prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: This report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on war-related and other international emergency or contingency-designated funding since FY2001  Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority designated for emergencies or OCO/GWOT in support of the broad U S  government response to the 9/11 attacks and for other related international affairs activities  This figure includes $1 8 trillion for the Department of Defense (DOD), $154 billion for the Department of State and U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), and $3 billion for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Coast Guard (see Figure 1 )  This CRS report is meant to serve as a reference on certain funding designated as emergency requirement s or for Overseas Contingency Ope rations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT), as well as related budgetary and policy issues  It does not provide an estimate of war costs within the OCO/GWOT account (all of which may not be for activities associated with war or defense) or such costs in the DOD base budget or other agency funding (which may be related to war activities, such as the cost of health care for combat veterans)  For additional information on the FY2019 budget and related issues, see CRS Report R45202, The Federal Budget: Overview and Issues for FY2019 and Beyond , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS In Focus IF10942, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: An Overview of H R  5515 , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R45168, Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]  For additional information on the Budget Control Act as amended, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions , by [author name scrubbed]  For additional information on U S  policy in Afghanistan and the Middle East, see CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U S  Policy , by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report R45096, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U S  Response , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]  Congress may consider one or more supplemental appropriations bills (colloquially called supplementals) for a fiscal year to provide funding for unforeseen needs (such as a response to a national security threat or a natural disaster), or to increase appropriations for other activities that have already been funded  Supplemental appropriations measures generally provide additional funding for selected activities over and above the amount provided through annual or continuing appropriations  Throughout the 20 th century, Congress relied on supplemental appropriations to fund war-related activities, particularly in the period immediately following the start of hostilities  For example, in 1951, a year after the start of the Korean War, Congress approved DOD supplemental appropriations totaling $32 8 billion ($268 billion in constant FY2019 dollars)  In 1952, DOD supplemental appropriations totaled just $1 4 billion ($11 billion in constant FY2019), as the base budget incorporated costs related to the war effort  A similar pattern occurred, to varying degrees, during the Vietnam War and 1990-1991 Gulf War  During the post-9/11 conflicts, primarily conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq but also in other countries, Congress has, for an extended period and to a much greater degree than in previous conflicts in the 20 th century, appropriated supplemental and specially designated funding over and above the base DOD budget—that is, funding for planned or regularly occurring costs to man, train, and equip the military force  Since FY2001, DOD funding designated for OCO/GWOT has averaged 17% of the department's total budget authority (see Figure 2 )  By comparison, during the conflict in Vietnam—the only other to last more than a decade—DOD funding designated for non-base activities averaged 6% of the department's total budget authority  Supplemental appropriations can provide flexibility for policymakers to address demands that arise after funding has been appropriated  However, that flexibility has caused some to question whether supplementals should only be used to respond to unforeseen events, or whether they should also provide funding for activities that could reasonably be covered in regular appropriations acts  Congress used supplemental appropriations to provide funds for defense and foreign affairs activities related to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq following 9/11, and each subsequent fiscal year through FY2010  Initially understood as reflecting needs that were not anticipated during the regular appropriations cycle, supplemental appropriations were generally enacted as requested, and almost always designated as emergency requirements  Beginning in FY2004, DOD received some of its war-related funding in its regular annual appropriations; these funds were designated as emergency  When funding needs for war and non-war-related activities were higher than anticipated, the Bush Administration submitted supplemental requests  In the FY2011 appropriations cycle, the Obama Administration moved away from submitting supplemental appropriations requests to Congress for war-related activities and used the regular budget and appropriation process to fund operations  This approach implied that while the funds might be war-related, they largely supported predictable ongoing activities rather than unanticipated needs  In concert with this change in budgetary approach, the Obama Administration began formally using the term Overseas Contingency Op erations in place of the Bush Administration's term Global War on Terror   Both the Obama and Trump Administrations requested that OCO funding be designated in a manner that would effectively exempt such funding from the BCA limits on discretionary defense spending  Currently, there is no overall procedural or statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO/GWOT-designated spending that may be appropriated on an annual basis  Both Congress and the President have roles in determining how much emergency or OCO/GWOT spending is provided to federal agencies each fiscal year  Such spending must be designated as such within the President's budget request for congressional consideration  The President must separately designate the spending after Congress enacts appropriations for it to be available for expenditure  The emergency funding designation predated the OCO/GWOT designation  Through definitions statutorily established by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P L  99-177 ), spending designated as emergency requirements is for "unanticipated" purposes, such as those that are "sudden     urgent     unforeseen     and temporary " The BBEDCA does not further specify the types of activities that are eligible for that designation  Thus, any discretionary funding designated by Congress and the President as being for an emergency is effectively exempted from certain statutory and procedural budget enforcement mechanisms, such as the BCA limits on discretionary spending  Debate of what should constitute OCO/GWOT or emergency activities and expenses has shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of U S  military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere  Over the years, both Congress and the President have at times adopted more, and at times less, expansive definitions of such designations to accommodate the strategic, budgetary, and political needs of the moment  Prior to February 2009, U S  operations in response to the 9/11 attacks were collectively referred to as the Global War on Terror , or GWOT  Between September 2001 and February 2009, there was no separate budgetary designation for GWOT funds—instead, funding associated with those operations was designated as an emergency requirement  The term OCO was not applied to the post-9/11 military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan until 2009  In February 2009, the Obama Administration released A New Era of Responsibili ty: Renewing America's Promise , a presidential fiscal policy document  That document did not mention or reference GWOT; instead, it used the term OCO in reference to ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan  The first request for emergency funding for OCO—not GWOT—was delivered to Congress in April 2009  Since the FY2010 budget cycle, DOD has requested both base budget and OCO funding as part of its annual budget submission to Congress  Beginning with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (NDAA; P L  111-84 ), the annual defense authorization bills have referenced the authorization of additional appropriations for OCO rather than the names of U S  military operations conducted primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq  In 2011, the BCA ( P L  112-125 ) amended the BBEDCA to create the Overseas Contingency Ope rations/Global War on Terrorism designation, which provided Congress and the President with an alternate way to exempt funding from the BCA caps without using the emergency designation  Beginning with the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P L  112-74 ), annual appropriations bills have referenced the OCO/GWOT designation  The foreign affairs agencies began formally requesting OCO/GWOT funding in FY2012, distinguishing between what is referred to as enduring, ongoing or base costs versus any extraordinary, temporary costs of the State Department and USAID in supporting ongoing U S  operations and policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan  Congress, having used OCO/GWOT exemption for DOD, adopted this approach for foreign affairs, though its uses for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) activities have never been permanently defined in statute  For the first foreign affairs OCO/GWOT appropriation, in FY2012, funds were provided for a wide range of recipient countries beyond the countries in the President's request, including Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, and the Philippines  In addition to country-specific uses, OCO/GWOT-designated funds were also appropriated for the Global Security Contingency Fund  All budgetary legislation is subject to a set of enforcement procedures associated with the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 ( P L  93-344 ), as well as other rules, such as those imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P L  112-125 ) as amended  Those rules provide mechanisms to enforce both procedural and statutory limits on discretionary spending  Enacted on August 2, 2011, the BCA as amended sets limits on defense and nondefense spending  As part of an agreement to increase the statutory limit on public debt, the BCA aimed to reduce annual federal budget deficits by a total of at least $2 1 trillion from FY2012 through FY2021, with approximately half of the savings to come from defense  The spending limits (or caps ) apply separately to defense and nondefense discretionary budget authority  The caps are enforced by a mechanism called sequestration   Sequestration automatically cancels previously enacted appropriations (a form of budget authority) by an amount necessary to reach prespecified levels  The BCA effectively exempted certain types of discretionary spending from the statutory limits, including funding designated for OCO/GWOT  As a result, Congress and the President have designated funding for OCO to support activities that, in previous times, had been funded within the base budget  This was done, in part, as a response to the discretionary spending limits enacted by the BCA  By designating funding for OCO for certain activities not directly related to contingency operations, Congress and the President can effectively continue to increase topline defense, foreign affairs, and other related discretionary spending without triggering sequestration  Congress has repeatedly amended the legislation to raise the spending limits (thus lowering its deficit-reduction effect by corresponding amounts)  Congress has passed four bills that revised the automatic spending caps initially established by the BCA, including the following: American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P L  112-240 ); Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013; P L  113-67 ); Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P L  114-74 ); and Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P L  115-123 )  On February 9, 2018, three days before President Donald Trump submitted his FY2019 budget request, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P L  115-123 )  The act raised the discretionary spending limits set by the BCA from $1 069 trillion for FY2017 to $1 208 trillion for FY2018 and to $1 244 trillion for FY2019  The BBA 2018 increased FY2019 discretionary defense funding levels (excluding OCO) by the largest amounts to date—$85 billion, from $562 billion to $647 billion, and nondefense funding (including SFOPS) by $68 billion, from $529 billion to $597 billion  It did not change discretionary spending limits for FY2020 and FY2021  DOD documents indicate the department in recent years has used OCO funding for activities viewed as unrelated to war  For example, the department's FY2019 budget request estimates $358 billion in OCO funding from FY2015 through FY2019  Of that amount, DOD categorizes $68 billion (19%) for activities unrelated to operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria  These activities are described as "EDI/Non-War," referring in part to the European Deterrence Initiative, and "Base-to-OCO," referring to OCO funding used for base-budget requirements  Similarly, a DOD Cost of War report from June 2018 shows $1 8 trillion in war-related appropriations from FY2001 through FY2018 for operations primarily conducted in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria  Of that total, DOD categorizes $219 billion (12%) as other than "war funds " These funds are described as "Classified," "Modularity," "Fuel (non-war)," "Noble Eagle (Base)," and "Non-War " International affairs agencies also began increasing the share of their budgets designated for OCO, and applying the designation to an increasing range of activities apparently unrelated to conflicts  OCO as a share of the international affairs budget grew from about 21% in FY2012 to nearly 35% in FY2017  Unlike DOD, however, the State Department and USAID have not specified whether any OCO-designated funds are considered part of the agencies' base budgets  According to a DOD budget document from FY2016, the Obama Administration planned to "transition all enduring costs currently funded in the OCO budget to the base budget beginning in 2017 and ending by 2020 " The plan was to describe "which OCO costs should endure as the United States shifts from major combat operations, how the Administration will budget for the uncertainty surrounding unforeseen future crises, and the implications for the base budgets of DOD, the Intelligence Community, and State/OIP  This transition will not be possible if the