prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: As we have previously reported, 911 services have evolved from basic 911—which provided Americans with a universally recognized emergency number—to Enhanced 911 which also routes calls to the appropriate call center and provides information about the caller’s location and a call back number  NG911 represents the next evolution in 911 services by using IP-based technology to deliver and process 911 traffic  Under NG911, call centers will continue to receive voice calls and location information, but will also be able to accommodate emergency communications from the range of technologies in use today  In addition, NG911 systems provide call centers with enhanced capabilities to route and transfer calls and data, which could improve call centers’ abilities to handle overflow calls and increase information sharing with first responders  Generally speaking, 911 communications begin when a caller dials 911 using a landline, wireless, or Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) system  Once a 911 caller places an emergency call, a communications provider receives and routes the call to the appropriate call center, along with the caller’s phone number and location (i e , street address for a landline caller, approximate geographic location for a wireless caller, and the subscriber’s address for VoIP)  Calls and data may be routed to 911 call centers using legacy methods (i e , routing calls across traditional telephone networks) or NG911 methods (i e , routing calls and other data through IP-networks)  Once the call reaches a call center, trained call takers and dispatchers determine the nature of the emergency and dispatch first responders, typically using a variety of equipment and systems, including call handling systems, mapping programs, and computer aided dispatch  Figure 1 illustrates the 911 communications and dispatch process  As illustrated in figure 1, NG911 systems use IP-networks capable of carrying voice plus large amounts of data  These emergency-services networks are typically deployed at the state or regional level with multiple call centers connecting to the network  However, the existence of an IP- network alone does not constitute an NG911 system  As defined by standards developed by the emergency communications community, an NG911 system should have the capability to, among other things: provide a secure environment for emergency communications; acquire and integrate additional data for routing and answering calls; process all types of emergency calls, including multimedia messages; transfer calls with added data to other call centers or first responders  While NG911 systems must possess certain capabilities, it is important to note that states and localities may make decisions about which capabilities they intend to use to best meet their needs  In addition, states and localities have the authority to make decisions about what NG911 equipment, systems, and vendors to use; thus, the configurations of these systems vary  According to a panel of experts convened by the National 911 Program, the transition to NG911 may require a variety of technical and operational changes to current 911 systems and processes  For example, technical changes can include upgrades to networks or installing new hardware or software in 911 call centers  Operational changes can include the need for additional training or the development of new policies and procedures (e g , new procedures for processing or storing multimedia)  These technical and operational changes may also have effects on 911 funding and state and local governance structures, which we will discuss in more detail later in this report  According to an FCC advisory body that examined NG911 systems architecture in 2016, while NG911 systems are implemented in a variety of ways at the state or local level, NG911 implementation can occur gradually and in phases  According to this model, NG911 implementation occurs on a continuum that begins with legacy 911 systems and ends with a fully deployed NG911 national end-state where all individual 911 call centers nationwide would be connected  The NG911 implementation model identifies activities that take place as part of the NG911 transition, many of which occur concurrently, such as: planning (e g , conducting feasibility studies, preparing databases, establishing governance models); acquiring, testing, and implementing NG911 system elements (e g , establishing an emergency-services IP-network, location-based call routing, processing multimedia); connecting call centers within a jurisdiction (i e , jurisdictional end- state in which all call centers are fully NG911 operational, supported by agreements, policies, and procedures); and connecting NG911 systems nationwide (i e , national end-state in which all call centers in the nation are fully NG911 operational, supported by agreements, policies, and procedures)  In addition, because 911 services provide an essential function, the implementation of NG911 generally involves using both the legacy system and the NG911 system simultaneously for a period of time, according to the FCC advisory body, to ensure 911 services are not disrupted as new system elements are tested and implemented  Deploying and operating 911 is the responsibility of 911 authorities at the state and local level  As we have previously reported, all 50 states and the District of Columbia collect—or have authorized local entities to collect—funding for 911 from telephone service subscribers, and methods within each state for collecting funds vary  FCC, as required by statute, reports to Congress annually on the states’ collection and distribution of 911 fees and charges  There are approximately 6,000 call centers nationwide that process 911 calls, often at the county or city level, and these centers can vary greatly in size and technical sophistication  The state and local governance structures that oversee 911 operations also vary by location  For example, we previously reported that some states collect fees or charges for 911 and administer a statewide 911 program  Other states authorize local entities to collect fees or charges for 911 and administer 911 programs at the local level  Still other states use a combination of these approaches  According to a panel of experts convened by the National 911 Program, historically, 911 authority has been coordinated and maintained locally with no requirement to coordinate with other jurisdictions  However, the transition to NG911 enables connection of 911 systems  Thus, as previously mentioned, the NG911 transition may require technological and operational changes, as well as changes to 911 policies and governance responsibilities for states and localities  While deploying and operating 911 is the responsibility of entities at the state and local level, federal agencies—including NHTSA, NTIA, FCC, and DHS—have responsibilities to support state and local implementation, including through facilitating coordination of activities among 911 stakeholders and administering federal grants, for example: NHTSA houses the National 911 Program as part of its Office of Emergency Medical Services (Office of EMS) to provide national leadership and coordination for the NG911 transition throughout the United States, as previously mentioned  According to NHTSA, the fiscal year 2017 budget for the National 911 Program was $2 74 million  Among other activities, which we will discuss later in this report, the National 911 Program surveys states on progress implementing NG911 and reports this survey data annually  FCC issues orders and regulations for 911 service providers on topics relevant to NG911, such as 911 reliability, location accuracy, and text- to-911  FCC also sponsors advisory bodies comprised of government and industry experts that study relevant topics and provide recommendations related to NG911, such as the Task Force on Optimal Public Safety Answering Point Architecture and the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council  While there are no federally mandated time frames for implementing NG911, the Next Generation 911 Advancement Act of 2012 requires specific actions of some federal agencies as outlined in table 1, below  In addition, according to the National 911 Program, as states and localities continue to implement NG911, and begin to explore interconnection with other states’ 911 systems, federal agencies may need to take steps to help ensure state NG911 networks are interoperable and connected  We will discuss actions taken by federal agencies to assist states and localities to implement NG911 later in this report  According to NHTSA’s most recent national survey, state and local progress implementing NG911 varies, and about half of all states reported being in some phase of transition to NG911 in 2015  While a few states are well into statewide implementation, NHTSA officials told us that no state had completely implemented all NG911 functions  Additionally, as of the fall of 2017, none of the selected states we spoke with were processing multimedia—such as images or audio/video recordings—through their 911 systems due to concerns related to privacy, liability, and the ability to store and manage these types of data, among other things  The national survey data, based on responses from 45 states, measured the extent to which NG911 planning and acquisition of NG911 equipment and services were occurring, and the extent to which basic NG911 functions were operational at the state and local levels in 2015  Planning: This measure includes state and local NG911 plans for governance, funding, system components, and operations  In this context, system components refer to an emergency services IP-based network, NG911 software, system and information security, and databases, among other things, according to NHTSA’s survey  In total, 25 of 45 states reported having a state or at least one local NG911 plan in place; conversely, 18 states reported having no NG911 plan in place at either the state or local level—which may indicate they are in the early stages of planning for the NG911 transition or have not yet begun the transition to NG911  Acquisition: These measures identify states or local entities that have defined their NG911 needs and awarded contracts, and then installed and tested acquired NG911 components and services  Twenty-four states reported awarding at least one contract at the state or local level for NG911 components and services  Twenty-three states reported having installed and tested NG911 components and services at either the state or local level  NG911 services: This is a measure of 911 authorities that have some basic, functioning NG911 infrastructure in place  In total, 21 states reported having some level of basic NG911 services in place at the state or local level  Of these 21 states, 10 reported that all 911 authorities within the state were using NG911 technology to process emergency calls  Another 7 of these states reported that 25 percent or less of their state’s 911 authorities were using NG911 technology to process emergency calls  Federal officials, industry stakeholders, and state and local 911 officials we interviewed from nine states identified a number of challenges to implementing NG911, including challenges related to funding, evolving technology and operations, and governance  Funding: State and local officials in four of nine selected states identified insufficient funding as one of the challenges they face in implementing NG911  Additionally, FCC, NHTSA, and industry reports noted that state and local financing strategies are generally insufficient to fully implement NG911  Specifically, these reports note that the need to provide new capital for NG911 implementation while simultaneously funding legacy operational costs during the transition can strain state and local funding  Limited funding: Officials in three states told us that their current funding may not be able to support the upfront costs of infrastructure and equipment acquisitions associated with the transition to NG911  Further, officials said they will need to simultaneously fund both the new NG911 and legacy 911 systems currently in operation until the NG911 systems are fully operational  To address these challenges, a Minnesota official told us about how the state leveraged economies of scale to reduce overall costs through cost sharing between multiple call centers and of call centers consolidating operations from 114 to 104 call centers  Additionally, a Virginia official told us that to cover the upfront costs of transitioning to NG911, the state plans to borrow from the state treasury and then repay the treasury with future-year fee collections  Fee diversion: Diversion of fees intended for 911 costs to non-911 activities may affect a state’s or locality’s ability to cover NG911 transition costs and necessitate identifying alternative funding sources  The FCC’s 2016 annual report on 911 fees indicates that for calendar year 2015, all but two of the states that responded to FCC’s 911 fee survey affirmed that their state or jurisdiction collects fees from phone users to support or implement 911 services  State and local authorities also determine how these 911 fees can be used  FCC’s report also indicated that eight states and Puerto Rico reported diverting a total of more than $220 million (or approximately 8 4 percent) of 911 fees collected to non-911 purposes  Some of these diverted funds were directed to other public safety programs, and others were diverted to either non-public safety or unspecified purposes  According to one state official, had it not been for 911 fees being diverted to non-911 purposes, funding would have been sufficient to cover the NG911 transition without having to go to the state legislature for additional funding  However, officials in the other eight selected states told us that either fee diversion was not an issue in their state or that the diversion of funds had not affected their state’s ability to implement NG911  Evolving technology and operations: Officials in eight states told us that the retirement of legacy infrastructure and the transition to IP-based systems introduces new technical and operational challenges for call