prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: U S  Code, Title 10, Section 5063, United States Marine Corps: Composition and Functions, dated October 1, 1986, states the following: The Marine Corps will be organized, trained and equipped to provide an amphibious and land operations capability to seize advanced naval bases and to conduct naval land campaigns  In this regard, the Marines are required by law to have the necessary equipment to conduct amphibious operations and land operations  The ACV and MPC were considered integral systems by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Marine Corps to meet this legal requirement, as well as providing critical capabilities to execute the nation's military strategy  On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps—with "encouragement" from DOD—cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program  The EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), which currently transports Marines from ships to shore under hostile conditions  The Marine Corps cancelled the EFV due to excessive cost growth and poor performance in operational testing  Recognizing the need to replace the AAV, the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a "more affordable and sustainable" vehicle to take the place of the EFV  The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner  In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore  At present, the Marines do not have a wheeled armored fighting vehicle that can operate as a dedicated infantry carrier with Marine maneuver forces inland  The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals  Because of a perceived amphibious "redundancy," some have questioned the need for both the ACV and MPC  In June 2013, citing budgetary pressures, the Marines reportedly put the MPC program "on ice" and suggested that it might not be resurrected for about 10 years  Although some have questioned why the Marines cannot simply "adopt" a U S  Army personnel carrier, Marine requirements for a personnel carrier reflect the need for this vehicle to be compatible with amphibious assault craft, as well as to have an enhanced amphibious capability, which is not necessarily an Army requirement  With the Marines involved in decades-long land conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and proliferating anti-access technologies such as guided missiles, some analysts questioned whether the Marines would ever again be called on to conduct a large-scale amphibious assault operation  In response to these questions and the perceived need to examine the post-Iraq and Afghanistan Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy and DOD studied the requirement to conduct large-scale amphibious operations and in early 2012 released a strategic vision for how amphibious operations will be conducted in the future  The primary assertion of this study is that the Marine Corps' and Navy's amphibious capabilities serve a central role in the defense of the global interests of a maritime nation  The need to maintain an amphibious assault capability is viewed by Marine Corps leadership as establishing the requirement for the ACV and MPC (as discussed in greater detail below)  Congress is responsible for authorizing and appropriating funds for all weapon systems programs, including the ACV  In its oversight role, Congress could be concerned about how the ACV enables the Marines to conduct not only amphibious operations but also operations ashore  Another possible congressional concern is to what extent a robust amphibious assault capability is a necessary component of U S  national security  Cost is another issue of interest to Congress  At present, the Marines use the AAV-7A1 series amphibious assault vehicle to move Marines from ship to shore  The Marines have used the AAV since 1971 and expect to continue to use it until replaced by the ACV or a similar vehicle  Over the years, the Marines have claimed the AAV has become increasingly difficult to operate, maintain, and sustain  As weapons technology and threat capabilities have evolved since the early 1970s, the AAV—despite upgrades—is viewed as having capabilities shortfalls in the areas of water and land mobility performance, lethality, protection, and network capability  The AAV's two-mile ship-to-shore range is viewed by many as a significant survivability issue not only for the vehicle itself but also for naval amphibious forces  Although the AAV has some armor protection and can operate inland to a limited extent, it is not intended for use as an infantry combat vehicle  The Marines do have the LAV-25, Light Armored Vehicle-25, an eight-wheeled armored vehicle that carries a crew of three and six additional marines  The LAV-25 is armed with a 25 mm chain gun and a 7 62 mm machine gun but is not fully amphibious, as it cannot cross a surf zone and would get to the beach via some type of connector such as the Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC)  The LAV-25 has been in service since 1983  According to the Marine Program Executive Office (PEO) Land Systems, the LAV is not employed as an armored personnel carrier and usually carries a four-person Marine scout/reconnaissance team in addition to its crew  In this regard, the MPC was viewed as necessary by Marine leadership for the transport and enhanced armor protection of Marine infantry forces  The Marines' 2011 Request for Information (RFI) to industry provides an overview of the operational requirements for the ACV  These requirements include the following: The proposed vehicle must be able to self-deploy from amphibious shipping and deliver a reinforced Marine infantry squad (17 marines) from a launch distance at or beyond 12 miles with a speed of not less than 8 knots in seas with 1-foot significant wave height and must be able to operate in seas up to 3-foot significant wave height  The vehicle must be able to maneuver with the mechanized task force for sustained operations ashore in all types of terrain  The vehicle's road and cross-country speed as well as its range should be greater than or equal to the M-1A1  The vehicle's protection characteristics should be able to protect against direct and indirect fire and mines and improvised explosive device (IED) threats  The vehicle should be able to accommodate command and control (C2) systems that permit it to operate both at sea and on land  The vehicle, at a minimum, should have a stabilized machine gun in order to engage enemy infantry and light vehicles  The Marine Corps' 2011 Request for Information (RFI) to industry provided an overview of the operational requirements for the MPC  These requirements included the following: The vehicle must accommodate nine marines and two crew members and have a "robust tactical swim capability (shore-to-shore [not designed to embark from an amphibious ship]) and be capable of operating at 6 knots in a fully developed sea " The vehicle must be able to operate on land with M-1A1s in mechanized task forces across the Marine Corps' mission profile  The vehicle shall provide protection for the occupants from the blasts, fragments, and incapacitating effects of attack from kinetic threats, indirect fire, and improvised explosive devices and mines  The vehicle shall be capable of firing existing Marine anti-structure and anti-armor missiles and should be able to accommodate existing command and control (C2) systems  Defense officials have noted the Marine Corps is "not currently organized, trained and equipped to face a peer adversary in the year 2025" and enemies with advanced air and shore defense will make amphibious operations even riskier  To counter this, the Navy is developing the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) operational concept to address these concerns  EABO is described as follows: Expeditionary Advance Base Operations is a naval operational concept that anticipates the requirements of the next paradigm of US Joint expeditionary operations  The concept is adversary based, cost informed and advantage focused  EABO calls for an alternative, difficult to target forward basing infrastructure that will enable US naval and joint forces to create a more resilient forward based posture to persist, partner and operate within range of adversary long range precision fires  The alternative forward posture enabled by Expeditionary Advance Bases (EABs) is designed to mitigate the growing threat posed by the abundant quantity, expanded range and enhanced precision of potential adversary weaponry—particularly ballistic and cruise missiles designed to attack critical joint fixed forward infrastructure and large platforms  EABs provide a dispersed and largely mobile forward basing infrastructure that enables a persistent alternative force capability set that is similarly designed to be difficult to target and inherently resilient  The resilient, reduced signature infrastructure of EABs, combined with naval forces designed and structured to persist and operate within the arc of adversary anti-access/aerial denial (A2AD) capabilities enables naval commanders to conduct Expeditionary Advance Base Operations to support Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), and Fleet Commanders in the fight for sea control, by exploiting the opportunities afforded by key maritime terrain, particularly in close and confined seas  EABO advances, sustains and maintains the naval and joint sensor, shooter and sustainment capabilities of dispersed forces to leverage the decisive massed capabilities of the larger joint force with enhanced situational awareness, augmented fires and logistical support  The EABO Concept enables US naval forces to exercise 21 st Century naval operational art, meet new enemy A2AD threats with new capabilities and operate and thrive in and around close and confined seas  In terms of Marine Corps amphibious assault operations, the adoption of EABO could reportedly result in "an entirely different approach to amphibious assaults as well as new weapon systems " Noting that "missiles can now hit ships and landing craft while they are hundreds of miles from shore, making it far too dangerous for Marines to storm a beach with current capabilities," Marine officials are reportedly exploring ways to create temporary "bubbles" where Marines can get ashore  In response to these challenges, current and planned weapons systems might need to be modified to accommodate EABO operational concepts  As previously noted, in June 2013, citing budgetary pressures, the Marines reportedly put the MPC program "on ice" and suggested it might not be resurrected for about 10 years  At the time of the decision, the Marines' acquisition priorities were refocused to the ACV as well as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)  Although the Marines refocused budgetary resources to the ACV, difficulties in developing an affordable high water speed capability for the ACV continued to confront Marine leadership  In what was described as a "drastic shift," the Marines decided in March 2014 to "resurrect" the MPC and designate it as ACV Increment 1 1 and initially acquire about 200 vehicles  The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1 2, a tracked version, and to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study  Although ACV Increment 1 1 will have a swim capability, a connector will be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore  Plans called for ACV Increment 1 1 to enter the acquisition cycle at Milestone B (Engineering and Manufacturing Development) in FY2016, award prototype contracts leading to a down select to one vendor in FY2018, and enter low-rate initial production  On April 23, 2014, the Marines released an RFI for ACV Increment 1 1  Some of the required capabilities included the following:     operate in a significant wave height of two feet and sufficient reserve buoyancy to enable safe operations; a high level of survivability and force protection; operate in four to six feet plunging surf with ship-to-shore operations and launch from amphibious ships as an objective; land mobility, operate on 30 percent improved surfaces and 70 percent unimproved surfaces; ability to integrate a  50 calibre remote weapon station (RWS) with growth potential to a dual mount 40 mm/ 50 calibre RWS or a 30 mm cannon RWS; carrying capacity to include three crew and 10 embarked troops as the threshold, 13 embarked troops as the objective, carry mission essential equipment and vehicle ammunition; and the ability to integrate a command, control and communications suite provided as government furnished equipment     The RFI included a requirement for industry to deliver 16 prototype vehicles nine months after contract award in April 2016 at a rate of 4 vehicles per month  The Marines estimated ACV Increment 1 1 would cost about $5 million to $6 million per vehicle, about $10 million less than what the previous ACV version was expected to cost  On November 5, 2014, the Marines reportedly released a draft RFP for ACV Increment 1 1  The Marines were looking for information from industry regarding program milestones, delivery schedules, and where in the program cost savings could be achieved  Plans were