prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: This report provides responses to frequently asked questions about the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant  It is intended to serve as a quick reference to provide easy access to information and data  Appendix B presents a series of tables with state-level data  This report does not provide information on TANF program rules (for a discussion of TANF rules, see CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements , by Gene Falk)  On January 24, 2019, the President signed legislation ( P L  116-4 ) that funds TANF and related programs through June 30, 2019  The legislation permits states to receive their quarterly TANF grants for the 2 nd quarter (January through March) and 3 rd quarter (April through June) of FY2019  Additional legislation would be required to pay TANF grants in the final quarter (July through September) of FY2019  TANF programs are funded through a combination of federal and state funds  In FY2018, TANF has two federal grants to states  The bulk of the TANF funding is in a basic block grant to the states, totaling $16 5 billion for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Indian tribes  There is also a contingency fund available that provides extra federal funds to states that meet certain conditions  Additionally, states are required to expend a minimum amount of their own funds for TANF and TANF-related activities under what is known as the maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement  States are required to spend at least 75% of what they spent in FY1994 on TANF's predecessor programs  The minimum MOE amount, in total, is $10 3 billion per year for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories  TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, P L  104-193 )  A TANF basic block grant amount—both nationally and for each state—was established in the 1996 welfare reform law  The amount established in that law for the 50 states, District of Columbia, territories, and tribes was $16 6 billion in total  From FY1997 through FY2016, that amount remained the same  It was not adjusted for changes that occur over time, such as inflation, the size of the TANF assistance caseload, or changes in the poverty population  During this period, the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the block grant declined by one-third (33 1%)  Beginning with FY2017, the state family assistance grant was reduced by 0 33% from its historical levels to finance TANF-related research and technical assistance  The reduced block grant amount is $16 5 billion  Table 1 shows the state family assistance grant, in both nominal (actual) and real (inflation-adjusted) dollars for each year, FY1997 through FY2018  In real (inflation-adjusted) terms, the FY2018 block grant was 36% below its value in FY1997  Figure 1 shows the uses of federal TANF grants to states and state MOE funds in FY2017  In FY2017, a total of $31 1 billion of both federal TANF and state MOE expenditures were either expended or transferred to other block grant programs  Basic assistance—ongoing benefits to families to meet basic needs—represented 23% ($7 1 billion) of total FY2017 TANF and MOE dollars  TANF is a major contributor of child care funding  In FY2017, $5 billion (16% of all TANF and MOE funds) were either expended on child care or transferred to the child care block grant (the Child Care and Development Fund, or CCDF)  TANF work-related activities (including education and training) were the third-largest TANF and MOE spending category at $3 3 billion, or 11% of total TANF and MOE funds  TANF also helps low-wage parents by helping to finance state refundable tax credits, such as state add-ons to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)  TANF and MOE expenditures on refundable tax credits in FY2017 totaled $2 8 billion, or 9% of total TANF and MOE spending  TANF is also a major contributor to the child welfare system, which provides foster care, adoption assistance, and services to families with children who either have experienced or are at risk of experiencing child abuse or neglect, spending about $2 2 billion on such activities  TANF and MOE funds also help fund state prekindergarten (pre-K) programs, with total FY2017 expenditures for that category also at $2 5 billion  TANF and MOE funds are also used for short-term and emergency benefits and a wide range of other social services  For state-specific information on the use of TANF funds, see Table B-1 and Table B-2   TANF law permits states to "reserve" unused funds without time limit  This permits flexibility in timing of the use of TANF funds, including the ability to "save" funds for unexpected occurrences that might increase costs (such as recessions or natural disasters)  At the end of FY2017 (September 30, 2017, the most recent data currently available), a total of $5 1 billion of federal TANF funding remained neither transferred nor spent  However, some of these unspent funds represent monies that states had already committed to spend later  At the end of FY2017, states had made such commitments to spend—that is, had obligated—a total of $1 8 billion  At the end of FY2017, states had $3 3 billion of "unobligated balances " These funds are available to states to make new spending commitments  Table B-3 shows unspent TANF funds by state  This number is not known  Federal TANF reporting requirements focus on families receiving only ongoing assistance   There is no complete reporting on families receiving other TANF benefits and services  Assistance is defined as benefits provided to families to meet ongoing, basic needs  It is most often paid in cash  However, some states use TANF or MOE funds to provide an "earnings supplement" to working parents added to monthly Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) allotments  These "earnings supplements" are paid separately from the regular TANF cash assistance program  Additionally, TANF MOE dollars are used to fund food assistance for immigrants barred from regular SNAP benefits in certain states  These forms of nutrition aid meet an ongoing need, and thus are considered TANF assistance  As discussed in a previous section of this report, TANF basic assistance accounts for about 24% of all TANF expenditures  Therefore, the federal reporting requirements that pertain to families receiving "assistance" are likely to undercount the number of families receiving any TANF-funded benefit or service  Table 2 provides assistance caseload information  A total of 1 2 million families, composed of 3 1 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded assistance in September 2018  The bulk of the "recipients" were children—2 3 million in that month  For state-by-state assistance caseloads, see Table B-4   Figure 2 provides a long-term historical perspective on the number of families receiving assistance from TANF or its predecessor program, from July 1959 to September 2017  The shaded areas of the figure represent months when the national economy was in recession  Though the health of the national economy has affected the trend in the cash assistance caseload, the long-term trend in receipt of cash assistance does not follow a classic countercyclical pattern  Such a pattern would have the caseload rise during economic slumps, and then fall again during periods of economic growth  Factors other than the health of the economy (demographic trends, policy changes) also have influenced the caseload trend  The figure shows two periods of sustained caseload increases: the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s and a second period from 1988 to 1994  The number of families receiving assistance peaked in March 1994 at 5 1 million families  The assistance caseload fell rapidly in the late 1990s (after the 1996 welfare reform law) before leveling off in 2001  In 2004, the caseload began another decline, albeit at a slower pace than in the late 1990s  During the recent 2007-2009 recession and its aftermath, the caseload began to rise from 1 7 million families in August 2008, peaking in December 2010 at close to 2 0 million families  By September 2018, the assistance caseload had declined to 1 2 million families  Table B-5 shows recent trends in the number of cash assistance families by state  Before PRWORA, the "typical" family receiving assistance has been headed by a single parent (usually the mother) with one or two children  That single parent has also typically been unemployed  However, over the past 20 years the assistance caseload decline has occurred together with a major shift in the composition of the rolls  Figure 3 shows the change in the size and composition of the assistance caseload under both AFDC (1988 and 1994) and TANF  In FY1988, an estimated 84% of AFDC families were headed by an unemployed adult recipient  In FY2016, families with an unemployed adult recipient represented 32% of all cash assistance families  This decline occurred, in large part, as the number of families headed by unemployed adult recipients declined more rapidly than other components of the assistance caseload  In FY1994, a monthly average of 3 8 million families per month who received AFDC cash assistance had adult recipients who were not working  In FY2016, a monthly average of 485,000 families per month had adult recipients or work-eligible individuals, with no adult recipient or work-eligible individual working  With the decline in families headed by unemployed adults, the share of the caseload represented by families with employed adults and "child only" families has increased  In FY2017, families with all adult recipients unemployed and families with employed adult recipients each represented 31% of all assistance families  The latter category includes families in "earnings supplement" programs separate from the regular TANF cash assistance program  "Child-only" families are those where no adult recipient receives benefits in their own right; the family receives benefits on behalf of its children  The share of the caseload that was child-only in FY2017 was 38%  In FY2017, families with a nonrecipient, nonparent relative (grandparents, aunts, uncles) represented 14% of all assistance families  Families with ineligible, noncitizen adults or adults who have not reported their citizenship status made up 9% of the assistance caseload in that year  Families where the parent received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and the children received TANF made up 9% of all assistance families in FY2017  There are no federal rules that help determine the amount of TANF cash benefits paid to a family  (There are also no federal rules that require states to use TANF to pay cash benefits, though all states do so ) Benefit amounts are determined solely by the states  Most states base TANF cash benefit amounts on family size, paying larger cash benefits to larger families on the presumption that they have greater financial needs  The maximum monthly cash benefit is usually paid to a family that receives no other income (e g , no earned or unearned income) and complies with program rules  Families with income other than TANF often are paid a reduced benefit  Moreover, some families are financially sanctioned for not meeting a program requirement (e g , a work requirement), and are also paid a lower benefit  Figure 4 shows the maximum monthly TANF cash benefit by state for a single mother caring for two children (family of three) in July 2016  The benefit amounts shown are those for a single-parent family with two children  For a family of three, the maximum TANF benefit paid in July 2017 varied from $170 per month in Mississippi to $1,201 per month in New Hampshire  The map shows a regional pattern to the maximum monthly benefit paid, with lower benefit amounts in the South than in other regions  Only New Hampshire (at 60% of the federal poverty guidelines) had a maximum TANF cash assistance amount for this sized family in excess of 50% of poverty-level income  TANF's main federal work requirement is actually a performance measure that applies to the states, rather than individual recipients  States determine the work rules that apply to individual recipients  The TANF statute requires states to have 50% of their caseload meet standards of participation in work or activities—that is, a family member must be in specified activities for a minimum number of hours  There is a separate participation standard that applies to the two-parent portion of a state's caseload, requiring 90% of the state's two-parent caseload to meet participation standards  However, the statutory work participation standards are reduced by a "caseload reduction credit " The caseload reduction credit reduces the participation standard one percentage point for each percentage point decline in a state's caseload  Additionally, under a regulatory provision, a state may get "extra" credit for caseload reduction if it spends more than required under the TANF MOE  Therefore, the effective standards states face are often less than the 50% and 90% targets, and vary by state and by year  States that do not meet the TANF work participation standard are at risk of being penalized through a reduction in their block grant  However, penalties can be forgiven if a state claims, and the Secretary of HHS finds, that it had "reasonable cause" for not meeting the standard  Penalties can also be forgiven for states that enter into "corrective compliance plans," and subsequently meet the work standard  The 50% and 90% target standards that states face, as well as the caseload reduction credit, date back to the 1996 welfare reform law  However, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P L  109-171 ) made several changes to the work participation rules effective in FY2007 The caseload reduction credit was changed to measure caseload reduction from FY2005, rather than the original law's FY1995  The work participation standards were broadened to include families receiving cash aid in "separate state programs " Separate state programs are programs run with state funds, distinct from a state's "TANF program," but with expenditures countable toward the TANF MOE  HHS was instructed to provide definition to the allowable TANF work activities listed in law  HHS was also required to define what is meant by a "work-eligible" individual, expanding the number of families that are included in the work participation calculation  States were required to develop plans and procedures to verify work activities  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P L  111-5 ), a law enacted in response to the sharp economic downturn of 2007-2009, held states "harmless" for caseload increases affecting the work participation standards for FY2009 through FY2011  It did so by allowing states to "freeze" caseload reduction credits at pre-recession levels through the FY2011 standards  HHS computes two work participation rates for each state that are then compared with the effective (after-credit) standard to determine if it has met the TANF work standard  An "all-families" work participation rate is computed and compared with the all-families effective standard (50% minus the state's caseload reduction credit)  HHS also computes a two-parent work participation rate that is compared with the two-parent effective standard (90% minus the state's caseload reduction credit)  Figure 5 shows the national average all-families work participation rate for FY2002 through FY2017  For the period FY2002 through FY2011, states achieved an average all-families work participation rate hovering around 30%  The work participation rate increased since then  In FY2016, it exceeded 50% for the first time since TANF was established  However, it is important to note that the increase in the work participation rate has not come from an increase in the number of