prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: According to international and U S  government sources, climate change poses serious risks to many of the physical and ecological systems upon which society depends, although the exact details of these impacts are uncertain  Climate change may intensify slow-onset disasters, such as drought, crop failure, and sea level rise  Climate change is also increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, including sudden- onset disasters, such as floods, according to key scientific assessments  These effects of climate change may alter existing migration trends across the globe, according to IOM  (See appendix II for further discussion of climate change as a driver of migration in seven geographic regions ) For example, sea level rise, a slow-onset disaster, may result in the salinization of soil and drinking water, thereby undermining a country or community’s ability to sustain livelihoods and maintain critical services, which could cause some people to migrate  Sudden-onset disasters may also contribute to migration as people flee natural disasters, in most cases leading to temporary displacement  For example, people may either voluntarily migrate, or be forced to migrate, to earn money needed to rebuild damaged homes after flooding, especially as extreme weather events increase in intensity and number  If unable or unwilling to migrate, people may find themselves trapped or choosing to stay in deteriorating conditions  Sources agree that the effects of climate change generally impact internal migration, while migration across international borders due to climate change is less common  In deciding whether to migrate, people weigh multiple factors including economic and political factors, social or personal motives, or demographic pressures  The effects of climate change add another layer of complexity to this decision, but there is debate about the role climate change plays in migration  Figure 1 depicts how climate change may influence other factors that drive the decision to migrate or stay  There are limitations to reliably estimating the number of people displaced by climate change because there are no reliable global estimates for those migrating due to slow-onset disasters, and estimates for those migrating due to sudden-onset disasters are based on limited data, according to IOM  The lack of reliable data is due in part to the multi- causal nature of migration  Further, IOM notes that forecasts for the number of environmental migrants by 2050 vary from 25 million to 1 billion  They and others have questioned the methodologies used to arrive at even these broad estimates  Migration, potentially driven by climate change, may contribute to instability and result in national security challenges, according to some international organizations and national governments  For example, an influx of migrants to a city may put pressure on existing resources, resulting in tensions between new migrants and residents, or between the population and its government  The U S  Global Change Research Program has also stated that migration, such as displacement resulting from extreme weather events, is a potential national security issue  At different times, the United Nations General Assembly and, in 2014, DOD have deemed climate change to be a threat multiplier, as the effects of climate change could increase competition for resources, reduce government capacity, and threaten livelihoods, thereby causing instability and migration  Further, the U S  intelligence community considers climate change to increase the risks of humanitarian disasters, conflict, and migration  Identifying the cause of a conflict, however, is complicated, and experts debate the connections linking climate, migration, and national security  For example, IOM has reported that existing evidence on climate migration and instability must be considered with caution  Further, some studies stress that other factors can mitigate the effects of climate change on migration and stability, including governance and community resilience, as the World Bank has reported  State, USAID, and DOD are among the U S  government agencies with a role in responding to issues related to climate change, including as a driver of migration  State interacts with foreign governments and international organizations focused on climate change and migration primarily through the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (State/OES) and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM)  USAID supports a range of development programs that help to mitigate the effects of climate change through the Bureaus for Economic Growth, Education and Environment; Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance; Food Security; Asia; and Africa; and individual USAID missions  Additionally, USAID’s Offices of U S  Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) and Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) lead and coordinate the U S  government’s emergency responses to sudden- and slow-onset disasters, and complex emergencies overseas  DOD assists in the United States’ humanitarian response to sudden- onset disasters abroad through its six geographic combatant commands, with support from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Joint Staff’s Office of Humanitarian Engagement  Climate change as a driver of migration was not a focus of the policy documents we reviewed for either the current or previous administrations during fiscal years 2014 through 2018  Our review of executive actions, budget requests, and executive branch strategies that affected State, USAID, and DOD found only brief mentions of climate change as a driver of migration  None of the documents we reviewed reflected a priority for assessing or addressing climate change as a driver of migration, although these documents reflect a shift in administrations’ climate change priorities more generally  The previous administration issued two executive orders and a presidential memorandum related to climate change  These executive actions had a policy of improving climate preparedness and resilience, factoring climate-resilience considerations into agencies’ international development decisions, and creating forums for interagency coordination  In March 2017, the current administration issued a subsequent executive order revoking some of the previous executive actions related to climate change  See figure 2 for a timeline of these executive actions  The previous administration issued three executive actions related to climate change, which included requirements focused on agencies’ considerations of the impacts of climate change and established forums for interagency coordination  The current administration issued an executive action related to energy independence and climate change  Executive Order 13653: Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change  Executive Order 13653 stated that agencies—including State, USAID, and DOD—shall, among other things, develop, implement, and update comprehensive Agency Adaptation Plans that integrate consideration of climate change into agency operations and overall mission objectives  Executive Order 13653 also established the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience  Executive Order 13677: Climate-Resilient International Development  Executive Order 13677 requires State, USAID, and other U S  government agencies with direct international development programs and investments to incorporate climate-resilience considerations into decision making by assessing climate-related risks to agency strategies, and to adjust relevant strategies as appropriate, among other things  Executive Order 13677 also established the Working Group on Climate-Resilient International Development as part of the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience  2016 Presidential Memorandum on Climate Change and National Security  The 2016 presidential memorandum required, among other things, that agencies, including State, USAID, and DOD, develop an agency-specific approach to address climate-related threats to national security  It also required agencies to develop implementation plans that would describe how they would identify the potential impact of climate change on human mobility, including migration and displacement, and the resulting impacts on national security, among other requirements, and stated that the effects of climate change can lead to population migration within and across international borders, spur crises, and amplify or accelerate conflict in countries or regions already facing instability  The 2016 memorandum also established the Climate and National Security Working Group  Executive Order 13783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth  Executive Order 13783 revoked Executive Order 13653 and the 2016 presidential memorandum, among other things, as seen in figure 2  Priorities related to climate change shifted between the past two administrations as reflected in a recent budget request that reduced some climate change funding affecting U S  foreign assistance  2017 Presidential Budget Request  The previous administration stated in its fiscal year 2017 budget request that “the challenge of climate change will define the contours of this century more dramatically than any other” and that “it is imperative for the United States to couple action on climate change at home with leadership internationally ” The fiscal year 2017 budget request sought $1 3 billion in discretionary funding to advance the goals of the Global Climate Change Initiative, which was established in 2010 and aimed to promote resilient, low-emission development, and integrate climate change considerations into U S  foreign assistance  The $1 3 billion in requested funding included $750 million in U S  funding for the Green Climate Fund, a multilateral trust fund designed to foster resilient low-emission development in developing countries  2018 Presidential Budget Request  The current administration, in its fiscal year 2018 budget request, did not include any funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative  In addition, the current administration’s budget request stated that it “Eliminate the Global Climate Change Initiative and fulfill the President’s pledge to cease payments to United Nations’ (UN) climate change programs by eliminating U S  funding related to the Green Climate Fund     ” Some strategies from the current and previous administrations that affect State, USAID, and DOD, among other agencies, reflect a shift in priorities related to climate change  For example, the previous administration cited climate change as a “top strategic risk” in its 2015 National Security Strategy and stated that climate change is an urgent and growing threat to U S  national security, contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like food and water  The current administration does not discuss climate change in its 2017 National Security Strategy  Additionally, State and USAID have a Joint Strategic Plan to help the agencies achieve the objectives of the National Security Strategy  The previous State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan included a strategic goal on “promoting the transition to a low-emission, climate-resilient world” that proposed leading international actions to combat climate change  The current State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan does not have a climate change goal  State, USAID, and DOD were required by executive orders to assess climate change-related risks to their missions and, for State and USAID, to their strategies, among other things  In response to Executive Order 13653, which has since been revoked, the agencies completed adaptation plans that integrated considerations of climate change into agency operations and overall mission objectives  In response to Executive Order 13677, which has not been revoked, State and USAID developed processes for climate change risk assessments for their country and regional planning documents  Although these executive orders did not require a specific assessment of climate change as a driver of migration, all three agencies have discussed the effects of climate change on migration in their adaptation plans and risk assessments  However, State lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change-related risks to its integrated country strategies  State, USAID, and DOD each completed adaptation plans in 2014 that included limited discussions of migration as one potential effect of climate change  Executive Order 13653 directed the agencies to develop or continue to develop, implement, and update comprehensive Agency Adaptation Plans that integrate consideration of climate change into agency operations and overall mission objectives  Each adaptation plan was to include, among other things, a description of how the agency would consider the need to improve climate adaptation and resilience  State  In its 2014 adaptation plan, State included a brief discussion of climate change as one of multiple factors that potentially will drive migration and impact its mission  State reported that the specific impacts of climate change on the ability of the department to promote peace and stability in regions of vital interest to the United States were unknown  For example, according to the plan, an increase in heavy precipitation events around the world could damage the electric grid and transportation and energy water infrastructure, upon which State depends, making it difficult to maintain operations and diplomatic relations  In its plan, State reported that climate change impacts may threaten international peace, civil stability, and economic growth through aggravating existing problems related to poverty and environmental degradation  Further, environmental and poverty- related issues and regional instability could stress relationships with some foreign governments  However, the plan noted that specific impacts of climate change on conflict, migration, terrorism, and complex disasters were still unknown  USAID  In its 2014 adaptation plan, USAID included a brief discussion of migration as one potential effect of climate change that could also impact security  USAID stated that the impact of climate change on its programs and operations, if left unaddressed, could compromise the agency’s ability to achieve its mission  Further, USAID’s plan referred to increased migration as a potential risk of climate change  Flooding and other extreme climate events can result in increased migration, among other impacts, that could affect existing and planned USAID programming  In particular, programs in areas like agriculture and food security, global health, water and sanitation, infrastructure, and disaster readiness and humanitarian response are vulnerable to climate change, according to USAID  In the infrastructure area, climate change may necessitate new protective measures for coastal homes and infrastructure, and in some cases even mass evacuations or permanent migration  USAID stated that climate change could further reduce or alter the distribution of already limited resources like food and water, or force temporary or permanent migration of communities  According to the plan, in areas with high risk factors for conflict, climate change stresses can aggravate tensions and contribute to conflict  DOD  In its 2014 adaptation roadmap, DOD included a brief discussion of migration as one of multiple potential effects of climate change that could impact national security  DOD referred to climate change as a threat multiplier that can aggravate other risks around the world, with migration being one effect that could increase requests for DOD to provide assistance  The roadmap stated that as climate change affects the availability of food and water, human migration, and competition for natural resources, the department’s unique capability to provide logistical, material, and security assistance on a massive scale or in rapid fashion may be called upon with increasing frequency  Furthermore, DOD stated that the impacts of climate change may cause instability in other countries by, among other things, impairing access to food and water, damaging infrastructure, uprooting and displacing large numbers of people, and compelling mass migration  These developments, according to the department, could undermine already fragile governments that are unable to respond effectively, or challenge currently stable governments, as well as increase competition and tension between countries vying for limited resources  In response to Executive Order 13677, State and USAID developed processes for climate change risk assessments for their country and regional planning documents  Though these assessments are not specific to migration, a few of the assessments identified the nexus of climate change and migration  State  State required climate change risk assessments for all new integrated country strategies drafted in 2016 or later  We reviewed 10 integrated country strategies from the two regions that were the first to implement the climate change risk assessment requirement— Africa, and East Asia and the Pacific  All 10 of the strategies included climate change risk assessments, one of which—Cambodia— identified migration as a risk for the country  The Cambodia strategy states that internal migration due to climate change hinders access to health care and the prevention of infectious diseases like malaria  We also reviewed 10 strategies from State’s functional and regional bureaus for assessments of climate-related risks, including 3 functional bureau strategies (State/PRM, State/OES, and State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs) and 7 regional bureau strategies  All of the functional bureau strategies we reviewed identified climate change as a risk and State/PRM cited the impact of climate change on migration  Of the regional bureau strategies we reviewed, we found that one, the Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, identified climate change as a driver of migration as a challenge or risk in its region  For example, the strategy states that climate change is becoming increasingly disruptive, potentially increasing migration due to rising sea levels  None of the other six regional bureau strategies we reviewed identified the nexus of climate change and migration as a risk or challenge  However, five regional bureaus identified climate change as a risk or challenge and one identified migration as a risk or challenge  USAID  USAID also requires the integration of climate risk management into all country or regional development cooperation strategies drafted since October 1, 2015  Missions must document in a climate change appendix to the strategy any climate risks they identified and how they considered climate change in their strategy  As of August 2018, USAID had completed five country or regional development cooperation strategy updates initiated since October 1, 2015—Uganda, Tunisia, East Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe—and all five included the required appendix  Of the five updated strategies, three—Uganda, Tunisia, and East Africa—discuss the indirect effect of climate change on migration, among other issues  For example, Uganda’s 2016-2021 country strategy states that increased frequency and duration of droughts is likely to be the most significant climate‐related change in Uganda  The strategy also notes that droughts have affected, and will continue to affect, water resources, hydroelectricity production, and agriculture, among other sectors  As agriculture, forestry, and fisheries decline in Uganda, the strategy asserts that people will migrate to urban areas, leading to the formation of slums  We also reviewed USAID’s nine regional development cooperation strategies, one of which—East Africa—had been updated since the requirement to include climate risk management  Of the other eight strategies that have yet to be updated, seven identified climate change as a challenge or risk and three identified climate change as a driver of migration as a challenge or risk  For example, the Southern Africa regional development cooperation strategy states that water scarcity, natural disasters, and other climate change related events will most likely increase migration throughout the region  Additionally, the Asia regional development cooperation strategy discusses the risks of climate change in urban areas  In Asia, the number of migrants seeking economic opportunities in urban centers is likely to increase  According to the strategy, migrants are moving into hazard-prone areas located along coastlines, flood plains, and other low-lying areas in many Asian primary and secondary cities—areas that experts predict will experience more frequent and intense storm surges, floods, and coastal erosion as a result of climate change  The requirement in Executive Order 13677 to assess climate change- related risks to agency strategies remains unchanged; however, State now lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change- related risks to its integrated country strategies  Specifically, State’s 2016 guidance for developing integrated country strategies stated that all missions should assess the risk of climate change on their strategies’ goals and objectives and included reference to the climate risk screening tool—a method that missions could use to assess climate change risks  State issued new guidance to its missions in 2018, but this guidance does not include information on the process for assessing climate change-related risks to agency strategies  According to State officials, the 2018 guidance for integrated country strategies does not reference climate change risk assessments because, in September 2017, State decided that the strategies should not single out climate change risks in a separate appendix  State officials said this decision resulted, in part, from the new administration’s shift in priorities on climate change  Officials also said that this decision reflects a new approach to risk management by State and that the missions could choose to include climate change and other potential risks in the general risk discussion section of their strategies  Officials from State’s Office of U S  Foreign Assistance Resources said that it is now up to each mission to decide whether a strategic objective may have a climate challenge  However, those missions that choose to include an assessment of climate change risks are not provided guidance on the process for doing so and there is no reference to the climate risk screening tool—or to climate change at all—in the 2018 guidance  Executive Order 13677 directed State to incorporate climate-resilience considerations into decision making by assessing climate-related risks to agency strategies, among other things  Subsequently, a State cable from September 2016 further explained that State would implement the executive order’s requirement by screening for climate risks as part of the process for drafting all new integrated country strategies  Additionally, the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that documentation is a necessary part of an effective internal control system  If management determines that a principle is not relevant, management must support that determination with documentation that includes the rationale of how, in the absence of that principle, the associated component could be designed, implemented, and operated effectively  Because State lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change-related risks to its integrated country strategies, it is less likely that the current round of strategies will include the assessment of climate- related risks  It is also possible that those missions