prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Since its founding in 2006, the National Popular Vote (NPV) initiative has promoted an agreement among the states, an interstate compact that would effectively establish direct popular election of the President and Vice President without a constitutional amendment, while retaining the structure of the electoral college system  The United States is unique among "presidential" republics by providing an indirect election to choose its chief executive  The President and Vice President of the United States are selected not by registered voters, but by the electoral college, electors appointed in the states "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct     " Alexander Hamilton, who was "present at the creation" of the Constitution in 1787, commented favorably on the electoral college system in The Federalist : The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents     I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent  It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages the union of which was to be wished for  Notwithstanding Hamilton's endorsement, the first proposal to change the electoral college system by constitutional amendment was introduced as early as 1800, and since that time more than 700 proposals to reform or eliminate the college have been introduced in Congress  Reform advocates have long focused on the fact that it does not provide for direct democratic election, that less-populous states are afforded an arithmetical advantage due to the assignment of two electors to each state, regardless of population, and that the winner-take-all system makes it possible for candidates to win an electoral college majority and the presidency, while gaining fewer votes than their principal opponents in the popular election  Between 1949 and 1979, Congress considered amendments to reform the electoral college, or replace it with direct popular election, in committee and on the floor of both chambers  Proposed amendments must, however, meet the requirements of the Constitution's Article V, which calls for two-thirds approval by both houses of Congress, and ratification by three-fourths of the states; to date, no electoral college reform proposal has met these requirements  Proponents of the National Popular Vote initiative contend that their plan will achieve direct popular election while circumventing the requirements of Article V, and will guarantee that the popular vote winners will always be elected President and Vice President  The fundamentals of the electoral college system were established by Article II, Section 1 of the U S  Constitution, and subsequently revised by the Twelfth Amendment  The Constitution's minimal provisions have been complemented over the past two centuries by a range of federal and state laws, political party procedures, and enduring political traditions, leading to the system as it exists today  The salient features of the contemporary system are detailed below  The electors are collectively known as the electoral college; although this phrase does not appear in the Constitution, it gained currency in the early days of the republic, and was recognized in federal law in 1845  The electoral college has no continuing existence; its sole purpose is to elect the President and Vice President  Each state is allocated a number of electors equal to the combined total of its U S  Senate and House of Representatives delegations  The District of Columbia is also allocated three electors  At present, the total is 538, reflecting the combined size of the Senate (100 Members), the House (435 Members), and the District of Columbia electors  Any person may serve as an elector, except Senators and Representatives, or any other person holding an office of "trust or profit" under the United States  Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution empowers the states to "appoint [electors], in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct     " This grant of authority provides the constitutional basis claimed for the NPV initiative  In practice, all states currently provide for popular election of their electoral college delegations  Candidates for the office of elector are nominated by political parties and other groups on the presidential ballot in each state  In most cases, the candidates for the office of elector are nominated by the state party committee or the party's statewide convention  The winning presidential nominees must gain a national majority of 270 or more electoral votes, out of the 538 total, in order to be elected  If no ticket of candidates attains a majority, then the House of Representatives elects the President, and the Senate the Vice President, in a procedure known as contingent election  Candidates for the office of elector are selected by their respective political parties  They are expected to vote for the presidential and vice presidential candidates to whom they are pledged  Some states seek to require them to so vote by law or other means, but most constitutional scholars hold that the electors remain free agents under the Constitution, and that they may vote for any person they choose  On rare occasions, an elector will vote for a different candidate, or abstain from casting a vote for any candidate; he or she is known as a "faithless elector " The goal of presidential campaigns under the existing system is to win by carrying states that collectively cast a majority of electoral votes  Political parties and presidential campaigns tend to focus on states that are closely contested (widely referred to as "battleground" states), or that have large delegations of electoral votes, or both  Winning a majority of the more populous and/or battleground states is considered crucial to obtaining the necessary electoral vote majority  In 48 states and the District of Columbia, the presidential/vice presidential ticket winning the most popular votes (a plurality or more) in that state is awarded all its electoral votes  That is to say, the winning party's entire ticket of electors is elected  This is referred to as the "winner-take-all" or "general ticket" system  Presidential Election Day is set by law for Tuesday after the first Monday in November every fourth year succeeding the election of President and Vice President  On Presidential Election Day, voters cast one vote for the candidates they support  They are, however, actually voting for the state political party "ticket" of electors supporting those presidential and vice presidential candidates  Presidential electors assemble on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December following the general election  They meet in their respective states, not collectively, and cast separate votes by ballot for the President and Vice President  After the electors vote, the results are sent by the states to Congress and various other federal authorities  On January 6 of the year following a presidential election, Congress meets in a joint session to count the electoral votes and make a formal declaration of which candidates have been elected President and Vice President  A range of factors contributed to the emergence of the National Popular Vote initiative in the first decade of the 21 st century  A major source was frustration by reform advocates after three decades of failed attempts to secure congressional approval for a direct popular election amendment  A more immediate spur was the contentious and disputed presidential election of 2000, which is regarded as having been a major factor contributing to the development of the NPV proposal  One of the factors cited for the emergence of the NPV initiative has been the exacting requirements set by the Constitution for amendments, in this case, a direct popular election constitutional amendment  As noted previously, approval by two-thirds of Members present and voting is required in both houses when Congress proposes an amendment, followed by ratification by three-fourths of the states, 38 at present, usually within a seven-year period specified by Congress  Between 1948 and 1979, Congress debated electoral college reform at length; throughout this time, hundreds of reform proposals were introduced in both chambers  They generally centered on one of two courses: "end it" by eliminating the entire electoral college system and establishing direct popular election, or "mend it" by reforming its more controversial provisions  Between 1948 and 1979, proposed amendments were the subject of hearings in the Senate and House Judiciary Committees on 17 different occasions, while electoral college reform was debated in the Senate on five occasions and twice in the House during this period  Proposals were approved by the necessary two-thirds majority twice in the Senate and once in the House, but never in the same Congress  Following the 1979 defeat of a direct popular election amendment on the Senate floor, and the retirement or defeat of prominent congressional advocates, the question of electoral college reform largely disappeared from public attention and Congress's legislative agenda  Although Senators and Representatives continued to introduce reform proposals, few received action beyond routine committee referral, and in time, the number of measures introduced dropped to zero  Even after the presidential elections of 2000 and 2016, in which the winner of the electoral vote won fewer popular votes than his opponent (a so-called "misfire") , there was little evidence that Congress was prepared to consider an electoral college reform amendment  Proposals to replace the electoral college system with direct popular election continued to be introduced, but in dwindling numbers as the years passed  No proposal for direct popular election was introduced in the 113 th Congress  By comparison, 41 direct popular election or electoral college reform amendments were proposed in the 95 th Congress (1977-1978)  Following the 2016 election, however, four constitutional amendments introduced late in the 114 th Congress proposed eliminating the electoral college and replacing it with direct election  To date in the 116 th Congress, three amendments to establish direct popular election by constitutional amendment have been introduced, but no action beyond committee referral has been taken on them  Until recently, survey research findings showed public support for presidential election reform through direct popular election by sizable margins  As early as 1967, the Gallup Poll reported that 58% of respondents supported direct election, compared with 22% who favored retaining the electoral college  More recently, Gallup's 2013 survey recorded that 63% of respondents favored an amendment providing for direct election, while 29% favored retention of the electoral college  Following the 2016 election, however, overall support for direct election was measured at 49% in favor to 47% opposed  It is arguable that the change in public attitudes was influenced by the 2016 election results, in which the Republican nominees won the election with a majority of electoral votes, but fewer popular votes than their Democratic opponents  For instance, Gallup reported a shift to greater support for the electoral college system by respondents who identified themselves as "Republican" or "Lean Republican " Conversely, already high levels of support for direct popular election among respondents who identified themselves as "Democratic" or "Lean Democratic" rose still further in the post-2016 election Gallup Poll  To date, CRS has identified one survey that was specifically designed to measure public commitment to the NPV initiative  A March 27, 2019, Politico/Morning Consult poll posed relevant questions on the presidential election process and the NPV compact  The first question, which presented a general outline of the existing electoral college system and the generic alternative of direct popular election, reported that respondents preferred direct election by 50% to 34% for retaining the electoral college, and 16% reporting "Don't know/No opinion " The next question explained the proposed NPV compact and asked respondents' preference for NPV or the electoral college method  Although the level of support for NPV was lower than that measured for generic direct popular election, a plurality of respondents to this question favored the "National Popular Vote Interstate Compact" by a plurality of 43% in favor, to 33% opposed and 23% who reported "Don't know/No opinion " The disputed presidential election of 2000 was arguably a catalyst for new thinking on electoral college reform   Following a closely contested campaign, Republican candidates George W  Bush and Richard Cheney were elected over Democratic nominees Al Gore Jr  and Joseph Lieberman following a bitter dispute over election results in Florida tha t was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court   The high court's decision left Bush and Cheney with a narrow plurality in Florida of 537 popular votes and a similarly narrow electoral college majority of 30 states with 271 electoral votes, while their Democratic opponents took 20 states and the District of Columbia with 266 electoral votes (one District of Columbia elector cast a blank ballot in protest against the outcome)   It was the first election since 1888 in which the candidates elected uncontestably won fewer popular votes than their principal opponents : the Gore / Lieberman Democratic ticket gained 50,992,335 popular votes to 50,455,156 for Bush / Cheney  The se election results generated considerable discontent with the system  Some critics argued for a constitutional amendment, but the 107 th Congress faced a heavy legislative workload throughout this period, which initially included enactment of President George W  Bush's legislative program and was later expanded to urgent responses to the terrorist attacks of September 1 1, 2001   Rather than focus on the lengthy process associated with consideration of a constitutional amendment, Congress focused on legislati ve remedies  The Help America Vote Act of 2002, passed in response to the numerous irregularities in voting systems and procedures revealed by the 2000 election, mandated election administration reforms and v oting system technology enhancements (funded in part by federal grants to the states) intended to ensure accurate and timely voting and vote tabulation in future elections  In 2016, the presidential election was again won by nominees who gained a majority of electoral votes but fewer popular votes than their major party opponents  Although proposals to amend the Constitution to provide direct popular election were introduced in response to this occurrence late in the 114 th Congress , and again in the 115 th Congress, the 2016 results did not result in the degree of c ontroversy a nd activism that followed the electoral college "misfire " of 2000  T he following factor may have contributed to this situation : i n 2000, a shift in Florida's electoral votes from Bush/Cheney to Gore/Lieberman would have changed the election result; by comparison, in 2016, a shift in the state with the closest vote margin, Michigan , would not have altered the election  While the 2000 election's "misfire" did not result in consideration of a constitutional amendment, it did prompt considerable study and investigation into new approaches to electoral reform among scholars of the presidential election process and political activists  Law professors Robert W  Bennett of Northwestern University, Vikram Amar of the University of California-Davis, and Akhil Amar of Yale University School of Law are generally credited as the intellectual godparents of the concept that ultimately evolved into the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, which relies on the Constitution's broad grant of power to each state to "appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct [emphasis added], a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress " Project FairVote, an issue advocacy group self-described as a nonprofit, nonpartisan "501(c)(4)" organization, appears to have been an incubator of the NPV concept  FairVote has supported NPV for "over a decade," and was an early supporter of National Popular Vote Inc , the plan's official advocacy group; moreover, longtime FairVote board members Robert Richie and the late Representative John B  Anderson were early supporters of the National Popular Vote initiative and contributors to its manifesto, Every Vote Equal   As noted previously, the NPV initiative was the ultimate result of the various studies and proposals offered following the presidential election of 2000  The NPV initiative seeks to establish direct popular election of the President and Vice President through an interstate compact, rather than by constitutional amendment  Ideally, under the compact's provisions, legislatures of the 50 states and the District of Columbia would pass legislation binding the signatories to appoint presidential electors committed to the presidential/vice presidential ticket that gained the most votes nationwide   If all 50 states and the District of Columbia were compact members, this would deliver a unanimous electoral college decision for the candidates winning a plurality of the popular vote  Specifically, the plan calls for an agreement among the states, an interstate compact effected through state legislation, in which the legislature in each of the participating states agrees to appoint electors pledged to the candidates who won the nationwide popular vote   State election authorities would count and certify the popular vote in each state, which would be aggregated and certified as the "nationwide popular vote " The participating state legislatures would then choose the slate of electors pledged to the "nationwide popular vote winner," notwithstanding the results within their particular state s   To ensure success, the initiative would come into effect only if states whose total electoral votes equal or exceed the constitutional majority of 270 were to approve the plan  If the nationwide popular vote were effectively tied, the states would be released from their commitment under the compact, and could choose electors who represented the presidential ticket that gained the most votes in each particular state  One novel NPV provision would enable the presidential candidate who won the national popular vote to fill any vacancies in the electoral college with electors of his or her own choice  States would retain the right to withdraw from the compact, but if a state chose to withdraw within six months of the end of a presidential term, the withdrawal would not be effective until after the succeeding President and Vice President had been elected  The NPV advocacy effort is managed by National Popular Vote Inc , a "501(c)(4)" nonprofit corporation established in California in 2006 by Barry Fadem, an attorney specializing in initiative and referendum law, and John R  Koza, Ph D , an automated systems scientist and entrepreneur  As a 501(c)(4) entity, it is permitted to engage in political activity in furtherance of its goal, without forfeiting its tax-exempt status, so long as this is not its primary activity  NPV states on its website that its "specific purpose is to study, analyze and educate the public regarding its proposal to implement a nationwide popular election of the President of the United States " Dr  Koza serves as chairman of NPV Inc , and Mr  Fadem serves as president  NPV's advisory board includes former Senators and Representatives of both major political parties  In 2006, National Popular Vote Inc  published a detailed handbook, Every Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan for Electing the President by National Popular Vote   This publication, in its fourth edition at the time of this writing, provides a detailed account of various issues related to the NPV initiative, including the electoral college, earlier reform efforts, interstate compacts, the text of the proposed compact, a strategy for advancing the initiative, and a 340-page section addressing "myths about the National Popular Vote Compact " National Popular Vote Inc  maintains an office in Mountain View, CA  Supporters in various state legislatures began to introduce measures to adopt the interstate compact shortly after NPV's inaugural press conference on February 23, 2006  The NPV Compact has been introduced at various sessions in the legislatures of all 50 states and the Council of the District of Columbia, which performs the functions of a state legislature in the nation's capital, and has received some form of active consideration in 38 states and the D C  Council  Among other activities, NPV maintains a regular communications program of email newsletters announcing activities and soliciting readers to petition governors and state legislators to support the compact  At the time of this writing, NPV claims that 3,112 state legislators have either sponsored or cast a recorded vote in their respective legislatures for the compact  NPV also claims endorsements from legislators and endorsements by the New York Times , Los Angeles Times , Chicago Sun-Times , Minneapolis Star Tribune , Boston Globe , Miami Herald , and other newspapers  NPV also advocates use of the citizen initiative process where available to enact state adherence to the compact; it asserts that when Article II, Section 1, clause 2 grants authority to the states to appoint "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," the authority extends to the states' entire lawmaking process, which in some states includes the proposal and passage of legislation and constitutional amendments through citizen initiative  The citizen initiative approach to the interstate compact, however, has yet to be used at the time of this writing  At the time of this writing, in May 2019, the following 14 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the National Popular Vote Compact  Collectively, they are assigned a total of 189 electoral votes  The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact has been introduced since its inception in all 50 states and the District of Columbia  States that have adopted NPV at the time of this writing are listed in chronological order, by year of adoption, as follows: Hawaii (4 electoral votes), 2008; Illinois (20 electoral votes), 2008; Maryland (10 electoral votes), 2008; New Jersey (14 electoral votes), 2008; Washington (12 electoral votes), 2009; Massachusetts (11 electoral votes), 2010; District of Columbia (3 electoral votes), 2010; Vermont (3 electoral votes), 2011; California (55 electoral votes), 2011; Rhode Island (4 electoral votes), 2013; New York (29 electoral votes), 2014; Connecticut (7 electoral votes), 2018; Colorado (9 electoral votes), 2019; Delaware (3 electoral votes), 2019; and New Mexico (5 electoral votes), 2019  After initial momentum in 2008, when four states joined the compact in one year, NPV made slower progress toward its goal of approval by states accounting for 270 electoral votes  Highlights were California's approval in 2011, which added 55 electoral votes to the tally, and New York's accession to the compact in 2014  Beginning with Connecticut's approval in 2018, followed in 2019 by Colorado, Delaware, and New Mexico, 24 additional electoral votes were added to the NVP count, bringing the total to 189, 70% of the 270 votes needed for NPV to go into effect  By early May 2019, legislation to join the NPV had been introduced in the current session of at least one chamber of the legislature in 14 states that controlled a combined total of 150 electoral votes  As of April 17, the compact had been approved in Nevada by the Assembly (lower chamber of the legislature) and in Oregon by the Senate  Accession by these two states would raise the NPV member total to 202 electoral votes  Conversely, proposals to rescind approval of the NPV Interstate Compact have been introduced in the legislatures of Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Washington, to date; none has been approved  Some observers note that, despite NPV's assertion of bipartisan support, all the jurisdictions that have joined the compact to date could be identified as "leaning" Democratic or "solid" Democratic in their support of the Democratic Party, as classified by a recent Gallup survey  For instance, 11 of the 14, including California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Vermont, were found by Gallup to be among the "most solidly Democratic states in 2017 " Alluding to this fact, one commentator observed that [a]ll the states to have joined so far are very blue  Until some purple states and red states sign on, the compact has little in the way of territory to conquer     The seven states where President Obama won [in 2012] by the widest margins, along