prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Oil and petroleum products markets have changed substantially in the years since the establishment of the SPR  Specifically, U S  domestic crude oil production has generally been increasing, consumption has been relatively stable, and crude oil and petroleum products markets have become increasingly global  Additionally, U S  crude oil production is projected to rise further in the future, according to EIA and IEA projections, further reversing a decades-long decline  Recent technological improvements have made onshore production from shale formations economically viable, and domestic crude oil production began to rise in about 2008  The combination of increasing production and relatively stable consumption has resulted in declining net crude oil and petroleum products imports, from a high of about 12 million barrels per day in 2005 to fewer than 4 million barrels per day in 2017  Since these trends are expected to continue, the IEA and EIA both project net U S  crude oil and petroleum products imports will decline to zero sometime in the late 2020s and the United States will become a net exporter shortly thereafter  Since the IEA 90-day reserve obligation is based on a country’s net imports, there is no such obligation for net exporters; therefore, the United States would have no 90-day reserve obligation as long as it is a net exporter, though it would still be obligated to release reserves in response to supply disruptions  Over the longer term, EIA’s projections show U S  net exports peaking in 2037 and the United States again becoming a net importer between 2040 and 2050  At the time of the Arab oil embargo, price controls in the United States prevented the prices of oil and petroleum products from increasing as much as they otherwise might have, contributing to a physical oil shortage that caused long lines at gasoline stations throughout the United States  In addition, in the 1970s, oil prices were often set in long-term contracts, which meant that prices would not automatically rise in the face of greater scarcity  This generally reduced incentives for producers to expand production and sales as well as for consumers to reduce consumption in the face of greater scarcity caused by a supply disruption  Now that crude oil and petroleum product markets are global, the prices of these commodities are determined in the world market, primarily on the basis of supply and demand  In the absence of long-term contracted prices or price controls, scarcity from a supply disruption is generally expressed in the form of higher prices, as purchasers are free to bid as high as they are willing to pay to secure oil supply  In a global market, a large enough supply disruption anywhere in the world raises prices everywhere  This creates incentives for producers unaffected by the disruption to increase their production and release existing inventories and for consumers everywhere to reduce consumption in the ways they find most efficient and least disruptive  While it can take time for some of these actions to affect crude oil and petroleum product markets—according to DOE officials, it can take approximately 6 months from when a producer drills an oil well until oil production comes on line—all these actions tend to mitigate the effects of supply disruptions  The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 authorized the creation of the SPR, partly in response to the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 that caused a shortfall in the international oil market  The purposes of the SPR are, among other things, to reduce the impact of disruptions in supplies of petroleum products and to carry out obligations of the United States under the international energy program  Specifically, the 1974 International Energy Program Agreement, a joint strategy and treaty, established the IEA to address oil security issues on an international scale  The SPR is owned by the federal government, managed by DOE’s Office of Petroleum Reserves, and maintained by Fluor Federal Petroleum Operations LLC  The SPR stores crude oil in underground salt caverns along the Gulf Coast in Louisiana and Texas  The SPR currently maintains four storage sites—Bayou Choctaw, Big Hill, Bryan Mound, and West Hackberry—with a design capacity of 713 5 million barrels  Under conditions prescribed by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, as amended, the President has discretion to authorize the release of petroleum products from the SPR to minimize significant supply disruptions  When oil is released from the SPR, it is distributed through commercial pipelines or on waterborne vessels to refineries, where it is converted into gasoline and other petroleum products, and then transported to distribution centers for sale to the public  According to DOE documents, well-functioning infrastructure is fundamental to the SPR’s ability to maintain operational readiness and meet mission requirements  However, most of the critical infrastructure for moving SPR oil has exceeded its serviceable life, which has led to increasing maintenance costs and decreasing system reliability  Specifically, the reserve relies on a complex system of salt caverns, pipelines, wells, and pumps, with other infrastructure and equipment  Any failures, such as ruptured pipelines, could affect the readiness of a site for an oil release  According to DOE officials, a growing backlog of major maintenance needs raises concerns about the ability of the system to operate as designed  In addition, there have been equipment failures that have rendered parts of the system temporarily inoperable  For example, the SPR has experienced at least five major equipment failures since fiscal year 2013, including the Big Hill site pipe failure shown in figure 1  The United States has two regional petroleum product reserves—the Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve and the Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve  The Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve, which is not part of the SPR, holds 1 million barrels of ultra low sulfur distillate, a petroleum product essentially equivalent to diesel fuel but that is also used for heating oil  The Northeast United States is heavily dependent on the use of heating oil in winter months  The distillate is stored in leased commercial tank storage in terminals in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey  In 2000, the President directed the creation of the reserve to hold approximately 10 days of inventory, the time required for ships to carry additional heating oil from the Gulf of Mexico to New York Harbor  The Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve, a part of the SPR, holds 1 million barrels of gasoline for consumers in the northeastern United States  According to DOE’s website, this region is particularly vulnerable to gasoline disruptions as a result of hurricanes and other natural events  For example, Hurricane Sandy caused widespread gasoline shortages in the region in 2012  DOE conducted a test sale of the SPR in 2014 and used a portion of the proceeds from the sale to create the reserve  The gasoline is stored in leased commercial tank storage in terminals in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Jersey  The SPR helps the United States meet its IEA obligation to hold the equivalent of 90 days of net imports of crude oil and petroleum products  In order to meet the IEA 90-day reserve obligation, countries, including the United States, can count existing private reserves of crude oil and petroleum products in addition to public reserves (in the United States, the SPR)  In most years, the United States has met its 90-day reserve obligation with a combination of SPR and private reserves  The days of import protection may vary based on actual net U S  crude oil and petroleum products imports as well as the inventory levels of the SPR and private reserves  As discussed previously, because the IEA 90-day reserve obligation is based on a country’s net imports, there is no such reserve obligation for countries that are net exporters of crude oil and petroleum products  The United States also relies on the SPR to meet its IEA obligation to release reserves in the event of a collective action to respond to a supply disruption  Countries contribute to an IEA collective action based on their share of IEA oil consumption, and they can meet their obligation by whatever measure they choose, including release of public or private reserves, or demand restraint  IEA collective actions are designed to mitigate the negative effects of sudden supply shortages by making additional crude oil and petroleum products available to the global market through a combination of emergency response measures, which include increasing supply and reducing demand  In the event of a global market disruption, IEA member countries can call for a collective action after reaching consensus on whether a response is needed  DOE stated that the collective action IEA obligation is more relevant to the SPR’s mission of protecting the U S  economy from severe petroleum supply interruptions than the 90-day reserve obligation  The United States has participated in each of the three IEA collective actions  In 1991, with the commencement of Operation Desert Storm, DOE released 17 3 million barrels of SPR crude oil  After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, DOE released 11 million barrels of SPR crude oil  Most recently, in June 2011, in response to crude oil supply disruptions driven by hostilities in Libya, DOE released 30 6 million barrels of crude oil from the SPR  The Libya collective action is an example of how, in practice, member countries participate according to national circumstances  After consultations with IEA member countries, all IEA member countries agreed to the Libya collective action, under which 12 of the 28 members at that time contributed to the action  In addition to the three IEA collective actions, the SPR has been used 10 times in response to U S  domestic supply disturbances that were not IEA collective actions, most notably in response to severe weather events  In terms of how they meet their IEA obligations, most other IEA members differ from the United States in two basic ways  Specifically, as of December 2017, most IEA members rely at least in part on private rather than public reserves to meet their obligations, and most hold significant proportions of these reserves as petroleum products rather than as crude oil  In December 2017, before Mexico joined the IEA in early 2018, there were 29 member countries  Of these 29 countries, 25 IEA members had two common attributes: (1) as net importers, they had a 90-day reserve obligation and met that obligation, and (2) they had formal processes for holding and releasing these reserves  As of December 2017, 18 of these 25 members relied entirely or in part on private reserves to meet their reserve obligations  Specifically, based on IEA data as of December 2017, these 18 countries met their 90-day reserve obligation through private reserves and either had no public reserves or had public reserves of less than 90 days  According to a 2014 IEA report, some of these countries require industry to hold reserves and, when needed, release them  For example, according to a 2014 IEA report and documentation provided by government officials, the United Kingdom meets its entire obligation by requiring private industry to hold reserves  In contrast, New Zealand had publicly held reserves amounting to 26 days of net imports, according to IEA data as of December 2017  According to a 2014 IEA report, New Zealand relied on industry reserves held for commercial purposes to meet the rest of its 90-day reserve obligation, although New Zealand does not formally require industry to hold reserves specifically for this purpose  Unlike the 18 countries that rely at least in part on private reserves, as of December 2017, the United States and 6 other IEA members met the 90- day reserve obligation exclusively through public reserves  Specifically, according to IEA data on member reserves, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, and the United States held public reserves equal to 90 days or more of net imports  Although the United States currently meets its IEA 90-day reserve obligation solely with public reserves, for most of the SPR’s existence, public reserves were insufficient to meet this obligation, so the United States also had to rely on private reserves  Specifically, according to EIA data, the United States has relied, at least in part, on private reserves together with the SPR to meet the 90-day reserve obligation with the exception of two time periods (1984-1987 and 2012-present), when the United States has relied solely on the SPR  The United States does not require industry to hold reserves for the purposes of meeting IEA obligations  Figure 2 compares the United States’ reserves in days of net imports to the IEA’s 90-day reserve obligation  According to a 2014 IEA report, most IEA members hold at least a third of their reserves as petroleum products, such as gasoline and diesel fuel, rather than as crude oil  Holding petroleum products can be advantageous during certain disruptions because such reserves can be directly distributed to consumers, whereas crude oil must first be refined and turned into products, adding response time  According to the IEA’s 2014 report, Germany’s stockholding agency holds 55 percent of its reserve as petroleum products  Similarly, France holds only petroleum products that are distributed geographically across the country so that the reserves can be used quickly in the event of a supply disruption  In contrast, more than 99 percent of the SPR (665 5 million barrels as of March 2018) is held as crude oil, all of which is stored at the four storage sites in Louisiana and Texas  The exception is the Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve, which, as mentioned previously, is a 1 million barrel gasoline reserve in terminals in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Jersey that was established in 2014 after Hurricane Sandy and that is considered part of the SPR  According to DOE officials, there are several reasons the SPR holds predominantly crude oil, including that it is more costly to store petroleum products than crude oil and that the United States has the largest refining capacity of any IEA member country  Because of the large U S  refining sector, crude oil from the SPR can be domestically refined into petroleum products to meet demand  Some IEA member countries store some of their reserves abroad, though the United States does not  According to a 2014 IEA report, some IEA member countries allow part of their reserves to be stored abroad to leverage spare storage capacity or more cost-effective storage by utilizing available storage space or excess private reserves in other countries  For example, approximately 30 percent of Ireland’s reserves are held in other European Union countries  In some of these cases, countries use short-term contracts, also known as tickets, instead of directly acquiring and storing oil and petroleum products  For example, according to documents provided by government officials, since 1995 the United Kingdom has increased its reserves held under ticket agreements outside of the country from around 10 percent of its total reserves to more than 25 percent  In addition, unlike the United States, some IEA countries specify the size of their public or private reserves in terms of net imports or consumption, rather than a specific volume  In the United States, the total volume of crude oil and petroleum products held in the SPR is the result of amounts historically purchased to fill the reserve and subsequent sales as mandated by Congress or released in response to a supply disruption  According to DOE, it cannot otherwise reduce or increase volumes held in reserve without congressional action—either through requirements to purchase additional oil or laws authorizing or mandating sales  On the other hand, some IEA countries have tied their reserves’ volumes of crude oil and petroleum products to a metric such as days of net imports or a percent of consumption  For example, according to documentation provided by government officials, in 2015 Japan changed how it specifies its target reserves from a specified amount to days of net imports  In specifying the size of reserves in this way, the amount held is adjusted as market conditions change—for example, if net imports change and require more or fewer reserves to meet the IEA 90-day reserve obligation, or when other underlying factors affecting a nation’s energy security needs change  While DOE has examined a range of sizes for the SPR, it has not identified the optimal size for the SPR to meet U S  energy security needs and IEA obligations, and DOE’s analysis of SPR sizes was limited in three ways  DOE also has not identified whether additional regional petroleum product reserves should be part of the SPR in U S  regions identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions  DOE has not identified the optimal size for the SPR and though the agency examined a range of SPR sizes, its analysis was limited in at least three ways  In response to direction from Congress and recommendations from GAO and the DOE Inspector General, DOE developed and published a long-term strategic review of the SPR in August 2016  In DOE’s 2016 review, the agency examined the expected economic benefits of SPR sizes ranging from 430 million to 695 million barrels of oil over a 25-year time horizon (2016 through 2040), but it did not recommend an optimal size for the reserve  DOE’s review did not identify the optimal size for the SPR because of three limitations: DOE did not fully evaluate implications of market fluctuations and estimate needs  DOE did not fully evaluate the implications of falling net imports of crude oil and petroleum products with respect to meeting IEA obligations to hold the equivalent of 90 days of net imports and to respond to collective actions  As mentioned previously, the United States is expected to become a net exporter of crude oil and petroleum products by the late 2020s  Since the IEA 90-day reserve obligation is based on a country’s net imports, this means that at that point the United States would not have a 90-day reserve obligation  However, even as a net exporter, the United States would still have to meet the IEA obligation to respond to a collective action  Yet, DOE’s analysis did not evaluate the SPR’s configuration as it relates to projected fluctuations in net imports or estimate the minimal amount of reserves needed to meet potential future collective actions  Without considering projected fluctuations in net imports or providing an analysis of how much oil is estimated to be needed to meet IEA collective actions, DOE cannot fully advise Congress on the optimal size of the SPR  DOE did not consider private-sector response  DOE’s analyses in its 2016 review focused on the publicly held reserves in the SPR as the only means to respond to oil supply disruptions and did not consider a response from the private sector or through consumers reducing demand  According to DOE’s 2016 review, the underlying analysis for the benefits of the SPR did not consider a response from the private sector for three reasons: (1) while U S  commercial stocks could conceivably address part of a supply disruption, private industry could also hold oil inventories in a crisis instead of releasing them; (2) unlike most other IEA member countries, the United States does not require private-sector response; and (3) research on the exact nature of private-sector response during a disruption is needed  DOE officials told us the agency has not studied the extent to which SPR releases of crude oil displace what would otherwise have been private releases of inventories  As we reported in September 2014, changing market conditions— most importantly the significant increase in domestic production of oil—have implications for the SPR’s size because increased production has led to increasing private reserves  According to IEA data as of December 2017, U S  private reserves held the equivalent of 194 days of net import protection coverage, up from about 59 days in 2006  Further, private reserves in the United States consist of both crude oil and petroleum products with more than half in the latter category  For example, as of January 2018, total private reserves of crude oil and petroleum products were about 1 215 billion barrels, of which about 420 million barrels were in the form of crude oil and 795 million barrels were petroleum products, according to the EIA  As of 2013, these private reserves were distributed across the entire country in more than 1,400 terminals, according to the EIA  As we reported in December 2007, international trade in oil and petroleum products has expanded significantly over the past 2 decades, making markets for gasoline and other petroleum products increasingly global in nature  In such a global oil market, higher levels of private reserves can benefit the United States and the rest of the world by helping mitigate a supply disruption  Most experts and stakeholders we interviewed generally agreed that the private sector is in a better position to respond to supply disruptions than they were when the SPR was created  With regard to demand response, DOE officials told us they do not consider this because there is no mechanism to require industry to respond to supply disruptions or consumers to reduce demand in response to a supply disruption  However, DOE has not studied how voluntary response to changes in petroleum product prices affects the need for or efficacy of strategic releases  Without conducting an analysis of how private parties respond to supply disruptions, DOE cannot advise Congress on the optimal size of the SPR because it cannot know how effective such private responses could be in mitigating supply disruptions  DOE did not fully examine costs of differently sized reserves  DOE’s review of the expected economic benefits of differently sized reserves did not fully examine the corresponding costs of those sizes  According to DOE officials, there was no requirement or need to conduct a formal cost benefit analysis of the SPR because the SPR’s oil acquisition and initial capital costs to create the reserve are sunk costs and the ongoing operational costs to maintain the reserve are minimal in comparison  However, this does not take into account the opportunity cost to the government that holding reserves represents; as Congress has mandated several times recently, crude oil from the reserve can be sold to fund other federal priorities  Without additional analysis, such as of the costs and benefits of SPR’s size, DOE cannot fully advise Congress on the optimal size of the SPR  When we reviewed the SPR in 2006 and 2014, we found that DOE had not periodically re-examined the strategic reserves  In 2006, we recommended that the Secretary of Energy reexamine the appropriate size of the SPR  In its response to our recommendation, DOE stated that its reexamination had taken the form of more “actionable items,” including not requesting expansion funding in its 2011 budget and canceling and redirecting the prior year’s expansion funding to general operations of the SPR, based on the Administration’s decision that the SPR’s current size at the time was adequate  Similarly, as previously mentioned, in 2014 we found that changing market conditions have implications for the size, location, and composition of the SPR, but DOE had not reexamined the SPR’s size since 2005  Accordingly, we recommended that the Secretary of Energy undertake a comprehensive reexamination of the appropriate size of the SPR  In response to our recommendation, the 2014 DOE Inspector General recommendation mentioned previously, and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, DOE published its 2016 review  As previously mentioned and reported, crude oil and petroleum markets are constantly changing, but DOE conducted its full evaluations of the SPR more than a decade apart  According to DOE officials, there is no formal policy to periodically reevaluate the SPR  We previously found that federal programs should be reexamined if there have been significant changes in the country or the world that relate to the reason for initiating the program  In that report, we found that many federal programs and policies were designed decades ago to respond to trends and challenges that existed at the time of their creation  Moreover, the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94 for benefit-cost analysis of federal programs includes guidelines that apply to any analysis used to support government decisions to initiate, renew, or expand programs or projects that would result in a series of measurable benefits or costs extending for 3 or more years into the future  Given changing market conditions and future projections, without conducting additional analysis to supplement its 2016 review and thereafter periodically reexamining the SPR to take into account changes in market conditions and include a thorough consideration of the costs and benefits of a wide range of SPR sizes, DOE cannot provide information to Congress to inform decisions about the appropriate size of the SPR and risks holding too much or too little in the SPR to meet the United States’ evolving energy security needs and IEA obligations  DOE has also not fully identified whether additional regional petroleum product reserves should be part of the SPR  Because the SPR stores oil nearly exclusively along the Gulf Coast, the SPR is configured primarily to respond to global oil supply disruptions  However, as we reported in November 2017, the SPR has primarily been used in response to domestic disruptions  The SPR is limited in its ability to respond to domestic disruptions because reserves are almost entirely composed of crude oil and not refined petroleum products, which may not be effective in responding to disruptions that affect the refining sector  For example, as we reported in November 2017, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria damaged infrastructure and property, caused the loss of life, and disrupted the operations of refineries representing at least 15 percent of the nation’s refining capacity  DOE has identified regions subject to product supply vulnerabilities as shown in Figure 3  The Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015 recommended that the agency analyze the need for additional or expanded regional product reserves by undertaking updated cost-benefit analyses for all of the regions of the United States that have been identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions  In response to this recommendation, DOE studied the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves in the West Coast and Southeast Coast  According to DOE officials, weather events in the Southeast Coast are of higher probability but lower consequence, and events in the West Coast are of lower probability but higher consequence  DOE did not finalize its 2015 studies on regional petroleum product reserves and make them publicly available  However, the draft 2015 studies concluded that a product reserve in the Southeast would provide significant net economic benefits to the region and the United States, particularly in the event of a major hurricane, while further analyses are needed to determine the potential benefits of a reserve on the West Coast  A prior DOE study also suggests that petroleum product reserves merit consideration—in 2011, DOE carried out a cost-benefit study of the establishment of a refined product reserve in the Southeast and estimated that such a reserve would reduce the average gasoline price rise by 50 percent to 70 percent in the weeks immediately after a hurricane landfall, resulting in consumer cost savings, according to the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015  According to DOE officials, the agency has no plans to conduct additional studies  DOE’s 2016 review of the SPR did not fully assess whether there is a need for additional regional product reserves in other U S  regions identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions, as recommended by DOE’s studies and the 2015 Quadrennial Energy Review  Without completing studies on the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves for all the vulnerable U S  regions and publicly releasing the results, DOE cannot ensure that it and Congress have the information they need to make decisions about whether additional regional product reserves are needed  DOE has taken steps to take into account the effects of congressionally mandated oil sales in its plans for modernizing the SPR, though DOE’s current plans are based on information largely developed prior to the most recent congressionally mandated oil sales  According to DOE, the SPR modernization program is focused on a life extension project to modernize aging infrastructure to ensure the SPR will be able to meet its mission requirements for the next several decades  The project’s scope of work has undergone several revisions since its inception in response to changing conditions and requirements, according to the agency  DOE has estimated the total cost for the SPR’s modernization at up to $1 4 billion  DOE raised about $323 million for modernization through the sale of SPR oil in fiscal year 2017, and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 provided that DOE is to draw down and sell an amount of crude oil not to exceed $350 million for modernization in fiscal year 2018  As of the end of February 2018, DOE has spent $22 million on modernization efforts and the additional funds will allow DOE to continue moving forward with the project, according to agency officials  According to DOE’s modernization plans, the first major construction is scheduled for fiscal year 2019  However, these plans are largely based on information DOE analyzed before recent congressionally mandated sales of an additional 117 million barrels of oil  Since the most recent mandated sales, DOE has taken steps to update its modernization plans and has changed its assumptions for SPR’s modernization  For example, DOE now assumes that the reserve will hold about 405 million barrels of oil and that one of the four SPR sites may close after congressionally mandated sales are completed at the end of fiscal year 2027, according to agency officials  However, DOE has not fully updated the SPR’s modernization plans based on these assumptions  According to DOE officials, in March 2018, DOE commenced a study—the SPR post-sale configuration study—to examine potential future reserve configurations  This study is to take into account the effects of congressionally mandated sales on the reserve and its modernization, and is targeted for completion in October 2018, according to agency officials  Information from the study will inform DOE’s updates to the SPR’s modernization plans, according to DOE officials  As part of its post-sale configuration study, DOE plans to examine how the agency may handle the potentially excess SPR facilities created by the mandated sales  In January 2017, the SPR had a design capacity to hold 713 5 million barrels of oil and actually held 695 million barrels  As shown in figure 4, without action by DOE to reduce the SPR’s design capacity or otherwise use SPR facilities, congressionally mandated sales will cause excess storage capacity to grow to 308 million barrels or more by the end of fiscal year 2027—meaning that about 43 percent of the SPR’s total design capacity to store oil would be unused  DOE plans to explore some options to use these potentially excess SPR assets in its ongoing post-sale configuration study  In withdrawing oil to meet congressionally mandated oil sales currently in place (290 million barrels through fiscal year 2027), DOE could close at least one SPR site based on our analysis of projected excess storage