prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: T he unemployment insurance (UI) system has two primary objectives: (1) to provide temporary, partial wage replacement for involuntarily unemployed workers and (2) to stabilize the economy during recessions  In support of these goals, several UI programs provide benefits for eligible unemployed workers  In general, when eligible workers lose their jobs, the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program may provide up to 26 weeks of income support through regular UC benefit payments  UC benefits may be extended for up to 13 weeks or 20 weeks by the Extended Benefit (EB) program if certain economic situations exist within the state  As of the date of this publication, although both the UC and EB programs are authorized, no state is in an active EB period  For an overview of EB, see the Appendix   The Social Security Act of 1935 (P L  74-271) authorizes the joint federal-state UC program to provide unemployment benefits  Most states provide up to a maximum of 26 weeks of UC benefits  Former federal workers may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) program  Former U S  military servicemembers may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX) program  The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 ( P L  102-164 ) provides that ex-servicemembers be treated the same as other unemployed workers with respect to benefit levels, the waiting period for benefits, and benefit duration  Although federal laws and regulations provide broad guidelines on UC benefit coverage, eligibility, and determination, the specifics regarding UC benefits are determined by each state  This results in essentially 53 different programs  Generally, UC eligibility is based on attaining qualified wages and employment in covered work over a 12-month period (called a base period) prior to unemployment  All states require a worker to have earned a certain amount of wages or to have worked for a certain period of time (or both) within the base period to be eligible to receive any UC benefits  The methods states use to determine eligibility vary greatly  Most state benefit formulas replace approximately half of a claimant's average weekly wage up to a weekly maximum  Additionally, each state's UC law requires individuals to have lost their jobs through no fault of their own, and recipients must be able to work, available for work, and actively seeking work  These eligibility requirements help ensure that UC benefits are directed toward workers with significant labor market experience and who are unemployed because of economic conditions  The UC program is financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under each state's State Unemployment Tax Act (SUTA)  The 0 6% effective net FUTA tax paid by employers on the first $7,000 of each employee's earnings (equaling no more than $42 per worker per year) funds federal and state administrative costs, loans to insolvent state UC accounts, the federal share (50%) of EB payments, and state employment services  SUTA taxes on employers are limited by federal law to funding regular UC benefits and the state share (50%) of EB payments  Federal law requires that the state tax be on at least the first $7,000 of each employee's earnings and that the maximum state tax rate be at least 5 4%  Federal law also requires each employer's state tax rate to be based on the amount of UC paid to former employees (known as "experience rating")  Within these broad requirements, each state has great flexibility in determining its SUTA structure  Generally, the more UC benefits paid out to its former employees, the higher the tax rate of the employer, up to a maximum established by state law  Funds from FUTA and SUTA are deposited in the appropriate accounts within the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF)  The sequester order required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P L  112-25 ) and implemented on March 1, 2013 (after being delayed by P L  112-240 ), affected some but not all types of UI expenditures  Regular UC, UCX, and UCFE payments are not subject to the sequester reductions  EB and most forms of administrative funding are subject to the sequester reductions  The FY2019 sequestration order requires a 6 2% reduction in all nonexempt nondefense mandatory expenditures, but no sequestration reductions are applicable to discretionary programs, projects, and activities  As a result, EB expenditures are required to be reduced 6 2% (only on the federal share of EB benefits) for weeks of unemployment during FY2019  As of January 22, 2019, EB has not been activated in any state during FY2019  The lapse in federal appropriations that occurred from December 22, 2018, until January 25, 2019, caused a partial government shutdown  As a result, during this lapse in appropriations, agencies without funding furloughed federal employees, and many federal employees excepted from furlough were working without pay  Furloughed federal employees may be eligible for UCFE benefits  States are required to operate the UCFE program under the same terms and conditions that apply to regular state UC  Therefore, UCFE eligibility is determined under the laws of the state in which an individual's official duty station in federal civilian service is located  Federal employees who are in furlough status on account of a government shutdown are generally treated by state law as laid off with an expectation of recall  Depending on state laws and regulations, the state may have an option to not require federal employees to search for work given an expected recall  However, according to guidance from U S  Department of Labor (DOL), excepted federal employees who are performing services (but working without pay) would generally be ineligible for UCFE benefits based on states' definitions of "unemployment " Private-sector workers who are furloughed or laid off due to the partial government shutdown because they were employed by government contractors or other businesses may be eligible for regular UC benefits  UC eligibility for these workers would be based on the requirements set out under the state laws in the state where they had worked  In this climate, there has been congressional interest in assisting furloughed and excepted federal employees through the UI system  For example, as described below in the section on " Unemployment Compensation for Excepted Federal Employees During a Government Shutdown ," there are proposals to provide new authority to pay UCFE benefits to excepted federal workers who are working without pay  The most recent lapse in federal appropriations began December 22, 2018, and ended on January 25, 2019, with the enactment of H J Res  28   Because retroactive pay for furloughed and excepted federal employees was authorized under S  24 , the Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019 (enacted January 16, 2019), UCFE payments made to federal employee claimants during this lapse in appropriations may be deemed an overpayment, subject to state UC laws regarding overpayment recovery  According to guidance from the Office of Personnel Management on this issue The state UI agency will determine whether or not an overpayment exists and, generally, the recovery of the UCFE overpayment is a matter for state action under its law; however, some state UI laws require the employer to recover such overpayment by collecting the overpayment amount from the employee  The Federal and state agencies will need to coordinate to determine the required action in accordance with the individual state UI law  Federal agencies are encouraged to develop lists or spreadsheets that can be provided to the state(s) containing the employees' names, social security numbers, and the amounts and periods of time covered by the retroactive payment  If a recession is deep enough and if state unemployment tax (SUTA) revenue is inadequate for long periods of time, states may have insufficient funds to pay for UC benefits  Federal law, which requires states to pay these benefits, provides a loan mechanism within the UTF framework that an insolvent state may use to meet its UC benefit payment obligations  States must pay back these loans  If the loans are not paid back quickly (depending on the timing of the beginning of the loan period), states may face interest charges, and states' employers may face increased net FUTA rates until the loans are repaid  The U S  Virgin Islands is the only jurisdiction with an outstanding loan  As of January 18, 2019, it had an outstanding loan of $68 4 million from the federal accounts within the UTF  At the end of 2017, fewer than half of states (24) had accrued enough funds in their accounts to meet or exceed the minimally solvent standard of an average high cost multiple (AHCM) of 1 0 in order to be prepared for a recession  Beginning in FY2015, DOL funded state efforts "addressing individual reemployment needs of UI claimants, and working to prevent and detect UI overpayments" through the voluntary Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessment (RESEA) program  RESEA provides funding to states to conduct in-person interviews with selected UI claimants to (1) assure that claimants are complying with the eligibility rules, (2) determine if reemployment services are needed for the claimant to secure future employment, (3) refer the individual to reemployment services as necessary, and (4) provide labor market information that addresses the claimant's specific needs  Section 30206 of P L  115-123 codified the authority for DOL to administer a RESEA program  It also set out various requirements for states to use certain types of evidence-based interventions for UI claimants under RESEA and allocated discretionary funding for RESEA across three categories (base funding, outcome payments, and research and technical assistance)  State RESEA programs must include reasonable notice and accommodations to participating UI beneficiaries  On April 4, 2019, DOL published a proposed methodology to allocate base RESEA funds and outcome payments  DOL requested state and public comments on this proposal by May 6, 2019  The President's budget for FY2020 proposes changes to several aspects of the UI system  It would create a new required standard for state account balances within the UTF and a new benefit entitlement for paid parental leave financed through state unemployment taxes  The President's FY2020 budget also proposes a set of additional integrity measures, including the required use of certain databases to confirm UC eligibility and requiring Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits offset UI benefits  The President's budget proposal for FY2020 would require states to maintain a minimum level of solvency in their UTF account balances to be at least half (0 5) of the state's AHCM  The proposal would alter the rules for calculating the net FUTA rate, requiring a higher net FUTA rate on a state's employers