prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Cluster munitions are weapons that open in mid-air and disperse smaller submunitions—anywhere from a few dozen to hundreds—into an area  They can be delivered by aircraft or from ground systems such as artillery, rockets, and missiles  Cluster munitions are valued militarily because one munition can kill or destroy many targets within its impact area, and fewer weapons systems are needed to deliver fewer munitions to attack multiple targets  Cluster munitions also permit a smaller force to engage a larger adversary and are considered by some an "economy of force" weapon  Many cluster munitions rely on simple mechanical fuzes that arm the submunition based on its rate of spin and explode on impact or after a time delay  A newer generation of sensor-fuzed submunitions is being introduced by a number of nations to improve the munitions' and submunitions' accuracy and to reduce the large number of residual unexploded submunitions  These sensor-fuzed submunitions are designed to sense and destroy vehicles without creating an extensive hazard area of unexploded submunitions  Cluster bombs were first used in World War II, and inclusive of their debut, cluster munitions have been used in at least 21 states by at least 13 different countries  Cluster munitions were used extensively in Southeast Asia by the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates that in Laos alone, 9 million to 27 million unexploded submunitions remained after the conflict, resulting in over 10,000 civilian casualties to date  Cluster munitions were used by the Soviets in Afghanistan, by the British in the Falklands, by the Coalition in the Gulf War, and by the warring factions in Yugoslavia  In Kosovo and Yugoslavia in 1999, NATO forces dropped 1,765 cluster bombs containing approximately 295,000 submunitions  From 2001 through 2002, the United States dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 submunitions in Afghanistan, and U S  and British forces used almost 13,000 cluster munitions containing an estimated 1 8 million to 2 million submunitions during the first three weeks of combat in Iraq in 2003  Senior U S  government officials have stated that the United States has not used cluster munitions since 2003, during the intervention in Iraq  It is widely believed that confusion over U S  cluster submunitions (BLU-97/B) that were the same color and size as air-dropped humanitarian food packets played a major role in the U S  decision to suspend cluster munitions use in Afghanistan but not before using them in Iraq  In 2006, Israeli use of cluster munitions against Hezbollah forces in Lebanon resulted in widespread international criticism  Israel was said to have fired significant quantities of cluster munitions—primarily during the last 3 days of the 34-day war after a U N  cease-fire deal had been agreed to —resulting in almost 1 million unexploded cluster bomblets to which the U N  attributed 14 deaths during the conflict  Reports maintain that Hezbollah fired about 113 "cluster rockets" at northern Israel and, in turn, Israel's use of cluster munitions supposedly affected 26% of southern Lebanon's arable land and contaminated about 13 square miles with unexploded submunitions  One report states that there was a failure rate of upward of 70% of Israel's cluster weapons  The fundamental criticisms of cluster munitions are that they disperse large numbers of submunitions imprecisely over an extended area, that they frequently fail to detonate and are difficult to detect, and that submunitions can remain explosive hazards for decades  Civilian casualties are primarily caused by munitions being fired into areas where soldiers and civilians are intermixed, inaccurate cluster munitions landing in populated areas, or civilians traversing areas where cluster munitions have been employed but failed to explode  Two technical characteristics of submunitions—failure rate and lack of a self-destruct capability—have received a great deal of attention  There appear to be significant discrepancies among failure rate estimates  Some manufacturers claim a submunition failure rate of 2% to 5%, whereas mine clearance specialists have frequently reported failure rates of 10% to 30%  A number of factors influence submunition reliability  These include delivery technique, age of the submunition, air temperature, landing in soft or muddy ground, getting caught in trees and vegetation, and submunitions being damaged after dispersal, or landing in such a manner that their impact fuzes fail to initiate  Submunitions lacking a self-destruct capability—referred to as "dumb" munitions—are of particular concern because they can remain a hazard for decades, thereby increasing the potential for civilian casualties  Some nations are developing "smart" or sensor-fuzed weapons with greater reliability and a variety of self-destruct mechanisms intended to address the residual hazard of submunitions  Experts maintain that self-destruct features reduce—but do not eliminate—the unexploded ordnance problem caused by cluster munitions and that the advantage gained by using "smart" cluster munitions is negated when high-failure rate and/or "dumb" cluster munitions are used in the same area  For some nations, replacing "dumb" and high-failure rate cluster munitions may not be an option—China, Russia, and the Republic of Korea maintain that they cannot afford to replace all current submunitions with "smart" submunitions  In an effort to restrict or ban specific types of weapons used in armed conflicts, 51 states negotiated the CCW in 1980  When the treaty entered into force in December 1983, it applied only to incendiary weapons, mines and booby-traps, and weapons intended to cause casualties through very small fragments  Since then, some states-parties have added provisions through additional protocols to address other types of weapons  Acting in accordance with the recommendation of a group of experts established during the 2006 CCW review conference, states-parties to the convention decided in 2007 to "negotiate a proposal to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions " Negotiations took place in 2008 and 2009, but the parties have not reached agreement on a new proposal  The experts group continued negotiations in 2011 "informed by" a Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions  However, the CCW states-parties were unable to reach agreement on a protocol during their November 2011 review conference  Described as "frustrated with the CCW process," a number of CCW members—led by Norway—initiated negotiations in 2007 outside of the CCW to ban cluster munitions  On May 30, 2008, they reached an agreement to ban cluster munitions  The United States, Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, India, and Pakistan did not participate in the talks or sign the agreement  During the Signing Conference in Oslo on December 3-4, 2008, 94 states signed the convention and 4 of the signatories ratified the convention at the same time  China, Russia, and the United States did not sign the convention, but France, Germany, and the United Kingdom were among the 18 NATO members to do so  The convention was to enter into force six months after the deposit of the 30 th ratification  The United Nations received the 30 th ratification on February 16, 2010, and the convention entered into force on August 1, 2010  As of January 2, 2019, 105 states were party to the convention  The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), inter alia, bans the use of cluster munitions, as well as their development, production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling  The convention does not prohibit cluster munitions that can detect and engage a single target or explosive submunitions equipped with an electronic self-destruction or self-deactivating feature —an exemption that seemingly permits sensor-fuzed or "smart" cluster submunitions  U S  officials were concerned that early versions of the CCM would prevent military forces from non-states-parties from providing humanitarian and peacekeeping support and significantly affect NATO military operations, but the version signed May 30, 2008, does permit states-parties to engage in military cooperation and operations with non-states-parties (Article 21, Paragraph 3)  Then-Acting Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Stephen Mull stated in May 2008 that the United States relies on cluster munitions "as an important part of our own defense strategy," and that Washington's preferred alternative to a ban is "to pursue technological fixes that will make sure that these weapons are no longer viable once the conflict is over " U S  officials note that Cluster munitions are available for use by every combat aircraft in the U S  inventory, they are integral to every Army or Marine maneuver element and in some cases constitute up to 50 percent of tactical indirect fire support  U S  forces simply can not fight by design or by doctrine without holding out at least the possibility of using cluster munitions  The United States also maintains that using cluster munitions reduces the number of aircraft and artillery systems needed to support military operations, and that if cluster munitions were eliminated, significantly more money would need to be spent on new weapons systems, ammunition, and logistical resources  Officials further suggest that if cluster munitions were eliminated, most militaries would increase their use of massed artillery and rocket barrages, which would likely increase destruction of key infrastructure  Then-Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh stated November 9, 2009, that the United States has determined that its "national security interests cannot be fully ensured consistent with the terms" of the CCM  The Barack Obama Administration announced on November 25, 2011, that the United States would continue to implement the DOD policy on cluster munitions issued June 19, 2008, which recognized the need to minimize harm to civilians and infrastructure but also reaffirmed that "cluster munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military utility " The central directive in the Pentagon's policy was the unwaiverable requirement that cluster munitions used after 2018 must leave less than 1% of unexploded submunitions on the battlefield  Prior to that deadline, U S  use of cluster munitions that did not meet this criterion required combatant commander approval  On November 30, 2017, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan issued a revised policy on cluster munitions  The memorandum describing the policy noted that [c]luster munitions provide the Joint Force with an effective and necessary capability to engage area targets, including massed formations of enemy forces, individual targets dispersed over a defined area, targets whose precise location are not known, and time-sensitive or moving targets  Cluster munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military utility, as they provide distinct advantages against a range of threats in the operating environment  Additionally, the use of cluster munitions may result in less collateral damage than the collateral damage that results from use of unitary munitions alone  Since the inception of the 2008 policy, in the midst of extended combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have witnessed important changes in the global security environment and experienced several years of budgets that under-invested in replacement systems and the modernization of the Joint Force more broadly  Our adversaries and our potential adversaries have developed advanced capabilities and operational approaches specifically designed to limit our ability to project power  Both Shanahan and Admiral Harry Harris Jr  have also argued that sustaining the current U S  cluster munitions arsenal is necessary to prepare for a potential conflict with North Korea  The revised policy reverses the 2008 policy that established an unwaiverable requirement that cluster munitions used after 2018 must leave less than 1% of unexploded submunitions on the battlefield  Combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands  Furthermore, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate, and these munitions will be removed only after new munitions that meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard are fielded in sufficient quantities to meet combatant commander requirements  However, the new DOD policy stipulates that the department "will only procure cluster munitions containing submunitions or submunition warheads" meeting the 2008 UXO requirement or possessing "advanced features to minimize the risks posed by unexploded submunitions " Specifically, DOD's revised policy stipulates the following: Continuing or beginning with their respective FY2019 budgets, the military departments will program for capabilities to replace cluster munitions currently in active inventories that do not meet the above-described standards for procuring new cluster munitions  The department's annual Program and Budget Review will be used to assess the sufficiency of the replacement efforts  The department's operational planners should plan for the availability of cluster munitions  The approval authority to employ cluster munitions that do not meet the standards prescribed by this policy for procuring new cluster munitions, however, rests with the combatant commanders  In accordance with their existing authorities, commanders may use cluster munitions that meet the standards prescribed by this policy for procuring new cluster munitions  The military departments and combatant commands, in keeping with U S  legal obligations under CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War and consistent with past practices, will continue to record and retain information on the use of cluster munitions and provide relevant information to facilitate the removal or destruction of unexploded submunitions  The military departments and combatant commands will maintain sufficient inventories and a robust stockpile surveillance program to ensure operational quality and reliability of cluster munitions  In extremis, to meet immediate warfighting demand, combatant commanders may accept transfers of cluster munitions that do not meet the above-described cluster-munition procurement standards  Cluster munitions that do not meet the standards prescribed by this policy for procuring new cluster munitions will be removed from active inventories and demilitarized after their capabilities have been replaced by sufficient quantities of munitions that meet the standards in this policy  The department will not transfer cluster munitions except as provided for under U S  law  The operational use of cluster munitions that include Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL) submunitions shall comply with presidential policy  Furthermore, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Expect(s) the Department to achieve the goals in this policy as rapidly as industry can support  Combatant Commanders will continue to ensure that the employment of cluster munitions is consistent with the law of war and applicable international agreements in order to minimize their harmful effects on civilian populations and infrastructure  In developing a new generation of cluster munitions less dangerous to civilians, DOD will need to determine whether such a high level of performance is achievable under both controlled laboratory conditions and real-world conditions  Factors such as delivery technique, landing in soft or muddy ground, getting caught in trees and vegetation, and submunitions being damaged after dispersal or landing could result in an appreciable number of dud submunitions, even if they have a self-deactivation feature  DOD and the services have been and are currently involved in efforts to reduce cluster munitions failure rates  The Army's Alternative Warhead Program (AWP) is intended to assess and recommend new technologies to reduce or eliminate cluster munitions failure rates  The AWP program is viewed as particularly relevant, as the Pentagon estimates that "upward of 80 percent of U S  cluster munitions reside in the Army artillery stockpile " In December 2008, the Army decided to cease procurement of a Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) warhead—the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) warhead—because its submunitions had a dud rate up to 5%  The Air Force has also acquired cluster munitions that comply with the less than 1% failure rate—the CBU-97 Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) and the CBU-105 WCMD/SFW  While DOD's new 2017 cluster munitions policy calls for DOD to continue its efforts to meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard "as rapidly as industry can support," it is not yet known how this policy will affect the aforementioned programs or how it could result in the establishment of new programs  It may be argued that even with advances in "sensor-fuzed" type submunitions that seek out and destroy certain targets, cluster munitions are still essentially an indiscriminate area weapon in an era where precision weapons are increasingly becoming the military norm  In Operation Desert Storm in 1991, only about 10% of ordnance used were precision-guided, but by the time of the Iraq invasion in 2003, "the ratio of 'smart' to dumb weapons was nearly reversed " Since then, this trend toward greater precision has continued, if not accelerated with the development of precision rocket, artillery, mortar munitions, and smaller precision aerial bombs designed to reduce collateral damage  Given current and predicted future precision weaponry trends, cluster munitions might be losing their military relevance—much as chemical weapons did between World War I and World War II  According to the State Department, the U S  military suspended its use of cluster munitions in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003  For subsequent military operations, where cluster munitions would otherwise have been the weapon of choice, Congress might review what types of weapons were substituted in place of cluster munitions and how effective they were in achieving the desired tactical results  Also worth considering are effects-based weapons systems and operations, which seek to achieve the same or similar effect against a potential target without applying a "kinetic solution" such as a cluster munition  Such insights could prove valuable in analyzing U S  policy options on the future of cluster munitions  DOD's November 2017 revised policy on cluster munitions potentially raises a number of issues for possible congressional consideration  With limits on cluster munition use after 2018 rescinded, how does this affect combatant commanders' operational plans in their respective theaters? Does this mean a lesser degree of military risk because combatant commanders can employ cluster munitions to meet warfighting demands, possibly translating into fewer forces needed to achieve the same result when the 2008 policy was in effect? Despite DOD emphasis on achieving a 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard "as rapidly as industry can support," will DOD funding restrictions slow or stall programs previously intended to replace those systems that exceeded 1% because there no longer is an urgent operational need to replace those systems? In a similar manner, will defense industry view this as a renewed opportunity to develop systems with a 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard or take a more sanguine view that since DOD is no longer time constrained to develop and field 1% or less weapons that funding these programs will be less of a priority and, therefore, an unprofitable venture? Another possible issue for consideration is how this U S  policy reversal on the military use of cluster munitions will be perceived by the international community and how this might affect future U S  and international military treaty initiatives  Consolidated Appropriations Acts The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P L  111-117 ), which the President signed into law December 16, 2009, prohibits the provision of military assistance for cluster munitions, the issuing of defense export licenses for cluster munitions, or the sale or transfer of cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology unless "the submunitions of the cluster munitions, after arming, do not result in more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments " Moreover, any agreement "applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of such cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology" must specify that the munitions "will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians " Subsequent appropriations laws have included similar provisions; the most recent is the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), which the President signed into law on February 15, 2019  


