prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas  Matters of particular significance include the following: Israel's own capabilities for addressing threats, and its cooperation with the United States  Shared U S -Israel concerns about Iran, within the context of the U S  exit from the 2015 international nuclear agreement, and growing tension involving Iran and Hezbollah at Israel's northern border with Syria and Lebanon  Israeli-Palestinian issues, including those involving Jerusalem, Hamas and the Gaza Strip, funding for Palestinians, and a possible Trump Administration peace plan  Israeli domestic political issues, including probable corruption-related indictments against Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and closely contested elections that are scheduled for April 9, 2019  For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U S  Relations , by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U S  Foreign Aid to Israel , by Jeremy M  Sharp  Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence  These strengths include robust military and homeland security capabilities, as well as close cooperation with the United States  Israel maintains conventional military superiority relative to its neighbors and the Palestinians  Shifts in regional order and evolving asymmetric threats during this decade have led Israel to update its efforts to project military strength, deter attack, and defend its population and borders  Israel appears to have reduced some unconventional threats via missile defense systems, reported cyber defense and warfare capabilities, and other heightened security measures  Israel has a robust homeland security system featuring sophisticated early warning practices and thorough border and airport security controls; most of the country's buildings have reinforced rooms or shelters engineered to withstand explosions  Israel also has proposed and partially constructed a national border fence network of steel barricades (accompanied at various points by watch towers, patrol roads, intelligence centers, and military brigades) designed to minimize militant infiltration, illegal immigration, and smuggling from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip  Additionally, Israeli authorities have built a separation barrier in and around parts of the West Bank  Israel is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintains a policy of "nuclear opacity" or amimut   A 2017 report estimated that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal of around 80-85 warheads  The United States has countenanced Israel's nuclear ambiguity since 1969, when Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and U S  President Richard Nixon reportedly reached an accord whereby both sides agreed never to acknowledge Israel's nuclear arsenal in public  Israel might have nuclear weapons deployable via aircraft, submarine, and ground-based missiles  No other Middle Eastern country is generally thought to possess nuclear weapons  Israeli officials closely consult with U S  counterparts in an effort to influence U S  decisionmaking on key regional issues, and U S  law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel's "qualitative military edge," or QME  Additionally, a 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3 3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations  Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U S  interests  They also argue that Israel is a valuable U S  ally  The United States and Israel do not have a mutual defense treaty or agreement that provides formal U S  security guarantees  Iran remains of primary concern to Israeli officials largely because of (1) Iran's antipathy toward Israel, (2) Iran's broad regional influence, and (3) the probability that some constraints on Iran's nuclear program could loosen in the future  In recent years, Israel and Arab Gulf states have discreetly cultivated closer relations with one another in efforts to counter Iran  Prime Minister Netanyahu has sought to influence U S  decisions on the international agreement on Iran's nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA)  He argued against the JCPOA when it was negotiated in 2015—including in a speech to a joint session of Congress—and welcomed President Trump's May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U S  sanctions on Iran's core economic sectors  A few days before President Trump's May announcement, Netanyahu presented information that Israeli intelligence operatives apparently seized in early 2018 from an Iranian archive  He used the information to question Iran's credibility and highlight its potential to parlay existing know-how into nuclear-weapons breakthroughs after the JCPOA expires  In his September 2018 speech before the U N  General Assembly, Netanyahu claimed that Iran maintains a secret "atomic warehouse for storing massive amounts of equipment and materiel " An unnamed U S  intelligence official was quoted as saying in response, "so far as anyone knows, there is nothing in [the facility Netanyahu identified] that would allow Iran to break out of the JCPOA any faster than it otherwise could " After Netanyahu publicly exposed the Iranian nuclear archive, some former Israeli officials speculated about what action Israel might consider taking against Iranian nuclear facilities if Iran abrogates the JCPOA and expands nuclear activities currently restricted under the agreement  However, Netanyahu had said in an interview that he was not seeking a military confrontation with Iran  Israel and Iran have engaged in hostile action over Iran's presence in Syria  In the early years of the Syria conflict, Israel primarily employed air strikes to prevent Iranian weapons shipments destined for the Iran-backed group Hezbollah in Lebanon  Later, as the Syrian government regained control of large portions of the country with Iranian backing, Israeli leaders began pledging to prevent Iran from constructing and operating bases or advanced weapons manufacturing facilities in Syria  Since 2018, Israeli and Iranian forces have repeatedly targeted one another in and over Syrian- and Israeli-controlled areas  In January 2019, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel had targeted Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria "hundreds of times " Limited Israeli strikes to enforce "redlines" against Iran-backed forces could expand into wider conflict, particularly if there is a miscalculation by one or both sides  U S  involvement in Syria could be one factor in Israeli calculations on this issue  The U S  base at Al Tanf in southern Syria has reportedly "served as a bulwark against Iran's efforts to create a land route for weapons from Iran to Lebanon " Israeli officials favor continued U S  involvement in Syria, while also preparing for the possibility that they may need to take greater direct responsibility for countering Iran there  Russia's advanced air defense systems in Syria could make it more difficult for Israel to operate there  Since 2015, Russia has operated an S-400 system at Russia's Khmeimim air base in Lattakia, a city on Syria's Mediterranean coast  To date, however, Russia does not appear to have acted militarily to thwart Israeli air strikes against Iranian or Syrian targets, and Israel and Russia maintain communications aimed at deconflicting their operations  In addition to the S-400 that it owns and operates, Russia delivered an S-300 air defense system for Syria's military to Khmeimim airbase in October 2018  The delivery followed Syria's downing of a Russian military surveillance plane in September 2018 under disputed circumstances, shortly after an Israeli operation in the vicinity  According to an Israeli satellite imagery analysis company, three launchers appeared to be operational as of February 2019  It is unclear to what extent Russia has transferred the S-300 to Syrian military control, and how this might affect future Israeli military action in Syria  An Israeli journalist wrote that "Israel has the knowledge, experience and equipment to evade the S-300, but the fact that additional batteries, manned by Russian personnel, are on the ground, will necessitate greater care [when carrying out future operations against Iran-aligned targets in Syria] " Since the September 2018 incident, Israeli air strikes appear to have decreased somewhat  On March 25, 2019, President Trump signed a proclamation stating that the United States recognizes the Golan Heights (hereinafter, the Golan) to be part of the State of Israel  The proclamation stated that "any possible future peace agreement in the region must account for Israel's need to protect itself from Syria and other regional threats" —presumably including threats from Iran and the Iran-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah  Israel gained control of the Golan from Syria during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and effectively annexed it unilaterally by applying Israeli law to the region in 1981 (see Figure 2 )  President Trump's proclamation changed long-standing U S  policy on the Golan  Since 1967, successive U S