if that state maintained an AHCM of less than 0 5 on January 1 of two or more consecutive years  The additional FUTA revenue would be deposited into the state UTF account and would be terminated once the state met the 0 5 AHCM criteria  The President's budget proposal for FY2020 would require states to establish a paid parental leave benefit by 2020, using the UC program as its base for an administrative framework  States would be required to provide six weeks of benefits to a worker on leave or otherwise absent from work for the birth or adoption of the worker's child  States would have discretion to determine the parameters of eligibility and financing for this new paid parental leave benefit  The President's 2020 budget would require states to use three specific data sources to confirm an individual's eligibility for UC benefits: the State Information Data Exchange System (SIDES, administered by Information Technology Support Center [ITSC] and DOL); the National Directory for New Hires (NDNH, administered by the Department of Health and Human Services); and the Prisoner Update Processing System (PUPS, administered by the Social Security Administration)  The proposal would create several additional integrity measures, including giving the Secretary of Labor the authority to implement new corrective action measures in response to poor state administrative performance within the program; allowing states to retain a percentage of UC overpayments for program integrity use; requiring states to deposit all UC penalty and interest payments into a special state fund, with these funds required to be used for improving state UI administration as well as providing reemployment services for UI claimants; and offsetting SSDI benefits to account for concurrent receipt of UI benefits  Section 2105 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P L  112-96 ; February 22, 2012) amended federal law to allow states to conduct two types of drug testing  First, it expanded the long-standing state option to disqualify UC applicants who were discharged from employment with their most recent employer (as defined under state law) for unlawful drug use by allowing states to drug test these applicants to determine UC benefit eligibility or disqualification  Second, it allowed states to drug test UC applicants for whom suitable work (as defined under state law) is available only in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing, to be determined under new regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor  As required by  P L  112-96 , on August 1, 2016, DOL promulgated  20 C F R  Part 620 ,  a new rule to implement the provisions of the law relating to the drug testing of UC applicants for whom suitable work (as defined under state law) is available only in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing  Amid concerns voiced by stakeholders about the 2016 DOL rule, Congress repealed this UC drug testing rule using the Congressional Review Act (CRA) via H J Res  42 / P L  115-17   On November 5, 2018, DOL published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to reissue the rule identifying occupations that regularly conduct drug testing for purposes of Section 2105 of  P L  112-96   The CRA prohibits an agency from reissuing the rule in "substantially the same form" or issuing a "new rule that is substantially the same" as the disapproved rule, "unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule " Notably, this is the first time an agency has proposed to reissue a rule after the original version was disapproved under the CRA  According to the 2018 NPRM, DOL has addressed the reissue requirements of the CRA by proposing a substantially different and more flexible approach to the statutory requirements than the 2016 Rule, enabling states to enact legislation to require drug testing for a far larger group of UC applicants than the previous rule permitted  This flexibility is intended to respect the diversity of states' economies and the different roles played by employment drug testing in those economies  Comments on the proposed 2018 rule were required to be submitted by January 4, 2019  On January 16, 2019, Senator Richard Blumenthal introduced S  165 , the Federal Unemployment Compensation Equity Act of 2019  This proposal would amend UCFE law and create a new permanent UCFE eligibility category for excepted federal employees who are unpaid but required to work during a government shutdown due to a lapse in appropriations  During any shutdown beginning on or after December 22, 2018, all excepted federal workers would be deemed eligible for UCFE benefits  Additionally, these employees would not be subject to a one-week waiting period (otherwise often required under state laws) before UCFE benefits were to be paid  On January 23, 2019, Representative Debbie Dingell introduced H R  725 , the Pay Federal Workers Act  This proposal would also provide UCFE benefits in a similar manner to S  165 , including permanently amending 5 U S C  Chapter 85 to provide federal authority for these benefits  On January 23, 2019, Representative Anthony Brown introduced H R  720   This proposal would deem excepted federal employees during a government shutdown to be eligible for UCFE during FY2019  The authority to provide UCFE to these excepted workers would expire at the end of FY2019  On February 8, 2019, Representative Katie Hill introduced H R  1117 , the Shutdown Fairness Act of 2019  This proposal would deem excepted federal employees and unpaid military servicemembers during a government shutdown to be eligible for UCFE or UCX during FY2019  The authority to provide UCFE to these excepted workers would expire at the end of FY2019  On January 15, 2019, Senator Ron Wyden and Representative Danny Davis introduced S  136 and H R  556 , the Economic Ladders to End Volatility and Advance Training and Employment Act of 2019 (the ELEVATE Act)   Among other provisions, this proposal would establish new self-employment and relocation assistance benefits for unemployed workers to be administered by the Social Security Administration, in consultation with DOL  The self-employment assistance benefits would provide weekly income replacement (half of prior earnings up to the maximum weekly benefit amount in the state) for up to of 26 weeks to individuals  They would be available to individuals who are (1) eligible for any type of UI benefit; or ineligible for any type of UI benefit, but became involuntarily unemployed over the previous 12 weeks; or were previously self-employed, but lost a hiring contract, and (2) have a viable business plan approved by their state department of labor, workforce board, or the Small Business Administration  Additionally, Section 3 of S  136 and H R  556 would provide up to $2,000 (or more, depending on family size) to fund to up to 90% of certain relocation expenses for eligible individuals and their families  In order to be eligible for this relocation assistance, an individual must be a (1) dislocated worker, (2) long-term unemployed individual, or (3) underemployed individual and also have filed a claim for relocation assistance and obtained suitable work with an expectation of obtaining such work in a new geographic region  On March 7, 2019, Representative Karen Bass introduced H R  1585 , the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019  Among many other provisions, Section 703 of H R  1585 would require states to consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits  The House passed H R  1585 on April 4, 2019  On March 14, 2019, Representative Stephanie Murphy introduced H R  1759 , the Building on Reemployment Improvements to Deliver Good Employment (BRIDGE) for Workers Act  This proposal would extend eligibility to any claimant of unemployment benefits, including those profiled as likely to exhaust benefits (rather than limiting eligibility to those who were profiled as likely to exhaust benefits)  The House passed H R  1759 on April 9, 2019  The Extended Benefit (EB) program was established by the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (EUCA; P L  91-373) (26 U S C  §3304, note)  EUCA may extend receipt of unemployment benefits (extended benefits) at the state level if certain economic conditions exist within the state  As of the date of this publication, EB is not active in any state  Extended Benefit Triggers The EB program is triggered when a state's insured unemployment rate (IUR) or total unemployment rate (TUR) reaches certain levels  All states must pay up to 13 weeks of EB if the IUR for the previous 13 weeks is at least 5% and is 120% of the average of the rates for the same 13-week period in each of the two previous years  States may choose to enact two other optional thresholds  (States may choose one, two, or none ) If the state has chosen one or more of the EB trigger options, it would provide the following: Option 1—up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's IUR is at least 6%, regardless of previous years' averages  Option 2—up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's TUR is at least 6 5% and is at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years; up to an additional 20 weeks of benefits if the state's TUR is at least 8% and is at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years  EB benefits are not "grandfathered" (phased out) when a state triggers "off" the program  When a state triggers "off" of an EB period, all EB benefit payments in the state cease immediately regardless of individual entitlement  The EB benefit amount is equal to the eligible individual's weekly regular UC benefits  Under permanent law, FUTA finances half (50%) of the EB payments and 100% of EB administrative costs  States fund the other half (50%) of EB benefit costs through their SUTA  On March 7, 2019, Representative Karen Bass introduced H R  1585 , the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019  Among many other provisions, Section 703 of H R  1585 would require states to consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits  The House passed H R  1585 on April 4, 2019  On March 14, 2019, Representative Stephanie Murphy introduced H R  1759 , the Building on Reemployment Improvements to Deliver Good Employment (BRIDGE) for Workers Act  This proposal would extend eligibility to any claimant of unemployment benefits, including those profiled as likely to exhaust benefits (rather than limiting eligibility to those who were profiled as likely to exhaust benefits)  The House passed H R  1759 on April 9, 2019 