with D C , have joined  So have three others—New Jersey, Illinois and Washington—where Obama won by at least 15 percentage points  But none below that threshold have done so  The 2016 presidential election results in Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, and New Mexico, the most recent adherents to the NPV compact, arguably confirm this observation—the Democratic candidates won the popular vote in all four states, by margins of between 4 9% in Colorado to 13 7% in Connecticut  On the other hand, several states where the NPV remained under active consideration in 2019—Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, and South Carolina—were carried by the Republican presidential ticket in 2016  As the NPV campaign developed momentum in the states, particularly between 2008 and 2011, defenders of the existing arrangements and the electoral college announced measures to promote retention of the electoral college system  In October 2011, the Heritage Foundation, a conservative public policy institute, released a report opposing the NPV compact  That same month, Roll Call reported that the State Government Leadership Foundation, a project of the Republican State Leadership Committee, would begin a campaign to defend the electoral college and counter recent NPV gains  Further activity, however, does not appear to have been undertaken by these groups by the time of this writing  Arguments in support of and opposed to the National Popular Vote proposal resemble those advanced in favor of and against direct popular election of the President  The central issue turns on the question of the asserted simplicity and democratic attractiveness of the direct election idea as compared to a more complex array of factors cited by supporters of the electoral college system  Proponents of the NPV initiative arguably share the philosophical criticism voiced by proponents of direct popular election, who maintain that the electoral college system is intrinsically undemocratic—it provides for "indirect" election of the President and Vice President  This, they assert, is an 18 th century anachronism, dating from a time when communications were poor, the literacy rate was much lower, and the nation had yet to develop the durable, sophisticated, and inclusive democratic political system it now enjoys  They maintain that only direct popular election of the President and Vice President is consistent with modern democratic values and practice  Beyond this fundamental challenge, critics cite what they identify as a wide range of technical failings of the electoral college arrangement  Perhaps the most prominent of these is that the electoral college system can result in the election of a President and Vice President who have won the electoral vote, but gained fewer popular votes than their major opponent  This condition results at least in part from the nearly universal reliance on the "winner-take-all" or general ticket system of awarding electoral votes in the states, which is also criticized by NPV advocates  Under the general ticket system, the candidates winning the most popular votes in a state (a plurality is sufficient) are awarded all that state's electors and electoral votes; under these circumstances, a presidential ticket can gain all of a state's electoral votes on even a slim margin of popular votes  Presidents were elected in 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016 who received fewer popular votes than their major party opponents, while the runner-up in both popular and electoral votes was elected by the House of Representatives when four candidates split the vote in the presidential election of 1824  NPV supporters advocate the compact on the grounds of fairness and respect for the voters' choice  At the core of their arguments, they assert that the process would be simple, national, and democratic; the NPV interstate compact would provide de facto for a single, democratic choice, allowing all the nation's voters to choose the President and Vice President directly, with no intermediaries  The "people's choice," they assert, would win in every election, and every vote would carry the same weight in the election, no matter where in the nation it was cast  No state would be advantaged, nor would any be disadvantaged  According to NPV, the central argument in favor is that the compact "would guarantee the Presidency to the candidate who receives the most popular votes [or at least a plurality] in all 50 states (and the District of Columbia) " According to NPV, there would never again be a presidential election "misfire" or another "wrong winner " Other elements of the electoral college system criticized by NPV advocates (and other electoral college reformers) would arguably disappear or be rendered irrelevant  These include the faithless elector phenomenon, the general ticket system's asserted "disfranchisement" of voters who backed the losing candidates, and various asserted "voting power" advantages attributed to large (populous) states, small states, states with large populations of noncitizens, states with low rates of voter participation, and populous states with concentrations of minority-group voters  In addition, the NPV compact would almost certainly eliminate the need for contingent election of the President and Vice President under the Twelfth Amendment  NPV advocates also assert the compact would provide a practical benefit to states that tend to be noncompetitive in presidential elections and which therefore receive fewer campaign visits by major party candidates  With "every vote equal," NPV maintains that presidential and vice presidential nominees and their organizations would need to spread their presence and resources more evenly as they campaigned for every vote nationwide, rather than concentrate on winning key "battleground" states  They assert that, under the present system candidates have no reason to poll, visit, organize, campaign, or worry about the concerns of voters of states that they cannot possibly win or lose  This means that voters in two thirds of the states are effectively disenfranchised in presidential elections because candidates concentrate their attention on a small handful of "battleground" states  In 2004, candidates concentrated over two-thirds of their money and campaign visits in just five states; over 80% in nine states, and over 99% of their money in just 16 states  For instance, NPV notes that California voters seldom see the presidential or vice presidential nominees or benefit from campaign spending because the Golden State, having voted Democratic since 1988, is considered to be reliably "blue," and Democratic Party candidates are said to take its 55 electoral votes for granted  They also note that Republican candidates make few California appearances, but, NPV asserts, for the opposite reason: why spend time and resources in support of an apparently hopeless cause? Similar arguments made by NPV on the Republican side apply to Texas, a state that has voted for Republican presidential nominees since 1980  In 2016 for instance, NPV claims that no Democratic nominee participated in a general election campaign event in California or Texas, while a Republican nominee appeared in only one campaign event in each of those states  By comparison, according to their calculations, the hotly contested battleground states of Florida, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania received, respectively, 71, 55, and 54 candidate appearances  According to NPV's analysis of campaign appearances, the 2016 major party candidates for President and Vice President appeared at a total of 375 campaign events during the general election campaign, but they visited only 12 states; by NPV's calculation, 38 states and the District of Columbia were bypassed during the campaign  NPV advocates also maintain that the concentration of campaign resources, advertising, and candidate appearances in battleground states depresses turnout in "flyover" states, where candidates make few campaign appearances  The U S  Elections Project report, America Goes to the Polls, 2016 , appears to offer statistics consistent with this assertion, finding that the participation rate of the population eligible to vote in 14 battleground states was 65% in the 2016 presidential election, as opposed to comparable nationwide turnout of 60%  It also reports findings similar to those advanced by NPV: 95% of campaign visits during the 2016 campaign were made in battleground states, as was 99% of "ad spending " The NPV manifesto also cites a Brookings Institution study of the 2004 presidential election in support of its argument, stating, "Because the electoral college has effectively narrowed elections like the last one to a quadrennial contest for the votes of a relatively small number of states, people elsewhere are likely to feel that their votes don't matter " It should be noted, however, that a range of other political, social, cultural, and economic factors may also contribute to the disparity in turnout between battleground and non-battleground states  NPV further suggests that the disparity in participation may ultimately damage the ability to govern on the state and local levels and could have a negative impact on the legitimacy of public institutions: Diminished voter turnout in presidential races in non-battleground states weakens down-ballot candidates, thereby making the state even less competitive in the future  Governance—not just electioneering—is affected by the winner-take-all rule  National Popular Vote opponents oppose the compact on various grounds  Some argue that it is unconstitutional or "anticonstitutional," that is, contrary to the Founders' intentions and the spirit of the nation's fundamental charter  It is also asserted that NPV would solve few of the electoral college system's alleged problem issues and would create some of its own  Finally, some observers note that the NPV compact is an interstate compact as defined in Article I, Section 10, clause 3 of the Constitution, and as such would be subject to congressional approval  This issue is examined in greater detail in a separate section of this report  On the most fundamental philosophical basis, opponents might argue that the NPV compact violates one of the basic principles of majoritarian democracy: it does not require that candidates win a majority of the popular vote in order to gain the presidency  Rather, it would anoint as winner the ticket that gains more popular votes than any other  A majoritarian democracy, it may be argued, should require a majority in order to elect; it may be further noted that the existing system, by comparison, requires a majority in the electoral college  As one commentary noted only the strictest of majoritarians desire a purely majoritarian presidential election system, and those individuals should be deeply troubled by the prospect of plurality presidencies, which the NPVC [sic] expressly countenances  Indeed, the NPVC promises to create more difficulties and "misfires" in its own way than the Electoral College system its proponents so earnestly seek to replace  Further, opponents might ask how the NPV compact would function in the event of a multicandidate election, a phenomenon that recurs from time to time in U S  presidential elections  One commentator posited the following problematic scenario under such circumstances: Under the compact, one can easily imagine a multi-candidate race in which a candidate would win, say, a thirty-four percent plurality of the popular vote nationwide while losing in every state and D C  If all of the states and D C  were signatories to the compact, all the electoral votes in such a hypothetical race would be awarded contrary to the will of voters choosing electors (still not voting directly for President under this plan)  Would the United States accept a President who wasn't the choice of sixty-six percent of those voting, nor even the choice of a single state? The existing electoral college system, NPV skeptics might also assert, is a fundamental element in the federal constitutional arrangements established by the Constitution  Fearing "the tyranny of the majority," the Founders established a system of government that provides checks and balances designed to restrain the majority and secure minority rights  These principles are also embedded in the structure of federal elections: the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the presidency were deliberately provided with different terms of office and different electorates, and the states were given an important role in the federal election process  In particular, through the electoral college the United States elects its national Presidents and Vice Presidents in a state-based federal election  Successful nominees are compelled under this system to present a broad political vision that commands nation-spanning "concurrent majorities" and appeals to the great variety of Americans  As in the case of the Senate, less populous states are accorded a small numerical advantage by assignment of two at-large electors reflecting the Constitution's equal apportionment of Senators to each state regardless of its population  The NPV initiative, they could claim, would discard the Founders' intentions in favor of what they consider to be a flawed "majoritarian" presidency that would ill-serve a continent-spanning and profoundly diverse republic  Another criticism centers on the use of the NPV compact to effect a fundamental change in the presidential election process and a de facto amendment to the Constitution, but without following the procedures set out in Article V  Critics may note that NPV's founders admit their plan is an "end run" around the Constitution  Proponents might counter with the argument that Article V presents too high a hurdle for what they consider a necessary reform of the system  Opponents, however, could respond that the Founders intended the various supermajority requirements in Congress and the states to ensure that successful constitutional amendments enjoy broad national support  The bare majority of electoral votes required to implement NPV, they might note, meets none of these supermajority requirements  As one study critical of the NPV initiative concluded, because the use of an interstate compact "does not conform to the constitutional means of changing the original decisions of the Framers, NPV could not [therefore] be a legitimate innovation " A final argument on this line might be that one "end run" around the amendment process might lead to others, setting a dangerous precedent for similar efforts in the future  Opponents might note that the NPV would eliminate the electoral college system's multiplier effect generated by the winner-take-all or general ticket system used in 48 states and the District of Columbia, which tends to magnify the winning ticket's margin of victory, and is said to confer greater legitimacy to the victors  For instance, in 2016, Republican nominee Donald Trump's clear electoral vote majority of 304 votes (56 5% of the total), compared with Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton's 227 (42 2% of the total) could be said to reinforce and confirm his victory, notwithstanding Clinton's plurality of the popular vote (48 2%), compared with Trump's 46 1%  From a practical standpoint, NPV opponents might argue that the NPV would actually lead to an increase in contested election results and legal challenges in the states, as the political parties maneuver to claim every possible vote  They assert that the existing tabulation of popular votes within each state reduces contested results and recounts  Under NPV, the incentive to gain every vote would arguably lead to far broader disputes and widespread recounts at every level of election administration  As a Heritage Foundation study concluded Under the NPV … any suspicions necessitating a recount in even a single district would be an incentive for a national recount     The prospect of a candidate challenging "every precinct, in every county, in every state of the Union" should be abhorrent to anyone who witnessed the drama, cost, delay, and undue litigation sparked by the Florida recount of 2000  Opponents might also assert that the increased incidence of recounts would be further complicated by wide-ranging disparities in state procedures, potentially leading to prolonged periods of uncertainty following close presidential elections  Critics may also note that the NPV plan contains no "statute of limitations," unlike proposed constitutional amendments, for which Congress typically sets a seven-year ratification period  Where, critics may ask, is a similar time limit that would "sunset" the NPV compact, after which it would expire or return to "square one"? According to its website, NPV was launched on February 23, 2006; if it were a constitutional amendment proposed by Congress, it would have expired on February 23, 2013, since by the end of the customary seven-year deadline it was "ratified" by only eight states and the District of Columbia  By what reasoning, they might ask, should the NPV be exempt from the standards of timeliness and contemporaneity Congress customarily sets for constitutional amendments? Opponents might reject claims that, under NPV, campaign spending and candidate appearances would be spread and scheduled more widely, beyond the current concentration of time and resources in battleground states  They might argue that spreading campaign resources and candidate events in non-battleground states is a questionable argument to justify a fundamental change in the presidential election process  Campaign appearances and spending, they could assert, should not be considered to be a local economic stimulus package, nor are the amounts in question sufficient to make much of a difference in the economic condition of most states  As one critical analysis notes, "    the nation does not hold presidential elections to foster local economic development " Moreover, they might continue, it is equally dubious to assert that nominees will slight the concerns of citizens of the non-battleground states from which they draw their greatest support, or that concentrated campaigning in the battleground states somehow "disenfranchises" voters in others  In the modern era, a small percentage of voters actually attends an in-person presidential or vice presidential candidate appearance  Television (especially broadcast and cable TV news networks), social media, the internet, and newspapers—not the traditional rallies, torchlight parades, and handbills—dominate presidential election campaigns in the 21 st century  In addition to policy issues discussed previously, some observers have also raised questions related to the NPV initiative based on the fact that it is an interstate compact as defined in the Constitution  Others have questioned whether NPV might conflict with some provisions of the Voting Rights Act  The NPV initiative has been described by its supporters variously as a bill, a state-level statute, and an interstate compact  The latter reference necessitates an analysis of whether the initiative complies with the Compact Clause of the Constitution  An interstate compact—under the broadest understanding—is a contract between two or more consenting states  The Supreme Court has further suggested that an interstate compact often requires reciprocal commitments between the governments of two or more states, such that one state's commitment is conditioned on the action of another state and no state can unilaterally repeal its commitment  The use of interstate compacts predates the Constitution, as the Articles of Confederation contained a similar Compact Clause that provided a qualified prohibition on states entering into any agreements between them without the consent of Congress  The chaos resulting from the disunity created by the Articles of Confederation prompted the Framers of the Constitution generally to "impose more uniformity" among the states, resulting in a Constitution that wholly prohibits states from entering into any treaties, alliances, and federations  Nonetheless, the Constitution maintained the Articles of Confederation's qualified prohibition on interstate compacts and agreements, allowing states to enter into an interstate compact so long as the participating states seek the consent of Congress  Specifically, the Compact Clause provides that "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress     enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State     " While the historical rationale for Article I's qualified prohibition on interstate compacts is unclear, the Compact Clause generally reflects the view of the Framers that states should be able to work cooperatively together, as well as the concern that unchecked interstate alliances might threaten the harmony of the Union or the authority vested by the Constitution in the federal government  As the Supreme Court noted in Cuyler v  Adams , "By vesting in Congress the power to grant or withhold consent, or to condition consent on the states' compliance with specified conditions, the Framers sought to ensure that Congress would maintain ultimate supervisory power over cooperative state action that might otherwise interfere with the full and free exercise of federal authority " The Compact Clause places no limits on what might be done through an interstate compact other than the requirement of congressional consent  In the early years of government under the Constitution, compacts were used almost exclusively to settle boundary disputes  Beginning with the establishment of the Port of New York Authority in 1921, however, compacts began to be used to address more complex, regional issues requiring intergovernmental cooperation  Some compacts are merely advisory in form, but others may be regulatory, with significant powers granted to multistate commissions  More recently, compacts have addressed such wide-ranging concerns as mental health treatment, law enforcement and crime control, education, driver licensing and enforcement, environmental conservation, energy, nuclear waste control, facilities operations, transportation, economic development, insurance regulation, placement of children and juveniles, disaster assistance, and pollution control  Approximately 200 interstate compacts are in effect today  Accordingly, the central legal issue with respect to the Compact Clause is whether a given interstate compact requires the consent of Congress  While a "literal" reading of the Compact Clause "would require the States to obtain congressional approval before entering into any agreement among themselves, irrespective of form, subject, duration, or interest to the United States [emphasis added]," the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected such a reading  In 1893, in Virginia v  Tenness e e , Justice Stephen Field, writing for the Court, contended that a broad reading of the Compact Clause would "embrace all forms of stipulation, written or verbal, and relating to all kinds of subjects[,]" requiring congressional consent to agreements "which the United States can have no possible objection or have any interest in interfering with," as well as those that "may tend to increase     the political influence of the contracting states, so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States     " Surmising that the Compact Clause could not have been intended to have such a broad reach, Justice Field concluded that the Clause prohibits states from entering into compacts without congressional consent only when the underlying compact is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States " The Supreme Court has subsequently reaffirmed Justice Field's "functional view of the Compact Clause," and, accordingly, generally where an agreement does not fall within the scope of the Compact Clause as envisioned by the Court in Virginia v  Tennessee , the agreement "will not be invalidated for lack of congressional consent " Whether the NPV initiative requires congressional consent under the Compact Clause first requires a determination as to whether NPV even constitutes an interstate compact  At times, its supporters have resisted framing the initiative as an interstate compact, arguably out of concern for running afoul of the Compact Clause's provisions  For example, Professor Akhil Amar has argued that because the initiative does not create a "new interstate governmental apparatus," the NPV should not be considered an interstate compact, as NPV compact signatory states are merely exercising power collectively that each state could exercise on its own  It is unclear, however, whether the creation of a new interstate governmental entity formed out of an agreement between two or more states is necessary, as opposed to sufficient, in order