prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: Many Members of Congress became actively engaged in foreign policy debates over U S  intervention in the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, "Bosnia")  Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response to the conflict through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative initiatives  Many observers contend that the United States is a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of the strong impact of U S  intervention on the postwar Bosnian state  Nearly 25 years after warring parties in Bosnia reached the Dayton Agreement (see below), Bosnia faces numerous internal and external challenges, and the country retains geopolitical importance to U S  interests in the Western Balkans  As Congress assesses ongoing and emerging security issues in the region, including resilience against malign external influence, renewed conflict, and radicalization, Bosnia's internal politics and its role in Balkan stability may merit further examination  Bosnia has existed in various forms throughout its history: a medieval kingdom, territory held by two major empires, a federal unit, and, since 1992, an independent state  Bosnia's present international borders are largely consistent with its administrative boundaries under later periods of Ottoman Turkish rule  After World War I, Bosnia became part of the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes  It was one of the six constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1945 until 1992  Bosnia's constitution stems from the U S -brokered Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the country's 1992-1995 war  It recognizes three "constituent peoples": Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs  All three groups are Slavic  Religious tradition is considered a marker of difference among the three ethnic identities: Bosniaks are predominantly Muslim, Serbs are largely Orthodox Christian, and Croats are mostly Catholic  Although Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian are recognized in Bosnia as distinct official languages, they are mutually intelligible  Bosniaks comprise approximately 50 1% of the population, Bosnian Serbs 30 8%, and Bosnian Croats 15 4%  In this report, Bosnian is used as a non-ethnic term for a person or institution from Bosnia  A Bosnian Serb is an ethnic Serb from Bosnia and a Bosnian Croat is an ethnic Croat from Bosnia  Bosniak refers to Slavic Muslims  Bosnia's religious and cultural diversity is one of its distinctive characteristics  Islam was introduced to part of Bosnia's population during the Ottoman period, although there were also large Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Jewish communities  Bosnia was the most heterogeneous Yugoslav republic and the only one where no ethnic group formed an absolute majority  During the 1990s, some popular accounts of Bosnia (and the former Yugoslavia) depicted its ethnic relations as "ancient hatreds," implying that the country's ethnic groups cannot peacefully coexist and that the 1992-1995 war was unavoidable  However, many experts on the region reject this thesis  Although Bosnia has experienced episodes of communal violence and bloodshed, most recently during World War II and the 1992-1995 war, its heterogeneous population also has lived in mixed communities for periods of peace  Many experts contend that ethnic conflict often was stoked by domestic leaders who manipulated historical memory and grievances to further their own agendas, or by external powers seeking to rule Bosnia or annex its territory  In the 1980s, Yugoslavia's escalating political and economic crises fueled nationalist movements  Nationalist leaders in Serbia and Croatia appealed to Bosnian Serbs and Croats as ethnic "kin " The party that ruled Croatia for most of the 1990s, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), established a sister party with the same name to mobilize Bosnian Croats and compete in Bosnia's elections  This gave Croatia an avenue of influence in Bosnian politics  Serbia, led by strongman Slobodan Milošević, likewise had influence over Bosnian Serb leaders  In Bosnia's November 1990 elections—the first competitive elections in decades—voters cast aside the ruling League of Communists party and elected ethnic parties that largely continue to dominate today  Bosnian voters backed independence in a 1992 referendum, following in the footsteps of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia  Bosnian Serbs, who did not want to separate from Yugoslavia, boycotted the referendum  Bosnian Serb forces seized more than two-thirds of Bosnia's territory, and a three-year conflict followed that pitted Serb, Croat, and Bosniak forces against one another  Bosnian Serb leaders declared a "Serb Republic" ( Republika Srpska) in March 1992, while Bosnian Croat leaders proclaimed the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosnia in July  Some Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb leaders advocated unification with Croatia and Serbia, respectively, where government factions—including their strongman leaders—likewise wanted to carve a Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia out of Bosnia's territory  Bosniak leaders opposed dismemberment of the state  Bosnia's war was one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since World War II  Bosnian Serb forces besieged Sarajevo for 44 months  More than 10,000 people, mostly civilians, died due to shelling, sniping, and blockade-related deprivation  Paramilitary factions from neighboring Croatia and Serbia—some of which reportedly had ties to the Croatian and Serbian government—fought alongside Bosnian Croats and Serbs  The Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army also aided Bosnian Serb forces, giving them a military advantage  In many areas, combatants from the three groups killed or expelled members of other ethnic groups to "purify" territory that they wanted to claim as their own  This "ethnic cleansing" changed Bosnia's demographic landscape  An estimated 100,000 or more Bosnians were killed in the conflict, and roughly half of its population displaced  In addition, an estimated 20,000 or more women and girls were victims of sexual violence  Hundreds of Bosnians have been prosecuted for war crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and in Bosnian courts  In 2016, the ICTY convicted wartime Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić of genocide and war crimes  In 2019, the tribunal rejected his appeal and increased his sentence from 40 years to life  Citizens of Croatia and Serbia have also been indicted for crimes committed in the Bosnian war  Highly publicized incidents in 1994 and 1995 underscored the war's human toll  Bosnian Serb forces bombarded a Sarajevo market in 1994 and 1995, resulting in over 100 civilian deaths  In July 1995, Serb forces commanded by Ratko Mladić seized and executed more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in a U N -designated safe area around the city of Srebrenica, an incident subsequently seen by some as a consequence of the international community's muddled, ineffectual response to the conflict  The International Court of Justice and ICTY subsequently ruled that the Srebrenica massacres constituted an act of genocide  Mladić was convicted of genocide and other crimes in 2017  These incidents increased pressure on U S  policymakers to take a stronger role in resolving a conflict that had largely been left to the EU and the United Nations  Under U S  command, NATO intervened in August and September 1995 with air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets, while allied Bosniak and Croat forces launched a simultaneous offensive in western Bosnia  The United States played a key role in brokering several agreements  The 1994 Washington Agreement ended the "war within a war" between Bosniaks and Croats  In November 1995, leaders from Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia met at the Wright-Patterson Air Force base in Dayton, OH, to negotiate a peace agreement  U S  diplomat Richard Holbrooke played a crucial role in brokering the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, more commonly known as the Dayton Peace Agreement  Bosnia's complex political system is a product of the Dayton Agreement; one of its annexes serves as Bosnia's constitution (Annex 4)  Its provisions partly reflect the situation on the ground in 1995, including the subdivision of Bosnia into two ethnoterritorial entities ( Figure 1 ): Republika Srpska ("RS"), which Bosnian Serb leaders had proclaimed in 1992, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("FBiH," predominantly populated by Bosniaks and Croats), which was created by the 1994 Washington Agreement  Entity borders were largely drawn to form ethnic majorities, even though they also reflected territorial seizure and ethnic cleansing  Many Bosniaks view the division of Bosnia into these roughly equal entities as awarding the spoils of war to Bosnian Serbs, whom they regard as the aggressors  Many Bosnian Serbs, however, view the Serb-majority entity as a protection against marginalization  The designation of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as Bosnia's three "constituent peoples" is a cornerstone of the Dayton system  Numerous government bodies have ethnic quotas requiring equal representation of the three groups  In these power-sharing institutions, delegates from each constituent group may veto measures that go against vital ethnic interests  While these arrangements make Bosnia's political system prone to gridlock, Dayton's negotiators viewed them as necessary to prevent any group from feeling marginalized in a context of low trust  Bosnia is a parliamentary republic with a high degree of decentralization  Its complex, tiered structure includes a central ("state-level") government, the two entities, the autonomous Brčko district, and cantonal and municipal governments  The central ("state-level") government covers the entirety of Bosnia  A three-member presidency is the head of state, and includes one Serb member who is elected by RS voters, and one Bosniak and one Croat member elected by FBiH voters  The Council of Ministers, led by a Chairperson, is roughly equivalent to a cabinet government and prime minister in other parliamentary systems  The Parliamentary Assembly is a state-level legislature with two chambers: a directly elected House of Representatives (42 members) and an indirectly elected House of Peoples (5 Serbs, 5 Croats, and 5 Bosniaks)  The state-level government is considered to be weak, despite some expansion of its functions in the 2000s  Its major responsibilities include foreign relations; trade, customs, and monetary policy; migration and asylum policy; defense; and intelligence  Bosnia is further subdivided into two ethnoterritorial entities: Republika Srpska (RS), where Serbs are the largest ethnic group (82%), and the Federation entity (FBiH), where Bosniaks (70%) and Croats (22%) are the largest groups  The two entities have broader policy jurisdiction than the state-level government  Governing functions that are not assigned to the state-level government fall to the entities  These include civilian policing, economic policy, fiscal policy, energy policy, and health and social policy, as well as other issues  Each entity has its own constitution, as well as a president, vice presidents, legislature, and cabinet government with a prime minister  Each entity may establish "special parallel relationships" with neighboring states (i e , Croatia and Serbia)  Numerous entity bodies also incorporate ethnic quotas  Brčko district, a border region in northeastern Bosnia, was initially administered by the international community to allay concerns about RS secession  Brčko's location interrupts RS's contiguity, and both entities initially claimed it  Brčko was later awarded to both entities, but remains a self-governing district whose population is a mix of all three constituent peoples  Some analysts believe it has been relatively more successful than the entities in passing reforms and reintegrating its divided population (e g , ethnically mixed schools with a common curriculum)  FBiH entity is further divided into ten cantons, many of which were drawn to form ethnic Bosniak or Croat majorities  The cantons have jurisdiction in many policy areas, including policing, housing, culture, and education  They also have their own constitutions—based on the FBiH constitution—as well as legislatures and cabinet-style governments  FBiH and RS are further divided into 79 and 64 municipalities, respectively  The Dayton Agreement established a strong oversight role for the international community  The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was created to monitor the implementation of civilian aspects of Dayton  The High Representative is supported by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), a group of 55 countries and agencies  A 1997 PIC conference empowered the High Representative to impose binding decisions and sanction politicians who obstruct Dayton  Until the mid-2000s, the High Representative used these powers to remove officials deemed to be obstructive to peace and to promote what are considered among the most constructive reforms since Dayton, including merging the entities' armed forces and intelligence services and putting them under new state-level ministries  However, the High Representative's proactive role has since decreased  This is partly due to criticism that the OHR lacks democratic legitimacy and accountability  Bosnian Serb politicians have claimed that the OHR's interventions support Bosniak leaders' preference for a more centralized state  At the same time, some U S  and EU policymakers believed that the attraction of EU membership could incentivize reforms in place of the OHR's more top-down approach  The international community also plays an ongoing security role  NATO led the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) that monitored security aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement  The initial deployment of NATO ground forces to Bosnia numbered nearly 60,000, of which the largest share (approximately one-third) was from the United States  The number of troops subsequently decreased  In 2004, NATO's peacekeeping role was transferred to the EU with the understanding that NATO would assist if necessary  The size of the EU operation (EUFOR Althea) decreased from 7,000 troops in 2004 to roughly 600 troops today  Many analysts contend that the Dayton Agreement helped hold Bosnia together after the war; they point to the absence of widespread violence since 1995 as an indicator of its success  However, observers also question whether Bosnia can function much longer under the Dayton system  They identify several key challenges: Critics claim that Bosnia's political system reinforces the country's ethnic divisions and makes ethnicity a core basis of political identity  The ethnic parties that have dominated politics since the war generally appeal to voters from their respective ethnic communities rather than all Bosnians  Critics accuse ethnic party leaders of inflaming nationalist tensions and manipulating historical memory to distract from corruption and win elections, thus aggravating rather than bridging the deep wounds that remain from the war  In some parts of Bosnia, divisions are further reproduced at the societal level through institutions like segregated schools, which separate schoolchildren from different ethnic groups and teach them different curriculum  Some analysts also contend that the system is too gridlock-prone to pass major political and economic reforms to be passed, even with the incentive of potential EU membership  Bosnia's fractured, overlapping institutions sometimes muddle policymaking jurisdiction and impede coordinated response  Furthermore, power-sharing arrangements create numerous veto points in the legislative process  Government coalitions are typically ideologically broad and unwieldy, creating a further source of potential dysfunction  One of the consequences of these barriers is that it is difficult to pass legislation  The previous state-level Parliament, for example, adopted twelve new laws over the course of its 2014-2018 term  Corruption in Bosnia has roots in the country's wartime economy  A 2000 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that "organized crime and corruption pervade Bosnia's national political parties, civil service, law enforcement and judicial systems  [Ethnic] parties control all aspects of the government, the judiciary, and the economy, and in so doing maintain the personal and financial power of their members " Many observers claim that the situation has improved little since then  In 2018, the High Representative warned that the rule of law has deteriorated, while the U S  