prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: This report describes and analyzes annual appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2019  It compares the enacted FY2018 appropriations for DHS, the Donald J  Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request, and the appropriations measures developed and considered by Congress in response to it  This report identifies additional informational resources, reports, and products on DHS appropriations that provide context for the discussion, and it provides a list of Congressional Research Service (CRS) policy experts with whom clients may consult on specific topics  The suite of CRS reports on homeland security appropriations tracks legislative action and congressional issues related to DHS appropriations, with particular attention paid to discretionary funding amounts  These reports do not provide in-depth analysis of specific issues related to mandatory funding—such as retirement pay—nor do they systematically follow other legislation related to the authorizing or amending of DHS programs, activities, or fee revenues  Discussion of appropriations legislation involves a variety of specialized budgetary concepts  The Appendix to this report explains several of these concepts, including budget authority, obligations, outlays, discretionary and mandatory spending, offsetting collections, allocations, and adjustments to the discretionary spending caps under the Budget Control Act (BCA; P L  112-25 )  A more complete discussion of those terms and the appropriations process in general can be found in CRS Report R42388, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction , coordinated by James V  Saturno, and the Government Accountability Office's A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process   All amounts contained in the suite of CRS reports on homeland security appropriations represent budget authority  For precision in percentages and totals, all calculations in these reports used unrounded data, which are presented in each report's tables  However, amounts in narrative discussions are rounded to the nearest million (or 10 million, in the case of numbers larger than 1 billion), unless noted otherwise  Data used in this report for FY2018 amounts are derived from the explanatory statement accompanying P L  115-141 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017—Division F of which is the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018  The explanatory statement also includes data on FY2018 supplemental appropriations for DHS enacted prior to the development of the consolidated appropriations act for FY2018  Data for the FY2019 requested levels and enacted levels are drawn from H Rept  116-9 , the explanatory statement accompanying P L  116-6   Data on the Senate Appropriations Committee recommendation are drawn from S Rept  115-283 , and data for the House Appropriations Committee recommendation are drawn from H Rept  115-948   Scoring methodology is consistent across this report, relying on data provided by the Appropriations Committees that has been developed with Congressional Budget Office (CBO) methodology  CRS does not attempt to compare this data with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) data because technical scoring differences do not allow precise comparisons  This section provides an overview of the process of enactment of appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for FY2019, from the Administration's initial request, through committee action in the House and Senate, continuing appropriations (and their lapse), and enactment of the consolidated appropriations bill that contained DHS annual appropriation  On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration released its budget request for FY2019  The enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ) three days before had established discretionary spending limits for FY2018 and FY2019, replacing the limits prescribed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P L  112-25 )  The Administration chose to submit an addendum to their request in a letter accompanying the formal request documentation, which included additional requests for resources for DHS and several other departments and agencies  The Trump Administration requested $47 43 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2019, as part of an overall budget that the Office of Management and Budget estimated to be $74 88 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not annually appropriated or does not score against discretionary budget limits)  The request amounted to a $0 29 billion (0 6%) decrease from the $47 72 billion in annual appropriations enacted for FY2018 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P L  115-141 , Division F)  The Trump Administration also requested discretionary funding for DHS components that does not count against discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act (BCA; P L  112-25 ) and is not reflected in the above totals  The Administration requested an additional $6 65 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the BCA, and in the budget request for the Department of Defense, $165 million in Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terror designated funding (OCO), to be transferred to the Coast Guard  On June 21, 2018, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out S  3109 , the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, accompanied by S Rept  115-283   Committee-reported S  3109 included $48 33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2019  This was $901 million (1 9%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $611 million (1 3%) above the enacted level for FY2018  The Senate committee-reported bill also included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, and $163 million in OCO-designated funding directly for the Coast Guard, as had been done in FY2018, rather than as a transfer, as had been requested by the Administration  This bill was never taken up for action on the Senate floor  On July 26, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee marked up H R  6776 , its version of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019  H Rept  115-948 was filed September 12, 2018  Committee-reported H R  6776 included $51 44 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority  The House committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, but unlike S  3109 , did not include the OCO funding for the Coast Guard  This bill did not see action on the House floor  As some of the annual appropriations for FY2019 remained unfinished, a consolidated appropriations bill that included a continuing resolution was passed by Congress and signed into law on September 28, 2018, as P L  115-245   The continuing resolution (Division C) continued funding for DHS at a rate of operations equal to that of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018, with some exceptions  The continuing resolution was extended through December 21, 2018, at which point it expired, and annual appropriations for DHS lapsed, resulting in a partial shutdown of DHS for 35 days  Continuing appropriations were restored at the FY2018 rate of operations with the enactment of P L  116-4 on January 25, 2019  On February 14, 2019, the House took up H J Res  31 , a consolidated appropriations bill that included eight annual appropriations bills  Division A, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, included $49 41 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, $1 69 billion (3 5%) more than had been provided for FY2018, and $2 04 billion more than had been requested by the Administration in February 2018  In addition to that total, the bill included $12 billion designated for the costs of major disasters—$5 35 billion (80 4%) more than had been requested, and the requested $165 million in OCO funding appropriated for the Coast Guard operating budget, rather than a transfer from the Navy  The bill passed the House by a vote of 300-128, and the Senate that same day by a vote of 83-16  The President signed it into law the next day  Generally, the homeland security appropriations bill includes all annual appropriations provided for DHS, allocating resources to every departmental component  Discretionary appropriations provide roughly two-thirds to three-fourths of the annual funding for DHS operations, depending how one accounts for disaster relief spending and funding for overseas contingency operations  The remainder of the budget is a mix of fee revenues, trust funds, and mandatory spending  Appropriations measures for DHS typically have been organized into five titles  The first four are thematic groupings of components, while the fifth provides general direction to the department, and sometimes includes provisions providing additional budget authority  Prior to the FY2017 act, the legislative language of many appropriations included directions to components or specific conditions on how the budget authority it provided could be used  Similarly, general provisions provided directions or conditions to one or more components  In the FY2017 act, a number of these provisions within appropriations and component-specific general provisions were grouped at the ends of the titles where their targeted components are funded, and identified as "administrative provisions " This practice has continued in subsequent years  When DHS was established in 2003, components of other agencies were brought together over a matter of months, in the midst of ongoing budget cycles  Rather than developing a new structure of appropriations for the entire department, Congress and the Administration continued to provide resources through existing account structures when possible  At the direction of Congress, in 2014 DHS began to work on a new Common Appropriations Structure (CAS), which would standardize the format of DHS appropriations across components  In an interim report in 2015, DHS noted that operating with "over 70 different appropriations and over 100 Programs, Projects, and Activities     has contributed to a lack of transparency, inhibited comparisons between programs, and complicated spending decisions and other managerial decision-making " After several years of work and negotiations with Congress, DHS made its first budget request in the CAS for FY2017, and implemented it while operating under the continuing resolutions funding the department in October 2016  For FY2017 and FY2018, all DHS components requested appropriations under the CAS except for the Coast Guard, due to constraints of its financial management system  For FY2019, all the components' requests generally conformed to the CAS  A visual representation of the FY2019 requested funding in this new structure follows in Figure 1   On the left, CAS appropriations categories are listed next to a black bar representing the total FY2018 funding levels requested for DHS for each category  A catch-all "other" category is included for budget authority associated with the legislation that does not fit the CAS categories  Colored lines flow to the DHS components listed on the right, showing how the amount of funding for each appropriations category is distributed across DHS components  Wider lines indicate greater funding levels, so it is possible to understand how components may be funded differently  For example, while Customs and Border Protection (CBP) gets most of its funding from Operations and Support appropriations, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) receives most of its discretionary funding from the Disaster Relief Fund appropriation  The following sections present textual and tabular comparisons among FY2018 enacted appropriations, FY2019 requested appropriations, the FY2019 appropriations bills developed by the appropriations committees, and the final enacted annual appropriation in Division A of the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P L  116-6 )  The structure of the appropriations reflects the organization outlined in the detail table of the explanatory statement accompanying the act ( H Rept  116-9 )  The tables summarize enacted appropriations for FY2018, and those requested by the Administration, and proposed in appropriations committee-developed legislation under development for FY2019  Only the formal request for FY2019 annual appropriations is reflected in the "Request" column  The tables include data on enacted annual and supplemental appropriations  Instances where appropriations are provided for a title's components in other parts of the bill (such as in general provisions or by transfer) are