capacity  For example, if DOE were to close the smallest SPR site, Bayou Choctaw, the agency could also explore selling the connected pipeline and marine terminal, which are currently being leased to a private company  DOE could also consider leasing excess storage capacity to other countries so that they could store oil at the SPR  DOE has not entered into any such leases with other countries and has not considered such leases because, according to DOE, the SPR has historically lacked capacity to store additional oil  DOE has not proposed any of these options or explored the revenue the agency could generate by selling or leasing these assets  According to DOE officials, the agency will examine the feasibility of such options in the ongoing SPR post-sale configuration study  As DOE takes steps to plan for the SPR’s modernization, ongoing uncertainty regarding the SPR’s long-term size and configuration have complicated DOE’s efforts  According to DOE officials, this uncertainty makes it extremely difficult to effectively perform any mid-to long-range planning efforts for the SPR’s modernization project, including the execution of major maintenance projects  Congress has generally set the SPR’s size by mandating purchases or sales of oil, and has established and amended the minimum size of the SPR as it pertains to the release of oil for emergency protection  Since 2015, Congress has, across six pieces of legislation, mandated 290 million barrels in additional oil sales  However, DOE developed its modernization plans in 2016  DOE officials told us they do not know whether additional sales will be mandated over the next 10 years or whether other changes may be required to the configuration of the reserve  Any additional congressionally mandated sales or direction to pursue additional petroleum product reserves would require DOE to again revisit its modernization plans and assessments of the potential uses of any excess SPR assets  Oil market projections also have implications for the future of the SPR  Under current projections, the United States may fluctuate between being a net importer and net exporter over the next several decades  Specifically, the United States is projected to become a net exporter by the late 2020s and would then no longer have a 90-day reserve obligation, but it is projected to return to being a net importer between 2040 and 2050  These projected fluctuations could affect the desired size of the SPR in the future  This uncertainty creates risks for DOE’s modernization plans, as DOE may end up spending funds on facilities that later turn out to be unnecessary should Congress ultimately decide on a larger- or smaller-sized SPR than DOE anticipates  Having a long-term target for the size and configuration of reserves helps other IEA member countries manage their reserves  For example, as previously discussed, unlike the United States, some other IEA members have specified in dynamic terms the amount of reserves to be held, such as days of net import protection or days of consumption, rather than specifying a specific static volume amount  Under such approaches, the amount held varies over time as entities managing the reserve acquire or sell reserves in order to meet the target  Setting a long-term target for the size and configuration of the SPR—taking into account projections for oil production, consumption, and IEA obligations—could better position DOE to ensure that funds spent on the SPR’s modernization do not modernize a system that is no longer needed and that DOE is able to adequately plan for potentially excess SPR assets  In the course of our work, we also identified other options for handling potentially excess SPR assets that DOE is not planning on examining, largely because DOE does not currently have the authority to pursue them, according to agency officials  First, DOE could explore leasing storage capacity to private industry  U S  oil production has generally increased over the last decade  As a result, the private sector may want to lease excess SPR capacity, which may be cheaper than above-ground storage, according to a representative of a private company we spoke with  Fees for doing so could help defray public reserve storage costs  However, officials told us that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act gives DOE authority to lease underutilized storage to other countries, but not to the private sector  Second, if Congress determines that the SPR holds oil in excess of that needed domestically, DOE could explore selling contracts or tickets for the excess oil rather than selling the oil outright  Australian and New Zealand officials told us that if DOE were to sell tickets for SPR oil, tickets would help these countries meet their IEA 90- day reserve obligations  Australian officials told us they have discussed this option with DOE  Currently the United States and Australia have agreed, through an arrangement, to allow Australia to contract for petroleum stocks located in the United States and controlled by commercial entities  According to DOE officials, the arrangement would permit Australia to receive credit from the IEA for tickets it purchases from the U S  private sector  While the arrangement does not cover government-owned oil in the SPR, if it did, based on our analysis, DOE could generate up to approximately $15 million annually if Australia purchased the maximum allowable amount of oil specified in an arrangement through tickets for excess SPR oil  However, although the Energy Policy and Conservation Act allows DOE to lease underutilized storage to other countries, DOE lacks the authority to sell tickets and does not plan to seek this authority, according to DOE officials  DOE officials told us that they do not plan to examine these options  According to DOE’s real property asset management order, the agency is to identify real property assets that are no longer needed to meet the program’s mission needs and that may be candidates for reuse or disposal  Once identified, the agency is to undertake certain actions, including determining whether to dispose of these assets by sale or lease  As part of its SPR post-sale configuration study, DOE plans to determine whether it is appropriate to close SPR facilities, and the relative benefit of any closures would be informed by potential lease revenues from maintaining sites so they could be leased, according to officials  However, without examining a full range of options in the post-sale configuration study, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources  Given changing crude oil and petroleum product market conditions and the constrained budget environment, it is important that DOE ensures the SPR is effective at meeting U S  energy security needs and IEA obligations while being managed and maintained in an efficient manner  In response to congressional direction and recommendations from GAO and DOE Inspector General, DOE conducted a long-term strategic review of the SPR in 2016 after its last comprehensive examination in 2005  In its review, DOE did not determine an optimal size for the SPR, and its analysis was limited in several ways  In particular, DOE did not fully consider recent and expected future changes in crude oil and petroleum market conditions such as the implications of projected fluctuations in U S  net imports or the role that increased levels of private reserves could play in responding to supply disruptions  DOE also did not perform a full cost-benefit analysis of holding different volumes of reserves  Without supplementing its 2016 strategic review by conducting additional analysis, and periodically conducting such analyses going forward, DOE cannot provide information to Congress to inform decisions about the appropriate amounts of crude oil and petroleum products to hold in the SPR and risks holding too much or too little in the SPR to meet the United States’ energy security needs and international obligations  Such information is needed on a timely basis, to reflect the pace of change in oil and petroleum markets and other relevant factors that affect the optimal size of the SPR  Though the SPR has primarily been used in response to domestic supply disruptions, such as hurricanes, the reserve is limited in this role because it is almost entirely composed of crude oil, and not petroleum products  In this regard, the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015 recommended that DOE analyze the need for additional regional product reserves for U S  regions that have been identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions  DOE has not identified whether additional regional product reserves should be part of the SPR or completed studies of all vulnerable U S  regions, and it has no plans to do so, according to DOE officials  Without conducting or completing studies for all the vulnerable U S  regions and releasing the results, DOE cannot ensure it and Congress have the information they need to make decisions about potential additional regional product reserves  In the face of declining net U S  imports, Congress has taken repeated steps to reduce the size of the reserve  Given that net imports are projected to continue to decline through the late 2020s and fluctuate in the future, there may be additional congressionally mandated SPR oil sales  This has created long-term uncertainty regarding the future size and configuration of the SPR  Congress could address this uncertainty by identifying a long-term target for the size of the SPR—either by volume or in terms tied to factors, such as consumption or net import protection, that affect the country’s energy security needs and IEA obligations  Setting such a long-term target could better position DOE to ensure the efficiency and efficacy of federal funds spent on the reserve  DOE has recently begun to study the potential effects of congressionally mandated sales on its modernization plans  As part of its SPR post-sale configuration study, DOE plans to determine whether it is appropriate to close SPR facilities, and the relative benefit of any closures would be informed by potential lease revenues from maintaining sites so they could be leased, according to officials  However, we identified other options for handling potentially excess SPR assets that DOE is not planning to examine in its study, inconsistent with the agency’s order on real property asset management  Although DOE does not currently have the authority to implement these options, according to officials, examining their potential use, including possible revenue enhancement, could inform Congress as it examines whether it should grant such authority  Without examining a full range of options in the post-sale configuration study for handling potentially excess SPR assets, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources  We are making the following matter for congressional consideration: Congress may wish to consider setting a long-range target for the size and configuration of the SPR that takes into account projections for future oil production, oil consumption, the efficacy of the existing SPR to respond to domestic supply disruptions, and U S  IEA obligations  (Matter 1) We are making four recommendations to DOE: The Secretary of Energy should supplement the agency’s 2016 long-term strategic review by conducting an additional analysis that takes into account private-sector response, oil market projections, and costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Energy should take actions to ensure that the agency periodically conducts and provides to Congress a strategic review of the SPR that, among other things, takes into account changes in crude oil and petroleum product market conditions and contains additional analysis, such as the costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes  (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Energy should conduct or complete studies on the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves for all U S  regions that have been identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions, and the Secretary should report the results to Congress  (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Energy, in completing DOE’s ongoing study on the effects of congressionally mandated sales, should consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets and, if needed, request congressional authority for the disposition of these assets  (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOE for review and comment  DOE provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I  Of the four recommendations, DOE agreed with two, partially agreed with one, and disagreed with one  Regarding our recommendation that DOE supplement its 2016 long- term strategic review with an additional analysis that takes into account private sector response, oil market projections, and costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes, the agency partially agreed with the recommendation  DOE agreed to conduct an additional analysis to assess the purpose, goals, and objectives of the SPR, taking into account private sector response, oil market projections, and any other relevant factors, that will lead to an evaluation of possible optimal sizes of the SPR in the future  In response to taking into account the costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes, DOE stated that the agency determined the projected benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes ranging from 430 million barrels of oil to 695 million barrels of oil in its 2016 review  However, the minimum SPR size considered by DOE is greater than the projected SPR size after congressionally mandated sales have occurred  Further, the SPR size after congressionally mandated sales is projected to be far in excess of the IEA obligation to hold a minimum of 90 days of net imports  DOE must also consider the minimum size needed to meet its IEA obligations in the event of a collective action  In conducting additional analysis, DOE should consider a smaller lower bound, in line with congressionally mandated sales, for the size of the SPR, and more fully consider the size needed to meet the IEA 90-day net import and collective action obligations  Regarding our recommendation that DOE conduct periodic reviews of the SPR, the agency agreed with the recommendation  DOE stated that a 5-year time interval between reviews would strike an appropriate balance between the need to periodically conduct a strategic assessment and evaluation of the SPR and the limitations on resources to plan and conduct such a review  Regarding our recommendation that DOE conduct or complete studies on the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves, the agency disagreed  DOE stated that it is the agency's position that government owned and operated regional petroleum product reserves are an inefficient and expensive solution to respond to regional fuel supply disruptions  DOE further stated, based on studies done in 2015 that DOE officials told us were pre-decisional and therefore could not be reported, that there are additional concerns associated with government-owned and operated regional refined petroleum product reserves, including little to no storage capacity for lease in commercial terminals and high costs for government owned and operated regional product reserves  However, these same studies took these concerns into account, and concluded that a product reserve in the Southeast would provide significant net economic benefits (benefits minus costs) to the region and the United States in the event of a major hurricane  These studies also concluded that additional analyses are required to inform decisions regarding the potential benefits of a similar reserve on the West Coast  Further, the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015 recommended that similar analyses be completed for other areas deemed by DOE to be vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions  Therefore, we continue to believe that conducting these analyses, as recommended in the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015, will provide Congress with information needed to make decisions about regional product reserves  Regarding our recommendation that DOE consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets, DOE agreed with the recommendation  DOE stated that in its ongoing study, the agency will include an assessment of disposition options for any potential excess or underutilized SPR assets, to include the need for new legislative authority, as necessary, for the disposition of assets  DOE expects this study to be completed in October 2018  DOE also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the individual named above, Quindi Franco (Assistant Director), Nkenge Gibson (Analyst-in-Charge), Philip Farah, Ellen Fried, Cindy Gilbert, Greg Marchand, Celia Mendive, Patricia Moye, Camille Pease, Oliver Richard, Dan Royer, Rachel Stoiko, and Marie Suding made key contributions to this report 


Report 2: The EFMP provides support to families with special needs at their current and proposed locations  Servicemembers relocate frequently, generally moving every 3 years if in the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, and every 4 years if in the Air Force  In fiscal year 2016, the Military Services relocated approximately 39,000 servicemembers enrolled in the EFMP to CONUS installations  To implement DOD’s policy on support for families with special needs, DOD requires each Service to establish its own EFMP for active duty servicemembers  EFMPs are to have three components—identification and enrollment, assignment coordination, and family support  Identification and enrollment: Medical and educational personnel at each installation are responsible for identifying eligible family members with special medical or educational needs to enroll in the EFMP  Once identified by a qualified medical provider, active duty servicemembers are required to enroll in their service’s EFMP  Servicemembers are also required to self-identify when they learn a family member has a qualifying condition  Assignment coordination: Before finalizing a servicemember’s assignment to a new location, DOD requires each Military Service to consider any family member’s special needs during this process, including the availability of required medical and special educational services at a new location  Family support: DOD requires each Military Service’s EFMP to include a family support component through which it helps families with special needs identify and gain access to programs and services at their current, as well as proposed, locations  Servicemembers assigned to a joint base would receive family support from the Service that is responsible for leading that installation  For example, an Airman assigned to a joint base where the Army is the lead would receive family support from the Army installation’s EFMP  As required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, DOD established the Office of Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs (Office of Special Needs or OSN) to develop, implement, and oversee a policy to support these families  Among other things, this policy must (1) address assignment coordination and family support services for families with special needs; (2) incorporate requirements for resources and staffing to ensure appropriate numbers of case managers are available to develop and maintain services plans that support these families; and (3) include requirements regarding the development and continuous updating of a services plan for each military family with special needs  OSN is also responsible for collaborating with the Services to standardize EFMP components as appropriate and for monitoring the Services’ EFMPs  OSN has been delegated the responsibility of implementing DOD’s policy for families with special needs by the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness through the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs according to DOD officials  Currently, OSN is administered under the direction of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family Policy through the Office of Military Family Readiness Policy  In addition, each Military Service has designated a program manager for its EFMP who is also responsible for working with OSN to implement its EFMP (see fig  1)  DOD’s guidance for the EFMP (1) identifies procedures for assignment coordination and family support services; (2) designates the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs as being responsible for monitoring overall EFMP effectiveness; (3) assigns the OSN oversight responsibility for the EFMP, including data review and monitoring; and (4) directs each Service to develop guidance for overseeing compliance with DOD requirements for their EFMP  Table 1 provides an overview of the procedures each Service must establish for the assignment coordination and family support components of the EFMP  As a part of its guidance for monitoring military family readiness programs, DOD also requires each Military Service to certify or accredit its family readiness services, including family support services provided through the EFMP  In addition, DOD states that each Service must balance the need for overarching consistency across EFMPs with the need for each Service to provide family support that is consistent with their specific mission  To accomplish this, each Service is required to jointly work with DOD to develop a performance strategy, which is a plan that assesses the elements of cost, quality, effectiveness, utilization, accessibility, and customer satisfaction for family readiness services  In addition, each Military Service is required to evaluate their family readiness services using performance goals that are linked to valid and reliable measures such as customer satisfaction and cost  DOD also requires each Service to use the results of these evaluations to inform their assessments of the effectiveness of their family readiness services for families with special needs  According to DOD officials, each Military Service provides family support services in accordance with DOD guidance as well as Service-specific guidance  However, we found wide variation in each Service’s requirements for family support personnel as well as the practices and expectations of EFMP staff  As a result the type, amount, and frequency of assistance enrolled families receive varies from Service to Service and when a servicemember from one Service is assigned to a joint base led by another Service (see table 2)  For example, in terms of a minimum level of contact for families with special needs enrolled in the EFMP, the Services vary in the frequency with which they require family support providers to contact families with special needs: The Marine Corps specifies a frequency (quarterly) with which families with special needs should be contacted by their family support providers  The Air Force has each installation obtain a roster of families with special needs enrolled in the EFMP on a monthly basis, but it does not require family support providers to, for example, use this information to regularly contact these families  The Navy assigns one of three service levels to each family member enrolled in the EFMP  These service levels are based on the needs of each family with special needs; family support providers are responsible for assigning a “service level” that directs the frequency with which the family must be contacted  The Army has no requirements for how often families with special needs should be contacted  The Services also vary as to whether they offer legal assistance to families with special needs as follows: The Marine Corps employs two attorneys who can represent families with special needs who fail to receive special education services from local school districts, as specified in their children’s individualized education programs (IEP)  They can also advise EFMP-enrolled families on their rights and options if a family believes their child needs special education services from a local school district (e g , an IEP)  The Air Force, Army, and Navy choose not to employ special education attorneys  Officials with whom we spoke said families with special needs in these Services can receive other types of assistance that may help them resolve special education legal issues  For example, Air Force officials said servicemembers and their families can receive support from attorneys that provide general legal assistance on an installation, Army officials said installation EFMP managers can refer families with special needs to other organizations that provide legal support, and Navy officials said families can find support through working with their installation’s School Liaison Officers  The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requires DOD’s policy to include requirements regarding the development and continuous updating of a services plan (SP) for each family with special needs, and DOD has specifically required these plans as part of the provision of family support services  These plans describe the necessary services and support for a family with special needs and document and track progress toward meeting related goals  According to DOD guidance, these plans should also document the support provided to the family, including case notes  In addition, the DOD reference guide for family support providers emphasizes that timely, up-to-date documentation is especially important each time a family relocates, as military families regularly do  Therefore, SPs are an important part of providing family support during the relocation process, and provide a record for the gaining installation  Requiring timely and up-to-date documentation is consistent with federal internal control standards, which state that agencies should periodically review policies, procedures, and related control activities for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving their objectives  SPs follow families with special needs each time they relocate and without timely and up-to-date documentation, DOD cannot ensure that all families continue to receive required medical and/or special educational services once they relocate to another installation  For every Service the number of SPs was relatively few when compared to the number of servicemembers (known as sponsors) or the number of family members enrolled in the EFMP (see table 3)  The Services and OSN provided a range of reasons as to why the Services do not develop and maintain a SP for each family with special needs  For example, Air Force officials said their family support providers consider the needs of each family with special needs before determining whether a SP will help them receive the required services  In addition, Army and Marine Corps officials said they may not develop these plans if families do not request them  Further, according to a Navy official, some families lack the required SPs because installations may not have the staff needed to develop them—even though DOD requires the Services to maintain sufficient staff and certify their EFMPs  OSN officials with whom we spoke also said that the Services may not have developed many SPs during fiscal year 2016 because DOD had not yet approved a standardized form that could be used to meet this requirement  Finally, OSN officials also said that each family with special needs enrolled in the EFMP may not need a SP because their condition does not require this type of family support  To meet requirements of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, in April 2017, DOD issued to the Services guidance that directed them to “rogram, budget, and allocate sufficient funds and other resources, including staffing,” to meet DOD’s policy objectives for the EFMP  According to OSN officials, DOD relies on each Service to determine what level of funds and resources is sufficient and what constitutes an appropriate number of family support personnel  To determine family support providers and related personnel staffing levels, the Service officials with whom we spoke said they consider a number of factors, including the number of families with special needs enrolled in the EFMP at any given installation (see app  II for more information about the EFMP data by installation)  See Table 4 for a summary of EFMP family support providers and other key personnel at CONUS installations  As required by DOD, all of the Services employ family support providers to assist families with special needs  In addition, some Services employ additional personnel to support implementation of the EFMP (see sidebar)  For example, the Air Force employs family support coordinators to administer its EFMP and no other personnel are dedicated to assisting these coordinators or enrolled families  The Army employs “system navigators” who provide individualized support to families with special needs at selected installations through its EFMP, as well as other personnel to administer the EFMP  workers at most of its CONUS installations to administer individualized support to families with special needs  In addition, the Marine Corps employs program managers, administrative assistants, as well as training and education outreach specialists  The Navy contracts regional case liaisons and case liaisons at selected CONUS installations to administer individualized support to families with special needs  In addition, the Navy employs collateral duty case liaisons who assist with the delivery of family support services at all other CONUS installations  Senior OSN officials said they rely on each Service to determine the extent to which its EFMP complies with DOD’s policy for families with special needs because they consider OSN to be a policy-making organization that is not primarily responsible for assessing compliance  In addition, these officials said the Services need flexibility to implement DOD’s policy for families with special needs because they each have unique needs and the number of enrolled families in the EFMP is constantly changing  However, DOD has not developed a standard for determining the sufficiency of funding and resources each Service allocates for family support  Air Force officials at one of the installations we visited said the Air Force identified the lack of staff and funding to provide individualized support to most families with special needs as an issue  In addition, officials from the Army and Navy said they have not received any guidance from OSN officials about their Service-specific guidance, including requirements for resources and services plans  Further, the Services may not know the extent to which their Service- specific guidance complies with DOD’s policy for families with special needs  The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requires DOD to identify and report annually to the congressional defense committees on gaps in services for military families with special needs and to develop plans to address these gaps  However, DOD’s most recent reports to the congressional defense committees did not address the relatively few SPs being created for families with special needs, or whether the Services are providing sufficient resources to ensure an appropriate number of family support providers  Federal internal control standards require that agencies establish control activities, such as developing clear policies, in order to accomplish agency objectives such as those of the Services’ EFMPs  Without fully identifying and addressing potential gaps in family support across these programs, some families with special needs may not get the assistance they require, particularly when they relocate  Each Service monitors EFMP assignment coordination and family support using a variety of mechanisms, such as regularly produced internal data reports  However, DOD has not yet established common performance measures to track the Services’ progress in implementing its standard procedures over time or developed a process to evaluate the overall effectiveness of each Service’s assignment coordination and family support procedures  DOD requires each Service to monitor implementation of their EFMP, including their procedures for assignment coordination and family support  To comply with this requirement, each Service has developed guidance that establishes monitoring protocols and assigns oversight responsibilities  Officials from each Service told us they use internal data reports from each installation to monitor assignment coordination and family support  To monitor assignment coordination, officials from each Service told us their headquarters reviews proposed assignment locations for families with special needs enrolled in the EFMP  These officials said monitoring proposed assignment locations helps ensure that enrolled families will be able to access required services at their new installations  In addition, Army officials said each Army unit commander is responsible for tracking the number of families with special needs that have expired enrollment paperwork because it affects assignment coordination worldwide  Several years ago, the Army determined that 25 percent of soldiers (over 13,000) enrolled in the EFMP had expired enrollment paperwork, complicating the task of considering each enrolled family’s special medical or educational needs as part of proposed relocations  In response, in August 2011, the Army revised its policies and procedures for updating enrollment paperwork which would help ensure a family member’s special needs are considered during the assignment coordination process  To monitor family support provided by installations worldwide, each Military Service told us they use a variety of mechanisms (see table 5)  The Marine Corps pays particular attention to customer satisfaction  Marine Corps officials told us that every three years Marine Corps headquarters administers a survey of family members enrolled in the EFMP  We previously reported that organizations may be able to increase customer satisfaction by better understanding customer needs and organizing services around those needs  This survey is one of the primary ways Marine Corps headquarters measures customer satisfaction with family support services at installations worldwide  Marine Corps officials also said this survey helps ensure its EFMP is based on the current needs of families with special needs  To improve its oversight of the EFMP and implement its policy for families with special needs, DOD, through OSN, has several efforts under way to standardize the Services’ procedures for assignment coordination and family support  However, DOD has not developed common performance measures to monitor its progress toward these efforts and has not developed a process for assessing the Services’ related monitoring activities  Federal internal control standards emphasize the importance of assessing performance over time and evaluating the results of monitoring activities  To help improve family member satisfaction by addressing gaps in support that may exist between Services, OSN has begun to standardize procedures for assignment coordination and family support  To date, OSN’s efforts have focused on ensuring each Service’s EFMP considers the needs of family members during the assignment process and helps family members identify and gain access to community resources  According to OSN’s April 2017 Report to Congress, the long-term goal of these efforts is to help ensure that all families with special needs enrolled in the EFMP receive the same level of service regardless of their Military Service affiliation or geographic location  In addition, OSN officials told us its standardized procedures will also help DOD perform required oversight by improving its access to Service-level data and its ability to validate each Service’s monitoring activities  To date, efforts to standardize assignment coordination and family support have included efforts such as developing new family member travel screening forms which will be the official documents used during the assignment coordination process and completing a DOD-wide customer service satisfaction survey on EFMP family support (see table 6)  Despite its efforts to begin standardizing assignment coordination and family support services, DOD is unable to measure its progress in standardizing assignment coordination and family support procedures for families with special needs and assessing the Services’ performance of these processes because it has not yet developed common metrics for doing so  Federal internal control standards emphasize the importance of agencies assessing performance over time  We have also reported on the importance of federal agencies engaging in large projects using performance metrics to determine how well they are achieving their goals and to identify any areas for improvement  By using performance metrics, decision makers can obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational effectiveness  Additionally, by tracking and developing a baseline for all measures, agencies can better evaluate progress made and whether or not goals are being achieved—thus providing valuable information for oversight by identifying areas of program risk and causes of risks or deficiencies to decision makers  Through our body of work on leading performance management practices, we have identified several attributes of effective performance metrics relevant to OSN’s work (see table 7)  OSN officials said each Service is currently responsible for assessing the performance of its own EFMP, including the development of Service- specific goals and performance measures  OSN officials said that they recognize the need to continually measure the department’s progress overall in implementing its policy for families with special needs, and are considering ways to do so  They also said they have encountered challenges to developing common performance measures  In addition, OSN officials said its efforts to reach consensus among the Services about performance measures for the overall EFMP are still ongoing because each Service wants to maintain its own measures, and DOD has not required them to reach a consensus  Absent common performance measures, DOD is unlikely to fully determine whether its long-standing efforts to improve support for families with special needs are being implemented as intended  DOD requires each Service to monitor its own family readiness programs, including procedures for assignment coordination and family support through the EFMP, but lacks a systematic process to evaluate the results of these monitoring activities  To monitor family readiness services, as required by DOD, each Service must accredit or certify its family support services, including the EFMP, using standards developed by a national accrediting body not less than once every 4 years  In addition, personnel from each Service’s headquarters are required to periodically visit installations as a part of their monitoring activities for assignment coordination, among other things  The Services initially had the Council on Accreditation accredit family support services provided through their installations’ EFMPs using national standards developed for military and family readiness programs, according to the officials with whom we spoke  However, by 2016, each Service was certifying installations’ family support services using standards that meet those of a national accrediting body, Service-specific standards, and best practices  According to officials from each Service with whom we spoke, this occurred due to changes in the funding levels allocated to this activity  Table 8 provides an overview of the certification process currently being used by each Service  OSN officials said they do not have an ongoing process to systematically review the results of the Services’ activities, including the certification of EFMPs because they choose to rely on the Services to develop their own monitoring activities and ensure they provide the desired outcomes  In doing so, DOD allows each Service to develop its own processes for certifying installations’ family support services, including the selection of standards  In addition, OSN officials told us that efforts to standardize certification of EFMPs are ongoing because the Military Services have not been able to reach consensus on a set of standards that can be used across DOD for installations’ family support services  Further, OSN has not established a process to assess the results of the Services’ processes for certifying installations’ family support services  Federal standards for internal control state that management should evaluate the results of monitoring efforts—such as those the Services are conducting on their own—to help ensure they meet their strategic goals  The lack of such a process hampers OSN’s ability to monitor the Services’ EFMPs and determine the adequacy of such programs as required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010  OSN’s job of developing a policy for families with special needs that will work across DOD’s four Services is challenging given the size, complexity, and mission of the U S  military  It has had to consider, among other things, the Services’ mission requirements, resource constraints, and the myriad demands on servicemembers and their families during their frequent relocations  Anything that further complicates a relocation—such as not receiving the required family support services for family members with special needs—potentially affects readiness or, at a minimum, makes an already stressful situation worse  By providing little direction on how the Services should provide family support or what the scope of family support services should be, some servicemembers get more—or less—from the EFMP each time they relocate, including when a servicemember from one Service is assigned to a joint base led by another Service  By largely deferring to the Services to design, implement, and monitor their EFMPs’ performance, DOD cannot, as required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, fully determine the adequacy of the Services’ EFMPs in serving families with special needs, including any gaps in services these families receive, because it has not built a systematic process to do so  Instead, it relies on the Services to self-monitor and address, within each Service, the results of monitoring activities  However, because servicemembers relocate frequently and often depend on the EFMP of a Service other than their own, a view of EFMP performance across all of the Services is essential to ensuring, for example, that relocating servicemembers get consistent EFMP service delivery no matter where they are stationed  Evaluating and developing program improvements based on the results of the Services’ monitoring would help DOD ensure the Services’ EFMPs achieve the desired outcomes and improve its ability to assess the overall effectiveness of the program  We are making the following three recommendations to DOD: We recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of Special Needs (OSN) to assess the extent to which each Service is (1) providing sufficient resources for an appropriate number of family support providers, and (2) developing services plans for each family with special needs, and to include these results as part of OSN’s analysis of any gaps in services for military families with special needs in each annual report issued by the Department to the congressional defense committees  (Recommendation 1) We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of Special Needs (OSN) to develop common performance metrics for assignment coordination and family support, in accordance with leading practices for performance measurement  (Recommendation 2) We recommend that the Secretary of Defense implement a systematic process for evaluating the results of monitoring activities conducted by each Service’s EFMP  (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense (DOD) for comment  DOD provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix IV  DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  DOD agreed with all three of our recommendations  In its written comments, DOD stated that additional performance metrics need to be developed for assignment coordination and that it is in the process of measuring families’ satisfaction with family support provided through the EFMP  DOD also stated that it is developing plans for evaluating the results of each Service’s monitoring activities for the EFMP  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and Education, and other interested parties  The report also is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (617) 788-0580 or nowickij@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V  The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 includes a provision for GAO to assess the effectiveness of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Exceptional Family Member Programs (EFMP)  This report focuses on the assignment coordination and family support components of the EFMP for dependents with special needs and examines: (1) the extent to which each Service has provided family support as required by DOD, and (2) the extent to which the Services monitor and DOD evaluates assignment coordination and family support  To address these objectives, we used a variety of data collection methods  Key methods are described in greater detail below  For both objectives, we reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and DOD guidance and documentation that pertain to the EFMP, including the following: The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, which established the Office of Special Needs and defined program requirements for assisting families with special needs, including assignment coordination and family support  DOD’s guidance for administering the EFMP  We assessed how DOD implements the requirements in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010; how each Service implements assignment coordination and family support; and how the Services and DOD monitor assignment coordination and family support using performance measures  Specially, we reviewed DOD Instruction 1315 19 - Exceptional Family Member Program; Service-specific guidance and related documents from the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy; and DOD Instruction 1342 22 - Military Family Readiness  Standards for internal control in the federal government related to the documentation of responsibilities through policies, performance measures, and evaluating the results of monitoring activities  We compared each Service’s procedures for monitoring assignment coordination and family support to these standards  To determine the extent of the Services’ EFMP family support, we obtained and analyzed fiscal year 2016 EFMP data (the most recent available) for each Service  We reviewed DOD policy to identify data variables that each Service maintains related to its EFMP  We used these data to summarize key characteristics of each Service’s EFMP  The selected variables provided Service-wide and installation-specific EFMP information on, the number of continental United States (CONUS) and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) installations; the number of servicemembers (sponsors) enrolled in the EFMP; the number of family members with special needs enrolled in the EFMP; the number of EFMP family support personnel; and the number of services plans created for families with special needs enrolled in the EFMP  We determined that the selected data variables from each Service are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing summary results about family support for fiscal year 2016  To learn more about how the Services implement their EFMPs, we visited seven installations in five states  We selected the seven installations based on their location in states with the largest number of military- connected students in school year 2012-2013 (the most recent available and reliable data) or in states with the largest percentage of students enrolled in U S  DOD schools as of May 2017, as well as their status as a joint base  At each installation, we interviewed installation officials, EFMP managers, selected family support personnel, and family members and caregivers enrolled in the program  In states we visited that had the largest number of military-connected students, the EFMP personnel we interviewed collectively served 66 percent of students who attend local public schools and 42 percent of the students attending U S  DOD schools  To obtain illustrative examples about how the EFMP serves families with special needs, we conducted seven group interviews with EFMP-enrolled family members and caregivers (one at each of the seven installations we visited)  Using a prepared script, we asked participants to describe how they were identified and enrolled in the EFMP, how they were assigned to new installations, and the types of family support services they received  We also asked about how these services aligned with their family member’s EFMP-eligible condition, the benefits and challenges they experienced, as well as their overall satisfaction  A total of 38 self- selected volunteers participated in the seven group discussions  While the participants in these groups included a variety of family members and caregivers, the number of participants and groups were very small relative to the total number of family members enrolled in the EFMP  Their comments are not intended to represent all EFMP-enrolled family members or caregivers  Other EFMP-enrolled family members and caregivers may have had other experiences with the program during the same period  Finally, for both objectives, we conducted interviews with a variety of DOD, Service-level, and nonfederal officials  We spoke with DOD officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense–Offices of Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Military Community and Family Policy, Military Family Readiness Policy, and Special Needs  We also spoke with EFMP Managers from Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy headquarters  We also met with officials from selected national military family advocacy organizations including the National Military Family Association; the Military Family Advisory Network; and the Military Officers Association of America to discuss the EFMP  We conducted this performance audit from February 2017 to May 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  Each Service has an Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) that provides support to military families with special needs  The tables below present the following information on selected EFMP and family support categories for each Service’s program at continental United States (CONUS) and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) installations in fiscal year 2016: City, state or country; Number of exceptional family members; Number of family support providers (by Full-Time Equivalent); Number of family support provider vacancies; Number of services plans; Number of indirect contacts; and Number of direct contacts  The information below is listed sequentially in alphabetical order by Service  We held small group discussions with Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) participants at the seven military installations we visited  Family members and caregivers who attended each session reported they had children or spouses with EFMP-eligible conditions  The discussion group participants were self-selected; and their comments are not intended to represent all EFMP -enrolled family members or caregivers in fiscal year 2016  In addition, other EFMP -enrolled family members and caregivers may have had different experiences with the program during the same period  There were a total of 38 participants representing all the Services  The following issues were discussed by one or more participants during the small group discussions at the installations we visited  The issues that emerged relate to the current and future overall effectiveness of the EFMP  Overall Satisfaction with EFMP (Discussed by 30 of 38 participants): Measure of participants’ approval of the family support services offered and experience with the EFMP  Many participants expressed overall satisfaction with the EFMP  Several participants expressed dissatisfaction with the EFMP  A participant expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of consistency in the provision of family support services (i e , special education advocacy) across installations  School Liaison Officers (Discussed by 20 of 38 participants): Serve as the primary point of contact for school-related matters as well as assist military families with school issues  Several participants noted that they received no response to their request for assistance from their School Liaison Officer or they only received general information  Several participants said School Liaison Officers were not helpful  Some participants found School Liaison Officers were helpful  Some participants were unaware of School Liaison Officers being available at their installation and the service(s) they provide  A few participants said School Liaison Officers did not follow up on requests for information  A participant noted there seems to be a disconnect between family support services provided through the EFMP and services provided by School Liaison Officers  Family Support Personnel (Discussed by 12 of 38 participants): Provide information and referral to military families with special needs  Some participants at one installation noted that the EFMP was understaffed  Some participants at one installation noted high turnover of family support personnel  Some participants noted family support personnel did not provide support for their family with special needs  Stigma (Discussed by 12 of 38 participants): A perception that participating in the EFMP may limit a soldier’s assignment opportunities and/or compromise career advancement  Several participants believe there is still stigma associated with participating in the EFMP  Some participants said participating in the EFMP has not affected career advancement  Assignment Coordination (Discussed by 10 of 38 participants): The assignment of military personnel in a manner consistent with the needs of armed forces that considers locations where care and support for family members with special needs are available  Some participants found the assignment coordination process challenging  Some participants described limitations with the assignment coordination process  A few participants noted there is a lack of information among families with special needs regarding how to express the need for stabilization and /or continuity of care  A few participants cited the challenges of assignment coordination as contributing to their decision to retire  One participant commented that the opinion of a medical professional was not reflected in the assignment coordination process  Special Education Services (Discussed by 10 of 38 participants): The provision of staff capable of assisting families with special needs with special education and disability law advice and/or assistance and attendance at individualized education program (IEP) meetings where appropriate  Several participants who had a family support provider assist them with preparing for or attending a school-based meeting, including IEP meetings, spoke positively of their experience(s)  Some participants at one installation agreed that assistance from family support providers during meetings with school officials regarding special education services is helpful  A few participants who were unable to get assistance with special education services from the EFMP sought the services of private attorneys at their own expense  Family Support Services (Discussed by 9 of 38 participants): The non-clinical case management delivery of information and referral for families with special needs, including the development and maintenance of a services plan  Some participants found that family support providers were helpful  Some participants could not identify needed resources or were unaware of the resources or services available to them  One participant noted that the family support provider had minimal contact  One participant said navigating the system can be challenging  Surveys (Discussed by 8 of 38 participants): The process of collecting data from a respondent using a structured instrument and survey method to ensure the accurate collection of data  Several participants noted that they had not or rarely had the opportunity to evaluate the family support services provided through the EFMP  One participant noted that comment cards used by each service are not effective for evaluating the EFMP  Warm hand-off (Discussed by 6 of 38 participants): Assistance to identify needed supports or services and facilitating the initial contact or meeting with the next program  Many participants at one installation agreed that the warm hand-off process worked well for them  Several participants said they found the warm hand-off process helpful when moving from one installation to the next  Outreach (Discussed by 5 of 38 participants): Developing partnerships with military and civilian agencies and offices (local, state, and national), improving program awareness, providing information updates to families, and hosting and participating in EFMP family events  Some participants found it difficult to obtain information regarding the types of family support services that are available  A few participants noted that communications regarding the EFMP were not targeted to address their needs  A few participants noted communications regarding the EFMP are untimely, (e g , newsletters not issued periodically)  Joint Base Family Support Services (Discussed by 1 of 38 participants): Family support services provided by the lead Service of the Joint Base that is different from that of the servicemember enrolled in the EFMP  One participant said that using family support services on joint bases may pose a challenge as each Service has different rules and procedures and as a result provides different types of family support services  In addition to the contact named above, Bill MacBlane (Assistant Director), Brian Egger (Analyst-in-Charge), Patricia Donahue, Holly Dye, Robin Marion, James Rebbe, Shelia Thorpe, and Walter Vance made significant contributions to this report  Also contributing to this report were Lucas Alvarez, Bonnie Anderson, Connor Kincaid, Brian Lepore, Daniel Meyer, and Mimi Nguyen 

ground_truth: More than 4 decades ago, Congress authorized the creation of the SPR to reduce the impact of disruptions in supplies of petroleum products. DOE manages the SPR. As a member of the International Energy Agency, the United States is obligated to maintain reserves equivalent to at least 90 days of the previous year's net imports (imports minus exports). The SPR's storage and related infrastructure is aging, and DOE has plans to modernize these facilities. Since 2015, Congress has mandated crude oil sales. As of March 2018, the SPR held about 665 million barrels of crude oil. GAO was asked to examine the SPR's ability to meet U.S. energy security needs. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which (1) DOE has identified the optimal size of the SPR, and (2) DOE's plans for modernizing the SPR take into account the effects of congressionally mandated crude oil sales. GAO reviewed DOE's plans and studies, and interviewed agency officials and nine experts selected based on prior work, referrals, and a literature review. The Department of Energy (DOE) has not identified the optimal size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). In 2016, DOE completed a long-term strategic review of the SPR after its last comprehensive examination conducted in 2005. The 2016 review examined the benefits of several SPR sizes, but it did not identify an optimal size and its review was limited in several ways. In particular, DOE did not fully consider recent and expected future changes in market conditions, such as the implications of falling net imports, or the role that increased levels of private reserves (reserves held by private companies for their own purposes) may play in responding to supply disruptions. These changes have contributed to SPR and private reserves reaching historically high levels on a net imports basis (see figure). These changes are expected to continue to evolve—according to government projections, the United States will become a net exporter in the late 2020s before again becoming a net importer between 2040 and 2050. GAO has found that agencies should reexamine their programs if conditions change. Without addressing the limitations of its 2016 review and periodically performing reexaminations in the future, DOE cannot be assured that the SPR will be sized appropriately into the future. DOE has taken steps to take into account congressionally mandated sales of SPR crude oil in its $1.4 billion modernization plans for SPR's infrastructure and facilities. The SPR is projected to hold 405 million barrels of oil by the end of fiscal year 2027. However, DOE's current plans are based on information analyzed prior to recently mandated sales. According to DOE officials, the agency began a study in March 2018 to assess the effects of these sales on the SPR's modernization. However, this study is not examining all options for handling any excess SPR assets that may be created by currently mandated sales or any additional sales that may be mandated in the future, inconsistent with an agency order on real property asset management that calls for identifying excess assets. For example, DOE does not plan to examine the potential to lease unused SPR storage capacity to the private sector because DOE is not currently authorized to enter into such leases, according to agency officials. If authorized, leasing capacity could generate revenues that could help offset the costs of modernization. By not examining a full range of options, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources. GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOE (1) supplement the 2016 review by conducting an additional analysis, (2) ensure that the agency periodically reexamines the size of the SPR, and (3) consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets as it conducts its study, among other things. DOE agreed with two, partially agreed with one, and disagreed with another recommendation on refined product reserve studies. GAO maintains that the recommendations are valid.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Requirements for military awards and decorations can change over time  New events and changes in military, political, or social conditions can generate debate over who is eligible for various military awards  These changes tend to be controversial, especially with veterans groups  Congress has considered several pieces of legislation that would change who would be eligible to receive the Purple Heart, and under what conditions  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have greatly increased the number of servicemembers receiving the Purple Heart award as well as the potential conditions under which they receive the award  Increasingly acknowledged conditions, such as traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as well as accidents and other events while deployed, bring up new questions as to when a servicemember deserves a Purple Heart  The July 17, 2015, shooting of servicemembers at a Marine recruiting office and a naval reserve center in Chattanooga, TN, again prompted questions about applying the Purple Heart to terrorist attacks versus criminal acts  Veterans groups often voice their views when Congress or the President proposes making changes to expand eligibility for the Purple Heart  These groups argue, for example, that a servicemember who acquires PTSD may not always deserve the same recognition as a servicemember killed or wounded in direct combat, while others contend that these medical conditions can debilitate servicemembers just as much as physical injuries and can have lasting effects on servicemembers' lives  Determining which actions and events make a servicemember qualified for receiving a Purple Heart, and whether expanding eligibility does a disservice to those who have already earned the award, are contentious elements of this debate  Although Congress has traditionally left many military award requirements to the executive branch, the Constitution does allow Congress to act in this area, and events have prompted changes regarding eligibility for the Purple Heart  On December 19, 2014, Congress passed The Carl Levin and Howard P  "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015  Section 571 of the NDAA for FY2015 expanded eligibility by redefining what should be considered an attack by a "foreign terrorist organization" for purposes of determining eligibility for the Purple Heart  As a result, servicemembers wounded and killed in the 2009 shootings in Little Rock, AR, and at Fort Hood, TX, were awarded Purple Hearts in 2015  Congressional offices often receive questions about Purple Heart eligibility from constituents, especially when eligibility rules change  The number of these questions is likely to increase as servicemembers return from conflicts around the world and if eligibility requirements are again changed  This report will examine the history of the Purple Heart and changes in eligibility over time as well as current issues facing Congress  In 1782, George Washington created the Badge of Military Merit to reward "any singularly meritorious action" displayed by a soldier, noncommissioned officer, or officer in the Continental Army  This award was intended to encourage gallantry and fidelity among soldiers, and would later become known as the Purple Heart  The Badge of Military Merit was designed as a purple heart of cloth edged with a narrow lace  Records are incomplete and researchers debate how many soldiers received this award  According to Military Order of the Purple Heart, three soldiers from Connecticut were the first to receive the Badge of Military Merit during the American Revolutionary War  All three were noncommissioned officers and the only recipients who received the award from General Washington  The soldiers were Sergeant William Brown, 5 th Connecticut Regiment of the Connecticut Line on May 3, 1783; Sergeant Elijah Churchill, 2 nd Continental Light Dragoons on May 3, 1783; and Sergeant Daniel Bissell, 2 nd Connecticut Regiment of the Connecticut Line, on June 10, 1783  However, the Badge of Military Merit fell into disuse shortly after its conception  The Badge of Military Merit was not seriously considered again until General Douglas MacArthur (then Army Chief of Staff) revived the award on February 22, 1932, the 200 th anniversary of George Washington's birth  This award, renamed the "Purple Heart," was redesigned to its modern appearance: a purple heart-shaped medal with bronze border and George Washington's coat of arms between two green spray leaves  See Figure 1   General MacArthur also redefined the eligibility requirements to those who received Meritorious Service Citation certificates from World War I or those authorized to wear wound chevrons by Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-22, Military Awards   It was at this point that the Purple Heart became focused on soldiers killed and wounded in combat, rather than "any singularly meritorious act " In 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt extended the Purple Heart award, which to this point was exclusively an Army award, to Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard members serving in World War II  In 1952, President Truman retroactively awarded Purple Hearts to personnel in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard that qualified after April 5, 1917, thus including World War I veterans of all services  From 1962 until 1998, eligibility for the Purple Hearts was changed on several occasions  President Kennedy authorized Purple Hearts to all servicemembers, and civilians serving with the Armed Forces, who were engaged in armed conflict against an opposing military or hostile foreign force  This expansion was written to permit U S  servicemembers, and the civilians that accompanied them, who were killed or wounded in Vietnam to receive the Purple Heart, as many of those servicemembers were officially considered advisors to the Republic of Vietnam, rather than combatants  Purple Heart eligibility was expanded again by President Reagan to include military personnel and government civilians killed or wounded in international terrorist attacks after March 28, 1973, or those serving in peacekeeping operations outside of the United States  This expansion was in response to increased terrorist attacks against U S  servicemembers abroad, namely the Marine Corps Barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983  The NDAA for Fiscal Year 1996 expanded eligibility to prisoners of war injured or wounded in captivity prior to 1962, a group of servicemembers previously not covered for Purple Heart eligibility by President Kennedy's executive order  In 1997, President Clinton signed the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1998, which limited future awards of the Purple Heart to military personnel  It has since remained a military-only award  The Department of Defense does not maintain a record of the number of Purple Heart recipients  However, some military historians estimated more than 1 million Purple Hearts have been awarded mostly to soldiers since 1932  Likewise, the National Purple Heart Hall of Honor estimates 1 8 million Purple Hearts have been awarded since the medal was established by the Army in 1932  During the 115 th Congress (2017-2018), H R  7097 was introduced as the "Find our Hearts Act " It would have amended Title 10, United States Code, to require the establishment of a searchable database containing the names and citations of members of the Armed Forces who have been awarded the Purple Heart  H R  7097 was referred to the House Armed Services Committee but saw no further action  See Table 1 for current Purple Heart legislation  Currently, the Purple Heart is authorized for any member of the U S  Armed Forces who has been wounded or died from wounds sustained under one of the following conditions: (1) In accordance with E O  11016, subject to the provisions of Sections 1129, 1129a, and 1131 of Title 10, U S C , and P L  104-106 , the Secretary of a Military Department, will, in the name of the President of the United States, award the PH, with suitable ribbons and appurtenances, to any Service member under the jurisdiction of that Department who, after April 5, 1917, has been wounded, killed, or who has died or may hereafter die of wounds received under any of the following circumstances: (a) In action against an opposing armed force of a foreign country in which U S  Armed Forces are or have been engaged  (b) In any action with an opposing armed force of a foreign country in which the Military Services are or have been engaged  (c) While serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party  (d) As a result of an act of any such enemy or opposing armed forces  (e) As the result of an act of any hostile foreign force  (f) After March 28, 1973, as a result of an international terrorist attack against the United States or a foreign nation friendly to the United States, recognized as such an attack for purposes of award of the PH by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned, or jointly by the Secretaries of the Military Departments concerned if members from more than one Military Department are wounded in the attack  The Secretary of the Military Department concerned shall notify the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness USD(P&R) prior to awarding the PH for an international terrorist attack that occurs in the United States or its territories  (g) After March 28, 1973, as a result of military operations while serving outside the territory of the United States as part of a peacekeeping force  (h) On or after December 7, 1941, pursuant to Section 1129 of Title 10, U S C , a service member who is killed or wounded in action as the result of action by friendly weapon fire while directly engaged in combat, other than as a result of an act of an enemy of the United States, unless (in the case of a wound) the wound is the result of willful misconduct of the member  (i) Before April 25, 1962, pursuant to Section 521 of P L  104-106 which held as a prisoner of war (POW), or while being taken captive in the same manner as a former POW who is wounded on or after that date while held as a POW  A person will be considered to be a former POW if the person is eligible for the POW Medal under Section 1128 of Title 10, U S C  (j) On or after December 7, 1941, to a Service member who is killed or dies while in captivity as a prisoner of war (POW) under circumstances establishing eligibility for the POW medal pursuant to section 1128 of Title 10, U S C , and Volume 2 of DoD Manual 1348 33, Manual of Military Decorations and Awards , unless compelling evidence is presented that shows that the member's death was not the result of enemy action  (k) After September 11, 2001, pursuant to section 1129a of Title 10, U S C , to a Service member on active duty who is killed or wounded in an attack by a foreign terrorist organizations in circumstances where the death or wound is the result of an attack targeted on the member due to such member's status as a member of the armed forces  An attack by an individual or entity shall be considered to be a foreign terrorist attack if the individual or entity was in communication with the foreign terrorist organization before the attack and the attack was inspired or motivated by the foreign terrorist organization  An award is not authorized if the death or wound was the result of the willful misconduct of the Service member  To assist in making a PH determination pursuant to section 1129a of Title 10, U S C , the Military Department Secretary concerned may request an intelligence assessment from the Defense Intelligence Agencies' Defense Combating Terrorism Center (DCTC)  The DCTC assessment of potential foreign terrorist attacks by an individual or entity will assess whether the individual or entity was in communication with the foreign terrorist organization before the attack, and if the attack was inspired or motivated by the foreign terrorist organization  The assessment shall include supporting citations and rationale  (2) A wound for which the award is made must have been of such severity that it required treatment, not just examination, by a military medical officer  (a) Treatment must be noted in the Servicemember's medical record  (b) Award may be made of wounds treated by a medical professional other than a medical officer provided a medical officer issues a statement in the Service member's medical record that the extent of the wounds were such that the wounds would have required treatment from a medical officer if one had one been available to treat the wounds  (3) After May 17, 1998, pursuant to Section 1131 of Title 10, U S C , the PH may only be awarded to a person who is a Service member at the time the person is killed or wounded under circumstances otherwise qualifying that person for award of the PH  Before this date, the Secretary of the Military Department concerned was authorized to award the PH to U S  civilian nationals who were serving under competent authority in any capacity with the armed forces of that department  For deceased servicemembers, the Purple Heart may be given to the representatives of the deceased as the individual Service Secretary considers appropriate  Servicemembers can be awarded multiple Purple Hearts for separate incidents  The servicemember receives the Purple Heart medal for the first award  Subsequent awards are indicated with oak leaf clusters or 5/16 inch service stars, depending on the rules of the recipient's service  Purple Hearts may not be awarded to foreign military personnel  Although the decision to award medals and other military decorations traditionally rests with the executive branch, Congress has been expanding its role in this area in recent decades, exercising its constitutional power "To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces " Previously, Congress took the lead and adjusted Purple Heart eligibility in both the NDAA for FY1996 and the NDAA for FY1998  See Appendix A   In response to some mass shootings in recent years, Congress passed a provision in the NDAA for FY2015 that expanded the Purple Heart's eligibility requirements  On June 1, 2009, a man who was allegedly angry over the killing of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan opened fire on two U S  Army soldiers near a recruiting station in Little Rock, AR, killing one and wounding the other  On November 5, 2009, an Army major opened fire at Ft  Hood, TX, killing 13 and wounding 29, many of them servicemembers  Both men were charged with murder and other crimes  Federal and local law enforcement authorities initially considered these acts to be crimes, and the Defense Department reports the Fort Hood shooting as "workplace violence," not acts perpetrated by an enemy or hostile force, which made them ineligible for the Purple Heart  However, some believed these acts should be viewed as acts of war or domestic terrorism because they involved Muslim perpetrators angered over U S


Report 2:  actions in Iraq and Afghanistan  Section 571 of the NDAA for FY2015 ( P L  113-291 ) expanded the eligibility for the Purple Heart by redefining what should be considered an attack by a "foreign terrorist organization" for purposes of determining eligibility for the Purple Heart  The law states that an event should be considered an attack by a foreign terrorist organization if the perpetrator of the attack "was in communication with the foreign terrorist organization before the attack" and "the attack was inspired or motivated by the foreign terrorist organization " Still, some are opposed to awarding the Purple Heart for terrorist acts that were initially deemed "workplace violence" by the Department of Defense (DOD) or a criminal act, and not earned on a battlefield  This act arguably sets a precedent for the future and could make Purple Heart eligibility more subjective, allowing public sentiment to determine what events are worthy of a Purple Heart  On April 10, 2015, then-Army Secretary John McHugh and Army Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland, 3 rd Corps and Fort Hood commanding general, presented Purple Hearts to the families of the 10 servicemembers killed and to the 26 servicemembers wounded during the attack  Defense of Freedom Medals were also awarded to DOD civilians killed and wounded during the attack  In a memorandum, Secretary McHugh directed the Army to "expedite certain other benefits for which soldiers receiving the Purple Heart are traditionally eligible " In addition to the victims of the Fort Hood shooting, the two victims of the June 2009, shooting at a recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, received Purple Hearts on July 1, 2015  Army Private William Andrew "Andy" Long was killed and Army Private Quinton Ezeagwula was wounded in that attack by Abdulhakim Muhammad, who was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole  Encouraged by the expanded eligibility provision in the NDAA for FY2015, legislation was introduced during the 114 th Congress to award Purple Hearts to other military victims of domestic terrorism  Section 583 of the House-passed version of H R  1735 , the NDAA for FY2016, would have awarded the Purple Heart to servicemembers who were victims of the April 19, 1995, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma bombing  Supporters for awarding the Purple Heart to the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing refer to the FY2015 NDAA as precedent  However, critics contend that the bombing was an act of domestic terrorism and does not meet the current eligibility requirements of the assailant