Report 2:  FAA data from 2010 through 2016 show that FAA has assessed its 55 higher-level facilities at least once every 3 years  FAA policy requires that specialists schedule assessments of higher-level facilities every 12– 18 months depending on whether the facility has met FAA physical security standards  The ISC Standard states that to make appropriate resource decisions, agencies need information, such as what is being accomplished, what needs management attention, and what is performing at expected levels  We found that agencies’ methods of collecting and storing security information had limitations that affected agency and facility officials’ oversight of the physical security of their facilities (see table 3)  Without having long-term, agency-wide information to monitor whether assessments are conducted on schedule, ARS and the Forest Service may not meet the ISC Standard, resulting in not adequately protecting their facilities and employees  The ISC Standard also states that agencies should measure their security program’s capabilities and effectiveness to demonstrate the need to fund facility security and to make appropriate decisions for allocating resources  However, the agencies in our review were unable to demonstrate appropriate oversight of their physical security programs because: CBP’s handbook does not include requirements for data collection and analysis for monitoring physical-security program activities  Facility managers and security officials do not enter assessment results, such as the countermeasures recommended for facilities, in the real property database  Consequently, they do not have comprehensive data to manage their security program, assess overall performance, and take any necessary corrective actions  A CBP official told us that a comprehensive database would allow CBP to set priorities for addressing countermeasures  Without including data collection and analysis requirements in its updated handbook, CBP may be unable to monitor the performance of its physical security program  FAA’s policy does not require ongoing monitoring of physical security information, such as the status of recommended countermeasures or assessment schedules  As a result, FAA officials do not proactively use physical security information to assess the overall performance of its physical security program and take corrective actions before an incident occurs  Without a policy requiring ongoing monitoring of information—an internal control activity, FAA may be unable to assess the overall performance of its security program and take necessary corrective actions  USDA has a decentralized security program and places the responsibility on agencies to create their physical security programs  Security officials from ARS and the Forest Service told us that USDA does not have a policy for collecting and managing agency-wide information; however, they said that USDA is drafting a new departmental regulation and manual that will specify (1) the roles and responsibilities of agency and facility managers and (2) electronic- data-reporting requirements for monitoring the performance of the physical security program  USDA officials provided a draft of USDA’s regulation and manual for our review  The draft regulation did not mention data reporting and monitoring, while the draft manual only contained a table of contents that included a section entitled “Facility Tracking Database ” USDA officials expect to issue new policies sometime between October 2017 and April 2018  In the absence of new departmental regulation and manual, USDA and Forest Service officials told us that they have begun to develop a Forest Service system for storing electronic copies of agency-wide assessments and that they plan to expand the use of this system to track site specific assessment dates and status of recommended countermeasures  Forest Service officials provided milestone dates and described the capabilities for a future information system, which they expect to complete in September 2017  However, we could not determine whether the manual will have information system requirements to monitor agencies’ physical security program, an internal control activity  Without USDA’s including data collection and analysis requirements in its manual, its agencies may not be able to monitor the performance of their physical security programs  Without agencies having information to monitor security activities, they were unable to provide us information on the status of countermeasures across their entire portfolio  In order to better understand the status of countermeasures implemented and facilities’ experiences when implementing countermeasures, we determined the status of countermeasures at 13 facilities we visited  As previously noted, risk management, as it pertains to physical security, involves agency officials monitoring their physical security programs  During our visits to 13 selected facilities, we found the four agencies differed in the number of countermeasures that they had not implemented  Facility officials provided us with some information on why countermeasures had not been implemented, specifically: CBP had a significant number of recommended countermeasures from 2010 through 2016 that remained open at the eight selected CBP facilities  CBP facility officials gave reasons why recommended countermeasures had not been implemented  At one facility, officials did not know about the recommended countermeasures from its last 2010 assessment because the individuals previously knowledgeable about the assessments left the organization without communicating the results  By taking action to improve facility security, they implemented some needed countermeasures  However, at the time of our review, a large number of the recommendations remained open  At another facility, officials told us that they too had not known (for the same reason mentioned above) of their 2010 assessment, which contained recommended countermeasures  However, these officials told us that they submitted a funding request a few weeks before our visit to address all except one of the open countermeasures  In other cases, facilities have not implemented needed countermeasures due to resource constraints or physical site limitations  FAA had a large number of recommended countermeasures from 2010 through 2016 that remained open at the time of our review for the two FAA facilities visited  In this case, the most recent security assessment, completed in late 2016, resulted in one facility’s having little time to implement countermeasures by the time we conducted our analysis  While ARS had closed almost all recommended countermeasures at two facilities at the time of our review, one Forest Service facility had not yet implemented a recommendation (to secure its entrance doors) that was identified in a 2013 security assessment (see bottom center photo, fig  3)  This countermeasure remained open because facility officials said they continued to explore alternatives to address the recommendation  Figure 3 shows examples of countermeasures not fully implemented at selected facilities we visited  During our site visits and discussions with facility staff, we found that physical site limitations or other priorities can make it difficult for facility managers to implement countermeasures  For example, a countermeasure might involve correcting a clear zone violation—that is, moving an object (such as a brick wall) a certain distance away from the facility’s perimeter fence to prevent a potential intruder from using the object to climb over the fence  However, when the object near the fence is a building and the property outside of the fence is not federally owned (see bottom right photo, fig  3), it may not be cost effective to correct the clear zone violation  In this situation, the agency bears the responsibility for exploring ways to address the vulnerability  In following the ISC Standard, as previously noted, managers are required to justify and document why they could not implement recommended countermeasures—what the ISC calls risk acceptance  Selected agencies carry a great responsibility for protecting facilities that support border protection activities, provide safe and efficient air traffic around the country, and protect the quality of the nation’s food supply  With this responsibility comes the need to appropriately assess risk to ensure the security of these agencies’ facilities  However, 7 years after the ISC issued its initial risk-management process standard, each of four selected agencies continued to use assessment methodologies that did not fully align with this standard  During our review, agencies improved their methodologies to better align with the ISC Standard, but the agencies had not yet incorporated the methodologies into their policies and procedures  Without updated policies and procedures requiring a methodology that adheres to the ISC Standard (including all 33 undesirable events now identified in the November 2016 revision to the ISC Standard), agencies may not collect the information needed to assess risk and determine priorities for improved security  This situation could hamper the agencies’ ability to make informed resource allocation decisions or to recommend countermeasures commensurate to the needs at specific facilities  To address challenges in conducting timely assessments, agencies that had a backlog developed plans to address them, but the assumptions used in CBP’s plans and time frames did not appear to fully reflect the agency’s competing priorities and actual experience  Additionally, ARS and Forest Service have not implemented a long-term assessment schedule with key milestones to ensure that higher-level facilities are reassessed at least once every 3 years  Further, in cases where the agencies may have had risk assessment information, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service lack the means to collect, store, and analyze this information in order to monitor the status of a facility’s security  Without these key aspects of a comprehensive security program—a methodology that meets the standard, policies, and procedures that incorporate that methodology; the ability to complete assessments on time; and information to perform monitoring—agencies remain vulnerable to substantial security risks  To improve agencies’ physical security programs’ alignment with the ISC Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government for information and monitoring, we recommend that the Commissioner of U S  Customs and Border Protection take the following three actions: with regard to the updated Security Policy and Procedures Handbook, the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities requirement to assess all undesirable events, consider all three factors of risk, and document deviations from the standard, and data collection and analysis requirements for monitoring the performance of CBP’s physical security program  revise the assumptions used in the plan to address the backlog to balance assessments with competing priorities, such as updating the policy manual and reviewing new construction design, to develop a feasible time frame for completing the assessment backlog  Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following three actions: develop a plan that provides sufficient details on the activities needed and time frames within the date when