms of the capital provided to banks are performance based; the more a bank increases its small business lending, the lower the dividend rate is for the SBLF capital  If a bank decreases its small business lending, it will be penalized with higher dividend rates  This legislation includes strong safeguards to ensure that banks adequately utilize available funds to increase lending to small businesses, not for other lending or to improve their balance sheet  There will be oversight consistently throughout the program, plus it requires that the capital be invested only in strong financial institutions at little risk of default and the best positioned to increase small business lending  It's important for Americans to understand that although this fund has a maximum value of $30 billion, it is estimated to make a profit for taxpayers in the long run  And the money will ultimately go not to banks, but to the small businesses and their communities that they lend to  As our financial system stabilizes and our community banks recapitalize, these funds will be repaid to Treasury with full repayment required over the next 10 years  Representative Nydia Velázquez, then-chair of the House Committee on Small Business, added that the legislation had sufficient safeguards in place to ensure that the funds were targeted at small businesses: First, banks must apply to the Treasury to receive funds, with a detailed plan on how to increase small business lending at their institution  This language was included at my insistence that we need to make sure that small businesses will get the benefit of this legislation  Second, this capital, repayment of the government loans will be at a dividend rate starting at 5% per year  This rate will be lowered by 1% for every 2 5% increase in small business lending over 2009 levels  It can go as low as a total dividend rate of just 1% if the bank increases its business lending by 10% or more, incentivizing banks to do the right thing  To ensure that banks actually use the funding they receive, the rate will increase—and there are penalties—to 7% if the bank fails to increase its small business lending at their institution within 2 years  To ensure that all federal funds are paid back within 5 years, the dividend rate will increase to 9% for all banks, irrespective of their small business lending, after 4 1/2 years  Representative Velázquez added "let me just make it clear … CBO estimates that [the SBLF] will save taxpayers $1 billion over 10 years, as banks are expected to pay back this loan over 10 years, with interest " Representative Randy Neugebauer opposed the bill's adoption, arguing that the majority is repeating the same failed initiatives that have helped our national debt grow to $13 trillion in the past 2 years  This bill follows the model of the TARP program, minus [TARP's] stronger oversight, and it puts another $30 billion into banks in the hopes that lending to small businesses will increase  In the words of Neil Barofsky, the Special Inspector General who oversees the TARP, "In terms of its basic design," he says, "its participants, its application process, from an oversight perspective, the Small Business Lending Fund would essentially be an extension of the TARP's Capital Purchase Program " From the Congressional Oversight Panel for TARP, chaired by Elizabeth Warren, she says, "The SBLF's prospects are far from certain  The SBLF also raises questions about whether, in light of the Capital Purchase Program's poor performance in improving credit access, any capital infusion program can successfully jump-start small business lending " This bill allows for another $33 billion in spending that will be added to the government's credit card  The CBO tells us that the bank lending portion will ultimately cost taxpayers $3 4 billion when market risk is taken into account  The House passed H R  5297 by a vote of 241-182, on June 17, 2010  The arguments presented during House floor debate on H R  5297 were also presented during Senate consideration of the bill  Advocates argued that the SBLF would encourage higher levels of small business lending and jobs  For example, Senator Mary Landrieu argued on July 21, 2010, that the SBLF should be adopted because it "is not a government program for banks  It is a public-private partnership lending strategy for small business " She added that as chair of the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, she talked with her colleagues, including the SBLF's opponents, and revised the program to address their concerns  She also argued that the SBLF has hundreds of endorsements from independent banks, the community banks and almost every small business association in America … makes $1 billion [according to the CBO score] … is not direct lending from the federal government  It is not creating a new bureaucracy … [It is] voluntary … there are no onerous restrictions … The small business gets the loans  We create jobs  People are employed  The recession starts ending…  It has nothing to do with TARP money  It is not a TARP program  It is not a bank program  It doesn't have anything to do with banks except that we are working in partnership with banks to lend money to small businesses which are desperate for money  Opponents argued that the SBLF could lose money, lacked sufficient oversight provisions, did not require lenders to increase their lending to small businesses, could serve as a vehicle for TARP recipients to effectively refinance their TARP loans on more favorable terms with little or no resulting benefit for small businesses, and could encourage a failing lender to make even riskier loans to avoid higher dividend payments  In addition, there were disagreements over the number of amendments that could be offered by the minority, which led several Senators to oppose further consideration of the bill until that issue was resolved to their satisfaction  For example, on July 22, 2010, Senator Olympia Snowe argued that although "under a cash-based estimate, CBO listed the official score for the lending fund as raising $1 1 billion over 10 years," SBLF proponents "fail to mention" that when CBO scored the SBLF using an alternative methodology that adjusts for market risk, it estimated that the SBLF could cost $6 2 billion  Senator Snowe also argued that the bipartisan Congressional Oversight Panel for TARP stated in its May 2010 oversight report that the proposed SBLF "substantially resembles" the TARP and "is a bank-focused capital infusion program that is being contemplated despite little, if any, evidence that such programs increase lending " Senator Snowe noted that she regretted "that we are in a position where we have not been able to reach agreement allowing the minority to offer amendments, which is confounding and perplexing as well as disappointing " Senator Snowe later added that the SBLF's incentives to encourage lending to small businesses also "could encourage unnecessarily risky behavior by banks … to avoid paying higher interest rates " Opponents also questioned the SBLF's use of quarterly call report data as submitted by lenders to their appropriate banking regulator to determine what counts as a small business loan  Call report data denotes loans of $1 million or less as small business loans, regardless of the size of the business receiving the loan  As a result, the SBLF's opponents argued that "the data used to measure small business lending in the SBLF covers an entirely different set of small businesses than those that fall within the definition set out in the Small Business Act or used by the SBA " The Senate's version of H R  5297 was agreed to on September 16, 2010, by a vote of 68-38  The House agreed to the Senate-passed version of H R  5297 on September 23, 2010, by a vote of 237-187, and the bill, retitled the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, was signed into law by President Obama on September 27, 2010  On February 14, 2011, the Obama Administration issued its budget recommendation for FY2012  The budget anticipated that the SBLF would provide $17 399 billion in financings, well below its authorized amount of $30 billion  This was the first indication that the SBLF's implementation may not proceed as expected  The second indication that the program's implementation may not proceed as expected was an unanticipated delay in the writing of the program's regulations  The U S  Treasury was criticized by some for not implementing the program quickly enough  The first financing took place on June 21, 2011, about nine months after the program's enactment  The delay was largely due to the Treasury's need to finalize the SBLF's investment decision process with federal banking agencies and the need to create separate SBLF regulations for financial institutions established as C corporations, Subchapter S corporations, mutual lending institutions, and Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs)  A C corporation is a legal entity established under state law and includes shareholders, directors, and officers  The profit of a C corporation is taxed to the corporation when earned and then is taxed to the shareholders when distributed as dividends  The majority of insured depository institutions, bank holding companies, and savings and loan holding companies are C corporations  A Subchapter S c orporation refers to a section of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) that allows a corporation to pass corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits through to its shareholders for federal tax purposes  Shareholders of S corporations report the flow-through of income and losses on their personal tax returns and are assessed tax at their