prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Grade-crossing safety has improved significantly since 1975, but since 2009, the number of crashes and fatalities at grade crossings has plateaued (see fig  1)  The yearly number of grade-crossing crashes declined from 12,126 in 1975 to 2,117 in 2017  In that time frame, fatalities dropped from 917 to 273  The most significant reductions in grade-crossing crashes and fatalities were achieved from 1975 to 1985, when states closed or improved the most dangerous crossings  Grade- crossing safety continued to improve until the mid-2000s, though at a slower rate  Since 2009, the number of grade-crossing crashes and fatalities remains at around 2,100 crashes and 250 fatalities a year  These fatalities typically make up less than one percent of all highway- related fatalities  The decrease in crashes and fatalities occurred as the volume of train and highway traffic generally increased over the years  FRA expects the traffic volumes to continue to increase and has expressed concern that grade-crossing crashes and fatalities may also increase  As a set-aside portion of FHWA’s much larger Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP), the Section 130 Program provides funds to state DOTs for the elimination of hazards at highway-rail grade crossings  States determine what improvements need to be made at grade crossings  FHWA has oversight responsibilities regarding the use of federal funds as part of its administration of federal-aid highway programs and funding, including HSIP funds  FHWA uses a statutory formula to distribute to states Section 130 Program funds, which averaged $235 million per year during the last 10 years (fiscal years 2009 through 2018)  Section 130 Program projects are funded at a 90 percent federal share, with the state or the roadway authority funding the remaining 10 percent  States have 4 years to obligate their program funds before they expire, meaning that in any given fiscal year, states can obligate funds appropriated in that year as well as any unobligated funds from the previous 3 fiscal years  In addition, states may choose to combine funds from multiple years to fund relatively expensive projects  The Section 130 Program’s requirements direct states to establish an implementation schedule for grade-crossing-safety improvement projects that, at a minimum, include warning signs for all public grade crossings  Grade crossings are generally categorized as “active” or “passive” depending on the type of traffic control devices that are present  As of July 2018, according to FRA’s National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory, there were approximately 68,000 public grade crossings with electronic, or active, traffic control devices in the United States  Another approximately 58,000 public grade crossings have passive traffic-control devices, which include signs and supplementary pavement markings  The requirements also specify that at least 50 percent of Section 130 Program funding must be dedicated to the installation of protective devices at grade crossings, including traffic control devices  States can use remaining program funds for any hazard elimination project  States may also use program funds to improve warning signs and pavement markings or to improve the way the roadway aligns with the tracks (e g , to ensure low-clearance vehicles do not get stuck on the tracks)  In addition, states can use up to 2 percent of the funds to improve their grade-crossing inventories and to collect and analyze data  See figure 2 for examples of the types of projects eligible for Section 130 Program funds and graphical depictions of grade crossings before and after safety improvements have been made  FHWA and FRA are the primary agencies responsible for safety at grade crossings, and they both play key—yet distinct—roles  FHWA oversees the Section 130 Program and monitors states’ uses of program funds through 52 division offices located in each state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico and through headquarters staff in Washington, D C  In addition, FHWA’s division staff reviews states’ processes for prioritizing and selecting grade-crossing-safety improvement projects  FHWA does not evaluate the appropriateness of individual grade-crossing projects, but instead helps states determine that projects meet program eligibility requirements  Division staff assists in the implementation of Section 130 Program state-administered projects, and they may participate in state- DOT-led, on-site reviews of grade crossings under consideration for Section 130 Program projects  FHWA headquarters staff is responsible for FHWA-wide initiatives, such as working with stakeholders to establish standards for traffic control devices and systems at grade crossings and for engineering oversight of state-administered safety improvement projects  FRA provides safety oversight of both freight and passenger railroads by: collecting and analyzing data; issuing and enforcing numerous safety regulations, including on grade-crossings’ warning systems; conducting focused inspections, audits, and accident providing technical assistance to railroads and other stakeholders  Specifically, FRA oversees rail safety through eight regional offices and through headquarters staff in Washington, D C  Regional staff monitor railroads’ compliance with federal safety regulations through inspections and provide technical assistance and guidance to states  In 2017, FRA created a new discipline for grade-crossing safety and is hiring new grade-crossing inspectors  These inspectors conduct field investigations, identify regulatory defects and violations, recommend civil penalty assessments when appropriate, and may participate in state- DOT-led teams that conduct on-site reviews of grade crossings to evaluate potential safety improvements  According to FRA documentation, FRA’s new inspectors will also work with a variety of stakeholders to institute new types of training, explore new safety concepts and technologies, and assist in the development of new or modified highway-rail grade-crossing-safety regulations, initiatives, and programs  The inspectors will also work with FHWA and other DOT operating administrations in a cooperative effort to improve grade- crossing safety  FRA regional staff also investigates select railroad crashes, including those at grade crossings, to determine root causation and any contributing factors, so that railroads can implement corrective actions  FRA headquarters staff develops analytical tools for states to use to prioritize grade-crossing projects  In addition, headquarters staff manages research and development to support improved railroad safety, including at grade crossings  FRA’s Office of Railroad Safety maintains the National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory database and the Railroad Accident/Incident Reporting System on grade-crossing crashes  Both states and railroads submit information to FRA’s crossing inventory, which is designed to contain information on every grade crossing in the nation  Railroads submit information such as train speed and volume; states submit information such as highway speed limits and average annual daily traffic  The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 added requirements for both railroads and states to periodically update the inventory; however, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) repealed a provision providing DOT authority to issue implementing regulations that would govern states’ reporting to the inventory  According to FRA officials, while FRA’s regulations do not require states to report the information, FRA encourages them to do so  FRA regulations require railroads to report and update their information in the inventory every 3 years or sooner in some instances, such as if new warning devices are installed or the grade crossing is closed  FRA’s accident system contains details about each grade-crossing accident that has occurred  In addition to submitting immediate reports of fatal grade-crossing crashes, railroads are required to submit accident reports within 30 days after the end of the month in which the accident occurred and describe conditions at the time of the accident (e g , visibility and weather); information on the grade crossing (e g , type of warning device); and information on the driver (e g , gender and age)  In its role overseeing grade-crossing safety, FRA has sponsored a number of research efforts to better understand the causes of grade- crossing crashes and identify potential ways to improve engineering, education, and enforcement efforts  For example, FRA sponsored an in- depth data analysis of grade-crossing crashes to better identify which crossing characteristics increase the risk of an accident  The report, issued in 2017, found that the volumes of train and vehicle traffic at a crossing are the biggest predictors of grade-crossing crashes  Changes in vehicle and train traffic therefore affect the annual number of grade- crossing crashes  For example, as highway traffic decreased in 2008, possibly due to the economic recession and higher gas prices, so too did the number of grade-crossing crashes  As previously noted, FRA expects that the number of grade-crossing crashes will likely grow with anticipated increases in future train and highway traffic  As discussed below, vehicle and train volume are included in the U S  DOT Accident Prediction Model, which some states use to select grade-crossing improvement projects  According to FRA officials, FRA is using the results of this recent in-depth data analysis to, in part, evaluate whether additional risk factors, such as the number of male drivers or trains carrying toxic materials, should be added to the model  FRA has targeted other research into understanding driver behavior at grade crossings, which is the leading cause of crashes  According to FRA’s accident data, in 2017, 71 percent of fatal crashes at public grade crossings occurred at those with gates  In 2004, the DOT Inspector General (IG) reported that 94 percent of grade-crossing crashes from 1994 to 2003 could be attributed to risky driver behavior or poor judgement  State officials we spoke with explained that drivers may become impatient waiting at a grade crossing and decide to go around the gates  Drivers may also line up over the grade crossing in heavy vehicular traffic, and be unable to exit before the gates come down  See figure 3 for examples of risky driver behavior at grade crossings  To better understand driver behavior, FRA sponsored a John A  Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) study that recorded and analyzed drivers’ actions as they approached grade crossings  The researchers found that almost half of drivers were doing another task, such as eating, and over a third did not look in either direction while approaching passive grade crossings  We have previously reported, and many stakeholders we interviewed agreed, that in light of inappropriate driver behavior, technological solutions alone may not fully resolve safety issues at grade crossings  In addition, public-education and law-enforcement efforts can augment the effectiveness of technological solutions  According to FRA officials, they shared information on driver education with DOT’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) as NHTSA works more closely with states on driver education manuals  According to DOT officials, NHTSA updates its driver education materials every 2–3 years and plans to consider including grade-crossing-safety materials in the next versions  FRA is also working with states and localities to research and develop new protective devices and other safety measures targeted at improving driver behavior at grade crossings  As most fatal crashes happen at grade crossings already equipped with gates, FRA and state and local agencies are exploring whether additional safety measures can improve safety at those locations  For example, in 2016 and 2017, FRA’s Grade Crossing Task Force worked with the Volpe Center and the City of Orlando to test whether photo enforcement at grade crossings could reduce risky driver behavior  The City of Orlando installed automated photo-enforcement devices at a grade crossing, and instead of issuing fines to drivers who had violated its warning devices, sent drivers a warning notice and educational safety materials  Eight months after the photo-enforcement system was installed, grade crossing violations decreased by 15 percent  While FRA judged these enforcement efforts successful at changing driver behavior, a 2015 FRA whitepaper noted that photo enforcement equipment is costly—on average costing over $300,000 per crossing to install and operate for 2 years—and may not be cost-effective for most grade crossings  FRA found that due to costs and state laws prohibiting photo-enforcement, only two photo- enforcement cameras were currently in operation at grade crossings across the country  States, localities, and FHWA are also exploring whether new types of pavement markings at grade crossings can improve driver behavior  According to DOT officials, FHWA is working with two states to develop new cross-hatch pavement markings for grade crossings that would comply with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, similar to the “don’t block the box” type pavement markings used in intersections  FHWA also worked with a city to test the use of in-roadway lights to delineate the crossing  (See fig  4)  FRA and state DOTs are also trying to improve pedestrian safety at grade crossings by developing new safety measures  Grade-crossing accidents involving pedestrians are less frequent than those involving automobiles at grade crossings but have a higher fatality rate  While pedestrians were involved in only 9 percent of accidents at public crossings in 2017, almost 40 percent of fatal grade-crossing accidents involved pedestrians  To try to improve pedestrian safety, in 2012 the Volpe Center worked with New Jersey Transit to study whether adding additional pedestrian gate skirts— hanging gates that further block a crossing (see fig  5)—would prevent people from ducking under the gates  The Volpe Center reported that these new gates had mixed success  While incidents of people going under and around the gates decreased, more people chose to cross the tracks in the street rather than at the sidewalk  Finally, FRA is exploring new automated and connected vehicle technologies that could reduce risky driver behavior at grade crossings  FRA, FHWA, and officials from one state we interviewed said they anticipate that such technology will be critical to further improving safety  Specifically, FRA and FHWA are coordinating with DOT’s Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office to develop pilot technology that would enable crossing infrastructure or trains to communicate wirelessly with vehicles  Vehicles can use this information to warn the driver that a crash or violation is imminent, or integrate with onboard active safety systems  According to FRA officials, they completed a proof of concept in 2013 and completed and tested a prototype of the technology in 2017  DOT officials said that DOT does not have a time frame for when automakers might begin incorporating such connected vehicle technologies and noted that retrofitting older cars with new equipment will likely make this a long-term effort  FRA shares information on its research in various ways with state DOTs, because states are responsible for deciding which safety measures to install at grade crossings  Specifically, FRA and FHWA jointly hold quarterly webinars with stakeholders, including state DOT officials, and conduct presentations at highway-rail safety workshops  Information on safety measures such as grade-crossing devices, signs, and markings are also included in the Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook  According to DOT officials, the handbook was developed jointly by FHWA and FRA  The last version of the handbook was updated in 2007 and includes some out of date information  FRA and FHWA officials said they began working on an update in 2017, but missed the July 2018 target completion date  According to FHWA officials, updating the handbook is a complex undertaking that has taken more time than they anticipated due to the extensive collaboration required among stakeholders  FHWA officials said they anticipate completing the update during the spring of 2019  The risk of crashes at public grade crossings within a state factors into states’ selection of over 1,000 new Section 130 Program projects nationally each fiscal year  FHWA requires states to develop a grade crossing program that considers relative risk  FHWA officials said they review the methods that states use to select projects to ensure that risk is considered  According to a 2016 academic study of 50 states, most states use mathematical formulas, or “accident prediction models,” to help assess risk and identify grade crossings for potential projects  More specifically, these accident prediction models use factors such as grade crossing characteristics and accident history to rank grade crossings by risk  DOT provides one such model—the Accident Prediction Model—and some states have developed their own models  The study reported that 19 states used DOT’s model and 20 states used a different model  It also found that the DOT and commonly used state models include some similar grade-crossing characteristics to predict accident risk  For example, the selected models reviewed all considered vehicle- and train- traffic volume, which FRA has found to be the strongest predictors of grade-crossing crashes  FRA makes its Accident Prediction Model available to states online through its Web Accident Prediction System  This system is an online tool that uses FRA’s crossing inventory, crossing collision history, and the DOT Accident Prediction Model to predict accident risk for grade crossings in each state  Only one of the eight states in our review used the system as its primary source for ranking grade-crossing risk  Most of the other states perform their own calculations to rank grade crossings  Officials from two states said that they believe their state-maintained data are more reliable than FRA’s crossing inventory and explained that they go directly to their contacts at railroads to get updated information on factors such as train volume  Accident prediction models are only one source of information states use when selecting Section 130 Program projects  According to the state officials we spoke with, a variety of other considerations can also influence their decisions, including the following: Proximity of projects together along a railroad “corridor” in order to gain efficiencies