prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President shall appoint officers of the United States "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate " The method by which the Senate provides advice and consent on presidential nominations, referred to broadly as the confirmation process, serves several purposes  First, largely through committee investigations and hearings, the confirmation process allows the Senate to examine the qualifications of nominees and any potential conflicts of interest  Second, Senators can influence policy through the confirmation process, either by rejecting nominees or by extracting promises from nominees before granting consent  Also, the Senate sometimes has delayed the confirmation process in order to increase its influence with the executive branch on unrelated matters  Senate confirmation is required for several categories of government officials  Military appointments and promotions make up the majority of nominations, approximately 65,000 per two-year Congress, and most are confirmed routinely  Each Congress, the Senate also considers approximately 2,000 civilian nominations, and, again, many of them, such as appointments to or promotions in the Foreign Service, are routine  Civilian nominations considered by the Senate also include federal judges and specified officers in executive departments, independent agencies, and regulatory boards and commissions  Many presidential appointees are confirmed routinely by the Senate  With tens of thousands of nominations each Congress, the Senate cannot possibly consider them all in detail  A regularized process facilitates quick action on thousands of government positions  The Senate may approve en bloc hundreds of nominations at a time, especially military appointments and promotions  The process also allows for close scrutiny of candidates when necessary  Each year, a few hundred nominees to high-level positions are regularly subject to Senate investigations and public hearings  Most of these are routinely approved, while a small number of nominations are disputed and receive more attention from the media and Congress  Judicial nominations, particularly Supreme Court appointees, are generally subject to greater scrutiny than nominations to executive posts, partly because judges may serve for life  Among the executive branch positions, nominees for policymaking positions are more likely to be examined closely, and are slightly less likely to be confirmed, than nominees for non-policy positions  There are several reasons that the Senate confirms a high percentage of nominations  Most nominations and promotions are not to policymaking positions and are of less interest to the Senate  In addition, some sentiment exists in the Senate that the selection of persons to fill executive branch positions is largely a presidential prerogative  Historically, the President has been granted wide latitude in the selection of his Cabinet and other high-ranking executive branch officials  Another important reason for the high percentage of confirmations is that Senators are often involved in the nomination stage  The President would prefer a smooth and fast confirmation process, so he may decide to consult with Senators prior to choosing a nominee  Senators most likely to be consulted, typically by White House congressional relations staff, are Senators from a nominee's home state, leaders of the committee of jurisdiction, and leaders of the President's party in the Senate  Senators of the President's party are sometimes invited to express opinions or even propose candidates for federal appointments in their own states  There is a long-standing custom of "senatorial courtesy," whereby the Senate will sometimes decline to proceed on a nomination if a home-state Senator expresses opposition  Positions subject to senatorial courtesy include U S  attorneys, U S  marshals, and U S  district judges  Over the past decade, Senators have expressed concerns over various aspects of the confirmation process, including the rate of confirmation for high-ranking executive branch positions and judgeships, as well as the speed of Senate action on routine nominations  When the Senate is controlled by the party of the President, this concern has often been raised as a complaint that minority party Senators are disputing a higher number of nominations, and have increasingly used their leverage under Senate proceedings to delay or even block their consideration  These concerns have led the Senate to make several changes to the confirmation process since 2011  The changes are taken into account in the following description of the process and are described in detail in other CRS Reports  The President customarily sends nomination messages to the Senate in writing  Once received, nominations are numbered by the executive clerk and read on the floor  The clerk actually assigns numbers to the presidential messages, not to individual nominations, so a message listing several nominations would receive a single number  Except by unanimous consent, the Senate cannot vote on nominations the day they are received, and most are referred immediately to committees  Senate Rule XXXI provides that nominations shall be referred to appropriate committees "unless otherwise ordered " A standing order of the Senate provides that some nominations to specified positions will not be referred unless a Senator requests referral  Instead of being immediately referred, the nominations are instead listed in a special section of the Executive Calendar , a document distributed daily to congressional offices and available online  This section of the Calendar is titled "Privileged Nominations " After the chair of the committee with jurisdiction over a nomination has notified the executive clerk that biographical and financial information on the nominee has been received, this is indicated in the Calendar  After 10 days, the nomination is moved from the "Privileged Nominations" section of the Calendar and placed on the "Nominations" section with the same status as a nomination that had been reported by a committee  (See " Executive Calendar " below ) Importantly, at any time that the nomination is listed in the new section of the Executive Calendar , any Senator can request that a nomination be referred, and it is then sent to the appropriate committee of jurisdiction  Formally the presiding officer, but administratively the executive clerk's office, refers the nominations to committees according to the Senate's rules and precedents  The Senate rule concerning committee jurisdictions (Rule XXV) broadly defines issue areas for committees, and the same jurisdictional statements generally apply to nominations as well as legislation  An executive department nomination can be expected to be referred to the committee with jurisdiction over legislation concerning that department or to the committee that handled the legislation creating the position  Judicial branch nominations, including judges, U S  attorneys, and U S  marshals, are under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee  In some instances, the committee of jurisdiction for a nomination has been set in statute  The number of nominations referred to various committees differs considerably  The Committee on Armed Services, which handles all military appointments and promotions, receives the most  The two other committees with major confirmation responsibilities are the Committee on the Judiciary, with its jurisdiction over nominations in the judicial branch, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, which considers ambassadorial and other diplomatic appointments  Occasionally, nominations are referred to more than one committee, either jointly or sequentially  A joint referral might occur when the jurisdictional claim of two committees is essentially equal  In such cases, both committees must report on the nomination before the whole Senate can act on it, unless the Senate discharges one or both committees  If two committees have unequal jurisdictional claims, then the nomination is more likely to be sequentially referred  In this case, the first committee must report the nomination before it is sequentially referred to the second committee  The second referral often is subject to a requirement that the committee report within a certain number of days  Typically, nominations are jointly or sequentially referred by unanimous consent  Sometimes the unanimous consent agreement applies to all future nominations to a position or category of positions  Most Senate committees that consider nominations have written rules concerning the process  Although committee rules vary, most contain standards concerning information to be gathered from a nominee  Many committees expect a biographical resumé and some kind of financial statement listing assets and liabilities  Some specify the terms under which financial statements will or will not be made public  Committee rules also frequently contain timetables outlining the minimum layover required between committee actions  A common timing provision is a requirement that nominations be held for one or two weeks before the committee proceeds to a hearing or a vote, permitting Senators time to review a nomination before committee consideration  Other committee rules specifically mandate a delay between steps of the process, such as the receipt of pre-hearing information and the date of the hearing, or the distribution of hearing transcripts and the committee vote on the nomination  Some of the written rules also contain provisions for the rules to be waived by majority vote, by unanimous consent, or by the chair and the ranking minority Member  Committees often gather and review information about a nominee either before or instead of a formal hearing  Because the executive branch acts first in selecting a nominee, congressional committees are sometimes able to rely partially on any field investigations and reports conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  Records of FBI investigations are provided only to the White House, although a report or a summary of a report may be shared, with the President's authorization, with Senators on the relevant committee  The practices of the committees with regard to FBI materials vary  Some rarely if ever request them  On other committees, the chair and ranking Member review any FBI report or summary, but on some committees these materials are available to any Senator upon request  Committee staff usually do not review FBI materials  Almost all nominees are also asked by the Office of the Counsel to the President to complete an "Executive Personnel Financial Disclosure Report, SF-278," which is reviewed and certified by the relevant agency as well as the Director of the Office of Government Ethics  The documents are then forwarded to the relevant committee, along with opinion letters from ethics officers in the relevant agency and the director of the Office of Government Ethics  In contrast to FBI reports, financial disclosure forms are made public  All committees review financial disclosure reports and some make them available in committee offices to Members, staff, and the public  To varying degrees, committees also conduct their own information-gathering exercises  Some committees, after reviewing responses to their standard questionnaire, might ask a nominee to complete a second questionnaire  Committees frequently require that written responses to these questionnaires be submitted before a hearing is scheduled  The Committee on the Judiciary sends form letters, sometimes called "blue slips," to Senators from a