individual income tax rates  This allows S corporations to avoid double taxation on the corporate income  Mutual lending institutions , which include many thrifts, are owned by their depositors or policyholders  They have no stockholders  CDFIs are financial entities certified by the CDFI Fund in the U S  Department of the Treasury and provide capital and financial services to underserved communities  The establishment of separate regulations for each of these different types of financial institutions was largely related to issues involving whether the SBLF's financings would be counted by banking regulatory agencies as Tier 1 capital (core capital that is relatively liquid, such as common shareholders' equity, disclosed reserves, most retained earnings, and perpetual noncumulative preferred stocks) or as Tier 2 capital (supplementary capital that consists mainly of undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions, hybrid instruments, and subordinated term debt)  The treatment of the SBLF's financings was important given that banks must maintain a minimum total risk-based capital ratio of 8% (the ratio measures bank capital against assets, with asset values risk-weighted, or adjusted on a scale of riskiness) to be considered adequately capitalized by federal banking regulators  In addition, banks must maintain a minimum Tier 1 risk-based ratio to assets, typically 3% for banking institutions with the highest financial ratings and 4% for others  According to Treasury officials, under Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rules, S corporations can have only a single class of stock (common shares)  Consequently, these institutions cannot issue preferred stock to Treasury  As a result, Treasury had to consider purchasing subordinated debt from these institutions, which the banking regulatory agencies would likely designate as Tier 2 capital  Treasury officials believed that providing Tier 2 capital would probably result in fewer S corporation participants  Additionally, because mutual lending institutions do not issue stock, Treasury officials were unable to receive preferred stock as consideration for an investment in this type of institution  Therefore, Treasury had to consider purchasing subordinated debt from these institutions as well  Treasury completed its regulations for C corporation banks first  For C corporations, SBLF funds are treated as Tier I capital and the Treasury purchases senior perpetual noncumulative preferred stock (or an equivalent)  The stock pays a quarterly dividend on the first day of each quarter after closing of the SBLF capital program funding  Tier 1 capital is the core measure of a bank's financial strength from a regulator's point of view  It is composed of core capital, which consists primarily of common stock and disclosed reserves (or retained earnings) but may also include nonredeemable, noncumulative preferred stock  In contrast, S corporations and mutual lending institutions receive unsecured subordinated debentures from the Treasury, which are considered Tier 2 capital for regulatory capital requirements  The application deadline for C corporation banks was May 16, 2011  The application deadline for Subchapter S corporations and mutual lending institutions was June 6, 2011, and the application deadline for CDFIs was June 22, 2011  A total of 926 institutions applied for $11 8 billion in SBLF funding  Treasury approved more than $4 0 billion in SBLF financing to 332 lending institutions ($3 9 billion to 281 community banks and $104 million to 51 CDFIs)  SBLF recipients have offices located in 47 states and the District of Columbia  The average financing was $12 1 million, ranging from $42,000 to $141 0 million  Of the 332 lending institutions which received financing, 137 institutions had participated in TARP's Community Development Capital Initiative or its Capital Purchase Program  These institutions received nearly $2 7 billion in SBLF financing (66 8% of the total)  Treasury is required to publish monthly reports describing all transactions made under the SBLF program during the reporting period  It is also required to publish a semiannual report (each March and September) providing all projected costs and liabilities, operating expenses, and transactions made by the SBLF, including a list of all participating institutions and the amounts each institution has received under the program  Treasury must also publish a quarterly report describing how participating institutions have used the funds they have received  SBLF participants must submit an initial supplemental report to Treasury no later than five business days before closing  The report provides information from the institution's FDIC call reports or, for holding companies, from their subsidiaries' FDIC call reports, that Treasury uses to establish an initial baseline for measuring the SBLF participants' progress in making loans to small businesses  The initial baseline is the average amount of qualified small business lending that was outstanding for the four full quarters ending on June 30, 2010  It is derived by first adding the outstanding amount of lending reported for all commercial and industrial loans, owner-occupied nonfarm, nonresidential real estate loans, loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to farmers, and loans secured by farmland  Then, the outstanding amount of lending for large loans (defined as any loan or group of loans greater than $10 million), loans to large businesses (defined as businesses with annual revenues greater than $50 million), and the portion of any loans guaranteed by the U S  government or for which the risk is assumed by a third party is subtracted from that amount  The lending institution then adds back any cumulative charge-offs with respect to such loans since July 1, 2010  This last adjustment is done to prevent lending institutions from being penalized for appropriately charging off loans  Each SBLF participant's small business lending baseline is also adjusted to take into account any gains in qualified small business lending during the four baseline quarters resulting from mergers, acquisitions, and loan purchases  This adjustment is designed to ensure that dividend rate reductions provided to any SBLF participant correspond to additional lending to small businesses and not to the acquisition of existing loans  In addition, the cumulative baseline for all SBLF participants will decrease over time as SBLF participants repay their SBLF loans and exit the program  For example, the initial small business lending baseline for the 332 SBLF participants as of March 31, 2011, was $35 52 billion ($34 75 billion for 281 banks and $770 48 million for 51 CDFIs)  The small business lending baseline for the 50 institutions that continued to participate in the SBLF as of December 31, 2018, was $1 5 billion ($808 8 million for 7 banks and $714 5 million for 43 CDFIs)  Table 3 provides the number and type of SBLF participating institutions, the small business lending baseline, the amount of small business lending by participants, the change in small business lending by participants, and the change in small business lending by both current and former participants from 2011 to 2018  The number of SBLF participating institutions is declining as institutions repay their loans and exit the program  As Treasury anticipated, this decline has accelerated following the first quarter of 2016 because the dividend rates for C corporation banks and savings associations and for S corporation banks and mutual lending institutions were increased at that time (to 9% and 13 8%, respectively)  SBLF institutions are also required to submit quarterly supplemental reports, due in the calendar quarter following submission of the initial supplemental report and in each of the next nine quarters, to determine their dividend rate for the next quarter  Using information contained in the quarterly supplemental reports, Treasury announced in its April 2019 quarterly report on SBLF Participants' Small Business Lending Growth that, as of December 31, 2018 The 50 current SBLF participants (7 banks and 43 CDFIs) increased their small business lending by $1 347 billion over a $1 523 billion baseline  Since inception, the total increase in small business lending reported by both current and former SBLF participants is more than $19 1 billion over the baseline  All seven of the currently participating community banks and 39 of the 43 currently participating CDLFs increased their small business lending over baseline levels  Most current participants report that their small business lending increases have been substantial, with 43 of 50 current SBLF participants (86 0%) increasing small business lending by 10% or more  Treasury officials have praised the SBLF's performance  For example, on October 9, 2012, then-Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Neal Wolin announced that the SBLF quarterly use of funds report released that day "is further indication that the Administration's Small Business Lending Fund is continuing to help create an environment in which entrepreneurial small businesses can succeed and excel " He added that "banks in the SBLF program continue to show large increases in the lending available for small businesses to grow, create jobs, and support families in communities across the country " Some financial commentators have expressed a somewhat less sanguine view of the program's performance  For example, one commentator noted, after the release of the quarterly use of funds report in January 2012, that although the report of increased small business lending was positive news "it is difficult to isolate the proportion