and reduce construction costs  Requests from local jurisdictions or railroads  These stakeholders may have information on upcoming changes at a grade crossing, such as higher train volume or new housing developments nearby, which would increase risk but would not be reflected yet in the accident prediction model  Availability of local funding to provide the required 10 percent match for Section 130 Program projects, while trying to spread the funds fairly across the state  States may also consider grade crossings that have had close calls in the past, such as where a car narrowly avoided being hit by a train  FRA does not require railroads to report on these close calls, or “near misses;” however, according to state officials, railroads sometimes provide this information to states on an ad-hoc basis  State officials from four of the eight states we spoke with said they considered near misses when selecting Section 130 Program projects  A 2004 Volpe Center report noted that studying close calls was a proactive way to improve safety  According to the report, FRA sponsored a workshop to learn about the benefits of collecting and analyzing close calls  However, stakeholders we interviewed noted challenges formalizing near-miss reporting  For example, Volpe Center officials said these reports are subjective in nature—what one engineer considers a close call, others may not  FRA developed another online tool—GradeDec—to allow states to compare the costs and benefits for various grade-crossing improvement projects  GradeDec uses models to analyze a project’s risk and calculate cost-benefit ratios and net present value for potential projects  FRA provides state DOTs with on-site GradeDec workshops upon request  While FRA officials noted that many state and local governments have registered to use the program, none of the state officials we spoke with identified GradeDec as a tool that they use to conduct cost-benefit analysis  Officials from two state DOTs we spoke with said that cost- benefit analyses could help them better identify and select the most cost- effective crossing safety projects in the future  According to the academic study of 50 states noted above, because of limited funding for grade-crossing improvements, states should consider the life-cycle costs of the projects as well as net present value to help select projects  As discussed later in this report, the small number of crashes at grade crossings can make it challenging to distinguish between different projects in terms of their effectiveness in reducing accidents  Finally, after they have considered risk factors and created a list of potential grade crossings for improvement, state officials, along with relevant stakeholders from railroads and local governments, conduct field reviews of the potential projects  According to state officials, these reviews help identify grade-crossing characteristics that may not be included in the accident prediction models, such as vegetation that would obstruct drivers’ views  In 2008, legislation was enacted mandating reporting by states and railroads to the National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory  However, the fact that reporting to the inventory remained voluntary until 2015 has had lingering effects on the completeness of the data in the inventory  In 2015, as mandated by statute, FRA issued regulations requiring railroads to update certain data elements for all grade crossings every 3 years  However, our analysis of FRA’s crossing inventory found that 4 percent of grade crossings were last updated in 2009 or earlier  In addition, because MAP-21 repealed DOT’s authority to issue regulations that would govern state reporting to the inventory, state reporting of grade-crossing data remains voluntary, according to FRA officials, and all state-reported information is not complete  Our analysis of state-reported data in FRA’s crossing inventory found varying levels of completeness  For example, while some state-reported data fields were almost entirely complete, 33 percent of public grade crossings were missing data on posted highway speed  We also found that of the crossings for which states reported the year when the highway-traffic count was conducted, 64 percent of the highway-traffic counts for public grade crossings, another important risk factor, had not been updated since 2009, or earlier  According to the 2015 final rule, FRA will continue to evaluate whether additional regulations to address state reporting are needed to maintain the crossing inventory’s accuracy  FRA officials told us that improving inventory data will help them better deploy their limited resources, particularly their grade-crossing inspectors, and said that they have taken steps to help improve the data  In 2017, FRA regional officials conducted field reviews to verify the latitude and longitude data for grade crossings in the inventory, data that states are responsible for updating  In addition, FRA expects its grade-crossing inspectors as part of their inspections to review and identify issues with the railroad- and state-reported inventory data  According to FRA officials, FRA has begun to both transition its 19 grade-crossing managers into grade-crossing inspectors and also hire new inspectors, for an eventual total of 24 inspectors and eight regional specialists to supervise their activities  To help ensure railroads’ compliance with crossing inventory regulations, officials said that the inspectors will use spot checks to validate the inventory data by comparing grade-crossing characteristics in the field with the information railroads submitted to the inventory  In addition, FRA has incorporated information on inventory-reporting requirements into the grade-crossing inspectors’ training  Finally, FRA is currently developing guidelines for the grade-crossing inspections similar to those for other FRA safety disciplines  FRA headquarters officials acknowledged that they are still clarifying the details for the inspections that will be included in the compliance manuals that inspectors will use  Specifically, they said they are still determining appropriate inspector workloads and drafting specific guidelines that will need to be integrated into FRA’s regional inspection plans  FRA officials said they are working to develop and make available inventory inspection guidance to the grade-crossing managers and inspectors by December 31, 2018  In the meantime, FRA held training that included information on inventory-reporting requirements  In August 2018, FRA developed guidance for grade-crossing inspections specific to quiet zones in response to a recommendation we made in 2017  It is important that FRA meets its goal to issue similar guidance specific to reviewing the accuracy of the inventory data, as FRA cannot have reasonable assurance that inspections that are already under way are being conducted in such a manner that would allow them to consistently identify data reliability issues at each crossing  About 75 percent of all Section 130 Program projects states implemented in fiscal year 2016 involved installing or updating active grade-crossing equipment, including warning lights and protective gates (see fig  6)  The prevalence of this type of project is in part due to the Section 130 Program requirement that states spend at least 50 percent of funds on protective devices  Other than eliminating a grade crossing, adding protective devices has long been considered the most effective way of reducing the risk of a crash  Officials from six of eight state DOTs we interviewed told us that the numbers and types of grade-crossing projects they implement are dependent on the amount of Section 130 Program funding they receive and the cost of the projects  As previously described, funds are set aside from the Highway Safety Improvement Program and distributed to states by a statutory formula that includes factors such as the number of grade crossings in each state  Officials from six of the eight state DOTs we spoke to agreed that the set-aside nature of the program was crucial in allowing them to implement projects, many of which they said would not have been possible without Section 130 Program funds  For example, many said the formula funding ensures that grade-crossing projects are completed along with highway safety projects, particularly given the fact that fatalities resulting from grade-crossing crashes account for so few when compared to highway deaths  Overall, fatalities resulting from grade-crossing crashes account for less than 1 percent of all highway- related fatalities  In fiscal year 2018, the funds distributed ranged from a low of approximately $1 2 million for eight states and Washington, D C , to over $16 million for California and over $19 million for Texas  The number of grade crossings in the eight states and Washington, D C  ranged from 5 to 380, while California had almost 6,000 and Texas had over 9,000  Project implementation costs varied by project type and ranged widely depending on project scope  Based on 2016 DOT data, some typical project costs ranged as follows: adding signs to passive grade crossings—$500 to $1,500; adding flashing lights and two gates to passive grade crossings— $150,000 to $300,000; adding four gates to grade crossings with flashing lights—$250,000 - closing a grade crossing—$25,000 to $100,000; and separating a grade crossing from traffic (Grade Separation)—$5 million to $40 million  State officials we spoke with cited several challenges in pursuing certain types of controversial, innovative, and expensive projects that could help them address the evolving nature of risk at grade crossings and difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of their projects  First, most state DOT officials said that the cost of grade-separation projects and, at times, the controversy of eliminating grade crossings through closure reduces the number of these projects, while acknowledging that they are the most effective ways to improve safety  These types of projects made up only 3 percent of Section 130 Program projects in fiscal year 2016 (see fig  6)  Grade-separation projects are often more expensive than the annual Section 130 Program funding available to states  In 2018, only eight states received annual Section 130 Program funding sufficient to fund a $7-million grade-separation project  As discussed previously, to fund relatively expensive projects, states may choose to combine funds from multiple years  Also, states and railroads may make incentive payments to localities for the permanent closure of a grade crossing  In addition to the cost, most state DOT officials reported challenges obtaining local support for closing grade crossings  They said closures may inconvenience residents who use the road and force emergency responders to take longer routes, potentially slowing response times  Grade-separation projects address these safety concerns and may be more agreeable to residents, but they are substantially more expensive  While up to $7,500 in Section 130 Program funding can be used to help incentivize communities to close grade crossings, officials from some of our selected state DOTs said this amount is generally not enough to persuade local officials to support the closing  Second, officials from many state DOTs we interviewed also reported that the requirements of the Section 130 Program create challenges for them in implementing what they considered to be innovative projects  For example, the program requirement that 50 percent of funds be used on protective devices, combined with what one researcher described to us as the tendency by states to implement “known” projects—i e , protective devices—may impede states’ selection of new, more innovative safety projects  Officials we interviewed from many state DOTs described challenges related to the program’s requirements  They noted that they are prevented from using Section 130 Program funds for new types of safety technologies not yet incorporated into FHWA’s Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices  As noted previously in this report, outside the Section 130 Program FHWA is working with states and localities to explore whether new types of pavement markings at grade crossings, not in the manual, can improve driver behavior  One state DOT official we interviewed suggested changes to allow states to fund one grade- crossing pilot project per year or to use a set percentage of program funds to finance a pilot project that could help them explore promising but as yet unproven technologies  Third, state DOT officials from four of the eight selected states also said it can be difficult to find funding for the required 10 percent state match  As previously mentioned, while certain rail-safety projects are eligible for up to 100 percent federal funding, Section 130 Program projects are funded at a 90 percent federal share  According to DOT documentation we reviewed, only some states have a dedicated source for such a match, and state DOT officials from one of our selected states said their state cannot use state funds for the 10 percent match  Some state DOT officials said this situation can drive project selection  For example, they sometimes chose projects based on which localities or railroads were willing to provide matching funds or offer cost savings  Finally, many state officials cited challenges in measuring the effectiveness of grade crossing projects in reducing crashes or the risk of crashes  In particular, state officials we spoke to said it can be difficult to use before-and-after crash statistics as a measure of effectiveness because of the low number and random nature of crashes  Also, as FRA research has shown and as FHWA and FRA have noted, reporting on before-and-after grade-crossing accident statistics can be misleading, given the infrequency of crashes and crashes that are not the result of grade crossing conditions  States’ required Section 130 Program annual progress reports to the Secretary of DOT call for states to report on the effectiveness of the improvements they made  FHWA reporting guidance suggests they define effectiveness as the reduction in the number of fatalities and serious injuries after grade-crossing projects were implemented, consistent with statutory requirements  In addition, FHWA guidance states that consideration should be given to quantifying effectiveness in the context of fatalities and serious injuries  However, states often report no differences in crashes after specific projects were implemented, and there have been instances where states reported a slight increase in crashes  Such an increase does not necessarily mean that the project was not effective in reducing the overall risk of a crash  Also, not all projects are implemented at grade crossings where there has been a crash  Among other information, states also typically report information on funding and data on the numbers and types of projects implemented  In addition, the extent to which states report projects’ effectiveness varies greatly  Given states’ responsibility for implementing the Section 130 Program and the differences in the amounts of funding they receive, FHWA officials said states should determine and report on the appropriate effectiveness metrics for their programs  According to FHWA officials, during the 2017 reporting year, a few states requested examples of what to include when reporting effectiveness, and FHWA responded with examples of various methods they could use, such as a benefit-cost ratio or the percentage decrease in fatalities, serious injuries, and crashes  Regardless of the difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of specific projects, most state DOT officials we interviewed stressed the importance of the Section 130 Program in funding grade-crossing projects  FHWA’s biennial report to Congress is intended to provide information to Congress on the progress being made by the states in implementing projects to improve safety and, in addition, make recommendations for future implementation of the program  FHWA reviews states’ annual Section 130 Program reports and uses them to formulate the report to Congress every 2 years  FHWA’s 2018 report highlights that the Section 130 Program has seen great success since 1975, with a decrease of approximately 74 percent in fatalities at the same time that there was an increase in vehicle and train traffic  The report described the latest available 10-year trend, from 2007 to 2016, as showing a 31 percent decrease in fatalities  Fatalities have also decreased when adjusted for train traffic  However, FHWA officials acknowledged in interviews with us that crashes and fatalities have remained constant since about 2009, with more recent data showing a slight increase in fatalities over the last 2 to 3 years, data that are consistent with the increases in overall roadway fatalities  The officials said increased train- and vehicle-traffic volumes could be contributing to that increase, in addition to other factors, such as more bicycle riders and pedestrians using grade crossings  As described earlier, states have generally already used Section 130 Program funding to address safety at the riskiest grade crossings by adding protective measures, typically lights and gates  Yet crashes continue to occur at these improved grade crossings  Given these trends and the challenges discussed earlier related to the requirements of the Section 130 Program, it is not clear whether the program remains effective in continuing to reduce the risk of crashes and fatalities at grade crossings  As required, FHWA’s biennial report includes a section on “recommendations for future implementation” of the Section 130 Program  As part of this, FHWA reports on challenges and actions being taken to address them  FHWA’s 2018 report identified one of the same challenges we heard about from state DOT officials related to the inability or unwillingness of local agencies to provide matching funds and the relatively low amount of funding designed to incentivize localities to close crossings  FHWA reported on its efforts to address these challenges, including by providing guidance, resources, and supportive training to states and local agencies and serving as a clearinghouse for innovative methods of supporting projects  However, with the exception of the funding challenge, FHWA’s most recent report does not include the other challenges state officials identified to us related to the requirements of the Section 130 Program discussed above  These include program funding requirements that may impede innovative approaches and the difficulties of using before-and-after crash statistics to measure effectiveness  Many state DOT officials we spoke with said there may be an opportunity to more broadly assess the Section 130 Program