prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: The U S  Constitution does not clearly specify how military bases should be managed  Article II, Section 2, appoints the President as the commander-in-chief, with the implied power to deploy, and redeploy, the armed forces as necessary for national defense  In common practice, this has included the authority to create and close military installations needed to accommodate and train personnel under the President's command  However, Article I, Section 8, charges Congress with the responsibility to raise armies, maintain a Navy, and regulate the militia  Through annual authorization and appropriation legislation, Congress legislates policy for managing DOD real property assets and funds the construction, maintenance, operation, and disposal of military infrastructure  Throughout most of American history, the President has exercised broad, relatively unchallenged authority for opening, closing, or realigning military installations  Congress largely deferred to the Executive branch primarily because the President, as commander-in-chief, is empowered with the responsibility of deploying military forces  Prompted by large-scale closures of World War II era infrastructure during the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted legislation in 1977 that effectively limited the Executive branch's ability to close or realign major military installations  The new statute, later codified as 10 U S C  2687 (Section 612 of the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1978, P L  95-82 ), generally required DOD to conduct comprehensive and lengthy assessments of major basing decisions as part of a congressional report-and-wait process  These assessments could be challenged in court on environmental grounds or on questions related to their sufficiency, further lengthening delays  The new legislation effectively halted DOD's ability to close or realign domestic bases of significant size  In the decade that followed the passage of 10 U S C  2687, congressional pressure grew to accommodate DOD basing priorities  By 1988, ongoing negotiations between the Secretary of Defense and the House and Senate Armed Service Committees led to new legislation ( P L  100-526 ) that authorized a limited number of base closures based on the oversight of an independent panel  Though later modified, the effort marked the beginning of the first Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, which was intended to insulate base closings from considerations such as favoritism or other political interference  Widely considered a success, the 1988 BRAC legislation was taken up again and modified in succeeding BRAC rounds; first in 1991, 1993, and 1995; and again in 2005  The modern BRAC process refers to a temporary authority that amends the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 ( P L  101-510 ), hereinafter referred to as the Base Closure Act , and features a framework of elements that entrusts an independent commission with certifying closure and realignment recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense  In general, the process has required the Secretary to submit a list of military installations recommended for closure or realignment to an independent, bipartisan BRAC commission  After analyzing the Secretary's recommendations, the commission may accept, reject, or modify the list  Upon completing its review, the commission forwards its final findings and recommendations to the President  Upon acceptance of commission's recommendations, the President then submits them to Congress  If the President does not submit the recommendations to Congress within the timeframe required under the Base Closure Act, the BRAC process is terminated  Upon receipt of the report from the President, Congress has the opportunity to disapprove of the recommendations in toto through the enactment of a joint resolution  The hallmarks of this framework include establishment of an independent commission whose members are appointed by the President, in consultation with congressional leadership (and the advice and consent of the Senate); reliance on objective and uniform criteria for evaluating basing recommendations; GAO review and certification of DOD data; deliberations that include open hearings, solicitation of feedback, installation visits, and data available for public review; requirement that the commission's final list of closure and realignment actions be accepted or rejected in its entirety; and presidential and congressional off-ramps that would terminate the BRAC process when certain conditions are not met  The timeline to complete an entire BRAC round has varied; however, the most recent one conducted in 2005 took approximately 10 years, from authorization to completion (end of the six-year BRAC implementation period)  Key milestones of a typical BRAC timeline include DOD force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and analysis of options (up to four years); nomination and confirmation of BRAC commissioners; DOD submission of BRAC recommendations (and associated reports) to the commission; commission deliberations (typically four months); final report sent to the President for approval; 45-day deadline for Congress to reject recommendations in their entirety (Joint Resolution of Disapproval) or allow implementation to begin; DOD implementation (two years to begin; six years to complete); and DOD disposal of real property (indeterminate)  BRAC is often characterized as a cost efficiency measure that enables DOD to more effectively manage its real property assets by allowing it to shed excess infrastructure, but historically, potential costs and savings have been a consideration that have ranked below military value  No BRAC round has established cost savings targets, floors, or ceilings  During BRAC rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to develop and report a set of objective selection criteria that would be used for identifying bases for closure and realignment  For the 2005 round, Congress amended the BRAC statute to require the Secretary to regard military value (defined below) as the primary consideration  Other factors, such as potential costs and savings, were explicitly categorized as lower priority  Because the amended legislative language reflected longstanding DOD policy, the 2005 BRAC criteria appear almost identical when compared with previous versions, with additional language added for emphasis or included for explanatory examples  The excerpt below indicates the 2005 BRAC selection criteria  Emphasized text (in italics) represents new language not included as part of the 1995 criteria  SEC  2913  SELECTION CRITERIA FOR 2005 ROUND  (a) FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA —The final criteria to be used by the Secretary in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005 shall be the military value and other criteria specified in subsections (b) and (c)  (b) MILITARY VALUE CRITERIA —The military value criteria are as follows: (1) The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness  (2) The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations  (3) The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training  (4) The cost of operations and the manpower implications  (c)  OTHER CRITERIA —The other criteria that the Secretary shall use in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005 are as follows: (1) The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs  (2) The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations  (3) The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel  (4) The environmental impact , including the impact of costs related to potential environ mental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities  The transfer and disposal of DOD real property made available following the implementation of a BRAC round is a complex process that may extend for years beyond the initial six-year implementation window  Disposal may be delayed or otherwise affected by the participation of local and state communities and the degree to which environmental remediation by federal authorities is necessary  The graph below shows the total acreage from previous BRAC rounds yet to be disposed  The Base Closure Act authorizes a variety of conveyance mechanisms not otherwise available for the transfer and disposal of federal property, a process typically performed by the General Services Administration (GSA)  Under a BRAC, conveyance authority is delegated from GSA, through the Secretary of Defense to the various military departments, which receive special approval to supersede GSA regulations with BRAC specific regulations  The primary difference between the routine disposal of federal property and real property conveyed under a BRAC is the role of local communities  Under normal (non-BRAC) circumstances, the General Services Administration (GSA) is directly responsible for disposing of any surplus federal real property, which includes defense property  A military department in possession would, for example, declare property as excess to its needs and turn over the administration of a site to the GSA  The GSA would then follow a number of consecutive steps for disposal of federal property laid out in statute  It would first offer the excess property to other federal agencies  If none expressed an interest, the excess property would be declared surplus   The GSA would then offer the surplus property to state or local governments and non-profits that might use it for a public benefit ( public benefit conveyance) , such as a homeless shelter or medical center  Finally, if the property has neither been transferred nor conveyed in the previous steps, the surplus property would be offered for sale to the public  Under a BRAC, local communities can significantly affect the BRAC property transfer and disposal decisions, which are managed by the Secretary of the responsible military department  Once approved for closure, communities around an installation typically organize a Local Redevelopment Authority (LRA) for the purpose of creating and executing a redevelopment plan for the property  While the plan is not binding on DOD, the Department has been statutorily directed to give the plan considerable weight  DOD makes economic development grants and technical support available through its Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to assist LRAs with the process  In recent BRAC rounds, Congress has authorized a special transfer authority that has permitted DOD to transfer title to property at less than fair market value, or even at no cost, if the LRA agrees to certain conditions designed to create employment at the former defense facility  This has been referred to as an Economic Development Conveyance (EDC)  DOD has asserted that savings generated from BRAC are generally the result of avoiding the cost of retaining and operating unneeded infrastructure, with upfront costs eventually offset by annual savings  Between FY2012 and FY2018, the Department consistently argued for a new BRAC, asserting that "absent another BRAC round, the Department will continue to operate some of its installations sub-optimally as other efficiency measures, changing force structure, and technology reduce the number of missions and personnel " Emphasizing the potential cost savings, DOD has suggested a new "efficiency-focused BRAC" could save the Department billions of dollars annually: "Savings from BRAC rounds are real and substantial  The last five BRAC rounds are collectively saving the Department $12B annually  A new efficiency-focused BRAC could save the Department an additional ~$2B annually (based on the '93/'95 rounds) " In its ongoing series of BRAC-related reports, the GAO has noted the unreliability of DOD cost savings estimates  In 2013, GAO concluded that, though the Department had achieved annual recurring savings as the result of the 2005 round, visibility into the outcome has been limited due to missing and inconsistent recordkeeping  Similar studies have raised questions about the data DOD has used to predict and monitor BRAC effectiveness, long-term savings, and outcomes  For example "    the services did not develop baseline operating costs before implementing the BRAC recommendations, which would have enabled it to determine whether savings were achieved " "    We found that DOD's process for providing the BRAC commission with cost and savings estimates was hindered by underestimating recommendation-specific requirements and that DOD did not fully anticipate information technology requirements for many of the recommendations " "The department cannot provide documentation to show to what extent it reduced plant replacement value or vacated leased space as it reported in May 2005 that it was intended to do     In addition, DOD bundled multiple closures     thus limiting visibility into the estimated costs and savings for individual closures and realignments " "    DOD has not reported to Congress how the cleanup of emerging contaminants, especially certain perfluorinated compounds, at installations closed under BRAC will significantly increase the estimated (BRAC) cleanup costs " "    We found that OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) did not have a fully developed method for accurately collecting information on costs, savings, and efficiencies achieved specifically from joint basing, and that OSD had not developed a plan to guide joint bases in achieving cost savings and efficiencies    " "    DOD has not committed to take action on some of our recommendations related to implementing any future BRAC rounds, such as improving DOD's ability to estimate potential liabilities, and savings to achieve desired outcomes " In its final report to the President, the 2005 BRAC commission noted DOD's initial estimate of savings had been "vastly overestimated," and suggested that the Department had claimed savings that were "not truly savings in the commonly understood sense of the term " Reflecting on the quality of cost estimates and savings associated with 2005 BRAC round, Anthony Principi, Chairman of the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, has suggested opportunities exist for the DOD to improve its analysis by adopting more consistent accounting practices and inclusive metrics: To start, DoD has to do a better job estimating the true cost of any closure or realignment     Second, the cost of base realignment actions (COBRA) accounting procedure, used by DoD as a basis of comparison among scenarios, should include cost estimates for environmental restoration not just "clean to current use" standards  In addition, COBRA or some other cost evaluation process should also include transportation and infrastructure costs and burden sharing with the federal government     In addition to refining DOD accounting metrics, some observers have suggested congressional visibility into BRAC cost and long-term effectiveness could be improved by amending the process to require the Department to disclose how closure and realignment recommendations meet expected cost saving and reduced infrastructure targets  A BRAC process is the chief means by which DOD disposes of excess infrastructure  Each year between 2013 and 2017, the Department requested a new BRAC round as a means of realizing greater efficiency and reducing excess infrastructure  It has also attempted to allay concerns related to the 2005 BRAC experience - marked by unexpectedly high costs and complexity - by emphasizing cost savings and efficiencies rather than force transformation  In April 2016, DOD submitted to the House Armed Services Committee an I nfrastructure C apacity R eport (interim version) that assessed 22% of the Department's base infrastructure excess to its needs  The methodology used in the report—required by Section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2016 (P L
Report 2:  Thus, the agency should be better positioned to realize the benefits of incremental development practices, such as reducing investment risk, delivering capabilities more rapidly, and permitting easier adoption of emerging technologies  IT acquisitions  FITARA includes a provision to enhance covered agency CIOs’ authority through, among other things, requiring agency heads to ensure that CIOs review and approve IT contracts  OMB’s FITARA implementation guidance expanded upon this aspect of the legislation in a number of ways  Specifically, according to the guidance, CIOs may review and approve IT acquisition strategies and plans, rather than individual IT contracts, and CIOs can designate other agency officials to act as their representatives  In January 2018, we reported that most of the CIOs at 22 selected agencies, including SSA, were not adequately involved in reviewing and approving billions of dollars of IT acquisitions  In particular, we found that SSA’s process to identify IT acquisitions for CIO review did not involve the acquisition office, as required by OMB  In addition, we noted that SSA had a CIO review and approval process in place that fully satisfied the requirements set forth in OMB’s guidance  However, while SSA provided evidence of the CIO’s review of most of the IT contracts we examined, the agency had not ensured that the CIO or a designee reviewed and approved each IT acquisition plan or strategy  Specifically, of 10 randomly selected IT contracts that we examined at SSA, 7 acquisitions associated with those contracts had been reviewed and approved, as required by OMB  We pointed out that, until SSA ensured that its CIO or designee reviewed and approved all IT acquisitions, the agency would have limited visibility and input into its planned IT expenditures and would not be effectively positioned to benefit from the increased authority that FITARA’s contract approval provision is intended to provide  Further, the agency could miss an opportunity to strengthen the CIO’s authority and the oversight of IT acquisitions—thus, increasing the potential to award IT contracts that are duplicative, wasteful, or poorly conceived  Accordingly, we made three recommendations to SSA to address these weaknesses  As of September 2018, the agency had made progress by implementing two of the recommendations: to ensure that (1) the acquisition office is involved in identifying IT acquisitions and (2) the CIO or designee reviews and approves IT acquisitions according to OMB guidance  By taking these actions, SSA should be better positioned to properly identify and provide oversight of IT acquisitions  However, SSA has not yet implemented our third recommendation that it issue guidance to assist in the identification of IT acquisitions  SSA stated that, in September 2017, it updated its policy for acquisition plan approval to address this recommendation; however, upon review of this policy, we did not find guidance for identifying IT acquisitions  Without the proper identification of IT acquisitions, SSA’s CIO cannot effectively provide oversight of these acquisitions  Software licenses  Federal agencies engage in thousands of software licensing agreements annually  The objective of software license management is to manage, control, and protect an organization’s software assets  Effective management of these licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses, which can result in unused software, as well as too few licenses, which can result in noncompliance with license terms and cause the imposition of additional fees  As part of its PortfolioStat initiative, OMB has developed policy that addresses software licenses  This policy requires agencies to conduct an annual, agency-wide IT portfolio review to, among other things, reduce commodity IT spending  Such areas of spending could include software licenses  In May 2014, we reported on federal agencies’ management of software licenses and determined that better management was needed to achieve significant savings government-wide  Of the 24 agencies we reviewed, SSA was 1 of 22 that lacked comprehensive policies that incorporated leading practices  In particular, SSA’s policy partially met four of the leading practices and did not meet one  Further, we noted that SSA was among 22 of the 24 selected agencies that had not established comprehensive software license inventories—a leading practice that would help the agencies to adequately manage their software licenses  As such, we made six recommendations to SSA to improve its policies and practices for managing software licenses  These included recommendations that the agency develop a comprehensive policy for the management of software licenses and establish a comprehensive inventory of software licenses  SSA agreed with the recommendations and, as of September 2018, had implemented all six of them  As a result, the agency should be better positioned to manage its software licenses and identify opportunities for reducing software license costs  While SSA has taken steps that improved its IT management in the areas of data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses, we reported in August 2018 that the agency had not fully addressed the role of the CIO in its policies  As previously mentioned, FITARA and the President Executive Order 13833, among other laws and guidance, outline the roles and responsibilities for agency CIOs in an attempt to improve the government’s performance in IT and related information management functions  Within these laws and guidance, we identified IT management responsibilities assigned to CIOs in six key IT areas: Leadership and accountability  CIOs are responsible and accountable for the effective implementation of IT management responsibilities  For example, CIOs are to report directly to the agency head or that official’s deputy and designate a senior agency information security officer  Strategic planning  CIOs are required to lead the strategic planning for all IT management functions  An example of a CIO requirement related to the strategic planning area is measuring how well IT supports agency programs and reporting annually on the progress in achieving the goals  IT workforce  CIOs are to assess agency IT workforce needs and develop strategies and plans for meeting those needs  For example, CIOs are responsible for annually assessing the extent to which agency personnel meet IT management knowledge and skill requirements, developing strategies to address deficiencies, and reporting to the head of the agency on the progress made in improving these capabilities  IT budgeting  CIOs are responsible for the processes for all annual and multi-year IT planning, programming, and budgeting decisions  For example, CIOs are to have a significant role in IT planning, programming, and budgeting decisions  IT investment management  CIOs are to manage, evaluate, and assess how well the agency is managing its IT resources  In particular, CIOs are required to improve the management of the agency’s IT through portfolio review  Information security  CIOs are to establish, implement, and ensure compliance with an agency-wide information security program  For example, CIOs are required to develop and maintain an agency-wide security program, policies, procedures, and control techniques  In our August 2018 report, we noted that SSA, along with 23 other agencies, did not have policies that fully addressed the role of the CIO in these six key areas, consistent with the laws and guidance  To its credit, SSA had fully addressed the role of the CIO in the IT leadership and accountability area  In particular, the agency’s policies addressed the requirements that the CIO report directly to the agency head, assume responsibility and accountability for IT investments, and designate a senior agency information security officer  However, the policies did not fully address the role of the CIO in the other five areas (i e , strategic planning, workforce, budgeting, investment management, and information security)  For example, the agency’s policies did not address the IT workforce area at all, including the requirements that the CIO annually assess the extent to which agency personnel meet IT management knowledge and skill requirements, develop strategies to address deficiencies, and report to the head of the agency on the progress made in improving these capabilities  Further, SSA’s policies minimally addressed the requirements for IT strategic planning  Specifically, while the agency’s policies required the CIO to establish goals for improving agency operations through IT, the policies did not require the CIO to measure how well IT supports agency programs and report annually on the progress in achieving the goals  Table 1 summarizes the extent to which SSA’s policies addressed the role of its CIO, as reflected in our August 2018 report  As a result of these findings, we made a recommendation to SSA to address the weaknesses in its policies with regard to the remaining five key management areas  In response, the agency agreed with our recommendation and, subsequently, stated that it planned to do so by the end of September 2018  Following through to ensure that the identified weaknesses are addressed in its policies will be essential to helping SSA overcome its longstanding IT management challenges  In conclusion, effective IT management is critical to the performance of SSA’s mission  Toward this end, the agency has taken steps to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations by implementing 14 of the 15 recommendations we made from 2011 through 2018 to improve its IT management  Nevertheless, SSA would be better positioned to effectively address longstanding IT management challenges by ensuring that it has policies in place that fully address the role and responsibilities of its CIO in the five key management areas, as we previously recommended  Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Larson, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have  If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony, please contact Carol C  Harris at (202) 512-4456 or harriscc@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this statement are Kevin Walsh (Assistant Director), Jessica Waselkow (Analyst in Charge), and Rebecca Eyler  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 

