prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: DOD has defined various types of unwanted sexual behaviors, including sexual assault, sexual harassment, and domestic violence  Sexual assault: DOD defines sexual assault as intentional sexual contact, characterized by use of force, threats, intimidation, abuse of authority, or when the victim does not or cannot consent  The term includes a broad category of sexual offenses consisting of the following specific Uniform Code of Military Justice offenses: rape, sexual assault, aggravated sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, forcible sodomy (forced oral or anal sex), or attempts to commit these acts  Sexual harassment: DOD defines sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person’s job, pay, or career; (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or employment decisions affecting that person; or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment  However, as noted earlier, a provision of the NDAA for FY 2017 changed the definition of sexual harassment for the military for purposes of investigations by commanding officers so that it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination, but is recognized as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behavior that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault  We discuss this changed definition of sexual harassment later in this report  Domestic violence: DOD defines domestic violence as an offense under the United States Code, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or state law involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force or violence against a person, or a violation of a lawful order issued for the protection of a person who is a current or former spouse, a person with whom the abuser shares a child in common or a current or former intimate partner with whom the abuser shares or has shared a common domicile  Sexual assault of spouses and intimate partners is a subset of domestic violence  Various offices and organizations within DOD play a role in addressing unwanted sexual behaviors in the military  The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for developing the overall policy and guidance for the department’s efforts to prevent and respond to instances of sexual assault, except for criminal investigative policy matters assigned to the DOD Inspector General and legal processes in the Uniform Code of Military Justice  The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness oversees the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO), which serves as the department’s single point of authority, accountability, and oversight for its sexual assault prevention and response program  The responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and SAPRO with regard to sexual assault prevention and response include providing the military services with guidance and technical support and facilitating the identification and resolution of issues; developing programs, policies, and training standards for the prevention of, reporting of, and response to sexual assault; developing strategic program guidance and joint planning objectives; overseeing the department’s collection and maintenance of data on reported alleged sexual assaults involving servicemembers; establishing mechanisms to measure the effectiveness of the department’s sexual assault prevention and response program; and preparing the department’s mandated annual reports to Congress on sexual assaults involving servicemembers  The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for establishing policies for preventing and responding to sexual assault within their respective military service, and for ensuring compliance with DOD’s policy  Further, they are responsible for establishing policies that ensure commander accountability for program implementation and execution  Each military service has established an office that is responsible for overseeing and managing the military service’s sexual assault prevention and response program  Each military service also maintains a primary policy document on its sexual assault prevention and response program  Much like DOD’s directive and instruction on sexual assault prevention and response, the military service policies outline responsibilities of relevant stakeholders, including commanders, sexual assault response coordinators, and victim advocates and training requirements for all personnel  The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has responsibility for developing the overall policy for DOD’s military equal opportunity program and monitoring compliance with the department’s policy  According to the policy, all servicemembers are afforded equal opportunity in an environment free from harassment, including sexual harassment, and unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex (including gender), and sexual orientation  The chain of command is used as the primary and preferred channel to (1) identify and correct unlawful discrimination practices, (2) process and resolve complaints of unlawful discrimination or harassment, to include sexual, and (3) ensure that military equal opportunity matters are taken seriously and acted on as necessary  The Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity (ODMEO) oversees the department’s efforts to promote equal opportunity, diversity, and inclusion management, and to help prevent unlawful discrimination and harassment throughout DOD  The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute develops training and studies on equal opportunity  Behaviors under the purview of the military equal opportunity program include unlawful discrimination on the basis of color, national origin, race, religion, or sex  The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for developing policies to prevent unlawful discrimination and harassment, (including sexual harassment), ensuring compliance with DOD’s policy, and establishing both formal and informal means of resolving complaints  The chain of command is the primary and preferred channel for identifying and correcting discriminatory practices and resolving servicemembers’ complaints of sexual harassment  The military services encourage servicemembers to resolve any complaints of sexual harassment they may have at the lowest possible level first  For servicemembers who wish to report a complaint of sexual harassment, DOD provides two complaint options—formal and informal  A formal complaint is an allegation of sexual harassment that a complainant submits in writing to the authority designated for the receipt of such complaints in military service implementing guidance  Formal complaints require specific actions to be taken, are subject to timelines, and require documentation of the actions taken, in accordance with federal law  In contrast, an informal complaint is an allegation of sexual harassment, made either orally or in writing, which is not submitted as a formal complaint  Informal complaints may be resolved directly by the complainant, such as by confronting the individual or by involving another individual or the chain of command  Servicemembers who elect to resolve their complaints informally may submit a formal complaint if they are dissatisfied with the outcome of the informal process  In 2014, DOD directed the military services to develop implementing instructions and mechanisms for reporting instances of sexual harassment anonymously  The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family Policy under the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for the development and oversight of policy for the military departments to implement a coordinated community response approach to addressing domestic abuse  The DOD Family Advocacy Program (FAP) office provides guidance and technical assistance to the military departments and DOD components to support their efforts to address, among other things, domestic abuse  The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for developing military service-wide policies, supplementary standards, and instructions to provide for the requirements within their respective installations FAPs  Each military service has established a FAP that is responsible for overseeing and managing, among other things, the installation-level FAPs and the military service’s domestic violence and domestic abuse prevention and response programs  When domestic abuse does occur, the military service installation FAP conducts a risk assessment and works to ensure the safety of the victims and help military families overcome the effects as well as change destructive patterns  CDC is one of the major operating components of the Department of Health and Human Services, which serves as the federal government’s principal agency for protecting the health of U S  citizens  As part of its health-related mission, CDC serves as the national focal point for developing and applying disease prevention and control, environmental health, and health promotion and education activities  CDC, among other things, conducts research to enhance prevention, develops and advocates public health policies, implements prevention strategies, promotes healthy behaviors, fosters safe and healthful environments, and provides associated training  In 1992, CDC established the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control as the lead federal organization for violence prevention  The center’s Division of Violence Prevention focuses on stopping violence, including sexual violence, before it begins and works to achieve this by conducting research on the factors that put people at risk for violence, examining the effective adoption and dissemination of prevention strategies, and evaluating the effectiveness of violence prevention programs  In 2004, CDC published a framework for effective sexual violence prevention strategies  This framework includes prevention concepts and strategies, such as identifying risk and protective factors (i e , factors that may put a person at risk for committing sexual assault or that, alternatively, may prevent harm)  CDC’s framework defines sexual violence as including non-contact unwanted sexual behaviors, sexual harassment, and physical sexual assault  DOD has acknowledged that connections exist across the continuum of unwanted sexual behaviors including sexual harassment and sexual assault and that this continuum of harm is reflected in key documents that guide prevention and response activities  For example, SAPRO has also reported that certain behavior and activities, such as hazing, can lead to sexual assault  Additionally, DOD’s Prevention Roundtable and 2014- 2016 Sexual Assault Prevention Strategy have both adopted CDC’s definition of “prevention” as it applies to sexual violence  CDC defines sexual violence to include sexual harassment and sexual assault  In 2014 and 2017, DOD contracted with RAND to conduct independent assessments of behaviors across the continuum of harm, including sexual assault and sexual harassment  In its 2014 report, RAND found that (1) 34 percent of male servicemembers who were surveyed reported that the sexual assault was part of a hazing incident, (2) servicemembers who experienced sexual harassment or gender discrimination in the past year also experienced higher rates of sexual assault, and (3) approximately one-third of servicemembers who are sexually assaulted stated the offender sexually harassed them before the assault  In its 2017 report, RAND found that (1) people are more likely to engage in problematic behaviors, such as sexual harassment, if that person perceives that peers and leaders condone those actions and (2) some organizations responsible for addressing unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment lack adequate policies, plans, information systems, and resources needed to establish a departmental approach to certain behavioral issues, inform senior leadership about these problems, and ensure that leadership’s decisions about problematic behaviors are uniformly enforced  CDC research revealed that behaviors such as bullying and homophobic teasing in early adolescence are significant predictors of sexual harassment over time  According to the CDC, these youth are at an increased potential to perpetrate sexual violence and engage in sexually harassing behavior  In response, CDC recommends that communities work to prevent all types of violence from occurring and coordinate and integrate responses to violence in a way that recognizes these connections  CDC’s research has also established that survivors of one form of violence are more likely to be victims of other forms of violence, that survivors of violence are at higher risk for behaving violently, and that people who behave violently are more likely to commit other forms of violence  Further, CDC states that violence prevention and intervention efforts that focus on only one form of violence can be broadened to address multiple, connected forms of violence to increase the public health impact  DOD’s policies on sexual harassment include some but not all of CDC’s principles and most relevant legislative elements  OSD and military service-specific sexual harassment policies generally include prevention strategies that CDC has identified in its principles for sexual violence prevention but leave out risk and protective factors, as well as risk domains  Additionally, DOD’s sexual harassment policies include most elements identified in section 579 of the NDAA for FY 2013, but do not consistently include mechanisms for anonymous reporting  ODMEO officials stated that they plan to issue a new policy that is intended to focus on sexual harassment and other forms of harassment, but it is too early to know whether that policy will include all the CDC principles or mechanisms for anonymous reporting  We also noted during our review that most existing policies have not yet been updated to reflect a provision in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA that redefined sexual harassment for certain purposes so it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination but is recognized also as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behaviors that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault  DOD’s sexual harassment policies include some of the principles that have been developed by CDC as part of a framework for preventing sexual violence, but other principles are not included  OSD includes sexual harassment as part of its broader military equal opportunity policy  It addresses, among other things, processes for preventing and responding to cases of discrimination, including sexual harassment; education and training in equal opportunity; and complaints processing  The military services’ policies on sexual harassment cover similar topics, such as chain of command responsibilities, complaint processing, and definitions for sexual harassment; however, they have some differences  For example, while all policies include provisions on sexual harassment prevention training, the Army’s and the Navy’s policies include specific characteristics of effective training  Both policies also specify what should be included in trainings for different levels of the chain of command  The Marine Corps and Air Force policies simply state that commanders must conduct sexual harassment prevention training  CDC’s framework defines sexual violence as including non-contact unwanted sexual behaviors, sexual harassment, and physical sexual assault  We applied six principles for sexual violence prevention from CDC’s framework to DOD’s sexual harassment policies  These principles are: Risk factors: Factors that may put people at risk for sexual violence perpetration or victimization, such as an organizational climate that either explicitly or implicitly condones sexual harassment  Protective factors: Factors that may protect high-risk people from harm, such as an organizational climate that promotes respect amongst personnel at all levels  Primary strategies for prevention: Strategies that occur before sexual violence takes place to prevent initial perpetration, such as sexual harassment prevention training  Secondary strategies for prevention: Immediate responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the early identification of victims and the short-term consequences of violence, such as mechanisms for reporting instances of sexual harassment and immediate interventions  Tertiary strategies for prevention: Long-term responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the lasting consequences of violence and sex-offender treatment interventions, such as long-term treatment of the victim and perpetrator  Risk domains: Levels at which risk and protective factors should be categorized, including: individual, relationship, community, and societal  In its sexual assault prevention strategy, DOD adapted risk domains to the military population, using the levels of: individual, relationship, leaders at all levels, military community, and society  Our comparison of DOD sexual harassment policies with CDC’s framework for preventing sexual violence showed that the policies include some of the principles in the framework but not others (see table 1 ) Our analysis showed that the OSD and the Air Force policies each include two of the six principles in CDC’s framework, and the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps policies include three principles  Specifically, the policies generally identify sexual harassment prevention training for the armed forces, a primary strategy for prevention  In addition, the policies generally outline mechanisms for reporting and responding to sexual harassment, considered a secondary strategy for prevention  The Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps policies outline counseling support and referral services, as well as specifying the options available for administrative or judicial punishment, including discharge from service for perpetrators, which can be considered to be tertiary strategies for prevention  Common elements missing from DOD’s sexual harassment policies are risk factors and protective factors, which identify conditions or behaviors that might heighten or lower the risk of sexual harassment victimization or perpetration, respectively  Examples of risk factors for sexual violence identified by the CDC include, but are not limited to, alcohol and drug use, hypermasculinity, emotionally unsupportive family environments, general tolerance of sexual violence within the community, and societal norms that support male superiority and sexual entitlement  Examples of protective factors from the CDC include emotional health and connectedness, and empathy and concern for how one’s actions affect others  Additionally, RAND identified an organizational climate that is oppositional to sexual violence as a protective factor  The policies also did not include risk domains, which would categorize risk and protective factors at the individual, relationship, community, and society levels  ODMEO officials told us that they are familiar with the CDC framework and are considering using it as a source of best practices for a new sexual harassment prevention strategy  DOD has previously used CDC’s sexual violence prevention framework to guide its sexual assault prevention strategy  In the absence of more comprehensive policies on sexual harassment that fully include principles in the CDC framework for sexual violence prevention, DOD may be missing opportunities to address and potentially reduce incidents of sexual harassment in the military population based on risk and protective factors and effective, tested strategies  Specifically, DOD may be missing the opportunity to identify risk factors, which would help to recognize situations where individuals and populations may be at a higher risk of sexual harassment perpetration or victimization; identify protective factors to lower the risk of sexual harassment; develop mechanisms to address sexual harassment across risk domains—at the individual, relationship, community, and society levels; and develop tertiary strategies, or long-term responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the lasting consequences of violence and sex- offender treatment interventions  DOD’s sexual harassment policies include three elements required by section 579 of the NDAA for FY 2013 but some do not include one element involving the anonymous reporting of incidents  Section 579 mandated that DOD, among other things, develop a comprehensive sexual harassment policy that includes the following elements: (1) prevention training for members of the armed forces; (2) mechanisms for reporting sexual harassment, including mechanisms for anonymous reporting; and (3) mechanisms for resolving sexual harassment that include the prosecution of perpetrators  In 2014, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued a policy memorandum addressing the provisions of Section 579 and directed the military services to develop implementing instructions that include mechanisms for anonymous reporting  We compared DOD’s policies with the required elements in section 579 and found that OSD and military service policies generally include required elements except for the element focused on DOD including anonymous reporting in its policies for sexual harassment  The OSD, Army, and Marine Corps policies do not include anonymous reporting, while the Air Force policy and a new Navy policy do  Officials from ODMEO said that providing an option for anonymous reporting is important because it increases the odds that incidents will be reported  ODMEO officials also told us that the services have hotlines that servicemembers can use to anonymously report complaints of sexual harassment, and the Air Force and Navy policies note that their respective military servicemembers have options for anonymous reporting  While the military services may have mechanisms in place for anonymous reporting of sexual harassment, these mechanisms are not included in OSD’s policy—as required by section 579—or the policies of two of the Services, those of the Army and the Marine Corps  Without including anonymous reporting of sexual harassment complaints in DOD’s sexual harassment policies, the statutory requirement for anonymous reporting may be interpreted and applied inconsistently throughout the military services, or left unmet  OSD is developing a new policy—planned to be issued in fiscal year 2018—that will specifically focus on various forms of harassment, including sexual harassment, hazing, and bullying  ODMEO officials who are developing the new policy stated that it is intended, among other things, to enhance oversight of sexual harassment prevention and response within the department  However, because the policy is under development, it is too early to determine how the policy will address the CDC principles and anonymous reporting, as discussed earlier  Further, it is unclear how OSD plans to improve oversight and whether it intends to include performance goals, objectives, milestones, and metrics as we previously recommended in 2011  Although OSD in 2014 directed the military services to improve their oversight of sexual harassment, none of the military services were able to demonstrate that they had implemented all the required elements  Specifically, DOD’s 2014 policy memorandum addressing the provisions of section 579 also directs the military services to develop a sexual harassment oversight framework to be reviewed quarterly by a senior leadership forum that includes long-term goals, objectives, and milestones; criteria for measuring progress; results-oriented performance measures to assess effectiveness of service sexual harassment policies and programs; standards for holding leaders accountable for promoting, supporting, and enforcing policies, plans