prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: For over a decade, each of VA’s 170 medical centers used VHA’s legacy MSPV program to order medical supplies, such as bandages and scalpels  Many of those items were purchased using the Federal Supply Schedules, which provided medical centers with a great deal of flexibility  However, as we reported in 2016, this legacy program prevented VHA from standardizing items used across its medical centers and affected its ability to leverage its buying power to achieve greater cost avoidance  Standardization is a process of narrowing the range of items purchased to meet a given need, such as buying 10 varieties of bandages instead of 100, in order to improve buying power, simplify supply chain management, and provide clinical consistency  In part because of the legacy MSPV program’s limited standardization, VHA decided to transition to a new iteration, called MSPV-NG  The transition to MSPV-NG has been a major effort, involving the MSPV- NG program office, stakeholders from the VHA’s Procurement and Logistics Office and VA’s Strategic Acquisition Center (SAC)—a VA-wide contracting organization—and logistics and clinical personnel at every medical center  The program also includes hundreds of new contracts with individual supply vendors and a new set of prime vendor contracts to distribute the supplies  VA’s goals for the MSPV-NG program include (1) standardizing requirements for supply items for greater clinical consistency; (2) demonstrating cost avoidance by leveraging VA’s substantial buying power when making competitive awards; (3) achieving greater efficiency in ordering and supply chain management, including a metric of ordering 40 percent of medical centers’ supplies from the MSPV-NG formulary; and (4) involving clinicians in requirements development to ensure uniform clinical review of medical supplies  VHA launched the MSPV-NG program in December 2016, but allowed a 4-month transition period  After April 2017, medical centers could no longer use the legacy program  MSPV-NG now restricts ordering to a narrow formulary  VHA policy requires medical centers to use MSPV- NG—as opposed to other means such as open market purchase card transactions—when purchasing items that are available in the formulary  Leading hospital networks we spoke with have similar goals to VA in managing their supply chains, including clinical standardization and reduced costs  These hospital networks reported they analyze their spending to identify items purchased most frequently, and which ones would be the best candidates to standardize first to yield cost savings  The hospitals’ supply chain managers reported establishing consensus with clinicians through early and frequent collaboration, understanding that clinician involvement is critical to the success of any effort to standardize their medical supply chain  By following these practices, these hospital networks have reported they have achieved significant cost savings in some cases, and the potential for improved patient care, while maintaining buy-in from their clinicians  VHA’s implementation of the MSPV-NG program—from its initial work to identify a list of supply requirements in early 2015, through its roll-out of the formulary to medical centers in December 2016—was not executed in line with leading practices  Specifically, VHA lacked a documented program strategy, leadership stability, and workforce capacity for the transition that, if in place, could have facilitated buy-in for the change throughout the organization  Further, the initial requirements development process and tight time frames contributed to ineffective contracting processes  As a result, VHA developed an initial formulary that did not meet the needs of the medical centers and has yet to achieve utilization and cost avoidance goals  VA made some changes in the second phase of requirements development to address deficiencies identified in the initial roll out  Key among these was to increase the level of clinical involvement, that is, to obtain input from the doctors and nurses at VA’s individual medical facilities  Despite changes aimed at improving implementation, the agency continues to face challenges that prevent the program from fully achieving its goals  VA did not document a clear overall strategy for the MSPV-NG program at the start and has not done so to date  About 6 months after our initial requests for a strategy or plan, a VHA official provided us with an October 2015 plan focusing on the mechanics of establishing the MSPV-NG formulary  However, this plan was used only within the VHA Procurement and Logistics Office and had not been approved by VHA or VA leadership  Leading practices for organizational transformation state that agencies must have well-documented plans and strategies for major initiatives (such as MSPV-NG) and communicate them clearly and consistently to all involved—which included VHA headquarters, the SAC, and all 170 medical centers  Without such a strategy, VA could not reasonably ensure that all stakeholders understood VHA’s approach for MSPV-NG and worked together in a coordinated manner to achieve program goals  In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the Director of the MSPV-NG program office should, with input from SAC, develop, document, and communicate to stakeholders an overarching strategy for the program, including how the program office will prioritize categories of supplies for future phases of requirement development and contracting  VA agreed with this recommendation and reported it would have a strategy in place by December 2017  Leadership instability and workforce challenges also made it difficult for VA to execute its transition to MSPV-NG  Our work has shown that leadership buy-in is necessary to ensure that major programs like MSPV- NG have the resources and support they need to execute their missions  Due to a combination of budget and hiring constraints, and lack of prioritization within VA, the MSPV-NG program office has never been fully staffed and has experienced instability in its leadership  As of January 2017, 24 of the office’s 40 positions were filled, and program office officials stated that this lack of staff affected their ability to implement certain aspects of the program within the planned time frames  In addition, since the inception of MSPV-NG, the program office has had four directors, two of whom were acting and two of whom were fulfilling the director position while performing other collateral duties  For instance, one of the acting MSPV-NG program office directors was on detail from a regional health network to fulfill the position, but had to abruptly leave and return to her prior position due to a federal hiring freeze  In our November 2017 report, we recommended that VHA prioritize the hiring of a MSPV- NG program director on a permanent basis  VA agreed with this recommendation and indicated a vacancy announcement will be posted by the end of 2017  The MSPV-NG program office initially developed requirements for items to be included in the formulary based almost exclusively on prior supply purchases, with limited clinician involvement  The program office concluded in its October 2015 formulary plan that relying on data from previous clinician purchases would be a good representation of medical centers’ needs and that clinician input would not be required for identifying which items to include in the initial formulary  Further, rather than standardizing purchases of specific categories of supplies—such as bandages or scalpels—program officials told us they identified medical and surgical items on which VA had spent $16,000 or more annually and ordered at least 12 times per year, and made those items the basis for the formulary  Officials said this analysis initially yielded a list of about 18,000 items, which the program office further refined to about 6,000 items by removing duplicate items or those that were not considered consumable commodities, such as medical equipment  This approach to requirements development stood in sharp contrast to those of the leading hospital networks we met with, which rely heavily on clinician input to help drive the standardization process and focus on individual categories of supplies that provide the best opportunities for cost savings  Based on the requirements developed by the program office, SAC began to issue competitive solicitations for the 6,000 items on the initial formulary in June 2015  Medical supply companies had responded to about 30 percent of the solicitations as of January 2016  As a result, according to SAC officials, they conducted outreach and some of these companies responded that VHA’s requirements did not appear to be based on clinical input and instead consisted of manufacturer-specific requirements that favored particular products instead of broader descriptions  Furthermore, SAC did not solicit large groups of related items, but rather issued separate solicitations for small groups of supply items—consisting of three or fewer items  This is contrary to industry practices of soliciting large groups of related supplies together  Therefore, according to SAC officials, some medical supply companies told them that submitting responses to SAC’s solicitations required more time and resources than they were willing to commit  By its April 2016 deadline for having 6,000 items on the formulary, SAC had been working on the effort for over a year and had established competitive agreements for about 200 items, representing about 3 percent of the planned items  Without contracts for the items on the formulary in place, VA delayed the launch of the MSPV-NG program until December 2016 and SAC began establishing non-competitive agreements in the last few months before the launch of MSPV-NG  As shown in figure 1, these non-competitive agreements accounted for approximately 79 percent of the items on the January 2017 version of the formulary  While this approach enabled the MSPV-NG program office to establish the formulary more quickly, it did so at the expense of one of the primary goals of the MSPV-NG program—leveraging VA’s buying power to obtain cost avoidance through competition  Once VA’s MSPV-NG initial formulary was established in December 2016, each medical center was charged with implementing it  According to logistics officials we spoke with at selected medical centers, they had varying levels of success due, in part, to incomplete guidance from the program office  Without clear guidance, many medical centers reported they were unable to find direct matches or substitutes on the MSPV-NG formulary for a substantial number of items they routinely used, which negatively impacted utilization rates for the initial formulary  In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the Director of the MSPV- NG program office provide complete guidance to medical centers for matching equivalent supply items  VA agreed with this recommendation and indicated it would provide this guidance to medical centers by December 2017  According to SAC, as of June 2017, only about a third of the items on the initial version of the formulary were being ordered in any significant quantity by medical centers, indicating that many items on the formulary were not those that are needed by medical centers  Senior VHA acquisition officials attributed this mismatch to shortcomings in their initial requirements development process as well as with VA’s purchase data  VA had set a target that medical centers would order 40 percent of their supplies from the MSPV-NG formulary, but utilization rates were below this target with a nationwide average utilization rate across medical centers of about 24 percent as of May 2017  Specifically, Chief Supply Chain Officers—who are responsible for managing the ordering and stocking of medical supplies at six selected medical centers—told us that many items they needed were not included in the MSPV-NG formulary  As such, we found that these six medical centers generally fell below VA’s stated utilization target  As shown in figure 2, among the six selected medical centers we reviewed, one met the target, while the remaining five were below 25 percent utilization  Instead of fully using MSPV-NG, the selected medical centers are purchasing many items through other means, such as purchase cards or new contracts awarded by their local contracting office, in part, because they said the formulary does not meet their needs  These approaches run counter to the goals of the MSPV-NG program and contribute to VA not making the best use of taxpayer dollars  Greater utilization of MSPV-NG is essential to VA achieving the cost avoidance goal of $150 million for its supply chain transformation effort  Under the legacy MSPV program, the National Acquisition Center tracked cost avoidance achieved by comparing prices for competitively-awarded MSPV supply contracts with prices available elsewhere  However, VHA officials stated that they are not currently tracking cost avoidance related specifically to MSPV-NG  In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the VHA Chief Procurement and Logistics Officer, in coordination with SAC, should calculate cost avoidance achieved by MSPV-NG on an ongoing basis  VA agreed with this recommendation and reported it would develop a new metric to measure cost avoidance by June 2018  In Phase 2 of MSPV-NG, the program office has taken some steps to incorporate greater clinical involvement in subsequent requirements development, but both its requirements development and SAC’s contracting efforts have been hampered by staffing and schedule constraints  In the fall of 2016, the program office began to establish panels of clinicians to serve on MSPV-NG integrated product teams (IPT) assigned to the task of developing updated requirements for the second phase of the formulary  Program officials said they had difficulty recruiting clinicians to participate  We found that slightly more than half (20 of the 38) of the IPTs had begun their work to review items and develop updated requirements by the time the MSPV-NG program launched in December 2016  Staff on the IPTs had to complete their responsibilities by the end of March 2017 while simultaneously managing their regular workload as physicians, surgeons, or nurses  By early March 2017, the IPTs still had about 4,200 items to review  Faced with meeting this unrealistic time frame, the MSPV-NG program office had 9 IPT members travel to one location—with an additional 10 members participating virtually—to meet for 5 days to review the remaining items  Members told us that this time pressure limited the extent to which they were able to pursue the goal of standardizing supplies, and that their review ended up being more of a data validation exercise than a standardization review  VHA ultimately met this compressed timeline, but in a rushed manner that limited the impact of clinician involvement  In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the VHA Chief Procurement and Logistics Officer use input from national clinical program offices to prioritize its requirements development and standardization efforts beyond Phase 2 to focus on supply categories that offer the best opportunity for standardization and cost avoidance  VA agreed with this recommendation and stated it is in the process of finalizing guidance that will detail the importance of involving the national clinical program offices in MSPV-NG requirements development and standardization efforts  The SAC plans to replace the existing Phase 1 non-competitive agreements with competitive awards based on the Phase 2 requirements generated by the IPTs, but it may not be able to keep up with expiring agreements due to an unrealistic schedule  Because they were made on a non-competitive basis, the Phase 1 agreements were established for a period of 1 year  In order to keep the full formulary available, the SAC director said the staff must award 200 to 250 contracts before the Phase 1 agreements expire later this year  SAC officials acknowledged that it is unlikely that they will be able to award the contracts by the time the existing agreements expire  According to SAC officials, they are in the process of hiring more staff to deal with the increased workload  Further, the SAC division director told us that they canceled all outstanding Phase 2 solicitations in September 2017 due to low response rates, protests from service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses, and changes in overall MSPV-NG strategy  In our November 2017 report, we recommended that the MSPV-NG program office and SAC should establish a plan for how to mitigate the potential risk of gaps in contract coverage while SAC is still working to make competitive Phase 2 awards, which could include prioritizing supply categories that are most likely to yield cost avoidance  