prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas  Matters of particular significance include the following: Israel's own capabilities for addressing threats, and its cooperation with the United States  Shared U S -Israel concerns about Iran, within the context of the U S  exit from the 2015 international nuclear agreement, and growing tension involving Iran and Hezbollah at Israel's northern border with Syria and Lebanon  Israeli-Palestinian issues, including those involving Jerusalem, Hamas and the Gaza Strip, funding for Palestinians, and a possible Trump Administration peace plan  Israeli domestic political issues, including probable corruption-related indictments against Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and closely contested elections that are scheduled for April 9, 2019  For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U S  Relations , by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U S  Foreign Aid to Israel , by Jeremy M  Sharp  Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence  These strengths include robust military and homeland security capabilities, as well as close cooperation with the United States  Israel maintains conventional military superiority relative to its neighbors and the Palestinians  Shifts in regional order and evolving asymmetric threats during this decade have led Israel to update its efforts to project military strength, deter attack, and defend its population and borders  Israel appears to have reduced some unconventional threats via missile defense systems, reported cyber defense and warfare capabilities, and other heightened security measures  Israel has a robust homeland security system featuring sophisticated early warning practices and thorough border and airport security controls; most of the country's buildings have reinforced rooms or shelters engineered to withstand explosions  Israel also has proposed and partially constructed a national border fence network of steel barricades (accompanied at various points by watch towers, patrol roads, intelligence centers, and military brigades) designed to minimize militant infiltration, illegal immigration, and smuggling from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip  Additionally, Israeli authorities have built a separation barrier in and around parts of the West Bank  Israel is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintains a policy of "nuclear opacity" or amimut   A 2017 report estimated that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal of around 80-85 warheads  The United States has countenanced Israel's nuclear ambiguity since 1969, when Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and U S  President Richard Nixon reportedly reached an accord whereby both sides agreed never to acknowledge Israel's nuclear arsenal in public  Israel might have nuclear weapons deployable via aircraft, submarine, and ground-based missiles  No other Middle Eastern country is generally thought to possess nuclear weapons  Israeli officials closely consult with U S  counterparts in an effort to influence U S  decisionmaking on key regional issues, and U S  law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel's "qualitative military edge," or QME  Additionally, a 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3 3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations  Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U S  interests  They also argue that Israel is a valuable U S  ally  The United States and Israel do not have a mutual defense treaty or agreement that provides formal U S  security guarantees  Iran remains of primary concern to Israeli officials largely because of (1) Iran's antipathy toward Israel, (2) Iran's broad regional influence, and (3) the probability that some constraints on Iran's nuclear program could loosen in the future  In recent years, Israel and Arab Gulf states have discreetly cultivated closer relations with one another in efforts to counter Iran  Prime Minister Netanyahu has sought to influence U S  decisions on the international agreement on Iran's nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA)  He argued against the JCPOA when it was negotiated in 2015—including in a speech to a joint session of Congress—and welcomed President Trump's May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U S  sanctions on Iran's core economic sectors  A few days before President Trump's May announcement, Netanyahu presented information that Israeli intelligence operatives apparently seized in early 2018 from an Iranian archive  He used the information to question Iran's credibility and highlight its potential to parlay existing know-how into nuclear-weapons breakthroughs after the JCPOA expires  In his September 2018 speech before the U N  General Assembly, Netanyahu claimed that Iran maintains a secret "atomic warehouse for storing massive amounts of equipment and materiel " An unnamed U S  intelligence official was quoted as saying in response, "so far as anyone knows, there is nothing in [the facility Netanyahu identified] that would allow Iran to break out of the JCPOA any faster than it otherwise could " After Netanyahu publicly exposed the Iranian nuclear archive, some former Israeli officials speculated about what action Israel might consider taking against Iranian nuclear facilities if Iran abrogates the JCPOA and expands nuclear activities currently restricted under the agreement  However, Netanyahu had said in an interview that he was not seeking a military confrontation with Iran  Israel and Iran have engaged in hostile action over Iran's presence in Syria  In the early years of the Syria conflict, Israel primarily employed air strikes to prevent Iranian weapons shipments destined for the Iran-backed group Hezbollah in Lebanon  Later, as the Syrian government regained control of large portions of the country with Iranian backing, Israeli leaders began pledging to prevent Iran from constructing and operating bases or advanced weapons manufacturing facilities in Syria  Since 2018, Israeli and Iranian forces have repeatedly targeted one another in and over Syrian- and Israeli-controlled areas  In January 2019, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel had targeted Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria "hundreds of times " Limited Israeli strikes to enforce "redlines" against Iran-backed forces could expand into wider conflict, particularly if there is a miscalculation by one or both sides  U S  involvement in Syria could be one factor in Israeli calculations on this issue  The U S  base at Al Tanf in southern Syria has reportedly "served as a bulwark against Iran's efforts to create a land route for weapons from Iran to Lebanon " Israeli officials favor continued U S  involvement in Syria, while also preparing for the possibility that they may need to take greater direct responsibility for countering Iran there  Russia's advanced air defense systems in Syria could make it more difficult for Israel to operate there  Since 2015, Russia has operated an S-400 system at Russia's Khmeimim air base in Lattakia, a city on Syria's Mediterranean coast  To date, however, Russia does not appear to have acted militarily to thwart Israeli air strikes against Iranian or Syrian targets, and Israel and Russia maintain communications aimed at deconflicting their operations  In addition to the S-400 that it owns and operates, Russia delivered an S-300 air defense system for Syria's military to Khmeimim airbase in October 2018  The delivery followed Syria's downing of a Russian military surveillance plane in September 2018 under disputed circumstances, shortly after an Israeli operation in the vicinity  According to an Israeli satellite imagery analysis company, three launchers appeared to be operational as of February 2019  It is unclear to what extent Russia has transferred the S-300 to Syrian military control, and how this might affect future Israeli military action in Syria  An Israeli journalist wrote that "Israel has the knowledge, experience and equipment to evade the S-300, but the fact that additional batteries, manned by Russian personnel, are on the ground, will necessitate greater care [when carrying out future operations against Iran-aligned targets in Syria] " Since the September 2018 incident, Israeli air strikes appear to have decreased somewhat  On March 25, 2019, President Trump signed a proclamation stating that the United States recognizes the Golan Heights (hereinafter, the Golan) to be part of the State of Israel  The proclamation stated that "any possible future peace agreement in the region must account for Israel's need to protect itself from Syria and other regional threats" —presumably including threats from Iran and the Iran-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah  Israel gained control of the Golan from Syria during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and effectively annexed it unilaterally by applying Israeli law to the region in 1981 (see Figure 2 )  President Trump's proclamation changed long-standing U S  policy on the Golan  Since 1967, successive U S  Administrations supported the general international stance that the Golan is Syrian territory occupied by Israel, with its final status subject to negotiation  In reaction to the U S  proclamation, others in the international community have insisted that the Golan's status has not changed  In Congress, Senate and House bills introduced in February 2019 ( S  567 and H R  1372 ) support Israeli sovereignty claims to the Golan, and would treat the Golan as part of Israel in any existing or future law "relating to appropriations or foreign commerce " For decades after 1967, various Israeli leaders, reportedly including Prime Minister Netanyahu as late as 2011, had entered into indirect talks with Syria aimed at returning some portion of the Golan as part of a lasting peace agreement  However, the effect of civil war on Syria and the surrounding region, including an increase in Iran's presence, may have influenced Netanyahu to shift focus from negotiating with Syria on a "land for peace" basis to obtaining international support for Israel's claims of sovereignty  As part of the periodic conflict in Syria between Israel and Iran , some Iranian missiles have targeted Israeli positions in the Golan  The Syrian government has denounced the U S  policy change as an illegal violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and insisted that Syria is determined to recover the Golan  Additionally, observers have argued that the policy change could unintentionally bolster Syrian President Bashar al Asad within Syria by rallying Syrian nationalistic sentiment in opposition to Israel's claims to the Golan and deflecting attention from Iran's activities inside Syria  Since 1974, the U N  Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled an area of the Golan Heights between the regions controlled by Israel and Syria, with about 880 troops from five countries stationed there as of January 2019  During that time, Israel's forces in the Golan have not faced serious military resistance to their continued deployment, despite some security threats and diplomatic challenges  Periodic resolutions by the U N  General Assembly have criticized Israel's occupation as hindering regional peace and Israel's settlement and de facto annexation of the Golan as illegal  Hezbollah's forces and Israel's military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader conflict  Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional implications  Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah's buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds  Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran over Iran's presence in Syria raises questions about the potential for Hezbollah's forces in Lebanon to open another front against Israel  After the September 2018 incident leading to Russia's installation of an S-300 system in Syria (discussed above), Iran reportedly began directly transferring weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon while reducing Syria's use as a transshipment hub  One Israeli media account warned that Hezbollah's threat to Israel is increasing because of initiatives to build precision-weapons factories in Lebanon and to set up a military infrastructure in southern Syria  In late 2018 and early 2019, Israel's military undertook an effort—dubbed "Operation Northern Shield"—to seal six Hezbollah attack tunnels to prevent them from crossing into Israel  Israeli officials claim that they do not want another war, while at the same time taking measures aimed at constraining and deterring Hezbollah, including through consultation with the U N  Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)  President Trump has expressed interest in brokering a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and his Administration has supposedly prepared a proposal to facilitate negotiations, but the Administration has repeatedly postponed releasing the proposal  Many factors may account for the delays, including recent U S  actions regarding Jerusalem, tension in and around the Gaza Strip, reduced funding for the Palestinians, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and political jockeying and domestic constraints among Israelis and Palestinians  The U S  decision—announced in December 2017—to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the U S  embassy there has fed U S -Palestinian tensions  Israeli leaders generally celebrated the change, but Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas strongly objected  Many other countries opposed President Trump's actions on Jerusalem, as reflected in action at the United Nations  Claiming U S  bias favoring Israel, Palestinian leaders broke off high-level political contacts with the United States shortly after the December 2017 announcement and have made efforts to advance Palestinian national claims in international fora  However, the PA continues security coordination with Israel in the West Bank  U S -Palestinian tensions appear to have influenced Administration decisions to cut off various types of U S  funding to the Palestinians, and arguably have dimmed prospects for restarting Israeli-Palestinian talks  In a September 2018 address before the U N  General Assembly, PLO Chairman/PA President Abbas denounced Administration actions that he characterized as taking disputed Israeli-Palestinian issues—such as Jerusalem's status and Palestinian refugee claims—off the negotiating table  Funding for economic and humanitarian needs in the West Bank and Gaza could become even scarcer  In February 2019, Israel announced that it would withhold a portion of the tax revenue it collects for the PA because—pursuant to a law passed by the Knesset in 2018—Israel had determined that amount represented PLO/PA payments made on behalf of individuals allegedly involved in terrorist acts  In response, Abbas announced that the PA would completely reject monthly revenue transfers from Israel if it withheld any amount, even though the transfers comprise approximately 65% of the PA budget  For February, Israel withheld approximately $11 million from the $193 million due to the PA, with the PA rejecting the entire amount as a result  The PA is reportedly seeking temporary financial support from the private sector and local banks, and also asking the Arab League to follow through on its 2010 decision to provide $100 million per month as a "financial safety net" for the PA  At the end of January 2019, U S  bilateral aid to the Palestinians—including nonlethal security assistance that Israel generally supports—ended completely due to the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA, P L  115-253 ), which became law on October 3, 2018  Two months after the law's enactment, PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah informed Secretary of State Michael Pompeo that the PA would not accept aid that subjected it to federal court jurisdiction  Apparently, U S  aid will not resume unless Congress amends or repeals the ATCA, or the Administration channels the aid differently  Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor Jared Kushner has stated that the Administration will publicly release a peace plan sometime after Israeli national elections, which are set to occur on April 9, 2019  According to Kushner, the peace plan contains detailed proposals on the various issues that divide Israel and the PLO  Many observers express skepticism about the prospect that these proposals can serve as a basis for the serious resumption of bilateral talks, but Kushner has reportedly said that the Administration is focusing on formulating "realistic solutions," and that "privately, people are more flexible " U S  officials hope to surmount potential obstacles to the peace plan in the Israeli and Palestinian domestic arenas by obtaining political and economic support for the U S  initiative from key Arab states in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Egypt  A number of Arab states share common interests in working behind the scenes with Israel to counter Iranian regional influence  While some diplomatic developments have fed speculation about warming Arab-Israeli ties, reports suggest that key Arab Gulf states remain reluctant to embrace more formal relations with Israel without a resolution of the Palestinian issue  Saudi Arabia's press agency responded to the U S  recognition of Israel's claims to sovereignty in the Golan Heights by saying that it "will have significant negative effects on the peace process in the Middle East and the security and stability of the region " In a statement with implications both for domestic and international audiences, Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly said that the March 2019 change in U S  policy on the Golan proves that countries can retain territory captured in a defensive war  His statement prompted speculation over the possibility that Israeli leaders might consider annexing part of the West Bank and whether the situation in the Golan is sufficiently similar to invite comparison  Days before the April elections, Netanyahu asserted that if he were to lead the next government, he would apply Israeli law to West Bank settlements  The closely contested Israeli national elections—scheduled for April 9, 2019—and the subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for the country's leadership and future policies  Prime Minister Netanyahu faces a challenge from the centrist Blue and White party under the combined leadership of former top general Benny Gantz and former Finance Minister Yair Lapid  Some setbacks for Netanyahu during the campaign have included the attorney general's announcement of probable corruption-related indictments against Netanyahu, new media allegations of possible misconduct relating to Israel's procurement of German submarines, and questions about some individuals or groups possibly spreading rumors against Netanyahu's opponents via social media  Yet, some observers calculate that Netanyahu's Likud could possibly get fewer Knesset seats than Blue and White and still form the next coalition  For more information on the actors involved in the elections, see CRS Insight IN11068, Israel: April 2019 Elections and Probable Indictments Against Prime Minister Netanyahu , by Jim Zanotti and this report's Appendix   In July 2018, the Knesset passed a Basic Law defining Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people  Some observers have expressed concern that the law might further undermine the place of Arabs in Israeli society, while others view its effect as mainly symbolic  In March 2019, Netanyahu said that Israel is a Jewish, democratic state with equal rights for all its citizens, and "the nation-state not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people," reviving domestic debate about the 2018 law and perhaps seeking support during the election campaign from sympathetic voter groups 


