prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Cobra Dane and other radar systems can provide capabilities that contribute to a range of missions, such as ballistic missile defense, space surveillance, and intelligence-gathering missions  DOD uses Cobra Dane and other radar systems to provide information over a short period of time to ground-based interceptors so they can hit their targets  Such radar systems contribute to ballistic missile defense by tracking incoming missile threats, classifying the missile threat, and determining if a threat was intercepted successfully  In addition, some radar systems can provide discrimination capabilities, which allow for that radar to identify a warhead when a missile threat deploys decoys at the same time  Radar systems can also have the capability to contribute to a space surveillance mission, which provides an awareness of space objects within or near the Earth’s orbit and their movements, capabilities, and intent  Finally, radars can also contribute intelligence-gathering capabilities  Each radar system’s ability to contribute to various missions can be dependent on that radar’s inherent capabilities and physical location  See table 1 for a description of selected radar systems that can provide some or all of these capabilities  Various offices within the Air Force, in coordination with MDA, are responsible for the operation and sustainment of the Cobra Dane radar  Since 2013, Air Force Space Command has overseen the operation of Cobra Dane, and contributes to the sustainment of Cobra Dane’s site at Shemya Island  The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center has overall responsibility of the sustainment of the Cobra Dane radar  In addition, MDA works in coordination with the Air Force and combatant commands to develop, test, and field ballistic missile defense assets  MDA also shares funding with the Air Force to operate and sustain Cobra Dane  U S  Northern Command and U S  Strategic Command define priorities for the overall radar infrastructure and establish the various missions that those radar systems are intended to meet  U S  Northern Command oversees the homeland ballistic missile defense mission, and establishes operational objectives for radar systems operating in its region  U S  Northern Command officials told us that they are the end user for Cobra Dane  U S  Strategic Command has established a ballistic missile defense and a space surveillance mission, both of which are supported by Cobra Dane  Further, U S  Strategic Command’s components coordinate global missile defense and space operations planning  In its January 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force described how Cobra Dane and LRDR can meet mission requirements through their shared and unique capabilities, as well as how their locations affect their ability to provide those capabilities for DOD’s ballistic missile defense mission  MDA studies we reviewed found that locating LRDR at Clear Air Force Station allows for operational advantages and cost savings  The Air Force included information in its report to Congress on the ballistic missile defense capabilities of Cobra Dane and LRDR, and the effects of each radar’s location on those capabilities  Specifically, the Air Force report stated that both radars have the capabilities to track and classify missile threats  However, the report incorrectly stated that both radar systems have the inherent capability to determine if a missile threat is successfully intercepted  MDA documentation that we reviewed shows that Cobra Dane does not yet have this capability  When we shared our finding with Air Force and MDA officials, they agreed that this reported capability was incorrectly identified in the Air Force report to Congress  MDA officials also told us that Cobra Dane could provide this capability in the future if it implements software changes, but they are unlikely to do this until calendar year 2025  The Air Force report also noted that LRDR would have a unique capability, once it is operational, to discriminate missile threats from any deployed decoys  See table 2 for a summary of what the Air Force reported for the ballistic missile defense capabilities of Cobra Dane and LRDR  In addition to identifying ballistic missile defense capabilities of each radar, the Air Force report noted that both Cobra Dane and LRDR will have the inherent capabilities to support space surveillance and intelligence-gathering missions  DOD officials we spoke to confirmed that they have plans to use those inherent capabilities to support these other missions  For example, U S  Strategic Command identified that DOD needs Cobra Dane to support its space surveillance mission  Further, Air Force and MDA officials told us that they use Cobra Dane to track small objects that no other radar system can track  MDA officials told us that LRDR could be used for space surveillance  However, Air Force and U S  Strategic Command officials stated that there are no plans to use LRDR’s space surveillance capabilities as a replacement for Cobra Dane  Additionally, Air Force officials told us that neither Cobra Dane nor LRDR is required to support an intelligence-gathering mission  The Air Force also included information in its report on how the locations of Cobra Dane and LRDR affect their abilities to contribute to the ballistic missile defense mission  For example, the Air Force reported that Cobra Dane’s location at Shemya Island, Alaska, allows it to track missile threats from North Korea earlier in their trajectories than LRDR would be able to track at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska  This is consistent with an MDA analysis that we reviewed that outlined additional advantages provided by Cobra Dane’s location at Shemya Island  According to that analysis, Cobra Dane can begin