that choose to conduct climate change risk assessments will not do so in a consistent manner  Such assessments might identify climate change as a driver of migration, as at least one previous assessment did under the 2016 guidance  Thus, without clear guidance, missions may not examine climate change as a risk to their strategic objectives and could miss opportunities to improve the climate resilience of foreign assistance activities  For fiscal years 2014 through 2017, State, USAID, and DOD had some activities that could potentially address climate change as a driver of migration, although none of these activities specifically focused on the issue  For example, USAID has climate change adaptation activities, but to date migration has not been a focus of this programming  With the shift in priorities related to climate change in fiscal year 2017, agencies have reduced some of these activities  State’s offices that are focused on the issues of climate change (State/OES) and migration (State/PRM) have participated in multilateral activities related to climate change as a driver of migration and funded adaptation and other activities related to the issue  State officials said that the agency does not, however, have any activities that specifically address migration due to climate change or environmental factors  State has participated in multilateral activities related to climate change and migration  With the shift in priorities related to climate change in fiscal year 2017, the United States has disengaged from some of these multilateral activities (see table 1)  In addition to State’s participation in the multilateral activities described in table 2, State has provided funding for activities related to climate change and capacity building that address natural disasters  These activities may involve efforts potentially related to migration  For example, according to State: State provided about $2 million per year, between fiscal years 2014 and 2016, to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which analyzed the impacts of climate change on migration in its most recent assessment report  State/PRM provided about $4 million, between fiscal years 2014 through 2018, for IOM’s Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative, which provides guidelines to protect migrants in countries experiencing conflict or natural disasters  IOM provides training to countries on these guidelines  State/PRM officials said that this initiative is not specifically related to climate change and does not focus on specific types of disasters but does mention sudden-onset disasters  Officials also said that IOM tries to promote a climate change perspective in its trainings  State/OES provided about $78 million in adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative to eight projects during fiscal years 2014 through 2017  (See appendix III for a description of all eight projects ) State/OES officials said that these projects help countries prepare for the impacts of climate change, potentially reducing the pressure to migrate  However, to these officials’ knowledge, none of these projects directly supported activities related to migration  For example, State/OES provided a $4 million grant to the National Adaptation Plans Global Network  This network focuses on increasing the capacity of governments to identify and assess climate risks, integrate these risks in planning, develop a pipeline of projects to address these risks, identify and secure funding for projects, and track progress toward resilience targets  Adaptation activities occurred in over 35 countries  With the shift in priorities related to climate change in fiscal year 2017, State discontinued some of these efforts  For example, funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative was not included in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2018  State/OES officials said that the agency does not plan to fund additional adaptation activities and has not requested additional funding for the activities  According to a State official, PRM had been in discussion with IOM to develop a project proposal that would have assisted the governments of Small Island Developing States in adapting their migration policies to account for challenges and opportunities associated with environmental degradation, ecosystem loss, climate change impacts, and natural disasters  State/PRM stopped further development of the proposal following the change in administrations  Additionally, according to a State official, the department made some efforts at the end of the previous administration to develop a formal position on the topic of climate change as a driver of migration  For example, State drafted an internal document to help clarify its role in responding to the humanitarian aspects of sudden-onset and slow-onset climate events  This initial work stopped under the current administration  USAID officials said that, with respect to the agency’s climate-related programming, its climate change adaptation programming was the most likely to include activities related to migration or displacement, although a broad swath of USAID development programming has the potential to build host country resilience  Officials stated that, to date, migration has not been a primary motivation for the agency’s climate-related or disaster assistance programming  However, officials said that, in a humanitarian crisis or under some economic conditions, development programming can reduce displacement or the pressure to migrate—such as by fostering greater resilience to drought or other adverse conditions—and that this is also true of climate-related programming  USAID also provides humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters that displace people  Officials said that USAID recognizes the links between displacement and natural disasters, but that the agency does not have specific programs linking disaster assistance, migration, and climate change  USAID identified about 250 activities that received adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative during fiscal years 2014 through 2016  Our analysis of the descriptions of these activities determined that none directly mentioned any efforts specifically related to migration  Officials emphasized that the connection between climate change and migration tends to be indirect and shaped by other more immediate factors  USAID’s data on activities that received adaptation funding identified 38 beneficiary countries, as well as activities described generally as implemented at the regional or global level  For activities where USAID’s data identified a specific region, most activities were located in Africa followed by Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean  Examples of the types of activities that received adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 include: The Mali Climate Change Adaptation Activity, which aims to build resilience to current climate variability and increase resilience to longer-term climate change effects  This activity is also working to strengthen the capacity of Mali’s meteorological agency to provide improved climate information as well as to incorporate climate considerations into local-level planning  The total estimated cost is about $13 million over 5 years  The activity for Climate-Resilient Ecosystems and Livelihoods, which ended in September 2018, aimed to increase Bangladesh’s resilience to natural hazards by working with community-based organizations, government ministries, and technical agencies  This activity provided technical assistance to the Government of Bangladesh and local communities to improve ecosystem conservation and resilience capacity  The total estimated cost was about $33 million in funding over 6 years  The activity for Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion, which aims to support pastoralists in Ethiopia via expansion of markets and long-term behavior change (see fig  3)  USAID officials cited this activity as an example of adaptation efforts that indirectly address the issue of climate change as a driver of migration  The activity has three interrelated objectives: increasing household incomes, enhancing resilience, and bolstering adaptive capacity to climate change among pastoral people in Ethiopia  An evaluation of the activity found that migration is a coping strategy for dealing with climate shocks, although participants said that drought is becoming more frequent, placing a severe strain on traditional coping mechanisms, such as migration and selling cattle, and that permanent migration is not a preferred strategy  The total estimated cost is about $60 million in funding over 6 years  With the shift in priorities related to climate change, funding for USAID’s climate change adaptation activities has decreased  Missions may continue to fund their adaptation activities with discretionary funds or other earmarked, sector funding, provided the activities further the funding source’s objective, according to USAID  For example, in some cases, missions are using Water sector funding to continue some of their adaptation work  USAID also said that among the agency’s goals are to increase the resilience of USAID partner countries to recurrent crises, including climate variability and change  In addition to USAID’s climate change adaptation programming, USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP provide emergency humanitarian assistance to people affected by sudden-onset disasters—such as hurricanes and floods—and slow-onset and extended disasters, including droughts and conflicts  Some of this assistance helps people who have been displaced by disaster  USAID officials stated that although disasters cause mainly temporary displacement, the relationship among humanitarian assistance, climate change, and migration is very complex and depends on both climatic and non-climatic factors  USAID/OFDA responded to 267 disasters from fiscal year 2014 through June 2018, according to agency data  For example, USAID/OFDA responded to the effects of Hurricane Matthew in Haiti in October 2016, as seen in figure 4, including helping temporarily displaced people  DOD assists in the U S  government response to overseas disasters, including helping people displaced by such disasters, regardless of the cause of the disaster  These efforts are not specific to climate change as a driver of migration  For example, officials from DOD’s geographic combatant commands said that, to the extent they address climate change, migration is not a focus of those efforts and they view migration as caused by security and economic issues  Between fiscal years 2014 and 2018, Congress has appropriated to DOD between $103 and $130 million per year for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid  Officials said that the geographic combatant commands use most of this funding for steady state humanitarian assistance related to health, education, basic infrastructure, and disaster preparedness with a smaller amount set aside for immediate disaster assistance although that varies based on emergency requirements  DOD officials said that they have not seen any changes to this funding or associated activities with the change of administrations in fiscal year 2017  DOD officials we spoke with also emphasized that USAID/OFDA is the lead agency for the U S  government’s response to disasters overseas  USAID/OFDA formally requested DOD support on about 10 percent of the foreign disaster assistance provided by USAID/OFDA, according to USAID data for fiscal year 2014 through June 2018 and DOD officials  DOD assistance is typically provided for the largest, most complex disasters, according to agency officials  According to a July 2015 assessment conducted by the geographic combatant commands, while their activities vary, each command works with partner nations to increase their abilities to reduce the risks and effects from environmental impacts and climate-related events, including severe weather and other hazards  For example, in the report, U S  Southern Command stated that it had requested funding to pre-position assets for when a severe storm threatens Haiti to be able to respond immediately to a potential disaster  U S  Southern Command officials said that they work with partner nations to encourage residents experiencing extreme weather to remain where they are because it is easier to provide help to people who stay in one place  Officials from U S  Southern Command and U S  Africa Command also said that the major factors driving migration in their regions are security and economic issues  State, USAID, and DOD have participated in interagency forums regarding climate change, which may have addressed its effects on migration  With changes to priorities regarding climate change in fiscal year 2017, these forums have been disbanded or are not meeting  The Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience  The Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience, of which State, USAID, and DOD were members, was established to facilitate the integration of climate science in policies and planning of government agencies, including by promoting the development of climate change related information, data, and tools, among other things  Additionally, the council was to develop, recommend, and coordinate interagency efforts on priority federal government actions related to climate preparedness and resilience  According to State officials, the council began working with the National Security Council and other agencies to facilitate greater interagency cooperation on adaptation  In addition, a task force on the council was discussing the federal role in addressing displacement related to climate change  The council was disbanded when Executive Order 13783 revoked Executive Order 13653, which had established the council  The Working Group on Climate-Resilient International Development  The Working Group on Climate-Resilient International Development, of which State and USAID were members, was established by Executive Order 13677 and placed under the Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience  The working group’s mission includes developing guidelines for integrating considerations of climate-change risks and climate resilience into agency strategies, plans, programs, projects, investments, and related funding decisions, among other things  Additionally, the working group was tasked with facilitating the exchange of knowledge and lessons learned in assessing climate risks to agency strategies, among other things  USAID officials said that the working group had not discussed climate change as a driver of migration  While the working group has not been formally disbanded, it has not met since at least November 2017 according to USAID  The Climate and National Security Working Group  The Climate and National Security Working Group, of which State, USAID, and DOD were members, was established by the 2016 presidential memorandum  The chairs of the working group were to coordinate the development of a strategic approach to identify, assess, and share information on current and projected climate-related impacts on national security interests and to inform the development of national security doctrine, policies, and plans, among other things  According to the memorandum, the working group was to provide a venue for enhancing the understanding of the links between climate change- related impacts and national security interests and for discussing opportunities for climate mitigation and adaptation activities to address national security issues  This working group was disbanded when Executive Order 13783 revoked the 2016 presidential memorandum, which had established the working group  State, USAID, and DOD assessments and activities have not focused specifically on the nexus of climate change and migration  State did identify migration as a risk of climate change in at least one of its climate change risk assessments for the department’s country strategies  However, State now lacks clear guidance on its process for assessing climate change-related risks to its integrated country strategies  State’s current guidance for these country strategies no longer mentions a climate change risk assessment and does not provide missions with information about the climate risk screening tool that can be used to conduct such an assessment  As such, missions are less likely to examine climate change as a risk to their strategic objectives, or to do so in a consistent manner, and thus may not have the information they would need to identify migration as a risk of climate change  By clearly documenting and providing guidance on how to assess the risk of climate change, State would ensure that the department examines the potential risks of climate change on its foreign assistance activities  We are making the following recommendation to State: The Secretary of State should ensure that the Director of the Office of U S  Foreign Assistance Resources provides missions with guidance that clearly documents the department’s process for climate change risk assessments for integrated country strategies  (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this product to State, USAID, and DOD for review and comment  State provided written comments, which we have reprinted in appendix IV  In its comments, State did not oppose the recommendation and noted that the agency will update its integrated country strategy guidance by June 30, 2019 to inform missions that they have the option to include an annex on climate resilience, as well as other topics  However, State also indicated that the agency will begin working with stakeholders to consider whether to recommend that the Secretary of State ask the President to rescind Executive Order 13677: Climate- Resilient International Development  USAID also provided written comments, which we have reprinted in appendix V  In its letter, USAID provided some additional information about its programs and its proposed transformation effort  USAID and DOD provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional requesters, Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, and the Secretary of Defense  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao gov, or Brian J  Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI  This report (1) describes executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018; (2) examines the extent to which the Department of State (State), the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD) have discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in their plans and risk assessments; and (3) describes State, USAID, and DOD activities, if any, that are related to climate change and global migration  We chose fiscal years 2014 through 2018 as our time frame based on our review of recent executive orders related to climate change  We selected State, USAID, and DOD because the agencies’ missions of diplomacy, development, and defense provide the foundation for promoting and protecting U S  interests abroad  To describe executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018, we reviewed documents that reflect priorities of the previous and current administrations  Specifically, we reviewed budget requests and enacted appropriations between fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for funding priorities related to climate change and U S  foreign assistance  In addition, we reviewed executive actions and executive branch strategies that applied to State, USAID, and DOD between fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for executive and national security priorities related to climate change  For example, we reviewed the current and previous national security strategies  strategies and seven regional bureau strategies  For USAID, we examined the five country and regional strategies that were required to include a climate risk assessment at the time of our review: Uganda, Tunisia, East Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe  We also reviewed all nine USAID regional strategies  For both State and USAID, we reviewed the selected strategies by searching for information related to migration and climate change  To determine whether State clearly documents the department’s current climate risk assessment process for integrated country strategies, we compared State’s 2018 guidance for developing integrated country strategies with standards related to documentation in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and previous State guidance issued in 2016, which was created in response to Executive Order 13677’s requirements to assess climate change risks to strategies, among other things  to these issues  The agency then provided us with data for about 250 activities from its annual operational plans for fiscal years 2014 through 2016, the 3 years during the period we reviewed in which it received adaptation funding  USAID identified these activities based on whether the agency had tagged them in its plans as having an “adaptation key issue ” USAID excluded projects that had planned attributions to the adaptation key issue of less than $250,000 in a given fiscal year, as well as certain other activities such as those that focused on project support  We then conducted an automated review of the activity description fields provided by USAID for terms related to migration and other descriptive information such as locations of activities  Because no USAID adaptation activities specifically mentioned migration, for the purposes of this report we chose illustrative examples to provide context for the types of activities the agency has funded  DOD officials we met with did not identify any specific activities related to climate change as a driver of migration  DOD officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the geographic combatant commands generally discussed DOD activities related to humanitarian assistance and disaster response as most relevant to our inquiry  Because DOD works in coordination with USAID’s Office of U S  Foreign Disaster Assistance on disaster assistance we also reviewed USAID data on its disaster response activities during this period  We determined that the USAID and State adaptation project data and USAID disaster assistance data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing these efforts  State, USAID, and DOD to obtain information on whether changes in government priorities related to climate change affected their activities  We conducted this performance audit from October 2017 to January 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  This appendix provides a review by region of observed and projected climate change effects, migration trends, and challenges in stability and security  Multiple sources we used for this overview make a connection between climate change and such events as rising sea levels, higher temperatures, and an increase in the number and severity of extreme weather events  The following regions are discussed: Asia, South America, the Arctic, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Oceania, and Central America and the Caribbean  We have provided an overview for each region and a focus on one country or territory in the region  international and regional organizations, including a variety of organizations within the United Nations, the World Bank, regional development banks, the European Union, and others  Third, we reviewed relevant public documents from U S  government agencies, including the Department of Defense, the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)  Fourth, we reviewed academic sources, research institutions, and documents from the relevant country’s national government  population  Economic conditions may be a factor for people deciding whether