Report 2:  NASA’s telescope and other science projects will always have inherent technical, design, and integration risks because they are complex, specialized, and often push the state of the art in space technology  But too often, our reports find that management and oversight problems—which can include poor planning, optimistic cost estimating, funding gaps, lax oversight, and poor contractor performance, among other issues—are the real drivers behind cost and schedule growth  To its credit, NASA has taken significant steps, partly in response to our past recommendations, to reduce acquisition risk from both a technical and management standpoint, including actions to enhance cost and schedule estimating, provide adequate levels of reserves to projects, establish better processes and metrics to monitor projects, and expand the use of earned value management to better monitor contractor performance  For example, in November 2012, we found that NASA employee skill sets available to analyze and implement earned value management vary widely from center to center, and we recommended that NASA conduct an earned value management skills gap analysis to identify areas requiring augmented capability across the agency, and, based on the results of the assessment, develop a workforce training plan to address any deficiencies  NASA concurred with this recommendation and developed an earned value management training plan in 2014 based on the results of an earned value management skills gap analysis that was conducted in 2013  Moreover, in recent years, we have found that many of the projects within the agency’s major project portfolio have improved their cost and schedule performance  Nevertheless, the extent to which NASA has adopted some of the following lessons learned within its portfolio of major projects is mixed, and NASA has an opportunity to strengthen its program management of major acquisitions, including its space telescopes, by doing so  Manage Cost and Schedule Performance for Large Projects to Limit Implications for Entire Portfolio  In 2013, following JWST’s cost increases and schedule growth, we found that though cost and schedule growth can occur on any project, increases associated with NASA’s most costly and complex missions can have cascading effects on the rest of the portfolio  For example, we found that the JWST cost growth would have reverberating effects on the portfolio for years to come and required the agency to identify $1 4 billion in additional resources over fiscal years 2012 through 2017, according to Science Mission Directorate officials  NASA identified approximately half of this required funding from the four science divisions within the Science Mission Directorate account  The majority of the cuts were related to future high priority missions, missions in the operations and sustainment phase, and research and analysis  In essence, NASA had to mortgage future high priority missions and research to address JWST’s additional resource needs  Similarly, the National Academy of Sciences has concluded in the past that it is important for NASA to have a clearly articulated and consistently applied method for prioritizing why and how its scarce fiscal resources are apportioned with respect to the science program in general and on a more granular level among component scientific disciplines  The academy noted that failure to do so could result in a loss of capacity, capability, and human resources in a number of scientific disciplines and technological areas that may take a generation or more to reconstitute once eliminated  NASA’s establishment of the WFIRST Independent External Technical/Management/Cost Review that I previously discussed is a step in the right direction to help ensure the Astrophysics Division incorporates this lesson learned  Establish Adequate Cost and Schedule Reserves to Address Risks  Twice in the history of the JWST program, independent reviewers found that the program’s planned cost reserves were inadequate  First, in April 2006, an Independent Review Team confirmed that the project’s technical content was complete and sound, but expressed concern over the project’s reserve funding, reporting that it was too low and phased in too late in the development lifecycle  The review team reported that for a project as complex as JWST, 25 to 30 percent total reserve funding was appropriate  The team cautioned that low reserve funding compromised the project’s ability to resolve issues, address risk areas, and accommodate unknown problems  As I previously mentioned, following additional cost increases and schedule threats, NASA commissioned the Independent Comprehensive Review Panel  In 2010, the panel again concluded JWST was executing well from a technical standpoint, but that the baseline cost estimate did not reflect the most probable cost with adequate reserves in each year of project execution, resulting in an unexecutable project  NASA heeded these lessons when it established a new baseline for JWST in 2011  For example, the revised schedule included more reserves than required by the procedural requirements issued by the NASA center responsible for managing JWST  We have found, however, that NASA has not applied this lesson learned to all of its large projects— most notably with its human spaceflight projects, including the Space Launch System, Orion Crew Capsule, and associated ground systems— and similar outcomes to the JWST project have started to emerge with these projects  We previously reported that all three of these programs were operating with limited cost reserves, which limited each program’s ability to address risks and unforeseen technical challenges  For example, we found in July 2016 that the Orion program planned to maintain very low levels of annual cost reserves until 2018  The lack of available cost reserves in the near term led to the program deferring work to address technical issues to stay within budget, and put the program’s future cost reserves at risk of being overwhelmed by deferred work  In April 2017, we also found that all three programs faced development challenges in completing work, and each had little to no schedule reserve remaining to the launch date—meaning they would have to complete all remaining work with minimal delay during the most challenging stage of development  We found that it was unlikely that the programs would achieve the planned launch readiness date and recommended that NASA reassess the date  NASA agreed with this recommendation and stated that it would establish a new launch readiness date  In November 2017, NASA announced that a review of the possible manufacturing and production schedule risks indicated a launch date of June 2020—a delay of 19 months—but the agency will manage to a December 2019 launch date because, according to NASA, they have put in mitigation strategies for those risks  We will follow-up on those mitigation strategies as part of future work on the human space exploration programs  Regularly and Consistently Update Project JCLs to Provide Realistic Estimates to Decision Makers  In 2009, NASA began requiring that programs and projects with estimated life-cycle costs greater than $250 million develop a JCL prior to project confirmation  This was a positive step for NASA to help ensure that cost and schedule estimates are realistic and projects are thoroughly planning for anticipated risks  This is because a JCL assigns a confidence level, or likelihood, of a project meeting its cost and schedule estimates  Our cost estimating best practices recommend that cost estimates should be updated to reflect changes to a program or be kept current as a program moves through milestones  As new risks emerge on a project, an updated cost and schedule risk analysis can provide realistic estimates to decision-makers, including the Congress  This is especially true for NASA’s largest projects as updated estimates may require the Congress to consider a variety of actions  However, there is no requirement for NASA projects to update their JCLs, and our prior work has found that projects—including JWST—do not regularly update cost risk analyses to take into account newly emerged risks  Our ongoing work indicates that of the 16 major projects currently in NASA’s portfolio that have developed JCL estimates, only 2 have reported updating their JCLs (other than required due to a rebaseline)  For example, the Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy, and Heat Transport Project (InSight), a Mars lander, updated its JCL after the project missed its committed launch date  As a result, the project was able to provide additional information to decision makers about the probability that it will meet its revised cost and schedule estimates  As a project reaches the later stages of development, especially integration and testing, the types of risks the project will face may change  An updated project JCL would provide both project and agency management with data on relevant risks that can guide the project decisions  For example, in December 2012, we recommended the JWST project update its JCL  NASA concurred with this recommendation; however, we recently closed the recommendation because NASA had not taken steps to implement it and the amount of time remaining before launch would not have allowed the benefit of implementing the recommendation to be realized  An updated JCL may have portended the current schedule delays, which could have been proactively addressed by the project  Enhance Oversight of Contractors to Improve Project Outcomes  In December 2012, we found that the JWST project had taken steps to enhance communications with and oversight of its contractors  According to project officials, the increased communication allowed them to better identify and manage project risks by having more visibility into contractors’ activities  The project reported that a great deal of communication existed across the project prior to the Independent Comprehensive Review Panel; however, additional improvements were made  For example, the project increased its presence at contractor facilities as necessary to provide assistance; this included assigning two engineers on a recurring basis at a Lockheed Martin facility to assist in solving problems with an instrument  The JWST project also assumed full responsibility for the mission system engineering functions from Northrop Grumman in March 2011  NASA and Northrop Grumman officials both said that NASA is better suited to perform these tasks  We continue to see instances in our ongoing work that highlight the importance of implementing this lesson learned from JWST  For example, we found in 2017 that the Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment project—a project that plans to develop and deliver a new ground system for one Space Network site that provides essential communications tracking services to NASA and non-NASA missions—exceeded its original cost baseline by at least $401 7 million and been delayed by 27 months  The project has attributed some of the cost overruns and schedule delays to the contractor’s incomplete understanding of its requirements, which led to poor contractor plans and late design changes  The project also took steps to assign a new NASA project manager, increase physical presence at the contractor facility, and have more staff focused on validation and verification activities  In summary, NASA continues to make progress developing its space telescopes to help understand the universe and our place in it  But much like other major projects that NASA is developing, there continues to be an opportunity for NASA to learn from JWST and other projects that have suffered from cost overruns and schedule delays  Key project management tools and prior GAO recommendations that I have highlighted here today, could help to better position these large, complex, and technically challenging efforts for a successful outcome  We look forward to continuing to work with NASA and this subcommittee in addressing these issues  Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Bera, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time  If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Cristina T  Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this statement include Molly Traci, Assistant Director; Richard Cederholm, Assistant Director; Carrie Rogers; Lisa Fisher; Laura Greifner; Erin Kennedy; and Jose Ramos  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 

ground_truth: Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas. Matters of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations include Israel's ability to address the threats it faces in its region. Shared U.S.-Israel concerns about Iran and its allies on the nuclear issue and in Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Palestinian issues. Israeli domestic political issues, including elections scheduled for 2019. Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence. It maintains conventional military superiority relative to neighboring states and the Palestinians. It also takes measures to deter attack and defend its population and borders from evolving asymmetric threats such as rockets and missiles, cross-border tunneling, drones, and cyberattacks. Additionally, Israel has an undeclared but presumed nuclear weapons capability. Against a backdrop of strong bilateral cooperation, Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually from FY2019 to FY2028, along with additional amounts from Defense Department accounts for missile defense. All of these amounts remain subject to congressional appropriations. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu released new Israeli intelligence on Iran's nuclear program in April 2018, days before President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that constrains Iran's nuclear activities. It is unclear whether Israel might take future military action in Iran if Iranian nuclear activities resume. Since 2018, Israel has conducted a number of military operations in Syria against Iran and its allies, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel and Iran also appear to be competing for military advantage over each other at the Israel-Lebanon border. Amid uncertainty in the area, in March 2019 President Trump recognized Israel's claim to sovereignty over the Golan Heights, changing long-standing U.S. policy that held—in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 497 from 1981—the Golan was occupied Syrian territory whose final status was subject to Israel-Syria negotiation. The prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process are complicated by many factors. Palestinian leaders cut off high-level political contacts with the Trump Administration after it recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017. U.S.-Palestinian tensions have since worsened amid U.S. cutoffs of funding to the Palestinians and diplomatic moves—including the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Palestinian leaders interpreted these actions as prejudicing their claims to a capital in Jerusalem and to a just resolution of Palestinian refugee claims. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has welcomed these U.S. actions. The Trump Administration has suggested that it will release a proposed peace plan after Israeli elections, which are scheduled for April 9, 2019. Speculation continues about how warming ties between Israel and Arab Gulf states may affect Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, though Saudi Arabia said that the U.S. policy change on the Golan Heights would negatively affect the peace process. Bouts of tension and violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza have continued—reportedly accompanied by indirect talks between the two parties that are being brokered by Egypt and aim for a long-term cease-fire. Domestically, Israel is preparing for the April 9 elections, which are closely contested. Former top general Benny Gantz is combining with former Finance Minister Yair Lapid to challenge Netanyahu, whom the attorney general has recommended be indicted for corruption in three separate cases. The elections and subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for Israel's future leadership and policies.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: The United States has many international agreements that require treaty partners to provide certain information to IRS, which can help prevent the use of foreign bank accounts to facilitate tax evasion  FATCA goes much further, requiring FFIs to report more detailed information to IRS about their U S  customers annually  These provisions are important developments in efforts to combat tax evasion by U S  persons holding investments in offshore accounts  FATCA generally requires certain taxpayers to report foreign financial accounts and other specified foreign financial assets whose aggregate value exceeds specified thresholds to IRS on Form 8938  These taxpayers must report these assets and income generated from such assets to IRS with their tax return on Form 8938  These thresholds vary by filing status—such as single or married filing jointly—and by domestic or foreign residency  FATCA also promotes third-party reporting of foreign financial assets by requiring a withholding agent to withhold 30 percent on certain payments to an FFI unless the FFI or the jurisdiction in which the FFI is located has entered into an agreement with the United States to report certain account information of their U S  customers  Under such an agreement, participating FFIs report detailed information to IRS annually about accounts held by their U S  customers using an IRS Form 8966, FATCA Report (Form 8966)  According to IRS, FATCA improves visibility into taxable income from foreign sources, and enhances the agency’s ability to identify and pursue taxpayer noncompliance  For example, FATCA allows IRS to compare information reported by FFIs on Forms 8966 to information reported by U S  persons on Forms 8938  According to IRS, this comparison can be used to ensure taxpayers and FFIs are properly reporting foreign financial assets and income from international investments  This type of comparison is a common IRS enforcement technique  For example, IRS can directly compare information it receives from financial institutions’ IRS Form 1099-INT, Interest Income, against a tax return to determine if the taxpayer reported income generated from interest earned  To facilitate FATCA implementation for FFIs operating in jurisdictions with laws that would prohibit FFIs from complying with the terms of the FFI agreement, Treasury developed two alternative intergovernmental agreements (IGA)—Model 1 and Model 2—to facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of FATCA by removing partner jurisdictions’ legal impediments to comply with FATCA reporting requirements, and reducing burdens on FFIs located in partner jurisdictions  FFIs from countries with Model 1 IGAs report information on U S  persons’ accounts to their respective host country tax authorities (HCTAs)  The HCTAs, in turn, compile the information from FFIs and transmit it to IRS  In contrast, FFIs from countries with Model 2 IGAs, or countries treated as not having an IGA in effect, directly report information on U S  persons’ accounts to IRS  Separate from the FATCA requirements, regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA) also impose a separate self-reporting requirement for foreign accounts  Specifically, certain taxpayers and residents are required to file an FBAR with FinCEN annually if they have financial interest or signature or other authority over one or more foreign financial accounts with a total of more than $10,000, regardless of whether they reside within or outside the United States  Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies can use information from these reports to combat financial crimes, including terrorist financing and tax evasion  Appendix IV provides a comparison of Form 8938 and FBAR reporting requirements  Figure 1 depicts the flow of foreign financial account information from U S  persons and FFIs to IRS and FinCEN through the FATCA and FBAR reporting processes  As part of the FATCA reporting requirements, IRS collects information on financial accounts through forms and reports submitted by both taxpayers and FFIs  As part of this effort, IRS requires taxpayers to identify their TINs on Forms 8938 they submit  IRS also requires participating FFIs to report the TINs of each account holder who is a specified U S  person on Forms 8966  IRS intends to use reported TINs to link Form 8938 data filed by taxpayers to Form 8966 data filed by the FFIs to ensure that taxpayers and FFIs are properly reporting foreign financial assets  However, IRS often could not link account information collected from FFIs to the account’s owner because of incorrect or missing TINs  In July 2018, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) found that almost half of new Forms 8966 filed by FFIs did not include a TIN or included an invalid TIN  A consulting firm working with FFIs to implement FATCA reporting requirements told us that FFIs encountered significant challenges obtaining accurate TINs from U S  persons as part of the self-certification process  For instance, FFIs encountered situations where U S  persons provided incomplete or inaccurate TINs—such as Social Security Numbers (SSN) with less than nine digits—on forms used to self-certify their status as U S  persons  FFIs also encountered situations where U S  persons may not have obtained TINs or were unwilling to provide them to FFIs  Additionally, banking associations told us that it has taken time, effort, and expense for FFIs to report TINs, as they had to upgrade computer systems to collect and record TINs from U S  customers  Finally, Treasury told us that jurisdictions that have an IGA with the United States but no legal requirement to collect TINs are not in compliance with the requirements of the IGA  Treasury and IRS determined that some FFIs reporting from countries with Model 1 IGAs needed additional time to implement procedures to obtain and report required U S  TINs for preexisting accounts that are U S  reportable accounts  Consequently, IRS provided a transition period, through the end of 2019, for compliance with the TIN requirements for FFIs under Model 1 IGAs  Specifically, in September 2017, IRS issued a notice modifying procedures for FFIs reporting from countries with Model 1 IGAs to become compliant with TIN reporting requirements for preexisting accounts  For calendar years 2017-2019, IRS will not determine that certain FFIs in countries with Model 1 IGAs are significantly noncompliant with their obligations under the IGA solely as a result of a failure to report U S  TINs associated with the FFI’s U S  reportable accounts, providing they (1) obtain and report the date of birth of each account holder and controlling person whose TIN is not reported, (2) make annual requests for missing TINs from each account holder, and (3) search electronically searchable data maintained by such FFIs for missing required U S  TINs before reporting information that relates to calendar year 2017 to a partner jurisdiction  As a result, even without any further extensions, calendar year 2020 is the earliest IRS will be enforcing requirements for FFIs from countries with Model 1 IGAs to provide accurate and complete information on U S  account holders’ TINs to IRS  Without valid TINs on Forms 8966 submitted by FFIs, according to IRS officials, IRS faces significant hurdles in matching accounts reported by FFIs to those reported by individual tax filers on their Forms 8938  As a result, IRS must rely on information such as names, dates of birth, and addresses that the filers and/or FFIs may not consistently report  Without data that can be reliably matched between Forms 8938 and 8966, IRS’s ability to identify taxpayers not reporting accurate or complete information on specified foreign financial assets is hindered, interfering with its ability to enforce compliance with FATCA reporting requirements, and ensure taxpayers are paying taxes on income generated from such assets  In July 2018, TIGTA reported that IRS lacked success in matching FFI and individual taxpayer data because reports FFIs filed did not include or included invalid TINs  This, in turn, affected IRS’s ability to identify and enforce requirements for individual taxpayers  TIGTA recommended, among other things, that IRS initiate compliance efforts to address and correct missing or invalid TINs on Form 8966 filings from FFIs from countries with Model 2 IGAs or without any IGAs with the United States  IRS management said it disagreed with this recommendation because a system to ensure validation of every TIN upon submission of a Form 8966 would be cost prohibitive  However, IRS management said that IRS would address invalid TINs as they are uncovered on other compliance efforts, such as initiating development of a data product to automate risk assessments across the FATCA filing population  IRS also said it continues efforts to systematically match Form 8966 and Form 8938 data to identify nonfilers and underreporting related to U S  holders of foreign accounts  However, IRS management told us they are waiting until they have a full set of data, including TINs, before doing analysis to develop a compliance strategy  According to TIGTA, IRS management believed that having the FFI’s Global Intermediary Identification Number (GIIN) on Form 8938, which is filed by the taxpayer, would help with matching records  However, Form 8938 instructions identify that the field is optional for taxpayers to complete  TIGTA recommended that to reduce taxpayer burden in obtaining GIINs from FFIs, IRS add guidance to Form 8938 instructions to inform taxpayers on how to use the FFI List Search and Download Tool on the IRS’s website to obtain an FFI’s GIIN  IRS agreed with this recommendation  However, even if an individual taxpayer provided GIINs, IRS may continue to have difficulty matching accounts with U S  taxpayers if the TIN and name of the account holder reported on the Form 8966 do not match the TIN and name of the taxpayer on the Form 8938  IRS officials said they are aware of these difficulties and have attempted to match Forms 8938 and 8966 based on other criteria such as dates of birth  In its response to our draft report, IRS said that all financial institutions and foreign tax authorities that file required account information receive a notification listing administrative and other minor errors contained in their reporting  According to IRS, its Large Business and International division follows up with foreign tax authorities regarding these errors to ensure the tax authorities are working with financial institutions to correct these errors in compliance with the countries’ IGAs  IRS added it has initiated a campaign addressing FFIs that do not meet their compliance responsibilities with respect to account opening requirements  Additionally, IRS drafted a risk acceptance form and tool addressing risks in implementing FATCA compliance and business process capabilities  This risk assessment focused on the limitations IRS faces due to budget constraints, but did not address the specific risks it faces from not receiving complete and valid TINs on U S  account holders  We previously reported that risk management could help stakeholders make decisions about assessing risk, allocating resources, and taking actions under conditions of uncertainty  Key management practices for risk management we identified from our prior work include identifying, analyzing, and prioritizing risks; developing a mitigation plan to address identified risks; implementing the plan; and monitoring, reporting, and controlling risks  Without developing a risk mitigation plan to address risks IRS faces from not receiving complete and valid TINs moving forward, IRS may lose opportunities to adjust its compliance programs to better identify U S  persons who are not fully reporting specified foreign financial assets as required under FATCA  Several IRS databases store data collected from individuals’ electronic and paper filings of Form 8938 and/or elements of parent individual tax returns to which the Form 8938 is attached—the filer’s country of residence and filing status—used to determine specified reporting thresholds for Form 8938 filers  Additionally, data from these databases and other sources are transferred downstream to IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse (CDW)—a database used for research and analytical purposes  We extracted data from copies of Individual Return Transaction File (IRTF) and Modernized Tax Return Database (MTRDB) data copied into CDW to obtain information reported on Forms 8938 and relevant information from parent tax returns, such as filing status and filers’ country of residence  We found that IRTF and MTRDB had inconsistent and incomplete data  For example, neither database had consistent and complete information on foreign financial account and other asset information submitted by Form 8938 filers  While IRS officials told us that IRTF is the authoritative source for filers of Form 8938, it does not store account and other asset information submitted on Forms 8938  Additionally, IRS officials said MTRDB is not designed to store information submitted on paper filings of Forms 8938 and parent tax returns  Officials from IRS’s Research, Applied Analytics and Statistics (RAAS) division also noted that CDW did not have reliable information from Form 8938 paper filings  Because of the lack of foreign financial asset information from such filings, we could not report complete information on assets reported by Form 8938 filers  Further, IRS does not provide instructions to CDW users on how to extract appropriate data from CDW—such as data copied from IRTF and MTRDB—leading to confusion on which databases to use for extracting Form 8938 and relevant parent tax return data  For example, five distinct tables within CDW are required to identify the TIN, parent form, filing status, country of residence, and amount of foreign assets accurately  Without clear explanations of how data in each of these tables relate to each other and to the underlying filings, errors could be introduced into CDW users’ analyses of foreign asset information  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government notes that management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives  One attribute of this principle includes processing data into quality information that is appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and provided on a timely basis  Additionally, the Internal Revenue Manual states that IRS needs to measure taxpayer compliance so that customer-focused programs and services can be enhanced or developed so that compliance information and tools can be improved  According to IRS officials, IRS researchers have been taking additional steps to obtain and review Form 8938 and parent tax return data stored in the Integrated Production Model (IPM) database  They said IPM is the only database that contains complete data from individuals’ electronic and paper filings of Forms 8938 and relevant elements of parent tax returns  IRS officials said that RAAS has been working with IRS’s information technology (IT) division to obtain read-only access to IPM, and import Forms 8938 and 8966 data from IPM into CDW for analysis  However, as of February 2019, this effort has been delayed due to budget constraints  In its response to our draft report, IRS said that obtaining read-only access would require a new technical process and plans to continue working with IT on the feasibility and timeframe for enabling this access  Enabling access to consistent and complete Form 8938 and parent tax return data for compliance staff and researchers from RAAS and other IRS business units would help IRS strengthen its efforts to enforce compliance with FATCA reporting requirements and conduct research to bolster enforcement efforts  However, such efforts may be hampered until IRS can ensure readily available access to such data  We previously recommended that IRS develop a broad strategy, including a timeline and performance measures, for how IRS intends to use FATCA information to improve tax compliance  IRS agreed with this recommendation and developed a strategy for FATCA in July 2013  IRS updated the strategy in 2016 by creating the FATCA Compliance Roadmap as a comprehensive plan to articulate IRS’s priorities to facilitate compliance with FATCA reporting requirements  The roadmap also provided an overview of compliance activities used solely for enforcing FATCA reporting requirements or enhancing existing compliance efforts  However, in July 2018, TIGTA reported that IRS had not updated the FATCA Compliance Roadmap since 2016, and had