of new lending that would have occurred anyway" due to improvements in the economy  Another commentator noted that the data may have been skewed by SBLF participants who were entering the small business lending market for the first time, making the increases appear larger and more significant than they actually are; yet another noted that the reported growth in small business lending occurred over six quarters (since June 30, 2010) and that the results, although positive, are "not as impressive as it may seem " A commentator argued in September 2012 that "if the SBLF ends up being a success story, it will have been on a far smaller scale than either Obama or Congress had originally expected  What's more, it's become clear that even boatloads of financing won't change the fact that demand for the loans themselves has also fallen off, as small businesses themselves are reluctant to expand in a stagnant economy " In addition, on August 29, 2013, Treasury's Office of Inspector General (OIG) released an audit of Treasury's reporting of small business lending gains relative to small business lending levels prior to the lenders' participation in the program  The OIG found that "small business lending gains reported by Treasury are significantly overstated and cannot be linked directly to SBLF funding " Specifically, the OIG noted that "substantial amounts [$3 4 billion of the then reported $8 9 billion] of the reported gains occurred prior to participants receiving SBLF funding " As the OIG explained, the lending gains reported [by Treasury] were measured against the same baseline period that the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (the Act) instructs Treasury to use for setting dividend rates for repayment of the SBLF capital, which is the four calendar quarters [which] ended [on] June 30, 2010  However, measuring program performance against a baseline with a midpoint seven quarters prior to when most participants received funding inflates program accomplishments and is not responsive to provisions in the Act that direct Treasury to report on participant use of the SBLF funds received  The OIG also argued that the reported lending gains cannot be directly linked to the SBLF capital that Treasury invested in the financial institutions because the lending gains reported "represent all small business lending gains that institutions participating in the SBLF achieved, regardless of how the loans were funded " In addition, the OIG noted, among other findings, that "a relatively small number (35 or 11%) of SBLF participants accounted for half of small business lending increases between the baseline figure and December 31, 2012 " During the 112 th Congress, several bills were introduced to change the SBLF  None of the bills were enacted  For example, then-Senator Snowe introduced S  681 , the Greater Accountability in the Lending Fund Act of 2011, on March 30, 2011  Senator Snowe argued that While I would prefer to terminate this fund altogether, it is unlikely based on the current political environment, which is why we must work to protect taxpayers from some of its most egregious provisions  My goal with this legislation is to ensure that only healthy banks have access to taxpayer money, that they are required to repay loans within a reasonable period of time, and that small businesses find the affordable credit they need  The bill would have, among other things, required recipients to repay SBLF distributions within 10 years of the receipt of the investment; terminated the program no later than 15 years after the date of the bill's enactment; prohibited the Secretary of the Treasury from making capital investments under the program if the FDIC is appointed receiver of 5% or more of the institutions receiving an investment under the program; prohibited participation by any institution that received an investment under TARP (effective on the date of the bill's enactment); removed provisions allowing the Secretary of Treasury to make a capital investment in institutions that would otherwise not be recommended to receive the investment based on the institution's financial condition, but are able to provide a matching investment from private, nongovernmental investors; required the approval of appropriate financial regulators when determining whether an institution should receive a capital investment; and revised the benchmark against which changes in the amount of small business lending is measured from the four full quarters immediately preceding the date of enactment to calendar year 2007  In addition, H R  1387 , the Small Business Lending Fund Accountability Act of 2011, would have provided the Special Inspector General for TARP responsibility for providing oversight over the SBLF  S Amdt  279 to S  493 , the Small Business Innovation Research, Small Business Technology Transfer Reauthorization Act of 2011, would have prevented TARP recipients from using funds received in any form under any other federal assistance program, including the SBLF program  H R  2807 , the Small Business Leg-Up Act of 2011, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund beginning on the date when the Secretary of the Treasury's authority to make capital investments in eligible institutions expired (on September 27, 2011)  The bill's stated intent was "to increase the availability of credit for small businesses " H R  3147 , the Small Business Lending Extension Act, would have extended the Department of the Treasury's investment authority from one year following enactment to two years and required the Treasury Secretary to provide any institution not selected for participation in the program the reason for the rejection, ensure that the rejection reason remains confidential, and establish an appeal process that provides the institution an opportunity to contest the reason provided for the rejection of its application  During the 113 th Congress, H R  2474 , the Community Lending and Small Business Jobs Act of 2013, would have, among other provisions, transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund  The SBLF was enacted as part of a larger effort to enhance the supply of capital to small businesses  Advocates argued that the SBLF would help to address the decline in small business lending and create jobs  Opponents were not convinced that it would enhance small business lending and worried about the program's potential cost to the federal treasury and its similarities to TARP  Participating institutions are reporting they have increased their small business lending  However, as has been discussed, questions have been raised concerning the validity of these reported amounts  Specifically, as Treasury's OIG argued in its August 2013 audit, more than one-third of the reported lending gains at that time occurred prior to September 30, 2011, the quarter in which most SBLF participants received their SBLF funds; the reported small business lending gains reflect all of the small business lending gains that the participants achieved, regardless of how the loans were funded; and previous OIG audits "have shown that a large number of participants misreport their small business lending activity " In those previous audits, "50% or more of the institutions reviewed submitted erroneous lending data to Treasury, either overstating or understating their small business lending gains " In addition to questions related to the validity of the reported small business lending gains, any analysis of the program's influence on small business lending is likely to be more suggestive than definitive because differentiating the SBLF's effect on small business lending from other factors, such as changes in the lender's local economy, is methodologically challenging, especially given the relatively small amount of financing involved relative to the national market for small business loans  The SBLF's $4 0 billion in financing represents less than 0 7% of outstanding small business loans (as defined by the FDIC)  In terms of the concerns expressed about the program's potential cost, Treasury initially estimated in December 2010 that the SBLF could cost taxpayers up to $1 26 billion (excluding administrative costs that were initially estimated at about $26 million annually but actual outlays were $4 54 million in FY2014, $9 05 million in FY2015, $5 01 million in FY2016, and $3 4 million in FY2017)  Treasury based that estimate on an expectation that about $17 billion in SBLF financings would be disbursed  In October 2011, Treasury estimated the program's costs based on actual participant data  It estimated that the SBLF would generate a savings of $80 million (excluding administrative costs), with the savings coming primarily from a lower-than-expected financing level and, to a lesser extent, improvements in projected default rates "due to higher participant quality than expected" and lower market interest rates  Treasury issues a semiannual report on SBLF costs  In its latest semiannual cost report, released on August 16, 2018, Treasury estimated that the SBLF will "generate a lifetime positive return of $31 million [excluding administrative costs] for the Treasury General Fund " One issue that arose relative to the program's projected cost is the noncumulative treatment of dividends  Treasury's OIG reported in May 2011 that Under the terms set by legislation, dividend payments are non-cumulative, meaning that institutions are under no obligation to make dividend payments as scheduled or to pay off previously missed payments before exiting the program  This dividend treatment differs from the TARP programs, in which many dividend payments were cumulative  This change in dividend treatment was driven