prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted to Congress its FY2019 budget request, which included $41 86 billion of base (or enduring) funds for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)  Of that amount, $13 26 billion would have been for State operations, international broadcasting, and related agencies and $28 60 billion for foreign operations  Comparing the request with the FY2018 actual SFOPS funding levels, the FY2019 request represented a 23 3% decrease in SFOPS funding  The proposed State and related agency funding would have been 18 7% below FY2018 funding levels, and the foreign operations funding would have been reduced by 25 2%  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), signed into law on February 15, included a total of $54 377 billion for SFOPS accounts, a 0 3% decrease over the FY2018 funding level and about 30% more than the Administration's request  An account-by-account comparison of the SFOPS request with the FY2018 actual funding and FY2019 enacted appropriation is provided in Appendix A   International Affairs 150 function funding levels are detailed in Appendix B   A chart depicting the components of the SFOPS appropriations bill is in Appendix C   A glossary is provided in Appendix D   The appropriations process for FY2019 was shaped by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA, H R  1892 , P L  115-123 ), which Congress passed on February 9, 2018  The act raised the overall revised discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P L  112-25 ) from $1 069 trillion for FY2017 to $1 208 trillion for FY2018 and to $1 244 trillion for FY2019  The BBA increased FY2019 defense funding levels by $85 billion, from $562 billion to $647 billion, and nondefense funding (including SFOPS) by $68 billion, from $529 billion to $597 billion  It also extended direct spending reductions from FY2021 in the original BCA through FY2027, as amended  Every year since FY2012, the Administration has distinguished SFOPS spending as either enduring (base) funds or those to support overseas contingency operations (OCO)  The OCO designation gained increased significance with enactment of the BCA, which specified that emergency or OCO funds do not count toward the spending limits established by the act  In early years of requesting OCO funds, the Obama Administration described OCO requests for "extraordinary, but temporary, costs of the Department of State and USAID in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan " Syria and other countries were added in later years, and the Trump Administration expanded OCO use in its first budget request in FY2018 to be available for longer-term, core activities and more countries  For FY2019, because the BBA raised spending limits, the Administration did not seek foreign affairs OCO funds, but requested the entire SFOPS budget within base funds  The final legislation, P L  116-6 , included $8 0 billion designated as OCO, or about 15% of enacted SFOPS funding  For funding trends, see Table 1   House and Senate SFOPS Legislation   FY2019 SFOPS legislation was introduced and approved by the full appropriations committee in each chamber  The House legislation, H R  6385 , included total SFOPS funding of $54 18 billion, 0 6% lower than FY2018 funding and 29% more than requested  The Senate proposal, S  3108 , would have provided $54 602 billion for SFOPS accounts, which is about 0 1% more than FY2018 funding and 30% more than requested  Neither bill received floor consideration in its respective chamber  Continuing Resolutions   On September 28, 2018, the President signed into law P L  115-245 , legislation which included the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 (CR) to continue funding for SFOPS accounts (among seven other appropriations that were not completed by the start of FY2019) at a prorated 2018 funding level through December 7, 2018  Funds designated as OCO in 2018 appropriations continued to be so designated for SFOPS in the CR  On December 3, 2018, Congress and the Administration extended funding through December 21, 2018 by enacting P L  115-298   After December 21, funding lapsed and a partial shutdown of the government occurred  On January 25, an agreement was reached to continue funding for SFOPS and other appropriations that had lapsed through February 15, at the FY2018 level ( P L  116-5 )  Enacted Legislation   On February 14 Congress passed, and the President later signed into law, a full year appropriation ( P L  116-6 , Division F) that included $54 38 billion in total SFOPS funding, a 0 3% decrease from the FY2018 funding level and about 30% more than the Administration's request  Of that total, $16 46 billion was for State Department operations and related agencies; $37 92 billion for foreign operations accounts  About 14 7%, or $8 0 billion, was designated as OCO  The State Department sought to cut funding for the Department of State and Related Agency category by 19% in FY2019 from FY2018 funding levels, to $13 26 billion  Conversely, both the House and Senate committee bills sought to maintain funding near previous fiscal year levels  The House committee bill would have increased funding in this category to $16 38 billion, or 0 4% above the FY2018 funding level  The Senate committee bill would have raised funding to $16 34 billion, around $40 million less than the House committee bill and approximately 0 1% more than the FY2018 funding level  Similar to the House and Senate committee bills, the FY2019 enacted appropriation ( P L  116-6 ) maintained funding for the State Department and Related Agency category slightly above FY2018 funding level  It provided $16 46 billion for this category, or 0 9% more than the F2018 level  The State Department's request sought to fund the entirety of this category through base (or enduring) funding  Following passage of the BBA and the resulting increase in discretionary spending cap levels for FY2018 and FY2019, the State Department moved the $3 69 billion request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) in this category into the base budget request  Both the House and Senate committee bills sought to retain OCO funding within the Department of State and Related Agency category  The House committee bill would have provided $3 03 billion for OCO, or around 28% less than the FY2018 figure of $4 18 billion  The Senate committee bill would have provided $4 11 billion, which constituted about 2% less than FY2018 level  While the House committee bill would have afforded approximately $1 08 billion less for OCO than the Senate committee bill, the House committee bill provided around $1 12 billion more in enduring funding ($13 35 billion) than the Senate committee bill ($12 23 billion)  As with the House and Senate committee bills, P L  116-6 retained OCO funding for the Department of State and Related Agency category  The law provided a total of $4 37 billion for OCO, or 4 5% more than the FY2018 funding level  While the law provided more for OCO than either the Senate or House committee bills, it provided less in enduring funding ($12 09 billion)  Areas where the State Department's proposed cuts were focused included the diplomatic security accounts (the Worldwide Security Protection programmatic allocation within the Diplomatic Programs account and, separately, the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance account), Contributions to International Organizations, and Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities  In most cases, P L  116-6 , in a manner similar to the House and Senate committee bills, maintained annual budget authority for these accounts closer to the FY2018 funding levels than the Administration requested (see following sections for more detailed analysis)  The State Department also requested $246 2 million to implement the Leadership and Modernization Impact Initiative, which serves as the implementation phase of the department's "Redesign" efforts  While neither the House nor the Senate committee bill directly addressed the Impact Initiative, both included provisions enabling Congress to conduct oversight of any broader reorganization efforts at the department  The enacted legislation, P L  116-6 , took the same approach  Table 3 provides an overview of proposed changes to selected accounts within the State Department and Related Agency category  Under the State Department's budget request, the Diplomatic Programs account, which is the State Department's principal operating appropriation, would have declined by 11% from the FY2018 funding level of $8 82 billion, to $7 81 billion  According to the State Department, this account provides funding for "core people, infrastructure, security, and programs that facilitate productive and peaceful U S  relations" with foreign governments and international organizations  The House and Senate committee bills would have provided $8 80 billion and $8 92 billion, respectively, for Diplomatic Programs  For FY2019 enacted, P L  116-6 provided $9 17 billion, or 4% more than the FY2018 funding level and 17% more than the State Department's request  In Section 7081 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P L  115-31 ), Congress authorized the establishment of a new "Consular and Border Security Programs" (CBSP) account into which consular fees shall be deposited for the purposes of administering consular and border security programs  As a result, consular fees retained by the State Department to fund consular services will be credited to this new account  The State Department thus requested that Congress rename the former Diplomatic and Consular Programs account "Diplomatic Programs " However, because many consular fees are generated and retained by the State Department to administer consular programs, they do not comprise part of the department's annual appropriations and therefore do not count against overall funds appropriated annually for this account  The FY2019 enacted legislation, P L  116-6 , authorized the renaming of Diplomatic and Consular Programs to Diplomatic Programs, as did the House and Senate committee bills  The Diplomatic Programs account provides funds for a large share of U S  direct hire positions, including but not limited to State Department Foreign Service and Civil Service officers  Although the Trump Administration lifted the federal hiring freeze upon issuance of OMB M-17-22 on April 12, 2017, the State Department elected to keep its own hiring freeze in place  The Department of State released guidance in May 2018 lifting the hiring freeze and allowing the department to increase staffing to December 31, 2017 levels  Some Members of Congress expressed concern with the hiring freeze and the continued impacts of perceived personnel shortages at the Department of State  Both the House and Senate committee bills, and the committee reports accompanying those bills, included oversight provisions pertaining to State Department personnel levels  In this vein, Section 7073 of P L  116-6 required that no appropriated funds may be used to expand or reduce the size of the State Department and USAID's Civil Service, Foreign Service, eligible family member, and locally employed staff workforce from the on-board levels as of December 31, 2017 without consultation with the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives  Section 7073 also required the Secretary of State to submit reports to Congress, beginning 60 days after enactment of the law, and every 60 days thereafter until September 30, 2020, regarding the State Department's on-board personnel levels, hiring, and attrition of the Civil Service, Foreign Service, eligible family member, and locally employed staff workforce  These reports were also required to include a hiring plan for maintaining Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel numbers at not less than December 31, 2017, levels through FY2019  Among other personnel-related provisions, the joint explanatory statement accompanying this law noted that keeping personnel at these levels reflected "minimum necessary hiring" and encouraged the Secretary of State to work with Congress to increase hiring above such levels as appropriate  The Human Resources funding category within Diplomatic Programs provides funding for the Charles B  Rangel International Affairs and Thomas R  Pickering Foreign Affairs fellowship programs to promote greater diversity in the Foreign Service, as authorized by Section 47 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act (P L  84-885)  While Congress required the State Department to expand the number of fellows participating in the Rangel and Pickering programs by 10 apiece pursuant to Section 706 of the Department of State Authorities Act, 2017 ( P L  114-323 ), it has provided the department the discretion to fund these programs at levels it deems appropriate from monies appropriated for Human Resources  P L  116-6 , like the House and Senate committee bills, continued to provide such discretion to the State Department  In addition, the House committee report indicated support