centers and states, as well as for equipment and service providers  Interoperability: Officials in three selected states mentioned that connecting to neighboring networks—whether within or between states—could pose challenges  For example, officials mentioned that states and localities may have obtained different equipment, software applications, or service providers – all of which can make interconnections difficult  Officials in Maine and New Hampshire told us that differences in service providers can also be a challenge to seamlessly connecting to neighboring systems  In an instance where two states (Minnesota and North Dakota) have worked to connect their 911 systems, both states used the same service provider, which officials said allowed for fewer barriers to connection  Cyber risks: Officials in three states told us that the transition from a traditional system that only transmits voice traffic to an IP-based system that transmits voice and data traffic has significantly increased the risk of a cyber-attack  This can be a challenge because managing cyber risks is a new and evolving role for state and local 911 authorities  Approaching the transition to NG911 without managing these risks could result in disrupted or disabled call center operations and ultimately a delayed response to an emergency situation  Multimedia: Officials in three states mentioned potential implementation challenges related to accepting and processing multimedia such as audio recordings, images, and videos  More specifically, one official said they did not have procedures to manage or store these multimedia files once received  In addition, another official raised privacy and liability concerns  Call routing: One of the core services of an NG911 system is the ability to have calls routed to the appropriate call center based on a wireless caller’s physical location, instead of the location of the cellular tower that receives and transmits the call  An FCC-sponsored working group reported that there are several options for achieving this and each option has unique positive and negative aspects  One challenge officials in two states noted was that rather than a single, nationwide approach to routing these calls, state and local 911 authorities would need to work individually with the wireless carriers to determine how to best implement location-based call routing  Governance: FCC has noted that transitioning to NG911 will likely result in new roles and levels of coordination between state 911 authorities, local 911 authorities, 911 call centers, and 911 service providers  Further, relationships among authorities at the state and local level may change as states work to interconnect NG911 systems  State and local officials noted that these types of governance challenges can apply in a variety of situations, including within or between states  Evolving roles: As previously mentioned, 911 governance structures vary among states  These varying governance structures may pose different challenges  For example, some states have a centralized structure in which a single government agency is responsible for statewide 911 system’s administration and policy  Officials in two states told us that although they faced challenges transitioning to NG911, their states’ centralized 911 structure eased the transition in their states because there was uniformity in policy and technology, among other things, coming from a single statewide authority  In other states, 911 systems are primarily a local responsibility and organized with decentralized authorities and resources  In these instances, there may be specific challenges related to transitioning to an interconnected NG911 system  Such challenges may include the need for increased levels of coordination among numerous jurisdictions with potentially disparate organizational structures, levels of funding, and priorities  An official also noted that there are governance challenges related to connecting states and evolving relationships between 911 authorities and service providers  Informing decision makers: One of the challenges identified by officials in two states is differing levels of experience and understanding by state and local officials as to what NG911 priorities should be for timely implementation  To help with this understanding, the federal government is making efforts to educate state and local authorities on how to facilitate policymaker understanding as well as provide regular updates to stakeholders on recent NG911 developments  We discuss some of these efforts later in this report  While state and local entities have the primary responsibility for implementing NG911 technology and services, federal agencies are taking actions to assist state and local 911 entities to address NG911 implementation challenges  Actions taken include developing resources, offering technical assistance, and convening stakeholders  More specifically, we identified selected activities that were taken by NHTSA, NTIA, FCC, and DHS that address some of the funding, technology, and governance challenges raised by state and local 911 stakeholders, for example: Cost study: NHTSA’s National 911 Program and NTIA, in consultation with FCC and DHS, plan to issue a study of the range of costs for 911 call centers and service providers to implement NG911 systems  According to NHTSA officials, the cost study will present a nationwide view, rather than a state-by-state view, on the progress of NG911 implementation and its associated costs  Grant program: NHTSA and NTIA are preparing to jointly administer a $115 million grant program to improve 911 services, including the adoption and operation of NG911 services  In September 2017, NHTSA and NTIA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking outlining implementing regulations for the grant program  NHTSA and NTIA expect to award the grants in 2018  Technology standards: The National 911 Program issued an annual guide in 2017 that stressed the importance of using open technology standards for NG911 services  The guide provides a list of standards that have been recently updated and an analysis that identifies whether existing standards fully address NG911 processes and protocols  Cybersecurity guides: DHS issued a guide in 2016 that identified cybersecurity risks for NG911 and risk mitigation strategies
Report 2:  The Action Plan focuses on capacity building for security personnel in Central America and the Caribbean by Colombian security forces (both Colombian military and police)  To implement the plan, Colombia undertook several hundred activities in cooperation with Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, and between 2013 and 2017 trained almost 17,000 individuals (see Figure 4 )  The Colombian government notes that this program grew dramatically from 34 executed activities in 2013 to 441 activities planned for 2018  Colombia has increasingly trained military and police from other countries both under this partnership and other arrangements, including countries across the globe  According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, around 80% of those trained were from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean  U S  and Colombian officials maintain that the broader effort is designed to export Colombian expertise in combating crime and terrorism while promoting the rule of law and greater bilateral and multilateral law enforcement cooperation  Critics of the effort to "export Colombian security successes" maintain that human rights concerns have not been adequately addressed  Some observers question the portion of these activities that are funded by the U S  government and want to see more transparency  In one analysis of the training, a majority of the training was provided by Colombian National Police rather than the Colombian Army, in such areas as ground, air, maritime, and river interdiction; police testimony; explosives; intelligence operations; psychological operations; and Comando JUNGLA, Colombia's elite counternarcotics police program  Other analysts praise the Colombian training and maintain that U S  assistance provided in this way has helped to improve, professionalize, and expand the Colombian military, making it the region's second largest  As that highly trained military shifts from combating the insurgency and the Colombian National Police take the dominant role in guaranteeing domestic security, Colombia may play a greater role in regional security and even in coalition efforts internationally  In September 2017, President Trump announced that he had considered designating Colombia in noncompliance with U S  counternarcotics requirements, but noted that he had not proceeded with the step in part because of Colombian training efforts to assist others in the region with combating narcotics and related crime  Colombia is a key U S  ally in the region  With diplomatic relations that began in the 19 th century following Colombia's independence from Spain, the countries have enjoyed close and strong ties  Because of Colombia's prominence in the production of illegal drugs, the United States and Colombia forged a close partnership over the past 16 years  Focused initially on counternarcotics, and later counterterrorism, a program called Plan Colombia laid the foundation for a strategic partnership that has broadened to include sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and many other areas of cooperation  Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U S  Congress appropriated more than $10 billion in assistance from U S  State Department and Department of Defense (DOD) accounts to carry out Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies  During this time, Colombia made notable progress combating drug trafficking and terrorist activities and reestablishing government control over much of its territory  Its economic and social policies have reduced the poverty rate and its security policies have lowered the homicide rate  Counternarcotics policy has been the defining issue in U S -Colombian relations since the 1980s because of Colombia's preeminence as a source country for illicit drugs  Peru and Bolivia were the main global producers of cocaine in the 1980s and early 1990s  However, successful efforts there in reducing supply pushed cocaine production from those countries to Colombia, which soon surpassed both its Andean neighbors  The FARC and other armed groups in the country financed themselves primarily through narcotics trafficking, and that lucrative illicit trade provided the gasoline for the decades-long internal armed conflict at least since the 1990s  Colombia emerged to dominate the cocaine trade by the late 1990s  National concern about the crack cocaine epidemic and extensive drug use in the United States led to greater concern with Colombia as a source  As Colombia became the largest producer of coca leaf and the largest exporter of finished cocaine, heroin produced from Colombian-grown poppies was supplying a growing proportion of the U S  market  Alarm over the volumes of heroin and cocaine being exported to the United States was a driving force behind U S  support for Plan Colombia at its inception  The evolution of Plan Colombia took place under changing leadership and changing conditions in both the United States and Colombia  Plan Colombia was followed by successor strategies such as the National Consolidation Plan, described below, and U S -Colombia policy has reached a new phase anticipating post-conflict Colombia  Announced in 1999, Plan Colombia originally was a six-year strategy to end the country's decades-long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote development  The counternarcotics and security strategy was developed by the government of President Andrés Pastrana in consultation with U S  officials  Colombia and its allies in the United States realized that for the nation to gain control of drug trafficking required a stronger security presence, the rebuilding of institutions, and extending state presence where it was weak or nonexistent  Initially, the U S  policy focus was on programs to reduce the production of illicit drugs  U S  support to Plan Colombia consisted of training and equipping counternarcotics battalions in the Colombian Army and specialized units of the Colombian National Police, drug eradication programs, alternative development, and other supply reduction programs  The original 1999 plan had a goal to reduce "the cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50%" over the plan's six-year timeframe  The means to achieve this ambitious goal were a special focus on eradication and alternative development; strengthening, equipping, and professionalizing the Colombian Armed Forces and the police; strengthening the judiciary; and fighting corruption  Other objectives were to protect citizens from violence, promote human rights, bolster the economy, and improve governance  U S  officials expressed their support for the program by emphasizing its counterdrug elements (including interdiction)  The focus on counternarcotics was the basis for building bipartisan support to fund the program in the U S  Congress because some Members of Congress were leery of involvement in fighting a counterinsurgency, which they likened to the "slippery slope" of the war in Vietnam  President George W  Bush came to office in 2001 and oversaw some changes to Plan Colombia  The primary vehicle for providing U S  support to Plan Colombia was the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, which was included in foreign operations appropriations  The Bush Administration requested new flexibility so that U S -provided assistance would back a "unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to [Colombia's] national security" due to the breakdown of peace talks between the FARC and the Pastrana government in February 2002  Congress granted this request for a unified campaign to fight drug trafficking and terrorist organizations as Members of Congress came to realize how deeply intertwined the activities of Colombia's terrorist groups were with the illicit drug trade that funded them  However, Congress prohibited U S  personnel from directly participating in combat missions  Congress placed a legislative cap on the