taken limited or no action on a majority of the planned activities outlined in it  We also found that IRS had not yet evaluated the effects of FATCA, including the effects on voluntary tax compliance  IRS documentation states that only 7 of 31 capabilities outlined in the FATCA Compliance Roadmap were delivered due to funding constraints  As of October 2018, IRS has stopped using the FATCA Compliance Roadmap and has not developed a revised comprehensive plan to manage efforts to leverage FATCA data to improve taxpayer compliance  According to IRS officials, IRS moved away from updating broad strategy documents, such as the FATCA Compliance Roadmap, to focus on individual compliance campaigns  These include a campaign to match individual tax filers to the reports from FFIs, and another campaign to identify FFIs with FATCA reporting requirements who are not meeting all of their obligations  According to what IRS told us, with the passage of time and as FATCA is becoming more integrated into agency operations, it has moved from updating the broad strategy documents focused on FATCA to working on compliance campaigns that incorporate FATCA into overall tax administration  Additionally, IRS and outside researchers plan to study the role of enforcement in driving overall patterns in reporting offshore assets and income generated from such assets  Though IRS maintains that FATCA is more integrated into its operations, TIGTA’s 2018 report concluded that IRS was still unprepared to enforce compliance with FATCA in part because it took limited or no action on the majority of planned activities outlined in the FATCA Compliance Roadmap  Documenting a framework for using FATCA reporting requirements to improve taxpayer compliance and measure their effect is consistent with three steps we found leading public sector organizations take to increase the accountability of their initiatives: (1) define clear missions and desired outcomes; (2) measure performance to gauge progress; and (3) use performance information as a basis for decision-making  We also previously reported that it is important for IRS to use a documented framework that defines a clear strategy, timeline, and plans for assessment  Having such a framework in place can help IRS better allocate resources and avoid unnecessary costs resulting from not having the necessary or appropriate data available to execute its objectives  In light of the challenges IRS faces to collect, manage, and use FATCA data to improve compliance in a resource-constrained environment, employing a comprehensive plan would help IRS maximize the use of collected data and better leverage individual campaigns to increase taxpayer compliance  Without such a plan, IRS’s ability to collect and leverage data collected under FATCA for compliance enforcement and other purposes is constrained  We could not report on total values of foreign financial assets on Forms 8938 in tax years 2015 and 2016  However, we could provide a range of total maximum account values reported on FBARs during the same period  Specifically, we determined that more than 900,000 individuals filed FBARs in calendar years 2015 and 2016, and declared total maximum values of accounts ranging from about $1 5 trillion to more than $2 trillion each year  A little more than one in five—or about 21 7 percent—of the approximately 404,800 Forms 8938 filed with IRS in tax year 2016 were done so from U S  persons living abroad, with the other 78 3 percent living in the United States  Table 1 shows that a higher proportion of Form 8938 filings from U S  persons living abroad for tax year 2016 were filed on paper (43 3 percent) than Form 8938 filings from U S  persons living in the United States during the same period (14 7 percent)  We extracted these data from IRTF, which IRS officials said is the authoritative source for filers of Form 8938  However, we could not report complete information on foreign financial assets reported by Form 8938 filers because such data are incomplete; as noted above, IRS databases we used to extract Form 8938 data—IRTF and MTRDB—do not include asset information reported on paper filings of Forms 8938  Of the approximately 404,800 Forms 8938 filed by individuals for tax year 2016—the most recent data available—we could access information on residency of filers and reported foreign financial assets from about 277,600 Forms 8938 that did not indicate that foreign financial assets and values were declared on other forms besides the Form 8938  Of the subset of these Forms 8938, more than one quarter—or about 73,500— reported foreign financial assets in amounts that indicate the Form 8938 may have been filed unnecessarily, since they reported specified foreign financial assets with aggregate values at or below reporting thresholds as of the last day of the tax year  Based on available Form 8938 data from tax year 2016, table 2 shows that about 61,900 filings from U S  persons living in the United States and about 11,600 filings from U S  persons living abroad during the same tax year reported specified foreign financial assets with aggregate values at or below end of tax year thresholds  These totals likely understate the total number of Forms 8938 that U S  persons may have filed unnecessarily in tax year 2016; due to data limitations, these totals exclude Forms 8938 without asset information stored in IRS’s databases, including most Forms 8938 filed on paper and Forms 8938 where filers identified that they declared foreign financial assets on other forms besides the Form 8938  There is no clear explanation as to why some U S  persons may have filed Forms 8938 unnecessarily  However, we identified a number of potential reasons from focus groups and other interviews with stakeholder groups  In focus groups we conducted, participants expressed confusion about IRS’s instructions for completing the Form 8938 and information provided on IRS’s website  In the instructions for completing Form 8938, IRS described the specific types of foreign financial assets that are to be reported on Form 8938, and the asset value thresholds that must be met for required reporting, depending on the location of residence and filing status of the taxpayer  IRS also posted responses to frequently asked questions on meeting FATCA reporting requirements on its website, and established a separate page on its website comparing foreign financial assets that must be reported on Form 8938 and/or FBAR  Nonetheless, focus group participants reported confusion on whether and how to report investment and retirement accounts and compulsory savings plans managed by their country of residence  In a meeting we convened with an organization representing tax attorneys, they told us taxpayers are unsure about what account values to report on the Form 8938  Tax practitioners participating in another focus group added that they filed Forms 8938 regardless of the aggregate value of the assets because it was too cumbersome for them to identify whether the assets exceeded reporting thresholds as of the end of the year or at any time during the year  IRS officials also cited a number of possible reasons why U S  persons may be filing Forms 8938 unnecessarily  For example, it may be easier for U S  persons to report all specified foreign financial assets they hold on the Form 8938, rather than determine whether the value of such assets met applicable thresholds  IRS officials also said that U S  persons might complete a Form 8938 for reasons besides meeting tax-filing requirements, such as providing evidence of assets for a loan application  IRS’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights states that taxpayers are entitled to clear explanations of the laws and IRS procedures in all tax forms, instructions, publications, notices, and correspondence  Furthermore, one of IRS’s strategic goals is to empower taxpayers by making it easier for them to understand and meet their filing, reporting, and payment obligations  IRS officials said they hosted sessions for tax practitioners at IRS Nationwide Tax Forums to address FATCA reporting requirements  However, they said IRS has not taken direct steps to identify or implement actions to further clarify instructions and related guidance on IRS’s website for completing Form 8938, such as information on which foreign financial assets to report, how to calculate asset values, and determine whether such values exceed required reporting thresholds  Additionally, IRS officials said they have not conducted additional outreach to educate taxpayers on required reporting thresholds under FATCA, or notify Form 8938 filers of instances where aggregate values of specified foreign financial assets reported on Forms 8938 were below reporting thresholds  IRS officials said they have not made efforts to determine whether there is a pattern of unnecessary Form 8938 filings that they could address  Rather, they said they believed resources should be devoted to FATCA implementation in general  However, as shown above, we have identified many tens of thousands of instances where U S  persons may have filed Forms 8938 unnecessarily  Without assessing factors contributing to unnecessary Form 8938 reporting—and identifying or implementing actions to further clarify and educate taxpayers on FATCA reporting requirements—IRS is missing opportunities to help taxpayers understand their filing and reporting obligations and minimize their compliance burdens while properly meeting their tax obligations  Additionally, IRS may be missing opportunities to reduce costs in processing forms that taxpayers did not need to file  Because of overlapping statutory reporting requirements, IRS and FinCEN—both bureaus within Treasury—collect duplicative foreign financial asset data using two different forms (Form 8938 and FBAR)  Our evaluation and management guide for fragmentation, overlap, and duplication states that overlap occurs when multiple agencies or programs have similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries  Table 3 shows that individuals required to report foreign financial assets on Form 8938, in many cases, also must meet FBAR reporting requirements  For example, specified individuals with foreign financial accounts exceeding $50,000 in aggregate value on the last day of the tax year must file both Form 8938 and FBAR if such values exceed the minimum Form 8938 thresholds; these thresholds depend on the filing status and address of specified individuals  Table 3 also shows that, in many cases, specified interests in foreign financial assets as defined in Form 8938 instructions are the same as the financial interest in such assets under FBAR  Further, as noted in table 3, the overlapping requirements lead to IRS and FinCEN collecting the same information on certain types of foreign financial assets  For example, both Form 8938 and FBAR collect information on foreign financial accounts for which a person has signature authority and a financial interest in the account  Form 8938 and FBAR also both collect duplicative information on several other types of foreign financial assets, such as foreign mutual funds and accounts at a foreign financial institution that include foreign stock or securities  Overlapping reporting requirements result in most Form 8938 filers also filing an FBAR during the same reporting year  Table 4 shows that close to 75 percent of Form 8938 filers in tax years 2015 and 2016 percent also filed an FBAR for the same year using the same TIN  Overlapping requirements to file both Form 8938 and FBAR increases the compliance burden on U S  persons and adds complexity that can create confusion, potentially resulting in inaccurate or unnecessary reporting  Focus group participants in all five countries included in our study affirmed that U S  persons experienced confusion and frustration with having to report duplicative foreign financial asset information on both forms  Focus group participants and others we interviewed also noted that U S  persons incurred additional financial costs to complete and file both Form 8938 and FBAR  For instance, one tax practitioner in Canada said the charge was about $190 to report four-to-five accounts on an FBAR in addition to charging about $540 for basic tax return packages  An accounting firm based in Japan typically charged between $300 and $800 to complete a Form 8938 and between $150 and $500 to complete an FBAR, depending on the number of accounts reported on the forms  Proposed revisions to regulations implementing BSA proposed by FinCEN may also increase the number of duplicative foreign financial accounts reported on Form 8938 and FBAR  Currently, U S  persons must report detailed information on all foreign financial accounts on Form 8938 if the value of such accounts and other specified foreign financial assets reaches applicable reporting thresholds  In contrast, U S  persons are generally exempted from reporting detailed account information on FBARs if they report having signature or other authority over 25 or more foreign financial accounts  FinCEN’s proposed revisions to BSA regulations would eliminate the exemption, requiring U S  persons to report detailed information on all foreign financial accounts in which he or she has a financial interest if the value of such accounts exceed FBAR’s $10,000 reporting threshold  FinCEN estimated that it will receive account information for the first time on about 5 4 million foreign financial accounts if it finalizes the proposed revisions  In turn, these revisions may lead to increased filings of duplicative asset data on both Form 8938 and FBAR, as U S  persons may have to report detailed information on all foreign financial accounts using both forms  U S  persons also face exposure to two different penalty regimes for any failures in accurately and completely reporting foreign financial asset information to two bureaus within Treasury—IRS and FinCEN  Officials from one organization representing U S  persons living abroad said penalties due to failure to report certain accounts on one or both forms can be significant, even if little or no taxes are owed on those accounts  The duplicative reporting of foreign financial asset data on two different forms also creates additional costs to the government to process and store the same or similar information twice, and enforce reporting compliance with both requirements  In 2012, we recommended that Treasury direct the Office of Tax Policy, IRS, and FinCEN to determine whether the benefits of implementing a less duplicative reporting process exceed the costs and, if so, implement that process  Treasury did not implement our recommendation  While we continue to believe that the agencies should have considered whether less duplicative reporting could have been implemented, we do recognize that FATCA and FBAR were enacted under two different statutes to serve different purposes  As mentioned above, according to IRS, FATCA improves visibility into taxable income from foreign sources and enhances the agency’s ability to identify and pursue taxpayer noncompliance  In contrast, the information reported on the FBAR is collected to identify money laundering and other financial crimes; law enforcement agencies can use BSA information—including information collected from FBARs— to aid regulatory and criminal investigations  Additionally, data collected from Form 8938 and FBAR are used in different systems for use by different bureaus within Treasury  Fully addressing issues stemming from overlapping reporting requirements and the resulting collection of duplicative information—while at the same time ensuring that such information can be used for tax compliance and law enforcement purposes—can only be done by modifying the statutes governing the requirements  Further, IRS and FinCEN have varying degrees of access to foreign financial asset information collected from Form 8938 and FBAR to enforce tax compliance and financial crime laws  FATCA was enacted, in part, to improve visibility into taxable income from foreign sources  However, information provided on Forms 8938 is taxpayer return information protected by section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), which generally prohibits IRS from disclosing information provided on Forms 8938  IRS can share return information with other government agencies and others when it is allowed by statute  For example, under section 6103, IRS may disclose return information related to taxes imposed under the IRC—such as self-employment income tax, Social Security and Medicare tax and income tax withholding—to the Social Security Administration (SSA) as needed to carry out its responsibilities under the Social Security Act  However, according to FinCEN officials, FinCEN, law enforcement, and regulators often cannot access information submitted on Forms 8938  While section 6103 provides other exceptions to disclosure prohibitions—such as allowing IRS to share return information with law enforcement agencies for investigation and prosecution of nontax criminal laws—such information is generally only accessible pursuant to a court order  As noted above, information reported on the FBAR can be used by law enforcement agencies to aid regulatory and criminal investigations  This includes IRS, which has been delegated responsibility from FinCEN to enforce compliance with FBAR reporting requirements  IRS has used FBAR information in addressing taxpayer noncompliance with reporting and paying taxes on foreign assets and income  For example, taxpayers accepted into one of IRS’s offshore voluntary disclosure programs must have filed amended or late FBARs as part of their program applications  