FAA will implement an improved methodology; update FAA’s policy to require the use of a methodology that fully aligns with the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities for assessing all undesirable events, considering all three factors of risk, and documenting all deviations from the standard countermeasures; and update FAA’s policy to include ongoing monitoring of physical security information  Secretary of Agriculture take the following two actions: include data collection and analysis requirements for monitoring the performance of agencies’ physical security programs, in the department’s revised physical-security manual, and direct the Administrator of the Agricultural Research Service and the Chief of the Forest Service to implement and monitor a long-term assessment schedule with key milestones to ensure that higher-level facilities are reassessed at least once every 3 years  We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, Transportation, and Agriculture for review and comment  All three departments agreed with the findings and recommendations for their respective agencies  DHS agreed with our recommendations and provided actions and timeframes for completion  With regard to our recommendation to update the Security Policy and Procedures Handbook, DHS stated that CBP is updating the handbook to include: (1) a discussion and diagram of the ISC risk management process and its application within CBP’s assessment processes; (2) specific guidance for conducting risk assessments in accordance with the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities; and (3) a requirement and guidance for data collection and analysis in support of a robust physical security program  With regard to our recommendation to revise the assumptions used in the plan to address the assessment backlog, DHS stated that CBP has reevaluated current priorities and believes the current plan to eliminate the risk assessment backlog by the end of fiscal year 2018 is achievable  DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  DHS’s official written response is reprinted in appendix IV  DOT also agreed with our recommendations and by e-mail requested that we publish the response to the sensitive version of this report  DOT stated that FAA continues to refine its policy and develop processes that address the ISC threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences  Further, DOT stated that FAA would either validate that current mitigation strategies address those risks or apply additional appropriate countermeasures  DOT stated that it will provide a detailed response to each recommendation within 60 days from the date of this report  DOT’s official written response is reprinted in appendix V  USDA agreed with our recommendations and provided the agency-wide actions for completion  USDA provided a plan to ensure compliance with the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities by development of a standard physical-security assessment process and by initiation of a compliance program to track assessments and monitor the installation of countermeasures  In an e-mail, USDA provided milestone dates and planned completion by January 2019  USDA’s official written response is reprinted in appendix VI  If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or RectanusL@gao gov  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI  This report examines: (1) how selected agencies’ assessment methodologies align with the Interagency Security Committee’s (ISC) risk management standard for identifying necessary countermeasures and (2) what management challenges, if any, selected agencies reported facing in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring the results  To determine how selected agencies’ assessment methodologies align with ISC standards for identifying the necessary countermeasures, we identified federal executive branch departments and agencies reported by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to have received delegations of authority to protect their own buildings  We reviewed the Federal Real Property Council’s data on the Federal Real Property Profile to identify federally owned and agency-controlled buildings  We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our reporting objectives based upon our recent report that reviewed these data fields  We selected four agencies based upon their large quantity of reported federally owned and agency-controlled buildings: DHS, U S  Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and USDA’s United States Forest Service (Forest Service)  This methodology purposely does not include federal buildings protected by FPS and under the control of the General Services Administration as well as other agencies that we reported on in our previous work  We obtained and reviewed one particular ISC standard, The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities (the ISC Standard) and its related appendices for assessing physical security and providing recommended countermeasures at federal facilities  We obtained and analyzed the selected departments’ and agencies’ facility-security policies and procedures for a risk assessment methodology  According to the ISC Standard, agencies’ risk assessment methodologies must: consider all of the undesirable events identified in the ISC Standard as possible risks to federal facilities as listed in appendix III; assess the threat, consequences, and vulnerability to specific produce similar or identical results when applied by various security provide sufficient justification for deviations from the ISC-defined security baseline  We limited the scope of this review to the first two standards above because agencies’ adherence to these standards could be objectively verified by reviewing and analyzing agency documentation and interviewing agency officials, and their adherence to the two additional standards could not be verified in this manner  We did not conduct risk assessments with independent security professionals to evaluate: 1) the results from prior agency evaluations and 2) the sufficiency of justifications for deviations from the ISC-defined security baseline, as both evaluations were outside of the scope of the engagement  Therefore, for the purposes of this report, risk assessment policies, procedures and resulting methodology that align with ISC standards are those that consider all of the undesirable events and assess the threats, consequences, and vulnerabilities to specific undesirable events  We reviewed and analyzed information to answer the following five questions: 1  Do the policies and procedures mention the ISC standards? 2  Do the policies and procedures consider all of the undesirable events? 3  Do the policies and procedures assess the threat of specific undesirable events? 4  Do the policies and procedures assess the consequences of specific undesirable events? 5  Do the policies and procedures assess the vulnerability to specific undesirable events? We answered each of these questions as either a “Yes” or “No” for our selected agencies  The “No” answer to questions 3, 4, and 5 includes the following two possibilities: (a) the agency’s threat, consequence, or vulnerability ratings are not tied to specific undesirable events, or (b) the agency does not have a framework or formalized steps within which it collects and analyzes threat-, consequence-, or vulnerability-related information  If the answer to each of the five questions was “Yes,” then the agency’s overall risk assessment methodology aligns with ISC risk assessment standards for the purposes of this report  If the answer to one or more of the five questions was “No”, then the agency’s methodology does not to align with ISC standards for the purposes of this report  We interviewed security officials at ISC; three departments (DHS, DOT, and USDA); and four agencies (CBP, FAA, ARS, and the Forest Service)  We obtained and analyzed agency guidance on prioritizing physical security needs and interviewed agencies’ facility maintenance and budget officials  We reviewed the ISC’s best practices for planning for physical security resources within an agency budget process  Additionally, we reviewed the Office of Management and Budget’s and our leading practices in capital decision-making that provide agencies with guidance for prioritizing budget decisions such as “countermeasure projects ” We also reviewed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government because internal controls play a significant role in helping agencies achieve their mission-related responsibilities  Our findings from our review of the selected agencies are not generalizable to all ISC member agencies, but provide insight into and illustrative examples about selected agencies’ facility risk-assessment methodologies  To determine what management challenges selected agencies reported facing in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring results, we interviewed agencies’ security, maintenance, and budget officials  We requested agency security officials to provide portfolio- wide data on facility security assessments for our review in order to select sites to visit and analyze data for dates of assessments and the status of findings  We assessed the reliability of this data through interviews with knowledgeable agency staff and a review for completeness and any unexpected values  We compiled information from physical security assessments when no portfolio-wide agency data were available  We determined that these data were sufficient for the purpose of our reporting objectives and selected geographically dispersed sites with buildings with higher reported security levels per the ISC Standard, as these higher security levels have greater requirements and therefore the potential for greater resource needs  See appendix II for the 13 sites we selected  For these selected sites, we interviewed agency staff concerning the assessment process, site-specific findings, recommendations, justification for deviations from ISC’s baseline standards, and management challenges faced in addressing physical security needs  We observed and photographed the status of the findings from the site physical security assessments  We did not independently determine what constitutes a management challenge or a physical security finding  Rather, we relied on these stakeholders to determine these physical security concerns as defined in their own standards and guidance  The information from our selected sites is illustrative and cannot be generalized to sites agency- wide  The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from June 2016 to August 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We subsequently worked with DHS, DOT and USDA from August 2017 to October 2017 to prepare this version of the original report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards  Error! No text of specified style in document  Error! No text of specified style in