prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: The Buy American Act of 1933 was enacted during the Great Depression when there was a need to create and preserve jobs for American workers, and it established a preference for the federal government to buy domestic end products  Many of the products the federal government buys—including aircraft engines and medical supplies—are end products that may be subject to the requirements of the Buy American Act  Further, the Buy American Act does not apply to products that are purchased for use outside the United States or obtained through contracts under the micro-purchase threshold, which was generally $3,500 in fiscal year 2017  end products manufactured in the United States provided that (a) the product is a commercially available off-the-shelf item; or (b) the cost of the components mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50 percent of the total cost of all components  End products that are not considered domestic under the Buy American Act are treated as foreign  This characterization is based on the origin of the end product—that is, where the product is manufactured or produced—and not the vendor’s location  For example, a vendor located in Finland may supply end products manufactured in the United States, in which case these products would be treated as domestic products  Conversely, a vendor located in the United States may supply end products manufactured in Finland  In this case, the end products would be considered foreign  Although the Buy American Act establishes a preference for domestic end products, there are situations in which agencies can procure foreign end products through established exceptions to the Buy American requirements  In addition, under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the United States has waived domestic purchasing requirements—including the Buy American Act—for certain acquisitions of foreign end products from countries that are party to international trade agreements or are considered designated countries by the U S  Trade Representative  In implementing the Buy American Act, the FAR sets forth several exceptions that permit federal agencies to buy foreign end products  These include situations when a domestic end product is not produced in sufficient quantities or cases where the cost would be unreasonable to buy a domestic end product  The steps that contracting officers must take to determine or document an exception will vary depending on the circumstances of the acquisition  For example, a written determination from the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) or a delegate may be necessary to determine non-availability in some cases  However, a written determination may not be required when an acquisition is conducted through full and open competition, is synopsized, and no domestic offer is received  Other exceptions to the Buy American Act restrictions on the purchase of foreign products, such as the exception for commercial information technology, are blanket exceptions that do not require a written determination  In addition, some agencies have specified additional considerations that must precede a determination and what level of authority is appropriate for certain determinations  The five Buy American Act exceptions that apply government-wide and the corresponding determination standards in the FAR are listed in Table 1  Individual federal agencies may make blanket determinations of situations in which the Act’s restrictions should not apply to that agency’s procurements, when it is not in the public interest to restrict the purchase of foreign end products  For example, over the years, DOD has entered into reciprocal procurement agreements with 27 foreign counterparts  DOD determined that it would be inconsistent with the public interest to apply the Buy American Act restrictions on products from these 27 qualifying countries  Thus, if an offer includes end products from a qualifying country, those products are not restricted by the Buy American Act and the acquisition of qualifying country end products does not require higher approval  This public interest exception for qualifying countries applies only to contracts awarded by DOD  Federal agencies can purchase eligible foreign end products from designated countries when the Buy American Act’s requirements are waived because of the terms of an international trade agreement or other criteria, such as a designation by the U S  Trade Representative as a least developed country  In accordance with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the president has the authority to waive the Buy American Act  For eligible products that come from countries covered by the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement, Free Trade Agreements, and the Israeli Trade Act, the Buy American Act has been waived so that these items receive nondiscriminatory consideration and are on equal footing with domestic end products  In total, these agreements cover approximately 60 countries—overlapping with all but two of the DOD qualifying countries  Appendix II highlights the overlap  Unlike DOD’s blanket public interest exception for qualifying countries, the Buy American Act requirements are only waived under a trade agreement if the acquisition is of a certain value set by the U S  Trade Representative  Current trade agreement thresholds, at or above which the requirements are waived, range from $25,000 for contracts for eligible products from Canada to $180,000 for the 45 other parties to the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement  Table 2 lists the parties eligible for trade agreements and the associated threshold for supply contracts  The FAR specifies certain conditions in which trade agreements do not apply, even if the acquisition is above the requisite threshold value set by the U S  Trade Representative  In these cases, the Buy American Act would apply  These conditions include, but are not limited to: acquisitions that do not use full and open competition, when the limitation of competition would preclude the procedures applicable to acquisitions covered by trade agreements; certain sole-source acquisitions for commercial items using simplified acquisition procedures; acquisitions set aside for small businesses; acquisition of ammunition, arms, or war materials, or for purchases indispensable for national security or national defense purposes; and acquisitions from federal prison industries or nonprofit agencies employing people who are blind or severely disabled  If the contracting officer determines that a trade agreement applies to a particular acquisition, which waives the Buy American restrictions, that determination does not require additional review at a higher level  This is similar to other circumstances where Buy American Act restrictions do not apply, such as for the acquisition of products for use outside the United States or contracts valued below the micro-purchase threshold  The Buy American Act’s applicability is based on the country of origin of the product being supplied, rather than the country of the vendor offering the product to the government  Vendors who propose to do business with the U S  government are required to certify as to where their products are manufactured or produced—whether in the United States or in a designated country covered by the Trade Agreements Act  Vendors can provide an annual certification applicable to all of their contracts through the federal government’s contractor registry, known as the System for Award Management (SAM)  Through SAM, a vendor identifies the country of origin for foreign products associated with a broad category of products  For example, a vendor could state that it provides aircraft components that originate in France and Mexico  Vendors also have the option not to certify the origin of their products in SAM, but instead provide information about foreign end products in their individual offers for contracts  Contracting officials include the relevant clauses in solicitations and contracts in accordance with regulation to require vendor certification  For example, the clause at FAR 52 225-2, Buy American Certificate, requires the offeror to certify that each end product is a domestic end product, or list any foreign end products and their country of origin  Once a contract is awarded, the awarding agency must enter certain information into FPDS-NG, a government-wide database for contract awards and obligations  The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) within the Office of Management and Budget provides the overall direction for FPDS-NG, which is managed by the General Services Administration  FPDS-NG data can be populated through the individual systems agencies use to develop contracts  Agencies are responsible for the quality of the information transmitted to FPDS-NG, including data captured on the contract value and whether the foreign product acquisition is authorized by one of the Buy American Act exceptions or a trade agreement  This information is recorded at the contract level, or at the delivery order level for orders from indefinite delivery contracts  For certain product categories—essentially those that represent end products—FPDS-NG requires that contracting staff enter information in the “Place of Manufacture” drop-down data field, as shown in Figure 1  This field must be populated for all reported manufactured end products, including those valued under the micro-purchase threshold, which at the time of our review was generally $3,500  Options in this field include indicating that the product is made in the United States, or that it is made outside the United States and qualifies under one of the Buy American Act exceptions, or that it is subject to the requirements of a trade agreement instead of the Buy American Act requirements  In 2018, FPDS-NG data on agencies’ historical reporting of the use of Buy American exceptions were added to the website on which agencies post contracting opportunities (www fbo gov)  According to OFPP, this allows vendors selling domestic products to more easily see how agencies acquire foreign goods pursuant to Buy American Act exceptions  In fiscal year 2017, the federal government obligated approximately $7 8 billion for the acquisition of foreign end products, which accounts for less than 5 percent of total federal contract obligations for end products in that year  We observed differences in how civilian agencies and DOD apply Buy American Act exceptions and waivers  In our review of 38 contracts and orders from four agencies—DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA—we found 6 instances where the place of manufacture information was misreported in FPDS-NG  We further identified system limitations in how FPDS-NG captures information  Based on our analysis of FPDS-NG data, almost 40 percent of federal contract obligations in fiscal year 2017—totaling approximately $196 billion—were for domestic and foreign end products, such as aircraft parts, that may be subject to the Buy American Act  Less than 5 percent of these obligations—approximately $7 8 billion—were reported as foreign end products  This is consistent with the information agencies reported in FPDS-NG in the previous 4 years, with foreign end products accounting for approximately 3 to 8 percent of goods subject to Buy American Act restrictions between fiscal years 2013 through 2016  The foreign end products in fiscal year 2017 primarily came from South Korea, the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Canada, Mexico, and the United Arab Emirates, which together accounted for almost half of the total foreign end products reported  Appendix III shows the federal government’s obligations for foreign end products from various countries for fiscal year 2017  The procurement of foreign end products is permitted by the flexibilities available under the Buy American Act’s exceptions and waivers  Agencies also procured foreign end products through means separate from the exceptions allowed under the Buy American Act, primarily in cases where the Act would not apply  Agencies reported obligating more than $700 million to procure foreign end products by applying one of the five government-wide Buy American Act exceptions—such as domestic non-availability or unreasonable cost—in FPDS-NG for fiscal year 2017  Agencies reported obligating approximately $550 million to procure foreign end products as permitted by the Trade Agreements Act, which waives the Buy American Act’s domestic preference requirements for US trading partners when eligible products are covered by trade agreements and are above certain dollar thresholds  DOD also obligated nearly $2 9 billion to procure foreign products from countries with which it has reciprocal procurement agreements, using what is referred to as the DOD qualifying country exception  This is an exercise of the authority available to agencies under the Buy American Act’s public interest exception  DOD determined that it is not in the public interest to restrict the purchase of foreign end products from 27 countries  All but two of these qualifying countries are also US trading partners, so some of these awards for eligible products may be authorized by a trade agreement  However, the qualifying country exception allows DOD to procure foreign end products without regard to dollar thresholds or other trade agreement eligibility limitations  Agencies also procured foreign end products, such as fuel, to be used outside the United States, in which circumstance the Buy American Act’s requirements do not apply  For fiscal year 2017, these obligations accounted for almost $3 7 billion—about 47 percent of all dollars obligated for foreign end products, as reported in FPDS-NG  Figure 2 highlights fiscal year 2017 obligations, including agencies’ reported spending on foreign end products under the Buy American Act exceptions and other means  DOD accounted for more than 80 percent—roughly $6 4 billion—of the total obligations for foreign end products in fiscal year 2017  Almost all of DOD purchases were either for use outside of the United States, so were not subject to Buy American Act restrictions, or were reported under the public interest exception for DOD qualifying countries  In contrast, civilian agencies report a more varied mix of the exceptions and waivers of the Buy American Act  The civilian agencies—which are unable to apply DOD’s qualifying country exception—were more likely to report buying foreign end products based on trade agreements or another exception to the Buy American Act requirements  Figure 3 shows how DOD and the civilian agencies acquired foreign end products authorized by the various exceptions and waivers of the Buy American Act  From our review of FPDS-NG data, the civilian agencies are more likely to cite one of the five Buy American Act exceptions or a trade agreement waiver when buying foreign end products, and thus take corresponding actions to document or approve the authority cited  For example, in our review of contracts from four agencies, VA obligated $71,000 for medical imaging equipment from Canada, and had to consider whether a trade agreement waiver applied  The manufacturer was determined to be the only source available and the contracting officer determined the acquisition was authorized by a Buy American exception based on domestic non-availability, which can require additional review  In contrast, DOD may make a similar contract award for equipment from Canada based on the qualifying countries exception  DOD acquisitions, then, may be authorized by exceptions such as domestic non-availability when a required item does not come from a qualifying country  For example, we reviewed a $744,000 DOD award for vehicle equipment that was only available from South Africa—which is not one of the DOD qualifying countries and not covered by any of the trade agreements—so the acquisition was authorized by the domestic non-availability exception  In addition, the civilian agencies also reported buying foreign end products for use outside the United States but to a lesser extent than DOD  For example, this included one of the contracts we reviewed, an HHS award for Ebola vaccines manufactured in the Netherlands, with $44 7 million obligated in fiscal year 2017  This contract was reported as used outside the United States because it is primarily stored overseas  FPDS-NG is the primary means for capturing procurement data regarding the Buy American Act, but we found that agencies may not always input reliable information on the extent to which exceptions or waivers authorized the acquisition of foreign end products  In addition, some aspects of how FPDS-NG is structured could lead to additional data reporting errors  In the non-generalizable sample of 38 contracts and orders we examined from DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA, we found 6 awards where information related to the Buy American Act was incorrectly reported in FPDS-NG  In three of the six contracts, agencies recorded the wrong exception or waiver, most often because of an error when reporting the place of manufacture in FPDS-NG  For example, DOD reported a $22,000 contract for vehicle equipment from South Africa as a Buy American Act exception due to unreasonable cost  But the contract file indicated that the exception that applied was domestic non-availability  DOD officials acknowledged the error and corrected it in FPDS-NG during the course of our review  In the three remaining contracts, agencies misreported whether an end product came from the United States or another country  For example, DHS incorrectly recorded that an $18 million contract was for aircraft accessories and other parts manufactured in the United States, even though file documentation showed the contract was for Italian-produced spare parts from the original equipment manufacturer  The Italian- produced spare parts were available from existing inventory maintained by the manufacturer and were needed immediately to meet a mandatory operational requirement  Officials from DHS acknowledged the recording oversight, attributed it to a mistake when entering information in FPDS- NG, and have since corrected the error in response to our observation  Additionally, FPDS-NG has system limitations that could hinder complete and accurate reporting of Buy American Act information: DOD Qualifying Country Exceptions and Trade Agreement Waivers  FPDS-NG requires that information on the type of Buy American Act exception or waiver applied be provided when end products are reported as foreign  But FPDS-NG does not identify errors associated with this process  For example, we reviewed an $8 3 million DHS contract for engines manufactured in Germany that was recorded as a DOD qualifying country exception in FPDS-NG, although this exception is not available to civilian agencies  Contracting officials corrected the data in FPDS-NG during the course of our review  Further, FPDS-NG does not prevent agencies from reporting trade agreement waivers when the contracts are valued below applicable thresholds or waivers do not apply, such as for small business set asides  For example, in the fiscal year 2017 data we reviewed, more than 5 percent of contract obligations reported for trade agreement waivers were for awards set-aside for small businesses, which would not be eligible under the Trade Agreements Act  OFPP officials noted that because of the various dollar thresholds applicable to different trade agreements, adding automatic thresholds in FPDS-NG to guide contracting staff in reporting an applicable trade agreement could lead to additional data errors in the procurement database  Awards under the Micro-purchase Threshold  Although the Buy American Act requirements do not apply to contract awards valued below the micro-purchase threshold—generally $3,500 in fiscal year 2017—the FPDS-NG ‘Place of Manufacture’ field does not have an option to indicate whether a contract is under the threshold  Instead, contracting officers entering information for awards under the micro- purchase amount must still state whether the product is domestic or foreign  If the product is foreign, the officials must select a Buy American Act exception authorizing the purchase, even though no exception is needed at these dollar levels  As a result, when agencies report in FPDS-NG that a Buy American Act exception or waiver applied for a procurement valued at less than $3,500, that information would not be accurate  Based on our review, this may have involved about $16 million in fiscal year 2017 obligations  Awards for both Foreign and Domestic Products  When reporting data for contracts that include multiple end products from both the United States and a foreign country, FPDS-NG only allows for one country of origin to be identified  Contracting officers told us that they typically will report a foreign end product in FPDS-NG when the foreign products account for the preponderance of the contract value  Thus, in cases where a contract includes foreign end products that do not account for the preponderance of the contract’s value, the value of these foreign end products would not be reported in FPDS-NG  We have previously reported that FPDS-NG has similar limitations in other fields, such the type of product or service provided, which prevent contracting officers from identifying more than one condition  According to OFPP, a recent change in the FAR requiring contract reporting at the line item level should provide greater transparency of all products included in a contract  Buy American Act Exceptions and Waivers under Indefinite Delivery Contracts  The way FPDS-NG captures data for Buy American Act exceptions and waivers for some indefinite-delivery contracts results in inaccurate data reporting  When an indefinite- delivery contract is initially awarded, FPDS-NG functionality does not give contracting staff the option to enter information for the ‘Place of Manufacture’ field  Instead, this information is typically captured once an order is placed on the contract  In our review of FPDS-NG data across the four agencies, however, we found that in some cases obligations are reported on the initial indefinite delivery contract so the Buy American Act exceptions or waivers are not recorded  This occurred with multiple agencies, but particularly at HHS, where information for almost 28 percent of HHS obligations for end products in fiscal year 2017 was not captured in FPDS-NG because the obligations were reported in the system through the initial contracts rather than orders  As a result, the applicability of the Buy American Act for HHS contracts totaling almost $1 9 billion in fiscal year 2017 was unreported in FPDS-NG  DOD, DHS, and VA officials told us they identified FPDS-NG reporting as an area of concern  GAO Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government state that management should use quality information to support objectives, and that such data should be complete and accurate  In response to the 2017 Executive Order calling for federal agencies to assess their implementation of the Buy American Act requirement, OFPP officials told us they are identifying potential strategies for improving the information agencies submit to FPDS-NG  As OFPP weighs potential options for FPDS-NG reporting, implementing enhancements to reduce data entry errors and ensure that the data collected are complete and accurate would help enable the system to provide the most useful information possible  Ensuring information is correctly reported in FPDS- NG is critical because the data are used to inform procurement policy decisions and facilitate congressional oversight  The four agencies we reviewed—DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA—took different approaches to provide training and guidance for the Buy American Act requirements  Contracting officers faced challenges when procuring products subject to the Buy American Act  For example, we found instances in which contracting officers applied a waiver or exception to contracts where the waiver did not apply and did not have complete guidance for required determinations or reviews  There also were challenges in confirming product origin information when vendors did not provide consistent information  The four agencies we reviewed varied in the mix of training and guidance provided to aid contracting officers in implementing the requirements of the Buy American Act  Three of the four agencies—DOD, DHS and VA— supplemented the federal acquisition regulation, which implements the requirements of the Buy American Act and Trade Agreements Act, with their own acquisition regulations  In addition, DHS and DOD have recently updated existing training or added new training and guidance  VA issued policy memoranda in 2017, emphasizing the importance of meeting Buy American Act requirements, but has not added training or provided specific guidance  HHS does not provide department-level training or guidance related to the Buy American Act  Most of the DHS and DOD contracting officers we spoke to reported that they had attended training and several found the guidance provided by the training to be helpful  HHS and VA contracting officials described confusion due to the lack of resources available at their respective agencies  In 2017, in response to a series of recommendations from the DOD Inspector General to re-emphasize Buy American Act training and guidance, the Defense Acquisition University introduced an updated training course that specifically focuses on the requirements and implementation of the Buy American Act  While not mandatory, a June 2017 memo notified all DOD services and the defense agencies that members of their contracting workforce should complete this training as part of their professional development  At the current pace of enrollment, DOD officials anticipate approximately 18,000 people will have taken this course by the end of September 2018, which is a seven-fold increase over previous graduation rates  Incorporated into these trainings were supplemental on-the-job tools to assist contracting officers when awarding contracts for end products subject to the Buy American Act requirements  One such tool is a flowchart outlining applicable solicitation provisions or contract clauses based upon the awarded contract’s total dollar value  DOD contracting officials we interviewed from Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) Land and Maritime division had completed the agency-level Buy American Act training and said it served as a good refresher, with some noting that most of the training they had received on the subject came when they were first hired  DOD provides regulations and guidance on Buy American Act requirements through both the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and the accompanying Procedures, Guidance and Information  DOD contracting officers use the provisions and clauses in DFARS to address the public interest exception for DOD qualifying countries  In addition, as a part of the updated training, the Defense Pricing and Contracting Office developed two documents to provide additional Buy American Act guidance  One outlines a step-by-step approach contracting officers can follow to determine whether the Buy American Act applies to their particular procurement and, if so, whether the use of an exception or waiver is appropriate  The second assists contracting officers with evaluating all offers—foreign and domestic— when price is the determining factor  In addition, we found that DLA supplements the available Defense Acquisition University training and guidance with a robust level of support, including annual training and subject matter expertise  DLA contracting officers told us that while they found the updated training helpful, they also appreciated the training course internal to their agency, as it addresses the types of procurements they typically handle in their day-to- day work, such as buying spare parts  Further, DLA contracting officers noted that they use the job aid provided through the local training  DHS introduced training courses in 2017 that specifically focus on the requirements and implementation of the Buy American Act, including a mandatory training course for DHS contracting officers  DHS reported that 94 percent of contracting staff had taken the required course as of April 2018  DHS developed these courses in response to the 2017 Executive Order to ensure its staff was familiar with the Buy American Act requirements  Incorporated into these training courses are supplemental on-the-job tools to assist contracting officers when awarding contracts for end products subject to the Buy American Act requirements, such as a flowchart outlining applicable solicitation provisions or contract clauses based upon contract dollar value


Report 2:  Contracting officials generally view the training and tools they received as beneficial  For example, several DHS contracting officials we interviewed said that the agency’s new course provided a helpful review on the topic, while one contracting officer specifically noted that the course materials are useful to new staff, to help them understand the Act’s waivers and exceptions  DHS also revised its acquisition manual in December 2017 to add further detail regarding the Buy American Act requirements  Specifically, DHS updated its acquisition manual to provide contracting officers more explicit FPDS-NG reporting instructions for procurements subject to the Buy American Act, as well as discretion to purchase domestic end products at or below the micro-purchase threshold  Additional changes include increasing the documentation and level of managerial review required to use several of the exceptions to the Buy American Act  For example, prior to 2018—which includes the time period in which the DHS contracts and orders we reviewed were awarded—the head of individual contracting offices had the authority to approve domestic non-availability and unreasonable cost exceptions, with a notification made to the DHS Chief Procurement Officer  But under the new policy, the use of these exceptions must have the concurrence of the HCA—who is responsible for contracting activities within individual DHS components—and be approved by the department’s Chief Procurement Officer  Table 3 outlines these changes  In September 2017, VA issued guidance to reinforce existing Buy American Act requirements  The policy memorandum encourages the HCAs within VA to institute reviews of awarded contracts subject to the Buy American Act to ensure compliance  As of September 2018, policy officials did not know how many HCAs had taken this step  Further, the guidance emphasizes the importance of Buy American Act training for its acquisition workforce  VA policy officials explained that the Buy American Act is introduced in several VA training courses, but the agency does not have a specific course on implementing the Buy American Act requirements or provide additional instruction or tools  During the course of our review, VA officials said that some of the HCAs had added internal training on the Buy American Act  In addition, VA contracting staff has the option of taking training offered outside the agency, such as the updated Defense Acquisition University course on the Buy American Act  This training is not required  Contracting officials we spoke to at VA said they struggled with the details of awarding contracts subject to Buy American Act requirements because they are not provided sufficient agency-specific training and guidance on the topic  Moreover, several contracting staff noted an increased need for training due to recent changes in VA contracting practices  Specifically, in response to a 2016 Supreme Court decision, VA has increased contracting efforts with veteran-owned small businesses through the Veterans First Contracting Program  As a result, contracting officials explained they have reduced their use of schedule contracts, in which the determinations related to the Buy American Act requirements were made with the initial awards  As one contracting officer explained, prior to this change, more than 90 percent of her division’s procurements were through VA schedule contracts in which Buy American Act applicability had already been established  However, this shift in contracting practices means contracting officers will more frequently need to consider the applicability of the Buy American Act, but contracting officers have not received specific guidance or training to do so  Noting the significance of this change, one contracting officer stated she approached VA management to obtain Buy American Act training for her division, but such training was not available  Federal internal controls state that agencies should ensure that training is aimed at developing and retaining employee knowledge, skills, and abilities to meet changing organizational needs  In September 2018, we reported that VA was experiencing difficulties implementing multiple aspects of the Veterans First policy, and we recommended that VA provide more targeted implementation training  As VA moves forward to implement this training, incorporating the Buy American Act requirements will be important to provide greater assurance that staff has the knowledge and skills needed to navigate the changing procurement environment  HHS does not have agency-level Buy American training or guidance  The HHS Acquisition Regulation Supplement does not address foreign acquisitions  HHS officials told us that efforts to develop guidance that would address Buy American Act requirements are underway, but they do not know when they will be finalized and made available to contracting officers, and could not describe the extent to which they will address Buy American Act implementation  The HHS contracting officers we interviewed discussed informal Buy American Act training their divisions had developed because department-level training was not available  For example, at HHS’ National Institutes of Health, a contracting official told us about a training course she recently developed because her office was taking on the administration of additional contracts for which the Buy American Act requirements would apply  Contracting officers at HHS’ Office of Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority described informal training on the agency’s contract writing system— included as part of their weekly internal staff meetings—that provides additional guidance on how to appropriately complete certain data fields relevant to the Buy American Act  In our analysis of 38 contracts from across the four agencies, we found that agencies faced various levels of challenge in applying the Trade Agreements Act waivers and Buy American Act exceptions to acquire foreign end products  This was particularly apparent in cases where contracting officers had to determine if a trade agreement applied or cases which required a determination that a domestic end product was not sufficiently available, in accordance with the domestic non-availability exception to the Buy American Act requirements  Contracting staff also had difficulty determining the origin of products in light of incomplete or conflicting information  Of the six contracts we reviewed reporting that a trade agreement applied to the foreign end products purchased, we found two cases in which this waiver did not apply to the contracts in question  The value of the contract is one determining factor for whether a trade agreement waives the Buy American Act requirements, although the FAR also states additional factors that would affect applicability under a trade agreement  The two contracts we found, both from VA, had total dollar values at award— $8,435 and $11,950, respectively—that were less than any of the thresholds at which trade agreement waivers of the Buy American Act are applicable  Both contracts were for products from countries that are party to the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement, so the value of the acquisition would have to be equal to or exceed $191,000—the threshold that was in effect at the time of award—for waivers from Buy American requirements to apply  Contracting officials in both cases were generally unaware that the applicable threshold was not met, making the trade agreement waiver inapplicable  Although VA has added Buy American Act guidance since these contracts were awarded early in fiscal year 2017, the information currently available does not provide sufficient detail to assist contracting officers when awarding contracts in these situations  For example, the guidance VA provided contracting officers in September 2017 does not emphasize consideration of the applicable trade agreement thresholds or include information on how contracting officers should determine the applicable waiver or exception  When contracting officers procure foreign end products, the type of waiver or exception used to support the purchase matters—particularly when required additional steps and review are not completed because the wrong waiver or exception was applied  We found that the two VA contracts with foreign end products were incorrectly reported as the Trade Agreements Act waiver having applied  If one of the other Buy American Act exceptions permitting purchases of foreign end products had applied, contracting officers may have been required to obtain higher-level review or complete a written determination  In addition, we reviewed contracts that show some of the complexities contracting officers face beyond applying the dollar thresholds when determining if an award for foreign end products is eligible under the Trade Agreements Act waiver of the Buy American Act  Specifically, we found instances where DHS contracting officials took different approaches for non-competed awards for similar foreign-manufactured products  For example, we reviewed a non-competed $58 million DHS award for acquiring spare aircraft parts from an original equipment manufacturer located in a foreign country that is party to the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement  DHS reported in FPDS-NG that the procurement was waived by the Trade Agreements Act  However, we also reviewed two other sole-source awards from DHS for similar products—spare aircraft parts from two separate manufacturers in foreign countries that are also party to the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement—that were instead reported as subject to the Buy American Act, but excepted due to the non-availability of domestic products  Contracting officers may come to different conclusions for similar products, in part, because of the multiple factors that have to be considered when determining whether an acquisition is subject to the Buy American Act and whether any waivers or exceptions apply  However, available guidance does not always address these complexities  For example, agencies need to decide if other conditions, such as the procurement of products deemed indispensable for national security or national defense purposes apply to an acquisition that would make a trade agreement inapplicable  Further, if the product’s country of origin is considered a designated country under the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement, officials need to determine that the product is eligible under that agreement  DHS updated its training and guidance for the Buy American Act, which includes a job aid outlining at what dollar values solicitation provisions and contract clauses under a trade agreement waiver are applicable  However, it does not address other situations in which contracts may not be eligible under the Trade Agreements Act, such as non-eligible products or products for national defense purposes  For the other agencies in our review, we found that DOD’s updated Buy American Act training and its acquisition supplement both address trade agreement eligibility, but HHS does not yet have Buy American guidance to address this topic  Federal internal control standards state that agencies should communicate quality information internally to achieve their objectives and that they should select the appropriate methods of communication  When written guidance is not available, agencies may miss opportunities to ensure appropriate steps are taken to meet Buy American Act requirements  Our review of 38 contracts also included 8 contracts for foreign end products pursuant to the domestic non-availability exception  In certain situations, such as when contracts are awarded without full and open competition, this exception requires an approved written determination  The FAR establishes requirements for domestic non-availability determinations, but agencies can delegate the level of review required or specify information to be included in the determination  Three of the agencies we reviewed—DOD, DHS, and VA—provide supplemental guidance on the process for making determinations, including who must make the determination when applying a domestic non-availability exception  However, DHS policy officials told us that when the agency uses the domestic non-availability exception for a sole-source acquisition, the written justification that the FAR requires for non- competed awards should suffice as the documentation to support the non-availability determination as well  The practice of using sole-source justifications to support Buy American determinations is not addressed in DHS guidance  According to DHS policy updated in 2018, determinations of domestic non-availability must be concurred with by the HCA and approved by the Chief Procurement Officer  Federal and DHS acquisition regulations, however, state that some justifications can be approved at a lower level  In the absence of further guidance, this difference in approval levels could result in inconsistent application within the department  In addition, as previously noted HHS does not yet have Buy American Act guidance so the department does not provide information on how to make determinations  According to federal internal control standards, agencies should communicate quality information internally to achieve their objectives and that they should select appropriate communication methods  When written guidance is not available, agencies may miss opportunities to ensure that contracting officers take the steps needed to meet requirements when applying a domestic non-availability exception  Knowing the country of origin of the products the federal government buys is necessary to implement the Buy American Act, but contracting officers do not always have access to accurate information on originating countries  The FAR and the DFARS provide various clauses which, when incorporated into contracts, require vendors to certify that the end products they provide to the government are domestic and, if necessary, declare the foreign countries from which they provide products  Vendors frequently certify this information through the System for Award Management (SAM), the government-wide system used to collect vendors’ annual representations and certifications  Contracting officers may rely on the information vendors provide about their product origins, but they are generally expected to take actions to verify incomplete or conflicting information when they have reason to believe that a vendor will be providing a non-compliant product  We found that SAM certifications and offers did not always include accurate information on end products from foreign countries  In 6 of the 38 contracts that we reviewed—from DHS, HHS, and VA—the vendors certified that they only provided domestic end products although the end products provided were foreign  In all of these cases, the contracting officers knew that the acquisitions included foreign end products  For example, we reviewed two DHS awards for spare aircraft parts from an Italian-based company, one of which was reported in FPDS-NG under the domestic non-availability exception to the Buy American Act, and the other which was incorrectly reported as being manufactured in the United States but has since been corrected  Contracting officials said they knew the parts were made in Italy based on extensive experience contracting with the company and, in part, because they had visited the production location  Contracting officials—including some at HHS and VA—said they use SAM as their primary source to determine whether the vendor is offering domestic end products  Others reported some awareness of the limitations of SAM certifications  At all four agencies, contracting officials emphasized that it is important to ask questions when end product origin information is not readily available—or if there is conflicting information—but agency guidance that we reviewed does not address this need or provide information on how to do so  Only the local training offered by DOD’s DLA addresses other sources of information, which officials said was helpful because it is specific to the industries with which they work  Instead, some officials described how they rely on their experience to know how to verify products’ origins but this can be problematic, particularly with newer staff  For example, in one contract we reviewed VA contracting officials acknowledged that a new contracting specialist at VA did not follow-up when the product origin certification was not provided and assumed all of the items procured were domestic  During the course of our review, the contracting specialist’s supervisor said that she contacted the vendor and learned that some of the items provided were in fact foreign end products  The foreign products were not considered to account for the preponderance of the contract so were not reported in FPDS-NG, but the contracting officer was acting with incomplete information at the time of award  Further, in 4 of the 38 contracts that we reviewed, it is not clear how contracting staff took steps to obtain product origin information in situations where it was not provided in SAM  In these cases—which include contracts for both domestic and foreign end products—the vendors had opted not to certify their product origins in SAM, but instead said that they would provide the information with their individual proposals  However, based on the information in the contract files, the proposals did not include this information  For example: Three of the contracts we reviewed from HHS—all reported as purchasing end items manufactured in the United States—did not certify product origin in SAM  The supervising contracting officer for two of the awards explained that his contracting staff regularly check the vendor’s written representations and certifications provided in the offer, because the SAM certifications are general and do not always apply to the specific equipment they buy  However, the three contract files we reviewed did not include manufacturing or origin information  The vendor for a DHS contract that was reported as manufactured in the United States did not certify this information in SAM  The contracting officer said that he checks SAM for product origin information, but in the documents we reviewed there is no evidence of the information in the contract file  Federal internal control standards state that agencies should communicate the necessary quality information needed to achieve the agency’s objectives, thereby enabling personnel to address risks  Providing guidance regarding the situations in which contracting officers should verify product origin information with vendors may help agencies better meet the requirements of the Buy American Act  Although purchases for foreign end products account for less than 5 percent of federal procurement spending in fiscal year 2017, it is important that these purchases be consistent with the domestic- purchasing restrictions in the Buy American Act  This requires that Buy American Act exceptions and trade agreement waivers be used only when applicable, and that agencies report accurate data on the extent to which they are used  However, data reporting errors by contracting staff and FPDS-NG limitations mean that data on the use of exceptions and waivers are not fully captured  The federal agencies all have responsibilities to ensure Buy American Act data are accurate and complete  The lack of good data can hinder congressional oversight of the extent to which foreign end products are procured as authorized by one of the exceptions or waivers of the Buy American Act  Agencies have taken varied approaches for providing information to contracting officers that navigate the complexities and nuances associated with applying the different Buy American Act exceptions or trade agreement waivers  DOD has added such detailed information through its revised training course and policy guidance  Adding these types of targeted information to address challenging areas would help contracting officers at other agencies implement the Buy American Act’s domestic preferences, as well as related exceptions and waivers  Further, to accurately determine how exceptions and waivers apply requires complete product origin information  Although the responsibility to certify the origins of products supplied to the federal government rests with the contractors, contracting officers would benefit from resources that help them identify information that may be inconsistent, to ensure that accurate information is available  We are making four recommendations, one each to the Office of Management and Budget, DHS, VA, and HHS  The Director of the Office of Management and Budget should instruct the Office of Federal Procurement Policy: To facilitate additional training to improve the understanding of the contracting workforce regarding the Buy American Act requirements; and To facilitate clarifying revisions to FPDS-NG, where needed, and provide training and guidance for recording Buy American Act information in FPDS-NG to improve the accuracy of the Buy American data  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Homeland Security should clarify existing guidance in the Homeland Security Acquisition Manual or update training to help contracting officials: Identify the factors that should be considered in order to determine the applicability of the Trade Agreements Act and waiver of the Buy American Act; Document determinations of the use of Buy American exception for domestic non-availability and ensure the required approvals are obtained, particularly when such determinations are evidenced through justifications for other than full and open competition; and Identify sources of information available for determining product origin and the steps they should take to verify information that is inconsistent  (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should clarify existing guidance, or provide training or other instruction, to help contracting officials: Address the applicability of the Buy American Act requirements and provide instruction on how to implement the requirements, including in any training developed to implement the Veterans First policy; Identify the factors that should be considered in order to determine the applicability of the Trade Agreements Act and waiver of the Buy American Act; and Identify sources of information available for determining products’ origins and the steps they should take to verify information that is inconsistent  (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Health and Human Services should provide guidance, training, or other instruction to help contracting officials: Identify the factors that should be considered in order to determine the applicability of the Trade Agreements Act and waiver of the Buy American Act; Document determinations of the use of Buy American exceptions for domestic non-availability and ensure the required approvals are obtained; and Identify sources of information available for determining products’ origins and the steps they should take to verify information that is inconsistent  (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOD, HHS, DHS, VA, and the Office of Management and Budget for review and comment  DOD reviewed the report, but did not offer comments  HHS, DHS, and VA provided written responses, which are reproduced in Appendices IV, V, and VI of this report, respectively  A senior official within the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) at the Office of Management and Budget provided a response via email  In addition, HHS, DHS, and OFPP provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report where appropriate  In their responses, HHS, DHS, VA agreed, and OFPP generally agreed, with our findings and recommendations  The written response from HHS and DHS included information on the steps each agency plans to take to address the recommendations  Specifically, HHS stated that the agency will evaluate ways to provide additional training and guidance to contracting officials  DHS stated that it will provide guidance on the applicability of the Buy American Act and the Trade Agreements Act in certain situations and the documentation and approvals required when awarding non-competed contracts that require an exception  Additionally, DHS plans to update training regarding actions contracting officers should take when there are discrepancies in product origin information  VA concurred with our three-part recommendation and described some of the actions the agency plans to take in response  However, VA’s comments do not fully address our recommendation  Specifically, we recommended that VA clarify guidance or provide training to identify factors that could help contracting officers determine the applicability of Trade Agreements Act waivers of the Buy American Act  The comments from VA, however, only restate the existing Buy American Act exceptions and make no mention of Trade Agreements Act waivers  Further, we recommended that VA identify sources of information regarding product origin and the steps to be taken to verify inconsistent product origin information  VA’s response only noted that contracting officers are responsible for conducting market research and ensuring that all product origin requirements are met  VA did not outline any additional steps the agency would take to help contracting officers navigate the complexities inherent in this area  Going forward, VA will need to develop a more robust and responsive approach in order to fully implement our recommendation  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or woodsw@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII  The objectives of this report are to assess the extent to which (1) the federal government procures foreign products through Buy American Act exceptions and waivers; and (2) selected agencies provide training and guidance to implement the Buy American Act requirements  To address both of these objectives, we reviewed relevant laws and policies, such as sections of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR); the Buy American Act as amended; the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 as amended; federal acquisition regulation supplements from audited agencies such as the Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS); the Executive Order “Buy American, Hire American” of 2017; the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement; and memorandums, policy, guidance, and instructions related to the Buy American Act  To assess the federal government procurement of foreign products, including those procured through citing exceptions and waivers of the Buy American Act, we analyzed data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) for fiscal year 2017, which was the most recent and complete data available at the time of our review  We analyzed procurement data in FPDS-NG across the federal government in fields relevant to the Buy American Act’s domestic preference requirements, including the product service code, country of product origin, and place of manufacture, in addition to fields such as the contract value and dollars obligated  We reviewed the place of manufacture field in particular as it contains information on how the Buy American Act applies to the contract, including whether the preponderance of the obligations is for manufactured end products and, if so, whether they are manufactured in or outside of the United States  When manufactured outside of the United States, this field also captures the reason the purchase was permissible, which we analyzed to assess the dollar obligations associated with the various Buy American exceptions or trade agreement waiver reported, as well as when products were used outside of the United States  We also analyzed data from FPDS-NG to identify the countries where foreign end products were reported to be manufactured and the associated dollars obligated in fiscal year 2017  In addition, we met with officials from the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal Procurement Policy to better understand ongoing reviews of the data in FPDS-NG that pertains to the Buy American Act  In our analysis of FPDS-NG data, we took steps to minimize issues that might affect data reliability  Specifically, we analyzed FPDS-NG data to identify potential errors and inconsistencies, such as non-eligible agencies reporting the use of exceptions for DOD qualifying countries, or reporting trade agreement waivers for contracts valued less than minimum thresholds for trade agreements  We made minor adjustments to minimize potential data reporting issues, including aggregating the exceptions reported, and where appropriate, limiting our analysis to one year of data, fiscal year 2017  Based on these steps, we determined that FPDS-NG data were sufficiently reliable to allow us to calculate the approximate extent of obligations for foreign end products and the use of the Buy American Act exceptions and the Trade Agreements Act waiver  However, we are unable to precisely determine the amount spent on foreign end products through the use of exceptions and waivers because of the reporting errors and data system limitations we identified in this report  Using FPDS-ND data, we identified four agencies—the Departments of Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and Veterans Affairs (VA)—that had the highest fiscal year 2017 obligations in the product codes for manufactured products, which are potentially subject to the Buy American Act restrictions  In addition, to identify trends and determine if there were variations in reported obligations for foreign end products in the past, we reviewed FPDS-NG data on the Buy American exceptions and trade agreement waivers in fiscal years 2013 through 2017  To assess the extent to which selected agencies are providing training and guidance to implement the requirements of the Buy American Act, we reviewed training course materials and regulations, policies, and other guidance available at the four agencies in our review—DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA—to determine the extent to which they address the Buy American Act requirements  In addition, we reviewed training materials available to government employees through sources such as the Federal Acquisition Institute  We interviewed policy officials from the four agencies to understand how training and guidance had been implemented  We further reviewed relevant inspector general reports from the DOD Inspector General issued between 2015 and 2018, which made several recommendations to improve compliance with the Buy American Act, among other requirements  Within the four agencies, we selected contracting offices that reported obligating fiscal year 2017 dollars for awards with foreign end products and awards with US-manufactured end products  We specifically focused on offices that reported a sufficient amount of foreign end product obligations and a sufficient number of contract awards to allow us to select multiple contracts  We also considered offices with a variety of Buy American exceptions and waiver types reported, in order to select a mix of contracts  The contracting offices selected were as follows: DOD: Defense Logistics Agency, Land and Maritime HHS: National Institutes of Health and the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response DHS: United States Coast Guard VA: Veterans Health Administration From these offices, we selected a non-generalizable sample of 38 contracts and delivery orders awarded in fiscal year 2017  At each agency, we selected awards to include a mix of end items produced by domestic and foreign manufacturers and, when products were reported as foreign manufactured, a mix of the various exceptions and waivers cited  We also include awards across a range of value for dollars obligated above the micro purchase threshold—ranging from approximately $5,000 to more than $100 million—to ensure we reviewed awards both above and below the various thresholds at which the Trade Agreements Act waiver might apply  Additionally, our sample included awards for similar types of end products across agencies, including aircraft parts at DOD and DHS and medical supplies at HHS and VA, to compare practices in different agencies  We originally selected 40 awards for review—10 from each agency—but removed two awards from our sample  One was an HHS award that we determined was awarded using Other Transaction Authority and was not subject to the Buy American Act  The second excluded contract was from DHS, which was modified after award to reflect that it was an information technology service rather than a product  As a service, it would not be subject to the Buy American Act  We reviewed the contract files for each of the 38 awards in our sample, including documentation such as the contract and task order award, solicitations, vendors’ offers or response to proposals, determination and finding memos, and FPDS-NG output documents  In addition, we reviewed the certifications each vendor provided in the System for Award Management (SAM) at the time of contract award  We interviewed contracting officials responsible for each of the 38 contracts and task orders to understand how they addressed the Buy American Act requirements, including how they determined exception or waiver applicability and product origin  We also reviewed any agency-specific or local training and guidance, tools, or job aids available to assist contracting officers in implementing the Act’s requirements We conducted this performance audit from October 2017 to December 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on audit objectives  The United States maintains trade relationships with other countries whose specific negotiated terms results in different levels and types of applicability for waivers and exceptions to the Buy American Act  Figure 4 depicts the range of relationships that the United States maintains with other nations that allow for less restrictive purchasing of foreign end products by the federal government  The federal government purchases foreign end products from various countries  Figure 5 highlights the different amounts of contract obligations for foreign end products from these countries for fiscal year 2017  The highest category, over $500 million, includes 4 countries that account for almost 40 percent of all federal procurement of foreign end products  Countries where the federal government obligated less than $5 million for the procurement of foreign end products are not included  In addition to the contact named above, Candice Wright, Assistant Director; and Jennifer Dougherty, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this review  Skip McClinton; Erin Stockdale; Adam Cowles; Stephanie Gustafson; Julia Kennon; Anne Louise Taylor; and Robin Wilson made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: Previous attempted and successful terrorist attacks against the United States have raised questions about the security of the U.S. government's process for adjudicating NIVs, which are issued to foreign nationals, such as tourists, business visitors, and students, seeking temporary admission into the United States. For example, the December 2015 shootings in San Bernardino, California, led to concerns about NIV screening and vetting processes because one of the attackers was admitted into the United States under a NIV. In 2017, the President issued executive actions directing agencies to improve visa screening and vetting, and establishing nationality-based visa entry restrictions, which the Supreme Court upheld in June 2018. GAO was asked to review NIV screening and vetting. This report examines (1) outcomes and characteristics of adjudicated NIV applications from fiscal years 2012 through 2017, and (2) key changes made to the NIV adjudication process in response to executive actions taken in 2017. GAO analyzed State NIV adjudication data for fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the most recent and complete data available. GAO visited seven consular posts selected based on visa workload and other factors. GAO reviewed relevant executive orders and proclamations, and documents related to implementing these actions. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in June 2018. Information that DHS, State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence deemed sensitive has been removed. The total number of nonimmigrant visa (NIV) applications that Department of State (State) consular officers adjudicated annually peaked at about 13.4 million in fiscal year 2016, and decreased by about 880,000 adjudications in fiscal year 2017. NIV adjudications varied by visa group, country of nationality, and refusal reason: Visa group. From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, about 80 percent of NIV adjudications were for tourists and business visitors. During this time, adjudications for temporary workers increased by about 50 percent and decreased for students and exchange visitors by about 2 percent. Country of nationality. In fiscal year 2017, more than half of all NIV adjudications were for applicants of six countries of nationality: China (2.02 million, or 16 percent), Mexico (1.75 million, or 14 percent), India (1.28 million, or 10 percent), Brazil (670,000, or 5 percent), Colombia (460,000, or 4 percent), and Argentina (370,000, or 3 percent). Refusal reason. State data indicate that over this time period, 18 percent of adjudicated applications were refused; more than 90 percent were because the applicant did not qualify for the visa sought, and a small percentage (0.05 percent) were due to terrorism and security-related concerns. In 2017, two executive orders and a proclamation issued by the President required, among other actions, visa entry restrictions for nationals of certain listed countries of concern, the development of uniform baseline screening and vetting standards, and changes to NIV screening and vetting procedures. GAO's analysis of State data indicates that, out of the nearly 2.8 million NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017, 1,338 applications were refused due to visa entry restrictions implemented per the executive actions. State, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and others developed standards for screening and vetting by the U.S. government for all immigration benefits, such as for the requirement for applicants to undergo certain security checks. Further, State sought and received emergency approval from the Office of Management and Budget in May 2017 to develop a new form to collect additional information from some visa applicants, such as email addresses and social media handles.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Several U S  agencies have roles and responsibilities related to the screening and vetting of NIV applicants, as shown in table 1  Key Visa Adjudication Process Terms Validity period: The length of time during which a nonimmigrant visa (NIV) is valid for use by a foreign national seeking to travel to a U S  port of entry and apply for admission into the United States  Entries: The number of applications for admission into the country permitted under a single NIV  Reciprocity arrangements: An understanding or arrangement between the U S  government and another country on the length of time visas issued by either or both nations are valid for admission  There are many NIVs, and for the purposes of this report, we have placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups, as shown in table 2  The validity period and number of entries varies depending on (1) the particular NIV and (2) reciprocity arrangement with an individual’s country of nationality, among other factors  For example, a foreign national of one country may be issued a tourist visa valid for 1 year that allows for a single U S  entry, while a foreign national of another country may be issued a tourist visa valid for 5 years and that permits multiple entries  However, the authorized period of stay—that is, the amount of time that the nonimmigrant is permitted to remain in the United States after being admitted—has no relation to the validity period  For more information on the various NIVs, see appendix I  State is generally responsible for the adjudication of NIV applications, and manages the NIV application process, including the consular officer corps and its functions at more than 220 visa-issuing posts overseas  Depending on various factors, such as the particular NIV sought, the applicant’s background, and visa demand, State officials noted that the length of the visa adjudication process can vary from a single day to months  This screening and vetting process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains several steps, as shown in figure 1: Petitions  Prior to State’s adjudication process, some NIVs require applicants to first obtain an approved petition from U S  Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), as shown in table 3  For example, applicants seeking an employment-based NIV or a U S  citizen’s foreign national fiancé(e) seeking U S  entry to conclude a valid marriage, must obtain an approved petition from USCIS prior to applying for their NIV  The petitioner (i e , a U S  citizen, organization or business entity) completes the petition on behalf of the applicant (i e , the beneficiary), and the petition would be submitted to a U S -based USCIS service center for adjudication  USCIS Background Checks  As part of the adjudication process for visas requiring a USCIS-approved petition before the NIV application is submitted to State, USCIS conducts background checks on U S - based petitioners and foreign beneficiaries  For example, petitioner and beneficiary information is screened against TECS—DHS’s principal law enforcement and antiterrorism database that includes enforcement, inspection, and operational records  Further, for U S  citizens petitioning for a K-1 visa on behalf of their fiancé(e), an FBI fingerprint check may also be required of the U S  citizen petitioner  If the background checks identify a potential match to derogatory information, the background check unit at the USCIS service center that received the petition is to conduct further research to confirm the match, such as running checks against other government systems and collaborating with other government agencies  If all background check hits have been resolved and documented, and there is no reason not to proceed, USCIS will adjudicate the petition  In fiscal year 2017, USCIS reported that it received about 640,000 petitions for NIVs, and approved over 550,000  NIV Application  After having obtained USCIS approval of the NIV petition, as applicable, the foreign national begins the consular process by completing an online NIV application, known as a DS-160  Upon submitting an application, the applicant can schedule an interview at a post overseas and pays the processing fee  Key Visa Adjudication Process Terms Inadmissible: Individuals are inadmissible to the United States if they fall within the classes of foreign nationals defined as such under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, Pub  L  No  82-414, tit  II, ch  2, § 212(a), 66 Stat  163, 182-87 (1952) (classified, as amended, at 8 U S C  § 1182(a)), such as foreign nationals who have engaged in terrorist or criminal activities or previously violated U S  immigration law  If a visa applicant is found inadmissible, and has not obtained a waiver from the Department of Homeland Security, the applicant would be statutorily ineligible for a visa  Ineligible: An individual is ineligible for a visa if it appears to the Department of State consular officer, based on the application or supporting documentation, that the applicant is not qualified to receive a visa under any provision of law  If the consular officer decides that an applicant is ineligible for visa issuance, the refusal may be based on statutory grounds of inadmissibility under INA § 212(a), or may be due to the individual’s failure to otherwise satisfy the applicable eligibility requirements for the particular visa, as defined in the INA  For example, a consular officer may refuse a J-1 exchange visitor visa to an applicant coming to the United States to perform services as a member of the medical profession if the applicant does not either demonstrate competency in oral and written English or hold a degree from an accredited school of medicine, as required of such visa applicants under INA § 212(j)  eligibility concerns related to visa applicants  Prior to adjudicating the visa application, consular officers must review all such security check results  Some applicants are not subjected to all of the security checks depending on certain characteristics, such as age and visa category  For example, State does not generally require that fingerprints be collected for applicants who are either under 14 years old or over 79 years old, or for foreign government officials seeking certain visas  As needed, some applicants undergo an interagency review process called a security advisory opinion (SAO), which is a multi-agency, U S-based review process for certain NIV applicants  For example, SAOs are mandatory in cases of certain security check hits, a foreign national’s background, or a foreign national’s intention while in the United States  In addition, consular officers have the discretion to request an SAO for any visa applicant  Through the SAO process, consular officers send additional information on applicants to U S - based agencies, who review that information against their holdings  Department of State data indicate that consular officers made over 180,000 requests for SAOs for NIV applicants in fiscal year 2017  Adjudication  If the consular officer determines that the applicant is eligible for the visa on the basis of the application, supporting documentation, and other relevant information such as statements made in an interview, he or she will take the applicant’s passport for final processing, but the visa cannot be printed until all security checks have been returned and reviewed  If the consular officer determines that the applicant is inadmissible to the United States or otherwise ineligible under the applicable visa eligibility criteria, he or she informs the applicant that the visa has been refused, and identifies the provision(s) of law under which the visa was refused  Recurrent vetting  In March 2010, shortly after the December 2009 attempted bombing by a foreign national traveling to the United States on a valid visa, CBP began vetting individuals with NIVs on a recurrent basis  This program has led State to revoke visas after they have been issued when information was later discovered that rendered the individual inadmissible to the United States or otherwise ineligible for the visa  In addition, CBP analysts may take other actions as needed after identifying new derogatory information, such as recommending that the airline deny boarding to the traveler because the traveler is likely to be deemed inadmissible upon arrival in the United States (known as a no-board recommendation) or making a referral to ICE, which may seek to remove the individual if already within the United States  According to NCTC, KFE also conducts recurrent vetting of NIV holders against emerging threat information  The total number of NIV applications that consular officers adjudicated annually (or, NIV adjudications) peaked at about 13 4 million in fiscal year 2016, which was an increase of approximately 30 percent since fiscal year 2012  In fiscal year 2017, NIV adjudications decreased by about 880,000 adjudications, or about 7 percent  Figure 2 shows the number of applications adjudicated each year from fiscal year 2012 through 2017  Appendix II includes additional data on NIV adjudications related to this and the other figures in this report  Annual Monthly Trends  State data from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 indicate that NIV adjudications generally followed an annual cycle, ebbing during certain months during the fiscal year; however, adjudications in fiscal year 2017 departed slightly from this trend  Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the number of NIV adjudications typically peaked in the summer months  State officials noted that the summer peak is generally due to international students who are applying for their visas for the coming academic year  However, in fiscal year 2017, the summer months did not experience a similar increase from previous months, departing from the trend over the previous five fiscal years, according to State data  Instead, NIV adjudications peaked in December of fiscal year 2017  State officials attributed some of the decline in fiscal year 2017 to a decrease in Chinese NIV applicants, which we discuss later in this report  Figure 3 shows monthly NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  State data on NIV applications adjudicated from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 indicate that the number of adjudications by visa group, applicant’s country of nationality, and location of adjudication were generally consistent, with some exceptions  Visa Group  From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, about 80 percent of NIV adjudications were for tourist and business visitors as shown in figure 4  The next largest groups were visas for students and exchange visitors and temporary workers, which accounted for an average of 9 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of all adjudications during this time period  Although adjudications for visas in some categories increased, others decreased over time  For example, as shown in figure 5, NIV adjudications for temporary workers increased by approximately 50 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (592,000 to 885,000)  During the same time period, adjudications for tourist and business visitors also increased by approximately 20 percent overall (from 8 18 million to 9 97 million), but decreased from fiscal years 2016 to 2017  However, NIV adjudications for student and exchange visitor visas decreased by about 2 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (1 01 million to 993,000) overall, but experienced a peak in fiscal year 2015 of 1 2 million  Appendix I includes additional information on NIV adjudication by visa group from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  State officials identified reasons to explain these trends: Temporary Workers  Although there was an increase in adjudications across all types of temporary worker visas, the largest percentage increase was for H-2A visas, which are for foreign workers seeking to perform agricultural services of a temporary or seasonal nature  Specifically, adjudications of H-2A visas increased by 140 percent from fiscal years 2012 to 2017 (from about 71,000 to 170,000)  State officials noted that H-2A visas are not numerically limited by statute  Further, State officials stated that they believe U S  employers are increasingly less likely to hire workers without lawful status and are petitioning for lawfully admitted workers, which in part led to an increase in H-2A visa demand  Tourist and Business Visitors  State officials partly attributed the overall changes to tourist and business visitor visas to the extension of the validity period of such visas for Chinese nationals, which represented the largest single country of nationality for tourist and business visitor visas in fiscal year 2017 (17 7 percent)  In November 2014, the United States and the People’s Republic of China reciprocally increased the validity periods of multiple-entry tourist and business visitor visas issued to each other’s citizens for up to 10 years  The change in policy was intended to support improved trade, investment, and business by facilitating travel between the two countries  According to State officials, extending validity periods can create an initial increase in demand for such visas, followed by a period of stabilization or even decline as NIV holders would be required to apply for renewal less frequently  According to State officials, in early fiscal year 2015, the increase in the validity period to 10 years for such visas created a spike in Chinese demand in fiscal year 2015, and by fiscal year 2016, the initial demand for these visas had been met and Chinese economic growth was simultaneously slowing, resulting in fewer adjudications for such visas in fiscal year 2017  State data for this time period indicate that the number of adjudications for tourist and business visitor visas for Chinese nationals increased from 1 58 million in fiscal year 2014 to 2 54 million in fiscal year 2015, followed by a decline to 2 34 million in fiscal year 2016 and 1 76 million in fiscal year 2017  Student and Exchange Visitors  Similar to tourist and business visitors, State officials partly attributed the overall changes in student and exchange visitor visa adjudications to the extension of the validity period of such visas for Chinese nationals, which represented the largest single country of nationality for student and exchange visitor visas in fiscal year 2017 (19 percent)  In November 2014, the United States extended the validity period of the F visa for academic students from 1 year to 5 years  State officials noted that similar to tourist and business visitor visas, there was an initial surge in Chinese F-visa applicants due to the new 5-year F-visa validity period that began in fiscal year 2015, but the number dropped subsequently because Chinese students with such 5-year visas no longer needed to apply as frequently for F visas  State data for this time period indicate that the number of visa adjudications for F visas for Chinese nationals increased from about 267,000 in fiscal year 2014 to 301,000 in fiscal year 2015, followed by a decline of 172,000 in fiscal year 2016 and 134,000 in fiscal year 2017  Applicant’s Country of Nationality  In fiscal year 2017, more than half of all NIV adjudications were for applicants of six countries of nationality: China (2 02 million, or 16 percent), Mexico (1 75 million, or 14 percent), India (1 28 million, or 10 percent), Brazil (670,000, or 5 percent), Colombia (460,000, or 4 percent), and Argentina (370,000, or 3 percent), as shown in figure 6  Location of Adjudication  State data indicate that the geographic distribution of NIV adjudications across visa-issuing posts worldwide remained relatively consistent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV adjudications from visa-issuing posts in the Western Hemisphere comprised the largest proportion worldwide during this time period; however, this proportion decreased from 48 8 percent in fiscal year 2012 to 41 7 percent in fiscal year 2017  During the same time period, the proportion of NIV adjudications at visa-issuing posts in other regions increased slightly  For example, the percentage of NIV adjudications from posts in Africa increased from 3 8 percent to 5 5 percent, and the percentage of adjudications from posts in South and Central Asia increased from 7 9 percent to 11 2 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Figure 7 provides the proportion of NIV adjudications at visa- issuing posts from each region from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  The percentage of NIVs refused—known as the refusal rate—increased from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, and was about the same in fiscal year 2017 as the previous year  As shown in figure 8, the NIV refusal rate rose from about 14 percent in fiscal year 2012 to about 22 percent in fiscal year 2016, and remained about the same in fiscal year 2017; averaging about 18 percent over the time period  As a result, the total number of NIVs issued peaked in fiscal year 2015 at about 10 89 million, before falling in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 to 10 38 million and 9 68 million, respectively  The NIV refusal rate can fluctuate from year to year due to many factors  For example, according to State officials, removing a large, highly- qualified set of travelers from the NIV applicant population can drive up the statistical refusal rate  State officials also noted that when a country joins the Visa Waiver Program or a visa for certain nationalities increase from 1-year to 10-year visa validity periods, these individuals no longer apply for visas and affect the overall refusal rate  Further, State officials noted that changes in political and economic conditions in individual countries can affect visa eligibility, which in turn affects the overall refusal rate  State officials noted that the degree to which an applicant might seek to travel to the United States unlawfully is directly related to political, economic, and social conditions in their countries  For example, if global or regional economic conditions deteriorate, more applicants may have an incentive to come to the United States illegally by, for example, obtaining a NIV with the intent to unlawfully stay for a particular time period or purpose other than as permitted by their visa, which then would increase the number of NIV applications that consular officers are refusing  From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the refusal rate varied by visa group  The highest refusal rate was for tourists and business visitors, which rose from about 15 percent in fiscal year 2012 to over 25 percent in fiscal year 2017, as shown in figure 9  Other visa categories, such as foreign officials and employees, transit and crewmembers, and fiancé(e)s and spouses, had refusal rates below 5 percent during this time period  State officials noted that because different visa categories have different eligibility and documentary requirements, they have different refusal rates  For example, F, J, and H visas require documentation of eligibility for student, exchange, or employment status, respectively  According to State data, while the majority of NIV refusals from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 were a result of consular officers finding the applicants ineligible, a relatively small number of refusals were due to terrorism and other security-related concerns  NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U S  immigration law and State policy  For the purposes of this report, we have grouped most of these grounds for refusal into one of seven categories, as shown in table 4  State data indicate the more than 90 percent of NIVs refused each year from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 were based on the consular officers’ determination that the applicants were ineligible nonimmigrants—in other words, the consular officers believed that the applicant was an intending immigrant seeking to stay permanently in the United States, which would generally violate NIV conditions, or that the applicant otherwise failed to demonstrate eligibility for the particular visa he or she was seeking  For example, an applicant applying for a student visa could be refused as an ineligible nonimmigrant for failure to demonstrate possession of sufficient funds to cover his or her educational expenses as required  Similarly, an applicant could be refused as an ineligible nonimmigrant for indicating to the consular officer an intention to obtain a student visa to engage in unsanctioned activities while in the United States, such as full-time employment instead of pursuing an approved course of study  According to State data, the second most common reason for refusal during this time period was inadequate documentation, which accounted for approximately 5 percent of refusals each year  In such cases, a consular officer determined that the application failed to include necessary documentation for the consular officer to ascertain whether the applicant was eligible to receive a visa at that time  If, for example, the applicant provides sufficient additional information in support of the application, a consular officer may subsequently issue the visa, as appropriate  Our analysis of State data indicates that relatively few applicants— approximately 0 05 percent—were refused for terrorism and other security-related reasons from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Security- related reasons can include applicants who have engaged in genocide, espionage, or torture, among other grounds  Terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility include when an applicant has engaged in or incited terrorist activity, is a member of a terrorist organization, or is the child or spouse of a foreign national who has been found inadmissible based on terrorist activity occurring within the last five years, among other reasons  As shown in figure 10, in fiscal year 2017, State data indicate that 1,256 refusals (or 0 05 percent) were based on terrorism and other security-related concerns, of which 357 refusals were specifically for terrorism-related reasons  In calendar year 2017, the President issued two executive orders and a presidential proclamation that required, among other actions, visa entry restrictions for nationals of certain countries of concern, a review of information needed for visa adjudication, and changes to visa (including NIV) screening and vetting protocols and procedures (see timeline in figure 11)  Initially, the President issued Executive Order 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States (EO-1), in January 2017  In March 2017, the President revoked and replaced EO-1 with the issuance of Executive Order 13780 (EO-2), which had the same title as EO-1  Among other things, EO-2 suspended entry of certain foreign nationals for a 90 day period, subject to exceptions and waivers  It further directed federal agencies—including DHS, State, DOJ and ODNI—to review information needs from foreign governments for visa adjudication and develop uniform screening and vetting standards for U S  entities to follow when adjudicating immigration benefits, including NIVs  In September 2017, as a result of the reviews undertaken pursuant to EO-2, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Proclamation), which imposes certain conditional restrictions and limitations on the entry of nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen—into the United States for an indefinite period  These restrictions are to remain in effect until the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State determine that a country provides sufficient information for the United States to assess adequately whether its nationals pose a security or safety threat  Challenges to both EOs and the Proclamation have affected their implementation and, while EO-2’s entry restrictions have expired, the visa entry restrictions outlined in the Proclamation continue to be fully implemented as of June 2018, consistent with the U S  Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the President may lawfully establish nationality-based entry restrictions under the INA, and that Proclamation 9645 itself “is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority ” A more detailed listing of the executive actions and related challenges to those actions brought in the federal courts can be found in appendix III  Our analysis of State data indicates, out of the nearly 2 8 million NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017, 1,338 were refused due to visa entry restrictions implemented in accordance with the executive actions  To implement the entry restrictions, in March 2017, State directed its consular officers to continue to accept all NIV applications and determine whether the applicant was otherwise eligible for a visa without regard to the applicable EO or Proclamation  If the applicant was ineligible for the visa on grounds unrelated to the executive action, such as having prior immigration violations, the applicant was to be refused on those grounds  If the applicant was otherwise eligible for the visa, but fell within the scope of the nationality-specific visa restrictions implemented pursuant to the applicable EO or Proclamation and was not eligible for a waiver or exception, the consular officer was to refuse the visa and enter a refusal code into State’s NIV database indicating that the applicant was refused solely due to the executive actions  More than 90 percent of the NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017 pursuant to an executive action were for tourist and business visitor visas, and more than 5 percent were for students and exchange visitors  State data also indicate that the number of applications adjudicated for nationals of the 7 countries identified in EO-1—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen—decreased by 22 percent in fiscal year 2017, as compared to a 7 percent general decrease in NIV adjudications worldwide that year  For example, as shown in table 5, the decrease in adjudications from fiscal years 2016 to 2017 for nationals of the 7 countries identified in EO-1 ranged from around 12 percent to more than 40 percent  As directed by the executive actions, DHS, State, DOJ, and ODNI took several steps to enhance NIV screening and vetting processes given their responsibilities for implementing the presidential actions  Among other things, the responsibilities included: (1) a review of information needed for visa adjudication; (2) the development of uniform screening standards for immigration programs; and (3) implementation of enhanced visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures  Review of information needed for visa adjudication  In accordance with EO-2, DHS conducted a worldwide review, in consultation with State and ODNI, to identify additional information needed from foreign countries to determine that an individual is not a security or public-safety threat when adjudicating an application for a visa, admission, or other immigration benefit  According to State officials, an interagency working group composed of State, DHS, ODNI, and National Security Council staff was formed to conduct the review  To conduct this review, DHS developed a set of criteria for information sharing in support of immigration screening and vetting, as shown by table 6  According to DHS officials, to develop these criteria, DHS, in coordination with other agencies, identified current standards and best practices for information collection and sharing under various categories of visas to create a core list of information needed from foreign governments in the visa adjudication process  For example, State sent an information request to all U S  posts overseas requesting information on host nations’ information sharing practices, according to State officials  To assess the extent to which countries were meeting the newly established criteria, DHS officials stated that they used various information sources to preliminarily develop a list of countries that were or were not meeting the standards for adequate information sharing  For example, DHS officials stated that they reviewed information from INTERPOL on a country’s frequency of reporting lost and stolen passport information, consulted with ODNI for information on which countries are terrorist safe havens, and worked with State to obtain information that State officials at post may have on host nations’ information sharing practices  According to the Proclamation, based on DHS assessments of each country, DHS reported to the President on July 9, 2017, that 47 countries were “inadequate” or “at risk” of not meeting the standards  DHS officials identified several reasons that a country may have been assessed as “inadequate” with regard to the criteria  For example, some countries may have been willing to provide information, but lacked the capacity to do so  Or, some countries may not have been willing to provide certain information, or simply did not currently have diplomatic relations with the U S  government  As was required by EO-2, State engaged with foreign governments on their respective performance based on these criteria for a 50-day period  In July 2017, State directed its posts to inform their respective host governments of the new information sharing criteria and request that host governments provide the required information or develop a plan to do so  Posts were directed to then engage more intensively with countries DHS’s report preliminarily deemed “inadequate” or “at risk”  Each post was to submit an assessment of mitigating factors or specific interests that should be considered in the deliberations regarding any travel restrictions for nationals of those countries  DHS officials stated that they reviewed the additional information host nations provided to State and then reevaluated the initial classifications to determine if any countries remained “inadequate ” On September 15, 2017, in accordance with EO-2, DHS submitted to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a presidential proclamation that would prohibit certain categories of foreign nationals of such countries from entering the United States  The countries listed were Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen— which were assessed as “inadequate,” and Somalia, which was identified as a terrorist safe haven  The Presidential Proclamation indefinitely suspended entry into the United States of certain nonimmigrants from the listed countries (see table 7) and directed DHS, in consultation with State, to devise a process to assess whether the entry restrictions should be continued, modified or terminated  In September 2017, State issued additional guidance to posts on implementation of the Presidential Proclamation  As of July 2018, State continues to accept and process the NIV applications of foreign nationals from the eight countries covered by the Proclamation  Such applicants are to be interviewed, according to State guidance, and consular officers are to determine if the applicant is otherwise eligible for the visa, meets any of the proclamation’s exceptions, or qualifies for a waiver  Development of uniform screening standards for U S  immigration benefit programs  Consistent with EO-2, State, DHS, DOJ, and ODNI developed a uniform baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures by the U S  government  According to State officials, an interagency working group comprised of State, DHS, DOJ, and ODNI staff is implementing these requirements  Based on its review of existing screening and vetting processes, DHS officials stated that the working group established uniform standards for (1) applications, (2) interviews, and (3) security system checks (i e , biographic and biometric)  Regarding applications, DHS officials stated that the group identified data elements against which applicants are to be screened and vetted  In February 2018, DHS Office of Policy officials stated that they had taken steps to create more consistency across U S  government forms that collect information used for screening and vetting purposes, such as State’s DS-160 NIV application as well as 12 DHS forms  For example, officials stated that they anticipate issuing Federal Register notices announcing the intended changes to such forms  Regarding interviews, DHS officials stated that the working group established a requirement for all applicants seeking an immigration benefit, including NIV applicants, to undergo a baseline uniform national security and public safety interview  DHS officials stated that the working group modeled its interview baseline on elements of the refugee screening interview  To help implement this standard, DHS officials stated that the department is offering more training courses in enhanced communications (i e  detecting deception and eliciting responses) and making such courses accessible to other U S  government entities and U S  officials overseas  Regarding security checks, the working group identified certain checks that should be conducted for all applicants seeking an immigration benefit, including NIV applicants  For example, DHS officials stated that the working group concluded that all applicants for U S  immigration benefits should be screened against DHS’s TECS, among other federal databases  In February 2018, DHS Office of Policy officials stated that they were also exploring the extent to which current screening and vetting technologies can be expanded  For example, technology that is being used to screen applicants for counterterrorism concerns can potentially be modified to screen applicants for other concerns such as public safety or participation in transnational organized crime  However, these officials noted such changes to technology can take a long time  DHS officials stated that each department and agency is responsible for implementing the uniform standards for their relevant immigration programs  For example, with regard to maintaining information electronically, State officials stated that for nonimmigrant and immigrant visas, as of May 2018, they collected most, but not all, of the application data elements  In addition to executive actions taken in calendar year 2017, the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 9 on February 6, 2018, which directed DHS, in coordination with State, DOJ, and ODNI, to establish a National Vetting Center to optimize the use of federal government information in support of the national vetting enterprise  This memorandum stated that the U S  government must develop an integrated approach to the use of intelligence and other data, across national security components, in order to improve how departments and agencies coordinate and use information to identify individuals presenting a threat to national security, border security, homeland security, or public safety  The center is to be overseen and guided by a National Vetting Governance Board, consisting of six senior executives designated by DHS, DOJ, ODNI, State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense  Further, within 180 days of the issuance of the memorandum, these six departments and agencies, in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget, are to jointly submit to the President for approval an implementation plan for the center, addressing, among other things, the initial scope of the center’s vetting activities; the roles and responsibilities of agencies participating in the center; a resourcing strategy for the center; and a projected schedule to reach both initial and full operational capability  On February 14, 2018, the Secretary of Homeland Security selected an official to serve as the Director of the National Vetting Center and delegated the center’s authorities to CBP  DHS Office of Policy officials stated in February 2018 that the center is intended to serve as the focal point of the larger screening and vetting enterprise, and will coordinate policy and set priorities  The center will use the uniform baselines for screening and vetting standards and procedures established per EO-2 to set short- and long-term priorities to improve screening and vetting across the U S  government  Further, these officials stated screening and vetting activities will continue to be implemented by the entities that are currently implementing such efforts, but roles and responsibilities for screening and vetting for immigration benefits may be modified in the future based on the work of the center  According to DHS Office of Policy officials, efforts to implement National Security Presidential Memorandum 9, such as the development of an implementation plan, are ongoing as of June 2018  Implementation of new visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures  In response to the EOs and a March 2017 presidential memorandum issued the same day as EO-2, State has taken several actions to implement new visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures  For example, State sought and received emergency approval from the Office of Management and Budget in May 2017 to develop a new form, the DS-5535  The form collects additional information from a subset of visa applicants to more rigorously evaluate applicants for visa ineligibilities, including those related to national security and terrorism  The new information requested includes the applicant’s travel history over the prior 15 years, all phone numbers used over the prior 15 years, and all email addresses and social media handles used in the last 5 years  State estimated that, across all posts, the groups requiring additional vetting represented about 70,500 individuals per year  We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS, DOJ, State, and ODNI  DHS, DOJ, and State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until seven days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777or GamblerR@gao gov  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV  There are many nonimmigrant visas (NIV), which are issued to foreign nationals such as tourists, business visitors, and students seeking temporary admission into the United States  For the purposes of this report, we placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups  In the following enclosures, we provide a descriptive overview of each group on the basis of our analysis of the Department of State’s (State) fiscal years 2012 through 2017 NIV data  Each enclosure also contains the following: Description of the group  In this section, we provide a narrative description of the group, as well as a table of the specific NIVs that comprise the group  Characteristics of the applicants  In this section, we provide the number of annual NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the specific NIVs adjudicated in fiscal year 2017 within the group, the regions to which applicants applied for these NIVs in fiscal year 2017, and the top five nationalities that applied for NIVs in the group in fiscal year 2017  Issuances  In this section, we provide the number of NIVs issued within this group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Refusals  In this section, we provide the refusal rate for the entire NIV group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  For the NIVs that were refused in fiscal year 2017 for this group, we also provide the top ground for refusal  NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U S  immigration law and State policy  However, across all visa groups, the top categories were either ineligible nonimmigrant or inadequate documentation: Ineligible nonimmigrant  For most NIV categories, the applicant is presumed to be an intending immigrant until the applicant establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer that he or she is entitled to a nonimmigrant status  An applicant may be refused under this provision if, among other things, the consular officer determines the applicant lacks sufficient ties to his or her home country, or intends to abandon foreign residence; that evidence otherwise indicates an intent to immigrate to the United States permanently; or that the applicant is likely to violate the terms of the visa after being admitted  Inadequate documentation  The consular officer determined that the application is not in compliance with the INA because, for example, it lacks necessary documentation to allow the consular officer to determine visa eligibility  In such cases, the applicant would not be found eligible for the visa unless and until satisfactory documentation is provided to the consular officer or after the completion of administrative processing, such as security advisory opinions  Visa types (FY 2017) (9,968,157 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (9,968,157 adjudications) percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2015, and declined by about 13 percent from fiscal years 2015 to 2017  ● The refusal rate for tourist and business visitor visas generally increased each year from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2017  ● The vast majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (992,855 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (992,855 adjudications) ● The refusal rate for student and exchange visitor issuances decreased each year from fiscal years 2015 through 2017  visas peaked in fiscal year 2016, and slightly declined in fiscal year 2017  ● The vast majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (884,667 adjudications) 19% 10% 16% Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (884,667 adjudications) ● Generally, the refusal rates for temporary worker years 2012 through 2017  visas decreased from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Department of State officials noted, for example, that H-2A visas are not numerically limited by statute  They also stated that they believe U S  employers are increasingly less likely to hire workers without lawful status and are petitioning for lawfully admitted workers  ● In fiscal year 2017, temporary worker visas were most frequently refused because the applicant did not provide adequate documentation to the consular officer  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (330,117 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (330,117 adjudications) ● The refusal rates for transit and crewmember visas about 8 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (from about 295,000 to 320,000)  varied over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Specifically, issued C-1/D visas increased over the ● The majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were same time period, but the number of issued visas for the remaining visa types in this category have decreased  due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (166,187 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (166,187 adjudications) ● The refusal rates for foreign official and employee visas remained under 4 percent  ● In fiscal year 2017, foreign official and employee visas were most frequently refused because the applicant did not provide adequate documentation to the consular officer  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (68,580 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (68,580 adjudications) ● Generally, refusal rates for treaty trader and investor increased over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  visas increased slightly over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Issuances for E-3 visas nearly doubled from fiscal ● The majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were year 2012 through 2017, but comprise a small percentage of this category overall  due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of their intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (40,533 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (40,533 adjudications) ● Refusal rates for fiancé(e) and spouse visas were fluctuated over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017, but increased overall during this time period  relatively low during the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Most refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to inadequate documentation from the visa applicant, potentially indicating that such applications failed to include necessary documentation for the consular officer to ascertain whether the applicant was eligible to receive a visa at that time  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Nonimmigrant visas (NIV) are issued to foreign nationals such as tourists, business visitors, and students seeking temporary admission into the United States  The Department of State (State) is generally responsible for the adjudication of NIV applications, and manages the application process, including the consular officer corps and its functions at more than 220 U S  embassies and consulates (i e , visa-issuing posts) overseas  Depending on various factors, such as the particular NIV sought, the applicant’s background, and visa demand, State officials noted that the length of the visa adjudication process can vary from a single day to months  This appendix provides descriptive statistics of NIV adjudications, issuances, and refusals for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Specific details are shown in table 8 below  State data from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 indicate that NIV adjudications generally followed an annual cycle, ebbing during certain months during the fiscal year; however, adjudications in fiscal year 2017 departed slightly from this trend  Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the number of NIV adjudications typically reached its highest peak in the summer months, as shown in table 9  For example, State officials noted that a summer peak is generally due to international students who are applying for their visas for the coming academic year  There are many NIVs, and for the purposes of this report, we have placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups  Table 10 includes the annual NIV adjudications, issuances, and refusal rates, for each visa group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV applicants seeking to travel to the United States represent many different nationalities, but the countries of nationality with the most NIV adjudications have remained relatively consistent in recent years  Table 11 provides the top 25 countries of nationality for NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV applicants can apply for their NIVs at more than 220 visa-issuing U S  posts overseas  Table 12 describes the regions to which NIV applicants applied from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U S  immigration law and State policy  For the purposes of this report, we have grouped most of these grounds for refusal into one of seven categories, and group the remaining into a miscellaneous category, as shown in table 13  From January through October 2017, the administration took various executive actions establishing nationality-based entry restrictions for certain categories of foreign nationals from designated countries  This appendix supplements information included in this report to provide a more comprehensive presentation of changes to U S  immigration policy affecting nonimmigrant and immigrant entry into the United States, and outlines the legal standards applied, and precedent developed and relied upon, by federal courts in resolving challenges to the executive actions  In particular, it describes relevant aspects of the executive actions specifically addressed in this report—Executive Orders 13769 and 13780, both titled Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, and Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats—that imposed visa entry restrictions on certain countries’ nationals and included provisions addressing NIV screening and vetting, as well as other executive actions on immigration issued by the current administration  Furthermore, this appendix provides a detailed account of the interrelated challenges to these executive actions brought in the federal courts through June 2018  In summary, on March 6, 2017, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which instituted visa and refugee entry restrictions, and an accompanying memorandum addressed to the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security and the Attorney General, calling for heightened screening and vetting of visa applications and other immigration benefits  EO 13780 stated that it is U S  policy to improve the screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with the visa-issuance process and U S  Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP)  Enforcement of sections 2(c) and 6(a) of EO 13780 which established visa entry restrictions for nationals of six countries of particular concern—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—for a 90-day period, and suspended all refugee admissions for 120 days, was enjoined by federal district court orders issued in March 2017  On appeal, the U S  Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits generally upheld these decisions  Upon review by the U S  Supreme Court in June 2017, the injunction was partially lifted except with respect to foreign nationals who have bona fide ties to the United States Implementation of EO 13780 commenced on June 29, 2017  On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats  This proclamation restricts entry into the United States of certain categories of foreign nationals from eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—for an indefinite period  Preliminary injunctions issued by the U S  District Courts for the Districts of Maryland (Maryland federal district court) and Hawaii (Hawaii federal district court) in October 2017 prohibited implementation of these visa entry restrictions except with respect to North Korean and Venezuelan nationals  On December 4, 2017, the U S  Supreme Court issued two orders staying these district court injunctions; and on January 19, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for review of the December 22, 2017, decision of the Ninth Circuit, which partially affirmed the Hawaii federal district court’s preliminary injunction  As of June 2018, these latest visa entry restrictions continue to be fully implemented consistent with the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the President may lawfully establish nationality-based entry restrictions, and that Proclamation 9645 itself “is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority ” The following sections describe these executive actions and related litigation in greater detail  On January 27, 2017, the President issued EO 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which directed a review of information needs for adjudicating visas and other immigration benefits to confirm individuals seeking such benefits are who they claim to be, and are not security or public-safety threats  To temporarily reduce investigative burdens during the review period, the EO suspended U S  entry for nationals of seven countries of particular concern—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen  In addition, EO 13769 put USRAP on hold for 120 days and indefinitely barred admission of Syrian refugees  Shortly after its issuance, however, the EO faced numerous legal challenges in federal courts across the country involving various constitutional and statutory issues such as detainee applications for writs of habeas corpus, alleged religious or nationality-based discrimination, and the extent of the EO’s applicability to certain categories of foreign nationals, including U S  lawful permanent residents (LPR) and dual nationals holding passports issued by a listed country as well as another nation not subject to visa entry restrictions  On February 3, 2017, the Washington federal district court entered a nationwide temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting enforcement of the EO’s entry restrictions  In rejecting the government’s argument that a TRO only cover the particular states at issue, the court reasoned that partial implementation would “undermine the constitutional imperative of ‘a uniform Rule of Naturalization’ and Congress’s instruction that the ‘immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly ’” On February 9, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the nationwide injunction, thereby denying the government’s emergency motion for a stay of the Washington federal district court’s TRO pending appeal, because the government did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of its appeal, or that failure to enter a stay would cause irreparable injury  On March 6, 2017, however, the President issued EO 13780, which revoked and replaced EO 13769, and established revised restrictions on entry for nationals of the same countries of particular concern, except Iraq  On March 6, 2017, the President signed EO 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which revoked and replaced EO 13769 and put in place revised visa and refugee entry restrictions, and issued an accompanying memorandum calling for heightened screening and vetting of visa applications and other immigration benefits  In general, sections 2(c) and 6(a) of EO 13780 barred visa travel for nationals of six designated countries—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—for 90 days, and all refugee admission for 120 days  On March 15, 2017, sections 2 and 6 of the EO were enjoined on statutory grounds (i e , based on potential violation of U S  immigration law) pursuant to the order of the Hawaii federal district court granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO  On March 16, 2017, the Maryland federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring implementation of visa entry restrictions on a nationwide basis with respect to nationals of the six listed countries  On May 25, 2017, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Maryland federal district court’s injunction on constitutional grounds (i e , based on potential violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U S  Constitution)  On June 12, 2017, the Ninth Circuit generally affirmed the Hawaii federal district court’s ruling, but vacated the district court’s order to the extent it enjoined internal review procedures not burdening individuals outside the Executive Branch, therefore permitting the administration to conduct the internal reviews of visa information needs as directed in the EO  On June 14, 2017, the President issued a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, Attorney General, and Director of National Intelligence, directing that sections 2 and 6 of EO 13780 were to be implemented 72 hours after all applicable injunctions are lifted or stayed  On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court granted, in part, the government’s application to stay the March 15 and 16 injunctions of the Hawaii and Maryland federal district courts, as generally upheld on May 25 and June 12 by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits  The Court explained that the administration may enforce visa and refugee travel restrictions under sections 2 and 6 except with respect to an individual who can “credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States ” In the case of a visa or refugee applicant who is the relative of a person in the United States, such foreign national would be exempt from entry restrictions provided the family connection with their U S  relative meets the “close familial relationship” standard  The Court further explained that a qualifying relationship with a U S  entity would have to be formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, and not for the purpose of evading EO 13780  On June 29, 2017, the day that implementation of EO 13780 began, the State Department issued guidance providing that a close familial relationship exists for the parents, spouse, children, adult sons or daughters, sons and daughters-in-law, and siblings of a person in the United States, but not for such person’s grandparents, grandchildren, uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, sisters-in-law, brothers-in-law or other relatives  The State of Hawaii filed a motion with the Hawaii federal district court seeking, among other things, a declaration that the partial injunction in place after the Supreme Court’s ruling prohibited application of travel restrictions to fiancés, grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the United States  On July 13, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court ruled, among other things, that section 2 of the EO, generally barring travel to the United States for nationals of certain countries, does not apply to the grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews and cousins of persons in the United States, who were initially excluded from the administration’s interpretation of “close family ” The government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court  On July 19, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the government’s motion seeking further clarification of its June 26 ruling, stayed the Hawaii federal district court’s order to the extent it included refugees covered by a formal assurance from a U S -based resettlement agency within the scope of the preliminary injunction, pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and left unchanged the district court’s broader formulation of exempt “close family ” On September 7, 2017, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Hawaii federal district court’s definition of close family members who are not to be subjected to travel restrictions, and rejected the government’s argument that refugees who had undergone a stringent review process and been approved by U S -based resettlement agencies lack a bona fide relationship to the United States, thus allowing admission of such refugees  On September 11, 2017, the Supreme Court temporarily enjoined aspects of the Hawaii federal district court’s holding that would permit admission of certain refugees with formal assurances from a U S  resettlement entity  The next day, on September 12, 2017, the Supreme Court indefinitely stayed the Ninth Circuit’s September 7 ruling with respect to refugees covered by a formal assurance, thereby permitting the administration to suspend entry of such refugees  On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public Safety Threats, which expanded the scope and duration of visa entry restrictions from six to eight countries, and from a 90-day to an indefinite period for the listed countries  On September 25, 2017, in light of the September 24 proclamation, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file briefs addressing whether, or to what extent, the cases before it regarding EO 13780 are moot  On October 10, 2017, after receiving the parties’ supplemental briefs, the Supreme Court decided that because section 2(c) of EO 13780 expired on September 24, there was no live case or controversy; and without expressing a view on the merits, the Court vacated and remanded the Maryland case to the Fourth Circuit with instructions to dismiss as moot the challenge to EO 13780  On October 24, 2017, consistent with its October 10 ruling, the Supreme Court also vacated and remanded the Hawaii case related to EO 13780 to the Ninth Circuit with instructions to dismiss it as moot  Consequently, after challenges to EO 13780 visa and refugee entry restrictions, as curtailed by the Supreme Court’s ruling of June 26, 2017, were rendered moot, litigation continued with respect to the President’s proclamation of September 24, 2017  On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645 (the Proclamation), Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, which imposes certain conditional restrictions and limitations on entry into the United States of nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—for an indefinite period  According to the Proclamation, travel restrictions are tailored to each nation’s information sharing and identity management deficiencies based on standard immigration screening and vetting criteria established by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and are to remain in effect until such time as the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State determine that a country provides sufficient information for the United States to assess adequately whether its nationals pose a security or safety threat  On October 17, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court issued a TRO, on statutory grounds, enjoining on a nationwide basis the implementation and enforcement of travel restrictions provided for under the Proclamation, except with respect to North Korean or Venezuelan nationals  On the same day, the Maryland federal district court granted in part plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, primarily on constitutional grounds, thereby prohibiting implementation of visa entry restrictions nationwide, except for nationals of North Korea and Venezuela as well as other covered foreign nationals who lack a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States  On October 20, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court converted its October 17 TRO into a preliminary injunction, thereby continuing the nationwide prohibition on enforcement or implementation of the suspension on entry for nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen  The district court did not stay its ruling or hold it in abeyance should an appeal be filed in the Ninth Circuit  On November 13, 2017, the Ninth Circuit granted, in part, the government’s request for an emergency stay of the Hawaii federal district court’s preliminary injunction, thereby allowing visa entry restrictions to go into effect with respect to the nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen  However, consistent with the Supreme Court’s June 2017 ruling, the court ordered that those with a bone fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States not be subject to such travel restrictions  On November 20, 2017, the government petitioned the Supreme Court for a stay of the preliminary injunction issued by the Hawaii federal district court, pending consideration and disposition of the government’s appeal from that injunction to the Ninth Circuit and, if that court affirms the injunction, pending filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari and any further proceedings in the Supreme Court  On November 28, 2017, plaintiffs in the challenge to the Proclamation arising out of Hawaii asked that the Supreme Court deny the government’s request to lift the partial injunction left in place by the Ninth Circuit  On the same day, plaintiffs in the case arising out of Maryland requested that the Supreme Court not grant a stay of the federal district court’s preliminary injunction  In both cases, plaintiffs assert that the more expansive visa entry restrictions violate U S  immigration law; additionally, for the Maryland case, plaintiffs argue that such restrictions are unconstitutional as a form of discrimination based on national origin  On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court issued two orders staying the Maryland and Hawaii federal district courts’ orders of October 17 and 20 that preliminarily enjoined implementation of the Proclamation, pending decisions of the Ninth and Fourth Circuits in the government’s appeals, and of the Supreme Court regarding a petition for a writ of certiorari (if sought)  As a result, the Proclamation’s visa entry restrictions were permitted to go into full effect unless and until they are either enjoined by the courts of appeals and a writ of certiorari is not sought thereafter, or the Supreme Court either denies a petition for certiorari (thereby resulting in termination of the Supreme Court’s stay order) or grants such petition followed by a final injunction prohibiting current or future implementation of the Proclamation’s restrictions  The Supreme Court further noted its expectation that the courts of appeals will render decisions “with appropriate dispatch,” in light of both courts having decided to consider their respective cases on an expedited basis  On December 8, 2017, the Department of State announced that it began fully implementing the Proclamation, as permitted by the Supreme Court, at the opening of business at U S  embassies and consulates overseas  On December 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the Hawaii federal district court’s October 20 order enjoining enforcement of visa entry restrictions under the Proclamation, while limiting the preliminary injunction’s scope to foreign nationals who have a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States  Without reaching plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, the court of appeals concluded that the Proclamation exceeded the scope of authority delegated to the President by Congress under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), in particular, sections 202(a)(1)(A) (immigrant visa nondiscrimination) and 212(f) (presidential suspension of, or imposition of restrictions on, alien entry), by deviating from statutory text, legislative history and prior executive practice; not including the requisite finding that entry of certain foreign nationals would be detrimental to U S  interests; and contravening the INA’s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas  However, the court stayed its decision, given that the Supreme Court’s December 4 order lifted the federal district courts’ injunctions pending not only review by the courts of appeals, but also “disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought ” On January 5, 2018, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the December 22, 2017, judgment of the Ninth Circuit which left in place the Hawaii federal district court injunction of the Proclamation’s visa entry restrictions for individuals with bona fide ties to the United States  On January 19, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the government’s certiorari petition and will therefore consider, and issue an opinion on the merits of, the Ninth Circuit’s decision  On February 15, 2018, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction granted by the Maryland federal district court on constitutional grounds, but stayed its decision pending the outcome of the Ninth Circuit case before the Supreme Court  The court of appeals found that “laintiffs offer undisputed evidence that the President has openly and often expressed his desire” to bar the entry of Muslims into the United States  Therefore, the court concluded that, in light of the President’s official statements, the Proclamation likely violates the Establishment Clause as it “fails to demonstrate a primarily secular purpose,” and also goes against the basic principle that government is not to act with religious animus  On February 23, 2018, Fourth Circuit challengers filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking for the Supreme Court to consolidate their case with the Court’s ongoing review of the Ninth Circuit decision  These petitioners requested that the Court additionally consider their argument that the preliminary injunction should not have been limited to individuals with a bona fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States  On February 26, 2018, the Supreme Court granted Fourth Circuit petitioners’ motion to expedite consideration of their certiorari petition  On April 10, 2018, the President issued a proclamation announcing that because Chad has improved its identity-management and information sharing practices sufficiently to meet U S  baseline security standards, nationals of Chad will again be able to receive visas for travel to the United States  On June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court held that the President lawfully exercised the broad discretion granted to him under INA § 212(f) (presidential suspension of, or imposition of restrictions on, alien entry), by issuing Proclamation No  9645, which established nationality-based visa entry restrictions applicable to categories of foreign nationals from eight (now seven) countries for an indefinite period  In addition, while three individual plaintiffs had standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to entry restrictions prohibiting their relatives from coming to the United States, the Court found the Proclamation to be legitimate on its face as a way to prevent entry of certain foreign nationals where the government determines there is insufficient information for visa vetting  As a result of the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the establishment of nationality-based entry restrictions is a lawful exercise of the President’s broad discretion in matters of immigration and national security, the visa entry restrictions imposed on categories of foreign nationals from certain countries pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9645 continue to be fully implemented , as they have been since the Supreme Court’s December 4, 2017, orders staying the lower courts’ injunctions  On October 24, 2017, the same day the 120-day suspension of refugee admissions under EO 13780 expired, the President signed EO 13815, Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions program With Enhanced Vetting Capabilities, which resumed USRAP and directed that special measures be applied to certain categories of refugees posing potential threats to the security and welfare of the United States  On December 23, 2017, the Washington federal district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction on aspects of EO 13815 (and its accompanying memorandum), thus prohibiting the administration from: (1) temporarily suspending admission of refugees from 11 previously identified countries of concern, and reallocating resources from the processing of their applications during the 90-day review period (except for those lacking a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States); and (2) indefinitely barring admission of, and application processing for, all following-to-join refugees  On January 5, 2018, the Washington federal district court denied the government’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s December 23, 2017, order temporarily halting enforcement of refugee entry restrictions that were to be implemented as part of the resumption of USRAP under the EO  Specifically, the government “ask the court to ‘modify its preliminary injunction to exclude from coverage refugee applicants who seek to establish a on the sole ground that they have received a formal assurance from a resettlement agency ’” In denying the government’s motion for reconsideration, the court relied on the September 7, 2017, decision of the Ninth Circuit which, among other things, rejected the notion that refugees with formal assurances from U S -based resettlement agencies do not meet the Supreme Court’s bona fide relationship standard  The court treated this Ninth Circuit ruling as binding precedent given that the Supreme Court’s indefinite stay of September 12 neither vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision, nor provided any underlying reason(s) that would allow another court to discern its rationale  On January 9, 2018, the Washington federal district court also denied the government’s emergency motion for a stay of the court’s December 23, 2017, preliminary injunction, pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit  On January 31, 2018, DHS announced additional security measures to prevent exploitation of USRAP  Specifically, these security measures include additional screening for certain nationals of high-risk countries, a more risk-based approach to administering USRAP, and a periodic review and update of the refugee high-risk countries list and selection criteria  Therefore, as of June 2018, while the administration has announced additional security measures to strengthen the integrity of USRAP, the Washington federal district court’s December 23, 2017, preliminary injunction of EO 13815 continues to: (1) prohibit implementation of the temporary suspension of admission, and reallocation of resources from processing applications, of refugees from 11 previously identified countries of concern; and (2) forbid enforcement of the indefinite bar on entry of following-to-join refugees  In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet (Assistant Director), Colleen Corcoran, Eric Hauswirth, Thomas Lombardi, Amanda Miller, Sasan J  “Jon” Najmi, Erin O’Brien, Garrett Riba, and Dina Shorafa made significant contributions to this report 


Report 2: According to international and U S  government sources, climate change poses serious risks to many of the physical and ecological systems upon which society depends, although the exact details of these impacts are uncertain  Climate change may intensify slow-onset disasters, such as drought, crop failure, and sea level rise  Climate change is also increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, including sudden- onset disasters, such as floods, according to key scientific assessments  These effects of climate change may alter existing migration trends across the globe, according to IOM  (See appendix II for further discussion of climate change as a driver of migration in seven geographic regions ) For example, sea level rise, a slow-onset disaster, may result in the salinization of soil and drinking water, thereby undermining a country or community’s ability to sustain livelihoods and maintain critical services, which could cause some people to migrate  Sudden-onset disasters may also contribute to migration as people flee natural disasters, in most cases leading to temporary displacement  For example, people may either voluntarily migrate, or be forced to migrate, to earn money needed to rebuild damaged homes after flooding, especially as extreme weather events increase in intensity and number  If unable or unwilling to migrate, people may find themselves trapped or choosing to stay in deteriorating conditions  Sources agree that the effects of climate change generally impact internal migration, while migration across international borders due to climate change is less common  In deciding whether to migrate, people weigh multiple factors including economic and political factors, social or personal motives, or demographic pressures  The effects of climate change add another layer of complexity to this decision, but there is debate about the role climate change plays in migration  Figure 1 depicts how climate change may influence other factors that drive the decision to migrate or stay  There are limitations to reliably estimating the number of people displaced by climate change because there are no reliable global estimates for those migrating due to slow-onset disasters, and estimates for those migrating due to sudden-onset disasters are based on limited data, according to IOM  The lack of reliable data is due in part to the multi- causal nature of migration  Further, IOM notes that forecasts for the number of environmental migrants by 2050 vary from 25 million to 1 billion  They and others have questioned the methodologies used to arrive at even these broad estimates  Migration, potentially driven by climate change, may contribute to instability and result in national security challenges, according to some international organizations and national governments  For example, an influx of migrants to a city may put pressure on existing resources, resulting in tensions between new migrants and residents, or between the population and its government  The U S  Global Change Research Program has also stated that migration, such as displacement resulting from extreme weather events, is a potential national security issue  At different times, the United Nations General Assembly and, in 2014, DOD have deemed climate change to be a threat multiplier, as the effects of climate change could increase competition for resources, reduce government capacity, and threaten livelihoods, thereby causing instability and migration  Further, the U S  intelligence community considers climate change to increase the risks of humanitarian disasters, conflict, and migration  Identifying the cause of a conflict, however, is complicated, and experts debate the connections linking climate, migration, and national security  For example, IOM has reported that existing evidence on climate migration and instability must be considered with caution  Further, some studies stress that other factors can mitigate the effects of climate change on migration and stability, including governance and community resilience, as the World Bank has reported  State, USAID, and DOD are among the U S  government agencies with a role in responding to issues related to climate change, including as a driver of migration  State interacts with foreign governments and international organizations focused on climate change and migration primarily through the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (State/OES) and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM)  USAID supports a range of development programs that help to mitigate the effects of climate change through the Bureaus for Economic Growth, Education and Environment; Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance; Food Security; Asia; and Africa; and individual USAID missions  Additionally, USAID’s Offices of U S  Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) and Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) lead and coordinate the U S  government’s emergency responses to sudden- and slow-onset disasters, and complex emergencies overseas  DOD assists in the United States’ humanitarian response to sudden- onset disasters abroad through its six geographic combatant commands, with support from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Joint Staff’s Office of Humanitarian Engagement  Climate change as a driver of migration was not a focus of the policy documents we reviewed for either the current or previous administrations during fiscal years 2014 through 2018  Our review of executive actions, budget requests, and executive branch strategies that affected State, USAID, and DOD found only brief mentions of climate change as a driver of migration  None of the documents we reviewed reflected a priority for assessing or addressing climate change as a driver of migration, although these documents reflect a shift in administrations’ climate change priorities more generally  The previous administration issued two executive orders and a presidential memorandum related to climate change  These executive actions had a policy of improving climate preparedness and resilience, factoring climate-resilience considerations into agencies’ international development decisions, and creating forums for interagency coordination  In March 2017, the current administration issued a subsequent executive order revoking some of the previous executive actions related to climate change  See figure 2 for a timeline of these executive actions  The previous administration issued three executive actions related to climate change, which included requirements focused on agencies’ considerations of the impacts of climate change and established forums for interagency coordination  The current administration issued an executive action related to energy independence and climate change  Executive Order 13653: Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change  Executive Order 13653 stated that agencies—including State, USAID, and DOD—shall, among other things, develop, implement, and update comprehensive Agency Adaptation Plans that integrate consideration of climate change into agency operations and overall mission objectives  Executive Order 13653 also established the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience  Executive Order 13677: Climate-Resilient International Development  Executive Order 13677 requires State, USAID, and other U S  government agencies with direct international development programs and investments to incorporate climate-resilience considerations into decision making by assessing climate-related risks to agency strategies, and to adjust relevant strategies as appropriate, among other things  Executive Order 13677 also established the Working Group on Climate-Resilient International Development as part of the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience  2016 Presidential Memorandum on Climate Change and National Security  The 2016 presidential memorandum required, among other things, that agencies, including State, USAID, and DOD, develop an agency-specific approach to address climate-related threats to national security  It also required agencies to develop implementation plans that would describe how they would identify the potential impact of climate change on human mobility, including migration and displacement, and the resulting impacts on national security, among other requirements, and stated that the effects of climate change can lead to population migration within and across international borders, spur crises, and amplify or accelerate conflict in countries or regions already facing instability  The 2016 memorandum also established the Climate and National Security Working Group  Executive Order 13783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth  Executive Order 13783 revoked Executive Order 13653 and the 2016 presidential memorandum, among other things, as seen in figure 2  Priorities related to climate change shifted between the past two administrations as reflected in a recent budget request that reduced some climate change funding affecting U S  foreign assistance  2017 Presidential Budget Request  The previous administration stated in its fiscal year 2017 budget request that “the challenge of climate change will define the contours of this century more dramatically than any other” and that “it is imperative for the United States to couple action on climate change at home with leadership internationally ” The fiscal year 2017 budget request sought $1 3 billion in discretionary funding to advance the goals of the Global Climate Change Initiative, which was established in 2010 and aimed to promote resilient, low-emission development, and integrate climate change considerations into U S  foreign assistance  The $1 3 billion in requested funding included $750 million in U S  funding for the Green Climate Fund, a multilateral trust fund designed to foster resilient low-emission development in developing countries  2018 Presidential Budget Request  The current administration, in its fiscal year 2018 budget request, did not include any funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative  In addition, the current administration’s budget request stated that it “Eliminate the Global Climate Change Initiative and fulfill the President’s pledge to cease payments to United Nations’ (UN) climate change programs by eliminating U S  funding related to the Green Climate Fund     ” Some strategies from the current and previous administrations that affect State, USAID, and DOD, among other agencies, reflect a shift in priorities related to climate change  For example, the previous administration cited climate change as a “top strategic risk” in its 2015 National Security Strategy and stated that climate change is an urgent and growing threat to U S  national security, contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like food and water  The current administration does not discuss climate change in its 2017 National Security Strategy  Additionally, State and USAID have a Joint Strategic Plan to help the agencies achieve the objectives of the National Security Strategy  The previous State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan included a strategic goal on “promoting the transition to a low-emission, climate-resilient world” that proposed leading international actions to combat climate change  The current State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan does not have a climate change goal  State, USAID, and DOD were required by executive orders to assess climate change-related risks to their missions and, for State and USAID, to their strategies, among other things  In response to Executive Order 13653, which has since been revoked, the agencies completed adaptation plans that integrated considerations of climate change into agency operations and overall mission objectives  In response to Executive Order 13677, which has not been revoked, State and USAID developed processes for climate change risk assessments for their country and regional planning documents  Although these executive orders did not require a specific assessment of climate change as a driver of migration, all three agencies have discussed the effects of climate change on migration in their adaptation plans and risk assessments  However, State lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change-related risks to its integrated country strategies  State, USAID, and DOD each completed adaptation plans in 2014 that included limited discussions of migration as one potential effect of climate change  Executive Order 13653 directed the agencies to develop or continue to develop, implement, and update comprehensive Agency Adaptation Plans that integrate consideration of climate change into agency operations and overall mission objectives  Each adaptation plan was to include, among other things, a description of how the agency would consider the need to improve climate adaptation and resilience  State  In its 2014 adaptation plan, State included a brief discussion of climate change as one of multiple factors that potentially will drive migration and impact its mission  State reported that the specific impacts of climate change on the ability of the department to promote peace and stability in regions of vital interest to the United States were unknown  For example, according to the plan, an increase in heavy precipitation events around the world could damage the electric grid and transportation and energy water infrastructure, upon which State depends, making it difficult to maintain operations and diplomatic relations  In its plan, State reported that climate change impacts may threaten international peace, civil stability, and economic growth through aggravating existing problems related to poverty and environmental degradation  Further, environmental and poverty- related issues and regional instability could stress relationships with some foreign governments  However, the plan noted that specific impacts of climate change on conflict, migration, terrorism, and complex disasters were still unknown  USAID  In its 2014 adaptation plan, USAID included a brief discussion of migration as one potential effect of climate change that could also impact security  USAID stated that the impact of climate change on its programs and operations, if left unaddressed, could compromise the agency’s ability to achieve its mission  Further, USAID’s plan referred to increased migration as a potential risk of climate change  Flooding and other extreme climate events can result in increased migration, among other impacts, that could affect existing and planned USAID programming  In particular, programs in areas like agriculture and food security, global health, water and sanitation, infrastructure, and disaster readiness and humanitarian response are vulnerable to climate change, according to USAID  In the infrastructure area, climate change may necessitate new protective measures for coastal homes and infrastructure, and in some cases even mass evacuations or permanent migration  USAID stated that climate change could further reduce or alter the distribution of already limited resources like food and water, or force temporary or permanent migration of communities  According to the plan, in areas with high risk factors for conflict, climate change stresses can aggravate tensions and contribute to conflict  DOD  In its 2014 adaptation roadmap, DOD included a brief discussion of migration as one of multiple potential effects of climate change that could impact national security  DOD referred to climate change as a threat multiplier that can aggravate other risks around the world, with migration being one effect that could increase requests for DOD to provide assistance  The roadmap stated that as climate change affects the availability of food and water, human migration, and competition for natural resources, the department’s unique capability to provide logistical, material, and security assistance on a massive scale or in rapid fashion may be called upon with increasing frequency  Furthermore, DOD stated that the impacts of climate change may cause instability in other countries by, among other things, impairing access to food and water, damaging infrastructure, uprooting and displacing large numbers of people, and compelling mass migration  These developments, according to the department, could undermine already fragile governments that are unable to respond effectively, or challenge currently stable governments, as well as increase competition and tension between countries vying for limited resources  In response to Executive Order 13677, State and USAID developed processes for climate change risk assessments for their country and regional planning documents  Though these assessments are not specific to migration, a few of the assessments identified the nexus of climate change and migration  State  State required climate change risk assessments for all new integrated country strategies drafted in 2016 or later  We reviewed 10 integrated country strategies from the two regions that were the first to implement the climate change risk assessment requirement— Africa, and East Asia and the Pacific  All 10 of the strategies included climate change risk assessments, one of which—Cambodia— identified migration as a risk for the country  The Cambodia strategy states that internal migration due to climate change hinders access to health care and the prevention of infectious diseases like malaria  We also reviewed 10 strategies from State’s functional and regional bureaus for assessments of climate-related risks, including 3 functional bureau strategies (State/PRM, State/OES, and State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs) and 7 regional bureau strategies  All of the functional bureau strategies we reviewed identified climate change as a risk and State/PRM cited the impact of climate change on migration  Of the regional bureau strategies we reviewed, we found that one, the Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, identified climate change as a driver of migration as a challenge or risk in its region  For example, the strategy states that climate change is becoming increasingly disruptive, potentially increasing migration due to rising sea levels  None of the other six regional bureau strategies we reviewed identified the nexus of climate change and migration as a risk or challenge  However, five regional bureaus identified climate change as a risk or challenge and one identified migration as a risk or challenge  USAID  USAID also requires the integration of climate risk management into all country or regional development cooperation strategies drafted since October 1, 2015  Missions must document in a climate change appendix to the strategy any climate risks they identified and how they considered climate change in their strategy  As of August 2018, USAID had completed five country or regional development cooperation strategy updates initiated since October 1, 2015—Uganda, Tunisia, East Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe—and all five included the required appendix  Of the five updated strategies, three—Uganda, Tunisia, and East Africa—discuss the indirect effect of climate change on migration, among other issues  For example, Uganda’s 2016-2021 country strategy states that increased frequency and duration of droughts is likely to be the most significant climate‐related change in Uganda  The strategy also notes that droughts have affected, and will continue to affect, water resources, hydroelectricity production, and agriculture, among other sectors  As agriculture, forestry, and fisheries decline in Uganda, the strategy asserts that people will migrate to urban areas, leading to the formation of slums  We also reviewed USAID’s nine regional development cooperation strategies, one of which—East Africa—had been updated since the requirement to include climate risk management  Of the other eight strategies that have yet to be updated, seven identified climate change as a challenge or risk and three identified climate change as a driver of migration as a challenge or risk  For example, the Southern Africa regional development cooperation strategy states that water scarcity, natural disasters, and other climate change related events will most likely increase migration throughout the region  Additionally, the Asia regional development cooperation strategy discusses the risks of climate change in urban areas  In Asia, the number of migrants seeking economic opportunities in urban centers is likely to increase  According to the strategy, migrants are moving into hazard-prone areas located along coastlines, flood plains, and other low-lying areas in many Asian primary and secondary cities—areas that experts predict will experience more frequent and intense storm surges, floods, and coastal erosion as a result of climate change  The requirement in Executive Order 13677 to assess climate change- related risks to agency strategies remains unchanged; however, State now lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change- related risks to its integrated country strategies  Specifically, State’s 2016 guidance for developing integrated country strategies stated that all missions should assess the risk of climate change on their strategies’ goals and objectives and included reference to the climate risk screening tool—a method that missions could use to assess climate change risks  State issued new guidance to its missions in 2018, but this guidance does not include information on the process for assessing climate change-related risks to agency strategies  According to State officials, the 2018 guidance for integrated country strategies does not reference climate change risk assessments because, in September 2017, State decided that the strategies should not single out climate change risks in a separate appendix  State officials said this decision resulted, in part, from the new administration’s shift in priorities on climate change  Officials also said that this decision reflects a new approach to risk management by State and that the missions could choose to include climate change and other potential risks in the general risk discussion section of their strategies  Officials from State’s Office of U S  Foreign Assistance Resources said that it is now up to each mission to decide whether a strategic objective may have a climate challenge  However, those missions that choose to include an assessment of climate change risks are not provided guidance on the process for doing so and there is no reference to the climate risk screening tool—or to climate change at all—in the 2018 guidance  Executive Order 13677 directed State to incorporate climate-resilience considerations into decision making by assessing climate-related risks to agency strategies, among other things  Subsequently, a State cable from September 2016 further explained that State would implement the executive order’s requirement by screening for climate risks as part of the process for drafting all new integrated country strategies  Additionally, the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that documentation is a necessary part of an effective internal control system  If management determines that a principle is not relevant, management must support that determination with documentation that includes the rationale of how, in the absence of that principle, the associated component could be designed, implemented, and operated effectively  Because State lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change-related risks to its integrated country strategies, it is less likely that the current round of strategies will include the assessment of climate- related risks  It is also possible that those missions that choose to conduct climate change risk assessments will not do so in a consistent manner  Such assessments might identify climate change as a driver of migration, as at least one previous assessment did under the 2016 guidance  Thus, without clear guidance, missions may not examine climate change as a risk to their strategic objectives and could miss opportunities to improve the climate resilience of foreign assistance activities  For fiscal years 2014 through 2017, State, USAID, and DOD had some activities that could potentially address climate change as a driver of migration, although none of these activities specifically focused on the issue  For example, USAID has climate change adaptation activities, but to date migration has not been a focus of this programming  With the shift in priorities related to climate change in fiscal year 2017, agencies have reduced some of these activities  State’s offices that are focused on the issues of climate change (State/OES) and migration (State/PRM) have participated in multilateral activities related to climate change as a driver of migration and funded adaptation and other activities related to the issue  State officials said that the agency does not, however, have any activities that specifically address migration due to climate change or environmental factors  State has participated in multilateral activities related to climate change and migration  With the shift in priorities related to climate change in fiscal year 2017, the United States has disengaged from some of these multilateral activities (see table 1)  In addition to State’s participation in the multilateral activities described in table 2, State has provided funding for activities related to climate change and capacity building that address natural disasters  These activities may involve efforts potentially related to migration  For example, according to State: State provided about $2 million per year, between fiscal years 2014 and 2016, to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which analyzed the impacts of climate change on migration in its most recent assessment report  State/PRM provided about $4 million, between fiscal years 2014 through 2018, for IOM’s Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative, which provides guidelines to protect migrants in countries experiencing conflict or natural disasters  IOM provides training to countries on these guidelines  State/PRM officials said that this initiative is not specifically related to climate change and does not focus on specific types of disasters but does mention sudden-onset disasters  Officials also said that IOM tries to promote a climate change perspective in its trainings  State/OES provided about $78 million in adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative to eight projects during fiscal years 2014 through 2017  (See appendix III for a description of all eight projects ) State/OES officials said that these projects help countries prepare for the impacts of climate change, potentially reducing the pressure to migrate  However, to these officials’ knowledge, none of these projects directly supported activities related to migration  For example, State/OES provided a $4 million grant to the National Adaptation Plans Global Network  This network focuses on increasing the capacity of governments to identify and assess climate risks, integrate these risks in planning, develop a pipeline of projects to address these risks, identify and secure funding for projects, and track progress toward resilience targets  Adaptation activities occurred in over 35 countries  With the shift in priorities related to climate change in fiscal year 2017, State discontinued some of these efforts  For example, funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative was not included in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2018  State/OES officials said that the agency does not plan to fund additional adaptation activities and has not requested additional funding for the activities  According to a State official, PRM had been in discussion with IOM to develop a project proposal that would have assisted the governments of Small Island Developing States in adapting their migration policies to account for challenges and opportunities associated with environmental degradation, ecosystem loss, climate change impacts, and natural disasters  State/PRM stopped further development of the proposal following the change in administrations  Additionally, according to a State official, the department made some efforts at the end of the previous administration to develop a formal position on the topic of climate change as a driver of migration  For example, State drafted an internal document to help clarify its role in responding to the humanitarian aspects of sudden-onset and slow-onset climate events  This initial work stopped under the current administration  USAID officials said that, with respect to the agency’s climate-related programming, its climate change adaptation programming was the most likely to include activities related to migration or displacement, although a broad swath of USAID development programming has the potential to build host country resilience  Officials stated that, to date, migration has not been a primary motivation for the agency’s climate-related or disaster assistance programming  However, officials said that, in a humanitarian crisis or under some economic conditions, development programming can reduce displacement or the pressure to migrate—such as by fostering greater resilience to drought or other adverse conditions—and that this is also true of climate-related programming  USAID also provides humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters that displace people  Officials said that USAID recognizes the links between displacement and natural disasters, but that the agency does not have specific programs linking disaster assistance, migration, and climate change  USAID identified about 250 activities that received adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative during fiscal years 2014 through 2016  Our analysis of the descriptions of these activities determined that none directly mentioned any efforts specifically related to migration  Officials emphasized that the connection between climate change and migration tends to be indirect and shaped by other more immediate factors  USAID’s data on activities that received adaptation funding identified 38 beneficiary countries, as well as activities described generally as implemented at the regional or global level  For activities where USAID’s data identified a specific region, most activities were located in Africa followed by Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean  Examples of the types of activities that received adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 include: The Mali Climate Change Adaptation Activity, which aims to build resilience to current climate variability and increase resilience to longer-term climate change effects  This activity is also working to strengthen the capacity of Mali’s meteorological agency to provide improved climate information as well as to incorporate climate considerations into local-level planning  The total estimated cost is about $13 million over 5 years  The activity for Climate-Resilient Ecosystems and Livelihoods, which ended in September 2018, aimed to increase Bangladesh’s resilience to natural hazards by working with community-based organizations, government ministries, and technical agencies  This activity provided technical assistance to the Government of Bangladesh and local communities to improve ecosystem conservation and resilience capacity  The total estimated cost was about $33 million in funding over 6 years  The activity for Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion, which aims to support pastoralists in Ethiopia via expansion of markets and long-term behavior change (see fig  3)  USAID officials cited this activity as an example of adaptation efforts that indirectly address the issue of climate change as a driver of migration  The activity has three interrelated objectives: increasing household incomes, enhancing resilience, and bolstering adaptive capacity to climate change among pastoral people in Ethiopia  An evaluation of the activity found that migration is a coping strategy for dealing with climate shocks, although participants said that drought is becoming more frequent, placing a severe strain on traditional coping mechanisms, such as migration and selling cattle, and that permanent migration is not a preferred strategy  The total estimated cost is about $60 million in funding over 6 years  With the shift in priorities related to climate change, funding for USAID’s climate change adaptation activities has decreased  Missions may continue to fund their adaptation activities with discretionary funds or other earmarked, sector funding, provided the activities further the funding source’s objective, according to USAID  For example, in some cases, missions are using Water sector funding to continue some of their adaptation work  USAID also said that among the agency’s goals are to increase the resilience of USAID partner countries to recurrent crises, including climate variability and change  In addition to USAID’s climate change adaptation programming, USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP provide emergency humanitarian assistance to people affected by sudden-onset disasters—such as hurricanes and floods—and slow-onset and extended disasters, including droughts and conflicts  Some of this assistance helps people who have been displaced by disaster  USAID officials stated that although disasters cause mainly temporary displacement, the relationship among humanitarian assistance, climate change, and migration is very complex and depends on both climatic and non-climatic factors  USAID/OFDA responded to 267 disasters from fiscal year 2014 through June 2018, according to agency data  For example, USAID/OFDA responded to the effects of Hurricane Matthew in Haiti in October 2016, as seen in figure 4, including helping temporarily displaced people  DOD assists in the U S  government response to overseas disasters, including helping people displaced by such disasters, regardless of the cause of the disaster  These efforts are not specific to climate change as a driver of migration  For example, officials from DOD’s geographic combatant commands said that, to the extent they address climate change, migration is not a focus of those efforts and they view migration as caused by security and economic issues  Between fiscal years 2014 and 2018, Congress has appropriated to DOD between $103 and $130 million per year for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid  Officials said that the geographic combatant commands use most of this funding for steady state humanitarian assistance related to health, education, basic infrastructure, and disaster preparedness with a smaller amount set aside for immediate disaster assistance although that varies based on emergency requirements  DOD officials said that they have not seen any changes to this funding or associated activities with the change of administrations in fiscal year 2017  DOD officials we spoke with also emphasized that USAID/OFDA is the lead agency for the U S  government’s response to disasters overseas  USAID/OFDA formally requested DOD support on about 10 percent of the foreign disaster assistance provided by USAID/OFDA, according to USAID data for fiscal year 2014 through June 2018 and DOD officials  DOD assistance is typically provided for the largest, most complex disasters, according to agency officials  According to a July 2015 assessment conducted by the geographic combatant commands, while their activities vary, each command works with partner nations to increase their abilities to reduce the risks and effects from environmental impacts and climate-related events, including severe weather and other hazards  For example, in the report, U S  Southern Command stated that it had requested funding to pre-position assets for when a severe storm threatens Haiti to be able to respond immediately to a potential disaster  U S  Southern Command officials said that they work with partner nations to encourage residents experiencing extreme weather to remain where they are because it is easier to provide help to people who stay in one place  Officials from U S  Southern Command and U S  Africa Command also said that the major factors driving migration in their regions are security and economic issues  State, USAID, and DOD have participated in interagency forums regarding climate change, which may have addressed its effects on migration  With changes to priorities regarding climate change in fiscal year 2017, these forums have been disbanded or are not meeting  The Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience  The Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience, of which State, USAID, and DOD were members, was established to facilitate the integration of climate science in policies and planning of government agencies, including by promoting the development of climate change related information, data, and tools, among other things  Additionally, the council was to develop, recommend, and coordinate interagency efforts on priority federal government actions related to climate preparedness and resilience  According to State officials, the council began working with the National Security Council and other agencies to facilitate greater interagency cooperation on adaptation  In addition, a task force on the council was discussing the federal role in addressing displacement related to climate change  The council was disbanded when Executive Order 13783 revoked Executive Order 13653, which had established the council  The Working Group on Climate-Resilient International Development  The Working Group on Climate-Resilient International Development, of which State and USAID were members, was established by Executive Order 13677 and placed under the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience  The working group’s mission includes developing guidelines for integrating considerations of climate-change risks and climate resilience into agency strategies, plans, programs, projects, investments, and related funding decisions, among other things  Additionally, the working group was tasked with facilitating the exchange of knowledge and lessons learned in assessing climate risks to agency strategies, among other things  USAID officials said that the working group had not discussed climate change as a driver of migration  While the working group has not been formally disbanded, it has not met since at least November 2017 according to USAID  The Climate and National Security Working Group  The Climate and National Security Working Group, of which State, USAID, and DOD were members, was established by the 2016 presidential memorandum  The chairs of the working group were to coordinate the development of a strategic approach to identify, assess, and share information on current and projected climate-related impacts on national security interests and to inform the development of national security doctrine, policies, and plans, among other things  According to the memorandum, the working group was to provide a venue for enhancing the understanding of the links between climate change- related impacts and national security interests and for discussing opportunities for climate mitigation and adaptation activities to address national security issues  This working group was disbanded when Executive Order 13783 revoked the 2016 presidential memorandum, which had established the working group  State, USAID, and DOD assessments and activities have not focused specifically on the nexus of climate change and migration  State did identify migration as a risk of climate change in at least one of its climate change risk assessments for the department’s country strategies  However, State now lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change-related risks to its integrated country strategies  State’s current guidance for these country strategies no longer mentions a climate change risk assessment and does not provide missions with information about the climate risk screening tool that can be used to conduct such an assessment  As such, missions are less likely to examine climate change as a risk to their strategic objectives, or to do so in a consistent manner, and thus may not have the information they would need to identify migration as a risk of climate change  By clearly documenting and providing guidance on how to assess the risk of climate change, State would ensure that the department examines the potential risks of climate change on its foreign assistance activities  We are making the following recommendation to State: The Secretary of State should ensure that the Director of the Office of U S  Foreign Assistance Resources provides missions with guidance that clearly documents the department’s process for climate change risk assessments for integrated country strategies  (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this product to State, USAID, and DOD for review and comment  State provided written comments, which we have reprinted in appendix IV  In its comments, State did not oppose the recommendation and noted that the agency will update its integrated country strategy guidance by June 30, 2019 to inform missions that they have the option to include an annex on climate resilience, as well as other topics  However, State also indicated that the agency will begin working with stakeholders to consider whether to recommend that the Secretary of State ask the President to rescind Executive Order 13677: Climate- Resilient International Development  USAID also provided written comments, which we have reprinted in appendix V  In its letter, USAID provided some additional information about its programs and its proposed transformation effort  USAID and DOD provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional requesters, Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, and the Secretary of Defense  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao gov, or Brian J  Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI  This report (1) describes executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018; (2) examines the extent to which the Department of State (State), the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD) have discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in their plans and risk assessments; and (3) describes State, USAID, and DOD activities, if any, that are related to climate change and global migration  We chose fiscal years 2014 through 2018 as our time frame based on our review of recent executive orders related to climate change  We selected State, USAID, and DOD because the agencies’ missions of diplomacy, development, and defense provide the foundation for promoting and protecting U S  interests abroad  To describe executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018, we reviewed documents that reflect priorities of the previous and current administrations  Specifically, we reviewed budget requests and enacted appropriations between fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for funding priorities related to climate change and U S  foreign assistance  In addition, we reviewed executive actions and executive branch strategies that applied to State, USAID, and DOD between fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for executive and national security priorities related to climate change  For example, we reviewed the current and previous national security strategies  strategies and seven regional bureau strategies  For USAID, we examined the five country and regional strategies that were required to include a climate risk assessment at the time of our review: Uganda, Tunisia, East Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe  We also reviewed all nine USAID regional strategies  For both State and USAID, we reviewed the selected strategies by searching for information related to migration and climate change  To determine whether State clearly documents the department’s current climate risk assessment process for integrated country strategies, we compared State’s 2018 guidance for developing integrated country strategies with standards related to documentation in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and previous State guidance issued in 2016, which was created in response to Executive Order 13677’s requirements to assess climate change risks to strategies, among other things  to these issues  The agency then provided us with data for about 250 activities from its annual operational plans for fiscal years 2014 through 2016, the 3 years during the period we reviewed in which it received adaptation funding  USAID identified these activities based on whether the agency had tagged them in its plans as having an “adaptation key issue ” USAID excluded projects that had planned attributions to the adaptation key issue of less than $250,000 in a given fiscal year, as well as certain other activities such as those that focused on project support  We then conducted an automated review of the activity description fields provided by USAID for terms related to migration and other descriptive information such as locations of activities  Because no USAID adaptation activities specifically mentioned migration, for the purposes of this report we chose illustrative examples to provide context for the types of activities the agency has funded  DOD officials we met with did not identify any specific activities related to climate change as a driver of migration  DOD officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the geographic combatant commands generally discussed DOD activities related to humanitarian assistance and disaster response as most relevant to our inquiry  Because DOD works in coordination with USAID’s Office of U S  Foreign Disaster Assistance on disaster assistance we also reviewed USAID data on its disaster response activities during this period  We determined that the USAID and State adaptation project data and USAID disaster assistance data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing these efforts  State, USAID, and DOD to obtain information on whether changes in government priorities related to climate change affected their activities  We conducted this performance audit from October 2017 to January 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  This appendix provides a review by region of observed and projected climate change effects, migration trends, and challenges in stability and security  Multiple sources we used for this overview make a connection between climate change and such events as rising sea levels, higher temperatures, and an increase in the number and severity of extreme weather events  The following regions are discussed: Asia, South America, the Arctic, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Oceania, and Central America and the Caribbean  We have provided an overview for each region and a focus on one country or territory in the region  international and regional organizations, including a variety of organizations within the United Nations, the World Bank, regional development banks, the European Union, and others  Third, we reviewed relevant public documents from U S  government agencies, including the Department of Defense, the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)  Fourth, we reviewed academic sources, research institutions, and documents from the relevant country’s national government  population  Economic conditions may be a factor for people deciding whether to migrate or stay in their country of origin  Remittances as Percent of GDP: The money international migrants transfer to recipients in their country of origin, expressed as a percentage of the origin country’s GDP  Sources agree that remittances support resilience in origin countries  Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry as Percent of GDP: A measure of the value added to an economy from the agricultural sector, which includes forestry, hunting, fishing, and the cultivation of crops and livestock, expressed as a percentage of the country’s GDP  Countries that depend on the agricultural sector may be vulnerable to the effects of climate change, according to the World Bank  Percent of Population in Cities: The population living in areas classified as urban according to criteria each country uses  Today, more than half of the global population lives in cities  Migration, in some cases due to climate change, is an important driver of urban growth, according to IOM  Cities are also expected to face increasing risks from rising sea levels, flooding, storms, and other climate change effects  Net Migration Rate: A measure of the number of people leaving a country compared to the number of people entering a country, expressed as a number per 1,000 people  The effects of climate change in Asia may impact migration and stability according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)  In coastal areas, effects of climate change include rising sea levels, storm surges, and others  Receding glaciers in mountanous areas may also cause flooding, and monsoons in a warmer climate may be more severe  Heat extremes and more rainfall are a particular concern in Southeast Asia  Changes in precipitation and drought in Asia may exacerbate food security challenges, and contribute to people deciding to migrate  Increases in migration, partly stemming from the effects of climate change in surrounding rural areas, may put pressure on existing urban infrastructure  Rural migrants may settle in informal communities on the outskirts of cities, areas that have little resilience to natural disasters  Although the World Bank and others agree that climate change largely causes internal migration, some evidence shows that the impact of climate change contributes to cross-border migration in Asia  Large numbers of migrants, along with other destabilizing factors, may contribute to instability and conflict, according to the IPCC  The effects of climate change on livelihoods, for example, could increase migration, strain governance, and contribute to conflict as a result  Bangladesh is one example where decreased yields from agriculture and fisheries have contributed to migration to the country’s coastal cities, which face their own climate change challenges  Bangladesh’s high population density and geography make the country susceptible to the effects of climate change, according to the World Bank, and others  Bangladesh’s coasts and river banks are vulnerable to sudden-onset events such as tropical cyclones and flooding  Cyclone Aila in 2009, for example, caused widespread flooding in the southern coastal areas of Bangladesh and impacted millions of people  The storm washed away embankments that protected coastlines and caused severe damage to crops and livelihoods  Tropical Cyclone Mora in 2017 damaged thousands of homes and displaced an estimated 200,000 people  Increases in the number and intensity of tropical cyclones, which some predict will occur in a warmer climate, could have severe impacts on homes, livelihoods, and food security  Bangladesh also experiences many slow-onset climate change events, such as rising sea levels and increasingly severe droughts, which are projected to intensify with climate change  Bangladesh would lose an estimated 17 5 percent of its land if the sea level rose 1 meter, as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has reported  Projected changes in precipitation levels could cause drought and food insecurity in the northwest and salt-water intrusion could reduce crop yields in the southwest  Migration is a common adaptation strategy to climate change in Bangladesh, according to the ADB  For example, some farmers have adapted to salt water intrusion and destroyed crops by switching to salt- tolerant rice production or shrimp cultivation  Others have migrated, often to Bangladesh’s cities to find work less dependent on agriculture  Many new migrants to Bangladesh’s cities live in informal settlements that lack the resilience to withstand sudden-onset climate events  The capital city, Dhaka, is a common destination for migrants displaced by salt-water intrusion, flooding, and river erosion, according to IOM  Dhaka, like many coastal cities in South Asia, is located on a low-lying riverbank and faces increasing risks of extreme flooding  For example, past floods in Dhaka have destroyed homes and contaminated drinking water, creating significant health hazards  In some cases, individuals migrate to cities temporarily for work and return home after the agricultural off season ends  Bangladeshis also provide a significant number of labor migrants to the Gulf States and Malaysia  Remittances from international migrants represent 5 4 percent of the country’s GDP, and may help to support resilience to climate change, according to IOM, and others  These migration trends may intensify in the future  One study estimates 9 6 million people will migrate from 2011 to 2050 due to the effects of climate change  Challenges in Stability and Security Migration due to climate change is cited as a potential destabilizing factor in Bangladesh by ADB, and others  The low-income population in Bangladesh is dependent on agriculture, making the effects of climate change—including impacts on food security—a particular concern  By 2030, these effects on livelihoods and food security could increase the poverty rate in Bangladesh by 15 percent, as the IPCC has reported  Given the proximity of Bangladesh to India, some individuals may also choose to cross the border  Increased migration to India is a potential concern, according to some sources, as India may not have the resources to absorb large numbers of Bangladeshi migrants  The CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: 2007); and Population Council, “Effects of Future Climate Change on Cross-Border Migration in North Africa and India,” Population and Development Review, Vol  36, No  2 (2010)  The effects of climate change in South America vary by region, according to the the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as potentially impacting migration and stability  On the coast, risks include sea level rise, depletion of fisheries, and coral reef bleaching, according to IOM  Coastal cities with growing populations are particularly vulnerable  Melting glaciers in the Andean mountain region, and increased rainfall are expected to change the distribution of water resources, and impact food production as global demand for food is growing  Desertification and land degradation, complicated by the effects of climate change, are contributing to migration from rural areas to cities in South America, as IOM has reported  An estimated 77 percent of people living in high risk areas in South America are located in cities, according to IOM  IOM predicts that as these people feel the effects of sea level rise and water scarcity, they will migrate from the large coastal cities to smaller urban areas  While South America has experienced economic growth in the last decade, poverty rates remain high, and the effects of climate change, including possible migration, may exacerbate inequalities, putting further pressure on cities to meet the needs of their populations  Water security in particular is expected to disproportionaly impact low-income communities, according to the IPCC  For example, in Brazil, drought in the northeast may increase migration to southern cities that are facing rising sea levels and landslides, with consequences for food, water, and energy security  Observed and Projected Effects of Climate Change Brazil’s cities and rural regions may encounter a range of climate change effects, according to the IPCC and IOM  Rural areas, particularly in the northeast, could experience significant impacts from climate change partly due to poverty rates, and historical vulnerability to drought  Higher temperatures are expected to affect crop yields and household incomes, especially for low-income communities  In northeastern Brazil, temperatures are expected to increase and rainfall to decrease  The northeast could see a 22 percent reduction in precipitation by 2100, according to IPCC projections  Brazil’s coastal areas, including cities, are also vulnerable to rising sea levels, heavy precipitation, flooding, and landslides  The vast majority of Brazil’s population, about 86 percent, lives in cities, many in coastal areas, according to the United Nations Development Program  As their populations have grown, urban areas have extended out  This urban growth in Brazil’s megacities has caused further increases in temperature, rainfall, and landslides  For example, current levels of urbanization in the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo may already be responsible for the 2°C warming observed in the city over the last 50 years, as well as the rise in extreme rainfall, according to the IPCC  The metropolitan area is expected to extend its area 38 percent by 2030  Multiple studies of the effects of urbanization on Sao Paulo’s climate suggest higher temperatures affect convective rainfall, which occurs when warm air rises, condenses to form clouds, and produces extreme rain  Other concerns are the depletion of coral reefs and mangrove forests on Brazil’s coastlines, and decreases in biodiversity  Migration from drought in northeastern Brazil to cities has increased urban populations, putting more people at risk of displacement from flooding and landslides  Migration from the northeast is a historical trend in Brazil, as economic migrants have sought seasonal jobs in more productive agricultural regions, or moved permanently to southern cities  Projected declines in rainfall have led some to predict further increases in migration in northeastern Brazil, as the IPCC has reported  However, remittances from family members who leave Brazil’s northeast support resilience for those who remain and may help to reduce migration  Already environmental factors contribute to migration to cities, including to favelas, informal settlements often constructed in hilly areas and floodplains outside of Brazilian cities  A significant number of the favela residents in Rio de Janeiro are migrants from northeastern Brazil, according to IOM  These new migrants may be at risk of further displacement if heavy rainfall, flooding, and other climate change effects destroy their vulnerable homes  For example, heavy rainfall in April 2010 resulted in landslides across Rio de Janeiro, displacing an estimated 5,000 people, according to a report from the World Bank  Brazil is also a destination for migrants from other countries in the region  Migrants from Venezuela searching for jobs and improved food security have come in growing numbers in recent years, as have migrants from Haiti fleeing a series of natural disasters, as IOM has reported  Challenges in Stability and Security Although Brazil ranks 106th out of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index, the effects of climate change may contribute to challenges with water, food, and energy access according to the IPCC  Decreased rainfall could decrease agricultural productivity, with potential health impacts for poor populations  These conditions are of particular concern in northeastern Brazil, as extreme weather and low crop yields are associated with more violence, according to the IPCC  Brazil also receives about 70 percent of its electricity from hydroelectric power, according the United Nations Environment Programme, and recent droughts caused power cuts across many major cities  Although not linked to the effects of climate change, absorbing a growing number of migrants fleeing political and economic instability in Venezuela may impact the broader region, according to the U S  Department of Defense and the National Intelligence Council  Neighboring countries, including Brazil, may struggle to absorb the influx of migrants  On average, 800 Venezuelans are crossing the border to Brazil every day in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, according to the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency  The effects of climate change in the Arctic, including higher temperatures and melting ice, have contributed to shifts in migration across the Arctic, and may have security implications  Increasing temperatures may have a variety of impacts in the Arctic, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  The effects of rising temperatures are disrupting livelihoods and food security, especially for indigenous communities, and opening up untapped natural resources to extraction  Both trends have impacted migration flows in the Arctic  Rising temperatures and melting ice have opened up previously inaccessible waterways in the Arctic, with implications for national security, according to the Department of Defense and others  Greenland, located in the Arctic and considered part of Kingdom of Denmark, exhibits many of these trends  Greenland is experiencing the effects of climate change, including glacial and ice melt, shifts in wildlife distribution, and newly available oil and mineral deposits, among others  The Greenland Ice Sheet covers approximately 80 percent of Greenland’s land mass  The ice sheet’s melting rate is slow, but uncertain  Increases in temperature greater than 1°C may result in the near loss of the entire ice sheet over a millennium and significant sea level rise, according to the IPCC  In the short term, predicting the ice sheet’s melting rate is a challenge as predictions vary in the scientific community  Accurate predictions would support mitigation and adaptation efforts in vulnerable areas  Rising temperatures and shrinking ice cover have shifted the distribution and migration patterns of marine mammals and fish, and impacted food security according to the IPCC and the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum for Arctic states  For example, the economy in Paamiut, Greenland, depended primarily on cod fisheries until changing climate conditions caused cod to disappear, and the town was slow to adapt to newly available shrimp  Similarly, fisheries in Disko Bay, Greenland, have struggled to adapt to new conditions  Rising temperatures and the resulting reduction in ice cover have required a shift to fishing from boats in open water instead of hunting and fishing over ice cover  Lastly, warming and ice melt may make significant oil and mineral deposits accessible for extraction in the future  The potential expansion of extraction industries makes environmental sustainability another possible concern  For example, an estimated 31 billion barrels of oil and gas may exist off the coast of Northeast Greenland, according to the Kingdom of Denmark’s 2011-2020 Arctic Strategy  The strategy stresses the importance of assessing and reducing risks to the environment resulting from the exploration and extraction of oil and gas  The effects of climate change are predicted to contribute to internal and external migration in Greenland  For example, young people are increasingly leaving indigenous communities in rural areas for cities in Greenland in search of work, as traditional livelihoods become unsustainable  Greenland is home to a majority indigenous population, primarily Inuit, whose traditional hunting and fishing practices require travel across ice  In the past, people adapted to seasonal changes to support livelihoods by migrating, and the practice was embedded into indigenous social structures  With reduced ice cover, however, migrating to hunt, fish, and maintain connections to community is more dangerous or restricted  Government policies promoting centralized services, such as health care and education, have also played a role in the shift away from migration as a way of life  As a result, indigenous livelihoods are more difficult to maintain, and young people often migrate to towns and cities in Greenland, or to Denmark, for education  At the same time, warmer temperatures have made mineral extraction feasible  As the extraction industry grows, new jobs may draw migrants from outside the Arctic region  In 2011 companies spent $100 million on the exploration of minerals in the Artic, and the estimated number of new mines is expected to require more workers than now live in the region 17 79Currently, more people leave than migrate to Greenland  The local Inuit population in Uummannaq, Greenland relies heavily on ice coverage for fishing and travel by traditional dog-sled  Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, A Complex Constellation: Displacement, Climate Change and Arctic Peoples (January 30, 2013)  Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement  The effects of climate change on Sub-Saharan Africa vary depending on the region and have impacts on migration and security, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)  Coastal areas, for example, in West and East Africa are at risk from sea level rise that could affect major cities  Drought and the risk of desertification in the Sahel is cited as a concern, as is increased rainfall in parts of Central Africa accompanied by lower agricultural yields  As desertification threatens the livelihoods of farmers and herders, and drought makes fishing more challenging, rural dwellers may be more likely to migrate to cities, according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)  Urbanization and population growth across Sub-Saharan Africa is already making densely populated cities vulnerable to flooding, storms, and erosion, increasing the number of people at risk of displacement by sudden-onset disasters  Climate change effects and changing migration flows across Sub-Saharan Africa may impact access to natural resources and contribute to existing tensions and conflicts, according to UNEP and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  In Nigeria, the effects of climate change may effect a variety of livelihoods and increase migration south, while also exacerbating existing conflicts  The effects of climate change on Nigeria may impact the country’s agriculture and economy, according to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)  Higher temperatures and decreased rainfall have contributed to drought in northern Nigeria  Desertification is also a concern  Some regions in northern Nigeria have less than 10 inches of rain a year, an amount that has decreased by 25 percent since the 1980’s, according to USIP  In other areas across Nigeria flooding has resulted in major crop losses, according to UNEP  Rising sea level, water inundation, and erosion are concerns in Nigeria’s coastal areas  Rising sea level is predicted to pose medium to very high risks to Africa’s coastal areas by 2100, according to the IPCC  Future sea level rise could result in the inundation of over 70 percent of the Nigerian coast  A rise of 0 2 meters in sea level could risk billions of dollars in assets, including oil wells near the coast  Even without a rapid rise in sea level, Nigeria’s coastal areas could experience erosion and significant land loss by 2100, as the IPCC has reported  The effects of climate change on livelihoods in northern Nigeria may contribute to migration to the south according to UNEP, while conflict in the north drives separate migration trends  As the effects of climate change make farming and fishing more challenging elsewhere in Nigeria, migration to southern coastal cities may increase  Traditionally, farmers, herders, and fishery workers migrated for temporary employment during the off season, including migration to Nigeria’s cities to work in the oil industry  Permanent migration south as well as to cities may become more common if land suitable for farming decreases  As fish habitats like Lake Chad dry up, fishery workers may also migrate  Larger urban populations on the coast will put more people at risk of sea level rise, water inundation, and erosion, according to the IPCC  A rise in sea level of 1 meter could put over 3 million people at risk of displacement as the IPCC has reported  Herders have also moved further south due to increased drought in northern Nigeria, as UNEP and USIP have reported  A 2010 survey of herdsmen in Nigeria, for example, found that nearly one-third of them had migrated southeast as a result of changes in the natural environment, according to the UNEP  The ongoing conflict with Boko Haram, while not caused by climate change, has further resulted in millions of displaced people across the Lake Chad region, including many Nigerians who have fled to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger  Nigerian refugees at the Minawao camp in Cameroon  Challenges in Stability and Security The effects of climate change, migration, and conflict are interconnected in Nigeria, as USIP has reported  The country is ranked 14th of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index  Events in northwest Africa, including Boko Haram’s attacks in Nigeria, have underscored concerns about the region’s vulnerability to the spread of violent extremism  The effects of climate change may exacerbate these concerns, according to USIP  Nigerians fleeing attacks from Boko Haram in the north have gone to communities in neighboring Chad, Cameroon, and Niger that are already experiencing food shortages due in part to climate change  These neighboring countries as a result have fewer resources to support both their own residents and the newer refugees  Non-state actors may also take advantage of government inaction on the effects of climate change  Boko Haram, for example, has justified its acts of violence by pointing to government failures, according to the USIP  Separately, increased drought in the north may aggravate historic tensions over land and water use between farmers in the south and herders migrating from the north, according to UNEP  Nigeria’s oil fields on the coast, which represent a significant part of the economy, are also at risk from sea level rise  Potential losses in oil revenue could impact Nigeria’s ability to respond to humanitarian crises and conflict at home  Increased violence within its borders could also affect Nigeria’s ability to support regional peacekeeping missions, such as the United Nations Mission in Liberia from 2003 to 2018, where Nigerian troops worked to restore security after a civil war  The effects of climate change in the Middle East and North Africa, including on its desert regions, may impact water access and compound migration and stability challenges, according to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)  Over 60 percent of the population already experiences high or very high water stress, according to the World Bank  Coupled with unsustainable water use, climate change may further exacerbate challenges with water security  The region continues to experience rising temperatures and declining annual rainfall, trends that contribute to the severity and length of drought, land degradation, and desertification  Decreased water security affects the livelihood and quality of life of farmers in the region, contributing to an increase in their migration to the cities and more urbanization, according to the World Bank  In contrast, many people are expected to migrate away from coastal cities as a result of sea level rise, according to UNEP  These potential migrations would be taking place in a region that already hosts large numbers of migrants such as those displaced by conflict and violence, including 18 percent of the world’s refugees, according to the International Organization for Migration  Challenges in water security may put greater pressure on unstable governments in the region, by intensifying existing tensions and conflicts between populations and their governments as well as between countries that share sources of water  The conflict in Syria illustrates the complex nature of climate change, migration, and conflict in the region, and the challenges to accurately assessing the links among the three, as noted in a technical paper commissioned by the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID)  Rising temperatures and declining rainfall have contributed to recent droughts in Syria, a trend that may continue  The country underwent an extended drought from about 2006 until 2011  During the drought an estimated 60 percent of Syria experienced severe crop failure, and accompanying impacts on food security  Some studies have linked the length and severity of the drought in Syria to climate change, as USAID has reported  Others, however, have pointed to government land and water use policies, combined with the effects of climate change, as responsible for the severity of the drought  Agricultural policies, for example, encouraged farmers to grow water intensive crops like wheat, and supported inefficient irrigation practices, policies which further depleted ground water and made the region more vulnerable to decreases in rainfall linked to climate change  Across the Middle East, the rising temperatures and declining rainfalls of recent decades may worsen, according to the World Bank  If these trends continue, countries in the Middle East, including Syria, could continue to experience periods of severe drought and reduced crop yields  Migration Trends The ongoing conflict in Syria, in which migration due to climate change may have been a contributing factor, has caused large-scale migration to neighboring countries in the Middle East and to Europe  Leading up to the civil war, prolonged drought, among other factors, had increased migration to Syrian cities  Because of the drought, in 2009, over 800,000 Syrians lost their livelihoods in the agricultural sector, while nearly 1 million experienced food insecurity  In 2010, an estimated 200,000 people migrated from farms in rural areas to cities, according to a UN report  The conflict in Syria, which began in 2011, has further displaced large numbers of people within the country and across the Middle East, as we have previously reported At the beginning of the conflict, Syrians, as well as Iraqi and Palestinian refugees who had been residing in Syria, fled mainly to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey  As the conflict persisted, refugees fled in larger numbers to Turkey, with the UNHCR reporting that nearly 1 million Syrians sought protection in that country in 2015  Starting that year, a growing number of Syrians risked dangerous sea voyages to reach countries in Europe, such as Greece, Germany, and Sweden  As of June 2017, more than 5 million registered Syrian refugees were living in neighboring countries, including more than 3 million in Turkey, and more than 1 million in Lebanon  Challenges in Stability and Security Sources agree that the Syrian conflict is a significant security challenge that has resulted in large scale migration across the Middle East and to Europe  Yet the link between prolonged drought, rural to urban migration, and the current conflict in Syria is uncertain  Some academic sources argue that the increased strain on urban infrastructure and resources due to the rural to urban migration played a role in Syria’s growing instability  Others highlight the complex nature of the Syrian conflict, pointing to broader political factors that exacerbated resource scarcity and inequality  For example, as the drought intensified, the Syrian government downplayed the severity of the humanitarian crisis, as described in research cited in a technical report commissioned by USAID result, appeals to the international community for emergency aid received minimal support  Combined with existing sectarian divisions, ongoing revolutions across the Middle East, and other factors, the government’s response to the drought may have contributed to the current conflict  Migration and displacement are a concern in the region, according to the Department of Defense and others  The U S  government has provided significant humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees in the Middle East, including in Lebanon and Jordan, as we have previously reported However, a technical report commissioned by USAID has cautioned that the ongoing conflict in Syria makes it difficult to conduct research and draw conclusions related to climate, migration and conflict  As a The effects of climate change on Oceania, particularly rising seas, may significantly impact coastal populations and increase migration in the future, as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have reported  Rising temperatures and declining rainfall may also contribute to lower yields from fisheries and agriculture, and a significant decrease in coral reef cover  Extreme weather events, including higher temperatures, wind, and rainfall, have already increased in number and intensity across the region  In the majority of Pacific island nations, of those who migrate, more people leave than come, according to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Observatory on Migration  The majority of migration in the region is economically driven  In the future, climate change may further impact these migration patterns across the region, according to the IPCC  Climate change has already exacerbated challenges that aid-dependent nations in the region face, restricting livelihoods and resources and contributing to pressures to migrate  The costs of climate change, including a decline in crop yields, a rise in energy demands, and a loss of coastal land, are predicted to be significant  The ADB estimates these costs will reach 12 7 percent of the Pacific regions’ GDP by 2100  Increased migration may also impact political stability and play a role in geopolitical rivalries within the region, according to the IPCC  The effects of climate change, especially rising sea levels, may result in forced migration from the Republic of the Marshall Islands (the Marshall Islands) and have additional impacts on the U S  defense infrastructure on the islands  Observed and Projected Effects of Climate Change Rising sea levels are a grave threat to the Marshall Islands The country consists of islands, low-lying atolls—coral caps sitting on top of submerged volcanoes—making it particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels  On average, the Marshall Islands are 2 meters above sea level  In Majuro, the country’s most populous atoll, observed rates of sea level rise are already twice as fast as the global average  Population centers experience significant flooding, with damage to roads, houses, and infrastructure, especially during La Niña years, which are significantly wetter and more prone to extreme rainfall  Flooding is expected to worsen with rising sea levels, with consequences for the availabity of drinking water  On Roi-Namur island, for example, a 0 4 meter rise in sea level combined with wave-driven flooding is predicted to make groundwater undrinkable year round as early as 2055  This salt water inundation may contaminate already limited groundwater across the Marshall Islands  Lastly, during the 1940s and 1950s, the Marshall Islands was the site of 67 U S  nuclear weapons tests on or near Bikini and Enewetak Atolls  Projected increases in frequency of flooding may negatively impact efforts to contain radioactive material stored on Runit Island  A number of factors have increased migration from the Marshall Islands, including to the United States  In 1986, the United States entered into a compact of free association with the country that allowed its citizens to migrate to the United States, as we have previously reported  As a result, more than 20,000 Marshallese now live in the United States People are more likely to migrate abroad as the effects of climate change on the Marshall Islands—including rising sea levels—increasingly impact livelihoods The threat of mass displacement and forced migration is also a concern, as the International Organization for Migration has reported  However, Marshallese culture has a strong connection to the land, which means that many view migration as a last resort  For people still living in the Marshall Islands, they face overpopulation in urban centers and displacement by sudden-onset disasters like cyclones and flooding  Factors influencing people deciding to move abroad include displacement, lack of economic opportunity—sometimes exacerbated by climate change—and limited access to health care  Climate change is likely to increase risks to public health in the country Increased rainfall, for instance, may expand mosquito breeding grounds, raising the risk of diseases like dengue fever  The country’s limited health care system may further contribute to migration from the islands  Challenges in Stability and Security In the future, the Marshall Islands may become uninhabitable  This prospect threatens the existence of the Marshall Islands as a sovereign state, as well as the United States defense facilities located on the islands  The total loss of land could result in the Marshall Islands being uninhabitable, which raises problems of migration, resettlement, cultural survival, and sovereignty  Relocation of the population of the Marshall Islands, and of other Pacific Island nations at risk of rising seas, could cause significant geopolitical challenges The Marshall Islands are also of strategic importance for the United States  Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States has permission to use several islands— including Kwajalein Atoll, the location of the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Range—until 2066  The country’s proximity to the equator makes the Marshall Islands ideal for missile defense and space work  Yet the island’s defense infrastructure and operations are at significant risk due to rising sea levels, flooding, and diminishing supplies of potable water  As the Department of Defense has noted, climate change will have serious implications for the department’s ability to maintain its infrastructure and ensure military readiness in the future  DOD, 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap (Alexandria, VA: June 2014)  The effects of climate change on Central America and the Caribbean may increase migration and exacerbate poverty rates, as the National Intelligence Council has reported  The climate in Central America and the Caribbean is predicted to be warmer and dryer  The Caribbean’s extensive coastlines and low-lying areas are vulnerable to sea level rise and an increase in sudden-onset disasters, including hurricanes and storm surges  Drought is a particular concern in Central America, where declines in rainfall have reduced crop yields and threatened livelihoods in recent years  Some evidence shows that drought in parts of Central America has contributed to migration north, including to the United States  Population growth, especially in coastal cities, has increased the number of people at risk during hurricane season, and the number and intensity of hurricanes have grown in recent years  Some attribute the increase in intensity to higher sea surface temperatures caused by climate change  However, there remains debate about long term hurricane trends  Recent hurricanes have caused displacement, and significant losses and damages—including to infrastructure—across the region  The depletion of coral reefs and mangrove trees, natural barriers to coastal erosion and flooding, has exacerbated vulnerability to storms in coastal areas  Climate change is likely to have negative impacts on tourism in the Caribbean, where the industry is an important part of the economy, according to Inter-American Development Bank  Climate change impacts on the economy may make it increasingly difficult for governments to reduce poverty and move towards environmental sustainability  Haiti’s geography, location, and high poverty rates make the country especially vulnerable  Haiti is highly vulnerable to climate change effects, partly due to its long coastline Hurricanes routinely make landfall in the country, and increases in rainfall and wind speeds associated with hurricanes are likely  Severe hurricanes, including Hurricane Matthew in September 2016, have hit Haiti in recent years  Hurricane Matthew was the first category 4 storm in Haiti since 1964  Damage from severe flooding and severe winds during the hurricane affected over 2 million people and created significant food security and public health challenges  Significant deforestation has further exacerbated Haiti’s vulnerability to hurricanes, as trees previously provided a natural barrier to the erosion that strong winds and more rainfall can cause  Rising temperature and highly variable rainfall have led to extreme drought and flash flooding, according to the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID) 32 2 These trends decrease crop yields, affecting the livelihoods of farmers, and threaten water access  Projected increase in temperature and decreases in rainfall are likely to intensify drought in Haiti’s interior  USAID, Haiti: Environment and Climate Change Fact Sheet (January 2016)  Migration Trends Slow-onset climate events, such as drought, and rising sea levels, and sudden-onset events, including earthquakes, affect Haiti, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)  Haiti is also particularly exposed to extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, which can lead to displacement  In January 2010, a catastrophic earthquake in Haiti killed an estimated 230,000 people and left close to 1 5 million people homeless  According to IOM, the recurrence of environmental disruptions increases risks and vulnerabilities  When Hurricane Sandy struck Haiti in October 2012, the country had still not recovered from the 2010 earthquake  The worsening of climate change effects around the world, particularly in low-income countries, may increase the number of people wanting to immigrate to the United States, where approximately 700,000 Haitians live today Remittances from family members living outside Haiti make up a significant portion of the economy, at 24 7 percent of GDP  The majority of these remittances come from the United States, as we have previously reported 34 4Remittances may support resilience to climate change effects as migrants send money home for disaster recovery and adaptation  Challenges in Stability and Security Haiti, the poorest country in the western hemisphere, has experienced political instability for most of its history, and ranks 12th of 178 on the Fragile States Index  The government has a low capacity to respond to additional challenges like those related to climate change, according to USAID  The Ministry of Environment, for example, is a relatively new organization within the Haitian government, and local and regional governments have a limited ability to enforce environmental laws and regulations  The United States has provided substantial aid to Haiti, both in disaster response and broader development projects  Official development assistance for Haiti in 2015, for instance, totaled slightly more than $1 billion  According to a January 2018 UN report, 2 8 million people were still in need of humanitarian assistance  GAO, Remittances To Fragile Countries: Treasury Should Assess Risks from Shifts to Non-Banking Channels, GAO-18-313 (Washington, D C , March 8, 2018)  The Department of State’s Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (State/OES) provided about $78 million in adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative for eight projects for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 (see table 2)  The Global Climate Change Initiative was established in 2010 to promote resilient, low- emission development, and integrate climate change considerations into U S  foreign assistance and was divided into three main programmatic initiatives: (1) Adaptation assistance, (2) Clean Energy assistance, and (3) Sustainable Landscapes assistance  The primary purpose of these contributions to the LDCF was to address the adaptation needs of the least developed countries, which are especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change  The LDCF financed the preparation and implementation of National Adaptation Programs of Action, which identify a country’s priorities for adaptation actions  Initial grant to the National Adaptation Plans Global Network  The network is focused on increasing the capacity of national and subnational governments to identify and assess climate risks, integrate these risk considerations in sector planning, develop a pipeline of projects to address risks, identify and secure funding for projects, and track progress toward resilience targets  Colombia, East Caribbean (Guyana, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Ethiopia, Peru, South Africa, Uganda, West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Togo) and, under current consideration, East Caribbean (Dominica, Suriname), and Pacific (Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu) The cost amendment intensified the technical support on National Adaptation Plans to select countries dependent upon specific country adaption needs  In addition, the cost amendment continued the learning and progress from the initial grant  Implemented through the Department of Treasury, this funding supported a Treasury grant to the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative Multi Donor Trust Fund at the World Bank  This activity established the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Foundation and the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Company, among other things  The goal of PIER is to increase private sector investment in resilience to climate change in eight developing countries  The first phase of the project will assess and identify opportunities for private investment in resilience, as well as build public and private capacity for climate risk assessment in all the countries  In the second phase, public and private sector partners will develop and pilot climate risk-reduction investment models in four of the countries  The third phase will publicize the piloted investment models and lessons learned among the eight countries  Implemented through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, this activity aims to implement a capacity-building partnership with India to promote effective climate resilient decision making at national, state, and local levels  In addition to the contacts named above, the following individuals made key contributions to this report: Miriam Carroll Fenton (Assistant Director), Kristy Williams (Assistant Director), Rachel Girshick (Analyst-in-Charge), Nancy Santucci, Miranda Cohen, Aldo Salerno, Neil Doherty, and Judith Williams  Alexander Welsh, Justin Fisher, and Joseph Thompson provided technical and other support  Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Needs to Better Incorporate Adaptation into Planning and Collaboration at Overseas Installations  GAO-18-206  Washington, D C : November 13, 2017  Compacts Of Free Association: Actions Needed to Prepare for The Transition of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands to Trust Fund Income  GAO-18-415  Washington, D C : May 17, 2018  Remittances to Fragile Countries: Treasury Should Assess Risks from Shifts to Non-Banking Channels  GAO-18-313  Washington, D C : March 8, 2018  Syrian Refugees: U S  Agencies Conduct Financial Oversight Activities for Humanitarian Assistance but Should Strengthen Monitoring  GAO-18-58  Washington, D C : October 31, 2017  International Food Assistance: Agencies Should Ensure Timely Documentation of Required Market Analyses and Assess Local Markets for Program Effects  GAO-17-640  Washington, D C : July 13, 2017  High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others  GAO-17-317  Washington, D C : February 15, 2017  Federal Disaster Assistance: Federal Departments and Agencies Obligated at Least $277 6 Billion during Fiscal Years 2005 through 2014  GAO-16-797  Washington, D C : September 22, 2016  Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy Is Underway, but Agency Could Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps  GAO-16-453  Washington, D C : July 12, 2016  Climate Information: A National System Could Help Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Decision Makers Use Climate Information  GAO-16-37  Washington, D C : November 23, 2015  Hurricane Sandy: An Investment Strategy Could Help the Federal Government Enhance National Resilience for Future Disasters  GAO-15-515  Washington, D C : July 30, 2015  High-Risk Series: An Update  GAO-15-290  Washington, D C : February 11, 2015  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  GAO-14-704G  Washington, D C : September 10, 2014  Combating Terrorism: U S  Efforts in Northwest Africa Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management  GAO-14-518  Washington, D C : June 24, 2014  Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Can Improve Infrastructure Planning and Processes to Better Account for Potential Impacts  GAO-14-446  Washington, D C : May 30, 2014  Extreme Weather Events: Limiting Federal Fiscal Exposure and Increasing the Nation’s Resilience  GAO-14-364T  Washington, D C : February 12, 2014  Climate Change: State Should Further Improve Its Reporting on Financial Support to Developing Countries to Meet Future Requirements and Guidelines  GAO-13-829  Washington, D C : September 19, 2013  High-Risk Series: An Update  GAO-13-283  Washington, D C : February 14, 2013  International Climate Change Assessments: Federal Agencies Should Improve Reporting and Oversight of U S  Funding  GAO-12-43  Washington, D C : November 17, 2011  Climate Change Adaptation: Federal Efforts to Provide Information Could Help Government Decision Making  GAO-12-238T  Washington, D C : November 16, 2011  Foreign Relation: Kwajalein Atoll Is the Key U S  Defense Interest in Two Micronesian Nations, GAO-02-119  Washington D C : January 22, 2002 

ground_truth: The effects of climate change, combined with other factors, may alter human migration trends across the globe, according to the International Organization for Migration. For example, climate change can increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters, causing populations to move from an area. Climate change can also intensify slow-onset disasters, such as drought, crop failure, or sea level rise, potentially altering longer-term migration trends. GAO was asked to review how U.S. agencies address climate change as a potential driver of global migration. For State, USAID, and DOD, this report (1) describes executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018; (2) examines the extent to which the agencies discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in their plans and risk assessments; and (3) describes agency activities on the issue. GAO analyzed documents on administration priorities; reviewed agency plans, risk assessments, and documentation of agency activities; and interviewed agency officials. From fiscal years 2014 through 2018, a variety of executive branch actions related to climate change—such as executive orders and strategies—affected the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD), including their activities that could potentially address the nexus of climate change and migration. For example, a fiscal year 2016 presidential memorandum—rescinded in 2017—required agencies to develop implementation plans to identify the potential impact of climate change on human mobility, among other things. In general, however, climate change as a driver of migration was not a focus of the executive branch actions. For example, a fiscal year 2014 executive order—also rescinded in 2017—requiring agencies to prepare for the impacts of climate change did not highlight migration as a particular concern. State, USAID, and DOD have discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in agency plans and risk assessments. For example, State and USAID required climate change risk assessments when developing country and regional strategies, and a few of the strategies reviewed by GAO identified the nexus of climate change and migration as a risk. However, State changed its approach in 2017, no longer providing missions with guidance on whether and how to include climate change risks in their integrated country strategies. In doing so, State did not include in its 2018 guidance to the missions any information on how to include climate change risks, should the missions choose to do so. Without clear guidance, State may miss opportunities to identify and address issues related to climate change as a potential driver of migration. The three agencies have been involved in climate change related activities but none were specifically focused on the nexus with global migration. For example, USAID officials said that the agency's adaptation efforts, such as its Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion project in Ethiopia, were the most likely to include activities, such as enhancing resilience, that can indirectly address the issue of climate change as a driver of migration. GAO recommends that State provide missions with guidance that clearly documents its process for climate change risk assessments for country strategies. In commenting on a draft of this report, State indicated that it would update its integrated country strategy guidance and will specifically note that missions have the option to provide additional information on climate resilience and related topics.