sequester-level discretionary spending caps remain in place " The BCA remained in effect and OCO funding was used for base-budget requirements  Some defense officials and policymakers say OCO funding enables a flexible and timely response to an emergency or contingency and provides a political and fiscal safety valve to the BCA caps and threat of sequestration  They say if OCO funding were not used in such a manner and discretionary spending limits remained in place, DOD and other federal agencies would be forced to cut base budgets and revise strategic priorities  For example, former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has said if Congress allows the FY2020 and FY2021 defense spending caps to take effect, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which calls for the United States to bolster its military advantage against potential competitors such as Russia and China, "is not sustainable " Critics, including Acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, have described the OCO account as a "slush fund" for military and foreign affairs spending unrelated to contingency operations  Mulvaney, former director of the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), has described the use of OCO funding for base budget requirements as "budget gimmicks " Critics argue what was once generally restricted to a fund for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupplying expended munitions, transporting troops to and through war zones, and distributing foreign aid to frontline states has "ballooned into an ambiguous part of the budget to which government financiers increasingly turn to pay for other, at times unrelated, costs " OMB criteria for OCO funding include the combat losses of ground vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment; replenishment of munitions expended in combat operations; facilities and infrastructure in the theater of operations; transport of personnel, equipment, and supplies to and from the theater; among other items and activities  Determining which activities are directly related, tangentially related, or unrelated to war operations is often a point of debate  Some have questioned the use of OCO funding to purchase F-35 fighter jets: "It is jumping the shark     There's no pretense that it has anything to do with the region " Others have argued it makes sense for the military to use OCO funding to purchase new aircraft to replace planes used in current conflicts and no longer in production: "What are the conditions that are making the combatant commanders and those with train/equip authority to say, 'We need more of this?'" Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority for war-related and other international emergency or contingency-designated activities since 9/11  This figure is a CRS estimate of funding designated for emergencies or OCO/GWOT in support of the broad U S  government response to the 9/11 attacks, as well as other foreign affairs activities, from FY2001 through FY2019  This includes $1 8 trillion for DOD, $154 billion for the Department of State and USAID, and $3 billion for DHS and the Coast Guard (see Table 1 )  These figures do not include emergency-designated funding appropriated in this period for domestic programs, such as disaster response  From FY2001 through FY2009, DOD received $1 8 trillion in appropriations for OCO/GWOT, or approximately 17% of the department's total discretionary budget authority of $10 8 trillion during the period  The department's OCO/GWOT funding peaked in FY2008 both in terms of nominal dollars, at $186 9 billion, and as a share of its discretionary budget, at 28 1% (see Figure 3 ), after the Bush Administration surged additional U S  military personnel to Iraq  The department's OCO funding also increased as a share of its discretionary spending from FY2009 to FY2010 following the Obama Administration's deployment of more U S  military personnel to Afghanistan, and again in FY2017 following enactment of legislation in response to the Trump Administration's request for additional appropriations  In FY2019, the department's OCO/GWOT funding totaled $68 8 billion, or 10% of its discretionary spending  In terms of appropriations titles, more than two-thirds of OCO/GWOT funding since FY2001 has been for Operation and Maintenance (O&M)—nearly double the percentage of base budget funding for O&M over the same period (see Figure 4 )  O&M funds pay for the operating costs of the military such as fuel, maintenance to repair facilities and equipment, and the mobilization of forces  DOD describes "war-related operational costs" as operations, training, overseas facilities and base support, equipment maintenance, communications, and replacement of combat losses and enhancements  In terms of the military services, more than half (55%) of OCO/GWOT funding since FY2001 has gone to the Army—more than double the percentage of base budget funding for the service during this period (see Figure 5 )  Emergency appropriations were initially provided as general "defense-wide" appropriations  Beginning in FY2003, as operations evolved and planning developed, allocations increased and were specifically provided for the services  OCO funding for DOD has not decreased at the same rate as the number of U S  troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has decreased  For example, the number of U S  military personnel in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria decreased from a peak of 187,000 personnel in FY2008 (including 148,000 in Iraq and 39,000 in Afghanistan) to an assumed level of nearly 18,000 personnel in FY2019 (including 11,958 personnel in Afghanistan and 5,765 personnel in Iraq and Syria)—a decline of approximately 169,000 personnel (90%)  Meanwhile, OCO funding decreased from a peak of $187 billion in FY2008 to $69 billion in FY2019—a decline of approximately $118 billion (63%)  While the number of U S  forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has decreased since FY2009, the number of U S  troops deployed or stationed elsewhere to support those personnel has fallen by a lesser degree and, in recent years, remained relatively steady  For example, the number of support forces—that is, personnel from units and forces operating outside of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries (including those stationed in the continental United States or otherwise mobilized) decreased from 112,000 personnel in FY2009 to an assumed level of 76,073 personnel in FY2019—a decline of 35,927 personnel (32%)  In addition, when these support forces are combined with in-country force levels, the total force level decreases by a percentage more similar to the OCO budget, from 297,000 personnel in FY2009 to an assumed level of 93,796 personnel in FY2019—a decline of 203,204 personnel (68%) (see Figure 6 )  Some of these support forces serve in U S  Central Command's area of responsibility, which includes 20 countries in West Asia, North Africa, and Central Asia, and whose forward headquarters is based in Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar  According to DOD, the reason OCO funding has not fallen in proportion to the number of U S  troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria is "due to the fixed, and often inelastic, costs of infrastructure, support requirements, and in-theater presence to support contingency operations " For example, in FY2019, the department requested $20 billion in OCO funding for "in-theater support"—nearly 30% of the OCO request and more than any other functional category  However, some analysts have noted the U S  military's fixed costs in Afghanistan remained relatively stable at roughly $7 billion a year from FY2005 through FY2013 until after the BCA went into effect—and have since increased to roughly $32 billion a year, suggesting "that roughly $25 billion in 'enduring' or base budget costs migrated into the Afghanistan budget, effectively circumventing the budget caps  The actual funding needed for operations in Afghanistan is roughly $20 billion in FY2019 " Title 10, Section 101, of the United States Code, defines a contingency operation as any Secretary of Defense-designated military operation "in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force " Since the 1990s NATO intervention in the Balkans, DOD Financial Management Regulations (FMR) have defined contingency operations costs as those expenses necessary to cover incremental costs "that would not have been incurred had the contingency operation not been supported " Such incremental costs would not include, for example, base pay for troops or planned equipment modernization, as those expenditures are normal peacetime needs of the DOD  In September 2010, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in collaboration with DOD, issued criteria for the department to use in making war/overseas contingency operations funding requests (see Appendix A )  In January 2017, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded the criteria for deciding whether items belong in the base budget or OCO funding "are outdated and do not address the full scope of activities" in the budget request  "For example, they do not address geographic areas such as Syria and Libya, where DOD has begun military operations; DOD's deterrence and counterterrorism initiatives; or requests for OCO funding to support requirements not related to ongoing contingency operations" it states  Section 1524 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 ( P L  115-91 ), directed the Secretary of Defense to "update the guidelines regarding the budget items that may be covered by overseas contingency operations accounts " Congress has enacted legislation directing DOD to compile reports on the costs of certain contingency operations  Section 1266 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 ( P L  115-91 ) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit the Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution report, known as the Cost of War report, on a quarterly basis to the congressional defense committees and the GAO: "Not later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal year quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees and the Comptroller General of the United States the Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution report for such fiscal year quarter " The conference report accompanying the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-245 ) requires DOD to report incremental costs for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries in the U S  Central Command area of responsibility and directs: the Secretary of Defense to continue to report incremental costs for all named operations in the Central Command Area of Responsibility on a quarterly basis and to submit, also on a quarterly basis, commitment, obligation, and expenditure data for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund, and for all security cooperation programs funded under the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide Account  DOD's June 2018 Cost of War report to Congress details $1 5 trillion in obligations associated with certain contingency operations from FY2001 through FY2018  That figure includes $757 1 billion for those conducted primarily in Iraq—Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation New Dawn (OND), and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR); $727 7 billion for those conducted primarily in Afghanistan—Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS); and $27 8 billion for those conducted primarily in the United States (see Table 2 and Figure 7 )  DOD's quarterly Cost of War reports are intended to provide Congress, GAO, and other stakeholders insight into the how the department obligates war-related appropriations  The reports include base and OCO obligations related to war activities, as well as obligation data broken down by certain major operations, service, component, agency, and appropriation  However, as GAO has noted, "the proportion of OCO appropriations not associated with specific operations identified in the statutory Cost of War reporting requirement has trended upward" in part because the criteria DOD uses for making OCO funding requests is outdated and not always used  More recently, the June 2018 Cost of War report does not appear to reference three recently classified overseas contingency operations targeting militants affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS): Operation Yukon Journey in the Middle East, Northwest Africa Counterterrorism, and East Africa Counterterrorism  Some observers have noted other limitations to Cost of War reports, such as incomplete accounting of costs, limited distribution of the documents and underlying data, and formatting that makes it difficult to reconcile the data with information contained in budget justification documents  Between FY2001 and FY2018, Congress appropriated a total of $154 billion in OCO funds for State Department and USAID  For FY2018 (the most recent full-year appropriations for foreign affairs agencies), OCO funding amounted to 22% of the total appropriations for State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Programs appropriation  The Obama Administration's FY2012 International Affairs budget request was the first to include a request for OCO funds for "extraordinary and temporary costs of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan " At the time, the Administration indicated that the use of this designation was intended to provide a transparent, whole-of-government approach to the exceptional war-related costs incurred in those three countries, thus better aligning the associated military and civilian costs  This first foreign affairs OCO request identified the significant resource demands placed on the State Department as a result of the transitions from military-led to civilian-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the importance of a stable Pakistan for the U S  effort in Afghanistan  The FY2012 foreign affairs OCO request included: for Iraq, funding for the U S  Embassy in Baghdad, consulates throughout Iraq, security costs in light of the then-planned U S  military withdrawal, a then-planned civilian-led Police Development and Criminal Justice Program, military and development assistance in Iraq, and oversight of U S  foreign assistance through the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction; for Afghanistan, funding to strengthen the Afghan government and build institutional capacity, support State/USAID and other U S  government agency civilians deployed in Afghanistan, provide short-term economic assistance to address counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts, and provide oversight of U S  foreign assistance programs in Afghanistan through the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction; and for Pakistan, funding to support U S  diplomatic presence and diplomatic security in Pakistan, provide Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Funds (PCCF) to train and equip Pakistani forces to eliminate insurgent sanctuaries and promote stability and