prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: The National Cemeteries Act of 1973 created the modern veterans’ cemetery system  NCA, within VA, manages a majority of veterans’ cemeteries in the United States  In that role NCA maintains existing national cemeteries and builds new national cemeteries for the nation’s veterans and their family members  Since 1978 NCA has also provided funding through VA’s Veterans Cemetery Grants Program (Grants Program) to help establish, expand, or improve state and tribal veterans’ cemeteries  States and tribal governments seeking funding from the Grants Program must apply to the VA  Any cemetery established, expanded, or improved through funding from VA’s Grants Program must be maintained and operated in accordance with NCA’s operational standards  Veterans from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and some U S  territories are served by national, state, or tribal cemeteries  In addition, over time NCA has changed its policies and procedures to better fulfill its mission to serve and honor veterans and their family members  For example, in 2011 NCA lowered its policy threshold for establishing new national cemeteries from an area having at least 170,000 veterans who are unserved by burial options to an area having 80,000 unserved veterans  NCA established this revised policy threshold in recognition that many highly populated areas still lacked reasonable access to a burial option, and based on data and analysis provided by an independent review of VA’s burial benefits program in 2008  This revised minimum veteran population threshold was chosen based on data showing that state veterans’ cemeteries funded through VA’s Grants Program were located in areas that typically served a maximum of 80,000 veterans within a 75-mile service area  According to VA documentation, moving to this lower threshold has enabled the agency to establish new national cemeteries in areas where states may not have been willing to place them because of the size and cost of operating a larger state veterans’ cemetery  NCA offers a variety of facilities to meet the burial needs of veterans, including various cemetery configurations that either provide burial options to eligible veterans or improve their access to burial options, as shown in table 1  NCA uses county-level population data to determine whether veterans currently have reasonable access to burial options and uses county-level population projections to support decisions about future cemetery locations  NCA makes its decisions regarding whether a veteran is served or unserved based on the county in which the veteran resided, without reference to the location of the veteran’s actual residence  NCA’s methodology uses a veteran’s county of residence as a proxy for being within 75 miles of a veterans’ cemetery  NCA’s plan entails establishing 18 new national cemeteries—comprised of five traditional national cemeteries and 13 urban and rural initiative national cemeteries—and awarding funds for new state veterans’ cemeteries  In 2014, we reported that NCA estimated approximately 90 percent of the veteran population had reasonable access to burial options, and that it expected to reach its strategic goal of providing reasonable access to 96 percent of veterans by the end of fiscal year 2017  Since 2014, NCA has revised its strategic goal to provide reasonable access to 95 percent of the veteran population, and NCA’s current long-range plan to achieve this goal covers fiscal years 2018- 2022  NCA’s 2014 plan to increase veterans’ access to burial options included building 18 new national cemeteries as follows: Five traditional national cemeteries, to be located in Western New York; Central East Florida; Southern Colorado; Tallahassee, Florida; and Omaha, Nebraska  Taken together, according to NCA, these cemeteries are intended to provide a burial option to an additional 550,000 veterans and their families  Five urban initiative cemeteries, to be located in Los Angeles, California; the San Francisco Bay Area, California; Chicago, Illinois; Indianapolis, Indiana; and New York, New York  Taken together, according to NCA, the urban initiative is intended to expand burial options for approximately 2 4 million additional veterans in certain urban areas  NCA announced this initiative in 2011 with the purpose of expanding burial options in urban areas through building columbaria-only (facilities for cremated remains) national cemeteries close to the urban core  Eight rural initiative cemeteries, to be located in Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming  Taken together, according to NCA, the intent of the rural initiative is to increase the burial options for approximately 106,000 additional veterans in certain rural areas  NCA announced this initiative in 2012 with the purpose of increasing access by establishing new national cemeteries for states with no open national cemetery and a population of 25,000 or fewer veterans  In addition, since 1978, NCA has used the Grants Program to help increase veterans’ cemetery access  The Grants Program was established to complement national cemeteries by assisting state, territory, and tribal government applicants to establish, expand, or improve veterans’ cemeteries in order to provide gravesites for veterans in those areas where NCA cannot fully satisfy their burial needs  As noted earlier, states and tribal governments seeking grant funding must apply to the VA  States, funded by the Grants Program, often build in areas with veteran populations that are too small to qualify for a national cemetery  NCA prioritizes pending grant applications by giving the highest priority to cemetery construction projects in geographic locations with the greatest projected number of veterans who will benefit from the project, as determined by NCA based on county-level population projections  In 2018, NCA provided funding for a total of 15 grants for the expansion, improvement, or establishment of state and tribal government veterans’ cemeteries  This includes the establishment of two new state and tribal government veterans’ cemeteries  In 2019, NCA expects to provide funding for 17 state and tribal government veterans’ cemetery projects, three of which would be for new cemeteries  While NCA has made some progress in implementing its plan to increase burial access for veterans, that progress has been limited, as it is years behind its original schedule for opening new cemeteries  In its efforts, NCA has experienced three key challenges: (1) acquiring suitable land for new national cemeteries, (2) estimating the costs associated with establishing new national cemeteries, and (3) using all available data to inform how its Grants Program targets unserved veteran populations  In 2014, NCA planned to open 18 new sites by the end of fiscal year 2017 to better serve the burial needs of the veteran population  As of September 2019, NCA has opened four new traditional national cemeteries—Tallahassee National Cemetery in Tallahassee, Florida; Cape Canaveral National Cemetery in Mims, Florida; Omaha National Cemetery in Omaha, Nebraska; and Pikes Peak National Cemetery in Colorado Springs, Colorado  NCA also opened two of its eight planned rural initiative cemeteries—Yellowstone National Cemetery in Laurel, Montana, and Fargo National Cemetery in Harwood, North Dakota  As a result, according to NCA, by the end of fiscal year 2018 the percentage of veterans with reasonable access had increased from 90 percent to about 92 percent  As previously discussed, NCA’s goal is to provide 95 percent of veterans with reasonable access to burial options  As we reported in 2014, NCA had initially planned to open all of its 13 urban and rural initiative sites by the end of fiscal year 2017  As shown in figure 1, NCA had originally estimated completing all five of its urban initiative sites by the end of fiscal year 2015  However, the completion dates for all of these sites have slipped multiple times  In July 2019, NCA officials stated that the planned completion dates for the urban initiative sites were as follows: October 2019 for Los Angeles, sometime in 2020 for New York and Indianapolis, September 2021 for Chicago, and sometime in 2027 for San Francisco  As shown in figure 2, NCA has opened two of its rural initiative sites, in Laurel, Montana, and Fargo, North Dakota  However, the completion dates for the other six rural initiative sites have slipped multiple times  In September 2019, NCA officials stated that the planned completion dates for the rural initiative sites were currently Fall 2019 for Twin Falls, Idaho, Machias, Maine, and Rhinelander, Wisconsin; sometime in 2020 for Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Summer 2021 for Cedar City, Utah  NCA did not provide a specific estimated completion date for the site in Elko, Nevada, affirming that it would be completed “in a future year ” When we asked NCA officials why the rural and urban initiative sites were currently projected to take years longer to complete than originally planned, they replied that they might have overstated their 2014 expectations for having all initiative sites completed by the end of fiscal year 2017  NCA officials also stated that it takes at least 12 months for the land acquisition phase of cemetery construction projects; 9 to 12 months for the design phase; and 12 to 15 months—sometimes up to 30—for the construction phase  According to NCA officials, as of September 2019, five of the 11 initiative sites had reached the construction phase, and one of the sites no longer had an estimated completion date  There were still some outstanding or unresolved issues that had complicated NCA’s ability to estimate a completion date for the site in Elko, Nevada  See figure 3 for a timeline of each of NCA’s urban and rural initiative sites as of September 2019  In executing its plans to increase access to burial options for veterans, NCA has experienced three key challenges: (1) acquiring suitable land for new national cemeteries; (2) estimating the costs associated with establishing new national cemeteries; and (3) using all available data to inform how its Grants Program targets unserved veteran populations  The primary factor that has led NCA to adjust its timelines for completing these cemeteries concerns challenges in acquiring suitable land  Such challenges include difficulty in finding viable land for development, legal issues related to the acquisitions process, and resistance from the local community, among others  Four examples are described below, including two instances in which, as of July 2019, NCA had not yet acquired suitable land, which may further delay the opening of those specific urban and rural sites  Chicago, Illinois  NCA officials stated that they are on their fifth attempt to acquire land for the urban initiative site in Chicago, Illinois  In addition, they said that the environmental assessment process for the Chicago site is currently underway, and that a site viability decision will not occur until the environmental assessment process is completed later in 2019  According to NCA documentation we reviewed, NCA initiated the land acquisition process for the Chicago site in June 2011 and planned to complete the process by July 2018  If the fifth attempt to acquire land is not successful, then NCA will attempt—for the sixth time—to acquire land  According to NCA officials, this would result in an additional 12 to 18 months to identify and evaluate new property for potential acquisition, likely further delaying the opening of this site  See figure 4 for more details on NCA’s attempts to acquire land for the urban initiative site in Chicago  Elko, Nevada  NCA officials stated that they have identified a top- rated site for the rural initiative site in Elko, Nevada, on land currently owned by the Bureau of Land Management  However, according to NCA officials, Congress would need to enact legislation transferring this land from the Bureau of Land Management to VA before NCA could begin construction  As of June 2019, Congress had not done so  According to NCA officials, VA has opened dialogue with local officials about drafting a utility agreement for the city to construct infrastructure needed to supply water to the site  Implementation of a utility agreement would be dependent upon whether future legislation may potentially be introduced and subsequently passed authorizing the Bureau of Land Management to permanently transfer property to VA for national cemetery use  Also, according to NCA officials, once legislation has passed to allow the transfer of land from the Bureau of Land Management to VA, they estimate it will take 12 to 18 months for the land transfer to be completed  Indianapolis, Indiana  In a written response, NCA officials stated that construction for the urban initiative site in Indianapolis, Indiana, has been delayed by about a year due to a public protest of NCA’s acquisition of the site because of environmental concerns, which resulted in a land transfer with the previous landowner in January 2019  In addition, NCA had to conduct a partial project re-design for the exchanged property  According to NCA’s May 2018 plan of actions and milestones, it had expected to have acquired the land for the Indianapolis site by August 2018 and to have completed construction in December 2019  However, officials told us in September 2018 that, due to the delays in acquiring the land, NCA had revised its planned construction completion date to August 2020  Los Angeles, California  According to officials, NCA is partnering with the Veterans Health Administration, which transferred property for the proposed columbarium at the Los Angeles, California, urban initiative site  Officials stated that this project was delayed initially due to the need to remove existing encumbrances on the land (for example, leases with tenants), among other things  In July 2019, officials stated that the project is scheduled for completion in October 2019  According to NCA officials, unforeseen site conditions can also contribute to delays in cemetery construction projects  During the design phase, soil and geotechnical samples are taken but do not cover the entire site  After excavation begins, issues such as rock formations or hazardous waste not identified during the geotechnical investigation may create challenges to developing land for cemetery use  For example, in July 2019 NCA officials stated that the urban initiative site in San Francisco had encountered major geotechnical and soil issues, causing the project completion to slip to 2027  Also, according to NCA’s 2017 annual status report to Congress on new national cemeteries, the cemetery construction contract for a new cemetery construction project in Western New York could not begin solicitation until additional parcels of land had been acquired  Those parcels of land have a gas well and a gas pipeline that must be relocated  According to NCA officials, as of September 2019, six of the 11 urban and rural initiative sites had not yet begun to be excavated, and any issues that arise during the excavation process at these sites could pose further scheduling delays
Report 2:  We previously found that results-oriented organizations set performance goals to clearly define desired program outcomes and develop performance measures that are clearly linked to the performance goals  Performance measures should focus on whether a program has achieved measurable standards toward achieving program goals, and allow agencies to monitor and report program accomplishments on an ongoing basis  Our previous work on performance metrics identified 10 attributes of effective performance  Table 7 identifies each key attribute of effective performance measures along with its definition  We evaluated the current performance measures included in the 2018 NSTS, the DHS fiscal year 2019 congressional budget justification, the CSR goals and priorities database, and the CFSR status database related to TSA’s Pipeline Security Branch  We primarily focused on key attributes which could be applied to individual measures  These include clarity, linkage, measurable targets, objectivity, reliability, and baseline and trend data  Our prior work on performance measurement found that all performance measure attributes are not equal and failure to have a particular attribute does not necessarily indicate that there is a weakness in that area or that the measure is not useful; rather, it may indicate an opportunity for further refinement  Based on our evaluation, the TSA-identified measures do not possess attributes that we have identified as being key to successful performance measures  As a result, TSA cannot fully determine the extent to which the Pipeline Security Branch has achieved desired outcomes, including the effectiveness of its efforts to reduce risks to pipelines  Specifically, many of TSA’s measures cover agency goals and mission, but they generally lack clarity and measurable targets, provide significantly overlapping information, and do not include baseline and trend data  Clarity  The pipeline-related measures in the 2018 NSTS are not clear because they do not describe the methodology used to calculate them, and the names and definitions are not clearly described  For example, NSTS goal 1 includes an objective to conduct training of employees responding to terrorist attacks  The desired outcome is to improve the capability of industry employees to respond and recover from terrorist attacks  However, the performance measure is the percentage of critical pipeline systems implementing the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines  It is not clear if this measure is specific to the sections of the guidelines related to employee training or overall implementation of the guidelines  The CFSR status database measures include the percentage of recommendations implemented by topic, such as “Site Specific Security Measures,” “Signage,” or “Miscellaneous ” However, the database does not specifically define these topics or explain the methodology for calculating the measures  Unclear measures could be confusing and misleading to users  Core program activities  The pipeline-related measures in the 2018 NSTS cover some of the agency’s core program activities, such as conducting security exercises with the pipeline industry and providing intelligence and information products to the industry  However, the NSTS Pipeline Security Plan measures do not specifically include some core program activities, such as updating the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines or the results of conducting CSRs and CFSRs in order to collect the information necessary for the existing performance measures  The CSR goals and priorities database and the CFSR status database include measures intended to track some of the results of pipeline security reviews, such as the average percentage compliance with the guidelines by fiscal year and the percentage of CFSR recommendations implemented  If core program activities are not covered, there may not be enough information available in those areas to managers and stakeholders  Limited overlap  The pipeline-related measures in the 2018 NSTS do not have limited overlap  As discussed previously, four of the five NSTS measures are based on the percentage of critical pipeline systems implementing TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines  The management measure is based on the number of complete pipeline security reviews  The CFSR status database measures are based on the percentage of recommendations implemented overall and by groups  Finally, the CSR goals and priorities database measures are based on the average compliance percentage of companies that had CSRs conducted in fiscal years 2016 and 2017  This is similar to four of the five NSTS measures  Significantly overlapping measures may lead to redundant, costly information that does not add value for TSA management  Linkage  The pipeline-related measures in the 2018 NSTS generally exhibited this key attribute  For example, all of the NSTS measures were arranged by agency strategic goals and risk-based priorities  However, the management measure in DHS’s fiscal year 2019 congressional budget justification and the CFSR status database measures did not specify the TSA goals and priorities to which they were aligned  If measures are not aligned with division and agency- wide goals and mission, the behaviors and incentives created by these measures do not support achieving those goals or mission  Measurable target  TSA’s measures generally did not include measurable targets in the form of a numerical goal and none of the NSTS measures had measurable targets  For example, the NSTS measure under the Security Planning priority, which tracks the percentage of critical pipeline systems implementing TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines, does not state what specific percentages would be considered an improvement in industry security plans  However, the management measure did include target numbers of pipeline security reviews by fiscal year  Both the CFSR status database measures and CSR goals and priorities database measures did not include measurable targets  Without measurable targets, TSA cannot tell if performance is meeting expectations  Objectivity  Because the pipeline-related measures in the 2018 NSTS, the CFSR status database, and the CSR goals and priorities database generally lack clarity and measurable targets, TSA cannot ensure its measures are free from bias or manipulation, and therefore, are not objective  If measures are not objective, the results of performance assessments may be systematically overstated or understated  Reliability  Because the pipeline-related measures in the 2018 NSTS, the CFSR status database, and the CSR goals and priorities database generally lack clarity, measurable targets, and baseline and trend data, it is not clear if TSA’s measures produce the same result under similar conditions; therefore, the pipeline-related measures are unreliable  If measures are not reliable, reported performance data may be inconsistent and add uncertainty  Baseline and trend data  TSA’s measures generally did not include baseline and trend data  For example, none of the NSTS measures included past results and compared them to measurable targets  TSA officials were unable to identify measures or goals to assess the extent to which pipeline operators have fully implemented the guidelines or increased pipeline security, but did say developing a feedback mechanism to measure progress in closing vulnerability gaps was important  However, the management measure did include the number of completed pipeline security reviews for each fiscal year from 2014 through 2017, as well as numerical goals  The CFSR status database includes information on CFSRs conducted from May 22, 2012, through June 29, 2017, but the measures are calculated for the entire time period rather than year-by-year  The CSR goals and priorities database measures include percentage compliance with the guidelines for CSRs conducted in fiscal years 2016 and 2017, as well as a combined measure  However, baseline and trend data are not tracked or reported in either database  Collecting, tracking, developing, and reporting baseline and trend data allows agencies to better evaluate progress being made and whether or not goals are being achieved  Pipeline Security Branch officials explained that in addition to the measures reported in the 2018 NSTS Pipeline Security Plan, they primarily rely on measures assessing CSR and CFSR implementation for assessing the value of its pipeline security program  TSA officials reported that they collect and analyze data and information collected from CSRs and CFSRs to, among other things, determine strengths and weaknesses at critical pipeline facilities, areas to target for risk reduction strategies, and pipeline industry implementation of the voluntary Pipeline Security Guidelines  For example, TSA officials reported that they analyzed information from approximately 734 CFSR recommendations that were made during fiscal years 2012 through 2016  They found that pipeline operators had made the strongest improvements in security training, public awareness outreach and law enforcement coordination, and site specific security measures  The most common areas in need of improvement were 24x7 monitoring, frequency of security vulnerability assessments, and proper signage  However, as described above, we found those measures also did not comport with key attributes for successful measures and we report below on reliability concerns for underlying data supporting those measures  In addition, while the Pipeline Security Branch may not rely on the measures included in the 2018 NSTS Pipeline Security Plan and the fiscal year 2019 congressional budget justification, they are important for reporting the status of pipeline security efforts to TSA as a whole and to external stakeholders such as Congress  Taking steps to ensure that the pipeline security program performance measures exhibit key attributes of successful performance measures could allow TSA to better assess the program’s effectiveness at reducing pipeline physical and cybersecurity risks  This could include steps such as modifying its suite of measures so they are clear, have measurable targets, and add baseline and trend data  Further examples include the following: Adding measurable targets consisting of numerical goals could allow TSA to better determine if the pipeline security program is meeting expectations  For example, measurable targets could be added to TSA’s existing measures by developing annual goals for the percentage of recommendations implemented to the CFSR status database and then reporting annual results  To make measures clearer, TSA could verify that each measure has a clearly stated name, definition, and methodology for how the measure is calculated  For example, the NSTS objective for security training mentioned above could have more specific language explaining how the measure is calculated and whether it applies to pipeline operators’ implementation of the training-related portions of the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines or overall implementation  Finally, adding baseline and trend data could allow TSA to identify, monitor, and report changes in performance and help ensure that performance is viewed in context  For example, the NSTS measures, CFSR status database measures, and CSR goals and priorities database measures could have annual results from prior years  This could help TSA and external stakeholders evaluate the effectiveness of the pipeline security program and whether it is making progress toward its goals  According to TSA officials, the primary means for assessing the effectiveness of the agency’s efforts to reduce pipeline security risks is through conducting pipeline security reviews— Corporate Security Reviews (CSRs) and Critical Facility Security Reviews (CFSRs)  However, TSA has not tracked the status of CSR recommendations for over 5 years and related security review data are not sufficiently reliable  When conducting CSRs and CFSRs, TSA staff makes recommendations to operators, if appropriate  For example, a CSR recommendation might include a suggestion to conduct annual security-related drills and exercises, and a CFSR recommendation might include a suggestion to install barbed wire on the main gate of a pipeline facility  In response to recommendations that we made in our 2010 report, TSA developed three databases to track CSR and CFSR recommendations and their implementation status by pipeline facility, system, operator, and product type  In addition, the agency recently developed a fourth database to collect and analyze information gathered from pipeline operators’ responses to CSR questions  TSA officials reported that they use this database to assess the extent that TSA’s pipeline security program has met NSTS goals and Pipeline Security Branch priorities  TSA officials stated that they use the CSR goals and priorities database for follow-up on recommendations, indications of improvement in pipeline security, and as an input into TSA performance goals and measures, including the performance measures for the 2018 NSTS Pipeline Security Plan  We found several problems with the databases that indicate that the pipeline security program data are not sufficiently reliable and do not provide quality information that is current, complete, and accurate  First, the CSR recommendations database only included information for reviews conducted from November 2010 through February 2013  TSA officials stated that the agency stopped capturing CSR recommendations and status information in 2014  A TSA official stated that one factor was that the pipeline staffing level was one FTE in fiscal year 2014  However, the Pipeline Security Branch did not resume entering CSR recommendation-related information when staffing levels rose to 6 FTEs in the following year and beyond  As a result, TSA is missing over 5 years of data for the recommendations it made to pipeline operators when conducting CSRs  The agency collected some information from CSRs conducted in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 in the separate CSR goals and priorities database  However, this database does not include all of the information that TSA collects when conducting CSRs  Specifically, the CSR goals and priorities database does not state which companies were reviewed, what specific recommendations were made, or the current status of those recommendations, and only records operators’ responses to 79 of the 222 CSR questions  Second, our review identified instances of missing data, inconsistent data entry formats, and data entry errors in the four databases  For example: The CSR recommendations database had missing data in all 13 of the included fields and a data entry error shifted 50 observations into the wrong fields, impacting both the Status Date and Completion Code fields  The CSR goals and priorities database had seven entries with inconsistent data formatting and five of those entries were not taken into account when calculating summary figures  The CFSR recommendations database had missing data in 3 of 9 fields  There was also inconsistent data entry formats in 3 fields  The CFSR status database had missing data in 7 of 29 fields and inconsistent data entry formats in 4 fields  Finally, TSA has not documented its data entry and verification procedures, such as in a data dictionary or user manual, and does not have electronic safeguards for out-of-range or inconsistent entries for any of the databases it uses to track the status of CSR or CFSR recommendations and analyze operator responses to the CSR  TSA Pipeline Security Branch officials told us that they had not documented data entry and verification procedures and did not have electronic safeguards  This was for two reasons  First, the officials stated that the databases are small and maintained in a commercial spreadsheet program that does not allow for electronic safeguards  However, based on our review of the databases, the spreadsheet program does allow for a variety of electronic safeguards  For example, entries can be restricted to only allow selections from a drop-down list or only allow dates to be entered  Second, only a small number of TSA employees enter information into these databases  TSA officials explained that typically one TSA employee is responsible for entering information from pipeline security reviews, and another individual, usually whoever conducted the review, is tasked to verify the accuracy of the data entered  As a result, according to the officials, any errors would be self-evident and caught during these TSA employees’ reviews  Our work has emphasized the importance of quality information for management to make informed decisions and evaluate agencies’ performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks  The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should use quality information to achieve agency objectives, where “quality” means, among other characteristics, current, complete, and accurate  In addition, DHS’s Information Quality Guidelines state that all DHS component agencies should treat information quality as integral to every step of the development of information, including creation, collection, maintenance, and dissemination  The guidelines also state that agencies should substantiate the quality of the information disseminated through documentation or other appropriate means  Without current, complete, and accurate information, it is difficult for TSA to evaluate the performance of the pipeline security program  Until TSA monitors and records the status of these reviews’ recommendations, it will be hindered in its efforts to determine whether its recommendations are leading to significant reduction in risk  By entering information on CSR recommendations and monitoring and recording their status, developing written documentation of its data entry and verification procedures and electronic safeguards, and improving the quality of its pipeline security program data, TSA could better ensure it has the information necessary to effectively monitor pipeline operators’ progress in improving their security posture, and evaluate its pipeline security program’s effectiveness in reducing security risks to pipelines  A successful pipeline attack could have dire consequences on public health and safety, as well as the U S  economy  Recent coordinated campaigns by environmental activists to disrupt pipeline operations, and the successful attempts by nation-state actors to infiltrate and obtain sensitive information from pipeline operators’ business and operating systems, demonstrate the dynamic and continuous threat to the security of our nation’s pipeline network  To help ensure the safety of our pipelines throughout the nation, it is important for TSA to address weaknesses in the management of its pipeline security program  TSA’s Pipeline Security Branch revised its security guidelines in March 2018 to, among other things, reflect the dynamic threat environment and incorporate NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework cybersecurity principles and practices  However, without a documented process defining how frequently TSA is to review and, if deemed necessary, revise its guidelines, TSA cannot ensure that its guidelines reflect the latest known standards and best practices for physical and cybersecurity, or address the persistent and dynamic security threat environment currently facing the nation’s pipeline system  Further, without clearly defined criteria for determining pipeline facilities’ criticality, TSA cannot ensure that pipeline operators are applying guidance uniformly and that all of the critical facilities across the pipeline sector have been identified; or that their vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed  TSA could improve its ability to conduct pipeline security reviews and the means that it uses to prioritize which pipeline systems to review based on their relative risk ranking  Establishing a strategic workforce plan could help TSA ensure that it has identified the necessary skills, competencies, and staffing allocations that the Pipeline Security Branch needs to carry out its responsibilities, including conducting security reviews of critical pipeline companies and facilities, as well as their cybersecurity posture  Better considering threat, vulnerability, and consequence elements in its risk assessment and incorporating an independent, external peer review in its process would provide more assurance that the Pipeline Security Branch ranks relative risk among pipeline systems using comprehensive and accurate data and methods  We are making 10 recommendations to TSA: The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to implement a documented process for reviewing, and if deemed necessary, for revising TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines at regular defined intervals  (Recommendation 1) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to clarify TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines by defining key terms within its criteria for determining critical facilities  (Recommendation 2) The TSA Administrator should develop a strategic workforce plan for its Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division, which could include determining the number of personnel necessary to meet the goals set for its Pipeline Security Branch, as well as the knowledge, skills, and abilities, including cybersecurity, that are needed to effectively conduct CSRs and CFSRs  (Recommendation 3) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to update the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool to include up-to-date data to ensure it reflects industry conditions, including throughput and threat data  (Recommendation 4) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to fully document the data sources, underlying assumptions and judgments that form the basis of the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool, including sources of uncertainty and any implications for interpreting the results from the assessment  (Recommendation 5) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to identify or develop other data sources relevant to threat, vulnerability, and consequence consistent with the NIPP and DHS critical infrastructure risk mitigation priorities and incorporate that data into the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool to assess relative risk of critical pipeline systems, which could include data on prior attacks, natural hazards, feedback data on pipeline system performance, physical pipeline condition, and cross-sector interdependencies  (Recommendation 6) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to take steps to coordinate an independent, external peer review of its Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool, after the Pipeline Security Branch completes enhancements to its risk assessment approach  (Recommendation 7) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to ensure that it has a suite of performance measures which exhibit key attributes of successful performance measures, including measurable targets, clarity, and baseline and trend data  (Recommendation 8) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to take steps to enter information on CSR recommendations and monitor and record their status  (Recommendation 9) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to improve the quality of its pipeline security program data by developing written documentation of its data entry and verification procedures, implementing standardized data entry formats, and correcting existing data entry errors  (Recommendation 10) We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOE, DOT, and FERC  DHS provided written comments which are reproduced in appendix III  In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendations and described actions planned to address them  DHS, DOE, DOT, FERC, also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We also provided draft excerpts of this product to the American Petroleum Institute (API), the Association of Oil Pipe Lines, the American Gas Association (AGA), the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), the American Public Gas Association, and the selected pipeline operators that we interviewed  For those who provided technical comments, we incorporated them as appropriate  With regard to our first recommendation, that TSA implement a documented process for reviewing, and if deemed necessary, for revising its Pipeline Security Guidelines at regular defined intervals, DHS stated that TSA will implement a documented process for reviewing and revising its Pipeline Security Guidelines at regular defined intervals, as appropriate  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by March 31, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our second recommendation, that TSA clarify its Pipeline Security Guidelines by defining key terms within its criteria for determining critical facilities, DHS stated that TSA will clarify its Pipeline Security Guidelines by defining key terms within its criteria for determining critical facilities  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by May 31, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our third recommendation, that TSA develop a strategic workforce plan for its Security Policy and Industry Engagement's Surface Division, DHS stated that TSA will develop a strategic workforce plan for the division, which includes determining the number of personnel necessary to meet the goals set for the Pipeline Security Branch, as well as the knowledge, skills, and abilities, including cybersecurity, that are needed to effectively conduct CSRs and CFSRs  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by June 30, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our fourth recommendation, that TSA update the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool to include up-to-date data in order to ensure it reflects industry conditions, including throughput and threat data, DHS stated that TSA will update the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool to include up-to-date data in order to ensure it reflects industry conditions, including throughput and threat data  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by February 28, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our fifth recommendation, that TSA fully document the data sources, underlying assumptions, and judgements that form the basis of the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool, including sources of uncertainty and any implications for interpreting the results from the assessment, DHS stated that TSA will fully document the data sources, underlying assumptions, and judgements that form the basis of the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool  According to DHS, this will include sources of uncertainty and any implications for interpreting the results from the assessment  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by February 28, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our sixth recommendation, that TSA identify or develop other data sources relevant to threat, vulnerability, and consequence consistent with the NIPP and DHS critical infrastructure risk mitigation priorities and incorporate that data into the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool to assess relative risk of critical pipeline systems, DHS stated that TSA will identify and/or develop other sources relevant to threat, vulnerability, and consequence consistent with the NIPP and DHS critical infrastructure risk mitigation priorities  DHS also stated that TSA will incorporate that data into the Pipeline Risk Ranking Tool to assess relative risk of critical pipeline systems, which could include data on prior attacks, natural hazards, feedback data on pipeline system performance, physical pipeline condition, and cross-sector interdependencies  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by June 30, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our seventh recommendation, that TSA take steps to coordinate an independent, external peer review of its Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool, after the Pipeline Security Branch completes enhancements to its risk assessment approach, DHS stated that, after completing enhancements to its risk assessment approach, TSA will take steps to coordinate an independent, external peer review of its Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by November 30, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our eighth recommendation, that TSA ensure that the Security Policy and Industry Engagement's Surface Division has a suite of performance measures which exhibit key attributes of successful performance measures, including measurable targets, clarity, baseline, and trend data, DHS stated that TSA’s Surface Division’s Pipeline Section will develop both physical and cyber security performance measures, in consultation with pipeline stakeholders, to ensure that it has a suite of performance measures which exhibit key attributes of successful performance measures, including measurable targets, clarity, baseline, and trend data  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by November 30, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our ninth recommendation, that TSA take steps to enter information on CSR recommendations and monitor and record their status, DHS stated that TSA will enter information on CSR recommendations and monitor and record their status  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by October 31, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our tenth recommendation, that TSA take steps to improve the quality of its pipeline security program data by developing written documentation of its data entry and verification procedures, implementing standardized data entry formats, and correcting existing data entry errors, DHS stated that TSA will develop written documentation of its data entry and verification procedures, implementing standardized data entry formats, and correcting existing data entry errors  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by July 31, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until one day from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Energy, Homeland Security, and Transportation; the Executive Director of the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee; and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao gov, and Nick Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or marinosn@gao gov  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV  This appendix lists security guidance and guidance-related tools that the pipeline operators and industry association officials we interviewed identified as adopted or available in order to secure their physical and cyber operations  This list should not be considered to include all physical and cybersecurity guidance that may be available or used by all pipeline operators nor do all operators use all guidance listed  The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Pipeline Security Branch developed the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool (risk assessment) in 2007  The risk assessment calculates threat, vulnerability, and consequence on variables such as the amount of throughput in the pipeline system (consequence input)  Pipeline Security Branch officials told us that they use the pipeline risk assessment to rank relative risk of the top 100 critical pipeline systems, and the standard operating procedures for conducting Corporate Security Reviews (CSR) state the results of the risk ranking are the primary factor considered when prioritizing CSRs of pipeline companies  However, we identified several factors that likely limit the usefulness of the current assessment in calculating threat, vulnerability, and consequence to allow the Pipeline Security Branch to effectively prioritize reviews of pipeline systems  For example, because the risk assessment has not changed since 2014, information on threat may be outdated  Additionally, sources of data and underlying assumption and judgments regarding certain threat and vulnerability inputs to the assessment are not fully documented  For example, threats to cybersecurity are not specifically accounted for in the description of the risk assessment methodology, making it unclear if cybersecurity is part of the assessment’s threat factor  Further, the risk assessment does not include information that is consistent with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) priorities for critical infrastructure risk mitigation, such as information on natural hazards and the ability to measure risk reduction (feedback data)  According to Pipeline Security Branch officials, the risk ranking assessment is not intended to be a fully developed risk model detailing all pipeline factors influencing risk  Rather, officials said they are primarily interested in assessing risk data that impacts security  However, because TSA’s Pipeline Security Program is designed to enhance the security preparedness of the pipeline systems, incorporating additional factors that enhance security into their risk calculation of the most critical pipeline systems would better align their efforts with Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21)  For example, PPD-21 calls for agencies to integrate and analyze information to prioritize assets and manage risks to critical infrastructure, as well as anticipate interdependencies and cascading impacts  Below we present the various shortfalls in the risk assessment—outdated data, limited description of sources and methodology, and opportunities to better align with the NIPP and other DHS priorities for critical infrastructure risk mitigation—in the context of the components that comprise a risk assessment: threat, vulnerability, and consequence  Whereas in 2010 we made recommendations to improve the consequence component in the pipeline relative risk ranking tool, we have currently identified shortfalls that cut across all risk components: threat, vulnerability, and consequence  We identified several shortfalls in the pipeline risk assessment’s calculation of threat  First, while the risk assessment assesses consequence and vulnerability by pipeline system through use of multiple variables, it currently ranks threat for pipeline systems equally  Second, the evolving nature of threats to pipelines may not be reflected, since the risk assessment was last updated in 2014  Third, the threat calculation does not take into account natural hazards  Pipeline Security Branch officials said they currently rank threat equally across pipeline systems because they do not have granular enough threat information to distinguish threat by pipeline  However, ranking threat equally effectively has no effect on the risk calculation for pipeline systems  Further, this judgment is not documented in the risk assessment’s methodology  According to the NIPP, a risk assessment’s methodology must clearly document what information is used and how it is synthesized to generate a risk estimate, including any assumptions and judgments  Additionally, our analysis of the pipeline risk assessment found that it includes at least one field that TSA could use to differentiate threat by pipeline  Specifically, the risk assessment includes a field that accounts for whether a pipeline experienced a previous security threat (including failed attacks), and information provided by Pipeline Security Branch suggests some pipeline systems have experienced such threats  However, the Pipeline Security Branch did not capture these events in the risk assessment’s calculation, which Pipeline Security Branch officials said should be part of the threat calculation, but could not account for why they were not calculated for the systems in the risk assessment  These officials also clarified that incidents such as suspicious photography or vandalism do not constitute an attack to be accounted for in the threat calculation  Documenting such assumptions, judgments, or decisions to exclude information could provide increased transparency to those expected to interpret or use the results  Pipeline Security Branch officials also said that they ranked threat equally because TSA Intelligence and Analysis data show that threats to the oil and natural gas sector have been historically low, and Intelligence and Analysis does not conduct specific threat analysis against individual pipeline systems  However, the Pipeline Security Branch has not updated the risk assessment since June 2014; therefore, the threat information it used to determine threat calculations—and decide to rank threat equally—may be outdated and not reflect the threats to the industry that have emerged in recent years  In fact, pipeline operators we interviewed indicated that the types of threats that concern pipeline operators have evolved  For example, 5 of the 10 operators we interviewed indicated that environmental activists were an increased threat to the pipeline industry because they use sabotage techniques, such as valve turning and cutting in service pipelines with blow torches, against pipelines  Additionally, 6 of 10 pipeline operators we interviewed said cyber attacks from nation-state actors were a primary threat to their industry  Further, when TSA issued its revised Pipeline Security Guidelines in March 2018, it stated that its revisions to the guidelines were made to reflect the ever-changing threat environment in both the physical and cybersecurity realms  However, threats to cybersecurity are not specifically accounted for in the description of the risk assessment methodology  Recent Pipeline Modal and Cyber Modal Threat Assessments include cyber threats to the pipeline industry, but the description of the pipeline risk assessment’s methodology does not specify what types of threat assessments (sources) are used to calculate its threat score  To better align with the guidance in the NIPP for documenting sources of information when conducting risk assessments, the Pipeline Security Branch should document the information used  Keeping the risk assessment updated with current information, as well as documenting those data sources, could help the Pipeline Security Branch ensure it is using its limited resources to review the pipeline systems with greater risk  Natural Hazard Threats to Pipelines The Transportation Systems Sector, of which pipelines are a part, is critical to the Pacific Northwest, but also at risk from natural hazards, like earthquakes  For example, according to the Department of Homeland Security, an earthquake in the Puget Sound region—which relies on the transportation of crude oil from Alaska—could cripple the ports of Seattle and Tacoma, as well as the Olympic and Williams Pipelines greatly impacting the Pacific Northwest Economic Region  Hurricanes are the most frequent disruptive natural hazard for the oil and natural gas subsector and can cause the shutdown of facilities in an area, even when the facilities themselves are not directly affected by the storms  For example, according to the U S  Energy Information Administration, the flow of petroleum into the New York area via pipeline from the Gulf Coast relies on the ability to move it through major terminals  In August 2017, Hurricane Harvey caused major disruptions to crude oil and petroleum product supply chains, including those to New York Harbor from Houston, Texas via the Colonial Pipeline  Due to the hurricane, decreased supplies of petroleum products available for the pipeline in Houston forced Colonial Pipeline to limit operations temporarily  Finally, another shortfall in the current pipeline risk assessment methodology is that it does not account for natural hazards in its threat calculation, even though DHS’s definition of threat includes natural hazards, and security and resilience of critical infrastructure are often presented in the context of natural hazards  According to the NIPP, threat is a natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or property  As such, along with terrorism, criminal activity and cybersecurity, natural disasters are a key element of DHS’s critical infrastructure security and resilience mission  According to Pipeline Security Branch officials, there is not sufficient historical data available that would indicate a significant impact from natural disasters on specific pipeline systems  However, we identified possible sources of data for the Pipeline Security Branch to consider  For example, a 2016 RAND Corporation study examined national infrastructure systems’ exposure to natural hazards, including pipelines  Additionally, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has collaborated with stakeholders to develop the National Risk Index to, among other things, establish a baseline of natural hazards risk for the United States While there may not be historical data of natural hazard impact for every pipeline system, consulting other sources or experts could provide regional data or analysis to build a more comprehensive threat picture to help distinguish threats by pipeline system  According to the NIPP, hazard assessments should rely not only on historical information, but also future predictions about natural hazards to assess the likelihood or frequency of various hazards  We also identified multiple shortfalls in the vulnerability factors used in the risk assessment methodology, such as the potential uncertainty of the number of critical facilities and incorporating a feedback mechanism to calculate overall risk reduction  Other considerations for vulnerability calculations include physical condition of the pipeline system, cybersecurity activities, and interdependencies among sectors  The number of critical facilities a pipeline system has identified is used as an input for its vulnerability calculation in the Pipeline Security Branch’s risk assessment methodology  As discussed earlier, we identified deficiencies in TSA’s criteria for identifying critical facilities, and found that well-defined criteria and consistent application of the criteria for identifying critical facilities could improve the results of the Pipeline Security Branch’s risk assessment  Nevertheless, communicating in the risk assessment the uncertainty that may be inherent in this self-reported information would better align the risk assessment with the NIPP  Measuring Effectiveness in a Voluntary Environment According to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the use of performance metrics is an important step in the critical infrastructure risk management process to enable assessment of improvements in critical infrastructure security and resilience  The metrics provide a basis for the critical infrastructure community to establish accountability, document actual performance, promote effective management, and provide a feedback mechanism to inform decision making  By using metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of voluntary partnership efforts to achieve national and sector priorities, critical infrastructure partners can adjust and adapt their security and resilience approaches to account for progress achieved, as well as changes in the threat and other relevant environments  Metrics are used to focus attention on areas of security and resilience that warrant additional resources or other changes through an analysis of challenges and priorities at the national, sector, and owner/operator levels  Metrics also serve as a feedback mechanism for other aspects of the critical infrastructure risk management approach  Another shortfall in the risk assessment is its inability to reliably measure the progress a pipeline system made in addressing vulnerability gaps between security reviews  The current risk assessment includes a CSR score as part of its vulnerability calculation, which was developed in part in response to our 2010 recommendation to use more reliable data to measure a pipeline system’s vulnerability gap  However, during our review, Pipeline Security Branch officials said they plan to remove pipeline companies’ CSR scores from the risk assessment calculations, because they and industry partners do not have confidence that the score appropriately measures a pipeline system’s vulnerability  For example, Pipeline Security Branch officials explained that pipeline companies consider security factors differently, which can lead to variation in implementing risk reduction activities and by extension lead to different CSR scores  However, removing the CSR score eliminates the only feedback mechanism in the risk assessment from a pipeline company’s actual security review conducted by the Pipeline Security Branch  The NIPP and DHS’s Risk Management fundamentals emphasize the important role that such feedback mechanisms play in risk management  Officials from the Pipeline Security Branch agree on the importance of a feedback mechanism tying results of reviews to a revised vulnerability metric, but said they need a better measure than the current CSR score which is unreliable for comparative and analytic purposes  Developing a feedback mechanism based on implementation of TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines could be an important input to the risk assessment’s vulnerability calculation  This information would also inform the amount of risk pipeline companies are reducing by implementing the guidelines and could be used to inform overall risk reduction  The physical and cyber environments in which the pipeline sector operates also present vulnerabilities not accounted for in the pipeline risk assessment  In recent years, DHS has listed the potential for catastrophic losses to dramatically increase the overall risk associated with failing infrastructure and highlighted risks due to climate change and natural hazards to pipelines  For example, DHS reported extreme temperatures—such as higher and lower temperatures over prolonged periods of time—increase vulnerability to the critical infrastructure by causing elements to break and cease to function  Pipelines that freeze and then rupture can affect the energy and transportation systems sectors  As noted above, according to the NIPP, a natural or man-made occurrence or action with the potential to harm life is considered a threat, whereas vulnerability is defined as a physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity open to exploitation or susceptible to a given threat or hazard  While pipeline physical condition is typically thought of in context of safety, pipeline condition or location (such as above or below ground) could touch upon pipeline security as it relates to system vulnerability  For example, a pipeline system or segment of a system with a compromised physical condition due to corrosion or age could affect the system’s vulnerability to threats and affect its ability to recover from such threats by potentially increasing the time a system is offline  According to the Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan, vulnerabilities to damage in aging transportation infrastructure—of which pipelines are a part—are projected to increase with the continued effects of climate change  Further, according to TSA’s Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan, pipeline integrity efforts—including the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of pipelines—are important to pipeline security because well-maintained, safe pipelines are more likely to tolerate a physical attack  The Pipeline Security Branch already collects information from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) for its risk assessment, specifically information on High Consequence Area and High Threat Urban Area mileage  By considering additional information PHMSA collects on pipeline integrity, the Pipeline Security Branch could also use the information to help pipeline operators identify security measures to help reduce the consequences related to the comparatively higher vulnerability of an aging or compromised system  This would align with the Pipeline Security Branch’s efforts to improve security preparedness of pipeline systems and could better inform its vulnerability calculations for relative risk ranking of pipeline systems  Capturing cybersecurity in the risk assessment is also an area for improvement  Pipeline Security Branch officials told us they consulted with the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center to revise TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines to align with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework and that absent data specific to pipelines on their cybersecurity vulnerabilities, they are unable to include a pipelines’ vulnerability to cyber attack in the risk assessment  However, the Pipeline Security Branch recently updated the security review questions asked of pipeline operators during corporate and critical facility reviews based on the recently updated Pipeline Security Guidelines  Using these updated questions related to companies’ cybersecurity posture, the Pipeline Security Branch could collect additional information on cybersecurity vulnerabilities which could inform the risk assessment  This could be an element of the feedback mechanism described above and emphasized in the NIPP  Additionally, NIST identified several supply chain vulnerabilities associated with cybersecurity, which are not currently accounted for in TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines  As pipeline operators implement increasing levels of network technologies to control their systems, the Pipeline Security Branch may not be fully accounting for pipeline systems’ cybersecurity posture by not including the cybersecurity-related vulnerabilities in its risk assessment inputs  Finally, we identified shortfalls in cross-sector interdependencies, which could affect vulnerability calculations  According to the NIPP, understanding and addressing risks from cross-sector dependencies and interdependencies is essential to enhancing critical infrastructure security and resilience  The Pipeline Security Branch’s pipeline risk assessment currently considers the effects of a pipeline system’s ability to service assets such as major airports, the electric grid, and military bases  However, consequence is calculated on the loss or disruption of the pipeline system to these other assets and does not capture the dependency of the pipeline system on other energy sources, such as electricity  Weather events such as Gulf of Mexico hurricanes and Superstorm Sandy highlighted the interdependencies between the pipeline and electrical sectors  Specifically, according to a 2015 DHS annual report on critical infrastructure, power failures during Superstorm Sandy in 2012 closed major pipelines for 4 days, reducing regional oil supplies by 35 to 40 percent  The report goes on to say that the interconnected nature of infrastructure systems can lead to cascading impacts and are increasing in frequency  Pipeline Security Branch officials are considering cross-sector interdependencies and said they discuss these factors with operators as they relate to system resiliency  Considering interdependencies of sectors in both directions—such as calculating the likelihood that an input like electricity could fail and cause disruptions to critical pipelines—could improve the calculations in the pipeline risk assessment  As previously discussed, the Pipeline Security Branch last calculated relative risk among the top 100 pipeline systems in 2014  When doing so, it used pipeline systems’ throughput data from 2010 to assess relative risk  According to Pipeline Security Branch officials, the amount of throughput in pipeline systems does not change substantially year to year  However, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for management to use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives, including using relevant data from reliable sources obtained in a timely manner  The Pipeline Security Branch uses throughput data as a consequence factor in the risk assessment to determine a pipeline system’s relative risk score  Throughput changes could affect relative risk ranking and the Pipeline Security Branch’s ability to accurately prioritize reviews based on relative risk  Chris P  Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao gov Nick Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or marinosn@gao gov  In addition to the contacts named above, Ben Atwater, Assistant Director; Michael W  Gilmore, Assistant Director; and Michael C  Lenington, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment  Chuck Bausell, David Blanding, Dominick Dale, Eric Hauswirth, Kenneth A  Johnson, Steve Komadina, Susanna Kuebler, Thomas Lombardi, David Plocher, and Janay Sam made significant contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP); the Department of Energy (DOE); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill's funding. President Trump submitted his FY2020 detailed budget proposal to Congress on March 18, 2019 (after submitting a general budget overview on March 11). The budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill total $38.02 billion—$6.64 billion (15%) below the FY2019 appropriation. The largest exception to the overall decrease proposed for energy and water programs is a $1.309 billion increase (12%) for DOE nuclear weapons activities. For FY2019, the conference agreement on H.R. 5895 (H.Rept. 115-929) provided total Energy and Water Development appropriations of $44.66 billion—3% above the FY2018 level, excluding supplemental funding, and 23% above the FY2019 request. It was signed by the President on September 21, 2018 (P.L. 115-244). Emergency supplemental appropriations totaling $17.419 billion were provided to USACE and DOE for hurricane response by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), signed February 9, 2018. Major Energy and Water Development funding issues for FY2020 are listed below. They were selected based on the total funding involved, the percentage of proposed increases or decreases, and potential impact on broader public policy considerations. Water Agency Funding Reductions. The Trump Administration requested reductions of 31% for USACE and 29% for Reclamation for FY2020 from the FY2019 enacted levels. The largest reductions would be from USACE Operation and Maintenance (-48%) and Reclamation's Water and Related Resources account (-31%). Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. Power Marketing Administration (PMA) Reforms. DOE's FY2020 budget request includes mandatory proposals to sell PMA electricity transmission lines and other assets, repeal certain PMA borrowing authority, and eliminate cost-based limits on the electricity rates charged by the PMAs. The proposals would need to be enacted in authorizing legislation. Termination of Energy Efficiency Grants. DOE's Weatherization Assistance Program and State Energy Program would be terminated under the FY2020 budget request. The Administration had proposed to eliminate the grants in FY2018 and FY2019, but Congress continued funding. Reductions in Energy Research and Development. Under the FY2020 budget request, DOE research and development appropriations would be reduced for energy efficiency and renewable energy (EERE) by 83%, nuclear energy by 38%, and fossil energy by 24%. Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. Nuclear Waste Repository. The Administration's budget request would provide new funding for the first time since FY2010 for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. DOE would receive $116 million to seek an NRC license for the repository and develop interim waste storage capacity. NRC would receive $38.5 million to consider DOE's repository license application. Similar Administration funding requests for FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. Elimination of Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E). The Trump Administration proposes no new appropriations for ARPA-E in FY2020 and to cancel $287 million in unobligated balances from previous appropriations. Similar proposals to terminate ARPA-E in FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. Loan Programs Termination. The FY2020 budget request would terminate DOE's Title 17 Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program, the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program, and the Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program. Administration proposals to eliminate the programs were not included in the enacted appropriations measures for FY2018 and FY2019. Weapons Activities. The FY2020 budget request for DOE Weapons Activities is 12% greater than it was in FY2019 ($12.4 billion vs. $11.1 billion), in contrast to a proposed 10% reduction in DOE's total funding. Notable proposed increases would be used for warhead life extension programs and preparations for increase production of plutonium pits (warhead cores).

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U S  Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC)  Figure 1 compares the major components of the Energy and Water Development bill from FY2017 through the FY2020 request  President Trump submitted his FY2020 detailed budget proposal to Congress on March 18, 2019 (after submitting a general budget overview on March 11)  The budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill total $38 02 billion—$6 64 billion (15%) below the FY2019 appropriation  (See Table 3  ) A $1 309 billion increase (12%) is proposed for DOE nuclear weapons activities  For FY2019, the conference agreement on H R  5895 ( H Rept  115-929 ) provided total Energy and Water Development appropriations of $44 66 billion—3% above the FY2018 level and 23% above the FY2019 request  The bill was signed by the President on September 21, 2018 ( P L  115-244 )  Figures for FY2019 exclude emergency supplemental appropriations totaling $17 419 billion provided to USACE and DOE for natural disaster response by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ), signed February 9, 2018  For more details, see CRS Report R45258, Energy and Water Development: FY2019 Appropriations , by Mark Holt and Corrie E  Clark, and CRS Report R45326, Army Corps of Engineers Annual and Supplemental Appropriations: Issues for Congress , by Nicole T  Carter  The FY2020 budget request proposes substantial reductions from the FY2019 enacted level for DOE energy research and development (R&D) programs, including a reduction of $178 million (-24%) in fossil fuels and $502 million (-38%) in nuclear energy  Energy efficiency and renewable energy R&D would decline by $1 724 billion (-83%)  DOE science programs would be reduced by $1 039 billion (-16%)  Programs targeted by the budget for elimination or phaseout include energy efficiency grants, the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E), and loan guarantee programs  Funding would be reduced for USACE by $2 172 billion (-31%), and Reclamation and CUP by $462 million (-29%)  Congress did not enact similar reductions included in the FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests  Congressional consideration of the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill is affected by certain procedural and statutory budget enforcement measures  These consist primarily of limits associated with the budget resolution on total discretionary spending and allocations of this amount that apply to spending under the jurisdiction of each appropriations subcommittee  Statutory budget enforcement is derived from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P L  112-25 )  The BCA established separate limits on defense and nondefense discretionary spending  These limits are in effect for each of the fiscal years from FY2012 through FY2021, and are primarily enforced by an automatic spending reduction process called sequestration, in which a breach of a spending limit would trigger across-the-board cuts within that spending category  The BCA's statutory discretionary spending limits were increased for FY2018 and FY2019 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P L  115-123 ), enacted February 9, 2018  However, the BCA discretionary spending limits have not been increased for FY2020  As a result, the limits currently in place for FY2020 are substantially lower than the limits that were in place for FY2019  For discretionary defense spending, the FY2020 limit drops from $647 billion to $576 billion (-11%), while the nondefense limit drops from $597 billion to $542 billion (-9%)  A bill to raise the defense and nondefense spending limits for FY2020 and FY2021 was reported by the House Budget Committee April 5, 2019 ( H R  2021 , H Rept  116-35 )  (For more information, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions , by Grant A  Driessen and Megan S  Lynch ) Several issues raised by the Administration's budget request could generate controversy during congressional consideration of Energy and Water Development appropriations for FY2020  The issues described in this section—listed approximately in the order the affected agencies appear in the Energy and Water Development bill—were selected based on the total funding involved, the percentage of proposed increases or decreases, and potential impact on broader public policy considerations  For USACE, the Trump Administration requested $4 827 billion for FY2020, which is $2 172 billion (-31%) below the FY2019 appropriation  The request includes no funding for initiating new studies and construction projects (referred to as new starts)  The FY2020 request seeks to limit funding for ongoing navigation and flood risk-reduction construction projects to those whose benefits are at least 2 5 times their costs, or projects that address safety concerns  Many congressionally authorized USACE projects would not meet that standard  The Administration also proposes to transfer the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program from USACE to DOE  For Reclamation, FY2020 funding would be reduced by $461 6 million (29%) from the FY2019 level, to $1 11 billion  For more details, see CRS In Focus IF11137, Army Corps of Engineers: FY2020 Appropriations , by Nicole T  Carter and Anna E  Normand; CRS In Focus IF11158, Bureau of Reclamation: FY2020 Appropriations , by Charles V  Stern; and CRS Report R45326, Army Corps of Engineers Annual and Supplemental Appropriations: Issues for Congress , by Nicole T  Carter  DOE's FY2020 budget request includes three mandatory proposals related to the Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs)—Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and Western Area Power Administration (WAPA)  PMAs sell the power generated by the dams operated by Reclamation and USACE  The Administration proposes to divest the assets of the three PMAs that own transmission infrastructure: BPA, SWPA, and WAPA  These assets consist of thousands of miles of high voltage transmission lines and hundreds of power substations  The budget request projects that mandatory savings from the sale of these assets would total approximately $5 8 billion over a 10-year period  The FY2020 budget request includes a proposal to repeal the borrowing authority for WAPA's Transmission Infrastructure Program, which facilitates the delivery of renewable energy resources  The FY2020 budget also proposes eliminating the statutory requirement that PMAs limit rates to amounts necessary to recover only construction, operations, and maintenance costs; the budget proposes that the PMAs instead transition to a market-based approach to setting rates  The Administration has estimated that this proposal would yield $1 9 billion in new revenues over 10 years  The budget also calls for repealing $3 25 billion in borrowing authority provided to WAPA for transmission projects enacted under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P L  111-5 )  The proposal is estimated to save $640 million over 10 years  All of these proposals would need to be enacted in authorizing legislation, and no congressional action has been taken on them to date  The proposals have been opposed by groups such as the American Public Power Association and the National Rural Electrical Cooperative Association, and they have been the subject of opposition letters to the Administration from several regionally based bipartisan groups of Members of Congress  PMA reforms have been supported by some policy research institutes, such as the Heritage Foundation  For further information, see CRS Report R45548, The Power Marketing Administrations: Background and Current Issues , by Richard J  Campbell  The FY2020 budget request proposes to terminate both the DOE Weatherization Assistance Program and the State Energy Program (SEP)  The Weatherization Assistance Program provides formula grants to states to fund energy efficiency improvements for low-income housing units to reduce their energy costs and save energy  The SEP provides grants and technical assistance to states for planning and implementation of their energy programs  Both the weatherization and SEP programs are under DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)  The weatherization program received $257 million and SEP $55 million for FY2019, after also having been proposed for elimination in that year's budget request, as well as in FY2018  According to DOE, the proposed elimination of the grant programs is "due to a departmental shift in focus away from deployment activities and towards early-stage R&D " Appropriations for DOE R&D on energy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear energy, and fossil energy would be reduced from $4 133 billion in FY2019 to $1 729 billion (-58%) under the Administration's FY2020 budget request  Major proposed reductions include bioenergy technologies (-82%), vehicle technologies (-79%), natural gas technologies (-79%), advanced manufacturing (-75%), building technologies (-75%), wind energy (-74%), solar energy (-73%), geothermal technologies (-67%), and nuclear fuel cycle R&D (-66%)  DOE says the proposed reductions would primarily affect the later stages of energy research, which tend to be the most costly  "The Budget focuses DOE resources toward early-stage R&D, where the Federal role is strongest, and reflects an increased reliance on the private sector to fund later-stage research, development, and commercialization of energy technologies," according to the FY2020 DOE request  Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted  The Administration's FY2020 budget request, for the first time since FY2010, would provide new funding for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV; similar Administration requests for the repository project were not included in the enacted funding measures for FY2018 and FY2019  Under the FY2020 request, DOE would receive $116 million to seek an NRC license for the repository and to develop interim nuclear waste storage capacity  NRC would receive $38 5 million to consider DOE's application  DOE's total of $116 million in nuclear waste funding would come from two appropriations accounts: $90 million from Nuclear Waste Disposal and $26 million from Defense Nuclear Waste Disposal (to pay for defense-related nuclear waste that would be disposed of at Yucca Mountain)  DOE submitted a license application for the Yucca Mountain repository in 2008, but NRC suspended consideration in 2011 for lack of funding  The Obama Administration had declared the Yucca Mountain site "unworkable" because of opposition from the state of Nevada  The House voted to provide the Yucca Mountain funding requested for FY2018 and a $100 million increase for FY2019, but the Senate Appropriations Committee did not include it for FY2018, and it was not included in the Senate-passed bill for FY2019  Also as in FY2018, the FY2019 Senate bill included an authorization for a pilot program to develop an interim nuclear waste storage facility at a voluntary site (§304)  The enacted FY2019 appropriations measure did not include the House-passed funding for Yucca Mountain or the Senate's nuclear waste pilot program provisions  For more background, see CRS Report RL33461, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal , by Mark Holt  The FY2020 budget request would halt further loans and loan guarantees under DOE's Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program and the Title 17 Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program  Similar proposals to eliminate the programs in FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted  The FY2020 budget request would also halt further loan guarantees under DOE's Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program  Under the FY2020 budget proposal, DOE would continue to administer its existing portfolio of loans and loan guarantees  Unused prior-year authority, or ceiling levels, for loan guarantee commitments would be rescinded, as well as $169 5 million in unspent appropriations to cover loan guarantee "subsidy costs" (which are primarily intended to cover potential losses)  On March 22, 2019, after the FY2020 budget request had been submitted, DOE provided $3 7 billion in additional Title 17 loan guarantees for two new reactors under construction at the Vogtle nuclear plant in Georgia  The Vogtle project had previously received $8 3 billion in loan guarantees under the DOE program  The Administration's request for DOE includes $107 million in FY2020 for the U S  contribution to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), which is under construction in France by a multinational consortium  "ITER will be the first fusion device to maintain fusion for long periods of time" and is to lay the technical foundation "for the commercial production of fusion-based electricity," according to the consortium's website  The FY2020 DOE appropriation request, 19% below the FY2020 level, would pay for components supplied by U S  companies for the project, such as central solenoid superconducting magnet modules  ITER has long attracted congressional concern about management, schedule, and cost  The United States is to pay 9% of the project's construction costs, including contributions of components, cash, and personnel  Other collaborators in the project include the European Union, Russia, Japan, India, South Korea, and China  The total U S  share of the cost was estimated in 2015 at between $4 0 billion and $6 5 billion, up from $1 45 billion to $2 2 billion in 2008  DOE funding for the project was $122 million in FY2018 and $132 million in FY2019  The Trump Administration's FY2020 budget would eliminate the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E) and rescind $287 million of the agency's unobligated balances  ARPA-E funds research on technologies that are determined to have potential to transform energy production, storage, and use  "This elimination facilitates opportunities to integrate the positive aspects of ARPA-E into DOE's applied energy research programs," according to the DOE request  The Administration also proposed to terminate ARPA-E in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests, but Congress increased the program's funding in both years  Because ARPA-E provides advance funding for projects for up to three years, oversight and management of the program would still be required during a phaseout period  According to the Administration budget request, "ARPA-E will utilize the remainder of its unobligated balances to execute the multi-year termination of the program, with all operations ceasing by FY 2022 " The FY2020 budget request for DOE Weapons Activities is 12% greater than the FY2019 enacted level ($12 4 billion vs  $11 1 billion)  Weapons Activities programs are carried out by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within DOE  Under Weapons Activities, FY2020 funding for nuclear warhead life-extension programs (LEPs) would increase by 10% ($2 1 billion vs $1 9 billion)  The two most notable increases within that account are the funding request for W80-4 LEP, which increases by 37% ($898 6 million vs  $654 8 million) and the initiation of funding for the W87-1 LEP  The increase in the request for the W80-4 warhead, which is due to be carried on the new long-range standoff weapon (a new cruise missile), apparently is the result of a new budget estimate, as the Department of Defense is not accelerating development of the missile  The FY2020 request seeks $112 million for the W87-1 warhead (formerly the Interoperable Warhead 1, or IW-I), which received $53 million in FY2019  This warhead is to be carried by the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, a new land-based missile that is scheduled to enter the force in the 2030s  The FY2020 budget request seeks $10 million for the W76-2 LEP, down from $65 million in FY2019  Work on this warhead is nearly complete  It is a low-yield modification of the current W76 warhead carried by U S  submarine-launched ballistic missiles  It remains controversial in Congress despite its relatively low price tag  In FY2020, NNSA is seeking $51 5 million, in the Stockpile Systems account, for surveillance efforts for the B83 gravity bomb, the most powerful bomb in the U S  inventory  This effort represents a 47% increase over the $35 million request in FY2019  The Obama Administration had planned to retire this bomb, but the Trump Administration reversed that decision in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review  This decision may also prove controversial, as several Senators have been vocal supporters of the plan to retire the bomb  Within the Strategic Materials account in the NNSA budget, funding for Plutonium Sustainment would increase 97%, from $361 million enacted for FY2019 to $712 million requested for FY2020  This increase would support the Administration's plans to produce plutonium pits (or cores) for nuclear warheads at two facilities—Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina  The Administration is seeking $410 million to begin conceptual design and pre-Critical Decision (CD)-1 activities at Savannah River  For more information, see CRS Report R44442, Energy and Water Development Appropriations: Nuclear Weapons Activities , by Amy F  Woolf  DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for environmental cleanup and waste management at the department's nuclear facilities  The total FY2020 appropriations request for EM activities of $6 469 billion would be a decrease of $706 million (-10%) from FY2019  The budgetary components of the EM program are Defense Environmental Cleanup (-9%), Non-Defense Environmental Cleanup (-20%), and the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund (-15%)  The FY2020 request includes a proposal to transfer management of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) from USACE to the Office of Legacy Management (LM), the DOE office responsible for long-term stewardship of remediated sites  The FY2020 LM budget request includes $141 million for FUSRAP, down from $150 million appropriated to USACE for the program in FY2019  According to the DOE budget justification, "USACE will continue to conduct cleanup of FUSRAP sites on a reimbursable basis " Table 1 indicates the steps during consideration of FY2020 Energy and Water Development appropriations  (For more details, see the CRS Appropriations Status Table at http://www crs gov/AppropriationsStatusTable/Index  ) As of the publication date of this report, no markups had been held  Table 2 includes budget totals for energy and water development appropriations enacted for FY2011 through FY2019, plus the FY2020 request  The annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes four titles: Title I—Corps of Engineers—Civil; Title II—Department of the Interior (Central Utah Project and Bureau of Reclamation); Title III—Department of Energy; and Title IV—Independent Agencies, as shown in Table 3   Major programs in the bill are described in this section in the approximate order they appear in the bill  Previous appropriations and budget recommendations for FY2020 are shown in the accompanying tables, and additional details about many of these programs are provided in separate CRS reports as indicated  For a discussion of current funding issues related to these programs, see " Funding Issues and Initiatives ," above  Congressional clients may obtain more detailed information by contacting CRS analysts listed in CRS Report R42638, Appropriations: CRS Experts , by James M  Specht and Justin Murray  FY2020 budget justifications for the largest agencies funded by the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill can be found through the following links: Title I, U S  Army Corps of Engineers, Civil Works, http://www usace army mil/Missions/CivilWorks/Budget Title II Bureau of Reclamation, https://www usbr gov/budget/ Central Utah Project, https://www doi gov/sites/doi gov/files/uploads/fy2020_cupca_budget_justification pdf Title III, Department of Energy, https://www energy gov/cfo/downloads/fy-2020-budget-justification Title IV, Independent Agencies Appalachian Regional Commission, http://www arc gov/images/newsroom/publications/fy2020budget/FY2020PerformanceBudgetMar2019 pdf Nuclear Regulatory Commission, https://www nrc gov/docs/ML1906/ML19065A279 pdf Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, https://www dnfsb gov/about/congressional-budget-requests Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, http://www nwtrb gov/about-us/plans USACE is an agency in the Department of Defense with both military and civilian responsibilities  Under its civil works program, which is funded by the Energy and Water appropriations bill, USACE plans, builds, operates, and in some cases maintains water resources facilities for coastal and inland navigation, riverine and coastal flood risk reduction, and aquatic ecosystem restoration  In recent decades, Congress has generally authorized Corps studies, construction projects, and other activities in omnibus water authorization bills, typically titled Water Resources Development Acts (WRDA), prior to funding them through appropriations legislation  Recent Congresses enacted the following omnibus water resources authorization acts: in June 2014, the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA, P L  113-121 ); in December 2016, the Water Resources Development Act of 2016 (Title I of P L  114-322 , the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act [WIIN]); and in October 2018, the Water Resources Development Act of 2018 (Title I of P L  115-270 , America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 [AWIA 2018])  These acts consisted largely of authorizations for new USACE projects, and they altered numerous USACE policies and procedures  Unlike in highways and municipal water infrastructure programs, federal funds for USACE are not distributed to states or projects based on formulas or delivered via competitive grants  Instead, USACE generally is directly involved in planning, designing, and managing the construction of projects that are cost-shared with nonfederal project sponsors  Prior to FY2010, in addition to site-specific project funding included in the President's annual budget request for USACE, Congress, during the discretionary appropriations process, had identified many additional USACE projects to receive funding or had adjusted the funding levels for the projects identified in the President's request  Starting in the 112 th Congress, site-specific project line items added or increased by Congress (i e , earmarks) became subject to House and Senate earmark moratorium policies  As a result, Congress generally has not added funding at the project level since FY2010  In lieu of the project-based increases, Congress has included "additional funding" for select categories of USACE projects and provided direction and limitations on the use of these funds  For more information, CRS In Focus IF11137, Army Corps of Engineers: FY2020 Appropriations , by Nicole T  Carter and Anna E  Normand  Previous appropriations and the President's request for FY2020 are shown in Table 4   Most of the large dams and water diversion structures in the West were built by, or with the assistance of, the Bureau of Reclamation  While the Corps of Engineers built hundreds of flood control and navigation projects, Reclamation's original mission was to develop water supplies, primarily for irrigation to reclaim arid lands in the West for farming and ranching  Reclamation has evolved into an agency that assists in meeting the water demands in the West while working to protect the environment and the public's investment in Reclamation infrastructure  The agency's municipal and industrial water deliveries have more than doubled since 1970  Today, Reclamation manages hundreds of dams and diversion projects, including more than 300 storage reservoirs, in 17 western states  These projects provide water to approximately 10 million acres of farmland and 31 million people  Reclamation is the largest wholesale supplier of water in the 17 western states and the second-largest hydroelectric power producer in the nation  Reclamation facilities also provide substantial flood control, recreation, and other benefits  Reclamation facility operations are often controversial, particularly for their effect on fish and wildlife species and because of conflicts among competing water users during drought conditions  As with the Corps of Engineers, the Reclamation budget is made up largely of individual project funding lines, rather than general programs that would not be covered by congressional earmark requirements  Therefore, as with USACE, these Reclamation projects have often been subject to earmark disclosure rules  The current moratorium on earmarks restricts congressional steering of money directly toward specific Reclamation projects  Reclamation's single largest account, Water and Related Resources, encompasses the agency's traditional programs and projects, including construction, operations and maintenance, dam safety, and ecosystem restoration, among others  Reclamation also typically requests funds in a number of smaller accounts, and has proposed additional accounts in recent years  Implementation and oversight of the Central Utah Project (CUP), also funded by Title II, is conducted by a separate office within the Department of the Interior  For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11158, Bureau of Reclamation: FY2020 Appropriations , by Charles V  Stern  Previous appropriations and recommendations for FY2020 are shown in Table 5   The Energy and Water Development bill has funded all DOE programs since FY2005  Major DOE activities include (1) research and development (R&D) on renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear power, fossil energy, and electricity; (2) the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; (3) energy statistics; (4) general science; (5) environmental cleanup; and (6) nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs  Table 6 provides the recent funding history for DOE programs, which are briefly described further below  DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) conducts research and development on transportation energy technology, energy efficiency in buildings and manufacturing processes, and the production of solar, wind, geothermal, and other renewable energy  EERE also administers formula grants to states for making energy efficiency improvements to low-income housing units and for state energy planning  The Sustainable Transportation program area includes electric vehicles, vehicle efficiency, and alternative fuels  DOE's electric vehicle program aims to "reduce the cost of electric vehicle batteries by more than half, to less than $100/kWh [kilowatt-hour] (ultimate goal is $80/kWh), increase range to 300 miles, and decrease charge time to 15 minutes or less " DOE's vehicle fuel cell program is focusing on the costs of fuel cells and their hydrogen fuel  According to the FY2020 budget request, "To be cost competitive with gasoline-powered internal combustion engines on a cents-per-mile driven basis, the cost of hydrogen delivered and dispensed needs to be less than $4/gge [gasoline gallon equivalent] (untaxed), and the cost of a durable fuel cell system to be less than $40/kW " Bioenergy goals include the development of "drop-in" fuels—fuels that would be largely compatible with existing energy infrastructure and vehicles, with a goal of $3/gge  Renewable power programs focus on electricity generation from solar, wind, water, and geothermal sources  The solar energy program has a goal of achieving, by 2030, costs of 3 cents per kWh for unsubsidized, utility-scale photovoltaics (PV)  Wind R&D is to focus on early-stage research and testing to reduce costs and improve performance and reliability  The geothermal program is to focus on developing "enhanced geothermal systems" with an electricity generation cost target of 20 8 cents/kWh by 2022  In the energy efficiency program area, the advanced manufacturing program focuses on improving the energy efficiency of manufacturing processes and on the manufacturing of energy-related products  The building technologies program includes R&D on lighting, space conditioning, windows, and control technologies to reduce building energy-use intensity  The energy efficiency program also provides weatherization grants to states for improving the energy efficiency of low-income housing units and state energy planning grants  For more details, see CRS Report R44980, DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE): Appropriations Status , by Corrie E  Clark  The Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) was created from programs that were previously part of the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability  The programs that were not moved into CESER became part of the DOE Office of Electricity (OE)  OE's mission is to lead DOE efforts "to strengthen, transform, and improve energy infrastructure so that consumers have access to secure and resilient sources of energy " Major priorities of OE are developing a model of North American energy vulnerabilities, pursuing megawatt-scale electricity storage, integrating electric power system sensing technology, and analyzing electricity policy issues  The office also includes the DOE power marketing administrations, which are funded from separate appropriations accounts  CESER is the federal government's lead entity for energy sector-specific responses to energy security emergencies—whether caused by physical infrastructure problems or by cybersecurity issues  The office conducts R&D on energy infrastructure security technology; provides energy sector security guidelines, training, and technical assistance; and enhances energy sector emergency preparedness and response  DOE's Multiyear Plan for Energy Sector Cybersecurity describes the department's strategy to "strengthen today's energy delivery systems by working with our partners to address growing threats and promote continuous improvement, and develop game-changing solutions that will create inherently secure, resilient, and self-defending energy systems for tomorrow " The plan includes three goals that DOE has established for energy sector cybersecurity: strengthen energy sector cybersecurity preparedness; coordinate cyber incident response and recovery; and accelerate game-changing research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) of resilient energy delivery systems  DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) "focuses on three major mission areas: the nation's existing nuclear fleet, the development of advanced nuclear reactor concepts, and fuel cycle technologies," according to DOE's FY2020 budget justification  It calls nuclear energy "a key element of United States energy independence, energy dominance, electricity grid resiliency, national security, and clean baseload power " The Reactor Concepts program area includes research on advanced reactors, including advanced small modular reactors, and research to enhance the "sustainability" of existing commercial light water reactors  Advanced reactor research focuses on "Generation IV" reactors, as opposed to the existing fleet of commercial light water reactors, which are generally classified as generations II and III  R&D under this program focuses on advanced coolants, fuels, materials, and other technology areas that could apply to a variety of advanced reactors  To help develop those technologies, the Reactor Concepts program is developing a Versatile Test Reactor that would allow fuels and materials to be tested in a fast neutron environment (in which neutrons would not be slowed by water, graphite, or other "moderators")  Research on extending the life of existing commercial light water reactors beyond 60 years, the maximum operating period currently licensed by NRC, is being conducted by this program with industry cost-sharing  The Fuel Cycle Research and Development program includes generic research on nuclear waste management and disposal  One of the program's primary activities is the development of technologies to separate the radioactive constituents of spent fuel for reuse or solidifying into stable waste forms  Other major research areas in the Fuel Cycle R&D program include the development of accident-tolerant fuels for existing commercial reactors, evaluation of fuel cycle options, and development of improved technologies to prevent diversion of nuclear materials for weapons  The program is also developing sources of high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU), in which uranium is enriched to between 5% and 20% in the fissile isotope U-235, for potential use in advanced reactors  For more information, see CRS Report R45706, Advanced Nuclear Reactors: Technology Overview and Current Issues , by Danielle A  Arostegui and Mark Holt  Much of DOE's Fossil Energy R&D Program focuses on carbon capture and storage for power plants fueled by coal and natural gas  Major activities include Advanced Coal Energy Systems and Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS); Natural Gas Technologies; and Unconventional Fossil Energy Technologies from Petroleum—Oil Technologies  Advanced Coal Energy Systems includes R&D on modular coal-gasification systems, advanced turbines, solid oxide fuel cells, advanced sensors and controls, and power generation efficiency  Elements of the CCUS program include the following: Carbon Capture subprogram for separating CO 2 in both precombustion and postcombustion systems; Carbon Utilization subprogram for R&D on technologies to convert carbon to marketable products, such as chemicals and polymers; and Carbon Storage subprogram on long-term geologic storage of CO 2 , focusing on saline formations, oil and natural gas reservoirs, unmineable coal seams, basalts, and organic shales  For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10589, FY2019 Funding for CCS and Other DOE Fossil Energy R&D , by Peter Folger, and CRS Report R44472, Funding for Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) at DOE: In Brief , by Peter Folger  The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), authorized by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act ( P L  94-163 ) in 1975, consists of caverns built within naturally occurring salt domes in Louisiana and Texas  The SPR provides strategic and economic security against foreign and domestic disruptions in U S  oil supplies via an emergency stockpile of crude oil  The program fulfills U S  obligations under the International Energy Program, which avails the United States of International Energy Agency (IEA) assistance through its coordinated energy emergency response plans, and provides a deterrent against energy supply disruptions  DOE has been conducting a major maintenance program to address aging infrastructure and a deferred maintenance backlog at SPR facilities  The federal government has not purchased oil for the SPR since 1994  Beginning in 2000, additions to the SPR were made with royalty-in-kind (RIK) oil acquired by DOE in lieu of cash royalties paid on production from federal offshore leases  In September 2009, the Secretary of the Interior announced a phaseout of the RIK Program  By early 2010, the SPR's capacity reached 727 million barrels  A series of oil sales and purchases since then have resulted in a net reduction of the SPR inventory  Currently, the SPR contains about 649 million barrels  Congress has enacted several laws since 2015 that mandate sales of SPR oil, including the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P L  114-74 ), the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act ( P L  114-94 ), the 21 st Century Cures Act of 2016 ( P L  114-255 ), the 2017 Tax Revision ( P L  115-97 ), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ), and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018  Broadly considered, this legislation requires oil to be sold from the reserve over the period FY2017 through FY2027, totaling 266 million barrels  For more information, see CRS Report R45577, Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Mandated Sales and Reform , by Robert Pirog, and CRS In Focus IF10869, Reconsidering the Strategic Petroleum Reserve , by Robert Pirog  The DOE Office of Science conducts basic research in six program areas: advanced scientific computing research, basic energy sciences, biological and environmental research, fusion energy sciences, high-energy physics, and nuclear physics  According to DOE's FY2020 budget justification, the Office of Science "is the Nation's largest Federal sponsor of basic research in the physical sciences and the lead Federal agency supporting fundamental scientific research for our Nation's energy future " DOE's Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) program focuses on developing and maintaining computing and networking capabilities for science and research in applied mathematics, computer science, and advanced networking  The program plays a key role in the DOE-wide effort to advance the development of exascale computing, which seeks to build a computer that can solve scientific problems 1,000 times faster than today's best machines  DOE has asserted that the department is on a path to have a capable exascale machine by the early 2020s  Basic Energy Sciences (BES), the largest program area in the Office of Science, focuses on understanding, predicting, and ultimately controlling matter and energy at the electronic, atomic, and molecular levels  The program supports research in disciplines such as condensed matter and materials physics, chemistry, and geosciences  BES also provides funding for scientific user facilities (e g , the National Synchrotron Light Source II, and the Linac Coherent Light Source-II), and certain DOE research centers and hubs (e g , Energy Frontier Research Centers, as well as the Batteries and Energy Storage and Fuels from Sunlight Energy Innovation Hubs)  Biological and Environmental Research (BER) seeks a predictive understanding of complex biological, climate, and environmental systems across a continuum from the small scale (e g , genomic research) to the large (e g , Earth systems and climate)  Within BER, Biological Systems Science focuses on plant and microbial systems, while Biological and Environmental Research supports climate-relevant atmospheric and ecosystem modeling and research  BER facilities and centers include four Bioenergy Research Centers and the Environmental Molecular Science Laboratory at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory  Fusion Energy Sciences (FES) seeks to increase understanding of the behavior of matter at very high temperatures and to establish the science needed to develop a fusion energy source  FES provides funding for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, a multinational effort to design and build an experimental fusion reactor  According to DOE, ITER "aims to provide fusion power output approaching reactor levels of hundreds of megawatts, for hundreds of seconds " However, many U S  analysts have expressed concern about ITER's cost, schedule, and management, as well as the budgetary impact on domestic fusion research  The High Energy Physics (HEP) program conducts research on the fundamental constituents of matter and energy, including studies of dark energy and the search for dark matter  Nuclear Physics supports research on the nature of matter, including its basic constituents and their interactions  A major project in the Nuclear Physics program is the construction of the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams at Michigan State University  A separate DOE office, the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E), was authorized by the America COMPETES Act ( P L  110-69 ) to support transformational energy technology research projects  DOE budget documents describe ARPA-E's mission as overcoming long-term, high-risk technological barriers to the development of energy technologies  For more details, see CRS Report R45150, Federal Research and Development (R&D) Funding: FY2019 , coordinated by John F  Sargent Jr  DOE's Loan Programs Office provides loan guarantees for projects that deploy specified energy technologies, as authorized by Title 17 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P L  109-58 ), direct loans for advanced vehicle manufacturing technologies, and loan guarantees for tribal energy projects  Section 1703 of the act authorizes loan guarantees for advanced energy technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and Section 1705 established a temporary program for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects  Title 17 allows DOE to provide loan guarantees for up to 80% of construction costs for eligible energy projects  Successful applicants must pay an up-front fee, or "subsidy cost," to cover potential losses under the loan guarantee program  Under the loan guarantee agreements, the federal government would repay all covered loans if the borrower defaulted  Such guarantees would reduce the risk to lenders and allow them to provide financing at below-market interest rates  The following is a summary of loan guarantee amounts that have been authorized (loan guarantee ceilings) for various technologies: $8 3 billion for nonnuclear technologies under Section 1703; $2 0 billion for unspecified projects from FY2007 under Section 1703; $18 5 billion for nuclear power plants ($12 0 billion committed); $4 billion for loan guarantees for uranium enrichment plants; $1 18 billion for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects under Section 1703, in addition to other loan guarantee ceilings, which can include applications that were pending under Section 1705 before it expired; and In addition to the loan guarantee ceilings above, an appropriation of $161 million was provided for subsidy costs for renewable energy and energy efficiency loan guarantees under Section 1703  If the subsidy costs averaged 10% of the loan guarantees, this funding could leverage loan guarantees totaling about $1 6 billion  The only loan guarantees under Section 1703 were $8 3 billion in guarantees provided to the consortium building two new reactors at the Vogtle plant in Georgia  DOE committed an additional $3 7 billion in loan guarantees for the Vogtle project on March 22, 2019  Another nuclear loan guarantee is being sought by NuScale Power to build a small modular reactor in Idaho  In the absence of explosive testing of nuclear weapons, the United States has adopted a science-based program to maintain and sustain confidence in the reliability of the U S  nuclear stockpile  Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 ( P L  103-160 )  The goal of the program, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 ( P L  111-84 , §3111), is to ensure "that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of underground nuclear weapons testing " The program is operated by NNSA, a semiautonomous agency within DOE established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 ( P L  106-65 , Title XXXII)  NNSA implements the Stockpile Stewardship Program through the activities funded by the Weapons Activities account in the NNSA budget  Most of NNSA's weapons activities take place at the nuclear weapons complex, which consists of three laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, CA; and Sandia National Laboratories, NM and CA); four production sites (Kansas City National Security Campus, MO; Pantex Plant, TX; Savannah River Site, SC; and Y-12 National Security Complex, TN); and the Nevada National Security Site (formerly the Nevada Test Site)  NNSA manages and sets policy for the weapons complex; contractors to NNSA operate the eight sites  Radiological activities at these sites are subject to oversight and recommendations by the independent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, funded by Title IV of the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill  There are three major program areas in the Weapons Activities account  Directed Stockpile Work includes the life extension programs (LEPs) on existing warheads and stockpile services programs that monitor their condition; and maintaining warheads through repairs, refurbishment, and modifications  It also includes funding for research and development in support of specific warheads, and dismantlement of warheads that have been removed from the stockpile  This last activity received more significant funding as the number of warheads in the U S  stockpile declined after the Cold War; it also provides a source for critical components for warheads remaining in the stockpile  Directed Stockpile Work also involves programs that work on the materials needed for nuclear warheads, including the plutonium pits that are the core of the weapons  Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) includes five programs that focus on "efforts to develop and maintain critical capabilities, tools, and processes needed to support science based stockpile stewardship, refurbishment, and continued certification of the stockpile over the long-term in the absence of underground nuclear testing " This area includes operation of some large experimental facilities, such as the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory  Infrastructure and Operations has, as its main funding elements, material recycle and recovery, recapitalization of facilities, and construction of facilities  The latter include two major projects that have generated congressional controversy: the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project, which deals with plutonium, at Los Alamos National Laboratory  Nuclear Weapons Activities also has several smaller programs, including the following: Secure Transportation Asset, providing for safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons, components, and materials; Defense Nuclear Security, providing operations, maintenance, and construction funds for protective forces, physical security systems, personnel security, and related activities; and Information Technology and Cybersecurity, whose elements include cybersecurity, secure enterprise computing, and Federal Unclassified Information Technology  For more information, see CRS Report R44442, Energy and Water Development Appropriations: Nuclear Weapons Activities , by Amy F  Woolf, and CRS Report R45306, The U S  Nuclear Weapons Complex: Overview of Department of Energy Sites , by Amy F  Woolf and James D  Werner  DOE's nonproliferation and national security programs provide technical capabilities to support U S  efforts to prevent, detect, and counter the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide  These programs are administered by NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation  The Materials Management and Minimization program conducts activities to minimize and, where possible, eliminate stockpiles of weapons-useable material around the world  Major activities include conversion of reactors that use highly enriched uranium (useable for weapons) to low-enriched uranium, removal and consolidation of nuclear material stockpiles, and disposition of excess nuclear materials  Global Materials Security has three major program elements  International Nuclear Security focuses on increasing the security of vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear material in other countries  Radiological Security promotes the worldwide reduction and security of radioactive sources, including the removal of surplus sources and substitution of technologies that do not use radioactive materials  Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence works to improve the capability of other countries to halt illicit trafficking of nuclear materials  Nonproliferation and Arms Control works to "to support U S  nonproliferation and arms control objectives to prevent proliferation, ensure peaceful nuclear uses, and enable verifiable nuclear reductions," according to the FY2020 DOE justification  This program conducts reviews of nuclear export applications and technology transfer authorizations, implements treaty obligations, and analyzes nonproliferation policies and proposals  Other programs under Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation include research and development and construction, which advances nuclear detection and nuclear forensics technologies  Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response provides "interagency policy, contingency planning, training, and capacity building" to counter nuclear terrorism and strengthen incident response capabilities, according to the FY2020 budget justification  The development and production of nuclear weapons during half a century since the beginning of the Manhattan Project resulted in a waste and contamination legacy managed by DOE that continues to present substantial challenges today  DOE also manages legacy environmental contamination at sites used for nondefense nuclear research  In 1989, DOE established the Office of Environmental Management primarily to consolidate its responsibilities for the cleanup of former nuclear weapons production sites that had been administered under multiple offices  DOE's nuclear cleanup efforts are broad in scope and include the disposal of large quantities of radioactive and other hazardous wastes generated over decades; management and disposal of surplus nuclear materials; remediation of extensive contamination in soil and groundwater; decontamination and decommissioning of excess buildings and facilities; and safeguarding, securing, and maintaining facilities while cleanup is underway  DOE's cleanup of nuclear research sites adds a nondefense component to the EM's mission, albeit smaller in terms of the scope of their cleanup and associated funding  DOE has identified more than 100 separate sites in over 30 states that historically were involved in the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy research for civilian purposes  The geographic scope of these sites is substantial, collectively encompassing a land area of approximately 2 million acres  Cleanup remedies are in place and operational at the majority of these sites  Responsibility for the long-term stewardship of them has been transferred to the Office of Legacy Management and other offices within DOE for the operation and maintenance of cleanup remedies and monitoring  Some of the smaller sites for which DOE initially was responsible were transferred to the Army Corps of Engineers in 1997 under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP)  Once USACE completes the cleanup of a FUSRAP site, it is transferred back to DOE for long-term stewardship under the Office of Legacy Management, which is separate from EM and has its own funding account  Three appropriations accounts fund the Office of Environmental Management  The Defense Environmental Cleanup account is the largest in terms of funding, and it finances the cleanup of former nuclear weapons production sites  The Non-Defense Environmental Cleanup account funds the cleanup of federal nuclear energy research sites  Title XI of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ( P L  102-486 ) established the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund to pay for the cleanup of three federal facilities that enriched uranium for national defense and civilian purposes  Those facilities are located near Paducah, KY; Piketon, OH (Portsmouth plant); and Oak Ridge, TN  Title X of P L  102-486 authorized the reimbursement of uranium and thorium producers for their costs of cleaning up contamination attributable to uranium and thorium sold to the federal government  The adequacy of funding for the Office of Environmental Management to attain cleanup milestones across the entire site inventory has been a recurring issue  Cleanup milestones are enforceable measures incorporated into compliance agreements negotiated among DOE, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the states  These milestones establish time frames for the completion of specific actions to satisfy applicable requirements at individual sites  DOE's four Power Marketing Administrations were established to sell the power generated by the dams operated by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers  Preference in the sale of power is given to publicly owned and cooperatively owned utilities  The PMAs operate in 34 states; their assets consist primarily of transmission infrastructure in the form of more than 33,000 miles of high voltage transmission lines and 587 substations  PMA customers are responsible for repaying all power program expenses, plus the interest on capital projects  Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i e , receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority  Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress  For more information, see CRS Report R45548, The Power Marketing Administrations: Background and Current Issues , by Richard J  Campbell  Independent agencies that receive funding in Title IV of the Energy and Water Development bill include the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board  NRC is by far the largest of the independent agencies, with a total budget of more than $900 million  However, as noted in the description of NRC below, about 90% of NRC's budget is offset by fees, so that the agency's net appropriation is less than half of the total funding in Title IV  The recent appropriations history for all the Title IV agencies is shown in Table 7   Established in 1965, the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) is a regional economic development agency  It awards grants and contracts to state and local governments and nonprofit organizations to foster economic opportunities, improve workforce skills, build critical infrastructure, strengthen natural and cultural assets, and improve leadership skills and capacity in the region  ARC's authorizing statute defines the Appalachian Region as including all of West Virginia and parts of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia  More than 25 million people currently live in the region as defined  ARC provides funding to several hundred projects each year, with particular focus on the region's most economically distressed counties  Major areas of infrastructure support broadband communication systems, transportation, and water and wastewater systems  ARC has supported development of the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS), a planned 3,000-mile system of highways that connect with the U S  Interstate Highway System  According to ARC, 90 5% of ADHS is currently "complete, open to traffic, or under construction " NRC is an independent agency that establishes and enforces safety and security standards for nuclear power plants and users of nuclear materials  Major appropriations categories for NRC are shown in Table 8   Nuclear Reactor Safety is NRC's largest program and is responsible for licensing and regulating the U S  fleet of 98 power reactors, plus two under construction  NRC is also responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear waste facilities, such as the proposed underground nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV  NRC is required by law to offset about 90% of its total budget, excluding specified items, through fees charged to nuclear reactor owners and other holders of NRC licenses  As a result, NRC's net appropriation can be as low as 10% of its total funding level, depending on the activities that Congress excludes from fee recovery  For example, excluded items in NRC's FY2019 enacted appropriation are prior-year balances, development of advanced reactor regulations, and international activities  The following hearings have been held by the Energy and Water Development subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on the FY2020 budget request  Testimony and opening statements are posted on most of the web pages cited for each hearing, along with webcasts in many cases  Department of Energy , March 26, 2019, https://appropriations house gov/legislation/hearings/budget-department-of-energy   Corps of Engineers (Civil Works) and the Bureau of Reclamation , March 27, 2019, https://appropriations house gov/legislation/hearings/budget-us-army-corps-of-engineers-and-bureau-of-reclamation   National Nuclear Security Administration , April 2, 2019, https://appropriations house gov/legislation/hearings/budget-department-of-energy-national-nuclear-security-administration  DOE Science, Energy, and Environmental Management Programs , April 3, 2019, https://appropriations house gov/legislation/hearings/budget-science-energy-and-environmental-management-programs  Department of Energy , March 27, 2019, https://www appropriations senate gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-request-for-the-us-department-of-energy   National Nuclear Security Administration , April 3, 2019, https://www appropriations senate gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-request-for-the-national-nuclear-security-administration   U S  Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation , April 10, 2019, https://www appropriations senate gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-requests-for-army-corps-of-engineers-and-bureau-of-reclamation  


Report 2:  NCA’s Cost Estimates for Most of Its Rural Initiative Sites Have Increased Significantly We found that NCA’s cost estimates for seven rural initiative sites have increased significantly above what NCA officials had initially estimated  In its strategy, NCA had estimated that the construction cost estimate for each of the seven rural initiative sites would be approximately $1 million (totaling approximately $7 million)  However, NCA officials told us in August 2018 that the construction cost estimates for these sites had increased to more than $3 million each (totaling almost $24 million)  This amounts to a cost increase of more than 200 percent  Further, the information they provided was not always consistent  For example, in July 2018 NCA officials provided us the average land acquisition and construction costs for the urban and rural initiatives  According to the document they provided, the average construction cost for each urban initiative cemetery is $7 5 million  However, in August 2018 NCA stated in a written response that the construction cost estimates for each of the urban initiatives ranged from approximately $9 million to more than $22 million, reflecting an average cost of $13 6 million  NCA’s cost-estimating guidance used to prepare construction cost estimates does not fully incorporate the 12 steps identified in our Cost Guide that should result in reliable and valid estimates that management can use to make informed decisions, as shown in table 2  Appendix I provides a detailed summary of our assessment of NCA’s cost-estimating guidance  Specifically, NCA’s cost-estimating guidance fully met one step, substantially met four steps, partially met four steps, minimally met two steps, and did not meet one step  For example: NCA’s cost-estimating guidance fully met the step of “obtaining the data” in that it requires a market survey that explores all factors that will affect the bid cost and collects valid and useful historical data to develop a sound cost estimate  NCA’s cost-estimating guidance substantially met the step of “updating the estimate” in that it requires cost estimates to be regularly updated  For instance, it requires an updated cost-estimating report at each stage of the design of the construction project  NCA’s cost-estimating guidance minimally met the step of “conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis” in that, while it mentions the inclusion of a risk analysis, it does not describe what a risk analysis is and how it relates to cost  Additionally, none of the guidance we reviewed contains any discussion of risk management  NCA’s cost-estimating guidance did not meet the step of “conducting a sensitivity analysis ” According to our Cost Guide, a sensitivity analysis should be included in all cost estimates because it examines the effects of changing assumptions and ground rules  Because uncertainty cannot be avoided, it is necessary to identify the cost elements that represent the most risk, and cost estimators should if possible quantify the risk  NCA uses multiple guidance documents on cost estimation and requires that managers and contractors use all of these documents in implementing their projects  Specifically, NCA uses VA’s 2011 Manual for Preparation of Cost Estimates and Related Documents for VA Facilities (Manual); VA’s 2011 Architect/Engineer (A/E) Submission Requirements for National Cemetery Projects Program Guide PG 18-15 Volume D (Guide); and NCA’s Construction Program Conceptual Estimate Worksheet  We refer to these documents collectively as “NCA’s cost- estimating guidance ” We previously reported on VA’s management of minor construction projects and made several recommendations, including that the Veterans Health Administration revise its cost-estimating guidance to incorporate the 12 steps presented in the Cost Guide, to help VA have greater assurance that its cost estimates for minor construction projects are reliable  VA concurred and stated that it would ensure that the Veterans Health Administration update its cost-estimating guidance by incorporating the 12 steps outlined in the Cost Guide, as applicable  As of August 2019, VA had not taken any action to implement this recommendation  The guidance document it plans to update, the VA Manual, is also used by NCA  Further, NCA uses additional guidance documents to develop cost estimates for its cemetery construction projects—including the urban and rural initiatives—that do not fully incorporate the 12 steps presented in the Cost Guide  Without NCA’s revising its cost-estimating guidance to more fully reflect the 12 steps in the Cost Guide, including “conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis,” NCA will not be well-positioned to provide reliable cost estimates to VA and enable it to make informed decisions regarding the management of cemetery construction projects  As noted earlier, the Grants Program is part of NCA’s plan to increase veterans’ reasonable access to burial options  According to NCA officials, their plan to meet their strategic goal of 95 percent of veterans being served by burial options relies, in part, on the state and tribal government efforts funded by the Grants Program  The Grants Program, in turn, relies on states and tribal governments applying for funding to build new cemeteries or expand existing cemeteries  An NCA official told us that NCA does not have the authority to formally request that a state seek grant funding to expand access in an unserved area  However, according to VA officials, the Grants Program has had informal discussions with states that it believes have larger concentrations of unserved veterans, in order to encourage grant applications to provide increased burial access for unserved veteran populations  When reviewing grant applications, NCA considers a number of factors, including how the grant would enhance access for unserved veterans  NCA officials stated that they use the VA’s county-level population data to identify veteran population areas unserved by national, state, or tribal government veterans’ cemeteries  This analysis also allows NCA to project where additional state and tribal government veterans’ cemeteries may be most needed  Specifically, NCA has ranked what it identified as the 40 largest currently unserved veteran population areas  NCA performs this ranking at the county level, not the more precise census tract level, although as we have previously reported it has the technical ability to use census tract data  In September 2014, we reported that NCA was using population data at the county level to identify veterans not served by burial options, and that using population data at the census tract level would enhance NCA’s management of the national cemetery program  Specifically, we recommended that NCA use its existing capabilities to estimate the served and unserved veteran populations using census tract data  This would have allowed them to make better-informed decisions concerning where to locate new national cemeteries, as well as identify which state and tribal government cemetery grant applications would provide reasonable burial access to the greatest number of veterans  However, VA did not concur with that recommendation  In its comments on our draft report, VA agreed that census tract data may yield more precise information than county-level population data, but it disagreed with our conclusion that the use of census tract data would have helped VA to make better-informed decisions regarding the location of burial options  For this review, we performed an analysis using census tract data to examine the 40 prospective sites that NCA has identified as the currently largest unserved areas, using current veteran population data  Our analysis yielded estimates for veterans in the service areas for these prospective sites that differed substantially in some instances from the numbers used by NCA (see figure 5)  For example, NCA ranked Erie, Pennsylvania, as 4th on its list of prospective sites, based on its estimate that an additional 45,154 veterans could be served by a cemetery at this location  However, using census tract data we estimate that only about 10,000 veterans could be served there, resulting in a lower priority for Erie, Pennsylvania, on this list of prospective sites  Similarly, the county- based methodology used by NCA ranked Decatur, Alabama, as 25th on the list of prospective sites, while our methodology based upon nearby census tracts placed it 2nd on the list by estimated number of veterans in the service area  Thus, even though it could serve many additional veterans, Decatur, Alabama, would not be ranked highly on the list for funding using NCA’s methodology  By using the more precise census tract data to help inform its grant- making decisions, NCA could enhance its ability to implement its plan to provide burial options to unserved veterans  Comparing estimates of unserved veterans based on current census tract data with such estimates based on current county-level data can be a useful supplement to NCA’s current reliance on long-term projected county-level population data  Comparing census tract data with county-level data could also identify areas where the county-level projections might be overridden or require additional scrutiny  This could position NCA to better identify those areas of the country that will have the most significant unserved veteran populations  Additionally, this could help NCA refine its current plans or develop new ones, as it deems appropriate  We therefore continue to maintain the validity of our 2014 recommendation for VA to use census tract data to estimate the served and unserved veteran populations to help inform its plans for providing reasonable access to burial options  By NCA’s estimates, more than 2 1 million veterans—about 10 percent of the veterans in the United States—did not have reasonable access to burial options at the end of fiscal year 2013  According to NCA, its plan had helped increase the percentage served by burial options to about 92 percent of the veteran population by the end of fiscal year 2018  However, completion of some of the urban and rural sites that are part of NCA’s plan is currently estimated to take 5 years or longer than planned at significantly higher cost, in part because construction cost estimates for the remaining sites may be unreliable  Without NCA’s revising its cost- estimating guidance to more fully reflect the 12 steps in the Cost Guide, including “conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis,” NCA will not be well-positioned to provide reliable cost estimates to VA and enable it to make informed decisions regarding the funding and oversight of NCA’s ongoing minor construction projects to enhance veterans’ burial options  The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should ensure that the Under Secretary for Memorial Affairs update its cost-estimating procedures for cemetery construction projects to fully incorporate the 12 steps identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs  We provided a draft of this report to VA for review and comment  In written comments, VA concurred with our recommendation  VA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  VA’s comments are printed in their entirety in appendix II  In its technical comments, VA disagreed with our finding that NCA had made limited progress implementing its plan for increasing burial access for veterans and stated that NCA had instead made significant progress  As we note in this report, in 2014, NCA planned to open 18 new sites by the end of fiscal year 2017 to better serve the burial needs of the veteran population  However, as of September 2019, only six of the planned sites were open, with NCA years behind its original schedule  For this reason, we characterized the progress as “limited ” While the progress has been limited, it is important to note that the opening of the six sites has increased accessibility of burial options to veterans  VA also stated that it continues to disagree with our 2014 recommendation that VA use census tract data to estimate the current served and unserved veteran populations to inform its plans for providing reasonable access to burial options  In its written response, VA stated that we recommended NCA use census tract rather than county-level data  However, that is not what we recommended  As we stated in this report, comparing estimates of unserved veterans based on current census tract data with estimates based on current county-level data would provide a useful supplement to NCA’s current reliance on long-term projected county-level population data  Specifically, NCA would be better positioned to identify those areas of the country that will have the most significant unserved veteran populations and refine its current plans or develop new ones, as it deems appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  We compared NCA’s cost-estimating guidance with the 12 steps identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs (Cost Guide)  We found that NCA’s cost-estimating guidance on preparing cost estimates for cemetery construction projects—specifically Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Manual for Preparation of Cost Estimates & Related Documents for VA Facilities (Manual), VA’s Architect/Engineer Submission Requirements for National Cemetery Projects, Program Guide 18-15 Volume D (Guide), and NCA’s Construction Program Conceptual Estimate Worksheet (Worksheet)—does not fully incorporate these 12 steps, as shown in table 3  The guidance incorporates some of the 12 steps to some degree, but not others, raising the possibility of unreliable cost estimates for NCA’s urban and rural initiatives  Specifically, NCA’s guidance on preparing cost estimates: fully or substantially met five of the 12 steps, partially met four of the 12 steps, and minimally met or did not meet three of the 12 steps  Diana Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao gov  In addition to the contact named above, Brian Lepore, Director (Retired); Maria Storts, Assistant Director; Pamela Nicole Harris, Analyst-in-Charge; Brian Bothwell, Jennifer Echard, Alexandra Gonzalez, Jason Lee, Amie Lesser, Serena Lo, John Mingus, Brenda Mittelbuscher, Maria Staunton, Frank Todisco, Cheryl Weissman, and John Wren made significant contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The VA is responsible for ensuring that veterans have reasonable access to burial options in a national or state veterans' cemetery. In fiscal year 2018 VA estimated that about 92 percent of veterans had reasonable access to burial options, which was an increase from 90 percent in fiscal year 2014 but short of its goal of 96 percent by the end of fiscal year 2017. The House Appropriations Committee has expressed concerns that there are geographic pockets where veterans remain unserved by burial options. House Report 115-188 accompanying a bill for the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018, includes a provision for GAO to examine veterans' access to burial options. This report (1) describes VA's plan for increasing reasonable access to burial options for veterans and (2) assesses VA's progress in implementing its plan and any challenges experienced. GAO reviewed applicable VA and NCA documents, compared NCA's cost-estimating practices with GAO's cost-estimating 12 steps, and met with cognizant officials regarding NCA's efforts to provide reasonable access to burial options. Within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the National Cemetery Administration (NCA) has a plan to establish 18 new national cemeteries to increase reasonable access to burial options for veterans. NCA defines reasonable access as a national or state veterans' cemetery being located within 75 miles of veterans' homes. Key parts of NCA's plan include establishing 13 urban and rural initiative national cemeteries and awarding grant funds to state applicants for establishing new state veterans' cemeteries. NCA has made limited progress in implementing its plan to increase burial access and is years behind its original schedule for opening new cemeteries. For example, NCA has opened only two of its planned urban and rural initiative sites and is behind its original schedule for the other 11 (see fig. below). The primary factor delaying NCA's completion of these cemeteries has been challenges in acquiring suitable land. NCA has also been challenged in producing accurate estimates of construction costs for most of its rural initiative sites. Cost estimates have increased more than 200 percent (from about $7 million to $24 million) for these sites, and NCA's guidance for developing cost estimates for the cemeteries does not fully incorporate the 12 steps identified in cost-estimating leading practices—such as conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis or a sensitivity analysis. As a result, NCA is not well positioned to provide reliable and valid cost estimates to better inform decisions to enhance veterans' cemetery access. GAO recommends that NCA fully adopt cost-estimating leading practices into its procedures to assist in improving its cost estimates for establishing cemeteries. NCA concurred with our recommendation.