prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Black lung benefits include both cash assistance and medical benefits  Maximum cash assistance payments generally ranged from about $650 to $1,300 per month in fiscal year 2017, depending on the number of dependents the miner has  Miners receiving cash assistance are also eligible for medical benefits that cover the treatment of their black-lung- related conditions, which may include hospital and nursing care, rehabilitation services, and drug and equipment charges, according to DOL documentation  DOL estimates that the average annual cost for medical treatment in fiscal year 2017 was approximately $6,980 per miner  There were about 25,700 total beneficiaries (primary and dependents) receiving black lung benefits during fiscal year 2017 (see fig  1)  The decrease in the number of beneficiaries over time has resulted from a combination of declining coal mining employment and an aging beneficiary population, according to DOL officials  Further, black lung beneficiaries could increase in the near term due to the increased occurrence of black lung disease and its most severe form, progressive massive fibrosis, particularly among Appalachian coal miners, according to HHS officials  Black lung claims are processed by DOL’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs  Contested claims are adjudicated by DOL’s Office of Administrative Law Judges, which issues decisions that can be appealed to the Benefits Review Board  Claimants and mine operators may further appeal these agency decisions to the federal courts  If an award is contested, claimants can receive interim benefits, which are generally paid from the Trust Fund according to DOL officials, while their claims are in the appeals process  Final awards are either funded by mine operators—who are identified as the responsible employers of claimants—or the Trust Fund, when responsible employers cannot be identified or do not pay  In fiscal year 2017, black lung claims had an approval rate of about 29 percent, according to DOL data  Of the 19,430 primary black lung beneficiaries receiving benefits during fiscal year 2017, 64 percent (12,464) were paid from the Trust Fund, 25 percent (4,798) were paid by liable mine operators, and 11 percent (2,168) were receiving interim benefits, according to DOL officials  Black Lung Disability Trust Fund revenue is primarily obtained from mine operators through the coal tax  The coal tax is imposed at two rates, depending on whether the coal is extracted from underground or surface mines  The current tax rates are $1 10 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0 55 per ton of surface-mined coal, up to 4 4 percent of the sales price  Therefore, if a ton of underground-mined coal is sold for less than $25, than the tax paid would be less than $1 10  For instance, if a ton of underground-mined coal sold for $20, than it would be taxed at 4 4 percent of the sales price, or $0 88  To a lesser extent, the Trust Fund also receives other miscellaneous revenue from interest payments, and various fines and penalties paid by mine operators, among other sources, according to DOL documentation  Coal tax revenue is collected from mine operators by Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service and then transferred to the Trust Fund where it is then used by DOL officials to pay black lung benefits and the costs of administering the program  Trust Fund expenditures include, among other things, black lung benefit payments, certain administrative costs incurred by DOL and Treasury to administer the black lung benefits program, and debt repayments  When necessary for the Trust Fund to make relevant expenditures under federal law, the Trust Fund borrows from the Treasury’s general fund  When this occurs, the federal government is essentially borrowing from itself—and hence from the general taxpayer—to fund its benefit payments and other expenditures  Multiple factors have challenged Trust Fund finances since it was established about 40 years ago  Its expenditures have consistently exceeded its revenue, interest payments have grown, and legislative actions taken that were expected to improve Trust Fund finances did not completely address its debt  Combined black lung benefit payments and program administrative costs exceeded Trust Fund revenue every year for the program’s first decade (fiscal years 1979 through 1989), resulting in the accrual of debt  During the Trust Fund’s first three fiscal years in particular, revenue covered less than 40 percent of the Trust Fund’s combined benefit payments and administrative costs  For instance, in fiscal year 1980, the Trust Fund received about $251 million in revenue and paid about $726 million in black lung benefits and administrative costs  Beginning in 1982, revenue increased as a result of the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981 that doubled the coal tax rates from $0 50 to $1 per ton of underground-mined coal and from $0 25 to $0 50 per ton of surface-mined coal, up to 4 percent of the sales price  Even with the tax rate increase, combined benefit payments and administrative costs continued to exceed revenue throughout the 1980s (see fig  2)  As a result, the Trust Fund borrowed from Treasury’s general fund to cover the annual differences between its expenditures and revenues, and by fiscal year 1989 the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund exceeded $3 billion  Beginning in fiscal year 1990, Trust Fund revenue generally began to exceed combined benefit payments and administrative costs, and, in fact, total Trust Fund cumulative revenue collected from fiscal years 1979 through 2017 exceeded total cumulative benefit payments and administrative costs incurred during these years  However, interest owed from earlier years of borrowing led to more borrowing and debt  From fiscal years 1979 through 1989, the Trust Fund borrowed—primarily through 30-year term loans according to Treasury officials—from Treasury’s general fund at interest rates that varied from about 6 5 percent to about 13 9 percent  In fiscal year 1985, for instance, the Trust Fund paid about $275 million in interest, which was equal to about half of the total revenue collected that year  Since fiscal year 1990, revenue has generally exceeded combined benefit payments and administrative costs, although interest payments on the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt kept the fund in a position whereby its total expenditures continued to exceed its total revenues  As a result, the principal amount of the Trust Fund’s total outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund increased and exceeded $10 billion by fiscal year 2008  Legislation has been enacted over the years that was expected to improve Trust Fund finances: In 1981, the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981 doubled the coal tax rates from $0 50 cents to $1 per ton of underground-mined coal, and from $0 25 cents to $0 50 cents per ton of surface-mined coal, up to 4 percent of the sales price (as mentioned previously)  In 1986, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 established a 5 year moratorium on interest accrual with respect to repayable advances to the Trust Fund (which we refer to as annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund), and increased the coal tax rates to $1 10 per ton of underground-mined coal, and $0 55 per ton of surface-mined coal (up to 4 4 percent of the sales price), where they have remained since  In 2008, the EIEA included provisions that were expected to eliminate the Trust Fund’s debt  Specifically, EIEA (1) generally extended the coal tax rates at their current rates until December 31, 2018 (after which they are scheduled to decrease to their original levels of $0 50 per ton of underground-mined coal, and $0 25 per ton of surface- mined coal, up to 2 percent of the sales price); (2) provided for a one- time federal appropriation toward Trust Fund debt forgiveness (about $6 5 billion, according to DOL data); and (3) provided for the refinancing of the Trust Fund’s debt that was not forgiven as a result of EIEA (which we refer to as the Trust Fund’s legacy debt)  Specifically, the Trust Fund’s legacy debt was refinanced with more favorable interest rates, according to DOL data  Interest rates on the refinanced legacy debt range from about 1 4 percent to about 4 5 percent  The forgiveness and refinancing of Trust Fund debt along with extending the current coal tax rates through 2018 were expected to result in annual tax revenue that could be used to pay down interest and principal on the Trust Fund’s legacy debt, according to DOL and Treasury officials  These officials said that models showed that debt would be eliminated by fiscal year 2040; however, they noted that coal tax revenue has been less than originally projected due, in part, to the 2008 recession and increased market competition from other energy sources  As a result, the Trust Fund’s total expenditures continued to exceed revenue and the Trust Fund borrowed from Treasury’s general fund each year from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 to cover debt repayments expenditures  In fiscal year 2017, the Trust Fund’s total principal amount of outstanding debt, which includes its legacy debt and the amount borrowed from Treasury’s general fund that year, was about $4 3 billion (see fig  3)  Trust Fund borrowing will likely continue to increase from fiscal years 2019 through 2050 due, in part, to the scheduled coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent that will take effect in 2019 and declining coal production, according to our moderate simulation  We simulated the effects of the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease on Trust Fund finances through 2050, and in this report, we generally present the results of a moderate case set of assumptions (see table 1)  These simulations