nominee's home state to determine whether they support the nomination  The Committee on the Judiciary also has its own investigative staff  The Committee on Rules and Administration handles relatively few nominations and conducts its own investigations, sometimes with the assistance of the FBI or the Government Accountability Office (GAO)  It is not unusual for nominees to meet with committee staff prior to a hearing  High-level nominees may meet privately with Senators  Generally speaking, these meetings, sometimes initiated by the nominee, serve basically to acquaint the nominee with the Members and committee staff, and vice versa  They occasionally address substantive matters as well  A nominee also might meet with the committee's chief counsel to discuss the financial disclosure report and any potential conflict-of-interest issues  Historically, approximately half of all civilian appointees were confirmed without a hearing  All committees that receive nominations do hold hearings on some nominations, and the likelihood of hearings varies with the importance of the position and the workload of the committee  The Committee on the Judiciary, for example, which receives a large number of nominations, does not usually hold hearings for U S  attorneys, U S  marshals, or members of part-time commissions  The Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, on the other hand, typically hold hearings on most nominations that are referred to them  Committees often combine related nominations into a single hearing  The length and nature of hearings varies  One or both home-state Senators will often introduce a nominee at a hearing  The nominee typically testifies at the hearing, and occasionally the committee will invite other witnesses, including Members of the House of Representatives, to testify as well  Some hearings function as routine welcomes, while others are directed at influencing the policy program of an appointee  In addition to policy views, hearings might address the nominee's qualifications and potential conflicts of interest  Senators also might take the opportunity to ask questions of particular concern to them or their constituents  Committees sometimes send questions to nominees in advance of a hearing and ask for written responses  Nominees also might be asked to respond in writing to additional questions after a hearing  Especially for high-level positions, the nomination hearing may be only the first of many times an individual will be asked to testify before a committee  Therefore, the committee often gains a commitment from the nominee to be cooperative with future oversight activities of the committee  Hearings, under Senate Rule XXVI, are open to the public unless closed by majority vote for one of the reasons specified in the rule  Witness testimony is sometimes made available online through the website of the relevant committee and also through several commercial services, including Congressional Quarterly  Most committees print the hearings, although no rule requires it  The number of Senators necessary to constitute a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony varies from committee to committee, but it is usually smaller than a majority of the membership  A committee considering a nomination has four options  It may report the nomination to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, or it may choose to take no action at all  It is more common for a committee to take no action on a nomination than to report unfavorably  Particularly for policymaking positions, committees sometimes report a nomination favorably, subject to the commitment of the nominee to testify before a Senate committee  Sometimes, committees choose to report a nomination without recommendation  Even if a majority of Senators on a committee do not agree that a nomination should be reported favorably, a majority might agree to report a nomination without a recommendation in order to permit a vote by the whole Senate  The timing of a vote to report a nomination varies in accordance with committee rules and practice  Most committees do not vote to report a nomination on the same day that they hold a hearing, but instead wait until the next meeting of the committee  Senate Rule XXVI, clause 7(a)(1) requires that a quorum for making a recommendation on a nomination consist of a majority of the membership of the committee  In most cases, the number of Senators necessary to constitute a quorum for making a recommendation on a nomination to the Senate is the same that the committee requires for reporting a measure  Every committee reports a majority of nominations favorably  Most of the time, committees do not formally present reports on nominations on the floor of the Senate  Instead, committee staff prepare the appropriate paperwork on behalf of the committee chair and file it with the clerk  The executive clerk then arranges for the nomination to be printed in the Congressional Record and placed on the Executive Calendar   If a report were presented on the floor, it would have to be done in executive session  Executive session and the Executive Calendar will be discussed in the next section  According to Senate Rule XXXI, the Senate cannot vote on a nomination the same day it is reported except by unanimous consent  It is fairly common for the Senate to discharge a committee from consideration of an unreported nomination by unanimous consent  This removes the nomination from the committee in order to allow the full Senate to consider it  When the Senate discharges a committee by unanimous consent, it is doing so with the support of the committee for the purposes of simplifying the process  It is unusual for Senators to attempt to discharge a committee by motion or resolution, instead of by unanimous consent, and only a few attempts have ever been successful  Senate Rule XVII does permit any Senator to submit a motion or resolution that a committee be discharged from the consideration of a subject referred to it  The discharge process, however, does not allow a simple majority to quickly initiate consideration of a nomination still in committee  It requires several steps and, most notably, a motion or resolution to discharge is debatable  This means that a cloture process may be necessary to discharge a committee  Cloture on a discharge motion or resolution requires the support of three-fifths of the Senate, usually 60 Senators, and several days  The Senate handles executive business, which includes both nominations and treaties, separately from its legislative business  All nominations reported from committee, regardless of whether they were reported favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, are listed on the Executive Calendar , a separate document from the Calendar of Business , which lists pending bills and resolutions  Usually, the majority leader schedules the consideration of nominations on the Calendar  Nominations are considered in executive session, a parliamentary form of the Senate in session that has its own journal and, to some extent, its own rules of procedure  After a committee reports a nomination or is discharged from considering it, the nomination is assigned a number by the executive clerk and placed on the Executive Calendar   Under a standing order of the Senate, certain nominations might also be placed in this status on the Executive Calendar after certain informational and time requirements are met  The list of nominations in the Executive Calendar includes basic information such as the name and office of the nominee, the name of the previous holder of the office, and whether the committee reported the nomination favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation  Long lists of routine nominations are printed in the Congressional Record and identified only by a short title in the Executive Calendar , such as "Foreign Service nominations (84) beginning John F  Aloia, and ending Paul G  Churchill " In addition to reported nominations and treaties, the Executive Calendar contains the text of any unanimous consent agreements concerning executive business  The Executive Calendar is distributed to Senate personal offices and committee offices when there is business on it  It is also available online by following the link to "Calendars and Schedules" on the Virtual Reference Desk under the Reference tab of the Senate website (www Senate gov)   Business on the Executive Calendar , which consists of nominations and treaties, is considered in executive session  In contrast, all measures and matters associated with lawmaking are considered in legislative session  Until 1929 executive sessions were also closed to the public, but now they are open unless ordered otherwise by the Senate  The Senate usually begins the day in legislative session and enters executive session either by a non-debatable motion or, far more often, by unanimous consent  Only if the Senate adjourned or recessed while in executive session would the next meeting automatically open in executive session  The motion to go into executive session can be offered at any time, is not debatable, and cannot be laid upon the table  All business concerning nominations, including seemingly routine matters such as requests for joint referral or motions to print hearings, must be done in executive session  In practice, Senators often make such motions or unanimous consent requests "as if in executive session " These usually brief proceedings during a legislative session do not constitute an official executive session  In addition, at the start of each Congress, the Senate adopts a standing order, by unanimous consent, that allows the Senate to receive nominations from the President and for them to be referred to committees even on days when the Senate does not meet in executive session  The majority leader, by custom, makes most motions and requests that determine when or whether a nomination will be called up for consideration  For example, the majority leader may move or ask unanimous consent to "immediately proceed to executive session to consider the following nomination on the Executive Calendar     " By precedent, the motion to go into executive session to take up a specified nomination is not debatable  The nomination itself, however, is debatable  It is not in order for a Senator to move to consider a nomination that is not on the Calendar, and, except by unanimous consent, a nomination on the Calendar cannot be taken up until it has been on the Calendar at least one day (Rule XXXI, clause 1)  A day for this purpose is a calendar day  In other words, a nomination reported and placed on the Calendar on a Monday can be considered on Tuesday, even if it is the same legislative day  If the Senate simply resolved into executive session, the business immediately pending would be the first item on the Executive Calendar   A motion to proceed to another matter on the Calendar would be debatable and subject to a filibuster  For this reason, the Senate does not begin consideration of executive business this way  Instead, the motion made to call up a nomination is a motion to proceed to executive session to consider that specific nomination  If the Senate is already in executive session, and the Leader wishes to call up a nomination, the Leader will first move that the Senate enter legislative session and then that the Senate enter executive session to take up the nomination  Both motions (to enter legislative session and to enter executive session) are not subject to debate and are decided by a simple majority  Typically they are approved by voice vote  The question before the Senate when