prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: Since 1952, when a cabal of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers Movement, ousted the British-backed king, Egypt's military has produced four presidents; Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), and Abdel Fattah el Sisi (2013-present)  In general, these four men have ruled Egypt with strong backing from the country's security establishment  The only significant and abiding opposition has come from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that has opposed single party military-backed rule and advocated for a state governed by a vaguely articulated combination of civil and Shariah (Islamic) law  Egypt's sole departure from this general formula took place between 2011 and 2013, after popular demonstrations sparked by the "Arab Spring," which had started in neighboring Tunisia, compelled the military to force the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011  During this period, Egypt experienced tremendous political tumult, culminating in the one-year presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood's Muhammad Morsi  When Morsi took office on June 30, 2012, after winning Egypt's first truly competitive presidential election, his ascension to the presidency was supposed to mark the end of a rocky 16-month transition period  Proposed time lines for elections, the constitutional drafting process, and the military's relinquishing of power to a civilian government had been constantly changed, contested, and sometimes even overruled by the courts  Instead of consolidating democratic or civilian rule, Morsi's rule exposed the deep divisions in Egyptian politics, pitting a broad cross-section of Egypt's public and private sectors, the Coptic Church, and the military against the Brotherhood and its Islamist supporters  The atmosphere of mutual distrust, political gridlock, and public dissatisfaction that permeated Morsi's presidency provided Egypt's military, led by then-Defense Minister Sisi, with an opportunity to reassert political control  On July 3, 2013, following several days of mass demonstrations against Morsi's rule, the military unilaterally dissolved Morsi's government, suspended the constitution that had been passed during his rule, and installed an interim president  The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters declared the military's actions a coup d'etat and protested in the streets  Weeks later, Egypt's military and national police launched a violent crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood, resulting in police and army soldiers firing live ammunition against demonstrators encamped in several public squares and the killing of at least 1,150 demonstrators  The Egyptian military justified these actions by decrying the encampments as a threat to national security  As Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi consolidates his power amid a continuing macroeconomic recovery, Egypt is poised to play an increasingly active role in the region, albeit from a more independent position vis-a-vis the United States than in the past  Although Egyptian relations with the Trump Administration are solid, and Egypt has relied on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program to guide its economic recovery, Egypt seems committed to broadening its international base of support  The United States plays a key role in that international base, but Egypt also has other significant partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, and France  The Egyptian government blames American criticism of its human rights record for preventing closer U S -Egyptian ties  From the U S  perspective, some Members of Congress, U S  media outlets, and advocacy groups document how Egyptian authorities have widened the scope of a crackdown against dissent, which initially was aimed at the Muslim Brotherhood but has evolved to encompass a broader range of political speech  Egypt's parliament is currently considering whether to adopt a package of draft constitutional amendments that would extend presidential term limits and executive branch control over the judiciary  If Egypt's 2019 constitutional amendments are approved, President Sisi will attain unprecedented power in the political system over the military and the judiciary and, if reelected, will have the potential to remain in office until 2034  He has inserted his older brother and oldest son into key security and intelligence positions while stymying all opposition to his rule and criticism of his government  This consolidation of power and crackdown against dissent has taken place during a period of steady economic growth, which has not benefitted wide swaths of the population  The state has enacted a series of austerity measures to reduce debt in compliance with IMF-mandated reforms  In the year ahead, economists anticipate gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 5 3%, driven by an expansion in tourism and natural gas production  Nevertheless, Egyptians continue to endure double-digit inflation stemming in part from the 2016 flotation of the currency, tax increases, and reductions in food and fuel subsidies  While it is difficult to ascertain how dissatisfied the public is with rising prices, President Sisi has responded to criticisms of his economic policies, stating: "The path of real reform is difficult and cruel and causes a lot of suffering     But there is no doubt that the suffering resulting from the lack of reform is much worse " The IMF has praised the Egyptian government's record of reform implementation, while also highlighting the need for private sector growth "that will absorb the rapidly growing labor force and ensure that the benefits are perceived more widely " After several years of observers seeing Egypt as more inwardly focused, several recent developments suggest an increasingly active foreign policy  In January 2019, Egypt hosted an international forum on Mediterranean gas which included European and Arab countries together with Israel  A month later, President Sisi was elected head of the African Union for a year-long term  In February 2019, Egypt hosted the first-ever European Union- Arab summit in Sharm el Sheikh, where officials discussed terrorism, migration, and the need for greater European-Arab cooperation to counter a perceived growing Chinese and Russian interest in the Middle East  Personnel moves and other developments in Egypt highlight apparent efforts by President Sisi to consolidate power with the help of political allies, including colleagues from Egypt's security establishment  In June 2018, Sisi reshuffled his cabinet, making key changes to the defense and interior ministries, among other appointments  Sisi appointed Mohamed Ahmed Zaki, former head of the Republican Guard, as defense minister and Mahmoud Tawfik, former head of the National Security Service, as interior minister  According to one account, Sisi may have been rewarding Zaki for his role in arresting former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi in 2013  In July 2018, parliament passed Law 161 of 2018, providing judicial immunity to senior military commanders for military acts committed during the two-and-a-half-year period beginning with the military coup of July 2013  The new law grants immunity to senior commanders while potentially keeping high-ranking officers on reserve duty for life, making them ineligible to run for president  In order for a senior commander to be prosecuted under this new law, a case would have to be first authorized by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which President Sisi appoints  According to one analysis, the law deters senior officers from challenging President Sisi (for example, some challenges occurred during the run-up to the 2018 presidential election), thereby acting "as a guarantor of President Sisi's authoritarian rule, setting the stage for him to remain president for life " Per the 2014 Egyptian constitution (article 140), President Sisi, who was reelected in April 2018, may only serve two four-year terms in office (current term ends in 2022)  However, his supporters have proposed a set of amendments to the constitution which, if approved by parliament and public referendum, have the potential to make President Sisi eligible for an additional two six-year terms when his current term ends in 2022  Other proposed changes to the constitution include granting the president the authority to appoint all chief justices of Egyptian judicial bodies, and the public prosecutor; requiring that at least one-quarter of the seats in the parliament be allocated to women and reducing the number of the seats in the House of Representatives from 596 to 450; and establishing an upper house of parliament (Senate) consisting of 250 members, two-thirds of whom would be elected and one-third of whom would be appointed by the president  President Sisi has come under repeated international criticism for an ongoing government crackdown against various forms of political dissent and freedom of expression  Certain practices of Sisi's government, the parliament, and the security apparatus have been contentious  According to the U S  State Department's report on human rights conditions in Egypt in 2017: The most significant human rights issues included arbitrary or unlawful killings by the government or its agents; major terrorist attacks; disappearances; torture; harsh or potentially life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; including the use of military courts to try civilians; political prisoners and detainees; unlawful interference in privacy; limits on freedom of expression, including criminal "defamation of religion" laws; restrictions on the press, internet, and academic freedom; and restrictions on freedoms of assembly and association, including government control over registration and financing of NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]  LGBTI persons faced arrests, imprisonment, and degrading treatment  The government did not effectively respond to violence against women, and there were reports of child labor  Select international human rights, democracy, and development monitoring organizations provide the following rankings for Egypt globally: Other human rights issues of potential interest to Congress may include the 2013 convictions of American, European, and Egyptian civil society representatives; the controversial 2017 NGO law; the detention of American citizens in Egypt; and the treatment of Coptic Christians, discussed in the following sections  In 2013, an Egyptian court convicted and sentenced 43 individuals from the United States, Egypt, and Europe, including the Egypt country directors of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), for spending money from organizations that were operating in Egypt without a license and for receiving foreign funds (known as Case 173 or the "foreign funding case")  Some lawmakers had protested that those individuals were wrongfully convicted and had requested that the Egyptian government and judiciary resolve the matter  In 2018, a retrial began and, on December 20, 2018, the individuals were acquitted of all charges  In January 2019, U S  Secretary of State Michael R  Pompeo traveled to Cairo, where he remarked: "I was happy to see our citizens, wrongly convicted of improperly operating NGOs here, finally be acquitted  And we strongly support President Sisi's initiative to amend Egyptian law so that this does not happen again  More work certainly needs to be done to maximize the potential of the Egyptian nation and its people  I'm glad that America will be a partner in those efforts " However, Case 173 remains active, as the judiciary has imposed asset freezes and travel bans on several Egyptian civil society activists  In May 2017, President Sisi signed Law 70 of 2017 on Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work  The parliament had passed this bill six months earlier, and both the passage and signing drew widespread international condemnation  The new law (which replaced a 2002 NGO law) requires NGOs to receive prior approval from internal security before accepting foreign funding  It also restricts the scope of permitted NGO activities and increases penalties for violations, including possible imprisonment for up to five years  However, the government did not issue implementing regulations for the new NGO law  At Egypt's November 2018 World Youth Forum in Sharm el Sheikh, President Sisi announced plans to amend Law 70  According to Sisi, "I want to reassure those who are listening to me inside Egypt and outside of Egypt, that in Egypt, we are keen that the law becomes balanced and achieves what is required of it to regulate the work of these groups in a good way  This is not just political talk " Since then, Egypt's Ministry of Social Solidarity has held multiple rounds of talks with local NGOs aimed at determining which articles of the law need to be amended  A draft proposal is expected to be ready in the spring of 2019, when it will be sent to parliament for consideration  The detention of American citizens in Egypt has continued to strain U S -Egyptian relations  Some Members of Congress are concerned about the case of 53-year-old New York resident Mustafa Kassem, who was detained by authorities in 2013 and sentenced to 15 years in prison in a mass trial in September 2018  These lawmakers insist that Kassem, who has been on a limited hunger strike, was wrongfully arrested and convicted, and they have sought Trump Administration support in securing his release from the government of Egypt  In January 2018, Vice President Pence raised Kassem's case directly with President Sisi in a meeting in Cairo, saying "I told him we'd like to see those American citizens restored to their families and restored to our country " Since taking office, President Sisi has publicly called for greater Muslim-Christian coexistence and national unity  In January 2019, he inaugurated Egypt's Coptic Cathedral of Nativity in the new administrative capital east of Cairo saying, "This is an important moment in our history     We are one and we will remain one " Despite these public calls for improved interfaith relations in Egypt, the minority Coptic Christian community continues to claim that they face professional and social discrimination, along with occasional sectarian attacks by terrorists and vigilantes  Coptic Christians have also voiced concern about state regulation of church construction  They have long demanded that the government reform long-standing laws (with two dating back to 1856 and 1934, respectively) on building codes for Christian places of worship  Article 235 of Egypt's 2014 constitution mandates that parliament reform these building code regulations  In 2016, parliament approved a church construction law (Law 80 of 2016) that expedited the government approval process for the construction and restoration of Coptic churches, among other structures  Although Coptic Pope Tawadros II welcomed the law, others claim that it continues to be discriminatory  According to Human Rights Watch , "the new law allows governors to deny church-building permits with no stated way to appeal, requires that churches be built 'commensurate with' the number of Christians in the area, and contains security provisions that risk subjecting decisions on whether to allow church construction to the whims of violent mobs " For 2019, the IMF projects 5 3% GDP growth for the Egyptian economy, noting that the outlook remains "favorable, supported by strong policy implementation " In 2016, the IMF and Egypt reached a three-year, $12 billion loan agreement, $10 billion of which has been disbursed as of March 2019  Key sources of foreign exchange (tourism and remittances) are up and unemployment is at its lowest level since 2011  In line with IMF recommendations, the government has taken several steps to reform the economy, including depreciating the currency, reducing fuel subsidies, enacting a value-added tax (VAT), and providing cash payments to the poor in lieu of subsidizing household goods (though many food subsidies continue)  Egypt's energy sector also is contributing to the economy's rebound  Egypt is the largest oil producer in Africa outside of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the third-largest natural gas producer on the continent following Algeria and Nigeria  In December 2017, an Egyptian and Italian partnership began commercial output from the Zohr natural gas field (est  30 trillion cubic feet of gas), the largest ever natural gas field discovered in the Mediterranean Sea (see Figure 3 )  The Egyptian government also has repaid debts owed to foreign energy companies, allowing for new investments from BP and BG Group  Egypt is attempting to position itself as a regional gas hub, whereby its own gas fields meet domestic demand while imported gas from Israel and Cyprus can be liquefied in Egypt and reexported  Israeli and Egyptian companies have bought significant shares of an unused undersea pipeline connecting Israel to the northern Sinai Peninsula (see Figure 4 )  The pipeline will be used to transport natural gas from Israel to Egypt for possible reexport, as part of an earlier 10-year, $15 billion gas deal between the U S  Company Noble Energy, its Israeli partner Delek, and the Egyptian company Dolphinus Holdings  In January 2019, Egypt convened the first ever Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a regional consortium consisting of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy, intended to consolidate regional energy policies and reduce costs  Despite Egypt's positive economic outlook, significant challenges remain  Inflation remains over 11%, making the cost of goods high for many Egyptians  In addition, while the fiscal deficit may be decreasing, Egypt's overall public and foreign debt have grown significantly in recent years and remain high, leading the government to allocate resources (nearly 38% of Egypt's budget) toward debt-service payments and away from spending on health and education  Economists forecast that total public debt will reach 84 8% of GDP and external debt 32% of GDP ($101 7 billion) in 2019  Some observers assert that Egypt's recent economic reforms, while successful in the short term, have not addressed deeper structural impediments to growth  For example, Egypt's industrial sector is heavily dependent upon imports and, as the economy expands, the demand for foreign currency increases  According to Bloomberg , "this means, the more the economy grows, the greater the pressure on dollar reserves  It doesn't help that these were built up almost entirely through foreign borrowing, pushing Egypt's foreign debt from $55 billion in 2016 to $92 billion in late 2018  It won't be long before the country's finances are once again in crisis " Many experts argue that to sustain growth over the long term, Egypt requires dramatic expansion of the nonhydrocarbon private sector  For decades, Egypt's military has played a key role in the nation's economy as a food producer and low-cost domestic manufacturer of consumable products; however, due to political sensitivities, the extent of its economic power is rarely quantified  Egypt's military is largely economically self-sufficient  It produces what it consumes (food and clothes) and then sells surplus goods for additional revenue  Egyptian military companies have been the main beneficiaries of the massive infrastructure contracts Sisi has commissioned  Moreover, military-owned manufacturing companies have expanded into new markets, producing goods (appliances, solar panels, some electronics, and some medical equipment) that are cheaper than either foreign imports or domestically produced goods made by the private sector  President Sisi, who led the 2013 military intervention and was elected president in mid-2014, came to power promising not only to defeat violent Salafi-Jihadi terrorist groups militarily, but also to counter their foundational ideology, which President Sisi and his supporters often attribute to the Muslim