State Department describes the rule of law as "an existential issue " Bosnia's major parties allegedly siphon from the state apparatus and public enterprises in their strongholds to amass wealth and power  Furthermore, parties in power reportedly politicize hiring in Bosnia's public sector, which employs an estimated third or more of the working population  For many Bosnians, satisfactory employment depends on having the right political connections, which creates a dependence that reportedly is exploited during elections  In 2018, the outgoing U S  ambassador to Bosnia decried the "[Bosnian] politicians who seek to destabilize the country in order to remain in power at all costs for personal profit and protection " Many analysts believe that Bosnia's entrenched ethnic parties benefit tremendously from the status quo and have little incentive to reform the system  Bosnia's MPs are among the best-paid in Europe relative to local incomes, commanding six to eight times the average Bosnian salary  Parties and politicians who gain office in the government or administration often find "a remarkably efficient path to personal enrichment " Politicians are skilled at using veto points to block legislation that threatens their position in Bosnia's patronage system  According to one analyst, Bosnia's patronage system is "the raison d'etre of the political elites and is the main cause of the state's dysfunctionality and resistance to reform " Bosnia's entrenched political class may also fear penalty if serious reforms are enacted and shine the spotlight on malfeasance  Criminal indictments against leaders in neighborhood countries like Romania, Croatia, and North Macedonia highlight this risk  Analysts believe these disincentives make entrenched politicians resistant to external pressure for reform  Several major rounds of U S - and EU-brokered constitutional reform efforts, including in 2006, 2008, and 2009, ultimately failed  Germany and the United Kingdom launched a major initiative in 2014 to shift the focus from difficult constitutional reforms to seemingly more feasible socioeconomic reforms that they hoped would improve Bosnia's economy and dismantle patronage networks  The 2015 "Reform Agenda" identified economic, administrative, and legal measures to be adopted by entity- and state-level governments  The process, which required the major parties to commit in writing to the reform framework, was supported by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group, and the United States  As an incentive for politicians to agree to the Agenda, the EU offered the entry into force of Bosnia's long-stalled Stabilization and Association Agreement, which marked the first step toward EU membership  However, most observers view the Reform Agenda as largely unsuccessful; many of its provisions failed when entrenched parties objected to measures that would undercut their dominance  While many officials recognize that Bosnia's political system needs reform, there is little consensus on how to change it or to generate the political will to find common ground so long as the dominant parties remain entrenched  Bosnian Serb leaders have expressed a desire to return to the "original" Dayton system, when the entities had greater competencies in security and justice  Milorad Dodik, who has dominated politics in Republika Srpska since the 2000s, has gone further by repeatedly threatening RS secession  Bosnian Croat leaders from the largest Croat party, the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia (HDZ-BiH), call for more autonomy for Croats, and have raised the prospect of splitting FBiH to create a third Croat-majority entity  By contrast, Bosniak leaders generally prefer more centralization and the removal of some of the institutional arrangements that they believe contribute to dysfunction and gridlock  Some Bosniak officials also have proposed dismantling the entities or eliminating FBiH's cantons  Survey research documents Bosnian citizens' anger toward the political class and their distrust of political institutions  In a 2018 International Republican Institute survey, 86% of respondents expressed belief that Bosnia is heading in the wrong direction  An estimated 170,000 individuals—disproportionately young and skilled—have emigrated since 2013  Dissatisfaction with education and healthcare, insecurity, and nepotism are cited as key motives to emigrate  Nevertheless, some analysts believe that periods of social discontent in 2014 and 2018, which challenged the system but appeared to transcend ethnic divides, suggest that strengthening Bosnian civil society could increase pressure for reform, and perhaps cultivate a new generation of party leaders  Other observers have put their hopes for reform in Bosnia's so-called "civic parties," which do not have nationalist platforms and typically mobilize voters on the basis of socioeconomic interests rather than ethnicity  While these parties have not matched the results of the ethnic parties, their electoral performance has improved in recent years  Bosnia's challenges came to the forefront during its most recent general election on October 7, 2018 (see Table 1 )  The Central Election Commission (CEC) registered 60 parties and over 3,500 candidates for state-level, entity, and cantonal offices  Observers noted that the campaign climate was more divisive and nationalist in tone than usual  Despite broad voter dissatisfaction, entrenched ethnic parties won the largest vote shares  Almost six months after the election, the parties are still negotiating over government formation at the state level and in FBiH; however, it appears that entrenched ethnic parties will continue to dominate  In March 2019, the leaders of the largest Bosniak, Croat, and Serb parties stated that they had agreed to a set of principles to guide forming the state-level government (the Council of Ministers)  Some observers viewed the improved result of civic parties (one-third of the vote in FBiH) as a positive development  Some of the most controversial outcomes concern the elections to the state-level presidency, composed of three members (one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb)  In a closely fought race, Šefik Džaferović, candidate of the ethnic Bosniak SDA party, narrowly defeated the candidate of the civic SDP party (36 6% and 33 5%, respectively), retaining the lock that the SDA has had on the Bosniak seat in most elections since 1996, but perhaps auguring a future victory by a civic party candidate  Prior to the election, some analysts expressed concern at the prospect of two of the three seats on the presidency being held by the nationalist Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik and his ally, the nationalist Bosnian Croat politician Dragan Čović  Both politicians have explicitly or implicitly challenged the legitimacy of Bosnian statehood and called for greater ethnoterritorial autonomy  However, to the surprise of some observers, Željko Komšić of the civic Democratic Front defeated incumbent Čović for the Croat seat with 53% of the vote  Komšić was previously elected as the Croat member of the presidency in 2006 and 2010, and is considered to be a moderate political figure who generally supports centralizing reforms  In contrast to HDZ-BiH leader Čović, he does not have strong ties to the Croatian government  Komšić's election as the Croat member of the presidency in 2006 and 2010 was mired in controversy amid complaints that he only won with the support of Bosniaks who voted in the election for the Croat member on the presidency rather than the Bosniak member  Komšić identifies as Croat but has been leader of several civic parties  He comes from central Bosnia, and not from the Croat-majority western regions that are the stronghold of the HDZ  Although it is not illegal for Bosniaks to vote for the Croat seat on the presidency rather than the Bosniak seat, some Croat leaders (especially HDZ-BiH and HDZ-1990) claim that it violates the spirit of Dayton and results in illegitimate representation of Croats  Similar accusations of ethnic cross-voting surfaced after Komšić's victory in 2018  Some analysts expect Komšić's victory to harden the HDZ-BiH position on electoral reform (see "Legal Challenges," above) and possibly embolden politicians who seek a separate entity  As most pre-election polls anticipated, RS strongman Milorad Dodik defeated the more moderate incumbent Serb member of the presidency with 54% of the vote  Dodik has dominated entity politics in RS since the mid-2000s as entity prime minister and president  Analysts note that RS's political environment grew more closed as Dodik consolidated power  Dodik has run afoul of the United States and the EU by frequently threatening to hold a referendum on RS secession, questioning the legitimacy of Bosnian statehood, and cultivating close ties to Russia (see below)  The U S  Treasury Department sanctioned him in 2017 for actively obstructing Dayton  Many analysts have expressed concern that Dodik will use his new position to obstruct the workings of the central government while continuing to dictate politics in RS through loyal allies  Shortly after the election he vowed to "work above all and only for the interests of Serbs " One of his first acts as head of state was to call for Bosnia to recognize Ukraine's Crimea region as Russian territory  In December 2018, the National Assembly of RS approved the creation of several new ministries, an act that some view as an attempt to wrest competencies from the state-level government  In early 2019, the RS parliament courted controversy when it passed legislation to create a new commission to reinvestigate the events of Srebrenica, which many view as an attempt to deny or downplay the massacres  Since the election, the formation of governments has proceeded piecemeal, and legal challenges to election law in FBiH (see above, "Legal Challenges") initially cast doubt over the formation of that entity's government  The RS National Assembly approved the new entity government in December 2018  Party leaders continue to negotiate over forming governments in FBiH and the state-level Council of Ministers  Because the FBiH government did not fix electoral legislation before the election, the Electoral Commission adopted a decision to assign delegates to the House of Peoples based on the 2013 census  (The Electoral Commission's actions reportedly came amid strong pressure from U S  and EU officials)  Several Bosniak parties challenged the decision before the Constitutional Court; however, the Court declined to take on the case  Bosnia is one of Europe's poorest countries  The 1992-1995 war caused an estimated $110 billion in damage, and Bosnia's economy contracted to one-eighth of its prewar level  Despite significant reconstruction and recovery since 1995, GDP per capita was $5,148 in 2017, well below the EU average ($33,715) and that of Bulgaria ($8,031), its lowest-ranking member  Nearly one in five Bosnians lives below the poverty level  Bosnia's unemployment rate was 18% in 2018, down from 28% in 2015  Youth unemployment also declined in recent years from 60% to 46%  Nevertheless, these rates are still high by European standards  Since 2015, annual GDP growth has averaged around 3%, but it is largely driven by consumption (much of which in turn is fueled by migrant remittances)  The IMF has urged Bosnia to privatize or restructure the nearly 550 state-owned enterprises that comprise roughly 20% of its economy; many of them are unprofitable but allegedly are used by politicians as "cash cows and workplaces for loyal cadres " Bosnia participates in several free trade schemes  In 2006, it joined the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) alongside other non-EU countries in the region, including other ex-Yugoslav neighbors  Bosnia's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union, which entered into force in 2015, provides for almost fully free trade  A free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) also entered into force in 2015  The EU is Bosnia's primary trade partner  Germany, Italy, Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria are Bosnia's key EU export markets, accounting for more than half of its exports in 2017
Report 2: , support for general aviation airports)  But there are significant disagreements about the appropriate degree of federal participation in airport development and finance and about the specific types of expenditure that should be given priority within AIP  Airline and airport operators tend to view the fully authorized funding of the program as a good thing  An alternative view, however, is that too much has been spent on AIP, particularly at smaller airports that do not play a significant role in commercial aviation  The assessment of airport capital needs is fundamental to determining the appropriate federal support needed to foster a safe and efficient national airport system  The federal government's interest goes beyond capacity issues to include implementation of federal safety and noise policies  Both FAA and the Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA) have issued projections of airports' long-term financial needs  In its most recent NPIAS report, FAA estimated that the national system's capital needs for FY2019-FY2023 will total $35 1 billion (an annual average of approximately $7 billion)  The ACI-NA infrastructure needs survey resulted in an estimate of $128 1 billion over the same years (an annual average of approximately $25 6 billion)  The main reason for the widely differing estimates was disparate views on what kinds of airport projects to include  The NPIAS report was based on information taken from airport master plans and state system plans, but FAA planners screened out planned projects not justified by aviation activity forecasts or not eligible for AIP grants  Only designated NPIAS airports were included in the FAA study  Implicit in this methodology is that the planning has been carried through to the point where financing is identified  Not all projects used to develop the NPIAS estimates are actually completed, or in some cases even begun, within the range of years covered in the NPIAS estimates  ACI-NA argues that the NPIAS underestimates AIP eligible needs because not all such needs will be in the current airport plans  The ACI-NA study reflects the broader business view of major airport operators and casts a substantially wider net  It includes projects funded by PFCs, bonds, or state or local funding; airport-funded air traffic control facilities; airport- or TSA-funded security projects; "necessary" AIP-ineligible projects such as parking facilities, hangars, revenue portions of terminals, and off-airport roads/transit facilities; and AIP-eligible projects not reported to FAA in the belief that there would be a low probability of receiving additional AIP funding  Its 2019-2023 infrastructure needs survey, for example, included major airport terminal projects that are ineligible for AIP grants  The ACI-NA study also includes projects without identified funding sources  The ACI-NA estimate is higher than the FAA estimate because of the wider net it casts and because it is adjusted for projected inflation  The estimates are important because the primary AIP reauthorization issue is the program's appropriate level of funding  Because the ACI-NA airport needs projection includes much that is not eligible for AIP grants, its accuracy may not be as critical in evaluating appropriate AIP funding levels as that of the NPIAS projections  On the other hand, the broader ACI-NA estimate may be more significant for policy choices related to bond issuance and PFCs, since these sources fund a broader range of projects than AIP  In 2004, then-FAA Administrator Marion C  Blakey stated that the agency's goal was to increase total capacity at the top 35 U S  airports by 30% over a 10-year period  FAA's Operational Evolution Plan (OEP) is intended to increase the capacity and efficiency of the National Airspace System (NAS) over a 10-year period to keep up with the expected growth in demand for air travel and air cargo  In support of that goal, FAA released a study focused on the 35 busiest airports, Capacity Needs in the National Airspace System: An Analysis of Airport and Metropolitan Area Demand and Operational Capacity in the Future (also referred to as FACT1)  The study projected 18 airports would need additional capacity by 2020  In 2007, FACT1 was updated by a second study, FACT2  FACT2 expanded the study to include 21 non-OEP airports that were identified as having the potential to be capacity constrained or were in capacity-constrained metropolitan areas  The study examined airports that would need capacity increases and also projected which airports would need capacity increases in 2015 and 2025  It identified four airports plus the New York metropolitan area that needed additional capacity in 2007  It further