recipients in regular TANF assistance programs who are either working or in job preparation activities  This increase stems mostly from states creating new "earnings supplement" programs that use TANF funds to aid working parents in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps) or who have left the regular TANF assistance programs for work  Figure 6 shows which states did not meet the TANF all-families work participation standards from FY2006 through FY2017  Before FY2007, the first year that DRA was effective, only a few jurisdictions did not meet TANF all-families work participation standards  However, in FY2007, 15 jurisdictions did not meet the all-families standard  This number declined to 9 in FY2008 and 8 in FY2009  In FY2012, despite the uptick in the national average work participation rate, 16 states did not meet the all-family standard, the largest number of states that did not meet their participation standards in any one year since the enactment of TANF  FY2012 was the year that ARRA's "freeze" of the caseload reduction credit expired, and states were generally required to meet higher standards than in previous years  The number of jurisdictions that did not meet the all-families standard declined over the FY2012 to FY2017 period  In FY2017, two jurisdictions did not meet the all-family participation standard: Nevada and Guam  In addition to meeting a work standard for all families, TANF also imposes a second standard—90%—for the two-parent portion of its cash assistance caseload  This standard can also be lowered by caseload reduction  Figure 7 shows whether each state met its two-parent work participation standard for FY2006 through FY2017  However, the display on the table is more complex than that for reporting whether a state met or did not meet its "all family" rate  A substantial number of states have reported no two-parent families subject to the work participation standard  These states are denoted on the table with an "NA," indicating that the two-parent standard was not applicable to the state in that year  Before the changes made by the DRA were effective, a number of states had their two-parent families in separate state programs that were not included in the work participation calculation  When DRA brought families receiving assistance in separate state programs into the work participation rate calculations, a number of states moved these families into solely state-funded programs  These are state-funded programs with expenditures not countable toward the TANF maintenance of effort requirement, and hence are outside of TANF's rules  For states with two-parent families in their caseloads, the table reports "Yes" for states that met the two-parent standard, and "No" for states that did not meet the two-parent standard  Of the 28 jurisdictions that had two-parent families in their FY2017 TANF work participation calculation, 19 met the standard and 9 did not  Appendix A  Supplementary Tables Appendix B  State Tables


Report 2: WMATA was created in 1967 through an interstate compact—matching legislation passed by the District of Columbia, state of Maryland, and Commonwealth of Virginia, and then ratified by Congress—to plan, develop, finance, and operate a regional transportation system in the National Capital area  A board of eight voting directors and eight alternate directors governs WMATA  The directors are appointed by the District of Columbia, Virginia, Maryland, and the federal government, with each appointing two voting and two alternate directors  WMATA operates six rail lines—the Red, Orange, Blue, Green, Yellow, and Silver Lines—connecting various locations within the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia  WMATA’s rail system has 118 linear miles of guideway: 51 miles of subway, 58 miles at ground level, and 9 miles on aerial structures  WMATA’s capital investments are funded through multiple sources  These include a combination of grants it receives from the federal government, along with matching funds and other contributions it receives from the states and local jurisdictions in which it operates (see fig  1)  From fiscal years 2011 through 2017, WMATA received about $5 8 billion in capital funding  Over half of this funding came from the federal government ($3 2 billion), and state and local jurisdictions provided 41 percent ($2 4 billion)  WMATA also took on about $230 million in long- term debt to finance its capital program during this time period  The federal funding included grant awards, in addition to annual appropriations authorized under PRIIA  In 2008, PRIIA authorized $1 5 billion to WMATA, available in increments over 10 years beginning in fiscal year 2009, or until expended, for capital improvements and preventive maintenance  PRIIA funding and certain federal grants require state or local jurisdictions to provide matching funds  Additionally, a large portion of funding from state and local jurisdictions is governed by capital-funding agreements, which are periodically negotiated between WMATA and the states and localities  From fiscal years 2011 through 2017, state and local jurisdictions contributed on average about $340 million annually to WMATA, generally for capital purposes  The annual capital contributions from the jurisdictions are expected to more than double as a result of the recent legislation enacted by the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia in 2018  In addition, WMATA officials told us that it will have the ability to further leverage this dedicated funding and issue debt to finance its capital projects  WMATA has several steps in its capital planning process  These include developing the following: Capital Needs Inventory  WMATA periodically identifies its capital investment needs in this inventory  WMATA issued a Capital Needs Inventory in February 2010 and another in November 2016, each covering a 10-year period  According to WMATA, Capital Needs Inventories help inform the annual capital budget and capital improvement program  Annual Capital Budget  Each year, WMATA prepares an annual capital budget, which identifies projects WMATA plans to undertake in the next fiscal year  WMATA’s fiscal year 2019 annual capital budget was approved by the board of directors at $1 3 billion  Six-Year Capital Improvement Program  Within WMATA’s annual capital budget, WMATA includes a Six-Year Capital Improvement Program identifying capital projects WMATA plans to implement over a 6-year period  WMATA’s most recent Six-Year Capital Improvement Program (covering the fiscal year 2019—2024 period) was approved by the board of directors at $8 5 billion  According to WMATA officials, WMATA is currently implementing a new capital planning process through which it will develop its fiscal year 2020 Capital Budget and fiscal year 2020-2025 Six-Year Capital Improvement Program  WMATA adopts and implements the capital budget by June 30 for the new fiscal year, which begins on July 1  The fiscal year 2020 Capital Budget is scheduled to be adopted and implemented by June 30, 2019  Among other things, the goals and objectives of this new capital planning process are to construct an objective, data-driven, and risk-based approach to estimate major rehabilitation and capital asset replacement needs; build a capital investment prioritization methodology aligned with WMATA’s strategic goals and grounded in asset inventory and condition assessments; and develop a process that will support the construction and ongoing stewardship of its Transit Asset Management Plan  The latter is discussed in more detail below  WMATA has also recently undertaken efforts to address issues related to the condition and maintenance of its track  After SafeTrack concluded in June 2017, WMATA implemented what officials describe as its first track preventive maintenance program designed to incorporate industry-wide best practices related to track maintenance, in order to improve the rail system’s long-term safety and reliability  The new program commenced in June 2017, and WMATA’s board reduced late-night service to allow for longer maintenance work hours  To make the best use of the extra maintenance hours, WMATA focused its new program on six separate initiatives that together would address what WMATA viewed as its two most pressing track maintenance concerns—electrical fires caused by cable and insulator defects along the track wayside, and defects to the track itself, including unsecured rail fasteners and worn track switches (see table 1)  These initiatives are planned to cover the entire transit system and will take various amounts of time to complete  FTA also plays a role in WMATA activities by providing and directing the use of federal funds, overseeing safety, and requiring transit asset management  FTA provides grants that support capital investment in public transportation, consistent with locally developed transportation plans, and has provided such funding to WMATA as noted above  Additionally, though states play a role in safety oversight of rail transit systems through state safety oversight programs, FTA also has the authority to conduct various safety oversight activities such as inspections and investigations  Furthermore, FTA has the authority to assume temporary, direct safety oversight of a rail transit system if it finds the state safety oversight program is inadequate, among other things  After FTA conducted a safety management inspection and issued a safety directive with 91 required actions, it found WMATA’s state safety- oversight program to be inadequate and assumed direct safety-oversight of WMATA in October 2015  Finally, FTA is responsible for assisting public transportation systems to achieve and maintain their infrastructure, equipment, and vehicles in a state of good repair  Specifically, in July 2016, FTA issued regulations establishing a National Transit Asset Management System  Applicable transit agencies were required to have an initial transit asset management plan completed by October 1, 2018  For “tier I providers,” such as WMATA, this plan is to contain nine elements, including an inventory of the number and type of capital assets, and a condition assessment of those inventoried assets for which a provider has direct capital responsibility  WMATA completed its Transit Asset Management plan, dated October 1, 2018  This plan outlines WMATA’s policy, approach, and targeted actions to improve its asset management practices over the next 4 years  WMATA expends its capital funds on a variety of capital assets as part of its capital budget and Capital Improvement Program  From fiscal year 2011 through 2017, WMATA expended approximately $5 9 billion on capital investments  Of this amount, WMATA expended the largest portion on assets related to the replacement, rehabilitation, and maintenance of its revenue vehicles (railcars, buses, and vans) and lesser amounts on other categories of assets, as discussed below and shown in figure 2  Rail and Bus Vehicle Fleet: WMATA expended approximately $2 16 billion (36 percent) of the total $5 9 billion on projects related to its rail and bus fleet from fiscal years 2011 through 2017  The $2 16 billion included approximately $1 1 billion (51 percent) on replacing, expanding, and rehabilitating its rail fleet and approximately $956 million (44 percent) on its bus fleet  According to WMATA, it initiated its railcar replacement program in 2005 to increase capacity and reduce maintenance costs  In addition, a June 2009 Red Line collision of two trains near Fort Totten resulted in nine deaths and led the NTSB to recommend that WMATA retire and replace all 1000 series railcars  From fiscal year 2011 through 2017, WMATA expended almost $656 million on replacing these and other railcars and expanding its overall fleet  This effort includes WMATA’s planned purchase of a total of 748 new 7000-series railcars (see fig  3)  Approximately $530 million was expended on replacing vehicles from fiscal years 2015 through 2017  For example, in fiscal year 2017 WMATA accepted delivery of about 50 percent (364 railcars) of its planned purchase of 748, 7000-series railcars  WMATA expects to complete its current railcar replacement program by fiscal year 2024, with an estimated total program cost of about $1 7 billion  Fixed Rail Infrastructure: WMATA expended about $1 23 billion of the total $5 9 billion (21 percent) to maintain its fixed-rail infrastructure  Of this $1 23 billion, WMATA expended about $650 million (53 percent) on rail infrastructure and rehabilitation projects and $573 million (47 percent) on improvements to its track and structures (e g , bridges and tunnels)  According to WMATA, the rail infrastructure and rehabilitation projects began in 2009 and were the first comprehensive rehabilitation of WMATA’s rail infrastructure in its history  Typical projects included rehabilitating WMATA’s water drainage pumps and tunnel ventilation, fire, and communications systems, among other things  WMATA work related to track and structures involved the maintenance and rehabilitation of the steel rail that guides railcars, the cross ties and fasteners that hold the rail in place, the third rail that provides power to trains, and the bridges and tunnels the track runs on or through  The share of WMATA’s total capital expenditures going to track and structures increased from about $80 million in fiscal year 2016 to $158 million in fiscal year 2017  This expenditure was primarily to implement SafeTrack  Maintenance Facilities and Equipment: WMATA expended approximately $1 1 billion of the total $5 9 billion (19 percent) on assets related to maintenance facilities and equipment, which include rail yards, bus garages, and equipment used to rehabilitate and maintain WMATA’s track and vehicle fleet  For example, from fiscal years 2011 through 2017 WMATA expended approximately $75 million in constructing the Cinder Bed Road bus maintenance facility in Lorton, Virginia  Passenger and Other Facilities: WMATA expended about $814 million of the total $5 9 billion (14 percent) on passenger, business, and security support facilities  Such facilities include rail and bus stations, police facilities, and elevator and escalator rehabilitation  Business Systems and Project Management Support: WMATA also expended about $628 million of the total $5 9 billion (11 percent) on assets related to operations and business support software and equipment  From fiscal years 2011 through 2017, WMATA frequently over-estimated in its annual budgets the annual amount of capital investments it could implement (see fig 4)  Out of the approximately $7 5 billion that WMATA budgeted for capital investments over this period, it expended approximately $5 9 billion (80 percent)  WMATA’s ability to fully expend its capital budget has varied from year to year  Specifically, WMATA expended about 65 percent ($700 million) of its $1 1 billion capital budget in fiscal year 2015, compared with 85 percent ($1 1 billion) of its $1 2 billion capital budget in fiscal year 2016  In fiscal year 2017, WMATA expended nearly 100 percent of its $1 18 billion capital budget  WMATA attributed the increased expenditures to intensified efforts to address deferred maintenance, primarily through the SafeTrack initiative and an increased delivery and acceptance rate for the new 7000-series railcars, among other things  The total amount expended in fiscal year 2017 to replace the older railcars with new vehicles totaled about $335 million  According to WMATA, there are a number of reasons why it has not fully expended its capital budget in any given year: Contracting and Scheduling Issues: WMATA officials stated that there were contract and scheduling delays in the implementation of planned capital projects  For example, WMATA officials said contracts were sometimes not executed during the fiscal year in which funds were originally budgeted for