a nomination is taken up is "will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?" The Senate can approve or reject a nomination  A majority of Senators present and voting, a quorum being present, is required to approve a nomination  According to Senate Rule XXXI, any Senator who voted with the majority on the nomination has the option of moving to reconsider a vote on the day of the vote or the next two days the Senate meets in executive session  Only one motion to reconsider is in order on each nomination, and often the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table, by unanimous consent, shortly after the vote on the nomination  This action prevents any subsequent attempt to reconsider  After the Senate acts on a nomination, the Secretary of the Senate attests to a resolution of confirmation or disapproval and transmits it to the White House  Many nominations are brought up by unanimous consent and approved without objection; routine nominations often are grouped by unanimous consent in order to be brought up and approved together, or en bloc   A small proportion of nominations, generally to higher-level positions, may need more consideration  When there is debate on a nomination, the chair of the committee usually makes an opening speech  For positions within a state, Senators from the state may wish to speak on the nominee, particularly if they were involved in the selection process  Under Senate rules, there are no time limits on debate except when conducted under cloture or a unanimous consent agreement  Senate Rule XXII provides a means to bring debate on a nomination to a close, if necessary  Under the terms of Rule XXII, at least 16 Senators sign a cloture motion to end debate on a pending nomination  The motion proposed is "to bring to a close the debate upon [the pending nomination] " A Senator can interrupt a Senator who is speaking to present a cloture motion  Cloture may be moved only on a question that is pending before the Senate; therefore, absent unanimous consent, the Senate must be in executive session and considering the nomination when the motion is filed  After the clerk reads the motion, the Senate returns to the business it was considering before the presentation of the motion  Unless a unanimous consent agreement provides otherwise, the Senate does not vote on the cloture motion until the second day of session after the day it is presented; for example, if the motion was presented on a Monday, the Senate would act on it on Wednesday  One hour after the Senate has convened on the day the motion "ripened," the presiding officer can interrupt the proceedings during an executive session to present a cloture motion for a vote  If the Senate is in legislative session when the time arrives for voting on the cloture motion, it proceeds into executive session prior to taking action on the cloture petition  According to Rule XXII, the presiding officer first directs the clerk to call the roll to ascertain that a quorum is present, although this requirement is often waived by unanimous consent  Senators then vote either yea or nay on the question: "Is it the sense of the Senate that the debate shall be brought to a close?" In April 2017, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII in order to allow cloture to be invoked on all nominations by a majority of Senators voting (a quorum being present), including Supreme Court justice nominations  This expanded the results of similar actions taken by the Senate in November 2013, which changed the cloture vote requirement to a majority for nominations except to the Supreme Court  Once cloture is invoked, for most nominations there can be a maximum of two hours of post-cloture consideration  The two hour maximum includes debate as well as any actions taken while the nomination is formally pending, including quorum calls  If cloture is invoked on nominations to the highest ranking executive branch positions, or on nominations to the Supreme Court or the U S  Circuit Court of Appeals, then the maximum time for consideration after cloture is invoked is 30 hours (see Table 1 )  Under the rule, the 2 or 30 hours is floor time spent considering the nomination in the Senate, not simply the passage of time  Thus, for time to count against the 2 or 30-hour maximum, the Senate must be in session and the question must be pending  Time spent in recess or adjournment does not count, and if the Senate were to take up other business by unanimous consent, the time spent on that other business also would not count against the post-cloture time  A hold is a request by a Senator to his or her party leader to prevent or delay action on a nomination or a bill  Holds are not mentioned in the rules or precedents of the Senate, and they are enforced only through the agenda decisions of party leaders  A standing order of the Senate aims to ensure that any Senator who places a hold on any matter (including a nomination) make public his or her objection to the matter  Senators have placed holds on nominations for a number of reasons  One common purpose is to give a Senator more time to review a nomination or to consult with the nominee  Senators may also place holds because they disagree with the policy positions of the nominee  Senators have also admitted to using holds in order to gain concessions from the executive branch on matters not directly related to the nomination  The Senate precedents reducing the threshold necessary to invoke cloture on nominations, and the recent precedent reducing the time necessary for a cloture process, could affect the practice of holds  In some sense, holds are connected to the Senate traditions of mutual deference, since they may have originated as requests for more time to examine a pending nomination or bill  The effectiveness of a hold, however, ultimately has been grounded in the power of the Senator placing the hold to filibuster the nomination and the difficulty of invoking cloture to overcome a filibuster  Invoking cloture is now easier because the support of fewer Senators is necessary, and in most cases, the floor time required for a cloture process is less  The large number of nominations submitted by the President for Senate consideration, however, might still lead Senators to seek unanimous consent to quickly approve nominations  On April 3, 2019, the Senate reinterpreted Senate Rule XXII to reduce, from 30 hours to 2 hours, the maximum time allowed for consideration of most nominations after cloture is invoked  The Senate took this step by reversing two rulings by the Presiding Officer  The first vote established that "postcloture time under rule XXII for all executive branch nominations other than a position at level 1 of the Executive Schedule under section 5312 of title 5 of the United States Code is 2 hours " On the second vote, the Senate established that "postcloture time under rule XXII for all judicial nominations, other than circuit courts or Supreme Court of the United States, is 2 hours" (see Table 1 )  It is uncommon for the Senate to reverse a decision by the Presiding Officer  Any Senator can attempt to reverse a ruling by making an appeal, and except in specific cases, appeals are decided by majority vote  In most circumstances, however, appeals are debatable, and therefore supermajority support (through a cloture process) is typically necessary to reach a vote to reverse a decision of the Presiding Officer  In the April 3 proceedings, however, the appeal was raised after cloture had been invoked  Senate Rule XXII states that after a successful cloture vote, "appeals from the decision of the Presiding Officer, shall be decided without debate " Therefore, when the Majority Leader appealed the rulings of the Presiding Officer, the questions on whether the ruling should stand as the judgment of the Senate received a vote without an opportunity for extended debate  The Senate voted that the ruling should not stand, and thereby upheld instead the position of the Majority Leader  The future impact of these decisions on the nominations process is difficult to assess  The immediate and obvious expected impact is that the time between a cloture vote and a confirmation vote will decrease  In recent years, a vote to confirm a nominee has typically occurred the day after cloture was invoked (or on the next day of Senate session)  Usually, Senators did not spend all of the time between the votes debating the nomination  Instead, Senators typically debated the nomination for some time post-cloture, but also usually entered into unanimous consent agreements that affected when the vote would occur  For example, it became common in recent Congresses for the Senate to agree, by unanimous consent, to consider the time the Senate spent in adjournment or recesses (e g , overnight) to count as post-cloture time  The cloture rule affected the time of the vote set by unanimous consent: the rule provided for up to 30 hours of consideration of the nomination, and the Senate would agree to vote on the nomination a day later—reflecting the approximate time that the Senate could have debated the nomination under the rule  Assuming the Senate continues to establish times for voting on nominations by unanimous consent, those negotiations will be affected by the reinterpretation of the rule  In the absence of a unanimous consent agreement, most nominations can now receive a vote two hours after a vote to invoke cloture  The two hours is not formally divided between the parties pursuant to the rule (or pursuant to the reinterpretation of the rule), but it might be divided, by unanimous consent, between the Majority and Minority Leader  Even without an explicit unanimous consent agreement, the Majority and Minority Leaders are recognized before any other Senators  In addition, a Senator can speak for a maximum of one hour post-cloture  As a result, the Majority Leader could claim the first hour, and the Minority Leader the second, or vice versa  (Of course, Senators could speak on a nomination at times other than after cloture has been invoked, even when the nomination is not formally pending before the Senate  ) It is also possible that the recent reinterpretation of the rule will affect how often the Senate relies on the cloture process to approve nominations  After the first reinterpretation of the cloture rule in 2013, the number of nominations subjected to cloture motions increased significantly in both of the Congresses when the Senate was controlled by the same party as the President (113 th (2013-2014) and 115 th (2017-2018) Congresses)  Nominations that are not confirmed or rejected are returned to the President at the end of a session or when the Senate adjourns or recesses for more than 30 days (Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6)  If the President still wants a nominee considered, he must submit a new nomination to the Senate  The Senate can, however, waive this rule by unanimous consent, and it often does to allow nominations to remain "in status quo" between the first and second sessions of a Congress or during a long recess  The majority leader or his designee also may exempt specific nominees by name from the unanimous consent agreement, allowing them to be returned during the recess or adjournment  The Constitution, in Article II, Section 2, grants the President the authority to fill temporarily vacancies that "may happen during the Recess of the Senate " These appointments do not require the advice and consent of the Senate; the appointees temporarily fill the vacancies without Senate confirmation  In most cases, recess appointees have also been nominated to the positions to which they were appointed  Furthermore, when a recess appointment is made of an individual previously nominated to the position, the President usually submits a new nomination to the Senate in order to comply with a provision of law affecting the pay of recess appointees (5 U S C  5503(a))  Recess appointments have sometimes been controversial and have occasionally led to inter-branch conflict 