to migrate or stay in their country of origin  Remittances as Percent of GDP: The money international migrants transfer to recipients in their country of origin, expressed as a percentage of the origin country’s GDP  Sources agree that remittances support resilience in origin countries  Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry as Percent of GDP: A measure of the value added to an economy from the agricultural sector, which includes forestry, hunting, fishing, and the cultivation of crops and livestock, expressed as a percentage of the country’s GDP  Countries that depend on the agricultural sector may be vulnerable to the effects of climate change, according to the World Bank  Percent of Population in Cities: The population living in areas classified as urban according to criteria each country uses  Today, more than half of the global population lives in cities  Migration, in some cases due to climate change, is an important driver of urban growth, according to IOM  Cities are also expected to face increasing risks from rising sea levels, flooding, storms, and other climate change effects  Net Migration Rate: A measure of the number of people leaving a country compared to the number of people entering a country, expressed as a number per 1,000 people  The effects of climate change in Asia may impact migration and stability according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)  In coastal areas, effects of climate change include rising sea levels, storm surges, and others  Receding glaciers in mountanous areas may also cause flooding, and monsoons in a warmer climate may be more severe  Heat extremes and more rainfall are a particular concern in Southeast Asia  Changes in precipitation and drought in Asia may exacerbate food security challenges, and contribute to people deciding to migrate  Increases in migration, partly stemming from the effects of climate change in surrounding rural areas, may put pressure on existing urban infrastructure  Rural migrants may settle in informal communities on the outskirts of cities, areas that have little resilience to natural disasters  Although the World Bank and others agree that climate change largely causes internal migration, some evidence shows that the impact of climate change contributes to cross-border migration in Asia  Large numbers of migrants, along with other destabilizing factors, may contribute to instability and conflict, according to the IPCC  The effects of climate change on livelihoods, for example, could increase migration, strain governance, and contribute to conflict as a result  Bangladesh is one example where decreased yields from agriculture and fisheries have contributed to migration to the country’s coastal cities, which face their own climate change challenges  Bangladesh’s high population density and geography make the country susceptible to the effects of climate change, according to the World Bank, and others  Bangladesh’s coasts and river banks are vulnerable to sudden-onset events such as tropical cyclones and flooding  Cyclone Aila in 2009, for example, caused widespread flooding in the southern coastal areas of Bangladesh and impacted millions of people  The storm washed away embankments that protected coastlines and caused severe damage to crops and livelihoods  Tropical Cyclone Mora in 2017 damaged thousands of homes and displaced an estimated 200,000 people  Increases in the number and intensity of tropical cyclones, which some predict will occur in a warmer climate, could have severe impacts on homes, livelihoods, and food security  Bangladesh also experiences many slow-onset climate change events, such as rising sea levels and increasingly severe droughts, which are projected to intensify with climate change  Bangladesh would lose an estimated 17 5 percent of its land if the sea level rose 1 meter, as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has reported  Projected changes in precipitation levels could cause drought and food insecurity in the northwest and salt-water intrusion could reduce crop yields in the southwest  Migration is a common adaptation strategy to climate change in Bangladesh, according to the ADB  For example, some farmers have adapted to salt water intrusion and destroyed crops by switching to salt- tolerant rice production or shrimp cultivation  Others have migrated, often to Bangladesh’s cities to find work less dependent on agriculture  Many new migrants to Bangladesh’s cities live in informal settlements that lack the resilience to withstand sudden-onset climate events  The capital city, Dhaka, is a common destination for migrants displaced by salt-water intrusion, flooding, and river erosion, according to IOM  Dhaka, like many coastal cities in South Asia, is located on a low-lying riverbank and faces increasing risks of extreme flooding  For example, past floods in Dhaka have destroyed homes and contaminated drinking water, creating significant health hazards  In some cases, individuals migrate to cities temporarily for work and return home after the agricultural off season ends  Bangladeshis also provide a significant number of labor migrants to the Gulf States and Malaysia  Remittances from international migrants represent 5 4 percent of the country’s GDP, and may help to support resilience to climate change, according to IOM, and others  These migration trends may intensify in the future  One study estimates 9


Report 2: 6 million people will migrate from 2011 to 2050 due to the effects of climate change  Challenges in Stability and Security Migration due to climate change is cited as a potential destabilizing factor in Bangladesh by ADB, and others  The low-income population in Bangladesh is dependent on agriculture, making the effects of climate change—including impacts on food security—a particular concern  By 2030, these effects on livelihoods and food security could increase the poverty rate in Bangladesh by 15 percent, as the IPCC has reported  Given the proximity of Bangladesh to India, some individuals may also choose to cross the border  Increased migration to India is a potential concern, according to some sources, as India may not have the resources to absorb large numbers of Bangladeshi migrants  The CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: 2007); and Population Council, “Effects of Future Climate Change on Cross-Border Migration in North Africa and India,” Population and Development Review, Vol  36, No  2 (2010)  The effects of climate change in South America vary by region, according to the the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as potentially impacting migration and stability  On the coast, risks include sea level rise, depletion of fisheries, and coral reef bleaching, according to IOM  Coastal cities with growing populations are particularly vulnerable  Melting glaciers in the Andean mountain region, and increased rainfall are expected to change the distribution of water resources, and impact food production as global demand for food is growing  Desertification and land degradation, complicated by the effects of climate change, are contributing to migration from rural areas to cities in South America, as IOM has reported  An estimated 77 percent of people living in high risk areas in South America are located in cities, according to IOM  IOM predicts that as these people feel the effects of sea level rise and water scarcity, they will migrate from the large coastal cities to smaller urban areas  While South America has experienced economic growth in the last decade, poverty rates remain high, and the effects of climate change, including possible migration, may exacerbate inequalities, putting further pressure on cities to meet the needs of their populations  Water security in particular is expected to disproportionaly impact low-income communities, according to the IPCC  For example, in Brazil, drought in the northeast may increase migration to southern cities that are facing rising sea levels and landslides, with consequences for food, water, and energy security  Observed and Projected Effects of Climate Change Brazil’s cities and rural regions may encounter a range of climate change effects, according to the IPCC and IOM  Rural areas, particularly in the northeast, could experience significant impacts from climate change partly due to poverty rates, and historical vulnerability to drought  Higher temperatures are expected to affect crop yields and household incomes, especially for low-income communities  In northeastern Brazil, temperatures are expected to increase and rainfall to decrease  The northeast could see a 22 percent reduction in precipitation by 2100, according to IPCC projections  Brazil’s coastal areas, including cities, are also vulnerable to rising sea levels, heavy precipitation, flooding, and landslides  The vast majority of Brazil’s population, about 86 percent, lives in cities, many in coastal areas, according to the United Nations Development Program  As their populations have grown, urban areas have extended out  This urban growth in Brazil’s megacities has caused further increases in temperature, rainfall, and landslides  For example, current levels of urbanization in the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo may already be responsible for the 2°C warming observed in the city over the last 50 years, as well as the rise in extreme rainfall, according to the IPCC  The metropolitan area is expected to extend its area 38 percent by 2030  Multiple studies of the effects of urbanization on Sao Paulo’s climate suggest higher temperatures affect convective rainfall, which occurs when warm air rises, condenses to form clouds, and produces extreme rain  Other concerns are the depletion of coral reefs and mangrove forests on Brazil’s coastlines, and decreases in biodiversity  Migration from drought in northeastern Brazil to cities has increased urban populations, putting more people at risk of displacement from flooding and landslides  Migration from the northeast is a historical trend in Brazil, as economic migrants have sought seasonal jobs in more productive agricultural regions, or moved permanently to southern cities  Projected declines in rainfall have led some to predict further increases in migration in northeastern Brazil, as the IPCC has reported  However, remittances from family members who leave Brazil’s northeast support resilience for those who remain and may help to reduce migration  Already environmental factors contribute to migration to cities, including to favelas, informal settlements often constructed in hilly areas and floodplains outside of Brazilian cities  A significant number of the favela residents in Rio de Janeiro are migrants from northeastern Brazil, according to IOM  These new migrants may be at risk of further displacement if heavy rainfall, flooding, and other climate change effects destroy their vulnerable homes  For example, heavy rainfall in April 2010 resulted in landslides across Rio de Janeiro, displacing an estimated 5,000 people, according to a report from the World Bank  Brazil is also a destination for migrants from other countries in the region  Migrants from Venezuela searching for jobs and improved food security have come in growing numbers in recent years, as have migrants from Haiti fleeing a series of natural disasters, as IOM has reported  Challenges in Stability and Security Although Brazil ranks 106th out of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index, the effects of climate change may contribute to challenges with water, food, and energy access according to the IPCC  Decreased rainfall could decrease agricultural productivity, with potential health impacts for poor populations  These conditions are of particular concern in northeastern Brazil, as extreme weather and low crop yields are associated with more violence, according to the IPCC  Brazil also receives about 70 percent of its electricity from hydroelectric power, according the United Nations Environment Programme, and recent droughts caused power cuts across many major cities  Although not linked to the effects of climate change, absorbing a growing number of migrants fleeing political and economic instability in Venezuela may impact the broader region, according to the U S  Department of Defense and the National Intelligence Council  Neighboring countries, including Brazil, may struggle to absorb the influx of migrants  On average, 800 Venezuelans are crossing the border to Brazil every day in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, according to the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency  The effects of climate change in the Arctic, including higher temperatures and melting ice, have contributed to shifts in migration across the Arctic, and may have security implications  Increasing temperatures may have a variety of impacts in the Arctic, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  The effects of rising temperatures are disrupting livelihoods and food security, especially for indigenous communities, and opening up untapped natural resources to extraction  Both trends have impacted migration flows in the Arctic  Rising temperatures and melting ice have opened up previously inaccessible waterways in the Arctic, with implications for national security, according to the Department of Defense and others  Greenland, located in the Arctic and considered part of Kingdom of Denmark, exhibits many of these trends  Greenland is experiencing the effects of climate change, including glacial and ice melt, shifts in wildlife distribution, and newly available oil and mineral deposits, among others  The Greenland Ice Sheet covers approximately 80 percent of Greenland’s land mass  The ice sheet’s melting rate is slow, but uncertain  Increases in temperature greater than 1°C may result in the near loss of the entire ice sheet over a millennium and significant sea level rise, according to the IPCC  In the short term, predicting the ice sheet’s melting rate is a challenge as predictions vary in the scientific community  Accurate predictions would support mitigation and adaptation efforts in vulnerable areas  Rising temperatures and shrinking ice cover have shifted the distribution and migration patterns of marine mammals and fish, and impacted food security according to the IPCC and the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum for Arctic states  For example, the economy in Paamiut, Greenland, depended primarily on cod fisheries until changing climate conditions caused cod to disappear, and the town was slow to adapt to newly available shrimp  Similarly, fisheries in Disko Bay, Greenland, have struggled to adapt to new conditions  Rising temperatures and the resulting reduction in ice cover have required a shift to fishing from boats in open water instead of hunting and fishing over ice cover  Lastly, warming and ice melt may make significant oil and mineral deposits accessible for extraction in the future  The potential expansion of extraction industries makes environmental sustainability another possible concern  For example, an estimated 31 billion barrels of oil and gas may exist off the coast of Northeast Greenland, according to the Kingdom of Denmark’s 2011-2020 Arctic Strategy  The strategy stresses the importance of assessing and reducing risks to the environment resulting from the exploration and extraction of oil and gas  The effects of climate change are predicted to contribute to internal and external migration in Greenland  For example, young people are increasingly leaving indigenous communities in rural areas for cities in Greenland in search of work, as traditional livelihoods become unsustainable  Greenland is home to a majority indigenous population, primarily Inuit, whose traditional hunting and fishing practices require travel across ice  In the past, people adapted to seasonal changes to support livelihoods by migrating, and the practice was embedded into indigenous social structures  With reduced ice cover, however, migrating to hunt, fish, and maintain connections to community is more dangerous or restricted  Government policies promoting centralized services, such as health care and education, have also played a role in the shift away from migration as a way of life  As a result, indigenous livelihoods are more difficult to maintain, and young people often migrate to towns and cities in Greenland, or to Denmark, for education  At the same time, warmer temperatures have made mineral extraction feasible  As the extraction industry grows, new jobs may draw migrants from outside the Arctic region  In 2011 companies spent $100 million on the exploration of minerals in the Artic, and the estimated number of new mines is expected to require more workers than now live in the region 17 79Currently, more people leave than migrate to Greenland  The local Inuit population in Uummannaq, Greenland relies heavily on ice coverage for fishing and travel by traditional dog-sled  Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, A Complex Constellation: Displacement, Climate Change and Arctic Peoples (January 30, 2013)  Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement  The effects of climate change on Sub-Saharan Africa vary depending on the region and have impacts on migration and security, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)  Coastal areas, for example, in West and East Africa are at risk from sea level rise that could affect major cities  Drought and the risk of desertification in the Sahel is cited as a concern, as is increased rainfall in parts of Central Africa accompanied by lower agricultural yields  As desertification threatens the livelihoods of farmers and herders, and drought makes fishing more challenging, rural dwellers may be more likely to migrate to cities, according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)  Urbanization and population growth across Sub-Saharan Africa is already making densely populated cities vulnerable to flooding, storms, and erosion, increasing the number of people at risk of displacement by sudden-onset disasters  Climate change effects and changing migration flows across Sub-Saharan Africa may impact access to natural resources and contribute to existing tensions and conflicts, according to UNEP and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  In Nigeria, the effects of climate change may effect a variety of livelihoods and increase migration south, while also exacerbating existing conflicts  The effects of climate change on Nigeria may impact the country’s agriculture and economy, according to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)  Higher temperatures and decreased rainfall have contributed to drought in northern Nigeria  Desertification is also a concern  Some regions in northern Nigeria have less than 10 inches of rain a year, an amount that has decreased by 25 percent since the 1980’s, according to USIP  In other areas across Nigeria flooding has resulted in major crop losses, according to UNEP  Rising sea level, water inundation, and erosion are concerns in Nigeria’s coastal areas  Rising sea level is predicted to pose medium to very high risks to Africa’s coastal areas by 2100, according to the IPCC  Future sea level rise could result in the inundation of over 70 percent of the Nigerian coast  A rise of 0 2 meters in sea level could risk billions of dollars in assets, including oil wells near the coast  Even without a rapid rise in sea level, Nigeria’s coastal areas could experience erosion and significant land loss by 2100, as the IPCC has reported  The effects of climate change on livelihoods in northern Nigeria may contribute to migration to the south according to UNEP, while conflict in the north drives separate migration trends  As the effects of climate change make farming and fishing more challenging elsewhere in Nigeria, migration to southern coastal cities may increase  Traditionally, farmers, herders, and fishery workers migrated for temporary employment during the off season, including migration to Nigeria’s cities to work in the oil industry  Permanent migration south as well as to cities may become more common if land suitable for farming decreases  As fish habitats like Lake Chad dry up, fishery workers may also migrate  Larger urban populations on the coast will put more people at risk of sea level rise, water inundation, and erosion, according to the IPCC  A rise in sea level of 1 meter could put over 3 million people at risk of displacement as the IPCC has reported  Herders have also moved further south due to increased drought in northern Nigeria, as UNEP and USIP have reported  A 2010 survey of herdsmen in Nigeria, for example, found that nearly one-third of them had migrated southeast as a result of changes in the natural environment, according to the UNEP  The ongoing conflict with Boko Haram, while not caused by climate change, has further resulted in millions of displaced people across the Lake Chad region, including many Nigerians who have fled to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger  Nigerian refugees at the Minawao camp in Cameroon  Challenges in Stability and Security The effects of climate change, migration, and conflict are interconnected in Nigeria, as USIP has reported  The country is ranked 14th of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index  Events in northwest Africa, including Boko Haram’s attacks in Nigeria, have underscored concerns about the region’s vulnerability to the spread of violent extremism  The effects of climate change may exacerbate these concerns, according to USIP  Nigerians fleeing attacks from Boko Haram in the north have gone to communities in neighboring Chad, Cameroon, and Niger that are already experiencing food shortages due in part to climate change  These neighboring countries as a result have fewer resources to support both their own residents and the newer refugees  Non-state actors may also take advantage of government inaction on the effects of climate change  Boko Haram, for example, has justified its acts of violence by pointing to government failures, according to the USIP  Separately, increased drought in the north may aggravate historic tensions over land and water use between farmers in the south and herders migrating from the north, according to UNEP  Nigeria’s oil fields on the coast, which represent a significant part of the economy, are also at risk from sea level rise  Potential losses in oil revenue could impact Nigeria’s ability to respond to humanitarian crises and conflict at home  Increased violence within its borders could also affect Nigeria’s ability to support regional peacekeeping missions, such as the United Nations Mission in Liberia from 2003 to 2018, where Nigerian troops worked to restore security after a civil war  The effects of climate change in the Middle East and North Africa, including on its desert regions, may impact water access and compound migration and stability challenges, according to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)  Over 60 percent of the population already experiences high or very high water stress, according to the World Bank  Coupled with unsustainable water use, climate change may further exacerbate challenges with water security  The region continues to experience rising temperatures and declining annual rainfall, trends that contribute to the severity and length of drought, land degradation, and desertification  Decreased water security affects the livelihood and quality of life of farmers in the region, contributing to an increase in their migration to the cities and more urbanization, according to the World Bank  In contrast, many people are expected to migrate away from coastal cities as a result of sea level rise, according to UNEP  These potential migrations would be