for two companies to build 16 prototype vehicles each for testing  Companies who competed for the two contracts included BAE Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), Lockheed Martin, and Scientific Applications International Corporation (SAIC)  Under the provisions of the RFP, the ACV 1 1 was envisioned as an eight-wheeled vehicle capable of carrying 10 Marines and a crew of 3 that would cost between $4 million to $7 5 million per copy—a change from the RFI estimate of $5 million to $6 million per vehicle  In terms of mobility, the ACV 1 1 would need to be able to travel at least 3 nautical miles from ship to shore, negotiate waves up to at least 2 feet, travel 5 to 6 knots in calm seas, and be able to keep up with the M-1 Abrams tank once ashore  Proposals were due in April 2016 and the Marines reportedly planned to award two EMD contracts for 16 vehicles each to be delivered in November 2016  In 2018, the Marines would then down select to one vendor and start full production  The Marines reportedly plan to acquire 204 ACV 1 1s, to be allocated as follows: 1 st Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, CA— 67 ; 2 nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, NC— 46 ; 3 rd Marine Expeditionary Force, Okinawa, Japan— 21 ; Assault Amphibian School, Camp Pendleton, CA— 25 ; Exercise Support Division, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twenty Nine Palms, CA— 25 ; and Program Manager, Quantico, VA, and Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch, Camp Pendleton, CA— 20   In April 2016 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration testified that the Marines' Acquisition Objective for the ACV 1 1 remained at 204 vehicles, which would provide lift for two infantry battalions  Full Operational Capability (FOC) for ACV 1 1 is planned for FY2020  On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1 1 prototypes for evaluation  BAE's contract was for $103 8 million and SAIC's for $121 5 million, and each company is to build 16 prototypes  The Marines expect to down select to a single vendor in 2018  Initial operational capability (IOC) was expected by the end of 2020, and all ACV 1 1 vehicles are planned to be fielded by summer 2023  Plans are to equip six battalions with ACV 1 1s and 392 existing upgraded AAVs  Both BAE and SAIC reportedly have a long history related to amphibious vehicles, as BAE built the Marines' original AAV and SAIC has built hundreds of Terrex 1 vehicles used by Singapore, and both companies had Marine Corps contracts to modernize AAVs  ACV 1 1 is intended to have some amphibious capability but would rely on ship-to-shore connectors  ACV 1 2 is intended to have greater amphibious capability, including greater water speed and the ability to self-deploy from amphibious ships  BAE planned to team with Italian manufacturer Iveco (which owns Chrysler and Ferrari)  BAE's prototype would accommodate 13 Marines and travel 11 5 miles at about 7 miles per hour (mph) in surf and 65 mph on land  BAE's version would incorporate a V hull design intended to protect passengers from underside blasts and have external fuel tanks for increased safety  BAE intends to produce its prototypes at its York, PA, facility  SAIC planned to team with Singapore Technology Kinetics to develop its prototype based on an existing design called Terrex  SAIC's version is said to travel 7 mph in water and incorporates a V hull design as well as blast-mitigating seats  It would carry a crew of 3 and can accommodate 11 Marines  SAIC's version plans for a Common Remote Weapons System (CROWS) ( 50 calibre machine gun and a 30 mm cannon), which could be operated from inside the vehicle while buttoned up, therefore not exposing crewmen to hostile fire  On December 7, 2015, it was reported that GDLS would protest the award of the ACV 1 1 contract to BAE and SAIC, claiming the Marines asked for particular capabilities and then evaluated vendors by a different set of standards  On March 15, 2016, GAO denied GDLS's protest, noting that "the Marine Corps' evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the evaluation scheme identified in the solicitation " The Marines reportedly stated that the protest put the ACV 1 1 program about 45 days behind schedule but anticipated the ACV 1 1 would still be fielded on time  BAE and SAIC reportedly delivered their ACV 1 1 prototypes, with BAE delivering its first prototype in December 2016 and SAIC delivering its prototype in February 2017  This early delivery could potentially result in an unspecified incentive fee award for both companies  EMD testing began the week of March 13 and was scheduled to last eight months  In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1 1 down select request for proposals to BAE and SAIC  Plans called for operational testing to start in January 2018, with the Marines anticipating announcing a contract winner in June 2018 for the delivery of 204 ACV 1 1s over a four-year period  In accordance with the provisions of the FY2014 National Defence Authorization Act ( P L  113-66 ) Section 251, GAO submitted its annual report to Congress on the ACV program in April 2018  GAO reviewed program cost estimates, updated schedules, and program assessments of test results and production readiness, and compared ACV acquisition efforts to DOD guidance and GAO-identified best practices  GAO found the following: The first version of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV 1 1) is on track to meet development cost goals with no additional anticipated delays for major acquisition milestones  With regard to costs, the development phase of ACV 1 1 is on pace to not exceed cost goals that were established at the start of development, based on a recent Navy estimate, the ACV program office, and reporting from the contractors  GAO recommended that the Marine Corps (1) not enter the second year of low rate production for ACV 1 1 until after the contractor has achieved an overall Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL) of 8 and (2) not enter full-rate production until achieving an overall MRL of 9  DOD partially concurred with this recommendation but noted that it was "reasonable to proceed at lower MRL levels if steps are taken to mitigate risks " On June 19, 2018, the Marine Corps selected BAE Systems to produce the ACV  Reportedly, the initial contract—valued at $198 million—will be for low-rate production of 30 vehicles to be delivered by the autumn of 2019  Eventually, 204 vehicles are to be delivered under the ACV 1 1 phase of the project  BAE will also produce the ACV 1 2 variant and, all told, the entire ACV 1 1 and 1 2 project is expected to deliver 700 vehicles, and, if all options are exercised, the total contract will reportedly be worth $1 2 billion  In December 2018, the Navy reportedly awarded BAE Systems a $140 million contract modification to build 30 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) ACVs as part of Lot 2, with the first vehicles expected to be delivered in the summer of 2020  Lot 1 is reportedly still scheduled to start delivery in the summer of 2019  In DOT&E's December 2018 FY2018 Annual Report, it was noted During the operational evaluation (OA), the ACV-equipped unit demonstrated the ability to maneuver to an objective, conduct immediate action drills, and provide suppressive fires in support of dismounted infantry maneuver in a desert environment  The ACV-equipped unit was able to maneuver in the littorals; embark aboard a landing craft air cushioned (LCAC), transit the open ocean and surf zone, and debark from the LCAC  The ACV demonstrated water mobility and the ability to self-deploy from the beach, cross the surf zone, enter the ocean, swim, and return to the beach  Based on data from the OA, reliability is below the program reliability growth curve (58 hours Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failures [MTBOMF])  BAE vehicles demonstrated 24 9 hours MTBOMF  There were no systemic problems identified that indicate a major redesign is required  The ACV section was successful in 15 of 16 missions and demonstrated the capability to negotiate terrain in the desert and littorals, operate with tanks and light armored vehicles, and maneuver to achieve tactical advantage over the opposing threat force  ACV crews, supported infantry, and the opposing force noted that the vehicles performed better than the legacy vehicle in a wide variety of areas  In terms of recommendations, DOT&E noted the Program Manager, Advanced Amphibious Assault should do the following: Modify the infantry troop commander's station to make it easier to move between the hatch and seat  Assess the capability of all existing Marine Corps recovery assets to recover the ACV  Investigate options for preventing damage to steering/suspension when encountering battlefield debris, such as concertina wire  According to reports, the Marines envisioned that the successor to ACV 1 1—the ACV 1 2—would have a threshold requirement of 12 miles from ship-to-shore  If this threshold can be achieved, it could help to reduce the vulnerability of U S  naval vessels supporting Marine amphibious operations to enemy shore fire  On April 10, 2019, during testimony to the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Navy and Marine Corps leadership noted During the fall of 2018, ACV 1 1 prototypes demonstrated satisfactory water mobility performance in high surf conditions, and in doing so met the full water mobility transition requirement for ACV 1 2 capability  Subsequently, the Milestone Decision Authority Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)) approved the consolidation of increments one and two into a single program to enable continuous production of ACVs to completely replace the AAV  The next key acquisition event is the Full Rate Production decision scheduled for the third quarter of FY 2020 following Initial Operational Test & Evaluation  ACV remains on schedule to achieve Initial Operational Capability in the fourth quarter of FY 2020  With the consolidation of ACV variants into a single variant, there will likely be a number of programmatic changes and potential ramifications for the ACV and ACV 2 0 programs  Reportedly, the Marines plan to develop an ACV 2 0, capable of carrying 10 to 13 Marines plus crew, capable of high water speeds and deployment from ships far from the coast  ACV 2 0 is planned to be capable of operating on land alongside tanks and light armored vehicles  According to the Marines ACV 2 0 serves as a conceptual placeholder for a future Decision Point (~ 2025, or sooner) at which time knowledge gained in the fielding and employment of the first phase of ACV (1 1 and 1 2), the state of the naval connector strategy, and science & technology work towards a high water speed capable self-deploying vehicle will support an informed decision  The FY2020 presidential budget request includes RDT&E and Procurement funding requests in the Base Budget, as well as FY2020 requested quantities  The Marines did not request ACV Overseas Contingency operations (OCO) funding in FY2020  According to DOD, the FY2020 ACV budget request will fund The ACV 1 1 Full Rate Production (FRP) Lot 3 of 56 vehicles, plus procurement of related items such as production support, systems engineering, program management, Engineering Change Orders (ECOs), Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), and integrated logistics support  Research and Development efforts include the procurement of ACV 1 2 MRV test articles, associated GFE, and initiation of a Vehicle Protective System trade study and integration efforts  While from an overall programmatic perspective, the consolidation of the ACV 1 1 and ACV 1 2 variants could be viewed as a favourable programmatic outcome, there are likely ramifications that might be of interest to policymakers  Potential issues include the following: Will the consolidation of ACV 1 1 and ACV 1 2 result in an overall cost savings? Will this consolidation permit the acquisition of additional ACVs because of potential cost savings? With the consolidation and the stated intent to replace AAVs, what is the revised timeline for the replacement of AAVs and will this result in cost savings from not having to upgrade and maintain AAVs longer than previously intended? How will the consolidation of ACV 1 1 and ACV 1 2 affect the ACV 2 0 program? If the Navy and Marine Corps decide to adopt Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) as an operational concept, it could possibly have implications for the ACV program, including the following: At the weapon systems level, would EABO require any changes to the vehicles themselves, such as enhanced survivability, lethality, or Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) features? If changes are required to facilitate EABO, how would this affect the program's overall acquisition timeline and cost? If EABO does not require any technical changes in the ACV program, would the adoption of EABO modify the Marines' current procurement quantities of ACVs? If EABO requires different procurement quantities for the different ACV versions (more or fewer), how might this affect program timelines and program costs?