shown separately  Supplemental appropriations provided with an emergency designation for a given component in FY2018 are displayed after the subtotal of annual appropriations  Following the methodology used by the appropriations committees, totals of "appropriations" do not include resources provided by transfer or under adjustments to discretionary spending limits (i e , for emergency requirements, overseas contingency operations for the Coast Guard or the cost of major disasters under the Stafford Act for the Federal Emergency Management Agency)  Amounts covered by adjustments are included with discretionary appropriations in a separate total for "discretionary funding " A subtotal for each component of total estimated budgetary resources that would be available under the legislation and from other sources (such as fees, mandatory spending, and trust funds) for the given fiscal year is also provided at the end of each component section  Totals at the bottom of each table indicate the total net discretionary appropriation for the title on its own, the total net discretionary funding from the annual appropriations bill and any supplemental appropriations (when such were provided), and the projected total estimated budgetary resources for each phase in the appropriations process shown in the table  Title I, Departmental Management and Operations, the smallest of the component-specific titles, contains appropriations for the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management, the Management Directorate, Analysis and Operations (A&O), and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)  For FY2018, these components received $1 36 billion in net discretionary funding through the appropriations process, including $25 million in FY2018 supplemental appropriations  The Trump Administration requested $1 60 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for components included in this title  In addition, $24 million was requested as a transfer from the FY2019 appropriation for the Disaster Relief Fund to the OIG  Not including the transfer, the appropriations request was $241 million (17 7%) more than the amount provided for FY2018  Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S  3109 included $1 47 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $137 million (8 6%) less than requested by the Trump Administration and $103 million (7 6%) more than the amount provided for FY2018  S  3109 included $72 million in discretionary budget authority drawn from unobligated prior-year balances from the DRF, but did not include the proposed transfer of FY2019 DRF resources to the OIG  As a result, the gross budgetary resources provided to components funded in Title I was $89 million (5 5%) less than the request, and $176 million (12 9%) more than provided in FY2018  House Appropriations Committee-reported H R  6776 included $1 48 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $119 million (7 4%) less than requested by the Trump Administration and $122 million (8 9%) more than the amount provided for FY2018  H R  6776 , like the Senate committee-reported bill, did not include the proposed transfer of FY2019 DRF resources to the OIG  As a result, the gross budgetary resources provided to components funded in Title I were $143 million (8 8%) less than the request, and $122 million (8 9%) more than provided in FY2018  P L  116-6 included a total of $1 88 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This included $51 million in a general provision for financial systems modernization, controlled by the management directorate  The total was $513 million (37 7%) more than was provided in FY2018, and $248 million (15 2%) more than was requested by the Administration, if one included the Administration's proposed transfer of $24 million from the Disaster Relief Fund to the Office of the Inspector General  Table 1 shows these comparisons in greater detail  As resources were requested or provided for the Management Directorate and Office of the Inspector General in some cases from outside Title I, separate lines are included for each of those components showing a total for what is provided solely within Title I, then the individual items funded outside the title, followed by the total annual appropriation for the components  Title II, Security, Enforcement, and Investigations, contains appropriations for U S  Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Coast Guard (USCG), and the U S  Secret Service (USSS)  Title II funding represents the majority of DHS's budget, comprising roughly three-quarters of the funding appropriated annually for the department  For FY2018, these components received $39 52 billion in net discretionary funding, as part of $47 13 billion in projected total budget authority  This included $1 06 billion in supplemental appropriations  The Trump Administration formally requested $38 41 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for components included in this title, as part of a total budget request for these components of $47 08 billion for FY2019  The funding request was $45 million (0 1%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  Again setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations, the total resources proposed for FY2019 was $1 01 billion (2 2%) more than projected for FY2018  The Administration reportedly sought additional funding in this title for construction of border barriers, above the formally requested level  In January 2019, the acting director of the Office of Management and Budget sent a letter to congressional leaders officially seeking an additional $4 1 billion  Those amounts are not included in these comparative calculations or in the table below  Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S  3109 included $38 68 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $271 million (0 7%) more than formally requested by the Trump Administration and $227 million (0 6%) more than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  The total budgetary resources projected under S  3109 were $614 million (1 3%) less than the Administration's request (largely due to rejection of a proposed TSA fee increase), but $391 million (0 8%) more than projected for FY2018, again setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  House Appropriations Committee-reported H R  6776 included $41 28 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $2 87 billion (7 5%) more than formally requested by the Trump Administration and $2 82 billion (7 3%) more than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  The total budgetary resources projected under H R  6776 were $2 08 billion (4 4%) more than formally requested by the Administration and $3 12 billion (6
Report 2: 8 million and $20 2 million, respectively, in FY2017, finance small-scale enterprise and grassroots self-help activities aimed at assisting poor people  Most U S  assistance is now provided as a grant (gift) rather than a loan, so as not to increase the heavy debt burden carried by many developing countries  However, the forms a grant may take are diverse  The most common type of U S  development aid is project-based assistance (77% in FY2017), in which aid is channeled through an implementing partner to complete a project  Aid is also provided in the form of core contribution to international organizations such as the United Nations, technical assistance, and direct budget support (cash transfer) to governments  A portion of aid money is also spent on administrative costs ( Figure 3 )  Within these categories, aid may take many forms, as described below  Although it is the exception rather than the rule, some countries receive aid in the form of a cash grant to the government  Dollars provided in this way support a government's balance-of-payments situation, enabling it to purchase more U S  goods, service its debt, or devote more domestic revenues to developmental or other purposes  Cash transfers have been made as a reward to countries that have supported the United States' counterterrorism operations (Turkey and Jordan in FY2004), to provide political and strategic support (both Egypt and Israel annually for decades after the 1979 Camp David Peace Accord), and in exchange for undertaking difficult political and economic reforms  Assistance may be provided in the form of food commodities, weapons systems, or equipment such as generators or computers  Food aid may be provided directly to meet humanitarian needs or to encourage attendance at a maternal/child health care program  Weapons supplied under the military assistance program may include training in their use  Equipment and commodities provided under development assistance are usually integrated with other forms of aid to meet objectives in a particular social or economic sector  For instance, textbooks have been provided in both Afghanistan and Iraq as part of a broader effort to reform the educational sector and train teachers  Computers may be offered in conjunction with training and expertise to fledgling microcredit institutions  Since PEPFAR was first authorized in 2004, antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) provided to individuals living with HIV/AIDS have been a significant component of commodity-based assistance  Although once a significant portion of U S  assistance programs, construction of economic infrastructure—roads, irrigation systems, electric power facilities, etc —was rarely provided after the 1970s  Because of the substantial expense of these projects, they were to be found only in large assistance programs, such as that for Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s, where the United States constructed major urban water and sanitation systems  The aid programs in Iraq and Afghanistan supported the building of schools, health clinics, roads, power plants, and irrigation systems  In Iraq alone, more than $10 billion went to economic infrastructure  Economic infrastructure is now also supported by U S  assistance in a wider range of developing countries through the Millennium Challenge Corporation  In this case, recipient countries design their own assistance programs, most of which, to date, include an infrastructure component  Transfer of knowledge and skills is a significant part of most assistance programs  The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) provides training to officers of the military forces of allied and friendly nations  Tens of thousands of citizens of aid recipient countries receive short-term technical training or longer-term degree training annually under USAID programs  More than one-quarter of Peace Corps volunteers are English, math, and science teachers  Other aid programs provide law enforcement personnel with anti-narcotics or anti-terrorism training  Many assistance programs provide expert advice to government and private sector organizations  The Department of the Treasury, USAID, and U S -funded multilateral banks all place specialists in host government ministries to make recommendations on policy reforms in a wide variety of sectors  USAID has often placed experts in private sector business and civic organizations to help strengthen them in their formative years or while indigenous staff are being trained  While most of these experts are U S  nationals, in Russia, USAID funded the development of locally staffed political and economic think tanks to offer policy options to that government  USAID, the Inter-American Foundation, and the African Development Foundation often provide aid in the form of small grants directly to local organizations to foster economic and social development and to encourage civic engagement in their communities  Grants are sometimes provided to microcredit organizations, such village-level women's savings groups, which in turn provide loans to microentrepreneurs  Small grants may also address specific community needs  Recent IAF grants, for example, have supported organizations that help resettle Salvadoran migrants deported from the United States and youth programs in Central America aimed at gang prevention  Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President may determine the terms and conditions under which most forms of assistance are provided  In general, the financial condition of a country—its ability to meet repayment obligations—has been an important criterion of the decision to provide a loan or grant  Some programs, such as humanitarian and disaster relief programs, were designed from the beginning to be entirely grant activities  During the past two decades, nearly all foreign aid—military as well as economic—has been provided in grant form  While