prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Black lung benefits include both cash assistance and medical benefits  Maximum cash assistance payments generally ranged from about $650 to $1,300 per month in fiscal year 2017, depending on the number of dependents the miner has  Miners receiving cash assistance are also eligible for medical benefits that cover the treatment of their black-lung- related conditions, which may include hospital and nursing care, rehabilitation services, and drug and equipment charges, according to DOL documentation  DOL estimates that the average annual cost for medical treatment in fiscal year 2017 was approximately $6,980 per miner  There were about 25,700 total beneficiaries (primary and dependents) receiving black lung benefits during fiscal year 2017 (see fig  1)  The decrease in the number of beneficiaries over time has resulted from a combination of declining coal mining employment and an aging beneficiary population, according to DOL officials  Further, black lung beneficiaries could increase in the near term due to the increased occurrence of black lung disease and its most severe form, progressive massive fibrosis, particularly among Appalachian coal miners, according to HHS officials  Black lung claims are processed by DOL’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs  Contested claims are adjudicated by DOL’s Office of Administrative Law Judges, which issues decisions that can be appealed to the Benefits Review Board  Claimants and mine operators may further appeal these agency decisions to the federal courts  If an award is contested, claimants can receive interim benefits, which are generally paid from the Trust Fund according to DOL officials, while their claims are in the appeals process  Final awards are either funded by mine operators—who are identified as the responsible employers of claimants—or the Trust Fund, when responsible employers cannot be identified or do not pay  In fiscal year 2017, black lung claims had an approval rate of about 29 percent, according to DOL data  Of the 19,430 primary black lung beneficiaries receiving benefits during fiscal year 2017, 64 percent (12,464) were paid from the Trust Fund, 25 percent (4,798) were paid by liable mine operators, and 11 percent (2,168) were receiving interim benefits, according to DOL officials  Black Lung Disability Trust Fund revenue is primarily obtained from mine operators through the coal tax  The coal tax is imposed at two rates, depending on whether the coal is extracted from underground or surface mines  The current tax rates are $1 10 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0 55 per ton of surface-mined coal, up to 4 4 percent of the sales price  Therefore, if a ton of underground-mined coal is sold for less than $25, than the tax paid would be less than $1 10  For instance, if a ton of underground-mined coal sold for $20, than it would be taxed at 4 4 percent of the sales price, or $0 88  To a lesser extent, the Trust Fund also receives other miscellaneous revenue from interest payments, and various fines and penalties paid by mine operators, among other sources, according to DOL documentation  Coal tax revenue is collected from mine operators by Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service and then transferred to the Trust Fund where it is then used by DOL officials to pay black lung benefits and the costs of administering the program  Trust Fund expenditures include, among other things, black lung benefit payments, certain administrative costs incurred by DOL and Treasury to administer the black lung benefits program, and debt repayments  When necessary for the Trust Fund to make relevant expenditures under federal law, the Trust Fund borrows from the Treasury’s general fund  When this occurs, the federal government is essentially borrowing from itself—and hence from the general taxpayer—to fund its benefit payments and other expenditures  Multiple factors have challenged Trust Fund finances since it was established about 40 years ago  Its expenditures have consistently exceeded its revenue, interest payments have grown, and legislative actions taken that were expected to improve Trust Fund finances did not completely address its debt  Combined black lung benefit payments and program administrative costs exceeded Trust Fund revenue every year for the program’s first decade (fiscal years 1979 through 1989), resulting in the accrual of debt  During the Trust Fund’s first three fiscal years in particular, revenue covered less than 40 percent of the Trust Fund’s combined benefit payments and administrative costs  For instance, in fiscal year 1980, the Trust Fund received about $251 million in revenue and paid about $726 million in black lung benefits and administrative costs  Beginning in 1982, revenue increased as a result of the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981 that doubled the coal tax rates from $0 50 to $1 per ton of underground-mined coal and from $0 25 to $0 50 per ton of surface-mined coal, up to 4 percent of the sales price  Even with the tax rate increase, combined benefit payments and administrative costs continued to exceed revenue throughout the 1980s (see fig  2)  As a result, the Trust Fund borrowed from Treasury’s general fund to cover the annual differences between its expenditures and revenues, and by fiscal year 1989 the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund exceeded $3 billion  Beginning in fiscal year 1990, Trust Fund revenue generally began to exceed combined benefit payments and administrative costs, and, in fact, total Trust Fund cumulative revenue collected from fiscal years 1979 through 2017 exceeded total cumulative benefit payments and administrative costs incurred during these years  However, interest owed from earlier years of borrowing led to more borrowing and debt  From fiscal years 1979 through 1989, the Trust Fund borrowed—primarily through 30-year term loans according to Treasury officials—from Treasury’s general fund at interest rates that varied from about 6 5 percent to about 13 9 percent  In fiscal year 1985, for instance, the Trust Fund paid about $275 million in interest, which was equal to about half of the total revenue collected that year  Since fiscal year 1990, revenue has generally exceeded combined benefit payments and administrative costs, although interest payments on the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt kept the fund in a position whereby its total expenditures continued to exceed its total revenues  As a result, the principal amount of the Trust Fund’s total outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund increased and exceeded $10 billion by fiscal year 2008  Legislation has been enacted over the years that was expected to improve Trust Fund finances: In 1981, the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981 doubled the coal tax rates from $0 50 cents to $1 per ton of underground-mined coal, and from $0 25 cents to $0 50 cents per ton of surface-mined coal, up to 4 percent of the sales price (as mentioned previously)  In 1986, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 established a 5 year moratorium on interest accrual with respect to repayable advances to the Trust Fund (which we refer to as annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund), and increased the coal tax rates to $1 10 per ton of underground-mined coal, and $0 55 per ton of surface-mined coal (up to 4 4 percent of the sales price), where they have remained since  In 2008, the EIEA included provisions that were expected to eliminate the Trust Fund’s debt  Specifically, EIEA (1) generally extended the coal tax rates at their current rates until December 31, 2018 (after which they are scheduled to decrease to their original levels of $0 50 per ton of underground-mined coal, and $0 25 per ton of surface- mined coal, up to 2 percent of the sales price); (2) provided for a one- time federal appropriation toward Trust Fund debt forgiveness (about $6 5 billion, according to DOL data); and (3) provided for the refinancing of the Trust Fund’s debt that was not forgiven as a result of EIEA (which we refer to as the Trust Fund’s legacy debt)  Specifically, the Trust Fund’s legacy debt was refinanced with more favorable interest rates, according to DOL data  Interest rates on the refinanced legacy debt range from about 1 4 percent to about 4 5 percent  The forgiveness and refinancing of Trust Fund debt along with extending the current coal tax rates through 2018 were expected to result in annual tax revenue that could be used to pay down interest and principal on the Trust Fund’s legacy debt, according to DOL and Treasury officials  These officials said that models showed that debt would be eliminated by fiscal year 2040; however, they noted that coal tax revenue has been less than originally projected due, in part, to the 2008 recession and increased market competition from other energy sources  As a result, the Trust Fund’s total expenditures continued to exceed revenue and the Trust Fund borrowed from Treasury’s general fund each year from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 to cover debt repayments expenditures  In fiscal year 2017, the Trust Fund’s total principal amount of outstanding debt, which includes its legacy debt and the amount borrowed from Treasury’s general fund that year, was about $4 3 billion (see fig  3)  Trust Fund borrowing will likely continue to increase from fiscal years 2019 through 2050 due, in part, to the scheduled coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent that will take effect in 2019 and declining coal production, according to our moderate simulation  We simulated the effects of the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease on Trust Fund finances through 2050, and in this report, we generally present the results of a moderate case set of assumptions (see table 1)  These simulations are not predictions of what will happen, but rather models of what could happen given certain assumptions  For more information on our simulation methodology see appendix I  In addition to the moderate case assumptions, we also simulated how Trust Fund debt could change through 2050 given various other assumptions, and the full range of results for all of our simulations are presented in appendix II  Our moderate case simulation suggests that Trust Fund revenue may decrease, from about $485 million in fiscal year 2018 to about $298 million in fiscal year 2019, due, in part, to the scheduled approximate 55 percent decrease in the coal tax  Our simulation, which incorporates EIA data on future expected coal production, also shows that annual Trust Fund revenue will likely continue to decrease beyond fiscal year 2019 due, in part, to declining coal production  Domestic coal production has declined from about 1 2 billion tons in 2008 to about 728 million tons in 2016, according to EIA  Based on these projections, our moderate simulation shows that Trust Fund annual revenue may continue to decrease from about $298 million in fiscal year 2019 to about $197 million in fiscal year 2050 (see fig  4)  With the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease, our moderate case simulation suggests that expected revenue will likely be insufficient to cover combined black lung benefit payments and administrative costs, as well as debt repayment expenditures  Specifically, our moderate case simulation suggests that revenue may not be sufficient to cover beneficiary payments and administrative costs from fiscal years 2020 through 2050 (see fig  5)  For instance, in fiscal year 2029, simulated benefit payments and administrative costs will likely exceed simulated revenue by about $99 million  These annual deficits will likely decrease over time to about $4 million by fiscal year 2050 due, in part, to the assumed continued net decline in total black lung beneficiaries  Our simulation also therefore suggests that Trust Fund revenue may not be enough to also cover the debt repayment expenditures it must continue to make through fiscal year 2040, per the payment schedule established following the 2008 EIEA  Our moderate simulation suggests that the amount borrowed by the Trust Fund will likely increase from about $1 6 billion in fiscal year 2019 to about $15 4 billion in fiscal year 2050 (see fig  6)  Although the Trust Fund’s legacy debt decreases through fiscal year 2040, total Trust Fund expenditures—including combined benefit payments and administrative costs as well as debt repayments—will likely continue to exceed revenue which will require continued annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund  However, the amount borrowed by the Trust Fund could vary