and programs; and strategies to implement the oversight framework  While some of the military services have included elements of the oversight framework directive from the 2014 policy memorandum, none of them were able to provide information that demonstrated that they had fulfilled all requirements set forth by that policy memorandum  For instance, when asked, none of the military services were able to provide details that they have senior leader forums that review their oversight efforts on a quarterly basis  Officials from the Air Force told us that they were waiting for ODMEO to release a new sexual harassment policy before establishing the oversight framework  Officials from the Navy referred us to their July 2017 sexual harassment policy, which instructs the Navy Sexual Harassment Prevention and Equal Opportunity Office to develop and implement standards for holding leaders accountable for promoting, supporting, and enforcing sexual harassment prevention and response policies, plans, and programs, and to develop results-oriented performance measures to assess the effectiveness of sexual harassment prevention and response policies and programs  Officials from the Army referred us to their SHARP Campaign Plan, which outlines methods to hold leaders accountable for taking appropriate action to address sexual harassment; goals and objectives for the program; and ways to measure program effectiveness  The Marine Corps did not respond to our request for information regarding an oversight framework for sexual harassment  A new department-wide policy on sexual harassment could be helpful to the military services as they review and update their respective policies  As noted earlier, military service policies have some differences in how they address aspects of sexual harassment  The Marine Corps told us that they have been waiting for additional guidance from OSD before updating their sexual harassment policies  However, following publicized incidents of Marines posting inappropriate photos on line of female servicemembers without their consent, the Marine Corps updated its guidance in May 2017 adding “the distribution or broadcasting of an intimate image, without consent” to its list of sexual harassment incidents that mandate separation processing  Additionally, in May 2017, a Marine Corps official said the service was revising its sexual harassment policy  The Navy updated its sexual harassment policy in July 2017 without additional guidance from OSD  We also noted during our review that most existing policies have not yet been updated to reflect a provision in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA that redefined sexual harassment for certain purposes so it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination but is recognized also as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behavior that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault  We asked DOD officials from several offices about the implications of this change  They identified some actions they will take, but the full implications, if any, of the change are unclear  Officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness said that there are no significant implications of the sexual harassment definition change beyond making conforming revisions to policy documents and guidance  ODMEO officials said that adjusting to the new definition of sexual harassment would not significantly affect their work at the OSD level, since they are already updating their sexual harassment policy to reflect this change and since sexual harassment is expected to remain within the responsibilities of ODMEO  They added that the military services will likely have to adjust to the new definition of sexual harassment, but did not offer details in how they would have to adjust  The Navy’s new policy dated July 2017 reflects the new definition, but the other military services have yet to incorporate the change  Officials from SAPRO said that they are working with ODMEO to revise surveys on unwanted sexual behaviors to reflect the new definition  SAPRO officials further stated that sexual harassment should remain under ODMEO’s purview since ODMEO personnel are trained specifically in sexual harassment response  Officials from the Army’s SHARP program said that the new definition means that sexual harassment will more often be considered misconduct, and taken more seriously  Since OSD is in the process of updating its policy, we are not making any recommendations  However, it will be important for OSD and the military services to address our prior recommendation regarding improving the oversight framework as well as incorporating the new definition of sexual harassment required by the fiscal year 2017 NDAA while updating their policies  DOD has processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on sexual assault incidents and domestic violence incidents that involve sexual assault, but the department does not have similar assurance of consistent data on incidents of sexual harassment  SAPRO and FAP each use centralized databases that enable them to maintain and report consistent data on those incidents that fall under their purview  In contrast, DOD relies on military service-specific databases on sexual harassment incidents and does not have assurance of consistent data from these databases because it has not established standard data elements and definitions to guide the military services in maintaining and reporting these data  DOD uses centralized databases to maintain and report data on sexual assault incidents in the military and domestic violence incidents involving sexual assault  Specifically, SAPRO and the military services use the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID), and FAP uses the DOD Central Registry  These databases maintain data on incidents that are included in statutorily required annual reports to Congress on sexual assaults in the military  In 2011, Congress mandated that DOD provide annual reports that include: the number of sexual assaults committed against and by members of the armed forces that were reported to military officials, including unsubstantiated and substantiated reports with a synopsis of each substantiated case organized by offense and the action taken, including disciplinary actions; the policies, processes, and procedures implemented by the Secretary concerned during the year covered by the report in response to incidents of sexual assaults; the number of substantiated sexual assault cases in which the victim is deployed where the assailant is a foreign national; and a description of the implementation of the accessibility plan, including a description of the steps taken to ensure that trained personnel, appropriate supplies, and transportation resources are available to deployed units  The most recent DOD annual report on sexual assault was issued in May 2017 and covered fiscal year 2016  The report includes data on the number of both restricted and unrestricted reports of sexual assault involving servicemembers  The report also contains separate enclosures for the Army, the Navy (including the Marine Corps), the Air Force, and the National Guard, as well as annexes on the Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members (WGRA) and the Military Investigation and Justice Experience Survey (MIJES)  The WGRA annex discusses topics including the continuum of harm and the MIJES annex contains information on closed cases of sexual assault  SAPRO and FAP both contributed sexual assault incident data to the fiscal year 2016 report, and our review of the underlying databases found that data elements and definitions were defined and management was able to process the data into consistent information  Specifically, the two databases used are the: DSAID Data on Sexual Assault Incidents: DSAID captures DOD-wide data on certain incidents of sexual assault that involve a servicemember or in some cases, when a sexual assault involves a servicemember’s spouse or adult family member or a DOD civilian or contractor  However, FAP-related sexual assault incidents are not captured in DSAID  Using information generated by DSAID, SAPRO includes both substantiated and unsubstantiated reports of sexual assault in its annual report  In 2017, we reviewed DSAID and found that DOD had taken steps to ensure the quality and consistency of data in DSAID as well as to monitor the data entered into the system  In addition, OSD had provided the military services with definitions for required data elements in the database, which include details on the incident, victim, and alleged offender  In addition, we identified several technical challenges with the system, including issues with the system’s speed and ease of use; interfaces with other external DOD databases; and users’ ability to query data and generate reports  At the time of the report’s release, DOD had plans to modify DSAID  As of July 2017, DOD officials told us that they are still in the process of making modifications to DSAID to resolve or alleviate the technical challenges for users  DOD Central Registry Data on Domestic Abuse Incidents Involving Sexual Assault: The DOD Central Registry captures DOD-wide data on reports of domestic abuse on populations within FAP’s purview, including on family members of servicemembers as well as on their intimate partners  The DOD Central Registry includes details of each case such as the status of cases, the demographics of the perpetrator and victim, the specific type of abuse, and other details surrounding the incident  FAP officials explained that they do not use the “substantiated” and “unsubstantiated” terminology like SAPRO does  Rather, FAP, which is not responsible for determining criminal or legal disposition, uses the terms “met criteria” and “not met criteria” for maltreatment  This difference in terminology has to do with FAP’s process for determining if an incident meets the clinical criteria to be classified as abuse for the purpose of developing an intervention/treatment plan for both the victim and the offenders involved in the allegations of domestic violence  Incidents that are determined as having met criteria are entered into the DOD Central Registry  We reviewed the DOD Central Registry and found that it includes well defined data elements and descriptions for collecting data on cases of domestic violence including those that involve sexual assault  The data in the DOD Central Registry includes 46 discrete data elements, including the relationship between the victim and perpetrator, the timeline of the case, and actions taken and treatments administered in response to the incident  The elements are defined and described in an OSD policy  In its annual reporting to Congress, FAP provides the number of domestic violence incidents involving sexual assault that met criteria and the total number of instances of domestic violence that did not meet criteria  However, FAP does not maintain or report data on the total number of reported domestic violence incidents that specifically involve sexual assault  That is because only the details of cases that meet criteria are recorded in the DOD Central Registry  A FAP official said that the military services likely have more detailed information about cases that did not meet the criteria, but it does not collect these data in the DOD Central Registry  A provision in the NDAA for FY 2017 requires DOD to submit an annual report on child abuse and domestic abuse incident data, including the number of incidents reported during the year involving the physical or sexual abuse of a spouse, intimate partner, or child  This report is to be submitted simultaneously with submission of DOD’s annual sexual assault report to Congress  FAP officials told us that they are currently working with SAPRO to ensure that all reported incidents of domestic violence involving sexual assault, including those that did not meet the criteria, are included in the annual sexual assault report  Though not required to do so, DOD has included sexual harassment incident data in an appendix of its annual report on sexual assault in the military  The appendix provides information on the total number of sexual harassment reports over the fiscal year and the total number of substantiated sexual harassment reports  It also breaks down complaints by sex, service, and pay grade  ODMEO generates the reported data through annual data calls to each military service; however, it does not have assurance that the services maintain consistent data on sexual harassment incidents consistent with federal standards of internal control  The military services maintain sexual harassment incident data in military service-specific databases, and there is no centralized database similar to DSAID or the Central Registry  The military service databases are intended to collect data on formal complaints  According to the military services, the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps use web-based systems, and the Navy tracks data using an Excel spreadsheet  Each service has a discrete process for entering and performing quality checks on sexual harassment incident data in its respective database, as shown in table 2  Although the military services perform some data quality checks as shown in table 2, ODMEO does not have assurance the military services are maintaining consistent data because it has not defined standard data elements and definitions for the information in their databases  Rather, the individual military services have established their own data elements and definitions  We compared data elements and definitions from each of the military services and found that there are several data elements that remain consistent throughout the services  For example, each military service records whether the complainant and offender are in the same unit, what their relationship is to each other, and the disposition of cases  However, we also found inconsistencies in data fields and their definitions across the military services, and some of the military services have data fields and definitions that do not exist in other databases  For example, the Marine Corps records whether or not the incident involves alcohol or drug use, which the rest of the military services do not record, and the military services record dates differently between their respective databases  For example, the Air Force records an initial date, the date the complaint form was signed, the date the general court martial was sent, the date the legal review was completed, and the final review date  The Marine Corps records the date the incident was reported, the date the incident occurred and whether the incident occurred over multiple dates; the dates associated with notifications and status updates to general courts martial proceedings; the dates associated with steps in the investigation, including any extensions; the dates associated with dispositions; and the dates associated with appeals  Additionally, the military services have different ways of categorizing sexual harassment incidents, as shown in table 3  As shown in table 3, while some data descriptions are similar—for instance, each of the military services include crude/offensive behavior, unwanted sexual attention, and sexual coercion—there are differences as well  The Air Force also categorizes sexual harassment into verbal, nonverbal, physical, and other, for example, whereas the other military services’ top-level categories are different  The Navy has a “not applicable” category that it describes as sexual harassment complaints that do not fall under sexual harassment, and only the Air Force has an “other” category  Because the military services have different descriptors for similar data fields, DOD cannot ensure that the services are categorizing similar types of sexual harassment in the same way  In addition, we found that the Army is more detailed in characterizing different types of sexual harassment  Specifically, as shown in table 4, the Army has an additional data field that provides more detailed descriptions of three types of sexual harassment; the other military services’ respective databases do not have this level of detail  Because the Army has this additional data field, it can capture information on multiple types of harassment that may occur in a single incident  The other military services, in contrast, do not have this capability in their respective databases  To illustrate, if one case of sexual harassment involved both verbal and nonverbal forms of sexual harassment, the Army could choose a more specific characterization to describe the incident, while the other military services would characterize the incident in more general terms  ODMEO officials are considering adapting an existing system to track instances of sexual harassment department-wide  That system, called Force Risk Reduction (FR2), is currently used to track safety issues like military injuries, civilian workers’ compensation claims, and casualty notifications at DOD  ODMEO recently completed a pilot of the system with the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the Army to test whether it would be useable for adaptation for sexual harassment data, and is planning a second pilot to include the Air Force and the National Guard Bureau  According to ODMEO officials, their adaptation of FR2 is intended to collect aggregate-level sexual harassment data from the military services, and the military services will continue to operate and rely on their individual databases to maintain more detailed case-level information on incidents  For example, ODMEO’s adaptation of FR2 would not have details such as descriptions of specific incidents, or information on dates associated with investigations or appeals  These types of data will continue to be maintained in the service systems  ODMEO officials told us that their new data system, if implemented, is not designed to collect case-level details in order to avoid personally identifiable information  Federal internal control standards state that management should define the identified information requirements at the relevant level and requisite specificity for appropriate personnel  Management should also process the obtained data into quality information  Consistency of information meets the identified information requirements when relevant data from reliable sources are used  While DOD is exploring implementing a system to track instances of sexual harassment department-wide, as currently planned this system will not collect case-level details and individual military service systems will continue to be relied upon for this type of information  Inconsistencies in data elements and definitions among the military services generally mean that one military service may be maintaining sexual harassment data that are more or less detailed than sexual harassment data maintained by other military services, or that is simply different from the data maintained by other military services  Additionally, inconsistent data elements and definitions may create difficulties in reporting sexual harassment data from the military services to OSD for a department-wide report, since ODMEO has to adapt data from the services to fit reporting requirements  Without standard data elements and definitions for sexual harassment data, DOD will continue to lack assurance about the consistency of these data across the military services  DOD has several overarching efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm  Specifically, the department established an office to oversee the integration and coordination of unwanted sexual behaviors in 2015 and is in the process of developing an overarching prevention strategy  However, because the strategy is under development, it is unclear whether it will contain key elements for long-term and results-oriented strategic planning  DOD also has ongoing collaborative efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors along the continuum of harm  Specifically, we identified 15 collaborative efforts, including regular meetings, Integrated Product Teams, and working groups that involve multiple entities that address unwanted sexual behaviors  DOD has taken steps to integrate activities related to the continuum of harm and is in the process of developing an overarching prevention strategy  Based on its research, DOD has sought to understand and define the continuum of harm, including the shared characteristics that contribute to increased unwanted sexual behaviors along the continuum and implications for prevention and response efforts  Also, in November 2015, DOD established a new entity—the Office of the Executive Director for Force Resiliency, within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness—to oversee policies and initiatives related to the continuum of harm  Specifically, the Executive Director for Force Resiliency was expected to provide senior leader policy guidance and oversight on high visibility departments that include SAPRO and ODMEO  In November 2016, the Office of the Executive Director for Force Resiliency was absorbed under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness  According to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, the functions of the Office of the Executive Director for Force Resiliency remain and coordination of the efforts of several offices that address the continuum of harm continues  Officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and SAPRO told us that they are drafting an overarching prevention strategy to encompass behaviors along the continuum of harm  However, because the strategy is still under development, its contents and timelines are unclear  We have previously identified six elements of strategic management planning that are key for establishing a long-term, results- oriented strategic planning framework: (1) a mission statement, (2) long- term goals, (3) strategies to achieve goals, (4) external factors that could affect goals, (5) the use of metrics to gauge progress, and (6) evaluations of the plan to monitor goals and objectives  By incorporating the elements of a comprehensive and results-oriented strategy into its overarching prevention strategy, the department will be better positioned to effectively coordinate and integrate prevention activities and reduce unwanted sexual behaviors  A mission statement, along with long-term goals and strategies to achieve those goals, should help to focus efforts in integrating prevention activities, and metrics and evaluations will allow the department to gauge progress and make changes as necessary, while also accounting for external factors that may impact progress towards goals  Our review identified 15 collaborative efforts that DOD has used to address behaviors along the continuum of harm, including sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual assault  Three of these efforts are cross-cutting between all three of the key OSD stakeholders—ODMEO, FAP, and SAPRO—and five involve cross-cutting efforts by at least two of the key stakeholders  Figure 1 lists DOD’s 15 collaborative efforts  Regarding the three cross-cutting efforts involving all three of the key stakeholders, The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Integrated Product Team provides a forum for OSD, the military departments, and the National Guard Bureau to address sexual assault prevention efforts  The team meets bimonthly and serves as the implementation and oversight arm for DOD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program  The team also coordinates new policies; reviews existing SAPR policies and programs to ensure they are consistent with applicable instructions; and monitors the progress of program elements including DOD’s SAPR strategic plan tasks, DOD’s sexual assault prevention strategy tasks, and implementation of NDAA- related sexual assault issues  SAPRO