prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: In March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations (hereinafter referred to as the Saudi-led coalition or the coalition) to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh  During 2014, the United States joined Saudi Arabia in demanding that Houthi forces reverse their campaign to occupy the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, but the rapid onset of hostilities in March 2015 forced the Obama Administration to react quickly  At the start of the Saudi-led intervention on March 25, 2015, the Administration announced that the United States would provide "logistical and intelligence support" to the coalition's operations without taking "direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort " Soon thereafter, a joint U S -Saudi planning cell was established to coordinate military and intelligence support for the campaign  At the United Nations Security Council, the United States supported the passage of Resolution 2216 (April 2015), which, among other things, required member states to impose an arms embargo against the Houthi-Saleh forces and demanded that the Houthis withdraw from all areas seized during the current conflict  Since the March 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, Congress has taken an active role in debating and overseeing U S  policy in the Arabian Peninsula  Members have considered legislative proposals seeking to reduce Yemeni civilian casualties resulting from the coalition's operations; improve deteriorating humanitarian conditions; end restrictions on the flow of goods and humanitarian aid; combat Iranian support for the Houthis; preserve maritime security in the Bab al Mandab Strait; and/or support continued Saudi-led coalition and U S  efforts to counter Al Qaeda and Islamic State forces in Yemen  Beyond Yemen, many Members have appeared to view the conflict through the prism of a broader regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the U S  effort to limit Iran's malign regional influence  Others lawmakers have viewed the Yemen conflict as indicative of what they perceive as problems in the U S -Saudi relationship, a concern that deepened after the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel in October 2018  Congress has considered but has not enacted proposals to curtail or condition U S  defense sales to Saudi Arabia  Responding to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen also appears to be reinvigorating some Members' interest in strengthening the role of Congress in foreign policy vis-à-vis the executive branch  Debate in Congress over Yemen has featured bipartisan statements of interest in asserting the prerogatives of the legislative branch to limit executive branch power, specifically using war powers legislation and the appropriations and authorization processes to curb U S  military involvement in support of coalition operations  Congressional scrutiny of U S  policy in Yemen also has led to legislative changes to global authorities, such as the Department of Defense's authority to enter into and use acquisition and cross servicing agreements with partner militaries  Congressional interest in the Yemen conflict has evolved and grown gradually and was not widespread at the outset of the coalition's March 2015 intervention in Yemen  In early to mid-2015, congressional interest in U S  foreign policy in the Middle East centered on the Iran nuclear deal and Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria  Several months after the March 2015 intervention, the Saudi-led coalition had not achieved a conclusive victory and what modest gains had been made on the ground were offset by mounting international criticism of growing civilian casualties from coalition air strikes  In Congress, several lawmakers began to express concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen  In late September 2015, Representative Ted W  Lieu wrote a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocating for a halt to U S  support for the Saudi-led coalition until it instituted safeguards to prevent civilian casualties  In October 2015, 10 Members of Congress wrote a letter to President Obama urging him to "work with our Saudi partners to limit civilian casualties to the fullest extent possible " In October 2015, Senator Markey stated that "I fear that our failure to strongly advocate diplomacy in Yemen over the past two years, coupled with our failure to urge restraint in the face of the crisis last spring, may put the viability of this critical [U S -Saudi] partnership at risk " By the fall of 2015, as the Obama Administration tried to balance its concern for adhering to the laws of armed conflict with its support for Gulf partners, lawmakers began to express their concern over U S  involvement in the coalition's intervention by scrutinizing U S  arms sales to Saudi Arabia  When the Administration informally notified Congress of a proposed sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia, some Senators sought to delay its formal notification  After the formal notification in November 2015, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) leaders jointly requested that the Administration notify Congress 30 days prior to associated shipments, marking the first use of this prior notification request authority  At that time, no related joint resolutions of disapproval on proposed sales of PGMs to the kingdom were introduced, but the delay and additional notification request demonstrated congressional concern  By the one-year anniversary of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, a more defined opposition to U S  support for the coalition had begun to coalesce amid repeated international documentation of human rights abuses and errant coalition airstrikes  In April 2016, legislation was introduced that sought to place conditions on future proposed sale notifications, previously approved sales, or transfers of PGMs to Saudi Arabia  Proposed amendments to FY2017 defense legislation would have added some similar conditions on the use of funds to implement sales of PGMs or prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia  The PGM amendment was not considered, but the cluster munitions amendment was narrowly defeated in a June 2016 House floor vote  In the spring and summer of 2016, the United Nations held multiple rounds of peace talks in Kuwait aimed at brokering an end to the conflict  From April 2016 to August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition had largely spared Yemen's capital Sanaa from aerial strikes as part of its commitment to the cessation of hostilities  When U N -mediated peace talks collapsed in August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition resumed bombing and the war intensified  During the summer of 2016, the Obama Administration reduced some U S  support for Saudi Arabia's air campaign in Yemen by withdrawing U S  personnel assigned to a joint U S -Saudi planning cell  Nevertheless, overall U S -Saudi cooperation continued and, in August 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of M1A2S tanks to Saudi Arabia  In response, some lawmakers wrote to request that President Obama withdraw the proposal, citing concerns about Yemen  In September 2016, joint resolutions of disapproval of the proposed tank sale were introduced in the Senate ( S J Res  39 ) and House ( H J Res  98 )  On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the SFRC from further consideration of S J Res  39 (71-27, Record Vote 145)  During debate over the motion, many Senators argued in favor of continued U S  support for Saudi Arabia, with Senator Lindsey Graham remarking "To those who want to vote today to suspend this aid to Saudi Arabia, people in Iran will cheer you on " In the wake of an October 2016 Saudi airstrike on a funeral hall in Sanaa that killed 140 people, the Obama Administration initiated a review of U S  security assistance to Saudi Arabia  Based on that review, it put a hold on a planned sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia and limited intelligence sharing, but maintained counterterrorism cooperation and refueling for coalition aircraft  In the final months of the Obama Administration, U S  Armed Forces briefly exchanged fire with forces party to the conflict  In October 2016, Houthi-Saleh forces launched anti-ship missiles at U S  Navy vessels on patrol off the coast of Yemen  The attacks against the U S  ships marked the first time U S  Armed Forces had come under direct fire in the war  The Obama Administration responded to the attacks against U S  naval vessels by directing the Armed Forces to fire cruise missiles against Houthi-Saleh radar installations  The Obama Administration described the U S  strikes as self-defense and indicated that it did not want to deepen its direct involvement in the conflict  In August and November 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry made several attempts to broker a peace initiative in Oman, but his efforts were rejected by the parties themselves  By the end of 114 th Congress, the war in Yemen was becoming a more significant foreign policy issue for lawmakers  While a growing number of Members were becoming critical of the U S  role in supporting the Saudi-led coalition amid a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen, more lawmakers still viewed the conflict through a regional lens rather than as a localized affair  Amid significant congressional opposition to the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), some Members viewed Iran's support for the Houthi movement and the broader conflict in Yemen as an example of Iran's malign regional activities not directly addressed by the JCPOA  As the Houthis targeted Gulf state infrastructure on land and vessels at sea, their behavior was touted as evidence of Iran's growing capabilities to threaten U S  and Gulf security  Just as some Members considered the Yemen conflict primarily a proxy war between the Iran-backed Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, others viewed it as a test of long-standing U S  commitments to supporting Saudi Arabian security  Supporters of the relationship, while acknowledging that Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war was at times problematic, argued that to curtail U S  arms sales or other defense support to the kingdom would weaken a vital partner that was under threat from a hostile nonstate actor on its southern border  Others lawmakers charged that continued U S  support for the coalition was not improving coalition behavior but damaging the U S  reputation for upholding commitments to international law and human rights  Legislation seeking to limit U S  arms sales to Saudi Arabia was not enacted in the 114 th Congress, but marked the beginning of the broader congressional debate that has continued  As the Trump Administration prepared to assume office, human rights organizations and aid groups were pressing Congress to become more attuned to the growing humanitarian crisis in Yemen  Though the Obama Administration had taken some steps, particularly in late 2016, to limit U S -coalition cooperation and restrict deliveries of PGMs to Saudi Arabia, nongovernmental groups deemed such action as insufficient  According to Human Rights Watch, "Whatever conditionality the Obama administration thought it had created—in holding up the transfer of precision munitions near the tail end of Obama's term and suspending cluster munition transfers earlier—ultimately did not have meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians " From the beginning of his Administration, President Donald Trump has signaled strong support for the Saudi-led coalition's operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference  He initiated a review of U S  policy toward Yemen, including President Obama's October 2016 restrictions on U S  arms sales and intelligence sharing to the coalition  On March 19, 2017, just prior to his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump notified Congress that he was proceeding with three proposed direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology deferred by the Obama Administration, subject to congressional review  In May 2017, the Administration officially notified Congress of its intention to proceed with proposed sales of precision guided munitions technologies that the Obama Administration had deferred, while announcing plans to increase training for Saudi Arabia's air force on both targeting and the Law of Armed Conflict  Congress debated another resolution of disapproval ( S J Res  42 ) of these proposed PGM sales in June 2017 (see below)  After completing the policy review in July 2017, President Trump directed his Administration "to focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity and commerce in the Red Sea " As President Trump entered office, the dynamics of the conflict in Yemen were changing, and the coalition launched a new offensive along Yemen's 280-mile western coastal plain ultimately aimed at taking the strategic Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah  In early 2017, the coalition's gradual advance toward Hudaydah, coupled with an ongoing deterioration in humanitarian conditions, sparked some Members of Congress to implore the Administration to improve aid access and negotiate a cease-fire  In March 2017, several House Members wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urging him to "use all U S  diplomatic tools to help open the Yemeni port of Hodeida [Hudaydah] to international humanitarian aid organizations " A month later, another group of House Members wrote to President Trump stating that Congress should approve any new U S  support to the coalition amid its offensive against Hudaydah  On June 13, 2017, the Senate debated another resolution ( S J Res  42 ) to disapprove of three direct commercial sales of PGMs to Saudi Arabia  During Senate floor consideration over the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S J Res  42 , Members once again weighed various issues, such as the U S -Saudi bilateral relationship, countering Iran, and limiting U S  involvement in the war in Yemen  Some lawmakers suggested that U S  arms sales and military support to the coalition had enabled alleged violations of international humanitarian law, while others argued that U S  support to the coalition improved its effectiveness and helps minimize civilian casualties  For example, during floor debate, Senator Graham argued that "If we are worried about collateral damage in Yemen, I understand the concern  Precision weapons would help that cause, not hurt it " Senator Murphy retorted, saying "What we are asking for is to hold off on selling these precision-guided munitions until we get some clear promise—some clear assurance—from the Saudis that they are going to use these munitions only for military purposes and that they are going to start taking steps—real steps, tangible steps—to address the humanitarian crisis " On June 13, 2017, the Senate voted to reject the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration (47-53, Record Vote 143), and a companion resolution was not taken up in the House ( H J Res  102 )  Representative Ro Khanna introduced a concurrent resolution ( H Con Res  81 ) pursuant to the War Powers Resolution ( P L  93-148 ) in a bid to end U S  support for the coalition's military intervention  After consultation between House leaders and supporters of the resolution on a compromise approach, the House agreed to delay expedited consideration of the resolution until after the November 2016 election and then adopted a nonbinding alternative ( H Res  599 , 366-30, 1 Present, Roll no  623)  In his first year in office, while President Trump sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, counter Iran, and increase U S  counterterrorism activity in Yemen, his Administration also at times took strong positions on the need for members of the coalition to improve humanitarian access, pursue a settlement to the conflict, and take measures to prevent civilian casualties  After a Houthi-fired missile with alleged Iranian origins landed deep inside Saudi Arabia in November 2017, the coalition instituted a full blockade of all of Yemen's ports, including the main port of Hudaydah, exacerbating the country's humanitarian crisis  The White House issued four press statements on the conflict between November 8 and December 8, including a statement on December 6 in which President Trump called on Saudi Arabia to "completely allow food, fuel, water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who desperately need it  This must be done for humanitarian reasons immediately " On December 20, 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would end its blockade of Hudaydah port for a 30-day period and permit the delivery of four U S -funded cranes to Yemen to increase the port's capability to off-load commercial and humanitarian goods  The next day, the White House issued a statement welcoming "Saudi Arabia's announcement of these humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict " As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate also proposed use of the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U S  support for the coalition's military intervention  On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S J Res  54 , a joint resolution to "direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress (except for those U S  forces engaged in counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces) " Efforts in the Senate followed a late 2017 attempt in the House (see Table 1 below), in which a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove U S  forces from Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed nonbinding resolution  Throughout 2018, between Congress and the Trump Administration and within Congress itself, there was disagreement as to whether U S  forces assisting the Saudi-led coalition have been introduced into active or imminent hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution  Some Members claimed that by providing support to the Saudi-led coalition, U S  forces have been introduced into a "situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated" based on the criteria of the War Powers Resolution  The Trump Administration disagreed  In February 2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the extent of current U S  support , and reported that "the United States provides the KSA-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties " On March 20, 2018, the Senate considered S J Res  54 on the floor  During debate, arguments centered on a number of issues, ranging from concern over exacerbating Yemen's humanitarian crisis to reasserting the role of Congress in authorizing the use of armed force abroad  After then-Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker promised to propose new legislation and hold hearings scrutinizing U S  policy in Yemen, a majority of Senators voted to table a motion to discharge the Foreign Relations committee from further consideration of S J Res  54   Senator Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker's approach, a view shared by some other Senators who voted to table the motion  The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Yemen a month later  In parallel testimony before Congress, U S  defense officials stated that while the United States refueled Saudi aircraft and provided advice on targeting techniques, CENTCOM did not track coalition aircraft after they were refueled and did not provide advice on specific targets  Then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert S  Karem testified that "It's correct that we do not monitor and track all of the Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen " During the same hearing, U S  officials acknowledged that pressure from Congress has altered how the Administration deals with the coalition over the Yemen conflict  Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield told Senator Todd Young and the SFRC the following: Senator, your efforts, the efforts of your colleagues in this body and on this Committee have been exceedingly helpful in allowing the Administration to send a message from whole of government regarding the very specific concerns we have over any limitations, restrictions, constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial goods specifically to include fuel to have unrestricted and expeditious entry into Yemen  And that messaging which comes from us, the Executive Branch, also comes from this body is extremely important  After the promised hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also proposed new legislation to place conditions on U S  assistance to the coalition  In May, the committee reported S J Res  58 to the Senate; it would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U S  funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained  The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the SFRC-reported text of S J Res  58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 ( S  2987 )  The provision was modified further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the FY2019 NDAA ( H R  5515 )  It was signed into law as P L  115-232 in mid-August, giving the Administration until mid-September 2018 to make certain certifications  In a statement accompanying the President's signing of P L  115-232 into law, President Trump objected to provisions such as Section 1290, stating the Administration's view that such provisions "encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is feasible and consistent" with "[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs " As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of 2018  On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched "Operation Golden Victory," aimed at retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah  As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could become widespread throughout northern Yemen  On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and then-Secretary of Defense Mattis saying, "We are concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical infrastructure  We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a near-term political resolution to the conflict " Several weeks later, Senator Robert Menendez, the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, placed a hold on a potential U S  sale of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates  In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said, I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective leverage to push back on Iran's actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own self-defense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates humanitarian suffering…  Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world's worst humanitarian crisis  On August 9, the coalition conducted an airstrike that hit a bus in a market near Dahyan, Yemen, in the northern Sa'ada governorate adjacent to the Saudi border  The strike reportedly killed 51 people, 40 of whom were children  The coalition claims that its airstrike was a "legitimate military operation" and conducted in response to a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi city of Jizan a day earlier that killed a Yemeni national in the kingdom  The U S  State Department called on the Saudi-led coalition to conduct a "thorough and transparent investigation into the incident " Several Members of Congress wrote to the Administration seeking additional information regarding U S  operations in the wake of the August 2018 coalition strike at Dahyan  Several Senators also submitted an amendment to the FY2019 Defense Department appropriations act ( H R  6157 ) that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to support the Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to Congress that the coalition air campaign "does not violate the principles of distinction and proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians " The provision did not apply to support for ongoing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Yemen  On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a certification that would allow the use of FY2019 defense funds to support in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft to continue, per the terms of Section 1290 (see discussion above) of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P L  115-232 )  Some Members of Congress criticized the Administration's actions, asserting that the coalition has not met the act's specified benchmarks for avoiding civilian casualties in Yemen  On September 26, several House Members introduced H Con Res  138 , which sought to direct the President to remove U S  Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, except for Armed Forces engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, within 30 days unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use has been enacted into law  In response to a similar initiative in the Senate, the Administration submitted a detailed argument expressing its view that U S  forces supporting Saudi-led coalition operations are not engaged in hostilities in Yemen  By late 2018, the prospect of widespread famine in Yemen coupled with international reprobation over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi pressured the Administration and the coalition to accelerate moves toward peace talks  On October 30, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for all parties to reach a cease-fire and resume negotiations  On November 9, Secretary Mattis further announced that effective immediately, the coalition would use its own military capabilities—rather than U S  capabilities—to conduct in-flight refueling in support of its operations in Yemen  Though fighting continued along several fronts, on December 13, 2018, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire centered on the besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah (Yemen's largest port)  As part of the U N -brokered deal (known as the Stockholm Agreement), the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside Hudaydah city and port  The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment  The international community praised the Stockholm Agreement as a first step toward broader de-escalation and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace settlement  Also on December 13, 2018, the Senate amended and passed S J Res  54 (56-41), which, among other things, directed the President to remove U S  forces from hostilities in Yemen, except U S  forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces  In the House, lawmakers twice narrowly approved rules resolutions containing provisions that made similar resolutions directing the President to remove U S  forces from hostilities in Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration ( H Res  1142 and H Res  1176 )  On December 13, the Senate also passed S J Res  69 , which, among other things, expresses the sense of the Senate that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is responsible for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and that there is no statutory authorization for United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war  The 115th Congress frequently debated the extent and terms of the United States' involvement in the ongoing conflict in Yemen  Lawmakers questioned the extent to which successive Administrations have adhered to existing law related to providing security assistance, including sales or transfers of defense goods and defense services, while upholding international human rights standards (e g , 22 U S C  §2754 or 22 U S C  §2304)  They also enacted new legislation that would condition or prohibit the use of U S  funds for some activities related to Yemen and extend legislative oversight over the executive branch's policy toward the war in Yemen  While the House and its Rules Committee voted to make resolutions with respect to war powers and Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration, the Senate passage of S J Res  54 at the conclusion of the 115 th Congress demonstrated growth in congressional opposition to U S  involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen relative to previous years  Over time, the balance of votes shifted in favor of measures that could be described as critical or restrictive of U S  support for Saudi-led coalition operations with regard to arms sales, oversight measures, and war powers measures  Nevertheless, after nearly four years of conflict, it remains difficult to identify the locus of congressional consensus about Yemen  Many in the House and Senate state that they seek to preserve cooperative U S -Saudi relations in broad terms and express concern about Iranian activities in Yemen, while also expressing support for expanded humanitarian access and efforts to bring the conflict to a close  Some lawmakers express opposition to the intervention and U S  involvement on moral grounds, citing errant coalition airstrikes and the prospect of a looming famine  Others argue the conflict's continuation creates opportunities for Iran and Sunni Islamist extremist groups to expand their influence and operations in Yemen  Still others may have come to oppose continued U S  support for the intervention based on factors not directly related to Yemen itself, including the opaque mechanisms used by the executive branch to support the coalition and/or anger with the Saudi government over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi  It remains to be seen whether recent congressional consideration of Yemen legislation is a harbinger of broader efforts by Members of Congress to reassert congressional prerogatives toward U S  foreign policy writ large  Measures to enhance oversight over U S  support to the Saudi-led coalition and U S  strategy toward Yemen have received broad bipartisan support, while proponents of other recently considered arms sales and war powers measures have used mechanisms to ensure privileged consideration of their proposals  The 116 th Congress may continue to debate U S  support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen  It is uncertain whether lawmakers may also broaden the scope of their oversight activities beyond the current conflict to more fully address the root causes of Yemen's chronic instability  Even if the United States is no longer an active supporter of coalition military efforts, Yemen itself has been devastated by years of war and remains the world's worst humanitarian crisis  Experts expect Yemen to require sustained international attention and financial assistance in order to help local actors reach and sustain a political settlement  This suggests that Congress may grapple with questions about the conduct of U S  diplomacy, the provision of U S  security support, and the investment of U S  assistance and defense funds for years to come 
Report 2:  According to a May 2018 study by the U S  Government Accountability Office, states commonly reported that reaching children in rural areas was "very" or "extremely" challenging in SFSP  The 2010 Agriculture Appropriations Act (Section 749(g) of P L  111-80 ) provided $85 million in discretionary funding for "demonstration projects to develop and test methods of providing access to food for children in urban and rural areas during the summer months " One of these is the Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children (SEBTC or Summer EBT) project, which began in summer 2011 and has continued each summer since (as of the date of this report) in a limited number of states and Indian Tribal Organizations  The project provides electronic food benefits to households with children eligible for free or reduced-price school meals  Depending on the site and year, either $30 or $60 per month is provided on an electronic benefits transfer (EBT) card for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) or Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)  Participants in jurisdictions providing benefits through SNAP can redeem benefits for SNAP-eligible foods at any SNAP-authorized retailer, while participants in the WIC EBT jurisdictions are limited to the smaller set of WIC-eligible foods at WIC-authorized retailers  An evaluation of Summer EBT was conducted from FY2011 through FY2013  The study, which used a random assignment design, found a significant decline in the prevalence of very low food security among participants (9 5% of control group children experienced very low food security compared to 6 4% in the Summer EBT group)  It also showed improvements in children's consumption of fruits, vegetables, and whole grains  Both the WIC and SNAP models showed increased consumption, but increases were greater at sites operating the WIC model  Congress has provided subsequent funding for Summer EBT projects (see Table 3 )  Most recently, the third FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P L  116-6 ) provided $28 million for the Summer EBT demonstration  Awardees for summer 2017 were Connecticut, Delaware, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, Virginia, and the Chickasaw and Cherokee nations  For summer 2018, USDA also awarded grants to Tennessee and Texas  Many of these jurisdictions participated in Summer EBT in previous summers as well  In October 2018, USDA-FNS announced a new strategy for determining grant recipients in FY2019, stating that the agency will prioritize new states that have not participated before, statewide projects, and projects that can operate in the summers of 2019 through 2021  There were proposals in the 114 th and 115 th Congresses to expand Summer EBT  For example, the Senate committee's child nutrition reauthorization proposal in the 114 th Congress ( S  3136 ) would have allowed a portion of SFSP's mandatory funding to cover Summer EBT and authorized up to $50 million in discretionary funding for the program  In addition, in its FY2017 budget proposal, the Obama Administration recommended expansion of Summer EBT nationwide with a phase-in over 10 years  Freestanding bills in the 114 th and 115 th Congresses had similar objectives  Funding from the 2010 Agriculture Appropriations Act (Section 749(g) of P L  111-80 ) was also used for other demonstration projects  One of these, the Enhanced Summer Food Service Program (eSFSP), took place during the summers of 2010 through 2012 in eight states  It included four initiatives: (1) incentives for SFSP sites to lengthen operations to 40 or more days, (2) funding to add recreational or educational activities at meal sites, (3) meal delivery for children in rural areas, and (4) food backpacks that children could take home on weekends and holidays  Evaluations of eSFSP were published from 2011 to 2014  Summer meal participation rates rose during the demonstration periods for all four initiatives  In addition, children in the meal delivery and backpack demonstrations had consistent rates of food insecurity from summer to fall (this was not measured for the other initiatives)  However, the results from these evaluations should be interpreted with caution due to a small sample size, the lack of a comparison group, and potential confounding factors  Another demonstration project, also operating under authority provided by the 2010 Agriculture Appropriations Act, provided exemptions from the congregate feeding requirement to SFSP and SSO outdoor meal sites experiencing excessive heat each summer since 2015 (as of the date of this report)  Exempted sites must continue to serve children in congregate settings on days when heat is not excessive, and provide meals in another form (e g , a take-home form) on days of excessive heat  USDA also offers exemptions on a case-by-case basis for other extreme weather conditions  This demonstration has not been evaluated  There were other proposals and hearings related to congregate feeding in SFSP in recent years  For example, in the 114 th Congress, committee-reported child nutrition reauthorization proposals in the Senate and the House ( S  3136 and H R  5003 , respectively) would have enabled some rural meal sites to provide SFSP meals for consumption offsite  Specifically, both proposals would have allowed offsite consumption for children (1) in rural areas ( H R  5003 to a more limited extent than S  3136 ) and (2) in nonrural areas in which more than 80% of students are certified as eligible for free or reduced-price meals  The bills would have also permitted congregate feeding sites to provide meals to be consumed offsite episodically under certain conditions such as extreme weather or public safety concerns  The HHFKA created the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP), an option to provide free meals (lunches and breakfasts) to all students in schools with high proportions of students who automatically qualify for free or reduced-price lunches  CEP became available to schools nationwide starting in SY2014-2015, and participation has increased since then  As of SY2016-2017, more than 20,700 schools participated in CEP, according to data from the Food Research and Action Center (FRAC), a nonprofit advocacy organization  This is roughly 22% of NSLP schools  Several groups have expressed support for CEP during its implementation, arguing that the provision improves access to meals, reduces stigma associated with receiving free or reduced-price meals, and reduces schools' administrative costs  Others have sought to change the option  For example, in the 114 th Congress, the House's committee-reported child nutrition reauthorization bill ( H R  5003 ) would have restricted schools' eligibility for CEP, which the committee majority argued was "to better target resources to those students in need, while also ensuring all students who are eligible for assistance continue to receive assistance " One secondary effect of CEP is that it has created data issues for other nonnutrition federal and state programs  Many programs, most notably the federal Title I-A program (the primary source of federal funding for elementary and secondary schools), use free and reduced-price lunch data to determine eligibility and/or funding allocations  These data come from school meal applications, which are no longer collected under CEP's automatic eligibility determination process  For more information on this issue, see CRS Report R44568, Overview of ESEA Title I-A and the School Meals' Community Eligibility Provision   Students may qualify for free meals, or they may have to pay for reduced-price or full-price meals  In recent years, the issue of students owing and not paying their meal costs, and schools' responses to such situations, has received increased attention  In many cases, schools serve students a regular meal, charging the unpaid meal cost and creating a debt that they may try to collect later from the family  In other cases, schools respond with what some have called "lunch shaming" practices—most commonly, taking or throwing away a student's selected hot foods and providing an alternative cold meal or, less commonly, barring children from participation in school events until debt is repaid or having children wear a visual indicator of meal debt (e g , a stamp or sticker)  Lunch shaming instances have largely been reported in news articles from different states, and there are limited national data available on the prevalence of such practices (available data are discussed in the text box below)  Many school districts report that unpaid meal costs create a financial burden on their meal programs (see text box below for more detail)  In addition to federal funds, student payments for full and reduced-price meals are a primary source of revenue for school food programs  Schools have an interest in collecting this revenue to help fund operations  Also, according to federal regulations, if schools are unable to recover unpaid meal funds, the money becomes "bad debt" and the school or school district must use other nonfederal funding sources to cover the costs  Starting in 2010, Congress and USDA have taken actions to address the issue of unpaid meal costs  Section 143 of the HHFKA required USDA to examine states' and school districts' policies and practices regarding unpaid meal charges  As part of the review, the law required USDA to "prepare a report on the feasibility of establishing national standards for meal charges and the provision of alternate meals" and, if applicable, make recommendations related to the implementation of the standards  The law also permitted USDA to take follow-up actions based on the findings from the report  USDA's subsequent Report to Congress in June 2016 ultimately did not recommend national standards, but instead recommended "clarifying and updating policy guidance on specific national policies impacting unpaid meal charges and facilitating the development and distribution of best practices to support decision making by States and localities " USDA-FNS followed up with a memorandum requiring SFAs to institute and communicate, by July 1, 2017, a written meal charge policy, which was to include instructions on how to address situations in which a child does not pay for a meal  USDA-FNS also provided clarification through webinars, other memoranda, and a best practice guide  In the Report to Congress, USDA stated that its recommendation was based on findings from a study published by USDA-FNS in March 2014 and a Request for Information (RFI) on "Unpaid Meal Charges" published by USDA-FNS in October 2014  The findings from both the study and the RFI—which garnered 462 comments—showed that meal charge policies were largely determined at the school and school district levels rather than the state level  The responses to the RFI also indicated that such policies ranged in formality, with varying degrees of review (e g , some required school board approval while others did not) and enforcement  In the RFI comments, school and district officials generally expressed a preference for local control of meal charge policies, while national advocacy groups generally favored national standards  The topics of lunch shaming and unpaid meal costs also surfaced in the 115 th Congress  For example, a provision in the FY2018 appropriations law stated that funds appropriated in the law could not be used in ways that result in discrimination against children eligible for free or reduced-price meals, including the practices of segregating children and overtly identifying children by special tokens or tickets (note that this does not pertain to children paying for full-price meals)  Legislative proposals in the 115 th Congress included the Anti-Lunch Shaming Act of 2017 ( H R  2401 / S  1064 ), which sought to establish national standards for how schools treat children unable to pay for a meal  Unpaid meal costs and lunch shaming have also been active topics at the state level  In recent years, a number of states have enacted legislation aimed at addressing these issues  For example, in 2018, Illinois passed legislation that requires schools to serve a regular (reimbursable) meal to students who do not pay and allows school districts to request an offset from the state for debts exceeding $500  The HHFKA created new requirements related to schools' pricing of paid lunches (sometimes referred to as "paid lunch equity" requirements)  Specifically, the law required all NSLP-participating SFAs to review their average price of paid lunches and, if necessary, gradually increase prices based on a formula  The law also gave SFAs the option to meet the requirements with specified nonfederal funding sources instead of raising prices  According to the Senate committee report on the HHFKA, the requirements were intended "to ensure that children receiving free and reduced price lunches receive the full value of federal funds " Prior to the paid lunch equity requirements, a USDA study found that federal subsidies for free and reduced-price lunches were cross-subsidizing other aspects of the meals programs, likely including paid lunches  This can occur because federal reimbursements for free, reduced-price, and paid lunches are all mixed into the same SFA-run "nonprofit school food service account" (NSFSA)  Some observers argue, however, that raising prices may reduce participation in paid lunches  Under the paid lunch equity formula, the price per paid lunch must eventually match or exceed the difference between the federal reimbursements for free and paid lunches  If this is not the case, schools must increase prices over time until they make up the difference  For example, the federal reimbursement was $3 37 for free lunches and $0 37 for paid lunches SY2018-2019 for some schools  Under the requirements, if schools were not charging at least $3 00 per paid lunch, they would be required to increase the price of a paid lunch gradually, based on a formula, until they closed the gap (see Figure 1 )  Schools cannot be required to raise the price by more than 10 cents annually, but they may choose to do so  The HHFKA also included related requirements for revenue from "nonprogram" (i e , competitive) foods  The law required that any revenue from nonprogram foods accrue to the SFA-run NSFSA  In practice, this prevents revenue from competitive foods from being used for other school purposes outside of food service  The law also required that, broadly speaking, revenue from nonprogram foods equal or exceed the costs of obtaining nonprogram foods (see the regulations for a specific formula)  In June 2011, USDA-FNS published an interim final rule implementing the requirements starting in SY2011-2012, offering some flexibility for that first year  USDA subsequently provided certain exemptions through agency guidance for SY2013-2014 through SY2017-2018 for SFAs "in strong financial standing," as determined by state agencies based on different criteria  For SY2018-2019, the enacted FY2018 appropriation (Section 775 of P L  115-141 ) expanded the exemptions, requiring only SFAs with a negative balance in the NSFSA as of January 31, 2018, potentially to have to raise prices for paid meals  Other legislative proposals related to the paid lunch equity requirements were considered in recent Congresses  For example, the House committee's child nutrition reauthorization proposal in the 114 th Congress would have eliminated the requirements  The Senate committee's proposal would have replaced the requirements with a broader "non-federal revenue target," which could have come from household payments for full-price lunches or other state and local contributions  CACFP: Child and Adult Care Food Program CDF: Canned, dried, or frozen CEP: Community Eligibility Provision eSFSP: Enhanced Summer Food Service Program FFVP: Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program HHFKA: Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act NSFSA: Nonprofit school food service account NSLP: National School Lunch Program SBP: School Breakfast Program SFA: School food authority SFSP : Summer Food Service Program SMP: Special Milk Program SSO: Summer Seamless Option Summer EBT or SEBTC : Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children SY: school year USDA-FNS: U S  Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service

ground_truth: The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP); the Department of Energy (DOE); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill's funding. President Trump submitted his FY2020 detailed budget proposal to Congress on March 18, 2019 (after submitting a general budget overview on March 11). The budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill total $38.02 billion—$6.64 billion (15%) below the FY2019 appropriation. The largest exception to the overall decrease proposed for energy and water programs is a $1.309 billion increase (12%) for DOE nuclear weapons activities. For FY2019, the conference agreement on H.R. 5895 (H.Rept. 115-929) provided total Energy and Water Development appropriations of $44.66 billion—3% above the FY2018 level, excluding supplemental funding, and 23% above the FY2019 request. It was signed by the President on September 21, 2018 (P.L. 115-244). Emergency supplemental appropriations totaling $17.419 billion were provided to USACE and DOE for hurricane response by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), signed February 9, 2018. Major Energy and Water Development funding issues for FY2020 are listed below. They were selected based on the total funding involved, the percentage of proposed increases or decreases, and potential impact on broader public policy considerations. Water Agency Funding Reductions. The Trump Administration requested reductions of 31% for USACE and 29% for Reclamation for FY2020 from the FY2019 enacted levels. The largest reductions would be from USACE Operation and Maintenance (-48%) and Reclamation's Water and Related Resources account (-31%). Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. Power Marketing Administration (PMA) Reforms. DOE's FY2020 budget request includes mandatory proposals to sell PMA electricity transmission lines and other assets, repeal certain PMA borrowing authority, and eliminate cost-based limits on the electricity rates charged by the PMAs. The proposals would need to be enacted in authorizing legislation. Termination of Energy Efficiency Grants. DOE's Weatherization Assistance Program and State Energy Program would be terminated under the FY2020 budget request. The Administration had proposed to eliminate the grants in FY2018 and FY2019, but Congress continued funding. Reductions in Energy Research and Development. Under the FY2020 budget request, DOE research and development appropriations would be reduced for energy efficiency and renewable energy (EERE) by 83%, nuclear energy by 38%, and fossil energy by 24%. Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. Nuclear Waste Repository. The Administration's budget request would provide new funding for the first time since FY2010 for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. DOE would receive $116 million to seek an NRC license for the repository and develop interim waste storage capacity. NRC would receive $38.5 million to consider DOE's repository license application. Similar Administration funding requests for FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. Elimination of Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E). The Trump Administration proposes no new appropriations for ARPA-E in FY2020 and to cancel $287 million in unobligated balances from previous appropriations. Similar proposals to terminate ARPA-E in FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. Loan Programs Termination. The FY2020 budget request would terminate DOE's Title 17 Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program, the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program, and the Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program. Administration proposals to eliminate the programs were not included in the enacted appropriations measures for FY2018 and FY2019. Weapons Activities. The FY2020 budget request for DOE Weapons Activities is 12% greater than it was in FY2019 ($12.4 billion vs. $11.1 billion), in contrast to a proposed 10% reduction in DOE's total funding. Notable proposed increases would be used for warhead life extension programs and preparations for increase production of plutonium pits (warhead cores).