Report 2: As of June 30, 2017, the UN had carried out 71 peacekeeping operations since 1948, and had 16 active UN peacekeeping operations worldwide  Eight of these UN peacekeeping operations were in sub-Saharan Africa (see fig  1)  In their earliest days, UN peacekeeping operations were primarily military in nature and limited to monitoring cease-fire agreements and stabilizing situations on the ground while political efforts were being made to resolve conflicts  Today, in response to increasingly complex situations in which conflicts may be internal, involve many parties, and include civilians as deliberate targets, UN peacekeeping operations are more commonly “multidimensional”—deploying civilian and police personnel in addition to military personnel  Multidimensional peacekeeping operations seek to create a secure and stable environment while working with national authorities and actors to make sure the peace agreement or political process is implemented  According to the UN, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are designed to protect civilians and often assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections; protect and promote human rights; and assist in restoring the rule of law  Figure 2 shows examples of UN peacekeepers serving in different capacities as part of MINUSCA in Bangui, CAR  Each UN peacekeeping operation, including its mandated size and tasks, is authorized through a UN Security Council resolution  The operation’s budget and resources are subject to General Assembly approval  The UN’s approved budget for global peacekeeping operations in UN fiscal year 2017 was about $7 9 billion  Individual operation budgets ranged from about $36 million for the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo to more than $1 2 billion for the peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see table 1)  The UN reported in June 2017 that it maintained 95,544 uniformed peacekeepers, 5,004 international civilians, 10,149 local civilians, and 1,597 UN volunteers in support of its operations around the world  According to UN documents, civilian peacekeeping personnel are generally recruited to peacekeeping operations as individuals, while police and military personnel are volunteered by member states to participate as part of their country’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations  The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations  From fiscal years 2014 to 2017, the United States contributed an average of about $2 1 billion per year to these operations  The UN General Assembly sets the assessment levels for UN member contributions to peacekeeping operations every 3 years  The United States’ assessment has averaged about 28 5 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget; however, Congress has authorized payment with appropriated funds at about 27 percent for U S  fiscal years 2014 through 2016, and 25 percent for U S  fiscal year 2017  In April 2014, UN Security Council Resolution 2149 established MINUSCA following escalating sectarian violence in CAR that resulted in the destruction of state institutions, thousands of deaths, and 2 5 million people—more than half of CAR’s entire population—in need of humanitarian aid, according to a UN report  The conflict also resulted in 174,000 people being internally displaced and over 400,000 fleeing to neighboring countries, according to the UN report  MINUSCA’s tasks include protecting civilians, given the security, humanitarian, human rights, and political crisis in CAR; supporting the implementation of the transition process, including efforts to extend state authority and preserve territorial integrity; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and promoting and protecting human rights; supporting justice and the rule of law; and facilitating the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation processes  On November 15, 2017, UN Security Council Resolution 2387 (2017) extended MINUSCA’s mandate for a fourth time, through November 15, 2018  MINUSCA’s approved personnel levels for UN fiscal year 2017 comprised 10,750 military personnel, 400 individual police officers, and 1,680 formed police unit personnel, as well as 790 international civilian and 696 national civilian personnel, 238 UN volunteers, and 40 government- provided personnel, according to a UN Secretary-General report  Table 2 shows average annual personnel deployment for MINUSCA and the number of authorized positions for the first 3 full fiscal years of the operation  Based on data and other input from the UN, DOD, and State, we estimate that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to MINUSCA, the ongoing UN operation in the Central African Republic (CAR)  In addition, the estimated cost of a U S  operation in CAR far exceeds U S  contributions to MINUSCA  Based on an estimate we developed in conjunction with DOD and State officials, a hypothetical, comparable U S  operation would likely cost nearly $5 7 billion, more than twice as much as MINUSCA, the ongoing UN operation in CAR  Our comparison covers the time from which MINUSCA was established in April 2014 through the end of UN fiscal year 2017, which ended on June 30, 2017—a total of 3 years and 3 months, the first 39 months of MINUSCA  Over this time period, UN costs for MINUSCA totaled approximately $2 4 billion  Using roughly the same basic parameters for MINUSCA, including similar deployment levels of military and civilian personnel over the same time period, in consultation with DOD and State officials, we estimate that a comparable, hypothetical U S  operation would likely cost nearly $5 7 billion, more than twice the UN cost for MINUSCA (see table 3 for a detailed comparison of estimated U S  costs and actual UN costs)  This estimate does not include, among other things, the cost for State diplomatic security and office space for civilian staff, the inclusion of which could further increase the total estimated U S  cost for such an operation  During the same time period, from April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017, the United States contributed approximately $700 million to the UN to support MINUSCA  Therefore, the estimated cost of a U S  operation (nearly $5 7 billion) would be almost eight times greater than the United States’ contribution to MINUSCA  See figure 3 for a comparison of these costs with the U S  estimate  Various factors contribute to the differences in costs between actual UN expenditures for MINUSCA from April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017— the first 39 months of MINUSCA—and a hypothetical, comparable U S  operation over the same time period, including disparities in the cost of sourcing and transporting equipment and supplies, staffing and compensating military and police personnel, and maintaining facilities and communications and intelligence systems  These disparities reflect operational, structural, and doctrinal differences in the way the United States likely would undertake a hypothetical, comparable operation, should such an operation be deemed in the U S  national interest  High U S  costs to source and transport supplies and equipment to the Central African Republic (CAR) contribute to the difference between our cost estimate for the hypothetical U S  peacekeeping operation and the UN’s actual costs for MINUSCA  In the hypothetical U S  operation, based on input from DOD and IDA officials and the output of the IDA cost estimating tool, the United States would fly in most of its consumable supplies from outside CAR  Specifically, materials such as water, ice, food, and other subsistence items would be airlifted into CAR from Italy, a supply location validated as reasonable by DOD and IDA officials given its proximity to the operation and because MINUSCA relies on a UN global service center there, one of two such UN centers in Europe  The estimated U S  cost of airlifting water alone over the 39-month time period for the hypothetical operation would total nearly $700 million  The United States would still deploy its equipment and personnel to CAR from the United States, at a cost of nearly $600 million  Transportation of equipment and supplies within CAR would cost an additional estimated $316 million  In contrast, the UN does not fly in water or consumables on the same scale as the United States would in the hypothetical operation  Instead, the UN relies on some in-country or local infrastructure and consumables  Military and formed police unit equipment is provided by the troop- and police-contributing countries  The UN reimburses these countries for equipment at set rates  The UN cost of reimbursing countries for deploying their equipment to CAR likely would be less than the amount the United States would spend on airlifting the equipment to CAR alone  For example, the UN cost of freight, deployment, and country reimbursements for military and formed police equipment was approximately $229 million over a 2-year period (July 2014 through June 2016), while in the hypothetical operation the U S  cost of deploying equipment alone would be over $382 million, which is about $154 million more than the UN cost over a similar 2-year period (September 2014 through August 2016)  The United States would staff and compensate its military and police personnel differently than the UN, leading to differences between the estimated U S  costs and actual UN costs  While neither the hypothetical U S  cost estimate nor UN expenditures include the cost of salaries for active duty personnel or troops contributed by other countries, respectively, the United States would bear the additional cost of salaries for the share of personnel drawn from military reserves  According to DOD officials, 10 percent of infantry unit personnel would have been reservist personnel in a hypothetical, comparable U S  operation, based on the average ratio of active to reserve personnel deployed by the United States in fiscal years 2015 through 2017, roughly the same time period as the first 39 months of MINUSCA  As a result, the total estimated cost of the hypothetical U S  operation reflects the additional U S  expense of paying full salaries and hardship duty pay for U S  reservist military personnel  The estimate also includes the incremental costs the United States would incur for deploying active duty military personnel, including hardship duty pay that is not incurred when those personnel are in the United States  For military troops deployed to MINUSCA, the UN pays a standard troop cost reimbursement to the troop-contributing countries, which is intended also to cover incremental expenses but not the cost of troops’ salaries  U S  costs for civilian police also are significantly higher than UN costs  The United States would pay over $167 million for U S  civilian police for the duration of the hypothetical operation, while the UN spent $41 million on its individual police officers over the same time frame  The U S  estimate includes the cost of police salaries and the additional costs of deployment, whereas UN costs for deploying individual police officers do not include salaries, which are borne by the police-contributing countries  Higher U S  standards for certain aspects of