prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: The House of Representatives has standing rules that govern how bills and resolutions are to be taken up and considered on the floor  However, to expedite legislation receiving floor action, the House may temporarily set aside these rules for measures that are not otherwise privileged for consideration  This can be done by agreeing to a special order of business resolution (special rule) or by adopting a motion to suspend the rules and pass the underlying measure  In general, special rules enable the consideration of complex or contentious legislation, such as major appropriations or reauthorizations, while the suspension of the rules procedure is usually applied to broadly supported legislation that can be approved without floor amendments or extensive debate in the chamber  Most bills and resolutions that receive floor action in the House are called up and considered under suspension of the rules  The suspension procedure allows nonprivileged measures to be raised without a special rule, waives points of order, limits debate, and prohibits floor amendments  Motions to suspend the rules and pass the measure require a two-thirds vote, so the procedure is typically reserved for bills and resolutions that can meet a supermajority threshold  Decisions to schedule bills for consideration under suspension are generally based on how widely supported the measures are, how long Members wish to debate them, and whether they want to propose floor amendments  These decisions are not necessarily related to the subject matter of the measure  Accordingly, measures brought up under suspension cover a wide range of policy areas but most often address government operations, such as the designation of federal facilities  This report describes the suspension procedure, which is defined in clause 1 of House Rule XV, and provides an analysis of measures considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress (2015-2016)  Figures 1- 8 display statistical data, including the prevalence and form of suspension measures, sponsors of measures, committee consideration, length of floor debate, voting, and resolution of differences between the chambers  Table 1 summarizes the final legislative status of measures initially considered in the House under the suspension of the rules  Finally, Figure A-1 depicts the use of the suspension procedure from the 110 th through the 114 th Congresses (2007-2016)  The suspension of the rules procedure is established by clause 1 of House Rule XV  Bills, resolutions, House amendments to Senate bills, amendments to the Constitution, conference reports, and other types of business may be considered under suspension, even those "that would otherwise be subject to a point of order … [or have] not been reported or referred to any calendar or previously introduced " Suspension motions are in order on designated days  As Rule XV states, "the Speaker may not entertain a motion that the House suspend the rules except on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays and during the last six days of a session of Congress " Suspension measures, however, may be considered on other days by unanimous consent or under the terms of a special order of business (special rule) reported by the Committee on Rules and agreed to by the House  A motion to suspend the rules is a compound motion to suspend the House rules and pass a bill or agree to a resolution  When considering such a motion, the House is voting on the two questions simultaneously  Once recognized, the Member making the motion will say, "Mr  [or Madam] Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass___ " The House rules that are suspended under this procedure include those that "would impede an immediate vote on passage of a measure … such as ordering the previous question, third reading, recommittal, or division of the question " A measure considered under the suspension procedure is not subject to floor amendment  The motion to suspend and pass the measure, though, may provide for passage of the measure in an amended form  That is, the text to be approved may be presented in a form altered by committee amendments or by informal negotiations  Suspension measures that are passed with changes incorporated into the text are passed "as amended " There are no separate votes on the floor approving such amendments  Suspension motions are "debatable for 40 minutes, one-half in favor of the motion and one-half in opposition thereto " However, in most instances, a true opponent never claims half the time, and most speakers come to the floor to express support for the measure  Debate time is controlled by two floor managers, one from each party, who sit on a committee of jurisdiction  Each manager makes an opening statement and may yield increments of the 20 minutes they control to other Members to debate the measure  Once debate has concluded, a single vote is held on the motion to suspend the rules and pass the measure  The motion requires approval by "two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum being present " Should the vote fall short of the two-thirds required for passage (290, if all Members vote), the measure is not permanently rejected  Before the end of the Congress, the House may consider the measure again under suspension, or the Committee on Rules may report a special rule that provides for floor consideration of the measure  As illustrated in Figure 1 , the majority of measures considered on the House floor during the 114 th Congress were called up under the suspension of the rules procedure  Sixty-two percent of all measures that received floor action were considered under suspension (743 out of the 1,200), compared to those under the terms of a special rule (14%), unanimous consent (7%), or privileged business (16%)  Figure 2 displays the form of suspension measures  Most of the measures considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress (94%) were bills  House bills made up 83% of the suspension total, Senate bills 11%  As represented in Figure 3 , most suspension measures were sponsored by members of the majority party during the 114 th Congress  House or Senate majority-party members sponsored 69% of all bills and resolutions initially considered in the House under suspension, while House majority-party members sponsored 467 (71%) of the 660 House-originated measures (designated with an H R , H Res , H Con Res  or H J Res  prefix)  Suspension is, however, the most common procedure used to consider minority-sponsored legislation in the House by a wide margin  In the 114 th Congress, 85% of the minority-sponsored measures that were considered on the House floor were raised under the suspension procedure  Members of the House or Senate minority parties sponsored 31% of all suspension measures originating in either chamber, compared to 9% of legislation subject to different procedures, including privileged business (17 measures), unanimous consent (21 measures), and special rules (one Senate bill)  Minority-party House Members sponsored 193 (29%) of the 660 House measures considered under suspension  No minority-party House Member sponsored a House-originated measure that was considered under a special rule  Most suspension measures are referred to at least one House committee before their consideration on the chamber floor  In the 114 th Congress, 710 out of the 743 suspension measures considered (96%) were previously referred to a House committee  Of the 33 measures that were considered without a referral, 31 were Senate bills that were "held at the desk," and two were House resolutions that provided concurrence to Senate amendments  Measures may be referred to multiple House committees before receiving floor action  When a bill or resolution is referred to more than one House committee, the Speaker will designate one committee as primary, meaning it is the committee exercising jurisdiction over the largest part of the measure  Generally, the chair of the committee of primary jurisdiction works with majority party leadership to determine if and when a measure should be considered under suspension  Figure 4 shows the number and percentage of measures brought up under suspension from each House committee of primary jurisdiction  The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (now Oversight and Reform) was the committee of primary jurisdiction for the plurality of measures considered under suspension in the 114 th Congress: 106, or 14%, of the total number of suspension measures considered  Many of these bills designated names for post offices or other federal properties  For most House committees, the majority of their referred measures that reached the floor were raised under the suspension procedure  In the 114 th Congress, the four exceptions were the Committee on House Administration—which had several measures considered by unanimous consent—and the Committees on Appropriations, the Budget, and Armed Services, which had at least half of their measures considered pursuant to special rules  For the other committees, suspension measures ranged from 57% to 100% of the total number of the committee's measures receiving floor action ( Figure 5 )  Since suspension motions require a two-thirds majority for passage, House committees that handle less contentious subjects tend to have more of their measures considered under the suspension procedure in comparison to other committees  In the 114 th Congress, high-suspension committees included Small Business (100% of measures receiving floor action) and Veterans' Affairs (92%)  The Small Business Committee's measures sought to authorize new business development programs  Veterans' Affairs measures included authorizations, reauthorizations, and bills designating federal facilities  While suspension measures are not subject to floor amendments, committees may recommend amendments to legislative texts during markup meetings or through informal negotiations  The motion to suspend the rules can include these proposed changes when a Member moves to suspend the rules and pass the measure "as amended " In the 114 th Congress, 396 suspension measures (53% of the total) were considered "as amended," meaning that the text to be approved differed from the measure's introduced text  Clause 2 of House Rule XIII requires that measures reported by House committees must be accompanied by a written report  Otherwise, they are not placed on a calendar of measures eligible for floor consideration  However, the written report requirement is among those rules suspended under the suspension procedure  Thus, measures may be called up on the floor under suspension of the rules even if a committee never ordered them to be reported or wrote an accompanying committee report  Instead, the motion to suspend the rules discharges the committee and moves the legislation directly to the House floor  In the 114 th Congress, 517 (70%) suspension measures were ordered to be reported by a House committee  Of this number, 398 were reported with an accompanying House committee report  Twenty measures that did not have a House report did have a Senate report, while 325 measures had no written report from either chamber (43% of the total number of suspension measures)  Pursuant to Rule XV, motions to suspend the rules are regularly in order on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays or on the last six days of a session of Congress  However, suspension motions may be considered on other days by unanimous consent or under the terms of a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and agreed to by the House  As displayed in Figure 6 , in the 114 th Congress, the plurality of suspension measures were considered on Tuesdays (312, 42% of the total number considered), followed by Mondays (291, 39%) and Wednesdays (114, 15%)  In addition, 25 suspension measures were considered on Thursdays and one on a Friday  Of these, one was considered by unanimous consent, while 25 were called up under suspension pursuant to permission included in a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and agreed to by the full House  Such special rules included a provision stating, "It shall be in order at any time on the legislative day of ___ for the Speaker to entertain motions that the House suspend the rules as though under clause 1 of rule XV " Pursuant to Rule XV, suspension measures are "debatable for 40 minutes, one-half in favor of the motion and one-half in opposition thereto " In practice, there is rarely a true opponent to a motion to suspend the rules, and the time is divided between two floor managers, usually one from each party, who both favor the motion  The floor managers each control 20 minutes of debate  The managers may be their parties' sole representative for or against the motion, or they may yield increments of the 20-minute allotment to other Members  Typically, the relevant committee chairs and ranking members select the majority and minority floor managers for particular bills and resolutions  These managers may be the measure's sponsor, the chair or ranking member of the measure's committee of primary jurisdiction, or another committee member  In the 114 th Congress, the measure's sponsor served as the majority manager on 26% of the suspension measures receiving floor action  The committee chair managed 29% of the measures  The minority manager was the measure's sponsor for 11% of the measures and the committee's ranking member for 26% of the measures considered  Occasionally, floor managers controlling time on a motion to suspend the rules ceded their control to other Members during debate  In two identified cases, both the majority and minority floor managers favored the measure, and another Member claimed the time in true opposition during the initial floor consideration of the measure  In at least one other instance, the minority manager asked unanimous consent to yield managerial control to another Member  A majority floor manager makes the motion to suspend the rules by stating, "Mr  [Madam] Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill [or resolution] ____ " The Speaker [or Speaker pro tempore] responds, "Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman[woman] from [state] and the gentleman[woman] from [state] each will control twenty minutes " The majority and minority managers then, in turn, make opening statements regarding the measure using the 20 minutes each controls  If the majority and minority managers have secured additional speakers, the speakers generally alternate between the parties within the 40-minute limit  During the 114 th Congress, on a motion to suspend the rules, the average number of speakers in addition to the floor managers was fewer than two  On 83% of the measures (620) considered, there were one or two additional speakers  On 27% of the measures (199) considered, there were no additional speakers, and in 16% of the measures (120) considered, there were 3 to 12 additional speakers  Three measures had 20, 21, and 25 additional speakers, respectively  At the start of the debate period, the majority manager may request "unanimous consent that all Members may have five legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and add extraneous materials on this bill [resolution] " This request enables general leave statements to be inserted into the Congressional Record   In 29% of the suspension measures considered in the 114 th Congress, a written general leave statement appeared in the Record following in-person remarks, indicating that the remarks were submitted on the day the legislation was considered  General leave statements submitted on a day other than the day of consideration appear in the Extension of Remarks section of the Congressional Record   Suspension measures are limited to a maximum of 40 minutes of debate under Rule XV  However, if there are time gaps between speakers or procedural interruptions, such as a vote on a motion to adjourn, the time period between the start of the first speaker's remarks and the conclusion of debate may exceed 40 minutes  The statistics displayed in Figure 7 show the length of consideration of suspension measures as documented in Congress gov, not the accumulated length of statements, as kept by official timekeepers in the chamber  In the 114 th Congress, the average length of consideration on a motion to suspend the rules was 13 minutes and 10 seconds, and half of the measures considered had a debate period of 10 minutes or less  Thus, while overall debate is limited to 40 minutes under the rule, on most suspension measures, only a fraction of that time was actually expended during consideration  Seventeen measures, however, had consideration periods that exceeded 40 minutes due to procedural delays or, in the case of one measure, a request for unanimous consent to extend debate by 10 minutes to each side  House leaders generally choose measures for suspension that are likely to achieve the two-thirds majority threshold for passage  Thus, almost all suspension measures were passed by the House in the 114 th Congress  The full House approved all House resolutions (28), concurrent resolutions (12), joint resolutions (2), and Senate bills (82) that were considered under suspension  The House also passed, via motions to suspend the rules, 612 of the 619 House bills that were initially considered under suspension  Seven bills did not receive the requisite supermajority  Two of these bills were later considered and approved under the terms of a special rule  The remaining five bills did not return to the floor and therefore did not pass the House  Most suspension motions are agreed to in the House by voice vote, which is the chamber's default method of voting on most questions  In 2015 and 2016, this method of voting led to the final approval of 72% (531) of the motions to suspend the rules and pass the measures (see Figure 8 )  After the initial voice vote, Members triggered an eventual record vote (often called a roll call vote) on 212 (28%) of the suspension measures considered in the 114 th Congress  This was done by demanding the "yeas and nays," objecting to the vote "on the grounds that a quorum is not present," or, in one case, demanding a recorded vote  In most instances, the chair elected to postpone the vote to a later period, within two additional legislative days, pursuant to clause 8 of House Rule XX  Of the 212 record votes, 3 immediately followed debate on the measure  The remaining 209 votes were postponed to another time on the legislative schedule, usually later the same day  In the 114 th Congress, 205 suspension motions were adopted by record vote, and 7 motions to suspend the rules were defeated by record votes  The defeat of a motion to suspend the rules, however, does not necessarily kill the legislation  The Speaker may choose to recognize a Member at a later time to make another motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, or the House may consider the measure pursuant to a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules  Accordingly, two of the initially unsuccessful measures were later called up and passed under the terms of a special rule  Five measures were not considered again, via any House floor procedure, before the end of the 114 th Congress  Although suspension measures generally receive broad support, measures that receive the requisite two-thirds majority in the House are not guaranteed passage in the Senate  As noted in Table 1 , in the 114 th Congress, the Senate passed 197 of the 619 House bills initially considered under suspension (32%)  Additionally, the Senate agreed to 1 of the 2 House joint resolutions and 5 of the 11 House concurrent resolutions considered under suspension of the rules  Of the number of suspension measures that passed the House and Senate, 60 required a resolution of differences between the chambers  Forty-four House measures and 15 Senate bills were subject to an amendment exchange process, and on one occasion, a conference committee was used to resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of a House bill  The Senate passed three House bills, initially approved in the House under suspension, that did not become public law because the House did not agree to the final bill text, as amended by the Senate  In those instances, the House did not reconsider the bills once the Senate returned the Senate-amended versions to the House chamber  Thus, 194 House bills were presented to the President for signature  Of the measures initially considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress, President Obama was presented with 194 House bills, 82 Senate bills, and 1 House joint resolution for signature or veto  The President vetoed H R  1777 (Presidential Allowance Modernization Act of 2016) and S  2040 (Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act)  The House chose not to attempt a veto override on H R  1777 , so the measure did not become public law  Both the Senate and House voted to override the veto of S  2040 , enabling it to become law without the President's signature ( P L  114-222 )  Thus, of the 703 law-making measures (bills and joint resolutions) initially considered under suspension of the rules, 193 House bills, 82 Senate bills, and 1 House joint resolution became public law (see Table 1 ) 
Report 2:  Several modernization efforts are under way (communications, engines, etc ), and is working with vendors and its own service engineers to identify problem areas and plan ahead so that replacement parts will be available  Depot maintenance on the B-52 is managed by the program office and conducted at Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex depot  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The C-17 is a long-range, heavy logistic transport aircraft powered by four F-117 turbofan engines with air-refueling capability that was first manufactured in 1987 (see fig  10)  It is capable of rapid strategic delivery of troops and all types of cargo to main operating bases or to bases in any forward deployment area  The C-17 can perform tactical airlift and airdrop missions and can transport ambulatory patients during aeromedical evacuations, when required  The C-17 can carry virtually all air-transportable equipment  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the C-17 have decreased from about $5 3 billion in fiscal 2011 to about $4 0 billion in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit operations decreased, while maintenance costs have generally increased during this period due to contractor logistics support because the C-17 is a predominantly contractor-managed aircraft  The C-17 Enterprise Life Cycle Management Plan and Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (2014) documents current and future acquisition, sustainment, and integration efforts of the aircraft  It also addresses contractual arrangements and partnership support agreements between Air Force, Boeing, and other service providers for aircraft sustainment  Boeing provides continued sole-source life-cycle support for the C-17 under the terms of the Globemaster Integrated Sustainment Program (2013)  Under this program, Boeing is responsible for sustainment, to include material management and depot maintenance support  The C-17 participates in a virtual fleet arrangement, a global network of 43 additional C-17 aircraft, which allows participants total aircraft parts access from any fleet participant worldwide  The C-17 is an aircraft being modified to meet its requirements as well as to address maintenance and supply issues  The Air Force’s actions to mitigate these challenges include processes to increase the service life of the aircraft, allowing managers to quickly hire skilled workers for critical positions, and locating other vendor source for parts  Logistics Complex, and at its facility in San Antonio; landing gear overhaul occurs at Ogden Air Logistics Complex, and engine overhaul occurs at Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex in partnership with Pratt & Whitney, the original equipment manufacturer on the F-117 turbofan engine  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  Sustainment: Depot maintenance conducted by Northrop Grumman, and field maintenance conducted organically, by the National Guard  The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (E-8C) was first manufactured in 1967 (see fig  12)  Its primary mission is to provide theater ground and air commanders with ground surveillance to support attack operations and targeting that contributes to the delay, disruption, and destruction of enemy forces  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the E-8C have generally increased from about $686 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $734 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, maintenance cost has increased partly because of increases in contractor logistics support since the E-8C is maintained by Northrop Grumman  E-8C aircraft were formerly used as commercial airliners and purchased by the Air Force  Therefore, the exact usage of the aircraft was unknown with any degree of specificity  The program office has utilized new analysis conducted by Boeing to develop an improved method of determining and tracking service life for the E-8C aircraft  The new method uses a quantitative analysis capability to identify safety of flight structural concerns, allowing for planning and execution of risk mitigation  The E-8C is an aircraft with significant maintenance and supply issues according to Air Force officials  The Air Force’s actions to mitigate these challenges include updating the Maintenance Plan and the Corrosion Plan for