prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: This report provides an overview of the FY2019 budget request and appropriations for the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U S  International Trade Commission (USITC), and the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)  These three trade-related agencies are funded through the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations  This report also provides a review of these trade agencies' programs  When comparing the Administration's FY2019 request with FY2018 funding, one may want to consider that the Administration formulated its FY2019 budget request before full-year appropriations for FY2018 were enacted  In this report, FY2018 funding levels reflect the amounts appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P L  115-141 ), enacted on March 23, 2018  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, provided $482 0 million in direct funding for ITA, $93 7 million for USTIC, and a total of $72 6 million for USTR for FY2018  The FY2018 appropriation for the three CJS trade-related agencies totaled $648 3 million  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, provided $484 0 million in direct appropriations for ITA, $95 0 million in funding for USITC, and a total of $68 0 million for USTR  The FY2019 appropriations for three CJS trade-related agencies totaled $647 0 million, a 0 2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations  See the Appendix for enacted budget authority for the trade-related agencies for FY2009-FY2019  The President submitted his FY2019 budget request to Congress on February 12, 2018  In it, the Administration requested a total of $590 8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies (see Table 1 )  This request represented an 8 9% decrease in funding from the FY2018 appropriated amount  The request included reduced funding for all three trade agencies: $440 1 million in direct funding for ITA (an 8 7% decrease from the FY2018 appropriation), $87 6 million for USITC (a 6 5% decrease), and $63 0 million for USTR (a 13 2% decrease)  Despite the proposed overall decrease in funding for CJS trade-related agencies, the Administration proposed increasing some trade enforcement activities within ITA and USTR  For ITA, the Administration proposed increasing trade enforcement activities while reducing funding for certain export promotion activities  For USTR, the Administration requested funds to increase staffing; however, the request did not include a request for funding to be drawn from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund  (For a description of the " Trade Enforcement Trust Fund ," see section below ) The President's budget did not provide a rationale for requesting a decrease in funding for USITC  A more detailed overview of these agencies' FY2019 budget requests is provided below  The House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported their CJS appropriation bills in the spring of 2018  Both committees largely declined the budget cuts requested by the Administration for these three trade agencies  (See Table 1  ) The House Committee on Appropriations reported H R  5952 on May 17, 2018  The House committee bill included a total of $647 6 million for the three trade-related agencies, which was $56 8 million more (9 6%) than the Administration's request and $0 7 million less (-0 1%) than the FY2018-enacted amount  The House committee recommended $480 0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95 0 million for USTIC, and a total of $72 6 million for USTR  The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S  3072 on June 14, 2018  The Senate bill included a total of $655 6 million for the three agencies, which was $64 8 million (11 0%) more than the Administration's request and $7 3 million (1 1%) more than the FY2018-enacted appropriation  The Senate committee recommended $488 0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95 0 million for USITC, and a total of $72 6 million for USTR  Through February 15, 2019, the CJS trade-related agencies operated under continuing resolutions (CR)—with the exception of a three-week lapse in funding when agencies halted most operations  Congress passed final FY2019 appropriations in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), which was signed into law on February 15, 2019  The act included a total of $647 0 million in funding for the three trade-related agencies—a 0 2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations  For FY2019, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, included $484 0 million in direct appropriations for ITA (a 0 4% increase from the FY2018 appropriation), $95 0 million in funding for USITC (a 1 4% increase), and a total of $68 0 million for USTR (a 0 2% decrease)  Within the Department of Commerce, ITA's mission is to improve U S  prosperity by strengthening the competitiveness of U S  industry, promoting trade and investment, and ensuring compliance with trade laws and agreements  ITA provides export promotion services; works to enforce and ensure compliance with trade laws and agreements; administers trade remedies such as antidumping and countervailing duties; and provides analytical support for ongoing trade negotiations  ITA went through a major organizational change in October 2013 in which it consolidated four organizational units into three more functionally aligned units: (1) Global Markets; (2) Industry and Analysis; and (3) Enforcement and Compliance  ITA also has a fourth organizational unit, the Executive and Administrative Directorate, which is responsible for providing policy leadership, information technology support, and administration services for all of ITA  ( Table A-1 shows budget amounts for ITA by unit between FY2009 and FY2019 ) For FY2019, the Administration requested $440 1 million for ITA in direct funding, with an additional $11 0 million to be collected in user fees, for a total of $451 1 million in authorized spending  The request for direct funding represents a $41 9 million decrease (-8 7%) from the FY2018-enacted amount ($482 0 million)  According to ITA's budget justification, the Administration proposed increasing ITA's enforcement and compliance efforts in FY2019, while deemphasizing other initiatives, such as export promotion  The Administration specifically proposed closing some domestic and international offices of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service (US&FCS)  The House committee-reported H R  5952 proposed $480 0 million for ITA in direct funding, with an additional $11 0 million to be collected from user fees, for a total of $491 0 million in authorized spending  The amount in direct funding proposed by the House Committee on Appropriations was $39 9 million (9 1%) more than the Administration's request and $2 0 million less (-0 4%) than the FY2018-enacted amount  The Senate committee-reported S  3072 included $488 0 million in direct funding for ITA, with an additional $11 0 million in user fees, for a total of $499 0 million in authorized spending  The amount in direct funding proposed by the Senate Committee on Appropriations was $47 9 million (10 9%) more than the Administration's request and $6 0 million (1 2%) more than the FY2018-enacted amount  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ) provided $484 0 million in direct appropriations for ITA, with an additional $11 0 million to be collected in user fees, for a total of $495 0 in authorized spending  The act provided $2 million more (0 4%) in direct appropriations for ITA than the FY2018-enacted amount and $43 9 million more (10 0%) than the Administration's request  ITA's Global Markets (GM) unit is a combination of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service (US&FCS) unit, a program that provides export promotion services to U S  businesses, and SelectUSA, a program that works to attract foreign investment into the United States  Through US&FCS, GM promotes U S  exports by helping U S  exporters research foreign markets and identify opportunities abroad  GM's country and regional experts―in domestic and overseas offices—help to advise U S  companies on market access, local standards, and regulations  The unit also helps to make connections through business-to-business trade shows, fairs, and missions  GM is designed to advance U S  commercial interests by engaging with foreign governments and U S  businesses, identifying and resolving market barriers, and leading efforts that advocate for U S  firms with foreign governments  Through its SelectUSA program, the GM unit also promotes the United States as a destination for foreign investment  (For more on SelectUSA, see section below, " SelectUSA Program  ") For FY2019, the Administration proposed reducing funding for the Global Markets unit  The Administration requested $276 5 million for Global Markets in direct funding, a 13 4% decrease from the FY2018-enacted appropriation  In its FY2019 budget submission, ITA proposed "rescaling export promotion" activities in the GM unit by reducing staff and its domestic and overseas offices, with a total reduction of 133 positions  The