security in neighboring Afghanistan and the region  In subsequent years, the Administration designated certain State Department activities in Syria and other peacekeeping activities as OCO, and Congress accepted and broadened this expanded use of OCO in annual appropriations  In the FY2017 budget request, the Administration further broadened its use of State OCO funds, applying the designation to funds for countering Russian aggression, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and aid to Africa  In addition to OCO funds requested through the normal appropriations process, the Administration in recent years requested emergency supplemental funding (designated as OCO) to support State/USAID efforts in countering the Islamic State and to respond to global health threats such as the Ebola and Zika viruses  For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested no OCO/GWOT funding for the Department of State and USAID, although the FY2019 House and Senate SFOPS bills ( H R  6385 and S  3108 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated approximately $8 billion in OCO-designated funding for various priorities  The estimated $154 1 billion in emergency and OCO/GWOT appropriations enacted to date for State/USAID includes major non-war-related programs, such as aid for the 2004 tsunami along Indian Ocean coasts, 2010 earthquake in Haiti, 2013 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, and 2015 worldwide outbreak of the Zika virus; as well as diplomatic operations (e g , paying staff, providing security, and building and maintaining embassies)  OCO/GWOT has also funded a variety of foreign aid programs, ranging from the Economic Support Fund to counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, among other activities in other countries  Figure 8 depicts the emergency or OCO appropriations for foreign affairs activities  Since 2012, when the OCO designation was first used for foreign affairs, more OCO funds have been appropriated than were requested each year, and those have also been authorized to be used in additional countries  Since January 2002, approximately $3 billion of post-9/11 emergency and OCO-designated funding has been provided to the U S  Coast Guard (USCG) for its traditional homeland security missions and for USCG operations in support of U S  Navy activities  This funding has been provided at various times as either an appropriation to the Coast Guard's operating expenses accounts, or as a transfer from Navy accounts to the Coast Guard  Open-source information on the use of those funds has varied  One FY2009 supplemental appropriations request included funding as a transfer, with the intent of funding "Coast Guard operations in support of OIF and OEF, as well as other classified activities " The FY2017 OCO request for annual appropriations for Navy Operations and Maintenance included $163 million for Coast Guard operational support for the deployment of patrol boats to the Northern Arabian Gulf and a port security unit to Guantanamo Bay, among other pay and equipment expenses  The Trump Administration initially requested a total of $89 billion in OCO funding for FY2019  All the funding was requested by DOD  In an amendment to the budget after Congress raised the BCA spending caps as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P L  115-123 ), the Administration removed the OCO designation from $20 billion of the funding, in effect, shifting that amount into the DOD base budget request  In a statement on the budget amendment, Mulvaney said the request fixes "long-time budget gimmicks" in which OCO funding has been used for base budget requirements  Beginning in FY2020, "the Administration proposes returning to OCO's original purpose by shifting certain costs funded in OCO to the base budget where they belong," he wrote  Of the revised amount of $69 billion requested for DOD OCO funding in FY2019: $46 3 billion (67%) was for Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS) in Afghanistan and related missions; $13 billion (22%) for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq and Syria and related missions; $4 8 billion (9%) for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to boost the U S  military presence in eastern Europe to deter Russian military aggression; and $0 9 billion (1%) for security cooperation (see Figure 9 )  The FY2019 OCO budget assumes a total force level (average annual troop strength) of 93,796 personnel  That figure includes: 11,958 primarily in Afghanistan (OFS); 5,765 primarily in Iraq and Syria (OIR); 59,463 for in-theater support; and 16,610 primarily in the continental United States (CONUS) or otherwise mobilized (see Figure 10 )  The number of personnel actually in-country or in-theater at any given time may exceed or fall below those assumed levels  The FY2019 force level assumes an increase of 3,153 personnel (3 5%) from the FY2018 assumed level, all of which is assumed for in-theater support  (For analysis of troop level and budget trends, see the section, " Trends in OCO Funding and Troop Levels ," earlier in this report ) As previously discussed, DOD acknowledges "OCO funding has not declined at the same rate as the in-country troop strength … due to the fixed, and often inelastic, costs of infrastructure, support requirements, and in-theater presence to support contingency operations " The departments lists the following as OCO cost drivers: In-theater support, including infrastructure costs like command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and base operations for U S  Central Command (CENTCOM) locations; Persistent demand for combat support such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets used to enhance force protection; Equipment reset, which lags troop level changes and procurement of contingency-focused assets like munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles and force protection capabilities that may not be linked directly to in-country operations; and International programs and deterrence activities, which are linked to U S  engagement in contingency operations and support U S  interests but are not directly proportional to U S  troop presence  DOD also breaks down the FY2019 OCO budget request by functional category (see Table 3 )  By this measure, the largest portion of OCO funding was $20 billion for in-theater support, followed by operations and force protection (including the incremental cost of military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries), at $14 7 billion; and unspecified classified programs, at $9 9 billion  According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), approximately $47 billion (68%) of the FY2019 OCO budget request consists of enduring activities—that is, "those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts"—that could be funded in the DOD base budget  CBO associates enduring activities with the following DOD functional categories: in-theater support, classified programs, equipment reset and readiness, European Deterrence Initiative, security cooperation, and joint improvised-threat defeat  Executive Branch budget documents for FY2019 show differing projections for how much OCO would be apportioned over the Future Years Defense Program (also known as the FYDP, pronounced "fiddip," the five-year period from FY2019 through FY2023)  For example, Table 1-11 in DOD's National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, citing OMB data, projects five-year OCO funding at $359 billion  However, Table 1-9 of the same document puts the figure at $149 billion after assuming a higher amount of OCO funding shifting into the base budget  According to OMB, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected increasing caps on defense discretionary base budget authority by $84 billion (15%) to $660 billion in FY2020 and by $87 billion (15%) to $677 billion in FY2021  It also projected defense funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) totaling $73 billion in FY2020 and $66 billion in FY2021  Thus, projected defense discretionary funding would total $733 billion in FY2020 and $743 billion in FY2021  FY2019 DOD budget documents show the same defense discretionary topline for FY2020 and FY2021  But they list an "Outyears Placeholder for OCO" of $20 billion in fiscal years FY2020-FY2023, and an "OCO to Base" amount of $53 billion in FY2020 and $45 8 billion in each year from FY2021-FY2023  The documents do not break down what accounts or activities are included in these amounts  The emergence of any new contingencies or conflicts would likely change DOD assumptions about OCO needs  Congress has appropriated a total of $68 8 billion for DOD OCO funding in FY2019, including the following amounts: $67 9 billion in defense funds provided in the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-245 ), which Congress passed on September 26, 2018; and $921 million in defense funds provided in the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-244 ), which Congress passed on September, 21, 2018  For the Department of State and USAID, as well as the Department of Homeland Security and U S  Coast Guard, FY2019 OCO levels have not yet been determined  They remain at prorated FY2018 levels because of continuing resolutions (CR) to fund certain agencies through December 21, 2018  The FY2019 House and Senate SFOPS bills ( H R  6385 and S  3108 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated approximately $8 billion in OCO-designated funding for various priorities  The House committee-reported version of the Homeland Security appropriations bill ( H R  6776 , 115 th Congress) would not have appropriated any OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard, while the Senate committee-reported version of the bill ( S  3109 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated $165 million for OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard  Any decision by the 116 th Congress to change discretionary defense and nondefense spending limits that remain in effect for FY2020 and FY2021 under the Budget Control Act (BCA; P L  112-25 ) could impact future OCO funding levels  Lawmakers may consider the following questions: Will Congress keep the BCA as is and rely on OCO funding that is not subject to the caps to meet agency requirements? Will Congress repeal the BCA and use less OCO funding? Will Congress amend the BCA limits for future years and continue to use OCO funding, as it has in the past? Will Congress significantly reduce DOD and international affairs funding to stay within the BCA caps and not use OCO funding? In a November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission, a bipartisan panel created by Congress, issued recommendations related to OCO and the BCA  Recommendation No  24 states, "Congress should eliminate the final two years of caps under the BCA " Recommendation 29 states, "To better prepare for major-power competition, Congress should gradually integrate OCO spending back into the base Pentagon budget  This also requires a dollar-for-dollar increase in the BCA spending caps, should they remain in force, so that this transfer does not result in an overall spending cut " Both House and Senate FY2019 committee-reported appropriations bills from the 115 th Congress included about $8 billion in OCO funding for State/USAID  It remains to be seen if the 116 th Congress will pass this OCO level as requested or extend the continuing resolution  Congress could enact legislation to authorize and appropriate a level of base and OCO spending to meet current or revised discretionary defense spending caps in any number of ways  In FY2019 budget documents from OMB and DOD, the Trump Administration projected increasing defense spending in FY2020 and FY2021 beyond the statutory limits of the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P L  112-25 ), but by differing amounts based on differing OCO projections  These figures serve as possible scenarios or options for Congress to consider  According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $660 billion (which assumes an $84 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO defense budget of $73 billion (see Figure 11 )  According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $713 billion (which assumes a $137 billion, or 24%, increase in the BCA defense cap—what would be the largest increase to the BCA defense caps yet—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion  Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $733 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $576 billion and designate an additional $157 billion for OCO  According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $677 billion (which assumes an $87 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $66 billion (see Figure 11 )  According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $723 billion (which assumes a $133 billion, or 23%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion  Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $743 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $590 billion and designate an additional $153 billion for OCO  As previously discussed, these figures would change with different toplines for the national defense budget function (050)  Former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and the National Defense Strategy Commission have recommended that Congress increase the defense budget between 3% and 5% a year above inflation ("real growth") to meet U S  strategic goals  President Donald Trump has said the discretionary defense spending request would total $700 billion in FY2020, a decrease of 2% in nominal terms from FY2019  Trump said, "We know what the budget—the new budget is for the Defense Department  It will probably be $700 billion " However, some media outlets have since reported that the President intends to request a discretionary defense budget of $750 billion in FY2020  Senator James Inhofe, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Representative Mac Thornberry, ranking member of the House Armed Services Committees in the 116 th Congress, have argued, "Any cut in the defense budget would be a senseless step backward " Thornberry has also said transferring recurring OCO costs into the regular budget "makes sense … it makes for more predictable budgeting, but it's all about what happens on the topline " Representative Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in the 116 th Congress, has said of the defense budget: "I think the number is too high, and it's certainly not going to be there in the future … We've got a debt, we've got a deficit, we've got infrastructure problems, we've got healthcare, education—there's a whole lot that is necessary to make our country safe, secure, and prosperous " Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan has talked about a flat topline for national defense: "When you look at the $700 billion, it's not just for one year drop down, [or] a phase, it's a drop and then held constant" over the FYDP  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer David Norquist, who is also performing the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, at