Investigators from IRS’s Criminal Investigation division generally reviewed applications to determine if the taxpayer has made a complete and truthful disclosure  IRS examiners can also use information from case files of program participants—such as information disclosed on FBARs— to identify new groups of taxpayers suspected of hiding income offshore  IRS can then choose to continue offering offshore programs and encourage these newly identified groups of taxpayers, as well as all taxpayers with unreported offshore accounts, to disclose their accounts voluntarily  In addition to eliminating overlapping reporting requirements, harmonizing statutes governing foreign financial asset reporting and use of information collected on such assets to make such statutes fully consistent could yield additional benefits to both IRS and the law enforcement community  Specifically, and as shown in appendix IV, there are specified foreign financial assets reported on Form 8938—such as foreign hedge funds and foreign private equity funds—that are not required to be reported on an FBAR  In contrast, there are other specified foreign financial assets reported on an FBAR—such as indirect interests in foreign financial assets through an entity—that are not required to be reported on Form 8938  Without congressional action to address overlap in foreign financial asset reporting requirements, IRS and FinCEN will neither be able to coordinate efforts to collect and use foreign financial asset information, nor reduce unnecessary burdens faced by U S  persons in reporting duplicative foreign financial asset information  Two reporting systems for sharing foreign account information from foreign financial institutions are in operation globally—FATCA and the Common Reporting Standard (CRS)  According to officials from banking associations and a consulting firm, FFIs in the countries where we examined FATCA implementation encountered challenges implementing and now maintaining two overlapping reporting systems for collecting and transmitting account information to other countries for a seemingly similar purpose, and collecting sufficient information from customers to ensure they meet the requirements of both systems  As noted above, we previously identified overlap as occurring when multiple agencies or programs have similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries  According to an IRS official, collecting account information under FATCA ushered in an era of greater transparency; as noted above, FATCA’s passage sought to reduce tax evasion by creating greater transparency and accountability with respect to offshore accounts and other assets held by U S  taxpayers  When FATCA was first introduced, there was no international platform to share account information between countries  The United States and other countries worked together to reach an agreement on the electronic formatting that would be used to share the information  Other countries tax authorities’ became more interested in understanding the financial assets held abroad by their residents through an exchange of account information among themselves  In response, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) established the CRS reporting system for automatic exchange of information among member countries  According to the OECD, CRS was developed with a view to maximize efficiency and reduce cost for financial institutions  Thus, CRS drew extensively on the intergovernmental approach used to implement FATCA reporting requirements for FFIs  Countries participating in CRS exchange account information with each other using OECD’s Common Transmission System, which was modeled on FATCA’s International Data Exchange System  Figure 2 depicts the flow of account information between countries under FATCA and CRS  CRS reporting requirements are in many ways similar to FATCA, including required reporting of the account holders’ name and address, taxpayer identification number, account number, account balance, and income and sales proceeds  However, the requirements differ in significant ways  The biggest differences in requirements are driven by the nature of the U S  tax system  The United States, like many countries, generally taxes citizens and resident aliens on their worldwide income regardless of where that income is earned  However, the United States differs from other countries because it generally subjects U S  citizens who reside abroad to U S  taxation in the same manner as U S  residents  In contrast to U S  policy, most other countries do not tax their citizens if they reside in a country other than their country of citizenship  Further, IGAs implementing FATCA require FFIs to report the foreign-held accounts of U S  citizens and residents—including resident aliens—while CRS requires financial institutions in jurisdictions participating in CRS to report on almost all accounts held by nonresidents of the reporting country  Appendix V provides more detailed information on differences in reporting requirements, due diligence requirements, and definitions under FATCA and CRS  These differences in tax systems drive variations in due diligence procedures between FATCA and CRS  For example, FATCA aims to identify whether an account holder at a foreign institution is a U S  person based on citizenship and tax residency information  In contrast, CRS aims to identify the tax residency of all account holders of a financial institution, and does not consider citizenship  Due to the multilateral nature of CRS, if an account holder is determined on the basis of the due diligence procedures to have residency in two or more countries, information would be exchanged with all jurisdictions in which the account holder is determined a resident for tax purposes  Under CRS rules, information about foreign accounts held by a U S  citizen with a tax residence abroad would not be reported to IRS, but rather to the jurisdiction in which they were a resident for tax purposes  Because the United States taxes the worldwide income of U S  citizens, CRS rules would need to require identification of account holders’ citizenship in member countries where they are residents if FATCA were to be aligned with CRS  Table 5 shows a comparison of individuals reported to IRS under FATCA and hypothetically under CRS  Treasury and IRS, as part of its 2017-2018 Priority Guidance Plan, are considering modifying certain elements of the existing FATCA regulations  For instance, Treasury and IRS are considering coordinating certain documentation requirements for participating FFIs with the requirements under IGAs  In December 2018, Treasury and IRS also proposed regulations intended, in part, to reduce the burdens of FATCA  The proposed regulations included a clarification of the definition of an investment entity that is similar to the guidance published by OECD interpreting the definition of a “managed by” investment entity under CRS  If the United States wanted to adopt CRS, some of the key differences between FATCA and CRS—as outlined above and in appendix V—could be aligned through regulation while others would require legislation  According to Treasury officials, to align FATCA and CRS, Congress would need to revise statutes to: provide for the collection of information for accounts that residents of partner jurisdictions maintain at U S  financial institutions; require certain U S  financial institutions to report the account balance (including, in the case of a cash value insurance contract or annuity contract, the cash value or surrender value) for all financial accounts maintained at a U S  office and held by foreign residents; expand the current reporting required with respect to U S  source income paid to accounts held by foreign residents to include similar non-U S  source payments; require financial institutions to report the gross proceeds from the sale or redemption of property held in, or with respect to, a financial account; and require financial institutions to report information with respect to financial accounts held by certain passive entities with substantial foreign owners  While better aligning FATCA and CRS to some extent is possible, anything short of the United States fully adopting CRS would not fully eliminate the burdens of overlapping requirements that FFIs must currently meet under the two different systems  While having the United States adopt the CRS reporting system in lieu of FATCA could benefit FFIs that may otherwise have to operate two overlapping reporting systems, it would result in no additional benefit to IRS in terms of obtaining information on U S  accounts  Additionally, it could generate additional costs and reporting burdens to U S  financial institutions that would need to implement systems to meet CRS requirements  The extent of these costs is unknown  Further, adoption of CRS would create the circumstance where foreign accounts held by U S  citizens with a tax residence in partner jurisdiction—including U S  citizens who have a U S  tax obligation—would not be reported to IRS  Tax practitioners and others we interviewed said that U S  persons living abroad—whether or not they are required to complete a Form 8938—risk being denied access to foreign financial services  U S  persons and tax practitioners located in four of the five countries where we conducted focus groups and interviews reported that some U S  persons and U S - owned businesses encountered difficulties opening bank accounts with FFIs after FATCA was enacted, with some FFIs closing U S  persons’ existing accounts or denying them opportunities to open new accounts  One focus group participant, for example, said that the financial institution closed down all accounts including business checking, savings, and money market accounts after FATCA was implemented, requiring this individual to find a local resident who could co-sign on a new account  Costs FFIs would incur from implementing FATCA were cited as a significant factor in increasing barriers faced by U S  persons in accessing foreign financial services  Officials from one organization representing tax attorneys said that as a result of costs associated with FATCA implementation, FFIs have found it less burdensome to close accounts of U S  persons or require the accounts to be moved to a Securities and Exchange Commission registered affiliate than comply with FATCA  Tax practitioners and an official from a bankers association added that because FFIs may gain only small margins of profit from U S  persons, FFIs may believe it is too troublesome to do business with them  Additionally, officials from a foreign government agency told us that because FATCA is expensive for FFIs to continue implementing, banks in their country might charge U S  persons seeking access to financial services additional fees to account for FATCA implementation costs  Tax practitioners, consultants working with FFIs to implement FATCA reporting requirements, and the National Taxpayer Advocate told us that FFIs with smaller asset sizes such as smaller trust companies were more prone to decline business with U S persons  Officials from an advocacy group representing U S  persons living abroad told the National Taxpayer Advocate that some smaller banks declined U S  persons as customers as a business decision, believing it would cost more for them to comply with FATCA reporting requirements than maintain U S  expatriates’ accounts  Banking associations we interviewed said that decisions made by FFIs on whether to accept U S  persons as customers also depends on the overall risks and benefits of taking on individual U S  persons, shaped in part from risks in not meeting FATCA reporting requirements  Representatives of a banking association and an advocacy group told us that some FFIs decided to avoid doing business with U S  persons after they became concerned about potential penalties for failure to comply—either willfully or in error—with FATCA reporting requirements  One banking association added that such errors could affect other aspects of FFIs’ relationships with the U S  government, such as nonprosecution agreements made with the U S  Department of Justice  Officials from one consulting firm that helped FFIs meet FATCA reporting requirements added that FFIs’ determination of risk depends on many layers, such as the value of clients’ assets or the country in which clients reside or possess citizenship  After FATCA’s implementation, according to officials from the consulting firm, FFIs decided to turn away U S  persons in some cases because the benefits of doing business with U S  persons were less than the potential risks  For example, if a U S  person only maintained a payroll account, the FFI may determine it would not make enough money to account for risks in incorrectly identifying the status of the customer as a U S  or non-U S  person  However, focus group participants from two countries said that FFIs may agree to accept U S persons as customers if they have higher account balances that offset risks from FATCA reporting requirements  One focus group participant, for instance, said banks in his country will do business with a U S  person if he or she has more than $500,000 in assets  Additionally, U S  persons and tax practitioners we interviewed said that other factors such as language barriers and U S  regulations designed to prevent money laundering may also inhibit U S  persons’ access to brokerage accounts while overseas  Focus group participants and others we interviewed said that Form 8938 reporting requirements contributed to denials of employment and promotion opportunities for U S  persons living abroad  Treasury officials noted that requirements imposed by FATCA do not directly hinder U S  persons from gaining employment or promotion opportunities overseas  However, focus group participants, a consulting firm, and a foreign government agency noted that foreign-owned companies and nonprofit organizations such as churches did not want to hire or promote U S  persons because they wanted to avoid exposing information to the U S  government on their organizations’ accounts and client trust accounts where the U S  person would have signature authority  As noted above, a U S  person is generally required to report on the Form 8938 foreign financial accounts for which the person has signature authority if he or she has a financial interest in the account  Focus group participants and others noted that such requirements have adversely affected the ability of U S  persons to serve on a corporate board or in a nonprofit organization, or maintain business relationships  Treasury and Department of Commerce officials stationed in one country included in our review added that FATCA implementation has played a role in dissuading foreign-owned corporations in some Asian countries from considering U S  persons for corporate leadership positions such as directorships  This is in part because FATCA has triggered additional paperwork burden and operating costs for onboarding U S  employees since they have had to help them meet Form 8938 reporting requirements  Two advocacy groups representing U S  persons living abroad added that it is also harder for U S -based companies to justify relocating U S  persons overseas and paying for such relocations since they also have had to help their U S  employees meet Form 8938 reporting requirements in addition to meeting other tax filing requirements  U S  embassy documents indicate there was increased demand for Social Security Numbers (SSN) since FATCA’s passage in 2010, driven in part by U S  citizens applying for an SSN to gain access to foreign financial services or resolve outstanding U S  tax obligations before completing renunciation  However, officials from two organizations representing Americans living abroad cited significant challenges faced by some U S  persons living abroad in obtaining SSNs required to meet their U S  tax obligations or obtain financial services  U S  persons living abroad might not possess an SSN because their parents did not obtain one for them as a minor  Often, this may have been due to the parents leaving the United States when the child was young  State officials also said that U S  citizens applying for U S  passports while overseas frequently forget their SSNs or do not know if their parents ever applied for an SSN on their behalf  Officials from organizations representing U S  persons living abroad added that without an SSN, these persons are unable to claim refunds or other tax benefits when filing their tax returns, or participate in IRS programs to voluntarily disclose previously unreported tax liabilities and assets  Additionally, some might be unable to gain or maintain access to financial accounts or other assets in their countries of residence without an SSN  According to these officials and tax practitioners we interviewed, U S  persons living abroad face greater challenges in obtaining SSNs than those living in the United States  For instance, they faced difficulties obtaining documentation from the United States that the Social Security Administration (SSA) requires with SSN applications; traveling to Social Security offices and U S  embassies or consulates to certify documents or submit applications in person; and receiving valid SSNs from SSA in a timely manner to file tax returns or participate in offshore disclosure programs  SSA officials also identified several challenges U S  persons experience when applying for an SSN from abroad  For instance, SSA officials said that efforts to authenticate documents submitted with SSN applications can cause delays for U S  persons living abroad in obtaining an SSN  Additionally, SSN applicants