depending, in part, on future coal production and the number of new beneficiaries and could range between about $6 billion and about $27 billion in 2050, according to our simulations (see appendix II)  We simulated three options that can affect Trust Fund finances through fiscal year 2050  Specifically, we simulated the effects of (1) adjusting the coal tax, (2) forgiving interest, and (3) forgiving debt  In each of the simulations, we compared the results of the option to a baseline in which the coal tax rates will decrease by about 55 percent, which we refer to as the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease  We compare interest and debt forgiveness options to a baseline which assumes the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease has taken effect, and that there is no interest or debt forgiveness  The simulated options are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular option or combination of options  Using the moderate case, we simulated four options: (1) implementing the 2019 coal tax rate reduction to $0 50 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0 25 per ton of surface-mined coal; (2) maintaining the current coal tax rates of $1 10 per ton for underground-mined coal and $0 55 per ton of surface-mined coal; (3) reducing the tax rates by 25 percent (from $1 10 and $0 55); and (4) increasing these tax rates by 25 percent (see fig  7)  Increasing the tax rates by 25 percent was the only option that eliminated simulated Trust Fund debt by fiscal year 2050, according to our moderate case simulation  We simulated three interest forgiveness options including forgiving interest on (1) legacy debt, (2) annual borrowing, and (3) all debt  Our moderate case simulation suggests that forgiving interest will not eliminate simulated debt by fiscal year 2050 (see fig  8)  We simulated two debt forgiveness options by forgiving principal and interest on (1) legacy debt and (2) all debt  Our moderate case simulation suggests that both debt forgiveness options would reduce simulated Trust Fund borrowing by fiscal year 2050, but these options would not eliminate debt altogether as simulated revenue will likely not be enough to cover simulated expenditures (see fig  9)  In these cases, the Trust Fund will need to continue borrowing from Treasury’s general fund to cover annual deficits, and thus accumulate debt  While adjusting coal tax rates and forgiving interest or debt could reduce the Trust Fund’s simulated borrowing by 2050, implementing them could affect the coal industry or general taxpayers, according to stakeholders we interviewed  For instance, a coal industry representative noted that maintaining the coal tax at its current rate would continue to burden the coal industry and increasing the tax would exacerbate the burden at a time when coal production has been declining  Treasury officials noted that the costs associated with forgiving Trust Fund interest or debt would be borne by the general taxpayer since Treasury borrows from taxpayers to lend to the Trust Fund as needed  These officials also said that making a one-time federal appropriation to forgive interest or debt would be the most transparent way to satisfy the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund  In addition to the simulations, other options could affect the financial position of the Trust Fund including reducing black lung benefits, eliminating or adjusting the coal tax cap, or creating a variable coal tax  Our moderate case simulation suggests that completely eliminating black lung benefits as of fiscal year 2019 could reduce the Trust Fund’s borrowing from Treasury’s general fund in fiscal year 2050 from about $15 4 billion to about $6 4 billion  However, doing so would generally mean that coal tax revenue would be collected solely to fund the repayment of Trust Fund debt  Another option could be to eliminate or adjust the coal tax cap, which currently prevents mine operators from paying a coal tax of more than 4 4 percent of the price per ton of coal sold  If the coal tax cap were eliminated, for instance, mine operators would pay $1 10 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0  55 per ton of surface-mined coal regardless of price sold, which could increase revenue  As an additional option, changing the structure of the coal tax to flexible rates that change based on an annual actuarial assessment of the Trust Fund could help to ensure that coal mine operators pay the necessary amount of tax to cover Trust Fund expenditures, without resulting in a Trust Fund balance or deficit  Multiple options could reduce the Trust Fund’s future debt and distribute the financial burden among the coal industry and general taxpayers  We simulated whether various coal tax and debt forgiveness options could balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050, whereby its simulated revenue would be sufficient to cover its simulated expenditures  These options were selected, in part, based on interviews with Trust Fund stakeholders and the availability of DOL and other data  We approached these simulations from two perspectives  First, we simulated how much Trust Fund debt would need to be forgiven based on various coal tax rates  Second, we simulated the average tax collected per ton needed to balance the Trust Fund by 2050, based on certain debt forgiveness options  The simulated options are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular combination of options  Our first set of options using the moderate case simulations are based on the current coal tax rates of $1 10 per ton of underground-mined coal and $0 55 per ton of surface-mined coal, and show the amount of debt forgiveness in fiscal year 2019 needed to balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050 based on certain tax rates (see fig  10)  Specifically, our moderate case simulations show the following: Increasing current coal tax rates by 25 percent could balance the Trust Fund by 2050 and would likely require no debt forgiveness  For this option, the simulated coal tax revenue would likely be sufficient to cover simulated Trust Fund expenditures, including combined benefit payments and administrative costs, as well as debt repayments  However, this option would place the burden solely on the coal industry that would be paying higher taxes at a time when coal production has been declining  Maintaining current coal tax rates could balance the Trust Fund by 2050 if coupled with about $2 4 billion of debt forgiveness  This option would distribute the burden among the coal industry and general taxpayers  Decreasing current coal tax rates by 25 percent could balance the Trust Fund by 2050 if coupled with about $4 8 billion in debt forgiveness  This option would burden the coal industry less than maintaining the current tax rates, but would increase the burden on general taxpayers  Decreasing current tax rates by 55 percent, which we refer to as the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease, would balance the Trust Fund by 2050 if coupled with about $7 8 billion in debt forgiveness  This figure comprises the Trust Fund’s total simulated outstanding debt in fiscal year 2019 ($6 6 billion), and an additional about $1 2 billion that would be required because the Trust Fund will accrue additional debt from fiscal years 2020 through 2050, according to our moderate case simulations  The coal industry would bear some of the financial burden of this option, while also placing a financial burden on general taxpayers  Our second set of options using moderate case simulations show the change in average coal tax revenue collected per ton to balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050 based on certain debt forgiveness options (see fig  11)  Specifically, our moderate simulations show the following: Forgiving the Trust Fund’s legacy debt would allow for an average tax collected of about $0 59 per ton to balance the Trust Fund by 2050  Based on certain assumptions, this could be accomplished with a tax of $0 88 per ton on underground-mined coal and $0 44 per ton on surface-mined coal  Forgiving all Trust Fund debt would allow for an average tax collected per ton of coal sold of $0 47 per ton to balance the Trust Fund by 2050  Based on certain assumptions, this could be accomplished with a tax of $0 70 per ton on underground-mined coal and a tax of $0 35 per ton of surface-mined coal  We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Labor (DOL), Treasury, and Health and Human Services (HHS) for review and comment  DOL, Treasury, and HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time we will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Labor, Treasury, and Health and Human Services, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s web site at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff should have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or brownbarnesc@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  We examined the extent to which (1) Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (Trust Fund) debt may change through 2050 and (2) selected options to improve its future financial position  We interviewed officials from the Departments of Labor (DOL), Treasury, and Health and Human Services (HHS), as well as representatives from the National Mining Association and the United Mine Workers of America  We then selected options to simulate based, in part, on these interviews and the availability of DOL and other data  These options included adjusting the coal tax, forgiving interest on some or all Trust Fund debt, forgiving some or all Trust Fund debt, or various combinations of these options  The options we simulated are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular option or combination of options  Our simulations are based on various assumptions and simulate Trust Fund revenues and expenditures from fiscal years 2016 through 2050  To develop these simulations, we used actual and projection data from (1) DOL for fiscal years 2015 through 2040; (2) Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis for fiscal years 2011 through 2015; (3) the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) for calendar years 2015 through 2050; and (4) the Office of Management and Budget for fiscal year 2017  To simulate future Trust Fund benefit expenditures, we simulated the number of beneficiaries each fiscal year, and the annual average amount of benefits received (cash assistance and medical benefits)  To simulate the numbers of beneficiaries, we used DOL data on the (1) age distributions of miner and widow beneficiaries for fiscal year 2015; (2) mortality rates by age for miner and widow beneficiaries as of fiscal year 2015; and (3) numbers of beneficiaries—including married miners, single miners, widows, and miners receiving medical benefits only—in fiscal year 2015  We assumed—as DOL does in its Black Lung Budget and Liability Model—that all miners are men, all widows are women, and all spouses are 3 years younger than the miner  We also assumed that the age distribution of single miners is the same as for married miners, and that the age distribution of new miner and widow beneficiaries is the same as for miner and widow beneficiaries during fiscal year 2015  We used DOL’s mortality rates to simulate the number of beneficiaries of each age and type in each year, and used those numbers to then simulate the total number of beneficiaries of each type each year (see table 2)  We also assumed that there will be no new medical-benefit-only recipients  Formula The number of married miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of new married miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y plus the number of married miner beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived and whose spouse survived  The total number of married miner beneficiaries in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of married miner beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y  Finally, we averaged the number of married miner beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total  The number of single miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of new single miner beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y plus the number of single miner beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived plus the number of married miner beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived but whose spouse did not survive  The total number of single miner beneficiaries in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of single miner beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y  Finally, we averaged the number of single miner beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total  The number of widow beneficiaries age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of new beneficiaries who are widows age a in fiscal year y plus the number of widow beneficiaries age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived plus the number of married miner beneficiaries age a+2 in fiscal year y-1 who did not survive but whose spouse did survive  The total number of widow beneficiaries in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of widow beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y  Finally, we averaged the number of widow beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total  The number of MBO beneficiaries of age a in fiscal year y is equal to the number of MBO beneficiaries of age a-1 in fiscal year y-1 who survived  The total number of MBO beneficiaries only in fiscal year y is then the sum of the number of MBO beneficiaries of all ages in fiscal year y  Finally, we averaged the number of MBO beneficiaries by averaging the prior fiscal year’s total and the current fiscal year’s total  To simulate future coal tax revenue, we used Treasury and EIA data to calculate (1) the amounts of underground and surface-mined coal taxed at fixed dollar amounts of $1 10 and $0 55 per ton, respectively, in 2015; (2) the amounts of underground and surface-mined coal taxed at variable dollar amounts per ton equal to 4 4 percent of the price in 2015; and (3) average prices of underground and surface-mined coal taxed at 4 4 percent of the price in 2015  We then used EIA data on projected amounts of total coal production, underground-mined coal production, lignite coal production, and coal exports, as well as projected average coal prices, for the period from 2015 through 2050 to simulate future coal tax revenues (see table 3)  We simulated other Trust Fund expenditures and revenues, including administrative costs and debt repayments (see table 4)  For our simulations, total Trust Fund expenditures are the sum of black lung benefits (cash assistance and medical benefits), total administrative costs, repayment of interest and principal on outstanding debt to Treasury’s general fund, and other expenditures  Total Trust Fund revenues are the sum of coal tax revenue and other miscellaneous revenue, and exclude annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund  Annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund is the difference between total Trust Fund expenditures and revenues and is assumed to be repaid with interest the following year  If total revenues are greater than total expenditures, then the Trust Fund has a balance and would not have to borrow that year  In this case, we assumed that the Trust Fund will earn interest on that balance at the same rate on which interest would accrue on annual borrowing  We simulated how the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease and various options including adjusting the coal tax, forgiving debt interest, and forgiving debt principal and interest may affect Trust Fund finances through fiscal year 2050 (see table 5)  The options listed are not intended to be exhaustive and we are not endorsing any particular option or combination of options  We simulated option combinations for coal tax rates, interest forgiveness, and debt forgiveness to demonstrate how potential financial adjustments could affect future Trust Fund borrowing from Treasury’s general fund through fiscal year 2050  For options that involve adjusting coal tax rates, we estimated the amount of debt that would need to be forgiven in fiscal year 2019 for the Trust Fund’s revenues to be sufficient to cover its expenditures through fiscal year 2050, assuming the Trust Fund does not borrow from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018  To do so, we first calculated the real discounted present value of Trust Fund expenditures for fiscal years 2019 through 2050, including benefit payments, administrative costs, legacy debt repayments, and repayment of annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund  Second, we calculated the real discounted present value of Trust Fund revenue for the same period, including coal tax revenue and other miscellaneous revenue  Third, we calculated debt forgiveness as the difference between the real discounted present value of Trust Fund expenditures from the first calculation and the real discounted present value of Trust Fund revenues from the second calculation  When the amount of debt forgiveness is greater than the amount of debt outstanding, the Trust Fund would need an additional cash inflow in addition to forgiveness of all outstanding debt  Amounts of debt forgiveness less than zero suggest that no debt forgiveness is required  For options involving forgiving debt (interest or principal), we estimated the average tax per ton of coal that, if implemented in fiscal year 2019, would provide the Trust Fund sufficient revenue to cover its expenditures through fiscal year 2050, assuming the Trust Fund does not receive any advances from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018  To do so, we first calculated the real discounted present value of Trust Fund expenditures for the period from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2050, again including benefit payments, administrative costs, legacy debt repayments, and repayment of annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund, minus the real discounted present value of miscellaneous revenues for the same period  Second, we calculated the real discounted present value of coal production for the same period  Third, we calculated the average tax per ton of coal as the first amount divided by the second amount  To assess the sensitivity of each option, we ran each simulation 36 times using four different sets of assumptions about the numbers of future beneficiaries and nine different sets of assumptions about future coal production and prices (see table 6)  Doing so provided a range of estimates about the Trust Fund’s future borrowing needs and provided insight on the sensitivity of its overall financial position relative to its various expenditures and revenues  The analysis also provided a range of estimates of the amount of debt forgiveness needed to bring the Trust Fund into balance by fiscal year 2050, assuming various coal tax rates, and the average tax collection per ton needed to do the same, and assuming various amounts of debt forgiveness  From the range of estimates that resulted from our sensitivity analysis, we selected cases with moderate expectations related to future Trust Fund expenditures and revenue  Specifically, for future expenditures, we assumed an average growth rate of new black lung beneficiaries for fiscal years 2003 through 2015 as a moderate case that reflects historical experience  For future revenue, we used a moderate coal production outlook based on EIA’s reference case, which reflects moderate expectations about future coal production based on various assumptions about economic growth, oil prices, technological innovation, and energy policy  We summarized the results of our simulations by showing the extent to which the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund’s (Trust Fund) balance—the sum of tax revenue and miscellaneous revenue less expenditures—may change in fiscal year 2050 for each option simulated  For example, with the scheduled 2019 tax rate decrease, our moderate case simulations suggest that the Trust Fund would likely have a deficit in fiscal year 2050 of about $15 4 billion  Multiple options could reduce the Trust Fund’s future debt and distribute the financial burden among the coal industry and general taxpayers  We simulated how various coal tax and debt forgiveness options could balance the Trust Fund by fiscal year 2050, whereby its simulated revenue would be sufficient to cover its simulated expenditures  We approached these simulations from two perspectives  First, we simulated how much Trust Fund debt would need to be forgiven based on various coal tax rates  Second, we simulated the average tax collected per ton needed to balance the Trust Fund by 2050, based on certain debt forgiveness options  For our first set of simulations, we calculated the amount of debt outstanding in fiscal year 2019 and the amount that would likely need to be forgiven in fiscal year 2019 for the Trust Fund to have sufficient revenues to cover its expenditures by fiscal year 2050, assuming that it does not borrow from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018  For example, before any options are implemented, our moderate case simulations suggest that the Trust Fund’s outstanding debt in fiscal year 2019—including both legacy debt and annual borrowing from Treasury’s general fund—would likely be about $6 6 billion (after discounting and adjusting for inflation)  Therefore, with implementation of the coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent as scheduled in calendar year 2019, about 117 7 percent of that debt would need to be forgiven to balance the Trust Fund  In other words, balancing the Trust Fund would require forgiveness of $6 6 billion and an additional cash inflow of about $1 2 billion because the Trust Fund will accrue additional debt from fiscal years 2020 through 2050, according to our moderate case simulations (see table 8)  For our second set of simulations, we estimated the average tax per ton of coal that, if implemented in fiscal year 2019, would likely provide the Trust Fund sufficient revenues to cover its expenditures in fiscal year 2050, assuming that it does not borrow from Treasury’s general fund after fiscal year 2018  For example, if all principal and interest on Trust Fund legacy debt is forgiven, as of 2019, the estimated average tax that balances the Trust Fund is about $0 59 per ton (see table 9)  Based on certain assumptions, this could be accomplished with a tax of $0 88 per ton on underground-mined coal and $0 44 per ton on surface-mined coal  In addition to the contact named above, Blake Ainsworth (Assistant Director), Justin Dunleavy (analyst-in-charge), Angeline Bickner, Courtney LaFountain, and Rosemary Torres Lerma made key contributions to this report  Also contributing to this report were James Bennett, Melinda Bowman, Lilia Chaidez, Caitlin Cusati, Holly Dye, Alex Galuten, Carol Henn, John Lack, Emei Li, Almeta Spencer, Kate van Gelder, and Shana Wallace 


Report 2: The LDA requires lobbyists to register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House and to file quarterly reports disclosing their respective lobbying activities  Lobbyists are required to file their registrations and reports electronically with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House through a single entry point  Registrations and reports must be publicly available in downloadable, searchable databases from the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House  No specific statutory requirements exist for lobbyists to generate or maintain documentation in support of the information disclosed in the reports they file  However, guidance issued by the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House recommends that lobbyists retain copies of their filings and documentation supporting reported income and expenses for at least 6 years after they file their reports  The LDA requires that the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House guide and assist lobbyists with the registration and reporting requirements and develop common standards, rules, and procedures for LDA compliance  The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House review the guidance semiannually  It was last revised January 31, 2017, to (among other issues) update the registration threshold to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index, and clarify the identification of clients and covered officials and issues related to rounding income and expenses  The guidance provides definitions of LDA terms, elaborates on registration and reporting requirements, includes specific examples of different scenarios, and provides explanations of why certain scenarios prompt or do not prompt disclosure under the LDA  The offices of the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House told us they continue to consider information we report on lobbying disclosure compliance when they periodically update the guidance  In addition, they told us they e-mail registered lobbyists quarterly on common compliance issues and reminders to file reports by the due dates  The LDA defines a lobbyist as an individual who is employed or retained by a client for compensation, who has made more than one lobbying contact (written or oral