VA agreed with this recommendation and indicated it has developed a plan to mitigate the risk of gaps in contract coverage with short- and mid-term procurement strategies to ensure continued provision of medical and surgical supplies to VHA facilities  The department also stated that it plans to replace the current MSPV-NG contract and formulary process with a new approach where the prime vendor would develop the formulary  However, VA will likely face challenges in this new approach until it fully addresses the existing shortcomings in the MSPV-NG program  Chairman Roe, Ranking Member Walz, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time  If you or your staff have any questions about this statement, please contact Shelby S  Oakley at 202-512-4841 or OakleyS@gao gov  In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Individuals who made key contributions to the report on which this testimony is based are Lisa Gardner, Assistant Director; Emily Bond; Matthew T  Crosby; Lorraine Ettaro; Michael Grogan; Jeff Hartnett; Katherine Lenane; Teague Lyons; Roxanna Sun; and Colleen Taylor  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2: The federal child nutrition programs provide assistance to schools and other institutions in the form of cash, commodity food, and administrative support (such as technical assistance and administrative funding) based on the provision of meals and snacks to children  In general, these programs were created (and amended over time) to both improve children's nutrition and provide support to the agriculture economy  Today, the child nutrition programs refer primarily to the following meal, snack, and milk reimbursement programs (these and other acronyms are listed in Appendix A ): National School Lunch Program (NSLP) (Richard B  Russell National School Lunch Act (42 U S C  1751 et seq )); School Breakfast Program (SBP) (Child Nutrition Act, Section 4 (42 U S C  1773)); Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP) (Richard B  Russell National School Lunch Act, Section 17 (42 U S C  1766)); Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) (Richard B  Russell National School Lunch Act, Section 13 (42 U S C  1761)); and Special Milk Program (SMP) (Child Nutrition Act, Section 3 (42 U S C  1772))  The programs provide financial support and/or foods to the institutions that prepare meals and snacks served outside of the home (unlike other food assistance programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp Program) where benefits are used to purchase food for home consumption)  Though exact eligibility rules and pricing vary by program, in general the amount of federal reimbursement is greater for meals served to qualifying low-income individuals or at qualifying institutions, although most programs provide some subsidy for all food served  Participating children receive subsidized meals and snacks, which may be free or at reduced price  Forthcoming sections discuss how program-specific eligibility rules and funding operate  This report describes how each program operates under current law, focusing on eligibility rules, participation, and funding  This introductory section describes some of the background and principles that generally apply to all of the programs; subsequent sections go into further detail on the workings of each  Unless stated otherwise, participation and funding data come from USDA-FNS's "Keydata Reports " The child nutrition programs are most often dated back to the 1946 enactment of the National School Lunch Act, which created the National School Lunch Program, albeit in a different form than it operates today  Most of the child nutrition programs do not date back to 1946; they were added and amended in the decades to follow as policymakers expanded child nutrition programs' institutional settings and meals provided: The Special Milk Program was created in 1954, regularly extended, and made permanent in 1970  The School Breakfast Program was piloted in 1966, regularly extended, and eventually made permanent in 1975  A program for child care settings and summer programs was piloted in 1968, with separate programs authorized in 1975 and then made permanent in 1978  These are now the Child and Adult Care Food Program and Summer Food Service Program  The Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program began as a pilot in 2002, was made permanent in 2004, and was expanded nationwide in 2008  The programs are now authorized under three major federal statutes: the Richard B  Russell National School Lunch Act (originally enacted as the National School Lunch Act in 1946), the Child Nutrition Act (originally enacted in 1966), and Section 32 of the act of August 24, 1935 (7 U S C  612c)  Congressional jurisdiction over the underlying three laws has typically been exercised by the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee; the House Education and the Workforce Committee; and, to a limited extent (relating to commodity food assistance and Section 32 issues), the House Agriculture Committee  Congress periodically reviews and reauthorizes expiring authorities under these laws  The child nutrition programs were most recently reauthorized in 2010 through the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA, P L  111-296 ); some of the authorities created or extended in that law expired on September 30, 2015  WIC (the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children) is also typically reauthorized with the child nutrition programs  WIC is not one of the child nutrition programs and is not discussed in this report  The 114 th Congress began but did not complete a 2016 child nutrition reauthorization (see CRS Report R44373, Tracking the Next Child Nutrition Reauthorization: An Overview )  There was no significant legislative activity with regard to reauthorization in the 115 th Congress  The U S  Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) administers the programs at the federal level  The programs are operated by a wide variety of local public and private providers and the degree of direct state involvement differs by program and state  At the state level, education, health, social services, and agriculture departments all have roles; at a minimum, they are responsible for approving and overseeing local providers such as schools, summer program sponsors, and child care centers and day care homes, as well as making sure they receive the federal support they are due  At the local level, program benefits are provided to millions of children (e g , there were 30 0 million in the National School Lunch Program, the largest of the programs, in FY2017), through some 100,000 public and private schools and residential child care institutions, nearly 170,000 child care centers and family day care homes, and just over 50,000 summer program sites  All programs are available in the 50 states and the District of Columbia  Virtually all operate in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands (and, in differing versions, in the Northern Marianas and American Samoa)  This section summarizes the nature and extent to which the programs' funding is mandatory and discretionary, including a discussion of appropriated entitlement status  Table 3 lists child nutrition program and related expenditures  Most spending for child nutrition programs is provided in annual appropriations acts to fulfill the legal financial obligation established by the authorizing laws  That is, the level of spending for such programs, referred to as appropriated mandatory spending, is not controlled through the annual appropriations process, but instead is derived from the benefit and eligibility criteria specified in the authorizing laws  The appropriated mandatory funding is treated as mandatory spending  Further, if Congress does not appropriate the funds necessary to fund the program, eligible entities may have legal recourse  Congress typically considers the Administration's forecast for program needs in its appropriations decisions  For the majority of funding discussed in this report, the formula that controls the funding is not capped and fluctuates based on the reimbursement rates and the number of meals/snacks served in the programs  In the meal service programs, such as the National School Lunch Program, School Breakfast Program, summer programs, and assistance for child care centers and day care homes, federal aid is provided in the form of statutorily set subsidies (reimbursements) paid for each meal/snack served that meets federal nutrition guidelines  Although all (including full-price) meals/snacks served by participating providers are subsidized, those served free or at a reduced price to lower-income children are supported at higher rates  All federal meal/snack subsidy rates are indexed annually (each July) for inflation, as are the income eligibility thresholds for free and reduced-price meals/snacks  Subsequent sections discuss how a specific program's eligibility and reimbursements work  Most subsidies are cash payments to schools or other providers, but a smaller portion of aid is provided in the form of USDA-purchased commodity foods   Laws for three child nutrition programs (NSLP, CACFP, and SFSP) require the provision of commodity foods (or in some cases allow cash in lieu of commodity foods)  Meal and snack service entails nonfood costs  Federal child nutrition per-meal/snack subsidies may be used to cover local providers' administrative and operating costs  However, the separate direct federal payments for administrative/operating costs ("State Administrative Expenses," discussed in the " Related Programs, Initiatives, and Support Activities " section) are limited  In addition to the open-ended, appropriated entitlement funds summarized above, the child nutrition programs' funding also includes certain other mandatory funding and a limited amount of discretionary funding  Some of the activities discussed in " Related Programs, Initiatives, and Support Activities ," such as Team Nutrition, are provided for with discretionary funding  Aside from the annually appropriated funding, the child nutrition programs are also supported by certain permanent appropriations and transfers  Notably, funding for the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program is funded by a transfer from USDA's Section 32 program, a permanent appropriation of 30% of the previous year's customs receipts  Federal subsidies do not necessarily cover the full cost of the meals and snacks offered by providers  States and localities help cover program costs, as do children's families by paying charges for nonfree or reduced-price meals/snacks  There is a nonfederal cost-sharing requirement for the school meals programs (discussed below), and some states supplement school funding through additional state per-meal reimbursements or other prescribed financing arrangements  Subsequent sections of this report delve into the details of how each of the child nutrition programs support the service of meals and snacks in institutional settings; first, it is useful to take a broader perspective of primary program elements  Table 1 is a top-level look at the different programs that displays distinguishing characteristics (what meals are provided, in what settings, to what ages) and recent program spending  Other relevant CRS reports in this area include CRS In Focus IF10266, An Introduction to Child Nutrition Reauthorization CRS Report R45486, Child Nutrition Programs: Current Issues CRS Report R42353, Domestic Food Assistance: Summary of Programs CRS Report R41354, Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization: P L  111-296 (summarizes the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010) CRS Report R44373, Tracking the Next Child Nutrition Reauthorization: An Overview CRS Report R44588, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2017 Appropriations CRS Report RL34081, Farm and Food Support Under USDA's Section 32 Program Other relevant resources include USDA-FNS's website, https://www fns usda gov/school-meals/child-nutrition-programs USDA-FNS's Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act page, http://www fns usda gov/school-meals/healthy-hunger-free-kids-act The FNS page of the Federal Register , https://www federalregister gov/agencies/food-and-nutrition-service This section discusses the school meals programs: the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and the School Breakfast Program (SBP)  Principles and concepts common to both programs are discussed first; subsections then discuss features and data unique to the NSLP and SBP, respectively  The federal school meals programs provide federal support in the form of cash assistance and USDA commodity foods; both are provided according to statutory formulas based on the number of reimbursable meals served in schools  The subsidized meals are served by both public and private nonprofit elementary and secondary schools and residential child care institutions (RCCIs) that opt to enroll and guarantee to offer free or reduced-price meals to eligible low-income children  Both cash and commodity support to participating schools are calculated based on the number and price of meals served (e g , lunch or breakfast, free or full price), but once the aid is received by the school it is used to support the overall school meal service budget, as determined by the school  This report focuses on the federal reimbursements and funding, but it should be noted that some states have provided state financing through additional state-specific funding  Federal law does not require schools to participate in the school meals programs  However, some states have mandated that schools provide lunch and/or breakfast, and some of these states require that their schools do so through NSLP and/or SBP  The program is open to public and private schools  A reimbursable meal requires compliance with federal school nutrition standards, which have changed throughout the history of the program based on nutritional science and children's nutritional needs  Food items not served as a complete meal meeting nutrition standards (e g , a la carte offerings) are not reimbursable meals, and therefore are not eligible for federal per-meal, per-snack reimbursements  Following rulemaking to implement provisions in the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 ( P L  111-296 ), USDA updated the nutrition standards for reimbursable meals in January 2012 (see " Nutrition Standards " for more information)  Schools serving meals that meet the updated nutrition standards are eligible for an increased reimbursement of 6 cents per lunch  USDA-FNS administers the school meals programs federally, and state agencies (typically state departments of education) oversee and transmit reimbursements through agreements with school food authorities (SFAs) (typically local educational agencies (LEAs); usually these are school districts)  Figure 1 provides an overview of the roles and relationships between these levels of government  There is a cost-sharing requirement for the programs, which amounts to a contribution of approximately $200 million from the states  There also are states that choose to supplement federal reimbursements with their own state reimbursements  The school meals programs and related funding do not serve only low-income children  All students can receive a meal at a NSLP- or SBP-participating school, but how much the child pays for the meal and/or how much of a federal reimbursement the state receives will depend largely on whether the child qualifies for a "free," "reduced-price," or "paid" (i e , advertised price) meal  Both NSLP and SBP use the same household income eligibility criteria and categorical eligibility rules  States and schools receive the largest reimbursements for free meals, smaller reimbursements for reduced-price meals, and the smallest (but still some federal financial support) for the full-price meals  There are three pathways through which a child can become certified to receive a free or reduced-price meal: 1  Household income eligibility for free and reduced-price meals (information typically collected via household application), 2  Categorical (or automatic) eligibility for free meals (information collected via household application or a direct certification process), and 3  School-wide free meals under the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP) , an option for eligible schools that is based on the share of students identified as eligible for free meals  Each of these pathways is discussed in more detail below  The income eligibility thresholds (shown in Table 2 ) are based on multipliers of the federal poverty guidelines  As the poverty guidelines are updated every year, so are the eligibility thresholds for NSLP and SBP  Free Meals: Children receive free meals if they have household