Report 2: This section provides an overview of FMD, as well as information on the potential impact of an outbreak in the United States; USDA activities to respond to outbreaks of diseases, including FMD; federal, state, tribal, and industry roles in FMD control; and FMD vaccines  FMD is a highly contagious viral disease that causes fever and painful lesions on cloven-hoofed animals’ hooves, mouths, and udders (see fig  1)  These debilitating effects, rather than high mortality rates, are responsible for severe productivity losses associated with FMD  The disease generally does not infect humans and is not considered a public health or food safety threat  Young animals may die from the virus, while most adult animals recover  However, livestock infected with FMD have severely diminished meat and milk production  FMD virus can be found in all secretions and excretions from infected animals, including in breath, saliva, milk, urine, feces, and semen, as well as in the fluid from the lesions  Animals can release the virus for up to 4 days before showing visible signs of infection, and FMD can spread from one animal species to another  The virus itself can survive in the environment for many months and can spread when healthy animals come into contact with infected animals or via contaminated vehicles, equipment, clothes, feed, or animal products, as shown in figure 2  The United States has not had an FMD outbreak since 1929, but the disease could be introduced here from countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, or South America where it is present  The United States is vulnerable to FMD transmission, given the large size and mobility of the U S  livestock sector  In 2018, the United States had about 94 million head of cattle, 74 million swine, 5 million sheep, and more than 2 million goats  Many of these livestock are concentrated in major livestock- producing states such as Texas and Iowa, but livestock are present in every state  (See figs  3 and 4 for the populations of cattle and swine by state ) According to USDA documents, a large percentage of livestock in the United States are kept on large farms, ranches, or feedlots (i e , areas or buildings where livestock are fed and fattened up), some with capacity for 50,000 to 100,000 or more animals  Livestock are transported daily to feeding facilities, markets, slaughter plants, and other farms or ranches  For example, swine are often moved among multiple premises at different stages of their life spans to accommodate their growth in size, among other things  According to the swine industry, approximately 1 million swine are on the road every day in transit to various stages of the production process  An FMD outbreak in the United States could have serious economic consequences  A 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom, for example, resulted in the killing of more than 6 million animals, with direct costs of more than $3 billion to the public sector and more than $5 billion to the private sector  The extent of economic damage in the United States would depend primarily on the duration and geographic extent of the outbreak, the extent of trade disruptions, and how consumers reacted to the disease and associated control measures, according to USDA  In a large and long-lasting outbreak, control measures such as killing animals and halting the transportation of animals could cause significant losses for livestock operations  In addition, trade disruptions could have an enormous impact because U S  exports of livestock, meat, and dairy products—together valued at more than $19 billion in 2017 based on estimates from the U S  Meat Export Federation and the U S  Dairy Export Council—would likely stop or be sharply reduced  In addition, domestic consumers might be reluctant to purchase meat and animal products such as milk during an FMD outbreak, even though the products would be safe for people to consume, according to USDA  Partly to protect the economic interests of the U S  livestock industry, the Animal Health Protection Act authorizes USDA to detect, control, and eradicate diseases in livestock  USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is the lead agency for responding to outbreaks of foreign animal diseases, including FMD  According to APHIS, in responding to an outbreak of FMD or any foreign animal disease, APHIS, in coordination with state and industry partners, would conduct the following activities, among others: Surveillance  Observing animals for visible signs of disease and analyzing data on locations and numbers of disease cases to detect premises with the disease, determine the size and extent of an outbreak, and determine whether outbreak control measures are working  Epidemiologic tracing  Gathering and analyzing data on cases of a disease, premises with such cases, movement of infected animals, and their potential contact with uninfected animals to locate other animals or premises with the disease, understand the outbreak’s rate and direction of spread, and investigate the source of the outbreak  Diagnostic testing  Conducting approved and validated assessments of samples taken from animals to identify infected animals or to demonstrate that healthy animals are free of disease  Applying quarantines and stop-movement orders  Restricting the movement of infected or potentially infected animals, animal products, and contaminated items to prevent the virus from spreading to healthy animals  Biosecurity Biosecurity measures, which help minimize disease spread, include the following: placing signs indicating precautions personnel and visitors must follow; establishing sign-in procedures at entry points; removing dirt from boots and disinfecting them prior to entering a facility; using disposable personal protective equipment, such as Tyvek suits, gloves, masks, and boots, when entering premises; disposing of contaminated items properly; designating “clean” and “dirty” storage areas in vehicles; and controlling movement on and off premises  Employing biosecurity measures  Taking steps, such as cleaning and disinfecting trucks that travel between premises, to contain the virus on infected premises and prevent it from spreading via objects or equipment that can carry infection  Stamping out and vaccination  Killing infected animals and vaccinating uninfected animals—for example in buffer zones around infected premises—to limit the spread of the virus  Compensating owners  Paying owners fair market value for animals and equipment that the government determines must be destroyed to limit disease spread  To help prepare for a potential FMD outbreak, APHIS and its partners conduct preparedness exercises in which officials practice responding to simulated FMD outbreaks  Such exercises range from small-scale, narrowly scoped exercises to full-scale, broadly scoped exercises  For example, some exercises focus on specific response tasks such as electronic messaging between laboratories or shipping response supplies to the field, and involve relatively few people for less than a day  Other exercises simulate a wide range of response activities that APHIS and its partners would use in an FMD outbreak, involve dozens of people from different agencies and industry organizations in locations across the country, and last for multiple days  Multiple units within APHIS carry out these preparedness and response activities at the agency’s headquarters in Maryland; field offices in 27 states and Puerto Rico; and the National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa, and on Plum Island, New York  APHIS’s Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory on Plum Island, New York, develops and performs diagnostic tests for foreign animal diseases, including FMD  APHIS also works with federal agencies within and outside of USDA, along with states, tribes, and academic and industry partners—all of which have roles related to FMD control, as discussed below  USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service is responsible for the safety of meat, poultry, and egg products  Agency officials assigned to slaughter establishments examine animals before processing to look for visible symptoms of FMD, among other things  USDA’s Agricultural Research Service conducts research on agricultural problems of high national priority, including the FMD virus and FMD vaccine  USDA’s National Institute of Food and Agriculture invests in and conducts agricultural research, education, and extension to help solve national challenges in agriculture, food, the environment, and communities  The agency has funded modeling of FMD spread and research on potential economic impacts  DHS has funded research on FMD vaccine and development of response decisions tools, training, and equipment; sponsored preparedness exercises; and developed emergency plans, among other things  In an FMD outbreak, DHS may assume the lead for coordination of federal resources if the Secretary of Agriculture requests assistance from DHS  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, is to ensure that the combined federal, state, and local response capabilities are adequate to respond quickly and effectively to a major disease outbreak, among other things, affecting the national agriculture or food infrastructure  The Department of the Interior carries out disease surveillance of wild animals and coordinates surveillance activities with state fish and wildlife agencies, among other things  The Department of the Interior’s U S  Geological Service conducts research on wildlife diseases, including FMD, and if needed in an FMD outbreak, would administer diagnostic tests for wildlife  The Federal Bureau of Investigation coordinates the federal investigation of criminal activities through the Joint Terrorism Task Force  If animals, livestock, or poultry are suspected targets of a terrorist attack, or if any evidence suggests a foreign animal disease may have been or could be intentionally introduced, USDA notifies the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate  State governments prepare plans for foreign animal diseases, including FMD; conduct preparedness exercises; and would play a key role in a response effort  In an FMD outbreak, a state animal health official and an APHIS field official would co-lead initial response efforts  For example, state governments might take immediate actions, such as applying quarantines and stop-movement orders  Tribal governments, like state governments, would play a key role in initial response efforts and conduct activities similar to those of state governments  The National Animal Health Laboratory Network is a partnership of 59 federal, state, and university-associated animal health laboratories throughout the United States, of which 45 are approved to administer diagnostic tests for FMD  Livestock industry organizations support communication and education efforts with their members and the public, participate in FMD preparedness exercises, and have helped develop some FMD planning documents  As part of its response to an FMD outbreak, APHIS may access vaccine through the North American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank (vaccine bank), which is jointly administered by the United States, Mexico, and Canada  Because finished vaccines have a short shelf life, the vaccine bank manages a supply of vaccine concentrate, which can be stored at extremely cold temperatures for about 5 years  Some of the concentrate is stored at the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory on Plum Island, New York, and some at the manufacturer’s facilities in Lyon, France  During an FMD outbreak, the manufacturer would convert the concentrate into finished vaccine and ship it to the United States  For the concentrate stored in the United States, the vaccine bank would need to first ship it to the manufacturer overseas  APHIS’s National Veterinary Stockpile coordinates logistics planning, particularly for catastrophic outbreaks, and would be responsible for delivering the finished vaccine to affected states, according to USDA planning documents  The FMD virus has seven distinct variations, or serotypes, and more than 60 subtypes within the serotypes, according to USDA documents  FMD vaccine should be as closely matched to the outbreak subtype as possible to provide more effective protection, according to USDA officials and a document on FMD vaccination  A vaccine for one FMD subtype may also provide good or partial immunity to other closely related subtypes, but it would not generally protect against other serotypes  The vaccine bank has concentrate for a number of FMD subtypes that pose the greatest risk to North American livestock based on recommendations from the World Reference Laboratory for FMD  We have previously reported on APHIS’s management of foreign animal diseases, including FMD  For example, in May 2015, we recommended that USDA assess and address its veterinarian workforce needs for emergency response to an outbreak of an animal disease such as FMD  USDA agreed, in part, with the recommendation, and in 2017 hired additional veterinarians  The agency is currently building a model to develop workforce estimates for a large-scale FMD outbreak, according to agency officials  USDA’s planned approach for responding to an FMD outbreak relies on several different strategies emphasizing stamping out, vaccination, or both, depending on factors such as the size of the outbreak  To aid agency officials in implementing the strategies, USDA has developed overarching guidance for responding to animal disease outbreaks and detailed procedures for many response activities  USDA’s APHIS has developed several different, but not mutually exclusive, outbreak response strategies that the agency will consider to control and eradicate FMD in an outbreak as part of its planned approach, according to USDA documents and officials  These strategies rely on stamping out—killing and disposing of—infected and susceptible animals, vaccination of uninfected animals, or both  For strategies involving vaccination, options include killing and disposing of vaccinated animals (vaccinate-to-kill), allowing the animals to be slaughtered and their meat processed (vaccinate-to-slaughter), or allowing the animals to live out their useful lifespan (vaccinate-to-live)  Response strategies would likely change as an outbreak unfolds, and might also vary by region or type of animal affected, according to APHIS planning documents  Over time, USDA’s FMD planned approach has evolved from relying solely on stamping out to including vaccination strategies as it became apparent that in many potential scenarios, reliance on stamping out alone would not be effective or feasible  Specifically, in 2010, USDA’s Foot-and- Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book (Red Book) first stated that APHIS would consider vaccination strategies such as vaccinate-to- slaughter and vaccinate-to-live  In 2014 APHIS updated the Red Book with the addition of a vaccinate-to-kill strategy to better distinguish what would happen to animals if they were not eligible for slaughter  By 2016, USDA had determined that complete stamping out of anything beyond a small FMD outbreak was not a viable, effective, or sustainable response strategy for the United States, according to USDA’s FMD vaccination policy  Experiences in preparedness exercises and foreign outbreaks of FMD influenced a shift in USDA’s planned approach toward vaccination strategies  In 2010, Japan and South Korea both experienced FMD outbreaks and initially relied on stamping out combined with strict movement restrictions  Japan stamped out about 300,000 