loans represented 32% of total military and economic assistance between 1962 and 1988, this figure declined substantially beginning in the mid-1980s, until by FY2001, loans represented less than 1% of total aid appropriations  The de-emphasis on loan programs came largely in response to the debt problems of developing countries  Both Congress and the executive branch have generally supported the view that foreign aid should not add to the already existing debt burden carried by these countries  In the FY2019 budget request, the Trump Administration encouraged the use of loans over grants when providing military assistance (Foreign Military Financing), but Congress did not include language in support of that proposal in the enacted FY2019 appropriation ( P L  116-6 )  Although a small proportion of total current aid, there are significant USAID-managed programs that guarantee loans, meaning the U S  government agrees to pay a portion of the amount owed in the case of a default on a loan  A Development Credit Authority (DCA) loan guarantee, in which risk is shared with a private sector bank, can be used to increase access to finance in support of any development sector  The DCA is to be transferred from USAID in 2019 to the new IDFC, established by the BUILD Act of 2018 ( P L  115-254 ), to enhance U S  development finance capacity  Under the Israeli Loan Guarantee Program, the United States has guaranteed repayment of loans made by commercial sources to support the costs of immigrants settling in Israel from other countries and may issue guarantees to support economic recovery  USAID has also provided loan guarantees in recent years to improve the terms or amounts of financing from international capital markets for Ukraine and Jordan  In these cases, assistance funds representing a fraction of the guarantee amount are provided to cover possible default  Between 1946 and 2016, the United States loaned $112 7 billion in foreign economic and military aid to foreign governments, and while most foreign aid is now provided through grants, $9 18 billion in loans to foreign governments remained outstanding at the end of FY2016  For nearly three decades, Section 620q of the Foreign Assistance Act (the Brooke amendment) has prohibited new assistance to the government of any country that falls more than one year past due in servicing its debt obligations to the United States, though the President may waive application of this prohibition if he determines it is in the national interest  The United States has also forgiven debts owed by foreign governments and encouraged, with mixed success, other foreign aid donors and international financial institutions to do likewise  In some cases, the decision to forgive foreign aid debts has been based largely on economic grounds as another means to support development efforts by heavily indebted, but reform-minded, countries  The United States has been one of the strongest supporters of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)  These initiatives, which began in the late 1990s, include participation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international financial institutions in a comprehensive debt workout framework for the world's poorest and most debt-strapped nations  The largest and most hotly debated debt forgiveness actions have been implemented for much broader foreign policy reasons with a more strategic purpose  Poland, during its transition from a communist system and centrally planned economy (1990—$2 46 billion); Egypt, for making peace with Israel and helping maintain the Arab coalition during the Persian Gulf War (1990—$7 billion); and Jordan, after signing a peace accord with Israel (1994—$700 million), are examples  Similarly, the United States forgave about $4 1 billion in outstanding Saddam Hussein-era Iraqi debt in November 2004 and helped negotiate an 80% reduction in Iraq's debt to creditor nations later that month  Most development and humanitarian assistance activities are not directly implemented by U S  government personnel but by private sector entities, such as individual personal service contractors, consulting firms, universities, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), or public international organizations (PIOs)  Generally speaking, U S  government foreign service and civil servants determine the direction and priorities of the aid program, allocate funds while keeping within legislative requirements, ensure that appropriate projects are in place to meet aid objectives, select implementers, and monitor the implementation of those projects for effectiveness and financial accountability  Both USAID and the State Department have promoted the use of public-private partnerships, in which private entities such as corporations and foundations are contributing partners, not paid implementers, in situations where business interests and development objectives coincide  In FY2017, the United States provided some form of bilateral foreign assistance to more than 150 countries  Aid is concentrated heavily in certain countries, reflecting the priorities and interests of United States foreign policy at the time  Table 2 identifies the top 15 recipients of U S  foreign assistance for FY1997, FY2007 and FY2017  As shown in the table above, there are both similarities and sharp differences among country aid recipients for the three periods  The most consistent thread connecting the top aid recipients over the past two decades has been continuing U S  strategic interests in the Middle East, with large programs maintained for Israel and Egypt and, for Iraq, following the 2003 invasion  Two key countries in the U S  counterterrorism strategy, Afghanistan and Pakistan, made their first appearances on the list in FY2002 and continued to be among the top recipients in FY2017  In FY1997, one sub-Saharan African country appeared among leading aid recipients; in FY2017, 7 of the 15 are sub-Saharan African  Many are focus countries under the PEPFAR initiative to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic; South Sudan receives support as a newly independent country with multiple humanitarian and development needs  In FY1997, three countries from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union made the list, as many from the region had for much of the 1990s, representing the effort to transform the former communist nations to democratic societies and market-oriented economies  None of those countries appear in the FY2017 list  In FY1997, four Latin American countries make the list; no countries from the region appear in FY2017  On a regional basis, the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region has received the largest share of U S  foreign assistance for many decades  Although economic aid to the region's top two recipients, Israel and Egypt, began to decline in the late 1990s, the dominant share of bilateral U S  assistance consumed by the MENA region was maintained in FY2005 by the war in Iraq  Despite the continued importance of the region, its share slipped substantially by FY2017 as the effort to train and equip Iraqi forces diminished  Since September 11, 2001, South and Central Asia has emerged as a significant target of U S  assistance, rising from a roughly 3% share 20 years ago to 16% in FY2007 and 15% in FY2017, largely because of aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan  Similarly, the share represented by African nations has increased from 10% and 19%, respectively, in FY1997 and FY2007, to 25% in FY2017, largely due to the HIV/AIDS initiative that funnels resources mostly to African countries and to a range of other efforts to address the region's development challenges  Meanwhile, the share of aid to Europe/Eurasia, which greatly surpassed that of Africa in FY1997, has declined significantly in the past decade, to about 4% in FY2017, with the graduation of many East European aid recipients and the termination of programs in Russia  The Ukraine was responsible for about one third of aid to that region in FY2017  East Asia/Pacific has remained at a low level during the past two decades, while Latin America's share has risen and fallen based on U S  interest in Colombia and a few Central American countries as aid has shifted to regions of more pressing strategic interest (see Figure 4 )  There are several methods commonly used for measuring the amount of federal spending on foreign assistance  Amounts can be expressed in terms of budget authority (funds appropriated by Congress), obligations (amounts contractually committed), outlays or disbursements (money actually spent)  Assistance levels are also sometimes measured as a percentage of the total federal budget, as a percentage of total discretionary budget authority (excluding mandatory and entitlement programs), or as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) (for an indication of the national wealth allocated to foreign aid)  By nearly all of these measures, foreign aid resources fell gradually on average over several decades since the historical high levels of the late 1940s and early 1950s ( Appendix A )  This downward trend was sporadically interrupted, largely due to major foreign policy initiatives such as the Alliance for Progress for Latin America beginning in 1961, the infusion of funds to implement the Camp David Middle East Peace Accords in 1979, and an increase in military assistance to Egypt, Turkey, Greece and others in the mid-1980s  The lowest point in U S  foreign aid spending since World War II came in 1997, when foreign assistance obligations fell to just above $20 billion (in 2017 dollar terms)  ( Figure 5 ) While foreign aid consistently represented just over 1% of U S  annual gross domestic product in the decade following World War II, it fell gradually to between 0 2% and 0 4% for most years in the past three decades  Foreign assistance spending has comprised, on average, around 3% of discretionary budget authority and just over 1% of total budget authority each year since 1977, though the percentages have sometimes varied considerably from year to year  Foreign aid dropped from 5% of discretionary budget authority in 1979 to 2 4% in 2001, before rising sharply in conjunction with U S  activities in Afghanistan and Iraq starting in 2003  As a portion of total budget authority, foreign assistance reached 2 5% in 1979, but has hovered below 1 5% since 1987  In 2017, foreign assistance was estimated to account for 4 1% of discretionary budget authority and 1 2% of total budget authority ( Figure 6 ; Appendix A )  As previously discussed, since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, foreign aid funding has been closely tied to U S  counterterrorism strategy, particularly in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan  Bush and Obama Administration global health initiatives, the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and growth in counter-narcotics activities have driven funding increases as well  The Budget Control Act of 2011, and the drawdown of U S  military forces in Iraq, and to some degree Afghanistan, led to a notable dip in aid obligations in FY2013, but aid levels have risen again with efforts to address the crisis in Syria, counter-ISIL activities, and humanitarian aid  The use of the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO, discussed below) designation has enabled this growth despite the BCA limitations  Figure 7 shows how trends in foreign aid funding in recent decades can be attributed to specific foreign policy events and presidential initiatives  The Obama Administration's FY2012 international affairs budget proposed that the overseas contingency operations (OCO) designation, which had been applied since 2009 to war-related Defense appropriations, including to DOD assistance programs such as ISFF, ASFF and CERP, be extended to include "extraordinary, but temporary, costs of the Department of State and USAID in the front line states of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan " Congress not only adopted the OCO designation in the FY2012 SFOPS appropriations legislation, but expanded it to include funding for additional accounts and countries  In every fiscal year since, a portion of certain foreign assistance accounts—primarily ESF, FMF, IDA, MRA and INCLE—has been appropriated with the OCO designation  The OCO designation is significant because the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), which set annual caps on discretionary funding from FY2013 through FY2021, specified that funds designated as OCO do not count toward the discretionary spending limits established by the act  OCO designation makes it