prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: Federal agencies’ personal property may include commonly used items, such as computers, office equipment, and furniture, and more specialized property reflective of their mission, such as scientific devices, fire control equipment, heavy machinery, precious metals, generators, and chemicals  Some items require special handling, such as hazardous materials, animals, and firearms  See figure 1 for examples of federal personal property  Federal agencies manage personal property while they are using it  Specifically, executive agencies are required by law to: maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under their control; continually survey property under their control to identify excess; promptly report excess property to GSA and dispose of it in accordance with GSA regulations; and use existing agency property or obtain excess property from other federal agencies before purchasing new property  GSA assists agencies when they no longer need personal property and has established a government-wide personal-property disposal process in federal regulation  The process generally begins when an agency declares a personal property item as “excess”—that is, the agency determines it no longer needs the item to carry out its mission  Agencies are to make this determination only after ensuring the property is not needed elsewhere within the agency  Once property is declared excess, there are four potential property disposal methods: transfer to another federal agency or certain non-federal entities, donation, sale, and abandonment or destruction  Federal agencies and some non-federal entities have the priority to acquire excess property, through transfer  If none of these eligible entities have requested the property for transfer after 21 days, the property becomes “surplus”—that is, GSA determines that federal agencies no longer need the item to carry out their missions  Surplus property may be donated to eligible entities through a State Agency for Surplus Property, representing the state of the prospective donee  Property not donated within 5 days after the close of the 21-day screening period may be sold to the general public and, finally, unsold property may be abandoned or destroyed  See appendix II for an expanded description of the personal property disposal process  OMB is responsible for establishing government-wide management policies and requirements and provides guidance to agencies to implement them  OMB has issued guidance for specific types of personal property, such as for government aircraft and information technology systems  OMB also implemented the Freeze the Footprint and Reduce the Footprint initiatives, starting in 2012, to reduce the amount of domestic office and warehouse space needed by the federal government, in part, through consolidations and improved space utilization  As a result, federal agencies have reported achieving space reductions, and they have goals for additional reductions in the future  Although these reductions are a relatively small part of the federal government’s overall footprint, according to OMB, through this and other efforts agencies collectively reduced their office and warehouse space by about 25 million square feet from fiscal years 2012 through 20156  As federal agencies continue to reduce office and warehouse space, they will also likely have to manage or dispose of personal property, such as office furniture or stored property, from these spaces  Each of the five selected agencies we reviewed have policies and processes for carrying out their responsibilities to maintain adequate accountability systems and inventory controls for property under their control: All five agencies have policies for regularly inventorying their personal property to physically locate and verify property tracked in their asset management systems  EPA, GSA OAS, and IRS policies require physical inventories of personal property once a year, while Forest Service’s policy requires inventories every other fiscal year and a 10 percent sample inventory in the alternate years  HUD policies require inventories every 2 years at its headquarters, but according to HUD officials, field locations conduct inventories annually  All of the agencies also have an electronic asset-management system for maintaining information on personal property  Although each agency has its own system, and the type of information maintained varied by agency or type of property, generally each system generates a record for each property item that provides descriptive information about the item, such as manufacturer name, model number, serial number or other identifier, acquisition cost, condition, and current location  We found that the five agencies use these policies and processes to track and inventory certain property determined by each agency to be “accountable ” Accountable property is nonexpendable personal property with an expected useful life of 2 years or longer that an agency determines should be tracked in its property records, based on an item’s acquisition cost and sensitivity  Each agency determines its own appropriate acquisition cost threshold: four of the agencies—EPA, Forest Service, HUD, and IRS—consider property with an original acquisition cost of $5,000 or greater to be accountable; GSA OAS’s accountable threshold is $10,000 or greater  In addition, certain sensitive property— such as digital cameras, laptop computers with hard drives, and firearms—is considered accountable regardless of acquisition cost because it could be easily stolen or can store data or personal information  Table 1 provides a snapshot of accountable personal property items— including the reported original acquisition cost, amount, and examples— reported from 4 of the selected agencies’ asset management systems in 2017  The agencies in our review generally did not track in their asset management systems or formally inventory their remaining—or “non- accountable”—personal property that did not meet their definition of accountable property  According to agency officials we interviewed, they do not track or inventory low value items because: (1) the cost and manpower required to do so are too high; (2) certain property, such as office furniture, is less susceptible to theft; or (3) agencies believe they are not required by law to inventory low value items  While agencies are required to have systems of accounting and internal controls that provide effective control over, and accountability for, their assets, they generally have latitude in how they implement these procedures, including which property to track and inventory  While the five selected agencies had policies and processes for their property accountability and inventory control responsibilities, they largely did not have policies and processes for carrying out their responsibilities, as established in law, to continually survey property under their control to identify excess  According to officials at each of the selected agencies, the responsibility for identifying unneeded property generally lies with that agency’s property custodians—designated officials who are assigned responsibility for the property—or the agency program or individual using the property  Four of the five selected agencies’ policies do not require property custodians or other property users to assess property for continued need  Furthermore, these four agencies’ policies did not have specific criteria for the property custodian or user to assess property for continued need  Only IRS’s personal-property management policy specifies that the property custodian is responsible for identifying excess property and provides criteria to be applied in doing so, such as whether property is still needed in its location and the feasibility of transferring it to other locations, taking into account the property’s condition and transportation charges  An official at one of the selected agencies identified several specific criteria that should be used to assess property for continued need, including the item’s serviceability, whether it poses a safety hazard, and the feasibility of relocating it  However, the official acknowledged that these or any other criteria are not part of the agency’s formal policy  The personal property policy of an agency not included in our review— NASA—includes requirements and criteria to review NASA property for continued need in multiple ways  For example, it requires a high-level NASA official to conduct a walk-through inspection annually to identify idle or underused equipment that is no longer needed and report it as excess  It also requires, as part of an annual property inventory, that property that appears to be excess, worn out, or in obvious need of repair be noted as such and that guidance on identifying unneeded property be provided to personnel involved in conducting the inventories as well as employees assigned to use the property  In addition to not having policies on identifying and assessing property for continued need, agencies we reviewed also did not have a systematic process for doing so  Instead, when describing situations in which they declared property as excess, officials said they typically did so as a result of a “triggering event ” The types of triggering events the officials cited include an office move or consolidation or a lifecycle replacement of laptops  For example, officials from field locations of three of these agencies reported declaring most of their existing furniture as excess as the result of an office relocation or renovation  Agency officials said they were unable to use their existing furniture and had to declare it excess because it did not conform to new space utilization standards  At another agency, officials were disposing of a large number of laptop computers that had been declared excess because they had been replaced by new computers  Officials at two agencies said an assessment of property for continued need is an assumed practice that is part of the inventory for accountable property  However, an official from one of these agencies acknowledged that assessing need is not addressed in the written instructions provided to those conducting the inventory  Officials from two other agencies acknowledged that they continue to retain unneeded property that should be declared excess in storage on-site but had not pursued disposal due to other competing responsibilities with higher priorities  Proactively assessing personal property for continued need instead of responding to a triggering event can help agencies achieve both effective and efficient operations by ensuring that only needed property is retained and unneeded property is identified and declared excess  Federal internal control standards require that agencies design and maintain internal control activities—such as policies and procedures—to identify risks arising from mission and mission-support operations, and to provide reasonable assurance that agencies are operating in an efficient manner that minimizes the waste of resources  Such a system also provides reasonable assurance that agency property is safeguarded against waste, loss, or unauthorized use  OMB staff and GSA officials agreed that assessing all types of property—accountable and non-accountable—for continued need is important and called-for by internal control standards  Because the agencies we reviewed did not have systematic processes for assessing the continued need for personal property, they may not be aware of potential risks of maintaining property that may no longer be needed for operational purposes  Furthermore, previous work others have performed has shown that inaction on unneeded or idle property can limit efficient use of the government’s personal property, unnecessarily use an agency’s resources, or miss opportunities for potential cost savings, for example: The Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General found that the U S  Coast Guard could not ensure that personal property was efficiently reutilized or properly disposed of to prevent unauthorized use or theft because the Coast Guard did not have adequate policies, procedures, and processes to identify and screen, reutilize, and dispose of excess personal property properly, including criteria for identifying such property  The EPA’s Inspector General estimated EPA could save $8 9 million in reduced warehouse costs through improved management of stored personal property  GSA personal property asset management studies conducted in 2003 and 2005 found, among other things, that personal property is not being used to its fullest extent in some agencies and that no government-wide usage assessment or standard exists to detect whether property is no longer needed and can be reported as excess  Without a triggering event, agencies may not be seeking out or identifying property that is no longer needed and declaring it excess as often as they should  Such unneeded property may be put to better use elsewhere within the agency or the federal government, or agencies may purchase or lease new property instead of using another agency’s property that is unneeded but not reported as excess  In addition, agencies may be missing opportunities to realize cost savings by identifying and disposing of unneeded property, such as property stored in warehouses, to reduce or make better use of that space  While the requirements for agencies to continually survey property under their control to identify excess is established in law, according to GSA officials, there are no government-wide regulations on managing personal property or fulfilling this specific requirement  According to GSA OGP officials, GSA does not have the authority to promulgate regulations or issue formal guidance on personal property that is in use by executive agencies  Furthermore, according to the officials, GSA is only authorized by law to prescribe regulations on excess and surplus personal property  OMB staff stated that they could issue a notification, such as a controller alert to agencies’ chief financial officers, to reinforce the statutory requirement that agencies conduct assessments of personal property for continued need  OMB periodically issues such alerts to highlight emerging financial management issues for agencies and also issues guidance to agencies through bulletins, circulars, and memorandums  By issuing a controller alert or other guidance, OMB can help ensure that agencies are proactively taking steps to evaluate their property for continued need, including developing appropriate policies for doing so, and can thereby improve efforts to promote maximum use of excess personal property  Officials from the five agencies we reviewed reported that they followed GSA’s automated process to dispose of property once they had made the determination it was no longer needed to support their agency’s mission  As previously described, GSA regulations on disposing of property establish a specific process for all executive agencies to follow, and GSA has also issued guidance to help agencies dispose of property under this process  In particular, once an agency has determined that the property it has is no longer needed within the agency, the agency is required to promptly report the property to GSA as excess, typically by entering information about it into GSAXcess, GSA’s web-based system for facilitating personal property disposal  This method requires agency employees to manually enter information using data entry screens that include help screens and error messages  GSA encourages agencies to provide a complete description of the property and to include multiple photographs of it  Officials from the five agencies we reviewed reported no significant difficulties with entering information into GSAXcess; collectively, these agencies reported over 37,000 items as excess property from fiscal year 2012 through 2016  Figure 2 indicates the number of items each selected agency reported to GSA as excess during that period  Once information entry is completed, the disposal process begins  If the property is not disposed of during one stage, it advances to the next stage  The disposal process is shown in figure 3  Agency officials we interviewed told us that responsibility for disposing of property is decentralized and typically occurs at the property’s location, whether at an agency headquarters, regional office, or lower level  Because of the large federal government presence in the Washington, D C , area, agency offices in that area may have access to resources to facilitate the disposal process that are unavailable elsewhere, such as transferring excess property to certain entities that complete some or all aspects of the disposal process for a fee  Two such entities are GSA’s Personal Property Center in Springfield, Virginia, which takes full accountability and control of an agency’s excess property for a fee and handles all the details of the disposal process, and USDA’s Centralized Excess Property Operation in Beltsville, Maryland  According to USDA’s Agriculture Property Management Regulations, property not needed by USDA or its bureau offices in the Washington, D C , area must be transferred to this office for final disposal actions  It also provides these same services to some non-USDA agencies  Agencies also use GSAXcess to search for and select available excess property  Agency officials told us that the system also sends disposition instructions to the property-holding agency, when the property is to be transferred to other federal agencies, donated, or sold and that the agencies follow these instructions  For example, when an agency requests an excess item in GSAXcess and GSA approves the request, the system notifies the requesting agency and the property-holding agency and provides contact information to arrange to complete the transaction  None of the selected agency officials reported difficulties completing a transfer or donation transaction  For property not transferred, donated, or sold, GSA notifies the agency that the property has no commercial value and can be abandoned or destroyed  All of our selected agencies reported trying to recycle such property  Selected agency officials told us they disposed of property from space reduction efforts, such as Freeze the Footprint and Reduce the Footprint, the same way as other personal property—using GSA’s disposal process  To meet space reduction goals, selected agencies are undertaking projects at dozens of locations  Projects have primarily involved leased space for offices and warehouses and have included office moves, consolidations, and closures  As federal agencies carry out these space reduction projects, they must also address any personal property in the project spaces  Selected agencies reported several factors that affected their decisions about this property, which for three of the agencies was primarily office furniture  Four agencies reported needing less space than they previously occupied because of changes in agency missions or staffing levels  Furthermore, officials from GSA OAS and IRS noted that workplace trends, including teleworking and decreased staffing, reduced the space needed  Finally, agencies also reported that the office furniture itself was mostly unsuitable because it was old and because it could not be configured for use in more efficient office space designs  As a result, some selected agency locations that completed an office move or renovation project reported that most of their existing furniture was not needed in their new space  For example, in its Reduce the Footprint plan for fiscal years 2017 through 2021, HUD noted that many of its locations were designed and furnished when it had a much larger staffing level and reported that in 2016, its usable square feet per employee was 356  Subsequently, HUD revised its space design standards, requiring future office spaces to adhere to a utilization rate of 175 square feet or less  At the HUD project we visited, an official told us the furniture in use before the project was old and was generally too large to be used to achieve space design standards  In 2017, Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reduced its Denver regional office space by 30 percent  HUD’s lease was expiring and it needed less space because it had fewer employees in the office, in part due to increased telework  Adhering to new space utilization standards in its office and furniture design further reduced HUD’s overall required space  An example of a new workstation is shown above  Before the project, the agency occupied about five floors of a commercial building  HUD renovated in place, one floor at a time, and replaced its existing office furniture with new  Personal property at this office included primarily office furniture, such as desks and 25-year old modular systems, and equipment, such as telephones  As each floor was completed and employees moved to new workstations, the property official on-site disposed of their old furniture and workstations by entering its information in GSAXcess  The official reported selling some of the excess furniture after completing the first floor but recycled or discarded excess furniture in subsequent rounds  In some cases, agencies did not dispose of all the personal property after a space reduction project but instead were able to retain it for other uses within the agency  For example, IRS officials reported closing an office in Englewood, Colorado, and transferred its furniture to Ogden, Utah, for storage for an upcoming project  GSA OAS officials in Denver said that after a space reduction project in which GSA decreased the size of its regional office, it retained the unneeded furniture and office space for temporary use by other agencies  For property that was declared excess following a space reduction project, agencies reported transferring, donating, and selling property to dispose of it, using GSA’s process  For example, officials in GSA OAS, Forest Service, and IRS locations told us they transferred some excess property to other federal agencies  The Forest Service in Denver transferred some modular office furniture to the Bureau of Land Management and the U S  Postal Service  The Forest Service and IRS also reported donating property, such as office furniture and equipment, through the State Agencies for Surplus Property program  Four agencies reported selling some of their property from a space reduction project  For example, HUD’s regional office in Denver sold some of its excess office furniture, which dated to 1992, and recycled or discarded the remainder  When disposing of property from a space reduction project, some agencies sought assistance from GSA  GSA’s Office of Personal Property Management (GSA OPPM) assists agencies, when requested, in disposing of personal property, and officials at selected agency locations reported receiving assistance and training  In one example, GSA officials told us that a regional office of a selected agency needed to dispose of an office full of furniture and, in addition to using the disposal process, contacted GSA OPPM for additional assistance  Because of the large amount of property, GSA OPPM took steps to make other agencies in the area aware of the available property and facilitated access to allow agencies to view the property  In another example, GSA OPPM officials met with officials from another agency in the planning stages of a relocation to answer questions and provided advice and guidance for disposing of personal property  When the Forest Service’s lease on its Denver-area office expired, the agency leased space in another location, requiring a move but reducing its office by over 21,000 square feet  The agency sought to conform to new space