leads this effort  The Prevention Collaboration Forum and working group develops coordinated prevention approaches that address factors impacting personnel readiness such as sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual assault  According to its proposed charter, the focus of the forum is on enhancing the health of military unit and family climates as well as strengthening and promoting the resiliency and readiness of the total force through a coordinated effort around integrated policies, collaborative direction of research, alignment of resources, analysis of gaps, and synchronization of activities  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness leads this effort with SAPRO providing administrative and facilitation support  The Victim Assistance Leadership Council advises the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on policies and practices related to victim assistance across DOD  According to its charter, the council provides a forum for senior leaders to exchange information and collaborate on issues affecting victims of all forms of crime and harassment within DOD, including but not limited to victims of sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual abuse  Leadership rotates between SAPRO, FAP, and ODMEO and other offices  Regarding the cross-cutting efforts involving two of the three key stakeholders, the Sexual Harassment Prevention and Response Working Group is led by ODMEO and includes SAPRO  The group was established to evaluate how to best position sexual harassment prevention and response policy and oversight and to leverage technology to automate annual reporting requirements  The four other cross-cutting efforts are (1) the hazing and bullying working group, (2) retaliation working groups created under the SAPR Integrated Process Team, (3) domestic abuse rapid improvement events, and (4) ODMEO and SHARP meetings  The remaining collaborative efforts we identified are specific to FAP, SAPRO, and ODMEO  For example, the Sexual Assault Prevention Roundtable is a forum for representatives from OSD, the military departments, and the National Guard Bureau to share information on sexual assault prevention efforts and requirements  According to its charter, the roundtable’s activities include, among other things, sharing promising practices and prevention updates; discussing challenges in prevention program implementation, including servicemember training, and identifying approaches to address them; identifying metrics to assess the impact and effectiveness of prevention efforts, and opportunities to collaborate on research projects; and tracking the implementation of prevention tasks identified in the DOD SAPR strategy  SAPRO leads this effort  The Defense Diversity Working Group is an ODMEO-specific group that collaborates with various OSD and military service offices on military and civilian diversity and inclusion issues and implements mandated diversity plans and programs  Studies by DOD and others have shown that unwanted sexual behaviors do not exist in isolation but are part of a range of interconnected, inappropriate behaviors that are connected to the occurrence of a sexual assault  While DOD has policies and procedures to prevent and respond to these types of unwanted behaviors, some of the policies do not include key elements like anonymous reporting of sexual harassment and principles in the CDC framework for sexual violence prevention  Fully including these elements in the department’s policies can help ensure that the military services are interpreting and applying prevention and response efforts consistently and may also decrease the risk of perpetration or victimization related to instances on unwanted sexual behaviors  Further, DOD has developed reliable data systems for collecting and reporting data on some of the unwanted sexual behaviors including sexual assault and instances of domestic violence with sexual assault  However, inconsistencies in sexual harassment data elements and definitions may be creating difficulties in developing department-wide reports on unwanted sexual behaviors  Improving and standardizing data collection efforts will not only improve the quality of data that DOD and the military services collect but may also increase the ability for DOD to further develop its understanding of the connection between unwanted sexual behaviors  Finally, DOD officials have stated that they are in the early stages of developing an overarching strategy to address the interconnected nature of the range of unwanted sexual behaviors  To ensure that the department is appropriately concentrating its efforts to prevent and respond to the full range of unwanted behaviors, it is important that DOD include elements of a long-term, results-oriented strategy into its overarching prevention strategy  In doing so, DOD will be in a better position to effectively coordinate and integrate prevention activities and ultimately reduce instances of unwanted sexual behaviors  We are making the following four recommendations to DOD: The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should fully include in the new policy for sexual harassment the principles in the Centers for Disease Control’s framework for sexual violence prevention, including risk and protective factors, risk domains, and tertiary strategies  (Recommendation 1) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should include in the new policy for sexual harassment mechanisms for anonymous reporting of incidents consistent with section 579 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013  (Recommendation 2) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should (1) direct the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity to develop standard data elements and definitions for maintaining and reporting information on sexual harassment incidents at the military service level, and (2) direct the military services to incorporate these data elements and definitions into their military service-specific databases  (Recommendation 3) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness to incorporate in its continuum of harm prevention strategy all the elements that are key for establishing a long-term, results-oriented strategic planning framework  The elements are (1) a mission statement, (2) long-term goals, (3) strategies to achieve goals, (4) external factors that could affect goals, (5) use of metrics to gauge progress, and (6) evaluations of the plan to monitor goals and objectives  (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOD and CDC for review and comment  In its written comments, DOD concurred with three recommendations and partially concurred with one, noting planned actions to address this recommendation  DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II  DOD and CDC also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate  DOD concurred with our three recommendations that DOD fully include in the new policy for sexual harassment the principles in the CDC's framework for sexual violence prevention, that DOD also include in the new sexual harassment policy mechanisms for anonymous reporting, and that DOD incorporate in its continuum of harm strategy all the elements that are key for establishing a long-term, results-oriented strategic planning framework  With regard to our recommendation that DOD develop standard data elements and definitions for maintaining and reporting information on sexual harassment incidents and direct the military services to incorporate these into their databases, DOD partially concurred and stated that while a 2013 policy memorandum provides standard data elements and definitions, the services collect other data elements based on their unique needs  DOD stated that ODMEO will conduct a review to determine compliance with DOD reporting requirements and identify emerging policy modifications or changes/additions to standard definitions  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has policies on sexual harassment that include Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) principles and relevant legislative elements, we obtained and reviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and service-level sexual harassment policies  We compared the policies with a framework developed by the CDC for preventing sexual violence, which CDC defines as including non-contact unwanted sexual behaviors, sexual harassment, and physical sexual assault  CDC’s model is based on the concept of addressing the health of a given population based on common risk and protective factors and effective, tested strategies  We reviewed CDC’s framework for preventing sexual violence as well as our report on DOD’s sexual assault prevention strategy to identify six principles that an organization can include in a sexual violence prevention strategy or policy: Risk factors: Factors that may put people at risk for sexual violence perpetration or victimization, such as an organizational climate that either explicitly or implicitly condones sexual harassment; Protective factors: Factors that may protect high-risk people from harm, such as an organizational climate that promotes respect among personnel at all levels; Primary strategies for prevention: Strategies that occur before sexual violence takes place to prevent initial perpetration, such as sexual harassment prevention training; Secondary strategies for prevention: Immediate responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the early identification of victims and the short-term consequences of violence, such as reporting mechanisms and immediate interventions; Tertiary strategies for prevention: Long-term responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the lasting consequences of violence and sex-offender treatment interventions, such as the long- term treatment of the victim and perpetrator; and Risk domains: Levels at which risk and protective factors should be categorized, including: individual, relationship, community, and society  DOD has previously adapted risk domains to the military population, using the levels of: individual, relationship, leaders at all levels, military community, and society  DOD previously used CDC’s framework for preventing sexual violence in the department’s 2014-2016 Sexual Assault Prevention Strategy  In addition, we reviewed the OSD and service-level sexual harassment policies to determine the extent to which they included three elements identified in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2013, which directed DOD to develop a comprehensive policy that includes sexual harassment prevention training for the armed forces; mechanisms for reporting incidents, including mechanisms for anonymous reporting; and mechanisms for responding to and resolving instances of sexual harassment, including for the prosecution of perpetrators  Two GAO analysts independently reviewed the policies and determined whether or not each element was included  Any discrepancies were resolved through discussion and consultation with a third analyst  We interviewed officials in the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, who oversee department- wide policy on sexual harassment, to obtain an understanding of their roles and processes regarding sexual harassment as well as the status of policy development in that area  We also interviewed officials from military equal opportunity offices in the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, as well as officials from the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Office to obtain an understanding of the service sexual harassment offices and roles, as well as the status of updates to their respective policies  To determine the extent to which DOD has processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors, we reviewed DOD reports to Congress that provide incident data regarding unwanted sexual behaviors, including DOD’s most recent annual report on sexual assault in the military  We identified the databases that generate the reported data and evaluated the processes for assuring the quality and consistency of data in those databases—including the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database, which maintains sexual assault data; the Central Registry database, which maintains data on domestic violence involving sexual assault; and various military service- level databases that maintain sexual harassment data  To evaluate DOD’s reported data we reviewed pertinent statutory provisions, DOD guidance, and the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government that address agencies’ use of quality data and our prior reports evaluating sexual assault data  In evaluating the reported data, we obtained and reviewed statutory provisions with reporting requirements, as well as DOD guidance on data collection for sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual abuse  With regard to DOD efforts to collect and maintain sexual assault data, we met with OSD, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps officials in their respective Sexual Assault Prevention and Response offices as well as officials in the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention office  We also reviewed our prior report on DOD’s Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database and our prior report that evaluated sexual assault data across agencies  To determine whether DOD has processes for collecting and maintaining consistent data for domestic violence with sexual assault, we obtained and compared data elements and processes from DOD’s Central Registry database, which contains data for domestic violence throughout the department  We also obtained and reviewed policies that outline processes for collecting and reporting domestic violence involving sexual abuse data, and interviewed officials from Family Advocacy Program offices in OSD and the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force to determine data reliability and comprehensiveness  To determine the extent to which reports of sexual assault, including reports of sexual assault among servicemembers and reports of domestic abuse involving sexual assault, meet statutory requirements for reporting, we reviewed DOD reports to Congress that provide sexual assault incident data, including DOD’s most recent annual report on sexual assault in the military and compared those reports with requirements in the NDAA for FY 2011, which directs DOD to report the total number of substantiated and unsubstantiated sexual assault incidents, among other things  With regard to sexual harassment data, we interviewed officials in the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, as well as officials from the Military Equal Opportunity offices in the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, and officials from the Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention office  We collected and compared data fields and data definitions from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force offices that address sexual harassment  We compared the data elements to determine whether the data elements and definitions across the services are consistent  To identify the extent to which DOD has overarching efforts, including a prevention strategy, to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm, we met with officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and DOD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response office  We reviewed our prior work and provisions from the Government Performance and Results Act to identify key elements that should be included in strategic plans as well as standards for coordinating within agencies  Key elements include (1) mission statement, (2) long-term goals, (3) strategies to achieve goals, (4) external factors that could affect goals, (5) use of metrics to gauge progress, and (6) evaluations of the plan to monitor goals and objectives  We identified and reviewed coordinating mechanisms used by OSD and the service offices that guide and oversee efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors  We reviewed DOD, RAND Corporation, and CDC reports that addressed the continuum of harm and the relationship between the various forms of unwanted sexual behaviors  We interviewed officials from OSD and service-level Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, Family Advocacy, and Military Equal Opportunity offices and the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention to identify the various efforts in which they participate  We also collected and reviewed charters and meeting notes for integrated product teams and working groups to identify their intended purposes, their activities, their membership, and whether they involved multiple offices addressing unwanted sexual behaviors  In identifying DOD’s collaborative efforts, we also reviewed our prior work on collaboration among federal agencies but we did not assess the effectiveness of department’s collaborative efforts  We conducted this performance audit from August 2016 to December 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the staff named above, key contributors to this report include Thomas Gosling (Assistant Director); Isabel Band; Matthew Bond; Vincent Buquicchio; Caroline DeCelles; Mae Jones; Kirsten Lauber; and Brian Pegram  Sexual Assault: Better Resource Management Needed to Improve Prevention and Response in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve  GAO-17-217  Washington, D C : February 27, 2017  Military Personnel: DOD Has Processes for Operating and Managing Its Sexual Assault Incident Database  GAO-17-99  Washington, D C : January 10, 2017  Sexual Violence Data: Actions Needed to Improve Clarity and Address Differences Across Federal Data Collection Efforts  GAO-16-546  Washington, D C : July 19, 2016  DOD and Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Increase Oversight and Management Information on Hazing Incidents Involving Servicemembers  GAO-16-226  Washington, D C : February 9, 2016  Sexual Assault: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Prevention Strategy and to Help Ensure It Is Effectively Implemented  GAO-16-61  Washington, D C : November 4, 2015  Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Address Sexual Assaults of Male Servicemembers  GAO-15-284  Washington, D C : March 19, 2015  Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Take Further Actions to Prevent Sexual Assault during Initial Military Training  GAO-14-806  Washington, D C : September 9, 2014  Military Personnel: DOD Has Taken Steps to Meet the Health Needs of Deployed Servicewomen, but Actions Are Needed to Enhance Care for Sexual Assault Victims  GAO-13-182  Washington, D C : January 29, 2013  Preventing Sexual Harassment: DOD Needs Greater Leadership Commitment and an Oversight Framework  GAO-11-809  Washington, D C : September 21, 2011  Military Justice: Oversight and Better Collaboration Needed for Sexual Assault Investigations and Adjudications  GAO-11-579  Washington, D C : June 22, 2011  Military Personnel: DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Need to Be Further Strengthened  GAO-10-405T  Washington, D C : February 24, 2010  Military Personnel: Additional Actions Are Needed to Strengthen DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs  GAO-10-215  Washington, D C : February 3, 2010  Military Personnel: DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Face Implementation and Oversight Challenges  GAO-08-924  Washington, D C : August 29, 2008  Military Personnel: The DOD and Coast Guard Academies Have Taken Steps to Address Incidents of Sexual Harassment and Assault, but Greater Federal Oversight Is Needed  GAO-08-296  Washington, D C : January 17, 2008 


Report 2: 8 million and $20 2 million, respectively, in FY2017, finance small-scale enterprise and grassroots self-help activities aimed at assisting poor people  Most U S  assistance is now provided as a grant (gift) rather than a loan, so as not to increase the heavy debt burden carried by many developing countries  However, the forms a grant may take are diverse  The most common type of U S  development aid is project-based assistance (77% in FY2017), in which aid is channeled through an implementing partner to complete a project  Aid is also provided in the form of core contribution to international organizations such as the United Nations, technical assistance, and direct budget support (cash transfer) to governments  A portion of aid money is also spent on administrative costs ( Figure 3 )  Within these categories, aid may take many forms, as described below  Although it is the exception rather than the rule, some countries receive aid in the form of a cash grant to the government  Dollars provided in this way support a government's balance-of-payments situation, enabling it to purchase more U S  goods, service its debt, or devote more domestic revenues to developmental or other purposes  Cash transfers have been made as a reward to countries that have supported the United States' counterterrorism operations (Turkey and Jordan in FY2004), to provide political and strategic support (both Egypt and Israel annually for decades after the 1979 Camp David Peace Accord), and in exchange for undertaking difficult political and economic reforms  Assistance may be provided in the form of food commodities, weapons systems, or equipment such as generators or computers  Food aid may be provided directly to meet humanitarian needs or to encourage attendance at a maternal/child health care program  Weapons supplied under the military assistance program may include training in their use  Equipment and commodities provided under development assistance are usually integrated with other forms of aid to meet objectives in a particular social or economic sector  For instance, textbooks have been provided in both Afghanistan and Iraq as part of a broader effort to reform the educational sector and train teachers  Computers may be offered in conjunction with training and expertise to fledgling microcredit institutions  Since PEPFAR was first authorized in 2004, antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) provided to individuals living with HIV/AIDS have been a significant component of commodity-based assistance  Although once a significant portion of U S  assistance programs, construction of economic infrastructure—roads, irrigation systems, electric power facilities, etc —was rarely provided after the 1970s  Because of the substantial expense of these projects, they were to be found only in large assistance programs, such as that for Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s, where the United States constructed major urban water and sanitation systems  The aid programs in Iraq and Afghanistan supported the building of schools, health clinics, roads, power plants, and irrigation systems  In Iraq alone, more than $10 billion went to economic infrastructure  Economic infrastructure is now also supported by U S  assistance in a wider range of developing countries through the Millennium Challenge Corporation  In this case, recipient countries design their own assistance programs, most of which, to date, include an infrastructure component  Transfer of knowledge and skills is a significant part of most assistance programs  The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) provides training to officers of the military forces of allied and friendly nations  Tens of thousands of citizens of aid recipient countries receive short-term technical training or longer-term degree training annually under USAID programs  More than one-quarter of Peace Corps volunteers are English, math, and science teachers  Other aid programs provide law enforcement personnel with anti-narcotics or anti-terrorism training  Many assistance programs provide expert advice to government and private sector