Brotherhood  President Sisi has outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood while launching a more general crackdown against a broad spectrum of opponents, both secular and Islamist  While Egypt is no longer beset by the kind of large-scale civil unrest and public protest it faced during the immediate post-Mubarak era, it continues to face terrorist and insurgent violence, both in the Sinai Peninsula and in the rest of Egypt  Terrorists based in the Sinai Peninsula (the Sinai) have been waging an insurgency against the Egyptian government since 2011  While the terrorist landscape in Egypt is evolving and encompasses several groups, the Islamic State's Sinai Province affiliate (IS-SP) is known as the most lethal  Since its affiliation with the Islamic State in 2014, IS-SP has attacked the Egyptian military continually, targeted Coptic Christian individuals and places of worship, and occasionally fired rockets into Israel  In October 2015, IS-SP targeted Russian tourists departing the Sinai by planting a bomb aboard Metrojet Flight 9268, which exploded midair, killing all 224 passengers and crew aboard  Two years later, on November 24, 2017, IS-SP gunmen launched an attack against the Al Rawdah mosque in the town of Bir al Abed in northern Sinai  That attack killed at least 305 people, making it the deadliest terrorist attack in Egypt's modern history  Combating terrorism in the Sinai is particularly challenging due to an array of factors, including the following: Geograph y : The peninsula's interior is mountainous and sparsely populated, providing militants with ample freedom of movement  Demograph y and Culture : The Sinai's northern population is a mix of Palestinians and Bedouin Arab tribes whose relationship to the state is filled with distrust  Sinai Bedouin have faced discrimination and exclusion from full citizenship and access to the economy  In the absence of development, a black market economy based primarily on smuggling has thrived, further contributing to the popular portrayal of Bedouin as outlaws  State authorities charge that the Sinai Bedouin seek autonomy from the central government, while residents insist on obtaining basic rights, such as property rights, full citizenship, and access to government services such as education and health care  Econom ics : Bedouins claim that Egypt has underinvested in northern Sinai, channeling development toward southern tourist destinations that cater to foreign visitors  Northern Sinai consists of mostly flat desert terrain inhospitable to large-scale agriculture without significant investment in irrigation  For decades, the Egyptian state has claimed to follow successive Sinai development plans  However, Egyptian governance and development of the Sinai has been hampered by corruption  Diploma cy : The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty limits the number of soldiers that Egypt can deploy in the Sinai, subject to the parties' ability to negotiate changes as circumstances necessitate  Egypt and Israel mutually agree upon any short-term increase of Egypt's military presence in the Sinai  Since Israel returned control over the Sinai to Egypt in 1982, the area has been partially demilitarized, and the Sinai has served as an effective buffer zone between the two countries  The Multinational Force and Observers, or MFO, are deployed in the Sinai to monitor the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (see Figure 5 )  Egypt and Israel reportedly continue to cooperate in countering terrorism in the Sinai  In a televised interview, President Sisi responded to a question on whether Egyptian-Israeli military cooperation was the closest it has ever been, saying "That is correct  The [Egyptian] Air Force sometimes needs to cross to the Israeli side  And that's why we have a wide range of coordination with the Israelis " One news account suggests that Israel, with Egypt's approval, has used its own drones, helicopters, and aircraft to carry out more than 100 covert airstrikes inside Egypt against militant targets  In order to counter IS-SP in northern Sinai, the Egyptian armed forces and police have declared a state of emergency, imposed curfews and travel restrictions, and erected police checkpoints along main roads  Authorities also have limited domestic and foreign media access to the northern Sinai, declaring it an active combat zone and unsafe for journalists  According to Jane's Defence Weekly , Egypt may be upgrading an old air base in the Sinai (Bir Gifgafa), where it could deploy Apache attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles for use in counterterrorism operations  While an increased Egyptian military presence in the Sinai may be necessary to stabilize the area, many observers have argued that military means alone are insufficient  These critics say that force should be accompanied by policies to reduce the appeal of antigovernment militancy by addressing local political and economic grievances  According to one account: Sinai residents are prohibited from joining any senior post in the state  They cannot work in the army, police, judiciary, or in diplomacy  Meanwhile, no development projects have been undertaken in North Sinai the past 40 years  The villages of Rafah and Sheikh Zuwayed have no schools or hospitals and no modern system to receive potable water  They depend on rainwater and wells, as if it were the Middle Ages  Egyptian counterterrorism efforts in the Sinai appear to have reduced the frequency of terrorist attacks somewhat  In February 2018, the military launched an offensive campaign, dubbed "Operation Sinai 2018 " During the campaign, the military deployed tens of thousands of troops to the peninsula and was able to eliminate several senior IS-SP leaders  One report suggests that unlike previous military operations against militants in the Sinai, this time the Egyptian military armed progovernment tribesmen to assist conventional forces in combating IS-SP  According to one analysis, the military's recent campaign has "to some degree, restricted the militants' movements, destroyed a number of hideouts, and most importantly eliminated several trained and influential elements " However, as in previous major operations, once the military reduces its presence in northern Sinai, terrorist groups may reconstitute themselves  In March 2019, CENTCOM Commander General Joseph L  Votel testified before Congress, stating that the "Egyptian Armed Forces have more effectively fought ISIS in the Sinai and are now taking active measures to address the underlying issues that give life to—to these violent extremist groups and are helping to contain the threat " Outside of the Sinai, either in the western desert near the Libya border or other areas (Cairo, Nile Delta, Upper Egypt), small nationalist insurgent groups, such as Liwa al Thawra (The Revolution Brigade) and Harakat Sawaed Misr (Arms of Egypt Movement, referred to by its Arabic acronym HASM), have carried out high-level assassinations of military/police officials and bombings of infrastructure  According to one expert, these insurgent groups are comprised mainly of former Muslim Brotherhood activists who have splintered off from the main organization to wage an insurgency against the government  On January 31, 2018, the U S  State Department designated Liwa al Thawra and HASM as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under Section 1(b) of Executive Order (E O ) 13224  The State Department noted that some of the leaders of both groups "were previously associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood " Terrorist attacks against key sectors of the economy continue  In December 2018, a bus carrying a group of Vietnamese tourists to the pyramids in Giza hit a roadside bomb killing 4 people and injuring 11 others  No group claimed responsibility for the attack  In February 2019, a terrorist detonated a suicide bomb he was carrying while being pursued by police, killing himself and two officers near Cairo's popular Khan el Khalili market and famous Al Azhar Mosque  Egypt and Israel have continued to find specific areas in which they can cooperate  In 2018, Israeli and Egyptian companies entered into a decade-long agreement by reaching a $15 billion natural gas deal, according to which Israeli off-shore natural gas will be exported to Egypt for liquefaction before being exported elsewhere (see " The Economy " above)  While people-to-people relations remain cold, Israel and Egypt continue to cooperate against Hamas in the Gaza Strip  In mid-November 2018, Egyptian mediation between Israel and Hamas helped calm tensions after an Israeli raid inside Gaza escalated tensions  Egypt reportedly continues to broker indirect Israel-Hamas talks aimed at establishing a long-term cease-fire  Egypt is opposed to Islamist groups wielding political power across the Middle East, and opposes Turkish and Qatari support for Hamas  On the Egyptian-Gaza border, Egypt has tried to thwart arms tunnel smuggling into Gaza and has accused Palestinian militants in Gaza of aiding terrorist groups in the Sinai  In order to weaken Hamas's rule in Gaza, Egypt has sought to restore a Palestinian Authority (PA) presence in Gaza by reconciling it with the PA  Though Egypt has helped broker several agreements aimed at ending the West Bank-Gaza split, Hamas still effectively controls Gaza  Egypt controls the Rafah border crossing into Gaza, the only non-Israeli-controlled entryway into the Strip, which it periodically closes for security reasons  Control over the Rafah border crossing provides Egypt with some leverage over Hamas, though Egyptian authorities use it carefully in order not to spark a humanitarian crisis on their border  Egypt's relations with most Gulf Arab monarchies are strong  Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait have provided billions of dollars in financial assistance to Egypt's military-backed government since 2013  Saudi Arabia also hosts nearly 3 million Egyptian expatriates who work in the kingdom, providing a valuable source of remittances for Egyptians back home  From 2013 onward, Emirati companies have made significant investments in the Egyptian economy  Egypt transferred sovereignty to Saudi Arabia over two islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba—Tiran and Sanafir—that had been under Egyptian control since 1950, in a move that sparked rare public criticism of President Sisi  In June 2017, Egypt joined other Gulf Arab monarchies in boycotting Qatar  In Yemen, Egypt is officially part of the Saudi-led coalition against Houthi forces, though its contribution to the war effort has been minimal  The Egyptian government supports Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) movement, which controls most of eastern Libya  Haftar's politics closely align with President Sisi's, as both figures hail from the military and broadly oppose Islamist political forces  From a security standpoint, Egypt seeks the restoration of order on its western border, which has experienced occasional terrorist attacks and arms smuggling  From an economic standpoint, thousands of Egyptian guest workers were employed in Libya's energy sector prior to unrest in Libya in 2011, and Egypt seeks their return to Libya and a resumption of the vital remittances those workers provided the Egyptian economy  Diplomatically, Egypt has tried to leverage its close ties to Haftar and the LNA in order to play the role of mediator between the LNA and Fayez al Sarraj, the Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya and Prime Minister of the U N -backed Government of National Accord
Report 2:  Serbia, another CEFTA signatory, is also an important export market  Bosnia's major exports include vehicle seats, raw materials, leather products, textiles, energy, and wood products  The EU is also Bosnia's primary source of foreign direct investment (FDI)  In 2016, 63% of Bosnia's FDI came from EU countries, with Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia the top sources  Serbia is also a significant source of FDI (16 3%)  However, Bosnia's fragmented legal and administrative structure create a challenging investment climate  Many relevant laws differ between the two entities  Corruption, entrenched economic interests, and political instability also deter investment  As a result, FDI amounts to just 2% of Bosnia's GDP, well below the Western Balkan average of 5%  Bosnia was the region's lowest-rated country in the World Bank's 2019 Ease of Doing Business Index  U S  and EU policymakers view the NATO and EU accession processes as a positive force for democratization and reform in the Western Balkans, including Bosnia  According to analysts, this assessment informed the United States' partial retreat from the region in the 2000s and 2010s  EU membership is one of the few policy issues for which there is relatively broad consensus among Bosnia's politicians and population  The EU's "fundamentals first" approach to enlargement in the Western Balkans frontloads the accession process with meeting the core requirements of having a democratic political system and functioning market economy; in Bosnia, the EU is currently focused on issues relating to the rule of law, public administration reform, and economic development  In 2016, Bosnia submitted its application to join the EU  Its current status is potential candidate , which entitles it to receive financial assistance from the EU's Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II (IPA II)  Between 2014 and 2020, Bosnia is expected to receive €552 million in IPA II allocations, making the EU Bosnia's largest source of foreign assistance  Many EU member states provide additional aid to Bosnia through domestic foreign assistance programs  Bosnia's EU membership prospects are uncertain  In a 2018 progress report, the European Commission (the EU's executive) flagged Bosnia's slow implementation of reforms, including the 2015 Reform Agenda (a flagship EU initiative in Bosnia) and numerous domestic and international court rulings (see "Legal Challenges," above)  Some analysts question whether Bosnia, under its current political system, would be capable of meeting the membership requirement of harmonizing domestic legislation with the many thousands of provisions in the acquis communautaire, the cumulative body of EU legislation, case law, and regulations  In comparison to EU membership, Bosnian leaders are more divided over the issue of joining NATO  These divisions largely fall along Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat/Bosniak lines  Bosnian Serb opposition is rooted in resentment over NATO's role in the Bosnian war, and may also reflect a desire to remain in lockstep with neighboring Serbia, which also does not seek NATO membership  Bosnia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 2006 and secured an Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2008  In 2010, NATO indicated that it would launch a Membership Action Plan (MAP)—a program to help aspiring members meet membership requirements—once Bosnia meets several conditions, the most challenging of which is the reregistration of permanent defense installations from entity to state-level government  RS officials have resisted ceding control over defense installations on entity territory  Although Bosnia does not yet meet these requirements, in December 2018 NATO foreign ministers invited Bosnia to activate its MAP by submitting its first Annual National Program  Some analysts interpreted this invitation as a gesture to generate reform momentum in Bosnia's fragile post-election period  The Bosniak and Croat members of the presidency responded positively, but Bosnian Serb leaders (and most Bosnian Serbs) do not want Bosnia to join NATO  In October 2017, the RS National Assembly passed a resolution supporting military neutrality  RS President Željka Cvijanović reiterated this stance after NATO's invitation, and Dodik—now a member of the state-level presidency—also has vowed to pursue military neutrality  Bosnia's relations with Croatia and Serbia are seen as an important component of regional stability  However, bilateral relations have often been fraught as a legacy of the Bosnian war, as well as sensitivities over Croatia and Serbia's relations with Bosnian Croats and Serbs  While democratic gains in Croatia and Serbia after 2000 contributed to improved relations with Bosnia, they remain reluctant to examine or acknowledge their role in the Bosnian war  At times, Bosnian leaders have objected to what they describe as Croatian and Serbian meddling in Bosnia's affairs  Ex-Bosnian Croat member of the presidency Dragan Čović and current Bosnian Serb member of the presidency Milorad Dodik draw support from leaders in Croatia and Serbia and reportedly hold Croatian and Serbian citizenship, respectively, alongside their Bosnian citizenship  The Croatian government financially and politically backed Čović in Bosnia's 2018 elections, and Croatian politicians have raised the issue of Bosnian Croats' constitutional challenges (see above, "Legal Challenges") in forums like the European Parliament, NATO, and the United Nations  These moves prompted three former High Representatives to Bosnia to issue a joint letter expressing alarm over Croatia's "meddling" in Bosnia's internal affairs  The Croatian government also challenged the legitimacy of Željko Komšić as the Croat member of the Bosnian presidency (see above, "2018 General Election")  Some parties in Croatia hold Croatian election campaign events on Bosnian territory to mobilize Bosnian Croat voters with dual citizenship to vote in Croatia's elections  The Serbian government likewise supports Dodik, who is a frequent visitor to Belgrade  Some Serbian politicians have made statements supporting convicted Bosnian Serb war criminals, inflaming an issue that remains highly sensitive in Bosnia  Bosnia and Serbia have an unresolved demarcation dispute over approximately 40 square kilometers of border area, including a railway segment and hydroelectric power stations  Bosnia has dual citizenship treaties with Croatia and Serbia, resulting in hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs acquiring dual citizenship  This has raised jurisdictional issues in cases in which indicted war criminals hold dual citizenship  Despite occasional tensions in their relations, Croatia and Serbia are important economic partners for Bosnia  Both countries are among Bosnia's top export markets and top sources of FDI  As part of its enlargement strategy in the Western Balkans, the EU has embraced a connectivity agenda to improve regional transportation, energy, and infrastructural linkages, reserving up to €1 billion in grants for projects for the period 2015-2020  Officials believe that improved connectivity could benefit bilateral relations and contribute to regional stability  Given its strategic location and relatively small, weak states, the Balkan region has long drawn in more powerful states  Many analysts maintain that as the United States and the European Union have both scaled back their presence in the Balkans to address other issues since the late 2000s, Russia, Turkey, and China partly filled the vacuum  U S  and EU officials have expressed concern over Russian influence in the Western Balkans, particularly after Russia occupied Ukraine's Crimea region in 2014  Many analysts maintain that Russia does not have a grand strategy in the Western Balkans, but rather aims to prevent Euro-Atlantic integration and shore up its claims to great power status by asserting itself in the EU's "inner courtyard " Analysts have identified several Russian tools in the region, including playing a "spoiler" role, projecting soft power, and leveraging energy dominance  Observers contend that Russia plays a "spoiler" role in Bosnia by exacerbating ethnic divisions, backing illiberal or anti-Western political factions, and helping to militarize RS  They claim that these actions help sustain the dysfunction and gridlock that undermine Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic reform efforts  Russia has