the hypothetical peacekeeping operation in CAR would contribute to costs that exceed those of MINUSCA  Facilities  The higher estimated U S  costs reflect higher U S  standards for facilities, according to State officials  The U S  cost estimate includes more than $1 1 billion for facilities and related costs, which include facility maintenance, food service, laundry, management and administration, and residential leases for civilian personnel  In contrast, the actual UN cost for facilities as part of MINUSCA totaled $292 million over the same time period  Communications and intelligence systems  The United States incurs costs associated with meeting U S  intelligence standards that are not part of UN operations, which lack comparable intelligence capabilities  The U S  cost estimate includes $140 million for the cost of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems, which represents additional operational costs to meet higher U S  standards for U S  communications and intelligence capabilities  Medical capability  Higher U S  standards for medical care and medical evacuation capability as compared to the UN are another factor that would contribute to higher U S  medical costs for a hypothetical operation, according to DOD and State officials  Some UN hospitals may not meet U S  minimum standards for medical care, according to DOD officials  Although medical costs do not constitute a significant portion of the U S  cost estimate, estimated U S  medical costs ($132 million) greatly exceed actual UN medical costs ($8 million) over the same time period  UN and U S  peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U S  and UN officials we met with  Relative strengths of UN peacekeeping operations include international and local acceptance, access to global expertise, and the ability to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks, according to these officials  Relative strengths of U S  peacekeeping operations would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities, according to U S  and UN officials  According to U S  and UN officials, UN peacekeeping operations benefit from greater international and local acceptance, access to global expertise, and the ability to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks  UN peacekeeping operations also provide indirect benefits to the military capacity of participating countries  International and local acceptance  As a multilateral organization, the UN benefits from greater international and local acceptance for its peacekeeping operations, according to State, DOD, and UN officials  These officials noted that the UN’s multinational character contributes to a reputation for local impartiality  Conversely, the United States acting alone may not be viewed as impartial and could face challenges gaining or maintaining international or local support for peacekeeping operations, according to State and DOD officials  Global expertise  UN officials noted that the UN has unmatched convening power and access to expertise and experience from across the globe to implement the objectives of multidimensional peacekeeping operations  The UN is able to bring in people with subject matter expertise, native language skills, and knowledge of local customs to work for these operations, according to U S  and UN officials  Leveraging multilateral assistance  U S  officials told us that the UN is better able to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and multilateral development banks to expand the scope of assistance provided in support of the goals of peacekeeping operations  For example, according to a UN report, MINUSCA is partnering with the UN Development Fund to provide capacity building related to elections, police, courts, and prisons  The report also noted that the UN, European Union, and World Bank supported the Central African Republic government in developing a “National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan” while harmonizing humanitarian and development funding to ensure complementarity with the UN peacekeeping operation

ground_truth: Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President shall appoint officers of the United States "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." This report describes the process by which the Senate provides advice and consent on presidential nominations, including receipt and referral of nominations, committee practices, and floor procedure. Committees play the central role in the process through investigations and hearings. Senate Rule XXXI provides that nominations shall be referred to appropriate committees "unless otherwise ordered." Most nominations are referred, although a Senate standing order provides that some "privileged" nominations to specified positions will not be referred unless requested by a Senator. The Senate rule concerning committee jurisdictions (Rule XXV) broadly defines issue areas for committees, and the same jurisdictional statements generally apply to nominations as well as legislation. A committee often gathers information about a nominee either before or instead of a formal hearing. A committee considering a nomination has four options. It can report the nomination to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, or it can choose to take no action. It is more common for a committee to take no action on a nomination than to reject a nominee outright. The Senate handles executive business, which includes both nominations and treaties, separately from its legislative business. All nominations reported from committee are listed on the Executive Calendar, a separate document from the Calendar of Business, which lists pending bills and resolutions. Generally speaking, the majority leader schedules floor consideration of nominations on the Calendar. Nominations are considered in "executive session," a parliamentary form of the Senate in session that has its own journal and, to some extent, its own rules of procedure. The Senate can call up a nomination expeditiously, because a motion to enter executive session to consider a specific nomination on the Calendar is not debatable. This motion requires a majority of Senators present and voting, a quorum being present, for approval. After a nomination has been called up, the question before the Senate is "will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?" A majority of Senators voting is required to approve a nomination. However, Senate rules place no limit on how long a nomination may be debated, and ending consideration could require invoking cloture. On April 6, 2017, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII in order to allow cloture to be invoked on nominations to the Supreme Court by a majority of Senators voting. This expanded the results of similar actions taken by the Senate in November 2013, which changed the cloture vote requirement to a majority for nominations other than to the Supreme Court. After the 2013 decision, the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process increased. On April 3, 2019, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII again. The Senate reduced, from 30 hours to 2 hours, the maximum time nominations can be considered after cloture has been invoked. This change applied to all executive branch nominations except to high-level positions such as heads of departments, and it applied to all judicial nominations except to the Supreme Court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The full impact of this change is difficult to assess at this time, but it is likely to shorten the time between a cloture vote and a vote on the nomination. If Senators respond as they did to the last reinterpretation of the cloture rule, it might also increase the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process. Nominations that are pending when the Senate adjourns sine die at the end of a session or recesses for more than 30 days are returned to the President unless the Senate, by unanimous consent, waives the rule requiring their return (Senate Rule XXXI, clause 6). If a nomination is returned, and the President still desires Senate consideration, he must submit a new nomination.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  Developing international military capacity  U S  officials told us that UN peacekeeping operations provide an indirect benefit of helping to professionalize the military units from many developing countries that contribute troops to the UN  We have previously reported that building military capacity of foreign partners to address security-related threats is an important goal of U S  national security strategy and foreign policy  According to U S  and UN officials, the relative strengths of U S  peacekeeping operations would be faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities  Deployment speed  State, DOD, and UN officials highlighted the United States’ ability to deploy troops and police to peacekeeping operations more quickly than the UN  Unlike the U S  military, which can draw from a ready pool of military personnel, the UN must seek troops from UN member states, which takes time  UN officials told us that the UN faces a shortage of both troops and UN police, which slows deployment  Further, a 2015 report by the UN High-level Panel on Peacekeeping stated that the UN “has struggled to get sufficient forces on the ground quickly enough and relies on under-resourced uniformed capabilities ” The report also stated that aviation, medical, and engineering specialists, among others, are difficult to mobilize in advance of infantry units  Command and control  State, DOD, and UN officials told us that U S  operations would enable the U S  military to have direct command and control, whereas UN operations, which are inherently multinational, face challenges with command and control over troops from several different countries  The UN High-level Panel report noted that UN peacekeeping operations’ weak command and control is a well-known constraint that limits the type of operations the UN can undertake  Logistics support  U S  and UN officials told us that U S  operations have superior logistics systems  U S  procurement likely would be faster than UN procurement, which lacks a standing supply chain and, therefore, relies on third-party vendors, according to UN officials  In addition, the UN High Level Panel report stated that UN peacekeeping operations’ logistics systems and structures in the field are under severe strain, which can limit the mobility of these operations  Intelligence capability  U S  and UN officials agreed that U S  operations would involve superior intelligence capability  The UN only recently established an intelligence policy—in May 2017—having recognized that some peacekeeping operations had been deployed in fragile political and security environments with asymmetrical and complex threats  However, UN officials acknowledged that the scope of UN intelligence capability remains limited  Counterterrorism capability  DOD officials told us that a U S  peacekeeping operation would have the capability to include a counterterrorism component and would not be constrained in the use of force, if needed, in response to terrorist threats  UN peacekeeping operations, on the other hand, lack the capabilities and specialized military preparation to engage in counterterrorism operations, according to the UN High-level Panel report  The UN report stated that counterterrorism should be undertaken by the host government, a capable regional force, or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the UN Security Council  According to the UN report, UN peacekeeping