one time was reportedly preparing two budgets for FY2020—one assuming $733 billion for national defense and another assuming $700 billion  An analyst has noted "returning enduring OCO costs to the base budget, particularly a vast majority of those enduring costs over a short period as DOD has outlined, could significantly complicate an agreement between congressional Democrats and Republicans to increase both the defense and nondefense BCA budget caps for FY2020 and FY2021 " As analyst noted, "OCO has become an even less-defined pot of money … Congress needs to properly question the DOD budget planners on the future of OCO " In a January 2017 report, GAO concluded, "Without a reliable estimate of DOD's enduring OCO costs, decision makers will not have a complete picture of the department's future funding needs or be able to make informed choices and trade-offs in budget formulation and decision making " The department states it has not fully estimated those costs in part because of the BCA  In a response to GAO, DOD wrote, "Developing reliable estimates of enduring OCO costs is an important first step to any future effort to transition enduring OCO costs to the base budget  In the context of such an effort, the Department would consider developing and reporting formal estimates of those costs  However, until there is sufficient relief from the budgetary caps established in the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Department will need OCO to finance counterterrorism operations, in particular [OFS] and [OIR] " In an October 2018 report, the Congressional Budget Office estimated OCO funding for DOD enduring activities—that is, those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts—totaled more than $50 billion a year (in 2019 dollars) from 2006 to 2018—and are projected to total about $47 billion a year starting in FY2020  This figure appears to be consistent with projections published by DOD  According to the department's FY2019 budget documents, DOD projected $53 billion for "OCO to Base" in FY2020 and $45 8 billion for "OCO to Base" for FY2021 through FY2023  Some analysts have concluded: Uncertainty created by current reliance on OCO, particularly to fund base budget needs, could be detrimental to national security on three levels: (a) by undermining budget controls and contributing thereby to larger deficits, (b) by generating insecurity in the defense workforce and in defense suppliers, and (c) by creating long-term uncertainty in defense planning  The alternative, transitioning longer-term OCO expenses to the base budget, could be achieved through a combination of increased budget caps, targeted cuts in inefficient Defense programs, and increased revenues  For example, a potential enduring activity in the OCO budget is the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)  It was previously known as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), an effort that began in June 2014 to increase the number of U S  military personnel and prepositioned equipment in Central and Eastern Europe intended in part to reassure NATO allies after Russia's military seized Crimea  As some analysts have noted, "Because it is in the OCO part of the budget request, EDI funding does not include a projection for how much funding will be allocated in future years, which can create uncertainty in the minds of allies and adversaries alike about the U S  military's commitment to the program " On the other hand, some contend that it is precisely EDI's flexibility that allows the commander of European Command to quickly respond to changing security and posture needs in Europe, and ensure that monies intended for European deterrence will not be redirected to other DOD priorities  In its November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission quoted the late military strategist Bernard Brodie, who wrote "strategy wears a dollar sign " The panel concluded that relying on OCO funding to increase the defense budget "is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources" for the type of great power competition outlined in the Secretary of Defense's 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which calls for the United States to bolster its competitive military advantage relative to threats posed by China and Russia: Because of budgetary constraints imposed by the BCA, lawmakers and the Department of Defense have increasingly relied upon the overseas contingency operations (OCO) fund to pay for warfighting operations in the greater Middle East, as well as other activities and initiatives  Yet this approach to resourcing has produced problems and distortions of its own  For one thing, the amount of money devoted to OCO since the BCA was enacted no longer corresponds to warfighting operations in the greater Middle East  Furthermore, such operations are no longer a top priority as articulated in the NDS  Finally, reorienting the military toward high-end competition and conflict will require new capabilities beyond the current program of record  OCO is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources for such a long-term endeavor, given its lack of predictability and the limitations on what OCO funds can be used to buy " Appendix A  Statutes, Guidance, and Regulations The designation of funding as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) is governed by several statues as well as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and the Department of Defense (DOD) Financial Management Regulation (FMR)  The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA) of 1985 BBEDCA, as amended, includes the statutory definitions of emergency and unanticipated as they relate to budget enforcement through sequestration  The act also allows for appropriations to be designated by Congress and the President as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism   Such appropriations are effectively exempt from the statutory discretionary spending limits  Title 10, United States Code—Armed Forces 10 U S C  101—Definitions Section 101 provides definitions of terms applicable to Title 10  While it does not define overseas contingency operations, it does include a definition of a contingency operations   Administration and Internal Guidance In addition to statutory requirements, the DOD and the Department of State are subject to guidance on OCO spending from the Administration  In October 2006 , under the Bush Administration, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directed the services to break with long-standing DOD regulatory policies and expand their request for supplemental funding to reflect incremental costs related to the "longer war on terror " There was no specific definition for the "longer war on terror," now one of the core missions of the DOD  In February 2009, at the beginning of the Obama Administration, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued updated budget guidance that required DOD to move some OCO costs back into the base budget  However, within six months of issuing the new criteria, officials waived restrictions related to pay and that would have prohibited end-strength growth  In a letter from OMB to the then-Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert Hale, the agency characterized its 2009 criteria as "very successful" for delineating base and OCO spending but stated, "This update clarifies language, eliminates areas of confusion and provides guidance for areas previously unanticipated " GAO subsequently reported that the revised guidance significantly changed the criteria used to build the fiscal year 2010 OCO funding request by: specifying stricter definitions for repair and procurement of equipment; limiting applicability of OCO funds for RDT&E; excluding pay and allowances for end-strength above the level requested in the budget; excluding enduring family support initiatives; and excluding base realignment and closures (BRAC) amounts  OMB again revised its guidance in September 2010 following a number of GAO reports that had concluded DOD reporting on OCO costs was of "questionable reliability," due in part to imprecisely defined financial management regulations related to OCO spending  (as of September 9, 2010) Source: Letter from Steven M  Kosiak, Associate Director for Defense and Foreign Affairs, OMB, to Robert Hale, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, "Revised War Funding Criteria," September 9, 2010  DOD Financial Management Regulations DOD incorporated the September 2010 OMB criteria for war costs into the Financial Management Regulation  Table 1 includes the general cost categories DOD uses in accounting for costs of contingency operations  Appendix B  Transfer Authorities, Special Purpose Accounts In addition to the supplemental appropriations and emergency or OCO/GWOT designation, the Department of Defense and the Department of State also have the authority to shift funds from one budget account to another in response to operational needs  For DOD, these transfers (sometimes called reprogramings ) are statutorily authorized by 10 U S C  2214—Transfer of funds: procedures and limitations  This authority allows the Secretary of Defense to reallocate funds for higher priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements, after receiving written approval from the four congressional defense committees  DOD may also reprogram funds within an account from one activity to another, as long as the general purpose for the use of those funds remains unchanged  Specific limits to transfer or reprogramming authorities have also been added to these general authorities through provisions in annual defense authorization and appropriation acts  The FY2019 defense appropriations bill sets the base budget transfer cap at $4 billion and the OCO transfer cap at $2 billion  The Department of State's OCO transfer authority has been provided in appropriations acts and has specifically authorized the Administration to transfer OCO funds only to other OCO funds within Title VIII SFOPS appropriations, not between OCO and base accounts  The transfer authority is capped, specified by account, and requires regular congressional notification procedures  Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) The OCOTF was established for DOD in FY1997 as a no year transfer account (meaning amounts are available until expended) in order to provide additional flexibility to meet operational requirements  Transfers from the OCOTF are processed using existing reprogramming procedures  A quarterly report is submitted to the congressional oversight committees, documenting all transfers from the OCOTF to DOD components base budget accounts  Beginning in FY2002, funds to support Southwest Asia, Kosovo, and Bosnia contingency requirements were appropriated directly to DOD components' Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel accounts rather than to the OCOTF for later disbursement  FY2014 was the last year the Administration requested a direct appropriation to the OCOTF  Contingency Operations Funded in the DOD Base Budget As first mandated by section 8091 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P L  110-116 ), Congress has required DOD to provide separate annual budget justification documents detailing the costs of U S  armed forces' participation in all named contingency operations where the total cost of the operation exceeds $100 million or is staffed by more than 1,000 U S  military personnel  Funding for certain DOD contingency operations has been moved to the base budget request, and is no longer designated as emergency or OCO/GWOT requirements  This movement of funding from the OCO request to the base budget request typically occurs as the operational activities of an enduring contingency operation evolve over time and DOD determines that certain elements of the associated military operations have become stable enough to be planned, financed, and executed within the base budget  For example, funding for Operation Noble Eagle, which provides fighter aircraft on 24/7 alert at several U S  military bases, was moved from the GWOT request to the base budget request in 2005  Contingency operations and other activities funded wholly or in part through DOD's base budget have included: NATO Operations in the Balkans   The U S  Army and U S  Air Force provide support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led operations in the Balkans region  Most U S  forces are deployed to Kosovo in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)  A small number of U S  personnel are deployed to the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Joint Task Force - Bravo   U S  forces support this task force, which operates from Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras and supports joint, combined, and interagency exercises and operations in Central America to counter the influence of transnational organized crime; carry out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and build military capacity with regional partners and allied nations to promote regional cooperation and security; Operation Juniper Shield  Previously known as Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), this operation supports efforts to defeat violent extremist organizations in East Africa  This operation also provides military-to-military engagement with partner African countries, as well as readiness for crisis response and evacuation of U S  military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel; Operation Noble Eagle   This operation funds the continuing efforts to defend the United States from airborne attacks, maintain the sovereignty of the United States airspace, and defend critical U S  facilities from potentially hostile threats or unconventional attacks; Operation Enduring Freedom- Horn of Africa   This operation was established to support efforts to defeat violent extremist organizations in East Africa; provide military-to-military engagement with partner African countries, as well as readiness for crisis response and evacuation of U S  military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel throughout East Africa; Operation Enduring Freedom- Caribbean and Central America   A U S  regional military operation initiated in 2008, under the operational control of Special Operations Command-South, this operation was established to focus on counterterrorism to support DOD's overall military objectives and the larger fight against terrorism  Operation Observant Compass   This operation was established to support the deployment of approximately 100 U S  military personnel assisting the Ugandan People's Defense Force and neighboring partner African countries in countering the Lord's Resistance Army operations  Operation Spartan Shield  This operation was established to support ongoing U S  Central Command missions  Other Congressionally Authorized Funds or Programs Through the OCO authorization and appropriation process, Congress has created numerous funds and programs that are designed to finance specific overseas contingency operations-related activities that do not fit into traditional budgetary accounts  Many