budget submission did not indicate how many or which domestic and overseas offices it was proposing to close  The House and Senate Appropriation Committees did not adopt the proposed cuts  The House Appropriations Committee recommended $319 0 million for the Global Markets unit for FY2019  This was $42 5 million (15 4%) more than the Administration's request  According to the committee report, "the recommendation does not adopt the proposal to reduce U S  and Foreign Commercial Service staff or close overseas offices or U S  Export Assistance Centers " The Senate Appropriations Committee report did not provide an exact funding amount, but recommended that ITA "fund US&FCS, and its core mission of export promotion, at the highest possible level in fiscal year 2019, and at no less than the amount provided in fiscal year 2018 " Like the House committee, the Senate committee did not adopt the Administration's proposal to close offices  The Senate committee report specifically noted, "No offices shall be closed in fiscal year 2019 unless the Committee approves a reprogramming request to close such office or offices  Additionally, the Committee will not approve requests to close any domestic offices, called U S  Export Assistance Centers, if such Center is the only one located in a given State " According to the conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), the final agreement for FY2019 appropriations included "no less than $320 million" in funding for Global Markets and required ITA to report quarterly to the Committees on staffing levels within the US&FCS  ITA's Industry and Analysis unit brings together ITA's industry, trade, and economic experts to advance the competitiveness of U S  industries through the development and execution of international trade and investment policies, export promotion strategies, and investment promotion  It develops economic and international policy analysis to improve market access for U S  businesses, and designs and implements trade and investment promotion programs  The unit serves as the primary liaison between U S  industries and the federal government on trade and investment promotion  It administers programs that support small and medium-sized enterprises, such as the Market Development Cooperator Program  For FY2019, the Administration requested $52 3 million for Industry and Analysis  The request is $3 4 million less than the FY2018 funding level  The Administration proposed refocusing some of the unit's priorities away from export promotion and toward trade enforcement  Specifically, the Administration proposed reducing activities related to trade missions, the International Buyer Program, and certified trade fairs, and eliminating Market Development Cooperator Program grants  The House committee proposed $52 0 million for Industry and Analysis  This represented $0 3 million less (-0 5%) than the Administration's request  The Senate committee-reported bill did not include a specific recommendation for Industry and Analysis  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P
Report 2:  For rural carriers, the most recently updated scanning procedures we found was dated 2013  As a result, some of these documents are not updated with the latest information on new scanning procedures  In a related example, the USPS OIG recently found that employees at three of the six USPS facilities the USPS OIG visited did not have an adequate understanding of the procedures for processing election and political mail due, in part, to guidance that was not updated, even though the procedures were centrally documented on an internal USPS website  USPS officials recognized this issue and stated that these handbooks are not updated regularly as the content of the handbooks are subject to labor negotiations  Therefore, new procedures are presented to USPS employees outside of the handbooks  However, given that these efforts rely on employees to orally communicate information, having consistent documented procedures is even more important  In addition to stating that the organization should deploy control activities through policies and procedures, the COSO Framework states that senior management should communicate objectives clearly through the organization so that other management and personnel understand their individual roles in the organization  By not having consistent procedures, USPS risks not clearly communicating to its employees how they should carry out scanning procedures and therefore contributing to scanning errors  As discussed below, USPS officials told us that management updates its procedures typically through regular meetings with employees, which are documented in handouts or slides  USPS officials stated that management stresses the importance of scanning and that employees should follow the prompts on their electronic devices when scanning competitive products  However, employees can still scan competitive products as delivered even if they are not, as device prompts can be misread, misinterpreted, or ignored  Furthermore, even with current prompts, scanning errors can and do occur  Consistent procedures, clearly communicated to employees, have become increasingly important as USPS hires new employees to handle, in part, anticipated growth in the volume of competitive packages  For example, GAO analysis of USPS data showed that USPS’s carrier workforce increased by 6 4 percent between fiscal years 2015 and 2017  The USPS OIG has found that these new employees require training and guidance to properly perform their roles and to reduce turnover  In addition to deploying policies and procedures to achieve an organization’s objectives, the COSO Framework states that an organization should internally communicate objectives and responsibilities that are necessary to support the functioning of internal controls  This process can be accomplished through training and meetings  Specifically, the COSO Framework states that training should enable individuals to develop competencies appropriate for assigned roles and responsibilities, among other things, and that active forms of communication such as face-to-face meetings are often more effective than passive forms such as broadcast e-mails and intranet postings  To communicate how its procedures should be correctly implemented, USPS has developed both initial and on-going training for employees  USPS officials stated that new employees are formally trained in scanning procedures when they start their employment  For example, carriers are trained how to use USPS’s electronic scanning devices, when to scan competitive items, the correct codes to use for different delivery situations (i e , signature required, vacation holds, how to code where a package was left at a delivery address)  Any new procedures can be introduced through presentations given by managers during meetings, as described below  Required regular meetings may be tracked by USPS management to ensure they are completed  Some district officials we spoke with stated that they certify that their employees have received required training and send that certification to area and USPS headquarters officials  Additional training also helps USPS reinforce correct scanning procedures  When scanning procedures are not being followed or scanning goals are not met at a post office, USPS officials stated that reminders of the correct procedures designed to reinforce USPS’s scanning procedures are presented to employees through presentations, posters, job aids, and additional documents such as carriers’ handbooks  For example, the representative of the major mailer we spoke with that had 8 to 10 percent of competitive products not scanned to the final delivery address stated that training was needed for both new and experienced carriers to reinforce that they should scan items at the delivery address  To further ensure the accurate scanning of competitive products, USPS reported that it holds internal and external meetings  Specifically, these meetings are designed to: Reinforce procedures: Post office managers can use stand-up talks— weekly meetings between management and employees at the post office—to discuss scanning issues with employees and opportunities to address those issues  For example, the postmaster at one post office we visited stated that this post office reinforces the standard work procedures designed to improve the scanning performance of employees during these meetings  Carriers and clerks can ask questions and learn why they are asked to do something or how to do a specific task, allowing for additional training and reinforcement of procedures  For example, we reviewed a handout developed by USPS headquarters to provide managers with talking points for service talks  This handout provided information on carriers delivering and scanning accurately and instructions on scanning at point of delivery on rural routes  Introduce new procedures: USPS officials told us that post office managers use stand-up talks to introduce new procedures and processes with carriers and clerks  For example, postmasters stated that they used these meetings to introduce and train carriers on new scanning features at the post offices  