the E-8C (formerly a commercial airframe) to bring them in line with military standards  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  Sustainment: Depot maintenance conducted organically at the designated air logistics complex, and field maintenance conducted organically and by contractors  The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a compact, single-engine, multirole fighter aircraft first manufactured in 1978 (see figure 14)  It is highly maneuverable and participates in air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack  There are four versions of the F-16: A, single-seat model; B, two-seat model with tandem cockpits; C and D, single- and two-seat models, respectively, incorporating newer capabilities  Total operating and support (O&S) cost for the F-16 decreased from about $5 billion in fiscal year 2011 to about $4 billion in fiscal year 2016 because of a 6 percent reduction of inventory  Specifically, maintenance cost has generally decreased during this same period as a result of a decrease in cost of depot maintenance  Sustainment: Performance-based logistics contract with depot maintenance subcontracted to Ogden Air Logistics Complex, Utah, and field maintenance performed organically  and is designed to project air dominance, rapidly and at great distances, and defeat threats  Overall operating and support costs (O&S) for the F-22 have decreased about $248 million overall since fiscal year 2011  Maintenance issues continue to be an area of concern for the aircraft, and these costs increased approximately $255 million from fiscal years 2011 to 2016, due to increases in contractor logistics costs  maintaining a comprehensive diminishing manufacturing sources program and proactively supporting the continued sustainment of component parts of the aircraft through various replacement programs, such as the F-22 Reliability and Maintainability Maturation  This initiative is an ongoing effort to drive continuous improvement in availability  The F-22 faces issues with its low- observable coating and supply funding  Actions to mitigate these challenges include contracting a repair facility to conduct coating reversion repair and securing additional spares funding  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The AV-8B Harrier (AV-8B) is a Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing attack aircraft first manufactured in 1984 (see fig  18)  The AV-8B has the capability of conducting close air support using conventional weapons for intermediate range intercept and attack missions  The AV-8B is capable of deploying and operating on aircraft carriers and other suitable seagoing platforms, advanced bases, expeditionary airfields, and remote tactical landing sites  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the AV-8B have decreased from about $815 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $646 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit-level manpower and operations as well as maintenance costs have decreased partly because the inventory is decreasing as AV-8B squadrons transition to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter  Average number of flying hours: 4,711 hours per aircraft Operating and support cost: $646 million Depot maintenance activity and squadron locations: AV-8B Program Strategic Sustainment and Warfighting Relevance Plan (2013) addresses strategic sustainment and warfighting requirements to ensure relevance, reliability, safety, and sustainability through five pillars: recruit and retain high-quality people, develop a comprehensive readiness and sustainment plan, meet combatant commander requirements, retain and sustain government and industry agencies to support engineering and logistics requirements, and integrate capabilities to remain tactically relevant and operationally effective  AV-8B is maintained organically at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under planned maintenance intervals occurring every 1,500 flight hours; supply support is provided organically by Naval Supply Systems Command and Defense Logistics Agency; contractor support services are provided by Boeing  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  Manufacturer: Grumman Corporation (acquired by Northrop Grumman) The C-2A Greyhound Logistics Aircraft (C-2A) is a high-wing, twin-engine monoplane cargo aircraft first manufactured in 1965 (see fig  20)  It is designed to land on aircraft carriers, with a primary mission of providing critical logistics support to Carrier Strike Groups by transporting high-priority cargo, mail, and passengers between carriers and shore bases  The original C-2A aircraft were overhauled to extend their operational life in 1973 and again from 2004 through 2011  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the C-2A have generally decreased from about $233 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $207 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit-level manpower, unit operations, and continuing system improvements have decreased, while maintenance costs have increased  landing gear, and avionics system, among others  The Navy will include an appendix for the C-2A when it updates the sustainment strategy for the E 2D for its 5-year update  C-2A completed a service life extension program from 2004 through 2011 to increase flight hours from 10,000 to 15,000 and landings from 16,020 to 36,000, among other things  Aircraft are maintained organically by field maintainers and at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under a planned maintenance interval cycle with three planned maintenance interval events occurring consecutively every 24 months, and supply support is provided organically by the Naval Supply Systems Command and Defense Logistics Agency  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The E-2 Hawkeye (E-2C) is the Navy’s all-weather, carrier-based tactical battle management, surface surveillance coordination and airborne early warning, command and control aircraft, with a planned sunset in 2026 when the last E-2D is delivered (see fig  22)  The E-2 is a twin-engine, five- crewmember, high-wing turboprop aircraft with a 24-foot diameter radar rotodome attached to the upper fuselage  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the E-2 have decreased from about $536 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $345 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit manpower and maintenance costs have decreased, partly because E-2C inventory is decreasing as E-2C squadrons transition to the E-2D fleet  comprehensive sustainment logistics, engineering programs, and financial resources necessary to ensure continued platform sustainment and attainment of readiness and safety operations  The Navy will include an appendix for the E-2C when it updates the sustainment strategy for the E-2D for its 5-year update  E-2C is maintained organically by field maintainers and at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under a planned maintenance interval cycle: initial planned maintenance interval is performed by field maintainers at 42 months and the second cycle is performed at a Fleet Readiness Center 46 months after the initial planned maintenance interval  Supply support is provided organically by the Naval Supply Systems Command and Defense Logistics Agency; contractor support services are provided by General Dynamics and Wyle Labs  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D) is the newest variant of the E-2 aircraft platform, expecting to reach full operational capability by 2027 (see fig  24)  Using the same configuration as the E-2C, the E-2D aircraft is used for surface-surveillance coordination and airborne early warning, and command control  Its mission is to provide advanced warning of approaching enemy surface units, and cruise missiles and aircraft, among other things  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the E-2D have increased consistently since fiscal year 2011 to about $125 million in fiscal year 2016  This increase is driven by the addition of aircraft to the inventory as the Navy continues to produce E-2D aircraft through 2026  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The EA-18G Growler is the fourth major variant of the F/A-18 family of aircraft manufactured in 2007 to replace the EA-6B Prowler (see fig  26)  The EA-18G is the first newly designed electronic warfare aircraft produced in more than 35 years and combines the proven F/A-18 Super Hornet platform with a sophisticated electronic warfare suite  Total O&S costs for the EA-18G have consistently increased from about $334 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $868 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit manpower and maintenance costs have increased partly because the inventory is increasing, as EA-18Gs are still in production  design, development, and fielding of the aircraft  Some of the key support program elements include developing support equipment and technical data, testing requirements for avionics, and facilities requirements, among others  The Navy is updating this plan and expects to finalize it in 2018  The aircraft are maintained organically at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under planned maintenance intervals, which typically occur every 72 months  Also, the Navy partners with Boeing to provide wholesale supply and depot repair support for major components, such as the engine  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The F/A-18A-D Hornet Strike Fighter is a twin-engine, mid-wing, multimission tactical aircraft initially fielded in the 1980s (see fig  28)  In its fighter mode, it is used primarily as a fighter escort and for air defense; in its attack mode, it is used for force projection, interdiction, and air support  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the F/A-18A-D have decreased consistently from about $3 1 billion in fiscal year 2011 to about $2 4 billion in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit manpower, operations, and maintenance costs have decreased, partly because the F/A-18A-Ds are being permanently transitioned out of service to be replaced by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter   and financial resources necessary to ensure continued readiness and supportability for the remainder of the aircraft’s service life  The Navy is currently updating this plan and expects to finalize it in 2018  The aircraft are maintained organically at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under planned maintenance intervals, which typically occur every 48 months for carrier-deploying aircraft, and every 72 months for land-based aircraft  The Navy implemented the High-Flight-Hour program in 2006 to extend the service life from 8,000 to 10,000 flight hours by inspecting and repairing airframes, and replacing major components and parts  The High-Flight-Hour program, along with other factors, has led to maintenance carryover (i e , into the next fiscal year) due to maintenance events taking longer than planned  In 1999, the Navy entered into a contract with Boeing for engineering support to leverage resources within the technology and industrial base to improve efficiency of the maintenance process and address the maintenance backlog  The F/A-18A-D is operating beyond its planned service life with maintenance and supply issues  The Navy’s actions to mitigate these challenges include extending the service life of the aircraft, allowing maintainers to work overtime to reduce backlog, and cannibalizing parts—moving parts from one aircraft to another  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The F/A-18E-F Super Hornet was first manufactured in 1998 (see fig  30)  The F/A-18E-F is highly capable across the full mission spectrum: air superiority, fighter escort, reconnaissance, aerial refueling, close air support, air defense suppression, and day/night precision strike  The F/A-18E-F provides aircrew the capability and performance necessary to face 21st century threats  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the F/A-18E-4 have increased from about $2 2 billion in fiscal year 2011 to about $3 1 billion in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit manpower, maintenance, and continuing system support have increased, partly because the inventory is increasing, as the F/A-18E-F is still in production  the Navy is conducting an assessment to determine the number of flight hours the aircraft can safely continue to fly, and then extend the service life of the program through inspections, repairs, and modifications, among other things  The Navy contracted with Boeing to potentially begin these efforts by fiscal year 2018  The F/A-18E-F is a high operational tempo aircraft supporting contingency operations with maintenance and supply issues  The Navy’s actions to mitigate these challenges include plans to extend the service life of the aircraft, training maintainers to transition to vacated positions, and cannibalizing parts—removing parts from one aircraft to another  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  To examine the trends in aircraft availability and operating and support (O&S) costs for selected Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft, including whether the aircraft met availability goals, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 fixed-wing aircraft managed by the Departments of the Air Force and the Navy  These included two Marine Corps aircraft that are managed by the Department of the Navy  This nongeneralizable sample was selected to ensure a mix of aircraft, including type of aircraft (fighter, bomber, cargo, etc ), age of the aircraft, and size of inventory, and whether the aircraft were sustained organically by the Department of Defense (DOD) or through contract arrangements, such as public-private partnerships or performance-based logistics, among other factors  For the Air Force, we selected five fixed-wing aircraft—the B-52 Stratofortress, C-17 Globemaster III, E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), F-16 Fighting Falcon, and F-22 Raptor  For the Navy, including the Marine Corps, we selected seven fixed-wing aircraft—the AV-8B Harrier, C-2A Greyhound Logistics Aircraft, E-2 Hawkeye Early Warning and Control Aircraft, E-2 Advanced Hawkeye Early Warning and Control Aircraft, EA-18G Growler, F/A-18 Hornet Strike Fighter A-D, and F/A-18 Super Hornet E-F  The Marine Corps uses the AV-8B Harrier and also uses a variant of the F/A-18A-D  For the selected aircraft, we obtained and reviewed the aircraft availability, sustainment, and O&S data for accuracy and completeness, interviewed officials regarding their data-collection processes, and reviewed available related policies and procedures associated with the collection of the data  As a result, we found the information to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting sustainment metrics, such as aircraft availability and O&S costs  status due to maintenance, supply, and both  With respect to O&S costs, we collected and analyzed data from fiscal years 2011 through 2016  We conducted data-reliability assessments for the data provided by the Air Force and the Navy  To do this, we sent data-reliability questionnaires to both departments requesting information on the sources that generated the data  For the Air Force, we conducted data-reliability assessments on the Air Force Total Ownership Cost system and the Logistics Installation and Mission Support system  For the Navy, we conducted data-reliability assessments on the Aviation Management Supply and Readiness Reporting—Type Model Series Integrated Database, the Decision Knowledge Programming for Logistics Analysis and Technical Evaluation system, the Flying Hour Projection System / Cost Adjustment and Visibility Tracking System, and the Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs system  We reviewed responses from both departments on these sources as well as documentation—such as guidance, user manuals, and data dictionaries—provided to corroborate questionnaire responses, and interviewed knowledgeable officials to discuss the data  We concluded that the data provided by the Air Force and the Navy were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting condition metrics such as aircraft availability; not mission capable status due to maintenance, supply, and both; depot inductions; budgeted and executed flight hours; and O&S costs for the selected fixed-wing aircraft in our review  To identify the sustainment challenges and mitigation actions for the selected aircraft, we reviewed sustainment metrics data, performance briefings, and other relevant documentation to identify specific challenges for each of the 12 aircraft in our review  We also reviewed ongoing and planned actions to address those challenges  Additionally, we interviewed program officials, depot officials, field maintainers, and squadron personnel to obtain their views on the challenges they face in sustaining the aircraft and the actions they take to mitigate those challenges  In some instances, we visited depots and squadrons to observe aircraft undergoing maintenance, discuss the respective maintenance processes, and discuss challenges and mitigation actions with officials  We then grouped the identified challenges into categories and represented them in a table to demonstrate which aircraft are experiencing specific challenges  To assess the extent to which the Air Force and the Navy have sustainment strategies, regularly review sustainment metrics, and have plans to improve aircraft availability for the selected fixed-wing aircraft, we obtained and analyzed sustainment strategies, performance management frameworks (i e , sustainment metrics collected and monitored as well as the levels of management review), and improvement plans for each of the selected 12 fixed-wing aircraft  We also identified and reviewed DOD, Air Force, and Navy guidance to analyze the departments’ efforts in sustaining these aircraft and to determine whether these were consistent with federal standards for internal control that deal with management defining objectives in specific terms  Specifically, we reviewed DOD Instruction 5000 02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, which provides management principles and mandatory policies for defense acquisition systems such as fixed- wing aircraft  These policies incorporate decision processes and assessing of readiness, which includes the creation of and requirements for a Life-cycle Sustainment Plan  We also reviewed Air Force Instruction 63-101/20-101, Integrated Life Cycle Management, which implements various Air Force and DOD policy directives, including DOD Instruction 5000 02  It establishes the integrated life-cycle management guidelines and procedures for Air Force personnel who develop, review, approve, or manage the systems, subsystems, end-items, services, and activities procured by the Air Force  For the Navy, we reviewed Secretary of the Navy M-5000 2, Department of the Navy Acquisition and Capabilities Guidebook, which provides guidance for the operation of the defense acquisition system and the joint capabilities integration and development system  It also implements DOD Instruction 5000 02 for the Navy and Marine Corps, including guidance on the management and execution of a sustainment strategy  and service guidance  We also reviewed the Air Force’s and the Navy’s performance metric briefings and improvement plans to determine whether the departments regularly reviewed sustainment metrics and had plans aimed at improving aircraft availability  We interviewed DOD, Air Force, and Navy officials knowledgeable about sustainment of these selected fixed-wing aircraft to discuss DOD’s and the departments’ efforts in sustaining these aircraft, including historical information on each aircraft, applicability of policy and guidance for legacy aircraft, and overviews of performance management frameworks identified by the departments to monitor and improve aircraft availability  To develop the fixed-wing aircraft sustainment summary documents (i e , “Sustainment Quick Looks”) in appendixes II–XIII we obtained historical and current information including background on aircraft capabilities, manufacturer, sustainment strategy, depot maintenance and squadron locations, and key dates in the life cycle of each aircraft (i e , first manufactured, initial and full operational capability, last production, and planned sunset year)  We collected and analyzed the following metrics: aircraft availability, not mission capable maintenance, not mission capable supply, and not mission capable aircraft from fiscal year 2011 through March 2017; the number of aircraft in depots for fiscal years 2011 through 2016; budgeted and executed flight hours from fiscal years 2011 through overall O&S and maintenance costs for fiscal years 2011 through 2016  We compared availability actuals to goals, aircraft in depots to availability trends, and budgeted and executed flight hours to availability trends  We analyzed O&S cost by reviewing its six elements and compared them to availability trends  We also analyzed the subcategories of the maintenance costs element  Through interviews with knowledgeable officials and reviewing documentation, we identified sustainment challenges (i e , aging, maintenance and supply support) and mitigation actions to address these challenges for each selected fixed-wing aircraft  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable status, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours, to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only), which must be protected from public disclosure  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  Additionally, to support our work for each objective we conducted site visits and interviewed officials to discuss data trends and identify specific sustainment challenges such as aging, maintenance, and supply support, among other challenges affecting aircraft availability, and mitigation actions to address these challenges  For the Air Force, we met with the following entities: Headquarters—Secretary of the Air Force, Logistics and Product Support and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cost and Economics, Air Force Cost Analysis Agency; Materiel Commands—Air Force Materiel Command and Air Force Life Cycle Management Center; Program Offices—B-52 Program Office, C-17 Program Office, E-8C Program Office, F-16 Program Office, and F-22 Program Office; Depots—Tinker Air Force Base at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (B-52); Robins Air Force Base at Warner Robbins, Georgia (C-17); Northrop Grumman facility at Lake Charles, Louisiana (E-8C); Ogden Air Logistics Center / Hill Air Force Base at Ogden, Utah (F-16 and F-22); and Squadrons—437th Maintenance Group, Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina (C-17); 461st Air Control Wing, Robins Air Force Base Georgia (E-8C); 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina (F-16); and 325th Maintenance Group, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida (F-22)  For the Navy, we met with the following entities: Headquarters—Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy— Expeditionary Programs and Logistics Management, Marine Corps Aviation Plans and Policy Branch, and Air Warfare Division; Materiel Commands—Commander, Fleet Readiness Center; Naval Air Systems Command; and Naval Supply Systems Command; Program Offices—Program Manager–Air (PMA)-231 (C-2A, E-2C, and E-2D); PMA- 257 (AV-8B); and PMA-265 (F/A-18A-F, and EA- 18G); Depots—Fleet Readiness Center–East at Cherry Point, North Carolina; Fleet Readiness Center–Mid Atlantic at Naval Air Station Norfolk, Virginia, and Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia; Squadrons—Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina; Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California; Naval Air Station Norfolk, Virginia; and Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia; and Other—Naval Center for Cost Analysis  The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from September 2016 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We subsequently worked with DOD from April 2018 to September 2018 to prepare this unclassified version of the original sensitive report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards  For fiscal year 2016, total operating and support (O&S) costs for the five Air Force fixed-wing aircraft selected in our review were about $12 billion, and the average O&S cost per aircraft across all five fleets was about $96 million, as shown in figure 32  Each of the C-17 and F-16 fleets accounted for about 33 percent of the total O&S cost, and the E-8C’s average cost per aircraft accounted for about 48 percent of the total average cost per aircraft  For fiscal year 2016, total O&S costs for the seven Navy fixed-wing aircraft selected in our review were about $7 7 billion, and the average O&S cost per aircraft across all seven fleets was about $44 million, as shown in figure 33  The F/A-18E-F fleet accounted for about 40 percent of the total O&S cost, and the E-2C’s average cost per aircraft accounted for about 19 percent of the total average cost per aircraft  In addition to the contact named above, John Bumgarner (Assistant Director), Clarine Allen, Ron Aribo, Vincent Buquicchio, Amie Lesser, Richard Powelson, Steven Putansu, Matt Spiers, and Natasha Wilder made key contributions to this report  Defense Supply Chain: DOD Needs Complete Information on Single Sources of Supply to Proactively Manage the Risks  GAO-17-768  Washington, D C : September 27, 2017  Weapon Systems Management: Product Support Managers’ Perspectives on Factors Critical to Influencing Sustainment-Related Decisions  GAO-17-744R  Washington, D C : September 12, 2017  Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs  GAO-17-333SP  Washington, D C : March 30, 2017  Depot Maintenance: Executed Workload and Maintenance Operations at DOD Depots  GAO-17-82R  Washington, D C : February 3, 2017  Defense Inventory: Further Analysis and Enhanced Metrics Could Improve Service Supply and Depot Operations  GAO-16-450  Washington, D C : June 9, 2016  Weapon Systems Management: DOD Has Taken Steps to Implement Product Support Managers but Needs to Evaluate Their Effects  GAO-14-326  Washington, D C : April 29, 2014 