communication to covered officials, such as a high ranking agency official or a Member of Congress made on behalf of a client), and whose lobbying activities represent at least 20 percent of the time that he or she spends on behalf of the client during the quarter  Lobbying firms are persons or entities that have one or more employees who lobby on behalf of a client other than that person or entity  Figure 1 provides an overview of the registration and filing process  Lobbying firms are required to register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House for each client if the firms receive or expect to receive more than $3,000 in income from that client for lobbying activities  Lobbyists are also required to submit an LD-2 quarterly report for each registration filed  The LD-2s contain information that includes: the name of the lobbyist reporting on quarterly lobbying activities; the name of the client for whom the lobbyist lobbied; a list of individuals who acted as lobbyists on behalf of the client during the reporting period; whether any lobbyists served in covered positions in the executive or legislative branch such as high-ranking agency officials or congressional staff positions, in the previous 20 years; codes describing general issue areas, such as agriculture and education; a description of the specific lobbying issues; houses of Congress and federal agencies lobbied during the reporting reported income (or expenses for organizations with in-house lobbyists) related to lobbying activities during the quarter (rounded to the nearest $10,000)  The LDA also requires lobbyists to report certain political contributions semiannually in the LD-203 report  These reports must be filed 30 days after the end of a semiannual period by each lobbying firm registered to lobby and by each individual listed as a lobbyist on a firm’s lobbying report  The lobbyists or lobbying firms must: list the name of each federal candidate or officeholder, leadership political action committee, or political party committee to which he or she contributed at least $200 in the aggregate during the semiannual period; report contributions made to presidential library foundations and presidential inaugural committees; report funds contributed to pay the cost of an event to honor or recognize an official who was previously in a covered position, funds paid to an entity named for or controlled by a covered official, and contributions to a person or entity in recognition of an official, or to pay the costs of a meeting or other event held by or in the name of a covered official; and certify that they have read and are familiar with the gift and travel rules of the Senate and House and that they have not provided, requested, or directed a gift or travel to a member, officer, or employee of Congress that would violate those rules  The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House, along with USAO, are responsible for ensuring LDA compliance  The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House notify lobbyists or lobbying firms in writing that they are not complying with the LDA reporting  Subsequently, they refer those lobbyists who fail to provide an appropriate response to USAO  USAO researches these referrals and sends additional noncompliance notices to the lobbyists or lobbying firms, requesting that they file reports or terminate their registration  If USAO does not receive a response after 60 days, it decides whether to pursue a civil or criminal case against each noncompliant lobbyist  A civil case could lead to penalties up to $200,000 for each violation, while a criminal case—usually pursued if a lobbyist’s noncompliance is found to be knowing and corrupt—could lead to a maximum of 5 years in prison  Generally, under the LDA, within 45 days of being employed or retained to make a lobbying contact on behalf of a client, the lobbyist must register by filing an LD-1 form with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House  Thereafter, the lobbyist must file quarterly disclosure (LD-2) reports detailing the lobbying activities  Of the 3,433 new registrations we identified for the third and fourth quarters of 2016 and the first and second quarters of 2017, we matched 2,995 of them (87 2 percent) to corresponding LD-2 reports filed within the same quarter as the registration  These results are consistent with the findings we have reported in prior reviews  We used the House lobbyists’ disclosure database as the source of the reports  We also used an electronic matching algorithm that allows for misspellings and other minor inconsistencies between the registrations and reports  Figure 2 shows lobbyists filed disclosure reports as required for most new lobbying registrations from 2010 through 2017  For selected elements of lobbyists’ LD-2 reports that can be generalized to the population of lobbying reports, our findings have generally been consistent from year to year  Most lobbyists reporting $5,000 or more in income or expenses provided written documentation to varying degrees for the reporting elements in their disclosure reports  Figure 3 shows that for most LD-2 reports, lobbyists provided documentation for income and expenses for sampled reports from 2010 through 2017  However, in recent years our findings showed some variation in the estimated percentage of lobbyists who have reports with documentation for income and expense supporting lobbying activities  Specifically, our estimate for 2017 (99 percent) represents a statistically significant increase from 2016  Figure 4 shows that for some LD-2 reports, lobbyists did not round their income or expenses as the guidance requires  In 2017, we estimate 25 percent of reports did not round reported income or expenses according to the guidance  We have found that rounding difficulties have been a recurring issue on LD-2 reports from 2010 through 2017  As we previously reported, several lobbyists who listed expenses told us that based on their reading of the LD-2 form they believed they were required to report the exact amount  While this is not consistent with the LDA and the guidance, this may be a source of some of the confusion regarding rounding errors  In 2016, the guidance was updated to include an additional example about rounding expenses to the nearest $10,000  In 2017, 11 percent of lobbyists reported $10,000 or more in income or expenses  The LDA requires lobbyists to disclose lobbying contacts made with federal agencies on behalf of the client for the reporting period  This year, of the 98 LD-2 reports in our sample, 51 reports disclosed lobbying activities at federal agencies  Of those, lobbyists provided documentation for all lobbying activities at executive branch agencies for 34 LD-2 reports  Figures 5 through 8 show that lobbyists for most LD-2 reports provided documentation for selected elements of their LD-2 reports from 2010 through 2017  Lobbyists for an estimated 93 percent of LD-2 reports filed year-end 2016 for all lobbyists listed political contributions on the report as required  Figure 9 shows that lobbyists for most lobbying firms filed contribution reports as required in our sample from 2010 through 2017  All individual lobbyists and lobbying firms reporting lobbying activity are required to file LD-203 reports semiannually, even if they have no contributions to report, because they must certify compliance with the gift and travel rules  The LDA requires a lobbyist to disclose previously held covered positions in the executive or legislative branch, such as high ranking agency officials and congressional staff, when first registering as a lobbyist for a new client  This can be done either on a new LD-1 or on the quarterly LD- 2 filing when added as a new lobbyist  This year, we estimate that 15 percent of all LD-2 reports may not have properly disclosed previously held covered positions as required  As in our other reports, some lobbyists were still unclear about the need to disclose certain covered positions, such as paid congressional internships or certain executive agency positions  Figure 10 shows the extent to which lobbyists may not have properly disclosed one or more covered positions as required from 2010 through 2017  Lobbyists amended 15 of the 98 LD-2 disclosure reports in our original sample to change previously reported information after we contacted them  Of the 15 reports, 7 were amended after we notified the lobbyists of our review, but before we met with them  An additional 8 of the 15 reports were amended after we met with the lobbyists to review their documentation  We consistently find a notable number of amended LD-2 reports in our sample each year following notification of our review  This suggests that sometimes our contact spurs lobbyists to more closely scrutinize their reports than they would have without our review  Table 1 lists reasons lobbying firms in our sample amended their LD-1 or LD-2 reports  As part of our review, we compared contributions listed on lobbyists’ and lobbying firms’ LD-203 reports against those political contributions reported in the Federal Election Commission (FEC) database to identify whether political contributions were omitted on LD-203 reports in our sample  The sample of LD-203 reports we reviewed contained 80 reports with contributions and 80 reports without contributions  We estimate that overall for 2017, lobbyists failed to disclose one or more reportable contributions on 12 percent of reports  Additionally, ten LD-203 reports were amended in response to our review  For this element in prior reports, we reported an estimated minimum percentage of reports based on a one-sided 95 percent confidence interval rather than the estimated proportion as shown here  Estimates in the table have a maximum margin of error of 11 percentage points  The year to year differences are not statistically significant  Table 2 illustrates that from 2010 through 2017 most lobbyists disclosed FEC reportable contributions on their LD-203 reports as required  As part of our review, 88 different lobbying firms were included in our 2017 sample of LD-2 disclosure reports  Consistent with prior reviews, most lobbying firms reported that they found it “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to comply with reporting requirements  Of the 88 different lobbying firms in our sample, 34 reported that the disclosure requirements were “very easy,” 40 reported them “somewhat easy,” and 13 reported them “somewhat difficult” or “very difficult” (see figure 11)  Most lobbying firms we surveyed rated the definitions of terms used in LD-2 reporting as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand with regard to meeting their reporting requirements  This is consistent with prior reviews  Figures 12 through 16 show what lobbyists reported as their ease of understanding the terms associated with LD-2 reporting requirements from 2012 through 2017  U S  Attorney’s Office (USAO) officials stated that they continue to have sufficient personnel resources and authority under the LDA to enforce reporting requirements  This includes imposing civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance  Noncompliance refers to a lobbyist’s or lobbying firm’s failure to comply with the LDA  However, USAO noted that the number of assigned personnel has decreased due to attrition  USAO officials stated that lobbyists resolve their noncompliance issues by filing LD-2, LD-203, or LD-2 amendments, or by terminating their registration, depending on the issue  Resolving referrals can take anywhere from a few days to years, depending on the circumstances  During this time, USAO creates summary reports from its database to track the overall number of referrals that are pending or become compliant as a result of the lobbyist receiving an e-mail, phone call, or noncompliance letter  Referrals remain in the pending category until they are resolved  The pending category is divided into the following areas: “initial research for referral,” “responded but not compliant,” “no response/waiting for a response,” “bad address,” and “unable to locate ” The USAO attempts to review and update all pending cases every six months  USAO focuses its enforcement efforts primarily on the “responded but not compliant” and the “no response/waiting for a response” groups  Officials told us that, if the USAO, after several unsuccessful attempts, has been unsuccessful in contacting the non-compliant firm or its lobbyist, USAO confers with both the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House to determine whether further action is needed  In the cases where the lobbying firm is repeatedly referred for not filing disclosure reports but does not appear to be actively lobbying, USAO suspends