to deem an agreement as being an interstate compact subject to the Compact Clause  While the Supreme Court, in Northeast Bancorp , suggested that a "joint organization or body" formed out of an interstate agreement is a "classic indic[ium] of a compact," the Court has never adopted a definition of an interstate compact that solely rests on the existence of an interstate governmental body  Instead, the Court appears to have adopted a broader definition of what an interstate compact can entail  For example, in Virginia v  Tennessee , the Court noted that the words "compacts" and "agreements" are synonymous and "cover all stipulations affecting the conduct or claims of the parties " In other words, when two or more states enter into a stipulated agreement whereby one state agrees to perform an act in consideration for a reciprocal act by the other state(s), that agreement can be considered an interstate compact  This broad definition of a compact appears to encompass the NPV compact, as the initiative requires signatory states to agree mutually to appoint their electors to the winner of the national popular vote  Moreover, NPV binds each assenting state, as no member state can withdraw from it within six months or less of the end of a President's term  Because NPV prohibits states from freely "modify[ing] or repeal[ing] [the agreement] unilaterally" and requires "reciprocation" of mutual obligations, it appears that the initiative can be described as an interstate compact  Assuming the NPV initiative is an interstate compact, the question remains whether it is one that implicates the Compact Clause  The answer to that question primarily depends on whether NPV is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States  " In other words, the "test" for whether a particular interstate compact requires congressional consent is centrally concerned with vertical balances of power between the federal government and the states; namely, "whether the Compact enhances state power quoad the National Government " While the NPV arguably increases the political power of the states that have consented to it by ensuring that those states' desired outcome for the presidential election—the awarding of the majority of electoral votes to the presidential candidate supported by the majority of the voting populace—it is unclear how that increase in political power would be at the expense of the power of the federal government  After all, the Constitution provides the federal government with no role in determining the members of the electoral college  One scholar has suggested that the NPV initiative would lead to a vertical alteration of power by eliminating the possibility that the House of Representatives would resolve a presidential election in the absence of an electoral majority for a single candidate because it is premised on a majority of electoral votes going to a single candidate  The House of Representatives, however, has decided only two presidential elections in American history, and whether such an arguably hypothetical and de minimis diminishment of federal power through the NPV would be sufficient to require congressional consent under the Compact Clause is simply unresolved by the relevant case law  While the Supreme Court's case law interpreting the Compact Clause is centrally concerned with vertical federalism concerns (i e , the balance of power between the state and federal governments), the Court has recognized a potential secondary rationale suggested for the Compact Clause: to preserve the horizontal balance of powers among the various states  And horizontal federalism concerns could very well be implicated by the Compact Clause, as the provision appears to have been included in the Constitution out of concern both for the supremacy of the federal government and unity among the various states  Whether the NPV compact threatens the powers of nonconsenting states has been the subject of much debate among academics  Those in support of the initiative have contended that the nonconsenting states do not lose any power as a result of the NPV  According to this line of argumentation, even under the NPV, all states would retain their right to select the electors of their choosing, as nonmember state electors would still be counted in the electoral vote  Others, however, have pointed to the underlying premise of the NPV—to enhance the political power of more populous states in presidential elections—as evidence that the initiative diminishes the power of nonconsenting states  In other words, while non-compacting states would still retain the power to appoint electors, the influence that comes with that power would arguably be diminished because a state's role in the national election would be defined by its percentage of the popular vote and not by its percentage of electors, warranting congressional interest in approving a compact that effectuated such a change in national elections  Ultimately, however, whether the NPV actually threatens the power of nonconsenting states is a debate that remains active within academia but would likely be the source of considerable litigation if the initiative ever became effective  If congressional consent is needed for the NPV, that consent can take various forms  Usually congressional consent to an interstate compact takes the form of a joint resolution or act of Congress specifying its approval of the text of the compact and adding any conditions or provisions it deems necessary, often embodying the compact document  As with most congressional actions, consent to an interstate compact must occur with the approval of both houses and must be signed by the President before it becomes law  Rarely has the President vetoed or threatened to veto consent legislation by Congress  While congressional consent to an interstate compact is most often explicit, consent by Congress may also be implied by subsequent acts of Congress as "[a]n inference clear and satisfactory that Congress     intended to consent" to a compact may be sufficient  Congress may also delegate its power to approve a compact to a federal official so long as an "intelligible principle" against which approval can be measured is apparent  Ultimately, if congressional consent is truly needed for NPV to be effective, the initiative might have difficulty ever being enacted because the approval of both houses of Congress and the President would likely necessitate additional hurdles beyond the already challenging task of amassing support at the state level for the NPV  Beyond the legal issues raised with respect to the Compact Clause, the NPV initiative also potentially raises other broader constitutional concerns, including whether the states can functionally obviate the role of the electoral college through the NPV  Article II of the Constitution establishes that the election of the President should occur indirectly through the election by the electoral college  The choice of an indirect election for the President was a deliberate one by the Framers of the Constitution, because, while noting the importance that the "sense of the people" should influence the choice for President, they found it "equally desirable" for the "immediate election" of the President to be made by a body representative of distinct state interests and removed from the threat of unchecked majoritarianism  The result was that the Constitution established a presidential election process that was "manifestly nonmajoritarian," with the electoral college, a body established to represent the distinct views of each state, as the centerpiece of the election process  The central constitutional issue presented by the NPV, therefore, is whether the states, through an interstate compact, can functionally transform the presidential election system enshrined in the Constitution into a more majoritarian process  Supporters of the NPV argue that the Constitution provides the legal means for states to transform the presidential election system into one where the President is elected based solely on the result of the national popular vote  Specifically, clause 2 of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution provides the states with the power to "appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," the electors who represent the state in the electoral college  Facially, the Constitution's primary limitation on the power of a state to select its electors is the final number of electors awarded to each state  While perhaps an argument can be made that the structure, logic, and history of the Constitution place limits on the manner or method in which a state chooses its electors, the text of the Constitution simply does not impose any such limits  Supreme Court case law also supports reading Article II of the Constitution to broadly provide states with wide discretion as to the manner in which its electors are selected  Specifically, in 1892 in McPherson v  Blacker, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld a Michigan law providing for the election by individual congressional district of presidential electors against a challenge that the law violated Article II of the Constitution  In so holding, the Court placed great emphasis on a number of state laws that existed shortly after the ratification that provided a variety of "modes of choosing the electors," including selection by the legislature itself, by a "vote of the people for a general ticket," "by vote of the people in districts," or by some permutation of those methods  Viewing this evidence together with the text of Article II and the historical evidence from the Constitutional Convention led the Court to broadly conclude state legislatures have "conceded plenary power     in the matter of the appointment of electors," allowing the Michigan law to stand  Applying McPherson to the case of the NPV, the argument can and has been made that if the states have plenary power with respect to the manner of how electors are appointed, the power necessarily allows states to select electors in line with the results of the national popular vote  More recently, supporters of the NPV have relied on the Supreme Court's 2015 ruling in Arizona Legislature v  Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC) —which held that the State of Arizona had wide discretion under the Elections Clause of the Constitution to select the method by which the state provided for redistricting —to argue that the states retain broad discretion in selecting electors under Article II, which uses similar language to the provision interpreted in AIRC  Others have argued that the structure of the Constitution and historical evidence suggest that the states do not have such vast discretion in appointing electors as to functionally transform the election for President into a national popular referendum  As noted elsewhere in this report, the electoral college was created by the Framers to ensure that states with the least population retained power in the selection of the President, providing a check against domination by the most populous states  The electoral college, being a product of the choices of individual state legislatures, was envisioned by the Framers as a body that would represent the specific interests of a given state, as opposed to the undifferentiated nation at large  Accordingly, it may be argued that allowing the most populous states to collude to ensure that the national popular vote, as opposed to the wishes of an individual state, dictates the results of a state's slate of electors, could arguably be irreconcilable with the Framers' intentions with respect to the electoral college  As such, for those who find the NPV compact constitutionally suspect under Article II, McPherson 's broad pronouncements about the nature of a state's power to appoint electors should be viewed in the context of that particular case, where the state of Michigan was attempting to appoint its electors based on the votes of an individual district in the state, as opposed to the state as a whole  In contrast to the law at issue in McPherson , with NPV, there appears to be no evidence contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution of a state selecting its electors in accordance with the results of the national popular vote  Unlike the State of Michigan in McPherson , an NPV state's electors might not be a product of the views of the state at the time of the election, but instead would reflect national popular sentiment about who should be the President  Moreover, the Supreme Court, in interpreting arguably analogous language from Article I of the Constitution allowing states to regulate the manner of the selection of the Members of the House of Representatives and Senate, concluded that the states cannot exercise their delegated authority in a way that would "effect a fundamental change in the constitutional structure " The question that remains is whether the Court in a future case challenging the NPV compact would interpret the states' authority under Article II to appoint electors to be broad enough to allow the President to be selected as a result of the national popular vote, a question that, given the lack of any precise precedent respecting the constitutionality of the NPV compact under Article II, will likely remain unresolved until such time  Other critics claim the NPV compact might violate Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)  Writing in Columbia Law Review , David Gringer invokes the voting power theory  He argues that the plan conflicts with Section 2 of the VRA because moving from "a state-based [vote] to a national popular vote dilutes the voting strength of a given state's minority population by reducing its ability [voting power] to influence the outcome of presidential elections " Gringer also asserts that the NPV compact may violate Section 5 of the act  In 2013, however, the U S  Supreme Court invalidated Section 4(b) of the VRA, which contained a formula prescribing which states and jurisdictions with a history of discrimination were required to obtain prior approval or "preclearance" under Section 5 before changing any voting standard, practice, or procedure  Although the Court invalidated only the coverage formula in Section 4, by extension, Section 5 has been rendered currently inoperable  Prior to the Supreme Court ruling, Gringer argued that the NPV compact would qualify as a covered practice under Section 5, and that the legislatures of all the "covered" states would have been required to obtain preclearance before implementing the compact  Responding to this point, National Popular Vote Inc  noted the following: The National Popular Vote bill manifestly would make every person's vote for President equal throughout the United States in an election to fill a single office (the Presidency)  It is entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act  There have been court cases under the Voting Rights Act concerning contemplated changes in voting methods for various representative legislative bodies     However, these cases do not bear on elections to fill a single office (i e , the Presidency)  In 2012, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division specifically declined to challenge California's accession to the NPV compact on VRA grounds  The states' authority to appoint electors by any method their legislatures choose is not absolute  Federal court decisions have struck down state laws concerning appointment of electors that were found to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection: Although Clause 2 (of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution) seemingly vests complete discretion in the states, certain older cases had recognized a federal interest in protecting the integrity of the process  Thus, the Court upheld the power of Congress to protect the right of all citizens who are entitled to vote to lend aid and support in any legal manner to the election of any legally qualified person as a presidential elector     [I]n Oregon v  Mitchell (42 U S  112 (1970)), the Court upheld the power of Congress to reduce the voting age in presidential elections and to set a thirty-day durational residency period as a qualification for voting in presidential elections  Although the Justices were divided on the reasons, the rationale emerging from this case, considered with Williams v  Rhodes , (393 U S  20 1968)) is that the Fourteenth Amendment limits state discretion in prescribing the manner of selecting electors and that Congress in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment may override state practices that violate that Amendment and may substitute standards of its own  Critics of the electoral college system have sought direct election of the President and Vice President without success for more than two centuries  The NPV initiative represents a novel effort to achieve this goal by use of an interstate compact that would circumvent the stringent requirements necessary for the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments  Since its inception in 2006, NPV has achieved a degree of success: 14 states and the District of Columbia, controlling a total of 189 electoral votes, have joined the compact since 2008  Progress has arguably been sporadic, however, notwithstanding active campaigning by National Popular Vote Inc  Over the course of more than a decade, NPV has heretofore failed to develop a sustained momentum toward its stated goal of states controlling 270 electoral votes  The action of three states in joining NPV to date in 2019 marks the most activity in a single year since 2008; it remains to be seen whether this trend will continue  To date, certain Democratic-leaning states have joined the compact  The arguable lack of support in Republican-controlled state legislatures raises questions about further accessions to the compact in the immediate future, particularly given the fact that the GOP controlled both legislative chambers in 30 states following the 2018 elections  To date, while the NPV initiative has generated interest among supporters of direct popular election of the President, it does not appear to have gained widespread awareness among the public at large  The findings of the March 27, 2019, Politico/Morning Consult survey cited earlier in this report arguably suggest that greater public knowledge of NPV might spur popular support for the compact  This might then contribute to further momentum if additional states were to join, particularly populous ones like Florida (29 electoral votes), Georgia (16 electoral votes), and Ohio (18 electoral votes) where the compact was under active consideration in 2019  Under these circumstances, proponents might be energized and encouraged by a sense of progress for the initiative  At the same time, NPV opponents could be expected to coalesce around the issues identified earlier in this report, and renew and increase their efforts in defense of the electoral college system  The activities of both might ultimately bring the NPV initiative to the more immediate attention of Congress 


Report 2:  A FIT official acknowledged that assessing software functionality, rather than implementation, was emphasized during the discovery process  Although DHS relied on OMB and Treasury’s designation of IBC as a federal SSP, this FIT official also told us that because agencies’ specific needs can vary significantly, agencies are responsible for conducting sufficient due diligence to assess a federal SSP’s ability to meet their requirements  Project schedule: DHS, IBC, FIT, and USSM officials acknowledged that migrating the TRIO components to IBC within original time frames was a significant challenge given the overall magnitude and complexity of the TRIO project  According to DHS officials and TRIO project documentation, DHS identified delays in completing various tasks and milestones including providing design phase technical documentation and design processing proposed change requests; meeting proposed baseline schedules for implementing Coast Guard and TSA on the modernized IBC solution; and achieving initial operating capability requirements and stabilizing the production environment after DNDO’s migration to IBC because of various issues related to reporting, invoice payment processing, contract management processes, and resolving help desk tickets in a timely manner  DHS officials also stated that IBC did not consistently update the IMS to ensure that it accurately reflected all required tasks, the completion status, and the resources required to complete them  Concerns related to meeting milestones and updating the IMS were discussed during periodic status update meetings that included DHS, IBC, OMB, FIT, and USSM officials  IBC and DHS officials acknowledged that processes for communicating and resolving issues were not always efficient and contributed to schedule delays  In addition, in November 2016, USSM noted several concerns based on its review of a draft IMS supporting TSA’s re-planning efforts to go-live in October 2017  USSM’s concerns included an incomplete project scope and schedule and need for additional discovery to determine cost and level of effort, an extremely aggressive schedule with very limited contingencies for the lack of interim checkpoints or oversight on tasks exceeding 30 days, the need for a resource-loaded IMS that incorporates an appropriate level of detail, and the need for an expedited program governance strategy and escalation path that DHS and IBC leadership could use to make program decisions within the time allotted on the schedule  Complex requirements: DHS, IBC, FIT, and USSM officials acknowledged the overall complexity of the TRIO project and that the lack of a detailed understanding of the components’ requirements earlier in the project impacted IBC’s and DHS’s ability to satisfy the requirements as planned  For example, USSM and FIT officials told us that under the shared services model, the approach for onboarding new customers usually involves migrating to a proven configuration of a solution that is already being used by the provider’s existing customers  However, rather than taking this approach, DHS and IBC agreed to implement a more recent version of Oracle Federal Financial software (version 12 2) with integrated contract life cycle and project modules  Under this approach, IBC’s plans included migrating other existing customers to this upgraded environment  USSM officials told us that migrating TRIO components to a new solution that required configuring new software and related applications and developing related interfaces introduced additional complexities that contributed to issues on the TRIO project  According to a FIT official, the functionality of this more recent version of software is very different than that of the version IBC’s existing customers used  This official stated that IBC did not have the needed government personnel with knowledge and experience associated with this new software, a condition that likely contributed to the challenges experienced on the TRIO project  IBC officials acknowledged that IBC’s lack of familiarity with Oracle 12 2 increased the complexity of the TRIO project  In addition, DHS and IBC perspectives on the need for changes differed because of the lack of clarity regarding TRIO project requirements  DHS officials told us that many change requests on the TRIO project reflected the need for required functionality based on previously stated requirements  They also told us that they did not consider DNDO-related requirements to be overly complex when compared to those associated with IBC’s similarly sized customers  However, DHS officials stated that as of June 2017, IBC has not yet met DNDO’s needs to deliver a functioning travel system interface and other requirements  According to IBC officials, TRIO project change requests to address components’ requirements were extensive and included significant customizations to meet unique requirements that were not aligned with the federal shared service model  IBC officials noted additional challenges in addressing TRIO project requirements related to DHS’s efforts to address certain organizational change management and business process reengineering responsibilities  According to IBC officials, in some instances, the TRIO components provided conflicting requirements related to the same process that would have been more consistent had DHS completed more of its business process reengineering efforts prior to providing them to IBC  Project costs: According to the July 2014 discovery report, proposed implementation costs for the TRIO project totaled $89 9 million  However, according to DHS officials and TRIO project documentation, estimated costs significantly increased because of schedule delays, unanticipated complexities, and other challenges  In January 2017, DHS prepared a summary