tracking missile threats approximately 210 seconds earlier than LRDR  Air Force officials told us that the additional time to track missile threats allows the warfighter an earlier opportunity to intercept a missile threat and deploy additional interceptors if the first attempt fails  Further, the MDA analysis described a tracking gap between the areas covered by LRDR—once it is operational at Clear Air Force Station—and the two sets of AN/TPY-2 radars that are currently located in Japan  Without Cobra Dane’s coverage of this gap, the analysis found that the warfighter would have a more limited opportunity to intercept a missile threat from North Korea  Figure 2 shows how Cobra Dane covers a gap between the LRDR (once operational) and the two AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan  The Air Force report also noted that LRDR’s geographic location has its own advantages in contributing to ballistic missile defense compared to Cobra Dane’s location  For example, the Air Force report noted that LRDR’s location would allow it to track missile threats later in their trajectories beyond Cobra Dane’s coverage as those threats make their way to the continental United States  We also found that MDA has determined LRDR will have other advantages due to its location  For example, an MDA analysis that we reviewed found that LRDR’s location will allow for the radar system to contribute to ballistic missile defense from North Korean and Iranian threats  Absent LRDR, this analysis determined that there are no other radar systems that are located in a position to provide the capability to discriminate missile threats and determine if a threat was successfully intercepted  In addition to what the Air Force reported, we found that DOD decided to locate LRDR at Clear Air Force Station in Alaska after considering the advantages and disadvantages of other locations  For example, MDA completed studies that examined how LRDR could perform at various locations in Alaska, and the cost-effectiveness of constructing and sustaining the radar at those sites  In a June 2015 analysis, MDA compared how LRDR could perform in discriminating missile threats when co-locating it with Cobra Dane at Shemya Island or placing it at Clear Air Force Station  MDA determined that LRDR could provide more real-time discrimination information for missile threats targeting Alaska and the continental United States if it constructed the radar at Clear Air Force Station versus Shemya Island  Additionally, MDA identified in an October 2016 study that the department could obtain operational advantages and cost savings by constructing LRDR at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska, when compared to constructing it at Shemya Island, Alaska  Specifically, MDA determined that Clear Air Force Station could provide better results for 11 of the 13 factors it reviewed compared to Shemya Island  For example, MDA determined that locating LRDR at Clear Air Force Station would result in lower costs and enhanced system performance  According to DOD officials and documents we reviewed, other radar investments may reduce the department’s reliance on Cobra Dane for ballistic missile defense and space surveillance, given that U S  Northern Command identified it has a need for Cobra Dane after DOD begins operating LRDR in fiscal year 2021  Specifically, the Pacific Radar and Space Fence may reduce DOD’s reliance on Cobra Dane to support ballistic missile defense and space surveillance, respectively  Pacific Radar: According to DOD officials, the department may no longer need Cobra Dane to meet the ballistic missile defense mission after MDA fields a new radar in the Pacific region in fiscal year 2025  MDA began developing the Pacific Radar to provide additional missile threat tracking and discrimination capabilities  According to U S  Northern Command and MDA officials, the Pacific Radar may fill the gap in tracking missile threats currently covered by Cobra Dane  Space Fence: The Air Force has also determined it will no longer have a requirement for Cobra Dane to provide space surveillance once the Space Fence is fully operational  The Air Force plans for the Space Fence to be operational in fiscal year 2019  According to a U S  Strategic Command briefing, the Space Fence will provide the same capabilities as Cobra Dane  Air Force officials noted that they want to continue relying on Cobra Dane for space surveillance when the Space Fence is operational, as long as the radar is available and used to contribute to ballistic missile defense  In its January 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force noted that Cobra Dane met its requirement for operational availability—i e , the percentage of time that the radar system is able to meet its ballistic missile defense and space surveillance missions  Specifically, the Air Force report noted that Cobra Dane had been available an average of 91 percent of the time over a 2-year period (January 2016 through December 2017), which exceeded the 90 percent requirement for operational availability  Information that we reviewed from a more recent 2-year period (August 2016 through July 2018) showed that Cobra Dane’s 2-year average for operational availability had declined to approximately 88 percent—below the 90 percent requirement  Air Force officials stated that the decline in the operational availability over the more recent two-year period was due to a few instances where they needed to take Cobra Dane off-line for extended periods of scheduled downtime (e g , regular operations and maintenance, calibration of instruments)  Further, they noted that when Cobra Dane is not operationally available, the reason is usually due to scheduled downtime  Officials also told us there was one instance of unscheduled downtime (e g , part or system failure) in that 