USPS district and area management develop and disseminate memos and handouts to assist managers conducting these meetings  We reviewed handouts USPS provided to managers for service talks  These handouts provided information on the rollout of some of the most recent scanning procedure changes  Continuously improve operations: District managers we interviewed stated that post offices with low scanning performance scores are placed on a district’s list of underperforming post offices  USPS district managers we interviewed told us that they meet with these post offices to determine how each post office plans to improve its scanning performance  District management also conducts audits of underperforming post offices and post offices that are in need of improvement  Our review of one district office’s service review checklist identified the key areas of audit for underperforming post offices  Reassess procedures: Representatives of mailers we interviewed told us that they meet with USPS representatives to discuss ways USPS can share scanning information for competitive products  Given that inaccurate scans can and do occur, it is important that postal managers explore and investigate any instances of missed or inaccurate scans  To do so, USPS managers—including area vice presidents, district managers, and postmasters—use a variety of reports as tools to ensure that the required scans are made at the appropriate place and time, and take action to monitor the status of competitive products, track lost items, and identify scanning issues  USPS headquarters designs reports used by managers to review performance at the local level across the country  Managers at each level are responsible for overseeing and reporting on the performances of the level below them  For example, the postmaster monitors performance of employees at the post office and is accountable to the district manager  In turn, each district manager is held accountable by the area vice president  To monitor performance of scanning of competitive products, these managers have access to several USPS data systems to generate reports  They can use the reports to monitor scanning performance of carriers and clerks at each post office and to identify the causes of scanning issues, such as missing or incorrect scans  Managers can also use these reports to track the status of competitive products or to investigate customer complaints of lost items  Some examples of reports available to managers include the following: Report 1: USPS officials told us that each post office receives this report from their District Office  The report identifies competitive products that do not have all the required scans, such as scans when the item arrives at the post office or when a delivery attempt was made  For example, one district official sends postmasters weekly reports on competitive products that do not have all the required scans  The officials told us that these reports help managers investigate the cause of incorrect scans identified in the report and how to prevent future occurrences  Report 2: USPS officials told us that this report is generated by district managers to proactively identify scanning irregularities, such as scans that may be out of sequence or multiple competitive products that are scanned at the same time but are for different addresses  District management can query postmasters about these scans and ask them to investigate the reason for the irregularities and determine if the scan was appropriate  Report 3: USPS officials told us that this report is generated by postmasters to monitor scanning status and performances for each competitive product that has received an arrival scan but lacks a delivery scan  While this may indicate a problem, it could also just reflect that the final scan had not been made by the end of the day or the scan that had not been uploaded into the USPS data systems when the report was generated  While having these reports are helpful, their full potential to help USPS managers may be limited because USPS lacks detailed and up-to-date standard operating procedures for how managers should use these reports or conduct other activities to efficiently investigate and resolve scanning issues  USPS’s Scanning Performance: Delivery Standard Operating Procedures for managers are a list of bullet points outlining managers’ responsibilities to meet scanning performance target goals and not a list of detailed procedures for managers to follow, such as how to use Report 1 to identify items that do not have all the required scans  In addition, USPS officials told us that this list has not been updated since approximately October 2005  The COSO Framework states that organizations should internally communicate information, including objectives and responsibilities for internal control, necessary to support the functioning of internal control  Further, it states that a process should be in place to communicate required information to enable all personnel to understand and carry out their internal-control responsibilities  Absent such communication, managers may take different actions to address problems or may have difficulty knowing where to find the appropriate information to locate a missing item to resolve a customer’s complaint quickly  For example, one post office manager told us that he will look at the scanning history in the USPS data systems to determine if the item received an acceptable delivery event scan or what the status of the item is on the route, while another post office manager told us he will use GPS data to see where the scans were made to determine if the item was delivered to the right address  If managers do not know where to find the appropriate information, they may spend more time investigating and be less efficient in resolving issues  Further, not having detailed standard operating procedures means managers may not be aware of all the reports available to them  For example, some post office managers told us that they use Report 3 while other post office managers told us that this report was not available to them  Without using Report 3, some managers told us that they look in several sources to find the same information needed to resolve the issue, such as locating a lost package  Some managers told us that USPS management discontinued the report because it was being misused by some managers  Specifically, managers told us that some managers were manually entering scanning or service-performance information retroactively to improve their performance scores  However, they told us that USPS management recently made Report 3 available to managers again but changed features to reduce any misuse  Additionally, USPS may miss opportunities to prevent scanning issues from happening again by not clearly communicating how managers should use the various reports to address specific scanning issues  For example, the USPS OIG recently determined that instances of missed and inaccurate scans for competitive products were a result of USPS management not adequately monitoring the implementation of those procedures  Without detailed procedures to guide managers in finding and using specific information in available reports and other tools, managers will not have consistent information to use to investigate and resolve customer complaints quickly or accurately  In addition, new managers may not know where to go for the most appropriate information and how to use this information to address some issues  As competitive products have become essential to USPS’s economic viability, it is increasingly important for USPS to accurately track them to remain competitive in this market  While USPS may be scanning most mail accurately, there continue to be instances where mail is not scanned accurately or is missing scans  Given the volume and growth in these competitive products, even a small percentage of inaccurately scanned products could be a large number of such products  Since USPS’s procedures were developed absent standards for internal control, the adoption of a set of internal control standards could enhance USPS’s efforts to continuously improve the design, implementation, and evaluation of its operational internal controls for scanning of competitive products  Further, since USPS’s standard operating procedures for scanning are located in numerous documents and are not always consistent—and given USPS’s reliance on stand-up talks and meetings to keep employees current—USPS employees may not always have accurate scanning procedures easily accessible to them  Having consistent standard operating procedures is increasingly important to ensure that employees are making accurate scans  Additionally, standard procedures that guide managers to investigate and resolve scanning issues would help managers more efficiently address these issues and ideally prevent these issues from happening again  To improve USPS’s competitive products scanning, we recommend that the Postmaster General take the following three actions  The Postmaster General should identify and adopt a set of internal control standards that can be used as the basis for operational internal-control activities, such as those