the work, and in other instances contract work was not carried out according to schedule and expenditures were delayed  Changing Priorities: WMATA officials stated that in some instances, the reevaluation and reprioritization of contracted projects affected WMATA’s ability to expend its capital budget  In such cases, new capital needs were sometimes identified and prioritized over other needs, which caused delays in work schedules and potential financial claims by contractors due to delays  For example, WMATA stated that in fiscal year 2011 the initiation of the Red Line rehabilitation program was delayed as a result of the prioritization of the safety needs in response to the 2009 Fort Totten accident  Federal Reimbursement Restrictions: WMATA officials cited FTA restrictions on its reimbursement of federal funds between fiscal years 2014 and 2015 as a reason for its inability to expend budgeted capital funds in those years  In a financial management oversight review completed by FTA in 2014, FTA found material weaknesses and significant deficiencies in WMATA’s financial management controls, policies, and procedures regarding its receipt of federal grant funds  Based on these preliminary findings, FTA restricted WMATA’s ability to automatically access federal grant reimbursements until WMATA undertook corrective actions  During these years, WMATA reported its management slowed expenditures on targeted capital projects due to concerns over reimbursement of grants  By October 2017, after WMATA implemented an action plan to improve its financial controls, FTA reinstated WMATA’s ability to automatically receive all awarded federal funds on a regular schedule  Unpredictable Funding: WMATA officials stated that unpredictable funding affected the level of its capital expenditures from year to year  Since WMATA had multi-year capital projects with multi-year procurements, according to WMATA officials, uncertainty with regard to how much capital funding would be received on an annual basis affected the implementation of projects  Inadequate Capital Planning Process: WMATA attributed some of its inability to expend budgeted capital funds to the absence of a uniform and efficient capital planning process  According to WMATA, it lacked formal procedures to initiate projects and newer projects often experienced delays in implementation, which delayed expenditures on these projects  Later in this report, we discuss WMATA’s efforts to develop a new capital planning process  Although WMATA expended more of its capital budget in fiscal year 2017 than it had in prior years, it estimated that capital spending will need to increase even more to address state-of-good-repair needs  In 2016, WMATA projected that its state-of-good-repair needs amounted to about $17 4 billion from 2017 through 2026  This level is almost $10 billion more than WMATA estimated for its state-of-good-repair needs from 2011 through 2020 in its February 2010 Capital Needs Inventory  WMATA officials attributed the increase to a capital planning process insufficient to identify capital needs and an increase in cost of needs that were previously unmet  In addition, WMATA officials said the quality and quantity of asset data had improved over time  To address its state-of- good-repair needs, in November 2016 WMATA estimated that it will need to expend about $1 74 billion annually on capital expenditures from 2017 through 2026  This is more than twice the $845 million average annual capital expenditures from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2017  WMATA’s new capital planning process could address some of the weaknesses it identified in the previous process, such as better distinguishing capital needs (investments in groups of related assets) from capital projects (investments in specific assets)  However, WMATA has not established documented policies and procedures to guide the developed performance measures to assess capital projects and the capital planning process; and developed a plan to obtain complete information about the inventory and condition of WMATA assets  These remaining weaknesses could hinder sound capital investment decisions  WMATA’s new capital planning process could facilitate better identification of capital investment needs  Leading practices for capital planning, among other things, call for an organization to conduct a comprehensive assessment of its needs to meet its mission  WMATA uses the Capital Needs Inventory to assess its capital needs over a 10- year period across its various assets and help identify specific projects to include on subsequent capital improvement programs  In November 2016, WMATA issued its most recent Capital Needs Inventory, covering calendar year 2017 through 2026, and reported there were weaknesses and limitations in the process used to prepare the previous Capital Needs Inventory, issued in 2010  Those weaknesses and the actions WMATA has taken to address them include the following: Distinguishing capital needs from capital projects  WMATA reported in 2016 that the 2010 Capital Needs Inventory was primarily a list of proposed projects and did not provide proper attention to evaluating WMATA’s overall asset needs and the readiness of projects for programming in the capital improvement program  WMATA has taken actions to potentially address this weakness  In April 2016, WMATA issued a policy/instruction document that established policies and procedures for preparing capital needs inventories  This document defined the process for capital needs identification and established a framework evaluating and prioritizing capital investment needs  Among other things, this framework requires that WMATA departments develop capital needs justification packages and that these packages be reviewed by the Capital Program Advisory Committee for completeness and accuracy before being forwarded for further review  The guidance also requires that WMATA’s strategic objectives be considered when identifying and prioritizing capital projects  Qualitative rather than quantitative prioritization of needs  In 2016, WMATA reported that the prioritization of capital needs in the 2010 Capital Needs Inventory was primarily based on qualitative assessments by management rather than being driven by quantitative information and condition assessments  According to WMATA, the 2010 Capital Needs Inventory was largely based on the professional judgment of staff in consideration of WMATA’s strategic goals but was not data-driven  WMATA has taken actions to address this weakness by issuing a policy that requires WMATA’s senior management serving on the Capital Program Advisory Committee to use a more quantitative-based capital prioritization formula in preparing the Capital Needs Inventory  For example, the November 2016 Capital Needs Inventory used a quantitative approach to rank and prioritize capital needs  This approach included the use of four criteria—asset condition, safety and security, service delivery, and ridership impact— to numerically score capital needs and WMATA then used a risk- based weighting approach to combine these criteria into a single overall prioritization score  While WMATA has addressed some weaknesses it identified in its prior planning, it has not established documented policies and procedures to guide the annual capital planning process, or developed measures to assess capital project and program performance and a plan to obtain complete information on its assets and their physical condition  Although WMATA established policies and procedures for prioritizing capital needs—that is, investments in groups of related assets—for the 2016 Capital Needs Inventory, it has not established documented policies and procedures for the new capital planning process, including how WMATA will rank and select individual projects to address those needs through its annual capital budgets and Six-Year Capital Improvement Program  For example, through its Capital Needs Inventory WMATA stated it needed to invest $17 4 billion over a 10-year period to address its state-of-good-repair needs, including replacing vehicles, rehabilitating stations, and investing in other types of assets  WMATA uses the annual capital budget and Six-Year Capital Improvement Program to identify the specific projects to be funded to meet the 10-year investment needs  However, because WMATA has not established documented policies and procedures for the new capital planning process, it has not yet identified the specific methodologies to rank and select projects for funding on an annual basis  According to WMATA officials, the legacy annual capital planning process was based on implementing the list of projects that resulted from its 2010 Capital Needs Inventory and WMATA did not have a documented capital planning process that it followed on an annual basis  WMATA officials told us that the legacy capital planning process was “ad hoc” in nature, in part because WMATA was reacting to emergencies  For example, because WMATA needed to address the NTSB recommendation to replace the 1000-series railcars and address FTA safety directives after the 2015 smoke incident at the L’Enfant Plaza Station, it did not adhere to a formal annual-planning process  The COSO internal control standards point out the importance of organizations documenting their processes to facilitate retention and sharing of organizational knowledge  Leading practices contained in the Executive Guide also recommend that organizations have defined processes for ranking and selecting projects for capital funding  In addition, the Executive Guide noted that organizations find it beneficial to rank projects because the number of requested projects often exceeds available funding  Officials from all five of the peer transit agencies we spoke with told us they had or planned to develop documented processes for making capital investment decisions  For example, officials from four of the five peer transit agencies we spoke with said they use a project scoring and ranking system in their capital planning process, and officials from the fifth agency told us it plans to develop such a system  Officials from one agency provided us with its project evaluation and scoring system that assigns scores using eight selection criteria that are tied to the agency’s strategic business plan and state priorities  The selection criteria include such things as system preservation, safety, and cost-effectiveness  Officials from another agency told us they use an analytical tool to score projects and that every project (new or existing) gets re-scored annually  As a result of WMATA not having documented policies and procedures for its capital planning process, it is unclear how important parts of the process will work and the basis for WMATA’s investment decisions  WMATA has outlined some high-level policies for the capital planning process and prepared limited guidance for certain parts of the process  For example, WMATA officials told us that its recently issued Transit Asset Management Plan contains asset management policies that address the ranking and selecting of capital projects  Although the Transit Asset Management Plan discusses the process for estimating and prioritizing capital needs and, which are precursors of projects, the plan does not specifically address how projects would be selected for annual capital budgets and the capital improvement program  In addition, WMATA developed limited guidance for staff to use in developing new capital projects  Under this guidance, capital funds could be provided to evaluate, plan, and develop projects  While this guidance may be useful for developing projects, it does not establish the policies and procedures WMATA will follow to decide which projects will be funded through the annual capital budget and the capital improvement program  Further, the documentation prepared by WMATA to date does not establish policies and procedures for the entire capital planning process and how decisions will be made throughout the process  WMATA reported in its fiscal year 2019 annual budget that it had created a capital program manual that identifies the roles, responsibilities, processes, and calendars of events to inform the fiscal year 2020 capital program  WMATA officials told us that the previous Director of the Capital Planning and Program Management Department had included this information in the draft budget proposal when these documents were being developed  However, WMATA officials told us that these documents were not completed, and that the information was mistakenly not removed from the budget before the previous director of the department left the agency  WMATA officials told us they plan to formalize policies, procedures, and manuals for the fiscal year 2021–2026 capital-investment program cycle  The current leadership of the Capital Planning and Program Management Department told us that given the time-constraints facing WMATA in the current fiscal year 2020 planning cycle, WMATA decided not to formally document the new capital planning process until after WMATA has had a chance to test it through the current planning cycle to see how it works  According to the official, the department’s leadership has instructed staff to document steps taken in implementing the new process so that WMATA will have the opportunity to learn from the new process and make necessary changes before developing formal, written procedures that will guide future planning cycles  Although delaying formal development of policies and procedures may provide an opportunity to learn from the process while implementing it, it does not provide the guidance necessary now as WMATA uses its new capital planning process to develop the fiscal year 2020 capital program  In particular, because WMATA has not established policies and procedures for ranking and selecting projects, WMATA does not have a framework or clear criteria for programming projects in the annual capital budget for fiscal year 2020  WMATA has proposed a fiscal year 2020 capital budget of $1 4 billion  In addition, WMATA’s plan to document steps taken in implementing the new process as it is occurring does not provide reasonable assurance that WMATA is making decisions using a consistent process to direct investments toward WMATA’s highest priority needs  A consistent process is all the more important to ensure that WMATA does not continue to use an ad-hoc process for capital investment decisions, as it did in its legacy process  WMATA’s annual capital spending is anticipated to increase substantially over the fiscal year 2020-2025 period, as WMATA expects to be programing the additional $500 million annually for capital purposes committed by the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia  Without a documented planning process that includes procedures for ranking and selecting projects for funding in the fiscal year 2020 capital budget, WMATA’s stakeholders lack reasonable assurance that WMATA’s capital investment decisions will be made using a sound and transparent process  WMATA has also not developed performance measures to assess capital projects and the capital planning process  Leading practices from the Executive Guide suggest that one way to determine if a capital investment achieved the benefits that were intended when it was selected is to evaluate its performance using measures that reflect a variety of outcomes and perspectives  By looking at a mixture of measures, such as financial improvement and customer satisfaction, managers can assess performance based on a comprehensive view of the needs and objectives of the organization  Leading organizations we studied in preparing the Executive Guide, such as private sector companies, use financial and non-financial criteria for success that are tied to organizational goals and objectives  According to the Executive Guide, project-specific