document  Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Error! No text of specified style in document  In addition to the contact named above, Amelia Shachoy (Assistant Director), Steve Martinez (Analyst-in-Charge), Jennifer Clayborne, George Depaoli, Geoffrey Hamilton, Joshua Ormond, Alison Snyder, Amelia Michelle Weathers, and Elizabeth Wood made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The 116th Congress has begun to consider several issues related to two programs in the unemployment insurance (UI) system: Unemployment Compensation (UC) and Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE). The lapse in federal appropriations that occurred from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019, created a partial government shutdown. As a result, agencies without funding furloughed many federal employees, and many federal employees excepted from furlough were working without pay during the lapse in appropriations. Furloughed federal employees may be eligible for UCFE benefits. Private-sector workers who are furloughed or laid off due to the partial government shutdown because they were employed by government contractors may be eligible for regular UC benefits. But, according to guidance from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), excepted federal employees who are performing services (without pay) would generally be ineligible for UCFE benefits based on states' definitions of "unemployment." In this climate, there has been congressional interest in assisting furloughed and excepted federal employees through the UI system. UI legislative issues currently facing the 116th Congress include the following: the effects of the FY2019 sequester order on UI programs and benefits, the role of UI in providing temporary income replacement during a government shutdown, state fiscal concerns related to financing UC benefits, reemployment services and eligibility assessments (RESEA), potential consideration of the UI proposals included in the President's FY2020 budget, and congressional oversight related to a proposed UC drug testing rule reissued by DOL after previously being disapproved using the Congressional Review Act. In the 116th Congress, policymakers have introduced legislation related to UCFE benefits in response to the recent partial government shutdown (S. 165, H.R. 720, H.R. 725, and H.R. 1117), legislation to provide self-employment and relocation assistance benefits (S. 136 and H.R. 556), legislation to require that states consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits (H.R. 1585), and legislation to amend Title III of the Social Security Act to extend RESEA to all UC claimants (H.R. 1759). For a brief overview of UC, see CRS In Focus IF10336, The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA)  Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area of the coterminous United States (see Figure 1 )  Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P L  93-205 ; 16 U S C  §§1531 et seq ), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies  In general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by federal dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification—that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve  With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the U S  Bureau of Reclamation (BOR)  PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e g , "preference customers"), selling their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U S  Treasury on schedule for the portion of federal facility costs that have been allocated to hydropower beneficiaries  Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i e , receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority  Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress  Each PMA also has unique elements and regional issues that affect its business  They are discussed in alphabetical order  Created by the Bonneville Project Act of 1937 (16 U S C  §832) just before the completion of two large dams in the Pacific Northwest—Bonneville Dam in 1938 and Grand Coulee Dam in 1941—BPA was the first PMA  Though it serves a smaller geographical area, BPA is on par with WAPA (which serves the largest area) in the size of its transmission system  The agency operates and maintains about 75% of the high voltage transmission lines in its service territory, which includes Idaho, Oregon, Washington, western Montana and small parts of eastern Montana, California, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming  BPA also markets wholesale electricity from 31 federally owned hydropower facilities in the Northwest  These generation facilities are owned both by the Corps and BOR  BPA differs from the other three PMAs in that it is self-financed: it receives no federal appropriations  Since passage of the Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act of 1974 (16 U S C  §838), BPA has covered its operating costs through power rates set to ensure repayment to the Treasury of capital and interest on funds used to construct the Columbia River power system  BPA also has permanent Treasury borrowing authority, which it may use for capital on large projects  This money is repaid with interest, through power sales  As of 2018, BPA had $5 53 billion of bonds outstanding to the U S  Treasury, with BPA's current borrowing authority capped by Congress at $7 70 billion  BPA has also looked at other financing options as it approaches its debt limit, looking at nonfederal debt refinancing, lease-purchases, and other asset management strategies  BPA has initiated strategies and a financial plan to address a changing power generation and demand market, as it endeavors to meet its mandate for cost-based electric power rates  These plans are outlined in its Strategic Plan for 2018 to 2023, and address goals from financial health to infrastructure modernization  Wholesale power prices in the United States are generally trending downward, while BPA's firm power rates have trended upward  BPA repays its funding from the U S  Treasury largely through electricity sales to customers  While BPA generates its electricity from hydropower (which is traditionally one of the lower-cost means of power generation), increasing amounts of renewable electricity from growing wind and solar capacity installations in the Pacific Northwest are challenging BPA's price competitiveness, and perhaps its ability to repay its debts in a timely manner  In 2014, BPA entered into the Regional Cooperation Agreement (RCA) with the State of Washington to address the debt of Energy Northwest, a "joint action agency formed by the Washington state legislature in 1957" to manage public power utility costs  Energy Northwest owns and operates four electric power generation facilities: White Bluffs Solar Station, Packwood Lake Hydroelectric Project, Nine Canyon Wind Project, and the Columbia Generating Station  The Regional Cooperation debt is "the issuance of new bonds by Energy Northwest to refund outstanding bonds shortly before their maturities when substantial principal repayments were and are due " According to BPA, this allows for "integrated debt management" for the combined total debt portfolios of BPA and Energy Northwest, with a net effect reducing the "weighted average interest rate and the maturity of BPA's overall debt portfolio" over the life of the program  This refinancing, according to BPA, has enabled BPA to prepay higher-interest-rate federal obligations, and has "preserved or restored U S  Treasury borrowing authority " However, the debt service of the RCA is "borne by BPA ratepayers through BPA rates " BPA estimates that the "aggregate potential principal amount" of RCA refunding through bonds issued in fiscal years 2019 through 2030 could exceed $4 0 billion  BPA is responsible for maintaining and modernizing the generation and transmission infrastructure of its systems, and preserving and enhancing its physical and cybersecurity  With energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) in the West, BPA is considering whether to join the EIM, and how this might affect its operations and customers  Environmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i e , operations consistent with the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act  In addition, several environmental groups filed a lawsuit blaming the dams for warm river waters in summer 2015 that resulted in the deaths of about 250,000 adult sockeye salmon migrating up the Columbia and Snake Rivers  Some of these parties have sought to remove the four lower dams on the Snake River to ensure survival of some salmon and steelhead species  In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams  However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020  The memorandum ordered the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce "to appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind any regulations or procedures that unduly burden" water infrastructure projects so they "are better able to meet the demands of their authorized purposes " How this will affect the fish endangerment finding is unclear at this time  The Southeastern Power Administration was created in 1950 by the Secretary of the Interior to carry out the functions assigned to the Secretary by the Flood Control Act of 1944 (P L  78-534) in 11 states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia)  SEPA is unique among the four PMAs in two ways  It is the smallest PMA, with just over 40 employees, and, unlike the other three agencies, SEPA does not operate or maintain any transmission facilities, and thus contracts with other utilities for transmitting the federal power it markets to more than 12 million consumers  Southeastern markets approximately 3,400 MW of power produced at 22 multipurpose water projects, operated and maintained by the Corps  SEPA's facilities are aging; for instance, in 2018 it reported that its Cumberland System customers have agreed to fund $1 2 billion of planned rehabilitations of the nine hydroelectric facilities in the Corps' Nashville District  According to SEPA, it has an overcapacity issue  Projections for electricity load growth (in consultation with its preference customers) made before the 2008 economic downturn reportedly led to SEPA acquiring additional capacity it currently does not use  As a result, municipalities and electric cooperatives in SEPA's service area will have to make economic decisions regarding how to handle this excess capacity  As of 2018, at least one preference customer has terminated its contract with SEPA due to this issue  Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 (P L  78-534) established the Southwestern Power Administration  SWPA markets hydroelectric power in Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas from 24 multipurpose Corps dams with a combined capacity of 2,194 MW  SWPA serves more than 100 preference customer utilities with more than 8 million end-use