enforcement actions  USAO officials reported they will continue to monitor these firms and will resume enforcement actions if required  USAO received 3,213 referrals from both the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House for failure to comply with LD-2 reporting requirements cumulatively for filing years 2009 through 2015  Table 4 shows the number and status of the referrals received and the number of enforcement actions taken by USAO to bring lobbying firms into compliance  Enforcement actions include USAO attempts to bring lobbyists into compliance through letters, e-mails, and calls  About 45 percent (1,450 of 3,213) of the total referrals received are now compliant because lobbying firms either filed their reports or terminated their registrations  In addition, some of the referrals were found to be compliant when USAO received the referral  Therefore, no action was taken  This may occur when lobbying firms respond to the contact letters from the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House after USAO received the referrals  About 55 percent (1,752 of 3,213) of referrals are pending further action because USAO could not locate the lobbying firm, did not receive a response from the firm after an enforcement action, or plans to conduct additional research to determine if it can locate the lobbying firm  The remaining 11 referrals did not require action or were suspended because the lobbyist or client was no longer in business or the lobbyist was deceased  LD-203 referrals consist of two types: (1) LD-203(R) referrals represent lobbying firms that have failed to file LD-203 reports for their lobbying firm and (2) LD-203 referrals represent the lobbyists at the lobbying firm who have failed to file their individual LD-203 reports as required  USAO received 2,255 LD-203(R) referrals (cumulatively from 2009 through 2015) and 3,716 LD-203 referrals (cumulatively from 2009 through 2014 from the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House for lobbying firms and lobbyists for noncompliance with reporting requirements)  LD- 203 referrals are more complicated than LD-2 referrals because both the lobbying firm and the individual lobbyists within the firm are each required to file a LD-203  Lobbyists employed by a lobbying firm typically use the firm’s contact information and not the lobbyists’ personal contact information  This makes it difficult to locate a lobbyist who is not in compliance and may have left the firm  USAO officials reported that, while many firms have assisted USAO by providing contact information for lobbyists, they are not required to do so  According to officials, USAO has difficulty pursuing LD-203 referrals for lobbyists who have departed a firm without leaving forwarding contact information with the firm  While USAO utilizes web searches and online databases, including social media, to find these missing lobbyists, it is not always successful  Table 5 shows the status of LD-203 (R) referrals received and the number of enforcement actions taken by USAO to bring lobbying firms into compliance  A little more than 44 percent (998 of 2,255) of the lobbying firms referred by the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House for noncompliance from calendar years 2009 through 2015 are now considered compliant because firms either filed their reports or terminated their registrations  About 56 percent (1,251 of 2,255) of the referrals are pending further action  Table 6 shows that USAO received 3,716 LD-203 referrals from the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House for lobbyists who failed to comply with LD-203 reporting requirements for calendar years 2009 through 2014  It also shows the status of the referrals received and the number of enforcement actions taken by USAO to bring lobbyists into compliance  In addition, table 6 shows that about 47 percent (1,741 of 3,716) of the lobbyists had come into compliance by filing their reports or are no longer registered as a lobbyist  About 53 percent (1,966 of 3,716) of the referrals are pending further action because USAO could not locate the lobbyist, did not receive a response from the lobbyist, or plans to conduct additional research to determine if it can locate the lobbyist  Table 7 shows that USAO received LD-203 referrals from the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House for 4,991 lobbyists who failed to comply with LD-203 reporting requirements for any filing year from 2009 through 2014  It also shows the status of compliance for individual lobbyists listed on referrals to USAO  About 51 percent (2,526 of 4,991) of the lobbyists had come into compliance by filing their reports or are no longer registered as a lobbyist  About 50 percent (2,465 of 4,991) of the referrals are pending action because USAO could not locate the lobbyists, did not receive a response from the lobbyists, or plans to conduct additional research to determine if it can locate the lobbyists  USAO officials said that many of the pending LD-203 referrals represent lobbyists who no longer lobby for the lobbying firms affiliated with the referrals, even though these lobbying firms may be listed on the lobbyist’s LD-203 report  According to USAO officials, lobbyists and lobbying firms who repeatedly fail to file reports are labeled chronic offenders and referred to one of the assigned attorneys for follow-up  USAO also receives complaints regarding lobbyists who are allegedly lobbying but never filed an LD-203  USAO officials added that USAO monitors and investigates chronic offenders to ultimately determine the appropriate enforcement actions, which may include settlement or other civil actions  In regards to the four active cases involving chronic offenders they reported to us in 2016, USAO officials noted that the agency is investigating one case, negotiating a resolution that will include a civil penalty in another case, and closing two other investigations without further action  In addition, USAO is reviewing its records to identify additional chronic offenders for further action due to noncompliance  We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Justice for review and comment  The Department of Justice provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General, Secretary of the Senate, Clerk of the House of Representatives, and interested congressional committees and members  In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2717 or jonesy@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  Our objectives were to determine the extent to which lobbyists are able to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA) by providing documentation to support information contained on registrations and reports filed under the LDA; to identify challenges and potential improvements to compliance, if any; and to describe the resources and authorities available to the U S  Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (USAO), its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts it has made to improve LDA enforcement  We used information in the lobbying disclosure database maintained by the Clerk of the House of Representatives (Clerk of the House)  To assess whether these disclosure data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, we reviewed relevant documentation and consulted with knowledgeable officials

ground_truth: With revenue of about $450 million in fiscal year 2017, the Trust Fund paid about $184 million in benefits to more than 25,000 coal miners and eligible dependents. However, the Trust Fund also borrowed about $1.3 billion from the Treasury's general fund in fiscal year 2017 to cover its debt repayment expenditures. Adding to this financial challenge, the coal tax that supports the Trust Fund is scheduled to decrease by about 55 percent beginning in 2019. GAO was asked to review the financial positon of the Trust Fund and identify options to improve it. This report examines (1) factors that have challenged the financial position of the Trust Fund since its inception and (2) the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050, and selected options that could improve its future financial position. GAO reviewed Trust Fund financial data from fiscal years 1979 through 2017. GAO also interviewed officials from the Departments of Labor, Treasury, Health and Human Services (HHS) and representatives of coal industry and union groups. Using assumptions, such as the about 55 percent coal tax decrease and moderately declining coal production, GAO simulated the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050. GAO also simulated how selected options, such as forgiveness of debt, could improve finances. The options simulated are not intended to be exhaustive. Further, GAO is not endorsing any particular option or combination of options. GAO provided a draft of this report to DOL, Treasury, and HHS. The agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. Multiple factors have challenged Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (Trust Fund) finances since it was established about 40 years ago. Its expenditures have consistently exceeded its revenues, interest payments have grown, and actions taken that were expected to improve Trust Fund finances did not completely address its debt. When necessary to make expenditures, the Trust Fund borrows with interest from the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) general fund. Because Trust Fund expenditures have consistently exceeded revenue, it has borrowed almost every year since 1979, its first complete fiscal year, and as a result debt and interest payments increased. Legislative actions were taken over the years including (1) raising the rate of the coal tax that provides Trust Fund revenues and (2) forgiving debt. For example, the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 provided an appropriation toward Trust Fund debt forgiveness; about $6.5 billion was forgiven, according to Department of Labor (DOL) data (see figure). However, coal tax revenues were less than expected due, in part, to the 2008 recession and increased competition from other energy sources, according to DOL and Treasury officials. As a result, the Trust Fund continued to borrow from Treasury's general fund from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 to cover debt repayment expenditures. GAO's simulation suggests that Trust Fund borrowing will likely increase from fiscal years 2019 through 2050 due, in part, to the coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent that will take effect in 2019 and declining coal production. The simulation estimates that Trust Fund borrowing may exceed $15 billion by 2050 (see figure). However, various options, such as adjusting the coal tax and forgiving interest or debt, could reduce future borrowing and improve the Trust Fund's financial position. For example, maintaining the current coal tax rates and forgiving debt of $2.4 billion could, under certain circumstances, balance the Trust Fund by 2050, whereby revenue would be sufficient to cover expenditures. However, a coal industry representative said that maintaining or increasing the coal tax would burden the coal industry, particularly at a time when coal production has been declining. Further, Treasury officials noted that the costs associated with forgiving Trust Fund interest or debt would be paid by taxpayers.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  Although registrations and reports are filed through a single web portal, each chamber subsequently receives copies of the data and follows different data-cleaning, processing, and editing procedures before storing the data in either individual files (in the House) or databases (in the Senate)  Currently, there is no means of reconciling discrepancies between the two databases caused by the differences in data processing  For example, Senate staff told us during previous reviews they set aside a greater proportion of registration and report submissions than the House for manual review before entering the information into the database  As a result, the Senate database would be slightly less current than the House database on any given day pending review and clearance  House staff told us during previous reviews that they rely heavily on automated processing  In addition, while they manually review reports that do not perfectly match information on file for a given lobbyist or client, staff members approve and upload such reports as originally filed by each lobbyist, even if the reports contain errors or discrepancies (such as a variant on how a name is spelled)  Nevertheless, we do not have reasons to believe that the content of the Senate and House systems would vary substantially  Based on interviews with knowledgeable officials and a review of documentation, we determined that House disclosure data were sufficiently reliable for identifying a sample of quarterly disclosure reports (LD-2) and for assessing whether newly filed lobbyists also filed required reports  We used the House database for sampling LD-2 reports from the third and fourth quarters of 2016 and the first and second quarters of 2017, as well as for sampling year-end 2016 and midyear 2017 political contributions reports (LD-203)  We also used the database for matching quarterly registrations with filed reports  We did not evaluate the Offices of the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House, both of which have key roles in the lobbying disclosure process  However, we did consult with officials from each office  They provided us with general background information at our request  To assess the extent to which lobbyists could provide evidence of their compliance with reporting requirements, we examined a stratified random sample of 98 LD-2 reports from the third and fourth quarters of 2016 and the first and second quarters of 2017  The sample size of 98 LD-2 reports for this year’s review represents an increase from the sample size selected for the 2015 and 2016 reviews, and is a return to the sample size selected in reviews prior to 2015  We increased the sample size because, in 2016, we observed a change in the estimate of the percentage of reports that had documentation of income and expenses (83 percent down from 92 percent in 2015)  At that time, we were unable to state that this was a statistically significant change because, in part, the reduced sample size of 80 did not give us enough power to detect and report on the change of that size  We excluded reports with no lobbying activity or with income or expenses of less than $5,000 from our sampling frame  We drew our sample from 45,818 activity reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of 2016 and the first and second quarters of 2017 available in the public House database, as of our final download date for each quarter  Our sample of LD-2 reports was not designed to detect differences over time  However, we conducted tests of significance for changes from 2010 to 2017 for the generalizable elements of our review  We found that results were generally consistent from year to year and there were few statistically significant changes after using a Bonferroni adjustment to account for multiple comparisons  For this year’s review, we identified that the estimated change in the percent of LD-2 reports that provided written documentation for the income and expenses from 2016 to 2017 is notable  In recent years, our findings show some variation in the estimate percentage of reports with documentation  Specifically, our estimate for 2017 (99 percent) represents a statistically significant increase from 2016  These changes are identified in the report  The inability to detect significant differences from year to year in our results may be related to sampling error alone or the nature of our sample, which was relatively small and was designed only for cross-sectional analysis  Our sample is based on a stratified random selection and is only one of a large number of samples that we may have drawn  Because each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval  This interval would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples that we could have drawn  The percentage estimates for LD-2 reports have 95 percent confidence intervals of within plus or minus 12 percentage points or fewer of the estimate itself  We contacted all the lobbyists and lobbying firms in our sample and, using a structured web-based survey, asked them to confirm key elements of the LD-2 and whether they could provide written documentation for key elements in their reports, including the amount of income reported for lobbying activities; the amount of expenses reported on lobbying activities; the names of those lobbyists listed in the report; the houses of Congress and federal agencies that they lobbied, and the issue codes listed to describe their lobbying activity  After reviewing the survey results for completeness, we interviewed lobbyists and lobbying firms to review the documentation they reported as having on their online survey for selected elements of their respective LD- 2 report  Prior to each interview, we conducted a search to determine whether lobbyists properly disclosed their covered position as required by the LDA  We reviewed the lobbyists’ previous work histories by searching lobbying firms’ websites, LinkedIn, Leadership Directories, Legistorm, and Google  Prior to 2008, lobbyists were only required to disclose covered official positions held within 2 years of registering as a lobbyist for the client  The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 amended that time frame to require disclosure of positions held 20 years before the date the lobbyists first lobbied on behalf of the client  Lobbyists are required to disclose previously held covered official positions either on the client registration (LD-1) or on an LD-2 report  Consequently, those who held covered official positions may have disclosed the information on the LD-1 or a LD-2 report filed prior to the report we examined as part of our random sample  Therefore, where we found evidence that a lobbyist previously held a covered official position, and that information was not disclosed on the LD-2 report under review, we conducted an additional review of the publicly available Secretary of the Senate or Clerk of the House database to determine whether the lobbyist properly disclosed the covered official position on a prior report or LD-1  Finally, if a lobbyist appeared to hold a covered position that was not disclosed, we asked for an explanation at the interview with the lobbying firm to ensure that our research was accurate  In previous reports, we reported the lower bound of a 90 percent confidence interval to provide a minimum estimate of omitted covered positions and omitted contributions with a 95 percent confidence level  We did so to account for the possibility that our searches may have failed to identify all possible omitted covered positions and contributions  As we have developed our methodology over time, we are more confident in the comprehensiveness of our searches for these items  Accordingly, this report presents the estimated percentages for omitted contributions and omitted covered positions, rather than the minimum estimates  As a result, percentage estimates for these items will differ slightly from the minimum percentage estimates presented in prior reports  In addition to examining the content of the LD-2 reports, we confirmed whether the most recent LD-203 reports had been filed for each firm and lobbyist listed on the LD-2 reports in our random sample  Although this review represents a random selection of lobbyists and firms, it is not a direct probability sample of firms filing LD-2 reports or lobbyists listed on LD-2 reports  As such, we did not estimate the likelihood that LD-203 reports were appropriately filed for the population of firms or lobbyists listed on LD-2 reports  To determine if the LDA’s requirement for lobbyists to file a report in the quarter of registration was met for the third and fourth quarters of 2016 and the first and second quarters of 2017, we used data filed with the Clerk of the House to match newly filed registrations with corresponding disclosure reports  Using an electronic matching algorithm that includes strict and loose text matching procedures, we identified matching disclosure reports for 2,995, or 87 2 percent, of the 3,433 newly filed registrations  We began by standardizing client and lobbyist names in both the report and registration files (including removing punctuation and standardizing words and abbreviations, such as “company” and “CO”)  We then matched reports and registrations using the House identification number (which is linked to a unique lobbyist-client pair), as well as the names of the lobbyist and client  For reports we could not match by identification number and standardized name, we also attempted to match reports and registrations by client and lobbyist name, allowing for variations in the names to accommodate minor misspellings or typos  For these cases, we used professional judgment to determine whether cases with typos were sufficiently similar to consider as matches  We could not readily identify matches in the report database for the remaining registrations using electronic means  To assess the accuracy of the LD-203 reports, we analyzed stratified random samples of LD-203 reports from the 30,594 total LD-203 reports  The first sample contains 80 reports of the 9,474 reports with political contributions and the second contains 80 reports of the 20,335 reports listing no contributions  Each sample contains 40 reports from the year- end 2016 filing period and 40 reports from the midyear 2017 filing period  The samples from 2017 allow us to generalize estimates in this report to either the population of LD-203 reports with contributions or the reports without contributions to within a 95 percent confidence interval of within plus or minus 11 percentage points or fewer  Although our sample of LD- 203 reports was not designed to detect differences over time, we conducted tests of significance for changes from 2010 to 2017 and found no statistically significant differences after adjusting for multiple comparisons  While the results provide some confidence that apparent fluctuations in our results across years are likely attributable to sampling error, the inability to detect significant differences may also be related to the nature of our sample, which was relatively small and designed only for cross- sectional analysis  We analyzed the contents of the LD-203 reports and compared them to contribution data found in the publicly available Federal Elections Commission’s (FEC) political contribution database  We consulted with staff at FEC responsible for administering the database  We determined that the data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives  We compared the FEC-reportable contributions on the LD-203 reports with information in the FEC database  The verification process required text and pattern matching procedures so we used professional judgment when assessing whether an individual listed is the same individual filing an LD-203  For contributions reported in the FEC database and not on the LD-203 report, we asked the lobbyists or organizations to explain why the contribution was not listed on the LD-203 report or to provide documentation of those contributions  As with covered positions on LD-2 disclosure reports, we cannot be certain that our review identified all cases of FEC-reportable contributions that were inappropriately omitted from a lobbyist’s LD-203 report  We did not estimate the percentage of other non-FEC political contributions that were omitted because they tend to constitute a small minority of all listed contributions and cannot be verified against an external source  To identify challenges to compliance, we used a structured web-based survey and obtained the views from 88 different lobbying firms included in our sample on any challenges to compliance  The number of different lobbying firms is 88, which is less than our original sample of 98 reports because some lobbying firms had more than one LD-2 report included in our sample  We calculated responses based on the number of different lobbying firms that we contacted rather than the number of interviews  Prior to our calculations, we removed the duplicate lobbying firms based on the most recent date of their responses  For those cases with the same response date, the decision rule was to keep the cases with the smallest assigned case identification number  To obtain their views, we asked them to rate their ease with complying with the LD-2 disclosure requirements using a scale of “very easy,” “somewhat easy,” “somewhat difficult,” or “very difficult ” In addition, using the same scale we asked them to rate the ease of understanding the terms associated with LD-2 reporting requirements  To describe the resources and authorities available to the U S  Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) and its efforts to improve its LDA enforcement, we interviewed USAO officials  We obtained information on the capabilities of the system officials established to track and report compliance trends and referrals and on other practices established to focus resources on LDA enforcement  USAO provided us with reports from the tracking system on the number and status of referrals and chronically