at the national level  It could be more informative to comprehensively assess more detailed crash trends, such as those that look forward over multiple years across the more than 1,700 crashes nationwide, rather than on the approximately 35 that occur on average within a state, and identify strategies to address those trends  Doing so could help FHWA learn more about why crashes are continuing and what types of projects may be effective  There could be ways to evaluate the program in a more comprehensive way; many state DOT officials we interviewed told us such a comprehensive evaluation could help improve program effectiveness in a number of ways, including by enabling the program to better keep up with the rapid pace of technological change and re- examining eligibility requirements that limit the flexibility of states to consider other types of projects beyond engineering  Also, most state DOT officials we interviewed agreed that education and enforcement efforts are crucial to further improving safety, as did 8 out of 10 other stakeholders we spoke to, as well as officials from Volpe Center and NTSB  However, according to FHWA officials, those project types are not allowed under the Section 130 Program’s requirements  The officials said FHWA has partnered with FRA and NHTSA on research efforts, such as driver-behavior studies, to inform grade-crossing safety issues  However, the officials said that FHWA has not conducted a program evaluation of the Section 130 Program to consider whether the program’s funding and other requirements allow states to adequately address ongoing safety issues such as driver behavior  FHWA officials said that there is no federal requirement for them to conduct such a program evaluation  We have previously reported that an important component of effective program management is through program performance assessment, which helps establish a program’s effectiveness—the extent to which a program is operating as it was intended and the extent to which a program achieves what the agency proposes to accomplish  This type of evaluative information helps the executive branch and congressional committees make decisions about the programs they oversee  Assessing program performance includes conducting program evaluations, which are individual systematic studies that answer specific questions about how well a program is meeting its objectives  In addition, federal internal-control standards state that management should identify, analyze, and respond to significant changes in a program’s environment that could pose new risks  FHWA officials said the fact that crashes and fatalities have held steady while the volume of train and vehicle traffic has increased is an indication that grade-crossing safety has continued to improve  However, specific to fatalities per million train-miles, FHWA’s 2018 biennial report shows this rate to be fairly constant since 2009  As noted previously, FRA expects train and traffic volumes to continue to increase and has expressed concern that grade-crossing crashes and fatalities may also increase  Without conducting a program evaluation, FHWA cannot ensure that the Section 130 Program is achieving one of the national goals of the federal- aid highway program, to reduce fatalities and injuries  In addition, It is difficult to see how FHWA, in its biennial reports to Congress, could make informed recommendations for future program implementation without conducting a program evaluation to assess, among other things, whether program requirements first established some four decades ago continue to reduce fatalities and injuries  We note that as part of a program evaluation, some changes that FHWA, working with FRA, identifies as potentially having merit to improve the program’s effectiveness could require a statutory change  The continued number of crashes and fatalities at grade crossings with devices intended to warn of a train’s presence calls into question whether the Section 130 Program is structured to help states continue making progress toward the national goal to reduce fatalities and injuries  An evaluation of the program’s requirements could help determine whether Congress should consider better ways to focus federal funds to address the key factor in crashes—risky driver behavior  An FHWA program evaluation could also help determine whether, for example, states could more strategically target emerging safety problems if changes were made to the types of projects eligible for funding under the Section 130 Program  FRA’s new grade-crossing inspectors are meant to increase the effectiveness of FRA’s rail-safety oversight activities, and accordingly, these FRA inspectors, along with FRA researchers, may be well positioned to help FHWA evaluate potential changes to improve the effectiveness of the Section 130 Program  The Administrator of FHWA, working with FRA, should evaluate the Section 130 Program’s requirements to determine whether they allow states sufficient flexibility to adequately address current and emerging grade-crossing safety issues  As part of this evaluation, FHWA should determine whether statutory changes to the program are necessary to improve its effectiveness  (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment  In written comments, reproduced in appendix II, DOT concurred with our recommendation  DOT also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration, and the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  This report examines (1) what has been the focus of Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) grade-crossing-safety research, (2) how states select and implement grade-crossing projects and what railroad- and state-reported data are available from FRA to inform states’ decisions, and (3) the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects and the extent to which the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) assesses the program’s effectiveness  The scope of this work focused on the nation’s more than 128,000 public grade crossings  We did not include private grade crossings, as states can only use Railway- Highway Crossings Program (commonly referred to as the Section 130 Program) funds to improve safety at public grade crossings  While FRA provides safety grants to address rail issues, including for grade-crossing projects, we focused our work on the Section 130 Program because it is the primary source of federal funding directed at grade-crossing-safety improvement  For each objective we reviewed: pertinent statutes and FHWA and FRA regulations and documents; interviewed FHWA and FRA program officials in headquarters; and conducted in-depth interviews with a non- generalizable sample of organizations that included officials from 4 freight and passenger railroads, 12 state agencies from 8 states, 6 FRA regional offices, and 8 FHWA state division offices  We also spoke with representatives from relevant associations and officials from NTSB and Volpe Center  We selected these organizations based on our initial background research, prior work, and input from other stakeholders, among other things  See the paragraph below for additional selection details and table 5 for a complete list of organizations we spoke with  We selected eight states as part of our non-generalizable sample for interviews  These states included Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania  The states were selected to include a mix of state experiences based on a variety of factors, including the number of grade crossings and crashes at those crossings, and the amount of Section 130 Program funding they received  Specifically, we selected four states from those in the top 25 percent of all states in terms of their number of grade crossings and the amount of Section 130 Program funds they received  We selected the other four states to include a mix of these factors  We also considered geographical diversity and recommendations from FRA and FHWA officials  Within these eight states, we conducted in-depth interviews with FHWA division staff, FRA regional staff, and state officials  A variety of state agencies administer the Section 130 Program within their state; the state officials we spoke with from our eight selected states worked for agencies such as state departments of transportation, corporation commissions, and public utility commissions  We also spoke with a non-generalizable sample of four railroads: Amtrak, CSX, Norfolk Southern, and Sierra Northern  We selected railroads based on a variety of factors including geographic location and stakeholder recommendations  We also conducted additional work related to each of the objectives  To describe the focus of FRA’s grade-crossing-safety research, we examined FRA research aimed at understanding the causes of grade- crossing crashes and identifying potential improvements and described FRA efforts to test new approaches that could improve safety  We did not assess the quality of FRA’s research, as that was beyond the scope of this engagement  Instead, we described the nature of the research  We also spoke with FRA research and development staff, Volpe researchers, and state partners about this work  To describe how states select and implement grade-crossing projects, and what FRA data are available to inform their decisions, we reviewed an academic study that included a literature review and interviews with state officials to describe how states select Section 130 Program projects  We spoke with the researcher and determined the study to be reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives  We also spoke with officials from our eight selected states, FHWA division staff, and FRA regional staff, and reviewed the states’ 2017 Section 130 Program reports  As part of this objective, we also assessed the reliability of data reported for all railroads in FRA’s National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory data as of August 31, 2018  For public grade crossings that were not closed, we examined a selection of fields within the database to identify the frequency of missing data (see table 1), data anomalies (see table 2), relational errors, where two related data fields had values that were incompatible (see table 3), and when the data was last updated (see table 4)  Specifically, we conducted the following electronic tests on the crossing inventory data to determine if they were within reasonable ranges, were internally consistent, and appeared complete: Before conducting our analysis, we filtered the inventory data to only include open, public, at-grade crossings  To understand FRA’s efforts to improve its crossing inventory data, we interviewed FRA regional and headquarters staff and reviewed job descriptions for FRA’s new grade- crossing inspectors  Finally, to determine the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing grade-crossing safety projects and the extent to which FHWA assesses the program’s effectiveness, we reviewed program requirements and state project data and other components from FHWA’s 2016 and 2018 Section 130 Program biennial reports to Congress  We also reviewed FHWA’s summary of fiscal year 2018 program funds provided to states and federal laws and guidance related to implementing projects and measuring performance  We interviewed state DOT officials from the eight selected states and other stakeholders on the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects, and FHWA and FRA officials for their perspectives on managing the program, including how FHWA measures performance and assesses program effectiveness  We compared information collected from FHWA and FRA to federal internal-control standards and criteria on program evaluation identified in our previous work  In addition, we reviewed FHWA and FRA documents designed to guide states, such as the Grade Crossing Handbook, the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, the Action Plan and Project Prioritization Noteworthy Practices Guide, and other related documents  We conducted this performance audit from November 2017 to November 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  Susan A  Fleming, (202) 512-2834, Flemings@gao gov  In addition to the individual named above, Maria Edelstein (Assistant Director); Gary Guggolz (Analyst in Charge); Steven Campbell; Tim Guinane; Ben Licht; Catrin Jones; Delwen Jones; SaraAnn Moessbauer; Malika Rice; Larry Thomas; and Crystal Wesco made key contributions to this report 


Report 2: This report presents background information and issues for Congress concerning the Navy's force structure and shipbuilding plans  The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years  The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests funding for the procurement of 12 new ships, including one Gerald R  Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, three Virginia-class attack submarines, three DDG-51 class Aegis destroyers, one FFG(X) frigate, two John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers, and two TATS towing, salvage, and rescue ships  The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's proposed FY2020 shipbuilding program and the Navy's longer-term shipbuilding plans  Decisions that Congress makes on this issue can substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U S  shipbuilding industrial base  Detailed coverage of certain individual Navy shipbuilding programs can be found in the following CRS reports: CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  (This report also covers the issue of the Administration's FY2020 budget proposal, which the Administration withdrew on April 30, to not fund a mid-life refueling overhaul [called a refueling complex overhaul, or RCOH] for the aircraft carrier Harry S  Truman [CVN-75], and to retire CVN-75 around FY2024 ) CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  CRS Report R44972, Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II Amphibious Ship Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  (This report also covers the issue of funding for the procurement of an amphibious assault ship called LHA-9 ) CRS Report R43546, Navy John Lewis (TAO-205) Class Oiler Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  For a discussion of the strategic and budgetary context in which U S  Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans may be considered, see Appendix A   On December 15, 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers  The 355-ship force-level goal replaced a 308-ship force-level goal that the Navy released in March 2015  The 355-ship force-level goal is the largest force-level goal that the Navy has released since a 375-ship force-level goal that was in place in 2002-2004  In the years between that 375-ship goal and the 355-ship goal, Navy force-level goals were generally in the low 300s (see Appendix B )  The force level of 355 ships is a goal to be attained in the future; the actual size of the Navy in recent years has generally been between 270 and 290 ships  Table 1 shows the composition of the 355-ship force-level objective  The 355-ship force-level goal is the result of a Force Structure Assessment (FSA) conducted by the Navy in 2016  An FSA is an analysis in which the Navy solicits inputs from U S  regional combatant commanders (CCDRs) regarding the types and amounts of Navy capabilities that CCDRs deem necessary for implementing the Navy's portion of the national military strategy and then translates those CCDR inputs into required numbers of ships, using current and projected Navy ship types  The analysis takes into account Navy capabilities for both warfighting and day-to-day forward-deployed presence  Although the result of the FSA is often reduced for convenience to single number (e g , 355 ships), FSAs take into account a number of factors, including types and capabilities of Navy ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and weapons, as well as ship homeporting arrangements and operational cycles  The Navy conducts a new FSA or an update to the existing FSA every few years, as circumstances require, to determine its force-structure goal  Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA ( H R  2810 / P L  115-91 of December 12, 2017), states the following: SEC  1025  Policy of the United States on minimum number of battle force ships  (a) Policy —It shall be the policy of the United States to have available, as soon as practicable, not fewer than 355 battle force ships, comprised of the optimal mix of platforms, with funding subject to the availability of appropriations or other funds  (b) Battle force ships defined —In this section, the term "battle force ship" has the meaning given the term in Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5030 8C  The term battle force ships in the above provision refers to the ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy in public policy discussions about the Navy  The Navy states that a new FSA is now underway as the successor to the 2016 FSA, and that this new FSA is to be completed by the end of 2019  The new FSA, Navy officials state, will take into account the Trump Administration's December 2017 National Security Strategy document and its January 2018 National Defense Strategy document, both of which put an emphasis on renewed great power competition with China and Russia, as well as updated information on Chinese and Russian naval and other military capabilities and recent developments in new technologies, including those related to unmanned vehicles (UVs)  Navy officials have suggested in their public remarks that this new FSA could change the 355-ship figure, the planned mix of ships, or both  Some observers, viewing statements by Navy officials, believe the new FSA in particular might shift the Navy's surface force to a more distributed architecture that includes a reduced proportion of large surface combatants (i e , cruisers and destroyers), an increased proportion of small surface combatants (i e , frigates and LCSs), and a newly created third tier of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs)  Some observers believe the new FSA might also change the Navy's undersea force to a more distributed architecture that includes, in addition to attack submarines (SSNs) and bottom-based sensors, a new element of extremely large unmanned underwater vehicles (XLUUVs), which might be thought of as unmanned submarines  In presenting its proposed FY2020 budget, the Navy highlighted its plans for developing and procuring USVs and UUVs in coming years  Shifting to a more distributed force architecture, Navy officials have suggested, could be appropriate for implementing the Navy's new overarching operational concept, called Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO)  Observers view DMO as a response to both China's improving