utilization standards, which required more efficiently-designed furniture than its existing office furniture  Because the Forest Service did not reuse most of its old furniture in its new space, it no longer had a need for it  The Forest Service retained some of the furniture for use in other Forest Service offices within the region and declared the remainder as excess  Through GSAXcess, the Forest Service transferred some of its excess furniture to other federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management and the U S  Postal Service  The Forest Service sold some furniture at auction; broken items were recycled  Agencies may dispose of large amounts of property during a space reduction project, but overall, agency officials reported few challenges in doing so  This may be in part because any effects from space reductions are distributed across an entire agency  Although selected agencies’ average Reduce the Footprint space reduction goals ranged from 97,000 square feet to 662,000 square feet each fiscal year from 2016 to 2020, each agency’s efforts consisted of dozens of geographically dispersed projects of various sizes to be completed over several years  For example, as of fiscal year 2016, EPA had 21 space reduction projects planned from fiscal years 2016 through 2021, with individual anticipated reductions ranging from less than 1,000 square feet to more than 140,000 square feet  At least one project is present in 8 of EPA’s 10 regions  Agencies’ ability to pay for space reduction projects may also have affected these projects’ effects  Two selected agencies said they delayed projects because of a lack of funding  Agencies may reduce costs over the long term because of lower rent for smaller spaces but they may have to pay some expenses upfront, such as for moving, renovations, and new furniture  Although officials from all five agencies told us they have been able to manage personal property disposals from space reductions, they identified factors that can impact the efficient use of the disposal process during a space reduction project and some strategies taken to address them: Inventorying non-accountable property: As a space reduction project commenced at a location, most selected agencies reported that they did not have a complete list of the personal property affected by the project  As previously described, selected agencies do not maintain an itemized list of non-accountable personal property and for four agencies, office furniture is generally non-accountable  During a space reduction project, property personnel had to develop some type of inventory to identify property that would be needed and property that should be disposed of  Selected agencies had various methods for conducting such an inventory  For example, officials from two agencies said they walked through the affected space and created a list of all the items  Officials from one agency said a contractor was hired for this purpose  Most agencies reported using the inventory they created to enter information on excess property into GSAXcess  Officials at GSA’s OPPM offices in Philadelphia and Fort Worth said that they offer training and guidance to agencies in conducting inventories  Managing disposals within time frames: Agencies generally are not able to begin the disposal process until the property is no longer in use  For example, agency staff continue to use their old workspaces until they can move to new workspaces  Agencies also face deadlines, such as vacating space due to a lease expiration or commencement of renovation work  Officials from three agencies described challenges completing the disposal process—reporting excess personal property as well as completing transactions to transfer, donate, sell or abandon or destroy it—within required time frames  Some agency officials reported using different strategies to address this timing challenge  For example, one agency official was able to enter information about the excess property items into GSAXcess while employees were still using them  According to the official, this was possible because a note could be included in the property item’s description in GSAXcess, with the date when the property would be available  When the property was no longer in-use within the agency, the transfers or other transactions were completed  Additionally, an agency may conduct an on-site screening of its unneeded property to allow other federal agencies or authorized parties to physically view and identify any furniture they want  For example, GSA OPPM officials in Philadelphia conducted an on-site screening of unneeded office furniture resulting from the agency’s regional office relocation  Federal agencies collectively have billions of dollars’ worth of personal property, ranging from office furniture to highly specialized equipment that, when in use, supports agency missions  However, the agencies in our review did not have policies and systematic processes for identifying unneeded property  Furthermore, other’s previous work has shown that agencies across the government may not be effectively assessing their property for continued need, leading to idle property that could be put to better use elsewhere within the agency or the federal government and potential unnecessary storage costs  Consequently, agencies may be retaining property that is no longer needed  GSA has recognized that opportunities may exist for agencies to more effectively manage property under their control, but according to GSA OGP officials, GSA’s authority is limited to agency property that has been declared excess or surplus  According to OMB staff, OMB has the authority to issue guidance, such as controller alerts, emphasizing agencies’ property management obligations, and thus, it is well-positioned to assist agencies to more effectively manage their property and to ensure unneeded property is made available to others, as appropriate  The Director of OMB should provide guidance to executive agencies on managing their personal property, emphasizing that agencies’ policies or processes should reflect the requirement to continuously review and identify unneeded personal property  (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this report to OMB, EPA, the Forest Service, GSA, HUD, and IRS for comment  OMB stated that it did not have any comments on our draft report in an email and provided a technical clarification to the report, which we incorporated  GSA and IRS provided technical comments in an email, which we incorporated as appropriate  EPA, the Forest Service, and HUD each stated in an email that they did not have any comments on the draft report  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of the U S  Department of Agriculture, the Administrator of the General Services Administration, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff making key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  The objectives of this report were to examine (1) how selected federal agencies assess whether personal property is needed and (2) how selected federal agencies dispose of unneeded personal property, and how, if at all, space reduction efforts have affected disposals  We excluded certain types of personal property, such as aircraft and vehicles, from our review because of our prior or ongoing work  To address our objectives, we reviewed applicable federal statutes and regulations pertaining to personal property management and disposal, our prior work, and reports by federal agencies’ Offices of Inspector General on personal property issues  In addition, to determine how selected federal agencies assess whether personal property is needed, we conducted background searches to inform our understanding of key practices for personal property and asset management through a search of databases containing peer-reviewed articles, government reports, general news, hearings and transcripts, and association and think tank papers  We also reviewed relevant asset management practices, such as ASTM standards and the General Services Administration’s (GSA) Federal Asset Management Evaluation and Personal Property Asset Management Study  In order to select agencies that may have had recent experiences with excess personal property, we selected 5 of the 24 agencies that were included in the Freeze the Footprint and Reduce the Footprint initiatives  We selected agencies based on their overall Freeze the Footprint results, in terms of the amount of square feet reduced, and Reduce the Footprint goals for reducing domestic office and warehouse space, and the amount of personal property declared excess over the last 5 years, as reported to GSA’s GSAXcess system from fiscal years 2012 to 2016, to coincide with the Freeze the Footprint time frame  Specifically, we obtained information on the Freeze the Footprint results and Reduce the Footprint goals from the Office of Management and Budget’s public website and from Performance gov  We limited our scope to civilian federal agencies with personal property within the United States  Although we have previously reported that the overall accuracy of data that agencies reported on office and warehouse space reductions could be improved, we found that the data were generally reliable for our purposes  After reviewing the data for any inconsistencies and discussing the information with selected agency officials to ensure that the reported numbers for the Reduce the Footprint initiative were current, we determined that the quality of the data were sufficient for our use in selecting agencies  In order to select agencies that were more likely to have relevant, recent experience with excess personal property from space reduction efforts, we ranked these agencies based on their Freeze the Footprint results, Reduce the Footprint goals, and the amount of declared excess personal property, and eliminated the bottom third of the agencies  We selected GSA as our first agency due to its central role in excess personal property disposal, and randomly selected four additional agencies from the remaining agencies  These agencies were the Environmental Protection Agency, the U S  Department of Agriculture, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of the Treasury  The organizational structure of two selected agencies, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Treasury, is different than the other three agencies in that they are comprised primarily of sub-agencies  Therefore, we selected the largest sub-agency for both departments—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Internal Revenue Service within the Department of the Treasury  We obtained information from the five selected federal agencies on the total value and number of items in their asset management systems in 2017 to understand the size and scope of personal property assets they manage  As we used the information to describe the scope of the agencies’ property holdings, we did not verify the data  We also analyzed documents, such as the selected agencies’ personal property management policies, along with policies from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Department of Energy, to understand how they addressed requirements for managing personal property  We included these agencies’ policies based on our review of prior work related to personal property  We interviewed officials from the selected agencies about their processes for managing personal property assets, such as their inventory procedures  However, we did not independently assess agencies’ inventory practices  We also interviewed staff from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to discuss regulations and policies pertaining to personal property and OMB’s role in personal property management  To determine how selected federal agencies dispose of excess and surplus personal property and how space reduction efforts may have affected disposals, in addition to the above, we obtained information from each selected agency on its space reduction projects and interviewed officials about their roles and responsibilities in the agency’s space reduction planning efforts and personal property disposal process  We also conducted site visits to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Denver, Colorado to meet with regional and local officials from each selected agency responsible for managing and disposing of personal property  These locations were chosen based on the number of our selected federal agencies present, the amount of excess personal property declared, and the existence of space reduction projects  We discussed property accountability policies, overall personal property disposal processes, and how the disposal processes were affected by government-wide space savings initiatives, such as Freeze the Footprint and Reduce the Footprint, and any efforts to prepare for them, and requested supporting documentation on the amount of property declared as excess and the disposition outcomes of that property  We did not independently verify the information that was provided, as data reported as excess from space reduction projects are not always tracked separately from other property disposed of for other reasons  We reviewed documents and interviewed officials from GSA’s Office of Personal Property Management (GSA OPPM) in GSA’s headquarters, in Philadelphia and in Fort Worth, Texas, to discuss their role in assisting agencies in disposing of personal property and to obtain their views on how personal property disposals have been affected by space reductions  Finally, we interviewed GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy (GSA OGP) officials about the Interagency Committee on Property Management and the Property Management Executive Council regarding their personal property and asset management efforts and met with officials and representatives from the following: the U S  Department of Agriculture’s Centralized Excess Property Operation, the Users and Screeners Association–Federal Excess Personal Property, and the National Association of State Agencies for Surplus Property to discuss their roles in the reuse and disposal of Federal personal property  We conducted this performance audit from July 2016 to February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, requires executive agencies, in part, to promptly report excess property to the General Services Administration (GSA) and dispose of it in accordance with GSA regulations  Each executive agency is also required to fulfill requirements for personal property by using existing agency property or by obtaining excess property from other federal agencies before purchasing new property  GSA’s disposal process, as laid out in federal regulation, incorporates and facilitates these requirements, providing a means for both disposing of and acquiring unneeded property: agencies with excess personal property can dispose of it and other agencies, authorized non-federal entities, and, eventually, the general public can acquire this property  After determining that a property item is no longer needed to complete its mission, an agency may have several options for proceeding before formally declaring the property as excess to GSA: Immediately authorize abandonment or destruction of the property: Determine, in writing, that the property has no commercial value or the estimated cost of its continued care and handling would exceed the estimated proceeds from its sale  If an agency makes such a determination, it may abandon or destroy the property without reporting it to GSA as excess  In lieu of abandonment or destruction, an agency may donate excess personal property to a public body without going through GSA  Directly transfer the property to another federal agency: Agencies usually become aware of available property through informal means, such as a contact at the disposing agency, according to GSA  GSA approval for such a transfer is not needed if the total original acquisition cost for each item does not exceed $10,000  If this cost is greater than $10,000, the acquiring agency must obtain prior approval from GSA  In either case, the acquiring agency must notify GSA of the transfer  Directly transfer the property to an eligible recipient under a special authority: Special authorities are legal provisions that are designed to give excess assets to groups that may use them for a particular purpose, such as universities that can use the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s scientific equipment in their research  Some authorities exist to collectively support all federal agencies and some support an agency-specific program  According to GSA, the primary government-wide programs are the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 and Executive Order 12999, also known as the Computers for Learning program  Recipients meeting eligibility requirements of the special authority contact agencies to determine the availability of property, and the agency and recipient must complete the appropriate documentation to make a record of the transfer  An agency initiates GSA’s disposal process by formally declaring property as excess, either by completing and submitting a form to GSA or, more typically, by electronic entry of an item into GSAXcess, GSA’s real-time, Web-based site for facilitating the disposal process  The latter method requires agency employees to enter information about the excess property using data entry screens that include help screens and error messages  GSA encourages reporting agencies to provide a complete description of the property and to include multiple photographs of the property  The disposal process generally consists of four sequential stages in which personal property may be transferred to another agency or eligible recipient, donated, sold, or abandoned or destroyed, as described below  If the property is not disposed of during one stage, it advances to the next stage, though the holding agency generally retains physical custody of the property until it is disposed of  Table 2 illustrates actions a disposing agency and eligible property recipients take during each of the four stages of the disposal process after an agency declares property excess  In addition to the individual named above, the following individuals made important contributions to this report: David J  Wise (Director), Nancy Lueke (Assistant Director), Travis Thomson (Analyst-in-Charge), Lacey Coppage, Rosa Leung, Josh Ormond, Amy Rosewarne, Pamela Vines, and Elizabeth Wood 
Report 2:  The Action Plan focuses on capacity building for security personnel in Central America and the Caribbean by Colombian security forces (both Colombian military and police)  To implement the plan, Colombia undertook several hundred activities in cooperation with Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, and between 2013 and 2017 trained almost 17,000 individuals (see Figure 4 )  The Colombian government notes that this program grew dramatically from 34 executed activities in 2013 to 441 activities planned for 2018  Colombia has increasingly trained military and police from other countries both under this partnership and other arrangements, including countries across the globe  According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, around 80% of those trained were from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean  U S  and Colombian officials maintain that the broader effort is designed to export Colombian expertise in combating crime and terrorism while promoting the rule of law and greater bilateral and multilateral law enforcement cooperation  Critics of the effort to "export Colombian security successes" maintain that human rights concerns have not been adequately addressed  Some observers question the portion of these activities that are funded by the U S  government and want to see more transparency  In one analysis of the training, a majority of the training was provided by Colombian National Police rather than the Colombian Army, in such areas as ground, air, maritime, and river interdiction; police testimony; explosives; intelligence operations; psychological operations; and Comando JUNGLA, Colombia's elite counternarcotics police program  Other analysts praise the Colombian training and maintain that U S  assistance provided in this way has helped to improve, professionalize, and expand the Colombian military, making it the region's second largest  As that highly trained military shifts from combating the insurgency and the Colombian National Police take the dominant role in guaranteeing domestic security, Colombia may play a greater role in regional security and even in coalition efforts internationally  In September 2017, President Trump announced that he had considered designating Colombia in noncompliance with U S  counternarcotics requirements, but noted that he had not proceeded with the step in part because of Colombian training efforts to assist others in the region with combating narcotics and related crime  Colombia is a key U S  ally in the region  With diplomatic relations that began in the 19 th century following Colombia's independence from Spain, the countries have enjoyed close and strong ties  Because of Colombia's prominence in the production of illegal drugs, the United States and Colombia forged a close partnership over the past 16 years  Focused initially on counternarcotics, and later counterterrorism, a program called Plan Colombia laid the foundation for a strategic partnership that has broadened to include sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and many other areas of cooperation  Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U S  Congress appropriated more than $10 billion in assistance from U S  State Department and Department of Defense (DOD) accounts to carry out Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies  During this time, Colombia made notable progress combating drug trafficking and terrorist activities and reestablishing government control over much of its territory  Its economic and social policies have reduced the poverty rate and its security policies have lowered the homicide rate  Counternarcotics policy has been the defining issue in U S -Colombian relations since the 1980s because of Colombia's preeminence as a source country for illicit drugs  Peru and Bolivia were the main global producers of cocaine in the 1980s and early 1990s  However, successful efforts there in reducing supply pushed cocaine production from those countries to Colombia, which soon surpassed both its Andean neighbors  The FARC and other armed groups in the country financed themselves primarily through narcotics trafficking, and that lucrative illicit trade provided the gasoline for the decades-long internal armed conflict at least since the 1990s  Colombia emerged to dominate the cocaine trade by the late 1990s  National concern about the crack cocaine epidemic and extensive drug use in the United States led to greater concern with Colombia as a source  As Colombia became the largest producer of coca leaf and the largest exporter of finished cocaine, heroin produced from Colombian-grown poppies was supplying a growing proportion of the U S  market  Alarm over the volumes of heroin and cocaine being exported to the United States was a driving force behind U S  support for Plan Colombia at its inception  The evolution of Plan Colombia took place under changing leadership and changing conditions in both the United States and Colombia  Plan Colombia was followed by successor strategies such as the National Consolidation Plan, described below, and U S -Colombia policy has reached a new phase anticipating post-conflict Colombia  Announced in 1999, Plan Colombia originally was a six-year strategy to end the country's