customers  The agency manages nearly 1,400 miles of high-voltage transmission lines  SWPA is the only U S  electrical balancing area supported solely by hydroelectric generation, and its use of the reservoirs and river systems within the SWPA marketing area must be balanced with flood control and other required uses so that the power needs of its customers can be met  SWPA states that it uses alternative financing and offsetting collection authorities to fund expenses and purchase power to help SWPA meet its obligations while minimizing congressional appropriations  Periodically, SWPA has been challenged by low water conditions  It has a rain-based water supply—rather than one that is snow-based, like the mountain snowpack water supply of WAPA and BPA—and sells power from a comparatively small reservoir system which stores that water  Extended dry periods sometimes mean that SWPA must purchase replacement power and energy to meet its contractual obligations  This means that SWPA requires congressional authority to use its revenues from power sales over the long term—across high and low water years  Prior year balances have been available to Southwestern so that we are financially prepared and able to achieve rate stability for our customers  This authority is critical to operating our program according to sound business principles  Southwestern's program is funded by authority to use receipts, alternative financing, and other authorities approved by Congress, including appropriations, which represent only 6 5% of Southwestern's total program  Created by the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 ( P L  95-91 ), WAPA is the newest and largest of the PMAs in terms of service area  WAPA's service area covers 1 3 million square miles, and its power—transmitted by a high voltage grid over 17,000 miles long—serves customers in 15 western states  WAPA markets and transmits hydropower from 56 federal dams operated by BOR, and the Corps  It also sells hydropower power produced by facilities administered by the International Boundary and Water Commission, and markets the United States' 24 3% share (547 megawatts) of the coal-fired Navajo Generating Station in Arizona  In addition to the types of public bodies traditionally served as preference customers by the other PMAs, WAPA has developed a policy to give preference to Native American tribes regardless of their utility status  WAPA has been working with other regional entities to address the changing electric power needs of its customers  In 2014, WAPA published its Strategic Roadmap 2024, titled "Powering the Energy Frontier " The document is intended to serve as WAPA's strategic plan to guide the agency's actions for the next 10 years  However, according to some, the developing Energy Imbalance Market in the West may provide additional options for WAPA to address transmission development needs to balance regional generation and demand  An issue of continuing importance to WAPA is its role in relieving transmission congestion within its marketing area  There are a number of constrained transmission paths in the West whose limited capacity to transfer power may reduce the ability of utilities to serve electric loads on a seasonal or ongoing basis  In 2009, Section 402 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( P L  111-5 ) amended the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 to give WAPA authority to borrow up to $3 25 billion from the U S  Treasury to pursue transmission projects that integrate renewable generation sources into the electric transmission grid  The law provides authority to construct and upgrade transmission lines to help deliver renewable resources to market  Western created the Transmission Infrastructure Program, also known as TIP, to implement this new initiative  Several transmission projects have been initiated under the program  Previous budget proposals and legislation have proposed repealing WAPA's loan authority, but to date, none of these proposals have been enacted  In 2015, WAPA's Upper Great Plains (UGP) region joined the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO)  Under the operating agreement with SPP, WAPA was required to transfer functional control of UGP's eligible transmission facilities to SPP  WAPA is the first PMA to formally join an RTO, and states that benefits to date from joining SPP have significantly exceeded the original estimate of $11 5 million per year  WAPA reports that two of its other regions are considering joining SPP  For Water Year 2017, WAPA reported that it delivered 26,148 gigawatt-hours of hydroelectric power to its customers, which is 101% of average annual power sales  The West has been experiencing periodic droughts for a number of years, resulting in lower snowmelts and less water in storage and available for power generation  To help smooth the resulting annual differences, a "drought-adder" reduction program has been implemented in recent years  A drought-adder charge was levied to help repay deferred drought costs accrued during the 2000s in the Rocky Mountain and Upper Great Plains regions  The balance was paid a year ahead of schedule and, as of this year, has resulted in $40 million annual savings for more than 50 percent of WAPA's customers in Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas and the western sections of Minnesota and Iowa  This is the second year that 417 of WAPA's customers, out of 700, have had a rate reduction  The drought-adder component of the rate remains available to WAPA to adjust to the variable hydropower resource—a lasting risk if drought conditions persist in WAPA's territory  Moderate to extreme drought conditions have been reported in parts of the western United States  In addition to issues specific to individual PMAs, some recent proposals have applied to multiple PMAs  In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations  The proposal suggested that "eliminating or reducing" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets and increasing the private sector role would "encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers " The proposal calls for federal transmission infrastructure assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) to be sold, with the private sector and/or state and local entities potentially taking over the transmission functions now provided by the PMAs  The Federal entities that would result after such sales could contract with other utilities to provide transmission service for the delivery of Federal power just as the Southeastern Power Administration, which does not own transmission lines, already does  The proposal reports that according to the Administration's FY2019 budget justification, the sale of federal transmission assets would result in a net budgetary savings of $9 5 billion, in total, over a 10-year window  Reportedly, the Administration dropped the plan due to stakeholder opposition, with the Department of Energy stating that such a sale of PMA transmission assets would not proceed unless directed by Congress  Proposals to sell all or part of the PMAs are not new, and have been made in some form by almost every President since Reagan  However, Congress has sought to prevent executive branch alterations of PMA structures and authority  Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 ( P L  99-349 ), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress  The Trump Administration divestment proposal could have had an indirect impact on the original congressional intent for the PMAs to provide electricity at the lowest possible cost  This in turn could require changes to the following provisions: Flood Control Act of 1944, as amended (FCA; 16 U S C  §825s et seq  ); The 1937 Bonneville Project Act (BPA; 16 U S C  §832c ); and The Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (RPA; 43 U S C  §485h(c))   These laws also stipulate a preference of public bodies for the sale of federal power  Selling federally owned transmission assets could potentially affect the "lowest possible" rates of sale, and the statutory preference for publicly or cooperatively owned utilities to be the vehicle for sale of electric power produced by federal facilities 
Report 2:  FAA data from 2010 through 2016 show that FAA has assessed its 55 higher-level facilities at least once every 3 years  FAA policy requires that specialists schedule assessments of higher-level facilities every 12– 18 months depending on whether the facility has met FAA physical security standards  The ISC Standard states that to make appropriate resource decisions, agencies need information, such as what is being accomplished, what needs management attention, and what is performing at expected levels  We found that agencies’ methods of collecting and storing security information had limitations that affected agency and facility officials’ oversight of the physical security of their facilities (see table 3)  Without having long-term, agency-wide information to monitor whether assessments are conducted on schedule, ARS and the Forest Service may not meet the ISC Standard, resulting in not adequately protecting their facilities and employees  The ISC Standard also states that agencies should measure their security program’s capabilities and effectiveness to demonstrate the need to fund facility security and to make appropriate decisions for allocating resources  However, the agencies in our review were unable to demonstrate appropriate oversight of their physical security programs because: CBP’s handbook does not include requirements for data collection and analysis for monitoring physical-security program activities  Facility managers and security officials do not enter assessment results, such as the countermeasures recommended for facilities, in the real property database  Consequently, they do not have comprehensive data to manage their security program, assess overall performance, and take any necessary corrective actions  A CBP official told us that a comprehensive database would allow CBP to set priorities for addressing countermeasures  Without including data collection and analysis requirements in its updated handbook, CBP may be unable to monitor the performance of its physical security program  FAA’s policy does not require ongoing monitoring of physical security information, such as the status of recommended countermeasures or assessment schedules  As a result, FAA officials do not proactively use physical security information to assess the overall performance of its physical security program and take corrective actions before an incident occurs  Without a policy requiring ongoing monitoring of information—an internal control activity, FAA may be unable to assess the overall performance of its security program and take necessary corrective actions  USDA has a decentralized security program and places the responsibility on agencies to create their physical security programs  Security officials from ARS and the Forest