number of U S  military and civilian contractor personnel who could be stationed in Colombia, although the cap was adjusted to meet needs over time  The current limit (first specified in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended) caps total military personnel at 800 and civilian contractors at 600, although numbers deployed have been far below the 1,400-person cap for years and now total fewer than 200  President Uribe (2002-2010) embraced Plan Colombia with an aggressive strategy toward the insurgent forces that prioritized citizen security  His Democratic Security Policy, implemented first in a military campaign called Plan Patriota, relied on the military to push FARC forces away from the major cities to remote rural areas and the borderlands  Like his predecessor, President Pastrana, Uribe continued to expand the Colombian military and police  He enhanced the intelligence capacity, professionalization, and coordination of the forces, in part with training provided by U S  forces  His strategy resulted in expanded state control over national territory and a significant reduction in kidnappings, terrorist attacks, and homicides  In 2007, the Uribe administration announced a shift to a "Policy of Consolidation of Democratic Security " The new doctrine was based on a "whole-of-government" approach to consolidate state presence in marginal areas that were historically neglected—vulnerable to drug crop cultivation, violence, and control by illegal armed groups  Called a strategic leap forward by then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, in 2009 the new strategy came to be called the National Consolidation Plan (see below)  Colombian support for Plan Colombia and for the nation's security program grew under Uribe's leadership  President Uribe levied a "wealth tax" to fund Colombia's security efforts, taxing the wealthiest taxpayers to fund growing defense and security expenditures  Overall U S  expenditures on Plan Colombia were only a modest portion of what Colombians spent on their own security  By one 2009 estimate, U S  expenditures were not more than 10% of what Colombians invested in their total security costs  In 2000, Colombia devoted less than 2% of its GDP to military and police expenditures and in 2010 that investment had grown to more than 4% of GDP  One assessment notes "in the end there is no substitute for host country dedication and funding" to turn around a security crisis such as Colombia faced at the beginning of the millennium  In 2008, congressional support for Plan Colombia and its successor programs also shifted  Some Members of Congress believed that the balance of programming was too heavily weighted toward security  Prior to 2008, the emphasis had been on "hard side" security assistance (to the military and police) compared with "soft side" traditional development and rule of law programs  Members debated if the roughly 75%/25% mix should be realigned  Since FY2008, Congress has reduced the proportion of assistance for security-related programs and increased the proportion for economic and social aid  As Colombia's security situation improved and Colombia's economy recovered, the United States also began turning over to Colombians operational and financial responsibility for efforts formerly funded by the U S  government  The Colombian government "nationalized" the training, equipping, and support for Colombian military programs, such as the counterdrug brigade, Colombian Army aviation, and the air bridge denial program  U S  funding overall began to decline  The nationalization efforts were not intended to end U S  assistance, but rather to gradually reduce it to pre-Plan Colombia levels, adjusted for inflation  A key goal of Plan Colombia was to reduce the supply of illegal drugs produced and exported by Colombia but the goals became broader over time  Bipartisan support for the policy existed through three U S  Administrations—President Bill Clinton, President George W  Bush, and President Barack Obama  Plan Colombia came to be viewed by some analysts as one of the most enduring and effective U S  policy initiatives in the Western Hemisphere  Some have lauded the strategy as a model  In 2009, William Brownfield, then-U S  Ambassador to Colombia, described Plan Colombia as "the most successful nation-building exercise that the United States has associated itself with perhaps in the last 25-30 years " Other observers, however, were critical of the policy as it unfolded  Many in the NGO and human rights community maintained the strategy, with its emphasis on militarization and security, was inadequate for solving Colombia's persistent, underlying problems of rural violence, poverty, neglect and institutional weakness  Nevertheless, it appears that improvements in security conditions have been accompanied by substantial economic growth and a reduction in poverty levels over time  The National Consolidation Plan first launched during the Uribe Administration, (renamed the National Plan for Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction), was designed to coordinate government efforts in regions where marginalization, drug trafficking, and violence converge  The whole-of-government consolidation was to integrate security, development, and counternarcotics to achieve a permanent state presence in vulnerable areas  Once security forces took control of a contested area, government agencies in housing, education, and development would regularize the presence of the state and reintegrate the municipalities of these marginalized zones into Colombia  The plan had been restructured several times by the Santos government  The United States supported the Colombian government's consolidation strategy through an inter-agency program called the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI)  CSDI provided U S  assistance to "fill gaps" in Colombian government programming  At the U S  Embassy in Colombia, CSDI coordinated efforts of the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department's Narcotics Affairs Section, the U S  Military Group, and the Department of Justice to assist Colombia in carrying out the consolidation plan by expanding state presence and promoting economic opportunities in priority zones  It combined traditional counternarcotics assistance for eradication, interdiction, alternative development, and capacity building for the police, military, and justice sector institutions with other economic and social development initiatives  As the peace agreement between the FARC and the government moved forward into implementation, the focus of U S  assistance to Colombia has shifted again  With a foundation of the work done to advance consolidation, U S  assistance has begun to aid in post-conflict planning and support Colombia's transition to peace by building up democratic institutions, protecting human rights and racial and ethnic minorities, and promoting economic opportunity  USAID's country cooperation strategy for 2014-2018 anticipated the Colombian government reaching a negotiated agreement with the FARC, but remained flexible if an agreement was not signed  It recognized early implementation efforts, especially in the first 24 months after signature, would be critical to demonstrate or model effective practices  In the next five years, it envisioned Colombia evolving from aid recipient to provider of technical assistance to neighbors in the region  Consolidating state authority and presence in the rural areas with weak institutions remains a significant challenge following the FARC's disarmament in the summer of 2017  Reintegration of the FARC and possibly other insurgent forces, such as the ELN, will be expensive and delicate  In particular, critics of the consolidation efforts of the Colombian government maintain that the Santos administration often lacked the commitment to hand off targeted areas from the military to civilian-led development and achieve locally led democratic governance  Consolidation efforts suffered from low political support, disorganization at the top levels of government, and failure to administer national budgets effectively in more remote areas, among other challenges  In August 2018, shortly after President Duque took office, USAID announced a framework of priorities for U S  economic development assistance to Colombia  Some of these priorities include promoting and supporting a whole-of-government strategy to include the dismantling of organized crime; increasing the effectiveness of Colombia's security and criminal justice institutions; promoting enhanced prosperity and job creation through trade; improving the investment climate for U S  companies; and advancing Colombia's capacity to strengthen governance and transition to sustainable peace, including reconciliation among victims, ex-combatants, and other citizens  The U S  Congress initially approved legislation in support of Plan Colombia in 2000, as part of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001 ( P L  106-246 )  Plan Colombia was never authorized by Congress, but it was funded annually through appropriations  From FY2000 through FY2016, U S  funding for Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies exceeded $10 billion in State Department and Defense Department programs  From FY2000 to FY2009, the United States provided foreign operations assistance to Colombia through the Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) account, formerly known as the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, and other aid accounts  In FY2008, Congress continued to fund eradication and interdiction programs through the ACP account, but funded alternative development and institution building programs through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account  In the FY2010 request, the Obama Administration shifted ACP funds into the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account  Since FY2008, U S  assistance has gradually declined because of tighter foreign aid budgets and nationalized Plan Colombia-related programs  In FY2014, in line with other foreign assistance reductions, funds appropriated to Colombia from State Department accounts declined to slightly below $325 million  In FY2015, Congress appropriated $300 million for bilateral assistance to Colombia in foreign operation  The FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations bill ( P L  114-113 ) provided Colombia from U S  State Department and U S  Agency for International Development accounts, slightly under $300 million, nearly identical to that appropriated in FY2015 (without P L  480, the Food for Peace account, the total for FY2016 was $293 million as shown in Table 1 )  In FY2017, Congress funded a program the Obama Administration had proposed called "Peace Colombia" to re-balance U S  assistance to support the peace process and implementation of the accord  In May 2017, Congress approved a FY2017 omnibus appropriations measure, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P L  115-31 ), which funded the various programs of Peace Colombia at $391 3 million  In the FY2017 legislation, Congress appropriated the following: The ESF account increased to $187 million (from $134 million in FY2016) to build government presence, encourage crop substitution to replace drug crops, and provide other assistance to conflict victims, including Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities  However, only $180 million was subsequently allocated  INCLE funding increased to $143 million with a focus on manual eradication of coca crops, support for the Colombian National Police, and judicial reform efforts  INCLE funding also included $10 million for Colombian forces' training to counterparts in other countries  $38 5 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF); and $21 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), which was a relatively large increase from under $4 million in FY2016 to focus on the demining effort  How the Trump Administration will engage with the issues of supporting post-conflict stability in Colombia has not been clearly defined by either the State Department or other executive departments  For example, the Trump Administration's proposed foreign aid budget for FY2018 would have reduced assistance to Colombia to $251 million  However, the FY2018 omnibus appropriations measure, approved by Congress in March 2018 ( P L  115-114 ), again included $391 3 million to support Colombia's transition to peace  The Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request for Colombia is $265 million, approximately a 32% reduction from the $391 3 million appropriated by Congress in FY2018  However, the House and Senate appropriations bills, H R  6385 and S  3108 , again would support the funding level of $391 3 million  The FY2019 Administration request would reduce post-conflict recovery programs and place greater emphasis on counternarcotics and security  Below, Table 1 provides account data from the annual international affairs congressional budget justification documents  The information about DOD-funded programs was provided to the Congressional Research Service by DOD analysts in December 2015 and October 2017 (and has not been updated)  The breakout of DOD assistance to Colombia is shown in Table 2     Colombia also has received additional U S  humanitarian funding to help it cope with more than 1 million Venezuelan migrants  As of September 30, 2018, U S  government humanitarian funding for the Venezuela response totaled approximately $96 5 million for both FY2017 and FY2018 combined, of which $54 8 million was for Colombia  (Humanitarian funding is drawn primarily from the global humanitarian accounts in annual Department of State/Foreign Operations appropriations acts ) In addition, the U S  Navy hospital ship USNS Comfort is on an 11-week medical support mission deployed through the end of 2018 to work with government partners, in part to assist with arrivals from Venezuela  In Colombia, the U S  response aims to help the Venezuelan arrivals as well as the local Colombian communities that are hosting them  In addition to humanitarian assistance, the United States is providing $37 million in bilateral assistance to support medium- and longer-term efforts by Colombia  Some Members of Congress have been deeply concerned about human rights violations in Colombia—especially those perpetrated by any recipients or potential recipients of U S  assistance  In Colombia's multisided, 50-year conflict, the FARC and ELN, the paramilitaries and their successors, and Colombia's security forces have all committed serious violations  Colombians have endured generations of noncombatant killings, massacres, kidnappings, forced displacements, forced disappearances, land mine casualties, and acts of violence that violate international humanitarian law  The extent of the crimes and the backlog of human rights cases to be prosecuted have overwhelmed the Colombian judiciary, which some describe as "inefficient" and overburdened  The United Nations and many human rights groups maintain that although some prosecutions have gone forward, most remain unresolved and the backlog of cases has been reduced slowly  In addition to the problem of impunity for such serious crimes, continued violations remain an issue  Since 2002, Congress has required in the annual foreign operations appropriations legislation that the Secretary of State certify annually to Congress that the Colombian military is severing ties to paramilitaries and that the government is investigating complaints of human rights abuses and meeting other human rights statutory criteria  (The certification criteria have evolved over time  ) For several years, certification was required before 30% of funds to the Colombian military could be released  The FY2014 appropriations legislation requires that 25% of funding under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program be held back pending certification by the Secretary of State  Some human rights groups have criticized the regular certification of Colombia, maintaining that evidence they have presented to the State Department has contradicted U S  findings  However, even some critics have acknowledged the human rights conditions on military assistance to Colombia to be "a flawed but useful tool" because the certification process requires that the U S  government regularly consult with Colombian and international human rights groups  Critics acknowledge that over time, conditionality can improve human rights compliance  Additional tools for monitoring human rights compliance by Colombian security forces receiving U S  assistance are the so-called "Leahy Law" restrictions, which Congress first passed in the late 1990s prior to the outset of Plan Colombia  First introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, these provisions deny U S  assistance to a foreign country's security forces if the U S  Secretary of State has credible information that such units have committed "a gross violation of human rights " The provisions apply to security assistance provided by the State Department and DOD  The Leahy Law under the State Department is authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and is codified at 22 U S C  2378d (§520M of the FAA)  The DOD Leahy provisions, which for years applied just to DOD training, now include a broader range of assistance, as modified in the FY2014 appropriations legislation  The provision related to the Leahy Laws for DOD assistance is codified at 10 U S C  362, and prohibits "any training, equipment, or other assistance," to a foreign security force unit if there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights  Both the State Department and DOD Leahy provisions require the State Department to review and clear—or vet—foreign security forces to determine if any individual or unit is credibly believed to be guilty of a gross human rights violation  Leahy vetting is typically conducted by U S  embassies and State Department headquarters  Reportedly on an annual basis about 1% of foreign security forces are disqualified from receiving assistance under the Leahy provisions, although many more are affected by administrative issues and are denied assistance until those conditions are resolved  Tainted security force units that are denied assistance may be remediated or cleared, but the procedures for remediation differ slightly between the DOD and State (or FAA) provisions  Because of the large amount of security assistance provided to Colombian forces (including the military and police), the State Department reportedly vets more candidates for assistance in Colombia than in any other country  In the late 1990s, poor human rights conditions in Colombia were a driving concern for developing the Leahy Law provisions  The U S  Embassy in Bogotá, with nearly two decades of experience in its vetting operations, has been cited as a source of best practices for other embassies seeking to bring their operations into compliance or enhance their performance  State Department officials have cited Colombia as a model operation that has helped Colombia to improve its human rights compliance  However, some human rights organizations are critical of the Leahy vetting process in Colombia, and cite the prevalence of extrajudicial executions allegedly committed by Colombian military units as evidence that these restrictions on U S  assistance have failed to remove human rights violators from the Colombian military  A human rights nongovernmental organization, Fellowship of Reconciliation, has published reports alleging an association between false positive killings and Colombian military units vetted by the State Department to receive U S  assistance  However, some have questioned the group's methodology  Some human rights organizations contend that the U S  government has tolerated abusive behavior by Colombian security forces without taking action or withholding assistance  Measured exclusively in counternarcotics terms, Plan Colombia has been a mixed success  Colombia remains the dominant producer of cocaine and in the DEA's National Drug Threat Assessment for 2017 continued to be the source for 95% of cocaine seized in the United States  Enforcement, eradication, and improved security squeezed production in Colombia, so that in 2012, Peru reemerged as the global leader in cocaine production, surpassing Colombia, for a year or so  In the early 2000s, given Colombia's predominance as the source of cocaine destined for U S  markets and its status as the second-largest producer of heroin consumed in the United States, eradication of coca bush and opium poppy (from which heroin is derived) was an urgent priority and became the preferred tool for controlling the production of these drugs  Another critical component of the drug supply reduction effort was alternative development programs funded by the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID) to assist illicit crop cultivators with transitioning to licit crop production and livelihoods  Analysts have long debated how effective Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies were in combating illegal drugs  Although Plan Colombia failed to meet its goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illicit drugs by 50% in its original six-year time frame, Colombia has sustained significant reductions in coca cultivation in recent years  According to U S  estimates, cultivation of coca declined from 167,000 hectares in 2007 to 78,000 hectares in 2012  (Poppy cultivation declined by more than 90% between 2000 and 2009 ) According to U S  government estimates, Colombia's potential production of pure cocaine fell to 170 metric tons in 2012, the lowest level in two decades  However, it started to rise slightly in 2013, and more dramatically in 2014 through 2016  In those years, cultivation of coca and production of cocaine grew significantly in part due to ending the aerial eradication of coca crops  In 2015, following a U N  agency determination that the herbicide used to spray coca crops was probably carcinogenic, Colombia's minister of health determined that aerial eradication of coca was not consistent with requirements of Colombia's Constitutional Court  In 2016, as noted above, the U S  DEA reported that 95% of cocaine seized in the United States originated in Colombia  According to U S  Office of National Drug Control Policy, Colombia in 2017 cultivated an unprecedented 209,000 hectares of coca, from which cocaine is derived, capable of generating 921 metric tons of cocaine  The United Nations estimates for 2017, which typically differ in quantity but follow the same trends as U S  estimates, maintained that Colombia's potential production of cocaine reached nearly 1,370 metric tons, 31% above its 2016 estimate  Even with Colombia's economic stability and improving security, cocaine exports (primarily to the U S  market) remain a major concern for U S  lawmakers  However, in drug interdiction, Colombia has set records for many years and is considered a strong and reliable U S  partner  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ( Table 4 ), shows Colombia cultivating 146,000 hectares of coca in 2016, a 52% increase over 2015 and another increase to 171,000 hectares, a 17% increase, in 2017  Although cocaine seizures were quite high in both years, the interdiction of cocaine was insufficient to counter the large increases in production  Both manual eradication and aerial eradication were central components of Plan Colombia to reduce coca and poppy cultivation  Manual eradication is conducted by teams, usually security personnel, who uproot and kill the plant  Aerial eradication involves spraying the plants from aircraft with an herbicide mixture to destroy the drug crop, but it may not kill the plants  In the context of Colombia's continuing internal conflict, manual eradication was far more dangerous than aerial spraying  U S  and Colombian policymakers recognized the dangers of manual eradication and, therefore, employed large-scale aerial spray campaigns to reduce coca crop yields, especially from large coca plantations  Colombia is the only country globally that aerially sprayed its illicit crops, and the practice has been controversial for health and environmental reasons, resulting in a Colombian decision to end aerial eradication in 2015  Since 2002, as a condition of fully funding the spraying program, Congress has regularly directed the State Department, after study and consultation with the U S  Environmental Protection Agency and other relevant agencies, to certify that the spraying did not "pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment " This certification requirement was included most years in the annual foreign operations appropriations legislation  Some analysts have also raised questions about the monetary and collateral costs of aerial eradication compared with other drug supply control strategies, its effectiveness, and its limited effect on the U S  retail price of cocaine  U S  State Department officials attribute Colombia's decline in coca cultivation after 2007 and prior to 2013 to the persistent aerial eradication of drug crops in tandem with manual eradication where viable  Between 2009 and 2013, Colombia aerially sprayed roughly 100,000 hectares annually  In 2013, however, eradication efforts declined  Colombia aerially eradicated roughly 47,000 hectares  It manually eradicated 22,120 hectares, short of the goal of 38,500 hectares  This reduction had a number of causes: the U S -supported spray program was suspended in October 2013 after two U S  contract pilots were shot down, rural protests in Colombia hindered manual and aerial eradication efforts, and security challenges limited manual eradicators working in border areas  In late 2013, Ecuador won an out-of-court settlement in a case filed in 2008 before the International Court of Justice in The Hague for the negative effects of spray drift over its border with Colombia  In negotiations with the FARC, the government and the FARC provisionally agreed in May 2014 that voluntary manual eradication would be prioritized over forced eradication  Aerial eradication remained a viable tool in the government's drug control strategy, according to the agreement, but would be permitted only if voluntary and manual eradication could not be conducted safely  In April 2015, the Santos administration determined that glyphosate, a broad-spectrum, nonselective herbicide used commercially, but in Colombia sprayed on coca plants to eradicate them, was "probably carcinogenic" to humans in a review published by a World Health Organization (WHO) affiliate  In October 2015, the government ended spraying operations and began to implement a new public health approach toward illicit drugs, one that proponents suggested would reduce human rights violations  On the supply side, Colombia's new drug policy gives significant attention to expanding alternative development and licit crop substitution while intensifying interdiction efforts  The State Department in its 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), however, warned that illicit cultivation was expanding in areas long off-limits to aerial spraying, including national parks, a buffer zone with Ecuador where aerial eradication has been restricted, and in indigenous or protected Afro-Colombian territories  Colombian interdiction practices are deemed some of the most effective in the world  The Colombian government reported seizing more than 207 metric tons (mt) of cocaine base in 2014 and that seizure total doubled by 2017 with capture of 442 mt of cocaine  According to the U S  State Department's 2018 INCSR , Colombia also seized 197 mt of marijuana, 348 kilograms of heroin, and destroyed more than 3,400 cocaine base and hydrochloride labs  USAID funds and runs alternative development programs in Colombia to assist communities with transitioning from a dependency on illicit crops to licit employment and livelihoods  Alternative development was once focused narrowly on crop substitution and assistance with infrastructure and marketing  Since the Colombian government's shift to a consolidation strategy, USAID has supported "consolidation and livelihoods" programming in 40 of the 58 strategically located, conflict-affected municipalities targeted by the government's National Consolidation Plan  To facilitate economic development, USAID funds initiatives that assist farmers and others with shifting from coca growing to licit economic opportunities  These programs are designed to strengthen small farmer producer organizations, improve their productivity, and connect them to markets  Some observers maintain that poor and unsustainable outcomes from alternative development programs while the Colombian conflict was still under way resulted from ongoing insecurity and lack of timeliness or sequencing of program elements  The renewed commitment to alternative development and crop substitution in the 2016 peace accord with the FARC may be similarly challenged  Formal implementation of the peace accord on drug eradication and crop substitution began in late May 2017 with collective agreements committing communities to replace their coca crops with licit crops  In some regions, the program is extended to families who cultivate coca and also to producers of legal crops and landless harvesters  The Colombian government also committed to a combined approach of both voluntary and forced manual eradication  The government's goal set for 2017 was eradicating 100,000 hectares of coca, 50,000 through forced manual eradication and 50,000 through "crop substitution" accords reached with coca farming households who would voluntary eradicate  At the U S -Colombia High Level Dialogue held in Bogotá in March 2018, a renewed commitment to the enduring partnership between the United States and Colombia was announced  A major outcome was a U S -Colombia pledge to reduce illegal narcotics trafficking through expanded counternarcotics cooperation  The new goal set was to reduce Colombia's estimated cocaine production and coca cultivation to 50% of current levels by 2023  In addition, a memorandum of understanding was signed to combat the illegal gold mining that funds transnational criminal organizations  Although President Duque appears determined to pursue a more aggressive approach to drug policy, he has not clearly stated how his approach to counternarcotics will differ from that of his predecessor  The government may restart aerial eradication, a strategy that ended in 2015 due to the Colombian Health Ministry's concerns over cancer-causing potential of the herbicide glyphosate, but no precise plans for restarting the program have been announced in the Duque Administration's first three months in office  Experimentation with delivering glyphosate by drones (rather than planes) began in June 2018 under the Santos Administration and is continuing under the Duque government  On October 1, 2018, President Duque authorized police to confiscate and destroy any quantity of drugs found on persons in possession of them, resulting in the seizure of more than 7 metric tons of drugs in less than two weeks  This enforcement measure may violate a 1994 Colombian Constitutional Court ruling, however, in which Colombians may carry small doses of drugs for personal use, including marijuana, hashish, and cocaine  Several court challenges have been filed that seek to nullify the Duque decree on constitutional grounds of protected personal use  Drug trafficking continues to trigger conflict over land in Colombia while affecting the most vulnerable groups, including Afro-Colombian, peasant, and indigenous populations  Some analysts warn that national and international pressure for drug eradication could also lead to increased human rights violations, including health consequences by reviving aerial spraying of drug crops and government actions to forcibly break up demonstrations by coca producers who resist eradication  Some analysts have advocated that investments to lower drug supply need to go beyond eradication, which has not been a lasting approach to reducing drug crop cultivation  For instance, the government could provide economic and education opportunities to at-risk youth to enhance their role in peace building and to prevent their recruitment into the drug trade and other illegal activity  Economic relations between Colombia and the United States have deepened  The U S -Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force in May 2012  By 2020, it will phase out all tariffs and other barriers to bilateral trade between Colombia and the United States, its largest trade partner  Since the U S -Colombia FTA went into force, the stock of U S  investment in Colombia surpassed $7 billion in 2014 but dropped to $6 2 billion in 2016 (on a historical cost basis), concentrated mostly in mining and manufacturing  According to the U S  Department of Commerce, U S  exports to Colombia exceeded $26 8 billion in 2016 and Colombia was the 22 nd -largest market for U S  exports; however, U S  imports from Colombia declined between 2015 and 2016  Major U S  exports to Colombia include oil (noncrude oil products including gasoline), machinery, cereals, organic chemicals, and plastic  Because 65% of U S  imports from Colombia are crude oil imports, much of the decline in value was caused by the sharp fall in oil prices that began in 2014  Major U S  imports beside crude oil, include gold, coffee, cut flowers, and fruits  Congressional interest in Colombia now extends far beyond security and counternarcotics and has grown in the area of bilateral trade following implementation of the U S -Colombia FTA, (also known at the U S -Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement)  Colombia is a founding member of the Pacific Alliance, along with Chile, Mexico, and Peru, and has sought to deepen trade integration and cross-border investment with its partners in the alliance while reducing trade barriers  The Pacific Alliance aims to go further by creating a common stock market, allowing for the eventual free movement of businesses and persons, and serving as an export platform to the Asia-Pacific region  Colombia's leadership role in the Pacific Alliance and Colombia's accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in May 2018, following a review of the country's macroeconomic policies and changes, are major new developments  The accession to the OECD was approved by Colombia's lower house in October 2018 and the Senate in November 2018, but it remained under final review by Colombia's Constitutional Court in early February 2019  The Santos administration pushed to meet the criteria required for OECD membership because it maintained that such recognition signified Colombia's attainment of world-class development standards and policies  Colombia has made progress on trade issues such as copyright, pharmaceuticals, fuel and trucking regulations, and labor concerns (including subcontracting methods and progress on resolving cases of violence against union activists)  Congress remains interested in Colombia's future because the country has become one of the United States' closest allies  With 17 years of investment in Colombia's security and stability, some maintain that there has already been a strong return on U S  investment  Plan Colombia and its successor strategies broadened from counternarcotics to include humanitarian concerns, efforts to bolster democratic development and human rights protections, and trade and investment to spark growth  The record expansion of Colombia's coca crop and increasing cocaine exports to the United States, however, may significantly hinder the effort to consolidate peace in Colombia and could potentially increase corruption and extortion  A significant portion of the Colombian public remains skeptical of the peace process and the FARC's role in Colombia's democracy  Other Colombians maintain that support for peace programs in Colombia is important not only to benefit former FARC or other demobilized combatants but also to fulfill promises the government made in the peace accords to the country's 8 6 million victims of the five-decade conflict  As President Duque concluded his first 100 days in office, his government faced overlapping challenges: (1) an upsurge in illicit drug crops, which had set records in 2016 and 2017; (2) implementation of provisions of the peace accord negotiated by former president Santos but marred by slow implementation, attacks on land and human rights activists, and projected budgetary shortfalls; (3) renewed violent competition among criminal groups in rural areas, some of which reportedly are sheltering in Venezuela; and (4) Venezuela's humanitarian crisis, which resulted in a surge of migrants fleeing to or through Colombia  The annual level of foreign assistance provided by the U S  Congress for Colombia began to decline in FY2008 and then gradually increased in FY2017 and FY2018 to support peace and implementation of the FARC-government peace accord  Some Members of Congress may want to build on cooperation with Colombian partners to continue to train Central Americans and other third-country nationals in counternarcotics and security, including programs in citizen security, crime prevention and monitoring, military and police capacity building, and hostage negotiation and cybersecurity  Congress may continue to closely monitor Colombia's domestic security situation  It also may continue to oversee issues such as drug trafficking; Colombia's effort to combat other illegal armed groups such as Bacrim; the status of human rights protections; and the expansion of health, economic, environmental, energy, and educational cooperation  Congress may seek to foster Colombian leadership in the region to counter growing political instability in Venezuela  The U S  Congress has been interested in expanding investment and trade opportunities both bilaterally with Colombia and within regional groupings, such as the Pacific Alliance  Some analysts contend that U S -Colombian trade improvements rest on the strength of the overall relationship between Colombia and the United States  

ground_truth: The Coast Guard, a component of DHS, serves as the principal federal agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship in U.S. ports and waterways. To ensure that the Coast Guard is effectively fulfilling its missions, agency managers must have accurate information and base decisions on sound analyses for effective program management. This statement discusses Coast Guard actions needed to (1) improve the quality of data used for program management and (2) improve the transparency of its data for reporting on mission performance and planning. This statement is based on relevant products GAO issued from June 2014 through December 2017 on Coast Guard strategic planning and management issues, as well as related recommendation follow-up conducted through February 2018. GAO reviewed applicable laws, regulations, policies and guidance. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials responsible for administering these programs and obtained information on how they used data to inform decisionmaking. GAO interviewed a range of stakeholders, including federal and industry officials. GAO's prior work recommended multiple actions to improve the Coast Guard's program management by improving the quality of data it uses to manage and report on its mission performance. Specifically, GAO recommended actions such as collecting more complete data and clarifying the data limitations to facilitate more effective program management. For example, in December 2017, GAO found that more information is needed to calculate vessel safety statistics that could enhance the Coast Guard's knowledge about accident, injury, and fatality trends involving commercial fishing vessels. Having more complete information could be useful to carrying out its marine safety mission, and GAO recommended, among other things, that the Coast Guard ensure that data collected during commercial fishing vessel incident investigations is accurately captured. In 2018, the Coast Guard reported taking initial steps to capture more accurate data. GAO's prior work also identified areas where the Coast Guard could improve the transparency of the data it uses for reporting on its mission performance as well its capital planning purposes. For example, in an October 2017 report on performance goals, GAO found the Coast Guard's Annual Performance Report (APR) has not been released publicly since 2011. Consequently, there has not been full visibility over performance across all of the Coast Guard's missions. Coast Guard officials stated that a decision by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership to limit the number of performance goals shared publicly had deterred the Coast Guard from public release of its APR. GAO recommended that APRs be available on the Coast Guard's website; the Coast Guard plans to publicly release future APRs. In addition, previous GAO reports found that the Coast Guard's annual 5-year capital investment plan, which projects acquisition funding needs for the upcoming 5 years, did not consistently reflect current total cost estimates or the effects of tradeoffs made as part of the annual budget cycle. GAO made recommendations to help the Coast Guard plan for future acquisitions and the difficult trade off decisions it will face given funding constraints. The Coast Guard agreed, but it is unclear when it will complete the 20-year plan. GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement but has made them to the Coast Guard and DHS in the past on improving its program management through, among other things, better quality and more transparent data. DHS and the Coast Guard agreed with these recommendations and reported actions or plans to address them.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: With a staff of over 47,000 members, the Coast Guard operates a multimission fleet of 201 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and over 1,400 boats and ships  Operational control of surface and air assets is divided into two geographic Areas (Pacific and Atlantic), within which are nine Districts consisting of 37 sectors and the stations within them  The Coast Guard’s program oversight, policy development, and personnel administration are carried out at the Coast Guard’s headquarters  As shown in table 1, the Coast Guard is responsible for 11 statutory missions identified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended  The Coast Guard manages these missions through six mission programs, also listed in table 1  As part of its marine safety mission, for example, the Coast Guard conducts, among other activities, safety inspections and vessel accident investigations, including those involving commercial fishing vessels, which are part of an industry with one of the highest death rates of any industry in the United States  For each of its 11 missions, the Coast Guard has developed goals and targets to assess and communicate agency performance  The Coast Guard’s performance assessment process also includes identifying performance gaps and implementing corrective actions to address unmet performance goals  As part of its process, the Coast Guard is to establish targets for the current and subsequent 2 fiscal years, according to Coast Guard officials  Each target is set by the Coast Guard, but according to the Coast Guard’s Annual Performance Report (APR), some are derived from external factors  For example, DHS requires that Coast Guard set a 100 percent target for the percent of people in imminent danger saved in the maritime environment  Further, several of the Coast Guard’s assets used to conduct these missions are approaching the end of their intended service lives  As part of its efforts to modernize its assets used to carry out various missions, the Coast Guard has begun acquiring new vessels, such as the National Security Cutter, the Fast Response Cutter as well as other assets  However, concerns surrounding the affordability of this effort remain as the Coast Guard continues to pursue multiple new acquisitions without long-term planning to guide the affordability of its acquisition portfolio  Figure 1 shows the Coast Guard’s Fast Response Cutter and National Security Cutter  We previously reported on actions the Coast Guard could take to ensure that, among other things, it addresses limitations posed by incomplete data, the use of unrealistic asset performance data, and limitations with its performance goal data, for more effective program management  Examples of data limitations that we have recommended that the Coast Guard take action on are below  Improve completeness of mission data  In December 2017, we found that several different federal agencies play a role in overseeing and promoting commercial fishing vessel safety, including the Coast Guard  As part of its marine safety activities, the Coast Guard conducts, among other activities, safety inspections and vessel accident investigations  Commercial fishing has one of the highest death rates of any industry in the United States and vessel disasters are the leading cause of fatalities among fishers, according to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health  However, our December 2017 review found that more information is needed to calculate vessel safety statistics that could enhance the Coast Guard’s knowledge about accident, injury, and fatality trends involving commercial fishing vessels  The Coast Guard collects some data on commercial fishing vessels that operate in federal waters—including a vessel’s length and construction date—but data on the population of the active U S  commercial fishing vessel fleet are not complete  Between 2006 and 2015, the Coast Guard investigated 2,101 commercial fishing vessel accidents that were identified as occurring in federal waters  While the number of accidents generally increased over this time period, the number of injuries and fatalities declined over the same 10-year period  However, we could not assess the number of accidents, injuries, and fatalities by fishery— meaning the area in which a certain type of fish (e g , shrimp, salmon, crab) is caught—because the Coast Guard’s data is not complete  Further, we were unable to calculate the rates of commercial fishing vessel accidents, injuries, and fatalities, because reliable data on certain information needed to do so—including the total number of vessels that are actively fishing and the fishery or region in which the vessel operates—are either not maintained or are not collected by the Coast Guard or other federal agencies  Having this information could be useful to carrying out the Coast Guard’s marine safety mission, which includes enforcing laws to prevent death, injury and property loss in the marine environment  We recommended in our December 2017 report that the Coast Guard ensure that data it collects during commercial fishing vessel incident investigations is accurately captured  We also recommended that the Coast Guard work with stakeholders to form a working group to determine an efficient means to establish a reliable estimate of the population of active commercial fishing vessels  The Coast Guard agreed with both recommendations, and in February 2018 informed us that it is in the process of developing additional data fields to capture more information, such as the fishery in which the commercial fishing is involved, and is engaging stakeholders to establish an appropriate working group  We will continue to monitor these actions  Use more realistic asset performance data  In our May 2016 report on Coast Guard strategic planning, we found that the Coast Guard did not provide field units with realistic goals for allocating assets, by mission  We reported that the Coast Guard’s strategic allocations of assets were based on unrealistic assumptions about the performance capacity of its assets and did not reflect asset condition and unscheduled maintenance  This was due, in part, to the Coast Guard not including information from its field units on the actual performance of its assets  For example, agency officials noted that one of its classes of cutters was 50 years old and these cutters were hampered by mechanical failures requiring emergency dry dock repairs, which resulted in reduced availability to carry out their missions during the year  In another example, a field unit stated that based on historical use, it planned for 575 hours per vessel for one type of cutter instead of the 825 hours performance capacity  Because actual asset use has consistently fallen below asset performance capacities, there is not a direct alignment between the Coast Guard’s strategic operational goals and its prospects for achieving those goals  As a result, the headquarters’ strategic intent, which is based on asset capacity rather than actual performance, did not provide the field with strategic, realistic goals for allocating assets by mission  Agencies should use quality information that is appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and timely to achieve objectives and address related risks  We recommended that the Coast Guard incorporate field unit input, such as information on assets’ actual performance, to inform more realistic asset allocation decisions  The Coast Guard concurred with this recommendation, and in February 2018 informed us that it plans to address this recommendation through changes to two process documents that are under revision, with an expected completion date in March 2018  Improve performance goal data  In our October 2017 review of Coast Guard performance goals, we reported that the Coast Guard and DHS identified limitations with two of the seven selected performance goals we reviewed, including the five year average number of recreational boating deaths and injuries  In particular, officials believe that many recreational boating injuries that do not require hospitalization are not reported to the Coast Guard  These officials believe that the amount of underreporting may vary over time due to changes in industry trends, making it difficult to accurately determine actual injury rates and program performance  We determined that the data for this performance goal was not sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives due to these likely limitations  We found that the Coast Guard did not report the possible extent of these limitations with this performance goal in its fiscal year 2016 APR  For the other performance goal, the Coast Guard and DHS identified limitations with the number of detected incursions of foreign fishing vessels violating U S  waters, which is publicly reported in DHS’s APR  DHS’s review of this performance goal, reported in August 2015, raised questions about the validity of this goal—that is, whether it provides a useful measure of the Coast Guard’s performance  Specifically, the review noted that this performance goal is intended to measure a deterrence effect, but doing so is inherently difficult and may lead to contradictory interpretations of performance  In October 2017, we found that the data for this performance goal was sufficiently reliable for our reporting objective purposes, but questions remain about its validity  Reliable data is not a useful indication of performance unless it is also a valid representation of the goal being addressed  DHS officials reported that they did not include a discussion of the limitations for this performance goal in DHS’s fiscal year 2015 APR because the performance goal met the minimum threshold for data reliability despite the goal’s limitations  Coast Guard officials reported they were aware of these limitations and were working with DHS and OMB to improve the performance goal and implement corrective actions within 1 to 2 years  We recommended that the Coast Guard assess the extent to which documentation on performance data reliability contains appropriate information on known data reliability limitations and update these documents, as needed, based on the results of the assessment  The Coast Guard concurred and in February 2018, informed us that it had taken initial actions to address our recommendation  However, our preliminary review of these actions indicates that further action will be needed to fully address our recommendation, such as documenting and reporting the limitations of performance data  Our previous reports have identified areas in which the Coast Guard could improve the transparency of its data used for reporting on its mission performance and planning  Improve transparency of data on mission performance  In our October 2017 report on performance goals, we found that the Coast Guard’s APR has not been released publicly since 2011 due to a previous DHS leadership decision  Consequently, there has not been full visibility over performance across all of the Coast Guard’s missions  For example, one of the Coast Guard’s missions—defense readiness—has no goals that are publicly reported or shared with Congress, even though measures related to defense readiness are included in the Coast Guard’s APR  Coast Guard officials stated that they could see the benefit of publicly releasing their APR; however, DHS’s decision to limit the number of performance goals shared publicly has so far deterred the Coast Guard from pursuing the public release of its APR  DHS officials told us that the department is concerned about conflicting information that a component’s APR might present because it is vetted and produced separately from the DHS APR  However, the lack of transparency regarding performance data shared publicly and with Congress can result in an incomplete picture of mission performance and can limit effective oversight of Coast Guard operations  As a result, the public and Congress may be unable to determine the extent to which the Coast Guard is meeting its missions  We recommended that future Coast Guard APRs be available on the Coast Guard’s public website  The Coast Guard concurred with this recommendation and in February 2018, the Coast Guard informed us that it had completed its 2017 APR and are determining an appropriate approach for making it publicly available  Improve capital planning transparency  In our previously issued work on the Coast Guard’s annual 5-year capital investment plan (CIP), we found that the CIP does not consistently reflect current total cost estimates or the effects of tradeoffs that are made as part of the annual budget cycle  We made several recommendations in recent years intended to help the Coast Guard plan for future acquisitions and the difficult tradeoff decisions it will likely face  The Coast Guard generally concurred with these recommendations and is in various stages of implementation  For example, in 2017 we reported that we have made recommendations that DHS and the Coast Guard take several actions to gain an understanding of what the Coast Guard needs to meet its mission within its likely acquisition funding levels  These recommended actions included the Coast Guard: (1) conducting a comprehensive portfolio review across all its acquisitions to develop revised baselines that meet mission needs and reflect realistic funding scenarios and (2) developing a 20-year plan that identifies all necessary recapitalization efforts and any fiscal resources likely necessary to complete these efforts  For example, in 2014 we recommended the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to maintain the current level of service and the fiscal resources needed to acquire them  Without these efforts, the Coast Guard will continue, as it has in recent years, to plan its future acquisitions through the annual budgeting process, an approach that has led to delayed and reduced capabilities  In 2016, the Coast Guard revised its 2005 Mission Needs Statement, which provides a basic foundation for long-term investment planning that is to serve as the basis for evaluating the effectiveness of various fleet mixes, and inform the Coast Guard’s CIP  However, the 2016 Mission Needs Statement did not identify specific assets the Coast Guard needs to achieve its missions, nor did it update the annual hours it needs from each asset class to satisfactorily complete its missions  The Coast Guard has stated it is developing a 20-year Long-term Major Acquisition Plan, but it has not stated when the plan will be completed or what will be included in this plan, such as potential trade-offs that could be made across the Coast Guard’s portfolio of acquisitions to better meet mission needs within realistic funding levels  A long-term plan with a tradeoff analysis would facilitate a full understanding of the affordability challenges facing the Coast Guard while it builds the Offshore Patrol Cutter  DHS concurred with our 2014 recommendation, but it is unclear when the Coast Guard plans to complete the 20-year plan  Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, and members of the sub- committee, this completes my prepared statement  I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time  If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony, please contact Nathan Anderson at (202) 512-3841 or andersonn@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Other individuals making key contributions to this work, and the underlying reports on which it is based, include Dawn Hoff (Assistant Director); Andrew Curry (Analyst-in-Charge); Chuck Bausell; David Bieler; Richard Cederholm; John Crawford; Timothy J  DiNapoli; Michele Fejfar; Laurier R  Fish; Peter Haderlein; Eric Hauswirth; Laura Jezewski; Tracey King; Benjamin Licht; Marie A  Mak; Gary Malavenda; Diana Moldafsky; Heidi Nielson; Meg Ullengren; and Kayli Westling  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2:  According to DHS officials, the National 911 Program provided input on this guide  In addition, an advisory body tasked by FCC to examine 911 call-centers’ architecture issued a report in 2016 that provided a cybersecurity self-assessment tool for call centers and guidance on cybersecurity strategies  Governance plans: To address challenges related to the evolving roles for state and local 911 authorities, the National 911 Program issued a guide in 2016 that provided practices for states to consider when interconnecting NG911 networks, and DHS issued a guide in 2015 for emergency communications officials for establishing, assessing, and updating their governance structures  In addition, an FCC advisory body issued a report in 2016 that identified NG911 governance approaches, issues, and recommendations for states, localities, and call centers to consider when planning for the deployment of NG911  In addition to federal agency efforts to assist the state and local 911 community, the National 911 Program is in the early stages of establishing an interagency initiative to create a National NG911 Roadmap  As part of this initiative, the National 911 Program plans to convene the 911 stakeholder community to identify tasks that need to be completed at the national level by the federal government and other public and private-sector organizations to support the creation of a national, interconnected NG911 system  Additional details regarding this planned activity are described in further detail later in this report  For additional information on federal actions to address state and local NG911 challenges, see appendix II  As the lead entity for coordinating federal NG911 activities, the National 911 Program has taken a variety of actions to assist the state and local 911 community, in collaboration with other federal agencies  However, the program lacks goals and performance measures to assess whether these activities are achieving desired results  National 911 Program officials stated that they initiate program activities based on feedback received from the 911 community  In addition, officials said the program’s activities fall within the tasks established in the Next Generation 911 Advancement Act of 2012  However, the National 911 Program does not have a means to assess its progress toward meeting its responsibilities established in the 2012 Act  National 911 Program officials said the Office of EMS—the office within NHTSA in which the program is housed—has a strategic plan, but it is outdated and does not contain specific goals or performance measures related to 911 or NG911 implementation  Officials said the Office of EMS has held preliminary discussions to begin updating its strategic plan by January 2019 and plans to include goals and performance measures related to 911 and NG911 services  Office of EMS officials told us the Office of EMS strategic plan will be jointly developed with the National 911 Program  However the Office of EMS had not yet developed a draft strategic plan during the time of our review  Federal internal control standards call for management to clearly define objectives in order to achieve desired results  According to these standards, an entity determines its mission, establishes specific measurable objectives, and formulates plans to achieve its objectives  These standards state that management sets objectives in order to meet the entity’s mission, strategic plan, and goals and requirements of applicable laws and regulations  In addition, our work on leading practices for managing for results indicated that an agency’s strategic goals should also explain what results are expected from the agency and when to expect those results  Further, these goals form a basis for an entity to identify strategies to fulfill its mission and improve its operations to support the achievement of that mission  As the lead entity for coordinating federal NG911 efforts, the National 911 Program faces a complex and challenging task of assisting the 911 community while the nation’s 911 systems undergo a major transformation  However, without specific goals and related performance measures, the National 911 Program is unable to assess how well its activities are achieving results in relation to its responsibilities identified in the 2012 Act  As the National 911 Program and the Office of EMS consider creating a strategic plan, ensuring that the plan includes specific goals and related measures for the National 911 Program would help officials better understand whether the program’s activities are effectively assisting states and localities in transitioning to a fully integrated national NG911 system, and help identify any programmatic changes that might be needed  As previously mentioned, the National 911 Program is in the early stages of establishing an interagency initiative to create a National NG911 Roadmap  This initiative will convene the 911 stakeholder community to identify national-level tasks that need to be completed by federal agencies and other organizations to realize a national, interconnected NG911 system  According to the National 911 Program, a list of the national-level tasks needed to advance NG911 implementation nationwide has not been created to date  In addition, state officials we spoke with said there are certain issues related to interoperability and cybersecurity that federal agencies need to address before states can connect their respective state NG911 systems  To address these issues, NHTSA’s National 911 Program issued a request for proposal (RFP) in August 2017 for managing the roadmap development process and awarded a contract in September 2017  While the National 911 Program is taking steps to develop a National NG911 Roadmap, the program does not have a plan to identify: (1) roles or responsibilities for federal entities to carry out national-level tasks or (2) how the program plans to achieve the roadmap’s objectives  NHTSA’s NG911 roadmap RFP specifies that by identifying a list of national-level tasks that are developed and adopted by the 911 stakeholder community, the roadmap could serve as a blueprint to carry out these tasks and thereby ensure the interoperability of the nation’s NG911 system  However, the National 911 Program does not have plans for the entities participating in the development of the roadmap to be assigned roles and responsibilities for executing the roadmap’s national- level tasks  National 911 Program officials told us the National 911 Program does not plan to assign roles and responsibilities because NHTSA does not have the authority to require or assign tasks for other entities  Additionally, program officials view the simultaneous identification of tasks and assignments of responsibility for those tasks as a risk to facilitating a candid and productive discussion with entities participating in the roadmap initiative  However, officials stated it may be appropriate for agencies participating in the roadmap initiative to perform specific tasks after the roadmap is finalized  We have previously examined interagency collaborative mechanisms and identified certain key issues for federal agencies to consider when using these mechanisms to achieve results  Our prior work has found that following leading collaboration practices, such as clarifying roles and responsibilities of agencies engaged in collaboration, can enhance and sustain collaboration among agencies and provide an understanding of who will do what in support of meeting the aims of the collaborative group  As stated above, the RFP specifies that a roadmap developed by and adopted by 911 stakeholders could serve as a blueprint to carry out the roadmap’s tasks  Securing the commitment of agencies to assigned roles could help organize the collaborative group’s joint and individual efforts and thereby better facilitate decision making  As we have previously found, a lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of agencies participating in an interagency effort—such as the execution of the roadmap’s tasks—may limit agencies’ abilities to effectively achieve shared objectives  Given the complexity of the task and the number of agencies that could be involved, following selected leading collaboration practices for the roadmap initiative—particularly with regard to collaborating with roadmap stakeholders to clarify their roles and responsibilities (whether during the creation of the task list or afterwards)—could reduce barriers to agencies effectively working together to achieve the national-level tasks  While clarifying the roles and responsibilities of roadmap stakeholders for the execution of the roadmap’s tasks is an important collaborative step, the National 911 Program has additional responsibilities as the lead entity for the initiative  However, National 911 Program officials are unable to clearly articulate how the program will proceed following the completion of the roadmap  National 911 Program officials said without knowing the contents of the roadmap, it would be premature to specify how the roadmap’s national-level tasks would be completed  Officials stated that once the roadmap is completed, possible next steps may include identification of timelines, deadlines, and a mechanism for tracking progress, among other things, but officials stated that these steps are not required in the roadmap RFP  As stated above, federal internal control standards call for management to clearly define objectives in specific terms  According to these standards, management defines what is to be achieved, who is to achieve it, how it will be achieved, and the time frames for achievement  Without a clear plan for how the National 911 Program would take next steps to support the implementation of the roadmap’s objectives and tasks, the National 911 Program may not be prepared to take effective action once the roadmap is completed  We have previously found that having an implementation plan can assist agencies to better focus and prioritize goals and objectives, and align planned activities  Once the roadmap is completed, developing an implementation plan that details what is to be achieved and how it will be accomplished will place the National 911 Program in a better position moving forward to support the completion of the national-level tasks  The current 911 system is undergoing a historic transition  With no federal requirement that states transition to NG911 services, federal leadership is critical to addressing interoperability challenges and promoting the goal of an interconnected national system  As the lead federal entity for fostering coordination and collaboration among federal, state, and local 911 authorities, the National 911 Program plays a critical role in coordinating NG911 implementation efforts to improve the nation’s 911 services  However, this program—in collaboration with other federal agencies— faces a complex and challenging task to help move approximately 6,000 independent 911 call centers toward an interconnected national NG911 system  In addition, given that the NG911 transition is still in its early stages and is an ongoing effort, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of various federal actions to assist states and localities in the transition  In light of these challenges, without specific goals and related measures to assess effectiveness, the National 911 Program may be hindered in determining whether it is making progress towards its stated mission  Through the roadmap initiative, the National 911 Program has taken important first steps in identifying the need for actions at the national level, in order to fully realize the desired end-state of a national, interconnected NG911 system  However, while identifying needed next steps is essential, equally important to the collaborative effort’s success is (1) defining and agreeing on the roles and responsibilities of the entities best suited to undertake these actions, and (2) developing plans for how the National 911 Program will support implementation to achieve the roadmap’s objectives  If taken, these actions could help further NG911 implementation nationwide and help the National 911 Program and federal agencies in assisting states and localities to improve these lifesaving services  We are making the following three recommendations to the Administrator of NHTSA regarding the National 911 Program: develop specific program goals and performance measures related to NG911 implementation  (Recommendation 1) in collaboration with the appropriate federal agencies, determine roles and responsibilities of federal agencies participating in the National NG911 Roadmap initiative in order to carry out the national-level tasks over which each agency has jurisdiction  (Recommendation 2) develop an implementation plan to support the completion of the National NG911 Roadmap’s national-level tasks  (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, and Homeland Security and FCC for their review and comment  In its comments, reproduced in appendix III, the Department of Transportation agreed with the recommendations  The Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  The Department of Commerce and FCC had no comments  As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, the Secretary of the Department of Commerce, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Managing Director of the FCC, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  Our