prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: We testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services in September 2017 after four significant mishaps at sea resulted in the loss of 17 sailors’ lives and serious damage to Navy ships  We reported on some of the Navy’s challenges, including the degraded condition and expired training certifications of ships homeported overseas, reductions to ship crews that contributed to sailor overwork and safety risks, and an inability to complete maintenance on time  Since that time, the Navy has completed two internal reviews to address these and other challenges, identifying 111 recommendations to improve surface fleet readiness  The Navy formed an executive group to guide and closely track the implementation of recommendations, and its reform efforts are ongoing  As of November 2018, the Navy reported that it had implemented 78 (i e , 70 percent) of these recommendations  Navy officials recognize that full implementation will take significant time and management attention to address the fundamental readiness challenges identified  In figure 1, we show photographs of two of the four Navy ships involved in significant mishaps that occurred in 2017  Both the USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S  McCain were involved in collisions that resulted in sailor fatalities  DOD has reported that more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and reductions in force structure have degraded its readiness; in response, the department has made rebuilding readiness a priority  The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness across the entire spectrum of conflict is critical to success in the emerging security environment  Nevertheless, DOD reported that readiness of the total military force remains low and has remained so since 2013  Our work has shown that the Navy has experienced increasing maintenance challenges as a high pace of operations has continued and maintenance has been deferred  Maintenance and personnel challenges also hinder readiness recovery of Navy aircraft  For the Marine Corps, our work has shown that ground force readiness has improved and remained stable in recent years, but acute readiness problems remain in aviation units  Over the past year, DOD has made department-wide progress in developing a plan to rebuild the readiness of the military force, with the military services providing regular input on the status of their readiness recovery efforts  In August 2018, we reported that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has developed a Readiness Recovery Framework that the department is using to guide the services’ efforts and plans to use to regularly assess, validate, and monitor readiness recovery  The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services have recently revised readiness goals and accompanying recovery strategies, metrics, and milestones to align with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance  We have ongoing work assessing DOD’s progress in achieveing its overall readiness goals  DOD’s readiness rebuilding efforts are occurring in a challenging context that requires the department to make difficult decisions regarding how best to address continuing operational demands while preparing for future challenges  Our work has shown that an important aspect of this, across all of the services, is determining an appropriate balance between maintaining and upgrading legacy weapon systems currently in operational use and procuring new ones to overcome rapidly advancing future threats  Based on updated information we received in November 2018, the Navy has taken steps to provide dedicated training time so its surface forces may meet existing Navy training standards and their training is certified when they deploy  However, the Navy continues to struggle with rebuilding the readiness of the existing fleet due to enduring maintenance and manning challenges  As the Navy seeks to expand its fleet by 25 percent, these challenges will likely be further exacerbated and the Navy will likely face additional affordability challenges  After the collisions in 2017, the Navy focused on training surface ship crews to its existing standards  We testified in September 2017 that there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers based in Japan and 37 percent of training certifications for these surface ship crews had lapsed as of June 2017  Since that time, the Navy has worked to ensure surface ships are certified before they are deployed  For example, the Navy has established controls to limit waivers that allowed training lapses to worsen, now requiring multiple high-level approvals for ships to operate uncertified  Based on our analysis of updated data, the Navy has improved markedly in the percentage of cruisers and destroyers with lapsed certifications in Japan, from 41 percent of certifications expired in September 2017 to 9 percent as of November 2018, with less than 3 percent of certifications expired on ships in operational status  While the Navy has demonstrated its commitment to ensuring that crews are certified prior to deploying, training for amphibious operations and higher-level collective training may not be fully implemented for several years  In September 2017, we reported that some Marine Corps units were limited in their ability to complete training to conduct an amphibious operation—a military operation that is launched from the sea to introduce a landing force ashore—by several factors, including a decline in the number of amphibious ships from 62 in 1990 to 32 as of November 2018, access to range space, and a high pace of deployments, among others  We recommended that the Navy and the Marine Corps develop an approach to mitigate their amphibious operations training shortfalls as the services await the arrival of additional amphibious ships into the fleet  Marine Corps officials told us that the Marine Corps and the Navy are working together to maximize amphibious training opportunities  Additionally, the Navy has plans to phase in high-level collective training into the operational schedules of its ships homeported in Japan over the next several years  Previously, advanced and integrated training involving multiple ships was conducted ad hoc if at all for ships homeported in Japan  Such collective training is important because the 2018 National Defense Strategy states that the department’s principal priority is to prepare for threats from strategic competitors due to the magnitude of the threat they pose  However, in November 2018, officials from Fleet Forces Command told us that fully implementing its training approach to prepare for advanced adversaries would not be fully implemented across the fleet for several years  We have reported that the Navy faces persistent challenges in completing maintenance on time and providing sufficient manning to its ships  Unless these challenges are addressed, the Navy will be hampered in its ability to rebuild readiness and prepare for the future  Our work has found that the Navy has been unable to complete ship and submarine maintenance on time, resulting in continuing schedule delays that reduce time for training and operations and create costly inefficiencies in a resource constrained environment  The Navy’s readiness recovery is premised on the rigorous adherence to deployment, training, and maintenance schedules  However, we reported in May 2016 on the difficulty that both the public and private shipyards were having in completing maintenance on time  We reported that, from 2011 through 2014, about 28 percent of scheduled maintenance for surface combatants was completed on time and 11 percent was completed on time for aircraft carriers  We updated these data as of November 2018 to include maintenance periods completed through the end of fiscal year 2018 and found that the Navy continues to struggle to complete maintenance on time  For fiscal years 2012-2018, our analysis for key portions of the Navy fleet shows that 30 percent of Navy maintenance was completed on time, leading to more than 27,000 days in which ships were delayed and unavailable for training and operations as shown in figure 2 below  In addition to affecting training and operations, maintenance delays are costly  In November 2018, we examined attack submarine maintenance delays and reported that the Navy was incurring significant operating and support costs to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that are delayed getting into and out of shipyard maintenance periods  We estimated that over the past 10 years the Navy has spent $1 5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle no longer certified to conduct normal operations—while waiting to enter the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards (see figure 3)  We recommended that the Navy analyze how it allocates its maintenance workload across public and private shipyards  DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that it has taken the first steps to take a more holistic view of submarine maintenance requirements and impacts across both the public and private shipyards  In an update provided in November 2018, the Navy told us that they are developing a contracting strategy to conduct two additional depot maintenance periods at private shipyards in the future  Our prior work has shown that three primary factors at the naval shipyards contribute to maintenance delays: Poor conditions and aging equipment limit the ability of the shipyards to meet current and future demands  We reported in September 2017 that facility and equipment limitations at the shipyards contributed to maintenance delays for the aircraft carriers and submarines, hindering the shipyards’ ability to support the Navy  Specifically, we found that the shipyards would be unable to support an estimated one-third of maintenance periods planned over the next 23 years  We recommended that the Navy take steps to improve its management of shipyard investments; the Navy concurred with this recommendation and we are encouraged by its response  For example, the Navy has developed a plan for the optimal placement of facilities and major equipment at each public shipyard, which the Navy estimates can ultimately increase its maintenance efficiency by reducing personnel and materiel travel by an average of 65 percent  This equates to recovering about 328,000 man days per year—an amount roughly equal to that of an aircraft carrier maintenance period  However, the Navy’s preliminary estimate —that this effort will require an estimated $21 billion and 20 years to address—is well beyond historical funding levels, and does not include some potentially significant costs (e g , for utilities, roads, or environmental remediation)  Shipyard workforce gaps and inexperience are limiting factors  The Navy has reported a variety of workforce challenges at the Navy’s four public shipyards such as hiring personnel in a timely manner and providing personnel with the training necessary to gain proficiency in critical skills  The Navy has noted that some occupations require years of training before workers become proficient  According to Navy officials, a large portion of its workforce is inexperienced  For example, 45 percent of the Puget Sound and 30 percent of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyards’ skilled workforce have fewer than 5 years of experience  According to DOD officials, workforce shortages and inexperience contribute to maintenance delays  For example, at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, two submarines were delayed approximately 20 months, in part because of shortages in ship fitters and welders, among other skilled personnel  Most of DOD’s depots, which include the naval shipyards, have taken actions to maintain critical skills through retention incentives, bonuses, and awards  We plan to issue a report examining DOD’s depot skill gaps, including those at the naval shipyards, later this month  Depot supply support may not be cost-effective  In June 2016, we reported that the naval shipyards and other depots had not implemented actions that would likely improve the cost-effectiveness of their supply operations  Specifically, the Navy had not transferred certain functions to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) at the shipyards in the same manner as the Navy and Air Force did for their aviation depots  The Navy and Air Force aviation depots that transferred these functions to DLA had reaped a number of efficiencies in their supply operations, including a 10-percent reduction in backorders over a 5-year period  We recommended that the Navy analyze whether such a transfer of functions is warranted at the shipyards and the Navy concurred with the recommendation  However, as of October 2018, the Navy had not conducted a comprehensive analysis of transferring these functions and had provided no plans to do so  In May 2017, we reported that the Navy’s process for determining manpower requirements—the number and skill mix of sailors needed on the Navy’s ships—did not fully account for all ship workload  The Navy was using outdated standards to calculate the size of ship crews that may have been leading to overburdened crews working long hours  We recommended steps to help ensure the Navy’s manpower requirements meet the needs of the existing and future surface fleet, and the Navy has been studying ship workload and revising its guidance  As of November 2018, the Navy was continuing to analyze the manpower requirements of its ship classes to better size and compose ship crews, and the Navy was also working to improve shipboard manning  However, these efforts are not yet complete and it is too early to assess their effectiveness  Until manpower requirements are reassessed across the fleet, the Navy risks that ship crews will continue to be undersized and sailors will be overworked with potential negative effects on readiness and safety  Additionally, the Navy provided information in November 2018 that showed that it is taking steps to ensure that ships have a minimum percentage of crew assigned and with the appropriate skills  The Navy has prioritized manning its surface ships homeported overseas  The Navy established a minimum threshold of filling at least 95 percent of authorized billets in its ship crews with sailors (referred to as fill), with a minimum goal of 92 percent of those sailors having the right qualifications for the billet (known as fit)  According to Navy officials, the Navy is for the most part meeting its fill goals Navy-wide, but has not consistently met its fit goals  However, during group discussions in November 2018 with ship crews and interviews with Navy officials in Japan, we learned that the Navy’s methods for tracking fit and fill do not account for sailor experience and may be inaccurately capturing the actual presence of sailors onboard and available for duty on its ships  Moreover, sailors consistently told us that ship workload has not decreased, and it is still extremely challenging to complete all required workload while getting enough sleep  Navy officials told us that manning challenges will continue through at least fiscal year 2021 as the Navy increases its end strength and trains its new sailors to gain the proper mix of skills to operate and maintain the fleet  To meet continued operational demands, the Navy is planning for the most significant fleet size increase in over 30 years  According to the Navy’s fiscal year 2019 shipbuilding plan, the Navy plans to build and maintain a fleet of 355 battle force ships—an increase of about 25 percent above the Navy’s current force of 287 ships  To reach its goal, the Navy plans to buy 301 ships through 2048 and extend the service life of its 66 Arleigh Burke class destroyers and up to 7 attack submarines  Together, the fiscal year 2019 shipbuilding plan and the service life extensions would allow the Navy to reach a 355-ship fleet by the 2030s  Congressional Budget Office reporting and our past work have shown that the Navy has consistently and significantly underestimated the cost and timeframes for