living abroad face significantly longer wait times than applicants living in the United States once their applications are processed  According to SSA officials, after an application is processed, it can take 3 to 6 months–-depending on the country’s mail service–-for an individual to receive a Social Security Card  This is significantly longer than the 2-week period it takes SSN applicants to receive a card after mailing in their applications from within the United States  According to Department of State (State) data, the annual number of approvals of requests for renunciations of U S  citizenships increased nearly 178 percent during a 6-year period, from 1,601 in 2011—the year after FATCA was enacted—to 4,449 in 2016, the most recent year to which full data on renunciations were available  According to U S  embassy documents and information provided by focus group participants and interviewees across all the countries we examined, FATCA was the reason or a contributing factor in some of these decisions and the resulting increase in total renunciations  Specific effects of FATCA implementation contributing to decisions to renounce U S  citizenship included reduced access to foreign financial services and employment or promotion opportunities in a foreign-owned company—as identified above from our document reviews, focus groups, and interviews—and burdens in meeting FATCA reporting requirements  However, the extent to which FATCA implementation contributed to increased renunciations is unclear  State officials said that data are unavailable to determine the extent to which these renunciation decisions were the direct result of FATCA because State has no legal obligation to collect information on the motivation behind renunciation of citizenship  In response to concerns about the availability of foreign financial services, Treasury implemented regulations that allow certain low-risk local FFIs to be deemed compliant with FATCA, but only if the FFIs do not implement policies or practices that discriminate against opening or maintaining accounts for specified U S  persons  Treasury and State also previously established joint strategies to address these challenges  For instance, Treasury and State developed guidance on FATCA that was posted on embassy websites to educate U S  persons and others  Additionally, Treasury and State officials conducted outreach events and workshops through U S  embassies and American chambers of commerce worldwide to provide information on FATCA and other tax filing requirements, According to State officials, the U S  embassies in at least two countries—Switzerland and France—also worked with foreign officials and/or FFIs to increase access to financial services for U S  citizens residing in those countries  For instance, Treasury and State officials reached agreements with FFIs in Switzerland to provide a wider range of financial services to U S  persons  Similarly, in 2017, SSA and State implemented an interagency agreement to streamline processes for providing SSNs to U S  persons living abroad after FATCA’s implementation in 2010  SSA officials said they are also in discussions with State on improving SSA’s website to include more transparent, specific information for SSN overseas applicants about SSA documentation requirements  Tax practitioners, advocacy groups, and Treasury officials we interviewed said FFIs have become more willing to accept U S  persons as customers compared to when FATCA was enacted in 2010  However, U S  persons living abroad continue to face issues gaining access to foreign financial services  For example, in a September 2018 letter sent by the Chair of the Finance Committee of the Netherlands House of Representatives to a member of Congress, U S  citizens born outside the United States and who have never lived, studied, or worked in the United States are effectively being denied access to financial services in the Netherlands  Focus group participants added that some banks will reject U S  clients or charge heavy fees for them to open an account  Agencies have ongoing efforts to address FATCA-related issues, as listed below, but some are ad hoc, fragmented, or otherwise not part of a broader effort between Treasury and other agencies such as State or SSA to use ongoing collaborative mechanisms to monitor and share information on such issues, and jointly develop and implement steps to address them: Treasury officials said they are participating in discussions with FFIs to address residual issues with access to foreign financial services  However, they said they have not involved other agencies in these discussions  IRS officials, in response to concerns from the French government, said they are developing a program to help streamline foreign asset- related tax compliance requirements for a small group of U S  born citizens that have been French residents most of their lives without an SSN, and—according to State officials—did not wish to take the necessary steps to renounce their citizenship  However, no effort has been made to address these issues more broadly  State encouraged U S  citizens to alert the nearest U S  embassy of any practices they encounter with regard to the provision of financial services  State documents noted that some Americans have been turned away by banks or required to meet a higher deposit threshold in part because of FATCA reporting requirements  State documentation also noted that there have been cases of U S  citizens with existing bank accounts who have been asked to close them  However, State documentation we reviewed does not highlight collaborative efforts currently underway with Treasury or other agencies to address banking access issues U S  persons living abroad are presently encountering worldwide  As described above, SSA and State streamlined processes and policies for U S  persons abroad seeking to obtain SSNs  However, SSA officials said they have not been involved in any ongoing efforts involving Treasury to identify systemic issues and related solutions involving SSNs for the purposes of tax compliance and citizenship renunciations  Treasury officials said they spoke with SSA officials about problems U S  persons living abroad face in obtaining SSNs, but SSA believed that cycle times for processing SSN applications submitted by U S  persons living abroad were not significantly greater than for applications submitted by U S  persons living in the United States, although mailing times could vary significantly and take up to 3 to 6 months  We have previously identified key practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration, including defining and articulating a common outcome, establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, and developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results  One goal in IRS’s strategic plan is to collaborate with external partners proactively to improve tax administration, while objectives in SSA’s strategic plan include improving service delivery and expanding service delivery options  Additionally, according to State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs website, one of State’s key priorities is to protect the interests of U S  citizens overseas, such as through ensuring responsive and efficient provision of consular services overseas  As noted above, there are a host of ongoing issues and challenges for U S  persons living abroad from implementation of FATCA, such as loss of access to foreign financial services, denial of employment and promotion opportunities overseas, and difficulty obtaining SSNs from abroad  However, Treasury currently lacks a collaborative mechanism to coordinate efforts with other agencies to address these issues, and Treasury officials said they do not plan to establish them  Without effective collaborative mechanisms to monitor and share information and implement cross-agency solutions, future efforts to address such issues will continue to be fragmented and less effective than they otherwise could be  In enacting FATCA, Congress sought to reduce tax evasion by creating greater transparency and accountability over offshore assets held by U S  taxpayers  Because of FATCA, IRS receives information on foreign financial assets from hundreds of thousands of filers annually  IRS could use this information to help ensure taxpayers holding offshore assets report and pay taxes owed on income generated from such assets  However, to take full advantage of the information, IRS must address key challenges  Specifically, Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TIN) reported by FFIs are often inaccurate or incomplete, which makes it difficult for IRS to match information reported by FFIs to individual taxpayers  As such, IRS must develop a plan to mitigate the risks that these data issues pose to agency efforts to identify and combat taxpayer noncompliance  Lack of consistent, complete, and readily available Form 8938 and related parent individual tax return data also affects IRS’s compliance activities, making it more difficult for IRS business units to extract and analyze FATCA data to improve tax compliance efforts and reduce tax revenue loss from income generated from offshore assets  At the same time, IRS has stopped following its FATCA Compliance Roadmap it developed in 2016 because, according to IRS officials, IRS moved away from updating broad strategy documents to focus on individual compliance campaigns  However, in light of the challenges IRS continues to face in fully integrating FATCA information into its compliance programs, it will not maximize use of such information and effectively leverage individual compliance campaigns unless it employs a comprehensive plan that enables IRS to better leverage such campaigns to improve taxpayer compliance  Our analysis of available data indicates that many of the Forms 8938 filed in tax year 2016 may have been filed unnecessarily  Factors that are contributing to this unnecessary reporting are unclear  While IRS has provided instructions and guidance on its website for completing Form 8938, focus group participants and tax practitioners reported confusion on whether and how to report investments in foreign accounts  Taking steps to identify and address factors contributing to unnecessary Form 8938 reporting would help reduce taxpayer burden and reduce processing costs for IRS  Reporting requirements for foreign financial assets under FATCA overlap with reporting requirements under FBAR  These overlapping requirements—implemented under two different statutes—have resulted in most taxpayers filing Forms 8938 also filing FBARs with FinCEN  Duplicative filings on foreign financial assets cause confusion, frustration, and compliance burdens for taxpayers  Duplicative filings also increased costs to the government to process and store the same or similar information  Modifying the statutes governing the requirements can fully address the issues outlined above, and can allow for the use of FATCA information for prevention and detection of financial crimes  This is similar to other statutory allowances for IRS to disclose return information for other purposes, such as for determining Social Security income tax withholding  Lastly, FATCA has created challenges for some U S  persons living abroad that go beyond increasing their tax compliance burdens  Some U S  persons living abroad are still facing issues accessing financial services and employment and obtaining SSNs  Treasury, State, and SSA have taken some steps to address these issues both separately and in coordination with each other  However, Treasury, as the agency ultimately responsible for effective administration of FATCA, currently lacks a collaborative mechanism with State and SSA to address ongoing issues  Establishing a formal means to collaboratively address burdens faced by Americans abroad from FATCA can help agencies develop effective solutions to mitigate such burdens  We are making the following matter for congressional consideration: Congress should consider amending the Internal Revenue Code, Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, and other statutes, as needed, to address overlap in foreign financial asset reporting requirements for the purposes of tax compliance and detection, and prevention of financial crimes, such as by aligning the types of assets to be reported and asset reporting thresholds, and ensuring appropriate access to the reported information  We are making the following four recommendations to IRS: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should develop a plan to mitigate risks with compliance activities due to the lack of accurate and complete TINs of U S  account holders collected from FFIs  (Recommendation 1) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should ensure that appropriate business units conducting compliance enforcement and research have access to consistent and complete data collected from individuals’ electronic and paper filings of Form 8938 and elements of parent individual tax returns  As part of this effort, the Commissioner should ensure that IRS provides clear guidance to the business units for accessing such data in IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse  (Recommendation 2) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should employ a comprehensive plan for managing efforts to leverage FATCA data in agency compliance efforts  The plan should document and track activities over time to ensure individuals and FFIs comply with FATCA reporting assess and mitigate data quality risks from FFIs; improve the quality, management, and accessibility of FATCA data for compliance, research, and other purposes; and establish, monitor, and evaluate compliance efforts involving FATCA data intended to improve voluntary compliance and address noncompliance with FATCA reporting requirements  (Recommendation 3) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should assess factors contributing to unnecessary Form 8938 reporting and take steps, as appropriate, to address the issue  Depending on the results of the assessment, potential options may include: identifying and implementing steps to further clarify IRS Form 8938 instructions and related guidance on IRS’s website on determining what foreign financial assets to report, and how to calculate and report asset values subject to reporting thresholds; and conducting additional outreach to educate taxpayers on required reporting thresholds, including notifying taxpayers that may have unnecessarily filed an IRS Form 8938 to reduce such filings  (Recommendation 4) We are also making the following recommendation to Treasury: The Secretary of the Treasury should lead efforts, in coordination with the Secretary of State and Commissioner of Social Security, to establish a formal means to collaboratively address ongoing issues— including issues accessing financial services and employment and obtaining SSNs—that U S  persons living abroad encounter from implementation of FATCA reporting requirements  (Recommendation 5) We are also making the following recommendation to State: The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and Commissioner of Social Security, should establish a formal means to collaboratively address ongoing issues—including issues accessing financial services and employment and obtaining SSNs—that U S  persons living abroad encounter from implementation of FATCA reporting requirements  (Recommendation 6) We are also making the following recommendation to SSA: The Commissioner of Social Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of State and Treasury, should establish a formal means to collaboratively address ongoing issues—including issues accessing financial services and employment and obtaining SSNs—that U S  persons living abroad encounter from implementation of FATCA reporting requirements  (Recommendation 7) We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Acting Commissioner of Social Security  IRS provided written comments that are summarized below and reprinted in appendix VI  IRS did not state whether it agreed or disagreed with our four recommendations but otherwise provided responses  Regarding our recommendation to develop a plan to mitigate risks with compliance activities due to the lack of accurate and complete TINs of U S  account holders collected from FFIs (recommendation 1), IRS reiterated that it provided a transition period, through the end of 2019, for compliance with the TIN requirements for FFIs in countries with Model 1 IGAs with the United States  IRS also said that it continued to make progress on improving FATCA filing compliance, citing efforts such as initiating a campaign addressing FFIs that do not meet their compliance responsibilities  While these efforts may help IRS obtain more accurate and complete information from financial accounts, IRS did not specify how it will mitigate the ongoing hurdles it faces in matching accounts reported by FFIs without valid TINs to accounts reported by individual tax filers and ensure compliance  Regarding our recommendation that appropriate business units have access to consistent and complete data collected from Forms 8938 and tax returns filed by individuals (recommendation 2), IRS reiterated that RAAS has been working to obtain read-only access to the IPM database but that limited budgetary resources are delaying implementation  Enabling access to consistent and complete Form 8938 and tax return data would help IRS better target compliance initiatives and leverage limited available enforcement resources  While IRS continues to work on enabling access to IPM, it could still provide clear guidance to its business