Report 2:  Administrations supported the general international stance that the Golan is Syrian territory occupied by Israel, with its final status subject to negotiation  In reaction to the U S  proclamation, others in the international community have insisted that the Golan's status has not changed  In Congress, Senate and House bills introduced in February 2019 ( S  567 and H R  1372 ) support Israeli sovereignty claims to the Golan, and would treat the Golan as part of Israel in any existing or future law "relating to appropriations or foreign commerce " For decades after 1967, various Israeli leaders, reportedly including Prime Minister Netanyahu as late as 2011, had entered into indirect talks with Syria aimed at returning some portion of the Golan as part of a lasting peace agreement  However, the effect of civil war on Syria and the surrounding region, including an increase in Iran's presence, may have influenced Netanyahu to shift focus from negotiating with Syria on a "land for peace" basis to obtaining international support for Israel's claims of sovereignty  As part of the periodic conflict in Syria between Israel and Iran , some Iranian missiles have targeted Israeli positions in the Golan  The Syrian government has denounced the U S  policy change as an illegal violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and insisted that Syria is determined to recover the Golan  Additionally, observers have argued that the policy change could unintentionally bolster Syrian President Bashar al Asad within Syria by rallying Syrian nationalistic sentiment in opposition to Israel's claims to the Golan and deflecting attention from Iran's activities inside Syria  Since 1974, the U N  Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled an area of the Golan Heights between the regions controlled by Israel and Syria, with about 880 troops from five countries stationed there as of January 2019  During that time, Israel's forces in the Golan have not faced serious military resistance to their continued deployment, despite some security threats and diplomatic challenges  Periodic resolutions by the U N  General Assembly have criticized Israel's occupation as hindering regional peace and Israel's settlement and de facto annexation of the Golan as illegal  Hezbollah's forces and Israel's military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader conflict  Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional implications  Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah's buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds  Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran over Iran's presence in Syria raises questions about the potential for Hezbollah's forces in Lebanon to open another front against Israel  After the September 2018 incident leading to Russia's installation of an S-300 system in Syria (discussed above), Iran reportedly began directly transferring weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon while reducing Syria's use as a transshipment hub  One Israeli media account warned that Hezbollah's threat to Israel is increasing because of initiatives to build precision-weapons factories in Lebanon and to set up a military infrastructure in southern Syria  In late 2018 and early 2019, Israel's military undertook an effort—dubbed "Operation Northern Shield"—to seal six Hezbollah attack tunnels to prevent them from crossing into Israel  Israeli officials claim that they do not want another war, while at the same time taking measures aimed at constraining and deterring Hezbollah, including through consultation with the U N  Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)  President Trump has expressed interest in brokering a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and his Administration has supposedly prepared a proposal to facilitate negotiations, but the Administration has repeatedly postponed releasing the proposal  Many factors may account for the delays, including recent U S  actions regarding Jerusalem, tension in and around the Gaza Strip, reduced funding for the Palestinians, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and political jockeying and domestic constraints among Israelis and Palestinians  The U S  decision—announced in December 2017—to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the U S  embassy there has fed U S -Palestinian tensions  Israeli leaders generally celebrated the change, but Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas strongly objected  Many other countries opposed President Trump's actions on Jerusalem, as reflected in action at the United Nations  Claiming U S  bias favoring Israel, Palestinian leaders broke off high-level political contacts with the United States shortly after the December 2017 announcement and have made efforts to advance Palestinian national claims in international fora  However, the PA continues security coordination with Israel in the West Bank  U S -Palestinian tensions appear to have influenced Administration decisions to cut off various types of U S  funding to the Palestinians, and arguably have dimmed prospects for restarting Israeli-Palestinian talks  In a September 2018 address before the U N  General Assembly, PLO Chairman/PA President Abbas denounced Administration actions that he characterized as taking disputed Israeli-Palestinian issues—such as Jerusalem's status and Palestinian refugee claims—off the negotiating table  Funding for economic and humanitarian needs in the West Bank and Gaza could become even scarcer  In February 2019, Israel announced that it would withhold a portion of the tax revenue it collects for the PA because—pursuant to a law passed by the Knesset in 2018—Israel had determined that amount represented PLO/PA payments made on behalf of individuals allegedly involved in terrorist acts  In response, Abbas announced that the PA would completely reject monthly revenue transfers from Israel if it withheld any amount, even though the transfers comprise approximately 65% of the PA budget  For February, Israel withheld approximately $11 million from the $193 million due to the PA, with the PA rejecting the entire amount as a result  The PA is reportedly seeking temporary financial support from the private sector and local banks, and also asking the Arab League to follow through on its 2010 decision to provide $100 million per month as a "financial safety net" for the PA  At the end of January 2019, U S  bilateral aid to the Palestinians—including nonlethal security assistance that Israel generally supports—ended completely due to the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA, P L  115-253 ), which became law on October 3, 2018  Two months after the law's enactment, PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah informed Secretary of State Michael Pompeo that the PA would not accept aid that subjected it to federal court jurisdiction  Apparently, U S  aid will not resume unless Congress amends or repeals the ATCA, or the Administration channels the aid differently  Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor Jared Kushner has stated that the Administration will publicly release a peace plan sometime after Israeli national elections, which are set to occur on April 9, 2019  According to Kushner, the peace plan contains detailed proposals on the various issues that divide Israel and the PLO  Many observers express skepticism about the prospect that these proposals can serve as a basis for the serious resumption of bilateral talks, but Kushner has reportedly said that the Administration is focusing on formulating "realistic solutions," and that "privately, people are more flexible " U S  officials hope to surmount potential obstacles to the peace plan in the Israeli and Palestinian domestic arenas by obtaining political and economic support for the U S  initiative from key Arab states in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Egypt  A number of Arab states share common interests in working behind the scenes with Israel to counter Iranian regional influence  While some diplomatic developments have fed speculation about warming Arab-Israeli ties, reports suggest that key Arab Gulf states remain reluctant to embrace more formal relations with Israel without a resolution of the Palestinian issue  Saudi Arabia's press agency responded to the U S  recognition of Israel's claims to sovereignty in the Golan Heights by saying that it "will have significant negative effects on the peace process in the Middle East and the security and stability of the region " In a statement with implications both for domestic and international audiences, Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly said that the March 2019 change in U S  policy on the Golan proves that countries can retain territory captured in a defensive war  His statement prompted speculation over the possibility that Israeli leaders might consider annexing part of the West Bank and whether the situation in the Golan is sufficiently similar to invite comparison  Days before the April elections, Netanyahu asserted that if he were to lead the next government, he would apply Israeli law to West Bank settlements  The closely contested Israeli national elections—scheduled for April 9, 2019—and the subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for the country's leadership and future policies  Prime Minister Netanyahu faces a challenge from the centrist Blue and White party under the combined leadership of former top general Benny Gantz and former Finance Minister Yair Lapid  Some setbacks for Netanyahu during the campaign have included the attorney general's announcement of probable corruption-related indictments against Netanyahu, new media allegations of possible misconduct relating to Israel's procurement of German submarines, and questions about some individuals or groups possibly spreading rumors against Netanyahu's opponents via social media  Yet, some observers calculate that Netanyahu's Likud could possibly get fewer Knesset seats than Blue and White and still form the next coalition  For more information on the actors involved in the elections, see CRS Insight IN11068, Israel: April 2019 Elections and Probable Indictments Against Prime Minister Netanyahu , by Jim Zanotti and this report's Appendix   In July 2018, the Knesset passed a Basic Law defining Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people  Some observers have expressed concern that the law might further undermine the place of Arabs in Israeli society, while others view its effect as mainly symbolic  In March 2019, Netanyahu said that Israel is a Jewish, democratic state with equal rights for all its citizens, and "the nation-state not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people," reviving domestic debate about the 2018 law and perhaps seeking support during the election campaign from sympathetic voter groups 