maritime anti-access/area denial capabilities (which include advanced weapons for attacking Navy surface ships) and opportunities created by new technologies, including technologies for UVs and for networking Navy ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and sensors into distributed battle networks  Figure 1 shows a Navy briefing slide depicting the Navy's potential new surface force architecture, with each sphere representing a manned ship or a USV  Consistent with Figure 1 , the Navy's 355-ship goal, reflecting the current force architecture, calls for a Navy with twice as many large surface combatants as small surface combatants  Figure 1 suggests that the potential new surface force architecture could lead to the obverse—a planned force mix that calls for twice as many small surface combatants than large surface combatants—along with a new third tier of numerous USVs  Observers believe the new FSA might additionally change the top-level metric used to express the Navy's force-level goal or the method used to count the size of the Navy, or both, to include large USVs and large UUVs  Table 2 shows the Navy's FY2020 five-year (FY2020-FY2024) shipbuilding plan  The table also shows, for reference purposes, the ships funded for procurement in FY2019  The figures in the table reflect a Navy decision to show the aircraft carrier CVN-81 as a ship to be procured in FY2020 rather than a ship that was procured in FY2019  Congress, as part of its action on the Navy's proposed FY2019 budget, authorized the procurement of CVN-81 in FY2019  As shown in Table 2 , the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests funding for the procurement of 12 new ships, including one Gerald R  Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, three Virginia-class attack submarines, three DDG-51 class Aegis destroyers, one FFG(X) frigate, two John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers, and two TATS towing, salvage, and rescue ships  If the Navy had listed CVN-81 as a ship procured in FY2019 rather than a ship to be procured in FY2020, then the total numbers of ships in FY2019 and FY2020 would be 14 and 11, respectively  As also shown Table 2 , the Navy's FY2020 five-year (FY2020-FY2024) shipbuilding plan includes 55 new ships, or an average of 11 new ships per year  The Navy's FY2019 budget submission also included a total of 55 ships in the period FY2020-FY2024, but the mix of ships making up the total of 55 for these years has been changed under the FY2020 budget submission to include one additional attack submarine, one additional FFG(X) frigate, and two (rather than four) LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ships over the five-year period  The FY2020 submission also makes some changes within the five-year period to annual procurement quantities for DDG-51 destroyers, ESBs, and TAO-205s without changing the five-year totals for these programs  Compared to what was projected for FY2020 itself under the FY2019 budget submission, the FY2020 request accelerates from FY2023 to FY2020 the aircraft carrier CVN-81 (as a result of Congress's action to authorize the ship in FY2019), adds a third attack submarine, accelerates from FY2021 into FY2020 a third DDG-51, defers from FY2020 to FY2021 an LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship to FY2021, defers from FY2020 to FY2023 an ESB ship, and accelerates from FY2021 to FY2020 a second TAO-205 class oiler  Table 3 shows the Navy's FY2020-FY2049 30-year shipbuilding plan  In devising a 30-year shipbuilding plan to move the Navy toward its ship force-structure goal, key assumptions and planning factors include but are not limited to ship construction times and service lives, estimated ship procurement costs, projected shipbuilding funding levels, and industrial-base considerations  As shown in Table 3 , the Navy's FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan includes 304 new ships, or an average of about 10 per year  Table 4 shows the Navy's projection of ship force levels for FY2020-FY2049 that would result from implementing the FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) 30-year shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3   As shown in Table 4 , if the FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan is implemented, the Navy projects that it will achieve a total of 355 ships by FY2034  This is about 20 years sooner than projected under the Navy's FY2019 30-year shipbuilding plan  This is not primarily because the FY2020 30-year plan includes more ships than did the FY2019 plan: The total of 304 ships in the FY2020 plan is only three ships higher than the total of 301 ships in the FY2019 plan  Instead, it is primarily due to a decision announced by the Navy in April 2018, after the FY2019 budget was submitted, to increase the service lives of all DDG-51 destroyers—both those existing and those to be built in the future—to 45 years  Prior to this decision, the Navy had planned to keep older DDG-51s (referred to as the Flight I/II DDG-51s) in service for 35 years and newer DDG-51s (the Flight II/III DDG-51s) for 40 years  Figure 2 shows the Navy's projections for the total number of ships in the Navy under the Navy's FY2019 and FY2020 budget submissions  As can be seen in the figure, the Navy projected under the FY2019 plan that the fleet would not reach a total of 355 ships any time during the 30-year period  The projected number of aircraft carriers in Table 4 , the projected total number of all ships in Table 4 , and the line showing the total number of ships under the Navy's FY2020 budget submission in Figure 2 all reflect the Navy's proposal, under its FY2020 budget submission, to not fund the mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul (called a refueling complex overhaul, or RCOH) of the aircraft carrier Harry S  Truman (CVN-75), and to instead retire CVN-75 around FY2024  On April 30, 2019, however, the Administration announced that it was withdrawing this proposal from the Navy's FY2020 budget submission  The Administration now supports funding the CVN-75 RCOH and keeping CVN-75 in service past FY2024  As a result of the withdrawal of its proposal regarding the CVN-75 RCOH, the projected number of aircraft carriers and consequently the projected total number of all ships are now one ship higher for the period FY2022-FY2047 than what is shown in Table 4 , and the line in Figure 2 would be adjusted upward by one ship for those years  (The figures in Table 4 are left unchanged from what is shown in the FY2020 budget submission so as to accurately reflect what is shown in that budget submission ) As shown in Table 4 , although the Navy projects that the fleet will reach a total of 355 ships in FY2034, the Navy in that year and subsequent years will not match the composition called for in the FY2016 FSA  Among other things, the Navy will have more than the required number of large surface combatants (i e , cruisers and destroyers) from FY2030 through FY2040 (a consequence of the decision to extend the service lives of DDG-51s to 45 years), fewer than the required number of aircraft carriers through the end of the 30-year period, fewer than the required number of attack submarines through FY2047, and fewer than the required number of amphibious ships through the end of the 30-year period  The Navy acknowledges that the mix of ships will not match that called for by the 2016 FSA but states that if the Navy is going to have too many ships of a certain kind, DDG-51s are not a bad type of ship to have too many of, because they are very capable multi-mission ships  One issue for Congress is whether the new FSA that the Navy is conducting will change the 355-ship force-level objective established by the 2016 FSA and, if so, in what ways  As discussed earlier, Navy officials have suggested in their public remarks that this new FSA could shift the Navy toward a more distributed force architecture, which could change the 355-ship figure, the planned mix of ships, or both  The issue for Congress is how to assess the appropriateness of the Navy's FY2020 shipbuilding plans when a key measuring stick for conducting that assessment—the Navy's force-level goal and planned force mix—might soon change  Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the prospective affordability of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan  This issue has been a matter of oversight focus for several years, and particularly since the enactment in 2011 of the Budget Control Act, or BCA ( S  365 / P L  112-25 of August 2, 2011)  Observers have been particularly concerned about the plan's prospective affordability during the decade or so from the mid-2020s through the mid-2030s, when the plan calls for procuring Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines as well as replacements for large numbers of retiring attack submarines, cruisers, and destroyers  Figure 3 shows, in a graphic form, the Navy's estimate of the annual amounts of funding that would be needed to implement the Navy's FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan  The figure shows that during the period from the mid-2020s through the mid-2030s, the Navy estimates that implementing the FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan would require roughly $24 billion per year in shipbuilding funds  As discussed in the CRS report on the Columbia-class program, the Navy since 2013 has identified the Columbia-class program as its top program priority, meaning that it is the Navy's intention to fully fund this program, if necessary at the expense of other Navy programs, including other Navy shipbuilding programs  This led to concerns that in a situation of finite Navy shipbuilding budgets, funding requirements for the Columbia-class program could crowd out funding for procuring other types of Navy ships  These concerns in turn led to the creation by Congress of the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF), a fund in the DOD budget that is intended in part to encourage policymakers to identify funding for the Columbia-class program from sources across the entire DOD budget rather than from inside the Navy's budget alone  Several years ago, when concerns arose about the potential impact of the Columbia-class program on funding available for other Navy shipbuilding programs, the Navy's shipbuilding budget was roughly $14 billion per year, and the roughly $7 billion per year that the Columbia-class program is projected to require from the mid-2020s to the mid-2030s (see Figure 3 ) represented roughly one-half of that total  With the Navy's shipbuilding budget having grown in more recent years to a total of roughly $24 billion per year, the $7 billion per year projected to be required by the Columbia-class program during those years does not loom proportionately as large as it once did in the Navy's shipbuilding budget picture  Even so, some concerns remain regarding the potential impact of the Columbia-class program on funding available for other Navy shipbuilding programs  If one or more Navy ship designs turn out to be more expensive to build than the Navy estimates, then the projected funding levels shown in Figure 3 would not be sufficient to procure all the ships shown in the 30-year shipbuilding plan  As detailed by CBO and GAO, lead ships in Navy shipbuilding programs in many cases have turned out to be more expensive to build than the Navy had estimated  Ship designs that can be viewed as posing a risk of being more expensive to build than the Navy estimates include Gerald R  Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers, Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, Virginia-class attack submarines equipped with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), Flight III versions of the DDG-51 destroyer, FFG(X) frigates, LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ships, and John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers, as well as other new classes of ships that the Navy wants to begin procuring years from now  The statute that requires the Navy to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan each year (10 U S C  231) also requires CBO to submit its own independent analysis of the potential cost of the 30-year plan (10 U S C  231[d])  CBO is now preparing its estimate of the cost of the Navy's FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan  In the meantime, Figure 4 shows, in a graphic form, CBO's estimate of the annual amounts of funding that would be needed to implement the Navy's FY2019 30-year shipbuilding plan  This figure might be compared to the Navy's estimate of its FY2020 30-year plan as shown in Figure 3 , although doing so poses some apples-vs -oranges issues, as the Navy's FY2019 and FY2020 30-year plans do not cover exactly the same 30-year periods, and for the years they do have in common, there are some differences in types and numbers of ships to be procured in certain years  CBO analyses of past Navy 30-year shipbuilding plans have generally estimated the cost of implementing those plans to be higher than what the Navy estimated  Consistent with that past pattern, as shown in Table 5 , CBO's estimate of the cost to implement the Navy's FY2019 30-year (FY2019-FY2048) shipbuilding plan is about 27% higher than the Navy's estimated cost for the FY2019 plan  ( Table 5 does not pose an apples-vs -oranges issue, because both the Navy and CBO estimates in this table are for the Navy's FY2019 30-year plan ) More specifically, as shown in the table, CBO estimated that the cost of the first 10 years of the FY2019 30-year plan would be about 2% higher than the Navy's estimate; that the cost of the middle 10 years of the plan would be about 13% higher than the Navy's estimate; and that the cost of the final 10 years of the plan would be about 27% higher than the Navy's estimate  The growing divergence between CBO's estimate and the Navy's estimate as one moves from the first 10 years of the 30-year plan to the final 10 years of the plan is due in part to a technical difference between CBO and the Navy regarding the treatment of inflation  This difference compounds over time, making it increasingly important as a factor in the difference between CBO's estimates and the Navy's estimates the further one goes into the 30-year period  In other words, other things held equal, this factor tends to push the CBO and Navy estimates further apart as one proceeds from the earlier years of the plan to the later years of the plan  The growing divergence between CBO's estimate and the Navy's estimate as one moves from the first 10 years of the 30-year plan to the final 10 years of the plan is also due to differences between CBO and the Navy about the costs of certain ship classes, particularly classes that are projected to be procured starting years from now  The designs of these future ship classes are not yet determined, creating more potential for CBO and the Navy to come to differing conclusions regarding their potential cost  For the FY2019 30-year plan, the largest source of difference between CBO and the Navy regarding the costs of individual ship classes was a new class of SSNs that the Navy wants to begin procuring in FY2034 as the successor to the Virginia-class SSN design  This new class of SSN, CBO says, accounted for 42% of the difference between the CBO and Navy estimates for the FY2019 30-year plan, in part because there were a substantial number of these SSNs in the plan, and because those ships occur in the latter years of the plan, where the effects of the technical difference between CBO and the Navy regarding the treatment of inflation show more strongly  The second-largest source of difference between CBO and the Navy regarding the costs of individual ship classes was a new class of large surface combatant (i e , cruiser or destroyer) that the Navy wants to begin procuring in the future, which accounted for 20% of the difference, for reasons that are similar to those mentioned above for the new class of SSNs  The third-largest source of difference was the new class of frigates (FFG[X]s) that the Navy wants to begin procuring in FY2020, which accounts for 9% of the difference  The remaining 29% of difference between the CBO and Navy estimates was accounted for collectively by several other shipbuilding programs, each of which individually accounts for between 1% and 4% of the difference  The Columbia-class program, which accounted for 4%, is one of the programs in this final group  Detailed coverage of legislative activity on certain Navy shipbuilding programs (including funding levels, legislative provisions, and report language) can be found in the following CRS reports: CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  (This report also covers the issue of the Administration's FY2020 budget proposal, which the Administration withdrew on April 30, to not fund a mid-life refueling overhaul [called a refueling complex overhaul, or RCOH] for the aircraft carrier Harry S  Truman [CVN-75], and to retire CVN-75 around FY2024 ) CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  CRS Report R44972, Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II Amphibious Ship Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  (This report also covers the issue of funding for the procurement of an amphibious assault ship called LHA-9 ) CRS Report R43546, Navy John Lewis (TAO-205) Class Oiler Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  Legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding programs that are not covered in detail in the above reports is covered below  The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests funding for the procurement of 12 new ships: 1 Gerald R  Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier; 3 Virginia-class attack submarines; 3 DDG-51 class Aegis destroyers; 1 FFG(X) frigate; 2 John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers; and 2 TATS towing, salvage, and rescue ships  As noted earlier, the above list of 12 ships reflects a Navy decision to show the aircraft carrier CVN-81 as a ship to be procured in FY2020 rather than a ship that was procured in FY2019  Congress, as part of its action on the Navy's proposed FY2019 budget, authorized the procurement of CVN-81 in FY2019  The Navy's proposed FY2020 shipbuilding budget also requests funding for ships that have been procured in prior fiscal years, and ships that are to be procured in future fiscal years, as well as funding for activities other than the building of new Navy ships  Table 6 summarizes congressional action on the Navy's FY2020 funding request for Navy shipbuilding  The table shows the amounts requested and congressional changes to those requested amounts  A blank cell in a filled-in column showing congressional changes to requested