ground_truth: A key U.S. ally in the Latin American region, Colombia endured an internal armed conflict for half a century. Drug trafficking fueled the violence by funding both left-wing and right-wing armed groups. Some analysts feared Colombia would become a failed state in the late 1990s, but the Colombian government devised a new security strategy, known as Plan Colombia, to counter the insurgencies. Originally designed as a 6-year program, Plan Colombia ultimately became a 17-year U.S.-Colombian bilateral effort. The partnership focused initially on counternarcotics and later on counterterrorism; it then broadened to include sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and many other areas of cooperation. Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $10 billion to help fund Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs. For FY2018, Congress appropriated $391.3 million in foreign aid for Colombia, including assistance to promote peace and end the conflict. President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) made concluding a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—the country's largest leftist guerrilla organization—his government's primary focus. Following four years of formal peace negotiations, Colombia's Congress ratified the FARC-government peace accord in November 2016. During a U.N.-monitored demobilization effort in 2017, approximately 11,000 FARC disarmed and demobilized. This figure included FARC who had been held in prison for crimes of rebellion and those making up FARC militias, who were accredited by the Colombian government as eligible to demobilize. On August 7, 2018, Iván Duque, a senator from the conservative Democratic Center party, was inaugurated to a four-year presidential term. Duque, who also worked at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, DC, and is Colombia's youngest president in a century, campaigned as a critic of the peace accord with the FARC. His party objected to specific measures concerning justice and political representation. Some observers maintain that his election has generated uncertainty for implementation of the accord. Shortly after taking office, Duque suspended peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN), the country's second-largest rebel group, which had begun under President Santos. Since the ratification of the peace accord, Colombia's long-term strategy has evolved from defeating insurgents to post-conflict stabilization. Many considered Plan Colombia and its successor strategies a remarkable advance, given the country's improvements in security and economic stability. Nevertheless, recent developments have called into question Colombia's progress. The FARC's demobilization has triggered open conflict among armed actors (including FARC dissidents and transnational criminal groups), which seek to control drug cultivation and trafficking, illegal mining, and other illicit businesses that the demobilized FARC abandoned. The ongoing lack of governance in remote rural areas recalls the conditions that originally gave rise to the FARC and other armed groups. Many observers continue to raise concerns about the country's human-rights conditions, sharp increases in coca cultivation and cocaine production, and problems stemming from the failing authoritarian government of neighboring Venezuela, which shares a nearly 1,400-mile border with Colombia. Venezuela's humanitarian crisis has set in motion an exodus of migrants, many of whom have sought temporary residence (or extended stays) in Colombia. Political upheaval has added yet more uncertainty after the United States and many other Western Hemisphere and European nations, including Colombia, called for a democratic transition in Venezuela and recognized the president of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as the country's interim president in January 2019. The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement went into force in May 2012. The United States remains Colombia's top trade partner. After several years of annual growth exceeding 4%, one of the steadiest expansion rates in the region, Colombia grew by an estimated 2.7% in 2018. The FARC-government peace accord is projected to cost more than $40 billion to implement over 15 years, adding to the polarization over the controversial peace process. For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10817, Colombia's 2018 Elections, CRS Report R44779, Colombia's Changing Approach to Drug Policy, CRS Report R42982, Colombia's Peace Process Through 2016, and CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Colombia, one of the oldest democracies in the Western Hemisphere and the third most populous Latin American country, has endured a multisided civil conflict for more than five decades until President Juan Ma nuel Santos declared the conflict over in August 2017 at the end of a U N -monitored disarmament  According to the National Center for Historical Memory 2013 report, presented to the Colombian government as part of the peace process to end the fighting, some 220,000 Colombians died in the armed conflict through 2012, 81% of them civilians  The report also provided statistics quantifying the scale of the conflict, which has taken a huge toll on Colombian society: more than 23,000 selective assassinations between 1981 and 2012; internal displacement of more than 5 million Colombians due to land seizure and violence; 27,000 kidnappings between 1970 and 2010; and 11,000 deaths or amputees from anti-personnel land mines laid primarily by Colombia's main insurgent guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)  To date, more than 8 million Colombians, or roughly 15% of the population, have registered as conflict victims  Although the violence has scarred Colombia, the country has achieved a significant turnaround  Once considered a likely candidate to become a failed state, Colombia, over the past two decades, has overcome much of the violence that had clouded its future  For example, between 2000 and 2016, Colombia saw a 94% decrease in kidnappings and a 53% reduction in homicides (below 25 per 100,000 in 2016)  Coupled with success in lowering violence, Colombia has opened its economy and promoted trade, investment, and growth  Colombia has become one of Latin America's most attractive locations for foreign direct investment  Yet, after steady growth over several years, Colombia's economy slowed to 3 1% growth in 2015 and declined to 1 7% in 2017  Many analysts identified Colombia's dependence on oil and other commodity exports as the primary cause  Between 2012 and 2016, the Colombian government held formal peace talks with the FARC, Colombia's largest guerrilla organization  Upon taking office for a second term in August 2014, President Santos declared peace, equality, and education as his top priorities, although achieving the peace agreement remained his major focus  In August 2016, the government and FARC negotiators announced they had concluded their talks and achieved a 300-page peace agreement  The accord was subsequently narrowly defeated in a popular referendum held in early October 2016, but was revised by the Santos government and agreed to by the FARC and then ratified by the Colombian Congress at the end of November 2016  The Colombian conflict predates the formal founding of the FARC in 1964, as the FARC had its beginnings in the peasant self-defense groups of the 1940s and 1950s  Colombian political life has long suffered from polarization and violence based on the significant disparities and inequalities suffered by landless peasants in the country's peripheral regions  In the late 19 th century and a large part of the 20 th century, the elite Liberal and Conservative parties dominated Colombian political life  Violence and competition between the parties erupted in a period of extreme violence in Colombia, known as La Violencia , set off in 1948 by the assassination of Liberal presidential candidate Jorge Gaitán  The violence continued for the next decade  After a brief military rule (1953-1958), the Liberal and Conservative parties agreed to a form of coalition governance, known as the National Front  Under the arrangement, the presidency of the country alternated between Conservatives and Liberals, each holding office in turn for four-year intervals  This form of government continued for 16 years (1958-1974)  The power-sharing formula did not resolve the tension between the two historic parties, and many leftist, Marxist-inspired insurgencies took root in Colombia, including the FARC, launched in 1964, and the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN), which formed the following year  The FARC and ELN conducted kidnappings, committed serious human rights violations, and carried out a campaign of terrorist activities to pursue their goal of unseating the central government in Bogotá  Rightist paramilitary groups formed in the 1980s when wealthy ranchers and farmers, including drug traffickers, hired armed groups to protect them from the kidnapping and extortion plots of the FARC and ELN  In the 1990s, most of the paramilitary groups formed an umbrella organization, the United-Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)  The AUC massacred and assassinated suspected supporters of the insurgents and directly engaged the FARC and ELN in military battles  The Colombian military has long been accused of close collaboration with the AUC, accusations ranging from ignoring their activities to actively supporting them  Over time, the AUC became increasingly engaged in drug trafficking, and other illicit businesses  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U S  government designated the FARC, ELN, and AUC as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)  The AUC was formally dissolved in a collective demobilization between 2003 and 2006 after many of its leaders stepped down  However, former paramilitaries joined armed groups (called criminal bands, or Bacrim, by the Colombian government) who continued to participate in the lucrative drug trade and commit other crimes and human rights abuses  When the FARC demobilized in 2017, other illegally armed groups began aggressive efforts to take control of former FARC territory and its criminal enterprises as FARC forces withdrew  (For more, see " The Current Security Environment ," below ) The inability of Colombia's two dominant parties to address the root causes of violence in the country led to the election of an independent, Álvaro Uribe, in the presidential contest of 2002  Uribe, who served two terms, came to office with promises to take on the violent leftist guerrillas, address the paramilitary problem, and combat illegal drug trafficking  During the 1990s, Colombia had become the region's—and the world's—largest producer of cocaine  Peace negotiations with the FARC under the prior administration of President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) had ended in failure; the FARC used a large demilitarized zone located in the central Meta department (see map, Figure 1 ) to regroup and strengthen itself  The central Colombian government granted the FARC this demilitarized zone, a traditional practice in Colombian peace negotiations, but the FARC used it to launch terror attacks, conduct operations, and increase the cultivation of coca and its processing, while failing to negotiate seriously  Many analysts, noting the FARC's strength throughout the country, feared that the Colombian state might fail and some Colombian citizens thought the FARC might at some point successfully take power  The FARC was then reportedly at the apogee of its strength, numbering an estimated 16,000 to 20,000 fighters under arms  This turmoil opened the way for the aggressive strategy advocated by Uribe  At President Uribe's August 2002 inauguration, the FARC showered the event with mortar fire, signaling the group's displeasure at the election of a hardliner, who believed a military victory over the Marxist rebels was possible  In his first term (2002-2006), President Uribe sought to shore up and expand the country's military, seeking to reverse the armed forces' losses by aggressively combating the FARC  He entered into peace negotiations with the AUC  President Pastrana had refused to negotiate with the rightist AUC, but Uribe promoted the process and urged the country to back a controversial Justice and Peace Law that went into effect in July 2005 and provided a framework for the AUC demobilization  By mid-2006, some 31,000 AUC paramilitary forces had demobilized  The AUC demobilization, combined with the stepped-up counternarcotics efforts of the Uribe administration and increased military victories against the FARC's irregular forces, helped to bring down violence, although a high level of human rights violations still plagued the country  Uribe became widely popular for the effectiveness of his security policies, a strategy he called "Democratic Security " Uribe's popular support was evident when Colombian voters approved a referendum to amend their constitution in 2005 to permit Uribe to run for a second term  Following his reelection in 2006, President Uribe continued to aggressively combat the FARC  For Uribe, 2008 was a critical year  In March 2008, the Colombian military bombed the camp of FARC's second-in-command, Raul Reyes (located inside Ecuador a short distance from the border), killing him and 25 others  Also in March, another of FARC's ruling seven-member secretariat was murdered by his security guard  In May, the FARC announced that their supreme leader and founder, Manuel Marulanda, had died of a heart attack  The near-simultaneous deaths of three of the seven most important FARC leaders were a significant blow to the organization  In July 2008, the Colombian government dramatically rescued 15 long-time FARC hostages, including three U S  defense contractors who had been held captive since 2003 and Colombian senator and former presidential candidate Ingrid Bentancourt  The widely acclaimed, bloodless rescue further undermined FARC morale  Uribe's success and reputation, however, were marred by several scandals  They included the "parapolitics" scandal in 2006 that exposed links between illegal paramilitaries and politicians, especially prominent members of the national legislature  Subsequent scandals that came to light during Uribe's tenure included the "false positive" murders allegedly carried out by the military (primarily the Colombian Army) in which innocent civilians were executed and then dressed to look like guerilla fighters to increase the military's rebel body count  In 2009, the media revealed another scandal of illegal wiretapping and other surveillance by the government intelligence agency, the Department of Administrative Security (DAS), to discredit journalists, members of the judiciary, and political opponents of the Uribe government  (In early 2012, the tarnished national intelligence agency was replaced by Uribe's successor, Juan Manuel Santos ) Despite the controversies, President Uribe remained popular and his supporters urged him to run for a third term in 2010  Another referendum was proposed to alter the constitution to allow a third term; however, it was turned down by Colombia's Constitutional Court  Once it became clear that President Uribe was constitutionally ineligible to run again, Juan Manuel Santos of the pro-Uribe National Unity party (or Party of the U) quickly consolidated his preeminence in the 2010 presidential campaign  Santos, a centrist, who came from an elite family that once owned the country's largest newspaper, had served as Uribe's defense minister through 2009  In 2010, Santos campaigned on a continuation of the Uribe government's approach to security and its role encouraging free markets and economic opening, calling his reform policy "Democratic Prosperity " In the May 2010 presidential race, Santos took almost twice as many votes as his nearest competitor, Antanas Mockus of the centrist Green Party, but he did not win a majority  Santos won the June runoff with 69% of the vote  Santos's "national unity" ruling coalition formed during his campaign included the center-right National Unity and Conservative parties, the centrist Radical Change Party, and the center-left Liberal party  On August 7, 2010, President Santos said in his first inauguration speech that he planned to follow in the path of President Uribe, but that "the door to [peace] talks [with armed rebels] is not locked " The Santos government was determined to improve relations with Ecuador and Venezuela, which had become strained under Uribe  Santos sought to increase cooperation on cross-border coordination and counternarcotics  He attempted to reduce tensions with Venezuela that had become fraught under Uribe, who claimed that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez had long harbored FARC and ELN forces  During his first two years in office, President Santos reorganized the executive branch and built on the market opening strategies of the Uribe administration and secured a free-trade agreement with the United States, Colombia's largest trade partner, which went into effect in May 2012  To address U S  congressional concerns about labor relations in Colombia, including the issue of violence against labor union members, the United States and Colombia agreed to an "Action Plan Related to Labor Rights" (Labor Action Plan) in April 2011  Many of the steps prescribed by the plan were completed in 2011 while the U S  Congress was considering the free trade agreement  Significantly, the Santos government maintained a vigorous security strategy and struck hard at the FARC's top leadership  In September 2010, the Colombian military killed the FARC's top military commander, Victor Julio Suárez (known as "Mono Jojoy"), in a bombing raid  In November 2011, the FARC's supreme leader, Guillermo Leon Saenz (aka "Alfonso Cano") was assassinated  He was replaced by Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri (known as "Timoleón Jiménez" or "Timochenko"), the group's current leader  While continuing the security strategy, the Santos administration began to re-orient the Colombian government's stance toward the internal armed conflict through a series of reforms  The first legislative reform that moved this new vision along, signed by President Santos in June 2011, was the Victims' and Land Restitution Law (Victims' Law), to provide comprehensive reparations to an estimated (at the time) 4 million to 5 million victims of the conflict  Reparations under the Victims' Law included monetary compensation, psycho-social support and other aid for victims, and the return of millions of hectares of stolen land to those displaced  The law was intended to process an estimated 360,000 land restitution cases  The government's implementation of this complex law began in early 2012  Between 2011 and 2016, there were more than 100,000 applications for restitution and 5,000 properties, or about 5%, were resolved by judges  The Victims' Law, while not a land reform measure, tackled issues of land distribution including the restitution of stolen property to displaced victims  Given the centrality of land issues to the rural peasant-based FARC, passage of the Victims' Law was a strong indicator that the Santos government shared its interest in addressing land and agrarian concerns  In June 2012, another government initiative—the Peace Framework Law, also known as the Legal Framework for Peace—was approved by the Colombian Congress, which signaled that congressional support for a peace process was growing  In August 2012, President Santos announced he had opened exploratory peace talks with the FARC and was ready to launch formal talks  The countries of Norway, Cuba, Venezuela, and Chile each held an international support role, with Norway and Cuba serving as peace talk hosts and "guarantors " Following the formal start in Norway, the actual negotiations began a month later in mid-November 2012 in Cuba, where the FARC-government talks continued until their conclusion in August 2016  In the midst of extended peace negotiations, Colombia's 2014 national elections presented a unique juncture for the country  During the elections, the opposition Centro Democrático (CD) party gained 20 seats in the Senate and 19 in the less powerful Chamber of Representatives, and its leader, former President Uribe, became a popular senator  His presence in the Senate challenged the new ruling coalition that backed President Santos  During his second-term inaugural address in August 2014, President Santos declared three pillars—peace, equality, and education—as his focus, yet his top priority was to conclude the peace negotiations with the FARC  In February 2015, the Obama Administration provided support to the peace talks by naming Bernard Aronson, a former U S  assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, as the U S  Special Envoy to the Colombian peace talks  Talks with the FARC concluded in August 2016  In early October, to the surprise of many, approval of the accord was narrowly defeated in a national plebiscite by less than a half percentage point of the votes cast, indicating a polarized electorate  Regardless, President Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2016, in part demonstrating strong international support for the peace agreement  In response to the voters' criticisms, the Santos government and the FARC crafted a modified agreement, which they signed on November 24, 2016  Rather than presenting this agreement to a plebiscite, President Santos sent it directly to the Colombian Congress, where it was ratified on November 30, 2016  Although both chambers of Colombia's Congress approved the agreement unanimously, members of the opposition CD party criticized various provisions in the accord that they deemed inadequate and boycotted the vote  The peace process was recognized as the most significant achievement of the Santos presidency and lauded outside of Colombia and throughout the region  Over the course of two terms, the President's approval ratings rose and fell rather significantly  His crowning achievement, the accord negotiated over 50 rounds of talks, covered five substantive topics: rural development and agricultural reform; political participation by the FARC; an end to the conflict, including demobilization, disarmament and reintegration; a solution to illegal drug trafficking; and justice for victims  A sixth topic provided for mechanisms to implement and monitor the peace agreement  Colombians elected a new congress in March 2018 and a new president in June 2018  Because no presidential candidate won more than 50% of the vote on May 27, 2018, as required for a victory in the first round, a second-round runoff was held June 17 between the rightist candidate Iván Duque and the leftist candidate Gustavo Petro (see results for presidential contest, Figure 3 )  Duque was carried to victory with almost 54% of the vote  Runner-up Petro, a former mayor of Bogotá, a former Colombian Senator, and once a member of the M-19 guerilla insurgency, nevertheless did better than any leftist candidate in a presidential race in the past century; he won 8 million votes and nearly 42% of the votes cast  Around 4 2% were protest votes, signifying Colombian voters who cast blank ballots  Through alliance building, Duque achieved a functional majority or a "unity" government, which involved the Conservative Party, Santos's prior National Unity or Party of the U, joining the CD, although compromise was required to keep the two centrist parties in sync with the more conservative CD  In the new Congress, two extra seats, for the presidential and vice presidential runners up, became automatic seats in the Colombian Senate and House, due to a constitutional change in 2015, allowing presidential runner up Gustavo Petro to return to the Senate  The CD party, which gained seats in both houses in the March vote, won the majority in the Colombian Senate (see Figure 2 for seat breakouts by party)  Duque, who was inaugurated on August 7, 2018, at the age of 42, was the youngest Colombian president elected in a century  He possessed limited experience in Colombian politics  Duque was partially educated in the United States and worked for at decade at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, DC  He was the handpicked candidate of former president Uribe, who vocally opposed many of Santos's policies  Disgruntled Colombians perceived Santos as an aloof president whose energy and political capital were expended accommodating an often-despised criminal group, the FARC  President Duque appeared to be technically oriented and interested in economic reform, presenting himself as a modernizer  During his campaign, Duque called for economic renewal and lower taxes, fighting crime, and building renewed confidence in the country's institutions through some reforms  On September 26, 2018, in a speech before the U N  General Assembly, the new president