income at or below 130% of the federal poverty guidelines; these meals receive the highest subsidy rate  (Reimbursements are approximately $3 30 per lunch served, less for breakfast ) Reduced-Price Meals: Children may receive reduced-price meals (charges of no more than 40 cents for a lunch or 30 cents for a breakfast) if their household income is above 130% and less than or equal to 185% of the federal poverty guidelines; these meals receive a subsidy rate that is 40 cents (NSLP) or 30 cents (SBP) below the free meal rate  (Reimbursements are approximately $2 90 per lunch served ) Paid Meals: A comparatively small per-meal reimbursement is provided for full-price or paid meals served to children whose families do not apply for assistance or whose family income does not qualify them for free or reduced-price meals  The paid meal price is set by the school but must comply with federal regulations  (Reimbursements are approximately 30 cents per lunch served ) The above reimbursement rates are approximate; exact current-year federal reimbursement rates for NSLP and SBP are listed in Table B -1 and Table B -3 , respectively  Households complete paper or online applications that collect relevant income and household size data, so that the school district can determine if children in the household are eligible for free meals, reduced-price meals, or neither  Though these income guidelines primarily influence funding and administration of NSLP and SBP, they also affect the eligibility rules for the SFSP, CACFP, and SMP (described further in subsequent sections)  In addition to the eligibility thresholds listed above, the school meals programs also convey eligibility for free meals based on household participation in certain other need-tested programs or children's specified vulnerabilities (e g , foster children)  Per Section 12 of the National School Lunch Act, "a child shall be considered automatically eligible for a free lunch and breakfast     without further application or eligibility determination, if the child is" in a household receiving benefits through SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program); FDPIR (Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations, a program that operates in lieu of SNAP on some Indian reservations) benefits; or TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) cash assistance; enrolled in Head Start; in foster care; a migrant; a runaway; or homeless  For meals served to students certified in the above categories, the state/school receive a reimbursement at the free meal amount and children receive a free meal  (See Table B -1 and Table B -3 for school year 2018-2019 rates ) Some school districts collect information for these categorical eligibility rules via paper application  Others conduct a process called direct certification —a proactive process where government agencies typically cross-check their program rolls and certify a household's children for free school meals without the household having to complete a school meals application  Prior to 2004, states had the option to conduct direct certification of SNAP (then, the Food Stamp Program), TANF, and FDPIR participants  In the 2004 child nutrition reauthorization ( P L  108-265 ), states were required under federal law to conduct direct certification for SNAP participants, with nationwide implementation taking effect in school year 2008-2009  Conducting direct certification for TANF and FDPIR remains at the state's discretion  The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA; P L  111-296 ) made further policy changes to expand direct certification (discussed further in the next section)  One of those changes was the initiation of a demonstration project to look at expanding categorical eligibility and direct certification to some Medicaid households  The law also funded performance incentive grants for high-performing states and authorized correcting action planning for low-performing states in direct certification activities  Under SNAP direct certification rules generally, schools enter into agreements with SNAP agencies to certify children in SNAP households as eligible for free school meals without requiring a separate application from the family  Direct certification systems match student enrollment lists against SNAP agency records, eliminating the need for action by the child's parents or guardians  Direct certification allows schools to make use of SNAP's more in-depth eligibility certification process; this can reduce errors that may occur in school lunch application eligibility procedures that are otherwise used  From a program access perspective, direct certification also reduces the number of applications a household must complete  Figure 2 , created by GAO and published in a May 2014 report, provides an overview of how school districts certify students for free and reduced-price meals under the income-based and category-based rules, via applications and direct certification  A USDA-FNS study of school year 2014-2015 estimates that 11 1 million students receiving free meals were directly certified—68% of all categorically eligible students receiving free meals  HHFKA also authorized the school meals Community Eligibility Provision (CEP), an option in NSLP and SBP law that allows eligible schools and school districts to offer free meals to all enrolled students based on the percentage of their students who are identified as automatically eligible from nonhousehold application sources (primarily direct certification through other programs)  Based on the statutory parameters, USDA-FNS piloted CEP in various states over three school years and it expanded nationwide in school year 2014-2015  Eligible LEAs have until June 30 of each year to notify USDA-FNS if they will participate in CEP  According to a database maintained by the Food Research and Action Center, just over 20,700 schools in more than 3,500 school districts (LEAs) participated in CEP in SY2016-2017, an increase of approximately 2,500 schools compared to SY2015-2016  For a school (or school district, or group of schools within a district) to provide free meals to all children the school(s) must be eligible for CEP based on the share (40% or greater) of enrolled children that can be identified as categorically (or automatically) eligible for free meals, and the school must opt-in to CEP  Though CEP schools serve free meals to all students, they are not reimbursed at the "free meal" rate for every meal  Instead, the law provides a funding formula: the percentage of students identified as automatically eligible (the "identified student percentage" or ISP) is multiplied by a factor of 1 6 to estimate the proportion of students who would be eligible for free or reduced-price meals had they been certified via application  The result is the percentage of meals served that will be reimbursed at the free meal rate, with the remainder reimbursed at the far lower paid meal rate  For example, if a CEP school identifies that 40% of students are eligible for free meals, then 64% of the meals served will be reimbursed at the free meal rate and 36% at the paid meal rate  Schools that identify 62 5% or more students as eligible for free meals receive the free meal reimbursement for all meals served  Some of the considerations that may impact a school's decision to participate in CEP include whether the new funding formula would be beneficial for their school meal budget; an interest in reducing paperwork for families and schools; and an interest in providing more free meals, including meals to students who have not participated in the program before  The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA; P L  111-296 ) set in motion changes to the nutrition standards for school meals, requiring USDA to update the standards within a certain timeframe  The law required that the revised standards be based on recommendations from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) (now the Health and Medicine Division) at the National Academy of Sciences  The law also provided increased federal subsidies (6 cents per lunch) for schools meeting the new requirements and funding for technical assistance related to implementation  USDA published the final regulations in January 2012  The final rule sought to align school meal patterns with the 2010 Dietary Guidelines for Americans, and, generally consistent with IOM's recommendations, increased the amount of fruits, vegetables, whole grains, and low-fat or fat-free milk in school meals  The regulations also included calorie maximums and sodium limits to phase in over time, among other requirements  The nutrition standards largely took effect in SY2012-2013 for lunches and in SY2013-2014 for breakfasts  A few other requirements were scheduled to phase in over multiple school years  Some schools experienced difficulty implementing the new guidelines, and Congress and USDA have made changes to the 2012 final rule's whole grain, sodium, and milk requirements  For SY2019-2020 and onwards, schools are operating under a final rule published December 12, 2018  The HHFKA also gave USDA the authority to regulate other foods in the school nutrition environment  Sometimes called "competitive foods," these include foods and drinks sold in a la carte lines, vending machines, snack bars and concession stands, and fundraisers  Relying on recommendations made by a 2007 IOM report, USDA-FNS promulgated a proposed rule and then an interim final rule in June 2013, which went into effect for SY2014-2015  The interim final rule created nutrition guidelines for all non-meal foods and beverages that are sold during the school day (defined as midnight until 30 minutes after dismissal)  The final rule, published on July 29, 2016, maintained the interim final rules with minor modifications  Under the final standards, these foods must meet whole-grain requirements; have certain primary ingredients; and meet calorie, sodium, and fat limits, among other requirements  Schools are limited to a list of no- and low-calorie beverages they may sell (with larger portion sizes and caffeine allowed in high schools)  There are no limits on fundraisers selling foods that meet the interim final rule's guidelines  Fundraisers outside of the school day are not subject to the guidelines  HHFKA and the interim final rule provide states with discretion to exempt infrequent fundraisers selling foods or beverages that do not meet the nutrition standards  The rule does not limit foods brought from home, only foods sold at school during the school day  The federal standards are minimum standards; states and school districts are permitted to issue more stringent policies  In FY2017, NSLP subsidized 4 9 billion lunches to children in close to 96,000 schools and 3,200 residential child care institutions (RCCIs)  Average daily participation was 30 0 million students (58% of children enrolled in participating schools and RCCIs)  Of the participating students, 66 7% (20 0 million) received free lunches and 6 5% (2 0 million) received reduced-price lunches  The remainder were served full-price meals, though schools still receive a reimbursement for these meals  Figure 3 shows FY2017 participation data  FY2017 federal school lunch costs totaled approximately $13 6 billion (see Table 3 for the various components of this total)  The vast majority of this funding is for per-meal reimbursements for free and reduced-price lunches  The HHFKA also provided an additional 6-cent per-lunch reimbursement to schools that provide meals that meet the updated nutritional guidelines requirements  This bonus is not provided for breakfast, but funds may be used to support schools' breakfast programs  NSLP lunch reimbursement rates are listed in Table B -1   In addition to federal cash subsidies, schools participating in NSLP receive USDA-acquired commodity food s   Schools are entitled to a specific, inflation-indexed value of USDA commodity foods for each lunch they serve  Also, schools may receive donations of bonus commodities acquired by USDA in support of the farm economy  In FY2017, the value of federal commodity food aid to schools totaled nearly $1 4 billion  The per-meal rate for commodity food assistance is included in Table B-4   While the vast majority of NSLP funding is for lunches served during the school day, NSLP may also be used to support snack service during the school year and to serve meals during the summer  These features are discussed in subsequent sections, " Summer Meals " and " After-School Meals and Snacks: CACFP, NSLP Options  " Reimbursement rates for snacks are listed in Table B -2   The School Breakfast Program (SBP) provides per-meal cash subsidies for breakfasts served in schools  Participating schools receive subsidies based on their status as a severe need or nonsevere need institution  Schools can qualify as a severe need school if 40% or more of their lunches are served free or at reduced prices  See Table B -3 for SBP reimbursement rates  Figure 4 displays SBP participation data for FY2017  In that year, SBP subsidized over 2 4 billion breakfasts in over 88,000 schools and nearly 3,200 RCCIs  Average daily participation was 14 7 million children (30 1% of the students enrolled in participating schools and RCCIs)  The majority of meals served through SBP are free or reduced-price  Of the participating students, 79 1% (11 6 million) received free meals and 5 7% (835,000) purchased reduced-price meals  Federal school breakfast costs for the fiscal year totaled approximately $4 3 billion (see Table 3 for the various components of this total)  Significantly fewer schools and students participate in SBP than in NSLP  Participation in SBP tends to be lower for several reasons, including the traditionally required early arrival by students in order to receive a meal and eat before school starts  Some schools offer (and anti-hunger groups have encouraged) models of breakfast service that can result in greater SBP participation, such as Breakfast in the Classroom, where meals are delivered in the classroom; "grab and go" carts, where students receive a bagged breakfast that they bring to class, or serving breakfast later in the day in middle and high schools  Unlike NSLP, commodity food assistance is not a formal part of SBP funding; however, commodities provided through NSLP may be used for school breakfasts as well  In addition to the school meals programs discussed above, other federal child nutrition programs provide federal subsidies and commodity food assistance for schools and other institutions that offer meals and snacks to children in early childhood, summer, and after-school settings  This assistance is provided to (1) schools and other governmental institutions, (2) private for-profit and nonprofit child care centers, (3) family/group day care homes, and (4) nongovernmental institutions/organizations that offer outside-of-school programs for children  (Although this report focuses on the programs that serve children, one child nutrition program (CACFP) also serves day care centers for chronically impaired adults and elderly persons under the same general per-meal/snack subsidy terms ) The programs in the sections to follow serve comparatively fewer children and spend comparatively fewer federal funds than the school meal programs  CACFP subsidizes meals and snacks served in early childhood, day care, and after-school settings  CACFP provides subsidies for meals and snacks served at participating nonresidential child care centers, family day care homes, and (to a lesser extent) adult day care centers  The program also provides assistance for meals served at after-school programs  CACFP reimbursements are available for meals and snacks served to children age 12 or under, migrant children age 15 or under, children with disabilities of any age, and, in the case of adult care centers, chronically impaired and elderly adults  Children in early childhood settings are the overwhelming majority of those served by the program  CACFP provides federal reimbursements for breakfasts, lunches, suppers, and snacks served in participating centers (facilities or institutions) or day care homes (private homes)  The eligibility and funding rules for CACFP meals and snacks depend first on whether the participating institution is a center or a day care home (the next two sections discuss the rules specific to centers and day care homes)  According to FY2017 CACFP data, child care centers have an average daily attendance of about 56 children per center, day care homes have an average daily attendance of approximately 7 children per home, and adult day care centers typically care for an average of 48 chronically ill or elderly adults per center  Providers must demonstrate that they comply with government-established standards for other child care programs  Like in school meals, federal assistance is made