of these funds and programs are supplied with amounts that are available until expended—however, authorization for the specified fund or program has an expiration date, thereby requiring further congressional action for reauthorization of affected funds or programs  Congress has also provided increased transfer authority to provide greater flexibility for U S  government activities in situations that are typically unpredictable  Examples of these types of congressionally authorized OCO programs or funds have included: Afghan istan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)   These funds were established to provide funding and support for the training, equipping, and expansion of selected military and security forces in support of U S  objectives; Counterterrorism Partnership s Fund   This fund was established to provide funding and support to partner nations engaged in counterterrorism and crisis response activities; Command er's Emergency Response Program  This program was established to support infrastructure improvements, such as road repair and construction and enable military commanders on the ground to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs by undertaking activities that will immediately aid local populations and assist U S  forces in maintaining security gains; Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) Defeat Fund   This fund was established to coordinate and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing research and development, throughout DOD  Due to the enduring nature of the threat, DOD began moving associated funding to the base budget in FY2010; Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) Fund   This fund was intended to expedite the procurement and deployment of MRAPs to Iraq and Afghanistan; European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)   Initially the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), this effort was established to provide funding and support to NATO allies and partners to "reassure allies of the U S  commitment to their security and territorial integrity as members of the NATO Alliance, provide near-term flexibility and responsiveness to the evolving concerns of our allies and partners in Europe, especially Central and Eastern Europe, and help increase the capability and readiness of U S  allies and partners;" Global Security Contingency Fund   This fund was established to provide funding for the Department of State and the Department of Defense "to facilitate an interagency approach to confronting security challenges;" Complex Crise s Fund   This fund was established to provide funding through the State Department and USAID "to help prevent crises and promote recovery in post-conflict situations during unforeseen political, social, or economic challenges that threaten regional security;" Migration and Refugee Assistance Fund   This fund was established to provide funding to respond to refugee crises in Africa, the Near East, South and Central Asia, and Europe and Eurasia; and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative   This initiative was established to provide assistance, including training, equipment, lethal weapons, of a defensive nature; logistics support; supplies and services; sustainment; and intelligence support to the military and national security forces of Ukraine  This is an update to a report originally co-authored by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in Defense Readiness and Infrastructure  It references research previously compiled by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in U S  Defense Policy and Budget; Christopher Mann, Analyst in Defense Policy and Trade; [author name scrubbed], Analyst in U S  Defense Acquisition Policy; [author name scrubbed], CRS Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process; and [author name scrubbed], CRS Analyst in Public Finance  [author name scrubbed], Research Assistant, helped compile the graphics 


Report 2: Article I, Section 6, of the U S  Constitution, states that the compensation of Members of Congress shall be "ascertained by law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States " Additionally, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution states, "No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened " This amendment was submitted to the states on September 25, 1789, along with 11 other proposed amendments, 10 of which were ratified and became the Bill of Rights  It was not ratified until May 7, 1992  Since FY1983, Member salaries have been funded in a permanent appropriations account  The most recent pay adjustment for Members of Congress was in January 2009  Since then, the compensation for most Senators, Representatives, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico has been $174,000  The only exceptions include the Speaker of the House ($223,500) and the President pro tempore of the Senate and the majority and minority leaders in the House and Senate ($193,400)  This report provides historical tables on the rate of pay for Members of Congress since 1789; details on enacted legislation with language prohibiting the automatic annual pay adjustment since the most recent adjustment; the adjustments projected by the Ethics Reform Act as compared with actual adjustments in Member pay; and Member pay in constant and current dollars since 1992  Additional CRS products also address pay and benefits for Members of Congress: For information on actions taken each year since the establishment of the Ethics Reform Act adjustment procedure, see CRS Report 97-615, Salaries of Members of Congress: Congressional Votes, 1990-2018 , by Ida A  Brudnick  Members of Congress only receive salaries during the terms for which they are elected  Following their service, former Members of Congress may be eligible for retirement benefits, which are discussed in CRS Report RL30631, Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress , by Katelin P  Isaacs  For information on health insurance options available to Members, see CRS Report R43194, Health Benefits for Members of Congress and Designated Congressional Staff: In Brief , by Ada S  Cornell  For an overview of compensation, benefits, allowances, and selected limitations, see CRS Report RL30064, Congressional Salaries and Allowances: In Brief , by Ida A  Brudnick  There are three basic ways to adjust Member pay  Specific legislation was enacted to adjust Member pay prior to 1968  It has been used periodically since, most recently affecting pay for 1991  The second method by which Member pay can be increased is pursuant to recommendations from the President, based on those made by a quadrennial salary commission  In 1967, Congress established the Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries to recommend salary increases for top-level federal officials (P L  90-206)  Three times (in 1969, 1977, and 1987) Congress received pay increases made under this procedure; on three occasions it did not  Effective with passage of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 ( P L  101-194 ), the commission ceased to exist  Its authority was assumed by the Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation  Although the first commission under the 1989 act was to have convened in 1993, it did not meet  The third method by which the salary of Members can be changed is by annual adjustments  Prior to 1990, the pay of Members, and other top-level federal officials, was tied to the annual comparability increases provided to General Schedule (GS) federal employees  This procedure was established in 1975 ( P L  94-82 )  Such increases were recommended by the President, subject to congressional acceptance, disapproval, or modification  Congress accepted 5 such increases for itself—in 1975, 1979 (partial), 1984, 1985, and 1987—and declined 10 (1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1986, 1988, and 1989)  The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 changed the method by which the annual adjustment is determined for Members and other senior officials  This procedure employs a formula based on changes in private sector wages and salaries as measured by the Employment Cost Index (ECI)  The annual adjustment automatically goes into effect unless 1  Congress statutorily prohibits the adjustment; 2  Congress statutorily revises the adjustment; or 3  The annual base pay adjustment of GS employees is established at a rate less than the scheduled adjustment for Members, in which case Members would be paid the lower rate  Under this revised method, annual adjustments were accepted 13 times (adjustments scheduled for January 1991, 1992, 1993, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2009) and denied 16 times (adjustments scheduled for January 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019)  Although discussion of the Member pay adjustment sometimes occurs during consideration of annual appropriations bills, these bills do not contain funds for the annual salaries or pay adjustment for Members  Nor do they contain language authorizing an increase  The use of appropriations bills as vehicles for provisions prohibiting the automatic annual pay adjustments for Members developed by custom  A provision prohibiting an adjustment to Member pay could be offered to any bill, or be introduced as a separate bill  The maximum potential January 2020 Member pay adjustment of 2 6%, or $4,500, was known when the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released data for the change in the Employment Cost Index (ECI) during the 12-month period from December 2017 to December 2018 on January 31, 2019  Each year, the adjustment takes effect automatically unless it is either denied or modified statutorily by Congress, or limited by the General Schedule (GS) base pay adjustment, since the percentage increase in Member pay is limited by law to the GS base pay percentage increase  The maximum potential January 2019 Member pay adjustment of 2 3%, or $4,000, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2016 to December 2017 on January 31, 2018  Each year, the adjustment takes effect automatically unless it is either denied or modified statutorily by Congress, or limited by the GS base pay adjustment, since the percentage increase in Member pay is limited by law to the GS base pay percentage increase  The 2019 GS base pay adjustment was 1 4%, automatically limiting any Member pay adjustment to $2,400  The House-passed ( H R  5894 ) and Senate-reported versions ( S  3071 ) of the FY2019 legislative branch appropriations bill both contained provisions to prevent this adjustment  The Member pay provision was included in the bills as introduced and no separate votes were held on this provision  Division B of P L  115-244 , enacted September 21, 2018, included the pay freeze provision  The maximum potential January 2018 member pay adjustment of 1 8%, or $3,100, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2015 to December 2016 on January 31, 2017  Each year, the adjustment takes effect automatically unless it is either denied or modified statutorily by Congress, or limited by the GS base pay adjustment, since the percentage increase in Member pay is limited by law to the GS base pay percentage increase  The 2018 GS base pay adjustment was 1 4%, automatically limiting any Member pay adjustment to $2,400  The House-passed ( H R  3162 ) and Senate-reported versions ( S  1648 ) of the FY2018 legislative branch appropriations bill both contained provisions to prevent this adjustment  The Member pay provision was included in the bills as introduced and no separate votes were held on this provision  Neither bill was enacted prior to the start of FY2018, and legislative branch activities were initially funded through a series of continuing appropriations resolutions (CRs) ( P L  115-56 , through December 8, 2017; P L  115-90 , through December 22, 2017; P L  115-96 , through January 19, 2018; P L  115-120 , through February 8, 2018; P L  115-123 , through March 23, 2018)  P L  115-56 contained a provision, extended in the subsequent CRs, continuing "section 175 of P L  114-223 , as amended by division A of P L  114-254  " This provision prohibited a Member pay adjustment in FY2017  Section 7 of the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P L  115-141 ) prohibited the adjustment for the remainder of the year  The maximum potential January 2017 Member pay adjustment of 1 6%, or $2,800, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2014 to December 2015 on January 30, 2016  Both the House-passed ( H R  5325 ) and Senate-reported ( S  2955 ) versions of the FY2017 legislative branch appropriations bill—which would provide approximately $4 4 billion in funding for the activities of the House of Representatives, Senate, and legislative branch support agencies —contained a provision that would prohibit this adjustment  The Member pay provision was included in the bills as introduced and no separate votes were held on this provision  No further action was taken on H R  5325 or S  2955 , but the pay prohibition language was included in the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P L  114-254 )  Absent the statutory prohibition on a Member pay adjustment, Members of Congress would have automatically been limited to a 1 0% ($1,700) salary increase to match the increase in base salaries for GS employees  The maximum potential January 2016 Member pay adjustment of 1 7%, or $3,000, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2013 to December 2014 on January 30, 2015  The House-passed and Senate-reported versions of the FY2016 legislative branch appropriations bill ( H R  2250 ) both contained a provision prohibiting this adjustment  The pay adjustment prohibition was subsequently included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P L  114-113 )  Absent the statutory prohibition on a Member pay adjustment, Members of Congress would have automatically been limited to a 1 0% ($1,700) salary increase to match the increase in base salaries for GS employees  The maximum potential January 2015 pay adjustment of 1 6%, or $2,800, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2012 to December 2013 on January 31, 2014  Each year, the adjustment takes effect automatically unless it is either denied statutorily by Congress, or limited by the GS base pay adjustment, since the percentage increase in Member pay is limited by law to the GS base pay percentage increase  The FY2015 legislative branch appropriations bill ( H R  4487 ), as reported by the Committee on Appropriations and passed by the House on May 1, 2014, contained a provision prohibiting this adjustment  This provision was continued in the House-passed and Senate-reported versions of this bill, with no separate vote on the Member pay provision  No further action on this bill was taken, but the provision was subsequently included in Section 8 of Division Q of the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, which was enacted on December 16, 2014  On August 29, 2014, President Obama issued an "alternative pay plan for federal civilian employees," which called for a 1 0% increase in