prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Coal accounted for 17 percent of energy production (30 percent of electricity production) in the United States in 2016  To generate this energy, approximately 730 million tons of coal were mined domestically in 2016, according to the U S  Energy Information Administration, approximately 40 percent of which was produced on federal lands  As of 2016, state regulatory authorities and OSMRE had received financial assurances associated with coal mines that had been permitted to disturb approximately 2 3 million acres, according to OSMRE data  Coal is mined in two different ways: surface mining and underground mining  In surface coal mining, before the underlying coal can be extracted, the land is cleared of forests and other vegetation and topsoil is removed and stored for later use  Explosives or other techniques are then used to break up the overlying solid rock, creating dislodged earth, rock, and other materials known as spoil  Surface coal mines can cover an area of many square miles  In underground coal mining, tunnels are dug to access coal that is too deep for surface mining methods  In some cases, underground coal mines are designed to leave sufficient coal in the mine to support the overlying surface, and in other cases, they are designed to extract higher quantities of coal that results in subsidence of the overlying surface as mining progresses  In addition to disturbing the land surface, coal mining can affect water quality, according to the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Academies, and others  For example, mining can increase sediments in rivers or streams, which may negatively affect aquatic species  Moreover, mining can expose minerals and heavy metals to air and water, leading to a condition known as acid mine drainage, which can lead to long-term water pollution and harm some fish and wildlife species  Mining can also lower the water table or change surface drainage patterns  The surface effects of coal mining in the United States are regulated under SMCRA, which also created OSMRE to administer the act  SMCRA allows an individual state or Indian tribe to develop its own program to implement the act if the Secretary of the Interior finds that the program is in accordance with federal law  A state with an approved program is said to have “primacy” for that program  To obtain primacy, a state or Indian tribe submits to the Secretary of the Interior for approval a program that demonstrates that the state or tribe has the capability of carrying out the requirements of SMCRA  The program must demonstrate that the state or Indian tribe has, among other things, a law that provides for the regulation of the surface effects of coal mining and reclamation in accordance with the requirements of SMCRA, and a regulatory authority with sufficient personnel and funding to do so  Of the 25 states and four Indian tribes that OSMRE identified as having active coal mining in 2017, 23 states had primacy, and OSMRE manages the coal program in 2 states and for the four Indian tribes  SMCRA requires a mine operator to obtain a permit before starting to mine  The permit process requires operators to submit plans describing the extent of proposed mining operations and how and on what timeline the mine sites will be reclaimed  In general, an operator must reclaim the land to a use it was capable of supporting before mining or to an alternative postmining land use that OSMRE or the state regulatory authority deems higher or better than the premining land use  In reclaiming the mine site, operators must comply with regulatory standards that govern, among other things, how the reclaimed area is regraded, replanting of the site, and the quality of water flowing from the site  Specifically: Operators are generally required to return mine sites to their approximate original contour unless the operator receives a variance from the regulatory authority  To return to this contour, the surface configuration achieved by backfilling and grading of the mined area must closely resemble the general surface configuration of the land before mining and blend into and complement the drainage pattern of the surrounding terrain, with all highwalls and spoil piles eliminated  Operators are required to demonstrate successful revegetation of the mine site for 5 years (in locations that receive more than 26 inches of rain annually) or 10 years (in drier areas)  States have requirements for what vegetation may be planted depending on the approved postmining land use  For example, West Virginia’s regulations call for sites with a postmining land use of forest land to be planted with at least 500 woody plants per acre  The state specifies that at least five species of trees be used, including at least three of the species being higher value hardwoods, such as oak, ash, or maple  SMCRA requires that financial assurances be sufficient to ensure reclamation compliant with water quality standards, including those established by the Environmental Protection Agency or the states under the Clean Water Act  SMCRA’s implementing regulations also contain additional water protection requirements  For example, the regulations require that all surface mining and reclamation activities be conducted to minimize disturbance of the hydrologic balance within the permit and adjacent areas and to prevent material damage to the hydrologic balance outside the permit area  The federal government also enacted SMCRA, in part, to implement an abandoned mine land program to promote the reclamation of mined areas left without adequate reclamation prior to 1977, when SMCRA was enacted, and that continue to substantially degrade the quality of the environment, prevent or damage the beneficial use of land or water resources, or endanger the health or safety of the public  Specifically, Congress found that a substantial number of acres of land throughout the United States had been disturbed by surface and underground coal mining on which little or no reclamation was conducted  Further, it found that the impacts from these unreclaimed lands imposed social and economic costs on residents in nearby areas as well as impaired environmental quality  Since the abandoned mine land program was created, approximately $3 9 billion has been spent to reclaim abandoned mine lands, and there is at least $10 2 billion in remaining reclamation costs for coal mines abandoned prior to 1977, as of September 30, 2017, according to OSMRE  SMCRA generally requires operators to submit a financial assurance in an amount sufficient to ensure that adequate funds will be available for OSMRE or the state regulatory authority to complete the reclamation if the operator does not do so  The amount of financial assurance required is determined by the regulatory authority—OSMRE or the state—and is based on its calculation of the estimated cost to complete the reclamation plan it approved as part of the mining permit  Financial assurance amounts can be adjusted as the size of the permit area or the projected cost of reclamation changes  SMCRA also authorizes states to enact an OSMRE-approved alternative bonding system as long as the alternative achieves the same objectives  One kind of alternative bonding system is known as a bond pool  Under this type of system, the operator may post a financial assurance for an amount determined by multiplying the number of acres in the permit area by a per-acre assessment  The per-acre assessment may vary depending on the site-specific characteristics of the planned mining operation and the operator’s history of compliance with state regulations  However, the per-acre bond amount may be less than the estimated cost of reclamation  To supplement the per-acre bond, the operator generally must pay a fee for each ton of mined coal and may also be required to pay other types of fees  These funds are pooled and can be used to reclaim sites that participants in the alternative bonding system do not reclaim  Under OSMRE regulations, all alternative bonding systems must provide a substantial economic incentive for the operator to comply with reclamation requirements and must ensure that the regulatory authority has adequate resources to complete the reclamation plan for any sites that may be in default at any time  OSMRE regulations implementing SMCRA recognize three major types of financial assurances: surety bonds, collateral bonds, and self-bonds  A surety bond is a bond in which the operator pays a surety company to guarantee the operator’s obligation to reclaim the mine site  If the operator does not reclaim the site, the surety company must pay the bond amount to the regulatory authority, or the regulatory authority may allow the surety company to perform the reclamation instead of paying the bond amount  Collateral bonds include cash; certificates of deposit; liens on real estate; letters of credit; federal, state, or municipal bonds; and investment-grade rated securities deposited directly with the regulatory authority  A self-bond is a bond in which the operator promises to pay reclamation costs itself  Self-bonds are available only to operators with a history of financial solvency and continuous operation  To remain qualified for self-bonding, operators must, among other requirements, do one of the following: have an “A” or higher bond rating, maintain a net worth of at least $10 million, or possess fixed assets in the United States of at least $20 million  In addition, the total amount of self-bonds any single operator can provide shall not exceed 25 percent of its tangible net worth in the United States  Primacy states have the discretion on whether to accept self-bonds  State regulatory authorities and OSMRE reported holding a total of approximately $10 2 billion in surety bonds, collateral bonds, and self- bonds as financial assurances for coal mine reclamation in 2017  Of the total amount of financial assurances, approximately 76 percent ($7 8 billion) were in the form of surety bonds, 12 percent ($1 2 billion) in collateral bonds, and 12 percent ($1 2 billion) in self-bonds (see fig  1)  Twenty-four states reported holding surety bonds, 20 states reported holding collateral bonds, and 8 states reported holding self-bonds (see table 1)  In addition, OSMRE officials identified 6 states—Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia—that have also established alternative bonding systems, such as bond pools  In a state with a bond pool, the operator may generally post a financial assurance for less than the full estimated cost of reclamation; in addition, the operator must pay into a bond pool  The pooled funds can be used to supplement forfeited financial assurances to reclaim sites that operators participating in the bond pool do not reclaim  States and OSMRE reported that operators forfeited more than 450 financial assurances for reclaiming coal mines between July 2007 and June 2016, with 13 of the 25 states reporting at least one forfeiture  States and OSMRE reported that the amount of financial assurance forfeited was sufficient to cover the cost of required reclamation in about 52 percent of the cases and did not cover the cost of required reclamation in about 22 percent of the cases  In the remainder of the cases (26 percent), the state or OSMRE reported that it had not yet determined if the financial assurance amount covered the reclamation costs that it was intended to cover  State and OSMRE officials said that it can take many years to fully reclaim a site and that it may take time for them to identify the extent of reclamation needed and to determine if the amount of financial assurance forfeited was sufficient to cover reclamation costs  State and OSMRE officials said there were several reasons why the amount of financial assurance obtained might not be sufficient to cover reclamation costs  For example, officials said the amount of financial assurance might not be sufficient if an operator mined in a manner inconsistent with the approved mining plan upon which the amount of financial assurance was calculated or if mining activity resulted in water pollution that was not considered when the amount of financial assurance was calculated  In cases where the amount of financial assurance does not cover the cost of reclamation, the operator remains responsible for reclaiming the mine site  However, OSMRE officials said that in those cases where the operator may be experiencing financial difficulties, it might be difficult for the states or OSMRE to compel the operator to complete the reclamation or provide additional funds to do so without having the operator go out of business or into bankruptcy  If the operator does not reclaim the site, the regulatory authority must use the forfeited financial assurance to do so  If the forfeited funds are not adequate, the site may not be fully reclaimed unless the regulatory authority either successfully sues the operator for more funds or provides any additional funds needed for reclamation  One other source of funds states can use to reclaim forfeited mines is civil penalties that the United States government collects from operators that violate conditions of their mining permits  OSMRE obligated approximately $2 8 million in civil penalties from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 for states to use to perform reclamation in cases where the financial assurance was not sufficient, according to agency officials  OSMRE has taken steps—including periodically reviewing financial assurance amounts, inspecting mine sites, and reviewing state programs that implement SMCRA—to oversee financial assurances and aspects of the mining and reclamation process that can affect whether the amount of financial assurances obtained will cover the cost of required reclamation  SMCRA requires OSMRE or the primacy state regulatory authority to calculate the amount of financial assurance required for each mine and to adjust the amount when the area requiring bond coverage increases or decreases or when the cost of future reclamation changes  OSMRE officials and state regulatory authority officials from four of the six states we interviewed said they generally review the amount of financial assurance at least every 2 1/2 years or when the mining plan has been modified in a way that may affect the amount of financial assurance required  Such periodic reviews are in part to help ensure that OSMRE and state regulatory authorities continue to hold an amount sufficient to complete required reclamation as conditions change  These reviews can lead to OSMRE or the state regulatory authority changing the amount of financial assurance required for a mine  For example: A state regulatory authority official in Utah said that the regulatory authority reviewed an existing mine permit in 2014, which led to it recalculating the estimated cost of reclamation on the basis of current costs  The state regulatory authority requested that the operator provide a financial assurance to cover the difference (approximately $195,000), in addition to the $445,000 financial assurance already in place  However, the official said that the operator—which had stopped mining the site in 2012 and filed for bankruptcy in 2013—did not provide the additional financial assurance amount  As a result, in 2017 the state regulatory authority collected the financial assurance that was in place (i e , the operator forfeited its assurance)  The official said in December 2017 that the state regulatory authority is determining the steps it will take to reclaim the site and expects that the forfeited amount will be sufficient to cover reclamation costs  OSMRE officials said that the agency reviewed a permit for a mine on Navajo tribal lands and determined that it needed to ask the operator to provide an additional financial assurance in the amount of $5 7 million  The increase was due to inflation and to include certain costs, such as the cost of mobilizing equipment needed for reclamation, that had inadvertently been excluded from the earlier calculation of the financial assurance required  The officials said that the operator provided the additional financial assurance amount  State regulatory authority officials in Wyoming said they review financial assurance amounts annually, and in 2017 they reduced the financial assurance for one mine by almost $35 million because of a substantial decline in fuel costs and the mine’s ability to share the cost of needed reclamation equipment with a neighboring mine  SMCRA requires OSMRE to make an average of at least one complete inspection per calendar quarter and one partial inspection per month for each active permit for which it is the regulatory authority to ensure that mines are in compliance with SMCRA and federal regulations  Complete inspections cover all inspection elements in OSMRE’s directive, while partial inspections may instead focus on issues that most frequently result in violations or a specific topic identified for oversight, according to OSMRE officials  In addition, OSMRE’s directive instructs the agency to inspect a sample of mines annually in states that have primacy to monitor and evaluate approved state programs’ compliance with SMCRA  The total number of inspections OSMRE is directed to conduct in primacy states is based on the number of inspectable units in each state  Complete inspections are to be done on 33 percent of those sites selected for inspection  Overall, OSMRE completed more inspections in primacy states than directed each year for evaluation years 2013 through 2016, according to agency data  For example, in evaluation year 2016, OSMRE’s directive called for it to conduct 1,225 inspections and OSMRE completed 1,388  As part of a complete inspection, OSMRE confirms that