delivering new ships to the fleet  For example, the Navy estimates that buying the new ships specified in the fiscal year 2019 plan would cost $631 billion over 30 years while the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that those new ships would cost $801 billion—a difference of 27 percent  We also reported in June 2018 that acquisition outcomes for ship classes built during the last 10 years have often not achieved cost, schedule, quality, or performance goals that were established  Furthermore, we have reported that: all 8 of the lead ships delivered over the past decade that we reviewed were provided to the fleet behind schedule, and more than half of those ships were delayed by more than 2 years, and six ships of different classes valued at $6 3 billion were delivered to the Navy with varying degrees of incomplete work and quality problems  As a result of past cost and schedule problems, our work has shown that the Navy has a less-capable and smaller fleet today than it planned over 10 years ago  The Navy has also received $24 billion more in funding than it originally planned in its 2007 long-range shipbuilding plan but has 50 fewer ships in its inventory today, as compared with the goals it first established  Therefore, we have reported that as the Navy moves forward in implementing its shipbuilding plan it will be paramount for the Navy to learn from and apply lessons learned from the past  In addition to the cost of buying the ships and submarines to expand fleet size, the Navy will likely face affordability challenges with regard to the manning of an expanded fleet with the right number of sailors with the right mix of skills  In May 2017, we reported that the personnel costs for surface ship classes in fiscal years 2000-2015 were the largest share of total operating and support costs and that careful planning will be needed as new ships are brought into the fleet  We also reported that crew sizes on recently inducted ship classes grew from original projections as the Navy gained experience operating them  For example, the total crew size of Littoral Combat Ships has grown from 75 in 2003 to 98 personnel in 2016, a 31-percent increase  Navy officials told us that they plan to better articulate the personnel and resources needed for a larger fleet after fully accounting for workload and right-sizing ship crews  The Navy’s end strength has since increased by over 11,000 personnel from fiscal year 2017 levels, which should help alleviate manning challenges as the fleet grows  In November 2018, officials from Fleet Forces Command provided us with projections of its manning shortfalls continuing through at least fiscal year 2021 and steps it was planning to take to mitigate them  Our work has shown that Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited by aging aircraft, delayed maintenance, and insufficient supply support  Pilot and maintenance personnel shortfalls further limit readiness recovery across legacy air platforms  The growing F-35 program, which is meant to replace many aging aircraft, has presented additional operational and sustainment challenges, which will likely persist into the future if not corrected  DOD, the Navy, and the Marine Corps have emphasized mission capability of critical aviation platforms— including the Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18s and F-35s—and are taking steps to improve availability, but these efforts will take time to realize results  Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited by challenges associated with aging aircraft fleets, depot maintenance, and supply support challenges that limit the services’ ability to keep aviation units ready  The Navy and Marine Corps spend billions of dollars each year on sustainment, such as for spare parts and depot maintenance, to meet aircraft availability goals  However, aircraft availability rates have generally declined since fiscal year 2011  While specific aircraft availability data are considered sensitive by the Navy and the Marine Corps, and cannot be discussed in detail, we found in September 2018 that the Navy and the Marine Corps generally did not meet aircraft availability goals in fiscal years 2011-2016 for the seven aircraft we reviewed  In updating data in November 2018, we found that none of the aircraft met aircraft availability goals for fiscal years 2017 and 2018  According to the Navy, the pace of operations has increased wear and tear on its aircraft and decreased the time available for maintenance and modernization—a necessity for an aging fleet  For example, the average age of a legacy F/A-18A-D Hornet is 26 years, of an AV-8B Harrier is 21 years, and of the C-2A Greyhound is 29 years  Both services expect these aircraft will continue to be used for the foreseeable future and in some cases into the 2030s  The Navy and the Marine Corps face delays in the arrival of the F-35 to replace their legacy F/A-18A-D Hornets and AV-8B Harriers  To compensate for the delay, the Navy and the Marine Corps are planning to procure additional aircraft, such as the F/A-18E-F Super Hornet, and extend the service life and upgrade the capabilities of their legacy aircraft  However, these efforts and the sustainment of the Navy and Marine Corps legacy aircraft fleet face key challenges as shown in figure 4  Specifically, our prior work has shown that the Navy and the Marine Corps are confronted with two sets of challenges in sustaining their aircraft: Depot maintenance complexities for aging aircraft and spare parts availability  Depot maintenance on aging weapon systems, including Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, becomes less predictable as structural fatigue occurs and parts that were not expected to be replaced begin to wear out  While the Navy and the Marine Corps reported that sustainment funding accounts, such as those for depot maintenance and spare parts, have been funded at increased levels in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, efforts to improve spare parts availability take time to produce results due to long lead times for acquiring some items  In addition, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft face challenges associated with diminishing manufacturing sources and parts obsolescence  DOD has a program intended to manage these risks, but we reported in September 2017 that its implementation varied across DOD weapon system program offices  We made recommendations to improve the program’s management; DOD concurred and has initiated improvement efforts  Maintenance personnel inexperience and retention  The Navy has had difficulty attracting and retaining skilled maintainers, such as sheet metal workers and machinists at its aviation depots (i e , Fleet Readiness Centers), which directly affects its ability to complete planned maintenance  Some of the depots experienced challenges attracting and retaining skilled personnel due to competition with nearby contractors that are able to offer higher pay, according to Navy depot officials  Similar to the shipyards, the aviation depots also lack experienced personnel, affecting the efficiency and quality of maintenance  For example, 41 percent of the skilled workers at Fleet Readiness Center Southwest have 2 years or fewer of experience  Workforce inexperience and attrition of skilled personnel were some of the reasons cited for machining defects detected in the landing gear for F/A-18, E-2, and C-2A aircraft by a recent Navy report  All of the depots have undertaken retention efforts such as incentives, bonuses, and awards to address these issues  Until the Navy and Marine Corps address maintenance and supply challenges it will be difficult to meet Secretary of Defense-established mission capability goals  Specifically, in September 2018, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum emphasizing that a key component of implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy is ensuring critical aviation platforms meet their mission capability targets by the end of fiscal year 2019  The memorandum established a goal of achieving a minimum of 80-percent mission capable rates for various aircraft, including for the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ F/A-18 inventories, by the end of fiscal year 2019 while also reducing operating and maintenance costs  To accomplish this, the Navy and the Marine Corps developed the Return to Readiness strategy in November 2018 that includes a broad array of actions to improve the availability of spare parts and evaluate the application of best commercial practices to naval aviation sustainment, among other actions  Office of the Secretary of Defense and Navy program officials told us, and based on our prior work we agree, that this goal will be challenging to achieve by the end of fiscal year 2019  We reported in April 2018 that fighter pilot shortages in the Navy and the Marine Corps have been worsening in recent years and shortfalls are projected to remain through at least fiscal year 2023  Our analysis of Navy and Marine Corps data showed that the Navy’s shortage of first operational tour fighter pilots more than doubled from 12 percent in fiscal year 2013 to 26 percent in fiscal year 2017  Similarly, the Marine Corps’ overall shortage of fighter pilots quadrupled from 6 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 24 percent in fiscal year 2017  Also, as we reported in April 2018, service officials attributed the pilot shortages to reduced training opportunities and increased attrition due to career dissatisfaction, among other factors  Officials from both services stated at the time that they have ensured that deploying squadrons have been fully staffed with fighter pilots by using various approaches including using senior pilots to staff junior positions and having pilots deploy more frequently and for longer periods  However, we reported that squadron leaders and fighter pilots said that these approaches had a negative impact on the fighter pilot training and retention and ultimately may be exacerbating the situation  Further compounding their pilot shortages, we also found that the services have not recently reevaluated squadron requirements to reflect an increased fighter pilot workload  As a result, the reported shortage actually could be greater  The services were taking actions, including increasing retention incentives for fighter pilots  To help determine the magnitude of the shortages and help target strategies to better meet their personnel needs, we recommended, and the Navy and Marine Corps agreed, to reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements  Sustainment challenges are not just an issue for older aircraft, but represent an enduring challenge for the F-35 Lightning II aircraft—a key component to the future of tactical aviation for the Navy and Marine Corps  The Navy and Marine Corps are both flying F-35s now as the program ramps up development, and they plan to procure nearly 700 aircraft over the coming decades  The sustainment costs of the F-35 fleet are projected to exceed $1 trillion over its 60-year life cycle  In October 2017, we reported that: F-35B aircraft (including Marine Corps aircraft) were available (i e , the aircraft were safe to fly, available for use, and able to perform at least one tasked mission) about 52 percent of the time from March 2017 through June 2017, which fell short of the 65-percent goal established by the Marine Corps for non-deployed units and F-35B aircraft (including Marine Corps aircraft) were fully mission capable (i e , the aircraft were capable of accomplishing all tasked missions) about 15 percent of the time from March 2017 through June 2017, which fell short of the 60-percent goal established by the Marine Corps for non-deployed units  We also reported on numerous sustainment challenges leading to less than desirable outcomes for F-35 warfighter readiness  For example, F-35 aircraft were unable to fly 22 percent of the time because of parts shortages from January 2017 through August 7, 2017  Additionally, DOD’s capabilities to repair F-35 parts at military depots were 6 years behind schedule, which resulted in average part repair times that are twice that of the program’s objective  As DOD gains experience with the F-35, our work has shown that the department has encountered additional challenges  In 2017, the Marine Corps became the first military service to station F-35 aircraft overseas, transferring aircraft to Iwakuni, Japan  While in the Pacific, DOD expects to disperse its F-35s into smaller detachments to outmaneuver the enemy and counter regional threats  However, in April 2018, we reported that this approach posed logistics and supply challenges  In June 2018, we reported that the F-35 program had not improved its reliability and maintainability over the past year and continued to fall short on half of its performance targets  Furthermore, we found that the program may not meet its required targets before each variant of the F-35 is expected to demonstrate maturity—the point at which the aircraft has flown enough hours to predictably determine reliability and maintainability over its lifespan  This means that the Navy and the Marine Corps may have to decide whether they are willing to accept less reliable and maintainable aircraft than originally planned  Among other outcomes, this could result in higher maintenance costs and lower aircraft availability than anticipated which also could pose readiness challenges in the future  As we reported in October 2017, the poor reliability of certain parts is already contributing to shortages of F-35 spare parts  Challenges posed by the F-35 program are largely the result of sustainment plans that do not fully include or consider key requirements  Our work has shown that planning for sustainment and aligning its funding are critical if DOD wants to meet its aircraft availability goals and effectively deploy to support operations  To address the challenges associated with F-35 sustainment and operational deployment, we recommended that DOD revise its sustainment plans, align associated funding, and mitigate the risks associated with key supply chain-related challenges for deployed F-35s in the Pacific, among others  DOD concurred with these recommendations and stated that it is taking steps to address them  Furthermore, as previously discussed, the Secretary of Defense has established an 80-percent mission capability goal for critical aviation assets, including the F-35  Due to current low availability and numerous sustainment issues, the F-35 fleet will be challenged in meeting the goal  In sum, the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ significant readiness challenges have developed over more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and reductions in force structure  Both services have made encouraging progress identifying the causes of their readiness decline and have begun efforts to arrest and reverse it; however, our prior work shows that fully addressing the persistent readiness challenges will require years of sustained management attention  Our work cited today contains 25 specific recommendations to the Navy and the Marine Corps and an additional 20 recommendations to various other DOD components to assist these services in rebuilding the readiness of their forces and in modernizing for the future  Attention to these recommendations can assist the Navy and the Marine Corps as they seek to rebuild the readiness of their forces  Chairmen Wicker and Sullivan, Ranking Members Hirono and Kaine, and Members of the Subcommittees, this concludes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time  If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact John H  Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Clarine Allen; Steven Banovac; John Bumgarner; Chris Cronin; Benjamin Emmel; Cynthia Grant; Mae Jones; Amie Lesser; Tobin McMurdie; Shahrzad Nikoo; Carol Petersen; Cody Raysinger; Michael Silver; John E  “Jet” Trubey; and Chris Watson  Over the past 4 years, we have issued a number of reports related to Navy and Marine Corps readiness and we used them to develop this statement  