for scanning competitive products  (Recommendation 1) The Postmaster General should improve the communication of standard operating procedures for scanning competitive products by, for example, updating or consolidating USPS documents, job aids, and standard work steps  (Recommendation 2) The Postmaster General should create standard operating procedures for managers on how to address inaccurate scans and use available reports to investigate and resolve scanning issues  (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this product to USPS for its review and comment  USPS’s comments are reproduced in appendix I  USPS stated that it cannot agree with our recommendation to identify and adopt a set of internal control standards for USPS’s operational internal control activities at this time  Although USPS has adopted an internal control framework for its financial internal control activities, USPS does not know what the benefits and costs are of adopting internal control standards for its operational internal control activities  As a result, USPS agreed to conduct a cost study to determine whether to commit resources to identifying and adopting a set of internal control standards for its operational internal control activities  We are encouraged that USPS is planning to conduct such a study and anticipate that performing this study will result in the implementation of an appropriate set of internal control standards  USPS agreed with the two recommendations regarding scanning procedures and committed to completing corrective actions by November of 2018  In its general comments, USPS noted that our reference to the USPS OIG’s report, Processing Readiness for Election and Political Mail for the 2018 Midterm Elections did not appear germane to the scanning of competitive mail  We recognize that this report was focused on a different type of mail, but as USPS noted in its letter, we use the OIG report as a related example of how USPS has taken efforts to improve the communication of its scanning procedures to employees  Therefore, we determined that our use of the report is appropriate  We have added information from the OIG report to characterize the OIG’s recommendations and USPS’s actions to address those recommendations  USPS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Postmaster General, the Chairman of the Postal Regulatory Commission, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff making key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the individual named above, Kyle Browning (Assistant Director); Greg Hanna (Analyst-in-Charge); Michael Hansen; Thanh Lu; John Mingus; Faye Morrison; Malika Rice; Amy Rosewarne; Crystal Wesco; Elizabeth Wood; and Matthew Zaun made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: Since January 2017, the Navy has suffered four significant mishaps at sea that resulted in serious damage to its ships and the loss of 17 sailors. Three of these incidents involved ships homeported in Japan. In response to these incidents, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered an operational pause for all fleets worldwide, and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of surface fleet operations, stating that these tragic incidents are not limited occurrences but part of a disturbing trend in mishaps involving U.S. ships. This statement provides information on the effects of homeporting ships overseas, reducing crew size on ships, and not completing maintenance on time on the readiness of the Navy and summarizes GAO recommendations to address the Navy's maintenance, training, and other challenges. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on work it has published since 2015 related to the readiness of ships homeported overseas, sailor training and workload issues, maintenance challenges, and other issues. GAO updated this information, as appropriate, based on Navy data. GAO's prior work shows that the Navy has increased deployment lengths, shortened training periods, and reduced or deferred maintenance to meet high operational demands, which has resulted in declining ship conditions and a worsening trend in overall readiness. The Navy has stated that high demand for presence has put pressure on a fleet that is stretched thin across the globe. Some of the concerns that GAO has highlighted include: Degraded readiness of ships homeported overseas: Since 2006, the Navy has doubled the number of ships based overseas. Overseas basing provides additional forward presence and rapid crisis response, but GAO found in May 2015 that there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers based in Japan. As a result, the crews of these ships did not have all of their needed training and certifications. Based on updated data, GAO found that, as of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser and destroyer crews based in Japan—including certifications for seamanship—had expired. This represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare certifications for these ships since GAO's May 2015 report. The Navy has made plans to revise operational schedules to provide dedicated training time for overseas-based ships, but this schedule has not yet been implemented. Crew size reductions contribute to sailor overwork and safety risks: GAO found in May 2017 that reductions to crew sizes the Navy made in the early 2000s were not analytically supported and may now be creating safety risks. The Navy has reversed some of those changes but continues to use a workweek standard that does not reflect the actual time sailors spend working and does not account for in-port workload—both of which have contributed to some sailors working over 100 hours a week. Inability to complete maintenance on time: Navy recovery from persistently low readiness levels is premised on adherence to maintenance schedules. However, in May 2016, GAO found that the Navy was having difficulty completing maintenance on time. Based on updated data, GAO found that, in fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 107 of 169 surface ships (63 percent) resulted in 6,603 lost operational days (i.e., the ships were not available for training and operations). Looking to the future, the Navy wants to grow its fleet by as much as 30 percent but continues to face challenges with manning, training, and maintaining its existing fleet. These readiness problems need to be addressed and will require the Navy to implement GAO's recommendations—particularly in the areas of assessing the risks associated with overseas basing, reassessing sailor workload and the factors used to size ship crews, managing investments to modernize and improve the efficiency of the naval shipyards, and applying sound planning and sustained management attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts. In addition, continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and other challenges. GAO made 14 recommendations in prior work cited in this statement. The Department of Defense generally concurred with all of them but has implemented only 1. Continued attention is needed to ensure that these recommendations are addressed, such as the Navy assessing the risks associated with overseas basing and reassessing sailor workload and factors used in its manpower requirements process.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Since January 2017, the Navy has suffered four significant mishaps at sea that have resulted in serious damage to Navy ships and the loss of 17 sailors (see figure 1)  Three of the four at sea mishaps that have occurred—two collisions and one grounding—have involved ships homeported overseas in Yokosuka, Japan  Appendix II provides a summary of major mishaps for Navy ships at sea in fiscal years 2009 through 2017  The Navy currently has 277 ships, a 17 percent reduction from the 333 ships it had in 1998  Over the past two decades, as the number of Navy ships has decreased, the number of ships deployed overseas has remained roughly constant at about 100 ships; consequently, each ship is being deployed more to maintain the same level of presence  We reported in September 2016 that the Navy, along with the other military services, had been reporting persistently low readiness levels  The Navy attributes these, in part, to the increased deployment lengths needed to meet the continuing high demand for its aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships  For example, the deployment lengths for carrier strike groups had increased from an average of 6 4 months during the period of 2008 through 2011 to a less sustainable 9 months for three carrier strike groups that were deployed in 2015  In 2016, the Navy extended the deployments of the Harry S Truman and Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Groups to 8 and 8 5 months, respectively  In addition, the Navy has had to shorten, eliminate, or defer training and maintenance periods to support these high deployment rates  These decisions have resulted in declining ship conditions across the fleet and have increased the amount of time required for the shipyards to complete maintenance on these ships  Lengthened maintenance periods, in turn, compress the time