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U S  Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC)  Figure 1 compares the major components of the Energy and Water Development bill from FY2017 through the FY2020 request  President Trump submitted his FY2020 detailed budget proposal to Congress on March 18, 2019 (after submitting a general budget overview on March 11)  The budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill total $38 02 billion—$6 64 billion (15%) below the FY2019 appropriation  (See Table 3  ) A $1 309 billion increase (12%) is proposed for DOE nuclear weapons activities  For FY2019, the conference agreement on H R  5895 ( H Rept  115-929 ) provided total Energy and Water Development appropriations of $44 66 billion—3% above the FY2018 level and 23% above the FY2019 request  The bill was signed by the President on September 21, 2018 ( P L  115-244 )  Figures for FY2019 exclude emergency supplemental appropriations totaling $17 419 billion provided to USACE and DOE for natural disaster response by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ), signed February 9, 2018  For more details, see CRS Report R45258, Energy and Water Development: FY2019 Appropriations , by Mark Holt and Corrie E  Clark, and CRS Report R45326, Army Corps of Engineers Annual and Supplemental Appropriations: Issues for Congress , by Nicole T  Carter  The FY2020 budget request proposes substantial reductions from the FY2019 enacted level for DOE energy research and development (R&D) programs, including a reduction of $178 million (-24%) in fossil fuels and $502 million (-38%) in nuclear energy  Energy efficiency and renewable energy R&D would decline by $1 724 billion (-83%)  DOE science programs would be reduced by $1 039 billion (-16%)  Programs targeted by the budget for elimination or phaseout include energy efficiency grants, the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E), and loan guarantee programs  Funding would be reduced for USACE by $2 172 billion (-31%), and Reclamation and CUP by $462 million (-29%)  Congress did not enact similar reductions included in the FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests  Congressional consideration of the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill is affected by certain procedural and statutory budget enforcement measures  These consist primarily of limits associated with the budget resolution on total discretionary spending and allocations of this amount that apply to spending under the jurisdiction of each appropriations subcommittee  Statutory budget enforcement is derived from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P L  112-25 )  The BCA established separate limits on defense and nondefense discretionary spending  These limits are in effect for each of the fiscal years from FY2012 through FY2021, and are primarily enforced by an automatic spending reduction process called sequestration, in which a breach of a spending limit would trigger across-the-board cuts within that spending category  The BCA's statutory discretionary spending limits were increased for FY2018 and FY2019 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P L  115-123 ), enacted February 9, 2018  However, the BCA discretionary spending limits have not been increased for FY2020  As a result, the limits currently in place for FY2020 are substantially lower than the limits that were in place for FY2019  For discretionary defense spending, the FY2020 limit drops from $647 billion to $576 billion (-11%), while the nondefense limit drops from $597 billion to $542 billion (-9%)  A bill to raise the defense and nondefense spending limits for FY2020 and FY2021 was reported by the House Budget Committee April 5, 2019 ( H R  2021 , H Rept  116-35 )  (For more information, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions , by Grant A  Driessen and Megan S  Lynch ) Several issues raised by the Administration's budget request could generate controversy during congressional consideration of Energy and Water Development appropriations for FY2020  The issues described in this section—listed approximately in the order the affected agencies appear in the Energy and Water Development bill—were selected based on the total funding involved, the percentage of proposed increases or decreases, and potential impact on broader public policy considerations  For USACE, the Trump Administration requested $4 827 billion for FY2020, which is $2 172 billion (-31%) below the FY2019 appropriation  The request includes no funding for initiating new studies and construction projects (referred to as new starts)  The FY2020 request seeks to limit funding for ongoing navigation and flood risk-reduction construction projects to those whose benefits are at least 2 5 times their costs, or projects that address safety concerns  Many congressionally authorized USACE projects would not meet that standard  The Administration also proposes to transfer the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program from USACE to DOE  For Reclamation, FY2020 funding would be reduced by $461 6 million (29%) from the FY2019 level, to $1 11 billion  For more details, see CRS In Focus IF11137, Army Corps of Engineers: FY2020 Appropriations , by Nicole T  Carter and Anna E  Normand; CRS In Focus IF11158, Bureau of Reclamation: FY2020 Appropriations , by Charles V  Stern; and CRS Report R45326, Army Corps of Engineers Annual and Supplemental Appropriations: Issues for Congress , by Nicole T  Carter  DOE's FY2020 budget request includes three mandatory proposals related to the Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs)—Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and Western Area Power Administration (WAPA)  PMAs sell the power generated by the dams operated by Reclamation and USACE  The Administration proposes to divest the assets of the three PMAs that own transmission infrastructure: BPA, SWPA, and WAPA  These assets consist of thousands of miles of high voltage transmission lines and hundreds of power substations  The budget request projects that mandatory savings from the sale of these assets would total approximately $5 8 billion over a 10-year period  The FY2020 budget request includes a proposal to repeal the borrowing authority for WAPA's Transmission Infrastructure Program, which facilitates the delivery of renewable energy resources  The FY2020 budget also proposes eliminating the statutory requirement that PMAs limit rates to amounts necessary to recover only construction, operations, and maintenance costs; the budget proposes that the PMAs instead transition to a market-based approach to setting rates  The Administration has estimated that this proposal would yield $1 9 billion in new revenues over 10 years  The budget also calls for repealing $3 25 billion in borrowing authority provided to WAPA for transmission projects enacted under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P L  111-5 )  The proposal is estimated to save $640 million over 10 years  All of these proposals would need to be enacted in authorizing legislation, and no congressional action has been taken on them to date  The proposals have been opposed by groups such as the American Public Power Association and the National Rural Electrical Cooperative Association, and they have been the subject of opposition letters to the Administration from several regionally based bipartisan groups of Members of Congress  PMA reforms have been supported by some policy research institutes, such as the Heritage Foundation  For further information, see CRS Report R45548, The Power Marketing Administrations: Background and Current Issues , by Richard J  Campbell  The FY2020 budget request proposes to terminate both the DOE Weatherization Assistance Program and the State Energy Program (SEP)  The Weatherization Assistance Program provides formula grants to states to fund energy efficiency improvements for low-income housing units to reduce their energy costs and save energy  The SEP provides grants and technical assistance to states for planning and implementation of their energy programs  Both the weatherization and SEP programs are under DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)  The weatherization program received $257 million and SEP $55 million for FY2019, after also having been proposed for elimination in that year's budget request, as well as in FY2018  According to DOE, the proposed elimination of the grant programs is "due to a departmental shift in focus away from deployment activities and towards early-stage R&D " Appropriations for DOE R&D on energy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear energy, and fossil energy would be reduced from $4 133 billion in FY2019 to $1 729 billion (-58%) under the Administration's FY2020 budget request  Major proposed reductions include bioenergy technologies (-82%), vehicle technologies (-79%), natural gas technologies (-79%), advanced manufacturing (-75%), building technologies (-75%), wind energy (-74%), solar energy (-73%), geothermal technologies (-67%), and nuclear fuel cycle R&D (-66%)  DOE says the proposed reductions would primarily affect the later stages of energy research, which tend to be the most costly  "The Budget focuses DOE resources toward early-stage R&D, where the Federal role is strongest, and reflects an increased reliance on the private sector to fund later-stage research, development, and commercialization of energy technologies," according to the FY2020 DOE request  Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted  The Administration's FY2020 budget request, for the first time since FY2010, would provide new funding for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV; similar Administration requests for the repository project were not included in the enacted funding measures for FY2018 and FY2019  Under the FY2020 request, DOE would receive $116 million to seek an NRC license for the repository and to develop interim nuclear waste storage capacity  NRC would receive $38 5 million to consider DOE's application  DOE's total of $116 million in nuclear waste funding would come from two appropriations accounts: $90 million from Nuclear Waste Disposal and $26 million from Defense Nuclear Waste Disposal (to pay for defense-related nuclear waste that would be disposed of at Yucca Mountain)  DOE submitted a license application for the Yucca Mountain repository in 2008, but NRC suspended consideration in 2011 for lack of funding  The Obama Administration had declared the Yucca Mountain site "unworkable" because of opposition from the state of Nevada  The House voted to provide the Yucca Mountain funding requested for FY2018 and a $100 million increase for FY2019, but the Senate Appropriations Committee did not include it for FY2018, and it was not included in the Senate-passed bill for FY2019  Also as in FY2018, the FY2019 Senate bill included an authorization for a pilot program to develop an interim nuclear waste storage facility at a voluntary site (§304)  The enacted FY2019 appropriations measure did not include the House-passed funding for Yucca Mountain or the Senate's nuclear waste pilot program provisions  For more background, see CRS Report RL33461, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal , by Mark Holt  The FY2020 budget request would halt further loans and loan guarantees under DOE's Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program and the Title 17 Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program  Similar proposals to eliminate the programs in FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted  The FY2020 budget request would also halt further loan guarantees under DOE's Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program  Under the FY2020 budget proposal, DOE would continue to administer its existing portfolio of loans and loan guarantees  Unused prior-year authority, or ceiling levels, for loan guarantee commitments would be rescinded, as well as $169 5 million in unspent appropriations to cover loan guarantee "subsidy costs" (which are primarily intended to cover potential losses)  On March 22, 2019, after the FY2020 budget request had been submitted, DOE provided $3 7 billion in additional Title 17 loan guarantees for two new reactors under construction at the Vogtle nuclear plant in Georgia  The Vogtle project had previously received $8 3 billion in loan guarantees under the DOE program  The Administration's request for DOE includes $107 million in FY2020 for the U S  contribution to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), which is under construction in France by a multinational consortium  "ITER will be the first fusion device to maintain fusion for long periods of time" and is to lay the technical foundation "for the commercial production of fusion-based electricity," according to the consortium's website  The FY2020 DOE appropriation request, 19% below the FY2020 level, would pay for components supplied by U S  companies for the project, such as central solenoid superconducting magnet modules  ITER has long attracted congressional concern about management, schedule, and cost  The United States is to pay 9% of the project's construction costs, including contributions of components, cash, and personnel  Other collaborators in the project include the European Union, Russia, Japan, India, South Korea, and China  The total U S  share of the cost was estimated in 2015 at between $4 0 billion and $6 5 billion, up from $1 45 billion to $2 2 billion in 2008  DOE funding for the project was $122 million in FY2018 and $132 million in FY2019  The Trump Administration's FY2020 budget would eliminate the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E) and rescind $287 million of the agency's unobligated balances  ARPA-E funds research on technologies that are determined to have potential to transform energy production, storage, and use  "This elimination facilitates opportunities to integrate the positive aspects of ARPA-E into DOE's applied energy research programs," according to the DOE request  The Administration also proposed to terminate ARPA-E in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests, but Congress increased the program's funding in both years  Because ARPA-E provides advance funding for projects for up to three years, oversight and management of the program would still be required during a phaseout period  According to the Administration budget request, "ARPA-E will utilize the remainder of its unobligated balances to execute the multi-year termination of the program, with all operations ceasing by FY 2022 " The FY2020 budget request for DOE Weapons Activities is 12% greater than the FY2019 enacted level ($12 4 billion vs  $11 1 billion)  Weapons Activities programs are carried out by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within DOE  Under Weapons Activities, FY2020 funding for nuclear warhead life-extension programs (LEPs) would increase by 10% ($2 1 billion vs $1 9 billion)  The two most notable increases within that account are the funding request for W80-4 LEP, which increases by 37% ($898 6 million vs  $654 8 million) and the initiation of funding for the W87-1 LEP  The increase in the request for the W80-4 warhead, which is due to