possible to prevent war-related funding from crowding out core international affairs activities within the budget allocation  The OCO approach is reminiscent of the use of supplemental international affairs appropriations for the first decade after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks  Congress appropriated significant emergency supplemental funds for foreign operations and Defense assistance programs every year from FY2002 through FY2010 for activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, which were not counted toward subcommittee budget allocations  Since the OCO designation was first applied to foreign operations in FY2012, supplemental appropriations for foreign aid have declined significantly  In the FY2019 and FY2020 budget requests, the Trump Administration did not request OCO funding within the international affairs budget, but did request OCO funding for the Department of Defense, including for DOD aid accounts  Congress used the OCO designation for both DOD and State/USAID accounts in the FY2019 appropriation, P L  116-6 , but a smaller portion of aid was designated as OCO compared to FY2018  It remains to be seen whether this is the beginning of a downward trend in OCO use for foreign aid  Congress historically sought to enhance the domestic benefits of foreign aid by requiring that most U S  foreign aid be used to procure U S  goods and services  The conditioning of aid on the procurement of goods and services from the donor-country is sometimes called "tied aid," and while quite common for much of the history of modern foreign assistance, has become increasingly disfavored in the international community  Studies have shown that tying aid increases the costs of goods and services by 15%-30% on average, and up to 40% for food aid, reducing the overall effectiveness of aid flows  The United States joined other donor nations in committing to reduce tied aid in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in March 2005, and the portion of tied aid from all donors fell from 70% of total bilateral development assistance in 1985 to an average of 12% in 2016  However, an estimated 32% of U S  bilateral development assistance was tied in 2016, the highest percentage among major donors, perhaps reflecting the perception of policymakers that maintaining public and political support for foreign aid programs requires ensuring direct economic benefit to the United States  About 67% of U S  foreign assistance funds in FY2017 were obligated to U S -based entities  A considerable amount of U S  foreign assistance funds remain in the United States, through domestic procurement or the use of U S  implementers, but the portion differs by program and is hard to identify with any accuracy  For some types of aid, the legislative requirements or program design make it relatively easy to determine how much aid is spent on U S  goods or services, while for others, this is more difficult to determine  USAID  Most USAID funding (Development Assistance, Global Health, Economic Support Fund) is implemented through contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with implementing partners  While many implementing partner organizations are based in the United States and employ U S  citizens, there is little information available about what portion of the funds used for program implementation are used for goods and services provided by American firms  Procurement reform efforts initiated by USAID in 2010 have aimed to increase procurement and implementation by host country entities as a means to enhance country ownership, build local capacity, and improve sustainability of aid programs  Food assistance commodities, until recently, were purchased wholly in the United States, and generally required by law to be shipped by U S  carriers, suggesting that the vast majority of food aid expenditures are made in the United States  Starting in FY2009, a small portion of food assistance was authorized to be purchased locally and regionally to meet urgent food needs more quickly  Successive Administrations and several Members of Congress have proposed greater flexibility in the food aid program, potentially increasing aid efficiency but reducing the portion of funds flowing to U S  farmers and shippers  To date, these proposals have been largely unsuccessful  Foreign Military Financing , with the exception of certain assistance allocated to Israel, is used exclusively to procure U S  military equipment and training  Millennium Challenge Corporation  The MCC bases its procurement regulations on those established by the World Bank, which calls for an open and competitive process, with no preference given to donor country suppliers  Between FY2011 and FY2017, the MCC awarded roughly 15% of the value of compact contracts to U S  firms  Multilateral development aid  Multilateral aid funds are mixed with funds from other nations and the bulk of the program is financed with borrowed funds rather than direct government contributions  Information on the U S  share of procurement financed by MDBs is unavailable  In addition to the direct benefits derived from aid dollars used for American goods and services, many argue that the foreign aid program brings significant indirect financial benefits to the United States  For example, analysts maintain that provision of military equipment through the military assistance program and food commodities through the Food for Peace program helps to develop future, strictly commercial, markets for those products  More broadly, as countries develop economically, they are in a position to purchase more goods from abroad and the United States benefits as a trade partner  Since an increasing majority of global consumers are outside of the United States, some business leaders assert that establishing strong economic and trade ties in the developing world, using foreign assistance as a tool, is key to U S  economic and job growth  Since World War II, with the exception of several years between 1989 and 2001, during which Japan ranked first among aid donors, the United States has led the developed countries in net disbursements of economic aid, or "Official Development Assistance (ODA)" as defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC)  In 2017, the most recent year for which data are available, the United States disbursed $34 12 billion in ODA, or about 24% of the $144 71 billion in total net ODA disbursements by DAC donors that year  Germany ranked second at $24 16 billion, the United Kingdom followed at $18 59 billion, Japan ranked fourth at $11 85 billion, and France rounded out the top donors with $11 03 billion in 2017 (see Figure 8 )  While the top five donors have not varied for more than a decade, there have been shifts lower down the ranking  For example, Turkey has become a much more prominent ODA donor in recent years (ranked 6 th in 2017, with $9 08 billion in ODA, compared to 21 st in 2006), reflecting large amounts of humanitarian aid to assist Syrian refugees  Even as it leads in dollar amounts of aid flows to developing countries, the United States often ranks low when aid is calculated as a percentage of gross national income (GNI)  This calculation is often cited in the context of international donor forums, as a level of 0 7% GNI was established as a target for donors in the 2000 U N  Millennium Development Goals  In 2017, the United States ranked at the bottom among major donors at 0 18% of GNI, slightly lower than Portugal and Spain (0 18% and 0 19%, respectively)  The United Arab Emirates, which has significantly increased its reported ODA in recent years, ranked first among top donors at 1 03% of GNI, followed by Sweden at 1 02% and Luxembourg at 1 00%  There has also been an increase in ODA from non-DAC countries  Between 2000 and 2014, China spent $81 1 billion in ODA, more than tripling its ODA commitments during this period  While reported Chinese ODA is still relatively small compared to that of major donor countries, policymakers are paying increasing attention to growing Chinese investments in developing countries that do not meet the ODA definition  China has touted its "Belt and Road" initiative as an effort to boost development and connectivity across as many as 125 countries to create "strategic propellers" for its own development  However, China has provided little official aggregate information on the initiative, including on the number of projects, countries involved, the terms of financing, and metrics for success  Numerous congressional authorizing committees and appropriations subcommittees maintain responsibility for U S  foreign assistance  Several committees have responsibility for authorizing legislation establishing programs and policy and for conducting oversight of foreign aid programs  In the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and in the House, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, have primary jurisdiction over bilateral development assistance, political/strategic and other economic security assistance, military assistance, and international organizations  Food aid, primarily the responsibility of the Agriculture Committees in both bodies, is periodically shared with the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House  U S  contributions to multilateral development banks are within the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Financial Services Committee  The large nontraditional aid programs funded by DOD, such as Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and the military aid programs in Afghanistan and Iraq, come under the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committees  Some global health assistance, such as research and other activities done by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, may fall under the jurisdiction of the House Energy and Commerce and Senate HELP committees  Traditionally, most foreign aid appropriations fall under the jurisdiction of the SFOPS Subcommittees, with food assistance appropriated by the Agriculture Subcommittees  As noted earlier, however, certain military, global health, and other activities that have been reported as foreign aid have been appropriated through other subcommittees in recent years, including the Defense and the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies subcommittees  (For current information on SFOPS Appropriations legislation, see CRS Report R45168, Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations , by Susan B  Epstein, Marian L  Lawson, and Cory R  Gill ) The most significant permanent foreign aid authorization laws are the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, covering most bilateral economic and security assistance programs (P L  87-195; 22 U S C  2151); the Arms Export Control Act (1976), authorizing military sales and financing (P L  90-629; 22 U S C  2751); the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P L  480), covering food aid (P L  83-480; 7 U S C  1691); and the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (1945), authorizing U S  participation in multilateral development banks (P L  79-171; 22 U S C  286)  In the past, Congress usually scheduled debates every two years on omnibus foreign aid legislation that amended these permanent authorization measures  Congress has not enacted into law a comprehensive foreign assistance authorization measure since 1985, although foreign aid authorizing bills have passed the House or Senate, or both, on numerous occasions  Foreign aid bills have frequently stalled at some point in the debate because of controversial issues, a tight legislative calendar, or executive-legislative foreign policy disputes  In contrast, DOD assistance is authorized in annual National Defense Authorization legislation  In lieu of approving a broad State Department/USAID authorization bill, Congress has on occasion authorized major foreign assistance initiatives for specific regions, countries, or aid sectors in stand-alone legislation or within an appropriation bill  Among these are the SEED Act of 1989 ( P L  101-179 ; 22 U S C  5401); the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 ( P L  102-511 ; 22 U S C  5801); the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 ( P L  108-25 ; 22 U S C  7601); the Tom Lantos and Henry J  Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 ( P L  110-293 ); the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (Division D, Title VI of P L  108-199 ); the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009 ( P L  111-73 ; 22 U S C  8401); the Global Food Security Act of 2016 ( P L  114-195 ; 22 U S C  9306), and the BUILD Act ( P L  115-254 )  In the absence of regular enactment of foreign aid authorization bills, appropriation measures considered annually within the SFOPS spending bill have assumed greater significance for Congress in influencing U S  foreign aid policy  Not only do appropriations bills set spending levels each year for nearly every foreign assistance account, SFOPS appropriations also incorporate new policy initiatives that would otherwise be debated and enacted as part of authorizing legislation  Appendix A  Data Table Appendix B  Common Foreign Assistance Abbreviations