outlined his policy objectives   Duque called for increasing legality, entrepreneurship, and fairness by (1) promoting peace; (2) combating drug trafficking and recognizing it as a global menace, and (3) fighting corruption, which he characterized as a threat to democracy  He also maintained that the humanitarian crisis in neighboring Venezuela, resulting in more than 1 million migrants fleeing to Colombia, was an emergency that threatened to destabilize the region  Duque proposed a leadership role for Colombia in denouncing the authoritarian government of President Nicolás Maduro and containing his government's damage  By late November 2018, 1 2 million Venezuelans already present in Colombia were putting increasing pressure on the government's finances, generating a burden estimated at nearly 0 5% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP)  President Duque, along with his vice president, Marta Lucía Ramírez, who initially ran as the Conservative Party candidate in the first round, recommended that drug policy shift back to a stricter counterdrug approach rather than a model endorsed in the peace accord, which focuses on voluntary eradication and economic support to peasant farmers to transition away from illicit drug crops  Duque campaigned on returning to spraying coca crops with the herbicide glyphosate  This would reverse Colombia's decision in mid-2015 to end aerial spraying, which had been a central—albeit controversial—feature of U S -Colombian counter-drug cooperation for two decades  Colombians' concerns with corruption became particularly acute during the 2018 elections, as major scandals were revealed  Similar to many countries in the region, government officials, including Santos during his 2014 campaign for reelection and the opposition candidate during that campaign were accused of taking payoffs (bribes) from the Odebrecht firm, the Brazilian construction company that became embroiled in a region-wide corruption scandal  In December 2018, presidential runner up Gustavo Petro was accused of taking political contributions from Odebrecht in a video released by a CD senator, indicating that both the left and the right of the Colombian political spectrum has been tainted by corruption allegations  In June 2017, the U S  Drug Enforcement Administration arrested Colombia's top anti-corruption official, Gustavo Moreno  In mid-September 2017, the former chief justice of Colombia's Supreme Court was arrested for his alleged role in a corruption scandal that involved other justices accused of taking bribes from Colombian congressmen, some with ties to illegal paramilitary groups  The series of corruption charges made against members of Colombia's judicial branch, politicians, and other officials made the issue a prominent one in Colombian politics and was the focus of a left-centrist candidate's campaign in the presidential contest  In late August 2018, an anti-corruption referendum was defeated by narrowly missing a high vote threshold by less than a half percentage point, although the actual vote favored all seven proposed changes on the ballot  President Duque endorsed the referendum and maintains he will seek to curb many of the abuses identified in the referendum through legislation that his administration will propose  The Duque Administration's first budget for 2019 presented in late October 2018 was linked to an unpopular tax reform that would expand a value-added tax to cover basic food and agricultural commodities (some 36 items in the basic basket of goods, such as eggs and rice, previously exempted)  The 2019 budget totals $89 7 billion, providing the education, military and police, and health sectors with the biggest increases, and reducing funding for peace accord implementation  Duque's own Democratic Center party split with him on the value-added tax, which quickly sank his approval ratings from 53% in early September 2018 to a low of 27% in November 2018, among the lowest levels in the early part of a presidential mandate in recent Colombian history  Colombia's economy is the fourth largest in Latin America after Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina  The World Bank characterizes Colombia as an upper middle-income country, although its commodities-dependent economy has been hit by oil price declines and peso devaluation related to the erosion of fiscal revenue  Between 2010 and 2014, Colombia's economy grew at an average of more than 4%, but slowed to 3 1% GDP growth in 2015  In 2017, Colombia's GDP growth slowed further to 1 7%  Despite its relative economic stability, high poverty rates and inequality have contributed to social upheaval in Colombia for decades  The poverty rate in 2005 was slightly above 45%, but declined to below 27% in 2016  The issues of limited land ownership and high rural poverty rates remain a problem  According to a United Nations study published in 2011, 1 2% of the population owned 52% of the land, and data revealed in 2016 that about 49% of Colombians continued to work in the informal economy  Colombia is often described as a country bifurcated between metropolitan areas with a developed, middle-income economy, and some rural areas that are poor, conflict-ridden, and weakly governed  The fruits of the growing economy have not been shared equally with this ungoverned, largely rural periphery  Frequently these more remote areas are inhabited by ethnic minorities or other disadvantaged groups, such as Afro-Colombians, indigenous populations, or landless peasants and subsistence farmers, who are vulnerable to illicit economies due to few connections to the formal economy  The United States is Colombia's leading trade partner  Colombia accounts for a small percentage of U S  trade (approximately 1%), ranking 22 nd among U S  export markets and 27 th among foreign exporters to the United States in 2017  Colombia has secured free trade agreements with the European Union, Canada, and the United States, and with most nations in Latin America  Colombian officials have worked over the past decade to increase the attractiveness of investing in Colombia, and foreign direct investment (FDI) grew by 16% between 2015 and 2016  This investment increase came not only from the extractive industries, such as petroleum and mining, but also from such areas as agricultural products, transportation, and financial services  Promoting more equitable growth and ending the internal conflict were twin goals of the two-term Santos administration  Unemployment, which historically has been high at over 10%, fell below that double-digit mark during Santos's first term and remained at 9 2% in 2016 but rose slightly to an estimated 9 6% in 2018  Although Colombia is ranked highly for business-friendly practices and has a favorable regulatory environment that encourages trade across borders, it is still plagued by persistent corruption and an inability to effectively implement institutional reforms it has undertaken, particularly in regions where government presence is weak  According to the U S  State Department in its analysis of national investment climates, Colombia has demonstrated a political commitment to create jobs, develop sound capital markets, and achieve a legal and regulatory system that meets international norms for transparency and consistency  Despite its macroeconomic stability, several issues remain, such as a still-complicated tax system, a high corporate tax burden, and continuing piracy and counterfeiting issues  Colombia's rural-sector protestors formed strikes and blockades beginning in 2013 with demands for long-term and integrated-agricultural reform in a country with one of the most unequal patterns of land ownership  In October and November 2018, Colombian secondary and university students protested in high numbers during six large mobilizations, taking place over 60 days, to demand more funding for education  The four-year peace talks between the FARC and the Santos administration started in Norway and moved to Cuba where negotiators worked through a six-point agenda during more than 50 rounds of talks that produced agreements on six major topics  The final topic—verification to enact the programs outlined in the final accord—all parties knew would be the most challenging, especially with a polarized public and many Colombians skeptical of whether the FARC would be held accountable for its violence and crimes during the years of conflict  Some analysts have estimated that to implement the programs required by the commitments in the accord to ensure stable post-conflict development may require 15 years and cost from $30 billion to $45 billion  The country faces steep challenges to underwrite the post-accord peace programs in an era of declining revenues  While progress has been uneven, some programs (those related to drug trafficking) had external pressure to move forward quickly and some considered urgent received "fast track" treatment to expedite their regulation by Congress  The revised peace accord that was approved by the Colombian Congress in late 2016 was granted fast track implementation by the Colombian Constitutional Court in a ruling on December 13, 2016, particularly applied to the FARC's disarmament and demobilization  However, in May 2017, a new ruling by the high court determined that all legislation related to the implementation of the accord needed to be fully debated rather than passed in an expedited fashion, which some analysts maintain started to slow the process of implementing the accord significantly  The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame is responsible for monitoring and implementing the agreement  It issued two interim reports in November 2017 and August 2018  At the end of the last reporting period (June 2018), the Kroc Institute estimated that 63% of the 578 peace accord commitments have begun implementation  In relation to other peace accords it had studied, the Kroc Institute found that the implementation of Colombia's accord was on course as about average, although that progress took place prior to President Duque's election  The first provision undertaken was the demobilization of the FARC, monitored by a U N  mission that was approved by the U N  Security Council to verify implementation of the accords  U N  monitors also emptied large arm caches identified by FARC leaders, seizing the contents of more than 750 of the reported nearly 1,000 caches by the middle of 2017  With the final disarmament, President Santos declared the conflict over in mid-August 2017  The U S  State Department reported in its Country Reports on Terrorism 201 , that by September 25, 2017, the United Nations had verified the collection of 8,994 arms, 1 7 million rounds, and more than 40 tons of explosives  The report states that the Colombian government had accredited "roughly 11,000 ex-combatants for transition to civilian life " The FARC also revealed its hidden assets in September 2017, listing more than $330 million in mostly real estate investments  This announcement drew criticism from several analysts who note that the FARC assets are likely much greater  In July 2017, the U N  Security Council voted to expand its mandate and launch a second mission for three years to verify the reintegration of FARC guerrillas into civil society beginning September 20, 2017  One of Colombia's greatest challenges continues to be ensuring security for ex-combatants and demobilized FARC  The FARC's reintegration into civil society is a charged topic because the FARC's efforts in the 1980s to start a political party, known as the Patriotic Union, or the UP by its Spanish acronym, resulted in more than 3,000 party members being killed by rightwing paramilitaries and others  As of the end of 2018, reportedly 85 FARC members and their close relatives had been killed  In addition to unmet government guarantees of security, the FARC also has criticized the government for not adequately preparing for the group's demobilization  According to observers, the government failed to provide basic resources to FARC gathered throughout the country in specially designated zones for disarmament and demobilization (later renamed reintegration zones)  The demobilization areas or cantonments had been so little prepared in early 2017 that the FARC had in many cases to construct their own housing and locate food and other provisions  Reintegration of former combatants has proceeded slowly  The Constitutional Court's May 2017 ruling to restrict fast track, and controversy about the new court to try war crimes and other serious violations, the "Special Jurisdiction of Peace" led to further delays  Peace process advocates have cited limited attention to include ethnic Colombians, such as Afro-Colombian leaders and indigenous communities, into the accord's implementation, as required by the "ethnic chapter" of the peace accord  A U N  deputy human rights official warned in October 2017 that after a successful demobilization it would be dangerous not to reintegrate FARC former combatants by providing them realistic options for income and delaying effective reintegration could undermine peace going forward  Under the peace accord, Territorially Focused Development Programs (PDETs in Spanish) are a tool for planning and managing a broad rural development process, with the aim of transforming170 municipalities (covering 16 subregions) most affected by the armed conflict  PDETs target those municipalities in Colombia with the highest number of displacements and those that have experienced the most killings, massacres, and forced disappearances  These marginal areas generally have experienced chronic poverty, high inequality, the presence of illicit crops such as coca, and low levels of local government institutional performance  Violence and forced displacements in some of the PDET municipalities increased in the last half of 2018  Colombia's Constitutional Court determined in October 2017 that over the next three presidential terms (until 2030), Colombia must follow the peace accord commitments negotiated by the Santos administration and approved by the Colombian Congress in 2016  The Special Jurisdiction of Peace, set up to adjudicate the most heinous crimes of Colombia's decades-long armed conflict, began to hear cases in July 2018  However, Colombians remain skeptical of its capacity  A key challenge is the case of a FARC leader and lead negotiator in the peace process, Jesús Santrich, alleged to have committed drug trafficking crimes in 2017 after the accord was ratified, who has been jailed  Colombia has confronted a complex security environment of armed groups: two violent leftist insurgencies, the FARC and the ELN, and groups that succeeded the AUC following its demobilization during the Uribe administration  The FARC, whittled down by the government's military campaign against it, continued to conduct a campaign of terrorist activities during peace negotiations with the government through mid-2015, but it imposed successive temporary unilateral cease-fires that significantly reduced violence levels  In August 2016, the FARC and the government concluded negotiations on a peace accord that was subsequently approved by Congress with modifications in November 2016  Authorities and some analysts maintain that since the peace accord was ratified, 5% to 10% of the FARC have become dissidents who reject the peace settlement, although other estimates suggest a higher percentage  These armed individuals remain a threat  As agreed in the peace accord, the demobilized rebels transitioned to a political party that became known as the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force (retaining the acronym FARC) in September 2017  On November 1, 2017, the FARC announced their party's presidential ticket: current FARC leader Rodrigo Londoño (aka Timochenko) for president and Imelda Daza for vice president  The FARC Party ran several candidates in congressional races but failed to win any additional congressional race for which it competed in the March 2018 legislative elections, so the automatic seats in Congress were the only ones that it filled  The ELN, like the FARC, became deeply involved in the drug trade and used extortion, kidnapping, and other criminal activities to fund itself  The ELN, with diminished resources and reduced offensive capability, according to government estimates, declined to fewer than 2,000 fighters, although some analysts maintain in 2018 the forces grew as high as 3,400, including former FARC who were recruited to join the ELN as the larger rebel group demobilized  In 2015, ELN leadership began exploratory peace talks with the Santos government in Ecuador, although the ELN continued to attack oil and transportation infrastructures and conduct kidnappings and extortions, at least periodically  Formal talks with the ELN finally opened in February 2017 in Quito, Ecuador  After the talks moved to Cuba in May 2018, at the request of Ecuador's President Lenín Moreno, several negotiating sessions took place  The ELN's central leadership, including Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista (aka "Gabino"), arrived in Cuba to continue the talks  However, President Duque in September 2018 suspended the talks and recalled the government negotiating team  The ELN is far more regionally oriented, decentralized, and nonhierarchical in its decisionmaking than the FARC  Late in 2018, a Colombian political online magazine claimed a meeting had been held two months earlier between FARC dissident groups and the ELN in Venezuela in which the parties discussed how to increase their coordination  On January 17, 2019, a car bomb attack at a National Police academy in southern Bogotá shattered illusions that Colombia's long internal conflict with insurgents was coming to an end  The bombing, allegedly carried out by an experienced ELN bomb maker, killed 20 police cadets and the bomber and injured more than 65 others  The ELN took responsibility for the attack in a statement published on January 21  Large demonstrations took place in Bogotá protesting the return of violence to Colombia's capital city  The Duque government ended peace talks with the ELN, which had been ongoing sporadically since 2017  The Duque government then requested extradition of the ELN's delegation of negotiators to the peace talks in Cuba on terrorism charges  The Cuban government, which condemned the bombing, responded that the protocols for the peace talks required that the negotiators be returned to Colombia without arrest  The Duque government has persisted in requesting the negotiators to be extradited  The AUC, the loosely affiliated national umbrella organization of paramilitaries, officially disbanded a decade ago  The organization was removed from the State Department's Foreign Terrorist Organizations list in July 2014  More than 31,000 AUC members demobilized between 2003 and 2006, and many AUC leaders stepped down  However, as noted, many former AUC paramilitaries continued their illicit activities or re-armed and joined criminal groups—known as Bacrim   Many observers view the Bacrim as successors to the paramilitaries, and the Colombian government has characterized these groups as the biggest threat to Colombia's security since 2011  The Bacrim do not appear to be motivated by the dream of defeating the national government, but they seek territorial control and appear to provide rudimentary justice in ungoverned parts of the country  In 2013, the criminal group Los Urabeños, launched in 2006, emerged as the dominant Bacrim  Over its lifetime, the group has been referred to as the Gaitanistas, the Clan Úsuga, and most recently El Clan del Golfo, growing to about 3,000 members by 2015  The Urabeños organization is heavily involved in cocaine trafficking as well as arms trafficking, money laundering, extortion, gold mining, human trafficking, and prostitution  Early leaders of the group, such as founder Daniel Rendón Herrera (alias "Don Mario") and his brother Feddy Rendón Herrera were designated drug kingpins under the U S  Kingpin Act in 2009 and 2010, respectively  However, because these men had been part of the AUC peace process, they could not be extradited to the United States until they had served time and paid reparations  In June 2015, the Justice Department unsealed indictments against 17 alleged Urabeños members  The Colombian government's efforts to dismantle the Urabeños and interrupt its operations began to result in the capture of top leaders and gradually to disrupt its illicit activities  The Urabeños faced an intense enforcement campaign by the Colombian police and military, especially after the Urabeños reportedly advertised and paid rewards to its subcontracted assassins to murder Colombian police  In September 2017, the Urabeños top leader, Dairo Antonio Úsuga (alias "Otoniel"), requested terms of surrender from the Santos government after the arrest of his wife and the killing or arrest of siblings and co-leaders, but this offer was never formalized  Colombia captured a vast amount of cocaine, approximately 12 metric tons, linked to the the Urabeños in November 2017  Splinter groups of the large Colombian drug cartels of the 1980s and 1990s, such as the Medellin Cartel and Cali Cartel, have come and gone in Colombia, including the powerful transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) the Norte del Valle Cartel and Los Rastrajos  The U S  Drug Enforcement Administration's 2018 National Drug Threat Assessment maintains "large-scale Colombian TCOs" work closely with Mexican and Central American TCOs to export large quantities of cocaine out of Colombia every year  Traditionally, the FARC and ELN had cooperated with Bacrim and other Colombian crime groups in defense of drug trafficking and other illicit activities despite the groups' ideological differences  Venezuela is a major transit corridor for Colombian cocaine  According to the State Department's 2018 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report , Venezuela's porous western border with Colombia, current economic crisis, weak judicial system, sporadic international drug control cooperation, and a permissive and corrupt environment make it a preferred trafficking route for illicit drugs  A May 2018 report by Insight Crime identified more than 120 high-level Venezuelan officials who have engaged in criminal activity  The report analyzes how the Venezuelan military, particularly the National Guard, has been involved in the drug trade since 2002 and colluded with other illegally armed groups  Another Bacrim, Los Rastrojos, reportedly controls important gasoline smuggling routes between Venezuela and Colombia in 2018  Similarly, in the past year, ELN guerrillas reportedly have moved from seeking safe haven in Venezuela to taking control of illicit gold mining areas near Venezuela's border with Guyana  Both the ELN, which is still engaged in armed conflict with the Colombian government, and its rival, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), reportedly recruit Venezuelans to cultivate coca in Colombia  Human trafficking and sexual exploitation of Venezuelan migrants throughout Colombia is prevalent  Dissident FARC guerrillas are using border areas and other remote areas in the countryside to regroup and could eventually seek to consolidate into a more unified organization or coordinate with other criminal groups sheltering in Venezuela  The State Department's 2017 terrorism report published in April 2018 maintained that the number of terrorist incidents in Colombia—carried out by the FARC and ELN—decreased significantly, by 40%, over the already much-diminished level of 2016  ELN aggression included high-impact attacks, such as launching mortars at police stations and bombing pipelines, although the report also states that ELN demobilizations and surrenders have increased  The humanitarian crisis in Venezuela has set in motion a mass exodus of desperate migrants, who have come temporarily (or for extended stays) to Colombia  Although Venezuela has experienced hyperinflation (the highest in the world), a rapid contraction of its economy, and severe shortages of food and medicine, as of November 2018 Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has refused most international humanitarian assistance  Based on estimates from the U N  High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of November 2018, more than 3 million Venezuelans were living outside Venezuela; of these, an estimated 2 3 million left after 2015  As conditions in Venezuela have continued to deteriorate, increasing numbers of Venezuelans have left the country  Neighboring countries, particularly Colombia, are straining to absorb a migrant population that is often malnourished and in poor health  The spread of previously eradicated diseases, such as measles, is also a major regional concern  In January 2019, the Trump Administration announced backing for the president of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as interim president of Venezuela  The Trump Administration has called for Maduro's departure, and Colombia joined many other countries in Latin America and Europe to recognize Guaidó  U S  Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced that the United States was prepared to provide $20 million in humanitarian assistance to the people of Venezuela  Colombia joined 11 countries in the Lima Group that declared on February 4, 2019, their desire to hasten a return to democracy in Venezuela by working with Guaidó for a peaceful transition without the use of force  Colombia's multisided internal conflict over the last half century generated a lengthy record of human rights abuses  Although it is widely recognized that Colombia's efforts to reduce