Report 2: Since 2001, the United States has made a commitment to building Afghanistan’s security and governance in order to prevent the country from once again becoming a sanctuary for terrorists  To achieve its security objectives, the United States currently has two missions in Afghanistan: a counterterrorism mission that it leads and the NATO-led Resolute Support train, advise, and assist mission, which it participates in with other coalition nations  The objective of Resolute Support, according to DOD reporting, is to establish self-sustaining Afghan security ministries and forces that work together to maintain security in Afghanistan  The United States is conducting these missions within a challenging security environment that has deteriorated since the January 2015 transition to Afghan-led security  The United Nations reported nearly 24,000 security incidents in Afghanistan in 2017—the most ever recorded—and, despite a slight decrease in the overall number of security incidents in early 2018, the United Nations noted significant security challenges, including a spike in high-casualty attacks in urban areas and coordinated attacks by the insurgency on ANDSF checkpoints  DOD provides both personnel and funding to support its efforts in Afghanistan  DOD documents indicate that the United States contributes more troops to Resolute Support than any other coalition nation  As of May 2018, the United States was contributing 54 percent of Resolute Support military personnel, according to DOD reporting  Of the approximately 14,000 U S  military personnel in Afghanistan as of June 2018, about 8,500 were assigned to Resolute Support to train, advise, and assist the ANDSF, according to DOD reporting  For fiscal year 2018, Congress appropriated about $4 67 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund—the primary mechanism of U S  financial support for manning, training, and equipping the ANDSF  Other international donors provided about $800 million, and the Afghan government committed to providing about $500 million, according to DOD reporting  Under Resolute Support and the International Security Assistance Force mission that preceded it, CSTC-A is the DOD organization responsible for (1) overseeing efforts to equip and train the ANA and ANP; (2) validating requirements, including equipment requirements; (3) validating existing supply levels; (4) submitting requests to DOD components to contract for procurement of materiel for the ANDSF; and (5) ensuring that the Afghan government appropriately uses and accounts for U S  funds provided as direct contributions from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund  OSD-P is responsible for developing policy on and conducting oversight of the bilateral security relationship with Afghanistan focused on efforts to develop the Afghan security ministries and their forces  In August 2017, we reported that the United States had spent almost $18 billion on equipment and transportation for the ANDSF from fiscal years 2005 through April 2017, representing the second-largest expenditure category from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund  In that report, we identified six types of key equipment the United States funded for the ANDSF in fiscal years 2003 through 2016, including approximately: 600,000 weapons, such as rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, shotguns, and pistols; 163,000 tactical and nontactical radios, such as handheld radios and 76,000 vehicles, such as Humvees, trucks, recovery vehicles, and mine resistant ambush protected vehicles; 30,000 equipment items for detecting and disposing of explosives, such as bomb disposal robots and mine detectors; 16,000 equipment items for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, such as unmanned surveillance drones and night vision devices; and 208 aircraft, such as helicopters, light attack aircraft, and cargo airplanes  The Ministry of Defense oversees the ANA, and the Ministry of the Interior oversees the ANP  According to DOD reporting, the authorized force level for the ANDSF, excluding civilians, as of June 2018 was 352,000: 227,374 for the Ministry of Defense and 124,626 for the Ministry of Interior  The ANA includes the ANA corps, Afghan Air Force, Special Mission Wing, ANA Special Operations Command, and Ktah Khas (counterterrorism forces)  The ANP includes the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Anti-Crime Police, Afghan Border Police, Public Security Police, Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, and General Command of Police Special Units  The ANA Special Mission Wing, Ktah Khas, ANA Special Operations Command, and ANP General Command of Police Special Units are collectively referred to as the Afghan Special Security Forces  In this report, we refer to the Afghan Air Force and the Afghan Special Security Forces as specialized forces, and the other components of the ANDSF as conventional forces  According to DOD reporting, the combined authorized force level for the specialized forces as of June 2018 was approximately 34,500, or about 10 percent of the ANDSF’s total authorized force level of 352,000, compared with the conventional forces, which make up about 74 percent of the total authorized force level for the ANDSF  Figure 1 shows the ANDSF’s organization  U S  and coalition advisors from Resolute Support focus on capacity building at the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and ANDSF regional headquarters, according to DOD reporting  Ministerial advisors are located at Resolute Support headquarters in Kabul  At the ministerial level, advisors provide assistance to improve institutional capabilities, focusing on several functional areas  Table 1 summarizes the indicators of effectiveness that ministerial advisors are to use to measure ministerial progress in developing functioning systems that can effectively execute each of the functional areas  Regional Resolute Support advisors from seven advising centers located throughout Afghanistan provide support to nearby ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters personnel, according to DOD reporting  Some advisors are embedded with their ANDSF counterparts, providing a continuous coalition presence, while others provide less frequent support, based on proximity to and capability of their ANDSF counterparts  Regional advisors are to track ANDSF capability development by assessing the progress of the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters based on five capability pillars (see table 2)  DOD and other Resolute Support advisors are to document the results of these assessments each quarter in an ANDSF Assessment Report  According to DOD reporting, in addition to ministerial and regional advising, two tactical-level advisory commands provide continuous support for the ANDSF’s specialized forces: Train, Advise, and Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air) advises the Afghan Air Force down to the unit level, and NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) primarily provides tactical-level special operations advising for the Afghan Special Security Forces  TAAC-Air and NSOCC-A assess capabilities at the headquarters level based on the five capability pillars described above in table 2, and these assessments are included in the quarterly ANDSF Assessment Report  Figure 2 shows the levels of advising each Resolute Support advisory command type provides for the ANDSF conventional forces and specialized forces  Since Resolute Support began, the ANDSF have improved some capabilities related to the functional areas and capability pillars described above, but face several capability gaps that leave them reliant on coalition assistance, according to publicly available DOD reporting  DOD defines capability as the ability to execute a given task  A capability gap is the inability to execute a specified course of action, such as an ANDSF functional area or a capability pillar (see tables 1 and 2 above)  According to DOD guidance, a gap may occur because forces lack a materiel or non-materiel capability, lack proficiency or sufficiency in a capability, or need to replace an existing capability solution to prevent a future gap from occurring  According to DOD reporting on the Afghan security ministries, ANA corps, and ANP zones, the ANDSF generally have improved in some capability areas since Resolute Support began, with some components performing better than others  For example, DOD has reported that the Afghan ministries have improved in operational planning, strategic communications, and coordination between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense at the national level  In general, the ANA is more capable than the ANP, according to DOD reporting  According to DOD officials and SIGAR reporting, this is due, in part, to the ANA having more coalition advisors and monitoring than the ANP  DOD officials also noted that the Ministry of Interior, which oversees the ANP, and Afghanistan’s justice system are both underdeveloped, hindering the effectiveness of the ANP  Corruption, understaffing, and training shortfalls have also contributed to the ANP’s underdevelopment, according to DOD and SIGAR reporting  The Afghan Special Security Forces are the most capable within the ANDSF and can conduct the majority of their operations independently without coalition enablers, according to DOD reporting  DOD and SIGAR reports have attributed the Afghan Special Security Forces’ relative proficiency to factors such as low attrition rates, longer training, and close partnership with coalition forces  The Afghan Air Force is becoming increasingly capable, and can independently plan for and perform some operational tasks, such as armed overwatch and aerial escort missions, according to DOD reporting  However, DOD has reported that the ANDSF generally continue to need support in several key areas  For example, as of December 2017, DOD reported several ministerial capability gaps, including force management; logistics; and analyzing and integrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information  DOD also reported that, as of December 2017, the ANA and ANP continued to have capability gaps in several key areas, such as weapons and equipment sustainment and integrating fire from aerial and ground forces  The ANDSF rely on support from contractors and coalition forces to mitigate capability gaps in these key areas  For some capability areas, such as aircraft and vehicle maintenance and logistics, the ANDSF is not expected to be self- sufficient until at least 2023, according to DOD reporting  According to DOD officials and SIGAR reporting, coalition and contractor support helps mitigate ANDSF capability gaps in the immediate term but may make it challenging to assess the ANDSF’s capabilities and gaps independent of such support  For example, vehicle and aircraft maintenance contractors are responsible for sustaining specific operational readiness rates for the equipment they service  While this helps ensure that ANDSF personnel have working equipment to accomplish their mission, thereby closing an immediate capability gap, it may mask the ANDSF’s underlying capabilities and potentially prolong reliance on such support, according to DOD officials and SIGAR reporting  DOD and the ANDSF have begun implementing plans and initiatives that aim to strengthen ANDSF capabilities  These include the following, among others: ANDSF Roadmap  In 2017, the Afghan government began implementing the ANDSF Roadmap—a series of developmental initiatives that seek to strengthen the ANDSF and increase security and governance in Afghanistan, according to DOD reporting  The Roadmap is structured to span 4 years, but DOD has reported that its full implementation will likely take longer than that  According to DOD reporting, the Roadmap aims to improve four key elements: (1) fighting capabilities; (2) leadership development; (3) unity of command and effort; and (4) counter-corruption efforts  Under the Roadmap’s initiative to increase the ANDSF’s fighting capabilities, DOD and the ANDSF have begun implementing plans to increase the size of the specialized forces  Specifically, DOD reports that the ANDSF plans to nearly double the size of the Afghan Special Security Forces by 2020 as an effort to bolster the ANDSF’s offensive reach and effectiveness  The Afghan Special Security Forces are to become the ANDSF’s primary offensive force, the conventional ANA forces are to focus on consolidating gains and holding key terrain and infrastructure, and the conventional ANP forces are to focus on community policing efforts  In addition, to provide additional aerial fire and airlift capabilities, the ANDSF began implementing an aviation modernization plan in 2017  The aim is to increase personnel strength and the size of the Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing fleets by 2023  Enhanced vehicle maintenance efforts  To help improve the ANDSF’s vehicle maintenance abilities, DOD awarded a National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract, which, according to DOD officials, became fully operational in December 2017  The National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract consolidated five separate vehicle maintenance and training contracts into a single contract and contains provisions for building the capacity of ANDSF and Afghan contractors to incrementally take control of vehicle maintenance over a 5-year period  Additional U S  military personnel  As part of the South Asia strategy, the United States committed 3,500 additional military personnel to increase support to its missions in Afghanistan  According to DOD reporting, most of the additional personnel will support the Resolute Support mission, providing more advising and combat enabler support to the ANDSF  Additionally, in March 2018, the United States began deploying a Security Force Assistance Brigade—a new type of unit made up of U S  Army personnel with expertise in training foreign militaries—to Afghanistan  The Security Force Assistance Brigade will advise conventional and specialized forces at and below the corps and zone levels and will accompany and support ANA conventional forces at the battalion level in ground operations as needed, according to DOD and SIGAR reporting  DOD collects some reliable information about the operation and maintenance abilities of ANDSF specialized forces, in part because advisors are embedded at the tactical level with the specialized forces, according to DOD officials  Specifically, U S  and coalition forces advise specialized forces at the tactical level under Resolute Support because building ANDSF aviation and special operations abilities are considered particularly important, according to DOD reporting  DOD officials told us that since U S  and