cattle and swine, and South Korea stamped out about 150,000 cattle and 3 million swine—a third of the country’s total swine population  Despite these efforts, FMD continued to spread in both countries until they implemented vaccination strategies, according to USDA documents  A 2007 FMD preparedness exercise, sponsored by the Texas Animal Health Commission and USDA, found that killing and disposing of infected animals in a livestock-dense area like the Texas panhandle would not be feasible in a timely manner because of the large number of animals on infected premises (e g , 50,000 to 75,000 head of cattle on large cattle feedlots)  USDA learned that having vaccination strategies in place would be necessary to effectively respond to an FMD outbreak  If an FMD outbreak occurred, APHIS would select a response strategy or multiple strategies, or it would modify strategies to achieve its FMD response goals based on the unique circumstances of the outbreak, according to agency planning documents  APHIS would do so in consultation with affected states and tribes, and if the agency chose to use vaccine, states would request it from USDA  According to agency planning documents we reviewed, APHIS would consider a number of factors when deciding on its approach, including the following: FMD vaccine availability; consequences of the outbreak (e g , trade restrictions or loss of valuable genetic stock); public acceptance of response strategy or strategies; scale of the outbreak (i e , number and size of infected premises); rate of outbreak spread; location of initial outbreak (e g , isolated ranch versus livestock- producing area); movement of animals (number of locations that infected or potentially infected animals have traveled to or through); and federal and state resources available to implement response strategies  Resource needs vary among strategies and generally increase with the scale of an outbreak, according to USDA planning documents  Having the necessary resources available to implement a stamping-out response strategy would include having qualified personnel to kill animals in accordance with accepted protocols and having appropriate disposal facilities  To implement strategies involving vaccination, APHIS would need a sufficient quantity of vaccine, the resources for distributing and administering the vaccine, and the diagnostic tests necessary to distinguish between vaccinated and infected animals, according to USDA’s FMD vaccination policy  If the scale of an outbreak were small, and APHIS had access to sufficient resources, agency officials would likely implement a stamping-out strategy in an attempt to quickly stop the production of virus in infected animals and limit the outbreak’s spread, according to agency planning documents  However, these planning documents indicate that if the outbreak grew to a moderate regional, large regional, national, or catastrophic scale, the resources required for killing all infected and potentially infected animals, disposing of carcasses, and paying compensation to livestock owners would quickly multiply, and APHIS policy calls for strategies focused on vaccination, according to USDA documents  Over time, USDA’s APHIS has developed various documents to guide its response to FMD, including overarching guidance for responding to FMD and other foreign animal diseases, procedures with in-depth operational details, and plans to secure the nation’s food supply  To aid agency officials in implementing FMD response strategies broadly, APHIS has developed FMD response plans and guidance for responding to foreign animal disease outbreaks more generally  For example, the Red Book describes USDA’s FMD response strategies; identifies the capabilities needed to respond to an FMD outbreak; and provides guidance on the critical activities required during the response, including time frames for these activities  The Red Book is intended for responders at all levels of government and industry partners  For example, if a state official or a livestock owner wanted to know the steps to test and confirm a positive case of FMD, the Red Book explains the process and has a flowchart to illustrate the steps  APHIS also has developed response manuals that provide guidance relevant to foreign animal disease outbreaks, including FMD  For example, a manual on roles and coordination provides an overview of USDA’s framework for incident management, funding, communication strategies, relationships, and authorities during a foreign animal disease outbreak, including an FMD outbreak  APHIS also has produced ready reference guides that condense guidance material from these broader documents into short summary documents for training and education purposes  In addition, APHIS has developed standard operating procedures (SOP) for many response activities  Some SOPs are specific to an FMD outbreak, and others provide more general instruction on activities to respond to foreign animal diseases  The FMD biosecurity SOP, for example, describes steps responders at all levels of government and industry partners can take to help prevent the spread of the virus, such as protocols for putting on and taking off personal protective equipment (e g , coverall suits, boots, and gloves); standards for separating “clean” and “dirty” zones in vehicles and on premises; and instructions for cleaning and disinfecting vehicles before arrival at and after departure from different premises  Many of the more general SOPs have proven useful during outbreaks of other animal diseases and exercises simulating FMD outbreaks, according to APHIS and state government officials, and APHIS has revised them to incorporate lessons learned  For example, one state animal health official said that during the 2014 avian influenza outbreak, the SOP for disposing of poultry carcasses through composting was initially insufficient because the poultry industry had not previously been composting in all states  To improve consistency across states, APHIS updated protocols during the outbreak and created composting protocols for avian influenza-infected flocks and livestock to supplement the agency’s disposal SOP, which addresses carcass disposal for foreign animal diseases generally  These composting protocols expanded on and clarified guidance to be used in subsequent outbreaks  In addition, APHIS held training on composting procedures for birds and on large animal composting, which could be part of an FMD response  USDA, in coordination with industry, state, federal, and academic representatives, has also developed supply plans to secure the nation’s food supply and keep businesses operating during an FMD outbreak while managing the risk of spreading the virus, which would decrease the economic impact of an outbreak  To date, USDA and its industry and university partners have developed Secure Milk Supply and Secure Pork Supply plans and have partially completed a Secure Beef Supply plan  These plans guide industry on managing uninfected premises and uninfected animals during an FMD or other foreign animal disease outbreak  For example, the Secure Milk Supply plan has guidance on what producers can do to continue moving shipments of milk during an outbreak, including how to implement enhanced biosecurity plans to prevent the spread of FMD to their facilities  The sheep industry is currently developing its own secure food and wool supply plan, according to industry representatives  USDA would likely face significant challenges in pursuing its FMD response goals of detecting, controlling, and containing FMD as quickly as possible; eradicating FMD using strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture industries and the economy; and facilitating continuity of commerce in uninfected animals  We identified 11 challenge areas, based on our review of USDA documents, interviews with agency officials and others with expertise with FMD, and 29 responses to our questionnaire  A majority of respondents indicated that in 10 of the 11 areas USDA would face challenges that are significant—that is, important enough to be worthy of USDA action  (See app  I, fig  7, for a summary of the responses ) For the 11th area, which is communication and coordination, opinions were split on whether the area would present significant challenges  The 11 challenge areas, which sometimes overlap or fall outside of USDA’s direct control, are described below  Examples of actions USDA is taking to address these challenges are described later in this report  USDA would likely face surveillance challenges that could delay detection of the first cases in an FMD outbreak  A majority (22 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area  FMD can spread without detection for the following reasons: there is no active surveillance for FMD, animals may not have visible signs until up to 4 days after becoming signs can be difficult to notice in some species, and infected wild animals could go undetected and spread the virus  For initial detection of an FMD outbreak, USDA relies on passive surveillance, waiting for producers or veterinarians to notice and report visible signs  In contrast, for initial detection of other diseases, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (commonly known as mad cow disease), USDA has active surveillance programs in which animals are routinely tested regardless of visible signs  According to USDA officials, the cost and resources required to conduct active surveillance for initial detection of an FMD outbreak would not be justified because the United States has not had an FMD outbreak for decades and there is a risk that false positives could create unnecessary disruptions  However, the officials said the agency would likely use active surveillance during an outbreak  Passive surveillance, however, may not allow for timely detection of the initial cases of FMD, particularly in sheep  FMD infection in sheep often causes only mild signs or symptoms, such as an elevated temperature or loose stool, and in some cases will not cause any overt signs or symptoms at all, even though the animal may be spreading the virus, according to representatives of the sheep industry  Therefore, an FMD outbreak could become widespread before USDA detects the first cases  Even if responders are able to detect FMD in domesticated animals before an outbreak becomes widespread, wild animals may become infected and spread the virus, posing additional challenges for USDA and its partners  For example, the U S  population of feral swine, which are susceptible to FMD, is estimated at 6 million and is rapidly expanding, according to APHIS  Detecting and controlling infected wild animals could be extremely difficult, according to agency officials, and if not controlled, these populations could serve as carriers for the disease  In addition, limitations in diagnostic capabilities, discussed below, could hamper the availability of data needed for surveillance, such as accurate information on new cases of FMD  USDA would likely face challenges related to its capability to diagnose FMD  Such challenges include the lack of validated population-level diagnostic tests and potentially insufficient resources to collect samples and perform diagnostic testing in a large outbreak  A majority (24 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area  Currently, during an FMD outbreak, USDA would rely on individual animal testing, given that it has not validated any diagnostic tests that can be used for a group or population of animals, according to USDA’s surveillance SOP  If an FMD outbreak expands, the ability to test a large number of animals quickly with minimal resources would be useful for USDA  In a 2017 study of the potential uses of a bulk milk test for FMD in dairy cattle, for example, USDA found that 720 bulk milk tests could replace over 35,000 individual animal tests with the same level of confidence in disease status  However, the study identifies additional work needed to implement bulk milk tests  USDA and state officials investigate suspected cases of FMD on previously uninfected premises, according to USDA documents  To do so, USDA or state officials travel to the suspected premises—sometimes over long distances—collect samples from the animal or animals, and send them to a qualified laboratory for diagnostic testing  During an outbreak, massive quantities of diagnostic testing may need to be conducted, straining the capacity of federal and state laboratories that are qualified to investigate suspected cases of FMD, and potentially causing delays in detecting infected premises, according to both an after-action report for a preparedness exercise and agency officials  In addition, USDA officials we interviewed expressed concern that diagnostic kits used for these individual animal tests would be in short supply during an outbreak and said that they do not currently know how much time it would take for manufacturers to produce more  In the event of a large FMD outbreak, delays in getting diagnostic results could slow USDAs ability to detect, control, and contain an outbreak  USDA would likely face challenges in the area of information management during an outbreak, including incompatible data systems at the state and federal levels or between diagnostic laboratories and USDA and responders who lack familiarity with USDA data systems  A majority (20 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area  USDA and state data systems track information on registered livestock premises and animals  In addition, USDA has an emergency response database for collecting and analyzing data on disease outbreaks and managing response resources  However, state data systems cannot always communicate directly with USDA’s data systems because they use different software, according to two state animal health officials  Such impediments to communication could delay information sharing about the location of infected and susceptible animals  One industry representative said that such delays could prolong decisions about permits for uninfected animals to move, disrupting industries’ continuity of business  According to an academic researcher, interruptions in movement of animals could cause processing facilities to either close, operate at a diminished capacity, or be overwhelmed by a backlog of animals once movement is restarted, leading to animal welfare concerns  These disruptions could present challenges for USDA to facilitate continuity of commerce in uninfected animals, one of its response goals  USDA’s ability to control an outbreak could also be impaired if responders lack familiarity with USDA data systems  For example, according to a USDA after-action report, during the 2014 avian influenza outbreak, some responders were unfamiliar with USDA’s system for entering outbreak response information, resulting in incorrect usage or underutilization of the system  As a result, USDA’s overall response was slower than it would have been if timely information had been available  USDA would likely face challenges related to the traceability of animals (i e , the ability to trace their locations and movements) after an outbreak was detected  We found that these challenges result from insufficient use of identification numbers for livestock premises (such as farms and ranches) and individual animals to enable tracing of infected, exposed, and susceptible animals, and from identification numbers that cannot be easily read (e g , because they are not electronic)  A majority (25 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area  In an outbreak, responders would use premises and animal identification numbers, if available, to trace the location and movements of infected animals to identify other animals that may have been exposed  They would also use the identification numbers to locate all susceptible animals in the region, in order to notify owners about the outbreak and any response measures in place, such as stop- movement orders  These activities would be hampered without the identification numbers  For example, Iowa and Texas regulations do not require producers to register all of their animals with the state  Also, record keeping varies at individual farms and ranches, where some producers have electronic records, but others have no written records or rely on hand-written paper documents, according to USDA documents  Searching through records by hand at individual farms could take days rather than the hours that it would take if the records were electronic, according to a USDA planning document  Without timely and accurate tracing through the use of premises and animal identification numbers, USDA may face challenges controlling and containing an FMD outbreak and facilitating continuity of commerce in uninfected animals  In addition, some animals have identification numbers on ear tags that must be read visually, which could slow USDA’s efforts to control and contain an outbreak  In an outbreak, responders would need to inspect animals with such ear tags to manually read and record the identification numbers for individual animals  In contrast, for animals with electronic tags, responders could use electronic readers, which can accurately read identification numbers for a group of animals from a distance of up to 12 feet, according to a 2016 USDA study on electronic identification for livestock  One industry representative said that the beef cattle industry has not widely implemented electronic identification because it is difficult for many operators to justify the added cost of purchasing and attaching an electronic tag for each animal  In an FMD outbreak, USDA would likely face biosecurity challenges including lack of sufficient biosecurity on some premises, difficulty in implementing biosecurity measures for certain species, and lack of documentation (such as a written plan) specifying what measures are currently in place  A majority (20 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area  If sufficient biosecurity measures are not consistently in place on farms, ranches, and feedlots, people and vehicles may inadvertently spread the FMD virus when they travel among premises, impeding USDA’s ability to control and contain an outbreak  For example during the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom, poor biosecurity and livestock owners’ movements between scattered farms led to the introduction