violence, combat drug trafficking and terrorism, and strengthen the economy have met with success, many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights groups continue to report significant human rights violations, including violence targeting noncombatants, that involves killings, torture, kidnappings, disappearances, forced displacements, forced recruitments, massacres, and sexual attacks  The Center for Historical Memory report issued to the Colombian government in July 2013 traces those responsible for human rights violations to the guerrillas (the FARC and ELN), the AUC paramilitaries and successor paramilitary groups, and the Colombian security forces  In analyzing nearly 2,000 massacres between 1980 and 2012 documented in the center's database, the report maintains that 58 9% were committed by paramilitaries, 17 3% by guerrillas, and 7 9% by public security forces  According to the U S  State Department's annual report on human rights covering 2017, Colombia's most serious human rights abuses centered on extrajudicial and unlawful killings; torture and detentions; rape and sexual crimes  In addition to the State Department, numerous sources report regularly on human rights conditions in Colombia  (See Appendix  ) Colombia continues to experience murders and threats of violence against journalists, human rights defenders, labor union members, social activists such as land rights leaders, and others  Crimes of violence against women, children, Afro-Colombian and indigenous leaders, and other vulnerable groups continue at high rates  In December 2018, the U N  special rapporteur on human rights defenders came out with strong criticism of heightened murders of human rights defenders, which he maintained were committed by hitmen paid no more than $100 per murder, according to reports he heard from activists and other community members whom he met with during a trip to Colombia  These ongoing issues reflect constraints of the Colombian judicial system to effectively prosecute crimes and overcome impunity  For many years, human rights organizations have raised concerns about extrajudicial executions committed by Colombian security forces, particularly the military  In 2008, it was revealed that several young men from the impoverished community of Soacha—who had been lured allegedly by military personnel from their homes to another part of the country with the promise of employment—had been executed  When discovered, the Soacha murder victims had been disguised as guerrilla fighters to inflate military claims of enemy body counts, resulting in the term false positives   Following an investigation into the Soacha murders, the military quickly fired 27 soldiers and officers, including three generals, and the army's commander resigned  The Colombian prosecutor general's criminal investigations of soldiers and officers who allegedly participated in the Soacha executions have proceeded quite slowly  Some 48 of the military members eventually charged with involvement in the Soacha cases were released due to the expiration of the statute of limitations  Whereas some soldiers have received long sentences, few sergeants or colonels have been successfully prosecuted  In 2009, the false positive phenomenon was investigated by the U N 's Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, who issued a report that concluded with no finding that such killings were a result of an official government policy  However, the Special Rapporteur did find, "the sheer number of cases, their geographic spread, and the diversity of military units implicated, indicate that these killings were carried out in a more or less systematic fashion by significant elements within the military " The majority of the cases took place between 2004 and 2008, when U S  assistance to Colombia peaked  In recent years, the number of new alleged false positive cases declined steeply, but human rights NGOs still reported a few cases in 2012 through 2015  To address the military's human rights violations, the Santos administration proposed a change to policy that did not prevail  This reform was a constitutional change to expand the jurisdiction of military courts and, it was approved by the Colombian Congress in late December 2012 by a wide margin despite controversy  Human rights groups criticized the legislation's shift in the jurisdiction over serious human rights crimes allegedly committed by Colombia's public security forces from the civilian to the military justice system  In its review of the constitutional amendment, the Colombian Constitutional Court struck down the law over procedural issues in October 2013  Human Rights Watch in a 2015 report on the false positive cases noted that prosecutors in the Human Rights Unit of the Prosecutor General's Office conducted investigations into more than 3,000 false positive homicide cases allegedly committed by army personnel that resulted in about 800 convictions, mostly of lower-ranking soldiers  Only a few of those convictions involved former commanders of battalions or other tactical units, and none of the investigations of 16 active and retired army generals had produced charges  In 2016, the prosecutions against generals accused of responsibility for false positives continued, although a few were closed and 12 remained under investigation at year's end  Additionally, in October 2016, the Colombian prosecutor general indicted Santiago Uribe, the brother of former President Uribe, on charges of murder and association to commit crimes for his alleged role in the paramilitary group "The 12 Apostols" in the 1990s  The State Department human rights report covering 2017, maintains that during the year through July, four new cases involving "aggravated homicide" committed by security forces and 11 new convictions were reached for "simple homicide" by security force members  Although estimates diverge, the number of human rights defenders murdered in 2016 totaled 80 and another 51 in the first half of 2017, according to Somos Defensores ("We are Defenders"), a Colombian NGO that tracks violence against defenders and is cited by the State Department  Some groups, such as the Colombian think tank, Indepaz, say the numbers are higher, up to 117 murders in 2016  In the two years since the approval of the 2016 peace accord, social leaders, ethnic community leaders, and human rights defenders have suffered from continued high levels of violence  Human rights organizations cite the murders of more than 100 activists in 2017 and in 2018  Of the 109 human rights and civil society activists killed in 2018 through November, some were leaders of efforts to implement the 2016 peace accord  For instance, 13 social leaders were assassinated in the southwest department of Cauca in the first six months of the year, a department in Colombia with the fourth largest area devoted to coca cultivation in the country and host to several peace accord programs associated with rural development, including voluntary eradication of drug crops  Few, if any, of those accused of making threats and ordering or carrying out assassinations have been prosecuted  According to these activists, perpetrators still have little to fear of legal consequences  Since early 2012, violence against land rights activists has risen sharply with the start of implementation of the Victims' Law that authorized the return of stolen land  A September 2013 report by Human Rights Watch pointing to the rise in violence against land activists and claimants maintained that the environment had turned so threatening that claimants who had received land judgments were too frightened to return, and the government had received more than 500 serious threats against claimants in less than 18 months  According to Human Rights Watch, many of the threats and killings have been conducted by paramilitary-influenced Bacrim, although they may be operating at the behest of third-party "landowners," who are trying to protect their land from seizure  For more than a decade, the Colombian government tried to suppress violence against groups facing extraordinary risk through the National Protection Unit (UPN) programs  Colombia's UPN provides protection measures, such as body guards and protective gear, to individuals in at-risk groups, including human rights defenders, journalists, trade unionists, and others  However, according to international and Colombian human rights groups, the UPN has been plagued by corruption issues and has inadequately supported the prosecution of those responsible for attacks  According to the State Department's Report on Human Rights Practices covering 2017, the UPN protected roughly 6,067 at-risk individuals, including 575 human rights activists, with a budget of $150 million  Journalists, a group that has traditionally received protection measures from the UPN, continue to operate in a dangerous environment in Colombia  According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), 47 journalists have been killed in work-related circumstances since 1992  Three Ecuadorian journalists were killed by a FARC dissident group close to the border of Ecuador in 2018, leading to the end of the Colombian government's peace talks with the ELN in Ecuador and their subsequent move to Cuba  To help monitor and verify that human rights were respected throughout implementation of the peace accord, the government formally renewed the mandate of the U N 's High Commissioner of Human Rights in 2016 for three years  The issue of violence against the labor movement in Colombia has sparked controversy and debate for years  Many human rights groups and labor advocates have maintained that Colombia's poor record on protecting its trade union members and leaders from violence is one reason to avoid closer trade relations with Colombia  The U S -Colombia Free Trade Agreement (also known as the U S -Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement) could not be enacted without addressing the deep concern of many Members of Congress that Colombia must enforce basic labor standards and especially measures to mitigate the alleged violence against trade union members and bring perpetrators of such violence to justice  In April 2011, the United States and Colombia agreed to an "Action Plan Related to Labor Rights" (the Labor Action Plan, LAP), which contained 37 measures that Colombia would implement to address violence, impunity, and workers' rights protection  Before the U S -Colombia Free Trade Agreement entered into force in April 2012, the U S  Trade Representative determined that Colombia had met all the important milestones in the LAP to date  Despite the programs launched and measures taken to implement the LAP, human rights and labor organizations claim that violence targeting labor union members continues  (Some analysts continue to debate whether labor activists are being targeted because of their union activities or for other reasons ) The Colombian government has acknowledged that violence and threats continue, but points to success in reducing violence generally and the number of homicides of labor unionists specifically  Violence levels in general are high in Colombia, but have steadily been decreasing  According to the data reported by the U N  Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in its annual homicide report, rates have decreased dramatically since 2002, when the homicide rate was at 68 9 per 100,000  The Colombian Ministry of Defense reported in 2016 that the homicide rate had declined to 24 4 per 100,000  In this context of an overall steady decline in homicides, the number of labor union killings has also declined  For many years, the government and the leading NGO source that tabulates these crimes did not agree on the number of labor union murders because they used different methodologies  Both sources recorded a decline, but the government generally saw a steeper decline  According to the Colombian labor rights NGO and think tank, the National Labor School ( Escuela Nacional Sindical , ENS), there has been a significant decline from 191 labor union murders in 2001 to 20 reported in 2012  In 2017, through the month of August the ENS reported 14 labor murders  Of the cases covering homicides between January 2011 and August 2017, 162 homicide cases in which victims were labor union members, were 409 convictions, 31 for cases after 2011 and 378 for cases before 2011  In addition, labor advocates note that tracking homicides does not capture the climate of intimidation that Colombian labor unions face  In addition to lethal attacks, trade union members encounter increased death threats, arbitrary detention, and other types of harassment  Measures to strengthen the judicial system to combat impunity for such crimes are also part of the Labor Action Plan  Nevertheless, many analysts maintain there remains a large backlog of cases yet to be investigated involving violent crimes against union members  The internal conflict has been the major cause of a massive displacement of the civilian population that has many societal consequences, including implications for Colombia's poverty levels and stability  Colombia has one of the largest populations of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world  Most estimates place the total at more than 7 million IDPs, or more than 10% of Colombia's estimated population of 49 million  This number of Colombians, forcibly displaced and impoverished as a result of the armed conflict, continues to grow and has been described by many observers as a humanitarian crisis  Indigenous and Afro-Colombian people make up an estimated 15%-22% of the Colombian population  They are, however, disproportionately represented among those displaced  The leading Colombian NGO that monitors displacement, Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES), reports that 36% of the victims of forced displacement nationwide in 2012 came from the country's Pacific region where Afro-Colombian and indigenous people predominate  The Pacific region has marginal economic development as a result of weak central government presence and societal discrimination  (Some 84% of the land in the Pacific region is subject to collective-title rights granted to Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities  ) Illegal armed groups are active in usurping land in this region, which is valued for its proximity to a major port and drug trafficking routes, and the Afro- and indigenous communities are also caught in the middle of skirmishes between illegal groups and Colombian security forces  IDPs suffer stigma and poverty and are often subject to abuse and exploitation  In addition to the disproportionate representation of Colombia's ethnic communities among the displaced, other vulnerable populations, including women and children, have been disproportionally affected  Women, who make up more than half of the displaced population in Colombia, can become targets for sexual harassment, violence, and human trafficking  Displacement is driven by a number of factors, most frequently in more remote regions of the country where armed groups compete and seek to control territory or where they confront Colombian security forces  Violence that uproots people includes threatened or actual child recruitment or other forced recruitment by illegal armed groups, as well as physical, psychological, and sexual violence  Other contributing factors reported by NGOs include counternarcotics measures such as aerial spraying, illegal mining, and large-scale economic projects in rural areas  Inter-urban displacement is a growing phenomenon in cities such as Buenaventura and Medellin, which often results from violence and threats by organized crime groups  The Victims' Law of 2011, which began to be implemented in 2012, is the major piece of legislation to redress Colombian displacement victims with the return of their stolen land  The historic law provides restitution of land to those IDPs who were displaced since January 1, 1991  The law aims to return land to as many as 360,000 families (impacting up to 1 5 million people) who had their land stolen  The government notes that some 50% of the land to be restituted has the presence of land mines and that the presence of illegally armed groups in areas where victims have presented their applications for land restitution has slowed implementation of the law  Between 2011 and 2016, 100,000 applications for land restitution were filed and approximately 5,000 properties (roughly 5% of applications) were successfully returned following judgements on the cases  With the international support from U S  Agency for International Development (USAID) and other donors, a Victims Unit was established to coordinate the range of services for victims, including financial compensation and psychosocial services, provided by a host of government agencies  The 2011 Victims' Law is considered a model and particularly the implementation of a Victims' registry, which was supported by USAID  Through its Victims Unit, the Colombian government had provided financial reparations to over 800,000 victims and psychosocial support to 700,000 as of October 2018  The Global Report on Internal Displacement from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reported, however, displacement inside Colombia continued with more than 171,000 internally displaced in 2016  As the political crisis in Venezuela has grown, a wave of refugees and migrants have come across the border into Colombia reversing an earlier trend  Venezuelans were fleeing political instability and economic turmoil in Colombia's once-wealthy neighboring nation  Venezuela's economic crisis worsened throughout 2018, prompting a sharp increase in migrants seeking to escape into Colombia  In response to the growing flood of Venezuelans, former President Santos initially announced that he would impose stricter migratory controls and deploy thousands of new security personnel along the frontier  Nevertheless, he acknowledged that Venezuela had once served as a vital escape valve for Colombian refugees fleeing their half century internal conflict, for which he was grateful  Colombia shares long borders with neighboring countries, and some of these border areas have been described as porous to illegal armed groups that threaten regional security  Colombia has a 1,370-mile border with Venezuela, approximately 1,000-mile borders with both Peru and Brazil, and shorter borders with Ecuador and Panama  Much of the territory is remote and rugged and suffers from inconsistent state presence  Although all of Colombia's borders have been problematic and subject to spillover effects from Colombia's armed conflict, the most affected are Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama  Over the years, Colombia's relations with Venezuela and Ecuador have been strained by Colombia's counterinsurgency operations, including cross-border military activity  The FARC and ELN insurgents have been present in shared-border regions and in some cases the insurgent groups used the neighboring countries to rest, resupply, and shelter  Former President Uribe accused the former Venezuelan government of Hugo Chávez of harboring the FARC and ELN and maintained that he had evidence of FARC financing the 2006 political campaign of Ecuador's leftist President Rafael Correa  Relations between Ecuador and Colombia remained tense following the Colombian military bombardment of a FARC camp inside Ecuador in March 2008  Ecuador severed diplomatic relations with Colombia for 33 months  Also in 2008, Ecuador filed a suit against Colombia in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), claiming damages to Ecuadorian residents affected by spray drift from Colombia's aerial eradication of drug crops  In September 2013, Colombia reached an out-of-court settlement awarding Ecuador $15 million  Once in office, President Santos reestablished diplomatic ties with both countries and in his first term (2010-2014) cooperation greatly increased between Colombia and Venezuela on border and security issues and with Ecuador's Correa  However, concerns about Venezuelan links to the FARC and the continued use of Venezuela by the FARC and ELN as a safe haven to make incursions into Colombia remained an irritant in Colombian-Venezuelan relations  Nevertheless, the Venezuelan and Colombian governments committed to jointly combat narcotics trafficking and illegal armed group activities along the porous Venezuelan-Colombian border and Venezuela remained a supporting government of the FARC-government peace talks (along with Chile, Norway, and Cuba) through 2016, even after former President Chávez died in office in March 2013  Ecuador's government hosted exploratory talks between the ELN and the Santos government beginning in 2015, which became formal talks hosted in Quito in February 2017, although Ecuador's president requested that the talks move to Cuba in May 2018, due to a spate of border violence that could have been related to the ELN  For many years, the region in Panama that borders Colombia, the Darien, was host to a permanent presence of FARC soldiers who used the remote area for rest and resupply as well to transit drugs north  By 2015, according to the State Department, the FARC was no longer maintaining a permanent militarized presence in Panamanian territory, in part due to effective approaches taken by Panama's National Border Service in coordination with Colombia  Nevertheless, the remote Darien region still faces challenges from smaller drug trafficking organizations and criminal groups such as Bacrim and experiences problems with human smuggling with counterterrorism implications  When Colombia hosted the Sixth Summit of the Americas in April 2012, President Obama and President Santos announced a new joint endeavor, the Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation  This joint effort, built on ongoing security cooperation, addresses hemispheric challenges, such as combating transnational organized crime, bolstering counternarcotics, strengthening institutions, and fostering resilient communities  The Action Plan focuses on capacity building for security personnel in Central America and the Caribbean by Colombian security forces (both Colombian military and police)  To implement the plan, Colombia undertook several hundred activities in cooperation with Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, and between 2013 and 2017 trained almost 17,000 individuals (see Figure 4 )  The Colombian government notes that this program grew dramatically from 34 executed activities in 2013 to 441 activities planned for 2018  Colombia has increasingly trained military and police from other countries both under this partnership and other arrangements, including countries across the globe  According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, around 80% of those trained were from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean  U S  and Colombian officials maintain that the broader effort is designed to export Colombian expertise in combating crime and terrorism while promoting the rule of law and greater bilateral and multilateral law enforcement cooperation  Critics of the effort to "export Colombian security successes" maintain that human rights concerns have not been adequately addressed  Some observers question the portion of these activities that are funded by the U S  government and want to see more transparency  In one analysis of the training, a majority of the training was provided by Colombian National Police rather than the Colombian Army, in such areas as ground, air, maritime, and river interdiction; police testimony; explosives; intelligence operations; psychological operations; and Comando JUNGLA, Colombia's elite counternarcotics police program  Other analysts praise the Colombian training and maintain that U S  assistance provided in this way has helped to improve, professionalize, and expand the Colombian military, making it the region's second largest  As that highly trained military shifts from combating the insurgency and the Colombian National Police take the dominant role in guaranteeing domestic security, Colombia may play a greater role in regional security and even in coalition efforts internationally  In September 2017, President Trump announced that he had considered designating Colombia in noncompliance with U S  counternarcotics requirements, but noted that he had not proceeded with the step in part because of Colombian training efforts to assist others in the region with combating narcotics and related crime  Colombia is a key U S  ally in the region  With diplomatic relations that began in the 19 th century following Colombia's independence from Spain, the countries have enjoyed close and strong ties  Because of Colombia's prominence in the production of illegal drugs, the United States and Colombia forged a close partnership over the past 16 years  Focused initially on counternarcotics, and later counterterrorism, a program called Plan Colombia laid the foundation for a strategic partnership that has broadened to include sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and many other areas of cooperation  Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U S  Congress appropriated more than $10 billion in assistance from U S  State Department and Department of Defense (DOD) accounts to carry out Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies  During this time, Colombia made notable progress combating drug trafficking and terrorist activities and reestablishing government control over much of its territory  Its economic and social policies have reduced the poverty rate and its security policies have lowered the homicide rate  Counternarcotics