performance measures are then used to develop unit performance measures and goals, which are ultimately used to determine how well an organization is meeting its goals and objectives  WMATA officials told us they have not developed performance measures for assessing the performance of individual projects or the capital planning process as a whole  One WMATA official told us that WMATA would like to evaluate results of the new capital planning process to determine whether organizational goals have been met  The official suggested that WMATA would work with a consultant to demonstrate a linkage between capital planning goals and WMATA’s organizational goals  However, the official did not indicate when this step would occur or provide additional information  Moreover, it is unclear whether the official’s intentions for this effort would result in measures for assessing individual projects as well as the overall capital planning process  By developing measures, WMATA will be better positioned to assess whether specific capital investments met their intended outcomes or if the capital planning process itself is helping WMATA achieve its strategic goals and objectives and effectively using taxpayer funds  WMATA also does not have a complete inventory or physical condition assessments of its assets  Leading practices for good capital decision- making call for organizations to conduct a comprehensive assessment of their needs and identify the organization’s capabilities to meet these needs  This process includes taking an inventory of assets and their condition and assessing where there are gaps in meeting organizational needs  The Transit Cooperative Research Program has also identified asset inventory and condition assessments as the first step in determining what asset rehabilitations and replacements are needed as transit providers address their state-of-good-repair requirements  Asset inventories and condition assessments provide critical information for capital-investment decision making  WMATA has initiated various efforts to obtain better information about its assets and their condition  These efforts have included: Transit Asset Inventory and Condition Assessment Project  In 2016, WMATA began this project to provide a physical inventory of WMATA assets and their condition, in part to comply with FTA’s Transit Asset Management regulations  According to WMATA, this project was to be the cornerstone in ensuring a complete, consistent, accurate, and centralized repository of relevant asset-related data  However, WMATA officials said that the project primarily focused on obtaining an inventory and condition assessment of WMATA facilities and equipment  A February 2018 WMATA memo to senior management stated that even when the project was completed, WMATA would still lack a robust database of track, guideway, infrastructure (e g , tunnels and bridges), systems, and communication assets—elements that the November 2016 Capital Needs Inventory noted were the largest gaps in the asset information used to support capital needs forecasting  According to WMATA, this project produced inventory and condition assessments for about 30 percent of WMATA’s asset base  As of October 2018, WMATA considered the project complete since it provided information to help prepare WMATA’s completed Transit Asset Management Plan, dated October 1, 2018  WMATA officials noted that they will continue to develop their asset inventories and condition assessments through its new Enterprise Asset Management Program, described below  Enterprise Asset Management Program  In December 2017, WMATA began development of an Enterprise Asset Management Program  According to WMATA, this program is an effort to institutionalize asset management practices that are aligned with industry best practices to provide, among other things, high quality asset data for informed decision-making, including for capital planning

ground_truth: The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant funds a wide range of benefits and services for low-income families with children. TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193). This report responds to some frequently asked questions about TANF; it does not describe TANF rules (see, instead, CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements, by Gene Falk). TANF Funding and Expenditures. TANF provides fixed funding for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the territories, and American Indian tribes. The basic block grant totals $16.5 billion per year. States are also required in total to contribute, from their own funds, at least $10.3 billion annually under a maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirement. Though TANF is best known for funding cash assistance payments for needy families with children, the block grant and MOE funds are used for a wide variety of benefits and activities. In FY2017, expenditures on basic assistance totaled $7.1 billion—23% of total federal TANF and MOE dollars. Basic assistance is often—but not exclusively—paid as cash. In addition to funding basic assistance, TANF also contributes funds for child care and services for children who have been, or are at risk of being, abused and neglected. Some states also count expenditures in prekindergarten programs toward the MOE requirement. The TANF Assistance Caseload. A total of 1.2 million families, composed of 3.1 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded assistance in September 2018. The bulk of the "recipients" were children—2.3 million in that month. The assistance caseload is heterogeneous. The type of family once thought of as the "typical" assistance family—one with an unemployed adult recipient—accounted for 32% of all families on the rolls in FY2016. Additionally, 31% of cash assistance families had an employed adult, while 38% of all TANF families were "child-only" and had no adult recipient. Child-only families include those with disabled adults receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), adults who are nonparents (e.g., grandparents, aunts, uncles) caring for children, and families consisting of citizen children and ineligible noncitizen parents. Cash Assistance Benefits. TANF cash benefit amounts are set by states. In July 2017, the maximum monthly benefit for a family of three ranged from $1,021 in New Hampshire to $170 in Mississippi. Only New Hampshire (at 60% of the federal poverty guidelines) had a maximum TANF cash assistance amount for this sized family in excess of 50% of poverty-level income. Work Requirements. TANF's main federal work requirement is actually a performance measure that applies to the states. States determine the work rules that apply to individual recipients. TANF law requires states to engage 50% of all families and 90% of two-parent families with work-eligible individuals in work activities, though these standards can be reduced by "credits." Therefore, the effective standards states face are often less than the 50% or 90% targets, and vary by state. In FY2017, states achieved, on average, an all-family participation rate of 53.0% and a two-parent rate of 69.5%. In FY2017, two jurisdictions did not meet the all-family participation standard: Nevada and Guam. This is a reduction from FY2012, when 16 states did not meet that standard. In FY2017, nine jurisdictions did not meet the two-parent standard. States that do not meet work standards are at risk of being penalized by a reduction in their block grant.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  Expected program tasks include updating asset records and improving and consolidating asset inventories in WMATA’s asset system of record (called Maximo)  WMATA’s efforts to develop more complete asset inventory and condition assessments are not complete  Among other things, WMATA documentation on the Enterprise Asset Management Program cited “inattention, poor standardization, and organizational silos” as factors that have resulted in WMATA having multiple sets of asset records in various states of accuracy and usefulness  The Enterprise Asset Management Program, according to WMATA, is an effort to help address this situation and improve asset data quality, including inventory and condition assessments  Although WMATA is developing a new Enterprise Asset Management Program, it has yet to develop a plan for obtaining a complete inventory or physical condition assessments of its assets  The Project Management Institute’s Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, PMBOK® Guide describes the elements of good project management and their importance in achieving organizational goals  Among these elements are: Having a project charter that formally authorizes a project, that commits resources to the activity, and that provides a direct link to organizational strategic objectives; Preparing a project plan to define the basis of the project’s work and how the work will be performed; and Establishing a monitoring and control process to track, review, and report overall progress in meeting the plan’s objectives  WMATA has prepared draft documents that describe how it will implement the Enterprise Asset Management Program and that contain some elements of good project management  For example, in January 2018 WMATA circulated a proposed charter that once approved would authorize the Enterprise Asset Management program, identify needed resources, and link to WMATA’s strategic goals  As of October 2018, this proposed charter had not yet been finalized  Draft program documents also indicate there would be a monitoring and control process that would establish regular reporting to internal stakeholders to assess program accomplishments and progress implementing the program  While WMATA has developed a proposed charter and a monitoring and control process for its Enterprise Asset Management Program, it has not established a plan for collecting asset inventory and condition assessment information  The draft program charter includes general tasks for updating asset records and improving and consolidating asset inventory data in Maximo  However, a plan would provide more specific details for how the work would be completed, such as the information to be collected on different assets, how and when this information would be consolidated into Maximo, milestones for completing the work, or how the effort would be funded  Without a plan to obtain asset inventory and condition assessment information WMATA will continue to lack critical information needed for good capital planning and sound investment decision-making  WMATA has reported significant progress toward its goals of reducing track defects and fire incidents, but still faces several challenges with implementing its track preventive maintenance program  WMATA defines an incident as any unplanned event that disrupts rail revenue service  According to WMATA officials, within the track preventive maintenance program WMATA seeks to reduce incidents specifically caused by electrical wayside fires and track defects each by 50 percent from fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2019  WMATA reported that in fiscal year 2018 it had met its goal for track defect incidents but not for electrical wayside fires  According to officials, track defect incidents—which include incidents caused by defective fasteners, switches, and “ballast”—were reduced by 50 percent from a total of 778 in fiscal year 2017 to 387 in fiscal year 2018  Electrical-wayside-fire incidents—including incidents caused by cable and insulator fires—went down 20 percent from a total of 55 in fiscal year 2017 to 44 in fiscal year 2018 (see fig 5)  Although WMATA has reduced both track defect incidents and electrical fires, the track preventive maintenance program is not intended to address the full range of all defects and track fires that may occur on the system  WMATA officials told us that the track preventive maintenance program specifically seeks to reduce electrical-wayside-fire incidents, which are a specific sub-set of overall track fires, and does not include non-electrical fires or smoke incidents, such as the ones caused by railcars or debris  WMATA captures and publicly reports the non-electrical fires as part of its quarterly Metro Performance Report, but according to WMATA officials, these fires are not specifically addressed through the track preventive maintenance program  While electrical fires decreased in fiscal year 2018, non-electrical fires did not change, as WMATA reported 23 non-electrical fires for both fiscal years 2017 and 2018  Additionally the track preventive maintenance program addresses a certain sub-set of track defect incidents such as those caused by loose fasteners and defective switches  According to WMATA, these track defect incidents can be addressed through its track geometry, torqueing, and switch maintenance initiatives  WMATA addresses other types of track defects, such as rail breaks and third-rail defects, through its capital program  However, according to WMATA, track defects attributable to the capital program are still included as part of the overall goal to reduce all track defect incidents by 50 percent by fiscal year 2019  WMATA established goals for completing each of the six track preventive maintenance initiatives within a certain time period and reported that in fiscal year 2018 it was on-track to meet or exceed those goals for four of the initiatives  For example, in implementing its “cable meggering” initiative, WMATA established a goal to inspect and replace electric cables across its entire rail system within 4 years  According to WMATA, it met its target for fiscal year 2018 by completing 25 percent of the entire system in that year  In addition to cable meggering, WMATA also met its annual targets for the switch maintenance, track bed cleaning, and stray current-testing initiatives  As for the two initiatives behind schedule, the torqueing initiative was 70 percent complete and the tamping initiative stood at 90 percent for the 2018 target (see table 2)  Officials told us they have developed various ways to improve efficiency with these initiatives  For instance, WMATA improved the productivity of its switch maintenance initiative by separating the work to inspect the switches from the follow-up repair work to grind and weld them  These activities had previously been conducted by the same team  However, WMATA faces challenges in implementing the track preventive maintenance program moving forward  WMATA officials described track preventive maintenance as a necessary operation that must be continuously performed and balanced in conjunction with regular train operations that provide service to their customers  According to WMATA officials, executing this new program requires regular refinements to ensure it continues to progress toward its desired outcomes  Among the implementation challenges identified by WMATA officials were the following: Securing Sufficient Track Time  WMATA officials told us that getting adequate time to perform track maintenance is difficult because it requires reducing the number of hours in which WMATA provides service to customers  Consequently, increased maintenance hours can result in lost revenue  Officials from the peer transit agencies we interviewed stated that the tension between conducting maintenance and providing service is common in the transit industry  According to WMATA officials, prior to SafeTrack, windows for performing track maintenance were not sufficient to complete all necessary work, partially because of this need to balance maintenance hours and service hours  To address this issue, WMATA increased its weekly overnight work hours from 33 hours to 39 hours during SafeTrack  After SafeTrack was complete, WMATA extended weekly overnight work hours again to a total of 41 hours  However, maintaining these extended overnight work