of FMD in previously uninfected areas, according to a 2002 report by the United Kingdom’s National Audit Office  Some livestock owners have not implemented extensive biosecurity measures on their premises, in part because they have not experienced a recent animal disease outbreak and measures may be difficult or expensive to implement, according to an industry representative  In addition, it may be difficult to implement biosecurity measures for certain species  For example, cattle feedlots operate outdoors and may have unrestricted points of entry and exit, so it can be more difficult and costly to control access and implement other biosecurity measures  In addition, even if producers have biosecurity measures in place, these measures may not be sufficiently documented to facilitate continuity of commerce in uninfected animals  According to USDA guidance documents, during an FMD outbreak, premises in areas with movement restrictions will be required to obtain permits to move any animals or animal products  To obtain such a permit, producers must show that they are not contributing to the spread of disease or putting their animals at risk of exposure, and producers without documented biosecurity plans may face delays moving their animals  According to swine industry representatives, even swine farms with biosecurity procedures do not always document such procedures or the steps they have taken  USDA would likely face depopulation challenges during an FMD outbreak, including limited capability for killing large numbers of animals in a timely manner and difficulties owing to the large size of some animals affected by FMD  A majority (22 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area  For example, USDA officials said killing animals in large feedlots—which can hold 50,000 or more animals—would quickly overwhelm resources, such as the staff and equipment required to kill animals  USDA policy calls for depopulating infected premises within 24 hours, but this may not be feasible on large livestock operations because the animals have to be killed individually, which would be time-consuming according to an industry representative  If infected premises are not quickly depopulated, animals will continue producing the virus and increase the risk of infecting animals on additional premises, hampering USDA’s ability to control and contain an outbreak  Rapid depopulation of infected swine is particularly critical to containing the spread of an outbreak because swine are known as amplifiers of FMD virus, producing and excreting 3,000 times more virus than cattle or sheep, according to USDA documents  USDA would likely face disposal challenges during an FMD outbreak, including the feasibility and logistics of disposing of a large number of animal carcasses, public concern about disposal options, and the environmental impacts of disposal  A majority (25 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area  In a large FMD outbreak, millions of cattle could be affected  It is possible that FMD can survive for several months on a frozen carcass, according to USDA documents, so if such carcasses are not disposed of properly, they could pose a risk for spreading FMD, hampering USDA’s efforts to control and contain an outbreak  Disposing of the carcasses of a 50,000- head herd of cattle from a large feedlot would be a massive effort: the total weight for disposal could be as much as 30,000 tons, or about 1,500 dump truck loads to move all the animals to disposal sites, according to an industry representative  One state animal health official stated that disposal of one or two herds may be possible, but if an outbreak were more widespread, the state would quickly run out of options  In addition, certain disposal strategies, such as incinerating large piles of carcasses, may cause a negative public reaction, according to an industry representative, USDA’s disposal SOP, and state animal health officials  Figure 5 illustrates carcass disposal during a 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom, where the government implemented a policy of stamping out all susceptible animals within 3 kilometers of known FMD cases  In reaction to the policy, the public staged protests, and businesses in rural areas lost customers who stayed away because of the striking images in the media, according to a 2002 report by the University of Newcastle  Finally, carcass disposal can create environmental impacts, such as when a burial site contaminates the groundwater or incineration contaminates the air  In general, states regulate disposal, including such things as the timing (e g , within 24 hours of an animal’s death) and the method of disposal (e g , prohibiting outdoor incineration or specifying that up to 7 cattle may be buried per acre per year)  In an FMD outbreak, large numbers of carcasses could make it difficult to comply with such regulations  USDA would likely face resource challenges in pursuing its FMD response goals, including insufficient numbers of incident responders to effectively implement USDA strategies in a medium or large outbreak, as well as insufficient resources devoted to preparedness planning in some states  A majority (23 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area  During the 2014 avian influenza outbreak, there were difficulties quickly providing response resources, such as personnel and equipment, to rapidly stamp out affected flocks, according to a USDA after-action report  According to an academic researcher, an FMD outbreak would be significantly more difficult to handle than recent avian influenza outbreaks  One state official noted that in his state there is not enough of a workforce to adequately respond to an outbreak, and there is no assigned workforce at the local level  For example, this official noted that his state employed only two veterinarians and a few animal health technicians to collect samples for testing in the event of an FMD outbreak  Other state animal health officials expressed concern that states and counties will have difficulty fielding adequate workforces to inspect animal transport vehicles and implement stop-movement orders  Insufficient preparedness planning in some states could also hamper response efforts, according to a response to our questionnaire from an academic researcher with expertise in FMD preparedness

ground_truth: Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been highly criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but in 2008 instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions to 1% or less after 2018. In November 2017, a new DOD policy was issued that essentially reversed the 2008 policy. Under the new policy, combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands. In addition, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate and states that DOD "will retain cluster munitions currently in active inventories until the capabilities they provide are replaced with enhanced and more reliable munitions." Potential issues for Congress include cluster munitions in an era of precision weapons, other weapons in lieu of cluster munitions, and the potential impact of DOD's 2017 revised cluster munitions policy.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  Some states have not allocated resources to develop FMD response plans, including, for example, the conditions that would trigger a stop-movement order  States typically control intrastate movement under the state’s authority, and if states delay issuing stop-movement orders, it may be more difficult for USDA to control and contain an outbreak  Communication and coordination may be an area where USDA could face challenges during an FMD outbreak because of ineffective external or internal communications and unclear roles and responsibilities  Responses to our questionnaire in all categories (federal and state government officials, industry representatives, and academic researchers) were mixed about whether communication and coordination was an area with significant challenges  Specifically, 11 respondents said it was an area with significant challenges, 12 said it was not, and 6 were unsure  One industry respondent who said that the area was not a challenge cited a team of industry representatives that is working with USDA and states to prepare for an FMD outbreak  On the other hand, during a 2016 FMD preparedness exercise in Texas, coordination between USDA and other participants was at times inadequate  For example, during the exercise USDA and the Texas Animal Health Commission shared leadership of the response effort, and some respondents cited frustration with this top-down leadership structure because they were accustomed to emergency management practices and protocols designed for incidents such as natural disaster response efforts, which are generally initiated at the local level  Participants commented that they were confused about who did what and said that coordination needs to be improved between USDA and local governments, according to an after-action report  Also, communication across participating agencies broke down  For example, information from USDA on stop-movement orders, the size of the quarantine zone, and the number of sites quarantined did not reach all stakeholders in a timely manner, according to an after-action report  Compensating livestock owners for animals or equipment that the government determines must be destroyed to limit the spread of FMD would likely pose various challenges for the agency  USDA would provide the owners with up to 100 percent of the expenses of purchase, destruction, and disposition of animals or materials required to be destroyed, based on the agency’s appraisal of the fair market value  Doing so would likely pose various challenges for the agency, according to USDA and state government officials  A majority (19 of 29) of respondents to our questionnaire indicated that USDA would face significant challenges in this area  Such challenges include uncertainties about fair appraisal methods (especially when an outbreak has caused livestock prices to decline), owners resisting killing their animals if compensation rates are too low, and the potentially massive scale of compensation payments  According to USDA economists, if trade restrictions were imposed during an FMD outbreak, the fair market value of animals and their products would likely drop as a result of oversupply  USDA’s response to the outbreak could be slowed if producers brought legal challenges to stop the stamping out of their herds because they were not satisfied with compensation levels, a scenario that took place in a 2018 USDA-led exercise simulating the first few days of an FMD outbreak  Moreover, in a widespread FMD outbreak, the scale of federal compensation payments could be substantial  For example, in the 2001 United Kingdom FMD outbreak, compensation costs were estimated at over $1 billion for the killing of about 6 million animals  Given the larger size of the livestock industry in the United States, federal compensation costs could be much higher, depending on the number of animals killed as part of the response  USDA would likely face challenges related to vaccination, an area of particular importance given vaccination’s central role in USDA’s strategies for pursuing its response goals  All 29 respondents to our questionnaire agreed that the challenges USDA faces related to vaccination are significant  In particular, USDA does not have access to sufficient vaccine to achieve its response goals under many potential outbreak scenarios, and there is not consensus about how to allocate the limited supply, according to USDA officials and documents  Other challenges in this area relate to the timing and logistics of obtaining, distributing, and administering vaccine and to scientific, procedural, and infrastructure issues in vaccine production  Supplies of FMD vaccine concentrate in the vaccine bank may be sufficient to help control and eradicate a small, localized outbreak, but it is unlikely that they would be sufficient to stop a larger outbreak, according to USDA planning documents and officials  With a vaccine that is matched to the appropriate FMD subtype, a single dose can protect cattle for 6 months, and two doses are required to provide the same protection to swine  APHIS’s 2016 FMD vaccination policy states that 25 million doses for each of 10 subtypes of the virus is an appropriate minimum target to have available  However, the United States currently has access to only 1 75 million doses of each subtype available in the vaccine bank, according to USDA documents  In the United States, there are 24 states in which the number of livestock exceeds the doses available in the vaccine bank, according to USDA documents  In a 2016 report to Congress, USDA stated that the cost to reach its target of 25 million doses would be about $125 million, which would be about 10 percent of APHIS’s budgetary resources in fiscal year 2016  In addition, because the vaccine concentrate has a 5-year shelf life, USDA would incur costs to routinely replace the supply of concentrate, according to agency officials  The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 contains a provision that directs the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a national animal vaccine and veterinary countermeasures bank, and to prioritize the acquisition and maintenance of sufficient quantities of FMD vaccine and accompanying diagnostic products  The need for additional FMD vaccine was reinforced by a 2016 survey of states by USDA and Iowa State University  On the basis of responses from 32 state animal health officials, the authors estimated that in a widespread or national outbreak, states would plan to use on average 4 2 million doses during the first 14 weeks of the outbreak  Based on these estimates, a vaccine request from a single state could greatly exceed the 1 75 million doses available per subtype in the vaccine bank’s supply  Moreover, if an FMD outbreak occurred in Texas or Iowa, the states with the largest cattle and swine populations, respectively, the available vaccine supply would provide a single dose for about 14 percent of Texas’s 12 3 million cattle or the required two doses for about 4 percent of Iowa’s 22 8 million swine  Texas’s and Iowa’s cattle and swine populations together make up about 24 percent of the combined population of cattle and swine nationwide  Figure 6 illustrates the vaccine doses needed to protect cattle and swine in Texas and Iowa compared with the currently available FMD vaccine bank supply of 1 75 million doses per subtype  In addition, because of the large number of FMD subtypes present around the world, and because the FMD virus is constantly mutating, it is possible that an FMD subtype could be introduced in the United States that is not covered by vaccines currently in the vaccine bank  According to a representative from an FMD vaccine manufacturer, producing a vaccine for a new subtype of FMD could take from 6 to 18 months, depending on whether the subtype was known and other factors  Because of the limited supply of vaccine and the potentially high demand for it, USDA would likely face the challenge of deciding how to allocate it in an FMD outbreak  In a 2016 survey of 13 industry veterinarians, there was no consensus within the beef, dairy, and swine industries about priorities for the vaccine  Specifically, USDA and Iowa State University asked the veterinarians to rank the importance of vaccinating various populations (e g , bull studs, lactating cows, and boar studs) within the beef, dairy, and swine industries, assuming there was only enough vaccine to vaccinate 25 to 50 percent of animals in a specified area  The responses varied widely, with high and low rankings for nearly every population of animals  The timing and logistics of obtaining, distributing, and administering the FMD vaccine could also pose challenges  The timing to reformulate the banked vaccine would pose challenges for USDA in an outbreak, according to respondents to our questionnaire  In addition, in March 2005, we found that USDA would not be able to deploy vaccines rapidly enough to contain a widespread FMD outbreak  After USDA requests FMD vaccine from the vaccine bank, vaccine manufacturers could take from 4 to 13 days to finish and ship all of the requested vaccine to the United States, during which time the virus could spread within the livestock population, according to USDA documents  If the vaccine bank’s supply of concentrate is exhausted during an outbreak and more is needed, manufacturers may take several months to produce it, according to a vaccine manufacturer  After obtaining the vaccine, USDA would distribute it to affected states, and the states would distribute it to veterinarians, producers, or others who would be responsible for administering vaccine, according to USDA and state FMD vaccination documents  Many states do not currently have vaccination plans in place and may not have identified the warehousing locations, staff needs, and tracking required to efficiently distribute FMD vaccine, according to agency and state government officials, which could slow USDA’s efforts to contain and control an outbreak  States with vaccination plans may be able to more quickly and effectively distribute and administer FMD vaccine during an outbreak  For example, California has a vaccination plan that details how it would receive, distribute, and administer FMD vaccine while maintaining the appropriate temperatures and documentation  The plan includes details such as the supplies needed for administering FMD vaccine to cattle  USDA faces challenges in obtaining vaccine and using it in a response effort because of scientific, procedural, and infrastructure challenges related to the vaccine and its production  There are very few vaccine manufacturers in the world with the capacity to produce most of the FMD vaccine subtypes and meet the quality standards required by the United States, according to agency officials  Further, there is currently no production capacity for FMD vaccine in the United States because dedicated infrastructure is not in place to produce vaccines without live virus  There is a statutory prohibition against working with live FMD virus on the U S  mainland, absent a permit granted by the Secretary of Agriculture, and live virus is needed to produce conventional vaccines  To work within this constraint, USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and DHS developed new technologies to produce vaccine using modified versions of the virus that are unable to cause or transmit disease  The agencies transferred these technologies to vaccine companies that are investing in their development, according to USDA officials  In 2018, the Secretary of Agriculture announced that vaccine companies could apply for permits to work with a specific modified, noninfectious version of the FMD virus on the mainland  One company has exclusive rights to use this modified version, which was developed and patented by ARS  The company plans to produce FMD vaccine in the United States, but it could take several years to license the initial product, complete the necessary permitting procedures, and build manufacturing infrastructure, according to USDA documents and a company official  Using FMD vaccine to respond to an outbreak presents additional challenges that are related to limitations of FMD vaccines  Specifically, animals may take up to 28 days after vaccination to develop protective immunity to FMD, depending on the species, potency of vaccine, and other factors  Even after 28 days, some vaccinated animals may not be fully immune to FMD and may continue spreading the virus despite having no visible signs of infection, according to USDA documents  To mitigate challenges in responding to potential FMD outbreaks, USDA’s APHIS has identified corrective actions through preparedness exercises, surveys, and lessons learned in other outbreaks, as called for in its SOPs  However, APHIS generally does not follow its SOPs for prioritizing or monitoring the completion of these actions  A USDA SOP outlines a process for identifying corrective actions to improve the agency’s preparedness for outbreaks of foreign animal diseases  According to the SOP, APHIS is to identify corrective actions after preparedness exercises and animal disease incidents  Consistent with this SOP, APHIS identifies corrective actions for FMD preparedness through exercises simulating FMD outbreaks, surveys of agency officials and others, and lessons learned from outbreaks of other diseases  More specifically, see the following: APHIS sponsors FMD preparedness exercises and participates in some such exercises that other federal or state agencies sponsor  After an exercise, the sponsoring agency generally prepares an after- action report that specifies corrective actions, and may include a responsible party for and a date for completing each action  APHIS has after-action reports for more than 40 FMD preparedness exercises that it sponsored or participated in from 2007 through 2018, which include corrective actions for USDA and APHIS  APHIS conducts annual surveys of its staff and others—including state government officials, industry representatives, and academics— to identify corrective actions related to preparedness and response training needs  APHIS identifies corrective actions for FMD preparedness based on lessons learned after outbreaks of other diseases  For example, some of the actions that APHIS identified after outbreaks of avian influenza, such as improving a database used for emergency response, could also help the agency mitigate challenges it would face in an FMD outbreak, according to agency officials  APHIS has identified dozens of corrective actions in all 11 of the areas where we identified challenges for USDA in pursuing its FMD response goals  APHIS has taken corrective actions in each area  For example, to help mitigate the challenge of insufficient biosecurity on some premises, the agency partnered with Iowa State University to offer producers across the nation training on developing enhanced biosecurity plans for implementation during a foreign animal disease outbreak  However, APHIS has not yet taken some other corrective actions that it has identified  According to agency officials and experts we interviewed, these corrective actions can help mitigate, but may not completely resolve, the challenges identified  Some challenges may be outside USDA’s control to fully resolve  For example, the logistical challenges of carcass disposal could be overwhelming in a large-scale outbreak, which could generate thousands of tons of carcasses  A corrective action calling for training on carcass management may help educate FMD responders about disposal methods or preventing environmental impacts; however, such training may not fully resolve the challenge  Table 1 shows examples of corrective actions identified by USDA in after- action reports, planning documents, other agency documents, or interviews, which the agency has taken or not yet taken for the 11 challenge areas we identified  Some of the corrective actions that USDA has identified and taken relate to the challenge area of vaccination  For example, to help speed access to vaccine, in 2018, the Secretary of Agriculture announced that vaccine companies could apply for permits to enable them to develop and produce certain types of FMD vaccine in the United States in the future, thereby avoiding delays from producing the vaccine overseas and shipping it here  Also, APHIS officials have used an FMD predictive model to evaluate the effectiveness of different vaccination schemes at the state level, and they told us that they plan to conduct a similar analysis at the national level  The results could help inform USDA’s vaccine prioritization decisions in advance of an outbreak, according to the officials  USDA has also begun implementing other corrective actions that have been identified related to FMD vaccination, although more work remains  For example, in February 2009, we recommended—and USDA agreed— that it should detail in a contingency response plan how a response using vaccines would be implemented  Similarly, after-action reports for 2013 and 2016 preparedness exercises highlighted the need for procedures to guide the implementation of FMD vaccination strategies  APHIS has taken or planned several steps to help address this need: In 2009, APHIS began drafting vaccine implementation procedures but realized that the national procedures needed to be developed in collaboration with states because of variation among states in their predominant industries, agriculture infrastructure, and government resources  When more states have developed vaccination implementation procedures, APHIS may revise and finalize the national procedures originally drafted in 2009, according to agency officials  APHIS’s National Veterinary Stockpile developed plans in 2009 and 2011 outlining how some aspects of a vaccination strategy would be implemented  Specifically, in 2009 it developed a template that states and tribes can use to develop their own plans, and in 2011 it prepared a logistical plan for distributing FMD vaccine to the field  The National Veterinary Stockpile also held preparedness exercises from 2008 to 2018 for states and tribes to practice requesting, receiving, and delivering the vaccine and to obtain information that could help APHIS develop national vaccination procedures  From 2011 to 2018, APHIS and the California Department of Food and Agriculture worked together to draft detailed procedures for implementing an FMD vaccination strategy in California  The draft procedures and related planning documents are intended to serve as templates to help other states develop such procedures, according to agency officials  APHIS also piloted a workshop on FMD vaccination planning in October 2018 and plans to hold related preparedness exercises with states from 2019 to 2021  Although APHIS has identified dozens of corrective actions for FMD preparedness, it has not consistently followed its SOP for prioritizing all of the actions and monitoring progress in implementing them  Specifically, once corrective actions have been identified, APHIS’s SOP calls for prioritizing the actions in an improvement plan, and monitoring the actions to track their completion  APHIS has sometimes designated actions related to FMD vaccination as high priority during annual management meetings, but not all corrective actions have been prioritized, according to agency officials  For example, a 2016 corrective action called for USDA to conduct an exercise to explore roles, responsibilities, and activities related to recovery from a large-scale animal disease outbreak  However, as of December 2018, this action has not been prioritized in an improvement plan, according to the after-action report and an agency official  In addition, corrective actions have sometimes been identified multiple times without being tracked to completion  For example, an after-action report for a 2007 exercise found that a process for making vaccine- allocation decisions was needed and suggested that a vaccine advisory group could assist with doing so  A 2014 after-action report stated that processes governing vaccine prioritization and allocation were not clear and identified a corrective action calling for USDA to develop a federal- level doctrine for vaccine prioritization and allocation  USDA’s 2016 FMD vaccination policy states that APHIS, in coordination with state, local, and industry stakeholders, should consider developing processes, procedures, and strategies for prioritizing the use of currently available vaccine in an outbreak  However, APHIS has not developed processes, procedures, or strategies for prioritizing and allocating its supply of FMD vaccine, according to agency officials  The officials said they have not developed such a process because of limited resources and competing priorities  Also, it would require participation from state and industry stakeholders, and given the small quantity of FMD vaccine relative to the large number of susceptible animals in the country, the stakeholders have had little incentive to devote the necessary time to the issue, according to agency officials  More generally, agency officials told us that the agency has not prioritized or monitored completion of some corrective actions because they have been responding to actual outbreaks of animal and plant diseases  They also noted that they have limited resources for FMD preparedness, which may make it difficult for them to complete all of the corrective actions that have been identified  However, for avian influenza preparedness, APHIS compiled and prioritized more than 300 corrective actions in a database and tracked more than 200 of them to completion  Through this process, it completed nearly all of the 111 high-priority actions and over 100 moderate-priority actions, according to its database as of May 2018  For example after the 2014 avian influenza outbreak, APHIS completed corrective actions that improved its response to a subsequent outbreak in 2016, according to agency documents  The corrective actions addressed such issues as how to quickly depopulate and dispose of infected poultry and efficiently compensate affected producers  APHIS continues to monitor its progress in implementing the remaining corrective actions for that disease, according to agency officials  APHIS’s SOP calls for prioritizing corrective actions to identify the most beneficial use of resources  The SOP also calls for monitoring corrective actions to track their completion so that APHIS can improve its response capabilities and correct problems or deficiencies identified in exercises or incidents  Without following its SOP to prioritize corrective actions for FMD preparedness, APHIS cannot ensure that it is allocating its limited resources toward implementing the most beneficial actions  And without following its SOP for monitoring the corrective actions, APHIS cannot ensure that the highest-priority actions are completed  APHIS has taken important steps to prepare for an FMD outbreak and to mitigate challenges it may face in responding to one  For example, the agency has developed an extensive collection of strategy and guidance documents, held FMD preparedness exercises to practice response activities, and identified dozens of corrective actions and completed some of these actions  However, APHIS has not yet completed other corrective actions, including actions that have been identified multiple times, such as developing a process for prioritizing and allocating the limited supply of FMD vaccine  APHIS has an SOP for prioritizing and monitoring corrective actions  By following this SOP for avian influenza preparedness, the agency succeeded in prioritizing more than 300 corrective actions and tracking over 200 corrective actions to completion, including nearly all high-priority actions  In contrast, for FMD preparedness, APHIS has not consistently prioritized or monitored the corrective actions it has identified  Without following its SOP to prioritize and monitor corrective actions for FMD preparedness, APHIS cannot ensure that it is allocating its limited resources to the most beneficial actions to prepare for a possible FMD outbreak  We are making the following two recommendations to USDA: The Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service should follow the agency’s SOP to prioritize corrective actions for FMD preparedness  (Recommendation 1) The Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service should follow the agency’s SOP to monitor progress and track completion of corrective actions for FMD preparedness  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to USDA and DHS for review and comment  USDA provided comments, reproduced in appendix II, in which it agreed with our recommendations  In addition, USDA and DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  In response to our recommendations, USDA said that, starting in the second quarter of fiscal year 2019, APHIS will implement the agency’s SOP and prioritize corrective actions to be tracked in its corrective actions database, as we recommended  USDA also said that, starting in the third quarter of fiscal year 2019, APHIS will assess and update the items related to FMD in its corrective actions database, as we recommended  In addition, USDA said that APHIS will track accomplishments it makes under a related provision of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If your or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or morriss@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  This report (1) describes the U S  Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) planned approach for responding to a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak; (2) identifies what challenges, if any, USDA would face in pursuing its FMD response goals; and (3) examines how USDA identifies, prioritizes, and monitors corrective actions to mitigate these challenges  To describe USDA’s planned approach for responding to an FMD outbreak, we reviewed relevant legislation and USDA strategy and guidance documents  We also interviewed officials from USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) at the agency’s headquarters in Riverdale, Maryland; laboratories on Plum Island, New York, and in Ames, Iowa; center for epidemiology and animal health in Fort Collins, Colorado; and center for veterinary biologics in Ames, Iowa; and officials from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) at DHS’s Plum Island Animal Disease Center on Plum Island, New York  We selected these officials to interview because of their knowledge about USDA’s planned approach, their involvement in preparing for an FMD outbreak, and the roles they would play in responding to such an outbreak  To identify what challenges, if any, USDA would face in pursuing its FMD response goals, we first came up with a list of potential challenge areas  To develop the list of potential challenge areas, we reviewed USDA documents, reports about FMD outbreaks in other countries, and after- action reports from 41 preparedness exercises in the United States from 2007 to 2018 in which officials practiced responding to simulated FMD outbreaks and identified emerging challenges  The preparedness exercises included small-scale as well as large-scale ones with a variety of participants, durations, and response activities  We also interviewed APHIS headquarters staff and field staff in Iowa (the state with the most livestock); APHIS and ARS laboratory officials; state animal health officials in California, Colorado, Iowa, and North Carolina; representatives from the beef cattle, dairy cattle, swine, and sheep industries; and academic researchers with expertise in this area  We selected the individuals to interview based on their knowledge about challenges that USDA could face in pursuing its FMD response goals, their central role in preparing for an FMD outbreak, and recommendations from other interviewees, as well as diversity in geographic location  We also visited a swine farm and cattle feedlot in Iowa and interviewed the owners  We selected a swine farm and cattle feedlot to visit because swine and cattle were the livestock industries with the greatest populations of animals in the United States in 2016  We identified a list of 11 potential challenge areas  To confirm the significance of the challenge areas, we used a questionnaire with the list of potential challenge areas  To select the questionnaire recipients, we identified four categories of people who are knowledgeable about challenges that USDA could face in pursuing its FMD response goals, including those who could be involved in a response effort  The four categories are (1) federal government officials, (2) state government officials, (3) livestock industry representatives, and (4) academic researchers with expertise in FMD preparedness  For categories with multiple individuals, we selected individuals to represent relevant units within APHIS, ARS, and DHS (e g  headquarters; field offices; laboratories; surveillance, preparedness and response services; and science, technology, and analysis services); different livestock industries (beef cattle, dairy cattle, swine, and sheep); and states with relatively high livestock populations  We asked the recipients whether USDA would face a significant challenge in each of the 11 areas and whether they knew of other challenge areas we had not listed  We defined significant to mean a challenge that is sufficiently great or important enough to be worthy of USDA action to address the