base salaries for General Schedule employees  Absent the statutory prohibition on a Member pay adjustment, Members of Congress would have automatically been limited to a 1 0% ($1,700) salary increase  The maximum potential 2014 pay adjustment of 1 2%, or $2,100, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2011 to December 2012 on January 31, 2013  The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P L  113-46 , enacted October 17, 2013), however, prohibited the scheduled 2014 pay adjustment for Members of Congress  Each year, the adjustment takes effect automatically unless it is either denied statutorily by Congress, or limited by the GS base pay adjustment, since the percentage increase in Member pay is limited by law to the GS base pay percentage increase  The scheduled January 2014 across-the-board increase in the base pay of GS employees under the annual adjustment formula was 1 3%  A scheduled GS annual pay increase may be altered only if the President issues an alternative plan or if a different increase, or freeze, is enacted  The President issued an alternate pay plan for civilian federal employees on August 30, 2013  This plan called for a January 2014 across-the-board pay increase of 1 0% for federal civilian employees, the same percentage as proposed in the President's FY2014 budget  Legislation was not enacted to prohibit or alter the GS adjustment, and Executive Order 13655, issued on December 23, 2013, implemented a 1 0% increase for GS employees  Had the Member pay adjustment not been prohibited by law, the GS base pay adjustment would have automatically limited a salary adjustment for Members of Congress to 1 0% ($1,700)  The maximum potential 2013 pay adjustment of 1 1%, or $1,900, was known when the BLS released data for the change in the ECI during the 12-month period from December 2010 to December 2011 on January 31, 2012  The adjustment takes effect automatically unless (1) denied statutorily by Congress or (2) limited by the GS base pay adjustment, since the percentage increase in Member pay is limited by law to the GS base pay percentage increase  The President's budget, submitted on February 13, 2012, proposed an average (i e , base and locality) 0 5% adjustment for GS employees  President Obama later stated in a letter to congressional leadership on August 21, 2012, that the current federal pay freeze should extend until FY2013 budget negotiations are finalized  Section 114 of H J Res  117 , the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013, which was introduced on September 10, 2012, extended the freeze enacted by P L  111-322 through the duration of this continuing resolution  H J Res  117 was passed by the House on September 13 and the Senate on September 22  It was signed by the President on September 28, 2012 ( P L  112-175 )  A delay in the implementation of pay adjustments for GS employees automatically delays any scheduled Member pay adjustment  On December 27, 2012, President Obama issued Executive Order 13635, which listed the rates of pay for various categories of officers and employees that would be effective after the expiration of the freeze extended by P L  112-175   The executive order included a 0 5% increase for GS base pay, which automatically lowered the maximum potential Member pay adjustment from 1 1% to 0 5%  As in prior years, schedule 6 of the 2012 executive order listed the pay rate for Members of Congress for the upcoming year  This executive order indicated that an annual adjustment would take effect after the expiration of the freeze included in P L  112-175   As stated above, the annual adjustments take effect automatically if legislation is not enacted preventing them  The executive order, however, by establishing the GS pay adjustment at a lower rate than the scheduled Member pay adjustment, automatically lowered the Member pay adjustment rate since by law Member pay adjustments cannot be higher than GS pay adjustments  Subsequently, a provision in H R  8 , the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, which was enacted on January 2, 2013 ( P L  112-240 ), froze Member pay at the 2009 level for 2013  The language was included in S Amdt  3448 , a substitute amendment agreed to by unanimous consent  The bill, as amended, passed the Senate (89-8, vote #251) and the House (257-167, roll call #659) on January 1, 2013  This freeze was subsequently reflected in Executive Order 13641, which was signed April 5, 2013  This represented the second time, the first being in 2006, that Member pay was statutorily frozen for only a portion of the following year at the time of the issuance of the executive order  In both instances, the executive order listed new pay rates and indicated an effective date following the expiration of the statutory freeze  Pay adjustments in both years were further frozen pursuant to subsequent laws  As stated above, projected Member pay adjustments are calculated based on changes in the ECI  The projected 2011 adjustment of 0 9% was known when the BLS released data for the ECI change during the 12-month period from December 2008 to December 2009 on January 29, 2010  This adjustment would have equaled a $1,600 increase, resulting in a salary of $175,600  The 2011 pay adjustment was prohibited by the enactment of H R  5146 ( P L  111-165 ) on May 14, 2010  H R  5146 was introduced in the House on April 27 and was agreed to the same day (Roll no  226)  It was agreed to in the Senate the following day by unanimous consent  Other legislation was also introduced to prevent the scheduled 2011 pay adjustment  Additionally, P L  111-322 , which was enacted on December 22, 2010, prevents any adjustment in GS base pay before December 31, 2012  Since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in the base pay of GS employees, Member pay is also frozen during this period  If not limited by GS pay, Members could have received a salary adjustment of 1 3% in January 2012 under the ECI formula  Pay for Members of Congress remained $174,000  Under the formula established in the Ethics Reform Act, Members were originally scheduled to receive a pay adjustment in January 2010 of 2 1%  This adjustment was denied by Congress through a provision included in the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act  Section 103 of Division J of the act states, "Notwithstanding any provision of section 601(a)(2) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U S C  31(2)), the percentage adjustment scheduled to take effect under any such provision in calendar year 2010 shall not take effect " Had this provision not been enacted, the 2 1% projected adjustment would have been automatically reduced to 1 5% to match the 2010 GS base pay adjustment  As in previous Congresses, legislation was introduced in the 116 th Congress to repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, H R  751 and H R  1466 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to congressional actions or economic indicators, including passage of a budget resolution, passage of appropriations, or reaching the debt limit (for example, S  39 , S  44 , S  949 , H R  86 , H R  102 , H R  129 , H R  236 , H R  298 , H R  834 , H R  1172 , H R  1178 , H R  1466 , H R  1612 , H J Res  10 , and H J Res  51 ); and prohibit pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, S  74 , S  949 , H R  26 , H R  211 , H R  845 , and H R  1612 )  Legislation was introduced in the 115 th Congress to prohibit adjustments in pay (for example, H R  342 ); repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, H R  668 and H R  5946 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to congressional actions or economic indicators, including passage of a budget resolution or reaching the debt limit (for example, H R  429 , H R  536 , H R  646 , H R  1779 , H R  1951 , H R  2153 , H R  2665 , H R  3675 , H R  4512 , and H R  5946 , and S

ground_truth: Congressional interest in Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding has continued as Members debate ways of funding priorities without breaching discretionary spending limits set in law. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority designated as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) in support of the broad U.S. government response to the 9/11 attacks and for other related international affairs activities. This figure amounts to approximately 9.4% of total discretionary spending during this period. Congress has used supplemental appropriation acts or designated funding for emergency requirements or OCO/GWOT—or both—in statute. These funds are not subject to limits on discretionary spending in congressional budget resolutions or to the statutory discretionary spending limits established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-125). The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P.L. 99-177) allows emergency funding to be excluded from budget control limits. The BCA added the OCO/GWOT designation to the BBEDCA exemption, thereby providing Congress and the President with an alternate way to exclude funding from the BCA spending limits. While there is no overall statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO/GWOT spending, both Congress and the President have fundamental roles in determining how much of the spending to provide each fiscal year. Congress must designate any such funding in statute on an account-by-account basis. The President is also required to designate it as such after it is appropriated to be available for expenditure. Debate over what should constitute OCO/GWOT or emergency activities and expenses has shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Funding designated for OCO/GWOT has also been used to fund base-budget requirements of the DOD and State Department and to prevent or respond to crises abroad, including armed conflict, as well as human-caused and natural disasters. Some defense officials and policymakers argue OCO funding allows for flexible response to contingencies, and provides a "safety valve" to the spending caps and threat of sequestration—the automatic cancellation of budget authority largely through across-the-board reductions of nonexempt programs and activities—under the BCA. Critics, however, have described OCO/GWOT as a loophole or "gimmick"—morphing from an account for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupplying expended munitions, and transporting troops through war zones, to a "slush fund" for activities unrelated to contingency operations. Congress appropriated approximately $103 billion for OCO in FY2017 (8.5% of all discretionary appropriations), $78 billion for OCO in FY2018 (5.5% of all discretionary appropriations), and $68.8 billion for OCO so far in FY2019. Discretionary appropriations for FY2019 are not yet final; a continuing resolution expired December 21, 2018. Following passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which raised discretionary budget caps for defense and foreign affairs agencies in FY2018 and FY2019, the Administration proposed shifting some OCO funding into the base, or regular, budget. Although Congress has generally not followed Administration requests for reduced funding for foreign affairs and domestic activities and has increased funding for defense, the President has asked cabinet secretaries to propose spending cuts of 5% in FY2020. Such proposals, if requested in a budget submission, may create difficult choices for Congress in FY2020 and FY2021—the final two years of the BCA discretionary spending limits. Congress's decisions on OCO/GWOT designations will affect how much agency funding is available for military operations and foreign affairs activities overseas, how much is subject to the BCA caps, and how much is incorporated into regular budgets and long-term budget projections.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  14 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H R  1786 and H R  5539 ); and prohibit pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, H R  1789 , H R  1794 , H R  2214 , H R  4852 , H R  4870 , and S  2327 )  Legislation was introduced in the 114 th Congress to prohibit adjustments in pay (for example, H R  109 and H R  302 ); repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, H R  179 , H R  513 , H R  688 , H R  1585 , and S  17 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to congressional actions or economic indicators, including the passage of a budget resolution or existence of a deficit (for example, H Con Res  27 , S Con Res  11 , H R  92 , H R  110 , H R  174 , H R  187 , H R  3757 , H R  4814 , H R  4476 , and S  39 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H R  179 and H R  688 ); and prohibit or reduce pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, S  2074 , H R  3562 , H R  2023 , and H R  1032 )  The House budget resolution for FY2016, H Con Res  27 , included a policy statement that Congress should agree to a concurrent budget resolution each year by April 15, and if not, congressional salaries should be held in escrow (Section 819)  The statement proposed that salaries would be released from the escrow account either when a chamber agrees to a concurrent resolution on the budget or the last day of the Congress, whichever is earlier  The House agreed to this resolution on March 25, 2015, and no further action was taken  The Senate agreed to its resolution on the FY2016 budget, S Con Res  11 , on March 27, 2015, without this language  The conference report for S Con Res  11 —agreed to in the House on April 30 and in the Senate on May 5, 2015—contains a "Policy Statement on 'No Budget, No Pay'" (Section 6216), which refers to actions by the House  Legislation was introduced in the 113 th Congress to prohibit adjustments in pay (for example, H R  54 , H R  243 , H R  636 , S  18 , S  30 ); repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, H R  134 , H R  150 , H R  196 , S  65 , and H R  398 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to congressional actions or economic indicators, including passage of a budget resolution or reaching the debt limit (for example, H R  108 , H R  167 , H R  284 , H R  308 , H R  310 , H R  325 , H R  372 , H R  397 , H R  396 , H R  522 , H R  593 , H R  1884 , H R  2335 , H R  3234 , S  18 , S  30 , and S  263 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H R  37 , H R  150 , H R  391 , H R  396 , H R  398 , and H R  1467 ); prohibit pay for Members of Congress during a lapse in appropriations resulting in a government shutdown (for example, H R  3160 , H R  3215 , H R  3224 , H R  3234 , and H R  3236 ); and apply any sequester to Member pay (for example, S  436 , H R  1181 , H R  1478 , and H R  2677 )  H R  325 , which (1) included language holding congressional salaries in escrow if a concurrent resolution on the budget was not agreed to by April 15, 2013, and (2) provided for a temporary extension of the debt ceiling through May 18, 2013, was introduced on January 21, 2013  Salaries would have been held in escrow for Members in a chamber if that chamber had not agreed to a concurrent resolution by that date  Salaries would have been released from