organizations  The Department of the Treasury, USAID, and U S -funded multilateral banks all place specialists in host government ministries to make recommendations on policy reforms in a wide variety of sectors  USAID has often placed experts in private sector business and civic organizations to help strengthen them in their formative years or while indigenous staff are being trained  While most of these experts are U S  nationals, in Russia, USAID funded the development of locally staffed political and economic think tanks to offer policy options to that government  USAID, the Inter-American Foundation, and the African Development Foundation often provide aid in the form of small grants directly to local organizations to foster economic and social development and to encourage civic engagement in their communities  Grants are sometimes provided to microcredit organizations, such village-level women's savings groups, which in turn provide loans to microentrepreneurs  Small grants may also address specific community needs  Recent IAF grants, for example, have supported organizations that help resettle Salvadoran migrants deported from the United States and youth programs in Central America aimed at gang prevention  Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President may determine the terms and conditions under which most forms of assistance are provided  In general, the financial condition of a country—its ability to meet repayment obligations—has been an important criterion of the decision to provide a loan or grant  Some programs, such as humanitarian and disaster relief programs, were designed from the beginning to be entirely grant activities  During the past two decades, nearly all foreign aid—military as well as economic—has been provided in grant form  While loans represented 32% of total military and economic assistance between 1962 and 1988, this figure declined substantially beginning in the mid-1980s, until by FY2001, loans represented less than 1% of total aid appropriations  The de-emphasis on loan programs came largely in response to the debt problems of developing countries  Both Congress and the executive branch have generally supported the view that foreign aid should not add to the already existing debt burden carried by these countries  In the FY2019 budget request, the Trump Administration encouraged the use of loans over grants when providing military assistance (Foreign Military Financing), but Congress did not include language in support of that proposal in the enacted FY2019 appropriation ( P L  116-6 )  Although a small proportion of total current aid, there are significant USAID-managed programs that guarantee loans, meaning the U S  government agrees to pay a portion of the amount owed in the case of a default on a loan  A Development Credit Authority (DCA) loan guarantee, in which risk is shared with a private sector bank, can be used to increase access to finance in support of any development sector  The DCA is to be transferred from USAID in 2019 to the new IDFC, established by the BUILD Act of 2018 ( P L  115-254 ), to enhance U S  development finance capacity  Under the Israeli Loan Guarantee Program, the United States has guaranteed repayment of loans made by commercial sources to support the costs of immigrants settling in Israel from other countries and may issue guarantees to support economic recovery  USAID has also provided loan guarantees in recent years to improve the terms or amounts of financing from international capital markets for Ukraine and Jordan  In these cases, assistance funds representing a fraction of the guarantee amount are provided to cover possible default  Between 1946 and 2016, the United States loaned $112 7 billion in foreign economic and military aid to foreign governments, and while most foreign aid is now provided through grants, $9 18 billion in loans to foreign governments remained outstanding at the end of FY2016  For nearly three decades, Section 620q of the Foreign Assistance Act (the Brooke amendment) has prohibited new assistance to the government of any country that falls more than one year past due in servicing its debt obligations to the United States, though the President may waive application of this prohibition if he determines it is in the national interest  The United States has also forgiven debts owed by foreign governments and encouraged, with mixed success, other foreign aid donors and international financial institutions to do likewise  In some cases, the decision to forgive foreign aid debts has been based largely on economic grounds as another means to support development efforts by heavily indebted, but reform-minded, countries  The United States has been one of the strongest supporters of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)  These initiatives, which began in the late 1990s, include participation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international financial institutions in a comprehensive debt workout framework for the world's poorest and most debt-strapped nations  The largest and most hotly debated debt forgiveness actions have been implemented for much broader foreign policy reasons with a more strategic purpose  Poland, during its transition from a communist system and centrally planned economy (1990—$2 46 billion); Egypt, for making peace with Israel and helping maintain the Arab coalition during the Persian Gulf War (1990—$7 billion); and Jordan, after signing a peace accord with Israel (1994—$700 million), are examples  Similarly, the United States forgave about $4 1 billion in outstanding Saddam Hussein-era Iraqi debt in November 2004 and helped negotiate an 80% reduction in Iraq's debt to creditor nations later that month  Most development and humanitarian assistance activities are not directly implemented by U S  government personnel but by private sector entities, such as individual personal service contractors, consulting firms, universities, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), or public international organizations (PIOs)  Generally speaking, U S  government foreign service and civil servants determine the direction and priorities of the aid program, allocate funds while keeping within legislative requirements, ensure that appropriate projects are in place to meet aid objectives, select implementers, and monitor the implementation of those projects for effectiveness and financial accountability  Both USAID and the State Department have promoted the use of public-private partnerships, in which private entities such as corporations and foundations are contributing partners, not paid implementers, in situations where business interests and development objectives coincide  In FY2017, the United States provided some form of bilateral foreign assistance to more than 150 countries  Aid is concentrated heavily in certain countries, reflecting the priorities and interests of United States foreign policy at the time  Table 2 identifies the top 15 recipients of U S  foreign assistance for FY1997, FY2007 and FY2017  As shown in the table above, there are both similarities and sharp differences among country aid recipients for the three periods  The most consistent thread connecting the top aid recipients over the past two decades has been continuing U S  strategic interests in the Middle East, with large programs maintained for Israel and Egypt and, for Iraq, following the 2003 invasion  Two key countries in the U S  counterterrorism strategy, Afghanistan and Pakistan, made their first appearances on the list in FY2002 and continued to be among the top recipients in FY2017  In FY1997, one sub-Saharan African country appeared among leading aid recipients; in FY2017, 7 of the 15 are sub-Saharan African  Many are focus countries under the PEPFAR initiative to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic; South Sudan receives support as a newly independent country with multiple humanitarian and development needs  In FY1997, three countries from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union made the list, as many from the region had for much of the 1990s, representing the effort to transform the former communist nations to democratic societies and market-oriented economies  None of those countries appear in the FY2017 list  In FY1997, four Latin American countries make the list; no countries from the region appear in FY2017  On a regional basis, the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region has received the largest share of U S  foreign assistance for many decades  Although economic aid to the region's top two recipients, Israel and Egypt, began to decline in the late 1990s, the dominant share of bilateral U S  assistance consumed by the MENA region was maintained in FY2005 by the war in Iraq  Despite the continued importance of the region, its share slipped substantially by FY2017 as the effort to train and equip Iraqi forces diminished  Since September 11, 2001, South and Central Asia has emerged as a significant target of U S  assistance, rising from a roughly 3% share 20 years ago to 16% in FY2007 and 15% in FY2017, largely because of aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan  Similarly, the share represented by African nations has increased from 10% and 19%, respectively, in FY1997 and FY2007, to 25% in FY2017, largely due to the HIV/AIDS initiative that funnels resources mostly to African countries and to a range of other efforts to address the region's development challenges  Meanwhile, the share of aid to Europe/Eurasia, which greatly surpassed that of Africa in FY1997, has declined significantly in the past decade, to about 4% in FY2017, with the graduation of many East European aid recipients and the termination of programs in Russia  The Ukraine was responsible for about one third of aid to that region in FY2017  East Asia/Pacific has remained at a low level during the past two decades, while Latin America's share has risen and fallen based on U S  interest in Colombia and a few Central American countries as aid has shifted to regions of more pressing strategic interest (see Figure 4 )  There are several methods commonly used for measuring the amount of federal spending on foreign assistance  Amounts can be expressed in terms of budget authority (funds appropriated by Congress), obligations (amounts contractually committed), outlays or disbursements (money actually spent)  Assistance levels are also sometimes measured as a percentage of the total federal budget, as a percentage of total discretionary budget authority (excluding mandatory and entitlement programs), or as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) (for an indication of the national wealth allocated to foreign aid)  By nearly all of these measures, foreign aid resources fell gradually on average over several decades since the historical high levels of the late 1940s and early 1950s ( Appendix A )  This downward trend was sporadically interrupted, largely due to major foreign policy initiatives such as the Alliance for Progress for Latin America beginning in 1961, the infusion of funds to implement the Camp David Middle East Peace Accords in 1979, and an increase in military assistance to Egypt, Turkey, Greece and others in the mid-1980s  The lowest point in U S  foreign aid spending since World War II came in 1997, when foreign assistance obligations fell to just above $20 billion (in 2017 dollar terms)  ( Figure 5 ) While foreign aid consistently represented just over 1% of U S  annual gross domestic product in the decade following World War II, it fell gradually to between 0 2% and 0 4% for most years in the past three decades  Foreign assistance spending has comprised, on average, around 3% of discretionary budget authority and just over 1% of total budget authority each year since 1977, though the percentages have sometimes varied considerably from year to year  Foreign aid dropped from 5% of discretionary budget authority in 1979 to 2 4% in 2001, before rising sharply in conjunction with U S  activities in Afghanistan and Iraq starting in 2003  As a portion of total budget authority, foreign assistance reached 2 5% in 1979, but has hovered below 1 5% since 1987  In 2017, foreign assistance was estimated to account for 4 1% of discretionary budget authority and 1 2% of total budget authority ( Figure 6 ; Appendix A )  As previously discussed, since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, foreign aid funding has been closely tied to U S  counterterrorism strategy, particularly in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan  Bush and Obama Administration global health initiatives, the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and growth in counter-narcotics activities have driven funding increases as well  The Budget Control Act of 2011, and the drawdown of U S  military forces in Iraq, and to some degree Afghanistan, led to a notable dip in aid obligations in FY2013, but aid levels have risen again with efforts to address the crisis in Syria, counter-ISIL activities, and humanitarian aid  The use of the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO, discussed below) designation has enabled this growth despite the BCA limitations  Figure 7 shows how trends in foreign aid funding in recent decades can be attributed to specific foreign policy events and presidential initiatives  The Obama Administration's FY2012 international affairs budget proposed that the overseas contingency operations (OCO) designation, which had been applied since 2009 to war-related Defense appropriations, including to DOD assistance programs such as ISFF, ASFF and CERP, be extended to include "extraordinary, but temporary, costs of the Department of State and USAID in the front line states of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan " Congress not only adopted the OCO designation in the FY2012 SFOPS appropriations legislation, but expanded it to include funding for additional accounts and countries  In every fiscal year since, a portion of certain foreign assistance accounts—primarily ESF, FMF, IDA, MRA and INCLE—has been appropriated with the OCO designation  The OCO designation is significant because the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), which set annual caps on discretionary funding from FY2013 through FY2021, specified that funds designated as OCO do not count toward the discretionary spending limits established by the act  OCO designation makes it possible to prevent war-related funding from crowding out core international affairs activities within the budget allocation  The OCO approach is reminiscent of the use of supplemental international affairs appropriations for the first decade after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks  Congress appropriated significant emergency supplemental funds for foreign operations and Defense assistance programs every year from FY2002 through FY2010 for activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, which were not counted toward subcommittee budget allocations  Since the OCO designation was first applied to foreign operations in FY2012, supplemental appropriations for foreign aid have declined significantly  In the FY2019 and FY2020 budget requests, the Trump Administration did not request OCO funding within the international affairs budget, but did request OCO funding for the Department of Defense, including for DOD aid accounts  Congress used the OCO designation for both DOD and State/USAID accounts in the FY2019 appropriation, P L  116-6 , but a smaller portion of aid was designated as OCO compared to FY2018  It remains to be seen whether this is the beginning of a downward trend in OCO use for foreign aid  Congress historically sought to enhance the domestic benefits of foreign aid by requiring that most U S  foreign aid be used to procure U S  goods and services  The conditioning of aid on the procurement of goods and services from the donor-country is sometimes called "tied aid," and while quite common for much of the history of modern foreign assistance, has become increasingly disfavored in the international community  Studies have shown that tying aid increases the costs of goods and services by 15%-30% on average, and up to 40% for food aid, reducing the overall effectiveness of aid flows  The United States joined other donor nations in committing to reduce tied aid in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in March 2005, and the portion of tied aid from all donors fell from 70% of total bilateral development assistance in 1985 to an average of 12% in 2016  However, an estimated 32% of U S  bilateral development assistance was tied in 2016, the highest percentage among major donors, perhaps reflecting the perception of policymakers that maintaining public and political support for foreign aid programs requires ensuring direct economic benefit to the United States  About 67% of U S  foreign assistance funds in FY2017 were obligated to U S -based entities  A considerable amount of U S  foreign assistance funds remain in the United States, through domestic procurement or the use of U S  implementers, but the portion differs by program and is hard to identify with any accuracy  For some types of aid, the legislative requirements or program design make it relatively easy to determine how much aid is spent on U S  goods or services, while for others, this is more difficult to determine  USAID  Most USAID funding (Development Assistance, Global Health, Economic Support Fund) is implemented through contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with implementing partners  While many implementing partner organizations are based in the United States and employ U S  citizens, there is little information available about what portion of the funds used for program implementation are used for goods and services provided by American firms  Procurement reform efforts initiated by USAID in 2010 have aimed to increase procurement and implementation by host country entities as a means to enhance country ownership, build local capacity, and improve sustainability of aid programs  Food assistance commodities, until recently, were purchased wholly in the United States, and generally required by law to be shipped by U S  carriers, suggesting that the vast majority of food aid expenditures are made in the United States  Starting in FY2009, a small portion of food assistance was authorized to be purchased locally and regionally to meet urgent food needs more quickly  Successive Administrations and several Members of Congress have proposed greater flexibility in the food aid program, potentially increasing aid efficiency but reducing the portion of funds flowing to U S  farmers and shippers  To date, these proposals have been largely unsuccessful  Foreign Military Financing , with the exception of certain assistance allocated to Israel, is used exclusively to procure U S  military equipment and training  Millennium Challenge Corporation  The MCC bases its procurement regulations on those established by the World Bank, which calls for an open and competitive process, with no preference given to donor country suppliers  Between FY2011 and FY2017, the MCC awarded roughly 15% of the value of compact contracts to U S  firms  Multilateral development aid  Multilateral aid funds are mixed with funds from other nations and the bulk of the program is financed with borrowed funds rather than direct government contributions  Information on the U S  share of procurement financed by MDBs is unavailable  In addition to the direct benefits derived from aid dollars used for American goods and services, many argue that the foreign aid program brings significant indirect financial benefits to the United States  For example, analysts maintain that provision of military equipment through the military assistance program and food commodities through the Food for Peace program helps to develop future, strictly commercial, markets for those products  More broadly, as countries develop economically, they are in a position to purchase more goods from abroad and the United States benefits as a trade partner  Since an increasing majority of global consumers are outside of the United States, some business leaders assert that establishing strong economic and trade ties in the developing world, using foreign assistance as a tool, is key to U S  economic and job growth  Since World War II, with the exception of several years between 1989 and 2001, during which Japan ranked first among aid donors, the United States has led the developed countries in net disbursements of economic aid, or "Official Development Assistance (ODA)" as defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC)  In 2017, the most recent year for which data are available, the United States disbursed $34 12 billion in ODA, or about 24% of the $144 71 billion in total net ODA disbursements by DAC donors that year  Germany ranked second at $24 16 billion, the United Kingdom followed at $18 59 billion, Japan ranked fourth at $11 85 billion, and France rounded out the top donors with $11 03 billion in 2017 (see Figure 8 )  While the top five donors have not varied for more than a decade, there have been shifts lower down the ranking  For example, Turkey has become a much more prominent ODA donor in recent years (ranked 6 th in 2017, with $9 08 billion in ODA, compared to 21 st in 2006), reflecting large amounts of humanitarian aid to assist Syrian refugees  Even as it leads in dollar amounts of aid flows to developing countries, the United States often ranks low when aid is calculated as a percentage of gross national income (GNI)  This calculation is often cited in the context of international donor forums, as a level of 0 7% GNI was established as a target for donors in the 2000 U N  Millennium Development Goals  In 2017, the United States ranked at the bottom among major donors at 0 18% of GNI, slightly lower than Portugal and Spain (0 18% and 0 19%, respectively)  The United Arab Emirates, which has significantly increased its reported ODA in recent years, ranked first among top donors at 1 03% of GNI, followed by Sweden at 1 02% and Luxembourg at 1 00%  There has also been an increase in ODA from non-DAC countries  Between 2000 and 2014, China spent $81 1 billion in ODA, more than tripling its ODA commitments during this period  While reported Chinese ODA is still relatively small compared to that of major donor countries, policymakers are paying increasing attention to growing Chinese investments in developing countries that do not meet the ODA definition  China has touted its "Belt and Road" initiative as an effort to boost development and connectivity across as many as 125 countries to create "strategic propellers" for its own development  However, China has provided little official aggregate information on the initiative, including on the number of projects, countries involved, the terms of financing, and metrics for success  Numerous congressional authorizing committees and appropriations subcommittees maintain responsibility for U S  foreign assistance  Several committees have responsibility for authorizing legislation establishing programs and policy and for conducting oversight of foreign aid programs  In the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and in the House, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, have primary jurisdiction over bilateral development assistance, political/strategic and other economic security assistance, military assistance, and international organizations  Food aid, primarily the responsibility of the Agriculture Committees in both bodies, is periodically shared with the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House  U S  contributions to multilateral development banks are within the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Financial Services Committee  The large nontraditional aid