policy has been the defining issue in U S -Colombian relations since the 1980s because of Colombia's preeminence as a source country for illicit drugs  Peru and Bolivia were the main global producers of cocaine in the 1980s and early 1990s  However, successful efforts there in reducing supply pushed cocaine production from those countries to Colombia, which soon surpassed both its Andean neighbors  The FARC and other armed groups in the country financed themselves primarily through narcotics trafficking, and that lucrative illicit trade provided the gasoline for the decades-long internal armed conflict at least since the 1990s  Colombia emerged to dominate the cocaine trade by the late 1990s  National concern about the crack cocaine epidemic and extensive drug use in the United States led to greater concern with Colombia as a source  As Colombia became the largest producer of coca leaf and the largest exporter of finished cocaine, heroin produced from Colombian-grown poppies was supplying a growing proportion of the U S  market  Alarm over the volumes of heroin and cocaine being exported to the United States was a driving force behind U S  support for Plan Colombia at its inception  The evolution of Plan Colombia took place under changing leadership and changing conditions in both the United States and Colombia  Plan Colombia was followed by successor strategies such as the National Consolidation Plan, described below, and U S -Colombia policy has reached a new phase anticipating post-conflict Colombia  Announced in 1999, Plan Colombia originally was a six-year strategy to end the country's decades-long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote development  The counternarcotics and security strategy was developed by the government of President Andrés Pastrana in consultation with U S  officials  Colombia and its allies in the United States realized that for the nation to gain control of drug trafficking required a stronger security presence, the rebuilding of institutions, and extending state presence where it was weak or nonexistent  Initially, the U S  policy focus was on programs to reduce the production of illicit drugs  U S  support to Plan Colombia consisted of training and equipping counternarcotics battalions in the Colombian Army and specialized units of the Colombian National Police, drug eradication programs, alternative development, and other supply reduction programs  The original 1999 plan had a goal to reduce "the cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50%" over the plan's six-year timeframe  The means to achieve this ambitious goal were a special focus on eradication and alternative development; strengthening, equipping, and professionalizing the Colombian Armed Forces and the police; strengthening the judiciary; and fighting corruption  Other objectives were to protect citizens from violence, promote human rights, bolster the economy, and improve governance  U S  officials expressed their support for the program by emphasizing its counterdrug elements (including interdiction)  The focus on counternarcotics was the basis for building bipartisan support to fund the program in the U S  Congress because some Members of Congress were leery of involvement in fighting a counterinsurgency, which they likened to the "slippery slope" of the war in Vietnam  President George W  Bush came to office in 2001 and oversaw some changes to Plan Colombia  The primary vehicle for providing U S  support to Plan Colombia was the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, which was included in foreign operations appropriations  The Bush Administration requested new flexibility so that U S -provided assistance would back a "unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to [Colombia's] national security" due to the breakdown of peace talks between the FARC and the Pastrana government in February 2002  Congress granted this request for a unified campaign to fight drug trafficking and terrorist organizations as Members of Congress came to realize how deeply intertwined the activities of Colombia's terrorist groups were with the illicit drug trade that funded them  However, Congress prohibited U S  personnel from directly participating in combat missions  Congress placed a legislative cap on the number of U S  military and civilian contractor personnel who could be stationed in Colombia, although the cap was adjusted to meet needs over time  The current limit (first specified in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended) caps total military personnel at 800 and civilian contractors at 600, although numbers deployed have been far below the 1,400-person cap for years and now total fewer than 200  President Uribe (2002-2010) embraced Plan Colombia with an aggressive strategy toward the insurgent forces that prioritized citizen security  His Democratic Security Policy, implemented first in a military campaign called Plan Patriota, relied on the military to push FARC forces away from the major cities to remote rural areas and the borderlands  Like his predecessor, President Pastrana, Uribe continued to expand the Colombian military and police  He enhanced the intelligence capacity, professionalization, and coordination of the forces, in part with training provided by U S  forces  His strategy resulted in expanded state control over national territory and a significant reduction in kidnappings, terrorist attacks, and homicides  In 2007, the Uribe administration announced a shift to a "Policy of Consolidation of Democratic Security " The new doctrine was based on a "whole-of-government" approach to consolidate state presence in marginal areas that were historically neglected—vulnerable to drug crop cultivation, violence, and control by illegal armed groups  Called a strategic leap forward by then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, in 2009 the new strategy came to be called the National Consolidation Plan (see below)  Colombian support for Plan Colombia and for the nation's security program grew under Uribe's leadership  President Uribe levied a "wealth tax" to fund Colombia's security efforts, taxing the wealthiest taxpayers to fund growing defense and security expenditures  Overall U S  expenditures on Plan Colombia were only a modest portion of what Colombians spent on their own security  By one 2009 estimate, U S  expenditures were not more than 10% of what Colombians invested in their total security costs  In 2000, Colombia devoted less than 2% of its GDP to military and police expenditures and in 2010 that investment had grown to more than 4% of GDP  One assessment notes "in the end there is no substitute for host country dedication and funding" to turn around a security crisis such as Colombia faced at the beginning of the millennium  In 2008, congressional support for Plan Colombia and its successor programs also shifted  Some Members of Congress believed that the balance of programming was too heavily weighted toward security  Prior to 2008, the emphasis had been on "hard side" security assistance (to the military and police) compared with "soft side" traditional development and rule of law programs  Members debated if the roughly 75%/25% mix should be realigned  Since FY2008, Congress has reduced the proportion of assistance for security-related programs and increased the proportion for economic and social aid  As Colombia's security situation improved and Colombia's economy recovered, the United States also began turning over to Colombians operational and financial responsibility for efforts formerly funded by the U S  government  The Colombian government "nationalized" the training, equipping, and support for Colombian military programs, such as the counterdrug brigade, Colombian Army aviation, and the air bridge denial program  U S  funding overall began to decline  The nationalization efforts were not intended to end U S  assistance, but rather to gradually reduce it to pre-Plan Colombia levels, adjusted for inflation  A key goal of Plan Colombia was to reduce the supply of illegal drugs produced and exported by Colombia but the goals became broader over time  Bipartisan support for the policy existed through three U S  Administrations—President Bill Clinton, President George W  Bush, and President Barack Obama  Plan Colombia came to be viewed by some analysts as one of the most enduring and effective U S  policy initiatives in the Western Hemisphere  Some have lauded the strategy as a model  In 2009, William Brownfield, then-U S  Ambassador to Colombia, described Plan Colombia as "the most successful nation-building exercise that the United States has associated itself with perhaps in the last 25-30 years " Other observers, however, were critical of the policy as it unfolded  Many in the NGO and human rights community maintained the strategy, with its emphasis on militarization and security, was inadequate for solving Colombia's persistent, underlying problems of rural violence, poverty, neglect and institutional weakness  Nevertheless, it appears that improvements in security conditions have been accompanied by substantial economic growth and a reduction in poverty levels over time  The National Consolidation Plan first launched during the Uribe Administration, (renamed the National Plan for Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction), was designed to coordinate government efforts in regions where marginalization, drug trafficking, and violence converge  The whole-of-government consolidation was to integrate security, development, and counternarcotics to achieve a permanent state presence in vulnerable areas  Once security forces took control of a contested area, government agencies in housing, education, and development would regularize the presence of the state and reintegrate the municipalities of these marginalized zones into Colombia  The plan had been restructured several times by the Santos government  The United States supported the Colombian government's consolidation strategy through an inter-agency program called the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI)  CSDI provided U S  assistance to "fill gaps" in Colombian government programming  At the U S  Embassy in Colombia, CSDI coordinated efforts of the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department's Narcotics Affairs Section, the U S  Military Group, and the Department of Justice to assist Colombia in carrying out the consolidation plan by expanding state presence and promoting economic opportunities in priority zones  It combined traditional counternarcotics assistance for eradication, interdiction, alternative development, and capacity building for the police, military, and justice sector institutions with other economic and social development initiatives  As the peace agreement between the FARC and the government moved forward into implementation, the focus of U S  assistance to Colombia has shifted again  With a foundation of the work done to advance consolidation, U S  assistance has begun to aid in post-conflict planning and support Colombia's transition to peace by building up democratic institutions, protecting human rights and racial and ethnic minorities, and promoting economic opportunity  USAID's country cooperation strategy for 2014-2018 anticipated the Colombian government reaching a negotiated agreement with the FARC, but remained flexible if an agreement was not signed  It recognized early implementation efforts, especially in the first 24 months after signature, would be critical to demonstrate or model effective practices  In the next five years, it envisioned Colombia evolving from aid recipient to provider of technical assistance to neighbors in the region  Consolidating state authority and presence in the rural areas with weak institutions remains a significant challenge following the FARC's disarmament in the summer of 2017  Reintegration of the FARC and possibly other insurgent forces, such as the ELN, will be expensive and delicate  In particular, critics of the consolidation efforts of the Colombian government maintain that the Santos administration often lacked the commitment to hand off targeted areas from the military to civilian-led development and achieve locally led democratic governance  Consolidation efforts suffered from low political support, disorganization at the top levels of government, and failure to administer national budgets effectively in more remote areas, among other challenges  In August 2018, shortly after President Duque took office, USAID announced a framework of priorities for U S  economic development assistance to Colombia  Some of these priorities include promoting and supporting a whole-of-government strategy to include the dismantling of organized crime; increasing the effectiveness of Colombia's security and criminal justice institutions; promoting enhanced prosperity and job creation through trade; improving the investment climate for U S  companies; and advancing Colombia's capacity to strengthen governance and transition to sustainable peace, including reconciliation among victims, ex-combatants, and other citizens  The U S  Congress initially approved legislation in support of Plan Colombia in 2000, as part of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001 ( P L  106-246 )  Plan Colombia was never authorized by Congress, but it was funded annually through appropriations  From FY2000 through FY2016, U S  funding for Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies exceeded $10 billion in State Department and Defense Department programs  From FY2000 to FY2009, the United States provided foreign operations assistance to Colombia through the Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) account, formerly known as the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, and other aid accounts  In FY2008, Congress continued to fund eradication and interdiction programs through the ACP account, but funded alternative development and institution building programs through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account  In the FY2010 request, the Obama Administration shifted ACP funds into the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account  Since FY2008, U S  assistance has gradually declined because of tighter foreign aid budgets and nationalized Plan Colombia-related programs  In FY2014, in line with other foreign assistance reductions, funds appropriated to Colombia from State Department accounts declined to slightly below $325 million  In FY2015, Congress appropriated $300 million for bilateral assistance to Colombia in foreign operation  The FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations bill ( P L  114-113 ) provided Colombia from U S  State Department and U S  Agency for International Development accounts, slightly under $300 million, nearly identical to that appropriated in FY2015 (without P L  480, the Food for Peace account, the total for FY2016 was $293 million as shown in Table 1 )  In FY2017, Congress funded a program the Obama Administration had proposed called "Peace Colombia" to re-balance U S  assistance to support the peace process and implementation of the accord  In May 2017, Congress approved a FY2017 omnibus appropriations measure, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P L  115-31 ), which funded the various programs of Peace Colombia at $391 3 million  In the FY2017 legislation, Congress appropriated the following: The ESF account increased to $187 million (from $134 million in FY2016) to build government presence, encourage crop substitution to replace drug crops, and provide other assistance to conflict victims, including Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities  However, only $180 million was subsequently allocated  INCLE funding increased to $143 million with a focus on manual eradication of coca crops, support for the Colombian National Police, and judicial reform efforts  INCLE funding also included $10 million for Colombian forces' training to counterparts in other countries  $38 5 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF); and $21 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), which was a relatively large increase from under $4 million in FY2016 to focus on the demining effort  How the Trump Administration will engage with the issues of supporting post-conflict stability in Colombia has not been clearly defined by either the State Department or other executive departments  For example, the Trump Administration's proposed foreign aid budget for FY2018 would have reduced assistance to Colombia to $251 million  However, the FY2018 omnibus appropriations measure, approved by Congress in March 2018 ( P L  115-114 ), again included $391 3 million to support Colombia's transition to peace  The Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request for Colombia is $265 million, approximately a 32% reduction from the $391 3 million appropriated by Congress in FY2018  However, the House and Senate appropriations bills, H R  6385 and S  3108 , again would support the funding level of $391 3 million  The FY2019 Administration request would reduce post-conflict recovery programs and place greater emphasis on counternarcotics and security  Below, Table 1 provides account data from the annual international affairs congressional budget justification documents  The information about DOD-funded programs was provided to the Congressional Research Service by DOD analysts in December 2015 and October 2017 (and has not been updated)  The breakout of DOD assistance to Colombia is shown in Table 2     Colombia also has received additional U S  humanitarian funding to help it cope with more than 1 million Venezuelan migrants  As of September 30, 2018, U S  government humanitarian funding for the Venezuela response totaled approximately $96 5 million for both FY2017 and FY2018 combined, of which $54 8 million was for Colombia  (Humanitarian funding is drawn primarily from the global humanitarian accounts in annual Department of State/Foreign Operations appropriations acts ) In addition, the U S  Navy hospital ship USNS Comfort is on an 11-week medical support mission deployed through the end of 2018 to work with government partners, in part to assist with arrivals from Venezuela  In Colombia, the U S  response aims to help the Venezuelan arrivals as well as the local Colombian communities that are hosting them  In addition to humanitarian assistance, the United States is providing $37 million in bilateral assistance to support medium- and longer-term efforts by Colombia  Some Members of Congress have been deeply concerned about human rights violations in Colombia—especially those perpetrated by any recipients or potential recipients of U S  assistance  In Colombia's multisided, 50-year conflict, the FARC and ELN, the paramilitaries and their successors, and Colombia's security forces have all committed serious violations  Colombians have endured generations of noncombatant killings, massacres, kidnappings, forced displacements, forced disappearances, land mine casualties, and acts of violence that violate international humanitarian law  The extent of the crimes and the backlog of human rights cases to be prosecuted have overwhelmed the Colombian judiciary, which some describe as "inefficient" and overburdened  The United Nations and many human rights groups maintain that although some prosecutions have gone forward, most remain unresolved and the backlog of cases has been reduced slowly  In addition to the problem of impunity for such serious crimes, continued violations remain an issue  Since 2002, Congress has required in the annual foreign operations appropriations legislation that the Secretary of State certify annually to Congress that the Colombian military is severing ties to paramilitaries and that the government is investigating complaints of human rights abuses and meeting other human rights statutory criteria  (The certification criteria have evolved over time  ) For several years, certification was required before 30% of funds to the Colombian military could be released  The FY2014 appropriations legislation requires that 25% of funding under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program be held back pending certification by the Secretary of State  Some human rights groups have criticized the regular certification of Colombia, maintaining that evidence they have presented to the State Department has contradicted U S  findings  However, even some critics have acknowledged the human rights conditions on military assistance to Colombia to be "a flawed but useful tool" because the certification process requires that the U S  government regularly consult with Colombian and international human rights groups  Critics acknowledge that over time, conditionality can improve human rights compliance  Additional tools for monitoring human rights compliance by Colombian security forces receiving U S  assistance are the so-called "Leahy Law" restrictions, which Congress first passed in the late 1990s prior to the outset of Plan Colombia  First introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, these provisions deny U S  assistance to a foreign country's security forces if the U S  Secretary of State has credible information that such units have committed "a gross violation of human rights " The provisions apply to security assistance provided by the State Department and DOD  The Leahy Law under the State Department is authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and is codified at 22 U S C  2378d (§520M of the FAA)  The DOD Leahy provisions, which for years applied just to DOD training, now include a broader range of assistance, as modified in the FY2014 appropriations legislation  The provision related to the Leahy Laws for DOD assistance is codified at 10 U S C  362, and prohibits "any training, equipment, or other assistance," to a foreign security force unit if there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights  Both the State Department and DOD Leahy provisions require the State Department to review and clear—or vet—foreign security forces to determine if any individual or unit is credibly believed to be guilty of a gross human rights violation  Leahy vetting is typically conducted by U S  embassies and State Department headquarters  Reportedly on an annual basis about 1% of foreign security forces are disqualified from receiving assistance under the Leahy provisions, although many more are affected by administrative issues and are denied assistance until those conditions are resolved  Tainted security force units that are denied assistance may be remediated or cleared, but the procedures for remediation differ slightly between the DOD and State (or FAA) provisions  Because of the large amount of security assistance provided to Colombian forces (including the military and police), the State Department reportedly vets more candidates for assistance in Colombia than in any other country  In the late 1990s, poor human rights conditions in Colombia were a driving concern for developing the Leahy Law provisions  The U S  Embassy in Bogotá, with nearly two decades of experience in its vetting operations, has been cited as a source of best practices for other embassies seeking to bring their operations into compliance or enhance their performance  State Department officials have cited Colombia as a model operation that has helped Colombia to improve its human rights compliance  However, some human rights organizations are critical of the Leahy vetting process in Colombia, and cite the prevalence of extrajudicial executions allegedly committed by Colombian military units as evidence that these restrictions on U S  assistance have failed to remove human rights violators from the Colombian military  A human rights nongovernmental organization, Fellowship of Reconciliation, has published reports alleging an association between false positive killings and Colombian military units vetted by the State Department to receive U S  assistance  However, some have questioned the group's methodology  Some human rights organizations contend that the U S  government has tolerated abusive behavior by Colombian security forces without taking action or withholding assistance  Measured exclusively in counternarcotics terms, Plan Colombia has been a mixed success  Colombia remains the dominant producer of cocaine and in the DEA's National Drug Threat Assessment for 2017 continued to be the source for 95% of cocaine seized in the United States  Enforcement, eradication, and improved security squeezed production in Colombia, so that in 2012, Peru reemerged as the global leader in cocaine production, surpassing Colombia, for a year or so  In the early 2000s, given Colombia's predominance as the source of cocaine destined for U S  markets and its status as the second-largest producer of heroin consumed in the United States, eradication of coca bush and opium poppy (from which heroin is derived) was an urgent priority and became the preferred tool for controlling the production of these drugs  Another critical component of the drug supply reduction effort was alternative development programs funded by the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID) to assist illicit crop cultivators with transitioning to licit crop production and livelihoods  Analysts have long debated how effective Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies were in combating illegal drugs  Although Plan Colombia failed to meet its goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illicit drugs by 50% in its original six-year time frame, Colombia has sustained significant reductions in coca cultivation in recent years  According to U S  