ground_truth: Wildlife trafficking—the poaching and illegal trade of plants, fish, and wildlife—is a multibillion-dollar, global criminal activity that imperils thousands of species. FWS and NOAA enforce laws prohibiting wildlife trafficking that authorize the agencies to pay financial rewards for information about such illegal activities. GAO was asked to review FWS's and NOAA's use of financial rewards to combat wildlife trafficking. This report examines (1) laws that authorize FWS and NOAA to pay rewards for information on wildlife trafficking and the extent to which the agencies paid such rewards from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, (2) the agencies' reward policies, (3) information available to the public on rewards, and (4) the extent to which the agencies reviewed the effectiveness of their use of rewards. GAO reviewed laws, examined FWS and NOAA policies and public communications on rewards, analyzed agency reward data for fiscal years 2007 through 2017 and assessed their reliability, interviewed FWS and NOAA officials, and compared agency policies and public communications on rewards to federal internal control standards. Multiple laws—such as the Endangered Species Act and Lacey Act—authorize the Departments of the Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to pay rewards for information on wildlife trafficking. FWS and NOAA reported paying few rewards from fiscal years 2007 through 2017. Specifically, the agencies collectively reported paying 27 rewards, totaling $205,500. Agency officials said that the information was complete to the best of their knowledge but could not sufficiently assure that this information represented all of their reward payments. FWS and NOAA have reward policies that outline the general process for preparing reward proposals, but FWS's policy does not specify factors for its agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts. Some FWS agents GAO interviewed said that in developing proposals, they did not know whether their proposed reward amounts were enough, too little, or too much. By augmenting its policy to specify factors for agents to consider, FWS can better ensure that its agents have the necessary quality information to prepare proposed reward amounts, consistent with federal internal control standards. FWS and NOAA communicate little information to the public on rewards. For example, most agency websites did not indicate that providing information on wildlife trafficking could qualify for a reward. This is inconsistent with federal standards that call for management to communicate quality information so that external parties can help achieve agency objectives. FWS and NOAA officials said they have not communicated general reward information because of workload concerns, but they said it may be reasonable to provide more information in some instances. By developing plans to communicate more reward information to the public, the agencies can improve their chances of obtaining information on wildlife trafficking that they otherwise might not receive. FWS and NOAA have not reviewed the effectiveness of their use of rewards. The agencies have not done so because using rewards has generally not been a priority. FWS and NOAA officials agreed that such a review would be worthwhile but provided no plans for doing so. By reviewing the effectiveness of their use of rewards, FWS and NOAA can identify opportunities to improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking. GAO is making seven recommendations, including that FWS and NOAA track reward information, FWS augment its reward policy to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts, FWS and NOAA develop plans to communicate more reward information to the public, and FWS and NOAA review the effectiveness of their reward use. Both agencies concurred with these recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: As reported by the United Nations, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other organizations, wildlife trafficking networks span the globe  These organizations have attempted to measure the value of illegally traded wildlife, but available estimates are subject to uncertainty  In 2016, for example, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reported that various sources estimated the global scale of illegal wildlife trade to be from $7 billion to $23 billion annually  UNEP also estimated that the scale of wildlife crime has increased in recent years in part based on a rise in environmental crime  U S  trade in wildlife and related products includes a variety of species, such as live reptiles, birds, and mammals, as well as elephant ivory, according to law enforcement reports and government and nongovernmental officials  FWS and NOAA data on wildlife products seized at U S  ports provide examples of the diversity of illegally traded plants, fish, and wildlife imported into or exported from the United States  For example, from 2007 to 2016, the top 10 plant, fish, and wildlife shipments seized nationally by FWS were coral, crocodiles, conchs, deer, pythons, sea turtles, mollusks, ginseng, clams, and seahorses  During that time, FWS reported that more than one-third of the wildlife shipments it seized were confiscated while being imported from or exported to Mexico (14 percent), China (13 percent), or Canada (9 percent)  FWS and NOAA law enforcement offices are responsible for enforcing certain laws and treaties prohibiting wildlife trafficking  FWS Office of Law Enforcement  This office enforces certain U S  laws and regulations as well as treaties prohibiting the trafficking of terrestrial wildlife, freshwater species, and birds  Among other things, the office aims to prevent the unlawful import, export, and interstate commerce of foreign fish and wildlife, as well as to protect U S  plants, fish, and wildlife from unlawful exploitation  As of fiscal year 2016, the office had a budget of $74 7 million and employed 205 special agents to investigate wildlife crime, including international and domestic wildlife trafficking rings  Most of these special agents report to one of eight regional offices, which receive national oversight, support, training, and policy guidance from the FWS Office of Law Enforcement headquarters  The office’s headquarters houses a special investigative unit focused on conducting complex, large- scale criminal investigations of wildlife traffickers  In addition, the FWS Office of Law Enforcement has deployed special agents to serve as international attachés at seven U S  embassies  These attachés provide countertrafficking expertise to embassy staff, work with host government officials to build law enforcement capacity, and contribute directly to casework or criminal investigations of wildlife traffickers  According to FWS data, the FWS Office of Law Enforcement opened more than 7,000 investigations on wildlife trafficking and other illegal activities in fiscal year 2016, including nearly 5,000 cases involving Endangered Species Act violations and nearly 1,500 cases involving Lacey Act violations  FWS Office of Law Enforcement investigations have disrupted wildlife trafficking operations  For example, Operation Crash—an ongoing rhino horn and elephant ivory-trafficking investigation launched in 2011—has led to over 30 convictions and more than $2 million in fines  NOAA Office of Law Enforcement  This office enforces certain U S  laws and regulations as well as treaties prohibiting the trafficking of marine wildlife, including fish, as well as anadromous fish  Among other things, the office aims to prevent the illegal, unregulated, and unreported harvesting and trade of fish as well as the trafficking of protected marine wildlife  As of fiscal year 2016, the office had a budget of $68 6 million and employed 77 special agents to investigate wildlife crimes within its jurisdiction  These agents report to one of five regional offices, and those offices receive national oversight, support, and policy guidance from the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement headquarters  According to NOAA data, the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement initiated more than 5,000 investigations in fiscal year 2016  About half of those investigations involved violations of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, as amended, and some of the 5,000 investigations involved violations of the Endangered Species Act or the Lacey Act  NOAA Office of Law Enforcement investigations have disrupted wildlife trafficking operations  For example, in fiscal year 2016, a NOAA Office of Law Enforcement investigation led to the conviction of a company and five individuals for illegally trafficking whale bone carvings, walrus ivory carvings, black coral carvings, and other products derived from protected species into the United States  The FWS and NOAA law enforcement offices collaborate with other government agencies and organizations to combat wildlife trafficking  Both agencies work with other federal, state, and tribal law enforcement officers as well as their international counterparts as needed during wildlife trafficking investigations  For example, FWS and NOAA work with U S  Customs and Border Protection, U S  Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U S  Department of Agriculture to maintain import and export controls and interdict smuggled wildlife and related products at U S  ports of entry  In addition, FWS and NOAA collaborate with Department of Justice prosecutors on criminal cases that result from agency investigations  Both agencies also collaborate with nongovernmental organizations to combat wildlife trafficking  For example, FWS and NOAA officials said that nongovernmental organizations have, in some cases, offered financial rewards (in addition to rewards offered by FWS and NOAA) for information on a wildlife crime  In addition, some nongovernmental organizations proactively provide information to FWS and NOAA on wildlife trafficking activities in the United States or foreign countries that violate U S  laws  For example, in 2017, a nongovernmental organization created a website to collect tips on wildlife crime and to connect the sources of those tips with relevant U S  authorities for potential financial rewards  FWS may pay financial rewards from moneys in two accounts  Law Enforcement Reward Account  FWS may pay rewards under the Endangered Species Act, the Lacey Act, and the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act from moneys in the agency’s Law Enforcement Reward Account  The moneys in this account come from fines, penalties, and proceeds from forfeited property for violations of these three laws  According to FWS officials, these moneys are available until expended  These moneys can be used to (1) pay financial rewards to those who provide information that leads to an arrest, criminal conviction, civil penalty assessment, or forfeiture of property for any violation of the Endangered Species Act, the Lacey Act, or the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act or (2) provide temporary care for plants, fish, or wildlife that are the subject of a civil or criminal proceeding under the Endangered Species Act, Lacey Act, or the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act  As of the beginning of fiscal year 2017, the balance of the Law Enforcement Reward Account was about $7 million  Law Enforcement Special Funds Account  FWS may also pay rewards from moneys in its law enforcement office’s Special Funds Account  The moneys in this account come from an annual line item appropriation and are available until expended  Since fiscal year 1988, this appropriation has provided FWS up to $400,000 each year to pay for information, rewards, or evidence concerning violations of laws FWS administers, as well as miscellaneous and emergency expenses of enforcement activity that the Secretary of the