programs funded by DOD, such as Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and the military aid programs in Afghanistan and Iraq, come under the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committees  Some global health assistance, such as research and other activities done by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, may fall under the jurisdiction of the House Energy and Commerce and Senate HELP committees  Traditionally, most foreign aid appropriations fall under the jurisdiction of the SFOPS Subcommittees, with food assistance appropriated by the Agriculture Subcommittees  As noted earlier, however, certain military, global health, and other activities that have been reported as foreign aid have been appropriated through other subcommittees in recent years, including the Defense and the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies subcommittees  (For current information on SFOPS Appropriations legislation, see CRS Report R45168, Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations , by Susan B  Epstein, Marian L  Lawson, and Cory R  Gill ) The most significant permanent foreign aid authorization laws are the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, covering most bilateral economic and security assistance programs (P L  87-195; 22 U S C  2151); the Arms Export Control Act (1976), authorizing military sales and financing (P L  90-629; 22 U S C  2751); the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P L  480), covering food aid (P L  83-480; 7 U S C  1691); and the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (1945), authorizing U S  participation in multilateral development banks (P L  79-171; 22 U S C  286)  In the past, Congress usually scheduled debates every two years on omnibus foreign aid legislation that amended these permanent authorization measures  Congress has not enacted into law a comprehensive foreign assistance authorization measure since 1985, although foreign aid authorizing bills have passed the House or Senate, or both, on numerous occasions  Foreign aid bills have frequently stalled at some point in the debate because of controversial issues, a tight legislative calendar, or executive-legislative foreign policy disputes  In contrast, DOD assistance is authorized in annual National Defense Authorization legislation  In lieu of approving a broad State Department/USAID authorization bill, Congress has on occasion authorized major foreign assistance initiatives for specific regions, countries, or aid sectors in stand-alone legislation or within an appropriation bill  Among these are the SEED Act of 1989 ( P L  101-179 ; 22 U S C  5401); the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 ( P L  102-511 ; 22 U S C  5801); the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 ( P L  108-25 ; 22 U S C  7601); the Tom Lantos and Henry J  Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 ( P L  110-293 ); the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (Division D, Title VI of P L  108-199 ); the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009 ( P L  111-73 ; 22 U S C  8401); the Global Food Security Act of 2016 ( P L  114-195 ; 22 U S C  9306), and the BUILD Act ( P L  115-254 )  In the absence of regular enactment of foreign aid authorization bills, appropriation measures considered annually within the SFOPS spending bill have assumed greater significance for Congress in influencing U S  foreign aid policy  Not only do appropriations bills set spending levels each year for nearly every foreign assistance account, SFOPS appropriations also incorporate new policy initiatives that would otherwise be debated and enacted as part of authorizing legislation  Appendix A  Data Table Appendix B  Common Foreign Assistance Abbreviations

ground_truth: Unwanted sexual behaviors in the military—including sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual assault—undermine core values, unit cohesion, combat readiness, and public goodwill. Recent studies suggest that these behaviors are part of a “continuum of harm,” which DOD defines as a range of interconnected, inappropriate behaviors that are connected to the occurrence of sexual assault and that support an environment that tolerates these behaviors. Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review efforts by DOD to prevent unwanted sexual behaviors in the military. GAO assessed the extent to which DOD has (1) policies on sexual harassment that include CDC principles and relevant legislative elements; (2) processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors; and (3) overarching efforts, including a prevention strategy, to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm. GAO reviewed DOD policies and pertinent databases, and interviewed agency officials. The Department of Defense's (DOD) policies on sexual harassment include some but not all of the Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) principles for preventing sexual violence and include most relevant legislative elements. GAO identified six principles from CDC's framework for preventing sexual violence, which CDC defines as including sexual harassment. GAO found that Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military service policies generally include CDC's principles regarding prevention strategies, but none address risk and protective factors, which identify conditions or behaviors that might heighten or lower the risk of sexual harassment victimization or perpetration, respectively. Additionally, a statutory provision in fiscal year 2013 mandated that DOD, among other things, develop a comprehensive sexual harassment policy that includes prevention training, mechanisms for anonymous reporting, and mechanisms for resolving incidents of sexual harassment. OSD and service policies are generally consistent with those required elements except for the inclusion of anonymous reporting. DOD is developing a new department-wide policy that will address sexual harassment, but it is too early to determine how the policy will address these issues. Without policies that include CDC's principles and mechanisms for anonymous reporting, DOD may miss opportunities to address and potentially reduce incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors. Finally, a statutory change in fiscal year 2017 redefined sexual harassment for certain purposes so it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination but is recognized also as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behavior that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault. While officials indicated a need to update policies, they were unclear on the full implications, if any, of this change. DOD has processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors including sexual assault and incidents of domestic violence that involve sexual assault, but does not have similar processes for maintaining and reporting data on incidents of sexual harassment. Specifically, DOD uses centralized databases to maintain and report data on incidents of sexual assault and domestic violence that involve sexual assault, but relies on military service-specific databases for information on incidents of sexual harassment. DOD has not established standard data elements and definitions to guide the services in maintaining and reporting data on sexual harassment. Inconsistencies in data elements and definitions generally mean that one service may be maintaining data that is more or less detailed than, or that differs from, the data maintained by other services. Such inconsistencies may create difficulties in reporting department-wide sexual harassment data, since the individual service data must be adapted to fit reporting requirements. DOD has several overarching efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm, including developing an overarching prevention strategy. However, it is unclear whether the strategy under development will contain key elements for long-term and results-oriented strategic planning such as long-term goals, strategies to achieve goals, and metrics to gauge progress. Without incorporating these elements into its overarching prevention strategy, DOD may not be in a position to effectively coordinate and integrate prevention activities and reduce instances of unwanted sexual behaviors. GAO recommends that DOD fully include in its new policy on sexual harassment CDC's principles for sexual violence prevention and mechanisms for anonymous reporting, develop standard data elements and definitions for reporting sexual harassment incidents, and incorporate in its overarching prevention strategy elements key for a long-term, results-oriented strategy. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: The 116 th Congress may consider a variety of housing-related issues  These may involve assisted housing programs, such as those administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and issues related to housing finance, among other things  Specific topics of interest may include ongoing issues such as interest in reforming the nation's housing finance system, how to prioritize appropriations for federal housing programs in a limited funding environment, oversight of the implementation of changes to certain housing programs that were enacted in prior Congresses, and the possibility of extending certain temporary housing-related tax provisions  Additional issues may emerge as the Congress progresses  This report provides a high-level overview of the most prominent housing-related issues that may be of interest during the 116 th   It is meant to provide a broad overview of major issues and is not intended to provide detailed information or analysis  However, it includes references to more in-depth CRS reports on these issues where possible  This section provides background on housing and mortgage market conditions to provide context for the housing policy issues discussed in the remainder of the report  This discussion of market conditions is at the national level  However, it is important to be aware that local housing market conditions can vary dramatically, and national housing market trends may not reflect the conditions in a specific area  Nevertheless, national housing market indicators can provide an overall sense of general trends in housing  In general, rising home prices, relatively low interest rates, and rising rental costs have been prominent features of housing and mortgage markets in recent years  Although interest rates have remained low, rising house prices and rental costs that in many cases have outpaced income growth have led to increased concerns about housing affordability for both prospective homebuyers and renters  Most homebuyers take out a mortgage to purchase a home  Therefore, owner-occupied housing markets and the mortgage market are closely linked, although they are not the same  The ability of prospective homebuyers to obtain mortgages, and the costs of those mortgages, impact housing demand and affordability  The following subsections show current trends in selected owner-occupied housing and mortgage market indicators  As shown in Figure 1 , nationally, nominal house prices have been increasing on a year-over-year basis in each quarter since the beginning of 2012, with year-over-year increases exceeding 5% for much of that time period and exceeding 6% for most quarters since mid-2016  These increases follow almost five years of house price declines in the years during and surrounding the economic recession of 2007-2009 and associated housing market turmoil  House price increases slowed somewhat during 2018, but year-over-year house prices still increased by nearly 6% during the fourth quarter of 2018  House prices, and changes in house prices, vary greatly across local housing markets  Some areas of the country are experiencing rapid increases in house prices, while other areas are experiencing slower or stagnating house price growth  Similarly, prices have fully regained or even exceeded their pre-recession levels in nominal terms in many parts of the country, but in other areas prices remain below those levels  House price increases affect participants in the housing market differently  Rising prices reduce affordability for prospective homebuyers, but they are generally beneficial for current homeowners due to the increased home equity that accompanies them (although rising house prices also have the potential to negatively impact affordability for current homeowners through increased property taxes)  For several years, mortgage interest rates have been low by historical standards  Lower interest rates increase mortgage affordability and make it easier for some households to purchase homes or refinance their existing mortgages  As shown in Figure 2 , average mortgage interest rates have been consistently below 5% since May 2010 and have been below 4% for several stretches during that time  After starting to increase somewhat in late 2017 and much of 2018, mortgage interest rates showed declines at the end of 2018 into early 2019  The average mortgage interest rate for February 2019 was 4 37%, compared to 4 46% in the previous month and 4 33% a year earlier  House prices have been rising for several years on a national basis, and mortgage interest rates, while still low by historical standards, have also risen for certain stretches  While incomes have also been rising in recent years, helping to mitigate some affordability pressures, on the whole house price increases have outpaced income increases  These trends have led to increased concerns about the affordability of owner-occupied housing  Despite rising house prices, many metrics of housing affordability suggest that owner-occupied housing is currently relatively affordable  These metrics generally measure the share of income that a median-income family would need to qualify for a mortgage to purchase a median-priced home, subject to certain assumptions  Therefore, rising incomes and, especially, interest rates that are still low by historical standards contribute to monthly mortgage payments being considered affordable under these measures despite recent house price increases  However, some factors that affect housing affordability may not be captured by these metrics  For example, several of the metrics are based on certain assumptions (such as a borrower making a 20% down payment) that may not apply to many households  Furthermore, because they typically measure the affordability of monthly mortgage payments, they often do not take into account other affordability challenges that homebuyers may face, such as affording a down payment and other upfront costs of purchasing a home (costs that generally increase as home prices rise)  Other factors—such as the ability to qualify for a mortgage, the availability of homes on the market, and regional differences in house prices and income—may also make homeownership less attainable for some households   Some of these factors may have a bigger impact on affordability for specific demographic groups, as income trends and housing preferences are not uniform across all segments of the population  Given that house price increases are showing some signs of slowing and interest rates have remained low, the affordability of owner-occupied homes may hold steady or improve  Such trends could potentially impact housing market activity, including home sales  In general, annual home sales have been increasing since 2014 and have improved from their levels during the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, although in 2018 the overall number of home sales declined from the previous year  While home sales have been improving somewhat in recent years (prior to falling in 2018), the supply of homes on the market has generally not been keeping pace with the demand for homes, thereby limiting home sales activity and contributing to house price increases  Home sales include sales of both existing and newly built homes  Existing home sales generally number in the millions each year, while new home sales are usually in the hundreds of thousands   Figure 3 shows the annual number of existing and new home sales for each year from 1995 through 2018  Existing home sales numbered about 5 3 million in 2018, a decline from 5 5 million in 2017 (existing home sales in 2017 were the highest level since 2006)  New home sales numbered about 622,000 in 2018, an increase from 614,000 in 2017 and the highest level since 2007  However, the number of new home sales remains appreciably lower than in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when they tended to be between 800,000 and 1 million per year  The number and types of homes on the market affect home sales and home prices  On a national basis, the supply of homes on the market has been relatively low in recent years, and in general new construction has not been creating enough new homes to meet demand  However, as noted previously, national housing market indicators are not necessarily indicative of local conditions  While many areas of the country are experiencing low levels of housing inventory that contribute to higher home prices, other areas, particularly those experiencing population declines, face a different set of housing challenges, including surplus housing inventory and higher levels of vacant homes  On a national basis, the inventory of homes on the market has been below historical averages in recent years, though the inventory, of new homes in particular, has begun to increase somewhat of late  Homes come onto the market through the construction of new homes and when current homeowners decide to sell their existing homes  Existing homeowners' decisions to sell their homes can be influenced by expectations about housing inventory and affordability  For example, current homeowners may choose not to sell if they are uncertain about finding new homes that meet their needs, or if their interest rates on new mortgages would be substantially higher than the interest rates on their current mortgages  New construction activity is influenced by a variety of factors including labor, materials, and other costs as well as the expected demand for new homes  One measure of the amount of new construction is housing starts  Housing starts are the number of new housing units on which construction is started in a given period and are typically reported monthly as a "seasonally adjusted annual rate " This means that the number of housing starts reported for a given month (1) has been adjusted to account for seasonal factors and (2) has been multiplied by 12 to reflect what the annual number of housing starts would be if the current month's pace continued for an entire year  Figure 4 shows the seasonally adjusted rate of starts on one-unit homes for each month from January 1995 through December 2018  Housing starts for single-family homes fell during the housing market turmoil, reflecting decreased home purchase demand  In recent years, levels of new construction have remained relatively low by historical standards, reflecting a variety of considerations including labor shortages and the cost of building  Housing starts have generally been increasing since about 2012, but remain well below their levels from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s  For 2018, the seasonally adjusted annual rate of housing starts averaged about 868,000  In comparison, the seasonally adjusted annual rate of housing starts exceeded 1 million from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s  Furthermore, high housing construction costs have led to a greater share of new housing being built at the more expensive end of the market  To the extent that new homes are concentrated at higher price points, supply and price pressures may be exacerbated for lower-priced homes  When a lender originates a mortgage, it can choose to hold that mortgage in its own portfolio, sell it to a private company, or sell it to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, two congressionally chartered government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bundle mortgages into securities and guarantee investors' payments on those securities  Furthermore, a mortgage might be insured by a federal government agency, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)  Most FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed mortgages are included in mortgage-backed securities that are guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, another government agency  The shares of mortgages that are provided through each of these channels may be relevant to policymakers because of their implications for mortgage access and affordability as well as the federal government's exposure to risk  As shown in Figure 5 , during the first three quarters of 2018, about two-thirds of the total dollar volume of mortgages originated was either backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (45%) or guaranteed by a federal agency such as FHA or VA (22%)  Nearly one-third of the dollar volume of mortgages originated was held in bank portfolios, while close to 2% was included in a private-label security without government backing  The shares of mortgage originations backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and held in bank portfolios are roughly similar to their respective shares in the early 2000s  The share of private-label securitization has been, and continues to be, very small since the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, while the FHA/VA share is higher than it was in the early and mid-2000s  The share of mortgages insured by FHA or guaranteed by VA was low by historical standards during that time period as many households opted for other types of mortgages, including subprime mortgages  As has been the case in owner-occupied housing markets, affordability has been a prominent concern in rental markets in recent years  In the years since the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, the number and share of renter households has increased, leading to lower rental vacancy rates and higher rents in many markets  The housing and mortgage market turmoil of the late 2000s led to a substantial decrease in the homeownership rate and a corresponding increase in the share of households who rent their homes  As shown in Figure 6 , the share of renters increased from about 31% in 2005 and 2006 to a high of about 36 6% in 2016, before decreasing slightly to 36 1% in 2017 and continuing to decline to 35 6% in 2018  The homeownership rate correspondingly fell from a high of 69% in the mid-2000s to 63 4% in 2016, before rising to 63 9% in 2017 and continuing to rise to 64 4% in 2018  The overall number of occupied housing units also increased over this time period, from nearly 110 million in 2006 to 121 million in 2018; most of this increase has been in renter-occupied units  The number of renter-occupied units increased from about 34 million in 2006 to about 43 million in 2018  The number of owner-occupied housing units fell from about 75 million units in 2006 to about 74 million in 2014, but has since increased to about 78 million units in 2018  The higher number and share of renter households has had implications for rental vacancy rates and rental housing costs  More renter households increases competition for rental housing, which may in turn drive up rents if there is not enough new rental housing created (whether through new construction or conversion of owner-occupied units to rental units) to meet the increased demand  As shown in Figure 7 , the rental vacancy rate has generally declined in recent years and was under 7% at the end of 2018  Rental housing affordability is impacted by a variety of factors, including the supply of rental housing units available, the characteristics of those units (e g , age and amenities), and the demand for available units  New