ground_truth: To promote international peace and security, the UN had 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations worldwide as of June 30, 2017, with a total budget of almost $8 billion in UN fiscal year 2017 and contributions of over 100,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from more than 120 countries. The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, providing an average of about 28 percent of total funding annually. The Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, includes a provision for GAO to compare the costs, strengths, and limitations of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. This report (1) compares the reported costs of a specific UN operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identifies factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identifies stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. GAO worked with the UN, DOD, and State to generate a cost estimate of a hypothetical U.S.-led operation in the Central African Republic comparable to MINUSCA. GAO developed this estimate using DOD's cost estimating tool for contingency operations and State data on civilian costs, assuming a U.S. operation using roughly the same levels of military and civilian personnel as MINUSCA. The cost estimate should not be construed as suggesting that the United States would likely implement such an operation in the Central African Republic or that it would implement such an operation in the same way. GAO is making no recommendations. Based on United Nations (UN) and Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) data, GAO estimates that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). MINUSCA cost the UN approximately $2.4 billion for the first 39 months of the operation. GAO estimates that a hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic of roughly the same size and duration would cost nearly $5.7 billion—almost eight times more than the $700 million the United States contributed to MINUSCA over the same time period. Various factors affect differences between the actual cost of MINUSCA and the estimated cost of a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation in the Central African Republic. The United States and the UN would source and transport some supplies and equipment differently, affecting the cost of both operations; for example, the United States would airlift water into the Central African Republic, while the UN does not do so to the same extent. The United States also would incur the cost of civilian police and military reservist salaries, while the UN does not pay any troop or police salaries. Finally, some higher standards for facilities, intelligence, and medical services increase the U.S. cost estimate relative to UN costs for similar operational elements. UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U.S. and UN officials. These officials said that, because the UN is a multilateral organization, UN peacekeeping operations have international acceptance and are more likely to be viewed as impartial. Officials also said that the UN enjoys global access to expertise and experience, and can leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks. Relative strengths of a U.S. peacekeeping operation would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capability, according to U.S. and UN officials.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: As of June 30, 2017, the UN had carried out 71 peacekeeping operations since 1948, and had 16 active UN peacekeeping operations worldwide  Eight of these UN peacekeeping operations were in sub-Saharan Africa (see fig  1)  In their earliest days, UN peacekeeping operations were primarily military in nature and limited to monitoring cease-fire agreements and stabilizing situations on the ground while political efforts were being made to resolve conflicts  Today, in response to increasingly complex situations in which conflicts may be internal, involve many parties, and include civilians as deliberate targets, UN peacekeeping operations are more commonly “multidimensional”—deploying civilian and police personnel in addition to military personnel  Multidimensional peacekeeping operations seek to create a secure and stable environment while working with national authorities and actors to make sure the peace agreement or political process is implemented  According to the UN, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are designed to protect civilians and often assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections; protect and promote human rights; and assist in restoring the rule of law  Figure 2 shows examples of UN peacekeepers serving in different capacities as part of MINUSCA in Bangui, CAR  Each UN peacekeeping operation, including its mandated size and tasks, is authorized through a UN Security Council resolution  The operation’s budget and resources are subject to General Assembly approval  The UN’s approved budget for global peacekeeping operations in UN fiscal year 2017 was about $7 9 billion  Individual operation budgets ranged from about $36 million for the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo to more than $1 2 billion for the peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see table 1)  The UN reported in June 2017 that it maintained 95,544 uniformed peacekeepers, 5,004 international civilians, 10,149 local civilians, and 1,597 UN volunteers in support of its operations around the world  According to UN documents, civilian peacekeeping personnel are generally recruited to peacekeeping operations as individuals, while police and military personnel are volunteered by member states to participate as part of their country’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations  The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations  From fiscal years 2014 to 2017, the United States contributed an average of about $2 1 billion per year to these operations  The UN General Assembly sets the assessment levels for UN member contributions to peacekeeping operations every 3 years  The United States’ assessment has averaged about 28 5 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget; however, Congress has authorized payment with appropriated funds at about 27 percent for U S  fiscal years 2014 through 2016, and 25 percent for U S  fiscal year 2017  In April 2014, UN Security Council Resolution 2149 established MINUSCA following escalating sectarian violence in CAR that resulted in the destruction of state institutions, thousands of deaths, and 2 5 million people—more than half of CAR’s entire population—in need of humanitarian aid, according to a UN report  The conflict also resulted in 174,000 people being internally displaced and over 400,000 fleeing to neighboring countries, according to the UN report  MINUSCA’s tasks include protecting civilians, given the security, humanitarian, human rights, and political crisis in CAR; supporting the implementation of the transition process, including efforts to extend state authority and preserve territorial integrity; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and promoting and protecting human rights; supporting justice and the rule of law; and facilitating the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation processes  On November 15, 2017, UN Security Council Resolution 2387 (2017) extended MINUSCA’s mandate for a fourth time, through November 15, 2018  MINUSCA’s approved personnel levels for UN fiscal year 2017 comprised 10,750 military personnel, 400 individual police officers, and 1,680 formed police unit personnel, as well as 790 international civilian and 696 national civilian personnel, 238 UN volunteers, and 40 government- provided personnel, according to a UN Secretary-General report  Table 2 shows average annual personnel deployment for MINUSCA and the number of authorized positions for the first 3 full fiscal years of the operation  Based on data and other input from the UN, DOD, and State, we estimate that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to MINUSCA, the ongoing UN operation in the Central African Republic (CAR)  In addition, the estimated cost of a U S  operation in CAR far exceeds U S  contributions to MINUSCA  Based on an estimate we developed in conjunction with DOD and State officials, a hypothetical, comparable U S  operation would likely cost nearly $5 7 billion, more than twice as much as MINUSCA, the ongoing UN operation in CAR  Our comparison covers the time from which MINUSCA was established in April 2014 through the end of UN fiscal year 2017, which ended on June 30, 2017—a total of 3 years and 3 months, the first 39 months of MINUSCA  Over this time period, UN costs for MINUSCA totaled approximately $2 4 billion  Using roughly the same basic parameters for MINUSCA, including similar deployment levels of military and civilian personnel over the same time period, in consultation with DOD and State officials, we estimate that a comparable, hypothetical U S  operation would likely cost nearly $5 7 billion, more than twice the UN cost for MINUSCA (see table 3 for a detailed comparison of estimated U S  costs and actual UN costs)  This estimate does not include, among other things, the cost for State diplomatic security and office space for civilian staff, the inclusion of which could further increase the total estimated U S  cost for such an operation  During the same time period, from April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017, the United States contributed approximately $700 million to the UN to support MINUSCA  Therefore, the estimated cost of a U S  operation (nearly $5 7 billion) would be almost eight times greater than the United States’ contribution to MINUSCA  See figure 3 for a comparison of these costs with the U S  estimate  Various factors contribute to the differences in costs between actual UN expenditures for MINUSCA from April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017— the first 39 months of MINUSCA—and a hypothetical, comparable U S  operation over the same time period, including disparities in the cost of sourcing and transporting equipment and supplies, staffing and compensating military and police personnel, and maintaining facilities and communications and intelligence systems  These disparities reflect operational, structural, and doctrinal differences in the way the United States likely would undertake a hypothetical, comparable operation, should such an operation be deemed in the U S  national interest  High U S  costs to source and transport supplies and equipment to the Central African Republic (CAR) contribute to the difference between our cost estimate for the hypothetical U S  peacekeeping operation and the UN’s actual costs for MINUSCA  In the hypothetical U S  operation, based on input from DOD and IDA officials and the output of the IDA cost estimating tool, the United States would fly in most of its consumable supplies from outside CAR  Specifically, materials such as water, ice, food, and other subsistence items would be airlifted into CAR from Italy, a supply location validated as reasonable by DOD and IDA officials given its proximity to the operation and because MINUSCA relies on a UN global service center there, one of two such UN centers in Europe  The estimated U S  cost of airlifting water alone over the 39-month time period for the hypothetical operation would total nearly $700 million  The United States would still deploy its equipment and personnel to CAR from the United States, at a cost of nearly $600 million  Transportation of equipment and supplies within CAR would cost an additional estimated $316 million  In contrast, the UN does not fly in water or consumables on the same scale as the United States would in the hypothetical operation  Instead, the UN relies on some in-country or local infrastructure and consumables  Military and formed police unit equipment is provided by the troop- and police-contributing countries  The UN reimburses these countries for equipment at set rates  The UN cost of reimbursing countries for deploying their equipment to CAR likely would be less than the amount the United States would spend on airlifting the equipment to CAR alone  For example, the UN cost of freight, deployment, and country reimbursements for military and formed police equipment was approximately $229 million over a 2-year period (July 2014 through June 2016), while in the hypothetical operation the U S  cost of deploying equipment alone would be over $382 million, which is about $154 million more than the UN cost over a similar 2-year period (September 2014 through August 2016)  The United States would staff and compensate its military and police personnel differently than the UN, leading to differences between the estimated U S  costs and actual UN costs  While neither the hypothetical U S  cost estimate nor UN expenditures include the cost of salaries for active duty personnel or troops contributed by other countries, respectively, the United States would bear the additional cost of salaries for the share of personnel drawn from military reserves  According to DOD officials, 10 percent of infantry unit personnel would have been reservist personnel in a hypothetical, comparable U S  operation, based on the average ratio of active to reserve personnel deployed by the United States in fiscal years 2015 through 2017, roughly the same time period as the first 39 months of MINUSCA  As a result, the total estimated cost of the hypothetical U S  operation reflects the additional U S  expense of paying full salaries and hardship duty pay for U S  reservist military personnel  The estimate also includes the incremental costs the United States would incur for deploying active duty military personnel, including hardship duty pay that is not incurred when those personnel are in the United States  For military troops deployed to MINUSCA, the UN pays a standard troop cost reimbursement to the troop-contributing countries, which is intended also to cover incremental expenses but not the cost of troops’ salaries  U S  costs for civilian police also are significantly higher than UN costs  The United States would pay over $167 million for U S  civilian police for the duration of the hypothetical operation, while the UN spent $41 million on its individual police officers over the same time frame  The U S  estimate includes the cost of police salaries and the additional costs of deployment, whereas UN costs for deploying individual police officers do not include salaries, which are borne by the police-contributing countries  Higher U S  standards for certain aspects of the hypothetical peacekeeping operation in CAR would contribute to costs that exceed those of MINUSCA  Facilities  The higher estimated U S  costs reflect higher U S  standards for facilities, according to State officials  The U S  cost estimate includes more than $1 1 billion for facilities and related costs, which include facility maintenance, food service, laundry, management and administration, and residential leases for civilian personnel  In contrast, the actual UN cost for facilities as part of MINUSCA totaled $292 million over the same time period  Communications and intelligence systems  The United States incurs costs associated with meeting U S  intelligence standards that are not part of UN operations, which lack comparable intelligence capabilities  The U S  cost estimate includes $140 million for the cost of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems, which represents additional operational costs to meet higher U S  standards for U S  communications and intelligence capabilities  Medical capability  Higher U S  standards for medical care and medical evacuation capability as compared to the UN are another factor that would contribute to higher U S  medical costs for a hypothetical operation, according to DOD and State officials  Some UN hospitals may not meet U S  minimum standards for medical care, according to DOD officials  Although medical costs do not constitute a significant portion of the U S  cost estimate, estimated U S  medical costs ($132 million) greatly exceed actual UN medical costs ($8 million) over the same time period  UN and U S  peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U S  and UN officials we met with  Relative strengths of UN peacekeeping operations include international and local acceptance, access to global expertise, and the ability to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks, according to these officials  Relative strengths of U S  peacekeeping operations would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities, according to U S  and UN officials  According to U S  and UN officials, UN peacekeeping operations benefit from greater international and local acceptance, access to global expertise, and the ability to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks  UN peacekeeping operations also provide indirect benefits to the military capacity of participating countries  International and local acceptance  As a multilateral organization, the UN benefits from greater international and local acceptance for its peacekeeping operations, according to State, DOD, and UN officials  These officials noted that the UN’s multinational character contributes to a reputation for local impartiality  Conversely, the United States acting alone may not be viewed as impartial and could face challenges gaining or maintaining international or local support for peacekeeping operations, according to State and DOD officials  Global expertise  UN officials noted that the UN has unmatched convening power and access to expertise and experience from across the globe to implement the objectives of multidimensional peacekeeping operations  The UN is able to bring in people with subject matter expertise, native language skills, and knowledge of local customs to work for these operations, according to U S  and UN officials  Leveraging multilateral assistance  U S  officials told us that the UN is better able to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and multilateral development banks to expand the scope of assistance provided in support of the goals of peacekeeping operations  For example, according to a UN report, MINUSCA is partnering with the UN Development Fund to provide capacity building related to elections, police, courts, and prisons  The report also noted that the UN, European Union, and World Bank supported the Central African Republic government in developing a “National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan” while harmonizing humanitarian and development funding to ensure complementarity with the UN peacekeeping operation  Developing international military capacity  U S  officials told us that UN peacekeeping operations provide an indirect benefit of helping to professionalize the military units from many developing countries that contribute troops to the UN  We have previously reported that building military capacity of foreign partners to address security-related threats is an important goal of U S  national security strategy and foreign policy  According to U S  and UN officials, the relative strengths of U S  peacekeeping operations would be faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities  Deployment speed  State, DOD, and UN officials highlighted the United States’ ability to deploy troops and police to peacekeeping operations more quickly than the UN  Unlike the U S  military, which can draw from a ready pool of military personnel, the UN must seek troops from UN member states, which takes time  UN officials told us that the UN faces a shortage of both troops and UN police, which slows deployment  Further, a 2015 report by the UN High-level Panel on Peacekeeping stated that the UN “has struggled to get sufficient forces on the ground quickly enough and relies on under-resourced uniformed capabilities ” The report also stated that aviation, medical, and engineering specialists, among others, are difficult to mobilize in advance of infantry units  Command and control  State, DOD, and UN officials told us that U S  operations would enable the U S  military to have direct command and control, whereas UN operations, which are inherently multinational, face challenges with command and control over troops from several different countries  The UN High-level Panel report noted that UN peacekeeping operations’ weak command and control is a well-known constraint that limits the type of operations the UN can undertake  Logistics support  U S  and UN officials told us that U S  operations have superior logistics systems  U S  procurement likely would be faster than UN procurement, which lacks a standing supply chain and, therefore, relies on third-party vendors, according to UN officials  In addition, the UN High Level Panel report stated that UN peacekeeping operations’ logistics systems and structures in the field are under severe strain, which can limit the mobility of these operations  Intelligence capability  U S  and UN officials agreed that U S  operations would involve superior intelligence capability  The UN only recently established an intelligence policy—in May 2017—having recognized that some peacekeeping operations had been deployed in fragile political and security environments with asymmetrical and complex threats  However, UN officials acknowledged that the scope of UN intelligence capability remains limited  Counterterrorism capability  DOD officials told us that a U S  peacekeeping operation would have the capability to include a counterterrorism component and would not be constrained in the use of force, if needed, in response to terrorist threats  UN peacekeeping operations, on the other hand, lack the capabilities and specialized military preparation to engage in counterterrorism operations, according to the UN High-level Panel report  The UN report stated that counterterrorism should be undertaken by the host government, a capable regional force, or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the UN Security Council  According to the UN report, UN peacekeeping operations may engage in proactive and preemptive use of force to protect civilians and UN personnel from threats; however, offensive force to degrade, neutralize or defeat an opponent is a fundamentally different type of posture that should be authorized by the Security Council only under limited and exceptional circumstances  We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, and the UN for review and comment  DOD provided a letter, reproduced in appendix II, which stated that it had no comments  State did not provide comments  The UN provided technical comments, which we incorporated into our report as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Secretary- General of the United Nations  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  The objectives of this report were to (1) compare the reported costs of a specific United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identify factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations  To compare the reported costs of a specific UN peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we selected the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) as a case study  We compared the reported UN expenditures for MINUSCA, which included both military and civilian components, with estimated costs for a hypothetical U S  operation with a similar level of military and civilian personnel  Our comparison covers a total of 3 years and 3 months—from MINUSCA’s establishment in April 2014 through June 30, 2017, the end of UN fiscal year 2017  We selected MINUSCA because it is in sub-Saharan Africa, where most UN peacekeeping operations established since 2003 have taken place, and has a typical scope and budget compared to other UN peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa, according to U S  and UN officials  In addition, MINUSCA is one of the most recent UN peacekeeping operations; thus, initial expenditures for the operation are relatively current  Because the results of our cost comparison are based on a single case study, they cannot be generalized to all UN peacekeeping operations  To determine the UN’s costs for MINUSCA, we analyzed UN budget and expenditure data covering the initial start-up period (April 2014 to June 2014) and the first 3 UN fiscal years (July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2017)  We spoke with officials of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support, and Management at UN Headquarters in New York, New York, to better understand the characteristics of MINUSCA and the different costs affecting MINUSCA’s budget and expenditures  We assessed UN expenditure data through discussions with cognizant UN officials and a review of external audits of UN budgetary information and found them sufficiently reliable for our purposes  We also analyzed data on U S  contributions to UN peacekeeping operations for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 from the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Organization Affairs to determine total U S  contributions to MINUSCA, and UN peacekeeping operations overall  To estimate the costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we developed a hypothetical scenario for a U S  operation based on the MINUSCA budget and supporting documents, assuming deployment of the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel in the Central African Republic (CAR) over the same time period (April 2014 through June 2017)  To estimate the military portion of the operation, we interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) officials and staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a DOD-sponsored non-profit corporation involved in developing cost estimates for U S  contingency operations  The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller and IDA generated a cost estimate for the military components included in the hypothetical operation using the Contingency Operations Support Tool (cost estimating tool)  DOD uses this tool to develop cost estimates for all military contingency operations  The cost estimate included only the incremental costs of the operation—those directly attributable to the operation that would not be incurred if the operation did not take place  For example, the estimate produced by the cost estimating tool did not include the direct salaries of active duty personnel as those costs would be incurred by the United States regardless of a possible decision to undertake the hypothetical operation  We assessed the cost estimating tool’s applicability to developing a hypothetical cost estimate for the purposes of this report through discussions with DOD and IDA officials, and compared the tool to the accurate and comprehensive characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, as described in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide  While we found the DOD cost estimating tool generated a sufficiently reliable cost estimate for a hypothetical U S  peacekeeping operation, we did not assess the overall reliability of the tool or its capability to generate accurate or comprehensive estimates for future U S  operations  To generate our estimate of U S  military costs using the DOD’s estimating tool, we used UN military deployment numbers as a baseline for the scale of a hypothetical, comparable U S  peacekeeping operation, while using unit sizes and rotations in deployment that were considered appropriate for the U S  military, according to DOD and IDA officials  We based the hypothetical U S  operation, and hence the cost estimate, on the following assumptions, which correspond approximately with MINUSCA’s actual UN personnel deployments: Theater of operation: Central African Republic (CAR) Type of operation: military contingency Operation time frame: April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017 Military contingents: as of June 30, 2017, 11,495 total personnel Infantry: 10 units of 630-785 personnel per unit, approximately 90 percent active duty / 10 percent reserves Communication / signals: 1 unit, 124 personnel per unit Engineering: 4 units, 200 personnel per unit Military police: 1 unit, 120 personnel per unit Formed police units (military police): 12 units, 140 personnel per Hospital / medical: 1 level III hospital, 248 beds, 495 personnel Helicopter units: 2 UH-60 C3 units, 1 MH-60M Assault attack helicopter unit, 100 personnel per unit Quick reaction force: 1 unit, 160 personnel per unit Special forces: 1 tactical civilian affairs unit, 1 Marine special operations intelligence unit, 160 personnel per unit Unmanned aerial vehicle: 1 unit, 84 personnel Transportation: 1 heavy transport unit, 120 personnel per unit Operational tempo: 1 0 for all phases of operation and units, except aviation units (set at 1 5) Deployment schedule and phasing: phased deployment, including 14 days for predeployment (e g , training), 5 days for deployment, 180 days for active duty unit sustainment and 270 days for reserve unit sustainment, 5 days for redeployment, and 0 days for reconstitution Housing: contractor-provided semi-permanent housing Transportation: personnel and equipment transported by airlift from the United States (primarily Fort Hood, Texas), material (such as water, food, and other consumables) transported by airlift from Italy We obtained input on the operational design for the military portion of the cost estimate from DOD officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Policy, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, and IDA officials  However, the military portions of the scenario and their corresponding cost estimate have some limitations  As a result of rounding for some units, U S  military personnel numbers do not exactly match the MINUSCA deployment levels  In addition, based on input from DOD officials, we attempted to select military units that would provide an essential function per U S  common practices while keeping the overall personnel deployment level as close as possible to MINUSCA’s deployment level  An actual U S  military plan may differ significantly from the UN plan as a result of differences between U S  and UN military operations, structure, doctrine, and circumstances at the time of the operation  To estimate U S  civilian costs, we matched the number of U S  civilian police and personnel to the number serving in MINUSCA  We then estimated the costs of deploying these U S  civilian personnel in CAR for the same time period as MINUSCA  We did not attempt to determine how the U S  government would actually implement civilian components of a peacekeeping operation in CAR  To estimate U S  civilian police costs, we met with State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to identify State’s costs for civilian police contractors providing police training and technical assistance in sub-Saharan Africa  Based on INL’s input we assumed that the base salary of civilian police would be grade 13, step 5 on the Office of Personnel Management’s general schedule salary tables for federal employees  In addition to the average base salary, we identified other costs—with input from INL—including, among others, personal equipment, travel from the United States, and State’s published allowances specific to CAR for local cost of living, post hardship differential, danger pay, and living quarters  We applied the average cost per officer to the average number of UN civilian police officers deployed in MINUSCA  To estimate U S  civilian personnel costs, we met with State’s Bureau of Budget and Planning to identify the costs of State Foreign Service officers and locally employed staff, based on the number of UN international and national civilian staff deployed to MINUSCA, respectively  We matched the number of State Foreign Service officers for the U S  cost estimate to the number of UN international staff in MINUSCA, with input from State to align the grade levels  The estimated costs for Foreign Service officers include average salaries based on State’s Foreign Service salary tables and State’s allowances specific to CAR, including local cost of living, post hardship differential, and danger pay  We also met with State Bureau of Budget and Planning officials to estimate other costs for Foreign Service officers, which we included in our cost estimate, including post assignment travel, administrative support costs, residential furnishings, and residential guards, among others, but we did not assess the reliability of these additional costs provided by State  In addition, State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations provided the actual costs of residential leases for Foreign Service officers in CAR in fiscal year 2017, which we used to estimate the cost of housing Foreign Service officers in CAR  We also matched the number of State locally employed staff to the number of UN national staff deployed to MINUSCA and added their average salaries and other costs in CAR based on data provided by State’s Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services  While MINUSCA’s expenditures also included costs for sending an annual average of up to about 200 UN volunteers to CAR, State officials told us that the United States generally would not send volunteers through its assistance efforts to a high-risk post, such as CAR  Therefore, we did not include any costs related to volunteers in the cost estimate  We also did not include costs related to host-government-provided personnel serving in MINUSCA  In addition, UN expenditures included about $7 million for “quick-impact projects” to support local government infrastructure and civil society initiatives  We did not include comparable costs for quick-impact projects in our U S  cost estimate because we did not have a basis for matching these costs  To identify factors that affect cost differences between MINUSCA and a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we reviewed the U S  cost estimate generated in conjunction with DOD, IDA, and State officials, and identified significant areas of cost for the United States and the assumptions incorporated in the estimate or factors specified by U S  officials that drive those costs  We compared the U S  cost estimate, including these significant areas of cost, to UN costs to identify differences  We interviewed U S  and UN officials regarding U S  and UN standards and policies that explain differences between MINUSCA costs and the estimated costs of a U S  operation  To identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations, we reviewed UN reports on peacekeeping operations and interviewed UN, DOD, and State officials  In addition, we reviewed GAO’s 2006 report comparing the costs as well as the strengths of a UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti with those of a hypothetical U S  operation  We conducted our review from February 2017 through February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the individual named above, Drew Lindsey (Assistant Director), Howard Cott, Juan Pablo Avila-Tournut, Debbie Chung, Martin de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Jennifer Leotta, Caitlin Mitchell, Elizabeth Repko, and Alex Welsh made significant contributions to this report 


Report 2: SSA’s mission is to deliver Social Security services that meet the changing needs of the public  The Social Security Act and amendments established three programs that the agency administers: Old-Age and Survivors Insurance provides monthly retirement and survivors benefits to retired and disabled workers, their spouses and their children, and the survivors of insured workers who have died  SSA has estimated that, in fiscal year 2019, $892 billion in old-age and survivors insurance benefits are expected to be paid to a monthly average of approximately 54 million beneficiaries  Disability Insurance provides monthly benefits to disabled workers and their spouses and children  The agency estimates that, in fiscal year 2019, a total of approximately $149 billion in disability insurance benefits will be paid to a monthly average of about 10 million eligible workers  Supplemental Security Income is a needs-based program financed from general tax revenues that provides benefits to aged adults, blind or disabled adults, and children with limited income and resources  For fiscal year 2019, SSA estimates that nearly $59 billion in federal benefits and state supplementary payments will be made to a monthly average of approximately 8 million recipients  SSA relies heavily on its IT resources to support the administration of its programs and related activities  For example, its systems are used to handle millions of transactions on the agency’s website, maintain records for the millions of beneficiaries and recipients of its programs, and evaluate evidence and make determinations of eligibility for benefits  According to the agency’s most recent Information Resources Strategic Plan, its systems supported the processing of an average daily volume of about 185 million individual transactions in fiscal year 2015  SSA’s Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Systems is responsible for developing, overseeing, and maintaining the agency’s IT systems  Comprised of approximately 3,800 staff, the office is headed by the Deputy Commissioner, who also serves as the agency’s CIO  SSA has long been challenged in its management of IT  As a result, we have previously issued a number of reports highlighting various weaknesses in the agency’s system development practices, governance, requirements management, and strategic planning, among other areas  Collectively, our reports stressed the need for the agency to strengthen its IT management controls  In 2016, we reported that SSA’s acting commissioner had stated that the agency’s aging IT infrastructure was not sustainable because it was increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain  Accordingly, the agency requested $132 million in its fiscal year 2019 budget to modernize its IT environment  As reflected in the budget, these modernization efforts are expected to include projects such as updating database designs by converting them to relational databases, eliminating the use of outdated code, and upgrading infrastructure  Among the agency’s priority IT spending initiatives in the budget is its Disability Case Processing System, which has been under development since December 2010  This system is intended to replace the 52 disparate Disability Determination Services’ component systems and associated processes with a modern, common case processing system  According to SSA, the new system is to modernize the entire claims process, including case processing, correspondence, and workload management  However, SSA has reported substantial difficulty in the agency’s ability to carry out this initiative, citing software quality and poor system performance as issues  Consequently, in June 2016, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) placed the initiative on its government- wide list of 10 high-priority programs requiring attention  As previously mentioned, Congress enacted federal IT acquisition reform legislation (commonly referred to as FITARA) in December 2014  This legislation was intended to improve agencies’ acquisitions of IT and enable Congress to monitor agencies’ progress and hold them accountable for reducing duplication and achieving cost savings  It includes specific requirements related to seven areas: (1) agency CIO authority enhancements, (2) federal data center consolidation initiative, (3) enhanced transparency and improved risk management, (4) portfolio review, (5) IT acquisition cadres, (6) government-wide software purchasing program, and (7) the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative  In June 2015, OMB released guidance describing how agencies are to implement FITARA  The guidance identifies a number of actions that agencies are to take to establish a basic set of roles and responsibilities (referred to as the common baseline) for CIOs and other senior agency officials and, thus, to implement the authorities described in the law  More recently, on May 15, 2018, the President signed Executive Order 13833, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Agency Chief Information Officers  Among other things, this executive order is intended to better position agencies to modernize their technology, execute IT programs more efficiently, and reduce cybersecurity risks  The order pertains to 22 of the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies; the Department of Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are exempt  For the covered agencies, including SSA, the executive order strengthens the role of the CIO by, among other things, requiring the CIO to report directly to the agency head; to serve as the agency head’s primary IT strategic advisor; and to have a significant role in all management, governance, and oversight processes related to IT  In addition, one of the cybersecurity requirements directs agencies to ensure that the CIO works closely with an integrated team of senior executives, including those with expertise in IT, security, and privacy, to implement appropriate risk management measures  In June 2018, we issued a report that examined the cybersecurity workforce of the government  We noted that most of the 24 agencies we examined had developed baseline assessments to identify cybersecurity personnel within their agencies that held certifications, but the results were potentially unreliable  However, SSA’s baseline was found to be reliable because it addressed all of the reportable information, such as the extent to which personnel without professional certifications were ready to obtain them or strategies for mitigating any gaps  Further, we found that most of the 24 agencies had established procedures to assign cybersecurity codes to positions, including SSA  We also have ongoing work at SSA, including reviewing its cybersecurity workforce; standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring; cybersecurity strategy; and intrusion detection and prevention capabilities  From July 2011 through January 2018, we issued a number of