taking place in a region that already hosts large numbers of migrants such as those displaced by conflict and violence, including 18 percent of the world’s refugees, according to the International Organization for Migration  Challenges in water security may put greater pressure on unstable governments in the region, by intensifying existing tensions and conflicts between populations and their governments as well as between countries that share sources of water  The conflict in Syria illustrates the complex nature of climate change, migration, and conflict in the region, and the challenges to accurately assessing the links among the three, as noted in a technical paper commissioned by the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID)  Rising temperatures and declining rainfall have contributed to recent droughts in Syria, a trend that may continue  The country underwent an extended drought from about 2006 until 2011  During the drought an estimated 60 percent of Syria experienced severe crop failure, and accompanying impacts on food security  Some studies have linked the length and severity of the drought in Syria to climate change, as USAID has reported  Others, however, have pointed to government land and water use policies, combined with the effects of climate change, as responsible for the severity of the drought  Agricultural policies, for example, encouraged farmers to grow water intensive crops like wheat, and supported inefficient irrigation practices, policies which further depleted ground water and made the region more vulnerable to decreases in rainfall linked to climate change  Across the Middle East, the rising temperatures and declining rainfalls of recent decades may worsen, according to the World Bank  If these trends continue, countries in the Middle East, including Syria, could continue to experience periods of severe drought and reduced crop yields  Migration Trends The ongoing conflict in Syria, in which migration due to climate change may have been a contributing factor, has caused large-scale migration to neighboring countries in the Middle East and to Europe  Leading up to the civil war, prolonged drought, among other factors, had increased migration to Syrian cities  Because of the drought, in 2009, over 800,000 Syrians lost their livelihoods in the agricultural sector, while nearly 1 million experienced food insecurity  In 2010, an estimated 200,000 people migrated from farms in rural areas to cities, according to a UN report  The conflict in Syria, which began in 2011, has further displaced large numbers of people within the country and across the Middle East, as we have previously reported At the beginning of the conflict, Syrians, as well as Iraqi and Palestinian refugees who had been residing in Syria, fled mainly to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey  As the conflict persisted, refugees fled in larger numbers to Turkey, with the UNHCR reporting that nearly 1 million Syrians sought protection in that country in 2015  Starting that year, a growing number of Syrians risked dangerous sea voyages to reach countries in Europe, such as Greece, Germany, and Sweden  As of June 2017, more than 5 million registered Syrian refugees were living in neighboring countries, including more than 3 million in Turkey, and more than 1 million in Lebanon  Challenges in Stability and Security Sources agree that the Syrian conflict is a significant security challenge that has resulted in large scale migration across the Middle East and to Europe  Yet the link between prolonged drought, rural to urban migration, and the current conflict in Syria is uncertain  Some academic sources argue that the increased strain on urban infrastructure and resources due to the rural to urban migration played a role in Syria’s growing instability  Others highlight the complex nature of the Syrian conflict, pointing to broader political factors that exacerbated resource scarcity and inequality  For example, as the drought intensified, the Syrian government downplayed the severity of the humanitarian crisis, as described in research cited in a technical report commissioned by USAID result, appeals to the international community for emergency aid received minimal support  Combined with existing sectarian divisions, ongoing revolutions across the Middle East, and other factors, the government’s response to the drought may have contributed to the current conflict  Migration and displacement are a concern in the region, according to the Department of Defense and others  The U S  government has provided significant humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees in the Middle East, including in Lebanon and Jordan, as we have previously reported However, a technical report commissioned by USAID has cautioned that the ongoing conflict in Syria makes it difficult to conduct research and draw conclusions related to climate, migration and conflict  As a The effects of climate change on Oceania, particularly rising seas, may significantly impact coastal populations and increase migration in the future, as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have reported  Rising temperatures and declining rainfall may also contribute to lower yields from fisheries and agriculture, and a significant decrease in coral reef cover  Extreme weather events, including higher temperatures, wind, and rainfall, have already increased in number and intensity across the region  In the majority of Pacific island nations, of those who migrate, more people leave than come, according to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Observatory on Migration  The majority of migration in the region is economically driven  In the future, climate change may further impact these migration patterns across the region, according to the IPCC  Climate change has already exacerbated challenges that aid-dependent nations in the region face, restricting livelihoods and resources and contributing to pressures to migrate  The costs of climate change, including a decline in crop yields, a rise in energy demands, and a loss of coastal land, are predicted to be significant  The ADB estimates these costs will reach 12 7 percent of the Pacific regions’ GDP by 2100  Increased migration may also impact political stability and play a role in geopolitical rivalries within the region, according to the IPCC  The effects of climate change, especially rising sea levels, may result in forced migration from the Republic of the Marshall Islands (the Marshall Islands) and have additional impacts on the U S  defense infrastructure on the islands  Observed and Projected Effects of Climate Change Rising sea levels are a grave threat to the Marshall Islands The country consists of islands, low-lying atolls—coral caps sitting on top of submerged volcanoes—making it particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels  On average, the Marshall Islands are 2 meters above sea level  In Majuro, the country’s most populous atoll, observed rates of sea level rise are already twice as fast as the global average  Population centers experience significant flooding, with damage to roads, houses, and infrastructure, especially during La Niña years, which are significantly wetter and more prone to extreme rainfall  Flooding is expected to worsen with rising sea levels, with consequences for the availabity of drinking water  On Roi-Namur island, for example, a 0 4 meter rise in sea level combined with wave-driven flooding is predicted to make groundwater undrinkable year round as early as 2055  This salt water inundation may contaminate already limited groundwater across the Marshall Islands  Lastly, during the 1940s and 1950s, the Marshall Islands was the site of 67 U S  nuclear weapons tests on or near Bikini and Enewetak Atolls  Projected increases in frequency of flooding may negatively impact efforts to contain radioactive material stored on Runit Island  A number of factors have increased migration from the Marshall Islands, including to the United States  In 1986, the United States entered into a compact of free association with the country that allowed its citizens to migrate to the United States, as we have previously reported  As a result, more than 20,000 Marshallese now live in the United States People are more likely to migrate abroad as the effects of climate change on the Marshall Islands—including rising sea levels—increasingly impact livelihoods The threat of mass displacement and forced migration is also a concern, as the International Organization for Migration has reported  However, Marshallese culture has a strong connection to the land, which means that many view migration as a last resort  For people still living in the Marshall Islands, they face overpopulation in urban centers and displacement by sudden-onset disasters like cyclones and flooding  Factors influencing people deciding to move abroad include displacement, lack of economic opportunity—sometimes exacerbated by climate change—and limited access to health care  Climate change is likely to increase risks to public health in the country Increased rainfall, for instance, may expand mosquito breeding grounds, raising the risk of diseases like dengue fever  The country’s limited health care system may further contribute to migration from the islands  Challenges in Stability and Security In the future, the Marshall Islands may become uninhabitable  This prospect threatens the existence of the Marshall Islands as a sovereign state, as well as the United States defense facilities located on the islands  The total loss of land could result in the Marshall Islands being uninhabitable, which raises problems of migration, resettlement, cultural survival, and sovereignty  Relocation of the population of the Marshall Islands, and of other Pacific Island nations at risk of rising seas, could cause significant geopolitical challenges The Marshall Islands are also of strategic importance for the United States  Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States has permission to use several islands— including Kwajalein Atoll, the location of the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Range—until 2066  The country’s proximity to the equator makes the Marshall Islands ideal for missile defense and space work  Yet the island’s defense infrastructure and operations are at significant risk due to rising sea levels, flooding, and diminishing supplies of potable water  As the Department of Defense has noted, climate change will have serious implications for the department’s ability to maintain its infrastructure and ensure military readiness in the future  DOD, 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap (Alexandria, VA: June 2014)  The effects of climate change on Central America and the Caribbean may increase migration and exacerbate poverty rates, as the National Intelligence Council has reported  The climate in Central America and the Caribbean is predicted to be warmer and dryer  The Caribbean’s extensive coastlines and low-lying areas are vulnerable to sea level rise and an increase in sudden-onset disasters, including hurricanes and storm surges  Drought is a particular concern in Central America, where declines in rainfall have reduced crop yields and threatened livelihoods in recent years  Some evidence shows that drought in parts of Central America has contributed to migration north, including to the United States  Population growth, especially in coastal cities, has increased the number of people at risk during hurricane season, and the number and intensity of hurricanes have grown in recent years  Some attribute the increase in intensity to higher sea surface temperatures caused by climate change  However, there remains debate about long term hurricane trends  Recent hurricanes have caused displacement, and significant losses and damages—including to infrastructure—across the region  The depletion of coral reefs and mangrove trees, natural barriers to coastal erosion and flooding, has exacerbated vulnerability to storms in coastal areas  Climate change is likely to have negative impacts on tourism in the Caribbean, where the industry is an important part of the economy, according to Inter-American Development Bank  Climate change impacts on the economy may make it increasingly difficult for governments to reduce poverty and move towards environmental sustainability  Haiti’s geography, location, and high poverty rates make the country especially vulnerable  Haiti is highly vulnerable to climate change effects, partly due to its long coastline Hurricanes routinely make landfall in the country, and increases in rainfall and wind speeds associated with hurricanes are likely  Severe hurricanes, including Hurricane Matthew in September 2016, have hit Haiti in recent years  Hurricane Matthew was the first category 4 storm in Haiti since 1964  Damage from severe flooding and severe winds during the hurricane affected over 2 million people and created significant food security and public health challenges  Significant deforestation has further exacerbated Haiti’s vulnerability to hurricanes, as trees previously provided a natural barrier to the erosion that strong winds and more rainfall can cause  Rising temperature and highly variable rainfall have led to extreme drought and flash flooding, according to the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID) 32 2 These trends decrease crop yields, affecting the livelihoods of farmers, and threaten water access  Projected increase in temperature and decreases in rainfall are likely to intensify drought in Haiti’s interior  USAID, Haiti: Environment and Climate Change Fact Sheet (January 2016)  Migration Trends Slow-onset climate events, such as drought, and rising sea levels, and sudden-onset events, including earthquakes, affect Haiti, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)  Haiti is also particularly exposed to extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, which can lead to displacement  In January 2010, a catastrophic earthquake in Haiti killed an estimated 230,000 people and left close to 1 5 million people homeless  According to IOM, the recurrence of environmental disruptions increases risks and vulnerabilities  When Hurricane Sandy struck Haiti in October 2012, the country had still not recovered from the 2010 earthquake  The worsening of climate change effects around the world, particularly in low-income countries, may increase the number of people wanting to immigrate to the United States, where approximately 700,000 Haitians live today Remittances from family members living outside Haiti make up a significant portion of the economy, at 24 7 percent of GDP  The majority of these remittances come from the United States, as we have previously reported 34 4Remittances may support resilience to climate change effects as migrants send money home for disaster recovery and adaptation  Challenges in Stability and Security Haiti, the poorest country in the western hemisphere, has experienced political instability for most of its history, and ranks 12th of 178 on the Fragile States Index  The government has a low capacity to respond to additional challenges like those related to climate change, according to USAID  The Ministry of Environment, for example, is a relatively new organization within the Haitian government, and local and regional governments have a limited ability to enforce environmental laws and regulations  The United States has provided substantial aid to Haiti, both in disaster response and broader development projects  Official development assistance for Haiti in 2015, for instance, totaled slightly more than $1 billion  According to a January 2018 UN report, 2 8 million people were still in need of humanitarian assistance  GAO, Remittances To Fragile Countries: Treasury Should Assess Risks from Shifts to Non-Banking Channels, GAO-18-313 (Washington, D C , March 8, 2018)  The Department of State’s Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (State/OES) provided about $78 million in adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative for eight projects for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 (see table 2)  The Global Climate Change Initiative was established in 2010 to promote resilient, low- emission development, and integrate climate change considerations into U S  foreign assistance and was divided into three main programmatic initiatives: (1) Adaptation assistance, (2) Clean Energy assistance, and (3) Sustainable Landscapes assistance  The primary purpose of these contributions to the LDCF was to address the adaptation needs of the least developed countries, which are especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change  The LDCF financed the preparation and implementation of National Adaptation Programs of Action, which identify a country’s priorities for adaptation actions  Initial grant to the National Adaptation Plans Global Network  The network is focused on increasing the capacity of national and subnational governments to identify and assess climate risks, integrate these risk considerations in sector planning, develop a pipeline of projects to address risks, identify and secure funding for projects, and track progress toward resilience targets  Colombia, East Caribbean (Guyana, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Ethiopia, Peru, South Africa, Uganda, West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Togo) and, under current consideration, East Caribbean (Dominica, Suriname), and Pacific (Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu) The cost amendment intensified the technical support on National Adaptation Plans to select countries dependent upon specific country adaption needs  In addition, the cost amendment continued the learning and progress from the initial grant  Implemented through the Department of Treasury, this funding supported a Treasury grant to the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative Multi Donor Trust Fund at the World Bank  This activity established the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Foundation and the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Company, among other things  The goal of PIER is to increase private sector investment in resilience to climate change in eight developing countries  The first phase of the project will assess and identify opportunities for private investment in resilience, as well as build public and private capacity for climate risk assessment in all the countries  In the second phase, public and private sector partners will develop and pilot climate risk-reduction investment models in four of the countries  The third phase will publicize the piloted investment models and lessons learned among the eight countries  Implemented through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, this activity aims to implement a capacity-building partnership with India to promote effective climate resilient decision making at national, state, and local levels  In addition to the contacts named above, the following individuals made key contributions to this report: Miriam Carroll Fenton (Assistant Director), Kristy Williams (Assistant Director), Rachel Girshick (Analyst-in-Charge), Nancy Santucci, Miranda Cohen, Aldo Salerno, Neil Doherty, and Judith Williams  Alexander Welsh, Justin Fisher, and Joseph Thompson provided technical and other support  Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Needs to Better Incorporate Adaptation into Planning and Collaboration at Overseas Installations  GAO-18-206  Washington, D C : November 13, 2017  Compacts Of Free Association: Actions Needed to Prepare for The Transition of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands to Trust Fund Income  GAO-18-415  Washington, D C : May 17, 2018  Remittances to Fragile Countries: Treasury Should Assess Risks from Shifts to Non-Banking Channels  GAO-18-313  Washington, D C : March 8, 2018  Syrian Refugees: U S  Agencies Conduct Financial Oversight Activities for Humanitarian Assistance but Should Strengthen Monitoring  GAO-18-58  Washington, D C : October 31, 2017  International Food Assistance: Agencies Should Ensure Timely Documentation of Required Market Analyses and Assess Local Markets for Program Effects  GAO-17-640  Washington, D C : July 13, 2017  High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others  GAO-17-317  Washington, D C : February 15, 2017  Federal Disaster Assistance: Federal Departments and Agencies Obligated at Least $277 6 Billion during Fiscal Years 2005 through 2014  GAO-16-797  Washington, D C : September 22, 2016  Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy Is Underway, but Agency Could Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps  GAO-16-453  Washington, D C : July 12, 2016  Climate Information: A National System Could Help Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Decision Makers Use Climate Information  GAO-16-37  Washington, D C : November 23, 2015  Hurricane Sandy: An Investment Strategy Could Help the Federal Government Enhance National Resilience for Future Disasters  GAO-15-515  Washington, D C : July 30, 2015  High-Risk Series: An Update  GAO-15-290  Washington, D C : February 11, 2015  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  GAO-14-704G  Washington, D C : September 10, 2014  Combating Terrorism: U S  Efforts in Northwest Africa Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management  GAO-14-518  Washington, D C : June 24, 2014  Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Can Improve Infrastructure Planning and Processes to Better Account for Potential Impacts  GAO-14-446  Washington, D C : May 30, 2014  Extreme Weather Events: Limiting Federal Fiscal Exposure and Increasing the Nation’s Resilience  GAO-14-364T  Washington, D C : February 12, 2014  Climate Change: State Should Further Improve Its Reporting on Financial Support to Developing Countries to Meet Future Requirements and Guidelines  GAO-13-829  Washington, D C : September 19, 2013  High-Risk Series: An Update  GAO-13-283  Washington, D C : February 14, 2013  International Climate Change Assessments: Federal Agencies Should Improve Reporting and Oversight of U S  Funding  GAO-12-43  Washington, D C : November 17, 2011  Climate Change Adaptation: Federal Efforts to Provide Information Could Help Government Decision Making  GAO-12-238T  Washington, D C : November 16, 2011  Foreign Relation: Kwajalein Atoll Is the Key U S  Defense Interest in Two Micronesian Nations, GAO-02-119  Washington D C : January 22, 2002 