decades-long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote development  The counternarcotics and security strategy was developed by the government of President Andrés Pastrana in consultation with U S  officials  Colombia and its allies in the United States realized that for the nation to gain control of drug trafficking required a stronger security presence, the rebuilding of institutions, and extending state presence where it was weak or nonexistent  Initially, the U S  policy focus was on programs to reduce the production of illicit drugs  U S  support to Plan Colombia consisted of training and equipping counternarcotics battalions in the Colombian Army and specialized units of the Colombian National Police, drug eradication programs, alternative development, and other supply reduction programs  The original 1999 plan had a goal to reduce "the cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50%" over the plan's six-year timeframe  The means to achieve this ambitious goal were a special focus on eradication and alternative development; strengthening, equipping, and professionalizing the Colombian Armed Forces and the police; strengthening the judiciary; and fighting corruption  Other objectives were to protect citizens from violence, promote human rights, bolster the economy, and improve governance  U S  officials expressed their support for the program by emphasizing its counterdrug elements (including interdiction)  The focus on counternarcotics was the basis for building bipartisan support to fund the program in the U S  Congress because some Members of Congress were leery of involvement in fighting a counterinsurgency, which they likened to the "slippery slope" of the war in Vietnam  President George W  Bush came to office in 2001 and oversaw some changes to Plan Colombia  The primary vehicle for providing U S  support to Plan Colombia was the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, which was included in foreign operations appropriations  The Bush Administration requested new flexibility so that U S -provided assistance would back a "unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to [Colombia's] national security" due to the breakdown of peace talks between the FARC and the Pastrana government in February 2002  Congress granted this request for a unified campaign to fight drug trafficking and terrorist organizations as Members of Congress came to realize how deeply intertwined the activities of Colombia's terrorist groups were with the illicit drug trade that funded them  However, Congress prohibited U S  personnel from directly participating in combat missions  Congress placed a legislative cap on the number of U S  military and civilian contractor personnel who could be stationed in Colombia, although the cap was adjusted to meet needs over time  The current limit (first specified in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended) caps total military personnel at 800 and civilian contractors at 600, although numbers deployed have been far below the 1,400-person cap for years and now total fewer than 200  President Uribe (2002-2010) embraced Plan Colombia with an aggressive strategy toward the insurgent forces that prioritized citizen security  His Democratic Security Policy, implemented first in a military campaign called Plan Patriota, relied on the military to push FARC forces away from the major cities to remote rural areas and the borderlands  Like his predecessor, President Pastrana, Uribe continued to expand the Colombian military and police  He enhanced the intelligence capacity, professionalization, and coordination of the forces, in part with training provided by U S  forces  His strategy resulted in expanded state control over national territory and a significant reduction in kidnappings, terrorist attacks, and homicides  In 2007, the Uribe administration announced a shift to a "Policy of Consolidation of Democratic Security " The new doctrine was based on a "whole-of-government" approach to consolidate state presence in marginal areas that were historically neglected—vulnerable to drug crop cultivation, violence, and control by illegal armed groups  Called a strategic leap forward by then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, in 2009 the new strategy came to be called the National Consolidation Plan (see below)  Colombian support for Plan Colombia and for the nation's security program grew under Uribe's leadership  President Uribe levied a "wealth tax" to fund Colombia's security efforts, taxing the wealthiest taxpayers to fund growing defense and security expenditures  Overall U S  expenditures on Plan Colombia were only a modest portion of what Colombians spent on their own security  By one 2009 estimate, U S  expenditures were not more than 10% of what Colombians invested in their total security costs  In 2000, Colombia devoted less than 2% of its GDP to military and police expenditures and in 2010 that investment had grown to more than 4% of GDP  One assessment notes "in the end there is no substitute for host country dedication and funding" to turn around a security crisis such as Colombia faced at the beginning of the millennium  In 2008, congressional support for Plan Colombia and its successor programs also shifted  Some Members of Congress believed that the balance of programming was too heavily weighted toward security  Prior to 2008, the emphasis had been on "hard side" security assistance (to the military and police) compared with "soft side" traditional development and rule of law programs  Members debated if the roughly 75%/25% mix should be realigned  Since FY2008, Congress has reduced the proportion of assistance for security-related programs and increased the proportion for economic and social aid  As Colombia's security situation improved and Colombia's economy recovered, the United States also began turning over to Colombians operational and financial responsibility for efforts formerly funded by the U S  government  The Colombian government "nationalized" the training, equipping, and support for Colombian military programs, such as the counterdrug brigade, Colombian Army aviation, and the air bridge denial program  U S  funding overall began to decline  The nationalization efforts were not intended to end U S  assistance, but rather to gradually reduce it to pre-Plan Colombia levels, adjusted for inflation  A key goal of Plan Colombia was to reduce the supply of illegal drugs produced and exported by Colombia but the goals became broader over time  Bipartisan support for the policy existed through three U S  Administrations—President Bill Clinton, President George W  Bush, and President Barack Obama  Plan Colombia came to be viewed by some analysts as one of the most enduring and effective U S  policy initiatives in the Western Hemisphere  Some have lauded the strategy as a model  In 2009, William Brownfield, then-U S  Ambassador to Colombia, described Plan Colombia as "the most successful nation-building exercise that the United States has associated itself with perhaps in the last 25-30 years " Other observers, however, were critical of the policy as it unfolded  Many in the NGO and human rights community maintained the strategy, with its emphasis on militarization and security, was inadequate for solving Colombia's persistent, underlying problems of rural violence, poverty, neglect and institutional weakness  Nevertheless, it appears that improvements in security conditions have been accompanied by substantial economic growth and a reduction in poverty levels over time  The National Consolidation Plan first launched during the Uribe Administration, (renamed the National Plan for Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction), was designed to coordinate government efforts in regions where marginalization, drug trafficking, and violence converge  The whole-of-government consolidation was to integrate security, development, and counternarcotics to achieve a permanent state presence in vulnerable areas  Once security forces took control of a contested area, government agencies in housing, education, and development would regularize the presence of the state and reintegrate the municipalities of these marginalized zones into Colombia  The plan had been restructured several times by the Santos government  The United States supported the Colombian government's consolidation strategy through an inter-agency program called the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI)  CSDI provided U S  assistance to "fill gaps" in Colombian government programming  At the U S  Embassy in Colombia, CSDI coordinated efforts of the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department's Narcotics Affairs Section, the U S  Military Group, and the Department of Justice to assist Colombia in carrying out the consolidation plan by expanding state presence and promoting economic opportunities in priority zones  It combined traditional counternarcotics assistance for eradication, interdiction, alternative development, and capacity building for the police, military, and justice sector institutions with other economic and social development initiatives  As the peace agreement between the FARC and the government moved forward into implementation, the focus of U S  assistance to Colombia has shifted again  With a foundation of the work done to advance consolidation, U S  assistance has begun to aid in post-conflict planning and support Colombia's transition to peace by building up democratic institutions, protecting human rights and racial and ethnic minorities, and promoting economic opportunity  USAID's country cooperation strategy for 2014-2018 anticipated the Colombian government reaching a negotiated agreement with the FARC, but remained flexible if an agreement was not signed  It recognized early implementation efforts, especially in the first 24 months after signature, would be critical to demonstrate or model effective practices  In the next five years, it envisioned Colombia evolving from aid recipient to provider of technical assistance to neighbors in the region  Consolidating state authority and presence in the rural areas with weak institutions remains a significant challenge following the FARC's disarmament in the summer of 2017  Reintegration of the FARC and possibly other insurgent forces, such as the ELN, will be expensive and delicate  In particular, critics of the consolidation efforts of the Colombian government maintain that the Santos administration often lacked the commitment to hand off targeted areas from the military to civilian-led development and achieve locally led democratic governance  Consolidation efforts suffered from low political support, disorganization at the top levels of government, and failure to administer national budgets effectively in more remote areas, among other challenges  In August 2018, shortly after President Duque took office, USAID announced a framework of priorities for U S  economic development assistance to Colombia  Some of these priorities include promoting and supporting a whole-of-government strategy to include the dismantling of organized crime; increasing the effectiveness of Colombia's security and criminal justice institutions; promoting enhanced prosperity and job creation through trade; improving the investment climate for U S  companies; and advancing Colombia's capacity to strengthen governance and transition to sustainable peace, including reconciliation among victims, ex-combatants, and other citizens  The U S  Congress initially approved legislation in support of Plan Colombia in 2000, as part of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001 ( P L  106-246 )  Plan Colombia was never authorized by Congress, but it was funded annually through appropriations  From FY2000 through FY2016, U S  funding for Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies exceeded $10 billion in State Department and Defense Department programs  From FY2000 to FY2009, the United States provided foreign operations assistance to Colombia through the Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) account, formerly known as the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, and other aid accounts  In FY2008, Congress continued to fund eradication and interdiction programs through the ACP account, but funded alternative development and institution building programs through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account  In the FY2010 request, the Obama Administration shifted ACP funds into the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account  Since FY2008, U S  assistance has gradually declined because of tighter foreign aid budgets and nationalized Plan Colombia-related programs  In FY2014, in line with other foreign assistance reductions, funds appropriated to Colombia from State Department accounts declined to slightly below $325 million  In FY2015, Congress appropriated $300 million for bilateral assistance to Colombia in foreign operation  The FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations bill ( P L  114-113 ) provided Colombia from U S  State Department and U S  Agency for International Development accounts, slightly under $300 million, nearly identical to that appropriated in FY2015 (without P L  480, the Food for Peace account, the total for FY2016 was $293 million as shown in Table 1 )  In FY2017, Congress funded a program the Obama Administration had proposed called "Peace Colombia" to re-balance U S  assistance to support the peace process and implementation of the accord  In May 2017, Congress approved a FY2017 omnibus appropriations measure, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P L  115-31 ), which funded the various programs of Peace Colombia at $391 3 million  In the FY2017 legislation, Congress appropriated the following: The ESF account increased to $187 million (from $134 million in FY2016) to build government presence, encourage crop substitution to replace drug crops, and provide other assistance to conflict victims, including Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities  However, only $180 million was subsequently allocated  INCLE funding increased to $143 million with a focus on manual eradication of coca crops, support for the Colombian National Police, and judicial reform efforts  INCLE funding also included $10 million for Colombian forces' training to counterparts in other countries  $38 5 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF); and $21 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), which was a relatively large increase from under $4 million in FY2016 to focus on the demining effort  How the Trump Administration will engage with the issues of supporting post-conflict stability in Colombia has not been clearly defined by either the State Department or other executive departments  For example, the Trump Administration's proposed foreign aid budget for FY2018 would have reduced assistance to Colombia to $251 million  However, the FY2018 omnibus appropriations measure, approved by Congress in March 2018 ( P L  115-114 ), again included $391 3 million to support Colombia's transition to peace  The Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request for Colombia is $265 million, approximately a 32% reduction from the $391 3 million appropriated by Congress in FY2018  However, the House and Senate appropriations bills, H R  6385 and S  3108 , again would support the funding level of $391 3 million  The FY2019 Administration request would reduce post-conflict recovery programs and place greater emphasis on counternarcotics and security  Below, Table 1 provides account data from the annual international affairs congressional budget justification documents  The information about DOD-funded programs was provided to the Congressional Research Service by DOD analysts in December 2015 and October 2017 (and has not been updated)  The breakout of DOD assistance to Colombia is shown in Table 2     Colombia also has received additional U S  humanitarian funding to help it cope with more than 1 million Venezuelan migrants  As of September 30, 2018, U S  government humanitarian funding for the Venezuela response totaled approximately $96 5 million for both FY2017 and FY2018 combined, of which $54 8 million was for Colombia  (Humanitarian funding is drawn primarily from the global humanitarian accounts in annual Department of State/Foreign Operations appropriations acts ) In addition, the U S  Navy hospital ship USNS Comfort is on an 11-week medical support mission deployed through the end of 2018 to work with government partners, in part to assist with arrivals from Venezuela  In Colombia, the U S  response aims to help the Venezuelan arrivals as well as the local Colombian communities that are hosting them  In addition to humanitarian assistance, the United States is providing $37 million in bilateral assistance to support medium- and longer-term efforts by Colombia  Some Members of Congress have been deeply concerned about human rights violations in Colombia—especially those perpetrated by any recipients or potential recipients of U S  assistance  In Colombia's multisided, 50-year conflict, the FARC and ELN, the paramilitaries and their successors, and Colombia's security forces have all committed serious violations  Colombians have endured generations of noncombatant killings, massacres, kidnappings, forced displacements, forced disappearances, land mine casualties, and acts of violence that violate international humanitarian law  The extent of the crimes and the backlog of human rights cases to be prosecuted have overwhelmed the Colombian judiciary, which some describe as "inefficient" and overburdened  The United Nations and many human rights groups maintain that although some prosecutions have gone forward, most remain unresolved and the backlog of cases has been reduced slowly  In addition to the problem of impunity for such serious crimes, continued violations remain an issue  Since 2002, Congress has required in the annual foreign operations appropriations legislation that the Secretary of State certify annually to Congress that the Colombian military is severing ties to paramilitaries and that the government is investigating complaints of human rights abuses and meeting other human rights statutory criteria  (The certification criteria have evolved over time  ) For several years, certification was required before 30% of funds to the Colombian military could be released  The FY2014 appropriations legislation requires that 25% of funding under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program be held back pending certification by the Secretary of State  Some human rights groups have criticized the regular certification of Colombia, maintaining that evidence they have presented to the State Department has contradicted U S  findings  However, even some critics have acknowledged the human rights conditions on military assistance to Colombia to be "a flawed but useful tool" because the certification process requires that the U S  government regularly consult with Colombian and international human rights groups  Critics acknowledge that over time, conditionality can improve human rights compliance  Additional tools for monitoring human rights compliance by Colombian security forces receiving U S  assistance are the so-called "Leahy Law" restrictions, which Congress first passed in the late 1990s prior to the outset of Plan Colombia  First introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, these provisions deny U S  assistance to a foreign country's security forces if the U S  Secretary of State has credible information that such units have committed "a gross violation of human rights " The provisions apply to security assistance provided by the State Department and DOD  The Leahy Law under the State Department is authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and is codified at 22 U S C  2378d (§520M of the FAA)  The DOD Leahy provisions, which for years applied just to DOD training, now include a broader range of assistance, as modified in the FY2014 appropriations legislation  The provision related to the Leahy Laws for DOD assistance is codified at 10 U S C  362, and prohibits "any training, equipment, or other assistance," to a foreign security force unit if there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights  Both the State Department and DOD Leahy provisions require the State Department to review and clear—or vet—foreign security forces to determine if any individual or unit is credibly believed to be guilty of a gross human rights violation  Leahy vetting is typically conducted by U S  embassies and State Department headquarters  Reportedly on an annual basis about 1% of foreign security forces are disqualified from receiving assistance under the Leahy provisions, although many more are affected by administrative issues and are denied assistance until those conditions are resolved  Tainted security force units that are denied assistance may be remediated or cleared, but the procedures for remediation differ slightly between the DOD and State (or FAA) provisions  Because of the large amount of security assistance provided to Colombian forces (including the military and police), the State Department reportedly vets more candidates for assistance in Colombia than in any other country  In the late 1990s, poor human rights conditions in Colombia were a driving concern for developing the Leahy Law provisions  The U S  Embassy in Bogotá, with nearly two decades of experience in its vetting operations, has been cited as a source of best practices for other embassies seeking to bring their operations into compliance or enhance their performance  State Department officials have cited Colombia as a model operation that has helped Colombia to improve its human rights compliance  However, some human rights organizations are critical of the Leahy vetting process in Colombia, and cite the prevalence of extrajudicial executions allegedly committed by Colombian military units as evidence that these restrictions on U S  assistance have failed to remove human rights violators from the Colombian military  A human rights nongovernmental organization, Fellowship of Reconciliation, has published reports alleging an association between false positive killings and Colombian military units vetted by the State Department to receive U S  assistance  However, some have questioned the group's methodology  Some human rights organizations contend that the U S  government has tolerated abusive behavior by Colombian security forces without taking action or withholding assistance  Measured exclusively in counternarcotics terms, Plan Colombia has been a mixed success  Colombia remains the dominant producer of cocaine and in the DEA's National Drug Threat Assessment for 2017 continued to be the source for 95% of cocaine seized in the United States  Enforcement, eradication, and improved security squeezed production in Colombia, so that in 2012, Peru reemerged as the global leader in cocaine production, surpassing Colombia, for a year or so  In the early 2000s, given Colombia's predominance as the source of cocaine destined for U S  markets and its status as the second-largest producer of heroin consumed in the United States, eradication of coca bush and opium poppy (from which heroin is derived) was an urgent priority and became the preferred tool for controlling the production of these drugs  Another critical component of the drug supply reduction effort was alternative development programs funded by the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID) to assist illicit crop cultivators with transitioning to licit crop production and livelihoods  Analysts have long debated