the escrow account either when that chamber agreed to a concurrent resolution on the budget or the last day of the 113 th Congress, whichever was earlier  H R  325 was agreed to in the House on January 23, 2013, and the Senate on January 31, 2013  It was enacted on February 4, 2013 ( P L  113-3 )  Both the House and Senate agreed to a budget resolution prior to that date, however, and salaries were not held in escrow  H R  807 , the Full Faith and Credit Act, was introduced in the House on February 25, 2013  The bill would have prioritized certain payments in the event the debt reaches the statutory limit  An amendment, H Amdt  61 , was offered on May 9, 2013, that would clarify that these obligations would not include compensation for Members of Congress  It was agreed to the same day  The bill passed the House on May 13, 2013  No further action was taken in the 113 th Congress  The House-passed version of H J Res  59 , the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2014, also contained a provision addressing actions by the Secretary of the Treasury in the event that the debt limit is reached and not raised  The provision (Section 138) would, in part, prohibit borrowing to provide pay for Members of Congress in the event that the debt reaches the statutory limit prior to December 15, 2014  The bill passed the House on September 20, 2013  It was enacted on December 26, 2013, without this section  Legislation was introduced in the 112 th Congress to repeal the automatic pay adjustment provision (for example, S  133 , S  148 , H R  187 , H R  235 , H R  246 , H R  343 , H R  431 , H R  3673 ); change the procedure by which pay for Members of Congress is adjusted or disbursed by linking it to other action or economic indicators (for example, H R  124 , H R  172 , H R  236 , H R  994 , H R  1454 , H R  3136 , H R  3565 , H R  3774 , H R  3799 , H R  3883 , H R  4036 , H R  6438 , S  1442 ); reduce the pay of Members of Congress (for example, H R  204 , H R  270 , H R  335 , H R  1012 , H R  4399 ); otherwise alter or restrict pay for Members under certain conditions (for example, H R  6108 ); and freeze Member pay (for example, S  1931 , S  1936 , S  2065 , S  2079 , S  2210 , H R  3858 , H R  6474 , H R  6720 , H R  6721 , H R  6722 )  Legislation was also introduced in the 112 th Congress that would have affected Member pay in the event of a lapse of appropriations resulting in a government shutdown  These included H R  819 , H R  1255 , H R  1305 , H Con Res  56 , and S  388   The Senate passed S  388 on March 1, 2011  The bill would have prohibited Members of the House and Senate from receiving pay, including retroactive pay, for each day that there is a lapse in appropriations or the federal government is unable to make payments or meet obligations because of the public debt limit  The House passed H R  1255 on April 1, 2011  The bill would have prohibited the disbursement of pay to Members of the House and Senate during either of these situations  No further action was taken on either bill  On April 8, 2011, the Speaker of the House issued a "Dear Colleague" letter indicating that in the event of a shutdown, Members of Congress would continue to be paid pursuant to the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, which as stated above, states: "No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened"—although Members could elect to return any compensation to the Treasury  Additional legislation to prohibit any Member pay adjustment in 2013 was introduced but not enacted in the 112 th Congress, including the following: Section 5421(b)(1) of H R  3630 , as introduced in the House, would have prohibited any adjustment for Members of Congress prior to December 31, 2013  Section 706 of the motion to recommit also contained language freezing Member pay  On December 13, 2011, the motion to recommit failed (183-244, roll call #922), and the bill passed the House (234-193, roll call #923)  The House-passed version of the bill was titled the "Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011 " The Senate substitute amendment, which did not address pay adjustments, passed on December 17  It was titled the "Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 " The bill was enacted on February 22, 2012 ( P L  112-96 ), without the pay freeze language  H R  3835 , introduced on January 27, 2012, also would have extended the pay freeze for federal employees, including Members of Congress, to December 31, 2013  This bill passed the House on February 1, 2012  H R  6726 , introduced on January 1, 2013, would have extended the pay freeze for federal employees, including Members of Congress, to December 31, 2013  This bill passed the House on January 2, 2013  Table 1 provides a history of the salaries of Members of Congress since 1789  For each salary rate, both the effective date and the statutory authority are provided  Table 2 provides information on pay adjustments for Members since 1992, which was the first full year after the Ethics Reform Act that Representatives and Senators received the same salary  The table provides the projected percentage changes under the formula based on the Employment Cost Index and the actual percentage adjustment  The differences between the projected and actual Member pay adjustments resulted from the enactment of legislation preventing the increase (adjustments for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019); limits on the percentage increase of Member pay because of the percentage increase in GS base pay (adjustments for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019); and a combination of the above  In some years, the percentage adjustment for Member pay would have been lowered to match the percentage adjustment in GS base pay if Congress had not passed legislation denying the adjustment (adjustments for 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019)  If Members of Congress had received every adjustment prescribed by the ECI formula since 1992, and the 2 U S C  §4501 limitation regarding the percentage base pay increase for GS employees remained unchanged, the 2019 salary would be $210,900  Table 3 lists the laws which have previously delayed or prohibited Member pay adjustments, the dates these laws were enacted, and the text of the provision  While many of the bills in this list are appropriations bills, a prohibition on Member pay adjustments could be included in any bill, or be introduced as a separate bill  Figure 1 , which follows, shows the salary of Members of Congress in current and constant (inflation adjusted) dollars since 1992  It shows that Member salaries, when adjusted for inflation, decreased 15% from 2009 until 2019 
Report 2:  When the committee finally rises and reports the bill back to the House, the House proceeds to vote on the amendments the committee has adopted  It usually approves all these amendments by one voice vote, though Members can demand separate votes on any or all of them as a matter of right  After a formal and routine stage called "third reading and engrossment" (when only the title of the bill is read), there is then an opportunity for a Member, virtually always from the minority party, to offer a motion to recommit the bill to committee  If the House agrees to a "simple" or "straight" motion to recommit, which only proposes to return the bill to committee, the bill is taken from the floor and returned to committee  Although the committee technically has the power to re-report the bill, in practice, the adoption of a straight motion to recommit is often characterized as effectively "killing" the measure  "Straight" motions to recommit are rare  Alternatively, motions to recommit far more frequently include instructions that the committee report the bill back to the House "forthwith" with an amendment that is stated in the motion  If the House agrees to such a motion, which is debatable for 10 minutes, evenly divided, it then immediately votes on the amendment itself, so a motion to recommit with instructions is really a final opportunity for the minority party to amend the bill before the House votes on whether to pass it  Thus, this complicated mode of consideration, which the House uses to consider most major bills, begins in the House with a decision to resolve into Committee of the Whole to consider a particular bill  General debate and the amending process take place in Committee of the Whole, but ultimately it is the House that formally amends and then passes or rejects the bill  Clause 1(m) of Rule X authorizes the Rules Committee to report resolutions affecting the order of business  Such a resolution—called a "rule" or "special rule"—usually proposes to make a bill in order for floor consideration so that it can be debated, amended, and passed or defeated by a simple majority vote  In effect, each special rule recommends to the House that it take from the Union or House Calendar a measure that is not otherwise privileged business and bring it to the floor out of its order on that calendar  Typically, such a resolution begins by providing that, at any time after its adoption, the Speaker may declare the House resolved into Committee of the Whole for the consideration of that bill  Because the special rule is itself privileged, under clause 5(a) of Rule XIII, the House can debate and vote on it promptly  If the House accepts the Rules Committee's recommendation, it proceeds to consider the bill itself  One fundamental purpose of most special rules, therefore, is to make another bill or resolution privileged so that it may interrupt the regular order of business  Their other fundamental purpose is to set special procedural ground rules for considering that measure; these ground rules may either supplement or supplant the standing rules of the House  For example, the special rule typically sets the length of time for general debate in Committee of the Whole and specifies which Members are to control that time  In addition, the special rule normally includes provisions that expedite final House action on the bill after the amending process in Committee of the Whole has been completed  Special rules may also waive points of order that Members could otherwise make against consideration of the bill, against one of its provisions, or against an amendment to be offered to it  The most controversial provisions of special rules affect the amendments that Members can offer to the bill that the resolution makes in order  As noted above, an "open rule" permits Representatives to propose any amendment that meets the normal requirements of House rules and precedents—for example, the requirement that each amendment must be germane  A "modified open rule" permits amendments to be offered that otherwise comply with House rules but imposes a time limit on the consideration of amendments or requires them to be preprinted in the Congressional Record   At the other extreme, a "closed rule" prohibits all amendments except perhaps for committee amendments and pro forma amendments ("to strike the last word") offered only for purposes of debate  A "structured" rule, which is the most common type of rule, permits only certain specific amendments to be considered on the floor  These provisions are very important because they can prevent Representatives from offering amendments as alternatives to provisions of the bill, thereby limiting the policy choices that the House can make  Open rules have been rare in recent Congresses  However, like other committees, the Rules Committee only makes recommendations to the House  As noted above, Members debate each of its procedural resolutions in the House under the hour rule and then vote to adopt or reject it  If the House votes against ordering the previous question on a special rule, a Member could offer an amendment to it, proposing to change the conditions under which the bill itself is to be considered  Because the adoption of a special rule is often viewed as a "party loyalty" vote, however, such a development is exceedingly rare  All the same, it is important to remember that while the Rules Committee is instrumental in helping the majority party leadership formulate its order of business and in setting appropriate ground rules for considering each bill, the House retains ultimate control over what it does, when, and how  Legislation is sometimes brought before the House of Representatives for consideration by the unanimous consent of its Members  Long-standing policies announced by the Speaker regulate unanimous consent requests for this purpose  Among other things, the Speaker will recognize a Member to propound a unanimous consent request to call up an unreported bill or resolution only if that request has been cleared in advance with both party floor leaders and with the bipartisan leadership of the committee of jurisdiction  Before any bill can become law, both the House and the Senate must pass it, and the two houses must agree on each and every one of its provisions  This basic constitutional requirement means that the House must have procedures to respond when the House and Senate pass different versions of the same bill  For example, the House may pass a Senate bill with House amendments, or the Senate may pass a House bill with Senate amendments and then send its amendments to the House  In either case, the two houses must resolve their differences over these amendments before the legislative process is completed  There are essentially two ways to approach this stage of the process: (1) by dealing with the amendments individually through a process of exchanging amendments between the chambers, with the bill being sent back and forth between the House and Senate, or (2) by dealing with the amendments collectively through a conference committee of Representatives and Senators who negotiate a series of compromises and concessions that are compiled in a conference report that the two houses can vote to accept  Because the process of resolving differences between the houses can be quite complicated, only some of its basic elements are summarized here  The House normally considers Senate amendments to a House bill by unanimous consent or by suspension of the rules; the House may accept the amendments (concur in them) or amend them (concur in them with House amendments)  Alternatively, the committee with jurisdiction over the bill may authorize its chair to move that the House disagree to the Senate's amendments and send them to a conference committee  When the House amends and passes a Senate bill, it may request a conference with the Senate immediately, or it may simply send its amendments to the Senate in the hope that the Senate will accept them  If the Senate refuses to do so, it may request a conference with the House instead  On the other hand, if the House and Senate can reach agreement by proposing amendments to each other's positions, the bill can be sent to the President for his signature or veto without the need to create a conference committee  This method of resolving differences is sometimes colloquially called "ping-pong," because each chamber acts in turn, shuttling the legislation back and forth as each proposes amendments