Interior authorized or approved  NOAA generally pays rewards from moneys available in the Fisheries Enforcement Asset Forfeiture Fund  The moneys in this account come from fines, penalties, and proceeds from forfeited property for violations of marine resource laws that NOAA enforces, including the Magnuson- Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Lacey Act  According to NOAA officials, moneys are available until expended and can be used to pay certain enforcement- related expenses, including travel expenses, equipment purchases, and the payment of financial rewards  As of the beginning of fiscal year 2017, the Fisheries Enforcement Asset Forfeiture Fund had a balance of about $18 million  Academic literature on the use of financial rewards to combat illegal activities and stakeholders we interviewed identified several advantages and disadvantages of using financial rewards to obtain information on wildlife trafficking  Potential advantages of using financial rewards include the following: Providing incentives  The potential for a financial reward can motivate people with information to come forward when they otherwise might not do so  Increasing public awareness  Financial rewards may bring greater public attention to the problem of wildlife trafficking, including federal efforts to combat wildlife trafficking  Saving resources  Using financial rewards may save agency resources by enabling agents to get information sooner and at a lower cost than they could have through their own efforts  Potential disadvantages of using financial rewards include the following: Eliciting false or unproductive leads  Financial rewards may generate false or unproductive leads  Affecting witness credibility  Financial rewards may lead to a source’s credibility being challenged at trial by defense attorneys since sources receive compensation for the information they provide  Consuming resources  The potential for a financial reward may create a flood of tips that take agency time and resources to follow up on or corroborate  Outside of wildlife trafficking, multiple federal agencies and federal courts are authorized to pay financial rewards for information on illegal activities under certain circumstances  For example, U S  Customs and Border Protection—which controls, regulates, and facilitates the import and export of goods through U S  ports of entry—is authorized, under certain circumstances, to pay rewards for original information about violations of any laws that it enforces  The Department of State may also pay rewards under certain circumstances, including for information leading to the disruption of financial mechanisms of a transnational criminal group  Similarly, the U S  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may pay rewards for information about violations of federal securities laws and the underpayment of taxes, respectively, if certain conditions are met  Federal judges may award money to persons who give information leading to convictions for violating treaties, laws, and regulations that prohibit certain pollution from ships, including oil and garbage discharges  FWS and NOAA officials identified multiple laws, such as the Endangered Species Act and the Lacey Act, that authorize the payment of financial rewards to people who provide information on wildlife trafficking  FWS and NOAA reported paying few financial rewards under these laws from fiscal years 2007 through 2017  However, agency officials could not provide sufficient assurance that the reward information they provided to us represented all of their reward payments for this period  FWS and NOAA officials identified over 10 laws prohibiting wildlife trafficking—including the Endangered Species Act, Lacey Act, and Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act—that specifically authorize the payment of financial rewards in certain circumstances to people who provide information on violations of the law (see app  II for a complete list of the laws)  These laws provide discretion to the agencies to choose whether to pay rewards but have varying requirements for who is eligible to receive a reward and the payment amounts  For example, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act caps rewards at $2,500 for information that leads to a conviction  In contrast, the Endangered Species Act does not cap reward amounts and authorizes rewards for information that leads to a conviction as well as to an arrest, civil penalty, or forfeiture of property  Table 1 identifies the laws that FWS and NOAA officials indicated they have used to pay financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, along with information on these laws’ requirements for payment of rewards  FWS and NOAA reported paying few financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, but agency officials could not provide sufficient assurance that this information was complete  Officials from both agencies said that their agencies have not prioritized the use of rewards, and they believed that the reward information they identified—such as the number, dollar amount, and year that rewards were paid—appropriately captured the few reward payments they made during this time frame  Based on the agencies’ reviews of their records, FWS reported paying 25 rewards for a total of $184,500 from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, and NOAA reported paying 2 rewards for a total of $21,000 during that same period (see table 2)  See appendix III for additional details on the cases where financial rewards were paid  FWS reported paying rewards in trafficking cases involving a variety of wildlife species, such as eagles, bears, reptiles, and mollusks, across the 11-year period  FWS officials said they generally paid rewards to thank sources who proactively provided information  For example, based on our review of a reward case, FWS paid a reward in 2010 because the source provided information that was crucial in uncovering an attempt to illegally traffic leopards into the United States from South Africa  FWS would not have known about this illegal activity if the source had not come forward with the information  In several cases we reviewed, FWS officials said that the sources did not know about the possibility of receiving a reward when they contacted the agency with information  The two rewards NOAA reported paying from fiscal years 2007 through 2017 involved the illegal trafficking of sea scallops and a green sea turtle  NOAA officials said that in both cases they paid a reward to thank the source who proactively provided information to law enforcement agents  For example, the agent who investigated the sea scallop case reported requesting the reward because the information the source proactively provided was timely, credible, and led to the criminal conviction of several individuals  FWS and NOAA officials could not provide sufficient assurance that the reward information they reported to us represented all of the rewards their agencies had paid from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, but they said the information was complete to the best of their knowledge  Specifically, FWS and NOAA officials said they track all their expenditures, including reward payments, in their financial databases  However, they are not able to readily identify reward payments because their financial systems do not include a unique identifier for such payments and their reward information is located in multiple databases and formats  As a result, FWS and NOAA officials said they identified the rewards they reported to us by manually reviewing their financial and law enforcement records  In particular, FWS officials said they reviewed their paper records to identify instances when the agency paid rewards and then retrieved additional information from their financial and law enforcement databases, such as final payment amounts  NOAA officials said they identified instances when the agency paid rewards by using a combination of paper and electronic records located at NOAA’s headquarters office  NOAA officials also contacted their regions to obtain additional information located at the regional offices to confirm information about the rewards NOAA had paid  Seventeen stakeholders we interviewed who had experience investigating wildlife trafficking or expertise in using financial rewards as a law enforcement tool said that it would be useful for FWS and NOAA to maintain comprehensive information on the rewards they paid  For example, two stakeholders said that maintaining comprehensive information and making that information available to law enforcement agents could motivate agents to make greater use of rewards as a law enforcement tool  Two other stakeholders said that maintaining information on and monitoring reward use would allow the agencies to make ongoing adjustments, such as adjusting payment amounts, to make the most effective use of rewards in combating wildlife trafficking  Federal internal control standards say that management should clearly document internal control and all transactions and other significant events in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination  Control activities can be implemented in either an automated or a manual manner, but automated control activities tend to be more reliable because they are less susceptible to human error and are typically more efficient  FWS and NOAA officials agreed that maintaining reward information so that complete information is easily retrievable may be beneficial  FWS officials said having clearly documented and readily available reward information could improve how they manage rewards and enable them to monitor and examine their use of rewards more holistically  The officials said they may analyze options for creating a single repository for reward information but did not commit to doing so  They said that creating a single repository for reward information may involve some drawbacks, such as duplicating some data entry in separate databases  Similarly, NOAA officials said having clearly documented and readily available reward information would provide agency management with easier and more consistent access to that information  As a result, they said that they are exploring modifications to their financial and law enforcement databases to better identify and track rewards  For example, NOAA officials said they may be able to create a unique identifier to flag payments that are for rewards in their financial system to enable them to identify payment amounts more easily  NOAA officials did not provide a time frame for completing modifications to their financial system  By tracking reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination, FWS and NOAA can better ensure that they have complete information on the rewards they have paid to help manage their use of rewards as a law enforcement tool  FWS and NOAA have policies to guide their law enforcement agents on the process for preparing and submitting a request to pay a financial reward  Specifically, both agencies’ policies call for agents to include a description of the case, the nature of the information that the source provided, a justification for providing a reward, and an explanation of how a proposed reward amount was developed  These policies also outline the general review and approval process, how payments are to be made upon approval of a request, and eligibility criteria to receive a reward  For example, FWS and NOAA policies prohibit paying rewards to foreign government officials as well as paying rewards to any person whose receipt of a reward would create a conflict of interest or the appearance of impropriety  NOAA’s policy explicitly states that the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement is to use statutorily authorized rewards as a tool to obtain information from the public on resource violations and that rewards can help promote compliance with marine resource laws  NOAA’s policy suggests that agents consider advertising reward offers to assist investigations, encourages press releases, and describes the process agents should follow to do so  Moreover, NOAA’s policy specifies factors that agents might include in their reward requests to support the proposed reward, such as (1) the benefit to the marine resources that was furthered by the information provided; (2) the risk, if any, the individual took in collecting and providing the information; (3) the probability that the investigation would have been successfully concluded without the information provided; and (4) the relationship between any fines or other collections and the information provided  FWS’s policy specifies that rewards may be provided in situations in which an individual furnishes essential information leading to an arrest, conviction, civil penalty, or forfeiture of property  However, it does not discuss the usefulness of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool or the types of circumstances when rewards should be used or advertised to the public  Further, FWS’s policy does not communicate necessary quality information internally that agents may need when deciding to request the payment of rewards  In particular, it does not specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts  Instead, the policy leaves it to the discretion of field and regional agents to develop proposed reward amounts within any limitations specified in law  Some FWS agents we interviewed said that they developed proposed reward amounts on a case-by-case basis and did not know whether their proposed amounts were enough, too little, or too much  In addition, some agents said that because FWS’s policy does not specify factors for agents to consider, the reward approval process is subjective and unclear and this has made it challenging for the agents to develop proposed reward amounts  For example, one agent we interviewed said he submitted a request to his supervisor to pay a $10,000 reward to a source who provided information on a major wildlife trafficker  But, for reasons unknown to the agent, his supervisor reduced the amount to $1,000  FWS headquarters officials said field agents submit reward requests to headquarters for approval, and these officials were not aware of instances of proposed reward amounts being changed or denied during the review process  Seven of the 20 stakeholders we interviewed suggested that FWS augment its reward policy to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts  For example, helpful factors to consider when developing a proposed reward amount may include (1) the number of hours the source dedicated to the case, (2) the risk the source took in providing the information, (3) the significance of the information provided by the source, and (4) the amount of fines or other penalties collected as a result of the information  Two stakeholders expressed concern that some of FWS’s reward payments were insufficient, especially when comparing the amount of time and effort or the risk a source faced in providing the information  A couple of stakeholders also said that without a policy that specifies factors for agents to consider, reward amounts may be subjective and could vary depending on which agent develops the reward proposal  Another stakeholder said that it was important to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts so that the agency has a reasonable and defensible basis for the reward amounts it pays across cases  According to federal standards for internal control, management should internally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve an agency’s objectives  For example, management communicates quality information down and across reporting lines to enable personnel to make key decisions  FWS officials said they believe that their reward policy is sound, indicating they believe that law enforcement agents have the information they need to develop proposals for reward amounts in cases where rewards are warranted  However, they also agreed that it may be helpful to review their policy but did not commit to doing so  By augmenting its policy to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts, FWS can better ensure that its agents have the necessary quality information to prepare defensible reward proposals  Based on our review of the agencies’ websites and other communications, we found that FWS and NOAA communicate little information to the public on financial rewards for reporting information on wildlife trafficking, such as the potential availability of rewards and eligibility criteria  Specifically, some FWS and NOAA law enforcement websites provided information to the public on ways to report violations of the laws that the agencies are responsible for enforcing, such as via tip lines  Some of the websites also provided examples of the types of information the public can report, such as photos or other documentation of illegal activities  However, most of the agencies’ websites did not indicate that providing information on illegal activities could result in a reward  In contrast, the FWS Alaska regional office’s website provided information on the potential availability of rewards and ways the public may submit information for a potential reward  For example, this website provided phone numbers and an e-mail address for the public to use when submitting information  Figure 1 shows the information available on FWS’s and NOAA’s national and regional websites relevant to reporting violations of the laws the agencies enforce in general and on receiving rewards in particular  In addition, FWS and NOAA headquarters officials said their field agents have used other means to communicate the potential availability of rewards in specific cases when the agents had no other information that could help solve those cases  For example, a FWS field official said that the agency advertised a reward offer for information on a case of bald eagle killings by distributing reward posters and posting news releases in the vicinity where the killings occurred  Similarly, NOAA officials said they have advertised reward offers through various means, including circulating reward posters in specific geographic areas after an illegal activity has occurred  Figure 2 shows a reward poster that NOAA distributed in Guam in 2017 advertising a $1,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of sea turtle poachers  Instead of having a plan for communicating general information to the public on rewards, FWS and NOAA grant discretion to their regional offices and law enforcement agents to determine the type and level of communication to provide, according to FWS and NOAA policies  FWS officials explained that because they typically use financial rewards to thank individuals who come forward on their own accord—rather than using rewards to incentivize individuals with information to come forward—they have not seen the need to communicate more information to the public on the potential availability of rewards  NOAA officials said they have targeted their communications on rewards by publicizing reward offers for specific cases where they do not have leads  They added that they want to receive quality information and already receive a substantial amount of information from sources who reach out to them proactively, so NOAA has not seen the need to communicate more information to the public on the potential availability of rewards  Sixteen of the 20 stakeholders we interviewed said that it would be useful for FWS and NOAA to advertise the potential availability of financial rewards  Several stakeholders said that if the public does not know about the possibility for rewards, then some people with information may not be incentivized to come forward  Two stakeholders added that agencies should carefully consider how and which reward information to communicate to the public so that people who are most likely to have information on illegal wildlife trafficking learn about the potential for rewards  For example, one stakeholder suggested advertising rewards at ports where international shipments are offloaded or placing advertisements at wildlife trafficking nodes, such as entrances to African wildlife refuges  This stakeholder suggested advertising rewards along with wildlife trafficking awareness-raising posters that nongovernment organizations place in some airports  In addition, 14 stakeholders suggested that it would be useful for FWS and NOAA to provide information to the public on the process for submitting information to potentially receive rewards  Several other stakeholders said that it is important for the public to understand whether they may be eligible for a reward, how to submit information, and whether or to what extent their confidentiality will be protected  Another stakeholder provided examples of how other agencies provide information about their reward programs on their websites  SEC and IRS, for instance, use their websites to communicate information to the public on the process for reporting illegal activity for financial rewards  This information includes the types of information to report, confidentiality rules, eligibility criteria, and the process for submitting information to obtain a reward  In addition, the Department of State posts instructions on its websites on how to submit information on an illegal activity and potentially receive a reward  Federal internal control standards say that management should externally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve an agency’s objectives  For example, using appropriate methods to communicate, management communicates quality information so that external parties, such as the public, can help the agency achieve its objectives  This could include communicating information to the public on the types of information and eligibility requirements for potentially receiving rewards for reporting information on wildlife trafficking  FWS officials said that making more reward information available could lead to a significant increase in the amount of information the agency receives, which, in turn, could strain FWS’s resources in following up on that information  However, FWS officials also agreed that it was reasonable to consider making more reward information available to relevant members of the public, particularly in targeted circumstances, but did not commit to doing so  Similarly, NOAA officials said they had some concerns about the additional resources it might take to investigate potentially unreliable or false tips that may result if they make reward information broadly available to the public, but they agreed that it would be reasonable for the agency to consider doing so  NOAA officials also said they may consider making more reward information publicly available at the conclusion of our audit but provided no plans for doing so  By determining the types of additional information to communicate to the public on rewards—such as providing information on the agency’s website on the potential availability of rewards—and then developing and implementing plans to do so, FWS and NOAA can improve their chances of obtaining information on wildlife trafficking activities that they otherwise might not receive  FWS and NOAA have not reviewed the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards or considered whether any changes might improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking  FWS officials said their agency has not reviewed or considered changes to its use of rewards because the agency has not prioritized the use of rewards  NOAA officials said their agency has not focused on using rewards or identified the need to review its use of this tool, particularly in light of other, higher mission priorities  Nine of the 20 stakeholders we interviewed said that FWS and NOAA should review the effectiveness of their use of rewards and consider potential improvements  Several stakeholders said that it would be useful for FWS and NOAA to compare their respective approaches to those of federal agencies that use rewards in contexts outside of wildlife trafficking to identify best practices or lessons learned that might be applicable in the context of combating wildlife trafficking  For example, one stakeholder said that SEC has an effective whistleblower program and may have lessons learned that are relevant for FWS and NOAA to consider  Another stakeholder we interviewed separately indicated that in 2010, before SEC had a whistleblower program that publicized rewards and provided detailed instructions on how members of the public could report information on illegal activities, SEC received few tips  Once SEC implemented a whistleblower program that publicized rewards and provided detailed instructions on its public website, the agency’s use of the program grew substantially, according to the stakeholder  Other stakeholders said it would be useful for the agencies to consider potential improvements to their use of rewards, such as making a standing reward offer for information on wildlife trafficking targeted at high-priority endangered species or particular criminal networks  Two of these stakeholders said such an offer might improve FWS’s and NOAA’s use of rewards by generating more tips than reward offers focused on individual cases  At the same time, they said such an offer would likely filter out some of the false or unproductive tips that the agencies might receive if they made an untargeted standing reward offer  Federal internal control standards state that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks by, for example, conducting reviews at the functional or activity level by comparing actual performance to planned or expected results and analyzing significant differences  Further, under the standards, management should periodically review policies, procedures, and related control activities for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving an agency’s objectives or addressing related risks  FWS and NOAA officials agreed that reviewing the effectiveness of their use of rewards would be worthwhile  Specifically, FWS officials said that it would be useful to compare their approach to those of other federal agencies that use rewards in investigating crimes that involve interstate and foreign smuggling of goods  Similarly, NOAA officials said that reviewing the agency’s use of financial rewards would be worthwhile but cautioned that such a review would need to be balanced against the agency’s constrained resources and many mission requirements  FWS and NOAA officials said they may consider conducting such a review at the conclusion of our audit but provided no plans for doing so  By reviewing the effectiveness of their use of rewards, FWS and NOAA can identify opportunities to improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking  Wildlife trafficking is a large and growing transnational criminal activity, with global environmental, security, and economic consequences  The federal government has emphasized strengthening law enforcement efforts to combat wildlife trafficking, and using financial rewards to obtain information on illegal activities is one tool that some federal agencies have used  However, to date, FWS and NOAA have not prioritized the use of rewards and were unable to provide sufficient assurance that the 27 rewards they paid during fiscal years 2007 through 2017 represented all of the rewards they provided during that period  By tracking reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination, FWS and NOAA can better ensure that they have complete information on the rewards they have paid to help manage their use of rewards as a law enforcement tool  Additionally, FWS and NOAA have policies outlining the processes their law enforcement agents are to use in making reward payments, and NOAA’s policy specifies factors for its agents to consider in developing proposed reward amounts, such as the risk the individual took in collecting the information  FWS’s policy does not specify such factors that could inform agents in achieving the agency’s objectives, which is not consistent with federal internal control standards  By augmenting its policy to specify factors for its agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts, FWS can better ensure that its agents have the necessary quality information to prepare defensible reward proposals  Both agencies have also advertised the potential for rewards in specific cases when agents had no other information, but FWS and NOAA have otherwise communicated little information to the public on the potential availability of rewards  If the public does not know about the possibility of rewards, then some people with information may not be incentivized to come forward  By determining the types of additional information to communicate to the public on rewards—such as providing information on the agency’s website about the potential availability of rewards—and then developing and implementing plans to do so, FWS and NOAA can improve their chances of obtaining information on wildlife trafficking activities that they otherwise might not receive  Finally, FWS and NOAA have not reviewed the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards or considered whether any changes might improve the usefulness of rewards as a law enforcement tool  By undertaking such reviews, the agencies can identify opportunities to improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking  We are making a total of seven recommendations, including four to FWS and three to NOAA  Specifically: The Assistant Director of the FWS Office of Law Enforcement should track financial reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination  (Recommendation 1) The Director of the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement should track financial reward information so that it is clearly documented and readily available for examination  (Recommendation 2) The Assistant Director of the FWS Office of Law Enforcement should augment FWS’s financial reward policy to specify factors law enforcement agents are to consider when developing proposed reward amounts  (Recommendation 3) The Assistant Director of the FWS Office of Law Enforcement should determine the types of additional information to communicate to the public on financial rewards and then develop and implement a plan for communicating that information  (Recommendation 4) The Director of the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement should determine the types of additional information to communicate to the public on financial rewards and then develop and implement a plan for communicating that information  (Recommendation 5) The Assistant Director of the FWS Office of Law Enforcement should review the effectiveness of the agency’s use of financial rewards and implement any changes that the agency determines would improve the usefulness of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool  (Recommendation 6) The Director of the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement should review the effectiveness of the agency’s use of financial rewards and implement any changes that the agency determines would improve the usefulness of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool  (Recommendation 7) We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Departments of Commerce and the Interior  The departments transmitted written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes IV and V of this report  The Department of Commerce concurred with the three recommendations directed to NOAA and stated that NOAA is developing procedures to ensure that its rewards are closely tracked, clearly documented, and better communicated  In written comments from NOAA, NOAA stated the report fairly and thoroughly reviews NOAA’s use of financial rewards  NOAA outlined the steps it plans to take in response to our recommendations, including developing a procedure to track financial reward information, reviewing information currently disseminated to the public and evaluating whether additional information may be useful, and reviewing the agency’s reward policy to determine whether changes are needed to enhance reward effectiveness  In its written comments, the Department of the Interior concurred with the four recommendations directed to FWS  Interior stated that it appreciated our review of the challenges faced by FWS’s Office of Law Enforcement in combating wildlife trafficking and identifying areas where FWS and NOAA can improve the use of financial rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking  Interior also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and of Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI  The objectives of our review were to (1) identify laws that authorize the U S  Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to pay financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking and the extent to which these agencies paid such rewards from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, (2) evaluate FWS’s and NOAA’s policies on financial rewards, (3) evaluate the information available to the public on financial rewards, and (4) determine the extent to which FWS and NOAA reviewed the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards in combating wildlife trafficking  To address these objectives, we reviewed academic literature on the use of financial rewards to combat illegal activities and United Nations Environment Programme reports on the scope and scale of wildlife trafficking  We also interviewed officials from federal agencies that play a role in combating wildlife trafficking or manage programs that pay financial rewards for information on illegal activities  Specifically, we interviewed officials from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, the Interior, Justice, and State, as well as officials from the Internal Revenue Service, the U S  Securities and Exchange Commission, and the U S  Agency for International Development  In addition, we reviewed documentation that the Department of the Treasury provided on its role in paying financial rewards  We did not compare FWS’s and NOAA’s use of financial rewards in combating wildlife trafficking to federal agencies’ use of financial rewards in other contexts because the different contexts are not directly comparable  However, we reviewed information on other federal agencies’ use of financial rewards as examples of how financial rewards are used in contexts outside of wildlife trafficking  In addition, we interviewed representatives of six nongovernmental organizations that we selected based on those organizations’ knowledge or experience in combating wildlife trafficking  Specifically, we interviewed representatives from the Elephant Action League, the Environmental Investigation Agency, the National Association of Conservation Law Enforcement Chiefs, the National Whistleblower Center, TRAFFIC, and the World Wildlife Fund  To identify laws that authorize FWS and NOAA to pay financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking, we asked FWS and NOAA attorneys to compile a list of laws that each of their agencies implements or enforces that prohibit wildlife trafficking and authorize the agency to pay rewards for providing information about trafficking  We then compared that list to the results of our search of the United States Code for such laws  We also reviewed FWS and NOAA documentation for accounts where the fines, penalties, and proceeds from forfeited property that are used to pay rewards are deposited as well as the accounts where appropriations available to pay rewards were deposited  To identify the extent to which FWS and NOAA have paid financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking, we analyzed FWS and NOAA data on financial rewards the agencies reported paying from fiscal years 2007 through 2017  The data included information on, among other things, the fiscal years in which rewards were paid, laws under which rewards were paid, types of wildlife involved in those cases, the amounts of civil penalties or criminal fines imposed in those cases, the numbers of arrests and convictions as a result of those cases, and whether reward recipients were individuals or groups and U S  or foreign citizens  To assess the reliability of the data FWS and NOAA provided on financial rewards, we interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data and compared the data to case records the agencies provided  Specifically, FWS and NOAA officials said they track all expenditures, including reward payments, in their financial databases, but they are not able to readily identify reward payments because their financial systems do not include a unique identifier for such payments and their reward information is located in multiple databases and formats  As a result, FWS and NOAA officials said they identified the rewards that they reported to us by manually reviewing their financial and law enforcement records, and officials said the information was complete to the best of their knowledge  Based on these steps, we found the data that the agencies provided to us to be sufficiently reliable for reporting information on the rewards the agencies reported paying  However, as we discuss in the report, FWS and NOAA officials could not provide sufficient assurance that the data included all the financial rewards that they had paid from fiscal years 2007 through 2017  To obtain additional detail about cases where financial rewards were paid, we reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 10 wildlife trafficking cases  We selected these cases based on the agency that investigated the case (to include both FWS and NOAA cases), the amount of the reward paid in the case (to reflect both low and high amounts), the year in which the reward was paid (to include rewards paid more recently), and the type of wildlife trafficked in the case (to include both fish and wildlife cases—there were no plant trafficking cases to select)  While the findings from our review cannot be generalized to cases we did not select and review, they illustrate how FWS and NOAA have used financial rewards in wildlife trafficking cases  