how effective Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies were in combating illegal drugs  Although Plan Colombia failed to meet its goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illicit drugs by 50% in its original six-year time frame, Colombia has sustained significant reductions in coca cultivation in recent years  According to U S  estimates, cultivation of coca declined from 167,000 hectares in 2007 to 78,000 hectares in 2012  (Poppy cultivation declined by more than 90% between 2000 and 2009 ) According to U S  government estimates, Colombia's potential production of pure cocaine fell to 170 metric tons in 2012, the lowest level in two decades  However, it started to rise slightly in 2013, and more dramatically in 2014 through 2016  In those years, cultivation of coca and production of cocaine grew significantly in part due to ending the aerial eradication of coca crops  In 2015, following a U N  agency determination that the herbicide used to spray coca crops was probably carcinogenic, Colombia's minister of health determined that aerial eradication of coca was not consistent with requirements of Colombia's Constitutional Court  In 2016, as noted above, the U S  DEA reported that 95% of cocaine seized in the United States originated in Colombia  According to U S  Office of National Drug Control Policy, Colombia in 2017 cultivated an unprecedented 209,000 hectares of coca, from which cocaine is derived, capable of generating 921 metric tons of cocaine  The United Nations estimates for 2017, which typically differ in quantity but follow the same trends as U S  estimates, maintained that Colombia's potential production of cocaine reached nearly 1,370 metric tons, 31% above its 2016 estimate  Even with Colombia's economic stability and improving security, cocaine exports (primarily to the U S  market) remain a major concern for U S  lawmakers  However, in drug interdiction, Colombia has set records for many years and is considered a strong and reliable U S  partner  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ( Table 4 ), shows Colombia cultivating 146,000 hectares of coca in 2016, a 52% increase over 2015 and another increase to 171,000 hectares, a 17% increase, in 2017  Although cocaine seizures were quite high in both years, the interdiction of cocaine was insufficient to counter the large increases in production  Both manual eradication and aerial eradication were central components of Plan Colombia to reduce coca and poppy cultivation  Manual eradication is conducted by teams, usually security personnel, who uproot and kill the plant  Aerial eradication involves spraying the plants from aircraft with an herbicide mixture to destroy the drug crop, but it may not kill the plants  In the context of Colombia's continuing internal conflict, manual eradication was far more dangerous than aerial spraying  U S  and Colombian policymakers recognized the dangers of manual eradication and, therefore, employed large-scale aerial spray campaigns to reduce coca crop yields, especially from large coca plantations  Colombia is the only country globally that aerially sprayed its illicit crops, and the practice has been controversial for health and environmental reasons, resulting in a Colombian decision to end aerial eradication in 2015  Since 2002, as a condition of fully funding the spraying program, Congress has regularly directed the State Department, after study and consultation with the U S  Environmental Protection Agency and other relevant agencies, to certify that the spraying did not "pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment " This certification requirement was included most years in the annual foreign operations appropriations legislation  Some analysts have also raised questions about the monetary and collateral costs of aerial eradication compared with other drug supply control strategies, its effectiveness, and its limited effect on the U S  retail price of cocaine  U S  State Department officials attribute Colombia's decline in coca cultivation after 2007 and prior to 2013 to the persistent aerial eradication of drug crops in tandem with manual eradication where viable  Between 2009 and 2013, Colombia aerially sprayed roughly 100,000 hectares annually  In 2013, however, eradication efforts declined  Colombia aerially eradicated roughly 47,000 hectares  It manually eradicated 22,120 hectares, short of the goal of 38,500 hectares  This reduction had a number of causes: the U S -supported spray program was suspended in October 2013 after two U S  contract pilots were shot down, rural protests in Colombia hindered manual and aerial eradication efforts, and security challenges limited manual eradicators working in border areas  In late 2013, Ecuador won an out-of-court settlement in a case filed in 2008 before the International Court of Justice in The Hague for the negative effects of spray drift over its border with Colombia  In negotiations with the FARC, the government and the FARC provisionally agreed in May 2014 that voluntary manual eradication would be prioritized over forced eradication  Aerial eradication remained a viable tool in the government's drug control strategy, according to the agreement, but would be permitted only if voluntary and manual eradication could not be conducted safely  In April 2015, the Santos administration determined that glyphosate, a broad-spectrum, nonselective herbicide used commercially, but in Colombia sprayed on coca plants to eradicate them, was "probably carcinogenic" to humans in a review published by a World Health Organization (WHO) affiliate  In October 2015, the government ended spraying operations and began to implement a new public health approach toward illicit drugs, one that proponents suggested would reduce human rights violations  On the supply side, Colombia's new drug policy gives significant attention to expanding alternative development and licit crop substitution while intensifying interdiction efforts  The State Department in its 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), however, warned that illicit cultivation was expanding in areas long off-limits to aerial spraying, including national parks, a buffer zone with Ecuador where aerial eradication has been restricted, and in indigenous or protected Afro-Colombian territories  Colombian interdiction practices are deemed some of the most effective in the world  The Colombian government reported seizing more than 207 metric tons (mt) of cocaine base in 2014 and that seizure total doubled by 2017 with capture of 442 mt of cocaine  According to the U S  State Department's 2018 INCSR , Colombia also seized 197 mt of marijuana, 348 kilograms of heroin, and destroyed more than 3,400 cocaine base and hydrochloride labs  USAID funds and runs alternative development programs in Colombia to assist communities with transitioning from a dependency on illicit crops to licit employment and livelihoods  Alternative development was once focused narrowly on crop substitution and assistance with infrastructure and marketing  Since the Colombian government's shift to a consolidation strategy, USAID has supported "consolidation and livelihoods" programming in 40 of the 58 strategically located, conflict-affected municipalities targeted by the government's National Consolidation Plan  To facilitate economic development, USAID funds initiatives that assist farmers and others with shifting from coca growing to licit economic opportunities  These programs are designed to strengthen small farmer producer organizations, improve their productivity, and connect them to markets  Some observers maintain that poor and unsustainable outcomes from alternative development programs while the Colombian conflict was still under way resulted from ongoing insecurity and lack of timeliness or sequencing of program elements  The renewed commitment to alternative development and crop substitution in the 2016 peace accord with the FARC may be similarly challenged  Formal implementation of the peace accord on drug eradication and crop substitution began in late May 2017 with collective agreements committing communities to replace their coca crops with licit crops  In some regions, the program is extended to families who cultivate coca and also to producers of legal crops and landless harvesters  The Colombian government also committed to a combined approach of both voluntary and forced manual eradication  The government's goal set for 2017 was eradicating 100,000 hectares of coca, 50,000 through forced manual eradication and 50,000 through "crop substitution" accords reached with coca farming households who would voluntary eradicate  At the U S -Colombia High Level Dialogue held in Bogotá in March 2018, a renewed commitment to the enduring partnership between the United States and Colombia was announced  A major outcome was a U S -Colombia pledge to reduce illegal narcotics trafficking through expanded counternarcotics cooperation  The new goal set was to reduce Colombia's estimated cocaine production and coca cultivation to 50% of current levels by 2023  In addition, a memorandum of understanding was signed to combat the illegal gold mining that funds transnational criminal organizations  Although President Duque appears determined to pursue a more aggressive approach to drug policy, he has not clearly stated how his approach to counternarcotics will differ from that of his predecessor  The government may restart aerial eradication, a strategy that ended in 2015 due to the Colombian Health Ministry's concerns over cancer-causing potential of the herbicide glyphosate, but no precise plans for restarting the program have been announced in the Duque Administration's first three months in office  Experimentation with delivering glyphosate by drones (rather than planes) began in June 2018 under the Santos Administration and is continuing under the Duque government  On October 1, 2018, President Duque authorized police to confiscate and destroy any quantity of drugs found on persons in possession of them, resulting in the seizure of more than 7 metric tons of drugs in less than two weeks  This enforcement measure may violate a 1994 Colombian Constitutional Court ruling, however, in which Colombians may carry small doses of drugs for personal use, including marijuana, hashish, and cocaine  Several court challenges have been filed that seek to nullify the Duque decree on constitutional grounds of protected personal use  Drug trafficking continues to trigger conflict over land in Colombia while affecting the most vulnerable groups, including Afro-Colombian, peasant, and indigenous populations  Some analysts warn that national and international pressure for drug eradication could also lead to increased human rights violations, including health consequences by reviving aerial spraying of drug crops and government actions to forcibly break up demonstrations by coca producers who resist eradication  Some analysts have advocated that investments to lower drug supply need to go beyond eradication, which has not been a lasting approach to reducing drug crop cultivation  For instance, the government could provide economic and education opportunities to at-risk youth to enhance their role in peace building and to prevent their recruitment into the drug trade and other illegal activity  Economic relations between Colombia and the United States have deepened  The U S -Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force in May 2012  By 2020, it will phase out all tariffs and other barriers to bilateral trade between Colombia and the United States, its largest trade partner  Since the U S -Colombia FTA went into force, the stock of U S  investment in Colombia surpassed $7 billion in 2014 but dropped to $6 2 billion in 2016 (on a historical cost basis), concentrated mostly in mining and manufacturing  According to the U S  Department of Commerce, U S  exports to Colombia exceeded $26 8 billion in 2016 and Colombia was the 22 nd -largest market for U S  exports; however, U S  imports from Colombia declined between 2015 and 2016  Major U S  exports to Colombia include oil (noncrude oil products including gasoline), machinery, cereals, organic chemicals, and plastic  Because 65% of U S  imports from Colombia are crude oil imports, much of the decline in value was caused by the sharp fall in oil prices that began in 2014  Major U S  imports beside crude oil, include gold, coffee, cut flowers, and fruits  Congressional interest in Colombia now extends far beyond security and counternarcotics and has grown in the area of bilateral trade following implementation of the U S -Colombia FTA, (also known at the U S -Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement)  Colombia is a founding member of the Pacific Alliance, along with Chile, Mexico, and Peru, and has sought to deepen trade integration and cross-border investment with its partners in the alliance while reducing trade barriers  The Pacific Alliance aims to go further by creating a common stock market, allowing for the eventual free movement of businesses and persons, and serving as an export platform to the Asia-Pacific region  Colombia's leadership role in the Pacific Alliance and Colombia's accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in May 2018, following a review of the country's macroeconomic policies and changes, are major new developments  The accession to the OECD was approved by Colombia's lower house in October 2018 and the Senate in November 2018, but it remained under final review by Colombia's Constitutional Court in early February 2019  The Santos administration pushed to meet the criteria required for OECD membership because it maintained that such recognition signified Colombia's attainment of world-class development standards and policies  Colombia has made progress on trade issues such as copyright, pharmaceuticals, fuel and trucking regulations, and labor concerns (including subcontracting methods and progress on resolving cases of violence against union activists)  Congress remains interested in Colombia's future because the country has become one of the United States' closest allies  With 17 years of investment in Colombia's security and stability, some maintain that there has already been a strong return on U S  investment  Plan Colombia and its successor strategies broadened from counternarcotics to include humanitarian concerns, efforts to bolster democratic development and human rights protections, and trade and investment to spark growth  The record expansion of Colombia's coca crop and increasing cocaine exports to the United States, however, may significantly hinder the effort to consolidate peace in Colombia and could potentially increase corruption and extortion  A significant portion of the Colombian public remains skeptical of the peace process and the FARC's role in Colombia's democracy  Other Colombians maintain that support for peace programs in Colombia is important not only to benefit former FARC or other demobilized combatants but also to fulfill promises the government made in the peace accords to the country's 8 6 million victims of the five-decade conflict  As President Duque concluded his first 100 days in office, his government faced overlapping challenges: (1) an upsurge in illicit drug crops, which had set records in 2016 and 2017; (2) implementation of provisions of the peace accord negotiated by former president Santos but marred by slow implementation, attacks on land and human rights activists, and projected budgetary shortfalls; (3) renewed violent competition among criminal groups in rural areas, some of which reportedly are sheltering in Venezuela; and (4) Venezuela's humanitarian crisis, which resulted in a surge of migrants fleeing to or through Colombia  The annual level of foreign assistance provided by the U S  Congress for Colombia began to decline in FY2008 and then gradually increased in FY2017 and FY2018 to support peace and implementation of the FARC-government peace accord  Some Members of Congress may want to build on cooperation with Colombian partners to continue to train Central Americans and other third-country nationals in counternarcotics and security, including programs in citizen security, crime prevention and monitoring, military and police capacity building, and hostage negotiation and cybersecurity  Congress may continue to closely monitor Colombia's domestic security situation  It also may continue to oversee issues such as drug trafficking; Colombia's effort to combat other illegal armed groups such as Bacrim; the status of human rights protections; and the expansion of health, economic, environmental, energy, and educational cooperation  Congress may seek to foster Colombian leadership in the region to counter growing political instability in Venezuela  The U S  Congress has been interested in expanding investment and trade opportunities both bilaterally with Colombia and within regional groupings, such as the Pacific Alliance  Some analysts contend that U S -Colombian trade improvements rest on the strength of the overall relationship between Colombia and the United States  

ground_truth: "Cross-border data flows" refers to the movement or transfer of information between computer servers across national borders. Such data flows enable people to transmit information for online communication, track global supply chains, share research, provide cross-border services, and support technological innovation. Ensuring open cross-border data flows has been an objective of Congress in recent trade agreements and in broader U.S. international trade policy. The free flow of personal data, however, has raised security and privacy concerns. U.S. trade policy has traditionally sought to balance the need for cross-border data flows, which often include personal data, with online privacy and security. Some stakeholders, including some Members of Congress, believe that U.S. policy should better protect personal data privacy and security, and have introduced legislation to set a national policy. Other policymakers and analysts are concerned about increasing foreign barriers to U.S. digital trade, including data flows. Recent incidents of private information being shared or exposed have heightened public awareness of the risks posed to personal data stored online. Consumers' personal online data is valued by organizations for a variety of reasons, such as analyzing marketing information and easing the efficiency of transactions. Concerns are likely to grow as the amount of online data organizations collect and the level of global data flows expand. As Congress assesses policy options, it may further explore the link between cross-border data flows, online privacy, and trade policy; the trade implications of a comprehensive data privacy policy; and the U.S. role in establishing best practices and binding trade rules that seek to balance public policy priorities. There is no globally accepted standard or definition of data privacy in the online world, and there are no comprehensive binding multilateral rules specifically about cross-border data flows and privacy. Several international organizations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), G-20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, have sought to develop best practice guidelines or principles related to privacy and cross-border data flows, although none are legally binding. U.S. and other recent trade agreements are establishing new enforceable trade rules and disciplines. Countries vary in their data policies and laws; some focus on limiting access to online information by restricting the flow of data beyond a country's borders, aiming to protect domestic interests (e.g., constituents' privacy). However, these policies can also act as protectionist measures. The EU and China, two top U.S. trading partners, have established prescriptive rules on cross-border data flows and personal data from different perspectives. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is driven by privacy concerns; China is focused on security. Their policies affect U.S. firms seeking to do business in those regions, as well as in other markets that emulate the EU and Chinese approaches. Unlike the EU or China, the United States does not broadly restrict cross-border data flows and has traditionally regulated privacy at a sectoral level to cover data, such as health records. U.S. trade policy has sought to balance the goals of consumer privacy, security, and open commerce. The proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) represents the Trump Administration's first attempt to include negotiated trade rules and disciplines on privacy, cross-border data flows, and security in a trade agreement. While the United States and other countries work to define their respective national privacy strategies, many stakeholders seek a more global approach that would allow interoperability between differing national regimes to facilitate and remove discriminatory trade barriers to cross-border data flows; this could offer an opportunity for the United States to lead the global conversation. Although Congress has examined issues surrounding online privacy and has considered multiple bills, there is not yet consensus on a comprehensive U.S. online data privacy policy. Congress may weigh in as the Administration seeks to define U.S. policy on data privacy and engages in international negotiations on cross-border data flows.