to the position of the other  If the House and Senate agree to send their versions of the bill to a conference committee, the Speaker appoints the House conferees  These conferees are usually drawn from the standing committee (or committees) with jurisdiction over the bill, although the Speaker may appoint some other Representatives as well  When the House and Senate conferees meet, they are to deal only with provisions of the bill on which the two houses disagree  They should not insert new provisions or change provisions that both houses have already approved  Furthermore, as the conferees resolve each provision or amendment in disagreement, they accept the House position, the Senate position, or a compromise between them  Like almost all other House rules, the rules limiting the authority of conferees are enforced only if Members make points of order at the appropriate time  The House may also adopt a special rule, reported by the Rules Committee, waiving points of order against a conference report  To complete their work successfully, a majority of the House conferees and a majority of the Senate conferees must sign a report that recommends all the agreements they have reached  The conferees also sign a "joint explanatory statement" that describes the original House and Senate positions and the conferees' recommendations and is the functional equivalent of a legislative committee report  After Representatives have had three days to examine a conference report, it is privileged for floor consideration; it may be called up at any time that the House is not already considering something else  The report may be debated in the House under the hour rule, so the vote almost always occurs after no more than one hour of debate  No amendments to the report are in order  In practice, however, the House almost always considers conference reports under the terms of a special rule from the Rules Committee that waives all points of order against the report and its consideration  The conference report is a proposed package settlement of a number of disagreements, so the House and Senate may accept it or reject it, but they may not change it  If the two houses agree to the report by simple majority vote, all their differences have been resolved and the bill is then "enrolled," or reprinted, for formal presentation to the President  In rare instances, conferees cannot reach agreement on one or more of the amendments in conference, or they may reach an agreement that they cannot include in their conference report because their proposal exceeds the scope of the differences between the House and Senate positions (and thus violates the rules governing the content of conference reports)  In either case, the conferees may report back to the two houses with an amendment (or amendments) in disagreement  After acting on the conference report and dealing collectively with all the other amendments that were sent to conference, the House acts on each of the amendments in disagreement by considering motions such as a motion to accept the Senate's amendment or a motion to amend it with a new House amendment  The Senate takes similar action until the disagreements on these amendments are resolved or until the two houses agree to create a new conference committee only to address the remaining amendments that are still in disagreement  The bill cannot become law until the two houses resolve all the differences between their positions  Whenever Representatives vote on the floor, there is almost always first a "voice vote," in which the Members in favor of the bill, amendment, or motion vote "Aye" in unison, followed by those voting "No " Before the Speaker (or the chair of the Committee of the Whole) announces the result, any Representative can demand a "division vote," in which the Members in favor stand up to be counted, again followed by those opposed  But before the result of either a voice vote or a division vote is announced, a Member may try to require another vote in which everyone's position is recorded publicly  This recorded vote is taken by using the House's electronic voting system  In Committee of the Whole, an electronic vote is ordered when 25 Members request it  In the House, such a vote occurs when demanded by at least one-fifth of the Members present  Alternatively, any Member can demand an electronically recorded vote in the House if a quorum of the membership is not present on the floor when the voice or division vote takes place  The Constitution requires that a quorum must be present on the floor when the House is conducting business  In the House, a quorum is a majority of the Representatives; in Committee of the Whole, it is only 100 Members  However, the House has traditionally assumed that a quorum is always present unless a Member makes a point of order that it is not  The rules restrict when Members can make such points of order, and they occur most often when the House or the Committee of the Whole is voting  In the House, for example, a Representative can object to a voice or division vote on the grounds that a quorum is not present and make that point of order  If a quorum is not present, the Speaker automatically orders an electronically recorded vote during which Members record their presence on the floor by casting their votes  The issue is decided and a quorum is established at the same time  A voice or division vote is valid even if less than a quorum participates in the vote so long as no one makes a point of order that a quorum is not present  For this reason, Members can continue to meet in their committees or fulfill their other responsibilities off the floor when the House is doing business that does not involve publicly recorded votes  On most days, the House will meet two hours prior to scheduled legislative business for Morning Hour Debate, a period in which Members can make speeches of up to five minutes on subjects of their choosing  Later, the House will meet for legislative session  After the opening prayer on each day by the House chaplain (or perhaps by a guest chaplain), the Speaker announces approval of the Journal of the previous day's proceedings  A Member may require a recorded vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval of the Journal  Following the Pledge of Allegiance, some Members may then ask unanimous consent to address the House for one minute each on whatever subjects they wish, including subjects unrelated to the scheduled legislative business of the day  The ability to set the House's floor schedule is one of the primary powers and responsibilities of the majority party leaders, and in doing so they often consult with minority party leaders  Generally speaking, to the extent possible, majority party leaders and the committee chairmen arrange the legislative schedule for each week in advance  During the last floor session of the week, the majority leader normally announces the expected schedule for the coming week in a traditional "wrap-up" colloquy with a minority party leader  Changes in the schedule may be announced as they are made  On a Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday, the House will commonly consider multiple measures under the "suspension of the rules" procedure  Typically, recorded votes on such measures, if requested, are clustered together and taken at the end of the day  On other days of the week, the House will usually consider a major bill pursuant to a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules  Such a special rule would be debated in the House under the hour rule, at the end of which the majority manager of the special rule would "move the previous question," which, when adopted, brings the resolution to a vote  Once adopted, the House would ordinarily consider a measure in Committee of the Whole pursuant to the terms for general debate and amendment established by the special rule  Following consideration in the Committee of the Whole, the House would take the final votes on the measure after voting on the amendments recommended by the committee and on a minority motion to recommit, which would likely be made with amendatory instructions  As each item of business is completed, the Speaker anticipates which Member should be seeking recognition to call up the next bill or resolution  If another Representative requests to be recognized instead, t he Speaker may ask, "For what purpose does the gentleman seek recognition?" The Speaker may decline to recognize that Member if the Speaker wants the House to consider another privileged measure, motion, or report  At the end of legislative business on most days, some Members address the House for as much as an hour each on subjects of their choice  These "special order" speeches are arranged in advance and organized by the party leadership  In this way, Representatives can comment at length on current national and international issues and discuss bills that have not yet reached the House floor  The House often adjourns by early evening, although it may remain in session later when the need arises or when the end of the annual session or some other deadline approaches  The House rules for each Congress are published in a volume often called the House manual but officially entitled Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives   A new edition of this collection is published each Congress  The precedents of the House established through 1935 have been compiled in the 11-volume set of Hinds' and Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives   More recent precedents are published as Deschler's or Deschler-Brown -Johnson Precedents of the U S  House of Representatives ; 18 volumes of this set now are available  Volume 1 of a fourth series of House precedents, Precedents of the United States House of Representatives , was initiated in 2017, and additional volumes are expected in the future  The House's procedures are summarized in House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House , by Charles W  Johnson, John V  Sullivan, and Thomas J  Wickham Jr , Parliamentarians of the House  The most recent version of House Practice was published in 2017  The Parliamentarian and his assistants welcome inquiries about House procedures and offer expert assistance compatible with their other responsibilities  CRS Report 98-995, The Amending Process in the House of Representatives , by Christopher M  Davis  CRS Report RL32200, Debate, Motions, and Other Actions in the Committee of the Whole , by Bill Heniff Jr  and Elizabeth Rybicki  CRS Report 97-552, The Discharge Rule in the House: Principal Features and Uses , by Richard S  Beth  CRS Report RL30787, Parliamentary Reference Sources: House of Representatives , by Richard S  Beth and Megan S  Lynch  CRS Report 98-696, Resolving Legislative Differences in Congress: Conference Committees and Amendments Between the Houses , by Elizabeth Rybicki  CRS Report 97-780, The Speaker of the House: House Officer, Party Leader, and Representative , by Valerie Heitshusen  CRS Report 98-314, Suspension of the Rules in the House: Principal Features , by Elizabeth Rybicki  CRS Report 98-870, Quorum Requirements in the House: Committee and Chamber , by Christopher M  Davis 

ground_truth: Congress is required by Article I, Section 6, of the Constitution to determine its own pay. In the past, Congress periodically enacted specific legislation to alter its pay; the last time this occurred affected pay in 1991. More recently, pay has been determined pursuant to laws establishing formulas for automatic adjustments. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 established the current automatic annual adjustment formula, which is based on changes in private sector wages as measured by the Employment Cost Index (ECI). The adjustment is automatic unless denied statutorily, although the percentage may not exceed the percentage base pay increase for General Schedule (GS) employees. Member pay has since been frozen in two ways: (1) directly, through legislation that freezes salaries for Members but not for other federal employees, and (2) indirectly, through broader pay freeze legislation that covers Members and other specified categories of federal employees. Members of Congress last received a pay adjustment in January 2009. At that time, their salary was increased 2.8%, to $174,000. A provision in P.L. 111-8 prohibited any pay adjustment for 2010. Under the pay adjustment formula, Members were originally scheduled to receive an adjustment in January 2010 of 2.1%, although this would have been revised downward automatically to 1.5% to match the GS base pay adjustment. Members next were scheduled to receive a 0.9% pay adjustment in 2011. The pay adjustment was prohibited by P.L. 111-165. Additionally, P.L. 111-322 prevented any adjustment in GS base pay before December 31, 2012. Since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in the base pay of GS employees, Member pay was also frozen during this period. If not limited by GS pay, Member pay could have been adjusted by 1.3% in 2012. The ECI formula established a maximum potential pay adjustment in January 2013 of 1.1%. P.L. 112-175 extended the freeze on GS pay rates for the duration of this continuing resolution, which also extended the Member freeze since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in GS base pay. Subsequently, Member pay for 2013 was further frozen in P.L. 112-240. The maximum potential 2014 pay adjustment of 1.2%, or $2,100, was denied by P.L. 113-46. The maximum potential January 2015 Member pay adjustment was 1.6%, or $2,800. President Obama proposed a 1.0% increase in the base pay of GS employees, which would automatically have limited any Member pay adjustment to 1.0%. P.L. 113-235 contained a provision prohibiting any Member pay adjustment. The maximum potential January 2016 pay adjustment of 1.7%, or $3,000, would have been limited to 1.0%, or $1,700, due to the GS base pay increase. Member pay for 2016 was frozen by P.L. 114-113. The maximum potential January 2017 pay adjustment of 1.6%, or $2,800, would have been limited to 1.0%, or $1,700, due to the GS base pay increase. Member pay for 2017 was frozen by P.L. 114-254. The maximum potential January 2018 pay adjustment of 1.8%, or $3,100, was automatically limited to 1.4%, or $2,400, before being frozen by P.L. 115-141. The maximum potential January 2019 pay adjustment of 2.3%, or $4,000, was automatically limited to 1.4%, or $2,400, before being frozen at the 2009 level by P.L. 115-244. The maximum potential January 2020 pay adjustment is 2.6%, or $4,500. If Members of Congress had received every adjustment prescribed by the ECI formula since 1992, and the 2 U.S.C. §4501 limitation regarding the percentage base pay increase for GS employees remained unchanged, the 2019 salary would be $210,900. When adjusted for inflation, Member salaries have decreased 15% since the last pay adjustment in 2009. Both the automatic annual adjustments and funding for Members' salaries are provided pursuant to other laws (2 U.S.C. §4501)—not the annual appropriations bills—and a provision prohibiting a scheduled adjustment could be included in any bill, or introduced as a separate bill.