To evaluate FWS and NOAA policies on financial rewards, we reviewed relevant FWS and NOAA policies and compared them to each other; interviewed FWS and NOAA officials about those policies; and compared the information in the policies with federal internal control standards on information and communication  To evaluate information available to the public on rewards, we reviewed relevant FWS and NOAA publications and examples of communications to the public on the availability of rewards in specific cases and interviewed FWS and NOAA officials  We also reviewed information available on FWS’s and NOAA’s national and regional websites as of December 2017 and January 2018, respectively, relevant to reporting violations of the laws that the agencies enforce in general and on receiving rewards in particular  We compared the agencies’ public communications on rewards with federal internal control standards on information and communication  To evaluate the extent to which FWS and NOAA reviewed the effectiveness of their use of financial rewards in combating wildlife trafficking, we interviewed FWS and NOAA officials and requested any reviews the agencies had conducted regarding their use of financial rewards to compare with federal internal control standards on control activities  FWS and NOAA did not have any such reviews to provide  In addition, for all four objectives, we interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 20 stakeholders who had experience investigating wildlife trafficking or expertise in the use of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool  To select stakeholders to interview, we first identified a list of stakeholders by reviewing (1) FWS and NOAA data on law enforcement agents with at least 5 years of experience who had investigated wildlife trafficking cases and used financial rewards, (2) Department of Justice data on federal prosecutors who had prosecuted wildlife trafficking cases since fiscal year 2014, (3) literature search results identifying academics with expertise in the use of financial rewards as a law enforcement tool and federal programs that use financial rewards to combat illegal activities in contexts outside of wildlife trafficking, (4) the biographies of members of the federal Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking, and (5) recommendations from stakeholders we interviewed  From this list, we then used a multistep process to select the 20 stakeholders to interview  To ensure coverage and a range of perspectives, we selected stakeholders from the following groups: FWS and NOAA law enforcement agents, including field and federal prosecutors responsible for prosecuting wildlife trafficking cases; federal officials responsible for programs that use financial rewards to combat illegal activities in contexts outside of wildlife trafficking; academics with expertise in the use of financial rewards as a law members of the federal Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking; and representatives of nongovernmental organizations that investigate wildlife trafficking  We conducted semistructured interviews with the 20 selected stakeholders using a standard set of questions  We asked questions about stakeholder views on the usefulness of financial rewards in combating wildlife trafficking; the strength and weaknesses of the statutory provisions that authorize federal agencies to pay financial rewards for information on wildlife trafficking; FWS’s and NOAA’s use of financial rewards to combat wildlife trafficking; and how, if at all, the two agencies could improve their use of financial rewards to combat wildlife trafficking  We analyzed the stakeholders’ responses to our questions, grouping the responses into overall themes  We summarized the results of our analysis and then shared the summary with relevant FWS and NOAA officials to obtain their views  Views from these stakeholders cannot be generalized to those whom we did not select and interview  We conducted this performance audit from February 2017 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  The Department of the Interior’s U S  Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) implement or enforce multiple laws that specifically authorize the payment, under specified circumstances, of financial rewards to persons for information about violations of laws that prohibit wildlife trafficking  The laws that FWS officials identified are listed and summarized in table 3, and the laws that NOAA officials identified are listed and summarized in table 4  In addition, as noted above, the reward provisions in the Magnuson- Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act as amended and the Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act as amended authorize the payment of rewards for information about violations of multiple laws  Specifically, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act as amended authorizes the payment of rewards for information about violations of the act as well as any other marine resource law that the Secretary of Commerce enforces  Further, the Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act as amended authorizes the payment of rewards for information about violations of any law administered by NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service relating to plants, fish, or wildlife  NOAA officials identified 14 such laws that prohibit wildlife trafficking (see table 5)  If a violation of the laws listed in table 5 occurs, NOAA officials said they could use the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act or Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act reward provision to pay a reward for information on the violation  None of the laws listed in table 5 specifically authorize the payment of financial rewards  Table 6 provides information on U S  Fish and Wildlife Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration cases where these agencies reported paying rewards for information on wildlife trafficking from fiscal years 2007 through 2017  In addition to the contact named above, Alyssa M  Hundrup (Assistant Director), David Marroni (Analyst-in-Charge), Cindy Gilbert, Keesha Luebke, Jeanette Soares, Sheryl Stein, Sara Sullivan, and Judith Williams made key contributions to this report 


Report 2:  114-92)—remained consistent with excess capacity reports submitted prior to the 1998 and 2005 BRAC rounds round  The Department stated its purpose for obtaining "a sense of excess and whether excess remains after various changes, such as (prior) BRAC or force structure reductions " A final infrastructure capacity report, submitted to Congress in October 2017, modified the original excess capacity estimate to 19%  The Department concluded its infrastructure capacity analysis by arguing it had established sufficient justification for a new BRAC round, a process that would allow it to more effectively dispose of excess infrastructure and manage remaining real property assets  The Department believes we have addressed all congressional concerns     The time to authorize another BRAC round is now  The BRAC process requires considerable time to analyze and develop recommendations, have those recommendations reviewed by the independent BRAC Commission, and then implemented over a six-year period of time  The longer authorization is delayed, the longer the Department will be forced to expend valuable resources on unnecessary facilities instead of weapons systems, readiness, and other national security priorities  Critics of the Department's methodology for estimating excess infrastructure have asserted it includes unreasonable research assumptions and metrics, undermining the basis for DOD's conclusion  For example, observers have cited the report's reliance on Cold War baseline values to establish excess capacity, inconsistent application of existing metrics for measuring capacity shortfalls, and overly broad categorization schemes  Some observers have also cited longstanding data management challenges that continue to affect the Department's ability to measure current excess facility inventory and utilization rates  Others have noted the dearth of data that support DOD claims related to BRAC effectiveness and the disposal of excess property  During a news briefing on the FY2019 defense budget, Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) David L  Norquist noted that the Department had declined to propose a BRAC round that year, stating that it would work instead to focus on internal reforms while preparing for a financial audit  And so, I think we're looking at doing two things, going forward  One is, working with Congress to find common areas where we can make reforms and changes that don't create the same types of obstacles  The other is that we are undergoing a financial-statement audit that includes a look at property, and assets and investments and improving the accuracy of the data behind it  And as a view of being able to take advantage of the data coming out of that process, to help us make better decision-making on real property  But, yes, you are correct, there is not (a) request for another BRAC round in this budget  In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, Lucian Niemeyer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment, indicated DOD would be working in FY2019 to improve its excess infrastructure accounting processes and demolish unneeded infrastructure: In lieu of another request for legislation in FY 2019 to authorize an additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, we will review our facilities, to include facility usage optimization review to ensure we have a better accounting of excess infrastructure  We also have proposed for FY 2019 increased efforts to demolish unneeded or obsolete facilities over the course of this year  The 2005 BRAC round was unique among all previous rounds due to its relative size, scope and complexity  (See Figure 2 for comparison of major and minor BRAC actions between rounds ) Colloquially called "the mother of all BRACs," the objectives of the 2005 round were primarily about transforming military infrastructure; however, unanticipated expenses have played a role in shaping subsequent congressional views of the BRAC process and, according to many observers, dampened support for consideration of a new round  Savings estimates submitted during the 2005 round were overvalued by as much as 67%, according to GAO analysis, with one-time implementation costs rising from $21 to $35 1 billion  GAO found that the $14 1 billion increase was due primarily to the rising cost of new construction associated with subsidiary projects not included in the original BRAC implementation plan  Referring to the implementation of the 2005 round, Assistant Secretary Niemeyer, noted, "BRAC legislation effectively limited the ability of Congress to oversee BRAC implementation costs and the Department made deliberate decisions to use BRAC implementation as a recapitalization tool, expanding facility requirements and associated costs " To address congressional concerns about spiraling costs in new BRAC rounds, DOD has periodically proposed legislative language that would constrain the Secretary's ability to recommend BRAC actions that would not yield savings within 20 years and to emphasize recommendations that would yield net savings within five years  Each year, Congress appropriates funding for the Department of Defense Base Closure Account, part of the Military Construction Defense-Wide appropriation  With no BRAC round authorized or underway, the primary purpose of continuing BRAC appropriations is to fund the environmental cleanup and caretaker functions at bases that were closed under prior rounds (see Figure 3 )  In FY2020, the Trump Administration has requested $278 5 million for BRAC continuing environmental and caretaker costs, with $158 3 million provided for the Navy (57%), $66 1 million for the Army (24%), and $54 million for the Air Force (19%)  The total request represents a $63 million decrease (19%) from FY2019 enacted levels ($342 million)  In FY2018, Congress urged DOD to accelerate environmental remediation at BRAC sites  In report language, appropriators stated that additional funds were provided to speed environmental remediation at installations closed under previous rounds  Accelerated cleanup —The agreement includes additional funding to accelerate environmental remediation at installations closed during previous Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds  Priority should be given to those sites with newly identified radiological cleanup cost  There are many factors hindering the cleanup of BRAC sites  However, strategic investments can lead to quicker clean-ups