housing units have been added to the rental stock in recent years through both construction of new rental units and conversions of existing owner-occupied units to rental housing  However, the supply of rental housing has not necessarily kept pace with the demand, particularly among lower-cost rental units, and low vacancy rates have been especially pronounced in less-expensive units  The increased demand for rental housing, as well as the concentration of new rental construction in higher-cost units, has led to increases in rents in recent years  Median renter incomes have also been increasing for the last several years, at times outpacing increases in rents  However, over the longer term, median rents have increased faster than renter incomes, reducing rental affordability  Rising rental costs and renter incomes that are not keeping up with rent increases over the long term can contribute to housing affordability problems, particularly for households with lower incomes  Under one common definition, housing is considered to be affordable if a household is paying no more than 30% of its income in housing costs  Under this definition, households that pay more than 30% are considered to be cost-burdened, and those that pay more than 50% are considered to be severely cost-burdened  The overall number of cost-burdened renter households has increased from 14 8 million in 2001 to 20 5 million in 2017, although the 20 5 million in 2017 represented a decrease from 20 8 million in 2016 and over 21 million in 2014 and 2015  (Over this time period, the overall number of renter households has increased as well ) While housing cost burdens can affect households of all income levels, they are most prevalent among the lowest-income households  In 2017, 83% of renter households with incomes below $15,000 experienced housing cost burdens, and 72% experienced severe cost burdens  A shortage of lower-cost rental units that are both available and affordable to extremely low-income renter households (households that earn no more than 30% of area median income), in particular, contributes to these cost burdens  A variety of housing-related issues may be of interest to the 116 th Congress, including housing finance, housing assistance programs, and housing-related tax provisions, among other things  Many of these are ongoing or perennial housing-related issues, though additional issues may emerge as the Congress progresses  Two major players in the U S  housing finance system are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that were created by Congress to provide liquidity to the mortgage market  By law, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cannot make mortgages; rather, they are restricted to purchasing mortgages that meet certain requirements from lenders  Once the GSEs purchase a mortgage, they either package it with others into a mortgage-backed security (MBS), which they guarantee and sell to institutional investors (which can be the mortgage originator), or retain it as a portfolio investment  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are involved in both single-family and multifamily housing, though their single-family businesses are much larger  In 2008, in the midst of housing and mortgage market turmoil, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac experienced financial trouble and entered voluntary conservatorship overseen by their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)  As part of the legal arrangements of this conservatorship, the Department of the Treasury contracted to purchase a maximum of $200 billion of new senior preferred stock from each of the GSEs; in return for this support, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pay dividends on this stock to Treasury  These funds become general revenues  Several issues related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could be of interest to the 116 th Congress  These include the potential for legislative housing finance reform, new leadership at FHFA and the potential for administrative changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and certain issues that could affect Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's finances and mortgage standards, respectively  For more information on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, see CRS Report R44525, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked Questions   Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac entered conservatorship in 2008, policymakers have largely agreed on the need for comprehensive housing finance reform legislation that would resolve the conservatorships of these GSEs and address the underlying issues that are perceived to have led to their financial trouble and conservatorships  Such legislation could eliminate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, possibly replacing them with other entities; retain the companies but transform their role in the housing finance system; or return them to their previous status with certain changes  In addition to addressing the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, housing finance reform legislation could potentially involve changes to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or other federal programs that support the mortgage market  While there is generally broad agreement on certain principles of housing finance reform—such as increasing the private sector's role in the mortgage market, reducing government risk, and maintaining access to affordable mortgages for creditworthy households—there is disagreement over how best to achieve these objectives and over the technical details of how a restructured housing finance system should operate  Since 2008, a variety of housing finance reform proposals have been put forward by Members of Congress, think tanks, and industry groups  Proposals differ on structural questions as well as on specific implementation issues, such as whether, and how, certain affordable housing requirements that currently apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be included in a new system  Previous Congresses have considered housing finance reform legislation in varying degrees  In the 113 th Congress, the House Committee on Financial Services and Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs considered different versions of comprehensive housing finance reform legislation, but none were ultimately enacted  The 114 th  Congress considered a number of more-targeted reforms to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but did not actively consider comprehensive housing finance reform legislation  At the end of the 115 th Congress, the House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on a draft housing finance reform bill released by then-Chairman Jeb Hensarling and then-Representative John Delaney, but no further action was taken on it  In the 116 th Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Chairman Mike Crapo has released an outline for potential housing finance reform legislation  The committee held hearings on March 26 and March 27, 2019 on the outline  FHFA, an independent agency, is the regulator for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System as well as the conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  The director of FHFA is appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, for a five-year term  The term of FHFA Director Mel Watt expired in January 2019  President Trump nominated Mark Calabria to be the next FHFA director  The Senate confirmed the nomination on April 4, 2019, and Dr  Calabria was sworn in on April 15, 2019  FHFA has relatively wide latitude to make many changes to Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's operations without congressional approval, though it is subject to certain statutory constraints  In recent years, for example, FHFA has directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to engage in risk-sharing transactions, develop a common securitization platform for issuing mortgage-backed securities, and undertake certain pilot programs  The prospect of new leadership at FHFA led many to speculate about possible administrative changes that FHFA could make to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac going forward  Any such changes could potentially lead to congressional interest and oversight  FHFA could make many changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, including changes to the pricing of mortgages they purchase, to their underwriting standards, or to certain product offerings  It could also make changes to pilot programs, start laying the groundwork for a post-conservatorship housing finance system, or take a different implementation approach to certain affordable housing initiatives required by statute, such as Duty to Serve requirements  Because the new FHFA director has been critical of certain aspects of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the past, some have expressed concerns that the new leadership could result in the agency taking steps to reduce Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's role in the mortgage market  In March 2019, nearly 30 industry groups sent a letter to Acting Director Otting urging that FHFA proceed cautiously with any administrative changes to ensure that they do not disrupt the mortgage market  That same month, President Trump issued a memorandum directing the Secretary of the Treasury to work with other executive branch agencies to develop a plan to end the GSEs' conservatorship, among other goals  Certain other issues related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may be of interest during the 116 th Congress  A new accounting standard (current expected credit loss, or CECL) that could require the GSEs to increase their loan loss reserves goes into effect in 2020  CECL could result in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac needing to draw on their support agreements with Treasury  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( P L  111-203 ) requires mortgage lenders to document and verify a borrower's ability to repay (ATR)  If a mortgage lacks certain risky features and a lender complies with the ATR regulations, the mortgage is considered to be a qualified mortgage (QM), which provides the lender certain protections against lawsuits claiming that the ATR requirements were not met  Mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac currently have an exemption (known as the QM Patch) from the debt-to-income ratio ATR rule  This exemption expires in early 2021 (or earlier if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exit conservatorship before that date)  For several years, concern in Congress about federal budget deficits has led to increased interest in reducing the amount of discretionary funding provided each year through the annual appropriations process  This interest manifested most prominently in the enactment of the Budget Control Act of 2011( P L  112-25 ), which set enforceable limits for both mandatory and discretionary spending  The limits on discretionary spending, which have been amended and adjusted since they were first enacted, have implications for HUD's budget, the largest source of funding for direct housing assistance, because it is made up almost entirely of discretionary appropriations  In FY2020, the discretionary spending limits are slated to decrease, after having been increased in FY2018 and FY2019 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of FY2018 (BBA; P L  115-123 )  The nondefense discretionary cap (the one relevant for housing programs and activities) will decline by more than 9% in FY2020, absent any additional legislative changes  More than three-quarters of HUD's appropriations are devoted to three rental assistance programs serving more than 4 million families: the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, Section 8 project-based rental assistance, and the public housing program  Funding for the HCV program and project-based rental assistance has been increasing in recent years, largely because of the increased costs of maintaining assistance for households that are currently served by the programs  Public housing has, arguably, been underfunded (based on studies undertaken by HUD of what it should cost to operate and maintain it) for many years  Despite the large share of total HUD funding these rental assistance programs command, their combined funding levels only permit them to serve an estimated one in four eligible families, which creates long waiting lists for assistance in most communities  A similar dynamic plays out in the U S  Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service budget  Demand for housing assistance exceeds the supply of subsidies, yet the vast majority of the RHS budget is devoted to maintaining assistance for current residents  In a budget environment with limits on discretionary spending, the pressure to provide increased funding to maintain current services for existing rental assistance programs must be balanced against the pressure from states, localities, and advocates to maintain or increase funding for other popular programs, such as HUD's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, grants for homelessness assistance, and funding for Native American housing  The Trump Administration's budget request for FY2020 proposes an 18% decrease in funding for HUD's programs and activities as compared to the prior year  It proposes to eliminate funding for several programs, including multiple HUD grant programs (CDBG, the HOME Investment Partnerships Program, and the Self-Help and Assisted Homeownership Opportunity Program (SHOP)), and to decrease funding for most other HUD programs  In proposing to eliminate the grant programs, the Administration cites budget constraints and proposes that state and local governments take on more of a role in the housing and community development activities funded by these programs  Additionally, the budget references policy changes designed to reduce the cost of federal rental assistance programs, including the Making Affordable Housing Work Act of 2018 (MAHWA) legislative proposal, released by HUD in April 2018  If enacted, the proposal would make a number of changes to the way tenant rents are calculated in HUD rental assistance programs, resulting in rent increases for assisted housing recipients, and corresponding decreases in the cost of federal subsidies  Further, it would permit local program administrators or property owners to institute work requirements for recipients  In announcing the proposal, HUD described it as setting the programs on "a more fiscally sustainable path," creating administrative efficiency, and promoting self-sufficiency  Low-income housing advocates have been critical of it, particularly the effect increased rent payments may have on families  Beyond HUD, the Administration's FY2020 budget request for USDA's Rural Housing Service would eliminate funding for most rural housing programs, except for several loan guarantee programs  It would continue to provide funding to renew existing rental assistance, but also proposes a new minimum rent policy for tenants designed to help reduce federal subsidy costs  For more on HUD appropriations trends in general, see CRS Report R42542, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): Funding Trends Since FY2002   For more on the FY2020 budget environment, including discretionary spending caps, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions   Several pieces of assisted housing legislation that were enacted in prior Congresses are expected to be implemented during the 116 th Congress  In the FY2016 HUD appropriations law, Congress mandated that HUD expand the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration by 100 public housing authorities (PHAs)  MTW is a waiver program that allows a limited number of participating PHAs to receive exceptions from HUD for most of the rules and regulations governing the public housing and voucher programs  MTW has been controversial for many years, with PHAs supporting the flexibility it provides (e g , allowing PHAs to move funding between programs), and low-income housing advocates criticizing some of the policies being adopted by PHAs (e g , work requirements and time limits)  Most recently, GAO issued a report raising concerns about HUD's oversight of MTW, including the lack of monitoring of the effects of policy changes under MTW on tenants  HUD was required to phase in the FY2016 expansion and evaluate any new policies adopted by participating PHAs  Following a series of listening sessions and advisory committee meetings, and several solicitations for comment, HUD issued a solicitation of interest for the first two expansion cohorts in December 2018  As of the date of this report, no selections had yet been made for those cohorts  The Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) was an Obama Administration initiative initially designed to test the feasibility of addressing the estimated $25 6 billion backlog in unmet capital needs in the public housing program by allowing local PHAs to convert their public housing properties to either Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers or Section 8 project-based rental assistance  PHAs are limited in their ability to mortgage, and thus raise private capital for, their public housing properties because of a federal deed restriction placed on the properties as a condition of federal assistance  When public housing properties are converted under RAD, that deed restriction is removed  As currently authorized, RAD conversions must be cost-neutral, meaning that the Section 8 rents the converted properties may receive must not result in higher subsidies than would have been received under the public housing program  Given this restriction, and without additional subsidy, not all public housing properties can use a conversion to raise private capital, potentially limiting the usefulness of a conversion for some properties  While RAD conversions have been popular with PHAs, and HUD's initial evaluations of the program have been favorable, a recent GAO study has raised questions about HUD's oversight of RAD, and about how much private funding is actually being raised for public housing through the conversions  RAD, as first authorized by Congress in the FY2012 HUD appropriations law, was originally limited to 60,000 units of public housing (out of roughly 1 million units)  However, Congress has since expanded the demonstration  Most recently, in FY2018, Congress raised the cap so that up to 455,000 units of public housing will be permitted to convert to Section 8 under RAD, and it further expanded the program so that Section 202 Housing for the Elderly units can also convert  Not only is HUD currently implementing the FY2018 expansion, but the President's FY2020 budget request to Congress requests that the cap on public housing RAD conversions be eliminated completely  Several major disasters that have recently affected the United States have led to congressional activity related to disaster response and recovery programs  When such incidents occur, the President may authorize an emergency or major disaster declaration under the Robert T  Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act; P L  93-288 , as amended), making various housing assistance programs, including programs provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) , available to disaster survivors  FEMA-provided housing assistance may include short-term, emergency sheltering accommodations under Section 403—Essential Assistance—of the Stafford Act (e g , the Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program, which is intended to provide short-term hotel/motel accommodations)  Interim housing needs may be met through the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) under Section 408—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households—of the Stafford Act  IHP assistance may include financial (e g , assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations ) and/or direct assistance (e g , multi family lease and repair , Transportable Temporary Housing Units , or direct lease ) to eligible individuals and households who, as a result of an emergency or disaster, have uninsured or under-insured necessary expenses and serious needs that cannot be met through other means or forms of assistance  IHP assistance is intended to be temporary and is generally limited to a period of 18 months following the date of the declaration , but it may be extended by FEMA  The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA, Division D of P L  115-254 ), which became law on October 5, 2018, is the most comprehensive reform of FEMA's disaster assistance programs since the passage of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA, Division B of P L  113-2 ) and, prior to that, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA, P L  109-295 )  The DRRA legislation focuses on improving pre-disaster planning and mitigation, response, and recovery, and increasing FEMA accountability  As such, it amends many sections of the Stafford Act  In addition to those amendments, DRRA includes new standalone authorities and requires reports to Congress, rulemaking, and other actions  The 116 th Congress has expressed interest in the oversight of DRRA's implementation, including sections that amend FEMA's temporary housing assistance programs under the Stafford Act  These sections include the following: DRRA Section 1211—State Administration of Assistance for Direct Temporary Housing and Permanent Housing Construction—amends Stafford Act Section 408(f)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, State Role—to allow state, territorial, or tribal governments to administer Direct Temporary Housing Assistance and Permanent Housing Construction, in addition to Other Needs Assistance (ONA)  It also provides a mechanism for state and local units of government to be reimbursed for locally implemented housing solutions  This provision may allow states to customize disaster housing solutions and expedite disaster recovery; however, FEMA may need to provide guidance to clarify the requirements of the application and approval process for the state, territorial, or tribal government that seeks to administer these programs  DRRA Section 1212—Assistance to Individuals and Households—amends Stafford Act Section 408(h)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, Maximum Amount of Assistance—to separate the cap on the maximum amount of financial assistance eligible individuals and households may receive for housing assistance and ONA  The provision also removes financial assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations from the cap, and creates an exception for accessibility-related costs  This may better enable FEMA's disaster assistance programs to meet the recovery-related needs of individuals, including those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, and households who experience significant damage to their primary residence and personal property as a result of an emergency or major disaster  However, there is also the potential that this change may disincentivize sufficient insurance coverage because of the new ability for eligible individuals and households to receive separate and increased housing and ONA awards that more comprehensively cover disaster-related real and personal property losses  DRRA Section 1213—Multifamily Lease and Repair Assistance—amends Stafford Act Section 408(c)(1)(B)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, Direct Assistance—to expand the eligible areas for multifamily lease and repair, and remove the requirement that the value of the improvements or repairs not exceed the value of the lease agreement  This may increase housing