ground_truth: BOP is the largest employer within DOJ and is responsible for the care and custody of an inmate population of about 186,000. BOP has faced challenges retaining staff at correctional facilities, although it has used retention incentives, along with other human capital flexibilities. GAO was asked to review BOP's use of retention incentives. This report addresses: (1) how BOP used its authority to pay retention incentives; (2) internal controls BOP has in place for the use of retention incentives; and (3) the extent to which BOP plans for and evaluates the use of retention incentives. GAO obtained employee-level retention incentive expenditure data from DOJ's Justice Management Division for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. GAO also reviewed agency documentation, such as policy statements and 40 randomly selected retention incentive application packet case files from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. GAO also interviewed officials from BOP's Central Office and four correctional facilities that use retention incentives, selected to reflect variation in the number and types of employees receiving retention incentives, BOP regions, and BOP institution security levels. From fiscal years 2012 to 2016, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) total retention incentive expenditures generally increased from $10.7 to $14.0 million and the number of employees receiving retention incentives increased from 2,024 to 2,460. During those five years, BOP spent more than 97 percent of its total retention incentive expenditures on employees at four BOP institutions in California and for medical professionals nationwide. Further, total retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals increased by an average of 21 percent per year (see figure). According to BOP officials, BOP uses retention incentives, for example, to supplement BOP's medical professionals' salaries which are generally lower than private sector salaries. BOP has a variety of internal controls in place throughout the retention incentive process that help ensure retention incentive applications and approvals meet requirements. For example, each application goes through multiple levels of review to verify its accuracy and completeness. BOP takes steps to determine workforce needs and how to fill those needs, but has not strategically planned for and evaluated its use of retention incentives. According to BOP, planning for human capital needs is conducted at institutions during quarterly meetings, but discussions about these incentives respond to short-term staffing situations rather than proactively addressing future staffing needs. Including human capital goals and strategies in BOP's human capital plan would create a roadmap so the agency could move from being reactive to its current workforce needs to being strategic in trying to achieve its long-term workforce goals. Additionally BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of its use of retention incentives in retaining staff. As a result, BOP does not know whether retention incentives have contributed to employees' retention in relation to other incentives used by BOP. Consistent with key principles for strategic human capital planning, planning for and evaluating the use of retention incentives could help BOP better determine if these incentives are an efficient and effective means by which to retain staff. GAO recommends that BOP (1) include human capital goals and how retention incentives will be used to achieve these goals in its human capital plan; and (2) evaluate the use of retention incentives. BOP concurred with GAO's recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Justice Management Division (JMD) JMD provides the Federal Bureau of Prisons senior management with guidance as it relates to Department of Justice (DOJ) policy for all matters pertaining to organization, management, and administration, including the use of human capital flexibilities such as retention incentives  BOP is responsible for incarcerating all federal offenders sentenced to prison  To carry out its mission, BOP, under the oversight of DOJ’s JMD, manages the human resource operations of its institutions, including the use of retention incentives  BOP administers, monitors, and oversees retention incentives through its Central Office, regional offices, and institutions  Central Office  The Central Office serves as BOP’s headquarters and provides oversight of BOP operations and program areas  Within the Central Office is BOP’s Human Resource Management Division (HRMD) which is responsible for developing, implementing and administering human resource policies and programs, including the use of retention incentives that meet OPM and DOJ requirements  In addition, the Central Office’s Program Review Division (PRD) is responsible for assessing BOP programs, including human resources, to ensure that they are managed and operated effectively  Regional offices  BOP has six regional offices that cover the Mid- Atlantic, North Central, Northeast, South Central, Southeast, and Western regions of the United States  These offices, each led by a regional director, oversee the operations of the 122 federal institutions within their respective geographic regions of the country  According to BOP officials, regional office staff also provide local level oversight of institutions’ human capital programs, such as retention incentives, among other things  Institutions  BOP institutions are managed by a warden and other officials, including an executive assistant and associate warden who generally provide overall direction and, in part, administer the institution’s human capital policies, including policies on retention incentives  Correctional services staff represent the largest segment of each institution’s workforce and are responsible for the correctional treatment, custody, and supervision of inmates  Non-correctional services staff include, among others, those employees assigned to non-correctional services management, facility operations, and the health services unit  Workers in health services and psychology services are responsible for providing inmates with medical, dental, and mental health services and include, for example, dentists, pharmacists, physicians, nurses, psychologists, and drug treatment specialists  The Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 first authorized OPM to allow federal agencies to give incentives, including retention incentives, to employees  The Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2004 provided federal agencies increased flexibilities regarding these incentives  For example, individual retention incentives that were capped at 25 percent of an employee’s basic pay rate could be increased up to 50 percent in cases of critical agency need with OPM’s approval  Generally, under OPM regulations, an agency is authorized to pay a retention incentive to employees  This happens when the agency determines that the unusually high or unique qualifications of the employee or a special need of the agency for the employee’s services makes it essential to retain the employee and that the employee would be likely to leave federal service in the absence of an incentive  In addition, OPM requires agencies to develop plans for using retention incentives outlining, in part, the required documentation for justifying the retention incentive and any criteria for determining the amount of incentive and the length of the service period  Generally, agencies must require that employees sign a written service agreement that outlines the terms of the service such as the employee’s agreement to remain a certain length of time with the agency  Additionally, according to OPM regulations, to qualify for a retention incentive, each employee must have a performance rating of at least “fully successful” or an agency’s equivalent performance rating  BOP funds the majority of its retention incentives through its Salaries and Expenses appropriation account which represented almost 93 percent of BOP’s budget in FY 2016  According to BOP officials, BOP’s Central Office allocates funding from the Salaries and Expenses account to the regional offices  These regional offices then determine how to allocate their budget among various salary and expense activities, including retention incentives  HRMD delegates retention incentive determinations to each institution  In accordance with OPM requirements and BOP’s October 2016 Program Statement on Compensation, the wardens make retention incentive requests based on documented evidence that the employee possesses unusually high or unique qualifications or meets a special need of the agency and has a performance rating of at least “successful or its equivalent ” These incentives are calculated as a percentage of the employee’s basic pay and are disbursed in installments to the employee each pay period  In addition to retention incentives, BOP has authority to provide other compensation-based human capital flexibilities to employees, in certain circumstances  The following summarizes some of the compensation- based human capital flexibilities that BOP uses in addition to retention incentives, to retain and recruit staff: Recruitment and relocation incentives  BOP pays recruitment incentives to new hires and relocation incentives to current employees who elect to move to a different geographic area, when a position is likely to be difficult to fill in the absence of an incentive  Student loan repayments  Using this authority, BOP may repay federally-insured student loans to attract job candidates or retain current employees  Special salary rates  With OPM approval, BOP may establish higher rates of pay for an occupation or group of occupations nationwide or in a local area when it finds the government’s recruitment or retention efforts are, or would likely become, significantly handicapped without those higher rates  Physicians and dental comparability allowances  Comparability allowances may be paid to certain eligible physicians or dental professionals who enter into service agreements  These allowances are paid only to categories of physicians and dentists for which the agency is experiencing recruitment and retention problems and are fixed at the minimum amounts necessary to deal with such problems  BOP retention incentive expenditures generally increased from $10 7 million in fiscal year 2012 to $14 0 million in fiscal year 2016  Additionally, as illustrated in table 1, the number of employees who received retention incentives increased each year from 2,024 employees in fiscal year 2012 to 2,460 employees in fiscal year 2016  In general, BOP employees who received retention incentives received the incentive for more than one year  For example, from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, a total of 3,382 BOP employees received retention incentive payments  Of those, 82 percent (2,766 of 3,382) received retention incentive payments for at least 2 years and 39 percent received retention incentives all 5 years, as shown in figure 1  From fiscal years 2012 through 2016, BOP spent more than 97 percent of its total retention incentive expenditures on employees at four California institutions and for medical professionals nationwide  BOP’s total retention incentive expenditures for the four California institutions and medical professionals nationwide in fiscal year 2016 are provided in figure 2  Four California Institutions  The California institutions—United States Penitentiary (USP) Atwater, Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Herlong, FCI Mendota, and Federal Correctional Complex (FCC) Victorville—constituted the largest portion of BOP’s total retention incentive expenditures, and the level of their expenditures remained relatively steady from fiscal year 2012 through 2016  BOP provides group retention incentives for staff at the General Schedule (GS) grades level 12 and below and those in the Federal Wage System at three institutions—USP Atwater, FCI Herlong, and FCC Victorville  BOP also provides individual retention incentives to its employees at GS grades level 12 and below and in the Federal Wage System at FCI Mendota  As shown in figure 3, our analysis of BOP data found that from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, these four California institutions had the largest percentage of retention incentive expenditures across institutions as well as the largest percentage of employees who received retention incentives  Additionally, the four California institutions’ retention incentive expenditures remained relatively steady—around $8 1 to $8 2 million during the 5-year period—even though the overall number of employees who received the incentives generally increased  BOP officials told us that these California institutions’ retention incentive expenditures remained relatively steady in spite of an overall increase in the number of employees receiving incentives, in part, because in fiscal year 2013 BOP reduced the retention incentive rate—the percentage of an employee’s basic pay that determines the employee’s retention incentive— by 3 percent at the four California institutions  BOP officials reported using retention incentives primarily at these four institutions to supplement correctional officers’ salaries and compensate for the gap between BOP’s and other institutions’ salaries  Specifically, officials told us that these four California institutions were consistently understaffed as a result of their lower salaries in comparison to salaries offered at California state and local prisons and at other BOP institutions in California metropolitan areas  The Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the average salary for correctional officers in California in 2016 was $70,020  For the same year, the annual average salary for BOP correctional officers at these four institutions was $50,859  To bring these four California institutions’ salaries in line with those offered by state, local, and other BOP institutions in California metropolitan areas, BOP officials told us that they first use recruitment incentives to attract and hire staff and then provide retention incentives to employees with a performance rating of at least “successful ” Medical Professionals  From fiscal years 2012 through 2016, BOP retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals increased by an average of approximately 21 percent per year  Our analysis showed that most recently—for fiscal years 2015 and 2016—BOP retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals accounted for the largest portion of BOP’s total retention incentive expenditures across the various occupation groups and was primarily responsible for the overall increase in BOP’s total retention incentive expenditures from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016  For example, in fiscal year 2016, BOP spent approximately 42 percent of total retention incentives expenditures for medical professionals ($5 8 million), 27 percent on correctional officers ($3 8 million), and the remaining 31 percent on employees in other occupations  In total, BOP retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals increased from approximately $2 7 million in fiscal year 2012 to $5 8 million in fiscal year 2016, as shown in figure 4  The increase accounted for 92 percent of BOP’s total increase in retention incentive expenditures during the five-year period  In comparison, BOP’s retention incentive expenditures for correctional officers and all other occupations remained relatively steady from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, increasing by an average of approximately 1 percent per year  According to our analysis, the increase in retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals during the five years is partially explained by the increase in the number of institutions providing retention incentives to medical professionals  Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the number of institutions providing retention incentives to medical professionals increased from 53 institutions with 341 employees in medical occupations receiving retention incentives to 84 institutions providing retention incentives to a total of 646 employees in medical occupations  According to BOP officials, BOP primarily uses retention incentives for medical professionals in an effort to retain these employees by supplementing BOP salaries which are generally lower than salaries offered to medical professionals in the private sector  Officials told us that BOP has designated medical professional positions as hard-to-fill and, therefore, BOP retaining these professionals in a correctional setting requires the use of a variety of incentives, including retention incentives, in order to increase pay  BOP has a number of internal controls in place to ensure that retention incentive applications meet BOP and other requirements  BOP officials told us that these controls are part of a multilayered application and review process that begins at the institution and culminates at BOP’s Central Office  Our review of a random sample of 40 application packet case files for retention incentives awarded from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2016 found that they all generally incorporated the internal controls described by officials  The key controls in this process include: Application review at the institution and regional levels  According to BOP officials, the retention incentive application process begins with an institution’s human resources office, whose staff complete a retention incentive application on behalf of an employee  The institution’s human resources office verifies that the information in the application justifies a retention incentive and that funds are available to pay the incentive  Although it is not required, BOP officials said that they use a retention incentive application checklist to help institutions ensure that retention incentive applications are complete  The institution’s human resources office then submits the completed application packet, which includes supporting documentation, to the warden for review  Next, the application packet is forwarded to the respective BOP regional director who also reviews it for accuracy and completeness  The regional director then adds an approval statement and forwards the packet to the Central Office for final review and approval  Of the 40 randomly selected application packet case files that we reviewed, 36 included a retention incentive checklist used by the institutions and all contained information to justify the retention incentive as well as a statement of the regional director’s approval  Central Office’s final application approval  BOP policy requires that all retention incentive applications undergo two levels of review in BOP’s Central Office: first by the Human Resource Management Division’s (HRMD) Staffing and Employee Relations Section (SERS) and next by HRMD’s Personnel Director, for final review and approval  According to BOP officials, during the review process there is ongoing communication between the various entities to ensure that applications are complete and accurate; for example, if SERS finds an error in the application or requests additional information, SERS returns the application to the regional or institutional level for correction and re-review  All of the 40 BOP application packet case files that we reviewed included approvals by HRMD’s Personnel Director or an authorized official, as required by BOP policy  Annual review and re-certification to continue retention incentives  According to BOP policy, on an annual basis, institutions’ human resources offices are required to review employees’ retention incentives to determine whether the incentive is still warranted  Payment of a retention incentive may be recertified and continued as long as the conditions giving rise to the original determination to pay the incentive still exist and funds are available  For each retention incentive, an institution’s human resources office must determine whether to continue, adjust, or terminate the incentive within one year of the initial or most recent approval  If the human resources office decides to continue the retention incentive, the institution’s warden must again submit a retention incentive application  Applications to continue the retention incentive proceed through the same review and approval process as initial applications  Of the 40 application files that we reviewed, 29 were continuations and 8 were initial requests for a retention incentive  According to BOP officials, after the initial approval of a retention incentive, an institution’s human resources office has primary responsibility for the monitoring of retention incentive payments  According to officials, institutions use a variety of internal controls to monitor the expiration, continuation, or termination of retention incentives, for example: Monitoring expiration dates  BOP officials stated that institutions’ human resources offices monitor retention incentives in order to identify incentives that are approaching their expiration date and need to be terminated or renewed  For example, according to BOP officials from USP Atwater, FCC Butner and FCI Phoenix, staff from their institutions’ human resources offices may generate a retention incentive activity report and cross reference this report with their locally generated tracking sheets  This process helps identify retention incentives approaching their expiration dates so that the human resources offices can submit a request for continuation before the incentive expires  Using automated reminders to prompt file review  BOP officials stated that institutions use automated reminders to alert human resources staff to check the records of retention incentive recipients for human resources-related events such as promotions or relocations that could affect the continuation of a retention incentive  Following a checklist of steps for relocation processes  BOP officials told us that in April 2016 they instituted a checklist that outlines steps that an institution’s human resources staff must take when employees relocate to a different institution  Based on our review of this checklist, one step on the sheet prompts human resources staff to review the employee’s retention incentive  According to BOP policy, when an employee receiving a retention incentive transfers to another location, the human resources office where the employee was receiving the retention incentive is responsible for submitting a request to terminate the incentive  The termination must be effective the last day of the pay period that the employee occupies the position  Submitting forgiveness waivers  BOP officials told us that institutions submit forgiveness waivers if a request to continue a retention incentive is not submitted and approved prior to the retention incentive expiring  BOP officials said that a forgiveness waiver is considered an acknowledgement of an administrative error and is a late submission of a retention incentive renewal that was still warranted  The waiver is not a request to forgive an overpayment since the employee was still considered to be eligible for the retention incentive  Of the 40 retention incentive applications that we reviewed, 5 applications included forgiveness waivers to excuse the tardiness of the filing and request continuations of the retention incentive  According to BOP officials, BOP conducts periodic audits and reviews of its human capital activities and related internal controls, to ensure that retention incentives are being used appropriately  The following offices conduct various audits and reviews involving BOP’s retention incentives: BOP’s Program Review Division (PRD) audits regional and institutional human resources functions  PRD audits BOP’s regional and institutional human resources offices to ensure that they are in compliance with BOP policies and procedures  According to BOP officials, as part of the audit process, PRD audits retention incentives to ensure that they have the proper approvals and are justified  PRD audits each institution’s human resources office at least every three years  During these audits, PRD generates retention incentive activity reports (the same reports that institutions run when monitoring for expiration dates), to check the accuracy of retention incentive programs under review  Following each audit, PRD issues a final report with findings to the institution and to the staff operating the program area under audit  Institutions respond to the report with corrective actions that the institution will take to address the findings  When the institution has resolved all corrective actions from the audit, the audit is closed  Additionally, each quarter, PRD provides HRMD with a report that summarizes its quarterly audit findings  According to BOP officials, HRMD uses these reports to identify any agency-wide trends that need to be addressed  Our review of BOP data showed that between fiscal years 