prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: The issue of executive discretion has been at the center of constitutional debates in liberal democracies throughout the twentieth century  How to balance a commitment to the rule of law with the exigencies of modern political and economic crises has engaged legislators and scholars in the United States and around the world  The United States Constitution is silent on questions of emergency power  As such, over the past two centuries, Congress and the President have answered those questions in varied and often ad hoc ways  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the answer was often for the President to act without congressional approval in a time of crisis, knowingly risking impeachment and personal civil liability  Congress claimed primacy over emergency action and would decide subsequently to either ratify the President's actions or indemnify the President for any civil liability  By the twentieth century, a new pattern had begun to emerge  Instead of retroactively judging an executive's extraordinary actions in a time of emergency, Congress created statutory bases permitting the President to declare a state of emergency and make use of extraordinary delegated powers  The expanding delegation of emergency powers to the executive and the increase of governing via emergency power by the executive has been a common trajectory among twentieth-century liberal democracies  As innovation has quickened the pace of social change and global crises, some legislatures have felt compelled to delegate to the executive, who traditional political theorists assumed could operate with greater "dispatch" than deliberate, future-oriented legislatures  Whether such actions subvert the rule of law or are a standard feature of healthy modern constitutional orders has been a subject of extensive debate  The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is one such example of a twentieth-century delegation of emergency authority  One of 123 emergency statutes under the umbrella of the National Emergencies Act (NEA), IEEPA grants the President extensive power to regulate a variety of economic transactions during a state of emergency  Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977 to rein in the expansive emergency economic powers that it had been delegated to the President under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)  Nevertheless, some scholars argue that judicial and legislative actions subsequent to IEEPA's enactment have made it, like TWEA, a source of expansive and unchecked executive authority in the economic realm  Others, however, argue that Presidents often use IEEPA to implement the will of Congress either as directed by law or as encouraged by congressional activity  Until recently, there has been little congressional discussion of modifying either IEEPA or its umbrella statute, the NEA  Recent presidential actions, however, have drawn attention to presidential emergency powers under the NEA of which IEEPA is the most frequently used  Should Congress consider changing IEEPA, there are two issues that Congress may wish to address  The first pertains to how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and its umbrella statute, the NEA  The second pertains to choices made in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018  The First World War (1914-1918) saw an unprecedented degree of economic mobilization  The executive departments of European governments began to regulate their economies with or without the support of their legislatures  The United States, in contrast, was in a privileged position relative to its allies in Europe  Separated by an ocean from Germany and Austria-Hungary, the United States was never under substantial threat of invasion  Rather than relying on the inherent powers of the presidency, or acting unconstitutionally and waiting for congressional ratification, President Wilson sought explicit pre-authorization for expansive new powers to meet the global crisis  Between 1916 and the end of 1917, Congress passed 22 statutes empowering the President to take control of private property for public use during the war  These statutes gave the President broad authority to control railroads, shipyards, cars, telegraph and telephone systems, water systems, and many other sectors of the American economy  TWEA was one of those 22 statutes  It granted to the executive an extraordinary degree of control over international trade, investment, migration, and communications between the United States and its enemies  TWEA defined "enemy" broadly and included "any individual, partnership, or other body of individuals [including corporations], of any nationality, resident within the territory     of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside of the United States and doing business within such a territory     " The first four sections of the act granted the President extensive powers to limit trading or communication with, or transporting enemies (or their allies) of the United States  These sections also empowered the President to censor foreign communications and place extensive restrictions on enemy insurance or reinsurance companies  It was Section 5(b) of TWEA, however, that would form one of the central bases of presidential emergency economic power in the twentieth century  Section 5(b), as originally enacted, states: That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly within the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of the ownership of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person within the United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is completed  The statute gave the President exceptional control over private international economic transactions in times of war  While Congress terminated many of the war powers in 1921, TWEA was specifically exempted because the U S  Government had yet to dispose of a large amount of alien property in its custody  The Great Depression, a massive global economic downturn that began in 1929, presented a challenge to liberal democracies in Europe and the Americas  To deal with the complexities presented by the crisis, nearly all such democracies began delegating discretionary authority to their executives to a degree that had only previously been done in times of war  The U S  Congress responded, in part, by dramatically expanding the scope of TWEA, delegating to the President the power to declare states of emergency in peacetime and assume expansive domestic economic powers  Such a delegation was made possible by analogizing economic crises to war  In public speeches about the crisis, President Franklin D  Roosevelt asserted that the Depression was to be "attacked," "fought against," "mobilized for," and "combatted" by "great arm[ies] of people " The economic mobilization of the First World War had blurred the lines between the executive's military and economic powers  As the Depression was likened to "armed strife" and declared to be "an emergency more serious than war" by a Justice of the Supreme Court, it became routine to use emergency economic legislation enacted in wartime as the basis for extraordinary economic authority in peacetime  As the Depression entered its third year, the newly-elected President Roosevelt sought from Congress "broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe " In his first act as President, Roosevelt proclaimed a bank holiday, suspending all transactions at all banking institutions located in the United States and its territories for four days  In his proclamation, Roosevelt claimed to have authority to declare the holiday under Section 5(b) of TWEA  However, because the United States was not in a state of war and the suspended transactions were primarily domestic, the President's authority to issue such an order was dubious  Despite the tenuous legality, Congress ratified Roosevelt's actions by passing the Emergency Banking Relief Act three days after his proclamation  The act amended Section 5(b) of TWEA to read: During time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President , the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, investigate, regulate, or prohibit     This amendment gave the President the authority to declare that a national emergency existed and assume extensive controls over the national economy previously only available in times of war  By 1934, Roosevelt had used these extensive new powers to regulate "Every transaction in foreign exchange, transfer of credit between any banking institution within the United States and any banking institution outside of the United States " With America's entry into the Second World War in 1941, Congress again amended TWEA to grant the President extensive powers over the disposition of private property, adding the so-called "vesting" power, which authorized the permanent seizure of property  Now in its most expansive form, TWEA authorized the President to declare a national emergency and, in so doing, to regulate foreign exchange, domestic banking, possession of precious metals, and property in which any foreign country or foreign national had an interest  The Second World War ended in 1945  Following the conflict, the allied powers constructed institutions and signed agreements designed to keep the peace and to liberalize world trade  However, the United States did not immediately resume a peacetime posture with respect to emergency powers  Instead, the onset of the Cold War rationalized the continued use of TWEA and other emergency powers outside the context of a declared war  Over the next several decades, Presidents declared four national emergencies under Section 5(b) of TWEA and assumed expansive authority over economic transactions in the postwar period  During the Cold War, economic sanctions became an increasingly popular foreign policy and national security tool, and TWEA was a prominent source of presidential authority to use the tool  In 1950, President Harry S  Truman declared a national emergency, citing TWEA, to impose economic sanctions on North Korea and China  Subsequent Presidents referenced that national emergency as authority for imposing sanctions on Vietnam, Cuba, and Cambodia  Truman likewise used Section 5(b) of TWEA to maintain regulations on foreign exchange, transfers of credit, and the export of coin and currency that had been in place since the early 1930s  Presidents Richard M  Nixon and Gerald R  Ford invoked TWEA to continue export controls established under the Export Administration Act when the act expired  TWEA was also a prominent instrument of postwar presidential monetary policy  Presidents Dwight D  Eisenhower and John F  Kennedy used TWEA and the national emergency declared by President Roosevelt in 1933 to maintain and modify regulations controlling the hoarding and export of gold  In 1968, President Lyndon B  Johnson explicitly used Truman's 1950 declaration of emergency under Section 5(b) of TWEA to limit direct foreign investment by U S  companies in an effort to strengthen the balance of payments position of the United States after the devaluation of the pound sterling by the United Kingdom  In 1971, after President Nixon ended the convertibility of the U S  dollar to gold, effectively ending the postwar monetary order, he made use of Section 5(b) of TWEA to declare a state of emergency and place a 10% ad valorem supplemental duty on all dutiable goods entering the United States  The reliance by the executive on the powers granted by Section 5(b) of TWEA meant that postwar sanctions regimes and significant parts of U S  international monetary policy relied on continued states of emergency for their operation  By the mid-1970s, in the wake of U S  military involvement in Vietnam, revelations of domestic spying, assassinations of foreign political leaders, the Watergate break-in, and other related abuses of power, Congress increasingly focused on checking the executive branch  The Senate formed a bipartisan special committee chaired by Senators Frank Church and Charles Mathias to reevaluate the expansive delegations of emergency authority to the President  The special committee issued a report surveying the President's emergency powers in which it asserted that the United States had technically "been in a state of national emergency since March 9, 1933" and that there were four distinct declarations of national emergency in effect  The report also noted that the United States had "on the books at least 470 significant emergency statutes without time limitations delegating to the Executive extensive discretionary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Legislature, which affect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encompassing ways " In the course of its investigations, Senator Mathias, committee co-chair, noted, "A majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency government " Senator Church, the other co-chair, said the central question before the committee was "whether it [was] possible for a democratic government such as ours to exist under its present Constitution and system of three separate branches equal in power under a continued state of emergency " Among the more controversial statutes highlighted by the committee was TWEA  In 1977, during the House markup of a bill revising TWEA, Representative Jonathan Bingham, Chairperson of the House International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Economic Policy, described TWEA as conferring "on the President what could have been dictatorial powers that he could have used without any restraint by Congress " According to the Department of Justice, TWEA granted the President four major groups of powers in a time of war or other national emergency: (a) Regulatory powers with respect to foreign exchange, banking transfers, coin, bullion, currency, and securities; (b) Regulatory powers with respect to "any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest"; (c) The power to vest "any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof"; and (d) The powers to hold, use, administer, liquidate, sell, or otherwise deal with "such interest or property" in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States  The House report on the reform legislation called TWEA "essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review " The criticisms of TWEA centered on the following: (a) It required no consultation or reports to Congress with regard to the use of powers or the declaration of a national emergency  (b) It set no time limits on a state of emergency, no mechanism for congressional review, and no way for Congress to terminate it  (c) It stated no limits on the scope of TWEA's economic powers and the circumstances under which such authority could be used  (d) The actions taken under the authority of TWEA were rarely related to the circumstances in which the national emergency was declared  In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Professor Harold G  Maier summed up the development and the main criticisms of TWEA: Section 5(b)'s effect is no longer confined to "emergency situations" in the sense of existing imminent danger  The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit, by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President…" Congress's reforms to emergency powers under TWEA came in two acts  First, Congress enacted the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976  The NEA provided for the termination of all existing emergencies in 1978, except those making use of Section 5(b) of TWEA, and placed new restrictions on the manner of declaring and the duration of new states of emergency, including: Requiring the President to immediately transmit to Congress of the declaration of national emergency  Requiring a biannual review whereby "each House of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a concurrent [now joint, see below] resolution to determine whether that emergency shall be terminated " Authorizing Congress to terminate the national emergency through a privileged concurrent [now joint] resolution  Second, Congress tackled the thornier question of TWEA  Because the authorities granted by TWEA were heavily entwined with postwar international monetary policy and the use of sanctions in U S  foreign policy, unwinding it was a difficult undertaking  The exclusion of Section 5(b) reflected congressional interest in preserving existing regulations regarding foreign assets, foreign funds, and exports of strategic goods  Similarly, establishing a means to continue existing uses of TWEA reflected congressional interest in "improving future use rather than remedying past abuses " The subcommittee charged with reforming TWEA spent more than a year preparing reports, including the first complete legislative history of TWEA, a tome that ran nearly 700 pages  In the resulting legislation, Congress did three things  First, Congress amended TWEA so that it was, as originally intended, only applicable "during a time of war " Second, Congress expanded the Export Administration Act to include powers that previously were authorized by reference to Section 5(b) of TWEA  Finally, Congress wrote the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to confer "upon the President a new set of authorities for use in time of national emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of section 5(b) and subject to procedural limitations, including those of the [NEA] " The Report of the House Committee on International Relations summed up the nature of an "emergency" in their "new approach" to international emergency economic powers: [G]iven the breadth of the authorities, and their availability at the President's discretion upon a declaration of a national emergency, their exercise should be subject to various substantive restrictions  The main one stems from a recognition that emergencies are by their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal ongoing problems  A national emergency should be declared and emergency authorities employed only with respect to a specific set of circumstances which constitute a real emergency, and for no other purpose  The emergency should be terminated in a timely manner when the factual state of emergency is over and not continued in effect for use in other circumstances  A state of national emergency should not be a normal state of affairs  IEEPA, as currently amended, empowers the president to: (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit: (i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or national thereof, (iii) the importing or exporting of currencies or securities; and (B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States  (C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes  These powers may be exercised "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat " Presidents may invoke IEEPA under the procedures set forth in the NEA  When declaring a national emergency, the NEA requires that the President "immediately" transmit the proclamation declaring the emergency to Congress and publish it in the Federal Register   The President must also specify the provisions of law that he or she intends to use  In addition to the requirements of the NEA, IEEPA provides several further restrictions  Preliminarily, IEEPA requires that the President consult with Congress "in every possible instance" before exercising any of the authorities granted under IEEPA  Once the President declares a national emergency invoking IEEPA, he or she must immediately transmit a report to Congress specifying: (1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority; (2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States; (3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to deal with those circumstances; (4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances; and (5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such actions are to be taken with respect to those countries  The President subsequently is to report on the actions taken under the IEEPA at least once in every succeeding six-month interval that the authorities are exercised  As per the NEA, the emergency may be terminated by the President, by a privileged joint resolution of Congress, or automatically if the President does not publish in the Federal Register and transmit to Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary  Congress has amended IEEPA eight times ( Table 1 )  Five of the eight amendments have altered civil and criminal penalties for violations of orders issued under the statute  Other amendments excluded certain informational materials and expanded IEEPA's scope following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001  Congress also amended the NEA in response to a ruling by the Supreme Court to require a joint rather than a concurrent resolution to terminate a national emergency  As originally enacted, IEEPA protected the rights of U S  persons to participate in the exchange of "any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value" with a foreign person otherwise subject to sanctions  Amendments in 1988 and 1994 updated this list of protected rights to include the exchange of published information in a variety of formats  The act currently protects the exchange of "information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds," provided such exchange is not otherwise controlled for national security or foreign policy reasons related to weapons proliferation or international terrorism  Unlike the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), IEEPA did not allow the President to vest assets as originally acted  In 2001, at the request of George W  Bush Administration, Congress amended IEEPA as part of the USA PATRIOT Act to return to the President the authority to vest frozen assets, but only under certain circumstances:     the President may     when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that [the President] determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes  Speaking about the efforts of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify and disrupt the flow of terrorist finances, Attorney General John Ashcroft told Congress: At present the President's powers are limited to freezing assets and blocking transactions with terrorist organizations  We need the capacity for more than a freeze  We must be able to seize  Doing business with terrorist organization must be a losing proposition  Terrorist financiers must pay a price for their support of terrorism, which kills innocent Americans  Consistent with the President's [issuance of E O  13224 ] and his statements [of September 24, 2001], our proposal gives law enforcement the ability to seize the terrorists' assets  Further, criminal liability is imposed on those who knowingly engage in financial transactions, money-laundering involving the proceeds of terrorist acts  The House Judiciary Committee report explaining the amendments described its purpose as follows: Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U S C  § 1702) grants to the President the power to exercise certain authorities relating to commerce with foreign nations upon his determination that there exists an unusual and extraordinary threat to the United States  Under this authority, the President may, among other things, freeze certain foreign assets within the jurisdiction of the United States  A separate law, the Trading With the Enemy Act, authorizes the President to take title to enemy assets when Congress has declared war  Section 159 of this bill amends section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to provide the President with authority similar to what he currently has under the Trading With the Enemy Act in circumstances where there has been an armed attack on the United States, or where Congress has enacted a law authorizing the President to use armed force against a foreign country, foreign organization, or foreign national  The proceeds of any foreign assets to which the President takes title under this authority must be placed in a segregated account can only be used in accordance with a statute authorizing the expenditure of such proceeds  Section 159 also makes a number of clarifying and technical changes to section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, most of which will not change the way that provision currently is implemented  The government has apparently never employed the vesting power to seize Al Qaeda assets within the United States  Instead, the government has sought to confiscate them through forfeiture procedures  The first, and to date, apparently only, use of this power under IEEPA occurred on March 20, 2003  On that date, in Executive Order 13290, President George W  Bush ordered the blocked "property of the Government of Iraq and its agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled entities" to be vested "in the Department of the Treasury     [to] be used to assist the Iraqi people and to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq " However, the President's order excluded from confiscation Iraq's diplomatic and consular property, as well as assets that had, prior to March 20, 2003, been ordered attached in satisfaction of judgments against Iraq rendered pursuant to the terrorist suit provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and § 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (which reportedly totaled about $300 million)   A subsequent executive order blocked the property of former Iraqi officials and their families, vesting title of such blocked funds in the Department of the Treasury for transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) to be "used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, for the cost of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefitting of the Iraqi people " The DFI was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which required member states to freeze all assets of the former Iraqi government and of Saddam Hussein, senior officials of his regime and their family members, and transfer such assets to the DFI, which was then administered by the United States  Most of the vested assets were used by the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) for reconstruction projects and ministry operations  The USA PATRIOT Act made three other amendments to Section 203 of IEEPA  After the power to investigate, it added the power to block assets during the pendency of an investigation  It clarified that the type of interest in property subject to IEEPA is an "interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States " It also added subsection (c), which provides: In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera  This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review  As described in the House Judiciary Committee report, these provisions were meant to clarify and codify existing practices  Like TWEA prior to its amendment in 1977, the President and Congress together have often turned to IEEPA to impose economic sanctions in furtherance of U S  foreign policy and national security objectives  While initially enacted to rein in presidential emergency authority, presidential emergency use of IEEPA has expanded in scale, scope, and frequency since the statute's enactment  The House report on IEEPA stated, "emergencies are by their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal, ongoing problems " National emergencies invoking IEEPA, however, have increased in frequency and length since its enactment  Since 1977, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in 54 declarations of national emergency  On average, these emergencies last nearly a decade  Most emergencies have been geographically specific, targeting a specific country or government  However, since 1990, Presidents have declared non-geographically-specific emergencies in response to issues like weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and malicious cyber-enabled activities  The erosion of geographic limitations has been accompanied by an expansion in the nature of the targets of sanctions issued under IEEPA authority  Originally, IEEPA was used to target foreign governments; however, Presidents have increasingly targeted groups and individuals  While Presidents usually make use of IEEPA as an emergency power, Congress has also directed the use of IEEPA or expressed its approval of presidential emergency use in several statutes  IEEPA is the most frequently cited emergency authority when the President invokes NEA authorities to declare a national emergency  ( Figure 1 )  Rather than referencing the same set of emergencies, as had been the case with TWEA, IEEPA has required the President to declare a national emergency for each independent use  As a result, the number of national emergencies declared under the terms of the NEA has proliferated over the past four decades  Presidents declared only four national emergencies under the auspices of TWEA in the four decades prior to IEEPA's enactment  In contrast, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in 54 of the 61 declarations of national emergency issued under the National Emergen cies Act  As of March 1, 2019, there were 32 ongoing national emergencies; all but three involved IEEPA  Each year since 1990, Presidents have issued roughly 4 5 executive orders citing IEEPA and declared 1 5 new national emergencies citing IEEPA  ( Figure 2 )  On average, emergencies invoking IEEPA last nearly a decade  The longest emergency was also the first  President Jimmy Carter, in response to the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, declared the first national emergency under the provisions of the National Emergencies Act and invoked IEEPA  Six successive Presidents have renewed that emergency annually for nearly forty years  As of March 1, 2019, that emergency is still in effect, largely to provide a legal basis for resolving matters of ownership of the Shah's disputed assets  That initial emergency aside, the length of emergencies invoking IEEPA has increased each decade  The average length of an emergency invoking IEEPA declared in the 1980s was four years  That average extended to 10 years for emergencies declared in the 1990s and 11 years for emergencies declared in the 2000s ( Figure 3 )  As such, the number of ongoing national emergencies has grown nearly continuously since the enactment of IEEPA and the NEA ( Figure 4 )  Between January 1, 1979, and January 1, 2019, there were on average 14 ongoing national emergencies each year, 13 of which invoked IEEPA  In most cases, the declared emergencies citing IEEPA have been geographically specific ( Figure 5 )  For example, in the first use of IEEPA, President Jimmy Carter issued an executive order that both declared a national emergency with respect to the "situation in Iran" and "blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran [   ] " Five months later, President Carter issued a second order dramatically expanding the scope of the first EO and effectively blocked the transfer of all goods, money, or credit destined for Iran by anyone subject to the jurisdiction of the United States  A further order expanded the coverage to block imports to the United States from Iran  Together, these orders touched upon virtually all economic contacts between any place or legal person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and the territory and government of Iran  Many of the executive orders invoking IEEPA have followed this pattern of limiting the scope to a specific territory, government, or its nationals  Executive Order 12513, for example, prohibited "imports into the United States of goods and services of Nicaraguan origin" and "exports from the United States of goods to or destined for Nicaragua " The order likewise prohibited Nicaraguan air carriers and vessels of Nicaraguan registry from entering U S  ports  Executive Order 12532 prohibited various transactions with the "Government of South Africa or to entities owned or controlled by that Government " While the majority (38) of national emergencies invoking IEEPA have been geographically specific, ten have lacked explicit geographic limitations  President George H W  Bush declared the first geographically nonspecific emergency in response to the threat posed by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons  Similarly, President George W  Bush declared a national emergency in response to the threat posed by "persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism " President Barack Obama declared emergencies to respond to the threats of "transnational criminal organizations" and "persons engaging in malicious cyber-enabled activities " Without explicit geographic limitations, these orders have included provisions that are global in scope  These geographically nonspecific emergencies have increased in frequency over the past 40 years—three of the ten have been declared since 2015  In addition to the erosion of geographic limitations, the stated motivations for declaring national emergencies have expanded in scope as well  Initially, stated rationales for declarations of national emergency citing IEEPA were short and often referenced either a specific geography or the specific actions of a government  Presidents found that circumstances like "the situation in Iran," or the "policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua," constituted "unusual and extraordinary threat[s] to the national security and foreign policy of the United States" and would therefore declare a national emergency  The stated rationales have, however, expanded over time in both the length and subject matter  Presidents have increasingly declared national emergencies, in part, to respond to human and civil rights abuses, slavery, denial of religious freedom, political repression, public corruption, and the undermining of democratic processes  While the first reference to human rights violations as a rationale for a declaration of national emergency came in 1985, most of such references have come in the past twenty years  Table A-2   Presidents have also expanded the nature of the targets of IEEPA sanctions  Originally, the targets of sanctions issued under IEEPA were foreign governments  The first use of IEEPA targeted "Iranian Government Property " Use of IEEPA quickly expanded to target geographically defined regions  Nevertheless, Presidents have also increasingly targeted groups, such as political parties or terrorist organizations, and individuals, such as supporters of terrorism or suspected narcotics traffickers  The first instances of orders directed at groups or persons were limited to foreign groups or persons  For example, in Executive Order 12978, President Bill Clinton targeted specific "foreign persons" and "persons determined [   ] to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of" such foreign persons  An excerpt is included below: Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U S C  1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property that are or hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, of: (a) the foreign persons listed in the Annex to this order; (b)  foreign persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State: (i) to play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking centered in Colombia; or (ii) materially to assist in, or provide financial or technological support for or goods or services in support of, the narcotics trafficking activities of persons designated in or pursuant to this order; and (c) persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of, persons designated in or pursuant to this order  However, in 2001, President George W  Bush issued Executive Order 13219 to target "persons who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans " While the order was similar to that of Executive Order 12978, it removed the qualifier "foreign " As such, persons in the United States, including U S  citizens, could be targets of the order  The following is an excerpt of the order: Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(1), (3), and (4) of IEEPA (50 U S C  1702(b)(1), (3), and (4)), the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (title IX, P L  106-387 ), and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, all property and interests in property of: (i)  the persons listed in the Annex to this order; and (ii)  persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, because they are found: (A) to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of violence    Several subsequent invocations of IEEPA have similarly not been limited to foreign targets  In sum, presidential emergency use of IEEPA was directed at foreign states initially, with targets that were delimited by geography or nationality  Since the 1990s, however, Presidents have expanded the scope of their declarations to include individual persons, regardless of nationality or geographic location, who are engaged in specific activities  While IEEPA is often categorized as an emergency statute, Congress has used IEEPA outside of the context of national emergencies  When Congress legislates sanctions, it often authorizes or directs the President to use IEEPA authorities to impose those sanctions  In the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018, the most recent example, Congress directed the President to exercise "all powers granted to the President [by IEEPA] to the extent necessary to block and prohibit [certain transactions] " Penalties for violations by a person of a measure imposed by the President under the Act would be, likewise, determined by reference to IEEPA  The trend has been long-term  Congress first directed the President to make use of IEEPA authorities in 1986 as part of an effort to assist Haiti in the recovery of assets illegally diverted by its former government  That statute provided: The President shall exercise the authorities granted by section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act [50 USC 1702] to assist the Government of Haiti in its efforts to recover, through legal proceedings, assets which the Government of Haiti alleges were stolen by former president-for-life Jean Claude Duvalier and other individuals associated with the Duvalier regime  This subsection shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of section 202 of that Act  [50 USC 1701] In directing the President to use IEEPA, Congress waived the requirement that he declare a national emergency (and none was declared)  Subsequent legislation has followed this general pattern, with slight variations in language and specificity  The following is an example of current legislative language that has appeared in several recent statutes: (a) IN GENERAL —The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to—     (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED — (1) IN GENERAL —The sanctions described in this subsection are the following: (A) ASSET BLOCKING —The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U S C  1701 et seq ) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person      (2) PENALTIES —A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of paragraph (1)(A) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out paragraph (1)(A) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U S C  1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section  Congress has also expressed, retroactively, its approval of unilateral presidential invocations of IEEPA in the context of a national emergency  In the Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, for example, Congress declared, "It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State should continue to implement Executive Order No  13382 " Presidents, however, have also used IEEPA to preempt or modify parallel congressional activity  On September 9, 1985, President Reagan, finding "that the policies and actions of the Government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States," declared a national emergency and limited transactions with South Africa  The President declared the emergency despite the fact that legislation limiting transactions with South Africa was quickly making its way through Congress  In remarks about the declaration, President Reagan stated that he had been opposed to the bill contemplated by Congress because unspecified provisions "would have harmed the very people [the U S  was] trying to help " Nevertheless, members of the press at the time (and at least one scholar since) noted that the limitations imposed by the Executive Order and the provisions in legislation then winding its way through Congress were "substantially similar " In general, IEEPA has served as an integral part of the postwar international sanctions regime  The President, either through a declaration of emergency or via statutory direction, has used IEEPA to limit economic transactions in support of administrative and congressional national security and foreign policy goals  Much of the action taken pursuant to IEEPA has involved blocking transactions and freezing assets  Once the President declares that a national emergency exists, he may use the authority in Section 203 of IEEPA (Grants of Authorities; 50 U S C  § 1702) to investigate, regulate, or prohibit foreign exchange transactions, transfers of credit, transfers of securities, payments, and may take specified actions relating to property in which a foreign country or person has interest—freezing assets, blocking property and interests in property, prohibiting U S  persons from entering into transactions related to frozen assets and blocked property, and in some instances denying entry into the United States  Pursuant to Section 203, Presidents have prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as engaging in malicious cyber-enabled activities, including "interfering with or undermining election processes or institutions" [Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015, as amended; 50 U S C  § 1701 note  See also Executive Order 13848 of September 12, 2018; 83 F R  46843 ]; prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as illicit narcotics traffickers including foreign drug kingpins; prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as engaging in human rights abuses or significant corruption; prohibited transactions related to illicit trade in rough diamonds; prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as Transnational Criminal Organizations; prohibited transactions with "those who disrupt the Middle East peace process;" prohibited transactions related to overflights with certain nations; instituted and maintained maritime restrictions; prohibited transactions related to weapons of mass destruction, in coordination with export controls authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979, and in furtherance of efforts to deter the weapons programs of specific countries (i e , Iran, North Korea); prohibited transactions those designated as "persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism;" maintained the dual-use export control system at times when its then-underlying authority, the Export Administration Act authority had lapsed; blocked property of and transactions with those designated as engaged in cyber activities that compromise critical infrastructures including election processes or the private sector's trade secrets; blocked property of and prohibited transactions with those designated as responsible for serious human rights abuse or engaged in corruption; blocked certain property of and transactions with foreign nationals of specific countries those designated as engaged in activities that constitute an extraordinary threat  No President has used IEEPA to place tariffs on imported products from a specific country or on products imported to the United States in general  However, IEEPA's similarity to TWEA, coupled with its relatively frequent use to ban imports and exports, suggests that such an action could happen  In addition, no President has used IEEPA to enact a policy that was primarily domestic in effect  Some scholars argue, however, that the interconnectedness of the global economy means it would probably be permissible to use IEEPA to take an action that was primarily domestic in effect  The ultimate disposition of assets frozen under IEEPA may serve as an important part of the leverage economic sanctions provide to influence the behavior of foreign actors  The President and Congress have each at times determined the fate of blocked assets to further foreign policy goals  Presidents have used frozen assets as a bargaining tool during foreign policy crises and to bring a resolution to such crises, at times by unfreezing the assets, returning them to the sanctioned entity or channeling them to a follow-on government  The following are some examples of how Presidents have made use of blocked assets to resolve foreign policy issues  President Carter invoked authority under IEEPA to impose trade sanctions against Iran, freezing Iranian assets in the United States, in response to the hostage crisis in 1979  On January 19, 1981, the United States and Iran entered into a series of executive agreements brokered by Algeria under which the hostages were freed, a portion of the blocked assets ($5 1 billion) was used to repay outstanding U S  bank loans to Iran, another part ($2 8 billion) was returned directly to Iran, another $1 billion was transferred into a security account in the Hague to pay other U S  claims against Iran as arbitrated by the Iran-U S  Claims Tribunal (IUSCT), and an additional $2 billion remained blocked pending further agreement with Iran or decision of the Tribunal  The United States also undertook to freeze the assets of the former Shah's estate along with those of the Shah's close relatives pending litigation in U S  courts to ascertain Iran's right to their return  Iran's litigation was unsuccessful, and none of the contested assets were returned to Iran  Presidents have also been able to channel frozen assets to opposition governments in cases where the United States continued to recognize a previous government that had been removed by coup d'état or otherwise replaced as the legitimate government of a country  For example, after Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle tried to dismiss de facto military ruler General Manuel Noriega from his post as head of the Panamanian Defense Forces, which resulted in Delvalle's own dismissal by the Panamanian Legislative Assembly, President Reagan recognized Delvalle as the legitimate head of government and instituted economic sanctions against the Noriega regime  The Department of State advised U S  banks not to disburse funds to the Noriega regime, and Delvalle was able to obtain court orders permitting him access to the funds  President Reagan issued Executive Order 12635, which blocked all property and interests in payments of the government of Panama, and the Department of the Treasury issued regulations requiring companies who owed money to Panama to pay those funds into an escrow account established at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which also held payments owed by the United States for the operation of the Panama Canal Commission  Some of the funds in the escrow account were used to pay the operating expenses of the Delvalle government  After the U S  invasion of Panama, President George H W  Bush lifted economic sanctions and used some of the frozen funds to repay debts owed by Panama to foreign creditors, with remaining funds returned to the successor government  In a similar more recent case, the Trump Administration's recognition of Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's interim president permitted Guaidó access to Venezuelan government assets held at the United States Federal Reserve and other insured United States financial institutions  President Barrack Obama initially froze Venezuelan government assets in 2015, pursuant to IEEPA and the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014  After official recognition of Guaidó, the Trump Administration imposed new sanctions under IEEPA to freeze the assets of the main Venezuelan state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa), which could both significantly reduce funds available to the regime of Nicolas Maduro and channel them to Guaidó  There is also precedent for using frozen foreign assets for purposes authorized by the U N  Security Council  After the first war with Iraq, President George H W  Bush ordered the transfer of frozen Iraqi assets derived from the sale of Iraqi petroleum held by U S  banks to be transferred to a holding account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to fulfill "the rights and obligations of the United States under U N  Security Council Resolution No  778 " The President cited a section of the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA), as well as IEEPA, as authority to take the action  The transferred funds were used to provide humanitarian relief and to finance the United Nations Compensation Commission, which was established to adjudicate claims against Iraq arising from the invasion  Other Iraqi assets remained frozen and accumulated interest until they were vested in 2003 (see below)  In some cases, the United States has ended sanctions and returned frozen assets to successor governments  In the case of the former Yugoslavia, for example, in 2003, $237 6 million in frozen funds belonging to the Central Bank of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were transferred to the central banks of the successor states  In the case of Afghanistan, $217 million in frozen funds belonging to the Taliban were released to the Afghan Interim Authority in January 2002  The executive branch has traditionally resisted congressional efforts to vest foreign assets to pay U S  claimants without first obtaining a settlement agreement with the country in question  Congress has overcome such resistance in the case of foreign governments that have been designated as "State Supporters of Terrorism " U S  nationals who are victims of state-supported terrorism involving designated states have been able to sue those countries for damages under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) since 1996  To facilitate the payment of judgments under the exception, Congress passed Section 117 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999, which further amended the FSIA by allowing attachment and execution against state property with respect to which financial transactions are prohibited or regulated under Section 5(b) TWEA, Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act (authorizing the trade embargo against Cuba), or Sections 202 and 203 of IEEPA, or any orders, licenses or other authority issued under these statutes  Because of the Clinton Administration's continuing objections, however, Section 117 also gave the President authority to "waive the requirements of this section in the interest of national security," an authority President Clinton promptly exercised in signing the statute into law  The Section 117 waiver authority protecting blocked foreign government assets from attachment to satisfy terrorism judgments has continued in effect ever since, prompting Congress to take other actions to make frozen assets available to judgment holders  Congress enacted §2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA) to mandate the payment from frozen Cuban assets of compensatory damages awarded against Cuba under the FSIA terrorism exception on or prior to July 20, 2000  The Department of the Treasury subsequently vested $96 7 million in funds generated from long-distance telephone services between the United States and Cuba in order to compensate claimants in Alejandre v  Republic of Cuba , the lawsuit based on the1996 downing of two unarmed U S  civilian airplanes by the Cuban air force  Another payment of more than $7 million was made using vested Cuban assets to a Florida woman who had won a lawsuit against Cuba based on her marriage to a Cuban spy  As unpaid judgments against designated state sponsors of terrorism continued to mount, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA)  Section 201 of TRIA overrode long-standing objections by the executive branch to make the frozen assets of terrorist states available to satisfy judgments for compensatory damages against such states (and organizations and persons) as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (b), in every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable  Subsection (b) of Section 201 provided waiver authority "in the national security interest," but only with respect to frozen foreign government "property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations " When Congress amended the FSIA in 2008 to revamp the terrorism exception, it provided that judgments entered under the new exception could be satisfied out of the property of a foreign state notwithstanding the fact that the property in question is regulated by the United States government pursuant to TWEA or IEEPA  Congress has also directed that the proceeds from certain sanctions violations be paid into a fund for providing compensation to the former hostages of Iran and terrorist state judgment creditors  To fund the program, Congress designated that certain real property and bank accounts owned by Iran and forfeited to the United States could go into the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, along with the sum of $1,025,000,000, representing the amount paid to the United States pursuant to the June 27, 2014, plea agreement and settlement between the United States and BNP Paribas for sanctions violations  The fund is replenished through criminal penalties and forfeitures for violations of IEEPA or TWEA-based regulations, or any related civil or criminal conspiracy, scheme, or other federal offense related to doing business or acting on behalf of a state sponsor of terrorism  Half of all civil penalties and forfeitures relating to the same offenses are also deposited into the fund  A number of lawsuits seeking to overturn actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have made their way through the judicial system, including challenges to the breadth of congressionally delegated authority and assertions of violations of constitutional rights  As demonstrated below, most of these challenges have failed  The few challenges that succeeded did not seriously undermine the overarching statutory scheme for sanctions  The breadth of presidential power under IEEPA is illustrated by the Supreme Court's 1981 opinion in Dames & Moore v  Regan   In Dames & Moore , petitioners had challenged President Carter's executive order establishing regulations to further compliance with the terms of the Algiers Accords, which the President had entered into to end the hostage crisis with Iran  Under these agreements, the United States was obligated (1) to terminate all legal proceedings in U S  courts involving claims of U S  nationals against Iran, (2) to nullify all attachments and judgments, and (3) to resolve outstanding claims exclusively through binding arbitration in the Iran-U S  Claims Tribunal (IUSCT)  The President, through executive orders, revoked all licenses that permitted the exercise of "any right, power, or privilege" with regard to Iranian funds, nullified all non-Iranian interests in assets acquired after a previous blocking order, and required banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be held or transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury  Dames and Moore had sued Iran for breach of contract to recover compensation for work performed  The district court had entered summary judgment in favor of Dames and Moore and issued an order attaching certain Iranian assets for satisfaction of any judgment that might result, but stayed the case pending appeal  The executive orders and regulations implementing the Algiers Accords resulted in the nullification of this prejudgment attachment and the dismissal of the case against Iran, directing that it be filed at the IUSCT  In response, Dames and Moore sued the government  The plaintiffs claimed that the President and the Secretary of the Treasury exceeded their statutory and constitutional powers to the extent they adversely affected Dames and Moore's judgment against Iran, the execution of that judgment, the prejudgment attachments, and the plaintiff's ability to continue to litigate against the Iranian banks  The government defended its actions, relying largely on IEEPA, which provided explicit support for most of the measures taken—nullification of the prejudgment attachment and transfer of the property to Iran—but could not be read to authorize actions affecting the suspension of claims in U S  courts  Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority: Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA…directly authorizes the President's suspension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor of Congress' legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the President is acting alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress  As we have noted, Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act  Such failure of Congress specifically to delegate authority does not, "especially       in the areas of foreign policy and national security," imply "congressional disapproval" of action taken by the Executive  On the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President's authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may be considered to "invite" "measures on independent presidential responsibility " At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of legislative intent and when, as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President  The Court remarked that Congress's implicit approval of the long-standing presidential practice of settling international claims by executive agreement was critical to its holding that the challenged actions were not in conflict with acts of Congress  For support, the Court cited to Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co  v  Sawyer stating that "a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned … may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art  II " Consequently, it may be argued that Congress's exclusion of certain express powers in IEEPA do not necessarily preclude the President from exercising them, at least where a court finds sufficient precedent exists  Lower courts have examined IEEPA under a number of other constitutional doctrines  Courts have reviewed whether Congress violated the non-delegation principle of separation of powers by delegating too much power to the President to legislate, in particular by creating new crimes  These challenges have generally failed  As the U S  Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained while evaluating IEEPA, delegations of congressional authority are constitutional so long as Congress provides through a legislative act an "intelligible principle" governing the exercise of the delegated authority  Even if the standards are higher for delegations of authority to define criminal offenses, the court held, IEEPA provides sufficient guidance  The court stated: The IEEPA "meaningfully constrains the [President's] discretion," by requiring that "[t]he authorities granted to the President     may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared " And the authorities delegated are defined and limited  The Second Circuit found it significant that "IEEPA relates to foreign affairs—an area in which the President has greater discretion," bolstering its view that IEEPA does not violate the non-delegation doctrine  The U S  Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Section 207(b) of IEEPA is an unconstitutional legislative veto  That provision states: The authorities described in subsection (a)(1) may not continue to be exercised under this section if the national emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent resolution pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act [50 U S C  § 1622] and if the Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution that such authorities may not continue to be exercised under this section  In U S  v  Romero-Fernandez , two defendants convicted of violating the terms of an executive order issued under IEEPA argued on appeal that IEEPA was unconstitutional, in part, because of the above provision  The Eleventh Circuit accepted that the provision was an unconstitutional legislative veto (as conceded by the government) based on INS v  Chadha , in which the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot void the exercise of power by the executive branch through concurrent resolution, but can act only through bicameral passage followed by presentment of the law to the President  The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless upheld the defendants' convictions for violations of IEEPA regulations, holding that the legislative veto provision was severable from the rest of the statute  Courts have also addressed whether certain actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have effected an uncompensated taking of property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment  The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prohibits "private property [from being] taken for public use, without just compensation " The Fifth Amendment's prohibitions apply as well to regulatory takings, in which the government does not physically take property but instead imposes restrictions on the right of enjoyment that decreases the value of the property or right therein  The Supreme Court has held that the nullification of prejudgment attachments pursuant to regulations issued under IEEPA was not an uncompensated taking, suggesting that the reason for this position was the contingent nature of the licenses that had authorized the attachments  The Court also suggested that the broader purpose of the statute supported the view that there was no uncompensated taking: This Court has previously recognized that the congressional purpose in authorizing blocking orders is "to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President    " Such orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency  The frozen assets serve as a "bargaining chip" to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile country  Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner's argument because the practical effect of it is to allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate this "bargaining chip" through attachments, garnishments, or similar encumbrances on property  Neither the purpose the statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language supports such a result  Similarly, a lower court held that the extinguishment of contractual rights due to sanctions enacted pursuant to IEEPA does not amount to a regulatory taking requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment  Even though the plaintiff suffered "obvious economic loss" due to the sanctions regulations, that factor alone was not enough to sustain plaintiff's claim of a compensable taking  The court quoted long-standing Supreme Court precedent to support its finding: A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals great losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless  They may destroy the worth of contracts  But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be changed, or a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared?      [W]as it ever imagined this was taking private property without compensation or without due process of law? Accordingly, it seems unlikely that entities whose business interests are harmed by the imposition of sanctions pursuant to IEEPA will be entitled to compensation from the government for their losses  Persons whose assets have been directly blocked by the U S  Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) pursuant to IEEPA have likewise found little success challenging the loss of the use of their assets as uncompensated takings  Many courts have recognized that a temporary blocking of assets does not constitute a taking because it is a temporary action that does not vest title in the United States  This conclusion is apparently so even if the blocking of assets necessitates the closing altogether of a business enterprise  In some circumstances, however, a court may analyze at least the initial blocking of assets under a Fourth Amendment standard for seizure  One court found a blocking to be unreasonable under a Fourth Amendment standard where there was no reason that OFAC could not have first obtained a judicial warrant  Some persons whose assets have been blocked have asserted that their right to due process has been violated  The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law  Where one company protested that the blocking of its assets without a pre-deprivation hearing violated its right to due process, a district court found that a temporary deprivation of property does not necessarily give rise to a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard  A second district court stated that the exigencies of national security and foreign policy considerations that are implicated in IEEPA cases have meant that OFAC historically has not provided pre-deprivation notice in sanctions programs  A third district court stated that OFAC's failure to provide a charitable foundation with notice or a hearing prior to its designation as a terrorist organization and blocking of its assets did not violate its right to procedural due process, because the OFAC designation and blocking order serve the important governmental interest of combating terrorism by curtailing the flow of terrorist financing  That same court also held that prompt action by the government was necessary to protect against the transfer of assets subject to the blocking order  In Al Haramain Islamic Foundation v  U S  Department of Treasury , the U S  Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether OFAC's use of classified information without any disclosure of its content in its decision to freeze the assets of a charitable organization, and its failure to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, violated the organization's right to procedural due process  The court applied the balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court in its landmark administrative law case Mathews v  Eldridge to resolve these questions  Under the Eldridge test, to determine if an individual has received constitutional due process, courts must weigh: (1) [the person's or entity's] private property interest, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, as well as the value of additional safeguards, and (3) the Government's interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of additional procedural requirements " While weighing the interests and risks at issue in Al Haramain , the Ninth Circuit found the organization's property interest to be significant: By design, a designation by OFAC completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity  All assets are frozen  No person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with the entity, other than a very narrow category of actions such as legal defense  Civil penalties attach even for unwitting violations  Criminal penalties, including up to 20 years' imprisonment, attach for willful violations  For domestic organizations such as AHIF–Oregon, a designation means that it conducts no business at all  The designation is indefinite  Although an entity can seek administrative reconsideration and limited judicial relief, those remedies take considerable time, as evidenced by OFAC's long administrative delay in this case and the ordinary delays inherent in our judicial system  In sum, designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct  Nevertheless, the court found "the government's interest in national security [could not] be understated " In evaluating the government's interest in maintaining its procedures, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Constitution requires that the government "take reasonable measures to ensure basic fairness to the private party and that the government follow procedures reasonably designed to protect against erroneous deprivation of the private party's interests " While the Ninth Circuit had previously held that the use of undisclosed information in a case involving the exclusion of certain longtime resident aliens should be considered presumptively unconstitutional, the court found that the presumption had been overcome in this case  The Ninth Circuit noted that all federal courts that have considered the argument that OFAC may not use undisclosed classified information in making its determinations have rejected it  Although the court found that OFAC's failure to provide even an unclassified summary of the information at issue was a violation of the organization's due process rights, the court deemed the error harmless because it would not likely have affected the outcome of the case  In the same case, the Ninth Circuit also considered the organization's argument that it had been denied adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard  Specifically, the organization asserted that OFAC had refused to disclose its reasons for investigating and designating the organization, leaving it unable to respond adequately to OFAC's unknown suspicions  Because OFAC had provided the organization with only one document to support its designation over the four-year period between the freezing of its assets and the redesignation of the organization as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT), the court agreed that the organization had been deprived of due process rights  However, the court found that this error too was harmless  Some courts have considered whether asset blocking or penalties imposed pursuant to regulations promulgated under IEEPA have violated the subjects' First Amendment rights to free association, free speech, or religion  Challenges on these grounds have typically failed  Courts have held that there is no First Amendment right to support terrorists  The U S  Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit distinguished advocacy from financial support and held that the blocking of assets affected only the ability to provide financial support, but did not implicate the organization's freedom of association  Similarly, a district court interpreted relevant case law to hold that government actions prohibiting charitable contributions are subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, a higher standard that applies to political contributions  With respect to a free speech challenge brought by a charitable organization whose assets were temporarily blocked during the pendency of an investigation, a district court explained that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms " Accordingly, the district court applied the following test to determine whether the designations and blocking actions were lawful  Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v  O'Brien , the court stated that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if: it is within the constitutional power of the government; it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest  The court found the government's actions to fall within the bounds of this test: First, the President clearly had the power to issue the Executive Order  Second, the Executive Order promotes an important and substantial government interest—that of preventing terrorist attacks  Third, the government's action is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; it prohibits the provision of financial and other support to terrorists  Fourth, the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are no greater than necessary  However, with respect to an organization that was not itself designated as an SDGT but wished to conduct coordinated advocacy with another organization that was so designated, one appellate court found that an OFAC regulation barring such coordinated advocacy based on its content was subject to strict scrutiny  Accordingly, the court rejected the government's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Holder v  Humanitarian Law Project to find that the regulation impermissibly implicated the organization's right to free speech  Accordingly, there may be some circumstances where the First Amendment protects speech coordinated with (but not on behalf of) an organization designated as an SDGT  Until the recent enactment of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, export of dual use goods and services was regulated pursuant to the authority of the Export Administration Act (EAA), which was subject to periodic expiry and reauthorization  President Reagan was the first President to use IEEPA as a vehicle for continuing the enforcement of the EAA's export controls  After Congress did not extend the expired EAA, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12444 in 1983, finding that "unrestricted access of foreign parties to United States commercial goods, technology, and technical data and the existence of certain boycott practices of foreign nations constitute, in light of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security " Although the EAA had been reauthorized for short periods since its initial expiration in 1983, every subsequent President utilized the authorities granted under IEEPA to maintain the existing system of export controls during periods of lapse  Figure 1   In the latest iteration, President George W  Bush issued Executive Order 13222 in 2001, finding the existence of a national emergency with respect to the expiration of the EAA and directing—pursuant to the authorities allocated under IEEPA—that "the provisions for administration of the [EAA] shall be carried out under this order so as to continue in full force and effect…the export control system heretofore maintained " Presidents Obama and Trump annually extended the 2001 executive order  Courts have generally treated this arrangement as authorized by Congress, although certain provisions of the EAA in effect under IEEPA have led to challenges  The determining factor appears to be whether IEEPA itself provides the President the authority to carry out the challenged action  In one case, the U S  Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a conviction for an attempt to violate the regulations even though the EAA had expired and did not expressly criminalize such attempts  The circuit court rejected the defendants' argument that the President had exceeded his delegated authority under the EEA by "enlarging" the crimes punishable under the regulations  Nevertheless, a district court held that the conspiracy provisions of the EAA regulations were rendered inoperative by the lapse of the EAA and "could not be repromulgated by executive order under the general powers that IEEPA vests in the President " The district court found that, even if Congress intended to preserve the operation of the EAA through IEEPA, that intent was limited by the scope of the statutes' substantive coverage at the time of IEEPA's enactment, when no conspiracy provision existed in either statute  The U S  Court of Appeals for the D C  Circuit upheld the application of the EAA as a statute permitting the government to withhold information under exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which exempts from disclosure information exempted from disclosure by statute, even though the EAA had expired  Referring to legislative history it interpreted as congressional approval of the use of IEEPA to continue the EAA provisions during periods of lapse, the court stated: Although the legislative history does not refer to the EAA's confidentiality provision, it does evince Congress's intent to authorize the President to preserve the operation of the export regulations promulgated under the EAA  Moreover, it is significant for purposes of determining legislative intent that Congress acted with the knowledge that the EAA's export regulations had long provided for confidentiality and that the President's ongoing practice of extending the EAA by executive order had always included these confidentiality protections  The D C  Circuit distinguished this holding in a later case involving appellate jurisdiction over a decision by the Department of Commerce to apply sanctions for a company's violation of the EAA regulations  Pursuant to the regulations and under the direction of the Commerce Department, the company sought judicial review directly in the D C  Circuit  The D C  Circuit, however, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction: This court would have jurisdiction pursuant to the President's order only if the President has the authority to confer jurisdiction—an authority that, if it exists, must derive from either the Executive's inherent power under the Constitution or a permissible delegation of power from Congress  The former is unavailing, as the Constitution vests the power to confer jurisdiction in Congress alone  Whether the executive order can provide the basis of our jurisdiction, then, turns on whether the President can confer jurisdiction on this court under the auspices of IEEPA…  We conclude that the President lacks that power  Nothing in the text of IEEPA delegates to the President the authority to grant jurisdiction to any federal court  Consequently, the appeal of the agency decision was determined to belong in the district court according to the default rule under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)  Congress may wish to address a number of issues with respect to IEEPA; two are addressed here  The first pertains to how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and its umbrella statute, the NEA  The second pertains to choices made in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018  Although the stated aim of the drafters of the NEA and IEEPA was to restrain the use of emergency powers, the use of such powers has expanded by several measures  Presidents declare national emergencies and renew them for years or even decades  The limitation of IEEPA to transactions involving some foreign interest was intended to limit IEEPA's domestic application  However, globalization has eroded that limit, as few transactions today do not involve some foreign interest  Many of the other criticisms of TWEA that IEEPA was supposed to address—consultation, time limits, congressional review, scope of power, and logical relationship to the emergency declared—are criticisms that scholars levy against IEEPA today  In general, three common criticisms are levied by scholars with respect to the structure of the NEA and IEEPA that may be of interest to Congress  First, the NEA and IEEPA do not define the phrases "national emergency" and "unusual and extraordinary threat" and Presidents have interpreted these terms broadly  Second, the scope of presidential authority under IEEPA has become less constrained in a highly globalized era  Third, owing to rulings by the Supreme Court and amendments to the NEA, Congress would likely have to have a two-thirds majority rather than a simple majority to terminate a national emergency  Despite these criticisms, Congress has not acted to terminate or otherwise express displeasure with an emergency declaration invoking IEEPA  This absence of any explicit statement of disapproval, coupled with explicit statements of approval in some instances, may indicate congressional approval of presidential use of IEEPA thus far  Arguably, then, IEEPA could be seen as an effective tool for carrying out the will of Congress  Neither the NEA nor IEEPA define what constitutes a "national emergency " IEEPA conditions its invocation in a declaration on its necessity for dealing with an "unusual and extraordinary threat … to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States " In the markup of IEEPA in the House, Fred Bergsten, then-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the Department of the Treasury, praised the requirement that a national emergency for the purposes of IEEPA be "based on an unusual and extraordinary threat" because such language "emphasizes that such powers should be available only in true emergencies " Because "unusual" and "extraordinary" are also undefined, the usual and ordinary invocation of the statute seems to conflict with those statutory conditions  If Congress wanted to refine the meaning of "national emergency" or "unusual and extraordinary threat," it could do so through statute  Additionally, Congress could consider requiring some sort of factual finding by a court prior to, or shortly after, the exercise of any authority, such as under the First Militia Act of 1792 or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act  However, Congress may consider that the ambiguity in the existing statute provides the executive with the flexibility necessary to address national emergencies with the requisite dispatch  While IEEPA nominally applies only to foreign transactions, the breadth of the phrase, "any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof" has left a great deal of room for executive discretion  The interconnectedness of the modern global economy has left few major transactions in which a foreign interest is not involved  As a result, at least one scholar has concluded, "the exemption of purely domestic transactions from the President's transaction controls seems to be a limitation without substance " Presidents have used IEEPA since the 1980s to control exports by maintaining the dual-use export control system, enshrined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in times when its underlying authorization, the Export Administration Act (EAA), periodically expired  During those times when Congress did not reauthorize the EAA, Presidents have declared emergencies to maintain the dual-use export control system  The current emergency has been ongoing since 2001  While Presidents have used IEEPA to implement trade restrictions against adversaries, it has not been used as a general way to impose tariffs  However, as noted above, President Nixon used TWEA to impose a 10% ad valorem tariff on goods entering the United States to avoid a balance of payments crisis after he ended the convertibility of the U S  dollar to gold  Although the use of TWEA in this instance was criticized at the time, it does not appear that the subsequent reforms resulting in the enactment of IEEPA would prevent the President from imposing tariffs or other restrictions on trade  However, the availability of diverse other authorities for addressing trade, including for national security purposes, makes the use of IEEPA for this purpose unlikely  The scope of powers over individual targets is also extensive  Under IEEPA, the President has the power to prohibit all financial transactions with individuals designated by Executive Order  Such power allows the President to block all the assets of a U S  citizen or permanent resident  Such uses of IEEPA may reflect the will of Congress or they may represent a grant of authority that may have gone beyond what Congress originally intended  The heart of the curtailment of presidential power by the NEA and IEEPA was the provision that Congress could terminate a state of emergency declared pursuant to the NEA with a concurrent resolution  When the "legislative veto" was struck down by the Supreme Court (see above), it left Congress with a steeper climb—presumably requiring passage of a veto-proof joint resolution—to terminate a national emergency declared under the NEA  Two such resolutions have ever been introduced and neither declarations of emergency involved IEEPA  The lack of congressional action here could be the result of the necessity of obtaining a veto-proof majority or it could be that the use of IEEPA has so far reflected the will of Congress  If Congress wanted to assert more authority over the use of IEEPA, it could amend the NEA or IEEPA to include a "sunset provision," terminating any national emergency after a certain number of days  At least one scholar has recommended such an amendment  Alternatively, Congress could amend IEEPA to provide for a review mechanism that would give Congress an active role  In the Senate during the 115 th Congress, for example, Senator Mike Lee introduced the Global Trade Accountability Act of 2017 required the President to report to Congress on any proposed trade action (including the use of IEEPA), including a description of the proposal together with a list of items to be affected, an economic impact study of the proposal including potential retaliation  Congress, using expedited procedures, would need to approve the President's action through a joint resolution within a 60-day period  The legislation would have provided for a temporary one-time unilateral trade action for a 90-day period  Similarly, in the 116 th Congress, Senator Lee introduced S  764 , a bill to provide for congressional approval of national emergency declarations, and for other purposes, which would amend the NEA to require an act of Congress within 30 days to allow a national emergency to continue  Another approach would establish a means for Congress to pass a resolution of disapproval if IEEPA authorities are invoked  An example of this approach is the Trade Authority Protection Act (H R  5760)  After the submission of similar reporting requirement to S  177 (above), Congress could, under Congressional Review Act (CRA)-style procedures, pass a joint resolution of disapproval  Congress does have the authority to pass a joint resolution under IEEPA, as noted above, but the use of CRA procedures would allow for certain expedited consideration  Alternatively, Congress could use any of these mechanisms to amend the current disapproval resolution process in IEEPA or the NEA itself  In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations in 1977, Professor Harold G  Maier summed up the main criticisms of TWEA: Section 5(b)'s effect is no longer confined to "emergency situations" in the sense of existing imminent danger  The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit, by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President…" Like TWEA before it, IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U S  sanction regime  Like TWEA before it, Congress has often approved explicitly of the President's use of IEEPA  In several circumstances, Congress has directed the President to impose a variety of sanctions under IEEPA and waived the requirement of an emergency declaration  Even when Congress has not given explicit approval, no Member of Congress has ever introduced a resolution to terminate a national emergency citing IEEPA  The NEA requires that both houses of Congress meet every six months to consider a vote on a joint resolution on terminating an emergency  Neither house has ever met to do so  In response to concerns over the scale and scope of the emergency economic powers granted by IEEPA, supporters of the status quo would argue that Congress has implicitly and explicitly expressed approval of the statute and its use  In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA)  The legislation repealed the expired Export Administration Act of 1979, the regulations of which had been continued by reference to IEEPA since 2001  The ECRA became the new statutory authority for Export Administration Regulations  Nevertheless, several export controls addressed in the Export Administration Act of 1979 were not updated in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018; instead, Congress chose to require the President to continue to use IEEPA to continue to implement the three sections of the Export Administration Act of 1979 that were not repealed  Going forward, Congress may wish to revisit these provisions, which all relate to deterring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction  Appendix A  NEA and IEEPA Use


Report 2:  Such controls would minimize the risk of abuse when officials act as both proposing and deciding officials  In addition, VA does not have oversight measures to ensure that all allegations of misconduct referred by the OIG to facility and program offices are investigated by an entity outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct  The investigation of allegations of misconduct by the program office or facility where the complaint originated may present the appearance of a conflict of interest in which managers and staff at facilities may investigate themselves or other allegations where they may have a personal stake or bias in the matter to be investigated  Therefore, the risk that the results of the investigation are minimized, or not handled adequately, is increased  VA’s newly developed process to communicate the scope of its reviews that involve matters referred by the OSC to the Office of the Secretary will be important to ensure any allegations outside the purview of the OIG’s investigation are fully addressed by a departmental entity in accordance with OSC requirements  Further, the OIG’s inability to locate investigative documentation prevents a third party from verifying whether the OIG examined the disclosures, whether any recommendations were addressed, or whether appropriate disciplinary action was taken for these cases  This lack of information has direct influence on management’s ability to make sound decisions relating to investigative matters  According to OIG officials, a spreadsheet is being used for tracking case numbers associated with disclosures, but plans to implement a process within the new system  Nonanonymous whistle-blowers faced higher rates of adverse action subsequent to their disclosure than the VA population as a whole  In addition, these individuals also had attrition rates higher than their peers who had not filed a disclosure  The disparities between whistle-blowers and other employees may be an indication that retaliation by senior officials may have occurred after misconduct was disclosed  Although VA has started to provide additional information for potential whistle-blowers who wish to report criminal or other activity to the OIG, VA does not have a process to inform employees of how their information may be shared between organizations when misconduct is reported  Without a clear understanding of how the lines for reporting misconduct operate, whistle- blowers may be uncertain as to their options for reporting misconduct, increasing the risk that they may not report workplace misconduct  We are making the following 16 recommendations to VA  The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should develop and implement guidance to collect complete and reliable misconduct and associated disciplinary-action data department-wide, whether through a single information system, or multiple interoperable systems  Such guidance should include direction and procedures on addressing blank data fields, lack of personnel identifiers, and standardization among fields, and on accessibility  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct applicable facility and program offices to adhere to VA’s policies regarding employee misconduct adjudication documentation  (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Office of Human Resource Management (OHRM) to routinely assess the extent to which misconduct-related files and documents are retained consistently with VA’s applicable documentation requirements  (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OHRM to assess whether human-resources personnel adhere to basic principles outlined in VA Handbook 5021 when informing employees of their rights during the adjudication process for alleged misconduct  (Recommendation 4) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should adhere to OPM and NARA guidance and establish a specific record-retention period for adverse action files  In doing so, the Secretary should direct applicable administration, facility, and program offices that have developed their own record-retention schedules to then adhere to the newly established record-retention period  (Recommendation 5) The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Inspector General should revise its policy to include a requirement to verify whether evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  (Recommendation 6) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) to review responses submitted by facility or program offices to ensure evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  (Recommendation 7) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will verify whether appropriate disciplinary action has been implemented for all substantiated misconduct by senior officials  (Recommendation 8) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to develop a process to ensure disciplinary actions proposed in response to findings of misconduct are recorded within appropriate information systems to maintain their relevance and value to management for making decisions and take steps to monitor whether the disciplinary actions are implemented  (Recommendation 9) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will review the disposition of accountability actions for all substantiated misconduct cases involving senior officials resulting from investigations  (Recommendation 10) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should implement internal controls to ensure that proper adherence to separation-of-duty standards involving the removal of an employee are consistent with policy  (Recommendation 11) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should develop oversight measures to ensure all investigations referred to facility and program offices are consistent with policy and reviewed by an official independent of and at least one level above the individual involved in the allegation  To ensure independence, referred allegations of misconduct should be investigated by an entity outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct  (Recommendation 12) The VA Inspector General, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of OAWP, should develop a process to ensure that OSC case numbers are linked to the investigative case number and final report  (Recommendation 13) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to develop a time frame for the completion of published guidance that would develop an internal process to monitor cases referred to facility and program offices  (Recommendation 14) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should ensure that employees who report wrongdoing are treated fairly and protected against retaliation  (Recommendation 15) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to develop a process to inform employees of how reporting lines operate, how they are used, and how the information may be shared between the OSC, the OIG, OAWP, or VA facility and program offices when misconduct is reported  (Recommendation 16) We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), VA Office of Inspector General (OIG), and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) for review and comment  In its comments, VA concurred with nine of our recommendations and partially concurred with five (see app  VI for a copy of VA’s letter)  Regarding our recommendations to the Inspector General, the OIG concurred with one recommendation and partially concurred with the other  The OIG also provided comments on our findings (see app  VII for a copy of the OIG’s letter)  We received technical comments by e-mail from OSC’s Principal Deputy Special Counsel, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate  Regarding VA’s comments, in its response to our first recommendation that the Secretary develop and implement guidance to collect complete and reliable misconduct and associated disciplinary-action data department-wide, VA concurred and outlined steps it plans to take to address our recommendations  These steps include the creation of new policies to address blank data fields, lack of personnel identifiers, lack of standardization among fields, and accessibility issues related to misconduct and associated disciplinary-action data department-wide  The target date for system implementation, dependent on approved funding and acquisition-related requirements, is January 1, 2020  On our second recommendation, that the Secretary direct applicable facility and program offices to adhere to VA’s policies regarding employee-misconduct adjudication documentation, VA concurred  It stated that a memorandum will be distributed to reiterate facility and program-office requirements to adhere to VA Handbook 5021, Employee/Management Relations, no later than October 1, 2018  VA also concurred with our third recommendation, that the Secretary direct the Office of Human Resource Management (OHRM) to routinely assess the extent to which misconduct-related files and documents are retained  According to VA, OHRM will assess, during periodic Oversight and Effectiveness Service reviews, the extent to which misconduct- related files and documents are retained  The first assessment is to be incorporated into the fiscal year 2019 Oversight and Effectiveness Service schedule no later than November 1, 2018  VA concurred with our fourth recommendation, that the Secretary direct OHRM to assess whether human-resources personnel adhere to basic principles outlined in VA Handbook 5021  VA stated that OHRM will assess, during periodic Oversight and Effectiveness Service reviews, whether human-resources and administration personnel adhere to basic principles outlined in VA Handbook 5021  The first assessment is to be incorporated into the fiscal year 2019 Oversight and Effectiveness schedule no later than November 1, 2018  In its response to our fifth recommendation, that the Secretary adhere to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) guidance and establish a specific record- retention period for adverse-action files, VA concurred and indicated that the Human Resources and Administration Assistant Secretary will establish VA guidance regarding the retention period for adverse-action files  In addition, the Human Resources and Administration Assistant Secretary is to advise applicable administration, facility, and program offices that have developed their own record-retention schedules to adhere to the newly established directive  According to VA, the directive will be established no later than November 1, 2018  VA partially concurred with our seventh recommendation, that the Secretary direct departmental heads to review responses submitted by facility or program offices to ensure evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  VA stated that the process described in our report pertaining to OIG findings or results will be changed to require all such reports to be submitted to OAWP  VA also indicated that it expects to publish new guidance by October 1, 2018, that will require the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) to review responses and recommendations from facilities or program offices  Given VA’s comments, we have revised our draft recommendation to have the Secretary direct OAWP, not the department heads, to ensure evidence demonstrates that the six elements have been addressed  VA also partially concurred with our eighth recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP review all substantiated misconduct by senior officials to verify whether disciplinary action has been implemented  VA stated that all substantiated misconduct by senior leaders in VA is handled by OAWP from intake, through investigation, working with the proposing and deciding officials  VA also stated that it expects to publish written guidance by October 1, 2018, that will clarify how OAWP will work with the appropriate servicing personnel office to ensure that the recommended disciplinary actions decided are implemented for