coalition forces are embedded at the tactical level for specialized forces, they can monitor, assess, and report on tactical abilities, including the ability to operate and maintain equipment  Our analysis of information provided by DOD about the Afghan Air Force’s ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters illustrates that DOD has some detailed information about specialized forces  TAAC-Air advisors help train Afghan pilots and maintainers and collect information on their tactical abilities  For example, TAAC-Air advisors track the percentage of maintenance performed by Afghan Air Force maintainers and aircraft operational readiness rates, according to DOD officials  According to DOD reporting and officials, as of December 2017, the Afghan Air Force could independently conduct MD-530 helicopter operations for short intervals without contractor support but relied on contractors to perform the majority of maintenance and sustainment activities  See appendix II for more information on the Afghan Air Force’s ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters  U S  and coalition forces perform high-level assessments of the ANDSF conventional forces’ capabilities at the corps and zone levels but do not assess their tactical abilities, such as the ability to operate and maintain equipment, according to DOD officials  For example, U S  and coalition forces assess the ANA and ANP conventional forces in quarterly ANDSF Assessment Reports, but these reports are at the corps and zone headquarters levels, and are not meant to provide an evaluation of the entire ANDSF, according to DOD reporting  DOD officials stated that other U S - and coalition-produced reports and assessments, such as DOD’s semiannual Section 1225 reports to Congress, semiannual periodic mission reviews, and annual Afghanistan Plans of Record, provide some information on the ANDSF’s high-level capabilities  However, according to DOD officials, these reports do not routinely assess the conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain equipment  According to DOD officials, DOD does not assess conventional forces’ tactical abilities because advisors have had little or no direct contact with conventional units below the corps and zone levels, and thus do not collect such information on conventional forces  Specifically, under Resolute Support, U S  and coalition forces have not embedded with the conventional forces below the corps and zone levels except in limited circumstances  Since U S  and coalition forces do not collect firsthand information on the conventional units’ tactical abilities, they rely on those units’ self-reporting for information on ANDSF abilities below the corps and zone levels, which, according to DOD officials, may be unreliable  ANDSF reporting is not verified by U S  officials and can be unreliable in its consistency, comprehensiveness, and credibility, according to DOD officials and SIGAR  For example, the ANDSF produce a monthly tracker on vehicle availability, maintenance backlog, repair times, and personnel productivity, but DOD officials told us that the trackers are of questionable accuracy  Our analysis of information provided by DOD about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain tactical and nontactical radios illustrates the limited amount of information DOD has on ANDSF conventional forces’ tactical abilities  Specifically, DOD officials could not say how well ANDSF personnel on the front lines operate radios in the field and had only limited information on the ANDSF’s ability to maintain radios  For example, the officials noted that the ANA conventional forces can perform some unit-level radio repairs but that complex ANA radio maintenance and all ANP radio maintenance is conducted by contractors  DOD officials at Resolute Support headquarters told us that they provide ministerial- level advising on how to manage ANDSF radio systems and do not provide tactical advising or inventory control for radios  See appendix III for more information on the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain radios  Our analysis of information provided by DOD about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV) highlights the limited amount of information DOD has on ANDSF conventional forces’ tactical abilities compared with specialized forces  DOD officials were able to provide operation and maintenance information for MSFVs that had transferred to the specialized forces as of January 2018 but were unable to provide operation and maintenance information for any other MSFVs  The ANDSF began transferring one of the ANDSF’s two MSFV brigades from the conventional to specialized forces in August 2017, according to DOD officials  As part of this transfer, NSOCC-A advisors—who provide tactical-level advising for the Afghan Special Security Forces—assumed oversight for the first brigade from Resolute Support headquarters advisors  DOD officials stated that the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain MSFVs in this brigade prior to the transfer was unknown, as neither Resolute Support headquarters nor the ANA had assessed this  The operation and maintenance abilities of the second brigade, which is still in the conventional forces, remains unknown  DOD officials at NSOCC-A were able to provide information such as inventory and mission capability rates for the MSFVs that had transferred, but only for the short period of time the vehicles had been under the control of the specialized forces  DOD officials told us that NSOCC-A plans to collect more information on the specialized forces’ ability to operate and maintain MSFVs as they are transferred  See appendix IV for more information on the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain MSFVs  In the absence of embedded advisors at the tactical level, DOD has not implemented alternative approaches to collect reliable information about the conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain equipment  Federal internal control standards state that U S  agencies should obtain and process reliable information to evaluate performance in achieving key objectives and assessing risks  DOD officials acknowledged that some of the plans described above that DOD and the ANDSF have begun implementing to address capability gaps may provide opportunities for DOD to collect more reliable information on the conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment  For example, the National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract requires that contractors regularly report the total work orders received, work in progress, and completed maintenance work performed by ANDSF personnel as well as vehicle availability rates, which may be more reliable than the ANDSF’s monthly report on vehicle availability  In addition, the Security Force Assistance Brigade may be able to collect and report on the tactical abilities of units they advise and accompany on missions since they are being deployed at or below the corps and zone levels  However, as of June 2018, DOD officials had not decided which, if any, of these options to pursue  Without reliable information on the equipment operation and maintenance abilities of ANDSF conventional forces, which represent nearly 75 percent of the ANDSF, DOD may be unable to fully evaluate the success of its train, advise, assist, and equip efforts in Afghanistan  The United States invested nearly $84 billion in Afghan security in the 17- year period spanning fiscal years 2002 through 2018, but DOD continues to face challenges to developing a self-sustaining ANDSF  While DOD has reported the ANDSF have improved in several capability areas, they continue to face critical capability gaps, impeding their ability to maintain security and stability in Afghanistan independent of U S  and coalition forces  Moreover, DOD lacks reliable information about the degree to which conventional forces—which make up about three-quarters of the ANDSF—are able to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment  This limits DOD’s ability to fully evaluate the success of its train, advise, assist, and equip efforts in Afghanistan  The Secretary of Defense should develop and, as appropriate, implement options for collecting reliable information on the ANDSF conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment  (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this report to DOD and State for comment  DOD declined to provide written comments specifically on this public version of the report, but DOD’s comments on the sensitive version of this report are reprinted in appendix V  The sensitive version of this report included two recommendations, which DOD cited in its comments on the draft of the sensitive report  One of those recommendations related to information that DOD deemed to be sensitive and that must be protected from public disclosure  Therefore, we have omitted that recommendation from DOD’s comment letter in appendix V  This omission did not have a material effect on the substance of DOD’s comments  In its comments, DOD concurred with the recommendation we made in this version of the report and stated it will take steps to implement it  DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  The Department of State had no comments  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff has any questions about this report please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or farbj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI  House Report 114-537 associated with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for us to review the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ (ANDSF) capability and capacity to operate and sustain U S -purchased weapon systems and equipment  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on September 20, 2018  Our September report included three objectives, including one on the extent to which DOD considers ANDSF input and meets their needs when identifying equipment requirements  DOD deemed the information related to that objective to be sensitive, which must be protected from public disclosure  Consequently, we removed that objective and a related recommendation from this public report  This version includes information on the other two objectives: (1) what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment  Although the information provided in this report is more limited, the report uses the same methodology for the two objectives as the sensitive report  To identify what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps, we reviewed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and DOD documents and reports, such as DOD’s semiannual Section 1225 reports to Congress, produced after the start of the NATO-led Resolute Support mission on January 1, 2015  To determine what steps DOD and NATO have taken to try to address gaps, we reviewed reports the Center for Naval Analyses produced for DOD, as well as DOD and NATO documents and reports produced after January 1, 2015, and reports from GAO, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and the DOD Inspector General  We also interviewed Center for Naval Analyses representatives and DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan, including DOD officials at the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-P) who helped create the DOD reporting we reviewed  To determine the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment, we reviewed DOD documents and reports and interviewed DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan, including DOD officials who advise the ANDSF  We also reviewed federal internal control standards to determine what responsibilities agencies have specifically related to information collection  To provide illustrative examples of information DOD has about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U S - purchased equipment and what that information indicates about the ANDSF’s abilities and challenges, we interviewed and analyzed written responses from DOD officials, including DOD officials who provide procurement and lifecycle management for some ANDSF aircraft and vehicles, about three equipment types—MD-530 helicopters, Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV), and radios  We selected these three equipment types from a list that we developed, for an August 2017 report, of key ANDSF equipment the United States purchased from fiscal years 2003 through 2016  We made our selections after reviewing DOD documentation and interviewing DOD officials regarding a number of considerations, such as (1) how critical the equipment is to the ANDSF’s ability to achieve its mission; (2) which ANDSF component uses the equipment (i e , Afghan National Police, Afghan National Army, or both); (3) whether DOD intends to continue procuring the equipment for the ANDSF; and (4) whether the equipment had been in use at least 5 years  We collected detailed information about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters, MSFVs, and radios, as well as other key statistics DOD provided about the equipment, such as inventory, average lifespan, average cost, role, and training  This information was based mainly on DOD responses collected from January 2018 to February 2018 as well as DOD documents and reports produced after January 1, 2015  The total amount of MD-530s and radios authorized for procurement was based on DOD data that we collected for our August 2017 report on key ANDSF equipment the United States purchased in fiscal years 2003 through 2016, which we supplemented with additional data DOD provided on U S -purchased equipment from October 1, 2016, through December, 31, 2017  The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from August 2016 to September 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We subsequently worked with DOD from September 2018 to October 2018 to prepare this public version of the original sensitive report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with those standards  Manufacturer: MD Helicopters, Inc  U S  Program Management Office: U S  Army, Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft Project Management Office Program Advising: Train Advise Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air) The United States originally procured 6 unarmed MD-530s for the AAF for rotary wing training in 2011  In 2014, the United States purchased 12 armed MD-530s and began retrofitting the 5 remaining trainer helicopters with armament for operational missions to address a close air attack gap  MD- 530s were chosen to fill the gap over other aircraft, in part because they could be delivered relatively quickly as the AAF awaited A-29 light attack aircraft that were experiencing procurement delays, according to Department of Defense (DOD) officials  The United States procured additional MD-530s in 2015, 2016, and 2017 because of the aircraft’s positive impact on the battlefield, according to DOD officials (see fig  3)  Key Statistics Variants: All can be armed with  50-cal machine gun pods and/or 2 75 inch rocket pods  Total Authorized for Procurement: 60 as of December 31, 2017 Inventory: 25 as of January 2018 (30 are scheduled for delivery; attrition of 5 due to crashes and enemy fire) Average Lifespan: Absent mishaps, and with good maintenance, there is no defined lifespan limit for MD-530s, according to DOD officials  National Army and Afghan National Police, depending on the mission, in all but one region of Afghanistan, which is supported by other aircraft  MD-530s are typically tasked two at a time for missions, according to DOD officials  An MD-530 crew consists of a pilot and co-pilot, according to DOD  Average cost: $6 3 million per aircraft, including all electronic devices, weapons management systems, and weapons (excluding ordnance), according to DOD officials  o Division of labor is based on the individual crew members' capabilities, with one pilot handling navigation and communication while the other identifies targets and operates the weapon systems  Army pilot advisors at Kandahar Air Field, according to DOD officials  o MD-530 pilot training takes about 3 years (see fig  4)  1  The GAO report number cited in DOD’s letter refers to a draft of the sensitive version of this report, which we issued on September 20, 2018  Prior to issuing that version, we changed its report number to GAO-18- 662SU to reflect its sensitive nature  That version of this report included two recommendations  The second recommendation has been omitted from DOD’s letter in this public version because it was related to information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  In addition to the contact named above, Joyee Dasgupta (Assistant Director), Kara Marshall, Katherine Forsyth, and Bridgette Savino made key contributions to this report  The team also benefitted from the expert advice and assistance of David Dayton, Neil Doherty, Justin Fisher, Ashley Alley, Cary Russell, Marie Mak, James Reynolds, Sally Williamson, Ji Byun, and J  Kristopher Keener 