of estimated TRIO project implementation costs associated with its IAA with IBC  According to this summary, estimated IBC-related TRIO project implementation costs through fiscal year 2017 increased by approximately $42 8 million (54 percent) from the $79 2 million provided in the original August 2014 IAA with IBC as a result of modifications required, in part, to address challenges impacting the project  DHS officials also expressed concerns regarding increases in estimated operations and maintenance costs for the IBC solution  For example, according to a December 2016 memorandum to DHS on action items associated with failing to meet the baseline schedule date for initial operational capability, DNDO stated that IBC’s updated projected costs of operations and maintenance of its system were unaffordable  In connection with these costs, DHS officials also stated that IBC determined that separate, rather than shared, help desk resources were required to support the TRIO project because it was significantly different from the solution that IBC’s existing customers used  As a result, the officials indicated that these costs were more than originally expected  However, IBC officials told us that a portion of the increase in help desk- related costs was also due to DNDO employees not using the system properly because they were not sufficiently trained on it before it was implemented  In addition, challenges impacting the TRIO project have contributed to significant changes in the path forward on the project; as a result, the extent to which overall TRIO project modernization costs will be impacted going forward has not yet been determined  Project management and communication: According to DHS officials, various program management-related challenges impacted the TRIO project  For example, they expressed concerns regarding the effectiveness of IBC’s project management efforts including cost, schedule, and change management as well as IBC’s allocation of resources and slow decision-making process  They also stated that DHS provided significant time and resources to make up for fundamental project management activities that were under IBC’s control and not performed  In addition, DHS officials identified limitations associated with (1) poorly defined service level agreements and program performance metrics, (2) poor quality control plan, and (3) the lack of mechanisms for measuring delivery and addressing concerns regarding IBC’s performance  DHS officials told us that although various mechanisms can be used to hold commercial vendors accountable—such as cure notices, quality assurance surveillance plans, and incentives or disincentives to monitor performance—few mechanisms are available to hold federal agency service providers accountable for performance concerns  DHS officials also acknowledged challenges in their project management and communication efforts and identified lessons learned to help improve future efforts, including the need to establish a performance-based contract to determine objective and enforceable activity level metrics; be more prepared for organizational changes; improve vendor, project, and schedule management efforts; better understand SSP resource plans and monitor SSP efforts to help ensure that sufficient resources are secured timely; and centralize program management for financial system modernization functions, rather than continuing with the structure used on the TRIO project—for example, the TRIO project’s program management structure consisted of program management offices at the component level performing cost, schedule, and technical monitoring activities with DHS headquarters’ involvement focused on governance and oversight, resulting in duplicate efforts across components  IBC officials acknowledged challenges concerning IBC’s lack of sufficient resources and turnover, as described above  However, they told us that DHS’s approach to project management often resulted in duplicative meetings and a lengthy decision-making process involving several officials and multiple review and approval processes  According to USSM officials, the TRIO project team focused an unbalanced portion of its efforts on the delivery of technology at the expense of organizational change management, communication management, and other project management areas  For example, the failure to incorporate lessons learned from DNDO’s deployment adversely affected subsequent TRIO project implementation efforts, as change management activities did not address previously encountered risks  An OMB staff member concurred with the lessons learned that DHS identified, including those indicating the need for stronger project management  While the project is ongoing, the OMB staff member noted the importance of DHS having well-defined requirements for the project and better coordination to achieve the desired outcomes  In connection with TRIO project challenges, DHS officials told us that IBC notified DHS in April 2016 that it would not be able to meet the planned October 2016 implementation date for TSA  In response, DHS and IBC established the TSA Replan Tiger Team to perform a detailed assessment of potential courses of action  According to DHS officials, DHS and IBC subsequently took various actions to help address these and other challenges impacting the TRIO project, as summarized below  May 2016: IBC requested additional funding for fiscal year 2016 for 14 additional IBC and contractor personnel to strengthen program coordination and management support  According to DHS officials, DHS provided this requested funding along with additional funding to establish a business integration office to help strengthen cross organizational communication  DHS determined that plans for migrating TSA and Coast Guard to IBC during the first quarter of fiscal years 2017 and 2018, respectively, were not viable  As a result, their planned migrations were each extended an additional year  June 2016: DHS and IBC developed a comprehensive remediation plan to track progress on efforts to resolve numerous issues associated with DNDO’s production environment that continued to hamper its stability since going live in November 2015  According to DHS officials, these issues related to invoice payment and interest accruals, contract life cycle management, reporting, and other activities and have required numerous work-arounds to execute business processes  August to October 2016: DHS, Coast Guard, and IBC determined that a similar replanning effort was needed for Coast Guard’s successful migration to IBC  According to DHS officials, IBC indicated that it was unable to simultaneously provide DNDO production and TSA implementation support while also addressing the complexities related to Coast Guard  DHS officials told us that another Tiger Team established to address Coast Guard issues failed to complete the scope of its charter, and as a result, Coast Guard was forced to assume a minimum of a 2- year delay (rather than the 1-year delay previously determined in May 2016) and that this significantly increased program costs  They further stated that some of the team’s deliverables have not been initiated or remain outstanding as of June 2017  December 2016: IBC communicated to DHS that it cannot support the discovery phase with DHS’s CUBE modernization project  In addition, DHS approved the establishment of a Joint Program Management Office to serve as the overarching program management for DHS financial systems modernization projects  According to DHS officials, using a department-wide approach will enable DHS to more effectively leverage the resources and expertise across all modernization projects  January 2017: IBC communicated to DHS that it cannot support Coast Guard implementation in October 2018, and DHS and IBC established a joint CPWG to assess viable options for improving program performance and addressing stakeholder concerns and key TRIO project priorities  February 2017: DHS and IBC issued a joint memorandum to provide an update on contingency planning discussions  DHS and IBC shared commitments and determinations included (1) stabilizing the DNDO production environment and executing TSA implementation activities, (2) delivering the best value for the government and ensuring mutual success to the greatest extent possible, (3) preserving and protecting the current investment, and (4) making TSA implementation the first priority  In addition, DHS and IBC presented two options as representing the best opportunities for success in improving program performance and addressing stakeholder concerns: (1) continue with the status quo plan for Coast Guard implementation in October 2019, with significant improvements to program management and overall support capability and capacity, or (2) platform replacement  Platform replacement was presented as the preferred path toward meeting the needs of both DHS and IBC  Under this option, DHS and IBC would proceed with TSA implementation and work toward an orderly transition of TRIO components to an alternate service provider, hosting location, or both  March 2017: According to DHS officials, DHS, IBC, and USSM officials met to review certain critical success criteria for TSA’s implementation  Based on these discussions, it was determined that TSA would not go live with IBC in fiscal year 2018 given the high-risk schedule and critical criteria involved and the Coast Guard implementation would also be delayed accordingly  Further, TSA release 3 0 would be delivered in October 2017 or as soon as possible thereafter  In addition, the CPWG would continue working to identify an alternative path forward, and DHS and IBC would identify and evaluate critical transition activities and timelines  April 2017: The CPWG recommended moving away from IBC to a commercial service provider leveraging the cloud as the best course of action to complete TRIO project implementation and as the most fiscally responsible approach from a long-term sustainment and cost perspective  The CPWG’s recommendation was based on its analysis of six options and proposed a transition timeline, including key activities, as shown in figure 3  May 2017: During its May 3, 2017 briefing of the Financial Systems Modernization Executive Steering Committee, DHS indicated that two of the options that the CPWG considered were no longer viable, including the CPWG’s recommendation to transition to a commercial cloud service provider because the software was not yet cloud-ready  DHS ranked the remaining four options using 13 OMB risk factors as selection criteria and determined that migrating the solution to a DHS data center represented the best option going forward  In addition, DHS decided to move forward with discovery efforts related to this option  According to its briefing presentation and DHS officials, the notional timeline of planned key events for the TRIO project included various items, as shown in figure 4  DHS officials indicated that DHS expects to present the findings and recommendations resulting from discovery efforts associated with this new path forward to USSM and OMB for concurrence  As of August 2017, results of this effort were under review by DHS leadership  The TRIO project represents a key element of DHS’s efforts to address long-standing deficiencies in its financial management systems and further improve financial management  Following best practices to manage risks effectively can help provide increased assurance that large, complex projects—such as the TRIO project—will achieve planned objectives  DNDO’s AA process substantially met the four characteristics of a reliable, high-quality AOA process  However, Coast Guard’s and TSA’s AAs substantially met one and partially met three of these four characteristics  Further, DHS did not always follow best practices for managing the risks of using IBC for the TRIO project  As a result, TRIO components faced an increased risk that the solution they chose would not represent the best alternative for meeting their mission needs and that the risks impacting the TRIO project would not be effectively managed to mitigate adverse impacts  In addition, significant challenges have impacted the TRIO project, raising concerns about the extent to which objectives will be achieved as planned  Plans for DHS’s path forward on the TRIO project, as of May 2017, involve significant changes, such as transitioning away from IBC and a 2-year delay in completing Coast Guard’s and TSA’s migration to a modernized solution  Without greater adherence to best practices for analyzing alternatives and managing project risks, DHS continues to face increased risk that its financial management system modernization project will not provide reasonable assurance of achieving its mission objectives  We are making the following two recommendations to DHS: The DHS Under Secretary for Management should develop and implement effective processes and improve guidance to reasonably assure that future AAs fully follow AOA process best practices and reflect the four characteristics of a reliable, high-quality AOA process  (Recommendation 1) The DHS Under Secretary for Management should improve the Risk Management Planning Handbook and other relevant guidance for managing risks associated with financial management system modernization projects to fully incorporate risk management best practices, including defining thresholds to facilitate review of performance metrics to determine when risks become unacceptable; identifying and analyzing risks to include periodically reconsidering risk sources, documenting risks specifically related to the lack of sufficient, reliable cost and schedule information needed to help properly manage and oversee the project, and timely disposition of IV&V contractor-identified risks; developing risk mitigation plans with specific risk-handling activities, the costs and benefits of implementing them, and contingency plans for selected critical risks; and implementing risk mitigation plans to include establishing periods of performance for risk-handling activities and defining time intervals for updating and certifying the accuracy and completeness of information on risks in DHS’s risk register  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this product to DHS and the Department of the Interior for comment  In its comments, reprinted in appendix IV, DHS concurred with our recommendations and provided details on its implementation of the recommendations as discussed below  In addition, DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  The Department of the Interior only provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  DHS stated that it remains committed to its financial system modernization program  Specifically, regarding our first recommendation to develop and implement effective processes and improve guidance to reasonably assure that future AAs fully follow AOA process best practices and reflect the four characteristics of a reliable, high-quality AOA process, DHS stated that it agrees that effective processes and guidance are necessary to assure best practices  DHS also stated that it is important to note that the GAO-identified best practices were published more than 2 years after the TRIO components’ AAs were completed  While this is the case, as discussed in our report, these best practices are based on long- standing, fundamental tenets of sound decision making and economic analysis and were identified by compiling and reviewing commonly mentioned AOA policies and guidance that are known to and have been used by government and private sector entities  DHS also stated that it has already implemented this recommendation through its issuance of guidance and instructions in 2016 and that a copy of this additional guidance and instructions was provided to GAO  However, the documentation provided by DHS does not fully address our recommendation  As part of our recommendation follow-up process, we will coordinate with DHS to obtain additional information on its efforts to address our recommendation  With regard to our second recommendation to improve the Risk Management Planning Handbook and other relevant guidance, DHS stated that it concurred and agreed that the Risk Management Planning Handbook required updating to fully incorporate risk management best practices  In addition, DHS described actions it will take, and has taken, to revise and publish an updated handbook  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, the DHS Under Secretary for Management, the Acting DHS Chief Financial Officer, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Director of the Interior Business Center  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9869 or khana@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V  To determine the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) followed best practices in analyzing the alternatives used in choosing the preferred alternative for modernizing TRIO components’ financial management systems, we reviewed information that the TRIO components provided as part of their alternatives analysis (AA) process, referred to as the AA body of work, which includes the AA and other supporting documentation that is not specifically included in the AA  In addition, we discussed the DHS AA process with the TRIO components and DHS officials  We evaluated each TRIO component’s AA body of work and assessed this information against the GAO-identified 22 analysis of alternatives (AOA) process best practices  We then scored each AA against those best practices  In appendix II, these GAO- identified best practices are described in detail  Our evaluation comprised the following steps: (1) two GAO analysts separately examined the AA information received for each component, providing a score for each of 18 best practices; (2) a third GAO analyst resolved any differences between the two analysts’ initial scoring; and (3) a GAO specialist on AOA best practices, independent of the audit team, reviewed the team’s AA documentation, scores, and analyses for consistency  The GAO specialist also assessed the four best practices related to cost estimating  We used the average scores for each best practice to determine an overall score for four summary characteristics—well-documented, comprehensive, unbiased, and credible—of a reliable, high-quality AOA process at each TRIO component  Next, we shared our preliminary analysis with the TRIO components and DHS, and requested their technical comments and any additional information for our further consideration  For those characteristics of the AA process that received a score of partially met or below, we met with TRIO component and DHS officials to discuss potential reasons that an AA did not always conform to best practices  Finally, using the same methodology and scoring process explained above, we performed a final assessment based on our preliminary analysis and the comments and additional information received  The best practices were not used to determine whether DHS made the correct decision in selecting Department of the Interior’s Interior Business Center (IBC) to implement the financial management systems modernization solution or whether the TRIO project would have arrived at a different conclusion had it more fully conformed to these best practices  We also reviewed DHS guidance for conducting AOAs and AAs against the GAO-identified 22 AOA process best practices using the same methodology described above for reviewing the TRIO components’ AAs  In the course of applying these best practices to a TRIO component’s AA and to DHS guidance for the AA process, we assessed the reasonableness of the information we collected  We determined that the information from the DHS AA process was sufficiently reliable to use in assessing the TRIO components’ AAs and DHS guidance against these 22 best practices  To determine the key factors, metrics, and processes used by the TRIO components in developing and evaluating DHS’s alternative solutions and final choice for financial system modernization, we reviewed each component’s AA, including a description of (1) the alternatives considered, (2) the market research conducted, (3) the three alternatives evaluated, (4) the selection criteria used and how the criteria were weighted, (5) how each alternative scored against the selection criteria, and (6) the alternative that scored the best according to the component’s evaluation  To determine the extent to which DHS managed the risks of using IBC consistent with risk management best practices, we reviewed DHS’s and TRIO components’ risk management guidance and other documentation supporting their risk management efforts, including risk registers, mitigation plans, status reports, and risk management meeting minutes  We also met with officials to gain an understanding of the key processes and documents used for managing and reporting on TRIO project risks  We assessed the processes against best practices that the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) identified  The practices we selected are fundamental to effective risk management activities  These practices are identified in SEI’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration (CMMI®) for Acquisition, Version 1 3  In particular, the key best practices for preparing for risk management are determine risk sources and categories, define risk parameters, and establish a risk management strategy  The key best practices for identifying and analyzing risks are evaluate, categorize, and prioritize risks  The key best practices for mitigating identified risks are develop risk mitigation plans and implement risk mitigation plans  We applied the criteria from the CMMI risk management process area to determine the extent to which the expected practices were implemented, or future activities were planned for, by the program office  The rating system we used is as follows: (1) meets, or generally satisfies all elements of the specific practice; (2) partially meets, or generally satisfies a portion of specific practice elements; and (3) does not meet, or does not satisfy specific practice elements  In the context of the best practices methodology, we assessed the reliability of TRIO project risk data contained in DHS’s risk register  We interviewed officials on how the risk register was developed and maintained, including key control activities used to provide reasonable assurance of the accuracy of the information reported in the register  We reviewed DHS’s July 2016 risk register and minutes from risk management committee meetings (one meeting per quarter, randomly selected)  Of 120 TRIO project risks on the July 2016 risk register, we found 13 risks with missing data  Of 47 active risks identified, 28 risk records had not been modified in the previous 3 months and the register did not indicate when their accuracy was last confirmed and 35 risks were beyond their indicated impact dates but had not been marked as issues  We concluded that the pervasiveness of these data reliability problems decreased the usefulness of the risk register in connection with managing TRIO project risks  To determine the key factors or challenges that have impacted the TRIO project and DHS’s plans for completing remaining key priorities, we met with DHS, IBC, Office of Financial Innovation and Transformation, and Unified Shared Services Management office officials and Office of Management and Budget staff to obtain their perspectives  In addition, we reviewed documentation provided by these officials, including TRIO project status reports and memorandums, leadership briefings, and other presentations  We conducted this performance audit from March 2016 to September 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  Many guides describe an approach to an analysis of alternatives (AOA); however, there is no single set of practices for the AOA process that has been broadly recognized by both the government and private sector entities  GAO has previously identified 22 best practices for an AOA process by (1) compiling and reviewing commonly mentioned AOA policies and guidance used by different government and private sector entities and (2) incorporating experts’ comments on a draft set of practices to develop a final set of practices  These practices are based on longstanding, fundamental tenets of sound decision making and economic analysis  In addition, these practices can be applied to a wide range of activities in which an alternative must be selected from a set of possible options, as well as to a broad range of capability areas, projects, and programs  These practices can provide a framework to help ensure that entities consistently and reliably select the project alternative that best meets mission needs  The guidance below is an overview of the key principles that lead to a successful AOA process and not as a “how to” guide with