supported Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat nationalist leaders Milorad Dodik and Dragan Čović  Dodik's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin just before Bosnia's October 7, 2018 general election was one of nearly ten meetings between the two over the past three years, signaling high-level Russian support  Many experts assert that Russia has been a key ally to Dodik in resisting Western pressure to cooperate on reforms  Moscow has also supported divisive RS policies  When Dodik violated a Bosnian Constitutional Court ruling in 2016 by holding a referendum to establish a controversial "Statehood Day," Russia stood apart from the High Representative and Western diplomats by supporting the initiative  More recently, Russia stated its support for RS's controversial Srebrenica commission (see above)  Analysts have also expressed concern at Russia's apparent support for Čović, who has advocated greater autonomy for Croats and the creation of a third Croat entity  Some analysts have expressed concern at Russia's role in RS's security sector  Russian forces have trained RS police special forces on counterterrorism and intelligence  Some observers believe that these exercises contribute to militarization in RS, potentially pushing the police force beyond its civilian law enforcement mandate  Analysts caution that militarization could increase the scale of violence in any confrontation between RS and the Bosnian government  Some Bosnian Serb ultranationalist and veterans groups have fought alongside pro-Russia combatants in Ukraine, and analysts believe they could be mobilized to support RS leaders as well  Russian soft power draws upon religious and cultural kinship with Bosnian Serbs, as well as Russia's history of support during the wars of Yugoslav disintegration  Kremlin-linked media, like Sputnik and RT , amplify existing anti-Western narratives and positively shape public opinion toward Russia  Some local media further propagate Sputnik and RT articles  A 2018 National Democratic Institute media study found that RS media stories about Russia were overwhelmingly positive, while the tone of most stories about the United States and NATO was negative  Pro-Russian media glorifies the Russian military, highlights cultural and religious links between Serbs and Russians, and documents high-level meetings between RS and Russian officials  Economic relations between Russia and RS have deepened in recent years  Russia is the largest source of FDI in RS, and it is largely concentrated in the energy sector  In 2007, Russian state-owned oil company Zarubezhneft bought RS's Bosanski Brod oil refinery, motor oil processing facilities in nearby Modrica, and retailer Banjaluka Petrol  Some analysts believe that these assets—which were purchased without an open tender—give Zarubezhneft influence in RS  In addition to being an important employer, Zarubezhneft is RS's biggest taxpayer; its value-added tax and excise duty contributions reportedly account for 25% of RS budget revenue  Bosnia depends upon Russian natural gas imports via Ukraine  Energy policy is vested in the entities, and Russian natural gas provider Gazprom reportedly has used its market dominance to pit the two entities against one another and undermine projects that would diversify supplies  Many analysts believe that Turkey's influence in Bosnia has increased over the last two decades due to Ankara's close relationship with Bosniak leaders  Some Turkish officials reportedly view Bosnia as a natural sphere of influence given geographic and historical connections  Observers note that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has at times invoked Ottoman-era ties to Bosnia and religious kinship with Bosniaks as soft power tools  Turkish influence in Bosnia has expanded since Yugoslavia's collapse  During the 1992-1995 war, Turkey gained prestige among Bosniaks by condemning the international arms embargo against Bosnia, arguing that it prevented Bosniaks from defending themselves  Turkey, as well as other predominantly Muslim countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, reportedly supplied Bosniak forces with arms  Turkish influence has continued since the war's end  Bosnia is one of the top recipients of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency assistance; much of this support is earmarked for projects to restore Ottoman-era buildings and monuments  A Turkish Cultural Center was established in Bosnia in 2003, and in 2009 the Yunus Emre Foundation, an NGO founded by the Turkish government, opened an office in Sarajevo to promote Turkish language and culture  Turkey has popular support among Bosniaks  In a 2018 International Republican Institute survey, 76% of Bosniak respondents had positive views of Turkey—the strongest support among Bosniaks for any foreign state  Many Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs look to Croatia and Serbia as external protectors, and some analysts believe that Turkey has attempted to establish a similar role for itself vis-à-vis Bosniaks  Observers contend that Erdogan's ruling party has particularly strong ties to the largest Bosniak ethnic party, the SDA  Erdogan and Turkish state-owned media openly supported SDA candidate Bakir Izetbegović in his bid for the Bosniak seat on the presidency in 2014  Some observers believe that Izetbegović's clout within the SDA rests in part on his support from Erdogan  Economic relations between Bosnia and Turkey have deepened in recent years  Turkish FDI in Bosnia accounted for 5 6% of FDI flows in 2016  One notable project is a highway to connect Sarajevo to Belgrade, Serbia  After years of disagreement, Bosnian officials approved the route in February 2019  Turkey is expected to provide funding for some of the expected €3 billion in costs, although the terms of the contract are not yet resolved  Some officials, including French President Emmanuel Macron, have expressed concern over Turkey's alleged ambitions as part of broader EU concern over external influence in the Balkans  However, analysts caution that Turkey's ambitions and capabilities in the Balkans may be overstated  They note that the scope of Turkish investment is sometimes exaggerated in the media, and that proposed projects do not always come to fruition  While Russian and Turkish influence in Bosnia relies in part on soft power, China's presence in Bosnia is primarily economic  Between 2011 and 2019, Chinese investments in Bosnia amounted to an estimated $3 6 billion, primarily in the form of direct lending for energy and transportation projects  Chinese firms have contracts to construct or expand energy plants, including a €350 million loan to construct a coal-fired plant in Stanari, RS  A €1 4 billion deal was signed to construct a highway between Banja Luka and Mlinište  In March 2019, the EU Energy Community criticized the FBiH entity government's decision to guarantee a €600 million loan from China's Exim Bank to build a coal-fired power plant in Tuzla  However, some analysts caution that China's economic influence in Bosnia may be overstated at present  While China's pledged investments in high-visibility projects garner media attention, the actual amount of Chinese FDI is far less than that of the EU  Moreover, many pledged projects do not come to fruition  Nevertheless, EU and U S  officials have voiced concern over the scope of China's investments in the Balkans, as well as Chinese lending practices  Chinese loans often require recipient state governments to assume the loan burden, potentially leading to high external debt  The EU has also raised concerns that Chinese lending practices violate EU rules in public procurement because they frequently require use of Chinese contractors, laborers, or supplies  In contrast to EU funds, which are partly designed to spur reform, Chinese loans have few conditions and rules linked to transparency or reform  Finally, EU officials have expressed concern that China's economic might could be a source of leverage over recipient states that are candidates or potential candidates for EU membership and thus impede the EU's ability to speak with one voice on relations with China if they do become members  Bosnia was not a core transit country in the "Balkan Route" that hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees followed in an attempt to reach the EU during heightened flows in 2015 and early 2016  However, recent route shifts have brought more migrant and refugee traffic through Bosnia  Since early 2018, an estimated 23,000 migrants and refugees have entered Bosnia; approximately 25% of them remain in the country  Most of them hope to enter EU territory via Bosnia's neighbor, Croatia, and from there move on and enter the EU's visa- and passport-free Schengen Area  However, the Croatian government has expanded border policing, and apprehended individuals are sent back to Bosnia  The EU provided €2 million in 2018 to help Bosnia respond to the crisis and provide shelter to migrants and refugees who are effectively stranded in Bosnia  The migration crisis has triggered a backlash from some Bosnians, particularly in Una-Sana Canton, which borders Croatia and has the highest concentration of migrants and refugees  Some residents of Bihać, Una-Sana's administrative center, protested against camps situated in their municipality in October 2018, while local authorities in Velika Kladuša, another city in the canton, reportedly obstructed the Ministry of Security's plans to house migrants in a local building  The incident illustrates local backlash as well as the state-level government's difficulty enforcing its decisions, even when it has jurisdiction  Islam was introduced to part of Bosnia's population during Ottoman rule  In socialist Yugoslavia, the semi-official Islamic Religious Community played a key role in religious affairs, including legal rulings and religious education  It was renamed the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, and remains an important religious institution  Islamic tradition in the Balkans, including Bosnia, is generally moderate and secular  The majority of Bosnia's practicing Muslims follow the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam  However, some analysts have expressed concern over the emergence of groups influenced or funded by state and non-state entities in the Arab Gulf states, where more conservative Hanbali Sunni practices are common  Aid workers, missionaries, and "mujahedeen" fighters from the Gulf States promoted transnational Islamist militancy and Salafist Hanbali religious doctrine during Bosnia's 1992-1995 war; Iran's government also supported Bosniak leaders and forces  After the war, Saudi Arabia provided an estimated $600 million in aid to repair and build hundreds of mosques and establish schools and cultural centers that promote socially conservative Sunni views  Iran has also maintained active cultural outreach and other ties to some Bosnian Muslims  Many analysts contend that Salafi groups have limited support in Bosnia because of the traditionally high level of secularism among Bosnian Muslims  They also note that few Bosnian Muslims who subscribe to Salafist ideas and practices have violent intentions, and many of them live in remote rural communities  While most of these groups were not originally affiliated with official religious organizations in Bosnia, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia's Islamic Community exerted pressure on them to acknowledge his authority and his right to monitor religious content  As a result, an estimated 90% of Salafi groups were brought under official structures  Nevertheless, some experts caution that radicalized groups and individuals may pose a terrorist threat despite their small numbers  Radicalized Muslims were implicated in the bombing of a police station in Bugojno in 2010 and a lone-gunman attack on the U S  Embassy in Sarajevo in 2011  The Islamic State (IS) and Nusra Front's gains in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s altered the dynamic of the terrorism threat in Bosnia and broadened the use of social media in recruitment  Between 2012 and 2017, an estimated 350 Bosnian citizens traveled from Bosnia or Bosnian diaspora communities to fight with armed groups in Iraq and Syria  More recently, returned foreign fighters are seen as a potential threat as the position of the IS and other armed groups has weakened  Bosnia's stock of illegal weapons, mines, and explosives may exacerbate the risk posed by returnees  As of December 2017, officials believed that just over 100 Bosnians remained in Syria (including women and children), roughly 50 had returned to Bosnia, and 70 had been killed in the conflict  In 2014, the Bosnian government introduced new criminal offenses to prosecute foreign terrorist fighters and recruiters  Several dozen returned fighters and domestic recruiters have been convicted of these offenses  While the U S  State Department describes Bosnia as a "cooperative counterterrorism partner," it warns that Bosnia's political fragmentation and dysfunction could undermine counterterrorism efforts  For example, in 2017 several ministries proposed new measures to tighten counterterrorism efforts; however, they were not enacted due to political gridlock in state-level and FBiH governments  Initially viewed as a "European problem," the Bosnian conflict eventually helped shape the post-Cold War role of the United States and NATO in European security  When the United States assumed greater responsibilities in resolving the conflict, its role was considerable: leading NATO airstrikes, garnering diplomatic support from Russia and European allies, persuading warring parties to agree to a ceasefire, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement, and deploying 20,000 troops to Bosnia  According to Richard Holbrooke, the U S  official who brokered the talks, the Bosnian war was a pivotal period in U S  foreign policy in Europe: "The three main pillars of [policy]—U S -Russian relations, NATO enlargement into Central Europe, and Bosnia—had often worked against each other  Now they reinforced each other: NATO sent its forces out of area for the first time in its history, and Russian troops, under an American commander, were deployed alongside them " Some analysts and policymakers believe that the United States' strong hand in resolving the conflict and in shaping Bosnia's political system have made it a stakeholder in Bosnia's future  U S  officials, often in cooperation with the EU, have intervened to defuse crises and broker reform talks  The United States also has imposed sanctions against Bosnian officials: in addition to Dodik (see above), the U S  State Department publicly designated Bosnian Serb politician Nikola Špirić (Dodik's associate) for "significant corruption or gross violation of human rights " U S  policymakers attach strategic importance to Bosnia's stability; many analysts believe turbulence in Bosnia could reverberate in the Balkans and potentially draw in Croatia and Serbia, while instability in other parts of the region could spill over into Bosnia  When the Trump Administration indicated in 2018 that it would consider supporting a potential Serbia-Kosovo agreement to "adjust borders" between the two—a major break with the long-standing EU and U S  policy to oppose redrawing borders in the Balkans along ethnic lines—some analysts expressed concern that the Administration could reshape long-standing U S  policy toward Bosnia  However, the new U S  Ambassador to Bosnia stated in February 2019 that the U S  will continue to be "guarantor of Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty and territorial integrity " On the other hand, many observers also note that U S  engagement in Bosnia (and the Western Balkans) decreased under the administrations of President George W  Bush and President Barack Obama  During this time U S  policymakers turned their focus to geopolitical crises and challenges in other parts of the globe while ceding the regional lead to the EU  Indeed, some analysts have urged the United States to assume a greater role in Bosnia, arguing that Bosnia's current crises warrant it, and that the EU and the United States are more effective in the region when they work together  Congressional interest in Bosnia dates back to the 1992-1995 war  Many Members featured prominently in foreign policy debates over U S  intervention in the conflict  In 2015, the House passed a resolution describing the Srebrenica massacres as a genocide and urging the United States to continue to support Bosnia's territorial integrity ( H Res  310 , 114 th Congress)  In the 114 th and 115 th Congresses, a bill was introduced in the Senate to establish an enterprise fund to promote economic development and the private sector in Bosnia ( S  2307 and S  864 )  In April 2018, the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats held a hearing on Bosnia's prospects ahead of its October 2018 elections  Congress's engagement with Bosnia also continues within the broader context of policy concern over the external influence of China, Turkey, and Russia in the Western Balkans and energy security  As a potential candidate for EU membership and NATO partner, Bosnia is eligible for assistance through the Countering Russian Influence Funds under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) enacted in 2017 ( P L  115-44 )  Through congressionally approved (and sometimes expanded) foreign assistance appropriations, Bosnia has received more than $2 billion in aid since 1995  Between 1996 and 1999, the United States pledged $1 billion of the $4 billion international commitment to implementing Dayton's civilian provisions and helping to rebuild Bosnia  The cost of U S  military operations in Bosnia since 1992 is estimated at more than $10 billion ( Appendix I )  Bosnia continues to receive U S  foreign assistance, although the amount has decreased in recent years  Assistance to Bosnia in FY2015 and FY2016 was approximately $33 million each year  In FY2017, it was $53 5 million, and $41 5 million in FY2018  The Administration requested $21 million for FY2019 and $16 9 million for FY2020  Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia faces many challenges  In considering U S  relations with Bosnia, Members of Congress may consider the following questions: How can the United States encourage Bosnia's government to incorporate the legal rulings of the Bosnian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights into election legislation and the constitution? How can U S  foreign assistance be used to counter Russian influence in Republika Srpska, in particular Russia's close ties to Bosnian Serb politicians and its use of local media and Sputnik to amplify anti-U S  narratives and project pro-Russia soft power? What are the implications of potential militarization in Republika Srpska? How can the United States effectively address this alleged trend? How can the United States support a successful reform initiative that secures transparency and accountability, and facilitates a political community in which politicians and voters are committed to the Bosnian state and socioeconomic challenges that transcend all three ethnic groups? Can the Germany-U K  initiative from 2015 be revived, or is it better to start from scratch? Are the approximately 600 troops in the European Union Force mission in Bosnia sufficient to stabilize Bosnia if violence breaks out? If Serbia and Kosovo agree to normalize relations by redrawing their borders, how can U S  policymakers prevent this development from destabilizing Bosnia, particularly given Milorad Dodik's threats to seek RS secession if Kosovo is "partitioned"? How can the United States encourage Croatia and Serbia to engage in Bosnia in a manner that helps bridge ethnic divisions and contributes to Bosnia's territorial integrity and sovereignty? Given the pervasiveness of corruption in Bosnia, how can U S  assistance most effectively be used to counter it? Does foreign assistance contribute to civic groups and independent media that could serve as a check against corruption? 

ground_truth: Previous attempted and successful terrorist attacks against the United States have raised questions about the security of the U.S. government's process for adjudicating NIVs, which are issued to foreign nationals, such as tourists, business visitors, and students, seeking temporary admission into the United States. For example, the December 2015 shootings in San Bernardino, California, led to concerns about NIV screening and vetting processes because one of the attackers was admitted into the United States under a NIV. In 2017, the President issued executive actions directing agencies to improve visa screening and vetting, and establishing nationality-based visa entry restrictions, which the Supreme Court upheld in June 2018. GAO was asked to review NIV screening and vetting. This report examines (1) outcomes and characteristics of adjudicated NIV applications from fiscal years 2012 through 2017, and (2) key changes made to the NIV adjudication process in response to executive actions taken in 2017. GAO analyzed State NIV adjudication data for fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the most recent and complete data available. GAO visited seven consular posts selected based on visa workload and other factors. GAO reviewed relevant executive orders and proclamations, and documents related to implementing these actions. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in June 2018. Information that DHS, State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence deemed sensitive has been removed. The total number of nonimmigrant visa (NIV) applications that Department of State (State) consular officers adjudicated annually peaked at about 13.4 million in fiscal year 2016, and decreased by about 880,000 adjudications in fiscal year 2017. NIV adjudications varied by visa group, country of nationality, and refusal reason: Visa group. From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, about 80 percent of NIV adjudications were for tourists and business visitors. During this time, adjudications for temporary workers increased by about 50 percent and decreased for students and exchange visitors by about 2 percent. Country of nationality. In fiscal year 2017, more than half of all NIV adjudications were for applicants of six countries of nationality: China (2.02 million, or 16 percent), Mexico (1.75 million, or 14 percent), India (1.28 million, or 10 percent), Brazil (670,000, or 5 percent), Colombia (460,000, or 4 percent), and Argentina (370,000, or 3 percent). Refusal reason. State data indicate that over this time period, 18 percent of adjudicated applications were refused; more than 90 percent were because the applicant did not qualify for the visa sought, and a small percentage (0.05 percent) were due to terrorism and security-related concerns. In 2017, two executive orders and a proclamation issued by the President required, among other actions, visa entry restrictions for nationals of certain listed countries of concern, the development of uniform baseline screening and vetting standards, and changes to NIV screening and vetting procedures. GAO's analysis of State data indicates that, out of the nearly 2.8 million NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017, 1,338 applications were refused due to visa entry restrictions implemented per the executive actions. State, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and others developed standards for screening and vetting by the U.S. government for all immigration benefits, such as for the requirement for applicants to undergo certain security checks. Further, State sought and received emergency approval from the Office of Management and Budget in May 2017 to develop a new form to collect additional information from some visa applicants, such as email addresses and social media handles.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Several U S  agencies have roles and responsibilities related to the screening and vetting of NIV applicants, as shown in table 1  Key Visa Adjudication Process Terms Validity period: The length of time during which a nonimmigrant visa (NIV) is valid for use by a foreign national seeking to travel to a U S  port of entry and apply for admission into the United States  Entries: The number of applications for admission into the country permitted under a single NIV  Reciprocity arrangements: An understanding or arrangement between the U S  government and another country on the length of time visas issued by either or both nations are valid for admission  There are many NIVs, and for the purposes of this report, we have placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups, as shown in table 2  The validity period and number of entries varies depending on (1) the particular NIV and (2) reciprocity arrangement with an individual’s country of nationality, among other factors  For example, a foreign national of one country may be issued a tourist visa valid for 1 year that allows for a single U S  entry, while a foreign national of another country may be issued a tourist visa valid for 5 years and that permits multiple entries  However, the authorized period of stay—that is, the amount of time that the nonimmigrant is permitted to remain in the United States after being admitted—has no relation to the validity period  For more information on the various NIVs, see appendix I  State is generally responsible for the adjudication of NIV applications, and manages the NIV application process, including the consular officer corps and its functions at more than 220 visa-issuing posts overseas  Depending on various factors, such as the particular NIV sought, the applicant’s background, and visa demand, State officials noted that the length of the visa adjudication process can vary from a single day to months  This screening and vetting process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains several steps, as shown in figure 1: Petitions  Prior to State’s adjudication process, some NIVs require applicants to first obtain an approved petition from U S  Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), as shown in table 3  For example, applicants seeking an employment-based NIV or a U S  citizen’s foreign national fiancé(e) seeking U S  entry to conclude a valid marriage, must obtain an approved petition from USCIS prior to applying for their NIV  The petitioner (i e , a U S  citizen, organization or business entity) completes the petition on behalf of the applicant (i e , the beneficiary), and the petition would be submitted to a U S -based USCIS service center for adjudication  USCIS Background Checks  As part of the adjudication process for visas requiring a USCIS-approved petition before the NIV application is submitted to State, USCIS conducts background checks on U S - based petitioners and foreign beneficiaries  For example, petitioner and beneficiary information is screened against TECS—DHS’s principal law enforcement and antiterrorism database that includes enforcement, inspection, and operational records  Further, for U S  citizens petitioning for a K-1 visa on behalf of their fiancé(e), an FBI fingerprint check may also be required of the U S  citizen petitioner  If the background checks identify a potential match to derogatory information, the background check unit at the USCIS service center that received the petition is to conduct further research to confirm the match, such as running checks against other government systems and collaborating with other government agencies  If all background check hits have been resolved and documented, and there is no reason not to proceed, USCIS will adjudicate the petition  In fiscal year 2017, USCIS reported that it received about 640,000 petitions for NIVs, and approved over 550,000  NIV Application  After having obtained USCIS approval of the NIV petition, as applicable, the foreign national begins the consular process by completing an online NIV application, known as a DS-160  Upon submitting an application, the applicant can schedule an interview at a post overseas and pays the processing fee  Key Visa Adjudication Process Terms Inadmissible: Individuals are inadmissible to the United States if they fall within the classes of foreign nationals defined as such under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, Pub  L  No  82-414, tit  II, ch  2, § 212(a), 66 Stat  163, 182-87 (1952) (classified, as amended, at 8 U S C  § 1182(a)), such as foreign nationals who have engaged in terrorist or criminal activities or previously violated U S  immigration law  If a visa applicant is found inadmissible, and has not obtained a waiver from the Department of Homeland Security, the applicant would be statutorily ineligible for a visa  Ineligible: An individual is ineligible for a visa if it appears to the Department of State consular officer, based on the application or supporting documentation, that the applicant is not qualified to receive a visa under any provision of law  If the consular officer decides that an applicant is ineligible for visa issuance, the refusal may be based on statutory grounds of inadmissibility under INA § 212(a), or may be due to the individual’s failure to otherwise satisfy the applicable eligibility requirements for the particular visa, as defined in the INA  For example, a consular officer may refuse a J-1 exchange visitor visa to an applicant coming to the United States to perform services as a member of the medical profession if the applicant does not either demonstrate competency in oral and written English or hold a degree from an accredited school of medicine, as required of such visa applicants under INA § 212(j)  eligibility concerns related to visa applicants  Prior to adjudicating the visa application, consular officers must review all such security check results  Some applicants are not subjected to all of the security checks depending on certain characteristics, such as age and visa category  For example, State does not generally require that fingerprints be collected for applicants who are either under 14 years old or over 79 years old, or for foreign government officials seeking certain visas  As needed, some applicants undergo an interagency review process called a security advisory opinion (SAO), which is a multi-agency, U S-based review process for certain NIV applicants  For example, SAOs are mandatory in cases of certain security check hits, a foreign national’s background, or a foreign national’s intention while in the United States  In addition, consular officers have the discretion to request an SAO for any visa applicant  Through the SAO process, consular officers send additional information on applicants to U S - based agencies, who review that information against their holdings  Department of State data indicate that consular officers made over 180,000 requests for SAOs for NIV applicants in fiscal year 2017  Adjudication  If the consular officer determines that the applicant is eligible for the visa on the basis of the application, supporting documentation, and other relevant information such as statements made in an interview, he or she will take the applicant’s passport for final processing, but the visa cannot be printed until all security checks have been returned and reviewed  If the consular officer determines that the applicant is inadmissible to the United States or otherwise ineligible under the applicable visa eligibility criteria, he or she informs the applicant that the visa has been refused, and identifies the provision(s) of law under which the visa was refused  Recurrent vetting  In March 2010, shortly after the December 2009 attempted bombing by a foreign national traveling to the United States on a valid visa, CBP began vetting individuals with NIVs on a recurrent basis  This program has led State to revoke visas after they have been issued when information was later discovered that rendered the individual inadmissible to the United States or otherwise ineligible for the visa  In addition, CBP analysts may take other actions as needed after identifying new derogatory information, such as recommending that the airline deny boarding to the traveler because the traveler is likely to be deemed inadmissible upon arrival in the United States (known as a no-board recommendation) or making a referral to ICE, which may seek to remove the individual if already within the United States  According to NCTC, KFE also conducts recurrent vetting of NIV holders against emerging threat information  The total number of NIV applications that consular officers adjudicated annually (or, NIV adjudications) peaked at about 13 4 million in fiscal year 2016, which was an increase of approximately 30 percent since fiscal year 2012  In fiscal year 2017, NIV adjudications decreased by about 880,000 adjudications, or about 7 percent  Figure 2 shows the number of applications adjudicated each year from fiscal year 2012 through 2017  Appendix II includes additional data on NIV adjudications related to this and the other figures in this report  Annual Monthly Trends  State data from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 indicate that NIV adjudications generally followed an annual cycle, ebbing during certain months during the fiscal year; however, adjudications in fiscal year 2017 departed slightly from this trend  Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the number of NIV adjudications typically peaked in the summer months  State officials noted that the summer peak is generally due to international students who are applying for their visas for the coming academic year  However, in fiscal year 2017, the summer months did not experience a similar increase from previous months, departing from the trend over the previous five fiscal years, according to State data  Instead, NIV adjudications peaked in December of fiscal year 2017  State officials attributed some of the decline in fiscal year 2017 to a decrease in Chinese NIV applicants, which we discuss later in this report  Figure 3 shows monthly NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  State data on NIV applications adjudicated from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 indicate that the number of adjudications by visa group, applicant’s country of nationality, and location of adjudication were generally consistent, with some exceptions  Visa Group  From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, about 80 percent of NIV adjudications were for tourist and business visitors as shown in figure 4  The next largest groups were visas for students and exchange visitors and temporary workers, which accounted for an average of 9 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of all adjudications during this time period  Although adjudications for visas in some categories increased, others decreased over time  For example, as shown in figure 5, NIV adjudications for temporary workers increased by approximately 50 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (592,000 to 885,000)  During the same time period, adjudications for tourist and business visitors also increased by approximately 20 percent overall (from 8 18 million to 9 97 million), but decreased from fiscal years 2016 to 2017  However, NIV adjudications for student and exchange visitor visas decreased by about 2 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (1 01 million to 993,000) overall, but experienced a peak in fiscal year 2015 of 1 2 million  Appendix I includes additional information on NIV adjudication by visa group from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  State officials identified reasons to explain these trends: Temporary Workers  Although there was an increase in adjudications across all types of temporary worker visas, the largest percentage increase was for H-2A visas, which are for foreign workers seeking to perform agricultural services of a temporary or seasonal nature  Specifically, adjudications of H-2A visas increased by 140 percent from fiscal years 2012 to 2017 (from about 71,000 to 170,000)  State officials noted that H-2A visas are not numerically limited by statute  Further, State officials stated that they believe U S  employers are increasingly less likely to hire workers without lawful status and are petitioning for lawfully admitted workers, which in part led to an increase in H-2A visa demand  Tourist and Business Visitors  State officials partly attributed the overall changes to tourist and business visitor visas to the extension of the validity period of such visas for Chinese nationals, which represented the largest single country of nationality for tourist and business visitor visas in fiscal year 2017 (17 7 percent)  In November 2014, the United States and the People’s Republic of China reciprocally increased the validity periods of multiple-entry tourist and business visitor visas issued to each other’s citizens for up to 10 years  The change in policy was intended to support improved trade, investment, and business by facilitating travel between the two countries  According to State officials, extending validity periods can create an initial increase in demand for such visas, followed by a period of stabilization or even decline as NIV holders would be required to apply for renewal less frequently  According to State officials, in early fiscal year 2015, the increase in the validity period to 10 years for such visas created a spike in Chinese demand in fiscal year 2015, and by fiscal year 2016, the initial demand for these visas had been met and Chinese economic growth was simultaneously slowing, resulting in fewer adjudications for such visas in fiscal year 2017  State data for this time period indicate that the number of adjudications for tourist and business visitor visas for Chinese nationals increased from 1 58 million in fiscal year 2014 to 2 54 million in fiscal year 2015, followed by a decline to 2 34 million in fiscal year 2016 and 1 76 million in fiscal year 2017  Student and Exchange Visitors  Similar to tourist and business visitors, State officials partly attributed the overall changes in student and exchange visitor visa adjudications to the extension of the validity period of such visas for Chinese nationals, which represented the largest single country of nationality for student and exchange visitor visas in fiscal year 2017 (19 percent)  In November 2014, the United States extended the validity period of the F visa for academic students from 1 year to 5 years  State officials noted that similar to tourist and business visitor visas, there was an initial surge in Chinese F-visa applicants due to the new 5-year F-visa validity period that began in fiscal year 2015, but the number dropped subsequently because Chinese students with such 5-year visas no longer needed to apply as frequently for F visas  State data for this time period indicate that the number of visa adjudications for F visas for Chinese nationals increased from about 267,000 in fiscal year 2014 to 301,000 in fiscal year 2015, followed by a decline of 172,000 in fiscal year 2016 and 134,000 in fiscal year 2017  Applicant’s Country of Nationality  In fiscal year 2017, more than half of all NIV adjudications were for applicants of six countries of nationality: China (2 02 million, or 16 percent), Mexico (1 75 million, or 14 percent), India (1 28 million, or 10 percent), Brazil (670,000, or 5 percent), Colombia (460,000, or 4 percent), and Argentina (370,000, or 3 percent), as shown in figure 6  Location of Adjudication  State data indicate that the geographic distribution of NIV adjudications across visa-issuing posts worldwide remained relatively consistent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV adjudications from visa-issuing posts in the Western Hemisphere comprised the largest proportion worldwide during this time period; however, this proportion decreased from 48 8 percent in fiscal year 2012 to 41 7 percent in fiscal year 2017  During the same time period, the proportion of NIV adjudications at visa-issuing posts in other regions increased slightly  For example, the percentage of NIV adjudications from posts in Africa increased from 3 8 percent to 5 5 percent, and the percentage of adjudications from posts in South and Central Asia increased from 7 9 percent to 11 2 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Figure 7 provides the proportion of NIV adjudications at visa- issuing posts from each region from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  The