by changes in capital requirements mandated by the Collins Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act  The amendment equalizes the consolidated capital requirements for Tier 1 capital of bank holding companies by requiring that, at a minimum, regulators apply the same capital and risk standards for FDIC-insured banks to bank holding companies  Under TARP, the FRB [Federal Reserve Board] and FDIC treated capital differently at the holding company and depository institution levels  The FRB treated cumulative securities issued by holding companies as Tier 1 capital, while FDIC treated non-cumulative securities issued by depository institutions as Tier 1 capital  In order to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act requirement that securities purchased from holding companies receive the same capital treatment as those purchased from depository institutions, Treasury made the dividends under SBLF non-cumulative  Additionally, given that Tier 1 capital must be perpetual and cannot have a mandatory redemption date, the 10-year repayment period in the Small Business Jobs Act cannot be enforced  Treasury addressed this issue by placing the following additional requirements and restrictions on participants who miss dividend payments: the participant's CEO [Chief Executive Office] and CFO [Chief Financial Officer] must provide written notice regarding the rationale of the board of directors (BOD) for not declaring a dividend; no repurchases may be affected and no dividends may be declared on any securities for the applicable quarter and the following three quarters; after four missed payments (consecutive or not), the issuer's BOD must certify in writing that the issuer used best efforts to declare and pay dividends appropriately; after five missed payments (consecutive or not), Treasury may appoint a representative to serve as an observer on the issuer's BOD; and after six missed payments (consecutive or not), Treasury may elect two directors to the issuer's BOD if the liquidation preference is $25 million or more  Treasury's OIG agreed that Treasury's equity investment policy is consistent with the legislation and that "it has reasonably structured the program to incentivize payment of dividends " However, it recommended that "Congress consider whether an amendment to the Small Business Jobs Act and/or waiver from the Collins Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act is needed to make the repayment of dividends a requirement for exiting the program " In conclusion, congressional oversight of the SBLF is currently focused on the program's potential long-term costs and effects on small business lending  Underlying those concerns are fundamental disagreements regarding the best way to assist small businesses  Some advocate the provision of additional federal resources to assist small businesses in acquiring capital necessary to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs  Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit  They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses and create jobs  The SBLF's Legislative Origin On March 16, 2009, President Obama announced the first SBLF-like proposal  Under that proposal, the Department of the Treasury would have used TARP funds to purchase up to $15 billion of SBA-guaranteed loans  The purchases were intended to "immediately unfreeze the secondary market for SBA loans and increase the liquidity of community banks " The plan was dropped after it met resistance from lenders  Some lenders objected to TARP's requirement that participating lenders comply with executive compensation limits and issue warrants to the federal government  Smaller, community banks objected to the program's paperwork requirements, such as the provision of a small-business lending plan and quarterly reports  In his January 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama proposed the creation of a $30 billion SBLF to enhance access to credit for small businesses: When you talk to small business owners in places like Allentown, Pennsylvania, or Elyria, Ohio, you find out that even though banks on Wall Street are lending again, they're mostly lending to bigger companies  Financing remains difficult for small business owners across the country, even those that are making a profit  Tonight, I'm proposing that we take $30 billion of the money Wall Street banks have repaid and use it to help community banks give small businesses the credit they need to stay afloat  In response to the opposition community lenders had expressed concerning TARP's restrictions in 2009, the Obama Administration proposed that Congress approve legislation authorizing the transfer of up to $30 billion in TARP spending authority to the SBLF and statutorily establish the new program as distinct and independent from TARP and its restrictions  The Administration's legislative proposal was finalized and sent to Congress on May 7, 2010  Representative Barney Frank, then-chair of the House Committee on Financial Services, introduced H R  5297 , the Small Business Lending Fund Act of 2010, on May 13, 2010  The House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on H R  5297 on May 18, 2010, and passed the bill, as amended to include a State Small Business Credit Initiative, the following day  The House passed the bill, as amended to include a Small Business Early-Stage Investment Program, a Small Business Borrower Assistance Program, and some small business tax reduction provisions, on June 17, 2010  The House-Passed Version of the SBLF Title I of the House-passed version of H R  5297 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion SBLF "to address the ongoing effects of the financial crisis on small businesses by providing temporary authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to make capital investments in eligible institutions" with total assets equal to or less than $1 billion or $10 billion (as of the end of the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009) "in order to increase the availability of credit for small businesses " The authority to make capital investments in eligible institutions was limited to one year after enactment  Eligible financial institutions having total assets equal to or less than $1 billion as of the end of the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009 could apply to receive a capital investment from the SBLF in an amount not exceeding 5% of risk-weighted assets, as reported in the FDIC call report immediately preceding the date of application  During the fourth quarter of 2009, 7,340 FDIC-insured lending institutions reported having assets amounting to less than $1 billion  Eligible financial institutions having total assets equal to or less than $10 billion as of the end of the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009 could apply to receive a capital investment from the fund in an amount not exceeding 3% of risk-weighted assets, as reported in the FDIC call report immediately preceding the date of application  During the fourth quarter of 2009, 565 FDIC-insured lending institutions reported having assets of $1 billion to $10 billion  Risk-weighted assets are assets such as cash, loans, investments, and other financial institution assets that have different risks associated with them  FDIC regulations (12 C F R  §567 6) establish that cash and government bonds have a 0% risk-weighting; residential mortgage loans have a 50% risk-weighting; and other types of assets (such as small business loans) have a higher risk-weighting  Lending institutions on the FDIC problem bank list or institutions that have been removed from the FDIC problem bank list for less than 90 days were ineligible to participate in the program  Lending institutions could refinance securities issued through the Treasury Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and the Community Development Capital Incentive (CDCI) program under TARP, but only if the institution had not missed more than one dividend payment due under those programs  Participating banks would be charged a dividend rate of no more than 5% per annum initially, with reduced rates available if the bank increased its small business lending  For example, during any calendar quarter in the initial two years of the capital investments under the program, the bank's rate would be lowered if it had increased its small business lending compared to the average small business lending it made in the four previous quarters immediately preceding the enactment of the bill, minus some allowable adjustments  A 2 5% to less than 5% increase in small business lending would have lowered the rate to 4%, a 5% to less than 7 5% increase would have lowered the rate to 3%, a 7 5% to less than 10% increase would have lowered the rate to 2%, and an increase of 10% or greater would have lowered the rate to 1%  Table A-1 shows the dividend rates associated with small business lending increases for C corporation banks and savings institutions under H R  5297   These rates were subsequently included in the final law  The bill also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to adjust these dividend rates for S corporations "to take into account any differential tax treatment of securities issued by such eligible institution " Also, Community Development Financial Institutions were to be charged a dividend rate of 2% per annum for eight years, and 9% thereafter  SBLF applicants were also required to submit a small business lending plan to the appropriate federal banking agency and, for applicants that are state-chartered banks, to the appropriate state banking regulator  The plan was to describe how the applicant's business