detailed instructions for each best practice identified  The 22 best practices that GAO identified are grouped into the following five phases: 1  Initialize the AOA process: Includes best practices that are applied before starting the process of identifying, analyzing, and selecting alternatives  This includes determining the mission need and functional requirements, developing the study time frame, creating a study plan, and determining who conducts the analysis  2  Identify alternatives: Includes best practices that help ensure that the alternatives to be analyzed are sufficient, diverse, and viable  3  Analyze alternatives: Includes best practices that compare the alternatives to be analyzed  The best practices in this category help ensure that the team conducting the analysis uses a standard, quantitative process to assess the alternatives  4  Document and review the AOA process: Includes best practices that would be applied throughout the AOA process, such as documenting all steps taken to initialize, identify, and analyze alternatives and to select a preferred alternative in a single document  5  Select a preferred alternative: Includes a best practice that is applied by the decision maker to compare alternatives and to select a preferred alternative  The five phases address different themes of analysis necessary to complete the AOA process, and comprise the beginning of the AOA process (defining the mission needs and functional requirements) through the final step of the AOA process (selecting a preferred alternative)  We also identified four characteristics that relate to a reliable, high-quality AOA process—that the AOA process is well-documented, comprehensive, unbiased, and credible  Table 4 shows the four characteristics and their relevant AOA best practices  Conforming to the 22 best practices helps ensure that the preferred alternative selected is the one that best meets the agency’s mission needs  Not conforming to the best practices may lead to an unreliable AOA process, and the agency will not have assurance that the preferred alternative best meets mission needs  The Department of Homeland Security’s TRIO components—the U S  Coast Guard (Coast Guard), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)—conducted alternatives analyses (AA) during 2012 and 2013 to determine the best alternative for transitioning to a modernized financial management system solution  We evaluated the TRIO components’ AA processes against analysis of alternatives (AOA) best practices GAO identified as necessary characteristics of a reliable, high-quality AOA process (described in app  II)  GAO’s assessment of the extent to which Coast Guard’s, TSA’s, and DNDO’s AAs met each of the 22 best practices is detailed in tables 5, 6, and 7  In addition to the contact named above, James Kernen (Assistant Director), William Brown, Courtney Cox, Eric Essig, Valerie Freeman, Matthew Gardner, Jason Lee, Jennifer Leotta, and Madhav Panwar made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The National Popular Vote (NPV) initiative proposes an agreement among the states, an interstate compact that would effectively achieve direct popular election of the President and Vice President without a constitutional amendment. It relies on the Constitution's grant of authority to the states in Article II, Section 1 to appoint presidential electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.... " Any state that joins the NPV compact pledges that if the compact comes into effect, its legislature will award all the state's electoral votes to the presidential ticket that wins the most popular votes nationwide, regardless of who wins in that particular state. The compact would, however, come into effect only if its success has been assured; that is, only if states controlling a majority of electoral votes (270 or more) join the compact. By early May 2019, 14 states and the District of Columbia had joined the compact. After early momentum—eight states and the District of Columbia joined the NPV Compact between 2007 and 2011—the pace of state accessions slowed through 2018. Since then, four additional states joined, bringing the total number of electoral votes controlled by NPV member states to 189. During the same period, legislation to join the compact had been introduced during the current session in at least one chamber of the legislature in 14 additional states that control an additional 150 electors. The NPV initiative emerged following the presidential election of 2000, in which one ticket gained an electoral vote majority, winning the presidency, but received fewer popular votes than its opponents. NPV grew out of subsequent discussions among scholars and activists about how to avoid similar outcomes in the future and to achieve direct popular election. Proponents of NPV assert that it would guarantee the presidential candidates who win the most popular votes nationwide will always win the presidency; that it would end the inequities of the general ticket/winner-take-all system of awarding electoral votes; and that candidates would extend their focus beyond winning the "battleground states," campaigning more widely and devoting greater attention to issues of concern to other parts of the country. They further assert that NPV would accomplish this while avoiding the exacting standards set for the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments. Opponents argue that NPV would undermine the authority of states under the Constitution and the Founders' intention that presidential elections should be both national and federal contests; that it is an admitted "end run" around the Constitution that would circumvent the amendment process; and that it might actually lead to more disputed presidential elections characterized by politically contentious state recounts. The NPV has also been debated on legal grounds. Some observers maintain that it must be approved by Congress, because it is an interstate compact that would affect key provisions of constitutional presidential election procedures. NPV Inc., the organization managing the initiative's advocacy campaign, responds that congressional approval is not necessary because NPV concerns the appointment of electors, a subject that falls within state constitutional authority, and that the Supreme Court has previously rejected arguments that similar compacts would impair the rights of nonmember states. Other critics claim that NPV might violate the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority voter influence and avoiding the recently invalidated preclearance requirement for election procedure changes in covered jurisdictions. In response, NPV Inc. has asserted that the compact is "entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act." This report monitors the NPV's progress in the states and will identify and analyze further developments as warranted.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: The federal child nutrition programs provide assistance to schools and other institutions in the form of cash, commodity food, and administrative support (such as technical assistance and administrative funding) based on the provision of meals and snacks to children  In general, these programs were created (and amended over time) to both improve children's nutrition and provide support to the agriculture economy  Today, the child nutrition programs refer primarily to the following meal, snack, and milk reimbursement programs (these and other acronyms are listed in Appendix A ): National School Lunch Program (NSLP) (Richard B  Russell National School Lunch Act (42 U S C  1751 et seq )); School Breakfast Program (SBP) (Child Nutrition Act, Section 4 (42 U S C  1773)); Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP) (Richard B  Russell National School Lunch Act, Section 17 (42 U S C  1766)); Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) (Richard B  Russell National School Lunch Act, Section 13 (42 U S C  1761)); and Special Milk Program (SMP) (Child Nutrition Act, Section 3 (42 U S C  1772))  The programs provide financial support and/or foods to the institutions that prepare meals and snacks served outside of the home (unlike other food assistance programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp Program) where benefits are used to purchase food for home consumption)  Though exact eligibility rules and pricing vary by program, in general the amount of federal reimbursement is greater for meals served to qualifying low-income individuals or at qualifying institutions, although most programs provide some subsidy for all food served  Participating children receive subsidized meals and snacks, which may be free or at reduced price  Forthcoming sections discuss how program-specific eligibility rules and funding operate  This report describes how each program operates under current law, focusing on eligibility rules, participation, and funding  This introductory section describes some of the background and principles that generally apply to all of the programs; subsequent sections go into further detail on the workings of each  Unless stated otherwise, participation and funding data come from USDA-FNS's "Keydata Reports " The child nutrition programs are most often dated back to the 1946 enactment of the National School Lunch Act, which created the National School Lunch Program, albeit in a different form than it operates today  Most of the child nutrition programs do not date back to 1946; they were added and amended in the decades to follow as policymakers expanded child nutrition programs' institutional settings and meals provided: The Special Milk Program was created in 1954, regularly extended, and made permanent in 1970  The School Breakfast Program was piloted in 1966, regularly extended, and eventually made permanent in 1975  A program for child care settings and summer programs was piloted in 1968, with separate programs authorized in 1975 and then made permanent in 1978  These are now the Child and Adult Care Food Program and Summer Food Service Program  The Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program began as a pilot in 2002, was made permanent in 2004, and was expanded nationwide in 2008  The programs are now authorized under three major federal statutes: the Richard B  Russell National School Lunch Act (originally enacted as the National School Lunch Act in 1946), the Child Nutrition Act (originally enacted in 1966), and Section 32 of the act of August 24, 1935 (7 U S C  612c)  Congressional jurisdiction over the underlying three laws has typically been exercised by the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee; the House Education and the Workforce Committee; and, to a limited extent (relating to commodity food assistance and Section 32 issues), the House Agriculture Committee  Congress periodically reviews and reauthorizes expiring authorities under these laws  The child nutrition programs were most recently reauthorized in 2010 through the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA, P L  111-296 ); some of the authorities created or extended in that law expired on September 30, 2015  WIC (the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children) is also typically reauthorized with the child nutrition programs  WIC is not one of the child nutrition programs and is not discussed in this report  The 114 th Congress began but did not complete a 2016 child nutrition reauthorization (see CRS Report R44373, Tracking the Next Child Nutrition Reauthorization: An Overview )  There was no significant legislative activity with regard to reauthorization in the 115 th Congress  The U S  Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) administers the programs at the federal level  The programs are operated by a wide variety of local public and private providers and the degree of direct state involvement differs by program and state  At the state level, education, health, social services, and agriculture departments all have roles; at a minimum, they are responsible for approving and overseeing local providers such as schools, summer program sponsors, and child care centers and day care homes, as well as making sure they receive the federal support they are due  At the local level, program benefits are provided to millions of children (e g , there were 30 0 million in the National School Lunch Program, the largest of the programs, in FY2017), through some 100,000 public and private schools and residential child care institutions, nearly 170,000 child care centers and family day care homes, and just over 50,000 summer program sites  All programs are available in the 50 states and the District of Columbia  Virtually all operate in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands (and, in differing versions, in the Northern Marianas and American Samoa)  This section summarizes the nature and extent to which the programs' funding is mandatory and discretionary, including a discussion of appropriated entitlement status  Table 3 lists child nutrition program and related expenditures  Most spending for child nutrition programs is provided in annual appropriations acts to fulfill the legal financial obligation established by the authorizing laws  That is, the level of spending for such programs, referred to as appropriated mandatory spending, is not controlled through the annual appropriations process, but instead is derived from the benefit and eligibility criteria specified in the authorizing laws  The appropriated mandatory funding is treated as mandatory spending  Further, if Congress does not appropriate the funds necessary to fund the program, eligible entities may have legal recourse  Congress typically considers the Administration's forecast for program needs in its appropriations decisions  For the majority of funding discussed in this report, the formula that controls the funding is not capped and fluctuates based on the reimbursement rates and the number of meals/snacks served in the programs  In the meal service programs, such as the National School Lunch Program, School Breakfast Program, summer programs, and assistance for child care centers and day care homes, federal aid is provided in the form of statutorily set subsidies (reimbursements) paid for each meal/snack served that meets federal nutrition guidelines  Although all (including full-price) meals/snacks served by participating providers are subsidized, those served free or at a reduced price to lower-income children are supported at higher rates  All federal meal/snack subsidy rates are indexed annually (each July) for inflation, as are the income eligibility thresholds for free and reduced-price meals/snacks  Subsequent sections discuss how a specific program's eligibility and reimbursements work  Most subsidies are cash payments to schools or other providers, but a smaller portion of aid is provided in the form of USDA-purchased commodity foods   Laws for three child nutrition programs (NSLP, CACFP, and SFSP) require the provision of commodity foods (or in some cases allow cash in lieu of commodity foods)  Meal and snack service entails nonfood costs  Federal child nutrition per-meal/snack subsidies may be used to cover local providers' administrative and operating costs  However, the separate direct federal payments for administrative/operating costs ("State Administrative Expenses," discussed in the " Related Programs, Initiatives, and Support Activities " section) are limited  In addition to the open-ended, appropriated entitlement funds summarized above, the child nutrition programs' funding also includes certain other mandatory funding and a limited amount of discretionary funding  Some of the activities discussed in " Related Programs, Initiatives, and Support Activities ," such as Team Nutrition, are provided for with discretionary funding  Aside from the annually appropriated funding, the child nutrition programs are also supported by certain permanent appropriations and transfers  Notably, funding for the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program is funded by a transfer from USDA's Section 32 program, a permanent appropriation of 30% of the previous year's customs receipts  Federal subsidies do not necessarily cover the full cost of the meals and snacks offered by providers  States and localities help cover program costs, as do children's families by paying charges for nonfree or reduced-price meals/snacks  There is a nonfederal cost-sharing requirement for the school meals programs (discussed below), and some states supplement school funding through additional state per-meal reimbursements or other prescribed financing arrangements  Subsequent sections of this report delve into the details of how each of the child nutrition programs support the service of meals and snacks in institutional settings; first, it is useful to take a broader perspective of primary program elements  Table 1 is a top-level look at the different programs that displays distinguishing characteristics (what meals are provided, in what settings, to what ages) and recent program spending  Other relevant CRS reports in this area include CRS In Focus IF10266, An Introduction to Child Nutrition Reauthorization CRS Report R45486, Child Nutrition Programs: Current Issues CRS Report R42353, Domestic Food Assistance: Summary of Programs CRS Report R41354, Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization: P L  111-296 (summarizes the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010) CRS Report R44373, Tracking the Next Child Nutrition Reauthorization: An Overview CRS Report R44588, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2017 Appropriations CRS Report RL34081, Farm and Food Support Under USDA's Section 32 Program Other relevant resources include USDA-FNS's website, https://www fns usda gov/school-meals/child-nutrition-programs USDA-FNS's Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act page, http://www fns usda gov/school-meals/healthy-hunger-free-kids-act The FNS page of the Federal Register , https://www federalregister gov/agencies/food-and-nutrition-service This section discusses the school meals programs: the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and the School Breakfast Program (SBP)  Principles and concepts common to both programs are discussed first; subsections then discuss features and data unique to the NSLP and SBP, respectively  The federal school meals programs provide federal support in the form of cash assistance and USDA commodity foods; both are provided according to statutory formulas based on the number of reimbursable meals served in schools  The subsidized meals are served by both public and private nonprofit elementary and secondary schools and residential child care institutions (RCCIs) that opt to enroll and guarantee to offer free or reduced-price meals to eligible low-income children  Both cash and commodity support to participating schools are calculated based on the number and price of meals served (e g , lunch or breakfast, free or full price), but once the aid is received by the school it is used to support the overall school meal service budget, as determined by the school  This report focuses on the federal reimbursements and funding, but it should be noted that some states have provided state financing through additional state-specific funding  Federal law does not require schools to participate in the school meals programs  However, some states have mandated that schools provide lunch and/or breakfast, and some of these states require that their schools do so through NSLP and/or SBP  The program is open to public and private schools  A reimbursable meal requires compliance with federal school nutrition standards, which have changed throughout the history of the program based on nutritional science and children's nutritional needs  Food items not served as a complete meal meeting nutrition standards (e g , a la carte offerings) are not reimbursable meals, and therefore are not eligible for federal per-meal, per-snack reimbursements  Following rulemaking to implement provisions in the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 ( P L  111-296 ), USDA updated the nutrition standards for reimbursable meals in January 2012 (see " Nutrition Standards " for more information)  Schools serving meals that meet the updated nutrition standards are eligible for an increased reimbursement of 6 cents per lunch  USDA-FNS administers the school meals programs federally, and state agencies (typically state departments of education) oversee and transmit reimbursements through agreements with school food authorities (SFAs) (typically local educational agencies (LEAs); usually these are school districts)  Figure 1 provides an overview of the roles and relationships between these levels of government  There is a cost-sharing requirement for the programs, which amounts to a contribution of approximately $200 million from the states  There also are states that choose to supplement federal reimbursements with their own state reimbursements  The school meals programs and related funding do not serve only low-income children  All students can receive a meal at a NSLP- or SBP-participating school, but how much the child pays for the meal and/or how much of a federal reimbursement the state receives will depend largely on whether the child qualifies for a "free," "reduced-price," or "paid" (i e , advertised price) meal  Both NSLP and SBP use the same household income eligibility criteria and categorical eligibility rules  States and schools receive the largest reimbursements for free meals, smaller reimbursements for reduced-price meals, and the smallest (but still some federal financial support) for the full-price meals  There are three pathways through which a child can become certified to receive a free or reduced-price meal: 1  Household income eligibility for free and reduced-price meals (information typically collected via household application), 2  Categorical (or automatic) eligibility for free meals (information collected via household application or a direct certification process), and 3  School-wide free meals under the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP) , an option for eligible schools that is based on the share of students identified as eligible for free meals  Each of these pathways is discussed in more detail below  The income eligibility thresholds (shown in Table 2 ) are based on multipliers of the federal poverty guidelines  As the poverty guidelines are updated every year, so are the eligibility thresholds for NSLP and SBP  Free Meals: Children receive free meals if they have household income at or below 130% of the federal poverty guidelines; these meals receive the highest subsidy rate  (Reimbursements are approximately $3 30 per lunch served, less for breakfast ) Reduced-Price Meals: Children may receive reduced-price meals (charges of no more than 40 cents for a lunch or 30 cents for a breakfast) if their household income is above 130% and less than or equal to 185% of the federal poverty guidelines; these meals receive a subsidy rate that is 40 cents (NSLP) or 30 cents (SBP) below the free meal rate  (Reimbursements are approximately $2 90 per lunch served ) Paid Meals: A comparatively small per-meal reimbursement is provided for full-price or paid meals served to children whose families do not apply for assistance or whose family income does not qualify them for free or reduced-price meals  The paid meal price is set by the school but must comply with federal regulations  (Reimbursements are approximately 30 cents per lunch served ) The above reimbursement rates are approximate; exact current-year federal reimbursement rates for NSLP and SBP are listed in Table B -1 and Table B -3 , respectively  Households complete paper or online applications that collect relevant income and household size data, so that the school district can determine if children in the household are eligible for free meals, reduced-price meals, or neither  Though these income guidelines primarily influence funding and administration of NSLP and SBP, they also affect the eligibility rules for the SFSP, CACFP, and SMP (described further in subsequent sections)  In addition to the eligibility thresholds listed above, the school meals programs also convey eligibility for free meals based on household participation in certain other need-tested programs or children's specified vulnerabilities (e g , foster children)  Per Section 12 of the National School Lunch Act, "a child shall be considered automatically eligible for a free lunch and breakfast     without further application or eligibility determination, if the child is" in a household receiving benefits through SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program); FDPIR (Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations, a