units for accessing Form 8938 and tax return data in IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse, as we recommended  Regarding our recommendation to employ a comprehensive plan for managing efforts to leverage FATCA data in agency compliance efforts (recommendation 3), IRS said the resources that would be required to develop a comprehensive plan would be better spent on enforcement activities  While implementing enforcement activities could increase compliance with FATCA reporting requirements, it risks not maximizing the value of such efforts without a comprehensive plan to manage and address the myriad of challenges discussed in this report  Further, it is our belief that IRS’s failure to execute the FATCA roadmap is not justification for abandoning a strategic approach going forward  Regarding our recommendation to assess factors contributing to unnecessary Form 8938 reporting and take appropriate steps to address the issue (recommendation 4), IRS said it will continue to observe filings of Form 8938 and, to the extent that there are unnecessary filings, assess options to inform account holders to reduce reporting and filing burdens followed by appropriate steps to implement any selected options  Our analysis of available data indicates that many Forms 8938 may have been filed unnecessarily  Implementing our recommendation reduces the risk that taxpayers file—and IRS processes—forms unnecessarily  Treasury provided written comments but did not state whether it agreed or disagreed with our recommendation that it lead efforts, in coordination with State and SSA, to establish a formal means to collaboratively address ongoing issues that U S  persons living abroad encounter from implementation of FATCA reporting requirements (recommendation 5)  Treasury said it will work collaboratively with State and SSA to answer questions that Americans abroad have regarding their tax obligations and, where appropriate, to direct U S  citizens to resources that will help them understand the procedures applied by SSA to apply for an SSN  However, Treasury said it is not the appropriate agency to lead coordination efforts involving foreign employment issues and issues regarding access to foreign financial services and obtaining SSNs  As we noted above, Treasury is ultimately responsible for effective administration of FATCA  As such, it is in a better position than State or SSA to adjust regulations and guidance implementing FATCA to address burdens FFIs and foreign employers face from FATCA implementation while ensuring tax compliance  Additionally, Treasury has an interest in helping U S  persons receive valid SSNs from SSA in a timely manner to meet their tax obligations  Treasury’s written response is reprinted in appendix VII  State and SSA also provided written comments in which they concurred with our recommendations to establish a formal means to address collaboratively together with Treasury ongoing issues that U S  persons living abroad encounter with FATCA (recommendations 6 and 7)  State and SSA’s written comments are reprinted in appendices VIII and IX, respectively  Treasury, State, and SSA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9110 or mctiguej@gao gov  Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs are on the last page of this report  GAO staff who contributed to this report are listed in appendix X  The objectives of this report are to (1) assess the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) efforts to use information collected under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) to improve taxpayer compliance; (2) examine available foreign financial asset reports submitted by U S  persons, including submissions that were below required filing thresholds; (3) examine the extent to which the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) administers overlapping reporting requirements on foreign financial assets; (4) describe similarities and differences between FATCA and Common Reporting Standard (CRS) reporting requirements; and (5) examine the effects of FATCA implementation that are unique to U S  persons living abroad  For our first objective, we reviewed Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration reports and collected information from Treasury and IRS to summarize efforts to collect complete and valid Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TIN) from foreign financial institutions (FFI)  We identified criteria from our prior work identifying key practices for risk management  The key practices are derived from the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Development and Office of Management and Budget guidance  We applied these criteria to assess steps IRS has taken to manage risks in not receiving complete and valid TIN information from FFIs  We also applied criteria from our prior work on use of documented frameworks to IRS documentation on FATCA compliance activities to determine the extent to which IRS implemented a comprehensive plan to maximize use of collected data to enforce compliance with FATCA  For our second objective, we identified total maximum account values reported by individual filers of Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Form 114s (commonly known as the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, or FBAR) in calendar years 2015 and 2016  See appendix III for more details on our methodology to evaluate these data  We also summarized the numbers of IRS Forms 8938, Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets (Form 8938) filed in tax year 2016, accounting for the data limitations described below  We also identified Forms 8938 filed in tax year 2016—the most recent year for which data were available—with available residency and asset information that reported specified foreign financial assets with aggregate values at or below end-of-year tax thresholds, which vary depending on the location of residence and filing status of such filers  For our third objective, we reviewed IRS and FinCEN documentation, and applied criteria from Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication: An Evaluation and Management Guide to identify the extent to which IRS and FinCEN were engaged in overlapping activities, and collecting duplicative information on foreign financial assets held by U S  persons  We assessed the extent to which individual filers who submitted a Form 8938 in 2015 and 2016 also submitted an FBAR for the same year by determining the number and percentage of Forms 8938 with TINs that also match the TIN listed on the corresponding FBAR for the same year  For the three objectives described above, we assessed the reliability of data submitted on Forms 8938 filed by individuals for tax years 2015 and 2016, the most recent data available  These data were extracted from IRS’s Individual Return Transaction File (IRTF) and Modernized Tax Return Database (MTRDB) through IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse (CDW)  We also assessed the reliability of data from FBARs for calendar years 2015 and 2016 by (1) reviewing documentation about the data and the systems that produced them; (2) conducting electronic tests, such as identifying data with significant numbers of missing Form 8938 or FBAR records, or values of foreign financial assets reported outside an expected range; (3) tracing selections or random samples of data to source documents; and (4) interviewing IRS and FinCEN officials knowledgeable about the data  We also reviewed Form 8938 and relevant parent tax return data stored in IRS databases to determine whether IRS management is using quality information collected from Forms 8938 to achieve its objectives, as defined in our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  We determined that data extracted from IRTF on characteristics of Form 8938 filers and from FBAR filings was sufficiently reliable for our purposes, subject to caveats identified in this report  However, we determined we could not obtain complete data on foreign financial assets reported on Forms 8938 filed on paper  For our fourth objective, we reviewed model international agreements and other documentation, and interviewed officials from Treasury, IRS, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to compare and contrast FATCA and CRS reporting requirements  We also used the collected information to identify what changes, if any, the United States and other countries could implement to align FATCA and CRS reporting requirements  For our fifth objective, we collected documentation and conducted focus groups and semi-structured interviews with 21 U S  persons living abroad that were subject to FATCA reporting requirements  We also conducted focus groups and interviews with tax practitioners, banking and CPA organizations, government agencies, advocacy groups representing Americans living abroad, and other organizations from the United States and five other countries (Canada, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom)  We selected these countries based on geography, relatively high numbers of U S  expatriates and Form 8938 filers, tax information sharing agreements, and other tax treaties with the United States  The findings from the focus groups and interviews are not generalizable to other U S  persons, tax practitioners or organizations, but were selected to represent the viewpoints of U S  persons, FFIs, and host country tax authorities required to transmit information on foreign accounts and other specified foreign financial assets to IRS  We conducted a thematic analysis of the focus groups and interviews, and reviewed cables from U S  embassies to identify the unique effects of FATCA implementation on U S  persons living abroad  We collected documentation from and interviewed Treasury, IRS, Department of State, and Social Security Administration officials on steps to monitor and mitigate such effects  We also identified criteria from our prior work on key practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration and mechanisms to facilitate coordination  We applied the criteria to agencies’ collaborative efforts addressing issues U S  persons living abroad faced from FATCA’s implementation, and identified the extent to which agencies established effective collaborative mechanisms to identify, assess, and implement cross-agency solutions to such issues  We conducted this performance audit from August 2017 to April 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  The following IRS databases store data collected from individuals’ electronic and paper filings of Forms 8938 and/or elements of individual parent tax returns—the filer’s address and filing status—used to determine specified reporting thresholds for Form 8938 filers: Individual Master File (IMF), which serves as IRS’s system for processing individual taxpayer account data  Using this system, accounts are updated, taxes are assessed, and refunds are generated as required during each tax-filing period  Individual Returns Transaction File (IRTF), which stores edited, transcribed, and error-corrected data from the Form 1040 series and related forms for the current processing year and two prior years  Modernized Tax Return Database (MTRDB), which serves as the official repository of all electronic returns processed through IRS’s Modernized e-File system  Tax return data is stored immediately after returns are processed  International Compliance Management Model (ICMM)-FATCA International Returns (ICMM-FIR), which collects, parses, and stores data from incoming form reports–such as Forms 8938 and 8966–into the FATCA Database (FDB), which serves as the repository where ICMM-FIR stores data and from which downstream applications can pull data  Integrated Production Model (IPM), which is a downstream data repository that houses IMF data, information returns, and other data  According to IRS officials, data from IPM are consolidated and made available to a variety of downstream, security certified, systems for use in conducive analysis, case selection, and report preparation  Additionally, data from these and other IRS databases are copied to IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse (CDW) periodically, which captures data from multiple production systems and organizes the data in a way that is conductive to analysis  Table 6 highlights several problems with the consistency and completeness of Form 8938 and relevant parent tax return data stored across the listed databases  Inconsistent and incomplete data on address and filing status of Form 8938 filers: As noted above, elements of parent tax returns— specifically the filer’s country of residence and filing status—are used to determine specified reporting thresholds for Form 8938 filers  However, IRTF and MTRDB have inconsistent and incomplete data on addresses linked to Form 8938 filers, and report inconsistent numbers of Forms 8938 filed from a U S  residence  For example, the variable identified as containing data on foreign countries of residence in IRTF shows approximately 8,100 foreign filers in tax years 2015 and 2016, whereas a similar variable in MTRDB shows approximately 89,000 foreign filers for those same years  Additionally, FDB does not contain country codes from paper filings of Form 8938  ICCM-FIR stores information from some elements from parent tax returns—such as TINs and document locator numbers  According to IRS officials, however, ICMM-FIR lacks data on country codes and filing status of Form 8938 filers  IRS officials said that ICMM-FIR was not designed or intended to store data on Form 8938 filers; rather, it was designed to be a database for use in comparing Form 8938 and 8966 data  In general, IRS officials indicated that they would like to adjust the way ICMM-FIR stores data, but that would require modifying the way the database was established  Incomplete data on assets reported on Forms 8938: MTRDB contains detailed information on specified foreign financial assets submitted on electronic filings of Form 8938 and the country code from which the Form 8938 was filed  IRS officials said it is not designed to store information submitted on paper filings of Forms 8938 and parent tax returns  IRS officials said that while IMF processes information transcribed from individual income tax returns, there is no requirement to cross-reference information from the tax return with information submitted with an accompanying Form 8938  Additionally, while IRS officials told us that IRTF is the authoritative source for filers of Form 8938, it does not store account and other asset information submitted from Forms 8938  When asked whether there is any move to store account and other asset information collected from Forms 8938 into IRTF, IRS officials said that the decision on what returns or portions of returns are transcribed are subject to resource constraints and are prioritized from year to year  Table 7 shows that more than 900,000 individuals filed Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Form 114s (commonly known as the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, or FBAR) in calendar years 2015 and 2016, and declared total maximum values of accounts ranging from about $1 5 trillion to more than $2 trillion each year  We are providing a range of estimates because we found a large number of filings made potentially in error  In some cases, for instance, FBAR filers reported more than $100 trillion in foreign financial accounts  We assume many of these filings are likely made in error, but have only limited means to determine which filings have errors, and which filings have accurate information  Because we cannot independently verify the accuracy of all self-reported FBAR data, we decided to present a range of data with (1) a lower bound discarding all FBAR filings reporting total values of reported foreign financial accounts at or above $1 billion; and (2) an upper bound discarding all filings reporting total values of such accounts at or above $5 billion  Table 2 excludes amended and duplicated FBAR filings  This table also excludes FBAR filings that reported a financial interest in 25 or more financial accounts, but reported total maximum account values of $0 from parts II and III of the FBAR  Although we identified problems with the data, we determined they were reliable enough to provide an estimated range of asset values to report the scale of foreign financial accounts held by U S  persons  Table 8 shows a detailed breakdown of 2015 and 2016 FBAR filings by residence and categories of total maximum account values reported on the FBARs  Appendix IV: Detailed Comparison of Individual Foreign Financial Asset Reporting Requirements 26 U S C  § 6038D; 26 C F R  §§ 1 6038D-1 to 1 6038D-8  26 C F R  § 1 6038D-2  Filers in this category include those who identify as single, married filing separately, “head of household,” or “qualifying widow(er) ” Includes maximum value of specified foreign financial assets (Form 8938) or maximum value of financial accounts maintained by a financial institution physically located in a foreign country (FBAR)  Under FATCA, any income, gains, losses, deductions, credits, gross proceeds, or distributions from holding or disposing of the account are or would be required to be reported, included, or otherwise reflected on a person’s income tax return  Under FBAR reporting requirements, a person has signature or other authority if he or she has the authority (alone or in conjunction with another) to control the disposition of money, funds or other assets held in a financial account by direct communication (whether in writing or otherwise) to the person with whom the financial account is maintained  The account itself is subject to reporting, but the contents of the account do not have to be separately reported  In addition to the contact named above, Brian James (Assistant Director), Mark Ryan (Analyst-in-Charge), Ariana Graham, George Guttman, Krista Loose, Daniel Mahoney, Cynthia Saunders, A J  Stephens, and Elwood White made key contributions to this report  Michael John Bechetti, Ted Burik, and Jacqueline Chapin also provided assistance 