are not predictions of what will happen, but rather models of what could happen given certain assumptions  For more information on our simulation methodology see appendix I  In addition to the moderate case assumptions, we also simulated how Trust Fund debt could change through 2050 given various other assumptions, and the full range of results for all of our simulations are presented in appendix II  Our moderate case simulation suggests that Trust Fund revenue may decrease, from about $485 million in fiscal year 2018 to about $298 million in fiscal year 2019, due, in part, to the scheduled approximate 55 percent decrease in the coal tax  Our simulation, which incorporates EIA data on future expected coal production, also shows that annual Trust Fund revenue will likely continue to decrease beyond fiscal year 2019 due, in part, to declining coal production  Domestic coal production has declined from about 1 2 billion tons in 2008 to about 728 million tons in 2016, according to EIA  Based on these projections, our moderate simulation shows that Trust Fund annual revenue may continue to decrease from about $298 million in fiscal year 2019 to about $197 million in fiscal year 2050 (see fig  4)  With the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease, our moderate case simulation suggests that expected revenue will likely be insufficient to cover combined black lung benefit payments and administrative costs, as well as debt repayment expenditures  Specifically, our moderate case simulation suggests that revenue may not be sufficient to cover beneficiary payments and administrative costs from fiscal years 2020 through 2050 (see fig  5)  For instance, in fiscal year 2029, simulated benefit payments and administrative costs will likely exceed simulated revenue by about $99 million  These annual deficits will likely decrease over time to about $4 million by fiscal year 2050 due, in part, to the assumed continued net decline in total black lung beneficiaries  Our simulation also therefore suggests that Trust Fund revenue may not be enough to also cover the debt repayment expenditures it must continue to make through fiscal year 2040, per the payment schedule established following the 2008 EIEA  Our moderate simulation suggests that the amount borrowed by the Trust Fund will likely increase from about $1 6 billion in fiscal year 2019 to about $15 4 billion in fiscal year 2050 (see fig  6)  Although the Trust Fund’s legacy debt decreases through fiscal year 2040, total Trust Fund expenditures—including combined benefit payments and administrative costs as well as debt repayments—will likely continue to exceed revenue which will require continued annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund  However, the amount borrowed by the Trust Fund could vary depending, in part, on future coal production and the number of new beneficiaries and could range between about $6 billion and about $27 billion in 2050, according to our simulations (see appendix II)  We simulated three options that can affect Trust Fund finances through fiscal year 2050  Specifically, we simulated the effects of (1) adjusting the coal tax, (2) forgiving interest, and (3) forgiving debt  In each of the simulations, we compared the results of the option to a baseline in which the coal tax rates will decrease by about 55 percent, which we refer to as the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease  We compare interest and debt forgiveness options to a baseline which assumes the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease has taken effect, and that there is no interest or debt forgiveness  The simulated options are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular option or combination of options  Using the moderate case, we simulated four options: (1) implementing the 2019 coal tax rate reduction to $0 50 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0 25 per ton of surface-mined coal; (2) maintaining the current coal tax rates of $1 10 per ton for underground-mined coal and $0 55 per ton of surface-mined coal; (3) reducing the tax rates by 25 percent (from $1 10 and $0 55); and (4) increasing these tax rates by 25 percent (see fig  7)  Increasing the tax rates by 25 percent was the only option that eliminated simulated Trust Fund debt by fiscal year 2050, according to our moderate case simulation  We simulated three interest forgiveness options including forgiving interest on (1) legacy debt, (2) annual borrowing, and (3) all debt  Our moderate case simulation suggests that forgiving interest will not eliminate simulated debt by fiscal year 2050 (see fig  8)  We simulated two debt forgiveness options by forgiving principal and interest on (1) legacy debt and (2) all debt  Our moderate case simulation suggests that both debt forgiveness options would reduce simulated Trust Fund borrowing by fiscal year 2050, but these options would not eliminate debt altogether as simulated revenue will likely not be enough to cover simulated expenditures (see fig  9)  In these cases, the Trust Fund will need to continue borrowing from Treasury’s general fund to cover annual deficits, and thus accumulate debt  While adjusting coal tax rates and forgiving interest or debt could reduce the Trust Fund’s simulated borrowing by 2050, implementing them could affect the coal industry or general taxpayers, according to stakeholders we interviewed  For instance, a coal industry representative noted that maintaining the coal tax at its current rate would continue to burden the coal industry and increasing the tax would exacerbate the burden at a time when coal production has been declining  Treasury officials noted that the costs associated with forgiving Trust Fund interest or debt would be borne by the general taxpayer since Treasury borrows from taxpayers to lend to the Trust Fund as needed  These officials also said that making a one-time federal appropriation to forgive interest or debt would be the most transparent way to satisfy the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund  In addition to the simulations, other options could affect the financial position of the Trust Fund including reducing black lung benefits, eliminating or adjusting the coal tax cap, or creating a variable coal tax  Our moderate case simulation suggests that completely eliminating black lung benefits as of fiscal year 2019 could reduce the Trust Fund’s borrowing from Treasury’s general fund in fiscal year 2050 from about $15 4 billion to about $6 4 billion  However, doing so would generally mean that coal tax revenue would be collected solely to fund the repayment of Trust Fund debt  Another option could be to eliminate or adjust the coal tax cap, which currently prevents mine operators from paying a coal tax of more than 4 4 percent of the price per ton of coal sold  If the coal tax cap were eliminated, for instance, mine operators would pay $1 10 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0


Report 2:  55 per ton of surface-mined coal regardless of price sold, which could increase revenue  As an additional option, changing the structure of the coal tax to flexible rates that change based on an annual actuarial assessment of the Trust Fund could help to ensure that coal mine operators pay the necessary amount of tax to cover Trust Fund expenditures, without resulting in a Trust Fund balance or deficit  Multiple options could reduce the Trust Fund’s future debt and distribute the financial burden among the coal industry and general taxpayers  We simulated whether various coal tax and debt forgiveness options could balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050, whereby its simulated revenue would be sufficient to cover its simulated expenditures  These options were selected, in part, based on interviews with Trust Fund stakeholders and the availability of DOL and other data  We approached these simulations from two perspectives  First, we simulated how much Trust Fund debt would need to be forgiven based on various coal tax rates  Second, we simulated the average tax collected per ton needed to balance the Trust Fund by 2050, based on certain debt forgiveness options  The simulated options are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular combination of options  Our first set of options using the moderate case simulations are based on the current coal tax rates of $1 10 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0 55 per ton of surface-mined coal, and show the amount of debt forgiveness in fiscal year 2019 needed to balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050 based on certain tax rates (see fig  10)  Specifically, our moderate case simulations show the following: Increasing current coal tax rates by 25 percent could balance the Trust Fund by 2050 and would likely require no debt forgiveness  For this option, the simulated coal tax revenue would likely be sufficient to cover simulated Trust Fund expenditures, including combined benefit payments and administrative costs, as well as debt repayments  However, this option would place the burden solely on the coal industry that would be paying higher taxes at a time when coal production has been declining  Maintaining current coal tax rates could balance the Trust Fund by 2050 if coupled with about $2 4 billion of debt forgiveness  This option would distribute the burden among the coal industry and general taxpayers  Decreasing current coal tax rates by 25 percent could balance the Trust Fund by 2050 if coupled with about $4 8 billion in debt forgiveness  This option would burden the coal industry less than maintaining the current tax rates, but would increase the burden on general taxpayers  Decreasing current tax rates by 55 percent, which we refer to as the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease, would balance the Trust Fund by 2050 if coupled with about $7 8 billion in debt forgiveness  This figure comprises the Trust Fund’s total simulated outstanding debt in fiscal year 2019 ($6 6 billion), and an additional about $1 2 billion that would be required because the Trust Fund will accrue additional debt from fiscal years 2020 through 2050, according to our moderate case simulations  The coal industry would bear some of the financial burden of this option, while also placing a financial burden on general taxpayers  Our second set of options using moderate case simulations show the change in average coal tax revenue collected per ton to balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050 based on certain debt forgiveness options (see fig  11)  Specifically, our moderate simulations show the following: Forgiving the Trust Fund’s legacy debt would allow for an average tax collected of about $0 59 per ton to balance the Trust Fund by 2050  Based on certain assumptions, this could be accomplished with a tax of $0 88 per ton on underground-mined coal and $0 44 per ton on surface-mined coal  Forgiving all Trust Fund debt would allow for an average tax collected per ton of coal sold of $0 47 per ton to balance the Trust Fund by 2050  Based on certain assumptions, this could be accomplished with a tax of $0 70 per ton on underground-mined coal and a tax of $0 35 per ton of surface-mined coal  We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Labor (DOL), Treasury, and Health and Human Services (HHS) for review and comment  DOL, Treasury, and HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time we will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Labor, Treasury, and Health and Human Services, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s web site at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff should have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or brownbarnesc@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  We examined the extent to which (1) Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (Trust Fund) debt may change through 2050 and (2) selected options to improve its future financial position  We interviewed officials from the Departments of Labor (DOL), Treasury, and Health and Human Services (HHS), as well as representatives from the National Mining Association and the United Mine Workers of America  We then selected options to simulate based, in part, on these interviews and the availability of DOL and other data  These options included adjusting the coal tax, forgiving interest on some or all Trust Fund debt, forgiving some or all Trust Fund debt, or various combinations of these options  The options we simulated are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular option or combination of options  Our simulations are based on various assumptions and simulate Trust Fund revenues and expenditures from fiscal years 2016 through 2050  To develop these simulations, we used actual and projection data from (1) DOL for fiscal years 2015 through 2040; (2) Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis for fiscal years 2011 through 2015; (3) the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) for calendar years 2015 through 2050; and (4) the Office of Management and Budget for fiscal year 2017  To simulate future Trust Fund benefit expenditures, we simulated the number of beneficiaries each fiscal year, and the annual average amount of benefits received (cash assistance and medical benefits)  To simulate the numbers of beneficiaries, we used DOL data on the (1) age distributions of miner and widow beneficiaries for fiscal year 2015; (2) mortality rates by age for miner and widow beneficiaries as of fiscal year 2015; and (3) numbers of beneficiaries—including married miners, single miners, widows, and miners receiving medical benefits only—in fiscal year 2015  We assumed—as DOL does in its Black Lung Budget and Liability Model—that all miners are men, all widows are women, and all spouses are 3 years younger than the miner  We also assumed that the age distribution of single miners is the same as for married miners, and that the age distribution of new miner and widow beneficiaries is the same as for miner and widow beneficiaries during fiscal year 2015  We used DOL’s mortality rates to simulate the number of beneficiaries of each age and type in each year, and used those numbers to then simulate the total number of beneficiaries of each type each year (see table 2)  We also assumed that there will be no new medical-benefit-only recipients  Formula The number of married miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of new married miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y plus the number of married miner beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived and whose spouse survived  The total number of married miner beneficiaries in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of married miner beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y  Finally, we averaged the number of married miner beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total  The number of single miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of new single miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y plus the number of single miner beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived plus the number of married miner beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived but whose spouse did not survive  The total number of single miner beneficiaries in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of single miner beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y  Finally, we averaged the number of single miner beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total  The number of widow beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of new beneficiaries who are widows age a in fiscal year y plus the number of widow beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived plus the number of married miner beneficiaries age a+2 in fiscal year y-1 who did not survive but whose spouse did survive  The total number of widow beneficiaries in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of widow beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y  Finally, we averaged the number of widow beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total  The number of MBO beneficiaries of age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of MBO beneficiaries of age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived  The total number of MBO beneficiaries only in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of MBO beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y  Finally, we averaged the number of MBO beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total  To simulate future coal tax revenue, we used Treasury and EIA data to calculate (1) the amounts of underground and surface-mined coal taxed at fixed dollar amounts of $1 10 and $0 55 per ton, respectively, in 2015; (2) the amounts of underground and surface-mined coal taxed at variable dollar amounts per ton equal to 4 4 percent of the price in 2015; and (3) average prices of underground and surface-mined coal taxed at 4 4 percent of the price in 2015  We then used EIA data on projected amounts of total coal production, underground-mined coal production, lignite coal production, and coal exports, as well as projected average coal prices, for the period from 2015 through 2050 to simulate future coal tax revenues (see table 3)  We simulated other Trust Fund expenditures and revenues, including administrative costs and debt repayments (see table 4)  For our simulations, total Trust Fund expenditures are the sum of black lung benefits (cash assistance and medical benefits), total administrative costs, repayment of interest and principal on outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund, and other expenditures  Total Trust Fund revenues are the sum of coal tax revenue and other miscellaneous revenue, and exclude annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund  Annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund is the difference between total Trust Fund expenditures and revenues and is assumed to be repaid with interest the following year  If total revenues are greater than total expenditures, then the Trust Fund has a balance and would not have to borrow that year  In this case, we assumed that the Trust Fund will earn interest on that balance at the same rate on which interest would accrue on annual borrowing  We simulated how the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease and various options including adjusting the coal tax, forgiving debt interest, and forgiving debt principal and interest may affect Trust Fund finances through fiscal year 2050 (see table 5)  The options listed are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular option or combination of options  We simulated option combinations for coal tax rates, interest forgiveness, and debt forgiveness to demonstrate how potential financial adjustments could affect future Trust Fund borrowing from Treasury’s general fund through fiscal year 2050  For options that involve adjusting coal tax rates, we estimated the amount of debt that would need to be forgiven in fiscal year 2019 for the Trust Fund’s revenues to be sufficient to cover its expenditures through fiscal year 2050, assuming the Trust Fund does not borrow from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018  To do so, we first calculated the real discounted present value of Trust Fund expenditures for fiscal years 2019 through 2050, including benefit payments, administrative costs, legacy debt repayments, and repayment of annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund  Second, we calculated the real discounted present value of Trust Fund revenue for the same period, including coal tax revenue and other miscellaneous revenue  Third, we calculated debt forgiveness as the difference between the real discounted present value of Trust Fund expenditures from the first calculation and the real discounted present value of Trust Fund revenues from the second calculation  When the amount of debt forgiveness is greater than the amount of debt outstanding, the Trust Fund would need an additional cash inflow in addition to forgiveness of all outstanding debt  Amounts of debt forgiveness less than zero suggest that no debt forgiveness is required  For options involving forgiving debt (interest or principal), we estimated the average tax per ton of coal that, if implemented in fiscal year 2019, would provide the Trust Fund sufficient revenue to cover its expenditures through fiscal year 2050, assuming the Trust Fund does not receive any advances from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018  To do so, we first calculated the real discounted present value of Trust Fund expenditures for the period from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2050, again including benefit payments, administrative costs, legacy debt repayments, and repayment of annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund, minus the real discounted present value of miscellaneous revenues for the same period  Second, we calculated the real discounted present value of coal production for the same period  Third, we calculated the average tax per ton of coal as the first amount divided by the second amount  To assess the sensitivity of each option, we ran each simulation 36 times using four different sets of assumptions about the numbers of future beneficiaries and nine different sets of assumptions about future coal production and prices (see table 6)  Doing so provided a range of estimates about the Trust Fund’s future borrowing needs and provided insight on the sensitivity of its overall financial position relative to its various expenditures and revenues  The analysis also provided a range of estimates of the amount of debt forgiveness needed to bring the Trust Fund into balance by fiscal year 2050, assuming various coal tax rates, and the average tax collection per ton needed to do the same, and assuming various amounts of debt forgiveness  From the range of estimates that resulted from our sensitivity analysis, we selected cases with moderate expectations related to future Trust Fund expenditures and revenue  Specifically, for future expenditures, we assumed an average growth rate of new black lung beneficiaries for fiscal years 2003 through 2015 as a moderate case that reflects historical experience  For future revenue, we used a moderate coal production outlook based on EIA’s reference case, which reflects moderate expectations about future coal production based on various assumptions about economic growth, oil prices, technological innovation, and energy policy  We summarized the results of our simulations by showing the extent to which the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund’s (Trust Fund) balance—the sum of tax revenue and miscellaneous revenue less expenditures—may change in fiscal year 2050 for each option simulated  For example, with the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease, our moderate case simulations suggest that the Trust Fund would likely have a deficit in fiscal year 2050 of about $15 4 billion  Multiple options could reduce the Trust Fund’s future debt and distribute the financial burden among the coal industry and general taxpayers  We simulated how various coal tax and debt forgiveness options could balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050, whereby its simulated revenue would be sufficient to cover its simulated expenditures  We approached these simulations from two perspectives  First, we simulated how much Trust Fund debt would need to be forgiven based on various coal tax rates  Second, we simulated the average tax collected per ton needed to balance the Trust Fund by 2050, based on certain debt forgiveness options  For our first set of simulations, we calculated the amount of debt outstanding in fiscal year 2019 and the amount that would likely need to be forgiven in fiscal year 2019 for the Trust Fund to have sufficient revenues to cover its expenditures by fiscal year 2050, assuming that it does not borrow from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018  For example, before any options are implemented, our moderate case simulations suggest that the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt in fiscal year 2019—including both legacy debt and annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund—would likely be about $6 6 billion (after discounting and adjusting for inflation)  Therefore, with implementation of the coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent as scheduled in calendar year 2019, about 117 7 percent of that debt would need to be forgiven to balance the Trust Fund  In other words, balancing the Trust Fund would require forgiveness of $6 6 billion and an additional cash inflow of about $1 2 billion because the Trust Fund will accrue additional debt from fiscal years 2020 through 2050, according to our moderate case simulations (see table 8)  For our second set of simulations, we estimated the average tax per ton of coal that, if implemented in fiscal year 2019, would likely provide the Trust Fund sufficient revenues to cover its expenditures in fiscal year 2050, assuming that it does not borrow from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018  For example, if all principal and interest on Trust Fund legacy debt is forgiven, as of 2019, the estimated average tax that balances the Trust Fund is about $0 59 per ton (see table 9)  Based on certain assumptions, this could be accomplished with a tax of $0 88 per ton on underground-mined coal and $0 44 per ton on surface-mined coal  In addition to the contact named above, Blake Ainsworth (Assistant Director), Justin Dunleavy (analyst-in-charge), Angeline Bickner, Courtney LaFountain, and Rosemary Torres Lerma made key contributions to this report  Also contributing to this report were James Bennett, Melinda Bowman, Lilia Chaidez, Caitlin Cusati, Holly Dye, Alex Galuten, Carol Henn, John Lack, Emei Li, Almeta Spencer, Kate van Gelder, and Shana Wallace 

ground_truth: Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas. Matters of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations include Israel's ability to address the threats it faces in its region. Shared U.S.-Israel concerns about Iran and its allies on the nuclear issue and in Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Palestinian issues. Israeli domestic political issues, including elections scheduled for 2019. Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence. It maintains conventional military superiority relative to neighboring states and the Palestinians. It also takes measures to deter attack and defend its population and borders from evolving asymmetric threats such as rockets and missiles, cross-border tunneling, drones, and cyberattacks. Additionally, Israel has an undeclared but presumed nuclear weapons capability. Against a backdrop of strong bilateral cooperation, Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually from FY2019 to FY2028, along with additional amounts from Defense Department accounts for missile defense. All of these amounts remain subject to congressional appropriations. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu released new Israeli intelligence on Iran's nuclear program in April 2018, days before President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that constrains Iran's nuclear activities. It is unclear whether Israel might take future military action in Iran if Iranian nuclear activities resume. Since 2018, Israel has conducted a number of military operations in Syria against Iran and its allies, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel and Iran also appear to be competing for military advantage over each other at the Israel-Lebanon border. Amid uncertainty in the area, in March 2019 President Trump recognized Israel's claim to sovereignty over the Golan Heights, changing long-standing U.S. policy that held—in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 497 from 1981—the Golan was occupied Syrian territory whose final status was subject to Israel-Syria negotiation. The prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process are complicated by many factors. Palestinian leaders cut off high-level political contacts with the Trump Administration after it recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017. U.S.-Palestinian tensions have since worsened amid U.S. cutoffs of funding to the Palestinians and diplomatic moves—including the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Palestinian leaders interpreted these actions as prejudicing their claims to a capital in Jerusalem and to a just resolution of Palestinian refugee claims. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has welcomed these U.S. actions. The Trump Administration has suggested that it will release a proposed peace plan after Israeli elections, which are scheduled for April 9, 2019. Speculation continues about how warming ties between Israel and Arab Gulf states may affect Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, though Saudi Arabia said that the U.S. policy change on the Golan Heights would negatively affect the peace process. Bouts of tension and violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza have continued—reportedly accompanied by indirect talks between the two parties that are being brokered by Egypt and aim for a long-term cease-fire. Domestically, Israel is preparing for the April 9 elections, which are closely contested. Former top general Benny Gantz is combining with former Finance Minister Yair Lapid to challenge Netanyahu, whom the attorney general has recommended be indicted for corruption in three separate cases. The elections and subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for Israel's future leadership and policies.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas  Matters of particular significance include the following: Israel's own capabilities for addressing threats, and its cooperation with the United States  Shared U S -Israel concerns about Iran, within the context of the U S  exit from the 2015 international nuclear agreement, and growing tension involving Iran and Hezbollah at Israel's northern border with Syria and Lebanon  Israeli-Palestinian issues, including those involving Jerusalem, Hamas and the Gaza Strip, funding for Palestinians, and a possible Trump Administration peace plan  Israeli domestic political issues, including probable corruption-related indictments against Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and closely contested elections that are scheduled for April 9, 2019  For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U S  Relations , by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U S  Foreign Aid to Israel , by Jeremy M  Sharp  Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence  These strengths include robust military and homeland security capabilities, as well as close cooperation with the United States  Israel maintains conventional military superiority relative to its neighbors and the Palestinians  Shifts in regional order and evolving asymmetric threats during this decade have led Israel to update its efforts to project military strength, deter attack, and defend its population and borders  Israel appears to have reduced some unconventional threats via missile defense systems, reported cyber defense and warfare capabilities, and other heightened security measures  Israel has a robust homeland security system featuring sophisticated early warning practices and thorough border and airport security controls; most of the country's buildings have reinforced rooms or shelters engineered to withstand explosions  Israel also has proposed and partially constructed a national border fence network of steel barricades (accompanied at various points by watch towers, patrol roads, intelligence centers, and military brigades) designed to minimize militant infiltration, illegal immigration, and smuggling from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip  Additionally, Israeli authorities have built a separation barrier in and around parts of the West Bank  Israel is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintains a policy of "nuclear opacity" or amimut   A 2017 report estimated that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal of around 80-85 warheads  The United States has countenanced Israel's nuclear ambiguity since 1969, when Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and U S  President Richard Nixon reportedly reached an accord whereby both sides agreed never to acknowledge Israel's nuclear arsenal in public  Israel might have nuclear weapons deployable via aircraft, submarine, and ground-based missiles  No other Middle Eastern country is generally thought to possess nuclear weapons  Israeli officials closely consult with U S  counterparts in an effort to influence U S  decisionmaking on key regional issues, and U S  law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel's "qualitative military edge," or QME  Additionally, a 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3 3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations  Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U S  interests  They also argue that Israel is a valuable U S  ally  The United States and Israel do not have a mutual defense treaty or agreement that provides formal U S  security guarantees  Iran remains of primary concern to Israeli officials largely because of (1) Iran's antipathy toward Israel, (2) Iran's broad regional influence, and (3) the probability that some constraints on Iran's nuclear program could loosen in the future  In recent years, Israel and Arab Gulf states have discreetly cultivated closer relations with one another in efforts to counter Iran  Prime Minister Netanyahu has sought to influence U S  decisions on the international agreement on Iran's nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA)  He argued against the JCPOA when it was negotiated in 2015—including in a speech to a joint session of Congress—and welcomed President Trump's May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U S  sanctions on Iran's core economic sectors  A few days before President Trump's May announcement, Netanyahu presented information that Israeli intelligence operatives apparently seized in early 2018 from an Iranian archive  He used the information to question Iran's credibility and highlight its potential to parlay existing know-how into nuclear-weapons breakthroughs after the JCPOA expires  In his September 2018 speech before the U N  General Assembly, Netanyahu claimed that Iran maintains a secret "atomic warehouse for storing massive amounts of equipment and materiel " An unnamed U S  intelligence official was quoted as saying in response, "so far as anyone knows, there is nothing in [the facility Netanyahu identified] that would allow Iran to break out of the JCPOA any faster than it otherwise could " After Netanyahu publicly exposed the Iranian nuclear archive, some former Israeli officials speculated about what action Israel might consider taking against Iranian nuclear facilities if Iran abrogates the JCPOA and expands nuclear activities currently restricted under the agreement  However, Netanyahu had said in an interview that he was not seeking a military confrontation with Iran  Israel and Iran have engaged in hostile action over Iran's presence in Syria  In the early years of the Syria conflict, Israel primarily employed air strikes to prevent Iranian weapons shipments destined for the Iran-backed group Hezbollah in Lebanon  Later, as the Syrian government regained control of large portions of the country with Iranian backing, Israeli leaders began pledging to prevent Iran from constructing and operating bases or advanced weapons manufacturing facilities in Syria  Since 2018, Israeli and Iranian forces have repeatedly targeted one another in and over Syrian- and Israeli-controlled areas  In January 2019, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel had targeted Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria "hundreds of times " Limited Israeli strikes to enforce "redlines" against Iran-backed forces could expand into wider conflict, particularly if there is a miscalculation by one or both sides  U S  involvement in Syria could be one factor in Israeli calculations on this issue  The U S  base at Al Tanf in southern Syria has reportedly "served as a bulwark against Iran's efforts to create a land route for weapons from Iran to Lebanon " Israeli officials favor continued U S  involvement in Syria, while also preparing for the possibility that they may need to take greater direct responsibility for countering Iran there  Russia's advanced air defense systems in Syria could make it more difficult for Israel to operate there  Since 2015, Russia has operated an S-400 system at Russia's Khmeimim air base in Lattakia, a city on Syria's Mediterranean coast  To date, however, Russia does not appear to have acted militarily to thwart Israeli air strikes against Iranian or Syrian targets, and Israel and Russia maintain communications aimed at deconflicting their operations  In addition to the S-400 that it owns and operates, Russia delivered an S-300 air defense system for Syria's military to Khmeimim airbase in October 2018  The delivery followed Syria's downing of a Russian military surveillance plane in September 2018 under disputed circumstances, shortly after an Israeli operation in the vicinity  According to an Israeli satellite imagery analysis company, three launchers appeared to be operational as of February 2019  It is unclear to what extent Russia has transferred the S-300 to Syrian military control, and how this might affect future Israeli military action in Syria  An Israeli journalist wrote that "Israel has the knowledge, experience and equipment to evade the S-300, but the fact that additional batteries, manned by Russian personnel, are on the ground, will necessitate greater care [when carrying out future operations against Iran-aligned targets in Syria] " Since the September 2018 incident, Israeli air strikes appear to have decreased somewhat  On March 25, 2019, President Trump signed a proclamation stating that the United States recognizes the Golan Heights (hereinafter, the Golan) to be part of the State of Israel  The proclamation stated that "any possible future peace agreement in the region must account for Israel's need to protect itself from Syria and other regional threats" —presumably including threats from Iran and the Iran-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah  Israel gained control of the Golan from Syria during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and effectively annexed it unilaterally by applying Israeli law to the region in 1981 (see Figure 2 )  President Trump's proclamation changed long-standing U S  policy on the Golan  Since 1967, successive U S  Administrations supported the general international stance that the Golan is Syrian territory occupied by Israel, with its final status subject to negotiation  In reaction to the U S  proclamation, others in the international community have insisted that the Golan's status has not changed  In Congress, Senate and House bills introduced in February 2019 ( S  567 and H R  1372 ) support Israeli sovereignty claims to the Golan, and would treat the Golan as part of Israel in any existing or future law "relating to appropriations or foreign commerce " For decades after 1967, various Israeli leaders, reportedly including Prime Minister Netanyahu as late as 2011, had entered into indirect talks with Syria aimed at returning some portion of the Golan as part of a lasting peace agreement  However, the effect of civil war on Syria and the surrounding region, including an increase in Iran's presence, may have influenced Netanyahu to shift focus from negotiating with Syria on a "land for peace" basis to obtaining international support for Israel's claims of sovereignty  As part of the periodic conflict in Syria between Israel and Iran , some Iranian missiles have targeted Israeli positions in the Golan  The Syrian government has denounced the U S  policy change as an illegal violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and insisted that Syria is determined to recover the Golan  Additionally, observers have argued that the policy change could unintentionally bolster Syrian President Bashar al Asad within Syria by rallying Syrian nationalistic sentiment in opposition to Israel's claims to the Golan and deflecting attention from Iran's activities inside Syria  Since 1974, the U N  Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled an area of the Golan Heights between the regions controlled by Israel and Syria, with about 880 troops from five countries stationed there as of January 2019  During that time, Israel's forces in the Golan have not faced serious military resistance to their continued deployment, despite some security threats and diplomatic challenges  Periodic resolutions by the U N  General Assembly have criticized Israel's occupation as hindering regional peace and Israel's settlement and de facto annexation of the Golan as illegal  Hezbollah's forces and Israel's military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader conflict  Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional implications  Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah's buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds  Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran over Iran's presence in Syria raises questions about the potential for Hezbollah's forces in Lebanon to open another front against Israel  After the September 2018 incident leading to Russia's installation of an S-300 system in Syria (discussed above), Iran reportedly began directly transferring weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon while reducing Syria's use as a transshipment hub  One Israeli media account warned that Hezbollah's threat to Israel is increasing because of initiatives to build precision-weapons factories in Lebanon and to set up a military infrastructure in southern Syria  In late 2018 and early 2019, Israel's military undertook an effort—dubbed "Operation Northern Shield"—to seal six Hezbollah attack tunnels to prevent them from crossing into Israel  Israeli officials claim that they do not want another war, while at the same time taking measures aimed at constraining and deterring Hezbollah, including through consultation with the U N  Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)  President Trump has expressed interest in brokering a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and his Administration has supposedly prepared a proposal to facilitate negotiations, but the Administration has repeatedly postponed releasing the proposal  Many factors may account for the delays, including recent U S  actions regarding Jerusalem, tension in and around the Gaza Strip, reduced funding for the Palestinians, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and political jockeying and domestic constraints among Israelis and Palestinians  The U S  decision—announced in December 2017—to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the U S  embassy there has fed U S -Palestinian tensions  Israeli leaders generally celebrated the change, but Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas strongly objected  Many other countries opposed President Trump's actions on Jerusalem, as reflected in action at the United Nations  Claiming U S  bias favoring Israel, Palestinian leaders broke off high-level political contacts with the United States shortly after the December 2017 announcement and have made efforts to advance Palestinian national claims in international fora  However, the PA continues security coordination with Israel in the West Bank  U S -Palestinian tensions appear to have influenced Administration decisions to cut off various types of U S  funding to the Palestinians, and arguably have dimmed prospects for restarting Israeli-Palestinian talks  In a September 2018 address before the U N  General Assembly, PLO Chairman/PA President Abbas denounced Administration actions that he characterized as taking disputed Israeli-Palestinian issues—such as Jerusalem's status and Palestinian refugee claims—off the negotiating table  Funding for economic and humanitarian needs in the West Bank and Gaza could become even scarcer  In February 2019, Israel announced that it would withhold a portion of the tax revenue it collects for the PA because—pursuant to a law passed by the Knesset in 2018—Israel had determined that amount represented PLO/PA payments made on behalf of individuals allegedly involved in terrorist acts  In response, Abbas announced that the PA would completely reject monthly revenue transfers from Israel if it withheld any amount, even though the transfers comprise approximately 65% of the PA budget  For February, Israel withheld approximately $11 million from the $193 million due to the PA, with the PA rejecting the entire amount as a result  The PA is reportedly seeking temporary financial support from the private sector and local banks, and also asking the Arab League to follow through on its 2010 decision to provide $100 million per month as a "financial safety net" for the PA  At the end of January 2019, U S  bilateral aid to the Palestinians—including nonlethal security assistance that Israel generally supports—ended completely due to the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA, P L  115-253 ), which became law on October 3, 2018  Two months after the law's enactment, PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah informed Secretary of State Michael Pompeo that the PA would not accept aid that subjected it to federal court jurisdiction  Apparently, U S  aid will not resume unless Congress amends or repeals the ATCA, or the Administration channels the aid differently  Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor Jared Kushner has stated that the Administration will publicly release a peace plan sometime after Israeli national elections, which are set to occur on April 9, 2019  According to Kushner, the peace plan contains detailed proposals on the various issues that divide Israel and the PLO  Many observers express skepticism about the prospect that these proposals can serve as a basis for the serious resumption of bilateral talks, but Kushner has reportedly said that the Administration is focusing on formulating "realistic solutions," and that "privately, people are more flexible " U S  officials hope to surmount potential obstacles to the peace plan in the Israeli and Palestinian domestic arenas by obtaining political and economic support for the U S  initiative from key Arab states in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Egypt  A number of Arab states share common interests in working behind the scenes with Israel to counter Iranian regional influence  While some diplomatic developments have fed speculation about warming Arab-Israeli ties, reports suggest that key Arab Gulf states remain reluctant to embrace more formal relations with Israel without a resolution of the Palestinian issue  Saudi Arabia's press agency responded to the U S  recognition of Israel's claims to sovereignty in the Golan Heights by saying that it "will have significant negative effects on the peace process in the Middle East and the security and stability of the region " In a statement with implications both for domestic and international audiences, Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly said that the March 2019 change in U S  policy on the Golan proves that countries can retain territory captured in a defensive war  His statement prompted speculation over the possibility that Israeli leaders might consider annexing part of the West Bank and whether the situation in the Golan is sufficiently similar to invite comparison  Days before the April elections, Netanyahu asserted that if he were to lead the next government, he would apply Israeli law to West Bank settlements  The closely contested Israeli national elections—scheduled for April 9, 2019—and the subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for the country's leadership and future policies  Prime Minister Netanyahu faces a challenge from the centrist Blue and White party under the combined leadership of former top general Benny Gantz and former Finance Minister Yair Lapid  Some setbacks for Netanyahu during the campaign have included the attorney general's announcement of probable corruption-related indictments against Netanyahu, new media allegations of possible misconduct relating to Israel's procurement of German submarines, and questions about some individuals or groups possibly spreading rumors against Netanyahu's opponents via social media  Yet, some observers calculate that Netanyahu's Likud could possibly get fewer Knesset seats than Blue and White and still form the next coalition  For more information on the actors involved in the elections, see CRS Insight IN11068, Israel: April 2019 Elections and Probable Indictments Against Prime Minister Netanyahu , by Jim Zanotti and this report's Appendix   In July 2018, the Knesset passed a Basic Law defining Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people  Some observers have expressed concern that the law might further undermine the place of Arabs in Israeli society, while others view its effect as mainly symbolic  In March 2019, Netanyahu said that Israel is a Jewish, democratic state with equal rights for all its citizens, and "the nation-state not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people," reviving domestic debate about the 2018 law and perhaps seeking support during the election campaign from sympathetic voter groups 


Report 2: The leaders of the eight legislative branch agencies and entities—the Government Accountability Office, the Library of Congress, the Government Publishing Office (formerly Government Printing Office), the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the U S  Capitol Police, the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the Office of Compliance—are appointed in a variety of manners  The first four agencies are led by a person appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate  The next two are appointed by Congress, the next by the Librarian of Congress, and the last by a board of directors  Congress has periodically examined the procedures used to appoint legislative branch officers with the aim of protecting the prerogatives of, and ensuring accountability to, Congress within the framework of the advice and consent appointment process established in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution  Legislation to alter the appointment process for legislative branch agencies and entities has periodically been introduced for many years  Questions remain about various reform proposals, including the ability of Congress to remove the President from the appointment process for some of these positions  These may depend upon the implication or interpretation of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, the definition of an "officer of the United States," the specific office or agency in question, and whether or not a change in appointing authority would require any revision in the powers and duties of legislative branch agency leaders  Some previous reforms and proposals have also attempted to find a role for the House of Representatives, which does not play a formal role in the confirmation of presidential nominees, in the search for legislative branch officials  The report also briefly addresses legislation considered, but not enacted, in the 115 th Congress to change the appointment process for the Register of Copyrights  The following sections contain information on the legislative branch agency heads' appointment processes, length of tenures (if terms are set), reappointment or removal provisions (if any), salaries and benefi ts, and most recent appointments  Information is provided on each agency and summarized in Table 1   Pursuant to the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1990, the Architect is "appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate for a term of 10 years " The act also established a congressional commission responsible for recommending individuals to the President for the position of Architect of the Capitol  The commission, originally consisting of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, the majority and minority leaders of the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the chairs and the ranking minority Members of the Committee on House Administration and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, was expanded in 1995 to include the chairs and ranking minority Members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees  Prior to 1989, the Architect was selected by the President for an unlimited term without any formal involvement of Congress  The FY1990 act, however, followed numerous attempts dating at least to the 1950s to alter the appointment procedure to provide a role for Congress  The proposals included requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, establishing a commission to recommend names to the President, and removing the appointment process from the President and instead making the Architect appointed solely by Congress  In the 111 th Congress, two measures ( H R  2185 and H R  2843 ) were introduced to remove the President from the Architect appointment process and shift it to congressional leaders and chairs and ranking Members of specific congressional committees  Under both measures, the Architect would still serve a 10-year term  Under H R  2843 , as reported, the Architect would have been appointed jointly by the same 14-member panel, equally divided between the House and Senate, that currently is responsible for recommending candidates to the President  This bill was reported by the Committee on House Administration ( H Rept  111-372 ) on December 10, 2009  The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure was discharged from further consideration the same day  The House agreed to the bill, as amended to include an 18-member panel, also equally divided between the House and Senate, by voice vote on February 3, 2010  H R  2843 was received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, although no further action was taken  Under the earlier bill ( H R  2185 , 111 th Congress), which was introduced on April 30, 2009, the Architect would have been appointed jointly by the Speaker of the House, the Senate majority leader, the minority leaders in the House and Senate, the chairs and ranking minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, and the chairs and ranking minority Members of the Committee on House Administration and Senate Committee on Rules and Administration  This bill followed similar legislation ( H R  6656 , 110 th Congress), with the same 12-member appointing panel, introduced on July 30, 2008  Both bills were referred to two committees, but no further action was taken  The Architect of the Capitol is compensated at an "annual rate which is equal to the lesser of the annual salary for the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives or the annual salary for the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper of the Senate " Stephen T  Ayers was nominated by President Obama for a 10-year term on February 24, 2010  He was the second Architect nominated pursuant to the new commission procedure  The nomination was referred to the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration  The committee held a hearing on April 15, 2010, and Ayers was confirmed by unanimous consent in the Senate on May 12, 2010  Ayers was previously the Deputy Architect/Chief Operating Officer and had served as Acting Architect of the Capitol following the February 4, 2007, retirement of former Architect of the Capitol Alan Hantman  Upon the retirement of Ayers on November 23, 2018, Christine Merdon, the Deputy Architect of the Capitol/Chief Operating Officer, became the Acting Architect of the Capitol  Pursuant to 31 U S C  703(a)(1), the Comptroller General shall be "appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate " This procedure dates to the establishment of the agency in 1921  Additionally, a commission procedure established in 1980 recommends individuals to the President in the event of a vacancy  The commission consists of the Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore of the Senate, the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate, the chairs and ranking minority Members of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform  The commission is to recommend at least three individuals for this position to the President, although the President may request additional names  The Comptroller General is appointed to a 15-year term and may not be reappointed  The Comptroller General may be removed by "(A) impeachment; or (B) joint resolution of Congress, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing" and only by reason of permanent disability; inefficiency; neglect of duty; malfeasance; or a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude  The salary of the Comptroller General is equal to Level II of the Executive Schedule  Additionally, a law enacted in 1953 established a separate retirement system for the Comptroller General  Gene L  Dodaro, then-Chief Operating Officer at GAO, became the acting Comptroller General on March 13, 2008, upon the resignation of David M  Walker, who had previously been confirmed on October 21, 1998  The White House announced Dodaro's nomination to a 15-year term as Comptroller General on September 22, 2010  The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held a hearing on the nomination on November 18, 2010, and Dodaro was confirmed by the Senate by unanimous consent on December 22, 2010  The Government Publishing Office (formerly Government Printing Office) was established in 1861  The U S  Code , at 44 U S C  301, states that the President "shall nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint a suitable person to take charge of and manage the Government Publishing Office  The title shall be Director of the Government Publishing Office " The current appointment language was enacted in 2014, although the use of the advice and consent procedure for this position can be traced back much further  There is no set term of office for the Director  The Director's pay is equivalent to Level II of the Executive Schedule  Robert C  Tapella was nominated to be Director of the Government Publishing on June 18, 2018  The nomination was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration  No further action was taken prior to the end of the 115 th Congress, and the nomination was returned to the President pursuant to Senate Rule XXXI  President Trump renominated Tapella on January 16, 2019  The nomination was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration  Previously, Tapella served in this role from October 4, 2007 (confirmed by the Senate by voice vote) until December 28, 2010  GPO's Chief Administrative Officer, Herbert H  Jackson Jr , has served as Acting Deputy Director since July 1, 2018, following the retirement of Andrew M  Sherman  Sherman, formerly GPO's Chief of Staff, had been serving as Acting Deputy Director since the retirement of Acting GPO Director Jim Bradley on March 6, 2018  Bradley, previously the GPO Deputy Director, had assumed this role following the departure of the previous Director, Davita Vance-Cooks, in November 2017  Vance-Cooks had been nominated by President Obama on May 9, 2013, to be Public Printer, as the head of the GPO was then known, and confirmed by the Senate by voice vote on August 1, 2013  The Library of Congress was established in 1800  The U S  Code , at 2 U S C  136, states: "The Librarian of Congress shall make rules and regulations for the government of the Library " Until an act of February 19, 1897, which made the appointment subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, the Librarian was appointed solely by the President  Recent changes to the appointment statute, at 2 U S C  136-1, amended the tenure of the Librarian  The Librarian of Congress Succession Modernization Act of 2015, S  2162 , was introduced in the Senate on October 7, 2015, and agreed to the same day by unanimous consent  It was agreed to in the House without objection on October 20 and signed by President Obama on November 5, 2015 ( P L  114-86 )  The act establishes a term limit of 10 years, with the possibility of reappointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate  Previously, there was no set term of office for the Librarian  The U S  Code , at 2 U S C  136a-2, states: "the Librarian of Congress shall be compensated at an annual rate of pay which is equal to the annual rate of basic pay payable for positions at Level II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5 " Carla D  Hayden was nominated to a 10-year term as Librarian of Congress by President Obama on February 24, 2016  The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration held a hearing on the nomination on April 20, 2016, and ordered the nomination favorably reported on June 9  Hayden was confirmed as the 14 th Librarian of Congress on July 13, 2016 (74-18, record vote number 128)  Hayden succeeded James H  Billington who retired effective September 30, 2015  Billington had been confirmed as Librarian of Congress by the Senate on July 24, 1987  The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 provides that the Librarian of Congress appoint the Director of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) "after consultation with the Joint Committee on the Library " The basic rate of pay for the director is equivalent to Level III of the Executive Schedule  There is no set term of office  Mary B  Mazanec, who served as Acting Director of CRS following the retirement of former Director Daniel P  Mulhollan on April 2, 2011, was appointed Director by the Librarian of Congress on December 5, 2011  2 U S C  1901 states: "There shall be a captain of the Capitol police and such other members with such rates of compensation, respectively, as may be appropriated for by Congress from year to year  The Capitol Police shall be headed by a Chief who shall be appointed by the Capitol Police Board and shall serve at the pleasure of the Board " The last sentence was inserted in 1979, struck by the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, and restored in 2010 by the U S  Capitol Police Administrative Technical Corrections Act  Pursuant to the FY2003 act, the chief of the Capitol Police receives compensation "equal to $1,000 less than the lower of the annual rate of pay in effect for the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives or the annual rate of pay in effect for the Sergeant-at-Arms and Doorkeeper of the Senate " Pay for the chief has been adjusted multiple times in recent years: it formerly was (1) equal to Level IV of the Executive Schedule under 1979 legislation, (2) linked to the Senior Executive Service under an act from 2000, and (3) equal to $2,500 less than these officers pursuant to a 2002 law  On February 24, 2016, the Capitol Police Board announced the appointment of Matthew R  Verderosa as the new Chief of the U S  Capitol Police, effective March 20, 2016  Previously, Chief Kim Dine was sworn in on December 17, 2012  The director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has been appointed wholly by Congress since the creation of the post with the passage of the Congressional Budget Act in 1974  The act stipulates that the director is appointed for a four-year term "by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate after considering recommendations received from the Committees on the Budget of the House and the Senate, without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of his fitness to perform his duties " The director may be reappointed, and either chamber can remove the director by simple resolution  Additionally, a director appointed "to fill a vacancy prior to the expiration of a term shall serve only for the unexpired portion of that term" and an "individual serving as Director at the expiration of a term may continue to serve until his successor is appointed " The director of CBO receives compensation at an annual rate that is equal to the lower of the highest annual rate of compensation of any officer of the House or any officer of the Senate  Keith Hall, the current director of CBO, began his service on April 1, 2015  He follows Douglas W  Elmendorf, who began his term on January 22, 2009  2 U S C  1382 states that the chair of the board of directors of the Office of Compliance, "subject to the approval of the Board, shall appoint and may remove an Executive Director  Selection and appointment of the Executive Director shall be without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties of the Office " The executive director must be "an individual with training or expertise in the application of laws referred to in section 1302(a)" of Title II of the U S  Code   The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act altered the compensation for the Office's statutorily established positions, including that of the executive director  The chair of the board may fix the annual rate of pay for the executive director, although the level may not exceed the lesser of House or Senate officers  Prior to the FY2008 act, the maximum pay for this position had been Level V of the Executive Schedule  Separate legislation, P L  110-164 , amended the Congressional Accountability Act and altered eligibility and tenure restrictions for the executive director by allowing current or former Office of Compliance employees to serve in this capacity  The legislation also permits the executive director, deputy executive directors, and general counsel, who formerly were limited to one five-year term in their positions, to serve up to two terms  Susan Tsui Grundmann was appointed to a five-year term as executive director commencing January 2017  She succeeded Barbara J  Sapin, who was appointed in 2013  During the 115 th Congress, the House and Senate considered legislation that would alter the appointment of one position within one of these agencies—the Register of Copyrights  Under current law pertaining to the copyright office (17 U S C  701): All administrative functions and duties     are the responsibility of the Register of Copyrights as director of the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress  The Register of Copyrights, together with the subordinate officers and employees of the Copyright Office, shall be appointed by the Librarian of Congress, and shall act under the Librarian's general direction and supervision  H R  1695 and S  1010 , the Register of Copyrights Selection and Accountability Act, would have made the Register of Copyrights a presidential appointment, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate  The legislation would have established a seven-person panel to recommend at least three candidates for this position to the President  The panel would consist of the Speaker of the House, President pro tempore of the Senate, majority and minority leaders in the House and Senate, and Librarian of Congress  The bills would have established a 10-year term of office for the Register  H R  1695 was reported by the House Judiciary Committee on April 20, 2017 ( H R  1695 , H Rept  115-91 ), and passed in the House, as amended, on April 26 (378–48, Roll no  227)  The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration held a hearing on September 26, 2018  A Senate committee markup of S  1010 initially scheduled for December 12, 2018, was postponed  No further action was taken during the 115 th Congress  The office is currently led by Acting Register of Copyrights Karyn A  Temple, who was named to the position by Librarian of Congress Carla Hayden on October 21, 2016 

ground_truth: The leaders of the legislative branch agencies and entities—the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Library of Congress (LOC), the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Government Publishing Office (GPO, formerly Government Printing Office), the Office of the Architect of the Capitol (AOC), the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Office of Compliance—are appointed in a variety of manners. Four agencies are led by a person appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate; two are appointed by Congress; one is appointed by the Librarian of Congress; and one is appointed by a board of directors. Congress has periodically examined the procedures used to appoint these officers with the aim of protecting the prerogatives of, and ensuring accountability to, Congress within the framework of the advice and consent appointment process established in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. This report contains information on the legislative branch agency heads' appointment processes, length of tenures (if terms are set), reappointment or removal provisions (if any), salaries and benefits, and most recent appointments. This report also briefly addresses legislation considered, but not enacted, in the 115th Congress to change the appointment process for the Register of Copyrights.