program that operates in lieu of SNAP on some Indian reservations) benefits; or TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) cash assistance; enrolled in Head Start; in foster care; a migrant; a runaway; or homeless  For meals served to students certified in the above categories, the state/school receive a reimbursement at the free meal amount and children receive a free meal  (See Table B -1 and Table B -3 for school year 2018-2019 rates ) Some school districts collect information for these categorical eligibility rules via paper application  Others conduct a process called direct certification —a proactive process where government agencies typically cross-check their program rolls and certify a household's children for free school meals without the household having to complete a school meals application  Prior to 2004, states had the option to conduct direct certification of SNAP (then, the Food Stamp Program), TANF, and FDPIR participants  In the 2004 child nutrition reauthorization ( P L  108-265 ), states were required under federal law to conduct direct certification for SNAP participants, with nationwide implementation taking effect in school year 2008-2009  Conducting direct certification for TANF and FDPIR remains at the state's discretion  The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA; P L  111-296 ) made further policy changes to expand direct certification (discussed further in the next section)  One of those changes was the initiation of a demonstration project to look at expanding categorical eligibility and direct certification to some Medicaid households  The law also funded performance incentive grants for high-performing states and authorized correcting action planning for low-performing states in direct certification activities  Under SNAP direct certification rules generally, schools enter into agreements with SNAP agencies to certify children in SNAP households as eligible for free school meals without requiring a separate application from the family  Direct certification systems match student enrollment lists against SNAP agency records, eliminating the need for action by the child's parents or guardians  Direct certification allows schools to make use of SNAP's more in-depth eligibility certification process; this can reduce errors that may occur in school lunch application eligibility procedures that are otherwise used  From a program access perspective, direct certification also reduces the number of applications a household must complete  Figure 2 , created by GAO and published in a May 2014 report, provides an overview of how school districts certify students for free and reduced-price meals under the income-based and category-based rules, via applications and direct certification  A USDA-FNS study of school year 2014-2015 estimates that 11 1 million students receiving free meals were directly certified—68% of all categorically eligible students receiving free meals  HHFKA also authorized the school meals Community Eligibility Provision (CEP), an option in NSLP and SBP law that allows eligible schools and school districts to offer free meals to all enrolled students based on the percentage of their students who are identified as automatically eligible from nonhousehold application sources (primarily direct certification through other programs)  Based on the statutory parameters, USDA-FNS piloted CEP in various states over three school years and it expanded nationwide in school year 2014-2015  Eligible LEAs have until June 30 of each year to notify USDA-FNS if they will participate in CEP  According to a database maintained by the Food Research and Action Center, just over 20,700 schools in more than 3,500 school districts (LEAs) participated in CEP in SY2016-2017, an increase of approximately 2,500 schools compared to SY2015-2016  For a school (or school district, or group of schools within a district) to provide free meals to all children the school(s) must be eligible for CEP based on the share (40% or greater) of enrolled children that can be identified as categorically (or automatically) eligible for free meals, and the school must opt-in to CEP  Though CEP schools serve free meals to all students, they are not reimbursed at the "free meal" rate for every meal  Instead, the law provides a funding formula: the percentage of students identified as automatically eligible (the "identified student percentage" or ISP) is multiplied by a factor of 1 6 to estimate the proportion of students who would be eligible for free or reduced-price meals had they been certified via application  The result is the percentage of meals served that will be reimbursed at the free meal rate, with the remainder reimbursed at the far lower paid meal rate  For example, if a CEP school identifies that 40% of students are eligible for free meals, then 64% of the meals served will be reimbursed at the free meal rate and 36% at the paid meal rate  Schools that identify 62 5% or more students as eligible for free meals receive the free meal reimbursement for all meals served  Some of the considerations that may impact a school's decision to participate in CEP include whether the new funding formula would be beneficial for their school meal budget; an interest in reducing paperwork for families and schools; and an interest in providing more free meals, including meals to students who have not participated in the program before  The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA; P L  111-296 ) set in motion changes to the nutrition standards for school meals, requiring USDA to update the standards within a certain timeframe  The law required that the revised standards be based on recommendations from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) (now the Health and Medicine Division) at the National Academy of Sciences  The law also provided increased federal subsidies (6 cents per lunch) for schools meeting the new requirements and funding for technical assistance related to implementation  USDA published the final regulations in January 2012  The final rule sought to align school meal patterns with the 2010 Dietary Guidelines for Americans, and, generally consistent with IOM's recommendations, increased the amount of fruits, vegetables, whole grains, and low-fat or fat-free milk in school meals  The regulations also included calorie maximums and sodium limits to phase in over time, among other requirements  The nutrition standards largely took effect in SY2012-2013 for lunches and in SY2013-2014 for breakfasts  A few other requirements were scheduled to phase in over multiple school years  Some schools experienced difficulty implementing the new guidelines, and Congress and USDA have made changes to the 2012 final rule's whole grain, sodium, and milk requirements  For SY2019-2020 and onwards, schools are operating under a final rule published December 12, 2018  The HHFKA also gave USDA the authority to regulate other foods in the school nutrition environment  Sometimes called "competitive foods," these include foods and drinks sold in a la carte lines, vending machines, snack bars and concession stands, and fundraisers  Relying on recommendations made by a 2007 IOM report, USDA-FNS promulgated a proposed rule and then an interim final rule in June 2013, which went into effect for SY2014-2015  The interim final rule created nutrition guidelines for all non-meal foods and beverages that are sold during the school day (defined as midnight until 30 minutes after dismissal)  The final rule, published on July 29, 2016, maintained the interim final rules with minor modifications  Under the final standards, these foods must meet whole-grain requirements; have certain primary ingredients; and meet calorie, sodium, and fat limits, among other requirements  Schools are limited to a list of no- and low-calorie beverages they may sell (with larger portion sizes and caffeine allowed in high schools)  There are no limits on fundraisers selling foods that meet the interim final rule's guidelines  Fundraisers outside of the school day are not subject to the guidelines  HHFKA and the interim final rule provide states with discretion to exempt infrequent fundraisers selling foods or beverages that do not meet the nutrition standards  The rule does not limit foods brought from home, only foods sold at school during the school day  The federal standards are minimum standards; states and school districts are permitted to issue more stringent policies  In FY2017, NSLP subsidized 4 9 billion lunches to children in close to 96,000 schools and 3,200 residential child care institutions (RCCIs)  Average daily participation was 30 0 million students (58% of children enrolled in participating schools and RCCIs)  Of the participating students, 66 7% (20 0 million) received free lunches and 6 5% (2 0 million) received reduced-price lunches  The remainder were served full-price meals, though schools still receive a reimbursement for these meals  Figure 3 shows FY2017 participation data  FY2017 federal school lunch costs totaled approximately $13 6 billion (see Table 3 for the various components of this total)  The vast majority of this funding is for per-meal reimbursements for free and reduced-price lunches  The HHFKA also provided an additional 6-cent per-lunch reimbursement to schools that provide meals that meet the updated nutritional guidelines requirements  This bonus is not provided for breakfast, but funds may be used to support schools' breakfast programs  NSLP lunch reimbursement rates are listed in Table B -1   In addition to federal cash subsidies, schools participating in NSLP receive USDA-acquired commodity food s   Schools are entitled to a specific, inflation-indexed value of USDA commodity foods for each lunch they serve  Also, schools may receive donations of bonus commodities acquired by USDA in support of the farm economy  In FY2017, the value of federal commodity food aid to schools totaled nearly $1 4 billion  The per-meal rate for commodity food assistance is included in Table B-4   While the vast majority of NSLP funding is for lunches served during the school day, NSLP may also be used to support snack service during the school year and to serve meals during the summer  These features are discussed in subsequent sections, " Summer Meals " and " After-School Meals and Snacks: CACFP, NSLP Options  " Reimbursement rates for snacks are listed in Table B -2   The School Breakfast Program (SBP) provides per-meal cash subsidies for breakfasts served in schools  Participating schools receive subsidies based on their status as a severe need or nonsevere need institution  Schools can qualify as a severe need school if 40% or more of their lunches are served free or at reduced prices  See Table B -3 for SBP reimbursement rates  Figure 4 displays SBP participation data for FY2017  In that year, SBP subsidized over 2 4 billion breakfasts in over 88,000 schools and nearly 3,200 RCCIs  Average daily participation was 14 7 million children (30 1% of the students enrolled in participating schools and RCCIs)  The majority of meals served through SBP are free or reduced-price  Of the participating students, 79 1% (11 6 million) received free meals and 5 7% (835,000) purchased reduced-price meals  Federal school breakfast costs for the fiscal year totaled approximately $4 3 billion (see Table 3 for the various components of this total)  Significantly fewer schools and students participate in SBP than in NSLP  Participation in SBP tends to be lower for several reasons, including the traditionally required early arrival by students in order to receive a meal and eat before school starts  Some schools offer (and anti-hunger groups have encouraged) models of breakfast service that can result in greater SBP participation, such as Breakfast in the Classroom, where meals are delivered in the classroom; "grab and go" carts, where students receive a bagged breakfast that they bring to class, or serving breakfast later in the day in middle and high schools  Unlike NSLP, commodity food assistance is not a formal part of SBP funding; however, commodities provided through NSLP may be used for school breakfasts as well  In addition to the school meals programs discussed above, other federal child nutrition programs provide federal subsidies and commodity food assistance for schools and other institutions that offer meals and snacks to children in early childhood, summer, and after-school settings  This assistance is provided to (1) schools and other governmental institutions, (2) private for-profit and nonprofit child care centers, (3) family/group day care homes, and (4) nongovernmental institutions/organizations that offer outside-of-school programs for children  (Although this report focuses on the programs that serve children, one child nutrition program (CACFP) also serves day care centers for chronically impaired adults and elderly persons under the same general per-meal/snack subsidy terms ) The programs in the sections to follow serve comparatively fewer children and spend comparatively fewer federal funds than the school meal programs  CACFP subsidizes meals and snacks served in early childhood, day care, and after-school settings  CACFP provides subsidies for meals and snacks served at participating nonresidential child care centers, family day care homes, and (to a lesser extent) adult day care centers  The program also provides assistance for meals served at after-school programs  CACFP reimbursements are available for meals and snacks served to children age 12 or under, migrant children age 15 or under, children with disabilities of any age, and, in the case of adult care centers, chronically impaired and elderly adults  Children in early childhood settings are the overwhelming majority of those served by the program  CACFP provides federal reimbursements for breakfasts, lunches, suppers, and snacks served in participating centers (facilities or institutions) or day care homes (private homes)  The eligibility and funding rules for CACFP meals and snacks depend first on whether the participating institution is a center or a day care home (the next two sections discuss the rules specific to centers and day care homes)  According to FY2017 CACFP data, child care centers have an average daily attendance of about 56 children per center, day care homes have an average daily attendance of approximately 7 children per home, and adult day care centers typically care for an average of 48 chronically ill or elderly adults per center  Providers must demonstrate that they comply with government-established standards for other child care programs  Like in school meals, federal assistance is made up overwhelmingly of cash reimbursements calculated based on the number of meals/snacks served and federal per-meal/snack reimbursements rates, but a far smaller share of federal aid (4 3% in FY2017) is in the form of federal USDA commodity foods (or cash in lieu of foods)  Federal CACFP reimbursements flow to individual providers either directly from the administering state agency (this is the case with many child/adult care centers able to handle their own CACFP administrative functions) or through "sponsors" who oversee and provide administrative support for a number of local providers (this is the case with some child/adult care centers and with all day care homes)  In FY2017, total CACFP spending was over $3 5 billion, including cash reimbursement, commodity food assistance, and costs for sponsor audits  (See Table 3 for a further breakdown of CACFP costs ) This total also includes the after-school meals and snacks provided through CACFP's "at-risk after-school" pathway; this aspect of the program is discussed later in " After-School Meals and Snacks: CACFP, NSLP Options  " As with school foods, the HHFKA required USDA to update CACFP's meal patterns  USDA's final rule revised the meal patterns for both meals served in child care centers and day care homes, as well as preschool meals served through the NSLP and SBP, effective October 1, 2017  For infants (under 12 months of age), the new meal patterns eliminated juice, supported breastfeeding, and set guidelines for the introduction of solid foods, among other changes  For children ages one and older, the new meal patterns increased whole grains, fruits and vegetables, and low-fat and fat-free milk; limited sugar in cereals and yogurts; and prohibited frying, among other requirements  Child care centers in CACFP can be (1) public or private nonprofit centers, (2) Head Start centers, (3) for-profit proprietary centers (if they meet certain requirements as to the proportion of low-income children they enroll), and (4) shelters for homeless families  Adult day care centers include public or private nonprofit centers and for-profit proprietary centers (if they meet minimum requirements related to serving low-income disabled and elderly adults)  In FY2017, over 65,000 child care centers with an average daily attendance of over 3 6 million children participated in CACFP  Over 2,700 adult care centers served nearly 132,000 adults through CACFP  Participating centers may receive daily reimbursements for up to either two meals and one snack or one meal and two snacks for each participant, so long as the meals and snacks meet federal nutrition standards  The eligibility rules for CACFP centers largely track those of NSLP: children in households at or below 130% of the current poverty line qualify for free meals/snacks while those between 130% and 185% of poverty qualify for reduced-price meals/snacks (see Table 2 )  In addition, participation in the same categorical eligibility programs as NSLP as well as foster child status convey eligibility for free meals in CACFP  Like school meals, eligibility is determined through paper applications or direct certification processes  Like school meals, all meals and snacks served in the centers are federally subsidized to some degree, even those that are paid  Different reimbursement amounts are provided for breakfasts, lunches/suppers, and snacks, and reimbursement rates are set in law and indexed for inflation annually  The largest subsidies are paid for meals and snacks served to participants with family income below 130% of the federal poverty income guidelines (the income limit for free school meals), and the smallest to those who have not met a means test  See Table B -5 for current CACFP center reimbursement rates  Unlike school meals, CACFP institutions are less likely to collect per-meal payments  Although federal assistance for day care centers differentiates by household income, centers have discretion on their pricing of meals  Centers may adjust their regular fees (tuition) to account for federal payments, but CACFP itself does not regulate these fees  In addition, centers can charge families separately for meals/snacks, so long as there are no charges for children meeting free-meal/snack income tests and limited charges for those meeting reduced-price income tests  Independent centers are those without sponsors handling administrative responsibilities  These centers must pay for administrative costs associated with CACFP out of nonfederal funds or a portion of their meal subsidy payments  For centers with sponsors, the sponsors may retain a proportion of the meal reimbursement payments they receive on behalf of their centers to cover such costs  CACFP-supported day care homes serve a smaller number of children than CACFP-supported centers , both in terms of the total number of children served and the average number of children per facility  Roughly 17% of children in CACFP (approximately 757,000 in FY2017 average daily attendance) are served through day care homes  In FY2017, approximately 103,000 homes (with just over 700 sponsors) received CACFP support  As with centers, payments to day care homes are provided for up to either two meals and one snack or one meal and two snacks a day for each child  Unlike centers, day care homes must participate under the auspices of a public or, more often, private nonprofit sponsor that typically has 100 or more homes under its supervision  CACFP day care home sponsors receive monthly administrative payments based on the number of homes for which they are responsible  Federal reimbursements for family day care homes differ by the home's status as "Tier I" or "Tier II " Unlike centers, day care homes receive cash reimbursements (but not commodity foods) that generally are not based on the child participants' household income  Instead, there are two distinct, annually indexed reimbursement rates that are based on area or operator eligibility criteria Tier I homes are located in low-income areas (defined as areas in which at least 50% of school-age and enrolled children qualify for free or reduced-price meals) or operated by low-income providers whose household income meets the free or reduced-price income standards  They receive higher subsidies for each meal/snack they serve  Tier II (lower) rates are by default those for homes that do not qualify for Tier I rates; however, Tier II providers may seek the higher Tier I subsidy rates for individual low-income children for whom financial information is collected and verified  (See Table B-6 for current Tier I and Tier II reimbursement rates ) Additionally, HHFKA introduced a number of additional ways (as compared to prior law) by which family day care homes can qualify as low-income and get Tier I rates for the entire home or for individual children  As with centers, there is no requirement that meals/snacks specifically identified as free or reduced-price be offered; however, unlike centers, federal rules prohibit any separate meal charges  Current law SFSP and the NSLP/SBP Seamless Summer Option provide meals in congregate settings nationwide; the related Summer Electronic Benefits Transfer (SEBTC or Summer EBT) demonstration project is an alternative to congregate settings  SFSP supports meals for children during the summer months  The program provides assistance to local public institutions and private nonprofit service institutions running summer youth/recreation programs, summer feeding projects, and camps  Assistance is primarily in the form of cash reimbursements for each meal or snack served; however, federally donated commodity foods are also offered  Participating service institutions are often entities that provide ongoing year-round service to the community including schools, local governments, camps, colleges and universities in the National Youth Sports program, and private nonprofit organizations like churches  Similar to the CACFP model, sponsors are institutions that manage the food preparation, financial, and administrative responsibilities of SFSP  Sites are the places where food is served and eaten  At times, a sponsor may also be a site  State agencies authorize sponsors, monitor and inspect sponsors and sites, and implement USDA policy  Unlike CACFP, sponsors are required for an institution's participation in SFSP as a site  In FY2017, nearly 5,500 sponsors with 50,000 food service sites participated in the SFSP and served an average of approximately 2 7 million children daily (according to July data)  Participation of sites and children in SFSP has increased in recent years  Program costs for FY2017 totaled over $485 million, including cash assistance, commodity foods, administrative cost assistance, and health inspection costs  There are several options for eligibility and meal/snack service for SFSP sponsors (and their sites) Open sites provide summer food to all children in the community  These sites are certified based on area eligibility measures, where 50% or more of area children have family income that would make them eligible for free or reduced-price school meals (see Table 2 )  Closed or Enrolled sites provide summer meals/snacks free to all children enrolled at the site  The eligibility test for these sites is that 50% or more of the children enrolled in the sponsor's program must be eligible for free or reduced-price school meals based on household income  Closed/enrolled sites may also become eligible based on area eligibility measures noted above  Summer camps (that are not enrolled sites) receive subsidies only for those children with household eligibility for free or reduced-price school meals  Other programs specified in law , such as the National Youth Sports Program and centers for homeless or migrant children  Summer sponsors get operating cost (food, storage, labor) subsidies for all meals/snacks they serve—up to one meal and one snack, or two meals per child per day  In addition, sponsors receive payments for administrative costs, and states are provided with subsidies for administrative costs and health and meal-quality inspections  See Table B -7 for current SFSP reimbursement rates  Actual payments vary slightly (e g , by about 5 cents for lunches) depending on the location of the site (e g , rural vs  urban) and whether meals are prepared on-site or by a vendor  Although SFSP is the child nutrition program most associated with providing meals during summer months, it is not the only program option for providing these meals and snacks  The Seamless Summer Option, run through NSLP or SBP programs, is also a means through which food can be provided to students during summer months  Much like SFSP, Seamless Summer operates in summer sites (summer camps, sports programs, churches, private nonprofit organizations, etc ) and for a similar duration of time  Unlike SFSP, schools are the only eligible sponsors , although schools may operate the program at other sites  Reimbursement rates for Seamless Summer meals are the same as current NSLP/SBP rates  Beginning in summer 2011 and (as of the date of this report) each summer since, USDA-FNS has operated Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children (SEBTC or "Summer EBT") demonstration projects in a limited number of states and Indian Tribal Organizations (ITOs)  These Summer EBT projects provide electronic food benefits over summer months to households with children eligible for free or reduced-price school meals  Depending on the site and year, either $30 or $60 per month is provided, through a WIC or SNAP EBT card model  In the demonstration projects, these benefits were provided as a supplement to the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) meals available in congregate settings  Summer EBT and other alternatives to congregate meals through SFSP were first authorized and funded by the FY2010 appropriations law ( P L  111-80 )  Although a number of alternatives were tested and evaluated, findings from Summer EBT were among the most promising, and Congress provided subsequent funding  Summer EBT evaluations showed significant impacts on reducing child food insecurity and improving nutritional intake   Summer EBT was funded by P L  111-80 in the summers from 2011 to 2014  Projects have continued to operate and were annually funded by FY2015-FY2018 appropriations; most recently, the FY2018 appropriations law ( P L  115-141 ) provided $28 million  According to USDA-FNS, in summer 2016 Summer EBT served over 209,000 children in nine states and two tribal nations—an increase from the 11,400 children served when the demonstration began in summer 2011  Schools (and institutions like summer camps and child care facilities) that are not already participating in the other child nutrition programs can participate in the Special Milk Program  Schools may also administer SMP for their part-day sessions for kindergartners or pre-kindergartners  Under SMP, participating institutions provide milk to children for free and/or at a subsidized paid price, depending on how the enrolled institution opts to administer the program (see Table B -8 for current Special Milk reimbursement rates for each of these options) An institution that only sells milk will receive the same per-half pint federal reimbursement for each milk sold (approximately 20 cents)  An institution that sells milk and provides free milk to eligible children (income eligibility is the same as free school meals, see Table 2 ), receives a reimbursement for the milk sold (approximately 20 cents) and a higher reimbursement for the free milks  An institution that does not sell milk provides milk free to all children and receives the same reimbursement for all milk (approximately 20 cents)  This option is sometimes called nonpricing  In FY2017, over 41 million half-pints were subsidized, 9 5% of which were served free  Federal expenditures for this program were approximately $8 3 million in FY2017  States receive formula grants through the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program, under which state-selected schools receive funds to purchase and distribute fresh fruit and vegetable snacks to all children in attendance (regardless of family income)  Money is distributed by a formula under which about half the funding is distributed equally to each state and the remainder is allocated by state population  States select participating schools (with an emphasis on those with a higher proportion of low-income children) and set annual per-student grant amounts (between $50 and $75)  Funding is set by law at $150 million for school year 2011-2012 and inflation-indexed for every year after  In FY2017, states used approximately $184 million in FFVP funds  FFVP is funded by a mandatory transfer of funds from USDA's Section 32 program—a permanent appropriation of 30% of the previous year's customs receipts  This transfer is required by FFVP's authorizing laws (Section 19 of the Richard B  Russell National School Lunch Act and Section 4304 of P L  110-246 )  Up until FY2018's law, annual appropriations laws delayed a portion of the funds to the next fiscal year  After a pilot period, the Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004 ( P L  108-265 ) permanently authorized and funded FFVP for a limited number of states and Indian reservations  In recent years, FFVP has been amended by omnibus farm bill laws rather than through child nutrition reauthorizations  The 2008 farm bill ( P L  110-246 ) expanded FFVP's mandatory funding, specifically providing funds through Section 32, and enabled all states to participate in the program  The 2014 farm bill ( P L  113-79 ) essentially made no changes to this program but did include, and fund at $5 million in FY2014, a pilot project that requires USDA to test offering frozen, dried, and canned fruits and vegetables and publish an evaluation of the pilot  Four states (Alaska, Delaware, Kansas, and Maine) participated in the pilot in SY2014-2015 and the evaluation was published in 2017  Other proposals to expand fruits and vegetables offered in FFVP have been introduced in both the 114 th and 115 th Congress  Two of the child nutrition programs discussed in previous sections, the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), provide federal support for snacks and meals served during after-school programs  NSLP provides reimbursements for after-school snacks; however, this option is open only to schools that already participate in NSLP  These schools may operate after-school snack-only programs during the school year, and can do so in two ways: (1) if low-income area eligibility criteria are met, provide free snacks in lower-income areas; or (2) if area eligibility criteria are not met, offer free, reduced-price, or fully paid-for snacks, based on household income eligibility (like lunches in NSLP)  The vast majority of snacks provided through this program are through the first option  Through this program, approximately 206 million snacks were served in FY2017 (a daily average of nearly 1 3 million)  This compares with nearly 4 9 billion lunches served (a daily average of 27 8 million)  CACFP provides assistance for after-school food in two ways  First, centers and homes that participate in CACFP and provide after-school care may participate in traditional CACFP (the eligibility and administration described earlier)  Second, centers in areas where at least half the children in the community are eligible for free or reduced-price school meals can opt to participate in the CACFP At-Risk Afterschool program, which provides free snacks and suppers  Expansion of the At-Risk After-School meals program was a major policy change included in HHFKA  Prior to the law, 13 states were permitted to offer CACFP At-Risk After-School meals (instead of just a snack); the law allowed all CACFP state agencies to offer such meals  In FY2017, the At-Risk Afterschool program served a total of approximately 242 6 million free meals and snacks to a daily average of more than 1 7 million children  Federal child nutrition laws authorize and program funding supports a range of additional programs, initiatives, and activities  Through State Administrative Expenses funding, states are entitled to federal grants to help cover administrative and oversight/monitoring costs associated with child nutrition programs  The national amount each year is equal to about 2% of child nutrition reimbursements  The majority of this money is allocated to states based on their share of spending on the covered programs; about 15% is allocated under a discretionary formula granting each state additional amounts for CACFP, commodity distribution, and Administrative Review efforts  In addition, states receive payments for their role in overseeing summer programs (about 2 5% of their summer program aid)  States are free to apportion their federal administrative expense payments among child nutrition initiatives (including commodity distribution activities) as they see fit, and appropriated funding is available to states for two years  State Administrative Expense spending in FY2017 totaled approximately $279 million  Team Nutrition is a USDA-FNS program that includes a variety of school meals initiatives around nutrition education and the nutritional content of the foods children eat in schools  This includes Team Nutrition Training Grants, which provide funding to state agencies for training and technical assistance, such as help implementing USDA's nutrition requirements and the Dietary Guidelines for Americans  From 2004 to 2018, Team Nutrition also included the HealthierUS Schools Challenge (HUSSC), which originated in the 2004 reauthorization of the Child Nutrition Act  HUSSC was a voluntary certification initiative designed to recognize schools that have created a healthy school environment through the promotion of nutrition and physical activity  Farm-to-school programs broadly refer to "efforts that bring regionally and locally produced foods into school cafeterias," with a focus on enhancing child nutrition  The goals of these efforts include increasing fruit and vegetable consumption among students, supporting local farmers and rural communities, and providing nutrition and agriculture education to school districts and farmers  HHFKA amended existing child nutrition programs to establish mandatory funding of $5 million per year for competitive farm-to-school grants that support schools and nonprofit entities in establishing farm-to-school programs that improve a school's access to locally produced foods  The FY2018 appropriations law provided an additional $5 million in discretionary funding to remain available until expended  Grants may be used for training, supporting operations, planning, purchasing equipment, developing school gardens, developing partnerships, and implementing farm-to-school programs  USDA's Office of Community Food Systems provides additional resources on farm-to-school issues  Through an Administrative Review process (formerly referred to as Coordinated Review Effort (CRE)), USDA-FNS, in cooperation with state agencies, conducts periodic on-site NSLP school compliance and accountability evaluations to improve management and identify administrative, subsidy claim, and meal quality problems  State agencies are required to conduct administrative reviews of all school food authorities (SFAs) that operate the NSLP under their jurisdiction at least once during a three-year review cycle  Federal Administrative Review expenditures were approximately $9 9 million in FY2017  USDA-FNS and state agencies conduct many other child nutrition program support activities for which dedicated funding is provided  Among other examples, there is the Institute of Child Nutrition (ICN), which provides technical assistance, instruction, and materials related to nutrition and food service management; it receives $5 million a year in mandatory funding appropriated in statute  ICN is located at the University of Mississippi  USDA-FNS provides training on food safety education  Funding is also provided for USDA-FNS to conduct studies, provide training and technical assistance, and oversee payment accuracy  Appendix A  Acronyms Used in This Report Appendix B  Per-meal or Per-snack Reimbursement Rates for Child Nutrition Programs This appendix lists the specific reimbursement rates discussed in the earlier sections of the report  Reimbursement rates are adjusted for inflation for each school or calendar year according to terms laid out in the programs' authorizing laws  Each year, the new rates are announced in the Federal Register   
Report 2:  A FIT official acknowledged that assessing software functionality, rather than implementation, was emphasized during the discovery process  Although DHS relied on OMB and Treasury’s designation of IBC as a federal SSP, this FIT official also told us that because agencies’ specific needs can vary significantly, agencies are responsible for conducting sufficient due diligence to assess a federal SSP’s ability to meet their requirements  Project schedule: DHS, IBC, FIT, and USSM officials acknowledged that migrating the TRIO components to IBC within original time frames was a significant challenge given the overall magnitude and complexity of the TRIO project  According to DHS officials and TRIO project documentation, DHS identified delays in completing various tasks and milestones including providing design phase technical documentation and design processing proposed change requests; meeting proposed baseline schedules for implementing Coast Guard and TSA on the modernized IBC solution; and achieving initial operating capability requirements and stabilizing the production environment after DNDO’s migration to IBC because of various issues related to reporting, invoice payment processing, contract management processes, and resolving help desk tickets in a timely manner  DHS officials also stated that IBC did not consistently update the IMS to ensure that it accurately reflected all required tasks, the completion status, and the resources required to complete them  Concerns related to meeting milestones and updating the IMS were discussed during periodic status update meetings that included DHS, IBC, OMB, FIT, and USSM officials  IBC and DHS officials acknowledged that processes for communicating and resolving issues were not always efficient and contributed to schedule delays  In addition, in November 2016, USSM noted several concerns based on its review of a draft IMS supporting TSA’s re-planning efforts to go-live in October 2017  USSM’s concerns included an incomplete project scope and schedule and need for additional discovery to determine cost and level of effort, an extremely aggressive schedule with very limited contingencies for the lack of interim checkpoints or oversight on tasks exceeding 30 days, the need for a resource-loaded IMS that incorporates an appropriate level of detail, and the need for an expedited program governance strategy and escalation path that DHS and IBC leadership could use to make program decisions within the time allotted on the schedule  Complex requirements: DHS, IBC, FIT, and USSM officials acknowledged the overall complexity of the TRIO project and that the lack of a detailed understanding of the components’ requirements earlier in the project impacted IBC’s and DHS’s ability to satisfy the requirements as planned  For example, USSM and FIT officials told us that under the shared services model, the approach for onboarding new customers usually involves migrating to a proven configuration of a solution that is already being used by the provider’s existing customers  However, rather than taking this approach, DHS and IBC agreed to implement a more recent version of Oracle Federal Financial software (version 12 2) with integrated contract life cycle and project modules  Under this approach, IBC’s plans included migrating other existing customers to this upgraded environment  USSM officials told us that migrating TRIO components to a new solution that required configuring new software and related applications and developing related interfaces introduced additional complexities that contributed to issues on the TRIO project  According to a FIT official, the functionality of this more recent version of software is very different than that of the version IBC’s existing customers used  This official stated that IBC did not have the needed government personnel with knowledge and experience associated with this new software, a condition that likely contributed to the challenges experienced on the TRIO project  IBC officials acknowledged that IBC’s lack of familiarity with Oracle 12 2 increased the complexity of the TRIO project  In addition, DHS and IBC perspectives on the need for changes differed because of the lack of clarity regarding TRIO project requirements  DHS officials told us that many change requests on the TRIO project reflected the need for required functionality based on previously stated requirements  They also told us that they did not consider DNDO-related requirements to be overly complex when compared to those associated with IBC’s similarly sized customers  However, DHS officials stated that as of June 2017, IBC has not yet met DNDO’s needs to deliver a functioning travel system interface and other requirements  According to IBC officials, TRIO project change requests to address components’ requirements were extensive and included significant customizations to meet unique requirements that were not aligned with the federal shared service model  IBC officials noted additional challenges in addressing TRIO project requirements related to DHS’s efforts to address certain organizational change management and business process reengineering responsibilities  According to IBC officials, in some instances, the TRIO components provided conflicting requirements related to the same process that would have been more consistent had DHS completed more of its business process reengineering efforts prior to providing them to IBC  Project costs: According to the July 2014 discovery report, proposed implementation costs for the TRIO project totaled $89 9 million  However, according to DHS officials and TRIO project documentation, estimated costs significantly increased because of schedule delays, unanticipated complexities, and other challenges  In January 2017, DHS prepared a summary of estimated TRIO project implementation costs associated with its IAA with IBC  According to this summary, estimated IBC-related TRIO project implementation costs through fiscal year 2017 increased by approximately $42 8 million (54 percent) from the $79 2 million provided in the original August 2014 IAA with IBC as a result of modifications required, in part, to address challenges impacting the project  DHS officials also expressed concerns regarding increases in estimated operations and maintenance costs for the IBC solution  For example, according to a December 2016 memorandum to DHS on action items associated with failing to meet the baseline schedule date for initial operational capability, DNDO stated that IBC’s updated projected costs of operations and maintenance of its system were unaffordable  In connection with these costs, DHS officials also stated that IBC determined that separate, rather than shared, help desk resources were required to support the TRIO project because it was significantly different from the solution that IBC’s existing customers used  As a result, the officials indicated that these costs were more than originally expected  However, IBC officials told us that a portion of the increase in help desk- related costs was also due to DNDO employees not using the system properly because they were not sufficiently trained on it before it was implemented  In addition, challenges impacting the TRIO project have contributed to significant changes in the path forward on the project; as a result, the extent to which overall TRIO project modernization costs will be impacted going forward has not yet been determined  Project management and communication: According to DHS officials, various program management-related challenges impacted the TRIO project  For example, they expressed concerns regarding the effectiveness of IBC’s project management efforts including cost, schedule, and change management as well as IBC’s allocation of resources and slow decision-making process  They also stated that DHS provided significant time and resources to make up for fundamental project management activities that were under IBC’s control and not performed  In addition, DHS officials identified limitations associated with (1) poorly defined service level agreements and program performance metrics, (2) poor quality control plan, and (3) the lack of mechanisms for measuring delivery and addressing concerns regarding IBC’s performance  DHS officials told us that although various mechanisms can be used to hold commercial vendors accountable—such as cure notices, quality assurance surveillance plans, and incentives or disincentives to monitor performance—few mechanisms are available to hold federal agency service providers accountable for performance concerns  DHS officials also acknowledged challenges in their project management and communication efforts and identified lessons learned to help improve future efforts, including the need to establish a performance-based contract to determine objective and enforceable activity level metrics; be more prepared for organizational changes; improve vendor, project, and schedule management efforts; better understand SSP resource plans and monitor SSP efforts to help ensure that sufficient resources are secured timely; and centralize program management for financial system modernization functions, rather than continuing with the structure used on the TRIO project—for example, the TRIO project’s program management structure consisted of program management offices at the component level performing cost, schedule, and technical monitoring activities with DHS headquarters’ involvement focused on governance and oversight, resulting in duplicate efforts across components  IBC officials acknowledged challenges concerning IBC’s lack of sufficient resources and turnover, as described above  However, they told us that DHS’s approach to project management often resulted in duplicative meetings and a lengthy decision-making process involving several officials and multiple review and approval processes  According to USSM officials, the TRIO project team focused an unbalanced portion of its efforts on the delivery of technology at the expense of organizational change management, communication management, and other project management areas  For example, the failure to incorporate lessons learned from DNDO’s deployment adversely affected subsequent TRIO project implementation efforts, as change management activities did not address previously encountered risks  An OMB staff member concurred with the lessons learned that DHS identified, including those indicating the need for stronger project management  While the project is ongoing, the OMB staff member noted the importance of DHS having well-defined requirements for the project and better coordination to achieve the desired outcomes  In connection with TRIO project challenges, DHS officials told us that IBC notified DHS in April 2016 that it would not be able to meet the planned October 2016 implementation date for TSA  In response, DHS and IBC established the TSA Replan Tiger Team to perform a detailed assessment of potential courses of action  According to DHS officials, DHS and IBC subsequently took various actions to help address these and other challenges impacting the TRIO project, as summarized below  May 2016: IBC requested additional funding for fiscal year 2016 for 14 additional IBC and contractor personnel to strengthen program coordination and management support  According to DHS officials, DHS provided this requested funding along with additional funding to establish a business integration office to help strengthen cross organizational communication  DHS determined that plans for migrating TSA and Coast Guard to IBC during the first quarter of fiscal years 2017 and 2018, respectively, were not viable  As a result, their planned migrations were each extended an additional year  June 2016: DHS and IBC developed a comprehensive remediation plan to track progress on efforts to resolve numerous issues associated with DNDO’s production environment that continued to hamper its stability since going live in November 2015  According to DHS officials, these issues related to invoice payment and interest accruals, contract life cycle management, reporting, and other activities and have required numerous work-arounds to execute business processes  August to October 2016: DHS, Coast Guard, and IBC determined that a similar replanning effort was needed for Coast Guard’s successful migration to IBC  According to DHS officials, IBC indicated that it was unable to simultaneously provide DNDO production and TSA implementation support while also addressing the complexities