challenge  We initially sent the questionnaire with potential challenges to 39 recipients  Two federal officials had retired from their positions, so we sent the list to their replacements  Of the 39 recipients, we received responses from 28  We also included an additional response that APHIS provided from an official who we had not initially contacted and who had relevant expertise, for a total of 29 responses  Despite two follow-up attempts, we did not receive responses from 11 recipients, including both recipients from ARS, 5 of the 18 from APHIS, 3 of the 10 state animal health officials, and 1 of the 2 national animal health laboratory network officials (these are affiliated with universities)  Figure 7 shows the categories of respondents and their responses in each of the11 challenge areas  Since we used a nonprobability sample, the results are not generalizable to all government officials, livestock industry officials, or FMD experts, but the responses helped confirm the list of 11 challenge areas and provided illustrative information about each one  We reviewed challenges related to vaccination for FMD in greater depth than other challenges because of the significant role vaccination could play if reliance solely on stamping out is not feasible  Specifically, we visited DHS’s Plum Island Animal Disease Center on Plum Island, New York, where we interviewed officials from USDA’s Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory and the Agricultural Research Service, as well as DHS officials, about challenges related to FMD vaccination  We also reviewed agency documents on the topic and interviewed other officials from USDA, the North American Vaccine Bank, universities, states, and industry groups about issues related to FMD vaccination  Further, we interviewed officials from the vaccine company that currently produces the majority of FMD vaccine available for use in the United States and a company that has rights to use a modified version of the FMD virus to produce FMD vaccine in the future  To determine how USDA identifies, prioritizes, and monitors corrective actions to mitigate the challenges, we reviewed APHIS and DHS guidance on evaluation and improvement planning and other agency documents, observed an FMD preparedness exercise, reviewed after- action reports from 41 FMD preparedness exercises conducted from 2007 through 2018, and interviewed USDA officials  We reviewed APHIS’s and DHS’s procedures for evaluation and improvement planning to understand how APHIS is to identify, prioritize, and monitor corrective actions  To determine whether APHIS was consistently following these procedures, we observed the preparedness exercise at APHIS’s Riverdale, Maryland, office; reviewed a preliminary after-action report for that exercise; and reviewed after-action reports for the 41 other preparedness exercises  We interviewed APHIS officials about corrective actions identified in the after-action reports and what steps the agency has taken to prioritize the actions and monitor their progress  We reviewed agency documents about these procedures and about actions USDA has taken and identified but not yet taken to mitigate challenges  To find examples of corrective actions that USDA has identified and taken or not yet taken, we reviewed after-action reports for the 41 preparedness exercises; APHIS’s 2018-2020 training and exercise plan for its veterinary services emergency preparedness and response unit; and other agency documents, such as contracts and plans, and interviewed agency officials  The examples of corrective actions in table 1 are illustrative only and do not include or represent all of the actions that USDA has identified  We sent a draft table of examples to APHIS officials and incorporated their comments as appropriate  We also reviewed a GAO report on USDA’s management of highly pathogenic avian influenza (avian influenza) outbreaks; interviewed agency officials; reviewed USDA after-action reports for avian influenza outbreaks; and reviewed USDA’s database of related corrective actions to learn how the agency identifies, prioritizes, and monitors actions to mitigate challenges for that disease  To assess the overall reliability of that database to use information from the database in our report, we reviewed management controls over the information systems that maintain the data and interviewed USDA officials who manage the database  We determined that the database was sufficiently reliable to describe the contents of the database and general status of corrective actions  We conducted this performance audit from May 2017 to March 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the contact named above, Nico Sloss (Assistant Director), Kevin Bray, Emily Christoff, Mary Denigan-Macauley, Christine Feehan, Jesse Lamarre-Vincent, Cynthia Norris, Anne Rhodes-Kline, and Amber Sinclair made key contributions to this report  Ross Campbell, Barb El Osta, Kathryn Godfrey, Hayden Huang, and Dan Royer also made important contributions to this report  Foot-and-Mouth Disease: USDA’s Evaluations of Foreign Animal Health Systems Could Benefit from Better Guidance and Greater Transparency  GAO-17-373  Washington, D C : April 28, 2017  Avian Influenza: USDA Has Taken Actions to Reduce Risks but Needs a Plan to Evaluate Its Efforts  GAO-17-360  Washington, D C : April 13, 2017  Emerging Animal Diseases: Actions Needed to Better Position USDA to Address Future Risks  GAO-16-132  Washington, D C : December 15, 2015  Federal Veterinarians: Efforts Needed to Improve Workforce Planning  GAO-15-495  Washington, D C : May 26, 2015  Homeland Security: An Overall Strategy Is Needed to Strengthen Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry  GAO-13-424  Washington, D C : May 21, 2013  Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are Needed to Ensure Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public and Animal Health  GAO-09-178  Washington, D C : February 4, 2009  High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: DHS Lacks Evidence to Conclude That Foot-and-Mouth Disease Research Can Be Done Safely on the U S  Mainland  GAO-08-821T  Washington, D C : May 22, 2008  National Animal Identification System: USDA Needs to Resolve Several Key Implementation Issues to Achieve Rapid and Effective Disease Traceback  GAO-07-592  Washington, D C : July 6, 2007  Avian Influenza: USDA Has Taken Important Steps to Prepare for Outbreaks, but Better Planning Could Improve Response  GAO-07-652  Washington, D C : June 11, 2007  Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain  GAO-05-214  Washington, D C : March 8, 2005 
Report 2:  Managing the growth and training of those new workforces while maintaining the current standard of quality and efficiency would represent the most significant industrywide challenge  In addition, industry and Navy sources indicate that as much as $4 billion would need to be invested in the physical infrastructure of the shipyards to achieve the higher production rates required under the [notional] 15-year and 20-year [buildup scenarios examined by CBO]  Less investment would be needed for the [notional] 25-year or 30-year [buildup scenarios examined by CBO]  A January 13, 2017, press report states the following: The Navy's production lines are hot and the work to prepare them for the possibility of building out a much larger fleet would be manageable, the service's head of acquisition said Thursday  From a logistics perspective, building the fleet from its current 274 ships to 355, as recommended in the Navy's newest force structure assessment in December, would be straightforward, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition Sean Stackley told reporters at the Surface Navy Association's annual symposium  "By virtue of maintaining these hot production lines, frankly, over the last eight years, our facilities are in pretty good shape," Stackley said  "In fact, if you talked to industry, they would say we're underutilizing the facilities that we have " The areas where the Navy would likely have to adjust "tooling" to answer demand for a larger fleet would likely be in Virginia-class attack submarines and large surface combatants, the DDG-51 guided missile destroyers—two ship classes likely to surge if the Navy gets funding to build to 355 ships, he said  "Industry's going to have to go out and procure special tooling associated with going from current production rates to a higher rate, but I would say that's easily done," he said  Another key, Stackley said, is maintaining skilled workers—both the builders in the yards and the critical supply-chain vendors who provide major equipment needed for ship construction  And, he suggested, it would help to avoid budget cuts and other events that would force workforce layoffs  "We're already prepared to ramp up," he said  "In certain cases, that means not laying off the skilled workforce we want to retain " A January 17, 2017, press report states the following: Building stable designs with active production lines is central to the Navy's plan to grow to 355 ships  "if you look at the 355-ship number, and you study the ship classes (desired), the big surge is in attack submarines and large surface combatants, which today are DDG-51 (destroyers)," the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Sean Stackley, told reporters at last week's Surface Navy Association conference  Those programs have proven themselves reliable performers both at sea and in the shipyards  From today's fleet of 274 ships, "we're on an irreversible path to 308 by 2021  Those ships are already in construction," said Stackley  "To go from there to 355, virtually all those ships are currently in production, with some exceptions: Ohio Replacement, (we) just got done the Milestone B there (to move from R&D into detailed design); and then upgrades to existing platforms  So we have hot production lines that will take us to that 355-ship Navy " A January 24, 2017, press report states the following: Navy officials say a recently determined plan to increase its fleet size by adding more new submarines, carriers and destroyers is "executable" and that early conceptual work toward this end is already underway     Although various benchmarks will need to be reached in order for this new plan to come to fruition, such as Congressional budget allocations, Navy officials do tell Scout Warrior that the service is already working—at least in concept—on plans to vastly enlarge the fleet  Findings from this study are expected to inform an upcoming 2018 Navy Shipbuilding Plan, service officials said  A January 12, 2017, press report states the following: Brian Cuccias, president of Ingalls Shipbuilding [a shipyard owned by Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) that builds Navy destroyers and amphibious ships as well as Coast Guard cutters], said Ingalls, which is currently building 10 ships for four Navy and Coast Guard programs at its 800-acre facility in Pascagoula, Miss , could build more because it is using only 70 to 75 percent of its capacity  A March 2017 press report states the following: As the Navy calls for a larger fleet, shipbuilders are looking toward new contracts and ramping up their yards to full capacity     The Navy is confident that U S  shipbuilders will be able to meet an increased demand, said Ray Mabus, then-secretary of the Navy, during a speech at the Surface Navy Association's annual conference in Arlington, Virginia  They have the capacity to "get there because of the ships we are building today," Mabus said  "I don't think we could have seven years ago " Shipbuilders around the United States have "hot" production lines and are manufacturing vessels on multi-year or block buy contracts, he added  The yards have made investments in infrastructure and in the training of their workers  "We now have the basis     [to] get to that much larger fleet," he said     Shipbuilders have said they are prepared for more work  At Ingalls Shipbuilding—a subsidiary of Huntington Ingalls Industries—10 ships are under construction at its Pascagoula, Mississippi, yard, but it is under capacity, said Brian Cuccias, the company's president  The shipbuilder is currently constructing five guided-missile destroyers, the latest San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship, and two national security cutters for the Coast Guard  "Ingalls is a very successful production line right now, but it has the ability to actually produce a lot more in the future," he said during a briefing with reporters in January  The company's facility is currently operating at 75 percent capacity, he noted     Austal USA—the builder of the Independence-variant of the littoral combat ship and the expeditionary fast transport vessel—is also ready to increase its capacity should the Navy require it, said Craig Perciavalle, the company's president  The latest discussions are "certainly something that a shipbuilder wants to hear," he said  "We do have the capability of increasing throughput if the need and demand were to arise, and then we also have the ability with the present workforce and facility to meet a different mix that could arise as well " Austal could build fewer expeditionary fast transport vessels and more littoral combat ships, or vice versa, he added  "The key thing for us is to keep the manufacturing lines hot and really leverage the momentum that we've gained on both of the programs," he said  The company—which has a 164-acre yard in Mobile, Alabama—is focused on the extension of the LCS and expeditionary fast transport ship program, but Perciavalle noted that it could look into manufacturing other types of vessels  "We do have excess capacity to even build smaller vessels … if that opportunity were to arise and we're pursuing that," he said  Bryan Clark, a naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington, D C -based think tank, said shipbuilders are on average running between 70 and 80 percent capacity  While they may be ready to meet an increased demand for ships, it would take time to ramp up their workforces  However, the bigger challenge is the supplier industrial base, he said  "Shipyards may be able to build ships but the supplier base that builds the pumps … and the radars and the radios and all those other things, they don't necessarily have that ability to ramp up," he said  "You would need to put some money into building up their capacity " That has to happen now, he added  Rear Adm  William Gallinis, program manager for program executive office ships, said what the Navy must be "mindful of is probably our vendor base that support the shipyards " Smaller companies that supply power electronics and switchboards could be challenged, he said  "Do we need to re-sequence some of the funding to provide some of the facility improvements for some of the vendors that may be challenged? My sense is that the industrial base will size to the demand signal  We just need to be mindful of how we transition to that increased demand signal," he said  The acquisition workforce may also see an increased amount of stress, Gallinis noted  "It takes a fair amount of experience and training to get a good contracting officer to the point to be [able to] manage contracts or procure contracts " "But I don't see anything that is insurmountable," he added  At a May 24, 2017, hearing before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the industrial-base aspects of the Navy's 355-ship goal, John P  Casey, executive vice president–marine systems, General Dynamics Corporation (one of the country's two principal builders of Navy ships) stated the following: It is our belief that the Nation's shipbuilding industrial base can scale-up hot production lines for existing ships and mobilize additional resources to accomplish the significant challenge of achieving the 355-ship Navy as quickly as possible     Supporting a plan to achieve a 355-ship Navy will be the most challenging for the nuclear submarine enterprise  Much of the shipyard and industrial base capacity was eliminated following the steep drop-off in submarine production that occurred with the cancellation of the Seawolf Program in 1992  The entire submarine industrial base at all levels of the supply chain will likely need to recapitalize some portion of its facilities, workforce, and supply chain just to support the current plan to build the Columbia Class SSBN program, while concurrently building Virginia Class SSNs  Additional SSN procurement will require industry to expand its plans and associated investment beyond the level today     Shipyard labor resources include the skilled trades needed to fabricate, build and outfit major modules, perform assembly, test and launch of submarines, and associated support organizations that include planning, material procurement, inspection, quality assurance, and ship certification  Since there is no commercial equivalency for Naval nuclear submarine shipbuilding, these trade resources cannot be easily acquired in large numbers from other industries  Rather, these shipyard resources must be acquired and developed over time to ensure the unique knowledge and know-how associated with nuclear submarine shipbuilding is passed on to the next generation of shipbuilders  The mechanisms of knowledge transfer require sufficient lead time to create the proficient, skilled craftsmen in each key trade including welding, electrical, machining, shipfitting, pipe welding, painting, and carpentry, which are among the largest trades that would need to grow to support increased demand  These trades will need to be hired in the numbers required to support the increased workload  Both shipyards have scalable processes in place to acquire, train, and develop the skilled workforce they need to build nuclear ships  These processes and associated training facilities need to be expanded to support the increased demand  As with the shipyards, the same limiting factors associated with facilities, workforce, and supply chain also limit the submarine unique first tier suppliers and sub-tiers in the industrial base for which there is no commercial equivalency     The supply base is the third resource that will need to be expanded to meet the increased demand over the next 20 years  During the OHIO, 688 and SEAWOLF construction programs, there were over 17,000 suppliers supporting submarine construction