prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: With a staff of over 47,000 members, the Coast Guard operates a multimission fleet of 201 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and over 1,400 boats and ships  Operational control of surface and air assets is divided into two geographic Areas (Pacific and Atlantic), within which are nine Districts consisting of 37 sectors and the stations within them  The Coast Guard’s program oversight, policy development, and personnel administration are carried out at the Coast Guard’s headquarters  As shown in table 1, the Coast Guard is responsible for 11 statutory missions identified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended  The Coast Guard manages these missions through six mission programs, also listed in table 1  As part of its marine safety mission, for example, the Coast Guard conducts, among other activities, safety inspections and vessel accident investigations, including those involving commercial fishing vessels, which are part of an industry with one of the highest death rates of any industry in the United States  For each of its 11 missions, the Coast Guard has developed goals and targets to assess and communicate agency performance  The Coast Guard’s performance assessment process also includes identifying performance gaps and implementing corrective actions to address unmet performance goals  As part of its process, the Coast Guard is to establish targets for the current and subsequent 2 fiscal years, according to Coast Guard officials  Each target is set by the Coast Guard, but according to the Coast Guard’s Annual Performance Report (APR), some are derived from external factors  For example, DHS requires that Coast Guard set a 100 percent target for the percent of people in imminent danger saved in the maritime environment  Further, several of the Coast Guard’s assets used to conduct these missions are approaching the end of their intended service lives  As part of its efforts to modernize its assets used to carry out various missions, the Coast Guard has begun acquiring new vessels, such as the National Security Cutter, the Fast Response Cutter as well as other assets  However, concerns surrounding the affordability of this effort remain as the Coast Guard continues to pursue multiple new acquisitions without long-term planning to guide the affordability of its acquisition portfolio  Figure 1 shows the Coast Guard’s Fast Response Cutter and National Security Cutter  We previously reported on actions the Coast Guard could take to ensure that, among other things, it addresses limitations posed by incomplete data, the use of unrealistic asset performance data, and limitations with its performance goal data, for more effective program management  Examples of data limitations that we have recommended that the Coast Guard take action on are below  Improve completeness of mission data  In December 2017, we found that several different federal agencies play a role in overseeing and promoting commercial fishing vessel safety, including the Coast Guard  As part of its marine safety activities, the Coast Guard conducts, among other activities, safety inspections and vessel accident investigations  Commercial fishing has one of the highest death rates of any industry in the United States and vessel disasters are the leading cause of fatalities among fishers, according to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health  However, our December 2017 review found that more information is needed to calculate vessel safety statistics that could enhance the Coast Guard’s knowledge about accident, injury, and fatality trends involving commercial fishing vessels  The Coast Guard collects some data on commercial fishing vessels that operate in federal waters—including a vessel’s length and construction date—but data on the population of the active U S  commercial fishing vessel fleet are not complete  Between 2006 and 2015, the Coast Guard investigated 2,101 commercial fishing vessel accidents that were identified as occurring in federal waters  While the number of accidents generally increased over this time period, the number of injuries and fatalities declined over the same 10-year period  However, we could not assess the number of accidents, injuries, and fatalities by fishery— meaning the area in which a certain type of fish (e g , shrimp, salmon, crab) is caught—because the Coast Guard’s data is not complete  Further, we were unable to calculate the rates of commercial fishing vessel accidents, injuries, and fatalities, because reliable data on certain information needed to do so—including the total number of vessels that are actively fishing and the fishery or region in which the vessel operates—are either not maintained or are not collected by the Coast Guard or other federal agencies  Having this information could be useful to carrying out the Coast Guard’s marine safety mission, which includes enforcing laws to prevent death, injury and property loss in the marine environment  We recommended in our December 2017 report that the Coast Guard ensure that data it collects during commercial fishing vessel incident investigations is accurately captured  We also recommended that the Coast Guard work with stakeholders to form a working group to determine an efficient means to establish a reliable estimate of the population of active commercial fishing vessels  The Coast Guard agreed with both recommendations, and in February 2018 informed us that it is in the process of developing additional data fields to capture more information, such as the fishery in which the commercial fishing is involved, and is engaging stakeholders to establish an appropriate working group  We will continue to monitor these actions  Use more realistic asset performance data  In our May 2016 report on Coast Guard strategic planning, we found that the Coast Guard did not provide field units with realistic goals for allocating assets, by mission  We reported that the Coast Guard’s strategic allocations of assets were based on unrealistic assumptions about the performance capacity of its assets and did not reflect asset condition and unscheduled maintenance  This was due, in part, to the Coast Guard not including information from its field units on the actual performance of its assets  For example, agency officials noted that one of its classes of cutters was 50 years old and these cutters were hampered by mechanical failures requiring emergency dry dock repairs, which resulted in reduced availability to carry out their missions during the year  In another example, a field unit stated that based on historical use, it planned for 575 hours per vessel for one type of cutter instead of the 825 hours performance capacity  Because actual asset use has consistently fallen below asset performance capacities, there is not a direct alignment between the Coast Guard’s strategic operational goals and its prospects for achieving those goals  As a result, the headquarters’ strategic intent, which is based on asset capacity rather than actual performance, did not provide the field with strategic, realistic goals for allocating assets by mission  Agencies should use quality information that is appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and timely to achieve objectives and address related risks  We recommended that the Coast Guard incorporate field unit input, such as information on assets’ actual performance, to inform more realistic asset allocation decisions  The Coast Guard concurred with this recommendation, and in February 2018 informed us that it plans to address this recommendation through changes to two process documents that are under revision, with an expected completion date in March 2018  Improve performance goal data  In our October 2017 review of Coast Guard performance goals, we reported that the Coast Guard and DHS identified limitations with two of the seven selected performance goals we reviewed, including the five year average number of recreational boating deaths and injuries  In particular, officials believe that many recreational boating injuries that do not require hospitalization are not reported to the Coast Guard  These officials believe that the amount of underreporting may vary over time due to changes in industry trends, making it difficult to accurately determine actual injury rates and program performance  We determined that the data for this performance goal was not sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives due to these likely limitations  We found that the Coast Guard did not report the possible extent of these limitations with this performance goal in its fiscal year 2016 APR  For the other performance goal, the Coast Guard and DHS identified limitations with the number of detected incursions of foreign fishing vessels violating U S  waters, which is publicly reported in DHS’s APR  DHS’s review of this performance goal, reported in August 2015, raised questions about the validity of this goal—that is, whether it provides a useful measure of the Coast Guard’s performance  Specifically, the review noted that this performance goal is intended to measure a deterrence effect, but doing so is inherently difficult and may lead to contradictory interpretations of performance  In October 2017, we found that the data for this performance goal was sufficiently reliable for our reporting objective purposes, but questions remain about its validity  Reliable data is not a useful indication of performance unless it is also a valid representation of the goal being addressed  DHS officials reported that they did not include a discussion of the limitations for this performance goal in DHS’s fiscal year 2015 APR because the performance goal met the minimum threshold for data reliability despite the goal’s limitations  Coast Guard officials reported they were aware of these limitations and were working with DHS and OMB to improve the performance goal and implement corrective actions within 1 to 2 years  We recommended that the Coast Guard assess the extent to which documentation on performance data reliability contains appropriate information on known data reliability limitations and update these documents, as needed, based on the results of the assessment  The Coast Guard concurred and in February 2018, informed us that it had taken initial actions to address our recommendation  However, our preliminary review of these actions indicates that further action will be needed to fully address our recommendation, such as documenting and reporting the limitations of performance data  Our previous reports have identified areas in which the Coast Guard could improve the transparency of its data used for reporting on its mission performance and planning  Improve transparency of data on mission performance  In our October 2017 report on performance goals, we found that the Coast Guard’s APR has not been released publicly since 2011 due to a previous DHS leadership decision  Consequently, there has not been full visibility over performance across all of the Coast Guard’s missions  For example, one of the Coast Guard’s missions—defense readiness—has no goals that are publicly reported or shared with Congress, even though measures related to defense readiness are included in the Coast Guard’s APR  Coast Guard officials stated that they could see the benefit of publicly releasing their APR; however, DHS’s decision to limit the number of performance goals shared publicly has so far deterred the Coast Guard from pursuing the public release of its APR  DHS officials told us that the department is concerned about conflicting information that a component’s APR might present because it is vetted and produced separately from the DHS APR  However, the lack of transparency regarding performance data shared publicly and with Congress can result in an incomplete picture of mission performance and can limit effective oversight of Coast Guard operations  As a result, the public and Congress may be unable to determine the extent to which the Coast Guard is meeting its missions  We recommended that future Coast Guard APRs be available on the Coast Guard’s public website  The Coast Guard concurred with this recommendation and in February 2018, the Coast Guard informed us that it had completed its 2017 APR and are determining an appropriate approach for making it publicly available  Improve capital planning transparency  In our previously issued work on the Coast Guard’s annual 5-year capital investment plan (CIP), we found that the CIP does not consistently reflect current total cost estimates or the effects of tradeoffs that are made as part of the annual budget cycle  We made several recommendations in recent years intended to help the Coast Guard plan for future acquisitions and the difficult tradeoff decisions it will likely face  The Coast Guard generally concurred with these recommendations and is in various stages of implementation  For example, in 2017 we reported that we have made recommendations that DHS and the Coast Guard take several actions to gain an understanding of what the Coast Guard needs to meet its mission within its likely acquisition funding levels  These recommended actions included the Coast Guard: (1) conducting a comprehensive portfolio review across all its acquisitions to develop revised baselines that meet mission needs and reflect realistic funding scenarios and (2) developing a 20-year plan that identifies all necessary recapitalization efforts and any fiscal resources likely necessary to complete these efforts  For example, in 2014 we recommended the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to maintain the current level of service and the fiscal resources needed to acquire them  Without these efforts, the Coast Guard will continue, as it has in recent years, to plan its future acquisitions through the annual budgeting process, an approach that has led to delayed and reduced capabilities  In 2016, the Coast Guard revised its 2005 Mission Needs Statement, which provides a basic foundation for long-term investment planning that is to serve as the basis for evaluating the effectiveness of various fleet mixes, and inform the Coast Guard’s CIP  However, the 2016 Mission Needs Statement did not identify specific assets the Coast Guard needs to achieve its missions, nor did it update the annual hours it needs from each asset class to satisfactorily complete its missions  The Coast Guard has stated it is developing a 20-year Long-term Major Acquisition Plan, but it has not stated when the plan will be completed or what will be included in this plan, such as potential trade-offs that could be made across the Coast Guard’s portfolio of acquisitions to better meet mission needs within realistic funding levels  A long-term plan with a tradeoff analysis would facilitate a full understanding of the affordability challenges facing the Coast Guard while it builds the Offshore Patrol Cutter  DHS concurred with our 2014 recommendation, but it is unclear when the Coast Guard plans to complete the 20-year plan  Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, and members of the sub- committee, this completes my prepared statement  I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time  If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony, please contact Nathan Anderson at (202) 512-3841 or andersonn@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Other individuals making key contributions to this work, and the underlying reports on which it is based, include Dawn Hoff (Assistant Director); Andrew Curry (Analyst-in-Charge); Chuck Bausell; David Bieler; Richard Cederholm; John Crawford; Timothy J  DiNapoli; Michele Fejfar; Laurier R  Fish; Peter Haderlein; Eric Hauswirth; Laura Jezewski; Tracey King; Benjamin Licht; Marie A  Mak; Gary Malavenda; Diana Moldafsky; Heidi Nielson; Meg Ullengren; and Kayli Westling  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2: The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization that administers the trade rules and agreements negotiated by its 164 members to eliminate trade barriers and create nondiscriminatory rules to govern trade  It also serves as an important forum for resolving trade disputes  The United States was a major force behind the establishment of the WTO in 1995 and the rules and agreements that resulted from the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1986-1994)  The WTO encompassed and expanded on the commitments and institutional functions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was established in 1947 by the United States and 22 other nations  Through the GATT and WTO, the United States and other countries sought to establish a more open, rules-based trading system in the postwar era, with the goal of fostering international economic cooperation, stability, and prosperity worldwide  Today, the vast majority of world trade, approximately 98%, takes place among WTO members  The evolution of U S  leadership in the WTO and the institution's future agenda have been of interest to Congress  The terms set by the WTO agreements govern the majority of U S  trading relationships  Some 65% of U S  global trade is with countries that do not have free trade agreements (FTAs) with the United States, including China, the European Union (EU), India, and Japan, and thus rely on the terms of WTO agreements  Congress has recognized the WTO as the "foundation of the global trading system" within U S  trade legislation and plays a direct legislative and oversight role over WTO agreements  U S  FTAs also build on core WTO agreements  While the U S  Trade Representative (USTR) represents the United States at the WTO, Congress holds constitutional authority over foreign commerce and establishes U S  trade negotiating objectives and principles and implements U S  trade agreements through legislation  U S  priorities and objectives for the GATT/WTO are reflected in trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation since 1974  Congress also has oversight of the USTR and other executive branch agencies that participate in WTO meetings and enforce WTO commitments  The WTO's effectiveness as a negotiating body for broad-based trade liberalization has come under intensified scrutiny, as has its role in resolving trade disputes  The WTO has often struggled to reach consensus over issues that can place developed against developing country members (such as agricultural subsidies, industrial goods tariffs, and intellectual property rights protection)  It has also struggled to address newer trade barriers, such as digital trade restrictions and the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in international commerce, which have become more prominent in the years since the WTO was established  Global supply chains and advances in technology have transformed global commerce, but trade rules have failed to keep up with the pace of change; since 1995 WTO members have been unable to reach consensus for a new comprehensive multilateral agreement  As a result, many countries have turned to negotiating FTAs with one another outside the WTO to build on core WTO agreements and advance trade liberalization and new rules  Plurilateral negotiations, involving subsets of WTO members rather than all members, are also becoming a more popular forum for tackling newer issues on the global trade agenda  The most recent round of WTO negotiations, the Doha Round, began in November 2001, but concluded with no clear path forward, leaving multiple unresolved issues after the 10 th Ministerial conference in 2015  Efforts to build on current WTO agreements outside of the Doha agenda continue  While WTO members have made some progress toward determining future work plans, no major deliverables or negotiated outcomes were announced at the 11 th Ministerial conference in December 2017 and no consensus Ministerial Declaration was released  Many have concerns that the growing use of protectionist trade policies by developed and developing countries, recent U S  tariff actions and counterretaliation, and escalating trade disputes between major economies may further strain the multilateral trading system  The WTO is faced with resolving several significant pending disputes, which involve the United States, and resolving debates about the role and procedures of its Appellate Body, which reviews appeals of dispute cases  In a break from past Administrations' approaches, U S  officials have recently expressed doubt over the value of the WTO institution to the U S  economy and questioned whether leadership in the organization is a benefit or cost to the United States  While USTR Robert Lighthizer acknowledged at the most recent Ministerial that the WTO is an "important institution" that does an "enormous amount of good," the Trump Administration has expressed deep skepticism toward multilateral trade deals, including those negotiated within the WTO  In remarks to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in November 2017, President Trump stated the following: "Simply put, we have not been treated fairly by the World Trade Organization     What we will no longer do is enter into large agreements that tie our hands, surrender our sovereignty, and make meaningful enforcement practically impossible " President Trump has also at times threatened to withdraw the United States from the WTO  In addition, amid concerns about "judicial overreach" in WTO dispute findings, the Administration is currently withholding approval for judge appointments to the WTO Appellate Body—a practice that began under the Obama Administration  While many of the U S  concerns are not new and are shared by other trading partners, questions remain about U S  priorities for improving the system  With growing debate over the role and future direction of the WTO, a number of issues may be of interest to Congress, including the value of U S  membership and leadership in the WTO, whether new U S  negotiating objectives or oversight hearings are needed to address prospects for new WTO reforms and rulemaking, and the relevant authorities and the impact of potential WTO withdrawal on U S  economic and foreign policy interests  This report provides background history of the WTO, its organization, and current status of negotiations  The report also explores concerns some have regarding the WTO's future direction and key policy issues for Congress  Following World War II, nations throughout the world, led by the United States and several other developed countries, sought to establish a more open and nondiscriminatory trading system with the goal of raising the economic well-being of all countries  Aware of the role of tit-for-tat trade barriers resulting from the U S  Smoot-Hawley tariffs in exacerbating the economic depression in the 1930s, including severe drops in world trade, global production, and employment, the countries that met to discuss the new trading system considered open trade as essential for peace and economic stability  The intent of these negotiators was to establish an International Trade Organization (ITO) to address not only trade barriers but other issues indirectly related to trade, including employment, investment, restrictive business practices, and commodity agreements  Unable to secure approval for such a comprehensive agreement, however, they reached a provisional agreement on tariffs and trade rules, known as the GATT, which went into effect in 1948  This provisional agreement became the principal set of rules governing international trade for the next 47 years, until the establishment of the WTO  The GATT was neither a formal treaty nor an international organization, but an agreement between governments, to which they were contracting parties  The GATT parties established a secretariat based in Geneva, but it remained relatively small, especially compared to the staffs of international economic institutions created by the postwar Bretton Woods conference—the International Monetary Fund and World Bank  Based on a mission to promote trade liberalization, the GATT became the principal set of rules and disciplines governing international trade  The core principles and articles of the GATT (which were carried over to the WTO) committed the original 23 members, including the United States, to lower tariffs on a range of industrial goods and to apply tariffs in a nondiscriminatory manner—the so-called most-favored nation or MFN principle (see text box )  By having to extend the same benefits and concessions to members, the economic gains from trade liberalization were magnified  Exceptions to the MFN principle are allowed, however, including for preferential trade agreements outside the GATT/WTO covering "substantially" all trade among members and for nonreciprocal preferences for developing countries  GATT members also agreed to provide "national treatment" for imports from other members  For example, countries could not establish one set of health and safety regulations on domestic products while imposing more stringent regulations on imports  Although the GATT mechanism for the enforcement of these rules or principles was generally viewed as largely ineffective, the agreement nonetheless brought about a substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers  The eight "negotiating rounds" of the GATT succeeded in reducing average tariffs on industrial products from between 20%-30% to just below 4%, facilitating a 14-fold increase in world trade over its 47-year history (see Table 1 )  When the first round concluded in 1947, 23 nations had participated, which accounted for a majority of global trade at the time  When the Uruguay Round establishing the WTO concluded in 1994, 123 countries had participated and the amount of trade affected was nearly $3 7 trillion  As of the end of 2018, there are 164 WTO members, and trade flows totaled $22 6 trillion in 2017  During the first trade round held in Geneva in 1947, members negotiated a 20% reciprocal tariff reduction on industrial products, and made further cuts in subsequent rounds  The Tokyo Round represented the first attempt to reform the trade rules that had existed unchanged since 1947 by including issues and policies that could distort international trade  As a result, Tokyo Round negotiators established several plurilateral codes dealing with nontariff issues such as antidumping, subsidies, technical barriers to trade, import licensing, customs valuation, and government procurement  Countries could choose which, if any, of these codes they wished to adopt  While the United States agreed to all of the codes, the majority of GATT signatories, including most developing countries, chose not to sign the codes  The Uruguay Round, which took eight years to negotiate (1986-1994), proved to be the most comprehensive GATT trade round  This round further lowered tariffs in industrial goods and liberalized trade in areas that had eluded previous negotiators, notably agriculture and textiles and apparel  It also extended rules to new areas such as services, trade-related investment measures, and intellectual property rights  It created a trade policy review mechanism, which periodically examines each member's trade policies and practices  Significantly, the Uruguay Round created the WTO as a legal international organization charged with administering a revised and stronger dispute settlement mechanism—a principal U S  negotiating objective (see text box )—as well as many new trade agreements adopted during the long negotiation  For the most part, the Uruguay Round agreements were accepted as a single package or single undertaking , meaning that all participants and future WTO members were required to subscribe to all of the agreements  The WTO succeeded the GATT in 1995  In contrast to the GATT, the WTO was created as a permanent organization  But as with the GATT, the WTO secretariat and support staff is small by international standards and lacks independent power  The power to write rules and negotiate future trade liberalization resides specifically with the member countries, and not the WTO director-general (DG) or staff  Thus, the WTO is referred to as a member-driven organization  Decisions within the WTO are made by consensus, although majority voting can be used in limited circumstances  The highest-level body in the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which is the body of political representatives (trade ministers) from each member country ( Figure 1 )  The body that oversees the day-to-day operations of the WTO is the General Council, which consists of a representative from each member country  Many other councils and committees deal with particular issues, and members of these bodies are also national representatives  In general, the WTO has three broad functions: administering the rules of the trading system; establishing new rules through negotiations; and resolving disputes between member states  The WTO administers the global rules and principles negotiated and signed by its members  The main purpose of the rules is "to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably, and freely as possible " WTO rules and agreements are essentially contracts that bind governments to keep their trade policies within agreed limits  A number of fundamental principles guide WTO rules  In general, as with the GATT, these key principles are nondiscrimination and the notion that freer trade through the gradual reduction of trade barriers strengthens the world economy and increases prosperity  The WTO agreements apply the GATT principles of nondiscrimination as discussed above: MFN treatment and national treatment  The trade barriers concerned include tariffs, quotas, and a growing range of nontariff measures, such as product standards, food safety measures, subsidies, and discriminatory domestic regulations  The fundamental principle of reciprocity is also behind members' aim of "entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations " Transparency is another key principle of the WTO, which aims to reduce information asymmetry in markets, ensure trust, and, therefore, foster greater stability in the global trading system  Transparency commitments are incorporated into individual WTO agreements  Active participation in various WTO committees also aims to ensure that agreements are monitored and that members are held accountable for their actions  For example, members are required to publish their trade practices and policies and notify new or amended regulations to WTO committees  Regular trade policy reviews of each member's trade policies and practices provide a deeper dive into an economy's implementation of its commitments—see " Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3)  " In addition, the WTO's annual trade monitoring report takes stock of trade-restrictive and trade-facilitating measures of the collective body of WTO members  While opening markets can encourage competition, innovation, and growth, it can also entail adjustments for workers and firms  Trade liberalization can also be more difficult for the least-developed countries (LDCs) and countries transitioning to market economies  WTO agreements thus allow countries to lower trade barriers gradually  Developing countries and sensitive sectors in particular are usually given longer transition periods to fulfill their obligations; developing countries make up about two-thirds of the WTO membership—WTO members self-designate developing country status  The WTO also supplements this so-called "special and differential" treatment (SDT) for developing countries with trade capacity-building measures to provide technical assistance and help implement WTO obligations, and with permissions for countries to extend nonreciprocal, trade preference programs  In WTO parlance, when countries agree to open their markets further to foreign goods and services, they "bind" their commitments or agree not to raise them  For goods, these bindings amount to ceilings on tariff rates  A country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating with its trading partners, which could entail compensating them for loss of trade  As shown in Figure 2 , one of the achievements of the Uruguay Round was to increase the amount of trade under binding commitments  Bound tariff rates are not necessarily the rates WTO members apply in practice to imports from trading partners; so-called applied MFN rates can be lower than bound rates, as reflected in tariff reductions under the GATT  Figure 3 shows average applied MFN tariffs worldwide  In 2017, the United States simple average MFN tariff was 3 4%  A key issue in the Doha Round for the United States was lowering major developing countries' relatively high bound tariffs to below their applied rates in practice to achieve commercially meaningful new market access  Promising not to raise a trade barrier can have a significant economic effect because the promise provides traders and investors certainty and predictability in the commercial environment  A growing body of economic literature suggests certainty in the stability of tariff rates may be just as important for increasing global trade as reduction in trade barriers  This proved particularly important during the 2009 global economic downturn  Unlike in the 1930s, when countries reacted to slumping world demand by raising tariffs and other trade barriers, the WTO reported that its 153 members (at the time), accounting for 90% of world trade, by and large did not resort to protectionist measures in response to the crisis  The promotion of fair and undistorted competition is another important principle of the WTO  While the WTO is often described as a "free trade" organization, numerous rules are concerned with ensuring transparent and nondistorted competition  In addition to nondiscrimination, MFN treatment and national treatment concepts aim to promote "fair" conditions of trade  WTO rules on subsidies and antidumping in particular aim to promote fair competition in trade through recourse to trade remedies, or temporary restriction of imports, in response to alleged unfair trade practices—see " Trade Remedies  " For example, when a foreign company receives a prohibited subsidy for exporting as defined in WTO agreements, WTO rules allow governments to impose duties to offset any unfair advantage found to cause injury to their domestic industries  The scope of the WTO is broader than the GATT because, in addition to goods, it administers multilateral agreements on agriculture, services, intellectual property, and certain trade-related investment measures  These newer rules in particular are forcing the WTO and its dispute settlement system to deal with complex issues that go beyond tariff border measures  As the GATT did for 47 years, the WTO provides a negotiating forum where members reduce barriers and try to sort out their trade problems  Negotiations can involve a few countries, many countries, or all members  As part of the post-Uruguay Round agenda, negotiations covering basic telecommunications and financial services were completed under the auspices of the WTO in 1997  Selected WTO members also negotiated deals to eliminate tariffs on certain information technology products and improve rules and procedures for government procurement  A recent significant accomplishment was the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2017, addressing customs and logistics barriers  The latest round of multilateral negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), or Doha Round, launched in 2001, has achieved limited progress to date, as the agenda proved difficult and contentious  Despite a lack of consensus on its future, many view the round as effectively over  The negotiations stalled over issues such as reducing domestic subsidies and opening markets further in agriculture, industrial tariffs, nontariff barriers, services, intellectual property rights, and SDT for developing countries  The negotiations exposed fissures between developed countries, led by the United States and the EU, on the one hand, and developing countries, led by China, Brazil, and India, on the other hand, who have come to play a more prominent role in global trade  The inability of countries to achieve the objectives of the Doha Round prompted many to question the utility of the WTO as a negotiating forum, as well as the practicality of conducting a large-scale negotiation involving 164 participants with consensus and the single undertaking as guiding principles  At the same time, many proposals have been advanced for moving forward from Doha and making the WTO a stronger forum for negotiations in the future  (See " Policy Issues and Future Direction  ") The WTO arguably has been more successful in the negotiation of discrete items to which not all parties must agree or be bound (see " Plurilateral Agreements (Annex 4) ")  Some view these plurilaterals as a more promising negotiating approach for the WTO moving forward given their flexibility, as they can involve subsets of more "like-minded" partners and advance parts of the global trade agenda  Some experts have raised concerns, however, that this approach could lead to "free riders"—those who benefit from the agreement but do not make commitments—for agreements on an MFN basis, or otherwise, could isolate some countries who do not participate and may face new trade restrictions or disadvantages as a result  Others argue that only though the single undertaking approach to negotiations can there be trade-offs that are sufficient to bring all members on board  The third function of the WTO is to provide a mechanism to enforce its rules and settle trade disputes  A central goal of the United States during the Uruguay Round negotiations was to strengthen the dispute settlement mechanism that existed under the GATT  While the GATT's process for settling disputes between member countries was informal, ad hoc, and voluntary, the WTO dispute settlement process is more formalized and enforceable  Under the GATT, panel proceedings could take years to complete; any defending party could block an unfavorable ruling; failure to implement a ruling carried no consequence; and the process did not cover all the agreements  Under the WTO, there are strict timetables—though not always followed—for panel proceedings; the defending party cannot block rulings; there is one comprehensive dispute settlement process covering all the agreements; and the rulings are enforceable  WTO adjudicative bodies can authorize retaliation if a member fails to implement a ruling or provide compensation  Yet, under both systems, considerable emphasis is placed on having the member countries attempt to resolve disputes through consultations and negotiations, rather than relying on formal panel rulings  See " Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) " for more detail on WTO procedures and dispute trends  The statutory basis for U S  membership in the WTO is the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA, P L  103-465 ), which approved the trade agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round  The legislation contained general provisions on approval and entry into force of the Uruguay Round Agreements, and the relationship of the agreements to U S  laws (Section 101 of the act); authorities to implement the results of current and future tariff negotiations (Section 111 of the act); oversight of activities of the WTO (Sections 121-130 of the act); procedures regarding implementation of dispute settlement proceedings affecting the United States (Section 123 of the act); objectives regarding extended Uruguay Round negotiations; statutory modifications to implement specific agreements, including the following: Antidumping Agreement; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM); Safeguards Agreement; Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA); Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) (product standards); Agreement on Agriculture; and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)  U S  priorities and objectives for the GATT/WTO have been reflected in various trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation since 1974  For example, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 specifically contained provisions directing U S  negotiators to negotiate disciplines on agriculture, dispute settlement, intellectual property, trade in services, and safeguards, among others, that resulted in WTO agreements in the Uruguay Round (see text box above)  The Trade Act of 2002 provided U S  objectives for the Doha Round, including seeking to expand commitments on e-commerce and clarifications to the WTO dispute settlement system  The 2015 TPA, perhaps reflecting the impasse of the Doha Round, was more muted, seeking full implementation of existing agreements, enhanced compliance by members with their WTO obligations, and new negotiations to extend commitments to new areas  Section 125(b) of the URAA sets procedures for congressional disapproval of WTO participation  It specifies that Congress's approval of the WTO agreement shall cease to be effective "if and only if" Congress enacts a joint resolution calling for withdrawal  Congress may vote every five years on withdrawal; resolutions were introduced in 2000 and 2005, however neither passed  The WTO member-led body negotiates, administers, and settles disputes for agreements that cover goods, agriculture, services, certain trade-related investment measures, and intellectual property rights, among other issues  The WTO core principles are enshrined in a series of trade agreements that include rules and commitments specific to each agreement, subject to various exceptions  The GATT/WTO system of agreements has expanded rulemaking to several areas of international trade, but does not extensively cover some key areas, including multilateral investment rules, trade-related labor or environment issues, and emerging issues like digital trade or the commercial role of state-owned enterprises  The Marrakesh Agreement is the umbrella agreement under which the various agreements, annexes, commitment schedules, and understandings reside  The Marrakesh Agreement itself created the WTO as a legal international organization and sets forth its functions, structure, secretariat, budget procedures, decisionmaking, accession, entry-into-force, withdrawal, and other provisions  The Agreement contains four annexes  The three major substantive areas of commitments undertaken by the members are contained in Annex 1  The Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods establishes the rules for trade in goods through a series of sectoral or issue-specific agreements (see Table 2 )  Its core is the GATT 1994, which includes GATT 1947, the amendments, understanding, protocols, and decisions of the GATT from 1947 to 1994, cumulatively known as the GATT- acquis , as well as six Understandings on Articles of the GATT 1947 negotiated in the Uruguay Round  In addition to clarifying the core WTO principles, each agreement contains sector- or issue-specific rules and principles  The schedule of commitments identifies each member's specific binding commitments on tariffs for goods in general, and combinations of tariffs and quotas for some agricultural goods  Through a series of negotiating rounds, members agreed to the current level of trade liberalization (see Figure 2 above)  In the last four rounds of negotiations, WTO members aimed to expand international trade rules beyond tariff reductions to tackle barriers in other areas  For example, agreements on technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures aim to protect a country's rights to implement domestic regulations and standards, while ensuring they do not discriminate against trading partners or unnecessarily restrict trade  The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) includes rules and commitments on market access and disciplines on certain domestic agricultural support programs and export subsidies  Its objective was to provide a framework for WTO members to reform certain aspects of agricultural trade and domestic farm policies to facilitate more market-oriented and open trade  Regarding market access, members agreed not to restrict agricultural imports by quotas or other nontariff measures, converting them to tariff-equivalent levels of protection, such as tariff-rate quotas—a process called "tariffication " Developed countries committed to cut tariffs (or out-of-quota tariffs, those tariffs applied to any imports above the agreed quota threshold) by an average of 36% in equal increments over six years; developed countries committed to 24% tariff cuts over 10 years  Special safeguards to temporarily restrict imports were permitted in certain events, such as falling prices or surges of imports  The AoA also categorizes and restricts agricultural domestic support programs according to their potential to distort trade  Members agreed to limit and reduce the most distortive forms of domestic subsidies over 6 to 10 years, referred to as "amber box" subsidies and measured by the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) index  Subsidies considered to cause minimal distortion on production and trade were not subject to spending limits and exempted from obligations as "green box" and "blue box" subsidies or under de minimis (below a certain threshold) or SDT provisions  In addition, export subsidies were to be capped and subject to incremental reductions, both by value and quantity of exports covered  A so-called "peace" clause protected members using subsidies that comply with the agreement from being challenged under other WTO agreements, such as through use of countervailing duties; the clause expired after nine years in 2003  Members are required to regularly submit notifications on the implementation of AoA commitments—though some countries, including the United States, have raised concerns that these requirements are not abided by in a consistent fashion  Further agricultural trade reform was a major priority under the Doha Round, but negotiations have seen limited progress to date (see " Ongoing WTO Negotiations ")  However, in 2015, members reached an agreement to fully eliminate export subsidies for agriculture  The framework of the GATT did not address the growing linkages between trade and investment  During the Uruguay Round, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) was drafted to address certain investment measures that may restrict and distort trade  The agreement did not address the regulation or protection of foreign investment, but focused on investment measures that may violate basic GATT disciplines on trade in goods, such as nondiscrimination  Specifically, members committed not to apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with provisions on national treatment or a prohibition of quantitative restrictions on imports or exports  TRIMS includes an annex with an illustrative list of prohibited measures, such as local content requirements—requirements to purchase or use products of domestic origin  The agreement also includes a safeguard measure for balance of payment difficulties, which permits developing countries to temporarily suspend TRIMS obligations  While TRIMS and other WTO agreements, such as the GATS (see below), include some provisions pertaining to investment, the lack of comprehensive multilateral rules on investment led to several efforts under the Doha Round to consider proposals, which to date have been unfruitful (see " Future Negotiations ")  In December 2017, 70 WTO members announced plans to begin new discussions on developing a multilateral framework on investment facilitation, in part to complement the successful negotiation of rules on trade facilitation  The GATT agreements focused solely on trade in goods, excluding services  Services were eventually covered in the GATS as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements  The GATS provides the first and only multilateral framework of principles and rules for government policies and regulations affecting trade in services  It has served as the foundation on which rules in other trade agreements on services are based  The services trade agenda is complex due to the characteristics of the sector  "Services" refers to a growing range of economic activities, such as audiovisual, construction, computer and related services, express delivery, e-commerce, financial, professional (e g , accounting and legal services), retail and wholesaling, transportation, tourism, and telecommunications  Advances in information technology and the growth of global supply chains have reduced barriers to trade in services, expanding the services tradable across national borders  But liberalizing trade in services can be more complex than for goods, since the impediments faced by service providers occur largely within the importing country, as so-called "behind the border" barriers, some in the form of government regulations  While the right of governments to regulate service industries is widely recognized as prudent and necessary to protect consumers from harmful or unqualified providers, a main focus of WTO members is whether these regulations are applied to foreign service providers in a discriminatory and unnecessarily trade restrictive manner that limits market access  The GATS contains multiple parts, including definition of scope (excluding government-provided services); principles and obligations, including MFN treatment and transparency; market access and national treatment obligations; annexes listing exceptions that members take to MFN treatment; as well as various technical elements  Members negotiated GATS on a positive list basis, which means that the commitments only apply to those services and modes of delivery listed in each member's schedule of commitments  WTO members adopted a system of classifying four modes of delivery for services to measure trade in services and classify government measures that affect trade in services, including cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and temporary presence of natural persons ( Figure 4 )  Under GATS, unless a member country has specifically committed to open its market to suppliers in a particular service, the national treatment and market access obligations do not apply  In addition to the GATS, some members made specific sectoral commitments in financial services and telecommunications  Negotiations to expand these commitments