up overwhelmingly of cash reimbursements calculated based on the number of meals/snacks served and federal per-meal/snack reimbursements rates, but a far smaller share of federal aid (4 3% in FY2017) is in the form of federal USDA commodity foods (or cash in lieu of foods)  Federal CACFP reimbursements flow to individual providers either directly from the administering state agency (this is the case with many child/adult care centers able to handle their own CACFP administrative functions) or through "sponsors" who oversee and provide administrative support for a number of local providers (this is the case with some child/adult care centers and with all day care homes)  In FY2017, total CACFP spending was over $3 5 billion, including cash reimbursement, commodity food assistance, and costs for sponsor audits  (See Table 3 for a further breakdown of CACFP costs ) This total also includes the after-school meals and snacks provided through CACFP's "at-risk after-school" pathway; this aspect of the program is discussed later in " After-School Meals and Snacks: CACFP, NSLP Options  " As with school foods, the HHFKA required USDA to update CACFP's meal patterns  USDA's final rule revised the meal patterns for both meals served in child care centers and day care homes, as well as preschool meals served through the NSLP and SBP, effective October 1, 2017  For infants (under 12 months of age), the new meal patterns eliminated juice, supported breastfeeding, and set guidelines for the introduction of solid foods, among other changes  For children ages one and older, the new meal patterns increased whole grains, fruits and vegetables, and low-fat and fat-free milk; limited sugar in cereals and yogurts; and prohibited frying, among other requirements  Child care centers in CACFP can be (1) public or private nonprofit centers, (2) Head Start centers, (3) for-profit proprietary centers (if they meet certain requirements as to the proportion of low-income children they enroll), and (4) shelters for homeless families  Adult day care centers include public or private nonprofit centers and for-profit proprietary centers (if they meet minimum requirements related to serving low-income disabled and elderly adults)  In FY2017, over 65,000 child care centers with an average daily attendance of over 3 6 million children participated in CACFP  Over 2,700 adult care centers served nearly 132,000 adults through CACFP  Participating centers may receive daily reimbursements for up to either two meals and one snack or one meal and two snacks for each participant, so long as the meals and snacks meet federal nutrition standards  The eligibility rules for CACFP centers largely track those of NSLP: children in households at or below 130% of the current poverty line qualify for free meals/snacks while those between 130% and 185% of poverty qualify for reduced-price meals/snacks (see Table 2 )  In addition, participation in the same categorical eligibility programs as NSLP as well as foster child status convey eligibility for free meals in CACFP  Like school meals, eligibility is determined through paper applications or direct certification processes  Like school meals, all meals and snacks served in the centers are federally subsidized to some degree, even those that are paid  Different reimbursement amounts are provided for breakfasts, lunches/suppers, and snacks, and reimbursement rates are set in law and indexed for inflation annually  The largest subsidies are paid for meals and snacks served to participants with family income below 130% of the federal poverty income guidelines (the income limit for free school meals), and the smallest to those who have not met a means test  See Table B -5 for current CACFP center reimbursement rates  Unlike school meals, CACFP institutions are less likely to collect per-meal payments  Although federal assistance for day care centers differentiates by household income, centers have discretion on their pricing of meals  Centers may adjust their regular fees (tuition) to account for federal payments, but CACFP itself does not regulate these fees  In addition, centers can charge families separately for meals/snacks, so long as there are no charges for children meeting free-meal/snack income tests and limited charges for those meeting reduced-price income tests  Independent centers are those without sponsors handling administrative responsibilities  These centers must pay for administrative costs associated with CACFP out of nonfederal funds or a portion of their meal subsidy payments  For centers with sponsors, the sponsors may retain a proportion of the meal reimbursement payments they receive on behalf of their centers to cover such costs  CACFP-supported day care homes serve a smaller number of children than CACFP-supported centers , both in terms of the total number of children served and the average number of children per facility  Roughly 17% of children in CACFP (approximately 757,000 in FY2017 average daily attendance) are served through day care homes  In FY2017, approximately 103,000 homes (with just over 700 sponsors) received CACFP support  As with centers, payments to day care homes are provided for up to either two meals and one snack or one meal and two snacks a day for each child  Unlike centers, day care homes must participate under the auspices of a public or, more often, private nonprofit sponsor that typically has 100 or more homes under its supervision  CACFP day care home sponsors receive monthly administrative payments based on the number of homes for which they are responsible  Federal reimbursements for family day care homes differ by the home's status as "Tier I" or "Tier II " Unlike centers, day care homes receive cash reimbursements (but not commodity foods) that generally are not based on the child participants' household income  Instead, there are two distinct, annually indexed reimbursement rates that are based on area or operator eligibility criteria Tier I homes are located in low-income areas (defined as areas in which at least 50% of school-age and enrolled children qualify for free or reduced-price meals) or operated by low-income providers whose household income meets the free or reduced-price income standards  They receive higher subsidies for each meal/snack they serve  Tier II (lower) rates are by default those for homes that do not qualify for Tier I rates; however, Tier II providers may seek the higher Tier I subsidy rates for individual low-income children for whom financial information is collected and verified  (See Table B-6 for current Tier I and Tier II reimbursement rates ) Additionally, HHFKA introduced a number of additional ways (as compared to prior law) by which family day care homes can qualify as low-income and get Tier I rates for the entire home or for individual children  As with centers, there is no requirement that meals/snacks specifically identified as free or reduced-price be offered; however, unlike centers, federal rules prohibit any separate meal charges  Current law SFSP and the NSLP/SBP Seamless Summer Option provide meals in congregate settings nationwide; the related Summer Electronic Benefits Transfer (SEBTC or Summer EBT) demonstration project is an alternative to congregate settings  SFSP supports meals for children during the summer months  The program provides assistance to local public institutions and private nonprofit service institutions running summer youth/recreation programs, summer feeding projects, and camps  Assistance is primarily in the form of cash reimbursements for each meal or snack served; however, federally donated commodity foods are also offered  Participating service institutions are often entities that provide ongoing year-round service to the community including schools, local governments, camps, colleges and universities in the National Youth Sports program, and private nonprofit organizations like churches  Similar to the CACFP model, sponsors are institutions that manage the food preparation, financial, and administrative responsibilities of SFSP  Sites are the places where food is served and eaten  At times, a sponsor may also be a site  State agencies authorize sponsors, monitor and inspect sponsors and sites, and implement USDA policy  Unlike CACFP, sponsors are required for an institution's participation in SFSP as a site  In FY2017, nearly 5,500 sponsors with 50,000 food service sites participated in the SFSP and served an average of approximately 2 7 million children daily (according to July data)  Participation of sites and children in SFSP has increased in recent years  Program costs for FY2017 totaled over $485 million, including cash assistance, commodity foods, administrative cost assistance, and health inspection costs  There are several options for eligibility and meal/snack service for SFSP sponsors (and their sites) Open sites provide summer food to all children in the community  These sites are certified based on area eligibility measures, where 50% or more of area children have family income that would make them eligible for free or reduced-price school meals (see Table 2 )  Closed or Enrolled sites provide summer meals/snacks free to all children enrolled at the site  The eligibility test for these sites is that 50% or more of the children enrolled in the sponsor's program must be eligible for free or reduced-price school meals based on household income  Closed/enrolled sites may also become eligible based on area eligibility measures noted above  Summer camps (that are not enrolled sites) receive subsidies only for those children with household eligibility for free or reduced-price school meals  Other programs specified in law , such as the National Youth Sports Program and centers for homeless or migrant children  Summer sponsors get operating cost (food, storage, labor) subsidies for all meals/snacks they serve—up to one meal and one snack, or two meals per child per day  In addition, sponsors receive payments for administrative costs, and states are provided with subsidies for administrative costs and health and meal-quality inspections  See Table B -7 for current SFSP reimbursement rates  Actual payments vary slightly (e g , by about 5 cents for lunches) depending on the location of the site (e g , rural vs  urban) and whether meals are prepared on-site or by a vendor  Although SFSP is the child nutrition program most associated with providing meals during summer months, it is not the only program option for providing these meals and snacks  The Seamless Summer Option, run through NSLP or SBP programs, is also a means through which food can be provided to students during summer months  Much like SFSP, Seamless Summer operates in summer sites (summer camps, sports programs, churches, private nonprofit organizations, etc ) and for a similar duration of time  Unlike SFSP, schools are the only eligible sponsors , although schools may operate the program at other sites  Reimbursement rates for Seamless Summer meals are the same as current NSLP/SBP rates  Beginning in summer 2011 and (as of the date of this report) each summer since, USDA-FNS has operated Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children (SEBTC or "Summer EBT") demonstration projects in a limited number of states and Indian Tribal Organizations (ITOs)  These Summer EBT projects provide electronic food benefits over summer months to households with children eligible for free or reduced-price school meals  Depending on the site and year, either $30 or $60 per month is provided, through a WIC or SNAP EBT card model  In the demonstration projects, these benefits were provided as a supplement to the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) meals available in congregate settings  Summer EBT and other alternatives to congregate meals through SFSP were first authorized and funded by the FY2010 appropriations law ( P L  111-80 )  Although a number of alternatives were tested and evaluated, findings from Summer EBT were among the most promising, and Congress provided subsequent funding  Summer EBT evaluations showed significant impacts on reducing child food insecurity and improving nutritional intake   Summer EBT was funded by P L  111-80 in the summers from 2011 to 2014  Projects have continued to operate and were annually funded by FY2015-FY2018 appropriations; most recently, the FY2018 appropriations law ( P L  115-141 ) provided $28 million  According to USDA-FNS, in summer 2016 Summer EBT served over 209,000 children in nine states and two tribal nations—an increase from the 11,400 children served when the demonstration began in summer 2011  Schools (and institutions like summer camps and child care facilities) that are not already participating in the other child nutrition programs can participate in the Special Milk Program  Schools may also administer SMP for their part-day sessions for kindergartners or pre-kindergartners  Under SMP, participating institutions provide milk to children for free and/or at a subsidized paid price, depending on how the enrolled institution opts to administer the program (see Table B -8 for current Special Milk reimbursement rates for each of these options) An institution that only sells milk will receive the same per-half pint federal reimbursement for each milk sold (approximately 20 cents)  An institution that sells milk and provides free milk to eligible children (income eligibility is the same as free school meals, see Table 2 ), receives a reimbursement for the milk sold (approximately 20 cents) and a higher reimbursement for the free milks  An institution that does not sell milk provides milk free to all children and receives the same reimbursement for all milk (approximately 20 cents)  This option is sometimes called nonpricing  In FY2017, over 41 million half-pints were subsidized, 9 5% of which were served free  Federal expenditures for this program were approximately $8 3 million in FY2017  States receive formula grants through the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program, under which state-selected schools receive funds to purchase and distribute fresh fruit and vegetable snacks to all children in attendance (regardless of family income)  Money is distributed by a formula under which about half the funding is distributed equally to each state and the remainder is allocated by state population  States select participating schools (with an emphasis on those with a higher proportion of low-income children) and set annual per-student grant amounts (between $50 and $75)  Funding is set by law at $150 million for school year 2011-2012 and inflation-indexed for every year after  In FY2017, states used approximately $184 million in FFVP funds  FFVP is funded by a mandatory transfer of funds from USDA's Section 32 program—a permanent appropriation of 30% of the previous year's customs receipts  This transfer is required by FFVP's authorizing laws (Section 19 of the Richard B  Russell National School Lunch Act and Section 4304 of P L  110-246 )  Up until FY2018's law, annual appropriations laws delayed a portion of the funds to the next fiscal year  After a pilot period, the Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004 ( P L  108-265 ) permanently authorized and funded FFVP for a limited number of states and Indian reservations  In recent years, FFVP has been amended by omnibus farm bill laws rather than through child nutrition reauthorizations  The 2008 farm bill ( P L  110-246 ) expanded FFVP's mandatory funding, specifically providing funds through Section 32, and enabled all states to participate in the program  The 2014 farm bill ( P L  113-79 ) essentially made no changes to this program but did include, and fund at $5 million in FY2014, a pilot project that requires USDA to test offering frozen, dried, and canned fruits and vegetables and publish an evaluation of the pilot  Four states (Alaska, Delaware, Kansas, and Maine) participated in the pilot in SY2014-2015 and the evaluation was published in 2017  Other proposals to expand fruits and vegetables offered in FFVP have been introduced in both the 114 th and 115 th Congress  Two of the child nutrition programs discussed in previous sections, the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), provide federal support for snacks and meals served during after-school programs  NSLP provides reimbursements for after-school snacks; however, this option is open only to schools that already participate in NSLP  These schools may operate after-school snack-only programs during the school year, and can do so in two ways: (1) if low-income area eligibility criteria are met, provide free snacks in lower-income areas; or (2) if area eligibility criteria are not met, offer free, reduced-price, or fully paid-for snacks, based on household income eligibility (like lunches in NSLP)  The vast majority of snacks provided through this program are through the first option  Through this program, approximately 206 million snacks were served in FY2017 (a daily average of nearly 1 3 million)  This compares with nearly 4 9 billion lunches served (a daily average of 27 8 million)  CACFP provides assistance for after-school food in two ways  First, centers and homes that participate in CACFP and provide after-school care may participate in traditional CACFP (the eligibility and administration described earlier)  Second, centers in areas where at least half the children in the community are eligible for free or reduced-price school meals can opt to participate in the CACFP At-Risk Afterschool program, which provides free snacks and suppers  Expansion of the At-Risk After-School meals program was a major policy change included in HHFKA  Prior to the law, 13 states were permitted to offer CACFP At-Risk After-School meals (instead of just a snack); the law allowed all CACFP state agencies to offer such meals  In FY2017, the At-Risk Afterschool program served a total of approximately 242 6 million free meals and snacks to a daily average of more than 1 7 million children  Federal child nutrition laws authorize and program funding supports a range of additional programs, initiatives, and activities  Through State Administrative Expenses funding, states are entitled to federal grants to help cover administrative and oversight/monitoring costs associated with child nutrition programs  The national amount each year is equal to about 2% of child nutrition reimbursements  The majority of this money is allocated to states based on their share of spending on the covered programs; about 15% is allocated under a discretionary formula granting each state additional amounts for CACFP, commodity distribution, and Administrative Review efforts  In addition, states receive payments for their role in overseeing summer programs (about 2 5% of their summer program aid)  States are free to apportion their federal administrative expense payments among child nutrition initiatives (including commodity distribution activities) as they see fit, and appropriated funding is available to states for two years  State Administrative Expense spending in FY2017 totaled approximately $279 million  Team Nutrition is a USDA-FNS program that includes a variety of school meals initiatives around nutrition education and the nutritional content of the foods children eat in schools  This includes Team Nutrition Training Grants, which provide funding to state agencies for training and technical assistance, such as help implementing USDA's nutrition requirements and the Dietary Guidelines for Americans  From 2004 to 2018, Team Nutrition also included the HealthierUS Schools Challenge (HUSSC), which originated in the 2004 reauthorization of the Child Nutrition Act  HUSSC was a voluntary certification initiative designed to recognize schools that have created a healthy school environment through the promotion of nutrition and physical activity  Farm-to-school programs broadly refer to "efforts that bring regionally and locally produced foods into school cafeterias," with a focus on enhancing child nutrition  The goals of these efforts include increasing fruit and vegetable consumption among students, supporting local farmers and rural communities, and providing nutrition and agriculture education to school districts and farmers  HHFKA amended existing child nutrition programs to establish mandatory funding of $5 million per year for competitive farm-to-school grants that support schools and nonprofit entities in establishing farm-to-school programs that improve a school's access to locally produced foods  The FY2018 appropriations law provided an additional $5 million in discretionary funding to remain available until expended  Grants may be used for training, supporting operations, planning, purchasing equipment, developing school gardens, developing partnerships, and implementing farm-to-school programs  USDA's Office of Community Food Systems provides additional resources on farm-to-school issues  Through an Administrative Review process (formerly referred to as Coordinated Review Effort (CRE)), USDA-FNS, in cooperation with state agencies, conducts periodic on-site NSLP school compliance and accountability evaluations to improve management and identify administrative, subsidy claim, and meal quality problems  State agencies are required to conduct administrative reviews of all school food authorities (SFAs) that operate the NSLP under their jurisdiction at least once during a three-year review cycle  Federal Administrative Review expenditures were approximately $9 9 million in FY2017  USDA-FNS and state agencies conduct many other child nutrition program support activities for which dedicated funding is provided  Among other examples, there is the Institute of Child Nutrition (ICN), which provides technical assistance, instruction, and materials related to nutrition and food service management; it receives $5 million a year in mandatory funding appropriated in statute  ICN is located at the University of Mississippi  USDA-FNS provides training on food safety education  Funding is also provided for USDA-FNS to conduct studies, provide training and technical assistance, and oversee payment accuracy  Appendix A  Acronyms Used in This Report Appendix B  Per-meal or Per-snack Reimbursement Rates for Child Nutrition Programs This appendix lists the specific reimbursement rates discussed in the earlier sections of the report  Reimbursement rates are adjusted for inflation for each school or calendar year according to terms laid out in the programs' authorizing laws  Each year, the new rates are announced in the Federal Register   

ground_truth: VA spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually on medical supplies to meet the health care needs of about 7 million veterans. To provide a more efficient, cost-effective way for its medical centers to order supplies, the VA established the MSPV-NG program. The program's goals include involving clinicians in requirements development, leveraging buying power when making competitive awards, and consolidating supplies used across medical centers. VA began developing requirements in early 2015 and launched the program in December 2016. This testimony summarizes key information contained in GAO's November 2017 report, GAO-18-34 . Specifically, it addresses the extent to which VA's implementation of MSPV-NG has been effective in meeting program goals. GAO analyzed VA's requirements development and contracting processes, and identified key supply chain practices cited by four leading hospital networks. GAO also met with contracting and clinical officials at six medical centers, selected based on high dollar contract obligations in fiscal years 2014-2016 and geographic representation. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) established the Medical Surgical Prime Vendor-Next Generation (MSPV-NG) program to provide an efficient, cost-effective way for its facilities to order supplies, but its initial implementation did not have an overarching strategy, stable leadership, and workforce capacity that could have facilitated medical center buy-in for the change. VA also developed requirements for a broad range of MSPV-NG items with limited clinical input. Further, starting in June 2015, VA planned to award competitive contracts, but instead, 79 percent of the items available for purchase under MSPV-NG were added through non-competitive agreements. (See figure). As a result, the program did not meet the needs of medical centers, and usage remained below VA's 40 percent target. (See figure.) VA has taken steps to address some deficiencies and is developing a new approach to the program. However, VA will likely continue to face challenges in meeting its goals until it fully addresses these existing shortcomings. GAO made 10 recommendations in its November 2017 report, including that VA develop an overarching strategy, expand clinician input in requirements development, and establish a plan for awarding future competitive contracts. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs to enhance small business access to capital; contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in securing federal contracts; direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist business formation and expansion  Congressional interest in these programs has increased in recent years, primarily because assisting small business is viewed as a means to enhance economic growth  The SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program has been operational since April 1971  It is designed to increase small business' access to federal, state, and local government contracting, as well as private-sector contracting, by guaranteeing bid, performance, payment, and specified ancillary bonds "on contracts … for small and emerging contractors who cannot obtain bonding through regular commercial channels " The program guarantees individual contracts of up to $6 5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary  The $6 5 million limit is periodically adjusted for inflation  The SBA's guarantee currently ranges from 80% to 90% of the surety's loss if a default occurs  In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 10,800 bid and final surety bonds (a payment bond, performance bond, or both a payment and performance bond) with a total contract value of nearly $6 5 billion  Although the surety industry does not report the total value of the bonds it issues each year, estimates based on the total amount of premiums collected by the private sector in recent years suggest that the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program represents, by design, a relatively small percentage of the market for surety bonds (from about 1 1% to 6 7% of the value of surety bonds issued by the private sector)  A surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety (that agrees to be responsible for the debt or obligation of another), a contractor, and a project owner  The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the contract's terms and conditions  If the contractor is unable to successfully perform the contract, the surety assumes the contractor's responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed  The surety bond reduces the risk of contracting  Surety bonds are viewed as a means to encourage project owners to contract with small businesses that may not have the credit history or prior experience of larger businesses and are considered to be at greater risk of failing to comply with the contract's terms and conditions  The four general types of surety bonds are bid bonds guarantee that the bidder on a contract will enter into the contract and furnish the required payment and performance bonds if awarded the contract, payment bonds guarantee that suppliers and subcontractors will be paid for work performed under the contract, performance bonds guarantee that the contractor will perform the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions, and ancillary bonds ensure completion of requirements outside of performance or payment, such as maintenance  Surety bonds are important to small businesses interested in competing for a federal contract because the federal government requires prime contractors, prior to the award of a federal contract exceeding $150,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building or public work of the United States, to furnish a performance bond issued by a surety satisfactory to the officer awarding the contract, and in an amount the contracting officer considers adequate, to protect the government  Prime contractors are also required to post a payment bond with a surety satisfactory to the contracting officer for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material in carrying out the work provided for in the contract  Both bonds become legally binding upon award of the contract and their "penal amounts," or the maximum amount of the surety's obligation, must generally be 100% of the original contract price plus 100% of any price increases  Most state and local governments have adopted similar legislation, often called "Little Miller Acts," referencing the Miller Act of 1935 that established the federal requirement  Many private project owners also require contractors to furnish a surety bond before awarding them a contract  This report opens with an examination of the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program's legislative origin and provides a historical summary of the major issues that have influenced the program's development, including the decision to supplement the original Prior Approval Program with a Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program (PSB program) that initially provided SBA-approved sureties a lower guarantee rate (not to exceed 70%) than those participating in the Prior Approval Program (not to exceed 80% or 90%, depending on the size of the contract and the type of small business) in exchange for allowing preferred sureties to issue SBA-guaranteed bonds to small businesses without the SBA's prior approval; P L  114-92 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which increased the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses; and the decision to increase the program's bond limit  It then examines the program's current eligibility standards and requirements, and provides performance statistics, including the number and amount of bond guarantees issued annually  In addition, it provides data concerning the number and amount of final bonds guaranteed from FY1971 through FY2017 (see Table A-1 ) and for bid and final bonds combined from FY2000 through FY2017 (see Table A-2 )  P L  91-609, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, authorized the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program  The act amended Title IV of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (P L  85-699, as amended) to provide the SBA authority to guarantee any surety against loss as the result of a breach of the terms of a bid bond, payment bond, or performance bond by a principal on any contract up to $500,000  The act specified that (1) the principal of the bond is a small business, (2) the bond is required as a condition of bidding on the contract or serving as a prime contractor or subcontractor on the project, (3) the small business is not able to obtain such bond on reasonable terms and conditions without the guarantee, (4) the SBA determines that there is a reasonable expectation that the small business will perform the covenants and conditions of the contract, (5) the contact meets SBA requirements concerning the feasibility of the contract being completed successfully and at a reasonable cost, and (6) the bond's terms and conditions are reasonable in light of the risks involved and the extent of the surety's participation  The act also required that the SBA's guarantee not exceed 90% of the loss incurred by the surety in the event of a breach of the bond's terms and conditions by the small business  The SBA was authorized to finance the program through the Leasing Guarantee Revolving Loan Fund within the Department of the Treasury, which renamed that fund the Lease and Surety Bond Guarantee Revolving Fund  The act authorized the transfer of $5 million from the SBA's Business Loan and Investment Revolving Fund to the Lease and Surety Bond Guarantee Revolving Fund, raising that fund's capital to $10 million available without fiscal year limitation, to support both the lease guarantee program and the surety bond guarantee program  The act also recommended that the program be appropriated up to $1 5 million each fiscal year for three fiscal years after its date of enactment (December 31, 1970) if additional funding were needed to offset the program's expenses  The SBA was directed to administer the program "on a prudent and economically justifiable basis " It was authorized to offset the program's administrative costs by charging a uniform annual fee, subject to periodic review to ensure that the fee is the "lowest fee that experience under the program shows to be justified," and uniform fees for the processing of applications for guarantees  The SBA also was authorized to "obligate the surety to pay the Administration such portions of the bond fee as the Administration determines to be reasonable in light of the relative risks and costs involved " The program's sponsors argued in 1970 that "there is widespread evidence that a significant number of construction contracting organizations find varying degrees of difficulty in obtaining surety bonds" and that "the major share of these organizations are small businesses, and many of them are headed by minority groups " They argued that the Surety Bond Guarantee Program would "facilitate the entry and advancement of small and minority contractors in the construction business " At that time, witnesses at congressional hearings testified that surety bonds were not necessarily required for most private sector construction contracts, but they were required for most public sector construction contracts  The SBA implemented the program on a pilot basis on April 5, 1971, in Kansas City  The program later was expanded to Los Angeles and became nationwide on September 2, 1971  Initially, the SBA guaranteed 90% of the amount of all of the surety bonds in the program and charged sureties 10% of the bond premium paid to the surety company by the contractor  It also charged small business applicants for payment and performance bonds 0 2% of the contract price upon their obtaining the contract  It did not charge for the processing of bid bonds, rejected applications, or applications that did not result in a contract award  Contractors wishing to participate in the program were required to have less than $750,000 in gross annual receipts for the past fiscal year or to have averaged less than $750,000 in gross annual receipts over the past three fiscal years  This size standard was more stringent than for other SBA programs, and it was designed "to reach that segment of small business which was obviously intended to benefit from the legislation as evidenced by the limit of $500,000 on any one contract " Demand for the program exceeded the SBA's expectations  In 1971, the SBA estimated that it would guarantee about 8,000 contracts amounting to about $540 million from FY1972 through FY1974  Instead, it guaranteed 16,118 contracts amounting to nearly $1 1 billion (see Table A-1 in the Appendix)  Because the demand for the program exceeded expectations and the initial fees proved to be insufficient to recoup the program's expenses, in 1974, the SBA requested an additional $25 million for the program  The SBA argued that the additional funds were necessary to take into account the program's projected growth and to establish a reserve fund "to protect against having to suspend [the] program in the fact of more rapid growth than is projected " In response to the SBA's request for additional funding for the program, Congress held congressional hearings to reassess the need for the program and to explore options concerning how to finance the program's proposed expansion  The financing discussions focused on the relative merits of relying primarily on higher fees to increase the program's revenue, reductions in the guarantee percentage to reduce the program's expenses, or additional appropriations to finance the program's proposed expansion  Although the SBA has periodically increased the program's fees and later instituted a tiered system of guarantee percentages, historically, the SBA has tried to keep the program's fees as low as economically feasible and the guarantee percentage as high as economically feasible to encourage the program's use  As an SBA official testified before Congress in 1975: SBA's loss exposure could be reduced by a decrease in the guarantee extended to sureties from 90% to 80%  Before proceeding with this recommendation, a thorough analysis will have to be made of the adverse effect on the willingness of sureties to participate in the program which would result from the increase from 10% to 20% of the sureties' share of the loss potential  An increase in contractor's fees would obviously be beneficial to the operating income of the program, but would also increase the bids which small business-contractors would have to make, thus placing them at a competitive disadvantage with contractors with more ready access to bonding  Moreover, as mentioned previously, the SBA is required by statute to ensure that the fees are the lowest "that experience under the program shows to be justified " Determining the program's appropriate size became a recurring theme at congressional hearings, and continues to be of congressional interest today  For example, Congress has regularly requested testimony from representatives of the surety bond industry and various construction organizations concerning the extent to which the program is necessary to assist small businesses generally, and minority-owned small businesses in particular, in gaining access to surety bonds  Congress has also periodically asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to examine the need for the SBA's surety bond guarantee program and to recommend ways to improve the program's management  That testimony and GAO's reports have supported a need for the program, but, as will be discussed, have had somewhat limited usefulness in helping Congress determine the program's appropriate size  In 1974, Congress responded to the SBA's request for additional funding by passing P L  93-386 , the Small Business Amendments of 1974  It established a separate Surety Bond Guarantees Revolving Fund account (hereinafter Revolving Fund) within the Department of the Treasury to support the program  The act also increased the total contract amount that could be guaranteed to $1 million from $500,000 and recommended that the Revolving Fund receive $35 million in additional funding  The Ford Administration objected to providing additional appropriations for the Revolving Fund  Instead, the Administration recommended that the Revolving Fund receive a $20 million transfer from the SBA's Business Loan and Investment Revolving Fund  The transfer would provide the program access to additional capital without affecting the federal budget deficit  Congress approved the Administration's proposal  As shown in Table 1 , the Revolving Fund received $130 5 million in additional appropriations for FY1976 through FY1979 and continued to receive additional appropriations during the 1980s and 1990s  In addition, the program's bond limit was increased to $1 25 million from $1 million in 1986  As discussed below, the increased appropriations and bond limit were not sufficient to continue the program's growth  Instead, both the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA began to slowly diminish  This general trend continued until the maximum individual surety contract amount was increased, first on a temporary basis by P L  111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and later, on a permanent statutory basis, by P L  112-239 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013  As shown in Table 1 , Congress did not appropriate funding for the Revolving Fund from FY2000 to FY2004, allowing the program to cover the cost of claim defaults through its reserve  Congress also increased the program's bond limit to $2 million from $1 25 million in 2000  Congress provided the Revolving Fund $2 9 million in FY2005, $2 86 million in FY2006, $2 86 million in FY2007, and $3 million in FY2008  During the 111 th Congress, P L  111-5 provided the Revolving Fund a separate appropriation of $15 million to support a temporary increase in the program's bond limit to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that a guarantee in excess of $5 million was necessary, from $2 million  Those funds were in addition to the $2 million appropriation that had already been approved for FY2009  In FY2010, the Revolving Fund received $1 million  Congress has not approved appropriations for the Revolving Fund since then, noting that there have been sufficient funds in the program's reserve to cover the cost of anticipated claim defaults  As mentioned previously, the SBA relied primarily on increased appropriations to finance the program's expansion during the 1970s, but it also increased the program's fees charged to applicants and sureties  For example, in 1976, the SBA increased its fees to sureties to 20% from 10% of the bond premium, instituted a deductible clause on bond claims, and generally limited its approval for bid, participation, and performance bonds to $250,000 unless specified circumstances were met  In 1977, it increased the contractor applicant fee for payment and performance bonds to 0 5% from 0 2% of the contract price upon obtaining the contract  The program's current fee structure is discussed later in this report  Both the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA increased relatively rapidly during the 1970s (see Table A-1 in the Appendix)  The number of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA increased from 1,339 in FY1972 to 20,095 in FY1979, and the amount guaranteed by the SBA increased from $94 4 million in FY1972 to $1 39 billion in FY1979  During the 1980s and 1990s, both the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA generally declined, in both nominal and inflation-adjusted dollars  A review of congressional testimony during that period suggests that there was no single, discernible factor to account for the program's slow contraction  Because the demand for surety bonds tends to fluctuate with changes in the economy, the program might have been expected to contract somewhat during recessions, but the economy experienced periods of both economic growth and decline during the 1980s and 1990s  There also was no indication that the ability of small businesses to access surety bonds in the private marketplace without the SBA's assistance had materially improved, which, if that had been the case, might have contributed to the decline by reducing the number of small businesses applying for assistance  One possible contributing factor to the decline in SBA-guaranteed surety bonds during that period was the continuing reluctance of many surety companies to participate in the program, either because they did not view the program as particularly profitable or they "had developed alternative methods to the program, such as requiring collateral or funds controls and underwriting programs based in part on credit scores, in order to write small and emerging contractors " Another possible contributing factor was a change in the way the program was perceived by congressional leaders and their reluctance to provide additional resources to continue the program's expansion  During the 1970s, at congressional hearings, witnesses praised the program as a great success in helping small businesses access surety bonds and compete for government contracts  During the 1980s and 1990s, congressional hearings focused less on the program's successes and more on its shortcomings  For example, in 1982, the chair of the Senate Committee on Small Business indicted that the program was subject to "the most insidious types of fraud," including "evidence of involvement of organized crime figures " In addition, reports by both GAO and the SBA's inspector general questioned the SBA's management of the program, arguing, among other things, that the SBA lacked useful underwriting guidelines for surety companies and adequate procedures for verifying applicants' information  During the 1980s, the SBA guaranteed, on average, 11,840 final surety bonds each fiscal year, with the SBA's share of those bonds' value averaging $1 0 billion  During the 1990s, the SBA guaranteed, on average, 5,859 final surety bonds each fiscal year, with the SBA's share of those bonds' value averaging $823 million  During the first decade of the 2000s, the SBA guaranteed, on average, about 1,802 final surety bonds each fiscal year, with the SBA's share of those bonds' value averaging about $385 million  Since then, as indicated in Table 2 and Table A-1 , the number and amount of final surety bonds guaranteed by the SBA has generally increased  This increase is likely due to generally improving economic conditions and the increase in 2013 of the maximum individual contract amount that could be guaranteed from $2 million to $6 5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary  The surety bonding process begins when a contractor applies for a bond  As GAO has reported Surety companies are generally corporations that are licensed under various insurance laws and, under their charters, have legal power to act as a surety (making themselves responsible for another's obligations) for others  Most surety companies accept business only through independent agents and brokers  In screening a bond applicant, a surety attempts to measure the contractor's ability to undertake and complete the job  When the surety's evaluation of the contractor's acceptability to perform the contract is favorable, the surety underwrites the bond  If the surety does not provide a bond to the bond applicant, the appropriate forms are forwarded to SBA for consideration of a surety bond guarantee  Initially, the SBA surety guaranteed program's bonds were underwritten and issued by large, "standard" surety companies  However, these companies' participation in the program soon began to decline, reportedly because of the administrative burdens associated with the program, such as the SBA's requirement that sureties submit all bond applications to the SBA for review and approval  In addition, the administrative costs of dealing with relatively small bonds versus relatively large ones may have also played a role in the larger, standard surety companies leaving the program  As a congressional witness testified in 1976: You have a professional underwriter, who     is going to be asked to spend 3 or 4 days looking into a $25,000 first-time application  There are many expenses involved  That same underwriter could very easily be writing four or five bonds for $10 million for contractors that everyone knows can perform  And it becomes a matter of how much time and resources can the surety industry devote to this type of business  Another reason may have been the outbreak of the Israeli-Egyptian War in 1973, which was followed by a tripling of oil prices and double-digit inflation  This led to the failure of many smaller contracting companies  In response to the economic downturn, many surety companies enhanced their underwriting standards to protect themselves from rising defaults  As a result, many of the larger surety companies became increasingly reluctant to participate in a program in which the profit margins were relatively small given the required paperwork and the program's limitation on the bond amount, and when the risk of defaults was at a historically high level  As standard sureties left the program, "specialty" surety companies filled the void  Initially, specialty sureties devoted almost all their business exclusively to SBA-guaranteed surety bonds  These companies later expanded their business into offering other high-risk bonds not normally handled by standard sureties  Specialty sureties typically required the contractor to provide collateral for the projects they bonded, and, in most cases, charged higher premiums than standard sureties  In 1982, the SBA invited officials from the Surety Association of America, representing the standard surety companies, to recommend ways to encourage their participation in the program  As mentioned previously, at that time, some specialty surety companies had been accused of associating with organized crime and GAO and the SBA's inspector general had reported fraud and mismanagement in the program  This may help to explain why the SBA was interested in encouraging the larger, more established surety companies to return to the program  The SBA also hoped that greater participation by the larger sureties would lead to lower premiums for small business contractors  During this outreach period, standard surety companies indicated a willingness to increase their participation in the program if the SBA would create a second special program, similar to the SBA's 7(a) loan guarantee program's Preferred Lenders Program  Under the proposal, a surety meeting specified qualification standards would be designed as a "preferred surety" and would be allowed to issue SBA-guaranteed surety bonds prior to receiving the SBA's approval  To participate in the preferred program, the surety's underwriting and administrative standards and procedures would be pre-approved by the SBA, and the surety's decisions would be subject to regular, annual audits  In addition, the SBA's reporting and access to records requirements would be retained  As a measure of their confidence in their own underwriting standards and claims decisions, the standard surety firms indicated that they would accept a 70% guarantee against losses as opposed to the then-allowed 80% or 90% guarantee against losses, as long as firms would not be required to seek the SBA's prior approval for underwriting decisions, bond administration, and claims procedures  Congress subsequently authorized the proposed Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program in P L  100-590 , the Small Business Administration Reauthorization and Amendment Act of 1988 (Title II, the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program Act of 1988)  The program was initially authorized on a three-year trial basis, and