ground_truth: SSA delivers services that touch the lives of almost every American, and relies heavily on IT resources to do so. Its systems support a range of activities, such as processing Disability Insurance payments, to calculating and withholding Medicare premiums, and issuing Social Security numbers and cards. For fiscal year 2018, the agency planned to spend approximately $1.6 billion on IT. GAO has previously reported that federal IT projects have often failed, in part, due to a lack of oversight and governance. Given the challenges that federal agencies, including SSA, have encountered in managing IT acquisitions, Congress and the administration have taken steps to improve federal IT, including enacting federal IT acquisition reform legislation and issuing related guidance. This statement summarizes GAO's previously reported findings regarding SSA's management of IT acquisitions and operations. In developing this testimony, GAO summarized findings from its reports issued in 2011 through 2018, and information on SSA's actions in response to GAO's recommendations. The Social Security Administration (SSA) has improved its management of information technology (IT) acquisitions and operations by addressing 14 of the 15 recommendations that GAO has made to the agency. For example, Incremental development . The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has emphasized the need for agencies to deliver IT investments in smaller increments to reduce risk and deliver capabilities more quickly. In November 2017, GAO reported that agencies, including SSA, needed to improve their certification of incremental development. As a result, GAO recommended that SSA's CIO (1) report incremental development information accurately, and (2) update its incremental development policy and processes. SSA implemented both recommendations. Software licenses . Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software. In May 2014, GAO reported that most agencies, including SSA, lacked comprehensive software license policies. As a result, GAO made six recommendations to SSA, to include developing a comprehensive software licenses policy and inventory. SSA implemented all six recommendations. However, SSA's IT management policies have not fully addressed the role of its CIO. Various laws and related guidance assign IT management responsibilities to CIOs in six key areas. In August 2018, GAO reported that SSA had fully addressed the role of the CIO in one of the six areas (see table). Specifically, SSA's policies fully addressed the CIO's role in the IT leadership and accountability area by requiring the CIO to report directly to the agency head, among other things. In contrast, SSA's policies did not address or minimally addressed the IT workforce and IT strategic planning areas. For example, SSA's policies did not include requirements for the CIO to annually assess the extent to which personnel meet IT management skill requirements or to measure how well IT supports agency programs. GAO recommended that SSA address the weaknesses in the remaining five key areas. SSA agreed with GAO's recommendation and stated that the agency plans to implement the recommendation by the end of this month. GAO has made 15 recommendations to SSA to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations from 2011 through 2018, and 1 recommendation to improve its CIO policies. While SSA has implemented nearly all of them, it would be better positioned to overcome longstanding IT management challenges when it addresses the CIO's role in its policies.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: SSA’s mission is to deliver Social Security services that meet the changing needs of the public  The Social Security Act and amendments established three programs that the agency administers: Old-Age and Survivors Insurance provides monthly retirement and survivors benefits to retired and disabled workers, their spouses and their children, and the survivors of insured workers who have died  SSA has estimated that, in fiscal year 2019, $892 billion in old-age and survivors insurance benefits are expected to be paid to a monthly average of approximately 54 million beneficiaries  Disability Insurance provides monthly benefits to disabled workers and their spouses and children  The agency estimates that, in fiscal year 2019, a total of approximately $149 billion in disability insurance benefits will be paid to a monthly average of about 10 million eligible workers  Supplemental Security Income is a needs-based program financed from general tax revenues that provides benefits to aged adults, blind or disabled adults, and children with limited income and resources  For fiscal year 2019, SSA estimates that nearly $59 billion in federal benefits and state supplementary payments will be made to a monthly average of approximately 8 million recipients  SSA relies heavily on its IT resources to support the administration of its programs and related activities  For example, its systems are used to handle millions of transactions on the agency’s website, maintain records for the millions of beneficiaries and recipients of its programs, and evaluate evidence and make determinations of eligibility for benefits  According to the agency’s most recent Information Resources Strategic Plan, its systems supported the processing of an average daily volume of about 185 million individual transactions in fiscal year 2015  SSA’s Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Systems is responsible for developing, overseeing, and maintaining the agency’s IT systems  Comprised of approximately 3,800 staff, the office is headed by the Deputy Commissioner, who also serves as the agency’s CIO  SSA has long been challenged in its management of IT  As a result, we have previously issued a number of reports highlighting various weaknesses in the agency’s system development practices, governance, requirements management, and strategic planning, among other areas  Collectively, our reports stressed the need for the agency to strengthen its IT management controls  In 2016, we reported that SSA’s acting commissioner had stated that the agency’s aging IT infrastructure was not sustainable because it was increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain  Accordingly, the agency requested $132 million in its fiscal year 2019 budget to modernize its IT environment  As reflected in the budget, these modernization efforts are expected to include projects such as updating database designs by converting them to relational databases, eliminating the use of outdated code, and upgrading infrastructure  Among the agency’s priority IT spending initiatives in the budget is its Disability Case Processing System, which has been under development since December 2010  This system is intended to replace the 52 disparate Disability Determination Services’ component systems and associated processes with a modern, common case processing system  According to SSA, the new system is to modernize the entire claims process, including case processing, correspondence, and workload management  However, SSA has reported substantial difficulty in the agency’s ability to carry out this initiative, citing software quality and poor system performance as issues  Consequently, in June 2016, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) placed the initiative on its government- wide list of 10 high-priority programs requiring attention  As previously mentioned, Congress enacted federal IT acquisition reform legislation (commonly referred to as FITARA) in December 2014  This legislation was intended to improve agencies’ acquisitions of IT and enable Congress to monitor agencies’ progress and hold them accountable for reducing duplication and achieving cost savings  It includes specific requirements related to seven areas: (1) agency CIO authority enhancements, (2) federal data center consolidation initiative, (3) enhanced transparency and improved risk management, (4) portfolio review, (5) IT acquisition cadres, (6) government-wide software purchasing program, and (7) the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative  In June 2015, OMB released guidance describing how agencies are to implement FITARA  The guidance identifies a number of actions that agencies are to take to establish a basic set of roles and responsibilities (referred to as the common baseline) for CIOs and other senior agency officials and, thus, to implement the authorities described in the law  More recently, on May 15, 2018, the President signed Executive Order 13833, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Agency Chief Information Officers  Among other things, this executive order is intended to better position agencies to modernize their technology, execute IT programs more efficiently, and reduce cybersecurity risks  The order pertains to 22 of the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies; the Department of Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are exempt  For the covered agencies, including SSA, the executive order strengthens the role of the CIO by, among other things, requiring the CIO to report directly to the agency head; to serve as the agency head’s primary IT strategic advisor; and to have a significant role in all management, governance, and oversight processes related to IT  In addition, one of the cybersecurity requirements directs agencies to ensure that the CIO works closely with an integrated team of senior executives, including those with expertise in IT, security, and privacy, to implement appropriate risk management measures  In June 2018, we issued a report that examined the cybersecurity workforce of the government  We noted that most of the 24 agencies we examined had developed baseline assessments to identify cybersecurity personnel within their agencies that held certifications, but the results were potentially unreliable  However, SSA’s baseline was found to be reliable because it addressed all of the reportable information, such as the extent to which personnel without professional certifications were ready to obtain them or strategies for mitigating any gaps  Further, we found that most of the 24 agencies had established procedures to assign cybersecurity codes to positions, including SSA  We also have ongoing work at SSA, including reviewing its cybersecurity workforce; standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring; cybersecurity strategy; and intrusion detection and prevention capabilities  From July 2011 through January 2018, we issued a number of reports that addressed specific weaknesses in SSA’s management of IT acquisitions and operations and in the role of its CIO  These reports included 15 recommendations aimed at improving the agency’s efforts with regard to data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses  We also made a recommendation to SSA to address weaknesses related to the role of the CIO in key management areas  SSA has taken steps to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations by addressing 14 of the 15 recommendations that we previously directed to the agency regarding data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses  Data center consolidation  OMB established the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative in February 2010 to improve the efficiency, performance, and environmental footprint of federal data center activities  The enactment of FITARA in 2014 codified and expanded the initiative  In addition, pursuant to FITARA, in August 2016, the Federal CIO issued a memorandum that announced the Data Center Optimization Initiative as a successor effort to the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative  Further, in August 2016, OMB released guidance which established the Data Center Optimization Initiative and included instructions on how to implement the date center consolidation and optimization provisions of FITARA  Among other things, the guidance required agencies to consolidate inefficient infrastructure, optimize existing facilities, improve their security posture, and achieve cost