percentage of NIVs refused—known as the refusal rate—increased from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, and was about the same in fiscal year 2017 as the previous year  As shown in figure 8, the NIV refusal rate rose from about 14 percent in fiscal year 2012 to about 22 percent in fiscal year 2016, and remained about the same in fiscal year 2017; averaging about 18 percent over the time period  As a result, the total number of NIVs issued peaked in fiscal year 2015 at about 10 89 million, before falling in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 to 10 38 million and 9 68 million, respectively  The NIV refusal rate can fluctuate from year to year due to many factors  For example, according to State officials, removing a large, highly- qualified set of travelers from the NIV applicant population can drive up the statistical refusal rate  State officials also noted that when a country joins the Visa Waiver Program or a visa for certain nationalities increase from 1-year to 10-year visa validity periods, these individuals no longer apply for visas and affect the overall refusal rate  Further, State officials noted that changes in political and economic conditions in individual countries can affect visa eligibility, which in turn affects the overall refusal rate  State officials noted that the degree to which an applicant might seek to travel to the United States unlawfully is directly related to political, economic, and social conditions in their countries  For example, if global or regional economic conditions deteriorate, more applicants may have an incentive to come to the United States illegally by, for example, obtaining a NIV with the intent to unlawfully stay for a particular time period or purpose other than as permitted by their visa, which then would increase the number of NIV applications that consular officers are refusing  From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the refusal rate varied by visa group  The highest refusal rate was for tourists and business visitors, which rose from about 15 percent in fiscal year 2012 to over 25 percent in fiscal year 2017, as shown in figure 9  Other visa categories, such as foreign officials and employees, transit and crewmembers, and fiancé(e)s and spouses, had refusal rates below 5 percent during this time period  State officials noted that because different visa categories have different eligibility and documentary requirements, they have different refusal rates  For example, F, J, and H visas require documentation of eligibility for student, exchange, or employment status, respectively  According to State data, while the majority of NIV refusals from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 were a result of consular officers finding the applicants ineligible, a relatively small number of refusals were due to terrorism and other security-related concerns  NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U S  immigration law and State policy  For the purposes of this report, we have grouped most of these grounds for refusal into one of seven categories, as shown in table 4  State data indicate the more than 90 percent of NIVs refused each year from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 were based on the consular officers’ determination that the applicants were ineligible nonimmigrants—in other words, the consular officers believed that the applicant was an intending immigrant seeking to stay permanently in the United States, which would generally violate NIV conditions, or that the applicant otherwise failed to demonstrate eligibility for the particular visa he or she was seeking  For example, an applicant applying for a student visa could be refused as an ineligible nonimmigrant for failure to demonstrate possession of sufficient funds to cover his or her educational expenses as required  Similarly, an applicant could be refused as an ineligible nonimmigrant for indicating to the consular officer an intention to obtain a student visa to engage in unsanctioned activities while in the United States, such as full-time employment instead of pursuing an approved course of study  According to State data, the second most common reason for refusal during this time period was inadequate documentation, which accounted for approximately 5 percent of refusals each year  In such cases, a consular officer determined that the application failed to include necessary documentation for the consular officer to ascertain whether the applicant was eligible to receive a visa at that time  If, for example, the applicant provides sufficient additional information in support of the application, a consular officer may subsequently issue the visa, as appropriate  Our analysis of State data indicates that relatively few applicants— approximately 0 05 percent—were refused for terrorism and other security-related reasons from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Security- related reasons can include applicants who have engaged in genocide, espionage, or torture, among other grounds  Terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility include when an applicant has engaged in or incited terrorist activity, is a member of a terrorist organization, or is the child or spouse of a foreign national who has been found inadmissible based on terrorist activity occurring within the last five years, among other reasons  As shown in figure 10, in fiscal year 2017, State data indicate that 1,256 refusals (or 0 05 percent) were based on terrorism and other security-related concerns, of which 357 refusals were specifically for terrorism-related reasons  In calendar year 2017, the President issued two executive orders and a presidential proclamation that required, among other actions, visa entry restrictions for nationals of certain countries of concern, a review of information needed for visa adjudication, and changes to visa (including NIV) screening and vetting protocols and procedures (see timeline in figure 11)  Initially, the President issued Executive Order 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States (EO-1), in January 2017  In March 2017, the President revoked and replaced EO-1 with the issuance of Executive Order 13780 (EO-2), which had the same title as EO-1  Among other things, EO-2 suspended entry of certain foreign nationals for a 90 day period, subject to exceptions and waivers  It further directed federal agencies—including DHS, State, DOJ and ODNI—to review information needs from foreign governments for visa adjudication and develop uniform screening and vetting standards for U S  entities to follow when adjudicating immigration benefits, including NIVs  In September 2017, as a result of the reviews undertaken pursuant to EO-2, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Proclamation), which imposes certain conditional restrictions and limitations on the entry of nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen—into the United States for an indefinite period  These restrictions are to remain in effect until the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State determine that a country provides sufficient information for the United States to assess adequately whether its nationals pose a security or safety threat  Challenges to both EOs and the Proclamation have affected their implementation and, while EO-2’s entry restrictions have expired, the visa entry restrictions outlined in the Proclamation continue to be fully implemented as of June 2018, consistent with the U S  Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the President may lawfully establish nationality-based entry restrictions under the INA, and that Proclamation 9645 itself “is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority ” A more detailed listing of the executive actions and related challenges to those actions brought in the federal courts can be found in appendix III  Our analysis of State data indicates, out of the nearly 2 8 million NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017, 1,338 were refused due to visa entry restrictions implemented in accordance with the executive actions  To implement the entry restrictions, in March 2017, State directed its consular officers to continue to accept all NIV applications and determine whether the applicant was otherwise eligible for a visa without regard to the applicable EO or Proclamation  If the applicant was ineligible for the visa on grounds unrelated to the executive action, such as having prior immigration violations, the applicant was to be refused on those grounds  If the applicant was otherwise eligible for the visa, but fell within the scope of the nationality-specific visa restrictions implemented pursuant to the applicable EO or Proclamation and was not eligible for a waiver or exception, the consular officer was to refuse the visa and enter a refusal code into State’s NIV database indicating that the applicant was refused solely due to the executive actions  More than 90 percent of the NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017 pursuant to an executive action were for tourist and business visitor visas, and more than 5 percent were for students and exchange visitors  State data also indicate that the number of applications adjudicated for nationals of the 7 countries identified in EO-1—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen—decreased by 22 percent in fiscal year 2017, as compared to a 7 percent general decrease in NIV adjudications worldwide that year  For example, as shown in table 5, the decrease in adjudications from fiscal years 2016 to 2017 for nationals of the 7 countries identified in EO-1 ranged from around 12 percent to more than 40 percent  As directed by the executive actions, DHS, State, DOJ, and ODNI took several steps to enhance NIV screening and vetting processes given their responsibilities for implementing the presidential actions  Among other things, the responsibilities included: (1) a review of information needed for visa adjudication; (2) the development of uniform screening standards for immigration programs; and (3) implementation of enhanced visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures  Review of information needed for visa adjudication  In accordance with EO-2, DHS conducted a worldwide review, in consultation with State and ODNI, to identify additional information needed from foreign countries to determine that an individual is not a security or public-safety threat when adjudicating an application for a visa, admission, or other immigration benefit  According to State officials, an interagency working group composed of State, DHS, ODNI, and National Security Council staff was formed to conduct the review  To conduct this review, DHS developed a set of criteria for information sharing in support of immigration screening and vetting, as shown by table 6  According to DHS officials, to develop these criteria, DHS, in coordination with other agencies, identified current standards and best practices for information collection and sharing under various categories of visas to create a core list of information needed from foreign governments in the visa adjudication process  For example, State sent an information request to all U S  posts overseas requesting information on host nations’ information sharing practices, according to State officials  To assess the extent to which countries were meeting the newly established criteria, DHS officials stated that they used various information sources to preliminarily develop a list of countries that were or were not meeting the standards for adequate information sharing  For example, DHS officials stated that they reviewed information from INTERPOL on a country’s frequency of reporting lost and stolen passport information, consulted with ODNI for information on which countries are terrorist safe havens, and worked with State to obtain information that State officials at post may have on host nations’ information sharing practices  According to the Proclamation, based on DHS assessments of each country, DHS reported to the President on July 9, 2017, that 47 countries were “inadequate” or “at risk” of not meeting the standards  DHS officials identified several reasons that a country may have been assessed as “inadequate” with regard to the criteria  For example, some countries may have been willing to provide information, but lacked the capacity to do so  Or, some countries may not have been willing to provide certain information, or simply did not currently have diplomatic relations with the U S  government  As was required by EO-2, State engaged with foreign governments on their respective performance based on these criteria for a 50-day period  In July 2017, State directed its posts to inform their respective host governments of the new information sharing criteria and request that host governments provide the required information or develop a plan to do so  Posts were directed to then engage more intensively with countries DHS’s report preliminarily deemed “inadequate” or “at risk”  Each post was to submit an assessment of mitigating factors or specific interests that should be considered in the deliberations regarding any travel restrictions for nationals of those countries  DHS officials stated that they reviewed the additional information host nations provided to State and then reevaluated the initial classifications to determine if any countries remained “inadequate ” On September 15, 2017, in accordance with EO-2, DHS submitted to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a presidential proclamation that would prohibit certain categories of foreign nationals of such countries from entering the United States  The countries listed were Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen— which were assessed as “inadequate,” and Somalia, which was identified as a terrorist safe haven  The Presidential Proclamation indefinitely suspended entry into the United States of certain nonimmigrants from the listed countries (see table 7) and directed DHS, in consultation with State, to devise a process to assess whether the entry restrictions should be continued, modified or terminated  In September 2017, State issued additional guidance to posts on implementation of the Presidential Proclamation  As of July 2018, State continues to accept and process the NIV applications of foreign nationals from the eight countries covered by the Proclamation  Such applicants are to be interviewed, according to State guidance, and consular officers are to determine if the applicant is otherwise eligible for the visa, meets any of the proclamation’s exceptions, or qualifies for a waiver  Development of uniform screening standards for U S  immigration benefit programs  Consistent with EO-2, State, DHS, DOJ, and ODNI developed a uniform baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures by the U S  government  According to State officials, an interagency working group comprised of State, DHS, DOJ, and ODNI staff is implementing these requirements  Based on its review of existing screening and vetting processes, DHS officials stated that the working group established uniform standards for (1) applications, (2) interviews, and (3) security system checks (i e , biographic and biometric)  Regarding applications, DHS officials stated that the group identified data elements against which applicants are to be screened and vetted  In February 2018, DHS Office of Policy officials stated that they had taken steps to create more consistency across U S  government forms that collect information used for screening and vetting purposes, such as State’s DS-160 NIV application as well as 12 DHS forms  For example, officials stated that they anticipate issuing Federal Register notices announcing the intended changes to such forms  Regarding interviews, DHS officials stated that the working group established a requirement for all applicants seeking an immigration benefit, including NIV applicants, to undergo a baseline uniform national security and public safety interview  DHS officials stated that the working group modeled its interview baseline on elements of the refugee screening interview  To help implement this standard, DHS officials stated that the department is offering more training courses in enhanced communications (i e  detecting deception and eliciting responses) and making such courses accessible to other U S  government entities and U S  officials overseas  Regarding security checks, the working group identified certain checks that should be conducted for all applicants seeking an immigration benefit, including NIV applicants  For example, DHS officials stated that the working group concluded that all applicants for U S  immigration benefits should be screened against DHS’s TECS, among other federal databases  In February 2018, DHS Office of Policy officials stated that they were also exploring the extent to which current screening and vetting technologies can be expanded  For example, technology that is being used to screen applicants for counterterrorism concerns can potentially be modified to screen applicants for other concerns such as public safety or participation in transnational organized crime  However, these officials noted such changes to technology can take a long time  DHS officials stated that each department and agency is responsible for implementing the uniform standards for their relevant immigration programs  For example, with regard to maintaining information electronically, State officials stated that for nonimmigrant and immigrant visas, as of May 2018, they collected most, but not all, of the application data elements  In addition to executive actions taken in calendar year 2017, the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 9 on February 6, 2018, which directed DHS, in coordination with State, DOJ, and ODNI, to establish a National Vetting Center to optimize the use of federal government information in support of the national vetting enterprise  This memorandum stated that the U S  government must develop an integrated approach to the use of intelligence and other data, across national security components, in order to improve how departments and agencies coordinate and use information to identify individuals presenting a threat to national security, border security, homeland security, or public safety  The center is to be overseen and guided by a National Vetting Governance Board, consisting of six senior executives designated by DHS, DOJ, ODNI, State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense  Further, within 180 days of the issuance of the memorandum, these six departments and agencies, in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget, are to jointly submit to the President for approval an implementation plan for the center, addressing, among other things, the initial scope of the center’s vetting activities; the roles and responsibilities of agencies participating in the center; a resourcing strategy for the center; and a projected schedule to reach both initial and full operational capability  On February 14, 2018, the Secretary of Homeland Security selected an official to serve as the Director of the National Vetting Center and delegated the center’s authorities to CBP  DHS Office of Policy officials stated in February 2018 that the center is intended to serve as the focal point of the larger screening and vetting enterprise, and will coordinate policy and set priorities  The center will use the uniform baselines for screening and vetting standards and procedures established per EO-2 to set short- and long-term priorities to improve screening and vetting across the U S  government  Further, these officials stated screening and vetting activities will continue to be implemented by the entities that are currently implementing such efforts, but roles and responsibilities for screening and vetting for immigration benefits may be modified in the future based on the work of the center  According to DHS Office of Policy officials, efforts to implement National Security Presidential Memorandum 9, such as the development of an implementation plan, are ongoing as of June 2018  Implementation of new visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures  In response to the EOs and a March 2017 presidential memorandum issued the same day as EO-2, State has taken several actions to implement new visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures  For example, State