that ships are available for training and operations  As we previously reported, to help meet the operational demands using its existing inventory of ships, the Navy has assigned more of its surface combatants and amphibious ships to overseas homeports  Since 2006, the Navy has doubled the percentage of the fleet assigned to overseas homeports  In 2006, 20 ships were homeported overseas (7 percent of the fleet); today, 40 ships are homeported overseas (14 percent of the fleet) in Japan, Spain, Bahrain, and Italy; and an additional destroyer will be homeported in Yokosuka, Japan in 2018 (see figure 2)  According to the Navy, homeporting ships overseas is an efficient method for providing forward presence and rapid crisis response  Our prior work confirms that having ships homeported overseas provides additional presence, but it comes at a cost  For example, we found in May 2015 that homeporting ships overseas results in higher operations and support costs than homeporting ships in the United States  In addition, the operational schedules the Navy uses for overseas-homeported ships limit dedicated training and maintenance periods, resulting in difficulty keeping crews fully trained and ships maintained  In fact, the primary reason that Navy ships homeported overseas provide more deployed time than ships homeported in the United States is that the Navy reduces their training and maintenance periods in order to maximize their operational availability  Ships homeported overseas do not operate within the traditional fleet response plan cycles that apply to U S -based ships  Since the ships are in permanent deployment status during their time homeported overseas, they do not have designated ramp-up and ramp- down maintenance and training periods built into their operational schedules (see figure 3)  Navy officials told us that because the Navy expects these ships to be operationally available for the maximum amount of time, their intermediate and depot-level maintenance are executed through more frequent, shorter maintenance periods or deferred until after they return to a U S  homeport—generally after 7 to 10 years overseas  In May 2015, we also found that high operational tempo for ships homeported overseas limits the time for crew training when compared with training time for ships homeported in the United States  Navy officials told us that U S -based crews are completely qualified and certified prior to deploying from their U S  homeports, with few exceptions  In contrast, the high operational tempo of ships homeported overseas had resulted in what Navy personnel called a “train on the margins” approach, a shorthand way to say there was no dedicated training time set aside for the ships so crews trained while underway or in the limited time between underway periods  We found that, at the time of our 2015 review, there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships homeported in Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan  As a result, these crews did not have all of their needed training and certifications  We recommended that the Navy develop and implement a sustainable operational schedule for all ships homeported overseas  DOD concurred with this recommendation and reported in 2015 that it had developed revised operational schedules for all ships homeported overseas  However, when we contacted DOD to obtain updated information in August 2017, U S  Pacific Fleet officials stated that the revised operational schedules for the cruisers and destroyers homeported in Japan were still under review and had not been employed  As of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser and destroyer crews homeported in Japan had expired, and over two-thirds of the expired certifications—including mobility-seamanship and air warfare—had been expired for 5 months or more  This represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare certifications for these ships since our May 2015 report  The Navy’s Surface Force Readiness Manual states that the high operational tempo and frequent tasking of ships homeported overseas requires that these ships always be prepared to execute complex operations and notes that this demand for continuous readiness also means that ships homeported overseas should maintain maximum training, material condition, and manning readiness  With respect to the material condition of the ships, we found in May 2015 that casualty reports—incidents of degraded or out-of-service equipment—nearly doubled over the 2009 through 2014 time frame, and the condition of overseas-homeported ships decreased even faster than that of U S -based ships (see figure 4)  The Navy uses casualty reports to provide information on the material condition of ships in order to determine current readiness  For example, casualty report data provide information on equipment or systems that are degraded or out of service, the lack of which will affect a ship’s ability to support required mission areas  In 2015, Navy officials acknowledged an increasing number of casualty reports on Navy ships and a worsening trend in material ship condition  They stated that equipment casualties require unscheduled maintenance and have a negative effect on fleet operations, because there is an associated capability or capacity loss  In our May 2015 report, we recommended that the Navy develop a comprehensive assessment of the long-term costs and risks to its fleet associated with the Navy’s increasing reliance on overseas homeporting to meet presence requirements; make any necessary adjustments to its overseas presence based on this assessment; and reassess these risks when making future overseas homeporting decisions  DOD concurred with this recommendation, but, as of August 2017, it has not conducted an assessment, even though it has continued to increase the number of ships homeported overseas  In the early 2000s, the Navy made several changes to its process for determining the size and composition of ship crews that may contribute to sailor overwork and create readiness and safety risks  These changes were intended to drive down crew sizes in order to save on personnel costs  However, as we reported in May 2017, these changes were not substantiated with analysis and may be creating readiness and safety risks  With fewer sailors operating and maintaining surface ships, the material condition of the ships declined, and we found that this decline ultimately contributed to an increase in operating and support costs that outweighed any savings on personnel (see figure 5)  The Navy eventually reassessed and reversed some of the changes it had made during this period—known as “optimal manning”—but it continued to use a workweek standard that does not reflect the actual time sailors spend working and does not account for in-port workload—both of which may be leading to sailors being overworked  Additionally, we found that heavy workload does not end after ships return to port  Crews typically operate with fewer sailors while in port, so those crew members remaining must cover the workload of multiple sailors, causing additional strain and potential overwork  In 2014, the Navy conducted a study of the standard workweek and identified significant issues that could negatively affect a crew’s capabilities to accomplish tasks and maintain the material readiness of ships, as well as crew safety issues that might result if crews slept less to accommodate workload that was not accounted for  The Navy study found that sailors were on duty 108 hours a week, exceeding their weekly on-duty allocation of 81 hours  This on-duty time included 90 hours of productive work—20 hours per week more than the 70 hours that are allotted in the standard workweek  This, in turn, reduced the time available for rest and resulted in sailors spending less time sleeping than was allotted, a situation that the study noted could encourage a poor safety culture  Moving forward, the Navy will likely face manning challenges, especially given its current difficulty in filling authorized positions, as it seeks to increase the size of its fleet by as much as 30 percent over its current size  Navy officials stated that even with manpower requirements that accurately capture all workload, the Navy will be challenged to fund these positions and fill them with adequately trained sailors at current personnel levels  Figure 6 shows the Navy’s projected end strength and fleet size  In our May 2017 report, we found that the Navy’s guidance does not require that the factors it uses to calculate manpower requirements be reassessed periodically or when conditions change, to ensure that these factors remain valid and that crews are appropriately sized  We made several recommendations to address this issue, including that the Navy should (1) reassess the standard workweek, (2) require examination of in- port workload, (3) develop criteria to reassess the factors used in its manpower requirements process, and (4) update its ship manpower requirements  DOD concurred with our recommendations, stating that it is committed to ensuring that the Navy’s manpower requirements are current and analytically based and will meet the needs of the