be carried on the new long-range standoff weapon (a new cruise missile), apparently is the result of a new budget estimate, as the Department of Defense is not accelerating development of the missile  The FY2020 request seeks $112 million for the W87-1 warhead (formerly the Interoperable Warhead 1, or IW-I), which received $53 million in FY2019  This warhead is to be carried by the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, a new land-based missile that is scheduled to enter the force in the 2030s  The FY2020 budget request seeks $10 million for the W76-2 LEP, down from $65 million in FY2019  Work on this warhead is nearly complete  It is a low-yield modification of the current W76 warhead carried by U S  submarine-launched ballistic missiles  It remains controversial in Congress despite its relatively low price tag  In FY2020, NNSA is seeking $51 5 million, in the Stockpile Systems account, for surveillance efforts for the B83 gravity bomb, the most powerful bomb in the U S  inventory  This effort represents a 47% increase over the $35 million request in FY2019  The Obama Administration had planned to retire this bomb, but the Trump Administration reversed that decision in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review  This decision may also prove controversial, as several Senators have been vocal supporters of the plan to retire the bomb  Within the Strategic Materials account in the NNSA budget, funding for Plutonium Sustainment would increase 97%, from $361 million enacted for FY2019 to $712 million requested for FY2020  This increase would support the Administration's plans to produce plutonium pits (or cores) for nuclear warheads at two facilities—Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina  The Administration is seeking $410 million to begin conceptual design and pre-Critical Decision (CD)-1 activities at Savannah River  For more information, see CRS Report R44442, Energy and Water Development Appropriations: Nuclear Weapons Activities , by Amy F  Woolf  DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for environmental cleanup and waste management at the department's nuclear facilities  The total FY2020 appropriations request for EM activities of $6 469 billion would be a decrease of $706 million (-10%) from FY2019  The budgetary components of the EM program are Defense Environmental Cleanup (-9%), Non-Defense Environmental Cleanup (-20%), and the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund (-15%)  The FY2020 request includes a proposal to transfer management of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) from USACE to the Office of Legacy Management (LM), the DOE office responsible for long-term stewardship of remediated sites  The FY2020 LM budget request includes $141 million for FUSRAP, down from $150 million appropriated to USACE for the program in FY2019  According to the DOE budget justification, "USACE will continue to conduct cleanup of FUSRAP sites on a reimbursable basis " Table 1 indicates the steps during consideration of FY2020 Energy and Water Development appropriations  (For more details, see the CRS Appropriations Status Table at http://www crs gov/AppropriationsStatusTable/Index  ) As of the publication date of this report, no markups had been held  Table 2 includes budget totals for energy and water development appropriations enacted for FY2011 through FY2019, plus the FY2020 request  The annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes four titles: Title I—Corps of Engineers—Civil; Title II—Department of the Interior (Central Utah Project and Bureau of Reclamation); Title III—Department of Energy; and Title IV—Independent Agencies, as shown in Table 3   Major programs in the bill are described in this section in the approximate order they appear in the bill  Previous appropriations and budget recommendations for FY2020 are shown in the accompanying tables, and additional details about many of these programs are provided in separate CRS reports as indicated  For a discussion of current funding issues related to these programs, see " Funding Issues and Initiatives ," above  Congressional clients may obtain more detailed information by contacting CRS analysts listed in CRS Report R42638, Appropriations: CRS Experts , by James M  Specht and Justin Murray  FY2020 budget justifications for the largest agencies funded by the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill can be found through the following links: Title I, U S  Army Corps of Engineers, Civil Works, http://www usace army mil/Missions/CivilWorks/Budget Title II Bureau of Reclamation, https://www usbr gov/budget/ Central Utah Project, https://www doi gov/sites/doi gov/files/uploads/fy2020_cupca_budget_justification pdf Title III, Department of Energy, https://www energy gov/cfo/downloads/fy-2020-budget-justification Title IV, Independent Agencies Appalachian Regional Commission, http://www arc gov/images/newsroom/publications/fy2020budget/FY2020PerformanceBudgetMar2019 pdf Nuclear Regulatory Commission, https://www nrc gov/docs/ML1906/ML19065A279 pdf Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, https://www dnfsb gov/about/congressional-budget-requests Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, http://www nwtrb gov/about-us/plans USACE is an agency in the Department of Defense with both military and civilian responsibilities  Under its civil works program, which is funded by the Energy and Water appropriations bill, USACE plans, builds, operates, and in some cases maintains water resources facilities for coastal and inland navigation, riverine and coastal flood risk reduction, and aquatic ecosystem restoration  In recent decades, Congress has generally authorized Corps studies, construction projects, and other activities in omnibus water authorization bills, typically titled Water Resources Development Acts (WRDA), prior to funding them through appropriations legislation  Recent Congresses enacted the following omnibus water resources authorization acts: in June 2014, the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA, P L  113-121 ); in December 2016, the Water Resources Development Act of 2016 (Title I of P L  114-322 , the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act [WIIN]); and in October 2018, the Water Resources Development Act of 2018 (Title I of P L  115-270 , America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 [AWIA 2018])  These acts consisted largely of authorizations for new USACE projects, and they altered numerous USACE policies and procedures  Unlike in highways and municipal water infrastructure programs, federal funds for USACE are not distributed to states or projects based on formulas or delivered via competitive grants  Instead, USACE generally is directly involved in planning, designing, and managing the construction of projects that are cost-shared with nonfederal project sponsors  Prior to FY2010, in addition to site-specific project funding included in the President's annual budget request for USACE, Congress, during the discretionary appropriations process, had identified many additional USACE projects to receive funding or had adjusted the funding levels for the projects identified in the President's request  Starting in the 112 th Congress, site-specific project line items added or increased by Congress (i e , earmarks) became subject to House and Senate earmark moratorium policies  As a result, Congress generally has not added funding at the project level since FY2010  In lieu of the project-based increases, Congress has included "additional funding" for select categories of USACE projects and provided direction and limitations on the use of these funds  For more information, CRS In Focus IF11137, Army Corps of Engineers: FY2020 Appropriations , by Nicole T  Carter and Anna E  Normand  Previous appropriations and the President's request for FY2020 are shown in Table 4   Most of the large dams and water diversion structures in the West were built by, or with the assistance of, the Bureau of Reclamation  While the Corps of Engineers built hundreds of flood control and navigation projects, Reclamation's original mission was to develop water supplies, primarily for irrigation to reclaim arid lands in the West for farming and ranching  Reclamation has evolved into an agency that assists in meeting the water demands in the West while working to protect the environment and the public's investment in Reclamation infrastructure  The agency's municipal and industrial water deliveries have more than doubled since 1970  Today, Reclamation manages hundreds of dams and diversion projects, including more than 300 storage reservoirs, in 17 western states  These projects provide water to approximately 10 million acres of farmland and 31 million people  Reclamation is the largest wholesale supplier of water in the 17 western states and the second-largest hydroelectric power producer in the nation  Reclamation facilities also provide substantial flood control, recreation, and other benefits  Reclamation facility operations are often controversial, particularly for their effect on fish and wildlife species and because of conflicts among competing water users during drought conditions  As with the Corps of Engineers, the Reclamation budget is made up largely of individual project funding lines, rather than general programs that would not be covered by congressional earmark requirements  Therefore, as with USACE, these Reclamation projects have often been subject to earmark disclosure rules  The current moratorium on earmarks restricts congressional steering of money directly toward specific Reclamation projects  Reclamation's single largest account, Water and Related Resources, encompasses the agency's traditional programs and projects, including construction, operations and maintenance, dam safety, and ecosystem restoration, among others  Reclamation also typically requests funds in a number of smaller accounts, and has proposed additional accounts in recent years  Implementation and oversight of the Central Utah Project (CUP), also funded by Title II, is conducted by a separate office within the Department of the Interior  For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11158, Bureau of Reclamation: FY2020 Appropriations , by Charles V  Stern  Previous appropriations and recommendations for FY2020 are shown in Table 5   The Energy and Water Development bill has funded all DOE programs since FY2005  Major DOE activities include (1) research and development (R&D) on renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear power, fossil energy, and electricity; (2) the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; (3) energy statistics; (4) general science; (5) environmental cleanup; and (6) nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs  Table 6 provides the recent funding history for DOE programs, which are briefly described further below  DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) conducts research and development on transportation energy technology, energy efficiency in buildings and manufacturing processes, and the production of solar, wind, geothermal, and other renewable energy  EERE also administers formula grants to states for making energy efficiency improvements to low-income housing units and for state energy planning  The Sustainable Transportation program area includes electric vehicles, vehicle efficiency, and alternative fuels  DOE's electric vehicle program aims to "reduce the cost of electric vehicle batteries by more than half, to less than $100/kWh [kilowatt-hour] (ultimate goal is $80/kWh), increase range to 300 miles, and decrease charge time to 15 minutes or less " DOE's vehicle fuel cell program is focusing on the costs of fuel cells and their hydrogen fuel  According to the FY2020 budget request, "To be cost competitive with gasoline-powered internal combustion engines on a cents-per-mile driven basis, the cost of hydrogen delivered and dispensed needs to be less than $4/gge [gasoline gallon equivalent] (untaxed), and the cost of a durable fuel cell system to be less than $40/kW " Bioenergy goals include the development of "drop-in" fuels—fuels that would be largely compatible with existing energy infrastructure and vehicles, with a goal of $3/gge  Renewable power programs focus on electricity generation from solar, wind, water, and geothermal sources  The solar energy program has a goal of achieving, by 2030, costs of 3 cents per kWh for unsubsidized, utility-scale photovoltaics (PV)  Wind R&D is to focus on early-stage research and testing to reduce costs and improve performance and reliability  The geothermal program is to focus on developing "enhanced geothermal systems" with an electricity generation cost target of 20 8 cents/kWh by 2022  In the energy efficiency program area, the advanced manufacturing program focuses on improving the energy efficiency of manufacturing processes and on the manufacturing of energy-related products  The building technologies program includes R&D on lighting, space conditioning, windows, and control technologies to reduce building energy-use intensity  The energy efficiency program also provides weatherization grants to states for improving the energy efficiency of low-income housing units and state energy planning grants  For more details, see CRS Report R44980, DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE): Appropriations Status , by Corrie E  Clark  The Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) was created from programs that were previously part of the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability  The programs that were not moved into CESER became part of the DOE Office of Electricity (OE)  OE's mission is to lead DOE efforts "to strengthen, transform, and improve energy infrastructure so that consumers have access to secure and resilient sources of energy " Major priorities of OE are developing a model of North American energy vulnerabilities, pursuing megawatt-scale electricity storage, integrating electric power system sensing technology, and analyzing electricity policy issues  The office also includes the DOE power marketing administrations, which are funded from separate appropriations accounts  CESER is the federal government's lead entity for energy sector-specific responses to energy security emergencies—whether caused by physical infrastructure problems or by cybersecurity issues  The office conducts R&D on energy infrastructure security technology; provides energy sector security guidelines, training, and technical assistance; and enhances energy sector emergency preparedness and response  DOE's Multiyear Plan for Energy Sector Cybersecurity describes the department's strategy to "strengthen today's energy delivery systems by working with our partners to address growing threats and promote continuous improvement, and develop game-changing solutions that will create inherently secure, resilient, and self-defending energy systems for tomorrow " The plan includes three goals that DOE has established for energy sector cybersecurity: strengthen energy sector cybersecurity preparedness; coordinate cyber incident response and recovery; and accelerate game-changing research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) of resilient energy delivery systems  DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) "focuses on three major mission areas: the nation's existing nuclear fleet, the development of advanced nuclear reactor concepts, and fuel cycle technologies," according to DOE's FY2020 budget justification  It calls nuclear energy "a key element of United States energy independence, energy dominance, electricity grid resiliency, national security, and clean baseload power " The Reactor Concepts program area includes research on advanced reactors, including advanced small modular reactors, and research to enhance the "sustainability" of existing commercial light water reactors  Advanced reactor research focuses on "Generation IV" reactors, as opposed to the existing fleet of commercial light water reactors, which are generally classified as generations II and III  R&D under this program focuses on advanced coolants, fuels, materials, and other technology areas that could apply to a variety of advanced reactors  To help develop those technologies, the Reactor Concepts program is developing a Versatile Test Reactor that would allow fuels and materials to be tested in a fast neutron environment (in which neutrons would not be slowed by water, graphite, or other "moderators")  Research on extending the life of existing commercial light water reactors beyond 60 years, the maximum operating period currently licensed by NRC, is being conducted by this program with industry cost-sharing  The Fuel Cycle Research and Development program includes generic research on nuclear waste management and disposal  One of the program's primary activities is the development of technologies to separate the radioactive constituents of spent fuel for reuse or solidifying into stable waste forms  Other major research areas in the Fuel Cycle R&D program include the development of accident-tolerant fuels for existing commercial reactors, evaluation of fuel cycle options, and development of improved technologies to prevent diversion of nuclear materials for weapons  The program is also developing sources of high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU), in which uranium is enriched to between 5% and 20% in the fissile isotope U-235, for potential use in advanced reactors  For more information, see CRS Report R45706, Advanced Nuclear Reactors: Technology Overview and Current Issues , by Danielle A  Arostegui and Mark Holt  Much of DOE's Fossil Energy R&D Program focuses on carbon capture and storage for power plants fueled by coal and natural gas  Major activities include Advanced Coal Energy Systems and Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS); Natural Gas Technologies; and Unconventional Fossil Energy Technologies from Petroleum—Oil Technologies  Advanced Coal Energy Systems includes R&D on modular coal-gasification systems, advanced turbines, solid oxide fuel cells, advanced sensors and controls, and power generation efficiency  Elements of the CCUS program include the following: Carbon Capture subprogram for separating CO 2 in both precombustion and postcombustion systems; Carbon Utilization subprogram for R&D on technologies to convert carbon to marketable products, such as chemicals and polymers; and Carbon Storage subprogram on long-term geologic storage of CO 2 , focusing on saline formations, oil and natural gas reservoirs, unmineable coal seams, basalts, and organic shales  For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10589, FY2019 Funding for CCS and Other DOE Fossil Energy R&D , by Peter Folger, and CRS Report R44472, Funding for Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) at DOE: In Brief , by Peter Folger  The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), authorized by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act ( P L  94-163 ) in 1975, consists of caverns built within naturally occurring salt domes in Louisiana and Texas  The SPR provides strategic and economic security against foreign and domestic disruptions in U S  oil supplies via an emergency stockpile of crude oil  The program fulfills U S  obligations under the International Energy Program, which avails the United States of International Energy Agency (IEA) assistance through its coordinated energy emergency response plans, and provides a deterrent against energy supply disruptions  DOE has been conducting a major maintenance program to address aging infrastructure and a deferred maintenance backlog at SPR facilities  The federal government has not purchased oil for the SPR since 1994  Beginning in 2000, additions to the SPR were made with royalty-in-kind (RIK) oil acquired by DOE in lieu of cash royalties paid on production from federal offshore leases  In September 2009, the Secretary of the Interior announced a phaseout of the RIK Program  By early 2010, the SPR's capacity reached 727 million barrels  A series of oil sales and purchases since then have resulted in a net reduction of the SPR inventory  Currently, the SPR contains about 649 million barrels  Congress has enacted several laws since 2015 that mandate sales of SPR oil, including the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P L  114-74 ), the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act ( P L  114-94 ), the 21 st Century Cures Act of 2016 ( P L  114-255 ), the 2017 Tax Revision ( P L  115-97 ), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P L  115-123 ), and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018  Broadly considered, this legislation requires oil to be sold from the reserve over the period FY2017 through FY2027, totaling 266 million barrels  For more information, see CRS Report R45577, Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Mandated Sales and Reform , by Robert Pirog, and CRS In Focus IF10869, Reconsidering the Strategic Petroleum Reserve , by Robert Pirog  The DOE Office of Science conducts basic research in six program areas: advanced scientific computing research, basic energy sciences, biological and environmental research, fusion energy sciences, high-energy physics, and nuclear physics  According to DOE's FY2020 budget justification, the Office of Science "is the Nation's largest Federal sponsor of basic research in the physical sciences and the lead Federal agency supporting fundamental scientific research for our Nation's energy future " DOE's Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) program focuses on developing and maintaining computing and networking capabilities for science and research in applied mathematics, computer science, and advanced networking  The program plays a key role in the DOE-wide effort to advance the development of exascale computing, which seeks to build a computer that can solve scientific problems 1,000 times faster than today's best machines  DOE has asserted that the department is on a path to have a capable exascale machine by the early 2020s  Basic Energy Sciences (BES), the largest program area in the Office of Science, focuses on understanding, predicting, and ultimately controlling matter and energy at the electronic, atomic, and molecular levels  The program supports research in disciplines such as condensed matter and materials physics, chemistry, and geosciences  BES also provides funding for scientific user facilities (e g , the National Synchrotron Light Source II, and the Linac Coherent Light Source-II), and certain DOE research centers and hubs (e g , Energy Frontier Research Centers, as well as the Batteries and Energy Storage and Fuels from Sunlight Energy Innovation Hubs)  Biological and Environmental Research (BER) seeks a predictive understanding of complex biological, climate, and environmental systems across a continuum from the small scale (e g , genomic research) to the large (e g , Earth systems and climate)  Within BER, Biological Systems Science focuses on plant and microbial systems, while Biological and Environmental Research supports climate-relevant atmospheric and ecosystem modeling and research  BER facilities and centers include four Bioenergy Research Centers and the Environmental Molecular Science Laboratory at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory  Fusion Energy Sciences (FES) seeks to increase understanding of the behavior of matter at very high temperatures and to establish the science needed to develop a fusion energy source  FES provides funding for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, a multinational effort to design and build an experimental fusion reactor  According to DOE, ITER "aims to provide fusion power output approaching reactor levels of hundreds of megawatts, for hundreds of seconds " However, many U S  analysts have expressed concern about ITER's cost, schedule, and management, as well as the budgetary impact on domestic fusion research  The High Energy Physics (HEP) program conducts research on the fundamental constituents of matter and energy, including studies of dark energy and the search for dark matter  Nuclear Physics supports research on the nature of matter, including its basic constituents and their interactions  A major project in the Nuclear Physics program is the construction of the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams at Michigan State University  A separate DOE office, the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E), was authorized by the America COMPETES Act ( P L  110-69 ) to support transformational energy technology research projects  DOE budget documents describe ARPA-E's mission as overcoming long-term, high-risk technological barriers to the development of energy technologies  For more details, see CRS Report R45150, Federal Research and Development (R&D) Funding: FY2019 , coordinated by John F  Sargent Jr  DOE's Loan Programs Office provides loan guarantees for projects that deploy specified energy technologies, as authorized by Title 17 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P L  109-58 ), direct loans for advanced vehicle manufacturing technologies, and loan guarantees for tribal energy projects  Section 1703 of the act authorizes loan guarantees for advanced energy technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and Section 1705 established a temporary program for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects  Title 17 allows DOE to provide loan guarantees for up to 80% of construction costs for eligible energy projects  Successful applicants must pay an up-front fee, or "subsidy cost," to cover potential losses under the loan guarantee program  Under the loan guarantee agreements, the federal government would repay all covered loans if the borrower defaulted  Such guarantees would reduce the risk to lenders and allow them to provide financing at below-market interest rates  The following is a summary of loan guarantee amounts that have been authorized (loan guarantee ceilings) for various technologies: $8 3 billion for nonnuclear technologies under Section 1703; $2 0 billion for unspecified projects from FY2007 under Section 1703; $18 5 billion for nuclear power plants ($12 0 billion committed); $4 billion for loan guarantees for uranium enrichment plants; $1 18 billion for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects under Section 1703, in addition to other loan guarantee ceilings, which can include applications that were pending under Section 1705 before it expired; and In addition to the loan guarantee ceilings above, an appropriation of $161 million was provided for subsidy costs for renewable energy and energy efficiency loan guarantees under Section 1703  If the subsidy costs averaged 10% of the loan guarantees, this funding could leverage loan guarantees totaling about $1 6 billion  The only loan guarantees under Section 1703 were $8 3 billion in guarantees provided to the consortium building two new reactors at the Vogtle plant in Georgia  DOE committed an additional $3 7 billion in loan guarantees for the Vogtle project on March 22, 2019  Another nuclear loan guarantee is being sought by NuScale Power to build a small modular reactor in Idaho  In the absence of explosive testing of nuclear weapons, the United States has adopted a science-based program to maintain and sustain confidence in the reliability of the U S  nuclear stockpile  Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 ( P L  103-160 )  The goal of the program, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 ( P L  111-84 , §3111), is to ensure "that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of underground nuclear weapons testing " The program is operated by NNSA, a semiautonomous agency within DOE established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 ( P L  106-65 , Title XXXII)  NNSA implements the Stockpile Stewardship Program through the activities funded by the Weapons Activities account in the NNSA budget  Most of NNSA's weapons activities take place at the nuclear weapons complex, which consists of three laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, CA; and Sandia National Laboratories, NM and CA); four production sites (Kansas City National Security Campus, MO; Pantex Plant, TX; Savannah River Site, SC; and Y-12 National Security Complex, TN); and the Nevada National Security Site (formerly the Nevada Test Site)  NNSA manages and sets policy for the weapons complex; contractors to NNSA operate the eight sites  Radiological activities at these sites are subject to oversight and recommendations by the independent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, funded by Title IV of the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill  There are three major program areas in the Weapons Activities account  Directed Stockpile Work includes the life extension programs (LEPs) on existing warheads and stockpile services programs that monitor their condition; and maintaining warheads through repairs, refurbishment, and modifications  It also includes funding for research and development in support of specific warheads, and dismantlement of warheads that have been removed from the stockpile  This last activity received more significant funding as the number of warheads in the U S  stockpile declined after the Cold War; it also provides a source for critical components for warheads remaining in the stockpile  Directed Stockpile Work also involves programs that work on the materials needed for nuclear warheads, including the plutonium pits that are the core of the weapons  Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) includes five programs that focus on "efforts to develop and maintain critical capabilities, tools, and processes needed to support science based stockpile stewardship, refurbishment, and continued certification of the stockpile over the long-term in the absence of underground nuclear testing " This area includes operation of some large experimental facilities, such as the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory  Infrastructure and Operations has, as its main funding elements, material recycle and recovery, recapitalization of facilities, and construction of facilities  The latter include two major projects that have generated congressional controversy: the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project, which deals with plutonium, at Los Alamos National Laboratory  Nuclear Weapons Activities also has several smaller programs, including the following: Secure Transportation Asset, providing for safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons, components, and materials; Defense Nuclear Security, providing operations, maintenance, and construction funds for protective forces, physical security systems, personnel security, and related activities; and Information Technology and Cybersecurity, whose elements include cybersecurity, secure enterprise computing, and Federal Unclassified Information Technology  For more information, see CRS Report R44442, Energy and Water Development Appropriations: Nuclear Weapons Activities , by Amy F  Woolf, and CRS Report R45306, The U S  Nuclear Weapons Complex: Overview of Department of Energy Sites , by Amy F  Woolf and James D  Werner  DOE's nonproliferation and national security programs provide technical capabilities to support U S  efforts to prevent, detect, and counter the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide  These programs are administered by NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation  The Materials Management and Minimization program conducts activities to minimize and, where possible, eliminate stockpiles of weapons-useable material around the world  Major activities include conversion of reactors that use highly enriched uranium (useable for weapons) to low-enriched uranium, removal and consolidation of nuclear material stockpiles, and disposition of excess nuclear materials  Global Materials Security has three major program elements  International Nuclear Security focuses on increasing the security of vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear material in other countries  Radiological Security promotes the worldwide reduction and security of radioactive sources, including the removal of surplus sources and substitution of technologies that do not use radioactive materials  Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence works to improve the capability of other countries to halt illicit trafficking of nuclear materials  Nonproliferation and Arms Control works to "to support U S  nonproliferation and arms control objectives to prevent proliferation, ensure peaceful nuclear uses, and enable verifiable nuclear reductions," according to the FY2020 DOE justification  This program conducts reviews of nuclear export applications and technology transfer authorizations, implements treaty obligations, and analyzes nonproliferation policies and proposals  Other programs under Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation include research and development and construction, which advances nuclear detection and nuclear forensics technologies  Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response provides "interagency policy, contingency planning, training, and capacity building" to counter nuclear terrorism and strengthen incident response capabilities, according to the FY2020 budget justification  The development and production of nuclear weapons during half a century since the beginning of the Manhattan Project resulted in a waste and contamination legacy managed by DOE that continues to present substantial challenges today  DOE also manages legacy environmental contamination at sites used for nondefense nuclear research  In 1989, DOE established the Office of Environmental Management primarily to consolidate its responsibilities for the cleanup of former nuclear weapons production sites that had been administered under multiple offices  DOE's nuclear cleanup efforts are broad in scope and include the disposal of large quantities of radioactive and other hazardous wastes generated over decades; management and disposal of surplus nuclear materials; remediation of extensive contamination in soil and groundwater; decontamination and decommissioning of excess buildings and facilities; and safeguarding, securing, and maintaining facilities while cleanup is underway  DOE's cleanup of nuclear research sites adds a nondefense component to the EM's mission, albeit smaller in terms of the scope of their cleanup and associated funding  DOE has identified more than 100 separate sites in over 30 states that historically were involved in the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy research for civilian purposes  The geographic scope of these sites is substantial, collectively encompassing a land area of approximately 2 million acres  Cleanup remedies are in place and operational at the majority of these sites  Responsibility for the long-term stewardship of them has been transferred to the Office of Legacy Management and other offices within DOE for the operation and maintenance of cleanup remedies and monitoring  Some of the smaller sites for which DOE initially was responsible were transferred to the Army Corps of Engineers in 1997 under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP)  Once USACE completes the cleanup of a FUSRAP site, it is transferred back to DOE for long-term stewardship under the Office of Legacy Management, which is separate from EM and has its own funding account  Three appropriations accounts fund the Office of Environmental Management  The Defense Environmental Cleanup account is the largest in terms of funding, and it finances the cleanup of former nuclear weapons production sites  The Non-Defense Environmental Cleanup account funds the cleanup of federal nuclear energy research sites  Title XI of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ( P L  102-486 ) established the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund to pay for the cleanup of three federal facilities that enriched uranium for national defense and civilian purposes  Those facilities are located near Paducah, KY; Piketon, OH (Portsmouth plant); and Oak Ridge, TN  Title X of P L  102-486 authorized the reimbursement of uranium and thorium producers for their costs of cleaning up contamination attributable to uranium and thorium sold to the federal government  The adequacy of funding for the Office of Environmental Management to attain cleanup milestones across the entire site inventory has been a recurring issue  Cleanup milestones are enforceable measures incorporated into compliance agreements negotiated among DOE, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the states  These milestones establish time frames for the completion of specific actions to satisfy applicable requirements at individual sites  DOE's four Power Marketing Administrations were established to sell the power generated by the dams operated by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers  Preference in the sale of power is given to publicly owned and cooperatively owned utilities  The PMAs operate in 34 states; their assets consist primarily of transmission infrastructure in the form of more than 33,000 miles of high voltage transmission lines and 587 substations  PMA customers are responsible for repaying all power program expenses, plus the interest on capital projects  Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i e , receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority  Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress  For more information, see CRS Report R45548, The Power Marketing Administrations: Background and Current Issues , by Richard J  Campbell  Independent agencies that receive funding in Title IV of the Energy and Water Development bill include the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board  NRC is by far the largest of the independent agencies, with a total budget of more than $900 million  However, as noted in the description of NRC below, about 90% of NRC's budget is offset by fees, so that the agency's net appropriation is less than half of the total funding in Title IV  The recent appropriations history for all the Title IV agencies is shown in Table 7   Established in 1965, the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) is a regional economic development agency  It awards grants and contracts to state and local governments and nonprofit organizations to foster economic opportunities, improve workforce skills, build critical infrastructure, strengthen natural and cultural assets, and improve leadership skills and capacity in the region  ARC's authorizing statute defines the Appalachian Region as including all of West Virginia and parts of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia  More than 25 million people currently live in the region as defined  ARC provides funding to several hundred projects each year, with particular focus on the region's most economically distressed counties  Major areas of infrastructure support broadband communication systems, transportation, and water and wastewater systems  ARC has supported development of the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS), a planned 3,000-mile system of highways that connect with the U S  Interstate Highway System  According to ARC, 90 5% of ADHS is currently "complete, open to traffic, or under construction " NRC is an independent agency that establishes and enforces safety and security standards for nuclear power plants and users of nuclear materials  Major appropriations categories for NRC are shown in Table 8   Nuclear Reactor Safety is NRC's largest program and is responsible for licensing and regulating the U S  fleet of 98 power reactors, plus two under construction  NRC is also responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear waste facilities, such as the proposed underground nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV  NRC is required by law to offset about 90% of its total budget, excluding specified items, through fees charged to nuclear reactor owners and other holders of NRC licenses  As a result, NRC's net appropriation can be as low as 10% of its total funding level, depending on the activities that Congress excludes from fee recovery  For example, excluded items in NRC's FY2019 enacted appropriation are prior-year balances, development of advanced reactor regulations, and international activities  The following hearings have been held by the Energy and Water Development subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on the FY2020 budget request  Testimony and opening statements are posted on most of the web pages cited for each hearing, along with webcasts in many cases  Department of Energy , March 26, 2019, https://appropriations house gov/legislation/hearings/budget-department-of-energy   Corps of Engineers (Civil Works) and the Bureau of Reclamation , March 27, 2019, https://appropriations house gov/legislation/hearings/budget-us-army-corps-of-engineers-and-bureau-of-reclamation   National Nuclear Security Administration , April 2, 2019, https://appropriations house gov/legislation/hearings/budget-department-of-energy-national-nuclear-security-administration  DOE Science, Energy, and Environmental Management Programs , April 3, 2019, https://appropriations house gov/legislation/hearings/budget-science-energy-and-environmental-management-programs  Department of Energy , March 27, 2019, https://www appropriations senate gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-request-for-the-us-department-of-energy   National Nuclear Security Administration , April 3, 2019, https://www appropriations senate gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-request-for-the-national-nuclear-security-administration   U S  Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation , April 10, 2019, https://www appropriations senate gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-requests-for-army-corps-of-engineers-and-bureau-of-reclamation  


Report 2:  According to a May 2018 study by the U S  Government Accountability Office, states commonly reported that reaching children in rural areas was "very" or "extremely" challenging in SFSP  The 2010 Agriculture Appropriations Act (Section 749(g) of P L  111-80 ) provided $85 million in discretionary funding for "demonstration projects to develop and test methods of providing access to food for children in urban and rural areas during the summer months " One of these is the Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children (SEBTC or Summer EBT) project, which began in summer 2011 and has continued each summer since (as of the date of this report) in a limited number of states and Indian Tribal Organizations  The project provides electronic food benefits to households with children eligible for free or reduced-price school meals  Depending on the site and year, either $30 or $60 per month is provided on an electronic benefits transfer (EBT) card for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) or Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)  Participants in jurisdictions providing benefits through SNAP can redeem benefits for SNAP-eligible foods at any SNAP-authorized retailer, while participants in the WIC EBT jurisdictions are limited to the smaller set of WIC-eligible foods at WIC-authorized retailers  An evaluation of Summer EBT was conducted from FY2011 through FY2013  The study, which used a random assignment design, found a significant decline in the prevalence of very low food security among participants (9 5% of control group children experienced very low food security compared to 6 4% in the Summer EBT group)  It also showed improvements in children's consumption of fruits, vegetables, and whole grains  Both the WIC and SNAP models showed increased consumption, but increases were greater at sites operating the WIC model  Congress has provided subsequent funding for Summer EBT projects (see Table 3 )  Most recently, the third FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P L  116-6 ) provided $28 million for the Summer EBT demonstration  Awardees for summer 2017 were Connecticut, Delaware, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, Virginia, and the Chickasaw and Cherokee nations  For summer 2018, USDA also awarded grants to Tennessee and Texas  Many of these jurisdictions participated in Summer EBT in previous summers as well  In October 2018, USDA-FNS announced a new strategy for determining grant recipients in FY2019, stating that the agency will prioritize new states that have not participated before, statewide projects, and projects that can operate in the summers of 2019 through 2021  There were proposals in the 114 th and 115 th Congresses to expand Summer EBT  For example, the Senate committee's child nutrition reauthorization proposal in the 114 th Congress ( S  3136 ) would have allowed a portion of SFSP's mandatory funding to cover Summer EBT and authorized up to $50 million in discretionary funding for the program  In addition, in its FY2017 budget proposal, the Obama Administration recommended expansion of Summer EBT nationwide with a phase-in over 10 years  Freestanding bills in the 114 th and 115 th Congresses had similar objectives  Funding from the 2010 Agriculture Appropriations Act (Section 749(g) of P L  111-80 ) was also used for other demonstration projects  One of these, the Enhanced Summer Food Service Program (eSFSP), took place during the summers of 2010 through 2012 in eight states  It included four initiatives: (1) incentives for SFSP sites to lengthen operations to 40 or more days, (2) funding to add recreational or educational activities at meal sites, (3) meal delivery for children in rural areas, and (4) food backpacks that children could take home on weekends and holidays  Evaluations of eSFSP were published from 2011 to 2014  Summer meal participation rates rose during the demonstration periods for all four initiatives  In addition, children in the meal delivery and backpack demonstrations had consistent rates of food insecurity from summer to fall (this was not measured for the other initiatives)  However, the results from these evaluations should be interpreted with caution due to a small sample size, the lack of a comparison group, and potential confounding factors  Another demonstration project, also operating under authority provided by the 2010 Agriculture Appropriations Act, provided exemptions from the congregate feeding requirement to SFSP and SSO outdoor meal sites experiencing excessive heat each summer since 2015 (as of the date of this report)  Exempted sites must continue to serve children in congregate settings on days when heat is not excessive, and provide meals in another form (e g , a take-home form) on days of excessive heat  USDA also offers exemptions on a case-by-case basis for other extreme weather conditions  This demonstration has not been evaluated  There were other proposals and hearings related to congregate feeding in SFSP in recent years  For example, in the 114 th Congress, committee-reported child nutrition reauthorization proposals in the Senate and the House ( S  3136 and H R  5003 , respectively) would have enabled some rural meal sites to provide SFSP meals for consumption offsite  Specifically, both proposals would have allowed offsite consumption for children (1) in rural areas ( H R  5003 to a more limited extent than S  3136 ) and (2) in nonrural areas in which more than 80% of students are certified as eligible for free or reduced-price meals  The bills would have also permitted congregate feeding sites to provide meals to be consumed offsite episodically under certain conditions such as extreme weather or public safety concerns  The HHFKA created the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP), an option to provide free meals (lunches and breakfasts) to all students in schools with high proportions of students who automatically qualify for free or reduced-price lunches  CEP became available to schools nationwide starting in SY2014-2015, and participation has increased since then  As of SY2016-2017, more than 20,700 schools participated in CEP, according to data from the Food Research and Action Center (FRAC), a nonprofit advocacy organization  This is roughly 22% of NSLP schools  Several groups have expressed support for CEP during its implementation, arguing that the provision improves access to meals, reduces stigma associated with receiving free or reduced-price meals, and reduces schools' administrative costs  Others have sought to change the option  For example, in the 114 th Congress, the House's committee-reported child nutrition reauthorization bill ( H R  5003 ) would have restricted schools' eligibility for CEP, which the committee majority argued was "to better target resources to those students in need, while also ensuring all students who are eligible for assistance continue to receive assistance " One secondary effect of CEP is that it has created data issues for other nonnutrition federal and state programs  Many programs, most notably the federal Title I-A program (the primary source of federal funding for elementary and secondary schools), use free and reduced-price lunch data to determine eligibility and/or funding allocations  These data come from school meal applications, which are no longer collected under CEP's automatic eligibility determination process  For more information on this issue, see CRS Report R44568, Overview of ESEA Title I-A and the School Meals' Community Eligibility Provision   Students may qualify for free meals, or they may have to pay for reduced-price or full-price meals  In recent years, the issue of students owing and not paying their meal costs, and schools' responses to such situations, has received increased attention  In many cases, schools serve students a regular meal, charging the unpaid meal cost and creating a debt that they may try to collect later from the family  In other cases, schools respond with what some have called "lunch shaming" practices—most commonly, taking or throwing away a student's selected hot foods and providing an alternative cold meal or, less commonly, barring children from participation in school events until debt is repaid or having children wear a visual indicator of meal debt (e g , a stamp or sticker)  Lunch shaming instances have largely been reported in news articles from different states, and there are limited national data available on the prevalence of such practices (available data are discussed in the text box below)  Many school districts report that unpaid meal costs create a financial burden on their meal programs (see text box below for more detail)  In addition to federal funds, student payments for full and reduced-price meals are a primary source of revenue for school food programs  Schools have an interest in collecting this revenue to help fund operations  Also, according to federal regulations, if schools are unable to recover unpaid meal funds, the money becomes "bad debt" and the school or school district must use other nonfederal funding sources to cover the costs  Starting in 2010, Congress and USDA have taken actions to address the issue of unpaid meal costs  Section 143 of the HHFKA required USDA to examine states' and school districts' policies and practices regarding unpaid meal charges  As part of the review, the law required USDA to "prepare a report on the feasibility of establishing national standards for meal charges and the provision of alternate meals" and, if applicable, make recommendations related to the implementation of the standards  The law also permitted USDA to take follow-up actions based on the findings from the report  USDA's subsequent Report to Congress in June 2016 ultimately did not recommend national standards, but instead recommended "clarifying and updating policy guidance on specific national policies impacting unpaid meal charges and facilitating the development and distribution of best practices to support decision making by States and localities " USDA-FNS followed up with a memorandum requiring SFAs to institute and communicate, by July 1, 2017, a written meal charge policy, which was to include instructions on how to address situations in which a child does not pay for a meal  USDA-FNS also provided clarification through webinars, other memoranda, and a best practice guide  In the Report to Congress, USDA stated that its recommendation was based on findings from a study published by USDA-FNS in March 2014 and a Request for Information (RFI) on "Unpaid Meal Charges" published by USDA-FNS in October 2014  The findings from both the study and the RFI—which garnered 462 comments—showed that meal charge policies were largely determined at the school and school district levels rather than the state level  The responses to the RFI also indicated that such policies ranged in formality, with varying degrees of review (e g , some required school board approval while others did not) and enforcement  In the RFI comments, school and district officials generally expressed a preference for local control of meal charge policies, while national advocacy groups generally favored national standards  The topics of lunch shaming and unpaid meal costs also surfaced in the 115 th Congress  For example, a provision in the FY2018 appropriations law stated that funds appropriated in the law could not be used in ways that result in discrimination against children eligible for free or reduced-price meals, including the practices of segregating children and overtly identifying children by special tokens or tickets (note that this does not pertain to children paying for full-price meals)  Legislative proposals in the 115 th Congress included the Anti-Lunch Shaming Act of 2017 ( H R  2401 / S  1064 ), which sought to establish national standards for how schools treat children unable to pay for a meal  Unpaid meal costs and lunch shaming have also been active topics at the state level  In recent years, a number of states have enacted legislation aimed at addressing these issues  For example, in 2018, Illinois passed legislation that requires schools to serve a regular (reimbursable) meal to students who do not pay and allows school districts to request an offset from the state for debts exceeding $500  The HHFKA created new requirements related to schools' pricing of paid lunches (sometimes referred to as "paid lunch equity" requirements)  Specifically, the law required all NSLP-participating SFAs to review their average price of paid lunches and, if necessary, gradually increase prices based on a formula  The law also gave SFAs the option to meet the requirements with specified nonfederal funding sources instead of raising prices  According to the Senate committee report on the HHFKA, the requirements were intended "to ensure that children receiving free and reduced price lunches receive the full value of federal funds " Prior to the paid lunch equity requirements, a USDA study found that federal subsidies for free and reduced-price lunches were cross-subsidizing other aspects of the meals programs, likely including paid lunches  This can occur because federal reimbursements for free, reduced-price, and paid lunches are all mixed into the same SFA-run "nonprofit school food service account" (NSFSA)  Some observers argue, however, that raising prices may reduce participation in paid lunches  Under the paid lunch equity formula, the price per paid lunch must eventually match or exceed the difference between the federal reimbursements for free and paid lunches  If this is not the case, schools must increase prices over time until they make up the difference  For example, the federal reimbursement was $3 37 for free lunches and $0 37 for paid lunches SY2018-2019 for some schools  Under the requirements, if schools were not charging at least $3 00 per paid lunch, they would be required to increase the price of a paid lunch gradually, based on a formula, until they closed the gap (see Figure 1 )  Schools cannot be required to raise the price by more than 10 cents annually, but they may choose to do so  The HHFKA also included related requirements for revenue from "nonprogram" (i e , competitive) foods  The law required that any revenue from nonprogram foods accrue to the SFA-run NSFSA  In practice, this prevents revenue from competitive foods from being used for other school purposes outside of food service  The law also required that, broadly speaking, revenue from nonprogram foods equal or exceed the costs of obtaining nonprogram foods (see the regulations for a specific formula)  In June 2011, USDA-FNS published an interim final rule implementing the requirements starting in SY2011-2012, offering some flexibility for that first year  USDA subsequently provided certain exemptions through agency guidance for SY2013-2014 through SY2017-2018 for SFAs "in strong financial standing," as determined by state agencies based on different criteria  For SY2018-2019, the enacted FY2018 appropriation (Section 775 of P L  115-141 ) expanded the exemptions, requiring only SFAs with a negative balance in the NSFSA as of January 31, 2018, potentially to have to raise prices for paid meals  Other legislative proposals related to the paid lunch equity requirements were considered in recent Congresses  For example, the House committee's child nutrition reauthorization proposal in the 114 th Congress would have eliminated the requirements  The Senate committee's proposal would have replaced the requirements with a broader "non-federal revenue target," which could have come from household payments for full-price lunches or other state and local contributions  CACFP: Child and Adult Care Food Program CDF: Canned, dried, or frozen CEP: Community Eligibility Provision eSFSP: Enhanced Summer Food Service Program FFVP: Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program HHFKA: Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act NSFSA: Nonprofit school food service account NSLP: National School Lunch Program SBP: School Breakfast Program SFA: School food authority SFSP : Summer Food Service Program SMP: Special Milk Program SSO: Summer Seamless Option Summer EBT or SEBTC : Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children SY: school year USDA-FNS: U S  Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service

ground_truth: This product provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy toward the conflict in Yemen. Summary tables provide information on legislative proposals considered in the 115th and 116th Congresses. Various legislative proposals have reflected a range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including with regard to the authorization of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces related to the conflict; the extent of U.S. logistical, material, advisory, and intelligence support for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia; the approval, disapproval, or conditioning of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia; the appropriation of funds for U.S. operations in support of the Saudi-led coalition; the conduct of the Saudi-led coalition's air campaign and its adherence to international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict; the demand for greater humanitarian access to Yemen; the call for a wider government assessment of U.S. policy toward Yemen and U.S. support to parties to the conflict; the nature and extent of U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and border security cooperation; and the role of Iran in supplying missile technology and other weapons to the forces of the Houthi movement. The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; presently, the World Food Program reports that 20 million Yemenis face hunger in the absence of sustained food assistance. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid agencies to count the war's casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) suggest that 60,000 Yemenis have been killed since January 2016. The Trump Administration has opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to reject or condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen. Many in Congress have condemned the October 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel, and in general, the incident appears to have exacerbated existing congressional concerns about Saudi leaders and the pace, scope, and direction of change in the kingdom's policies. This product includes legislative proposals considered during the 115th and 116th Congresses. It does not include references to Yemen in Iran sanctions legislation, which are covered in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, please see the following CRS products. CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. CRS Insight IN10729, Yemen: Cholera Outbreak.