identified 14 hub airports as likely to be capacity-constrained in 2025  FACT2 found that, in comparison to FACT1, many non-OEP airports "    have higher capacities than originally presumed and thus less need for additional capacity " A further update, FACT3, was released in January 2015  FACT3 forecasted that the 2007-2009 recession, volatile fuel costs, airline consolidation, and replacement of many 50-seat regional jets with larger aircraft would result in 32% fewer operations and about 23% fewer enplanements in 2025 at the 30 core airports than forecast in FACT2  It projected that airport delays would remain concentrated at a few major hub airports, notably the three New York City-area airports, Philadelphia International Airport, and Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport  This study may have implications for the reauthorization of AIP  The large runway projects that are the focus of the OEP can require long lead times—10 or more years from concept to initial construction is not unusual  At large and medium hub airports, runway projects are usually paid for, in part, by AIP funds  Therefore, some projects needed by 2025 may require AIP funding in earlier years  Because large and medium airports that levy PFCs must forgo either 50% or 75% of their AIP formula entitlement funds, most federal funding for their runway projects would probably need to take the form of AIP discretionary funds  The pool of discretionary funds is primarily the remainder of annual funding after the entitlement formula requirements are satisfied  Of the forgone PFC funds, 87 5% are reserved for the small airport fund and are also not available for OEP airports  If the AIP budget is constrained in the future, either under a reauthorization bill or during the annual appropriations process, and the entitlement formulas remain as they are, the discretionary portion of the AIP budget may be squeezed, limiting large airports' ability to draw on AIP funds for major capacity expansion projects  Many of the attributes of AIP's programmatic structure are similar to those of the 1982 act that created the program  Over the years these attributes have been modified based on perceived needs and on the practical politics of passing the periodic FAA reauthorization bills that contain the AIP provisions  These considerations make a major overhaul of the AIP structure unlikely, but may leave room for programmatic adjustments in the distribution of apportionments  One such adjustment might shift AIP funds to enhancing capacity at large and medium hub airports  There are several ways Congress might accomplish this  One would be to eliminate the requirement that large and medium hub airports that impose the maximum PFCs forgo 75% of their entitlements  This change would give larger airports a greater share of entitlement funding, but at the cost of reducing AIP grants to small airports  Alternatively, changes in the statutory set-asides of discretionary funds could give FAA more flexibility to use that money for capacity enhancement, but might reduce funding for noise mitigation and other purposes  Changes in the last several FAA authorization acts increased entitlements and broadened the range of landside projects eligible for AIP grants  These changes generally benefitted airports smaller than medium hub size  In particular, the increased amount of apportioned funds has limited the availability of funds for discretionary grants at major airports  Further changes giving airports increased flexibility in the use of their entitlements might benefit smaller airports not served by commercial aviation, in line with the national goal of having an "extensive" national airport system, but this use of funds might conflict with the goal of reducing congestion at major commercial airports  The current apportionment system relies on a $3 2 billion funding level trigger mechanism to lift most of the apportionments to twice their formula level  This has been in place for two reauthorization cycles  Should that trigger be breached, entitlements for all airports would be reduced drastically  The entitlement formulas may not be sustainable, without depleting discretionary funds, in the absence of additional funding for AIP  One way to reduce the amount of trust fund revenue needed for AIP would be to allow large and medium hub airports to opt out of AIP and rely exclusively on PFCs to finance capital projects  This would require raising or eliminating the federal cap on PFCs  These "defederalized" airports could then be released from some or all of the AIP grant assurances under which they now operate, such as land use requirements and airport revenue use restrictions  If airports exit the program, AIP spending could be reduced or could be redirected to other NPIAS airports  Airport privatization denotes a change in ownership from a public entity (such as a local government or an airport authority established by a state government) to a private one  In a number of countries, such as Great Britain, government-owned airports have been privatized by sale to private owners  In the United States, some airports have allowed private ownership of certain on-airport facilities or management functions, but the ownership of all major airports remains in the hands of government entities  The Airport Privatization Pilot Program (49 U S C  §47134; Section 149 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, P L  104-264 , as amended) authorizes FAA to exempt up to 10 airports from certain federal restrictions on the use of airport revenue off-airport  Participating airports may be also exempted from certain requirements on the repayment of federal grants  Privatized airports may still participate in the AIP, but at a lower federal share (70%)  The pilot program was renamed the Airport Investment Partnership Program (AIPP) in the 2018 FAA reauthorization act and expanded to admit more than 10 airports  The AIPP provides that at primary airports, the airport sponsor may only recover from the sale or lease an amount approved by at least 65% of the scheduled air carriers serving the airport, as well as by both scheduled and unscheduled air carriers that together account for 65% of the total landed weight at the airport for the year  The requirement that air carriers approve the use of airport revenue for nonairport purposes, such as profit distribution, may have served to limit interest in the program  To date, only two airports have completed the privatization process established under the provisions of the AIPP  One of those, Stewart International Airport in New York State, subsequently reverted to public ownership when it was purchased by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey  Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport in San Juan, PR, is now the only commercial service airport operating under private management after privatization under the APPP  As of 2018, there are three applicants under active FAA consideration: Hendry County Airglades Airport in Clewiston, FL; Westchester Airport in White Plains, NY; and St  Louis Lambert International Airport in St  Louis, MO  There is no certainty that any AIP cost savings from privatization would be retained for use by the other AIP-eligible airports  AIP spending is determined by the authorization and appropriations process, and Congress could choose to use any savings to reduce the program size, to marginally assist in deficit reduction, to reduce general fund portions of FAA operations funding, or to make money available for spending elsewhere  Debate over FAA reauthorization generally brings forth proposals to alter the AIP grant assurances, such as ensuring that workers on airport construction projects receive prevailing wages set under the Davis-Bacon Act and pledging to use airport revenue solely for spending on airport operations and capital costs  If AIP spending remains constrained, critics are likely to argue that the grant assurances raise the cost of projects to increase airport capacity and complicate the closure and reuse of underutilized airports or airports that are locally unpopular due to noise or safety concerns  Historically, a basic funding issue is whether to change the existing discretionary fund set-aside for noise mitigation and abatement  The noise set-aside, however, has been increased in previous reauthorization acts and is now 35% of discretionary funding  Demand to use AIP funds for noise mitigation could increase if Congress grants FAA the flexibility to fund noise mitigation projects that are outside the DNL 65 decibel (dB) noise impact area, but this could divert resources from capacity and safety projects  A related issue is whether to make the planning for noise-mitigating air traffic control procedures at individual airports eligible for AIP funding  The central issue related to PFCs is whether to raise the $4 50 per enplaned passenger ceiling or to eliminate the ceiling altogether  In general, airports argue for increasing or eliminating the ceiling, whereas most air carriers and some passenger advocates oppose higher limits on the PFCs  A 2015 GAO study analyzed the effects by raising the PFC cap under three scenarios: setting the cap at $6 47, $8 00, or $8 50  The study found raising PFC would significantly increase airport funding, but could also marginally slow passenger growth and therefore the growth in revenues to the trust fund  PFC supporters feel that the PFC is more reliable than AIP funding, which is subject to the authorization and appropriations process  They also argue that PFCs are procompetitive, helping airports build gates and facilities that both encourage new entrant carriers and allow incumbent carriers to expand  Advocates of an increase in the cap also argue that over time, the value of the PFC has been eroded by inflation and an adjustment is therefore necessary  The permissible uses of revenues are an ongoing point of contention  Airport operators, in particular, would like more freedom to use PFC funds for off-airport projects, such as transportation access projects, and want the process of obtaining FAA approval to be streamlined  Carriers, on the other hand, often complain that airports use PFC funds to finance proposals of dubious value, especially outside airport boundaries, instead of high-priority projects that offer meaningful safety or capacity enhancements  The major air carriers are also unhappy with their limited influence over project decisions, as airports are required only to consult with resident air carriers instead of having to get their agreement on PFC-funded projects  Unlike interest income from governmental bonds, which is not subject to the alternative minimum tax (AMT), interest from private activity bonds is still subject to the AMT  ACI-NA has proposed broadening the definition of governmental airport bonds to, in effect, include either all airport bonds or at least those bonds issued for public-use projects that meet AIP or PFC eligibility requirements  Opponents of such changes express concerns that these changes would reduce U S  Treasury revenues  Some also argue it would make more sense to change the AMT as part of a tax bill rather than including a specific exemption for income on airport bonds in an FAA reauthorization bill  In either case, such a change would not be under the jurisdiction of the congressional committees that will have jurisdiction over most reauthorization provisions  Changes to the AMT would be under the jurisdiction of the congressional tax-writing committees, the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance  Appendix A  Legislative History of Federal Grants-in-Aid to Airports Prior to World War II the federal government viewed airports as a local responsibility  During the 1930s, it spent about $150 million a year on airports through work relief agencies such as the Works Progress Administration (WPA)  The first federal support for airport construction was granted during World War II  After the war, the Federal Airport Act of 1946 (P L  79-377) created the Federal Aid to Airports Program, using funds appropriated annually from the general fund  Initially much of this spending supported conversion of military airports to civilian use  In the 1960s substantial funding went to upgrade and extend runways for use by commercial jets  By the end of the 1960s, congestion, both in the air and on the ground at U S  airports, was seen as evidence that airport capacity was inadequate  Airport and Airway Development and Revenue Acts of 1970 (P L  91-258) In 1970, Congress responded to the capacity concerns by passing two acts  The first, the Airport and Airway Development Act (Title I of P L  91-258), established the Airport Development Aid Program (ADAP) and the Planning Grant Program (PGP), and set forth the programs' grant criteria, distribution guidelines, and authorization of grant-in-aid funding for the first five years of the program  The second, the Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970 (Title II of P L  91-258), established the Airport and Airway Trust Fund  Revenues from levies on aviation users and fuel were dedicated to the fund  Under the 1970 acts the trust fund could pay capital costs and, when excess funds existed, could also help cover FAA's administrative and operations costs  Airport and Airway Development and Revenue Acts Amendments of 1971 (P L  92-174) The Nixon Administration's FAA budget requests for FY1971 and FY1972 under the new trust fund system brought it into immediate conflict with Congress over the budgetary treatment of trust fund revenues  The Administration treated the new financing system as a user-pay system, whereas many Members of Congress viewed the trust fund as primarily a capital fund  The 1971 Amendments Act made the trust fund a capital-only account (although only through FY1976), disallowing the use of trust fund revenues for FAA operations  Airport and Airway Development Amendments Act of 1976 ( P L  94-353 ) The 1976 act made a number of adjustments to the ADAP and reauthorized the Airport and Airway Trust Fund through FY1980  The act again allowed the use of trust fund resources for the costs of air navigation services (a part of operations and maintenance)  However, in an attempt to assure adequate funding of airport grants, the act included "cap and penalty" provisions which placed an annual cap on spending for costs of air navigation systems and a penalty that reduced these caps if airport grants were not funded each year at the airport program's authorized levels  This cap was altered multiple times in reauthorization acts in the following decades  ADAP grants totaled about $4 1 billion from 1971 through 1980  Congress did not pass authorizing legislation for ADAP during FY1981 and FY1982, during which the aviation trust fund lapsed, although spending for airport grants continued  Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 ( P L  97-248 ) The 1982 act created the current AIP and reactivated the Airport and Airway Trust Fund  It altered the funding distribution among the newly defined categories of airports, extending aid eligibility to privately owned general aviation airports, increasing the federal share of eligible project costs, and earmarking 8% of total funding for noise abatement and compatibility planning  The act also required the Secretary of Transportation to publish a national plan for the development of public-use airports in the United States  This biannual publication, the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS) , identifies airports that are considered important to the national aviation system  For an airport to receive AIP funds it must be listed in the NPIAS  Although the 1982 act was amended often in the 1980s and early 1990s, the general structure of AIP remained the same  The Airport and Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987 ( P L  100-223 ; 1987 act) authorized significant spending increases for AIP and added a cargo service apportionment  It also included provisions to encourage full funding of AIP at the authorized level  Title IX of P L  101-508 , the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA1990), included the Aviation and Airway Safety and Capacity Act of 1990, which allowed airports, under certain conditions, to levy a Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) to raise revenue and also established the Military Airport Program (MAP), which provided AIP funding for capacity and/or conversion-related projects at joint-use or former military airports  The Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990 (OBRA 1990, Title IX, Subtitle D) set a national aviation noise policy  OBRA1990 included the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, which reauthorized the Aviation Trust Fund and adjusted some of the aviation taxes  The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1994 ( P L  103-305 ) reauthorized AIP for two more years and again