existing and future surface fleet  As of August 2017, DOD had not yet taken any actions to implement these recommendations  We believe that, until the Navy makes the needed changes, its ships may not have the right number and skill mix of sailors to maintain readiness and prevent overworking its sailors  To address its persistently low readiness levels, the Navy began implementing a revised operational schedule in November 2014, which it referred to as the optimized fleet response plan  This plan seeks to maximize the employability of the existing fleet while preserving adequate time for maintenance and training, providing continuity in ship leadership and carrier strike group assignments, and restoring operational and personnel tempos to acceptable levels  The Navy’s implementation of the optimized fleet response plan—and readiness recovery more broadly—is premised on adherence to deployment, training, and maintenance schedules  However, in May 2016, we found that the Navy was having difficulty in implementing its new schedule as intended  Both the public and private shipyards were having difficulty completing maintenance on time, owing primarily to the poor condition of the ships after more than a decade of heavy use, deferred maintenance, and the Navy’s inability to accurately predict how much maintenance they would need  We reported that in 2011 through 2014 only 28 percent of scheduled maintenance for surface combatants was completed on time and just 11 percent was completed on time for aircraft carriers  We updated these data as of August 2017 to include maintenance availabilities completed through the end of fiscal year 2016 and found continued difficulty completing maintenance on time for key portions of the Navy fleet (see figure 7): Aircraft Carriers (CVNs): In fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 18 of 21 (86 percent) aircraft carriers resulted in a total of 1,103 lost operational days—days that ships were not available for operations—the equivalent of losing the use of 0 5 aircraft carriers each year  Surface Combatants (DDGs and CGs): In fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 107 of 169 (63 percent) surface combatants resulted in a total of 6,603 lost operational days—the equivalent of losing the use of 3 0 surface combatants each year  Submarines (SSNs, SSBNs, and SSGNs): In fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 39 of 47 (83 percent) submarines resulted in a total of 6,220 lost operational days—the equivalent of losing the use of 2 8 submarines each year  Navy officials are aware of the challenges faced by both the public and private shipyards and have taken steps to address the risks these pose to maintenance schedules, including hiring additional shipyard workers and improving their maintenance planning processes  However, Navy officials have told us that it will take time for these changes to bring about a positive effect  For example, as of May 2016, data on the public shipyards’ workforce showed that 32 percent of all employees had fewer than 5 years of experience  According to Navy officials, this workforce inexperience negatively affects the productivity of the shipyards, and it will take several years for them to attain full productivity  Just last week, we issued another report, prepared in response to direction from this committee, examining the ability of the Navy’s public shipyards to support the Navy’s readiness needs  We found that capacity limitations as well as the poor condition of the shipyards’ facilities and equipment contributed to the maintenance delays we discussed earlier and were hindering the shipyards’ ability to support the Navy  Specifically, we found that the shipyards will be unable to support 73—or about one-third—of 218 maintenance periods planned over the next 23 years  In addition, this estimate did not factor in planned increases to the fleet  We made three recommendations, with which the Navy agreed to take steps to improve its management of capital investment in the shipyards  However, we noted that at current average funding levels it would take at least 19 years and a Navy-estimated $4 86 billion to clear the backlog of restoration and modernization projects at the shipyards  Furthermore, this estimate does not include the $9 billion that the Navy estimates it will need for capacity and capability upgrades over the next 12 years to support maintenance operations for the current fleet  In September 2016, we found that although DOD has stated that readiness rebuilding is a priority, implementation and oversight of department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts did not fully include key elements of sound planning, and the lack of these elements puts the overall rebuilding efforts at risk  The Navy states that its overall goal for readiness recovery is to reach a predictable and sustainable level of global presence and surge capacity from year to year  The Navy identified carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups as key force elements in its plan for readiness recovery and had set 2020 for reaching a predictable and sustainable level of global presence and surge capacity by implementing the optimized fleet response plan  However, we found in 2016 that the Navy faced significant challenges, such as delays in completing maintenance and emerging demands, in achieving its readiness recovery goals for carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups, and projections show that the Navy will not meet its time frames for achieving readiness recovery  As a result, we recommended that DOD and the services establish comprehensive readiness goals, strategies for implementing them, and associated metrics that can be used to evaluate whether readiness recovery efforts are achieving intended outcomes  DOD generally concurred with our recommendations and, in November 2016, issued limited guidance to the military services on rebuilding readiness; it has also started to design a framework to guide the military services in achieving readiness recovery but has not yet implemented our recommendations  The Navy has since extended its time frame for readiness recovery to at least 2021, but it still has not developed specific benchmarks or interim goals for tracking and reporting on readiness recovery  Navy officials cited several challenges to rebuilding readiness, chief among them the continued high demand for its forces, the unpredictability of funding, and the current difficulty with beginning and completing ship maintenance on time  In January 2017, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a readiness review and identify actions that can be implemented in fiscal year 2017 to improve readiness  DOD and Navy officials told us that, as part of this readiness review, the Navy prioritized immediate readiness gaps and shortfalls  These officials added that this review would guide the Navy’s investment decisions in future budget cycles, with the intention to rebuild readiness and prepare the force for future conflicts  However, high demand for naval presence will continue to put pressure on a fleet that is already stretched thin across the globe  Looking to the future, the Navy has plans to grow its fleet by as much as 30 percent, but it has not yet shown the ability to adequately man, maintain, and operate the current fleet  These readiness problems need to be addressed and will require the Navy to implement our recommendations—particularly in the areas of assessing the risks associated with overseas basing, reassessing sailor workload and the factors used to size ship crews, managing investments in its shipyards, and applying sound planning and sustained management attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts  In addition, continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and other challenges  Chairmen McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time  If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact John Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao gov  Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Steven Banovac, Chris Cronin, Kerri Eisenbach, Joanne Landesman, Amie Lesser, Felicia Lopez, Tobin McMurdie, Shari Nikoo, Cody Raysinger, Michael Silver, Grant Sutton, and Chris Watson  Over the past three years, we issued several reports related to Navy readiness cited in this statement  Table 1 summarizes the status of recommendations made in these reports, which contained a total of 14 recommendations  The Department of Defense generally concurred with all of these recommendations but has implemented only one of them to date  For each of the reports, the specific recommendations and their implementation status are summarized in tables 2 through 5  The Navy defines a class A mishap as one that results in $2 million or more in damages to government or other property, or a mishap that resulted in a fatality or permanent total disability  We analyzed data compiled by the Naval Safety Center for fiscal years 2009 through 2017 to provide a summary of major Navy mishaps at sea (see table 6)  Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are Classified  