objectives were to examine (1) progress states and localities are making to implement Next Generation 911 (NG911) and the challenges they have faced and (2) how federal agencies have addressed state and local implementation challenges and planned next steps  To describe state and local progress in implementing NG911 and background information on fee collection and costs, we analyzed select survey data elements from the 2016 National 911 Progress Report and the Eighth Annual Report to Congress on State Collection and Distribution of 911 and Enhanced 911 Fees and Charges, maintained by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) respectively  More specifically, we analyzed the most recent state-provided data (from calendar year 2015) related to the planning and implementation of NG911 at the state and local levels, as well as NG911 cost and 911-related revenue data  We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing relevant documents and discussing data elements with staff responsible for collecting and analyzing the data  We also conducted our own testing to check the consistency of the data  We found the data from both sources to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes to describe states’ progress in implementing NG911 and provide background on 911 fee collection and costs  While these data provide the best nationwide picture of NG911 implementation and fee collection, and are reliable for our purposes, there are some limitations on how the data can be used  Since we did not validate the state-reported responses, our findings based on these data are limited to what states reported  Additionally, regarding the 2016 National 911 Progress Report data, there are limitations to (1) making comparisons between states because states have different approaches to implementing NG911 and (2) ascertaining year-over-year progress because reporting is voluntary and states’ response rates can vary year to year  To describe implementation challenges that states and local authorities may be encountering, we selected a non-generalizable sample of 10 states as case studies, based upon a variety of factors, including reported progress in implementing NG911, statewide planning and coordination, reported number of annual 911 calls, whether states diverted 911 fees to other uses, and variation in geographic location  We selected these states, in part, based on their responses to the two aforementioned surveys  Based on the aforementioned criteria, we selected the following states to include as case studies: California, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia  We reviewed documents and interviewed state officials from all of these states except Nevada about NG911 implementation progress, challenges, federal actions, and any additional assistance needed  We contacted 911 officials in Nevada but did not receive responses  We also interviewed local officials in four of the selected states  While not generalizable to all states, the information obtained from our case studies provides examples of broader issues faced by states and localities in managing the NG911 transition  To determine how federal agencies have addressed state and local implementation challenges and planned next steps, we reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and documentation of federal agency actions and plans, and our prior reports  We also interviewed officials from federal agencies, including NHTSA, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), FCC, and the U S  Department of Homeland Security (DHS), about federal actions taken and plans for next steps  To understand planning activities undertaken by NHTSA’s National 911 Program, and its planned project to develop a National NG911 Roadmap, we reviewed the National 911 Program’s internal planning documents, the program’s request for proposal to develop a national roadmap, the program’s written responses to our questions, and interviewed National 911 Program officials  In addition, we interviewed officials from national associations representing emergency-response- technology companies, wireless and wireline phone carriers, emergency- communications entities, and groups representing deaf and hard-of- hearing consumers to gain their perspectives on federal actions taken and next steps  We assessed the National 911 Program’s strategic- planning activities against leading practices for performance management found in our prior work on strategic planning and goal setting and federal internal control standards  We assessed the National 911 Program’s planned activities for the national roadmap project against federal internal control standards and selected key practices to enhance interagency collaboration identified in our prior work  We conducted our work from January 2017 to January 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  Description of challenge State and local funding may not be sufficient to support costs associated with transitioning to NG911 equipment and infrastructure  Transitioning from legacy infrastructure to Internet Protocol-based systems presents technical and operational challenges such as interoperability and cybersecurity risks  Federal actions Grant resources: The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) National 911 Program issued on its website a list clarifying which of the fiscal year 2016 emergency-communications grants may be used for NG911 services  Program officials said they developed this list in collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  Cost study: NHTSA’s National 911 Program and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), in consultation with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and DHS, plan to issue a study of the range of costs for 911 call centers and service providers to implement NG911 systems and on the nationwide progress of implementing NG911 services  Grant program: NHTSA and NTIA are preparing to jointly administer a $115 million grant program to improve 911 services, including the adoption and operation of NG911 services  NHTSA and NTIA expect to award the grants in 2018  Funding mechanisms: An advisory body tasked by FCC issued a report in 2016 that identified common costs and funding mechanisms for 911 officials to consider  The report also introduced a 911 funding sustainment model designed for use by 911 officials to calculate their financial needs to support a transition to NG911 implementation  Guides on technology standards and procurement practices: In 2017, NHTSA’s National 911 Program issued an annual guide on emergency- communications technology standards that stressed the importance of using open technology standards for NG911 services  The National 911 Program issued another guide in 2016 that provides information on procuring goods and services related to NG911 such as practices for call centers to consider when developing their request for proposals and contracts  Examining emerging technology issues: In 2017, FCC tasked a public- private advisory council to recommend how FCC can promote the NG911 transition, enhance the reliability of NG911, and mitigate the threat of 911 outages  Prior to that tasking, the FCC advisory council issued a report in 2016 that explored location-based routing issues and discussed transition considerations from legacy 911 to NG911  NG911 cybersecurity guide and technical assistance: DHS, with input from NHTSA’s National 911 Program according to DHS officials, issued a guide in 2016 that identifies cybersecurity risks for NG911 and risk mitigation strategies  In addition, DHS provides NG911 technical assistance for states seeking assistance with strategic planning and technology integration  In a separate effort, an advisory body tasked by FCC to examine 911 call center architecture issued a report in 2016 that provides a cybersecurity self- assessment tool for call centers and guidance on cybersecurity strategies  Description of challenge States may face a range of challenges related to evolving roles for state and local 911 authorities that could hinder NG911 implementation  Federal actions Guides on state and legislative planning: NHTSA’s National 911 Program issued guides on state 911 planning and legislative issues to consider for NG911 and awarded a contract in September 2017 to update those guides  In 2016, the National 911 Program issued a guidebased on the experiences of Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota that identifies practices to consider for states interconnecting NG911 networks across state lines  Exploring NG911 governance implementation issues: In 2016, an advisory body tasked by FCC issued a report that identifies NG911 governance approaches, issues, and recommendations for states, localities, and call centers to consider when planning for the deployment of NG911  In 2013, FCC also issued a report that details recommendations to Congress for transitioning from legacy 911 to NG911 networks  Guide on emergency communications governance structures: In 2015, DHS and the National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators issued a guide that provides characteristics of effective governance approaches and best practices for officials to establish, assess, and update their governance structures  In addition to the contact named above, Andrew Huddleston (Assistant Director), Jean Cook (Analyst in Charge), Camilo Flores, Steven Rabinowitz, Malika Rice, Kelly L  Rubin, Michael Sweet, Hai Tran, Marika Van Laan, and Michelle Weathers made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: Each year, millions of Americans call 911 for help during emergencies. However, the nation's legacy 911 system relies on aging infrastructure that is not designed to accommodate modern communications technologies. As a result, states and localities are upgrading to NG911, which offers improved capabilities, such as the ability to process images, audio files, and video. While deploying NG911 is the responsibility of state and local entities, federal agencies also support implementation, led by NHTSA's National 911 Program, which facilitates collaboration among federal, state, and local 911 stakeholders. GAO was asked to review NG911 implementation nationwide. This report examines: (1) state and local progress and challenges in implementing NG911 and (2) federal actions to address challenges and planned next steps. GAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and federal agency reports and plans. GAO also analyzed NHTSA's survey data on state 911 implementation for calendar year 2015, the most recent year for which data were available, and interviewed federal officials, state and local officials from nine states (selected to represent different regions and various phases of NG911 implementation), and officials from industry and advocacy groups. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) National 911 Program's most recent national survey on Next Generation 911 (NG911) implementation indicated that about half of states were in some phase of transition to NG911 in 2015, but that state and local progress varied. Specifically, 10 states reported that all 911 authorities in their state processed calls using NG911 systems; however, 18 states reported having no state or local NG911 transition plans in place—which may indicate these states were in the early phases of planning for the transition to NG911 or had not yet begun. GAO spoke with state and local 911 officials in 9 states, which were in various phases of implementing NG911, and found that none of the 9 selected states were accepting images, audio files, or video. State and local 911 officials identified a number of challenges to implementing NG911. Such challenges are related to funding, evolving technology and operations, and governance. For example, officials in 3 states said that the current funding they collect from telephone service subscribers may not be sufficient to support NG911's transition costs while simultaneously funding the operation of existing 911 systems. Federal agencies—including NHTSA, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security—have responsibilities to support NG911 implementation, such as through coordinating activities and administering grants, and are taking actions to assist state and local entities in addressing challenges to NG911's implementation. Such actions include developing resources, offering technical assistance, and convening stakeholders to explore emerging NG911 issues. For example, as the lead entity for coordinating federal NG911 efforts, NHTSA's National 911 Program is developing resources on NG911 topics, such as federal funding and governance structures. While the National 911 Program is taking steps to facilitate the state and local transition to NG911, the program lacks specific performance goals and measures to assess its progress. Without such goals and measures, it is not clear to what extent the program is effectively achieving its mission. In 2018, the National 911 Program plans to establish an interagency initiative tasked with creating a National NG911 Roadmap. This roadmap is intended to identify next steps for the federal government in supporting the creation of a national, interconnected NG911 system. While the National 911 Program is taking steps to develop a list of national-level tasks as part of its roadmap initiative, the program does not have a plan to identify: (1) roles or responsibilities for federal entities to carry out these tasks or (2) how the program plans to achieve the roadmap's objectives. Collaborating with the appropriate federal agencies to determine federal roles and responsibilities to carry out the roadmap's national-level tasks could reduce barriers to agencies effectively working together to achieve those tasks. Furthermore, developing an implementation plan that details how the roadmap's tasks will be achieved would place the National 911 Program in a better position to effectively lead interagency efforts to implement NG911 nationwide. GAO recommends that NHTSA's National 911 Program develop performance goals and measures and, for the National NG911 Roadmap, determine agencies' roles and responsibilities and develop an implementation plan. NHTSA agreed with GAO's recommendations.