noncompliant lobbyists and lobbying firms  The mandate does not require us to identify lobbyists who failed to register and report in accordance with the LDA requirements, or determine for those lobbyists who did register and report whether all lobbying activity or contributions were disclosed  Therefore, this was outside the scope of our audit  We conducted this performance audit from April 2017 to March 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  The random sample of lobbying disclosure reports we selected was based on unique combination of House ID, lobbyist, and client names (see table 8)  See table 9 for a list of the lobbyists and lobbying firms from our random sample of lobbying contribution reports with contributions  See table 10 for a list of the lobbyists and lobbying firms from our random sample of lobbying contribution reports without contributions  In addition to the contact named above, Clifton G  Douglas Jr  (Assistant Director), Shirley Jones (Assistant General Counsel) and Ulyana Panchishin (Analyst-In-Charge) supervised the development of this report  James Ashley, Ann Czapiewski, Krista Loose, Kathleen Jones, Amanda Miller, Sharon Miller, Stewart W  Small, and Kayla L  Robinson made key contributions to this report  Assisting with lobbyist file reviews were Justine Augeri, Matthew Bond, James A  Howard, Jesse Jordan, Sherrice Kerns, Dalton Matthew Lauderback, Alexandria Palmer, Alan Rozzi, Shane Spencer, Jessica Walker, Ralanda Winborn, and Kate Wulff  Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with New Disclosure Requirements  GAO-08-1099  Washington, D C: September 30, 2008  2008 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements  GAO-09-487  Washington, D C: April 1, 2009  2009 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements  GAO-10-499  Washington, D C: April 1, 2010  2010 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements  GAO-11-452  Washington, D C: April 1, 2011  2011 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements  GAO-12-492  Washington, D C: March 30, 2012  2012 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements  GAO-13-437  Washington, D C: April 1, 2013  2013 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements  GAO-14-485  Washington, D C: May 28, 2014  2014 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements  GAO-15-310  Washington, D C : March 26, 2015  2015 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements  GAO-16-320  Washington, D C : March 24, 2016  2016 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements  GAO-17-385  Washington, D C : March 31, 2017 
Report 2:  When the committee finally rises and reports the bill back to the House, the House proceeds to vote on the amendments the committee has adopted  It usually approves all these amendments by one voice vote, though Members can demand separate votes on any or all of them as a matter of right  After a formal and routine stage called "third reading and engrossment" (when only the title of the bill is read), there is then an opportunity for a Member, virtually always from the minority party, to offer a motion to recommit the bill to committee  If the House agrees to a "simple" or "straight" motion to recommit, which only proposes to return the bill to committee, the bill is taken from the floor and returned to committee  Although the committee technically has the power to re-report the bill, in practice, the adoption of a straight motion to recommit is often characterized as effectively "killing" the measure  "Straight" motions to recommit are rare  Alternatively, motions to recommit far more frequently include instructions that the committee report the bill back to the House "forthwith" with an amendment that is stated in the motion  If the House agrees to such a motion, which is debatable for 10 minutes, evenly divided, it then immediately votes on the amendment itself, so a motion to recommit with instructions is really a final opportunity for the minority party to amend the bill before the House votes on whether to pass it  Thus, this complicated mode of consideration, which the House uses to consider most major bills, begins in the House with a decision to resolve into Committee of the Whole to consider a particular bill  General debate and the amending process take place in Committee of the Whole, but ultimately it is the House that formally amends and then passes or rejects the bill  Clause 1(m) of Rule X authorizes the Rules Committee to report resolutions affecting the order of business  Such a resolution—called a "rule" or "special rule"—usually proposes to make a bill in order for floor consideration so that it can be debated, amended, and passed or defeated by a simple majority vote  In effect, each special rule recommends to the House that it take from the Union or House Calendar a measure that is not otherwise privileged business and bring it to the floor out of its order on that calendar  Typically, such a resolution begins by providing that, at any time after its adoption, the Speaker may declare the House resolved into Committee of the Whole for the consideration of that bill  Because the special rule is itself privileged, under clause 5(a) of Rule XIII, the House can debate and vote on it promptly  If the House accepts the Rules Committee's recommendation, it proceeds to consider the bill itself  One fundamental purpose of most special rules, therefore, is to make another bill or resolution privileged so that it may interrupt the regular order of business  Their other fundamental purpose is to set special procedural ground rules for considering that measure; these ground rules may either supplement or supplant the standing rules of the House  For example, the special rule typically sets the length of time for general debate in Committee of the Whole and specifies which Members are to control that time  In addition, the special rule normally includes provisions that expedite final House action on the bill after the amending process in Committee of the Whole has been completed  Special rules may also waive points of order that Members could otherwise make against consideration of the bill, against one of its provisions, or against an amendment to be offered to it  The most controversial provisions of special rules affect the amendments that Members can offer to the bill that the resolution makes in order  As noted above, an "open rule" permits Representatives to propose any amendment that meets the normal requirements of House rules and precedents—for example, the requirement that each amendment must be germane  A "modified open rule" permits amendments to be offered that otherwise comply with House rules but imposes a time limit on the consideration of amendments or requires them to be preprinted in the Congressional Record   At the other extreme, a "closed rule" prohibits all amendments except perhaps for committee amendments and pro forma amendments ("to strike the last word") offered only for purposes of debate  A "structured" rule, which is the most common type of rule, permits only certain specific amendments to be considered on the floor  These provisions are very important because they can prevent Representatives from offering amendments as alternatives to provisions of the bill, thereby limiting the policy choices that the House can make  Open rules have been rare in recent Congresses  However, like other committees, the Rules Committee only makes recommendations to the House  As noted above, Members debate each of its procedural resolutions in the House under the hour rule and then vote to adopt or reject it  If the House votes against ordering the previous question on a special rule, a Member could offer an amendment to it, proposing to change the conditions under which the bill itself is to be considered  Because the adoption of a special rule is often viewed as a "party loyalty" vote, however, such a development is exceedingly rare  All the same, it is important to remember that while the Rules Committee is instrumental in helping the majority party leadership formulate its order of business and in setting appropriate ground rules for considering each bill, the House retains ultimate control over what it does, when, and how  Legislation is sometimes brought before the House of Representatives for consideration by the unanimous consent of its Members  Long-standing policies announced by the Speaker regulate unanimous consent requests for this purpose  Among other things, the Speaker will recognize a Member to propound a unanimous consent request to call up an unreported bill or resolution only if that request has been cleared in advance with both party floor leaders and with the bipartisan leadership of the committee of jurisdiction  Before any bill can become law, both the House and the Senate must pass it, and the two houses must agree on each and every one of its provisions  This basic constitutional requirement means that the House must have procedures to respond when the House and Senate pass different versions of the same bill  For example, the House may pass a Senate bill with House amendments, or the Senate may pass a House bill with Senate amendments and then send its amendments to the House  In either case, the two houses must resolve their differences over these amendments before the legislative process is completed  There are essentially two ways to approach this stage of the process: (1) by dealing with the amendments individually through a process of exchanging amendments between the chambers, with the bill being sent back and forth between the House and Senate, or (2) by dealing with the amendments collectively through a conference committee of Representatives and Senators who negotiate a series of compromises and concessions that are compiled in a conference report that the two houses can vote to accept  Because the process of resolving differences between the houses can be quite complicated, only some of its basic elements are summarized here  The House normally considers Senate amendments to a House bill by unanimous consent or by suspension of the rules; the House may accept the amendments (concur in them) or amend them (concur in them with House amendments)  Alternatively, the committee with jurisdiction over the bill may authorize its chair to move that the House disagree to the Senate's amendments and send them to a conference committee  When the House amends and passes a Senate bill, it may request a conference with the Senate immediately, or it may simply send its amendments to the Senate in the hope that the Senate will accept them  If the Senate refuses to do so, it may request a conference with the House instead  On the other hand, if the House and Senate can reach agreement by proposing amendments to each other's positions, the bill can be sent to the President for his signature or veto without the need to create a conference committee  This method of resolving differences is sometimes colloquially called "ping-pong," because each chamber acts in turn, shuttling the legislation back and forth as each proposes amendments to the position of the other  If the House and Senate agree to send their versions of the bill to a conference committee, the Speaker appoints the House conferees  These conferees are usually drawn from the standing committee (or committees) with jurisdiction over the bill, although the Speaker may appoint some other Representatives as well  When the House and Senate conferees meet, they are to deal only with provisions of the bill on which the two houses disagree  They should not insert new provisions or change provisions that both houses have already approved  Furthermore, as the conferees resolve each provision or amendment in disagreement, they accept the House position, the Senate position, or a compromise between them  Like almost all other House rules, the rules limiting the authority of conferees are enforced only if Members make points of order at the appropriate time  The House may also adopt a special rule, reported by the Rules Committee, waiving points of order against a conference report  To complete their work successfully, a majority of the House conferees and a majority of the Senate conferees must sign a report that recommends all the agreements they have reached  The conferees also sign a "joint explanatory statement" that describes the original House and Senate positions and the conferees' recommendations and is the functional equivalent of a legislative committee report  After Representatives have had three days to examine a conference report, it is privileged for floor consideration; it may be called up at any time that the House is not already considering something else  The report may be