reports that addressed specific weaknesses in SSA’s management of IT acquisitions and operations and in the role of its CIO  These reports included 15 recommendations aimed at improving the agency’s efforts with regard to data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses  We also made a recommendation to SSA to address weaknesses related to the role of the CIO in key management areas  SSA has taken steps to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations by addressing 14 of the 15 recommendations that we previously directed to the agency regarding data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses  Data center consolidation  OMB established the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative in February 2010 to improve the efficiency, performance, and environmental footprint of federal data center activities  The enactment of FITARA in 2014 codified and expanded the initiative  In addition, pursuant to FITARA, in August 2016, the Federal CIO issued a memorandum that announced the Data Center Optimization Initiative as a successor effort to the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative  Further, in August 2016, OMB released guidance which established the Data Center Optimization Initiative and included instructions on how to implement the date center consolidation and optimization provisions of FITARA  Among other things, the guidance required agencies to consolidate inefficient infrastructure, optimize existing facilities, improve their security posture, and achieve cost savings  In addition, the guidance directed agencies to develop a data center consolidation and optimization strategic plan that defines the agency’s data center strategy for fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018  This strategy is to include, among other things, a statement from the agency CIO indicating whether the agency has complied with all data center reporting requirements in FITARA  Further, the guidance indicates that OMB is to maintain a public dashboard to display consolidation-related cost savings and optimization performance information for the agencies  In a series of reports that we issued from July 2011 through August 2017, we noted that, while data center consolidation could potentially save the federal government billions of dollars, weaknesses existed in agencies’ data center consolidation plans and data center optimization efforts  Specifically with regard to SSA, in 2011, we reported that the agency had an incomplete consolidation plan and inventory of IT assets  In 2016, we reported that SSA did not meet any of the seven applicable data center optimization targets, as required by OMB  In addition, in 2017, we reported that the agency had an incomplete data center optimization plan  We stressed that until SSA completed these required activities, it might not be able to consolidate data centers, as required, and realize expected savings  We made a total of four recommendations to SSA in our 2011, 2016, and 2017 reports to help improve the agency’s reporting of data center-related cost savings and to achieve data center optimization targets  As of September 2018, SSA had implemented all four recommendations  Consequently, the agency is better positioned to improve the efficiency of its data centers and achieve cost savings  In addition, we reported in May 2018 that the agencies participating in the Data Center Optimization Initiative had communicated mixed progress toward achieving OMB’s goals for closing data centers by September 2018  With regard to SSA, we noted that the agency had not yet achieved its planned savings but that its data centers were among the most optimized that we reviewed  In particular, while SSA reported that it planned to save $1 08 million on its data center initiative from 2016 through 2018, it had not achieved any of those savings  However, the agency reported having met the goal of closing 25 percent of its tiered data centers  Further, SSA reported the most progress among the 22 applicable agencies in meeting OMB’s data center optimization targets  Specifically, SSA reported that it had met four of the five targets  (One other agency reported that it had met three targets, 6 agencies reported having met either one or two targets, and 14 agencies reported meeting none of the targets)  Consequently, we did not make any additional recommendations to SSA in our May 2018 report  We also have ongoing work involving SSA related to agencies’ progress on closing data center and achieving optimization targets  Incremental development  OMB has emphasized the need to deliver investments in smaller parts, or increments, in order to reduce risk, deliver capabilities more quickly, and facilitate the adoption of emerging technologies  In 2010, it called for agencies’ major investments to deliver functionality every 12 months and, since 2012, every 6 months  Subsequently, FITARA codified a requirement that covered agency CIOs certify that IT investments are adequately implementing incremental development, as defined in the capital planning guidance issued by OMB  Further, subsequent OMB guidance on the law’s implementation, issued in June 2015, directed agency CIOs to define processes and policies for their agencies to ensure that they certify that IT resources are adequately implementing incremental development  In November 2017, we reported that 21 agencies, including SSA, needed to improve their certification of incremental development  We pointed out that, as of August 2016, agencies had reported that 103 of 166 major IT software development investments (62 percent) were certified by the agency CIO for implementing adequate incremental development in fiscal year 2017, as required by FITARA  With regard to SSA, we noted that only 3 of the agency’s 10 investments primarily in development had been certified by the agency CIO as using adequate incremental development, as required by FITARA  In addition, we noted that SSA’s incremental development certification policy did not describe the CIO’s role in the certification process or how CIO certification would be documented  However, accurate agency CIO certification of the use of adequate incremental development for major IT investments is critical to ensuring that agencies are making the best effort possible to create IT systems that add value while reducing the risks associated with low-value and wasteful investments  As a result of these findings, we recommended that SSA ensure that its CIO (1) reports major IT investment information related to incremental development accurately, in accordance with OMB guidance; and (2) updates the agency’s policy and processes for the certification of incremental development and confirm that the policy includes a description of how the CIO certification will be documented  SSA agreed with our recommendations and implemented both of them  Thus, the agency should be better positioned to realize the benefits of incremental development practices, such as reducing investment risk, delivering capabilities more rapidly, and permitting easier adoption of emerging technologies  IT acquisitions  FITARA includes a provision to enhance covered agency CIOs’ authority through, among other things, requiring agency heads to ensure that CIOs review and approve IT contracts  OMB’s FITARA implementation guidance expanded upon this aspect of the legislation in a number of ways  Specifically, according to the guidance, CIOs may review and approve IT acquisition strategies and plans, rather than individual IT contracts, and CIOs can designate other agency officials to act as their representatives  In January 2018, we reported that most of the CIOs at 22 selected agencies, including SSA, were not adequately involved in reviewing and approving billions of dollars of IT acquisitions  In particular, we found that SSA’s process to identify IT acquisitions for CIO review did not involve the acquisition office, as required by OMB  In addition, we noted that SSA had a CIO review and approval process in place that fully satisfied the requirements set forth in OMB’s guidance  However, while SSA provided evidence of the CIO’s review of most of the IT contracts we examined, the agency had not ensured that the CIO or a designee reviewed and approved each IT acquisition plan or strategy  Specifically, of 10 randomly selected IT contracts that we examined at SSA, 7 acquisitions associated with those contracts had been reviewed and approved, as required by OMB  We pointed out that, until SSA ensured that its CIO or designee reviewed and approved all IT acquisitions, the agency would have limited visibility and input into its planned IT expenditures and would not be effectively positioned to benefit from the increased authority that FITARA’s contract approval provision is intended to provide  Further, the agency could miss an opportunity to strengthen the CIO’s authority and the oversight of IT acquisitions—thus, increasing the potential to award IT contracts that are duplicative, wasteful, or poorly conceived  Accordingly, we made three recommendations to SSA to address these weaknesses  As of September 2018, the agency had made progress by implementing two of the recommendations: to ensure that (1) the acquisition office is involved in identifying IT acquisitions and (2) the CIO or designee reviews and approves IT acquisitions according to OMB guidance  By taking these actions, SSA should be better positioned to properly identify and provide oversight of IT acquisitions  However, SSA has not yet implemented our third recommendation that it issue guidance to assist in the identification of IT acquisitions  SSA stated that, in September 2017, it updated its policy for acquisition plan approval to address this recommendation; however, upon review of this policy, we did not find guidance for identifying IT acquisitions  Without the proper identification of IT acquisitions, SSA’s CIO cannot effectively provide oversight of these acquisitions  Software licenses  Federal agencies engage in thousands of software licensing agreements annually  The objective of software license management is to manage, control, and protect an organization’s software assets  Effective management of these licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses, which can result in unused software, as well as too few licenses, which can result in noncompliance with license