strategy and operating goals will allow it to address the needs of small businesses in the areas it serves, as well as a plan to provide linguistically and culturally appropriate outreach, where appropriate  The plan was to be treated as confidential supervisory information  The Secretary of the Treasury was required to consult with the appropriate federal banking agency or, in the case of an eligible institution that is a nondepository community development financial institution, the Community Development Financial Institution Fund, before determining if the eligible institution was to participate in the program  The bill specified that the SBLF would be "established as separate and distinct from the Troubled Asset Relief Program established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008  An institution shall not, by virtue of a capital investment under the Small Business Lending Fund Program, be considered a recipient of the Troubled Asset Relief Program " The bill also directed that all funds received by the Secretary of the Treasury in connection with purchases made by the SBLF, "including interest payments, dividend payments, and proceeds from the sale of any financial instrument, shall be paid into the general fund of the Treasury for reduction of the public debt " The Senate-Passed Version of the SBLF Title IV of the Senate-passed version of H R  5297 , which later became law, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion SBLF to make capital investments in eligible community banks with total assets equal to or less than $1 billion or $10 billion  There were several differences between the Senate-passed version of H R  5297 's SBLF provisions and the SBLF provisions in the House-passed version of H R  5297   Specifically, the House-passed version of H R  5297 indicated that eligible institutions may be insured depository institutions that are not controlled by a bank holding company or a savings and loan holding company that is also an eligible institution and is not directly or indirectly controlled by any company or other entity that has total consolidated assets of more than $10 billion, bank holding companies, savings and loan holding companies, community development financial institution loan funds, and small business lending companies, all with total assets of $10 billion or less (as of the end of 2009)  The Senate-passed version of H R  5297 did not provide eligibility to small business lending companies  House-passed version of H R  5297 defined small business lending "as small business lending as defined by and reported in an eligible institution's quarterly call report, where each loan comprising such lending is made to a small business and is one the following types: (1) commercial and industrial loans; (2) owner-occupied nonfarm, nonresidential real estate loans; (3) loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to farmers; (4) loans secured by farmland; (5) nonowner-occupied commercial real estate loans; and (6) construction, land development and other land loans " The Senate-passed version of H R  5297 's definition of small business lending did not include nonowner-occupied commercial real estate or construction, land development and other land loans  Senate-passed version of H R  5297 had an exclusion provision prohibiting recipient lending institutions from using the funds to issue loans that have an original amount greater than $10 million or that would be made to a business with more than $50 million in revenues  The House-passed version of H R  5297 did not contain this provision  House-passed version of H R  5297 indicated that the incentives received in the form of reduced dividend rates during the first 4 5-year period following the date on which an eligible institution received a capital investment under the program would be contingent on an increase in the number of loans made  If the number of loans made by the institution did not increase by 2 5% for each 2 5% increase of small business lending, then the rate at which dividends and interest would be payable during the following quarter on preferred stock or other financial instruments issued to the Treasury by the eligible institution would be (i) 5%, if this quarter is within the two-year period following the date on which the eligible institution received the capital investment under the program; or (ii) 7%, if the quarter is after the two-year period  The Senate-passed version of H R  5297 did not contain this legislative language  House-passed version of H R  5297 included an alternative computation provision that would have allowed eligible institutions to compute their small business lending amounts for incentive purposes as if the definition of their small business lending amounts did not require that the loans comprising such lending be made to small business  This alternative computation would have been allowed if the eligible institution certified that all lending included by the institution for purposes of computing the increase in lending was made to small businesses  The Senate-passed version of H R  5297 did not contain this provision  House-passed version of H R  5297 indicated that an eligible institution that is a community development loan fund may apply to receive a capital investment from the SBLF in an amount not exceeding 10% of total assets, as reported in the audited financial statements for the fiscal year of the eligible institution that ended in calendar year 2009  The Senate-passed version of H R  5297 specifies 5%  House-passed version of H R  5297 would have required the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, to develop eligibility criteria to determine the financial ability of a Community Development Loan Fund to participate in the program and repay the investment  It provided a list of recommended eligibility criteria that the Secretary of the Treasury could use for this purpose  The Senate-passed version of H R  5297 provided a similar, but mandatory, list of eligibility criteria that must be used for this purpose  House-passed version of H R  5297 contained a temporary amortization authority provision which would have allowed an eligible institution to amortize any loss or write-down on a quarterly straight-line basis over a period of time, adjusted to reflect the institution's change in the amount of small business lending relative to the baseline  The Senate-passed version of H R  5297 did not contain this provision  The Senate's version of H R  5297 was agreed to in the Senate on September 16, 2010, after considerable debate and amendment to remove the Small Business Early-Stage Investment Program and Small Business Borrower Assistance Program, revise the SBLF, and add numerous other provisions to assist small businesses, including additional small business tax reduction provisions  The House agreed to the Senate amendments on September 23, 2010, and President Obama signed the bill, retitled the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 ( P L  111-240 ), into law on September 27, 2010 


Report 2: Executive branch agencies are required to take various steps regarding improper payments under IPIA, as amended by IPERA and IPERIA, and related OMB guidance  The steps include the following: 1  reviewing all programs and activities and identifying those that may be susceptible to significant improper payments (commonly referred to as a risk assessment), 2  developing improper payment estimates for those programs and activities that the agency identified as being susceptible to significant improper payments, 3  analyzing the root causes of improper payments and developing corrective actions to reduce them for those programs and activities that the agency identified as being susceptible to significant improper payments, and 4  reporting on the results of addressing the foregoing requirements  Figure 1 lays out these steps, as well as the major components of developing an improper payment estimate  IPERA also directs executive branch agencies’ inspectors general to annually determine and report on whether their respective agencies complied with six criteria listed in the law  On an annual basis, agencies are required to develop improper payment estimates for programs that they consider susceptible to significant improper payments  This generally involves selecting a sample of program payments (or other items, such as invoices) and reviewing them in order to determine whether the relevant payments were proper  OMB guidance for developing improper payment estimates focuses on the statistical nature of the estimates and provides agencies with flexibility in developing their estimates  IPIA, as amended, provides the definition of “improper payment” with IPERIA further instructing OMB to issue guidance requiring agencies to include in the estimate all improper payments, regardless of whether those payments have been or are being recovered  OMB incorporated this requirement into Appendix C to Circular No  A-123, Requirements for Effective Estimation and Remediation of Improper Payments  In accordance with these relevant laws and OMB guidance, agencies must apply “improper payment” in the context of their programs when developing improper payment estimates  The 10 programs we reviewed serve a variety of purposes and are administered by various agencies across the federal government  Table 2 summarizes each of these programs  IPIA, as amended, requires agencies to develop statistically valid improper payment estimates or estimates that are otherwise appropriate using a methodology approved by the Director of OMB  The six agencies we reviewed reported using either statistically valid or alternative sampling approaches