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Cross-border data flows underlie today's globally connected world and are essential to conducting international trade and commerce  Data flows enable companies to transmit information for online communication, track global supply chains, share research, and provide cross-border services  One study estimates that digital commerce relying on data flows drives 22% of global economic output, and that global GDP will increase by another $2 trillion by 2020 due to advances in emerging technologies  However, while cross-border data flows increase productivity and enable innovation, they also raise concerns around the security and privacy of the information being transmitted  Cross-border data flows are central to trade and trade negotiations as organizations rely on the transmission of information to use cloud services, and to send nonpersonal corporate data as well as personal data to partners, subsidiaries, and customers  U S  policymakers are considering various policy options to address online privacy, some of which could affect cross-border data flows  For example, new consumer rights to control their personal data may impact how companies can use such data  To enable international data flows and trade, the United States has aimed to eliminate trade barriers and establish enforceable international rules and best practices that allow policymakers to achieve public policy objectives, including promoting online security and privacy  Building consensus for international rules and norms on data flows and privacy has become increasingly important as recent incidents have heightened the public's awareness of the risk of personal data stored online  For example, the 2018 Cambridge Analytica scandal drew attention because the firm reportedly acquired and used data on more than 87 million Facebook accounts in an effort to influence voters in the 2016 U S  presidential election and the UK referendum on continued European Union (EU) membership ("Brexit")  In addition, security concerns have been raised about data breaches, such as those that exposed the personal data of half a million Google users or 500 million Marriot hotel customers  Organizations value consumers' personal online data for a variety of reasons  For example, companies may seek to facilitate business transactions, analyze marketing information, detect disease patterns from medical histories, discover fraudulent payments, improve proprietary algorithms, or develop competitive innovations  Some analysts compare data to oil or gold, but unlike those valuable substances, data can be reused, analyzed, shared, and combined with other information; it is not a scarce resource  However, personal data is considered personal private property  Individuals often want to control who accesses their data and how it is used  Experts suggest that data may therefore be considered both a benefit and a liability that organizations hold  Data has value, but an organization takes on risk by collecting personal data; they become responsible for protecting users' privacy and not misusing the information  Data privacy concerns may become more urgent as the amount of online information organizations access and collect, and the level of global data flows, continue to expand  Countries vary in their policies and laws on these issues  The United States has traditionally supported open data flows and has regulated privacy at a sectoral level to cover data, such as health records, rather than create a comprehensive policy  U S  trade policy has sought to balance the goals of consumer privacy, security, and open commerce, including eliminating trade barriers and opening markets  Other countries are developing data privacy policies that affect international trade as some governments or groups seek to limit data flows outside of an organization or across national borders for a number of reasons  Blocking international data flows may impede the ability of a firm to do business or of an individual to conduct a transaction, creating a form of trade protectionism  Research demonstrates not only the economic gains from digital trade and international data flows, but also the real economic costs of restrictions on such flows  For many policymakers, the crux of the issue is: How can governments protect individual privacy in the least trade-restrictive way possible? The question is similar to concerns raised about ensuring cybersecurity while allowing the free flow of data  In recent years, Congress has examined multiple issues related to cross-border data flows and online privacy  In the 115 th Congress, congressional committees held hearings on these topics, introduced multiple bills, and conducted oversight over federal laws on related issues such as data breach notification  Members are introducing new bills and holding hearings in the 116 th Congress  Congress may consider the proposed U S -Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and examine the digital trade chapter as an example of how to address the issues through trade agreements  In most circumstances, a consumer expects both privacy and security when conducting an online transaction  However, users' expectations and values may vary and there is no globally accepted standard or definition of data privacy in the online world  In addressing online privacy, Congress may need to define personal data and differentiate between sensitive and nonsensitive personal data  In general, data privacy can be defined by an individual's ability to prevent access to personally identifiable information (PII)  According to the U S  Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance to federal agencies, PII refers to information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, either alone or when combined with other information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual  Since electronic data can be readily shared and combined, some data not traditionally considered PII may have become more sensitive  For example, the OMB definition does not specifically mention data on location tracking, purchase history, o r preferences, but these digital data points can be tracked by a device such as a mobile phone or laptop that an individual carries or logs into  The EU definition of PII attempts to capture the breadth of data available in the online world: "personal data" means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person  Policymakers may consider differentiating between sensitive and nonsensitive personal data  For example, sensitive personal data could include ethnic origin, political or religious affiliation, biometric data, health data, sexual orientation, precise geolocation data, etc  "Cross-border data flows" refers to the movement or transfer of information between computer servers across national borders  Cross-border data flows are part of, and integral to, digital trade and facilitate the movement of goods, services, people, and finance  A 2017 analysis estimated that global flows of goods, services, finance, and people increased world gross domestic product (GDP) by at least 10% in the past decade, adding $8 trillion between 2005 and 2015  Effective and sustainable digital trade relies on data flows that permit commerce and communication but that also ensure privacy and security, protect intellectual property, and build trust and confidence  Impeding cross-border data flows, including through some privacy regulations, may decrease efficiency and reduce other benefits of digital trade, resulting in the fracturing, or so-called balkanization, of the internet  In addressing online privacy, some policymakers focus on limiting access to online information by restricting the flow of data beyond a country's borders  Such limits may also act as protectionist measures  Online privacy policies may create barriers to digital trade, or damage trust in the underlying digital economy  For example, measures to limit cross-border data flows could block companies from using cloud computing to aggregate and analyze global data, or from gaining economies of scale, constrain e-commerce by limiting international online payments, hinder global supply chains seeking to use blockchain to track products or manage supply chains, customs documentation, or electronic payments, impede the trading of crypto-currency, or limit the use of advanced technology like artificial intelligence  According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), one of the most significant overall impacts of the growth of digital technologies is in transforming international trade  Technology can lower the costs of trade, change the types of goods and services that are traded, and may even change the factors defining a country's comparative advantage  The extent of the impact of digital technologies on trade, however, depends in large part on open cross-border data flows  One study of U S  companies found that data localization rules (i e , requiring organizations to store data on local servers) were the most-cited digital trade barrier  Some governments advocate privacy or security policies that require data localization and limit cross-border data flows  However, many industry stakeholders argue that blocking cross-border data flows and storing data domestically does not make such data more secure or private  Many experts argue that policymakers should limit cross-border data flows in the least trade-restrictive manner possible and also ensure security and privacy  These objectives are not easily reconciled  Moreover, although an overlap exists between data protection and privacy, the two are not equivalent  Cybersecurity measures are essential to protect data (e g , against intrusions or theft by hackers)  However, they may not be sufficient to protect privacy  For example, if an organization shares user data with a third party, it may be doing so securely, but not in a way that protects users' privacy or aligns with consumer expectations  Similarly, breach notification requirements are not the same as proactive privacy protection measures  At the same time, policies that protect a consumer's privacy can align with security policies  Laws can limit law enforcement's access to information except in certain circumstances  Keeping user information anonymous may enable firms to analyze data while protecting individuals' identities  Some see an inherent conflict between online security, privacy, and trade; others believe that policies protecting all three can be coherent and consistent  The U S  government has traditionally sought to balance these objectives  Some stakeholders note, however, that current U S  policy has been inadequate in protecting online privacy and that change is needed  In some cases in the past, Congress has acted to address privacy concerns in particular sectors; for example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 led to health privacy standards regulations  The Trump Administration has begun an effort to devise an overarching data privacy policy (see " Defining the U S  Approach ") and many Members of Congress are also considering possible approaches  There are no comprehensive multilateral rules specifically about privacy or cross-border data flows  However, the United States and other countries have begun to address these issues in negotiating new and updated trade agreements, and through international economic forums and organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)  The World Trade Organization (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) entered into force in January 1995, predating the current reach of the internet and the explosive growth of global data flows  Many digital products and services that did not exist when the agreements were negotiated are not covered  On the other hand, privacy is explicitly addressed within GATS as an exception to allow countries to take measures that do not conform with the agreement in order to protect "the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts," as long as those measures are not arbitrary or a disguised trade restriction  Efforts to update the multilateral agreement and discussions for new digital trade rules under the WTO Electronic Commerce Work Program stalled in 2017  Given the lack of progress on multilateral rules, some have suggested that the WTO should identify best practices or guidelines for digital trade rules that could lay the foundation for a future multilateral WTO agreement  In December 2017, a group of more than 70 WTO members, including the United States, agreed to "initiate exploratory work together toward future WTO negotiations on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce " Overall U S  objectives include allowing the free flow of information for international trade and cross-border data flows, "subject to reasonable safeguards like the protection of consumer data when it is exported," but do not specifically address privacy  The group formally launched the e-commerce initiative in January 2019  The official joint statement lists the United States and EU as participants, and also several developing countries such as China and Brazil  India stated it will not join, preferring to maintain its flexibility to favor domestic firms, limit foreign market access, and raise revenue in the future  The statement did not define the scope of any potential agreement  After the meeting, the EU noted data localization measures among the potential new rules to be discussed when negotiations officially launch in March 2019  The U S  Trade Representative's (USTR's) statement emphasized the need for a high-standard agreement that includes enforceable obligations  Although some experts note that harmonization or mutual recognition is unlikely given divergent legal systems, privacy regimes, and norms of the parties, a common system of rules to allow for cross-border data flows while ensuring privacy protection is reportedly under discussion  Personal privacy has received increasing focus with the growth of digital trade encouraging global cooperation  The United States has contributed to developing international guidelines or principles related to privacy and cross-border data flows, although none are legally binding  The OECD 1980 Privacy Guidelines established the first international set of privacy principles emphasizing data protection as a condition for the free flow of personal data across borders  These OECD guidelines were intended to assist countries with drawing up national data privacy policies  The guidelines were updated in 2013, focusing on national level implementation based on a risk management approach and improving interoperability between national privacy strategies  The updated guidelines identify specific principles for countries to take into account in establishing national policies  The guidelines are to be reviewed and updated again in 2019  Building on the OECD principles and prior G-20 work, the 2018 G-20 Digital Economy Ministerial Declaration identified principles to "facilitate an inclusive and whole-of-government approach to the use of information and communication technology (ICT) and assist governments in reshaping their capacities and strategies, while respecting the applicable frameworks of different countries, including with regards to privacy and data protection " Japan is to host the 2019 G-20 and plans to focus on data governance, offering a forum to address potential global standards on privacy and cross-border data flows  APEC is a regional forum for economic cooperation whose initiatives on privacy and cross-border data flows have influenced members' domestic policies  APEC's 21 members, including the United States, agreed to the 2005 APEC Privacy Framework , based on the OECD guidelines  The framework identifies a set of principles and implementation guidelines to provide members with a flexible approach to regulate privacy at a national level  Once the OECD publishes updated guidelines in 2019, APEC members may revise the framework and principles to reflect the updated guidelines  The APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR), endorsed by APEC Leaders in 2011, is a privacy code of conduct, based on the framework  The CBPR system establishes a set of principles for governments and businesses to follow to protect personal data and allow for cross-border data flows between CBPR members  They aim to balance information privacy with business needs and commercial interests, and facilitate digital trade to spur economic growth in the region  Rather than creating a new set of international regulations, the APEC framework and CBPR system identify best practices that each APEC member can tailor to its domestic legal system and allow for interoperability between countries  The scope and implementation mechanisms under CBPR can vary according to each member country's laws and regulations, providing flexibility for governments to design national privacy approaches  To become a member of the CBPR, a government must 1  Be a member of APEC; 2  Establish a regulator with authority to sign the Cross-Border Privacy Enforcement Arrangement (CPEA); 3  Map national laws to the published APEC guidelines, which set baseline standards; and 4  Establish an accountability agent empowered to audit and review a company's practices, and enforce privacy rules and laws  If a government joins the CBPR system, every domestic organization is not required to also join; however, becoming a member of CBPR may benefit an organization engaged in international trade by indicating to customers and partners that the organization values and protects data privacy  With certified enrollment in CBPR, organizations can transfer personal information between participating economies (e g , Mexico to Singapore) and be assured of compliance with the legal regimes in both places  To become a CBPR member, an individual organization must develop and implement data privacy policies consistent with the APEC Privacy Framework and complete a questionnaire  The third party accountability agent is responsible for assessing an organization's application, ongoing monitoring of compliance, investigating any complaints, and taking enforcement actions as necessary  Domestic enforcement authorities in each member country serve as a backstop for dispute resolution if an accountability agent cannot resolve a particular issue  All CBPR member governments must join the CPEA to ensure cooperation and collaboration between the designated national enforcement authorities  In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the regulator and enforcement authority  TrustArc is the only accountability agent, but many expect the U S  Department of Commerce to recognize additional agents soon  As of this writing, TrustArc lists about 20 U S  firms that are APEC CBPR certified  The CBPR grows in significance as the number of participating economies and organizations increases  The U S  ambassador to APEC aims to have "as many APEC economies as possible as soon as possible to join the system " Currently, the United States, Japan, Mexico, Canada, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Australia are CBPR members; the Philippines is in the process of joining  Russia, on the other hand, stated it has no plans to join  Although APEC initiatives are regionally focused, they can provide a basis to scale up to larger global efforts because they reflect economies at different stages of development and include industry participation  Due to its voluntary nature, APEC has served as a testbed for identifying best practices, standards, and principles and for creating frameworks that can lead to binding commitments in plurilateral or larger multilateral agreements (see " Data Flows and Privacy in U S  Trade Agreements ")  Expanding CBPR beyond APEC could represent the next step toward consistent international rules and disciplines on data flows and privacy  Countries vary in their privacy policies and laws, reflecting differing priorities, cultures, and legal structures  According to one index, China is the most restrictive digital trade country among 64 countries surveyed, followed by Russia, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam (see Figure 1 )  The United States ranks 22 in the index, less restrictive than Brazil or France but more restrictive than Canada or Australia  The relatively high U S  score largely reflects financial sector restrictions  The "restrictions on data" category covers data policies such as privacy and security measures; this category is included in the composite index  Looking specifically at the 64 countries' data policies, Russia is the most restrictive country, followed by Turkey and China  Russia's policies include data localization, retention, and transfer requirements, among others  Turkey's comprehensive Data Protection Law also establishes requirements in these areas  In contrast, the United States ranks 50 for data policy restrictions  Two of the top U S  trading partners (the EU and China) have established their data policies from different perspectives  The EU's policies are driven by privacy concerns; China's policies are based on security justifications  Both are setting examples that other countries, especially those with (or seeking) closer trading ties to China or the EU, are emulating; thus, these policies have affected U S  firms seeking to do business in those other countries as well  The EU considers the privacy of communications and the protection of personal data to be fundamental human rights, which are codified in EU law  Differences between the United States and EU in their approaches to data protection and data privacy laws have long been sticking points in U S -EU economic and security relations  The EU and United States negotiated the U S -EU Privacy Shield to allow for the transatlantic transfer of personal data by certified organizations  The bilateral agreement established a voluntary program with commitments and obligations for companies, limitations on law enforcement access, and transparency requirements  U S  companies that participate in the program must still comply with all of the obligations under EU law (see below) if they process personal data of EU persons  The Privacy Shield is overseen and enforced by EU federal and U S  agencies, including the Department of Commerce and the FTC, and is reviewed by both parties annually  The EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), effective May 2018, establishes rules for EU members, with extraterritorial implications  The GDPR is a comprehensive privacy regime that builds on previous EU data protection rules  It grants new rights to individuals to control personal data and creates specific new data protection requirements  The GDPR applies to (1) all businesses and organizations with an EU establishment that process (i e , perform operations on) personal data of individuals in the EU, regardless of where the actual processing of the data takes place; and (2) entities outside the EU that offer goods or services (for payment or for free) to individuals in the EU or monitor the behavior of individuals in the EU  While the GDPR is directly applicable at the EU member state level, individual countries are responsible for establishing some national-level rules and policies as well as enforcement authorities, and some are still in the process of doing so  As a result, some U S  stakeholders have voiced concerns about a lack of clarity and inadequate country compliance guidelines  Many U S  firms doing business in the EU have made and are making changes to comply with the GDPR, such as revising and clarifying user terms of agreement and asking for explicit consent  For some U S  companies, it may be easier and cheaper to apply GDPR protections to all users worldwide rather than to maintain different policies for different users  Large firms may have the resources to hire consultants and lawyers to guide implementation and compliance; it may be harder and costlier for small and mid-sized enterprises to comply, possibly deterring them from entering the EU market and creating a de facto trade barrier  Since the GDPR went into effect on May 25, 2018, some U S  businesses, including some newspaper websites and digital advertising firms, have opted to exit the EU market given the complexities of complying with the GDPR and the threat of potential enforcement actions  European Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) have received a range of GDPR complaints and initiated several GDPR enforcement actions in the fall of 2018  In January 2019, the French DPA issued the largest penalty to date for a data privacy breach  The agency imposed a €50 million (approximately $57 million) fine on Google for the "lack of transparency" regarding how the search engine processes user data  Analysts contend that the high fine may set a benchmark and signal for future enforcement, raising concerns among some firms doing business in the EU  Under the GDPR, a few options exist to transfer personal data in or out of the EU and ensure that privacy is maintained  1  An organization may use specific Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) or Model Contracts approved by the EU; 2  An organization may comply with domestic privacy regimes of a country that has obtained a mutual adequacy decision from the EU, which means that the EU has deemed that a country's laws and regulations provide an adequate level of data protection; currently, fewer than 15 jurisdictions are deemed adequate by the EU; or 3  A U S -based organization may enroll in the bilateral U S -EU Privacy Shield program for transatlantic transfer of personal data  The GDPR legal text seems to envision a fourth way, such as a certification scheme to transfer data, that the EU has yet to elaborate  A certification option(s) could create a less burdensome means of compliance for U S  and other non-EU organizations to transfer personal data to or from the EU in the future  This could be an opportunity