and faster turnover of DOD property to the local community  Therefore, the Department is directed to submit to the congressional defense committees a spend plan for the additional BRAC funds not later than 30 days after enactment of this Act  Congressional authorizers and appropriators have regularly inserted language into annual defense legislation that would disallow the use of funds for the purpose of a new BRAC round  In FY2019, for example, though DOD did not propose a BRAC, authorizers inserted language into the annual NDAA that prohibited a new round: SEC  2703  Prohibition on Conducting Additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Round  Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize an additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round  A similar provision was included in the final FY2019 defense appropriations bill: SEC  8122  None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to propose, plan for, or execute a new or additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round  In 2017, Members in both chambers proposed legislation that would have authorized a new round of base closures  Though no legislation for a full BRAC was enacted, a provision included the following year in the final FY2019 NDAA  Under the new scenario described by Section 2702 of the John S  McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H R  5515 , P L  115-232 ), BRAC-like actions are authorized within the confines of a state based on the recommendation of the governor and support of local communities affected by the proposed actions  Unlike a traditional BRAC process, the new authorities would forgo the creation of an independent review panel  The Secretary of Defense is, instead, required to deliver a report of planned BRAC actions to congressional defense committees and, following a 90-day waiting period, begin implementation  For details, please refer to "In-State BRAC" in Appendix A of this report  The BRAC related legislative proposals above illustrate the flexibility Congress has for amending or adopting the template of past BRAC processes that DOD has called "the only fair, objective, and comprehensive process to achieve these goals (eliminating excess infrastructure) " Congress may consider whether future legislative proposals for base closures and realignments will adopt the lessons learned from previous rounds while retaining the basic framework, or fundamentally alter the process  No BRAC legislation has so far been proposed in the 116 th Congress  Additionally, the Department has asserted that it does not intend to use the new BRAC-like authorities authorized by Section 2702 of the FY2019 NDAA  To date, DOD has received no state requests under this authority  Appendix A  Legislative References BRAC Authorizing Legislation 1988 Round The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, enacted October 24, 1988 (P L 100-526) 1991, 1993, 1995 Rounds National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, enacted November 5, 1990 (P L  107-107, Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Title XXIX) 2005 Round National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, ( P L  101-510 ; amended the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 ( P L  101-510 ) 10 U S C  2687, 10 U S C  993 Summary In 1977, Congress enacted 10 U S C  2687, the first statutory restriction on the President's ability to close or realign military installations  Amended over the years, the statute has retained its essential elements, establishing procedures the Secretary of Defense must follow before closing a military installation where a threshold number (currently 300) of civilian personnel are authorized to be employed, or realigning an installation that involves a reduction by more than 50% (or 1,000) of civilian workers  A more recent statute, 10 U S C  993, introduced additional reporting requirements that would restrict the Secretary's ability to realign installations if the plan would affect more than 1,000 assigned members of the Armed Forces  In-State BRAC Section 2702 of the John S  McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H R  5515 , P L  115-232 ) authorizes new in-state BRAC authorities  Text of the provision is included below in its entirety  SEC  2702  ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO REALIGN OR CLOSE CERTAIN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS  (a) Authorization —Notwithstanding sections 993 or 2687 of title 10, United States Code, and subject to subsection (d), the Secretary of Defense may take such actions as may be necessary to carry out the realignment or closure of a military installation in a State during a fiscal year if— (1) the military installation is the subject of a notice which is described in subsection (b); and (2) the Secretary includes the military installation in the report submitted under paragraph (2) of subsection (c) with respect to the fiscal year  (b) Notice From Governor of State —A notice described in this subsection is a notice received by the Secretary of Defense from the Governor of a State (or, in the case of the District of Columbia, the Mayor of the District of Columbia) in which the Governor recommends that the Secretary carry out the realignment or closure of a military installation located in the State, and which includes each of the following elements: (1) A specific description of the military installation, or a specific description of the relevant real and personal property  (2) Statements of support for the realignment or closure from units of local government in which the installation is located  (3) A detailed plan for the reuse or redevelopment of the real and personal property of the installation, together with a description of the local redevelopment authority which will be responsible for the implementation of the plan  (c) Response to Notice — (1) Mandatory response to governor and congress —Not later than 1 year after receiving a notice from the Governor of a State (or, in the case of the District of Columbia, from the Mayor of the District of Columbia), the Secretary of Defense shall submit a response to the notice to the Governor and the congressional defense committees indicating whether or not the Secretary accepts the recommendation for the realignment or closure of a military installation which is the subject of the notice  (2) Acceptance of recommendation —If the Secretary of Defense determines that it is in the interests of the United States to accept the recommendation for the realignment or closure of a military installation which is the subject of a notice received under subsection (b) and intends to carry out the realignment or closure of the installation pursuant to the authority of this section during a fiscal year, at the time the budget is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for the fiscal year, the Secretary shall submit a report to the congressional defense committees which includes the following: (A) The identification of each military installation for which the Secretary intends to carry out a realignment or closure pursuant to the authority of this section during the fiscal year, together with the reasons the Secretary of Defense believes that it is in the interest of the United States to accept the recommendation of the Governor of the State involved for the realignment or closure of the installation  (B) For each military installation identified under subparagraph (A), a master plan describing the required scope of work, cost, and timing for all facility actions needed to carry out the realignment or closure, including the construction of new facilities and the repair or renovation of existing facilities  (C) For each military installation identified under subparagraph (A), a certification that, not later than the end of the fifth fiscal year after the completion of the realignment or closure, the savings resulting from the realignment or closure will exceed the costs of carrying out the realignment or closure, together with an estimate of the annual recurring savings that would be achieved by the realignment or closure of the installation and the timeframe required for the financial savings to exceed the costs of carrying out the realignment or closure  (d) Limitations — (1) Timing —The Secretary may not initiate the realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of this section until the expiration of the 90-day period beginning on the date the Secretary submits the report under paragraph (2) of subsection (c)  (2) Total costs —Subject to appropriations, the aggregate cost to the government in carrying out the realignment or closure of military installations pursuant to the authority of this section for all fiscal years may not exceed $2,000,000,000  In determining the cost to the government for purposes of this section, there shall be included the costs of planning and design, military construction, operations and maintenance, environmental restoration, information technology, termination of public-private contracts, guarantees, and other factors contributing to the cost of carrying out the realignment or closure, as determined by the Secretary  (e) Process for Implementation —The implementation of the realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of this section shall be carried out in accordance with section 2905 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (title XXIX of P L  101-510 ; 10 U S C  2687 note) in the same manner as the implementation of a realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of such Act  (f) State Defined —In this section, the term ``State'' means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands  (g) Termination of Authority —The authority of the Secretary to carry out a realignment or closure pursuant to this section shall terminate at the end of fiscal year 2029  Appendix B  BRAC Acreage Disposal Status, By State

ground_truth: Since 1977, statutory thresholds have effectively constrained the President's ability to close or realign major military installations in the United States. Congress has instead periodically granted temporary authorities—known as a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)—that have established independent commissions for the review and approval of basing changes submitted by the Secretary of Defense. These unique and transient authorities last expired on April 16, 2006. There have been five rounds of base closures: 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005. Though Congress has periodically adjusted the BRAC process to account for lessons learned, the modern framework has remained generally consistent with earlier rounds, and includes establishment of an independent commission; reliance on objective and uniform criteria; Government Accountability Office (GAO) review and certification of Department of Defense (DOD) data; deliberations designed to be transparent that include open hearings, solicitation of feedback, installation visits, and data available for public review; and requirement that the final list of closure and realignment recommendations be accepted or rejected in their entirety. Congress has defined BRAC selection criteria in statute, thus requiring the Secretary to prioritize military value over cost savings. Additionally, Congress has required the Secretary to align the Department's recommendations with a comprehensive 20-year force structure plan. The commission may modify, reject, or add recommendations during its review before forwarding a final list to the President. After receiving the Commission's list of recommendations, the President may either accept the report in its entirety or seek to modify it by indicating disapproval and returning it to the commission for further evaluation. If the President accepts the commission's recommendations, they are forwarded to Congress. BRAC implementation begins by default unless Congress rejects the recommendations in their entirety within 45 days by enacting a joint resolution. During the implementation phase, DOD is required to initiate closures and realignments within two years and complete all actions within six years. The BRAC process represents a legislative compromise between the executive and legislative branches wherein each shares power in managing the closure and realignment of military bases. The imposition of an independent, third-party mediator was intended to insulate base closings from political considerations by both branches that had complicated similar actions in the past. This report provides background on the development of BRAC, describes its major elements and milestones, and outlines issues frequently cited in the context of new rounds, such as potential savings.