prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress  For most of the 19 th century, U S  law included language explicitly assigning the Secretary of the Navy the task of naming new Navy ships  The reference to the Secretary of the Navy disappeared from the U S  Code in 1925  The code today (10 U S C  §8662) is silent on the issue of who has the authority to name new Navy ships, but the Secretary of the Navy arguably retains implicit authority, given the location of Section 8662 in subtitle C of Title 10, which covers the Navy and Marine Corps  In discussing its name-selection process, the Naval History and Heritage Command—the Navy's in-house office of professional historians—cites the above-mentioned laws and states the following: As with many other things, the procedures and practices involved in Navy ship naming are as much, if not more, products of evolution and tradition than of legislation  As we have seen, the names for new ships are personally decided by the Secretary of the Navy  The Secretary can rely on many sources to help him reach his decisions  Each year, the Navy History and Heritage Command (NHHC) compiles primary and alternate ship name recommendations and forwards these to the Chief of Naval Operations by way of the chain of command  These recommendations are the result of research into the history of the Navy and by suggestions submitted by service members, Navy veterans, and the public  Ship name source records at NHHC reflect the wide variety of name sources that have been used in the past, particularly since World War I  Ship name recommendations are conditioned by such factors as the name categories for ship types now being built, as approved by the Secretary of the Navy; the distribution of geographic names of ships of the fleet; names borne by previous ships that distinguished themselves in service; names recommended by individuals and groups; and names of naval leaders, national figures, and deceased members of the Navy and Marine Corps who have been honored for heroism in war or for extraordinary achievement in peace  In its final form, after consideration at the various levels of command, the Chief of Naval Operations signs the memorandum recommending names for the current year's building program and sends it to the Secretary of the Navy  The Secretary considers these nominations, along with others he receives, as well as his own thoughts in this matter  At appropriate times, he selects names for specific ships and announces them  While there is no set time for assigning a name, it is customarily done before the ship is christened  The ship's sponsor─the person who will christen the ship─is also selected and invited by the Secretary  In the case of ships named for individuals, an effort is made to identify the eldest living direct female descendant of that individual to perform the role of ship's sponsor  For ships with other name sources, it is customary to honor the wives of senior naval officers or public officials  A July 2012 Navy report to Congress on the Navy's policies and practices for naming ships (see next section) states the following: Once a type/class naming convention [i e , a general rule or guideline for how ships of a certain type or class are to be named] is established, Secretaries can rely on many sources to help in the final selection of a ship name  For example, sitting Secretaries can solicit ideas and recommendations from either the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) or the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), or both  They can also task the Naval Heritage and History Command to compile primary and alternate ship name recommendations that are the result of research into the history of the Navy's battle force or particular ship names  Secretaries also routinely receive formal suggestions for ship names from concerned citizens, active and retired service members, or members of Congress  Finally, Congress can enact provisions in Public Law that express the sense of the entire body about new ship naming conventions or specific ship names  Regardless of the origin of the recommendations, however, the final selection of a ship's name is the Secretary's to make, informed and guided by his own thoughts, counsel, and preferences  At the appropriate time—normally sometime after the ship has been either authorized or appropriated by Congress and before its keel laying or christening—the Secretary records his decision with a formal naming announcement  On July 13, 2012, the Navy submitted to Congress a 73-page report on the Navy's policies and practices for naming ships  The report was submitted in response to Section 1014 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  1540 / P L  112-81 of December 31, 2011)  The executive summary of the Navy's report is reprinted here as Appendix A   Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time  Attack submarines, for example, were once named for fish, then later for cities, and most recently for states, while cruisers were once named for cities, then later for states, and most recently for battles  State names, to cite another example, were given to battleships, then later to nuclear-powered cruisers and ballistic missile submarines, and are now being given to attack submarines  The Naval History and Heritage Command states the following: "How will the Navy name its ships in the future? It seems safe to say that the evolutionary process of the past will continue; as the fleet itself changes, so will the names given to its ships  It seems equally safe, however, to say that future decisions in this area will continue to demonstrate regard for the rich history and valued traditions of the United States Navy " The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states that "US Navy ship-naming policies, practices, and 'traditions' are not fixed; they evolve constantly over time " The report also states that "Just as [ship] type naming conventions change over time to accommodate technological change as well as choices made by Secretaries, they also change over time as every Secretary makes their own interpretation of the original naming convention " There have been numerous exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else  The July 2012 report to Congress cites exceptions to ship naming rules dating back to the earliest days of the republic, and states that "a Secretary's discretion to make exceptions to ship-naming conventions is one of the Navy's oldest ship-naming traditions " The report argues that exceptions made for the purpose of naming ships for Presidents or Members of Congress have occurred frequently enough that, rather than being exceptions, they constitute a "special cross-type naming convention" for Presidents and Members of Congress  This CRS report continues to note, as exceptions to basic class naming rules, instances where ships other than aircraft carriers have been named for Presidents or Members of Congress  Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships  Such observers might cite, for example, the three-ship Seawolf (SSN-21) class of attack submarines— Seawolf (SSN-21), Connecticut (SSN-22), and Jimmy Carter (SSN-23)—which were named for a fish, a state, and a President, respectively, reflecting no apparent class naming rule  The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states the following: "Current ship naming policies and practices fall well within the historic spectrum of policies and practices for naming vessels of the Navy, and are altogether consistent with ship naming customs and traditions " For ship types now being procured for the Navy, or recently procured for the Navy, naming rules (and exceptions thereto) are summarized below  The July 2012 Navy report to Congress discusses current naming rules (and exceptions thereto) at length  On December 14, 2016, the Navy named the first of its 12 planned next-generation ballistic missile submarines Columbia (SSBN-826), in honor of the District of Columbia  The 12 planned boats are consequently now referred to as Columbia -class or SSBN-826 class boats  The Navy has not stated what the naming rule for these ships will be  Given the selection of Columbia as the name of the lead ship, possibilities for the naming rule include (but are not necessarily limited to) cities, capital cities, or states and federal districts and territories  It is also possible that the name Columbia will turn out to be an exception to the naming rule for the class  The current USS Columbia (SSN-771)—a Los Angeles (SSN-688) class attack submarine that was named for Columbia, SC; Columbia, IL; and Columbia, MO —entered service in 1995 and will reach the end of its 33-year expected service life in 2028, at about the time that construction of SSBN-826 is scheduled to be completed  If the service life of SSN-771 is extended for several years, it would remain in service after the commissioning of SSBN-826  This would create an issue to be resolved, since 10 U S C  §8662(a) states, "Not more than one vessel of the Navy may have the same name " One possible step for resolving such an issue would be to change the name of SSBN-826 to something else, such as District of Columbia —a step that could be viewed as somewhat similar to the below-discussed instance in which the name of the Los Angles-class submarine SSN-705 was changed from Corpus Christi to City of Corpus Christi (see " Congressional Responses to Announced Navy Ship-Naming Decisions " below)  Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states  An exception occurred on January 8, 2009, when then-Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter announced that SSN-785 would be named for former Senator John Warner  Another exception occurred on January 9, 2014, when then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that SSN-795, the second of the two Virginia-class boats procured in FY2015, would be named for Admiral Hyman G  Rickover, who served for many years as director of the Navy's nuclear propulsion program  As of May 6, 2019, the Navy has announced names for all Virginia-class boats through SSN-801, the second of two Virginia-class boats procured in FY2018  A total of 30 Virginia-class boats have been procured through FY2019, of which 26 have been named for states  (Two were named for people and the two procured in FY2019 have not yet been named ) The Navy's shipbuilding plan calls for procuring three additional Virginia-class boats in FY2020 and two per year FY2021 and subsequent years  The 26 state-named Virginia-class boats procured through FY2018, together with the additional Virginia-class boats planned for procurement in FY2020 and subsequent years and the 17 existing state-named Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs and cruise missile submarine (SSGNs), could make for a total of more than 50 boats starting around FY2022  Thus, starting around FY2022, the Navy might run out of state names for Virginia-class boats, and consequently might need to either amend the Virginia-class naming rule or begin making a series of exceptions to the rule  The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states that "while carrier names are still 'individually considered,' they are now generally named in honor of past US Presidents " Of the 14 most recently named aircraft carriers (those with hull numbers 67 through 80), 10 have been named for U S  Presidents and 2 for Members of Congress  The Navy is currently procuring Gerald R  Ford (CVN-78) class carriers  On January 16, 2007, the Navy announced that CVN-78, the lead ship in the CVN-78 class, would be named for President Gerald R  Ford  On May 29, 2011, the Navy announced that CVN-79, the second ship in the class, would be named for President John F  Kennedy  On December 1, 2012, the Navy announced that CVN-80, the third ship in the class, would be named Enterprise   The Navy made the announcement on the same day that it deactivated the 51-year-old aircraft carrier CVN-65, also named Enterprise   CVN-80 is the ninth Navy ship named Enterprise   CVN-80 was procured in the FY2018 budget, which Congress considered in 2017  If CVN-80, like most Navy ships, had been named at about the time of procurement, or later, rather than in 2012, it would have been named by the current Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer  The July 2012 Navy report to Congress, which was produced when Ray Mabus was the Secretary of the Navy, states that Secretary [of the Navy Ray] Mabus values the ability to consider [aircraft] carrier names on an individual, case‐by‐case basis, for two reasons  First, it will allow a future Secretary to name a future fleet aircraft carrier for someone or something other than a former President  Indeed, Secretary Mabus has a particular name in mind  With the scheduled decommissioning of USS Enterprise (CVN 65), perhaps the most famous ship name in US Navy history besides USS Constitution will be removed from the Naval Vessel Register  Secretary Mabus believes this circumstance could be remedied by bestowing the Enterprise's storied name on a future carrier  Prior to the naming of CVN-80, the most recent carrier that was not named for a President or Member of Congress was the second of the 14 most recently named carriers, Nimitz (CVN-68), which was procured in FY1967  Destroyers traditionally have been named for famous U S  naval leaders and distinguished heroes  The July 2012 Navy report to Congress discusses this tradition and states more specifically that destroyers are being named for deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy  Exceptions since 2012 (all of which involve Arleigh Burke [DDG-51] class destroyers) include the following: On May 7, 2012, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-116 for a living person, Thomas Hudner  On May 23, 2013, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-117 for a living person, Paul Ignatius, and that it was naming DDG-118 for the late Senator Daniel Inouye, who served in the U S  Army during World War II  On March 31 and April 5, 2016, it was reported that the Navy was naming DDG-120 for a living person, former Senator Carl Levin  On July 28, 2016, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-124 for a living person, Harvey C  Barnum Jr  On July 11, 2018, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer announced that the Navy was expanding the name of the destroyer John  S  McCain (DDG-56) to include a living person, Senator John S  McCain III (for additional discussion, see the next section below)  On May 6, 2019, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-133 for a living person, former Senator Sam Nunn, who had served in the Coast Guard from 1959 to 1960, and in the Coast Guard Reserve from 1960 until 1968 (for additional discussion, see the section following the next section)  As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had announced names for all DDG-51 class destroyers procured through DDG-131, the second of three DDG-51s procured in FY2019, and DDG-133, one of three DDG-51s requested for procurement in FY2020  On July 11, 2018, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer announced that the Navy was expanding the name of the destroyer John  S  McCain (DDG-56), originally named for Admiral John S  "Slew" McCain (1884-1945) and his son, Admiral John S  "Jack" McCain, Jr  (1911-1981), to also include Senator John S  McCain III, the grandson of Admiral John S  McCain and the son of Admiral John S  McCain, Jr  DDG-56 was procured in FY1989 and was commissioned into service on July 2, 1994  John S  McCain III served as a Member of the House of Representatives from 1983 to 1987, and as a Senator from 1987 to 2018  Among his committee chairmanships, he was the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee from January 3, 2015, until his death on August 25, 2018  He was the Republican Party candidate for President in 2008  On May 6, 2019, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-133 for former Senator Sam Nunn  Nunn served in the Coast Guard from 1959 to 1960, and in the Coast Guard Reserve from 1960 until 1968  He was a Senator from 1972 to 1997  During his time in the Senate, he was, among other things, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee from January 1987 to January 1995  The Navy in 2017 initiated a new program, called the FFG(X) program, to build a class of 20 guided-missile frigates (FFGs)  The Navy wants to procure the first FFG(X) in FY2020, the second in FY2021, and the remaining 18 at a rate of two per year in FY2022-FY2030  As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had not announced a naming rule for this planned new class of ships  Previous classes of U S  Navy frigates, like Navy destroyers, were generally named for naval leaders and heroes  Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) were at first named for U S  mid-tier cities, small towns, and other U S  communities  The naming rule was later adjusted to regionally important U S  cities and communities  An exception occurred on February 10, 2012, when the Navy announced that it was naming LCS-10 for former Representative Gabrielle Giffords  Another exception occurred on February 23, 2018, when President Trump, in a press conference with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, announced that an LCS would be named Canberra , in honor of HMAS Canberra (D33), an Australian cruiser named for the capital city of Australia that fought alongside U S  Navy forces World War II and was scuttled after being damaged by Japanese attack in the Battle of Savo Island on August 9, 1942  The Navy has identified the LCS to be named Canberra as LCS-30  A previous U S  Navy ship, the gun cruiser Canberra (CA-70), which served from 1943 to 1947 and again from 1956 to 1970, was similarly named in honor of HMAS Canberra   There is also a current HMAS Canberra (L02), an amphibious assault ship (i e , helicopter carrier) that entered service in 2014 and now serves as the flagship of the Australian navy  The situation of LCS-30 and L02 sharing the same name will presumably not violate 10 U S C  §8662(a)—which states that "not more than one vessel of the Navy may have the same name"—because 10 U S C  §8662 is a statute governing the naming of U S  Navy ships and L02 is not a U S  Navy ship  As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had posted or announced names for all LCSs up through LCS-30, plus LCS-32, LCS-34, LCS-36, and LCS-38  The Navy also announced on October 9, 2018, that one additional LCS would be named for Cleveland, OH, but the Navy did not specify which LCS would receive this name  A total of 35 LCSs have been procured through FY2019  In addition to LCSs 1-30, 32, 34, 36, and 38, the Navy has identified the 35 th LCS as LCS-31  As of May 6, 2019, this ship was listed by the Navy as having no name  The Navy does not want to procure any more LCSs beyond the 35 that have been procured  If no additional LCSs are procured beyond the 35 that have been procured, LCS-31 will be the last LCS to be named  Given the Navy's October 9, 2018, announcement that one additional LCS would be named for Cleveland, OH, it is possible the Navy will name LCS-31 for Cleveland  Amphibious assault ships (LHAs), which look like medium-sized aircraft carriers, are being named for important battles in which U S  Marines played a prominent part, and for famous earlier U S  Navy ships that were not named for battles  The Navy announced on June 27, 2008, that the first LHA-6 class amphibious assault ship, LHA-6, would be named America , a name previously used for an aircraft carrier (CV-66) that served in the Navy from 1965 to 1996  The Navy announced on May 4, 2012, that LHA-7, the second ship in the class, LHA-7, would be named Tripoli , the location of famous Marine battles in the First Barbary War  The Navy reaffirmed this name selection with a more formal announcement on May 30, 2014  On November 9, 2016, the Navy announced that the third ship in the class, LHA-8, will be named Bougainville , the location of a famous World War II campaign in the Pacific  San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for major U S  cities and communities (with major being defined as being one of the top three population centers in a state), and cities and communities attacked on September 11, 2001  An exception occurred on April 23, 2010, when the Navy announced that it was naming LPD-26, the 10 th ship in the class, for the late Representative John P  Murtha  Another exception occurred on May 2, 2018, when the Navy announced that it was naming LPD-29, the 13 th ship in the class, for Navy Captain Richard M  McCool, Jr , who received the Medal of Honor for his actions in World War II and later served in the Korean and Vietnam wars  As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had not announced a name for LPD-30, which was funded in FY2018, and which is to be the first of a new version, or flight, of the LPD-17 class design called the LPD-17 Flight II design  On January 6, 2016, then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that the Navy's new oilers will be named for "people who fought for civil rights and human rights," and that the first ship in the class, TAO-205, which was procured in FY2016, will be named for Representative John Lewis  The ships in this class consequently are now referred to as John Lewis (TAO-205) class ships  The Navy wants to procure a total of 20 John Lewis-class ships  On July 28, 2016, it was reported that the Navy would name the second through sixth ships in the class (i e , TAOs 206 through 210) for Harvey Milk, Earl Warren, Robert F  Kennedy, Lucy Stone, and Sojourner Truth, respectively  All these names were later posted by the Navy for these ships  The Navy's 14 Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class cargo and ammunition ships were named for famous American explorers, trailblazers, and pioneers  The Navy announced on October 9, 2009, that the 13 th ship in the class was being named for the civil rights activist Medgar Evers  The Navy announced on May 18, 2011, that the 14 th ship in the class would be named for civil rights activist Cesar Chavez  Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs), which until May 2011 were being procured by the Army as well as by the Navy, were at first named for American traits and values  In December 2009, the naming rule for EPFs was changed to small U S  cities  At some point between December 2010 and October 2011, it was adjusted to small U S  cities and counties  As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had posted names for all EPFs through EPF-12, which was procured in FY2016  A 13 th EPF was funded by Congress in FY2018, and a 14 th was funded by Congress in FY2019  The Navy's two Expeditionary Transport Docks (ESDs 1 and 2) and its Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESB 3 and higher) are being named for famous names or places of historical significance to U S  Marines  Two of these ships have been named for living persons—ESD-2, which was named John Glenn , and ESB-4, which was named for Hershel "Woody" Williams  On November 4, 2017, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer announced that the third ESB (ESB-5), which was procured in FY2016, would be named for Marine Corps Vietnam veteran and Medal of Honor recipient Lance Corporal Miguel Keith  This was Spencer's first announced naming of a Navy ship  A fourth ESB (ESB-6) was procured in FY2018, and a fifth (ESB-7) was procured in FY2019  Navy plans calls for procuring a total of six ESBs  On March 12, 2019, the Navy announced that that TATS-6, the first ship in a new class of towing, salvage, and rescue ships (TATSs), would be named Navajo, "in honor of the major contributions that the Navajo people have made to the armed forces," and that ships in this class will be named for prominent Native Americans or Native American tribes  It has been a long time since ships named for certain states were last in commissioned service with the Navy as combat assets  While there is no rule requiring the Navy, in selecting state names for ships, to choose states for which the most time has passed since a ship named for the state has been in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset, advocates of naming a ship for a certain state may choose to point out, among other things, the length of time that has transpired since a ship named for the state has been in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset  In its announcement of April 13, 2012, that the Navy was naming the Virginia class attack submarines SSNs 786 through 790 for Illinois, Washington, Colorado, Indiana, and South Dakota, respectively, the Department of Defense stated, "None of the five states has had a ship named for it for more than 49 years  The most recent to serve was the battleship Indiana, which was decommissioned in October 1963 " The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states the following: "Before deciding on which names to select [for the five submarines], [then-]Secretary [of the Navy Ray] Mabus asked for a list of State names that had been absent the longest from the US Naval Register    " In its announcement of November 19, 2012, that the Navy was naming the Virginia class attack submarine SSN-791 for Delaware, the Department of Defense quoted then-Secretary Mabus as saying, "It has been too long since there has been a USS Delaware in the fleet    " A Navy News Service article about the Navy's September 18, 2014, announcement that the Virginia class attack submarine SSN-792 was being named for Vermont stated that "This is the first ship named for Vermont since 1920[,] when the second USS Vermont was decommissioned " A Navy News Service article about the Navy's October 10, 2014, announcement that the Virginia class attack submarine SSN-793 was being named for Oregon stated that the previous USS Oregon "was a battleship best known for its roles in the Spanish American War when it helped destroy Admiral Cervera's fleet and in the Philippine-American War; it performed blockade duty in Manila Bay and off Lingayen Gulf, served as a station ship, and aided in the capture of Vigan " A Navy News Service article about the Navy's January 19, 2016, announcement that the Virginia-class attack submarine SSN-801 was being named for Utah stated, "The future USS Utah will be the second naval vessel to bear the name; the first, a battleship designated BB-31, was commissioned in 1911 and had a long, honorable time in service     While conducting anti-gunnery exercises in Pearl Harbor, BB-31 was struck by a torpedo and capsized during the initial stages of the Japanese attack [on December 7, 1941]  She was struck from the Navy record Nov  13, 1944 and received a battle star for her service in World War I " The Navy's naming announcements for Virginia-class submarines have reduced the group of states for which several decades had passed since a ship named for the state had been in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset, and for which no ship by that name is currently under construction


Report 2:  This group used to include Illinois, Delaware, Vermont, Oregon, and Montana, but Virginia-class attack submarines have now been named for these states  (See the Virginia-class attack submarine naming announcements of April 13, 2012; November 19, 2012; September 18, 2014; October 10, 2014; and September 2, 2015, respectively ) As shown in Table 1 , the three states for which the most time now appears to have passed since a ship named for the state has been in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset, and for which no ship by that name is currently under construction, are Kansas, Arizona, and Oklahoma  As of May 6, 2019, it has been more than 97 years since the decommissioning on December 16, 1921, of the battleship Kansas (BB-21), the most recent ship named for the state of Kansas that was in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset  As discussed earlier in the section on rules for naming SSNs, starting around FY2022, the Navy might run out of state names for Virginia-class boats, and consequently might need to either amend the Virginia-class naming rule or begin making a series of exceptions to the rule  The Navy historically has only rarely named ships for living persons, meaning (throughout this CRS report) persons who were living at the time the name was announced  The Navy stated in February 2012 that The Navy named several ships for living people (ex  George Washington, Ben Franklin, etc ) in the early years of our Republic  The Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) believes that the last ship to be named by the Navy in honor of a living person prior to [the aircraft carrier] CARL VINSON (CVN-70) was the brig JEFFERSON (launched in April 1814)  Between 1814 and November 18, 1973, when President Nixon announced the naming of CARL VINSON, NHHC does not believe that any ships had been named for a living person by the Navy as NHHC does not have records that would indicate such  The July 2012 Navy report to Congress, noting a case from 1900 that was not included in the above passage, states that the practice of naming ships in honor of deserving Americans or naval leaders while they are still alive can be traced all the way back to the Revolutionary War  At the time, with little established history or tradition, the young Continental Navy looked to honor those who were fighting so hard to earn America's freedom  Consequently, George Washington had no less than five ships named for him before his death; John Adams and James Madison, three apiece; John Hancock, two; and Benjamin Franklin, one  The practice of naming ships after living persons was relatively commonplace up through 1814, when a US Navy brig was named in honor of Thomas Jefferson  However, after the War of 1812, with the US Navy older and more established, and with the list of famous Americans and notable naval heroes growing ever longer, the practice of naming ships after living persons fell into disuse  Indeed, the only exception over the next 150 years came in 1900, when the Navy purchased its first submarine from its still living inventor, John Philip Holland, and Secretary of the Navy John D  Long named her USS Holland (SS 1) in his honor     [In the early 1970s], however, Department of the Navy leaders were considering the name for CVN 70  Secretary of the Navy John Warner knew the 93 rd Congress had introduced no less than three bills or amendments (none enacted) urging that CVN 70 be named for in honor of Carl Vinson, who served in the House for 50 years and was known as the "Father of the Two-Ocean Navy " Although Secretary Warner felt Congressman Vinson was more than worthy of a ship name, the former Congressman was still alive  Naming a ship for this giant of naval affairs would therefore violate a 160-year old tradition  After considering the pros and cons of doing so, Secretary Warner asked President Richard Nixon's approval to name CVN 70 for the 90-year old statesman  President Nixon readily agreed  Indeed, he personally announced the decision on January 18, 1974     In hindsight, rather than this decision being a rare exception, it signaled a return to the Continental Navy tradition of occasionally honoring famous living persons with a ship name  Since then, and before the appointment of current Secretary [now then-Secretary] of the Navy Ray Mabus, Secretaries of the Navy have occasionally chosen to follow this new, "old tradition," naming ships in honor of still living former Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H W  Bush, and Gerald R  Ford; Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze; Navy Admirals Hyman G  Rickover, Arleigh Burke, and Wayne E  Meyer; Senators John C  Stennis and John Warner; and famous entertainer Bob Hope  Moreover, it is important to note that three of these well-known Americans—Gerald R  Ford, John C  Stennis, and Bob Hope—were so honored after Congress enacted provisions in Public Laws urging the Navy to do so  By its own actions, then, Congress has acknowledged the practice of occasionally naming ships for living persons, if not outright approved of it  In other words, while naming ships after living persons remains a relatively rare occurrence—about three per decade since 1970—it is now an accepted but sparingly used practice for Pragmatic Secretaries [of the Navy] of both parties  For them, occasionally honoring an especially deserving member of Congress, US naval leader, or famous American with a ship name so that they might end their days on earth knowing that their life's work is both recognized and honored by America's Navy-Marine Corps Team, and that their spirit will accompany and inspire the Team in battle, is sometimes exactly the right thing to do  As shown in Table 2 , since the naming of CVN-70 for Carl Vinson in 1974, at least 21 U S  military ships have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced  Eight of the 21 were announced between January 2012 and March 2016, including three announced in 2012 and four announced in 2016  In four of the six most-recent instances, the ships were named for current or former Members of Congress  The most recent instance occurred on May 6, 2019, when the Navy announced that it was naming the destroyer DDG-51 for former Senator Sam Nunn  (For further discussion of that naming action, see the earlier section on names for destroyers ) A June 15, 2017, blog post states the following: Four [past U S  Navy] ships have been named for Confederate officers: the [ballistic missile submarine/attack submarine] USS Robert E  Lee (SSBN-601[/SSN-601]) [commissioned 1960; decommissioned 1983], the [ballistic missile submarine] USS Stonewall Jackson (SSBN-634) [commissioned 1964; decommissioned 1995], the [submarine tender] USS Hunley (AS-31) [commissioned 1962; decommissioned 1994], and the [submarine tender] USS Dixon (AS-37) [commissioned 1971; decommissioned 1995]  H  L  Hunley built the Confederate submarine that sank with him on board before it engaged in combat  A subsequent Confederate submarine was built and named for him  Commanded by George Dixon, the CSS Hunley carried out the world's first submarine attack when it struck the [sloop-of-war] USS Housatonic in February1864  Currently in the fleet is the [Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruiser] USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) [commissioned 1989], named for Lee's greatest victory over the U S  Army  Chancellorsville also was the battle in which Gen  Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson was mortally wounded by friendly fire  The purpose of erecting monuments and naming U S  ships after Confederates—enemies of the United States—seems to be to recognize their perceived status as noble warriors rather than to remember the cause for which they waged war: the dissolution of the United States to preserve the "peculiar institution" of human slavery  This view of history is not shared by millions of Americans who see the monuments to Confederates as glorifying, even justifying the "lost cause" and the enslavement of humans  Other ships have been named for enemies [of the United States], probably because they were considered "noble warriors" too  [The ballistic missile submarine] USS Tecumseh (SSBN-628) [commissioned 1964; decommissioned 1993] and [the harbor tug] USS Osceola (YTB-129) [commissioned 1938; sold for scrapping 1973] were named after American Indian leaders who fought wars against the United States  Regarding the Chancellorsville , the Navy states that the cruiser is The first U S  Navy ship named for a Civil War battle fought just south of the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers in Virginia (1–5 May 1863)  Gen  Robert E  Lee, CSA, who led the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, held Gen  Joseph Hooker, USA, who commanded the Union Army and Department of the Potomac, in position while Lt  Gen  Thomas J  Jackson, CSA, enveloped the Union right flank, surprising and rolling up the Federal's right  Lee's victory, combined with the urgent need to relieve pressure on Vicksburg, Miss , prompted the South's thrust into Pennsylvania that summer, resulting in the pivotal Battle of Gettysburg  An August 16, 2017, press report states the following: As America churns through a bloody debate over the place Confederate monuments occupy in the modern day United States, a Navy cruiser named in honor of a Confederate Civil War victory is unlikely to see its named changed, a service official said Wednesday [August 16]  The guided-missile cruiser Chancellorsville [CG-62] was commissioned in 1989 and derives its name from an 1863 battle considered to be the greatest victory of Confederate Gen  Robert E  Lee     But a Navy official speaking on the condition of anonymity Wednesday said that even though the Chancellorsville is named after a Confederate victory, the name comes from a battle, not an individual, and soldiers on both sides died  The week-long battle resulted in major casualties for both sides—13,000 Confederates and 17,000 Union troops, according to the National Parks [sic: Park] Service  The Navy official did say, however, that there remains a chance the ship's crest could be altered  The predominance of gray in the ship's crest speaks to "General Robert E  Lee's spectacular military strategies and his dominance in this battle," according to the ship's website  An inverted wreath also memorializes the Confederacy's second-best known general, Stonewall Jackson, who was mortally wounded in the battle  While the rupture of the country during the Civil War is reflected in the crest, it also features Jackson's order to "press on " "Maybe that is worth re-looking at or redoing," the official said  "There's a fine line " In recent years, the Navy on a few occasions has announced names for ships years before those ships were procured  Although announcing a name for a ship years before it is procured is not prohibited, doing so could deprive a future Secretary of the Navy (or, more broadly, a future Administration) of the opportunity to select a name for the ship  It could also deprive Congress of an opportunity to express its sense regarding potential names for a ship, and create a risk of assigning a name to a ship that eventually is not procured for some reason, a situation that could be viewed as potentially embarrassing to the Navy  As noted earlier, the July 2012 Navy report to Congress states the following: At the appropriate time—normally sometime after the ship has been either authorized or appropriated by Congress and before its keel laying or christening—the Secretary records his decision with a formal naming announcement  At the end of the above passage, there is a footnote (number 3) in the Navy report that states the following: Although there is no hard and fast rule, Secretaries most often name a ship after Congress has appropriated funds for its construction or approved its future construction in some way—such as authorization of either block buys or multi-year procurements of a specific number of ships  There are special cases, however, when Secretaries use their discretion to name ships before formal Congressional approval, such as when Secretary John Lehman announced the namesake for a new class of Aegis guided missile destroyers would be Admiral Arleigh Burke, several years before the ship was either authorized or appropriated  In connection with the quoted footnote passage immediately above, it can be noted that the lead ship of the DDG-51 class of destroyers was named for Arleigh Burke on November 5, 1982, about two years before the ship was authorized and fully funded  Recent examples of Navy ships whose names were announced more than two years before they were procured include the following: The destroyer Zumwalt (DDG-1000)  On July 4, 2000, President Bill Clinton announced that DDG-1000, the lead ship in a new class of destroyers, would be named Zumwalt in honor of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr , the Chief of Naval Operations from 1970 to 1974, who had died on January 2, 2000  At the time of the naming announcement, Congress was considering the Navy's proposed FY2001 budget, under which DDG-1000 was scheduled for authorization in FY2005, a budget that Congress would consider in 2004, which was then about four years in the future  The aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVN-80)  As noted earlier, on December 1, 2012, the Navy announced that CVN-80, the third Gerald R  Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, would be named Enterprise   At the time of the announcement, CVN-80 was scheduled for procurement in FY2018, the budget for which Congress was to consider in 2017, which was then more than four years in the future  (CVN-80 was in fact procured in FY2018 ) The ballistic missile submarine ( SSBN-826 ) Columbia   As noted earlier, on July 28, 2016, it was reported that the first Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN-826) will be named Columbia in honor of the District of Columbia  This ship is scheduled for procurement in FY2021, the budget for which Congress is to consider in 2020, which in July 2016 was about four years in the future  Three John Lewis (TAO- 205) class oilers  As noted earlier, on July 28, 2016, it was reported that the Navy would name the second through sixth John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers (i e , TAOs 206 through 210) for Harvey Milk, Earl Warren, Robert F  Kennedy, Lucy Stone, and Sojourner Truth, respectively  In 2016, these five ships were scheduled for procurement in FY2018, FY2019, FY2020, FY2021, and FY2022, respectively, the budgets for which Congress has considered or will consider in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021, respectively  Thus, using the procurement dates that were scheduled in 2016, the name for TAO-208 ( Robert F  Kennedy ) was announced about three years before it was to be procured, the name for TAO-209 ( Lucy Stone ) was announced about four years it was to be procured, and the name for TAO-210 ( Sojourner Truth ) was announced about five years before it was to be procured  As discussed in the CRS report on the TAO-205 class program, the first six ships in the TAO-205 class are being procured under a block buy contract that Congress authorized as part of its action on the FY2016 defense budget  The procurement of each ship under this contract remains subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose  Members of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for earlier U S  Navy ships (particularly those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire  Citizens with such an interest sometimes contact the Navy, the Department of Defense, or Congress seeking support for their proposals  An October 2008 news report, for example, suggested that a letter-writing campaign by New Hampshire elementary school students that began in January 2004 was instrumental in the Navy's decision in August 2004 to name a Virginia-class submarine after the state  The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states the following: In addition to receiving input and recommendations from the President and Congress, every Secretary of the Navy receives numerous requests from service members, citizens, interest groups, or individual members of Congress who want to name a ship in honor of a particular hometown, or State, or place, or hero, or famous ship  This means the "nomination" process is often fiercely contested as differing groups make the case that "their" ship name is the most fitting choice for a Secretary to make  Members of the public may also express their opposition to an announced naming decision  The July 2012 Navy report to Congress cites and discusses five recent examples of ship-naming decisions that were criticized by some observers: the destroyer DDG-1002 (named for President Lyndon Johnson), the Littoral Combat Ship LCS-10 (named for former Representative Gabrielle Giffords), the amphibious ship LPD-26 (named for late Representative John P  Murtha), the auxiliary ship TAKE-13 (named for Medgar Evers), and the auxiliary ship TAKE-14 (named for Cesar Chavez)  Congress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named, and has influenced or may have influenced pending Navy decisions on the naming of certain ships, including but not limited to the following: One source states that "[the aircraft carriers] CVN 72 and CVN 73 were named prior to their start [of construction], in part to preempt potential congressional pressure to name one of those ships for Admiral H G  Rickover ([instead,] the [attack submarine] SSN 709 was named for the admiral) " There was a friendly rivalry of sorts in Congress between those who supported naming the aircraft carrier CVN-76 for President Truman and those who supported naming it for President Reagan; the issue was effectively resolved by a decision announced by President Clinton in February 1995 to name one carrier (CVN-75) for Truman and another (CVN-76) for Reagan  One press report suggests that the decision to name CVN-77 for President George H  W  Bush may have been influenced by a congressional suggestion  Section 1012 of the FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  5122 / P L  109-364 of October 17, 2006), expressed the sense of the Congress that the aircraft carrier CVN-78 should be named for President Gerald R  Ford  The Navy announced on January 16, 2007, that CVN-78 would be named Gerald R  Ford   In the 111 th Congress, H Res  1505 , introduced on July 1, 2010, expressed the sense of the House of Representatives that the Secretary of the Navy should name the next appropriate naval ship in honor of John William Finn  The measure was not acted on after being referred to the House Armed Services Committee  On February 15, 2012, the Navy announced that DDG-113, an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer, would be named John Finn   Section 1012 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  1540 / P L  112-81 of December 31, 2011) expressed the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Navy is encouraged to name the next available naval vessel after Rafael Peralta  On February 15, 2012, the Navy announced that DDG-113, an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer, would be named Rafael Peralta   The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states that every Secretary of the Navy, regardless of point of view [on how to name ships], is subject to a variety of outside influences when considering the best names to choose  The first among these comes from the President of the United States, under whose direction any Secretary works    Secretaries of the Navy must also consider the input of Congress     Given the vital role Congress plays in maintaining the Navy-Marine Corps Team, any Secretary is sure to respect and consider its input when considering ships names  Sometimes, the Secretary must also balance or contend with differences of opinion between the President and Congress  The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known  Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names (see below)  Congress can pass legislation regarding a ship-naming decision that has been announced by the Navy  Such legislation can express Congress's views regarding the Navy's announced decision, and if Congress so desires, can also suggest or direct the Navy to take some action  The following are three examples of such legislation: S Res  332 of the 115 th Congress is an example of a measure that appears to reflect support for an announced Navy ship-naming decision  This measure, introduced in the Senate on November 15, 2017, and considered and agreed to without amendment and with a preamble by unanimous consent the same day, summarizes the military career of Hershel "Woody" Williams and commemorates the christening of ESB-4, an expeditionary sea base ship named for Williams (see " Legislative Activity in 115th and 116th Congress  ") H Res  1022 of the 111 th Congress is an example of a measure reflecting support for an announced Navy ship-naming decision  This measure, introduced on January 20, 2010, and passed by the House on February 4, 2010, congratulates the Navy on its decision to name a naval ship for Medgar Evers  H Con Res  312 of the 97 th Congress is an example of a measure that appears to reflect disagreement with an announced Navy ship-naming decision  This measure expressed the sense of Congress that the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class attack submarine Corpus Christi (SSN-705) should be renamed, and that a nonlethal naval vessel should instead be named Corpus Christi   (Los Angeles-class attack submarines were named for cities, and SSN-705 had been named for Corpus Christi, TX ) H Con Res  312 was introduced on April 21, 1982, and was referred to the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on April 28, 1982  On May 10, 1982, the Navy modified the name of SSN-705 to City of Corpus Christi   On April 12, 2013, then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that LPD-27, a San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship, would be named for Portland, OR  LPD-27 is to be the third Navy ship to bear the name Portland  The first, a cruiser (CA-33), was named for Portland, ME  It was commissioned into service in February 1933, decommissioned in July 1946, and maintained in reserve status until struck from the Navy list in March 1959  The second, an amphibious ship (LSD-37), was named for both Portland, ME, and Portland, OR  It was commissioned into service in October 1970, decommissioned in October 2003, and stricken from the Naval Vessel Register in March 2004  An April 18, 2013, press release from Senator Angus King stated that "U S  Senators Susan Collins and Angus King today sent a letter to Ray Mabus, the Secretary of the Navy, asking that the USS Portland [LPD-27], a new San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship named after the city of Portland, Oregon, also be named in honor of Portland, Maine, consistent with the long history and tradition of U S  Navy ships bestowed with the name USS Portland " In reply, the Navy sent letters dated April 24, 2013, to Senators Collins and King that stated the following in part: In addition to [the ballistic missile submarine] USS MAINE (SSBN 743), Secretary [of the Navy Ray] Mabus recently honored the state of Marine through his naming of [the expeditionary fast transport ship] USNS MILLINOCKET (JHSV 3) [now called T-EPF 3] which was christened last weekend and will proudly represent our Nation as part of the fleet for decades to come  The Secretary of the Navy has tremendous appreciation for the state of Maine, its citizens and the incredible support provided by them to our Navy and our Nation  However, Oregon is the only state in our Nation that does not currently have a ship in the fleet named for the state, its cities or communities  Secretary Mabus named LPD 27 after Portland, Oregon, to correct that oversight and acknowledge the support and contributions made by the men and women of Portland and Oregon  As noted elsewhere in this report, on October 10, 2014, the Navy announced that it was naming the Virginia-class attack submarine SSN-793 for Oregon  A May 21, 2016, Navy blog post about the ship's christening states that "LPD-27 will be the third Navy ship named Portland, honoring both the Oregon seaport and Maine's largest city " That statement is not correct, as the Navy confirms that LPD-27 is named solely for Portland, OR  A July 5, 2017, Navy News Service report states correctly that "LPD 27 is named for the city of Portland, Oregon, and follows the World War II heavy cruiser CA 33 and the amphibious ship LSD 37 as the third U S  Navy ship to bear the name Portland " LPD-27 is scheduled to be commissioned in Portland, OR, on April 21, 2018  Table 3 shows past enacted provisions going back to the 100 th Congress regarding future ship-naming decisions  All of these measures expressed the sense of the Congress (or of the Senate or House) about how a future Navy ship should be named  Table 4 shows past examples of proposed bills and amendments regarding future ship-naming decisions going back to the 93 rd Congress  Some of these measures expressed the sense of the Congress about how a Navy ship should be named, while others would mandate a certain name for a ship  Although few of these measures were acted on after being referred to committee, they all signaled congressional interest in how certain ships should be named, and thus may have influenced Navy decisions on these matters  S Con Res  10 of the 115 th Congress was introduced in the Senate on March 21, 2017; no further actions for the measure are listed at Congress gov  The text of S Con Res  10 as introduced was as follows: CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Navy should name the next nuclear powered submarine of the United States Navy the "USS Los Alamos"  Whereas the people of Los Alamos and the Navy have a 74-year relationship that continues from the Manhattan Project through the creation of a nuclear Navy and into the current ocean-borne leg of the strategic nuclear triad of the United States; Whereas the contributions of the people of Los Alamos and surrounding communities allowed the Navy to keep its offensive edge from World War II, through the Cold War, continuing to the emerging conflicts as of the date of adoption of this resolution; Whereas Captain "Deke" Parsons was one of the first residents of Los Alamos and, along with Laureate Ramsey, oversaw the safe delivery, assembly and loading of the nuclear bomb that led to the surrender of Japan in World War II; Whereas the people of Los Alamos and surrounding communities played a critical role in designing the nuclear portion of the first nuclear weapon to enter the arsenal of the Navy, known as the Regulus, along with atomic depth bombs, torpedoes, rockets, and even next generation weapon systems like the B61–12 precision-guided nuclear bomb; Whereas the people of Los Alamos designed the warheads that armed the first generation Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles of the Navy and the follow-on Trident II missile warheads used by the Navy; Whereas the research into nuclear energy conducted by Los Alamos during World War II advanced the technical basis for the development of the nuclear propulsion systems of the Navy used aboard Los Angeles, Seawolf, Ohio, and Virginia Class submarines along with multiple naval aircraft carriers today; Whereas the people of Los Alamos and Los Alamos National Laboratory host United States Naval Academy midshipmen every year to provide hands-on scientific and engineering experience working to solve real world challenges in national security, thereby directly contributing to the development of future Navy leadership; Whereas the people of Los Alamos carry the solemn responsibility to assess the sea-based nuclear deterrent carried aboard Navy fleet ballistic missile submarines; Whereas naming a submarine Los Alamos will recognize and continue to forge the longstanding relationship between the Navy and Los Alamos; Whereas the year 2018 will mark the 75th anniversary of Los Alamos National Laboratory; and Whereas the distinctive service and contributions from the people of Los Alamos to the Navy merits naming a vessel that embodies the heritage, service, fidelity, and achievements of the residents of Los Alamos and surrounding communities in partnership with the United States Navy: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of the Navy should name the next nuclear powered submarine of the United States Navy as the "USS Los Alamos"  Appendix A  Executive Summary of July 2012 Navy Report to Congress This appendix reprints the executive summary of the July 2012 Navy report to Congress on the Navy's policies and practices for naming its ships  The text of the executive summary is as follows: Executive Summary This report is submitted in accordance with Section 1014 of P L  112-81 , National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, dated 31 December 2011, which directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on "policies and practices of the Navy for naming vessels of the Navy " As required by the NDAA, this report: Includes a description of the current policies and practices of the Navy for naming vessels of the Navy, and a description of the extent to which theses policies and practices vary from historical policies and practices of the Navy for naming vessels of the Navy, and an explanation for such variances; Assesses the feasibility and advisability of establishing fixed policies for the naming of one or more classes of vessels of the Navy, and a statement of the policies recommended to apply to each class of vessels recommended to be covered by such fixed policies if the establishment of such fixed policies is considered feasible and advisable; and Identifies any other matter relating to the policies and practices of the Navy for naming vessels of the Navy that the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate  After examining the historical record in great detail, this report concludes: Current ship naming policies and practices fall well within the historic spectrum of policies and practices for naming vessels of the Navy, and are altogether consistent with ship naming customs and traditions  The establishment of fixed policies for the naming of one or more classes of vessels of the Navy would be highly inadvisable  There is no objective evidence to suggest that fixed policies would improve Navy ship naming policies and practices, which have worked well for over two centuries  In addition, the Department of the Navy used to routinely publish lists of current type naming rules for battle force ships, and update it as changes were made to them  At some point, this practice fell into disuse, leading to a general lack of knowledge about naming rules  To remedy this problem, the Naval History and Heritage Command will once again develop and publish a list of current type naming rules to help all Americans better understand why Secretaries of the Navy choose the ship names they do  This list will be updated as required 

ground_truth: Federal law contains a wide variety of disclosure requirements, including food labels, securities registrations, and disclosures about prescription drugs in direct-to-consumer advertising. These disclosure provisions require commercial actors to make statements that they otherwise might not, compelling speech and implicating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Nonetheless, while commercial disclosure requirements may regulate protected speech, that fact in and of itself does not render such provisions unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has historically allowed greater regulation of commercial speech than of other types of speech. Since at least the mid-1970s, however, the Supreme Court has been increasingly protective of commercial speech. This trend, along with other developments in First Amendment law, has led some commentators to question whether the Supreme Court might apply a stricter test in assessing commercial disclosure requirements in the near future. Nonetheless, governing Supreme Court precedent provides that disclosure requirements generally receive lesser judicial scrutiny when they compel only commercial speech, as opposed to noncommercial speech. In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, a decision released in June 2018, the Supreme Court explained that it has applied a lower level of scrutiny to compelled disclosures under two circumstances. First, the Supreme Court has sometimes upheld laws that regulate commercial speech if the speech regulation is part of a larger regulatory scheme that is focused on conduct and only incidentally burdens speech. If a law is properly characterized as a regulation of conduct, rather than speech, then it may be subject to rational basis review, a deferential standard that asks only whether the regulation is a rational way to address the problem. However, it can be difficult to distinguish speech from conduct, and the Supreme Court has not frequently invoked this doctrine to uphold laws against First Amendment challenges. Second, the Supreme Court has sometimes applied a lower level of scrutiny to certain commercial disclosure requirements under the authority of a 1985 case, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel. In Zauderer, the Court upheld a disclosure requirement after noting that the challenged provision compelled only "factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will be available." The Court said that under the circumstances, the service provider's First Amendment rights were sufficiently protected because the disclosure requirement was "reasonably related" to the government's interest "in preventing deception of consumers." Lower courts have generally interpreted Zauderer to mean that if a commercial disclosure provision requires only "factual and uncontroversial information" about the goods or services being offered, it should be analyzed under rational basis review. If a commercial disclosure requirement does not qualify for review under Zauderer, then it will most likely be analyzed under the intermediate standard that generally applies to government actions that regulate commercial speech. Some legal scholars have argued that recent Supreme Court case law suggests the Court may subject commercial disclosure provisions to stricter scrutiny in the future, either by limiting the factual circumstances under which these two doctrines apply or by creating express exceptions to these doctrines. If a court applies a heightened level of scrutiny, it may require the government to present more evidence of the problem it is seeking to remedy and stronger justifications for choosing a disclosure requirement to achieve its purposes.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Disclosure provisions that require commercial actors to convey specified information to consumers occupy an uneasy and shifting space in First Amendment jurisprudence  The First Amendment's Free Speech Clause protects the right to speak as well as the right not to speak, and at least outside the context of commercial speech, courts generally disfavor any government action that compels speech  Indeed, the Supreme Court in 1943 described the First Amendment's protection against compelled speech as a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation " Accordingly, government actions mandating speech are generally subject to strict scrutiny by courts, and will be upheld "only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests " However, the Court has also long accepted a variety of laws that require commercial actors to make certain disclosures to consumers, confirming that Congress can compel certain disclosures, even those involving protected speech, without running afoul of the First Amendment  Commercial disclosure requirements have largely withstood constitutional scrutiny in part because, historically, commercial speech has received less protection under the First Amendment than other speech  The government's ability to more freely regulate commercial speech has been linked to its general authority "to regulate commercial transactions " Thus, notwithstanding the fact that commercial disclosure requirements compel speech, courts generally have not analyzed such provisions under the strict scrutiny standard  Instead, courts have often employed less rigorous standards to evaluate such provisions  The precise nature of a court's First Amendment analysis, however, will depend on the character of the disclosure requirement at issue  In a recent decision, the Supreme Court distilled and explained its prior cases on this subject  First, the Court said that it has upheld some commercial disclosure requirements that target conduct and only incidentally burden speech  This rubric likely only applies if the disclosure provision is part of a larger scheme regulating commercial conduct  If the disclosure provision instead regulates "speech as speech," it might be subject either to intermediate scrutiny, as a government regulation of commercial speech, or to something closer to rational basis review, if the disclosure provision qualifies for review under the Supreme Court's decision in Zauderer v  Office of Disciplinary Counsel   Some of the Court's recent cases, however, have suggested that in certain circumstances, disclosure requirements may be subject to heightened scrutiny  This report begins with a short background on how courts generally view commercial speech under the First Amendment, then reviews in more detail the possible legal frameworks for analyzing the constitutionality of commercial disclosure requirements  Supreme Court precedent explaining the application of the First Amendment to commercial disclosure requirements is relatively recent  The Court did not squarely hold that purely commercial speech was entitled to any protection under the First Amendment until 1976 in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v  Virginia Citizens Consumer Council   The Court has defined commercial speech alternately as speech that "does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction'" and as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience " In Virginia Board of Pharmacy , the Court said that commercial speech was protected, but it also emphasized that the First Amendment did not prohibit all regulations of such speech  In particular, the Court said that it foresaw "no obstacle" to government regulation of "false" speech, or even of commercial speech that is only "deceptive or misleading " In subsequent cases, the Court has explained why "regulation to assure truthfulness" is more readily allowed in the context of commercial speech, as compared with other types of speech  While the First Amendment usually protects even untruthful speech, in order to better encourage uninhibited and robust debate, the Court has recognized that regulating "for truthfulness" in the commercial arena is unlikely to "undesirably inhibit spontaneity" because commercial speech is generally less likely to be spontaneous  Instead, it is more calculated, motivated by a "commercial interest " In particular, if a particular advertisement concerns a subject in which "the public lacks sophistication" and cannot verify the claims, the Court has suggested that the government may have a freer hand to address such concerns  Four years after Virginia Board of Pharmacy , in 1980, the Supreme Court set out the standard that generally governs a court's analysis of government restrictions on commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp  v  Public Service Commission   The Court first explained that commercial speech enjoys "lesser protection" than "other constitutionally guaranteed expression " After emphasizing that First Amendment protection for commercial speech "is based on the informational function of advertising," the Court said that "there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity " Accordingly, the Court held that the government may prohibit "forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it" as well as "commercial speech related to illegal activity " But if the regulated "communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity," the government's action is subject to intermediate scrutiny  Under Central Hudson 's intermediate standard, the government must prove that the government's interest is "substantial," and that the regulation "directly advances" that interest and is "not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest " The Central Hudson test continues to govern the constitutional analysis of government acts that infringe on commercial speech  However, in certain circumstances, commercial speech may lose its commercial character if "it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech " And more generally, some members of the Supreme Court have questioned whether commercial speech should categorically receive less protection under the First Amendment, suggesting that in at least some circumstances, infringements on commercial speech should instead be subject to strict scrutiny  Commentators have pointed out that, as a practical matter, Supreme Court decisions have increasingly struck down, rather than upheld, restrictions on commercial speech  Also relevant to the discussion of disclosure requirements, judges and legal scholars have noted that the Court may be adjusting the role of the content neutrality doctrine with respect to commercial speech  As a general matter, if a law is "content-based," in the sense that it "target[s] speech based on its communicative content," it will be subject to strict scrutiny  The Supreme Court stated in Reed v  Town of Gilbert that a regulation is content-based if it "applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed," if it "cannot be 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,'" or if it was "adopted by the government 'because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys '" Disclosure requirements are generally considered content-based, given that they require regulated parties to speak a certain message, and outside the commercial context, ordinarily trigger the application of strict scrutiny  In Central Hudson , however, the Supreme Court explained that in the context of commercial speech, "regulation of its content" is permissible  And, as commentators have pointed out, "the very category of commercial speech is a content-based category " Nonetheless, the Court has struck down certain regulations that prohibit commercial speech solely because its content is commercial, suggesting that content neutrality might be relevant in the commercial sphere  In its 2011 decision in Sorrell v  IMS Health, Inc  , the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting pharmacies from disclosing certain pharmacy records for marketing purposes  After observing that the law included "content- and speaker-based restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of" covered information, the Court concluded that the law was "designed to impose a specific, content-based burden on protected expression" because it applied specifically to marketing, a particular type of speech  Consequently, the law was subject to "heightened judicial scrutiny," notwithstanding the fact that the "burdened speech result[ed] from an economic motive" and was therefore commercial  Ultimately, however, the Court declined to say definitively whether Central Hudson or "a stricter form of judicial scrutiny" should apply because, in the Court's view, the law failed to pass constitutional muster even under Central Hudson   As discussed in more detail below, the shifting role of content neutrality in commercial speech doctrine holds special significance for commercial disclosure requirements: these requirements are content-based because they "compel[] individuals to speak a particular message " At least one legal scholar has suggested that lower courts have read Sorrell as an expression of the Supreme Court's increasing skepticism toward restrictions on commercial speech and, since that decision, have been more likely to strike down commercial disclosure requirements  However, the Court did not expressly limit the reach of Central Hudson in Sorrell or in subsequent cases, suggesting that, at least for now, Central Hudson 's standard of review applies even when a challenged action would otherwise trigger strict scrutiny as a content-based regulation of speech  Indeed, lower courts analyzing commercial disclosure requirements usually ask whether Zauderer or Central Hudson supplies the appropriate standard of review, contemplating at most only intermediate scrutiny —even in cases decided after Sorrell   In its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has generally distinguished between laws that regulate conduct and laws that regulate speech  The Court has held that conduct-focused regulations will not violate the First Amendment by merely incidentally burdening speech  For instance, while the government may regulate prices, attempts to regulate "the communication of prices" implicate the First Amendment  To take another example, the Court has noted that pursuant to "a ban on race-based hiring," a regulation "directed at commerce or conduct," the government "may require employers to remove 'White Applicants Only' signs " To differentiate a regulation targeting conduct from one targeting speech, the Court generally looks to the purpose of the law, asking whether the law appears to target certain content or certain speakers  As part of this inquiry, the Court may also ask whether a regulation applies because of the communicative content of the regulated party's actions  This distinction between speech and conduct is especially significant in the context of commercial speech, given that such speech "occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation " Thus, in 1978, the Supreme Court said: "[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed " Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are regulated without offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of information about securities, corporate proxy statements, the exchange of price and production information among competitors, and employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees  Each of these examples illustrates that the State does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of that activity  The Court has previously "upheld regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech " For example, the Court upheld an informed consent requirement in Planned Parenthood of S outheastern Pennsylvania v  Casey   The Casey challengers argued that a law requiring doctors to inform patients seeking abortions about "the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the unborn child" compelled doctors to speak in violation of the First Amendment  The Court rejected that argument, concluding that while "the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated," this was "only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State " In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v  Becerra , the Supreme Court emphasized that the informed consent requirement upheld in Casey was part of the broader regulation of professional conduct: specifically, the practice of medicine  By contrast, the Court held that the disclosure requirement at issue in NIFLA , which required certain health facilities to provide clients with information about state-sponsored services, could not be upheld as "an informed-consent requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct" because it was not tied to any medical procedure  Instead, in the Court's view, the requirement "regulate[d] speech as speech," as opposed to regulating speech only incidentally  While the Court has made clear that the First Amendment does not prohibit such incidental regulation of commercial speech, it has not articulated one overarching standard for evaluating whether such provisions are constitutionally permissible  Its decisions in this area have considered a wide variety of government actions incidentally burdening speech, and it may be that the standard varies according to the nature of the particular speech restriction evaluated  In some cases, the Court has suggested that "the First Amendment is not implicated by the enforcement" of a broader regulatory scheme where the regulated conduct does not have "a significant expressive element" or the statute does not inevitably single out "those engaged in expressive activity " In other cases where the Court has upheld a regulation that it characterized as focused on conduct rather than speech, the Court investigated the strength of the government's interest and asked whether the regulation advances that interest, suggesting that the Court subjected the regulation to some First Amendment scrutiny—albeit using a relatively relaxed standard  The Court has never explicitly held that a commercial disclosure requirement qualifies as a constitutionally permissible incidental restriction on commercial speech  While Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v  Casey did involve a disclosure requirement, the Court did not address whether the informed consent requirement involved commercial or noncommercial speech either in Casey or when discussing that requirement in NIFLA   In NIFLA , the Court held that a state law imposing disclosure requirements on clinics providing pregnancy-related services could not be characterized as a regulation that only incidentally burdened speech because the requirement was not tied to any specific medical procedures  However, the Court never expressly stated whether it considered the disclosures to consist of commercial or noncommercial speech  Similarly, in Expressions Hair Design v  Schneiderman , the Court rejected the application of this doctrine without expressly characterizing the government action as a commercial disclosure requirement  In that case, the Court considered the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting sellers from imposing surcharges on customers who use credit cards  The Supreme Court rejected the argument that this law primarily "regulated conduct, not speech," concluding that the law did not merely regulate pricing, but regulated the communication of prices by prohibiting merchants from posting a cash price and an additional credit card surcharge  The Court then remanded the case to the lower courts to consider the First Amendment challenges in the first instance, leaving open the question of whether the provision could be characterized as a requirement for sellers to disclose an item's credit card price, rather than as a prohibition of certain speech  As these cases suggest, the Court has seemed reluctant in recent years to uphold government actions as conduct-focused regulations that merely incidentally burden speech, especially in the context of compelled disclosure requirements  Instead, the Court has distinguished the few cases upholding government acts as incidental restrictions and subjected disclosure requirements to further scrutiny  Nonetheless, the Court has left open the possibility that commercial disclosure requirements might, in the future, qualify as permissible incidental speech regulation, if they are part of a broader regulatory scheme  If the government regulates "speech as speech," its actions will implicate the First Amendment's protections for freedom of speech and may trigger heightened standards of scrutiny  However, the First Amendment does not prescribe a single analysis for all government actions that potentially infringe on free speech protections  Instead, a court's review will depend on the nature of both the government action and the speech itself  This section first introduces the three possible levels of scrutiny a court might use to analyze a speech regulation and then explains their application to compelled commercial disclosures in more detail  In the context of commercial disclosure requirements, there are three primary categories of First Amendment analysis that may be relevant  First, as a general rule, government actions that compel speech are usually subject to strict scrutiny  To survive strict scrutiny, the government must show that the challenged action is "narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests " Laws are unlikely to meet this "stringent standard " Second, as discussed above, government actions regulating commercial speech generally receive only intermediate scrutiny  The intermediate scrutiny standard, pursuant to Central Hudson , requires a "substantial" state interest and requires the government to prove that the law "directly advances" that interest and "is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest " This standard is less demanding than strict scrutiny, but laws may still be struck down under this test  The final and most lenient category—one specific to commercial disclosure requirements—comes from a 1985 case, Zauderer v  Office of Disciplinary Counsel   In that case, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of state disciplinary rules regulating attorney advertising  As relevant here, the rules required advertisements referring to contingent-fee rates to disclose how the fee would be calculated  An attorney who had been disciplined by the state for violating these provisions argued that this disclosure requirement was unconstitutional because the state failed to meet the standards set out in Central Hudson   The Court acknowledged that it had previously held that prohibitions on commercial speech were subject to heightened scrutiny under Central Hudson , and that it had "held that in some instances compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions on speech " "But," the Court said, "[t]he interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those" implicated in cases involving the compulsion of noncommercial speech  Instead, the Court noted that the state's provision only involved "commercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement that appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which his services will be available " In this commercial context, the Court said that the attorney's "constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal," noting that in previous cases it had stated that states might "appropriately require[]" warnings or disclaimers "in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception " Rather than applying heightened scrutiny, the Court held that under these circumstances, "an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers " The Zauderer Court did warn, however, that commercial disclosure requirements raise First Amendment concerns, observing that "unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech " But the Court rejected the contention that the disclosure requirement before it was unduly burdensome  Instead, the Court concluded that "[t]he State's position that it is deceptive to employ advertising that refers to contingent-fee arrangements without mentioning the client's liability for costs is reasonable enough to support a requirement that information regarding the client's liability for costs be disclosed " Although the state had not submitted evidence that clients were in fact being misled, the Court stated that "the possibility of deception" was "self-evident," making the state's "assumption that substantial numbers of potential clients would be       misled" regarding the terms of payment reasonable  Zauderer sets out the most lenient of the three standards of review discussed above, and, as a result, a commercial disclosure requirement is most likely to be upheld if it is reviewed under the rubric of that case  However, the Zauderer standard of review has been interpreted to apply only to certain types of disclosure requirements  As described by the Court and discussed above, the state regulation upheld in Zauderer required "purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which [attorneys'] services [would] be available," and the provision was "reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers " Subsequent cases in both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have tested the extent to which this reasonableness review applies outside of the specific factual circumstances presented in Zauderer   The Supreme Court has decided whether to apply Zauderer review to government acts compelling commercial speech in three significant cases  First, in United States v  United Foods , decided in 2001, the Court invalidated a federal statute that compelled "handlers of fresh mushrooms to fund advertising for the product " United Foods thus involved a compelled subsidy, rather than a compelled disclosure  The Court concluded that these statutorily compelled subsidies for government-favored speech implicated the First Amendment and that "mandat[ing] support" from objecting parties was "contrary to       First Amendment principles " The Court held that Zauderer was inapplicable, noting that in the case before it, there was "no suggestion       that the mandatory assessments       are somehow necessary to make voluntary advertisements nonmisleading for consumers " By contrast, the Court applied Zauderer in a 2010 decision, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P A  v  United States , another case concerning attorney advertising  In that case, the Court considered an attorney's First Amendment challenges to a federal statute that required "debt relief agencies" to "make certain disclosures in their advertisements " "Debt relief agencies" was a statutorily defined term covering some attorneys who provided clients with bankruptcy assistance  Among other things, agencies advertising "bankruptcy assistance services or       the benefits of bankruptcy" were required to disclose that they were "a debt relief agency" that "help[ed] people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code " Rejecting the challenger's contention that Central Hudson 's intermediate scrutiny governed the disclosure requirement, the Court held instead that "the less exacting scrutiny described in Zauderer " governed its review  The Court concluded that the provision "share[d] the essential features of the rule at issue in Zauderer  " The disclosure requirement was "intended to combat the problem of inherently misleading commercial advertisements—specifically, the promise of debt relief without any reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has inherent costs " Further, the law required the covered entities to provide "only an accurate statement identifying the advertiser's legal status and the character of the assistance provided " As in Zauderer , where the "possibility of deception" was "self-evident," the Court was not troubled by the lack of evidence that current advertisements were misleading  Instead, "evidence in the congressional record demonstrating a pattern of advertisements that hold out the promise of debt relief without alerting consumers to its potential cost" was "adequate " The Court ultimately upheld the disclosure requirement as "reasonably related to the [Government's] interest in preventing deception of consumers " Most recently, in 2018, the Court considered the application of Zauderer in NIFLA   That case involved two distinct disclosure requirements imposed by California's Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act), which regulated crisis pregnancy centers  First, the FACT Act required any " licensed covered facility" to notify clients that "California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women," and give the telephone number of the local social services office  Second, any " unlicensed covered facility" had to provide notice that the "facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California and has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the provision of services " The Court first held that Zauderer 's reasonableness review did not apply to the licensed notice  In the Court's view, the notice was "not limited to 'purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which       services will be available '" The Court explained that the disclosure requirement "in no way relate[d] to the services that licensed clinics provide " The Court said that instead, the law "require[d] these clinics to disclose information about state -sponsored services—including abortion, anything but an 'uncontroversial' topic " The Court ultimately held that the licensed notice could not "survive even intermediate scrutiny " Turning to the unlicensed notice, the Court determined that it did not need to "decide whether the Zauderer standard applies to the unlicensed notice" because the disclosure requirement failed scrutiny even under Zauderer   The Court said that "under Zauderer , a disclosure requirement cannot be 'unjustified or unduly burdensome '" The Court interpreted this statement to require that the government prove it was seeking "to remedy a harm that is 'potentially real, not purely hypothetical '" Based on the record on appeal, the Court found that California's stated interest in "ensuring that pregnant women in California know when they are getting medical care from licensed professionals" was "purely hypothetical " Further, the Court held in the alternative that "[e]ven if California had presented a nonhypothetical justification for the unlicensed notice, the FACT Act unduly burden[ed] protected speech" by requiring a government statement to be placed in all advertisements, regardless of an advertisement's length or content  The Court also expressed concern that the unlicensed notice "target[ed]" certain speakers in imposing those burdens by focusing on "facilities that primarily provide 'pregnancy-related' services " While the Supreme Court has emphasized that Zauderer 's reasonableness review is available only for certain types of compelled commercial disclosures, lower courts have disagreed on the precise circumstances required to apply Zauderer   A few requirements have emerged in the case law  First, courts agree that to qualify for review under Zauderer , a commercial disclosure requirement must compel speech that is "factual and uncontroversial " Next, the disclosure must be related to the goods or services the speaker provides  Finally, courts have disagreed on the type of government interest that may be asserted to justify a Zauderer -eligible regulation: while Zauderer itself approved of the challenged disclosure requirement after concluding that the state was permissibly seeking to "prevent[] deception of consumers," lower courts have sometimes applied Zauderer review even where the regulation is not specifically intended to prevent deception  Before discussing the particulars of these requirements, it is worth noting that these elements are related to the Court's overarching justifications for affording the government more leeway to regulate commercial speech  The seminal Supreme Court case establishing that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v  Virginia Citizens Consumer Council , tied commercial speech's value to its ability to inform consumers  Critically, the Court said that governments could continue to ban false or misleading commercial speech , noting in another case that "the public and private benefits from commercial speech derive from confidence in its accuracy and reliability " It was against this background that the Court in Zauderer concluded that the provision requiring the disclosure of factual information about contingent fee arrangements did not involve First Amendment interests "of the same order as those" involved in other cases involving the compulsion of noncommercial speech  Accordingly, the state acted reasonably by prescribing that attorneys had to include in their advertising "purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which [their] services [would] be available " The first element for a commercial disclosure requirement to be eligible for Zauderer review is that the government regulation must require the disclosure of "factual and uncontroversial" information  The two parts of Zauderer's initial requirement are often evaluated as one, although courts have sometimes pointed out that "factual" and "uncontroversial," logically, connote two different things  Viewing the two words together, some have characterized the "factual and uncontroversial" requirement as distinguishing regulations that compel the disclosure of facts from those that compel individuals to state opinions or ideologies  As discussed, the Supreme Court has said that the value of commercial speech largely lies in its ability to inform consumers  And in Zauderer , the Court emphasized that because protection for commercial speech is justified by its informational value, the attorney challenging the disclosure requirement had a "minimal" First Amendment interest "in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising " As the Second Circuit has explained: Commercial disclosure requirements are treated differently from restrictions on commercial speech because mandated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information does not offend the core First Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information or protecting individual liberty interests  Such disclosure furthers, rather than hinders, the First Amendment goal of the discovery of truth and contributes to the efficiency of the "marketplace of ideas " Protection of the robust and free flow of accurate information is the principal First Amendment justification for protecting commercial speech, and requiring disclosure of truthful information promotes that goal  In such a case, then, less exacting scrutiny is required than where truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech is restricted  In this vein, the Supreme Court upheld disclosure requirements regarding the nature of contingent fee arrangements in Zauderer and statements clarifying the nature of the bankruptcy-related assistance provided by debt relief agencies in Milavetz   Lower courts have approved as "factual and uncontroversial" within the meaning of Zauderer a variety of other commercial disclosure requirements, including regulations requiring the disclosure of: country-of-origin information for meat; calorie information at restaurants; the fact that products contain mercury; and textual and graphic warnings about the health risks of tobacco products  By contrast, in a 2015 opinion, the D C  Circuit concluded that a federal regulation requiring firms to disclose whether their products used "conflict minerals" that originated "in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country" could not be characterized as factual and uncontroversial  The court said that "[t]he label '[not] conflict free' is a metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war        An issuer, including an issuer who condemns the atrocities of the Congo war in the strongest terms, may disagree with that assessment of its moral responsibility        By compelling an issuer to confess blood on its hands, the statute interferes with that exercise of the freedom of speech under the First Amendment " Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in a 2006 opinion, held that disclosure requirements in a state law regulating sexually explicit video games were not "factual and uncontroversial" as required for Zauderer to apply  In relevant part, the law required "video game retailers to place a four square-inch label with the numerals '18' on any 'sexually explicit' video game," and to post signs and provide brochures "explaining the video game rating system " The court held first that the sticker "ultimately communicates a subjective and highly controversial message—that the game's content is sexually explicit " Similarly, the panel concluded that "the message" communicated by the signs and brochures was "neither purely factual nor uncontroversial" because it was "intended to communicate that any video games in the store can be properly judged pursuant to the standards described in the       ratings " As mentioned above, some courts have treated "factual" and "uncontroversial" as two distinct requirements  But at times, courts have struggled to define "controversial," standing alone  The D C  Circuit has suggested that controversial must mean that a disclosure "communicates a message that is controversial for some reason other than dispute about simple factual accuracy " One trial court interpreting a decision of the Second Circuit suggested that "it is the nature of the regulation of compelled speech that controls, not the nature of the legislative debate that gave rise to its enactment " That court then noted that other courts had equated controversial messages with disclosures that are "opinion-based " Courts have disagreed about whether a disclosure may be characterized as "controversial" because it is "inflammatory" or "evoke[s] an emotional response " In NIFLA , the Supreme Court struck down the licensed notice after noting that the required disclosures related to "abortion, anything but an 'uncontroversial' topic," although it did not further explain when a topic is "uncontroversial" for purposes of Zauderer  Second, to be eligible for review under Zauderer , a commercial disclosure requirement must be related to the services provided by the speaker  In Zauderer itself, the Court had noted that the disputed disclosure required the attorney to provide information in his advertising "about the terms under which his services will be available " By and large, lower courts, at least prior to NIFLA, had not treated this relationship to the speaker's services as a distinct requirement  The Court in NIFLA , however, said that this was a necessary prerequisite for Zauderer review and held in that case that the notice requirement for licensed clinics at issue was not "relate[d] to the services that licensed clinics provide" because it instead provided information "about state -sponsored services " Judges have disagreed on whether there exists a third requirement for Zauderer review  In Zauderer itself, the Supreme Court noted that the disclosure requirements at issue in that case were intended to "prevent[] deception of customers " Further, when applying Zauderer review to the bankruptcy-related disclosures at issue in Milavetz , the Court stated that the disclosures were "intended to combat the problem of inherently misleading commercial advertisements " Perhaps most notably, in United Foods , the Court explained its decision not to apply Zauderer by noting that there was "no suggestion" that the compelled subsidies at issue in that case were "somehow necessary to make voluntary advertisements nonmisleading for consumers " The Supreme Court's decisions applying Zauderer have thus suggested that one factor in deciding whether to apply this "reasonably related" review is whether the targeted commercial speech is misleading, or whether the state's interest in requiring the disclosure is to prevent "consumer confusion or deception " Nonetheless, the Court has not squarely held that this is a necessary condition for Zauderer review, and several lower courts have rejected this position  The D C  Circuit concluded that Zauderer 's justification characterizing "the speaker's interest in opposing forced disclosure of such information as 'minimal' seems inherently applicable beyond" the state's "interest in remedying deception " The Second Circuit has also held that Zauderer review applies more broadly  In rejecting a litigant's argument that the Supreme Court's decision in United Foods limited Zauderer only to laws intended to prevent consumer deception, the Second Circuit said that United Foods "simply distinguishes Zauderer on the basis that the compelled speech in Zauderer was necessary to prevent deception of consumers; it does not provide that all other disclosure requirements are subject to heightened scrutiny " If a commercial disclosure requirement involves only "purely factual and uncontroversial information" about the goods or services being sold, and is therefore eligible for review under Zauderer , then it will be constitutional so long as the disclosure requirement is "reasonably related" to the government's interest  This reasonableness review is relatively lenient, especially as compared with the standards that would otherwise apply to compelled speech  But, as emphasized in NIFLA , even under Zauderer , "unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech " Lower courts had previously come to different conclusions regarding whether "unjustified or unduly burdensome" presented an additional inquiry, to be conducted separately from the reasonableness inquiry otherwise prescribed by Zauderer , or whether instead this inquiry was subsumed by the "reasonably related" inquiry  NIFLA did not entirely resolve this issue, although it did frame its analysis using the "unjustified or unduly burdensome" language rather than the language of rational basis review  In Zauderer , the Supreme Court upheld the contingent fee disclosure after concluding that the requirement was "reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers " But as noted above, lower courts have largely concluded that Zauderer 's reasonableness review may govern the analysis even when the government asserts an interest other than preventing consumer deception  The D C  Circuit has, so far, largely declined to articulate a clear standard for "what type of interest might suffice " That court did conclude in one case that where the government's interest was "substantial under Central Hudson 's standard," that would qualify as a sufficient interest under Zauderer   Perhaps taking a different approach, in a case upholding a disclosure requirement under Zauderer , the Second Circuit described the state's interest as "legitimate and significant " Other than "the interest in correcting misleading or confusing commercial speech," the federal courts of appeals have upheld commercial disclosure requirements where the government asserted interests in food safety, preventing obesity, "protecting human health and the environment from mercury poisoning," and in protecting health benefit providers "from questionable       business practices " By contrast, the Second Circuit held in International Dairy Foods Association v  Amestoy that "consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual statement " In NIFLA , the Supreme Court indicated that under Zauderer , the government must assert an interest that is "more than 'purely hypothetical '" As discussed above, the State of California's justification for the notice requiring unlicensed clinics to disclose that they were unlicensed was to "ensur[e] that pregnant women in California know when they are getting medical care from licensed professionals " The Court concluded that the state had "point[ed] to nothing suggesting that pregnant women do not already know that the covered facilities are staffed by unlicensed medical professionals " NIFLA 's requirement that the government provide evidence supporting an asserted interest differs from the Court's approach in Zauderer itself and in Milavetz   In both Zauderer and Milavetz , the Court rejected arguments that the government had failed to present sufficient evidence to support its interest in the disclosure requirement, concluding that in both of those cases, "the possibility of deception" in the regulated advertisements was "self-evident " Although the standard is not entirely clear, it is possible that in future cases the Court could conclude again that a particular advertisement is so obviously deceptive that the government does not need to submit significant evidence proving that the advertisements are misleading  If the government has asserted a sufficient interest, then under Zauderer , it needs to show only that the disputed disclosure requirement is "reasonably related" to that interest  Describing the Supreme Court's decision in Zauderer , the D C  Circuit has said that the "evidentiary parsing" required by more rigorous First Amendment tests "is hardly necessary when the government uses a disclosure mandate to achieve a goal of informing consumers about a particular product trait, assuming of course that the reason for informing consumers qualifies as an adequate interest " That court further elaborated that "[t]he self-evident tendency of a disclosure mandate to assure that recipients get the mandated information may in part explain why, where that is the goal, many such mandates have persisted for decades without anyone questioning their constitutionality " Similarly, the Second Circuit has observed in one case that "while the First Amendment precludes the government from restricting commercial speech without showing that 'the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree,'" the First Amendment "does not demand 'evidence or empirical data' to demonstrate the rationality of mandated disclosures in the commercial context " Notwithstanding the suggestion that little evidence is required to show that a disclosure requirement is reasonably related to an appropriate government interest, lower courts have often relied on the government's evidence supporting the disputed requirement when they uphold the provision  This showing may be easiest where the government asserts an interest in preventing misleading speech, given "the self-evident tendency of a disclosure mandate to assure that recipients get the mandated information " Additionally, courts have sometimes held that commercial disclosure requirements fail even this lenient test for rationality, particularly where the government has asserted an interest other than preventing consumer confusion  For example, in National Association of Manufacturers v  SEC , the D C  Circuit held that a provision requiring companies to disclose whether their products were "conflict free" violated the First Amendment  In defending this rule, the government asserted an interest in "ameliorat[ing] the humanitarian crisis in the [Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)] " In the court's view, however, the government had failed to demonstrate that its measure would achieve this interest  The D C  Circuit observed that the government had "offered little substance beyond" statements by political officials to support "the effectiveness of the measure " The court assumed that the government's theory "must be that the forced disclosure regime will [lead to boycotts that] decrease the revenue of armed groups in the DRC and their loss of revenue will end or at least diminish the humanitarian crisis there " But in the view of the court, this theory could not justify the regulation, as the idea was "entirely unproven and rest[ed] on pure speculation " To take another example, the Third Circuit struck down a commercial disclosure requirement concerning attorney advertising in Dwyer v  Cappell   In that case, an attorney challenged a state regulation that prohibited attorneys from using quotations from judicial opinions in their advertising unless they presented "the full text" of those opinions  The state argued that such quotations were "inherently misleading because laypersons       would understand them to be judicial endorsements " The court, however, said that even assuming "that excerpts of judicial opinions are potentially misleading to some persons," the state had failed "to explain how [an attorney's] providing a complete judicial opinion somehow dispels this assumed threat of deception " The court reasoned that "providing a full judicial opinion does not reveal to a potential client that an excerpt of the same opinion is not an endorsement " Additionally, the court held that the disputed requirement was "unduly burdensome," as it "effectively rules out the possibility that [an attorney] can advertise with even an accurately quoted excerpt of a judicial statement about his abilities " And in the view of the Third Circuit, "that type of restriction—an outright ban on advertising with judicial excerpts—would properly be analyzed under the heightened Central Hudson standard of scrutiny " As Dwyer suggests, courts may strike down disclosure requirements under Zauderer if the requirement is "unduly burdensome " In NIFLA , the Supreme Court held that the unlicensed notice was likely unconstitutional because it "unduly burden[ed] protected speech," noting that it applied to all advertisements for these licensed facilities, regardless of their content  In particular, the majority opinion highlighted one hypothetical discussed at oral argument, noting that "a billboard for an unlicensed facility that says 'Choose Life' would have to surround that two-word statement with a 29-word statement from the government, in as many as 13 different languages " In this instance, the Court said, the notice would "drown[] out the facility's own message," and therefore be unduly burdensome  If a commercial disclosure requirement is not a factual and uncontroversial disclosure related to the speaker's goods or services under Zauderer , courts will likely apply a heightened standard of review  Under prevailing Supreme Court precedent, if a provision does not qualify for Zauderer 's reasonableness review, a court may review the challenged regulation under Central Hudson   As discussed above, Central Hudson established the general standard of review for government restrictions on commercial speech  The Supreme Court described "a four-part analysis:" At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment  For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading  Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial  If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest  The Court has described the Central Hudson test as "intermediate" scrutiny  If a disclosure requirement affects commercial speech but does not qualify for Zauderer review, courts have generally held that Central Hudson 's intermediate scrutiny applies  However, courts have sometimes suggested that some higher standard of review, more stringent than Central Hudson 's intermediate scrutiny, should apply to commercial disclosure requirements that do not qualify for review under Zauderer   Some lower court judges have concluded that because such disclosures compel particular speech and are by definition not content-neutral, they should be evaluated under strict scrutiny  In contrast to Central Hudson review, which requires the government to show that a law is "not more extensive than is necessary to serve" a "substantial" interest, strict scrutiny "requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest " The Supreme Court has suggested—but not squarely held—that at least some types of commercial disclosure requirements might be subject to some form of scrutiny more strict than Central Hudson   In NIFLA , the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of state provisions requiring crisis pregnancy centers to make certain disclosures to clients and in their advertising  The Court suggested that the provision requiring licensed facilities to disseminate notices about state-provided services might be subject to strict scrutiny as a content-based regulation of speech, but concluded that it did not need to resolve that question because the notice could not "survive even intermediate scrutiny " Significantly, however, the NIFLA Court never described the licensed notice as involving commercial speech  In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit had held that the notice should not be subject to strict scrutiny because it regulated "professional speech " That court, like other federal courts of appeals, had recognized "speech that occurs between professionals and their clients in the context of their professional relationship" "as a separate category of speech that is subject to different rules " The Ninth Circuit had concluded that speech that was part of the practice of a profession could be regulated by the state, subject only to intermediate scrutiny  The Court rejected this idea, saying that the First Amendment does not encompass a tradition of lower scrutiny "for a category called 'professional speech '" Ultimately, the Court said that it saw no "persuasive reason" to treat "professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles " To the extent that "professional speech" could be seen to overlap with commercial speech, this sentence could be read to suggest that commercial speech should also be subject to "ordinary First Amendment principles " This suggestion would seem to conflict with prior cases saying that commercial speech occupies a "subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values " Although the NIFLA Court implicitly suggested that disclosure requirements for professionals might constitute commercial speech by evaluating the FACT Act's requirements under Zauderer and Central Hudson , it never expressly clarified whether "professional speech" overlaps with commercial speech  Because the FACT Act's requirements applied outside of the advertising context, it may be open to some debate whether these licensed notices involved commercial speech  The unlicensed notice challenged in NIFLA was required to be included in advertising, and advertisements are "classic examples of commercial speech " But the unlicensed notice was also required to be posted on-site, and the state required licensed facilities to post disclosures on-site or to otherwise distribute the notice to clients directly  Further, in a similar context, at least one federal court of appeals concluded that a Baltimore ordinance requiring certain pregnancy centers to make specified disclosures regulated noncommercial speech  That court said the pregnancy centers were not motivated by economic interest or proposing a commercial transaction, but were instead "provid[ing] free information about pregnancy, abortion, and birth control as informed by a religious and political belief " If the licensed disclosures in NIFLA did not regulate commercial speech, then it would be unsurprising that the Court would consider applying strict scrutiny rather than Central Hudson   Others, however, have pointed out that crisis pregnancy centers, even if they do not charge fees, operate "in a marketplace where other providers generally charge fees," and argued that these centers "are engaged in commercial activity by providing physical and mental health services to pregnant women " And more generally, some have pointed out the similarities between "professional" and commercial speech  The fact that the NIFLA Court did not directly address the relationship between professional and commercial speech may suggest that heightened scrutiny may be necessary with respect to some commercial disclosure requirements  Specifically, the Court did not cite the commercial speech doctrine as "a persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles " At least one commentator has argued that the Court's failure to mention Central Hudson —"not even to dismiss it as       another inapposite exception to Reed 's general rule [of strict scrutiny]"—may suggest that the Court is seeking to limit Central Hudson 's holding that commercial speech may be more freely regulated than other speech under the First Amendment  Although NIFLA may not have expressly altered the framework used to evaluate commercial disclosure requirements, it may nonetheless signal that the Supreme Court will view them with more skepticism in the future  The majority opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, emphasized that "[t]he dangers associated with content-based regulations of speech are also present in the context of professional speech " Even if "professional speech" is not coterminous with "commercial speech," this statement does seem to suggest that the Court believes content neutrality principles are relevant in the commercial sphere  In dissent, Justice Breyer, viewing the majority opinion as adopting such a view, argued that the majority's approach, "if taken literally, could radically change prior law, perhaps placing much securities law or consumer protection law at constitutional risk " He pointed out that "[v]irtually every disclosure law could be considered 'content based,' for virtually every disclosure law requires individuals 'to speak a particular message '" In response to Justice Breyer, the NIFLA majority stated that it did not "question the legality of health and safety warnings long considered permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial products " This view echoed the Court's prior statement that "[p]urely commercial speech is more susceptible to compelled disclosure requirements " Following the Court's 2010 decision in Reed , in which the Court articulated a more "precise test to determine whether speech regulations are content based," many lower courts had rejected the idea that content-based requirements affecting only commercial speech should be subject to strict scrutiny, even if they otherwise discriminated based on content under Reed   But because NIFLA appeared to suggest that content neutrality is relevant in the commercial sphere, it seems reasonable to think that lower courts may now be more likely to conclude that strict scrutiny could apply to content-based commercial disclosure requirements  This would be consistent with what some commentators have described as the Court's increasingly heightened scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech  For now, though, Central Hudson generally continues to govern the analysis of government actions affecting lawful, non-misleading commercial speech, including commercial disclosure requirements that do not qualify for Zauderer review  As discussed, Central Hudson requires that the government prove that its interest is "substantial," and that the regulation "directly advances" that interest and is "not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest " Government regulations are more likely to fail this more rigorous standard than the Zauderer reasonableness standard, often because a court believes there is some less restrictive means available for the government to achieve its goals  Courts will require more "evidence of a measure's effectiveness" under Central Hudson , as compared to Zauderer   However, Central Hudson is more forgiving than strict scrutiny, and courts do uphold government actions infringing on commercial speech under Central Hudson   For example, in Spirit Airlines v  Department of Transportation , the D C  Circuit concluded that a federal regulation governing the way that airlines must display flight prices "satisfie[d]       the Central Hudson test " In the court's view, "[t]he government interest—ensuring the accuracy of commercial information in the marketplace—[was] clearly and directly advanced by a regulation requiring that the total, final price be the most prominent" price displayed  And the regulation was "reasonably tailored to accomplish that end" because the rule "simply regulate[d] the manner of disclosure " Government actions are unlikely to be upheld if a court applies strict scrutiny  Nonetheless, some scholars have argued that many disclosure requirements might survive strict scrutiny, and the Supreme Court has, in rare instances, said that the government may "directly regulate speech to address extraordinary problems, where its regulations are appropriately tailored to resolve those problems without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech " It is possible that a court could hold that the government has a compelling interest in protecting consumers, for example, and that particular disclosures are narrowly tailored to meet that interest  The Supreme Court has long emphasized that the government can regulate commercial activity "deemed harmful to the public " But a court would likely require more proof from the government under strict scrutiny and likely would not simply accept the government's allegations as "self-evident" under such review  Congress has enacted a wide variety of disclosure requirements, many of which arguably compel commercial speech  For example, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 sets out disclosure requirements for registering securities  Federal law, among a host of other food labeling requirements, requires "bioengineered food" to bear a label disclosing that the food is bioengineered  Direct-to-consumer advertisements for prescription drugs must contain a series of disclosures, including the drug's name and side effects  Certain appliances must contain labels disclosing information about their energy efficiency  Bills in the 115 th and 116 th Congresses have proposed additional disclosure requirements, including a bill that would require large online platforms to disclose any studies conducted on users for the purposes of promoting engagement, and a bill that would require public companies to disclose climate-related risks  Recent Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Court is more closely reviewing commercial disclosure requirements, perhaps moving away from a more deferential treatment of such provisions  In NIFLA , the Court held that a disclosure requirement was likely unconstitutional under Zauderer because the government had not presented sufficient evidence to justify the measure —even though in other cases, the Court had rejected similar challenges to commercial disclosure requirements, saying that the government did not need to present more evidence because the harm it sought to remedy was "self-evident " Further, the Court has recently suggested that if a law regulating commercial speech discriminates on the basis of content—as all disclosure requirements seemingly do —then this content discrimination might subject the law to heightened scrutiny  If the Court further embraces this view, it could be a marked departure from its opinions holding that commercial speech could be regulated on the basis of its content, so long as the government's justification for the content discrimination were sufficiently related to its legitimate interests in regulating the speech  In concurring and dissenting opinions that have been joined by other Justices, Justice Breyer has argued that insofar as the Court's recent decisions suggest that commercial disclosure requirements should be subject to heightened scrutiny, they are inconsistent with prior case law and are not a proper application of the First Amendment  The Supreme Court said in NIFLA that it was "not question[ing] the legality of health and safety warnings long considered permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial products " And lower courts have frequently upheld commercial disclosure requirements, perhaps suggesting that disclosures of the kind cited by Justice Breyer are not in danger of wholesale invalidation under the First Amendment  However, the majority opinion in NIFLA did not clarify what kind of disclosures it would consider permissible, and its opinion made clear that disclosure requirements should be scrutinized in light of the speakers they cover and the burdens they pose  Moreover, although the NIFLA Court said that it was not questioning these disclosures' "legality," it left open the possibility that these disclosure should nonetheless be subject to heightened scrutiny  This statement may mean only that the Court believes that many commercial disclosure requirements would meet a higher standard of scrutiny  At least one federal appellate court seems to have taken NIFLA as a signal that lower courts should more closely scrutinize commercial disclosure requirements  In American Beverage Association v  City & County of San Francisco , the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc , relied on NIFLA to reverse a prior decision that had upheld an ordinance requiring "health warnings on advertisements for certain sugar-sweetened beverages " While a panel of judges had previously concluded that the disclosure requirement was constitutional under Zauderer , the full Ninth Circuit, reviewing that decision, said: " NIFLA requires us to reexamine how we approach a First Amendment claim concerning compelled speech " Namely, the court held that, in light of NIFLA , the health warnings were likely unjustified and unduly burdensome under Zauderer , noting that the regulation required the warnings to "occupy at least 20% of those products' labels or advertisements"—but that the record showed that "a smaller warning—half the size—would accomplish [the government's] stated goals " As such, the court held that the warnings violated the First Amendment "by chilling protected speech " Accordingly, when Congress and federal agencies consider adopting new commercial disclosure requirements, or reauthorizing old ones, it may be wise to develop a record with more evidence demonstrating a need for the regulation  Under any level of scrutiny, courts will examine the government's asserted purpose for the legislation, as well as how closely tailored the disclosure requirement is to achieve that purpose  Under Zauderer , particularly in light of NIFLA , courts may ask for evidence to support the government's claim that the regulated speech is misleading or that the government has some other interest in regulating that speech, and will likely scrutinize the disclosure requirement to make sure it is not unduly burdensome  Under intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny, a court may also ask whether the government considered alternative policies that would be less restrictive of speech, examining more closely the government's justifications for choosing a disclosure requirement 


Report 2: Agencies generally acquire equipment from commercial vendors and through GSA, which contracts for the equipment from commercial vendors  In acquiring heavy equipment from a commercial vendor or GSA, agencies can purchase or lease the equipment  Generally, agencies use the term “lease” to refer to acquisitions that are time-limited and therefore distinct from purchases  The term “lease” is used to refer to both long-term and short-term leases  For example, the three agencies we reviewed in-depth use the term “rental” to refer to short-term leases of varying time periods  According to Air Force officials, they define rentals as leases that are less than 120 days while FWS and NPS officials said they generally use the term rental to refer to leases that are a year or less  For the purposes of this report, we use the term “rental” to refer to short-term leases defined as rentals by the agency and “long-term lease” to refer to a lease that is not considered a rental by the agency  (See fig  1 ) In 2013, GSA began offering heavy equipment through its Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part to eliminate ownership and maintenance cost for infrequently used heavy equipment  Under this program, agencies can request a short-term equipment rental (less than a year) from GSA, and GSA will work with a network of commercial vendors to provide the requested heavy equipment  Unlike for some other types of federal property, there are no central reporting requirements for agencies’ inventories of heavy equipment  However, each federal agency is required to maintain inventory controls for its property, which includes heavy equipment  Agencies maintain inventory data through the use of agency-specific databases, and each agency can set its own requirements for what data are required and how these data are maintained  For example, while an agency may choose to maintain data in a headquarters database, it could also choose to maintain data at the local level  As another example, an agency may decide to track and maintain data on the utilization of its heavy equipment (such as the hours used) or may choose not to have such data or require any particular utilization levels  The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) governs the acquisition process of executive branch agencies when acquiring certain goods and services, including heavy equipment  Under the FAR, agencies should consider whether to lease equipment instead of purchasing it based on several factors  Specifically, the FAR provides that agency officials should evaluate cost and other factors by conducting a “lease-versus-purchase” analysis before acquiring heavy equipment  Additionally, DOD’s regulations require its component agencies to prepare a justification supporting lease-versus-purchase decisions if the equipment is to be leased for more than 60 days  Twenty agencies reported data on their owned heavy equipment, including the (1) number, (2) types, (3) acquisition year, and (4) location of agencies’ owned heavy equipment in their inventories as of June 2017  The 20 agencies reported owning over 136,000 heavy equipment items  DOD reported owning most of this heavy equipment—over 100,000 items, about 74 percent  (See app  I for more information on agencies’ ownership of these items ) The Department of Agriculture reported owning the second highest number of heavy equipment items—almost 9,000 items, about 6 percent  (See fig  2 ) Four agencies—the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Agency for International Development—reported owning five or fewer heavy equipment items each  The 20 agencies reported owning various types of heavy equipment, such as cranes, backhoes, and road maintenance equipment in five categories: (1) construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance equipment; (2) airfield-specialized trucks and trailers; (3) self-propelled warehouse trucks and tractors; (4) tractors; and (5) soil preparation and harvesting equipment  Thirty-eight percent (almost 52,000 items) were in the construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance category (see fig  3)  Fifteen of the 20 agencies reported owning at least some items in this category  Twenty-four percent (over 33,000 items) were in the airfield- specialized trucks and trailers category, generally used to service and re-position aircraft on runways  DOD reported owning 99 percent (over 32,000) of these items, while 9 other agencies, including the Department of Labor and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, reported owning the other one percent (317 items)  Twenty-two percent (over 29,000 items) were in the self-propelled warehouse trucks and tractors category, which includes equipment such as forklift trucks  All 20 agencies reported owning at least one item in this category, and five agencies—the Agency for International Development, Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Office of Personnel Management—reported owning only items in this category  (For additional information on agencies’ ownership of heavy equipment in various categories, see app  I ) The twenty agencies reported acquiring their owned heavy equipment between 1944 and 2017, with an average of about 13 years since acquisition (see fig  4)  One heavy equipment manager we interviewed reported that a dump truck can last 10 to 15 years, whereas other types of equipment can last for decades if regularly used and well-maintained  The 20 agencies reported that over 117,000 heavy equipment items (86 percent) were located within the United States or its territories  Of these, about one-fifth (over 26,000) were located in California and Virginia, the two states with the most heavy equipment (see fig  5)  Of the equipment located outside of the United States and its territories, 94 percent was owned by the Department of Defense  The rest was owned by the Department of State (714 items in 141 countries from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe) and the National Science Foundation (237 items in areas such as Antarctica)  The twenty agencies reported spending over $7 4 billion in 2016 dollars to acquire the heavy equipment they own (see table 1)  However, actual spending was higher because this inflation-adjusted figure excludes over 37,000 heavy equipment items for which the agencies did not report acquisition cost or acquisition year, or both  Without this information, we could not determine the inflation-adjusted cost and therefore did not include the cost of these items in our calculation  The Army owns almost all of these items, having not reported acquisition cost or acquisition year, or both, for 36,589 heavy equipment items because, according to Army officials, the data were not available centrally but may have been available at individual Army units and would have been resource- intensive to obtain  The heavy equipment items reported by the 20 agencies ranged in acquisition cost from zero dollars to over $2 million in 2016 dollars, with an average acquisition cost in 2016 dollars of about $78,000, excluding assets with a reported acquisition cost of $0  Of the items which we adjusted to 2016 dollars and for which non-zero acquisition costs were provided: 94 percent cost less than $250,000 and accounted for 57 percent of the total adjusted acquisition costs (See fig  6 ) 6 percent of items cost more than $250,000 and accounted for 43 percent of the adjusted acquisition costs  (See fig  6 ) High-cost items included a $779,000 hydraulic crane acquired by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1997 ($1 2 million in 2016 dollars), a $1 4 million ultra-deep drilling simulator acquired by the Department of Energy in 2009 ($1 6 million in 2016 dollars), and several $2 2 million well-drilling machines acquired by the Air Force in 2013 ($2 3 million in 2016 dollars)  In calendar years 2012 through 2016, the Air Force, FWS, and NPS purchased almost 3,500 pieces of heavy equipment through GSA and private vendors at a total cost of about $360 million to support mission needs  (See table 2 ) These agencies also spent over $5 million on long- term leases and rentals during this time period  The Air Force spent over $300 million to purchase over 2,600 heavy equipment assets in calendar years 2012 through 2016 that were used to support and maintain its bases globally  For example, according to Air Force officials, heavy equipment is often used to maintain runways and service and reposition aircraft on runways  While the majority of Air Force heavy equipment purchased in this time period is located in the United States, 41 percent of this heavy equipment is located outside the United States and its territories in 17 foreign countries to support global military bases  The Air Force could not provide complete information on its heavy equipment leases for fiscal years 2012 through 2016  Specifically, the Air Force provided data on 33 commercial heavy equipment leases that were ongoing as of August 2017 but could not provide cost data for these leases because this information is not tracked centrally  Additionally, the Air Force could not provide any data on leases that occurred previously because, according to Air Force officials, lease records are removed from the Air Force database upon termination of the lease  Officials said that rentals are generally handled locally and obtaining complete data would require a data call to over 300 base contracting offices  Air Force officials stated that rentals are generally used in unique situations involving short- term needs such as responding to natural disasters  For example, following Hurricane Sandy, staff at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia used rental equipment to clean up and repair the base  Although Air Force did not provide complete information on rentals, data we obtained from GSA’s Short-Term Rental program indicated that Air Force rented heavy equipment in 46 transactions not reflected in the Air Force data we received totaling over $3 7 million since GSA began offering heavy equipment through its Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program in 2013  FWS spent over $32 million to purchase 348 heavy equipment assets from calendar years 2012 through 2016  FWS used its heavy equipment to maintain refuge areas throughout the United States and its territories, including maintaining roads and nature trails  FWS also used heavy equipment to respond to inclement weather and natural disasters  Most of the heavy equipment items purchased by FWS were in the construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance equipment category and include items such as excavators, which were used for moving soil, supplies, and other resources  FWS officials reported that they did not have any long-term leases for any heavy equipment in fiscal years 2012 through 2016 because they encourage equipment sharing and rentals to avoid long-term leases whenever possible  FWS officials provided data on 228 rentals for this time period with a total cost of over $1 million  Information regarding these rentals is contained in an Interior-wide property management system, the Financial Business Management System (FBMS)  FWS officials told us that they have not rented heavy equipment through GSA’s program because they have found lower prices through local equipment rental companies  NPS spent over $27 million to purchase 471 heavy equipment assets from calendar years 2012 through 2016  NPS uses heavy equipment— located throughout the United States and its territories—to maintain national parks and respond to inclement weather and natural disasters  For example, NPS used heavy equipment such as dump trucks, snow plows, road graders, and wheel loaders to clear and salt the George Washington Memorial Parkway in Washington, D C , following snow and ice storms  Most of the heavy equipment items purchased by NPS were in the construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance equipment category and include items such as excavators, which are used for moving soil, supplies, and other resources  NPS reported spending about $360,000 on 230 long-term leases and rentals in fiscal years 2012 through 2016, not including rentals through GSA’s Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program  As with FWS, NPS leases and rentals are contained in FBMS, which is Interior’s property management system  Data we obtained from GSA’s Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program indicated that NPS rented heavy equipment in 26 transactions totaling over $200,000 since GSA began offering heavy equipment through its Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program in 2013, for a potential total cost of over $560,000 for these long-term leases and rentals  As mentioned earlier, the FAR provides that executive branch agencies seeking to acquire equipment should consider whether it is more economical to lease equipment rather than purchase it and identifies factors agencies should consider in this analysis, such as estimated length of the period that the equipment is to be used, the extent of use in that time period, and maintenance costs  This analysis is commonly referred to as a lease-versus-purchase analysis  While the FAR does not specifically require that agencies document their lease-versus-purchase analyses, according to federal internal control standards, management should clearly document all transactions and other significant events in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination and also communicate quality information to enable staff to complete their responsibilities  As discussed below, we found that most acquisitions we reviewed from FWS, NPS, and the Air Force did not contain any documentation of a lease-versus-purchase analysis  Specifically, officials were unable to provide documentation of a lease-versus-purchase analysis for six of the eight acquisitions we reviewed  FWS officials were able to provide documentation for the other two  Officials told us that a lease-versus- purchase analysis was not conducted for five of the six acquisitions and did not know if such analysis was conducted for the other acquisition  According to agency officials, the main reason why analyses were not conducted or documented for these six acquisitions is that the circumstances in which such analyses were to be performed or documented were not always clear to FWS, NPS, and Air Force officials  In addition to the FAR, Interior has agency guidance stating that bureaus should conduct and document lease-versus-purchase analyses  This July 2013 guidance—that FWS and NPS are to follow—states that requesters of equipment valued at $15,000 or greater should perform a lease-versus- purchase analysis when requesting heavy equipment  According to the guidance, this analysis should address criteria in the FAR and include a discussion of the financial and operating advantages of alternate approaches that would help contracting officials determine the final appropriate acquisition method  At the time the guidance was issued, Interior also provided a lease-versus-purchase analysis tool to aid officials in conducting this analysis  Additionally, in April 2016, Interior issued a policy to implement the July 2013 guidance  The 2016 policy clarifies that program offices are required to complete Interior’s lease-versus-purchase analysis tool and provide the completed analysis to the relevant contracting officer  Within Interior, bureaus are responsible for ensuring that procurement requirements are met, including the requirements and directives outlined in Interior’s 2013 guidance and 2016 policy on lease-versus-purchase analyses, according to agency officials  Within FWS, local procurement specialists prepare procurement requests and ensure that procurement requirements are met and that all viable options have been considered  Regional equipment managers review these procurement requests, decide whether to purchase or lease the requested equipment, and prepare the lease-versus-purchase analysis tool if the procurement specialist has indicated that it is required  Within NPS, local procurement specialists are responsible for ensuring that all procurements adhere to relevant requirements and directives, including documenting the lease- versus-purchase analysis  Of the three FWS heavy equipment acquisitions we reviewed for which the 2013 Interior guidance was applicable, one included a completed lease-versus-purchase analysis tool; one documented the rationale for purchasing rather than leasing, although it did not include Interior’s lease- versus-purchase analysis tool; and one did not include any documentation related to a lease-versus-purchase analysis  (See table 3 ) Regarding the acquisition for which no documentation of a lease-versus- purchase analysis was provided—a 12-month lease of an excavator and associated labor costs for over $19,000—FWS officials initially told us that a lease-versus-purchase analysis was not required because the equipment lease was less than $15,000, and Interior’s guidance required a lease-versus-purchase analysis for procurements of equipment valued at $15,000 or greater  However, we found the guidance did not specify whether the $15,000 threshold includes the cost of labor  We also found that Interior’s guidance did not specify if a lease-versus-purchase analysis was required if the total cost of a rental is less than the purchase price  FWS officials acknowledged that Interior guidance is not clear and that it would be helpful for Interior to clarify whether these leases require a lease-versus-purchase analysis  NPS officials were unable to provide documentation of a lease-versus- purchase analysis for the single heavy equipment acquisition we reviewed—the purchase of a wheeled tractor in 2015 for $43,177  According to these officials, they could not do so because of personnel turnover in the contracting office that would have documented the analysis  In addition, they told us that they believe that such analyses are not always completed for heavy equipment acquisitions because responsibility for completing these analyses is unclear  Specifically, they told us that it was unclear whether the responsibility lies with the official requesting the equipment, the contracting personnel who facilitate the acquisition, or the property personnel who manage inventory data  However, when we discussed our findings with Interior and NPS officials, NPS officials were made aware of the 2016 Interior policy that specifically requires program offices—the officials requesting the equipment—to complete the lease-versus-purchase analysis and provide documentation of this analysis to the contracting officer  As a result, NPS officials told us at the end of our review that program office officials will now be required to complete the lease-versus-purchase analysis tool and document this analysis  According to Air Force officials responsible for managing heavy equipment, financial or budget personnel at individual bases are responsible for conducting lease-versus-purchase analyses, also called economic analyses, to support purchase and lease requests  Air Force fleet officials told us that they then review these requests from a fleet perspective, considering factors such as whether the cost information provided in the request is from a reputable source, expected maintenance costs, and whether a requesting base has the capability to maintain the requested equipment  However, they said they do not check to ensure that a lease-versus-purchase analysis was completed or review the analysis  Equipment rentals can be approved at individual bases  In our review of four Air Force heavy equipment acquisitions, we found no instances in which Air Force officials documented a lease-versus- purchase analysis (see table 4)  For the acquisitions that we reviewed, Air Force officials told us they did not believe a lease-versus-purchase analysis was required because the new equipment was either replacing old equipment that was previously approved or could be deployed  Accordingly, the Air Force purchased two forklifts in 2013 without conducting lease-versus-purchase analyses because the forklifts were replacing old forklifts that were authorized in 1997 and 2005  Furthermore, Air Force officials told us that both of these forklifts could be deployed and indicated that lease-versus-purchase analyses are not required for deployable equipment  However, the Air Force does not have guidance that describes the circumstances that require either a lease-versus-purchase analysis or documentation of the rationale for not completing such analysis  Although we identified several instances in which officials in the three selected agencies did not document lease-versus-purchase analyses, officials from these agencies stated that they consider mission needs and equipment availability, among other factors, when making these decisions  For example, Air Force officials told us following Hurricane Sandy, staff at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia used rental equipment to clean and repair the base because the equipment was needed immediately to ensure the base could meet its mission  Moreover, availability of heavy equipment for lease or rental, which can be affected by factors such as geography and competition for equipment, is a key consideration  For example, FWS officials told us that the specialized heavy equipment sometimes needed may not be available for long-term lease or rent in remote areas such as Alaska and the Midway Islands, so the agency purchases the equipment  In addition, some agency officials told us that they may purchase heavy equipment even if that equipment is needed only sporadically if there is likely to be high demand for rental equipment  For example, following inclement weather or a natural disaster, demand for certain heavy equipment rentals can be high and equipment may not be available to rent when it is needed  While we recognize that mission needs and other factors are important considerations, without greater clarity regarding when to conduct or document lease-versus-purchase analyses, officials at FWS, NPS, and Air Force may not be conducting such analyses when appropriate and may not always make the best acquisition decisions  These agencies could be overspending on leased equipment that would be more cost- effective if purchased or overspending to purchase equipment when it would be more cost-effective to lease or rent  Moreover, without documenting decisions on whether to purchase or lease equipment, they lack information that could be used to inform future acquisition decisions for similar types of equipment or projects  Air Force guidance requires that fleet managers collect utilization data for both vehicles and heavy equipment items, such as the number of hours used, miles traveled, and maintenance costs  The Air Force provided us with utilization data for over 18,000 heavy equipment items and uses such data to inform periodic base validations  Specifically, Air Force officials said that every 3 to 5 years each Air Force base reviews the on- base equipment to ensure that the installation has the appropriate heavy equipment to complete its mission and reviews utilization data to identify items that are underutilized  If heavy equipment is considered underutilized, the equipment is relocated—either moved to another location or sent to the Defense Logistics Agency for reuse or transfer to another agency  According to Air Force officials the Air Force has relocated over 700 heavy equipment items based on the results of the validation process and other factors such as replacing older items and agency needs since 2014  Similarly, FWS guidance for managing heavy equipment utilization sets forth minimum utilization hours for certain types of heavy equipment and describes requirements for reporting utilization data  FWS provided us with utilization data on over 3,000 heavy equipment items  According to officials, condition assessments of heavy equipment are required by FWS guidance every 3 to 5 years  According to FWS officials, condition assessments inform regional-level decision making about whether to move equipment to another FWS location or dispose of the equipment  In contrast, NPS does not require the collection of utilization data to evaluate heavy equipment use and does not have guidance for managing heavy equipment utilization  However, NPS officials told us that they recognize the need for such guidance  NPS officials shared with us draft guidance that they have developed, which would require collection of utilization data for heavy equipment such as hours or days of usage each month  According to NPS officials, they plan to send the guidance to the NPS policy office for final review in March 2018  Until this guidance is completed and published, NPS is taking interim actions to manage the utilization of its heavy equipment  For example, NPS officials stated that they have asked NPS locations to collect and post monthly utilization data, discussed the collection of utilization data at fleet meetings, and distributed job aids to support this effort  During the course of our review, NPS officials provided us with some utilization data for about 1,400 of the more than 2,400 NPS heavy equipment items  Specifically, for the 1,459 heavy equipment items for which NPS provided utilization data, 541 items had utilization data for each month  For the remaining 918 items, utilization data were reported for some, but not all months  The federal government has spent billions of dollars to acquire heavy equipment  There is no requirement that agencies report on the inventory of this equipment, as there is no standard definition of heavy equipment  When deciding how to acquire this equipment, agencies’ should conduct a lease-versus-purchase analysis as provided in the FAR, which is a critical mechanism to ensure agencies are acquiring the equipment in the most cost-effective manner  Because FWS, NPS and the Air Force were unclear when such an analysis was required, they did not consistently conduct or document analyses of whether it was more economical to purchase or lease heavy equipment  In the absence of clarity on the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchase analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented, the agencies may not be spending funds on heavy equipment cost- effectively  We are making two recommendations—one to the Air Force and one to the Department of the Interior  The Secretary of the Air Force should develop guidance to clarify the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchase analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of the Interior should further clarify in guidance the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchase analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Justice, Labor, State, and Veterans Affairs; General Services Administration; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; National Science Foundation; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Personnel Management; and U S  Agency for International Development  The departments of Agriculture, Energy, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, State and Veterans Affairs, as well as the General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management; and U S  Agency for International Development did not have comments  The Department of Labor provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  In written comments, reproduced in appendix III, the Department of Defense stated that it concurred with our recommendation and plans to issue a bulletin to Air Force contracting officials  In written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, the Department of the Interior stated that it concurred with our recommendation and plans to implement it  If you or members of your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or RectanusL@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V  Specialized Trucks and Trailers 37   Self-Propelled Warehouse Trucks and Tractors 1,733 3                                       Specialized Trucks and Trailers 7   Self-Propelled Warehouse Trucks and Tractors 2,925 134                                     Specialized Trucks and Trailers   Self-Propelled Warehouse Trucks and Tractors 146             7       - 109       Self-Propelled Warehouse Trucks and Tractors 575 64 40                       4                   Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Personnel Management Social Security Administration United States Agency for International Development Grand Total         This report addresses: (1) the number, type, and cost of heavy equipment items that are owned by the 24 CFO Act agencies; (2) the heavy equipment items selected agencies have recently acquired and how selected agencies decided to purchase or lease this equipment; and (3) how selected agencies manage the utilization of their heavy equipment  To identify the number, type, and cost of heavy equipment owned by federal agencies, we first interviewed officials at the General Services Administration to determine whether there were government-wide reporting requirements for owned heavy equipment and learned that there are no such requirements  We then obtained and analyzed data on agencies’ spending on equipment purchases and leases from the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS-NG), which contains government-wide data on agencies’ contracts  However, in reviewing the data available and identifying issues with the reliability of the data, we determined that data on contracts would not be sufficient to answer the question of what heavy equipment the 24 CFO Act agencies own  We therefore conducted a data collection effort to obtain heavy equipment inventory information from the 24 CFO Act agencies, which are the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs; Environmental Protection Agency; General Services Administration; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; National Science Foundation; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Personnel Management; Small Business Administration; Social Security Administration; and Agency for International Development  Because there is no generally accepted definition of heavy equipment, we identified 12 federal supply classes in which the majority of items are self- propelled equipment but not passenger vehicles or items that are specific to combat and tactical purposes, as these items are generally not considered to be heavy equipment  (See table 5 ) We then vetted the appropriateness of these selected supply classes with Interior, FWS, NPS, and Air Force agency officials, as well as with representatives from a fleet management consultancy and a rental company, and they generally agreed that items in selected federal supply classes are considered heavy equipment  Federal supply classes are used in FPDS- NG and are widely used in agencies’ inventory systems  Overall, about 90 percent of the heavy equipment items that agencies reported were assigned a federal supply class in the agency’s inventory data  In discussing heavy equipment categories in the report, we use the category titles below  To identify points of contact at the 24 CFO Act agencies, we obtained GSA’s list of contact information for agencies’ national utilization officers, who are agency property officers who coordinate with GSA  As a preliminary step, we contacted these individuals at each of the 24 CFO Act agencies and asked them to either confirm that they were the appropriate contacts or provide contact information for the appropriate contact and to inform us if they do not own heavy equipment  Officials at 4 agencies—Department of Education, Department of the Treasury, General Services Administration, and Small Business Administration— indicated that the agency did not own any items in the relevant federal supply classes  Officials at 16 of these agencies indicated that they would be able to respond on a departmental level because the relevant inventory data are maintained centrally, while officials at 4 agencies indicated that we would need to obtain responses from officials at some other level because the relevant inventory data are not maintained centrally  (See table 7 for a list of organizations within the 20 CFO Act agencies that indicated they own relevant equipment and responded to our data collection effort ) After identifying contacts responsible for agencies’ heavy-equipment inventory data, we prepared data collection instruments for requesting information on heavy equipment and tested these documents with representatives from 4 of the 20 CFO Act agencies that indicated they own heavy equipment to ensure that the documents were clear and logical and that respondents would be able to provide the requested data and answer the questions without undue burden  These agency representatives were selected to provide a variety of spending on federal supply group 38 equipment as reported in FPDS-NG, civilian and military agencies, and different levels at which the agency would be responding to the data collection effort (e g , at the departmental level or at a sub- departmental level)  Our data collection instrument requested the following data on respondent organizations’ owned assets in 12 federal supply classes as of June 2017: Respondents provided data on original acquisition costs in nominal terms, with some acquisitions occurring over 50 years ago  In order to provide a fixed point of reference for appropriate comparison, we present in our report inflation-adjusted acquisition costs using calendar year 2016 as the reference  To adjust these dollar amounts for inflation, we used the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Producer Price Index by Commodity for Machinery and Equipment: Construction Machinery and Equipment (WPU112), compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of St  Louis  We conducted the data collection effort from July 2017 through October 2017 and received responses from all 20 agencies that indicated they own heavy equipment  In order to assess the reliability of agencies’ reported data, we collected and reviewed agencies’ responses regarding descriptions of their inventory systems, frequency of data entry, agency uses of the data, and agencies’ opinions on potential limitations of the use of their data in our analysis  We conducted some data cleaning, which included examining the data for obvious errors and eliminating outliers  We did not verify the data or responses received; the results of our data collection effort are used only for descriptive purposes and are not generalizable beyond the 24 CFO Act agencies  Based on the steps we took, we found these data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes  To determine the heavy equipment items that selected agencies recently acquired and how these agencies decided whether to purchase or lease this equipment, we first used data from the FPDS-NG to identify agencies that appeared to have the highest obligations for construction or heavy equipment, or both, and used this information, along with other factors, to select DOD and Interior  At the time, in the absence of a generally accepted definition of heavy equipment, we reviewed data related to federal supply group 38—construction, mining, excavating, and highway maintenance equipment—because (1) we had not yet defined heavy equipment for the purposes of our review; (2) agency officials had told us that most of what could be considered heavy equipment was in this federal supply group; and (3) our analysis of data from usaspending gov showed that about 80 percent of spending on items that may be considered heavy equipment were in this federal supply group  In meeting with officials at these departments, we learned that agencies within each department manage heavy equipment independently, so we requested current inventory data for Interior bureaus and the DOD military departments and selected three agencies that had among the largest inventories of construction and/or heavy equipment at the time, among other criteria: the U S  Air Force (Air Force); the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); and the National Park Service (NPS)  We then used information from our data collection effort—which included the number, type, cost, acquisition year and other data elements—to determine heavy equipment items that these agencies acquired during 2012 through 2016  We interviewed agency officials to determine what lease data were available from the three selected agencies  We assessed the reliability of these data with agency official interviews and reviewed the data for completeness and potential outliers  We determined that the data provided were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of documenting leased and rental heavy equipment  We also obtained data from GSA’s Short- Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program for August 2012, when the first item was rented under this program, to February 2017, when GSA provided the data  We used these data to identify selected agencies’ rentals of heavy equipment through GSA’s Short-Term Rental program, which had previously been limited to passenger vehicles, in part program and associated costs  We interviewed officials from GSA’s Short-Term Rental program to discuss the program history as well as the reliability of their data on these rented heavy equipment items  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes  To determine how the three selected agencies decide whether to purchase or lease heavy equipment, we interviewed fleet and property managers at these selected agencies and asked them to describe their process for making these decisions as well as to identify relevant federal and agency regulations and guidance  We reviewed relevant federal and agency regulations and guidance regarding how agencies should make these decisions, including: Federal Acquisition Regulation, Office of Management Budget’s A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit- Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Air Force Manual 65-506, Air Force Guidance Memorandum to Air Force Instruction 65-501, and Interior’s Guidance On Lease Versus Purchase Analysis and Capital Lease Determination for Equipment Leases  We also reviewed the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government for guidance on documentation as well as past GAO work that reviewed agencies’ lease-versus-purchase analyses  To determine whether the three selected federal agencies documented lease-versus-purchase decisions for selected acquisitions and adhered to relevant agency guidance, we selected and reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 10 heavy equipment acquisitions—two purchases each from the Air Force, FWS, and NPS, and two leases each from the Air Force and FWS  Specifically, we used inventory data obtained through our data collection effort, described above, to randomly select two heavy equipment purchases from each selected agency using the following criteria: calendar years 2012 through 2016; the two federal supply classes most prevalent in each selected agency’s heavy equipment inventory, as determined by the data collection effort described above; and for NPS and FWS, acquisition costs of over $15,000  In addition, we used lease data provided by the Air Force and FWS to randomly selected two heavy equipment leases per agency  Because NPS could not provide data on heavy equipment leases, we did not select or review any NPS lease decisions  To select the Air Force and FWS leases we used the following criteria: fiscal years 2012 through 2016; for the Air Force, which included federal supply classes in the lease data provided, the two federal supply classes most prevalent in the lease data and for FWS, which did not include federal supply class in the lease data provided, the two federal supply classes most prevalent in the purchase data; and for FWS, leases over $15,000  After selecting these acquisitions, we determined that one FWS lease and one NPS purchase we selected pre-dated Interior’s 2013 guidance on lease-versus-purchase analysis and excluded these acquisitions from our analysis for a total of eight acquisitions  In reviewing agencies’ documentation related to these acquisitions, we developed a data collection instrument to assess the extent to which agencies documented lease-versus-purchase analyses and, in the case of FWS and NPS, adhered to relevant Interior guidance  We supplemented our review of these acquisition decisions with additional information by interviewing officials at the three selected agencies and requesting additional information to understand specific circumstances surrounding each procurement  Our findings are not generalizable across the federal government or within each selected department  To determine how selected agencies manage heavy equipment utilization, we interviewed officials at the three selected agencies to identify departmental and agency-specific guidance and policies and to determine whether utilization requirements exist  We reviewed guidance identified by these officials, including Interior and Air Force vehicle guidance, both of which apply to heavy equipment, and FWS’s Heavy Equipment Utilization and Replacement Handbook  We also compared their practices to relevant Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  For the selected agencies with guidance for managing heavy equipment—Air Force and FWS—we reviewed the guidance to determine if and how selected agencies measured and documented heavy equipment utilization  For example, we reviewed whether selected agencies developed reports for managing heavy equipment utilization such as Air Force validation reports and FWS conditional assessment reports  We also reviewed Air Force, FWS, and NPS utilization data for heavy equipment but we did not independently calculate or verify the utilization rate for individual heavy equipment items because each heavy equipment item (backhoe, forklift, tractor, etc ,) has different utilization requirements depending on various factors such as the brand, model, or age of equipment  However, we did request information about agency procedures to develop and verify utilization rates  We assessed the reliability of the utilization data with agency official interviews and a review of the data for completeness and potential outliers  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing evidence of utilization data collection for heavy equipment assets  We also visited the NPS George Washington Memorial Parkway to interview equipment maintenance officials regarding the procurement and management of heavy equipment and to document photos of heavy equipment  We selected this site because of its range of heavy equipment and close proximity to the Capital region  We conducted this performance audit from October 2016 to February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the individual named above, John W  Shumann (Assistant Director), Rebecca Rygg (Analyst in Charge), Nelsie Alcoser, Melissa Bodeau, Terence Lam, Ying Long, Josh Ormond, Kelly Rubin, Crystal Wesco, and Elizabeth Wood made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: Federal agencies use heavy equipment such as cranes and forklifts to carry out their missions, but there is no government-wide data on federal agencies' acquisition or management of this equipment. GAO was asked to review federal agencies' management of heavy equipment. This report, among other objectives, examines: (1) the number, type, and costs of heavy equipment items that are owned by 20 federal agencies and (2) the heavy equipment that selected agencies recently acquired as well as how they decided whether to purchase or lease this equipment. GAO collected heavy equipment inventory data as of June 2017 from the 24 agencies that have chief financial officers responsible for overseeing financial management. GAO also selected three agencies (using factors such as the heavy equipment fleet's size) and reviewed their acquisitions of and guidance on heavy equipment. These agencies' practices are not generalizable to all acquisitions but provide insight into what efforts these agencies take to acquire thousands of heavy equipment items. GAO also interviewed officials at the three selected agencies. Of the 24 agencies GAO reviewed, 20 reported owning over 136,000 heavy equipment items such as cranes, backhoes, and forklifts, and spending over $7.4 billion (in 2016 dollars) to acquire this equipment. The remaining 4 agencies reported that they do not own any heavy equipment. The three selected agencies GAO reviewed in-depth—the Air Force within the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service within the Department of the Interior (Interior)—spent about $360 million to purchase about 3,500 heavy equipment assets in calendar years 2012 through 2016 and over $5 million to lease heavy equipment from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Officials from all three agencies stated that they consider mission needs and the availability of equipment leases when deciding whether to lease or purchase heavy equipment. Federal regulations provide that agencies should consider whether it is more economical to lease or purchase equipment when acquiring heavy equipment, and federal internal control standards require that management clearly document all transactions in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination. However, in reviewing selected leases and purchases of heavy equipment from these three agencies, GAO found that officials did not consistently conduct or document lease-versus-purchase analyses. Officials at the Air Force and Interior said that there was a lack of clarity in agency policies about when they were required to conduct and document such analyses. Without greater clarity on when lease-versus-purchase analyses should be conducted and documented, these agencies may not be spending funds on heavy equipment effectively. The Department of the Interior and the Air Force should clarify the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchases analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented. The Departments of the Interior and Defense concurred with these recommendations.