Table 1 summarizes the recommendations in these reports  The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with most of the 45 recommendations and has many actions underway  However, DOD has not fully implemented any of the recommendations to date  For each of the reports, the specific recommendations and any progress made in implementing them are summarized in tables 2 through 16  Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are classified  Report numbers with a SU suffix are sensitive but unclassified  Classified and sensitive but unclassified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances and need to know, upon request  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet  GAO-19-229  Washington, D C : November 19, 2018  Air Force Readiness: Actions Needed to Rebuild Readiness and Prepare for the Future  GAO-19-120T  Washington, D C : October 10, 2018  Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need to Be Clarified  GAO-18-678  Washington, D C : September 10, 2018  Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need Clarification  GAO-18-146SU  Washington, D C : April 25, 2018  Military Readiness: Update on DOD’s Progress in Developing a Readiness Rebuilding Plan  GAO-18-441RC  Washington, D C : August 10, 2018  (SECRET) Military Personnel: Collecting Additional Data Could Enhance Pilot Retention Efforts  GAO-18-439  Washington, D C : June 21, 2018  F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Development Is Nearly Complete, but Deficiencies Found in Testing Need to Be Resolved  GAO-18-321  Washington, D C : June 5, 2018  Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Share F-35 Operational Lessons Across the Military Services  GAO-18-464R  Washington, D C : April 25, 2018  Military Readiness: Clear Policy and Reliable Data Would Help DOD Better Manage Service Members’ Time Away from Home  GAO-18-253  Washington, D C : April 25, 2018  Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Fighter Pilot Workforce Requirements  GAO-18-113  Washington, D C : April 11, 2018  Military Aircraft: F-35 Brings Increased Capabilities, but the Marine Corps Needs to Assess Challenges Associated with Operating in the Pacific  GAO-18-79C  Washington, D C : March 28, 2018  (SECRET) Navy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training  GAO-18-212T  Washington, DC : December 1, 2017  F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Challenges Affecting Readiness and Cost Transparency  GAO-18-75  Washington, D C : October 26, 2017  Defense Supply Chain: DOD Needs Complete Information on Single Sources of Supply to Proactively Manage the Risks  GAO-17-768  Washington, D C : September 28, 2017  Navy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training  GAO-17-789  Washington, D C : September 26, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-809T  Washington, D C : September 19, 2017  Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions That Affect Operation  GAO-17-548  Washington, D C : September 12, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-798T  Washington, D C : September 7, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Maintain Viable Surge Sealift and Combat Logistics Fleets GAO-17-503  Washington, D C : August 22, 2017 (reissued on Oct 31, 2017)  Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges  GAO-17-369  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  Military Readiness: Coastal Riverine Force Challenges  GAO-17-462C  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  (SECRET) Navy Shipbuilding: Policy Changes Needed to Improve the Post-Delivery Process and Ship Quality  GAO-17-418  Washington, D C : July 13, 2017 Offshore Petroleum Discharge System: The Navy Has Not Mitigated Risk Associated with System Limitations  GAO-17-531C  Washington, D C : June 22, 2017  (SECRET) Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and Composition of Ship Crews  GAO-17-413  Washington, D C : May 18, 2017  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-841  Washington, D C : September 7, 2016  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-534C  Washington, D C : June 30, 2016  (SECRET) Defense Inventory: Further Analysis and Enhanced Metrics Could Improve Service Supply and Depot Operations  GAO-16-450  Washington, D C : June 9, 2016  Navy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness  GAO-16-481RC  Washington, D C : May 25, 2016  (SECRET//NOFORN) Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan  GAO-16-466R  Washington, D C : May 2, 2016  F-35 Sustainment: DOD Needs a Plan to Address Risks Related to Its Central Logistics System  GAO-16-439  Washington, D C : April 14, 2016  Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports  GAO-15-329  Washington, D C : May 29, 2015  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2: Grade-crossing safety has improved significantly since 1975, but since 2009, the number of crashes and fatalities at grade crossings has plateaued (see fig  1)  The yearly number of grade-crossing crashes declined from 12,126 in 1975 to 2,117 in 2017  In that time frame, fatalities dropped from 917 to 273  The most significant reductions in grade-crossing crashes and fatalities were achieved from 1975 to 1985, when states closed or improved the most dangerous crossings  Grade- crossing safety continued to improve until the mid-2000s, though at a slower rate  Since 2009, the number of grade-crossing crashes and fatalities remains at around 2,100 crashes and 250 fatalities a year  These fatalities typically make up less than one percent of all highway- related fatalities  The decrease in crashes and fatalities occurred as the volume of train and highway traffic generally increased over the years  FRA expects the traffic volumes to continue to increase and has expressed concern that grade-crossing crashes and fatalities may also increase  As a set-aside portion of FHWA’s much larger Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP), the Section 130 Program provides funds to state DOTs for the elimination of hazards at highway-rail grade crossings  States determine what improvements need to be made at grade crossings  FHWA has oversight responsibilities regarding the use of federal funds as part of its administration of federal-aid highway programs and funding, including HSIP funds  FHWA uses a statutory formula to distribute to states Section 130 Program funds, which averaged $235 million per year during the last 10 years (fiscal years 2009 through 2018)  Section 130 Program projects are funded at a 90 percent federal share, with the state or the roadway authority funding the remaining 10 percent  States have 4 years to obligate their program funds before they expire, meaning that in any given fiscal year, states can obligate funds appropriated in that year as well as any unobligated funds from the previous 3 fiscal years  In addition, states may choose to combine funds from multiple years to fund relatively expensive projects  The Section 130 Program’s requirements direct states to establish an implementation schedule for grade-crossing-safety improvement projects that, at a minimum, include warning signs for all public grade crossings  Grade crossings are generally categorized as “active” or “passive” depending on the type of traffic control devices that are present  As of July 2018, according to FRA’s National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory, there were approximately 68,000 public grade crossings with electronic, or active, traffic control devices in the United States  Another approximately 58,000 public grade crossings have passive traffic-control devices, which include signs and supplementary pavement markings  The requirements also specify that at least 50 percent of Section 130 Program funding must be dedicated to the installation of protective devices at grade crossings, including traffic control devices  States can use remaining program funds for any hazard elimination project  States may also use program funds to improve warning signs and pavement markings or to improve the way the roadway aligns with the tracks (e g , to ensure low-clearance vehicles do not get stuck on the tracks)  In addition, states can use up to 2 percent of the funds to improve their grade-crossing inventories and to collect and analyze data  See figure 2 for examples of the types of projects eligible for Section 130 Program funds and graphical depictions of grade crossings before and after safety improvements have been made  FHWA and FRA are the primary agencies responsible for safety at grade crossings, and they both play key—yet distinct—roles  FHWA oversees the Section 130 Program and monitors states’ uses of program funds through 52 division offices located in each state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico and through headquarters staff in Washington, D C  In addition, FHWA’s division staff reviews states’ processes for prioritizing and selecting grade-crossing-safety improvement projects  FHWA does not evaluate the appropriateness of individual grade-crossing projects, but instead helps states determine that projects meet program eligibility requirements  Division staff assists in the implementation of Section 130 Program state-administered projects, and they may participate in state- DOT-led, on-site reviews of grade crossings under consideration for Section 130 Program projects  FHWA headquarters staff is responsible for FHWA-wide initiatives, such as working with stakeholders to establish standards for traffic control devices and systems at grade crossings and for engineering oversight of state-administered safety improvement projects  FRA provides safety oversight of both freight and passenger railroads by: collecting and analyzing data; issuing and enforcing numerous safety regulations, including on grade-crossings’ warning systems; conducting focused inspections, audits, and accident providing technical assistance to railroads and other stakeholders  Specifically, FRA oversees rail safety through eight regional offices and through headquarters staff in Washington, D C  Regional staff monitor railroads’ compliance with federal safety regulations through inspections and provide technical assistance and guidance to states  In 2017, FRA created a new discipline for grade-crossing safety and is hiring new grade-crossing inspectors  These inspectors conduct field investigations, identify regulatory defects and violations, recommend civil penalty assessments when appropriate, and may participate in state- DOT-led teams that conduct on-site reviews of grade crossings to evaluate potential safety improvements  According to FRA documentation, FRA’s new inspectors will also work with a variety of stakeholders to institute new types of training, explore new safety concepts and technologies, and assist in the development of new or modified highway-rail grade-crossing-safety regulations, initiatives, and programs  The inspectors will also work with FHWA and other DOT operating administrations in a cooperative effort to improve grade- crossing safety  FRA regional staff also investigates select railroad crashes, including those at grade crossings, to determine root causation and any contributing factors, so that railroads can implement corrective actions  FRA headquarters staff develops analytical tools for states to use to prioritize grade-crossing projects  In addition, headquarters staff manages research and development to support improved railroad safety, including at grade crossings  FRA’s Office of Railroad Safety maintains the National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory database and the Railroad Accident/Incident Reporting System on grade-crossing crashes  Both states and railroads submit information to FRA’s crossing inventory, which is designed to contain information on every grade crossing in the nation  Railroads submit information such as train speed and volume; states submit information such as highway speed limits and average annual daily traffic  The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 added requirements for both railroads and states to periodically update the inventory; however, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) repealed a provision providing DOT authority to issue implementing regulations that would govern states’ reporting to the inventory  According to FRA officials, while FRA’s regulations do not require states to report the information, FRA encourages them to do so  FRA regulations require railroads to report and update their information in the inventory every 3 years or sooner in some instances, such as if new warning devices are installed or the grade crossing is closed  FRA’s accident system contains details about each grade-crossing accident that has occurred  In addition to submitting immediate reports of fatal grade-crossing crashes, railroads are required to submit accident reports within 30 days after the end of the month in which the accident occurred and describe conditions at the time of the accident (e g , visibility and weather); information on the grade crossing (e g , type of warning device); and information on the driver (e g , gender and age)  In its role overseeing grade-crossing safety, FRA has sponsored a number of research efforts to better understand the causes of grade- crossing crashes and identify potential ways to improve engineering, education, and enforcement efforts  For example, FRA sponsored an in- depth data analysis of grade-crossing crashes to better identify which crossing characteristics increase the risk of an accident  The report, issued in 2017, found that the volumes of train and vehicle traffic at a crossing are the biggest predictors of grade-crossing crashes  Changes in vehicle and train traffic therefore affect the annual number of grade- crossing crashes  For example, as highway traffic decreased in 2008, possibly due to the economic recession and higher gas prices, so too did the number of grade-crossing crashes  As previously noted, FRA expects that the number of grade-crossing crashes will likely grow with anticipated increases in future train and highway traffic  As discussed below, vehicle and train volume are included in the U S  DOT Accident Prediction Model, which some states use to select grade-crossing improvement projects  According to FRA officials, FRA is using the results of this recent in-depth data analysis to, in part, evaluate whether additional risk factors, such as the number of male drivers or trains carrying toxic materials, should be added to the model  FRA has targeted other research into understanding driver behavior at grade crossings, which is the leading cause of crashes  According to FRA’s accident data, in 2017, 71 percent of fatal crashes at public grade crossings occurred at those with gates  In 2004, the DOT Inspector General (IG) reported that 94 percent of grade-crossing crashes from 1994 to 2003 could be attributed to risky driver behavior or poor judgement  State officials we spoke with explained that drivers may become impatient waiting at a grade crossing and decide to go around the gates  Drivers may also line up over the grade crossing in heavy vehicular traffic, and be unable to exit before the gates come down  See figure 3 for examples of risky driver behavior at grade crossings  To better understand driver behavior, FRA sponsored a John A  Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) study that recorded and analyzed drivers’ actions as they approached grade crossings  The researchers found that almost half of drivers were doing another task, such as eating, and over a third did not look in either direction while approaching passive grade crossings  We have previously reported, and many stakeholders we interviewed agreed, that in light of inappropriate driver behavior, technological solutions alone may not fully resolve safety issues at grade crossings  In addition, public-education and law-enforcement efforts can augment the effectiveness of technological solutions  According to FRA officials, they shared information on driver education with DOT’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) as