Classified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances and need to know, upon request  Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions that Affect Operation  GAO-17-548  Washington, D C : September 12, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-798T  Washington, D C : September 7, 2017  Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges  GAO-17-369  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  Military Readiness: Coastal Riverine Force Challenges  GAO-17-462C  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  (SECRET) Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and Composition of Ship Crews  GAO-17-413  Washington, D C : May 18, 2017  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-841  Washington, D C : September 7, 2016  Navy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness  GAO-16-481RC  Washington, D C : May 25, 2016  (SECRET//NOFORN) Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan  GAO-16-466R  Washington, D C : May 2, 2016  Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports  GAO-15-329  Washington, D C : May 29, 2015  Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Assess Risks to Its Strategy to Improve Ship Readiness  GAO-12-887  Washington, D C : September 21, 2012  Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions  GAO-12-711  Washington, D C : June 6, 2012  Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and Assumptions for Ship Crewing Requirements and Training  GAO-10-592  Washington, D C : June 9, 2010  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2: L  116-6 ), did not provide an exact funding guidance for Industry and Analysis  The mission of ITA's Enforcement and Compliance unit is to enforce U S  trade laws and ensure compliance with negotiated international trade agreements  It is responsible for enforcing U S  antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) laws; overseeing a variety of programs and policies regarding the enforcement and administration of U S  trade remedy laws; assisting U S  industry and businesses with unfair trade matters; and administering the Foreign Trade Zone program and other U S  import programs  For FY2019, the Administration requested $90 6 million for the Enforcement and Compliance unit, an increase of $3 1 million (3 6%) from the FY2018-enacted amount  For the requested increase in funding, ITA cited the unit's increasing number of AD/CVD investigations, its new focus on self-initiating AD/CVD cases, and the increased workload due to the tariffs and investigations initiated through Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962  The House Appropriations Committee proposed $85 5 million for Enforcement and Compliance  The House committee proposal represented $2 1 million less (-2 3%) than the Administration's request, and $1 0 million (1 1%) more than the FY2018-enacted amount   The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $91 5 million for Enforcement and Compliance  The Senate recommendation represented $0 9 million more than the Administration's request and $4 0 million more than the 2018-enacted amount  The Senate committee report noted that the committee was supportive of the Administration's request to self-initiate AD/CVD cases  For FY2019 appropriations, the conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), included $88 5 million for Enforcement and Compliance  This amount was $1 0 million more (1 1%) than the FY2018 funding, and $2 1 million less (-2 1%) than the Administration's request  USITC is an independent, quasi-judicial agency responsible for conducting trade-related investigations and providing independent technical advice related to U S  international trade policy to Congress, the President, and the USTR  The commission (1) investigates and determines whether imports injure a domestic industry or violate U S  intellectual property rights; (2) provides independent tariff, trade, and competitiveness-related analysis to the President and Congress; and (3) maintains the U S  tariff schedule  USITC also serves as a federal resource for trade data and other trade policy information  It makes most of its information and analyses available to the public to promote understanding of competitiveness, international trade issues, and the role that international trade plays in the U S  economy  In addition to the President's budget request for the commission, USITC also has bypass authority to submit its budget directly to Congress without revision by the President, pursuant to Section 175 of the Trade Act of 1975  For FY2019, the President requested $87 6 million for USITC, which represented a $6 1 million decrease (-6 5%) from the FY2018-enacted amount ($93 7 million)  While the President requested a decrease in funding for USITC, the commission's independent budget submission—sent directly to Congress without revision by the President—requested $97 5 million for FY2019, an increase of $3 8 million (4 0%) from the FY2018-enacted amount  USITC cited the increasing number of import injury cases in the previous five years and projected that the caseload would increase further in FY2019  Both the House and Senate committee-reported bills recommended $95 0 million for USITC  This amount was $7 4 million (8 4%) more than the President's request and $1 3 million (1 4%) more than the FY2018-enacted amount  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), provided $95 0 million for USITC, which was $7 4 million (8 4%) more than the President's request and $1 3 million (1 4%) more than the FY2018-enacted amount  USTR, located in the Executive Office of the President, is responsible for developing and coordinating U S  international trade and direct investment policies  USTR is the President's chief negotiator for international trade agreements, including commodity and direct investment negotiations  It negotiates directly with foreign governments to create trade agreements, resolve disputes, and participate in global trade policy organizations such as the World Trade Organization  It also meets with business groups, policymakers, and public interest groups on trade policy issues  In 2018, USTR led the negotiations for the modernization of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the investigations into Chinese intellectual property practices  In addition to direct appropriations for USTR, supplementary funding for the agency is available through the congressionally established Trade Enforcement Trust Fund  For more detail on the trust fund, see section " Trade Enforcement Trust Fund ," below  For FY2019, the Administration requested $63 0 million for USTR's salaries and expenses, and no additional funding from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund  The request represents a $9 6 million decrease (-13 2%) from the FY2018-enacted amounts ($72 6 million)  In the Administration's budget request, USTR outlined the Trump Administration's "aggressive trade agenda," and its goals of "(1) defending U S  national sovereignty over trade policy; (2) strictly enforcing U S  trade laws; (3) using all possible sources of leverage to encourage other countries to open their markets to U S  exports of goods and services, and protecting U S  intellectual property rights; and (4) negotiating better trade deals with countries in key markets around the world " Both the House and Senate committee-reported bills recommended a total of $72 6 million for USTR for FY2019  These proposals included $57 6 million for USTR's salaries and expenses and $15 0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for enforcement activities authorized in Section 611 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( P L  114-125 )  The total proposals were $9 6 million (15 2%) more than the Administration's request, and were equal to the FY2018-enacted amount  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), provided a total of $63 0 million for USTR, which included $53 0 million in salaries and expenses for USTR and an additional $15 0 million to be derived from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund  The total funding was $4 6 million less (-6 3%) than the FY2018 appropriated amount  Over the past decade, Congress has provided funding for specific trade-related programs, including (1) China trade enforcement and compliance activities; (2) trade promotion and attracting foreign direct investment to the United States through ITA's SelectUSA program; and (3) trade enforcement activities through the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund and the Interagency Center on Trade Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement (ICTIME, formerly the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center (ITEC))  Since 2004, Congress has dedicated some of ITA's funding to AD/CVD enforcement and compliance activities with respect to China and other nonmarket economies  ITA's Office of China Compliance was established by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004 ( P L  108-199 )  Its primary role has been to enforce U S  AD/CVD laws and to develop and implement other policies and programs aimed at countering unfair foreign trade