programs  That resource base was "rationalized" during submarine low rate production over the last 20 years  The current submarine industrial base reflects about 5,000 suppliers, of which about 3,000 are currently active (i e , orders placed within the last 5 years), 80% of which are single or sole source (based on $)  It will take roughly 20 years to build the 12 Columbia Class submarines that starts construction in FY21  The shipyards are expanding strategic sourcing of appropriate non-core products (e g , decks, tanks, etc ) in order to focus on core work at each shipyard facility (e g , module outfitting and assembly)  Strategic sourcing will move demand into the supply base where capacity may exist or where it can be developed more easily  This approach could offer the potential for cost savings by competition or shifting work to lower cost work centers throughout the country  Each shipyard has a process to assess their current supply base capacity and capability and to determine where it would be most advantageous to perform work in the supply base     Achieving the increased rate of production and reducing the cost of submarines will require the Shipbuilders to rely on the supply base for more non-core products such as structural fabrication, sheet metal, machining, electrical, and standard parts  The supply base must be made ready to execute work with submarine-specific requirements at a rate and volume that they are not currently prepared to perform  Preparing the supply base to execute increased demand requires early non-recurring funding to support cross-program construction readiness and EOQ funding to procure material in a manner that does not hold up existing ship construction schedules should problems arise in supplier qualification programs  This requires longer lead times (estimates of three years to create a new qualified, critical supplier) than the current funding profile supports     We need to rely on market principles to allow suppliers, the shipyards and GFE material providers to sort through the complicated demand equation across the multiple ship programs  Supplier development funding previously mentioned would support non-recurring efforts which are needed to place increased orders for material in multiple market spaces  Examples would include valves, build-to-print fabrication work, commodities, specialty material, engineering components, etc  We are engaging our marine industry associations to help foster innovative approaches that could reduce costs and gain efficiency for this increased volume     Supporting the 355-ship Navy will require Industry to add capability and capacity across the entire Navy Shipbuilding value chain  Industry will need to make investment decisions for additional capital spend starting now in order to meet a step change in demand that would begin in FY19 or FY20  For the submarine enterprise, the step change was already envisioned and investment plans that embraced a growth trajectory were already being formulated  Increasing demand by adding additional submarines will require scaling facility and workforce development plans to operate at a higher rate of production  The nuclear shipyards would also look to increase material procurement proportionally to the increased demand  In some cases, the shipyard facilities may be constrained with existing capacity and may look to source additional work in the supply base where capacity exists or where there are competitive business advantages to be realized  Creating additional capacity in the supply base will require non-recurring investment in supplier qualification, facilities, capital equipment and workforce training and development  Industry is more likely to increase investment in new capability and capacity if there is certainty that the Navy will proceed with a stable shipbuilding plan  Positive signals of commitment from the Government must go beyond a published 30-year Navy Shipbuilding Plan and line items in the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) and should include: Multi-year contracting for Block procurement which provides stability in the industrial base and encourages investment in facilities and workforce development Funding for supplier development to support training, qualification, and facilitization efforts—Electric Boat and Newport News have recommended to the Navy funding of $400M over a three-year period starting in 2018 to support supplier development for the Submarine Industrial Base as part of an Integrated Enterprise Plan Extended Enterprise initiative Acceleration of Advance Procurement and/or Economic Order Quantities (EOQ) procurement from FY19 to FY18 for Virginia Block V Government incentives for construction readiness and facilities / special tooling for shipyard and supplier facilities, which help cash flow capital investment ahead of construction contract awards Procurement of additional production back-up (PBU) material to help ensure a ready supply of material to mitigate construction schedule risk     So far, this testimony has focused on the Submarine Industrial Base, but the General Dynamics Marine Systems portfolio also includes surface ship construction  Unlike Electric Boat, Bath Iron Works and NASSCO are able to support increased demand without a significant increase in resources      Bath Iron Works is well positioned to support the Administration's announced goal of increasing the size of the Navy fleet to 355 ships  For BIW that would mean increasing the total current procurement rate of two DDG 51s per year to as many as four DDGs per year, allocated equally between BIW and HII  This is the same rate that the surface combatant industrial base sustained over the first decade of full rate production of the DDG 51 Class (1989-1999)     No significant capital investment in new facilities is required to accommodate delivering two DDGs per year  However, additional funding will be required to train future shipbuilders and maintain equipment  Current hiring and training processes support the projected need, and have proven to be successful in the recent past  BIW has invested significantly in its training programs since 2014 with the restart of the DDG 51 program and given these investments and the current market in Maine, there is little concern of meeting the increase in resources required under the projected plans  A predictable and sustainable Navy workload is essential to justify expanding hiring/training programs  BIW would need the Navy's commitment that the Navy's plan will not change before it would proceed with additional hiring and training to support increased production  BIW's supply chain is prepared to support a procurement rate increase of up to four DDG 51s per year for the DDG 51 Program  BIW has long-term purchasing agreements in place for all major equipment and material for the DDG 51 Program  These agreements provide for material lead time and pricing, and are not constrained by the number of ships ordered in a year  BIW confirmed with all of its critical suppliers that they can support this increased procurement rate     The Navy's Force Structure Assessment calls for three additional ESBs  Additionally, NASSCO has been asked by the Navy and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to evaluate its ability to increase the production rate of T-AOs to two ships per year  NASSCO has the capacity to build three more ESBs at a rate of one ship per year while building two T-AOs per year  The most cost effective funding profile requires funding ESB 6 in FY18 and the following ships in subsequent fiscal years to avoid increased cost resulting from a break in the production line  The most cost effective funding profile to enable a production rate of two T-AO ships per year requires funding an additional long lead time equipment set beginning in FY19 and an additional ship each year beginning in FY20  NASSCO must now reduce its employment levels due to completion of a series of commercial programs which resulted in the delivery of six ships in 2016  The proposed increase in Navy shipbuilding stabilizes NASSCO's workload and workforce to levels that were readily demonstrated over the last several years  Some moderate investment in the NASSCO shipyard will be needed to reach this level of production  The recent CBO report on the costs of building a 355-ship Navy accurately summarized NASSCO's ability to reach the above production rate stating, "building more … combat logistics and support ships would be the least problematic for the shipyards " At the same hearing, Brian Cuccias, president, Ingalls Shipbuilding, Huntington Ingalls Industries (the country's other principal builder of Navy ships) stated the following: Qualifying to be a supplier is a difficult process  Depending on the commodity, it may take up to 36 months  That is a big burden on some of these small businesses  This is why creating sufficient volume and exercising early contractual authorization and advance procurement funding is necessary to grow the supplier base, and not just for traditional long-lead time components; that effort needs to expand to critical components and commodities that today are controlling the build rate of submarines and carriers alike  Many of our suppliers are small businesses and can only make decisions to invest in people, plant and tooling when they are awarded a purchase order  We need to consider how we can make commitments to suppliers early enough to ensure material readiness and availability when construction schedules demand it  With questions about the industry's ability to support an increase in shipbuilding, both Newport News and Ingalls have undertaken an extensive inventory of our suppliers and assessed their ability to ramp up their capacity  We have engaged many of our key suppliers to assess their ability to respond to an increase in production  The fortunes of related industries also impact our suppliers, and an increase in demand from the oil and gas industry may stretch our supply base  Although some low to moderate risk remains, I am convinced that our suppliers will be able to meet the forecasted Navy demand     I strongly believe that the fastest results can come from leveraging successful platforms on current hot production lines  We commend the Navy's decision in 2014 to use the existing LPD 17 hull form for the LX(R), which will replace the LSD-class amphibious dock landing ships scheduled to retire in the coming years  However, we also recommend that the concept of commonality be taken even further to best optimize efficiency, affordability and capability  Specifically, rather than continuing with a new design for LX(R) within the "walls" of the LPD hull, we can leverage our hot production line and supply chain and offer the Navy a variant of the existing LPD design that satisfies the aggressive cost targets of the LX(R) program while delivering more capability and survivability to the fleet at a significantly faster pace than the current program  As much as 10-15 percent material savings can be realized across the LX(R) program by purchasing respective blocks of at least five ships each under a multi-year procurement (MYP) approach  In the aggregate, continuing production with LPD 30 in FY18, coupled with successive MYP contracts for the balance of ships, may yield savings greater than $1 billion across an 11-ship LX(R) program  Additionally, we can deliver five LX(R)s to the Navy and Marine Corps in the same timeframe that the current plan would deliver two, helping to reduce the shortfall in amphibious warships against the stated force requirement of 38 ships  Multi-ship procurements, whether a formal MYP or a block-buy, are a proven way to reduce the price of ships  The Navy took advantage of these tools on both Virginia-class submarines and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers  In addition to the LX(R) program mentioned above, expanding multi-ship procurements to other ship classes makes sense     The most efficient approach to lower the cost of the Ford class and meet the goal of an increased CVN fleet size is also to employ a multi-ship procurement strategy and construct these ships at three-year intervals  This approach would maximize the material procurement savings benefit through economic order quantities procurement and provide labor efficiencies to enable rapid acquisition of a 12-ship CVN fleet  This three-ship approach would save at least $1 5 billion, not including additional savings that could be achieved from government-furnished equipment  As part of its Integrated Enterprise Plan, we commend the Navy's efforts to explore the prospect of material economic order quantity purchasing across carrier and submarine programs  At the same hearing, Matthew O  Paxton, president, Shipbuilders Council of America (SCA)—a trade association representing shipbuilders, suppliers, and associated firms—stated the following: To increase the Navy's Fleet to 355 ships, a substantial and sustained investment is required in both procurement and readiness  However, let me be clear: building and sustaining the larger required Fleet is achievable and our industry stands ready to help achieve that important national security objective  To meet the demand for increased vessel construction while sustaining the vessels we currently have will require U S  shipyards to expand their work forces and improve their infrastructure in varying degrees depending on ship type and ship mix – a requirement our Nation's shipyards are eager to meet  But first, in order to build these ships in as timely and affordable manner as possible, stable and robust funding is necessary to sustain those industrial capabilities which support Navy shipbuilding and ship maintenance and modernization     Beyond providing for the building of a 355-ship Navy, there must also be provision to fund the "tail," the maintenance of the current and new ships entering the fleet  Target fleet size cannot be reached if existing ships are not maintained to their full service lives, while building those new ships  Maintenance has been deferred in the last few years because of across-the-board budget cuts     The domestic shipyard industry certainly has the capability and know-how to build and maintain a 355-ship Navy  The Maritime Administration determined in a recent study on the Economic Benefits of the U S  Shipyard Industry that there are nearly 110,000 skilled men and women in the Nation's private shipyards building, repairing and maintaining America's military and commercial fleets 1 The report found the U S  shipbuilding industry supports nearly 400,000 jobs across the country and generates $25 1 billion in income and $37 3 billion worth of goods and services each year  In fact, the MARAD report found that the shipyard industry creates direct and induced employment in every State and Congressional District and each job in the private shipbuilding and repairing industry supports another 2 6 jobs nationally  This data confirms the significant economic impact of this manufacturing sector, but also that the skilled workforce and industrial base exists domestically to build these ships  Long-term, there needs to be a workforce expansion and some shipyards will need to reconfigure or expand production lines  This can and will be done as required to meet the need if adequate, stable budgets and procurement plans are established and sustained for the long-term  Funding predictability and sustainability will allow industry to invest in facilities and more effectively grow its skilled workforce  The development of that critical workforce will take time and a concerted effort in a partnership between industry and the federal government  U S  shipyards pride themselves on implementing state of the art training and apprenticeship programs to develop skilled men and women that can cut, weld, and bend steel and aluminum and who can design, build and maintain the best Navy in the world  However, the shipbuilding industry, like so many other manufacturing sectors, faces an aging workforce  Attracting and retaining the next generation shipyard worker for an industry career is critical  Working together with the Navy, and local and state resources, our association is committed to building a robust training and development pipeline for skilled shipyard workers  In addition to repealing sequestration and stabilizing funding the continued development of a skilled workforce also needs to be included in our national maritime strategy     In conclusion, the U S  shipyard industry is certainly up to the task of building a 355-ship Navy and has the expertise, the capability, the critical capacity and the unmatched skilled workforce to build these national assets  Meeting the Navy's goal of a 355-ship fleet and securing America's naval dominance for the decades ahead will require sustained investment by Congress and Navy's partnership with a defense industrial base that can further attract and retain a highly-skilled workforce with critical skill sets  Again, I would like to thank this Subcommittee for inviting me to testify alongside such distinguished witnesses  As a representative of our nation's private shipyards, I can say, with confidence and certainty, that our domestic shipyards and skilled workers are ready, willing and able to build and maintain the Navy's 355-ship Fleet  Employment Impact Building the additional ships that would be needed to achieve and maintain the 355-ship fleet could create many additional manufacturing and other jobs at shipyards, associated supplier firms, and elsewhere in the U S  economy  A 2015 Maritime Administration (MARAD) report states, Considering the indirect and induced impacts, each direct job in the shipbuilding and repairing industry is associated with another 2 6 jobs in other parts of the US economy; each dollar of direct labor income and GDP in the shipbuilding and repairing industry is associated with another $1 74 in labor income and $2 49 in GDP, respectively, in other parts of the US economy  A March 2017 press report states, "Based on a 2015 economic impact study, the Shipbuilders Council of America [a trade association for U S  shipbuilders and associated supplier firms] believes that a 355-ship Navy could add more than 50,000 jobs nationwide " The 2015 economic impact study referred to in that quote might be the 2015 MARAD study discussed in the previous