operations may engage in proactive and preemptive use of force to protect civilians and UN personnel from threats; however, offensive force to degrade, neutralize or defeat an opponent is a fundamentally different type of posture that should be authorized by the Security Council only under limited and exceptional circumstances  We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, and the UN for review and comment  DOD provided a letter, reproduced in appendix II, which stated that it had no comments  State did not provide comments  The UN provided technical comments, which we incorporated into our report as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Secretary- General of the United Nations  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  The objectives of this report were to (1) compare the reported costs of a specific United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identify factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations  To compare the reported costs of a specific UN peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we selected the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) as a case study  We compared the reported UN expenditures for MINUSCA, which included both military and civilian components, with estimated costs for a hypothetical U S  operation with a similar level of military and civilian personnel  Our comparison covers a total of 3 years and 3 months—from MINUSCA’s establishment in April 2014 through June 30, 2017, the end of UN fiscal year 2017  We selected MINUSCA because it is in sub-Saharan Africa, where most UN peacekeeping operations established since 2003 have taken place, and has a typical scope and budget compared to other UN peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa, according to U S  and UN officials  In addition, MINUSCA is one of the most recent UN peacekeeping operations; thus, initial expenditures for the operation are relatively current  Because the results of our cost comparison are based on a single case study, they cannot be generalized to all UN peacekeeping operations  To determine the UN’s costs for MINUSCA, we analyzed UN budget and expenditure data covering the initial start-up period (April 2014 to June 2014) and the first 3 UN fiscal years (July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2017)  We spoke with officials of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support, and Management at UN Headquarters in New York, New York, to better understand the characteristics of MINUSCA and the different costs affecting MINUSCA’s budget and expenditures  We assessed UN expenditure data through discussions with cognizant UN officials and a review of external audits of UN budgetary information and found them sufficiently reliable for our purposes  We also analyzed data on U S  contributions to UN peacekeeping operations for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 from the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Organization Affairs to determine total U S  contributions to MINUSCA, and UN peacekeeping operations overall  To estimate the costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we developed a hypothetical scenario for a U S  operation based on the MINUSCA budget and supporting documents, assuming deployment of the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel in the Central African Republic (CAR) over the same time period (April 2014 through June 2017)  To estimate the military portion of the operation, we interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) officials and staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a DOD-sponsored non-profit corporation involved in developing cost estimates for U S  contingency operations  The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller and IDA generated a cost estimate for the military components included in the hypothetical operation using the Contingency Operations Support Tool (cost estimating tool)  DOD uses this tool to develop cost estimates for all military contingency operations  The cost estimate included only the incremental costs of the operation—those directly attributable to the operation that would not be incurred if the operation did not take place  For example, the estimate produced by the cost estimating tool did not include the direct salaries of active duty personnel as those costs would be incurred by the United States regardless of a possible decision to undertake the hypothetical operation  We assessed the cost estimating tool’s applicability to developing a hypothetical cost estimate for the purposes of this report through discussions with DOD and IDA officials, and compared the tool to the accurate and comprehensive characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, as described in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide  While we found the DOD cost estimating tool generated a sufficiently reliable cost estimate for a hypothetical U S  peacekeeping operation, we did not assess the overall reliability of the tool or its capability to generate accurate or comprehensive estimates for future U S  operations  To generate our estimate of U S  military costs using the DOD’s estimating tool, we used UN military deployment numbers as a baseline for the scale of a hypothetical, comparable U S  peacekeeping operation, while using unit sizes and rotations in deployment that were considered appropriate for the U S  military, according to DOD and IDA officials  We based the hypothetical U S  operation, and hence the cost estimate, on the following assumptions, which correspond approximately with MINUSCA’s actual UN personnel deployments: Theater of operation: Central African Republic (CAR) Type of operation: military contingency Operation time frame: April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017 Military contingents: as of June 30, 2017, 11,495 total personnel Infantry: 10 units of 630-785 personnel per unit, approximately 90 percent active duty / 10 percent reserves Communication / signals: 1 unit, 124 personnel per unit Engineering: 4 units, 200 personnel per unit Military police: 1 unit, 120 personnel per unit Formed police units (military police): 12 units, 140 personnel per Hospital / medical: 1 level III hospital, 248 beds, 495 personnel Helicopter units: 2 UH-60 C3 units, 1 MH-60M Assault attack helicopter unit, 100 personnel per unit Quick reaction force: 1 unit, 160 personnel per unit Special forces: 1 tactical civilian affairs unit, 1 Marine special operations intelligence unit, 160 personnel per unit Unmanned aerial vehicle: 1 unit, 84 personnel Transportation: 1 heavy transport unit, 120 personnel per unit Operational tempo: 1 0 for all phases of operation and units, except aviation units (set at 1 5) Deployment schedule and phasing: phased deployment, including 14 days for predeployment (e g , training), 5 days for deployment, 180 days for active duty unit sustainment and 270 days for reserve unit sustainment, 5 days for redeployment, and 0 days for reconstitution Housing: contractor-provided semi-permanent housing Transportation: personnel and equipment transported by airlift from the United States (primarily Fort Hood, Texas), material (such as water, food, and other consumables) transported by airlift from Italy We obtained input on the operational design for the military portion of the cost estimate from DOD officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Policy, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, and IDA officials  However, the military portions of the scenario and their corresponding cost estimate have some limitations  As a result of rounding for some units, U S  military personnel numbers do not exactly match the MINUSCA deployment levels  In addition, based on input from DOD officials, we attempted to select military units that would provide an essential function per U S  common practices while keeping the overall personnel deployment level as close as possible to MINUSCA’s deployment level  An actual U S  military plan may differ significantly from the UN plan as a result of differences between U S  and UN military operations, structure, doctrine, and circumstances at the time of the operation  To estimate U S  civilian costs, we matched the number of U S  civilian police and personnel to the number serving in MINUSCA  We then estimated the costs of deploying these U S  civilian personnel in CAR for the same time period as MINUSCA  We did not attempt to determine how the U S  government would actually implement civilian components of a peacekeeping operation in CAR  To estimate U S  civilian police costs, we met with State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to identify State’s costs for civilian police contractors providing police training and technical assistance in sub-Saharan Africa  Based on INL’s input we assumed that the base salary of civilian police would be grade 13, step 5 on the Office of Personnel Management’s general schedule salary tables for federal employees  In addition to the average base salary, we identified other costs—with input from INL—including, among others, personal equipment, travel from the United States, and State’s published allowances specific to CAR for local cost of living, post hardship differential, danger pay, and living quarters  We applied the average cost per officer to the average number of UN civilian police officers deployed in MINUSCA  To estimate U S  civilian personnel costs, we met with State’s Bureau of Budget and Planning to identify the costs of State Foreign Service officers and locally employed staff, based on the number of UN international and national civilian staff deployed to MINUSCA, respectively  We matched the number of State Foreign Service officers for the U S  cost estimate to the number of UN international staff in MINUSCA, with input from State to align the grade levels  The estimated costs for Foreign Service officers include average salaries based on State’s Foreign Service salary tables and State’s allowances specific to CAR, including local cost of living, post hardship differential, and danger pay  We also met with State Bureau of Budget and Planning officials to estimate other costs for Foreign Service officers, which we included in our cost estimate, including post assignment travel, administrative support costs, residential furnishings, and residential guards, among others, but we did not assess the reliability of these additional costs provided by State  In addition, State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations provided the actual costs of residential leases for Foreign Service officers in CAR in fiscal year 2017, which we used to estimate the cost of housing Foreign Service officers in CAR  We also matched the number of State locally employed staff to the number of UN national staff deployed to MINUSCA and added their average salaries and other costs in CAR based on data provided by State’s Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services  While MINUSCA’s expenditures also included costs for sending an annual average of up to about 200 UN volunteers to CAR, State officials told us that the United States generally would not send volunteers through its assistance efforts to a high-risk post, such as CAR  Therefore, we did not include any costs related to volunteers in the cost estimate  We also did not include costs related to host-government-provided personnel serving in MINUSCA  In addition, UN expenditures included about $7 million for “quick-impact projects” to support local government infrastructure and civil society initiatives  We did not include comparable costs for quick-impact projects in our U S  cost estimate because we did not have a basis for matching these costs  To identify factors that affect cost differences between MINUSCA and a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we reviewed the U S  cost estimate generated in conjunction with DOD, IDA, and State officials, and identified significant areas of cost for the United States and the assumptions incorporated in the estimate or factors specified by U S  officials that drive those costs  We compared the U S  cost estimate, including these significant areas of cost, to UN costs to identify differences  We interviewed U S  and UN officials regarding U S  and UN standards and policies that explain differences between MINUSCA costs and the estimated costs of a U S  operation  To identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations, we reviewed UN reports on peacekeeping operations and interviewed UN, DOD, and State officials  In addition, we reviewed GAO’s 2006 report comparing the costs as well as the strengths of a UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti with those of a hypothetical U S  operation  We conducted our review from February 2017 through February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the individual named above, Drew Lindsey (Assistant Director), Howard Cott, Juan Pablo Avila-Tournut, Debbie Chung, Martin de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Jennifer Leotta, Caitlin Mitchell, Elizabeth Repko, and Alex Welsh made significant contributions to this report 
Report 2:  In January 2017, we reported that DOD did not apply the OCO criteria to ERI prior to deciding to budget for its requirements using its OCO budget  We recommended that DOD, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, reevaluate and revise the criteria for determining what can be included in OCO budget requests  DOD concurred with our recommendation and noted that it plans to propose revised OCO criteria  As of May 2017, the department has not implemented our recommendation  DOD’s planning for ERI’s posture initiatives does not establish priorities for ERI initiatives relative to those in the base budget, estimate long-term sustainment costs for some posture initiatives funded under ERI, or communicate future ERI costs to Congress  When planning ERI’s posture initiatives, DOD establishes priorities among ERI’s initiatives but does not review posture initiatives funded under ERI relative to those funded in the military services’ base budgets  DOD’s posture management process is intended to establish priorities among global posture elements and is overseen by a Global Posture Executive Council  According to DOD Instruction 3000 12, the Executive Council is responsible for reviewing, prioritizing, and endorsing across the combatant commands key posture elements such as military construction projects and international agreements  The Executive Council’s endorsements inform the military services’ budget deliberations  For the fiscal year 2017 ERI budget, EUCOM requested funding for several posture initiatives, including the continuous, rotational deployment of an armored brigade combat team and the establishment of prepositioned equipment in Europe  Officials representing the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation said that as part of its planning process for ERI the Deputy’s Management Action Group evaluated and prioritized posture initiatives funded under ERI  However, DOD could not provide documentation that it had established priorities relative to posture initiatives funded through the base budget  Further, the Global Posture Executive Council did not review or prioritize posture initiatives funded under ERI relative to posture initiatives funded through DOD’s base budget  Similarly, as DOD prepared the fiscal year 2018 ERI budget request, the Global Posture Executive Council did not prioritize EUCOM’s proposed ERI posture initiatives relative to initiatives funded through DOD’s base budget  More detailed information about these proposals, and their potential funding requirements, are classified  According to officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Staff, DOD did not prioritize posture initiatives funded under ERI against base-budget funded posture initiatives, because ERI is funded through DOD’s OCO budget—which does not directly affect the services’ base budgets  However, because it does not prioritize ERI initiatives against other initiatives funded through the base budget, DOD lacks an understanding of the relative importance of initiatives funded under ERI and may begin investing in projects that it would not support in the absence of funding from DOD’s OCO budget  For example, Army officials noted that if funding were to become unavailable in DOD’s OCO budget, the Army is unsure how initiatives funded under ERI would rank in importance relative to other posture initiatives funded in its base budget  Consequently, the Army would be forced to make critical—and potentially costly—decisions quickly and without a clear idea of which posture initiatives were most important to the department  In planning for posture initiatives funded under ERI, EUCOM and the military services have not fully estimated the long-term sustainment costs of ERI’s posture initiatives to establish prepositioned equipment and construct new facilities  DOD’s global defense posture guidance indicates that, when evaluating potential changes to posture, the combatant commands should work with the military services to estimate the full cost of planned posture initiatives, including sustainment costs  DOD’s guidance on economic analysis also notes the importance of understanding both the size and timing of costs  Finally, our prior work has demonstrated that comprehensive cost estimates of current and future resource requirements are critical to making funding decisions and assessing program affordability  DOD leadership emphasized throughout the fiscal year 2018 budget review process that the services would need to fund ERI posture sustainment costs through their respective base budgets, but DOD did not direct the services and EUCOM to estimate these costs as they would have under their established processes  Officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation said that DOD leadership emphasized that the military services would need to fund all future sustainment costs for ERI projects from their base budgets  Based on DOD’s approach for calculating rough order sustainment costs, we determined that ERI sustainment costs for prepositioned equipment and construction could be substantial  Army and Air Force officials said that they were working to identify and incorporate these costs into future base budget submissions  DOD officials said that we correctly applied DOD’s approach for estimating sustainment costs, but noted that actual costs may be lower than the estimated costs, because the military services may not fully fund sustainment  Additionally, officials said that EUCOM is trying to negotiate burden sharing agreements with host nations; however, it is unclear whether these negotiations will be successful or how any resulting agreements would affect DOD’s future costs  Without comprehensive estimates of the sustainment costs for the prepositioned equipment and major military construction projects in Europe, DOD decision makers have been limited in their ability to evaluate the affordability of these initiatives  Further, in the absence of these estimates, the services have been limited in their ability to plan for costs in future budgets, because they have an incomplete understanding of the magnitude of those costs and of when they are likely to be incurred  The funding plan that DOD submits to Congress for ERI does not contain information about ERI’s future costs  This is in contrast to the way DOD submits its funding plan for its base budget, where DOD provides Congress with cost projections over a 5-year period, by appropriation, leaving Congress with a better understanding of how and when to allocate resources  In reviewing the fiscal year 2018 ERI request, the Director for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation assessed future costs associated with posture initiatives funded under ERI  We previously reported that DOD was not developing enduring requirements funded through its OCO budget as part of its budget and programming process  Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation told us that DOD has not been required to provide estimates for future OCO costs for ERI to Congress previously  An official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) told us that DOD does not plan to provide these future costs to Congress along with its fiscal year 2018 ERI budget submission  Additionally, in preparing its posture requirements, EUCOM did not identify assumptions regarding host nation and NATO burden sharing  For example, officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy said that DOD has submitted a request to the NATO Security Investment Programmé for $200 million in funding to build a facility in Poland to store Army equipment  Officials told us that, as a result, this construction project was identified as a lesser priority in EUCOM’s fiscal year 2018 request for funding  A senior Army officer told us that completion of a facility in Poland was critical to its plans in Europe  Officials from the U S  Mission to NATO told us that as of July 2016 NATO had approved funding to complete preliminary architectural and engineering design for this project  Officials expect additional funding will be made available in July 2017 to complete final design and site preparation and the full cost of the project will be approved in early 2019  However, these officials noted that additional funding beyond what has been approved by NATO may be required to meet U S -specific requirements  Similarly, EUCOM officials said that they are working to identify opportunities to defray future costs through host nation contributions, but it is unclear how much funding—if any—host nations will provide moving forward  Congress has expressed interest in knowing the future costs of enduring activities being funded through DOD’s OCO budget  The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report accompanying a bill for DOD’s fiscal year 2015 appropriations stated that the committee does not have an understanding of enduring activities funded by the OCO budget  The committee further noted that there is a potential for risk in continuing to fund non-contingency-related activities through the OCO budget  Both GAO’s and other federal standards emphasize that agencies should provide complete and reliable information on the costs of programs externally, so that decision makers can make informed decisions when allocating resources  DOD has not provided Congress projections of future costs for posture initiatives funded under ERI because it is reviewing those requirements outside of its budget and programming processes, and DOD officials said that the department is not required to provide this information  As a result, DOD is limiting congressional visibility into the resources needed to achieve ERI’s objectives  If DOD does not provide Congress with projections of the future costs of posture initiatives funded under ERI and information on its assumptions pertaining to host nation support and burden sharing, it will continue to impede congressional visibility into the resources that are needed to fully implement these initiatives  Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent threat of further aggression led DOD to establish and later expand ERI’s objectives and enhance posture in Europe to support a new U S  strategy toward Russia  DOD has requested funding for these enhancements using its OCO budget; however, the processes DOD uses to develop its OCO budget were not designed to plan for and fund long-term, enduring initiatives such as ERI  By following a separate planning process when funding ERI with OCO, DOD is taking on risk by not reviewing and prioritizing ERI posture plans against other posture initiatives, estimating the costs for sustaining ERI initiatives, and providing Congress with estimates of ERI’s future costs  DOD risks making decisions that lack a strategic vision in comparison to other DOD priorities and may fund initiatives that cannot be sustained over the long term  Furthermore, Congress is likely to face challenges in assessing DOD’s estimated costs for ERI and the affordability of initiatives funded under ERI over the long term  To better ensure that DOD can target resources to its most critical initiatives and establish priorities across its base budget and overseas contingency operations budget, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense prioritize posture initiatives under ERI relative to those funded in its base budget as part of its established posture-planning processes  (Recommendation 1) To better enable decision makers to evaluate the full long-term costs of posture initiatives under ERI, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct EUCOM and the military services to develop estimates for the sustainment costs of prepositioned equipment and other infrastructure projects under ERI and ensure that the services plan for these long-term costs in future budgets  (Recommendation 2) To support congressional decision making, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense provide to Congress, along with the department’s annual budget submission, estimates of the future costs for posture initiatives funded under ERI and other enduring costs that include assumptions such as those pertaining to the level of host nation support and burden sharing  (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of the classified report to DOD for review and comment  DOD partially concurred with all three of our recommendations, and we have reproduced DOD’s comments on the classified report in appendix II  DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation to use its established posture-planning processes to prioritize ERI’s posture initiatives relative to those funded in DOD’s base budget  In its comments, DOD stated that it will continue to prioritize the negotiation of international agreements supporting ERI through the Global Posture Executive Council, and that an on-going Strategic Review will inform ERI and guide both EUCOM and the services in their program planning efforts  These are positive steps  DOD also stated it will adjudicate its ERI-funded force requirements through its global force management process, adding that it will continue to resource OCO funds for ERI requirements until there is a sufficient increase in DOD’s base budget to do so  However, we continue to believe, as noted in our report, that DOD could improve its planning for posture initiatives funded under ERI, whether or not they are funded through OCO, by using DOD’s established posture planning processes  Although DOD’s global force management process directly affects overseas military posture in the near term, this process is not designed to evaluate long-term posture priorities  If DOD does not prioritize the forces and infrastructure projects funded under ERI against those funded using the military services’ base budgets, it will continue to lack an understanding of the relative importance of the posture initiatives funded under ERI  Without such an understanding, DOD increases the risk that the services will need to make critical and potentially costly decisions without a clear idea of which posture initiatives are most critical to the department  DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that EUCOM and the military services develop estimates for future sustainment costs and plan for these costs in future budgets  In its comments, DOD stated that its components will continue to estimate the sustainment costs for prepositioned stocks and other infrastructure projects during DOD’s annual program and budget review process  DOD also commented that without additional topline base budget funding, some portion of the associated sustainment costs will need to be financed with OCO funds  However, as we noted in our report, neither the Army nor the Air Force has fully estimated these potentially significant future costs, nor had either service incorporated them into their future budgets  Using OCO funds would mark a departure from DOD leadership’s emphasis that the services would need to fund ERI posture sustainment costs through their respective base budgets  Additionally, not developing robust estimates for sustaining these initiatives could increase long-term fiscal risk for the department if DOD shifts more ERI-associated enduring costs into its OCO budget  In the absence of robust cost estimates and deliberate planning to address those costs in future budgets, DOD will continue to be limited in its ability to evaluate the affordability of posture initiatives funded under ERI, and the military services may not plan adequate funding to sustain posture investments in Europe  DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation, to provide Congress with estimates of the future costs for posture initiatives funded under ERI and information on any underlying assumptions, such as those pertaining to the level of host nation support and burden sharing  In its comments, DOD stated that it does not currently prepare a formal 5-year Future Years Defense Program for OCO-related costs  Moreover, DOD commented that it factors in host nation support and burden sharing when preparing budget estimates for Congress  However, DOD does not state whether it will begin to provide Congress future estimates and any underlying assumptions with its budget submission  It is critical that DOD increase congressional visibility into ERI’s future costs and its underlying assumptions to facilitate congressional oversight and reasonably ensure that initiatives can be sustained over the long-term  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Commander, U S  European Command  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in Appendix III  The Army and Air Force identified approximately $224 million in unspecified minor military construction and facilities maintenance and repair projects (hereafter, minor construction and repair) that were programmed or obligated for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) in fiscal years 2015 through 2017  This includes $157 million for minor construction and repair projects identified by the Army and nearly $67 million for minor construction and repair projects identified by the Air Force  According to U S  European Command officials, Navy and Marine Corps construction projects funded under ERI were either major military construction or exercise-related construction projects  The tables below do not include Navy and Marine Corps exercise-related construction projects  Using the data provided by the military services, we compiled the programmed and obligated funding for these minor construction and repair projects by fiscal year, country, location, and project name in tables 3 and 4  The information in these tables was provided by U S  Army Europe and U S  Air Force Europe in response to our request for a list of minor military construction and repair projects  The data provided did not identify the appropriations used for each project  Accordingly, we have not conducted a review to examine whether funds were appropriately used for a given project  In addition to the contact named above, Kevin O’Neill, Assistant Director; Alex Winograd, Analyst-in-Charge; Scott Bruckner, Adrianne Cline, Martin De Alteriis, Joanne Landesman, Jennifer Leotta, Carol Petersen, Michael Shaughnessy, and Jena Sinkfield all made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: To promote international peace and security, the UN had 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations worldwide as of June 30, 2017, with a total budget of almost $8 billion in UN fiscal year 2017 and contributions of over 100,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from more than 120 countries. The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, providing an average of about 28 percent of total funding annually. The Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, includes a provision for GAO to compare the costs, strengths, and limitations of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. This report (1) compares the reported costs of a specific UN operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identifies factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identifies stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. GAO worked with the UN, DOD, and State to generate a cost estimate of a hypothetical U.S.-led operation in the Central African Republic comparable to MINUSCA. GAO developed this estimate using DOD's cost estimating tool for contingency operations and State data on civilian costs, assuming a U.S. operation using roughly the same levels of military and civilian personnel as MINUSCA. The cost estimate should not be construed as suggesting that the United States would likely implement such an operation in the Central African Republic or that it would implement such an operation in the same way. GAO is making no recommendations. Based on United Nations (UN) and Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) data, GAO estimates that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). MINUSCA cost the UN approximately $2.4 billion for the first 39 months of the operation. GAO estimates that a hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic of roughly the same size and duration would cost nearly $5.7 billion—almost eight times more than the $700 million the United States contributed to MINUSCA over the same time period. Various factors affect differences between the actual cost of MINUSCA and the estimated cost of a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation in the Central African Republic. The United States and the UN would source and transport some supplies and equipment differently, affecting the cost of both operations; for example, the United States would airlift water into the Central African Republic, while the UN does not do so to the same extent. The United States also would incur the cost of civilian police and military reservist salaries, while the UN does not pay any troop or police salaries. Finally, some higher standards for facilities, intelligence, and medical services increase the U.S. cost estimate relative to UN costs for similar operational elements. UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U.S. and UN officials. These officials said that, because the UN is a multilateral organization, UN peacekeeping operations have international acceptance and are more likely to be viewed as impartial. Officials also said that the UN enjoys global access to expertise and experience, and can leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks. Relative strengths of a U.S. peacekeeping operation would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capability, according to U.S. and UN officials.