prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: This report addresses frequently asked questions related to the overtime provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for executive, administrative, and professional employees (the "EAP" or "white collar" exemptions)  For a history of DOL regulations on the EAP exemptions, see CRS Report R45007, Overtime Exemptions in the Fair Labor Standards Act for Executive, Administrative, and Professional Employees , by David H  Bradley  For a broader overview of the FLSA, see CRS Report R42713, The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): An Overview   This report proceeds in three sections  First, there is an overview of the main federal statute on overtime pay—the FLSA—and of defining and delimiting the EAP exemptions  Second, there is a discussion of the applicability of the EAP exemptions  Finally, there is information on the EAP exemptions in the 2019 proposed rule and the 2016 final rule (which was finalized but invalidated before it took effect)  The FLSA, enacted in 1938, is the main federal law that establishes minimum wage and overtime pay requirements for most, but not all, private and public sector employees  Section 7(a) of the FLSA specifies that unless an employee is specifically exempted in the FLSA, he or she is considered to be a covered "nonexempt" employee and must receive pay at the rate of one-and-a-half times ("time and a half") the employee's regular rate for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek  When the FLSA was enacted, Section 13(a)(1) provided an exemption, from both the minimum wage (Section 6) and overtime (Section 7) provisions of the act, for "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, and professional capacity " Rather than define the terms executive, administrative, or professional employee, the FLSA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to define and delimit these terms "from time to time" by regulations   The general rationale for including the EAP exemption in the FLSA at the time of enactment was twofold  One, the nature of the work performed by EAP employees seemed to make standardization difficult and thus output of EAP employees was not as clearly associated with hours of work per day as it was for typical nonexempt workers  Two, bona fide EAP employees were considered to have other forms of compensation (e g , above-average benefits, greater opportunities for advancement) not available to nonexempt workers  As mentioned, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to define and delimit the EAP exemptions  Including the first rulemaking on EAP exemptions in 1938, DOL has finalized nine rules  Although the determinations have changed over time, to qualify for an exemption currently under Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA (i e , not to be entitled to overtime pay), an employee generally has to meet three criteria: 1  The "salary basis" test: the employee must be paid a predetermined and fixed salary  2  The "duties" test: the employee must perform executive, administrative, or professional duties  3  The "salary level" test: the employee must be paid above the threshold established in the rulemaking process, typically expressed as a per week rate  To qualify for the EAP exemption, an employee must be paid on a "salary basis," rather than on a per hour basis  That is, an EAP employee must receive a predetermined and fixed payment that is not subject to reduction due to variations in the quantity or quality of work  The salary must be paid on a weekly or less-frequent basis  Job titles alone do not determine exemption status for an employee  Rather, the Secretary of Labor, through issuance of regulations, specifies the duties that EAP employees must perform to be exempt from the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA  To qualify for the exemption for executive employees , all of the following job duties tests must be met: the employee's primary duty "is management of the enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof"; the employee "customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees"; and the employee "has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight " To qualify for the exemption for administrative employees , both of the following job duties tests must be met: the employee's primary duty "is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer's customers"; and the employee's primary duty "includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance " To qualify for the exemption for professional employees , the following job duties test must be met: The employee's primary duty is the performance of work requiring "knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction"; or work "requiring invention, imagination, originality or talent in a recognized field of artistic or creative endeavor " In addition to the duties test, an employee must earn above a certain salary in order to qualify for the EAP exemption  Since the FLSA was enacted and the first salary thresholds were established in 1938, the standard salary level thresholds have been raised nine times  Prior to 2004, the salary level for exemption varied by the type of employee and the type of duty test  In addition to the standard salary level, in 2004 DOL created a "highly compensated employee" (HCE) exemption in which employees earning an amount above the standard EAP salary threshold annually are exempt from overtime requirements if they perform at least one (among many) of the duties of an EAP employee  Because the FLSA applies to "employees," individuals who are classified as independent contractors are not covered by the FLSA provisions  Yes  There is no general exemption for nonprofits in the FLSA or the EAP overtime regulations  Coverage for workers in nonprofits, like other entities, is determined by the enterprise and individual coverage tests  It is important to note, however, that charitable activities often associated with nonprofits do not count as ordinary commercial activities and thus do not count toward the $500,000 threshold for enterprise coverage under the FLSA  Only the commercial activities of nonprofits (e g , gift shops, fee for service activities) count toward that threshold  On the other hand, even if a nonprofit does not meet the enterprise test for coverage, individual employees in an otherwise exempt nonprofit may be covered by the FLSA and the overtime rules if they engage in interstate commerce (e g , regularly making out of state phone calls, processing credit card transactions)  Yes  Both the FLSA and the EAP overtime regulations apply to institutions of higher education (IHEs)  Due to other provisions of the FLSA, however, many personnel at IHEs are not eligible for overtime on the basis of the duties test alone and thus are unaffected by changes in the EAP standard salary level for exemption  For example, in general, bona fide teachers are exempt regardless of salary level and thus are not eligible for overtime  Similarly, academic administrative personnel are exempt from overtime pay if they are paid at least the EAP salary level threshold or are paid at least equal to the entrance salary for teachers at the same institution  On the other hand, some IHE workers would be affected by changes in the EAP salary level for exemption, including postdoctoral researchers who are employees, nonacademic administrative employees, and other salaried workers who are not covered by another exemption  Finally, like some public sector employers, but unlike private sectors employers, public IHEs may have the option of using compensatory time (i e , a rate of 1 5 hours for each hour of overtime), rather than cash payment, to meet the obligation of providing overtime compensation  Yes  There is no blanket exemption from FLSA and overtime rule coverage for state and local governments  In general, employees of state and local governments are covered by the overtime provisions of the FLSA and thus are affected by EAP rulemaking updating the salary level threshold for the EAP exemptions  That said, other FLSA provisions apply to state and local governments that affect the applicability of overtime rules to these public sector employees  One way in which FLSA overtime rules apply differently in the public sector relates to the mode of compensation  State and local governments may have the option of using compensatory time, at a rate of 1 5 hours for each hour of overtime, rather than cash payment to meet the obligation of providing overtime compensation—an alternative not available to private sector employers  Additionally, some public sector employees are not covered by the FLSA  For instance, certain state and local employees—elected officials, their appointees and staff who are not subject to civil service laws, and legislative branch employees not subject to civil service laws—are not covered and will not be affected by changes to the EAP exemptions  The FLSA provides partial exemptions from the overtime requirements for fire protection and law enforcement employees  Specifically, fire protection and law enforcement employees are exempt from overtime pay requirements if they are employed by an agency with fewer than five fire protection or law enforcement employees  In addition, the FLSA allows overtime for all fire protection and law enforcement employees (not just those in small agencies) to be calculated on a "work period" (i e , 7 to 28 consecutive days) rather than the standard "workweek" period (i e , 7 consecutive 24-hour periods)  Yes  The FLSA overtime provisions apply to employees in the U S  territories—American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U S  Virgin Islands  While the exemption for American Samoa has traditionally been set at 84% of the standard salary level, the other territories have been subject to the standard level  The application of the provisions of the FLSA is determined by the Congressional Accountability Act (CAA, P L  104-1 ), which was enacted in 1995 and extends some FLSA provisions, including overtime provisions, and other labor and workplace laws to congressional employees  In addition, the CAA created the Office of Compliance (now the Office of Congressional Workplace Rights), headed by a five-member Board of Directors (Board), to enforce the CAA  Rulemaking on the EAP exemptions would apply to congressional staff if the Board adopts them and Congress approves the Board's regulations, pursuant to the process established in the CAA  In other words, regulations adopted by the Board do not have legal effect until they are approved by Congress  When the Secretary of Labor issued new regulations to update the EAP exemptions in 2004, the Board adopted them; but thus far, Congress has apparently not approved the 2004 overtime regulations  Thus, overtime regulations that were adopted by the Board and approved by Congress in 1996, based on DOL regulations originally promulgated in 1975, currently apply to congressional staff  In the absence of action by the Board and by Congress, the provisions in any future final rules would not change the status quo  Congress can pass legislation to repeal rules or compel new rules  For example, prior to the publication of the 2016 final rule, legislation was introduced that would have prohibited the Secretary of Labor from enforcing the final rule and would have required additional analysis from the Secretary before the issuance of any substantially similar rule in the future  Given that rulemaking on the EAP exemptions typically includes increases in the salary level threshold for the EAP exemption, a greater number of employees become eligible for overtime pay with each upward adjustment of the salary level  To comply with the proposed regulations, employers would have several options, including the following: pay overtime to newly covered EAP employees if they work more than 40 hours in a workweek; increase the weekly pay for workers near the salary threshold to a level above it so that the EAP employees would become exempt and thus not be eligible for overtime pay; reduce work hours of nonexempt (covered) employees to 40 or fewer so that overtime pay would not be triggered; hire additional workers to offset the reduction in hours from nonexempt employees; or reduce base pay of nonexempt workers and maintain overtime hours so that base pay plus overtime pay would not exceed, or would remain close to, previous employer costs of base pay plus overtime  This section provides an overview of the main provisions of the 2019 proposed rule on EAP exemptions  For context, some provisions of the 2016 final rule are discussed  A final rule updating the EAP exemptions was published in the Federal Register on May 23, 2016, with an effective date of December 1, 2016  However, on November 22, 2016, the U S  District Court for the Eastern District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction blocking the implementation of the rule  On August 31, 2017, the U S  District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ruled that DOL exceeded its authority by setting the threshold at the salary level in the 2016 final rule ($913 per week) and thus invalidated it  Subsequently, DOJ appealed that decision to the U S  Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which granted DOJ's motion to hold the appeal in abeyance until DOL issued new rulemaking on the EAP salary level  Thus, DOL is currently enforcing the EAP regulations in effect on November 30, 2016, which include a standard salary level of $455 per week  DOL issued a request for information (RFI) related to the EAP exemptions on July 26, 2017, seeking information from the public to assist in formulating a proposal to revise the exemptions  On March 22, 2019, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was published in the Federal Register to define and delimit EAP exemptions  The proposed rule would not only revise the regulations on the EAP exemptions but would also formally rescind the 2016 final rule  Such a rescission would provide that if any or all of the substantive provisions of the 2019 rule were invalidated or not put into effect, the EAP regulations would revert to those promulgated in the 2004 final rule  Due to the invalidation of the 2016 final rule (discussed above), DOL currently enforces the provisions of the 2004 final rule  The main changes to the EAP exemptions in the 2019 proposed rule, as summarized in Table 1 , include the following: an increase in the salary level test from the current $455 per week ($23,660 annually) to $679 per week ($35,308 annually); an increase in the annual salary threshold for the HCE exemption from $100,000 to $147,414; an allowance that up to 10% of the standard salary level may be comprised of nondiscretionary bonuses, incentive payments, and commissions; a salary level of $455 per week for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U S  Virgin Islands, and of $380 in American Samoa; and an increase in the "base rate" weekly salary level for employees in the motion picture industry from $695 per week to $1,036 per week  Since the FLSA was enacted in 1938, the salary level threshold has been increased eight times, including the proposed 2019 increase  Each of the previous increases have occurred through intermittent rulemaking by the Secretary of Labor, with periods between adjustments ranging from 2 years (1938–1940) to 29 years (1975–2004)  Since 1938, measures of the salary level have fluctuated according to DOL's identification of data sources most suitable for studying wage distributions and the department's determinations of the proportion and types of workers who should be below salary thresholds, as well as its determinations of whether regional, industry, or cost-of-living considerations should be factored into salary tests  Starting with the 2004 final rule, DOL has used survey data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) in determining the salary level for the EAP exemptions, albeit with different methodological choices  Effective January 2020 (approximately), the standard salary level threshold would equal the 20 th percentile of weekly earnings of full-time non-hourly workers in the lowest-wage Census region, which in 2019 is the South, and/or in the retail sector nationwide  In 2020, about 20% of full-time salaried workers in the South region and/or the retail sector nationwide are estimated to earn at or below $679 per week ($35,308 annually)  Effective January 2020 (approximately), the HCE salary level for the EAP exemptions would equal the annual earnings equivalent of the 90 th percentile of the weekly earnings of full-time non-hourly workers nationally  In 2020, 90% of full-time non-hourly workers are estimated to earn at or below $147,414 per year  Effective January 2020 (approximately), the salary level for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U S  Virgin Islands would be $455 per week, and in American Samoa it would be $380 per week  Except for American Samoa, this would depart from past regulations by establishing a salary threshold for the territories below the standard level  Effective January 2020 (approximately), the motion picture industry employee salary level for the EAP exemption would be $1,036 per week  This level was derived by increasing the previous threshold ($695 per week) proportionally to the increase in the standard salary level  This would continue a special salary test created in 1953 for the motion picture industry that provides an exception to the "salary basis" test  Specifically, employees in the motion picture industry may be classified as exempt if they meet the duties tests for EAP exemption and are paid a "base rate" (rather than on a "salary basis") equal to the salary level for this exemption  The 2019 proposed rule would implement a commitment by DOL to update the EAP salary level thresholds every four years by submitting an NPRM for comment  If the 2019 proposed rule is finalized, DOL would publish its first proposed update on January 1, 2023, and subsequent updates every four years thereafter  The future salary level updates would be based on the same data source (CPS) and methodology of the salary levels established in the 2019 proposed rule: the standard salary level would be adjusted to the 20 th percentile of weekly earnings of full-time salaried workers in the lowest-wage Census region and/or in the retail sector, the HCE salary level threshold would be adjusted to the 90 th percentile of annual earnings of full-time non-hourly workers nationally, and the quadrennial NPRM would seek comment on whether to update the salary level for the territories established in the 2019 proposed rule  The 2019 proposed rule would expand overtime coverage to EAP employees through a higher salary level threshold rather than through additional classes of employees  As such, EAP employees making between $455 per week (the current effective level) and the new rate of $679 per week in 2019 would likely become nonexempt (i e , covered) by the overtime provisions and entitled to overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek  It is difficult to project the number of employees currently exempt under the EAP exemptions who would no longer be exempt under the 2019 proposed rule  This is due in part to uncertainty about potential employer responses, such as increasing salaries above the new threshold to maintain exemption for EAP employees  DOL estimates, with caveats, that approximately 4 9 million workers would be affected by the proposed rule  DOL identifies two groups in particular that would be affected—newly covered workers and workers with strengthened protections  Specifically, DOL estimates the following: In the first year under the provisions of the 2019 proposed rule, about 1 3 million EAP employees would become newly entitled to overtime pay due to the increase in the salary threshold: about 1 1 million employees in this group meet the duties test for the EAP exemption but earn between the current standard salary threshold ($455 per week) and the proposed threshold ($679 per week); and an additional 201,000 employees in this group meet the HCE duties test for exemption, but not the standard test, and earn at least the current HCE salary threshold ($100,000 per year) but less than the proposed threshold ($147,414 per year)  An additional 3 6 million workers would receive "strengthened" overtime protections, including the following: An additional 2 0 million white collar workers who are paid on a salary basis and earn between the current salary threshold of $455 per week and the proposed threshold of $679 per week but do not meet the EAP duties test (i e , they perform nonexempt work but might be misclassified) would gain overtime protections because their exemption status would not depend on the duties test  In other words, this group of workers would gain overtime coverage because the higher salary threshold would create a clearer line exemption test and reduce misclassification for exemption purposes  About 1 6 million salaried workers in blue collar occupations whose overtime coverage would have been clearer with the higher salary threshold  As DOL notes, this group of workers should currently be covered by overtime provisions but may not be due to worker classification  By comparison, DOL estimated that in the first year under the provisions of the 2016 final rule, approximately 13 1 million workers would have been affected  This total would have included about 4 2 million EAP employees who would have become newly entitled to overtime pay due to the increase in the salary threshold and an additional 8 9 million workers who would have received "strengthened" overtime protections  The data in Table 2 provide a summary of the estimated numbers of affected workers under the 2019 proposed rule and the 2016 final rule 


Report 2:  National Popular Vote opponents oppose the compact on various grounds  Some argue that it is unconstitutional or "anticonstitutional," that is, contrary to the Founders' intentions and the spirit of the nation's fundamental charter  It is also asserted that NPV would solve few of the electoral college system's alleged problem issues and would create some of its own  Finally, some observers note that the NPV compact is an interstate compact as defined in Article I, Section 10, clause 3 of the Constitution, and as such would be subject to congressional approval  This issue is examined in greater detail in a separate section of this report  On the most fundamental philosophical basis, opponents might argue that the NPV compact violates one of the basic principles of majoritarian democracy: it does not require that candidates win a majority of the popular vote in order to gain the presidency  Rather, it would anoint as winner the ticket that gains more popular votes than any other  A majoritarian democracy, it may be argued, should require a majority in order to elect; it may be further noted that the existing system, by comparison, requires a majority in the electoral college  As one commentary noted only the strictest of majoritarians desire a purely majoritarian presidential election system, and those individuals should be deeply troubled by the prospect of plurality presidencies, which the NPVC [sic] expressly countenances  Indeed, the NPVC promises to create more difficulties and "misfires" in its own way than the Electoral College system its proponents so earnestly seek to replace  Further, opponents might ask how the NPV compact would function in the event of a multicandidate election, a phenomenon that recurs from time to time in U S  presidential elections  One commentator posited the following problematic scenario under such circumstances: Under the compact, one can easily imagine a multi-candidate race in which a candidate would win, say, a thirty-four percent plurality of the popular vote nationwide while losing in every state and D C  If all of the states and D C  were signatories to the compact, all the electoral votes in such a hypothetical race would be awarded contrary to the will of voters choosing electors (still not voting directly for President under this plan)  Would the United States accept a President who wasn't the choice of sixty-six percent of those voting, nor even the choice of a single state? The existing electoral college system, NPV skeptics might also assert, is a fundamental element in the federal constitutional arrangements established by the Constitution  Fearing "the tyranny of the majority," the Founders established a system of government that provides checks and balances designed to restrain the majority and secure minority rights  These principles are also embedded in the structure of federal elections: the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the presidency were deliberately provided with different terms of office and different electorates, and the states were given an important role in the federal election process  In particular, through the electoral college the United States elects its national Presidents and Vice Presidents in a state-based federal election  Successful nominees are compelled under this system to present a broad political vision that commands nation-spanning "concurrent majorities" and appeals to the great variety of Americans  As in the case of the Senate, less populous states are accorded a small numerical advantage by assignment of two at-large electors reflecting the Constitution's equal apportionment of Senators to each state regardless of its population  The NPV initiative, they could claim, would discard the Founders' intentions in favor of what they consider to be a flawed "majoritarian" presidency that would ill-serve a continent-spanning and profoundly diverse republic  Another criticism centers on the use of the NPV compact to effect a fundamental change in the presidential election process and a de facto amendment to the Constitution, but without following the procedures set out in Article V  Critics may note that NPV's founders admit their plan is an "end run" around the Constitution  Proponents might counter with the argument that Article V presents too high a hurdle for what they consider a necessary reform of the system  Opponents, however, could respond that the Founders intended the various supermajority requirements in Congress and the states to ensure that successful constitutional amendments enjoy broad national support  The bare majority of electoral votes required to implement NPV, they might note, meets none of these supermajority requirements  As one study critical of the NPV initiative concluded, because the use of an interstate compact "does not conform to the constitutional means of changing the original decisions of the Framers, NPV could not [therefore] be a legitimate innovation " A final argument on this line might be that one "end run" around the amendment process might lead to others, setting a dangerous precedent for similar efforts in the future  Opponents might note that the NPV would eliminate the electoral college system's multiplier effect generated by the winner-take-all or general ticket system used in 48 states and the District of Columbia, which tends to magnify the winning ticket's margin of victory, and is said to confer greater legitimacy to the victors  For instance, in 2016, Republican nominee Donald Trump's clear electoral vote majority of 304 votes (56 5% of the total), compared with Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton's 227 (42 2% of the total) could be said to reinforce and confirm his victory, notwithstanding Clinton's plurality of the popular vote (48 2%), compared with Trump's 46 1%  From a practical standpoint, NPV opponents might argue that the NPV would actually lead to an increase in contested election results and legal challenges in the states, as the political parties maneuver to claim every possible vote  They assert that the existing tabulation of popular votes within each state reduces contested results and recounts  Under NPV, the incentive to gain every vote would arguably lead to far broader disputes and widespread recounts at every level of election administration  As a Heritage Foundation study concluded Under the NPV … any suspicions necessitating a recount in even a single district would be an incentive for a national recount     The prospect of a candidate challenging "every precinct, in every county, in every state of the Union" should be abhorrent to anyone who witnessed the drama, cost, delay, and undue litigation sparked by the Florida recount of 2000  Opponents might also assert that the increased incidence of recounts would be further complicated by wide-ranging disparities in state procedures, potentially leading to prolonged periods of uncertainty following close presidential elections  Critics may also note that the NPV plan contains no "statute of limitations," unlike proposed constitutional amendments, for which Congress typically sets a seven-year ratification period  Where, critics may ask, is a similar time limit that would "sunset" the NPV compact, after which it would expire or return to "square one"? According to its website, NPV was launched on February 23, 2006; if it were a constitutional amendment proposed by Congress, it would have expired on February 23, 2013, since by the end of the customary seven-year deadline it was "ratified" by only eight states and the District of Columbia  By what reasoning, they might ask, should the NPV be exempt from the standards of timeliness and contemporaneity Congress customarily sets for constitutional amendments? Opponents might reject claims that, under NPV, campaign spending and candidate appearances would be spread and scheduled more widely, beyond the current concentration of time and resources in battleground states  They might argue that spreading campaign resources and candidate events in non-battleground states is a questionable argument to justify a fundamental change in the presidential election process  Campaign appearances and spending, they could assert, should not be considered to be a local economic stimulus package, nor are the amounts in question sufficient to make much of a difference in the economic condition of most states  As one critical analysis notes, "    the nation does not hold presidential elections to foster local economic development " Moreover, they might continue, it is equally dubious to assert that nominees will slight the concerns of citizens of the non-battleground states from which they draw their greatest support, or that concentrated campaigning in the battleground states somehow "disenfranchises" voters in others  In the modern era, a small percentage of voters actually attends an in-person presidential or vice presidential candidate appearance  Television (especially broadcast and cable TV news networks), social media, the internet, and newspapers—not the traditional rallies, torchlight parades, and handbills—dominate presidential election campaigns in the 21 st century  In addition to policy issues discussed previously, some observers have also raised questions related to the NPV initiative based on the fact that it is an interstate compact as defined in the Constitution  Others have questioned whether NPV might conflict with some provisions of the Voting Rights Act  The NPV initiative has been described by its supporters variously as a bill, a state-level statute, and an interstate compact  The latter reference necessitates an analysis of whether the initiative complies with the Compact Clause of the Constitution  An interstate compact—under the broadest understanding—is a contract between two or more consenting states  The Supreme Court has further suggested that an interstate compact often requires reciprocal commitments between the governments of two or more states, such that one state's commitment is conditioned on the action of another state and no state can unilaterally repeal its commitment  The use of interstate compacts predates the Constitution, as the Articles of Confederation contained a similar Compact Clause that provided a qualified prohibition on states entering into any agreements between them without the consent of Congress  The chaos resulting from the disunity created by the Articles of Confederation prompted the Framers of the Constitution generally to "impose more uniformity" among the states, resulting in a Constitution that wholly prohibits states from entering into any treaties, alliances, and federations  Nonetheless, the Constitution maintained the Articles of Confederation's qualified prohibition on interstate compacts and agreements, allowing states to enter into an interstate compact so long as the participating states seek the consent of Congress  Specifically, the Compact Clause provides that "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress     enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State     " While the historical rationale for Article I's qualified prohibition on interstate compacts is unclear, the Compact Clause generally reflects the view of the Framers that states should be able to work cooperatively together, as well as the concern that unchecked interstate alliances might threaten the harmony of the Union or the authority vested by the Constitution in the federal government  As the Supreme Court noted in Cuyler v  Adams , "By vesting in Congress the power to grant or withhold consent, or to condition consent on the states' compliance with specified conditions, the Framers sought to ensure that Congress would maintain ultimate supervisory power over cooperative state action that might otherwise interfere with the full and free exercise of federal authority " The Compact Clause places no limits on what might be done through an interstate compact other than the requirement of congressional consent  In the early years of government under the Constitution, compacts were used almost exclusively to settle boundary disputes  Beginning with the establishment of the Port of New York Authority in 1921, however, compacts began to be used to address more complex, regional issues requiring intergovernmental cooperation  Some compacts are merely advisory in form, but others may be regulatory, with significant powers granted to multistate commissions  More recently, compacts have addressed such wide-ranging concerns as mental health treatment, law enforcement and crime control, education, driver licensing and enforcement, environmental conservation, energy, nuclear waste control, facilities operations, transportation, economic development, insurance regulation, placement of children and juveniles, disaster assistance, and pollution control  Approximately 200 interstate compacts are in effect today  Accordingly, the central legal issue with respect to the Compact Clause is whether a given interstate compact requires the consent of Congress  While a "literal" reading of the Compact Clause "would require the States to obtain congressional approval before entering into any agreement among themselves, irrespective of form, subject, duration, or interest to the United States [emphasis added]," the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected such a reading  In 1893, in Virginia v  Tenness e e , Justice Stephen Field, writing for the Court, contended that a broad reading of the Compact Clause would "embrace all forms of stipulation, written or verbal, and relating to all kinds of subjects[,]" requiring congressional consent to agreements "which the United States can have no possible objection or have any interest in interfering with," as well as those that "may tend to increase     the political influence of the contracting states, so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States     " Surmising that the Compact Clause could not have been intended to have such a broad reach, Justice Field concluded that the Clause prohibits states from entering into compacts without congressional consent only when the underlying compact is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States " The Supreme Court has subsequently reaffirmed Justice Field's "functional view of the Compact Clause," and, accordingly, generally where an agreement does not fall within the scope of the Compact Clause as envisioned by the Court in Virginia v  Tennessee , the agreement "will not be invalidated for lack of congressional consent " Whether the NPV initiative requires congressional consent under the Compact Clause first requires a determination as to whether NPV even constitutes an interstate compact  At times, its supporters have resisted framing the initiative as an interstate compact, arguably out of concern for running afoul of the Compact Clause's provisions  For example, Professor Akhil Amar has argued that because the initiative does not create a "new interstate governmental apparatus," the NPV should not be considered an interstate compact, as NPV compact signatory states are merely exercising power collectively that each state could exercise on its own  It is unclear, however, whether the creation of a new interstate governmental entity formed out of an agreement between two or more states is necessary, as opposed to sufficient, in order to deem an agreement as being an interstate compact subject to the Compact Clause  While the Supreme Court, in Northeast Bancorp , suggested that a "joint organization or body" formed out of an interstate agreement is a "classic indic[ium] of a compact," the Court has never adopted a definition of an interstate compact that solely rests on the existence of an interstate governmental body  Instead, the Court appears to have adopted a broader definition of what an interstate compact can entail  For example, in Virginia v  Tennessee , the Court noted that the words "compacts" and "agreements" are synonymous and "cover all stipulations affecting the conduct or claims of the parties " In other words, when two or more states enter into a stipulated agreement whereby one state agrees to perform an act in consideration for a reciprocal act by the other state(s), that agreement can be considered an interstate compact  This broad definition of a compact appears to encompass the NPV compact, as the initiative requires signatory states to agree mutually to appoint their electors to the winner of the national popular vote  Moreover, NPV binds each assenting state, as no member state can withdraw from it within six months or less of the end of a President's term  Because NPV prohibits states from freely "modify[ing] or repeal[ing] [the agreement] unilaterally" and requires "reciprocation" of mutual obligations, it appears that the initiative can be described as an interstate compact  Assuming the NPV initiative is an interstate compact, the question remains whether it is one that implicates the Compact Clause  The answer to that question primarily depends on whether NPV is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States  " In other words, the "test" for whether a particular interstate compact requires congressional consent is centrally concerned with vertical balances of power between the federal government and the states; namely, "whether the Compact enhances state power quoad the National Government " While the NPV arguably increases the political power of the states that have consented to it by ensuring that those states' desired outcome for the presidential election—the awarding of the majority of electoral votes to the presidential candidate supported by the majority of the voting populace—it is unclear how that increase in political power would be at the expense of the power of the federal government  After all, the Constitution provides the federal government with no role in determining the members of the electoral college  One scholar has suggested that the NPV initiative would lead to a vertical alteration of power by eliminating the possibility that the House of Representatives would resolve a presidential election in the absence of an electoral majority for a single candidate because it is premised on a majority of electoral votes going to a single candidate  The House of Representatives, however, has decided only two presidential elections in American history, and whether such an arguably hypothetical and de minimis diminishment of federal power through the NPV would be sufficient to require congressional consent under the Compact Clause is simply unresolved by the relevant case law  While the Supreme Court's case law interpreting the Compact Clause is centrally concerned with vertical federalism concerns (i e , the balance of power between the state and federal governments), the Court has recognized a potential secondary rationale suggested for the Compact Clause: to preserve the horizontal balance of powers among the various states  And horizontal federalism concerns could very well be implicated by the Compact Clause, as the provision appears to have been included in the Constitution out of concern both for the supremacy of the federal government and unity among the various states  Whether the NPV compact threatens the powers of nonconsenting states has been the subject of much debate among academics  Those in support of the initiative have contended that the nonconsenting states do not lose any power as a result of the NPV  According to this line of argumentation, even under the NPV, all states would retain their right to select the electors of their choosing, as nonmember state electors would still be counted in the electoral vote  Others, however, have pointed to the underlying premise of the NPV—to enhance the political power of more populous states in presidential elections—as evidence that the initiative diminishes the power of nonconsenting states  In other words, while non-compacting states would still retain the power to appoint electors, the influence that comes with that power would arguably be diminished because a state's role in the national election would be defined by its percentage of the popular vote and not by its percentage of electors, warranting congressional interest in approving a compact that effectuated such a change in national elections  Ultimately, however, whether the NPV actually threatens the power of nonconsenting states is a debate that remains active within academia but would likely be the source of considerable litigation if the initiative ever became effective  If congressional consent is needed for the NPV, that consent can take various forms  Usually congressional consent to an interstate compact takes the form of a joint resolution or act of Congress specifying its approval of the text of the compact and adding any conditions or provisions it deems necessary, often embodying the compact document  As with most congressional actions, consent to an interstate compact must occur with the approval of both houses and must be signed by the President before it becomes law  Rarely has the President vetoed or threatened to veto consent legislation by Congress  While congressional consent to an interstate compact is most often explicit, consent by Congress may also be implied by subsequent acts of Congress as "[a]n inference clear and satisfactory that Congress     intended to consent" to a compact may be sufficient  Congress may also delegate its power to approve a compact to a federal official so long as an "intelligible principle" against which approval can be measured is apparent  Ultimately, if congressional consent is truly needed for NPV to be effective, the initiative might have difficulty ever being enacted because the approval of both houses of Congress and the President would likely necessitate additional hurdles beyond the already challenging task of amassing support at the state level for the NPV  Beyond the legal issues raised with respect to the Compact Clause, the NPV initiative also potentially raises other broader constitutional concerns, including whether the states can functionally obviate the role of the electoral college through the NPV  Article II of the Constitution establishes that the election of the President should occur indirectly through the election by the electoral college  The choice of an indirect election for the President was a deliberate one by the Framers of the Constitution, because, while noting the importance that the "sense of the people" should influence the choice for President, they found it "equally desirable" for the "immediate election" of the President to be made by a body representative of distinct state interests and removed from the threat of unchecked majoritarianism  The result was that the Constitution established a presidential election process that was "manifestly nonmajoritarian," with the electoral college, a body established to represent the distinct views of each state, as the centerpiece of the election process  The central constitutional issue presented by the NPV, therefore, is whether the states, through an interstate compact, can functionally transform the presidential election system enshrined in the Constitution into a more majoritarian process  Supporters of the NPV argue that the Constitution provides the legal means for states to transform the presidential election system into one where the President is elected based solely on the result of the national popular vote  Specifically, clause 2 of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution provides the states with the power to "appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," the electors who represent the state in the electoral college  Facially, the Constitution's primary limitation on the power of a state to select its electors is the final number of electors awarded to each state  While perhaps an argument can be made that the structure, logic, and history of the Constitution place limits on the manner or method in which a state chooses its electors, the text of the Constitution simply does not impose any such limits  Supreme Court case law also supports reading Article II of the Constitution to broadly provide states with wide discretion as to the manner in which its electors are selected  Specifically, in 1892 in McPherson v  Blacker, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld a Michigan law providing for the election by individual congressional district of presidential electors against a challenge that the law violated Article II of the Constitution  In so holding, the Court placed great emphasis on a number of state laws that existed shortly after the ratification that provided a variety of "modes of choosing the electors," including selection by the legislature itself, by a "vote of the people for a general ticket," "by vote of the people in districts," or by some permutation of those methods  Viewing this evidence together with the text of Article II and the historical evidence from the Constitutional Convention led the Court to broadly conclude state legislatures have "conceded plenary power     in the matter of the appointment of electors," allowing the Michigan law to stand  Applying McPherson to the case of the NPV, the argument can and has been made that if the states have plenary power with respect to the manner of how electors are appointed, the power necessarily allows states to select electors in line with the results of the national popular vote  More recently, supporters of the NPV have relied on the Supreme Court's 2015 ruling in Arizona Legislature v  Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC) —which held that the State of Arizona had wide discretion under the Elections Clause of the Constitution to select the method by which the state provided for redistricting —to argue that the states retain broad discretion in selecting electors under Article II, which uses similar language to the provision interpreted in AIRC  Others have argued that the structure of the Constitution and historical evidence suggest that the states do not have such vast discretion in appointing electors as to functionally transform the election for President into a national popular referendum  As noted elsewhere in this report, the electoral college was created by the Framers to ensure that states with the least population retained power in the selection of the President, providing a check against domination by the most populous states  The electoral college, being a product of the choices of individual state legislatures, was envisioned by the Framers as a body that would represent the specific interests of a given state, as opposed to the undifferentiated nation at large  Accordingly, it may be argued that allowing the most populous states to collude to ensure that the national popular vote, as opposed to the wishes of an individual state, dictates the results of a state's slate of electors, could arguably be irreconcilable with the Framers' intentions with respect to the electoral college  As such, for those who find the NPV compact constitutionally suspect under Article II, McPherson 's broad pronouncements about the nature of a state's power to appoint electors should be viewed in the context of that particular case, where the state of Michigan was attempting to appoint its electors based on the votes of an individual district in the state, as opposed to the state as a whole  In contrast to the law at issue in McPherson , with NPV, there appears to be no evidence contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution of a state selecting its electors in accordance with the results of the national popular vote  Unlike the State of Michigan in McPherson , an NPV state's electors might not be a product of the views of the state at the time of the election, but instead would reflect national popular sentiment about who should be the President  Moreover, the Supreme Court, in interpreting arguably analogous language from Article I of the Constitution allowing states to regulate the manner of the selection of the Members of the House of Representatives and Senate, concluded that the states cannot exercise their delegated authority in a way that would "effect a fundamental change in the constitutional structure " The question that remains is whether the Court in a future case challenging the NPV compact would interpret the states' authority under Article II to appoint electors to be broad enough to allow the President to be selected as a result of the national popular vote, a question that, given the lack of any precise precedent respecting the constitutionality of the NPV compact under Article II, will likely remain unresolved until such time  Other critics claim the NPV compact might violate Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)  Writing in Columbia Law Review , David Gringer invokes the voting power theory  He argues that the plan conflicts with Section 2 of the VRA because moving from "a state-based [vote] to a national popular vote dilutes the voting strength of a given state's minority population by reducing its ability [voting power] to influence the outcome of presidential elections " Gringer also asserts that the NPV compact may violate Section 5 of the act  In 2013, however, the U S  Supreme Court invalidated Section 4(b) of the VRA, which contained a formula prescribing which states and jurisdictions with a history of discrimination were required to obtain prior approval or "preclearance" under Section 5 before changing any voting standard, practice, or procedure  Although the Court invalidated only the coverage formula in Section 4, by extension, Section 5 has been rendered currently inoperable  Prior to the Supreme Court ruling, Gringer argued that the NPV compact would qualify as a covered practice under Section 5, and that the legislatures of all the "covered" states would have been required to obtain preclearance before implementing the compact  Responding to this point, National Popular Vote Inc  noted the following: The National Popular Vote bill manifestly would make every person's vote for President equal throughout the United States in an election to fill a single office (the Presidency)  It is entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act  There have been court cases under the Voting Rights Act concerning contemplated changes in voting methods for various representative legislative bodies     However, these cases do not bear on elections to fill a single office (i e , the Presidency)  In 2012, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division specifically declined to challenge California's accession to the NPV compact on VRA grounds  The states' authority to appoint electors by any method their legislatures choose is not absolute  Federal court decisions have struck down state laws concerning appointment of electors that were found to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection: Although Clause 2 (of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution) seemingly vests complete discretion in the states, certain older cases had recognized a federal interest in protecting the integrity of the process  Thus, the Court upheld the power of Congress to protect the right of all citizens who are entitled to vote to lend aid and support in any legal manner to the election of any legally qualified person as a presidential elector     [I]n Oregon v  Mitchell (42 U S  112 (1970)), the Court upheld the power of Congress to reduce the voting age in presidential elections and to set a thirty-day durational residency period as a qualification for voting in presidential elections  Although the Justices were divided on the reasons, the rationale emerging from this case, considered with Williams v  Rhodes , (393 U S  20 1968)) is that the Fourteenth Amendment limits state discretion in prescribing the manner of selecting electors and that Congress in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment may override state practices that violate that Amendment and may substitute standards of its own  Critics of the electoral college system have sought direct election of the President and Vice President without success for more than two centuries  The NPV initiative represents a novel effort to achieve this goal by use of an interstate compact that would circumvent the stringent requirements necessary for the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments  Since its inception in 2006, NPV has achieved a degree of success: 14 states and the District of Columbia, controlling a total of 189 electoral votes, have joined the compact since 2008  Progress has arguably been sporadic, however, notwithstanding active campaigning by National Popular Vote Inc  Over the course of more than a decade, NPV has heretofore failed to develop a sustained momentum toward its stated goal of states controlling 270 electoral votes  The action of three states in joining NPV to date in 2019 marks the most activity in a single year since 2008; it remains to be seen whether this trend will continue  To date, certain Democratic-leaning states have joined the compact  The arguable lack of support in Republican-controlled state legislatures raises questions about further accessions to the compact in the immediate future, particularly given the fact that the GOP controlled both legislative chambers in 30 states following the 2018 elections  To date, while the NPV initiative has generated interest among supporters of direct popular election of the President, it does not appear to have gained widespread awareness among the public at large  The findings of the March 27, 2019, Politico/Morning Consult survey cited earlier in this report arguably suggest that greater public knowledge of NPV might spur popular support for the compact  This might then contribute to further momentum if additional states were to join, particularly populous ones like Florida (29 electoral votes), Georgia (16 electoral votes), and Ohio (18 electoral votes) where the compact was under active consideration in 2019  Under these circumstances, proponents might be energized and encouraged by a sense of progress for the initiative  At the same time, NPV opponents could be expected to coalesce around the issues identified earlier in this report, and renew and increase their efforts in defense of the electoral college system  The activities of both might ultimately bring the NPV initiative to the more immediate attention of Congress 

ground_truth: The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), enacted in 1938, is the main federal law that establishes general wage and hour standards for most, but not all, private and public sector employees. Among other protections, the FLSA establishes that covered nonexempt employees must be compensated at one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked over 40 hours in a workweek. The FLSA also establishes certain exemptions from its general labor market standards. One of the major exemptions to the overtime provisions in the FLSA is for bona fide "executive, administrative, and professional" employees (the "EAP" or "white collar" exemptions). The FLSA grants authority to the Secretary of Labor to define and delimit the EAP exemption "from time to time." To qualify for this exemption from the FLSA's overtime pay requirement, an employee must be salaried (the "salary basis" test); perform specified executive, administrative, or professional duties (the "duties" test); and earn above an established salary level threshold (the "salary level" test). In March 2019, the Secretary of Labor published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to make changes to the EAP exemptions. The 2019 proposed rule would become effective around January 2020. The major changes in the 2019 proposed rule include increasing the standard salary level threshold from the previous level of $455 per week to $679 per week and committing the Department of Labor (DOL) to updating the EAP exemptions every four years through the rulemaking process. The 2019 proposed rule does not change the duties and responsibilities that employees must perform to be exempt. Thus, the 2019 proposed rule would affect EAP employees at salary levels between $455 and $679 per week in 2020. DOL estimates that about 4.9 million workers would be affected in the first year, including about 1.3 million EAP employees who would become newly entitled to overtime pay and an additional 3.6 million workers who would have overtime protection clarified and thereby strengthened. This report answers frequently asked questions about the overtime provisions of the FLSA, the EAP exemptions, and the 2019 proposed rule that would define and delimit the EAP exemptions.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: The Forest Service’s mission includes sustaining the nation’s forests and grasslands; managing the productivity of those lands for the benefit of citizens; conserving open space; enhancing outdoor recreation opportunities; and conducting research and development in the biological, physical, and social sciences  The agency carries out its responsibilities in three main program areas: (1) managing public lands, known collectively as the National Forest System, through nine regional offices, 154 national forests, 20 national grasslands, and over 600 ranger districts; (2) conducting research through its network of seven research stations, multiple associated research laboratories, and 81 experimental forests and ranges; and (3) working with state and local governments, forest industries, and private landowners and forest users in the management, protection, and development of forest land in nonfederal ownership, largely through its nine regional offices  According to the Forest Service, it employs a workforce of over 30,000 employees across the country  However, this number grows by thousands in the summer months, when the agency hires seasonal employees to conduct fieldwork, respond to wildland fires, and meet the visiting public’s needs  The Office of the Chief of the Forest Service is located in Washington, D C , with 27 offices reporting directly to the Office of the Chief, as illustrated in figure 1  The nine national forest regions, each led by a regional forester, oversee the national forests and grasslands located in their respective regions  Each national forest or grassland is headed by a supervisor, the seven research stations are each led by a station director, and a state and private forestry area is headed by an area director  The Forest Service collectively refers to its forest regions, research stations, and area as RSAs  The RSAs are organized differently according to their operations, and comparable operations within the RSAs, such as collections from reimbursable agreements, may be processed differently in the various regions and stations, resulting in highly decentralized operations  In addition, the offices of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO); Deputy Chief of Business Operations (includes the budget office); and eight other offices located in the Washington, D C , headquarters also report directly to the Office of the Chief of the Forest Service  The Forest Service receives appropriations for its various programs and for specific purposes to meet its mission goals  Prior to fiscal year 2017, the Forest Service’s budgetary resources consisted primarily of no-year funds  Its budget office in Washington, D C , initiates apportionment requests and monitors the receipt of Department of the Treasury (Treasury) warrants  Upon receipt of the warrant, the apportionment is recorded in the financial system and then the budget office develops an allocation summary detailing the allocation of its budget authority by fund, programs within the funds, and distribution of funds at the regional, station, and area levels  The Forest Service may also transfer funds from other appropriations to the appropriations account that funds its fire suppression activities when available funds appropriated for fire suppression and the Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement (FLAME) fund will be exhausted within 30 days  The Forest Service’s administrative policies, practices, and procedures are issued in its Directive System, which provides a unified system for issuing, storing, and retrieving internal direction that governs Forest Service programs and activities  The Directive System consists of the Forest Service’s manuals and handbooks  The manuals contain management objectives, policies, and responsibilities and provide general direction to Forest Service line officers and staff directors for planning and executing their assigned programs and activities  The handbooks provide detailed direction to employees and are the principal source of specialized guidance and instruction for carrying out directions issued in the manuals  Line officers at the national and RSA levels have authority to issue directives in the manuals and handbooks under their respective jurisdictions  The Forest Service’s policy states that the Directive System is the only place where Forest Service policy and procedures are issued  In addition to the Directive System, Forest Service staff have also developed standard operating procedures (SOP) and desk guides to supplement guidance provided in directives  However, the SOPs and desk guides are not part of the Forest Service Directive System and therefore are not official policy and procedures  While the Forest Service had documented processes for allotting its budgetary resources, it did not have an adequate process and related control activities for reasonably assuring that (1) amounts designated in appropriations acts for specific purposes are used as designated and (2) unobligated no-year appropriation balances from prior years were reviewed for their continuing need  In addition, the Forest Service did not have a properly designed and documented system for administrative control of funds  Finally, the Forest Service had not properly designed control activities for fund transfers for fire suppression activities under its Wildland Fire Management program  While the Forest Service had documented processes for allotting its budgetary resources, it did not have an adequate process and related control activities to reasonably assure that amounts designated in appropriations acts for specific purposes are used as designated—as required by the purpose statute, which states that “appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law ” We reviewed Forest Service documents about its budget authority processes, which included control objectives, related control activities, and processes over the allotment of its budgetary resources  We found that these documents, including manuals and handbooks, did not include an adequate process and related control activities for assuring that appropriated amounts are used for the purposes designated  For example, such a process would include the Forest Service allotting appropriated funds for specific programs or objects as provided in the applicable appropriation act, by either using specific budget line items already defined in the Forest Service’s financial system or creating new budget line items, as needed  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should define objectives clearly to enable the identification of risks and design appropriate control activities to achieve objectives and respond to the risks identified  As a result of the Forest Service not having an adequate process and related control activities for assuring that appropriated amounts are used for the purposes designated, the Forest Service did not properly allocate certain funds for specific purposes detailed in the appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016  For example, in fiscal year 2015, the Forest Service did not set aside in its financial system the $65 million specified in the fiscal year 2015 appropriations act for acquiring aircraft for the next- generation airtanker fleet  According to Forest Service documents, as of January 6, 2016, $35 million of the designated funds was used for other purposes  In February 2017, we issued a legal opinion, related to the Forest Service’s use of the $65 million, which concluded that the Forest Service had failed to comply with the purpose statute  According to USDA’s Office of General Counsel, “this lack of any separate apportionment or account for the next-generation airtanker fleet was due to the fact that it was a new item, not included in the agency’s budget request, and added late in the appropriations process ” Similarly, in fiscal year 2016, the Forest Service did not create new budget line items to reserve in its financial system $75 million for the Forest Inventory and Analysis Program specified in the fiscal year 2016 appropriations act  Rather than creating a new budget line item for the program specified in the appropriations act, the funds were combined with an existing budget line item, making it difficult to track related budget amounts and actual expenditures  The lack of an adequate process and related control activities to reasonably assure that appropriated amounts are used for the purpose designated also increases the risk that the Forest Service may violate the Antideficiency Act  The Forest Service did not have a process and related control activities to reasonably assure that unobligated, no-year funds from prior years were reviewed for continuing need  We reviewed the Forest Service’s budget authority process document and related manuals and handbooks, which documented control objectives and procedures over its budgetary resources and the guidance for administrative control of funds  We found that these documents did not include a process for reviewing the Forest Service’s unobligated, no-year funds from prior years and related control activities to reasonably assure that such funds were reviewed for continuing need  Such reviews, if performed, may identify unneeded funds that could be reallocated to other programs needing additional budgetary resources, if consistent with the purposes designated in appropriations acts  The USDA Budget Manual states as a department policy that “agencies of the Department have a responsibility to review their programs continually and recommend, when appropriate, deferrals or rescissions ” The USDA Budget Manual further states the following: “Agency officials should remain alert to this responsibility since the establishment of reserves is an important phase of budgetary administration  If it becomes evident during the fiscal year that any amount of funds available will not be needed to carry out foreseeable program requirements, it is in the interest of good management to recommend appropriate actions, thereby maintaining a realistic relationship between apportionments, allotments, and obligations ” However, the Forest Service did not develop a directive addressing the control objectives, related risks, and control activities for implementing this USDA policy  Up until fiscal year 2017, Forest Service budgetary resources consisted primarily of no-year funds  At the beginning of each fiscal year, unobligated balances of no-year funds are carried forward and reapportioned to become part of budget authority available for obligation in the new fiscal year  Unobligated balances can increase during the fiscal year due to deobligation of prior years’ unliquidated obligations that the Forest Service determines it no longer needs  These resources are immediately available to the Forest Service to the extent authorized by law without further legislation or action from Office of Management and Budget (OMB) unless the apportionment states otherwise  According to Forest Service officials, unobligated funds reported in the Forest Service’s September 30, 2016, Statement of Budgetary Resources included $351 million in discretionary unobligated no-year funds, appropriated as far back as fiscal year 1999  The Forest Service did not identify and define a process and control objectives related to its review of unobligated no-year funds from prior years for continuing need  As a result, the Forest Service did not have reasonable assurance that prior no-year unobligated balances were properly managed and considered in its annual budget requests  This increased the risk that the Forest Service may make budget requests in excess of its needs  Additionally, the Forest Service could miss opportunities to use its prior year unobligated no-year funds more timely and effectively, for example, using these funds for other Forest Service program needs, if consistent with the purposes designated in appropriations acts  During our work, we brought this issue to management’s attention, and in response, Forest Service officials stated that the Forest Service is planning to develop a quarterly process to review available balances and, as needed, redirect funds to agency priorities  However, as of July 2017, the Forest Service had not yet developed this review process  Further, Congress rescinded about $18 million of the Forest Service’s prior year unobligated balances and required it to report unobligated balances quarterly within 30 days after the close of each quarter and appropriated multi-year funds instead of no- year funds to the Forest Service for fiscal year 2017  The Forest Service issued guidance related to administrative control of funds in manuals and handbooks, which USDA did not review and approve prior to their issuance  Based on our review of these documents, we found that the processes and related control activities over the administrative control of funds were dispersed in numerous manuals and handbooks, which may hamper a clear understanding of the overall system  Further, the system lacked key elements that would allow it to serve as an adequate system of administrative control of funds  For example, in its manuals and handbooks the Forest Service did not identify, by title or office, those officials with the authority and responsibility for obligating the service’s appropriated funds, such as funds for contracts, travel, and training  As a result, the responsibility for obligating funds was not clearly described and properly assigned in Forest Service policy as required by the USDA Budget Manual and OMB Circular No  A-11  OMB Circular No  A-11 states that the Antideficiency Act requires that the agency head prescribe, by regulation, a system of administrative control of funds, and OMB provided a checklist in appendix H to the circular that agencies can use for drafting their fund control regulations  This requirement is consistent with those in the USDA Budget Manual, which prescribes budgetary administration through a system of administrative controls for its component agencies, including the Forest Service  The USDA Budget Manual states that to the extent necessary for effective administration, (1) the heads of USDA component agencies may delegate to subordinate officials responsibilities in connection with the administrative distribution of funds within apportionments and allotments and the monitoring, control, and reporting of the occurrence of obligations and expenditures under apportionments and allotments and (2) the chain of such responsibility shall be clearly defined  In addition, USDA requires its component agencies to promulgate and maintain administrative control of funds regulation and to send such regulation to USDA’s Office of Program and Budget Analysis for review and approval prior to issuance  Because the Forest Service has not developed and issued a comprehensive system for administrative control of funds that considers all aspects of the budget execution processes, it cannot reasonably assure that (1) programs will achieve their intended results; (2) the use of resources is consistent with the agency’s mission; (3) programs and resources are protected from waste, fraud, and mismanagement; and (4) laws and regulations are followed  We also found that the Forest Service had not reviewed and updated most of its administrative control of funds guidance in the manuals and handbooks for over 5 years  The USDA Budget Manual requires each component to periodically review its funds control system for overall effectiveness and to assure that it is consistent with its agency programs and organizational structures  Further, Forest Service policy also requires routine review, every 5 years, of policies and procedures in its Directive System  According to Forest Service officials, when directives are up for review and update, a staff from the Office of Regulatory and Management Services (ORMS) sends an e-mail reminder to notify responsible personnel that updates to applicable directives are needed  However, we found that the Forest Service does not have adequate controls in place to monitor the reviews and any updates of the manuals and handbooks in its Directive System to reasonably assure that their efforts resulted in timely updates  As a result, the Forest Service is at risk that guidance for its system for administrative control of funds may lose relevance as processes change over time and control activities may become inadequate  The Forest Service did not have properly designed control activities over its process for fund transfers related to wildland fire suppression activities  The Forest Service receives appropriations for necessary expenses for (1) fire suppression activities on National Forest System lands, (2) emergency fire suppression on or adjacent to such lands or other lands under fire protection agreement, (3) hazardous fuels management on or adjacent to such lands, and (4) state and volunteer fire assistance  Transfer of funds from other Forest Service programs to its fire suppression activities occurs when the Forest Service has exhausted all available funds appropriated for the purpose of fire suppression and the FLAME fund  A key aspect of this process is assessing the FLAME forecast, which the Forest Service uses to predict the costs of fighting wildland fires for a given season, and developing a strategy to identify specific programs and the amounts that may be transferred to pay for fire suppression activities when needed  The process for reviewing the FLAME forecast and strategizing the fund transfers was documented in the Basic Budget Desk Guide created by staff in the Forest Service’s Strategic Planning and Budget Analysis Office  However, the desk guide did not contain evidence of review by responsible officials  As a result, the Forest Service lacked reasonable assurance that the desk guide was complete and appropriate for its use  The Basic Budget Desk Guide included a listing of actions to be performed by the analyst for reviewing the FLAME forecast report and developing a strategy for fund transfer from other programs  However, the desk guide did not specify the factors to be considered when developing the strategy  For example, it did not call for documentation addressing the rationale for the strategy or an assessment of the risk that the fund transfer could have on the programs from which the funds would be transferred  The desk guide also did not describe the review and approval of the strategy by a responsible official(s) prior to the fund transfer request sent to the Chief of the Forest Service  According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks and that such control activities should be designed at the appropriate levels in the organizational structure  Further, management may design a variety of transaction control activities for operational processes, which may include verifications, authorizations and approvals, and supervisory control activities  The lack of properly designed control activities for supervisory review of the desk guide and strategy to identify the amounts for fund transfers does not provide the Forest Service reasonable assurance that the objectives of the fund transfers—including mitigating the risk of a shortfall of funding for other critical Forest Service program activities, such as payroll or other day-to-day operating costs—will be efficiently and effectively achieved  The Forest Service enters into various reimbursable agreements with agencies within USDA, other federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and nongovernment entities to carry out its mission for public benefit  The reimbursable agreements may be for the Forest Service to provide goods and services to a third party or to receive goods and services from a third party, or may be a partnership agreement with a third party for a common goal  According to Forest Service officials, the two distinct types of Forest Service reimbursable agreements are (1) fire incident cooperative agreements and (2) reimbursable and advanced collection agreements (RACA)  The Forest Service did not have documented processes and related control activities for its fire incident cooperative agreements to reasonably assure the effectiveness and efficiency of its related fire incident operations  In addition, processes and related control activities applicable to RACAs were not adequately described in applicable manuals and handbooks in the Directive System, to reasonably assure that control activities could be performed consistently and effectively  Further, certain RACA processes in the Directive System had not been timely reviewed by management and did not reflect current processes  Moreover, as previously discussed, SOPs and desk guides developed in field offices related to RACA processes were not in the Forest Service’s Directive System  Finally, the Forest Service lacked control activities segregating incompatible duties performed by line officers and program managers in creating reimbursable agreements and the final disposition of related receivables  The Forest Service did not have documented processes and related control activities for its fire incident cooperative agreements to reasonably assure the effectiveness and efficiency of its related fire incident operations and reliable reporting internally and externally  As part of the service’s mission objective to suppress wildland fires, Forest Service officials stated that they enter into 5-year agreements referred to as master cooperative agreements with federal, state, and other entities  These agreements document the framework for commitment and support efficient and effective coordination and cooperation among the parties in suppressing fires, when they occur  The master cooperative agreements do not require specific funding commitments as amounts are not yet known  These agreements vary from region to region because of the differing laws and regulations pertaining to the participating states and other entities  These variations can also result in different billing and collection processes between regions  When a fire occurs, supplemental agreements, which are based on the framework established in the applicable master cooperative agreements, are signed by relevant parties for each fire incident  These agreements establish the share of fire suppression costs incurred by the Forest Service and amounts related to entities that benefitted from those fire suppression efforts  These supplemental agreements require commitment and obligation of funds  As indicated in figure 2, the Forest Service’s obligations for fire suppression activities ranged from $412 million to $1 4 billion over the 10-year period from fiscal years 2007 through 2016  In response to our request for documentation of processes and related control activities over its fire incident cooperative agreements, Forest Service officials stated that processes and related control activities over reimbursable agreements were applicable to both fire incident cooperative agreements and RACAs  However, based on our review of the Forest Service’s processes and related control activities over its reimbursable agreements, we found that the unique features of fire incident cooperative agreements (as compared to features of RACAs) were not addressed in the processes and related controls for reimbursable agreements  For example, there was no process and related control activities over the negotiation and review of (1) a fire incident master cooperative agreement, which is developed before a fire occurs, and (2) supplemental agreements, which are signed by all relevant parties after the start of a fire incident  These supplemental agreements detail, among other things, the terms for (1) fire department resource use, (2) financial arrangements, and (3) specific cost-sharing agreements  Another unique feature of fire incident cooperative agreements, which was not covered in process documents for its reimbursable agreements, was the preparation of the Cost Settlement Package  The preparation of this package does not start until after the fire has ended and the Forest Service has received and paid all bills  According to Forest Service officials, a fire incident is deemed to have ended when there are no more resources (firefighters and equipment) on the ground putting out the fire  However, this definition was not documented in the Forest Service’s manuals and handbooks in the Directive System  Based on our review of documentation that the Forest Service provided for four fire incidents, we found that for these incidents the Cost Settlement Packages and the billings took several months to years to complete after the fire incident  According to Forest Service officials, delays in preparing the Cost Settlement Package in many cases were due to parties involved in suppressing the fires taking a long time to submit their invoices to the Forest Service for payment  Because the preparation of Cost Settlement Packages was not included in the process documents, the Forest Service did not have a defined time frame for when, in relation to the end of the fire, the Cost Settlement Package must be completed  For example, in one case we reviewed, the bill for a cost settlement was sent 9 months after the fire occurred, and in another case, settlement occurred approximately 2 years after the fire occurred  For both fire incidents, based on the reports we reviewed, the fires were contained within a week or two, but the Forest Service does not have a policy for documenting the date when the fire incident is deemed to have ended  Because of the complexity of the process for negotiating and determining the reimbursable amounts from all the costs that the Forest Service pays for a fire incident, the reimbursable amounts may take time to negotiate, and subsequent billing to and collection from parties may take much longer  Forest Service officials stated that some receivables that were not going to be collected until after its financial system’s aging process for receivables deemed such receivables uncollectible and a bad debt are tracked in a spreadsheet outside its financial system  We found that the Forest Service did not have a documented process and related control activities to reasonably assure that its Budget Office was informed of these older receivables being tracked in a spreadsheet and the related progress of collection activities that local program managers and line officers perform, which could affect the reliability of the reported reimbursable receivable amounts  According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, management should internally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives  Without proper communication, important information, such as amounts that the Forest Service will receive from fire incident cost settlement negotiations, may not be considered in the Forest Service’s strategy for the effective and efficient management of fund transfers for fire suppression activities  Processes and related control activities applicable to RACAs were not adequately described in Forest Service manuals and handbooks in its Directive System  RACAs, which may be for research or other nonemergency purposes, are billed and collected based on previously agreed upon billing and collection terms  In accordance with the Forest Service’s Directive System, policies related to business processes, such as RACAs, are documented in its manuals while procedures for performing specialized activities are documented in its handbooks  We found that the manuals and handbooks in the Directive System did not adequately describe the processes and related control activities over the RACA processes to enable efficient and effective performance of the work by appropriate and responsible personnel  The manuals and handbooks related to RACAs state that a manager review the documentation to ensure that the funding supports the objective of the agreement, the agreement is the correct instrument for funding the project, all relevant terms and conditions have been included in the agreement, the entity’s financial strength and capability are acceptable, and all applicable regulations and OMB circulars have been addressed  However, there was no discussion in the manuals and handbooks about when the manager needs to perform the reviews and how these reviews were to be documented  Further, in response to our inquiry regarding procedures performed to assess the entity’s financial strength and capability are acceptable before a RACA is signed, Forest Service officials stated that there is currently no formal process for determining financial capability for RACAs  For reimbursable agreements, the Forest Service’s process documented in its handbook consisted of completing a creditworthiness checklist  However, the handbook did not describe procedures for (1) completing the checklist and (2) documenting responsible personnel’s review and approval of an entity’s acceptable financial capability  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks  Management’s design of internal control establishes and communicates the who, what, when, where, and why of internal control execution to personnel  Documentation also provides a means to retain organizational knowledge and mitigate the risk of having that knowledge limited to a few personnel  Further, the standards also explain that management clearly document internal control in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available and properly managed and maintained  In addition, the manuals and handbooks applicable to the RACAs have not been timely reviewed by management, and had not been updated to reflect current processes  For example, the document that serves as direction for Forest Service personnel on how to enter into RACAs referred to an outdated financial system that was replaced in fiscal year 2013  Further, the manuals and handbooks for the RACA processes had no indication that they had been reviewed within the past 5 years  Forest Service policy requires routine review, every 5 years, of policies and procedures in its Directive System  According to Forest Service officials, a staff member from ORMS sends an e-mail to officials responsible for updating these policies and procedures  However, appropriate control activities have not been designed to reasonably assure that updates were made, reviewed, approved, and issued as needed for continued relevance and effectiveness  Without adequate descriptions of processes and related control activities in its manuals and handbooks over RACAs, the Forest Service is at risk that processes and related control activities may not be properly, consistently, and timely performed  Further, because it lacks a process and related controls for monitoring and reviewing the updates of the guidance and various process documents in the Directive System, the Forest Service is at risk that its policies and procedures may not provide appropriate agency-wide direction in achieving control objectives, particularly when financial systems change and old processes may no longer be applicable  SOPs and desk guides related to RACA processes were not in the Directive System and are not considered official Forest Service policy and procedures  Forest Service field staff responsible for various processes generally developed SOPs and desk guides to document day-to-day procedures for employees in carrying out RACA processes to supplement the manuals and handbooks  However, the SOPs and desk guides did not reference the applicable manuals and handbooks they supplemented  Further, the SOPs and desk guides did not provide descriptions of (1) review procedures for authorization, completeness, and validity of RACAs and related receivables; (2) detailed review procedures to be performed and by whom; (3) timing of review procedures; and (4) how to document the completion of the review procedures  Finally, SOPs and desk guides did not have evidence that responsible officials reviewed and approved them to authorize their use  These SOPs and desk guides are only available in the field office where these were developed, and if similar SOPs and desk guides were developed in other field offices, control activities and how they are performed could vary  We also noted that these SOPs and desk guides were not timely updated to reflect processes and systems currently in use  For example, there were many instances where the SOPs and desk guides referred to systems that the Forest Service no longer used  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should establish an organizational structure, assign responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve the entity’s objectives  Effective documentation assists in management’s design of internal control by establishing and communicating the who, what, when, where, and why of internal control execution to personnel  Documentation also provides a means to retain organizational knowledge and mitigate the risk of having that knowledge limited to a few personnel and to achieve the entity’s objectives  Management assigns responsibility and delegates authority to key roles throughout the entity  As a result of the issues discussed above, the Forest Service is at risk that control activities may not be properly and consistently performed and its related control objectives may not be achieved efficiently and effectively  In addition, the Forest Service is at risk that knowledge for performing the control activities may be limited to a few personnel or lost altogether in the event of employee turnover  The Forest Service lacked control activities over the segregation of incompatible duties performed by line officers and program managers for reimbursable agreements and any adjustments affecting the final disposition of related receivables  Field offices manage the majority of Forest Service projects, including authorizing the agreements and monitoring related collection  The Forest Service line officer for fire incident cooperative agreements and program managers for RACA at the RSA, unit, or field levels initiate and develop the terms of the agreements and are also responsible for any subsequent negotiation of the agreements  In the process of negotiating and settling costs, the line officer or program manager has the authority to cancel or change related receivables that they deemed uncollectible  For example, in a fire incident, the line officer at the region or field level is involved in both developing a Cost Share Agreement and after the fire incident has ended, negotiating the Cost Settlement Package with parties involved in the agreement to determine the final settlement amount that the Forest Service will be reimbursed for expenses paid in suppressing the fire incident  Therefore, the line officer is responsible for initiating the Cost Share Agreement, modifying the Cost Settlement Package, and changing or canceling the related receivable, which represent conflicting duties  We also found that the Forest Service did not have any mitigating controls, such as independent approval of any adjustments affecting the final disposition of receivables, to mitigate the risk of these incompatible duties  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks  Segregation of duties contributes to the design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of control activities  To achieve segregation of key functions, management can divide responsibilities among different people to reduce the risk of error, misuse, or fraud  This may include separating the responsibilities for authorizing or approving transactions, processing and recording them, and reviewing the transactions so that no one individual controls all key aspects of a transaction or event  Forest Service officials stated they did not consider segregating the conflicting duties related to reimbursable agreements because these line officers and program managers were most familiar with the terms of the agreement and the activities performed  However, a lack of adequate segregation of conflicting duties or proper monitoring and review of conflicting duties for receivables from reimbursable agreements could result in receivables not being collected, and an increased risk of fraud  The Forest Service’s processes and related control activities over review of unliquidated obligations were not properly designed to reasonably assure optimum utilization of funds and were inconsistent with USDA and Forest Service policy  Further, Forest Service manuals and handbooks related to the review of unliquidated obligations did not clearly describe control activities and were not timely reviewed by management  The Forest Service reported unliquidated obligations of approximately $2 6 billion and $2 5 billion in its financial statements as of September 30, 2015, and 2016, respectively  In fiscal year 2016, the Forest Service deobligated about $319 million of its unliquidated obligations from prior years  The Forest Service’s procedures related to the review of unliquidated obligations were not properly designed and were inconsistent with USDA and Forest Service policy  In accordance with USDA Departmental Regulation (Regulation 2230-001) and related Forest Service policy, the Forest Service identifies and reviews unliquidated obligations that have been inactive for at least 12 months to determine whether delivery or performance of goods or services is still expected to occur  Once a determination has been made that an unliquidated obligation can be deobligated, program or procurement personnel are to notify finance personnel, in writing, within 5 days of the determination to process the deobligation  Within 15 days of receipt of the written notification, the unliquidated obligations are to be adjusted in the financial management system  The Forest Service CFO is then to be notified in writing that the deobligation was processed  Within 1 month of the close of each quarter, the Forest Service CFO is to submit to USDA’s Associate CFO for Financial Operations a certification stating that the Forest Service has performed reviews of its unliquidated obligations and taken appropriate actions, such as promptly deobligating an unliquidated obligation that is no longer needed  However, the Forest Service’s quarterly certifications are inconsistent with USDA and Forest Service policy because the months included in each quarterly review do not line up with the months outlined in policy  For example, as shown in table 1, based on policy the certification due on October 31, covers the months July through September  However in practice, the certification that the Forest Service prepared for October 31 covers May through July  As a result, the review and certification for August and September would be delayed an entire quarter  According to Forest Service officials, it takes considerable time to produce accurate unliquidated obligations reports from USDA’s financial system and then distribute them to field offices  Therefore, there is not sufficient time for the field offices to review and deobligate amounts not needed from the unliquidated obligations balances to meet USDA’s certification timing and requirements  However, the Forest Service has not developed other processes and control activities that could help meet USDA and Forest Service policy and reasonably assure that unliquidated obligations are reviewed timely and appropriate actions are taken  As a result, there is an increased risk that the Forest Service may not achieve its control objectives of optimum utilization of funds and timely adjustments of obligated balances  The Forest Service’s process and related control activities over its review of unliquidated obligations and resulting certifications were not adequately described in manuals and handbooks in its Directive System  Further, the manuals and handbooks were not timely reviewed and updated to reflect processes and systems currently in use  In accordance with the Forest Service’s Directive System, policies are documented in its manuals while procedures for performing specialized activities are documented in its handbooks  However, we found that the Forest Service’s processes and related control activities for reviewing unliquidated obligations were not adequately described and documented in such manuals and handbooks  Although parts of the applicable section of the handbook referred to procedures, there were no detailed descriptions of the processes, and only references to objectives of the procedures for reviewing unliquidated obligations were listed  For example, in identifying unliquidated obligations for review, the narrative description of the procedures in the handbook states that the responsible obligating official must review each selected unliquidated obligation to determine whether (1) delivery or performance of goods or services has occurred or is expected to occur and (2) accounting corrections to the obligation data in the accounting system are necessary  The handbook also refers to an unliquidated obligations report listing the unliquidated obligations that must be reviewed  The narrative does not provide any detailed procedures that obligating officials or responsible personnel need to perform, how to perform those procedures, and how those control activities are to be documented  The guidance in the handbook was supplemented by two desk guides  However, the desk guides are outside the Forest Service’s Directive System and, as previously noted, the Directive System is the only place where the Forest Service’s policy and procedures are issued  In addition, these desk guides did not reference the applicable guidance in the Directive System that they were supplementing  Further, the process and related control activities for adjusting unliquidated obligations within 15 days of receipt of written notification, as stated in USDA’s policy, were not described in either the handbooks or the desk guides  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks to achieve an effective internal control system  Management’s design of internal control establishes and communicates the who, what, when, where, and why of internal control execution to personnel  Documentation also provides a means to retain organizational knowledge and mitigate the risk of having that knowledge limited to a few personnel  Further, the standards also explain that management clearly document internal control in a manner that allows documentation to be readily available and that documentation be properly managed and maintained  In addition, manuals and handbooks for processes related to review and certification of unliquidated obligations had no evidence that they had been reviewed within the past 5 years for ongoing relevance and effectiveness  According to a Forest Service manual, all service-wide directives, except interim directives, shall be reviewed at least once every 5 years  The Forest Service does not have an effective process in place to monitor the reviews and any updates of the manuals and handbooks in its Directive System  As previously discussed, while ORMS sends an e- mail requesting that the applicable officials review and update the guidance in the manuals and handbooks, there is no follow-up process to help ensure that documents were reviewed and updated as needed  Because the Forest Service’s process and related control activities over its review and certification of unliquidated obligations were not adequately described in its manuals and handbooks, the Forest Service is at risk that its control activities may not reasonably assure that control objectives provide (1) optimum utilization of funds and (2) for unliquidated obligations that are no longer needed to be efficiently and effectively deobligated and made available for other program needs  Adequate processes and related control activities over the Forest Service’s budgetary resources are critical in reasonably assuring that these resources are timely and effectively available for its mission operations, including fire suppression  However, we identified deficiencies in the Forest Service’s processes and related controls over allotments, unobligated no-year funds from prior years, administrative control of funds, fund transfers, reimbursable agreements, and available funds from deobligation of unliquidated obligations  Deficiencies ranged from a lack of processes to control activities that were not properly designed, resulting in an increased risk that Forest Service funds may not be effectively and efficiently monitored and used  In addition, the Forest Service’s manuals and handbooks, which provide the directives for the areas we reviewed, had not been reviewed by management in accordance with the Forest Service’s 5-year review policy  Further, Forest Service staff prepared SOPs and desk guides that documented control activities, but they were not issued as official policy and had not been reviewed and approved by responsible officials  As a result, the Forest Service is at increased risk that the control activities may not be consistently performed across the agency and that the guidance in the SOPs and desk guides may not comply with agency policy in the Directive System  To improve internal controls over the Forest Service’s budget execution processes, we are making the following 11 recommendations: The Chief of the Forest Service should (1) revise its process and (2) design, document, and implement related control activities to reasonably assure that amounts designated in appropriations acts for specific purposes are properly used for the purposes specifically designated  (Recommendation 1) The Chief of the Forest Service should (1) develop a process and (2) design, document, and implement related control activities to reasonably assure that unobligated no-year funds from prior years are reviewed for continuing need  (Recommendation 2) The Chief of the Forest Service should (1) design, document, and implement a comprehensive system for administrative control of funds and (2) submit it for review and approval by USDA before issuance, as required by the USDA Budget Manual  (Recommendation 3) The Chief of the Forest Service should design, document, and implement control activities over the preparation and approval of a fire suppression fund transfers strategy, to specify all appropriate factors to be considered in developing and documenting the strategy, and incorporate these control activities into the Directive System  (Recommendation 4) The Chief of the Forest Service should design, document, and implement processes and related control activities for its fire incident cooperative agreements to reasonably assure efficient and effective operations and timely and reliable reporting of reimbursable receivables related to fire incident cooperative agreements, and incorporate them in the Directive System  (Recommendation 5) The Chief of the Forest Service should update the RACA manuals and handbooks to adequately describe the processes and related control activities applicable to RACAs to reasonably assure that staff will know (1) how and when to perform processes and control activities and (2) how to document their performance  (Recommendation 6) The Chief of the Forest Service should design, document, and implement segregation of duties or mitigating control activities over reimbursable agreements and any adjustments affecting the final disposition of related receivables  (Recommendation 7) The Chief of the Forest Service should modify, document, and implement control activities consistent with USDA and Forest Service policy to reasonably assure that unliquidated obligations are reviewed timely and appropriate actions are taken  (Recommendation 8) The Chief of the Forest Service should adequately describe the processes and related control activities for unliquidated obligations review and certification processes in manuals and handbooks within the Directive System  (Recommendation 9) The Chief of the Forest Service should develop, document, and implement a process and related control activities to reasonably assure that manuals and handbooks for allotments, reimbursable agreements, and review of unliquidated obligations are reviewed and updated every 5 years, consistent with Forest Service policy  (Recommendation 10) The Chief of the Forest Service should develop, document, and implement a process and related control activities to reasonably assure that SOPs and desk guides (1) clearly refer to guidance in the Directive System for allotments, reimbursable agreements, and review of unliquidated obligations and (2) are reviewed and approved by responsible officials prior to use  (Recommendation 11) We provided a draft of this report to USDA for comment  In its comments, reproduced in appendix III, the Forest Service stated that it generally agreed with the report and that it has made significant progress to address the report’s findings  Specifically, the Forest Service stated that its financial policies concerning budget execution have been revised to address our concerns with allotments, unliquidated obligations, commitments, and administrative control of funds as prescribed by OMB Circular No  A-11  Further, the Forest Service stated that it has undertaken an in-depth review of its unliquidated obligations and modified the certification process to comply with the USDA requirement  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and to the Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the Forest Service  In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9869 or khana@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  Our objectives were to determine the extent to which the Forest Service properly designed control activities over (1) allotments of budgetary resources, its system for administrative control of funds, and any fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations; (2) reimbursables and related collections; and (3) unliquidated obligations  We reviewed the Forest Service’s process documents and control activities, policies and procedures from its manual and handbooks in its Directive System, and other guidance in the form of standard operating procedures (SOP) and desk guides to obtain an understanding of internal controls at the Forest Service related to our three objectives  We reviewed the control activities that the Forest Service identified to determine whether the activities would achieve the control objectives that the service identified and whether the activities were consistent with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  We also reviewed recent relevant GAO and U S  Department of Agriculture (USDA) Office of Inspector General reports to obtain background information related to the Forest Service’s budget execution processes  We evaluated the design of the Forest Service’s control activities based on data for fiscal year 2016  To address our first objective, we reviewed Forest Service process documents related to allotments and budget authority to obtain an understanding of control activities over the allotments of budgetary resources, its system for administrative control of funds, and any related fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations  The process documents included a list of control objectives and related control activities that the Forest Service had used to assess its internal controls  We also reviewed the related guidance in appendix H to Office of Management and Budget Circular No  A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget for Administrative Control of Funds, to identify requirements that agencies must meet to ascertain whether their controls over funds management are properly designed  We interviewed key officials from the Forest Service’s Strategic Planning, Budget and Accountability Office to gain an understanding of their processes for allotments of budgetary resources, its system for administrative control of funds, and fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations for wildland fire suppression activities, including how each of their risk assessments were performed and their plans to mitigate the risks  We reviewed and analyzed the processes documented in the manuals and handbooks collectively referred to as directives to determine whether the processes and control activities were designed to achieve the Forest Service’s stated objectives  Specifically, we examined the Forest Service’s control activities to determine whether these sufficiently communicated the procedures to be performed and the documentation to be prepared  We also reviewed USDA Budget Manual to determine whether Forest Service guidance was consistent with USDA’s requirements for all of its component agencies, specifically requirements related to the administrative control of funds  To address our second objective, we reviewed the Forest Service’s policies, procedures, and other documentation and interviewed agency officials to develop an understanding of its processes related to reimbursable agreements and related collection activities  We first identified, through interviews with Forest Service officials, the different kinds of reimbursable agreements that the Forest Service enters into with other USDA components, other federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and nongovernment entities to carry out its mission for the benefit of the public  Two distinct types of reimbursable agreements include (1) fire incident cooperative agreements and (2) reimbursable and advanced collection agreements  We reviewed Forest Service process documents and templates related to these two types of reimbursable agreements provided to obtain an understanding of control activities over reimbursable processes  We reviewed the list of control objectives and related control activities that the Forest Service identified to determine whether the control activities were designed to achieve the applicable control objectives  To address our third objective, we reviewed the Forest Service’s policies, procedures, and other documentation related to and interviewed agency officials about unliquidated obligations to develop an understanding of the Forest Service’s review and certification processes for unliquidated obligations balances  We reviewed the Forest Service’s control activities related to its process for reviewing unliquidated obligations to obtain an understanding of control activities around its process and to determine whether the control activities were designed to achieve the applicable control objectives  Based on the results of our evaluation of the Forest Service’s design of internal control activities over the budget execution processes, we did not evaluate the implementation of the control activities or whether they were operating as designed  While our audit objectives focused on certain control activities related to (1) allotments of budgetary resources, the Forest Service’s system for administrative control of funds, and related fund transfers; (2) reimbursables and related collections for reimbursable agreements; and (3) unliquidated obligations, we did not evaluate all control activities and other components of internal control  If we had done so, additional deficiencies may or may not have been identified that could impair the effectiveness of the control activities evaluated as part of this audit  We conducted this performance audit from August 2016 to January 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides the overall framework for establishing and maintaining internal control  Internal control represents an agency’s plans, methods, policies, and procedures used to fulfill its mission, strategic plan, goals, and objectives  Internal control is a process by an entity’s oversight body, management, and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance that the objectives of the entity will be achieved  When properly designed, implemented, and operating effectively, it provides reasonable assurance that the following objectives are achieved: (1) effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) reliability of internal and external reporting, and (3) compliance with applicable laws and regulations  Internal control is not one event, but a series of actions that occur throughout an entity’s operations  The five components of internal control are as follows: Control Environment - The foundation for an internal control system that provides the discipline and structure to help an entity achieve its objectives  Risk Assessment - Assesses the risks facing the entity as it seeks to achieve its objectives and provides the basis for developing appropriate risk responses  Control Activities - The actions management establishes through policies and procedures to achieve objectives and respond to risks in the internal control system, which includes the entity’s information system  Information and Communication - The quality information management and personnel communicate and use to support the internal control system  Monitoring - Activities management establishes and operates to assess the quality of performance over time and promptly resolve the findings of audits and other reviews  An effective internal control system has each of the five components of internal control effectively designed, implemented, and operating with the components operating together in an integrated manner  In this audit, we assessed the design of control activities at the Forest Service related to its (1) allotments of budgetary resources and any related fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations, (2) reimbursables and related collections, and (3) review of unliquidated obligations  In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made key contributions to this report: Roger Stoltz (Assistant Director), Meafelia P  Gusukuma (Auditor-in-Charge), Tulsi Bhojwani, Cory Mazer, Sabrina Rivera, and Randy Voorhees 
Report 2:  National Popular Vote opponents oppose the compact on various grounds  Some argue that it is unconstitutional or "anticonstitutional," that is, contrary to the Founders' intentions and the spirit of the nation's fundamental charter  It is also asserted that NPV would solve few of the electoral college system's alleged problem issues and would create some of its own  Finally, some observers note that the NPV compact is an interstate compact as defined in Article I, Section 10, clause 3 of the Constitution, and as such would be subject to congressional approval  This issue is examined in greater detail in a separate section of this report  On the most fundamental philosophical basis, opponents might argue that the NPV compact violates one of the basic principles of majoritarian democracy: it does not require that candidates win a majority of the popular vote in order to gain the presidency  Rather, it would anoint as winner the ticket that gains more popular votes than any other  A majoritarian democracy, it may be argued, should require a majority in order to elect; it may be further noted that the existing system, by comparison, requires a majority in the electoral college  As one commentary noted only the strictest of majoritarians desire a purely majoritarian presidential election system, and those individuals should be deeply troubled by the prospect of plurality presidencies, which the NPVC [sic] expressly countenances  Indeed, the NPVC promises to create more difficulties and "misfires" in its own way than the Electoral College system its proponents so earnestly seek to replace  Further, opponents might ask how the NPV compact would function in the event of a multicandidate election, a phenomenon that recurs from time to time in U S  presidential elections  One commentator posited the following problematic scenario under such circumstances: Under the compact, one can easily imagine a multi-candidate race in which a candidate would win, say, a thirty-four percent plurality of the popular vote nationwide while losing in every state and D C  If all of the states and D C  were signatories to the compact, all the electoral votes in such a hypothetical race would be awarded contrary to the will of voters choosing electors (still not voting directly for President under this plan)  Would the United States accept a President who wasn't the choice of sixty-six percent of those voting, nor even the choice of a single state? The existing electoral college system, NPV skeptics might also assert, is a fundamental element in the federal constitutional arrangements established by the Constitution  Fearing "the tyranny of the majority," the Founders established a system of government that provides checks and balances designed to restrain the majority and secure minority rights  These principles are also embedded in the structure of federal elections: the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the presidency were deliberately provided with different terms of office and different electorates, and the states were given an important role in the federal election process  In particular, through the electoral college the United States elects its national Presidents and Vice Presidents in a state-based federal election  Successful nominees are compelled under this system to present a broad political vision that commands nation-spanning "concurrent majorities" and appeals to the great variety of Americans  As in the case of the Senate, less populous states are accorded a small numerical advantage by assignment of two at-large electors reflecting the Constitution's equal apportionment of Senators to each state regardless of its population  The NPV initiative, they could claim, would discard the Founders' intentions in favor of what they consider to be a flawed "majoritarian" presidency that would ill-serve a continent-spanning and profoundly diverse republic  Another criticism centers on the use of the NPV compact to effect a fundamental change in the presidential election process and a de facto amendment to the Constitution, but without following the procedures set out in Article V  Critics may note that NPV's founders admit their plan is an "end run" around the Constitution  Proponents might counter with the argument that Article V presents too high a hurdle for what they consider a necessary reform of the system  Opponents, however, could respond that the Founders intended the various supermajority requirements in Congress and the states to ensure that successful constitutional amendments enjoy broad national support  The bare majority of electoral votes required to implement NPV, they might note, meets none of these supermajority requirements  As one study critical of the NPV initiative concluded, because the use of an interstate compact "does not conform to the constitutional means of changing the original decisions of the Framers, NPV could not [therefore] be a legitimate innovation " A final argument on this line might be that one "end run" around the amendment process might lead to others, setting a dangerous precedent for similar efforts in the future  Opponents might note that the NPV would eliminate the electoral college system's multiplier effect generated by the winner-take-all or general ticket system used in 48 states and the District of Columbia, which tends to magnify the winning ticket's margin of victory, and is said to confer greater legitimacy to the victors  For instance, in 2016, Republican nominee Donald Trump's clear electoral vote majority of 304 votes (56 5% of the total), compared with Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton's 227 (42 2% of the total) could be said to reinforce and confirm his victory, notwithstanding Clinton's plurality of the popular vote (48 2%), compared with Trump's 46 1%  From a practical standpoint, NPV opponents might argue that the NPV would actually lead to an increase in contested election results and legal challenges in the states, as the political parties maneuver to claim every possible vote  They assert that the existing tabulation of popular votes within each state reduces contested results and recounts  Under NPV, the incentive to gain every vote would arguably lead to far broader disputes and widespread recounts at every level of election administration  As a Heritage Foundation study concluded Under the NPV … any suspicions necessitating a recount in even a single district would be an incentive for a national recount     The prospect of a candidate challenging "every precinct, in every county, in every state of the Union" should be abhorrent to anyone who witnessed the drama, cost, delay, and undue litigation sparked by the Florida recount of 2000  Opponents might also assert that the increased incidence of recounts would be further complicated by wide-ranging disparities in state procedures, potentially leading to prolonged periods of uncertainty following close presidential elections  Critics may also note that the NPV plan contains no "statute of limitations," unlike proposed constitutional amendments, for which Congress typically sets a seven-year ratification period  Where, critics may ask, is a similar time limit that would "sunset" the NPV compact, after which it would expire or return to "square one"? According to its website, NPV was launched on February 23, 2006; if it were a constitutional amendment proposed by Congress, it would have expired on February 23, 2013, since by the end of the customary seven-year deadline it was "ratified" by only eight states and the District of Columbia  By what reasoning, they might ask, should the NPV be exempt from the standards of timeliness and contemporaneity Congress customarily sets for constitutional amendments? Opponents might reject claims that, under NPV, campaign spending and candidate appearances would be spread and scheduled more widely, beyond the current concentration of time and resources in battleground states  They might argue that spreading campaign resources and candidate events in non-battleground states is a questionable argument to justify a fundamental change in the presidential election process  Campaign appearances and spending, they could assert, should not be considered to be a local economic stimulus package, nor are the amounts in question sufficient to make much of a difference in the economic condition of most states  As one critical analysis notes, "    the nation does not hold presidential elections to foster local economic development " Moreover, they might continue, it is equally dubious to assert that nominees will slight the concerns of citizens of the non-battleground states from which they draw their greatest support, or that concentrated campaigning in the battleground states somehow "disenfranchises" voters in others  In the modern era, a small percentage of voters actually attends an in-person presidential or vice presidential candidate appearance  Television (especially broadcast and cable TV news networks), social media, the internet, and newspapers—not the traditional rallies, torchlight parades, and handbills—dominate presidential election campaigns in the 21 st century  In addition to policy issues discussed previously, some observers have also raised questions related to the NPV initiative based on the fact that it is an interstate compact as defined in the Constitution  Others have questioned whether NPV might conflict with some provisions of the Voting Rights Act  The NPV initiative has been described by its supporters variously as a bill, a state-level statute, and an interstate compact  The latter reference necessitates an analysis of whether the initiative complies with the Compact Clause of the Constitution  An interstate compact—under the broadest understanding—is a contract between two or more consenting states  The Supreme Court has further suggested that an interstate compact often requires reciprocal commitments between the governments of two or more states, such that one state's commitment is conditioned on the action of another state and no state can unilaterally repeal its commitment  The use of interstate compacts predates the Constitution, as the Articles of Confederation contained a similar Compact Clause that provided a qualified prohibition on states entering into any agreements between them without the consent of Congress  The chaos resulting from the disunity created by the Articles of Confederation prompted the Framers of the Constitution generally to "impose more uniformity" among the states, resulting in a Constitution that wholly prohibits states from entering into any treaties, alliances, and federations  Nonetheless, the Constitution maintained the Articles of Confederation's qualified prohibition on interstate compacts and agreements, allowing states to enter into an interstate compact so long as the participating states seek the consent of Congress  Specifically, the Compact Clause provides that "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress     enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State     " While the historical rationale for Article I's qualified prohibition on interstate compacts is unclear, the Compact Clause generally reflects the view of the Framers that states should be able to work cooperatively together, as well as the concern that unchecked interstate alliances might threaten the harmony of the Union or the authority vested by the Constitution in the federal government  As the Supreme Court noted in Cuyler v  Adams , "By vesting in Congress the power to grant or withhold consent, or to condition consent on the states' compliance with specified conditions, the Framers sought to ensure that Congress would maintain ultimate supervisory power over cooperative state action that might otherwise interfere with the full and free exercise of federal authority " The Compact Clause places no limits on what might be done through an interstate compact other than the requirement of congressional consent  In the early years of government under the Constitution, compacts were used almost exclusively to settle boundary disputes  Beginning with the establishment of the Port of New York Authority in 1921, however, compacts began to be used to address more complex, regional issues requiring intergovernmental cooperation  Some compacts are merely advisory in form, but others may be regulatory, with significant powers granted to multistate commissions  More recently, compacts have addressed such wide-ranging concerns as mental health treatment, law enforcement and crime control, education, driver licensing and enforcement, environmental conservation, energy, nuclear waste control, facilities operations, transportation, economic development, insurance regulation, placement of children and juveniles, disaster assistance, and pollution control  Approximately 200 interstate compacts are in effect today  Accordingly, the central legal issue with respect to the Compact Clause is whether a given interstate compact requires the consent of Congress  While a "literal" reading of the Compact Clause "would require the States to obtain congressional approval before entering into any agreement among themselves, irrespective of form, subject, duration, or interest to the United States [emphasis added]," the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected such a reading  In 1893, in Virginia v  Tenness e e , Justice Stephen Field, writing for the Court, contended that a broad reading of the Compact Clause would "embrace all forms of stipulation, written or verbal, and relating to all kinds of subjects[,]" requiring congressional consent to agreements "which the United States can have no possible objection or have any interest in interfering with," as well as those that "may tend to increase     the political influence of the contracting states, so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States     " Surmising that the Compact Clause could not have been intended to have such a broad reach, Justice Field concluded that the Clause prohibits states from entering into compacts without congressional consent only when the underlying compact is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States " The Supreme Court has subsequently reaffirmed Justice Field's "functional view of the Compact Clause," and, accordingly, generally where an agreement does not fall within the scope of the Compact Clause as envisioned by the Court in Virginia v  Tennessee , the agreement "will not be invalidated for lack of congressional consent " Whether the NPV initiative requires congressional consent under the Compact Clause first requires a determination as to whether NPV even constitutes an interstate compact  At times, its supporters have resisted framing the initiative as an interstate compact, arguably out of concern for running afoul of the Compact Clause's provisions  For example, Professor Akhil Amar has argued that because the initiative does not create a "new interstate governmental apparatus," the NPV should not be considered an interstate compact, as NPV compact signatory states are merely exercising power collectively that each state could exercise on its own  It is unclear, however, whether the creation of a new interstate governmental entity formed out of an agreement between two or more states is necessary, as opposed to sufficient, in order to deem an agreement as being an interstate compact subject to the Compact Clause  While the Supreme Court, in Northeast Bancorp , suggested that a "joint organization or body" formed out of an interstate agreement is a "classic indic[ium] of a compact," the Court has never adopted a definition of an interstate compact that solely rests on the existence of an interstate governmental body  Instead, the Court appears to have adopted a broader definition of what an interstate compact can entail  For example, in Virginia v  Tennessee , the Court noted that the words "compacts" and "agreements" are synonymous and "cover all stipulations affecting the conduct or claims of the parties " In other words, when two or more states enter into a stipulated agreement whereby one state agrees to perform an act in consideration for a reciprocal act by the other state(s), that agreement can be considered an interstate compact  This broad definition of a compact appears to encompass the NPV compact, as the initiative requires signatory states to agree mutually to appoint their electors to the winner of the national popular vote  Moreover, NPV binds each assenting state, as no member state can withdraw from it within six months or less of the end of a President's term  Because NPV prohibits states from freely "modify[ing] or repeal[ing] [the agreement] unilaterally" and requires "reciprocation" of mutual obligations, it appears that the initiative can be described as an interstate compact  Assuming the NPV initiative is an interstate compact, the question remains whether it is one that implicates the Compact Clause  The answer to that question primarily depends on whether NPV is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States  " In other words, the "test" for whether a particular interstate compact requires congressional consent is centrally concerned with vertical balances of power between the federal government and the states; namely, "whether the Compact enhances state power quoad the National Government " While the NPV arguably increases the political power of the states that have consented to it by ensuring that those states' desired outcome for the presidential election—the awarding of the majority of electoral votes to the presidential candidate supported by the majority of the voting populace—it is unclear how that increase in political power would be at the expense of the power of the federal government  After all, the Constitution provides the federal government with no role in determining the members of the electoral college  One scholar has suggested that the NPV initiative would lead to a vertical alteration of power by eliminating the possibility that the House of Representatives would resolve a presidential election in the absence of an electoral majority for a single candidate because it is premised on a majority of electoral votes going to a single candidate  The House of Representatives, however, has decided only two presidential elections in American history, and whether such an arguably hypothetical and de minimis diminishment of federal power through the NPV would be sufficient to require congressional consent under the Compact Clause is simply unresolved by the relevant case law  While the Supreme Court's case law interpreting the Compact Clause is centrally concerned with vertical federalism concerns (i e , the balance of power between the state and federal governments), the Court has recognized a potential secondary rationale suggested for the Compact Clause: to preserve the horizontal balance of powers among the various states  And horizontal federalism concerns could very well be implicated by the Compact Clause, as the provision appears to have been included in the Constitution out of concern both for the supremacy of the federal government and unity among the various states  Whether the NPV compact threatens the powers of nonconsenting states has been the subject of much debate among academics  Those in support of the initiative have contended that the nonconsenting states do not lose any power as a result of the NPV  According to this line of argumentation, even under the NPV, all states would retain their right to select the electors of their choosing, as nonmember state electors would still be counted in the electoral vote  Others, however, have pointed to the underlying premise of the NPV—to enhance the political power of more populous states in presidential elections—as evidence that the initiative diminishes the power of nonconsenting states  In other words, while non-compacting states would still retain the power to appoint electors, the influence that comes with that power would arguably be diminished because a state's role in the national election would be defined by its percentage of the popular vote and not by its percentage of electors, warranting congressional interest in approving a compact that effectuated such a change in national elections  Ultimately, however, whether the NPV actually threatens the power of nonconsenting states is a debate that remains active within academia but would likely be the source of considerable litigation if the initiative ever became effective  If congressional consent is needed for the NPV, that consent can take various forms  Usually congressional consent to an interstate compact takes the form of a joint resolution or act of Congress specifying its approval of the text of the compact and adding any conditions or provisions it deems necessary, often embodying the compact document  As with most congressional actions, consent to an interstate compact must occur with the approval of both houses and must be signed by the President before it becomes law  Rarely has the President vetoed or threatened to veto consent legislation by Congress  While congressional consent to an interstate compact is most often explicit, consent by Congress may also be implied by subsequent acts of Congress as "[a]n inference clear and satisfactory that Congress     intended to consent" to a compact may be sufficient  Congress may also delegate its power to approve a compact to a federal official so long as an "intelligible principle" against which approval can be measured is apparent  Ultimately, if congressional consent is truly needed for NPV to be effective, the initiative might have difficulty ever being enacted because the approval of both houses of Congress and the President would likely necessitate additional hurdles beyond the already challenging task of amassing support at the state level for the NPV  Beyond the legal issues raised with respect to the Compact Clause, the NPV initiative also potentially raises other broader constitutional concerns, including whether the states can functionally obviate the role of the electoral college through the NPV  Article II of the Constitution establishes that the election of the President should occur indirectly through the election by the electoral college  The choice of an indirect election for the President was a deliberate one by the Framers of the Constitution, because, while noting the importance that the "sense of the people" should influence the choice for President, they found it "equally desirable" for the "immediate election" of the President to be made by a body representative of distinct state interests and removed from the threat of unchecked majoritarianism  The result was that the Constitution established a presidential election process that was "manifestly nonmajoritarian," with the electoral college, a body established to represent the distinct views of each state, as the centerpiece of the election process  The central constitutional issue presented by the NPV, therefore, is whether the states, through an interstate compact, can functionally transform the presidential election system enshrined in the Constitution into a more majoritarian process  Supporters of the NPV argue that the Constitution provides the legal means for states to transform the presidential election system into one where the President is elected based solely on the result of the national popular vote  Specifically, clause 2 of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution provides the states with the power to "appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," the electors who represent the state in the electoral college  Facially, the Constitution's primary limitation on the power of a state to select its electors is the final number of electors awarded to each state  While perhaps an argument can be made that the structure, logic, and history of the Constitution place limits on the manner or method in which a state chooses its electors, the text of the Constitution simply does not impose any such limits  Supreme Court case law also supports reading Article II of the Constitution to broadly provide states with wide discretion as to the manner in which its electors are selected  Specifically, in 1892 in McPherson v  Blacker, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld a Michigan law providing for the election by individual congressional district of presidential electors against a challenge that the law violated Article II of the Constitution  In so holding, the Court placed great emphasis on a number of state laws that existed shortly after the ratification that provided a variety of "modes of choosing the electors," including selection by the legislature itself, by a "vote of the people for a general ticket," "by vote of the people in districts," or by some permutation of those methods  Viewing this evidence together with the text of Article II and the historical evidence from the Constitutional Convention led the Court to broadly conclude state legislatures have "conceded plenary power     in the matter of the appointment of electors," allowing the Michigan law to stand  Applying McPherson to the case of the NPV, the argument can and has been made that if the states have plenary power with respect to the manner of how electors are appointed, the power necessarily allows states to select electors in line with the results of the national popular vote  More recently, supporters of the NPV have relied on the Supreme Court's 2015 ruling in Arizona Legislature v  Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC) —which held that the State of Arizona had wide discretion under the Elections Clause of the Constitution to select the method by which the state provided for redistricting —to argue that the states retain broad discretion in selecting electors under Article II, which uses similar language to the provision interpreted in AIRC  Others have argued that the structure of the Constitution and historical evidence suggest that the states do not have such vast discretion in appointing electors as to functionally transform the election for President into a national popular referendum  As noted elsewhere in this report, the electoral college was created by the Framers to ensure that states with the least population retained power in the selection of the President, providing a check against domination by the most populous states  The electoral college, being a product of the choices of individual state legislatures, was envisioned by the Framers as a body that would represent the specific interests of a given state, as opposed to the undifferentiated nation at large  Accordingly, it may be argued that allowing the most populous states to collude to ensure that the national popular vote, as opposed to the wishes of an individual state, dictates the results of a state's slate of electors, could arguably be irreconcilable with the Framers' intentions with respect to the electoral college  As such, for those who find the NPV compact constitutionally suspect under Article II, McPherson 's broad pronouncements about the nature of a state's power to appoint electors should be viewed in the context of that particular case, where the state of Michigan was attempting to appoint its electors based on the votes of an individual district in the state, as opposed to the state as a whole  In contrast to the law at issue in McPherson , with NPV, there appears to be no evidence contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution of a state selecting its electors in accordance with the results of the national popular vote  Unlike the State of Michigan in McPherson , an NPV state's electors might not be a product of the views of the state at the time of the election, but instead would reflect national popular sentiment about who should be the President  Moreover, the Supreme Court, in interpreting arguably analogous language from Article I of the Constitution allowing states to regulate the manner of the selection of the Members of the House of Representatives and Senate, concluded that the states cannot exercise their delegated authority in a way that would "effect a fundamental change in the constitutional structure " The question that remains is whether the Court in a future case challenging the NPV compact would interpret the states' authority under Article II to appoint electors to be broad enough to allow the President to be selected as a result of the national popular vote, a question that, given the lack of any precise precedent respecting the constitutionality of the NPV compact under Article II, will likely remain unresolved until such time  Other critics claim the NPV compact might violate Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)  Writing in Columbia Law Review , David Gringer invokes the voting power theory  He argues that the plan conflicts with Section 2 of the VRA because moving from "a state-based [vote] to a national popular vote dilutes the voting strength of a given state's minority population by reducing its ability [voting power] to influence the outcome of presidential elections " Gringer also asserts that the NPV compact may violate Section 5 of the act  In 2013, however, the U S  Supreme Court invalidated Section 4(b) of the VRA, which contained a formula prescribing which states and jurisdictions with a history of discrimination were required to obtain prior approval or "preclearance" under Section 5 before changing any voting standard, practice, or procedure  Although the Court invalidated only the coverage formula in Section 4, by extension, Section 5 has been rendered currently inoperable  Prior to the Supreme Court ruling, Gringer argued that the NPV compact would qualify as a covered practice under Section 5, and that the legislatures of all the "covered" states would have been required to obtain preclearance before implementing the compact  Responding to this point, National Popular Vote Inc  noted the following: The National Popular Vote bill manifestly would make every person's vote for President equal throughout the United States in an election to fill a single office (the Presidency)  It is entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act  There have been court cases under the Voting Rights Act concerning contemplated changes in voting methods for various representative legislative bodies     However, these cases do not bear on elections to fill a single office (i e , the Presidency)  In 2012, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division specifically declined to challenge California's accession to the NPV compact on VRA grounds  The states' authority to appoint electors by any method their legislatures choose is not absolute  Federal court decisions have struck down state laws concerning appointment of electors that were found to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection: Although Clause 2 (of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution) seemingly vests complete discretion in the states, certain older cases had recognized a federal interest in protecting the integrity of the process  Thus, the Court upheld the power of Congress to protect the right of all citizens who are entitled to vote to lend aid and support in any legal manner to the election of any legally qualified person as a presidential elector     [I]n Oregon v  Mitchell (42 U S  112 (1970)), the Court upheld the power of Congress to reduce the voting age in presidential elections and to set a thirty-day durational residency period as a qualification for voting in presidential elections  Although the Justices were divided on the reasons, the rationale emerging from this case, considered with Williams v  Rhodes , (393 U S  20 1968)) is that the Fourteenth Amendment limits state discretion in prescribing the manner of selecting electors and that Congress in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment may override state practices that violate that Amendment and may substitute standards of its own  Critics of the electoral college system have sought direct election of the President and Vice President without success for more than two centuries  The NPV initiative represents a novel effort to achieve this goal by use of an interstate compact that would circumvent the stringent requirements necessary for the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments  Since its inception in 2006, NPV has achieved a degree of success: 14 states and the District of Columbia, controlling a total of 189 electoral votes, have joined the compact since 2008  Progress has arguably been sporadic, however, notwithstanding active campaigning by National Popular Vote Inc  Over the course of more than a decade, NPV has heretofore failed to develop a sustained momentum toward its stated goal of states controlling 270 electoral votes  The action of three states in joining NPV to date in 2019 marks the most activity in a single year since 2008; it remains to be seen whether this trend will continue  To date, certain Democratic-leaning states have joined the compact  The arguable lack of support in Republican-controlled state legislatures raises questions about further accessions to the compact in the immediate future, particularly given the fact that the GOP controlled both legislative chambers in 30 states following the 2018 elections  To date, while the NPV initiative has generated interest among supporters of direct popular election of the President, it does not appear to have gained widespread awareness among the public at large  The findings of the March 27, 2019, Politico/Morning Consult survey cited earlier in this report arguably suggest that greater public knowledge of NPV might spur popular support for the compact  This might then contribute to further momentum if additional states were to join, particularly populous ones like Florida (29 electoral votes), Georgia (16 electoral votes), and Ohio (18 electoral votes) where the compact was under active consideration in 2019  Under these circumstances, proponents might be energized and encouraged by a sense of progress for the initiative  At the same time, NPV opponents could be expected to coalesce around the issues identified earlier in this report, and renew and increase their efforts in defense of the electoral college system  The activities of both might ultimately bring the NPV initiative to the more immediate attention of Congress 

ground_truth: The Forest Service, an agency within USDA, performs a variety of tasks as steward of 193 million acres of public forests and grasslands. Its budget execution process for carrying out its mission includes (1) allotments, which are authorizations by an agency to incur obligations within a specified amount, and (2) unliquidated obligations, which represent budgetary resources that have been committed but not yet paid. Deobligation refers to an agency's cancellation or downward adjustments of previously incurred obligations, which may result in funds that may be available for reobligation. GAO was asked to review the Forest Service's internal controls over its budget execution processes. This report examines the extent to which the Forest Service properly designed control activities over (1) allotments of budgetary resources, its system for administrative control of funds, and any fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations; (2) reimbursables and related collections; and (3) review and certification of unliquidated obligations. GAO reviewed the Forest Service's policies, procedures, and other documentation and interviewed agency officials. In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the Forest Service received discretionary no-year appropriations of $5.1 billion and $5.7 billion, respectively. It is critical for the Forest Service to manage its budgetary resources efficiently and effectively. While the Forest Service had processes over certain of its budget execution activities, GAO found the following internal control deficiencies: Budgetary resources . The purpose statute requires that amounts designated in appropriations acts for specific purposes are used as designated. The Forest Service did not have an adequate process and related control activities to reasonably assure that amounts were used as designated. In fiscal year 2017, GAO issued a legal opinion that the Forest Service had failed to comply with the purpose statute with regard to a $65 million line-item appropriation specifically provided for the purpose of acquiring aircraft for the next-generation airtanker fleet. Further, the Forest Service lacked a process and related control activities to reasonably assure that unobligated no-year appropriation balances from prior years were reviewed for their continuing need; did not have a properly designed system for administrative control of funds, which keeps obligations and expenditures from exceeding limits authorized by law; and had not properly designed control activities for fund transfers to its Wildland Fire Management program. These deficiencies increase the risk that the Forest Service may make budget requests in excess of its needs. Reimbursable agreements . To carry out its mission, the Forest Service enters into reimbursable agreements with agencies within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), other federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and nongovernment entities. The Forest Service (1) did not have adequately described processes and related control activities in manuals and handbooks for its reimbursable agreement processes and (2) lacked control activities related to segregating incompatible duties performed by line officers and program managers. For example, line officers may be responsible for initiating cost sharing agreements, modifying cost settlement packages, and changing or canceling the related receivable, which represent incompatible duties. As a result, programs and resources may not be protected from waste, fraud, and mismanagement. Unliquidated obligations . The Forest Service's processes and control activities over the review and certification of unliquidated obligations were not properly designed to reasonably assure the best use of funds and that unliquidated obligations would be efficiently and effectively deobligated and made available for other program needs. Further, the current process, as designed, was inconsistent with USDA and Forest Service policy. In addition, the Forest Service's manuals and handbooks, which provide directives for the areas that GAO reviewed, had not been reviewed by management in accordance with the Forest Service's 5-year review policy. Further, standard operating procedures and desk guides prepared by staff to supplement the manuals and handbooks were not issued as directives and therefore were not considered official policy. This increases the risk that control activities may not be consistently performed across the agency. GAO is making 11 recommendations to improve processes and related internal control activities over the management of the Forest Service's budgetary resources, reimbursable receivables and collections, and its process for reviewing unliquidated obligations. The Forest Service generally agreed with the report and stated that it has made significant progress to address the report findings.