paragraph  An estimate of more than 50,000 additional jobs nationwide might be viewed as a higher-end estimate; other estimates might be lower  A June 14, 2017, press report states the following: "The shipbuilding industry will need to add between 18,000 and 25,000 jobs to build to a 350-ship Navy, according to Matthew Paxton, president of the Shipbuilders Council of America, a trade association representing the shipbuilding industrial base  Including indirect jobs like suppliers, the ramp-up may require a boost of 50,000 workers " Appendix E  A Summary of Some Acquisition Lessons Learned for Navy Shipbuilding This appendix presents a general summary of lessons learned in Navy shipbuilding, reflecting comments made repeatedly by various sources over the years  These lessons learned include the following: At the outset, get the operational requirements for the program right  Properly identify the program's operational requirements at the outset  Manage risk by not trying to do too much in terms of the program's operational requirements, and perhaps seek a so-called 70%-to-80% solution (i e , a design that is intended to provide 70%-80% of desired or ideal capabilities)  Achieve a realistic balance up front between operational requirements, risks, and estimated costs  Impose cost discipline up front  Use realistic price estimates, and consider not only development and procurement costs, but life-cycle operation and support (O&S) costs  Employ competition where possible in the awarding of design and construction contracts  Use a contract type that is appropriate for the amount of risk involved , and structure its terms to align incentives with desired outcomes  Minimize design/construction concurrency by developing the design to a high level of completion before starting construction and by resisting changes in requirements (and consequent design changes) during construction  Properly supervise construction work  Maintain an adequate number of properly trained Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) personnel  Provide stability for industry , in part by using, where possible, multiyear procurement (MYP) or block buy contracting  Maintain a capable government acquisition workforce that understands what it is buying, as well as the above points  Identifying these lessons is arguably not the hard part—most if not all these points have been cited for years  The hard part, arguably, is living up to them without letting circumstances lead program-execution efforts away from these guidelines  Appendix F  Some Considerations Relating to Warranties in Shipbuilding and Other Defense Acquisition This appendix presents some considerations relating to warranties in shipbuilding and other defense acquisition  In discussions of Navy (and also Coast Guard) shipbuilding, one question that sometimes arises is whether including a warranty in a shipbuilding contract is preferable to not including one  The question can arise, for example, in connection with a GAO finding that "the Navy structures shipbuilding contracts so that it pays shipbuilders to build ships as part of the construction process and then pays the same shipbuilders a second time to repair the ship when construction defects are discovered " Including a warranty in a shipbuilding contract (or a contract for building some other kind of defense end item), while potentially valuable, might not always be preferable to not including one—it depends on the circumstances of the acquisition, and it is not necessarily a valid criticism of an acquisition program to state that it is using a contract that does not include a warranty (or a weaker form of a warranty rather than a stronger one)  Including a warranty generally shifts to the contractor the risk of having to pay for fixing problems with earlier work  Although that in itself could be deemed desirable from the government's standpoint, a contractor negotiating a contract that will have a warranty will incorporate that risk into its price, and depending on how much the contractor might charge for doing that, it is possible that the government could wind up paying more in total for acquiring the item (including fixing problems with earlier work on that item) than it would have under a contract without a warranty  When a warranty is not included in the contract and the government pays later on to fix problems with earlier work, those payments can be very visible, which can invite critical comments from observers  But that does not mean that including a warranty in the contract somehow frees the government from paying to fix problems with earlier work  In a contract that includes a warranty, the government will indeed pay something to fix problems with earlier work—but it will make the payment in the less-visible (but still very real) form of the up-front charge for including the warranty, and that charge might be more than what it would have cost the government, under a contract without a warranty, to pay later on for fixing those problems  From a cost standpoint, including a warranty in the contract might or might not be preferable, depending on the risk that there will be problems with earlier work that need fixing, the potential cost of fixing such problems, and the cost of including the warranty in the contract  The point is that the goal of avoiding highly visible payments for fixing problems with earlier work and the goal of minimizing the cost to the government of fixing problems with earlier work are separate and different goals, and that pursuing the first goal can sometimes work against achieving the second goal  The Department of Defense's guide on the use of warranties states the following: Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 46 7 states that "the use of warranties is not mandatory " However, if the benefits to be derived from the warranty are commensurate with the cost of the warranty, the CO [contracting officer] should consider placing it in the contract  In determining whether a warranty is appropriate for a specific acquisition, FAR Subpart 46 703 requires the CO to consider the nature and use of the supplies and services, the cost, the administration and enforcement, trade practices, and reduced requirements  The rationale for using a warranty should be documented in the contract file     In determining the value of a warranty, a CBA [cost-benefit analysis] is used to measure the life cycle costs of the system with and without the warranty  A CBA is required to determine if the warranty will be cost beneficial  CBA is an economic analysis, which basically compares the Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of the system with and without the warranty to determine if warranty coverage will improve the LCCs  In general, five key factors will drive the results of the CBA: cost of the warranty + cost of warranty administration + compatibility with total program efforts + cost of overlap with Contractor support + intangible savings  Effective warranties integrate reliability, maintainability, supportability, availability, and life-cycle costs  Decision factors that must be evaluated include the state of the weapon system technology, the size of the warranted population, the likelihood that field performance requirements can be achieved, and the warranty period of performance  Appendix G  Some Considerations Relating to Avoiding Procurement Cost Growth vs  Minimizing Procurement Costs This appendix presents some considerations relating to avoiding procurement cost growth vs  minimizing procurement costs in shipbuilding and other defense acquisition  The affordability challenge posed by the Navy's shipbuilding plans can reinforce the strong oversight focus on preventing or minimizing procurement cost growth in Navy shipbuilding programs, which is one expression of a strong oversight focus on preventing or minimizing cost growth in DOD acquisition programs in general  This oversight focus may reflect in part an assumption that avoiding or minimizing procurement cost growth is always synonymous with minimizing procurement cost  It is important to note, however, that as paradoxical as it may seem, avoiding or minimizing procurement cost growth is not always synonymous with minimizing procurement cost, and that a sustained, singular focus on avoiding or minimizing procurement cost growth might sometimes lead to higher procurement costs for the government  How could this be? Consider the example of a design for the lead ship of a new class of Navy ships  The construction cost of this new design is uncertain, but is estimated to be likely somewhere between Point A (a minimum possible figure) and Point D (a maximum possible figure)  (Point D, in other words, would represent a cost estimate with a 100% confidence factor, meaning there is a 100% chance that the cost would come in at or below that level ) If the Navy wanted to avoid cost growth on this ship, it could simply set the ship's procurement cost at Point D  Industry would likely be happy with this arrangement, and there likely would be no cost growth on the ship  The alternative strategy open to the Navy is to set the ship's target procurement cost at some figure between Points A and D—call it Point B—and then use that more challenging target cost to place pressure on industry to sharpen its pencils so as to find ways to produce the ship at that lower cost  (Navy officials sometimes refer to this as "pressurizing" industry ) In this example, it might turn out that industry efforts to reduce production costs are not successful enough to build the ship at the Point B cost  As a result, the ship experiences one or more rounds of procurement cost growth, and the ship's procurement cost rises over time from Point B to some higher figure—call it Point C  Here is the rub: Point C, in spite of incorporating one or more rounds of cost growth, might nevertheless turn out to be lower than Point D, because Point C reflected efforts by the shipbuilder to find ways to reduce production costs that the shipbuilder might have put less energy into pursuing if the Navy had simply set the ship's procurement cost initially at Point D  Setting the ship's cost at Point D, in other words, may eliminate the risk of cost growth on the ship, but does so at the expense of creating a risk of the government paying more for the ship than was actually necessary  DOD could avoid cost growth on new procurement programs starting tomorrow by simply setting costs for those programs at each program's equivalent of Point D  But as a result of this strategy, DOD could well wind up leaving money on the table in some instances—of not, in other words, minimizing procurement costs  DOD does not have to set a cost precisely at Point D to create a potential risk in this regard  A risk of leaving money on the table, for example, is a possible downside of requiring DOD to budget for its acquisition programs at something like an 80% confidence factor—an approach that some observers have recommended—because a cost at the 80% confidence factor is a cost that is likely fairly close to Point D  Procurement cost growth is often embarrassing for DOD and industry, and can damage their credibility in connection with future procurement efforts  Procurement cost growth can also disrupt congressional budgeting by requiring additional appropriations to pay for something Congress thought it had fully funded in a prior year  For this reason, there is a legitimate public policy value to pursuing a goal of having less rather than more procurement cost growth  Procurement cost growth, however, can sometimes be in part the result of DOD efforts to use lower initial cost targets as a means of pressuring industry to reduce production costs—efforts that, notwithstanding the cost growth, might be partially successful  A sustained, singular focus on avoiding or minimizing cost growth, and of punishing DOD for all instances of cost growth, could discourage DOD from using lower initial cost targets as a means of pressurizing industry, which could deprive DOD of a tool for controlling procurement costs  The point here is not to excuse away cost growth, because cost growth can occur in a program for reasons other than DOD's attempt to pressurize industry  Nor is the point to abandon the goal of seeking lower rather than higher procurement cost growth, because, as noted above, there is a legitimate public policy value in pursuing this goal  The point, rather, is to recognize that this goal is not always synonymous with minimizing procurement cost, and that a possibility of some amount of cost growth might be expected as part of an optimal government strategy for minimizing procurement cost  Recognizing that the goals of seeking lower rather than higher cost growth and of minimizing procurement cost can sometimes be in tension with one another can lead to an approach that takes both goals into consideration  In contrast, an approach that is instead characterized by a sustained, singular focus on avoiding and minimizing cost growth may appear virtuous, but in the end may wind up costing the government more  Appendix H  Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate Size of the Navy Table H-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count toward the total  Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available  Figures in the table for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy  As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter  The Navy fell below 300 battle force ships in August 2003 and as of April 26, 2019, included 289 battle force ships  As discussed in Appendix C , historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time, and because the number of ships in the fleet in an earlier year might itself have been inappropriate (i e , not enough or more than enough) for meeting the Navy's mission requirements in that year  For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet's ability to perform its stated missions  An increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet's ability to perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet's mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability  Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet's ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the fleet's mission requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers  Shipbuilding Rate Table H-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2019) and requested or programmed (FY2020-FY2024) rates of Navy ship procurement 

ground_truth: FMD is a highly contagious viral disease that causes painful lesions on the hooves and mouths of some livestock, making it difficult for them to stand or eat, thus greatly reducing meat and milk production. The United States has not had an FMD outbreak since 1929, but FMD is present in much of the world. An FMD outbreak in the United States could have serious economic impacts, in part because trade partners would likely halt all imports of U.S. livestock and livestock products until the disease was eradicated. These imports were valued at more than $19 billion in 2017. GAO was asked to review USDA's efforts to prepare for an FMD outbreak. This report examines (1) USDA's planned approach for responding to an FMD outbreak; (2) challenges USDA would face in pursuing its response goals; and (3) how USDA identifies, prioritizes, and monitors corrective actions to mitigate the challenges. GAO observed a USDA FMD preparedness exercise; reviewed agency documents and nongeneralizable questionnaire responses from 29 respondents from federal and state government, livestock industries, and universities; and interviewed officials from federal and state governments and representatives of livestock industries and universities. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) planned approach for responding to an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) includes several strategies. These strategies generally rely on killing infected and susceptible animals, vaccinating uninfected animals, or a combination of both approaches. USDA would implement one or more of the strategies, depending on factors such as the outbreak's size and the resources available, according to agency documents. USDA would likely face significant challenges in pursuing its response goals of detecting, controlling, and containing FMD quickly; eradicating FMD while seeking to stabilize industry and the economy; and facilitating continuity of commerce in uninfected animals. GAO identified challenges in 11 areas—including allocating a limited supply of FMD vaccine—based on its review of USDA documents, responses to GAO's questionnaire, and interviews with agency officials and others with expertise on FMD. According to USDA, the agency may not have a sufficient supply of FMD vaccine to control more than a small outbreak because of limited resources to obtain vaccine. As shown below, the current vaccine supply would be sufficient to protect about 14 percent of Texas's cattle or about 4 percent of Iowa's swine; these states' cattle and swine populations are the nation's largest. The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 includes a provision to increase the FMD vaccine supply. USDA has identified dozens of corrective actions to mitigate the challenges of responding to an FMD outbreak, as called for in USDA procedures, but has not prioritized these corrective actions or monitored their completion, as also called for in its procedures. USDA has identified the corrective actions through exercises simulating FMD outbreaks, surveys, and lessons learned from other foreign animal disease outbreaks. However, USDA has not completed all of the corrective actions, including actions related to vaccination. Agency officials stated that they have not completed such corrective actions because they have been responding to outbreaks of other animal diseases and have limited resources. Without following agency procedures to prioritize and monitor corrective actions, USDA cannot ensure that it is allocating its resources to the most beneficial actions to prepare for a possible FMD outbreak. GAO is recommending that USDA follow its procedures to prioritize and monitor the completion of corrective actions that the agency has identified for FMD preparedness. USDA agreed with these recommendations, and described actions it will take to implement them.