ground_truth: On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a "more affordable and sustainable" vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles were intended to play central roles in future Marine amphibious operations. On June 14, 2013, Marine leadership put the MPC program "on ice" due to budgetary pressures but suggested the program might be resurrected some 10 years down the road when budgetary resources might be more favorable. In what was described as a "drastic shift," the Marines decided to "resurrect" the MPC in March 2014. The Marines designated the MPC as ACV Increment 1.1 and planned to acquire about 200 vehicles. The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1.2, a tracked, fully amphibious version, and at the time planned to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study. Although ACV Increment 1.1 is to have a swim capability, another mode of transport (ship or aircraft) would be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore. The Marines are reportedly exploring the possibility of developing a high water speed ACV 2.0, which could accompany tanks and light armored vehicles into combat. On November 5, 2014, the Marines released a draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for ACV Increment 1.1. On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1.1 prototypes for evaluation. BAE's contract was for $103.8 million and SAIC's for $121.5 million, and each company was to build 16 prototypes to be tested over the next two years. Both BAE and SAIC delivered their prototypes early, and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) testing began mid-March 2017. In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1.1 down select request for proposals to BAE and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). On June 19, 2018, the Marine Corps selected BAE Systems to produce the ACV. The initial contract—valued at $198 million—was for low-rate production of 30 vehicles to be delivered by the autumn of 2019. On April 10, 2019, during testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Navy and Marine Corps leadership announced that during the fall of 2018, ACV 1.1 prototypes demonstrated satisfactory water mobility performance in high surf conditions and, in doing so, met the full water mobility transition requirement for ACV 1.2 capability. As a result, ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 were to be consolidated into a single variant—the ACV—which is intended to replace all AAVs. Potential issues for Congress include the potential ramifications of the consolidation of the ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 programs and how the possible adoption of the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) operational concept could affect the ACV program.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Safety defect vehicle recalls (auto recalls) are initiated when a defect in a vehicle or vehicle equipment creates an unreasonable safety risk, as determined by NHTSA or a manufacturer  After a recall is initiated, manufacturers are required to provide written notification to vehicle owners via First-Class Mail within 60 days and remedy the defect  Franchised dealers—which sell or lease an auto manufacturer’s new vehicles—perform the recall remedy  Before manufacturers send recall notification letters to affected vehicle owners, NHTSA reviews draft letters and envelopes to ensure they include required information about the safety defect  Required information includes, among other things, a clear description of the safety defect, an evaluation of the risk to vehicle safety, and a statement that the manufacturer will remedy the defect without charge  See appendix II for an example of a notification letter  The number of vehicles affected by safety defect vehicle recalls has increased dramatically since 2011 (see fig  1)  The increase reflects, in part, several large-scale recalls  For example, in 2014, General Motors initiated a recall of over 8 million vehicles with faulty ignition switches  Similarly, according to NHTSA in 2014 and 2015, some passenger vehicle manufacturers began recalling Takata air bag inflators, recalls that have grown to include approximately 34 million vehicles and 19 auto manufacturers  For the Takata recall, NHTSA issued various orders and established a Coordinated Remedy Program under which the agency oversees the supply of remedy parts and risk-based prioritization of vehicles for repair, and manages related recalls with the assistance of an Independent Monitor  The Independent Monitor assesses compliance with the applicable orders issued by NHTSA and makes recommendations aimed at enhancing the remedy program  According to NHTSA’s Strategic Plan 2016–2020, this unprecedented recall activity encouraged the agency to improve its system for identifying and addressing defective vehicles  For example, the plan states that NHTSA’s “vision is to achieve a 100-percent completion rate for every recall by improving communication at every level, at every step of the way ” Thus, according to the plan, NHTSA and the auto industry have committed to identifying and implementing effective strategies to inform consumers of safety defects and envision that their coordination will bolster recall efforts to improve completion rates  NHTSA reported that annual completion rates for passenger vehicle recalls have remained relatively flat, ranging from 63 to 67 percent between calendar year 2011 and calendar year 2014  See appendix III for completion rates by vehicle component and vehicle type  In part, to improve communication and encourage consumers to complete repairs, NHTSA and manufacturers provide auto recall information to the public on their websites  For example, certain motor vehicle manufacturers are required to allow consumers to search a vehicle’s recall remedy status on the Internet using the vehicle identification number (VIN)  NHTSA also provides publicly available auto recall information on its website, including examples of recall notification letters  In December 2016, NHTSA began consolidating its websites into NHTSA gov to provide a single access point for its auto recall content  One of these websites, safercar gov, was once NHTSA’s primary method of communicating auto recall information to consumers; however, the agency is in the process of moving this information to NHTSA gov  NHTSA’s Strategic Plan 2016–2020 states that the agency wants NHTSA gov to be a comprehensive user-friendly platform that serves as the premier source of vehicle safety information by, for example, improving the website’s search capabilities  NHTSA also aims to encourage consumers to use its website’s auto recall information through its communications program  NHTSA’s Office of Communications and Consumer Information (OCCI) is the primary office responsible for implementing the agency’s public communication efforts  OCCI intends to increase public engagement with the agency’s information through its social media channels, such as Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook  The amount OCCI obligated to support the agency’s auto recall efforts has increased from nearly $ 5 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $2 5 million in fiscal year 2016  According to NHTSA officials, these obligations supported various efforts, including public awareness campaigns, an auto recall hotline, advertising agencies, exhibits at auto shows, and NHTSA’s mobile application  As part of our focus group discussion sessions, consumers selected safety risk and convenience as the two most influential factors they considered when using auto recall information to decide whether to complete repairs  All factors considered: During each session, we first asked consumers to describe all the factors they considered  Across the sessions, consumers shared a wide variety of factors including availability of a loaner vehicle, time to schedule and complete the repair, safety risk, and other factors  For example, some consumers had not yet repaired their vehicles because they were “just waiting” for parts to become available  Other consumers considered their previous customer service experiences at the franchised dealership or the distance they would need to travel to complete the repair  For example, one consumer at our rural focus group location told us it would take roughly 2 hours to reach the dealership’s repair shop  Most influential factors considered: After the discussion of all factors, we then asked each consumer to select the single most influential factor they considered  Consumers in the sessions overwhelmingly selected safety risk and convenience as the two most influential factors (see table 1)  More than half of consumers in our focus group discussion sessions selected safety risk as the most influential factor they considered when making repair decisions  They told us that their perception of the risk influenced whether or not they repaired their vehicle  For instance, some consumers stated that they completed repairs immediately, because the risks “sounded serious” or that they considered the defect a “safety concern ” Conversely, some consumers said they did not complete the repairs because the defect “didn’t sound very urgent ” While each recall notification letter is required to include an evaluation of the risk to vehicle safety reasonably related to the defect, consumers in our focus group sessions shared mixed opinions about the quality and clarity of safety risk information included in the notification letter they received  For example, some consumers told us the letter’s safety risk information seemed vague  For instance, one consumer told us the letter’s description of the safety defect did not clearly state the chances of an increased risk of injury and so he “had to figure out on his own ” In addition, some consumers commented that the safety risk information could be more prominent in the notification letter, that the letter could emphasize the severity of the risk, or that the letter could describe the risk in simpler language  However, other consumers stated the notification letter they received adequately described the recall’s safety risk  In June 2011, we recommended that NHTSA modify the requirements for defect notification letters to include additional information to obtain readers’ attention  In 2013, NHTSA responded to our recommendation by requiring manufacturers to include the statement “IMPORTANT SAFETY RECALL” at the top of auto recall notification letters  Focus Group Participant’s Comment “I don't want to be without a car for half the day or stay with my kids all day ” Consumers in our focus group discussion sessions selected convenience as the second most influential factor they considered in making repair decisions  While some consumers described the “hassle” of the repair and being “too busy” to schedule and fix the defect, other consumers told us they repaired their vehicles more easily because, for example, they could take advantage of previously scheduled service appointments to also repair the defect  Also, some consumers in our sessions stated that the letter or notification they received could better address the inconvenience of the recall, for example by including better estimates of how long repairs might take  In addition, some consumers recommended the letter include options for scheduling needed repairs  As we discuss later in the report, NHTSA officials told us they continue to work with auto manufacturers to identify ways to encourage consumers to complete needed repairs, while representatives from some manufacturers we met with described specific steps they have taken to address some of the inconveniences consumers may experience in completing repairs  For example, one manufacturer facilitated a pilot program for a third-party service provider in conjunction with dealers to repair vehicles at the owner’s home or place of work, while another manufacturer told us they work with individual dealers to hold events specifically for recall repairs when consumers can come in to have repairs performed after normal business hours  Industry stakeholders’ use of auto recall information varies because these stakeholders play different roles in the auto recall process  Auto manufacturers are primarily responsible for providing auto recall information to the public and others, including NHTSA and auto dealers  Franchised dealers are responsible for performing the recall remedy for manufacturers and therefore use manufacturer-provided information for that purpose  Specifically, all of the franchised dealers we interviewed told us they identify recalls on new vehicles in their inventory primarily by accessing auto recall information through internal manufacturer databases  These franchised dealers may also use information from third-party providers or publicly available auto recall information on NHTSA’s website to identify recalls affecting used vehicles  Independent dealers—which are not generally authorized by manufacturers to perform recall remedies—may use publicly available auto recall information to identify open recalls  Specifically, 2 of the 3 independent dealers we met with told us they use NHTSA’s VIN look-up tool to search for open recalls affecting vehicles in their inventory before selling them to consumers  However, these dealers told us that the current design of the tool takes too much time to use, because it requires users to search each VIN individually  For example, one dealer told us each search took about 15 seconds to perform, resulting in significant time and cost because the dealership has tens of thousands of vehicles in its inventory  These dealers told us being able to search multiple VINs in a single search (i e , VIN-batch search) could save them time or money  Representatives from the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers stated they—in coordination with other industry stakeholders—are working with a third-party provider to develop a search tool that would address this concern by enabling VIN-batch searches for use by government agencies, such as state departments of motor vehicles, and commercial entities  The group anticipates the tool will be available in the first half of 2018  Although the vast majority of consumers who participated in our focus group discussion sessions reported a preference to receive auto recall notification by mail, most preferred to receive notifications by at least one additional electronic means such as e-mail, phone calls, and text messages  Eighty of the 94 consumers in our sessions reported a preference for receiving notification by mail, and all but 4 reported actually receiving mailed notification (see fig  2)  However, 69 of the 94 consumers in our sessions also reported a preference for receiving recall notification by electronic means, but only 7 reported actually receiving at least one type of electronic notification  This result suggests a gap between industry recall notification practices and notification preferences for most consumers in our focus groups, especially for younger consumers who were more likely to report a preference for notification by electronic means  For complete results of the questionnaire we administered to consumers for the discussion session, see appendix IV  As we discuss later in this report, in September 2016, NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that proposes to require auto manufacturers to notify consumers about auto recalls by electronic means in addition to First-Class Mail  NHTSA officials told us the agency is working with the administration on NHTSA’s regulatory portfolio and priorities, including this rulemaking  Some manufacturers told us they use additional methods to reach consumers, including notifying consumers by electronic means and translating recall information into Spanish  For example, representatives from one manufacturer told us they always notify consumers by e-mail before sending out the required First-Class Mail letter notification  These representatives told us using multiple recall notification means resulted in higher recall completion rates  In addition, eight of the remaining nine manufacturers told us they use supplemental electronic means notification on a case-by-case basis—generally using additional means to improve recall completion rates—while four manufacturers stated they consider safety risk severity when deciding when or how to use additional notification means for individual recalls  Also, representatives from 3 of the 10 manufacturers we spoke with told us they translate the entire mailed notification letter into Spanish  In late 2016, NHTSA launched its redesigned NHTSA gov website, including the auto recall areas consumers assessed during our testing sessions  According to responses to a questionnaire we administered during our testing sessions, 78 of the 94 consumers found the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov either “somewhat” or “very easy” to use (see fig  3)  See appendix V for complete participant responses to the questionnaire we administered to each consumer  To inform the development of the redesigned website, NHTSA worked with a contractor to conduct a usability study in 2015 to evaluate users’ reactions to the agency’s websites, including NHTSA gov  According to agency officials, NHTSA implemented several changes based on the findings from the usability study, including: the creation of a dedicated “recalls” area of NHTSA gov, and the ability for users to access the VIN look-up tool in three different ways—on the homepage, in the “recalls” area, and through direct links either in a NHTSA e-mail for subscribers or from an external website  In addition, NHTSA officials told us that Department of Transportation (DOT) and NHTSA staff meet as needed to discuss the website and consider improvements  For example, the officials said they monitor user searches for the relevance and accuracy of results and adjust the search software to better assist users in finding auto recall information  Officials also told us the agency collects a variety of other information about how visitors use NHTSA gov, including how visitors access the website, and makes adjustments accordingly  For instance, NHTSA incorporated responsive web design as part of the agency’s ongoing consolidation effort—meaning the site is optimized for viewing on desktop, tablet, and mobile devices  In addition to monitoring searches and how visitors access NHTSA gov, NHTSA officials told us they collect and consider online survey data to make website improvements and use web-analytic software to monitor, for example, where visitors choose to exit the website  Officials stated that such monitoring activities have allowed NHTSA to identify and correct problems with NHTSA gov  We did not directly evaluate the accessibility of the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov to ensure the ability of people with physical or mental disabilities to use the website  However, NHTSA officials provided us with an overview of several steps the agency takes to ensure NHTSA gov complies with website accessibility requirements  For example, according to officials, NHTSA subscribes to a service that provides monthly accessibility scans of the agency’s websites  While most consumers in our usability testing sessions generally found the auto recall areas of NHTSA’s website easy to use, some consumers experienced difficulties completing tasks we asked them to perform (see table 2)  Specifically, during each testing session we asked participants to perform tasks using the primary means NHTSA gov provides for consumers to access information about auto recalls affecting their vehicles: searching for auto recalls using their vehicle’s VIN; searching for auto recalls using their vehicle’s year, make, and model; and locating NHTSA’s auto recall notification e-mail subscription service  In addition, an evaluation we requested to corroborate the results of our consumer usability testing, identified similar issues  As discussed below, consumers experienced these difficulties because the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov do not always reflect federal and industry key website usability practices, which describe standards and guidelines for making websites easy to use  Following such practices can assist agencies in creating quality websites while providing the flexibility necessary to meet organizational needs  Website usability is particularly important for agencies, such as NHTSA, that are responsible for conveying safety information to the public  Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should communicate quality information externally and select appropriate methods for communicating with the public  While most consumers in our usability testing sessions found searching for recalls by VIN somewhat or very easy, some consumers found the search results did not provide the information they were seeking  When we asked consumers to perform VIN searches, they generally found the VIN look-up tool easy to use—88 of 94 consumers found searching with a VIN either somewhat or very easy  But some consumers experienced difficulties performing this task  Specifically, some consumers who had had their vehicles repaired expected to find the completed recall on the search results page  However, they were confused because the page is designed to display only open (i e , unrepaired) recalls, not completed (i e , repaired) recalls—leading these consumers to question the accuracy of the results  In addition, the evaluation conducted by website usability professionals found that, when an error occurred during a VIN search, the error message was too difficult to locate on the search results page  The evaluation recommended the error message have greater weight and more prominence on the page  Federal key website usability practices state that agencies should ensure that results of user searches provide the precise information being sought, and in a format matching users’ expectations  When users are confused by search results, or do not immediately find what they are searching for, they become frustrated and may abandon the search or the website entirely  Since NHTSA launched the VIN look-up tool in August 2014, the number of VIN searches performed has increased (see fig  4)  According to NHTSA officials, major increases occurred in mid-2015— when the Takata air bag inflator recalls were announced—and in early 2017, when NHTSA made the VIN look-up tool search function available on NHTSA gov and displayed it prominently on the website  Ensuring the usability of NHTSA’s VIN look-up tool is particularly important because it is the only way on NHTSA gov for a consumer to determine whether their specific vehicle has an open safety recall  Recall Search Using Vehicle Year, Make, and Model Some consumers’ vehicle year, make, and model searches were hampered by the information required to conduct an accurate search, as the content on the website is not always in plain language  We asked consumers to perform a recall search using their vehicles’ year, make, and model, and 78 of 94 consumers found the task to be either somewhat or very easy  However, some consumers found that they did not know enough information about their specific vehicles to feel confident that they were searching for the correct vehicle  For example, a year, make, and model search for a 2009 Toyota Tacoma may ask the consumer to choose among vehicle options, including “2009 TOYOTA TACOMA REGULAR CAB W/SAB RWD/AWD ” Acronyms such as “W/SAB”— which stands for “with side air bags”—may be confusing to consumers  Federal key website usability practices state that federal agencies should write website content using plain language, so website visitors can easily find and use what they need  Focus Group Participant’s Comment “I think [the Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up is] poorly placed  I had to scroll to find it  I had to search for it  You want at the top  ” Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up Some consumers suggested improvements to make the Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up easier to locate on the homepage  NHTSA first made its Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up available in March 2008  Of the 94 consumers in our testing sessions, 66 found it either “somewhat” or “very easy” to find the Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up—making this the least easy of the three tasks we asked consumers to perform  Specifically, several consumers said the Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up should include a clearer description, be easier to find, and be located at the top of the homepage (see fig  5)  These improvements are particularly important because some consumers in our focus group sessions told us that the ability to sign up for auto recall e-mail notifications was the most useful part of the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov  The website evaluation conducted by website usability professionals recommended that NHTSA streamline its homepage with more of a focus on primary website tasks  The evaluation also found that users must move through too many pages to sign up for recall e-mails  Federal key website design and usability practices state that agencies should put important items closer to the top of the page, where users can better locate the information  Key practices also state that agencies should design their websites so users can successfully complete the most common tasks in the fewest number of steps  The website usability difficulties that consumers in our focus groups experienced may be due to the fact that NHTSA has not studied the website’s usability since the agency redesigned NHTSA gov in late 2016 and, therefore, may have been unaware of these difficulties prior to our review  NHTSA plans to conduct a website usability study with consumers after the consolidation effort, discussed above, is complete  However, NHTSA could not provide a general time frame for conducting the study because it has not yet determined when the consolidation effort will be complete  We have previously reported that it is essential for organizations to effectively guide their information technology efforts by establishing timelines to complete them, among other strategic planning best practices  Without establishing a completion date for its website consolidation effort, the website usability difficulties we identified may persist and limit the effectiveness of NHTSA’s primary means of providing consumers with safety recall information about their vehicles on NHTSA gov  In January 2016, NHTSA launched a national advertising campaign encouraging consumers to check for open recalls using the agency’s VIN and year, make, and model look-up tools  Through March 2017, NHTSA spent about $1 million on its Safe Cars Save Lives campaign, which sponsors advertisements on Google, Facebook, and other media platforms  For example, Google might place NHTSA’s advertisement above other search results, when a consumer typed certain keywords— such as “recall,” “airbag recalls,” or “safercar gov”—into the search  NHTSA evaluated the campaign’s effectiveness by monitoring website traffic performance reports to determine how frequently consumers clicked on NHTSA-sponsored advertisements and ultimately searched for open recalls using the agency’s look-up tools  NHTSA also compared results across media platforms and adjusted the campaign’s strategy to improve performance  For example, NHTSA optimized advertisements on mobile devices, since mobile-device users performed more recall searches than other users  According to NHTSA data, the awareness campaign resulted in consumers performing 1 1 million recall searches through March 2017—a cost of about $0 90 per search  Agency data indicate that this cost generally decreased as NHTSA improved the campaign’s strategy  Agency officials told us NHTSA plans to spend another approximately $1 8 million on Safe Cars Save Lives from September 2017 through September 2018 due to the campaign’s effectiveness in raising the public’s awareness about auto recalls


Report 2:  NHTSA began implementing a mandated 2-year pilot grant program intended to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of informing consumers about open auto recalls during state vehicle registration  In September 2016, NHTSA solicited applications to participate in the program, wherein selected states would inform consumers—at no charge—about open recalls using all means that permit consumers to register vehicles within the state (e g , in person, Internet, and mail)  According to NHTSA, only one state applied for the grant  In September 2017, NHTSA awarded the sole applicant $223,000  Under the program, the grantee needs to collect and report program performance data, including the extent to which open recalls have been identified and repaired  In addition, the grantee must report whether certain notification means were more effective than others and what could be done to improve the program  Upon completion of the pilot program, NHTSA is required to evaluate the extent to which open recalls identified have been remedied  Auto manufacturers we met with were generally supportive of the program  Specifically, representatives from 9 of the 10 manufacturers told us that notifying consumers about open recalls during vehicle registration can raise consumer awareness or improve recall completion rates  In September 2016, NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), which proposes to require auto manufacturers to notify consumers about open recalls by electronic means—such as e-mails, phone calls, and text messages, in addition to First-Class Mail  As we described earlier, auto manufacturers are currently required to notify consumers about safety recalls affecting their vehicles via First-Class Mail  According to NHTSA, the NPRM aims to aid in efficiently and effectively improving recall completion rates, by proposing that manufacturers provide notification using electronic means in addition to First-Class Mail  Consumers in our focus groups as well as auto manufacturers and consumer associations we interviewed generally supported additional notification using electronic means  Consumers in our focus groups: As we discussed earlier, 69 of the consumers in our focus group discussion sessions reported they would prefer to receive additional notification by at least one type of electronic means  However, only 7 consumers actually received such notifications—suggesting a gap between industry notification practices and notification preferences for these consumers  Auto manufacturers: Representatives from 9 of 10 manufacturers we interviewed told us they generally support providing notification using electronic means  Although the NPRM proposes a broad definition of electronic means to give manufacturers flexibility to determine the most effective means, these representatives also shared implementation concerns  For example, representatives from 1 of the 9 manufacturers told us that—although the company collects e- mail addresses from some customers for other purposes—not all customers provide e-mail addresses, and those collected are not always accurate  As we discussed previously, most manufacturers we met with currently use supplemental electronic means notification on a case-by-case basis  Consumer associations: Similarly, both consumer associations we interviewed told us additional electronic notification can help reach consumers who do not complete repairs after receiving initial mailed notification  NHTSA’s proposal would maintain manufacturer reporting requirements, though it may result in additional reporting  This additional information could help the agency evaluate the effectiveness of various means of consumer notification  We previously found that NHTSA may be able to use manufacturers’ data to identify what factors make some recalls more or less successful than others  We recommended that NHTSA use the recall data it collects to analyze particular patterns or trends that may characterize successful recalls and determine whether these factors represent best practices  If the NPRM is finalized, manufacturers would provide NHTSA with representative copies of the newly required electronic notifications, in addition to mailed notifications, and would specify the electronic means used, such as e-mail or text message  According to NHTSA officials, this information could allow the agency to track and evaluate the effectiveness of various notification means used by manufacturers by, for example, comparing completion rates across means—a key step in identifying best practices that could encourage consumers to complete repairs  However, it is too early for NHTSA to conduct such an evaluation, because the agency has not issued a final rule  NHTSA officials told us the agency is working with the administration on NHTSA’s regulatory portfolio and priorities, including this rulemaking  NHTSA has also taken steps to collaborate with industry stakeholders and explore consumer education best practices  For example, in April 2015 NHTSA hosted a day-long workshop that brought together auto industry stakeholders to examine public education of the recall process  During the workshop, participants identified current barriers to the public’s awareness of auto recalls and discussed potential solutions to address them, such as using text messages and social media to communicate with younger consumers and using different delivery methods for recall notices  Similarly, in January 2016 NHTSA and 18 auto manufacturers adopted a set of Proactive Safety Principles to explore and employ new ways to increase safety recall participation rates  For example, NHTSA and auto manufacturers agreed to share industry best practices and policies based on lessons learned from ongoing safety recalls  The Independent Monitor of Takata in conjunction with NHTSA has also issued a set of coordinated communications recommendations based on consumer research, best practices observed during the Takata recall, and discussions with manufacturers  For example, the recommendations encourage manufacturers to: pursue a “multi-touch” communications strategy that employs non- traditional means, such as e-mail and text messages; convey risk in clear, accurate and urgent terms; and include a clear “call to action” designed to facilitate prompt and efficient scheduling of repairs  According to NHTSA officials, the agency relies on auto manufacturers to evaluate the effectiveness of these efforts  However, agency officials told us NHTSA reviews manufacturers communication plans as part of the Takata recall’s Coordinated Remedy Program and provides ongoing recommendations on manufacturers’ communication language, approach, and strategies  With the recent steep increase in safety defect vehicle recalls and continued low recall completion rates, it is vital for consumers to be able to easily access and use publicly available auto recall information  NHTSA has taken important steps to improve its website—which provides safety recall information to consumers—resulting in most consumers in our focus groups finding the website easy to use  However, the difficulties some experienced in attempting to complete essential auto recall tasks demonstrated that NHTSA gov does not always reflect key website usability practices for website design  Although NHTSA plans to conduct a website usability study with consumers after consolidating its websites, it has not determined a completion date for this effort—an essential step for organizations to effectively guide their information technology efforts  Without such a date, the website usability difficulties may persist and limit the effectiveness of NHTSA gov in providing consumers with recall information about their vehicles  By addressing these difficulties in the interim, NHTSA can better assure that consumers obtain this information, which can be vital to their safety  We are making the following two recommendations to NHTSA: The Administrator of NHTSA should determine a completion date for the agency’s website consolidation effort  (Recommendation 1) The Administrator of NHTSA should, while the agency continues its website consolidation effort, take interim steps to improve the usability of the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov by addressing the website usability difficulties we identified  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment  In its written comments, reproduced in appendix VI, DOT stated that it concurred with our recommendations  The department also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to relevant congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Administrator of NHTSA  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII  This report examines the use of publicly available auto recall information for safety defects affecting passenger vehicles  The report addresses the following objectives: (1) How do consumers and industry stakeholders use publicly available auto recall information? (2) How easy or difficult to use do consumers find the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov? (3) What steps, if any, has the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) taken to raise consumer awareness about auto recalls and how has NHTSA evaluated the effectiveness of these steps? We define publicly available auto recall information to include information on the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov, such as examples of notification letters that manufacturers mail to consumers  This report focuses on safety defect vehicle recalls affecting passenger vehicles that are initiated when a defect in a vehicle or vehicle equipment creates an unreasonable safety risk, as determined by NHTSA or a manufacturer  To determine how consumers use publicly available auto recall information, we conducted and analyzed transcripts and questionnaires from 12 consumer focus groups we conducted with used and new vehicle owners who had experienced an auto recall in the last 24 months  Each focus group was split into two sessions: (1) a discussion session to explore participants’ thoughts, experiences, and preferences about auto recall information and (2) a website usability testing session  Also, we administered a questionnaire as part of each of these sessions  For the discussion session, we asked consumers about the recall notification process and how they used the recall information, and for the website usability testing session, we asked consumers to fill in a questionnaire during the session itself as they assessed the usability of the auto recall areas of NHTSA’s website  We conducted the 12 focus groups at six locations across the country, with each group including 7 or 8 consumers for a total of 94 participants  Half of the focus groups were comprised of consumers who had completed the repair and the remaining half included consumers who had not completed the repair  We selected the six focus group locations to provide population and geographic dispersion  To ensure geographic dispersion, we selected at least one location in each U S  Census region (see table 3)  To ensure population dispersion, we selected Metropolitan Statistical Areas representing a range of population sizes based on 2015 U S  Census estimates  To ensure our selection included the perspectives of vehicle owners in geographically distant or isolated communities, we also selected a rural location, which we defined as a city or town that has a population of less than 50,000 inhabitants and is not an urbanized area contiguous and adjacent to a city or town that has a population of greater than 50,000 inhabitants  Using information provided by the participants, we selected focus group participants based on age, income, gender, education level, race, and ethnicity to ensure we collected a range of perspectives on auto recall information use  However, since we did not select a representative sample of participants, focus group results are not generalizable to all vehicle owners  During focus group discussion sessions, we asked participants to discuss factors they considered when deciding whether to repair their recalled vehicle and then to select the single most influential factor  Each of the 12 focus group sessions was audio recorded and transcriptions were created; transcripts served as the record for each group  We then evaluated those transcripts using systematic content analysis to identify the factors consumers considered when deciding whether to complete repairs and any suggested improvements to the auto recall communication process  The analysis was conducted in three steps  First, two analysts independently developed a code framework and then worked together to resolve any discrepancies  Second, each transcript was coded independently by analysts using the framework and any discrepancies were resolved by both analysts agreeing on the coding of the associated statement by a participant  Third, if needed, another analyst adjudicated any continued disagreement between coders  Because the transcripts did not include a unique identifier for each focus group participant, we conducted our analysis of focus group session discussions at the group level (i e , of the 12 focus groups we conducted)  We also administered and analyzed a questionnaire as part of each discussion session to quantify responses regarding consumers’ use of auto recall information, including how they received and preferred to receive auto recall notifications  Our analysis of the questionnaire responses was conducted at the individual consumer level (i e , of the 94 consumers who participated)  These focus group sessions were structured, guided by a moderator who used a standardized list of questions to encourage participants to share their thoughts, experiences, and preferences  We also conducted two pretest focus groups at our headquarters and made some revisions to the focus group guide prior to beginning the sessions with consumers  Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to demonstrate the extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population or provide statistically representative samples or reliable quantitative estimates  Instead, they are intended to generate in-depth information about the reasons for the focus group participants’ thoughts, experiences, and preferences on specific topics  The projectability of the information produced by our focus group sessions is limited  For example, the information includes only the responses from the vehicle owners from the 12 selected groups and their individual responses to questions we asked  The experiences and preferences expressed may not reflect other vehicle owners’ thoughts and preferences  In addition, while the composition of the groups was designed to ensure a range of age and education levels, among the other criteria mentioned previously, the groups were not constructed using a random sampling method  To determine how industry stakeholders use auto recall information, we interviewed selected auto manufacturers, selected franchised and independent auto dealerships, NHTSA program officials, and other industry stakeholders  Specifically, we interviewed representatives from the following 10 auto manufacturers, selected based on each manufacturer’s sales market share (small, medium, and large), place of ownership (foreign and domestic), and experience with auto recalls (lower to higher based on the average annual number of auto recall campaigns and average market share of each manufacturer from 2010 to 2014) to collect a range of perspectives on how manufacturers use auto recall information: Tesla Motors, Inc  To understand the perspective of auto dealers, we interviewed four franchised dealerships, one in each of the four U S  Census regions where we conducted focus groups with consumers  We also interviewed three independent auto dealerships in two U S  Census regions  The results of these interviews are not generalizable to all auto manufacturers and dealerships, but provide insights about how some industry stakeholders use auto recall information  We conducted interviews with NHTSA program officials to understand NHTSA’s role in the auto recall process  In addition, we interviewed other stakeholders, including the Independent Monitor of Takata, which assists NHTSA in overseeing the Takata recall, as well as officials from consumer associations and other industry groups (see table 4)  To evaluate how easy or difficult consumers find the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov to use, we reviewed various website usability resources to understand federal and industry key website usability practices for making websites easy to use, such as focusing on design and how easily users can find information  In addition, we reviewed federal standards for internal control related to communicating quality information externally  During our usability testing sessions, we asked consumers to attempt to complete auto recall tasks—the primary means NHTSA gov provides for consumers to access information about auto recalls affecting their vehicles—and discuss their experiences  We then compared consumers’ experiences with the usability of the website against these practices  To identify key website usability practices, we analyzed guidance documents from NHTSA and other federal agencies  For example, we analyzed the General Services Administration’s (GSA) and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Research-Based Web Design & Usability Guidelines, which includes quantified, peer-reviewed guidelines intended to help federal agencies improve the design and usability of their information-based websites  We also analyzed GSA’s Requirements for Federal Websites and Digital Services, and the U S  Digital Services Playbook to identify key practices for making websites easy to use  Identified key practices are: (1) design and content— focusing on the layout, headers, and design; (2) navigation—how easily users can find information; (3) clarity—the ability to read and digest content; (4) identity and purpose—whether the site clearly presents its purpose; and (5) accessibility—the ability of people with physical or mental disabilities to use the site  To analyze the results of focus group website testing sessions, we performed a systematic content analysis of the session transcripts using the same content analysis methods described above and an analysis of the questionnaire we administered to each participant during the website usability sessions  Specifically, we analyzed the transcripts from the website usability testing sessions to account for consumers’ experiences, including their initial impressions of the website and any suggested usability improvements  We also analyzed the results of the questionnaire that each participant completed where participants were asked to mark responses regarding their experience including an assessment of the usability of the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov  Our analysis of the results from the questionnaire responses was conducted at the individual consumer level (i e , of the 94 consumers who participated) while our analysis of focus group session discussions was conducted at the group level (i e , of the 12 focus groups we conducted)  To corroborate the results of usability testing sessions we conducted with the consumers in our focus groups, we requested that five website usability professionals from GSA’s Federal User Experience Community conduct an independent evaluation of the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov against federal and industry key website usability practices (described above)  The website usability professionals developed a website usability evaluation form, which they used to individually evaluate the auto recall areas of NHTSA’s website  The website usability professionals then met to form a consensus and provided us with one final group evaluation of the website usability of the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov  Also, although neither our usability testing nor the website usability evaluation conducted by website usability professionals directly addressed accessibility, we interviewed responsible agency officials about how the agency assesses the accessibility of NHTSA gov  We also requested and analyzed website data provided by NHTSA to understand how consumers access and use NHTSA gov  Requested data included the number of subscribers to NHTSA’s Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-up; the number of weekly vehicle identification number (VIN) searches performed on NHTSA gov from August 2014 through May 2017; and NHTSA gov usage data by device (i e , usage by mobile devices, tablets, and desktop computers)  We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing any supporting documents provided by the agency and interviewing responsible NHTSA officials, and concluded the data were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes  While we did not independently review the usability of auto manufacturers’ auto recall websites, we requested and reviewed the results of any audits that NHTSA performed of these websites, including whether the websites met statutory and regulatory requirements for providing auto recall information to the public  We then corroborated any audit findings by reviewing the auto recall websites of the selected auto manufacturers that we interviewed  To determine any steps NHTSA has taken to raise consumer awareness about auto recalls and how NHTSA evaluates the effectiveness of any steps, we reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and proposed rules, including the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking related to recall notification methods  We also reviewed agency and other documents that describe or evaluate NHTSA’s public awareness activities  For example, we analyzed NHTSA’s strategic planning documents—such as NHTSA’s Strategic Plan 2016–2020—to identify ongoing public awareness activities along with their related goals, objectives, or performance metrics  Similarly, we requested and analyzed any documents NHTSA uses to evaluate the effectiveness of its public awareness activities, including performance reports for NHTSA’s ongoing Safe Cars Save Lives campaign  To assess the reliability of data included in these performance reports— such as VIN searches performed—we reviewed agency documentation and interviewed agency officials about the reliability, accuracy, and completeness of the data and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes  We reviewed performance management practices as provided in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, and standards for internal control in the federal government to identify any opportunities for improvement  We also performed a literature review to identify any related published articles and research studies  To understand how NHTSA implements and evaluates any public awareness activities, we also interviewed responsible agency officials from NHTSA’s Office of Communications and Consumer Information and other offices  In addition, we discussed NHTSA’s public awareness efforts during interviews with industry stakeholders, including selected auto manufacturers, selected franchised and independent auto dealerships, and other industry stakeholders  We analyzed the results of these interviews along with the focus group discussions we conducted with consumers (discussed above) to identify perspectives on the effectiveness of NHTSA’s public awareness steps  We conducted this performance audit from October 2016 to December 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is required to conduct a biennial analysis of vehicle safety recall completion rates and submit the results of its analysis in a report to certain congressional committees  The report must include, among other things, the annual recall completion rate by vehicle type and vehicle component (such as brakes, fuel systems, and air bags) for each of the 5 years preceding the year the report is submitted  According to NHTSA’s May 2017 report, completion rates for all vehicles combined ranged between 63 percent and 67 percent between calendar year 2011 and calendar year 2014 (see table 5)  However, NHTSA reported wider variation when the recall completion rates are broken down by vehicle type  Similarly, the report found that completion rates for most component categories fall within a range of 60 percent to 75 percent (see table 6)  The annual completion rate is a volume-based, weighted metric, such that the more vehicles affected by the recall, the more weight or influence it has on the computed rate  Focus group participants responded to a questionnaire we administered to collect information on consumers’ auto recall notification preferences during our discussion sessions  Table 7 shows participants’ responses to the administered questionnaire, by age group  We present these responses by age group, because consumers’ notification preferences may vary according to their ages  Focus group participants responded to a questionnaire we administered to collect information on the usability of NHTSA gov during our usability testing sessions  Table 8 shows focus group participants’ responses to the administered questionnaire, by age group  We present these responses by age group, because consumers’ website usability needs or preferences may vary according to their ages  In addition to the individual named above, H  Brandon Haller (Assistant Director); Katherine Blair; Jason Blake; Melissa Bodeau; Alicia Cackley; William Colwell (Analyst in Charge); Lacey Coppage; Elizabeth Dretsch; Jaci Evans; Marcia Fernandez; Sarah Kaczmarek; Malika Rice; Todd Schartung; and Andrew Stavisky made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: Developing independently capable ANDSF is a key component of U.S. and coalition efforts to create sustainable security and stability in Afghanistan under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support mission. The United States is the largest contributor of funding and personnel to Resolute Support, providing and maintaining ANDSF equipment, along with training, advising, and assistance to help the ANDSF effectively use and sustain the equipment in the future. House Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to review the ANDSF's capability and capacity to operate and sustain U.S.-purchased weapon systems and equipment. This report addresses (1) what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF's ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD and NATO reports and documents, examined three critical equipment types, and interviewed DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in September 2018. Information that DOD deemed sensitive has been omitted. Since the Resolute Support mission began in 2015, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have improved some fundamental capabilities, such as high-level operational planning, but continue to rely on U.S. and coalition support to fill several key capability gaps, according to Department of Defense (DOD) reporting. DOD has initiatives to address some ANDSF capability gaps, such as a country-wide vehicle maintenance and training effort, but DOD reports it does not expect the ANDSF to develop and sustain independent capabilities in some areas, such as logistics, for several years. While DOD has firsthand information on the abilities of the Afghan Air Force and Special Security Forces to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment, it has little reliable information on the equipment proficiency of conventional ANDSF units. U.S. and coalition advisors are embedded at the tactical level for the Air Force and Special Security Forces, enabling DOD to directly assess those forces' abilities. However, the advisors have little direct contact with conventional ANDSF units on the front lines. As a result, DOD relies on those units' self-assessments of tactical abilities, which, according to DOD officials, can be unreliable. GAO's analysis of three critical equipment types illustrated the varying degrees of DOD's information (see figure above). For example, DOD provided detailed information about the Air Force's ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters and the Special Security Forces' ability to operate and maintain Mobile Strike Force Vehicles; however, DOD had limited information about how conventional forces operate and maintain radios and Mobile Strike Force Vehicles. DOD's lack of reliable information on conventional forces' equipment operations and maintenance abilities adds to the uncertainty and risk in assessing the progress of DOD efforts in Afghanistan. GAO recommends that DOD develop options for collecting reliable information on conventional ANDSF units' ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. DOD concurred with this recommendation.