were later folded into the broader services negotiations  WTO members aimed to update GATS provisions and market access commitments as part of the Doha Round  Several WTO members have since submitted revised offers of services liberalization, but in the view of the United States and others the talks have not yielded adequate offers of improved market access (see " Future Negotiations ")  Given the lack of progress, in 2013, 23 WTO members, including the United States, representing approximately 70% of global services trade, launched negotiations of a services-specific plurilateral agreement  Although outside of the WTO structure, participants designed the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) negotiations in a way that would not preclude a concluded agreement from someday being brought into the WTO  TiSA talks were initially led by Australia and the United States, but have since stalled; the Trump Administration has not stated a formal position on TiSA  The TRIPS Agreement marked the first time multilateral trade rules incorporated intellectual property rights (IPR)—legal, private, enforceable rights that governments grant to inventors and artists to encourage innovation and creative output  Like the GATS, TRIPS was negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round and was a major U S  objective for the round  The TRIPS Agreement sets minimum standards of protection and enforcement for IPR  Much of the agreement sets out the extent of coverage of the various types of intellectual property, including patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and geographical indications  TRIPS includes provisions on nondiscrimination and on enforcement measures, such as civil and administrative procedures and remedies  IPR disputes under the agreement are also subject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism  The TRIPS Agreement's newly placed requirements on many developing countries elevated the debate over the relationship between IPR and development  At issue is the balance of rights and obligations between protecting private right holders and securing broader public benefits, such as access to medicines and the free flow of data, especially in developing countries  TRIPS includes flexibilities for developing countries allowing longer phase-in periods for implementing obligations and, separately, for pharmaceutical patent obligations—these were subsequently extended for LDCs until January 2033 or until they no longer qualify as LDCs, whichever is earlier  The 2001 WTO "Doha Declaration" committed members to interpret and implement TRIPS obligations in a way that supports public health and access to medicines  In 2005, members agreed to amend TRIPS to allow developing and LDC members that lack production capacity to import generic medicines from third country producers under "compulsory licensing" arrangements  The amendment entered into force in January 2017  While WTO agreements uphold MFN principles, they also allow exceptions to binding tariffs in certain circumstances  The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), Agreement on Safeguards, and articles in the GATT, commonly known as the Antidumping Agreement, allow for trade remedies in the form of temporary measures (e g , primarily duties or quotas) to mitigate the adverse impact of various trade practices on domestic industries and workers  These include actions taken against dumping (selling at an unfairly low price) or to counter certain government subsidies, and emergency measures to limit "fairly"-traded imports temporarily, designed to "safeguard" domestic industries  Supporters of trade remedies view them as necessary to shield domestic industries and workers from unfair competition and to level the playing field  Other domestic constituents, including some importers and downstream consuming industries, voice concern that antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) actions can serve as disguised protectionism and create inefficiencies in the world trading system by raising prices on imported goods  How trade remedies are applied to imports has become a major source of disputes under the WTO (see below)  The United States has enacted trade remedy laws that conform to the WTO rules: U S  antidumping laws (19 U S C  §1673 et seq ) provide relief to domestic industries that have been, or are threatened with, the adverse impact of imports sold in the U S  market at prices that are shown to be less than fair market value  The relief provided is an additional import duty placed on the dumped imports  U S  countervailing duty laws (19 U S C  §1671 et seq ) give similar relief to domestic industries that have been, or are threatened with, the adverse impact of imported goods that have been subsidized by a foreign government or public entity, and can therefore be sold at lower prices than U S -produced goods  The relief provided is a duty placed on the subsidized imports  U S  safeguard laws give domestic industries relief from import surges of goods; no allegation of "unfair" practices is needed to launch a safeguard investigation  Although used less frequently than AD/CVD laws, Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U S C  §2251 et seq ), is designed to give domestic industry the opportunity to adjust to import competition and remain competitive  The relief provided is generally a temporary import duty and/or quota  Unlike AD/CVD, safeguard laws require presidential action for relief to be put into effect  The dispute settlement system, often called the "crown jewel" of the WTO, has been considered by some observers to be one of the most important successes of the multilateral trading system  WTO agreements contain provisions that are either binding or nonbinding  The WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes—Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU—provides an enforceable means for WTO members to resolve disputes arising under the binding provisions  The DSU commits members not to determine violations of WTO obligations or impose penalties unilaterally, but to settle complaints about alleged violations under DSU rules and procedures  The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is a plenary committee of the WTO, which oversees the panels and adopts the recommendation of a dispute settlement panel or Appellate Body (AB) panel  Panels are composed of three (or five in complex cases) panelists—not citizens of the members involved—chosen through a roster of "well qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals" maintained by the Secretariat  WTO members must first attempt to settle a dispute through consultations, but if these fail, a member seeking to initiate a dispute may request that a panel examine and report on its complaint  A respondent party is able to block the establishment of a panel at the DSB once, but if the complainant requests its establishment again at a subsequent meeting of the DSB, a panel is established  At its conclusion, the panel recommends a decision to the DSB that it will adopt unless all parties agree to block the recommendation  The DSU sets out a timeline of one year for the initial resolution of disputes (see Figure 5 ); however, cases are rarely resolved in this timeframe  The DSU also provides for AB review of panel reports in the event a panel decision is appealed  The AB is composed of seven rotating panelists serving four-year terms, with the possibility of a one-term reappointment  According to the DSU, appeals are to be limited to questions of law or legal interpretation developed by the panel in the case (Article 17 6)  The AB is to make a recommendation and the DSB is to ratify that recommendation within 120 days of the ratification of the initial panel report, but again, such timely resolution rarely occurs  The United States has raised several issues regarding the practices of the AB and has blocked the appointments of several judges—for more on the current debate, see " Proposed Institutional Reforms  " Following the adoption of a panel or appellate report, the DSB oversees the implementation of the findings  The losing party is then to propose how it is to bring itself into compliance "within a reasonable period of time" with the DSB-adopted findings  A reasonable period of time is determined by mutual agreement with the DSB, among the parties, or through arbitration  If a dispute arises over the manner of implementation, the DSB may form a panel to judge compliance  If a party declines to comply, the parties negotiate over compensation pending full implementation  If there is still no agreement, the DSB may authorize retaliation in the amount of the determined cost of the offending party's measure to the aggrieved party's economy  There have been some calls for reform of the dispute settlement system to deal with the procedural delays and new strains on the system, including the growing volume and complexity of cases  Filing a dispute settlement case provides a way for countries to resolve disputes through a legal process and to do so publicly, signaling to domestic and international constituents the need to address outstanding issues  Dispute settlement procedures can serve as a deterrent for countries considering not abiding by WTO agreements, and rulings can help build a body of case law to inform countries when they implement new regulatory regimes or interpret WTO agreements  That said, WTO agreements and decisions of panels are not self-executing and cannot directly modify U S  law  If a case is brought against the United States and the panel renders an adverse decision, the United States would be expected to remove the offending measure within a reasonable period of time or face the possibility of either paying compensation to the complaining member or becoming subject to sanctions, often in the form of higher tariffs on imports of certain U S  products  As of the beginning of 2019, the WTO has initiated nearly 580 disputes on behalf of its members and issued more than 350 rulings, with 2018 marking its most active year to date  Nearly two-thirds of WTO members have participated in the dispute settlement system  Not all complaints result in formal panel proceedings; about half were resolved during consultations  The complainants usually win their cases, in large part because they initiate disputes that they have a high chance of winning  In the words of WTO Director-General (DG) Roberto Azevêdo, the widespread use of the DS system is evidence it "enjoys tremendous confidence among the membership, who value it as a fair, effective, efficient mechanism to solve trade problems " The United States is an active user of the DS system  Among WTO members, the United States has been a complainant in the most dispute cases since the system was established in 1995, initiating 123 disputes, followed by the EU with 100 disputes  The two largest targets of complaints initiated by the United States are China and the EU, which, combined, account for more than one-third ( Figure 6 )  The latest summary by USTR reports that among WTO disputes through 2015 the United States largely prevailed on "core issues" in 46 of its complaints and lost in 4  Since the report was released, additional cases have been ruled in favor of the United States, including disputes over India's solar energy policies and Indonesia's import licensing requirements  The majority of disputes initiated by the United States between 2016 and early 2019 remain in the consultation or panel stages and have not been decided  As a respondent in 153 dispute cases since 1995, the United States has also had the most disputes filed against it by other WTO members, followed by the EU (85 disputes) and China (43 disputes)  The EU is the largest source of disputes filed against the United States, followed by Canada, China, South Korea, Brazil, and India  A large number of complaints concern U S  trade remedies, in particular the methodologies used for calculating and imposing antidumping duties on U S  imports  The latest summary by USTR reports that as a respondent, the United States won on "core issues" in 17 cases and lost in 57 cases through 2015  Since then, the WTO has ruled against the United States on certain aspects of complaints related to U S  trade remedies, including in cases initiated by South Korea, China, Canada, and Turkey  The United States has prevailed in other cases, for example in December 2017, a panel ruled in U S  favor in a case brought by Indonesia over U S  duties on coated paper imports  The DSB has authorized retaliation against the United States for maintaining a measure in violation of WTO rules in just a handful of cases  Most recently, in February 2019, a panel authorized South Korea to retaliate in a complaint over U S  methodology for calculating antidumping duties on South Korean imports of large residential washers  Several pending WTO disputes are of significance to the United States  One involves China's complaints over U S  and EU failure to grant China market economy status (see " China's Accession and Membership " )   Other cases involve challenges to the tariff measures imposed by the Trump Administration under U S  trade laws, including Section 201 (safeguards), Section 232 (national security), and Section 301 ("unfair" trading practices) ( Table 3 )  Nine WTO members, including China, the EU, Canada, and Mexico, initiated separate complaints at the WTO, based on allegations that U S  Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports are inconsistent with WTO rules  Consultations were unsuccessful in resolving the disputes, and panels have been established in all nine cases  Most countries notified their consultation requests pursuant to the Agreement on Safeguards, though some countries also allege that U S  tariff measures and related exemptions are contrary to U S  obligations under several provisions of the GATT  Several other WTO members have requested to join the disputes as third parties  On July 16, 2018, the United States filed its own WTO complaints over retaliatory tariffs imposed by five countries (Canada, China, EU, Mexico, and Turkey) in response to U S  actions, and in late August, it filed a similar case against Russia  The United States has invoked the so-called national security exception (GATT Article XXI) in defense of the tariffs (see " Key Exceptions under GATT/WTO "), and states that the tariffs are not safeguards as claimed by other countries  By the end of January 2019, all of the disputes had entered the panel phase  Annex 3 sets out the procedures for the regular trade policy reviews that are conducted by the Secretariat to report on the trade policies of the membership  These reviews are carried out by the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) and are conducted periodically with the largest economies (United States, EU, Japan, and China) evaluated every three years, the next 16 largest economies every five years, and remaining economies every seven years  These reviews are meant to increase transparency of a country's trade policy and enable a multilateral assessment of the effect of policies on the trading system  These reviews also allow each member country to question specific practices of other members, and may serve as a forum to flag, and possibly avoid, future disputes  The most recent trade policy review of China occurred in July 2018  During the review members noted and commended some recent initiatives of China to open market access and liberalize its foreign investment regime  Several concerns were also raised, including "the preponderant role of the State in general, and of state-owned enterprises in particular," and "China's support and subsidy policies and local content requirements, including those that may be part of the 2025 [Made in China] plan " Most WTO agreements in force have been negotiated on a multilateral basis, meaning the entire body of WTO members subscribes to them  By contrast, plurilateral agreements are negotiated by a subset of WTO members and often focus on a specific sector  A handful of such agreements supplement the main WTO agreements discussed previously  Within the WTO, members have two ways to negotiate on a plurilateral basis, also known as "variable geometry " A group of countries can negotiate with one another provided that the group extends the benefits to all other WTO members on an MFN basis—the foundational nondiscrimination principle of the GATT/WTO  Because the benefits of the agreement are to be shared among all WTO members and not just the participants, the negotiating group likely would include those members forming a critical mass of world trade in the product or sector covered by the negotiation in order to avoid the problem of free riders—those countries that receive trade benefits without committing to liberalization  An example of this type of plurilateral agreement granting unconditional MFN is the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), in which tariffs on selected information technology goods were lowered to zero, as negotiated by WTO members comprising more than 90% of world trade in these goods (see below)  A second type of WTO plurilateral is the non-MFN agreement, often referred to as "conditional-MFN " In this type, participants undertake additional obligations among themselves, but do not extend the benefits to other WTO members, unless they directly participate in the agreement  Also known as the "club" approach, non-MFN plurilaterals allow for willing members to address policy issues not covered by WTO disciplines  However, these types of agreements require a waiver from the entire WTO membership to commence negotiations  Some countries are reluctant even to allow other countries to negotiate for fear of being left out, even while not being ready to commit themselves to new disciplines  Yet, according to one commentator, these members are "simply outsmarting themselves" by encouraging more ambitious members to take negotiations out of the WTO altogether, such as the proposed expansion of the GATS through the plurilateral (and outside the WTO) TiSA  The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) is an early example of a plurilateral agreement with limited WTO membership—first developed as a code in the 1979 Tokyo Round  As of the end of 2018, 47 WTO members (including the 28 EU member countries and United States) participate in the GPA; non-GPA signatories do not enjoy rights under the GPA  The GPA provides market access for various nondefense government projects to contractors of its signatories  Each member specifies government entities and goods and services (with thresholds and limitations) that are open to procurement bids by foreign firms of the other GPA members  For example, the U S  GPA market access schedules of commitments cover 85 federal-level entities and voluntary commitments by 37 states  Negotiations to expand the GPA were concluded in March 2012, and a revised GPA entered into force on April 6, 2014  Several countries, including China—which committed to pursuing GPA participation in its 2001 WTO accession process—are in long-pending negotiations to accede to the GPA  South Korea, Moldova, and Ukraine were the latest WTO members to join the GPA in 2016  According to estimates by the U S  Government Accountability Office (GAO), from 2008 to 2012, 8% of total global government expenditures, and approximately one-third of U S  federal government procurement, was covered by the GPA or similar commitments in U S  FTAs  Unlike the GPA, the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) is a plurilateral agreement that is applied on an unconditional MFN basis  In other words, all WTO members benefit from the tariff reductions enacted by parties to the ITA regardless of their own participation  Originally concluded in 1996 by a subset of WTO members, the ITA provides tariff-free treatment for covered IT products; however, the agreement does not cover services or digital products like software  In December 2015, a group of 51 WTO members, including the United States, negotiated an expanded agreement to cover an additional 201 products and technologies, valued at over $1 trillion in annual global exports  Members committed to reduce the majority of tariffs by 2019  In June 2016, the United States initiated the ITA tariff cuts  China began its cuts in mid-September 2016 with plans to reduce tariffs over five to seven years  ITA members are expected to review the agreement's scope in 2018 to determine if additional product coverage is needed  The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) is the newest WTO multilateral trade agreement, entering into force on February 22, 2017, and perhaps the lasting legacy of the Doha Round, since it is the only major concluded component of the negotiations  The TFA aims to address multiple trade barriers confronted by exporters and importers and reduce trade costs by streamlining, modernizing, and speeding up the customs processes for cross-border trade, as well as making it more transparent  Some analysts view the TFA as evidence that achieving new multilateral agreements is possible and that the design, including special and differential treatment provisions, could serve as a template for future agreements  The TFA has three sections  The first is the heart of the agreement, containing the main provisions, of which many, but not all, are binding and enforceable  Mandatory articles include requiring members to publish information, including publishing certain items online; issue advance rulings in a reasonable amount of time; and provide for appeals or reviews, if requested  The second section provides for SDT for developing country and LDC members, allowing them more time and assistance to implement the agreement  The TFA is the first WTO agreement in which members determine their own implementation schedules and in which progress in implementation is explicitly linked to technical and financial capacity  The TFA requires that "donor members," including the United States, provide the needed capacity building and support  Finally, the third section sets institutional arrangements for administering the TFA  Under WTO agreements, members generally cannot discriminate among trading partners, though specific market access commitments can vary significantly by agreement and by member  WTO rules permit some broad exceptions, which allow members to adopt trade policies and practices that may be inconsistent with WTO disciplines and principles such as MFN treatment, granting special preferences to certain countries, and restricting trade in certain sectors, provided certain conditions are met  Some of the key exceptions follow  General e xceptions   GATT Article XX grants WTO members the right to take certain measures necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, or to conserve exhaustible natural resources, among other aims  The measures, however, must not entail "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable" discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or serve as "disguised restriction on international trade " GATS Article XIV provides for similar exceptions for trade in services  National security exception  GATT Article XXI protects the right of members to take any action they consider "necessary for the protection of essential national security interests" as related to (i) fissionable materials; (ii) traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war, and such traffic in other goods and materials carried out to supply a military establishment; and (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations  Similar exceptions relate to trade in services (GATS Article XIV bis) and intellectual property rights (TRIPS Article 73)  More f avorable t reatment to d eveloping c ountries   The so-called "enabling clause" of the GATT—called the "Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries" of 1979—enables developed country members to grant differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries that is not extended to other members  For example, this permits granting unilateral and nonreciprocal trade preferences to developing countries under special programs, such as the U S  Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and also relates to regional trade agreements outside the WTO (see below)  Exceptions for r egi onal tr ade agreements (RTAs )   WTO countries are permitted to depart from the MFN principle and grant each other more favorable treatment in trade agreements outside the WTO, provided certain conditions are met  Three sets of rules generally apply  GATT Article XXIV applies to goods trade, and allows the formation of free trade areas and customs unions (areas with common external tariffs)  These provisions require that RTAs be notified to the other WTO members, cover "substantially all trade," and do not effectively raise barriers on imports from third parties  GATS Article V allows for economic integration agreements related to services trade, provided they entail "substantial sectoral coverage," eliminate "substantially all discrimination," and do not "raise the overall level of barriers to trade in services" on members outside the agreement  Paragraph 2(c) of the "enabling clause," which deals with special and differential treatment, allows for RTAs among developing countries in goods trade, based on the "mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs " RTA provisions in the GATS also allow greater flexibility in sectoral coverage within services agreements that include developing countries  There are currently 164 members of the WTO  Another 22 countries are seeking to become members  Joining the WTO means taking on the commitments and obligations of all the multilateral agreements  Governments are motivated to join not just to expand access to foreign markets but also to spur domestic economic reforms, help transition to market economies, and promote the rule of law  While any state or customs territory fully in control of its trade policy may become a WTO member, a lengthy process of accession involves a series of documentation of a country's trade regime and market access negotiation requirements (see Figure 7 )  For example, Kazakhstan joined the WTO on November 30, 2015, after a 20-year process  Afghanistan became the 164th WTO member on July 29, 2016, after nearly 12 years of negotiating its accession terms  Other countries have initiated the process but face delays  Iran first applied for membership in 1996 and, while it submitted its Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime in 2009 (a prerequisite for negotiating an accession package), Iran has not begun the bilateral negotiation process, and the United States is unlikely to support its accession  As the WTO generally operates by member consensus, any single member could block the accession of a prospective new member  As part of the process, a prospective member must satisfy specific market access conditions of other WTO members by negotiating on a bilateral basis  The United States has been a central arbiter of the accession process for countries like China (joined in 2001, see below), Vietnam (2007), and Russia (2012), with which permanent normal trade relations had to be established concurrently under U S  law for the United States to receive the full benefits of their membership  China formally joined the WTO in December 2001  China has emerged as a major player in the global economy, as the fastest-growing economy, largest merchandise exporter, and second-largest merchandise importer worldwide  China's accession into the WTO on commercially meaningful terms was a major U S  trade objective during the late 1990s  Entry into the WTO was viewed as an important catalyst for spurring additional economic and trade reforms and the opening of China's economy in a market, rules-based direction  These reforms have made China an increasingly significant market for U S  exporters , a central factor in global supply chains, and a major source of low -cost goods for U S  consumers  At the same time, China has yet to fully transit ion to a market economy and the government continue s to intervene in many parts of the econom y, which has created a growing debate over the role of the WTO in both respects   Negotiations for China's accession to the GATT and then the WTO began in 1986 and took more than 15 years to complete  During WTO negotiations, China sought to enter the WTO as a developing country, while U S  trade officials insisted that China's entry into the WTO had to be based on "commercially meaningful terms" that would require China to significantly reduce trade and investment barriers within a relatively short time  In the end, a compromise was reached that required China to make immediate and extensive reductions in various trade and investment barriers, while allowing it to maintain some level of protection (or a transitional period of protection) for certain sensitive sectors (see text box )  According to USTR, after joining the WTO, China began to implement economic reforms that facilitated its transition toward a market economy and increased its openness to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI)  China also generally implemented its tariff cuts on schedule  However, by 2006, U S  officials and companies noted evidence of some trends toward a more restrictive trade regime and more state intervention in the economy  In particular, observers voiced concern about various Chinese industrial policies, such as those that foster indigenous innovation based on forced technology transfer, domestic subsidies, and IP theft  Some stakeholders have expressed concerns over China's mixed record of implementing certain WTO obligations and asserted that, in some cases, China appeared to be abiding by the letter but not the "spirit" of the WTO  The United States and other WTO members have used dispute settlement procedures on a number of occasions to address China's alleged noncompliance with certain WTO commitments  As a respondent, China accounts for about 12% of total WTO disputes since 2001  The United States has brought 23 dispute cases against China at the WTO on issues, including IPR protection, subsidies, and discriminatory industrial policies, and has largely prevailed in most cases  Though some issues remain contested, China has largely complied with most WTO rulings  China has also increasingly used dispute settlement to confront what it views as discriminatory measures; to date, it has brought 15 cases against the United States (as of February 2019)  More broadly, the Trump Administration has questioned whether WTO rules are sufficient to address the challenges that China's economy presents  USTR Robert Lighthizer expressed this view in remarks in September 2017: "The sheer scale of their coordinated efforts to develop their economy, to subsidize, to create national champions, to force technology transfer, and to distort markets in China and throughout the world is a threat to the world trading system that is unprecedented  Unfortunately, the World Trade Organization is not equipped to deal with this problem " USTR views efforts to resolve concerns over Chinese trade practices to date as limited in effectiveness, including through WTO dispute settlement, as well as recent proposals by WTO members to craft new rules and WTO reforms  In its latest report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, USTR stated the following: [The WTO dispute settlement] mechanism is not designed to address a trade regime that broadly conflicts with the fundamental underpinnings of the WTO system  No amount of WTO dispute settlement by other WTO members would be sufficient to remedy this systemic problem  Indeed, many of the most harmful policies and practices being pursued by China are not even directly disciplined by WTO rules  Another related concern some have is whether China claims it is a "developing country" under the WTO  Through developing country status, which countries self-designate, countries are entitled to certain rights under special and differential treatment (SDT), among other provisions in WTO agreements (see " Treatment of Developing Countries " and text box )  USTR has claimed that "China persists in claiming to be a 'developing Member'" in future negotiations at the WTO  While it is unclear what SDT provisions China has sought in ongoing negotiations, China is a part of the coalition group of Asian developing members at the WTO and has claimed to be a developing country in various fora  Chinese officials have asserted that despite being the world's second-largest economy, China remains a developing country, due to its relatively low GDP per capita and other economic challenges  Concerns over China's trade actions have led the Trump Administration to increase the use of unilateral mechanisms outside the WTO that in its view more effectively address Chinese "unfair trade practices;" the recent Section 301 investigation of Chinese IPR and technology transfer practices and resulting imposition of tariffs is evidence of this strategy  Prior to the establishment of the WTO, the United States resorted to Section 301 relatively frequently, in particular due to concerns that the GATT lacked an effective dispute settlement system  When the United States joined the WTO in 1995, it agreed to use the dispute settlement mechanism rather than act unilaterally; many analysts contend that the United States has violated its WTO obligations by imposing tariffs against China under Section 301  The United States also initiated a WTO dispute settlement case against China's "discriminatory technology licensing" in March 2018  Subsequently, China filed its own complaints at the WTO over U S  tariff actions  The United States has pursued cooperation to some extent with other countries with similar concerns over certain Chinese trade practices and the need to clarify and improve WTO rules on industrial subsidies and SOEs in particular  At the WTO Ministerial meeting in December 2017, USTR Lighthizer, the European Commissioner for Trade Cecelia Malmström, and Japan's Minister of the Economy, Trade and Industry Hiroshige Seko announced new trilateral efforts to cooperate on issues related to government-supported excess capacity, unfair competition caused by market-distorting subsidies and SOEs, forced technology transfer, and local content requirements  Observers believe that China, while not specifically named, is the intended target of the coordinated action  The three officials continued talks in 2018 and 2019, issuing a scoping paper on stronger rules on industrial subsidies, as well as joint statements on technology transfer and "market-oriented conditions " They indicated plans to propose a draft text on subsidies rules by spring 2019  Some experts have questioned whether recent U S  tariff actions might undermine efforts to coordinate further action to address these challenges (see " Selected Challenges and Issues for Congress ")  Another pending dispute involving China could have significant implications for the treatment of China's economy under WTO rules, in particular debate over the terms of China's "nonmarket economy" (NME) status under its WTO accession protocol  Under its accession, China agreed to allow other WTO members to continue to use alternative methodologies, such as surrogate countries, for assessing prices and costs on products subject to antidumping measures  This concession was a result of WTO members' concerns that distortions in the Chinese economy caused by government intervention result in Chinese prices that do not reflect market forces, making them poorly suited to determining dumping margins  China contends that language in its WTO accession protocol requires all WTO members to terminate their use of the alternative methodology by December 11, 2016, including the United States, which has classified China as a NME for trade remedy cases since 1981  The NME distinction is important to China because it has often resulted in higher antidumping margins on Chinese exports; moreover, a significant share of Chinese exports is subject to trade remedies, namely AD duties  The United States and the EU have argued that the WTO language is vague and did not automatically obligate them to extend market economy status (MES) to China because it is still not a market economy

ground_truth: The Coast Guard, a component of DHS, serves as the principal federal agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship in U.S. ports and waterways. To ensure that the Coast Guard is effectively fulfilling its missions, agency managers must have accurate information and base decisions on sound analyses for effective program management. This statement discusses Coast Guard actions needed to (1) improve the quality of data used for program management and (2) improve the transparency of its data for reporting on mission performance and planning. This statement is based on relevant products GAO issued from June 2014 through December 2017 on Coast Guard strategic planning and management issues, as well as related recommendation follow-up conducted through February 2018. GAO reviewed applicable laws, regulations, policies and guidance. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials responsible for administering these programs and obtained information on how they used data to inform decisionmaking. GAO interviewed a range of stakeholders, including federal and industry officials. GAO's prior work recommended multiple actions to improve the Coast Guard's program management by improving the quality of data it uses to manage and report on its mission performance. Specifically, GAO recommended actions such as collecting more complete data and clarifying the data limitations to facilitate more effective program management. For example, in December 2017, GAO found that more information is needed to calculate vessel safety statistics that could enhance the Coast Guard's knowledge about accident, injury, and fatality trends involving commercial fishing vessels. Having more complete information could be useful to carrying out its marine safety mission, and GAO recommended, among other things, that the Coast Guard ensure that data collected during commercial fishing vessel incident investigations is accurately captured. In 2018, the Coast Guard reported taking initial steps to capture more accurate data. GAO's prior work also identified areas where the Coast Guard could improve the transparency of the data it uses for reporting on its mission performance as well its capital planning purposes. For example, in an October 2017 report on performance goals, GAO found the Coast Guard's Annual Performance Report (APR) has not been released publicly since 2011. Consequently, there has not been full visibility over performance across all of the Coast Guard's missions. Coast Guard officials stated that a decision by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership to limit the number of performance goals shared publicly had deterred the Coast Guard from public release of its APR. GAO recommended that APRs be available on the Coast Guard's website; the Coast Guard plans to publicly release future APRs. In addition, previous GAO reports found that the Coast Guard's annual 5-year capital investment plan, which projects acquisition funding needs for the upcoming 5 years, did not consistently reflect current total cost estimates or the effects of tradeoffs made as part of the annual budget cycle. GAO made recommendations to help the Coast Guard plan for future acquisitions and the difficult trade off decisions it will face given funding constraints. The Coast Guard agreed, but it is unclear when it will complete the 20-year plan. GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement but has made them to the Coast Guard and DHS in the past on improving its program management through, among other things, better quality and more transparent data. DHS and the Coast Guard agreed with these recommendations and reported actions or plans to address them.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  On December 12, 2016, China requested consultations under WTO dispute settlement with the United States and EU over the failure to grant China MES, and the cases are now pending  In April 2017, a panel was established in the EU case, and in November 2017, the United States formally submitted arguments as a third party in support of the EU  The panel said it expected to issue its final report during the second quarter of 2019  The 11 th WTO Ministerial Conference took place December 10-13, 2017, in Buenos Aires, Argentina  The Ministerial generally convenes every two years to make decisions and announce progress on multilateral trade agreements  After countries were unable to complete the Doha Round (see text box ), many questioned what could effectively be achieved in 2017  Members have made some progress in recent years, reaching the Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2013, followed by a small package of deals in 2015 concerning agriculture and rules for LDCs  Still, they remain sharply divided over how to prioritize both unresolved and new issues on the agenda, and, more fundamentally, how to conduct negotiations to better facilitate successful outcomes  WTO Director-General Azevêdo had tempered expectations for major negotiated outcomes or announcements at the 11 th Ministerial, acknowledging that "members' positions continue to diverge significantly on the substantial issues " These differences were perhaps most apparent by the inability of WTO members to reach consensus over a draft Ministerial Declaration, largely due to staunch disagreements over including references to the mandate of the Doha Round (see text box )  Instead the Ministerial became primarily an opportunity for members to take stock of ongoing talks and further define priority work areas  WTO members had worked intensively to build consensus over proposals in several areas, including reducing fisheries subsidies, a permanent solution to public stockholding for food security, domestic services regulations, and e-commerce  Some members pushed for new initiatives in areas such as investment facilitation; others like India advocated for a greater focus on trade facilitation in services  The U S  proposal to improve overall transparency at the WTO, with penalties for countries that fail to comply with notification requirements, did not garner enough support to be discussed extensively at the Ministerial  The 11 th Ministerial did not result in major breakthroughs  WTO members committed to intensify fisheries subsidies negotiations, "with a view to adopting" an agreement by the next Ministerial; the United States has supported these efforts  A joint statement was issued by 60 members in support of advancing multilateral negotiations on domestic regulations in services  Subsets of WTO members also issued statements committing to new work programs or open-ended talks for interested parties to potentially conclude plurilateral agreements in areas, including the following: E-commerce : among 71 WTO members (covering 77% of global trade); Investment facilitation : among 70 WTO members (covering 73% of global trade and 66% of inward FDI); and Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) : among 87 WTO members (covering 78% of global trade)  Of these, the United States signed on to the declaration in support of e-commerce  The lack of concrete multilateral outcomes at the 11 th Ministerial was a reminder of the continued resistance of some countries to a new agenda outside of the original 2001 Doha mandate  In the view of EU Trade Commissioner Malmström, the Ministerial "laid bare the deficiencies of the negotiating function at the WTO" and that "members are systematically being blocked from addressing the pressing realities of global trade " Malmström blamed the lack of progress on "procedural excuses and vetoes" and "cynical hostage taking " Some developing country members, including India, attempted to block progress in a range of areas—including the renewal of the decades-old moratorium on e-commerce customs duties—absent more progress on Doha issues such as agricultural stockholding for food security  Such "hostage-taking" tactics, widely acknowledged to have hindered progress in the Doha Round, further highlight the difficulty of achieving future consensus among all 164 members  While the United States provided input and signaled support for select proposals, the overall perception of many was a lack of U S  leadership in the Ministerial discussions  Consistent with the Trump Administration's "America First" trade policy, the U S  stated objective for the Ministerial was broadly to "advocate for U S  economic and trade interests, including WTO institutional reform and market-based, fair trade policies " Several observers were relieved when USTR Lighthizer acknowledged in Ministerial remarks that the WTO plays an important role, even as he outlined key criticisms  The United States viewed the Ministerial outcome positively—that it signaled "the impasse at the WTO was broken," paving the way for like-minded countries to pursue new work in other areas  USTR expressed U S  support in particular for forthcoming work on e-commerce, scientific standards for agriculture, and disciplines on fisheries subsidies  While WTO members did not announce any negotiated outcomes at the 11 th Ministerial meeting, several countries committed to make progress on ongoing talks, including fisheries subsidies and e-commerce  In other areas, such as agriculture and environmental goods, talks remain stalled with no clear path forward  For some issues multilateral solutions arguably remain ideal, for example, disciplines on agricultural subsidies, which are widely used by developed and advanced developing countries alike  One concern is that such important, unresolved issues may founder for want of a negotiating venue  While the Doha Round largely did not achieve its comprehensive negotiating mandate to lower agricultural tariffs and subsidies, negotiations more limited in scope have continued  The 2015 Nairobi Ministerial agreed to eliminate export subsidies for agriculture, but the issue of public stockholding remains seemingly intractable  Public stockholding, also known as food security programs, is used by governments, especially in developing countries, to purchase and stockpile food to release to the public during periods of market volatility or shortage  These programs become problematic when governments purchase food at a price and quantity that effectively become trade-distorting domestic support  While no agreement was reached at Buenos Aires, some developing countries, such as India, have demanded that the issue be resolved before new issues are considered in the WTO work program  The United States has also flagged the broader issue of notification and transparency  Under WTO agreements, members are required to notify subsidies and trade-distorting support to ensure transparency and consistency with a member's obligation  Compliance with notifications has been notoriously lax, with some countries years behind on their reporting  According to U S  Department of Agriculture trade counsel Jason Hafemeister, these practices have consequences: In the absence of transparency, how are we to determine whether Members are complying with existing obligations? Moreover, only with comprehensive and current information can negotiators understand, discuss, and address the problems that face farmers today: high tariffs, trade distorting support, and non-tariff barriers  The United States with other countries recently issued new proposals to address these concerns—see " Transparency/Notification  " As noted above, WTO members committed to negotiate disciplines related to fisheries subsidies at the 11 th Ministerial with a view toward reaching an agreement by 2020  The proposals aim to meet the goals outlined in United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14 targeting illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing  Though multiple areas of disagreement remain, members have been negotiating on the scope of exemptions, such as for fuel subsidies  The United States reportedly seeks to minimize the level and scope of such exclusions  Members are expected to move from discussions of proposals into negotiations on a consolidated draft text by early 2019  The Trump Administration has voiced support for the talks, stating that it continues "to support stronger disciplines and greater transparency in the WTO with respect to fisheries subsidies " Digital trade has emerged as a major force in world trade since the Uruguay Round, creating end products (e g , email or social media), enabling trade in services (e g , consulting), and facilitating goods trade through services, such as logistics and supply chain management that depend on digital data flows  While the GATS contains explicit commitments for telecommunications and financial services that underlie e-commerce, trade barriers related to digital trade, information flows, and other related issues are not specifically included  The WTO Work Program on Electronic Commerce was established in 1998 to examine trade-related issues for e-commerce under existing agreements  Under the work program, members agreed to continue a temporary moratorium on e-commerce customs duties, and have renewed the moratorium at each ministerial meeting  Some developing countries, however, have begun to question the moratorium, seeing it as blocking a potential government revenue stream  Progress under the work program has largely stalled as multiple members have put forward competing views on possible paths forward  In advance of the 2017 Ministerial, various members had submitted proposals for specific work agendas in e-commerce  The U S  submission, dated July 4, 2016, reflected many of the ideas included in the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an FTA with 11 other countries in the Asia-Pacific from which the United States withdrew in January 2017  The proposal may gain the support of other TPP members as several have already ratified a slightly modified agreement—the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TPP (CPTPP or TPP-11)—which maintained the digital trade provisions as negotiated by the United States  The Chinese WTO submission, on the other hand, more narrowly focuses on facilitating e-commerce  India has