for the 10 selected programs, and some agencies reported additionally incorporating actual improper payment amounts into their estimates, as shown in table 3  If an agency is unable to produce a statistically valid improper payment estimate, it can use an alternative approach if approved by OMB  For example, the Department of Education (Education) reported using an alternative methodology for the Direct Loan program after conducting a cost-benefit analysis comparing use of a statistical and an alternative methodology  Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reported using an alternative methodology for Medicaid to better manage resources needed to conduct the required reviews  In addition to their statistical approaches, two agencies reported incorporating actual improper payment amounts into the estimates for 2 of the programs we reviewed  Officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) stated that the agency calculates its Military Pay improper payment estimate by adding the amount of debts due to DOD entered into its financial system based on overpayments (i e , debts due to DOD by a recipient of an overpayment) identified during the fiscal year to a projected estimate of improper payments  Officials at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) stated that the agency calculates its Retirement program improper payment estimate by adding the amount of debts due to OPM entered into its financial system based on overpayments (i e , debts due to OPM by a recipient of an overpayment) identified during the fiscal year to a projected estimate of underpayments  To implement their sampling approaches, agencies select a sample of data to test from a larger, specified population of data  For the six agencies we reviewed, data sampled varied by program and include payments, claims, tax returns, and pay accounts  For example, according to their policies and procedures DOD samples invoices related to payments made from 12 financial systems for Defense Finance and Accounting Service Commercial Pay, HHS samples medical claims for Medicare Fee-for-Service, and DOD samples pay accounts for Military Pay  Agencies subject specific data populations to sampling, which may not include all payments made for a program  Reasons for sampling exclusions varied across programs, as shown by the examples in table 4  Some of the selected agencies reported sampling multiple sets of data  For example, for its Direct Loan improper payment estimate, Education officials stated that the agency reviews Program Review Reports to identify improper payments in originations and also samples loan consolidation and refund payments  According to agency officials, Direct Loan origination, consolidation, and refund transactions carry different risks of improper payment  To estimate improper payments for fiscal year 2017, the six agencies we reviewed reported sampling and testing data that varied in age from calendar year 2013 to fiscal year 2017  Figure 2 shows the range of data used  OMB guidance states that to the extent possible, data used for estimating improper payments should coincide with the fiscal year being reported, but agencies may use a different 12-month reporting period with approval from OMB  OMB staff acknowledged there are costs and benefits to sampling newer or older data  OMB staff stated that although they review agencies’ sampling and estimation plans, they defer to the agencies regarding the appropriateness of the age of data used to estimate improper payments  OMB staff stated that they approve the timeframe of the data used in alternative methodologies as part of the approval of the methodology overall, whereas OMB silence provides tacit approval (i e , no communication to the agency) for statistically valid methodologies  After agencies determine what subsets of data and types of transactions to review, they generally test the data and calculate their improper payment estimates  Testing processes varied among the 10 programs, with some of the six agencies using processes designed specifically to estimate improper payments and others leveraging existing processes designed for other purposes  Some of the selected agencies reported using multiple testing processes and combining the results to develop a program’s improper payment estimate  For example, according to their policies and procedures the Direct Loan estimate comprises three component estimates for loan originations, consolidations, and refunds and the Medicaid estimate includes fee-for-service, managed care, and eligibility components  Table 5 summarizes the processes used by the six agencies we reviewed  Although agencies’ testing processes varied, most included steps to address aspects of eligibility of beneficiaries, goods, or services—a key component of determining the appropriateness of a payment—in their programs  For example, according to their policies and procedures for Medicare Fee-for-Service, reviewers examine the medical necessity, compliance with documentation requirements, and coding of services provided, among other things; for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), auditors examine whether the taxpayer properly reported income and whether the taxpayer meets eligibility criteria, including income and qualifying child requirements, and auditors examine, among other things, whether the taxpayer is subject to a disallowance period on receiving EITC; for Medicaid, reviewers examine fee-for-service claims and managed care payments to determine the eligibility status of the beneficiary and the provider, as well as support for the medical necessity of fee-for- service claims, among other things; for Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), reviewers examine factors to support the beneficiary’s eligibility, including, among other things, citizenship, relationship (in the case of survivor benefits), and receipt of other government benefits; and although Education’s Direct Loan program reviews can vary in scope, they may include, among other things, steps to verify educational institution eligibility (such as licensing and accreditation) and student eligibility (such as enrollment status and satisfactory academic progress)  In contrast, per their policies and procedures, eligibility is not tested for DOD’s Military Pay or the overpayment component of OPM’s Retirement estimate  DOD Military Pay  DOD reported using the results of monthly payment reviews to calculate a projected improper payment amount for Military Pay  However, DOD’s policies and procedures do not require a review of servicemember eligibility for special pay or allowances as part of these monthly reviews  DOD’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) direct reviewers to recalculate payments to servicemembers solely based on the pay account data included in DOD systems (i e , to verify that components of servicemember pay were calculated appropriately)  DOD’s SOP does not direct reviewers to verify that servicemembers were eligible for special pay or allowances by verifying the information included in the pay account (such as pay grade) with supporting documentation  According to DOD officials, reviewers may investigate potential inconsistencies in pay account data identified during their reviews—which may include eligibility issues—but this process is not consistently performed or documented  According to DOD officials, an example of a potential inconsistency is when a servicemember receives jump pay (a hazard pay for parachute jumps) but is located at a site where no jump activity occurred  According to DOD officials, to help compensate for the limitations of its monthly reviews, DOD calculates the final reported Military Pay improper payment estimate by adding actual debts due to DOD (related to overpayments) identified during the year to the projected estimate of the monthly reviews  DOD identifies the actual overpayments through various methods, including other postpayment reviews and servicemember self- reporting  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving the defined objectives  DOD has acknowledged internal control deficiencies related to the Military Pay program, which—if addressed in improper payment testing—could have an impact on the program’s improper payment rate  However, these deficiencies were identified through other internal control reviews not related to estimating improper payments  For the purposes of estimating improper payments, DOD has not fully assessed the risks in its Military Pay program and evaluated whether its approach for estimating improper payments effectively addresses these risks  As a result, DOD’s process for estimating Military Pay improper payments may not reflect significant risks of improper payment in the program, specifically whether servicemembers are eligible for the special pay or allowances they receive, calling into question the improper payment estimate and its usefulness for developing effective corrective actions  OPM Retirement  OPM relies on its existing Quality Assurance (QA) process to estimate Retirement underpayments  The QA process is designed to determine whether new Retirement claims (i e , claims paid for the first time) have been adjudicated correctly  Therefore, only new Retirement claims are sampled and tested for accuracy  OPM applies historical results of QA testing to older claims; however, these historical results do not reflect any different risks of underpayment that the older claims may face  Although OPM’s QA process also produces an estimate of overpayments, the agency’s policies and procedures instead use actual debts due to OPM (related to overpayments) that were identified during the fiscal year