amounts indicates no change from the requested amount  Appendix A  Strategic and Budgetary Context This appendix presents some brief comments on elements of the strategic and budgetary context in which U S  Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans may be considered  Shift in International Security Environment World events have led some observers, starting in late 2013, to conclude that the international security environment has undergone a shift over the past several years from the familiar post-Cold War era of the past 20-25 years, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition with China and Russia, and challenges to elements of the U S -led international order that has operated since World War II  This situation is discussed further in another CRS report  World Geography and U S  Grand Strategy Discussion of the above-mentioned shift in the international security environment has led to a renewed emphasis in discussions of U S  security and foreign policy on grand strategy and geopolitics  From a U S  perspective on grand strategy and geopolitics, it can be noted that most of the world's people, resources, and economic activity are located not in the Western Hemisphere, but in the other hemisphere, particularly Eurasia  In response to this basic feature of world geography, U S  policymakers for the past several decades have chosen to pursue, as a key element of U S  national strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another, on the grounds that such a hegemon could represent a concentration of power strong enough to threaten core U S  interests by, for example, denying the United States access to some of the other hemisphere's resources and economic activity  Although U S  policymakers have not often stated this key national strategic goal explicitly in public, U S  military (and diplomatic) operations in recent decades—both wartime operations and day-to-day operations—can be viewed as having been carried out in no small part in support of this key goal  U S  Grand Strategy and U S  Naval Forces As noted above, in response to basic world geography, U S  policymakers for the past several decades have chosen to pursue, as a key element of U S  national strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another  The traditional U S  goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another has been a major reason why the U S  military is structured with force elements that enable it to cross broad expanses of ocean and air space and then conduct sustained, large-scale military operations upon arrival  Force elements associated with this goal include, among other things, an Air Force with significant numbers of long-range bombers, long-range surveillance aircraft, long-range airlift aircraft, and aerial refueling tankers, and a Navy with significant numbers of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack submarines, large surface combatants, large amphibious ships, and underway replenishment ships  The United States is the only country in the world that has designed its military to cross broad expanses of ocean and air space and then conduct sustained, large-scale military operations upon arrival  The other countries in the Western Hemisphere do not design their forces to do this because they cannot afford to, and because the United States has been, in effect, doing it for them  Countries in the other hemisphere do not design their forces to do this for the very basic reason that they are already in the other hemisphere, and consequently instead spend their defense money on forces that are tailored largely for influencing events in their own local region  The fact that the United States has designed its military to do something that other countries do not design their forces to do—cross broad expanses of ocean and air space and then conduct sustained, large-scale military operations upon arrival—can be important to keep in mind when comparing the U S  military to the militaries of other nations  For example, in observing that the U S  Navy has 11 aircraft carriers while other countries have no more than one or two, it can be noted other countries do not need a significant number of aircraft carriers because, unlike the United States, they are not designing their forces to cross broad expanses of ocean and air space and then conduct sustained, large-scale military operations upon arrival  As another example, it is sometimes noted, in assessing the adequacy of U S  naval forces, that U S  naval forces are equal in tonnage to the next dozen or more navies combined, and that most of those next dozen or more navies are the navies of U S  allies  Those other fleets, however, are mostly of Eurasian countries, which do not design their forces to cross to the other side of the world and then conduct sustained, large-scale military operations upon arrival  The fact that the U S  Navy is much bigger than allied navies does not necessarily prove that U S  naval forces are either sufficient or excessive; it simply reflects the differing and generally more limited needs that U S  allies have for naval forces  (It might also reflect an underinvestment by some of those allies to meet even their more limited naval needs ) Countries have differing needs for naval and other military forces  The United States, as a country located in the Western Hemisphere that has adopted a goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another, has defined a need for naval and other military forces that is quite different from the needs of allies that are located in Eurasia  The sufficiency of U S  naval and other military forces consequently is best assessed not through comparison to the militaries of other countries, but against U S  strategic goals  More generally, from a geopolitical perspective, it can be noted that that U S  naval forces, while not inexpensive, give the United States the ability to convert the world's oceans—a global commons that covers more than two-thirds of the planet's surface—into a medium of maneuver and operations for projecting U S  power ashore and otherwise defending U S  interests around the world  The ability to use the world's oceans in this manner—and to deny other countries the use of the world's oceans for taking actions against U S  interests—constitutes an immense asymmetric advantage for the United States  This point would be less important if less of the world were covered by water, or if the oceans were carved into territorial blocks, like the land  Most of the world, however, is covered by water, and most of those waters are international waters, where naval forces can operate freely  The point, consequently, is not that U S  naval forces are intrinsically special or privileged—it is that they have a certain value simply as a consequence of the physical and legal organization of the planet  Uncertainty Regarding Future U S  Role in the World The overall U S  role in the world since the end of World War II in 1945 (i e , over the past 70 years) is generally described as one of global leadership and significant engagement in international affairs  A key aim of that role has been to promote and defend the open international order that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the years after World War II  In addition to promoting and defending the open international order, the overall U S  role is generally described as having been one of promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights, while criticizing and resisting authoritarianism where possible, and opposing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia or a spheres-of-influence world  Certain statements and actions from the Trump Administration have led to uncertainty about the Administration's intentions regarding the U S  role in the world  Based on those statements and actions, some observers have speculated that the Trump Administration may want to change the U S  role in one or more ways  A change in the overall U S  role could have profound implications for DOD strategy, budgets, plans, and programs, including the planned size and structure of the Navy  Declining U S  Technological and Qualitative Edge DOD officials have expressed concern that the technological and qualitative edge that U S  military forces have had relative to the military forces of other countries is being narrowed by improving military capabilities in other countries  China's improving military capabilities are a primary contributor to that concern  Russia's rejuvenated military capabilities are an additional contributor  DOD in recent years has taken a number of actions to arrest and reverse the decline in the U S  technological and qualitative edge  Challenge to U S  Sea Control and U S  Position in Western Pacific Observers of Chinese and U S  military forces view China's improving naval capabilities as posing a potential challenge in the Western Pacific to the U S  Navy's ability to achieve and maintain control of blue-water ocean areas in wartime—the first such challenge the U S  Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War  More broadly, these observers view China's naval capabilities as a key element of an emerging broader Chinese military challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific  Longer Ship Deployments U S  Navy officials have testified that fully meeting requests from U S  regional combatant commanders (CCDRs) for forward-deployed U S  naval forces would require a Navy much larger than today's fleet  For example, Navy officials testified in March 2014 that a Navy of 450 ships would be required to fully meet CCDR requests for forward-deployed Navy forces  CCDR requests for forward-deployed U S  Navy forces are adjudicated by DOD through a process called the Global Force Management Allocation Plan  The process essentially makes choices about how best to apportion a finite number forward-deployed U S  Navy ships among competing CCDR requests for those ships  Even with this process, the Navy has lengthened the deployments of some ships in an attempt to meet policymaker demands for forward-deployed U S  Navy ships  Although Navy officials are aiming to limit ship deployments to seven months, Navy ships in recent years have frequently been deployed for periods of eight months or more  Limits on Defense Spending in Budget Control Act of 2011 as Amended Limits on the "base" portion of the U S  defense budget established by Budget Control Act of 2011, or BCA ( S  365 / P L  112-25 of August 2, 2011), as amended, combined with some of the considerations above, have led to discussions among observers about how to balance competing demands for finite U S  defense funds, and about whether programs for responding to China's military modernization effort can be adequately funded while also adequately funding other defense-spending priorities, such as initiatives for responding to Russia's actions in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe and U S  operations for countering the Islamic State organization in the Middle East  Appendix B  Earlier Navy Force-Structure Goals Dating Back to 2001 The table below shows earlier Navy force-structure goals dating back to 2001  The 308-ship force-level goal of March 2015, shown in the first column of the table, is the goal that was replaced by the 355-ship force-level goal released in December 2016  Appendix C  Comparing Past Ship Force Levels to Current or Potential Future Ship Force Levels In assessing the appropriateness of the current or potential future number of ships in the Navy, observers sometimes compare that number to historical figures for total Navy fleet size  Historical figures for total fleet size, however, can be a problematic yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of the current or potential future number of ships in the Navy, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time; and the number of ships in the fleet in an earlier year might itself have been inappropriate (i e , not enough or more than enough) for meeting the Navy's mission requirements in that year  Regarding the first bullet point above, the Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of FY1987, and as of May 7, 2019, included a total of 289 battle force ships  The FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multitheater NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the May 2019 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of mission requirements centered on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based military forces of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as well as nonstate terrorist organizations  In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the May 2019 fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of Tomahawk-capable ships, and the sophistication of C4ISR systems and networking capabilities  In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, and the capabilities of Navy ships will likely have changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive implementation of networking technology, increased use of ship-based unmanned vehicles, and the potential fielding of new types of weapons such as lasers or electromagnetic rail guns  The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated missions; the 289-ship fleet of May 2019 may or may not be capable of performing its stated missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be capable of performing its stated missions  Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another  For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet's ability to perform its stated missions  An increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet's ability to perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet's mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability  Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet's ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the fleet's mission requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers  Regarding the second of the two bullet points above, it can be noted that comparisons of the size of the fleet today with the size of the fleet in earlier years rarely appear to consider whether the fleet was appropriately sized in those earlier years (and therefore potentially suitable as a yardstick of comparison), even though it is quite possible that the fleet in those earlier years might not have been appropriately sized, and even though there might have been differences of opinion among observers at that time regarding that question  Just as it might not be prudent for observers years from now to tacitly assume that the 286-ship Navy of September 2018 was appropriately sized for meeting the mission requirements of 2018, even though there were differences of opinion among observers on that question, simply because a figure of 286 ships appears in the historical records for 2016, so, too, might it not be prudent for observers today to tacitly assume that the number of ships of the Navy in an earlier year was appropriate for meeting the Navy's mission requirements that year, even though there might have been differences of opinion among observers at that time regarding that question, simply because the size of the Navy in that year appears in a table like Table H-1   Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table B-1 , might provide some insight into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other force-planning factors, as well as the possibility that earlier force-structure plans might not have been appropriate for meeting the mission demands of their times, suggest that some caution should be applied in using past force structure plans for this purpose, particularly if those past force structure plans are more than a few years old  The Reagan-era goal for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning the Navy today, and there was considerable debate during those years as to the appropriateness of the 600-ship goal  Appendix D  Industrial Base Ability for, and Employment Impact of, Additional Shipbuilding Work This appendix presents background information on the ability of the industrial base to take on the additional shipbuilding work associated with achieving and maintaining the Navy's 355-ship force-level goal and on the employment impact of additional shipbuilding work  Industrial Base Ability The U S  shipbuilding industrial base has some unused capacity to take on increased Navy shipbuilding work, particularly for certain kinds of surface ships, and its capacity could be increased further over time to support higher Navy shipbuilding rates  Navy shipbuilding rates could not be increased steeply across the board overnight—time (and investment) would be needed to hire and train additional workers and increase production facilities at shipyards and supplier firms, particularly for supporting higher rates of submarine production  Depending on their specialties, newly hired workers could be initially less productive per unit of time worked than more experienced workers  Some parts of the shipbuilding industrial base, such as the submarine construction industrial base, could face more challenges than others in ramping up to the higher production rates required to build the various parts of the 355-ship fleet  Over a period of a few to several years, with investment and management attention, Navy shipbuilding could ramp up to higher rates for achieving a 355-ship fleet over a period of 20-30 years  An April 2017 CBO report stated that all seven shipyards [currently involved in building the Navy's major ships] would need to increase their workforces and several would need to make improvements to their infrastructure in order to build ships at a faster rate  However, certain sectors face greater obstacles in constructing ships at faster rates than others: Building more submarines to meet the goals of the 2016 force structure assessment would pose the greatest challenge to the shipbuilding industry  Increasing the number of aircraft carriers and surface combatants would pose a small to moderate challenge to builders of those vessels  Finally, building more amphibious ships and combat logistics and support ships would be the least problematic for the shipyards  The workforces across those yards would need to increase by about 40 percent over the next 5 to 10 years

ground_truth: Crashes at highway-rail grade crossings are one of the leading causes of railroad-related deaths. According to FRA data, in 2017, there were more than 2,100 crashes resulting in 273 fatalities. Since 2009 crashes have occurred at a fairly constant rate. The federal government provides states funding to improve grade-crossing safety through FHWA's Section 130 Program. The persistence of crashes and deaths raises questions about the effectiveness of the federal grade-crossing-safety program. GAO was asked to review federal efforts to improve grade-crossing safety. This report examines: (1) the focus of FRA's grade-crossing-safety research, (2) how states select and implement grade-crossing projects and what data are available from FRA to inform their decisions, and (3) the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects and the extent to which FHWA assesses the program's effectiveness. GAO analyzed FRA data; reviewed FRA's, FHWA's, and states' documents; reviewed a study of states' selection of projects; and interviewed FRA and FHWA headquarters and field staff, and officials from a non-generalizable sample of eight states, selected to include a mix in the number of grade crossings and crashes, and geographic diversity. Research sponsored by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has identified driver behavior as the main cause of highway-rail grade crossing crashes and that factors such as train and traffic volume can contribute to the risk of a crash. (See figure.) Over 70 percent of fatal crashes in 2017 occurred at grade crossings with gates. To meet the requirements of the federal grade-crossing program, states are responsible for selecting and ensuring the implementation of grade-crossing improvement projects. Most state DOT officials and other relevant transportation officials use local knowledge of grade crossings to supplement the results of models that rank grade crossings based on the risk of an accident. These states generally consider the same primary risk factors, such as vehicle and train traffic. FRA is taking steps to improve the data used in its model to help states assess risk factors at grade crossings. For example, FRA's grade-crossing inspectors will review and identify issues with railroad- and state-reported inventory data. FRA is currently developing guidelines, which it plans to finalize by the end of 2018, to implement these inspections as it has for other types of FRA inspections. Officials we spoke with in eight states reported challenges in pursuing certain types of projects that could further enhance safety, in part because of federal requirements. While safety has improved, many crashes occur at grade crossings with gates, and officials said there could be additional ways to focus program requirements to continue improving safety. States' and the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) reporting focuses on the program's funding and activity, such as the number and types of projects, yet the low number of crashes makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of projects in reducing crashes and fatalities. FHWA reports the program has been effective in reducing fatalities by about 74 percent since 1975. However, since 2009, annually there have been about 250 fatalities—almost one percent of total highway fatalities. FRA expects future crashes to grow, in part, due to the anticipated increase in rail and highway traffic. An evaluation of the program should consider whether its funding and other requirements allow states to adequately address ongoing safety issues. FHWA officials said they are not required to perform such evaluations. GAO has previously reported on the importance of program evaluations to determine the extent to which a program is meeting its objectives. An evaluation of the program could lead FHWA to identify changes that could allow states to more strategically address problem areas. GAO recommends that FHWA evaluate the program's requirements to determine if they allow states the flexibility to address ongoing safety issues. The Department of Transportation concurred with GAO's recommendation.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  Managing the growth and training of those new workforces while maintaining the current standard of quality and efficiency would represent the most significant industrywide challenge  In addition, industry and Navy sources indicate that as much as $4 billion would need to be invested in the physical infrastructure of the shipyards to achieve the higher production rates required under the [notional] 15-year and 20-year [buildup scenarios examined by CBO]  Less investment would be needed for the [notional] 25-year or 30-year [buildup scenarios examined by CBO]  A January 13, 2017, press report states the following: The Navy's production lines are hot and the work to prepare them for the possibility of building out a much larger fleet would be manageable, the service's head of acquisition said Thursday  From a logistics perspective, building the fleet from its current 274 ships to 355, as recommended in the Navy's newest force structure assessment in December, would be straightforward, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition Sean Stackley told reporters at the Surface Navy Association's annual symposium  "By virtue of maintaining these hot production lines, frankly, over the last eight years, our facilities are in pretty good shape," Stackley said  "In fact, if you talked to industry, they would say we're underutilizing the facilities that we have " The areas where the Navy would likely have to adjust "tooling" to answer demand for a larger fleet would likely be in Virginia-class attack submarines and large surface combatants, the DDG-51 guided missile destroyers—two ship classes likely to surge if the Navy gets funding to build to 355 ships, he said  "Industry's going to have to go out and procure special tooling associated with going from current production rates to a higher rate, but I would say that's easily done," he said  Another key, Stackley said, is maintaining skilled workers—both the builders in the yards and the critical supply-chain vendors who provide major equipment needed for ship construction  And, he suggested, it would help to avoid budget cuts and other events that would force workforce layoffs  "We're already prepared to ramp up," he said  "In certain cases, that means not laying off the skilled workforce we want to retain " A January 17, 2017, press report states the following: Building stable designs with active production lines is central to the Navy's plan to grow to 355 ships  "if you look at the 355-ship number, and you study the ship classes (desired), the big surge is in attack submarines and large surface combatants, which today are DDG-51 (destroyers)," the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Sean Stackley, told reporters at last week's Surface Navy Association conference  Those programs have proven themselves reliable performers both at sea and in the shipyards  From today's fleet of 274 ships, "we're on an irreversible path to 308 by 2021  Those ships are already in construction," said Stackley  "To go from there to 355, virtually all those ships are currently in production, with some exceptions: Ohio Replacement, (we) just got done the Milestone B there (to move from R&D into detailed design); and then upgrades to existing platforms  So we have hot production lines that will take us to that 355-ship Navy " A January 24, 2017, press report states the following: Navy officials say a recently determined plan to increase its fleet size by adding more new submarines, carriers and destroyers is "executable" and that early conceptual work toward this end is already underway     Although various benchmarks will need to be reached in order for this new plan to come to fruition, such as Congressional budget allocations, Navy officials do tell Scout Warrior that the service is already working—at least in concept—on plans to vastly enlarge the fleet  Findings from this study are expected to inform an upcoming 2018 Navy Shipbuilding Plan, service officials said  A January 12, 2017, press report states the following: Brian Cuccias, president of Ingalls Shipbuilding [a shipyard owned by Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) that builds Navy destroyers and amphibious ships as well as Coast Guard cutters], said Ingalls, which is currently building 10 ships for four Navy and Coast Guard programs at its 800-acre facility in Pascagoula, Miss , could build more because it is using only 70 to 75 percent of its capacity  A March 2017 press report states the following: As the Navy calls for a larger fleet, shipbuilders are looking toward new contracts and ramping up their yards to full capacity     The Navy is confident that U S  shipbuilders will be able to meet an increased demand, said Ray Mabus, then-secretary of the Navy, during a speech at the Surface Navy Association's annual conference in Arlington, Virginia  They have the capacity to "get there because of the ships we are building today," Mabus said  "I don't think we could have seven years ago " Shipbuilders around the United States have "hot" production lines and are manufacturing vessels on multi-year or block buy contracts, he added  The yards have made investments in infrastructure and in the training of their workers  "We now have the basis     [to] get to that much larger fleet," he said     Shipbuilders have said they are prepared for more work  At Ingalls Shipbuilding—a subsidiary of Huntington Ingalls Industries—10 ships are under construction at its Pascagoula, Mississippi, yard, but it is under capacity, said Brian Cuccias, the company's president  The shipbuilder is currently constructing five guided-missile destroyers, the latest San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship, and two national security cutters for the Coast Guard  "Ingalls is a very successful production line right now, but it has the ability to actually produce a lot more in the future," he said during a briefing with reporters in January  The company's facility is currently operating at 75 percent capacity, he noted     Austal USA—the builder of the Independence-variant of the littoral combat ship and the expeditionary fast transport vessel—is also ready to increase its capacity should the Navy require it, said Craig Perciavalle, the company's president  The latest discussions are "certainly something that a shipbuilder wants to hear," he said  "We do have the capability of increasing throughput if the need and demand were to arise, and then we also have the ability with the present workforce and facility to meet a different mix that could arise as well " Austal could build fewer expeditionary fast transport vessels and more littoral combat ships, or vice versa, he added  "The key thing for us is to keep the manufacturing lines hot and really leverage the momentum that we've gained on both of the programs," he said  The company—which has a 164-acre yard in Mobile, Alabama—is focused on the extension of the LCS and expeditionary fast transport ship program, but Perciavalle noted that it could look into manufacturing other types of vessels  "We do have excess capacity to even build smaller vessels … if that opportunity were to arise and we're pursuing that," he said  Bryan Clark, a naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington, D C -based think tank, said shipbuilders are on average running between 70 and 80 percent capacity  While they may be ready to meet an increased demand for ships, it would take time to ramp up their workforces  However, the bigger challenge is the supplier industrial base, he said  "Shipyards may be able to build ships but the supplier base that builds the pumps … and the radars and the radios and all those other things, they don't necessarily have that ability to ramp up," he said  "You would need to put some money into building up their capacity " That has to happen now, he added  Rear Adm  William Gallinis, program manager for program executive office ships, said what the Navy must be "mindful of is probably our vendor base that support the shipyards " Smaller companies that supply power electronics and switchboards could be challenged, he said  "Do we need to re-sequence some of the funding to provide some of the facility improvements for some of the vendors that may be challenged? My sense is that the industrial base will size to the demand signal  We just need to be mindful of how we transition to that increased demand signal," he said  The acquisition workforce may also see an increased amount of stress, Gallinis noted  "It takes a fair amount of experience and training to get a good contracting officer to the point to be [able to] manage contracts or procure contracts " "But I don't see anything that is insurmountable," he added  At a May 24, 2017, hearing before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the industrial-base aspects of the Navy's 355-ship goal, John P  Casey, executive vice president–marine systems, General Dynamics Corporation (one of the country's two principal builders of Navy ships) stated the following: It is our belief that the Nation's shipbuilding industrial base can scale-up hot production lines for existing ships and mobilize additional resources to accomplish the significant challenge of achieving the 355-ship Navy as quickly as possible     Supporting a plan to achieve a 355-ship Navy will be the most challenging for the nuclear submarine enterprise  Much of the shipyard and industrial base capacity was eliminated following the steep drop-off in submarine production that occurred with the cancellation of the Seawolf Program in 1992  The entire submarine industrial base at all levels of the supply chain will likely need to recapitalize some portion of its facilities, workforce, and supply chain just to support the current plan to build the Columbia Class SSBN program, while concurrently building Virginia Class SSNs  Additional SSN procurement will require industry to expand its plans and associated investment beyond the level today     Shipyard labor resources include the skilled trades needed to fabricate, build and outfit major modules, perform assembly, test and launch of submarines, and associated support organizations that include planning, material procurement, inspection, quality assurance, and ship certification  Since there is no commercial equivalency for Naval nuclear submarine shipbuilding, these trade resources cannot be easily acquired in large numbers from other industries  Rather, these shipyard resources must be acquired and developed over time to ensure the unique knowledge and know-how associated with nuclear submarine shipbuilding is passed on to the next generation of shipbuilders  The mechanisms of knowledge transfer require sufficient lead time to create the proficient, skilled craftsmen in each key trade including welding, electrical, machining, shipfitting, pipe welding, painting, and carpentry, which are among the largest trades that would need to grow to support increased demand  These trades will need to be hired in the numbers required to support the increased workload  Both shipyards have scalable processes in place to acquire, train, and develop the skilled workforce they need to build nuclear ships  These processes and associated training facilities need to be expanded to support the increased demand  As with the shipyards, the same limiting factors associated with facilities, workforce, and supply chain also limit the submarine unique first tier suppliers and sub-tiers in the industrial base for which there is no commercial equivalency     The supply base is the third resource that will need to be expanded to meet the increased demand over the next 20 years  During the OHIO, 688 and SEAWOLF construction programs, there were over 17,000 suppliers supporting submarine construction programs  That resource base was "rationalized" during submarine low rate production over the last 20 years  The current submarine industrial base reflects about 5,000 suppliers, of which about 3,000 are currently active (i e , orders placed within the last 5 years), 80% of which are single or sole source (based on $)  It will take roughly 20 years to build the 12 Columbia Class submarines that starts construction in FY21  The shipyards are expanding strategic sourcing of appropriate non-core products (e g , decks, tanks, etc ) in order to focus on core work at each shipyard facility (e g , module outfitting and assembly)  Strategic sourcing will move demand into the supply base where capacity may exist or where it can be developed more easily  This approach could offer the potential for cost savings by competition or shifting work to lower cost work centers throughout the country  Each shipyard has a process to assess their current supply base capacity and capability and to determine where it would be most advantageous to perform work in the supply base     Achieving the increased rate of production and reducing the cost of submarines will require the Shipbuilders to rely on the supply base for more non-core products such as structural fabrication, sheet metal, machining, electrical, and standard parts  The supply base must be made ready to execute work with submarine-specific requirements at a rate and volume that they are not currently prepared to perform  Preparing the supply base to execute increased demand requires early non-recurring funding to support cross-program construction readiness and EOQ funding to procure material in a manner that does not hold up existing ship construction schedules should problems arise in supplier qualification programs  This requires longer lead times (estimates of three years to create a new qualified, critical supplier) than the current funding profile supports     We need to rely on market principles to allow suppliers, the shipyards and GFE material providers to sort through the complicated demand equation across the multiple ship programs  Supplier development funding previously mentioned would support non-recurring efforts which are needed to place increased orders for material in multiple market spaces  Examples would include valves, build-to-print fabrication work, commodities, specialty material, engineering components, etc  We are engaging our marine industry associations to help foster innovative approaches that could reduce costs and gain efficiency for this increased volume     Supporting the 355-ship Navy will require Industry to add capability and capacity across the entire Navy Shipbuilding value chain  Industry will need to make investment decisions for additional capital spend starting now in order to meet a step change in demand that would begin in FY19 or FY20  For the submarine enterprise, the step change was already envisioned and investment plans that embraced a growth trajectory were already being formulated  Increasing demand by adding additional submarines will require scaling facility and workforce development plans to operate at a higher rate of production  The nuclear shipyards would also look to increase material procurement proportionally to the increased demand  In some cases, the shipyard facilities may be constrained with existing capacity and may look to source additional work in the supply base where capacity exists or where there are competitive business advantages to be realized  Creating additional capacity in the supply base will require non-recurring investment in supplier qualification, facilities, capital equipment and workforce training and development  Industry is more likely to increase investment in new capability and capacity if there is certainty that the Navy will proceed with a stable shipbuilding plan  Positive signals of commitment from the Government must go beyond a published 30-year Navy Shipbuilding Plan and line items in the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) and should include: Multi-year contracting for Block procurement which provides stability in the industrial base and encourages investment in facilities and workforce development Funding for supplier development to support training, qualification, and facilitization efforts—Electric Boat and Newport News have recommended to the Navy funding of $400M over a three-year period starting in 2018 to support supplier development for the Submarine Industrial Base as part of an Integrated Enterprise Plan Extended Enterprise initiative Acceleration of Advance Procurement and/or Economic Order Quantities (EOQ) procurement from FY19 to FY18 for Virginia Block V Government incentives for construction readiness and facilities / special tooling for shipyard and supplier facilities, which help cash flow capital investment ahead of construction contract awards Procurement of additional production back-up (PBU) material to help ensure a ready supply of material to mitigate construction schedule risk     So far, this testimony has focused on the Submarine Industrial Base, but the General Dynamics Marine Systems portfolio also includes surface ship construction  Unlike Electric Boat, Bath Iron Works and NASSCO are able to support increased demand without a significant increase in resources      Bath Iron Works is well positioned to support the Administration's announced goal of increasing the size of the Navy fleet to 355 ships  For BIW that would mean increasing the total current procurement rate of two DDG 51s per year to as many as four DDGs per year, allocated equally between BIW and HII  This is the same rate that the surface combatant industrial base sustained over the first decade of full rate production of the DDG 51 Class (1989-1999)     No significant capital investment in new facilities is required to accommodate delivering two DDGs per year  However, additional funding will be required to train future shipbuilders and maintain equipment  Current hiring and training processes support the projected need, and have proven to be successful in the recent past  BIW has invested significantly in its training programs since 2014 with the restart of the DDG 51 program and given these investments and the current market in Maine, there is little concern of meeting the increase in resources required under the projected plans  A predictable and sustainable Navy workload is essential to justify expanding hiring/training programs  BIW would need the Navy's commitment that the Navy's plan will not change before it would proceed with additional hiring and training to support increased production  BIW's supply chain is prepared to support a procurement rate increase of up to four DDG 51s per year for the DDG 51 Program  BIW has long-term purchasing agreements in place for all major equipment and material for the DDG 51 Program  These agreements provide for material lead time and pricing, and are not constrained by the number of ships ordered in a year  BIW confirmed with all of its critical suppliers that they can support this increased procurement rate     The Navy's Force Structure Assessment calls for three additional ESBs  Additionally, NASSCO has been asked by the Navy and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to evaluate its ability to increase the production rate of T-AOs to two ships per year  NASSCO has the capacity to build three more ESBs at a rate of one ship per year while building two T-AOs per year  The most cost effective funding profile requires funding ESB 6 in FY18 and the following ships in subsequent fiscal years to avoid increased cost resulting from a break in the production line  The most cost effective funding profile to enable a production rate of two T-AO ships per year requires funding an additional long lead time equipment set beginning in FY19 and an additional ship each year beginning in FY20  NASSCO must now reduce its employment levels due to completion of a series of commercial programs which resulted in the delivery of six ships in 2016  The proposed increase in Navy shipbuilding stabilizes NASSCO's workload and workforce to levels that were readily demonstrated over the last several years  Some moderate investment in the NASSCO shipyard will be needed to reach this level of production  The recent CBO report on the costs of building a 355-ship Navy accurately summarized NASSCO's ability to reach the above production rate stating, "building more … combat logistics and support ships would be the least problematic for the shipyards " At the same hearing, Brian Cuccias, president, Ingalls Shipbuilding, Huntington Ingalls Industries (the country's other principal builder of Navy ships) stated the following: Qualifying to be a supplier is a difficult process  Depending on the commodity, it may take up to 36 months  That is a big burden on some of these small businesses  This is why creating sufficient volume and exercising early contractual authorization and advance procurement funding is necessary to grow the supplier base, and not just for traditional long-lead time components; that effort needs to expand to critical components and commodities that today are controlling the build rate of submarines and carriers alike  Many of our suppliers are small businesses and can only make decisions to invest in people, plant and tooling when they are awarded a purchase order  We need to consider how we can make commitments to suppliers early enough to ensure material readiness and availability when construction schedules demand it  With questions about the industry's ability to support an increase in shipbuilding, both Newport News and Ingalls have undertaken an extensive inventory of our suppliers and assessed their ability to ramp up their capacity  We have engaged many of our key suppliers to assess their ability to respond to an increase in production  The fortunes of related industries also impact our suppliers, and an increase in demand from the oil and gas industry may stretch our supply base  Although some low to moderate risk remains, I am convinced that our suppliers will be able to meet the forecasted Navy demand     I strongly believe that the fastest results can come from leveraging successful platforms on current hot production lines  We commend the Navy's decision in 2014 to use the existing LPD 17 hull form for the LX(R), which will replace the LSD-class amphibious dock landing ships scheduled to retire in the coming years  However, we also recommend that the concept of commonality be taken even further to best optimize efficiency, affordability and capability  Specifically, rather than continuing with a new design for LX(R) within the "walls" of the LPD hull, we can leverage our hot production line and supply chain and offer the Navy a variant of the existing LPD design that satisfies the aggressive cost targets of the LX(R) program while delivering more capability and survivability to the fleet at a significantly faster pace than the current program  As much as 10-15 percent material savings can be realized across the LX(R) program by purchasing respective blocks of at least five ships each under a multi-year procurement (MYP) approach  In the aggregate, continuing production with LPD 30 in FY18, coupled with successive MYP contracts for the balance of ships, may yield savings greater than $1 billion across an 11-ship LX(R) program  Additionally, we can deliver five LX(R)s to the Navy and Marine Corps in the same timeframe that the current plan would deliver two, helping to reduce the shortfall in amphibious warships against the stated force requirement of 38 ships  Multi-ship procurements, whether a formal MYP or a block-buy, are a proven way to reduce the price of ships  The Navy took advantage of these tools on both Virginia-class submarines and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers  In addition to the LX(R) program mentioned above, expanding multi-ship procurements to other ship classes makes sense     The most efficient approach to lower the cost of the Ford class and meet the goal of an increased CVN fleet size is also to employ a multi-ship procurement strategy and construct these ships at three-year intervals  This approach would maximize the material procurement savings benefit through economic order quantities procurement and provide labor efficiencies to enable rapid acquisition of a 12-ship CVN fleet  This three-ship approach would save at least $1 5 billion, not including additional savings that could be achieved from government-furnished equipment  As part of its Integrated Enterprise Plan, we commend the Navy's efforts to explore the prospect of material economic order quantity purchasing across carrier and submarine programs  At the same hearing, Matthew O  Paxton, president, Shipbuilders Council of America (SCA)—a trade association representing shipbuilders, suppliers, and associated firms—stated the following: To increase the Navy's Fleet to 355 ships, a substantial and sustained investment is required in both procurement and readiness  However, let me be clear: building and sustaining the larger required Fleet is achievable and our industry stands ready to help achieve that important national security objective  To meet the demand for increased vessel construction while sustaining the vessels we currently have will require U S  shipyards to expand their work forces and improve their infrastructure in varying degrees depending on ship type and ship mix – a requirement our Nation's shipyards are eager to meet  But first, in order to build these ships in as timely and affordable manner as possible, stable and robust funding is necessary to sustain those industrial capabilities which support Navy shipbuilding and ship maintenance and modernization     Beyond providing for the building of a 355-ship Navy, there must also be provision to fund the "tail," the maintenance of the current and new ships entering the fleet  Target fleet size cannot be reached if existing ships are not maintained to their full service lives, while building those new ships  Maintenance has been deferred in the last few years because of across-the-board budget cuts     The domestic shipyard industry certainly has the capability and know-how to build and maintain a 355-ship Navy  The Maritime Administration determined in a recent study on the Economic Benefits of the U S  Shipyard Industry that there are nearly 110,000 skilled men and women in the Nation's private shipyards building, repairing and maintaining America's military and commercial fleets 1 The report found the U S  shipbuilding industry supports nearly 400,000 jobs across the country and generates $25 1 billion in income and $37 3 billion worth of goods and services each year  In fact, the MARAD report found that the shipyard industry creates direct and induced employment in every State and Congressional District and each job in the private shipbuilding and repairing industry supports another 2 6 jobs nationally  This data confirms the significant economic impact of this manufacturing sector, but also that the skilled workforce and industrial base exists domestically to build these ships  Long-term, there needs to be a workforce expansion and some shipyards will need to reconfigure or expand production lines  This can and will be done as required to meet the need if adequate, stable budgets and procurement plans are established and sustained for the long-term  Funding predictability and sustainability will allow industry to invest in facilities and more effectively grow its skilled workforce  The development of that critical workforce will take time and a concerted effort in a partnership between industry and the federal government  U S  shipyards pride themselves on implementing state of the art training and apprenticeship programs to develop skilled men and women that can cut, weld, and bend steel and aluminum and who can design, build and maintain the best Navy in the world  However, the shipbuilding industry, like so many other manufacturing sectors, faces an aging workforce  Attracting and retaining the next generation shipyard worker for an industry career is critical  Working together with the Navy, and local and state resources, our association is committed to building a robust training and development pipeline for skilled shipyard workers  In addition to repealing sequestration and stabilizing funding the continued development of a skilled workforce also needs to be included in our national maritime strategy     In conclusion, the U S  shipyard industry is certainly up to the task of building a 355-ship Navy and has the expertise, the capability, the critical capacity and the unmatched skilled workforce to build these national assets  Meeting the Navy's goal of a 355-ship fleet and securing America's naval dominance for the decades ahead will require sustained investment by Congress and Navy's partnership with a defense industrial base that can further attract and retain a highly-skilled workforce with critical skill sets  Again, I would like to thank this Subcommittee for inviting me to testify alongside such distinguished witnesses  As a representative of our nation's private shipyards, I can say, with confidence and certainty, that our domestic shipyards and skilled workers are ready, willing and able to build and maintain the Navy's 355-ship Fleet  Employment Impact Building the additional ships that would be needed to achieve and maintain the 355-ship fleet could create many additional manufacturing and other jobs at shipyards, associated supplier firms, and elsewhere in the U S  economy  A 2015 Maritime Administration (MARAD) report states, Considering the indirect and induced impacts, each direct job in the shipbuilding and repairing industry is associated with another 2 6 jobs in other parts of the US economy; each dollar of direct labor income and GDP in the shipbuilding and repairing industry is associated with another $1 74 in labor income and $2 49 in GDP, respectively, in other parts of the US economy  A March 2017 press report states, "Based on a 2015 economic impact study, the Shipbuilders Council of America [a trade association for U S  shipbuilders and associated supplier firms] believes that a 355-ship Navy could add more than 50,000 jobs nationwide " The 2015 economic impact study referred to in that quote might be the 2015 MARAD study discussed in the previous paragraph  An estimate of more than 50,000 additional jobs nationwide might be viewed as a higher-end estimate; other estimates might be lower  A June 14, 2017, press report states the following: "The shipbuilding industry will need to add between 18,000 and 25,000 jobs to build to a 350-ship Navy, according to Matthew Paxton, president of the Shipbuilders Council of America, a trade association representing the shipbuilding industrial base  Including indirect jobs like suppliers, the ramp-up may require a boost of 50,000 workers " Appendix E  A Summary of Some Acquisition Lessons Learned for Navy Shipbuilding This appendix presents a general summary of lessons learned in Navy shipbuilding, reflecting comments made repeatedly by various sources over the years  These lessons learned include the following: At the outset, get the operational requirements for the program right  Properly identify the program's operational requirements at the outset  Manage risk by not trying to do too much in terms of the program's operational requirements, and perhaps seek a so-called 70%-to-80% solution (i e , a design that is intended to provide 70%-80% of desired or ideal capabilities)  Achieve a realistic balance up front between operational requirements, risks, and estimated costs  Impose cost discipline up front  Use realistic price estimates, and consider not only development and procurement costs, but life-cycle operation and support (O&S) costs  Employ competition where possible in the awarding of design and construction contracts  Use a contract type that is appropriate for the amount of risk involved , and structure its terms to align incentives with desired outcomes  Minimize design/construction concurrency by developing the design to a high level of completion before starting construction and by resisting changes in requirements (and consequent design changes) during construction  Properly supervise construction work  Maintain an adequate number of properly trained Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) personnel  Provide stability for industry , in part by using, where possible, multiyear procurement (MYP) or block buy contracting  Maintain a capable government acquisition workforce that understands what it is buying, as well as the above points  Identifying these lessons is arguably not the hard part—most if not all these points have been cited for years  The hard part, arguably, is living up to them without letting circumstances lead program-execution efforts away from these guidelines  Appendix F  Some Considerations Relating to Warranties in Shipbuilding and Other Defense Acquisition This appendix presents some considerations relating to warranties in shipbuilding and other defense acquisition  In discussions of Navy (and also Coast Guard) shipbuilding, one question that sometimes arises is whether including a warranty in a shipbuilding contract is preferable to not including one  The question can arise, for example, in connection with a GAO finding that "the Navy structures shipbuilding contracts so that it pays shipbuilders to build ships as part of the construction process and then pays the same shipbuilders a second time to repair the ship when construction defects are discovered " Including a warranty in a shipbuilding contract (or a contract for building some other kind of defense end item), while potentially valuable, might not always be preferable to not including one—it depends on the circumstances of the acquisition, and it is not necessarily a valid criticism of an acquisition program to state that it is using a contract that does not include a warranty (or a weaker form of a warranty rather than a stronger one)  Including a warranty generally shifts to the contractor the risk of having to pay for fixing problems with earlier work  Although that in itself could be deemed desirable from the government's standpoint, a contractor negotiating a contract that will have a warranty will incorporate that risk into its price, and depending on how much the contractor might charge for doing that, it is possible that the government could wind up paying more in total for acquiring the item (including fixing problems with earlier work on that item) than it would have under a contract without a warranty  When a warranty is not included in the contract and the government pays later on to fix problems with earlier work, those payments can be very visible, which can invite critical comments from observers  But that does not mean that including a warranty in the contract somehow frees the government from paying to fix problems with earlier work  In a contract that includes a warranty, the government will indeed pay something to fix problems with earlier work—but it will make the payment in the less-visible (but still very real) form of the up-front charge for including the warranty, and that charge might be more than what it would have cost the government, under a contract without a warranty, to pay later on for fixing those problems  From a cost standpoint, including a warranty in the contract might or might not be preferable, depending on the risk that there will be problems with earlier work that need fixing, the potential cost of fixing such problems, and the cost of including the warranty in the contract  The point is that the goal of avoiding highly visible payments for fixing problems with earlier work and the goal of minimizing the cost to the government of fixing problems with earlier work are separate and different goals, and that pursuing the first goal can sometimes work against achieving the second goal  The Department of Defense's guide on the use of warranties states the following: Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 46 7 states that "the use of warranties is not mandatory " However, if the benefits to be derived from the warranty are commensurate with the cost of the warranty, the CO [contracting officer] should consider placing it in the contract  In determining whether a warranty is appropriate for a specific acquisition, FAR Subpart 46 703 requires the CO to consider the nature and use of the supplies and services, the cost, the administration and enforcement, trade practices, and reduced requirements  The rationale for using a warranty should be documented in the contract file     In determining the value of a warranty, a CBA [cost-benefit analysis] is used to measure the life cycle costs of the system with and without the warranty  A CBA is required to determine if the warranty will be cost beneficial  CBA is an economic analysis, which basically compares the Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of the system with and without the warranty to determine if warranty coverage will improve the LCCs  In general, five key factors will drive the results of the CBA: cost of the warranty + cost of warranty administration + compatibility with total program efforts + cost of overlap with Contractor support + intangible savings  Effective warranties integrate reliability, maintainability, supportability, availability, and life-cycle costs  Decision factors that must be evaluated include the state of the weapon system technology, the size of the warranted population, the likelihood that field performance requirements can be achieved, and the warranty period of performance  Appendix G  Some Considerations Relating to Avoiding Procurement Cost Growth vs  Minimizing Procurement Costs This appendix presents some considerations relating to avoiding procurement cost growth vs  minimizing procurement costs in shipbuilding and other defense acquisition  The affordability challenge posed by the Navy's shipbuilding plans can reinforce the strong oversight focus on preventing or minimizing procurement cost growth in Navy shipbuilding programs, which is one expression of a strong oversight focus on preventing or minimizing cost growth in DOD acquisition programs in general  This oversight focus may reflect in part an assumption that avoiding or minimizing procurement cost growth is always synonymous with minimizing procurement cost  It is important to note, however, that as paradoxical as it may seem, avoiding or minimizing procurement cost growth is not always synonymous with minimizing procurement cost, and that a sustained, singular focus on avoiding or minimizing procurement cost growth might sometimes lead to higher procurement costs for the government  How could this be? Consider the example of a design for the lead ship of a new class of Navy ships  The construction cost of this new design is uncertain, but is estimated to be likely somewhere between Point A (a minimum possible figure) and Point D (a maximum possible figure)  (Point D, in other words, would represent a cost estimate with a 100% confidence factor, meaning there is a 100% chance that the cost would come in at or below that level ) If the Navy wanted to avoid cost growth on this ship, it could simply set the ship's procurement cost at Point D  Industry would likely be happy with this arrangement, and there likely would be no cost growth on the ship  The alternative strategy open to the Navy is to set the ship's target procurement cost at some figure between Points A and D—call it Point B—and then use that more challenging target cost to place pressure on industry to sharpen its pencils so as to find ways to produce the ship at that lower cost  (Navy officials sometimes refer to this as "pressurizing" industry ) In this example, it might turn out that industry efforts to reduce production costs are not successful enough to build the ship at the Point B cost  As a result, the ship experiences one or more rounds of procurement cost growth, and the ship's procurement cost rises over time from Point B to some higher figure—call it Point C  Here is the rub: Point C, in spite of incorporating one or more rounds of cost growth, might nevertheless turn out to be lower than Point D, because Point C reflected efforts by the shipbuilder to find ways to reduce production costs that the shipbuilder might have put less energy into pursuing if the Navy had simply set the ship's procurement cost initially at Point D  Setting the ship's cost at Point D, in other words, may eliminate the risk of cost growth on the ship, but does so at the expense of creating a risk of the government paying more for the ship than was actually necessary  DOD could avoid cost growth on new procurement programs starting tomorrow by simply setting costs for those programs at each program's equivalent of Point D  But as a result of this strategy, DOD could well wind up leaving money on the table in some instances—of not, in other words, minimizing procurement costs  DOD does not have to set a cost precisely at Point D to create a potential risk in this regard  A risk of leaving money on the table, for example, is a possible downside of requiring DOD to budget for its acquisition programs at something like an 80% confidence factor—an approach that some observers have recommended—because a cost at the 80% confidence factor is a cost that is likely fairly close to Point D  Procurement cost growth is often embarrassing for DOD and industry, and can damage their credibility in connection with future procurement efforts  Procurement cost growth can also disrupt congressional budgeting by requiring additional appropriations to pay for something Congress thought it had fully funded in a prior year  For this reason, there is a legitimate public policy value to pursuing a goal of having less rather than more procurement cost growth  Procurement cost growth, however, can sometimes be in part the result of DOD efforts to use lower initial cost targets as a means of pressuring industry to reduce production costs—efforts that, notwithstanding the cost growth, might be partially successful  A sustained, singular focus on avoiding or minimizing cost growth, and of punishing DOD for all instances of cost growth, could discourage DOD from using lower initial cost targets as a means of pressurizing industry, which could deprive DOD of a tool for controlling procurement costs  The point here is not to excuse away cost growth, because cost growth can occur in a program for reasons other than DOD's attempt to pressurize industry  Nor is the point to abandon the goal of seeking lower rather than higher procurement cost growth, because, as noted above, there is a legitimate public policy value in pursuing this goal  The point, rather, is to recognize that this goal is not always synonymous with minimizing procurement cost, and that a possibility of some amount of cost growth might be expected as part of an optimal government strategy for minimizing procurement cost  Recognizing that the goals of seeking lower rather than higher cost growth and of minimizing procurement cost can sometimes be in tension with one another can lead to an approach that takes both goals into consideration  In contrast, an approach that is instead characterized by a sustained, singular focus on avoiding and minimizing cost growth may appear virtuous, but in the end may wind up costing the government more  Appendix H  Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate Size of the Navy Table H-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count toward the total  Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available  Figures in the table for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy  As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter  The Navy fell below 300 battle force ships in August 2003 and as of April 26, 2019, included 289 battle force ships  As discussed in Appendix C , historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time, and because the number of ships in the fleet in an earlier year might itself have been inappropriate (i e , not enough or more than enough) for meeting the Navy's mission requirements in that year  For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet's ability to perform its stated missions  An increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet's ability to perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet's mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability  Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet's ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the fleet's mission requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers  Shipbuilding Rate Table H-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2019) and requested or programmed (FY2020-FY2024) rates of Navy ship procurement 
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and Human Services (HHS) has published several guidance and educational resources related to neonatal abstinence syndrome and prenatal opioid use  According to HHS, these documents serve as tools to help stakeholders, including state entities and health care providers, and policymakers  Examples of these resources are listed below  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Pregnancy and Opioid Medications Factsheet, accessed June 8, 2017, https://www cdc gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pregnancy_opioid_pain_factsheet- a pdf  CDC Public Health Grand Rounds, Primary Prevention and Public Strategies to Prevent Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (Atlanta, GA: CDC, last updated August 18, 2016), accessed July 19, 2017, https://www cdc gov/cdcgrandrounds/archives/2016/August2016 htm  CDC, Treating for Two: Safer Medication Use in Pregnancy Initiative (Atlanta, GA: CDC, last updated May 5, 2016), accessed June 8, 2017, https://www cdc gov/pregnancy/meds/treatingfortwo  Department of Health and Human Services, Opioids: The Prescription Drug & Heroin Overdose Epidemic (Washington, D C , last reviewed March 24, 2016), accessed June 8, 2017, https://www hhs gov/opioids/index html  Department of Health and Human Services, National Center for Substance Abuse and Child Welfare, Resources & Topics on Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, accessed June 8, 2017, https://www ncsacw samhsa gov/resources/opioid-use-disorders-and-me dication-assisted-treatment/neonatal-abstinence-syndrome aspx  Jean Y  Ko  et al , “CDC Grand Rounds: Public Health Strategies to Prevent Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, March 10, 2017), accessed June 8, 2017, https://www cdc gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6609a2 htm  National Institute on Drug Abuse, Principles of Substance Abuse Prevention for Early Childhood: A Research Based Guide (last updated March 2016), accessed June 8, 2017, https://www drugabuse gov/publications/principles-substance-abuse-prev ention-early-childhood/principles-substance-abuse-prevention-early-child hood  National Institute on Drug Abuse, Substance Use in Women (last updated September 2016), accessed June 8, 2017, https://www drugabuse gov/publications/research-reports/substance-use-i n-women/summary  Reddy, Uma M  J  M  Davis, Z  Ren, and M  F  Greene, “Opioid Use in Pregnancy, Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, and Childhood Outcomes: Executive Summary of a Joint Workshop ” Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol  130, issue 1 (July 2017)  Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, A Collaborative Approach to the Treatment of Pregnant Women with Opioid Use Disorders  HHS Publications No  (SMA) 16-4978  Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2016  Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, “Advancing the Care of Pregnant and Parenting Women With Opioid Use Disorder and Their Infants: A Foundation for Clinical Guidance,” Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2016  Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, “Methadone Treatment for Pregnant Women ” HHS Publication No  (SMA) 14-4124 (Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, revised 2014)  In addition to the contact named above, Rashmi Agarwal, Assistant Director; Amy Leone, Analyst-in-Charge; Melissa Duong; Krister Friday; Jacquelyn Hamilton; Giao N  Nguyen; and Laurie Pachter made key contributions to this report  Drug Control Policy: Information on Status of Federal Efforts and Key Issues for Preventing Illicit Drug Use  GAO-17-766T  Washington, D C : July 26, 2017  Medicaid Expansion: Behavioral Health Treatment Use in Selected States in 2014  GAO-17-529  Washington, D C : July 21, 2017  VA Health Care: Actions Needed to Ensure Medical Facility Controlled Substance Inspection Programs Meet Agency Requirements  GAO-17-242  Washington, D C : February 15, 2017  Highlights of a Forum: Preventing Illicit Drug Use  GAO-17-146SP  Washington, D C : November 14, 2016  Opioid Addiction: Laws, Regulations, and Other Factors Can Affect Medication-Assisted Treatment Access  GAO-16-833  Washington, D C : September 27, 2016  Drug Enforcement Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Address Prior GAO Recommendations  GAO-16-737T  Washington, D C : June 22, 2016  Office of National Drug Control Policy: Progress toward Some National Drug Control Strategy Goals, but None Have Been Fully Achieved  GAO-16-660T  Washington, D C : May 17, 2016  Veterans Justice Outreach Program: VA Could Improve Management by Establishing Performance Measures and Fully Assessing Risks  GAO-16-393  Washington, D C : April 28, 2016  State Marijuana Legalization: DOJ Should Document Its Approach to Monitoring the Effects of Legalization  GAO-16-1  Washington, D C : December 30, 2015  Prescription Drugs: More DEA Information about Registrants’ Controlled Substances Roles Could Improve Their Understanding and Help Ensure Access  GAO-15-471  Washington, D C : June 25, 2015  Mental Health: Better Documentation Needed to Oversee Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Grantees  GAO-15-405  Washington, D C : May 12, 2015  Prenatal Drug Use and Newborn Health: Federal Efforts Need Better Planning and Coordination  GAO-15-203  Washington, D C : February 10, 2015  Medicare Program Integrity: CMS Pursues Many Practices to Address Prescription Drug Fraud, Waste, and Abuse  GAO-15-66  Washington, D C : October 24, 2014  Office of National Drug Control Policy: Office Could Better Identify Opportunities to Increase Program Coordination  GAO-13-333  Washington D C : March 26, 2013  Child Welfare: States Use Flexible Federal Funds, But Struggle to Meet Service Needs  GAO-13-170  Washington, D C : January 30, 2013 

ground_truth: The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years. On December 15, 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-ship force-level goal is the result of a Force Structure Assessment (FSA) conducted by the Navy in 2016. The Navy states that a new FSA is now underway as the successor to the 2016 FSA. This new FSA, Navy officials state, is to be completed by the end of 2019. Navy officials have suggested in their public remarks that this new FSA could change the 355-ship figure, the planned mix of ships, or both. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests funding for the procurement of 12 new ships, including one Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, three Virginia-class attack submarines, three DDG-51 class Aegis destroyers, one FFG(X) frigate, two John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers, and two TATS towing, salvage, and rescue ships. The Navy's FY2020 five-year (FY2020-FY2024) shipbuilding plan includes 55 new ships, or an average of 11 new ships per year. The Navy's FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan includes 304 ships, or an average of about 10 per year. If the FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan is implemented, the Navy projects that it will achieve a total of 355 ships by FY2034. This is about 20 years sooner than projected under the Navy's FY2019 30-year shipbuilding plan—an acceleration primarily due to a decision announced by the Navy in April 2018, after the FY2019 plan was submitted, to increase the service lives of all DDG-51 destroyers to 45 years. Although the Navy projects that the fleet will reach a total of 355 ships in FY2034, the Navy in that year and subsequent years will not match the composition called for in the FY2016 FSA. One issue for Congress is whether the new FSA that the Navy is conducting will change the 355-ship force-level objective established by the 2016 FSA and, if so, in what ways. Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the prospective affordability of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. Decisions that Congress makes regarding Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans can substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.