for the United States to work with the EU on creating a common system, perhaps even setting a global standard  Some experts contend that the GDPR may effectively set new global data privacy standards, since many companies and organizations are striving for GDPR compliance to avoid being shut out of the EU market, fined, or otherwise penalized, or in case other countries introduce rules that imitate the GDPR  The EU is actively promoting the GDPR and some countries, such as Argentina, are imitating all or parts of the GDPR in their own privacy regulatory and legislative efforts or as part of broader trade negotiations with the EU  In general, the EU does not include cross-border data flows or privacy in free trade agreements  However, alongside trade negotiations with Japan, the EU and Japan agreed to recognize each other's data protection systems as "equivalent," allowing for the free flow of data between the EU and Japan and serving as a first step in adopting an adequacy decision  Under the agreement, Japan committed to implementing additional measures to address the handling of the personal data of EU persons on top of Japan's own privacy regime  China's trade and internet policies reflect state direction and industrial policy, limiting the free flow of information and individual privacy  For example, the requirement for all internet traffic to pass through a national firewall can impede the cross-border transmission of data  China's 2015 counterterrorism law requires telecommunications operators and internet service providers to provide assistance to the government, which could include sharing individuals' data  Citing national security concerns, China's Internet Sovereignty policies, Cybersecurity Law, and Personal Information Security Specification impose strict requirements on companies, such as storing data domestically; limiting the ability to access, use, or transfer data internationally; and mandating security assessments that provide Chinese authorities access to proprietary information  In 2014, China announced a new social credit system, a centralized big-data-enabled system for monitoring and shaping businesses' and citizens' behavior that serves as a self-enforcing regulatory mechanism  According to the government, China aims to make individuals more "sincere" and "trustworthy," while obtaining reliable data on the creditworthiness of businesses and individuals  An individual's score would determine the level of government services and opportunities he or she could receive  China seeks to have all its citizens subject to the social credit system by 2020, forcing some U S  businesses who do business in China, such as airlines, to participate  As of 2018, multiple government agencies and financial institutions contribute data to the platform  Pilot projects are underway in some provinces to apply various rewards and punishments in response to data collected  The lack of control an individual may have and the exposure of what some consider private data is controversial among observers in and out of China  Some countries, such as Vietnam, are following China's approach in creating cybersecurity policies that limit data flows and require local data storage and possible access by government authorities  Some U S  firms and other multinational companies are considering exiting the Vietnamese market rather than complying, while some analysts suggest that Vietnam's law may not be in compliance with its recent commitments in trade agreements (see below)  India has also cited security as the rationale for its draft Personal Data Protection Bill, which would establish broad data localization requirements and limit cross-border transfer of some data  Unlike the EU, these countries do not specify mechanisms to allow for cross-border data flows  U S  officials have raised concerns with both Vietnam's and India's localization requirements  The EU's emphasis on privacy protection and China's focus on national security (and the countries that emulate their policies) have led these countries to create data-focused policies that restrict international trade and commerce  The United States has traditionally sought a balanced approach between trade, privacy, and security  U S  data flow policy priorities are articulated in USTR's Digital 2 Dozen report, first developed under the Obama Administration, and the White House's 2017 National Security Strategy  Both Administrations emphasize the need for protection of privacy, the free flow of data across borders, and an interoperable internet  These documents establish the U S  position that the free flow of data is not inconsistent with privacy protection  Recent free trade agreements translate the U S  position into binding international commitments  The United States has taken a data-specific approach to regulating data privacy, with laws protecting specific information, such as healthcare or financial data  The FTC enforces consumer protection laws and requires that consumers be notified of and consent to how their data will be used, but the FTC does not have the mandate or resources to enforce broad online privacy protections  There is growing interest among some Members of Congress and in the Administration for a more holistic U S  data privacy policy  The United States has played an important role in international discussions on privacy and data flows, such as in the OECD, G-20, and APEC, and has included provisions on these subjects in recent free trade agreements  Congress noted the importance of digital trade and the internet as a trading platform in setting the current U S  trade negotiating objectives in the June 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation ( P L  114-26 )  TPA includes a specific principal U S  trade negotiating objective on "digital trade in goods and services and cross-border data flows " According to TPA, a trade agreement should ensure that governments "refrain from implementing trade-related measures that impede digital trade in goods and services, restrict cross-border data flows, or require local storage or processing of data " However, TPA also recognizes that sometimes measures are necessary to achieve legitimate policy objectives and aims for such regulations to be the least trade restrictive, nondiscriminatory, and transparent  Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans‐Pacific Partnership (CPTPP /TPP-11 )   The CPTPP is a recently concluded trade agreement among 11 Asia-Pacific countries  The CPTPP is based on the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement negotiated by the Obama Administration and from which President Trump withdrew the United States in January 2017  The electronic commerce chapter in TPP, left unchanged in CPTPP, contains the strongest binding trade agreement commitments on digital trade in force globally  CPTPP includes provisions on cross-border data flows and personal information protection  The text specifically states that the parties "shall allow the cross-border transfer of information " The agreement allows restrictive measures for legitimate public policy purposes if they are not discriminatory or disguised trade barriers  The agreement also prohibits localization requirements for computing facilities, with similar exceptions  On privacy, the CPTPP requires parties to have a legal framework in place to protect personal information and to have consumer protection laws that cover online commerce  It encourages interoperability between data privacy regimes and encourages cooperation between consumer protection authorities  United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)  The released text for the proposed USMCA aims to revise and update the trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and illustrates the Trump Administration's approach  The USMCA chapter 19 on digital trade includes articles on consumer protection, personal information protection, cross-border transfer of information by electronic means, and cybersecurity, among other topics  Building on the TPP, the agreement seeks to balance the legitimate objectives by requiring parties to have a legal framework to protect personal information, have consumer protection laws for online commercial activities, and not prohibit or restrict cross-border transfer of information  While the agreement does not prescribe specific rules or measures that a party must take to protect privacy, it goes further than the TPP (or CPTPP) provisions and provides guidance to inform a country's privacy regime  In particular, the USMCA explicitly refers to the APEC Privacy Framework and OECD Guidelines as relevant and identifies key principles  In general, the proposed USMCA requires that parties not restrict cross-border data flows  Governments are allowed to do so to achieve a legitimate public policy objective (e g , privacy, national security), provided the measure is not arbitrary, discriminatory, a disguised trade barrier, or greater than necessary to achieve the particular objective  In this way, the parties seek to balance the free flow of data for commerce and communication with protecting privacy and security  The agreement specifically states that the parties may take different legal approaches to protect personal data and also recognizes APEC CBPR as a "valid mechanism to facilitate cross-border information transfer while protecting personal information " The agreement aims to increase cooperation between the United States, Mexico, and Canada on a number of digital trade issues, including exchanging information on personal information protection and enforcement experiences; strengthening collaboration on cybersecurity issues; and promoting the APEC CBPR and global interoperability of national privacy regimes  The governments also commit to encourage private-sector self-regulation models and promote cooperation to enforce privacy laws  While the agreement is only between three parties, the provisions are written broadly to encompass global efforts  Some stakeholders look at USMCA as the basis for potential future trade agreements (such as with the UK)  Cross-border data flows will likely be a key issue in future U S -EU trade negotiations  The United States has articulated a clear position on data privacy in trade agreements; however, there is no single U S  data privacy policy  Nevertheless, the Trump Administration is seeking to define an overarching U S  policy on data privacy  The Trump Administration's ongoing three-track process is being managed by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) in consultation with the White House  Different bureaus in Commerce are tasked with different aspects of the process, as follows  1  The National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) is developing a privacy framework  Similar to its cybersecurity framework, NIST aims to create a voluntary framework as a tool for organizations to adopt to identify, assess, manage, and communicate about privacy risks  By classifying specific privacy outcomes and potential approaches, the framework is intended to enable organizations to create and adapt privacy strategies, innovate, and manage privacy risks within diverse environments  As part of its transparent approach, NIST is currently consulting with public- and private-sector stakeholders through various forms of outreach to collect feedback and aims to have a draft framework before the end of 2019  2  The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is developing a set of privacy principles to guide a domestic legal and policy approach  The NITA sought public comment on a proposed set of "user-centric privacy outcomes" and a set of high-level goals  3  The International Trade Administration (ITA) engages with foreign governments and international organizations such as APEC  ITA is focusing on the international interoperability aspects of potential U S  privacy policy  ITA's role is to ensure that the NIST and NTIA approaches are consistent with U S  international policy objectives, including TPA, and principles, such as the OECD framework and APEC CBPRs  Like the EU and China, Commerce is seeking input through a public- and private-sector consultation process  However, unlike the EU or China, Commerce is expecting to create a voluntary privacy framework  Some observers question whether the Commerce approach is sufficient to result in strong privacy protections if it is not backed up by congressional action and federal legislation  Some suggest that Congress could lead a whole-of-government approach through new federal legislation  In the 115 th Congress, then-House Committee on Energy and Commerce Ranking Member Frank Pallone, Jr  requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) examine issues related to federal oversight of internet privacy  The January 2019 GAO report concluded that now is "an appropriate time for Congress to consider comprehensive Internet privacy " GAO stated that "Congress should consider developing comprehensive legislation on Internet privacy that would enhance consumer protections and provide flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment  Issues that should be considered include what authorities agencies should have in order to oversee Internet privacy, including appropriate rulemaking authority " Recognizing the importance of protecting open data flows amid growing concerns about online privacy, some stakeholders seek to influence U S  policies on these issues  In addition to submitting comments in response to NTIA and NIST requests and participating in their forums, multiple organizations issued their own sets of principles or guidelines, some referencing the EU GDPR  The U S  Chamber of Commerce has also published model privacy legislation for Congress to consider  Though they vary in emphasis, these proposals share common themes: transparency on what data is being collected and how it is being used; user control, including the ability to opt out of sharing at least some information and to access and correct personal data collected; data security measures, like data breach notification requirements; and enforcement by the FTC; FTC commissioners also voiced support for the agency as the appropriate federal enforcer for consumer privacy  But these groups also differ in some areas, such as whether, or to what extent, to include certain aspects included in the GDPR, such as the right to deletion (so-called "right to be forgotten"), requirements for data minimization, or extraterritorial reach  There is not consensus on whether the FTC should be given rule-making authority or additional resources, the enforcement role of states, or if an independent data protection commission is needed similar to EU DPAs  Consistent with U S  trade policy, industry groups generally point out the need to be flexible, encourage private-sector innovation, establish sector- and technology-neutral rules, create international interoperability between privacy regimes, and facilitate cross-border data flows  Private-sector stakeholders generally want to avoid what they regard as overregulation or high compliance burdens  These groups emphasize risk management and a harm-based approach, which they state keeps an organization's costs proportional to the consumer harm prevented  On the other hand, some consumer advocates point to a need for baseline obligations to protect against discrimination, disinformation, or other harm  In general, consumer advocates believe that any comprehensive federal privacy policy should complement, and not supplant, sector-specific privacy legislation or state-level legislation  Finding a global consensus on how to balance open data flows and privacy protection may be key to maintaining trust in the digital environment and advancing international trade  One study found that over 120 countries have laws related to personal data protection  Divergent national privacy approaches raise the costs of doing business and make it harder for governments to collaborate and share data, whether for scientific research, defense, or law enforcement  A system for global interoperability in a least trade-restrictive and nondiscriminatory way between different national systems could help minimize costs and allow entities in different jurisdictions with varying online privacy regimes to share data via cross-border data flows  Such a system could help avoid fragmentation of the internet between European, Chinese, and American spheres, a danger that some analysts have warned against  For example, Figure 2 suggests the potential of an interoperability system that allows data to flow freely between GDPR- and CBPR-certified economies  The OECD guidelines, G-20 principles, APEC CBPR, CPTPP, and USMCA provisions demonstrate an evolving understanding on how to balance cross-border data flows, security, and privacy, to create interoperable policies that can be tailored by countries and avoid fragmentation or the potential exclusion of other countries or regulatory systems  The various trade agreements and initiatives with differing sets of parties may ultimately pave the way for a broader multilateral understanding and eventually lead to more enforceable binding commitments founded on the key WTO principles of nondiscrimination, least trade restrictiveness, and transparency  Congress may consider the trade-related aspects of data flows in trade agreements, including through close examination of these provisions during the congressional debate and consideration of legislation to implement the proposed USMCA  Issues include whether the agreements make progress in meeting TPA's related trade negotiating objectives and if the provisions strike the appropriate balance among public policy objectives  In addition, USTR's specific trade negotiating objectives for future agreements with the EU and Japan include establishing rules to protect cross-border data flows  These future trade negotiations present challenges and provide opportunities for Congress to further engage USTR on the issues and to conduct oversight  Congress may further consider how best to achieve broader consensus on data flows and privacy at the global level  Congress could, for example, conduct additional oversight of current best practice approaches (e g , OECD, APEC) or ongoing negotiations in the WTO on e-commerce to create rules through plurilateral or multilateral agreements  Congress may consider endorsing certain of these efforts to influence international discussions and the engagement of other countries  Congress may want to examine the potential challenges and implications of building a system of interoperability between APEC, CBPR, and the EU GDPR  Related issues are the extent to which the EU is establishing its system as a potential de facto global approach through its trade agreements and other mechanisms, and how U S  and other trade agreements may ultimately provide approaches that could be adopted more globally  Congress may seek to better understand the economic impact of data flows and privacy regimes in other countries related to U S  access to other markets and the extent to which barriers are being put in place that may discriminate against U S  exporters  Congress may examine the lack of reciprocal treatment and limits on U S  firms' access to some foreign markets  Congress may consider the implications of not having a comprehensive national data privacy policy  Will the EU GDPR and China cybersecurity policies become the global norms that other countries follow in the absence of a clear U S  alternative? Congress may enact comprehensive privacy legislation  In considering such action, Congress could investigate and conduct oversight of the Administration's ongoing privacy efforts, including requesting briefings and updates on the NTIA, NIST, and ITA initiatives to provide congressional feedback and direction and ensure they are aligned with U S  trade objectives  Congress may also seek input from other federal agencies  In deliberating a comprehensive U S  policy on personal data privacy, Congress may review the GAO report's findings and conclusions  Congress may also weigh several factors, including: How can U S  trade and domestic policy achieve the appropriate balance to encourage cross-border commerce, economic growth, and innovation, while safeguarding individual privacy and national security? How would a new privacy regime affect U S  consumers and businesses, including large multinationals who must comply with different national privacy regimes and small- and medium-sized enterprises with limited resources and technology expertise? Do U S  agencies have the needed tools to accurately assess the size and scope of cross-border data flows to help analyze the economic impact of different privacy policies, or measure the costs of trade barriers? How should an evolving U S  privacy regime align with U S  trade policy objectives and evolving international standards, such as the OECD Guidelines for privacy and cybersecurity, and should U S  policymakers prioritize interoperability with other international privacy frameworks to avoid further fragmentation of global markets and so-called balkanization of the internet? In addition, there are a host of other policy considerations not directly related to trade 


Report 2:  The Action Plan focuses on capacity building for security personnel in Central America and the Caribbean by Colombian security forces (both Colombian military and police)  To implement the plan, Colombia undertook several hundred activities in cooperation with Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, and between 2013 and 2017 trained almost 17,000 individuals (see Figure 4 )  The Colombian government notes that this program grew dramatically from 34 executed activities in 2013 to 441 activities planned for 2018  Colombia has increasingly trained military and police from other countries both under this partnership and other arrangements, including countries across the globe  According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, around 80% of those trained were from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean  U S  and Colombian officials maintain that the broader effort is designed to export Colombian expertise in combating crime and terrorism while promoting the rule of law and greater bilateral and multilateral law enforcement cooperation  Critics of the effort to "export Colombian security successes" maintain that human rights concerns have not been adequately addressed  Some observers question the portion of these activities that are funded by the U S  government and want to see more transparency  In one analysis of the training, a majority of the training was provided by Colombian National Police rather than the Colombian Army, in such areas as ground, air, maritime, and river interdiction; police testimony; explosives; intelligence operations; psychological operations; and Comando JUNGLA, Colombia's elite counternarcotics police program  Other analysts praise the Colombian training and maintain that U S  assistance provided in this way has helped to improve, professionalize, and expand the Colombian military, making it the region's second largest  As that highly trained military shifts from combating the insurgency and the Colombian National Police take the dominant role in guaranteeing domestic security, Colombia may play a greater role in regional security and even in coalition efforts internationally  In September 2017, President Trump announced that he had considered designating Colombia in noncompliance with U S  counternarcotics requirements, but noted that he had not proceeded with the step in part because of Colombian training efforts to assist others in the region with combating narcotics and related crime  Colombia is a key U S  ally in the region  With diplomatic relations that began in the 19 th century following Colombia's independence from Spain, the countries have enjoyed close and strong ties  Because of Colombia's prominence in the production of illegal drugs, the United States and Colombia forged a close partnership over the past 16 years  Focused initially on counternarcotics, and later counterterrorism, a program called Plan Colombia laid the foundation for a strategic partnership that has broadened to include sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and many other areas of cooperation  Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U S  Congress appropriated more than $10 billion in assistance from U S  State Department and Department of Defense (DOD) accounts to carry out Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies  During this time, Colombia made notable progress combating drug trafficking and terrorist activities and reestablishing government control over much of its territory  Its economic and social policies have reduced the poverty rate and its security policies have lowered the homicide rate  Counternarcotics policy has been the defining issue in U S -Colombian relations since the 1980s because of Colombia's preeminence as a source country for illicit drugs  Peru and Bolivia were the main global producers of cocaine in the 1980s and early 1990s  However, successful efforts there in reducing supply pushed cocaine production from those countries to Colombia, which soon surpassed both its Andean neighbors  The FARC and other armed groups in the country financed themselves primarily through narcotics trafficking, and that lucrative illicit trade provided the gasoline for the decades-long internal armed conflict at least since the 1990s  Colombia emerged to dominate the cocaine trade by the late 1990s  National concern about the crack cocaine epidemic and extensive drug use in the United States led to greater concern with Colombia as a source  As Colombia became the largest producer of coca leaf and the largest exporter of finished cocaine, heroin produced from Colombian-grown poppies was supplying a growing proportion of the U S  market  Alarm over the volumes of heroin and cocaine being exported to the United States was a driving force behind U S  support for Plan Colombia at its inception  The evolution of Plan Colombia took place under changing leadership and changing conditions in both the United States and Colombia  Plan Colombia was followed by successor strategies such as the National Consolidation Plan, described below, and U S -Colombia policy has reached a new phase anticipating post-conflict Colombia  Announced in 1999, Plan Colombia originally was a six-year strategy to end the country's decades-long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote development  The counternarcotics and security strategy was developed by the government of President Andrés Pastrana in consultation with U S  officials  Colombia and its allies in the United States realized that for the nation to gain control of drug trafficking required a stronger security presence, the rebuilding of institutions, and extending state presence where it was weak or nonexistent  Initially, the U S  policy focus was on programs to reduce the production of illicit drugs  U S  support to Plan Colombia consisted of training and equipping counternarcotics battalions in the Colombian Army and specialized units of the Colombian National Police, drug eradication programs, alternative development, and other supply reduction programs  The original 1999 plan had a goal to reduce "the cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50%" over the plan's six-year timeframe  The means to achieve this ambitious goal were a special focus on eradication and alternative development; strengthening, equipping, and professionalizing the Colombian Armed Forces and the police; strengthening the judiciary; and fighting corruption  Other objectives were to protect citizens from violence, promote human rights, bolster the economy, and improve governance  U S  officials expressed their support for the program by emphasizing its counterdrug elements (including interdiction)  The focus on counternarcotics was the basis for building bipartisan support to fund the program in the U S  Congress because some Members of Congress were leery of involvement in fighting a counterinsurgency, which they likened to the "slippery slope" of the war in Vietnam  President George W  Bush came to office in 2001 and oversaw some changes to Plan Colombia  The primary vehicle for providing U S  support to Plan Colombia was the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, which was included in foreign operations appropriations  The Bush Administration requested new flexibility so that U S -provided assistance would back a "unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to [Colombia's] national security" due to the breakdown of peace talks between the FARC and the Pastrana government in February 2002  Congress granted this request for a unified campaign to fight drug trafficking and terrorist organizations as Members of Congress came to realize how deeply intertwined the activities of Colombia's terrorist groups were with the illicit drug trade that funded them  However, Congress prohibited U S  personnel from directly participating in combat missions  Congress placed a legislative cap on the number of U S  military and civilian contractor personnel who could be stationed in Colombia, although the cap was adjusted to meet needs over time  The current limit (first specified in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended) caps total military personnel at 800 and civilian contractors at 600, although numbers deployed have been far below the 1,400-person cap for years and now total fewer than 200  President Uribe (2002-2010) embraced Plan Colombia with an aggressive strategy toward the insurgent forces that prioritized citizen security  His Democratic Security Policy, implemented first in a military campaign called Plan Patriota, relied on the military to push FARC forces away from the major cities to remote rural areas and the borderlands  Like his predecessor, President Pastrana, Uribe continued to expand the Colombian military and police  He enhanced the intelligence capacity, professionalization, and coordination of the forces, in part with training provided by U S  forces  His strategy resulted in expanded state control over national territory and a significant reduction in kidnappings, terrorist attacks, and homicides  In 2007, the Uribe administration announced a shift to a "Policy of Consolidation of Democratic Security " The new doctrine was based on a "whole-of-government" approach to consolidate state presence in marginal areas that were historically neglected—vulnerable to drug crop cultivation, violence, and control by illegal armed groups  Called a strategic leap forward by then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, in 2009 the new strategy came to be called the National Consolidation Plan (see below)  Colombian support for Plan Colombia and for the nation's security program grew under Uribe's leadership  President Uribe levied a "wealth tax" to fund Colombia's security efforts, taxing the wealthiest taxpayers to fund growing defense and security expenditures  Overall U S  expenditures on Plan Colombia were only a modest portion of what Colombians spent on their own security  By one 2009 estimate, U S  expenditures were not more than 10% of what Colombians invested in their total security costs  In 2000, Colombia devoted less than 2% of its GDP to military and police expenditures and in 2010 that investment had grown to more than 4% of GDP  One assessment notes "in the end there is no substitute for host country dedication and funding" to turn around a security crisis such as Colombia faced at the beginning of the millennium  In 2008, congressional support for Plan Colombia and its successor programs also shifted  Some Members of Congress believed that the balance of programming was too heavily weighted toward security  Prior to 2008, the emphasis had been on "hard side" security assistance (to the military and police) compared with "soft side" traditional development and rule of law programs  Members debated if the roughly 75%/25% mix should be realigned  Since FY2008, Congress has reduced the proportion of assistance for security-related programs and increased the proportion for economic and social aid  As Colombia's security situation improved and Colombia's economy recovered, the United States also began turning over to Colombians operational and financial responsibility for efforts formerly funded by the U S  government  The Colombian government "nationalized" the training, equipping, and support for Colombian military programs, such as the counterdrug brigade, Colombian Army aviation, and the air bridge denial program  U S  funding overall began to decline  The nationalization efforts were not intended to end U S  assistance, but rather to gradually reduce it to pre-Plan Colombia levels, adjusted for inflation  A key goal of Plan Colombia was to reduce the supply of illegal drugs produced and exported by Colombia but the goals became broader over time  Bipartisan support for the policy existed through three U S  Administrations—President Bill Clinton, President George W  Bush, and President Barack Obama  Plan Colombia came to be viewed by some analysts as one of the most enduring and effective U S  policy initiatives in the Western Hemisphere  Some have lauded the strategy as a model  In 2009, William Brownfield, then-U S  Ambassador to Colombia, described Plan Colombia as "the most successful nation-building exercise that the United States has associated itself with perhaps in the last 25-30 years " Other observers, however, were critical of the policy as it unfolded  Many in the NGO and human rights community maintained the strategy, with its emphasis on militarization and security, was inadequate for solving Colombia's persistent, underlying problems of rural violence, poverty, neglect and institutional weakness  Nevertheless, it appears that improvements in security conditions have been accompanied by substantial economic growth and a reduction in poverty levels over time  The National Consolidation Plan first launched during the Uribe Administration, (renamed the National Plan for Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction), was designed to coordinate government efforts in regions where marginalization, drug trafficking, and violence converge  The whole-of-government consolidation was to integrate security, development, and counternarcotics to achieve a permanent state presence in vulnerable areas  Once security forces took control of a contested area, government agencies in housing, education, and development would regularize the presence of the state and reintegrate the municipalities of these marginalized zones into Colombia  The plan had been restructured several times by the Santos government  The United States supported the Colombian government's consolidation strategy through an inter-agency program called the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI)  CSDI provided U S  assistance to "fill gaps" in Colombian government programming  At the U S  Embassy in Colombia, CSDI coordinated efforts of the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department's Narcotics Affairs Section, the U S  Military Group, and the Department of Justice to assist Colombia in carrying out the consolidation plan by expanding state presence and promoting economic opportunities in priority zones  It combined traditional counternarcotics assistance for eradication, interdiction, alternative development, and capacity building for the police, military, and justice sector institutions with other economic and social development initiatives  As the peace agreement between the FARC and the government moved forward into implementation, the focus of U S  assistance to Colombia has shifted again  With a foundation of the work done to advance consolidation, U S  assistance has begun to aid in post-conflict planning and support Colombia's transition to peace by building up democratic institutions, protecting human rights and racial and ethnic minorities, and promoting economic opportunity  USAID's country cooperation strategy for 2014-2018 anticipated the Colombian government reaching a negotiated agreement with the FARC, but remained flexible if an agreement was not signed  It recognized early implementation efforts, especially in the first 24 months after signature, would be critical to demonstrate or model effective practices  In the next five years, it envisioned Colombia evolving from aid recipient to provider of technical assistance to neighbors in the region  Consolidating state authority and presence in the rural areas with weak institutions remains a significant challenge following the FARC's disarmament in the summer of 2017  Reintegration of the FARC and possibly other insurgent forces, such as the ELN, will be expensive and delicate  In particular, critics of the consolidation efforts of the Colombian government maintain that the Santos administration often lacked the commitment to hand off targeted areas from the military to civilian-led development and achieve locally led democratic governance  Consolidation efforts suffered from low political support, disorganization at the top levels of government, and failure to administer national budgets effectively in more remote areas, among other challenges  In August 2018, shortly after President Duque took office, USAID announced a framework of priorities for U S  economic development assistance to Colombia  Some of these priorities include promoting and supporting a whole-of-government strategy to include the dismantling of organized crime; increasing the effectiveness of Colombia's security and criminal justice institutions; promoting enhanced prosperity and job creation through trade; improving the investment climate for U S  companies; and advancing Colombia's capacity to strengthen governance and transition to sustainable peace, including reconciliation among victims, ex-combatants, and other citizens  The U S  Congress initially approved legislation in support of Plan Colombia in 2000, as part of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001 ( P L  106-246 )  Plan Colombia was never authorized by Congress, but it was funded annually through appropriations  From FY2000 through FY2016, U S  funding for Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies exceeded $10 billion in State Department and Defense Department programs  From FY2000 to FY2009, the United States provided foreign operations assistance to Colombia through the Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) account, formerly known as the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, and other aid accounts  In FY2008, Congress continued to fund eradication and interdiction programs through the ACP account, but funded alternative development and institution building programs through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account  In the FY2010 request, the Obama Administration shifted ACP funds into the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account  Since FY2008, U S  assistance has gradually declined because of tighter foreign aid budgets and nationalized Plan Colombia-related programs  In FY2014, in line with other foreign assistance reductions, funds appropriated to Colombia from State Department accounts declined to slightly below $325 million  In FY2015, Congress appropriated $300 million for bilateral assistance to Colombia in foreign operation  The FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations bill ( P L  114-113 ) provided Colombia from U S  State Department and U S  Agency for International Development accounts, slightly under $300 million, nearly identical to that appropriated in FY2015 (without P L  480, the Food for Peace account, the total for FY2016 was $293 million as shown in Table 1 )  In FY2017, Congress funded a program the Obama Administration had proposed called "Peace Colombia" to re-balance U S  assistance to support the peace process and implementation of the accord  In May 2017, Congress approved a FY2017 omnibus appropriations measure, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P L  115-31 ), which funded the various programs of Peace Colombia at $391 3 million  In the FY2017 legislation, Congress appropriated the following: The ESF account increased to $187 million (from $134 million in FY2016) to build government presence, encourage crop substitution to replace drug crops, and provide other assistance to conflict victims, including Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities  However, only $180 million was subsequently allocated  INCLE funding increased to $143 million with a focus on manual eradication of coca crops, support for the Colombian National Police, and judicial reform efforts  INCLE funding also included $10 million for Colombian forces' training to counterparts in other countries  $38 5 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF); and $21 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), which was a relatively large increase from under $4 million in FY2016 to focus on the demining effort  How the Trump Administration will engage with the issues of supporting post-conflict stability in Colombia has not been clearly defined by either the State Department or other executive departments  For example, the Trump Administration's proposed foreign aid budget for FY2018 would have reduced assistance to Colombia to $251 million  However, the FY2018 omnibus appropriations measure, approved by Congress in March 2018 ( P L  115-114 ), again included $391 3 million to support Colombia's transition to peace  The Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request for Colombia is $265 million, approximately a 32% reduction from the $391 3 million appropriated by Congress in FY2018  However, the House and Senate appropriations bills, H R  6385 and S  3108 , again would support the funding level of $391 3 million  The FY2019 Administration request would reduce post-conflict recovery programs and place greater emphasis on counternarcotics and security  Below, Table 1 provides account data from the annual international affairs congressional budget justification documents  The information about DOD-funded programs was provided to the Congressional Research Service by DOD analysts in December 2015 and October 2017 (and has not been updated)  The breakout of DOD assistance to Colombia is shown in Table 2     Colombia also has received additional U S  humanitarian funding to help it cope with more than 1 million Venezuelan migrants  As of September 30, 2018, U S  government humanitarian funding for the Venezuela response totaled approximately $96 5 million for both FY2017 and FY2018 combined, of which $54 8 million was for Colombia  (Humanitarian funding is drawn primarily from the global humanitarian accounts in annual Department of State/Foreign Operations appropriations acts ) In addition, the U S  Navy hospital ship USNS Comfort is on an 11-week medical support mission deployed through the end of 2018 to work with government partners, in part to assist with arrivals from Venezuela  In Colombia, the U S  response aims to help the Venezuelan arrivals as well as the local Colombian communities that are hosting them  In addition to humanitarian assistance, the United States is providing $37 million in bilateral assistance to support medium- and longer-term efforts by Colombia  Some Members of Congress have been deeply concerned about human rights violations in Colombia—especially those perpetrated by any recipients or potential recipients of U S  assistance  In Colombia's multisided, 50-year conflict, the FARC and ELN, the paramilitaries and their successors, and Colombia's security forces have all committed serious violations  Colombians have endured generations of noncombatant killings, massacres, kidnappings, forced displacements, forced disappearances, land mine casualties, and acts of violence that violate international humanitarian law  The extent of the crimes and the backlog of human rights cases to be prosecuted have overwhelmed the Colombian judiciary, which some describe as "inefficient" and overburdened  The United Nations and many human rights groups maintain that although some prosecutions have gone forward, most remain unresolved and the backlog of cases has been reduced slowly  In addition to the problem of impunity for such serious crimes, continued violations remain an issue  Since 2002, Congress has required in the annual foreign operations appropriations legislation that the Secretary of State certify annually to Congress that the Colombian military is severing ties to paramilitaries and that the government is investigating complaints of human rights abuses and meeting other human rights statutory criteria  (The certification criteria have evolved over time  ) For several years, certification was required before 30% of funds to the Colombian military could be released  The FY2014 appropriations legislation requires that 25% of funding under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program be held back pending certification by the Secretary of State  Some human rights groups have criticized the regular certification of Colombia, maintaining that evidence they have presented to the State Department has contradicted U S  findings  However, even some critics have acknowledged the human rights conditions on military assistance to Colombia to be "a flawed but useful tool" because the certification process requires that the U S  government regularly consult with Colombian and international human rights groups  Critics acknowledge that over time, conditionality can improve human rights compliance  Additional tools for monitoring human rights compliance by Colombian security forces receiving U S  assistance are the so-called "Leahy Law" restrictions, which Congress first passed in the late 1990s prior to the outset of Plan Colombia  First introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, these provisions deny U S  assistance to a foreign country's security forces if the U S  Secretary of State has credible information that such units have committed "a gross violation of human rights " The provisions apply to security assistance provided by the State Department and DOD  The Leahy Law under the State Department is authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and is codified at 22 U S C  2378d (§520M of the FAA)  The DOD Leahy provisions, which for years applied just to DOD training, now include a broader range of assistance, as modified in the FY2014 appropriations legislation  The provision related to the Leahy Laws for DOD assistance is codified at 10 U S C  362, and prohibits "any training, equipment, or other assistance," to a foreign security force unit if there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights  Both the State Department and DOD Leahy provisions require the State Department to review and clear—or vet—foreign security forces to determine if any individual or unit is credibly believed to be guilty of a gross human rights violation  Leahy vetting is typically conducted by U S  embassies and State Department headquarters  Reportedly on an annual basis about 1% of foreign security forces are disqualified from receiving assistance under the Leahy provisions, although many more are affected by administrative issues and are denied assistance until those conditions are resolved  Tainted security force units that are denied assistance may be remediated or cleared, but the procedures for remediation differ slightly between the DOD and State (or FAA) provisions  Because of the large amount of security assistance provided to Colombian forces (including the military and police), the State Department reportedly vets more candidates for assistance in Colombia than in any other country  In the late 1990s, poor human rights conditions in Colombia were a driving concern for developing the Leahy Law provisions  The U S  Embassy in Bogotá, with nearly two decades of experience in its vetting operations, has been cited as a source of best practices for other embassies seeking to bring their operations into compliance or enhance their performance  State Department officials have cited Colombia as a model operation that has helped Colombia to improve its human rights compliance  However, some human rights organizations are critical of the Leahy vetting process in Colombia, and cite the prevalence of extrajudicial executions allegedly committed by Colombian military units as evidence that these restrictions on U S  assistance have failed to remove human rights violators from the Colombian military  A human rights nongovernmental organization, Fellowship of Reconciliation, has published reports alleging an association between false positive killings and Colombian military units vetted by the State Department to receive U S  assistance  However, some have questioned the group's methodology  Some human rights organizations contend that the U S  government has tolerated abusive behavior by Colombian security forces without taking action or withholding assistance  Measured exclusively in counternarcotics terms, Plan Colombia has been a mixed success  Colombia remains the dominant producer of cocaine and in the DEA's National Drug Threat Assessment for 2017 continued to be the source for 95% of cocaine seized in the United States  Enforcement, eradication, and improved security squeezed production in Colombia, so that in 2012, Peru reemerged as the global leader in cocaine production, surpassing Colombia, for a year or so  In the early 2000s, given Colombia's predominance as the source of cocaine destined for U S  markets and its status as the second-largest producer of heroin consumed in the United States, eradication of coca bush and opium poppy (from which heroin is derived) was an urgent priority and became the preferred tool for controlling the production of these drugs  Another critical component of the drug supply reduction effort was alternative development programs funded by the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID) to assist illicit crop cultivators with transitioning to licit crop production and livelihoods  Analysts have long debated how effective Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies were in combating illegal drugs  Although Plan Colombia failed to meet its goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illicit drugs by 50% in its original six-year time frame, Colombia has sustained significant reductions in coca cultivation in recent years  According to U S  estimates, cultivation of coca declined from 167,000 hectares in 2007 to 78,000 hectares in 2012  (Poppy cultivation declined by more than 90% between 2000 and 2009 ) According to U S  government estimates, Colombia's potential production of pure cocaine fell to 170 metric tons in 2012, the lowest level in two decades  However, it started to rise slightly in 2013, and more dramatically in 2014 through 2016  In those years, cultivation of coca and production of cocaine grew significantly in part due to ending the aerial eradication of coca crops  In 2015, following a U N  agency determination that the herbicide used to spray coca crops was probably carcinogenic, Colombia's minister of health determined that aerial eradication of coca was not consistent with requirements of Colombia's Constitutional Court  In 2016, as noted above, the U S  DEA reported that 95% of cocaine seized in the United States originated in Colombia  According to U S  Office of National Drug Control Policy, Colombia in 2017 cultivated an unprecedented 209,000 hectares of coca, from which cocaine is derived, capable of generating 921 metric tons of cocaine  The United Nations estimates for 2017, which typically differ in quantity but follow the same trends as U S  estimates, maintained that Colombia's potential production of cocaine reached nearly 1,370 metric tons, 31% above its 2016 estimate  Even with Colombia's economic stability and improving security, cocaine exports (primarily to the U S  market) remain a major concern for U S  lawmakers  However, in drug interdiction, Colombia has set records for many years and is considered a strong and reliable U S  partner  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ( Table 4 ), shows Colombia cultivating 146,000 hectares of coca in 2016, a 52% increase over 2015 and another increase to 171,000 hectares, a 17% increase, in 2017  Although cocaine seizures were quite high in both years, the interdiction of cocaine was insufficient to counter the large increases in production  Both manual eradication and aerial eradication were central components of Plan Colombia to reduce coca and poppy cultivation  Manual eradication is conducted by teams, usually security personnel, who uproot and kill the plant  Aerial eradication involves spraying the plants from aircraft with an herbicide mixture to destroy the drug crop, but it may not kill the plants  In the context of Colombia's continuing internal conflict, manual eradication was far more dangerous than aerial spraying  U S  and Colombian policymakers recognized the dangers of manual eradication and, therefore, employed large-scale aerial spray campaigns to reduce coca crop yields, especially from large coca plantations  Colombia is the only country globally that aerially sprayed its illicit crops, and the practice has been controversial for health and environmental reasons, resulting in a Colombian decision to end aerial eradication in 2015  Since 2002, as a condition of fully funding the spraying program, Congress has regularly directed the State Department, after study and consultation with the U S  Environmental Protection Agency and other relevant agencies, to certify that the spraying did not "pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment " This certification requirement was included most years in the annual foreign operations appropriations legislation  Some analysts have also raised questions about the monetary and collateral costs of aerial eradication compared with other drug supply control strategies, its effectiveness, and its limited effect on the U S  retail price of cocaine  U S  State Department officials attribute Colombia's decline in coca cultivation after 2007 and prior to 2013 to the persistent aerial eradication of drug crops in tandem with manual eradication where viable  Between 2009 and 2013, Colombia aerially sprayed roughly 100,000 hectares annually  In 2013, however, eradication efforts declined  Colombia aerially eradicated roughly 47,000 hectares  It manually eradicated 22,120 hectares, short of the goal of 38,500 hectares  This reduction had a number of causes: the U S -supported spray program was suspended in October 2013 after two U S  contract pilots were shot down, rural protests in Colombia hindered manual and aerial eradication efforts, and security challenges limited manual eradicators working in border areas  In late 2013, Ecuador won an out-of-court settlement in a case filed in 2008 before the International Court of Justice in The Hague for the negative effects of spray drift over its border with Colombia  In negotiations with the FARC, the government and the FARC provisionally agreed in May 2014 that voluntary manual eradication would be prioritized over forced eradication  Aerial eradication remained a viable tool in the government's drug control strategy, according to the agreement, but would be permitted only if voluntary and manual eradication could not be conducted safely  In April 2015, the Santos administration determined that glyphosate, a broad-spectrum, nonselective herbicide used commercially, but in Colombia sprayed on coca plants to eradicate them, was "probably carcinogenic" to humans in a review published by a World Health Organization (WHO) affiliate  In October 2015, the government ended spraying operations and began to implement a new public health approach toward illicit drugs, one that proponents suggested would reduce human rights violations  On the supply side, Colombia's new drug policy gives significant attention to expanding alternative development and licit crop substitution while intensifying interdiction efforts  The State Department in its 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), however, warned that illicit cultivation was expanding in areas long off-limits to aerial spraying, including national parks, a buffer zone with Ecuador where aerial eradication has been restricted, and in indigenous or protected Afro-Colombian territories  Colombian interdiction practices are deemed some of the most effective in the world  The Colombian government reported seizing more than 207 metric tons (mt) of cocaine base in 2014 and that seizure total doubled by 2017 with capture of 442 mt of cocaine  According to the U S  State Department's 2018 INCSR , Colombia also seized 197 mt of marijuana, 348 kilograms of heroin, and destroyed more than 3,400 cocaine base and hydrochloride labs  USAID funds and runs alternative development programs in Colombia to assist communities with transitioning from a dependency on illicit crops to licit employment and livelihoods  Alternative development was once focused narrowly on crop substitution and assistance with infrastructure and marketing  Since the Colombian government's shift to a consolidation strategy, USAID has supported "consolidation and livelihoods" programming in 40 of the 58 strategically located, conflict-affected municipalities targeted by the government's National Consolidation Plan  To facilitate economic development, USAID funds initiatives that assist farmers and others with shifting from coca growing to licit economic opportunities  These programs are designed to strengthen small farmer producer organizations, improve their productivity, and connect them to markets  Some observers maintain that poor and unsustainable outcomes from alternative development programs while the Colombian conflict was still under way resulted from ongoing insecurity and lack of timeliness or sequencing of program elements  The renewed commitment to alternative development and crop substitution in the 2016 peace accord with the FARC may be similarly challenged  Formal implementation of the peace accord on drug eradication and crop substitution began in late May 2017 with collective agreements committing communities to replace their coca crops with licit crops  In some regions, the program is extended to families who cultivate coca and also to producers of legal crops and landless harvesters  The Colombian government also committed to a combined approach of both voluntary and forced manual eradication  The government's goal set for 2017 was eradicating 100,000 hectares of coca, 50,000 through forced manual eradication and 50,000 through "crop substitution" accords reached with coca farming households who would voluntary eradicate  At the U S -Colombia High Level Dialogue held in Bogotá in March 2018, a renewed commitment to the enduring partnership between the United States and Colombia was announced  A major outcome was a U S -Colombia pledge to reduce illegal narcotics trafficking through expanded counternarcotics cooperation  The new goal set was to reduce Colombia's estimated cocaine production and coca cultivation to 50% of current levels by 2023  In addition, a memorandum of understanding was signed to combat the illegal gold mining that funds transnational criminal organizations  Although President Duque appears determined to pursue a more aggressive approach to drug policy, he has not clearly stated how his approach to counternarcotics will differ from that of his predecessor  The government may restart aerial eradication, a strategy that ended in 2015 due to the Colombian Health Ministry's concerns over cancer-causing potential of the herbicide glyphosate, but no precise plans for restarting the program have been announced in the Duque Administration's first three months in office  Experimentation with delivering glyphosate by drones (rather than planes) began in June 2018 under the Santos Administration and is continuing under the Duque government  On October 1, 2018, President Duque authorized police to confiscate and destroy any quantity of drugs found on persons in possession of them, resulting in the seizure of more than 7 metric tons of drugs in less than two weeks  This enforcement measure may violate a 1994 Colombian Constitutional Court ruling, however, in which Colombians may carry small doses of drugs for personal use, including marijuana, hashish, and cocaine  Several court challenges have been filed that seek to nullify the Duque decree on constitutional grounds of protected personal use  Drug trafficking continues to trigger conflict over land in Colombia while affecting the most vulnerable groups, including Afro-Colombian, peasant, and indigenous populations  Some analysts warn that national and international pressure for drug eradication could also lead to increased human rights violations, including health consequences by reviving aerial spraying of drug crops and government actions to forcibly break up demonstrations by coca producers who resist eradication  Some analysts have advocated that investments to lower drug supply need to go beyond eradication, which has not been a lasting approach to reducing drug crop cultivation  For instance, the government could provide economic and education opportunities to at-risk youth to enhance their role in peace building and to prevent their recruitment into the drug trade and other illegal activity  Economic relations between Colombia and the United States have deepened  The U S -Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force in May 2012  By 2020, it will phase out all tariffs and other barriers to bilateral trade between Colombia and the United States, its largest trade partner  Since the U S -Colombia FTA went into force, the stock of U S  investment in Colombia surpassed $7 billion in 2014 but dropped to $6 2 billion in 2016 (on a historical cost basis), concentrated mostly in mining and manufacturing  According to the U S  Department of Commerce, U S  exports to Colombia exceeded $26 8 billion in 2016 and Colombia was the 22 nd -largest market for U S  exports; however, U S  imports from Colombia declined between 2015 and 2016  Major U S  exports to Colombia include oil (noncrude oil products including gasoline), machinery, cereals, organic chemicals, and plastic  Because 65% of U S  imports from Colombia are crude oil imports, much of the decline in value was caused by the sharp fall in oil prices that began in 2014  Major U S  imports beside crude oil, include gold, coffee, cut flowers, and fruits  Congressional interest in Colombia now extends far beyond security and counternarcotics and has grown in the area of bilateral trade following implementation of the U S -Colombia FTA, (also known at the U S -Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement)  Colombia is a founding member of the Pacific Alliance, along with Chile, Mexico, and Peru, and has sought to deepen trade integration and cross-border investment with its partners in the alliance while reducing trade barriers  The Pacific Alliance aims to go further by creating a common stock market, allowing for the eventual free movement of businesses and persons, and serving as an export platform to the Asia-Pacific region  Colombia's leadership role in the Pacific Alliance and Colombia's accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in May 2018, following a review of the country's macroeconomic policies and changes, are major new developments  The accession to the OECD was approved by Colombia's lower house in October 2018 and the Senate in November 2018, but it remained under final review by Colombia's Constitutional Court in early February 2019  The Santos administration pushed to meet the criteria required for OECD membership because it maintained that such recognition signified Colombia's attainment of world-class development standards and policies  Colombia has made progress on trade issues such as copyright, pharmaceuticals, fuel and trucking regulations, and labor concerns (including subcontracting methods and progress on resolving cases of violence against union activists)  Congress remains interested in Colombia's future because the country has become one of the United States' closest allies  With 17 years of investment in Colombia's security and stability, some maintain that there has already been a strong return on U S  investment  Plan Colombia and its successor strategies broadened from counternarcotics to include humanitarian concerns, efforts to bolster democratic development and human rights protections, and trade and investment to spark growth  The record expansion of Colombia's coca crop and increasing cocaine exports to the United States, however, may significantly hinder the effort to consolidate peace in Colombia and could potentially increase corruption and extortion  A significant portion of the Colombian public remains skeptical of the peace process and the FARC's role in Colombia's democracy  Other Colombians maintain that support for peace programs in Colombia is important not only to benefit former FARC or other demobilized combatants but also to fulfill promises the government made in the peace accords to the country's 8 6 million victims of the five-decade conflict  As President Duque concluded his first 100 days in office, his government faced overlapping challenges: (1) an upsurge in illicit drug crops, which had set records in 2016 and 2017; (2) implementation of provisions of the peace accord negotiated by former president Santos but marred by slow implementation, attacks on land and human rights activists, and projected budgetary shortfalls; (3) renewed violent competition among criminal groups in rural areas, some of which reportedly are sheltering in Venezuela; and (4) Venezuela's humanitarian crisis, which resulted in a surge of migrants fleeing to or through Colombia  The annual level of foreign assistance provided by the U S  Congress for Colombia began to decline in FY2008 and then gradually increased in FY2017 and FY2018 to support peace and implementation of the FARC-government peace accord  Some Members of Congress may want to build on cooperation with Colombian partners to continue to train Central Americans and other third-country nationals in counternarcotics and security, including programs in citizen security, crime prevention and monitoring, military and police capacity building, and hostage negotiation and cybersecurity  Congress may continue to closely monitor Colombia's domestic security situation  It also may continue to oversee issues such as drug trafficking; Colombia's effort to combat other illegal armed groups such as Bacrim; the status of human rights protections; and the expansion of health, economic, environmental, energy, and educational cooperation  Congress may seek to foster Colombian leadership in the region to counter growing political instability in Venezuela  The U S  Congress has been interested in expanding investment and trade opportunities both bilaterally with Colombia and within regional groupings, such as the Pacific Alliance  Some analysts contend that U S -Colombian trade improvements rest on the strength of the overall relationship between Colombia and the United States  

ground_truth: The federal government owns billions of dollars of personal property—such as office furniture, scientific equipment, and industrial machinery. By law, each agency is required to follow GSA's disposal process so that an agency's unneeded property can be used by other agencies or certain non-federal entities. Since 2012, agencies have reduced their office and warehouse space due to government-wide initiatives, a reduction that in turn has required agencies to dispose of some affected personal property. GAO was asked to review how federal agencies identify and dispose of unneeded personal property. This report examines (1) how selected agencies assess whether personal property is needed and (2) how these agencies dispose of unneeded property and how, if at all, space reduction efforts have affected disposals. GAO reviewed federal statutes and regulations, and selected five agencies—EPA, Forest Service, GSA, HUD, and IRS—mainly based on space reduction results and goals. GAO reviewed these agencies' property disposal data for 2012 through 2016 and interviewed headquarters and field staff about their property management and disposal processes. The five agencies GAO reviewed—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Forest Service, General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS)—generally do not have policies or processes for identifying unneeded personal property, such as office furniture, on a proactive basis. Instead, officials from these agencies said they typically identified unneeded property as a result of a “triggering event,” such as an office space reduction. Executive agencies are required by law to continuously review property under their control to identify unneeded personal property and then dispose of it promptly. Without such policies or processes, agencies may not be routinely identifying unneeded property that could be used elsewhere, and efforts to maximize federal personal property use and minimize unnecessary storage costs may not be effective. GSA has issued regulations establishing a government-wide disposal process for unneeded personal property. However, according to GSA officials, the agency lacks the authority to promulgate regulations or formal guidance on management of in-use agency property, and there is no government-wide guidance to agencies on identifying unneeded personal property. Agencies are required to have internal control activities—such as policies and procedures—for reasonable assurance of efficient operations and minimal resource waste, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides guidance to agencies on implementing such activities. Guidance from OMB that emphasizes agencies' internal control responsibilities could help ensure that agencies are proactively and regularly identifying property that is no longer needed. The selected agencies reported little difficulty in following GSA's personal property disposal process, reporting over 37,000 items as unneeded property in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. This property was disposed of through transfers to other agencies, donations to authorized recipients, sales, or discarding. When disposing of personal property from space reduction projects at locations GAO visited, agencies also reported using GSA's process (see figure). Overall, agencies said they have not experienced major challenges with disposing of personal property from space reduction efforts. This lack of challenges could be because projects are geographically dispersed and spread over several years. OMB should provide guidance to executive agencies on managing their personal property, emphasizing that agencies' policies or processes should reflect the requirement to continuously review and identify unneeded personal property. OMB did not comment on GAO's recommendation.