sought and received emergency approval from the Office of Management and Budget in May 2017 to develop a new form, the DS-5535  The form collects additional information from a subset of visa applicants to more rigorously evaluate applicants for visa ineligibilities, including those related to national security and terrorism  The new information requested includes the applicant’s travel history over the prior 15 years, all phone numbers used over the prior 15 years, and all email addresses and social media handles used in the last 5 years  State estimated that, across all posts, the groups requiring additional vetting represented about 70,500 individuals per year  We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS, DOJ, State, and ODNI  DHS, DOJ, and State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until seven days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777or GamblerR@gao gov  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV  There are many nonimmigrant visas (NIV), which are issued to foreign nationals such as tourists, business visitors, and students seeking temporary admission into the United States  For the purposes of this report, we placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups  In the following enclosures, we provide a descriptive overview of each group on the basis of our analysis of the Department of State’s (State) fiscal years 2012 through 2017 NIV data  Each enclosure also contains the following: Description of the group  In this section, we provide a narrative description of the group, as well as a table of the specific NIVs that comprise the group  Characteristics of the applicants  In this section, we provide the number of annual NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the specific NIVs adjudicated in fiscal year 2017 within the group, the regions to which applicants applied for these NIVs in fiscal year 2017, and the top five nationalities that applied for NIVs in the group in fiscal year 2017  Issuances  In this section, we provide the number of NIVs issued within this group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Refusals  In this section, we provide the refusal rate for the entire NIV group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  For the NIVs that were refused in fiscal year 2017 for this group, we also provide the top ground for refusal  NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U S  immigration law and State policy  However, across all visa groups, the top categories were either ineligible nonimmigrant or inadequate documentation: Ineligible nonimmigrant  For most NIV categories, the applicant is presumed to be an intending immigrant until the applicant establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer that he or she is entitled to a nonimmigrant status  An applicant may be refused under this provision if, among other things, the consular officer determines the applicant lacks sufficient ties to his or her home country, or intends to abandon foreign residence; that evidence otherwise indicates an intent to immigrate to the United States permanently; or that the applicant is likely to violate the terms of the visa after being admitted  Inadequate documentation  The consular officer determined that the application is not in compliance with the INA because, for example, it lacks necessary documentation to allow the consular officer to determine visa eligibility  In such cases, the applicant would not be found eligible for the visa unless and until satisfactory documentation is provided to the consular officer or after the completion of administrative processing, such as security advisory opinions  Visa types (FY 2017) (9,968,157 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (9,968,157 adjudications) percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2015, and declined by about 13 percent from fiscal years 2015 to 2017  ● The refusal rate for tourist and business visitor visas generally increased each year from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2017  ● The vast majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (992,855 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (992,855 adjudications) ● The refusal rate for student and exchange visitor issuances decreased each year from fiscal years 2015 through 2017  visas peaked in fiscal year 2016, and slightly declined in fiscal year 2017  ● The vast majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (884,667 adjudications) 19% 10% 16% Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (884,667 adjudications) ● Generally, the refusal rates for temporary worker years 2012 through 2017  visas decreased from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Department of State officials noted, for example, that H-2A visas are not numerically limited by statute  They also stated that they believe U S  employers are increasingly less likely to hire workers without lawful status and are petitioning for lawfully admitted workers  ● In fiscal year 2017, temporary worker visas were most frequently refused because the applicant did not provide adequate documentation to the consular officer  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (330,117 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (330,117 adjudications) ● The refusal rates for transit and crewmember visas about 8 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (from about 295,000 to 320,000)  varied over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Specifically, issued C-1/D visas increased over the ● The majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were same time period, but the number of issued visas for the remaining visa types in this category have decreased  due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (166,187 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (166,187 adjudications) ● The refusal rates for foreign official and employee visas remained under 4 percent  ● In fiscal year 2017, foreign official and employee visas were most frequently refused because the applicant did not provide adequate documentation to the consular officer  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (68,580 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (68,580 adjudications) ● Generally, refusal rates for treaty trader and investor increased over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  visas increased slightly over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Issuances for E-3 visas nearly doubled from fiscal ● The majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were year 2012 through 2017, but comprise a small percentage of this category overall  due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of their intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (40,533 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (40,533 adjudications) ● Refusal rates for fiancé(e) and spouse visas were fluctuated over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017, but increased overall during this time period  relatively low during the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Most refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to inadequate documentation from the visa applicant, potentially indicating that such applications failed to include necessary documentation for the consular officer to ascertain whether the applicant was eligible to receive a visa at that time  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Nonimmigrant visas (NIV) are issued to foreign nationals such as tourists, business visitors, and students seeking temporary admission into the United States  The Department of State (State) is generally responsible for the adjudication of NIV applications, and manages the application process, including the consular officer corps and its functions at more than 220 U S  embassies and consulates (i e , visa-issuing posts) overseas  Depending on various factors, such as the particular NIV sought, the applicant’s background, and visa demand, State officials noted that the length of the visa adjudication process can vary from a single day to months  This appendix provides descriptive statistics of NIV adjudications, issuances, and refusals for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Specific details are shown in table 8 below  State data from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 indicate that NIV adjudications generally followed an annual cycle, ebbing during certain months during the fiscal year; however, adjudications in fiscal year 2017 departed slightly from this trend  Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the number of NIV adjudications typically reached its highest peak in the summer months, as shown in table 9  For example, State officials noted that a summer peak is generally due to international students who are applying for their visas for the coming academic year  There are many NIVs, and for the purposes of this report, we have placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups  Table 10 includes the annual NIV adjudications, issuances, and refusal rates, for each visa group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV applicants seeking to travel to the United States represent many different nationalities, but the countries of nationality with the most NIV adjudications have remained relatively consistent in recent years  Table 11 provides the top 25 countries of nationality for NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV applicants can apply for their NIVs at more than 220 visa-issuing U S  posts overseas  Table 12 describes the regions to which NIV applicants applied from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U S  immigration law and State policy  For the purposes of this report, we have grouped most of these grounds for refusal into one of seven categories, and group the remaining into a miscellaneous category, as shown in table 13  From January through October 2017, the administration took various executive actions establishing nationality-based entry restrictions for certain categories of foreign nationals from designated countries  This appendix supplements information included in this report to provide a more comprehensive presentation of changes to U S  immigration policy affecting nonimmigrant and immigrant entry into the United States, and outlines the legal standards applied, and precedent developed and relied upon, by federal courts in resolving challenges to the executive actions  In particular, it describes relevant aspects of the executive actions specifically addressed in this report—Executive Orders 13769 and 13780, both titled Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, and Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats—that imposed visa entry restrictions on certain countries’ nationals and included provisions addressing NIV screening and vetting, as well as other executive actions on immigration issued by the current administration  Furthermore, this appendix provides a detailed account of the interrelated challenges to these executive actions brought in the federal courts through June 2018  In summary, on March 6, 2017, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which instituted visa and refugee entry restrictions, and an accompanying memorandum addressed to the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security and the Attorney General, calling for heightened screening and vetting of visa applications and other immigration benefits  EO 13780 stated that it is U S  policy to improve the screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with the visa-issuance process and U S  Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP)  Enforcement of sections 2(c) and 6(a) of EO 13780 which established visa entry restrictions for nationals of six countries of particular concern—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—for a 90-day period, and suspended all refugee admissions for 120 days, was enjoined by federal district court orders issued in March 2017  On appeal, the U S  Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits generally upheld these decisions  Upon review by the U S  Supreme Court in June 2017, the injunction was partially lifted except with respect to foreign nationals who have bona fide ties to the United States Implementation of EO 13780 commenced on June 29, 2017  On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats  This proclamation restricts entry into the United States of certain categories of foreign nationals from eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—for an indefinite period  Preliminary injunctions issued by the U S  District Courts for the Districts of Maryland (Maryland federal district court) and Hawaii (Hawaii federal district court) in October 2017 prohibited implementation of these visa entry restrictions except with respect to North Korean and Venezuelan nationals  On December 4, 2017, the U S  Supreme Court issued two orders staying these district court injunctions; and on January 19, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for review of the December 22, 2017, decision of the Ninth Circuit, which partially affirmed the Hawaii federal district court’s preliminary injunction  As of June 2018, these latest visa entry restrictions continue to be fully implemented consistent with the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the President may lawfully establish nationality-based entry restrictions, and that Proclamation 9645 itself “is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority ” The following sections describe these executive actions and related litigation in greater detail  On January 27, 2017, the President issued EO 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which directed a review of information needs for adjudicating visas and other immigration benefits to confirm individuals seeking such benefits are who they claim to be, and are not security or public-safety threats  To temporarily reduce investigative burdens during the review period, the EO suspended U S  entry for nationals of seven countries of particular concern—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen  In addition, EO 13769 put USRAP on hold for 120 days and indefinitely barred admission of Syrian refugees  Shortly after its issuance, however, the EO faced numerous legal challenges in federal courts across the country involving various constitutional and statutory issues such as detainee applications for writs of habeas corpus, alleged religious or nationality-based discrimination, and the extent of the EO’s applicability to certain categories of foreign nationals, including U S  lawful permanent residents (LPR) and dual nationals holding passports issued by a listed country as well as another nation not subject to visa entry restrictions  On February 3, 2017, the Washington federal district court entered a nationwide temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting enforcement of the EO’s entry restrictions  In rejecting the government’s argument that a TRO only cover the particular states at issue, the court reasoned that partial implementation would “undermine the constitutional imperative of ‘a uniform Rule of Naturalization’ and Congress’s instruction that the ‘immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly ’” On February 9, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the nationwide injunction, thereby denying the government’s emergency motion for a stay of the Washington federal district court’s TRO pending appeal, because the government did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of its appeal, or that failure to enter a stay would cause irreparable injury  On March 6, 2017, however, the President issued EO 13780, which revoked and replaced EO 13769, and established revised restrictions on entry for nationals of the same countries of particular concern, except Iraq  On March 6, 2017, the President signed EO 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which revoked and replaced EO 13769 and put in place revised visa and refugee entry restrictions, and issued an accompanying memorandum calling for heightened screening and vetting of visa applications and other immigration benefits  In general, sections 2(c) and 6(a) of EO 13780 barred visa travel for nationals of six designated countries—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—for 90 days, and all refugee admission for 120 days  On March 15, 2017, sections 2 and 6 of the EO were enjoined on statutory grounds (i e , based on potential violation of U S  immigration law) pursuant to the order of the Hawaii federal district court granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO  On March 16, 2017, the Maryland federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring implementation of visa entry restrictions on a nationwide basis with respect to nationals of the six listed countries  On May 25, 2017, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Maryland federal district court’s injunction on constitutional grounds (i e , based on potential violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U S  Constitution)  On June 12, 2017, the Ninth Circuit generally affirmed the Hawaii federal district court’s ruling, but vacated the district court’s order to the extent it enjoined internal review procedures not burdening individuals outside the Executive Branch, therefore permitting the administration to conduct the internal reviews of visa information needs as directed in the EO  On June 14, 2017, the President issued a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, Attorney General, and Director of National Intelligence, directing that sections 2 and 6 of EO 13780 were to be implemented 72 hours after all applicable injunctions are lifted or stayed  On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court granted, in part, the government’s application to stay the March 15 and 16 injunctions of the Hawaii and Maryland federal district courts, as generally upheld on May 25 and June 12 by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits  The Court explained that the administration may enforce visa and refugee travel restrictions under sections 2 and 6 except with respect to an individual who can “credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States ” In the case of a visa or refugee applicant who is the relative of a person in the United States, such foreign national would be exempt from entry restrictions provided the family connection with their U S  relative meets the “close familial relationship” standard  The Court further explained that a qualifying relationship with a U S  entity would have to be formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, and not for the purpose of evading EO 13780  On June 29, 2017, the day that implementation of EO 13780 began, the State Department issued guidance providing that a close familial relationship exists for the parents, spouse, children, adult sons or daughters, sons and daughters-in-law, and siblings of a person in the United States, but not for such person’s grandparents, grandchildren, uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, sisters-in-law, brothers-in-law or other relatives  The State of Hawaii filed a motion with the Hawaii federal district court seeking, among other things, a declaration that the partial injunction in place after the Supreme Court’s ruling prohibited application of travel restrictions to fiancés, grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the United States  On July 13, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court ruled, among other things, that section 2 of the EO, generally barring travel to the United States for nationals of certain countries, does not apply to the grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews and cousins of persons in the United States, who were initially excluded from the administration’s interpretation of “close family ” The government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court  On July 19, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the government’s motion seeking further clarification of its June 26 ruling, stayed the Hawaii federal district court’s order to the extent it included refugees covered by a formal assurance from a U S -based resettlement agency within the scope of the preliminary injunction, pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and left unchanged the district court’s broader formulation of exempt “close family ” On September 7, 2017, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Hawaii federal district court’s definition of close family members who are not to be subjected to travel restrictions, and rejected the government’s argument that refugees who had undergone a stringent review process and been approved by U S -based resettlement agencies lack a bona fide relationship to the United States, thus allowing admission of such refugees  On September 11, 2017, the Supreme Court temporarily enjoined aspects of the Hawaii federal district court’s holding that would permit admission of certain refugees with formal assurances from a U S  resettlement entity  The next day, on September 12, 2017, the Supreme Court indefinitely stayed the Ninth Circuit’s September 7 ruling with respect to refugees covered by a formal assurance, thereby permitting the administration to suspend entry of such refugees  On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public Safety Threats, which expanded the scope and duration of visa entry restrictions from six to eight countries, and from a 90-day to an indefinite period for the listed countries  On September 25, 2017, in light of the September 24 proclamation, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file briefs addressing whether, or to what extent, the cases before it regarding EO 13780 are moot  On October 10, 2017, after receiving the parties’ supplemental briefs, the Supreme Court decided that because section 2(c) of EO 13780 expired on September 24, there was no live case or controversy; and without expressing a view on the merits, the Court vacated and remanded the Maryland case to the Fourth Circuit with instructions to dismiss as moot the challenge to EO 13780  On October 24, 2017, consistent with its October 10 ruling, the Supreme Court also vacated and remanded the Hawaii case related to EO 13780 to the Ninth Circuit with instructions to dismiss it as moot  Consequently, after challenges to EO 13780 visa and refugee entry restrictions, as curtailed by the Supreme Court’s ruling of June 26, 2017, were rendered moot, litigation continued with respect to the President’s proclamation of September 24, 2017  On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645 (the Proclamation), Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, which imposes certain conditional restrictions and limitations on entry into the United States of nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—for an indefinite period  According to the Proclamation, travel restrictions are tailored to each nation’s information sharing and identity management deficiencies based on standard immigration screening and vetting criteria established by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and are to remain in effect until such time as the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State determine that a country provides sufficient information for the United States to assess adequately whether its nationals pose a security or safety threat  On October 17, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court issued a TRO, on statutory grounds, enjoining on a nationwide basis the implementation and enforcement of travel restrictions provided for under the Proclamation, except with respect to North Korean or Venezuelan nationals  On the same day, the Maryland federal district court granted in part plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, primarily on constitutional grounds, thereby prohibiting implementation of visa entry restrictions nationwide, except for nationals of North Korea and Venezuela as well as other covered foreign nationals who lack a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States  On October 20, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court converted its October 17 TRO into a preliminary injunction, thereby continuing the nationwide prohibition on enforcement or implementation of the suspension on entry for nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen  The district court did not stay its ruling or hold it in abeyance should an appeal be filed in the Ninth Circuit  On November 13, 2017, the Ninth Circuit granted, in part, the government’s request for an emergency stay of the Hawaii federal district court’s preliminary injunction, thereby allowing visa entry restrictions to go into effect with respect to the nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen  However, consistent with the Supreme Court’s June 2017 ruling, the court ordered that those with a bone fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States not be subject to such travel restrictions  On November 20, 2017, the government petitioned the Supreme Court for a stay of the preliminary injunction issued by the Hawaii federal district court, pending consideration and disposition of the government’s appeal from that injunction to the Ninth Circuit and, if that court affirms the injunction, pending filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari and any further proceedings in the Supreme Court  On November 28, 2017, plaintiffs in the challenge to the Proclamation arising out of Hawaii asked that the Supreme Court deny the government’s request to lift the partial injunction left in place by the Ninth Circuit  On the same day, plaintiffs in the case arising out of Maryland requested that the Supreme Court not grant a stay of the federal district court’s preliminary injunction  In both cases, plaintiffs assert that the more expansive visa entry restrictions violate U S  immigration law; additionally, for the Maryland case, plaintiffs argue that such restrictions are unconstitutional as a form of discrimination based on national origin  On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court issued two orders staying the Maryland and Hawaii federal district courts’ orders of October 17 and 20 that preliminarily enjoined implementation of the Proclamation, pending decisions of the Ninth and Fourth Circuits in the government’s appeals, and of the Supreme Court regarding a petition for a writ of certiorari (if sought)  As a result, the Proclamation’s visa entry restrictions were permitted to go into full effect unless and until they are either enjoined by the courts of appeals and a writ of certiorari is not sought thereafter, or the Supreme Court either denies a petition for certiorari (thereby resulting in termination of the Supreme Court’s stay order) or grants such petition followed by a final injunction prohibiting current or future implementation of the Proclamation’s restrictions  The Supreme Court further noted its expectation that the courts of appeals will render decisions “with appropriate dispatch,” in light of both courts having decided to consider their respective cases on an expedited basis  On December 8, 2017, the Department of State announced that it began fully implementing the Proclamation, as permitted by the Supreme Court, at the opening of business at U S  embassies and consulates overseas  On December 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the Hawaii federal district court’s October 20 order enjoining enforcement of visa entry restrictions under the Proclamation, while limiting the preliminary injunction’s scope to foreign nationals who have a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States  Without reaching plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, the court of appeals concluded that the Proclamation exceeded the scope of authority delegated to the President by Congress under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), in particular, sections 202(a)(1)(A) (immigrant visa nondiscrimination) and 212(f) (presidential suspension of, or imposition of restrictions on, alien entry), by deviating from statutory text, legislative history and prior executive practice; not including the requisite finding that entry of certain foreign nationals would be detrimental to U S  interests; and contravening the INA’s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas  However, the court stayed its decision, given that the Supreme Court’s December 4 order lifted the federal district courts’ injunctions pending not only review by the courts of appeals, but also “disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought ” On January 5, 2018, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the December 22, 2017, judgment of the Ninth Circuit which left in place the Hawaii federal district court injunction of the Proclamation’s visa entry restrictions for individuals with bona fide ties to the United States  On January 19, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the government’s certiorari petition and will therefore consider, and issue an opinion on the merits of, the Ninth Circuit’s decision  On February 15, 2018, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction granted by the Maryland federal district court on constitutional grounds, but stayed its decision pending the outcome of the Ninth Circuit case before the Supreme Court  The court of appeals found that “laintiffs offer undisputed evidence that the President has openly and often expressed his desire” to bar the entry of Muslims into the United States  Therefore, the court concluded that, in light of the President’s official statements, the Proclamation likely violates the Establishment Clause as it “fails to demonstrate a primarily secular purpose,” and also goes against the basic principle that government is not to act with religious animus  On February 23, 2018, Fourth Circuit challengers filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking for the Supreme Court to consolidate their case with the Court’s ongoing review of the Ninth Circuit decision  These petitioners requested that the Court additionally consider their argument that the preliminary injunction should not have been limited to individuals with a bona fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States  On February 26, 2018, the Supreme Court granted Fourth Circuit petitioners’ motion to expedite consideration of their certiorari petition  On April 10, 2018, the President issued a proclamation announcing that because Chad has improved its identity-management and information sharing practices sufficiently to meet U S  baseline security standards, nationals of Chad will again be able to receive visas for travel to the United States  On June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court held that the President lawfully exercised the broad discretion granted to him under INA § 212(f) (presidential suspension of, or imposition of restrictions on, alien entry), by issuing Proclamation No  9645, which established nationality-based visa entry restrictions applicable to categories of foreign nationals from eight (now seven) countries for an indefinite period  In addition, while three individual plaintiffs had standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to entry restrictions prohibiting their relatives from coming to the United States, the Court found the Proclamation to be legitimate on its face as a way to prevent entry of certain foreign nationals where the government determines there is insufficient information for visa vetting  As a result of the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the establishment of nationality-based entry restrictions is a lawful exercise of the President’s broad discretion in matters of immigration and national security, the visa entry restrictions imposed on categories of foreign nationals from certain countries pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9645 continue to be fully implemented , as they have been since the Supreme Court’s December 4, 2017, orders staying the lower courts’ injunctions  On October 24, 2017, the same day the 120-day suspension of refugee admissions under EO 13780 expired, the President signed EO 13815, Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions program With Enhanced Vetting Capabilities, which resumed USRAP and directed that special measures be applied to certain categories of refugees posing potential threats to the security and welfare of the United States  On December 23, 2017, the Washington federal district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction on aspects of EO 13815 (and its accompanying memorandum), thus prohibiting the administration from: (1) temporarily suspending admission of refugees from 11 previously identified countries of concern, and reallocating resources from the processing of their applications during the 90-day review period (except for those lacking a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States); and (2) indefinitely barring admission of, and application processing for, all following-to-join refugees  On January 5, 2018, the Washington federal district court denied the government’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s December 23, 2017, order temporarily halting enforcement of refugee entry restrictions that were to be implemented as part of the resumption of USRAP under the EO  Specifically, the government “ask the court to ‘modify its preliminary injunction to exclude from coverage refugee applicants who seek to establish a on the sole ground that they have received a formal assurance from a resettlement agency ’” In denying the government’s motion for reconsideration, the court relied on the September 7, 2017, decision of the Ninth Circuit which, among other things, rejected the notion that refugees with formal assurances from U S -based resettlement agencies do not meet the Supreme Court’s bona fide relationship standard  The court treated this Ninth Circuit ruling as binding precedent given that the Supreme Court’s indefinite stay of September 12 neither vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision, nor provided any underlying reason(s) that would allow another court to discern its rationale  On January 9, 2018, the Washington federal district court also denied the government’s emergency motion for a stay of the court’s December 23, 2017, preliminary injunction, pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit  On January 31, 2018, DHS announced additional security measures to prevent exploitation of USRAP  Specifically, these security measures include additional screening for certain nationals of high-risk countries, a more risk-based approach to administering USRAP, and a periodic review and update of the refugee high-risk countries list and selection criteria  Therefore, as of June 2018, while the administration has announced additional security measures to strengthen the integrity of USRAP, the Washington federal district court’s December 23, 2017, preliminary injunction of EO 13815 continues to: (1) prohibit implementation of the temporary suspension of admission, and reallocation of resources from processing applications, of refugees from 11 previously identified countries of concern; and (2) forbid enforcement of the indefinite bar on entry of following-to-join refugees  In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet (Assistant Director), Colleen Corcoran, Eric Hauswirth, Thomas Lombardi, Amanda Miller, Sasan J  “Jon” Najmi, Erin O’Brien, Garrett Riba, and Dina Shorafa made significant contributions to this report 


Report 2:  Egypt's policy toward Libya also is closely aligned with other foreign backers of the LNA, including France and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)  Reportedly, the three countries are working in concert to strengthen the position of Haftar in order to facilitate the eventual reunification of the Libyan army  A 2019 LNA offensive into southern Libya has placed additional pressure on the Government of National Accord and may complicate U S -backed efforts by the United Nations to facilitate a national dialogue, constitutional referendum, and elections in 2019  To Egypt's south, the government is embroiled in regional disputes with Nile Basin countries, such as Ethiopia, which is nearing completion of the $4 2 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a major hydroelectric project  Egypt argues that the dam, once filled, will limit the flow of the Nile River below Egypt's agreed share  However, many analysts expect that Egypt will address the dispute by increasing water-use efficiency and investing in desalination, rather than using its military to bomb the dam  Reduced Nile flow into Egypt may exacerbate existing water shortages and cause short-term political problems for the Egyptian government, which faces extensive domestic water needs  In February 2019, President Sisi assumed the one-year chairmanship of the African Union, during which he is expected to promote closer relations with fellow African states  Egypt and Russia, close allies in early years of the Cold War, have again strengthened bilateral ties under President Sisi, who has promised to restore Egyptian stability and international prestige  His relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin has rekindled, in the words of one observer, "a romanticized memory of relations with Russia during the Nasser era " President Sisi first turned to Russia during the Obama Administration, when U S -Egyptian ties were strained, and Egypt seemed intent on signaling its displeasure with U S  policy  Since 2014, Egypt and Russia have improved ties in a number of ways, including through arms deals  Reportedly, Egypt is upgrading its aging fleet of legacy Soviet MiG-21 aircraft to a fourth generation MiG-29M variant with additional deliveries to Egypt in 2018 (first delivered in April 2017)  Egypt also has purchased 46 standard Ka-52 Russian attack helicopters for its air force  Egypt reportedly also has purchased the naval version of the Ka-52 for use on Egypt's two French-procured Mistral-class helicopter dock vessels (see below), and the S-300VM surface-to-air missile defense system from Russia  In August 2018, Egyptian Defense Minister Mohamed Zaki visited Russia, where he attended a Russian arms exhibition  Additionally, Egypt and Russia reportedly have expanded their cooperation on nuclear energy  In 2015, Egypt reached a deal with Russian state energy firm Rosatom to construct a 4,800-megawatt nuclear power plant in the Egyptian Mediterranean coastal town of Daba'a, 80 miles northwest of Cairo  Russia is lending Egypt $25 billion over 35 years to finance the construction and operation of the nuclear power plant (this will cover 85% of the project's total costs)  The contract also commits Russia to supply the plant's nuclear fuel for 60 years and transfer and store depleted nuclear fuel from the reactors  As Egyptian and Russian foreign policies have become more closely aligned in conflict zones such as eastern Libya, bilateral military cooperation has expanded  One report suggests that Russian Special Forces based out of an airbase in Egypt's western desert (Sidi Barrani) may be aiding General Haftar  In November 2017, Egypt and Russia signed a draft agreement governing the use of each other's air space  While Egyptian-Russian ties have grown warmer in recent years, they are not without complications  In the aftermath of an October 2015 terrorist attack against a Russian passenger jet departing from Sharm El Sheikh, visits to Egypt by Russian tourists, previously the country's largest source of tourists, dropped significantly  Russian commercial aircraft have resumed direct flights to Cairo but not to Sharm El Sheikh  Egypt and Russia also engaged in a trade dispute in 2016 over Russian wheat imports  Egypt is the largest global importer of wheat, and the largest export market for Russian wheat  Aside from Russia, France stands out as a non-U S  country with which President Sisi has sought to build a diplomatic and military procurement relationship  In the last five years, as French-Egyptian ties have improved, Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense contractors, including the following: Four Gowind Corvettes (produced by Naval Group)—This deal was signed in July 2014  As part of the French-Egyptian arrangement, some of the Corvette construction has taken place at the Alexandria Shipyard in Egypt  One FREMM multi-mission Frigate (produced by Naval Group)—Named the Tahya Misr (Long Live Egypt), this vessel was delivered to Egypt in 2015  This ship has participated in an annual joint French-Egyptian naval exercise, known as Cleopatra  In February 2015, Egypt purchased 24 Rafale multirole