for department efforts to increase diversity in hiring, including through the Rangel and Pickering programs  It also encouraged the Secretary of State to explore more opportunities to further the goal of increasing workforce diversity  The Senate committee report recommended the continued expansion of the department's workforce diversity programs and directed that qualified graduates of the Rangel and Pickering programs shall be inducted into the Foreign Service  While neither P L  116-6 nor the accompanying joint explanatory statement addressed the Rangel and Pickering programs specifically or Foreign Service diversity more generally, the joint explanatory statement did not negate any of the language in the House and Senate committee reports  The Diplomatic Programs account also provides funding for a number of overseas programs  These include programs carried out by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and the department's regional bureaus  Activities of the department's Bureau of Medical Services, which is responsible for providing health care services to U S  government employees and their families assigned to overseas posts, are also funded through this account  Public diplomacy programs are among the overseas programs funded through Diplomatic Programs, which include the Global Engagement Center's (GEC's) countering state disinformation (CSD) program  According to the State Department, planned CSD activities, for which $20 million was requested, included "coordinating U S  government efforts in specific sub-regions; enhancing the capacity of local actors to build resilience against disinformation, including thwarting attacks on their IT systems; providing attribution of adversarial disinformation; and convening anti-disinformation practitioners, journalists, and other influencers to exchange best practices, build networks, and generate support for U S  efforts against disinformation " The House committee report registered concern regarding "foreign propaganda and disinformation that threatens United States national security, especially as carried out by China, Russia, and extremists groups" and asserted that the GEC "is expected to use a wide range of technologies and techniques to counter these campaigns," consistent with its statutory mandate  The Senate committee report recommended up to $75 4 million for the GEC, including up to $40 million for countering foreign state propaganda and disinformation  The joint explanatory statement accompanying for the FY2019-enacted legislation ( P L  116-6 ) included up to $55 4 million for the GEC and up to $20 million for CSD, a funding level for CSD identical to the department's request  Section 1284 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( P L  115-232 ) authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to transfer not more than $60 million to the GEC for each of FY2019 and FY2020; DOD has previously transferred funds to the GEC under similar authorities  The State Department's FY2019 budget request sought to provide approximately $5 36 billion for the department's key embassy security accounts: $3 70 billion for the Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) programmatic allocation within the Diplomatic Programs account and $1 66 billion for the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account  The House committee bill would have provided $3 76 billion for WSP and $2 31 billion for ESCM, for a total funding level of $6 07 billion for these accounts  While the House bill would have funded the ESCM account exclusively through the base budget, it would have provided approximately $2 38 billion of overall funding for WSP through OCO  The Senate committee bill would have provided $3 82 billion for WSP and $1 92 billion for ESCM, for a total funding level of $5 74 billion  As with the House committee measure, the Senate committee bill would have funded the ESCM account with base budget funds only  For WSP, the Senate committee measure, like the House committee bill, would provide $2 38 billion of total account funds through OCO  The FY2019 enacted appropriations provided a total of $4 10 billion for WSP and $1 98 billion for ESCM, for a total funding level of $6 08 billion in budget authority for these accounts  Like the House and Senate committee bills, P L  116-6 funded ESCM exclusively through the base budget  Of the $4 10 billion provided for WSP in the law, $2 63 billion was done so through OCO  Had the Administration's request been enacted, it would have marked a decline of 2% for WSP and 28% for ESCM relative to the FY2018 figures of approximately $3 76 billion and $2 31 billion, respectively  The enacted legislation provided 9% more funding for WSP and 15% less for ESCM relative to FY2018 levels  Over the past several years, Congress has provided no-year appropriations for both WSP and ESCM, thereby authorizing the State Department to indefinitely retain appropriated funds beyond the fiscal year for which they were appropriated  As a result, the department has carried over large balances of unexpired, unobligated funds each year that it is authorized to obligate for programs within both accounts when it deems appropriate to do so  For example, for FY2018, the State Department carried over more than $7 6 billion in previously appropriated funds for ESCM  Both the House and Senate committee bills would have continued this practice with respect to WSP, and the Senate committee bill would have continued with respect to ESCM, as well  The House committee bill, if enacted, would have provided that all funds appropriated for ESCM remained available until September 30, 2023, rather than indefinitely  P L  116-6 provided no-year appropriations for WSP  For ESCM, the law stipulated that while funds for worldwide security upgrades and for purposes of acquisition and construction would remain available until expended, all other monies within this account (such as funds for preserving, maintaining, repairing, and planning for real property that State Department owns) would remain available only until September 30, 2023  The Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) allocation within the Diplomatic Programs account supports the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's (DS's) implementation of security programs located at over 275 overseas posts and 125 domestic offices of the State Department, including a worldwide guard force protecting overseas diplomatic posts, residences, and domestic offices  The State Department revisited previous assumptions for funding for the U S  security presence, which prompted it to ask for a rescission of $301 20 million for WSP OCO funds provided through the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 (SAAA) ( P L  114-254 )  State Department officials noted that this funding was "intended to support diplomatic reengagements in Syria, Libya, and Yemen that were predicated on different security and political conditions " The department maintained that this proposed cancellation was based on evolving security and political conditions, and would not affect DS operations  While neither the House nor the Senate committee bill included a rescission, P L  116-6 provided for a rescission of $301 2 million of SAAA funds appropriated for Diplomatic Programs and designated them more generally for OCO  The Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account funds the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations (OBO), which is responsible for providing U S  diplomatic and consular missions overseas with secure, safe, and functional facilities  The State Department's request included $869 54 million to provide its share of what it maintains is the $2 20 billion in annual funding that the Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) recommended for the Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) and Maintenance Cost Sharing (MCS) programs (the remainder of the funding is provided through consular fee revenues and contributions from other agencies)  These programs are used to fund the planning, design, and construction of new overseas posts and the maintenance of existing diplomatic facilities  The House committee report maintained that funds the House bill made available for ESCM would allow for the State Department's CSCS and MCS contributions, when combined with those from other agencies and consular fees, to exceed the ARB's annual recommended funding and support " the accelerated multi-year program to construct new secure replacement facilities for the most vulnerable embassies and consulates " The Senate committee bill stipulated that of funds made available for ESCM by it and prior acts making appropriations for SFOPS, not less than $1 02 billion shall be made available for the department's FY2019 CSCS and MCS contributions; the joint explanatory statement accompanying P L  116-6 indicated that Congress provided the same amount for this purpose for FY2019  In FY2019, OBO intended to fund four CSCS projects and one MCS project (see Table 4 )  The House committee report noted concern with the cost of new embassy and consulate compound projects, including ongoing projects in Beirut, Lebanon; Mexico City, Mexico; New Delhi, India; Erbil, Iraq; and Jakarta, Indonesia  Like Section 7004(h) of the House bill, as noted in the joint explanatory statement accompanying P L  116-6 , Congress mandated that the State Department provide more detailed reports regarding the costs of these projects than previously required  The State Department maintained that the "construction of a new U S  Embassy facility in Jerusalem is a high priority for the Administration     planning and interagency coordination for the Jerusalem Embassy move is ongoing and the department intends to realign CSCS project funding, as necessary, to execute this project " It later attached a timeframe to its intent, and the United States opened a new U S  embassy in Jerusalem in May 2018  This new embassy is located in a building that housed consular operations of the former U S  Consulate General in Jerusalem  The State Department has said that one of its next steps would be to construct an embassy annex to the current building, while also considering options for a permanent embassy over the long term  The department could choose to draw upon the unexpired, unobligated funds previously appropriated by Congress to the ESCM account for any construction expenses related to interim and permanent embassy facilities in Jerusalem  The Senate committee report requires the Secretary of State to "regularly inform the Committee" on the status of plans for a permanent New Embassy Compound in Jerusalem  Neither P L  116-6 nor its joint explanatory statement addresses this issue or negates the Senate committee report language  The State Department's FY2019 budget request included a combined request of $2 29 billion for the Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) and Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) accounts, a 20% reduction from the FY2018 funding levels for these accounts  The CIO account is the source for funding for annual U S  assessed contributions to 45 international organizations, including the United Nations and its affiliated organizations and other international organizations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)  The State Department's FY2019 request for CIO totaled approximately $1 10 billion  Following passage of the BBA, the department increased its request for CIO by approximately $100 million to fund a higher U S  contribution to the U N  regular budget at a rate of 20% of the overall U N  budget (the U S  assessment is 22%)


Report 2:  According to the department, U N  assessments of U S  contributions to the United Nations and its affiliated agencies exceeded the request for funds to pay these contributions  Therefore, if the department's request was enacted, the United States may have accumulated arrears to some organizations  The Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account provides U S  funding for U N  peacekeeping missions around the world that the State Department says "seek to maintain or restore international peace and security " The State Department's FY2019 request for CIPA totaled $1 20 billion  According to the department, this request "reflects the Administration's commitment to seek reduced costs by reevaluating the mandates, design, and implementation of peacekeeping missions and sharing the funding burden more fairly among U N  members " Under this request, no U S  contribution would have exceeded 25% of all assessed contributions for a single operation, which is the cap established in Section 404(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 ( P L  103-236 )  The State Department maintained that it expected that the "unfunded portion of U S  assessed expenses will be met through a combination of a reduction in the U S  assessed rate of contributions, reductions in the number of U N  peacekeeping missions, and significant reductions in the budgets of peacekeeping missions across the board " The department also requested that Congress provide two-year funds for CIPA (in other words, that Congress make funds available for both the fiscal year for which the funds were appropriated and the subsequent fiscal year) "due to the demonstrated unpredictability of the requirements in this account from year to year and the nature of multi-year operations that have mandates overlapping U S  fiscal years " The House committee bill would have provided $1 36 billion for CIO and $1 59 billion for CIPA, for a combined total of $2 95 billion for these accounts, which was 29% higher than the department's request and 4% higher than the FY2018 funding levels  The Senate committee bill would have provided $1 44 billion for CIO and $1 68 billion for CIPA, for a combined total of $3 12 billion  This figure was 36% higher than the department's request and 9% higher than the FY2018 level  The Senate committee bill included a provision not present in recent appropriations laws mandating that funds appropriated for CIO "are made available to pay not less than the full fiscal year 2019 United States assessment for each respective international organization " With regard to CIPA, both the House and Senate committee reports noted that appropriated monies were intended to support an assessed peacekeeping cost at the statutory level of 25% rather than the U N  assessed rate for the United States of 28 4%  Both committee reports called on the department to review peacekeeping missions for cost savings and work to renegotiate rates of assessment  For FY2019, P L  116-6 provided $1 36 billion for CIO and $1 55 billion for CIPA, for a total of $2 91 billion—slightly less than both the House and Senate committee bills  This figure was still 2% higher than the FY2018 figure and 27% higher than the department's request  While the law did not include the aforementioned Senate committee bill provision regarding payment of full U S  assessments for organizations funded through the CIO account, the law's joint explanatory statement noted that it assumed the payment of the full United States assessment for each relevant organization (with some exceptions, including organizations from which the United States has withdrawn) and required the Secretary of State to consult with the Committees on Appropriations with respect to any decision not to provide the full assessment for any such organization  With respect to CIPA, the joint explanatory statement noted that sufficient funds are provided for contributions to peacekeeping missions at the statutory level of 25%  The enacted legislation, like the House and Senate committee bills, provided a share of CIPA funds as two-year funds, as requested by the department  The State Department requested $246 2 million for FY2019 to implement the Leadership and Modernization Impact Initiative (hereinafter, the Impact Initiative)  The Impact Initiative constitutes the implementation phase of the State Department's "Redesign" project  Former Secretary Tillerson initiated the redesign in 2017 to implement Executive Order 13781 and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum M-17-22, which aim to "improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the executive branch " The Impact Initiative constitutes 16 keystone modernization projects in three focus areas: Modernizing Information Technology and Human Resources Operations; Modernizing Global Presence, and Creating and Implementing Policy; and Improving Operational Efficiencies (see Table 5 )  According to the State Department, these focus areas and modernization projects are derived from the results of the listening tour that former Secretary Tillerson launched in May 2017, which included interviews conducted with approximately 300 individuals that the department said comprised a representative cross-section of its broader workforce, and a survey completed by 35,000 department personnel that asked them to discuss the means they use to help complete the department's mission and obstacles they encounter in the process  Of the $246 2 million requested, $150 0 million was requested from the IT Central Fund (which is funded through funds appropriated by Congress to the Capital Investment Fund account and, separately, expedited passport fees) and $96 2 million from the D&CP account to implement modernization projects  Proceeds from the IT Central Fund were intended to implement projects focused on IT, including modernizing existing IT infrastructure, systems, and applications based on a roadmap to be created in FY2018 and centralizing management of all WiFi networks  Funds from the D&CP account were intended to implement modernization projects focusing on Human Resources issues, including leadership development, management services consolidation, data analytics, and workforce readiness initiatives  Like the House and the Senate committee bills and reports, neither P L  116-6 nor the joint explanatory statement accompanying the law specifically mentioned the Impact Initiative by name  However, both the law and the joint explanatory statement included provisions explicitly prohibiting the Department of State from using appropriated funds to implement a reorganization without prior consultation, notification, and reporting to Congress (for example, see Section 7073 of P L  116-6 )  Like the Senate committee bill, P L  116-6 stated that no funds appropriated for SFOPs may be used to "downsize, downgrade, consolidate, close, move, or relocate" the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration  Foreign operations accounts, together with food aid appropriated through the Agriculture appropriations bill, constitute the foreign aid component of the international affairs budget  These accounts fund bilateral economic aid, humanitarian assistance, security assistance, multilateral aid, and export promotion programs  For FY2019, the Administration requested $28 60 billion for foreign aid programs within the international affairs (function 150) budget, about 28% less than the FY2018 actual funding level  None of the requested funds were designated as OCO  The FY2019 enacted appropriation provided $37 92 billion for foreign operations account, including $3 63 billion designated as OCO  Together with food aid accounts in the Agriculture appropriation, total enacted foreign aid within the international affairs budget was $39 85 billion, or 0 7% below the FY2018 actual funding level and 39% above the FY2019 request  Table 6 shows foreign aid funding by type for FY2017 and FY2018 actual, and the FY2019 request, committee-approved legislation, and enacted legislation  Account Mergers and Eliminations   The Administration aimed to simplify the foreign operations budget in part by channeling funds through fewer accounts and eliminating certain programs  These account mergers and eliminations were also proposed in the FY2018 budget request Under bilateral economic assistance, the Development Assistance (DA), Economic Support Fund (ESF), Assistance to Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) and Democracy Fund (DF) accounts were zero funded in the FY2019 request  Programs currently funded through these accounts would have been funded through a new Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) account  The proposed funding level for ESDF, $5 063 billion, was more than 36% below the FY2018 funding for the accounts it would have replaced  Fifteen countries that received DA, ESF, or AEECA in FY2017 would no longer have received funding from these accounts or from ESDF under the FY2019 request  Within multilateral assistance, the International Organizations & Programs (IO&P) account, which funds U S  voluntary contributions to many U N  entities, including UNICEF, U N  Development Program, and UN Women, would also have been zeroed out  Budget documents suggested that some unspecified activities currently funded through IO&P could have received funding through the ESDF or other accounts  Related to humanitarian assistance, the P L  480 Title II food aid account in the Agriculture appropriation would have been zero-funded and all food assistance would have been funded through the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account, which would have nevertheless declined by about 17% from FY2018 actual funding (see " Humanitarian Assistance " section below)  The Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account would have been subsumed into the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account  Closeout of Inter-American Foundation and U S -Africa Development Foundation   The FY2019 request proposed to terminate the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) and the U S -Africa Development Foundation (ADF), independent entities that implement small U S  assistance grants, often in remote communities  The Administration proposed to consolidate all small grant programs aimed at reaching the poor under USAID, as a means of improving their integration with larger development programs and U S  foreign policy objectives, as well as improving efficiency  Funds were requested for IAF and ADF only for the purposes of an orderly closeout  Development Finance Institution   The Administration requested, for the first time in FY2019, the consolidation of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and USAID's Development Credit Authority (DCA) into a new standalone Development Finance Institution (DFI)  The request called for $96 million for administrative expenses and $38 million for credit subsidies for DFI, but assumed that these expenses would be more than offset by collections, resulting in a net income of $460 million (based on OPIC's projected offsetting collections)  In addition, $56 million in ESDF funds would have been used to support DFI activities  The Administration sought congressional authority for the new standalone entity, which it described as a means of incentivizing private sector investment in development and improving the efficiency of U S  development finance programs  Both the House and Senate committee bills, as well as the enacted FY2019 appropriation, rejected these account changes, with the exception of the elimination of the ERMA account, which the House bill eliminated and the Senate and final bill funded with $1 million  All the FY2019 SFOPS legislation, including P L  116-6 , used the same bilateral account structure used for FY2018, not a new ESDF, and funded IAF and ADF at the FY2018 levels  Prior to enactment of the final FY2019 SFOPS appropriation, Congress passed the BUILD Act ( P L  115-254 ), which authorized the establishment of a new International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC), consistent with the Administration's DFI proposal  The IDFC is expected to become operational near the end of FY2019, and P L  116-6 made FY2019 appropriations for OPIC and DCA using the same account structure as in prior years, but authorized $5 million in the OPIC noncredit account to be used for transition costs  Top Country Recipients   Under the FY2019 request, top foreign assistance recipients would not have changed significantly, continuing to include strategic allies in the Middle East (Israel, Egypt, Jordan) and major global health and development partners in Africa (see Table 7 )  Israel would have seen an increase of $200 million from FY2017, reflecting a new 10-year security assistance Memorandum of Understanding  Zambia and Uganda would both have seen an 11% increase  All other top recipients would have seen reduced aid in FY2019 compared with FY2017 (comprehensive FY2018 country allocations were not yet available), though unallocated global health and humanitarian funds (added to the request after passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018) may have changed these totals  Figure 1 and Table 7 show the requested FY2019 foreign operations budget allocations by region and country  Under the FY2019 request, foreign assistance for every region would have been reduced compared to FY2018 funding  The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and Sub-Saharan Africa would continue to be the top regional recipients, together comprising nearly 80% of aid allocated by region ( Figure 2 )  Proposed cuts ranged from 61% in Europe and Eurasia to 2% in the MENA  Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa would have declined by 31%, aid to East Asia and Pacific by approximately half (51%), aid to South and Central Asia by about 4%, and aid to Western Hemisphere by 35%  The House bill ( H R  6385 ) and accompanying report did not provide comprehensive country and regional allocations, but did specify aid levels for some countries and regional programs, including Israel ($3 300 billion), Egypt ($1 457 billion), Jordan ($1 525 billion), Ukraine ($441 million), the U S  Strategy for Engagement in Central America ($595 million), and the Countering Russian Influence Funds ($250 million)  The Senate bill ( S  3108 ) and report specified aid allocations for several countries and regional programs, including Israel ($3 300 billion), Egypt ($1 082 billion), Jordan ($1 525 billion), Iraq ($429 million), West Bank & Gaza ($286 million), Afghanistan ($698 million), Pakistan ($271 million), Colombia ($391 million), Ukraine $426 million), U S  Strategy for Engagement in Central America ($515 million) and the Countering Russian Influence Fund ($300 million)  The enacted legislation, P L  116-6 , and the accompanying explanatory statement, specified FY2019 aid levels for several countries, including Israel ($3 300 billion), Egypt ($1 419 billion), Jordan ($1 525 billion), Iraq ($407 million), Colombia ($418 million), Mexico ($163 million), and Ukraine ($446 million), as well as for the U S  Strategy for engagement in Central America ($528 million) and the Countering Russian Influence Fund ($275 million)  The budget submission did not identify any new foreign assistance initiatives  The FY2019 request called for decreases in foreign aid funding generally while continuing to prioritize the aid sectors that have long made up the bulk of U S  foreign assistance: global health, humanitarian, and security assistance  The Administration requested $6 70 billion for global health programs in FY2019  This was a 23% reduction from the FY2018 funding level, yet global health programs would have increased slightly as a proportion of the foreign aid budget, from 22% of total aid in FY2018 to 23% in the FY2019 request, due to deeper proposed cuts elsewhere  HIV/AIDS programs, for which funding would have been cut about 27% from FY2018 actual levels, would have continued to make up the bulk (69%) of global health funding, as they have since the creation of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2004  Family planning and reproductive health services (for which the Administration proposed no funding for FY2018) would have received $302 million, a 42% reduction from FY2018 funding  Assistance levels would have been reduced for every health sector compared to FY2018, including maternal and child health (-25%), tuberculosis (-31%), malaria (-11%), neglected tropical diseases (-25%), global health security (-0 1%, funded through a proposed repurposing of FY2015 Ebola emergency funds), and nutrition (-37%)  The House committee bill included $8 69 billion for global health programs, the same as FY2018 funding  While total funding would remain the same, the House proposal would have reduced funding for family planning and reproductive health by about 12% compared to FY2018, while slightly increasing funding for polio, nutrition, and maternal and child health, and more than doubling funding for global health security and emerging threats  The Senate committee bill would have funded global health programs $8 792 billion, 1 2% above the FY2018 level  No subsectors would have received reduced funding and allocations for tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, family planning, nutrition, neglected tropical diseases and vulnerable children would all have increased slightly  While both bills included long-standing language preventing the use of appropriated funds to pay for abortions, the House bill, but not the Senate bill, also included a provision prohibiting aid to any foreign nongovernmental organizations that "promotes or performs" voluntary abortion, with some exceptions, regardless of the source of funding for such activities  P L  116-6 provides $8 84 billion for global health programs for FY2019, a 1 7% increase over FY2018 funding  Every health subsector was funded at the same or slightly higher level than in FY2018  The Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request for humanitarian assistance totaled $6 358 billion, which was roughly 32% less than FY2018 actual funding ($9 37 billion) and about 22% of the total FY2019 foreign aid request  The request included $2,800 4 million for the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account (-17% from FY2018) and $3,557 4 million for the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account (-17%) ( Figure 2 )  As in its FY2018 request, the Administration proposed to eliminate the Food for Peace (P L  480, Title II) and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) accounts, asserting that the activities supported through these accounts can be more efficiently and effectively funded through the IDA and MRA accounts, respectively  (Congress did not adopt the proposed changes to Food for Peace for FY2018, appropriating $1 716 billion for the account through the Agriculture appropriation, but did appropriate only $1 million for ERMA, a 98% reduction from FY2017 funding ) The Administration also sought authority to transfer and merge IDA and MRA base funds (current authority only applies to OCO-designated funds)  The Administration described its IDA request as focused "on crises at the forefront of U S  security interests, such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria, Somalia, and South Sudan " The MRA request focused on "conflict displacement in Afghanistan, Burma, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen," as well as strengthening bilateral relationships with "key refugee hosting countries such as Kenya, Turkey, Jordan, Ethiopia and Bangladesh " Consistent with last year, the request suggested that the proposed funding reduction assumes that other donors will shoulder an increased share of the overall humanitarian assistance burden worldwide  The House committee bills proposed $9 145 billion for humanitarian assistance accounts, about 2% less than FY2018 funding  The total included $1 5 billion for Food for Peace from the Agriculture appropriation but would not have funded the ERMA account  The Senate committee bills proposed $9 534 billion for humanitarian assistance, about 2% more than FY2018 funding  The total included $1 716 billion for Food for Peace and $1 million for the ERMA account  Neither bill included language authorizing broad transfers and mergers between the IDA and MRA base funding account, though both bills include provisions allowing for the transfer and merger of funds from several accounts, including IDA and MRA, as an extraordinary measure in response to a severe international infectious disease outbreak  As in FY2018, Congress did not adopt the significant humanitarian aid changes proposed by the Administration  P L  116-6 provided a total of $9 534 billion for humanitarian assistance in FY2019, almost level with FY2018 funding (-0 5%), of which about 21% was designated as OCO  This total included $3 434 billion in MRA funds, $1 million for ERMA, and $4 385 billion for IDA in the SFOPS division of the bill, as well as $1 716 billion for Food for Peace in the Agriculture division  The FY2019 security assistance request within foreign operations accounts totaled $7 304 billion, a 19% reduction from the FY2018 actual funding level and about 26% of the total foreign aid request  Consistent with recent years, 63% of the entire security assistance request was for FMF aid to Israel and Egypt  However, six countries were identified in the request as joint Department of Defense (DOD) and State Department security sector assistance priorities: Philippines, Vietnam, Ukraine, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Colombia  The International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account would have been reduced by about 36% from FY2018 actual levels, Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR) by 21%, and International Military Education and Training (IMET) by about 14%  In each of these cases, the Administration described the proposed reductions as concentrating resources where they offer the most value and U S  national security impact  As in the FY2018 request, the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, which supports most non-U N  multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations, including U S  training and equipment for African militaries and funding for the U N  Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), would have seen the biggest reduction (-46%) under the FY2019 request  This is because Administrations generally request UNSOS funds through the CIPA account, while Congress usually funds the office through the PKO account  The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account would have been reduced by 13% compared to FY2018, with specific allocations for 11 countries and a proposed $75 million Global Fund to be allocated flexibly  This was a notable change from the FY2018 FMF request, in which funds were allocated to four countries and a larger global fund, and from FY2018-enacted funding, for which allocations were specified for more than 20 countries  The House committee bill would have provided $9 274 billion for security assistance, a 3% increase over FY2018 funding, with funding increases proposed for the INCLE (+7%) and FMF (+4%) accounts and a reduction proposed for the PKO account (-9%)  Consistent with the request, and in contrast to recent year appropriations, no security assistance funding in the House committee bill was designated as OCO  The Senate committee bill included $8 789 billion for security assistance programs, a 2 6% total decrease from FY2018 funding  The INCLE account would have increased by 2 6% while the FMF and PKO accounts would be reduced by 3% and 11%, respectively  About 16% of the security assistance funding in the Senate bill was designated as OCO  In the final FY2019 appropriation, P L  116-6 , security assistance funding totaled $9 153 billion, a 1 4% increase from FY2018  Of the total, $555 million within the PKO and FMF accounts (6% of total security funding) was designated as OCO  Funding provided for most accounts was similar to FY2018 levels, with the exception of INCLE, which increased by 9 4% in part to support increased efforts to address the flow of illegal opioids, and PKO, for which funding decreased by about 9 2%  Bilateral economic development assistance is the broad category that includes programs focused on education, agricultural development and food security, good governance and democracy promotion, microfinance, environmental management, and other sectors  While the majority of this aid is implemented by USAID, it also includes the programs carried out by the independent Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Peace Corps, Inter-American Foundation and the U S -Africa Development Foundation  Excluding global health assistance, bilateral economic development assistance in the Administration's FY2019 request totaled $6 354 billion, a 33% reduction from FY2018 funding levels  Proposed FY2019 allocations for key sectors, compared with FY2018 levels prescribed in legislation, included the following: food security, $518 million (-48% from FY2018); democracy promotion programs, $1,235 million (-47% from FY2018); and education, $512 million (-51% from FY2018)  The Administration requested $800 million for MCC and $396 million for Peace Corps, representing cuts of 12% and 3%, respectively  As discussed above, the budget request also proposed to merge I-AF and USADF into USAID, and requested only small amounts of funding to close out their independent activities  The House committee bill would have provided $9 383 billion for economic development assistance and specified allocations for several development sectors, including education ($1 035 billion), conservation programs ($360 million), food security and agricultural development ($1 001 million), microenterprise and microfinance ($265 million), water and sanitation ($400 million) and democracy programs ($2 4 billion)  The Senate committee bill would have provided $9 764 billion for economic development activities and specifies allocations for education ($750 million), environment and renewable energy ($943 million), food security and agricultural development ($1 001 billion), small and micro credit ($265 million), water and sanitation ($435 million), and democracy programs ($2 4 billion), among others  Both the House and Senate bills would have funded the I-AF, USADF, Peace Corp, and MCC at the FY2018 funding level, and both bills explicitly rejected the Administration's proposal to merge I-AF and USADF into USAID  The enacted appropriation for FY2019, P L  116-6 , provided about $9 239 billion for nonhealth economic development aid  Minimum allocations specified for key sectors included $1 035 billion for education (basic and higher), $285 million for biodiversity conservation, $125 million for sustainable landscapes, $1 001 billion for food security and agricultural development, $265 million to support micro and small enterprises, $67 million to combat trafficking in persons, and $435 million for water and sanitation programs  The independent agencies were all funded at the same level as in FY2018  Appendix A  State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations, by Account Appendix B  International Affairs Budget The International Affairs budget, or Function 150, includes funding that is not in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriation: foreign food aid programs (P L  480 Title II Food for Peace and McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition programs) are in the Agriculture Appropriations, and the Foreign Claim Settlement Commission and the International Trade Commission are in the Commerce, Justice, Science appropriations  In addition, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriation measure includes funding for certain international commissions that are not part of the International Affairs Function 150 account  Appendix C  SFOPS Organizational Chart Appendix D  Glossary

ground_truth: This product provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy toward the conflict in Yemen. Summary tables provide information on legislative proposals considered in the 115th and 116th Congresses. Various legislative proposals have reflected a range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including with regard to the authorization of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces related to the conflict; the extent of U.S. logistical, material, advisory, and intelligence support for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia; the approval, disapproval, or conditioning of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia; the appropriation of funds for U.S. operations in support of the Saudi-led coalition; the conduct of the Saudi-led coalition's air campaign and its adherence to international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict; the demand for greater humanitarian access to Yemen; the call for a wider government assessment of U.S. policy toward Yemen and U.S. support to parties to the conflict; the nature and extent of U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and border security cooperation; and the role of Iran in supplying missile technology and other weapons to the forces of the Houthi movement. The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; presently, the World Food Program reports that 20 million Yemenis face hunger in the absence of sustained food assistance. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid agencies to count the war's casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) suggest that 60,000 Yemenis have been killed since January 2016. The Trump Administration has opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to reject or condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen. Many in Congress have condemned the October 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel, and in general, the incident appears to have exacerbated existing congressional concerns about Saudi leaders and the pace, scope, and direction of change in the kingdom's policies. This product includes legislative proposals considered during the 115th and 116th Congresses. It does not include references to Yemen in Iran sanctions legislation, which are covered in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, please see the following CRS products. CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. CRS Insight IN10729, Yemen: Cholera Outbreak.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: In March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations (hereinafter referred to as the Saudi-led coalition or the coalition) to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh  During 2014, the United States joined Saudi Arabia in demanding that Houthi forces reverse their campaign to occupy the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, but the rapid onset of hostilities in March 2015 forced the Obama Administration to react quickly  At the start of the Saudi-led intervention on March 25, 2015, the Administration announced that the United States would provide "logistical and intelligence support" to the coalition's operations without taking "direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort " Soon thereafter, a joint U S -Saudi planning cell was established to coordinate military and intelligence support for the campaign  At the United Nations Security Council, the United States supported the passage of Resolution 2216 (April 2015), which, among other things, required member states to impose an arms embargo against the Houthi-Saleh forces and demanded that the Houthis withdraw from all areas seized during the current conflict  Since the March 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, Congress has taken an active role in debating and overseeing U S  policy in the Arabian Peninsula  Members have considered legislative proposals seeking to reduce Yemeni civilian casualties resulting from the coalition's operations; improve deteriorating humanitarian conditions; end restrictions on the flow of goods and humanitarian aid; combat Iranian support for the Houthis; preserve maritime security in the Bab al Mandab Strait; and/or support continued Saudi-led coalition and U S  efforts to counter Al Qaeda and Islamic State forces in Yemen  Beyond Yemen, many Members have appeared to view the conflict through the prism of a broader regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the U S  effort to limit Iran's malign regional influence  Others lawmakers have viewed the Yemen conflict as indicative of what they perceive as problems in the U S -Saudi relationship, a concern that deepened after the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel in October 2018  Congress has considered but has not enacted proposals to curtail or condition U S  defense sales to Saudi Arabia  Responding to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen also appears to be reinvigorating some Members' interest in strengthening the role of Congress in foreign policy vis-à-vis the executive branch  Debate in Congress over Yemen has featured bipartisan statements of interest in asserting the prerogatives of the legislative branch to limit executive branch power, specifically using war powers legislation and the appropriations and authorization processes to curb U S  military involvement in support of coalition operations  Congressional scrutiny of U S  policy in Yemen also has led to legislative changes to global authorities, such as the Department of Defense's authority to enter into and use acquisition and cross servicing agreements with partner militaries  Congressional interest in the Yemen conflict has evolved and grown gradually and was not widespread at the outset of the coalition's March 2015 intervention in Yemen  In early to mid-2015, congressional interest in U S  foreign policy in the Middle East centered on the Iran nuclear deal and Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria  Several months after the March 2015 intervention, the Saudi-led coalition had not achieved a conclusive victory and what modest gains had been made on the ground were offset by mounting international criticism of growing civilian casualties from coalition air strikes  In Congress, several lawmakers began to express concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen  In late September 2015, Representative Ted W  Lieu wrote a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocating for a halt to U S  support for the Saudi-led coalition until it instituted safeguards to prevent civilian casualties  In October 2015, 10 Members of Congress wrote a letter to President Obama urging him to "work with our Saudi partners to limit civilian casualties to the fullest extent possible " In October 2015, Senator Markey stated that "I fear that our failure to strongly advocate diplomacy in Yemen over the past two years, coupled with our failure to urge restraint in the face of the crisis last spring, may put the viability of this critical [U S -Saudi] partnership at risk " By the fall of 2015, as the Obama Administration tried to balance its concern for adhering to the laws of armed conflict with its support for Gulf partners, lawmakers began to express their concern over U S  involvement in the coalition's intervention by scrutinizing U S  arms sales to Saudi Arabia  When the Administration informally notified Congress of a proposed sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia, some Senators sought to delay its formal notification  After the formal notification in November 2015, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) leaders jointly requested that the Administration notify Congress 30 days prior to associated shipments, marking the first use of this prior notification request authority  At that time, no related joint resolutions of disapproval on proposed sales of PGMs to the kingdom were introduced, but the delay and additional notification request demonstrated congressional concern  By the one-year anniversary of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, a more defined opposition to U S  support for the coalition had begun to coalesce amid repeated international documentation of human rights abuses and errant coalition airstrikes  In April 2016, legislation was introduced that sought to place conditions on future proposed sale notifications, previously approved sales, or transfers of PGMs to Saudi Arabia  Proposed amendments to FY2017 defense legislation would have added some similar conditions on the use of funds to implement sales of PGMs or prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia  The PGM amendment was not considered, but the cluster munitions amendment was narrowly defeated in a June 2016 House floor vote  In the spring and summer of 2016, the United Nations held multiple rounds of peace talks in Kuwait aimed at brokering an end to the conflict  From April 2016 to August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition had largely spared Yemen's capital Sanaa from aerial strikes as part of its commitment to the cessation of hostilities  When U N -mediated peace talks collapsed in August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition resumed bombing and the war intensified  During the summer of 2016, the Obama Administration reduced some U S  support for Saudi Arabia's air campaign in Yemen by withdrawing U S  personnel assigned to a joint U S -Saudi planning cell  Nevertheless, overall U S -Saudi cooperation continued and, in August 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of M1A2S tanks to Saudi Arabia  In response, some lawmakers wrote to request that President Obama withdraw the proposal, citing concerns about Yemen  In September 2016, joint resolutions of disapproval of the proposed tank sale were introduced in the Senate ( S J Res  39 ) and House ( H J Res  98 )  On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the SFRC from further consideration of S J Res  39 (71-27, Record Vote 145)  During debate over the motion, many Senators argued in favor of continued U S  support for Saudi Arabia, with Senator Lindsey Graham remarking "To those who want to vote today to suspend this aid to Saudi Arabia, people in Iran will cheer you on " In the wake of an October 2016 Saudi airstrike on a funeral hall in Sanaa that killed 140 people, the Obama Administration initiated a review of U S  security assistance to Saudi Arabia  Based on that review, it put a hold on a planned sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia and limited intelligence sharing, but maintained counterterrorism cooperation and refueling for coalition aircraft  In the final months of the Obama Administration, U S  Armed Forces briefly exchanged fire with forces party to the conflict  In October 2016, Houthi-Saleh forces launched anti-ship missiles at U S  Navy vessels on patrol off the coast of Yemen  The attacks against the U S  ships marked the first time U S  Armed Forces had come under direct fire in the war  The Obama Administration responded to the attacks against U S  naval vessels by directing the Armed Forces to fire cruise missiles against Houthi-Saleh radar installations  The Obama Administration described the U S  strikes as self-defense and indicated that it did not want to deepen its direct involvement in the conflict  In August and November 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry made several attempts to broker a peace initiative in Oman, but his efforts were rejected by the parties themselves  By the end of 114 th Congress, the war in Yemen was becoming a more significant foreign policy issue for lawmakers  While a growing number of Members were becoming critical of the U S  role in supporting the Saudi-led coalition amid a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen, more lawmakers still viewed the conflict through a regional lens rather than as a localized affair  Amid significant congressional opposition to the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), some Members viewed Iran's support for the Houthi movement and the broader conflict in Yemen as an example of Iran's malign regional activities not directly addressed by the JCPOA  As the Houthis targeted Gulf state infrastructure on land and vessels at sea, their behavior was touted as evidence of Iran's growing capabilities to threaten U S  and Gulf security  Just as some Members considered the Yemen conflict primarily a proxy war between the Iran-backed Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, others viewed it as a test of long-standing U S  commitments to supporting Saudi Arabian security  Supporters of the relationship, while acknowledging that Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war was at times problematic, argued that to curtail U S  arms sales or other defense support to the kingdom would weaken a vital partner that was under threat from a hostile nonstate actor on its southern border  Others lawmakers charged that continued U S  support for the coalition was not improving coalition behavior but damaging the U S  reputation for upholding commitments to international law and human rights  Legislation seeking to limit U S  arms sales to Saudi Arabia was not enacted in the 114 th Congress, but marked the beginning of the broader congressional debate that has continued  As the Trump Administration prepared to assume office, human rights organizations and aid groups were pressing Congress to become more attuned to the growing humanitarian crisis in Yemen  Though the Obama Administration had taken some steps, particularly in late 2016, to limit U S -coalition cooperation and restrict deliveries of PGMs to Saudi Arabia, nongovernmental groups deemed such action as insufficient  According to Human Rights Watch, "Whatever conditionality the Obama administration thought it had created—in holding up the transfer of precision munitions near the tail end of Obama's term and suspending cluster munition transfers earlier—ultimately did not have meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians " From the beginning of his Administration, President Donald Trump has signaled strong support for the Saudi-led coalition's operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference  He initiated a review of U S  policy toward Yemen, including President Obama's October 2016 restrictions on U S  arms sales and intelligence sharing to the coalition  On March 19, 2017, just prior to his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump notified Congress that he was proceeding with three proposed direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology deferred by the Obama Administration, subject to congressional review  In May 2017, the Administration officially notified Congress of its intention to proceed with proposed sales of precision guided munitions technologies that the Obama Administration had deferred, while announcing plans to increase training for Saudi Arabia's air force on both targeting and the Law of Armed Conflict  Congress debated another resolution of disapproval ( S J Res  42 ) of these proposed PGM sales in June 2017 (see below)  After completing the policy review in July 2017, President Trump directed his Administration "to focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity and commerce in the Red Sea " As President Trump entered office, the dynamics of the conflict in Yemen were changing, and the coalition launched a new offensive along Yemen's 280-mile western coastal plain ultimately aimed at taking the strategic Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah  In early 2017, the coalition's gradual advance toward Hudaydah, coupled with an ongoing deterioration in humanitarian conditions, sparked some Members of Congress to implore the Administration to improve aid access and negotiate a cease-fire  In March 2017, several House Members wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urging him to "use all U S  diplomatic tools to help open the Yemeni port of Hodeida [Hudaydah] to international humanitarian aid organizations " A month later, another group of House Members wrote to President Trump stating that Congress should approve any new U S  support to the coalition amid its offensive against Hudaydah  On June 13, 2017, the Senate debated another resolution ( S J Res  42 ) to disapprove of three direct commercial sales of PGMs to Saudi Arabia  During Senate floor consideration over the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S J Res  42 , Members once again weighed various issues, such as the U S -Saudi bilateral relationship, countering Iran, and limiting U S  involvement in the war in Yemen  Some lawmakers suggested that U S  arms sales and military support to the coalition had enabled alleged violations of international humanitarian law, while others argued that U S  support to the coalition improved its effectiveness and helps minimize civilian casualties  For example, during floor debate, Senator Graham argued that "If we are worried about collateral damage in Yemen, I understand the concern  Precision weapons would help that cause, not hurt it " Senator Murphy retorted, saying "What we are asking for is to hold off on selling these precision-guided munitions until we get some clear promise—some clear assurance—from the Saudis that they are going to use these munitions only for military purposes and that they are going to start taking steps—real steps, tangible steps—to address the humanitarian crisis " On June 13, 2017, the Senate voted to reject the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration (47-53, Record Vote 143), and a companion resolution was not taken up in the House ( H J Res  102 )  Representative Ro Khanna introduced a concurrent resolution ( H Con Res  81 ) pursuant to the War Powers Resolution ( P L  93-148 ) in a bid to end U S  support for the coalition's military intervention  After consultation between House leaders and supporters of the resolution on a compromise approach, the House agreed to delay expedited consideration of the resolution until after the November 2016 election and then adopted a nonbinding alternative ( H Res  599 , 366-30, 1 Present, Roll no  623)  In his first year in office, while President Trump sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, counter Iran, and increase U S  counterterrorism activity in Yemen, his Administration also at times took strong positions on the need for members of the coalition to improve humanitarian access, pursue a settlement to the conflict, and take measures to prevent civilian casualties  After a Houthi-fired missile with alleged Iranian origins landed deep inside Saudi Arabia in November 2017, the coalition instituted a full blockade of all of Yemen's ports, including the main port of Hudaydah, exacerbating the country's humanitarian crisis  The White House issued four press statements on the conflict between November 8 and December 8, including a statement on December 6 in which President Trump called on Saudi Arabia to "completely allow food, fuel, water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who desperately need it  This must be done for humanitarian reasons immediately " On December 20, 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would end its blockade of Hudaydah port for a 30-day period and permit the delivery of four U S -funded cranes to Yemen to increase the port's capability to off-load commercial and humanitarian goods  The next day, the White House issued a statement welcoming "Saudi Arabia's announcement of these humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict " As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate also proposed use of the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U S  support for the coalition's military intervention  On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S J Res  54 , a joint resolution to "direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress (except for those U S  forces engaged in counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces) " Efforts in the Senate followed a late 2017 attempt in the House (see Table 1 below), in which a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove U S  forces from Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed nonbinding resolution  Throughout 2018, between Congress and the Trump Administration and within Congress itself, there was disagreement as to whether U S  forces assisting the Saudi-led coalition have been introduced into active or imminent hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution  Some Members claimed that by providing support to the Saudi-led coalition, U S  forces have been introduced into a "situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated" based on the criteria of the War Powers Resolution  The Trump Administration disagreed  In February 2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the extent of current U S  support , and reported that "the United States provides the KSA-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties " On March 20, 2018, the Senate considered S J Res  54 on the floor  During debate, arguments centered on a number of issues, ranging from concern over exacerbating Yemen's humanitarian crisis to reasserting the role of Congress in authorizing the use of armed force abroad  After then-Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker promised to propose new legislation and hold hearings scrutinizing U S  policy in Yemen, a majority of Senators voted to table a motion to discharge the Foreign Relations committee from further consideration of S J Res  54   Senator Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker's approach, a view shared by some other Senators who voted to table the motion  The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Yemen a month later  In parallel testimony before Congress, U S  defense officials stated that while the United States refueled Saudi aircraft and provided advice on targeting techniques, CENTCOM did not track coalition aircraft after they were refueled and did not provide advice on specific targets  Then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert S  Karem testified that "It's correct that we do not monitor and track all of the Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen " During the same hearing, U S  officials acknowledged that pressure from Congress has altered how the Administration deals with the coalition over the Yemen conflict  Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield told Senator Todd Young and the SFRC the following: Senator, your efforts, the efforts of your colleagues in this body and on this Committee have been exceedingly helpful in allowing the Administration to send a message from whole of government regarding the very specific concerns we have over any limitations, restrictions, constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial goods specifically to include fuel to have unrestricted and expeditious entry into Yemen  And that messaging which comes from us, the Executive Branch, also comes from this body is extremely important  After the promised hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also proposed new legislation to place conditions on U S  assistance to the coalition  In May, the committee reported S J Res  58 to the Senate; it would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U S  funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained  The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the SFRC-reported text of S J Res  58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 ( S  2987 )  The provision was modified further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the FY2019 NDAA ( H R  5515 )  It was signed into law as P L  115-232 in mid-August, giving the Administration until mid-September 2018 to make certain certifications  In a statement accompanying the President's signing of P L  115-232 into law, President Trump objected to provisions such as Section 1290, stating the Administration's view that such provisions "encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is feasible and consistent" with "[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs " As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of 2018  On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched "Operation Golden Victory," aimed at retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah  As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could become widespread throughout northern Yemen  On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and then-Secretary of Defense Mattis saying, "We are concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical infrastructure  We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a near-term political resolution to the conflict " Several weeks later, Senator Robert Menendez, the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, placed a hold on a potential U S  sale of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates  In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said, I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective leverage to push back on Iran's actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own self-defense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates humanitarian suffering…  Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world's worst humanitarian crisis  On August 9, the coalition conducted an airstrike that hit a bus in a market near Dahyan, Yemen, in the northern Sa'ada governorate adjacent to the Saudi border  The strike reportedly killed 51 people, 40 of whom were children  The coalition claims that its airstrike was a "legitimate military operation" and conducted in response to a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi city of Jizan a day earlier that killed a Yemeni national in the kingdom  The U S  State Department called on the Saudi-led coalition to conduct a "thorough and transparent investigation into the incident " Several Members of Congress wrote to the Administration seeking additional information regarding U S  operations in the wake of the August 2018 coalition strike at Dahyan  Several Senators also submitted an amendment to the FY2019 Defense Department appropriations act ( H R  6157 ) that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to support the Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to Congress that the coalition air campaign "does not violate the principles of distinction and proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians " The provision did not apply to support for ongoing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Yemen  On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a certification that would allow the use of FY2019 defense funds to support in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft to continue, per the terms of Section 1290 (see discussion above) of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P L  115-232 )  Some Members of Congress criticized the Administration's actions, asserting that the coalition has not met the act's specified benchmarks for avoiding civilian casualties in Yemen  On September 26, several House Members introduced H Con Res  138 , which sought to direct the President to remove U S  Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, except for Armed Forces engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, within 30 days unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use has been enacted into law  In response to a similar initiative in the Senate, the Administration submitted a detailed argument expressing its view that U S  forces supporting Saudi-led coalition operations are not engaged in hostilities in Yemen  By late 2018, the prospect of widespread famine in Yemen coupled with international reprobation over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi pressured the Administration and the coalition to accelerate moves toward peace talks  On October 30, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for all parties to reach a cease-fire and resume negotiations  On November 9, Secretary Mattis further announced that effective immediately, the coalition would use its own military capabilities—rather than U S  capabilities—to conduct in-flight refueling in support of its operations in Yemen  Though fighting continued along several fronts, on December 13, 2018, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire centered on the besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah (Yemen's largest port)  As part of the U N -brokered deal (known as the Stockholm Agreement), the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside Hudaydah city and port  The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment  The international community praised the Stockholm Agreement as a first step toward broader de-escalation and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace settlement  Also on December 13, 2018, the Senate amended and passed S J Res  54 (56-41), which, among other things, directed the President to remove U S  forces from hostilities in Yemen, except U S  forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces  In the House, lawmakers twice narrowly approved rules resolutions containing provisions that made similar resolutions directing the President to remove U S  forces from hostilities in Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration ( H Res  1142 and H Res  1176 )  On December 13, the Senate also passed S J Res  69 , which, among other things, expresses the sense of the Senate that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is responsible for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and that there is no statutory authorization for United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war  The 115th Congress frequently debated the extent and terms of the United States' involvement in the ongoing conflict in Yemen  Lawmakers questioned the extent to which successive Administrations have adhered to existing law related to providing security assistance, including sales or transfers of defense goods and defense services, while upholding international human rights standards (e g , 22 U S C  §2754 or 22 U S C  §2304)  They also enacted new legislation that would condition or prohibit the use of U S  funds for some activities related to Yemen and extend legislative oversight over the executive branch's policy toward the war in Yemen  While the House and its Rules Committee voted to make resolutions with respect to war powers and Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration, the Senate passage of S J Res  54 at the conclusion of the 115 th Congress demonstrated growth in congressional opposition to U S  involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen relative to previous years  Over time, the balance of votes shifted in favor of measures that could be described as critical or restrictive of U S  support for Saudi-led coalition operations with regard to arms sales, oversight measures, and war powers measures  Nevertheless, after nearly four years of conflict, it remains difficult to identify the locus of congressional consensus about Yemen  Many in the House and Senate state that they seek to preserve cooperative U S -Saudi relations in broad terms and express concern about Iranian activities in Yemen, while also expressing support for expanded humanitarian access and efforts to bring the conflict to a close  Some lawmakers express opposition to the intervention and U S  involvement on moral grounds, citing errant coalition airstrikes and the prospect of a looming famine  Others argue the conflict's continuation creates opportunities for Iran and Sunni Islamist extremist groups to expand their influence and operations in Yemen  Still others may have come to oppose continued U S  support for the intervention based on factors not directly related to Yemen itself, including the opaque mechanisms used by the executive branch to support the coalition and/or anger with the Saudi government over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi  It remains to be seen whether recent congressional consideration of Yemen legislation is a harbinger of broader efforts by Members of Congress to reassert congressional prerogatives toward U S  foreign policy writ large  Measures to enhance oversight over U S  support to the Saudi-led coalition and U S  strategy toward Yemen have received broad bipartisan support, while proponents of other recently considered arms sales and war powers measures have used mechanisms to ensure privileged consideration of their proposals  The 116 th Congress may continue to debate U S  support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen  It is uncertain whether lawmakers may also broaden the scope of their oversight activities beyond the current conflict to more fully address the root causes of Yemen's chronic instability  Even if the United States is no longer an active supporter of coalition military efforts, Yemen itself has been devastated by years of war and remains the world's worst humanitarian crisis  Experts expect Yemen to require sustained international attention and financial assistance in order to help local actors reach and sustain a political settlement  This suggests that Congress may grapple with questions about the conduct of U S  diplomacy, the provision of U S  security support, and the investment of U S  assistance and defense funds for years to come 


Report 2: Our past work has identified progress and challenges in a number of areas related to DHS’s management of the CFATS program including (1) the process for identifying high risk chemical facilities; (2) how it assesses risk and prioritizes facilities; (3) reviewing and approving facility security plans; (4) how it conducts facility compliance inspections; and (5) efforts to conduct stakeholder outreach and gather feedback  DHS has made a number of programmatic changes to CFATS in recent years that may also impact its progress in addressing our open recommendations; these changes are included as part of our ongoing review of the program  In May 2014, we found that more than 1,300 facilities had reported having ammonium nitrate to DHS  However, based on our review of state data and records, there were more facilities with ammonium nitrate holdings than those that had reported to DHS under the CFATS program  Thus, we concluded that some facilities that were required to report may have failed to do so  We recommended that DHS work with other agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to develop and implement methods of improving data sharing among agencies and with states as members of a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group  DHS agreed with our recommendation and has since addressed it  Specifically, DHS compared DHS data with data from other federal agencies, such as EPA, as well as member states from the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group to identify potentially noncompliant facilities  As a result of this effort, in July 2015, DHS officials reported that they had identified about 1,000 additional facilities that should have reported information to comply with CFATS and subsequently contacted these facilities to ensure compliance  DHS officials told us that they continue to engage with states to identify potentially non-compliant facilities  For example, as of June 2018, DHS officials stated they have received 43 lists of potentially noncompliant facilities from 34 state governments, which are in various stages of review by DHS  DHS officials also told us that they recently hired an individual to serve as the lead staff member responsible for overseeing this effort  DHS has also taken action to strengthen the accuracy of data it uses to identify high risk facilities  In July 2015, we found that DHS used self- reported and unverified data to determine the risk categorization for facilities that held toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released  At the time, DHS required that facilities self- report the Distance of Concern—an area in which exposure to a toxic chemical cloud could cause serious injury or fatalities from short-term exposure—as part of its Top-Screen  We estimated that more than 2,700 facilities with a toxic release threat had misreported the Distance of Concern and therefore recommended that DHS (1) develop a plan to implement a new Top-Screen to address errors in the Distance of Concern submitted by facilities, and (2) identify potentially miscategorized facilities that could cause the greatest harm and verify that the Distance of Concern of these facilities report is accurate  DHS has fully addressed both of these recommendations  Specifically, DHS implemented an updated Top-Screen in October 2016 and now collects data from facilities and calculates the Distance of Concern itself, rather than relying on the facilities’ calculation  In response to our second recommendation, in November 2016, DHS officials stated they completed an assessment of all Top-Screens that reported threshold quantities of toxic release chemicals of interest and identified 158 facilities with the potential to cause the greatest harm  As of May 2017, according to ISCD officials, 156 of the 158 facilities submitted updated Top-Screens and 145 of the 156 Top-Screens had undergone a quality assurance review process  DHS has also taken actions to better assess regulated facilities’ risks in order to place the facilities into the appropriate risk tier  In April 2013, we reported that DHS’s risk assessment approach did not consider all of the elements of threat, vulnerability, and consequence associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals  Our work showed that DHS’s risk assessment was based primarily on consequences from human casualties, but did not consider economic consequences, as called for by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the CFATS regulation  We also found that (1) DHS’s approach was not consistent with the NIPP because it treated every facility as equally vulnerable to a terrorist attack regardless of location or on-site security and (2) DHS was not using threat data for 90 percent of the tiered facilities—those tiered for the risk of theft or diversion—and using 5-year-old threat data for the remaining 10 percent of those facilities that were tiered for the risks of release or sabotage  We recommended that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk and conduct a peer review after doing so  DHS agreed with our recommendations and has made progress towards addressing them  Specifically, with regard to our recommendation that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk, DHS worked with Sandia National Laboratories to develop a model to estimate the economic consequences of a chemical attack  In addition, DHS worked with Oak Ridge National Laboratory to devise a new tiering methodology, called the Second Generation Risk Engine  In so doing, DHS revised the CFATS threat, vulnerability, and consequence scoring methods to better cover the range of CFATS security issues  Additionally, with regard to our recommendation that DHS conduct a peer review after enhancing its risk assessment approach, DHS conducted peer reviews and technical reviews with government organizations and facility owners and operators, and worked with Sandia National Laboratories to verify and validate the new tiering approach  We are currently reviewing the reports and data that DHS has provided about its new tiering methodology as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of this work later this summer  To further enhance its risk assessment approach, in fall 2016, DHS also revised its Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT), which supports DHS efforts to gather information from facilities to assess their risk  According to DHS officials, the new tool—called CSAT 2 0—is intended to eliminate duplication and confusion associated with DHS’s original CSAT  DHS officials told us that they have improved the tool by revising some questions in the original CSAT to make them easier to understand; eliminating some questions; and pre-populating data from one part of the tool to another so that users do not have to retype the same information multiple times  DHS officials also told us that the facilities that have used the CSAT 2 0 have provided favorable feedback that the new tool is more efficient and less burdensome than the original CSAT  Finally, DHS officials told us that as of June 2018, DHS has completed all notifications and has processed tiering results for all but 226 facilities  DHS officials stated they are currently working to identify correct points of contact to update registration information for these remaining facilities  We are currently assessing DHS’s efforts to assess risk and prioritize facilities as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of this work in our report later this summer  DHS has also made progress reviewing and approving facility site security plans by reducing the time it takes to review these plans and eliminating the backlog of plans awaiting review  In April 2013, we reported that DHS revised its procedures for reviewing facilities’ security plans to address DHS managers’ concerns that the original process was slow, overly complicated, and caused bottlenecks in approving plans  We estimated that it could take DHS another 7 to 9 years to review the approximately 3,120 plans in its queue at that time  We also estimated that, given the additional time needed to do compliance inspections, the CFATS program would likely be implemented in 8 to 10 years  We did not make any recommendations for DHS to improve its procedures for reviewing facilities’ security plans because DHS officials reported that they were exploring ways to expedite the process, such as reprioritizing resources and streamlining inspection requirements  In July 2015, we reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities  DHS officials attributed the increased approval rate to efficiencies in DHS’s review process, updated guidance, and a new case management system  Subsequently, DHS reported in its December 2016 semi-annual report to Congress that it had eliminated its approval backlog  Finally, we found in our 2017review that DHS also took action to implement an Expedited Approval Program (EAP)  The CFATS Act of 2014 required that DHS create the EAP as another option that tier 3 and tier 4 chemical facilities may use to develop and submit security plans to DHS  Under the program, facilities may develop a security plan based on specific standards published by DHS (as opposed to the more flexible performance standards using the standard, non-expedited process)  DHS issued guidance intended to help facilities prepare and submit their EAP security plans to DHS, which includes an example that identifies prescriptive security measures that facilities are to have in place  According to committee report language, the EAP was expected to reduce the regulatory burden on smaller chemical companies, which may lack the compliance infrastructure and the resources of large chemical facilities, and help DHS to process security plans more quickly  If a tier 3 or 4 facility chooses to use the expedited option, DHS is to review the plan to determine if it is facially deficient, pursuant to the reporting requirements of the CFATS Act of 2014  If DHS approves the EAP site security plan, it is to subsequently conduct a compliance inspection  In 2017, we found that DHS had implemented the EAP and had reported to Congress on the program, as required by the CFATS Act of 2014  In addition, as of June 2018 according to DHS officials, only 18 of the 3,152 facilities eligible to use the EAP opted to use it  DHS officials we interviewed attributed the low participation to several possible factors including: DHS had implemented the expedited program after most eligible facilities already submitted standard (non-expedited) security plans to DHS; facilities may consider the expedited program’s security measures to be too strict and prescriptive, not providing facilities the flexibility of the standard process; and the lack of an authorization inspection may discourage some facilities from using the expedited program because this inspection provides useful information about a facility’s security  We also found in 2017 that recent changes made to the CFATS program could affect the future use of the expedited program  As discussed previously, DHS has revised its methodology for determining the level of each facility’s security risk, which could affect a facility’s eligibility to participate in the EAP  DHS continues to apply the revised methodology to facilities regulated under the CFATS program and but it is too early to assess the impact on participation in the EAP  In our July 2015 report, we found that DHS began conducting compliance inspections in September 2013, and by April 2015, had conducted inspections of 83 of the 1,727 facilities that had approved security plans  Our analysis showed that nearly half of the facilities were not fully compliant with their approved site security plans and that DHS had not used its authority to issue penalties because DHS officials found it more productive to work with facilities to bring them in compliance  We also found that DHS did not have documented processes and procedures for managing the compliance of facilities that had not implemented planned measures by the deadlines outlined in the plans  We recommended that DHS document processes and procedures for managing compliance to provide more reasonable assurance that facilities implement planned measures and address security gaps  DHS agreed and has taken steps toward implementing this recommendation  DHS updated its CFATS Enforcement Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and has made progress on the new CFATS Inspections SOP  Once completed these two documents collectively are expected to formally document the processes and procedures currently being used to track noncompliant facilities and ensure they implement planned measures as outlined in their approved site security plans, according to ISCD officials  DHS officials stated they expect to finalize these procedures by the end of fiscal year 2018  We are examining compliance inspections as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of our work in our report later this summer  In April 2013, we reported that DHS took various actions to work with facility owners and operators, including increasing the number of visits to facilities to discuss enhancing security plans, but that some trade associations had mixed views on the effectiveness of DHS’s outreach  We found that DHS solicited informal feedback from facility owners and operators in its efforts to communicate and work with them, but did not have an approach for obtaining systematic feedback on its outreach activities  We recommended that DHS take action to solicit and document feedback on facility outreach consistent with DHS efforts to develop a strategic communication plan  DHS agreed and implemented this recommendation by developing a questionnaire to solicit feedback on outreach with industry stakeholders and began using the questionnaire in October 2016  Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member Tonko, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time  If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Other individuals making key contributions to this work include John Mortin, Assistant Director; and Brandon Jones, Analyst-in-Charge; Michael Lennington, Ben Emmel, and Hugh Paquette  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 

ground_truth: Thousands of facilities have hazardous chemicals that could be targeted or used to inflict mass casualties or harm surrounding populations in the United States. In accordance with the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007, DHS established the CFATS program in 2007 to, among other things, identify and assess the security risk posed by chemical facilities. DHS inspects high-risk facilities after it approves facility security plans to ensure that the facilities are implementing required security measures and procedures. This statement summarizes progress and challenges related to DHS's CFATS program management. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from July 2012 through June 2017, along with updates conducted in June 2018 on DHS actions to address prior GAO recommendations. To conduct the prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and DHS policies for administering the CFATS program, how DHS assesses risk, and data on high-risk chemical facilities. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and reviewed information on DHS actions to implement its prior recommendations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress addressing challenges that GAO's past work identified to managing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The following summarizes progress made and challenges remaining in key aspects of the program. Identifying high-risk chemical facilities. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS used self-reported and unverified data to determine the risk of facilities holding toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released. GAO recommended that DHS should better verify the accuracy of facility-reported data. DHS implemented this recommendation by revising its methodology so it now calculates the risk of toxic release, rather than relying on facilities to do so. Assessing risk and prioritizing facilities. In April 2013, GAO reported weaknesses in multiple aspects of DHS's risk assessment and prioritization approach. GAO made two recommendations for DHS to review and improve this process, including that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. DHS launched a new risk assessment methodology in October 2016 and is currently gathering new or updated data from about 27,000 facilities to (1) determine which facilities should be categorized as high-risk because of the threat of sabotage, theft or diversion, or a toxic release and (2) assign those facilities deemed high risk to one of four risk-based tiers. GAO has ongoing work assessing these efforts and will report later this summer on the extent to which they fully address prior recommendations. Reviewing and approving facilities' site security plans . DHS is to review security plans and visit facilities to ensure their security measures meet DHS standards. In April 2013, GAO reported a 7 to 9 year backlog for these reviews and visits. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities. DHS has since taken additional action to expedite these activities and has eliminated this backlog. Inspecting facilities and ensuring compliance. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS conducted compliance inspections at 83 of the 1,727 facilities with approved security plans. GAO found that nearly half of the inspected facilities were not fully compliant with their approved security plans and that DHS did not have documented procedures for managing facilities' compliance. GAO recommended that DHS document procedures for managing compliance. As a result, DHS has developed an enforcement procedure and a draft compliance inspection procedure and expects to finalize the compliance inspection procedure by the end of fiscal year 2018. GAO has made various recommendations to strengthen DHS's management of the CFATS program, with which DHS has generally agreed. DHS has implemented or described planned actions to address most of these recommendations.