as its overpayment amount (i e , the overpayment amount does not reflect any testing of Retirement payments to verify eligibility or accuracy)  These actual overpayments represent amounts that have been identified through various means, such as inspector general fraud referrals  OPM officials stated that the agency uses actual amounts because the QA estimate may overstate overpayments  However, the fiscal year 2016 QA overpayment estimate was lower than the actual amount of debts identified as due to OPM  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving the defined objectives  OPM has not fully assessed the risks of improper payments in its Retirement program—particularly related to the risk of underpayments in older claims and the risk of overpayments— and evaluated whether its approach for estimating improper payments effectively addresses these risks  As a result, OPM’s processes for estimating Retirement improper payments may not reflect significant risks of improper payment in the program, calling into question the improper payment estimate and its usefulness for developing effective corrective actions  OMB guidance  OMB issues guidance for agencies to implement various requirements of the improper payment laws  Specifically, OMB is required by IPERIA to issue guidance to set standards for agencies to follow in determining the underlying validity of sampled payments to ensure that amounts being billed, paid, or obligated for payment are proper  Although existing OMB guidance addresses requirements for sampling, it does not address how agencies test to identify improper payments, such as using a risk-based approach to help ensure that key risks of improper payments, like eligibility, are addressed through testing processes  Without such guidance, there is increased risk that agencies’ processes may not address key risks of improper payments in their programs—for example, the cases of DOD Military Pay and OPM Retirement described above—calling into question the improper payment estimates for such programs and their usefulness for developing effective corrective actions  According to OMB guidance, when an agency’s review is unable to determine whether a payment was proper because of insufficient or lack of documentation, the payment must be considered an improper payment  Among the six agencies and 10 programs we reviewed, treatment of insufficient documentation varied by program, as did the classification of these issues for root cause reporting in the AFRs  HHS’s programs were the only ones we reviewed that reported improper payments in the insufficient documentation root cause category for fiscal years 2016 or 2017, as shown in table 6  Some agencies stated that they report insufficient documentation in other root cause categories that they consider more appropriate  For example, Education officials stated that for the Direct Loan program, payments that lack sufficient supporting documentation may be placed in the “Administrative or Process Error Made by Other Party” root cause category  In these cases, a third party—such as a loan servicer—is unable to provide sufficient documentation supporting that the sampled payment was proper  OMB guidance states that in cases where the agency believes that more than one root cause category might be suitable, the agency should determine which category it believes to be the most appropriate  Additionally, some agencies stated that the “insufficient documentation” category was not always relevant when they recreated sampled cases to estimate a program’s improper payments  For example, according to officials, to complete an OASDI stewardship review of a sampled case, a Social Security Administration (SSA) quality reviewer reviews the documentation related to the original determination and then independently re-develops all factors of the payment and interviews the associated beneficiary  According to agency officials, insufficient documentation would not apply as all improper payments identified in the stewardship sample are supported by documentation and payment has been verified in all reviewed cases  As noted previously, the processes for estimating DOD Military Pay and OPM Retirement improper payments were limited, and these limitations may have an impact on the agencies’ ability to identify improper payments related to insufficient documentation  Treatment of cases of nonresponse  Some agencies contact outside entities—such as payees or beneficiaries—as part of their improper payment testing processes  Among the six agencies we reviewed, treatment of cases of nonresponse differed  For example: SSA officials stated that in cases where quality reviewers do not receive responses from OASDI beneficiaries they contact, they exclude the cases from review (unless the reviewer identifies an improper payment in the initial review that is completed prior to reaching out to the beneficiary)  For EITC improper payment estimation purposes, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) stated that the agency does not consider the sampled payment associated with a nonresponse case to be proper or improper  It sets the sampling weight of nonresponse cases to zero and adjusts the sampling weights of respondents upward to account for the nonresponse cases  IRS’s methodology assumes nonresponse and response cases have an equal likelihood of improper payment  For Medicare Fee-for-Service and Medicaid, HHS’s policies and procedures consider payments associated with nonresponse cases to be improper  OMB guidance states that when an agency’s review is unable to discern whether a payment was proper as a result of insufficient or lack of documentation, this payment must be considered an improper payment  However, it does not specifically address the appropriate treatment of nonresponse cases for improper payment estimation purposes  As a result, without clearer guidance there is increased risk that agencies’ improper payment estimates may be understated and that estimates for similar programs may not be comparable  When agencies identify improper payments, they must determine the amount of the payment that was improperly made  The six agencies we reviewed generally reported using the definition of improper payment in relevant laws and OMB guidance to determine the amount of improper payments identified  OMB guidance provides agencies with instructions on how to calculate the amount of improper payments  However, when developing its improper payment estimate for EITC, IRS subtracted overpayments that were paid out and later recovered  By subtracting recovered overpayments, IRS excluded them from the EITC improper payment estimate  For 2013—the tax year used to produce the fiscal year 2017 improper payment estimate—IRS estimated that $1 2 billion in EITC overpayments would be recovered  IPERIA directed OMB to provide guidance that requires agencies to include all improper payments in their improper payment estimates, regardless of whether they have been or are being recovered  Although the OMB guidance was revised in October 2014 to implement this requirement, IRS has not updated its estimation methodology for EITC  By not updating its guidance and continuing to remove EITC overpayments that may be subsequently recovered, IRS is understating its improper payment estimate and potentially limits its ability to address these types of improper payments before they occur  Improper payments are a long-standing, significant problem in the federal government  Estimation of improper payments is key to understanding the extent of the problem and to developing effective corrective actions to address it  Among the six agencies we reviewed, processes to estimate improper payments in their programs varied, and certain differences in these processes may affect the quality of the resulting estimates and consequently these agencies’ efforts to reduce improper payments  Specifically, policies and procedures for DOD’s Military Pay and OPM’s Retirement programs’ improper payment estimation methodologies do not address certain key risks, like eligibility, in part because these agencies have not fully assessed their processes  Further, although OMB guidance addresses requirements for sampling, it does not address how agencies test to identify improper payments  Without such assessments and guidance, there is increased risk that agencies’ processes may not address key risks of improper payments in their programs, calling into question the improper payment estimates for such programs and their usefulness for developing effective corrective actions  Additionally, for agencies we reviewed that contact outside entities as part of their improper payment estimation processes, the treatment of cases of nonresponse varied  OMB guidance does not specifically address the appropriate treatment of nonresponse cases for improper payment estimation purposes  Without clearer guidance there is increased risk that agencies’ improper payment estimates may be understated and that estimates for similar programs may not be comparable  Finally, although IPERIA directed OMB to provide guidance that requires agencies to include all improper payments in their improper payment estimates, regardless of whether they have been or are being recovered, IRS has not updated its processes to reflect the change  By not updating its guidance and continuing to remove EITC overpayments that may be subsequently recovered, IRS is understating its improper payment estimate and potentially limits its ability to address these types of improper payments before they occur  We are making two recommendations to the Director of OMB that have government-wide implications and specific recommendations to