NHTSA works more closely with states on driver education manuals  According to DOT officials, NHTSA updates its driver education materials every 2–3 years and plans to consider including grade-crossing-safety materials in the next versions  FRA is also working with states and localities to research and develop new protective devices and other safety measures targeted at improving driver behavior at grade crossings  As most fatal crashes happen at grade crossings already equipped with gates, FRA and state and local agencies are exploring whether additional safety measures can improve safety at those locations  For example, in 2016 and 2017, FRA’s Grade Crossing Task Force worked with the Volpe Center and the City of Orlando to test whether photo enforcement at grade crossings could reduce risky driver behavior  The City of Orlando installed automated photo-enforcement devices at a grade crossing, and instead of issuing fines to drivers who had violated its warning devices, sent drivers a warning notice and educational safety materials  Eight months after the photo-enforcement system was installed, grade crossing violations decreased by 15 percent  While FRA judged these enforcement efforts successful at changing driver behavior, a 2015 FRA whitepaper noted that photo enforcement equipment is costly—on average costing over $300,000 per crossing to install and operate for 2 years—and may not be cost-effective for most grade crossings  FRA found that due to costs and state laws prohibiting photo-enforcement, only two photo- enforcement cameras were currently in operation at grade crossings across the country  States, localities, and FHWA are also exploring whether new types of pavement markings at grade crossings can improve driver behavior  According to DOT officials, FHWA is working with two states to develop new cross-hatch pavement markings for grade crossings that would comply with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, similar to the “don’t block the box” type pavement markings used in intersections  FHWA also worked with a city to test the use of in-roadway lights to delineate the crossing  (See fig  4)  FRA and state DOTs are also trying to improve pedestrian safety at grade crossings by developing new safety measures  Grade-crossing accidents involving pedestrians are less frequent than those involving automobiles at grade crossings but have a higher fatality rate  While pedestrians were involved in only 9 percent of accidents at public crossings in 2017, almost 40 percent of fatal grade-crossing accidents involved pedestrians  To try to improve pedestrian safety, in 2012 the Volpe Center worked with New Jersey Transit to study whether adding additional pedestrian gate skirts— hanging gates that further block a crossing (see fig  5)—would prevent people from ducking under the gates  The Volpe Center reported that these new gates had mixed success  While incidents of people going under and around the gates decreased, more people chose to cross the tracks in the street rather than at the sidewalk  Finally, FRA is exploring new automated and connected vehicle technologies that could reduce risky driver behavior at grade crossings  FRA, FHWA, and officials from one state we interviewed said they anticipate that such technology will be critical to further improving safety  Specifically, FRA and FHWA are coordinating with DOT’s Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office to develop pilot technology that would enable crossing infrastructure or trains to communicate wirelessly with vehicles  Vehicles can use this information to warn the driver that a crash or violation is imminent, or integrate with onboard active safety systems  According to FRA officials, they completed a proof of concept in 2013 and completed and tested a prototype of the technology in 2017  DOT officials said that DOT does not have a time frame for when automakers might begin incorporating such connected vehicle technologies and noted that retrofitting older cars with new equipment will likely make this a long-term effort  FRA shares information on its research in various ways with state DOTs, because states are responsible for deciding which safety measures to install at grade crossings  Specifically, FRA and FHWA jointly hold quarterly webinars with stakeholders, including state DOT officials, and conduct presentations at highway-rail safety workshops  Information on safety measures such as grade-crossing devices, signs, and markings are also included in the Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook  According to DOT officials, the handbook was developed jointly by FHWA and FRA  The last version of the handbook was updated in 2007 and includes some out of date information  FRA and FHWA officials said they began working on an update in 2017, but missed the July 2018 target completion date  According to FHWA officials, updating the handbook is a complex undertaking that has taken more time than they anticipated due to the extensive collaboration required among stakeholders  FHWA officials said they anticipate completing the update during the spring of 2019  The risk of crashes at public grade crossings within a state factors into states’ selection of over 1,000 new Section 130 Program projects nationally each fiscal year  FHWA requires states to develop a grade crossing program that considers relative risk  FHWA officials said they review the methods that states use to select projects to ensure that risk is considered  According to a 2016 academic study of 50 states, most states use mathematical formulas, or “accident prediction models,” to help assess risk and identify grade crossings for potential projects  More specifically, these accident prediction models use factors such as grade crossing characteristics and accident history to rank grade crossings by risk  DOT provides one such model—the Accident Prediction Model—and some states have developed their own models  The study reported that 19 states used DOT’s model and 20 states used a different model  It also found that the DOT and commonly used state models include some similar grade-crossing characteristics to predict accident risk  For example, the selected models reviewed all considered vehicle- and train- traffic volume, which FRA has found to be the strongest predictors of grade-crossing crashes  FRA makes its Accident Prediction Model available to states online through its Web Accident Prediction System  This system is an online tool that uses FRA’s crossing inventory, crossing collision history, and the DOT Accident Prediction Model to predict accident risk for grade crossings in each state  Only one of the eight states in our review used the system as its primary source for ranking grade-crossing risk  Most of the other states perform their own calculations to rank grade crossings  Officials from two states said that they believe their state-maintained data are more reliable than FRA’s crossing inventory and explained that they go directly to their contacts at railroads to get updated information on factors such as train volume  Accident prediction models are only one source of information states use when selecting Section 130 Program projects  According to the state officials we spoke with, a variety of other considerations can also influence their decisions, including the following: Proximity of projects together along a railroad “corridor” in order to gain efficiencies and reduce construction costs  Requests from local jurisdictions or railroads  These stakeholders may have information on upcoming changes at a grade crossing, such as higher train volume or new housing developments nearby, which would increase risk but would not be reflected yet in the accident prediction model  Availability of local funding to provide the required 10 percent match for Section 130 Program projects, while trying to spread the funds fairly across the state  States may also consider grade crossings that have had close calls in the past, such as where a car narrowly avoided being hit by a train  FRA does not require railroads to report on these close calls, or “near misses;” however, according to state officials, railroads sometimes provide this information to states on an ad-hoc basis  State officials from four of the eight states we spoke with said they considered near misses when selecting Section 130 Program projects  A 2004 Volpe Center report noted that studying close calls was a proactive way to improve safety  According to the report, FRA sponsored a workshop to learn about the benefits of collecting and analyzing close calls  However, stakeholders we interviewed noted challenges formalizing near-miss reporting  For example, Volpe Center officials said these reports are subjective in nature—what one engineer considers a close call, others may not  FRA developed another online tool—GradeDec—to allow states to compare the costs and benefits for various grade-crossing improvement projects  GradeDec uses models to analyze a project’s risk and calculate cost-benefit ratios and net present value for potential projects  FRA provides state DOTs with on-site GradeDec workshops upon request  While FRA officials noted that many state and local governments have registered to use the program, none of the state officials we spoke with identified GradeDec as a tool that they use to conduct cost-benefit analysis  Officials from two state DOTs we spoke with said that cost- benefit analyses could help them better identify and select the most cost- effective crossing safety projects in the future  According to the academic study of 50 states noted above, because of limited funding for grade-crossing improvements, states should consider the life-cycle costs of the projects as well as net present value to help select projects  As discussed later in this report, the small number of crashes at grade crossings can make it challenging to distinguish between different projects in terms of their effectiveness in reducing accidents  Finally, after they have considered risk factors and created a list of potential grade crossings for improvement, state officials, along with relevant stakeholders from railroads and local governments, conduct field reviews of the potential projects  According to state officials, these reviews help identify grade-crossing characteristics that may not be included in the accident prediction models, such as vegetation that would obstruct drivers’ views  In 2008, legislation was enacted mandating reporting by states and railroads to the National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory  However, the fact that reporting to the inventory remained voluntary until 2015 has had lingering effects on the completeness of the data in the inventory  In 2015, as mandated by statute, FRA issued regulations requiring railroads to update certain data elements for all grade crossings every 3 years  However, our analysis of FRA’s crossing inventory found that 4 percent of grade crossings were last updated in 2009 or earlier  In addition, because MAP-21 repealed DOT’s authority to issue regulations that would govern state reporting to the inventory, state reporting of grade-crossing data remains voluntary, according to FRA officials, and all state-reported information is not complete  Our analysis of state-reported data in FRA’s crossing inventory found varying levels of completeness  For example, while some state-reported data fields were almost entirely complete, 33 percent of public grade crossings were missing data on posted highway speed  We also found that of the crossings for which states reported the year when the highway-traffic count was conducted, 64 percent of the highway-traffic counts for public grade crossings, another important risk factor, had not been updated since 2009, or earlier  According to the 2015 final rule, FRA will continue to evaluate whether additional regulations to address state reporting are needed to maintain the crossing inventory’s accuracy  FRA officials told us that improving inventory data will help them better deploy their limited resources, particularly their grade-crossing inspectors, and said that they have taken steps to help improve the data  In 2017, FRA regional officials conducted field reviews to verify the latitude and longitude data for grade crossings in the inventory, data that states are responsible for updating

ground_truth: The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness is critical to success in the emerging security environment. The Navy and Marine Corps are working to rebuild the readiness of their forces while growing and modernizing their aging fleet of ships and aircraft. However, achieving readiness recovery goals will take years as both services continue to be challenged to rebuild readiness amid continued operational demands. This statement provides information on current and future readiness challenges facing (1) the Navy ship and submarine fleet and (2) Navy and Marine Corps aviation. GAO also discusses prior recommendations on Navy and Marine Corps readiness and progress to address them. This statement is based on previously published work since 2015 related to Navy and Marine Corps readiness challenges, including shipyard workforce and capital investment, ship crewing, weapon system sustainment, the fighter pilot workforce, and modernizing force structure. GAO conducted site visits to the Pacific fleet in November 2018 and analyzed updated data, as appropriate. The Navy has taken steps to address training shortfalls in the surface fleet, but faces persistent maintenance and personnel challenges as it seeks to rebuild ship and submarine readiness. While the Navy has corrective actions underway, they will take years to implement. Following ship collisions in 2017, the Navy has taken steps to ensure its crews are trained to standards prior to deployment and made significant progress in those efforts. However, the Navy has struggled to complete ship maintenance—with only 30 percent of maintenance completed on time since fiscal year 2012—leading to thousands of days that ships were unavailable for training and operations (see figure). Additionally, manning shortfalls and experience gaps continue to contribute to high sailor workload and are likely to continue through at least fiscal year 2021. The Navy has developed a plan to improve shipyards and is re-examining its ship manning, among other actions; however, these positive steps have not yet fully addressed GAO's recommendations. Looking to the future, the Navy has indicated that it wants to grow its fleet to meet demands. However, the costs of such growth are not yet known and would likely require resourcing well above currently planned levels. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited due to numerous challenges (see figure). Specifically, the seven aircraft GAO reviewed have generally experienced decreasing availability since fiscal year 2011 and did not meet availability goals in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. The F-35—the future of naval aviation—also has not met availability goals due to part shortages and poor sustainment planning. In September 2018, the Department of Defense established aggressive targets for aircraft availability. While the Navy and Marine Corps are taking actions to improve aircraft availability, including addressing GAO's recommendations, aviation readiness will take many years to recover. GAO has made a total of 45 recommendations in the prior work described in this statement. The Department of Defense concurred with most of them, and has many actions underway, but has not yet fully implemented any. Attention to these recommendations can assist the Navy and the Marine Corps as they seek to rebuild the readiness of their forces.