made modifications in the cap and penalty provisions  Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 ( P L  104-264 ) The 1996 reauthorization of the AIP made a number of adjustments to entitlement funding and discretionary set-aside provisions  It also included directives concerning intermodal planning, cost reimbursement rules, letters of intent, and the small airport fund  A demonstration airport privatization program and a demonstration program for innovative financing techniques were established  The demonstration status of the state block grant program was removed  The act did not reauthorize the taxes that supported the Airport and Airway Trust Fund  This was done by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ( P L  105-34 ), which extended, subject to a number of modifications, the existing aviation trust fund taxes through September 30, 2007  The Wendell H  Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21 st Century of 2000 (AIR21; P L  106-181 ) The enactment of AIR21 was the culmination of two years of legislative effort to pass a multiyear FAA reauthorization bill  The initial debate focused on provisions to take the aviation trust fund off-budget or erect budgetary "firewalls" to assure that all trust fund revenues and interest would be spent each year for aviation purposes  These proposals, however, never emerged from the conference committee  Instead, the enacted legislation included a so-called "guarantee" that all of each year's receipts and interest credited to the trust fund would be made available annually for aviation purposes  AIR21 did not make major changes in the structure or functioning of AIP  It did, however, greatly increase the amount available for airport development projects  The AIP funding authorization rose from $1 9 billion in FY2000 to $3 4 billion in FY2003  The formula funding and minimums for primary airports were doubled starting in FY2001  The state apportionment for general aviation airports was increased from 18 5% to 20%  The noise set-aside was increased from 31% to 34% of discretionary funding and a reliever airport discretionary set-aside of 0 66% was established  AIR21 also increased the PFC maximum to $4 50 per boarding passenger  In return for imposing a PFC above the $3 level, large and medium hub airports would forgo 75% of their AIP formula funds  This had the effect of making a greater share of AIP funding available to smaller airports  Vision 100: Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act of 2003 ( P L  108-176 ; H Rept  108-334 ) Vision 100, signed by President George W  Bush on December 12, 2003, included significant changes to AIP  The law codified the AIR21 spending "guarantees" through FY2007  It increased the discretionary set-aside for noise compatibility projects from 34% to 35%  It increased the amount that an airport participating in the Military Airport Program (MAP) could receive to $10 million for FY2004 and FY2005, but in FY2006 and FY2007 it returned the maximum funding level to $7 million  The act allowed nonprimary airports to use their entitlements for revenue-generating aeronautical support facilities, including fuel farms and hangars, if the Secretary of Transportation determines that the sponsor has made adequate provisions for the airside needs of the airport  The law permitted AIP grants at small airports to be used to pay interest on bonds issued to finance airport projects  The act included a trial program to test procedures for authorizing small airports to impose PFCs  Vision 100 repealed the authority to use AIP or PFC funds for most airport security purposes  FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 ( P L  112-95 ) The 2012 FAA reauthorization act funded AIP for four years from FY2012 to FY2015 at an annual level of $3 35 billion  A new provision, Section 138, permitted small airports reclassified as medium hubs due to increased passenger volumes to retain eligibility for up to a 90% federal share for a two-year transition period  This provision also allows certain economically distressed communities receiving subsidized air service to be eligible for up to a 95% federal share of project costs  The 2012 act maintained the $4 50 PFC cap, with a maximum charge of $18 per round-trip flight  It included a provision that instructed GAO to study alternative means for collecting PFCs  The act also expanded the number of airports that could participate in the airport privatization pilot program from 5 to 10  This law was extended through July 15, 2016  The FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 ( P L  114-190 ) The 2016 FAA extension act funded AIP through FY2017 at an annual level of $3 35 billion  A new provision, Section 2303, provided temporary relief to small airports that had 10,000 or more passenger boardings in 2012 but had fewer than 10,000 during the calendar year used to calculate the AIP apportionment for FY2017  This provision allowed such airports to receive apportionment for FY2017 an amount based on the number of passenger boardings at the airport during calendar year 2012  The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 ( P L  115-254 ) The 2018 FAA reauthorization act funded AIP for five years from FY2019 through FY2023 at an annual level of $3 35 billion  It also authorized supplemental annual funding from the general fund to the AIP discretionary funds—$1 02 billion in FY2019, $1 04 billion in FY2020, $1 06 billion in FY2021, $1 09 billion in FY2022, and $1 11 billion in FY2023—and required at least 50% of the additional discretionary funds to be available to nonhub and small hub airports  The act included a provision permitting eligible projects at small airports (including those in the State Block Grant Program) to receive 95% federal share of project costs (otherwise capped at 90%), if such projects are determined to be successive phases of a multiphase construction project that received a grant in FY2011  The 2018 reauthorization expanded the number of states that could participate in the State Block Grant Program from 10 to 20 and also expanded the existing airport privatization pilot program (now renamed the Airport Investment Partnership Program) to include more than 10 airports  The law included a provision that forbids states or local governments from levying or collecting taxes on a business on an airport that "is not generally imposed on sales or services by that State, political subdivision, or authority unless wholly utilized for airport or aeronautical purposes " Appendix B  Definitions of Airports Included in the NPIAS Commercial Service Airports Publicly owned airports that receive scheduled passenger service and board at least 2,500 passengers each year (506 airports)  Primary Airports   Airports that board more than 10,000 passengers each year  There are four subcategories: Large Hub Airports   Board 1% or more of system -wide boardings ( 30 airports, 72 % of all enplanements)Medium Hub Airports   Board 0 25% but less than 1% (31 airports, 16% of all enplanements) Small Hub Airports   Board 0 05% but less than 0 25% (72 airports, 8% of all enplanements) Non hub Primary Airports   Board more than 10,000 but less than 0 05% (247 airports, 3% of all enplanements) Non primary Commercial Service Airports   Board at least 2,500 but no more than 10,000 passengers each year (126 airports, 0 1% of all enplanements)  Other Airports General Aviation Airports   General aviation airports do not receive scheduled commercial or military service but typically do support business, personal, and instructional flying; agricultural spraying; air ambulances; on-demand air-taxies; and/or charter aircraft service (2,554 airports)  Reliever Airports   Airports designated by FAA to relieve congestion at commercial airports and provide improved general aviation access (261 airports)  Cargo Service Airports   Airports served by aircraft that transport cargo only and have a total annual landed weight of over 100 million pounds  An airport may be both a commercial service and a cargo service airport  New Airports Seven airports are anticipated to be built between 2019 and 2023  They include two primary airports, two nonprimary commercial service airports, and three general aviation airports 

ground_truth: The daily order of business on the floor of the House of Representatives is governed by standing rules that make certain matters and actions privileged for consideration. On a day-to-day basis, however, the House can also decide to grant individual bills privileged access to the floor, using one of several parliamentary mechanisms. The standing rules of the House include several different parliamentary mechanisms that the body may use to act on bills and resolutions. Which of these will be employed in a given instance usually depends on the extent to which Members want to debate and amend the legislation. In general, all of the procedures of the House permit a majority of Members to work their will without excessive delay. The House considers most legislation by motions to suspend the rules, with limited debate and no floor amendments, with the support of at least two-thirds of the Members voting. Occasionally, the House will choose to consider a measure on the floor by the unanimous consent of Members. The Rules Committee is instrumental in recommending procedures for considering major bills and may propose restrictions on the floor amendments that Members can offer or bar them altogether. Many major bills are first considered in Committee of the Whole before being passed by a simple majority vote of the House. The Committee of the Whole is governed by more flexible procedures than the basic rules of the House, under which a majority can vote to pass a bill after only one hour of debate and with no floor amendments. Although a quorum is supposed to be present on the floor when the House is conducting business, the House assumes a quorum is present unless a quorum call or electronically recorded vote demonstrates that it is not. However, the standing rules preclude quorum calls at most times other than when the House is voting. Questions are first decided by voice vote, although any Member may then demand a division vote. Before the final result of a voice or division vote is announced, Members can secure an electronically recorded vote instead if enough Members desire it or if a quorum is not present in the House. The constitutional requirements for making law mean that each chamber must pass the same measure with the identical text before transmitting it to the President for his consideration. When the second chamber of Congress amends a measure sent to it by the first chamber, the two chambers must resolve legislative differences to meet this requirement. This can be accomplished by shuttling the bill back and forth between the House and Senate, with each chamber proposing amendments to the position of the other, or by establishing a conference committee to try to negotiate a compromise version of the legislation.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: A complicated body of rules, precedents, and practices governs the legislative process on the floor of the House of Representatives  The official manual of House rules is more than 1,000 pages long and is supplemented by 30 volumes of precedents, with more volumes to be published in coming years  Yet there are two reasons why gaining a fundamental understanding of the House's legislative procedures is not as difficult as the sheer number and size of these documents might suggest  First, the ways in which the House applies its rules are largely predictable, at least in comparison with the Senate  Some rules are certainly more complex and more difficult to interpret than others, but the House tends to follow similar procedures under similar circumstances  Even the ways in which the House frequently waives, supplants, or supplements its standing rules with special, temporary procedures generally fall into a limited number of recognizable patterns  Second, underlying most of the rules that Representatives may invoke and the procedures the House may follow is a fundamentally important premise—that a majority of Members should ultimately be able to work their will on the floor  Although House rules generally recognize the importance of permitting any minority—partisan or bipartisan—to present its views and sometimes propose its alternatives, the rules do not enable that minority to filibuster or use other parliamentary devices to prevent the majority from prevailing without undue delay  This principle provides an underlying coherence to the various specific procedures discussed in this report  Article I of the Constitution imposes a few restrictions on House (and Senate) procedures—for example, requirements affecting quorums and roll-call votes—but otherwise the Constitution authorizes each house of Congress to determine for itself the "Rules of its Proceedings" (Article 1, Section 5)  This liberal grant of authority has several important implications  First, the House can amend its rules unilaterally; it need not consult with either the Senate or the President  Second, the House is free to suspend, waive, or ignore its rules whenever it chooses to do so  By and large, the Speaker or whatever Representative is presiding usually does not enforce the rules at his or her own initiative  Instead, Members must protect their own rights by affirmatively making points of order whenever they believe the rules are about to be violated  In addition, House rules include several formal procedures for waiving or suspending certain other rules, and almost any rule can be waived by unanimous consent  Thus, the requirements and restrictions discussed in this report generally apply only if the House chooses to enforce them  If for no other reason than the size of its membership, the House has found it necessary to limit the opportunities for each Representative to participate in floor deliberations  Whenever a Member is recognized to speak on the floor, there is always a time limit on his or her right to debate  The rules of the House never permit a Representative to hold the floor for more than one hour  Under some parliamentary circumstances, there are more stringent limits, with Members being allowed to speak for no more than 5 minutes, 20 minutes, or 30 minutes  Furthermore, House rules sometimes impose a limit on how long the entire membership of the House may debate a motion or measure  Most bills and resolutions, for instance, are considered under a set of procedures called "suspension of the rules" (discussed later in this report) that limits all debate on a measure to a maximum of 40 minutes  Under other conditions, when there is no such time limit imposed by the rules, the House (and to some extent, the Committee of the Whole as well) can impose one by simple majority vote  These debate limitations and debate-limiting devices generally prevent a minority of the House from thwarting the will of the majority  House rules also limit debate in other important respects  First, all debate on the floor must be germane to whatever legislative business the House is conducting  Representatives may speak on other subjects only in one-minute speeches most often made at the beginning of each day's session, special order speeches occurring after the House has completed its legislative business for the day, and during morning hour debates that are scheduled on certain days of the week  Second, all debate on the floor must be consistent with certain rules of courtesy and decorum  For example, a Member should not question or criticize the motives of a colleague  When a House committee reports a public bill or resolution that had been referred to it, the measure is placed on the House Calendar or the Union Calendar  In general, tax, authorization, and appropriations bills are placed on the Union Calendar; all others go to the House Calendar  In effect, the calendars are catalogues of measures that have been approved, with or without proposed amendments, by one or more House committees and are now available for consideration on the floor  Placement on a calendar does not guarantee that a measure will receive floor consideration at a specified time or at all  Because it would be impractical or undesirable for the House to take up measures in the chronological order in which they are reported and placed on one of the calendars, there must be some procedures for deciding the order in which measures are to be brought from the calendars to the House floor—in other words, procedures for determining the order of business  Clause 1 of Rule XIV lists the daily order of business on the floor, beginning with the opening prayer, the approval of the Journal (the official record of House proceedings required by the Constitution), and the Pledge of Allegiance  Apart from these routine matters, however, the House never follows the order of business laid out in this rule  Instead, certain