substantiated misconduct involving senior officials  Given VA’s comments, we have revised our draft recommendation to have the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will verify that appropriate disciplinary action has been implemented for all substantiated misconduct by senior officials  VA partially concurred with our ninth recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP develop a process to ensure disciplinary actions proposed are recorded within appropriate information systems  VA stated that the VA-wide discipline tracking system currently used by OAWP will eventually be phased out  It added that once the Human Resources Information System (HRSmart) is capable of capturing and recording similar data, it will be used for this purpose  Accordingly, we have not revised our draft recommendation  VA partially concurred with our 10th recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP assess all misconduct cases involving senior officials to ensure investigative reports with findings of substantiated misconduct include recommendations for action  According to VA, OAWP has instituted several processes since our review  VA plans to issue written guidance that outlines the process for the review and disposition of appropriate accountability actions for allegations of misconduct by senior officials by October 1, 2018  Given VA’s comments, we have revised our draft recommendation to have the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will review the disposition of accountability actions for all substantiated misconduct cases involving senior officials resulting from investigations  In its response to our 11th recommendation, that the Secretary implement internal controls to ensure that separation-of-duty standards involving the removal of an employee are consistent with policy, VA concurred  It stated that it will also establish and distribute internal controls to ensure that separation-of-duty standards involving the removal of an employee are consistent with policy no later than November 1, 2018  VA partially concurred with our 12th recommendation, that the Secretary take steps to ensure independence of referred allegations of misconduct by requiring that investigations be conducted outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct  VA stated that OAWP is responsible for recording, tracking, reviewing, and confirming the implementation of recommendations from audits and investigations  However, VA did not address how it will ensure the independence of the entity responsible for conducting an investigation  As we discuss in our report, during the review OAWP officials stated that the process of referring cases of misconduct back to facilities and program offices where the misconduct occurred will continue  Accordingly, we have not revised our draft recommendation and believe implementation of it will help ensure independence  VA concurred with our 14th recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP develop a time frame for the completion of published guidance for the development of an internal process to monitor cases referred to facility and program offices  VA provided an expected date of October 1, 2018, for publishing the internal VA guidance, with the subsequent Directive and Handbook to be published as rapidly as staff coordination permits  In its response to our 15th recommendation, that the Secretary ensure that employees who report wrongdoing are treated fairly and protected against retaliation, VA concurred  It stated that OAWP and OSC have developed a functional process to ensure whistle-blower protections are implemented, but did not indicate what the process entails  The VA Secretary has also delegated authority to the Executive Director, OAWP, to put individual personnel actions on hold if the actions appear motivated by whistle-blower retaliation  VA added that OAWP has also hired two whistle-blower program specialists specifically to increase awareness of whistle-blower protections and work with individuals that disclose employee wrongdoing to ensure individuals are treated fairly and protected from retaliation for their disclosures  VA concurred with our 16th recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP develop a process to inform employees of how reporting lines operate  VA stated that it will provide whistle-blower training to all employees on a biennial basis, which will include the reporting lines for disclosures of wrongdoing, the manner in which disclosures flow once they are made, how information is shared among the whistle-blower entities, and what protections exists for those who disclose wrongdoing  Regarding our recommendations to the Inspector General, the OIG partially concurred with our sixth recommendation, to revise its policy to include a requirement to verify whether evidence produced in senior- official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  The OIG indicated that VA Directive 0701 is currently being updated to require a written or electronic signature from the person preparing the responses as an attestation that the specific requirements of the directive were met  The OIG also indicated in its letter that the OIG’s Hotline staff carefully review the case response but Hotline staff are not required to request an updated response from VA to address matters not necessary to the resolution to the referral  The OIG asserted that requesting an update would detract from the resources for other important VA activities  On page 4 of the OIG’s letter, the OIG states that Hotline analysts are allowed to exercise some discretion in accepting responses that may include minor departures from the six elements  We continue to believe that, in order to have a complete response to a referral, all six elements required by the directive should be addressed  In addition, Directive 0701 does not allow for the use of professional judgement to decide which elements to include or not to include in a response  While we agree that requiring a written or electronic signature from the person preparing the responses as an attestation will help ensure that the specific requirements of the directive were met, we maintain that not requiring Hotline analysts to review responses to ensure that all elements of the directive are addressed is inconsistent with the intent of the directive  In its response to our 13th recommendation, that the OIG develop a process to ensure that an OSC case number is linked to the investigative case number and the final report, the OIG concurred  It stated that it will engage with the Executive Director of OAWP to develop a process to ensure that OSC case numbers are linked to OIG and OAWP investigative case numbers, as appropriate, and linked to any final report of investigation  In addition to its response to recommendations, the VA OIG also raised a number of concerns with our findings  Page 1 of its letter summarizes some of these concerns and then provides more detail on each concern raised, starting on page 2  Our responses to each of these detailed concerns are provided below  The OIG stated that our report does not focus on the most important cases, but focuses primarily on case referrals regarding senior officials that were not handled by the OIG because the allegations were lower risk or because of resource constraints  In addition, the OIG stated that GAO risks presenting a skewed picture of the OIG’s oversight work  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  We requested that the OIG provide us with data from the OIG’s Master Case Index (MCI) information system that would allow us to select a sample of cases, in accordance with the scope of our review  The OIG was unable to provide the requested information due to several reasons  Instead, the OIG provided data from the OIG Hotline and Office of Investigations case- management systems (subsystems within MCI) that contained a limited number of fields for analysis and 23 cases pertaining to SES misconduct that were referred to VA for investigation during GAO’s period of review  Therefore, as we discuss in the report, we were only able to review the 23 senior-official misconduct cases included in our report because the OIG was only able to provide related documentation for these cases  The OIG stated that we only reviewed a sample of just 23 case referrals from fiscal years 2011 through 2014  As described, we reviewed all 23 senior-official misconduct cases that were referred to VA for investigation that the OIG was able to provide us, not a sample  The OIG stated that our report inaccurately states that the extracts received from the MCI information system contained missing information  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  Our review included a comprehensive assessment of the reliability of the OIG’s data  To conduct this assessment, we requested an explanation of each data field to clarify when fields are normally populated and how they are used  Our findings are consistent with the information provided in response to this request  For example, the OIG’s response to our data-reliability assessment stated that the data field used to identify the type of allegations being investigated should never be blank  However, we found that field to be blank in some cases in the data that were provided to us, though the OIG asserted that the MCI information system is a relational database where each case may be associated with multiple allegations and codes  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested supporting documentation to demonstrate that the fields analyzed during our period of review did not contain missing data  The OIG provided the MCI information system user’s manual that contains detailed procedures for accessing and entering data into the MCI information system, and a compilation of various internal documents  However, the documentation did not provide evidence of the completeness of data entered into the MCI information system as part of quality-assurance reviews performed by the OIG or other designated entity  Absent evidence of data-quality reviews aimed at assessing the accuracy and completeness of data contained in the MCI information system, we did not change the conclusions based on our previous analysis  The OIG stated that our report provides incomplete information regarding sampled cases and mischaracterized one of the OIG’s case referrals in the body of the report  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  Specifically, the OIG said that we inaccurately stated that a medical center director conducted the investigation into his own alleged misconduct and found no allegations were substantiated  The synopsis included in our report clearly articulates that the medical center director was named in the allegation for having received a similar complaint involving time and attendance abuse by a physician  The medical center director, who provided the response to the OIG, was implicated in the allegation as having not addressed a similar time and attendance complaint regarding the same physician 2 years earlier  The OIG did not provide any supporting documentation to demonstrate that the alleged time and attendance abuse allegations against the physician were not substantiated  The OIG stated that our report inaccurately stated that the medical center director conducted his own investigation of himself and found no allegations were substantiated  We disagree  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested that the OIG provide additional support used to determine that the medical center director did not investigate the allegation in which he was named  The additional case documentation provided by the OIG further reaffirmed our assessment that the medical center director performed his own investigation and found no allegations were substantiated  Additional documentation provided by the OIG indicated that the OIG referred the case to the Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) for a response  However, documentation we examined during the course of our audit, and the documentation provided in response to our draft report, indicates that the medical center director performed the investigation of the allegations and then the results were routed through the VISN back to the OIG  The OIG stated that routing the response through the VISN should address our concerns of independence  This process does not address our concerns regarding independence because VA Directive 0701 states that all responses to Hotline case referrals must contain evidence of an independent review by an official separate from and at a higher grade than the subject / alleged wrongdoer  In this case, the name of the medical center director who signed the facility response provided to the OIG was the same individual named in the allegations  The OIG stated that the report does not provide a balanced presentation of the rigor with which the OIG reviews all incoming Hotline contacts and case responses  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  As described above, the OIG was unable to provide comprehensive data to select a sample of OIG audits, evaluations, and inspections for review due to the limitations cited  We focused on misconduct involving senior officials consistently with the scope of our review and thoroughly reviewed all 23 senior-official misconduct cases that were referred to VA for investigation, which were the only cases that the OIG was able to provide  The OIG stated that the description for one of the cases included in appendix V of the draft report was incomplete because we misunderstood the OIG’s process  We disagree with this characterization  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested additional supporting documentation  The documentation provided reaffirmed our assessment that another medical center director performed his own investigation and found no allegations were substantiated  Similar to the case described above, the medical center director completed his own investigation and then routed the response through the VISN back to the OIG  In contrast to the previous case, however, the Hotline Workgroup reviewed the response to the OIG and found it to be insufficient  Specifically, the OIG noted that the medical center director who provided the response was the subject of the complaint, despite the response being directed to the VISN, and requested clarification  The VISN informed the OIG that it is not its policy for the complainant to have any involvement in the review and data submission on a case in which the complainant is involved  The VISN stated that while this did obviously occur in this instance, it has taken steps to ensure it does not occur in the future  The supporting evidence provided for the case included in appendix V also contradicts the OIG’s previous assertion that the routing of a response through the entity with oversight (VISN) over the medical center director should have addressed GAO’s concerns of independence  The OIG stated our report provides a misrepresentation of the OIG’s failure to follow internal policies for department responses  We disagree  According to OIG statements on page 4 of the OIG’s letter, Hotline analysts are allowed to exercise some discretion in accepting responses that may include minor departures from the six elements required in VA Directive 0701  We continue to believe that in order to have a complete response to a referral, all six elements required by the directive should be addressed  On the basis of our review, the OIG does not have an effective method to ensure that cases referred to VA are reviewed in accordance with VA Directive 0701  Out of the 23 cases we reviewed, only 4 included sufficient documentation needed to support VA’s findings, and we could not identify a case that contained all six elements required in VA Directive 0701  This suggests that the current OIG review process is not adequately resolving case referrals, as asserted by the OIG’s response  In addition, VA Directive 0701 does not currently include a provision that would allow Hotline analysts to deviate from the six required elements  As stated in our report, the OSC also raised concerns regarding 40 percent of disclosure cases that were referred to VA facility and program offices  The OIG stated that much of the information in the draft report is dated and ignores system updates, specifically several key Hotline-related process improvements since 2014  Although our review began in 2015, we disagree with this characterization of our findings  In our report, we included relevant improvements to demonstrate where the OIG was able to provide support for those improvements  For example, our report discusses: (1) a new process for communicating the scope of reviews that involve matters referred by the OSC to the Office of the Secretary, (2) a description on the VA website of the process for employees who wish to report criminal or other activity to the OIG, (3) a new Enterprise Management System, and (4) a new process for receiving whistle-blower disclosures by the Secretary  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested additional documentation for any systems, practices, or personnel changes that have been implemented since 2011, including improvements to Hotline-related processes since 2014 that were not included in our report  In response, the OIG provided a copy of the OIG’s organizational chart (current as of Apr  23, 2018), described the oversight responsibilities of each OIG component, and summarized the pertinent staff positions within each component  On the basis of this documentation, we identified a new office (the Office of Special Reviews), a promotion, staff reassignments, and numerous vacancies during our review period  However, the OIG did not provide evidence of any measures to improve the MCI information system, case-referral processes, or relevant staff roles that were not already included in our report  As described above, the OIG was unable to provide comprehensive data to select a sample of OIG audits, evaluations, and inspections for our initial review due to the limitations cited  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested documentation related to any significant changes that have been made to the MCI information system that allows the OIG to identify all allegations of misconduct for export and analysis  The OIG provided additional information regarding overall departmental achievements that are highlighted in the OIG’s Semiannual Report to Congress, and other products from its website published between fiscal years 2011 through 2018  We recognize the OIG’s broader administrative and oversight work described in the published reports  However, this information does not address changes specifically made to the MCI information system that would enable the OIG to analyze cases pertaining to alleged misconduct by senior officials that we requested  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5045 or larink@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Our objectives were to determine the extent to which the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (1) collects reliable information associated with employee misconduct and disciplinary actions that is accessible and could be used to analyze misconduct department-wide; (2) retains documentation that demonstrates VA adheres to its policies when adjudicating cases of employee misconduct; (3) ensures allegations of misconduct involving senior officials are reviewed in accordance with VA investigative standards, and these officials are held accountable; (4) has procedures to investigate whistle-blower allegations of misconduct; and the extent to which (5) data and whistle-blower testimony indicate whether retaliation for disclosing misconduct occurs at VA  For the first objective, we obtained VA employee misconduct data from 12 information systems operated by various VA components covering October 2009 through July 2017, where available  To determine the reliability of VA’s misconduct data, we analyzed the contents of the 12 information systems operated by various offices across VA  These data encompass each of the three major administrations that constitute VA— the National Cemetery Administration (NCA), Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and Veterans Health Administration (VHA)  We selected the information systems based on our discussions with VA officials and staff that oversee the data and, hence, identified databases capable of collecting information pertaining to either employee misconduct or disciplinary actions  Data fields were selected based on whether they would provide beneficial information to better understand the disciplinary process  VA’s Personnel and Accounting Integrated Data (PAID) system, which was developed to track payroll actions, contains information about adverse disciplinary actions that affect employee salary department-wide  We obtained an extract of all adverse disciplinary actions from the PAID system  We assessed the reliability of each system for the purposes of identifying and tracking misconduct cases  To do this, we performed electronic tests on 12 information systems to determine the completeness and accuracy of the fields contained in the data files  We also submitted to the overseeing offices for all 12 information systems general data-quality questions regarding the purpose of the data, their structure, definitions and values for certain fields, automated and manual data-quality checks to ensure the accuracy of the data, and limitations  As discussed further, the data were generally not reliable for a department-wide assessment of all misconduct and disciplinary actions due to the lack of completeness and compatibility of the data across all information systems  VA staff could not confirm whether some of the missing data we identified were artifacts of the database extraction process VA used to assemble the data files we used in our review  Despite challenges with aspects of the data, we found the data sufficiently reliable for conducting analysis where fields were populated and field definition concurrence was obtained by program offices  For the second objective, we selected a generalizable stratified random sample of 544 misconduct cases from October 2009 through May 2015  Where available, we reviewed the employees’ disciplinary-action files and Electronic Official Personnel Folders to determine the extent to which VA’s actions were consistent with disciplinary policy outlined in VA Handbook 5021, Employee/Management Relations  These data encompass each of the three major administrations that constitute VA— NCA, VBA, and VHA  We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for analysis of disciplinary actions affecting salary that resulted from misconduct that was not reported to supervisors directly from employees  Accordingly, our sample only includes misconduct cases that resulted in a change in salary or were reported to departmental organizations within the 12 information systems selected  We developed a data-collection instrument to document the results of our case reviews  We revised our data-collection instrument to address issues found during the course of our analysis, and developed a companion document that outlined the decision rules for reviewing cases  We also designated two primary reviewers to ensure the decision rules were consistently applied across all cases  Our review of laws and regulations revealed that disciplinary rules sometimes vary depending on whether employees fall under Title 5, Title 38, or hybrid Title 5 and Title 38 hiring authority  To minimize confusion associated with these differences, we incorporated criteria into our data- collection instrument  In addition, we were unable to obtain complete case information for 25 percent of the cases  For these cases, we obtained direct access to the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Electronic Official Personnel Folders system to attempt to recover some of the missing information  Ultimately, we were unable to complete our review for 10 percent of cases in our sample because of missing files  In addition to reporting missing case information, we used our generalizable analysis results to project VA-wide figures for several data elements that were not in compliance with VA policy  Unless otherwise noted, estimates in this report have a margin of error of +/-7 4 percentage points or less for a 95 percent confidence interval  For the third objective, we analyzed data from the Office of Accountability Review (OAR) Legacy Referral Tracking List and VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) case-referral and investigative case-management systems, and we selected cases for in-depth review  We selected these two systems based on discussions with VA officials who were knowledgeable with databases that have the capacity to track misconduct information pertaining to senior officials  The OAR Legacy Referral Tracking List comprises referrals from January 2011 through May 2015  The OIG provided 23 case-referral files involving senior officials from calendar years 2011 through 2014  As part of our review of the OIG case files, we evaluated specific data elements contained in VA’s response documents using VA policy for referring and reviewing misconduct cases  We assessed the reliability of the OAR Legacy Referral Tracking List and OIG case-management systems for the purposes of identifying and tracking misconduct cases  To do this, we performed electronic tests on each database to determine the completeness and accuracy of the fields contained in the data files, including senior-official indicators  Where feasible, we opted to match individual datasets to PAID to determine whether disciplinary actions were administered as prescribed  We also submitted to OAR and the OIG general data-quality questions regarding the purpose of the data, their structure, definitions and values for certain fields, automated and manual data-quality checks to ensure the accuracy of the data, and limitations  On the basis of this information, we found the OAR data to be sufficiently reliable for conducting analysis where fields were sufficiently populated  For the OAR data, we matched the persons of interest to adverse-action files from PAID to determine whether adverse disciplinary actions were administered as prescribed during the available time frame (January 2011 through May 2015)  We also obtained VA’s response documents for the 23 case-referral files provided by the OIG to evaluate whether VA was adhering to its own policy for referring and reviewing misconduct cases  Through our OAR Legacy Referral Tracking List analysis, we identified illustrative case examples of misconduct involving senior officials  Further, based on our evaluation of the 23 OIG case referrals using VA’s referral policy, we developed several illustrative case examples  For the fourth objective, we interviewed senior officials from VA and the OSC responsible for investigating whistle-blower complaints  We obtained the OSC’s procedures for referring disclosure complaints and VA’s policy for investigating these complaints once received at the agency  In addition, we obtained whistle-blower disclosure data from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) covering calendar years 2010 through 2014  To determine the reliability of the data, we conducted electronic testing and traced data elements to source documentation  We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable to identify the total number of cases that were investigated by the OIG, or referred to facility and program offices  We also observed a course to assess VA’s training provided to VA employees conducting investigations  We identified 135 OSC disclosure cases for analysis based on two criteria: (1) they contained at least partial complainant information (i e , the allegations were not anonymously reported or could be identified with supplemental information) and (2) they contained an indicator that the case had been closed by the OSC pending an ongoing investigation by VA or the OIG  These cases represent the universe of VA disclosures accepted by the OSC  Of the 135 disclosure cases referred to VA, 53 cases were referred to VA facility and program offices for further investigation  The remaining 82 disclosure cases indicated that they were investigated by the OIG  We reviewed the results of OSC’s assessment of investigative documentation developed by VA for these whistle-blower disclosure cases  For the fifth objective, we analyzed the 135 whistle-blower disclosure cases obtained from the OSC  These cases represent the universe of VA disclosures accepted by the OSC from calendar years 2010 through 2014, which were investigated by VA  We obtained an extract of year-end rosters from the PAID system as of September for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, with a final extract through May 30, 2015  Finally, we interviewed representatives from whistle-blower advocacy groups, as well as established whistle-blowers who disclosed wrongdoing or retaliation at VA and who were referred to us by one advocacy group  Of the 135 disclosures received by the OSC, a total of 129 employees made a total of 130 disclosures nonanonymously  For these 130 disclosure cases, we reviewed OSC and OIG investigative reports, as well as PAID roster files, to gather additional information to perform analysis of potential retaliation  We also interviewed six individual whistle- blowers with formal disclosure cases accepted by the OSC, indicating that the OSC had previously reviewed the case and determined that it contained sufficient evidence and merit to warrant further investigation  Our analysis of potential retaliation comprised two parts  First, we compared the 129 employees associated with the selected OSC cases to the PAID rosters using the complainants’ information to determine whether employees associated with the selected OSC cases were more likely to leave the agency  We identified the overall count and proportion (across years) of roster-matched employees who made a disclosure between fiscal years 2010 through 2014 but were not employed at VA the following fiscal year  Second, to determine whether employees associated with the selected OSC cases were more likely to receive disciplinary action, we also calculated the yearly totals and proportion of roster-matched employees identified above for whom a record existed in the PAID disciplinary action information system  We did this by comparing the proportion of employees who received one or more disciplinary actions in the year prior to the appearance in the roster, in the same fiscal year as the roster, and in the subsequent fiscal year  We also completed this analysis utilizing the PAID roster file to determine the yearly proportion of all VA employees who left the agency  On the basis of the results of our analysis, we reported by fiscal year the percentage of whistle-blowers that received disciplinary action or left VA at a higher rate than the overall VA population following a disclosure  To address all objectives, we interviewed senior officials from VA’s major components responsible for investigating and adjudicating cases of employee misconduct  We also reviewed standard operating procedures, policy statements, and guidance for staff charged with investigating and adjudicating allegations of employee misconduct  We conducted this performance audit from January 2015 to May 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  This data file is designed to track referrals made to OAR, including allegations of misconduct related to senior officials  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 11 fields out of 92 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Complainant #1 (First Name) (20 percent of 1,245 blank)— According to OAR, this field is populated when there is a known complainant for a matter  Some matters referred to OAR may be anonymously disclosed and not contain complainant information  This file also contains a case-origin field that specifies whether a case was anonymous  Our review of both the complainant and case-origin field indicated that only 11 percent of the complaints were generated from an anonymous source, and the remaining records should have included a complainant name  Disciplinary Action (96 percent of 1,245 blank)—This field should be populated to indicate whether a disciplinary action was taken after the completion of an investigation  Grade (97 percent of 1,245 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the grade of the Person of Interest (POI), if known  Our review of this field indicated that 97 percent were blank, therefore we were unable to analyze the variation in grade level for officials who were the subject of complaints  OAR Action (77 percent of 1,245 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated as an internal reference to describe what stage in the administrative process the matter was in when received  The lack of information did not allow for analysis of the types of actions taken for each case  Person of Interest (POI) (47 percent of 1,245 blank)—This field specifies the first and last name of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employee who is the subject of an allegation  POI (Person of Interest) Last Name 1–5 (51 to 99 percent of 1,245 blank)—This field specifies the last name of VA employee who is the subject of an allegation  There are a total of five person-of-interest (POI) fields for each matter  According to OAR, blank POI fields occur when the case has fewer than five POIs or the POI was not specified in the matter referred  Our review of the five POI fields indicated that more than half of the records did not contain at least one POI because no individual was specified  The lack of information did not allow for further investigation of senior-level officials involved in misconduct  Proposed Action (97 percent of 1,245 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated to notify OAR staff if any disciplinary action was proposed  Our review of this field indicated that 97 percent were blank, suggesting that very few high-level officials received corrective action, or the field was not consistently completed for each record  Due to the large share of blank values, the data posed limitations when analyzing how many senior officials received corrective action as a result of a complaint  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary actions taken against VA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 9 fields out of 21 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Action Taken (3 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the action that the deciding official takes, with the exception of pending actions  If there is a pending action, this field will remain blank  Our review of the action-taken field found three records that were annotated as a “pending decision” within this field, which indicates that there is an option for entering information into this field when there is an action pending and the field should never be blank  Admin Leave (30 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated if an employee is placed on administrative leave while an adverse action is pending  If an employee is not placed on administrative leave, the field may be left blank  Our review of the admin-leave field found that about 66 percent of the records were annotated as “no” within this field, which indicates that there is an option for entering information into this field when an employee was not placed on administrative leave  Date Proposed (11 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field is used when an adverse action is proposed for an employee  There are some actions that are not proposed, such as probationary terminations or admonishments that may be taken without being proposed, and therefore result in this field being blank  Our analysis found that about 95 percent of these records containing blank proposed date fields also had an entry in the proposed adverse-action field, which contained such entries as removals, suspensions, and demotions that require a proposed date  Deciding Official (14 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the name of the official who issued the action taken  Effective Date (5 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the date of the action taken  Some entries will not have an effective date if an entry is pending decision  Also, if no action is taken, the decision was counseling, or the proposed action was rescinded, this field may not have an effective date  Our review found that about 14 percent of the cases that included adverse actions, such as a suspension, removal, reassignment, or demotion, and that should have included a date of action, were blank  Offense 2 and 3 (79 and 95 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field tracks the second- and third-most-significant charge against the employee when applicable  Proposing Official (16 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the name of the official who makes the proposed adverse action  Instances where a proposing official has left the agency at the time of entry and could not be found in the lookup feature that relies on the e-mail global address list may produce blank fields  Also, disciplinary actions that were taken without proposal would not have a proposing official  In these instances, the human-resources specialists who enter the actions are instructed to include the name in the other-comments box  Our review of these records indicated that a majority of records lacking an entry in the proposing official field also lacked an annotation in the other- comments field to accurately identify the proposing official  Settlement (14 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field tracks whether a settlement agreement occurred  This data file is designed to collect allegations of criminal activity, waste, abuse, and mismanagement received by the OIG Hotline Division  Through our analysis of this information system, we identified one field out of seven that was missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Nature of Complaint (54 percent of 896 blank)—According to the OIG, this field should contain a brief description of the issue that most closely matches the allegation  Each case can have more than one nature of complaint and corresponding administrative action, if any  OIG officials stated that this field identifies the type of allegations being investigated and should never be blank  Our review of these cases found that over half of the cases involving the OIG contained entries for administrative action taken, but the nature-of-complaint fields corresponding to these actions were blank  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary action taken against VBA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 3 fields out of 20 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Alleged Offense 2 and 3 (92 and 99 percent of 1,375 blank)— According to VBA officials, this field should be populated if an individual is charged with multiple offenses, or has additional offenses in the same reporting period  In most instances, there is typically only one offense at the time of reporting  Sustained (52 percent of 1,375 blank)—According to VBA, this field should be populated if an offense is sustained at the time of reporting  This data file is designed to track all allegations of misconduct and associated disciplinary actions taken against VA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 8 fields out of 34 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Deciding Official (3 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated with the name of the official who makes the decision for adverse action  Detail Position (89 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated with the position an employee was detailed to if removed from official position  Offense 2 and 3 (69 and 91 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field tracks the most-significant charges against the employee  If there are fewer than three charges, these fields are left blank  Offense 1 Sustained (14 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated if an individual’s first offense has been sustained  Offense 2 and 3 Sustained (73 and 91 percent of 5,571 blank)— According to OAWP, these fields should be populated if an individual’s second and third offenses have been sustained  The majority of cases only involve one offense  Proposing Official (9 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated with the name of the official who makes the proposed adverse action  This data file tracks Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) discrimination complaints  Through our analysis of this information system, we identified 1 field out of 66 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Employment—We found that the values for this field were not mutually exclusive, or independent of one another  For example, this field includes two distinct categories of information: employment status, such as full time or part time; and hiring authority, such as Title 5 or Title 38  This method of storing information resulted in undercounting each of the separate values due to the system’s failure to account for expected overlap  For instance, an employee could be both a full-time and Title 5 employee and the field only tracks one or the other  ORM officials stated that this field has since been modified to capture more options to account for the overlap  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary actions taken against Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 21 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Position—We found the VA-Wide Adverse Employment Action Database contained variations within this field, such as multiple values for the “Cemetery Caretaker” position name  According to OAR, this field is a free-text field, and the office conducts manual searches to review and analyze position titles when needed  Our review found that the different variations in position titles made it difficult to successfully determine the frequency and nature of allegations by position  This is an information system designed to collect allegations of criminal activity, waste, abuse, and mismanagement received by the OIG Hotline Division  Through our analysis of this data file, we identified 1 field out of 7 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Nature of Complaint—Our review of the Master Case Index file found variations of similar values in this field  For example, this field contained 21 different claim types pertaining to similar types of fraud, which made it difficult to assess the frequency and nature of claims entered into the system  OIG officials stated that they do not attempt to account for these variations or assess the frequency of use because they are assigned based on a “best match” to the allegations of the case  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary action taken against VBA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 20 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Position—Our review found some duplication and overlapping values among this field  For example, the position title for “service representative” contained 21 similar categories with numerous variations in spelling (i e , Veteran Service Representative vs  Veterans Service Representative, and Rating Veteran Service Representative vs  Rating Veterans Service Representative)  We were unable to verify the number of distinct positions due to the lack of standardization within this field  This data file is a tracking spreadsheet for monitoring misconduct and disciplinary action workload  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 5 fields out of 12 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Action Proposed/Decided/Taken—We were unable to analyze this data field because the action taken was tracked in one single field and updated with the most-recent action, rather than each distinct action being entered in a separate field  Consequently, we were not able to distinguish those cases where corrective action may have been taken, to verify whether the corrective action had been implemented  Current Status—We were unable to analyze this data field because it was not a standardized field  For example, we were unable to determine the total number of cases that were closed, open, or pending due to the variations in the data field (e g , Open, open, open – pending, open-pending)  Full Name of Employee, Grievant, Appellant, Complainant, Non- Employee—We were unable to distinguish whether the individual filing a complaint was an employee, grievant, appellant, complainant, or nonemployee because the information entered into this single field only provided the employee’s full name and did not provide a distinction as to which category the record was assigned, as indicated by the field name  NCA Facility—We were unable to analyze this data field because it was not a standardized field  For example, we were unable to run demographic information on the different facilities involved because this field contained erroneous information  Examples of erroneous information included the name of the Memorial Service Network in one case, and the region, rather than the facility name, in another  Supervisor Name—We were unable to analyze this data field because it was not a standardized field  For example, we were unable to determine the total number of supervisors that were associated with each case due to the variations in the names entered within this field, which included misspelled first or last names, addition/omission of middle initials, or no first name  This data file is a tracking spreadsheet for all allegations received by the VA Secretary regarding misconduct, patient care, or other wrongdoing  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 9 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Subject—Our review of this tracking spreadsheet found over 380 different possible categories that could be assigned to one record  These categories contained a significant number of variations  For example, we found 38 different categories that contained possible EEO-related issues such as “EEO/Whistleblower,” “Potential EEO,” and “EEO Violations ” We were unable to distinguish the different subject categories for this field due to the lack of standardization  CSRT officials stated that ExecVA reports contain only data corresponding to specific search criteria  This is an information system for tracking allegations of misconduct at all VA facilities that include violation of law and misdemeanors  Through our analysis of this data file, we identified 3 fields out of 29 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Classification—We found that this field contained at least three different variations of assault categories (i e , assault, assault-other, and assault-aggravated)  VAPS officials stated that this field is determined and entered by the user  Crime Type—We found this field contained at least five different variations of alcohol-consumption categories, such as “entering premises under the influence” and “alcohol – under the influence ” VAPS officials stated that this field is determined and entered by the user  Final Disposition—We found this field contained at least two different variations of charge type (i e , charged, charged – Issued Ticket), six different variations of open type (for example, open/referred to Court, open/cvb), and two different variations of closed type (i e , closed, case closed)  VAPS officials stated that this field is determined and entered by the user  This data file is designed to track all allegations of misconduct and associated disciplinary actions taken against VA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 34 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Position Title—We found this field contained at least 15 different variations of Registered Nurse, such as “Registered Nurse,” “Staff RN,” and “RN ” Allegations surrounding inadequate staffing, patient care, and safety at a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) emergency room were investigated by the medical center director of the facility  The medical center director found that the inadequate patient care and safety issue was unsubstantiated based on a review of patient safety incidents for the last 6 months  The medical center director did not provide a copy of her report review to support this conclusion  She also indicated that an external consultant was hired to assess staffing issues, and found generally that improvements could be made for staffing to address surge capacity  The director stated the medical center was in the process of implementing the recommendations made by the consultant, but her response did not discuss the specific improvements planned or include the external consultant’s report  A fact-finding was performed by a panel comprised of VA Connecticut Healthcare System officials in response to alleged violations of law, gross mismanagement, and waste of funds that included the improper billing of services for a Las Vegas conference and paying contracts through a VA nonprofit corporation to handle such expenditures  The allegations specifically requested a cost-benefit analysis for the conference location  The response received from the program office stated that an outside accounting firm performs an annual financial audit of the VA nonprofit corporation and found no material issues  Neither a copy of the annual financial audit nor a cost-benefit analysis was provided in the response as support  Additionally, the response did not address allegations regarding the status of several essential positions vacated over the prior 3 years  Allegations involved time-and-attendance abuse by a physician who was accused of not responding to calls from peers or coming into the clinic, in favor of his private practice  According to the complainant, physician assistants (PA) examine the physician’s patients at the clinic for him  The medical center director, who was also named in the allegation as having received a similar complaint against the physician 2 years earlier, reviewed the case against the physician and himself  The medical center director’s response claimed that the location indicated in the allegation was not a private practice, but rather a location where the physician reviews medical records and sometimes serves as an expert witness  He did not provide evidence to support his claim  The medical center director also stated that he had not received any reports against the physician for missed calls or clinics and that PAs are expected to participate in these activities  However, he did not provide the physician’s work log, or the PA position descriptions showing that they are allowed to perform these functions autonomously  Finally, the medical center director claimed he did not recall the allegation made against the physician 2 years prior and neither formally substantiated nor disproved the current allegations against the physician  No recommendations were made  The medical center director was accused of hiring an unqualified individual to a Quality Manager position due to their romantic relationship  The response received from the human-resources consultant noted that it was unusual to find a Nurse II manager with only an associate’s degree, but was not illegal, and the employee was qualified based on prior experience  Concerns were also raised concerning the medical center director’s use of over $400 in government funds to “soundproof” the Quality Manager’s office, including having panels attached to one wall and the hollow office door replaced with a solid door  The Chief of Engineering Services was interviewed regarding the request and stated it was an odd request, and the first time he was asked to soundproof an administrative employee’s office  The response provided by the program office did not address why the director used government funds to soundproof the Quality Manager’s office  The response provided also did not address whether recommendations that the Quality Manager’s retention allowance be reviewed for compliance and that she be counseled for appropriate office dress code were implemented  The medical center director was alleged to have misrepresented a plan to track and provide mental-health services to veterans in non-VA hospitals and created a hostile work environment against African-American veterans and employees  The medical center director investigated the allegations against himself and provided a response that was eventually submitted late to the OIG  His response indicated that a review was completed and all allegations were unsubstantiated  Several documents provided with his response showed that only 12 contacts were made to veterans with mental-health care needs during the requested 24-month period, the percentage of patients experiencing wait times greater than 14 days before receiving mental-health services averaged 18 percent, and two veteran suicides occurred  The medical center director did not address allegations of creating a hostile work environment for African American veterans and employees  The medical center director improperly reannounced a vacancy in order to hire an individual with whom he allegedly had a close personal relationship to an Assistant Director position  He also requested the master key to the facility be issued to her against regulations  The allegation involving the master key was substantiated, but the Deputy Under Secretary who conducted the investigation stated that while there was no record of the key being returned, the key was returned and the general engineer brought the facility into compliance with VA regulations  Nonetheless, the Deputy Under Secretary found that a master key was issued in violation of policy, but no recommendations were made to the medical center director for corrective action  Allegations involved false patient wait-time documentation and abuse of authority  Specifically, a medical center director instructed staff to falsify patient wait times between follow-up appointments in order to meet VA’s 14-day timeliness metric  The investigation concluded that the false documentation allegation was substantiated, but attributed the cause to staff not understanding how to enter a follow-up appointment date into the system  It was also concluded that the correction of several hundred dates in the system improved the performance of the department for the national wait-time metric  However, no documentation was provided to (1) prove the medical center director had not abused his authority by instructing staff to review wait times greater than 14 days to determine how they could be reduced, and (2) support the conclusion that the original wait times were entered in error  In addition to the contact above, Dave Bruno (Assistant Director), Erica Varner (Analyst in Charge), Hiwotte Amare, Chris Cronin, Carrie Davidson, Ranya Elias, Colin Fallon, Mitch Karpman, Grant Mallie, Anna Maria Ortiz, Sabrina Streagle, Reed Van Beveren, and April Van Cleef made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the President broad authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national emergency. IEEPA, like the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) from which it branched, sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanctions regime. Changes in the use of IEEPA powers since the act's enactment in 1977 have caused some to question whether the statute's oversight provisions are robust enough given the sweeping economic powers it confers upon the President upon declaration of a state of emergency. Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated increasing amounts of emergency power to the President by statute. The Trading with the Enemy Act was one such statute. Congress passed TWEA in 1917 to regulate international transactions with enemy powers following the U.S. entry into the First World War. Congress expanded the act during the 1930s to allow the President to declare a national emergency in times of peace and assume sweeping powers over both domestic and international transactions. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, TWEA became a critically important means to impose sanctions as part of U.S. Cold War strategy. Presidents used TWEA to block international financial transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict exports, modify regulations to deter the hoarding of gold, limit foreign direct investment in U.S. companies, and impose tariffs on all imports into the United States. Following committee investigations that discovered that the United States had been in a state of emergency for more than 40 years, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and IEEPA in 1977. The pair of statutes placed new limits on presidential emergency powers. Both included reporting requirements to increase transparency and track costs, and the NEA required the President to annually assess and extend, if appropriate, the emergency. However, some experts argue that the renewal process has become pro forma. The NEA also afforded Congress the means to terminate a national emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in each chamber. A decision by the Supreme Court, in a landmark immigration case, however, found the use of concurrent resolutions to terminate an executive action unconstitutional. Congress amended the statute to require a joint resolution, significantly increasing the difficulty of terminating an emergency. Like TWEA, IEEPA has become an important means to impose economic-based sanctions since its enactment; like TWEA, Presidents have frequently used IEEPA to restrict a variety of international transactions; and like TWEA, the subjects of the restrictions, the frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have expanded over time. Initially, Presidents targeted foreign states or their governments. Over the years, however, presidential administrations have increasingly used IEEPA to target individuals, groups, and non-state actors such as terrorists and persons who engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities. As of March 1, 2019, Presidents had declared 54 national emergencies invoking IEEPA, 29 of which are still ongoing. Typically, national emergencies invoking IEEPA last nearly a decade, although some have lasted significantly longer--the first state of emergency declared under the NEA and IEEPA, which was declared in response to the taking of U.S. embassy staff as hostages by Iran in 1979, may soon enter its fifth decade. IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Despite these broad powers, Congress has never attempted to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA. Instead, Congress has directed the President on numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Congress may want to consider whether IEEPA appropriately balances the need for swift action in a time of crisis with Congress' duty to oversee executive action. Congress may also want to consider IEEPA's role in implementing its influence in U.S. foreign policy and national security decision-making.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: A complicated body of rules, precedents, and practices governs the legislative process on the floor of the House of Representatives  The official manual of House rules is more than 1,000 pages long and is supplemented by 30 volumes of precedents, with more volumes to be published in coming years  Yet there are two reasons why gaining a fundamental understanding of the House's legislative procedures is not as difficult as the sheer number and size of these documents might suggest  First, the ways in which the House applies its rules are largely predictable, at least in comparison with the Senate  Some rules are certainly more complex and more difficult to interpret than others, but the House tends to follow similar procedures under similar circumstances  Even the ways in which the House frequently waives, supplants, or supplements its standing rules with special, temporary procedures generally fall into a limited number of recognizable patterns  Second, underlying most of the rules that Representatives may invoke and the procedures the House may follow is a fundamentally important premise—that a majority of Members should ultimately be able to work their will on the floor  Although House rules generally recognize the importance of permitting any minority—partisan or bipartisan—to present its views and sometimes propose its alternatives, the rules do not enable that minority to filibuster or use other parliamentary devices to prevent the majority from prevailing without undue delay  This principle provides an underlying coherence to the various specific procedures discussed in this report  Article I of the Constitution imposes a few restrictions on House (and Senate) procedures—for example, requirements affecting quorums and roll-call votes—but otherwise the Constitution authorizes each house of Congress to determine for itself the "Rules of its Proceedings" (Article 1, Section 5)  This liberal grant of authority has several important implications  First, the House can amend its rules unilaterally; it need not consult with either the Senate or the President  Second, the House is free to suspend, waive, or ignore its rules whenever it chooses to do so  By and large, the Speaker or whatever Representative is presiding usually does not enforce the rules at his or her own initiative  Instead, Members must protect their own rights by affirmatively making points of order whenever they believe the rules are about to be violated  In addition, House rules include several formal procedures for waiving or suspending certain other rules, and almost any rule can be waived by unanimous consent  Thus, the requirements and restrictions discussed in this report generally apply only if the House chooses to enforce them  If for no other reason than the size of its membership, the House has found it necessary to limit the opportunities for each Representative to participate in floor deliberations  Whenever a Member is recognized to speak on the floor, there is always a time limit on his or her right to debate  The rules of the House never permit a Representative to hold the floor for more than one hour  Under some parliamentary circumstances, there are more stringent limits, with Members being allowed to speak for no more than 5 minutes, 20 minutes, or 30 minutes  Furthermore, House rules sometimes impose a limit on how long the entire membership of the House may debate a motion or measure  Most bills and resolutions, for instance, are considered under a set of procedures called "suspension of the rules" (discussed later in this report) that limits all debate on a measure to a maximum of 40 minutes  Under other conditions, when there is no such time limit imposed by the rules, the House (and to some extent, the Committee of the Whole as well) can impose one by simple majority vote  These debate limitations and debate-limiting devices generally prevent a minority of the House from thwarting the will of the majority  House rules also limit debate in other important respects  First, all debate on the floor must be germane to whatever legislative business the House is conducting  Representatives may speak on other subjects only in one-minute speeches most often made at the beginning of each day's session, special order speeches occurring after the House has completed its legislative business for the day, and during morning hour debates that are scheduled on certain days of the week  Second, all debate on the floor must be consistent with certain rules of courtesy and decorum  For example, a Member should not question or criticize the motives of a colleague  When a House committee reports a public bill or resolution that had been referred to it, the measure is placed on the House Calendar or the Union Calendar  In general, tax, authorization, and appropriations bills are placed on the Union Calendar; all others go to the House Calendar  In effect, the calendars are catalogues of measures that have been approved, with or without proposed amendments, by one or more House committees and are now available for consideration on the floor  Placement on a calendar does not guarantee that a measure will receive floor consideration at a specified time or at all  Because it would be impractical or undesirable for the House to take up measures in the chronological order in which they are reported and placed on one of the calendars, there must be some procedures for deciding the order in which measures are to be brought from the calendars to the House floor—in other words, procedures for determining the order of business  Clause 1 of Rule XIV lists the daily order of business on the floor, beginning with the opening prayer, the approval of the Journal (the official record of House proceedings required by the Constitution), and the Pledge of Allegiance  Apart from these routine matters, however, the House never follows the order of business laid out in this rule  Instead, certain measures and actions are privileged, meaning they may interrupt the regular order of business  In practice, all the legislative business that the House conducts comes to the floor by interrupting the order of business under Rule XIV, either by unanimous consent or under the provisions of another House rule  Every bill and resolution that cannot be considered by unanimous consent must become privileged business if it is going to reach the floor at all  There is no one single set of procedures that the House always follows when it considers a public bill or resolution on the floor  Instead, there are several modes of consideration, or different sets of procedural rules, that the House uses  In some cases, House rules require that certain kinds of bills be considered in certain ways  By various means, however, the House chooses to use whichever mode of consideration is most appropriate for a given bill  Which of these modes the House uses depends on such factors as the importance and potential cost of the bill and the amount of controversy the bill has generated among Members  The differences among these sets of procedures rest largely on the balance that each strikes between the opportunities for Members to debate and propose amendments, on the one hand, and the ability of the House to act promptly, on the other  Regardless of which procedure the House uses to consider legislation, the House majority party leadership generally tries to post the text of measures coming to the chamber floor in advance on an internet website created for that purpose  The House most frequently resorts to a set of procedures that enables it to act quickly on bills that enjoy overwhelming but not unanimous support  Although this set is called "suspension of the rules," clause 1 of Rule XV provides for these procedures as an alternative to the other modes of consideration  The essential components of suspension of the rules are (1) a 40-minute limit on debate, (2) a prohibition against floor amendments, and (3) a two-thirds vote of those present and voting for passage  On every Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday—and at other times by special arrangement—the Speaker may recognize Members to move to suspend the rules and pass a particular bill (or take some other action, such as agreeing to the Senate's amendments to a House bill)  Once such a motion is made, the motion and the bill itself together are debatable for a maximum of 40 minutes  Half of the time is controlled by the Representative making the motion, often the chair of the committee with jurisdiction over the bill; the other half is usually controlled by the ranking minority member of the committee (or sometimes the subcommittee) of jurisdiction, especially when he or she opposes the motion  The suspension motion itself may propose to pass the bill with certain amendments, but no Member may propose an amendment from the floor  During the debate, the two Members who control the time yield parts of it to other Members who wish to speak  Once the 40 minutes is either used or yielded back, a single vote occurs on suspending the rules and simultaneously passing the bill  If two-thirds of the Members present vote "Aye," the motion is agreed to and the bill is passed  If the motion fails, the House may debate the bill again at another time, perhaps under another mode of consideration that permits floor amendments and more debate and requires only a simple majority vote for passage  The House frequently considers several suspension motions on the same day, which could result in a series of electronically recorded votes taking place at 40-minute intervals if such votes are requested  For the convenience of the House, therefore, clause 8 of Rule XX permits the Speaker to postpone electronic votes that Members have demanded on motions to suspend the rules until a later time on the same day or the following day  When the votes do take place, they are clustered together, occurring one after the other without intervening debate  One of the ironies of the legislative process on the House floor is that the House does relatively little business under the basic rules of the House  Instead, most of the debate and votes on amendments to major bills occur in Committee of the Whole (discussed below)  This is largely because of the rule that generally governs debate in the House itself  The rule controlling debate during meetings of the House (as opposed to meetings of the Committee of the Whole) is clause 2 of Rule XVII, which states in part that a "Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner may not occupy more than one hour in debate on a question in the House " In theory, this rule permits each Representative to speak for as much as an hour on each bill, on each amendment to each bill, and on each of the countless debatable motions that Members could offer  Thus, there could be more than four hundred hours of debate on each such question, a situation that would make it virtually impossible for the House to function effectively  In practice, however, this "hour rule" usually means that each measure considered "in the House" is debated by all Members for no more than a total of only one hour before the House votes on passing it  The reason for this dramatic difference between the rule in theory and the rule in practice lies in the consequences of a parliamentary motion to order what is called the "previous question " When a bill or resolution is called up for consideration in the House—and, therefore, under the hour rule—the Speaker recognizes the majority floor manager to control the first hour of debate  The majority floor manager is usually the chair of the committee or subcommittee with jurisdiction over the measure and most often supports its passage without amendment  This Member will yield part of his or her time to other Members and may allocate control of half of the hour to the minority floor manager (usually the ranking minority member of the committee or subcommittee)  However, the majority floor manager almost always yields to other Representatives "for purposes of debate only " Thus, no other Member may propose an amendment or make any motion during that hour  During the first hour of debate, or at its conclusion, the majority floor manager invariably "moves the previous question " This nondebatable motion asks the House if it is ready to vote on passing the bill  If a majority votes for the motion, no more debate on the bill is in order, nor can any amendments to it be offered; after disposing of the motion, the House usually votes immediately on whether to pass the bill  If the House defeats the previous question, however, opponents of the bill would then be recognized to control the second hour of debate, and might use that time to try to amend the measure  Because of this, it is unusual for the House not to vote for the previous question—the House disposes of most measures considered in the House, under the hour rule, after no more than one hour of debate and with no opportunity for amendment from the floor  These are not very flexible and accommodating procedural ground rules for the House to follow in considering most legislation  Debate on a bill is usually limited to one hour, and only one or two Members control this time  Before an amendment to the bill can even be considered, the House must first vote against a motion to order the previous question  For these reasons, most major bills are not considered in the House under the hour rule  In current practice, the most common type of legislation considered under the hour rule in the House are procedural resolutions reported by the House Committee on Rules that are commonly referred to as "special rules" (discussed below)  Much of the legislative process on the floor occurs not "in the House" but in a committee of the House known as the Committee of the Whole (formally, the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union)  Every Representative is a member of the Committee of the Whole, and it is in this committee, meeting in the House chamber, that many major bills are debated and amended before being passed or defeated by the House itself  Most bills are first referred to, considered in, and reported by a standing legislative committee of the House before coming to the floor  In much the same way, once bills do reach the floor, many of them then are referred to a second committee, the Committee of the Whole, for further debate and for the consideration of amendments  The Speaker presides over meetings of the House but not over meetings of the Committee of the Whole  Instead, the Speaker appoints another Member of the majority party to serve as the chair of the Committee of the Whole during the time the committee is considering a particular bill or resolution  In addition, the rules that apply in Committee of the Whole are somewhat different from those that govern meetings of the House itself  The major differences are discussed in the following sections of this report  In general, the combined effect of these differences is to make the procedures in Committee of the Whole—especially the procedures for offering and debating amendments—considerably more flexible than those of the House  Clause 3 of Rule XVIII requires that most bills affecting federal taxes and spending be considered in Committee of the Whole before the House votes on passing them  Most other major bills are also considered in this way  Most commonly, the House adopts a resolution, reported by the Rules Committee, that authorizes the Speaker to declare the House "resolved" into Committee of the Whole to consider a particular bill  There are two distinct stages to consideration in Committee of the Whole  First, there is a period for general debate, which is routinely limited to an hour  Each of the floor managers usually controls half the time, yielding parts of it to other Members who want to participate in the debate  During general debate, the two floor managers and other Members discuss the bill, the conditions prompting the committee to recommend it, and the merits of its provisions  Members may describe and explain the reasons for the amendments that they intend to offer, but no amendments can actually be proposed at this time  During or after general debate, the majority floor manager may move that the committee "rise"—in other words, that the committee transform itself back into the House  When the House agrees to this motion, it may resolve into Committee of the Whole again at another time to resume consideration of the bill  Alternatively, the Committee of the Whole may proceed immediately from general debate to the next stage of consideration: the amending process  The Committee of the Whole may consider a bill for amendment section by section or, in the case of appropriations measures, paragraph by paragraph  Amendments to each section or of the bill are in order after the part they would amend has been read or designated and before the next section is read or designated  Alternatively, the bill may be open to amendment at any point, usually by unanimous consent  The first amendments considered to each part of the bill are those (if any) recommended by the committee that reported it  Thereafter, members of the committee are usually recognized before other Representatives to offer their own amendments  All amendments must be germane to the text they would amend  Germaneness is a subject matter standard more stringent than one of relevancy and reflects a complex set of criteria that have developed by precedent over the years  The Committee of the Whole votes only on amendments; it does not vote directly on the bill as a whole  And like the standing committees of the House, the Committee of the Whole does not actually amend the bill; it only votes to recommend amendments to the House  The motion to order the previous question may not be made in Committee of the Whole, so, under a purely open amendment process, Members may offer whatever germane amendments they wish  After voting on the last amendment to the last portion of the bill, the committee rises and reports the bill back to the House with whatever amendments it has agreed to  Purely open amendment processes have been rare in recent Congresses; the amendment process is far more frequently structured by the terms of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and adopted by the House  This process is discussed in the next section of this report  An amendment to a bill is a first-degree amendment  After such an amendment is offered, but before the committee votes on it, another Member may offer a perfecting amendment to make some change in the first degree amendment  In current floor practice, this is rare  A perfecting amendment to a first-degree amendment is a second-degree amendment  After debate, the committee first votes on the second-degree perfecting amendment and then on the first-degree amendment as it may have been amended  Clause 6 of Rule XVI also provides that a Member may offer a substitute for the first-degree amendment before or after a perfecting amendment is offered, and this substitute may also be amended  Although a full discussion of these possibilities is beyond the scope of this report, it is important to note that the amending process can become complicated, with Members proposing several competing policy choices before the Committee of the Whole votes on any of them  Debate on amendments in Committee of the Whole is governed by the five-minute rule, not the hour rule that regulates debate in the House  The Member offering each amendment (or the majority floor manager, in the case of a committee amendment) is first recognized to speak for five minutes  Then a Member opposed to the amendment may claim five minutes for debate  Other Members may also speak for five minutes each by offering a motion "to strike the last word " Technically, this motion is an amendment that proposes to strike out the last word of the amendment being debated  But it is a "pro forma amendment" that is offered merely to secure time for debate and so is not voted on when the five minutes expire  In this way, each Representative may speak for five minutes on each amendment  However, a majority of the Members can vote (or agree by unanimous consent) to end the debate on an amendment immediately or at some specified time  Also, as mentioned, if the amendment process is governed by a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and adopted by the House, that resolution will limit the number, order, and form of amendments that can be considered  When the committee finally rises and reports the bill back to the House, the House proceeds to vote on the amendments the committee has adopted  It usually approves all these amendments by one voice vote, though Members can demand separate votes on any or all of them as a matter of right  After a formal and routine stage called "third reading and engrossment" (when only the title of the bill is read), there is then an opportunity for a Member, virtually always from the minority party, to offer a motion to recommit the bill to committee  If the House agrees to a "simple" or "straight" motion to recommit, which only proposes to return the bill to committee, the bill is taken from the floor and returned to committee  Although the committee technically has the power to re-report the bill, in practice, the adoption of a straight motion to recommit is often characterized as effectively "killing" the measure  "Straight" motions to recommit are rare  Alternatively, motions to recommit far more frequently include instructions that the committee report the bill back to the House "forthwith" with an amendment that is stated in the motion  If the House agrees to such a motion, which is debatable for 10 minutes, evenly divided, it then immediately votes on the amendment itself, so a motion to recommit with instructions is really a final opportunity for the minority party to amend the bill before the House votes on whether to pass it  Thus, this complicated mode of consideration, which the House uses to consider most major bills, begins in the House with a decision to resolve into Committee of the Whole to consider a particular bill  General debate and the amending process take place in Committee of the Whole, but ultimately it is the House that formally amends and then passes or rejects the bill  Clause 1(m) of Rule X authorizes the Rules Committee to report resolutions affecting the order of business  Such a resolution—called a "rule" or "special rule"—usually proposes to make a bill in order for floor consideration so that it can be debated, amended, and passed or defeated by a simple majority vote  In effect, each special rule recommends to the House that it take from the Union or House Calendar a measure that is not otherwise privileged business and bring it to the floor out of its order on that calendar  Typically, such a resolution begins by providing that, at any time after its adoption, the Speaker may declare the House resolved into Committee of the Whole for the consideration of that bill  Because the special rule is itself privileged, under clause 5(a) of Rule XIII, the House can debate and vote on it promptly  If the House accepts the Rules Committee's recommendation, it proceeds to consider the bill itself  One fundamental purpose of most special rules, therefore, is to make another bill or resolution privileged so that it may interrupt the regular order of business  Their other fundamental purpose is to set special procedural ground rules for considering that measure; these ground rules may either supplement or supplant the standing rules of the House  For example, the special rule typically sets the length of time for general debate in Committee of the Whole and specifies which Members are to control that time  In addition, the special rule normally includes provisions that expedite final House action on the bill after the amending process in Committee of the Whole has been completed  Special rules may also waive points of order that Members could otherwise make against consideration of the bill, against one of its provisions, or against an amendment to be offered to it  The most controversial provisions of special rules affect the amendments that Members can offer to the bill that the resolution makes in order  As noted above, an "open rule" permits Representatives to propose any amendment that meets the normal requirements of House rules and precedents—for example, the requirement that each amendment must be germane  A "modified open rule" permits amendments to be offered that otherwise comply with House rules but imposes a time limit on the consideration of amendments or requires them to be preprinted in the Congressional Record   At the other extreme, a "closed rule" prohibits all amendments except perhaps for committee amendments and pro forma amendments ("to strike the last word") offered only for purposes of debate  A "structured" rule, which is the most common type of rule, permits only certain specific amendments to be considered on the floor  These provisions are very important because they can prevent Representatives from offering amendments as alternatives to provisions of the bill, thereby limiting the policy choices that the House can make  Open rules have been rare in recent Congresses  However, like other committees, the Rules Committee only makes recommendations to the House  As noted above, Members debate each of its procedural resolutions in the House under the hour rule and then vote to adopt or reject it  If the House votes against ordering the previous question on a special rule, a Member could offer an amendment to it, proposing to change the conditions under which the bill itself is to be considered  Because the adoption of a special rule is often viewed as a "party loyalty" vote, however, such a development is exceedingly rare  All the same, it is important to remember that while the Rules Committee is instrumental in helping the majority party leadership formulate its order of business and in setting appropriate ground rules for considering each bill, the House retains ultimate control over what it does, when, and how  Legislation is sometimes brought before the House of Representatives for consideration by the unanimous consent of its Members  Long-standing policies announced by the Speaker regulate unanimous consent requests for this purpose  Among other things, the Speaker will recognize a Member to propound a unanimous consent request to call up an unreported bill or resolution only if that request has been cleared in advance with both party floor leaders and with the bipartisan leadership of the committee of jurisdiction  Before any bill can become law, both the House and the Senate must pass it, and the two houses must agree on each and every one of its provisions  This basic constitutional requirement means that the House must have procedures to respond when the House and Senate pass different versions of the same bill  For example, the House may pass a Senate bill with House amendments, or the Senate may pass a House bill with Senate amendments and then send its amendments to the House  In either case, the two houses must resolve their differences over these amendments before the legislative process is completed  There are essentially two ways to approach this stage of the process: (1) by dealing with the amendments individually through a process of exchanging amendments between the chambers, with the bill being sent back and forth between the House and Senate, or (2) by dealing with the amendments collectively through a conference committee of Representatives and Senators who negotiate a series of compromises and concessions that are compiled in a conference report that the two houses can vote to accept  Because the process of resolving differences between the houses can be quite complicated, only some of its basic elements are summarized here  The House normally considers Senate amendments to a House bill by unanimous consent or by suspension of the rules; the House may accept the amendments (concur in them) or amend them (concur in them with House amendments)  Alternatively, the committee with jurisdiction over the bill may authorize its chair to move that the House disagree to the Senate's amendments and send them to a conference committee  When the House amends and passes a Senate bill, it may request a conference with the Senate immediately, or it may simply send its amendments to the Senate in the hope that the Senate will accept them  If the Senate refuses to do so, it may request a conference with the House instead  On the other hand, if the House and Senate can reach agreement by proposing amendments to each other's positions, the bill can be sent to the President for his signature or veto without the need to create a conference committee  This method of resolving differences is sometimes colloquially called "ping-pong," because each chamber acts in turn, shuttling the legislation back and forth as each proposes amendments to the position of the other  If the House and Senate agree to send their versions of the bill to a conference committee, the Speaker appoints the House conferees  These conferees are usually drawn from the standing committee (or committees) with jurisdiction over the bill, although the Speaker may appoint some other Representatives as well  When the House and Senate conferees meet, they are to deal only with provisions of the bill on which the two houses disagree  They should not insert new provisions or change provisions that both houses have already approved  Furthermore, as the conferees resolve each provision or amendment in disagreement, they accept the House position, the Senate position, or a compromise between them  Like almost all other House rules, the rules limiting the authority of conferees are enforced only if Members make points of order at the appropriate time  The House may also adopt a special rule, reported by the Rules Committee, waiving points of order against a conference report  To complete their work successfully, a majority of the House conferees and a majority of the Senate conferees must sign a report that recommends all the agreements they have reached  The conferees also sign a "joint explanatory statement" that describes the original House and Senate positions and the conferees' recommendations and is the functional equivalent of a legislative committee report  After Representatives have had three days to examine a conference report, it is privileged for floor consideration; it may be called up at any time that the House is not already considering something else  The report may be debated in the House under the hour rule, so the vote almost always occurs after no more than one hour of debate  No amendments to the report are in order  In practice, however, the House almost always considers conference reports under the terms of a special rule from the Rules Committee that waives all points of order against the report and its consideration  The conference report is a proposed package settlement of a number of disagreements, so the House and Senate may accept it or reject it, but they may not change it  If the two houses agree to the report by simple majority vote, all their differences have been resolved and the bill is then "enrolled," or reprinted, for formal presentation to the President  In rare instances, conferees cannot reach agreement on one or more of the amendments in conference, or they may reach an agreement that they cannot include in their conference report because their proposal exceeds the scope of the differences between the House and Senate positions (and thus violates the rules governing the content of conference reports)  In either case, the conferees may report back to the two houses with an amendment (or amendments) in disagreement  After acting on the conference report and dealing collectively with all the other amendments that were sent to conference, the House acts on each of the amendments in disagreement by considering motions such as a motion to accept the Senate's amendment or a motion to amend it with a new House amendment  The Senate takes similar action until the disagreements on these amendments are resolved or until the two houses agree to create a new conference committee only to address the remaining amendments that are still in disagreement  The bill cannot become law until the two houses resolve all the differences between their positions  Whenever Representatives vote on the floor, there is almost always first a "voice vote," in which the Members in favor of the bill, amendment, or motion vote "Aye" in unison, followed by those voting "No " Before the Speaker (or the chair of the Committee of the Whole) announces the result, any Representative can demand a "division vote," in which the Members in favor stand up to be counted, again followed by those opposed  But before the result of either a voice vote or a division vote is announced, a Member may try to require another vote in which everyone's position is recorded publicly  This recorded vote is taken by using the House's electronic voting system  In Committee of the Whole, an electronic vote is ordered when 25 Members request it  In the House, such a vote occurs when demanded by at least one-fifth of the Members present  Alternatively, any Member can demand an electronically recorded vote in the House if a quorum of the membership is not present on the floor when the voice or division vote takes place  The Constitution requires that a quorum must be present on the floor when the House is conducting business  In the House, a quorum is a majority of the Representatives; in Committee of the Whole, it is only 100 Members  However, the House has traditionally assumed that a quorum is always present unless a Member makes a point of order that it is not  The rules restrict when Members can make such points of order, and they occur most often when the House or the Committee of the Whole is voting  In the House, for example, a Representative can object to a voice or division vote on the grounds that a quorum is not present and make that point of order  If a quorum is not present, the Speaker automatically orders an electronically recorded vote during which Members record their presence on the floor by casting their votes  The issue is decided and a quorum is established at the same time  A voice or division vote is valid even if less than a quorum participates in the vote so long as no one makes a point of order that a quorum is not present  For this reason, Members can continue to meet in their committees or fulfill their other responsibilities off the floor when the House is doing business that does not involve publicly recorded votes  On most days, the House will meet two hours prior to scheduled legislative business for Morning Hour Debate, a period in which Members can make speeches of up to five minutes on subjects of their choosing  Later, the House will meet for legislative session  After the opening prayer on each day by the House chaplain (or perhaps by a guest chaplain), the Speaker announces approval of the Journal of the previous day's proceedings  A Member may require a recorded vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval of the Journal  Following the Pledge of Allegiance, some Members may then ask unanimous consent to address the House for one minute each on whatever subjects they wish, including subjects unrelated to the scheduled legislative business of the day  The ability to set the House's floor schedule is one of the primary powers and responsibilities of the majority party leaders, and in doing so they often consult with minority party leaders  Generally speaking, to the extent possible, majority party leaders and the committee chairmen arrange the legislative schedule for each week in advance  During the last floor session of the week, the majority leader normally announces the expected schedule for the coming week in a traditional "wrap-up" colloquy with a minority party leader  Changes in the schedule may be announced as they are made  On a Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday, the House will commonly consider multiple measures under the "suspension of the rules" procedure  Typically, recorded votes on such measures, if requested, are clustered together and taken at the end of the day  On other days of the week, the House will usually consider a major bill pursuant to a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules  Such a special rule would be debated in the House under the hour rule, at the end of which the majority manager of the special rule would "move the previous question," which, when adopted, brings the resolution to a vote  Once adopted, the House would ordinarily consider a measure in Committee of the Whole pursuant to the terms for general debate and amendment established by the special rule  Following consideration in the Committee of the Whole, the House would take the final votes on the measure after voting on the amendments recommended by the committee and on a minority motion to recommit, which would likely be made with amendatory instructions  As each item of business is completed, the Speaker anticipates which Member should be seeking recognition to call up the next bill or resolution  If another Representative requests to be recognized instead, t he Speaker may ask, "For what purpose does the gentleman seek recognition?" The Speaker may decline to recognize that Member if the Speaker wants the House to consider another privileged measure, motion, or report  At the end of legislative business on most days, some Members address the House for as much as an hour each on subjects of their choice  These "special order" speeches are arranged in advance and organized by the party leadership  In this way, Representatives can comment at length on current national and international issues and discuss bills that have not yet reached the House floor  The House often adjourns by early evening, although it may remain in session later when the need arises or when the end of the annual session or some other deadline approaches  The House rules for each Congress are published in a volume often called the House manual but officially entitled Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives   A new edition of this collection is published each Congress  The precedents of the House established through 1935 have been compiled in the 11-volume set of Hinds' and Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives   More recent precedents are published as Deschler's or Deschler-Brown -Johnson Precedents of the U S  House of Representatives ; 18 volumes of this set now are available  Volume 1 of a fourth series of House precedents, Precedents of the United States House of Representatives , was initiated in 2017, and additional volumes are expected in the future  The House's procedures are summarized in House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House , by Charles W  Johnson, John V  Sullivan, and Thomas J  Wickham Jr , Parliamentarians of the House  The most recent version of House Practice was published in 2017  The Parliamentarian and his assistants welcome inquiries about House procedures and offer expert assistance compatible with their other responsibilities  CRS Report 98-995, The Amending Process in the House of Representatives , by Christopher M  Davis  CRS Report RL32200, Debate, Motions, and Other Actions in the Committee of the Whole , by Bill Heniff Jr  and Elizabeth Rybicki  CRS Report 97-552, The Discharge Rule in the House: Principal Features and Uses , by Richard S  Beth  CRS Report RL30787, Parliamentary Reference Sources: House of Representatives , by Richard S  Beth and Megan S  Lynch  CRS Report 98-696, Resolving Legislative Differences in Congress: Conference Committees and Amendments Between the Houses , by Elizabeth Rybicki  CRS Report 97-780, The Speaker of the House: House Officer, Party Leader, and Representative , by Valerie Heitshusen  CRS Report 98-314, Suspension of the Rules in the House: Principal Features , by Elizabeth Rybicki  CRS Report 98-870, Quorum Requirements in the House: Committee and Chamber , by Christopher M  Davis 
Report 2:  Such controls would minimize the risk of abuse when officials act as both proposing and deciding officials  In addition, VA does not have oversight measures to ensure that all allegations of misconduct referred by the OIG to facility and program offices are investigated by an entity outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct  The investigation of allegations of misconduct by the program office or facility where the complaint originated may present the appearance of a conflict of interest in which managers and staff at facilities may investigate themselves or other allegations where they may have a personal stake or bias in the matter to be investigated  Therefore, the risk that the results of the investigation are minimized, or not handled adequately, is increased  VA’s newly developed process to communicate the scope of its reviews that involve matters referred by the OSC to the Office of the Secretary will be important to ensure any allegations outside the purview of the OIG’s investigation are fully addressed by a departmental entity in accordance with OSC requirements  Further, the OIG’s inability to locate investigative documentation prevents a third party from verifying whether the OIG examined the disclosures, whether any recommendations were addressed, or whether appropriate disciplinary action was taken for these cases  This lack of information has direct influence on management’s ability to make sound decisions relating to investigative matters  According to OIG officials, a spreadsheet is being used for tracking case numbers associated with disclosures, but plans to implement a process within the new system  Nonanonymous whistle-blowers faced higher rates of adverse action subsequent to their disclosure than the VA population as a whole  In addition, these individuals also had attrition rates higher than their peers who had not filed a disclosure  The disparities between whistle-blowers and other employees may be an indication that retaliation by senior officials may have occurred after misconduct was disclosed  Although VA has started to provide additional information for potential whistle-blowers who wish to report criminal or other activity to the OIG, VA does not have a process to inform employees of how their information may be shared between organizations when misconduct is reported  Without a clear understanding of how the lines for reporting misconduct operate, whistle- blowers may be uncertain as to their options for reporting misconduct, increasing the risk that they may not report workplace misconduct  We are making the following 16 recommendations to VA  The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should develop and implement guidance to collect complete and reliable misconduct and associated disciplinary-action data department-wide, whether through a single information system, or multiple interoperable systems  Such guidance should include direction and procedures on addressing blank data fields, lack of personnel identifiers, and standardization among fields, and on accessibility  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct applicable facility and program offices to adhere to VA’s policies regarding employee misconduct adjudication documentation  (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Office of Human Resource Management (OHRM) to routinely assess the extent to which misconduct-related files and documents are retained consistently with VA’s applicable documentation requirements  (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OHRM to assess whether human-resources personnel adhere to basic principles outlined in VA Handbook 5021 when informing employees of their rights during the adjudication process for alleged misconduct  (Recommendation 4) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should adhere to OPM and NARA guidance and establish a specific record-retention period for adverse action files  In doing so, the Secretary should direct applicable administration, facility, and program offices that have developed their own record-retention schedules to then adhere to the newly established record-retention period  (Recommendation 5) The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Inspector General should revise its policy to include a requirement to verify whether evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  (Recommendation 6) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) to review responses submitted by facility or program offices to ensure evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  (Recommendation 7) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will verify whether appropriate disciplinary action has been implemented for all substantiated misconduct by senior officials  (Recommendation 8) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to develop a process to ensure disciplinary actions proposed in response to findings of misconduct are recorded within appropriate information systems to maintain their relevance and value to management for making decisions and take steps to monitor whether the disciplinary actions are implemented  (Recommendation 9) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will review the disposition of accountability actions for all substantiated misconduct cases involving senior officials resulting from investigations  (Recommendation 10) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should implement internal controls to ensure that proper adherence to separation-of-duty standards involving the removal of an employee are consistent with policy  (Recommendation 11) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should develop oversight measures to ensure all investigations referred to facility and program offices are consistent with policy and reviewed by an official independent of and at least one level above the individual involved in the allegation  To ensure independence, referred allegations of misconduct should be investigated by an entity outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct  (Recommendation 12) The VA Inspector General, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of OAWP, should develop a process to ensure that OSC case numbers are linked to the investigative case number and final report  (Recommendation 13) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to develop a time frame for the completion of published guidance that would develop an internal process to monitor cases referred to facility and program offices  (Recommendation 14) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should ensure that employees who report wrongdoing are treated fairly and protected against retaliation  (Recommendation 15) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct OAWP to develop a process to inform employees of how reporting lines operate, how they are used, and how the information may be shared between the OSC, the OIG, OAWP, or VA facility and program offices when misconduct is reported  (Recommendation 16) We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), VA Office of Inspector General (OIG), and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) for review and comment  In its comments, VA concurred with nine of our recommendations and partially concurred with five (see app  VI for a copy of VA’s letter)  Regarding our recommendations to the Inspector General, the OIG concurred with one recommendation and partially concurred with the other  The OIG also provided comments on our findings (see app  VII for a copy of the OIG’s letter)  We received technical comments by e-mail from OSC’s Principal Deputy Special Counsel, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate  Regarding VA’s comments, in its response to our first recommendation that the Secretary develop and implement guidance to collect complete and reliable misconduct and associated disciplinary-action data department-wide, VA concurred and outlined steps it plans to take to address our recommendations  These steps include the creation of new policies to address blank data fields, lack of personnel identifiers, lack of standardization among fields, and accessibility issues related to misconduct and associated disciplinary-action data department-wide  The target date for system implementation, dependent on approved funding and acquisition-related requirements, is January 1, 2020  On our second recommendation, that the Secretary direct applicable facility and program offices to adhere to VA’s policies regarding employee-misconduct adjudication documentation, VA concurred  It stated that a memorandum will be distributed to reiterate facility and program-office requirements to adhere to VA Handbook 5021, Employee/Management Relations, no later than October 1, 2018  VA also concurred with our third recommendation, that the Secretary direct the Office of Human Resource Management (OHRM) to routinely assess the extent to which misconduct-related files and documents are retained  According to VA, OHRM will assess, during periodic Oversight and Effectiveness Service reviews, the extent to which misconduct- related files and documents are retained  The first assessment is to be incorporated into the fiscal year 2019 Oversight and Effectiveness Service schedule no later than November 1, 2018  VA concurred with our fourth recommendation, that the Secretary direct OHRM to assess whether human-resources personnel adhere to basic principles outlined in VA Handbook 5021  VA stated that OHRM will assess, during periodic Oversight and Effectiveness Service reviews, whether human-resources and administration personnel adhere to basic principles outlined in VA Handbook 5021  The first assessment is to be incorporated into the fiscal year 2019 Oversight and Effectiveness schedule no later than November 1, 2018  In its response to our fifth recommendation, that the Secretary adhere to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) guidance and establish a specific record- retention period for adverse-action files, VA concurred and indicated that the Human Resources and Administration Assistant Secretary will establish VA guidance regarding the retention period for adverse-action files  In addition, the Human Resources and Administration Assistant Secretary is to advise applicable administration, facility, and program offices that have developed their own record-retention schedules to adhere to the newly established directive  According to VA, the directive will be established no later than November 1, 2018  VA partially concurred with our seventh recommendation, that the Secretary direct departmental heads to review responses submitted by facility or program offices to ensure evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  VA stated that the process described in our report pertaining to OIG findings or results will be changed to require all such reports to be submitted to OAWP  VA also indicated that it expects to publish new guidance by October 1, 2018, that will require the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) to review responses and recommendations from facilities or program offices  Given VA’s comments, we have revised our draft recommendation to have the Secretary direct OAWP, not the department heads, to ensure evidence demonstrates that the six elements have been addressed  VA also partially concurred with our eighth recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP review all substantiated misconduct by senior officials to verify whether disciplinary action has been implemented  VA stated that all substantiated misconduct by senior leaders in VA is handled by OAWP from intake, through investigation, working with the proposing and deciding officials  VA also stated that it expects to publish written guidance by October 1, 2018, that will clarify how OAWP will work with the appropriate servicing personnel office to ensure that the recommended disciplinary actions decided are implemented for substantiated misconduct involving senior officials  Given VA’s comments, we have revised our draft recommendation to have the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will verify that appropriate disciplinary action has been implemented for all substantiated misconduct by senior officials  VA partially concurred with our ninth recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP develop a process to ensure disciplinary actions proposed are recorded within appropriate information systems  VA stated that the VA-wide discipline tracking system currently used by OAWP will eventually be phased out  It added that once the Human Resources Information System (HRSmart) is capable of capturing and recording similar data, it will be used for this purpose  Accordingly, we have not revised our draft recommendation  VA partially concurred with our 10th recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP assess all misconduct cases involving senior officials to ensure investigative reports with findings of substantiated misconduct include recommendations for action  According to VA, OAWP has instituted several processes since our review  VA plans to issue written guidance that outlines the process for the review and disposition of appropriate accountability actions for allegations of misconduct by senior officials by October 1, 2018  Given VA’s comments, we have revised our draft recommendation to have the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will review the disposition of accountability actions for all substantiated misconduct cases involving senior officials resulting from investigations  In its response to our 11th recommendation, that the Secretary implement internal controls to ensure that separation-of-duty standards involving the removal of an employee are consistent with policy, VA concurred  It stated that it will also establish and distribute internal controls to ensure that separation-of-duty standards involving the removal of an employee are consistent with policy no later than November 1, 2018  VA partially concurred with our 12th recommendation, that the Secretary take steps to ensure independence of referred allegations of misconduct by requiring that investigations be conducted outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct  VA stated that OAWP is responsible for recording, tracking, reviewing, and confirming the implementation of recommendations from audits and investigations  However, VA did not address how it will ensure the independence of the entity responsible for conducting an investigation  As we discuss in our report, during the review OAWP officials stated that the process of referring cases of misconduct back to facilities and program offices where the misconduct occurred will continue  Accordingly, we have not revised our draft recommendation and believe implementation of it will help ensure independence  VA concurred with our 14th recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP develop a time frame for the completion of published guidance for the development of an internal process to monitor cases referred to facility and program offices  VA provided an expected date of October 1, 2018, for publishing the internal VA guidance, with the subsequent Directive and Handbook to be published as rapidly as staff coordination permits  In its response to our 15th recommendation, that the Secretary ensure that employees who report wrongdoing are treated fairly and protected against retaliation, VA concurred  It stated that OAWP and OSC have developed a functional process to ensure whistle-blower protections are implemented, but did not indicate what the process entails  The VA Secretary has also delegated authority to the Executive Director, OAWP, to put individual personnel actions on hold if the actions appear motivated by whistle-blower retaliation  VA added that OAWP has also hired two whistle-blower program specialists specifically to increase awareness of whistle-blower protections and work with individuals that disclose employee wrongdoing to ensure individuals are treated fairly and protected from retaliation for their disclosures  VA concurred with our 16th recommendation, that the Assistant Secretary of OAWP develop a process to inform employees of how reporting lines operate  VA stated that it will provide whistle-blower training to all employees on a biennial basis, which will include the reporting lines for disclosures of wrongdoing, the manner in which disclosures flow once they are made, how information is shared among the whistle-blower entities, and what protections exists for those who disclose wrongdoing  Regarding our recommendations to the Inspector General, the OIG partially concurred with our sixth recommendation, to revise its policy to include a requirement to verify whether evidence produced in senior- official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed  The OIG indicated that VA Directive 0701 is currently being updated to require a written or electronic signature from the person preparing the responses as an attestation that the specific requirements of the directive were met  The OIG also indicated in its letter that the OIG’s Hotline staff carefully review the case response but Hotline staff are not required to request an updated response from VA to address matters not necessary to the resolution to the referral  The OIG asserted that requesting an update would detract from the resources for other important VA activities  On page 4 of the OIG’s letter, the OIG states that Hotline analysts are allowed to exercise some discretion in accepting responses that may include minor departures from the six elements  We continue to believe that, in order to have a complete response to a referral, all six elements required by the directive should be addressed  In addition, Directive 0701 does not allow for the use of professional judgement to decide which elements to include or not to include in a response  While we agree that requiring a written or electronic signature from the person preparing the responses as an attestation will help ensure that the specific requirements of the directive were met, we maintain that not requiring Hotline analysts to review responses to ensure that all elements of the directive are addressed is inconsistent with the intent of the directive  In its response to our 13th recommendation, that the OIG develop a process to ensure that an OSC case number is linked to the investigative case number and the final report, the OIG concurred  It stated that it will engage with the Executive Director of OAWP to develop a process to ensure that OSC case numbers are linked to OIG and OAWP investigative case numbers, as appropriate, and linked to any final report of investigation  In addition to its response to recommendations, the VA OIG also raised a number of concerns with our findings  Page 1 of its letter summarizes some of these concerns and then provides more detail on each concern raised, starting on page 2  Our responses to each of these detailed concerns are provided below  The OIG stated that our report does not focus on the most important cases, but focuses primarily on case referrals regarding senior officials that were not handled by the OIG because the allegations were lower risk or because of resource constraints  In addition, the OIG stated that GAO risks presenting a skewed picture of the OIG’s oversight work  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  We requested that the OIG provide us with data from the OIG’s Master Case Index (MCI) information system that would allow us to select a sample of cases, in accordance with the scope of our review  The OIG was unable to provide the requested information due to several reasons  Instead, the OIG provided data from the OIG Hotline and Office of Investigations case- management systems (subsystems within MCI) that contained a limited number of fields for analysis and 23 cases pertaining to SES misconduct that were referred to VA for investigation during GAO’s period of review  Therefore, as we discuss in the report, we were only able to review the 23 senior-official misconduct cases included in our report because the OIG was only able to provide related documentation for these cases  The OIG stated that we only reviewed a sample of just 23 case referrals from fiscal years 2011 through 2014  As described, we reviewed all 23 senior-official misconduct cases that were referred to VA for investigation that the OIG was able to provide us, not a sample  The OIG stated that our report inaccurately states that the extracts received from the MCI information system contained missing information  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  Our review included a comprehensive assessment of the reliability of the OIG’s data  To conduct this assessment, we requested an explanation of each data field to clarify when fields are normally populated and how they are used  Our findings are consistent with the information provided in response to this request  For example, the OIG’s response to our data-reliability assessment stated that the data field used to identify the type of allegations being investigated should never be blank  However, we found that field to be blank in some cases in the data that were provided to us, though the OIG asserted that the MCI information system is a relational database where each case may be associated with multiple allegations and codes  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested supporting documentation to demonstrate that the fields analyzed during our period of review did not contain missing data  The OIG provided the MCI information system user’s manual that contains detailed procedures for accessing and entering data into the MCI information system, and a compilation of various internal documents  However, the documentation did not provide evidence of the completeness of data entered into the MCI information system as part of quality-assurance reviews performed by the OIG or other designated entity  Absent evidence of data-quality reviews aimed at assessing the accuracy and completeness of data contained in the MCI information system, we did not change the conclusions based on our previous analysis  The OIG stated that our report provides incomplete information regarding sampled cases and mischaracterized one of the OIG’s case referrals in the body of the report  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  Specifically, the OIG said that we inaccurately stated that a medical center director conducted the investigation into his own alleged misconduct and found no allegations were substantiated  The synopsis included in our report clearly articulates that the medical center director was named in the allegation for having received a similar complaint involving time and attendance abuse by a physician  The medical center director, who provided the response to the OIG, was implicated in the allegation as having not addressed a similar time and attendance complaint regarding the same physician 2 years earlier  The OIG did not provide any supporting documentation to demonstrate that the alleged time and attendance abuse allegations against the physician were not substantiated  The OIG stated that our report inaccurately stated that the medical center director conducted his own investigation of himself and found no allegations were substantiated  We disagree  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested that the OIG provide additional support used to determine that the medical center director did not investigate the allegation in which he was named  The additional case documentation provided by the OIG further reaffirmed our assessment that the medical center director performed his own investigation and found no allegations were substantiated  Additional documentation provided by the OIG indicated that the OIG referred the case to the Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) for a response  However, documentation we examined during the course of our audit, and the documentation provided in response to our draft report, indicates that the medical center director performed the investigation of the allegations and then the results were routed through the VISN back to the OIG  The OIG stated that routing the response through the VISN should address our concerns of independence  This process does not address our concerns regarding independence because VA Directive 0701 states that all responses to Hotline case referrals must contain evidence of an independent review by an official separate from and at a higher grade than the subject / alleged wrongdoer  In this case, the name of the medical center director who signed the facility response provided to the OIG was the same individual named in the allegations  The OIG stated that the report does not provide a balanced presentation of the rigor with which the OIG reviews all incoming Hotline contacts and case responses  We disagree with this characterization of our findings  As described above, the OIG was unable to provide comprehensive data to select a sample of OIG audits, evaluations, and inspections for review due to the limitations cited  We focused on misconduct involving senior officials consistently with the scope of our review and thoroughly reviewed all 23 senior-official misconduct cases that were referred to VA for investigation, which were the only cases that the OIG was able to provide  The OIG stated that the description for one of the cases included in appendix V of the draft report was incomplete because we misunderstood the OIG’s process  We disagree with this characterization  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested additional supporting documentation  The documentation provided reaffirmed our assessment that another medical center director performed his own investigation and found no allegations were substantiated  Similar to the case described above, the medical center director completed his own investigation and then routed the response through the VISN back to the OIG  In contrast to the previous case, however, the Hotline Workgroup reviewed the response to the OIG and found it to be insufficient  Specifically, the OIG noted that the medical center director who provided the response was the subject of the complaint, despite the response being directed to the VISN, and requested clarification  The VISN informed the OIG that it is not its policy for the complainant to have any involvement in the review and data submission on a case in which the complainant is involved  The VISN stated that while this did obviously occur in this instance, it has taken steps to ensure it does not occur in the future  The supporting evidence provided for the case included in appendix V also contradicts the OIG’s previous assertion that the routing of a response through the entity with oversight (VISN) over the medical center director should have addressed GAO’s concerns of independence  The OIG stated our report provides a misrepresentation of the OIG’s failure to follow internal policies for department responses  We disagree  According to OIG statements on page 4 of the OIG’s letter, Hotline analysts are allowed to exercise some discretion in accepting responses that may include minor departures from the six elements required in VA Directive 0701  We continue to believe that in order to have a complete response to a referral, all six elements required by the directive should be addressed  On the basis of our review, the OIG does not have an effective method to ensure that cases referred to VA are reviewed in accordance with VA Directive 0701  Out of the 23 cases we reviewed, only 4 included sufficient documentation needed to support VA’s findings, and we could not identify a case that contained all six elements required in VA Directive 0701  This suggests that the current OIG review process is not adequately resolving case referrals, as asserted by the OIG’s response  In addition, VA Directive 0701 does not currently include a provision that would allow Hotline analysts to deviate from the six required elements  As stated in our report, the OSC also raised concerns regarding 40 percent of disclosure cases that were referred to VA facility and program offices  The OIG stated that much of the information in the draft report is dated and ignores system updates, specifically several key Hotline-related process improvements since 2014  Although our review began in 2015, we disagree with this characterization of our findings  In our report, we included relevant improvements to demonstrate where the OIG was able to provide support for those improvements  For example, our report discusses: (1) a new process for communicating the scope of reviews that involve matters referred by the OSC to the Office of the Secretary, (2) a description on the VA website of the process for employees who wish to report criminal or other activity to the OIG, (3) a new Enterprise Management System, and (4) a new process for receiving whistle-blower disclosures by the Secretary  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested additional documentation for any systems, practices, or personnel changes that have been implemented since 2011, including improvements to Hotline-related processes since 2014 that were not included in our report  In response, the OIG provided a copy of the OIG’s organizational chart (current as of Apr  23, 2018), described the oversight responsibilities of each OIG component, and summarized the pertinent staff positions within each component  On the basis of this documentation, we identified a new office (the Office of Special Reviews), a promotion, staff reassignments, and numerous vacancies during our review period  However, the OIG did not provide evidence of any measures to improve the MCI information system, case-referral processes, or relevant staff roles that were not already included in our report  As described above, the OIG was unable to provide comprehensive data to select a sample of OIG audits, evaluations, and inspections for our initial review due to the limitations cited  In response to the OIG’s comments on our report, we requested documentation related to any significant changes that have been made to the MCI information system that allows the OIG to identify all allegations of misconduct for export and analysis  The OIG provided additional information regarding overall departmental achievements that are highlighted in the OIG’s Semiannual Report to Congress, and other products from its website published between fiscal years 2011 through 2018  We recognize the OIG’s broader administrative and oversight work described in the published reports  However, this information does not address changes specifically made to the MCI information system that would enable the OIG to analyze cases pertaining to alleged misconduct by senior officials that we requested  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5045 or larink@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Our objectives were to determine the extent to which the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (1) collects reliable information associated with employee misconduct and disciplinary actions that is accessible and could be used to analyze misconduct department-wide; (2) retains documentation that demonstrates VA adheres to its policies when adjudicating cases of employee misconduct; (3) ensures allegations of misconduct involving senior officials are reviewed in accordance with VA investigative standards, and these officials are held accountable; (4) has procedures to investigate whistle-blower allegations of misconduct; and the extent to which (5) data and whistle-blower testimony indicate whether retaliation for disclosing misconduct occurs at VA  For the first objective, we obtained VA employee misconduct data from 12 information systems operated by various VA components covering October 2009 through July 2017, where available  To determine the reliability of VA’s misconduct data, we analyzed the contents of the 12 information systems operated by various offices across VA  These data encompass each of the three major administrations that constitute VA— the National Cemetery Administration (NCA), Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and Veterans Health Administration (VHA)  We selected the information systems based on our discussions with VA officials and staff that oversee the data and, hence, identified databases capable of collecting information pertaining to either employee misconduct or disciplinary actions  Data fields were selected based on whether they would provide beneficial information to better understand the disciplinary process  VA’s Personnel and Accounting Integrated Data (PAID) system, which was developed to track payroll actions, contains information about adverse disciplinary actions that affect employee salary department-wide  We obtained an extract of all adverse disciplinary actions from the PAID system  We assessed the reliability of each system for the purposes of identifying and tracking misconduct cases  To do this, we performed electronic tests on 12 information systems to determine the completeness and accuracy of the fields contained in the data files  We also submitted to the overseeing offices for all 12 information systems general data-quality questions regarding the purpose of the data, their structure, definitions and values for certain fields, automated and manual data-quality checks to ensure the accuracy of the data, and limitations  As discussed further, the data were generally not reliable for a department-wide assessment of all misconduct and disciplinary actions due to the lack of completeness and compatibility of the data across all information systems  VA staff could not confirm whether some of the missing data we identified were artifacts of the database extraction process VA used to assemble the data files we used in our review  Despite challenges with aspects of the data, we found the data sufficiently reliable for conducting analysis where fields were populated and field definition concurrence was obtained by program offices  For the second objective, we selected a generalizable stratified random sample of 544 misconduct cases from October 2009 through May 2015  Where available, we reviewed the employees’ disciplinary-action files and Electronic Official Personnel Folders to determine the extent to which VA’s actions were consistent with disciplinary policy outlined in VA Handbook 5021, Employee/Management Relations  These data encompass each of the three major administrations that constitute VA— NCA, VBA, and VHA  We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for analysis of disciplinary actions affecting salary that resulted from misconduct that was not reported to supervisors directly from employees  Accordingly, our sample only includes misconduct cases that resulted in a change in salary or were reported to departmental organizations within the 12 information systems selected  We developed a data-collection instrument to document the results of our case reviews  We revised our data-collection instrument to address issues found during the course of our analysis, and developed a companion document that outlined the decision rules for reviewing cases  We also designated two primary reviewers to ensure the decision rules were consistently applied across all cases  Our review of laws and regulations revealed that disciplinary rules sometimes vary depending on whether employees fall under Title 5, Title 38, or hybrid Title 5 and Title 38 hiring authority  To minimize confusion associated with these differences, we incorporated criteria into our data- collection instrument  In addition, we were unable to obtain complete case information for 25 percent of the cases  For these cases, we obtained direct access to the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Electronic Official Personnel Folders system to attempt to recover some of the missing information  Ultimately, we were unable to complete our review for 10 percent of cases in our sample because of missing files  In addition to reporting missing case information, we used our generalizable analysis results to project VA-wide figures for several data elements that were not in compliance with VA policy  Unless otherwise noted, estimates in this report have a margin of error of +/-7 4 percentage points or less for a 95 percent confidence interval  For the third objective, we analyzed data from the Office of Accountability Review (OAR) Legacy Referral Tracking List and VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) case-referral and investigative case-management systems, and we selected cases for in-depth review  We selected these two systems based on discussions with VA officials who were knowledgeable with databases that have the capacity to track misconduct information pertaining to senior officials  The OAR Legacy Referral Tracking List comprises referrals from January 2011 through May 2015  The OIG provided 23 case-referral files involving senior officials from calendar years 2011 through 2014  As part of our review of the OIG case files, we evaluated specific data elements contained in VA’s response documents using VA policy for referring and reviewing misconduct cases  We assessed the reliability of the OAR Legacy Referral Tracking List and OIG case-management systems for the purposes of identifying and tracking misconduct cases  To do this, we performed electronic tests on each database to determine the completeness and accuracy of the fields contained in the data files, including senior-official indicators  Where feasible, we opted to match individual datasets to PAID to determine whether disciplinary actions were administered as prescribed  We also submitted to OAR and the OIG general data-quality questions regarding the purpose of the data, their structure, definitions and values for certain fields, automated and manual data-quality checks to ensure the accuracy of the data, and limitations  On the basis of this information, we found the OAR data to be sufficiently reliable for conducting analysis where fields were sufficiently populated  For the OAR data, we matched the persons of interest to adverse-action files from PAID to determine whether adverse disciplinary actions were administered as prescribed during the available time frame (January 2011 through May 2015)  We also obtained VA’s response documents for the 23 case-referral files provided by the OIG to evaluate whether VA was adhering to its own policy for referring and reviewing misconduct cases  Through our OAR Legacy Referral Tracking List analysis, we identified illustrative case examples of misconduct involving senior officials  Further, based on our evaluation of the 23 OIG case referrals using VA’s referral policy, we developed several illustrative case examples  For the fourth objective, we interviewed senior officials from VA and the OSC responsible for investigating whistle-blower complaints  We obtained the OSC’s procedures for referring disclosure complaints and VA’s policy for investigating these complaints once received at the agency  In addition, we obtained whistle-blower disclosure data from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) covering calendar years 2010 through 2014  To determine the reliability of the data, we conducted electronic testing and traced data elements to source documentation  We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable to identify the total number of cases that were investigated by the OIG, or referred to facility and program offices  We also observed a course to assess VA’s training provided to VA employees conducting investigations  We identified 135 OSC disclosure cases for analysis based on two criteria: (1) they contained at least partial complainant information (i e , the allegations were not anonymously reported or could be identified with supplemental information) and (2) they contained an indicator that the case had been closed by the OSC pending an ongoing investigation by VA or the OIG  These cases represent the universe of VA disclosures accepted by the OSC  Of the 135 disclosure cases referred to VA, 53 cases were referred to VA facility and program offices for further investigation  The remaining 82 disclosure cases indicated that they were investigated by the OIG  We reviewed the results of OSC’s assessment of investigative documentation developed by VA for these whistle-blower disclosure cases  For the fifth objective, we analyzed the 135 whistle-blower disclosure cases obtained from the OSC  These cases represent the universe of VA disclosures accepted by the OSC from calendar years 2010 through 2014, which were investigated by VA  We obtained an extract of year-end rosters from the PAID system as of September for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, with a final extract through May 30, 2015  Finally, we interviewed representatives from whistle-blower advocacy groups, as well as established whistle-blowers who disclosed wrongdoing or retaliation at VA and who were referred to us by one advocacy group  Of the 135 disclosures received by the OSC, a total of 129 employees made a total of 130 disclosures nonanonymously  For these 130 disclosure cases, we reviewed OSC and OIG investigative reports, as well as PAID roster files, to gather additional information to perform analysis of potential retaliation  We also interviewed six individual whistle- blowers with formal disclosure cases accepted by the OSC, indicating that the OSC had previously reviewed the case and determined that it contained sufficient evidence and merit to warrant further investigation  Our analysis of potential retaliation comprised two parts  First, we compared the 129 employees associated with the selected OSC cases to the PAID rosters using the complainants’ information to determine whether employees associated with the selected OSC cases were more likely to leave the agency  We identified the overall count and proportion (across years) of roster-matched employees who made a disclosure between fiscal years 2010 through 2014 but were not employed at VA the following fiscal year  Second, to determine whether employees associated with the selected OSC cases were more likely to receive disciplinary action, we also calculated the yearly totals and proportion of roster-matched employees identified above for whom a record existed in the PAID disciplinary action information system  We did this by comparing the proportion of employees who received one or more disciplinary actions in the year prior to the appearance in the roster, in the same fiscal year as the roster, and in the subsequent fiscal year  We also completed this analysis utilizing the PAID roster file to determine the yearly proportion of all VA employees who left the agency  On the basis of the results of our analysis, we reported by fiscal year the percentage of whistle-blowers that received disciplinary action or left VA at a higher rate than the overall VA population following a disclosure  To address all objectives, we interviewed senior officials from VA’s major components responsible for investigating and adjudicating cases of employee misconduct  We also reviewed standard operating procedures, policy statements, and guidance for staff charged with investigating and adjudicating allegations of employee misconduct  We conducted this performance audit from January 2015 to May 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  This data file is designed to track referrals made to OAR, including allegations of misconduct related to senior officials  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 11 fields out of 92 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Complainant #1 (First Name) (20 percent of 1,245 blank)— According to OAR, this field is populated when there is a known complainant for a matter  Some matters referred to OAR may be anonymously disclosed and not contain complainant information  This file also contains a case-origin field that specifies whether a case was anonymous  Our review of both the complainant and case-origin field indicated that only 11 percent of the complaints were generated from an anonymous source, and the remaining records should have included a complainant name  Disciplinary Action (96 percent of 1,245 blank)—This field should be populated to indicate whether a disciplinary action was taken after the completion of an investigation  Grade (97 percent of 1,245 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the grade of the Person of Interest (POI), if known  Our review of this field indicated that 97 percent were blank, therefore we were unable to analyze the variation in grade level for officials who were the subject of complaints  OAR Action (77 percent of 1,245 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated as an internal reference to describe what stage in the administrative process the matter was in when received  The lack of information did not allow for analysis of the types of actions taken for each case  Person of Interest (POI) (47 percent of 1,245 blank)—This field specifies the first and last name of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employee who is the subject of an allegation  POI (Person of Interest) Last Name 1–5 (51 to 99 percent of 1,245 blank)—This field specifies the last name of VA employee who is the subject of an allegation  There are a total of five person-of-interest (POI) fields for each matter  According to OAR, blank POI fields occur when the case has fewer than five POIs or the POI was not specified in the matter referred  Our review of the five POI fields indicated that more than half of the records did not contain at least one POI because no individual was specified  The lack of information did not allow for further investigation of senior-level officials involved in misconduct  Proposed Action (97 percent of 1,245 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated to notify OAR staff if any disciplinary action was proposed  Our review of this field indicated that 97 percent were blank, suggesting that very few high-level officials received corrective action, or the field was not consistently completed for each record  Due to the large share of blank values, the data posed limitations when analyzing how many senior officials received corrective action as a result of a complaint  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary actions taken against VA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 9 fields out of 21 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Action Taken (3 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the action that the deciding official takes, with the exception of pending actions  If there is a pending action, this field will remain blank  Our review of the action-taken field found three records that were annotated as a “pending decision” within this field, which indicates that there is an option for entering information into this field when there is an action pending and the field should never be blank  Admin Leave (30 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated if an employee is placed on administrative leave while an adverse action is pending  If an employee is not placed on administrative leave, the field may be left blank  Our review of the admin-leave field found that about 66 percent of the records were annotated as “no” within this field, which indicates that there is an option for entering information into this field when an employee was not placed on administrative leave  Date Proposed (11 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field is used when an adverse action is proposed for an employee  There are some actions that are not proposed, such as probationary terminations or admonishments that may be taken without being proposed, and therefore result in this field being blank  Our analysis found that about 95 percent of these records containing blank proposed date fields also had an entry in the proposed adverse-action field, which contained such entries as removals, suspensions, and demotions that require a proposed date  Deciding Official (14 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the name of the official who issued the action taken  Effective Date (5 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the date of the action taken  Some entries will not have an effective date if an entry is pending decision  Also, if no action is taken, the decision was counseling, or the proposed action was rescinded, this field may not have an effective date  Our review found that about 14 percent of the cases that included adverse actions, such as a suspension, removal, reassignment, or demotion, and that should have included a date of action, were blank  Offense 2 and 3 (79 and 95 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field tracks the second- and third-most-significant charge against the employee when applicable  Proposing Official (16 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field should be populated with the name of the official who makes the proposed adverse action  Instances where a proposing official has left the agency at the time of entry and could not be found in the lookup feature that relies on the e-mail global address list may produce blank fields  Also, disciplinary actions that were taken without proposal would not have a proposing official  In these instances, the human-resources specialists who enter the actions are instructed to include the name in the other-comments box  Our review of these records indicated that a majority of records lacking an entry in the proposing official field also lacked an annotation in the other- comments field to accurately identify the proposing official  Settlement (14 percent of 9,851 blank)—According to OAR, this field tracks whether a settlement agreement occurred  This data file is designed to collect allegations of criminal activity, waste, abuse, and mismanagement received by the OIG Hotline Division  Through our analysis of this information system, we identified one field out of seven that was missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Nature of Complaint (54 percent of 896 blank)—According to the OIG, this field should contain a brief description of the issue that most closely matches the allegation  Each case can have more than one nature of complaint and corresponding administrative action, if any  OIG officials stated that this field identifies the type of allegations being investigated and should never be blank  Our review of these cases found that over half of the cases involving the OIG contained entries for administrative action taken, but the nature-of-complaint fields corresponding to these actions were blank  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary action taken against VBA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 3 fields out of 20 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Alleged Offense 2 and 3 (92 and 99 percent of 1,375 blank)— According to VBA officials, this field should be populated if an individual is charged with multiple offenses, or has additional offenses in the same reporting period  In most instances, there is typically only one offense at the time of reporting  Sustained (52 percent of 1,375 blank)—According to VBA, this field should be populated if an offense is sustained at the time of reporting  This data file is designed to track all allegations of misconduct and associated disciplinary actions taken against VA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 8 fields out of 34 that were missing information that could be used to analyze misconduct  Deciding Official (3 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated with the name of the official who makes the decision for adverse action  Detail Position (89 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated with the position an employee was detailed to if removed from official position  Offense 2 and 3 (69 and 91 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field tracks the most-significant charges against the employee  If there are fewer than three charges, these fields are left blank  Offense 1 Sustained (14 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated if an individual’s first offense has been sustained  Offense 2 and 3 Sustained (73 and 91 percent of 5,571 blank)— According to OAWP, these fields should be populated if an individual’s second and third offenses have been sustained  The majority of cases only involve one offense  Proposing Official (9 percent of 5,571 blank)—According to OAWP, this field should be populated with the name of the official who makes the proposed adverse action  This data file tracks Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) discrimination complaints  Through our analysis of this information system, we identified 1 field out of 66 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Employment—We found that the values for this field were not mutually exclusive, or independent of one another  For example, this field includes two distinct categories of information: employment status, such as full time or part time; and hiring authority, such as Title 5 or Title 38  This method of storing information resulted in undercounting each of the separate values due to the system’s failure to account for expected overlap  For instance, an employee could be both a full-time and Title 5 employee and the field only tracks one or the other  ORM officials stated that this field has since been modified to capture more options to account for the overlap  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary actions taken against Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 21 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Position—We found the VA-Wide Adverse Employment Action Database contained variations within this field, such as multiple values for the “Cemetery Caretaker” position name  According to OAR, this field is a free-text field, and the office conducts manual searches to review and analyze position titles when needed  Our review found that the different variations in position titles made it difficult to successfully determine the frequency and nature of allegations by position  This is an information system designed to collect allegations of criminal activity, waste, abuse, and mismanagement received by the OIG Hotline Division  Through our analysis of this data file, we identified 1 field out of 7 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Nature of Complaint—Our review of the Master Case Index file found variations of similar values in this field  For example, this field contained 21 different claim types pertaining to similar types of fraud, which made it difficult to assess the frequency and nature of claims entered into the system  OIG officials stated that they do not attempt to account for these variations or assess the frequency of use because they are assigned based on a “best match” to the allegations of the case  This data file is designed to track misconduct and disciplinary action taken against VBA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 20 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Position—Our review found some duplication and overlapping values among this field  For example, the position title for “service representative” contained 21 similar categories with numerous variations in spelling (i e , Veteran Service Representative vs  Veterans Service Representative, and Rating Veteran Service Representative vs  Rating Veterans Service Representative)  We were unable to verify the number of distinct positions due to the lack of standardization within this field  This data file is a tracking spreadsheet for monitoring misconduct and disciplinary action workload  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 5 fields out of 12 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Action Proposed/Decided/Taken—We were unable to analyze this data field because the action taken was tracked in one single field and updated with the most-recent action, rather than each distinct action being entered in a separate field  Consequently, we were not able to distinguish those cases where corrective action may have been taken, to verify whether the corrective action had been implemented  Current Status—We were unable to analyze this data field because it was not a standardized field  For example, we were unable to determine the total number of cases that were closed, open, or pending due to the variations in the data field (e g , Open, open, open – pending, open-pending)  Full Name of Employee, Grievant, Appellant, Complainant, Non- Employee—We were unable to distinguish whether the individual filing a complaint was an employee, grievant, appellant, complainant, or nonemployee because the information entered into this single field only provided the employee’s full name and did not provide a distinction as to which category the record was assigned, as indicated by the field name  NCA Facility—We were unable to analyze this data field because it was not a standardized field  For example, we were unable to run demographic information on the different facilities involved because this field contained erroneous information  Examples of erroneous information included the name of the Memorial Service Network in one case, and the region, rather than the facility name, in another  Supervisor Name—We were unable to analyze this data field because it was not a standardized field  For example, we were unable to determine the total number of supervisors that were associated with each case due to the variations in the names entered within this field, which included misspelled first or last names, addition/omission of middle initials, or no first name  This data file is a tracking spreadsheet for all allegations received by the VA Secretary regarding misconduct, patient care, or other wrongdoing  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 9 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Subject—Our review of this tracking spreadsheet found over 380 different possible categories that could be assigned to one record  These categories contained a significant number of variations  For example, we found 38 different categories that contained possible EEO-related issues such as “EEO/Whistleblower,” “Potential EEO,” and “EEO Violations ” We were unable to distinguish the different subject categories for this field due to the lack of standardization  CSRT officials stated that ExecVA reports contain only data corresponding to specific search criteria  This is an information system for tracking allegations of misconduct at all VA facilities that include violation of law and misdemeanors  Through our analysis of this data file, we identified 3 fields out of 29 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Classification—We found that this field contained at least three different variations of assault categories (i e , assault, assault-other, and assault-aggravated)  VAPS officials stated that this field is determined and entered by the user  Crime Type—We found this field contained at least five different variations of alcohol-consumption categories, such as “entering premises under the influence” and “alcohol – under the influence ” VAPS officials stated that this field is determined and entered by the user  Final Disposition—We found this field contained at least two different variations of charge type (i e , charged, charged – Issued Ticket), six different variations of open type (for example, open/referred to Court, open/cvb), and two different variations of closed type (i e , closed, case closed)  VAPS officials stated that this field is determined and entered by the user  This data file is designed to track all allegations of misconduct and associated disciplinary actions taken against VA employees  Through our analysis of this spreadsheet, we identified 1 field out of 34 that did not have standardization that could be useful to analyze misconduct  Position Title—We found this field contained at least 15 different variations of Registered Nurse, such as “Registered Nurse,” “Staff RN,” and “RN ” Allegations surrounding inadequate staffing, patient care, and safety at a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) emergency room were investigated by the medical center director of the facility  The medical center director found that the inadequate patient care and safety issue was unsubstantiated based on a review of patient safety incidents for the last 6 months  The medical center director did not provide a copy of her report review to support this conclusion  She also indicated that an external consultant was hired to assess staffing issues, and found generally that improvements could be made for staffing to address surge capacity  The director stated the medical center was in the process of implementing the recommendations made by the consultant, but her response did not discuss the specific improvements planned or include the external consultant’s report  A fact-finding was performed by a panel comprised of VA Connecticut Healthcare System officials in response to alleged violations of law, gross mismanagement, and waste of funds that included the improper billing of services for a Las Vegas conference and paying contracts through a VA nonprofit corporation to handle such expenditures  The allegations specifically requested a cost-benefit analysis for the conference location  The response received from the program office stated that an outside accounting firm performs an annual financial audit of the VA nonprofit corporation and found no material issues  Neither a copy of the annual financial audit nor a cost-benefit analysis was provided in the response as support  Additionally, the response did not address allegations regarding the status of several essential positions vacated over the prior 3 years  Allegations involved time-and-attendance abuse by a physician who was accused of not responding to calls from peers or coming into the clinic, in favor of his private practice  According to the complainant, physician assistants (PA) examine the physician’s patients at the clinic for him  The medical center director, who was also named in the allegation as having received a similar complaint against the physician 2 years earlier, reviewed the case against the physician and himself  The medical center director’s response claimed that the location indicated in the allegation was not a private practice, but rather a location where the physician reviews medical records and sometimes serves as an expert witness  He did not provide evidence to support his claim  The medical center director also stated that he had not received any reports against the physician for missed calls or clinics and that PAs are expected to participate in these activities  However, he did not provide the physician’s work log, or the PA position descriptions showing that they are allowed to perform these functions autonomously  Finally, the medical center director claimed he did not recall the allegation made against the physician 2 years prior and neither formally substantiated nor disproved the current allegations against the physician  No recommendations were made  The medical center director was accused of hiring an unqualified individual to a Quality Manager position due to their romantic relationship  The response received from the human-resources consultant noted that it was unusual to find a Nurse II manager with only an associate’s degree, but was not illegal, and the employee was qualified based on prior experience  Concerns were also raised concerning the medical center director’s use of over $400 in government funds to “soundproof” the Quality Manager’s office, including having panels attached to one wall and the hollow office door replaced with a solid door  The Chief of Engineering Services was interviewed regarding the request and stated it was an odd request, and the first time he was asked to soundproof an administrative employee’s office  The response provided by the program office did not address why the director used government funds to soundproof the Quality Manager’s office  The response provided also did not address whether recommendations that the Quality Manager’s retention allowance be reviewed for compliance and that she be counseled for appropriate office dress code were implemented  The medical center director was alleged to have misrepresented a plan to track and provide mental-health services to veterans in non-VA hospitals and created a hostile work environment against African-American veterans and employees  The medical center director investigated the allegations against himself and provided a response that was eventually submitted late to the OIG  His response indicated that a review was completed and all allegations were unsubstantiated  Several documents provided with his response showed that only 12 contacts were made to veterans with mental-health care needs during the requested 24-month period, the percentage of patients experiencing wait times greater than 14 days before receiving mental-health services averaged 18 percent, and two veteran suicides occurred  The medical center director did not address allegations of creating a hostile work environment for African American veterans and employees  The medical center director improperly reannounced a vacancy in order to hire an individual with whom he allegedly had a close personal relationship to an Assistant Director position  He also requested the master key to the facility be issued to her against regulations  The allegation involving the master key was substantiated, but the Deputy Under Secretary who conducted the investigation stated that while there was no record of the key being returned, the key was returned and the general engineer brought the facility into compliance with VA regulations  Nonetheless, the Deputy Under Secretary found that a master key was issued in violation of policy, but no recommendations were made to the medical center director for corrective action  Allegations involved false patient wait-time documentation and abuse of authority  Specifically, a medical center director instructed staff to falsify patient wait times between follow-up appointments in order to meet VA’s 14-day timeliness metric  The investigation concluded that the false documentation allegation was substantiated, but attributed the cause to staff not understanding how to enter a follow-up appointment date into the system  It was also concluded that the correction of several hundred dates in the system improved the performance of the department for the national wait-time metric  However, no documentation was provided to (1) prove the medical center director had not abused his authority by instructing staff to review wait times greater than 14 days to determine how they could be reduced, and (2) support the conclusion that the original wait times were entered in error  In addition to the contact above, Dave Bruno (Assistant Director), Erica Varner (Analyst in Charge), Hiwotte Amare, Chris Cronin, Carrie Davidson, Ranya Elias, Colin Fallon, Mitch Karpman, Grant Mallie, Anna Maria Ortiz, Sabrina Streagle, Reed Van Beveren, and April Van Cleef made key contributions to this report 

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