being inspired by or motivated by an international terrorist organization  The final version of the FY2016 NDAA ( P L  114-92 ) did not include this provision  On July 16, 2015, Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez shot at a Marine Corps recruiting center and Naval Reserve Center in Chattanooga, TN  This incident again raised congressional interest regarding the eligibility for the Purple Heart for servicemembers killed and wounded during an attack inspired by or motivated by international terrorist organizations  Four marines were killed and one was injured during the rampage, and the lone sailor later died from his injuries  The FBI investigation later concluded that Abdulazeez was "motivated by foreign terrorist organization propaganda," but that it was difficult to determine which terrorist group may have inspired him  On December 16, 2015, then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that the Purple Heart would be awarded to five servicemembers killed and one wounded in the July 2015 shootings at two naval centers in Chattanooga, Tennessee  Secretary Mabus stated that "following an extensive investigation, the FBI and NCIS have determined that this attack was inspired by a foreign terrorist group, the final criteria required for the awarding of the Purple Heart to this Sailor and these Marines " On January 14, 2016, then-Navy Vice Admiral Robin Braun presented the Purple Heart to the family of Logistics Specialist 2 nd Class Randall Smith at the Navy Operational Support Center Chattanooga  Brigadier General Terry V  Williams presented the Purple Heart on January 26, 2016, to Sergeant DeMonte R  Cheeley, who survived the attack, at a ceremony in Chattanooga  On April 20, 2016, Lieutenant General Rex McMillian, then-head of Marine Corps Forces Reserve, presented Purple Hearts to the families of Gunnery Sergeant Thomas Sullivan, Staff Sergeant David Wyatt, Sergeant Carson Holmquist, and Lance Corporal Squire "Skip" Wells in a ceremony at the Hunter Museum of American Art in Chattanooga  U S  Airman 1 st Class Spencer Stone was onboard a train from Amsterdam to Paris with two friends, Anthony Sadler and Alek Skarlatos, when they subdued a heavily armed gunman who attempted to fire an AK-47 at the passengers  Stone was stabbed in the face and neck by the gunman as the trio restrained him before he could discharge his weapon  The vacationing Americans were hailed as heroes and awarded the French Legion of Honor on August 24, 2015  On September 14, 2015, Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James announced that Stone would receive the Purple Heart along with the Airman's Medal, the Air Force's highest noncombat award  At the Pentagon on September 17, 2015, then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter presented Stone the Purple Heart and Airman's Medal  During the ceremony, Carter presented the Soldier's Medal to Oregon National Guard Specialist Alek Skarlatos, and civilian Anthony Sadler received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Valor  On June 12, 2016, a security guard, Omar Mateen, killed 49 people and wounded 53 others in an attack inside Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida  Army Reserve Captain Antonio Davon Brown was one of the 49 people killed and may be eligible for the Purple Heart depending on the outcome of the FBI investigation  According to the FBI, Mateen had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group after his attack in a call to 911  At this time, it is unclear if the Army will make a decision regarding Captain Brown's eligibility for the Purple Heart  On September 28, 2016, H R  6234 was introduced to amend Title 18, U S C , to provide for penalties for the sale of any Purple Heart awarded to a member of the Armed Forces  This legislation would have made selling the medal punishable by fines and up to six months in prison  H R  6234 would have placed the Purple Heart into a new protected category, keeping it away from not just con artists but also memorabilia collectors  The measure was named for Private Corrado Piccoli, a World War II infantryman killed in action in 1944, whose Purple Heart was found for sale at an antique store in 2009  This bill was referred to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations but saw no further action in the 114 th Congress  This legislation was reintroduced in the 115 th Congress on January 13, 2017, as H R  544 , the Private Corrado Piccoli Purple Heart Preservation Act of 2017, and a related bill, S  765 , was passed by the Senate on August 3, 2017  Both bills were referred to committee in the House but saw no further action  On January 15, 2019, S  122 , Private Corrado Piccoli Purple Heart Preservation Act, was introduced in the 116 th Congress  The bill was read twice and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee  The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2019, H R  5515 , included a provision (Section 629) that would extend certain morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) privileges to certain veterans, including Purple Hearts recipients, and their caregivers  This bill became P L  115-232 on August 13, 2018  Section 621 of the enacted bill adopted House Section 629, which extends eligibility of certain MWR and commissary privileges to certain veterans, including Purple Heart recipients, and their caregivers starting in 2020  For additional information see section, "Defense Commissary System," in CRS Report R45343, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues   For bill summaries of Purple Heart legislation in the 116 th Congress as introduced, see Table 1   The large number of veterans with invisible wounds returning from Iraq and Afghanistan has the Department of Defense (DOD) reevaluating Purple Heart eligibility for traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and mental conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)  DOD considers some TBIs eligible for the Purple Heart, as many of those injuries can be diagnosed using brain scans and other objective medical tests  However, there is continued debate on the inclusion of mental conditions, such as PTSD, as part of the appropriate criteria for the Purple Heart  Congress, as well as various executive agencies and departments, is funding and conducting studies regarding PTSD  The National Alliance on Mental Illness, a national grassroots advocacy group representing families and people affected by mental illness, is advocating that the Purple Heart be awarded for psychological wounds including PTSD to eliminate stigma and encourage servicemembers to seek care  At this time, DOD does not consider servicemembers with PTSD eligible for the Purple Heart  Army Regulation 600-8-22 allows "concussion injuries caused as a result of enemy generated explosions" but specifically disqualifies post-traumatic stress disorders  Army guidance emphasizes "the degree to which the enemy caused the injury" when determining eligibility and places PTSD in a column of noneligible injuries  The Marine Corps defines PTSD as a "severe combat stress injury" and says that combat stress injuries are "not directly caused by the enemy's intentional use of an outside force or agent," and thus do not qualify  Servicemembers are divided on this issue  Some servicemembers believe that mental injuries such as PTSD should be eligible for the Purple Heart, while others believe that it would dishonor those who have received Purple Hearts for physical injuries  Proponents argue that some veterans are less likely to seek help for their mental-health injuries because of the stigma associated with PTSD, and that stigma could be lessened by recognizing their injuries as real  Opponents, including some veterans from the Military Order of the Purple Heart and Veterans of Foreign Wars, are resistant to accepting PTSD as grounds for eligibility  A representative of The Military Order of the Purple Heart stated, "We believe strongly in and support the criteria that the wound or death should be sustained in combat at the hands of the enemies of the United States " In addition, the national spokesman for the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Joseph E  Davis, said, "Medals aren't awarded for illness or disease, but for 'achievement and valor '" Appendix A  Timeline of Purple Heart Eligibility August 7, 1782: George Washington creates the Badge of Military Merit  Awarded to several Continental soldiers but it quickly falls from use  February 22, 1932: Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur revives the Badge of Military Merit as an Army award, renamed "the Purple Heart," and retroactively awarded to wounded WWI veterans  December 3, 1942: Executive Order 9277—President Franklin Roosevelt expands Purple Heart eligibility to include U S  Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard  Retroactively awards Purple Hearts to December 6, 1941  November 12, 1952: Executive Order 10409—President Truman retroactively awards Purple Hearts to U S  Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard veterans after April 5, 1917  April 25, 1962: Executive Order 11016—President Kennedy extends eligibility to civilians serving with military forces  February 23, 1984: Executive Order 12464—President Reagan awards Purple Hearts to those killed and wounded in terrorist attacks after March 28, 1973, or on peacekeeping missions outside the United States  February 10, 1996: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Section 521, P L  104-106 ) includes "prisoners of war wounded before April 25, 1962, while held as a prisoner of war (or while being taken captive) in the same manner as a former prisoner of war who is wounded on or after that date while held as a prisoner of war (or while being taken captive) " November 18, 1997: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Section 571, P L  105-85 ) limits future Purple Heart awards to members of the Armed Forces  October 17, 2006: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Section 556, P L  109-364 ) includes prisoners of war captured after December 7, 1941  April 30, 2008: Purple Heart Family Equity Act of 2007 ( P L  110-207 ) revises the congressional charter of the Military Order of the Purple Heart to authorize associate membership for the spouse and siblings of a recipient of the Purple Heart medal  December 19, 2014: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Section 571, P L  113-291 ) expands eligibility for the Purple Heart by redefining what should be considered an attack by a foreign terrorist organization, and awards Purple Heart medals to servicemembers wounded or killed during the 2009 shootings at Ft  Hood, Texas, and Little Rock, Arkansas  Appendix B  Staffer Instructions for Medal Requests Members of Congress are able to directly request that a Service Secretary consider awarding military decorations to individuals or groups  Upon receiving a request from a Member's office, the Service Secretary concerned will review the proposal for the award or presentation of a decoration (or the upgrading of a decoration)  Based on that review, the Secretary shall determine the merits of approving the award or presentation of the decoration and other necessary determinations  The Secretary shall submit a notice to the requesting Member, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the House Armed Services Committee with one of the following results: (1) The award or presentation of the decoration does not warrant approval on the merits  A statement explaining the Secretary's reason will be included  (2) The award or presentation of the decoration warrants approval and a waiver by law of time restrictions prescribed by law is recommended  (3) The award or presentation of the decoration warrants approval on the merits and has been approved as an exception to policy  (4) The award or presentation of the decoration warrants approval on the merits, but a waiver of the time restrictions prescribed in law is not recommended  A statement explaining the Secretary's reason will be included  Source: Compiled from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 ( P L  104-106 , §526), February 10, 1996 

ground_truth: Military families with special medical and educational needs face unique challenges because of their frequent moves. To help assist these families, DOD provides services plans, which document the support a family member requires. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to review the Services' EFMPs, including DOD's oversight of these programs. This report examines the extent to which (1) each Service provides family support and (2) the Services monitor and DOD evaluates assignment coordination and family support. GAO analyzed DOD and Service-specific EFMP guidance and documents; analyzed fiscal year 2016 EFMP data (the most recent available); visited seven military installations, selected for their large numbers of military-connected students; and interviewed officials responsible for implementing each Service's EFMP, as well as officials in OSN that administer DOD's EFM policy. The support provided to families with special needs through the Department of Defense's (DOD) Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) varies widely for each branch of Military Service. Federal law requires DOD's Office of Special Needs (OSN) to develop a uniform policy that includes requirements for (1) developing and updating a services plan for each family with special needs and (2) resources, such as staffing, to ensure an appropriate number of family support providers. OSN has developed such a policy, but DOD relies on each Service to determine its compliance with the policy. However, Army and Navy officials said they have not received feedback from OSN about the extent to which their Service-specific guidance complies. Federal internal control standards call for developing clear policies to achieve agency goals. In addition, DOD's most recent annual reports to Congress do not indicate the extent to which each Service provides services plans or allocates sufficient resources for family support providers. According to GAO's analysis, the Military Services have developed relatively few services plans, and there is wide variation in the number of family support providers employed, which raises questions about potential gaps in services for families with special needs (see table). Each Service uses various mechanisms to monitor how servicemembers are assigned to installations (assignment coordination) and obtain family support, but DOD has not established common performance measures to assess these activities. DOD has taken steps to better support families with special needs, according to the DOD officials GAO interviewed. For example, DOD established a working group to identify gaps in services. However, OSN officials said that DOD lacks common performance measures for assignment coordination and family support because the Services have not reached consensus on what those measures should be. In addition, OSN does not have a process to systematically evaluate the results of the Services' monitoring activities. Federal internal control standards call for assessing performance over time and evaluating the results of monitoring activities. Without establishing common performance measures and assessing monitoring activities, DOD will be unable to fully determine the effect of its efforts to better support families with special needs and the adequacy of the Services' EFMPs as required by federal law. GAO makes a total of three recommendations to DOD. DOD should assess and report to Congress on the extent to which each Service provides sufficient family support personnel and services plans, develop common performance metrics for assignment coordination and family support, and evaluate the results of the Services' monitoring activities. DOD agreed with these recommendations and plans to develop performance metrics for assignment coordination and develop plans to evaluate the Services' monitoring activities.