it was provided permanent statutory authority by P L  108-447 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005  As discussed in " 114th Congress: Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Rates " below, P L  114-92 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, increased the SBA's guarantee for preferred sureties from not less than 70% to not less than 90% of losses  The SBA is authorized to guarantee surety bonds issued to contractors or subcontractors when the business, together with its affiliates, meets the SBA's size standard for the primary industry in which it is engaged; the bond is required; the applicant is not able to obtain such bond on reasonable terms and conditions without a guarantee; and there is a reasonable expectation that the applicant will perform the covenants and conditions of the contract, and the terms and conditions of the bond are reasonable in light of the risks involved and the extent of the surety's participation  The applicant must also "possess good character and reputation," as demonstrated by (1) not being under indictment, being convicted of a felony, or having a final civil judgment stating that the applicant has committed a breach of trust or has violated a law or regulation protecting the integrity of business transactions or business relationships; (2) not having a regulatory authority revoke, cancel, or suspend a license held by the applicant, which is necessary to perform the contract; and (3) never having obtained a bond guarantee by fraud or material misrepresentation or failing to keep the surety informed of unbonded contracts or of a contract bonded by another surety  Applicants must also certify the percentage of work under the contract to be subcontracted  The SBA does not guarantee bonds for applicants that are primarily brokers or have effectively transferred control over the project to one or more subcontractors  Applicants must also certify that they are not presently debarred, suspended, proposed for debarment, declared ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from transactions with any federal department or agency  In addition, the SBA will not guarantee a bond issued by a particular surety if that surety, an affiliate of that surety, or a close relative or member of the household of that surety or affiliate owns, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of the business applying for the guarantee  This conflict of interest prohibition also applies to ownership interests in any of the applicant's affiliates  As mentioned previously, the SBA guarantees contracts up to $6 5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary  There is no limit to the number of bonds that can be guaranteed for any one contractor  The SBA guarantees up to 90% of the loss incurred and paid by a surety if the contract is $100,000 or less, or if the bond is issued on behalf of a socially and economically disadvantaged-owned and controlled small business, a qualified HUBZone small business, a veteran-owned and controlled small business, or a service-disabled veteran-owned and controlled small business  The guarantee rate is 80% if the contract is greater than $100,000, and the business is not owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, a qualified HUBZone small business, or a veteran-owned or service-disabled veteran-owned small business  The SBA does not charge principals (small business applicants) application or bid bond guarantee fees  If the SBA guarantees a final bond, the principal must pay a contractor fee equal to a percentage of the contract amount, which is determined by the SBA and published in the Federal Register   The FY2019 contractor fee is 0 6% of the contract price for a final bond


Report 2:  The contractor fee is rounded to the nearest dollar, paid to the surety, and the surety remits the fee to the SBA  Sureties also charge principals a premium for issuing and servicing the bond  Sureties are not allowed to charge principals a premium that is more than the amount permitted under applicable state law  Premiums vary depending on the surety's assessment of the risk involved and job size; typically ranging from 1 5% to 3 0% of the contract amount  Sureties interested in participating in the Prior Approval Program or the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program (PSB program) must apply in writing to the SBA  Applicants must be a corporation listed by the U S  Treasury as eligible to issue bonds in connection with federal procurement contracts  The SBA considers several factors when evaluating sureties for the PSB program: the surety must have an underwriting limitation of at least $6 5 million on the Department of the Treasury's list of acceptable sureties; the surety must agree that it will neither charge a bond premium in excess of that authorized by the appropriate state insurance department nor impose any non-premium fee unless such fee is permitted by applicable state law and approved by the SBA; the surety's premium income from contract bonds guaranteed by any government agency (federal, state, or local) can account for no more than one-quarter of the surety's total contract bond premium income; and the surety must vest the underwriting authority for SBA guaranteed bonds to its own employees and final settlement authority for claims and recovery to employees in the surety's permanent claims department  The SBA also considers the surety's rating or ranking designation assigned by a recognized authority  Sureties participating in the PSB program are not eligible to participate in the Prior Approval Program  However, this prohibition does not apply to the surety's affiliates provided that the affiliate is not a participant in the PSB program, their affiliation has been fully disclosed to the SBA, and the affiliate has been approved to participate in the Prior Approval Program  Sureties in the Prior Approval Program must obtain the SBA's approval before issuing a guaranteed bond  Sureties in the PSB program may issue, monitor, and service SBA-guaranteed bonds without prior approval  However, these sureties must notify the SBA electronically of all bonds issued and, for final bonds, they must report and submit to the SBA on a monthly basis all contractor and surety fees that are due  These sureties are also subject to a periodic maximum guarantee authority amount set by the SBA  In addition, effective August 21, 2017, sureties are required, during their initial nine months in the PSB program, to obtain the SBA's prior written approval before executing a bond greater than $2 million  The SBA argued that it was in the taxpayer's interest to require newer sureties to "demonstrate an understanding of the program before being allowed to issue bonds larger than $2 million without SBA's oversight " The terms and conditions of the SBA's bond guarantee agreements with the surety, including the guarantee percentage, may vary from surety to surety, depending on past experience with the SBA  The SBA may take into consideration, among other things, the rating or ranking assigned to the surety by recognized authorities, the surety's loss rate, average contract amount, average bond penalty per guaranteed bond, and the ratio of bid bonds to final bonds, all in comparison with other sureties participating in the same SBA Surety Bond Guarantee Program (Prior Approval or PSB programs)  Sureties are required, among other things, to evaluate the credit, capacity, and character of a principal using standards generally accepted by the surety industry and in accordance with the SBA's standard operating procedures on underwriting and the surety's principles and practices on unguaranteed bonds; reasonably expect that the principal will successfully perform the contract to be bonded; provide bond terms and conditions that are reasonable in light of the risks involved and the extent of the surety's participation; be satisfied as to the reasonableness of cost and the feasibility of successful completion of the contract; ensure that the principal remains viable and eligible for the program; monitor the principal's progress on guaranteed contracts; maintain documentation of job status requests; take all reasonable action to minimize risk of loss, including, but not limited to, obtaining from each principal a written indemnity agreement, secured by such collateral as the surety or the SBA finds appropriate, which covers actual losses under the contract and imminent breach payments; and in the case of loss, pursue all possible sources of salvage and recovery  Participating sureties are subject to audits by SBA-selected and -approved examiners  Prior Approval Program sureties are audited at least once each year and PSB sureties are audited at least once every three years  The SBA does not charge sureties (or small businesses) application or bid bond guarantee fees  It does require sureties to pay a guarantee fee on each SBA-guaranteed bond (other than bid bonds)  The surety fee, which is determined by the SBA and published in the Federal Register , is a percentage of the bond premium  The FY2019 surety fee is 20% of the bond premium that the surety charges the small business, rounded to the nearest dollar  The surety fee is due within 60 days after the SBA's approval of the prior approval payment or performance bond  The SBA does not receive any portion of a surety's non-premium charges  As shown in Table 2 , the number and amount of bid bonds guaranteed by the SBA has generally increased in recent years  For example, in FY2007, the SBA guaranteed 4,192 bid bonds totaling $1 7 billion  In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 7,354 bid bonds totaling $4 7 billion  Table 2 also shows that the number and amount of SBA-guaranteed final bonds declined somewhat from FY2007 through FY2009 (coinciding with the 2007-2009 recession), and has generally increased since then  Recent increases are likely due to generally improving economic conditions and legislation that temporarily ( P L  111-5 ) and then permanently ( P L  112-239 ) raised the program's maximum individual contract amount from $2 million to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary  As shown in Table 3 , excluding program costs of about $4 million annually, the program has experienced a net positive cash flow in each of the past 12 fiscal years  There is about $97 million in the Surety Bond Guarantee Program Revolving Fund  Historically, the program's default rate has averaged about 3% to 5%  According to the SBA, on average, the default rate on larger contracts tends to be lower than for smaller contracts and the recovery rate for larger contract defaults tends to be greater than for smaller contract defaults  Currently, 28 sureties participate in the Prior Approval Program and 6 participate in the PSB program  Agents empowered to represent a participating surety company are located, or licensed, in all 50 states, American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands  About 80% of the SBA's surety bonds are issued through the Prior Approval Program and 20% through the PSB program  P L  111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the program an additional appropriation of $15 million and temporarily increased, from February 17, 2009, through September 30, 2010, the maximum bond amount from $2 million to $5 million  The act also authorized the SBA to guarantee a bond of up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that a guarantee in excess of $5 million was necessary  It also revised the program's size standard to "the size standard for the primary industry in which such business concern, and the affiliates of such business concern, is engaged, as determined by the Administrator in accordance with the North American Industry Classification System " The new size standard (e g , up to $36 5 million in average annual receipts over the previous three years for most heavy construction contractors, and up to $15 million in average annual receipts over the previous three years for specialty trade contractors) increased the number of businesses that qualified for the program  Using its rulemaking authority, the SBA made ARRA's temporary size standard permanent on August 11, 2010  Proponents argued that the increased bond limit and size were necessary to "ensure that small businesses are able to secure the surety bonds they need to compete for contracts, grow, and hire more employees " They also argued that "in our current economic recession, small businesses are finding it even more difficult to secure the credit lines necessary to get bonds in the private sector " In their view, the temporary changes would create "significant opportunities to create jobs now in which small businesses will participate and be the driving engine for creation of new jobs in our country " There was no apparent organized opposition to these specific temporary changes to the Surety Bond Guarantee Program  However, there was opposition to ARRA's package of program enhancements for the SBA as a whole, which among other things, provided the SBA $730 million in additional funding, including $255 million for a temporary, two-year small business stabilization program to guarantee loans of $35,000 or less to small businesses for qualified debt consolidation, later named the America's Recovery Capital (ARC) Loan program and $375 million to temporarily subsidize fees for the SBA's 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90%  Instead of modifying the SBA's program requirements and increasing the SBA's appropriation, opponents advocated business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses, generate economic growth, and create jobs  On September 12, 2011, the Obama Administration advocated, as part of its proposed American Jobs Act, a temporary increase in the SBA surety bond limit to $5 million until the end of FY2012  The Administration argued that raising the program's bond limit "will make it easier for small businesses to take advantage of contracting opportunities generated by the American Jobs Act's proposed infrastructure investments " On December 7, 2012, the Administration also recommended, as part of its request for an additional $60 4 billion in federal resources to address damage caused by Hurricane Sandy, that the SBA surety bond limit be increased to $5 million to enable "more small businesses to participate in the recovery efforts " There were several legislative efforts during the 112 th Congress to increase the program's bond limit  S  1334 , the Expanding Opportunities for Main Street Act of 2011, and its companion bill in the House, H R  2424 , would have reinstated and made permanent ARRA's higher limits (up to $5 million and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies in writing that a guarantee in excess of $5 million is necessary)  Neither of these bills was reported by a committee for consideration by the House or the Senate  S  1660 , the American Jobs Act of 2011, and its companion bill in the House, H R  12 , would have provided $3 million in additional funding to pay for the cost of temporarily increasing the program's bond limit to $5 million from $2 million until the end of FY2012  Cloture on a motion to proceed to S  1660 was not invoked in the Senate on October 11, 2011, by a vote of 50 to 49  H R  12 was not reported by a committee for consideration in the House  On December 12, 2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations released its draft of the Hurricane Sandy Emergency Assistance Supplemental bill  It included a provision to increase the program's bond limit to $5 million  This provision was later removed following congressional approval of H R  4310 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which became law ( P L  112-239 ) on January 2, 2013  It increased the program's bond limit to $6 5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary  There was relatively little discussion in the legislative record concerning the reasons for increasing the surety bond program's bond limits, and even less discussion of the reasons for not increasing the limits  Hearings were not held on S  1334 and H R  2424   Also, only one witness during hearings on H R  4310 addressed the SBA surety bond program  That witness supported an increase in the surety bond limit to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a contracting officer certifies its necessity  Advocates argued that bond limits should be raised to bring them more in line with the contracting amounts for other small business programs, such as the 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program, the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program, the Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract program, and the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Concerns Program  For example, under 