measures and actions are privileged, meaning they may interrupt the regular order of business  In practice, all the legislative business that the House conducts comes to the floor by interrupting the order of business under Rule XIV, either by unanimous consent or under the provisions of another House rule  Every bill and resolution that cannot be considered by unanimous consent must become privileged business if it is going to reach the floor at all  There is no one single set of procedures that the House always follows when it considers a public bill or resolution on the floor  Instead, there are several modes of consideration, or different sets of procedural rules, that the House uses  In some cases, House rules require that certain kinds of bills be considered in certain ways  By various means, however, the House chooses to use whichever mode of consideration is most appropriate for a given bill  Which of these modes the House uses depends on such factors as the importance and potential cost of the bill and the amount of controversy the bill has generated among Members  The differences among these sets of procedures rest largely on the balance that each strikes between the opportunities for Members to debate and propose amendments, on the one hand, and the ability of the House to act promptly, on the other  Regardless of which procedure the House uses to consider legislation, the House majority party leadership generally tries to post the text of measures coming to the chamber floor in advance on an internet website created for that purpose  The House most frequently resorts to a set of procedures that enables it to act quickly on bills that enjoy overwhelming but not unanimous support  Although this set is called "suspension of the rules," clause 1 of Rule XV provides for these procedures as an alternative to the other modes of consideration  The essential components of suspension of the rules are (1) a 40-minute limit on debate, (2) a prohibition against floor amendments, and (3) a two-thirds vote of those present and voting for passage  On every Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday—and at other times by special arrangement—the Speaker may recognize Members to move to suspend the rules and pass a particular bill (or take some other action, such as agreeing to the Senate's amendments to a House bill)  Once such a motion is made, the motion and the bill itself together are debatable for a maximum of 40 minutes  Half of the time is controlled by the Representative making the motion, often the chair of the committee with jurisdiction over the bill; the other half is usually controlled by the ranking minority member of the committee (or sometimes the subcommittee) of jurisdiction, especially when he or she opposes the motion  The suspension motion itself may propose to pass the bill with certain amendments, but no Member may propose an amendment from the floor  During the debate, the two Members who control the time yield parts of it to other Members who wish to speak  Once the 40 minutes is either used or yielded back, a single vote occurs on suspending the rules and simultaneously passing the bill  If two-thirds of the Members present vote "Aye," the motion is agreed to and the bill is passed  If the motion fails, the House may debate the bill again at another time, perhaps under another mode of consideration that permits floor amendments and more debate and requires only a simple majority vote for passage  The House frequently considers several suspension motions on the same day, which could result in a series of electronically recorded votes taking place at 40-minute intervals if such votes are requested  For the convenience of the House, therefore, clause 8 of Rule XX permits the Speaker to postpone electronic votes that Members have demanded on motions to suspend the rules until a later time on the same day or the following day  When the votes do take place, they are clustered together, occurring one after the other without intervening debate  One of the ironies of the legislative process on the House floor is that the House does relatively little business under the basic rules of the House  Instead, most of the debate and votes on amendments to major bills occur in Committee of the Whole (discussed below)  This is largely because of the rule that generally governs debate in the House itself  The rule controlling debate during meetings of the House (as opposed to meetings of the Committee of the Whole) is clause 2 of Rule XVII, which states in part that a "Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner may not occupy more than one hour in debate on a question in the House " In theory, this rule permits each Representative to speak for as much as an hour on each bill, on each amendment to each bill, and on each of the countless debatable motions that Members could offer  Thus, there could be more than four hundred hours of debate on each such question, a situation that would make it virtually impossible for the House to function effectively  In practice, however, this "hour rule" usually means that each measure considered "in the House" is debated by all Members for no more than a total of only one hour before the House votes on passing it  The reason for this dramatic difference between the rule in theory and the rule in practice lies in the consequences of a parliamentary motion to order what is called the "previous question " When a bill or resolution is called up for consideration in the House—and, therefore, under the hour rule—the Speaker recognizes the majority floor manager to control the first hour of debate  The majority floor manager is usually the chair of the committee or subcommittee with jurisdiction over the measure and most often supports its passage without amendment  This Member will yield part of his or her time to other Members and may allocate control of half of the hour to the minority floor manager (usually the ranking minority member of the committee or subcommittee)  However, the majority floor manager almost always yields to other Representatives "for purposes of debate only " Thus, no other Member may propose an amendment or make any motion during that hour  During the first hour of debate, or at its conclusion, the majority floor manager invariably "moves the previous question " This nondebatable motion asks the House if it is ready to vote on passing the bill  If a majority votes for the motion, no more debate on the bill is in order, nor can any amendments to it be offered; after disposing of the motion, the House usually votes immediately on whether to pass the bill  If the House defeats the previous question, however, opponents of the bill would then be recognized to control the second hour of debate, and might use that time to try to amend the measure  Because of this, it is unusual for the House not to vote for the previous question—the House disposes of most measures considered in the House, under the hour rule, after no more than one hour of debate and with no opportunity for amendment from the floor  These are not very flexible and accommodating procedural ground rules for the House to follow in considering most legislation  Debate on a bill is usually limited to one hour, and only one or two Members control this time  Before an amendment to the bill can even be considered, the House must first vote against a motion to order the previous question  For these reasons, most major bills are not considered in the House under the hour rule  In current practice, the most common type of legislation considered under the hour rule in the House are procedural resolutions reported by the House Committee on Rules that are commonly referred to as "special rules" (discussed below)  Much of the legislative process on the floor occurs not "in the House" but in a committee of the House known as the Committee of the Whole (formally, the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union)  Every Representative is a member of the Committee of the Whole, and it is in this committee, meeting in the House chamber, that many major bills are debated and amended before being passed or defeated by the House itself  Most bills are first referred to, considered in, and reported by a standing legislative committee of the House before coming to the floor  In much the same way, once bills do reach the floor, many of them then are referred to a second committee, the Committee of the Whole, for further debate and for the consideration of amendments  The Speaker presides over meetings of the House but not over meetings of the Committee of the Whole  Instead, the Speaker appoints another Member of the majority party to serve as the chair of the Committee of the Whole during the time the committee is considering a particular bill or resolution  In addition, the rules that apply in Committee of the Whole are somewhat different from those that govern meetings of the House itself  The major differences are discussed in the following sections of this report  In general, the combined effect of these differences is to make the procedures in Committee of the Whole—especially the procedures for offering and debating amendments—considerably more flexible than those of the House  Clause 3 of Rule XVIII requires that most bills affecting federal taxes and spending be considered in Committee of the Whole before the House votes on passing them  Most other major bills are also considered in this way  Most commonly, the House adopts a resolution, reported by the Rules Committee, that authorizes the Speaker to declare the House "resolved" into Committee of the Whole to consider a particular bill  There are two distinct stages to consideration in Committee of the Whole  First, there is a period for general debate, which is routinely limited to an hour  Each of the floor managers usually controls half the time, yielding parts of it to other Members who want to participate in the debate  During general debate, the two floor managers and other Members discuss the bill, the conditions prompting the committee to recommend it, and the merits of its provisions  Members may describe and explain the reasons for the amendments that they intend to offer, but no amendments can actually be proposed at this time  During or after general debate, the majority floor manager may move that the committee "rise"—in other words, that the committee transform itself back into the House  When the House agrees to this motion, it may resolve into Committee of the Whole again at another time to resume consideration of the bill  Alternatively, the Committee of the Whole may proceed immediately from general debate to the next stage of consideration: the amending process  The Committee of the Whole may consider a bill for amendment section by section or, in the case of appropriations measures, paragraph by paragraph  Amendments to each section or of the bill are in order after the part they would amend has been read or designated and before the next section is read or designated  Alternatively, the bill may be open to amendment at any point, usually by unanimous consent  The first amendments considered to each part of the bill are those (if any) recommended by the committee that reported it  Thereafter, members of the committee are usually recognized before other Representatives to offer their own amendments  All amendments must be germane to the text they would amend  Germaneness is a subject matter standard more stringent than one of relevancy and reflects a complex set of criteria that have developed by precedent over the years  The Committee of the Whole votes only on amendments; it does not vote directly on the bill as a whole  And like the standing committees of the House, the Committee of the Whole does not actually amend the bill; it only votes to recommend amendments to the House  The motion to order the previous question may not be made in Committee of the Whole, so, under a purely open amendment process, Members may offer whatever germane amendments they wish  After voting on the last amendment to the last portion of the bill, the committee rises and reports the bill back to the House with whatever amendments it has agreed to  Purely open amendment processes have been rare in recent Congresses; the amendment process is far more frequently structured by the terms of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and adopted by the House  This process is discussed in the next section of this report  An amendment to a bill is a first-degree amendment  After such an amendment is offered, but before the committee votes on it, another Member may offer a perfecting amendment to make some change in the first degree amendment  In current floor practice, this is rare  A perfecting amendment to a first-degree amendment is a second-degree amendment  After debate, the committee first votes on the second-degree perfecting amendment and then on the first-degree amendment as it may have been amended  Clause 6 of Rule XVI also provides that a Member may offer a substitute for the first-degree amendment before or after a perfecting amendment is offered, and this substitute may also be amended  Although a full discussion of these possibilities is beyond the scope of this report, it is important to note that the amending process can become complicated, with Members proposing several competing policy choices before the Committee of the Whole votes on any of them  Debate on amendments in Committee of the Whole is governed by the five-minute rule, not the hour rule that regulates debate in the House  The Member offering each amendment (or the majority floor manager, in the case of a committee amendment) is first recognized to speak for five minutes  Then a Member opposed to the amendment may claim five minutes for debate  Other Members may also speak for five minutes each by offering a motion "to strike the last word " Technically, this motion is an amendment that proposes to strike out the last word of the amendment being debated  But it is a "pro forma amendment" that is offered merely to secure time for debate and so is not voted on when the five minutes expire  In this way, each Representative may speak for five minutes on each amendment  However, a majority of the Members can vote (or agree by unanimous consent) to end the debate on an amendment immediately or at some specified time  Also, as mentioned, if the amendment process is governed by a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and adopted by the House, that resolution will limit the number, order, and form of amendments that can be considered  When the committee finally rises and reports the bill back to the House, the House proceeds to vote on the amendments the committee has adopted  It usually approves all these amendments by one voice vote, though Members can demand separate votes on any or all of them as a matter of right  After a formal and routine stage called "third reading and engrossment" (when only the title of the bill is read), there is then an opportunity for a Member, virtually always from the minority party, to offer a motion to recommit the bill to committee  If the House agrees to a "simple" or "straight" motion to recommit, which only proposes to return the bill to committee, the bill is taken from the floor and returned to committee  Although the committee technically has the power to re-report the bill, in practice, the adoption of a straight motion to recommit is often characterized as effectively "killing" the measure  "Straight" motions to recommit are rare  Alternatively, motions to recommit far more frequently include instructions that the committee report the bill back to the House "forthwith" with an amendment that is stated in the motion  If the House agrees to such a motion, which is debatable for 10 minutes, evenly divided, it then immediately votes on the amendment itself, so a motion to recommit with instructions is really a final opportunity for the minority party to amend the bill before the House votes on whether to pass it  Thus, this complicated mode of consideration, which the House uses to consider most major bills, begins in the House with a decision to resolve into Committee of the Whole to consider a particular bill  General debate and the amending process take place in Committee of the Whole, but ultimately it is the House that formally amends and then passes or rejects the bill  Clause 1(m) of Rule X authorizes the Rules Committee to report resolutions affecting the order of business  Such a resolution—called a "rule" or "special rule"—usually proposes to make a bill in order for floor consideration so that it can be debated, amended, and passed or defeated by a simple majority vote  In effect, each special rule recommends to the House that it take from the Union or House Calendar a measure that is not otherwise privileged business and bring it to the floor out of its order on that calendar  Typically, such a resolution begins by providing that, at any time after its adoption, the Speaker may declare the House resolved into Committee of the Whole for the consideration of that bill  Because the special rule is itself privileged, under clause 5(a) of Rule XIII, the House can debate and vote on it promptly  If the House accepts the Rules Committee's recommendation, it proceeds to consider the bill itself  One fundamental purpose of most special rules, therefore, is to make another bill or resolution privileged so that it may interrupt the regular order of business  Their other fundamental purpose is to set special procedural ground rules for considering that measure; these ground rules may either supplement or supplant the standing rules of the House  For example, the special rule typically sets the length of time for general debate in Committee of the Whole and specifies which Members are to control that time  In addition, the special rule normally includes provisions that expedite final House action on the bill after the amending process in Committee of the Whole has been completed  Special rules may also waive points of order that Members could otherwise make against consideration of the bill, against one of its provisions, or against an amendment to be offered to it  The most controversial provisions of special rules affect the amendments that Members can offer to the bill that the resolution makes in order  As noted above, an "open rule" permits Representatives to propose any amendment that meets the normal requirements of House rules and precedents—for example, the requirement that each amendment must be germane  A "modified open rule" permits amendments to be offered that otherwise comply with House rules but imposes a time limit on the consideration of amendments or requires them to be preprinted in the Congressional Record   At the other extreme, a "closed rule" prohibits all amendments except perhaps for committee amendments and pro forma amendments ("to strike the last word") offered only for purposes of debate  A "structured" rule, which is the most common type of rule, permits only certain specific amendments to be considered on the floor  These provisions are very important because they can prevent Representatives from offering amendments as alternatives to provisions of the bill, thereby limiting the policy choices that the House can make  Open rules have been rare in recent Congresses  However, like other committees, the Rules Committee only makes recommendations to the House  As noted above, Members debate each of its procedural resolutions in the House under the hour rule and then vote to adopt or reject it  If the House votes against ordering the previous question on a special rule, a Member could offer an amendment to it, proposing to change the conditions under which the bill itself is to be considered  Because the adoption of a special rule is often viewed as a "party loyalty" vote, however, such a development is exceedingly rare  All the same, it is important to remember that while the Rules Committee is instrumental in helping the majority party leadership formulate its order of business and in setting appropriate ground rules for considering each bill, the House retains ultimate control over what it does, when, and how  Legislation is sometimes brought before the House of Representatives for consideration by the unanimous consent of its Members  Long-standing policies announced by the Speaker regulate unanimous consent requests for this purpose  Among other things, the Speaker will recognize a Member to propound a unanimous consent request to call up an unreported bill or resolution only if that request has been cleared in advance with both party floor leaders and with the bipartisan leadership of the committee of jurisdiction  Before any bill can become law, both the House and the Senate must pass it, and the two houses must agree on each and every one of its provisions  This basic constitutional requirement means that the House must have procedures to respond when the House and Senate pass different versions of the same bill  For example, the House may pass a Senate bill with House amendments, or the Senate may pass a House bill with Senate amendments and then send its amendments to the House  In either case, the two houses must resolve their differences over these amendments before the legislative process is completed  There are essentially two ways to approach this stage of the process: (1) by dealing with the amendments individually through a process of exchanging amendments between the chambers, with the bill being sent back and forth between the House and Senate, or (2) by dealing with the amendments collectively through a conference committee of Representatives and Senators who negotiate a series of compromises and concessions that are compiled in a conference report that the two houses can vote to accept  Because the process of resolving differences between the houses can be quite complicated, only some of its basic elements are summarized here  The House normally considers Senate amendments to a House bill by unanimous consent or by suspension of the rules; the House may accept the amendments (concur in them) or amend them (concur in them with House amendments)  Alternatively, the committee with jurisdiction over the bill may authorize its chair to move that the House disagree to the Senate's amendments and send them to a conference committee  When the House amends and passes a Senate bill, it may request a conference with the Senate immediately, or it may simply send its amendments to the Senate in the hope that the Senate will accept them  If the Senate refuses to do so, it may request a conference with the House instead  On the other hand, if the House and Senate can reach agreement by proposing amendments to each other's positions, the bill can be sent to the President for his signature or veto without the need to create a conference committee  This method of resolving differences is sometimes colloquially called "ping-pong," because each chamber acts in turn, shuttling the legislation back and forth as each proposes amendments to the position of the other  If the House and Senate agree to send their versions of the bill to a conference committee, the Speaker appoints the House conferees  These conferees are usually drawn from the standing committee (or committees) with jurisdiction over the bill, although the Speaker may appoint some other Representatives as well  When the House and Senate conferees meet, they are to deal only with provisions of the bill on which the two houses disagree  They should not insert new provisions or change provisions that both houses have already approved  Furthermore, as the conferees resolve each provision or amendment in disagreement, they accept the House position, the Senate position, or a compromise between them  Like almost all other House rules, the rules limiting the authority of conferees are enforced only if Members make points of order at the appropriate time  The House may also adopt a special rule, reported by the Rules Committee, waiving points of order against a conference report  To complete their work successfully, a majority of the House conferees and a majority of the Senate conferees must sign a report that recommends all the agreements they have reached  The conferees also sign a "joint explanatory statement" that describes the original House and Senate positions and the conferees' recommendations and is the functional equivalent of a legislative committee report  After Representatives have had three days to examine a conference report, it is privileged for floor consideration; it may be called up at any time that the House is not already considering something else  The report may be debated in the House under the hour rule, so the vote almost always occurs after no more than one hour of debate  No amendments to the report are in order  In practice, however, the House almost always considers conference reports under the terms of a special rule from the Rules Committee that waives all points of order against the report and its consideration  The conference report is a proposed package settlement of a number of disagreements, so the House and Senate may accept it or reject it, but they may not change it  If the two houses agree to the report by simple majority vote, all their differences have been resolved and the bill is then "enrolled," or reprinted, for formal presentation to the President  In rare instances, conferees cannot reach agreement on one or more of the amendments in conference, or they may reach an agreement that they cannot include in their conference report because their proposal exceeds the scope of the differences between the House and Senate positions (and thus violates the rules governing the content of conference reports)  In either case, the conferees may report back to the two houses with an amendment (or amendments) in disagreement  After acting on the conference report and dealing collectively with all the other amendments that were sent to conference, the House acts on each of the amendments in disagreement by considering motions such as a motion to accept the Senate's amendment or a motion to amend it with a new House amendment  The Senate takes similar action until the disagreements on these amendments are resolved or until the two houses agree to create a new conference committee only to address the remaining amendments that are still in disagreement  The bill cannot become law until the two houses resolve all the differences between their positions  Whenever Representatives vote on the floor, there is almost always first a "voice vote," in which the Members in favor of the bill, amendment, or motion vote "Aye" in unison, followed by those voting "No " Before the Speaker (or the chair of the Committee of the Whole) announces the result, any Representative can demand a "division vote," in which the Members in favor stand up to be counted, again followed by those opposed  But before the result of either a voice vote or a division vote is announced, a Member may try to require another vote in which everyone's position is recorded publicly  This recorded vote is taken by using the House's electronic voting system  In Committee of the Whole, an electronic vote is ordered when 25 Members request it  In the House, such a vote occurs when demanded by at least one-fifth of the Members present  Alternatively, any Member can demand an electronically recorded vote in the House if a quorum of the membership is not present on the floor when the voice or division vote takes place  The Constitution requires that a quorum must be present on the floor when the House is conducting business  In the House, a quorum is a majority of the Representatives; in Committee of the Whole, it is only 100 Members  However, the House has traditionally assumed that a quorum is always present unless a Member makes a point of order that it is not  The rules restrict when Members can make such points of order, and they occur most often when the House or the Committee of the Whole is voting  In the House, for example, a Representative can object to a voice or division vote on the grounds that a quorum is not present and make that point of order  If a quorum is not present, the Speaker automatically orders an electronically recorded vote during which Members record their presence on the floor by casting their votes  The issue is decided and a quorum is established at the same time  A voice or division vote is valid even if less than a quorum participates in the vote so long as no one makes a point of order that a quorum is not present  For this reason, Members can continue to meet in their committees or fulfill their other responsibilities off the floor when the House is doing business that does not involve publicly recorded votes  On most days, the House will meet two hours prior to scheduled legislative business for Morning Hour Debate, a period in which Members can make speeches of up to five minutes on subjects of their choosing  Later, the House will meet for legislative session  After the opening prayer on each day by the House chaplain (or perhaps by a guest chaplain), the Speaker announces approval of the Journal of the previous day's proceedings  A Member may require a recorded vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval of the Journal  Following the Pledge of Allegiance, some Members may then ask unanimous consent to address the House for one minute each on whatever subjects they wish, including subjects unrelated to the scheduled legislative business of the day  The ability to set the House's floor schedule is one of the primary powers and responsibilities of the majority party leaders, and in doing so they often consult with minority party leaders  Generally speaking, to the extent possible, majority party leaders and the committee chairmen arrange the legislative schedule for each week in advance  During the last floor session of the week, the majority leader normally announces the expected schedule for the coming week in a traditional "wrap-up" colloquy with a minority party leader  Changes in the schedule may be announced as they are made  On a Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday, the House will commonly consider multiple measures under the "suspension of the rules" procedure  Typically, recorded votes on such measures, if requested, are clustered together and taken at the end of the day  On other days of the week, the House will usually consider a major bill pursuant to a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules  Such a special rule would be debated in the House under the hour rule, at the end of which the majority manager of the special rule would "move the previous question," which, when adopted, brings the resolution to a vote  Once adopted, the House would ordinarily consider a measure in Committee of the Whole pursuant to the terms for general debate and amendment established by the special rule  Following consideration in the Committee of the Whole, the House would take the final votes on the measure after voting on the amendments recommended by the committee and on a minority motion to recommit, which would likely be made with amendatory instructions  As each item of business is completed, the Speaker anticipates which Member should be seeking recognition to call up the next bill or resolution  If another Representative requests to be recognized instead, t he Speaker may ask, "For what purpose does the gentleman seek recognition?" The Speaker may decline to recognize that Member if the Speaker wants the House to consider another privileged measure, motion, or report  At the end of legislative business on most days, some Members address the House for as much as an hour each on subjects of their choice  These "special order" speeches are arranged in advance and organized by the party leadership  In this way, Representatives can comment at length on current national and international issues and discuss bills that have not yet reached the House floor  The House often adjourns by early evening, although it may remain in session later when the need arises or when the end of the annual session or some other deadline approaches  The House rules for each Congress are published in a volume often called the House manual but officially entitled Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives   A new edition of this collection is published each Congress  The precedents of the House established through 1935 have been compiled in the 11-volume set of Hinds' and Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives   More recent precedents are published as Deschler's or Deschler-Brown -Johnson Precedents of the U S  House of Representatives ; 18 volumes of this set now are available  Volume 1 of a fourth series of House precedents, Precedents of the United States House of Representatives , was initiated in 2017, and additional volumes are expected in the future  The House's procedures are summarized in House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House , by Charles W  Johnson, John V  Sullivan, and Thomas J  Wickham Jr , Parliamentarians of the House  The most recent version of House Practice was published in 2017  The Parliamentarian and his assistants welcome inquiries about House procedures and offer expert assistance compatible with their other responsibilities  CRS Report 98-995, The Amending Process in the House of Representatives , by Christopher M  Davis  CRS Report RL32200, Debate, Motions, and Other Actions in the Committee of the Whole , by Bill Heniff Jr  and Elizabeth Rybicki  CRS Report 97-552, The Discharge Rule in the House: Principal Features and Uses , by Richard S  Beth  CRS Report RL30787, Parliamentary Reference Sources: House of Representatives , by Richard S  Beth and Megan S  Lynch  CRS Report 98-696, Resolving Legislative Differences in Congress: Conference Committees and Amendments Between the Houses , by Elizabeth Rybicki  CRS Report 97-780, The Speaker of the House: House Officer, Party Leader, and Representative , by Valerie Heitshusen  CRS Report 98-314, Suspension of the Rules in the House: Principal Features , by Elizabeth Rybicki  CRS Report 98-870, Quorum Requirements in the House: Committee and Chamber , by Christopher M  Davis 


Report 2:  Serbia, another CEFTA signatory, is also an important export market  Bosnia's major exports include vehicle seats, raw materials, leather products, textiles, energy, and wood products  The EU is also Bosnia's primary source of foreign direct investment (FDI)  In 2016, 63% of Bosnia's FDI came from EU countries, with Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia the top sources  Serbia is also a significant source of FDI (16 3%)  However, Bosnia's fragmented legal and administrative structure create a challenging investment climate  Many relevant laws differ between the two entities  Corruption, entrenched economic interests, and political instability also deter investment  As a result, FDI amounts to just 2% of Bosnia's GDP, well below the Western Balkan average of 5%  Bosnia was the region's lowest-rated country in the World Bank's 2019 Ease of Doing Business Index  U S  and EU policymakers view the NATO and EU accession processes as a positive force for democratization and reform in the Western Balkans, including Bosnia  According to analysts, this assessment informed the United States' partial retreat from the region in the 2000s and 2010s  EU membership is one of the few policy issues for which there is relatively broad consensus among Bosnia's politicians and population  The EU's "fundamentals first" approach to enlargement in the Western Balkans frontloads the accession process with meeting the core requirements of having a democratic political system and functioning market economy; in Bosnia, the EU is currently focused on issues relating to the rule of law, public administration reform, and economic development  In 2016, Bosnia submitted its application to join the EU  Its current status is potential candidate , which entitles it to receive financial assistance from the EU's Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II (IPA II)  Between 2014 and 2020, Bosnia is expected to receive €552 million in IPA II allocations, making the EU Bosnia's largest source of foreign assistance  Many EU member states provide additional aid to Bosnia through domestic foreign assistance programs  Bosnia's EU membership prospects are uncertain  In a 2018 progress report, the European Commission (the EU's executive) flagged Bosnia's slow implementation of reforms, including the 2015 Reform Agenda (a flagship EU initiative in Bosnia) and numerous domestic and international court rulings (see "Legal Challenges," above)  Some analysts question whether Bosnia, under its current political system, would be capable of meeting the membership requirement of harmonizing domestic legislation with the many thousands of provisions in the acquis communautaire, the cumulative body of EU legislation, case law, and regulations  In comparison to EU membership, Bosnian leaders are more divided over the issue of joining NATO  These divisions largely fall along Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat/Bosniak lines  Bosnian Serb opposition is rooted in resentment over NATO's role in the Bosnian war, and may also reflect a desire to remain in lockstep with neighboring Serbia, which also does not seek NATO membership  Bosnia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 2006 and secured an Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2008  In 2010, NATO indicated that it would launch a Membership Action Plan (MAP)—a program to help aspiring members meet membership requirements—once Bosnia meets several conditions, the most challenging of which is the reregistration of permanent defense installations from entity to state-level government  RS officials have resisted ceding control over defense installations on entity territory  Although Bosnia does not yet meet these requirements, in December 2018 NATO foreign ministers invited Bosnia to activate its MAP by submitting its first Annual National Program  Some analysts interpreted this invitation as a gesture to generate reform momentum in Bosnia's fragile post-election period  The Bosniak and Croat members of the presidency responded positively, but Bosnian Serb leaders (and most Bosnian Serbs) do not want Bosnia to join NATO  In October 2017, the RS National Assembly passed a resolution supporting military neutrality  RS President Željka Cvijanović reiterated this stance after NATO's invitation, and Dodik—now a member of the state-level presidency—also has vowed to pursue military neutrality  Bosnia's relations with Croatia and Serbia are seen as an important component of regional stability  However, bilateral relations have often been fraught as a legacy of the Bosnian war, as well as sensitivities over Croatia and Serbia's relations with Bosnian Croats and Serbs  While democratic gains in Croatia and Serbia after 2000 contributed to improved relations with Bosnia, they remain reluctant to examine or acknowledge their role in the Bosnian war  At times, Bosnian leaders have objected to what they describe as Croatian and Serbian meddling in Bosnia's affairs  Ex-Bosnian Croat member of the presidency Dragan Čović and current Bosnian Serb member of the presidency Milorad Dodik draw support from leaders in Croatia and Serbia and reportedly hold Croatian and Serbian citizenship, respectively, alongside their Bosnian citizenship  The Croatian government financially and politically backed Čović in Bosnia's 2018 elections, and Croatian politicians have raised the issue of Bosnian Croats' constitutional challenges (see above, "Legal Challenges") in forums like the European Parliament, NATO, and the United Nations  These moves prompted three former High Representatives to Bosnia to issue a joint letter expressing alarm over Croatia's "meddling" in Bosnia's internal affairs  The Croatian government also challenged the legitimacy of Željko Komšić as the Croat member of the Bosnian presidency (see above, "2018 General Election")  Some parties in Croatia hold Croatian election campaign events on Bosnian territory to mobilize Bosnian Croat voters with dual citizenship to vote in Croatia's elections  The Serbian government likewise supports Dodik, who is a frequent visitor to Belgrade  Some Serbian politicians have made statements supporting convicted Bosnian Serb war criminals, inflaming an issue that remains highly sensitive in Bosnia  Bosnia and Serbia have an unresolved demarcation dispute over approximately 40 square kilometers of border area, including a railway segment and hydroelectric power stations  Bosnia has dual citizenship treaties with Croatia and Serbia, resulting in hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs acquiring dual citizenship  This has raised jurisdictional issues in cases in which indicted war criminals hold dual citizenship  Despite occasional tensions in their relations, Croatia and Serbia are important economic partners for Bosnia  Both countries are among Bosnia's top export markets and top sources of FDI  As part of its enlargement strategy in the Western Balkans, the EU has embraced a connectivity agenda to improve regional transportation, energy, and infrastructural linkages, reserving up to €1 billion in grants for projects for the period 2015-2020  Officials believe that improved connectivity could benefit bilateral relations and contribute to regional stability  Given its strategic location and relatively small, weak states, the Balkan region has long drawn in more powerful states  Many analysts maintain that as the United States and the European Union have both scaled back their presence in the Balkans to address other issues since the late 2000s, Russia, Turkey, and China partly filled the vacuum  U S  and EU officials have expressed concern over Russian influence in the Western Balkans, particularly after Russia occupied Ukraine's Crimea region in 2014  Many analysts maintain that Russia does not have a grand strategy in the Western Balkans, but rather aims to prevent Euro-Atlantic integration and shore up its claims to great power status by asserting itself in the EU's "inner courtyard " Analysts have identified several Russian tools in the region, including playing a "spoiler" role, projecting soft power, and leveraging energy dominance  Observers contend that Russia plays a "spoiler" role in Bosnia by exacerbating ethnic divisions, backing illiberal or anti-Western political factions, and helping to militarize RS  They claim that these actions help sustain the dysfunction and gridlock that undermine Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic reform efforts  Russia has supported Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat nationalist leaders Milorad Dodik and Dragan Čović  Dodik's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin just before Bosnia's October 7, 2018 general election was one of nearly ten meetings between the two over the past three years, signaling high-level Russian support  Many experts assert that Russia has been a key ally to Dodik in resisting Western pressure to cooperate on reforms  Moscow has also supported divisive RS policies  When Dodik violated a Bosnian Constitutional Court ruling in 2016 by holding a referendum to establish a controversial "Statehood Day," Russia stood apart from the High Representative and Western diplomats by supporting the initiative  More recently, Russia stated its support for RS's controversial Srebrenica commission (see above)  Analysts have also expressed concern at Russia's apparent support for Čović, who has advocated greater autonomy for Croats and the creation of a third Croat entity  Some analysts have expressed concern at Russia's role in RS's security sector  Russian forces have trained RS police special forces on counterterrorism and intelligence  Some observers believe that these exercises contribute to militarization in RS, potentially pushing the police force beyond its civilian law enforcement mandate  Analysts caution that militarization could increase the scale of violence in any confrontation between RS and the Bosnian government  Some Bosnian Serb ultranationalist and veterans groups have fought alongside pro-Russia combatants in Ukraine, and analysts believe they could be mobilized to support RS leaders as well  Russian soft power draws upon religious and cultural kinship with Bosnian Serbs, as well as Russia's history of support during the wars of Yugoslav disintegration  Kremlin-linked media, like Sputnik and RT , amplify existing anti-Western narratives and positively shape public opinion toward Russia  Some local media further propagate Sputnik and RT articles  A 2018 National Democratic Institute media study found that RS media stories about Russia were overwhelmingly positive, while the tone of most stories about the United States and NATO was negative  Pro-Russian media glorifies the Russian military, highlights cultural and religious links between Serbs and Russians, and documents high-level meetings between RS and Russian officials  Economic relations between Russia and RS have deepened in recent years  Russia is the largest source of FDI in RS, and it is largely concentrated in the energy sector  In 2007, Russian state-owned oil company Zarubezhneft bought RS's Bosanski Brod oil refinery, motor oil processing facilities in nearby Modrica, and retailer Banjaluka Petrol  Some analysts believe that these assets—which were purchased without an open tender—give Zarubezhneft influence in RS  In addition to being an important employer, Zarubezhneft is RS's biggest taxpayer; its value-added tax and excise duty contributions reportedly account for 25% of RS budget revenue  Bosnia depends upon Russian natural gas imports via Ukraine  Energy policy is vested in the entities, and Russian natural gas provider Gazprom reportedly has used its market dominance to pit the two entities against one another and undermine projects that would diversify supplies  Many analysts believe that Turkey's influence in Bosnia has increased over the last two decades due to Ankara's close relationship with Bosniak leaders  Some Turkish officials reportedly view Bosnia as a natural sphere of influence given geographic and historical connections  Observers note that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has at times invoked Ottoman-era ties to Bosnia and religious kinship with Bosniaks as soft power tools  Turkish influence in Bosnia has expanded since Yugoslavia's collapse  During the 1992-1995 war, Turkey gained prestige among Bosniaks by condemning the international arms embargo against Bosnia, arguing that it prevented Bosniaks from defending themselves  Turkey, as well as other predominantly Muslim countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, reportedly supplied Bosniak forces with arms  Turkish influence has continued since the war's end  Bosnia is one of the top recipients of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency assistance; much of this support is earmarked for projects to restore Ottoman-era buildings and monuments  A Turkish Cultural Center was established in Bosnia in 2003, and in 2009 the Yunus Emre Foundation, an NGO founded by the Turkish government, opened an office in Sarajevo to promote Turkish language and culture  Turkey has popular support among Bosniaks  In a 2018 International Republican Institute survey, 76% of Bosniak respondents had positive views of Turkey—the strongest support among Bosniaks for any foreign state  Many Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs look to Croatia and Serbia as external protectors, and some analysts believe that Turkey has attempted to establish a similar role for itself vis-à-vis Bosniaks  Observers contend that Erdogan's ruling party has particularly strong ties to the largest Bosniak ethnic party, the SDA  Erdogan and Turkish state-owned media openly supported SDA candidate Bakir Izetbegović in his bid for the Bosniak seat on the presidency in 2014  Some observers believe that Izetbegović's clout within the SDA rests in part on his support from Erdogan  Economic relations between Bosnia and Turkey have deepened in recent years  Turkish FDI in Bosnia accounted for 5 6% of FDI flows in 2016  One notable project is a highway to connect Sarajevo to Belgrade, Serbia  After years of disagreement, Bosnian officials approved the route in February 2019  Turkey is expected to provide funding for some of the expected €3 billion in costs, although the terms of the contract are not yet resolved  Some officials, including French President Emmanuel Macron, have expressed concern over Turkey's alleged ambitions as part of broader EU concern over external influence in the Balkans  However, analysts caution that Turkey's ambitions and capabilities in the Balkans may be overstated  They note that the scope of Turkish investment is sometimes exaggerated in the media, and that proposed projects do not always come to fruition  While Russian and Turkish influence in Bosnia relies in part on soft power, China's presence in Bosnia is primarily economic  Between 2011 and 2019, Chinese investments in Bosnia amounted to an estimated $3 6 billion, primarily in the form of direct lending for energy and transportation projects  Chinese firms have contracts to construct or expand energy plants, including a €350 million loan to construct a coal-fired plant in Stanari, RS  A €1 4 billion deal was signed to construct a highway between Banja Luka and Mlinište  In March 2019, the EU Energy Community criticized the FBiH entity government's decision to guarantee a €600 million loan from China's Exim Bank to build a coal-fired power plant in Tuzla  However, some analysts caution that China's economic influence in Bosnia may be overstated at present  While China's pledged investments in high-visibility projects garner media attention, the actual amount of Chinese FDI is far less than that of the EU  Moreover, many pledged projects do not come to fruition  Nevertheless, EU and U S  officials have voiced concern over the scope of China's investments in the Balkans, as well as Chinese lending practices  Chinese loans often require recipient state governments to assume the loan burden, potentially leading to high external debt  The EU has also raised concerns that Chinese lending practices violate EU rules in public procurement because they frequently require use of Chinese contractors, laborers, or supplies  In contrast to EU funds, which are partly designed to spur reform, Chinese loans have few conditions and rules linked to transparency or reform  Finally, EU officials have expressed concern that China's economic might could be a source of leverage over recipient states that are candidates or potential candidates for EU membership and thus impede the EU's ability to speak with one voice on relations with China if they do become members  Bosnia was not a core transit country in the "Balkan Route" that hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees followed in an attempt to reach the EU during heightened flows in 2015 and early 2016  However, recent route shifts have brought more migrant and refugee traffic through Bosnia  Since early 2018, an estimated 23,000 migrants and refugees have entered Bosnia; approximately 25% of them remain in the country  Most of them hope to enter EU territory via Bosnia's neighbor, Croatia, and from there move on and enter the EU's visa- and passport-free Schengen Area  However, the Croatian government has expanded border policing, and apprehended individuals are sent back to Bosnia  The EU provided €2 million in 2018 to help Bosnia respond to the crisis and provide shelter to migrants and refugees who are effectively stranded in Bosnia  The migration crisis has triggered a backlash from some Bosnians, particularly in Una-Sana Canton, which borders Croatia and has the highest concentration of migrants and refugees  Some residents of Bihać, Una-Sana's administrative center, protested against camps situated in their municipality in October 2018, while local authorities in Velika Kladuša, another city in the canton, reportedly obstructed the Ministry of Security's plans to house migrants in a local building  The incident illustrates local backlash as well as the state-level government's difficulty enforcing its decisions, even when it has jurisdiction  Islam was introduced to part of Bosnia's population during Ottoman rule  In socialist Yugoslavia, the semi-official Islamic Religious Community played a key role in religious affairs, including legal rulings and religious education  It was renamed the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, and remains an important religious institution  Islamic tradition in the Balkans, including Bosnia, is generally moderate and secular  The majority of Bosnia's practicing Muslims follow the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam  However, some analysts have expressed concern over the emergence of groups influenced or funded by state and non-state entities in the Arab Gulf states, where more conservative Hanbali Sunni practices are common  Aid workers, missionaries, and "mujahedeen" fighters from the Gulf States promoted transnational Islamist militancy and Salafist Hanbali religious doctrine during Bosnia's 1992-1995 war; Iran's government also supported Bosniak leaders and forces  After the war, Saudi Arabia provided an estimated $600 million in aid to repair and build hundreds of mosques and establish schools and cultural centers that promote socially conservative Sunni views  Iran has also maintained active cultural outreach and other ties to some Bosnian Muslims  Many analysts contend that Salafi groups have limited support in Bosnia because of the traditionally high level of secularism among Bosnian Muslims  They also note that few Bosnian Muslims who subscribe to Salafist ideas and practices have violent intentions, and many of them live in remote rural communities  While most of these groups were not originally affiliated with official religious organizations in Bosnia, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia's Islamic Community exerted pressure on them to acknowledge his authority and his right to monitor religious content  As a result, an estimated 90% of Salafi groups were brought under official structures  Nevertheless, some experts caution that radicalized groups and individuals may pose a terrorist threat despite their small numbers  Radicalized Muslims were implicated in the bombing of a police station in Bugojno in 2010 and a lone-gunman attack on the U S  Embassy in Sarajevo in 2011  The Islamic State (IS) and Nusra Front's gains in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s altered the dynamic of the terrorism threat in Bosnia and broadened the use of social media in recruitment  Between 2012 and 2017, an estimated 350 Bosnian citizens traveled from Bosnia or Bosnian diaspora communities to fight with armed groups in Iraq and Syria  More recently, returned foreign fighters are seen as a potential threat as the position of the IS and other armed groups has weakened  Bosnia's stock of illegal weapons, mines, and explosives may exacerbate the risk posed by returnees  As of December 2017, officials believed that just over 100 Bosnians remained in Syria (including women and children), roughly 50 had returned to Bosnia, and 70 had been killed in the conflict  In 2014, the Bosnian government introduced new criminal offenses to prosecute foreign terrorist fighters and recruiters  Several dozen returned fighters and domestic recruiters have been convicted of these offenses  While the U S  State Department describes Bosnia as a "cooperative counterterrorism partner," it warns that Bosnia's political fragmentation and dysfunction could undermine counterterrorism efforts  For example, in 2017 several ministries proposed new measures to tighten counterterrorism efforts; however, they were not enacted due to political gridlock in state-level and FBiH governments  Initially viewed as a "European problem," the Bosnian conflict eventually helped shape the post-Cold War role of the United States and NATO in European security  When the United States assumed greater responsibilities in resolving the conflict, its role was considerable: leading NATO airstrikes, garnering diplomatic support from Russia and European allies, persuading warring parties to agree to a ceasefire, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement, and deploying 20,000 troops to Bosnia  According to Richard Holbrooke, the U S  official who brokered the talks, the Bosnian war was a pivotal period in U S  foreign policy in Europe: "The three main pillars of [policy]—U S -Russian relations, NATO enlargement into Central Europe, and Bosnia—had often worked against each other  Now they reinforced each other: NATO sent its forces out of area for the first time in its history, and Russian troops, under an American commander, were deployed alongside them " Some analysts and policymakers believe that the United States' strong hand in resolving the conflict and in shaping Bosnia's political system have made it a stakeholder in Bosnia's future  U S  officials, often in cooperation with the EU, have intervened to defuse crises and broker reform talks  The United States also has imposed sanctions against Bosnian officials: in addition to Dodik (see above), the U S  State Department publicly designated Bosnian Serb politician Nikola Špirić (Dodik's associate) for "significant corruption or gross violation of human rights " U S  policymakers attach strategic importance to Bosnia's stability; many analysts believe turbulence in Bosnia could reverberate in the Balkans and potentially draw in Croatia and Serbia, while instability in other parts of the region could spill over into Bosnia  When the Trump Administration indicated in 2018 that it would consider supporting a potential Serbia-Kosovo agreement to "adjust borders" between the two—a major break with the long-standing EU and U S  policy to oppose redrawing borders in the Balkans along ethnic lines—some analysts expressed concern that the Administration could reshape long-standing U S  policy toward Bosnia  However, the new U S  Ambassador to Bosnia stated in February 2019 that the U S  will continue to be "guarantor of Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty and territorial integrity " On the other hand, many observers also note that U S  engagement in Bosnia (and the Western Balkans) decreased under the administrations of President George W  Bush and President Barack Obama  During this time U S  policymakers turned their focus to geopolitical crises and challenges in other parts of the globe while ceding the regional lead to the EU  Indeed, some analysts have urged the United States to assume a greater role in Bosnia, arguing that Bosnia's current crises warrant it, and that the EU and the United States are more effective in the region when they work together  Congressional interest in Bosnia dates back to the 1992-1995 war  Many Members featured prominently in foreign policy debates over U S  intervention in the conflict  In 2015, the House passed a resolution describing the Srebrenica massacres as a genocide and urging the United States to continue to support Bosnia's territorial integrity ( H Res  310 , 114 th Congress)  In the 114 th and 115 th Congresses, a bill was introduced in the Senate to establish an enterprise fund to promote economic development and the private sector in Bosnia ( S  2307 and S  864 )  In April 2018, the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats held a hearing on Bosnia's prospects ahead of its October 2018 elections  Congress's engagement with Bosnia also continues within the broader context of policy concern over the external influence of China, Turkey, and Russia in the Western Balkans and energy security  As a potential candidate for EU membership and NATO partner, Bosnia is eligible for assistance through the Countering Russian Influence Funds under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) enacted in 2017 ( P L  115-44 )  Through congressionally approved (and sometimes expanded) foreign assistance appropriations, Bosnia has received more than $2 billion in aid since 1995  Between 1996 and 1999, the United States pledged $1 billion of the $4 billion international commitment to implementing Dayton's civilian provisions and helping to rebuild Bosnia  The cost of U S  military operations in Bosnia since 1992 is estimated at more than $10 billion ( Appendix I )  Bosnia continues to receive U S  foreign assistance, although the amount has decreased in recent years  Assistance to Bosnia in FY2015 and FY2016 was approximately $33 million each year  In FY2017, it was $53 5 million, and $41 5 million in FY2018  The Administration requested $21 million for FY2019 and $16 9 million for FY2020  Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia faces many challenges  In considering U S  relations with Bosnia, Members of Congress may consider the following questions: How can the United States encourage Bosnia's government to incorporate the legal rulings of the Bosnian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights into election legislation and the constitution? How can U S  foreign assistance be used to counter Russian influence in Republika Srpska, in particular Russia's close ties to Bosnian Serb politicians and its use of local media and Sputnik to amplify anti-U S  narratives and project pro-Russia soft power? What are the implications of potential militarization in Republika Srpska? How can the United States effectively address this alleged trend? How can the United States support a successful reform initiative that secures transparency and accountability, and facilitates a political community in which politicians and voters are committed to the Bosnian state and socioeconomic challenges that transcend all three ethnic groups? Can the Germany-U K  initiative from 2015 be revived, or is it better to start from scratch? Are the approximately 600 troops in the European Union Force mission in Bosnia sufficient to stabilize Bosnia if violence breaks out? If Serbia and Kosovo agree to normalize relations by redrawing their borders, how can U S  policymakers prevent this development from destabilizing Bosnia, particularly given Milorad Dodik's threats to seek RS secession if Kosovo is "partitioned"? How can the United States encourage Croatia and Serbia to engage in Bosnia in a manner that helps bridge ethnic divisions and contributes to Bosnia's territorial integrity and sovereignty? Given the pervasiveness of corruption in Bosnia, how can U S  assistance most effectively be used to counter it? Does foreign assistance contribute to civic groups and independent media that could serve as a check against corruption? 

ground_truth: Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, "Bosnia") drew heavily on U.S. support after gaining independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. The United States helped end the Bosnian war (1992-1995), one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since the Second World War, by leading NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, and deploying 20,000 U.S. troops. Some Members of Congress became involved in policy debates over these measures, and Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative proposals. Since 1995, the United States has been a major source of aid to Bosnia and firmly supports its territorial integrity. The United States also supports Bosnia's aspirations for NATO and European Union (EU) membership. Today, Bosnia faces serious challenges. Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia continues to use part of the Agreement as its constitution, which divides the country into two ethnoterritorial entities. Critics charge that Bosnia's political system is too decentralized to enact the reforms required for NATO and EU membership. They also contend that the ethnic power-sharing arrangements and veto points embedded in numerous government bodies are sources of gridlock. Domestic and international courts have ruled against several aspects of Bosnia's constitution, yet the Bosnian government thus far has failed to implement these rulings. Since Bosnia's independence, its politics has been dominated by ethnic parties representing the country's three main groups: Bosniaks (Slavic Muslims), Croats, and Serbs. These parties have prospered under a system that critics charge lacks transparency and accountability. Critics also maintain that ethnic party leaders use divisive nationalist rhetoric to distract from serious issues affecting the country as a whole, including poverty, unemployment, and stalled political reforms. The Bosnian population exhibits low trust in political parties and the government, and disaffection toward the country's elite. U.S. and EU officials brokered several ultimately unsuccessful rounds of constitutional reform negotiations, and continue to call on Bosnia's leaders to implement reforms to make governance more efficient and effective, dismantle patronage networks, and bring Bosnia closer to EU and NATO membership. However, there is little consensus among the country's leaders on how the country should be reformed. Bosnian Serb leaders from the Serb-majority entity (Republika Srpska) have called for greater autonomy and even secession from Bosnia. Some Bosnian Croat leaders have called for partitioning Bosnia's other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to create a separate Croat-majority entity. Bosniak leaders, by contrast, generally prefer a more centralized state. Many analysts caution that any move to partition the country could lead to renewed violence, while greater decentralization could make Bosnia's government less functional. U.S. policy has long been oriented toward preserving Bosnia's statehood. Bosnia's 2018 general elections largely returned to power the same entrenched ethnic parties. Of particular concern is the election of Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik to Bosnia's collective presidency. Dodik, a sharp critic of the United States and NATO, has periodically called for a referendum on Republika Srpska's secession. He is under U.S. sanctions for obstructing the Dayton Agreement. In addition to these internal challenges, U.S. and EU officials have expressed concern over external influence in the region. Russia reportedly relies on soft power, energy leverage, and "spoiler" tactics to influence Bosnia, particularly in the Serb-majority entity. Turkish soft power draws on Bosnia's Ottoman-era heritage and Turkey's shared religious tradition with Bosniaks. China is a more recent presence in the region, but its heavy investments and lending have prompted concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Policymakers have also expressed concern at the challenges posed by the return of Bosnians who fought with the Islamic State and Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq. Many observers contend that the United States remains a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of its central role in resolving the conflict and shaping the postwar Bosnian state. Given the history of U.S. involvement in Bosnia, Bosnia's importance to regional stability in the Balkans, and concerns over Russian and Chinese influence in Bosnia, Members of Congress may be interested in monitoring how the country navigates its internal and external challenges. Congress may also consider future U.S. aid levels to Bosnia and the degree to which such assistance supports the long-standing U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia of territorial integrity, NATO and EU integration, energy security, and resilience against malign influence.