fighters (produced by Dassault Aviation)  Under the initial agreement, Egypt and France may enter into a new procurement agreement for 12 additional Rafale fighters  According to the manufacturer, the Rafale has flown in combat in Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, Iraq, and Syria and is used by Egypt, Qatar, and India  In 2018, French officials said that the United States would not permit France to export the SCALP air-launched land-attack cruise missile used on the Rafale to Egypt under the International Trade in Arms Regulation (ITAR) agreement  The United States may have been concerned over the transfer of sensitive technology to Egypt  Two Mistral-class Helicopter Carriers (produced by Naval Group)—In the fall of 2015, France announced that it would sell Egypt two Mistral-class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) vessels (each carrier can carry 16 helicopters, 4 landing craft, and 13 tanks) for $1 billion  The LHDs (ENS Anwar El Sadat and ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser ) were delivered in 2016  In 2017, Egypt announced that it would purchase Russian 46 Ka-52 Alligator helicopters, which can operate on the LHDs  In January 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron paid a three-day visit to Egypt, where he raised human rights issues in public and with Egyptian authorities and civil society representatives  According to Macron, "I can't see how you can pretend to ensure long-term stability in this country, which was at the heart of the Arab Spring and showed its taste for freedom, and think you can continue to harden beyond what's acceptable or justified for security reasons " President Trump has praised the Egyptian government's counterterrorism efforts while his Administration has worked to restore high-level diplomatic engagement, joint military exercises, and arms sales  Many commentators initially expected President Trump to bring the United States and Egypt closer together, and that largely has been the case  The Administration has withheld some foreign assistance for policy reasons on at least one occasion, however, and the United States has not had an ambassador in Cairo since June 30, 2017  As evidence of improved bilateral ties, the U S  Defense Department notified Congress in November 2018 of a major $1 billion sale of defense equipment to Egypt, consisting of 10 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters, among other things  The Egyptian Air Force already possesses 45 less advanced versions of the Apache that were acquired between 2000 and 2014  In January 2019, U S  Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivered a major policy speech at the American University in Cairo, where he stated: "And as we seek an even stronger partnership with Egypt, we encourage President Sisi to unleash the creative energy of Egypt's people, unfetter the economy, and promote a free and open exchange of ideas  The progress made to date can continue " U S  officials have not yet publicly criticized efforts by supporters of President Sisi to advance amendments to the constitution (see above) to extend the possibility of Sisi's continued presidency  Human rights advocates have called for Western governments to withhold assistance to Egypt if the amendments are approved  According to Human Rights Watch , "Al-Sisi's government is encouraged by the continued silence of its allies, and if the US, UK, and France want to avoid the destabilizing consequences of entrenching authoritarian rule in Egypt, they should act now " On February 22, 2019, a bipartisan group of national security experts called on U S  officials to "express strong concern about the amendments to the Egyptian constitution now moving through a rapid approval process " Egypt's poor record on human rights and democratization has sparked regular criticism from U S  officials and some Members of Congress  Since FY2012, Members have passed appropriations legislation that withholds the obligation of FMF to Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights  With the exception of FY2014, lawmakers have included a national security waiver to allow the Administration to waive these congressionally mandated certification requirements under certain conditions  Over the last year, the Administration has obligated several tranches of FMF to Egypt, including the following: In September 2018, the Administration obligated $1 billion in FY2018 FMF  Per Section 7041(a)(3)(A) of P L  115-141 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2018, $300 million in FMF remains withheld from obligation until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights  In previous acts, the amount withheld had been $195 million  FY2018 FMF for Egypt remains available to be expended until September 30, 2019  In August 2018, the Administration waived the certification requirement in Section 7041(a)(3)(B) of P L  115-31 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2017, allowing for the obligation of $195 million in FY2017 FMF, which occurred in September 2018  However, according to one report, Senator Patrick Leahy has placed a hold on $105 million in FY2017 FMF and is seeking more information on the plight of detained Egyptian-American Moustafa Kassem  In January 2018, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to obligate $1 039 billion in FY2017 FMF out of a total of $1 3 billion appropriated for FY2017  It chose not to obligate $65 7 million in FY2017 FMF  The remaining $195 million had been withheld until a national security waiver was issued in August 2018 (see above)  For FY2019, the President requested a total of $1 381 billion in foreign assistance for Egypt, the same amount requested for the previous year  Nearly all of the requested funds for Egypt are for the FMF account  For FY2020, the request is nearly identical from previous years, as the President is seeking a total of $1 382 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt  The FY2019 Omnibus ( P L  116-6 ) provides the following for Egypt: a total of $1 419 billion in bilateral U S  foreign assistance for Egypt, of which $1 3 billion is in FMF, $112 5 million in ESF, $3 million in NADR, $2 million in INCLE, and $1 8 million in IMET; and a reauthorization of ESF to support future loan guarantees to Egypt; P L  116-6 sets the following conditions for Egypt: As in previous years, it requires that funds may only be made available when the Secretary of State certifies that the government of Egypt is sustaining the strategic relationship with the United States and meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty  As in previous years, the act withholds ESF that "the Secretary determines to be equivalent to that expended by the United States Government for bail, and by nongovernmental organizations for legal and court fees, associated with democracy-related trials in Egypt until the Secretary certifies and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the Government of Egypt has dismissed the convictions issued by the Cairo Criminal Court on June 4, 2013, in Public Prosecution Case No  1110 for the Year 2012 and has not subjected the defendants to further prosecution or if convicted they have been granted full pardons  " This last condition (bolded) was added in 2019 to account for the acquittal of the 43 foreign defendants in Case 173 (see above)  As in previous years, the FY2019 Omnibus also includes a limitation on ESF, stating that no FY2018 ESF or prior-year ESF "may be made available for a contribution, voluntary or otherwise, to the Civil Associations and Foundations Support Fund, or any similar fund, established pursuant to Law 70 on Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work [informally known as the NGO law] " As in previous years, the act also includes a provision that withholds $300 million of FMF funds until the Secretary of State certifies that the Government of Egypt is taking effective steps to advance, among other things, democracy and human rights in Egypt  The Secretary of State may waive this certification requirement, though any waiver must be accompanied by, among other things, an assessment of the Government of Egypt's compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 and other such resolutions regarding North Korea  There has been some concern in the Administration and Congress over Egypt's alleged weapons procurement from North Korea in recent years  P L  115-245 , the Department of Defense (DOD) and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, specifies that the Secretary of Defense may provide Egypt with funds from the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) to enhance its border security  To date, Egypt has not received security assistance from DOD-managed accounts  Between 1946 and 2016, the United States provided Egypt with $78 3 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation)  The 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt ushered in the current era of U S  financial support for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors  In two separate memoranda accompanying the treaty, the United States outlined commitments to Israel and Egypt, respectively  In its letter to Israel, the Carter Administration pledged to "endeavor to take into account and will endeavor to be responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel " In his letter to Egypt, former U S  Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote the following: In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared to enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of military equipment and services and the financing of, at least a portion of those sales, subject to such Congressional review and approvals as may be required  All U S  foreign aid to Egypt (or any foreign recipient) is appropriated and authorized by Congress   The 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is a bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, and the United States is not a legal party to the treaty  The treaty itself does not include any U S  aid obligations, and any assistance commitments to Israel and Egypt that could be potentially construed in conjunction with the treaty were through ancillary documents or other communications and were—by their terms—subject to congressional approval (see above)  However, as the peace broker between Israel and Egypt, the United States has traditionally provided foreign aid to both countries to ensure a regional balance of power and sustain security cooperation with both countries  In some cases, an Administration may sign a bilateral "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) with a foreign country pledging a specific amount of foreign aid to be provided over a selected time period subject to the approval of Congress  In the Middle East, the United States has signed foreign assistance MOUs with Israel and Jordan  Currently, there is no U S -Egyptian MOU specifying a specific amount of total U S  aid pledged to Egypt over a certain time period  Congress typically specifies a precise allocation of most foreign assistance for Egypt in the foreign operations appropriations bill  Egypt receives the bulk of foreign aid funds from three primary accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET)  The United States offers IMET training to Egyptian officers in order to facilitate U S -Egyptian military cooperation over the long term  Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large amounts of military assistance  U S  policymakers have routinely justified this aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and sustaining the treaty—principles that are supposed to be mutually reinforcing  Egypt has used U S  military aid through the FMF to (among other things) purchase major U S  defense systems, such as the F-16 fighter aircraft, the M1A1 Abrams battle tank, and the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter  For decades, FMF grants have supported Egypt's purchases of large-scale conventional military equipment from U S  suppliers  However, as mentioned above, the Obama Administration announced that future FMF grants may only be used to purchase equipment specifically for "counterterrorism, border security, Sinai security, and maritime security" (and for sustainment of weapons systems already in Egypt's arsenal)  It is not yet clear how the Trump Administration will determine which U S -supplied military equipment would help the Egyptian military counter terrorism and secure its land and maritime borders  Overall, some defense experts continue to view the Egyptian military as inadequately prepared, both doctrinally and tactically, to face the threat posed by terrorist/insurgent groups such as Sinai Province  According to a former U S  National Security Council official, "they [the Egyptian military] understand they have got a problem in Sinai, but they have been unprepared to invest in the capabilities to deal with it " To reorient the military toward unconventional warfare, the Egyptian military needs, according to one assessment, "heavy investment into rapid reaction forces equipped with sophisticated infantry weapons, optics and communication gear     backed by enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms  In order to transport them, Egypt would also need numerous modern aviation assets " In addition to substantial amounts of annual U S  military assistance, Egypt has benefited from certain aid provisions that have been available to only a few other countries  For example Early Disbursal and Interest - Bearing Account : Between FY2001 and FY2011, Congress granted Egypt early disbursement of FMF funds (within 30 days of the enactment of appropriations legislation) to an interest-bearing account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York  Interest accrued from the rapid disbursement of aid has allowed Egypt to receive additional funding for the purchase of U S -origin equipment  In FY2012, Congress began to condition the obligation of FMF, requiring the Administration to certify certain conditions had been met before releasing FMF funds, thereby eliminating their automatic early disbursal  However, Congress has permitted Egypt to continue to earn interest on FMF funds already deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York  The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides one means by which the United States can advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and allied nations through provision of equipment in excess of the requirements of its own defense forces  The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages the EDA program, which enables the United States to reduce its inventory of outdated equipment by providing friendly countries with necessary supplies at either reduced rates or no charge  As a designated "major non-NATO ally," Egypt is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 23(a) of the Arms Export Control Act  Over the past two decades, U S  economic aid to Egypt has been reduced by over 90%, from $833 million in FY1998 to a request of $75 million for FY2019  Beginning in the mid to late 1990s, as Egypt moved from an impoverished country to a lower-middle-income economy, the United States and Egypt began to rethink the assistance relationship, emphasizing "trade not aid " Congress began to scale back economic aid both to Egypt and Israel due to a 10-year agreement reached between the United States and Israel in the late 1990s known as the "Glide Path Agreement," which gradually reduced U S  economic aid to Egypt to $400 million by 2008  U S  economic aid to Egypt stood at $200 million per year by the end of the George W  Bush Administration, whose relations with then-President Hosni Mubarak suffered over the latter's reaction to the Administration's democracy agenda in the Arab world  During the final years of the Obama Administration, distrust of U S  democracy promotion assistance led the Egyptian government to obstruct many U S -funded economic assistance programs  According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of State and the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID) reported hundreds of millions of dollars ($460 million as of 2015) in unobligated prior year ESF funding  As these unobligated balances grew, it created pressure on the Obama Administration to reobligate ESF funds for other purposes  In 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress that it was reprogramming $108 million of ESF that had been appropriated for Egypt in FY2015 but remained unobligated for other purposes  The Administration claimed that its actions were due to "continued government of Egypt process delays that have impeded the effective implementation of several programs " In 2017, the Trump Administration also reprogrammed FY2016 ESF for Egypt  U S  economic aid to Egypt is divided into two components: (1) USAID-managed programs (public health, education, economic development, democracy and governance); and (2) the U S -Egyptian Enterprise Fund  Both are funded primarily through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriations account  

ground_truth: Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, which is one of the world's most well-known maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Egypt, with its population of more than 100 million people, is by far the most populous Arabic-speaking country. Although it may not play the same type of leading political or military role in the Arab world as it has in the past, Egypt may retain some "soft power" by virtue of its history, media, and culture. Cairo plays host both to the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar University, which claims to be the oldest continuously operating university in the world and has symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship. Additionally, Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain cold, the Israeli and Egyptian governments have increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Personnel moves and possible amendments to the Egyptian constitution highlight apparent efforts by President Sisi to consolidate power with the help of political allies, including colleagues from Egypt's security establishment. President Sisi has come under repeated international criticism for an ongoing government crackdown against various forms of political dissent and freedom of expression. The Egyptian government has defended its human rights record, asserting that the country is under pressure from terrorist groups seeking to destabilize Arab nation-states. The Trump Administration has tried to normalize ties with the Sisi government that were generally perceived as strained under President Obama. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivered a major policy speech at the American University in Cairo, where he stated, "And as we seek an even stronger partnership with Egypt, we encourage President Sisi to unleash the creative energy of Egypt's people, unfetter the economy, and promote a free and open exchange of ideas." The United States has provided significant military and economic assistance to Egypt since the late 1970s. Successive U.S. Administrations have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. All U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any recipient) is appropriated and authorized by Congress. Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $83 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation). Annual appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors. For FY2019, Congress has appropriated $1.4 billion in total bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount it provided in FY2018. For FY2020, the President is requesting a total of $1.382 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt. Nearly all of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the FMF account (military aid). In November 2018, the U.S. Defense Department notified Congress of a major $1 billion sale of defense equipment to Egypt, consisting of 10 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters, among other things. Beyond the United States, President Sisi has broadened Egypt's international base of support to include several key partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, and France. In the last five years, as French-Egyptian ties have improved, Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense companies.