hours past fiscal year 2019 requires approval from WMATA’s board of directors  As a result, the long-term viability of WMATA’s track preventive maintenance program is partially dependent on the board’s decision to balance the competing demands for service hours and maintenance time  Work Time Productivity  To maintain extended track-maintenance hours into succeeding years, it will be important for WMATA to demonstrate the new program’s productivity  According to WMATA officials, making the most productive use of the extended working hours is a challenge, but it will be necessary to justify the extended maintenance windows  WMATA officials told us that only a portion of overnight work hours yields productive maintenance time  For example, once a line ceases operations, it takes an additional hour for all trains to reach their final destination, and another hour after that to safely turn off all power running to the track and then establish a work zone  Once maintenance work is completed, additional time must be allotted for restoring power and allowing trains to move back into position  Because of these requirements, a five-hour work window may only yield two hours of productive work time (called “wrench time”)  For this reason, WMATA began tracking its wrench time at the beginning of fiscal year 2018  As of June 2018, WMATA reported that average wrench time had increased from about 2 0 hours per day in July 2017 to 2 37 hours  Resource Constraints  According to WMATA officials, having sufficient people with the necessary skills and experience to perform track maintenance work is a significant challenge  For instance, expanded maintenance windows have increased WMATA’s workforce requirements  As a result, WMATA has used contractors to assist with its stray-current testing and track bed cleaning initiatives  In another example, WMATA’s torqueing initiative is particularly resource intensive as the entire rail system contains 135 miles of “direct fixation” track, where the torqueing work is being done, and over 504,000 fasteners to check and tighten as necessary  According to WMATA officials, bolts and fasteners are torqued during their initial installment and then again 90 days afterward as part of the initial capital expenditure  After that, any subsequent torqueing is executed as part of the new track preventive maintenance program  WMATA stated that the torqueing initiative seeks to torque all 135 miles of direct fixation track annually  WMATA officials said the torqueing initiative is a mix of contractor and in-house staff, with contractors supplementing WMATA forces as needed  WMATA’s track preventive maintenance program has followed certain leading program management practices such as establishing key performance metrics and monitoring progress toward them  Leading practices recommend that organizations establish performance baselines for their programs and communicate performance metrics to key stakeholders  For instance, as previously noted, WMATA established a measureable program goal to reduce track-defect and electrical-wayside- fire incidents by 50 percent within 2 years, and WMATA also established time periods to complete its system-wide preventive maintenance initiatives  In addition, WMATA’s Rail Services Department—which manages the track preventive maintenance program—among other things, holds a monthly “RailSTAT” meeting in which the teams leading the preventive maintenance initiatives report their progress toward these goals to WMATA’s management  However, WMATA’s program does not fully align with other applicable internal-control standards or leading program-management practices  Specifically, COSO internal control standards and leading practices identified by the Project Management Institute’s The Standard for Program Management stresses the importance of identifying and assessing program risks and developing a program management plan  COSO recommends that organizations identify risks to the achievement of its objectives and analyze risks as a basis for determining how the risks should be managed  Furthermore, the risk identification is to be comprehensive  The Standard for Program Management also recommends that when identifying risks, the assessments be both qualitative and quantitative in nature  Regarding program management plans: The Standard for Program Management recommends that organizations develop program management plans that align with organizational goals and objectives  This includes aligning the program management plan with the organization’s overall strategic plan  Elements of the plan are to provide a roadmap that identifies such things as milestones and decision points to guide program activities  In developing the track preventive maintenance program, WMATA did not fully identify or quantitatively assess risks associated with the program  WMATA officials told us that in developing the track preventive maintenance program they used their professional judgment to identify track-defect and fire incidents as the most significant risks that they needed to address through the program  However, WMATA’s risk identification was not comprehensive in nature, as it only considered two technical aspects of track maintenance: electrical fires and track defects  As previously mentioned, non-electrical fires—which were not included in the scope of the program or risk assessment—did not change from fiscal year 2017 through 2018 and represent approximately 30 percent of all fires on the system over those years  Although WMATA officials told us in designing the program they reviewed track-related incident data from 2016, they did not quantitatively analyze the impact of these incidents on service or safety  In addition, WMATA did not consider broader strategic risks to its program, such as the availability of a program’s funding and stakeholders’ support for the continuation of the program  Specifically, while WMATA has identified several challenges with implementing the program—such as securing sufficient track time, demonstrating work time productivity, and overcoming resource constraints—none of these factors, or potential mitigations, were documented in a risk assessment in developing the program  WMATA has also not prepared a program management plan for the track preventive maintenance program  Although WMATA has identified program goals, officials told us that WMATA has not formally documented the overall structure of the program or how it would be implemented  Instead, the officials said the presentations they provide to WMATA’s board of directors, along with their ongoing staff and executive team meetings, regarding the track preventive maintenance program cover the relevant information needed for running the program  While providing such information to the WMATA board of directors provides some accountability for the program, these presentations do not represent a formal program management plan that links with WMATA’s strategic plan or that identifies milestones and decision points necessary to guide the program  As we previously reported, WMATA did not develop a project management plan before starting its SafeTrack work, and due to this omission and other issues, we found that WMATA lacked assurance that the approach taken with SafeTrack was the most effective way to identify and address safety issues  Furthermore, as this is the first time WMATA has implemented a track preventive maintenance program, a program management plan could help formally establish the program, provide strategic guidance for this new program by providing accountability for both internal and external stakeholders, and ensure that program goals are met  A program management plan could also provide practical benefits, such as helping ensure that WMATA’s extended overnight work hours are efficiently implemented and that sufficient resources are devoted to the program  Without the strategic direction provided by a comprehensive risk assessment and a formal program management plan, WMATA lacks a documented vision for how the track preventive maintenance program should be structured and implemented in order to meet the agency’s strategic goals and improve track safety  Specifically, without a risk assessment that uses quantitative and qualitative data to assess risks— such as data for all fires on the system and qualitative risks such as securing sufficient time for maintenance—WMATA lacks assurance that the program is comprehensively designed to address risks affecting the safety of the rail system or other risks that could hinder the program’s success  Moreover, a program management plan that draws on information from a comprehensive risk assessment would provide WMATA officials with the assurance that they are prepared to respond to current and future challenges that could threaten the long-term viability of the program  Finally, although WMATA developed the track preventive maintenance program to prevent the need for another emergency repair project like SafeTrack, without a formal program management plan, the WMATA employees charged with managing and implementing the program lack an important document to guide their decision-making to meet that objective and the agency’s overall strategic objectives  Developing a program management plan would outline the specific requirements to successfully implement the program, including necessary track time, expected productivity of program initiatives, and required resources  Furthermore, it would provide WMATA’s board of directors with confidence that the program has a clear roadmap with milestones and decision points as the board considers maintaining the extended overnight work hours necessary to implement the program  WMATA’s rail and bus systems provide nearly a million passenger trips each day, and those passengers rely on WMATA for safe and reliable public transportation in the nation’s capital and the surrounding areas  The federal, state, and local jurisdictions that fund WMATA expect WMATA to wisely use taxpayer funds to ensure the system is safe and reliable  WMATA can better meet these expectations by establishing documented policies and procedures that outline how the new capital planning process will work and the basis of investment decisions  In addition, developing measures to assess the performance of individual projects and the capital planning process would provide greater assurance to WMATA’s funding partners that its investment decisions result in a measurable improvement in operating performance, reliability, or other metrics  Furthermore, WMATA’s recent efforts to establish an Enterprise Asset Management Program, once finalized, could help WMATA develop a more complete inventory of its assets and collect critical information on their condition—both of which are consistent with sound capital planning  However, without a plan that provides specific details for obtaining this information, WMATA will continue to lack the critical asset information necessary to make lasting improvements in its capital planning process and make sound capital-investment decisions  Similarly, track preventive maintenance plays a critical role as WMATA works to reduce the track defects and fires that have endangered safety and service reliability  WMATA could better demonstrate the direction of the track preventive maintenance program and how it can improve track safety by more comprehensively assessing the technical and broader risks facing the program and by developing a formal plan that provides greater assurance WMATA is prepared to address challenges that could threaten the long-term viability of the program  Both actions would help WMATA better focus the program on critical maintenance needs and demonstrate its value to WMATA’s board of directors and other stakeholders as WMATA endeavors to provide safe, reliable, and quality service to its riders  We are making the following five recommendations to WMATA  The General Manager of WMATA should establish documented policies and procedures for the new capital planning process  These policies and procedures should include methodologies for ranking and selecting capital projects for funding in WMATA’s fiscal year 2020 capital budget and fiscal years 2020-2025 Capital Improvement Program and for future planning cycles  (Recommendation 1) The General Manager of WMATA should develop performance measures to be used for assessing capital investments and the capital planning process to determine if the investments and planning process have achieved their planned goals and objectives  (Recommendation 2) The General Manager of WMATA should develop a plan for obtaining complete information regarding WMATA’s asset inventory and physical condition assessments, including assets related to track and structures  (Recommendation 3) The General Manager of WMATA should conduct a comprehensive risk assessment of the track preventive maintenance program that includes both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of relevant program risks  In addition to considering technical program risks, WMATA should also consider broader program risks, such as the availability of funding for the program and stakeholders’ support  (Recommendation 4) The General Manager of WMATA should prepare a formal program management plan for the track preventive maintenance program that aligns with WMATA’s strategic plan, addresses how the program is linked to overall strategic goals and objectives, and includes program milestones and decision points  (Recommendation 5) We provided a draft of this report to WMATA and the Department of Transportation for review and comment  WMATA provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix II, and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate in the report  The Department of Transportation provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  WMATA concurred in part, or with the intent of four of the recommendations, and disagreed with a fifth  Specifically, regarding the first recommendation, which is that WMATA establish documented policies and procedures for the new capital planning process, and that the policies and procedures include methodologies for ranking and selecting capital projects for the fiscal year 2020 capital budget and fiscal year 2020—2025 capital-improvement program  WMATA stated that it agreed with the recommendation, in part  WMATA said it will continue its efforts to finalize and document policies and procedures for the capital planning process for fiscal year 2021 and beyond  WMATA noted that it already has in place numerous planning tools, such as the 2016 Capital Needs Inventory assessment, which helped inform the fiscal year 2020 capital planning process  According to WMATA, it is currently reviewing policies, procedures, training materials, and other documents for the fiscal year 2020 planning process, and those documents will be updated and formalized through final documentation in fiscal year 2021  WMATA noted that it anticipates that many of the elements we recommend regarding the capital planning process will be part of the process documented in fiscal year 2021  For example, WMATA expects that additional automation, decision-making, governance, and reporting capabilities, will be part of the process that will be documented for fiscal year 2021  However, while WMATA has tools available to inform the capital planning process, it has not prepared documented policies and procedures for this process in fiscal year 2020  As we reported, without documented policies and procedures, including those for ranking and selecting projects for the fiscal year 2020 capital budget, WMATA’s stakeholders do not have reasonable assurance that capital investment decisions are made using a sound and transparent process  Taking action now to establish methodologies for ranking and selecting projects for the fiscal year 2020 capital budget would provide WMATA