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  In addition, FRA expects its grade-crossing inspectors as part of their inspections to review and identify issues with the railroad- and state-reported inventory data  According to FRA officials, FRA has begun to both transition its 19 grade-crossing managers into grade-crossing inspectors and also hire new inspectors, for an eventual total of 24 inspectors and eight regional specialists to supervise their activities  To help ensure railroads’ compliance with crossing inventory regulations, officials said that the inspectors will use spot checks to validate the inventory data by comparing grade-crossing characteristics in the field with the information railroads submitted to the inventory  In addition, FRA has incorporated information on inventory-reporting requirements into the grade-crossing inspectors’ training  Finally, FRA is currently developing guidelines for the grade-crossing inspections similar to those for other FRA safety disciplines  FRA headquarters officials acknowledged that they are still clarifying the details for the inspections that will be included in the compliance manuals that inspectors will use  Specifically, they said they are still determining appropriate inspector workloads and drafting specific guidelines that will need to be integrated into FRA’s regional inspection plans  FRA officials said they are working to develop and make available inventory inspection guidance to the grade-crossing managers and inspectors by December 31, 2018  In the meantime, FRA held training that included information on inventory-reporting requirements  In August 2018, FRA developed guidance for grade-crossing inspections specific to quiet zones in response to a recommendation we made in 2017  It is important that FRA meets its goal to issue similar guidance specific to reviewing the accuracy of the inventory data, as FRA cannot have reasonable assurance that inspections that are already under way are being conducted in such a manner that would allow them to consistently identify data reliability issues at each crossing  About 75 percent of all Section 130 Program projects states implemented in fiscal year 2016 involved installing or updating active grade-crossing equipment, including warning lights and protective gates (see fig  6)  The prevalence of this type of project is in part due to the Section 130 Program requirement that states spend at least 50 percent of funds on protective devices  Other than eliminating a grade crossing, adding protective devices has long been considered the most effective way of reducing the risk of a crash  Officials from six of eight state DOTs we interviewed told us that the numbers and types of grade-crossing projects they implement are dependent on the amount of Section 130 Program funding they receive and the cost of the projects  As previously described, funds are set aside from the Highway Safety Improvement Program and distributed to states by a statutory formula that includes factors such as the number of grade crossings in each state  Officials from six of the eight state DOTs we spoke to agreed that the set-aside nature of the program was crucial in allowing them to implement projects, many of which they said would not have been possible without Section 130 Program funds  For example, many said the formula funding ensures that grade-crossing projects are completed along with highway safety projects, particularly given the fact that fatalities resulting from grade-crossing crashes account for so few when compared to highway deaths  Overall, fatalities resulting from grade-crossing crashes account for less than 1 percent of all highway- related fatalities  In fiscal year 2018, the funds distributed ranged from a low of approximately $1 2 million for eight states and Washington, D C , to over $16 million for California and over $19 million for Texas  The number of grade crossings in the eight states and Washington, D C  ranged from 5 to 380, while California had almost 6,000 and Texas had over 9,000  Project implementation costs varied by project type and ranged widely depending on project scope  Based on 2016 DOT data, some typical project costs ranged as follows: adding signs to passive grade crossings—$500 to $1,500; adding flashing lights and two gates to passive grade crossings— $150,000 to $300,000; adding four gates to grade crossings with flashing lights—$250,000 - closing a grade crossing—$25,000 to $100,000; and separating a grade crossing from traffic (Grade Separation)—$5 million to $40 million  State officials we spoke with cited several challenges in pursuing certain types of controversial, innovative, and expensive projects that could help them address the evolving nature of risk at grade crossings and difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of their projects  First, most state DOT officials said that the cost of grade-separation projects and, at times, the controversy of eliminating grade crossings through closure reduces the number of these projects, while acknowledging that they are the most effective ways to improve safety  These types of projects made up only 3 percent of Section 130 Program projects in fiscal year 2016 (see fig  6)  Grade-separation projects are often more expensive than the annual Section 130 Program funding available to states  In 2018, only eight states received annual Section 130 Program funding sufficient to fund a $7-million grade-separation project  As discussed previously, to fund relatively expensive projects, states may choose to combine funds from multiple years  Also, states and railroads may make incentive payments to localities for the permanent closure of a grade crossing  In addition to the cost, most state DOT officials reported challenges obtaining local support for closing grade crossings  They said closures may inconvenience residents who use the road and force emergency responders to take longer routes, potentially slowing response times  Grade-separation projects address these safety concerns and may be more agreeable to residents, but they are substantially more expensive  While up to $7,500 in Section 130 Program funding can be used to help incentivize communities to close grade crossings, officials from some of our selected state DOTs said this amount is generally not enough to persuade local officials to support the closing  Second, officials from many state DOTs we interviewed also reported that the requirements of the Section 130 Program create challenges for them in implementing what they considered to be innovative projects  For example, the program requirement that 50 percent of funds be used on protective devices, combined with what one researcher described to us as the tendency by states to implement “known” projects—i e , protective devices—may impede states’ selection of new, more innovative safety projects  Officials we interviewed from many state DOTs described challenges related to the program’s requirements  They noted that they are prevented from using Section 130 Program funds for new types of safety technologies not yet incorporated into FHWA’s Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices  As noted previously in this report, outside the Section 130 Program FHWA is working with states and localities to explore whether new types of pavement markings at grade crossings, not in the manual, can improve driver behavior  One state DOT official we interviewed suggested changes to allow states to fund one grade- crossing pilot project per year or to use a set percentage of program funds to finance a pilot project that could help them explore promising but as yet unproven technologies  Third, state DOT officials from four of the eight selected states also said it can be difficult to find funding for the required 10 percent state match  As previously mentioned, while certain rail-safety projects are eligible for up to 100 percent federal funding, Section 130 Program projects are funded at a 90 percent federal share  According to DOT documentation we reviewed, only some states have a dedicated source for such a match, and state DOT officials from one of our selected states said their state cannot use state funds for the 10 percent match  Some state DOT officials said this situation can drive project selection  For example, they sometimes chose projects based on which localities or railroads were willing to provide matching funds or offer cost savings  Finally, many state officials cited challenges in measuring the effectiveness of grade crossing projects in reducing crashes or the risk of crashes  In particular, state officials we spoke to said it can be difficult to use before-and-after crash statistics as a measure of effectiveness because of the low number and random nature of crashes  Also, as FRA research has shown and as FHWA and FRA have noted, reporting on before-and-after grade-crossing accident statistics can be misleading, given the infrequency of crashes and crashes that are not the result of grade crossing conditions  States’ required Section 130 Program annual progress reports to the Secretary of DOT call for states to report on the effectiveness of the improvements they made  FHWA reporting guidance suggests they define effectiveness as the reduction in the number of fatalities and serious injuries after grade-crossing projects were implemented, consistent with statutory requirements  In addition, FHWA guidance states that consideration should be given to quantifying effectiveness in the context of fatalities and serious injuries  However, states often report no differences in crashes after specific projects were implemented, and there have been instances where states reported a slight increase in crashes  Such an increase does not necessarily mean that the project was not effective in reducing the overall risk of a crash  Also, not all projects are implemented at grade crossings where there has been a crash  Among other information, states also typically report information on funding and data on the numbers and types of projects implemented  In addition, the extent to which states report projects’ effectiveness varies greatly  Given states’ responsibility for implementing the Section 130 Program and the differences in the amounts of funding they receive, FHWA officials said states should determine and report on the appropriate effectiveness metrics for their programs  According to FHWA officials, during the 2017 reporting year, a few states requested examples of what to include when reporting effectiveness, and FHWA responded with examples of various methods they could use, such as a benefit-cost ratio or the percentage decrease in fatalities, serious injuries, and crashes  Regardless of the difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of specific projects, most state DOT officials we interviewed stressed the importance of the Section 130 Program in funding grade-crossing projects  FHWA’s biennial report to Congress is intended to provide information to Congress on the progress being made by the states in implementing projects to improve safety and, in addition, make recommendations for future implementation of the program  FHWA reviews states’ annual Section 130 Program reports and uses them to formulate the report to Congress every 2 years  FHWA’s 2018 report highlights that the Section 130 Program has seen great success since 1975, with a decrease of approximately 74 percent in fatalities at the same time that there was an increase in vehicle and train traffic  The report described the latest available 10-year trend, from 2007 to 2016, as showing a 31 percent decrease in fatalities  Fatalities have also decreased when adjusted for train traffic  However, FHWA officials acknowledged in interviews with us that crashes and fatalities have remained constant since about 2009, with more recent data showing a slight increase in fatalities over the last 2 to 3 years, data that are consistent with the increases in overall roadway fatalities  The officials said increased train- and vehicle-traffic volumes could be contributing to that increase, in addition to other factors, such as more bicycle riders and pedestrians using grade crossings  As described earlier, states have generally already used Section 130 Program funding to address safety at the riskiest grade crossings by adding protective measures, typically lights and gates  Yet crashes continue to occur at these improved grade crossings  Given these trends and the challenges discussed earlier related to the requirements of the Section 130 Program, it is not clear whether the program remains effective in continuing to reduce the risk of crashes and fatalities at grade crossings  As required, FHWA’s biennial report includes a section on “recommendations for future implementation” of the Section 130 Program  As part of this, FHWA reports on challenges and actions being taken to address them  FHWA’s 2018 report identified one of the same challenges we heard about from state DOT officials related to the inability or unwillingness of local agencies to provide matching funds and the relatively low amount of funding designed to incentivize localities to close crossings  FHWA reported on its efforts to address these challenges, including by providing guidance, resources, and supportive training to states and local agencies and serving as a clearinghouse for innovative methods of supporting projects  However, with the exception of the funding challenge, FHWA’s most recent report does not include the other challenges state officials identified to us related to the requirements of the Section 130 Program discussed above  These include program funding requirements that may impede innovative approaches and the difficulties of using before-and-after crash statistics to measure effectiveness  Many state DOT officials we spoke with said there may be an opportunity to more broadly assess the Section 130 Program at the national level  It could be more informative to comprehensively assess more detailed crash trends, such as those that look forward over multiple years across the more than 1,700 crashes nationwide, rather than on the approximately 35 that occur on average within a state, and identify strategies to address those trends  Doing so could help FHWA learn more about why crashes are continuing and what types of projects may be effective  There could be ways to evaluate the program in a more comprehensive way; many state DOT officials we interviewed told us such a comprehensive evaluation could help improve program effectiveness in a number of ways, including by enabling the program to better keep up with the rapid pace of technological change and re- examining eligibility requirements that limit the flexibility of states to consider other types of projects beyond engineering  Also, most state DOT officials we interviewed agreed that education and enforcement efforts are crucial to further improving safety, as did 8 out of 10 other stakeholders we spoke to, as well as officials from Volpe Center and NTSB  However, according to FHWA officials, those project types are not allowed under the Section 130 Program’s requirements  The officials said FHWA has partnered with FRA and NHTSA on research efforts, such as driver-behavior studies, to inform grade-crossing safety issues  However, the officials said that FHWA has not conducted a program evaluation of the Section 130 Program to consider whether the program’s funding and other requirements allow states to adequately address ongoing safety issues such as driver behavior  FHWA officials said that there is no federal requirement for them to conduct such a program evaluation  We have previously reported that an important component of effective program management is through program performance assessment, which helps establish a program’s effectiveness—the extent to which a program is operating as it was intended and the extent to which a program achieves what the agency proposes to accomplish  This type of evaluative information helps the executive branch and congressional committees make decisions about the programs they oversee  Assessing program performance includes conducting program evaluations, which are individual systematic studies that answer specific questions about how well a program is meeting its objectives  In addition, federal internal-control standards state that management should identify, analyze, and respond to significant changes in a program’s environment that could pose new risks  FHWA officials said the fact that crashes and fatalities have held steady while the volume of train and vehicle traffic has increased is an indication that grade-crossing safety has continued to improve  However, specific to fatalities per million train-miles, FHWA’s 2018 biennial report shows this rate to be fairly constant since 2009  As noted previously, FRA expects train and traffic volumes to continue to increase and has expressed concern that grade-crossing crashes and fatalities may also increase  Without conducting a program evaluation, FHWA cannot ensure that the Section 130 Program is achieving one of the national goals of the federal- aid highway program, to reduce fatalities and injuries  In addition, It is difficult to see how FHWA, in its biennial reports to Congress, could make informed recommendations for future program implementation without conducting a program evaluation to assess, among other things, whether program requirements first established some four decades ago continue to reduce fatalities and injuries  We note that as part of a program evaluation, some changes that FHWA, working with FRA, identifies as potentially having merit to improve the program’s effectiveness could require a statutory change  The continued number of crashes and fatalities at grade crossings with devices intended to warn of a train’s presence calls into question whether the Section 130 Program is structured to help states continue making progress toward the national goal to reduce fatalities and injuries  An evaluation of the program’s requirements could help determine whether Congress should consider better ways to focus federal funds to address the key factor in crashes—risky driver behavior  An FHWA program evaluation could also help determine whether, for example, states could more strategically target emerging safety problems if changes were made to the types of projects eligible for funding under the Section 130 Program  FRA’s new grade-crossing inspectors are meant to increase the effectiveness of FRA’s rail-safety oversight activities, and accordingly, these FRA inspectors, along with FRA researchers, may be well positioned to help FHWA evaluate potential changes to improve the effectiveness of the Section 130 Program  The Administrator of FHWA, working with FRA, should evaluate the Section 130 Program’s requirements to determine whether they allow states sufficient flexibility to adequately address current and emerging grade-crossing safety issues  As part of this evaluation, FHWA should determine whether statutory changes to the program are necessary to improve its effectiveness  (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment  In written comments, reproduced in appendix II, DOT concurred with our recommendation  DOT also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration, and the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  This report examines (1) what has been the focus of Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) grade-crossing-safety research, (2) how states select and implement grade-crossing projects and what railroad- and state-reported data are available from FRA to inform states’ decisions, and (3) the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects and the extent to which the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) assesses the program’s effectiveness  The scope of this work focused on the nation’s more than 128,000 public grade crossings  We did not include private grade crossings, as states can only use Railway- Highway Crossings Program (commonly referred to as the Section 130 Program) funds to improve safety at public grade crossings  While FRA provides safety grants to address rail issues, including for grade-crossing projects, we focused our work on the Section 130 Program because it is the primary source of federal funding directed at grade-crossing-safety improvement  For each objective we reviewed: pertinent statutes and FHWA and FRA regulations and documents; interviewed FHWA and FRA program officials in headquarters; and conducted in-depth interviews with a non- generalizable sample of organizations that included officials from 4 freight and passenger railroads, 12 state agencies from 8 states, 6 FRA regional offices, and 8 FHWA state division offices  We also spoke with representatives from relevant associations and officials from NTSB and Volpe Center  We selected these organizations based on our initial background research, prior work, and input from other stakeholders, among other things  See the paragraph below for additional selection details and table 5 for a complete list of organizations we spoke with  We selected eight states as part of our non-generalizable sample for interviews  These states included Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania  The states were selected to include a mix of state experiences based on a variety of factors, including the number of grade crossings and crashes at those crossings, and the amount of Section 130 Program funding they received  Specifically, we selected four states from those in the top 25 percent of all states in terms of their number of grade crossings and the amount of Section 130 Program funds they received  We selected the other four states to include a mix of these factors  We also considered geographical diversity and recommendations from FRA and FHWA officials  Within these eight states, we conducted in-depth interviews with FHWA division staff, FRA regional staff, and state officials  A variety of state agencies administer the Section 130 Program within their state; the state officials we spoke with from our eight selected states worked for agencies such as state departments of transportation, corporation commissions, and public utility commissions  We also spoke with a non-generalizable sample of four railroads: Amtrak, CSX, Norfolk Southern, and Sierra Northern  We selected railroads based on a variety of factors including geographic location and stakeholder recommendations  We also conducted additional work related to each of the objectives  To describe the focus of FRA’s grade-crossing-safety research, we examined FRA research aimed at understanding the causes of grade- crossing crashes and identifying potential improvements and described FRA efforts to test new approaches that could improve safety  We did not assess the quality of FRA’s research, as that was beyond the scope of this engagement  Instead, we described the nature of the research  We also spoke with FRA research and development staff, Volpe researchers, and state partners about this work  To describe how states select and implement grade-crossing projects, and what FRA data are available to inform their decisions, we reviewed an academic study that included a literature review and interviews with state officials to describe how states select Section 130 Program projects  We spoke with the researcher and determined the study to be reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives  We also spoke with officials from our eight selected states, FHWA division staff, and FRA regional staff, and reviewed the states’ 2017 Section 130 Program reports  As part of this objective, we also assessed the reliability of data reported for all railroads in FRA’s National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory data as of August 31, 2018  For public grade crossings that were not closed, we examined a selection of fields within the database to identify the frequency of missing data (see table 1), data anomalies (see table 2), relational errors, where two related data fields had values that were incompatible (see table 3), and when the data was last updated (see table 4)  Specifically, we conducted the following electronic tests on the crossing inventory data to determine if they were within reasonable ranges, were internally consistent, and appeared complete: Before conducting our analysis, we filtered the inventory data to only include open, public, at-grade crossings  To understand FRA’s efforts to improve its crossing inventory data, we interviewed FRA regional and headquarters staff and reviewed job descriptions for FRA’s new grade- crossing inspectors  Finally, to determine the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing grade-crossing safety projects and the extent to which FHWA assesses the program’s effectiveness, we reviewed program requirements and state project data and other components from FHWA’s 2016 and 2018 Section 130 Program biennial reports to Congress  We also reviewed FHWA’s summary of fiscal year 2018 program funds provided to states and federal laws and guidance related to implementing projects and measuring performance  We interviewed state DOT officials from the eight selected states and other stakeholders on the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects, and FHWA and FRA officials for their perspectives on managing the program, including how FHWA measures performance and assesses program effectiveness  We compared information collected from FHWA and FRA to federal internal-control standards and criteria on program evaluation identified in our previous work  In addition, we reviewed FHWA and FRA documents designed to guide states, such as the Grade Crossing Handbook, the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, the Action Plan and Project Prioritization Noteworthy Practices Guide, and other related documents  We conducted this performance audit from November 2017 to November 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  Susan A  Fleming, (202) 512-2834, Flemings@gao gov  In addition to the individual named above, Maria Edelstein (Assistant Director); Gary Guggolz (Analyst in Charge); Steven Campbell; Tim Guinane; Ben Licht; Catrin Jones; Delwen Jones; SaraAnn Moessbauer; Malika Rice; Larry Thomas; and Crystal Wesco made key contributions to this report 
Report 2:  National Popular Vote opponents oppose the compact on various grounds  Some argue that it is unconstitutional or "anticonstitutional," that is, contrary to the Founders' intentions and the spirit of the nation's fundamental charter  It is also asserted that NPV would solve few of the electoral college system's alleged problem issues and would create some of its own  Finally, some observers note that the NPV compact is an interstate compact as defined in Article I, Section 10, clause 3 of the Constitution, and as such would be subject to congressional approval  This issue is examined in greater detail in a separate section of this report  On the most fundamental philosophical basis, opponents might argue that the NPV compact violates one of the basic principles of majoritarian democracy: it does not require that candidates win a majority of the popular vote in order to gain the presidency  Rather, it would anoint as winner the ticket that gains more popular votes than any other  A majoritarian democracy, it may be argued, should require a majority in order to elect; it may be further noted that the existing system, by comparison, requires a majority in the electoral college  As one commentary noted only the strictest of majoritarians desire a purely majoritarian presidential election system, and those individuals should be deeply troubled by the prospect of plurality presidencies, which the NPVC [sic] expressly countenances  Indeed, the NPVC promises to create more difficulties and "misfires" in its own way than the Electoral College system its proponents so earnestly seek to replace  Further, opponents might ask how the NPV compact would function in the event of a multicandidate election, a phenomenon that recurs from time to time in U S  presidential elections  One commentator posited the following problematic scenario under such circumstances: Under the compact, one can easily imagine a multi-candidate race in which a candidate would win, say, a thirty-four percent plurality of the popular vote nationwide while losing in every state and D C  If all of the states and D C  were signatories to the compact, all the electoral votes in such a hypothetical race would be awarded contrary to the will of voters choosing electors (still not voting directly for President under this plan)  Would the United States accept a President who wasn't the choice of sixty-six percent of those voting, nor even the choice of a single state? The existing electoral college system, NPV skeptics might also assert, is a fundamental element in the federal constitutional arrangements established by the Constitution  Fearing "the tyranny of the majority," the Founders established a system of government that provides checks and balances designed to restrain the majority and secure minority rights  These principles are also embedded in the structure of federal elections: the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the presidency were deliberately provided with different terms of office and different electorates, and the states were given an important role in the federal election process  In particular, through the electoral college the United States elects its national Presidents and Vice Presidents in a state-based federal election  Successful nominees are compelled under this system to present a broad political vision that commands nation-spanning "concurrent majorities" and appeals to the great variety of Americans  As in the case of the Senate, less populous states are accorded a small numerical advantage by assignment of two at-large electors reflecting the Constitution's equal apportionment of Senators to each state regardless of its population  The NPV initiative, they could claim, would discard the Founders' intentions in favor of what they consider to be a flawed "majoritarian" presidency that would ill-serve a continent-spanning and profoundly diverse republic  Another criticism centers on the use of the NPV compact to effect a fundamental change in the presidential election process and a de facto amendment to the Constitution, but without following the procedures set out in Article V  Critics may note that NPV's founders admit their plan is an "end run" around the Constitution  Proponents might counter with the argument that Article V presents too high a hurdle for what they consider a necessary reform of the system  Opponents, however, could respond that the Founders intended the various supermajority requirements in Congress and the states to ensure that successful constitutional amendments enjoy broad national support  The bare majority of electoral votes required to implement NPV, they might note, meets none of these supermajority requirements  As one study critical of the NPV initiative concluded, because the use of an interstate compact "does not conform to the constitutional means of changing the original decisions of the Framers, NPV could not [therefore] be a legitimate innovation " A final argument on this line might be that one "end run" around the amendment process might lead to others, setting a dangerous precedent for similar efforts in the future  Opponents might note that the NPV would eliminate the electoral college system's multiplier effect generated by the winner-take-all or general ticket system used in 48 states and the District of Columbia, which tends to magnify the winning ticket's margin of victory, and is said to confer greater legitimacy to the victors  For instance, in 2016, Republican nominee Donald Trump's clear electoral vote majority of 304 votes (56 5% of the total), compared with Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton's 227 (42 2% of the total) could be said to reinforce and confirm his victory, notwithstanding Clinton's plurality of the popular vote (48 2%), compared with Trump's 46 1%  From a practical standpoint, NPV opponents might argue that the NPV would actually lead to an increase in contested election results and legal challenges in the states, as the political parties maneuver to claim every possible vote  They assert that the existing tabulation of popular votes within each state reduces contested results and recounts  Under NPV, the incentive to gain every vote would arguably lead to far broader disputes and widespread recounts at every level of election administration  As a Heritage Foundation study concluded Under the NPV … any suspicions necessitating a recount in even a single district would be an incentive for a national recount     The prospect of a candidate challenging "every precinct, in every county, in every state of the Union" should be abhorrent to anyone who witnessed the drama, cost, delay, and undue litigation sparked by the Florida recount of 2000  Opponents might also assert that the increased incidence of recounts would be further complicated by wide-ranging disparities in state procedures, potentially leading to prolonged periods of uncertainty following close presidential elections  Critics may also note that the NPV plan contains no "statute of limitations," unlike proposed constitutional amendments, for which Congress typically sets a seven-year ratification period  Where, critics may ask, is a similar time limit that would "sunset" the NPV compact, after which it would expire or return to "square one"? According to its website, NPV was launched on February 23, 2006; if it were a constitutional amendment proposed by Congress, it would have expired on February 23, 2013, since by the end of the customary seven-year deadline it was "ratified" by only eight states and the District of Columbia  By what reasoning, they might ask, should the NPV be exempt from the standards of timeliness and contemporaneity Congress customarily sets for constitutional amendments? Opponents might reject claims that, under NPV, campaign spending and candidate appearances would be spread and scheduled more widely, beyond the current concentration of time and resources in battleground states  They might argue that spreading campaign resources and candidate events in non-battleground states is a questionable argument to justify a fundamental change in the presidential election process  Campaign appearances and spending, they could assert, should not be considered to be a local economic stimulus package, nor are the amounts in question sufficient to make much of a difference in the economic condition of most states  As one critical analysis notes, "    the nation does not hold presidential elections to foster local economic development " Moreover, they might continue, it is equally dubious to assert that nominees will slight the concerns of citizens of the non-battleground states from which they draw their greatest support, or that concentrated campaigning in the battleground states somehow "disenfranchises" voters in others  In the modern era, a small percentage of voters actually attends an in-person presidential or vice presidential candidate appearance  Television (especially broadcast and cable TV news networks), social media, the internet, and newspapers—not the traditional rallies, torchlight parades, and handbills—dominate presidential election campaigns in the 21 st century  In addition to policy issues discussed previously, some observers have also raised questions related to the NPV initiative based on the fact that it is an interstate compact as defined in the Constitution  Others have questioned whether NPV might conflict with some provisions of the Voting Rights Act  The NPV initiative has been described by its supporters variously as a bill, a state-level statute, and an interstate compact  The latter reference necessitates an analysis of whether the initiative complies with the Compact Clause of the Constitution  An interstate compact—under the broadest understanding—is a contract between two or more consenting states  The Supreme Court has further suggested that an interstate compact often requires reciprocal commitments between the governments of two or more states, such that one state's commitment is conditioned on the action of another state and no state can unilaterally repeal its commitment  The use of interstate compacts predates the Constitution, as the Articles of Confederation contained a similar Compact Clause that provided a qualified prohibition on states entering into any agreements between them without the consent of Congress  The chaos resulting from the disunity created by the Articles of Confederation prompted the Framers of the Constitution generally to "impose more uniformity" among the states, resulting in a Constitution that wholly prohibits states from entering into any treaties, alliances, and federations  Nonetheless, the Constitution maintained the Articles of Confederation's qualified prohibition on interstate compacts and agreements, allowing states to enter into an interstate compact so long as the participating states seek the consent of Congress  Specifically, the Compact Clause provides that "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress     enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State     " While the historical rationale for Article I's qualified prohibition on interstate compacts is unclear, the Compact Clause generally reflects the view of the Framers that states should be able to work cooperatively together, as well as the concern that unchecked interstate alliances might threaten the harmony of the Union or the authority vested by the Constitution in the federal government  As the Supreme Court noted in Cuyler v  Adams , "By vesting in Congress the power to grant or withhold consent, or to condition consent on the states' compliance with specified conditions, the Framers sought to ensure that Congress would maintain ultimate supervisory power over cooperative state action that might otherwise interfere with the full and free exercise of federal authority " The Compact Clause places no limits on what might be done through an interstate compact other than the requirement of congressional consent  In the early years of government under the Constitution, compacts were used almost exclusively to settle boundary disputes  Beginning with the establishment of the Port of New York Authority in 1921, however, compacts began to be used to address more complex, regional issues requiring intergovernmental cooperation  Some compacts are merely advisory in form, but others may be regulatory, with significant powers granted to multistate commissions  More recently, compacts have addressed such wide-ranging concerns as mental health treatment, law enforcement and crime control, education, driver licensing and enforcement, environmental conservation, energy, nuclear waste control, facilities operations, transportation, economic development, insurance regulation, placement of children and juveniles, disaster assistance, and pollution control  Approximately 200 interstate compacts are in effect today  Accordingly, the central legal issue with respect to the Compact Clause is whether a given interstate compact requires the consent of Congress  While a "literal" reading of the Compact Clause "would require the States to obtain congressional approval before entering into any agreement among themselves, irrespective of form, subject, duration, or interest to the United States [emphasis added]," the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected such a reading  In 1893, in Virginia v  Tenness e e , Justice Stephen Field, writing for the Court, contended that a broad reading of the Compact Clause would "embrace all forms of stipulation, written or verbal, and relating to all kinds of subjects[,]" requiring congressional consent to agreements "which the United States can have no possible objection or have any interest in interfering with," as well as those that "may tend to increase     the political influence of the contracting states, so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States     " Surmising that the Compact Clause could not have been intended to have such a broad reach, Justice Field concluded that the Clause prohibits states from entering into compacts without congressional consent only when the underlying compact is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States " The Supreme Court has subsequently reaffirmed Justice Field's "functional view of the Compact Clause," and, accordingly, generally where an agreement does not fall within the scope of the Compact Clause as envisioned by the Court in Virginia v  Tennessee , the agreement "will not be invalidated for lack of congressional consent " Whether the NPV initiative requires congressional consent under the Compact Clause first requires a determination as to whether NPV even constitutes an interstate compact  At times, its supporters have resisted framing the initiative as an interstate compact, arguably out of concern for running afoul of the Compact Clause's provisions  For example, Professor Akhil Amar has argued that because the initiative does not create a "new interstate governmental apparatus," the NPV should not be considered an interstate compact, as NPV compact signatory states are merely exercising power collectively that each state could exercise on its own  It is unclear, however, whether the creation of a new interstate governmental entity formed out of an agreement between two or more states is necessary, as opposed to sufficient, in order to deem an agreement as being an interstate compact subject to the Compact Clause  While the Supreme Court, in Northeast Bancorp , suggested that a "joint organization or body" formed out of an interstate agreement is a "classic indic[ium] of a compact," the Court has never adopted a definition of an interstate compact that solely rests on the existence of an interstate governmental body  Instead, the Court appears to have adopted a broader definition of what an interstate compact can entail  For example, in Virginia v  Tennessee , the Court noted that the words "compacts" and "agreements" are synonymous and "cover all stipulations affecting the conduct or claims of the parties " In other words, when two or more states enter into a stipulated agreement whereby one state agrees to perform an act in consideration for a reciprocal act by the other state(s), that agreement can be considered an interstate compact  This broad definition of a compact appears to encompass the NPV compact, as the initiative requires signatory states to agree mutually to appoint their electors to the winner of the national popular vote  Moreover, NPV binds each assenting state, as no member state can withdraw from it within six months or less of the end of a President's term  Because NPV prohibits states from freely "modify[ing] or repeal[ing] [the agreement] unilaterally" and requires "reciprocation" of mutual obligations, it appears that the initiative can be described as an interstate compact  Assuming the NPV initiative is an interstate compact, the question remains whether it is one that implicates the Compact Clause  The answer to that question primarily depends on whether NPV is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States  " In other words, the "test" for whether a particular interstate compact requires congressional consent is centrally concerned with vertical balances of power between the federal government and the states; namely, "whether the Compact enhances state power quoad the National Government " While the NPV arguably increases the political power of the states that have consented to it by ensuring that those states' desired outcome for the presidential election—the awarding of the majority of electoral votes to the presidential candidate supported by the majority of the voting populace—it is unclear how that increase in political power would be at the expense of the power of the federal government  After all, the Constitution provides the federal government with no role in determining the members of the electoral college  One scholar has suggested that the NPV initiative would lead to a vertical alteration of power by eliminating the possibility that the House of Representatives would resolve a presidential election in the absence of an electoral majority for a single candidate because it is premised on a majority of electoral votes going to a single candidate  The House of Representatives, however, has decided only two presidential elections in American history, and whether such an arguably hypothetical and de minimis diminishment of federal power through the NPV would be sufficient to require congressional consent under the Compact Clause is simply unresolved by the relevant case law  While the Supreme Court's case law interpreting the Compact Clause is centrally concerned with vertical federalism concerns (i e , the balance of power between the state and federal governments), the Court has recognized a potential secondary rationale suggested for the Compact Clause: to preserve the horizontal balance of powers among the various states  And horizontal federalism concerns could very well be implicated by the Compact Clause, as the provision appears to have been included in the Constitution out of concern both for the supremacy of the federal government and unity among the various states  Whether the NPV compact threatens the powers of nonconsenting states has been the subject of much debate among academics  Those in support of the initiative have contended that the nonconsenting states do not lose any power as a result of the NPV  According to this line of argumentation, even under the NPV, all states would retain their right to select the electors of their choosing, as nonmember state electors would still be counted in the electoral vote  Others, however, have pointed to the underlying premise of the NPV—to enhance the political power of more populous states in presidential elections—as evidence that the initiative diminishes the power of nonconsenting states  In other words, while non-compacting states would still retain the power to appoint electors, the influence that comes with that power would arguably be diminished because a state's role in the national election would be defined by its percentage of the popular vote and not by its percentage of electors, warranting congressional interest in approving a compact that effectuated such a change in national elections  Ultimately, however, whether the NPV actually threatens the power of nonconsenting states is a debate that remains active within academia but would likely be the source of considerable litigation if the initiative ever became effective  If congressional consent is needed for the NPV, that consent can take various forms  Usually congressional consent to an interstate compact takes the form of a joint resolution or act of Congress specifying its approval of the text of the compact and adding any conditions or provisions it deems necessary, often embodying the compact document  As with most congressional actions, consent to an interstate compact must occur with the approval of both houses and must be signed by the President before it becomes law  Rarely has the President vetoed or threatened to veto consent legislation by Congress  While congressional consent to an interstate compact is most often explicit, consent by Congress may also be implied by subsequent acts of Congress as "[a]n inference clear and satisfactory that Congress     intended to consent" to a compact may be sufficient  Congress may also delegate its power to approve a compact to a federal official so long as an "intelligible principle" against which approval can be measured is apparent  Ultimately, if congressional consent is truly needed for NPV to be effective, the initiative might have difficulty ever being enacted because the approval of both houses of Congress and the President would likely necessitate additional hurdles beyond the already challenging task of amassing support at the state level for the NPV  Beyond the legal issues raised with respect to the Compact Clause, the NPV initiative also potentially raises other broader constitutional concerns, including whether the states can functionally obviate the role of the electoral college through the NPV  Article II of the Constitution establishes that the election of the President should occur indirectly through the election by the electoral college  The choice of an indirect election for the President was a deliberate one by the Framers of the Constitution, because, while noting the importance