the operator is following the mining and reclamation plans to assure that the amount of financial assurance in place is adequate, according to OSMRE officials  If a violation is identified during an inspection, SMCRA requires OSMRE to issue a ten-day notice to the state regulatory authority or an immediate cessation order to the operator  If the violation increases the estimated cost of reclamation (e g , if the operator disturbed more land than it was approved for) or an adequate financial assurance had not been collected, OSMRE or the state regulatory authority can request that the operator provide an additional financial assurance  For example: OSMRE issued a ten-day notice to the Pennsylvania regulatory authority in 2015 because a water treatment system for a mine in that state did not have a financial assurance  According to OSMRE officials, the state regulatory authority took appropriate action to resolve the situation by issuing an order for the operator to post a financial assurance within 7 days  During an inspection of a mine in Tennessee, a nonprimacy state, OSMRE determined that the operator had not correctly reclaimed a portion of the mine because the slope of the regraded area was too steep, according to an OSMRE official  For the reclamation work that would be needed to regrade that area, OSMRE determined that the operator needed to provide an additional financial assurance of $272,000  Under SMCRA, OSMRE is required to evaluate each primacy state’s coal program annually to ensure that it complies with SMCRA  SMCRA includes a requirement that the regulatory authority secure necessary financial assurances to assure the reclamation of each permitted mine site  While OSMRE’s directive on oversight of state and tribal regulatory programs does not instruct the agency to review state regulatory authority calculations of financial assurance amounts, it instructs OSMRE to focus on the state programs’ success in achieving the overall purposes of SMCRA  For example, OSMRE, in conducting its oversight, is to evaluate the states’ effectiveness in successfully reclaiming lands affected by mining and in avoiding negative effects outside of areas authorized for mining activities  If OSMRE’s review of a state program identifies an issue that could result in the state not effectively implementing, administering, enforcing, or maintaining all or any portion of its approved coal program, OSMRE can work with the state regulatory authority to develop an action plan to correct the issue  If a state regulatory authority does not take the necessary corrective action, OSMRE may begin the process of withdrawing approval for a part or all of the state’s primacy  In addition to annually evaluating state programs, OSMRE can conduct national or regional reviews on specific topics  For example, OSMRE conducted a national review in 2010 that examined how state regulatory authorities calculated the required amount of financial assurances for coal mine reclamation  The review examined financial assurance practices in 23 states and reported that on the basis of the sample of mining permits reviewed, OSMRE was unable to determine if the amount of financial assurances was adequate for at least one of the permits it reviewed in 10 of the 23 states  Among the potential issues OSMRE identified were errors in the methods state regulatory authorities used to calculate financial assurance amounts and insufficient information in the reclamation plan upon which to calculate reclamation costs  OSMRE has worked with the 10 state regulatory authorities to address the financial assurance issues identified in the 2010 review  For example, OSMRE’s review found that the regulatory authority in Pennsylvania did not secure sufficient financial assurances to complete reclamation plans, in part because amounts were not calculated based on the actual sizes of the areas excavated for mining  In August 2014, OSMRE and Pennsylvania’s regulatory authority agreed to an action plan to ensure that the financial assurances for all active and new permits would be calculated using the actual sizes of the excavated areas  According to an OSMRE official, as of February 2017, the state regulatory authority had recalculated the financial assurance amount for all mines and had secured the additional financial assurances needed from operators of all but two of the mines  State officials said in October 2017 that they were continuing to work to obtain the assurances required for the two mines  OSMRE’s 2010 review also found that financial assurances in Kentucky were not always sufficient to cover required reclamation costs, in part because the method Kentucky’s regulatory authority used to calculate financial assurance amounts did not factor in all costs, such as the cost of moving equipment to and from the reclamation site  In February 2011, OSMRE and Kentucky’s regulatory authority signed an action plan identifying steps needed to address the issues OSMRE had identified  However, in May 2012, OSMRE determined that the state regulatory authority’s proposed changes to its method for calculating financial assurance amounts was an improvement but would not result in the authority obtaining sufficient funds to cover required reclamation  As a result, OSMRE initiated the process of revoking Kentucky’s primacy for this aspect of its program  In response, Kentucky implemented regulations to increase the minimum financial assurance required  The regulations also required the state regulatory authority to evaluate financial assurance amounts every 2 years to determine whether they need to be increased, among other things  The state regulatory authority sent a set of program amendments to OSMRE designed to address the identified deficiencies, some of which OSMRE is currently reviewing  OSMRE and state regulatory authorities face a number of challenges in managing financial assurances for coal mine reclamation—including those related to self-bonding, unanticipated reclamation costs, and the financial stability of surety companies—according to federal and selected state regulatory authority officials, representatives from organizations associated with the mining and financial assurance industries, and representatives from environmental nongovernmental organizations whom we interviewed  Challenges facing OSMRE and state regulatory authorities related to self- bonding include the following: Not knowing the complete financial health of an operator  The information federal regulations require operators to provide to regulatory authorities may provide an incomplete picture of the financial health of an operator, according to some parties we interviewed  For example, the financial information that operators provide reflects their past financial health, which may not reflect the operators’ current financial position, according to OSMRE’s response to the 2016 petition seeking revisions to its self-bonding regulations  In addition, if an operator applying for a self-bond is a subsidiary of another company, the operator is not required by regulation to submit information on the financial health of its parent company  While the operator applying may have sufficient financial assets to qualify for self-bonding, if its parent company experiences financial difficulties, the operator’s assets may be drawn on to meet the parent’s obligations, which could worsen the financial health of the self-bonded operator  In addition, according to OSMRE officials, even if OSMRE or a state regulatory authority were to become aware that an operator’s parent company was at financial risk, it would be difficult for the agency to deny the operator’s request for a self-bond because eligibility is specific to the entity applying for the self-bond, according to regulations  OSMRE could change its self-bonding regulations to require more information, according to OSMRE officials  However, the financial relationships between parent and subsidiary companies have become increasingly complex, making it difficult to ascertain an operator’s financial health on the basis of information reported in company financial and accounting documents, according to officials  When OSMRE first approved its self-bonding regulations in 1983, it noted that it was attempting to provide rules that would allow self-bonding without necessitating regulatory authorities to employ financial experts to determine which companies should be allowed to self-bond  However, according to OSMRE officials, financial expertise is now often needed to evaluate the current complex financial structures of large coal companies, which was not envisioned when the regulations were developed  Difficulty in determining whether an operator qualifies for self- bonding  The regulatory authority in a given state may not be aware that an operator had self-bonded in other states, making it difficult for the agency to determine whether the operator qualifies for self- bonding, according to some parties we interviewed  Operators are only allowed to self-bond for up to 25 percent of their net worth in the United States, according to regulations  Regulatory authority decisions on accepting self-bonds generally focus on assessing activities occurring in a specific state, not nationwide, according to the Interstate Mining Compact Commission  As a result, the state regulatory authority or OSMRE may know whether an operator has applied for self-bonds in other states that if approved would exceed 25 percent of its net worth in total  Difficulty in replacing existing self-bonds with other assurances if needed  OSMRE and state regulatory authorities may find it difficult to get operators to replace existing self-bonds with another type of financial assurance when needed, according to some parties we interviewed  If an operator no longer qualifies for self-bonding (e g , if it has declared bankruptcy), federal regulations require it to either replace self-bonds with other types of financial assurances or stop mining and reclaim the site  In either case, however, some parties noted that such actions could lead to a worsening of the operator’s financial condition, which could make it less likely that the operator will successfully reclaim the site  Some parties we interviewed have noted that regulatory authorities may be reluctant to direct the operator to replace a self-bond with another type of financial assurance and may instead allow the operator to keep mining so that any generated revenue could help the operator reclaim the site  For example, in 2015 the Wyoming regulatory authority determined that an operator no longer qualified for self-bonding and ordered it to replace a $411 million self-bond  However, the operator entered into bankruptcy without having replaced the self-bond  In this case, the state regulatory authority determined that reclamation was more likely to occur if the operator continued mining and allowed the operator to do so without a valid financial assurance  The operator replaced its self-bond as a part of its bankruptcy settlement approximately 17 months after the state regulatory authority’s order to replace the self-bond, according to OSMRE officials  However, if a self-bonded operator were to enter bankruptcy and did not secure a financial assurance to replace the self-bond or complete the required reclamation, the state regulatory authority would have to work through the bankruptcy proceedings to obtain funds for reclamation, according to OSMRE’s preamble to its 1983 self-bonding regulations  As a result, the state may recover only some, or possibly none, of the funds promised through the self- bond, and the cost of reclamation could fall on taxpayers  Difficulty in managing the risk associated with self-bonding  The risk associated with self-bonding is greater now than when the practice was first authorized under SMCRA, according to some parties we interviewed  According to SMCRA, the purpose of financial assurances is to ensure that regulatory authorities have sufficient funds to complete required reclamation if the operator does not do so  While SMCRA allows self-bonding in certain circumstances, when OSMRE first approved its self-bonding regulations, the agency did so noting that at the time there were companies financially sound enough that the probability of bankruptcy was small  Furthermore, the regulations stated that the intent was to avoid, to the extent reasonably possible, the acceptance of a self-bond from a company that would enter bankruptcy  However, as previously mentioned, three of the largest coal companies in the United States declared bankruptcy in 2015 and 2016, and these companies held approximately $2 billion in self-bonds at the time, according to an OSMRE August 2016 policy advisory, making it a very different risk landscape than originally envisioned  Following these bankruptcies—and recognizing that the coal industry was likely to continue to face economic challenges for several more years— OSMRE initiated steps in 2016 to reexamine the role of self-bonding for coal mine reclamation  Specifically, as previously mentioned, OSMRE issued a policy advisory in August 2016 noting that given these circumstances, state regulatory authorities should exercise their discretion under SMCRA and not accept new or additional self-bonds for any permit until coal production and consumption market conditions reach equilibrium  OSMRE has reported that it is not likely for that to occur until at least 2021  OSMRE also announced in September 2016 that the agency planned to examine changes to its bonding regulations that would, among other things, help ensure that reclamation is completed if a self-bonded operator does not do so  However, following a review of department actions that could affect domestic energy production, Interior announced in October 2017 that it was reconsidering the need for and scope of potential changes to its bonding regulations  OSMRE officials said that they did not have a timeline for finalizing a decision on potential changes in its bonding regulations  In addition, OSMRE rescinded its August 2016 policy advisory that states take steps to assess whether operators currently using self-bonds can still quality to do so and that states not accept any new self-bonds  Similar issues involving bankruptcies of hardrock mining operators led the Bureau of Land Management to implement regulations in 2001 eliminating the use of self-bonding for hardrock mining  In doing so, the Bureau of Land Management determined that a self-bond is less secure than other types of financial assurances, especially in cases where commodity prices fluctuate  The agency also noted that operators that would otherwise be eligible to self-bond should not have a significant problem obtaining another type of financial assurance  In our previous work examining other types of environmental cleanup, we found that the financial risk to the government and the amount of oversight needed for self-bonds are relatively high compared to other forms of financial assurances  Furthermore, we also previously reviewed federal financial assurance requirements for coal mining, hardrock mining, onshore oil and gas extraction, and wind and solar energy production and found that of these activities coal mining is the only one where self-bonding was allowed  Because SMCRA explicitly allows states to decide whether to accept self-bonds, eliminating the risk that self-bonding poses to the federal government and states would require that SMCRA be amended  Unanticipated reclamation costs, such as those related to long-term treatment for water pollution, may arise late in a mine’s projected lifespan, and the operator may not have the financial means to cover the additional costs, according to OSMRE officials  Under SMCRA, OSMRE and state regulatory authorities are not to approve a permit for a coal mine if the regulatory authority expects the mine to result in long-term water pollution  As a result, since long-term water pollution is not anticipated to occur, the cost of addressing it would not be included in the initial financial assurance that the operator provides  If the regulatory authority later determines that long-term water treatment is needed, the regulatory authority must adjust the amount of financial assurance that the operator is required to provide  Some parties we interviewed have also noted that the costs and duration of long-term water treatment are not well defined and that surety bonds are not well-suited to provide assurance for such indefinite long-term costs  For example, according to the Interstate Mining Compact Commission, surety bonds are designed for shorter-term, defined obligations that have a high certainty for bond release following the completion of reclamation  To help address this challenge, some states have established, or allowed operators to establish, trust funds to help cover such unanticipated reclamation costs  For example, West Virginia established a fund, primarily supported through a tax on the amount of coal mined, to operate water treatment systems on forfeited sites  West Virginia’s regulatory authority is also working to evaluate permits for sites with water pollution to estimate water treatment costs within the state more precisely  Similarly, Pennsylvania allows operators to establish trust funds that are maintained by foundations and monitored by the state regulatory authority and are intended to ensure that there are sufficient funds to cover the costs of long-term water treatment, according to state regulatory authority officials  In addition, the OSMRE-run coal program in Tennessee allows trust funds for water treatment, in part because an assurance system that provides an income stream may be better suited to ensuring the treatment of long-term water pollution than conventional financial assurances, according to an OSMRE notice in the Federal Register  The utility of surety bonds in providing a financial assurance depends on the surety company’s ability to pay the amount pledged if the operator forfeits  OSMRE regulations require that a surety company be licensed to do business in the state where a mine is located  Some parties we interviewed noted that surety companies have declared bankruptcy or experienced financial difficulties in the past and could experience similar difficulties in the future  In addition, two states reported recent issues related to surety companies  For example, state regulatory authority officials in Alabama said that a surety company that had provided surety bonds totaling $760,000 for four mines in that state had gone bankrupt or was insolvent  As of May 2017, the state had collected only $127,000  Similarly, state regulatory authority officials in Alaska said that as of August 2017, the state had not collected any part of a forfeited $150,000 surety bond because the surety company had gone bankrupt  In our previous work examining other types of environmental cleanup, we have found that the financial risk to the government and the amount of oversight needed for surety bonds are relatively low to moderate compared to other forms of financial assurances  Billions have been spent to reclaim mines abandoned prior to the financial assurance requirements SMCRA put in place, and billions more remain  Under SMCRA, self-bonding is allowed for coal mine operators with a history of financial solvency and continuous operation—the only type of energy production or mineral extraction activity we have reviewed for which this is allowed  Bankruptcies of coal mine operators in 2015 and 2016 have highlighted risks that OSMRE and state regulatory authorities face in managing self-bonding—a risk that may be greater today than when self-bonding was first authorized under SMCRA  If a self-bonded operator were to enter bankruptcy and does not provide a different type of financial assurance or complete the required reclamation, the regulatory authority and the taxpayer potentially assume the risk of paying for the reclamation  Although OSMRE said it would examine changes to its self- bonding regulations following recent bankruptcies, Interior recently said that it is reconsidering the need to do so  Because SMCRA explicitly allows states to decide whether to accept self-bonds, eliminating the risk that self-bonding poses would require amending SMCRA  Until such a change is made, the government will remain potentially at financial risk for future reclamation costs resulting from coal mines with unsecured financial assurances  Congress should consider amending SMCRA to eliminate the use of self- bonding as a type of financial assurance for coal mine reclamation  (Matter for Consideration 1) We provided a draft of this report to the Department of the Interior for review and comment  Interior did not provide written comments on our findings and matter for congressional consideration  OSMRE provided technical comments in an e-mail, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of the Interior, the Acting Director of OSMRE, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions, please contact Anne-Marie Fennell at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II  We selected a nonprobability sample of states to examine the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement’s (OSMRE) oversight activities in more detail  We generally selected states that produced the most coal in 2015 but also selected states in order to achieve some variation in factors such as geographic location, the dominant type of coal mining conducted (e g , surface or underground mining), whether the state had primacy, and whether the state allowed self-bonding (see table 2)  In addition to the contact named above, Elizabeth Erdmann (Assistant Director), Antoinette Capaccio, Jonathan Dent, Cynthia Grant, Marya Link, Anne Rhodes-Kline, Sheryl Stein, Guiovany Venegas, and Jack Wang made key contributions to this report 


Report 2: Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA; P L  89-329), as amended, authorizes programs that provide financial assistance to students to attend certain institutions of higher education (IHEs)  In academic year (AY) 2016-2017, 6,760 institutions were classified as Title IV eligible IHEs  Of these IHEs eligible to participate in Title IV programs, approximately 29 4% were public institutions, 27 8% were private nonprofit institutions, and 42 9% were proprietary (or private, for-profit) institutions  It is estimated that $122 5 billion was made available to students through Title IV federal student aid in FY2017  To be able to receive Title IV assistance, students must attend an institution that is eligible to participate in the Title IV programs  IHEs must meet a variety of requirements to participate in the Title IV programs  First, an IHE must meet basic eligibility criteria, including offering at least one eligible program of education  In addition, an IHE must satisfy the program integrity triad, under which it must be legally authorized to provide a postsecondary education in the state in which it is located; accredited or preaccredited by an agency recognized by the Department of Education (ED) for such purposes, and certified by ED as eligible to participate in Title IV programs  The state authorization and accreditation components of the triad were developed independently to address the issues of quality assurance and consumer protection, and the federal government (ED specifically) generally relies on states and accrediting agencies to determine standards of educational program quality  The federal government's only direct role in determining Title IV eligibility is through the process of certification of eligibility and ensuring IHEs meet some additional Title IV requirements  Certification, as a component of the program integrity triad, focuses on an institution's fiscal responsibility and administrative capacity to administer Title IV funds  An IHE must fulfill a variety of other related requirements, including those that relate to institutional recruiting practices, student policies and procedures, and Title IV program administration  Finally, additional criteria may apply to an institution depending on its control or the type of educational programs it offers  For instance, proprietary institutions must derive at least 10% of their revenues from non-Title IV funds (also known as the 90/10 rule)  Failure to fulfill some of these requirements does not necessarily end an IHE's participation in the Title IV programs, but may lead to additional oversight from ED and/or restrictions placed an IHE's Title IV participation  This report provides a general overview of HEA provisions that affect a postsecondary institution's eligibility for participation in Title IV student aid programs  It first describes general eligibility criteria at both the institutional and programmatic level and then, in more detail, the program integrity triad  Next, it discusses several issues that are closely related to institutional eligibility: Program Participation Agreements, campus safety policies and crime reporting required under the Clery Act, the return of Title IV funds, and distance education  To be eligible to participate in HEA Title IV student aid programs, institutions must meet several criteria  These criteria include requirements related to programs offered by the institutions, student enrollment, institutional operations, and the length of academic programs  This section discusses the definition of an eligible IHE for the purposes of Title IV participation and program eligibility requirements  The HEA contains two definitions of institutions of higher education  Section 101 provides a general definition of IHE that applies to institutional eligibility for participation in HEA programs other than Title IV programs  The Section 102 definition of IHE is used only to determine institutional eligibility to participate in HEA Title IV programs  Section 101 of the HEA provides a general definition of IHE  This definition applies to institutional participation in non-Title IV HEA programs  Section 101 IHEs can be public or private nonprofit educational institutions  Section 101 specifies criteria both public and private nonprofit educational institutions must meet to be considered IHEs  Neither the HEA nor regulations specifically define a public institution of higher education  However, in general, public institutions can be described as those whose educational programs are operated by states or other government entities and are primarily supported by public funds  Regulations define a nonprofit IHE as one that (1) is owned and operated by a nonprofit corporation or association, with no part of the corporation's or association's net earnings benefiting a private shareholder or individual, (2) is determined by the Internal Revenue Service to be a tax-exempt organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and (3) is legally authorized to operate as a nonprofit organization by each state in which it is physically located  To be considered a Section 101 IHE, public and private nonprofit educational institutions must admit as regular students only individuals with a high school diploma or its equivalent, individuals beyond the age of compulsory school attendance, or individuals who are dually or concurrently enrolled in both the institution and in a secondary school; be legally authorized to provide a postsecondary education within the state in which they are located; offer a bachelor's degree, provide a program of at least two-years that is acceptable for full credit toward a bachelor's degree, award a degree that is accepted for admission to a graduate or professional program, or provide a training program of at least a one-year that prepares students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation; and be accredited or preaccredited by an accrediting agency recognized by ED to grant accreditation or preaccreditation status Section 102 of the HEA defines IHE only for the purposes of Title IV participation  The Section 102 definition includes all institutions included in the Section 101 definition (i e , public and private nonprofit IHEs) and also includes proprietary institutions, postsecondary vocational institutions, and foreign institutions that have been approved by ED  Section 102 specifies that proprietary and postsecondary vocational institutions must meet many of the same Section 101 requirements that are applicable to public and private nonprofit institutions  In addition, Section 102 specifies other criteria that all types of educational institutions must meet to be considered Title IV eligible IHEs  HEA Section 102 specifies that a proprietary IHEs is an institution that is neither a public nor a private nonprofit institution  In addition to the basic Title IV eligibility criteria that all IHEs must meet (e g , state authorization, accreditation by an ED-recognized accrediting agency), proprietary IHEs must meet additional criteria to be considered Title IV eligible  Specifically, a proprietary IHE must (1) provide an eligible program of training "to prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation" or (2) provide a program leading to a baccalaureate degree in liberal arts that has been continuously accredited by a regional accrediting agency since October 1, 2007, and have provided the program continuously since January 1, 2009  Additionally, it must have been legally authorized to provide (and have continuously been providing) the same or a substantially similar educational program for at least two consecutive years  HEA Section 102 defines a postsecondary vocational institution as a public or private nonprofit institution that provides an eligible program of training "to prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation," and has been legally authorized to provide (and has continuously been providing) the same or a substantially similar educational program for at least two consecutive years  It is possible for a public or private nonprofit IHE that offers a degree program (e g , an associate's or bachelor's degree) to also qualify as a postsecondary vocational institution by offering programs that are less than one academic year and that lead to a nondegree recognized credential such as a certificate  Institutional participation in Title IV student aid programs allows students from the United States to borrow through the federal Direct Loan program to attend postsecondary institutions located outside of the United States  In general, a foreign institution is eligible to participate in the Direct Loan program if it is comparable to an eligible IHE (as defined in HEA Section 101) within the United States, is a public or private nonprofit institution, and has been approved by ED  Foreign graduate medical schools, veterinary schools, and nursing schools are also eligible to participate in Title IV student aid programs, but must meet additional requirements  Freestanding foreign graduate medical schools, veterinary schools, and nursing schools may be proprietary institutions  Additional requirements for foreign institutions to participate in Title IV student aid programs are beyond the scope of this report and, generally, will not be discussed hereinafter  The definitions of proprietary institutions and postsecondary vocational institutions contained in Section 102 have several overlapping components with the Section 101 definition of IHE  For instance, both proprietary and postsecondary vocational institutions must (1) admit as regular students only those individuals with a high school diploma or its equivalent, individuals beyond the age of compulsory school attendance, or individuals who are dually or concurrently enrolled in both the institution and in a secondary school; (2) be legally authorized to provide a postsecondary education by the state in which they are located; and (3) be accredited or preaccredited by an accrediting agency recognized by ED to grant such statuses  In addition, all types of institutions (including public and private nonprofit institutions) must meet requirements related to the course of study offered at the institution and student enrollment to be considered Title IV eligible under Section 102  In general, any type of institution is considered ineligible to participate in Title IV programs if more than 25% of its enrolled students are incarcerated, or if more than 50% of the its enrolled students do not have a secondary school diploma or equivalent and the institution does not provide a two-year associate's degree or a four-year bachelor's degree  Also, in general, an institution is ineligible if more than 50% of the courses offered are correspondence courses or if 50% or more of its students are enrolled in correspondence courses  These "50% rules" are discussed in more detail in the distance education section of this report  Finally, an institution is considered ineligible to participate in Title IV programs if the institution has filed for bankruptcy or the institution (or its owner or chief executive officer) has been convicted of or pled no contest or guilty to a crime involving the use of Title IV funds  While the above-described criteria generally apply to most types of Section 102 institutions, specific criteria apply to individual types of Section 102 institutions  The following sections provide information on Title IV eligibility criteria that apply to those additional types of IHEs not specified in Section 101, but specified in Section 102: proprietary IHEs, postsecondary vocational institutions, and foreign institutions  Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, the term "institution of high education (IHE)" only refers to Section 102 institutions  To qualify as an eligible institution for Title IV participation, an institution must offer at least one eligible program, but overall institutional eligibility does not necessarily extend to all programs offered by the institution  Not all of an institution's programs must meet program eligibility requirements for an IHE to participate in Title IV, but, in general, students enrolled solely in ineligible programs cannot receive Title IV student aid  To be Title IV eligible, a program must lead to a degree (e g , an associate's or bachelor's degree) or certificate or prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation  Before awarding Title IV aid to students, an IHE must determine that the program in which a student is participating is Title IV eligible, ensure that the program is included in its accreditation notice, and ensure that the the IHE is authorized by the appropriate state to offer the program  In addition to the general criteria for all types of institutions, a program must meet specific eligibility requirements depending on whether the institution at which it is offered is a public or private nonprofit IHE, a proprietary IHE, or a postsecondary vocational IHE  At a public or private nonprofit IHE, the following types of programs are Title IV eligible: (1) programs that lead to an associate's, bachelor's, professional, or graduate degree; (2) transfer programs that are at least two academic years in length and for which the institution does not award a credential but that are acceptable for full credit toward a bachelor's degree; (3) programs that lead to a certificate or other recognized nondegree credential, that prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation, and that are at least one academic year in length; (4) certificate or diploma training programs that are less than one year in length, if the institution also meets the definition of a postsecondary vocational institution; and (5) programs consisting of courses required for elementary or secondary teacher certification in the state in which the student intends to teach  For all of these, an academic year must also require an undergraduate course of study to contain an amount of instructional time in which a full-time student is expected to complete at least 24 semester or trimester credit hours, 36 quarter credit hours, or 900 clock hours  In general, eligible programs at proprietary and postsecondary vocational institutions must meet a specified number of weeks of instruction and must provide training that prepares students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation (described below)  At proprietary and postsecondary vocational institutions, the following types of programs are Title IV eligible: undergraduate programs that provide at least 600 clock hours, 16 semester or trimester hours, or 24 quarter hours of instruction offered over a minimum of at least 15 weeks ; such programs may admit, as regular students, individuals who have not completed the equivalent of an associate's degree; programs that provide at least 300 clock hours, 8 semester hours, or 12 quarter hours of instruction offered over a minimum of 10 weeks; such programs must be graduate or professional programs or must admit as regular students only individuals who have completed the equivalent of an associate's degree; short-term programs that provide between 300 and 600 clock hours of instruction over a minimum of 10 weeks ; such programs must have been in existence for at least one year, have verified completion and placement rates of at least 70%, may not last more than 50% longer than the minimum training period required by the state or federal agency for the occupation for which the program is being offered, and must admit as regular students some individuals who have not completed the equivalent of an associate's degree; and programs offered by accredited proprietary IHEs that lead to a bachelor's degree in liberal arts; the school must have been continuously accredited by an ED-recognized accrediting agency since at least October 1, 2007 and must have provided the program continuously since January 1, 2009  Most nondegree programs offered by public and private nonprofit IHEs must prepare students for "gainful employment in a recognized occupation " Gainful employment requirements also apply to almost all programs offered by proprietary and postsecondary vocational institutions, regardless of whether they lead to a degree  In response to concerns about the quality of programs that prepare students for gainful employment and the level of student debt assumed by individuals who attend these programs, ED issued final rules on gainful employment on October 31, 2014  The regulations require that educational programs subject to gainful employment requirements offered by IHEs meet minimum performance standards to be considered offering education that prepares students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation  They also require IHEs to disclose specified information about each of its gainful employment programs to enrolled or prospective students  Finally, the gainful employment rules require IHEs to report information to ED necessary to calculate the debt-to-earnings ratios  Although the gainful employment regulations became effective July 1, 2015, various aspects of them have not yet been fully implemented or have been delayed in implementation  For example, ED delayed until July 1, 2019, some portions of the rule relating to certain disclosure requirements  Additionally, to enable ED to calculate whether an IHE's programs meet the minimum performance standards (discussed below), regulations specify that ED obtains data from the Social Security Administration (SSA)  However, a memorandum of understanding relating to data sharing between ED and SSA lapsed in 2018  In August 2018, ED issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that proposes to rescind the gainful employment rules in their entirety  Based on HEA requirements relating to the implementation date for Title IV regulations, the earliest possible date the proposed rules could go into effect is July 1, 2020  The gainful employment regulations establish a framework within which educational programs offered by IHEs must meet minimum performance standards to be considered offering education that prepares students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation  Under the framework, ED annually calculates two debt-to-earnings (D/E) rates for each gainful employment program offered by an IHE, the discretionary income rate and the annual earnings rate  These rates measure a gainful employment program's completers' debt (their annual loan payments) as a percentage of their post-completion earnings  Using these measures, institutions will be determined to be "passing," "in the zone," or "failing " Thresholds for each category are as follows: Passing : Programs whose completers have annual loan payments less than or equal to 8% of annual earnings (the annual earnings rate) or less than or equal to 20% of discretionary income (the discretionary income rate)  In the zone: Programs whose completers have annual loan payments greater than 8% but less than or equal to 12% of annual earnings or greater than 20% but less than or equal to 30% of discretionary income  Failing : Programs whose completers have annual loan payments greater than 12% of annual earnings and greater than 30% of discretionary income  Programs that are failing in two out of any three consecutive years or that are in the zone for four consecutive years will be ineligible for Title IV participation for three years  The gainful employment rules also contain several disclosure requirements  For any year in which ED notifies an IHE that a gainful employment program could become ineligible in the next year based on its debt-to-earnings ratios (i e , one year of failure or three years in the zone), the IHE must provide a warning to current and prospective students that the program does not meet the gainful employment standards and that if the program does not meet the gainful employment standards in the future, students would not be able to receive Title IV aid  In addition, an IHE must disclose specified information about each of its gainful employment programs to enrolled and prospective students  Information to be disclosed includes the following: the primary occupation that the program prepares students to enter; whether the program satisfies applicable educational prerequisites for professional licensure or certification in each state within the institution's metropolitan statistical area (MSA); program length and number of clock or credit hours, or equivalent, in the program; the program's completion rates for full-time and less-than-full-time students and the program's withdrawal rates; Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) and Direct Loan program loan repayment rates for all students who entered repayment on Title IV loans and who enrolled in the program, for those who withdrew from the program, and for those who completed the program; the program tuition, fees, and additional costs incurred by a student who completes the program within the program's published length; the job placement rate for the program, if otherwise required by the institution's accrediting agency or state; the percentage of enrolled students who received Title IV or private loans for enrollment in the program; the median loan debt and mean or median earnings of students who completed the program, of students who withdrew from the program, and of both groups combined; the program cohort default rate; and the annual earnings rate for the program  Institutions must also certify that each of their gainful employment programs is included in the IHE's accreditation, meets any state or federal entity accreditation requirements, and meets any state licensing and certification requirements for the state in which the IHE is located  Title IV of the HEA sets forth three requirements to ensure program integrity in postsecondary education, known as the program integrity triad  The three requirements are state authorization, accreditation by an accrediting agency recognized by ED, and eligibility and certification by ED  This triad is intended to provide a balance in the Title IV eligibility requirements  The states' role is to provide consumer protection, the accrediting agencies' role is to provide quality assurance, and the federal government's role is to provide oversight of compliance to ensure administrative and fiscal integrity of Title IV programs at IHEs  The state role in the program integrity triad is to provide legal authority for an institution to operate a postsecondary educational program in the state in which it is physically located  There are two basic requirements for an IHE to be considered legally authorized by a state: 1  the state must authorize the IHE by name to operate postsecondary educational programs, and 2  the state must have in place a process to review and address complaints concerning IHEs, including enforcing applicable state law  An IHE can be authorized by name through a state charter, statute, constitutional provision, or other action by an appropriate state agency (e g , authorization to conduct business or operate as a nonprofit organization)  Additionally, an institution must also comply with any applicable state approval or licensure requirements  The state agency responsible for the authorization of postsecondary institutions must also perform three additional functions: upon request, provide the Secretary with information about the process it uses to authorize institutions to operate within its borders; notify the Secretary if it has evidence to believe that an institution within its borders has committed fraud in the administration of Title IV programs; and notify the Secretary if it revokes an institution's authorization to operate  On December 19, 2016, ED issued final regulations related to state authorization for IHEs offering postsecondary distance or correspondence education (discussed later in this report)  The regulations would require an IHE offering postsecondary distance or correspondence education to students residing in a state in which the IHE is not physically located to meet any requirements within the student's state of residence  Under the rules, an IHE may meet this requirement if it participates in a state authorization reciprocity agreement  These regulations were scheduled to become effective July 1, 2018  However, on July 3, 2018 (and effective June 29, 2018), the Secretary of Education (Secretary) issued a final rule delaying the implementation of these requirements until July 1, 2020  The second component of the program integrity triad is accreditation by an ED-recognized accrediting agency or association  In higher education, accreditation is intended to help ensure an acceptable level of quality within IHEs  For Title IV purposes, an institution must be accredited or preaccredited by an ED-recognized accrediting agency  Each accrediting agency must meet HEA-specified standards to be recognized by ED  From its inception, accreditation has been a voluntary process  It developed with the formation of associations that distinguished between IHEs that merited the designation of college or university from those that did not  Since then, accreditation has been used as a form of "external quality review     to scrutinize colleges, universities and programs for quality assurance and quality improvement " In 1952, shortly after the passage of the Veterans' Readjustment Act of 1952 (the Korean GI Bill; P L  82-550), the federal government began formally recognizing accrediting agencies  This was done as one means to assess higher education quality and link it to determining which institutions would qualify to receive federal aid under the Korean GI Bill  Rather than creating a centralized authority to assess quality, the federal government chose to rely in part on the existing expertise of accrediting agencies  Today, ED's formal recognition of accrediting agencies is important, because an IHE's Title IV eligibility is conditioned upon accreditation from an ED-recognized accreditation organization  As part of the accreditation system's development, three types of accrediting agencies have emerged: Regional accrediting agencies  These operate in six regions of the United States, with each agency concentrating on a specific region  Generally, these accredit entire public and private nonprofit degree-granting IHEs  National accrediting agencies  These operate across the United States and also accredit entire institutions  There are two types of national accrediting agencies: faith-based agencies that accredit religiously affiliated or doctrinally based institutions, which are typically private nonprofit degree-granting institutions, and career-related agencies that typically accredit proprietary, career-based, degree- and nondegree-granting institutions  Specialized or programmatic accrediting agencies  These operate throughout the United States and accredit individual educational programs (e g , law) and single-purpose institutions (e g , freestanding medical schools)  Specific educational programs are often accredited by a specialized accrediting agency, and the institution at which the program is offered is accredited by a regional or national accrediting organization  Generally, an institution must be accredited by an ED-recognized accrediting agency that has the authority to cover all of the institution's programs  Alternatively, a public or private nonprofit IHE may be preaccredited by an agency recognized by ED to grant such preaccreditation, and a public postsecondary vocational institution may be accredited by a state agency that ED determines is a reliable authority  Proprietary institutions must be accredited by an ED-recognized accrediting agency  The accreditation process begins with an institution or program requesting accreditation  Institutional accreditation is cyclical, with a cycle ranging from every few years up to 10 years  Initial accreditation does not guarantee subsequent renewal of the accredited status  Typically, an institution seeking accreditation will first perform a self-assessment to determine whether its operations and performance meet the basic standards required by the relevant accrediting agency  Next, an outside group of higher education peers (e g , faculty and administrators) and members of the public conduct an on-site visit at the institution during which the team determines whether the accrediting organization's standards are being met  Based on the results of the self-assessment and site visit, the accrediting organization determines whether accreditation will be awarded, renewed, denied, or provisionally awarded to an institution  Educational programs within institutions can be accredited by programmatic accrediting agencies; however, a program is not required to be accredited by a programmatic accrediting agency for Title IV purposes  Rather, it only needs to be covered by the IHE's primary accrediting agency  Frequently, programmatic accrediting agencies review a specific program within an IHE that is accredited by a regional or national accrediting agency  An institution that has had its accreditation revoked or terminated for cause cannot be recertified as an IHE eligible to participate in Title IV programs for 24 months following the loss of accreditation, unless the accrediting agency rescinds the loss  The same rules apply if an institution voluntarily withdraws its accreditation  The Secretary can, however, continue the eligibility of a religious institution whose loss of accreditation, whether voluntary or not, is related to its religious mission and not to the HEA accreditation standards  If an institution's accrediting agency loses its recognition from ED, it has up to 18 months to obtain accreditation from another ED-recognized agency  Although the federal government does not set specific standards for institutional or programmatic accreditation, generally, it does require that institutions be accredited or preaccredited by a recognized accrediting organization to be eligible for Title IV participation  ED's primary role in accreditation is to recognize an accrediting agency as a "reliable authority regarding the quality of education or training offered" at IHEs through the processes and conditions set forth in the HEA and federal regulations  For ED recognition, Section 496 of the HEA specifically requires that an accrediting agency be a state, regional, or national agency that demonstrates the ability to operate as an accrediting agency within the relevant state or region or nationally  Additionally, agencies must meet one of the following criteria: IHE membership with the agency must be voluntary, and one of the primary purposes of the agency must be accreditation of the IHEs  The agency must be a state agency approved by the Secretary as an accrediting agency on or before October 1, 1991  The agency must either conduct accreditation through a voluntary membership of individuals in a profession, or it must have as its primary purpose the accreditation of programs within institutions that have already been accredited by another ED-recognized agency  Agencies that meet the first or third criterion listed above must also be administratively and financially separate and independent of any related trade association or membership organization  For an agency that meets the third criterion and that was ED-recognized on or before October 1, 1991, the Secretary may waive the requirement that the agency be administratively and financially independent of any related organization, but only if the agency can show that the existing relationship with the related organization has not compromised its independence in the accreditation process  All types of accrediting agencies must show that they consistently apply and enforce standards that ensure that the education programs, training, or courses of study offered by an IHE are of sufficient quality to meet the stated objectives for which the programs, training, or courses are offered  The standards used by the accrediting agencies must assess student achievement in relation to the institution's mission; this may include course completion, job placement rates, and passage rates of state licensing exams  Agencies must also consider curricula, faculty, facilities, fiscal and administrative capacity, student support services, and admissions practices  Accrediting agencies must also meet requirements that focus on the review of an institution's operating procedures, including reviewing an institution's policies and procedures for determining credit hours, the application of those policies and procedures to programs and coursework, and reviewing any newly established branch campuses  They must also perform regular on-site visits that focus on the quality of education and program effectiveness  The final component of the program integrity triad is eligibility and certification by ED  Here, ED is responsible for verifying an institution's legal authority to operate within a state and its accreditation status  ED also evaluates an institution's financial responsibility and administrative capability to administer Title IV student aid programs  An institution can be certified to participate in Title IV for up to six years before applying for recertification  ED determines an IHE's financial responsibility based on its ability to provide the services described in its official publications, to administer the Title IV programs in which it participates, and to meet all of its financial obligations  A public IHE is deemed financially responsible if its debts and liabilities are backed by the full faith and credit of the state or another government entity  A proprietary or private nonprofit IHE is financially responsible if it meets specific financial ratios (e g , equity ratio) established by ED, has sufficient cash reserves to make any required refunds (including the return of Title IV funds), is meeting all of its financial obligations, and is current on its debt payments  Even if an institution meets the above requirements, ED does not consider it financially responsible if the IHE does not meet third-party financial audit requirements or if the IHE violated past performance requirements, such as failing to satisfactorily resolve any compliance issues identified in program reviews or audits  Alternatively, if an institution does not meet the above standards of financial responsibility, ED may still consider it financially responsible or give it provisional certification, under which it may operate for a time, if it qualifies under an alternative standard  These alternative standards include submitting an irrevocable letter of credit to ED that is equal to at least 50% of the Federal Student Aid (FSA) program funds that the IHE received during its most recently completed fiscal year, meeting specific monitoring requirements, or participating in the Title IV programs under provisional certification  Along with demonstrating financial responsibility, an institution must demonstrate its ability to properly administer the Title IV programs in which it participates and to provide the education it describes in public documents (e g , marketing brochures)  Administrative capability focuses on the processes, procedures, and personnel used in administering Title IV funds and indicators of student success  Administrative capability standards address numerous aspects of Title IV administration  For example, to administer Title IV programs an institution must use ED's electronic processes and develop a system to identify and resolve discrepancies in Title IV information received by various institutional offices  The IHE must also refer cases of Title IV student fraud or criminal misconduct to ED's Office of Inspector General for resolution, and it must provide all enrolled and prospective students financial aid counseling  Finally, the IHE must have an adequate internal system of checks and balances that includes dividing the functions of authorizing payments and disbursing funds between two separate offices  Institutions are required to have a capable staff member to administer Title IV programs and coordinate those programs with other aid received by students  This person must also have an adequate number of qualified staff to assist with aid administration  Before receiving Title IV funds, an IHE must certify that neither it nor its employees have been debarred or suspended by a federal agency; similar limitations apply to lenders, loan servicers, and third-party servicers  Relating to indicators of student success, an institution must have satisfactory academic progress (SAP) standards for students receiving Title IV funds  In general, IHEs must develop SAP standards that establish a minimum grade point average (or its equivalent) for students and a maximum time frame in which students must complete their educational programs  A student who fails to meet the SAP requirements becomes ineligible to receive Title IV funds  Also related to student success indicators, an institution that seeks to participate in Title IV programs for the first time may not have an undergraduate withdrawal rate for regular students that is greater than 33% during its most recently completed award year  An institution may be deemed administratively incapable if it has a high cohort default rate (CDR)  In general, the CDR is the number of an IHE's federal loan recipients who enter repayment in a given fiscal year (the cohort fiscal year) and who default within a certain period of time after entering repayment (cohort default period; CDP), divided by the total number of borrowers who entered repayment in the cohort fiscal year  Since 2014, ED has used a three-year CDP in calculating an institution's CDR  An IHE will be found administratively incapable if one of the following conditions is met: 1  an institution's CDR is greater than 40% in one year for loans made under the FFEL and Direct Loans programs; 2  an institution's CDR is 30% or greater for each of the three most recent fiscal years for loans made under the FFEL and Direct Loans programs; or 3  an institution's CDR is 15% or greater in any single year for loans made under the Federal Perkins Loan Program  When an IHE is determined to be administratively incapable due to a high CDR, it may become ineligible to participate in the Direct Loan, Pell Grant, and/or Perkins Loan programs (but not other Title IV programs)  ED may grant provisional certification for up to three years to an institution that would be deemed administratively capable except for its high cohort default rates  If an institution is seeking initial certification, ED can grant it up to one year of provisional certification  ED can also grant an institution provisional certification for up to three years if ED is determining the IHE's administrative capacity and financial responsibility for the first time, if the IHE has experienced a partial or total change in ownership, or if ED determines that the administrative or financial condition of the IHE may hinder its ability to meet its financial responsibilities  Additionally, if an accrediting agency loses its ED recognition, any institution that was accredited by that agency may continue to participate in Title IV programs for up to 18 months after ED's withdrawal of recognition  To ensure that an institution is conforming to eligibility requirements, ED can conduct program reviews  During a program review, ED evaluates an institution's compliance with Title IV requirements and identifies actions the IHE must take to correct any problem(s)  Review priority is given to those institutions with high cohort default rates; IHEs with significant fluctuations in Pell Grant awards or Direct Loan volume that are not accounted for by changes in programs offered; IHEs that are reported to have deficiencies or financial aid problems by their state or accrediting agency; IHEs with high annual dropout rates; and IHEs determined by ED to pose a significant risk of failing to comply with the administrative capability or financial responsibility requirements  If, during a review, ED determines that an institution is not administratively capable or financially responsible or is violating Title IV program rules, ED may grant it provisional certification, take corrective actions, or impose sanctions  ED has the authority to impose a variety of sanctions and corrective actions on an institution that violates Title IV program rules, a Program Participation Agreement (discussed later in this report) or any other agreement made under the laws or regulations, or if it substantially misrepresents the nature of its educational programs, financial charges, or graduates' employability  Sanctions include fines, limitations, suspensions, emergency actions, and terminations  ED can also sanction third-party servicers performing tasks related to the institution's Title IV programs  ED may impose several types of sanctions on institutions for statutory and regulatory violations, including fines, limitations, and suspensions  ED can fine an institution up to $55,907 for each statutory or regulatory violation it commits, depending on the size of the IHE and the seriousness of the violation  Under a limitation, ED imposes specific conditions or restrictions on an institution related to its administration of Title IV funds  A limitation lasts for at least 12 months, and if an institution fails to abide by the limitation, ED may initiate a termination proceeding  Finally, under a suspension, an institution is not allowed to participate in Title IV programs for up to 60 days  Each of these sanctions may require an institution to take corrective actions as well, which may include repaying illegally used funds or making payments to eligible students from the IHE's own funds  ED can take emergency action to withhold Title IV funds from an institution if it receives reliable information that an IHE is violating applicable laws or regulations, agreements, or limitations  ED must determine that the institution is misusing federal funds, that immediate action is necessary to stop misuses, and that the potential losses outweigh the importance of using established procedures for limitation, suspension, or termination  An emergency action suspends an institution's participation in Title IV programs and prohibits it from disbursing such funds  Typically, the emergency action may not last more than 30 days  The final action ED can take is the termination of an institution's participation in Title IV programs  Generally, an institution that has had its participation terminated cannot reapply to be reinstated for at least 18 months  To request reinstatement, an institution must submit a fully completed application to ED and demonstrate that it has corrected the violation(s) for which its participation was terminated  ED may then approve, approve subject to limitations, or deny the institution's request  Several other requirements affect institutional eligibility for Title IV programs  Some of these requirements include institution Program Participation Agreements, which include provisions related to incentive compensation and campus crime reporting requirements; return of Title IV funds; and distance education  The failure to meet the requirements for any of these may result in the loss of Title IV eligibility or other sanctions  HEA Section 487 specifies that each institution wanting to participate in Title IV student aid programs is required to have a current Program Participation Agreement (PPA)  A PPA is a document in which the institution agrees to comply with the laws, regulations, and policies applicable to the Title IV programs; it applies to an IHE's branch campuses and locations that meet Title IV requirements, as well as its main campus  It also lists all of the Title IV programs in which the IHE is eligible to participate, the date on which the PPA expires, and the date on which the IHE must reapply for participation  By signing a PPA, an institution agrees that it will act as a fiduciary responsible for properly administering Title IV funds, will not charge students a processing fee to determine a student's eligibility for such funds, and will establish and maintain administrative and fiscal procedures to ensure the proper administration of Title IV programs  The PPA reiterates many provisions required for institutional eligibility and ED certification discussed earlier in this report and contains several additional notable requirements that may affect an IHE's Title IV eligibility, which are described below  Along with the general participation requirements with which an institution must comply, a PPA may also contain institution-specific requirements  As part of their PPAs, domestic and foreign proprietary IHEs must agree to derive at least 10% of their revenue from non-Title IV funds (i e , no more than 90% of their revenue can come from Title IV funds)  This is known as the 90/10 rule  Examples of non-Title IV funds include private education loans and some military and veterans' benefits, such as benefits provided under the Post-9/11 GI Bill program  If an IHE violates the 90/10 rule in one year, it does not immediately lose its Title IV eligibility  Rather, it is placed on a provisional eligibility status for two years  If the IHE violates the 90/10 rule for two consecutive years, it loses its eligibility for at least two years  In a PPA, an IHE must agree it will not provide any commission or incentive compensation to individuals based directly or indirectly on their success in enrolling students or the enrolled students' obtaining financial aid; however, some exceptions apply to this general rule  For instance, IHEs can provide incentive compensation to individuals for the recruitment of foreign students who are ineligible to receive Title IV funds or they can provide incentive compensation through a profit-sharing plan  The ban on incentive compensation only applies to the activities of securing enrollment (recruitment) and securing financial aid  Other activities are not banned, and ED draws a distinction between activities that involve directly working with individual students and policy-level determinations that affect recruitment and financial aid awards  For instance, an individual who is responsible for contacting potential student applicants or assisting students in filling out an enrollment application cannot receive incentive compensation, but an individual who conducts marketing activities, such as the broad dissemination of informational brochures or the collection of contact information, can receive incentive compensation  HEA Section 485(f), referred to as the Clery Act, requires domestic Title IV participating IHEs (1) to report to ED campus crime statistics and (2) establish and disseminate campus safety and security policies  Both the campus crime statistics and campus safety and security policies must be compiled and disseminated to current and prospective students and employees in an IHE's annual security report (ASR)  Campus crime statistics required to be reported to ED and included in an ASR include data on the occurrence on campus of a range of offenses specified in statute, including murder, burglary, robbery, domestic violence, rape, and other forms of sexual violence  In addition to campus crime statistics, ASRs must include statements of campus safety and security policies regarding, for example, procedures and facilities for students and others to report criminal actions or other emergencies occurring on campus and an IHE's response to such reports; security and access to campus facilities; campus law enforcement, including the law enforcement authority of campus security personnel, and the working relationship between campus security personnel and state and local law enforcement; programs designed to inform students and employees about the prevention of crimes; and the possession, use, and sale of alcoholic beverages and illegal drugs; enforcement of state underage drinking laws; enforcement of federal and state drug laws; and any drug or alcohol abuse education programs required under the HEA  An ASR must also include statements of policies specifically relating to incidence of domestic and sexual violence  For example, an ASR must include statements of policy regarding programs to prevent such incidents; procedures a victim should follow if such an incident as occurred; procedures an IHE will follow once such an incident has been reported and procedures for institutional disciplinary actions in cases of alleged incidents (including a statement of the standard of evidence that will be used in any school proceeding arising from the incident report); and possible sanctions and protective measures that an IHE may impose following a final determination in an institutional proceeding regarding such incidences  The Clery Act prohibits the Secretary of Education from requiring IHEs to adopt particular policies, procedures, or practices; and prohibits retaliation against anyone exercising his or her rights or responsibilities under the act  HEA Section 484B specifies that when a Title IV aid recipient withdraws from an IHE before the end of the payment or enrollment period for which funds were disbursed, Title IV funds must be returned to ED according to a statutorily prescribed schedule  In general, when a student withdraws from an IHE, an IHE first determines the portion of Title IV aid considered to be "earned" by the student while enrolled and the portion considered to be "unearned " Unearned aid must be returned to ED  Up to the 60% point of a payment or enrollment period, unearned funds must be returned on a pro rata schedule  After the 60% point of a payment or enrollment period, the total amount of funds awarded is considered to have been earned by the student and no funds are required to be returned  Whether an IHE and/or the student is required to return the funds to ED depends on a variety of circumstances, including whether Title IV funds have been applied directly to a student's institutional charges  Unearned funds must be returned to their respective programs in a specified order, with loans being returned first, followed by Pell Grants, and then other Title IV aid  In some instances, a student may have earned more aid than has been disbursed, and the difference is disbursed to the student after the student withdraws  Generally, distance education and correspondence education refers to educational instruction with a separation in time, place, or both between the student and instructor  It is a way in which institutions can increase student access to postsecondary education by offering alternatives to traditional on-campus instruction  Recently, due to the greater availability of new technologies, there has been substantial growth in the amount and types of courses institutions offer  Section 103(7)(A) and (B) of the HEA and the accompanying regulations define distance education as instruction that uses "(1) the internet; (2) one-way and two-way transmissions through open broadcast, closed circuit, cable, microwave, broadband lines, fiber optics, satellite, or wireless communications devices; [or]     (3) audio conferencing" to deliver instruction to students separated from the instructor  A course taught through a video cassette, DVD, or CD-ROM is considered a distance education course if one of the above-mentioned technologies is used to support student-instructor interaction  Regardless of the technology used, "regular and substantive interaction between the students and the instructor" must be ensured  Correspondence courses are expressly excluded from the definition of distance education  A correspondence course is one for which an institution provides instructional materials and exams for students who do not physically attend classes at the IHE, but does not include those courses that are delivered with "regular and substantive interaction between the students and the instructor" via one of the above-described technologies  In 1992, partially in response to cases of some correspondence institutions' fraudulent and abusive practices used to attract unqualified students to enroll in programs of poor or questionable quality, Congress incorporated provisions referred to as the "50% rules" into the HEA  The rules affected both the eligibility of institutions offering correspondence courses and their students' eligibility for Title IV aid  In general, under the rules, an institution is ineligible for Title IV aid if more than 50% of its courses are offered by correspondence, or if 50% or more of its students are enrolled in correspondence courses  As discussed earlier in this report, rules promulgated in 2016 would have required an IHE offering postsecondary distance or correspondence education in a state in which it is not physically located to meet any state authorization requirements within that state  Under the regulations, an IHE could meet this requirement if it participates in a state authorization reciprocity agreement  These regulations were scheduled to become effective July 1, 2018  However, on July 3, 2018 (and effective June 29, 2018), the Secretary of Education issued a final rule delaying the implementation of these requirements until July 1, 2020  The distinction between distance education and traditional instruction is also important for the purposes of Title IV program eligibility  Distance education programs provided by domestic IHEs are eligible for Title IV participation if they have been accredited by an accrediting agency recognized by ED to evaluate distance education programs  A program offered by a foreign IHE, in whole or in part, through distance education (including telecommunications) or correspondence is ineligible for Title IV participation 

ground_truth: Coal accounts for 17 percent of domestic energy production. SMCRA requires coal mine operators to reclaim lands that were disturbed during mining and to submit a financial assurance in an amount sufficient to ensure that adequate funds will be available to complete reclamation if the operator does not do so. Recent coal company bankruptcies have drawn attention to whether financial assurances obtained by OSMRE and state agencies will be adequate to reclaim land once coal mining operations have ceased. GAO was asked to review management of financial assurances for coal mine reclamation. This report describes, among other things, the amounts and types of financial assurances held for coal mine reclamation in 2017 and the challenges that OSMRE and state agencies face in managing these financial assurances. GAO collected and analyzed data from OSMRE and 23 state agencies; reviewed federal laws, regulations, and directives; and interviewed OSMRE and state agency officials and representatives from organizations associated with the mining and financial assurance industries and environmental organizations. State agencies and the Department of the Interior's Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) reported holding approximately $10.2 billion in surety bonds (guaranteed by a third party), collateral bonds (guaranteed by a tangible asset, such as a certificate of deposit), and self-bonds (guaranteed on the basis of a coal operator's own finances) as financial assurances for coal mine reclamation. OSMRE and state agencies face several challenges in managing financial assurances, according to the stakeholders GAO interviewed. Specifically, Obtaining additional financial assurances from operators for unanticipated reclamation costs, such as long-term treatment for water pollution, can be difficult. Determining the financial stability of surety companies has been challenging in certain instances. Self-bonding presents a risk to the government because it is difficult to (1) ascertain the financial health of an operator, (2) determine whether the operator qualifies for self-bonding, and (3) obtain a replacement for existing self-bonds when an operator no longer qualifies. In addition, some stakeholders said that the risk from self-bonding is greater now than when the practice was first authorized under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). GAO's previous work examining environmental cleanup found that the financial risk to government and the amount of oversight needed for self-bonds are relatively high compared to other forms of financial assurances. GAO also previously reviewed federal financial assurance requirements for various energy and mineral extraction sectors and found that coal mining is the only one where self-bonding was allowed. However, because SMCRA explicitly allows states to decide whether to accept self-bonds, eliminating the risk that self-bonds pose to the federal government and states would require SMCRA be amended. GAO recommends that Congress consider amending SMCRA to eliminate self-bonding. Interior neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendation.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: T he federal government pays benefits to coal miners affected by coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP, commonly referred to as black lung disease) and other lung diseases linked to coal mining in cases where the responsible mine operators are not able to pay  Benefit payments and related administrative expenses are paid out of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  The primary source of revenue for the trust fund is an excise tax on coal produced and sold domestically  If excise tax revenue is not sufficient to finance Black Lung Program benefits, the trust fund may borrow from the general fund of the Treasury, which contains federal receipts not earmarked for a specific purpose  For 2018, the tax rates on coal were $1 10 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0 55 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 4 4% of the sales price  Starting in 2019, under current law, these tax rates are $0 50 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0 25 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 2% of the sales price  This decline in the excise tax rates will likely put additional financial strain on a trust fund that already borrows from the general fund to meet obligations  The decline in domestic coal production, recent increases in the rate of CWP, and bankruptcies in the coal sector also contribute to the financial strain on the trust fund  This report provides background information and policy options to help inform the debate surrounding the coal excise tax rate, and other considerations related to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  The report begins with an overview of the federal black lung program, providing information on black lung disease and benefits under the program  The report proceeds to examine Black Lung Disability Trust Fund revenues, focusing on the coal excise tax and its history  The report closes with a discussion of policy options, evaluating various revenue- and benefits-related policy options that could improve the fiscal outlook of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund is used to finance the payment of federal Black Lung Program benefits under Part C of the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) when a responsible coal operator does not meet its obligations under the law to pay benefits  Coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP, commonly referred to as black lung disease) is an interstitial lung disease caused by the inhalation of coal dust  Like in other types of pneumoconioses, the inhalation of coal dust results in the scarring of the lung tissue and affects the gas-exchanging ability of the lungs to remove carbon dioxide and take oxygen into the bloodstream  Exposure to coal dust over an extended period of time can lead to CWP and continued exposure can lead to the progression from the early stages of CWP referred to as "simple CWP," to more advanced stages of scarring referred to as "complicated CWP" or progressive massive fibrosis (PMF)  There is no cure for CWP and PMF  CWP can lead to loss of lung function, the need for lung transplantation, and premature death  CWP can be identified by observing light spots, or opacities, in x-ray images of the lungs and can be classified using guidelines established by the International Labour Organization (ILO)  Despite technological advances in mining dust control, mandatory chest x-rays for miners, free CWP surveillance offered to miners by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the enactment of numerous pieces of mine safety and health legislation, and the promulgation and enforcement of mine safety and health standards by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), CWP persists in American coal miners, especially those in the Appalachian region  After reductions in rates of PMF in the 1990s, this advanced form of CWP has recently been found in Central Appalachia at rates not seen since the early 1970s  In 2017 researchers discovered, among coal miners mostly living in Kentucky and Virginia and served by three federally funded Black Lung Clinics in Virginia, what may be the largest cluster of PMF ever recorded  This cluster of miners with PMF includes a relatively high number of miners with less than 20 years of mining experience as well as cases of PMF in current miners  The occurrence of this advanced stage of CWP in short-tenured and current miners is noteworthy since MSHA standards require that any miner with evidence of CWP be given the option, without loss of compensation or other penalty, to work in an area of the mining operation in which the average concentration of coal dust in the air is continuously maintained at or below an established level that is lower than the permissible exposure level for all miners with the goal of preventing the progression of CWP  The federal Black Lung Program was created in 1969 with the enactment of Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Coal Act, P L  91-173, later renamed the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 by P L  95-164 )  Section 401 of the Coal Act provides the congressional justification for the federal Black Lung Program and cites the lack of benefits for disability and death caused by CWP provided by existing state workers' compensation systems as justification for the creation of a federal program  This section also states that the program is intended to be a cooperative effort between the federal government and the states  The Coal Act also established mandatory safety and health standards for coal mines, including standards limiting exposure of miners to coal dust and giving miners with CWP the option of being moved, without loss of compensation or penalty, to an area of the mine with lower dust concentrations  The Coal Act was later amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 (BLBA, P L  92-303)  The Coal Act established Part B of the federal Black Lung Program to provide cash benefits to miners totally disabled due to CWP and to the survivors of miners who die from CWP  Part B only applies to cases filed on or before December 31, 1973  Part B benefits are paid out of general revenue and were initially administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA)  Today, with the exception of a small number of pending appellate cases, Part B benefits are administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP)  The Coal Act established Part C of the Federal Black Lung Program for cases filed after December 31, 1973, and was later amended by the BLBA  Under Part C of the BLBA, all claims for benefits for disability or death due to CWP are to be filed with each state's workers' compensation system, but only if such systems have been determined by DOL as providing benefits that are equivalent to or greater than the cash benefits provided by the federal government under Part B of the BLBA and the medical benefits provided to disabled longshore and harbor workers under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)  If a state's workers' compensation system is not determined by DOL to meet these standards, then Part C benefits are to be paid by the each miner's coal employer, or, if no such employer is available to pay benefits, by the federal government  In 1973, Maryland, Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia submitted their state workers' compensation laws to DOL for approval, but were denied  To date, no state workers' compensation system has been approved by DOL under Part C of the BLBA  Because no state's workers' compensation system has been determined to be sufficient to pay benefits under Part C, each operator of an underground coal mine is responsible for the payment of benefits to that operator's miners  Operators are required to provide for these benefits either by purchasing insurance for benefits or through self-insurance approved by DOL  A self-insured operator is required to purchase an indemnity bond or provide another form of security (such as a deposit of negotiable securities in a Federal Reserve Bank or the establishment of a trust) in an amount specified by DOL  In order to be approved for self-insurance, federal regulations require that a mine operator have been in business for at least the three previous years and have average assets over the previous three years that exceed current liabilities by the sum of expected benefit payments and annual premiums on the indemnity bond  When a claim for benefits is approved, benefits are to be paid by the "responsible" operator, which is generally the last coal operator to employ the miner  If a company has acquired the assets of a mine operator, then that company is considered a "successor operator" and is responsible for the payment of claims related to the original operator  The federal government pays benefits in cases in which the responsible operator no longer exists and has no successor operator, or is unable to pay benefits  The federal government pays benefits when an operator has not made payment within 30 days of a determination of eligibility or when benefits are otherwise due to be paid  Initially, under Part C of the Coal Act, these federal benefits were paid out of general revenue  However, pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977 ( P L  95-227 ), these benefits are now paid from the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund established by this law and primarily financed by an excise tax on coal  If a responsible operator can later be identified, the trust fund is authorized by law to seek to recover from this operator the amount of benefits paid by the trust fund and any interest earned on these amounts  The trust fund is also used for the following federal Black Lung Program-related expenses: the payment of benefits for miners whose last coal mine employment was before January 1, 1970; reimbursement to the Treasury for the costs of Part C benefits paid from general revenue before April 1, 1978, for periods of benefit eligibility after January 1, 1974; the repayment and payment of interest on advances made from the general fund to the trust fund; the payment of administrative expenses related to Part C of the BLBA and the coal excise tax incurred after March 1, 1978; and the reimbursement of coal operators who paid Part C benefits before April 1, 1978, for miners whose last coal mine employment ended before January 1, 1970  A miner is eligible for benefits if that miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment  The survivors of a miner are eligible for benefits if the miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment  Benefits are only available to miners and their survivors  The BLBA defines a miner as any individual who works or has worked in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility in the extraction or preparation of coal  Such term also includes an individual who works or has worked in coal mine construction or transportation in or around a coal mine, to the extent such individual was exposed to coal dust as a result of such employment  Thus, other workers who may be exposed to coal dust in their work, such as railroad workers or workers at coal-fired power plants are not eligible for benefits  Persons who live near coal mines or power plants are also not eligible for benefits even if they are exposed to coal dust  In addition, while a miner's family members may receive benefits as survivors and the number of family members can increase the amount of a miner's monthly benefits, family members may not claim benefits on their own due to exposure to coal dust in the home such as from cleaning the miner's soiled clothing  The BLBA defines pneumoconiosis for the purposes of benefit eligibility as "a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment " The BLBA directs the Secretary of Labor to develop, through regulations, standards for determining if a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or died due to pneumoconiosis  The federal Black Lung Program regulations provide that the definition of pneumoconiosis includes medical or "clinical" pneumoconiosis and statutory or "legal" pneumoconiosis  Clinical pneumoconiosis is defined as follows: "Clinical pneumoconiosis" consists of those diseases recognized by the medical community as pneumoconioses, i e , the conditions characterized by permanent deposition of substantial amounts of particulate matter in the lungs and the fibrotic reaction of the lung tissue to that deposition caused by dust exposure in coal mine employment  This definition includes, but is not limited to, coal workers' pneumoconiosis, anthracosilicosis, anthracosis, anthrosilicosis, massive pulmonary fibrosis, silicosis or silicotuberculosis, arising out of coal mine employment  Legal pneumoconiosis is defined as any chronic lung disease or impairment and its sequelae arising out of coal mine employment  This definition includes, but is not limited to, any chronic restrictive or obstructive pulmonary disease arising out of coal mine employment  Through these definitions, DOL has established that benefits are available not just to miners with CWP, but also to those miners with other respiratory diseases arising out of coal mine employment such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) even though these diseases are not pneumoconioses and may be linked to other factors unrelated to exposure to coal dust such as cigarette smoking  The BLBA contains five presumptions used to determine if a miner is eligible for black lung benefits  Three of these presumptions are "rebuttable," meaning that, in the absence of any contrary evidence, eligibility is presumed  One presumption is "irrebutable" and eligibility for Black Lung program benefits is established if the statutory requirements of the presumption are met  Three of these presumptions apply to current Black Lung Program claims while two apply only to cases filed before the end of 1981  Table 1 provides a summary of the following five presumptions provided by the BLBA  1  A rebuttable presumption that the pneumoconiosis of a miner who was employed in mining for at least 10 years was caused by his or her employment  2  A rebuttable presumption that the death of a miner who worked in mining for at least 10 years and who died of any respirable disease, was due to pneumoconiosis  This presumption does not apply to claims filed on or after January 1, 1982, the effective date of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981 ( P L  97-119 )  3  An irrebuttable presumption that a miner with any chronic lung disease which meets certain statutory tests or diagnoses is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or died due to pneumoconiosis  4  A rebuttable presumption that a miner employed in mining for at least 15 years, and who has a chest x-ray that is interpreted as negative with respect to certain statutory standards but who has other evidence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or died due to pneumoconiosis  This presumption may only be rebutted by the Secretary of Labor establishing that the miner does not or did not have pneumoconiosis or that the miner's respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of connection to mine employment  5  A presumption that a miner who died on or before March 1, 1978, and who was employed in mining for at least 25 years before June 30, 1971, died due to pneumoconiosis, unless it is established that at the time of the miner's death, he or she was not at least partially disabled due to pneumoconiosis  This presumption does not apply to claims filed on or after June 29, 1982, which is 180 days after the effective date of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981  This presumption is not listed in the law as either rebuttable or irrebuttable  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA), P L  111-148 ) included two provisions that amended the BLBA to reinstate one of the eligibility presumptions and a provision affecting survivors' benefits  The effect of these changes was to increase the opportunity to establish eligibility through the statutory presumptions and make it easier for certain survivors to receive benefits  Pursuant to Section 202(a) of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, the fourth presumption did not apply to cases filed on or after January 1, 1982  Section 1556(a) of the ACA removed the prohibition on applying the fourth presumption to cases filed on or after January 1, 1982  It is expected that this ACA provision will increase the number of miners eligible for benefits  The BLBA provides that, for Part C claims, the survivors of a miner who was determined to be eligible to receive benefits at the time of his or her death are not required to file new claims for benefits or revalidate any claim for benefits, thus permitting the payment of survivors' benefits in these cases even if the miner's death was not caused by pneumoconiosis  Pursuant to Section 203(a)(6) of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, this provision did not apply to claims filed on or after January 1, 1982  Section 1556(b) of the ACA removed from this provision the exception for claims filed on or after January 1, 1982  It is expected that this ACA provision will increase the number of survivors eligible for benefits  The amendments to the BLBA provided in Section 1556 of the ACA apply to any claims filed under Part B or C of the act after January 1, 2005, that were pending on or after March 23, 2010, the date of enactment of the ACA  Eligible miners receiving benefits under Parts B and C are entitled to medical coverage for their pneumoconiosis and related disability  This medical coverage is provided at no cost to the miner and can generally be obtained from the miner's choice of medical providers  Eligible miners are also entitled to cash disability benefits  The basic benefit rate is set at 37 5% of the basic pay rate at GS-2, Step 1, on the federal pay schedule without any locality adjustment  If the miner has one dependent (a spouse or minor child) the miner is eligible for a benefit of 150% of the basic benefit  A miner with two dependents is eligible for 175% of the basic benefit and a miner with three or more dependents is eligible for 200% of the basic benefit  Benefits may also be paid to the divorced spouse of a miner if the marriage lasted at least 10 years and the divorced spouse was dependent on the miner for at least half of the spouse's support at the time of the miner's disability  A child is considered a dependent until the child marries, or reaches age 18, unless the child is either disabled using the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) definition of disability or is under the age of 23 and a full-time student  The benefit rates are adjusted whenever there are changes to the federal employee pay schedules, but are not separately adjusted to reflect changes in the cost of living  Table 2 provides the benefit rates for 2019  Benefits are offset by state workers' compensation or other benefits paid on account of the miner's disability or death due to pneumoconiosis  Part C benefits, but not Part B benefits, are considered workers' compensation for the purposes of reducing a miner's SSDI benefits  The total amount paid in cash disability benefits has fallen over time, as illustrated in Figure 1   More is paid in cash disability benefits than is paid in medical benefits  Certain survivors of a miner whose death was due to pneumoconiosis are eligible for cash benefits  In the case of a surviving spouse or divorced spouse, the spouse's benefit is equal to what the miner would have received and is based on the number of dependents of the spouse as provided in Table 2   If there is no surviving spouse, then benefits are awarded to the surviving minor children in equal shares  If there are no surviving minor children, then benefits can be paid to the miner's dependent parents or dependent siblings  If there are no eligible survivors, no benefits are paid upon the miner's death and benefits do not go to the miner's estate or to any other person, including a person named by the miner in a will  The number of miners and survivors receiving benefits has declined over time, as illustrated in Figure 2   The primary revenue source for the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund is a per-ton excise tax on coal  Historically, the coal excise tax has not generated enough revenue to meet the trust fund's obligations  Thus, additional funds have been provided from the general fund of the Treasury  The general fund includes governmental receipts not earmarked for a specific purpose, the proceeds of general borrowing, and is used for general governmental expenditures  Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 4121 imposes the black lung excise tax (BLET) on sales or use of domestically mined coal  Generally, a producer that sells the coal is liable for the tax  Producers that use their own domestically mined coal, such as integrated utilities or steel companies, are also liable for the tax  The tax rate depends on how coal is mined  Effective January 1, 2019, the tax on underground-mined coal is the lesser of (1) $0 50 per ton, or (2) 2% of the sale price  The tax on surface-mined coal is the lesser of (1) $0 25 per ton, or (2) 2% of the sales price  Before 2019, the tax rates were $1 10 per ton for coal from underground mines or $0 55 per ton for coal from surface mines, with the tax being no more than 4 4% of the sale price  In FY2017, $229 million was collected on coal mined underground (see Figure 3 )  Nearly all of this coal was taxed at the $1 10 per ton rate  In FY2017, $200 million was collected on surface-mined coal  Just over half of this coal was taxed at the $0 55 per ton rate, with the rest subject to the 4 4% of sales price maximum tax  On January 1, 2019, the BLET rates declined to their current levels  The rates that took effect January 1, 2019, would also have taken effect if the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund had repaid, with interest, all amounts borrowed from the General Fund of the Treasury  The tax is imposed on "coal from mines located in the United States" and does not apply to imported coal  The tax is designed to support the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund for domestic miners  Very little domestically consumed coal is imported  The BLET also does not apply to exported coal under the Export Clause of the United States Constitution  A credit or refund can be claimed if coal is taxed before it is exported  Black lung excise tax collections have generally declined in recent years (see Figure 3 )  In FY2009, more than $650 million was collected from the BLET  In FY2017, collections were about $429 million  The decline in BLET collections follows the general decline in U S


Report 2:  coal production  As the price of coal rose in the 2000s, coal mined underground tended to pay the tax at a fixed rate of $1 10 per ton, as opposed to paying 4 4% of the sales price  In the years beyond 2018, coal excise tax receipts are expected to fall sharply, reflecting the decrease in the coal excise tax rate (see Figure 3 )  The excise tax on coal was established to help ensure the coal industry shared in the social costs imposed by black lung disease  Over time, the rate of the tax has been increased, in an effort to provide sufficient revenue to meet this objective  The Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977 ( P L  95-227 ) first imposed the Section 4121 excise tax on coal  When enacted, the tax was $0 50 per ton for coal from underground mines, and $0 25 per ton for coal from surface mines  The tax was limited to 2% of the sales price  The tax was effective for sales after March 31, 1978  Before P L  95-227 was enacted there was considerable debate surrounding how black lung benefits programs should be financed  Various mechanisms to shift the costs of the black lung benefits program to the coal industry and its customers were considered  These debates ultimately led to the establishment of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund and the related excise tax on coal  There was also debate about how to structure the proposed tax  Some suggested a graduated tax, with higher rates imposed on coal with a higher British thermal unit (Btu) content, as such coal was believed to be more likely to cause black lung disease  There were concerns, however, that such a tax could be difficult to administer  Other proposals suggested that coal be subject to a uniform rate, with coal mined from underground deposits subject to a higher rate than other coal (including lignite)  A concern with this approach was that coal prices vary substantially per ton for different types of coal (lignite is less expensive than anthracite), meaning that the tax as a percent of the sales price could differ substantially across different types of coal  One answer to this concern is to impose an ad valorem tax, or a tax based on the sales price  Another approach that was considered was to impose a "premium rate" at a level that would fully finance the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, giving authority to the Department of Labor to adjust the fee as necessary  The tax as enacted was the lesser of the per-unit price or the ad valorem rate of 2%  In the early 1980s, it was observed that coal excise tax revenues were not sufficient to meet the trust fund's obligations  The Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981 ( P L  97-119 ) doubled the excise tax rates to $1 00 per ton for coal from underground mines, and $0 50 per ton for coal from surface mines, not to exceed 4% of the sales price  The higher rates were effective January 1, 1982  The doubled rates were temporary, and scheduled to revert to the previous rates on January 1, 1996  Further, the rates could be reduced earlier if the trust fund repaid all advances and interest from the general fund of the Treasury  A stated goal of this legislation was to eliminate the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund's debt  The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ( P L  99-272 ) again increased the BLET rates to $1 10 for underground-mined coal, and $0 55 for surface-mined coal, not to exceed 4 4% of the sales price  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 ( P L  100-203 ) extended these rates through 2013  Increased excise tax rates on coal were again extended in 2008  Current-law rates were extended through 2018 as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P L  110-343 )  When extending the increased rates, Congress reiterated the original intent of establishing trust fund financing for black lung benefits, observing that it is "to reduce reliance on the Treasury and to recover costs from the mining industry " It was also observed that the program's expenses had continued to exceed revenues over time, and that the debt to the Treasury was not likely to be paid off by 2013  For these reasons, "the Congress believe[d] that it [was] appropriate to continue the tax on coal at the increased rates beyond the expiration date " When receipts of the trust fund are less than expenditures, advances are appropriated from the general fund of the Treasury to the trust fund  These advances are repayable, and interest charged on these advances is also payable to the general fund  The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ( P L  99-272 ) provided a five-year forgiveness of interest on debt owed to the Treasury's general fund  As a result, the principal amount of trust fund debt outstanding was relatively unchanged throughout the late 1980s  The moratorium on interest payments ended September 30, 1990  Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, the cumulative end-of-year debt of the trust fund grew, and the trust fund continued to receive repayable advances from the general fund to cover expenses  The trust fund was subject to financial restructuring when the current excise tax rate was extended until January 1, 2019, in EESA  The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund debt was restructured in FY2009  Essentially, the partial forgiveness and restructuring allowed the trust fund to refinance outstanding repayable advances and unpaid interest on those advances  As a result of the partial forgiveness and refinancing, the cumulative debt was reduced from $10 4 billion at the end of FY2008 to $6 2 billion by the end of FY2009  At the time of the restructuring it was expected that the trust fund's debt would be fully eliminated by FY2040  The trust fund's cumulative debt has trended downward since the restructuring (see Figure 4 )  However, coal excise tax revenue has been less than anticipated in recent years  As a result, current projections suggest that the trust fund debt will rise over time when considering annual borrowing as well as legacy debt  The trust fund's debt is therefore not on a path to be eliminated  By FY2050, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) projects the trust fund's debt will be $15 4 billion without any changes in current policy  In addition to revenue from the BLET and repayable general fund advances, the trust fund receives revenue from the collection of certain fines, penalties, and interest paid by coal operators and miners and reimbursements from responsible operators  Part C of the BLBA authorizes the following fines and penalties for violations of the act: a civil penalty of up to $1,000 per day for a mine operator's failure to secure benefits through insurance or approved self-insurance; a fine of up to $1,000 upon conviction of the misdemeanor offense of knowingly destroying or transferring property of a mine operator with the intent to avoid the payment of benefits for which the mine operator is responsible; a fine of up to $1,000 upon conviction of the misdemeanor offense of making a false or misleading statement or representation for the purposes of obtaining benefits; and a civil penalty of up to $500 for a mine operator's failure to file a report on miners who are or may be entitled to benefits as required by DOL  The amount of these penalties and fines, as well as interest assessed, is paid into the trust fund  In FY2017, trust fund receipts from fines, penalties, and interest totaled $1 2 million  This is a small source of trust fund revenue relative to the coal excise tax, which generated $428 7 million in trust fund revenues in FY2017  The trust fund is authorized to begin paying benefits within 30 days if no responsible operator has begun payment  If, after paying benefits, DOL is able to identify a responsible operator, the trust fund may seek to collect from that operator the costs of benefits already paid by the trust fund and interest assessed on this amount  The amount of these collections is paid into the trust fund  In FY2017, $19 9 million was collected from responsible mine operators  The amount collected from responsible mine operators has fluctuated over time, but has averaged about 1% of total receipts since 1995  Various factors have contributed to the ongoing situation of trust fund expenditures exceeding trust fund revenues  Throughout the 1980s, black lung benefit payments and administrative expenditures exceeded trust fund revenue  As a result, the trust fund accumulated debt  As discussed above, over time, various efforts have been made to improve the fiscal condition of the trust fund  However, as of the end of FY2017, the trust fund remains in debt  The trust fund's cumulative debt at the end of FY2017 was $3 1 billion  The trust fund also borrowed $1 3 billion from the general fund that same year  Projections suggest that borrowing from the general fund will increase over the next few years, even as cumulative (or legacy) debt is paid down  Under the current excise tax rates, benefit payments and administrative expenses will be approximately equal to trust fund revenues in FY2020 through FY2022 (see Figure 5 )  However, revenues are not projected to be sufficient to repay debt, and expenses are projected to rise over time when debt and interest expenses are included  Specifically, by FY2022, it is projected that the trust fund will borrow $2 6 billion in repayable advances from the general fund  There are various policy options that Congress might consider to improve the fiscal condition of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  Broadly, increasing taxes on the coal industry (or maintaining 2018 rates) would pass the costs associated with paying black lung benefits onto the coal industry  Alternatively, forgiving trust fund interest or debt or financing black lung benefits out of general fund revenues would pass the costs of federal black lung benefits onto taxpayers in general  Another option would be to reduce federal black lung benefits  Additional revenue would likely need to be provided to the trust fund if the trust fund is to pay for past black lung benefits and maintain current benefit levels  Additional revenue may be needed even if past debt is forgiven (or assumed by the general fund), as anticipated trust fund revenues are not likely to be sufficient to cover anticipated trust fund expenditures  As discussed above, in the past, Congress and the President have opted to increase the excise tax on coal to address shortfalls in the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund  These increased rates have been temporary, and scheduled to revert back to the reduced rate if the trust fund's debt is eliminated  Congress has chosen to extend the increased rates beyond their scheduled expiration when the trust fund is in debt  One option would be to extend 2018 rates   The GAO projects that if 2018 coal excise tax rates are extended, the trust fund will have a debt of $4 5 billion in 2050 (see "GAO Options for Improving Trust Fund Finances" below)  GAO projections suggest that increasing 2018 tax rates by 25% would eliminate the trust fund's debt, leaving the trust fund with a surplus of $0 6 billion in 2050  An alternative way to raise revenue from the coal industry is to scale back or eliminate various tax expenditures, or tax preferences, from which the coal industry benefits  For example, coal producers benefit from being able to expense exploration and development costs and are able to recover costs using percentage depletion (depletion based on revenue from the sale of the mineral asset) instead of cost depletion (depletion based on the amount of the mineral asset exhausted and the amount invested in the asset)  The Obama Administration regularly proposed repealing these tax incentives as part of the Administration's annual budget  It could be difficult to assign the revenues raised via the repeal of tax benefits to the trust fund  With an excise tax, it is straightforward to identify the revenue generated by the tax and earmark the revenue for a trust fund  It is not as straightforward to determine the amount of revenue that is raised through the repeal of an income tax expenditure, or direct the additional revenue raised because a certain preference is no longer in the code to a trust fund  Repeal of coal-industry tax benefits could, however, be used to offset the cost of a one-time transfer from the general fund to the trust fund  Revenue from various sources, including the general fund, could be used to supplement trust fund revenue generated from current sources  General fund revenues are not earmarked for a specific purpose, and there is generally no direct link between the source of general fund revenue and the government good or service provided  Black lung benefits were paid out of general revenue before the trust fund was established in 1977  Trust funds are generally established when there is a link between the government benefits or services being provided and the revenue source funding those benefits or services  The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund was established because Congress believed that the costs of the part C black lung program should be borne by the coal industry  Financing black lung benefits with general fund revenue would weaken the link between the industry and black lung benefits, while reducing the burden on the industry associated with paying for black lung benefits  In the past the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund's fiscal outlook has been improved through interest and debt forgiveness  As discussed above, in the late 1990s, there was a five-year forgiveness of interest on debt owed to the Treasury's general fund  More recently, debt was forgiven as part of the 2008 restructuring of the trust fund's debt  The GAO projects that if all current debt were forgiven, the trust fund would accumulate $2 3 billion in new debt by 2050  If all interest were forgiven, the trust fund debt is projected to be $5 8 billion by 2050  Forgiving the trust fund's interest or debt obligations would shift the burden of paying for black lung disability benefits from the coal industry to general taxpayers  However, a one-time appropriation to forgive interest or debt is a transparent option for satisfying the trust fund's obligations to the general fund  The primary expenditures of the trust fund are for the payment of Part C benefits to miners in cases in which there is no responsible operator  In order to reduce expenditures and improve the long-term financial health of the trust fund, Congress could consider several options to reduce the generosity and scope of benefits or increase the ability of the federal government to ensure that coal operators, even those who are in the bankruptcy process, pay benefits for their miners  A reduction in the amount of Part C benefits would result in lower Part C expenditures from both responsible coal operators and the trust fund  However, as compared to other workers' compensation benefits, Part C benefits are relatively low  The basic Part C benefit rate for a single miner is equal to 37 5% of the base rate of pay for federal employees at the GS-2, Step 1 level  For 2019 this benefit is just over $660 per month, or under $8,000 per year  In the majority of state workers' compensation programs, the basic benefit rate is set at two-thirds of the worker's pre-disability wage, subject to statutory minimums and maximums  The other workers' compensation programs administered by DOL, the LHWCA, and the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) use two-thirds of a worker's pre-disability wage as the basis for their benefits  A federal worker with a spouse or dependent in the FECA program is entitled to 75% of his or her pre-disability wage  The minimum benefit for total disability or death in the FECA program, 75% of GS-2, Step 1, is twice the amount of the Part C benefit rate  In addition, unlike the other federal workers' compensation programs and many state programs, there is no automatic adjustment to Part C benefits to reflect increases in the cost of living  Part C benefits instead increase only when federal pay rates are increased  The eligibility of miners and survivors to Part C benefits could be restricted to reduce expenditures from responsible operators and the trust fund  In 1981, Congress enacted several eligibility restrictions to miners and survivors as part of the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, to address concerns about the financial insolvency of the trust fund  Specifically, this law removed the following three eligibility presumptions for new claims going forward: A rebuttable presumption that the death of a miner who worked in mining for at least 10 years and who died of any respirable disease, was due to pneumoconiosis (listed as presumption 2 in Table 1 )  A rebuttable presumption that a miner employed in mining for at least 15 years, and who has a chest x-ray that is interpreted as negative with respect to certain statutory standards but who has other evidence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or died due to pneumoconiosis  This presumption may only be rebutted by the Secretary of Labor establishing that the miner does not or did not have pneumoconiosis or that the miner's respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of connection to mine employment (presumption 4 in Table 1 )  A presumption that a miner who died on or before March 1, 1978, and who was employed in mining for at least 25 years before June 30, 1971, died due to pneumoconiosis, unless it is established that at the time of the miner's death, he or she was not at least partially disabled due to pneumoconiosis (presumption 5 in Table 1 )  In addition to removing three of the five existing eligibility presumptions, the 1981 law also removed the right of the survivors of a miner who is determined to be eligible for Part C benefits at the time of his or her death to receive survivors' benefits without filing a new claim, thus permitting the payment of survivors' benefits in the case of a current beneficiary, even if the beneficiary's death is not proven to be linked to pneumoconiosis  Two of the restrictions put in place by the 1981 legislation were later removed by the ACA  The ACA reinstated the fourth eligibility presumption and expanded rights for survivors' benefits, thus expanding eligibility for both miners and certain survivors  Under Part C of the BLBA, the federal government may recover the costs of benefits, and interest accrued on those benefits, paid by the trust fund from identified responsible operators  In addition, Part C allows the federal government to place a lien on the property and rights to property of an operator that refuses to pay the benefits and interest it owes to the trust fund  In the case of a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, this lien is to be treated in the same manner as a lien for taxes owed to the federal government  However, in a 2016 letter to the Comptroller General requesting a GAO review of the trust fund, Representatives Bobby Scott, Ranking Member of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, and Sander Levin, Ranking Member of the House Committee on Ways and Means, claimed that the number of current and potential bankruptcies among coal operators is placing stress on the trust fund  Representatives Scott and Levin cited the example of Patriot Coal which, according to their letter, transferred $62 million in Part C liabilities to the trust fund when it became insolvent  In addition, this letter claims that insolvent coal operators may be able to avoid trust fund liens by continuing to make benefit payments until after the court in their bankruptcy cases has approved the sale of their assets to another company  Because the original company was never in default of its payments, no lien was filed, and these assets were able to be purchased by another company without any lien or future liability to the trust fund  Congress may examine the issue of the impact of coal operator bankruptcies and the interaction of bankruptcy law and the BLBA's lien provisions, to strengthen both the federal government's ability to ensure that responsible operators are paying for benefits and reduce the benefit expenditures of the trust fund 

ground_truth: Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes programs that provide financial assistance to students to assist them in obtaining a postsecondary education at certain institutions of higher education (IHEs). These IHEs include public, private nonprofit, and proprietary institutions. For students attending such institutions to be able to receive Title IV assistance, an institution must meet basic criteria, including offering at least one eligible program of education (e.g., programs leading to a degree or preparing a student for gainful employment in a recognized occupation). In addition, an IHE must satisfy the program integrity triad, under which it must be licensed or otherwise legally authorized to operate in the state in which it is physically located, accredited or preaccredited by an agency recognized for that purpose by the Department of Education (ED), and certified by ED as eligible to participate in Title IV programs. These requirements are intended to provide a balance between consumer protection, quality assurance, and oversight and compliance in postsecondary education providers participating in Title IV student aid programs. An IHE must also fulfill a variety of other related requirements, including those that relate to institutional recruiting practices, student policies and procedures, and the administration of the Title IV student aid programs. Finally, additional criteria may apply to an institution depending on its control or the type of educational programs it offers. For example, proprietary institutions must meet HEA requirements that are otherwise inapplicable to public and private nonprofit institutions, including deriving at least 10% of their revenues from non-Title IV funds (also known as the 90/10 rule). While an institution is ineligible to participate in Title IV programs if more than 50% of its courses are offered by correspondence or if 50% or more of its students are enrolled in correspondence courses. This report first describes the types of institutions eligible to participate in Title IV programs and discusses the program integrity triad. It then discusses additional issues related to institutional eligibility, including program participations agreements, required campus safety policies and crime reporting, and distance and correspondence education.