debated in the House under the hour rule, so the vote almost always occurs after no more than one hour of debate  No amendments to the report are in order  In practice, however, the House almost always considers conference reports under the terms of a special rule from the Rules Committee that waives all points of order against the report and its consideration  The conference report is a proposed package settlement of a number of disagreements, so the House and Senate may accept it or reject it, but they may not change it  If the two houses agree to the report by simple majority vote, all their differences have been resolved and the bill is then "enrolled," or reprinted, for formal presentation to the President  In rare instances, conferees cannot reach agreement on one or more of the amendments in conference, or they may reach an agreement that they cannot include in their conference report because their proposal exceeds the scope of the differences between the House and Senate positions (and thus violates the rules governing the content of conference reports)  In either case, the conferees may report back to the two houses with an amendment (or amendments) in disagreement  After acting on the conference report and dealing collectively with all the other amendments that were sent to conference, the House acts on each of the amendments in disagreement by considering motions such as a motion to accept the Senate's amendment or a motion to amend it with a new House amendment  The Senate takes similar action until the disagreements on these amendments are resolved or until the two houses agree to create a new conference committee only to address the remaining amendments that are still in disagreement  The bill cannot become law until the two houses resolve all the differences between their positions  Whenever Representatives vote on the floor, there is almost always first a "voice vote," in which the Members in favor of the bill, amendment, or motion vote "Aye" in unison, followed by those voting "No " Before the Speaker (or the chair of the Committee of the Whole) announces the result, any Representative can demand a "division vote," in which the Members in favor stand up to be counted, again followed by those opposed  But before the result of either a voice vote or a division vote is announced, a Member may try to require another vote in which everyone's position is recorded publicly  This recorded vote is taken by using the House's electronic voting system  In Committee of the Whole, an electronic vote is ordered when 25 Members request it  In the House, such a vote occurs when demanded by at least one-fifth of the Members present  Alternatively, any Member can demand an electronically recorded vote in the House if a quorum of the membership is not present on the floor when the voice or division vote takes place  The Constitution requires that a quorum must be present on the floor when the House is conducting business  In the House, a quorum is a majority of the Representatives; in Committee of the Whole, it is only 100 Members  However, the House has traditionally assumed that a quorum is always present unless a Member makes a point of order that it is not  The rules restrict when Members can make such points of order, and they occur most often when the House or the Committee of the Whole is voting  In the House, for example, a Representative can object to a voice or division vote on the grounds that a quorum is not present and make that point of order  If a quorum is not present, the Speaker automatically orders an electronically recorded vote during which Members record their presence on the floor by casting their votes  The issue is decided and a quorum is established at the same time  A voice or division vote is valid even if less than a quorum participates in the vote so long as no one makes a point of order that a quorum is not present  For this reason, Members can continue to meet in their committees or fulfill their other responsibilities off the floor when the House is doing business that does not involve publicly recorded votes  On most days, the House will meet two hours prior to scheduled legislative business for Morning Hour Debate, a period in which Members can make speeches of up to five minutes on subjects of their choosing  Later, the House will meet for legislative session  After the opening prayer on each day by the House chaplain (or perhaps by a guest chaplain), the Speaker announces approval of the Journal of the previous day's proceedings  A Member may require a recorded vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval of the Journal  Following the Pledge of Allegiance, some Members may then ask unanimous consent to address the House for one minute each on whatever subjects they wish, including subjects unrelated to the scheduled legislative business of the day  The ability to set the House's floor schedule is one of the primary powers and responsibilities of the majority party leaders, and in doing so they often consult with minority party leaders  Generally speaking, to the extent possible, majority party leaders and the committee chairmen arrange the legislative schedule for each week in advance  During the last floor session of the week, the majority leader normally announces the expected schedule for the coming week in a traditional "wrap-up" colloquy with a minority party leader  Changes in the schedule may be announced as they are made  On a Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday, the House will commonly consider multiple measures under the "suspension of the rules" procedure  Typically, recorded votes on such measures, if requested, are clustered together and taken at the end of the day  On other days of the week, the House will usually consider a major bill pursuant to a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules  Such a special rule would be debated in the House under the hour rule, at the end of which the majority manager of the special rule would "move the previous question," which, when adopted, brings the resolution to a vote  Once adopted, the House would ordinarily consider a measure in Committee of the Whole pursuant to the terms for general debate and amendment established by the special rule  Following consideration in the Committee of the Whole, the House would take the final votes on the measure after voting on the amendments recommended by the committee and on a minority motion to recommit, which would likely be made with amendatory instructions  As each item of business is completed, the Speaker anticipates which Member should be seeking recognition to call up the next bill or resolution  If another Representative requests to be recognized instead, t he Speaker may ask, "For what purpose does the gentleman seek recognition?" The Speaker may decline to recognize that Member if the Speaker wants the House to consider another privileged measure, motion, or report  At the end of legislative business on most days, some Members address the House for as much as an hour each on subjects of their choice  These "special order" speeches are arranged in advance and organized by the party leadership  In this way, Representatives can comment at length on current national and international issues and discuss bills that have not yet reached the House floor  The House often adjourns by early evening, although it may remain in session later when the need arises or when the end of the annual session or some other deadline approaches  The House rules for each Congress are published in a volume often called the House manual but officially entitled Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives   A new edition of this collection is published each Congress  The precedents of the House established through 1935 have been compiled in the 11-volume set of Hinds' and Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives   More recent precedents are published as Deschler's or Deschler-Brown -Johnson Precedents of the U S  House of Representatives ; 18 volumes of this set now are available  Volume 1 of a fourth series of House precedents, Precedents of the United States House of Representatives , was initiated in 2017, and additional volumes are expected in the future  The House's procedures are summarized in House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House , by Charles W  Johnson, John V  Sullivan, and Thomas J  Wickham Jr , Parliamentarians of the House  The most recent version of House Practice was published in 2017  The Parliamentarian and his assistants welcome inquiries about House procedures and offer expert assistance compatible with their other responsibilities  CRS Report 98-995, The Amending Process in the House of Representatives , by Christopher M  Davis  CRS Report RL32200, Debate, Motions, and Other Actions in the Committee of the Whole , by Bill Heniff Jr  and Elizabeth Rybicki  CRS Report 97-552, The Discharge Rule in the House: Principal Features and Uses , by Richard S  Beth  CRS Report RL30787, Parliamentary Reference Sources: House of Representatives , by Richard S  Beth and Megan S  Lynch  CRS Report 98-696, Resolving Legislative Differences in Congress: Conference Committees and Amendments Between the Houses , by Elizabeth Rybicki  CRS Report 97-780, The Speaker of the House: House Officer, Party Leader, and Representative , by Valerie Heitshusen  CRS Report 98-314, Suspension of the Rules in the House: Principal Features , by Elizabeth Rybicki  CRS Report 98-870, Quorum Requirements in the House: Committee and Chamber , by Christopher M  Davis 

ground_truth: The LDA, as amended, requires lobbyists to file quarterly disclosure reports and semiannual reports on certain political contributions. The law also includes a provision for GAO to annually audit lobbyists' compliance with the LDA. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements, (2) identify challenges to compliance that lobbyists report, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to USAO in its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts USAO has made to improve enforcement. This is GAO's 11th report under the provision. GAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 98 quarterly disclosure LD-2 reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 2016 and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2017. GAO also reviewed two random samples totaling 160 LD-203 reports from year-end 2016 and midyear 2017. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 45,818 disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity, and 30,594 reports of federal political campaign contributions. GAO also met with officials from USAO to obtain status updates on its efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Justice for review and comment. The Department of Justice provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. For the 2017 reporting period, most lobbyists provided documentation for key elements of their disclosure reports to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA). For lobbying disclosure (LD-2) reports and political contributions (LD-203) reports filed during the third and fourth quarter of 2016 and the first and second quarter of 2017, GAO estimates that 87 percent of lobbyists filed reports as required for the quarter in which they first registered; the figure below describes the filing process and enforcement; 99 percent of all lobbyists who filed (up from 83 percent in 2016) could provide documentation for income and expenses; and 93 percent filed year-end 2016 LD-203 reports as required. These findings are generally consistent with prior reports GAO issued for the 2010 through 2016 reporting periods. However, in recent years GAO's findings showed some variation in the estimated percentage of reports with supporting documentation. For example, an estimated increase in lobbyists who could document expenses is notable in 2017 and represents a statistically significant increase from 2016. As in GAO's other reports, some lobbyists were still unclear about the need to disclose certain previously held covered positions, such as paid congressional internships or certain executive agency positions. GAO estimates that 15 percent of all LD-2 reports may not have properly disclosed previously held covered positions. On the other hand, over the past several years of reporting on lobbying disclosure, GAO found that most lobbyists in the sample rated the terms associated with LD-2 reporting as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) stated it has sufficient resources and authority to enforce compliance with the LDA. USAO continued its efforts to bring lobbyists into compliance by reminding them to file reports or by applying civil penalties.