savings  In addition, the guidance directed agencies to develop a data center consolidation and optimization strategic plan that defines the agency’s data center strategy for fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018  This strategy is to include, among other things, a statement from the agency CIO indicating whether the agency has complied with all data center reporting requirements in FITARA  Further, the guidance indicates that OMB is to maintain a public dashboard to display consolidation-related cost savings and optimization performance information for the agencies  In a series of reports that we issued from July 2011 through August 2017, we noted that, while data center consolidation could potentially save the federal government billions of dollars, weaknesses existed in agencies’ data center consolidation plans and data center optimization efforts  Specifically with regard to SSA, in 2011, we reported that the agency had an incomplete consolidation plan and inventory of IT assets  In 2016, we reported that SSA did not meet any of the seven applicable data center optimization targets, as required by OMB  In addition, in 2017, we reported that the agency had an incomplete data center optimization plan  We stressed that until SSA completed these required activities, it might not be able to consolidate data centers, as required, and realize expected savings  We made a total of four recommendations to SSA in our 2011, 2016, and 2017 reports to help improve the agency’s reporting of data center-related cost savings and to achieve data center optimization targets  As of September 2018, SSA had implemented all four recommendations  Consequently, the agency is better positioned to improve the efficiency of its data centers and achieve cost savings  In addition, we reported in May 2018 that the agencies participating in the Data Center Optimization Initiative had communicated mixed progress toward achieving OMB’s goals for closing data centers by September 2018  With regard to SSA, we noted that the agency had not yet achieved its planned savings but that its data centers were among the most optimized that we reviewed  In particular, while SSA reported that it planned to save $1 08 million on its data center initiative from 2016 through 2018, it had not achieved any of those savings  However, the agency reported having met the goal of closing 25 percent of its tiered data centers  Further, SSA reported the most progress among the 22 applicable agencies in meeting OMB’s data center optimization targets  Specifically, SSA reported that it had met four of the five targets  (One other agency reported that it had met three targets, 6 agencies reported having met either one or two targets, and 14 agencies reported meeting none of the targets)  Consequently, we did not make any additional recommendations to SSA in our May 2018 report  We also have ongoing work involving SSA related to agencies’ progress on closing data center and achieving optimization targets  Incremental development  OMB has emphasized the need to deliver investments in smaller parts, or increments, in order to reduce risk, deliver capabilities more quickly, and facilitate the adoption of emerging technologies  In 2010, it called for agencies’ major investments to deliver functionality every 12 months and, since 2012, every 6 months  Subsequently, FITARA codified a requirement that covered agency CIOs certify that IT investments are adequately implementing incremental development, as defined in the capital planning guidance issued by OMB  Further, subsequent OMB guidance on the law’s implementation, issued in June 2015, directed agency CIOs to define processes and policies for their agencies to ensure that they certify that IT resources are adequately implementing incremental development  In November 2017, we reported that 21 agencies, including SSA, needed to improve their certification of incremental development  We pointed out that, as of August 2016, agencies had reported that 103 of 166 major IT software development investments (62 percent) were certified by the agency CIO for implementing adequate incremental development in fiscal year 2017, as required by FITARA  With regard to SSA, we noted that only 3 of the agency’s 10 investments primarily in development had been certified by the agency CIO as using adequate incremental development, as required by FITARA  In addition, we noted that SSA’s incremental development certification policy did not describe the CIO’s role in the certification process or how CIO certification would be documented  However, accurate agency CIO certification of the use of adequate incremental development for major IT investments is critical to ensuring that agencies are making the best effort possible to create IT systems that add value while reducing the risks associated with low-value and wasteful investments  As a result of these findings, we recommended that SSA ensure that its CIO (1) reports major IT investment information related to incremental development accurately, in accordance with OMB guidance; and (2) updates the agency’s policy and processes for the certification of incremental development and confirm that the policy includes a description of how the CIO certification will be documented  SSA agreed with our recommendations and implemented both of them  Thus, the agency should be better positioned to realize the benefits of incremental development practices, such as reducing investment risk, delivering capabilities more rapidly, and permitting easier adoption of emerging technologies  IT acquisitions  FITARA includes a provision to enhance covered agency CIOs’ authority through, among other things, requiring agency heads to ensure that CIOs review and approve IT contracts  OMB’s FITARA implementation guidance expanded upon this aspect of the legislation in a number of ways  Specifically, according to the guidance, CIOs may review and approve IT acquisition strategies and plans, rather than individual IT contracts, and CIOs can designate other agency officials to act as their representatives  In January 2018, we reported that most of the CIOs at 22 selected agencies, including SSA, were not adequately involved in reviewing and approving billions of dollars of IT acquisitions  In particular, we found that SSA’s process to identify IT acquisitions for CIO review did not involve the acquisition office, as required by OMB  In addition, we noted that SSA had a CIO review and approval process in place that fully satisfied the requirements set forth in OMB’s guidance  However, while SSA provided evidence of the CIO’s review of most of the IT contracts we examined, the agency had not ensured that the CIO or a designee reviewed and approved each IT acquisition plan or strategy  Specifically, of 10 randomly selected IT contracts that we examined at SSA, 7 acquisitions associated with those contracts had been reviewed and approved, as required by OMB  We pointed out that, until SSA ensured that its CIO or designee reviewed and approved all IT acquisitions, the agency would have limited visibility and input into its planned IT expenditures and would not be effectively positioned to benefit from the increased authority that FITARA’s contract approval provision is intended to provide  Further, the agency could miss an opportunity to strengthen the CIO’s authority and the oversight of IT acquisitions—thus, increasing the potential to award IT contracts that are duplicative, wasteful, or poorly conceived  Accordingly, we made three recommendations to SSA to address these weaknesses  As of September 2018, the agency had made progress by implementing two of the recommendations: to ensure that (1) the acquisition office is involved in identifying IT acquisitions and (2) the CIO or designee reviews and approves IT acquisitions according to OMB guidance  By taking these actions, SSA should be better positioned to properly identify and provide oversight of IT acquisitions  However, SSA has not yet implemented our third recommendation that it issue guidance to assist in the identification of IT acquisitions  SSA stated that, in September 2017, it updated its policy for acquisition plan approval to address this recommendation; however, upon review of this policy, we did not find guidance for identifying IT acquisitions  Without the proper identification of IT acquisitions, SSA’s CIO cannot effectively provide oversight of these acquisitions  Software licenses  Federal agencies engage in thousands of software licensing agreements annually  The objective of software license management is to manage, control, and protect an organization’s software assets  Effective management of these licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses, which can result in unused software, as well as too few licenses, which can result in noncompliance with license terms and cause the imposition of additional fees  As part of its PortfolioStat initiative, OMB has developed policy that addresses software licenses  This policy requires agencies to conduct an annual, agency-wide IT portfolio review to, among other things, reduce commodity IT spending  Such areas of spending could include software licenses  In May 2014, we reported on federal agencies’ management of software licenses and determined that better management was needed to achieve significant savings government-wide  Of the 24 agencies we reviewed, SSA was 1 of 22 that lacked comprehensive policies that incorporated leading practices  In particular, SSA’s policy partially met four of the leading practices and did not meet one  Further, we noted that SSA was among 22 of the 24 selected agencies that had not established comprehensive software license inventories—a leading practice that would help the agencies to adequately manage their software licenses  As such, we made six recommendations to SSA to improve its policies and practices for managing software licenses  These included recommendations that the agency develop a comprehensive policy for the management of software licenses and establish a comprehensive inventory of software licenses  SSA agreed with the recommendations and, as of September 2018, had implemented all six of them  As a result, the agency should be better positioned to manage its software licenses and identify opportunities for reducing software license costs  While SSA has taken steps that improved its IT management in the areas of data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses, we reported in August 2018 that the agency had not fully addressed the role of the CIO in its policies  As previously mentioned, FITARA and the President Executive Order 13833, among other laws and guidance, outline the roles and responsibilities for agency CIOs in an attempt to improve the government’s performance in IT and related information management functions  Within these laws and guidance, we identified IT management responsibilities assigned to CIOs in six key IT areas: Leadership and accountability  CIOs are responsible and accountable for the effective implementation of IT management responsibilities  For example, CIOs are to report directly to the agency head or that official’s deputy and designate a senior agency information security officer  Strategic planning  CIOs are required to lead the strategic planning for all IT management functions  An example of a CIO requirement related to the strategic planning area is measuring how well IT supports agency programs and reporting annually on the progress in achieving the goals  IT workforce  CIOs are to assess agency IT workforce needs and develop strategies and plans for meeting those needs  For example, CIOs are responsible for annually assessing the extent to which agency personnel meet IT management knowledge and skill requirements, developing strategies to address deficiencies, and reporting to the head of the agency on the progress made in improving these capabilities  IT budgeting  CIOs are responsible for the processes for all annual and multi-year IT planning, programming, and budgeting decisions  For example, CIOs are to have a significant role in IT planning, programming, and budgeting decisions  IT investment management  CIOs are to manage, evaluate, and assess how well the agency is managing its IT resources  In particular, CIOs are required to improve the management of the agency’s IT through portfolio review  Information security  CIOs are to establish, implement, and ensure compliance with an agency-wide information security program  For example, CIOs are required to develop and maintain an agency-wide security program, policies, procedures, and control techniques  In our August 2018 report, we noted that SSA, along with 23 other agencies, did not have policies that fully addressed the role of the CIO in these six key areas, consistent with the laws and guidance  To its credit, SSA had fully addressed the role of the CIO in the IT leadership and accountability area  In particular, the agency’s policies addressed the requirements that the CIO report directly to the agency head, assume responsibility and accountability for IT investments, and designate a senior agency information security officer  However, the policies did not fully address the role of the CIO in the other five areas (i e , strategic planning, workforce, budgeting, investment management, and information security)  For example, the agency’s policies did not address the IT workforce area at all, including the requirements that the CIO annually assess the extent to which agency personnel meet IT management knowledge and skill requirements, develop strategies to address deficiencies, and report to the head of the agency on the progress made in improving these capabilities  Further, SSA’s policies minimally addressed the requirements for IT strategic planning  Specifically, while the agency’s policies required the CIO to establish goals for improving agency operations through IT, the policies did not require the CIO to measure how well IT supports agency programs and report annually on the progress in achieving the goals  Table 1 summarizes the extent to which SSA’s policies addressed the role of its CIO, as reflected in our August 2018 report  As a result of these findings, we made a recommendation to SSA to address the weaknesses in its policies with regard to the remaining five key management areas  In response, the agency agreed with our recommendation and, subsequently, stated that it planned to do so by the end of September 2018  Following through to ensure that the identified weaknesses are addressed in its policies will be essential to helping SSA overcome its longstanding IT management challenges  In conclusion, effective IT management is critical to the performance of SSA’s mission  Toward this end, the agency has taken steps to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations by implementing 14 of the 15 recommendations we made from 2011 through 2018 to improve its IT management  Nevertheless, SSA would be better positioned to effectively address longstanding IT management challenges by ensuring that it has policies in place that fully address the role and responsibilities of its CIO in the five key management areas, as we previously recommended  Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Larson, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have  If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony, please contact Carol C  Harris at (202) 512-4456 or harriscc@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this statement are Kevin Walsh (Assistant Director), Jessica Waselkow (Analyst in Charge), and Rebecca Eyler  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2: 8%) more than projected for FY2018, again setting aside FY2018 supplemental appropriations  H R  6776 would have provided $2 59 billion (6 7%) more than S  3019 , largely due to the House Appropriations Committee recommending $3 35 billion more than its Senate counterpart for CBP's Border Security Assets and Infrastructure activity  P L  116-6 included $40 00 billion in net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  The enacted annual appropriations were $1 59 billion (4 1%) more than requested, and $486 million (1 2%) more than the amount provided in FY2018  Setting aside FY2018 supplemental funding, FY2019 enacted net discretionary funding exceeded FY2018 levels by $1 55 billion (4 0%)  The total budgetary resources projected for components funded in this title were $47 82 billion, $704 million (1 5%) more than was formally requested by the Administration, and $1 75 billion (3 8%) more than was provided in FY2018, setting aside the FY2018 supplemental funding  Table 2 shows these comparisons in greater detail  Title III, Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, contains appropriations for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)  It is the second largest of the component-specific titles  For FY2018, these components received $7 22 billion in net discretionary appropriations and $7 37 billion in specially designated funding for disaster relief through the annual appropriations process  In addition to that annual funding, $58 23 billion was provided for FEMA in emergency supplemental appropriations in FY2018  Incorporating all these elements, the total net discretionary funding level for all Title III components was $72 61 billion for FY2018  The Trump Administration requested $6 19 billion in FY2019 net discretionary appropriations for components included in this title, and $6 65 billion in specially designated funding for disaster relief as part of a total net discretionary funding level for these components of $12 84 billion for FY2019  Setting aside the $58 23 billion in FY2018 supplemental appropriations, the appropriations request was $1 54 billion (10 7%) less than the amount provided for FY2018 in net discretionary funding  Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S  3109 included $13 54 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $694 million (5 4%) more than requested by the Trump Administration and $847 million (5 9%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  The total budgetary resources projected would be $718 million (3 8%) more than the Administration's request, but $1 29 billion (6 2%) less than projected for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  The Senate committee-reported bill included within these totals the requested disaster relief funding of $6 65 billion, and offset $228 million in its Federal Assistance appropriation from unobligated DRF balances  House Appropriations Committee-reported H R  6776 included $13 70 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  This was $861 million (6 7%) more than requested by the Trump Administration and $681 million (4 7%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  The total budgetary resources projected would be $885 million (4 7%) more than the Administration's request, but $1 13 billion (5 4%) less than projected for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  The House committee-reported bill included within these totals the requested disaster relief funding of $6 65 billion  P L  116-6 included $18 27 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  The enacted discretionary funding level was $5 43 billion (42 3%) more than requested, and $3 89 billion (27 1%) more than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside the historically high level of supplemental appropriations  The total budgetary resources projected for FY2019 was $5 46 billion (29 0%) more than was requested, and $3 44 billion (16 5%) more than was projected for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental funding  Table 3 shows these comparisons in greater detail  As some annually appropriated resources were provided for FEMA from outside Title III in FY2018, a separate line is included for FEMA showing a total for what is provided solely within Title III, then the non-Title III appropriation, followed by the total annual appropriation for FEMA  Title IV, Research and Development, Training, and Services, the second smallest of the component-specific titles, contains appropriations for the U S  Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)  In FY2018, these components received $1 57 billion in net discretionary funding, as part of a projected total budget of $5 92 billion  This included $10 million in supplemental appropriations for FLETC  The Trump Administration requested $1 53 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for components included in this title, as part of a total budget for these components of $6 11 billion for FY2018  The funding request was $36 million (2 3%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, setting aside supplemental appropriations, although the overall budget request was $201 million (3 3%) higher than the annual budget projected for FY2018 (again, setting aside supplemental funding)  This is due to changes in anticipated fee collections for USCIS and reorganization of most of the Office of Health Affairs and DNDO into the new CWMD component reflected in the request  Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S  3109 included $1 53 billion in net discretionary funding for components included in this title, as part of a projected total budget of $6 23 billion  This was $115 million (7 5%) more than requested, and $79 million (5 0%) less than the amount provided for FY2018, not including supplemental funding  The total budgetary resources projected under S  3109 would have been $115 million (1 9%) more than the Administration's request, and $316 million (5 3%) more than projected for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  House Appropriations Committee-reported H R  6776 included $1 64 billion in net discretionary funding for components included in this title, as part of a projected total budget of $6 21 billion  This was $97 million (6 3%) more than requested, and $60 million (3 9%) more than the amount provided for FY2018, not including supplemental funding  The total budgetary resources projected under H R  6776 would have been $97 million (1 6%) more than the Administration's request, and $297 million (5 0%) more than projected for FY2018, setting aside supplemental funding  P L  116-6 included $1 62 billion in FY2019 net discretionary funding for the components funded in this title  Enacted FY2019 appropriations were $199 million (3 3%) more than was requested by the Administration, and $163 million (10 4%) more than was provided in FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental funding  Total budgetary resources projected for FY2019 are $199 million (3 3%) more than were requested by the Administration, and $400 million (6 8%) more than was projected for FY2018, setting aside FY2018 supplemental funding  Table 4 shows these comparisons in greater detail  As noted above, the fifth title of the FY2019 DHS appropriations act contains general provisions, the impact of which may reach across the entire department, affect multiple components, or focus on a single activity  Rescissions of prior-year appropriations—cancellations of budget authority that reduce the net funding level in the bill—are found in this title  For FY2018, Division F of P L  115-141 included $489 million in rescissions  For FY2019, the Administration proposed rescinding $300 million in prior-year funding from the DRF  S  3109 included $137 million in rescissions from other appropriations, but specifically directed the $300 million the Administration had proposed rescinding from the DRF to other activities within DHS  H R  6776 did not include any rescissions, although an amendment from Representative Palazzo was passed in full committee markup on a voice vote redirecting unobligated balances from the Science and Technology Directorate to the Coast Guard  Division A of P L  116-6 included $303 million in rescissions, and a provision directing that $300 million of DRF unobligated balances be used to offset new DRF appropriations  In FY2018, funding was also included in Title V for the Financial Systems Modernization initiative and a grant program for Presidential Residence Protection costs, which are reflected in the tables for Title I and Title III, respectively, as those titles fund the components that manage these resources  For FY2019, Title V of S  3109 only funded the Financial Systems Modernization initiative, and Title V of H R  6776 only funded Presidential Residence Protection costs  Title V of P L  116-6 , Division A, included funding for both the Financial Systems Modernization initiative and Presidential Residence Protection costs  The detail table in the back of H Rept  115-948 also notes the discretionary cost of several policy changes in H R  6776   Four amendments adopted in House Appropriations Committee markup resulted in a net $13 million increase in the score of the bill, which is reflected in the detail table, but not in the tables of this report  No such costs are reflected in the detail table of H Rept  116-9   For additional perspectives on FY2019 DHS appropriations, see the following: CRS Report R44604, Trends in the Timing and Size of DHS Appropriations: In Brief ; CRS Report R44052, DHS Budget v  DHS Appropriations: Fact Sheet ; and CRS Report R45262, Comparing DHS Component Funding, FY2019: In Brief   Congressional clients also may wish to consult CRS's experts directly  The following table lists CRS analysts and specialists who have expertise in policy areas linked to DHS appropriations  Budget Authority, Obligations, and Outlays Federal government spending involves a multistep process that begins with the enactment of budget authority by Congress  Federal agencies then obligate funds from enacted budget authority to pay for their activities  Finally, payments are made to liquidate those obligations; the actual payment amounts are reflected in the budget as outlays  Budget authority is established through appropriations acts or direct spending legislation and determines the amounts that are available for federal agencies to spend  The Antideficiency Act prohibits federal agencies from obligating more funds than the budget authority enacted by Congress  Budget authority also may be indefinite in amount, as when Congress enacts language providing "such sums as may be necessary" to complete a project or purpose  Budget authority may be available on a one-year, multiyear, or no-year basis  One-year budget authority is available for obligation only during a specific fiscal year; any unobligated funds at the end of that year are no longer available for spending  Multiyear budget authority specifies a range of time during which funds may be obligated for spending, and no-year budget authority is available for obligation for an indefinite period of time  Obligations are incurred when federal agencies employ personnel, enter into contracts, receive services, and engage in similar transactions in a given fiscal year—which create a legal requirement for the government to pay  Outlays are the funds that are actually spent during the fiscal year  Because multiyear and no-year budget authorities may be obligated over a number of years, outlays do not always match the budget authority enacted in a given year  Additionally, budget authority may be obligated in one fiscal year but spent in a future fiscal year, especially with certain contracts  In sum, budget authority allows federal agencies to incur obligations and authorizes payments, or outlays, to be made from the Treasury  Discretionary funded agencies and programs, and appropriated entitlement programs, are funded each year in appropriations acts  Discretionary and Mandatory Spending Gross budget authority , or the total funds available for spending by a federal agency, may be composed of discretionary and mandatory spending  Discretionary spending is not mandated by existing law and is thus appropriated yearly by Congress through appropriations acts  The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 defines discretionary appropriations as budget authority provided in annual appropriations acts and the outlays derived from that authority, but it excludes appropriations for entitlements  Mandatory spending , also known as direct spending , consists of budget authority and resulting outlays provided in laws other than appropriations acts and is typically not appropriated each year  Some mandatory entitlement programs, however, must be appropriated each year and are included in appropriations acts  Within DHS, Coast Guard retirement pay is an example of appropriated mandatory spending  Offsetting Collections Offsetting funds are collected by the federal government, either from government accounts or the public, as part of a business-type transaction such as collection of a fee  These funds are not considered federal revenue  Instead, they are counted as negative outlays  DHS net discretionary budget authority , or the total funds appropriated by Congress each year, is composed of discretionary spending minus any fee or fund collections that offset discretionary spending  Some collections offset a portion of an agency's discretionary budget authority  Other collections offset an agency's mandatory spending  These mandatory spending elements are typically entitlement programs under which individuals, businesses, or units of government that meet the requirements or qualifications established by law are entitled to receive certain payments if they establish eligibility  The DHS budget features two mandatory entitlement programs: the Secret Service and the Coast Guard retired pay accounts (pensions)  Some entitlements are funded by permanent appropriations, and others are funded by annual appropriations  Secret Service retirement pay is a permanent appropriation and, as such, is not annually appropriated  In contrast, Coast Guard retirement pay is annually appropriated  In addition to these entitlements, the DHS budget contains offsetting Trust and Public Enterprise Funds  These funds are not appropriated by Congress  They are available for obligation and included in the President's budget to calculate the gross budget authority  302(a) and 302(b) Allocations In general practice, the maximum budget authority for annual appropriations (including DHS) is determined through a two-stage congressional budget process  In the first stage, Congress sets overall spending totals in the annual concurrent resolution on the budget  Subsequently, these totals are allocated among the appropriations committees, usually through the statement of managers for the conference report on the budget resolution  These amounts are known as the 302(a) allocations   They include discretionary totals available to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations for enactment in annual appropriations bills through the subcommittees responsible for the development of the bills  In the second stage of the process, the appropriations committees allocate the 302(a) discretionary funds among their subcommittees for each of the appropriations bills  These amounts are known as the 302(b) allocations   These allocations must add up to no more than the 302(a) discretionary allocation and form the basis for enforcing budget discipline, since any bill reported with a total above the ceiling is subject to a point of order  The 302(b) allocations may be adjusted during the year by the respective appropriations committee issuing a report delineating the revised suballocations as the various appropriations bills progress toward final enactment  No subcommittee allocations are developed for conference reports or enacted appropriations bills  Table A-1 shows comparable figures for the 302(b) allocation for FY2018, based on the adjusted net discretionary budget authority included in Division F of P L  115-141 , the President's request for FY2019, and the House and Senate subcommittee allocations for the Homeland Security appropriations bills for FY2019  The Budget Control Act, Discretionary Spending Caps, and Adjustments The Budget Control Act established enforceable discretionary limits, or caps, for defense and nondefense spending for each fiscal year from FY2012 through FY2021  Subsequent legislation, including the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, amended those caps  Most of the budget for DHS is considered nondefense spending  In addition, the Budget Control Act allows for adjustments that would raise the statutory caps to cover funding for overseas contingency operations/Global War on Terror, emergency spending, and, to a limited extent, disaster relief and appropriations for continuing disability reviews and control of health care fraud and abuse  Three of the four justifications outlined in the Budget Control Act for adjusting the caps on discretionary budget authority have played a role in DHS's appropriations process  Two of these—emergency spending and overseas contingency operations/Global War on Terror—are not limited  The third justification—disaster relief—is limited  Under the Budget Control Act, the allowable adjustment for disaster relief was determined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), using the following formula until FY2019: Limit on disaster relief cap adjustment for the fiscal year = Rolling average of the disaster relief spending over the last ten fiscal years (throwing out the high and low years) + the unused amount of the potential adjustment for disaster relief from the previous fiscal year  The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 amended the above formula, increasing the allowable size of the adjustment by adding 5% of the amount of emergency-designated funding for major disasters under the Stafford Act, calculated by OMB as $6 296 billion  The act also extended the availability of unused adjustment capacity  In August 2018, OMB released a sequestration update report for FY2019 that provided a preview estimate of the allowable adjustment for FY2019 of $14 965 billion —the second-largest allowable adjustment for disaster relief in the history of the mechanism  $12 billion of that adjustment was exercised in P L  116-6 , Division A, in appropriations for the Disaster Relief Fund  No other annual appropriations used the disaster relief adjustment for FY2019  

ground_truth: This report provides an overview and analysis of FY2019 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The primary focus of this report is on congressional direction and funding provided to DHS through the appropriations process. It includes an Appendix with definitions of key budget terms used throughout the suite of Congressional Research Service reports on homeland security appropriations. It also directs the reader to other reports providing context for specific component appropriations. As part of an overall DHS budget that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimated to be $74.88 billion, the Trump Administration requested $47.43 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority through the appropriations process for DHS for FY2018. The request amounted to a $0.29 billion (0.6%) decrease from the $47.72 billion in annual appropriations enacted for FY2018 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141, Division F). The Administration also requested discretionary funding for DHS components that does not count against discretionary spending limits and is not reflected in the adjusted net discretionary budget authority total. The Administration requested an additional $6.65 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25; BCA), and in the budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD), $165 million in Overseas Contingency Operations designated funding (OCO) from the Operations and Maintenance budget of the U.S. Navy. On June 21, 2018, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out S. 3109, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, accompanied by S.Rept. 115-283. Committee-reported S. 3109 included $48.33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2019. This was $901 million (1.9%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $611 million (1.3%) above the enacted level for FY2018. The Senate committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, and included the OCO funding in an appropriation to the Coast Guard, rather than as a transfer from the U.S. Navy. On July 26, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee marked up H.R. 6776, its version of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019. H.Rept. 115-948 was filed September 12, 2018. Committee-reported H.R. 6776 included $51.44 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority. The House committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, but unlike S. 3109, did not include the OCO funding for the Coast Guard. As some of the annual appropriations for FY2019 remained unfinished, a consolidated appropriations bill that included a continuing resolution was passed by Congress and signed into law on September 28, 2018. The resolution, which covered DHS along with several other departments and agencies, continued funding at a rate of operations equal to FY2018 with some exceptions. This continuing resolution was extended through December 21, 2018, after which point annual appropriations lapsed. A partial government shutdown ensued for 35 days until continuing appropriations were resumed January 25, 2019, by P.L. 116-5. P.L. 116-6, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, was passed by Congress on February 14, 2019, and signed into law the following day. Division A of the act included the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, which included $49.41 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, $12 billion designated for the costs of major disasters, and $165 million in OCO funding for the Coast Guard. This report will be updated in the event of FY2019 supplemental appropriations actions.