Service told us that USDA does not have a policy for collecting and managing agency-wide information; however, they said that USDA is drafting a new departmental regulation and manual that will specify (1) the roles and responsibilities of agency and facility managers and (2) electronic- data-reporting requirements for monitoring the performance of the physical security program  USDA officials provided a draft of USDA’s regulation and manual for our review  The draft regulation did not mention data reporting and monitoring, while the draft manual only contained a table of contents that included a section entitled “Facility Tracking Database ” USDA officials expect to issue new policies sometime between October 2017 and April 2018  In the absence of new departmental regulation and manual, USDA and Forest Service officials told us that they have begun to develop a Forest Service system for storing electronic copies of agency-wide assessments and that they plan to expand the use of this system to track site specific assessment dates and status of recommended countermeasures  Forest Service officials provided milestone dates and described the capabilities for a future information system, which they expect to complete in September 2017  However, we could not determine whether the manual will have information system requirements to monitor agencies’ physical security program, an internal control activity  Without USDA’s including data collection and analysis requirements in its manual, its agencies may not be able to monitor the performance of their physical security programs  Without agencies having information to monitor security activities, they were unable to provide us information on the status of countermeasures across their entire portfolio  In order to better understand the status of countermeasures implemented and facilities’ experiences when implementing countermeasures, we determined the status of countermeasures at 13 facilities we visited  As previously noted, risk management, as it pertains to physical security, involves agency officials monitoring their physical security programs  During our visits to 13 selected facilities, we found the four agencies differed in the number of countermeasures that they had not implemented  Facility officials provided us with some information on why countermeasures had not been implemented, specifically: CBP had a significant number of recommended countermeasures from 2010 through 2016 that remained open at the eight selected CBP facilities  CBP facility officials gave reasons why recommended countermeasures had not been implemented  At one facility, officials did not know about the recommended countermeasures from its last 2010 assessment because the individuals previously knowledgeable about the assessments left the organization without communicating the results  By taking action to improve facility security, they implemented some needed countermeasures  However, at the time of our review, a large number of the recommendations remained open  At another facility, officials told us that they too had not known (for the same reason mentioned above) of their 2010 assessment, which contained recommended countermeasures  However, these officials told us that they submitted a funding request a few weeks before our visit to address all except one of the open countermeasures  In other cases, facilities have not implemented needed countermeasures due to resource constraints or physical site limitations  FAA had a large number of recommended countermeasures from 2010 through 2016 that remained open at the time of our review for the two FAA facilities visited  In this case, the most recent security assessment, completed in late 2016, resulted in one facility’s having little time to implement countermeasures by the time we conducted our analysis  While ARS had closed almost all recommended countermeasures at two facilities at the time of our review, one Forest Service facility had not yet implemented a recommendation (to secure its entrance doors) that was identified in a 2013 security assessment (see bottom center photo, fig  3)  This countermeasure remained open because facility officials said they continued to explore alternatives to address the recommendation  Figure 3 shows examples of countermeasures not fully implemented at selected facilities we visited  During our site visits and discussions with facility staff, we found that physical site limitations or other priorities can make it difficult for facility managers to implement countermeasures  For example, a countermeasure might involve correcting a clear zone violation—that is, moving an object (such as a brick wall) a certain distance away from the facility’s perimeter fence to prevent a potential intruder from using the object to climb over the fence  However, when the object near the fence is a building and the property outside of the fence is not federally owned (see bottom right photo, fig  3), it may not be cost effective to correct the clear zone violation  In this situation, the agency bears the responsibility for exploring ways to address the vulnerability  In following the ISC Standard, as previously noted, managers are required to justify and document why they could not implement recommended countermeasures—what the ISC calls risk acceptance  Selected agencies carry a great responsibility for protecting facilities that support border protection activities, provide safe and efficient air traffic around the country, and protect the quality of the nation’s food supply  With this responsibility comes the need to appropriately assess risk to ensure the security of these agencies’ facilities  However, 7 years after the ISC issued its initial risk-management process standard, each of four selected agencies continued to use assessment methodologies that did not fully align with this standard  During our review, agencies improved their methodologies to better align with the ISC Standard, but the agencies had not yet incorporated the methodologies into their policies and procedures  Without updated policies and procedures requiring a methodology that adheres to the ISC Standard (including all 33 undesirable events now identified in the November 2016 revision to the ISC Standard), agencies may not collect the information needed to assess risk and determine priorities for improved security  This situation could hamper the agencies’ ability to make informed resource allocation decisions or to recommend countermeasures commensurate to the needs at specific facilities  To address challenges in conducting timely assessments, agencies that had a backlog developed plans to address them, but the assumptions used in CBP’s plans and time frames did not appear to fully reflect the agency’s competing priorities and actual experience  Additionally, ARS and Forest Service have not implemented a long-term assessment schedule with key milestones to ensure that higher-level facilities are reassessed at least once every 3 years  Further, in cases where the agencies may have had risk assessment information, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service lack the means to collect, store, and analyze this information in order to monitor the status of a facility’s security  Without these key aspects of a comprehensive security program—a methodology that meets the standard, policies, and procedures that incorporate that methodology; the ability to complete assessments on time; and information to perform monitoring—agencies remain vulnerable to substantial security risks  To improve agencies’ physical security programs’ alignment with the ISC Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government for information and monitoring, we recommend that the Commissioner of U S  Customs and Border Protection take the following three actions: with regard to the updated Security Policy and Procedures Handbook, the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities requirement to assess all undesirable events, consider all three factors of risk, and document deviations from the standard, and data collection and analysis requirements for monitoring the performance of CBP’s physical security program  revise the assumptions used in the plan to address the backlog to balance assessments with competing priorities, such as updating the policy manual and reviewing new construction design, to develop a feasible time frame for completing the assessment backlog  Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following three actions: develop a plan that provides sufficient details on the activities needed and time frames within the date when FAA will implement an improved methodology; update FAA’s policy to require the use of a methodology that fully aligns with the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities for assessing all undesirable events, considering all three factors of risk, and documenting all deviations from the standard countermeasures; and update FAA’s policy to include ongoing monitoring of physical security information  Secretary of Agriculture take the following two actions: include data collection and analysis requirements for monitoring the performance of agencies’ physical security programs, in the department’s revised physical-security manual, and direct the Administrator of the Agricultural Research Service and the Chief of the Forest Service to implement and monitor a long-term assessment schedule with key milestones to ensure that higher-level facilities are reassessed at least once every 3 years  We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, Transportation, and Agriculture for review and comment  All three departments agreed with the findings and recommendations for their respective agencies  DHS agreed with our recommendations and provided actions and timeframes for completion  With regard to our recommendation to update the Security Policy and Procedures Handbook, DHS stated that CBP is updating the handbook to include: (1) a discussion and diagram of the ISC risk management process and its application within CBP’s assessment processes; (2) specific guidance for conducting risk assessments in accordance with the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities; and (3) a requirement and guidance for data collection and analysis in support of a robust physical security program  With regard to our recommendation to revise the assumptions used in the plan to address the assessment backlog, DHS stated that CBP has reevaluated current priorities and believes the current plan to eliminate the risk assessment backlog by the end of fiscal year 2018 is achievable  DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  DHS’s official written response is reprinted in appendix IV  DOT also agreed with our recommendations and by e-mail requested that we publish the response to the sensitive version of this report  DOT stated that FAA continues to refine its policy and develop processes that address the ISC threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences  Further, DOT stated that FAA would either validate that current mitigation strategies address those risks or apply additional appropriate countermeasures  DOT stated that it will provide a detailed response to each recommendation within 60 days from the date of this report  DOT’s official written response is reprinted in appendix V  USDA agreed with our recommendations and provided the agency-wide actions for completion  USDA provided a plan to ensure compliance with the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities by development of a standard physical-security assessment process and by initiation of a compliance program to track assessments and monitor the installation of countermeasures  In an e-mail, USDA provided milestone dates and planned completion by January 2019  USDA’s official written response is reprinted in appendix VI  If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or RectanusL@gao gov  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI  This report examines: (1) how selected agencies’ assessment methodologies align with the Interagency Security Committee’s (ISC) risk management standard for identifying necessary countermeasures and (2) what management challenges, if any, selected agencies reported facing in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring the results  To determine how selected agencies’ assessment methodologies align with ISC standards for identifying the necessary countermeasures, we identified federal executive branch departments and agencies reported by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to have received delegations of authority to protect their own buildings  We reviewed the Federal Real Property Council’s data on the Federal Real Property Profile to identify federally owned and agency-controlled buildings  We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our reporting objectives based upon our recent report that reviewed these data fields  We selected four agencies based upon their large quantity of reported federally owned and agency-controlled buildings: DHS, U S  Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and USDA’s United States Forest Service (Forest Service)  This methodology purposely does not include federal buildings protected by FPS and under the control of the General Services Administration as well as other agencies that we reported on in our previous work  We obtained and reviewed one particular ISC standard, The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities (the ISC Standard) and its related appendices for assessing physical security and providing recommended countermeasures at federal facilities  We obtained and analyzed the selected departments’ and agencies’ facility-security policies and procedures for a risk assessment methodology  According to the ISC Standard, agencies’ risk assessment methodologies must: consider all of the undesirable events identified in the ISC Standard as possible risks to federal facilities as listed in appendix III; assess the threat, consequences, and vulnerability to specific produce similar or identical results when applied by various security provide sufficient justification for deviations from the ISC-defined security baseline  We limited the scope of this review to the first two standards above because agencies’ adherence to these standards could be objectively verified by reviewing and analyzing agency documentation and interviewing agency officials, and their adherence to the two additional standards could not be verified in this manner  We did not conduct risk assessments with independent security professionals to evaluate: 1) the results from prior agency evaluations and 2) the sufficiency of justifications for deviations from the ISC-defined security baseline, as both evaluations were outside of the scope of the engagement  Therefore, for the purposes of this report, risk assessment policies, procedures and resulting methodology that align with ISC standards are those that consider all of the undesirable events and assess the threats, consequences, and vulnerabilities to specific undesirable events  We reviewed and analyzed information to answer the following five questions: 1  Do the policies and procedures mention the ISC standards? 2  Do the policies and procedures consider all of the undesirable events? 3  Do the policies and procedures assess the threat of specific undesirable events? 4  Do the policies and procedures assess the consequences of specific undesirable events? 5  Do the policies and procedures assess the vulnerability to specific undesirable events? We answered each of these questions as either a “Yes” or “No” for our selected agencies  The “No” answer to questions 3, 4, and 5 includes the following two possibilities: (a) the agency’s threat, consequence, or vulnerability ratings are not tied to specific undesirable events, or (b) the agency does not have a framework or formalized steps within which it collects and analyzes threat-, consequence-, or vulnerability-related information  If the answer to each of the five questions was “Yes,” then the agency’s overall risk assessment methodology aligns with ISC risk assessment standards for the purposes of this report  If the answer to one or more of the five questions was “No”, then the agency’s methodology does not to align with ISC standards for the purposes of this report  We interviewed security officials at ISC; three departments (DHS, DOT, and USDA); and four agencies (CBP, FAA, ARS, and the Forest Service)  We obtained and analyzed agency guidance on prioritizing physical security needs and interviewed agencies’ facility maintenance and budget officials  We reviewed the ISC’s best practices for planning for physical security resources within an agency budget process  Additionally, we reviewed the Office of Management and Budget’s and our leading practices in capital decision-making that provide agencies with guidance for prioritizing budget decisions such as “countermeasure projects ” We also reviewed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government because internal controls play a significant role in helping agencies achieve their mission-related responsibilities  Our findings from our review of the selected agencies are not generalizable to all ISC member agencies, but provide insight into and illustrative examples about selected agencies’ facility risk-assessment methodologies  To determine what management challenges selected agencies reported facing in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring results, we interviewed agencies’ security, maintenance, and budget officials  We requested agency security officials to provide portfolio- wide data on facility security assessments for our review in order to select sites to visit and analyze data for dates of assessments and the status of findings  We assessed the reliability of this data through interviews with knowledgeable agency staff and a review for completeness and any unexpected values  We compiled information from physical security assessments when no portfolio-wide agency data were available  We determined that these data were sufficient for the purpose of our reporting objectives and selected geographically dispersed sites with buildings with higher reported security levels per the ISC Standard, as these higher security levels have greater requirements and therefore the potential for greater resource needs  See appendix II for the 13 sites we selected  For these selected sites, we interviewed agency staff concerning the assessment process, site-specific findings, recommendations, justification for deviations from ISC’s baseline standards, and management challenges faced in addressing physical security needs  We observed and photographed the status of the findings from the site physical security assessments  We did not independently determine what constitutes a management challenge or a physical security finding  Rather, we relied on these stakeholders to determine these physical security concerns as defined in their own standards and guidance  The information from our selected sites is illustrative and cannot be generalized to sites agency- wide  The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from June 2016 to August 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We subsequently worked with DHS, DOT and USDA from August 2017 to October 2017 to prepare this version of the original report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards  Error! No text of specified style in document  Error! No text of specified style in document  Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Error! No text of specified style in document  In addition to the contact named above, Amelia Shachoy (Assistant Director), Steve Martinez (Analyst-in-Charge), Jennifer Clayborne, George Depaoli, Geoffrey Hamilton, Joshua Ormond, Alison Snyder, Amelia Michelle Weathers, and Elizabeth Wood made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area. Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205; 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq.), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies. In general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification—that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve. With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). By statute, PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e.g., "preference customers"), and sell their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U.S. Treasury for the portion of federal facility costs allocated to hydropower beneficiaries. With energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market in the West, BPA and WAPA may have to adapt their plans with regard to generation needs and how transmission systems are developed. In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations. The proposal suggested that "eliminating or reducing" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets, and increasing the private sector's role, would "encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers." The resulting PMA entities would then contract with other utilities to provide transmission services for the delivery of federal power, similar to what SEPA does currently. Reportedly, the proposed sale of PMA assets was dropped after opposition to the plan emerged from stakeholders. Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 (P.L. 99-349), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress. Environmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i.e., the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the ESA. In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams. However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020. Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i.e., receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority. Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress.