prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: We testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services in September 2017 after four significant mishaps at sea resulted in the loss of 17 sailors’ lives and serious damage to Navy ships  We reported on some of the Navy’s challenges, including the degraded condition and expired training certifications of ships homeported overseas, reductions to ship crews that contributed to sailor overwork and safety risks, and an inability to complete maintenance on time  Since that time, the Navy has completed two internal reviews to address these and other challenges, identifying 111 recommendations to improve surface fleet readiness  The Navy formed an executive group to guide and closely track the implementation of recommendations, and its reform efforts are ongoing  As of November 2018, the Navy reported that it had implemented 78 (i e , 70 percent) of these recommendations  Navy officials recognize that full implementation will take significant time and management attention to address the fundamental readiness challenges identified  In figure 1, we show photographs of two of the four Navy ships involved in significant mishaps that occurred in 2017  Both the USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S  McCain were involved in collisions that resulted in sailor fatalities  DOD has reported that more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and reductions in force structure have degraded its readiness; in response, the department has made rebuilding readiness a priority  The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness across the entire spectrum of conflict is critical to success in the emerging security environment  Nevertheless, DOD reported that readiness of the total military force remains low and has remained so since 2013  Our work has shown that the Navy has experienced increasing maintenance challenges as a high pace of operations has continued and maintenance has been deferred  Maintenance and personnel challenges also hinder readiness recovery of Navy aircraft  For the Marine Corps, our work has shown that ground force readiness has improved and remained stable in recent years, but acute readiness problems remain in aviation units  Over the past year, DOD has made department-wide progress in developing a plan to rebuild the readiness of the military force, with the military services providing regular input on the status of their readiness recovery efforts  In August 2018, we reported that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has developed a Readiness Recovery Framework that the department is using to guide the services’ efforts and plans to use to regularly assess, validate, and monitor readiness recovery  The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services have recently revised readiness goals and accompanying recovery strategies, metrics, and milestones to align with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance  We have ongoing work assessing DOD’s progress in achieveing its overall readiness goals  DOD’s readiness rebuilding efforts are occurring in a challenging context that requires the department to make difficult decisions regarding how best to address continuing operational demands while preparing for future challenges  Our work has shown that an important aspect of this, across all of the services, is determining an appropriate balance between maintaining and upgrading legacy weapon systems currently in operational use and procuring new ones to overcome rapidly advancing future threats  Based on updated information we received in November 2018, the Navy has taken steps to provide dedicated training time so its surface forces may meet existing Navy training standards and their training is certified when they deploy  However, the Navy continues to struggle with rebuilding the readiness of the existing fleet due to enduring maintenance and manning challenges  As the Navy seeks to expand its fleet by 25 percent, these challenges will likely be further exacerbated and the Navy will likely face additional affordability challenges  After the collisions in 2017, the Navy focused on training surface ship crews to its existing standards  We testified in September 2017 that there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers based in Japan and 37 percent of training certifications for these surface ship crews had lapsed as of June 2017  Since that time, the Navy has worked to ensure surface ships are certified before they are deployed  For example, the Navy has established controls to limit waivers that allowed training lapses to worsen, now requiring multiple high-level approvals for ships to operate uncertified  Based on our analysis of updated data, the Navy has improved markedly in the percentage of cruisers and destroyers with lapsed certifications in Japan, from 41 percent of certifications expired in September 2017 to 9 percent as of November 2018, with less than 3 percent of certifications expired on ships in operational status  While the Navy has demonstrated its commitment to ensuring that crews are certified prior to deploying, training for amphibious operations and higher-level collective training may not be fully implemented for several years  In September 2017, we reported that some Marine Corps units were limited in their ability to complete training to conduct an amphibious operation—a military operation that is launched from the sea to introduce a landing force ashore—by several factors, including a decline in the number of amphibious ships from 62 in 1990 to 32 as of November 2018, access to range space, and a high pace of deployments, among others  We recommended that the Navy and the Marine Corps develop an approach to mitigate their amphibious operations training shortfalls as the services await the arrival of additional amphibious ships into the fleet  Marine Corps officials told us that the Marine Corps and the Navy are working together to maximize amphibious training opportunities  Additionally, the Navy has plans to phase in high-level collective training into the operational schedules of its ships homeported in Japan over the next several years  Previously, advanced and integrated training involving multiple ships was conducted ad hoc if at all for ships homeported in Japan  Such collective training is important because the 2018 National Defense Strategy states that the department’s principal priority is to prepare for threats from strategic competitors due to the magnitude of the threat they pose  However, in November 2018, officials from Fleet Forces Command told us that fully implementing its training approach to prepare for advanced adversaries would not be fully implemented across the fleet for several years  We have reported that the Navy faces persistent challenges in completing maintenance on time and providing sufficient manning to its ships  Unless these challenges are addressed, the Navy will be hampered in its ability to rebuild readiness and prepare for the future  Our work has found that the Navy has been unable to complete ship and submarine maintenance on time, resulting in continuing schedule delays that reduce time for training and operations and create costly inefficiencies in a resource constrained environment  The Navy’s readiness recovery is premised on the rigorous adherence to deployment, training, and maintenance schedules  However, we reported in May 2016 on the difficulty that both the public and private shipyards were having in completing maintenance on time  We reported that, from 2011 through 2014, about 28 percent of scheduled maintenance for surface combatants was completed on time and 11 percent was completed on time for aircraft carriers  We updated these data as of November 2018 to include maintenance periods completed through the end of fiscal year 2018 and found that the Navy continues to struggle to complete maintenance on time  For fiscal years 2012-2018, our analysis for key portions of the Navy fleet shows that 30 percent of Navy maintenance was completed on time, leading to more than 27,000 days in which ships were delayed and unavailable for training and operations as shown in figure 2 below  In addition to affecting training and operations, maintenance delays are costly  In November 2018, we examined attack submarine maintenance delays and reported that the Navy was incurring significant operating and support costs to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that are delayed getting into and out of shipyard maintenance periods  We estimated that over the past 10 years the Navy has spent $1 5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle no longer certified to conduct normal operations—while waiting to enter the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards (see figure 3)  We recommended that the Navy analyze how it allocates its maintenance workload across public and private shipyards  DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that it has taken the first steps to take a more holistic view of submarine maintenance requirements and impacts across both the public and private shipyards  In an update provided in November 2018, the Navy told us that they are developing a contracting strategy to conduct two additional depot maintenance periods at private shipyards in the future  Our prior work has shown that three primary factors at the naval shipyards contribute to maintenance delays: Poor conditions and aging equipment limit the ability of the shipyards to meet current and future demands  We reported in September 2017 that facility and equipment limitations at the shipyards contributed to maintenance delays for the aircraft carriers and submarines, hindering the shipyards’ ability to support the Navy  Specifically, we found that the shipyards would be unable to support an estimated one-third of maintenance periods planned over the next 23 years  We recommended that the Navy take steps to improve its management of shipyard investments; the Navy concurred with this recommendation and we are encouraged by its response  For example, the Navy has developed a plan for the optimal placement of facilities and major equipment at each public shipyard, which the Navy estimates can ultimately increase its maintenance efficiency by reducing personnel and materiel travel by an average of 65 percent  This equates to recovering about 328,000 man days per year—an amount roughly equal to that of an aircraft carrier maintenance period  However, the Navy’s preliminary estimate —that this effort will require an estimated $21 billion and 20 years to address—is well beyond historical funding levels, and does not include some potentially significant costs (e g , for utilities, roads, or environmental remediation)  Shipyard workforce gaps and inexperience are limiting factors  The Navy has reported a variety of workforce challenges at the Navy’s four public shipyards such as hiring personnel in a timely manner and providing personnel with the training necessary to gain proficiency in critical skills  The Navy has noted that some occupations require years of training before workers become proficient  According to Navy officials, a large portion of its workforce is inexperienced  For example, 45 percent of the Puget Sound and 30 percent of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyards’ skilled workforce have fewer than 5 years of experience  According to DOD officials, workforce shortages and inexperience contribute to maintenance delays  For example, at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, two submarines were delayed approximately 20 months, in part because of shortages in ship fitters and welders, among other skilled personnel  Most of DOD’s depots, which include the naval shipyards, have taken actions to maintain critical skills through retention incentives, bonuses, and awards  We plan to issue a report examining DOD’s depot skill gaps, including those at the naval shipyards, later this month  Depot supply support may not be cost-effective  In June 2016, we reported that the naval shipyards and other depots had not implemented actions that would likely improve the cost-effectiveness of their supply operations  Specifically, the Navy had not transferred certain functions to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) at the shipyards in the same manner as the Navy and Air Force did for their aviation depots  The Navy and Air Force aviation depots that transferred these functions to DLA had reaped a number of efficiencies in their supply operations, including a 10-percent reduction in backorders over a 5-year period  We recommended that the Navy analyze whether such a transfer of functions is warranted at the shipyards and the Navy concurred with the recommendation  However, as of October 2018, the Navy had not conducted a comprehensive analysis of transferring these functions and had provided no plans to do so  In May 2017, we reported that the Navy’s process for determining manpower requirements—the number and skill mix of sailors needed on the Navy’s ships—did not fully account for all ship workload  The Navy was using outdated standards to calculate the size of ship crews that may have been leading to overburdened crews working long hours  We recommended steps to help ensure the Navy’s manpower requirements meet the needs of the existing and future surface fleet, and the Navy has been studying ship workload and revising its guidance  As of November 2018, the Navy was continuing to analyze the manpower requirements of its ship classes to better size and compose ship crews, and the Navy was also working to improve shipboard manning  However, these efforts are not yet complete and it is too early to assess their effectiveness  Until manpower requirements are reassessed across the fleet, the Navy risks that ship crews will continue to be undersized and sailors will be overworked with potential negative effects on readiness and safety  Additionally, the Navy provided information in November 2018 that showed that it is taking steps to ensure that ships have a minimum percentage of crew assigned and with the appropriate skills  The Navy has prioritized manning its surface ships homeported overseas  The Navy established a minimum threshold of filling at least 95 percent of authorized billets in its ship crews with sailors (referred to as fill), with a minimum goal of 92 percent of those sailors having the right qualifications for the billet (known as fit)  According to Navy officials, the Navy is for the most part meeting its fill goals Navy-wide, but has not consistently met its fit goals  However, during group discussions in November 2018 with ship crews and interviews with Navy officials in Japan, we learned that the Navy’s methods for tracking fit and fill do not account for sailor experience and may be inaccurately capturing the actual presence of sailors onboard and available for duty on its ships  Moreover, sailors consistently told us that ship workload has not decreased, and it is still extremely challenging to complete all required workload while getting enough sleep  Navy officials told us that manning challenges will continue through at least fiscal year 2021 as the Navy increases its end strength and trains its new sailors to gain the proper mix of skills to operate and maintain the fleet  To meet continued operational demands, the Navy is planning for the most significant fleet size increase in over 30 years  According to the Navy’s fiscal year 2019 shipbuilding plan, the Navy plans to build and maintain a fleet of 355 battle force ships—an increase of about 25 percent above the Navy’s current force of 287 ships  To reach its goal, the Navy plans to buy 301 ships through 2048 and extend the service life of its 66 Arleigh Burke class destroyers and up to 7 attack submarines  Together, the fiscal year 2019 shipbuilding plan and the service life extensions would allow the Navy to reach a 355-ship fleet by the 2030s  Congressional Budget Office reporting and our past work have shown that the Navy has consistently and significantly underestimated the cost and timeframes for delivering new ships to the fleet  For example, the Navy estimates that buying the new ships specified in the fiscal year 2019 plan would cost $631 billion over 30 years while the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that those new ships would cost $801 billion—a difference of 27 percent  We also reported in June 2018 that acquisition outcomes for ship classes built during the last 10 years have often not achieved cost, schedule, quality, or performance goals that were established  Furthermore, we have reported that: all 8 of the lead ships delivered over the past decade that we reviewed were provided to the fleet behind schedule, and more than half of those ships were delayed by more than 2 years, and six ships of different classes valued at $6 3 billion were delivered to the Navy with varying degrees of incomplete work and quality problems  As a result of past cost and schedule problems, our work has shown that the Navy has a less-capable and smaller fleet today than it planned over 10 years ago  The Navy has also received $24 billion more in funding than it originally planned in its 2007 long-range shipbuilding plan but has 50 fewer ships in its inventory today, as compared with the goals it first established  Therefore, we have reported that as the Navy moves forward in implementing its shipbuilding plan it will be paramount for the Navy to learn from and apply lessons learned from the past  In addition to the cost of buying the ships and submarines to expand fleet size, the Navy will likely face affordability challenges with regard to the manning of an expanded fleet with the right number of sailors with the right mix of skills  In May 2017, we reported that the personnel costs for surface ship classes in fiscal years 2000-2015 were the largest share of total operating and support costs and that careful planning will be needed as new ships are brought into the fleet  We also reported that crew sizes on recently inducted ship classes grew from original projections as the Navy gained experience operating them  For example, the total crew size of Littoral Combat Ships has grown from 75 in 2003 to 98 personnel in 2016, a 31-percent increase  Navy officials told us that they plan to better articulate the personnel and resources needed for a larger fleet after fully accounting for workload and right-sizing ship crews  The Navy’s end strength has since increased by over 11,000 personnel from fiscal year 2017 levels, which should help alleviate manning challenges as the fleet grows  In November 2018, officials from Fleet Forces Command provided us with projections of its manning shortfalls continuing through at least fiscal year 2021 and steps it was planning to take to mitigate them  Our work has shown that Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited by aging aircraft, delayed maintenance, and insufficient supply support  Pilot and maintenance personnel shortfalls further limit readiness recovery across legacy air platforms  The growing F-35 program, which is meant to replace many aging aircraft, has presented additional operational and sustainment challenges, which will likely persist into the future if not corrected  DOD, the Navy, and the Marine Corps have emphasized mission capability of critical aviation platforms— including the Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18s and F-35s—and are taking steps to improve availability, but these efforts will take time to realize results  Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited by challenges associated with aging aircraft fleets, depot maintenance, and supply support challenges that limit the services’ ability to keep aviation units ready  The Navy and Marine Corps spend billions of dollars each year on sustainment, such as for spare parts and depot maintenance, to meet aircraft availability goals  However, aircraft availability rates have generally declined since fiscal year 2011  While specific aircraft availability data are considered sensitive by the Navy and the Marine Corps, and cannot be discussed in detail, we found in September 2018 that the Navy and the Marine Corps generally did not meet aircraft availability goals in fiscal years 2011-2016 for the seven aircraft we reviewed  In updating data in November 2018, we found that none of the aircraft met aircraft availability goals for fiscal years 2017 and 2018  According to the Navy, the pace of operations has increased wear and tear on its aircraft and decreased the time available for maintenance and modernization—a necessity for an aging fleet  For example, the average age of a legacy F/A-18A-D Hornet is 26 years, of an AV-8B Harrier is 21 years, and of the C-2A Greyhound is 29 years  Both services expect these aircraft will continue to be used for the foreseeable future and in some cases into the 2030s  The Navy and the Marine Corps face delays in the arrival of the F-35 to replace their legacy F/A-18A-D Hornets and AV-8B Harriers  To compensate for the delay, the Navy and the Marine Corps are planning to procure additional aircraft, such as the F/A-18E-F Super Hornet, and extend the service life and upgrade the capabilities of their legacy aircraft  However, these efforts and the sustainment of the Navy and Marine Corps legacy aircraft fleet face key challenges as shown in figure 4  Specifically, our prior work has shown that the Navy and the Marine Corps are confronted with two sets of challenges in sustaining their aircraft: Depot maintenance complexities for aging aircraft and spare parts availability  Depot maintenance on aging weapon systems, including Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, becomes less predictable as structural fatigue occurs and parts that were not expected to be replaced begin to wear out  While the Navy and the Marine Corps reported that sustainment funding accounts, such as those for depot maintenance and spare parts, have been funded at increased levels in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, efforts to improve spare parts availability take time to produce results due to long lead times for acquiring some items  In addition, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft face challenges associated with diminishing manufacturing sources and parts obsolescence  DOD has a program intended to manage these risks, but we reported in September 2017 that its implementation varied across DOD weapon system program offices  We made recommendations to improve the program’s management; DOD concurred and has initiated improvement efforts  Maintenance personnel inexperience and retention  The Navy has had difficulty attracting and retaining skilled maintainers, such as sheet metal workers and machinists at its aviation depots (i e , Fleet Readiness Centers), which directly affects its ability to complete planned maintenance  Some of the depots experienced challenges attracting and retaining skilled personnel due to competition with nearby contractors that are able to offer higher pay, according to Navy depot officials  Similar to the shipyards, the aviation depots also lack experienced personnel, affecting the efficiency and quality of maintenance  For example, 41 percent of the skilled workers at Fleet Readiness Center Southwest have 2 years or fewer of experience  Workforce inexperience and attrition of skilled personnel were some of the reasons cited for machining defects detected in the landing gear for F/A-18, E-2, and C-2A aircraft by a recent Navy report  All of the depots have undertaken retention efforts such as incentives, bonuses, and awards to address these issues  Until the Navy and Marine Corps address maintenance and supply challenges it will be difficult to meet Secretary of Defense-established mission capability goals  Specifically, in September 2018, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum emphasizing that a key component of implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy is ensuring critical aviation platforms meet their mission capability targets by the end of fiscal year 2019  The memorandum established a goal of achieving a minimum of 80-percent mission capable rates for various aircraft, including for the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ F/A-18 inventories, by the end of fiscal year 2019 while also reducing operating and maintenance costs  To accomplish this, the Navy and the Marine Corps developed the Return to Readiness strategy in November 2018 that includes a broad array of actions to improve the availability of spare parts and evaluate the application of best commercial practices to naval aviation sustainment, among other actions  Office of the Secretary of Defense and Navy program officials told us, and based on our prior work we agree, that this goal will be challenging to achieve by the end of fiscal year 2019  We reported in April 2018 that fighter pilot shortages in the Navy and the Marine Corps have been worsening in recent years and shortfalls are projected to remain through at least fiscal year 2023  Our analysis of Navy and Marine Corps data showed that the Navy’s shortage of first operational tour fighter pilots more than doubled from 12 percent in fiscal year 2013 to 26 percent in fiscal year 2017  Similarly, the Marine Corps’ overall shortage of fighter pilots quadrupled from 6 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 24 percent in fiscal year 2017  Also, as we reported in April 2018, service officials attributed the pilot shortages to reduced training opportunities and increased attrition due to career dissatisfaction, among other factors  Officials from both services stated at the time that they have ensured that deploying squadrons have been fully staffed with fighter pilots by using various approaches including using senior pilots to staff junior positions and having pilots deploy more frequently and for longer periods  However, we reported that squadron leaders and fighter pilots said that these approaches had a negative impact on the fighter pilot training and retention and ultimately may be exacerbating the situation  Further compounding their pilot shortages, we also found that the services have not recently reevaluated squadron requirements to reflect an increased fighter pilot workload  As a result, the reported shortage actually could be greater  The services were taking actions, including increasing retention incentives for fighter pilots  To help determine the magnitude of the shortages and help target strategies to better meet their personnel needs, we recommended, and the Navy and Marine Corps agreed, to reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements  Sustainment challenges are not just an issue for older aircraft, but represent an enduring challenge for the F-35 Lightning II aircraft—a key component to the future of tactical aviation for the Navy and Marine Corps  The Navy and Marine Corps are both flying F-35s now as the program ramps up development, and they plan to procure nearly 700 aircraft over the coming decades  The sustainment costs of the F-35 fleet are projected to exceed $1 trillion over its 60-year life cycle  In October 2017, we reported that: F-35B aircraft (including Marine Corps aircraft) were available (i e , the aircraft were safe to fly, available for use, and able to perform at least one tasked mission) about 52 percent of the time from March 2017 through June 2017, which fell short of the 65-percent goal established by the Marine Corps for non-deployed units and F-35B aircraft (including Marine Corps aircraft) were fully mission capable (i e , the aircraft were capable of accomplishing all tasked missions) about 15 percent of the time from March 2017 through June 2017, which fell short of the 60-percent goal established by the Marine Corps for non-deployed units  We also reported on numerous sustainment challenges leading to less than desirable outcomes for F-35 warfighter readiness  For example, F-35 aircraft were unable to fly 22 percent of the time because of parts shortages from January 2017 through August 7, 2017  Additionally, DOD’s capabilities to repair F-35 parts at military depots were 6 years behind schedule, which resulted in average part repair times that are twice that of the program’s objective  As DOD gains experience with the F-35, our work has shown that the department has encountered additional challenges  In 2017, the Marine Corps became the first military service to station F-35 aircraft overseas, transferring aircraft to Iwakuni, Japan  While in the Pacific, DOD expects to disperse its F-35s into smaller detachments to outmaneuver the enemy and counter regional threats  However, in April 2018, we reported that this approach posed logistics and supply challenges  In June 2018, we reported that the F-35 program had not improved its reliability and maintainability over the past year and continued to fall short on half of its performance targets  Furthermore, we found that the program may not meet its required targets before each variant of the F-35 is expected to demonstrate maturity—the point at which the aircraft has flown enough hours to predictably determine reliability and maintainability over its lifespan  This means that the Navy and the Marine Corps may have to decide whether they are willing to accept less reliable and maintainable aircraft than originally planned  Among other outcomes, this could result in higher maintenance costs and lower aircraft availability than anticipated which also could pose readiness challenges in the future  As we reported in October 2017, the poor reliability of certain parts is already contributing to shortages of F-35 spare parts  Challenges posed by the F-35 program are largely the result of sustainment plans that do not fully include or consider key requirements  Our work has shown that planning for sustainment and aligning its funding are critical if DOD wants to meet its aircraft availability goals and effectively deploy to support operations  To address the challenges associated with F-35 sustainment and operational deployment, we recommended that DOD revise its sustainment plans, align associated funding, and mitigate the risks associated with key supply chain-related challenges for deployed F-35s in the Pacific, among others  DOD concurred with these recommendations and stated that it is taking steps to address them  Furthermore, as previously discussed, the Secretary of Defense has established an 80-percent mission capability goal for critical aviation assets, including the F-35  Due to current low availability and numerous sustainment issues, the F-35 fleet will be challenged in meeting the goal  In sum, the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ significant readiness challenges have developed over more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and reductions in force structure  Both services have made encouraging progress identifying the causes of their readiness decline and have begun efforts to arrest and reverse it; however, our prior work shows that fully addressing the persistent readiness challenges will require years of sustained management attention  Our work cited today contains 25 specific recommendations to the Navy and the Marine Corps and an additional 20 recommendations to various other DOD components to assist these services in rebuilding the readiness of their forces and in modernizing for the future  Attention to these recommendations can assist the Navy and the Marine Corps as they seek to rebuild the readiness of their forces  Chairmen Wicker and Sullivan, Ranking Members Hirono and Kaine, and Members of the Subcommittees, this concludes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time  If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact John H  Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Clarine Allen; Steven Banovac; John Bumgarner; Chris Cronin; Benjamin Emmel; Cynthia Grant; Mae Jones; Amie Lesser; Tobin McMurdie; Shahrzad Nikoo; Carol Petersen; Cody Raysinger; Michael Silver; John E  “Jet” Trubey; and Chris Watson  Over the past 4 years, we have issued a number of reports related to Navy and Marine Corps readiness and we used them to develop this statement  Table 1 summarizes the recommendations in these reports  The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with most of the 45 recommendations and has many actions underway  However, DOD has not fully implemented any of the recommendations to date  For each of the reports, the specific recommendations and any progress made in implementing them are summarized in tables 2 through 16  Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are classified  Report numbers with a SU suffix are sensitive but unclassified  Classified and sensitive but unclassified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances and need to know, upon request  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet  GAO-19-229  Washington, D C : November 19, 2018  Air Force Readiness: Actions Needed to Rebuild Readiness and Prepare for the Future  GAO-19-120T  Washington, D C : October 10, 2018  Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need to Be Clarified  GAO-18-678  Washington, D C : September 10, 2018  Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need Clarification  GAO-18-146SU  Washington, D C : April 25, 2018  Military Readiness: Update on DOD’s Progress in Developing a Readiness Rebuilding Plan  GAO-18-441RC  Washington, D C : August 10, 2018  (SECRET) Military Personnel: Collecting Additional Data Could Enhance Pilot Retention Efforts  GAO-18-439  Washington, D C : June 21, 2018  F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Development Is Nearly Complete, but Deficiencies Found in Testing Need to Be Resolved  GAO-18-321  Washington, D C : June 5, 2018  Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Share F-35 Operational Lessons Across the Military Services  GAO-18-464R  Washington, D C : April 25, 2018  Military Readiness: Clear Policy and Reliable Data Would Help DOD Better Manage Service Members’ Time Away from Home  GAO-18-253  Washington, D C : April 25, 2018  Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Fighter Pilot Workforce Requirements  GAO-18-113  Washington, D C : April 11, 2018  Military Aircraft: F-35 Brings Increased Capabilities, but the Marine Corps Needs to Assess Challenges Associated with Operating in the Pacific  GAO-18-79C  Washington, D C : March 28, 2018  (SECRET) Navy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training  GAO-18-212T  Washington, DC : December 1, 2017  F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Challenges Affecting Readiness and Cost Transparency  GAO-18-75  Washington, D C : October 26, 2017  Defense Supply Chain: DOD Needs Complete Information on Single Sources of Supply to Proactively Manage the Risks  GAO-17-768  Washington, D C : September 28, 2017  Navy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training  GAO-17-789  Washington, D C : September 26, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-809T  Washington, D C : September 19, 2017  Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions That Affect Operation  GAO-17-548  Washington, D C : September 12, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-798T  Washington, D C : September 7, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Maintain Viable Surge Sealift and Combat Logistics Fleets GAO-17-503  Washington, D C : August 22, 2017 (reissued on Oct 31, 2017)  Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges  GAO-17-369  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  Military Readiness: Coastal Riverine Force Challenges  GAO-17-462C  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  (SECRET) Navy Shipbuilding: Policy Changes Needed to Improve the Post-Delivery Process and Ship Quality  GAO-17-418  Washington, D C : July 13, 2017 Offshore Petroleum Discharge System: The Navy Has Not Mitigated Risk Associated with System Limitations  GAO-17-531C  Washington, D C : June 22, 2017  (SECRET) Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and Composition of Ship Crews  GAO-17-413  Washington, D C : May 18, 2017  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-841  Washington, D C : September 7, 2016  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-534C  Washington, D C : June 30, 2016  (SECRET) Defense Inventory: Further Analysis and Enhanced Metrics Could Improve Service Supply and Depot Operations  GAO-16-450  Washington, D C : June 9, 2016  Navy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness  GAO-16-481RC  Washington, D C : May 25, 2016  (SECRET//NOFORN) Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan  GAO-16-466R  Washington, D C : May 2, 2016  F-35 Sustainment: DOD Needs a Plan to Address Risks Related to Its Central Logistics System  GAO-16-439  Washington, D C : April 14, 2016  Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports  GAO-15-329  Washington, D C : May 29, 2015  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2:  The number of projects identified in agency Plans ranged from as few as 3 projects (the minimum required in the Plans) to nearly 400 projects  The estimated space reductions per project across agencies ranged from about 1,400 to over 94,000 square feet  For example, the Department of Veterans Affairs has a relatively large office and warehouse portfolio of over 28-million square feet  As part of its fiscal year 2017 Plan, the agency reported 320 planned or ongoing projects with an average space reduction of about 1,800 square feet per project  Conversely, the Office of Personnel Management has a relatively small office space portfolio of about 1-million square feet; its fiscal year 2017 Plan identified 4 ongoing or potential projects with an average space reduction of about 6,000 square feet  In fiscal year 2016—the first and only year RTF data were available at the time of our review—the majority (71 percent or 17 of the 24 agencies) reported they achieved reductions in their office and warehouse space even though the agencies had varying success in achieving the individual targets they set for themselves  For example, as shown in figure 2, of the 17 agencies that reduced space, 9 exceeded their targets (i e , reduced more space than planned); 7 reduced space but missed their target (by anywhere between 2 8 and 96 7 percent); and 1 agency expected to increase in square footage, but reduced space  Whether an agency met its target is not the only indicator of an agency’s success in reducing space  For example, although some agencies missed their targets, they reduced their office and warehouse space by a larger percentage than some agencies that exceeded their targets  Also, the fact that some agencies missed their targets can in part be attributed to setting more aggressive targets than other agencies  Agencies’ fiscal year 2016 targets ranged from a 0 8 percent increase to an 8 4 percent decrease in office and warehouse space  Of the 9 agencies that exceeded their reduction targets, 4 more than tripled their target  As mentioned, agency targets are set by the agency and are a reflection of their unique situation including mission needs and priorities and therefore cannot be generalized across agencies  For example, Energy exceeded its fiscal year 2016 reduction target and reduced 292,140 square feet of space (0 8 percent of its total square footage)  However, the Environmental Protection Agency missed its target, which was the second most aggressive target across all the agencies at 7 2 percent of its total square footage; but the agency reduced 174,003 square feet (3 24 percent of its total square footage)  Of the three agencies with the most aggressive target reductions—those that ranged between 6 7 and 8 4 percent of their total square footage—only one met its target  Figure 3 shows the extent to which each of the CFO Act agencies met its fiscal year 2016 targets  See appendix II for more detailed information on each agencies’ square footage of space, reduction targets and fiscal year 2016 reductions  Officials from our case study agencies cited a number of factors that influenced whether or not they met their fiscal year 2016 targets, and may also affect their target achievement in subsequent years  Of our five case study agencies, three exceeded their fiscal year 2016 reduction target and two missed their target  Timing and funding: Officials from two case study agencies cited timing as a factor, noting that there is fluidity to the project’s planning, implementation, and disposal process that may not always be within an agency’s control  As a result, space reductions anticipated in one fiscal year may not be realized until a subsequent fiscal year; conversely, some space reduction opportunities may present themselves unexpectedly  For example, according to officials at HUD, which missed its fiscal year 2016 reduction target, some projects take longer than anticipated to start or complete  HUD officials said that their fiscal year 2016 target may have been too ambitious and planned projects were delayed because they were unable to secure sufficient funding  As such, the officials said the agency must carefully select which projects to move forward with in a given fiscal year, but expected to move forward with their delayed, planned projects in the next fiscal year  Energy on the other hand, exceeded its fiscal year 2016 reduction target  Energy officials said that they tend to be conservative in listing potential RTF projects in their Plans  They noted that it takes a long time to dispose of a building and the timing was dependent on the building’s level of contamination, location, size, agency budget, and other factors  As a result, even though the agency may have planned to dispose of a building in a given fiscal year, there were numerous reasons why the project may get delayed  Further, RTF is a long-term effort and should not be judged based on agencies’ progress in their first year  According to an OMB official, it is understood that there may be circumstances in a given year that may hinder agencies from reaching their RTF targets, such as budget constraints or the timing of leases; however, the expectation is that agencies will continue to work toward accomplishing their target in the next year  Accordingly, under RTF, agencies set annual space reduction targets for a 5-year period  Officials from our case study agencies emphasized that the 5-year targets are not static, but rather are subject to annual updates  The RTF policy also acknowledged that changes to mission requirements and the availability of budgetary resources may require modifications to an agency’s targets, particularly in each of the subsequent years  Lastly, given that the RTF policy is still relatively recent, an OMB official noted that agencies are still in the process of learning how to set appropriate targets  Previous space reductions: Officials from three of our case study agencies noted that prior space reductions made during the Freeze the Footprint policy limited their ability to reduce space more aggressively  Though the thrust of Freeze the Footprint was to maintain the fiscal year 2012 size of an agency’s portfolio, agencies started to look more strategically for opportunities to dispose of excess space in their portfolios  The majority of agencies (18 of 24) have been decreasing the square footage of their domestic office and warehouse space since the Freeze the Footprint policy was implemented in 2013  OMB reported that under Freeze the Footprint, agencies achieved a 24 7-million square foot reduction between fiscal years 2012 and 2015  Officials from the IRS, which accounts for 70 percent of Treasury’s real property inventory, noted it has released 2 7-million square feet (approximately 10 percent) in the past 5 years, bringing its total square footage down to 25 3 million  According to officials from three of our case study agencies, a certain amount of space is required to effectively fulfill their missions  As such, the closer agencies get to attaining their optimum footprint, their ability to achieve further space reductions may be limited  In November 2016, GSA put into effect a new standard operating procedure to, among other things, standardize and streamline the process of receiving, reviewing, and documenting agencies’ space release actions  As previously mentioned, GSA’s occupancy agreements for space it leases on behalf of its customer agencies generally allow the agencies to release space back to GSA with as little as 4 months’ notice, if certain conditions are met  This can enable agencies to reduce their space and related rent costs relatively quickly without penalty  As a result of this new process, GSA established a centralized e-mail for agencies to submit their space release requests  The e-mail is maintained at GSA headquarters before it is forwarded to the respective GSA region  GSA also developed a centralized space release tracking spreadsheet to help ensure that all GSA regions were (1) notifying the customer agency of GSA’s determination on whether the space release request was within GSA’s policy, and (2) processing the space release and ceasing rent billings in a timely manner  According to GSA headquarters officials, this new process was implemented to rectify past concerns that space release requests were not centrally tracked, GSA regions may not have been making consistent determinations, and some requests either were missed or were not processed within the appropriate time frames  GSA officials noted that GSA similarly manages all vacant space in federally owned property under its custody and control and in commercial space it leases, and the agency seeks to utilize the space as quickly as possible  GSA has 11 regional offices throughout the country that generally conduct the day-to-day real property management activities for its customer agencies  These responsibilities include acquiring, managing, and disposing of real property, as well as executing, renewing, and terminating leases on behalf of its customer agencies in exchange for a monthly fee for GSA’s services  GSA headquarters officials told us that GSA regional offices track all the occupancy agreements and proactively work with customer agencies to help manage their space needs well before the agreements expire to understand ongoing space requirements  For example, according to GSA headquarters officials, this process includes working with agencies at a strategic level and helping them think about how they can accomplish their space needs and meet their targets 4 to 5 years in advance  GSA headquarters and regional officials noted that the advance planning helps the GSA regional officials integrate agencies’ potential space needs into the work they are already doing in the region as GSA manages the regional inventory as a whole, including managing the amount of vacant space  GSA regional officials told us that they work closely with the agencies in their space consolidation and reduction efforts to minimize the likelihood that GSA would be caught off guard by a release of space  This work enables GSA to develop options for either filling vacant space based on the known needs in the region or developing an alternative plan to effectively utilize the unneeded space  One of GSA’s strategic objectives is to improve the federal utilization of space in order to lower the government’s operational costs  To assess progress, GSA has an agency-wide vacant space performance goal of 3 2 percent for its federally-owned and leased inventory (with a 5 percent goal for federally owned and 1 5 percent goal for leased space)  Based on GSA data, the agency has steadily lowered its percentage of vacant space under its custody and control from 3 8 percent in fiscal year 2013 to 3 percent in fiscal year 2016, exceeding its performance goal of 3 2 percent for the first time in 4 years  The vacant space performance goal’s data help GSA evaluate its real property assets and plan for and make investment decisions while meeting its customer’s needs  According to GSA officials, the lower vacant space percentage is a reflection of the agency’s continued focus on working with its customer agencies to: (1) move into federally owned space, when possible; (2) decrease the size of commercially leased space to reduce agency rental costs and overall government reliance on leased space; and (3) dispose of unneeded federally owned assets  However, GSA officials noted that a certain level of vacant space is necessary to meet the space needs of new customers and customers with changing space requirements  According to GSA officials, GSA also tracks and reports annual cost avoidance data for all office and warehouse space reductions  These data include space covered under RTF in federally owned buildings under GSA’s custody and control and commercial space that GSA leases  Cost avoidance is defined as the results of an action taken in the immediate timeframe that will decrease future costs  The government-wide cost avoidance for fiscal year 2016 was $104 million based upon a net 10 7 million square foot reduction to all office and warehouse space  Of the government-wide figure, according to GSA, the total cost avoidance associated with office and warehouse space reductions in federally- owned space under GSA’s custody and control and commercial space GSA leased in fiscal year 2016 was over $75 8 million and 3 1 million square feet  In its cost avoidance calculation, GSA accounts for space returned to it by customer agencies only if there is a net square footage reduction in GSA’s total square footage across all the space that it manages  Similarly, the space returned to GSA does not reduce the federal government’s overall office and warehouse square footage unless GSA disposes of it  However, space that is returned to GSA is reflected as a square footage reduction for the customer agency and contributes toward that agency’s RTF target reduction  According to GSA regional officials, agencies’ requests to return space prior to the end of their occupancy agreements appear to have increased since the implementation of the RTF policy  Thus far, GSA has processes to manage agencies’ space release requests and keep its vacant space to a minimum  However, it is too early to determine how the recent increase in space release requests, in combination with agencies’ continued focus on occupying a smaller footprint and reducing their square footage, will affect: (1) the size of GSA’s inventory of vacant space in the long term, (2) GSA’s regional office workload to manage the requests, and (3) the cost savings for the federal government  We provided a draft of this report to GSA, OMB, Commerce, Energy, HUD, Interior, and Treasury for review and comment  We received technical comments from Energy, which we incorporated, where appropriate  GSA, OMB, Commerce, HUD, Interior, and Treasury did not have comments on our draft report  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Administrator of GSA; the Director of the OMB; the Secretaries of the Departments of Commerce, Energy, HUD, the Interior, and the Treasury; and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  Our objectives were to determine: (1) the approaches and any challenges the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies identified to achieving their Reduce the Footprint (RTF) reduction targets for all their domestic office and warehouse space; (2) the extent to which these agencies reduced space and met their fiscal year 2016 RTF targets; and (3) how the General Services Administration (GSA) manages vacated space that it had leased to these agencies  To obtain background information for all three objectives, we reviewed relevant literature, including laws governing federal real-property management and agencies’ efforts to reduce their real property portfolios and Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) and GSA’s memorandums and guidance governing the RTF policy  We also reviewed prior GAO and GSA inspector general reports describing agencies’ real-property management and efforts to more efficiently manage their real property portfolios  To determine the approaches used and any challenges faced by the CFO Act agencies in achieving their RTF reduction targets for all their domestic office and warehouse space, we conducted a content analysis of the agencies’ 5-year Real Property Efficiency Plans (Plans) for fiscal years 2016 and 2017  These Plans were obtained directly from each of the agencies  Each Plan describes an agency’s overall strategic and tactical approach in managing its real property, provides a rationale for and justifies its optimum portfolio, and directs the identification and execution of real property disposals, efficiency improvements, general usage, and cost-savings measures  The content analysis of the Plans helped us to understand the approaches agencies used to reduce space, how space- reduction targets were set, and any challenges they experienced in reducing their space  To identify agencies’ approaches to achieving their RTF targets, we reviewed all agencies’ Plans to determine the most frequently mentioned approaches agencies reported using or planned to use to reduce their real-property footprints  As part of their plans, each agency is required to include a section detailing approaches it plans to use to reduce space  While these sections were the primary focus of the analysis, we analyzed the Plans as a whole for any additional mention of agencies’ approaches to reduce space  Based on the frequently identified approaches, codes were developed  An analyst reviewed all the agencies’ Plans and coded the approaches and another analyst reviewed the coding  If there was a disagreement, the two analysts reviewed and discussed until they reached an agreement  As a result of the analysis, five approaches were identified that agencies most frequently reported using or were planning to use to achieve their RTF targets  These five approaches are described in more detail in the report: (1) consolidation; (2) co-location; (3) disposition of unneeded space; (4) better utilization of existing space; and (5) teleworking and hoteling  For the purposes of our report, telework and hoteling were combined because these approaches are often used in combination  For example, agencies can use telework strategically to reduce space needs and increase efficiency by making hoteling (i e , desk sharing) possible  To identify any challenges agencies faced in achieving their RTF targets, we similarly conducted a content analysis of agencies’ fiscal year 2016 and 2017 Plans  As part of their Plans, each agency included a section describing challenges it faced to reducing space  While these sections were the primary focus of the analysis, we analyzed the Plans as a whole for any additional mention of agencies’ challenges  Based on the frequently identified challenges, codes were developed  An analyst went through all the agencies’ Plans to code the challenges and another analyst reviewed the coding  If there was a disagreement, the two analysts reviewed and discussed until they reached an agreement  As a result of the analysis, we identified the four challenges that agencies most frequently described in their Plans: (1) space reduction costs; (2) mission delivery; (3) employee organization concerns; and (4) workload growth  In our report, we relied specifically on agencies’ fiscal year 2016 and 2017 Plans to provide examples and context for our description of the approaches agencies use and challenges they experience in achieving their RTF targets  However, after these Plans were submitted, agencies reported that the specific details as described in their Plans may in some instances, have changed due to a variety of factors  For our case study agencies, to the extent possible, we have provided updated information from agency officials as of December 2017  We selected five agencies as case studies to inform our first two objectives  We selected the agencies using a variety of considerations such as the diversity in the size of the agency’s domestic office and warehouse portfolio, the extent to which the agency met its fiscal year 2016 RTF targets, the types of real property authorities the agency has, as well as suggestions from GSA and OMB related to agencies’ experiences  Based on these factors, we selected the: (1) Department of Commerce (Commerce); (2) Department of Energy (Energy); (3) Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); (4) Department of the Interior (Interior); and (5) Department of the Treasury (Treasury)  While our case-study agencies and their experiences reducing their space are not generalizable to all CFO Act agencies, they provide a range of examples of how agencies are implementing the RTF policy  We interviewed officials at the selected agencies as well as GSA and OMB, and reviewed relevant agency real-property management and RTF guidance, to obtain more detailed information about agencies’ RTF approaches, challenges, specific RTF projects, RTF project funding and prioritization, and experiences in meeting their RTF targets  In addition, we visited three office buildings of our case study agencies in Washington, D C , with ongoing or recently completed RTF projects that illustrated approaches the agencies used to reduce space and met with officials to discuss the projects in more detail  The spaces we visited were the headquarters buildings for Commerce, HUD, and Interior  We selected the buildings based on recommendations from officials at our case study agencies  To determine to what extent agencies reduced their space and met their fiscal year 2016 RTF targets, we analyzed the 24 CFO Act agencies’ data as submitted to GSA on their RTF targets and reported reductions for fiscal year 2016  The office and warehouse square footage reductions are calculated annually using GSA occupancy agreement data and agencies’ self-reported data in GSA’s Federal Real Property Profile  For example, for fiscal year 2016, the space reduction calculations based on these data sources at the end of the fiscal year was compared to the square footage reported in fiscal year 2015  At the time of our review, this was the first and only year of RTF data available as the policy was implemented in March 2015  We conducted a data reliability assessment of the RTF data GSA provided by interviewing GSA officials and reviewing documentation, and concluded the data were reliable for our purposes  We also interviewed officials at GSA and OMB and reviewed relevant documentation to learn more about each agency’s role and the requirements of the RTF policy  We interviewed officials from our selected case-study agencies to obtain supporting documentation and to improve our understanding of how agencies set their RTF targets, agencies’ progress toward those targets, and the approaches used and challenges faced in meeting those targets  We also asked the agency officials for examples of successful practices used to reduce their office and warehouse space  To determine how GSA manages vacated federally owned and commercially leased space that it leases to agencies, we reviewed federal requirements and GSA policies and vacancy data  We conducted a data reliability assessment of GSA’s vacancy and cost avoidance data by interviewing GSA officials and reviewing documentation, and concluded the data were reliable for our purposes  We also interviewed GSA headquarters and regional officials and obtained documentation on how GSA manages space returned by agencies  We conducted this performance audit from April 2017 to March 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  FY 2016- FY 2020 target reduction (118,127) Social Security Administration Missed target and increased in space Department of Health and Human Services (170,147) (520,987) (15,466) (47,946) (56,062) In addition to the individual named above, Maria Edelstein (Assistant Director); Lacey Coppage; Edgar Garcia; Delwen Jones; Catherine Kim (Analyst-in-Charge); Michael Mgebroff; Malika Rice; Kelly Rubin; and David Wise made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness is critical to success in the emerging security environment. The Navy and Marine Corps are working to rebuild the readiness of their forces while growing and modernizing their aging fleet of ships and aircraft. However, achieving readiness recovery goals will take years as both services continue to be challenged to rebuild readiness amid continued operational demands. This statement provides information on current and future readiness challenges facing (1) the Navy ship and submarine fleet and (2) Navy and Marine Corps aviation. GAO also discusses prior recommendations on Navy and Marine Corps readiness and progress to address them. This statement is based on previously published work since 2015 related to Navy and Marine Corps readiness challenges, including shipyard workforce and capital investment, ship crewing, weapon system sustainment, the fighter pilot workforce, and modernizing force structure. GAO conducted site visits to the Pacific fleet in November 2018 and analyzed updated data, as appropriate. The Navy has taken steps to address training shortfalls in the surface fleet, but faces persistent maintenance and personnel challenges as it seeks to rebuild ship and submarine readiness. While the Navy has corrective actions underway, they will take years to implement. Following ship collisions in 2017, the Navy has taken steps to ensure its crews are trained to standards prior to deployment and made significant progress in those efforts. However, the Navy has struggled to complete ship maintenance—with only 30 percent of maintenance completed on time since fiscal year 2012—leading to thousands of days that ships were unavailable for training and operations (see figure). Additionally, manning shortfalls and experience gaps continue to contribute to high sailor workload and are likely to continue through at least fiscal year 2021. The Navy has developed a plan to improve shipyards and is re-examining its ship manning, among other actions; however, these positive steps have not yet fully addressed GAO's recommendations. Looking to the future, the Navy has indicated that it wants to grow its fleet to meet demands. However, the costs of such growth are not yet known and would likely require resourcing well above currently planned levels. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited due to numerous challenges (see figure). Specifically, the seven aircraft GAO reviewed have generally experienced decreasing availability since fiscal year 2011 and did not meet availability goals in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. The F-35—the future of naval aviation—also has not met availability goals due to part shortages and poor sustainment planning. In September 2018, the Department of Defense established aggressive targets for aircraft availability. While the Navy and Marine Corps are taking actions to improve aircraft availability, including addressing GAO's recommendations, aviation readiness will take many years to recover. GAO has made a total of 45 recommendations in the prior work described in this statement. The Department of Defense concurred with most of them, and has many actions underway, but has not yet fully implemented any. Attention to these recommendations can assist the Navy and the Marine Corps as they seek to rebuild the readiness of their forces.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: We found that from October 2013 through March 2017, the five selected VA medical centers required reviews of a total of 148 providers’ clinical care after concerns were raised about their care, but officials at these medical centers could not provide documentation to show that almost half of these reviews were conducted  We found that all five VA medical centers lacked at least some documentation of the reviews they told us they conducted, and in some cases, we found that the required reviews were not conducted at all  Specifically, across the five VA medical centers, we found the following: The medical centers lacked documentation showing that one type of review—focused professional practice evaluations (FPPE) for cause—had been conducted for 26 providers after concerns had been raised about their care  FPPEs for cause are reviews of providers’ care over a specified period of time, during which the provider continues to see patients and has the opportunity to demonstrate improvement  Documentation of these reviews is explicitly required under VHA policy  Additionally, VA medical center officials confirmed that FPPEs for cause that were required for another 21 providers were never conducted  The medical centers lacked documentation showing that retrospective reviews—which assess the care previously delivered by a provider during a specific period of time— had been conducted for 8 providers after concerns had been raised about their clinical care  One medical center lacked documentation showing that reviews had been conducted for another 12 providers after concerns had been raised about their care  In the absence of any documentation, we were unable to identify the types of reviews, if any, that were conducted for these 12 providers  We also found that the five selected VA medical centers did not always conduct reviews of providers’ clinical care in a timely manner  Specifically, of the 148 providers, the VA medical centers did not initiate reviews of 16 providers for 3 months, and in some cases, for multiple years, after concerns had been raised about the providers’ care  In a few of these cases, additional concerns about the providers’ clinical care were raised before the reviews began  We found that two factors were largely responsible for the inadequate documentation and untimely reviews of providers’ clinical care we identified at the selected VA medical centers  First, VHA policy does not require VA medical centers to document all types of reviews of providers’ clinical care, including retrospective reviews, and VHA has not established a timeliness requirement for initiating reviews of providers’ clinical care  Second, VHA’s oversight of the reviews of providers’ clinical care is inadequate  Under VHA policy, networks are responsible for overseeing the credentialing and privileging processes at their respective VA medical centers  While reviews of providers’ clinical care after concerns are raised are a component of credentialing and privileging, we found that none of the network officials we spoke with described any routine oversight of such reviews  This may be in part because the standardized tool that VHA requires the networks to use during their routine audits does not direct network officials to ensure that all reviews of providers’ clinical care have been conducted and documented  Further, some of the VISN officials we interviewed told us they were not using the standardized audit tool as required  Without adequate documentation and timely completion of reviews of providers’ clinical care, VA medical center officials lack the information they need to make decisions about providers’ privileges, including whether or not to take adverse privileging actions against providers  Furthermore, because of its inadequate oversight, VHA lacks reasonable assurance that VA medical center officials are reviewing all providers about whom clinical care concerns have been raised and are taking adverse privileging actions against the providers when appropriate  To address these shortcomings, we recommended that VHA 1) require documentation of all reviews of providers’ clinical care after concerns have been raised, 2) establish a timeliness requirement for initiating such reviews, and 3) strengthen its oversight by requiring networks to oversee VA medical centers to ensure that such reviews are documented and initiated in a timely manner  VA concurred with these recommendations and described plans for VHA to revise existing policy and update the standardized audit tool used by the networks to include more comprehensive oversight of VA medical centers’ reviews of providers’ clinical care after concerns have been raised  We found that from October 2013 through March 2017, the five VA medical centers we reviewed had only reported one of nine providers required to be reported to the NPDB under VHA policy  These nine providers either had adverse privileging actions taken against them or resigned or retired while under investigation before an adverse privileging action could be taken  None of these nine providers were reported to state licensing boards as required by VHA policy  The VA medical centers documented that these nine providers had significant clinical deficiencies that sometimes resulted in adverse outcomes for veterans  For example, the documentation shows that one provider’s surgical incompetence resulted in numerous repeat surgeries for veterans  Another provider’s opportunity to improve through an FPPE for cause had to be halted and the provider was removed from providing care after only a week due to concerns that continuing the review would potentially harm patients  In addition to these nine providers, one VA medical center terminated the services of four contract providers based on deficiencies in the providers’ clinical performance, but the facility did not follow any of the required steps for reporting providers to the NPDB or relevant state licensing boards  This is concerning, given that the VA medical center documented that one of these providers was terminated for cause related to patient abuse after only 2 weeks of work at the facility  Two of the five VA medical centers we reviewed each reported one provider to the state licensing boards for failing to meet generally accepted standards of clinical practice to the point that it raised concerns for the safety of veterans  However, we found that the medical centers’ reporting to the state licensing board took over 500 days to complete in both cases, which was significantly longer than the 100 days suggested in VHA policy  Across the five VA medical centers, we found that providers were not reported to the NPDB and state licensing boards as required for two reasons  First, VA medical center officials were generally not familiar with or misinterpreted VHA policies related to NPDB and state licensing board reporting  For example, at one VA medical center, we found that officials failed to report six providers to the NPDB because they were unaware that they had been delegated responsibility for NPDB reporting  Officials at two other VA medical centers incorrectly told us that VHA cannot report contract providers to the NDPB  At another VA medical facility, officials did not report a provider to the NPDB or to any of the state licensing boards where the provider held a medical license because medical center officials learned that one state licensing board had already found out about the issue independently  Therefore, VA officials did not believe that they needed to report the provider  This misinterpretation of VHA policy meant that the NPDB and the state licensing boards in other states where the provider held licenses were not alerted to concerns about the provider’s clinical practice  Second, VHA policy does not require the networks to oversee whether VA medical centers are reporting providers to the NPDB or state licensing boards when warranted  We found, for example, that network officials were unaware of situations in which VA medical center officials failed to report providers to the NPDB  We concluded that VHA lacks reasonable assurance that all providers who should be reported to these entities are reported  VHA’s failure to report providers to the NPDB and state licensing boards as required facilitates providers who provide substandard care at one facility obtaining privileges at another VA medical center or at hospitals outside of VA’s health care system  We found several cases of this occurring among the providers who were not reported to the NPDB or state licensing boards by the five VA medical centers we reviewed  For example, we found that two of the four contract providers whose contracts were terminated for clinical deficiencies remained eligible to provide care to veterans outside of that VA medical center  At the time of our review, one of these providers held privileges at another VA medical center, and another participated in the network of providers that can provide care for veterans in the community  We also found that a provider who was not reported as required to the NPDB during the period we reviewed had their privileges revoked 2 years later by a non-VA hospital in the same city for the same reason the provider was under investigation at the VA medical center  Officials at this VA medical center did not report this provider following a settlement agreement under which the provider agreed to resign  A committee within the VA medical center had recommended that the provider’s privileges be revoked prior to the agreement  There was no documentation of the reasons why this provider was not reported to the NPDB under VHA policy  To improve VA medical centers’ reporting of providers to the NPDB and state licensing boards and VHA oversight of these processes, we recommended that VHA require its networks to establish a process for overseeing VA medical centers to ensure they are reporting to the NPDB and to state licensing boards and to ensure that this reporting is timely  VA concurred with this recommendation and told us that it plans to include oversight of timely reporting to the NPDB and state licensing boards as part of the standard audit tool used by the networks  If you or your staff members have any questions concerning this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 (williamsonr@gao gov)  Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Other individuals who made key contributions to this testimony include Marcia A  Mann (Assistant Director), Kaitlin M  McConnell (Analyst-in-Charge), Summar C  Corley, Krister Friday, and Jacquelyn Hamilton  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 
Report 2:  The number of projects identified in agency Plans ranged from as few as 3 projects (the minimum required in the Plans) to nearly 400 projects  The estimated space reductions per project across agencies ranged from about 1,400 to over 94,000 square feet  For example, the Department of Veterans Affairs has a relatively large office and warehouse portfolio of over 28-million square feet  As part of its fiscal year 2017 Plan, the agency reported 320 planned or ongoing projects with an average space reduction of about 1,800 square feet per project  Conversely, the Office of Personnel Management has a relatively small office space portfolio of about 1-million square feet; its fiscal year 2017 Plan identified 4 ongoing or potential projects with an average space reduction of about 6,000 square feet  In fiscal year 2016—the first and only year RTF data were available at the time of our review—the majority (71 percent or 17 of the 24 agencies) reported they achieved reductions in their office and warehouse space even though the agencies had varying success in achieving the individual targets they set for themselves  For example, as shown in figure 2, of the 17 agencies that reduced space, 9 exceeded their targets (i e , reduced more space than planned); 7 reduced space but missed their target (by anywhere between 2 8 and 96 7 percent); and 1 agency expected to increase in square footage, but reduced space  Whether an agency met its target is not the only indicator of an agency’s success in reducing space  For example, although some agencies missed their targets, they reduced their office and warehouse space by a larger percentage than some agencies that exceeded their targets  Also, the fact that some agencies missed their targets can in part be attributed to setting more aggressive targets than other agencies  Agencies’ fiscal year 2016 targets ranged from a 0 8 percent increase to an 8 4 percent decrease in office and warehouse space  Of the 9 agencies that exceeded their reduction targets, 4 more than tripled their target  As mentioned, agency targets are set by the agency and are a reflection of their unique situation including mission needs and priorities and therefore cannot be generalized across agencies  For example, Energy exceeded its fiscal year 2016 reduction target and reduced 292,140 square feet of space (0 8 percent of its total square footage)  However, the Environmental Protection Agency missed its target, which was the second most aggressive target across all the agencies at 7 2 percent of its total square footage; but the agency reduced 174,003 square feet (3 24 percent of its total square footage)  Of the three agencies with the most aggressive target reductions—those that ranged between 6 7 and 8 4 percent of their total square footage—only one met its target  Figure 3 shows the extent to which each of the CFO Act agencies met its fiscal year 2016 targets  See appendix II for more detailed information on each agencies’ square footage of space, reduction targets and fiscal year 2016 reductions  Officials from our case study agencies cited a number of factors that influenced whether or not they met their fiscal year 2016 targets, and may also affect their target achievement in subsequent years  Of our five case study agencies, three exceeded their fiscal year 2016 reduction target and two missed their target  Timing and funding: Officials from two case study agencies cited timing as a factor, noting that there is fluidity to the project’s planning, implementation, and disposal process that may not always be within an agency’s control  As a result, space reductions anticipated in one fiscal year may not be realized until a subsequent fiscal year; conversely, some space reduction opportunities may present themselves unexpectedly  For example, according to officials at HUD, which missed its fiscal year 2016 reduction target, some projects take longer than anticipated to start or complete  HUD officials said that their fiscal year 2016 target may have been too ambitious and planned projects were delayed because they were unable to secure sufficient funding  As such, the officials said the agency must carefully select which projects to move forward with in a given fiscal year, but expected to move forward with their delayed, planned projects in the next fiscal year  Energy on the other hand, exceeded its fiscal year 2016 reduction target  Energy officials said that they tend to be conservative in listing potential RTF projects in their Plans  They noted that it takes a long time to dispose of a building and the timing was dependent on the building’s level of contamination, location, size, agency budget, and other factors  As a result, even though the agency may have planned to dispose of a building in a given fiscal year, there were numerous reasons why the project may get delayed  Further, RTF is a long-term effort and should not be judged based on agencies’ progress in their first year  According to an OMB official, it is understood that there may be circumstances in a given year that may hinder agencies from reaching their RTF targets, such as budget constraints or the timing of leases; however, the expectation is that agencies will continue to work toward accomplishing their target in the next year  Accordingly, under RTF, agencies set annual space reduction targets for a 5-year period  Officials from our case study agencies emphasized that the 5-year targets are not static, but rather are subject to annual updates  The RTF policy also acknowledged that changes to mission requirements and the availability of budgetary resources may require modifications to an agency’s targets, particularly in each of the subsequent years  Lastly, given that the RTF policy is still relatively recent, an OMB official noted that agencies are still in the process of learning how to set appropriate targets  Previous space reductions: Officials from three of our case study agencies noted that prior space reductions made during the Freeze the Footprint policy limited their ability to reduce space more aggressively  Though the thrust of Freeze the Footprint was to maintain the fiscal year 2012 size of an agency’s portfolio, agencies started to look more strategically for opportunities to dispose of excess space in their portfolios  The majority of agencies (18 of 24) have been decreasing the square footage of their domestic office and warehouse space since the Freeze the Footprint policy was implemented in 2013  OMB reported that under Freeze the Footprint, agencies achieved a 24 7-million square foot reduction between fiscal years 2012 and 2015  Officials from the IRS, which accounts for 70 percent of Treasury’s real property inventory, noted it has released 2 7-million square feet (approximately 10 percent) in the past 5 years, bringing its total square footage down to 25 3 million  According to officials from three of our case study agencies, a certain amount of space is required to effectively fulfill their missions  As such, the closer agencies get to attaining their optimum footprint, their ability to achieve further space reductions may be limited  In November 2016, GSA put into effect a new standard operating procedure to, among other things, standardize and streamline the process of receiving, reviewing, and documenting agencies’ space release actions  As previously mentioned, GSA’s occupancy agreements for space it leases on behalf of its customer agencies generally allow the agencies to release space back to GSA with as little as 4 months’ notice, if certain conditions are met  This can enable agencies to reduce their space and related rent costs relatively quickly without penalty  As a result of this new process, GSA established a centralized e-mail for agencies to submit their space release requests  The e-mail is maintained at GSA headquarters before it is forwarded to the respective GSA region  GSA also developed a centralized space release tracking spreadsheet to help ensure that all GSA regions were (1) notifying the customer agency of GSA’s determination on whether the space release request was within GSA’s policy, and (2) processing the space release and ceasing rent billings in a timely manner  According to GSA headquarters officials, this new process was implemented to rectify past concerns that space release requests were not centrally tracked, GSA regions may not have been making consistent determinations, and some requests either were missed or were not processed within the appropriate time frames  GSA officials noted that GSA similarly manages all vacant space in federally owned property under its custody and control and in commercial space it leases, and the agency seeks to utilize the space as quickly as possible  GSA has 11 regional offices throughout the country that generally conduct the day-to-day real property management activities for its customer agencies  These responsibilities include acquiring, managing, and disposing of real property, as well as executing, renewing, and terminating leases on behalf of its customer agencies in exchange for a monthly fee for GSA’s services  GSA headquarters officials told us that GSA regional offices track all the occupancy agreements and proactively work with customer agencies to help manage their space needs well before the agreements expire to understand ongoing space requirements  For example, according to GSA headquarters officials, this process includes working with agencies at a strategic level and helping them think about how they can accomplish their space needs and meet their targets 4 to 5 years in advance  GSA headquarters and regional officials noted that the advance planning helps the GSA regional officials integrate agencies’ potential space needs into the work they are already doing in the region as GSA manages the regional inventory as a whole, including managing the amount of vacant space  GSA regional officials told us that they work closely with the agencies in their space consolidation and reduction efforts to minimize the likelihood that GSA would be caught off guard by a release of space  This work enables GSA to develop options for either filling vacant space based on the known needs in the region or developing an alternative plan to effectively utilize the unneeded space  One of GSA’s strategic objectives is to improve the federal utilization of space in order to lower the government’s operational costs  To assess progress, GSA has an agency-wide vacant space performance goal of 3 2 percent for its federally-owned and leased inventory (with a 5 percent goal for federally owned and 1 5 percent goal for leased space)  Based on GSA data, the agency has steadily lowered its percentage of vacant space under its custody and control from 3 8 percent in fiscal year 2013 to 3 percent in fiscal year 2016, exceeding its performance goal of 3 2 percent for the first time in 4 years  The vacant space performance goal’s data help GSA evaluate its real property assets and plan for and make investment decisions while meeting its customer’s needs  According to GSA officials, the lower vacant space percentage is a reflection of the agency’s continued focus on working with its customer agencies to: (1) move into federally owned space, when possible; (2) decrease the size of commercially leased space to reduce agency rental costs and overall government reliance on leased space; and (3) dispose of unneeded federally owned assets  However, GSA officials noted that a certain level of vacant space is necessary to meet the space needs of new customers and customers with changing space requirements  According to GSA officials, GSA also tracks and reports annual cost avoidance data for all office and warehouse space reductions  These data include space covered under RTF in federally owned buildings under GSA’s custody and control and commercial space that GSA leases  Cost avoidance is defined as the results of an action taken in the immediate timeframe that will decrease future costs  The government-wide cost avoidance for fiscal year 2016 was $104 million based upon a net 10 7 million square foot reduction to all office and warehouse space  Of the government-wide figure, according to GSA, the total cost avoidance associated with office and warehouse space reductions in federally- owned space under GSA’s custody and control and commercial space GSA leased in fiscal year 2016 was over $75 8 million and 3 1 million square feet  In its cost avoidance calculation, GSA accounts for space returned to it by customer agencies only if there is a net square footage reduction in GSA’s total square footage across all the space that it manages  Similarly, the space returned to GSA does not reduce the federal government’s overall office and warehouse square footage unless GSA disposes of it  However, space that is returned to GSA is reflected as a square footage reduction for the customer agency and contributes toward that agency’s RTF target reduction  According to GSA regional officials, agencies’ requests to return space prior to the end of their occupancy agreements appear to have increased since the implementation of the RTF policy  Thus far, GSA has processes to manage agencies’ space release requests and keep its vacant space to a minimum  However, it is too early to determine how the recent increase in space release requests, in combination with agencies’ continued focus on occupying a smaller footprint and reducing their square footage, will affect: (1) the size of GSA’s inventory of vacant space in the long term, (2) GSA’s regional office workload to manage the requests, and (3) the cost savings for the federal government  We provided a draft of this report to GSA, OMB, Commerce, Energy, HUD, Interior, and Treasury for review and comment  We received technical comments from Energy, which we incorporated, where appropriate  GSA, OMB, Commerce, HUD, Interior, and Treasury did not have comments on our draft report  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Administrator of GSA; the Director of the OMB; the Secretaries of the Departments of Commerce, Energy, HUD, the Interior, and the Treasury; and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  Our objectives were to determine: (1) the approaches and any challenges the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies identified to achieving their Reduce the Footprint (RTF) reduction targets for all their domestic office and warehouse space; (2) the extent to which these agencies reduced space and met their fiscal year 2016 RTF targets; and (3) how the General Services Administration (GSA) manages vacated space that it had leased to these agencies  To obtain background information for all three objectives, we reviewed relevant literature, including laws governing federal real-property management and agencies’ efforts to reduce their real property portfolios and Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) and GSA’s memorandums and guidance governing the RTF policy  We also reviewed prior GAO and GSA inspector general reports describing agencies’ real-property management and efforts to more efficiently manage their real property portfolios  To determine the approaches used and any challenges faced by the CFO Act agencies in achieving their RTF reduction targets for all their domestic office and warehouse space, we conducted a content analysis of the agencies’ 5-year Real Property Efficiency Plans (Plans) for fiscal years 2016 and 2017  These Plans were obtained directly from each of the agencies  Each Plan describes an agency’s overall strategic and tactical approach in managing its real property, provides a rationale for and justifies its optimum portfolio, and directs the identification and execution of real property disposals, efficiency improvements, general usage, and cost-savings measures  The content analysis of the Plans helped us to understand the approaches agencies used to reduce space, how space- reduction targets were set, and any challenges they experienced in reducing their space  To identify agencies’ approaches to achieving their RTF targets, we reviewed all agencies’ Plans to determine the most frequently mentioned approaches agencies reported using or planned to use to reduce their real-property footprints  As part of their plans, each agency is required to include a section detailing approaches it plans to use to reduce space  While these sections were the primary focus of the analysis, we analyzed the Plans as a whole for any additional mention of agencies’ approaches to reduce space  Based on the frequently identified approaches, codes were developed  An analyst reviewed all the agencies’ Plans and coded the approaches and another analyst reviewed the coding  If there was a disagreement, the two analysts reviewed and discussed until they reached an agreement  As a result of the analysis, five approaches were identified that agencies most frequently reported using or were planning to use to achieve their RTF targets  These five approaches are described in more detail in the report: (1) consolidation; (2) co-location; (3) disposition of unneeded space; (4) better utilization of existing space; and (5) teleworking and hoteling  For the purposes of our report, telework and hoteling were combined because these approaches are often used in combination  For example, agencies can use telework strategically to reduce space needs and increase efficiency by making hoteling (i e , desk sharing) possible  To identify any challenges agencies faced in achieving their RTF targets, we similarly conducted a content analysis of agencies’ fiscal year 2016 and 2017 Plans  As part of their Plans, each agency included a section describing challenges it faced to reducing space  While these sections were the primary focus of the analysis, we analyzed the Plans as a whole for any additional mention of agencies’ challenges  Based on the frequently identified challenges, codes were developed  An analyst went through all the agencies’ Plans to code the challenges and another analyst reviewed the coding  If there was a disagreement, the two analysts reviewed and discussed until they reached an agreement  As a result of the analysis, we identified the four challenges that agencies most frequently described in their Plans: (1) space reduction costs; (2) mission delivery; (3) employee organization concerns; and (4) workload growth  In our report, we relied specifically on agencies’ fiscal year 2016 and 2017 Plans to provide examples and context for our description of the approaches agencies use and challenges they experience in achieving their RTF targets  However, after these Plans were submitted, agencies reported that the specific details as described in their Plans may in some instances, have changed due to a variety of factors  For our case study agencies, to the extent possible, we have provided updated information from agency officials as of December 2017  We selected five agencies as case studies to inform our first two objectives  We selected the agencies using a variety of considerations such as the diversity in the size of the agency’s domestic office and warehouse portfolio, the extent to which the agency met its fiscal year 2016 RTF targets, the types of real property authorities the agency has, as well as suggestions from GSA and OMB related to agencies’ experiences  Based on these factors, we selected the: (1) Department of Commerce (Commerce); (2) Department of Energy (Energy); (3) Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); (4) Department of the Interior (Interior); and (5) Department of the Treasury (Treasury)  While our case-study agencies and their experiences reducing their space are not generalizable to all CFO Act agencies, they provide a range of examples of how agencies are implementing the RTF policy  We interviewed officials at the selected agencies as well as GSA and OMB, and reviewed relevant agency real-property management and RTF guidance, to obtain more detailed information about agencies’ RTF approaches, challenges, specific RTF projects, RTF project funding and prioritization, and experiences in meeting their RTF targets  In addition, we visited three office buildings of our case study agencies in Washington, D C , with ongoing or recently completed RTF projects that illustrated approaches the agencies used to reduce space and met with officials to discuss the projects in more detail  The spaces we visited were the headquarters buildings for Commerce, HUD, and Interior  We selected the buildings based on recommendations from officials at our case study agencies  To determine to what extent agencies reduced their space and met their fiscal year 2016 RTF targets, we analyzed the 24 CFO Act agencies’ data as submitted to GSA on their RTF targets and reported reductions for fiscal year 2016  The office and warehouse square footage reductions are calculated annually using GSA occupancy agreement data and agencies’ self-reported data in GSA’s Federal Real Property Profile  For example, for fiscal year 2016, the space reduction calculations based on these data sources at the end of the fiscal year was compared to the square footage reported in fiscal year 2015  At the time of our review, this was the first and only year of RTF data available as the policy was implemented in March 2015  We conducted a data reliability assessment of the RTF data GSA provided by interviewing GSA officials and reviewing documentation, and concluded the data were reliable for our purposes  We also interviewed officials at GSA and OMB and reviewed relevant documentation to learn more about each agency’s role and the requirements of the RTF policy  We interviewed officials from our selected case-study agencies to obtain supporting documentation and to improve our understanding of how agencies set their RTF targets, agencies’ progress toward those targets, and the approaches used and challenges faced in meeting those targets  We also asked the agency officials for examples of successful practices used to reduce their office and warehouse space  To determine how GSA manages vacated federally owned and commercially leased space that it leases to agencies, we reviewed federal requirements and GSA policies and vacancy data  We conducted a data reliability assessment of GSA’s vacancy and cost avoidance data by interviewing GSA officials and reviewing documentation, and concluded the data were reliable for our purposes  We also interviewed GSA headquarters and regional officials and obtained documentation on how GSA manages space returned by agencies  We conducted this performance audit from April 2017 to March 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  FY 2016- FY 2020 target reduction (118,127) Social Security Administration Missed target and increased in space Department of Health and Human Services (170,147) (520,987) (15,466) (47,946) (56,062) In addition to the individual named above, Maria Edelstein (Assistant Director); Lacey Coppage; Edgar Garcia; Delwen Jones; Catherine Kim (Analyst-in-Charge); Michael Mgebroff; Malika Rice; Kelly Rubin; and David Wise made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's November 2017 report, entitled VA Health Care: Improved Policies and Oversight Needed for Reviewing and Reporting Providers for Quality and Safety Concerns ( GAO-18-63 ). Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical center (VAMC) officials are responsible for reviewing the clinical care delivered by their privileged providers—physicians and dentists who are approved to independently perform specific services—after concerns are raised. The five VAMCs GAO selected for review collectively required review of 148 providers from October 2013 through March 2017 after concerns were raised about their clinical care. GAO found that these reviews were not always documented or conducted in a timely manner. GAO identified these providers by reviewing meeting minutes from the committee responsible for requiring these types of reviews at the respective VAMCs, and through interviews with VAMC officials. The selected VAMCs were unable to provide documentation of these reviews for almost half of the 148 providers. Additionally, the VAMCs did not start the reviews of 16 providers for 3 months to multiple years after the concerns were identified. GAO found that VHA policies do not require documentation of all types of clinical care reviews and do not establish timeliness requirements. GAO also found that the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) does not adequately oversee these reviews at VAMCs through its Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), which are responsible for overseeing the VAMCs. Without documentation and timely reviews of providers' clinical care, VAMC officials may lack information needed to reasonably ensure that VA providers are competent to provide safe, high quality care to veterans and to make appropriate decisions about these providers' privileges. GAO also found that from October 2013 through March 2017, the five selected VAMCs did not report most of the providers who should have been reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) or state licensing boards (SLB) in accordance with VHA policy. The NPDB is an electronic repository for critical information about the professional conduct and competence of providers. GAO found that selected VAMCs did not report to the NPDB eight of nine providers who had adverse privileging actions taken against them or who resigned during an investigation related to professional competence or conduct, as required by VHA policy, and none of these nine providers had been reported to SLBs. GAO found that officials at the selected VAMCs misinterpreted or were not aware of VHA policies and guidance related to NPDB and SLB reporting processes resulting in providers not being reported. GAO also found that VHA and the VISNs do not conduct adequate oversight of NPDB and SLB reporting practices and cannot reasonably ensure appropriate reporting of providers. As a result, VHA's ability to provide safe, high quality care to veterans is hindered because other VAMCs, as well as non-VA health care entities, will be unaware of serious concerns raised about a provider's care. For example, GAO found that after one VAMC failed to report to the NPDB or SLBs a provider who resigned to avoid an adverse privileging action, a non-VA hospital in the same city took an adverse privileging action against that same provider for the same reason 2 years later.