estimates, cultivation of coca declined from 167,000 hectares in 2007 to 78,000 hectares in 2012  (Poppy cultivation declined by more than 90% between 2000 and 2009 ) According to U S  government estimates, Colombia's potential production of pure cocaine fell to 170 metric tons in 2012, the lowest level in two decades  However, it started to rise slightly in 2013, and more dramatically in 2014 through 2016  In those years, cultivation of coca and production of cocaine grew significantly in part due to ending the aerial eradication of coca crops  In 2015, following a U N  agency determination that the herbicide used to spray coca crops was probably carcinogenic, Colombia's minister of health determined that aerial eradication of coca was not consistent with requirements of Colombia's Constitutional Court  In 2016, as noted above, the U S  DEA reported that 95% of cocaine seized in the United States originated in Colombia  According to U S  Office of National Drug Control Policy, Colombia in 2017 cultivated an unprecedented 209,000 hectares of coca, from which cocaine is derived, capable of generating 921 metric tons of cocaine  The United Nations estimates for 2017, which typically differ in quantity but follow the same trends as U S  estimates, maintained that Colombia's potential production of cocaine reached nearly 1,370 metric tons, 31% above its 2016 estimate  Even with Colombia's economic stability and improving security, cocaine exports (primarily to the U S  market) remain a major concern for U S  lawmakers  However, in drug interdiction, Colombia has set records for many years and is considered a strong and reliable U S  partner  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ( Table 4 ), shows Colombia cultivating 146,000 hectares of coca in 2016, a 52% increase over 2015 and another increase to 171,000 hectares, a 17% increase, in 2017  Although cocaine seizures were quite high in both years, the interdiction of cocaine was insufficient to counter the large increases in production  Both manual eradication and aerial eradication were central components of Plan Colombia to reduce coca and poppy cultivation  Manual eradication is conducted by teams, usually security personnel, who uproot and kill the plant  Aerial eradication involves spraying the plants from aircraft with an herbicide mixture to destroy the drug crop, but it may not kill the plants  In the context of Colombia's continuing internal conflict, manual eradication was far more dangerous than aerial spraying  U S  and Colombian policymakers recognized the dangers of manual eradication and, therefore, employed large-scale aerial spray campaigns to reduce coca crop yields, especially from large coca plantations  Colombia is the only country globally that aerially sprayed its illicit crops, and the practice has been controversial for health and environmental reasons, resulting in a Colombian decision to end aerial eradication in 2015  Since 2002, as a condition of fully funding the spraying program, Congress has regularly directed the State Department, after study and consultation with the U S  Environmental Protection Agency and other relevant agencies, to certify that the spraying did not "pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment " This certification requirement was included most years in the annual foreign operations appropriations legislation  Some analysts have also raised questions about the monetary and collateral costs of aerial eradication compared with other drug supply control strategies, its effectiveness, and its limited effect on the U S  retail price of cocaine  U S  State Department officials attribute Colombia's decline in coca cultivation after 2007 and prior to 2013 to the persistent aerial eradication of drug crops in tandem with manual eradication where viable  Between 2009 and 2013, Colombia aerially sprayed roughly 100,000 hectares annually  In 2013, however, eradication efforts declined  Colombia aerially eradicated roughly 47,000 hectares  It manually eradicated 22,120 hectares, short of the goal of 38,500 hectares  This reduction had a number of causes: the U S -supported spray program was suspended in October 2013 after two U S  contract pilots were shot down, rural protests in Colombia hindered manual and aerial eradication efforts, and security challenges limited manual eradicators working in border areas  In late 2013, Ecuador won an out-of-court settlement in a case filed in 2008 before the International Court of Justice in The Hague for the negative effects of spray drift over its border with Colombia  In negotiations with the FARC, the government and the FARC provisionally agreed in May 2014 that voluntary manual eradication would be prioritized over forced eradication  Aerial eradication remained a viable tool in the government's drug control strategy, according to the agreement, but would be permitted only if voluntary and manual eradication could not be conducted safely  In April 2015, the Santos administration determined that glyphosate, a broad-spectrum, nonselective herbicide used commercially, but in Colombia sprayed on coca plants to eradicate them, was "probably carcinogenic" to humans in a review published by a World Health Organization (WHO) affiliate  In October 2015, the government ended spraying operations and began to implement a new public health approach toward illicit drugs, one that proponents suggested would reduce human rights violations  On the supply side, Colombia's new drug policy gives significant attention to expanding alternative development and licit crop substitution while intensifying interdiction efforts  The State Department in its 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), however, warned that illicit cultivation was expanding in areas long off-limits to aerial spraying, including national parks, a buffer zone with Ecuador where aerial eradication has been restricted, and in indigenous or protected Afro-Colombian territories  Colombian interdiction practices are deemed some of the most effective in the world  The Colombian government reported seizing more than 207 metric tons (mt) of cocaine base in 2014 and that seizure total doubled by 2017 with capture of 442 mt of cocaine  According to the U S  State Department's 2018 INCSR , Colombia also seized 197 mt of marijuana, 348 kilograms of heroin, and destroyed more than 3,400 cocaine base and hydrochloride labs  USAID funds and runs alternative development programs in Colombia to assist communities with transitioning from a dependency on illicit crops to licit employment and livelihoods  Alternative development was once focused narrowly on crop substitution and assistance with infrastructure and marketing  Since the Colombian government's shift to a consolidation strategy, USAID has supported "consolidation and livelihoods" programming in 40 of the 58 strategically located, conflict-affected municipalities targeted by the government's National Consolidation Plan  To facilitate economic development, USAID funds initiatives that assist farmers and others with shifting from coca growing to licit economic opportunities  These programs are designed to strengthen small farmer producer organizations, improve their productivity, and connect them to markets  Some observers maintain that poor and unsustainable outcomes from alternative development programs while the Colombian conflict was still under way resulted from ongoing insecurity and lack of timeliness or sequencing of program elements  The renewed commitment to alternative development and crop substitution in the 2016 peace accord with the FARC may be similarly challenged  Formal implementation of the peace accord on drug eradication and crop substitution began in late May 2017 with collective agreements committing communities to replace their coca crops with licit crops  In some regions, the program is extended to families who cultivate coca and also to producers of legal crops and landless harvesters  The Colombian government also committed to a combined approach of both voluntary and forced manual eradication  The government's goal set for 2017 was eradicating 100,000 hectares of coca, 50,000 through forced manual eradication and 50,000 through "crop substitution" accords reached with coca farming households who would voluntary eradicate  At the U S -Colombia High Level Dialogue held in Bogotá in March 2018, a renewed commitment to the enduring partnership between the United States and Colombia was announced  A major outcome was a U S -Colombia pledge to reduce illegal narcotics trafficking through expanded counternarcotics cooperation  The new goal set was to reduce Colombia's estimated cocaine production and coca cultivation to 50% of current levels by 2023  In addition, a memorandum of understanding was signed to combat the illegal gold mining that funds transnational criminal organizations  Although President Duque appears determined to pursue a more aggressive approach to drug policy, he has not clearly stated how his approach to counternarcotics will differ from that of his predecessor  The government may restart aerial eradication, a strategy that ended in 2015 due to the Colombian Health Ministry's concerns over cancer-causing potential of the herbicide glyphosate, but no precise plans for restarting the program have been announced in the Duque Administration's first three months in office  Experimentation with delivering glyphosate by drones (rather than planes) began in June 2018 under the Santos Administration and is continuing under the Duque government  On October 1, 2018, President Duque authorized police to confiscate and destroy any quantity of drugs found on persons in possession of them, resulting in the seizure of more than 7 metric tons of drugs in less than two weeks  This enforcement measure may violate a 1994 Colombian Constitutional Court ruling, however, in which Colombians may carry small doses of drugs for personal use, including marijuana, hashish, and cocaine  Several court challenges have been filed that seek to nullify the Duque decree on constitutional grounds of protected personal use  Drug trafficking continues to trigger conflict over land in Colombia while affecting the most vulnerable groups, including Afro-Colombian, peasant, and indigenous populations  Some analysts warn that national and international pressure for drug eradication could also lead to increased human rights violations, including health consequences by reviving aerial spraying of drug crops and government actions to forcibly break up demonstrations by coca producers who resist eradication  Some analysts have advocated that investments to lower drug supply need to go beyond eradication, which has not been a lasting approach to reducing drug crop cultivation  For instance, the government could provide economic and education opportunities to at-risk youth to enhance their role in peace building and to prevent their recruitment into the drug trade and other illegal activity  Economic relations between Colombia and the United States have deepened  The U S -Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force in May 2012  By 2020, it will phase out all tariffs and other barriers to bilateral trade between Colombia and the United States, its largest trade partner  Since the U S -Colombia FTA went into force, the stock of U S  investment in Colombia surpassed $7 billion in 2014 but dropped to $6 2 billion in 2016 (on a historical cost basis), concentrated mostly in mining and manufacturing  According to the U S  Department of Commerce, U S  exports to Colombia exceeded $26 8 billion in 2016 and Colombia was the 22 nd -largest market for U S  exports; however, U S  imports from Colombia declined between 2015 and 2016  Major U S  exports to Colombia include oil (noncrude oil products including gasoline), machinery, cereals, organic chemicals, and plastic  Because 65% of U S  imports from Colombia are crude oil imports, much of the decline in value was caused by the sharp fall in oil prices that began in 2014  Major U S  imports beside crude oil, include gold, coffee, cut flowers, and fruits  Congressional interest in Colombia now extends far beyond security and counternarcotics and has grown in the area of bilateral trade following implementation of the U S -Colombia FTA, (also known at the U S -Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement)  Colombia is a founding member of the Pacific Alliance, along with Chile, Mexico, and Peru, and has sought to deepen trade integration and cross-border investment with its partners in the alliance while reducing trade barriers  The Pacific Alliance aims to go further by creating a common stock market, allowing for the eventual free movement of businesses and persons, and serving as an export platform to the Asia-Pacific region  Colombia's leadership role in the Pacific Alliance and Colombia's accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in May 2018, following a review of the country's macroeconomic policies and changes, are major new developments  The accession to the OECD was approved by Colombia's lower house in October 2018 and the Senate in November 2018, but it remained under final review by Colombia's Constitutional Court in early February 2019  The Santos administration pushed to meet the criteria required for OECD membership because it maintained that such recognition signified Colombia's attainment of world-class development standards and policies  Colombia has made progress on trade issues such as copyright, pharmaceuticals, fuel and trucking regulations, and labor concerns (including subcontracting methods and progress on resolving cases of violence against union activists)  Congress remains interested in Colombia's future because the country has become one of the United States' closest allies  With 17 years of investment in Colombia's security and stability, some maintain that there has already been a strong return on U S  investment  Plan Colombia and its successor strategies broadened from counternarcotics to include humanitarian concerns, efforts to bolster democratic development and human rights protections, and trade and investment to spark growth  The record expansion of Colombia's coca crop and increasing cocaine exports to the United States, however, may significantly hinder the effort to consolidate peace in Colombia and could potentially increase corruption and extortion  A significant portion of the Colombian public remains skeptical of the peace process and the FARC's role in Colombia's democracy  Other Colombians maintain that support for peace programs in Colombia is important not only to benefit former FARC or other demobilized combatants but also to fulfill promises the government made in the peace accords to the country's 8 6 million victims of the five-decade conflict  As President Duque concluded his first 100 days in office, his government faced overlapping challenges: (1) an upsurge in illicit drug crops, which had set records in 2016 and 2017; (2) implementation of provisions of the peace accord negotiated by former president Santos but marred by slow implementation, attacks on land and human rights activists, and projected budgetary shortfalls; (3) renewed violent competition among criminal groups in rural areas, some of which reportedly are sheltering in Venezuela; and (4) Venezuela's humanitarian crisis, which resulted in a surge of migrants fleeing to or through Colombia  The annual level of foreign assistance provided by the U S  Congress for Colombia began to decline in FY2008 and then gradually increased in FY2017 and FY2018 to support peace and implementation of the FARC-government peace accord  Some Members of Congress may want to build on cooperation with Colombian partners to continue to train Central Americans and other third-country nationals in counternarcotics and security, including programs in citizen security, crime prevention and monitoring, military and police capacity building, and hostage negotiation and cybersecurity  Congress may continue to closely monitor Colombia's domestic security situation  It also may continue to oversee issues such as drug trafficking; Colombia's effort to combat other illegal armed groups such as Bacrim; the status of human rights protections; and the expansion of health, economic, environmental, energy, and educational cooperation  Congress may seek to foster Colombian leadership in the region to counter growing political instability in Venezuela  The U S  Congress has been interested in expanding investment and trade opportunities both bilaterally with Colombia and within regional groupings, such as the Pacific Alliance  Some analysts contend that U S -Colombian trade improvements rest on the strength of the overall relationship between Colombia and the United States  


Report 2:  Several modernization efforts are under way (communications, engines, etc ), and is working with vendors and its own service engineers to identify problem areas and plan ahead so that replacement parts will be available  Depot maintenance on the B-52 is managed by the program office and conducted at Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex depot  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The C-17 is a long-range, heavy logistic transport aircraft powered by four F-117 turbofan engines with air-refueling capability that was first manufactured in 1987 (see fig  10)  It is capable of rapid strategic delivery of troops and all types of cargo to main operating bases or to bases in any forward deployment area  The C-17 can perform tactical airlift and airdrop missions and can transport ambulatory patients during aeromedical evacuations, when required  The C-17 can carry virtually all air-transportable equipment  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the C-17 have decreased from about $5 3 billion in fiscal 2011 to about $4 0 billion in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit operations decreased, while maintenance costs have generally increased during this period due to contractor logistics support because the C-17 is a predominantly contractor-managed aircraft  The C-17 Enterprise Life Cycle Management Plan and Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (2014) documents current and future acquisition, sustainment, and integration efforts of the aircraft  It also addresses contractual arrangements and partnership support agreements between Air Force, Boeing, and other service providers for aircraft sustainment  Boeing provides continued sole-source life-cycle support for the C-17 under the terms of the Globemaster Integrated Sustainment Program (2013)  Under this program, Boeing is responsible for sustainment, to include material management and depot maintenance support  The C-17 participates in a virtual fleet arrangement, a global network of 43 additional C-17 aircraft, which allows participants total aircraft parts access from any fleet participant worldwide  The C-17 is an aircraft being modified to meet its requirements as well as to address maintenance and supply issues  The Air Force’s actions to mitigate these challenges include processes to increase the service life of the aircraft, allowing managers to quickly hire skilled workers for critical positions, and locating other vendor source for parts  Logistics Complex, and at its facility in San Antonio; landing gear overhaul occurs at Ogden Air Logistics Complex, and engine overhaul occurs at Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex in partnership with Pratt & Whitney, the original equipment manufacturer on the F-117 turbofan engine  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  Sustainment: Depot maintenance conducted by Northrop Grumman, and field maintenance conducted organically, by the National Guard  The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (E-8C) was first manufactured in 1967 (see fig  12)  Its primary mission is to provide theater ground and air commanders with ground surveillance to support attack operations and targeting that contributes to the delay, disruption, and destruction of enemy forces  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the E-8C have generally increased from about $686 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $734 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, maintenance cost has increased partly because of increases in contractor logistics support since the E-8C is maintained by Northrop Grumman  E-8C aircraft were formerly used as commercial airliners and purchased by the Air Force  Therefore, the exact usage of the aircraft was unknown with any degree of specificity  The program office has utilized new analysis conducted by Boeing to develop an improved method of determining and tracking service life for the E-8C aircraft  The new method uses a quantitative analysis capability to identify safety of flight structural concerns, allowing for planning and execution of risk mitigation  The E-8C is an aircraft with significant maintenance and supply issues according to Air Force officials  The Air Force’s actions to mitigate these challenges include updating the Maintenance Plan and the Corrosion Plan for the E-8C (formerly a commercial airframe) to bring them in line with military standards  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  Sustainment: Depot maintenance conducted organically at the designated air logistics complex, and field maintenance conducted organically and by contractors  The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a compact, single-engine, multirole fighter aircraft first manufactured in 1978 (see figure 14)  It is highly maneuverable and participates in air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack  There are four versions of the F-16: A, single-seat model; B, two-seat model with tandem cockpits; C and D, single- and two-seat models, respectively, incorporating newer capabilities  Total operating and support (O&S) cost for the F-16 decreased from about $5 billion in fiscal year 2011 to about $4 billion in fiscal year 2016 because of a 6 percent reduction of inventory  Specifically, maintenance cost has generally decreased during this same period as a result of a decrease in cost of depot maintenance  Sustainment: Performance-based logistics contract with depot maintenance subcontracted to Ogden Air Logistics Complex, Utah, and field maintenance performed organically  and is designed to project air dominance, rapidly and at great distances, and defeat threats  Overall operating and support costs (O&S) for the F-22 have decreased about $248 million overall since fiscal year 2011  Maintenance issues continue to be an area of concern for the aircraft, and these costs increased approximately $255 million from fiscal years 2011 to 2016, due to increases in contractor logistics costs  maintaining a comprehensive diminishing manufacturing sources program and proactively supporting the continued sustainment of component parts of the aircraft through various replacement programs, such as the F-22 Reliability and Maintainability Maturation  This initiative is an ongoing effort to drive continuous improvement in availability  The F-22 faces issues with its low- observable coating and supply funding  Actions to mitigate these challenges include contracting a repair facility to conduct coating reversion repair and securing additional spares funding  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The AV-8B Harrier (AV-8B) is a Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing attack aircraft first manufactured in 1984 (see fig  18)  The AV-8B has the capability of conducting close air support using conventional weapons for intermediate range intercept and attack missions  The AV-8B is capable of deploying and operating on aircraft carriers and other suitable seagoing platforms, advanced bases, expeditionary airfields, and remote tactical landing sites  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the AV-8B have decreased from about $815 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $646 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit-level manpower and operations as well as maintenance costs have decreased partly because the inventory is decreasing as AV-8B squadrons transition to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter  Average number of flying hours: 4,711 hours per aircraft Operating and support cost: $646 million Depot maintenance activity and squadron locations: AV-8B Program Strategic Sustainment and Warfighting Relevance Plan (2013) addresses strategic sustainment and warfighting requirements to ensure relevance, reliability, safety, and sustainability through five pillars: recruit and retain high-quality people, develop a comprehensive readiness and sustainment plan, meet combatant commander requirements, retain and sustain government and industry agencies to support engineering and logistics requirements, and integrate capabilities to remain tactically relevant and operationally effective  AV-8B is maintained organically at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under planned maintenance intervals occurring every 1,500 flight hours; supply support is provided organically by Naval Supply Systems Command and Defense Logistics Agency; contractor support services are provided by Boeing  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  Manufacturer: Grumman Corporation (acquired by Northrop Grumman) The C-2A Greyhound Logistics Aircraft (C-2A) is a high-wing, twin-engine monoplane cargo aircraft first manufactured in 1965 (see fig  20)  It is designed to land on aircraft carriers, with a primary mission of providing critical logistics support to Carrier Strike Groups by transporting high-priority cargo, mail, and