that the "sense of the people" should influence the choice for President, they found it "equally desirable" for the "immediate election" of the President to be made by a body representative of distinct state interests and removed from the threat of unchecked majoritarianism  The result was that the Constitution established a presidential election process that was "manifestly nonmajoritarian," with the electoral college, a body established to represent the distinct views of each state, as the centerpiece of the election process  The central constitutional issue presented by the NPV, therefore, is whether the states, through an interstate compact, can functionally transform the presidential election system enshrined in the Constitution into a more majoritarian process  Supporters of the NPV argue that the Constitution provides the legal means for states to transform the presidential election system into one where the President is elected based solely on the result of the national popular vote  Specifically, clause 2 of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution provides the states with the power to "appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," the electors who represent the state in the electoral college  Facially, the Constitution's primary limitation on the power of a state to select its electors is the final number of electors awarded to each state  While perhaps an argument can be made that the structure, logic, and history of the Constitution place limits on the manner or method in which a state chooses its electors, the text of the Constitution simply does not impose any such limits  Supreme Court case law also supports reading Article II of the Constitution to broadly provide states with wide discretion as to the manner in which its electors are selected  Specifically, in 1892 in McPherson v  Blacker, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld a Michigan law providing for the election by individual congressional district of presidential electors against a challenge that the law violated Article II of the Constitution  In so holding, the Court placed great emphasis on a number of state laws that existed shortly after the ratification that provided a variety of "modes of choosing the electors," including selection by the legislature itself, by a "vote of the people for a general ticket," "by vote of the people in districts," or by some permutation of those methods  Viewing this evidence together with the text of Article II and the historical evidence from the Constitutional Convention led the Court to broadly conclude state legislatures have "conceded plenary power     in the matter of the appointment of electors," allowing the Michigan law to stand  Applying McPherson to the case of the NPV, the argument can and has been made that if the states have plenary power with respect to the manner of how electors are appointed, the power necessarily allows states to select electors in line with the results of the national popular vote  More recently, supporters of the NPV have relied on the Supreme Court's 2015 ruling in Arizona Legislature v  Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC) —which held that the State of Arizona had wide discretion under the Elections Clause of the Constitution to select the method by which the state provided for redistricting —to argue that the states retain broad discretion in selecting electors under Article II, which uses similar language to the provision interpreted in AIRC  Others have argued that the structure of the Constitution and historical evidence suggest that the states do not have such vast discretion in appointing electors as to functionally transform the election for President into a national popular referendum  As noted elsewhere in this report, the electoral college was created by the Framers to ensure that states with the least population retained power in the selection of the President, providing a check against domination by the most populous states  The electoral college, being a product of the choices of individual state legislatures, was envisioned by the Framers as a body that would represent the specific interests of a given state, as opposed to the undifferentiated nation at large  Accordingly, it may be argued that allowing the most populous states to collude to ensure that the national popular vote, as opposed to the wishes of an individual state, dictates the results of a state's slate of electors, could arguably be irreconcilable with the Framers' intentions with respect to the electoral college  As such, for those who find the NPV compact constitutionally suspect under Article II, McPherson 's broad pronouncements about the nature of a state's power to appoint electors should be viewed in the context of that particular case, where the state of Michigan was attempting to appoint its electors based on the votes of an individual district in the state, as opposed to the state as a whole  In contrast to the law at issue in McPherson , with NPV, there appears to be no evidence contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution of a state selecting its electors in accordance with the results of the national popular vote  Unlike the State of Michigan in McPherson , an NPV state's electors might not be a product of the views of the state at the time of the election, but instead would reflect national popular sentiment about who should be the President  Moreover, the Supreme Court, in interpreting arguably analogous language from Article I of the Constitution allowing states to regulate the manner of the selection of the Members of the House of Representatives and Senate, concluded that the states cannot exercise their delegated authority in a way that would "effect a fundamental change in the constitutional structure " The question that remains is whether the Court in a future case challenging the NPV compact would interpret the states' authority under Article II to appoint electors to be broad enough to allow the President to be selected as a result of the national popular vote, a question that, given the lack of any precise precedent respecting the constitutionality of the NPV compact under Article II, will likely remain unresolved until such time  Other critics claim the NPV compact might violate Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)  Writing in Columbia Law Review , David Gringer invokes the voting power theory  He argues that the plan conflicts with Section 2 of the VRA because moving from "a state-based [vote] to a national popular vote dilutes the voting strength of a given state's minority population by reducing its ability [voting power] to influence the outcome of presidential elections " Gringer also asserts that the NPV compact may violate Section 5 of the act  In 2013, however, the U S  Supreme Court invalidated Section 4(b) of the VRA, which contained a formula prescribing which states and jurisdictions with a history of discrimination were required to obtain prior approval or "preclearance" under Section 5 before changing any voting standard, practice, or procedure  Although the Court invalidated only the coverage formula in Section 4, by extension, Section 5 has been rendered currently inoperable  Prior to the Supreme Court ruling, Gringer argued that the NPV compact would qualify as a covered practice under Section 5, and that the legislatures of all the "covered" states would have been required to obtain preclearance before implementing the compact  Responding to this point, National Popular Vote Inc  noted the following: The National Popular Vote bill manifestly would make every person's vote for President equal throughout the United States in an election to fill a single office (the Presidency)  It is entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act  There have been court cases under the Voting Rights Act concerning contemplated changes in voting methods for various representative legislative bodies     However, these cases do not bear on elections to fill a single office (i e , the Presidency)  In 2012, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division specifically declined to challenge California's accession to the NPV compact on VRA grounds  The states' authority to appoint electors by any method their legislatures choose is not absolute  Federal court decisions have struck down state laws concerning appointment of electors that were found to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection: Although Clause 2 (of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution) seemingly vests complete discretion in the states, certain older cases had recognized a federal interest in protecting the integrity of the process  Thus, the Court upheld the power of Congress to protect the right of all citizens who are entitled to vote to lend aid and support in any legal manner to the election of any legally qualified person as a presidential elector     [I]n Oregon v  Mitchell (42 U S  112 (1970)), the Court upheld the power of Congress to reduce the voting age in presidential elections and to set a thirty-day durational residency period as a qualification for voting in presidential elections  Although the Justices were divided on the reasons, the rationale emerging from this case, considered with Williams v  Rhodes , (393 U S  20 1968)) is that the Fourteenth Amendment limits state discretion in prescribing the manner of selecting electors and that Congress in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment may override state practices that violate that Amendment and may substitute standards of its own  Critics of the electoral college system have sought direct election of the President and Vice President without success for more than two centuries  The NPV initiative represents a novel effort to achieve this goal by use of an interstate compact that would circumvent the stringent requirements necessary for the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments  Since its inception in 2006, NPV has achieved a degree of success: 14 states and the District of Columbia, controlling a total of 189 electoral votes, have joined the compact since 2008  Progress has arguably been sporadic, however, notwithstanding active campaigning by National Popular Vote Inc  Over the course of more than a decade, NPV has heretofore failed to develop a sustained momentum toward its stated goal of states controlling 270 electoral votes  The action of three states in joining NPV to date in 2019 marks the most activity in a single year since 2008; it remains to be seen whether this trend will continue  To date, certain Democratic-leaning states have joined the compact  The arguable lack of support in Republican-controlled state legislatures raises questions about further accessions to the compact in the immediate future, particularly given the fact that the GOP controlled both legislative chambers in 30 states following the 2018 elections  To date, while the NPV initiative has generated interest among supporters of direct popular election of the President, it does not appear to have gained widespread awareness among the public at large  The findings of the March 27, 2019, Politico/Morning Consult survey cited earlier in this report arguably suggest that greater public knowledge of NPV might spur popular support for the compact  This might then contribute to further momentum if additional states were to join, particularly populous ones like Florida (29 electoral votes), Georgia (16 electoral votes), and Ohio (18 electoral votes) where the compact was under active consideration in 2019  Under these circumstances, proponents might be energized and encouraged by a sense of progress for the initiative  At the same time, NPV opponents could be expected to coalesce around the issues identified earlier in this report, and renew and increase their efforts in defense of the electoral college system  The activities of both might ultimately bring the NPV initiative to the more immediate attention of Congress 

ground_truth: Crashes at highway-rail grade crossings are one of the leading causes of railroad-related deaths. According to FRA data, in 2017, there were more than 2,100 crashes resulting in 273 fatalities. Since 2009 crashes have occurred at a fairly constant rate. The federal government provides states funding to improve grade-crossing safety through FHWA's Section 130 Program. The persistence of crashes and deaths raises questions about the effectiveness of the federal grade-crossing-safety program. GAO was asked to review federal efforts to improve grade-crossing safety. This report examines: (1) the focus of FRA's grade-crossing-safety research, (2) how states select and implement grade-crossing projects and what data are available from FRA to inform their decisions, and (3) the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects and the extent to which FHWA assesses the program's effectiveness. GAO analyzed FRA data; reviewed FRA's, FHWA's, and states' documents; reviewed a study of states' selection of projects; and interviewed FRA and FHWA headquarters and field staff, and officials from a non-generalizable sample of eight states, selected to include a mix in the number of grade crossings and crashes, and geographic diversity. Research sponsored by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has identified driver behavior as the main cause of highway-rail grade crossing crashes and that factors such as train and traffic volume can contribute to the risk of a crash. (See figure.) Over 70 percent of fatal crashes in 2017 occurred at grade crossings with gates. To meet the requirements of the federal grade-crossing program, states are responsible for selecting and ensuring the implementation of grade-crossing improvement projects. Most state DOT officials and other relevant transportation officials use local knowledge of grade crossings to supplement the results of models that rank grade crossings based on the risk of an accident. These states generally consider the same primary risk factors, such as vehicle and train traffic. FRA is taking steps to improve the data used in its model to help states assess risk factors at grade crossings. For example, FRA's grade-crossing inspectors will review and identify issues with railroad- and state-reported inventory data. FRA is currently developing guidelines, which it plans to finalize by the end of 2018, to implement these inspections as it has for other types of FRA inspections. Officials we spoke with in eight states reported challenges in pursuing certain types of projects that could further enhance safety, in part because of federal requirements. While safety has improved, many crashes occur at grade crossings with gates, and officials said there could be additional ways to focus program requirements to continue improving safety. States' and the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) reporting focuses on the program's funding and activity, such as the number and types of projects, yet the low number of crashes makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of projects in reducing crashes and fatalities. FHWA reports the program has been effective in reducing fatalities by about 74 percent since 1975. However, since 2009, annually there have been about 250 fatalities—almost one percent of total highway fatalities. FRA expects future crashes to grow, in part, due to the anticipated increase in rail and highway traffic. An evaluation of the program should consider whether its funding and other requirements allow states to adequately address ongoing safety issues. FHWA officials said they are not required to perform such evaluations. GAO has previously reported on the importance of program evaluations to determine the extent to which a program is meeting its objectives. An evaluation of the program could lead FHWA to identify changes that could allow states to more strategically address problem areas. GAO recommends that FHWA evaluate the program's requirements to determine if they allow states the flexibility to address ongoing safety issues. The Department of Transportation concurred with GAO's recommendation.