options for disaster survivors  The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security must assess the use of FEMA's direct assistance authority to justify this alternative to other temporary housing options, and submit a report to Congress  For more information on DRRA, see CRS Insight IN11055, The Disaster Recovery Reform Act: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress   Additionally, tables of deadlines associated with the implementation actions and requirements of DRRA are available upon request  Native Americans living in tribal areas experience a variety of housing challenges  Housing conditions in tribal areas are generally worse than those for the United States as a whole, and factors such as the legal status of trust lands present additional complications for housing  In light of these challenges, and the federal government's long-standing trust relationship with tribes, certain federal housing programs provide funding specifically for housing in tribal areas  The Tribal HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (Tribal HUD-VASH) program provides rental assistance and supportive services to Native American veterans who are homeless or at risk of homelessness  Tribal HUD-VASH is modeled on the broader HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) program, which provides rental assistance and supportive services for homeless veterans  Tribal HUD-VASH was initially created and funded through the FY2015 HUD appropriations act ( P L  113-235 ), and funds to renew rental assistance have been provided in subsequent appropriations acts  However, no separate authorizing legislation for Tribal HUD-VASH currently exists  In the 116 th Congress, a bill to codify the Tribal HUD-VASH program ( S  257 ) was ordered to be reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in February 2019  A substantively identical bill passed the Senate during the 115 th Congress ( S  1333 ), but the House ultimately did not consider it  For more information on HUD-VASH and Tribal HUD-VASH, see CRS Report RL34024, Veterans and Homelessness   The main federal program that provides housing assistance to Native American tribes and Alaska Native villages is the Native American Housing Block Grant (NAHBG), which was authorized by the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA,  P L  104-330 )  NAHASDA reorganized the federal system of housing assistance for tribes while recognizing the rights of tribal self-governance and self-determination  The NAHBG provides formula funding to tribes that can be used for a range of affordable housing activities that benefit primarily low-income Native Americans or Alaska Natives living in tribal areas  A separate block grant program authorized by NAHASDA, the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant (NHHBG), provides funding for affordable housing activities that benefit Native Hawaiians eligible to reside on the Hawaiian Home Lands  NAHASDA also authorizes a loan guarantee program, the Title VI Loan Guarantee, for tribes to carry out eligible affordable housing activities  The most recent authorization for most NAHASDA programs expired at the end of FY2013, although NAHASDA programs have generally continued to be funded in annual appropriations laws  (The NHHBG has not been reauthorized since its original authorization expired in FY2005, though it has continued to receive funding in most years  ) NAHASDA reauthorization legislation has been considered in varying degrees in the 113 th , 114 th , and 115 th Congresses but none was ultimately enacted  The 116 th Congress may again consider legislation to reauthorize NAHASDA  In general, tribes and Congress have been supportive of NAHASDA, though there has been some disagreement over specific provisions or policy proposals that have been included in reauthorization bills  Some of these disagreements involve debates over specific program changes that have been proposed  Others involve debate over broader issues, such as the appropriateness of providing federal funding for programs specifically for Native Hawaiians and whether such funding could be construed to provide benefits based on race  For more information on NAHASDA, see CRS Report R43307, The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA): Background and Funding   In the past, Congress has regularly extended a number of temporary tax provisions that address a variety of policy issues, including certain provisions related to housing  This set of temporary provisions is commonly referred to as "tax extenders " Two housing-related provisions that have been included in tax extenders packages recently are (1) the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, and (2) the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, each of which is discussed further below  The most recently enacted tax extenders legislation was the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ) in the 115 th Congress  That law extended the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and the ability to deduct mortgage insurance premiums through the end of 2017 (each had previously expired at the end of 2016)  As of the date of this report, these provisions had not been extended beyond 2017  In the 116 th Congress, S  617 , the Tax Extender and Disaster Relief Act of 2019, would extend each of these provisions through calendar year 2019  For more information on tax extenders in general, see CRS Report R45347, Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders")   Historically, when all or part of a taxpayer's mortgage debt has been forgiven, the forgiven amount has been included in the taxpayer's gross income for tax purposes  This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income  During the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, some efforts to help troubled borrowers avoid foreclosure resulted in canceled mortgage debt  The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P L  110-142 ), signed into law in December 2007, temporarily excluded qualified canceled mortgage debt income associated with a primary residence from taxation  The provision was originally effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010, and was subsequently extended several times  Rationales put forth when the provision was originally enacted included minimizing hardship for distressed households, lessening the risk that nontax homeownership retention efforts would be thwarted by tax policy, and assisting in the recoveries of the housing market and overall economy  Arguments against the exclusion at the time included concerns that it makes debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, which could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations, and concerns about fairness given that the ability to realize the benefits depends on a variety of factors  More recently, because the economy, housing market, and foreclosure rates have improved significantly since the height of the housing and mortgage market turmoil, the exclusion may no longer be warranted  For more information on the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, see CRS Report RL34212, Analysis of the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Income   Traditionally, homeowners have been able to deduct the interest paid on their mortgage, as well as property taxes they pay, as long as they itemize their tax deductions  Beginning in 2007, homeowners could also deduct qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as a result of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P L  109-432 )  Specifically, homeowners could effectively treat qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as mortgage interest, thus making the premiums deductible if homeowners itemized and their adjusted gross incomes were below a specified threshold ($55,000 for single, $110,000 for married filing jointly)  Originally, the deduction was to be available only for 2007, but it was subsequently extended several times  Two possible rationales for allowing the deduction of mortgage insurance premiums are that it assisted in the recovery of the housing market, and that it promotes homeownership  The housing market, however, has largely recovered from the market turmoil of the late 2000s, and it is not clear that the deduction has an effect on the homeownership rate  Furthermore, to the degree that owner-occupied housing is over subsidized, extending the deduction could lead to a greater misallocation of the resources that are directed toward the housing industry  In the past, Congress has regularly extended a number of temporary tax provisions that address a variety of policy issues, including certain provisions related to housing  This set of temporary provisions is commonly referred to as "tax extenders " Two housing-related provisions that have been included in tax extenders packages recently are (1) the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, and (2) the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, each of which is discussed further below  The most recently enacted tax extenders legislation was the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ) in the 115 th Congress  That law extended the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and the ability to deduct mortgage insurance premiums through the end of 2017 (each had previously expired at the end of 2016)  As of the date of this report, these provisions had not been extended beyond 2017  In the 116 th Congress, S  617 , the Tax Extender and Disaster Relief Act of 2019, would extend each of these provisions through calendar year 2019  For more information on tax extenders in general, see CRS Report R45347, Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders")   Historically, when all or part of a taxpayer's mortgage debt has been forgiven, the forgiven amount has been included in the taxpayer's gross income for tax purposes  This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income  During the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, some efforts to help troubled borrowers avoid foreclosure resulted in canceled mortgage debt  The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P L  110-142 ), signed into law in December 2007, temporarily excluded qualified canceled mortgage debt income associated with a primary residence from taxation  The provision was originally effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010, and was subsequently extended several times  Rationales put forth when the provision was originally enacted included minimizing hardship for distressed households, lessening the risk that nontax homeownership retention efforts would be thwarted by tax policy, and assisting in the recoveries of the housing market and overall economy  Arguments against the exclusion at the time included concerns that it makes debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, which could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations, and concerns about fairness given that the ability to realize the benefits depends on a variety of factors  More recently, because the economy, housing market, and foreclosure rates have improved significantly since the height of the housing and mortgage market turmoil, the exclusion may no longer be warranted  For more information on the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, see CRS Report RL34212, Analysis of the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Income   Traditionally, homeowners have been able to deduct the interest paid on their mortgage, as well as property taxes they pay, as long as they itemize their tax deductions  Beginning in 2007, homeowners could also deduct qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as a result of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P L  109-432 )  Specifically, homeowners could effectively treat qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as mortgage interest, thus making the premiums deductible if homeowners itemized and their adjusted gross incomes were below a specified threshold ($55,000 for single, $110,000 for married filing jointly)  Originally, the deduction was to be available only for 2007, but it was subsequently extended several times  Two possible rationales for allowing the deduction of mortgage insurance premiums are that it assisted in the recovery of the housing market, and that it promotes homeownership  The housing market, however, has largely recovered from the market turmoil of the late 2000s, and it is not clear that the deduction has an effect on the homeownership rate  Furthermore, to the degree that owner-occupied housing is over subsidized, extending the deduction could lead to a greater misallocation of the resources that are directed toward the housing industry  
Report 2: 8 million and $20 2 million, respectively, in FY2017, finance small-scale enterprise and grassroots self-help activities aimed at assisting poor people  Most U S  assistance is now provided as a grant (gift) rather than a loan, so as not to increase the heavy debt burden carried by many developing countries  However, the forms a grant may take are diverse  The most common type of U S  development aid is project-based assistance (77% in FY2017), in which aid is channeled through an implementing partner to complete a project  Aid is also provided in the form of core contribution to international organizations such as the United Nations, technical assistance, and direct budget support (cash transfer) to governments  A portion of aid money is also spent on administrative costs ( Figure 3 )  Within these categories, aid may take many forms, as described below  Although it is the exception rather than the rule, some countries receive aid in the form of a cash grant to the government  Dollars provided in this way support a government's balance-of-payments situation, enabling it to purchase more U S  goods, service its debt, or devote more domestic revenues to developmental or other purposes  Cash transfers have been made as a reward to countries that have supported the United States' counterterrorism operations (Turkey and Jordan in FY2004), to provide political and strategic support (both Egypt and Israel annually for decades after the 1979 Camp David Peace Accord), and in exchange for undertaking difficult political and economic reforms  Assistance may be provided in the form of food commodities, weapons systems, or equipment such as generators or computers  Food aid may be provided directly to meet humanitarian needs or to encourage attendance at a maternal/child health care program  Weapons supplied under the military assistance program may include training in their use  Equipment and commodities provided under development assistance are usually integrated with other forms of aid to meet objectives in a particular social or economic sector  For instance, textbooks have been provided in both Afghanistan and Iraq as part of a broader effort to reform the educational sector and train teachers  Computers may be offered in conjunction with training and expertise to fledgling microcredit institutions  Since PEPFAR was first authorized in 2004, antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) provided to individuals living with HIV/AIDS have been a significant component of commodity-based assistance  Although once a significant portion of U S  assistance programs, construction of economic infrastructure—roads, irrigation systems, electric power facilities, etc —was rarely provided after the 1970s  Because of the substantial expense of these projects, they were to be found only in large assistance programs, such as that for Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s, where the United States constructed major urban water and sanitation systems  The aid programs in Iraq and Afghanistan supported the building of schools, health clinics, roads, power plants, and irrigation systems  In Iraq alone, more than $10 billion went to economic infrastructure  Economic infrastructure is now also supported by U S  assistance in a wider range of developing countries through the Millennium Challenge Corporation  In this case, recipient countries design their own assistance programs, most of which, to date, include an infrastructure component  Transfer of knowledge and skills is a significant part of most assistance programs  The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) provides training to officers of the military forces of allied and friendly nations  Tens of thousands of citizens of aid recipient countries receive short-term technical training or longer-term degree training annually under USAID programs  More than one-quarter of Peace Corps volunteers are English, math, and science teachers  Other aid programs provide law enforcement personnel with anti-narcotics or anti-terrorism training  Many assistance programs provide expert advice to government and private sector organizations  The Department of the Treasury, USAID, and U S -funded multilateral banks all place specialists in host government ministries to make recommendations on policy reforms in a wide variety of sectors  USAID has often placed experts in private sector business and civic organizations to help strengthen them in their formative years or while indigenous staff are being trained  While most of these experts are U S  nationals, in Russia, USAID funded the development of locally staffed political and economic think tanks to offer policy options to that government  USAID, the Inter-American Foundation, and the African Development Foundation often provide aid in the form of small grants directly to local organizations to foster economic and social development and to encourage civic engagement in their communities  Grants are sometimes provided to microcredit organizations, such village-level women's savings groups, which in turn provide loans to microentrepreneurs  Small grants may also address specific community needs  Recent IAF grants, for example, have supported organizations that help resettle Salvadoran migrants deported from the United States and youth programs in Central America aimed at gang prevention  Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President may determine the terms and conditions under which most forms of assistance are provided  In general, the financial condition of a country—its ability to meet repayment obligations—has been an important criterion of the decision to provide a loan or grant  Some programs, such as humanitarian and disaster relief programs, were designed from the beginning to be entirely grant activities  During the past two decades, nearly all foreign aid—military as well as economic—has been provided in grant form  While loans represented 32% of total military and economic assistance between 1962 and 1988, this figure declined substantially beginning in the mid-1980s, until by FY2001, loans represented less than 1% of total aid appropriations  The de-emphasis on loan programs came largely in response to the debt problems of developing countries  Both Congress and the executive branch have generally supported the view that foreign aid should not add to the already existing debt burden carried by these countries  In the FY2019 budget request, the Trump Administration encouraged the use of loans over grants when providing military assistance (Foreign Military Financing), but Congress did not include language in support of that proposal in the enacted FY2019 appropriation ( P L  116-6 )  Although a small proportion of total current aid, there are significant USAID-managed programs that guarantee loans, meaning the U S  government agrees to pay a portion of the amount owed in the case of a default on a loan  A Development Credit Authority (DCA) loan guarantee, in which risk is shared with a private sector bank, can be used to increase access to finance in support of any development sector  The DCA is to be transferred from USAID in 2019 to the new IDFC, established by the BUILD Act of 2018 ( P L  115-254 ), to enhance U S  development finance capacity  Under the Israeli Loan Guarantee Program, the United States has guaranteed repayment of loans made by commercial sources to support the costs of immigrants settling in Israel from other countries and may issue guarantees to support economic recovery  USAID has also provided loan guarantees in recent years to improve the terms or amounts of financing from international capital markets for Ukraine and Jordan  In these cases, assistance funds representing a fraction of the guarantee amount are provided to cover possible default  Between 1946 and 2016, the United States loaned $112 7 billion in foreign economic and military aid to foreign governments, and while most foreign aid is now provided through grants, $9 18 billion in loans to foreign governments remained outstanding at the end of FY2016  For nearly three decades, Section 620q of the Foreign Assistance Act (the Brooke amendment) has prohibited new assistance to the government of any country that falls more than one year past due in servicing its debt obligations to the United States, though the President may waive application of this prohibition if he determines it is in the national interest  The United States has also forgiven debts owed by foreign governments and encouraged, with mixed success, other foreign aid donors and international financial institutions to do likewise  In some cases, the decision to forgive foreign aid debts has been based largely on economic grounds as another means to support development efforts by heavily indebted, but reform-minded, countries  The United States has been one of the strongest supporters of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)  These initiatives, which began in the late 1990s, include participation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international financial institutions in a comprehensive debt workout framework for the world's poorest and most debt-strapped nations  The largest and most hotly debated debt forgiveness actions have been implemented for much broader foreign policy reasons with a more strategic purpose  Poland, during its transition from a communist system and centrally planned economy (1990—$2 46 billion); Egypt, for making peace with Israel and helping maintain the Arab coalition during the Persian Gulf War (1990—$7 billion); and Jordan, after signing a peace accord with Israel (1994—$700 million), are examples  Similarly, the United States forgave about $4 1 billion in outstanding Saddam Hussein-era Iraqi debt in November 2004 and helped negotiate an 80% reduction in Iraq's debt to creditor nations later that month  Most development and humanitarian assistance activities are not directly implemented by U S  government personnel but by private sector entities, such as individual personal service contractors, consulting firms, universities, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), or public international organizations (PIOs)  Generally speaking, U S  government foreign service and civil servants determine the direction and priorities of the aid program, allocate funds while keeping within legislative requirements, ensure that appropriate projects are in place to meet aid objectives, select implementers, and monitor the implementation of those projects for effectiveness and financial accountability  Both USAID and the State Department have promoted the use of public-private partnerships, in which private entities such as corporations and foundations are contributing partners, not paid implementers, in situations where business interests and development objectives coincide  In FY2017, the United States provided some form of bilateral foreign assistance to more than 150 countries  Aid is concentrated heavily in certain countries, reflecting the priorities and interests of United States foreign policy at the time  Table 2 