practices in China  ITA's China Countervailing Duty Group was established in FY2009 to accommodate the workload that resulted from the application of countervailing duty law to imports from nonmarket economy countries  The Office of China Compliance is within the Enforcement and Compliance unit at ITA  ITA's FY2019 budget justification did not provide a breakdown of funding for its China AD/CVD activities  Both the House and Senate committee-reported bills included $16 4 million from ITA's funding for China AD/CVD enforcement and compliance activities for FY2019  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), provided $16 4 million from ITA's funding for China AD/CVD enforcement and compliance activities for FY2019  This amount was equal to the FY2018-enacted amount  SelectUSA was created in 2011 and is now part of ITA's Global Markets unit  It coordinates investment-related resources across more than 20 federal agencies to (1) promote the United States as an investment market and (2) address investor climate concerns that may impede investment in the United States  The program serves as an information resource for international investors and advocates for U S  cities, states, and regions as investment destinations  ITA's budget justification did not provide a breakdown for requested funding for SelectUSA  The House committee-reported bill did not propose a specific funding amount for SelectUSA  The Senate committee report recommended $10 0 million in funding for SelectUSA, an amount equal to the FY2018-enacted amount  The Senate Committee on Appropriation proposed making funding contingent on (1) SelectUSA updating its protocol to ensure that its programs did not encourage foreign investments by state-owned entities into the United States and (2) SelectUSA reporting its updated protocol to the committee within 30 days of enactment of the bill  According to the conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), the final agreement adopted the Senate committee report language regarding SelectUSA  ITA's Survey of International Air Travelers (SIAT) gathers statistics about air passenger travelers in the United States  These statistics are used across federal agencies, for a variety of purposes, such as to estimate the contribution of international travel to the economy, develop public policy on the travel industry, and forecast staffing needs at consulates and ports of entry  The Administration requested $5 0 million for FY2019 for SIAT to expand the survey and data collection  The Administration proposed that "$5 million in fee revenues collected from the surcharge on international travelers utilizing the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) be redirected to fully fund the SIAT " The House committee-reported bill did not include a specific recommendation for SIAT  According to the Senate committee report, the Senate Committee on Appropriations did not adopt the Administration's proposal to seek alternative funding sources for SIAT and "direct[ed] ITA to continue funding SIAT out of its base budget  Within funds provided, ITA [was] encouraged to increase the sample size for SIAT " The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), and the accompanying conference report did not provide specific language regarding SIAT  In order to provide additional funding for USTR's trade enforcement activities, Congress established the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund (TETF) in 2016  In Section 611 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( P L  114-125 ), Congress set up the trust fund and outlined authorized uses of the funds  According to Section 611(d), USTR can use funds from the TETF to monitor and enforce trade agreements and WTO commitments and to support trade capacity-building assistance to help partner countries meet their free-trade agreement obligations and commitments  USTR can also transfer funds to select federal agencies for trade enforcement activities authorized in Section 611(d) of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015  For FY2019, the Administration requested no funding to be derived from the TETF; the FY2018-enacted amount was $15 0 million  Both the House and Senate committee bills proposed $15 0 million from the TETF for enforcement activities authorized in Section 611 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015  These proposals were equal to the FY2018-enacted amount  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), provided $15 0 million to be derived from the TETF for USTR, for enforcement activities authorized in Section 611 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015  This amount is equal to the FY2018-enacted amount  ITEC was established by executive order in 2012 to take a "whole-of-government" approach to monitoring and enforcing U S  trade rights by using expertise from across the federal government  In 2016, the ITEC was succeeded by ICTIME, which Congress established through the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( P L  114-125 )  The executive-established ITEC received its funding through ITA; funding for ICTIME is now appropriated through USTR  ICTIME's purpose is to advance U S  trade policy through strengthened and coordinated enforcement of U S  trade rights  ICTIME investigates potential disputes under the auspices of the World Trade Organization; inspects potential disputes pursuant to bilateral and regional trade agreements to which the United States is a party; and carries out the functions of USTR with respect to the monitoring and enforcement of trade agreements to which the United States is a party  USTR and ITA work closely within the ICTIME to identify issues and develop information in areas of economic importance to U S  industries  The USTR's budget justification did not provide a breakdown for requested funding for ICTIME  The House and Senate committee-reported bills did not include a specific funding amount for ICTIME  The Senate committee report did note that the Senate committee supports ICTIME within the funds provided for USTR  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ) and the accompanying conference report also did not provide specific language regarding ICTIME 

ground_truth: The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for three trade-related agencies under the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies (CJS) account—the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). This represents a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations. For FY2019, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, included $484.0 million in direct appropriations for ITA (a 0.4% increase from the FY2018 appropriation), $95.0 million in funding for USITC (a 1.4% increase), and a total of $68.0 million for USTR (a 0.2% decrease). The Administration's Request On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted its FY2019 budget request to Congress. The FY2019 proposal included a total of $590.8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies, an 8.9% decrease from FY2018 total appropriated amounts for these agencies. The Administration requested reducing funding for all three trade-related agencies. For FY2019, the request included $440.1 million in direct funding for ITA (an 8.7% decrease from the FY2018 appropriation), $87.6 million for USITC (a 6.5% decrease), and $63.0 million for USTR (a 13.2% decrease). Congressional Actions In the spring of 2018, the House and Senate reported FY2019 CJS appropriations bills, which included proposed funding for ITA, USITC, and USTR. The reported bills did not adopt many of the Administration's budget reductions, and instead proposed funding levels that were more similar to the FY2018-enacted amounts. The House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 5952 on May 17, 2018. The House proposal recommended a total of $647.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This proposal was $56.8 million more (9.6%) than the Administration's request, and $0.7 million less (-0.1%) than the FY2018-enacted legislation. The House committee proposed $480.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95.0 million for USTIC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities as authorized by the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125). The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 3072 on June 14, 2018. The Senate committee-reported proposal recommended a total of $655.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This is $64.8 million (11.0%) more than the Administration's request and $7.3 million (1.1%) more than the FY2018-enacted appropriations. The Senate committee proposed $488.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95 million for USITC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities. After three continuing resolutions and a three-week lapse in funding, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act. 2019 (P.L. 116-6), which was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for the three trade-related agencies, which represented a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 funding levels.