DOD, OPM, and IRS regarding their programs included in this review  The Director of OMB should develop guidance on how agencies test to identify improper payments, such as using a risk-based approach to help ensure that key risks of improper payments, such as eligibility, are addressed through testing processes  (Recommendation 1) The Director of OMB should develop guidance clarifying the appropriate treatment of nonresponse cases during improper payment testing  (Recommendation 2) The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) should assess the processes for estimating Military Pay improper payments to determine whether they effectively address key risks of improper payments— including eligibility for different types of pay and allowances—and take steps to update the processes to incorporate key risks that are not currently addressed  (Recommendation 3) The Director of OPM should assess the processes to estimate Retirement improper payments to determine whether they effectively address key risks of improper payments—including eligibility and whether older claims face different risks of improper payments than new claims—and take steps to update the processes to incorporate key risks that are not currently addressed  (Recommendation 4) The Commissioner of IRS should update IRS’s improper payment estimation methodology to not exclude recovered overpayments from its EITC improper payment estimate  (Recommendation 5) We provided a draft of this report for comment to OMB, DOD, Education, HHS, Treasury, OPM, SSA, and USDA  OMB provided oral comments, which are summarized below  OPM, DOD, and IRS provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes II through IV, respectively  Education, HHS, SSA, and USDA did not provide written comments on the draft report  In addition, HHS, IRS, OMB, OPM, and SSA provided technical comments, which we have incorporated, as appropriate  In oral comments provided on April 30, 2018, a Senior Policy Advisor in OMB’s Office of Federal Financial Management stated that OMB partially agreed with our first recommendation and agreed with our second recommendation  Regarding the first recommendation, the Senior Policy Advisor stated that OMB should not have to develop more specific guidance as each program and activity has its own risks  Instead, inspectors general are better equipped and positioned to review the sampling and estimation plans as part of their annual IPERA compliance audits and that agencies, their statisticians, and inspectors general should work out the best testing procedures for their agencies  OMB could provide suggestions during OMB’s annual town hall meeting related to improper payments for areas that inspectors general may consider  Although we agree that programs and activities may face different risks of improper payment, we continue to believe that guidance from OMB on how agencies test to identify improper payments—such as directing agencies to take a risk-based approach in developing their testing procedures—could help ensure that agencies address the specific risks they identify when developing improper payment estimates  Further, such guidance could also help ensure that testing processes are designed to address an agency’s identified risks before the estimate is developed, whereas an inspector general’s review—as well as related recommendations for improvement—would generally occur after the agency’s improper payment estimate had been developed and reported  Regarding the second recommendation, the Senior Policy Advisor noted that OMB plans to update its guidance to direct agencies to treat nonresponse cases as improper payments and to include a new category for tracking such cases  In its written comments, OPM partially concurred with our recommendation to assess the processes to estimate Retirement improper payments to determine whether they effectively address the key risks of improper payments  OPM agreed to conduct an audit of older claims to determine if they face different risks than new claims  However, OPM did not agree with the part of the recommendation to assess the risk of improper payments related to eligibility in the estimation process  OPM stated that eligibility is determined before annuity or survivor benefits are fully adjudicated  However, the objective of an improper payment estimate is to determine whether payments were made properly  To do so, an agency should determine whether the payee was eligible for the payment that was made, among other things  As such, we continue to believe that the recommendation—including the assessment of the risk of improper payments related to eligibility—is warranted  In their written comments, DOD and IRS both agreed with our recommendations directed to them and described the steps they plan to take to implement them  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Education, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury; the Director of the Office of Personnel Management; the Administrator of the Social Security Administration; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2623 or davisbh@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V  Table 7 lists the fiscal year 2017 improper payment estimates by agency and program, as reported by agencies in their fiscal year 2017 agency financial reports and compiled on the Office of Management and Budget’s payment integrity website, paymentaccuracy gov  In addition to the contact named above, Phillip McIntyre (Assistant Director), James M  Healy (Auditor in Charge), Daniel Flavin, and Fabiola Torres made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: Improper payments—which include payments that should not have been made or were made in an incorrect amount—are a long-standing, significant problem in the federal government, estimated at almost $141 billion for fiscal year 2017. Executive branch agencies are required to annually estimate improper payments for certain programs. Estimation of improper payments is key to understanding the extent of the problem and to developing effective corrective actions. Relevant laws and guidance provide agencies flexibility in developing estimates. This report describes agencies' processes to estimate improper payments in selected programs for fiscal year 2017 and the extent to which certain differences in these processes can affect the usefulness of the resulting estimates. GAO selected 10 programs across six agencies with the largest reported program outlays in fiscal years 2015 and 2016. For these programs, GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance, analyzed agencies' policies and procedures, and interviewed officials at relevant agencies and OMB staff. The six agencies GAO reviewed reported taking various approaches related to key components of estimating improper payments—shown in the figure below—for 10 selected programs, which collectively reported outlays of over $2.5 trillion for fiscal year 2017. Sample selection. Eight of the 10 programs GAO reviewed reported using statistically valid approaches, and the remaining 2 reported using alternative methodologies approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The sampled data elements varied, including payments, medical claims, and tax returns. The age of the data used to develop fiscal year 2017 improper payment estimates also varied, ranging from calendar year 2013 to fiscal year 2017. Identification of improper payments. Some of the six agencies reported using processes designed specifically to estimate improper payments, whereas others reported leveraging existing reviews. These agencies' policies and procedures include a review of aspects of eligibility, except for those related to the Department of Defense's (DOD) Military Pay and the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Retirement overpayments. DOD and OPM have not fully assessed whether their estimation processes effectively consider key program risks. OMB guidance does not specifically address how agencies are to test to identify improper payments, such as using a risk-based approach to help ensure that key risks of improper payments are addressed. The six agencies also varied in the treatment of insufficient documentation, both in identifying and in reporting the root causes of improper payments. For the agencies that contact entities outside the agency to estimate improper payments, the treatment of nonresponse differed, with one agency including nonresponses as improper payments and another generally excluding the nonresponse cases from review. Although OMB guidance states that agencies should treat cases of insufficient documentation as improper payments, it does not specifically address the treatment of nonresponse cases. Calculation of the improper payment estimate. The six agencies generally reported using law and OMB guidance to calculate improper payment estimates for the selected programs, except for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) removed overpayments that were recovered when developing its estimate. OMB guidance requires agencies to include recovered amounts in their estimates. Removing these overpayments understates the EITC improper payment estimate and may limit IRS's ability to develop corrective actions to prevent improper payments. GAO recommends that OMB develop guidance on treatment of nonresponse cases and testing to identify improper payments, that DOD and OPM assess their estimation processes, and that IRS revise its methodology to not exclude recovered payments from its estimate. All of the agencies either agreed or partially agreed with the specific recommendations to them. GAO believes that the actions are warranted, as discussed in the report.