said it would not agree to any new obligations in the WTO related to e-commerce or digital trade, preferring to focus on issues identified under the original Doha mandate, including agriculture  As a result, the 2017 Ministerial ended with an agreement to "endeavor to reinvigorate our work " The plurilateral effort announced at the ministerial agreeing to "initiate exploratory work on negotiations on electronic commerce issues in the WTO" may provide the best avenue to pursue an agreement within the WTO framework  A U S  discussion paper on the initiative outlined potential provisions, including protecting cross-border data flows, source code, and encryption technology; prohibiting discrimination, customs duties, technology transfer or localization requirements; and promoting cybersecurity and open government data  The United States also included the WTO Telecommunications Reference Paper, seeking all WTO members to adopt its principles on telecommunications competition  Notably, the U S  submission did not list privacy or consumer protection among its provisions  The group of 49 WTO members formally launched the e-commerce initiative in January 2019, on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum annual meetings  Their joint statement lists not only the United States and EU as participants, but also several developing countries, including China and Brazil  In the statement, the group agreed to seek a "high standard outcome that builds on existing WTO agreements and frameworks with the participation of as many WTO Members as possible," but did not specify which trade barriers and issues are to be addressed  USTR's statement after the meeting emphasized the need for an enforceable agreement with the "same obligations for all participants " The negotiation process is expected to begin in March 2019  It is unclear how, or if, the plurilateral effort will overlap or be incorporated into the existing multilateral work program  Some countries viewed the 11 th Ministerial meeting as a missed opportunity to reinvigorate the stalled EGA plurilateral negotiations  The EGA negotiations, initiated in mid-2014 by 14 WTO members including the United States and China, seek to liberalize trade in environmental goods through tariff liberalization  Current EGA members represent 86% of global trade in covered environmental goods  Like the ITA, the EGA would be an open plurilateral agreement so that the benefits achieved through negotiations would be extended on an MFN basis to all WTO members  Despite 18 rounds of negotiations, members were unable to conclude the agreement at the December 2016 General Council   meeting, and talks have since stalled  Most parties blamed China for the lack of progress, as it rejected the list of products to be included and requested several lengthy tariff phaseout periods which other countries refused to accept  The EGA's future now remains uncertain—while several countries have expressed support for resuming the talks, the Trump Administration has not put forward a public position on the agreement  The inability of WTO members to conclude a comprehensive agreement during the Doha Round raised new questions about the WTO's future direction  Many intractable issues from Doha remain unresolved, and members have yet to reach consensus on a way forward  Persistent differences about the extent and balance of trade liberalization continue to stymie progress, as evidenced by the outcomes of recent ministerial meetings  Further, members remain divided over adopting new issues on the agenda, amid concerns that the WTO could lose relevance if its rules are not updated to reflect the modern global economy  Some WTO members seek to incorporate new issues that pose challenges to the trading system, such as digital trade, competition with SOEs, global supply chains, and the relationship between trade and environment issues  These divisions have called into question the viability of the "single undertaking," or one-package approach in future multilateral negotiations and suggest broader need for institutional reform if the WTO is to remain a relevant negotiating body  Moreover, the consistent practice of some countries like India to block discussion of new issues serves as a reminder of the power of a single member to halt progress in the WTO's consensus-based system  As a result of slow progress at the WTO, countries have increasingly turned to other venues to advance trade liberalization and rules, namely plurilateral agreements and preferential FTAs outside the WTO  Plurilaterals have been seen as having the potential to resurrect the WTO's relevance as a negotiating body, but have also been seen as possibly undermining multilateralism if the agreements are not extended to all WTO members on an MFN basis  Regional trade agreements have also been seen as potential laboratories for new rules  How these negotiations and agreements will ultimately affect the WTO's status as the preeminent global trade institution is widely debated  In addition, an open question is whether U S  leadership within these initiatives will continue under the Trump Administration  More recently, concerns for some have been mounting about further strains on the multilateral system, due to the growing use of trade protectionist policies by both developed and developing countries, the recent U S  tariff actions and counterretaliation by other countries, and the escalating trade disputes between major economies  Many countries are questioning whether the WTO is equipped to effectively handle the challenges of emerging markets, as well as the deepening trade tensions  Some experts view the system as facing a potential crisis, while o thers remain optimistic that the current state of affairs could spur renewed focus on reforms of the system  Certain WTO members, like the EU and Canada, have begun to explore some areas for reform (see below)  In contrast to the consensus-based agreements of the WTO, some members, including the United States, point to the progress made in sectoral or plurilateral settings as the way forward for the institution  By assembling coalitions of interested parties, negotiators may more easily and quickly achieve trade liberalizing objectives, as shown by the ITA  Sectoral agreements are viewed as one way to pursue new agreements and extend WTO disciplines and commitments in new areas, including, for example, U S  trade priorities in digital trade and SOEs  The commitments by some WTO members to pursue talks in e-commerce, investment facilitation, and SMEs could plant the seeds for future plurilaterals  Plurilateral negotiations, however, still involve resolving divisions among developed and advanced developing countries  Members were able ultimately to overcome their differences in the ITA negotiation, but thus far have been unable to reach consensus in the EGA  At the same time, the participation of developing and emerging market economies, such as China and India, is critical to achieving agreements that cover a meaningful share of global trade  There is also a concern that plurilateral agreements not applied on an MFN basis could lead nonparticipating countries to become marginalized from the trading system and face new trade restrictions  To attract a critical mass of participants and lower barriers for developing countries and LDCs who may be hesitant to agree to ambitious commitments, agreements could allow flexibility in implementation timeframes and provide additional assistance, as in the TFA  Some experts question whether potential waning U S  leadership in plurilateral and multilateral trade negotiations might slow momentum toward concluding new agreements (see " Value of the Multilateral System and U S  Leadership and Membership ")  The Trump Administration has yet to clarify its position on plurilaterals pursued under the Obama Administration, such as EGA and TiSA, which have stalled, but is supporting new efforts on e-commerce/digital trade  Given that the WTO allows its members to establish preferential FTAs outside the WTO that are consistent with WTO rules, many countries have formed bilateral or regional FTAs and customs areas; since 1990, the number of RTAs in force has increased seven-fold, with 290 trade agreements notified to the WTO and in force, as of the end of 2018  FTAs have often provided more negotiating flexibility for countries to advance new trade liberalization and rulemaking that builds on WTO agreements; however, the agreements vary widely in terms of scope and depth  Like plurilaterals, many view comprehensive FTAs as having potential for advancing the global trade agenda  Also like plurilaterals, however FTAs can also have downsides compared to multilateral deals  The United States currently has 14 FTAs in force with 20 countries  The Trump Administration has stated a preference for negotiating bilateral FTAs, rather than multiparty agreements  In September 2018, the United States, Mexico, and Canada completed negotiations of the proposed USMCA, which revamps the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)  The United States and South Korea also agreed to some modifications of their bilateral FTA  In addition, USTR notified Congress of its intent to begin trade negotiations with the EU, Japan, and the UK  In general, U S  FTAs are considered to be "WTO-plus" in that they reaffirm the WTO agreements, but also eliminate most tariff and nontariff barriers and contain rules and obligations in areas not covered by the WTO  For example, most U S  FTAs include access to services markets beyond what is contained in the GATS or, more recently, digital trade obligations  While U S  FTAs cover some major trading partners, the majority of U S  trade, including with significant trade partners such as China, the EU, and Japan, continues to rely solely on the terms of market access and rulemaking in WTO agreements  In 2017, the United States traded $3 4 trillion with non-FTA partners, compared to $1 8 trillion with its FTA partners ( Figure 8 )  More recently, groups of countries have also been pursuing so-called "mega-regional" trade agreements that cover significant shares of global trade  These include the CPTPP signed in March 2018 between 11 countries in the Asia-Pacific to replace the TPP, ongoing negotiations over the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and six of its FTA partners including China, and the Pacific Alliance signed in June 2012 among Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru  Negotiations on the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) between the United States and EU stalled, and though new U S -EU trade talks are to resume, their scope remains unclear  Such agreements could potentially consolidate trade rules across regions and to a varying extent address new issues not covered by the WTO  There has been wide debate regarding the relationship of preferential FTAs to the WTO and multilateral trading system  Some argue that crafting new rules through mega-regionals could undermine the trading system, create competing regional trade blocs, lead to trade diversion, and marginalize countries not participating in the initiatives  On the other hand, some view such agreements as potentially spurring new momentum at the global level  WTO DG Azevêdo has supported the latter sentiment, expressing that "RTAs [regional trade agreements] are blocks which can help build the edifice of global rules and liberalization " Many analysts have viewed the CPTPP specifically through this lens  Some experts view plurilateral agreements in particular as potential vehicles for bringing new rulemaking from RTAs into the multilateral trading system  While RTAs may propagate precisely what the multilateral system—with MFN and national treatment at its underpinnings—was designed to prevent, namely trade diversion and fragmented trading blocs, some observers believe it may be the only way trade may be liberalized in the future as additional interested parties could join the agreements over time  Since the founding of the WTO, the landscape of global trade has changed dramatically  The commercial internet, the growth of supply chains, and increasing trade in services have all contributed to the tremendous expansion of trade  However, WTO disciplines have not been modernized or expanded since 1995, aside from the TFA and the renegotiation of the ITA and the GPA  In addition to ongoing WTO efforts to negotiate new trade liberalization and rules in areas like e-commerce and digital trade, the following are selected areas of trade policy that could be subjects for future negotiations multilaterally within the WTO, or as plurilaterals  Meaningful progress in areas such as services, competition with SOEs, investment, and labor and environment issues could help increase the relevance of the WTO as a negotiating body  Since the GATS, the scope of global trade in services has increased tremendously, spurred by advances in IT and the growth of global supply chains  Yet, these advances are largely not reflected in the GATS  WTO members committed to further services negotiations (GATS Article XIX), which began in 2000 and were incorporated into the Doha Round  Further talks were spurred by the recognition among many observers that the GATS, while it extended the principles of nondiscrimination and transparency to services trade, was not thought to provide much actual liberalization, as many countries simply bound existing practices  However, services negotiations during Doha also succumbed to the resistance of developing countries to open their markets in response to developed country demands, as well as dissatisfaction with other aspects of the single undertaking  Whether the stalled plurilateral TiSA talks will ultimately lead to services reform in the WTO is an open question  Aside from increased market access, several issues are ripe for future negotiations at the WTO, such as transition from the current positive list schedule of commitments to a negative list  Instead of a member declaring which services are open for competition, it would need to declare which sectors are exempted  This exercise in itself could force members to reexamine their approximately 25-year-old commitments and decide whether current market access barriers will be maintained  New services sectors, such as online education and telemedicine, that were not envisioned at the founding of GATS could also be the subject of future negotiations, at least on a plurilateral basis  The issue of "servicification" of traditional goods industries—for example, services that are sold with a good, such as insurance or maintenance services, or enabling services, such as distribution, transportation, marketing, or retail—has also attracted attention as the subject of possible WTO negotiations  Other issues of interest to members include services facilitation (transparency, streamlining administrative procedures, simplifying domestic regulations), and emergency safeguards, envisioned in the GATS (Article X) as an issue for future negotiation  The United States and other members of the WTO see an increased need to discipline state-owned or state-dominated enterprises engaged in international commerce, and designated monopolies, whether through the WTO or through regional or bilateral FTAs  However, WTO rules on competition with state-owned or state-dominated enterprises are limited to state trading enterprises (STE)—enterprises, such as agricultural marketing boards, that influence the import or export of a good  GATT Article XVII requires them to act consistently with GATT commitments on nondiscrimination, to operate in accordance with commercial considerations, and to abide by other GATT disciplines, such as disciplines on import and export restrictions  The transparency obligations consist of reporting requirements describing the reason and purpose of the STE, the products covered by STE, a description of its functions, and pertinent statistical information  Meanwhile, countries desiring disciplines on SOEs have turned to FTAs  The TPP and the proposed USMCA have dedicated chapters on SOEs  The USMCA includes commitments that SOEs of a party act in accordance with commercial considerations; requires parties to provide nondiscriminatory treatment to like goods or services to those provided by SOEs; and prohibits most noncommercial assistance to its SOE, among other issues  The SOE chapter in USMCA likely is aimed at countries other than the three USMCA parties, such as China, to signal their negotiating intentions going forward  While there could be a desire to multilateralize these disciplines, they likely would face objections from those members engaged in such practices  State support provided to SOEs, including subsidies, is a closely related issue, as it can play a major role in market-distorting behavior under current rules  The WTO ASCM covers the provision of specified subsidies granted to SOEs, including by the government or any "public body " Some members, including the United States and EU, have contested past interpretations by the WTO Appellate Body of what qualifies as a public body as too narrow, and remain concerned that a large share of Chinese and other SOEs in effect have avoided being subject to disciplines  As discussed, the United States, EU, and Japan are engaged in ongoing discussions on strengthening rules on industrial subsidies and SOEs, including "how to develop effective rules to address market-distorting behavior of state enterprises and confront particularly harmful subsidy practices "  They commit to both "maintain effectiveness of existing WTO disciplines" and also initiate negotiations on "more effective subsidy rules" in the near future  At the latest meetings in January 2019, the three partners indicated plans to finalize a proposed text on industrial subsidies by spring 2019  With limited provisions under TRIMS and GATS, rules and disciplines covering international investment are not part of WTO  More extensive protection for investors was one of the "Singapore issues" proposed at the 1996 WTO Ministerial as a topic for future negotiations, but then dropped under opposition from developing countries at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial  The OECD also attempted to liberalize investment practices and provide investor protections through a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, however, that effort was abandoned in 1998 in the face of widespread campaigns by nongovernment organizations in developed countries  While multilateral attempts to negotiate investment disciplines have not borne fruit, countries have agreed to investment protections within bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and chapters in bilateral and regional FTAs  The U S  "model BIT" serves as the basis for most recent U S  FTAs  These provisions are often negotiated between developed countries and developing countries—often viewed as having less robust legal systems—that want to provide assurance that incoming FDI will be protected in the country  Developed countries themselves have begun to diverge on the use and inclusion of provisions on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)  Incorporating investment issues more fully in the WTO would recognize that trade and investment issues are increasingly interlinked  Moreover, bringing coherence to the nearly 3,000 BITs or trade agreements with investment provisions could be a role for the WTO  In addition, agreement on investment disciplines could help to resolve the thorny issue of investment adjudication between the competing models of ISDS and an investment court, as proposed by the EU in its recent FTAs, given that disputes likely would remit to WTO dispute settlement  While it remains unclear whether developing countries would be more amenable to negotiating investment disciplines multilaterally than they were in 2003, this area could be ripe for plurilateral activity  In the meantime, since the Ministerial some WTO members are pursuing the development of a multilateral framework on investment facilitation  The group is comprised of a mix of developed and developing economies, including the EU, Canada, China, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, and Russia, but not the United States  Labor and environmental provisions were not included in the Uruguay Round agreements, largely at the insistence of developing countries  Some observers maintain that this has created major gaps in global trade rules and call for the WTO to address these issues  Related provisions have developed and evolved within U S  FTAs outside the WTO  Recent U S  FTAs require partner countries to adhere to internationally recognized labor principles of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and applicable multilateral environmental agreements, and to enforce their labor or environmental laws and not to derogate from these laws to attract trade and investment  The CPTPP and proposed USMCA also contain provisions, though not identical, prohibiting the most harmful fisheries subsidies, and relating to illegal trafficking, marine species, air quality, marine litter, and sustainable forestry  More broadly, while inclusion of labor and environmental provisions within FTAs has expanded in the past decade, in general the commitments can vary widely in their scope and depth, with only some subject to dispute settlement mechanisms  While general provisions on labor and environment may be a heavy lift at this time given these differences, the WTO has undertaken an effort to discipline fisheries subsidies, which could have a beneficial environmental effect (see above)  However, fisheries subsidies may be a special case, as it directly pertains to an existing trade-related agreement, the ASCM  Many observers believe the WTO needs to adopt reforms to continue its role as the foundation of the world trading system  In particular, its negotiating function has atrophied following the collapse of the Doha Round  Its dispute settlement mechanism, while functioning, is viewed by some as cumbersome and time consuming  And some observers, including U S  officials, contend it has exceeded its mandate when deciding cases  Potential changes described below address institutional and negotiation reform, as well as reforms to the dispute settlement system  Reforms concern the administration of the organization, including its procedures and practices, and attempts to address the inability of WTO members to conclude new agreements  Dispute settlement reforms attempt to improve the working of the dispute settlement system, particularly the Appellate Body (AB)  Addressing concerns related to the dispute settlement system may take priority in the near term, as the WTO faces a pending crisis should the AB fall below its three-member quorum in late 2019  Certain WTO members have begun to explore some aspects of reform  In July 2018, the European Commission produced a discussion paper on WTO reform proposals, and in September published a revised paper on its comprehensive approach "to modernise the WTO and to make international trade rules fit for the challenges of the global economy " As noted, the United States, EU, and Japan have issued scoping papers and joint statements on strengthening WTO disciplines on industrial subsidies and SOEs and cooperating on forced technology transfer  In addition, Canada organized a ministerial among a small group of "like-minded" countries interested in WTO reform, including Australia, Brazil, Chile, the EU, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, and Switzerland, held in Ottawa on October 24-25, based on a discussion draft of its proposals  Canadian trade officials have said that "starting small has allowed us to address problems head-on and quickly develop proposals," while acknowledging that a larger effort must include the United States and China  In a joint communiqué, the group of 13 countries emphasized that "the current situation at the WTO is no longer sustainable," and identified three areas requiring "urgent consideration": safeguarding and strengthening the dispute settlement system; reinvigorating the WTO's negotiating function; including how the development dimension can be best pursued in rulemaking; and strengthening the monitoring and transparency of WTO members' trade policies  The group met again in January 2019 on the sidelines of the annual World Economic Forum meetings, committing to make "significant progress" toward WTO reform before the G20 meetings convene in June 2019  Some Members of Congress have expressed support for these new efforts to address long-standing concerns of the United States  While consensus in decisionmaking is a long-standing core practice at the GATT/WTO, voting on a nonconsensus basis is authorized for certain activities on a one member-one vote basis  For example, interpretations of the WTO agreements and country waivers from certain provisions require a three-fourths affirmative vote for some matters, while a two-thirds affirmative vote is required for an amendment to an agreement  However, even when voting is possible, the practice of consensus decisionmaking remains the norm  As an organization of sovereign entities, some observers believe the practice of consensus decisionmaking