2012 and 2016, PRD conducted nearly 200 audits  For example, in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016, PRD audited five institutions’ and regional offices’ human resource management functions  During these audits, PRD identified nine deficiencies, one of which pertained to retention incentives  Specifically, it found that one audited institution did not terminate an employee’s retention incentive after the employee had relocated to another institution  To correct the deficiency, the institution cancelled the retention incentive which discontinued future disbursements  According to BOP officials, a bill was generated to recoup the overpayment from the employee  BOP institutions conduct annual operation reviews of internal functions, such as human resources  BOP officials told us that each institution conducts annual operational reviews of various internal functions, such as human resources  According to BOP’s Program Review Guidelines for Human Resource Servicing Offices, during these reviews, institutions are required to review supporting documentation for staff currently receiving an incentive to determine if the incentives are still warranted  If the initial request for the retention incentive was made over the preceding 12 months, institutions are also required to ensure that it was approved  According to BOP officials, the results of these reviews are reported to PRD through the Central Office  DOJ’s Justice Management Division (JMD) audits BOP’s human resources programs  According to BOP officials, JMD conducts audits of component-level human resources programs to determine whether BOP’s systems are compliant with DOJ policy and aligned with DOJ’s Human Capital Strategic Plan  JMD’s most recent audit of BOP’s human resources programs that included a review of BOP’s retention incentives occurred in September 2010 at BOP’s Human Resource Service Center in Grand Prairie, Texas  JMD found that in some cases BOP granted retention incentives prior to the signing of service agreements  JMD also found that BOP lacked documentation to authorize a group retention incentive for employees at its Victorville, California institution  BOP’s written response to the findings stated that JMD incorrectly applied the service agreement requirement, as service agreements were not warranted in the specific case that it identified  Additionally, BOP stated that the documents JMD identified as missing from the case files in question were kept in separate files and not required to be part of the retention incentive application  JMD agreed with BOP’s responses and in January 2013, JMD closed out the audit’s findings noting that these responses satisfied all required corrective actions  While BOP takes a number of steps to determine current workforce needs and how to fill those needs, BOP does not strategically plan for how retention incentives can be used to meet long-term human capital goals  BOP officials stated that planning for human capital needs is conducted at institutions during quarterly workforce utilization meetings or manpower salary meetings  During these meetings, executive staff at the institution discuss the current state of the institution’s workforce  According to the BOP officials, while considering attrition, hiring, and turnover rates, the executive staff decide strategies they will employ to attract and retain employees for their current needs  While officials we spoke with at four institutions have discussed retention incentives at their workforce utilization meetings, details about the content of these discussions ranged  According to these officials and our review of meeting minutes from the four institutions, discussions about retention incentives respond to each institution’s short-term staffing situation rather than address future staffing needs based on an overall strategic human capital plan  For example: USP Atwater officials told us that they review the current turnover rate, budget, projected vacancies, and use of retention incentives at annual budget development meetings  Meeting minutes reflected the following on retention incentives: “retention … still necessary to retain staff and hard-to-fill positions ” FCC Butner is a medical facility that offers retention incentives to all medical officers (all types of doctors) and nurses (practitioners, registered, etc ) at the institution  According to Butner officials, during workforce utilization meetings, Butner officials discuss recruitment and staffing trends for the institution and plans for how to address any staffing challenges  Meeting minutes we reviewed did not indicate specific discussions about the use of retention incentives  FCC Pollock executive staff discuss current institutional salary expenditures and projections and the status of vacant positions at workforce utilization meetings  While meeting minutes we reviewed indicated discussions about projected expenditures for incentive awards, the minutes did not differentiate between retention incentive awards, and other incentive awards such as recruitment or relocation incentive awards  FCI Phoenix officials stated that in their workforce utilization meetings, executive staff discuss salary projections and vacancy statuses  Meeting minutes we reviewed did not indicate specific discussions about the use of retention incentives  BOP decisions about retention incentives are currently not tied to any strategic human capital plan for how to use human capital flexibilities— such as retention incentives—to address their ongoing challenge of retaining staff in hard-to-fill positions  According to officials, retention incentives are awarded on an as-needed basis, determined by an institution’s warden, if funds are available  According to key principles for effective strategic human capital planning, such planning is an important component of an agency’s effort to develop long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff needed for an agency to achieve its goals  Specifically, senior leaders should be involved in developing, communicating, and implementing strategic human capital plans  Within an agency’s strategic human capital plan, the human capital policies, practices, and programs—for example, an agency’s retention incentive program—should clearly link to the human capital and program goals of the organization  By not having a strategic human capital plan that clearly establishes strategies that will be used to achieve specific human capital goals, BOP cannot ensure that its institutions are strategically managing their workforces in a manner that meets the agency’s human capital needs  In August 2017, BOP officials told us that they began drafting a strategic human capital operating plan that will include strategic objectives, action plans, performance objectives and measures, and evaluation/reporting requirements  Officials stated that the plan will also include planning regarding the use of human capital flexibilities, such as retention incentives  BOP officials told us that they anticipate that the strategic human capital operating plan will be a supplement to their workforce utilization meetings and that an agency-wide plan will provide a set of strategies for all institutions to consider  However, BOP could not provide documentation of the project beginning or whether it would include a strategic approach specific to retention incentives  Including retention incentives in BOP’s strategic human capital operating plan would create a roadmap for the agency and the institutions to use to move from being reactive in their current workforce needs—for example, awarding retention incentives on an ad hoc basis when funds are available—to being strategic in how retention incentives are used and to ensure that these and other flexibilities help the agency achieve its long-term workforce goals  From fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, BOP spent more than $59 million on retention incentives but has not established any measures to evaluate their effectiveness  According to officials, BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of its use of retention incentives because BOP officials consider a retention incentive successful if an employee does not leave the agency  However, BOP also uses other human capital flexibilities along with retention incentives to help retain staff  For example, BOP uses physician and dental comparability allowances—additional pay to a physician or dentist who enters into an agreement for a specified period of service—to help retain these medical personnel  According to officials, it would otherwise be difficult to compete with private sector salaries without the use of all available incentives  However, BOP has not studied whether or how retention incentives have contributed to employees’ retention in relation to other incentives such as physician and dental comparability allowances  According to our work on strategic human capital management and OPM’s guidance, it is crucial for organizations to evaluate the success of their human capital strategies, such as the use of retention incentives  In measuring the performance of these strategies and their contribution to key programmatic results, agencies can make adjustments, if necessary  For example, agencies can use evaluation results to make targeted investments in certain human capital strategies—such as the use of retention incentives—creating a cycle of strategic workforce management, where evaluation informs planning, planning dictates strategies, and strategies are evaluated for effectiveness  While BOP uses retention incentives to address critical skills gaps—such as with medical professionals—evaluating the effectiveness of retention incentives would help BOP determine whether and how retention incentives, as well as other human capital flexibilities, contribute to an employee’s continued employment at BOP or if adjustments to BOP retention strategies must be made for improved results  BOP officials agreed that evaluating the effectiveness of retention incentives would help them be more strategic about their human capital needs and spending on incentives  By including and implementing such an evaluation in its upcoming strategic human capital operating plan, BOP could better determine if it is making maximum use of its funds to retain the necessary qualified personnel or if changes must be made to most effectively retain its staff  As the largest employer within DOJ with some staff working in remote locations and undesirable conditions, BOP relies on a number of available flexibilities, including retention incentives, to help retain its employees  However, BOP currently lacks a strategic approach for using and evaluating retention incentives to address human capital goals  Given BOP’s ongoing staffing challenges, for example, retaining staff in hard-to- fill medical positions, developing a plan that includes a thoughtful blueprint for using retention incentives could help BOP better anticipate and address staffing needs  Moreover, evaluating its use of retention incentives could help BOP determine whether these incentives are effective or whether adjustments are needed to better retain its employees  By using evaluation results to inform planning, and planning to inform how retention incentives are used, BOP would be better positioned to achieve its long-term human capital goals and address its critical staffing needs  We are making two recommendations to BOP: 1  The Director of BOP should include in the forthcoming strategic human capital operating plan, 1) human capital goals and 2) strategies on how human capital flexibilities—including retention incentives—will be used to meet these goals  (Recommendation 1) 2  The Director of BOP should evaluate the effectiveness of BOP’s use of retention incentives to help determine whether the incentives have helped BOP achieve its human capital goals or if adjustments in retention incentives are needed  (Recommendation 2) We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOJ  In an email received November 15, 2017, the DOJ liaison stated that DOJ concurred with our recommendations  The Department did not provide official written comments to include in our report, but did provide written technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Attorney General and the Director of BOP  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in Appendix III  This report examines (1) how BOP has used its authority to pay retention incentives; (2) what internal controls are in place for the use of retention incentives; and (3) the extent to which BOP plans for and evaluates the use of retention incentives  To determine how BOP has used its authority to pay retention incentives, we reviewed BOP’s July 2012 report on its use of recruitment, relocation, and retention (3R) incentives  We then obtained underlying retention incentive expenditure data from DOJ’s Justice Management Division because it serves as the focal point for performance and financial information for all Department of Justice components and employees, including BOP  In particular, we obtained employee-level retention incentive payroll data for fiscal years 2012 through 2016  We selected this time period because it includes the most recent five complete fiscal years for which data were available and because we believe five years is sufficient time to identify trends in BOP’s retention incentive expenditures  We analyzed and aggregated the employee-level data by institution, occupation, and employee grade level  To identify trends, we compared per fiscal year expenditures across the various categories of occupations and locations across the five years  Additionally, we categorized institutions by BOP region, institutions that use group retention incentives, and institutions that use individual retention incentives  We also categorized occupations as medical professionals, correctional officers, and all other occupations and compared aggregate retention incentive expenditures for the different groups  Using information from BOP’s website and testimonial evidence from BOP officials on its health care system, for the purposes of this report, we defined medical professionals as BOP employees in occupations that provide medical, dental, and mental health care services and who do not solely provide these services in an administrative function  For the purposes of our analyses, medical professionals are dentists, dental assistants and hygienists, diagnostic radiological technologists, health aid and technicians, medical doctors (including psychiatrists), medical technologists, nurses, pharmacists, pharmacy technicians, physician assistants, and practical nurses and psychologists  To assess the employee-level retention incentive payroll data’s reliability, we obtained and analyzed documentation on systems’ capabilities and data control, interviewed data users and managers responsible for maintaining data, conducted checks for completeness and logical consistency, and compared the employee-level data to aggregated institution-level retention incentive expenditure data from BOP’s Financial Management Information System  We found the employee-level data to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this report  Additionally for this objective, we reviewed documents such as the DOJ’s Financial Management Information System Sub-Object Classification Code Guide and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families to respectively identify the system codes used to track retention incentives expenditures and to identify the names for each occupational series code in the datasets  We also interviewed BOP Human Resource Management headquarters officials to obtain information on the primary purposes for BOP’s use of retention incentives and their views on identified retention incentive expenditures trends  We also interviewed U S  Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Public Health Service (PHS) officials to better understand how BOP and PHS manage costs, including retention incentive expenditures, for PHS staff assigned to BOP  BOP partners with PHS to acquire medical staff to provide medical care for BOP’s inmate population  BOP reimburses PHS for the costs of compensation and benefits—including retention incentive payments, if applicable—for PHS staff assigned to BOP  PHS has final approval authority for retention incentives paid to PHS staff assigned to BOP facilities  Furthermore, we obtained aggregated retention incentive expenditure data from PHS on the total amount of funds BOP reimbursed PHS for fiscal years 2012 through 2016  For the reliability of PHS’s data, we reviewed the system’s data fields to check that the appropriate fields were used to provide data and interviewed data users and managers to discuss how expenditures are recorded and maintained  We found the PHS data to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this report  To identify and describe the internal controls that BOP has in place related to retention incentives, we obtained and analyzed documentation regarding BOP requirements and guidance for the use of retention incentives  We also interviewed officials from BOP’s Central Office who are responsible for the administration, management, and oversight of BOP’s human capital management systems, including retention incentives  We focused on the management and administrative controls used by BOP to review, approve, re-certify, and monitor retention incentives  Additionally, we interviewed the warden and human capital officers at 4 of the 122 institutions to obtain illustrative examples regarding the internal controls in place at these institutions to ensure the proper disbursement of retention incentives  We interviewed BOP officials at Federal Correctional Complex Pollock in Pollock, LA; Federal Correctional Complex Butner in Butner, NC; United States Penitentiary, Atwater in Atwater, CA and Federal Correctional Institution Phoenix, in Phoenix, AZ  These institutions were selected to ensure variation in the number and types of employees receiving retention incentives, BOP region, and security-level  Although the information we obtained from the interviews with officials at these four institutions cannot be generalized to other BOP institutions, these interviews provided important insights and perspectives about the use of retention incentives at BOP institutions  We also reviewed a non-generalizable random sample of 40 retention incentive application packet case files to determine the extent to which these files contained documentation on the internal control activities in place to monitor the application, approval, and funds disbursement processes of BOP’s retention incentive program  To identify our sample, we used employee-level expenditure data to randomly select 40 application files from the universe of BOP employees who received retention incentives from fiscal years 2014 through 2016  Each application file was reviewed by two GAO analysts who each assessed the extent to which each application contained the appropriate justification, approval signatures, and other documentation such as an application checklist and whether the application was an initial or continuation application  To determine the extent to which BOP plans for and evaluates the use of retention incentives, we interviewed BOP officials regarding their experiences with retention incentives, how they use retention incentives to strategically manage their workforce needs, how the agency evaluates the effectiveness of retention incentives, and how retention incentives contribute to BOP’s broader human capital goals  We then compared these efforts to our work on strategic human capital planning, specifically in terms of planning for and evaluating the use of human capital flexibilities  Additionally, we interviewed the warden and human capital officers at four BOP institutions mentioned above to obtain illustrative examples of how workforce planning occurs at these institutions  We also reviewed the DOJ’s Office of Inspector General Report 16-02 “Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Medical Staffing Challenges” (March 2016) and our past work to better understand the challenges that BOP faces in retaining medical professionals and other staff  Table 2 provides the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) fiscal year 2016 retention incentive expenditures by various occupations and groups of occupations, such as medical professionals, correctional officers, and other occupations  A range of occupations are reflected in the table primarily as a result of four California institutions—United States Penitentiary (USP) Atwater, Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Herlong, FCI Mendota, and Federal Correctional Complex Victorville—providing retention incentives to all employees at General Schedule grades level 12 and below and those in the Federal Wage System  In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Locke (Assistant Director) and Meghan Squires (Analyst-in-Charge) managed the work  Also, David Alexander, Renee Caputo, Willie Commons III, Jamarla Edwards, Robert Goldenkoff, Chelsa Gurkin, Eric Hauswirth, Janice Latimer, Lerone Reid, Rachel Stoiko, and Adam Vogt made significant contributions to this report 


Report 2: Risk management, as applied to security of federal facilities, entails a continuous process of applying a series of mitigating actions—assessing risk through the evaluation of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences; responding to risks with appropriate countermeasures; and monitoring risks using quality information (see fig  1)  In 1995, Executive Order 12977 established the ISC after the bombing of the Oklahoma City Alfred P  Murrah Federal Building in April 1995  The ISC’s mandate is to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security in and protection of federal facilities in the United States occupied by federal employees for nonmilitary activities  The order directs the ISC to develop and evaluate security standards for federal facilities, develop a strategy to ensure executive agencies and departments comply with such standards, and oversee the implementation of appropriate security measures in federal facilities  The ISC has released a body of standards, including the ISC Standard, designed to apply to the physical security efforts of all federal, non-military agencies  The ISC Standard prescribes a process for agencies to follow in developing their risk assessment methodologies (see fig  2)  Most federal departments and agencies are generally responsible for protecting their own facilities and have physical security programs in place to do so  The ISC Standard requires executive departments and agencies to follow the risk-management process when conducting risk assessments for each of their facilities  That process begins with determining the facility security level, ranging from level I (lowest risk) for facilities generally having 100 or fewer employees to level V (highest risk) for the most critical facilities and generally having greater than 750 employees  The security level designation determines the facility’s baseline countermeasures  For each facility, departments and agencies are required to (a) consider all of the “undesirable events” that could pose a risk to their facilities— such as active shooters, vandalism, and explosions—and (b) assess three factors of risk (threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences) to specific undesirable events  Subsequently, agencies are to combine all three factors to yield a measurable level of risk for each undesirable event (see app  III)  Based on the results of these assessments, agencies should customize (either increase or decrease) the countermeasures to adequately reflect the assessed level of risk  In addition, as part of planning for physical security resources within an agency’s budget process, the ISC has identified the need to balance allocations for countermeasures with other operational needs and with competing priorities  The ISC Best Practices have some similarities with leading practices in capital decision-making  For example, both state that the allocation of resources should be integrated into the agency’s mission, objectives, goals, and budget process  However, beyond the ISC Best Practices, the Office of Management and Budget and we have developed more comprehensive leading practices in capital decision- making that provide agencies with guidance for prioritizing budget decisions such as for countermeasure projects  The Office of Management and Budget and our guidance also emphasize evaluating a full range of alternatives, informed by agency asset inventories that contain condition information, to bridge any identified performance gap  Furthermore, the guidance calls for a comprehensive decision-making framework to review, rank, and select from among competing project proposals  Such a framework should include the appropriate levels of management review, and selections should be based on the use of established criteria  The following describes the mission and physical security program characteristics for the agencies in our review: CBP, the nation’s largest law enforcement agency, has responsibility for securing the country’s borders  It also has responsibility for conducting security assessments at about 1,200 facilities, including approximately 215 federally owned and agency-controlled higher-level facilities (facility security levels III and IV)  These facilities include border patrol stations with holding cells for people detained at the border, office buildings, and canine-training centers  CBP conducts these assessments  FAA’s mission is to provide a safe and efficient aerospace system for the country  According to agency data, FAA has 55 federally owned and agency-controlled higher-level facilities—including critical air traffic control towers  According to FAA officials, FAA specialists conduct security assessments  ARS conducts research related to agriculture and disseminates information to ensure high-quality safe food and to sustain a competitive agricultural economy  According to agency data, ARS has security responsibility for four domestic federally owned and agency- controlled higher-level facilities—including laboratories for research to improve food and crop quality, office buildings, and warehouses  ARS security personnel have responsibility for conducting security assessments  The Forest Service sustains the health, diversity, and productivity of the nation’s forests and grasslands  According to agency officials, the Forest Service has one federally owned and agency-controlled higher- level facility—a regional headquarters office building  The Forest Service’s security officials have responsibility for conducting security assessments, but at the time of our review, USDA security officials conducted the assessment at Forest Service’s one higher-level facility  None of the four selected agencies’ security assessment methodologies fully aligned with the ISC Standard  The ISC gives agencies some flexibility to design their own security-assessment methodologies for identifying necessary countermeasures as long as the chosen methodology adheres to fundamental principles of a sound risk- management methodology  Specifically, methodologies must: consider all of the undesirable events identified in the ISC Standard as possible risks to federal facilities, and assess three factors of risk (threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences) for each of the events  Furthermore, the ISC Standard requires executive departments and agencies to document decisions that deviate from the ISC Standard  Agencies’ policies and methodologies reference the ISC Standard  However, none of the agencies’ methodologies considered all of the undesirable events during assessments although they used some type of risk assessment methodology  In addition, the agencies did not always adhere to these principles of risk management (see table 1)  At the time of our review, CBP’s methodology did not fully align with the ISC Standard because it did not consider all of the 33 undesirable events nor assess threat and consequence  CBP security specialists assessed vulnerabilities at building entrances and exits, in interior rooms, and around the perimeter using a yes/no checklist during the assessment process  However, assessment reports showed that specialists did not assess the threats and consequences of undesirable events at each facility  According to security officials, the gap occurred because they designed the checklist to meet requirements in the 2009 CBP Security Policy and Procedures Handbook, which predates the first edition of the ISC Standard issued in 2010  CBP officials told us that as of January 2017, they began using an improved methodology to assess the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences for 30 of 33 undesirable events— omitting three now identified in the November 2016 revision to the ISC Standard  However, CBP has not yet updated its handbook to align with the ISC Standard, even though it started this effort over 3 years ago in December 2013  CBP officials did not provide a draft of its updated handbook, but they provided a plan with milestone dates for issuing the handbook by September 2018  CBP officials also told us that updates to the handbook may have to wait due to competing priorities, including efforts to address the backlog of assessments (which we discuss later in this report)  Delays in updating the handbook mean that CBP’s policy will continue to not align with the ISC Standard  Furthermore, although CBP security officials told us that all of the agency’s security specialists have been trained to use the improved assessment methodology, without documentation of the methodology in agency policy, there may be greater risk of its inconsistent application  Standards for Internal Control emphasize the importance of agencies developing and documenting policies to ensure agency-wide objectives are met  Documentation serves to retain institutional knowledge over time when questions about previous decisions arise  Without an updated policy handbook that requires a methodology that assesses all undesirable events consistent with the ISC Standard, CBP cannot reasonably ensure that its facilities will have levels of protection commensurate to their risk  FAA’s methodology does not fully align with the ISC Standard because it does not consider all of the 33 undesirable events nor does it assess all three factors of risk  FAA security specialists assess vulnerabilities to the site perimeter, entryways, and interior rooms using a yes/no checklist, but the checklist does not assess the consequences from each of the undesirable events at each facility  With respect to threat, FAA applies the ISC’s baseline threat—a general federal facilities threat level that relates directly to a set of baseline countermeasures—across all its higher-level facilities because FAA policy states that there is no agency-specific threat that exceeds the current baseline threat  According to FAA officials, the baseline threat standardizes the security needs across their facilities rather than addressing the security needs of individual facilities from specific threats  When necessary, FAA policy allows specialists to modify countermeasures based on an evaluation of conditions at the facility  FAA realized that this approach was no longer appropriate given the agency-wide goal to make risk-based decisions, a review of the assessment process after a 2014 Chicago fire incident that destroyed critical FAA equipment, and an awareness of ISC initiatives to assess compliance  To address the resulting methodological gaps, FAA hired a contractor to design, develop, test, and validate an improved risk- assessment methodology  Subsequently, FAA improved its methodology in January 2017 to assess the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences for 30 of the 33 undesirable events identified in the November 2016 revision to the ISC Standard —and tested the methodology at lower- and higher-level facilities  This revised methodology addresses the need to assess individual facility needs rather than using a standardized baseline approach  In April 2017, FAA officials told us of their plan for implementing this methodology and provided tentative milestone dates to conduct further testing, training, and analysis before deciding to use the improved methodology, which they expect to complete by January 2018  However, their plan lacks the necessary information to ensure successful implementation, such as detail on how many facilities they will test and how they will use the results of testing, training, and analysis to implement the improved methodology within the identified 9-month time frame  Furthermore, the improved methodology does not address undesirable events for which ISC issued countermeasures in May 2017  Without a detailed implementation plan to assess the methodology’s impact on its security program, FAA cannot reasonably ensure that its facilities have the proper countermeasures  With ongoing changes to its security program, FAA has an opportunity to fully align its improved methodology with the ISC Standard by including all 33 undesirable events and to update its policy requiring the use of such a methodology  Unlike CBP and FAA—which developed their own methodologies separate from their parent departments (Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Transportation (DOT), respectively)— ARS and the Forest Service follow an assessment methodology developed by USDA  USDA’s methodology does not fully align with the ISC Standard because it does not consider all of the 33 undesirable events for which ISC issued countermeasures in May 2017  Security specialists from USDA headquarters typically assess ARS’s and the Forest Service’s higher-level facilities using a risk-based methodology that considers the 31 undesirable events listed in the previous version of the ISC Standard dated August 2013  However, until recently, USDA did not assign ratings to each of the three risk factors—threat, vulnerability, and consequence—and then combine these ratings to yield a measurable level of risk for each undesirable event  USDA security officials said that they have revised the assessment-reporting format to include this risk calculation and trained their specialists to measure risk in this way  USDA officials provided us with a new assessment template that addresses all 33 undesirable events and includes measuring risk  Additionally, USDA officials said that they are revising their outdated physical security manual and expect to complete it by April 2018  With a revised manual and application of the new assessment template, USDA should be better positioned to assess risk at its facilities  When agencies do not use methodologies that fully align with the ISC Standard, they could face deleterious effects, ranging from facilities having inappropriate levels of protection to agencies having an inability to make informed resource allocation decisions for their physical security needs  Specifically, the ISC Standard states that facilities may face the effect of either having (1) less protection than needed resulting in inadequate security or (2) more protection than needed resulting in an unnecessary use of resources  The ISC Standard also states that these effects can be negated by determining the proper protection according to a risk assessment  Identified excess resources in one risk area then can be reallocated to underserved areas, thus ensuring the most cost- effective security program is implemented  As an illustration of such potential effects, we found that two agencies assessing two higher-level facilities came to two different conclusions in terms of their need for X-ray machines to screen for guns, knives, and other prohibitive items in federal facilities  Specifically, one agency based its decision on a policy that does not deviate from the ISC’s baseline set of countermeasures, and the other agency based its decision on professional judgement that deviated from the ISC’s baseline set of countermeasures  Neither agency based its decision on a risk assessment nor documented its decision—both ISC requirements, specifically: Without conducting a risk assessment, FAA recently expanded a policy requirement calling for all higher-level facilities to have X-ray machines and magnetometers  This new requirement poses a potentially sizeable investment for the agency with an estimated cost of X-ray machines of about $24,000 and magnetometers of about $4,000 each  FAA may need such equipment at all its higher-level facilities  However, the ISC Standard requires that agencies conduct risk assessments first to justify their needs  Without conducting risk assessments, FAA managers could unnecessarily use resources by installing such equipment in all higher-level air traffic facilities when there may be higher priority needs A USDA security specialist decided, despite an ISC baseline requirement that higher–level facilities have X-ray machines, not to recommend an X-ray machine at a higher-level Forest Service facility  The specialist reasoned that unlike other federal buildings with numerous unknown visitors, this facility receives mostly known individuals and a limited number of visitors  The ISC Standard allows for professional judgement; however, the ISC requires that agencies document deviations from the baseline set of countermeasures  Reducing the facility’s level of protection without documenting an assessment of risk could result in no record of the basis of the decision for current and future facility managers and security officials to review or use as justification in the case of a question of compliance  In another case, we found that one higher-level facility did not have access control for employees or visitors nor did it have armed guard patrols  The facility manager told us that intelligence and a history without incidents gave leadership reason to believe that these measures were not needed and that therefore the agency did not require and would not fund such protective measures for this facility—in effect, accepting the risks to the facility  Security officials said they also had the same understanding and did not document the matter in the assessment report even though agency policy and the ISC Standard require written documentation when officials deviate from the baseline requirement  Without security assessments that fully align with the ISC Standard and provide measureable levels of risk, agencies do not have the information they need to determine priorities and make informed resource allocation decisions  For example, they may not be able to assess whether to acquire or forego costly physical-security countermeasures—such as, X- ray machines, access control systems, and closed-circuit television systems—for facilities  Additionally, after determining the need to acquire a countermeasure, agencies must fund the countermeasure  As previously discussed, leading practices in capital decision-making include a comprehensive framework to review, rank, and select from competing project proposals for funding  In conducting risk assessments that do not fully align with the ISC Standard (i e , not assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences and measuring risks), agencies miss the opportunity for more informed funding decisions  Three of the four agencies (CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service) currently prioritize funding for operational needs over physical security needs (see table 2) when agencies’ priorities might be different if they based their decisions on an aligned risk assessment  Standards for Internal Control state that agencies should use quality information on an ongoing basis as a means to monitor program activities and take corrective action, as necessary  The ISC requires that agencies assess higher-level facilities at least once every 3 years—an interval requirement to identify and address evolving risks  We found that three of the four agencies (CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service) did not meet this requirement  Officials reported various challenges including (1) assessments competing with other security activities, (2) an insufficient number of qualified staff to conduct assessments when compared to the number of facilities, or (3) not knowing of the required assessment schedule  An “information system” is the people, processes, data, and technology that management organizes to obtain, communicate, or dispose of information  that had not been reassessed since 2010  CBP security officials attributed the backlog to (1) having too few security specialists assigned to assess about 1,200 facilities and (2) the specialists working on competing priorities, such as revising the security handbook, conducting technical inspections, and reviewing new construction designs and renovation projects  According to CBP security officials, they have developed a plan to eliminate the backlog by the end of fiscal year 2018 by prioritizing the completion of assessments  While we found the plan comprehensive, the schedule did not seem feasible  For example, the plan assumes that one specialist can complete six assessments in 3 consecutive days and that another specialist can complete three assessments in 1 day  In contrast, security officials told us specialists take about 20 work hours (or 2½ days) to conduct an on-site assessment of one facility  CBP officials said that they believe they can meet the time frames of the plan because they have set aside other priorities and have a thorough understanding of the scope of work involved at the facilities  They added that it will not be easy to meet the timeline, but they can accomplish it with a motivated and committed workforce, adequate financial resources, and absent activities that would otherwise require shifting of resources  We question the feasibility of setting aside important priorities, such as updating the policy manual and reviewing physical security elements in new construction designs, as well as the workload assumptions for completing the assessments  Further, these other priorities are also key to securing facilities  Without balancing assessments with competing priorities, CBP’s time frames for completing the assessments by the end of fiscal year 2018 may not be feasible and may also result in the agency’s not addressing other important physical security responsibilities  Since the ISC issued its standard in 2010, ARS and the Forest Service have assessed their higher-level facilities at least once  However, these agencies have not reassessed all of their higher-level facilities within the 3-year interval requirement  Specifically, security specialists have not conducted required reassessments of two ARS and one Forest Service higher-level facilities  The ARS headquarters official explained that the agency had not reassessed the two facilities due to competing priorities and insufficient internal resources  During the course of our review, ARS headquarters officials said they began assessing one of the two ARS facilities in May 2017 and will begin assessing the second facility in October 2017  The Forest Service official explained that the agency missed its security reassessment of the regional office because the facility staff had not requested one  During our visit, facility staff responsible for security told us that they were not aware of the ISC’s 3- year interval requirement  Facility staff requested a reassessment, and security officials told us that they expected to complete it by mid-June 2017  Completing this one-time assessment may address the facility’s security needs temporarily  However, ARS and the Forest Service have not implemented a long-term schedule with key milestones and lack a means to monitor completion of assessments of higher-level facilities at least once every 3 years  Consequently, these agencies cannot reasonably ensure that they have full knowledge of the risks to their facilities  FAA data from 2010 through 2016 show that FAA has assessed its 55 higher-level facilities at least once every 3 years  FAA policy requires that specialists schedule assessments of higher-level facilities every 12– 18 months depending on whether the facility has met FAA physical security standards  The ISC Standard states that to make appropriate resource decisions, agencies need information, such as what is being accomplished, what needs management attention, and what is performing at expected levels  We found that agencies’ methods of collecting and storing security information had limitations that affected agency and facility officials’ oversight of the physical security of their facilities (see table 3)  Without having long-term, agency-wide information to monitor whether assessments are conducted on schedule, ARS and the Forest Service may not meet the ISC Standard, resulting in not adequately protecting their facilities and employees  The ISC Standard also states that agencies should measure their security program’s capabilities and effectiveness to demonstrate the need to fund facility security and to make appropriate decisions for allocating resources  However, the agencies in our review were unable to demonstrate appropriate oversight of their physical security programs because: CBP’s handbook does not include requirements for data collection and analysis for monitoring physical-security program activities  Facility managers and security officials do not enter assessment results, such as the countermeasures recommended for facilities, in the real property database  Consequently, they do not have comprehensive data to manage their security program, assess overall performance, and take any necessary corrective actions  A CBP official told us that a comprehensive database would allow CBP to set priorities for addressing countermeasures  Without including data collection and analysis requirements in its updated handbook, CBP may be unable to monitor the performance of its physical security program  FAA’s policy does not require ongoing monitoring of physical security information, such as the status of recommended countermeasures or assessment schedules  As a result, FAA officials do not proactively use physical security information to assess the overall performance of its physical security program and take corrective actions before an incident occurs  Without a policy requiring ongoing monitoring of information—an internal control activity, FAA may be unable to assess the overall performance of its security program and take necessary corrective actions  USDA has a decentralized security program and places the responsibility on agencies to create their physical security programs  Security officials from ARS and the Forest Service told us that USDA does not have a policy for collecting and managing agency-wide information; however, they said that USDA is drafting a new departmental regulation and manual that will specify (1) the roles and responsibilities of agency and facility managers and (2) electronic- data-reporting requirements for monitoring the performance of the physical security program  USDA officials provided a draft of USDA’s regulation and manual for our review  The draft regulation did not mention data reporting and monitoring, while the draft manual only contained a table of contents that included a section entitled “Facility Tracking Database ” USDA officials expect to issue new policies sometime between October 2017 and April 2018  In the absence of new departmental regulation and manual, USDA and Forest Service officials told us that they have begun to develop a Forest Service system for storing electronic copies of agency-wide assessments and that they plan to expand the use of this system to track site specific assessment dates and status of recommended countermeasures  Forest Service officials provided milestone dates and described the capabilities for a future information system, which they expect to complete in September 2017  However, we could not determine whether the manual will have information system requirements to monitor agencies’ physical security program, an internal control activity  Without USDA’s including data collection and analysis requirements in its manual, its agencies may not be able to monitor the performance of their physical security programs  Without agencies having information to monitor security activities, they were unable to provide us information on the status of countermeasures across their entire portfolio  In order to better understand the status of countermeasures implemented and facilities’ experiences when implementing countermeasures, we determined the status of countermeasures at 13 facilities we visited  As previously noted, risk management, as it pertains to physical security, involves agency officials monitoring their physical security programs  During our visits to 13 selected facilities, we found the four agencies differed in the number of countermeasures that they had not implemented  Facility officials provided us with some information on why countermeasures had not been implemented, specifically: CBP had a significant number of recommended countermeasures from 2010 through 2016 that remained open at the eight selected CBP facilities  CBP facility officials gave reasons why recommended countermeasures had not been implemented  At one facility, officials did not know about the recommended countermeasures from its last 2010 assessment because the individuals previously knowledgeable about the assessments left the organization without communicating the results  By taking action to improve facility security, they implemented some needed countermeasures  However, at the time of our review, a large number of the recommendations remained open  At another facility, officials told us that they too had not known (for the same reason mentioned above) of their 2010 assessment, which contained recommended countermeasures  However, these officials told us that they submitted a funding request a few weeks before our visit to address all except one of the open countermeasures  In other cases, facilities have not implemented needed countermeasures due to resource constraints or physical site limitations  FAA had a large number of recommended countermeasures from 2010 through 2016 that remained open at the time of our review for the two FAA facilities visited  In this case, the most recent security assessment, completed in late 2016, resulted in one facility’s having little time to implement countermeasures by the time we conducted our analysis  While ARS had closed almost all recommended countermeasures at two facilities at the time of our review, one Forest Service facility had not yet implemented a recommendation (to secure its entrance doors) that was identified in a 2013 security assessment (see bottom center photo, fig  3)  This countermeasure remained open because facility officials said they continued to explore alternatives to address the recommendation  Figure 3 shows examples of countermeasures not fully implemented at selected facilities we visited  During our site visits and discussions with facility staff, we found that physical site limitations or other priorities can make it difficult for facility managers to implement countermeasures  For example, a countermeasure might involve correcting a clear zone violation—that is, moving an object (such as a brick wall) a certain distance away from the facility’s perimeter fence to prevent a potential intruder from using the object to climb over the fence  However, when the object near the fence is a building and the property outside of the fence is not federally owned (see bottom right photo, fig  3), it may not be cost effective to correct the clear zone violation  In this situation, the agency bears the responsibility for exploring ways to address the vulnerability  In following the ISC Standard, as previously noted, managers are required to justify and document why they could not implement recommended countermeasures—what the ISC calls risk acceptance  Selected agencies carry a great responsibility for protecting facilities that support border protection activities, provide safe and efficient air traffic around the country, and protect the quality of the nation’s food supply  With this responsibility comes the need to appropriately assess risk to ensure the security of these agencies’ facilities  However, 7 years after the ISC issued its initial risk-management process standard, each of four selected agencies continued to use assessment methodologies that did not fully align with this standard  During our review, agencies improved their methodologies to better align with the ISC Standard, but the agencies had not yet incorporated the methodologies into their policies and procedures  Without updated policies and procedures requiring a methodology that adheres to the ISC Standard (including all 33 undesirable events now identified in the November 2016 revision to the ISC Standard), agencies may not collect the information needed to assess risk and determine priorities for improved security  This situation could hamper the agencies’ ability to make informed resource allocation decisions or to recommend countermeasures commensurate to the needs at specific facilities  To address challenges in conducting timely assessments, agencies that had a backlog developed plans to address them, but the assumptions used in CBP’s plans and time frames did not appear to fully reflect the agency’s competing priorities and actual experience  Additionally, ARS and Forest Service have not implemented a long-term assessment schedule with key milestones to ensure that higher-level facilities are reassessed at least once every 3 years  Further, in cases where the agencies may have had risk assessment information, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service lack the means to collect, store, and analyze this information in order to monitor the status of a facility’s security  Without these key aspects of a comprehensive security program—a methodology that meets the standard, policies, and procedures that incorporate that methodology; the ability to complete assessments on time; and information to perform monitoring—agencies remain vulnerable to substantial security risks  To improve agencies’ physical security programs’ alignment with the ISC Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government for information and monitoring, we recommend that the Commissioner of U S  Customs and Border Protection take the following three actions: with regard to the updated Security Policy and Procedures Handbook, the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities requirement to assess all undesirable events, consider all three factors of risk, and document deviations from the standard, and data collection and analysis requirements for monitoring the performance of CBP’s physical security program  revise the assumptions used in the plan to address the backlog to balance assessments with competing priorities, such as updating the policy manual and reviewing new construction design, to develop a feasible time frame for completing the assessment backlog  Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following three actions: develop a plan that provides sufficient details on the activities needed and time frames within the date when FAA will implement an improved methodology; update FAA’s policy to require the use of a methodology that fully aligns with the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities for assessing all undesirable events, considering all three factors of risk, and documenting all deviations from the standard countermeasures; and update FAA’s policy to include ongoing monitoring of physical security information  Secretary of Agriculture take the following two actions: include data collection and analysis requirements for monitoring the performance of agencies’ physical security programs, in the department’s revised physical-security manual, and direct the Administrator of the Agricultural Research Service and the Chief of the Forest Service to implement and monitor a long-term assessment schedule with key milestones to ensure that higher-level facilities are reassessed at least once every 3 years  We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, Transportation, and Agriculture for review and comment  All three departments agreed with the findings and recommendations for their respective agencies  DHS agreed with our recommendations and provided actions and timeframes for completion  With regard to our recommendation to update the Security Policy and Procedures Handbook, DHS stated that CBP is updating the handbook to include: (1) a discussion and diagram of the ISC risk management process and its application within CBP’s assessment processes; (2) specific guidance for conducting risk assessments in accordance with the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities; and (3) a requirement and guidance for data collection and analysis in support of a robust physical security program  With regard to our recommendation to revise the assumptions used in the plan to address the assessment backlog, DHS stated that CBP has reevaluated current priorities and believes the current plan to eliminate the risk assessment backlog by the end of fiscal year 2018 is achievable  DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  DHS’s official written response is reprinted in appendix IV  DOT also agreed with our recommendations and by e-mail requested that we publish the response to the sensitive version of this report  DOT stated that FAA continues to refine its policy and develop processes that address the ISC threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences  Further, DOT stated that FAA would either validate that current mitigation strategies address those risks or apply additional appropriate countermeasures  DOT stated that it will provide a detailed response to each recommendation within 60 days from the date of this report  DOT’s official written response is reprinted in appendix V  USDA agreed with our recommendations and provided the agency-wide actions for completion  USDA provided a plan to ensure compliance with the ISC’s Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities by development of a standard physical-security assessment process and by initiation of a compliance program to track assessments and monitor the installation of countermeasures  In an e-mail, USDA provided milestone dates and planned completion by January 2019  USDA’s official written response is reprinted in appendix VI  If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or RectanusL@gao gov  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI  This report examines: (1) how selected agencies’ assessment methodologies align with the Interagency Security Committee’s (ISC) risk management standard for identifying necessary countermeasures and (2) what management challenges, if any, selected agencies reported facing in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring the results  To determine how selected agencies’ assessment methodologies align with ISC standards for identifying the necessary countermeasures, we identified federal executive branch departments and agencies reported by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to have received delegations of authority to protect their own buildings  We reviewed the Federal Real Property Council’s data on the Federal Real Property Profile to identify federally owned and agency-controlled buildings  We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our reporting objectives based upon our recent report that reviewed these data fields  We selected four agencies based upon their large quantity of reported federally owned and agency-controlled buildings: DHS, U S  Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and USDA’s United States Forest Service (Forest Service)  This methodology purposely does not include federal buildings protected by FPS and under the control of the General Services Administration as well as other agencies that we reported on in our previous work  We obtained and reviewed one particular ISC standard, The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities (the ISC Standard) and its related appendices for assessing physical security and providing recommended countermeasures at federal facilities  We obtained and analyzed the selected departments’ and agencies’ facility-security policies and procedures for a risk assessment methodology  According to the ISC Standard, agencies’ risk assessment methodologies must: consider all of the undesirable events identified in the ISC Standard as possible risks to federal facilities as listed in appendix III; assess the threat, consequences, and vulnerability to specific produce similar or identical results when applied by various security provide sufficient justification for deviations from the ISC-defined security baseline  We limited the scope of this review to the first two standards above because agencies’ adherence to these standards could be objectively verified by reviewing and analyzing agency documentation and interviewing agency officials, and their adherence to the two additional standards could not be verified in this manner  We did not conduct risk assessments with independent security professionals to evaluate: 1) the results from prior agency evaluations and 2) the sufficiency of justifications for deviations from the ISC-defined security baseline, as both evaluations were outside of the scope of the engagement  Therefore, for the purposes of this report, risk assessment policies, procedures and resulting methodology that align with ISC standards are those that consider all of the undesirable events and assess the threats, consequences, and vulnerabilities to specific undesirable events  We reviewed and analyzed information to answer the following five questions: 1  Do the policies and procedures mention the ISC standards? 2  Do the policies and procedures consider all of the undesirable events? 3  Do the policies and procedures assess the threat of specific undesirable events? 4  Do the policies and procedures assess the consequences of specific undesirable events? 5  Do the policies and procedures assess the vulnerability to specific undesirable events? We answered each of these questions as either a “Yes” or “No” for our selected agencies  The “No” answer to questions 3, 4, and 5 includes the following two possibilities: (a) the agency’s threat, consequence, or vulnerability ratings are not tied to specific undesirable events, or (b) the agency does not have a framework or formalized steps within which it collects and analyzes threat-, consequence-, or vulnerability-related information  If the answer to each of the five questions was “Yes,” then the agency’s overall risk assessment methodology aligns with ISC risk assessment standards for the purposes of this report  If the answer to one or more of the five questions was “No”, then the agency’s methodology does not to align with ISC standards for the purposes of this report  We interviewed security officials at ISC; three departments (DHS, DOT, and USDA); and four agencies (CBP, FAA, ARS, and the Forest Service)  We obtained and analyzed agency guidance on prioritizing physical security needs and interviewed agencies’ facility maintenance and budget officials  We reviewed the ISC’s best practices for planning for physical security resources within an agency budget process  Additionally, we reviewed the Office of Management and Budget’s and our leading practices in capital decision-making that provide agencies with guidance for prioritizing budget decisions such as “countermeasure projects ” We also reviewed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government because internal controls play a significant role in helping agencies achieve their mission-related responsibilities  Our findings from our review of the selected agencies are not generalizable to all ISC member agencies, but provide insight into and illustrative examples about selected agencies’ facility risk-assessment methodologies  To determine what management challenges selected agencies reported facing in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring results, we interviewed agencies’ security, maintenance, and budget officials  We requested agency security officials to provide portfolio- wide data on facility security assessments for our review in order to select sites to visit and analyze data for dates of assessments and the status of findings  We assessed the reliability of this data through interviews with knowledgeable agency staff and a review for completeness and any unexpected values  We compiled information from physical security assessments when no portfolio-wide agency data were available  We determined that these data were sufficient for the purpose of our reporting objectives and selected geographically dispersed sites with buildings with higher reported security levels per the ISC Standard, as these higher security levels have greater requirements and therefore the potential for greater resource needs  See appendix II for the 13 sites we selected  For these selected sites, we interviewed agency staff concerning the assessment process, site-specific findings, recommendations, justification for deviations from ISC’s baseline standards, and management challenges faced in addressing physical security needs  We observed and photographed the status of the findings from the site physical security assessments  We did not independently determine what constitutes a management challenge or a physical security finding  Rather, we relied on these stakeholders to determine these physical security concerns as defined in their own standards and guidance  The information from our selected sites is illustrative and cannot be generalized to sites agency- wide  The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from June 2016 to August 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We subsequently worked with DHS, DOT and USDA from August 2017 to October 2017 to prepare this version of the original report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards  Error! No text of specified style in document  Error! No text of specified style in document  Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Error! No text of specified style in document  In addition to the contact named above, Amelia Shachoy (Assistant Director), Steve Martinez (Analyst-in-Charge), Jennifer Clayborne, George Depaoli, Geoffrey Hamilton, Joshua Ormond, Alison Snyder, Amelia Michelle Weathers, and Elizabeth Wood made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: Protecting federal employees and facilities from security threats is of critical importance. Most federal agencies are generally responsible for their facilities and have physical security programs to do so. GAO was asked to examine how federal agencies assess facilities' security risks. This report examines: (1) how selected agencies' assessment methodologies align with the ISC's risk management standard for identifying necessary countermeasures and (2) what management challenges, if any, selected agencies reported facing in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring the results. GAO selected four agencies—CBP, FAA, ARS, and the Forest Service—based on their large number of facilities and compared each agency's assessment methodology to the ISC Standard; analyzed facility assessment schedules and results from 2010 through 2016; and interviewed security officials. GAO also visited 13 facilities from these four agencies, selected based on geographical dispersion and their high risk level. None of the four agencies GAO reviewed—U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Agricultural Research Service (ARS), and the Forest Service—used security assessment methodologies that fully aligned with the Interagency Security Committee's Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities standard (the ISC Standard). This standard requires that methodologies used to identify necessary facility countermeasures—such as fences and closed-circuit televisions—must: 1. Consider all of the undesirable events (i.e., arson and vandalism) identified by the ISC Standard as possible risks to facilities. 2. Assess three factors—threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences—for each of these events and use these three factors to measure risk. All four agencies used methodologies that included some ISC requirements when conducting assessments. CBP and FAA assessed vulnerabilities but not threats and consequences. ARS and the Forest Service assessed threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, but did not use these factors to measure risk. In addition, the agencies considered many, but not all 33 undesirable events related to physical security as possible risks to their facilities. Agencies are taking steps to improve their methodologies. For example, ARS and the Forest Service now use a methodology that measures risk and plan to incorporate the methodology into policy. Although CBP and FAA have updated their methodologies, their policies do not require methodologies that fully align with the ISC standard. As a result, these agencies miss the opportunity for a more informed assessment of the risk to their facilities. All four agencies reported facing management challenges in conducting physical security assessments or monitoring assessment results. Specifically, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service have not met the ISC's required time frame of every 3 years for conducting assessments. For example, security specialists have not conducted required reassessments of two ARS and one Forest Service higher-level facilities. While these three agencies have plans to address backlogs, CBP's plan does not balance conducting risk assessments with other competing security priorities, such as updating its policy manual, and ARS and the Forest Service lack a means to monitor completion of future assessments. Furthermore, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service did not have the data or information systems to monitor assessment schedules or the status of countermeasures at facilities, and their policies did not specify such data requirements. For example, ARS and the Forest Service do not collect and analyze security-related data, such as countermeasures' implementation. FAA does not routinely monitor the performance of its physical security program. Without improved monitoring, agencies are not well equipped to prioritize their highest security needs, may leave facilities' vulnerabilities unaddressed, and may not take corrective actions to meet physical security program objectives. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in August 2017. Information that the agencies under review deemed sensitive has been omitted. GAO recommends: (1) that CBP and FAA update policies to require the use of methodologies fully aligned with the ISC Standard; (2) that CBP revise its plan to eliminate the assessments backlog; and (3) that all four agencies improve monitoring of their physical security programs. All four agencies agreed with the respective recommendations.