identifies the top 15 recipients of U S  foreign assistance for FY1997, FY2007 and FY2017  As shown in the table above, there are both similarities and sharp differences among country aid recipients for the three periods  The most consistent thread connecting the top aid recipients over the past two decades has been continuing U S  strategic interests in the Middle East, with large programs maintained for Israel and Egypt and, for Iraq, following the 2003 invasion  Two key countries in the U S  counterterrorism strategy, Afghanistan and Pakistan, made their first appearances on the list in FY2002 and continued to be among the top recipients in FY2017  In FY1997, one sub-Saharan African country appeared among leading aid recipients; in FY2017, 7 of the 15 are sub-Saharan African  Many are focus countries under the PEPFAR initiative to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic; South Sudan receives support as a newly independent country with multiple humanitarian and development needs  In FY1997, three countries from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union made the list, as many from the region had for much of the 1990s, representing the effort to transform the former communist nations to democratic societies and market-oriented economies  None of those countries appear in the FY2017 list  In FY1997, four Latin American countries make the list; no countries from the region appear in FY2017  On a regional basis, the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region has received the largest share of U S  foreign assistance for many decades  Although economic aid to the region's top two recipients, Israel and Egypt, began to decline in the late 1990s, the dominant share of bilateral U S  assistance consumed by the MENA region was maintained in FY2005 by the war in Iraq  Despite the continued importance of the region, its share slipped substantially by FY2017 as the effort to train and equip Iraqi forces diminished  Since September 11, 2001, South and Central Asia has emerged as a significant target of U S  assistance, rising from a roughly 3% share 20 years ago to 16% in FY2007 and 15% in FY2017, largely because of aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan  Similarly, the share represented by African nations has increased from 10% and 19%, respectively, in FY1997 and FY2007, to 25% in FY2017, largely due to the HIV/AIDS initiative that funnels resources mostly to African countries and to a range of other efforts to address the region's development challenges  Meanwhile, the share of aid to Europe/Eurasia, which greatly surpassed that of Africa in FY1997, has declined significantly in the past decade, to about 4% in FY2017, with the graduation of many East European aid recipients and the termination of programs in Russia  The Ukraine was responsible for about one third of aid to that region in FY2017  East Asia/Pacific has remained at a low level during the past two decades, while Latin America's share has risen and fallen based on U S  interest in Colombia and a few Central American countries as aid has shifted to regions of more pressing strategic interest (see Figure 4 )  There are several methods commonly used for measuring the amount of federal spending on foreign assistance  Amounts can be expressed in terms of budget authority (funds appropriated by Congress), obligations (amounts contractually committed), outlays or disbursements (money actually spent)  Assistance levels are also sometimes measured as a percentage of the total federal budget, as a percentage of total discretionary budget authority (excluding mandatory and entitlement programs), or as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) (for an indication of the national wealth allocated to foreign aid)  By nearly all of these measures, foreign aid resources fell gradually on average over several decades since the historical high levels of the late 1940s and early 1950s ( Appendix A )  This downward trend was sporadically interrupted, largely due to major foreign policy initiatives such as the Alliance for Progress for Latin America beginning in 1961, the infusion of funds to implement the Camp David Middle East Peace Accords in 1979, and an increase in military assistance to Egypt, Turkey, Greece and others in the mid-1980s  The lowest point in U S  foreign aid spending since World War II came in 1997, when foreign assistance obligations fell to just above $20 billion (in 2017 dollar terms)  ( Figure 5 ) While foreign aid consistently represented just over 1% of U S  annual gross domestic product in the decade following World War II, it fell gradually to between 0 2% and 0 4% for most years in the past three decades  Foreign assistance spending has comprised, on average, around 3% of discretionary budget authority and just over 1% of total budget authority each year since 1977, though the percentages have sometimes varied considerably from year to year  Foreign aid dropped from 5% of discretionary budget authority in 1979 to 2 4% in 2001, before rising sharply in conjunction with U S  activities in Afghanistan and Iraq starting in 2003  As a portion of total budget authority, foreign assistance reached 2 5% in 1979, but has hovered below 1 5% since 1987  In 2017, foreign assistance was estimated to account for 4 1% of discretionary budget authority and 1 2% of total budget authority ( Figure 6 ; Appendix A )  As previously discussed, since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, foreign aid funding has been closely tied to U S  counterterrorism strategy, particularly in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan  Bush and Obama Administration global health initiatives, the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and growth in counter-narcotics activities have driven funding increases as well  The Budget Control Act of 2011, and the drawdown of U S  military forces in Iraq, and to some degree Afghanistan, led to a notable dip in aid obligations in FY2013, but aid levels have risen again with efforts to address the crisis in Syria, counter-ISIL activities, and humanitarian aid  The use of the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO, discussed below) designation has enabled this growth despite the BCA limitations  Figure 7 shows how trends in foreign aid funding in recent decades can be attributed to specific foreign policy events and presidential initiatives  The Obama Administration's FY2012 international affairs budget proposed that the overseas contingency operations (OCO) designation, which had been applied since 2009 to war-related Defense appropriations, including to DOD assistance programs such as ISFF, ASFF and CERP, be extended to include "extraordinary, but temporary, costs of the Department of State and USAID in the front line states of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan " Congress not only adopted the OCO designation in the FY2012 SFOPS appropriations legislation, but expanded it to include funding for additional accounts and countries  In every fiscal year since, a portion of certain foreign assistance accounts—primarily ESF, FMF, IDA, MRA and INCLE—has been appropriated with the OCO designation  The OCO designation is significant because the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), which set annual caps on discretionary funding from FY2013 through FY2021, specified that funds designated as OCO do not count toward the discretionary spending limits established by the act  OCO designation makes it possible to prevent war-related funding from crowding out core international affairs activities within the budget allocation  The OCO approach is reminiscent of the use of supplemental international affairs appropriations for the first decade after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks  Congress appropriated significant emergency supplemental funds for foreign operations and Defense assistance programs every year from FY2002 through FY2010 for activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, which were not counted toward subcommittee budget allocations  Since the OCO designation was first applied to foreign operations in FY2012, supplemental appropriations for foreign aid have declined significantly  In the FY2019 and FY2020 budget requests, the Trump Administration did not request OCO funding within the international affairs budget, but did request OCO funding for the Department of Defense, including for DOD aid accounts  Congress used the OCO designation for both DOD and State/USAID accounts in the FY2019 appropriation, P L  116-6 , but a smaller portion of aid was designated as OCO compared to FY2018  It remains to be seen whether this is the beginning of a downward trend in OCO use for foreign aid  Congress historically sought to enhance the domestic benefits of foreign aid by requiring that most U S  foreign aid be used to procure U S  goods and services  The conditioning of aid on the procurement of goods and services from the donor-country is sometimes called "tied aid," and while quite common for much of the history of modern foreign assistance, has become increasingly disfavored in the international community  Studies have shown that tying aid increases the costs of goods and services by 15%-30% on average, and up to 40% for food aid, reducing the overall effectiveness of aid flows  The United States joined other donor nations in committing to reduce tied aid in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in March 2005, and the portion of tied aid from all donors fell from 70% of total bilateral development assistance in 1985 to an average of 12% in 2016  However, an estimated 32% of U S  bilateral development assistance was tied in 2016, the highest percentage among major donors, perhaps reflecting the perception of policymakers that maintaining public and political support for foreign aid programs requires ensuring direct economic benefit to the United States  About 67% of U S  foreign assistance funds in FY2017 were obligated to U S -based entities  A considerable amount of U S  foreign assistance funds remain in the United States, through domestic procurement or the use of U S  implementers, but the portion differs by program and is hard to identify with any accuracy  For some types of aid, the legislative requirements or program design make it relatively easy to determine how much aid is spent on U S  goods or services, while for others, this is more difficult to determine  USAID  Most USAID funding (Development Assistance, Global Health, Economic Support Fund) is implemented through contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with implementing partners  While many implementing partner organizations are based in the United States and employ U S  citizens, there is little information available about what portion of the funds used for program implementation are used for goods and services provided by American firms  Procurement reform efforts initiated by USAID in 2010 have aimed to increase procurement and implementation by host country entities as a means to enhance country ownership, build local capacity, and improve sustainability of aid programs  Food assistance commodities, until recently, were purchased wholly in the United States, and generally required by law to be shipped by U S  carriers, suggesting that the vast majority of food aid expenditures are made in the United States  Starting in FY2009, a small portion of food assistance was authorized to be purchased locally and regionally to meet urgent food needs more quickly  Successive Administrations and several Members of Congress have proposed greater flexibility in the food aid program, potentially increasing aid efficiency but reducing the portion of funds flowing to U S  farmers and shippers  To date, these proposals have been largely unsuccessful  Foreign Military Financing , with the exception of certain assistance allocated to Israel, is used exclusively to procure U S  military equipment and training  Millennium Challenge Corporation  The MCC bases its procurement regulations on those established by the World Bank, which calls for an open and competitive process, with no preference given to donor country suppliers  Between FY2011 and FY2017, the MCC awarded roughly 15% of the value of compact contracts to U S  firms  Multilateral development aid  Multilateral aid funds are mixed with funds from other nations and the bulk of the program is financed with borrowed funds rather than direct government contributions  Information on the U S  share of procurement financed by MDBs is unavailable  In addition to the direct benefits derived from aid dollars used for American goods and services, many argue that the foreign aid program brings significant indirect financial benefits to the United States  For example, analysts maintain that provision of military equipment through the military assistance program and food commodities through the Food for Peace program helps to develop future, strictly commercial, markets for those products  More broadly, as countries develop economically, they are in a position to purchase more goods from abroad and the United States benefits as a trade partner  Since an increasing majority of global consumers are outside of the United States, some business leaders assert that establishing strong economic and trade ties in the developing world, using foreign assistance as a tool, is key to U S  economic and job growth  Since World War II, with the exception of several years between 1989 and 2001, during which Japan ranked first among aid donors, the United States has led the developed countries in net disbursements of economic aid, or "Official Development Assistance (ODA)" as defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC)  In 2017, the most recent year for which data are available, the United States disbursed $34 12 billion in ODA, or about 24% of the $144 71 billion in total net ODA disbursements by DAC donors that year  Germany ranked second at $24 16 billion, the United Kingdom followed at $18 59 billion, Japan ranked fourth at $11 85 billion, and France rounded out the top donors with $11 03 billion in 2017 (see Figure 8 )  While the top five donors have not varied for more than a decade, there have been shifts lower down the ranking  For example, Turkey has become a much more prominent ODA donor in recent years (ranked 6 th in 2017, with $9 08 billion in ODA, compared to 21 st in 2006), reflecting large amounts of humanitarian aid to assist Syrian refugees  Even as it leads in dollar amounts of aid flows to developing countries, the United States often ranks low when aid is calculated as a percentage of gross national income (GNI)  This calculation is often cited in the context of international donor forums, as a level of 0 7% GNI was established as a target for donors in the 2000 U N  Millennium Development Goals  In 2017, the United States ranked at the bottom among major donors at 0 18% of GNI, slightly lower than Portugal and Spain (0 18% and 0 19%, respectively)  The United Arab Emirates, which has significantly increased its reported ODA in recent years, ranked first among top donors at 1 03% of GNI, followed by Sweden at 1 02% and Luxembourg at 1 00%  There has also been an increase in ODA from non-DAC countries  Between 2000 and 2014, China spent $81 1 billion in ODA, more than tripling its ODA commitments during this period  While reported Chinese ODA is still relatively small compared to that of major donor countries, policymakers are paying increasing attention to growing Chinese investments in developing countries that do not meet the ODA definition  China has touted its "Belt and Road" initiative as an effort to boost development and connectivity across as many as 125 countries to create "strategic propellers" for its own development  However, China has provided little official aggregate information on the initiative, including on the number of projects, countries involved, the terms of financing, and metrics for success  Numerous congressional authorizing committees and appropriations subcommittees maintain responsibility for U S  foreign assistance  Several committees have responsibility for authorizing legislation establishing programs and policy and for conducting oversight of foreign aid programs  In the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and in the House, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, have primary jurisdiction over bilateral development assistance, political/strategic and other economic security assistance, military assistance, and international organizations  Food aid, primarily the responsibility of the Agriculture Committees in both bodies, is periodically shared with the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House  U S  contributions to multilateral development banks are within the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Financial Services Committee  The large nontraditional aid programs funded by DOD, such as Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and the military aid programs in Afghanistan and Iraq, come under the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committees  Some global health assistance, such as research and other activities done by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, may fall under the jurisdiction of the House Energy and Commerce and Senate HELP committees  Traditionally, most foreign aid appropriations fall under the jurisdiction of the SFOPS Subcommittees, with food assistance appropriated by the Agriculture Subcommittees  As noted earlier, however, certain military, global health, and other activities that have been reported as foreign aid have been appropriated through other subcommittees in recent years, including the Defense and the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies subcommittees  (For current information on SFOPS Appropriations legislation, see CRS Report R45168, Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations , by Susan B  Epstein, Marian L  Lawson, and Cory R  Gill ) The most significant permanent foreign aid authorization laws are the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, covering most bilateral economic and security assistance programs (P L  87-195; 22 U S C  2151); the Arms Export Control Act (1976), authorizing military sales and financing (P L  90-629; 22 U S C  2751); the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P L  480), covering food aid (P L  83-480; 7 U S C  1691); and the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (1945), authorizing U S  participation in multilateral development banks (P L  79-171; 22 U S C  286)  In the past, Congress usually scheduled debates every two years on omnibus foreign aid legislation that amended these permanent authorization measures  Congress has not enacted into law a comprehensive foreign assistance authorization measure since 1985, although foreign aid authorizing bills have passed the House or Senate, or both, on numerous occasions  Foreign aid bills have frequently stalled at some point in the debate because of controversial issues, a tight legislative calendar, or executive-legislative foreign policy disputes  In contrast, DOD assistance is authorized in annual National Defense Authorization legislation  In lieu of approving a broad State Department/USAID authorization bill, Congress has on occasion authorized major foreign assistance initiatives for specific regions, countries, or aid sectors in stand-alone legislation or within an appropriation bill  Among these are the SEED Act of 1989 ( P L  101-179 ; 22 U S C  5401); the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 ( P L  102-511 ; 22 U S C  5801); the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 ( P L  108-25 ; 22 U S C  7601); the Tom Lantos and Henry J  Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 ( P L  110-293 ); the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (Division D, Title VI of P L  108-199 ); the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009 ( P L  111-73 ; 22 U S C  8401); the Global Food Security Act of 2016 ( P L  114-195 ; 22 U S C  9306), and the BUILD Act ( P L  115-254 )  In the absence of regular enactment of foreign aid authorization bills, appropriation measures considered annually within the SFOPS spending bill have assumed greater significance for Congress in influencing U S  foreign aid policy  Not only do appropriations bills set spending levels each year for nearly every foreign assistance account, SFOPS appropriations also incorporate new policy initiatives that would otherwise be debated and enacted as part of authorizing legislation  Appendix A  Data Table Appendix B  Common Foreign Assistance Abbreviations

ground_truth: The 116th Congress may consider a variety of housing-related issues. These could include topics related to housing finance, federal housing assistance programs, and housing-related tax provisions, among other things. Particular issues that may be of interest during the Congress include the following: The status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that have been in conservatorship since 2008. Congress might consider comprehensive housing finance reform legislation to resolve the status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Furthermore, a new director for the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's regulator and conservator, was sworn in on April 15, 2019. Congress may take an interest in any administrative changes that FHFA might make to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under new leadership. Appropriations for federal housing programs, including programs at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and rural housing programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), particularly in light of discretionary budget caps that are currently scheduled to decrease for FY2020. Oversight of the implementation of certain changes to federal assisted housing programs that were enacted in prior Congresses, such as expansions of HUD's Moving to Work (MTW) program and Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. Considerations related to housing and the federal response to major disasters, including oversight of the implementation of certain changes related to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance that were enacted in the previous Congress. Consideration of legislation related to certain federal housing programs that provide assistance to Native Americans living in tribal areas. Consideration of legislation to extend certain temporary tax provisions that are currently expired, including housing-related provisions that provide a tax exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and allow for the deductibility of mortgage insurance premiums, respectively. Housing and mortgage market conditions provide context for these and other issues that Congress may consider, although housing markets are local in nature and national housing market indicators do not necessarily accurately reflect conditions in specific communities. On a national basis, some key characteristics of owner-occupied housing markets and the mortgage market in recent years include increasing housing prices, low mortgage interest rates, and home sales that have been increasing but constrained by a limited inventory of homes on the market. Key characteristics of rental housing markets include an increasing number of renters, low rental vacancy rates, and increasing rents. Rising home prices and rents that have outpaced income growth in recent years have led to policymakers and others increasingly raising concerns about the affordability of both owner-occupied and rental housing. Affordability challenges are most prominent among the lowest-income renter households, reflecting a shortage of rental housing units that are both affordable and available to this population.