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program, federal contracting officials, at that time, could provide a sole source award to a 8(a) small business if the anticipated award price of the contract did not exceed $6 5 million for manufacturing contracts (now $7 0 million) or $4 million for other contract opportunities, and the contracting officer believed that the award could be made at a fair and reasonable price  Advocates argued that raising the program's bond limit would provide more consistency across small business contracting programs and make it easier for agencies experiencing difficulty issuing contracts in increments of $2 million or less (e g , the Department of Defense [DOD], the General Services Administration, and the Department of State) to participate in the program  Advocates also argued that small businesses awarded contracts exceeding $2 million under the other small business contracting programs are at risk of not being able to complete those contracts due to difficulties in securing a surety bond  For example, the House Committee on Armed Services' Panel on Business Challenges in the Defense Industry argued that the SBA surety bond program's limit should be increased to $6 5 million to match the 8(a) program's $6 5 million threshold for manufacturing contracts and to "increase the opportunities for small businesses to compete for federal contracts, especially in those departments, such as the Department of Defense, where the average size of construction contracts awarded to small businesses for FY2010 exceeded $5 9 million—nearly triple the size for which SBA can provide bonding support " There was no organized opposition to raising the program's bond limits  One possible argument that could have been raised is that higher limits could lead to higher amounts being guaranteed by the SBA and, as a result, increase the risk of program losses  However, the SBA's experience with Recovery Act bonds (over $2 million) suggested that raising the limit may not lead to an increased risk of program losses  The SBA reported that the program's default rate on Recovery Act bonds was lower, in 2009 and 2010, than for its other bonds  The SBA guaranteed 166 Recovery Act bid bonds valued at $518 million and 52 Recovery Act final bonds valued at $145 4 million  There were two defaults, with a bond value of $2 7 million and $2 2 million, respectively  In an effort to enhance surety participation in the SBA's program, H R  776 , the Security in Bonding Act of 2013, introduced and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee on Small Business on February 15, 2013, would have increased the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses  The bill was reported favorably by both committees on May 21, 2014, and included in H R  4435 , the Howard P  "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, which was passed by the House on May 22, 2014  This provision was not included in the final version of the bill which was subsequently passed by Congress  Advocates of increasing the PSB program's guarantee rate argued that Despite the different guarantee amounts and the differing levels of review, both the PAP [Prior Approval Program] and PSBP [Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program] have similar levels of default  However, over the years, the PSBP program has become less effective for small businesses since only four sureties currently participate in the program because the guarantee rates are no longer competitive enough to encourage commercial sureties to participate  Therefore, since the PSBP is the more efficient program and … does not expose taxpayers to any risk, this legislation amends the SBIA [Small Business Investment Act] to standardize the guarantee rate at 90 percent  The SBA did not formally endorse the proposed guarantee rate increase  However, in its FY2015 and FY2016 congressional budget justification documents, the SBA indicated that it "will investigate establishing a single guaranty percentage in the Prior Approval and PSB programs and restructuring the Prior Approval program " Also, when asked at a congressional hearing held on May 23, 2013, about the proposed guarantee rate increase, an SBA official testified that We are looking very closely at the program  We have seen a decline in the preferred sureties going down from 50% to 14% of our program, which is a very small number  We would like to see more participation in that program  Because of the additional cash flow we have, we do not expect it to increase our costs  And we have some history in our other programs that demonstrate that having the same guarantee level is not a disincentive  There was no discussion in the legislative record during the 113 th Congress opposing an increase in the guarantee rate for the PSB program  One possible objection might have been that increasing the guarantee rate could increase the risk of program losses and result in higher program fees  Higher fees, in turn, could cause hardship for some companies seeking a surety bond  H R  838 , the Security in Bonding Act of 2015, was introduced and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee on Small Business on February 10, 2015  The bill would have increased the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90%, specify requirements concerning the pledge of assets by individual sureties, and require GAO to examine the effects of these changes on small businesses  The House-passed version of H R  1735 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, included H R  838 's provisions  The Senate-passed version of the bill did not  The conference agreement for H R  1735 , which became P L  114-92 , included H R  838 's provision to increase the PSB program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses and its provision to specify requirements concerning the pledge of assets by individual sureties, subject to a one-year delay "to allow for the necessary rulemaking " Congress specified additional requirements concerning the pledge of assets by individual sureties as a means to ensure that "individual sureties have sufficient assets to redeem the bonds " The SBA's final rule implementing the increased PSB program's guarantee rate was effective as of September 20, 2017  The SBA has reported that it is focusing on "strengthening relationships with individual surety companies and the large network of bond agents and producers across the country in order to reach more small businesses in need of bonding " As part of this outreach effort, the SBA has reported that it will continue to emphasize "process improvements that will streamline the application requirements for small businesses and surety companies and their agents " For example, in August 2012, the SBA announced a "Quick APP" for surety bonds up to $250,000 that provides a streamlined underwriting and application process by combining "two applications into one to make it easier and faster for small businesses and contractors, including veteran-owned small businesses, to compete for contracts " The SBA increased the Quick APP (now called the Quick Bond Program) eligibility threshold to $400,000 in 2017  In addition, the SBA reported in 2016 that it was also considering combing the Prior Approval Program and PSB program into a single program featuring the streamlined bond approval and monitoring processes under the PSB program  Several industry groups, including the National Association of Surety Bond Producers and The Surety & Fidelity Association of America, have recommended that the programs be merged, the emphasis on reduced regulatory burdens under the PSB program be maintained, and the program's fees kept as low as economically feasible as a means to encourage more sureties to participate in the program  Perhaps because the proposal has not been formally introduced as a bill, there are no public statements opposing the merger of the two programs  Opposition might come from (1) those who are not convinced that the Surety Bond Guarantee Program is necessary to supplement the private market for surety bonds and would prefer that the program be eliminated rather than reformed or (2) those who believe that a federal program is necessary to supplement the private market for surety bonds, but the existing program is sufficient to meet that need and does not require changes to encourage its expansion  Still other opponents might argue that providing additional authority to sureties to approve and monitor bonds could increase the risk of defaults and program losses  Throughout the program's history, both congressional testimony and GAO examinations have indicated that smaller contracting firms, and especially minority-owned and women-owned small business contracting firms, often have a more difficult time accessing surety bonds in the private marketplace than larger firms  For example, in 1995, GAO reported that "it is not unusual for a small construction company to have some difficulty in obtaining a surety bond " GAO found that about one in three of the smallest contracting firms it surveyed, compared with about one in six of the larger contracting firms it surveyed, reported that they were required to provide collateral  GAO also reported The experiences of the minority-owned firms differed from those of the firms not owned by minorities in several areas  For example, these firms were more likely to be asked to provide certain types of financial documentation, as well as to provide collateral or to meet other conditions; were more likely to be denied a bond and to report losing an opportunity to bid because of delays in processing their request for a bond; and were more likely to depend on jobs requiring bonds for a higher proportion of their revenues  The women-owned firms differed from the firms not owned by women in a few key respects  For example, they … were more likely to be asked to provide more types of financial or other documentation to obtain a bond  In addition, the minority-owned firms reported more often than the firms not owned by minorities that they had to (1) establish an escrow account controlled by the surety company, (2) hire a CPA or a management or consulting firm selected by the surety company to manage the contract, and (3) enter into an arrangement that allows the surety company to manage the job even when the firm is not in default  Although congressional testimony and GAO examinations have supported the need for a program such as the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program, that testimony and GAO's surveys of businesses have been somewhat less useful in helping Congress determine the appropriate size for the program  For example, a review of congressional hearings since the program's inception suggests that congressional witnesses representing the surety companies and various construction organizations, including minority-owned small contracting businesses, have focused their testimony on the need to reduce the SBA's paperwork requirements, which are designed to prevent fraud but increase the sureties' costs; keep the program's fees as low as possible; and keep the program's guarantee rates as high as possible  The SBA's testimony has tended to focus on the need to attract more sureties to the program so that it can reverse the slow downward trajectory the program has experienced over the past two decades in the number and amount of final bonds guaranteed  There has been relatively little testimony provided concerning the broader issue of how large the program should be in comparison with the private sector and what measures or metrics could be used to help make that determination  One possible starting point for determining the program's size in comparison with the private sector is to examine congressional testimony concerning the supply and demand for sureties in the private sector  That testimony suggests that the supply and demand for sureties tends to fluctuate with changes in the overall economy, with the supply of sureties contracting during economic recessions and expanding during economic expansions and the demand for sureties slowing during economic recessions and increasing during economic expansions  Arguably, federal policies could take these fluctuations into account—enacting policies that expand federal support for surety guarantees when supply is tight and reducing federal support for surety guarantees when supply is more plentiful  Of course, when making these decisions, it is necessary to first establish measures or metrics to determine current market conditions  In addition, this line of reasoning assumes that having a federal presence in the surety marketplace is desirable, an assumption not held by all  Ultimately, although having established measures or metrics concerning the supply and demand for surety bonds might be helpful in determining the appropriate size for the SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Program, that decision will largely rest on personal views concerning the role of the federal government in the private marketplace and the level of acceptable risk in assisting small businesses to gain greater access to surety bonds 

ground_truth: The "child nutrition programs" refer to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) programs that provide food for children in school or institutional settings. The best known programs, which serve the largest number of children, are the school meals programs: the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and the School Breakfast Program (SBP). The child nutrition programs also include the Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), which provides meals and snacks in day care and after school settings; the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP), which provides food during the summer months; the Special Milk Program (SMP), which supports milk for schools that do not participate in NSLP or SBP; and the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP), which funds fruit and vegetable snacks in select elementary schools. Funding: The vast majority of the child nutrition programs account is considered mandatory spending, with trace amounts of discretionary funding for certain related activities. Referred to as open-ended, "appropriated entitlements," funding is provided through the annual appropriations process; however, the level of spending is controlled by benefit and eligibility criteria in federal law and dependent on the resulting levels of participation. Federal cash funding (in the form of per-meal reimbursements) and USDA commodity food support is guaranteed to schools and other providers based on the number of meals or snacks served and participant category (e.g., free meals for poor children get higher subsidies). Participation: The child nutrition programs serve children of varying ages and in different institutional settings. The NSLP and SBP have the broadest reach, serving qualifying children of all ages in school settings. Other child nutrition programs serve more-narrow populations. CACFP, for example, provides meals and snacks to children in early childhood and after-school settings among other venues. Programs generally provide some subsidy for all food served but a larger federal reimbursement for food served to children from low-income households. Administration: Responsibility for child nutrition programs is divided between the federal government, states, and localities. The state agency and type of local provider differs by program. In the NSLP and SBP, schools and school districts ("school food authorities") administer the program. Meanwhile, SFSP (and sometimes CACFP) uses a model in which sponsor organizations handle administrative responsibilities for a number of sites that serve meals. Reauthorization: The underlying laws covering the child nutrition programs were last reauthorized in the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA, P.L. 111-296, enacted December 13, 2010). This law made significant changes to child nutrition programs, including increasing federal financing for school lunches, expanding access to community eligibility and direct certification options for schools, and expanding eligibility options for home child care providers. The law also required an update to school meal nutrition guidelines as well as new guidelines for food served outside the meal programs (e.g., snacks sold in vending machines and cafeteria a la carte lines). Current Issues: The 114th Congress began but did not complete a 2016 child nutrition reauthorization, and there was no significant legislative activity with regard to reauthorization in the 115th Congress. However, the vast majority of operations and activities continue with funding provided by appropriations laws. Current issues in the child nutrition programs are discussed in CRS Report R45486, Child Nutrition Programs: Current Issues.