passengers between carriers and shore bases  The original C-2A aircraft were overhauled to extend their operational life in 1973 and again from 2004 through 2011  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the C-2A have generally decreased from about $233 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $207 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit-level manpower, unit operations, and continuing system improvements have decreased, while maintenance costs have increased  landing gear, and avionics system, among others  The Navy will include an appendix for the C-2A when it updates the sustainment strategy for the E 2D for its 5-year update  C-2A completed a service life extension program from 2004 through 2011 to increase flight hours from 10,000 to 15,000 and landings from 16,020 to 36,000, among other things  Aircraft are maintained organically by field maintainers and at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under a planned maintenance interval cycle with three planned maintenance interval events occurring consecutively every 24 months, and supply support is provided organically by the Naval Supply Systems Command and Defense Logistics Agency  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The E-2 Hawkeye (E-2C) is the Navy’s all-weather, carrier-based tactical battle management, surface surveillance coordination and airborne early warning, command and control aircraft, with a planned sunset in 2026 when the last E-2D is delivered (see fig  22)  The E-2 is a twin-engine, five- crewmember, high-wing turboprop aircraft with a 24-foot diameter radar rotodome attached to the upper fuselage  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the E-2 have decreased from about $536 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $345 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit manpower and maintenance costs have decreased, partly because E-2C inventory is decreasing as E-2C squadrons transition to the E-2D fleet  comprehensive sustainment logistics, engineering programs, and financial resources necessary to ensure continued platform sustainment and attainment of readiness and safety operations  The Navy will include an appendix for the E-2C when it updates the sustainment strategy for the E-2D for its 5-year update  E-2C is maintained organically by field maintainers and at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under a planned maintenance interval cycle: initial planned maintenance interval is performed by field maintainers at 42 months and the second cycle is performed at a Fleet Readiness Center 46 months after the initial planned maintenance interval  Supply support is provided organically by the Naval Supply Systems Command and Defense Logistics Agency; contractor support services are provided by General Dynamics and Wyle Labs  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D) is the newest variant of the E-2 aircraft platform, expecting to reach full operational capability by 2027 (see fig  24)  Using the same configuration as the E-2C, the E-2D aircraft is used for surface-surveillance coordination and airborne early warning, and command control  Its mission is to provide advanced warning of approaching enemy surface units, and cruise missiles and aircraft, among other things  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the E-2D have increased consistently since fiscal year 2011 to about $125 million in fiscal year 2016  This increase is driven by the addition of aircraft to the inventory as the Navy continues to produce E-2D aircraft through 2026  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The EA-18G Growler is the fourth major variant of the F/A-18 family of aircraft manufactured in 2007 to replace the EA-6B Prowler (see fig  26)  The EA-18G is the first newly designed electronic warfare aircraft produced in more than 35 years and combines the proven F/A-18 Super Hornet platform with a sophisticated electronic warfare suite  Total O&S costs for the EA-18G have consistently increased from about $334 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $868 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit manpower and maintenance costs have increased partly because the inventory is increasing, as EA-18Gs are still in production  design, development, and fielding of the aircraft  Some of the key support program elements include developing support equipment and technical data, testing requirements for avionics, and facilities requirements, among others  The Navy is updating this plan and expects to finalize it in 2018  The aircraft are maintained organically at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under planned maintenance intervals, which typically occur every 72 months  Also, the Navy partners with Boeing to provide wholesale supply and depot repair support for major components, such as the engine  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The F/A-18A-D Hornet Strike Fighter is a twin-engine, mid-wing, multimission tactical aircraft initially fielded in the 1980s (see fig  28)  In its fighter mode, it is used primarily as a fighter escort and for air defense; in its attack mode, it is used for force projection, interdiction, and air support  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the F/A-18A-D have decreased consistently from about $3 1 billion in fiscal year 2011 to about $2 4 billion in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit manpower, operations, and maintenance costs have decreased, partly because the F/A-18A-Ds are being permanently transitioned out of service to be replaced by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter   and financial resources necessary to ensure continued readiness and supportability for the remainder of the aircraft’s service life  The Navy is currently updating this plan and expects to finalize it in 2018  The aircraft are maintained organically at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under planned maintenance intervals, which typically occur every 48 months for carrier-deploying aircraft, and every 72 months for land-based aircraft  The Navy implemented the High-Flight-Hour program in 2006 to extend the service life from 8,000 to 10,000 flight hours by inspecting and repairing airframes, and replacing major components and parts  The High-Flight-Hour program, along with other factors, has led to maintenance carryover (i e , into the next fiscal year) due to maintenance events taking longer than planned  In 1999, the Navy entered into a contract with Boeing for engineering support to leverage resources within the technology and industrial base to improve efficiency of the maintenance process and address the maintenance backlog  The F/A-18A-D is operating beyond its planned service life with maintenance and supply issues  The Navy’s actions to mitigate these challenges include extending the service life of the aircraft, allowing maintainers to work overtime to reduce backlog, and cannibalizing parts—moving parts from one aircraft to another  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The F/A-18E-F Super Hornet was first manufactured in 1998 (see fig  30)  The F/A-18E-F is highly capable across the full mission spectrum: air superiority, fighter escort, reconnaissance, aerial refueling, close air support, air defense suppression, and day/night precision strike  The F/A-18E-F provides aircrew the capability and performance necessary to face 21st century threats  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the F/A-18E-4 have increased from about $2 2 billion in fiscal year 2011 to about $3 1 billion in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit manpower, maintenance, and continuing system support have increased, partly because the inventory is increasing, as the F/A-18E-F is still in production  the Navy is conducting an assessment to determine the number of flight hours the aircraft can safely continue to fly, and then extend the service life of the program through inspections, repairs, and modifications, among other things  The Navy contracted with Boeing to potentially begin these efforts by fiscal year 2018  The F/A-18E-F is a high operational tempo aircraft supporting contingency operations with maintenance and supply issues  The Navy’s actions to mitigate these challenges include plans to extend the service life of the aircraft, training maintainers to transition to vacated positions, and cannibalizing parts—removing parts from one aircraft to another  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  To examine the trends in aircraft availability and operating and support (O&S) costs for selected Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft, including whether the aircraft met availability goals, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 fixed-wing aircraft managed by the Departments of the Air Force and the Navy  These included two Marine Corps aircraft that are managed by the Department of the Navy  This nongeneralizable sample was selected to ensure a mix of aircraft, including type of aircraft (fighter, bomber, cargo, etc ), age of the aircraft, and size of inventory, and whether the aircraft were sustained organically by the Department of Defense (DOD) or through contract arrangements, such as public-private partnerships or performance-based logistics, among other factors  For the Air Force, we selected five fixed-wing aircraft—the B-52 Stratofortress, C-17 Globemaster III, E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), F-16 Fighting Falcon, and F-22 Raptor  For the Navy, including the Marine Corps, we selected seven fixed-wing aircraft—the AV-8B Harrier, C-2A Greyhound Logistics Aircraft, E-2 Hawkeye Early Warning and Control Aircraft, E-2 Advanced Hawkeye Early Warning and Control Aircraft, EA-18G Growler, F/A-18 Hornet Strike Fighter A-D, and F/A-18 Super Hornet E-F  The Marine Corps uses the AV-8B Harrier and also uses a variant of the F/A-18A-D  For the selected aircraft, we obtained and reviewed the aircraft availability, sustainment, and O&S data for accuracy and completeness, interviewed officials regarding their data-collection processes, and reviewed available related policies and procedures associated with the collection of the data  As a result, we found the information to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting sustainment metrics, such as aircraft availability and O&S costs  status due to maintenance, supply, and both  With respect to O&S costs, we collected and analyzed data from fiscal years 2011 through 2016  We conducted data-reliability assessments for the data provided by the Air Force and the Navy  To do this, we sent data-reliability questionnaires to both departments requesting information on the sources that generated the data  For the Air Force, we conducted data-reliability assessments on the Air Force Total Ownership Cost system and the Logistics Installation and Mission Support system  For the Navy, we conducted data-reliability assessments on the Aviation Management Supply and Readiness Reporting—Type Model Series Integrated Database, the Decision Knowledge Programming for Logistics Analysis and Technical Evaluation system, the Flying Hour Projection System / Cost Adjustment and Visibility Tracking System, and the Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs system  We reviewed responses from both departments on these sources as well as documentation—such as guidance, user manuals, and data dictionaries—provided to corroborate questionnaire responses, and interviewed knowledgeable officials to discuss the data  We concluded that the data provided by the Air Force and the Navy were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting condition metrics such as aircraft availability; not mission capable status due to maintenance, supply, and both; depot inductions; budgeted and executed flight hours; and O&S costs for the selected fixed-wing aircraft in our review  To identify the sustainment challenges and mitigation actions for the selected aircraft, we reviewed sustainment metrics data, performance briefings, and other relevant documentation to identify specific challenges for each of the 12 aircraft in our review  We also reviewed ongoing and planned actions to address those challenges  Additionally, we interviewed program officials, depot officials, field maintainers, and squadron personnel to obtain their views on the challenges they face in sustaining the aircraft and the actions they take to mitigate those challenges  In some instances, we visited depots and squadrons to observe aircraft undergoing maintenance, discuss the respective maintenance processes, and discuss challenges and mitigation actions with officials  We then grouped the identified challenges into categories and represented them in a table to demonstrate which aircraft are experiencing specific challenges  To assess the extent to which the Air Force and the Navy have sustainment strategies, regularly review sustainment metrics, and have plans to improve aircraft availability for the selected fixed-wing aircraft, we obtained and analyzed sustainment strategies, performance management frameworks (i e , sustainment metrics collected and monitored as well as the levels of management review), and improvement plans for each of the selected 12 fixed-wing aircraft  We also identified and reviewed DOD, Air Force, and Navy guidance to analyze the departments’ efforts in sustaining these aircraft and to determine whether these were consistent with federal standards for internal control that deal with management defining objectives in specific terms  Specifically, we reviewed DOD Instruction 5000 02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, which provides management principles and mandatory policies for defense acquisition systems such as fixed- wing aircraft  These policies incorporate decision processes and assessing of readiness, which includes the creation of and requirements for a Life-cycle Sustainment Plan  We also reviewed Air Force Instruction 63-101/20-101, Integrated Life Cycle Management, which implements various Air Force and DOD policy directives, including DOD Instruction 5000 02  It establishes the integrated life-cycle management guidelines and procedures for Air Force personnel who develop, review, approve, or manage the systems, subsystems, end-items, services, and activities procured by the Air Force  For the Navy, we reviewed Secretary of the Navy M-5000 2, Department of the Navy Acquisition and Capabilities Guidebook, which provides guidance for the operation of the defense acquisition system and the joint capabilities integration and development system  It also implements DOD Instruction 5000 02 for the Navy and Marine Corps, including guidance on the management and execution of a sustainment strategy  and service guidance  We also reviewed the Air Force’s and the Navy’s performance metric briefings and improvement plans to determine whether the departments regularly reviewed sustainment metrics and had plans aimed at improving aircraft availability  We interviewed DOD, Air Force, and Navy officials knowledgeable about sustainment of these selected fixed-wing aircraft to discuss DOD’s and the departments’ efforts in sustaining these aircraft, including historical information on each aircraft, applicability of policy and guidance for legacy aircraft, and overviews of performance management frameworks identified by the departments to monitor and improve aircraft availability  To develop the fixed-wing aircraft sustainment summary documents (i e , “Sustainment Quick Looks”) in appendixes II–XIII we obtained historical and current information including background on aircraft capabilities, manufacturer, sustainment strategy, depot maintenance and squadron locations, and key dates in the life cycle of each aircraft (i e , first manufactured, initial and full operational capability, last production, and planned sunset year)  We collected and analyzed the following metrics: aircraft availability, not mission capable maintenance, not mission capable supply, and not mission capable aircraft from fiscal year 2011 through March 2017; the number of aircraft in depots for fiscal years 2011 through 2016; budgeted and executed flight hours from fiscal years 2011 through overall O&S and maintenance costs for fiscal years 2011 through 2016  We compared availability actuals to goals, aircraft in depots to availability trends, and budgeted and executed flight hours to availability trends  We analyzed O&S cost by reviewing its six elements and compared them to availability trends  We also analyzed the subcategories of the maintenance costs element  Through interviews with knowledgeable officials and reviewing documentation, we identified sustainment challenges (i e , aging, maintenance and supply support) and mitigation actions to address these challenges for each selected fixed-wing aircraft  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable status, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours, to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only), which must be protected from public disclosure  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  Additionally, to support our work for each objective we conducted site visits and interviewed officials to discuss data trends and identify specific sustainment challenges such as aging, maintenance, and supply support, among other challenges affecting aircraft availability, and mitigation actions to address these challenges  For the Air Force, we met with the following entities: Headquarters—Secretary of the Air Force, Logistics and Product Support and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cost and Economics, Air Force Cost Analysis Agency; Materiel Commands—Air Force Materiel Command and Air Force Life Cycle Management Center; Program Offices—B-52 Program Office, C-17 Program Office, E-8C Program Office, F-16 Program Office, and F-22 Program Office; Depots—Tinker Air Force Base at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (B-52); Robins Air Force Base at Warner Robbins, Georgia (C-17); Northrop Grumman facility at Lake Charles, Louisiana (E-8C); Ogden Air Logistics Center / Hill Air Force Base at Ogden, Utah (F-16 and F-22); and Squadrons—437th Maintenance Group, Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina (C-17); 461st Air Control Wing, Robins Air Force Base Georgia (E-8C); 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina (F-16); and 325th Maintenance Group, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida (F-22)  For the Navy, we met with the following entities: Headquarters—Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy— Expeditionary Programs and Logistics Management, Marine Corps Aviation Plans and Policy Branch, and Air Warfare Division; Materiel Commands—Commander, Fleet Readiness Center; Naval Air Systems Command; and Naval Supply Systems Command; Program Offices—Program Manager–Air (PMA)-231 (C-2A, E-2C, and E-2D); PMA- 257 (AV-8B); and PMA-265 (F/A-18A-F, and EA- 18G); Depots—Fleet Readiness Center–East at Cherry Point, North Carolina; Fleet Readiness Center–Mid Atlantic at Naval Air Station Norfolk, Virginia, and Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia; Squadrons—Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina; Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California; Naval Air Station Norfolk, Virginia; and Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia; and Other—Naval Center for Cost Analysis  The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from September 2016 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We subsequently worked with DOD from April 2018 to September 2018 to prepare this unclassified version of the original sensitive report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards  For fiscal year 2016, total operating and support (O&S) costs for the five Air Force fixed-wing aircraft selected in our review were about $12 billion, and the average O&S cost per aircraft across all five fleets was about $96 million, as shown in figure 32  Each of the C-17 and F-16 fleets accounted for about 33 percent of the total O&S cost, and the E-8C’s average cost per aircraft accounted for about 48 percent of the total average cost per aircraft  For fiscal year 2016, total O&S costs for the seven Navy fixed-wing aircraft selected in our review were about $7 7 billion, and the average O&S cost per aircraft across all seven fleets was about $44 million, as shown in figure 33  The F/A-18E-F fleet accounted for about 40 percent of the total O&S cost, and the E-2C’s average cost per aircraft accounted for about 19 percent of the total average cost per aircraft  In addition to the contact named above, John Bumgarner (Assistant Director), Clarine Allen, Ron Aribo, Vincent Buquicchio, Amie Lesser, Richard Powelson, Steven Putansu, Matt Spiers, and Natasha Wilder made key contributions to this report  Defense Supply Chain: DOD Needs Complete Information on Single Sources of Supply to Proactively Manage the Risks  GAO-17-768  Washington, D C : September 27, 2017  Weapon Systems Management: Product Support Managers’ Perspectives on Factors Critical to Influencing Sustainment-Related Decisions  GAO-17-744R  Washington, D C : September 12, 2017  Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs  GAO-17-333SP  Washington, D C : March 30, 2017  Depot Maintenance: Executed Workload and Maintenance Operations at DOD Depots  GAO-17-82R  Washington, D C : February 3, 2017  Defense Inventory: Further Analysis and Enhanced Metrics Could Improve Service Supply and Depot Operations  GAO-16-450  Washington, D C : June 9, 2016  Weapon Systems Management: DOD Has Taken Steps to Implement Product Support Managers but Needs to Evaluate Their Effects  GAO-14-326  Washington, D C : April 29, 2014 

ground_truth: Suspension of the rules is the most commonly used procedure to call up measures on the floor of the House of Representatives. As the name suggests, the procedure allows the House to suspend its standing and statutory rules in order to consider broadly supported legislation in an expedited manner. More specifically, the House temporarily sets aside its rules that govern the raising and consideration of measures and assumes a new set of constraints particular to the suspension procedure. The suspension of the rules procedure has several parliamentary advantages: (1) it allows nonprivileged measures to be raised on the House floor without the need for a special rule, (2) it enables the consideration of measures that would otherwise be subject to a point of order, and (3) it streamlines floor action by limiting debate and prohibiting floor amendments. Given these features, as well as the required two-thirds supermajority vote for passage, suspension motions are generally used to process less controversial legislation. In the 114th Congress (2015-2016), measures considered under suspension made up 62% of the bills and resolutions that received floor action in the House (743 out of 1,200 measures). The majority of suspension measures were House bills (83%), followed by Senate bills (11%) and House resolutions (4%). The measures covered a variety of policy areas but most often addressed government operations, such as the designation of federal facilities or amending administrative policies. Most measures that are considered in the House under the suspension procedure are sponsored by a House or Senate majority party member. However, suspension is the most common House procedure used to consider minority-party-sponsored legislation regardless of whether the legislation originated in the House or Senate. In 2015 and 2016, minority-party members sponsored 31% of suspension measures, compared to 9% of legislation subject to different procedures, including privileged business (17 measures), unanimous consent (21 measures), and under the terms of a special rule (one Senate bill). Most suspension measures are referred to at least one House committee before their consideration on the floor. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (now called the Committee on Oversight and Reform) was the committee of primary jurisdiction for the plurality of suspension measures considered in the 114th Congress. Additional committees—such as Energy and Commerce, Homeland Security, Natural Resources, Foreign Affairs, and Veterans' Affairs—also served as the primary committee for a large number of suspension measures. Suspension motions are debatable for up to 40 minutes. In most cases, only a fraction of that debate time is actually used. In the 114th Congress, the average amount of time spent considering a motion to suspend the rules was 13 minutes and 10 seconds. The House adopted nearly every suspension motion considered in 2015 and 2016. Approval by the House, however, did not guarantee final approval in the 114th Congress. The Senate passed or agreed to 40% of the bills, joint resolutions, and concurrent resolutions initially considered in the House under suspension of the rules, and 276 measures were signed into law. This report briefly describes the suspension of the rules procedure, which is defined in House Rule XV, and provides an analysis of measures considered under this procedure during the 114th Congress. Figures and one table display statistics on the use of the procedure, including the prevalence and form of suspension measures, sponsorship of measures by party, committee consideration, length of debate, voting, resolution of differences between the chambers, and the final status of legislation. In addition, an Appendix illustrates trends in the use of the suspension procedure from the 110th to the 114th Congress (2007-2016).