Report 2:  NASA’s telescope and other science projects will always have inherent technical, design, and integration risks because they are complex, specialized, and often push the state of the art in space technology  But too often, our reports find that management and oversight problems—which can include poor planning, optimistic cost estimating, funding gaps, lax oversight, and poor contractor performance, among other issues—are the real drivers behind cost and schedule growth  To its credit, NASA has taken significant steps, partly in response to our past recommendations, to reduce acquisition risk from both a technical and management standpoint, including actions to enhance cost and schedule estimating, provide adequate levels of reserves to projects, establish better processes and metrics to monitor projects, and expand the use of earned value management to better monitor contractor performance  For example, in November 2012, we found that NASA employee skill sets available to analyze and implement earned value management vary widely from center to center, and we recommended that NASA conduct an earned value management skills gap analysis to identify areas requiring augmented capability across the agency, and, based on the results of the assessment, develop a workforce training plan to address any deficiencies  NASA concurred with this recommendation and developed an earned value management training plan in 2014 based on the results of an earned value management skills gap analysis that was conducted in 2013  Moreover, in recent years, we have found that many of the projects within the agency’s major project portfolio have improved their cost and schedule performance  Nevertheless, the extent to which NASA has adopted some of the following lessons learned within its portfolio of major projects is mixed, and NASA has an opportunity to strengthen its program management of major acquisitions, including its space telescopes, by doing so  Manage Cost and Schedule Performance for Large Projects to Limit Implications for Entire Portfolio  In 2013, following JWST’s cost increases and schedule growth, we found that though cost and schedule growth can occur on any project, increases associated with NASA’s most costly and complex missions can have cascading effects on the rest of the portfolio  For example, we found that the JWST cost growth would have reverberating effects on the portfolio for years to come and required the agency to identify $1 4 billion in additional resources over fiscal years 2012 through 2017, according to Science Mission Directorate officials  NASA identified approximately half of this required funding from the four science divisions within the Science Mission Directorate account  The majority of the cuts were related to future high priority missions, missions in the operations and sustainment phase, and research and analysis  In essence, NASA had to mortgage future high priority missions and research to address JWST’s additional resource needs  Similarly, the National Academy of Sciences has concluded in the past that it is important for NASA to have a clearly articulated and consistently applied method for prioritizing why and how its scarce fiscal resources are apportioned with respect to the science program in general and on a more granular level among component scientific disciplines  The academy noted that failure to do so could result in a loss of capacity, capability, and human resources in a number of scientific disciplines and technological areas that may take a generation or more to reconstitute once eliminated  NASA’s establishment of the WFIRST Independent External Technical/Management/Cost Review that I previously discussed is a step in the right direction to help ensure the Astrophysics Division incorporates this lesson learned  Establish Adequate Cost and Schedule Reserves to Address Risks  Twice in the history of the JWST program, independent reviewers found that the program’s planned cost reserves were inadequate  First, in April 2006, an Independent Review Team confirmed that the project’s technical content was complete and sound, but expressed concern over the project’s reserve funding, reporting that it was too low and phased in too late in the development lifecycle  The review team reported that for a project as complex as JWST, 25 to 30 percent total reserve funding was appropriate  The team cautioned that low reserve funding compromised the project’s ability to resolve issues, address risk areas, and accommodate unknown problems  As I previously mentioned, following additional cost increases and schedule threats, NASA commissioned the Independent Comprehensive Review Panel  In 2010, the panel again concluded JWST was executing well from a technical standpoint, but that the baseline cost estimate did not reflect the most probable cost with adequate reserves in each year of project execution, resulting in an unexecutable project  NASA heeded these lessons when it established a new baseline for JWST in 2011  For example, the revised schedule included more reserves than required by the procedural requirements issued by the NASA center responsible for managing JWST  We have found, however, that NASA has not applied this lesson learned to all of its large projects— most notably with its human spaceflight projects, including the Space Launch System, Orion Crew Capsule, and associated ground systems— and similar outcomes to the JWST project have started to emerge with these projects  We previously reported that all three of these programs were operating with limited cost reserves, which limited each program’s ability to address risks and unforeseen technical challenges  For example, we found in July 2016 that the Orion program planned to maintain very low levels of annual cost reserves until 2018  The lack of available cost reserves in the near term led to the program deferring work to address technical issues to stay within budget, and put the program’s future cost reserves at risk of being overwhelmed by deferred work  In April 2017, we also found that all three programs faced development challenges in completing work, and each had little to no schedule reserve remaining to the launch date—meaning they would have to complete all remaining work with minimal delay during the most challenging stage of development  We found that it was unlikely that the programs would achieve the planned launch readiness date and recommended that NASA reassess the date  NASA agreed with this recommendation and stated that it would establish a new launch readiness date  In November 2017, NASA announced that a review of the possible manufacturing and production schedule risks indicated a launch date of June 2020—a delay of 19 months—but the agency will manage to a December 2019 launch date because, according to NASA, they have put in mitigation strategies for those risks  We will follow-up on those mitigation strategies as part of future work on the human space exploration programs  Regularly and Consistently Update Project JCLs to Provide Realistic Estimates to Decision Makers  In 2009, NASA began requiring that programs and projects with estimated life-cycle costs greater than $250 million develop a JCL prior to project confirmation  This was a positive step for NASA to help ensure that cost and schedule estimates are realistic and projects are thoroughly planning for anticipated risks  This is because a JCL assigns a confidence level, or likelihood, of a project meeting its cost and schedule estimates  Our cost estimating best practices recommend that cost estimates should be updated to reflect changes to a program or be kept current as a program moves through milestones  As new risks emerge on a project, an updated cost and schedule risk analysis can provide realistic estimates to decision-makers, including the Congress  This is especially true for NASA’s largest projects as updated estimates may require the Congress to consider a variety of actions  However, there is no requirement for NASA projects to update their JCLs, and our prior work has found that projects—including JWST—do not regularly update cost risk analyses to take into account newly emerged risks  Our ongoing work indicates that of the 16 major projects currently in NASA’s portfolio that have developed JCL estimates, only 2 have reported updating their JCLs (other than required due to a rebaseline)  For example, the Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy, and Heat Transport Project (InSight), a Mars lander, updated its JCL after the project missed its committed launch date  As a result, the project was able to provide additional information to decision makers about the probability that it will meet its revised cost and schedule estimates  As a project reaches the later stages of development, especially integration and testing, the types of risks the project will face may change  An updated project JCL would provide both project and agency management with data on relevant risks that can guide the project decisions  For example, in December 2012, we recommended the JWST project update its JCL  NASA concurred with this recommendation; however, we recently closed the recommendation because NASA had not taken steps to implement it and the amount of time remaining before launch would not have allowed the benefit of implementing the recommendation to be realized  An updated JCL may have portended the current schedule delays, which could have been proactively addressed by the project  Enhance Oversight of Contractors to Improve Project Outcomes  In December 2012, we found that the JWST project had taken steps to enhance communications with and oversight of its contractors  According to project officials, the increased communication allowed them to better identify and manage project risks by having more visibility into contractors’ activities  The project reported that a great deal of communication existed across the project prior to the Independent Comprehensive Review Panel; however, additional improvements were made  For example, the project increased its presence at contractor facilities as necessary to provide assistance; this included assigning two engineers on a recurring basis at a Lockheed Martin facility to assist in solving problems with an instrument  The JWST project also assumed full responsibility for the mission system engineering functions from Northrop Grumman in March 2011  NASA and Northrop Grumman officials both said that NASA is better suited to perform these tasks  We continue to see instances in our ongoing work that highlight the importance of implementing this lesson learned from JWST  For example, we found in 2017 that the Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment project—a project that plans to develop and deliver a new ground system for one Space Network site that provides essential communications tracking services to NASA and non-NASA missions—exceeded its original cost baseline by at least $401 7 million and been delayed by 27 months  The project has attributed some of the cost overruns and schedule delays to the contractor’s incomplete understanding of its requirements, which led to poor contractor plans and late design changes  The project also took steps to assign a new NASA project manager, increase physical presence at the contractor facility, and have more staff focused on validation and verification activities  In summary, NASA continues to make progress developing its space telescopes to help understand the universe and our place in it  But much like other major projects that NASA is developing, there continues to be an opportunity for NASA to learn from JWST and other projects that have suffered from cost overruns and schedule delays  Key project management tools and prior GAO recommendations that I have highlighted here today, could help to better position these large, complex, and technically challenging efforts for a successful outcome  We look forward to continuing to work with NASA and this subcommittee in addressing these issues  Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Bera, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time  If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Cristina T  Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this statement include Molly Traci, Assistant Director; Richard Cederholm, Assistant Director; Carrie Rogers; Lisa Fisher; Laura Greifner; Erin Kennedy; and Jose Ramos  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 

ground_truth: Concerns over efforts by U.S. taxpayers to use offshore accounts to hide income or evade taxes contributed to the passage of FATCA in 2010, which sought to create greater transparency and accountability over offshore assets held by U.S. taxpayers. House Report 114-624 included a provision for GAO to evaluate FATCA implementation and determine the effects of FATCA on U.S. citizens living abroad. GAO—among other things—(1) assessed IRS's efforts to use FATCA-related information to improve taxpayer compliance; (2) examined the extent to which Treasury administers overlapping reporting requirements on financial assets held overseas; and (3) examined the effects of FATCA implementation unique to U.S. persons living abroad. GAO reviewed applicable documentation; analyzed tax data; and interviewed officials from IRS, other federal agencies and organizations, selected tax practitioners, and more than 20 U.S. persons living overseas. Data quality and management issues have limited the effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to improve taxpayer compliance using foreign financial asset data collected under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Specifically, IRS has had difficulties matching the information reported by foreign financial institutions (FFI) with U.S. taxpayers' tax filings due to missing or inaccurate Taxpayer Identification Numbers provided by FFIs. Further, IRS lacks access to consistent and complete data on foreign financial assets and other data reported in tax filings by U.S. persons, in part, because some IRS databases do not store foreign asset data reported from paper filings. IRS has also stopped pursuing a comprehensive plan to leverage FATCA data to improve taxpayer compliance because, according to IRS officials, IRS moved away from updating broad strategy documents to focus on individual compliance campaigns. Ensuring access to consistent and complete data collected from U.S. persons—and employing a plan to leverage such data—would help IRS better leverage such campaigns and increase taxpayer compliance. Due to overlapping statutory reporting requirements, IRS and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—both within the Department of the Treasury (Treasury)—collect duplicative foreign financial account and other asset information from U.S. persons. Consequently, in tax years 2015 and 2016, close to 75 percent of U.S. persons who reported information on foreign accounts and other assets on their tax returns also filed a separate form with FinCEN. The overlapping requirements increase the compliance burden on U.S. persons and add complexity that can create confusion, potentially resulting in inaccurate or unnecessary reporting. Modifying the statutes governing the requirements to allow for the sharing of FATCA information for the prevention and detection of financial crimes would eliminate the need for duplicative reporting. This is similar to other statutory allowances for IRS to disclose return information for other purposes, such as for determining Social Security income tax withholding. According to documents GAO reviewed, and focus groups and interviews GAO conducted, FFIs closed some U.S. persons' existing accounts or denied them opportunities to open new accounts after FATCA was enacted due to increased costs, and risks they pose under FATCA reporting requirements. According to Department of State (State) data, annual approvals of renunciations of U.S. citizenship increased from 1,601 to 4,449—or nearly 178 percent—from 2011 through 2016, attributable in part to the difficulties cited above. Treasury previously established joint strategies with State to address challenges U.S. persons faced in accessing foreign financial services. However, it lacks a collaborative mechanism to coordinate efforts with other agencies to address ongoing challenges in accessing such services or obtaining Social Security Numbers. Implementation of a formal means to collaboratively address burdens faced by Americans abroad from FATCA can help federal agencies develop more effective solutions to mitigate such burdens by monitoring and sharing information on such issues, and jointly developing and implementing steps to address them. GAO is making one matter for congressional consideration to address overlap in foreign asset reporting requirements. GAO is making seven recommendations to IRS and other agencies to enhance IRS's ability to leverage FATCA data to enforce compliance, address unnecessary reporting, and better collaborate to mitigate burdens on U.S. persons living abroad. State and Social Security Administration agreed with GAO's recommendations. Treasury and IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations.