prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: The Navy currently has 51 attack submarines—comprising 33 Los Angeles class, 3 Seawolf class, and 15 Virginia class submarines (see fig  1)  Attack submarines are homeported at bases in the United States: in New London, Connecticut; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Norfolk, Virginia; San Diego, California; and Bangor, Washington; 4 are homeported overseas, in the U S  territory of Guam  Submarine Safety Controls and Culture On April 10, 1963, the USS Thresher (SSN 593) sank during deep submergence tests off the coast of New England  One hundred and twelve officers and enlisted sailors and 17 civilians perished in the tragedy  The accident investigation concluded that the Navy did not have adequate procedures in place to prevent and respond to a catastrophic flooding incident  time, and that maintenance delays reduce the amount of time during which ships and submarines are available for training and operations  Submarine fleet and squadron officials emphasized the strict safety culture that permeates the submarine community  This emphasis on meeting safety certification criteria means that the Navy operates a supply-based submarine force that does not compromise on adherence to training and maintenance standards to meet combatant commander demands, according to these officials (see sidebar)  Officials added that the Navy will delay deployment dates if necessary to ensure that these standards are met  As a result, deployed readiness is high and attack submarines are in excellent materiel condition as compared with the rest of the Navy fleet  The loss of the USS Thresher and its crew spurred the Navy to establish stringent safety requirements for submarines to prevent another loss at sea  Following the accident, the Navy established submarine safety certification criteria to provide maximum reasonable assurance that critical systems would protect the crew from flooding and allow the submarine to conduct an emergency surfacing should flooding occur  This program, known as SUBSAFE, is still in use today, to ensure that these critical systems receive a high quality of work and that all work is properly documented  According to the Navy, the SUBSAFE certification status of a submarine is fundamental to its mission capability, as it provides a thorough and systematic approach to quality, and to a culture that permeates the entire submarine community  According to Navy officials, since the SUBSAFE program was established in 1963, no SUBSAFE-certified submarine has ever been lost  The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and support cost expenditures  Our analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between fiscal year 2008 and the end of fiscal year 2018, attack submarines will have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards  Our analysis found that the primary driver affecting attack submarines are delays in completing depot maintenance  For example, of the 10,363 total days of lost time since fiscal year 2008, 8,472 (82 percent) were due to depot maintenance delays  As we previously reported, completing ship and submarine maintenance on time is essential to Navy readiness, as maintenance periods lasting longer than planned could reduce the number of days during which ships and crews are available for training or operations  Attack submarines also face delays in beginning maintenance when the public shipyards have no available capacity, in some cases forcing submarines to idle pierside because they are no longer certified to conduct normal operations  According to Navy officials, the SUBSAFE program—its program to ensure and certify submarine safety—requires submarines to adhere to strict maintenance schedules and pass materiel condition assessments before they are allowed to submerge  Attack submarines that go too long without receiving required maintenance are at risk of having their materiel certification expire  Should this certification expire, these submarines are restricted to sitting idle, pierside, while they wait until a shipyard has the capacity to begin their maintenance period (see fig  2)  We found that since fiscal year 2008, 14 attack submarines have spent a combined 61 months (1,891 days) idling while waiting to enter shipyards for maintenance  Idle time incurred while waiting to begin a maintenance period is often coupled with maintenance delays while at the shipyards, thus compounding total delays  We also found that the Navy incurs significant costs in operating and supporting submarines that are experiencing maintenance delays and idle time  We analyzed the operating and support costs the Navy incurs on average to estimate the costs of crewing, maintaining, and supporting attack submarines that are delayed in getting into and out of the shipyards  Using historical daily cost data the Navy adjusted for inflation, we estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has spent more than $1 5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars on attack submarines sitting idle while waiting to enter the shipyards, and on those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards (see table 1)  While the Navy would incur these costs regardless of whether the submarine was delayed, idled, or deployed, our estimate of $1 5 billion represents costs incurred from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2018 for attack submarines without receiving any operational capability in return  While acknowledging the magnitude of these costs, Navy officials stated that there may be some benefits that could be realized from these operating and support costs since crews on idle attack submarines can conduct some limited training  Operating and support costs include payment of crew salaries, purchasing of spare parts, and conducting of maintenance, among other things, but they do not represent the full operational impact incurred by the Navy from the idle time and maintenance delays  For example, attack submarine depot-level maintenance requires the use of a drydock, and officials from the three public shipyards we visited told us that their drydock capacity was limited  A delayed attack submarine maintenance period can restrict the use of a drydock for much longer than originally anticipated, thereby preventing the shipyard from using that drydock to maintain other vessels, including other types of ships, or to conduct necessary repairs on the facilities  The Navy has started to address workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards  These efforts to address the Navy’s maintenance challenges are important steps, but they will require several years of sustained management attention to reach fruition  As we reported in September 2017, maintenance on ships and submarines may be delayed for numerous reasons, including workforce gaps and inexperience, the poor condition of facilities and equipment, parts shortages, changes in planned maintenance work, and weather  According to Navy officials, all of these issues continue to affect the Navy’s ability to complete attack submarine maintenance on time  According to officials, the Navy has begun to address some of these challenges  For example: The public shipyards have been hiring to address workforce shortages  The number of civilian full-time employees at the shipyards increased from 25,087 in 2007 to 34,160 in 2017, with a goal to reach 36,100 by 2020  Navy officials cautioned that this newly hired workforce is largely inexperienced and will require time to attain full proficiency  The Navy has released a plan to guide public shipyard capital investments  In September 2017 we reported that the Navy projected an inability to support 50 planned submarine maintenance periods over the ensuing 23 years, due to capacity and capability shortfalls at the public shipyards  We recommended that the Navy develop a comprehensive plan for shipyard capital investment  In February 2018 the Navy published its shipyard optimization plan, outlining an estimated $21 billion investment needed to address shipyard facility and equipment needs over 20 years to meet the operational needs of the current Navy fleet, but not the larger fleet size planned for the future  While the public shipyards have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing  The Navy expects the maintenance backlogs at the public shipyards to continue  We estimate that, as a result of these backlogs, the Navy will incur approximately $266 million in operating and support costs in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars for idle submarines from fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year 2023, as well as additional depot maintenance delays  The Navy may have options to mitigate idle time and maintenance delays  For example, officials at the private shipyards—General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News Shipbuilding—told us that they will have available capacity for repair work for at least the next 5 years  Although the Navy has shifted about 8 million man-hours in attack submarine maintenance to private shipyards over the past 5 years, it has done so sporadically, having decided to do so in some cases only after experiencing lengthy periods of idle time  According to private shipyard officials, the sporadic shifts in workload have resulted in repair workload gaps that have disrupted private shipyard workforce, performance, and capital investment—creating costs that are ultimately borne in part by the Navy  We believe that the Navy has not fully mitigated this challenge because it has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards, and to proactively minimize attack submarine idle time and maintenance delays  Such an analysis would help the Navy better assess private shipyard capacity to perform attack submarine maintenance and would help it incorporate a complete accounting of all costs, benefits, and risks, including: the large operating and support costs of having attack submarines sitting idle; the qualitative benefits associated with providing additional availability to the combatant commanders; and the potential for additional work at private shipyards to reduce schedule risk to submarine construction programs by allowing the yards to build and maintain a stable shipyard workforce  The April 2011 DOD Product Support Business Case Analysis Guidebook provides standards for DOD’s process for conducting analyses of costs, benefits, and risks  It states that data sources used to conduct a business case analysis should be comprehensive and should include both quantitative and qualitative values  It notes that benefits, such as the availability of a weapon system, may be qualitative in nature, and that DOD should evaluate all possible support options, to include government- and contractor-provided maintenance  Navy leadership has acknowledged that they need to be more proactive in leveraging private shipyard repair capacity, but officials cautioned that maintenance could cost more at a private shipyard than at a public shipyard  However, without a complete accounting of all costs, benefits, and risks, the Navy will remain unable to determine whether the cost of performing a maintenance period at a private shipyard would outweigh the mission benefits of having reduced idle time, additional operational availability, and the potential for reduced risk to submarine construction programs  The nation’s investment in attack submarines provides the United States an asymmetric advantage to gather intelligence undetected, attack enemy targets, and insert special forces, among other capabilities  However, the Navy’s attack submarine fleet has suffered from persistent and costly maintenance delays  Although the Navy has several activities underway to reduce maintenance delays for the attack submarine fleet, it has not yet taken additional steps to maximize attack submarine readiness that fully address challenges such as the allocation of maintenance periods between public and private shipyards  Without addressing this challenge, the Navy will not achieve the full benefit of the nation’s investment in its attack submarines, and it risks continued expenditure of operating and support funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance  The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Chief of Naval Operations conducts a business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards; this analysis should include an assessment of private shipyard capacity to perform attack submarine maintenance, and should incorporate a complete accounting of both (a) the costs and risks associated with attack submarines sitting idle, and (b) the qualitative benefits associated with having the potential to both mitigate risk in new submarine construction and provide additional availability to the combatant commanders  We provided a draft of the classified version of the report to DOD for review and comment  That draft contained the same recommendation as this unclassified version as well as three additional recommendations DOD deemed sensitive  In written comments provided by DOD (reprinted in appendix II), DOD concurred with our recommendation stating that it has taken the first steps to take a more holistic view of submarine maintenance requirements and impacts across both the public and private shipyards  The Navy also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy, and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  To assess the extent to which the Navy has experienced maintenance delays in its attack submarine fleet, we analyzed attack submarine maintenance delay and idle time data from Naval Sea Systems Command, and we reviewed prior GAO work on shipyard maintenance delays  The Navy determines depot maintenance delays by counting each day in which a submarine maintenance period extends beyond the planned completion date  Two Navy offices within Naval Sea Systems Command—that is, the Logistics, Maintenance, and Industrial Operations office and Program Executive Office Submarines—track days incurred from depot-level maintenance delays and idle time  To determine the total number of days of maintenance delays for each fiscal year within our scope, we subtracted the planned completion date from the actual completion date to produce the number of days of maintenance delays for each maintenance period for each submarine  We added together the days of maintenance delays across all attack submarines for each fiscal year, and then added the fiscal year totals to produce the overall total  Although the data included some maintenance periods that began before fiscal year 2008, we counted days of maintenance delays only from periods that were incurred in fiscal years 2008 through 2018  We also tracked the total number of days that the Navy completed maintenance periods ahead of schedule—that is, 153—but we noted these separately instead of subtracting them from the total number of days of maintenance delays  To estimate costs associated with these delays, we analyzed annual data from fiscal years 2011 through 2017 (the most current data available at the time of our review) from the Navy’s Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs system  We also reviewed prior work on determining the operating and support costs of Navy ships  The Navy calculates total operating and support expenditures for each attack submarine on an annual basis, as well as the yearly average expenditure for each attack submarine class, including Los Angeles class, Seawolf class, and Virginia class blocks one and two  For each class, we converted the Navy’s annual class averages into daily average costs by adding the annual class averages together for each year that data were available, fiscal years 2011 through 2017, then dividing that number by the total number of days  We then multiplied the daily class average by the total number of days of maintenance delays and idle time incurred by submarines within that class, according to our calculations outlined above, between fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2018, and we added these totals together to produce the total estimated operating and support cost for days of maintenance delays and idle time incurred during this period  The data did not include annual class average costs for fiscal years 2008, 2009, 2010, or 2018  However, the annual class averages for fiscal years 2011 through 2017 did not show significant variation, so we applied these averages to 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2018  To assess the extent to which the Navy has addressed any challenges and developed mitigation plans for any maintenance delays, we reviewed the Navy’s plans to address attack submarine maintenance delays and interviewed Navy headquarters, fleet, and squadron officials, attack submarine crews, and public and private shipyard officials to understand any plans to address attack submarine maintenance delays and idle time  We analyzed data on factors contributing to attack submarine maintenance delays, such as cannibalization rates  We visited three of the four public shipyards, including Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and Norfolk Naval Shipyard, to observe operations, training, and the condition of the facilities and equipment, and to interview officials about challenges affecting operational efficiency and performance  We also met with Navy maintainers at Naval Station Norfolk and Naval Submarine Base New London, and with the crew of the submarine tenders USS Frank Cable (AS-40) and USS Emory S  Land (AS-39) in Guam  We toured the two private shipyards that conduct attack submarine repair work—General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News Shipbuilding—and interviewed executives at both locations  We also toured attack submarines and met with crew leadership, selected according to which submarines and crews were available for tours at each of the sites we visited  We visited the USS Boise (SSN 764) at Naval Station Norfolk and four attack submarines in depot-level maintenance: the USS Albany (SSN 753), the USS Jefferson City (SSN 759), the USS New Mexico (SSN 779), and the USS Springfield (SSN 761)  We met with the crews of two attack submarines assigned to the operating forces at the time of our visit, the USS Missouri (SSN 780) and the USS North Dakota (SSN 784)  We evaluated the Navy’s plans to address any challenges against criteria in federal standards for internal control, which state that agencies should evaluate performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks; the Department of Defense’s business case analysis guidebook, which provides standards for the process used to conduct analyses of costs, benefits, and risks; the Project Management Book of Knowledge, which provides best practices for project management; and the Secretary of the Navy’s December 2017 Strategic Readiness Review, which calls for the early identification of systemic risks before problems occur  To assess the reliability of the data sources for conducting analyses to address all of the objectives in this report, we reviewed systems documentation and interviewed officials to understand system operating procedures, organizational roles and responsibilities, and error-checking mechanisms  We selected the time frames for each of the data series above after assessing their availability and reliability, to maximize the amount of data available for us to make meaningful comparisons  We assessed the reliability of each of the data sources  The Navy provided information based on our questions regarding data reliability, including information on an overview of the data, data-collection processes and procedures, data quality controls, and overall perceptions of data quality  The Navy provided documentation of how the systems are structured and what written procedures are in place to help ensure that the appropriate information is collected and properly categorized  Additionally, we interviewed Navy officials to obtain further clarification on data reliability, discuss how the data were collected and reported, and explain how we planned to use the data  We also conducted our own error checks to look for inaccurate or questionable data, and we discussed with officials any data irregularities we found  We conducted these assessments on the following data for attack submarines: Navy deployed and surge-ready submarines from fiscal years 2011 through 2018; maintenance timeliness from fiscal years 2000 through 2018; idle time from fiscal years 2008 through 2018; operating and support costs from fiscal years 2011 through 2017; and cannibalization rates from 2012 through 2017  Some of these data were used in prior reports, and their reliability had previously been assessed  After further assessing any data that we had not recently used, we determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of summarizing attack submarine readiness trends and related information  We interviewed officials, and where appropriate obtained documentation, at the following locations: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Undersea Warfare Division (N97) Warfare Integration Division (N83) U S  Fleet Forces Command Commander, Submarine Force, U S  Atlantic Fleet Commander, Submarine Squadron 4 Commander, Regional Support Group Groton Commander, Submarine Force, U S  Pacific Fleet Commander, Submarine Squadron 1 Commander, Submarine Squadron 7 Commander, Submarine Squadron 15 Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Logistics, Maintenance, and Industrial Operations (NAVSEA 04) Program Executive Office, Submarines Attack Submarine Program Office (PMS 392) Submarine Maintenance Engineering, Planning, and Procurement (SUBMEPP) Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP) Newport News, Virginia Navy Education and Training Command Submarine Learning Facility Norfolk Navy Board of Inspection and Survey Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine Newport News Shipbuilding, Virginia, operated by Huntington Ingalls Industries Electric Boat, Groton, Connecticut, operated by General Dynamics The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from August 2017 to October 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We worked with DOD to prepare this unclassified version of the report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards  Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are Classified  Classified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances and need to know, upon request  Columbia Class Submarine: Immature Technologies Present Risks to Achieving Cost Schedule and Performance Goals  GAO-18-158  Washington, D C : Dec  21, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Affecting the Fleet  GAO-17-809T  Washington, D C : Sept  19, 2017  Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions that Affect Operations  GAO-17-548  Washington, D C : Sept  12, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-798T  Washington, D C : Sept  7, 2017  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-841  Washington, D C : Sept  7, 2016  Navy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness  GAO-16-481RC  Washington, D C : May 25, 2016  (SECRET//NOFORN) Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan  GAO-16-466R  Washington, D C : May 2, 2016  Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports  GAO-15-329  Washington, D C : May 29, 2015  In addition to the contact named above, Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Chris Watson, Analyst in Charge; Herb Bowsher; Chris Cronin; Ally Gonzalez; Cynthia Grant; Carol Petersen; Amber Sinclair; and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this report 


Report 2: Global defense posture is an enabler of U S  defense activities and military operations overseas and is a central means of defining and communicating U S  strategic interests to allies, partners, and adversaries  It is driven by a hierarchy of national-level and DOD-specific guidance, which includes the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy  Under DOD Instruction 3000 12, global defense posture includes three elements: Forces: forward stationed or rotationally deployed forces, U S  military capabilities, equipment, and units (assigned or allocated)  Footprint: networks of U S  foreign and overseas locations, infrastructure, facilities, land, and prepositioned equipment  Agreements: treaties and access, transit, support, and status- protection agreements and arrangements with allies and partners that set the terms regarding the U S  military’s presence within the territory of the host country  EUCOM is one of six geographic combatant commands and is responsible for missions in all of Europe, large portions of Asia, parts of the Middle East, and the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans (see figure 1)  EUCOM evaluates the adequacy of posture in Europe to support relevant plans and achieve military objectives  EUCOM shares responsibility with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for U S  military relations with allies and partners in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)  The number of U S  military sites located in EUCOM’s area of responsibility and the number of military personnel assigned to Europe have decreased substantially since the end of the Cold War, and two heavy combat brigades had been deactivated by the end of fiscal year 2014  As of May 2016, EUCOM supported one airborne infantry brigade and one Stryker brigade, as well as approximately 62,000 military personnel across approximately 250 sites  Since 2009, we have reported on issues related to DOD’s efforts to estimate and report on the total cost of its global defense posture  In 2009, we identified weaknesses in DOD’s approach for adjusting its global defense posture and recommended, among other things, that DOD issue guidance for estimating total costs for global defense posture and modify its annual report to Congress to include the total cost to complete each planned posture initiative  In February 2011, we reported that EUCOM lacked comprehensive cost data in a key posture planning document and that therefore decision makers lacked critical information that they needed to make fully informed posture decisions  We recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revise the Joint Staff’s posture planning guidance to include direction on how the combatant commands should analyze costs and benefits when considering changes to posture and to require that posture plans include comprehensive cost estimates  DOD agreed with the recommendations in both reports and subsequently took steps to implement them  In June 2012, we reported that DOD did not fully understand the cost implications of two posture initiatives in Europe—including its decision to return two heavy brigades from Europe to the United States—and that key posture planning documents did not completely and consistently include cost data  We recommended that DOD fully estimate the cost implications of these two initiatives, clarify components’ roles and responsibilities for estimating costs, and develop a standard reporting format for cost data  DOD generally agreed with our recommendations and has taken steps to implement two of them  Following the President’s June 2014 announcement of ERI, EUCOM identified five lines of effort that it would pursue under ERI, as described in table 1  Three of ERI’s lines of effort are expected to enhance DOD’s posture in Europe  For example, DOD is using ERI to increase the forces present in Europe by rotating an armored brigade combat team and elements of a combat aviation brigade to Europe every nine months  DOD also plans to enhance its footprint in Europe by using ERI funding to make infrastructure improvements and establish locations for prepositioned equipment  Finally, in order to implement ERI’s lines of effort and support U S  activities, DOD is partnering with the State Department to negotiate host nation agreements that, among other things, establish protections for U S  military personnel and provide DOD the authority to improve host nation installations and infrastructure  DOD is also supporting additional exercises and training to improve interoperability with partner countries while providing them with the capability and capacity to defend themselves, but these efforts are not expected to affect DOD’s long-term posture in Europe  Since 2014, DOD has expanded ERI’s objectives, increased its funding, and planned enhancements to posture in Europe  In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, ERI’s objective was to provide short-term reassurance to allies, and the initiative had little funding for long-term enhancements to posture  DOD focused its efforts on bolstering the security and capacity of NATO allies and partners by funding training, conducting exercises, and temporarily rotating Army and Air Force units to Eastern Europe  In fiscal year 2017, DOD expanded ERI’s objectives to include deterring Russian aggression in the long term and developing the capacity to field a credible combined force should deterrence fail  Recognizing that ERI’s expanded objectives would require DOD to alter its posture in Europe, DOD has requested increased ERI funding  DOD will have requested approximately $4 5 billion in ERI funding for posture enhancements through the end of fiscal year 2017; about $3 2 billion of this was requested for use in fiscal years 2017  During the time of our review, EUCOM had identified a need for additional funding over the next several years for additional posture enhancements in Europe  Specific details about EUCOM’s future posture plans and funding requirements were omitted because they are classified  DOD has requested increased funding to support planned enhancements to all three posture elements—forces, footprint, and agreements—in Europe: Force deployments to Eastern Europe: In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the Army deployed armored brigade combat teams to Eastern Europe to provide short-term reassurance to allies and partners, which DOD officials said included Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, among other countries  These short-duration deployments were intermittent and focused on demonstrating U S  commitment to allies and partners  Additionally, the Air Force deployed air units on 4- month rotations to help protect allies’ and partners’ air space  In the fiscal year 2017 budget justification materials provided to Congress, as ERI’s objectives expanded, DOD requested funding to retain Air Force fighter units in Europe  It also began deploying a rotational armored brigade combat team so that one such brigade would be present in Europe at all times (see figure 2)  The first deployment, in January 2017, included approximately 4,000 personnel, 90 Abrams tanks, 90 Bradley Infantry fighting vehicles, and 112 supporting vehicles  Additionally, DOD began procuring and prepositioning equipment for two planned armored brigades in Europe, one of which will include modernized tanks, as an additional deterrent  According to Army officials, these force enhancements in Europe give the Army the ability to quickly deploy a substantial ground force in the event of a conflict  As of April 2017, DOD was still evaluating force enhancements in Europe as part of its fiscal year 2018 budget submission  Specific details were omitted because they are classified  New locations and improvements to infrastructure: Since ERI was announced in 2014, DOD has established new enduring locations in Europe  An enduring location is designated by DOD and is a geographic site that DOD expects to access and use to support U S  security interests for the foreseeable future  During our review, DOD had not yet determined whether additional enduring locations would be needed to support ERI  In addition to establishing new enduring locations, DOD plans to improve installations and infrastructure  From fiscal years 2015 through 2017, DOD requested funding in its budget justification submissions to Congress for major military construction projects in nine European countries and to improve support infrastructure—such as roads, railheads, and airbasing—at these locations  Major military construction projects are those projects specified in National Defense Authorization Acts  During the time of our review, DOD was considering addition improvements to existing infrastructure, specific details of which are classified  According to DOD and State Department officials, DOD is also working with U S  allies and partners to determine what infrastructure improvements to roads, railroads, and bridges need to occur outside enduring locations to allow rapid response to a conflict  New host nation agreements: Since ERI was announced, DOD and the State Department have completed host nation agreements with six European nations in support of ERI efforts: Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland, implementing previous agreements, in order to facilitate U S  construction on installations and areas in the host country (June and July 2015 and June 2016)  Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, providing an overarching framework for protections for U S  personnel and U S  access to installations in host nations (January 2017)  DOD is using a separate process instead of its established posture planning process to plan for ERI’s posture initiatives because of the emergent nature of ERI requirements and their having been funded through the OCO budget  DOD has established global defense posture management and base budget development processes that plan for posture initiatives and collectively support the department’s efforts to establish priorities, evaluate resource requirements, and develop strategy and policy  As a result of its not using its established processes, DOD is not prioritizing posture initiatives funded under ERI against posture initiatives funded through its base budget, estimating these initiatives’ long-term sustainment costs, or communicating their future costs to Congress  DOD is planning ERI posture initiatives outside of its established processes and is funding these enduring initiatives—including rotational deployments and infrastructure projects—out of its OCO budget  We have previously identified risks associated with DOD’s practice of completing construction projects outside of its established processes  For example, in September 2016 we reported that DOD had not issued implementing guidance to establish a formal process for reevaluating ongoing contingency construction projects when missions change and that as a result DOD risked completing unnecessary construction projects  We also found that DOD lacked visibility into the amount of funding it was spending on operations and maintenance-funded construction projects in U S  Central Command and that this increased financial risk and duplication risk for the department  Like U S  Central Command, EUCOM is using DOD’s OCO budget to fund construction projects and is planning those projects outside of its established processes  Based on our analysis, DOD plans to spend approximately $503 million from fiscal year 2015 through the end of fiscal year 2017 on ERI-related construction projects—about $279 million for major military construction projects and $224 million for minor military construction and facilities maintenance and repair projects (hereafter, minor construction and repair), as shown in table 2  DOD has established global defense posture management and base budget development processes that plan for posture initiatives and collectively support the department’s efforts to establish priorities, evaluate resource requirements, and develop strategy and policy  According to DOD Instruction 3000 12, DOD’s global defense posture processes apply to DOD forces, footprint, and agreements that support joint and combined global operations and plans in foreign countries  According to the instruction, DOD’s components use these processes to address planning for global defense posture, resource requirements, and policy development, among other things  Further, it states that these processes are overseen by an executive council that provides recommendations, inputs, and expertise on global defense posture to key national strategy products  DOD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process serves as the annual resource allocation process for DOD and is intended to enable DOD to align resources to prioritized capabilities; balance necessary warfighting capabilities with risk, affordability, and effectiveness; and provide mechanisms for making and implementing fiscally sound decisions in support of the national security strategy and the national defense strategy  DOD is using a separate and evolving process to plan ERI’s posture initiatives—rather than following its established processes—because ERI is being funded through DOD’s OCO budget  According to officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, the department has recognized that the short-term planning process used to develop DOD’s OCO budget can create problems when it is used to plan for enduring initiatives  As a result, DOD has developed a separate process to plan for ERI  As part of the fiscal year 2018 planning process, EUCOM provided a prioritized list of potential requirements and an estimate of its annual costs by appropriation account to the Director for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation  According to officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, DOD completed its review and provided recommendations to DOD’s senior leaders for approval in October 2016 and final decisions were made within DOD in April 2017  The specific criteria by which DOD assessed EUCOM’s potential requirements are classified  DOD is requesting funds for ERI’s posture initiatives as part of its OCO budget, which is generally intended to be short-term funding for ongoing contingency operations  In February 2009, the Office of Management and Budget, in collaboration with DOD, issued criteria to assist in determining whether funding properly belonged in DOD’s base budget or in its OCO budget  These criteria were updated in September 2010 and currently indicate that funding requests should be for specific geographic areas where combat or direct combat support operations occur (such as Iraq and Afghanistan)  Further, budget items must meet other criteria  For example, OCO funding requests may be for constructing facilities and infrastructure in the theater of operations in direct support of combat operations  In these cases, the level of construction should be the minimum needed to meet operational requirements, and construction completed at enduring locations must be tied to surge operations or major changes in operational requirements

ground_truth: According to the Navy, its 51 attack submarines provide the United States an asymmetric advantage to gather intelligence undetected, attack enemy targets, and insert special forces, among others. These capabilities make attack submarines some of the most–requested assets by the global combatant commanders. GAO was asked to review the readiness of the Navy's attack submarine force. This report discusses the extent to which the Navy (1) has experienced maintenance delays in its attack submarine fleet and costs associated with any delays; and (2) has addressed any challenges and developed mitigation plans for any maintenance delays. GAO analyzed readiness information from fiscal years 2008-2018, operating and support costs, maintenance performance, and other data; visited attack submarines and squadrons; and interviewed public and private shipyard and fleet officials. This is a public version of a classified report issued in October 2018. Information the Department of Defense deemed classified or sensitive, such as attack submarine force structure requirements and detailed data on attack submarine maintenance delays, has been omitted. The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and support cost expenditures. GAO's analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between fiscal year 2008 and 2018, attack submarines have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards. For example, the Navy originally scheduled the USS Boise to enter a shipyard for an extended maintenance period in 2013 but, due to heavy shipyard workload, the Navy delayed the start of the maintenance period. In June 2016, the USS Boise could no longer conduct normal operations and the boat has remained idle, pierside for over two years since then waiting to enter a shipyard (see figure). GAO estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has spent more than $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle while waiting to enter the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards. The Navy has started to address challenges related to workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards. However, it has not effectively allocated maintenance periods among public shipyards and private shipyards that may also be available to help minimize attack submarine idle time. GAO's analysis found that while the public shipyards have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing. The Navy may have options to mitigate this idle time and maintenance delays by leveraging private shipyard capacity for repair work. But the Navy has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis as recommended by Department of Defense guidelines to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. Navy leadership has acknowledged that they need to be more proactive in leveraging potential private shipyard repair capacity. Without addressing this challenge, the Navy risks continued expenditure of operating and support funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance. GAO recommends that the Navy conduct a business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO's recommendation.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  In January 2017, we reported that DOD did not apply the OCO criteria to ERI prior to deciding to budget for its requirements using its OCO budget  We recommended that DOD, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, reevaluate and revise the criteria for determining what can be included in OCO budget requests  DOD concurred with our recommendation and noted that it plans to propose revised OCO criteria  As of May 2017, the department has not implemented our recommendation  DOD’s planning for ERI’s posture initiatives does not establish priorities for ERI initiatives relative to those in the base budget, estimate long-term sustainment costs for some posture initiatives funded under ERI, or communicate future ERI costs to Congress  When planning ERI’s posture initiatives, DOD establishes priorities among ERI’s initiatives but does not review posture initiatives funded under ERI relative to those funded in the military services’ base budgets  DOD’s posture management process is intended to establish priorities among global posture elements and is overseen by a Global Posture Executive Council  According to DOD Instruction 3000 12, the Executive Council is responsible for reviewing, prioritizing, and endorsing across the combatant commands key posture elements such as military construction projects and international agreements  The Executive Council’s endorsements inform the military services’ budget deliberations  For the fiscal year 2017 ERI budget, EUCOM requested funding for several posture initiatives, including the continuous, rotational deployment of an armored brigade combat team and the establishment of prepositioned equipment in Europe  Officials representing the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation said that as part of its planning process for ERI the Deputy’s Management Action Group evaluated and prioritized posture initiatives funded under ERI  However, DOD could not provide documentation that it had established priorities relative to posture initiatives funded through the base budget  Further, the Global Posture Executive Council did not review or prioritize posture initiatives funded under ERI relative to posture initiatives funded through DOD’s base budget  Similarly, as DOD prepared the fiscal year 2018 ERI budget request, the Global Posture Executive Council did not prioritize EUCOM’s proposed ERI posture initiatives relative to initiatives funded through DOD’s base budget  More detailed information about these proposals, and their potential funding requirements, are classified  According to officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Staff, DOD did not prioritize posture initiatives funded under ERI against base-budget funded posture initiatives, because ERI is funded through DOD’s OCO budget—which does not directly affect the services’ base budgets  However, because it does not prioritize ERI initiatives against other initiatives funded through the base budget, DOD lacks an understanding of the relative importance of initiatives funded under ERI and may begin investing in projects that it would not support in the absence of funding from DOD’s OCO budget  For example, Army officials noted that if funding were to become unavailable in DOD’s OCO budget, the Army is unsure how initiatives funded under ERI would rank in importance relative to other posture initiatives funded in its base budget  Consequently, the Army would be forced to make critical—and potentially costly—decisions quickly and without a clear idea of which posture initiatives were most important to the department  In planning for posture initiatives funded under ERI, EUCOM and the military services have not fully estimated the long-term sustainment costs of ERI’s posture initiatives to establish prepositioned equipment and construct new facilities  DOD’s global defense posture guidance indicates that, when evaluating potential changes to posture, the combatant commands should work with the military services to estimate the full cost of planned posture initiatives, including sustainment costs  DOD’s guidance on economic analysis also notes the importance of understanding both the size and timing of costs  Finally, our prior work has demonstrated that comprehensive cost estimates of current and future resource requirements are critical to making funding decisions and assessing program affordability  DOD leadership emphasized throughout the fiscal year 2018 budget review process that the services would need to fund ERI posture sustainment costs through their respective base budgets, but DOD did not direct the services and EUCOM to estimate these costs as they would have under their established processes  Officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation said that DOD leadership emphasized that the military services would need to fund all future sustainment costs for ERI projects from their base budgets  Based on DOD’s approach for calculating rough order sustainment costs, we determined that ERI sustainment costs for prepositioned equipment and construction could be substantial  Army and Air Force officials said that they were working to identify and incorporate these costs into future base budget submissions  DOD officials said that we correctly applied DOD’s approach for estimating sustainment costs, but noted that actual costs may be lower than the estimated costs, because the military services may not fully fund sustainment  Additionally, officials said that EUCOM is trying to negotiate burden sharing agreements with host nations; however, it is unclear whether these negotiations will be successful or how any resulting agreements would affect DOD’s future costs  Without comprehensive estimates of the sustainment costs for the prepositioned equipment and major military construction projects in Europe, DOD decision makers have been limited in their ability to evaluate the affordability of these initiatives  Further, in the absence of these estimates, the services have been limited in their ability to plan for costs in future budgets, because they have an incomplete understanding of the magnitude of those costs and of when they are likely to be incurred  The funding plan that DOD submits to Congress for ERI does not contain information about ERI’s future costs  This is in contrast to the way DOD submits its funding plan for its base budget, where DOD provides Congress with cost projections over a 5-year period, by appropriation, leaving Congress with a better understanding of how and when to allocate resources  In reviewing the fiscal year 2018 ERI request, the Director for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation assessed future costs associated with posture initiatives funded under ERI  We previously reported that DOD was not developing enduring requirements funded through its OCO budget as part of its budget and programming process  Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation told us that DOD has not been required to provide estimates for future OCO costs for ERI to Congress previously  An official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) told us that DOD does not plan to provide these future costs to Congress along with its fiscal year 2018 ERI budget submission  Additionally, in preparing its posture requirements, EUCOM did not identify assumptions regarding host nation and NATO burden sharing  For example, officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy said that DOD has submitted a request to the NATO Security Investment Programmé for $200 million in funding to build a facility in Poland to store Army equipment  Officials told us that, as a result, this construction project was identified as a lesser priority in EUCOM’s fiscal year 2018 request for funding  A senior Army officer told us that completion of a facility in Poland was critical to its plans in Europe  Officials from the U S  Mission to NATO told us that as of July 2016 NATO had approved funding to complete preliminary architectural and engineering design for this project  Officials expect additional funding will be made available in July 2017 to complete final design and site preparation and the full cost of the project will be approved in early 2019  However, these officials noted that additional funding beyond what has been approved by NATO may be required to meet U S -specific requirements  Similarly, EUCOM officials said that they are working to identify opportunities to defray future costs through host nation contributions, but it is unclear how much funding—if any—host nations will provide moving forward  Congress has expressed interest in knowing the future costs of enduring activities being funded through DOD’s OCO budget  The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report accompanying a bill for DOD’s fiscal year 2015 appropriations stated that the committee does not have an understanding of enduring activities funded by the OCO budget  The committee further noted that there is a potential for risk in continuing to fund non-contingency-related activities through the OCO budget  Both GAO’s and other federal standards emphasize that agencies should provide complete and reliable information on the costs of programs externally, so that decision makers can make informed decisions when allocating resources  DOD has not provided Congress projections of future costs for posture initiatives funded under ERI because it is reviewing those requirements outside of its budget and programming processes, and DOD officials said that the department is not required to provide this information  As a result, DOD is limiting congressional visibility into the resources needed to achieve ERI’s objectives  If DOD does not provide Congress with projections of the future costs of posture initiatives funded under ERI and information on its assumptions pertaining to host nation support and burden sharing, it will continue to impede congressional visibility into the resources that are needed to fully implement these initiatives  Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent threat of further aggression led DOD to establish and later expand ERI’s objectives and enhance posture in Europe to support a new U S  strategy toward Russia  DOD has requested funding for these enhancements using its OCO budget; however, the processes DOD uses to develop its OCO budget were not designed to plan for and fund long-term, enduring initiatives such as ERI  By following a separate planning process when funding ERI with OCO, DOD is taking on risk by not reviewing and prioritizing ERI posture plans against other posture initiatives, estimating the costs for sustaining ERI initiatives, and providing Congress with estimates of ERI’s future costs  DOD risks making decisions that lack a strategic vision in comparison to other DOD priorities and may fund initiatives that cannot be sustained over the long term  Furthermore, Congress is likely to face challenges in assessing DOD’s estimated costs for ERI and the affordability of initiatives funded under ERI over the long term  To better ensure that DOD can target resources to its most critical initiatives and establish priorities across its base budget and overseas contingency operations budget, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense prioritize posture initiatives under ERI relative to those funded in its base budget as part of its established posture-planning processes  (Recommendation 1) To better enable decision makers to evaluate the full long-term costs of posture initiatives under ERI, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct EUCOM and the military services to develop estimates for the sustainment costs of prepositioned equipment and other infrastructure projects under ERI and ensure that the services plan for these long-term costs in future budgets  (Recommendation 2) To support congressional decision making, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense provide to Congress, along with the department’s annual budget submission, estimates of the future costs for posture initiatives funded under ERI and other enduring costs that include assumptions such as those pertaining to the level of host nation support and burden sharing  (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of the classified report to DOD for review and comment  DOD partially concurred with all three of our recommendations, and we have reproduced DOD’s comments on the classified report in appendix II  DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation to use its established posture-planning processes to prioritize ERI’s posture initiatives relative to those funded in DOD’s base budget  In its comments, DOD stated that it will continue to prioritize the negotiation of international agreements supporting ERI through the Global Posture Executive Council, and that an on-going Strategic Review will inform ERI and guide both EUCOM and the services in their program planning efforts  These are positive steps  DOD also stated it will adjudicate its ERI-funded force requirements through its global force management process, adding that it will continue to resource OCO funds for ERI requirements until there is a sufficient increase in DOD’s base budget to do so  However, we continue to believe, as noted in our report, that DOD could improve its planning for posture initiatives funded under ERI, whether or not they are funded through OCO, by using DOD’s established posture planning processes  Although DOD’s global force management process directly affects overseas military posture in the near term, this process is not designed to evaluate long-term posture priorities  If DOD does not prioritize the forces and infrastructure projects funded under ERI against those funded using the military services’ base budgets, it will continue to lack an understanding of the relative importance of the posture initiatives funded under ERI  Without such an understanding, DOD increases the risk that the services will need to make critical and potentially costly decisions without a clear idea of which posture initiatives are most critical to the department  DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that EUCOM and the military services develop estimates for future sustainment costs and plan for these costs in future budgets  In its comments, DOD stated that its components will continue to estimate the sustainment costs for prepositioned stocks and other infrastructure projects during DOD’s annual program and budget review process  DOD also commented that without additional topline base budget funding, some portion of the associated sustainment costs will need to be financed with OCO funds  However, as we noted in our report, neither the Army nor the Air Force has fully estimated these potentially significant future costs, nor had either service incorporated them into their future budgets  Using OCO funds would mark a departure from DOD leadership’s emphasis that the services would need to fund ERI posture sustainment costs through their respective base budgets  Additionally, not developing robust estimates for sustaining these initiatives could increase long-term fiscal risk for the department if DOD shifts more ERI-associated enduring costs into its OCO budget  In the absence of robust cost estimates and deliberate planning to address those costs in future budgets, DOD will continue to be limited in its ability to evaluate the affordability of posture initiatives funded under ERI, and the military services may not plan adequate funding to sustain posture investments in Europe  DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation, to provide Congress with estimates of the future costs for posture initiatives funded under ERI and information on any underlying assumptions, such as those pertaining to the level of host nation support and burden sharing  In its comments, DOD stated that it does not currently prepare a formal 5-year Future Years Defense Program for OCO-related costs  Moreover, DOD commented that it factors in host nation support and burden sharing when preparing budget estimates for Congress  However, DOD does not state whether it will begin to provide Congress future estimates and any underlying assumptions with its budget submission  It is critical that DOD increase congressional visibility into ERI’s future costs and its underlying assumptions to facilitate congressional oversight and reasonably ensure that initiatives can be sustained over the long-term  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Commander, U S  European Command  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in Appendix III  The Army and Air Force identified approximately $224 million in unspecified minor military construction and facilities maintenance and repair projects (hereafter, minor construction and repair) that were programmed or obligated for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) in fiscal years 2015 through 2017  This includes $157 million for minor construction and repair projects identified by the Army and nearly $67 million for minor construction and repair projects identified by the Air Force  According to U S  European Command officials, Navy and Marine Corps construction projects funded under ERI were either major military construction or exercise-related construction projects  The tables below do not include Navy and Marine Corps exercise-related construction projects  Using the data provided by the military services, we compiled the programmed and obligated funding for these minor construction and repair projects by fiscal year, country, location, and project name in tables 3 and 4  The information in these tables was provided by U S  Army Europe and U S  Air Force Europe in response to our request for a list of minor military construction and repair projects  The data provided did not identify the appropriations used for each project  Accordingly, we have not conducted a review to examine whether funds were appropriately used for a given project  In addition to the contact named above, Kevin O’Neill, Assistant Director; Alex Winograd, Analyst-in-Charge; Scott Bruckner, Adrianne Cline, Martin De Alteriis, Joanne Landesman, Jennifer Leotta, Carol Petersen, Michael Shaughnessy, and Jena Sinkfield all made key contributions to this report 
Report 2: S  military  It has had to consider, among other things, the Services’ mission requirements, resource constraints, and the myriad demands on servicemembers and their families during their frequent relocations  Anything that further complicates a relocation—such as not receiving the required family support services for family members with special needs—potentially affects readiness or, at a minimum, makes an already stressful situation worse  By providing little direction on how the Services should provide family support or what the scope of family support services should be, some servicemembers get more—or less—from the EFMP each time they relocate, including when a servicemember from one Service is assigned to a joint base led by another Service  By largely deferring to the Services to design, implement, and monitor their EFMPs’ performance, DOD cannot, as required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, fully determine the adequacy of the Services’ EFMPs in serving families with special needs, including any gaps in services these families receive, because it has not built a systematic process to do so  Instead, it relies on the Services to self-monitor and address, within each Service, the results of monitoring activities  However, because servicemembers relocate frequently and often depend on the EFMP of a Service other than their own, a view of EFMP performance across all of the Services is essential to ensuring, for example, that relocating servicemembers get consistent EFMP service delivery no matter where they are stationed  Evaluating and developing program improvements based on the results of the Services’ monitoring would help DOD ensure the Services’ EFMPs achieve the desired outcomes and improve its ability to assess the overall effectiveness of the program  We are making the following three recommendations to DOD: We recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of Special Needs (OSN) to assess the extent to which each Service is (1) providing sufficient resources for an appropriate number of family support providers, and (2) developing services plans for each family with special needs, and to include these results as part of OSN’s analysis of any gaps in services for military families with special needs in each annual report issued by the Department to the congressional defense committees  (Recommendation 1) We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of Special Needs (OSN) to develop common performance metrics for assignment coordination and family support, in accordance with leading practices for performance measurement  (Recommendation 2) We recommend that the Secretary of Defense implement a systematic process for evaluating the results of monitoring activities conducted by each Service’s EFMP  (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense (DOD) for comment  DOD provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix IV  DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  DOD agreed with all three of our recommendations  In its written comments, DOD stated that additional performance metrics need to be developed for assignment coordination and that it is in the process of measuring families’ satisfaction with family support provided through the EFMP  DOD also stated that it is developing plans for evaluating the results of each Service’s monitoring activities for the EFMP  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and Education, and other interested parties  The report also is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (617) 788-0580 or nowickij@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V  The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 includes a provision for GAO to assess the effectiveness of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Exceptional Family Member Programs (EFMP)  This report focuses on the assignment coordination and family support components of the EFMP for dependents with special needs and examines: (1) the extent to which each Service has provided family support as required by DOD, and (2) the extent to which the Services monitor and DOD evaluates assignment coordination and family support  To address these objectives, we used a variety of data collection methods  Key methods are described in greater detail below  For both objectives, we reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and DOD guidance and documentation that pertain to the EFMP, including the following: The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, which established the Office of Special Needs and defined program requirements for assisting families with special needs, including assignment coordination and family support  DOD’s guidance for administering the EFMP  We assessed how DOD implements the requirements in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010; how each Service implements assignment coordination and family support; and how the Services and DOD monitor assignment coordination and family support using performance measures  Specially, we reviewed DOD Instruction 1315 19 - Exceptional Family Member Program; Service-specific guidance and related documents from the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy; and DOD Instruction 1342 22 - Military Family Readiness  Standards for internal control in the federal government related to the documentation of responsibilities through policies, performance measures, and evaluating the results of monitoring activities  We compared each Service’s procedures for monitoring assignment coordination and family support to these standards  To determine the extent of the Services’ EFMP family support, we obtained and analyzed fiscal year 2016 EFMP data (the most recent available) for each Service  We reviewed DOD policy to identify data variables that each Service maintains related to its EFMP  We used these data to summarize key characteristics of each Service’s EFMP  The selected variables provided Service-wide and installation-specific EFMP information on, the number of continental United States (CONUS) and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) installations; the number of servicemembers (sponsors) enrolled in the EFMP; the number of family members with special needs enrolled in the EFMP; the number of EFMP family support personnel; and the number of services plans created for families with special needs enrolled in the EFMP  We determined that the selected data variables from each Service are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing summary results about family support for fiscal year 2016  To learn more about how the Services implement their EFMPs, we visited seven installations in five states  We selected the seven installations based on their location in states with the largest number of military- connected students in school year 2012-2013 (the most recent available and reliable data) or in states with the largest percentage of students enrolled in U S  DOD schools as of May 2017, as well as their status as a joint base  At each installation, we interviewed installation officials, EFMP managers, selected family support personnel, and family members and caregivers enrolled in the program  In states we visited that had the largest number of military-connected students, the EFMP personnel we interviewed collectively served 66 percent of students who attend local public schools and 42 percent of the students attending U S  DOD schools  To obtain illustrative examples about how the EFMP serves families with special needs, we conducted seven group interviews with EFMP-enrolled family members and caregivers (one at each of the seven installations we visited)  Using a prepared script, we asked participants to describe how they were identified and enrolled in the EFMP, how they were assigned to new installations, and the types of family support services they received  We also asked about how these services aligned with their family member’s EFMP-eligible condition, the benefits and challenges they experienced, as well as their overall satisfaction  A total of 38 self- selected volunteers participated in the seven group discussions  While the participants in these groups included a variety of family members and caregivers, the number of participants and groups were very small relative to the total number of family members enrolled in the EFMP  Their comments are not intended to represent all EFMP-enrolled family members or caregivers  Other EFMP-enrolled family members and caregivers may have had other experiences with the program during the same period  Finally, for both objectives, we conducted interviews with a variety of DOD, Service-level, and nonfederal officials  We spoke with DOD officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense–Offices of Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Military Community and Family Policy, Military Family Readiness Policy, and Special Needs  We also spoke with EFMP Managers from Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy headquarters  We also met with officials from selected national military family advocacy organizations including the National Military Family Association; the Military Family Advisory Network; and the Military Officers Association of America to discuss the EFMP  We conducted this performance audit from February 2017 to May 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  Each Service has an Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) that provides support to military families with special needs  The tables below present the following information on selected EFMP and family support categories for each Service’s program at continental United States (CONUS) and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) installations in fiscal year 2016: City, state or country; Number of exceptional family members; Number of family support providers (by Full-Time Equivalent); Number of family support provider vacancies; Number of services plans; Number of indirect contacts; and Number of direct contacts  The information below is listed sequentially in alphabetical order by Service  We held small group discussions with Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) participants at the seven military installations we visited  Family members and caregivers who attended each session reported they had children or spouses with EFMP-eligible conditions  The discussion group participants were self-selected; and their comments are not intended to represent all EFMP -enrolled family members or caregivers in fiscal year 2016  In addition, other EFMP -enrolled family members and caregivers may have had different experiences with the program during the same period  There were a total of 38 participants representing all the Services  The following issues were discussed by one or more participants during the small group discussions at the installations we visited  The issues that emerged relate to the current and future overall effectiveness of the EFMP  Overall Satisfaction with EFMP (Discussed by 30 of 38 participants): Measure of participants’ approval of the family support services offered and experience with the EFMP  Many participants expressed overall satisfaction with the EFMP  Several participants expressed dissatisfaction with the EFMP  A participant expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of consistency in the provision of family support services (i e , special education advocacy) across installations  School Liaison Officers (Discussed by 20 of 38 participants): Serve as the primary point of contact for school-related matters as well as assist military families with school issues  Several participants noted that they received no response to their request for assistance from their School Liaison Officer or they only received general information  Several participants said School Liaison Officers were not helpful  Some participants found School Liaison Officers were helpful  Some participants were unaware of School Liaison Officers being available at their installation and the service(s) they provide  A few participants said School Liaison Officers did not follow up on requests for information  A participant noted there seems to be a disconnect between family support services provided through the EFMP and services provided by School Liaison Officers  Family Support Personnel (Discussed by 12 of 38 participants): Provide information and referral to military families with special needs  Some participants at one installation noted that the EFMP was understaffed  Some participants at one installation noted high turnover of family support personnel  Some participants noted family support personnel did not provide support for their family with special needs  Stigma (Discussed by 12 of 38 participants): A perception that participating in the EFMP may limit a soldier’s assignment opportunities and/or compromise career advancement  Several participants believe there is still stigma associated with participating in the EFMP  Some participants said participating in the EFMP has not affected career advancement  Assignment Coordination (Discussed by 10 of 38 participants): The assignment of military personnel in a manner consistent with the needs of armed forces that considers locations where care and support for family members with special needs are available  Some participants found the assignment coordination process challenging  Some participants described limitations with the assignment coordination process  A few participants noted there is a lack of information among families with special needs regarding how to express the need for stabilization and /or continuity of care  A few participants cited the challenges of assignment coordination as contributing to their decision to retire  One participant commented that the opinion of a medical professional was not reflected in the assignment coordination process  Special Education Services (Discussed by 10 of 38 participants): The provision of staff capable of assisting families with special needs with special education and disability law advice and/or assistance and attendance at individualized education program (IEP) meetings where appropriate  Several participants who had a family support provider assist them with preparing for or attending a school-based meeting, including IEP meetings, spoke positively of their experience(s)  Some participants at one installation agreed that assistance from family support providers during meetings with school officials regarding special education services is helpful  A few participants who were unable to get assistance with special education services from the EFMP sought the services of private attorneys at their own expense  Family Support Services (Discussed by 9 of 38 participants): The non-clinical case management delivery of information and referral for families with special needs, including the development and maintenance of a services plan  Some participants found that family support providers were helpful  Some participants could not identify needed resources or were unaware of the resources or services available to them  One participant noted that the family support provider had minimal contact  One participant said navigating the system can be challenging  Surveys (Discussed by 8 of 38 participants): The process of collecting data from a respondent using a structured instrument and survey method to ensure the accurate collection of data  Several participants noted that they had not or rarely had the opportunity to evaluate the family support services provided through the EFMP  One participant noted that comment cards used by each service are not effective for evaluating the EFMP  Warm hand-off (Discussed by 6 of 38 participants): Assistance to identify needed supports or services and facilitating the initial contact or meeting with the next program  Many participants at one installation agreed that the warm hand-off process worked well for them  Several participants said they found the warm hand-off process helpful when moving from one installation to the next  Outreach (Discussed by 5 of 38 participants): Developing partnerships with military and civilian agencies and offices (local, state, and national), improving program awareness, providing information updates to families, and hosting and participating in EFMP family events  Some participants found it difficult to obtain information regarding the types of family support services that are available  A few participants noted that communications regarding the EFMP were not targeted to address their needs  A few participants noted communications regarding the EFMP are untimely, (e g , newsletters not issued periodically)  Joint Base Family Support Services (Discussed by 1 of 38 participants): Family support services provided by the lead Service of the Joint Base that is different from that of the servicemember enrolled in the EFMP  One participant said that using family support services on joint bases may pose a challenge as each Service has different rules and procedures and as a result provides different types of family support services  In addition to the contact named above, Bill MacBlane (Assistant Director), Brian Egger (Analyst-in-Charge), Patricia Donahue, Holly Dye, Robin Marion, James Rebbe, Shelia Thorpe, and Walter Vance made significant contributions to this report  Also contributing to this report were Lucas Alvarez, Bonnie Anderson, Connor Kincaid, Brian Lepore, Daniel Meyer, and Mimi Nguyen 

ground_truth: In response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the President announced the ERI, to reassure allies in Europe of U.S. commitment to their security. This initiative has been funded using OCO appropriations, which Congress provides in addition to DOD's base budget appropriations. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, included a provision for GAO to review matters related to ERI. In this report, we (1) describe changes in ERI's objectives, funding under ERI, and DOD's posture in Europe since 2014 and (2) evaluate the extent to which DOD's planning processes for posture initiatives funded under ERI prioritize those initiatives, estimate their long-term costs, and communicate their estimated costs to Congress. GAO analyzed DOD strategy documentation, budget and cost analysis guidance, budget justification materials, and cost and obligations data. GAO also interviewed knowledgeable officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. European Command, the military services, and the State Department. Since 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) has expanded the European Reassurance Initiative's (ERI) objectives, increased its funding, and planned enhancements to European posture. DOD expanded ERI's objectives from the short-term reassurance of allies and partners to include deterring Russian aggression in the long term and developing the capacity to field a credible combined force should deterrence fail. With respect to funding, DOD will have requested approximately $4.5 billion for ERI's posture enhancements through the end of fiscal year 2017 (about $3.2 billion for fiscal year 2017 alone), and in July 2016 EUCOM identified funding needs for future posture initiatives. The expansion of ERI's objectives has contributed to DOD's enhancing its posture in Europe. Specifically, DOD has increased the size and duration of Army combat unit deployments, planned to preposition Army equipment in Eastern Europe, added new enduring locations (e.g., locations that DOD expects to access and use to support U.S. security interests for the foreseeable future), improved infrastructure, and negotiated new agreements with European nations. As of April 2017, DOD was considering further force enhancements under ERI as part of the department's ERI budget request. DOD also was reviewing whether new enduring locations to support ERI were needed and was considering other improvements to existing infrastructure. DOD's process for planning ERI has not established priorities among posture initiatives funded under ERI relative to those in its base budget, nor estimated long-term sustainment costs for some posture initiatives funded under ERI, nor communicated future costs to Congress. ERI is being planned using a separate process from DOD's established processes and is funded from DOD's overseas contingency operations (OCO) appropriations. GAO found several weaknesses: Lack of prioritization : DOD establishes priorities among ERI posture initiatives but has not evaluated them against base budget initiatives using its posture management process. As a result, DOD lacks an understanding of the relative importance of ERI initiatives and may be investing in projects that it will not continue should OCO funding become unavailable. Lack of sustainment costs : EUCOM and the military services have not fully estimated the long-term costs to sustain equipment and construction funded under ERI. Based on DOD's approach for calculating rough order sustainment costs, GAO determined that these costs could be substantial. DOD officials said that GAO correctly applied DOD's approach for estimating sustainment costs, but noted that actual costs may be lower, because the military services may not fully fund sustainment. In the absence of comprehensive estimates, DOD has been limited in its ability to assess affordability and plan for future costs. Not communicating future costs : DOD limits Congress's visibility into the resources needed to implement ERI and achieve its objectives because it does not include future costs in its ERI budget request. This is a public version of a classified report issued in August 2017. Information on specific posture planning, guidance, and budget estimates that DOD deemed to be classified have been omitted from this report. GAO recommends that DOD prioritize ERI posture initiatives against initiatives in its base budget, develop cost estimates for sustaining initiatives, and communicate future costs to Congress. DOD partially concurred with GAO's recommendations. GAO continues to believe that these recommendations are warranted.