with an opportunity to improve upon those methodologies for the fiscal year 2021 capital planning process to better ensure investments are directed to WMATA’s highest priority needs  As such, we continue to believe this recommendation is valid and that WMATA should fully implement it  Regarding the second recommendation that WMATA develop performance measures for assessing capital investments and the capital planning process, WMATA stated that it agreed with the intent of the recommendation  WMATA also stated that it has developed such measures through compliance with federal requirements, including the FTA’s performance-based planning requirements and the requirement under MAP-21 that tier I transit providers, such as WMATA, establish state-of-good-repair targets that are linked to the capital program  WMATA noted these targets are set forth in its Transit Asset Management Plan  Although WMATA’s October 2018 Transit Asset Management plan includes some broad performance measures and targets for the state-of-good-repair for its various asset classes, as we reported, WMATA has not developed performance measures to assess individual capital projects or the capital planning process itself, as suggested by leading practices in the Executive Guide  As discussed in the report, such measures are important to determine if capital investments have achieved their expected benefits and if they have achieved organizational goals  Leading practices also indicate that by using a mixture of measures managers can assess performance based on a comprehensive view of the needs and objectives of an organization  These needs and objectives can go beyond just the state-of-good-repair to include such things as measures for assessing projects that would improve service reliability, expand capacity, or achieve financial objectives  We continue to believe that fully implementing this recommendation would help ensure that capital investments meet their intended outcomes and that the capital planning process helps WMATA achieve its strategic goals and objectives  Regarding the third recommendation that WMATA develop a plan for obtaining complete information about asset inventories and condition assessments, WMATA stated that it agreed with the intent of the recommendation and that its 2018 Transit Asset Management Plan outlines plans for continuing its asset inventory update  WMATA also said that it is working to ensure it has a complete asset inventory that addresses legacy information and that includes accurate, up-to-date condition assessments  As we reported, the Enterprise Asset Management Program—the program that WMATA told us it plans to use to continue development of asset inventories and condition assessments—includes some elements of good project management, but it also lacks an established plan for collecting asset inventory and condition assessment information  Without a plan to obtain asset inventory and condition assessment information WMATA will continue to lack critical information needed for good capital planning and sound investment decision-making  Thus, we continue to believe that this recommendation is valid and that WMATA should fully implement it  Regarding the fourth recommendation that WMATA conduct a comprehensive risk assessment of the track preventive maintenance program that includes both quantitative and qualitative assessment of relevant program risks, WMATA stated that it agreed with the intent of the recommendation and is putting in place a new process that will address it  Specifically, WMATA stated it is in the process of developing a new Reliability Centered Maintenance process that will include a comprehensive risk assessment of track infrastructure that includes consideration of broader risks such as costs, funding, and track access  According to WMATA, the new process is an engineering framework that will define the maintenance regimen, including preventive maintenance, and improve safety, reliability, and cost-effectiveness  During our review, WMATA officials did not discuss the Reliability Centered Maintenance process in detail or provide documentation that allowed us to evaluate how this process might interface with the current track preventive maintenance program  As a result, we were not able to evaluate how it might address identification and assessment of risks associated with track preventive maintenance  As we reported, going forward track preventive maintenance will play a critical role as WMATA works to reduce track defects and fires  We will review WMATA’s actions to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment as part of our routine recommendation follow-up process  Regarding the fifth recommendation that WMATA prepare a formal program management plan for the track preventive maintenance program, WMATA stated that it disagreed with the recommendation  WMATA noted that specific technical details of the track preventive maintenance program are evolving as it better understands the most effective maintenance regime through implementation of the Reliability Centered Maintenance process  WMATA stated that it believes the framework of Reliability Centered Maintenance is better suited to the ongoing mission of physical asset management than traditional project and program management tools  According to WMATA, the purpose of Reliability Centered Maintenance is to ensure that all efforts are focused on the safety, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of assets through their lifecycle, which is more relevant and applicable to WMATA’s strategic plan than any individual preventive maintenance program  As stated above, WMATA did not provide details about Reliability Centered Maintenance during our review so we are not able to evaluate this process in relation to the track preventive maintenance program  We will review WMATA’s actions related to implementation of the Reliability Centered Maintenance process as part of our routine recommendation follow-up process  We continue to believe this recommendation is valid and that WMATA should fully implement it  We will send copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Federal Transit Administration, and the General Manager of WMATA  In addition, we will make copies available to others upon request, and the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  This report examines: (1) How WMATA expended its capital funding from fiscal years 2011 through 2017; (2) How WMATA’s new capital planning process addresses weaknesses it identified in the previous process; and (3) WMATA’s progress toward its track preventive maintenance goals and how the program aligns with leading program management practices  For each of our objectives we reviewed pertinent federal statutes and regulations as well as WMATA and FTA policies and documents  We also selected a non-generalizable sample of five similar U S  transit agencies based on similarity to WMATA in transit route mileage, system use, capital spending, system age, and rail fleet age  We also factored geographical diversity into our selection process  We then interviewed the officials from these selected transit agencies using a standard set of questions to learn how they utilize their capital funds, conduct capital planning, and oversee maintenance; and then we compared their processes to WMATA  Transit route mileage, system use, capital spending, and rail fleet age were measured using data from FTA’s National Transit Database  We measured system age according to data available within the American Public Transportation Association’s 2017 Public Transportation Fact Book, and geographical diversity was determined through data available from the U S  Census Bureau  The transit agencies we selected were: (1) Bay Area Rapid Transit, Oakland, California; (2) Chicago Transit Authority, Chicago, Illinois; (3) Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Boston, Massachusetts; (4) Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, Atlanta, Georgia; and (5) Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  To assess WMATA’s capital spending from 2011 through 2017, we interviewed knowledgeable officials from WMATA and FTA and also reviewed WMATA annual budgets, fourth-quarter and year-end financial reports, budget reconciliation reports, comprehensive annual financial reports, and FTA grant awards  We selected fiscal year 2011 because it was the first year in which WMATA received federal funding authorized by the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA), and we selected fiscal year 2017 because it was the most recent year that capital expenditure data were available at the time of our review  By analyzing this information we determined that the following sources provided the most comprehensive and reliable available data on each of the following topics for our report (see table 3): We collected the aforementioned data, analyzed them to identify errors or other anomalies, and interviewed officials to determine how the data are compiled and checked for accuracy  We determined that these data had some limitations, as an external audit report of WMATA financial information for fiscal year 2016 noted a material weakness with WMATA’s process for accounting acquisition costs of capital assets  Specifically, there were inconsistencies between WMATA’s general ledger and sub- ledger, which are used to record acquisition costs, depreciation, and other financial information related to capital assets  As a result, additional steps were required to reconcile the differences between the two sources and could have resulted in a material error  However, after interviewing WMATA officials about the weakness and assessing the available financial information, we determined that the data we used were sufficiently reliable for our purpose of showing general trends of capital expenditures  Our analysis sought to depict how WMATA allocates and expends funds according to major asset categories within its capital-improvement plan  However, these asset categories only remained consistent from 2011 through 2015, and were revised during 2016 and 2017  However, we determined that each asset category consisted of Capital Improvement Projects that were each assigned a number  These projects and their corresponding numbers remained in existence from fiscal year 2011 through 2017, even though the asset categories were updated in fiscal year 2016  Tracking by Capital Improvement Project number provided a means to report consistently through that time period  Therefore, we used the asset categories from fiscal years 2011 through 2015 as our base reporting categories  These categories consisted of: (1) Vehicles/Vehicle Parts, (2) Rail System Infrastructure Rehabilitation, (3) Maintenance Facilities, (4) Systems and Technology, (5) Track and Structures, (6) Passenger Facilities, (7) Maintenance Equipment, (8) Other Facilities, and (9) Project Management and Support  We consolidated WMATA’s nine asset categories into five asset categories in order to represent broader categories of investment: Rail and Bus Vehicle Fleet (Vehicle/Vehicle Parts), Fixed Rail Infrastructure (Rail System Infrastructure and Track and Structures), Maintenance Facilities and Equipment (Maintenance Facilities and Maintenance Equipment), Passenger and Other Facilities (Passenger Facilities and Other Facilities), and Business Systems and Project Management Support (Systems and Technology and Project Management and Support)  We then reviewed WMATA’s fiscal year 2016 Fourth Quarter Report, fiscal year 2017 Fourth Quarter Report, and fiscal year 2017 Budget Reconciliation Report to match each project number from those two years to their corresponding category from fiscal year 2011 through 2015  To assess WMATA’s new capital planning process and how it addresses weaknesses WMATA identified in the previous process, we interviewed WMATA officials about their capital planning process and reviewed WMATA documentation related to the capital planning process  This included Capital Needs Inventories, WMATA’s policy for preparation of the 2010 and 2016 Capital Needs Inventories, annual capital budgets—to include capital improvement programs, and guidance documents issued by WMATA related to submitting projects for inclusion in the annual capital budget  We also reviewed the fiscal year 2018 business plan for WMATA’s Capital Planning and Program Management Department  We also interviewed officials from the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, the American Public Transportation Association, and FTA to discuss WMATA’s capital planning and budgeting processes  Furthermore, we compared WMATA’s capital planning practices to leading practices identified in GAO’s Executive Guide  The Executive Guide was used since it identifies leading practices for capital decision- making that are applicable to a wide variety of organizations, both public and private  For example, the Executive Guide developed leading capital planning practices by (1) identifying government and private sector organizations recognized for outstanding capital decision-making practices and (2) identifying and describing the leading capital decision- making practices implemented by these organizations  To identify leading practices for capital planning, we also reviewed Transit Cooperative Research Program Report 157  This report developed a framework for transit agencies to use when prioritizing the rehabilitation and replacement of capital assets and discusses leading practices in how to do this  We also identified project management principles from the Project Management Institute, Inc  Finally, we discussed capital planning with the peer transit agencies and prepared a summary of various aspects of capital planning in these agencies  To examine progress toward goals in WMATA’s track preventive maintenance program and how the program compares with leading program management practices, we reviewed WMATA documentation about the program, interviewed WMATA officials, and analyzed track- defect data and electrical-wayside-fire data provided by WMATA for fiscal years 2016 through 2018—which were the only years detailed track defect and electrical fire incident data were available  In order to determine whether the data provided were sufficiently reliable, we checked the data for errors, conducted interviews with knowledgeable officials to learn their procedures for collecting and analyzing the data, and performed independent tests that included verifying WMATA’s final tally of track defect and fire incidents and verifying there were no extended periods of time where data was missing  We also provided a set of data reliability questions to determine whether procedures were sufficient  After performing these steps we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report  In our interviews with WMATA, officials also described what goals they had created for the track preventive maintenance program, their progress in meeting those goals, and provided documentation to demonstrate their progress, which we reviewed  We also interviewed officials from the American Public Transportation Association and the American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association about best maintenance practices in the transit industry  We then compared WMATA’s track preventive maintenance program to leading program management practices identified by the Project Management Institute, Inc ’s The Standard for Program Management and internal control standards published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)  The Project Management Institute’s, standards are utilized worldwide and provide guidance on how to manage various aspects of projects, programs, and portfolios  In particular, The Standard for Program Management provides guidance that is generally recognized to support good program-management practices for most programs, most of the time  We conducted our work from November 2017 to January 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the contact named above, Matt Barranca (Assistant Director), Richard Jorgenson (Analyst in Charge), Melissa Bodeau, Lacey Coppage, Cory Gerlach, Erin Guinn-Villareal, Kirsten Lauber, Joshua Ormond, and Patrick Tierney made significant contributions to this report 
Report 2:  This bonus is not provided for breakfast, but funds may be used to support schools' breakfast programs  NSLP lunch reimbursement rates are listed in Table B -1   In addition to federal cash subsidies, schools participating in NSLP receive USDA-acquired commodity food s   Schools are entitled to a specific, inflation-indexed value of USDA commodity foods for each lunch they serve  Also, schools may receive donations of bonus commodities acquired by USDA in support of the farm economy  In FY2017, the value of federal commodity food aid to schools totaled nearly $1 4 billion  The per-meal rate for commodity food assistance is included in Table B-4   While the vast majority of NSLP funding is for lunches served during the school day, NSLP may also be used to support snack service during the school year and to serve meals during the summer  These features are discussed in subsequent sections, " Summer Meals " and " After-School Meals and Snacks: CACFP, NSLP Options  " Reimbursement rates for snacks are listed in Table B -2   The School Breakfast Program (SBP) provides per-meal cash subsidies for breakfasts served in schools  Participating schools receive subsidies based on their status as a severe need or nonsevere need institution  Schools can qualify as a severe need school if 40% or more of their lunches are served free or at reduced prices  See Table B -3 for SBP reimbursement rates  Figure 4 displays SBP participation data for FY2017  In that year, SBP subsidized over 2 4 billion breakfasts in over 88,000 schools and nearly 3,200 RCCIs  Average daily participation was 14 7 million children (30 1% of the students enrolled in participating schools and RCCIs)  The majority of meals served through SBP are free or reduced-price  Of the participating students, 79 1% (11 6 million) received free meals and 5 7% (835,000) purchased reduced-price meals  Federal school breakfast costs for the fiscal year totaled approximately $4 3 billion (see Table 3 for the various components of this total)  Significantly fewer schools and students participate in SBP than in NSLP  Participation in SBP tends to be lower for several reasons, including the traditionally required early arrival by students in order to receive a meal and eat before school starts  Some schools offer (and anti-hunger groups have encouraged) models of breakfast service that can result in greater SBP participation, such as Breakfast in the Classroom, where meals are delivered in the classroom; "grab and go" carts, where students receive a bagged breakfast that they bring to class, or serving breakfast later in the day in middle and high schools  Unlike NSLP, commodity food assistance is not a formal part of SBP funding; however, commodities provided through NSLP may be used for school breakfasts as well  In addition to the school meals programs discussed above, other federal child nutrition programs provide federal subsidies and commodity food assistance for schools and other institutions that offer meals and snacks to children in early childhood, summer, and after-school settings  This assistance is provided to (1) schools and other governmental institutions, (2) private for-profit and nonprofit child care centers, (3) family/group day care homes, and (4) nongovernmental institutions/organizations that offer outside-of-school programs for children  (Although this report focuses on the programs that serve children, one child nutrition program (CACFP) also serves day care centers for chronically impaired adults and elderly persons under the same general per-meal/snack subsidy terms ) The programs in the sections to follow serve comparatively fewer children and spend comparatively fewer federal funds than the school meal programs  CACFP subsidizes meals and snacks served in early childhood, day care, and after-school settings  CACFP provides subsidies for meals and snacks served at participating nonresidential child care centers, family day care homes, and (to a lesser extent) adult day care centers  The program also provides assistance for meals served at after-school programs  CACFP reimbursements are available for meals and snacks served to children age 12 or under, migrant children age 15 or under, children with disabilities of any age, and, in the case of adult care centers, chronically impaired and elderly adults  Children in early childhood settings are the overwhelming majority of those served by the program  CACFP provides federal reimbursements for breakfasts, lunches, suppers, and snacks served in participating centers (facilities or institutions) or day care homes (private homes)  The eligibility and funding rules for CACFP meals and snacks depend first on whether the participating institution is a center or a day care home (the next two sections discuss the rules specific to centers and day care homes)  According to FY2017 CACFP data, child care centers have an average daily attendance of about 56 children per center, day care homes have an average daily attendance of approximately 7 children per home, and adult day care centers typically care for an average of 48 chronically ill or elderly adults per center  Providers must demonstrate that they comply with government-established standards for other child care programs  Like in school meals, federal assistance is made up overwhelmingly of cash reimbursements calculated based on the number of meals/snacks served and federal per-meal/snack reimbursements rates, but a far smaller share of federal aid (4 3% in FY2017) is in the form of federal USDA commodity foods (or cash in lieu of foods)  Federal CACFP reimbursements flow to individual providers either directly from the administering state agency (this is the case with many child/adult care centers able to handle their own CACFP administrative functions) or through "sponsors" who oversee and provide administrative support for a number of local providers (this is the case with some child/adult care centers and with all day care homes)  In FY2017, total CACFP spending was over $3 5 billion, including cash reimbursement, commodity food assistance, and costs for sponsor audits  (See Table 3 for a further breakdown of CACFP costs ) This total also includes the after-school meals and snacks provided through CACFP's "at-risk after-school" pathway; this aspect of the program is discussed later in " After-School Meals and Snacks: CACFP, NSLP Options  " As with school foods, the HHFKA required USDA to update CACFP's meal patterns  USDA's final rule revised the meal patterns for both meals served in child care centers and day care homes, as well as preschool meals served through the NSLP and SBP, effective October 1, 2017  For infants (under 12 months of age), the new meal patterns eliminated juice, supported breastfeeding, and set guidelines for the introduction of solid foods, among other changes  For children ages one and older, the new meal patterns increased whole grains, fruits and vegetables, and low-fat and fat-free milk; limited sugar in cereals and yogurts; and prohibited frying, among other requirements  Child care centers in CACFP can be (1) public or private nonprofit centers, (2) Head Start centers, (3) for-profit proprietary centers (if they meet certain requirements as to the proportion of low-income children they enroll), and (4) shelters for homeless families  Adult day care centers include public or private nonprofit centers and for-profit proprietary centers (if they meet minimum requirements related to serving low-income disabled and elderly adults)  In FY2017, over 65,000 child care centers with an average daily attendance of over 3 6 million children participated in CACFP  Over 2,700 adult care centers served nearly 132,000 adults through CACFP  Participating centers may receive daily reimbursements for up to either two meals and one snack or one meal and two snacks for each participant, so long as the meals and snacks meet federal nutrition standards  The eligibility rules for CACFP centers largely track those of NSLP: children in households at or below 130% of the current poverty line qualify for free meals/snacks while those between 130% and 185% of poverty qualify for reduced-price meals/snacks (see Table 2 )  In addition, participation in the same categorical eligibility programs as NSLP as well as foster child status convey eligibility for free meals in CACFP  Like school meals, eligibility is determined through paper applications or direct certification processes  Like school meals, all meals and snacks served in the centers are federally subsidized to some degree, even those that are paid  Different reimbursement amounts are provided for breakfasts, lunches/suppers, and snacks, and reimbursement rates are set in law and indexed for inflation annually  The largest subsidies are paid for meals and snacks served to participants with family income below 130% of the federal poverty income guidelines (the income limit for free school meals), and the smallest to those who have not met a means test  See Table B -5 for current CACFP center reimbursement rates  Unlike school meals, CACFP institutions are less likely to collect per-meal payments  Although federal assistance for day care centers differentiates by household income, centers have discretion on their pricing of meals  Centers may adjust their regular fees (tuition) to account for federal payments, but CACFP itself does not regulate these fees  In addition, centers can charge families separately for meals/snacks, so long as there are no charges for children meeting free-meal/snack income tests and limited charges for those meeting reduced-price income tests  Independent centers are those without sponsors handling administrative responsibilities  These centers must pay for administrative costs associated with CACFP out of nonfederal funds or a portion of their meal subsidy payments  For centers with sponsors, the sponsors may retain a proportion of the meal reimbursement payments they receive on behalf of their centers to cover such costs  CACFP-supported day care homes serve a smaller number of children than CACFP-supported centers , both in terms of the total number of children served and the average number of children per facility  Roughly 17% of children in CACFP (approximately 757,000 in FY2017 average daily attendance) are served through day care homes  In FY2017, approximately 103,000 homes (with just over 700 sponsors) received CACFP support  As with centers, payments to day care homes are provided for up to either two meals and one snack or one meal and two snacks a day for each child  Unlike centers, day care homes must participate under the auspices of a public or, more often, private nonprofit sponsor that typically has 100 or more homes under its supervision  CACFP day care home sponsors receive monthly administrative payments based on the number of homes for which they are responsible  Federal reimbursements for family day care homes differ by the home's status as "Tier I" or "Tier II " Unlike centers, day care homes receive cash reimbursements (but not commodity foods) that generally are not based on the child participants' household income  Instead, there are two distinct, annually indexed reimbursement rates that are based on area or operator eligibility criteria Tier I homes are located in low-income areas (defined as areas in which at least 50% of school-age and enrolled children qualify for free or reduced-price meals) or operated by low-income providers whose household income meets the free or reduced-price income standards  They receive higher subsidies for each meal/snack they serve  Tier II (lower) rates are by default those for homes that do not qualify for Tier I rates; however, Tier II providers may seek the higher Tier I subsidy rates for individual low-income children for whom financial information is collected and verified  (See Table B-6 for current Tier I and Tier II reimbursement rates ) Additionally, HHFKA introduced a number of additional ways (as compared to prior law) by which family day care homes can qualify as low-income and get Tier I rates for the entire home or for individual children  As with centers, there is no requirement that meals/snacks specifically identified as free or reduced-price be offered; however, unlike centers, federal rules prohibit any separate meal charges  Current law SFSP and the NSLP/SBP Seamless Summer Option provide meals in congregate settings nationwide; the related Summer Electronic Benefits Transfer (SEBTC or Summer EBT) demonstration project is an alternative to congregate settings  SFSP supports meals for children during the summer months  The program provides assistance to local public institutions and private nonprofit service institutions running summer youth/recreation programs, summer feeding projects, and camps  Assistance is primarily in the form of cash reimbursements for each meal or snack served; however, federally donated commodity foods are also offered  Participating service institutions are often entities that provide ongoing year-round service to the community including schools, local governments, camps, colleges and universities in the National Youth Sports program, and private nonprofit organizations like churches  Similar to the CACFP model, sponsors are institutions that manage the food preparation, financial, and administrative responsibilities of SFSP  Sites are the places where food is served and eaten  At times, a sponsor may also be a site  State agencies authorize sponsors, monitor and inspect sponsors and sites, and implement USDA policy  Unlike CACFP, sponsors are required for an institution's participation in SFSP as a site  In FY2017, nearly 5,500 sponsors with 50,000 food service sites participated in the SFSP and served an average of approximately 2 7 million children daily (according to July data)  Participation of sites and children in SFSP has increased in recent years  Program costs for FY2017 totaled over $485 million, including cash assistance, commodity foods, administrative cost assistance, and health inspection costs  There are several options for eligibility and meal/snack service for SFSP sponsors (and their sites) Open sites provide summer food to all children in the community  These sites are certified based on area eligibility measures, where 50% or more of area children have family income that would make them eligible for free or reduced-price school meals (see Table 2 )  Closed or Enrolled sites provide summer meals/snacks free to all children enrolled at the site  The eligibility test for these sites is that 50% or more of the children enrolled in the sponsor's program must be eligible for free or reduced-price school meals based on household income  Closed/enrolled sites may also become eligible based on area eligibility measures noted above  Summer camps (that are not enrolled sites) receive subsidies only for those children with household eligibility for free or reduced-price school meals  Other programs specified in law , such as the National Youth Sports Program and centers for homeless or migrant children  Summer sponsors get operating cost (food, storage, labor) subsidies for all meals/snacks they serve—up to one meal and one snack, or two meals per child per day  In addition, sponsors receive payments for administrative costs, and states are provided with subsidies for administrative costs and health and meal-quality inspections  See Table B -7 for current SFSP reimbursement rates  Actual payments vary slightly (e g , by about 5 cents for lunches) depending on the location of the site (e g , rural vs  urban) and whether meals are prepared on-site or by a vendor  Although SFSP is the child nutrition program most associated with providing meals during summer months, it is not the only program option for providing these meals and snacks  The Seamless Summer Option, run through NSLP or SBP programs, is also a means through which food can be provided to students during summer months  Much like SFSP, Seamless Summer operates in summer sites (summer camps, sports programs, churches, private nonprofit organizations, etc ) and for a similar duration of time  Unlike SFSP, schools are the only eligible sponsors , although schools may operate the program at other sites  Reimbursement rates for Seamless Summer meals are the same as current NSLP/SBP rates  Beginning in summer 2011 and (as of the date of this report) each summer since, USDA-FNS has operated Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer for Children (SEBTC or "Summer EBT") demonstration projects in a limited number of states and Indian Tribal Organizations (ITOs)  These Summer EBT projects provide electronic food benefits over summer months to households with children eligible for free or reduced-price school meals  Depending on the site and year, either $30 or $60 per month is provided, through a WIC or SNAP EBT card model  In the demonstration projects, these benefits were provided as a supplement to the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) meals available in congregate settings  Summer EBT and other alternatives to congregate meals through SFSP were first authorized and funded by the FY2010 appropriations law ( P L  111-80 )  Although a number of alternatives were tested and evaluated, findings from Summer EBT were among the most promising, and Congress provided subsequent funding  Summer EBT evaluations showed significant impacts on reducing child food insecurity and improving nutritional intake   Summer EBT was funded by P L  111-80 in the summers from 2011 to 2014  Projects have continued to operate and were annually funded by FY2015-FY2018 appropriations; most recently, the FY2018 appropriations law ( P L  115-141 ) provided $28 million  According to USDA-FNS, in summer 2016 Summer EBT served over 209,000 children in nine states and two tribal nations—an increase from the 11,400 children served when the demonstration began in summer 2011  Schools (and institutions like summer camps and child care facilities) that are not already participating in the other child nutrition programs can participate in the Special Milk Program  Schools may also administer SMP for their part-day sessions for kindergartners or pre-kindergartners  Under SMP, participating institutions provide milk to children for free and/or at a subsidized paid price, depending on how the enrolled institution opts to administer the program (see Table B -8 for current Special Milk reimbursement rates for each of these options) An institution that only sells milk will receive the same per-half pint federal reimbursement for each milk sold (approximately 20 cents)  An institution that sells milk and provides free milk to eligible children (income eligibility is the same as free school meals, see Table 2 ), receives a reimbursement for the milk sold (approximately 20 cents) and a higher reimbursement for the free milks  An institution that does not sell milk provides milk free to all children and receives the same reimbursement for all milk (approximately 20 cents)  This option is sometimes called nonpricing  In FY2017, over 41 million half-pints were subsidized, 9 5% of which were served free  Federal expenditures for this program were approximately $8 3 million in FY2017  States receive formula grants through the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program, under which state-selected schools receive funds to purchase and distribute fresh fruit and vegetable snacks to all children in attendance (regardless of family income)  Money is distributed by a formula under which about half the funding is distributed equally to each state and the remainder is allocated by state population  States select participating schools (with an emphasis on those with a higher proportion of low-income children) and set annual per-student grant amounts (between $50 and $75)  Funding is set by law at $150 million for school year 2011-2012 and inflation-indexed for every year after  In FY2017, states used approximately $184 million in FFVP funds  FFVP is funded by a mandatory transfer of funds from USDA's Section 32 program—a permanent appropriation of 30% of the previous year's customs receipts  This transfer is required by FFVP's authorizing laws (Section 19 of the Richard B  Russell National School Lunch Act and Section 4304 of P L  110-246 )  Up until FY2018's law, annual appropriations laws delayed a portion of the funds to the next fiscal year  After a pilot period, the Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004 ( P L  108-265 ) permanently authorized and funded FFVP for a limited number of states and Indian reservations  In recent years, FFVP has been amended by omnibus farm bill laws rather than through child nutrition reauthorizations  The 2008 farm bill ( P L  110-246 ) expanded FFVP's mandatory funding, specifically providing funds through Section 32, and enabled all states to participate in the program  The 2014 farm bill ( P L  113-79 ) essentially made no changes to this program but did include, and fund at $5 million in FY2014, a pilot project that requires USDA to test offering frozen, dried, and canned fruits and vegetables and publish an evaluation of the pilot  Four states (Alaska, Delaware, Kansas, and Maine) participated in the pilot in SY2014-2015 and the evaluation was published in 2017  Other proposals to expand fruits and vegetables offered in FFVP have been introduced in both the 114 th and 115 th Congress  Two of the child nutrition programs discussed in previous sections, the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), provide federal support for snacks and meals served during after-school programs  NSLP provides reimbursements for after-school snacks; however, this option is open only to schools that already participate in NSLP  These schools may operate after-school snack-only programs during the school year, and can do so in two ways: (1) if low-income area eligibility criteria are met, provide free snacks in lower-income areas; or (2) if area eligibility criteria are not met, offer free, reduced-price, or fully paid-for snacks, based on household income eligibility (like lunches in NSLP)  The vast majority of snacks provided through this program are through the first option  Through this program, approximately 206 million snacks were served in FY2017 (a daily average of nearly 1 3 million)  This compares with nearly 4 9 billion lunches served (a daily average of 27 8 million)  CACFP provides assistance for after-school food in two ways  First, centers and homes that participate in CACFP and provide after-school care may participate in traditional CACFP (the eligibility and administration described earlier)  Second, centers in areas where at least half the children in the community are eligible for free or reduced-price school meals can opt to participate in the CACFP At-Risk Afterschool program, which provides free snacks and suppers  Expansion of the At-Risk After-School meals program was a major policy change included in HHFKA  Prior to the law, 13 states were permitted to offer CACFP At-Risk After-School meals (instead of just a snack); the law allowed all CACFP state agencies to offer such meals  In FY2017, the At-Risk Afterschool program served a total of approximately 242 6 million free meals and snacks to a daily average of more than 1 7 million children  Federal child nutrition laws authorize and program funding supports a range of additional programs, initiatives, and activities  Through State Administrative Expenses funding, states are entitled to federal grants to help cover administrative and oversight/monitoring costs associated with child nutrition programs  The national amount each year is equal to about 2% of child nutrition reimbursements  The majority of this money is allocated to states based on their share of spending on the covered programs; about 15% is allocated under a discretionary formula granting each state additional amounts for CACFP, commodity distribution, and Administrative Review efforts  In addition, states receive payments for their role in overseeing summer programs (about 2 5% of their summer program aid)  States are free to apportion their federal administrative expense payments among child nutrition initiatives (including commodity distribution activities) as they see fit, and appropriated funding is available to states for two years  State Administrative Expense spending in FY2017 totaled approximately $279 million  Team Nutrition is a USDA-FNS program that includes a variety of school meals initiatives around nutrition education and the nutritional content of the foods children eat in schools  This includes Team Nutrition Training Grants, which provide funding to state agencies for training and technical assistance, such as help implementing USDA's nutrition requirements and the Dietary Guidelines for Americans  From 2004 to 2018, Team Nutrition also included the HealthierUS Schools Challenge (HUSSC), which originated in the 2004 reauthorization of the Child Nutrition Act  HUSSC was a voluntary certification initiative designed to recognize schools that have created a healthy school environment through the promotion of nutrition and physical activity  Farm-to-school programs broadly refer to "efforts that bring regionally and locally produced foods into school cafeterias," with a focus on enhancing child nutrition  The goals of these efforts include increasing fruit and vegetable consumption among students, supporting local farmers and rural communities, and providing nutrition and agriculture education to school districts and farmers  HHFKA amended existing child nutrition programs to establish mandatory funding of $5 million per year for competitive farm-to-school grants that support schools and nonprofit entities in establishing farm-to-school programs that improve a school's access to locally produced foods  The FY2018 appropriations law provided an additional $5 million in discretionary funding to remain available until expended  Grants may be used for training, supporting operations, planning, purchasing equipment, developing school gardens, developing partnerships, and implementing farm-to-school programs  USDA's Office of Community Food Systems provides additional resources on farm-to-school issues  Through an Administrative Review process (formerly referred to as Coordinated Review Effort (CRE)), USDA-FNS, in cooperation with state agencies, conducts periodic on-site NSLP school compliance and accountability evaluations to improve management and identify administrative, subsidy claim, and meal quality problems  State agencies are required to conduct administrative reviews of all school food authorities (SFAs) that operate the NSLP under their jurisdiction at least once during a three-year review cycle  Federal Administrative Review expenditures were approximately $9 9 million in FY2017  USDA-FNS and state agencies conduct many other child nutrition program support activities for which dedicated funding is provided  Among other examples, there is the Institute of Child Nutrition (ICN), which provides technical assistance, instruction, and materials related to nutrition and food service management; it receives $5 million a year in mandatory funding appropriated in statute  ICN is located at the University of Mississippi  USDA-FNS provides training on food safety education  Funding is also provided for USDA-FNS to conduct studies, provide training and technical assistance, and oversee payment accuracy  Appendix A  Acronyms Used in This Report Appendix B  Per-meal or Per-snack Reimbursement Rates for Child Nutrition Programs This appendix lists the specific reimbursement rates discussed in the earlier sections of the report  Reimbursement rates are adjusted for inflation for each school or calendar year according to terms laid out in the programs' authorizing laws  Each year, the new rates are announced in the Federal Register   

ground_truth: Safety incidents in recent years on WMATA's rail system have raised questions about its processes for performing critical maintenance and replacing capital assets. WMATA initiated a new preventive maintenance program for its rail track in 2017, and is currently implementing a new capital planning process. GAO was asked to examine issues related to WMATA's capital funding and maintenance practices. This report examines: (1) how WMATA spent its capital funds from fiscal years 2011 through 2017, (2) how WMATA's new capital planning process addresses weaknesses it identified in the prior process, and (3) WMATA's progress toward its track preventive maintenance program's goals and how the program aligns with leading program management practices. GAO analyzed WMATA's financial and program information, interviewed officials of WMATA, the Federal Transit Administration, and five transit agencies selected for similarities to WMATA. GAO compared WMATA's capital planning process and track maintenance program with leading practices. From fiscal years 2011 through 2017, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) spent almost $6 billion on a variety of capital assets, with the largest share spent on improving its rail and bus fleet (see figure). Over this period, WMATA's capital spending was, on average, about $845 million annually. WMATA's new capital planning process could address some weaknesses it identified in the prior process. WMATA established a framework for quantitatively prioritizing capital needs (investments to a group of related assets) over a 10-year period. However, WMATA has not established documented policies and procedures for implementing the new process, such as those for selecting specific projects for funding in its annual capital budget. WMATA is currently using its new capital planning process to make fiscal year 2020 investment decisions. WMATA has proposed a fiscal year 2020 capital budget of $1.4 billion. Without documented policies and procedures for implementing the new planning process, WMATA's stakeholders do not have reasonable assurance that WMATA is following a sound process for making investment decisions. WMATA has made significant progress toward its track preventive maintenance program's goals, which are to reduce both track-defect and electrical-fire incidents by 50 percent in fiscal year 2019 compared with 2017. In fiscal year 2018, WMATA met its goal for reducing track defect incidents and reduced electrical fire incidents by 20 percent. However, in designing the program, WMATA did not fully assess risks. For example, WMATA did not quantitatively assess the impact of track defects or electrical fires on its ability to provide service, nor did it consider other risks such as non-electrical track fires, which represent about 30 percent of all fires on the system, or other factors, such as resources or track time. Without a comprehensive risk assessment, WMATA lacks reasonable assurance that the program is designed to address risks affecting the safety of the rail system or other risks that could hinder the new program's success. GAO is making five recommendations, including that WMATA establish documented policies and procedures for the new capital planning process and conduct a comprehensive risk assessment for the track preventive maintenance program. WMATA described actions planned or underway to address GAO's recommendations. GAO believes the recommendations should be fully implemented, as discussed in the report.