terms and cause the imposition of additional fees  As part of its PortfolioStat initiative, OMB has developed policy that addresses software licenses  This policy requires agencies to conduct an annual, agency-wide IT portfolio review to, among other things, reduce commodity IT spending  Such areas of spending could include software licenses  In May 2014, we reported on federal agencies’ management of software licenses and determined that better management was needed to achieve significant savings government-wide  Of the 24 agencies we reviewed, SSA was 1 of 22 that lacked comprehensive policies that incorporated leading practices  In particular, SSA’s policy partially met four of the leading practices and did not meet one  Further, we noted that SSA was among 22 of the 24 selected agencies that had not established comprehensive software license inventories—a leading practice that would help the agencies to adequately manage their software licenses  As such, we made six recommendations to SSA to improve its policies and practices for managing software licenses  These included recommendations that the agency develop a comprehensive policy for the management of software licenses and establish a comprehensive inventory of software licenses  SSA agreed with the recommendations and, as of September 2018, had implemented all six of them  As a result, the agency should be better positioned to manage its software licenses and identify opportunities for reducing software license costs  While SSA has taken steps that improved its IT management in the areas of data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses, we reported in August 2018 that the agency had not fully addressed the role of the CIO in its policies  As previously mentioned, FITARA and the President Executive Order 13833, among other laws and guidance, outline the roles and responsibilities for agency CIOs in an attempt to improve the government’s performance in IT and related information management functions  Within these laws and guidance, we identified IT management responsibilities assigned to CIOs in six key IT areas: Leadership and accountability  CIOs are responsible and accountable for the effective implementation of IT management responsibilities  For example, CIOs are to report directly to the agency head or that official’s deputy and designate a senior agency information security officer  Strategic planning  CIOs are required to lead the strategic planning for all IT management functions  An example of a CIO requirement related to the strategic planning area is measuring how well IT supports agency programs and reporting annually on the progress in achieving the goals  IT workforce  CIOs are to assess agency IT workforce needs and develop strategies and plans for meeting those needs  For example, CIOs are responsible for annually assessing the extent to which agency personnel meet IT management knowledge and skill requirements, developing strategies to address deficiencies, and reporting to the head of the agency on the progress made in improving these capabilities  IT budgeting  CIOs are responsible for the processes for all annual and multi-year IT planning, programming, and budgeting decisions  For example, CIOs are to have a significant role in IT planning, programming, and budgeting decisions  IT investment management  CIOs are to manage, evaluate, and assess how well the agency is managing its IT resources  In particular, CIOs are required to improve the management of the agency’s IT through portfolio review  Information security  CIOs are to establish, implement, and ensure compliance with an agency-wide information security program  For example, CIOs are required to develop and maintain an agency-wide security program, policies, procedures, and control techniques  In our August 2018 report, we noted that SSA, along with 23 other agencies, did not have policies that fully addressed the role of the CIO in these six key areas, consistent with the laws and guidance  To its credit, SSA had fully addressed the role of the CIO in the IT leadership and accountability area  In particular, the agency’s policies addressed the requirements that the CIO report directly to the agency head, assume responsibility and accountability for IT investments, and designate a senior agency information security officer  However, the policies did not fully address the role of the CIO in the other five areas (i e , strategic planning, workforce, budgeting, investment management, and information security)  For example, the agency’s policies did not address the IT workforce area at all, including the requirements that the CIO annually assess the extent to which agency personnel meet IT management knowledge and skill requirements, develop strategies to address deficiencies, and report to the head of the agency on the progress made in improving these capabilities  Further, SSA’s policies minimally addressed the requirements for IT strategic planning  Specifically, while the agency’s policies required the CIO to establish goals for improving agency operations through IT, the policies did not require the CIO to measure how well IT supports agency programs and report annually on the progress in achieving the goals  Table 1 summarizes the extent to which SSA’s policies addressed the role of its CIO, as reflected in our August 2018 report  As a result of these findings, we made a recommendation to SSA to address the weaknesses in its policies with regard to the remaining five key management areas  In response, the agency agreed with our recommendation and, subsequently, stated that it planned to do so by the end of September 2018  Following through to ensure that the identified weaknesses are addressed in its policies will be essential to helping SSA overcome its longstanding IT management challenges  In conclusion, effective IT management is critical to the performance of SSA’s mission  Toward this end, the agency has taken steps to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations by implementing 14 of the 15 recommendations we made from 2011 through 2018 to improve its IT management  Nevertheless, SSA would be better positioned to effectively address longstanding IT management challenges by ensuring that it has policies in place that fully address the role and responsibilities of its CIO in the five key management areas, as we previously recommended  Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Larson, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have  If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony, please contact Carol C  Harris at (202) 512-4456 or harriscc@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this statement are Kevin Walsh (Assistant Director), Jessica Waselkow (Analyst in Charge), and Rebecca Eyler  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 

ground_truth: SSA delivers services that touch the lives of almost every American, and relies heavily on IT resources to do so. Its systems support a range of activities, such as processing Disability Insurance payments, to calculating and withholding Medicare premiums, and issuing Social Security numbers and cards. For fiscal year 2018, the agency planned to spend approximately $1.6 billion on IT. GAO has previously reported that federal IT projects have often failed, in part, due to a lack of oversight and governance. Given the challenges that federal agencies, including SSA, have encountered in managing IT acquisitions, Congress and the administration have taken steps to improve federal IT, including enacting federal IT acquisition reform legislation and issuing related guidance. This statement summarizes GAO's previously reported findings regarding SSA's management of IT acquisitions and operations. In developing this testimony, GAO summarized findings from its reports issued in 2011 through 2018, and information on SSA's actions in response to GAO's recommendations. The Social Security Administration (SSA) has improved its management of information technology (IT) acquisitions and operations by addressing 14 of the 15 recommendations that GAO has made to the agency. For example, Incremental development . The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has emphasized the need for agencies to deliver IT investments in smaller increments to reduce risk and deliver capabilities more quickly. In November 2017, GAO reported that agencies, including SSA, needed to improve their certification of incremental development. As a result, GAO recommended that SSA's CIO (1) report incremental development information accurately, and (2) update its incremental development policy and processes. SSA implemented both recommendations. Software licenses . Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software. In May 2014, GAO reported that most agencies, including SSA, lacked comprehensive software license policies. As a result, GAO made six recommendations to SSA, to include developing a comprehensive software licenses policy and inventory. SSA implemented all six recommendations. However, SSA's IT management policies have not fully addressed the role of its CIO. Various laws and related guidance assign IT management responsibilities to CIOs in six key areas. In August 2018, GAO reported that SSA had fully addressed the role of the CIO in one of the six areas (see table). Specifically, SSA's policies fully addressed the CIO's role in the IT leadership and accountability area by requiring the CIO to report directly to the agency head, among other things. In contrast, SSA's policies did not address or minimally addressed the IT workforce and IT strategic planning areas. For example, SSA's policies did not include requirements for the CIO to annually assess the extent to which personnel meet IT management skill requirements or to measure how well IT supports agency programs. GAO recommended that SSA address the weaknesses in the remaining five key areas. SSA agreed with GAO's recommendation and stated that the agency plans to implement the recommendation by the end of this month. GAO has made 15 recommendations to SSA to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations from 2011 through 2018, and 1 recommendation to improve its CIO policies. While SSA has implemented nearly all of them, it would be better positioned to overcome longstanding IT management challenges when it addresses the CIO's role in its policies.