gives legitimacy to WTO actions  Consensus assures that actions taken are in the self-interest of all its members  Consensus also reassures small countries that their concerns must be addressed  However, the practice of consensus has often led to deadlock, especially in the Doha Round negotiations  The ability to block consensus also has perpetuated so-called "hostage taking," in which a country can block consensus over an unrelated matter  In order to attempt to expedite institutional decisionmaking, some expert observers have proposed alternatives to the current system, such as the following: Use the voting procedures currently prescribed in the WTO agreements  Adopt a weighted voting system based on a formula that includes criteria relating to a member's gross domestic product, trade flows, population, or a combination thereof  Establish an executive committee composed of a combination of permanent and rotating members, or composed based on a formula as above or representatives of differing groups of countries  Maintain current consensus voting but require a member stating an objection to explain why it is doing so, or why it is a matter of vital national interest  The "single undertaking" method by which WTO members negotiate agreements means that during a negotiating round, all issues are up for negotiation until everything is agreed  On one hand, this method, in which nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, is suited for large, complex rounds in which rules and disciplines in many areas of trade (goods, services, agriculture, IPR, etc ) are discussed  It permits negotiation on a cross-sectoral basis, so countries can make a concession in one area of negotiation and receive a concession elsewhere  The method is intended to prevent smaller countries from being "steamrolled" by the demands of larger economies, and helps ensure that each country sees a net benefit in the resulting agreement  On the other hand, arguably, the single undertaking has contributed to the breakdown of the negotiating function under the WTO, exemplified by the never-completed Doha Round, as issues of importance to one country or another served to block consensus at numerous points during the round  Some members, including the EU, have called for "flexible multilateralism," based on continued support for full multilateral negotiations where possible, but pursuit of plurilateral agreements on an MFN basis where multilateral consensus is not possible  An important task of the WTO is to monitor each member's compliance with various agreements  A WTO member is required to notify the Secretariat of certain relevant domestic laws or practices so that other members can assess the consistency of WTO members' domestic laws, regulations, and actions with WTO agreements  Required notifications include measures concerning subsidies, agricultural support, quantitative restrictions, technical barriers to trade, and sanitary and phytosanitary standards  Compliance with the WTO agreement's notification requirements, especially regarding government subsidy programs, has become a serious concern among certain members, including the United States  Many WTO members are late in submitting their required notifications or do not submit them at all  This effectively prevents other members from fully examining the policies of their trading partners  In response, some members—notably the United States and the EU—have proposed incentives for compliance or sanctions for noncompliance with notification reporting requirements  These include the following: A U S  proposal to impose a series of sanctions including steps to "name and shame" an offending member, limiting the member from using certain WTO resources, and designating a member "inactive " An EU proposal to create a rebuttable presumption that a non-notified subsidy measure is an actionable subsidy or a subsidy causing serious prejudice, thereby allowing a member to challenge the subsidy under WTO dispute settlement  An EU proposal to encourage counternotifications—a challenge to the accuracy or existence of another member's notification—against members that do not voluntarily notify on their own  In May and November 2018, for example, the United States launched counternotifications of India's farm subsidy notifications regarding wheat, rice, and cotton  In November 2018, the United States, EU, Japan, Argentina, and Costa Rica put forward a joint proposal that reflects several of these elements, including penalties for noncompliance  It also specifies exemptions for developing countries that lack capacity and have requested assistance to help fulfill notification obligations  A country's development status can affect the pace at which a country undertakes its WTO obligations  Given that WTO members self-designate their status, some members hold on to developing-country status even after their economies begin more to resemble their developed-country peers  In addition, some of the world's largest economies, including China, India, and Brazil, may justify developing country status because their per capita incomes more closely resemble those of a developing country than those of developed countries  Developing country status enables a country to claim special and differential treatment (SDT) both in the context of existing obligations and in negotiations for new disciplines (see text box )  The WTO specifies, however, that while the designated status is on the basis of self-selection, it is "not necessarily automatically accepted in all WTO bodies " Developed countries, including the EU and United States, have expressed frustration at this state of affairs  In January 2019, the United States circulated a paper warning that the WTO is at risk of becoming irrelevant due to the practice of allowing members to self-designate their development status to obtain special and differential treatment  The paper noted that some of the world's richest nations, including Singapore, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as some of the world's major trading economies, such as China and India, consider themselves developing countries at the WTO  The paper maintained that self-designation has damaged the negotiating function of the WTO, and contributed to the failure of the Doha Round and possibly ongoing negotiations, if countries can avoid making meaningful offers by claiming exemptions from the rules  Several suggestions have been made to address the situation, including encouraging countries to graduate from developing country status; setting quantifiable criteria for development status; targeting SDT in future agreements on a needs-driven, differential basis; and requiring full eventual implementation of all new agreements  Some of these steps were implemented in the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement  Supporters of the multilateral trading system consider the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) not only a success of the system, but essential to maintain the relevance of the institution, especially while the WTO has struggled as a negotiating body  However, the DSM is facing increased pressure for reform, in part due to long-standing U S  objections over certain rules and procedures  USTR Lighthizer contends that the WTO has become a "litigation-centered organization," which has lost its focus on negotiations  While WTO members have actively used the DSM since its creation, some have also voiced concerns about various aspects, including procedural delays and compliance, and believe the current system could be reformed to be fairer and more efficient  The Doha Round included negotiations to reform the dispute settlement system through "improvements and clarifications" to DSU rules  A framework of 50 proposals was circulated in 2003 but countries were unable to reach consensus  Discussions have continued beyond Doha with a primary focus on 12 issues, including third-party rights, panel composition, and remand authority of the Appellate Body  Under prior Administrations, the United States proposed greater control for WTO members over the process, guidelines for the adjudicative bodies, and greater transparency, such as public access to proceedings  However, these negotiations have yet to achieve results  Some experts suggest that enhancing the capabilities and legitimacy of the dispute settlement system will likely require several changes, including improving mechanisms for oversight, narrowing the scope of and diverting sensitive issues from adjudication, improving institutional support, and providing WTO members more input over certain procedures  The immediate flashpoint to the system is the refusal of the United States to consent to the appointment of new AB jurists  The United States has long-standing objections to decisions involving the AB's interpretation of certain U S  trade remedy laws in particular—the subject of the majority of complaints brought by other WTO members against the United States  The AB consists of seven jurists appointed to four-year terms on a rolling basis, with the possibility of a one-term reappointment  Each dispute case is heard by three jurists  Like the previous Administration, the Trump Administration blocked the process to appoint new jurists in 2017 and 2018, leaving only three AB jurists remaining to hear all cases  Concerns are rising that the AB, already facing a backlog of cases, could come to a halt in 2019 if additional appointments are not made  Deputy DG of the WTO Alan Wolff summarized the stakes in recent remarks, noting that if the Appellate Body were to cease to function, member countries would be unable to appeal an adverse panel decision against one of their policies, and without that option, "there is a risk of every trade dispute devolving into small and not so small trade wars, consisting of retaliation and counter-retaliation " The United States expounded on some of the perceived shortcomings of the dispute settlement system in its most recent trade policy agenda  Arguably the main U S  complaint is that the system, particularly the AB, is "adding to or diminishing U S  rights by not applying the WTO agreements as written" in the areas of subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties, standards, and safeguards  At its crux, the current controversy is over the autonomy of the AB, its deference to the DSB, and its obligations to implement the provisions of the DSU  The United States has been the most vocal in its criticisms, yet other WTO members have expressed similar concerns  While the United States has not tabled specific reforms for these complaints to the WTO membership, other members have  Two groups (G-12, G-3) submitted specific proposals for the December 2018 General Council meeting to attempt to break the impasse  The G-12 submission reflects proposals of all 12 members; the G-3 submission contains supplementary proposals put forward by a subset of the 12  The United States criticized the proposals as seeking to change WTO DS rules to fit the practices objectionable to the United States, rather than adhering to the rules as originally negotiated  Instead of seeking to accommodate current practices, U S  Ambassador to the WTO Dennis Shea proposed that WTO members "engage in a deeper discussion of the concerns raised, to consider why the Appellate Body has felt free to depart from what WTO Members agreed to, and to discuss how best to ensure that the system adheres to WTO rules as written " Ambassador Shea also criticized the G-3 proposals as lessening the accountability of the Appellate Body, rather than increasing it  Under each of the following issues, these proposals are raised along with other reform proposals that members or observers have put forward to address current concerns  Disregard for the 90-day, DSU-mandated deadline for AB appeals  USTR claims that the AB does not have the authority to fail to meet the deadline without consulting the DSB, maintaining that the deadline "helps ensure that the AB focuses its report on the issue on appeal " The G-12 submission proposes to amend the DSU to allow parties, based on a proposal by the AB, to extend the length of time to conclude an appeal  If the parties do not agree on an extension, the AB would propose work procedures or arrangements to allow it to conclude the appeal within 90 days  In addition, the G-3 submission proposes to amend the DSU to increase the number of AB jurists from seven to nine to allow for greater efficiency and geographical diversity  Extension of service by former AB jurists on cases continuing after their four-year terms have expired  The United States maintains that the AB does not have the authority unilaterally to extend the terms of jurists, rather that authority lies with the DSB and that it is a matter of adherence to the DSU  In actual practice, however, it may be the case that having former jurists stay on to finish an appeal may be more efficient than having a new jurist join the case  The G-12 submission proposes to amend the DSU to allow outgoing AB jurists to complete the disposition of a pending appeal, provided that the hearing stage has taken place  In addition, the G-3 submission proposes that outgoing AB members continue to serve until replaced, but not more than two years following expiration of their term  Alternatively, some trade experts have suggested that the AB could refrain from assigning cases to jurists less than 90 days before their exits  During the Obama Administration, the United States blocked the reappointment of a South Korean jurist to the AB in May 2016  The United States cited what it considered "abstract discussions" in prior decisions by the jurist that went beyond the legal scope of the WTO  This action has led to the concern that the prospect of non-reappointment could affect the independence of the AB system  However, one former AB jurist opines that, "reappointment is an option, not a right," and calls for the WTO members to determine if a more formal process similar to initial appointment of AB jurists is needed for reappointment  The G-3 submission proposes to amend the DSU to permit AB members to serve one term of longer length (6-8 years) and not allow for reappointment  Other criticisms of the AB involve the extent to which it can interpret WTO agreements  The United States, in arguing for a more restrictive view of the power of the DSB, points to Article 3 2 that "recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements" (see text box above)  However, those supporting a more expansive view of the DSU's role can point to the same article, which highlights the role "to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law " The scope and reach of the AB's activities is an enduring controversy for the organization, not limited to the Trump Administration  USTR has flagged several specific practices relating to these issues, such as the following: Issuing advisory opinions on issues not relevant to the issue on appeal  This point is related to the U S  concern that the AB is engaged in "judicial overreach" by going beyond deciding the case at hand  USTR contends that the ability to issue advisory opinions or interpretations of text rests with the Ministerial Conference or General Council  The G-12 proposes to amend the DSU to stipulate that the AB address each issue raised in a dispute "to the extent necessary for the resolution of the dispute " Rather than issue advisory opinions, some observers have suggested that the AB also could "remand" issues of uncertainty to the standing committees of the WTO for further negotiation  In addition, members could also use a provision of the WTO Agreement (Article IX 2) to seek an "authoritative interpretation" of a WTO text at the General Council or Ministerial Conference, which could be adopted by a three-fourths vote  De novo review of facts or domestic law in cases on appeal  The United States alleges that the AB is not giving the initial panel due deference on matters of fact, including regarding the panel's interpretation of domestic law  This point derives from USTR's view that a country's domestic law should be considered as fact, and that the panel's interpretation of the domestic law is thus not reviewable by the AB  The G-12 submission proposes to amend the DSU to clarify that the meaning of a party's domestic laws is a matter of fact, and not reviewable by the AB  Treatment of AB decisions as precedent  Like the previous two concerns, this complaint speaks to the alleged overreach of the AB  USTR asserts that while AB reports can provide "valuable clarification" of covered agreements, they cannot be considered or substituted for the WTO agreements and obligations negotiated by members  However, according to a former DG of the WTO, "the precedent concept used in the WTO jurisprudence is     centrally important to the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement procedure goals of security and predictability " A related concern some WTO members have is "gap-filling" by the DS system, where the legal precedent is unclear or ambiguous or there are no or incomplete WTO rules regarding a contested issue  Here there are diametrically opposite beliefs: a U S  trade practitioner asks, "Is filling gaps and construing silences really not the creation of rights and obligations through disputes vs  leaving such function to negotiations by the members?" The former DG, however, contends that "every juridical institution has at least some measure of gap-filling responsibility as part of its efforts to resolve ambiguity " The issue of the legitimacy of precedence or gap-filling may be one of the thorniest issues of all with few solutions proposed that would potentially satisfy differences among members  The G-12 submission proposes to amend the DSU to establish a yearly meeting between the AB and the DSB  This session would allow for WTO members to comment on rulings made during the year  According to the submission, it could be a venue "where concerns with regard to some Appellate Body approaches, systemic issues or trends in the jurisprudence could be voiced " It is likely that many of the issues that could arise from proposed reforms to the WTO system would require clarification of or amendment to the language of the Marrakesh Agreement or the DSU  Clarification could take the form of interpretation of the agreements  As noted above, interpretation can be undertaken by the Ministerial Conference (held every two years), General Council, or Dispute Settlement Body, with a three-fourths vote of the WTO membership  Amending the decisionmaking provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement (Article IX) or the DSU would require consensus of the membership at the Ministerial Conference (Marrakesh Agreement, Article X 8)  Amendments to the Marrakesh Agreement would require a two-thirds vote of the membership  As noted above, negotiations related to reforms of the DSM occurred during the Doha Round, and despite the criticism of the DSM by the United States and others, the General Council or the DSB has not undertaken serious consideration of these reforms  The United States has served as a leader in the WTO and the GATT since their creation  The United States played a major role in shaping GATT/WTO negotiations and rulemaking, many of which reflect U S  laws and norms  It was a leading advocate in the Uruguay Round for expanding negotiations to include services and IPR, key sources of U S  competitiveness, as well as binding dispute settlement to ensure new rules were enforceable  Today, many stakeholders across the United States rely on WTO rules to open markets for importing and exporting goods and services, and to defend and advance U S  economic interests  The Trump Administration has expressed doubt over the value of the WTO and multilateral trade negotiations to the U S  economy  As a candidate, President Trump asserted that WTO trade deals are a "disaster" and that the United States should "renegotiate" or "pull out "  In late June 2018, media reports suggested that President Trump was considering withdrawing the United States from the WTO  While U S  officials have downplayed talks of withdrawal as "premature" and an "exaggeration," the President has since reportedly repeated these threats in July and August 2018  The Administration has continued to express skepticism toward the value of multilateral agreements, preferring bilateral negotiations to address "unfair trading practices " In addition, "reform of the multilateral trading system" is a stated Administration trade policy objective  While some U S  frustrations with the WTO are not new and are shared by other trading partners, the Administration's overall approach has spurred new questions regarding the future of U S  leadership of and participation in the WTO  Most observers would maintain that the possibility of U S  withdrawal from the WTO remains unlikely for procedural and substantive reasons  Procedurally, a withdrawal resolution would have to pass the House and Senate; it has also been debated what legal effect the resolution would have if adopted  Moreover, if the United States were to consider such a step, withdrawal would have a number of practical consequences  The United States could face economic costs, since absent WTO membership, remaining members would no longer be obligated to grant the United States MFN status under WTO agreements  WTO rules also restrict members' ability to use quotas, regulations, trade-related investment measures, or subsidies in ways that discriminate or disadvantage U S  goods and services  They also require members to respect U S  IPR  Consequently, U S  businesses could face significant disadvantages in other markets, as members without FTAs with the United States could raise tariffs or other trade barriers at will  Nondiscrimination, a key bedrock principle of the multilateral trading system, could be eroded, particularly given the added impetus U S  withdrawal could give to the proliferation of FTAs  Withdrawal could also lead to a U S  loss of influence over how important international trade matters are decided and who writes global trade rules  In the process, economic inefficiencies and political tensions could increase  Exiting the WTO and the international trading relationships it creates and governs could have broader policy implications, including for cooperation between the United States and allies on foreign policy issues  Another question is whether the WTO would flounder without U S  leadership, or whether other WTO members like the EU and China would increase their roles  As some in the United States question the value of WTO participation and leadership, other countries have begun to assert themselves as leaders and advocates for the global trading system  As noted, cooperation on WTO reform has become elevated as a major topic of discussion at recent high-level meetings, including the latest EU-China Summit held in July 2018 and at the October summit held in Canada among trade ministers from 13 WTO members  Congressional oversight could examine the value, both economic and political, of U S  membership and leadership in the WTO  As part of its oversight, Congress could consider, or could ask the U S  International Trade Commission to investigate, the value of the WTO or potential impact of withdrawal from the WTO on U S  businesses, consumers, federal agencies, laws and regulations, and foreign policy  Congress could vote on a resolution expressing support of the WTO, instructing USTR to prioritize WTO engagement, or, conversely, a resolution for disapproval of U S  membership under the URAA in 2020  The founding of the GATT and creation of the WTO were premised on the notion that an open and rules-based multilateral trading system was necessary to avoid a return to the nationalistic interwar trade policies of the 1930s  There are real costs and benefits to the United States and other countries to uphold the rules and enforce their commitments and those of other WTO members  A liberalized, rules-based global trading system increases international competition for companies domestically, but also helps to ensure that companies and their workers have access and opportunity to compete in foreign markets with the certainty of a stable, rules-based system  A framework for resolving disputes that inevitably arise from repeated commercial interactions may also help ensure such trade frictions do not spill over into broader international relations  However, certain actions by the Trump Administration and other countries have raised questions about respect for the rules-based trading system, and could weaken the credibility of the WTO  In particular, recent U S  actions to raise tariffs against major trading partners under Section 232 and Section 301, and to potentially obstruct the functioning of the dispute settlement system by withholding approval for appointments to the AB, have prompted concerns that the United States and other countries who have retaliated to the U S  actions may undermine the effectiveness and credibility of the institution that it helped to create  Moreover, the outcomes of controversial ongoing dispute cases at the WTO, initiated by several countries over U S  tariffs, could set precedents and have serious implications for the future credibility of the global trading system  In particular, several U S  trading partners view U S  action as blatant protection of domestic industry and not a legitimate use of the national security exception  Some are concerned that U S  actions may embolden other countries to protect their own industries under claims of protecting their own national security interests  Furthermore, U S  tariff actions outside of the multilateral system's dispute settlement process may open the United States to criticism and could impede U S  efforts to use the WTO for its own enforcement purposes  Respect for the rules is also weakened when any country imposes new trade restrictions and takes actions that are not in line with WTO agreements  In particular, China's industrial state policies, including IPR violations and forced technology transfer practices, arguably damage the credibility of the multilateral trading system that is based on respect for the consensus-based rules  In part, the WTO's perceived inability to address certain Chinese policies led to the United States resorting to Section 301 actions  Other countries' pursuit of industrial policy or imposition of discriminatory measures broadly in the name of national or economic security further call into question the viability of the WTO rules-based system  Under the Trump Administration, USTR has put new emphasis on "preserving national sovereignty" within the U S  trade policy agenda, emphasizing that any multinational system to resolve trade disputes "must not force Americans to live under new obligations to which the United States and its elected officials never agreed " The question of sovereignty is not a new one  The withdrawal procedures in the URAA responded to concerns that the WTO would infringe on U S  sovereignty  During the congressional debate over the Uruguay Round agreements, there were some proposals to create extra review mechanisms of WTO dispute settlement, and many Members stressed that only Congress can change U S  laws as a result of dispute findings  While U S  concerns regarding alleged "judicial overreach" in WTO dispute findings are long-standing, the Trump Administration has also emphasized unilateral action outside the WTO as a means of defending U S  interests, including national security  Some observers fear that disagreements at the WTO on issues related to national security (e g , Section 232 tariffs) may be difficult to resolve through the existing dispute settlement procedures, given current disagreements related to the WTO AB and concerns over national sovereignty that would likely be raised if a dispute settlement panel issued a ruling relating to national security  As noted previously, Article XXI of the GATT allows WTO members to take measures to protect "essential security interests " WTO members and parties to the GATT have invoked Article XXI in other trade disputes  These parties, including the United States, have often argued that each country is the sole judge of questions relating to its own security interests  However, neither the WTO members nor a WTO panel have formally interpreted the Article XXI exception to define its scope  Accordingly, there is little guidance as to (1) whether a WTO panel would decide, as a threshold matter, that it had the authority to evaluate whether U S  invocation of the exception was proper; and (2) how a panel might apply the national security exception, if invoked, in any dispute before the WTO involving the steel and aluminum tariffs  The broadened membership of the WTO over the past two decades has promoted greater integration of emerging markets such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China in the global economy, and helped ensure that developing country interests are represented on the global trade agenda  At the same time, many observers have attributed the inability of WTO members to collectively reach compromise over new rules and trade liberalization to differing priorities for reforms and market opening among developed countries and emerging markets  One question is to what extent emerging countries like China, with significant economic clout, will take on greater leadership; will such countries play a constructive role, advance the global trade agenda, and facilitate compromise among competing interests? China has voiced support for globalization and the multilateral trading system under which it has thrived  The Chinese government's recent white paper on the WTO stated the following: "The multilateral trading system, with the WTO at its core, is the cornerstone of international trade and underpins the sound and orderly development of global trade  China firmly observes and upholds the WTO rules, and supports the multilateral trading system that is open, transparent, inclusive and nondiscriminatory " At the same time, China has blocked further progress in certain initiatives, including the WTO plurilateral Environmental Goods Agreement, and has not put forward a sufficiently robust offer on government procurement to join that WTO agreement, a long-standing promise  With its industrial policies that advantage domestic industries, some analysts contend that China often abides by the letter but not the "spirit" of WTO rules, raising questions about the country's willingness in practice to take on more leadership responsibility in the WTO context  Another related concern voiced by the United States and other WTO members is the role of large emerging markets and the use of developing country status by those and other countries to ensure flexibility in implementing future liberalization commitments  The United States could work with other WTO members to set specific criteria to clarify the "developing" country qualification, such as using a combination of metrics including GDP, per capita income, and trade volume  Members could be given incentives to graduate from developing status; different WTO agreements could offer different incentives  The Administration included "reform of the multilateral trading system" in its 2018 trade policy objectives  Congress may also hold oversight hearings to ask the USTR about specific plans or objectives regarding WTO reforms for the institution, dispute settlement, or in regards to updating or amending existing agreements to address trade barriers and market-distorting behaviors not sufficiently covered by current rules  Congress could also consider directing the executive branch to increase U S  engagement in reform negotiations, by, for example, endorsing the current trilateral negotiations announced by USTR, the EU, and Japan to address nonmarket practices, mostly aimed at China  Congress may also want to review the recent report by economists from the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank that identifies potential areas for greater trade integration, and determine which are in the U S  national economic interest  Congress could further consider establishing specific or enhanced new negotiating objectives for multilateral trade agreement negotiations, possibly through amendment to TPA  Congress may request that USTR provide an update of ongoing plurilateral negotiations to address new issues, including digital trade—specified by Congress as a principal trade negotiating objective of TPA  Some experts argue however, that recent U S  unilateral tariff actions may limit other countries' interest in engaging in future WTO or other negotiations to reduce international trade barriers and craft new rules  Such concerns are amplified given the proliferation of preferential FTAs outside the context of the WTO, which have the potential for discriminatory effects on countries not participating, including the United States  Congress may consider the long-term implications of the U S  actions on current and future trade negotiations  The future outlook of the multilateral trading system is the subject of growing debate, as it faces serious challenges, some long-standing and some emerging more recently  Some experts view the system as long stagnant and facing a potential crisis; others remain optimistic that the current state of affairs could spur new momentum toward reforms and alternative negotiating approaches moving forward  Despite differing views, there is a growing consensus that the status quo is no longer sustainable, and that there is urgent need to improve the system and find ground for new compromises if the WTO is to remain the cornerstone of the trading system  Debate about the path forward continues  Recent proposals for WTO reforms and for new rules have provided the seeds for new ideas, though concrete solutions and next steps have yet to be agreed among countries involved in discussions  In the near term, several events on the horizon could provide added impetus for resolving differences and assessing progress  The dispute settlement system could cease to function by late 2019 if the terms of the three remaining AB members continue to expire without the approval of new appointments  WTO members will also face their biennial Ministerial Conference in June 2020, which could provide an opportunity for countries to announce completion of ongoing negotiations, such as on fisheries subsidies, and concrete progress in other areas of long-standing priority, including the plurilateral efforts launched during the 2017 Ministerial  Meanwhile, other ambitious trade initiatives outside the WTO are proceeding, including the CPTPP, which entered into force in December 2018 for several members and which many analysts view as providing a possible template for future trade liberalization and rulemaking in several areas  
Report 2:  Attracting teens can be particularly challenging, in part because of meal service time periods, a lack of age- appropriate activities, and stigma, according to national organizations and providers we interviewed  For example, early morning meal sites generally attract younger kids as teens may be apt to sleep later in the summer, and teens may also perceive a stigma in participating in a free meal program and may face peer pressure not to eat  In addition, meal offerings at SFSP sites may also present challenges to teen participation  Specifically, because FNS bases minimum portion size requirements for meals on the needs of younger children, meals are not always adequate to meet the nutritional needs of teens, according to one sponsor we interviewed  Across the 30 meal sites in the 3 states we visited in summer 2016, we observed variety in the meals served during different meal services  (see fig  8 ) States and SFSP providers have collaborated with others and sought specific types of sites to help provide enrichment activities and attract certain age groups—efforts that FNS has supported through information sharing and related grant funding  Sponsors in the selected states said they have focused on partnerships with groups such as those focused on youth development, churches, libraries, and police or fire departments, to offer age-appropriate activities for children (see fig  9)  For example, programs with local police departments, such as Cops N Kids in one selected state, or libraries in two selected states, provided meal services in combination with youth development or other enrichment activities  (See sidebar for highlights on the Cops N Kids program ) One national organization official said activities at SFSP sites can help take away the stigma around the program because children are not just there for the meal  Efforts to rebrand the SFSP as a community event where entire families can participate at the meal site also can have this effect, which is why some sponsors in the selected states said they partnered with foodbanks to donate meals for adults  In addition, a sponsor in one selected state told us they adjusted their meal offerings to match the needs of children of different age groups, for example, by serving meals to younger children earlier in the day and meals to teens later in the day  To support participation from children of all ages, FNS has shared information on age-appropriate activities through its SFSP toolkit and provided related grant funding  For example, in 2010, FNS funded the Activity Incentive demonstration project, in which sponsors in Mississippi were provided with mini-grants to increase enrichment and recreational activities, such as education, tutoring, sports and games, arts and other activities, to draw children to meal sites  More than half the states reported in our survey that they faced a moderate to extreme challenge with limited state agency staffing (27), a limited amount of federal funding for SFSP administration (27), as well as ensuring sponsor participation to meet needs (28)  In addition, 28 states reported in our survey that they faced a moderate to extreme challenge with sponsors not following program requirements  Limited staffing can affect a state agency’s ability to conduct efforts aimed at increasing participation, identifying potential sponsors, and reviewing and monitoring sponsors, according to national organization and state officials we interviewed  For example, increases in sponsors and sites requires additional staff and time to conduct pre-approval visits, sponsor and site reviews, vendor reviews, and technical assistance visits, which directly affects the amount of funding needed to support staff salaries and travel reimbursement, according to one state in our survey  However, because the SFSP administrative funds FNS provides to states are based on the number of meals served in the previous year, increasing the number of staff to help increase SFSP participation is difficult, according to a national organization official we interviewed  States reported a moderate to extreme challenge with the following issues related to ensuring sponsor participation: a lack of sponsors to meet summer meal needs, a lack of awareness of the summer meal program among potential sponsors or sites, completing federal requirements for monitoring of SFSP sponsors, and identifying potential sponsors  State agencies responsible for administering the SFSP reported relying on other resources and partners to help with program administration— strategies that FNS has supported through information sharing and its online tools  As discussed earlier, all three selected state agencies we interviewed told us they partner with advocacy groups to help expand and conduct outreach on the SFSP  Additionally, more than half the states in our survey reported several factors—which may ease the administrative burden on states—as critical to the success of the SFSP, including partnerships with SFSP sponsors (49) and retaining sponsors and sites over multiple summers (51)  To support states’ use of alternative funding sources to help administer the SFSP, FNS has shared information on federal, state, and private funding and grant opportunities  FNS also developed the online Capacity Builder tool, which 35 states reported in our survey was moderately to extremely useful in identifying or confirming meal site eligibility in fiscal year 2017  Seventeen states reported in our survey that ensuring summer meal sites are in safe locations was moderately to very challenging, a challenge that some states and SFSP providers have taken steps to help address  State officials and SFSP providers in the selected states reported that when crime has occurred near a site, there are concerns about ensuring children’s safety while they are consuming meals at the site, as well as the safety of site staff delivering meals  Some sponsors noted, in particular, parents’ concerns for the safety of their children at meal sites in light of criminal activities in the surrounding area  To ensure children continue to have access to meals, some sponsors noted that in the event of an immediate threat at an outdoor meal site, site staff are sometimes able to bring children to a nearby indoor space instead  States and SFSP provider officials in two selected states told us they have also used other strategies, including partnerships with local law enforcement agencies, to help address safety concerns during the meal service and ensure children have access to meals  For example, national organizations involved in summer meals and sponsor officials in the selected states said they encourage partnerships with local police departments to use police escorts at meal sites or to follow mobile meal routes in situations where safety at the meal site is a concern  When violence or crime has occurred near a site, some states and SFSP sponsors have also sought flexibility from FNS with respect to the federal requirement that children consume summer meals on site, according to state and local officials  FNS has used its available authorities to grant some states and sponsors flexibility with respect to the requirement that children consume summer meals on site, such as when safety at the site is a concern; however, FNS has not clearly communicated to all states and sponsors the circumstances it considers when deciding whether to grant this flexibility  According to our review of letters FNS sent to multiple states approving their requests for this type of flexibility, the agency identified a consistent set of circumstances that needed to be met for it to grant this flexibility  These circumstances were described in the letters the agency sent to states and generally included verification that violent crime activities occurred within both a 6-block radius of the meal site and 72 hours prior to the meal service  FNS’s letters to states indicate that when documentation was provided to the agency showing that these circumstances existed at a summer meals site on a particular day or days, meals consumed by children off site on those days were eligible for federal reimbursement  Although FNS has issued guidance on the general processes for requesting flexibility from program requirements under its waiver and demonstration authorities, these guidance documents do not detail the specific circumstances that the agency considers when deciding whether to grant flexibility from the on-site requirement due to safety concerns  FNS has communicated this information only in its responses to specific state and sponsor requests, and it has not communicated these circumstances more broadly to all states and sponsors  FNS officials explained that they review state and sponsor requests for flexibility due to safety concerns on a case-by-case basis  However, they also acknowledged that the set of circumstances used for approval of state and sponsor requests for flexibility, which we identified in their letters to states, has been used repeatedly  Further, states and sponsors reported challenges obtaining the specific data needed for approval of a site for this type of flexibility, hampering some providers’ efforts to ensure safe delivery of meals  For example, state agency and sponsor officials in one selected state said obtaining the crime data needed to qualify for the flexibility can be an administrative burden on sponsors, and these data are not consistently available in a timely manner  According to state agency and sponsor officials in one of the selected states, daily crime statistics are not available in all areas, and while a sponsor can sometimes access current data on crime in a city, the most recent available data on crime in suburban areas are sometimes one year old  FNS is aware of state and local challenges obtaining the necessary crime data, according to our discussions with FNS officials  FNS officials acknowledged that while they have granted some state and sponsor requests to allow children to consume meals off site in certain areas where violence or crime has occurred, some sponsors were unable to implement the flexibility because they could not obtain the necessary crime data  To help achieve agency objectives and address related risks, the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that agencies should communicate key information to their internal and external stakeholders  Although FNS officials told us they do not have one set of circumstances under which they approve these requests, our review found only one set of circumstances under which this type of flexibility has been approved  However, FNS has not broadly communicated the circumstances it considers in deciding whether to approve requests for flexibility with respect to the requirement that children consume summer meals on site in areas with violence or crime  Unless FNS shares this information with all states and sponsors, states and sponsors will likely continue to be challenged to use this flexibility, hindering its usefulness in ensuring safe summer meal delivery to children  In addition, FNS has issued reports to Congress evaluating some of its demonstration projects, as required under its statutory authorities, but the agency has not issued any such reports to Congress specifically on the use of flexibilities with respect to the on-site requirement in areas where safety is a concern  As previously discussed, the agency is required to annually submit certain reports to Congress regarding the use of waivers and evaluations of projects carried out under its demonstration authority  Furthermore, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management should use quality information to make informed decisions and evaluate the entity’s performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks  Yet, FNS has not evaluated nor reported on the use of waivers and demonstration projects in cases where safety was a concern  Although FNS requests reports from state agencies or sponsors that have received flexibility with summer meals delivery under FNS’s demonstration and waiver authorities, FNS officials told us they have not assessed whether their use of these flexibilities to address safety issues has been effective in ensuring safe meal delivery  FNS officials told us that they have not evaluated or reported on these flexibilities, in part, because they have limited information on their outcomes  Without understanding the impact of its use of these flexibilities, neither FNS nor Congress knows whether these flexibilities are helping provide meals to children  In addition to the challenges with safety at meal sites, sponsors also sometimes face administrative challenges when participating in multiple child nutrition programs that are operated by different state agencies or divisions within the same agency, according to officials from national and regional organizations and sponsors we interviewed  For example, officials from national organizations involved in summer meals told us the management of each child nutrition program and processes related to applications, funding, and oversight are fragmented in many states  For example, a sponsor in one of the selected states told us aspects of the SFSP and CACFP sponsor applications are highly duplicative and estimated it took 42 hours last year to complete duplicative paperwork  Another sponsor that provides school meals during the school year told us they had to fill out 60 additional pages of paperwork to provide summer meals, which coupled with having a state contact for the SFSP that was different from the one they worked with for the NSLP, was a significant burden for them  Officials from one national organization told us a lack of interoperability of some state agencies’ data systems has caused challenges and administrative burden for some sponsors  For example, in some states, different agencies oversee child nutrition programs, yet are unable to share data on sponsor approval, and therefore, sponsors are required to submit similar information to both, according to these officials  Duplicative paperwork can be particularly burdensome for some SFSP providers, as national organization officials and SFSP providers in the selected states said completing SFSP application paperwork can be especially challenging when a sponsor has staff shortages or no dedicated SFSP staff  Some selected states have worked with SFSP sponsors to help minimize the administrative burden  For example, state agency officials from one of the selected states said they have connected less-experienced sponsors to more-experienced sponsors in the community to help them with program administration  In one case, an experienced SFSP sponsor partnered with a small sponsor new to the program to help with SFSP administration, including helping them understand program rules and paperwork requirements  One SFSP sponsor also noted that their state agency took additional steps to ease administrative burden, such as making the forms for the CACFP more consistent with those for the SFSP and streamlining certain requirements for large and experienced sponsors, which the sponsor found helpful  At the federal level, FNS has established program and policy simplifications to help lessen the administrative burden on sponsors participating in multiple child nutrition programs, though the persistence of these challenges indicate that information about these simplifications has not reached all relevant state agencies  While FNS officials told us that some of the duplicative requirements may be a function of differences in statute, FNS provided guidance to states in 2011 and 2014 on simplified application procedures for institutions participating in CACFP that also wish to apply for SFSP  FNS noted in its guidance that in states where CACFP and SFSP are administered by different state agencies, state agencies are encouraged to work together to share information and streamline the application and agreement process as much as possible  FNS also addressed these simplifications in a state agency meeting in November 2017  Additionally, FNS provided guidance to states in 2012 on simplified application and review procedures for school food authorities participating in the NSLP that wish to also participate in the SFSP  Although FNS has shared this information with states in an attempt to make them aware of streamlining options, FNS officials noted that some states may choose not to implement them  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management should externally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives, as well as periodically evaluate the methods of communication to ensure communication is effective and appropriate  FNS’s existing guidance addresses options for streamlining administrative requirements for sponsors participating in multiple child nutrition programs  However, information on program and policy simplifications available for sponsors participating in both NSLP and SFSP has not been shared with states recently, and challenges in this area persist, indicating this information has not reached all relevant state agencies  Without further efforts from FNS to disseminate information on current options for streamlining administrative requirements across child nutrition programs, overlapping and duplicative administrative requirements may limit children’s access to meals by discouraging sponsor participation in child nutrition programs  The purpose of the SFSP is to continue to provide children in low-income areas with nutritious meals over the summer when school is no longer in session, and to that end, the program provided 149 million SFSP meals to children in fiscal year 2016  Although meals served are one indicator of participation, FNS’s current estimates of children participating in SFSP are unreliable  Without additional understanding of children’s participation in the SFSP, FNS lacks information critical for informing program implementation, strategic planning, and outreach  The majority of states nationwide and SFSP providers in the three states we visited reported experiencing a number of challenges with the SFSP, and FNS has taken important steps to address these challenges  Two key challenges identified by officials in the selected states and national organizations we interviewed are ensuring summer meal sites are in safe locations, and meeting administrative requirements when participating in multiple child nutrition programs  FNS has taken steps to address these challenges by providing flexibilities in how meals are delivered to children and streamlining options for those providers participating in more than one child nutrition program  However, a lack of clarity concerning the circumstances under which FNS grants flexibilities in areas of violence and crime, and a lack of information on its use of these flexibilities and their impact on program administration, hinder efforts to ensure program goals are met  Furthermore, absent a reminder to states regarding existing options for streamlining administration across multiple nutrition programs, some providers may continue to be discouraged from participating in these programs due to duplicative and burdensome administrative requirements, which may ultimately limit the provision of nutritious meals to children  We are making the following four recommendations to FNS: The Administrator of FNS should improve its estimate of children’s participation in the SFSP by focusing on addressing, at a minimum, data reliability issues caused by variations in the number of operating days of meal sites and in the months in which states see the greatest number of meals served  (Recommendation 1) The Administrator of FNS should communicate to all SFSP stakeholders the circumstances it considers in approving requests for flexibility with respect to the requirement that children consume SFSP meals on-site in areas that have experienced crime and violence, taking into account the feasibility of accessing data needed for approval, to ensure safe delivery of meals to children  (Recommendation 2) The Administrator of FNS should evaluate and annually report to Congress, as required by statute, on its use of waivers and demonstration projects to grant states and sponsors flexibility with respect to the requirement that children consume SFSP meals on-site in areas experiencing crime or violence, to improve its understanding of the use and impact of granting these flexibilities on meeting program goals  (Recommendation 3) The Administrator of FNS should disseminate information about existing flexibilities available to state agencies to streamline administrative requirements for sponsors participating in the SFSP and other child nutrition programs to help lessen the administrative burden  For example, FNS could re-distribute existing guidance to state agencies that explains available flexibilities and encourage information sharing  (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the USDA for review and comment  FNS officials provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  In addition, in oral comments, FNS officials, including the Deputy Administrator for Child Nutrition Programs, generally agreed with the recommendations in the report  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of the USDA and interested congressional committees  The report will also be available at no charge on the GAO website at www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or larink@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  This appendix discusses in detail our methodology for addressing three research objectives: (1) What is known about participation in the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) and how has it changed in the last 10 years? (2) What other programs help feed low-income children over the summer? and (3) What challenges exist, if any, in providing summer meals to children, and to what extent does the U S  Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) provide assistance to states and sponsors to address these challenges? In addition to the methods we discuss below, to address all three research objectives, we reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; interviewed FNS officials in its headquarters and seven regional offices; and interviewed a broad range of regional and nationwide organizations involved in the SFSP  In addition, we coordinated with officials in USDA’s Office of Inspector General on their ongoing work in this area  To address our first objective about participation in the SFSP, we analyzed FNS data on meals served for fiscal years 2007 through 2016  Specifically, we analyzed the total number of meals served nationwide through the SFSP from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2016  Each month, states report to FNS the number of meals served by meal type (breakfast, lunch, snack, and supper) and the number of meals served by meal and sponsor type (e g , government, nonprofit, etc ) using the FNS- 418 form  To add context on these trends, we also analyzed and compared the number of SFSP lunches served in July with the number of free and reduced-price lunches served to children in March through the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), the largest child nutrition assistance program, from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2016  Each month, states report to FNS the number of meals served through the NSLP using the FNS-10 form  To assess the reliability of SFSP and NSLP data, we (1) performed electronic testing of relevant data elements, (2) reviewed existing information about the data and the system that produced them, and (3) interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data  Electronic testing included, but was not limited to, checks for missing data elements, duplicative records, and values outside a designated range or valid time period  We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to identify the number of SFSP meals served and assess change over time  To further examine what is known about participation in the SFSP, we also reviewed FNS’s data on estimates of children’s participation in the program and determined that these estimates have been calculated inconsistently and are unreliable  To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed documentation about the estimates, interviewed FNS officials, and asked states about the estimate calculation in our survey  As described in our findings, FNS does not collect data on the number of children participating in the SFSP  Instead, FNS relies on states’ estimates of children’s participation, which are based on other data reported by sponsors, such as the number of meals served and meal service days in July  To address our second objective about other programs that help feed children in the summer, we reviewed FNS’s estimate of the number of meals served through the NSLP’s Seamless Summer Option in fiscal year 2016  FNS does not collect data on the number of meals served through the Seamless Summer Option  Instead, FNS annually estimates the number of Seamless Summer Option meals served nationally by aggregating the number of free and reduced-price breakfasts, lunches, and snacks served through the School Breakfast Program (SBP) and NSLP in July  As previously noted, states report these data monthly to FNS  Although FNS does not know the actual number of meals served through the Seamless Summer Option, agency officials told us they believe the number of summer meals provided through the NSLP is small relative to the number of meals served through the Seamless Summer Option during the summer months  They noted that their use of July NSLP data to estimate the Seamless Summer Option meals likely overestimates the number of these meals for July and underestimates the number of these meals for the entire summer  To assess the reliability of the July NSLP data, we (1) performed electronic testing of relevant data elements, (2) reviewed existing information about the data and the system that produced them, and (3) interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data  Electronic testing included, but was not limited to, checking for missing data and data that fell outside of a reasonable range or date for the specific time period (July)  We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to describe the number of meals served  In addition to the data FNS requires states to report, some states collect summer meals data at the meal site level and we used such data from the three selected states to address all three objectives  For objective one, to examine the number of meals served and days of operation at each summer meals site, we analyzed site-level data for 2 months from summer 2016, including the month with the largest number of SFSP meals served in each selected state: Arizona (June and July 2016), Illinois (July and August 2016), and Massachusetts (July and August 2016)  Each state also provided us with data on the number and types of meals served at each SFSP site, the site location, and the duration of time each site operated over the summer  Using the data provided by the states, we calculated the average daily attendance (ADA) for each meal site based on FNS’s instructions and examined the variation in ADA across sites and months  For our second objective on other programs, these selected states provided similar site level data for the state’s Seamless Summer Option sites, if applicable  We assessed the reliability of these data by (1) performing electronic testing of relevant data elements, (2) reviewing existing information about the data and the system that produced them, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report  For both our second objective on other programs and third objective about challenges in providing summer meals to children, we also examined meal site availability in the three selected states by mapping the locations of meal sites  On the maps, we included fiscal year 2016 area eligibility data from FNS’s Capacity Builder mapping tool, as provided by FNS  The site area eligibility data from FNS’s Capacity Builder is based on the U S  Census Bureau’s 5-Year American Community Survey (ACS) estimates of children ages 0-12 and 0-18 eligible for free and reduced-price meals by Census block group and tract  According to FNS officials, FNS obtains 5-Year ACS estimates annually from the U S  Census Bureau and updates its site area eligibility in the Capacity Builder accordingly  For fiscal year 2016, FNS used 2009- 2013 ACS data to identify and include site area eligibility in its Capacity Builder  To help inform all of our research objectives, we conducted a survey of the state agencies that oversee the SFSP in the 50 states and the District of Columbia  We administered our web-based survey between August and October 2017 and received 100 percent response rate  The survey included questions about participation in the SFSP, factors critical to the overall success of the SFSP, outreach efforts, federal technical assistance, barriers and challenges in providing summer meals, alternative summer feeding models, the NSLP’s Seamless Summer Option and the federal Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children demonstration, and nonfederal programs that provide children of low- income households with meals during the summer months  The survey also requested data on SFSP sites participating in the program in fiscal year 2016 and the method state agencies used to calculate ADA in SFSP on the FNS-418 form in fiscal year 2016  Because this was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors  However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce nonsampling errors, such as variations in how respondents interpret questions and their willingness to offer accurate responses  We took steps to minimize nonsampling errors, including pretesting draft instruments and using a web-based administration system  Specifically, during survey development, we pretested draft instruments with SFSP staff from four states (Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina, and South Dakota) in May 2017  We selected the pretest states based on information provided by officials from FNS’s regional offices and national organizations involved in summer meals about state administration of summer meals programs, with the goal of selecting a group of states with varied experiences  In the pretests, we were generally interested in the clarity, precision, and objectivity of the questions, as well as the flow and layout of the survey  For example, we wanted to ensure definitions used in the surveys were clear and known to the respondents, categories provided in close-ended questions were complete and exclusive, and the ordering of survey sections and the questions within each section were appropriate  We revised the final survey based on pretest results  Another step we took to minimize nonsampling errors was using a web-based survey  Allowing respondents to enter their responses directly into an electronic instrument created a record for each respondent in a data file and eliminated the need for and the errors associated with a manual data entry process  We did not fully validate specific information that states reported through our survey  To help inform all of our objectives and gather information about the SFSP directly at the local-level, we conducted 30 site visits in three states: Arizona (12 sites), Illinois (8 sites), and Massachusetts (10 sites) between June and July 2017, and interviewed organizations involved with the SFSP in each site visit state  We used U S  Census Bureau data to select states and local areas within those states based on a high proportion of children in poverty, a mix of urban and rural locations, as well as a mix of sponsor and site type and diverse locations  We visited a wide variety of site locations including, but not limited to, schools, parks, community recreation areas, and libraries  At each SFSP site, we gathered information on local level factors related to SFSP participation and administration by interviewing the organization sponsoring the site, the site operators and staff, and those participating at the site using semi-structured questions  While interviewing SFSP sponsor organizations, we collected information on the sponsors’ roles in the SFSP, characteristics of the sites the organizations sponsored, outreach efforts, any challenges or barriers to SFSP administration and any efforts to address such challenges, relationships with the state agencies that administer the SFSP, relationships with FNS (national and regional offices), and the availability of nonfederally funded programs that provide meals to low-income children over the summer  During the interviews with site operators and staff, we collected information about site operation (e g , site operating days, meals offered, etc ), any challenges to providing SFSP meals to children and any efforts to address such challenges, outreach efforts, and the proximity of the next closest meal site  The information we collected from those participating at the sites included their perspectives on the SFSP food, site food consumption habits, ease of travel to the site, and access to other SFSP sites  At each site, we made observations as to how the food was provided to the children, food consumption and waste, the approximate age range of the children being served, and availability of programs or activities (e g , recreational sports)  Using semi-structured questions, we also interviewed the state agencies responsible for administering the SFSP in the site visit states to gather further information on how the SFSP is administered in each state, statewide participation in the program, related data collection activities, any challenges to administering the program and any efforts to address such challenges, related outreach efforts, alternative meal delivery models being employed by SFSP sponsors, FNS guidance or technical assistance, and the availability of nonfederally funded programs that provide meals to low-income children over the summer  For states that indicated there were other challenge(s), we provided an open-ended question that requested a description of the challenge(s) and 14 states provided descriptions of other challenges, not shown here  For states that indicated there were other challenge(s), we provided an open-ended question that requested a description of the challenge(s) and 8 states provided descriptions of other challenges, not shown here  In addition to the contact named above, Rachel Frisk (Assistant Director), Claudine Pauselli (Analyst-in-Charge), Melissa Jaynes, and Matthew Nattinger made key contributions to this report  Also contributing to this report were Susan Aschoff, Sarah Cornetto, Ying Long, Jean McSween, Mimi Nguyen, Almeta Spencer, and Ashanta Williams 

ground_truth: Historically, the United States' leadership of the global trading system has ensured the United States a seat at the table to shape the international trade agenda in ways that both advance and defend U.S. interests. The evolution of U.S. leadership and the global trade agenda remain of interest to Congress, which holds constitutional authority over foreign commerce and establishes trade negotiating objectives and principles through legislation. Congress has recognized the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the "foundation of the global trading system" within trade promotion authority (TPA) and plays a direct legislative and oversight role over WTO agreements. The statutory basis for U.S. WTO membership is the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465), and U.S. priorities and objectives for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO have been reflected in various TPA legislation since 1974. Congress also has oversight of the U.S. Trade Representative and other agencies that participate in WTO meetings and enforce WTO commitments. The WTO is a 164-member international organization that was created to oversee and administer multilateral trade rules, serve as a forum for trade liberalization negotiations, and resolve trade disputes. The United States was a major force behind the establishment of the WTO in 1995, and the rules and agreements resulting from multilateral trade negotiations. The WTO encompassed and succeeded the GATT, established in 1947 among the United States and 22 other countries. Through the GATT and WTO, the United States, with other countries, sought to establish a more open, rules-based trading system in the postwar era, with the goal of fostering international economic cooperation and raising economic prosperity worldwide. Today, 98% of global trade is among WTO members. The WTO is a consensus and member-driven organization. Its core principles include nondiscrimination (most favored nation treatment and national treatment), freer trade, fair competition, transparency, and encouraging development. These are enshrined in a series of WTO trade agreements covering goods, agriculture, services, intellectual property rights, and trade facilitation, among other issues. Some countries, including China, have been motivated to join the WTO not just to expand access to foreign markets but to spur domestic economic reforms, help transition to market economies, and promote the rule of law. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides an enforceable means for members to resolve disputes over WTO commitments and obligations. The WTO has processed more than 500 disputes, and the United States has been an active user of the dispute settlement system. Supporters of the multilateral trading system consider the dispute settlement mechanism an important success of the system. At the same time, some members, including the United States, contend it has procedural shortcomings and has exceeded its mandate in deciding cases. Many observers are concerned that the effectiveness of the WTO has diminished since the collapse of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which began in 2001, and believe the WTO needs to adopt reforms to continue its role as the foundation of the global trading system. To date, WTO members have been unable to reach consensus for a new comprehensive multilateral agreement on trade liberalization and rules. While global supply chains and technology have transformed international trade and investment, global trade rules have not kept up with the pace of change. Many countries have turned to negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) outside the WTO as well as plurilateral agreements involving subsets of WTO members rather than all members. At the latest WTO Ministerial conference in December 2017, no major deliverables were announced. Several members committed to make progress on ongoing talks, such as fisheries subsidies and e-commerce, while other areas remain stalled. While many were disappointed by the limited progress, in the U.S. view, the outcome signaled that "the impasse at the WTO was broken," paving the way for groups of like-minded countries to pursue new work in other key areas. Certain WTO members have begun to explore aspects of reform and future negotiations. Potential reforms concern the administration of the organization, its procedures and practices, and attempts to address the inability of WTO members to conclude new agreements. Proposed DS reforms also attempt to improve the working of the dispute settlement system, particularly the Appellate Body—the seven-member body that reviews appeals by WTO members of a panel's findings in a dispute case. Some U.S. frustrations with the WTO are not new and many are shared by other trading partners, such as the European Union. At the same time, the Administration's overall approach has spurred new questions regarding the future of U.S. leadership and U.S. priorities for improving the multilateral trading system. Concerns have emphasized that the Administration's recent actions to unilaterally raise tariffs under U.S. trade laws and to possibly impede the functioning of the dispute settlement system might undermine the credibility of the WTO system. A growing question of some observers is whether the WTO would flounder for lack of U.S. leadership, or whether other WTO members like the EU and China taking on larger roles would continue to make it a meaningful actor in the global trade environment. The growing debate over the role and future direction of the WTO may be of interest to Congress. Important issues it may address include how current and future WTO agreements affect the U.S. economy, the value of U.S. membership and leadership in the WTO, whether new U.S. negotiating objectives or oversight hearings are needed to address prospects for new WTO reforms and rulemaking, and the relevant authorities and impact of potential U.S. withdrawal from the WTO on U.S. economic and foreign policy interests.