related to Coast Guard  DHS officials told us that another Tiger Team established to address Coast Guard issues failed to complete the scope of its charter, and as a result, Coast Guard was forced to assume a minimum of a 2- year delay (rather than the 1-year delay previously determined in May 2016) and that this significantly increased program costs  They further stated that some of the team’s deliverables have not been initiated or remain outstanding as of June 2017  December 2016: IBC communicated to DHS that it cannot support the discovery phase with DHS’s CUBE modernization project  In addition, DHS approved the establishment of a Joint Program Management Office to serve as the overarching program management for DHS financial systems modernization projects  According to DHS officials, using a department-wide approach will enable DHS to more effectively leverage the resources and expertise across all modernization projects  January 2017: IBC communicated to DHS that it cannot support Coast Guard implementation in October 2018, and DHS and IBC established a joint CPWG to assess viable options for improving program performance and addressing stakeholder concerns and key TRIO project priorities  February 2017: DHS and IBC issued a joint memorandum to provide an update on contingency planning discussions  DHS and IBC shared commitments and determinations included (1) stabilizing the DNDO production environment and executing TSA implementation activities, (2) delivering the best value for the government and ensuring mutual success to the greatest extent possible, (3) preserving and protecting the current investment, and (4) making TSA implementation the first priority  In addition, DHS and IBC presented two options as representing the best opportunities for success in improving program performance and addressing stakeholder concerns: (1) continue with the status quo plan for Coast Guard implementation in October 2019, with significant improvements to program management and overall support capability and capacity, or (2) platform replacement  Platform replacement was presented as the preferred path toward meeting the needs of both DHS and IBC  Under this option, DHS and IBC would proceed with TSA implementation and work toward an orderly transition of TRIO components to an alternate service provider, hosting location, or both  March 2017: According to DHS officials, DHS, IBC, and USSM officials met to review certain critical success criteria for TSA’s implementation  Based on these discussions, it was determined that TSA would not go live with IBC in fiscal year 2018 given the high-risk schedule and critical criteria involved and the Coast Guard implementation would also be delayed accordingly  Further, TSA release 3 0 would be delivered in October 2017 or as soon as possible thereafter  In addition, the CPWG would continue working to identify an alternative path forward, and DHS and IBC would identify and evaluate critical transition activities and timelines  April 2017: The CPWG recommended moving away from IBC to a commercial service provider leveraging the cloud as the best course of action to complete TRIO project implementation and as the most fiscally responsible approach from a long-term sustainment and cost perspective  The CPWG’s recommendation was based on its analysis of six options and proposed a transition timeline, including key activities, as shown in figure 3  May 2017: During its May 3, 2017 briefing of the Financial Systems Modernization Executive Steering Committee, DHS indicated that two of the options that the CPWG considered were no longer viable, including the CPWG’s recommendation to transition to a commercial cloud service provider because the software was not yet cloud-ready  DHS ranked the remaining four options using 13 OMB risk factors as selection criteria and determined that migrating the solution to a DHS data center represented the best option going forward  In addition, DHS decided to move forward with discovery efforts related to this option  According to its briefing presentation and DHS officials, the notional timeline of planned key events for the TRIO project included various items, as shown in figure 4  DHS officials indicated that DHS expects to present the findings and recommendations resulting from discovery efforts associated with this new path forward to USSM and OMB for concurrence  As of August 2017, results of this effort were under review by DHS leadership  The TRIO project represents a key element of DHS’s efforts to address long-standing deficiencies in its financial management systems and further improve financial management  Following best practices to manage risks effectively can help provide increased assurance that large, complex projects—such as the TRIO project—will achieve planned objectives  DNDO’s AA process substantially met the four characteristics of a reliable, high-quality AOA process  However, Coast Guard’s and TSA’s AAs substantially met one and partially met three of these four characteristics  Further, DHS did not always follow best practices for managing the risks of using IBC for the TRIO project  As a result, TRIO components faced an increased risk that the solution they chose would not represent the best alternative for meeting their mission needs and that the risks impacting the TRIO project would not be effectively managed to mitigate adverse impacts  In addition, significant challenges have impacted the TRIO project, raising concerns about the extent to which objectives will be achieved as planned  Plans for DHS’s path forward on the TRIO project, as of May 2017, involve significant changes, such as transitioning away from IBC and a 2-year delay in completing Coast Guard’s and TSA’s migration to a modernized solution  Without greater adherence to best practices for analyzing alternatives and managing project risks, DHS continues to face increased risk that its financial management system modernization project will not provide reasonable assurance of achieving its mission objectives  We are making the following two recommendations to DHS: The DHS Under Secretary for Management should develop and implement effective processes and improve guidance to reasonably assure that future AAs fully follow AOA process best practices and reflect the four characteristics of a reliable, high-quality AOA process  (Recommendation 1) The DHS Under Secretary for Management should improve the Risk Management Planning Handbook and other relevant guidance for managing risks associated with financial management system modernization projects to fully incorporate risk management best practices, including defining thresholds to facilitate review of performance metrics to determine when risks become unacceptable; identifying and analyzing risks to include periodically reconsidering risk sources, documenting risks specifically related to the lack of sufficient, reliable cost and schedule information needed to help properly manage and oversee the project, and timely disposition of IV&V contractor-identified risks; developing risk mitigation plans with specific risk-handling activities, the costs and benefits of implementing them, and contingency plans for selected critical risks; and implementing risk mitigation plans to include establishing periods of performance for risk-handling activities and defining time intervals for updating and certifying the accuracy and completeness of information on risks in DHS’s risk register  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this product to DHS and the Department of the Interior for comment  In its comments, reprinted in appendix IV, DHS concurred with our recommendations and provided details on its implementation of the recommendations as discussed below  In addition, DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  The Department of the Interior only provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  DHS stated that it remains committed to its financial system modernization program  Specifically, regarding our first recommendation to develop and implement effective processes and improve guidance to reasonably assure that future AAs fully follow AOA process best practices and reflect the four characteristics of a reliable, high-quality AOA process, DHS stated that it agrees that effective processes and guidance are necessary to assure best practices  DHS also stated that it is important to note that the GAO-identified best practices were published more than 2 years after the TRIO components’ AAs were completed  While this is the case, as discussed in our report, these best practices are based on long- standing, fundamental tenets of sound decision making and economic analysis and were identified by compiling and reviewing commonly mentioned AOA policies and guidance that are known to and have been used by government and private sector entities  DHS also stated that it has already implemented this recommendation through its issuance of guidance and instructions in 2016 and that a copy of this additional guidance and instructions was provided to GAO  However, the documentation provided by DHS does not fully address our recommendation  As part of our recommendation follow-up process, we will coordinate with DHS to obtain additional information on its efforts to address our recommendation  With regard to our second recommendation to improve the Risk Management Planning Handbook and other relevant guidance, DHS stated that it concurred and agreed that the Risk Management Planning Handbook required updating to fully incorporate risk management best practices  In addition, DHS described actions it will take, and has taken, to revise and publish an updated handbook  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, the DHS Under Secretary for Management, the Acting DHS Chief Financial Officer, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Director of the Interior Business Center  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9869 or khana@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V  To determine the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) followed best practices in analyzing the alternatives used in choosing the preferred alternative for modernizing TRIO components’ financial management systems, we reviewed information that the TRIO components provided as part of their alternatives analysis (AA) process, referred to as the AA body of work, which includes the AA and other supporting documentation that is not specifically included in the AA  In addition, we discussed the DHS AA process with the TRIO components and DHS officials  We evaluated each TRIO component’s AA body of work and assessed this information against the GAO-identified 22 analysis of alternatives (AOA) process best practices  We then scored each AA against those best practices  In appendix II, these GAO- identified best practices are described in detail  Our evaluation comprised the following steps: (1) two GAO analysts separately examined the AA information received for each component, providing a score for each of 18 best practices; (2) a third GAO analyst resolved any differences between the two analysts’ initial scoring; and (3) a GAO specialist on AOA best practices, independent of the audit team, reviewed the team’s AA documentation, scores, and analyses for consistency  The GAO specialist also assessed the four best practices related to cost estimating  We used the average scores for each best practice to determine an overall score for four summary characteristics—well-documented, comprehensive, unbiased, and credible—of a reliable, high-quality AOA process at each TRIO component  Next, we shared our preliminary analysis with the TRIO components and DHS, and requested their technical comments and any additional information for our further consideration  For those characteristics of the AA process that received a score of partially met or below, we met with TRIO component and DHS officials to discuss potential reasons that an AA did not always conform to best practices  Finally, using the same methodology and scoring process explained above, we performed a final assessment based on our preliminary analysis and the comments and additional information received  The best practices were not used to determine whether DHS made the correct decision in selecting Department of the Interior’s Interior Business Center (IBC) to implement the financial management systems modernization solution or whether the TRIO project would have arrived at a different conclusion had it more fully conformed to these best practices  We also reviewed DHS guidance for conducting AOAs and AAs against the GAO-identified 22 AOA process best practices using the same methodology described above for reviewing the TRIO components’ AAs  In the course of applying these best practices to a TRIO component’s AA and to DHS guidance for the AA process, we assessed the reasonableness of the information we collected  We determined that the information from the DHS AA process was sufficiently reliable to use in assessing the TRIO components’ AAs and DHS guidance against these 22 best practices  To determine the key factors, metrics, and processes used by the TRIO components in developing and evaluating DHS’s alternative solutions and final choice for financial system modernization, we reviewed each component’s AA, including a description of (1) the alternatives considered, (2) the market research conducted, (3) the three alternatives evaluated, (4) the selection criteria used and how the criteria were weighted, (5) how each alternative scored against the selection criteria, and (6) the alternative that scored the best according to the component’s evaluation  To determine the extent to which DHS managed the risks of using IBC consistent with risk management best practices, we reviewed DHS’s and TRIO components’ risk management guidance and other documentation supporting their risk management efforts, including risk registers, mitigation plans, status reports, and risk management meeting minutes  We also met with officials to gain an understanding of the key processes and documents used for managing and reporting on TRIO project risks  We assessed the processes against best practices that the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) identified  The practices we selected are fundamental to effective risk management activities  These practices are identified in SEI’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration (CMMI®) for Acquisition, Version 1 3  In particular, the key best practices for preparing for risk management are determine risk sources and categories, define risk parameters, and establish a risk management strategy  The key best practices for identifying and analyzing risks are evaluate, categorize, and prioritize risks  The key best practices for mitigating identified risks are develop risk mitigation plans and implement risk mitigation plans  We applied the criteria from the CMMI risk management process area to determine the extent to which the expected practices were implemented, or future activities were planned for, by the program office  The rating system we used is as follows: (1) meets, or generally satisfies all elements of the specific practice; (2) partially meets, or generally satisfies a portion of specific practice elements; and (3) does not meet, or does not satisfy specific practice elements  In the context of the best practices methodology, we assessed the reliability of TRIO project risk data contained in DHS’s risk register  We interviewed officials on how the risk register was developed and maintained, including key control activities used to provide reasonable assurance of the accuracy of the information reported in the register  We reviewed DHS’s July 2016 risk register and minutes from risk management committee meetings (one meeting per quarter, randomly selected)  Of 120 TRIO project risks on the July 2016 risk register, we found 13 risks with missing data  Of 47 active risks identified, 28 risk records had not been modified in the previous 3 months and the register did not indicate when their accuracy was last confirmed and 35 risks were beyond their indicated impact dates but had not been marked as issues  We concluded that the pervasiveness of these data reliability problems decreased the usefulness of the risk register in connection with managing TRIO project risks  To determine the key factors or challenges that have impacted the TRIO project and DHS’s plans for completing remaining key priorities, we met with DHS, IBC, Office of Financial Innovation and Transformation, and Unified Shared Services Management office officials and Office of Management and Budget staff to obtain their perspectives  In addition, we reviewed documentation provided by these officials, including TRIO project status reports and memorandums, leadership briefings, and other presentations  We conducted this performance audit from March 2016 to September 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  Many guides describe an approach to an analysis of alternatives (AOA); however, there is no single set of practices for the AOA process that has been broadly recognized by both the government and private sector entities  GAO has previously identified 22 best practices for an AOA process by (1) compiling and reviewing commonly mentioned AOA policies and guidance used by different government and private sector entities and (2) incorporating experts’ comments on a draft set of practices to develop a final set of practices  These practices are based on longstanding, fundamental tenets of sound decision making and economic analysis  In addition, these practices can be applied to a wide range of activities in which an alternative must be selected from a set of possible options, as well as to a broad range of capability areas, projects, and programs  These practices can provide a framework to help ensure that entities consistently and reliably select the project alternative that best meets mission needs  The guidance below is an overview of the key principles that lead to a successful AOA process and not as a “how to” guide with detailed instructions for each best practice identified  The 22 best practices that GAO identified are grouped into the following five phases: 1  Initialize the AOA process: Includes best practices that are applied before starting the process of identifying, analyzing, and selecting alternatives  This includes determining the mission need and functional requirements, developing the study time frame, creating a study plan, and determining who conducts the analysis  2  Identify alternatives: Includes best practices that help ensure that the alternatives to be analyzed are sufficient, diverse, and viable  3  Analyze alternatives: Includes best practices that compare the alternatives to be analyzed  The best practices in this category help ensure that the team conducting the analysis uses a standard, quantitative process to assess the alternatives  4  Document and review the AOA process: Includes best practices that would be applied throughout the AOA process, such as documenting all steps taken to initialize, identify, and analyze alternatives and to select a preferred alternative in a single document  5  Select a preferred alternative: Includes a best practice that is applied by the decision maker to compare alternatives and to select a preferred alternative  The five phases address different themes of analysis necessary to complete the AOA process, and comprise the beginning of the AOA process (defining the mission needs and functional requirements) through the final step of the AOA process (selecting a preferred alternative)  We also identified four characteristics that relate to a reliable, high-quality AOA process—that the AOA process is well-documented, comprehensive, unbiased, and credible  Table 4 shows the four characteristics and their relevant AOA best practices  Conforming to the 22 best practices helps ensure that the preferred alternative selected is the one that best meets the agency’s mission needs  Not conforming to the best practices may lead to an unreliable AOA process, and the agency will not have assurance that the preferred alternative best meets mission needs  The Department of Homeland Security’s TRIO components—the U S  Coast Guard (Coast Guard), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)—conducted alternatives analyses (AA) during 2012 and 2013 to determine the best alternative for transitioning to a modernized financial management system solution  We evaluated the TRIO components’ AA processes against analysis of alternatives (AOA) best practices GAO identified as necessary characteristics of a reliable, high-quality AOA process (described in app  II)  GAO’s assessment of the extent to which Coast Guard’s, TSA’s, and DNDO’s AAs met each of the 22 best practices is detailed in tables 5, 6, and 7  In addition to the contact named above, James Kernen (Assistant Director), William Brown, Courtney Cox, Eric Essig, Valerie Freeman, Matthew Gardner, Jason Lee, Jennifer Leotta, and Madhav Panwar made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The "child nutrition programs" refer to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) programs that provide food for children in school or institutional settings. The best known programs, which serve the largest number of children, are the school meals programs: the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and the School Breakfast Program (SBP). The child nutrition programs also include the Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), which provides meals and snacks in day care and after school settings; the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP), which provides food during the summer months; the Special Milk Program (SMP), which supports milk for schools that do not participate in NSLP or SBP; and the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP), which funds fruit and vegetable snacks in select elementary schools. Funding: The vast majority of the child nutrition programs account is considered mandatory spending, with trace amounts of discretionary funding for certain related activities. Referred to as open-ended, "appropriated entitlements," funding is provided through the annual appropriations process; however, the level of spending is controlled by benefit and eligibility criteria in federal law and dependent on the resulting levels of participation. Federal cash funding (in the form of per-meal reimbursements) and USDA commodity food support is guaranteed to schools and other providers based on the number of meals or snacks served and participant category (e.g., free meals for poor children get higher subsidies). Participation: The child nutrition programs serve children of varying ages and in different institutional settings. The NSLP and SBP have the broadest reach, serving qualifying children of all ages in school settings. Other child nutrition programs serve more-narrow populations. CACFP, for example, provides meals and snacks to children in early childhood and after-school settings among other venues. Programs generally provide some subsidy for all food served but a larger federal reimbursement for food served to children from low-income households. Administration: Responsibility for child nutrition programs is divided between the federal government, states, and localities. The state agency and type of local provider differs by program. In the NSLP and SBP, schools and school districts ("school food authorities") administer the program. Meanwhile, SFSP (and sometimes CACFP) uses a model in which sponsor organizations handle administrative responsibilities for a number of sites that serve meals. Reauthorization: The underlying laws covering the child nutrition programs were last reauthorized in the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA, P.L. 111-296, enacted December 13, 2010). This law made significant changes to child nutrition programs, including increasing federal financing for school lunches, expanding access to community eligibility and direct certification options for schools, and expanding eligibility options for home child care providers. The law also required an update to school meal nutrition guidelines as well as new guidelines for food served outside the meal programs (e.g., snacks sold in vending machines and cafeteria a la carte lines). Current Issues: The 114th Congress began but did not complete a 2016 child nutrition reauthorization, and there was no significant legislative activity with regard to reauthorization in the 115th Congress. However, the vast majority of operations and activities continue with funding provided by appropriations laws. Current issues in the child nutrition programs are discussed in CRS Report R45486, Child Nutrition Programs: Current Issues.