2-year period which required emergency maintenance on the radar’s mission control hardware  We also reviewed Air Force data on the frequency of unscheduled downtime between August 2016 and July 2018, which show that Cobra Dane is able to contribute to its missions without unscheduled downtime 99 7 percent of the time  According to U S  Northern Command and MDA officials, they can mitigate the effect on the ballistic missile defense mission if they know far enough in advance that Cobra Dane will not be operationally available— such as during scheduled downtime  Officials stated that they do this by moving a transportable radar, known as the Sea-Based X-band radar, to specific locations in the Pacific Ocean to provide additional tracking coverage of missile threats  A U S  Northern Command analysis that we reviewed describes how DOD can deploy the Sea-Based X-band radar at particular locations in the Pacific Ocean to supplement Cobra Dane  This analysis found that U S  Northern Command can lose the ability to track some missile threat trajectories if Cobra Dane is not available and the Sea-Based X-band radar is not deployed  We also reviewed Air Force data on space surveillance, which shows that the Air Force would face some limitations in its ability to complete its space surveillance mission when Cobra Dane is not operationally available  According to the data, Cobra Dane tracks 3,300 space objects each day that cannot be tracked by any other radar system  Air Force officials noted that when Cobra Dane is not operationally available for space surveillance for short periods (less than 24 hours), they can overcome that downtime without losing track of those unique objects  However, officials told us that it would take six months to reacquire all of the small space objects that Cobra Dane tracks, if they encounter any significant scheduled or unscheduled downtime  MDA officials told us there are no scheduled plans to take Cobra Dane down long enough to compromise DOD’s ability to conduct space surveillance  In its January 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force projected that the Air Force and MDA would contribute total funding of $278 6 million based on their fiscal year 2019 budget plans for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane  According to the report, the Air Force and MDA plan to share funding for the operation and maintenance of the Cobra Dane radar, and for three modernization projects that make up their sustainment plan for the radar  Table 3 outlines the plan for how the Air Force and MDA will share funding for the operation and maintenance of Cobra Dane  In addition, the Air Force included information in its report on how the Air Force and MDA plan to share funding to support Cobra Dane’s three modernization projects  Specifically, the Air Force and MDA plan to redesign parts for three sets of obsolete systems: (1) mission system replacement; (2) traveling wave tubes; and (3) transmitter groups  The Air Force has identified that it no longer has vendors that manufacture some critical parts, and failure of any of the three systems could result in Cobra Dane not being available to meet mission requirements  As such, the Air Force determined that it could sustain these three systems more effectively if they were redesigned  Table 4 summarizes the reported funding for the three projects that make up the Cobra Dane sustainment plan  In addition to what the Air Force reported, we identified that the Air Force developed a total cost estimate for its transmitter group replacement, but not for its other two projects  For the other two projects, Air Force officials stated that they plan to complete estimates for the total costs in conjunction with their fiscal year 2020 budget submission  In August 2016, the Air Force estimated that the transmitter group replacement would have a total cost of $91 2 million, but reported it would fund this project at $94 0 million through fiscal year 2023 (see table 4)  Air Force officials plan to request the transfer of any unused funding to the other projects once it completes the transmitter group project  The Air Force also completed a partial cost estimate for the traveling wave tube redesign—covering the redesign of the parts and replacement of 1 of 12 groups of parts—estimating that the first phase would cost $16 0 million  Further, Air Force officials told us that they have not yet developed a total cost estimate for the mission system replacement  We also found that the Air Force and MDA expedited Cobra Dane’s mission system replacement project, but Air Force officials told us they face challenges in expediting the other two projects without compromising Cobra Dane’s operational availability  For the mission system replacement, MDA requested additional funding in fiscal year 2018  Air Force and MDA officials told us that the additional funding they received allowed them to prioritize the mission system replacement and advance its timeline earlier that year  Air Force officials stated that they explored ways to expedite the two other projects: the traveling wave tubes and transmitter groups  However, they stated that replacing too many parts at the same time will result in their having to take Cobra Dane off-line for longer periods of time  According to Air Force and MDA officials, they may look for opportunities to expedite timeframes for their other two projects as long as the amount of scheduled downtime is kept to acceptable levels  In its report to Congress, the Air Force identified that it plans to provide $140 million in funding for the sustainment and maintenance of operational access to Cobra Dane’s site at Shemya Island based on its fiscal year 2019 budget plans  According to the report, the Air Force is solely responsible for funding all work related to the operation and sustainment of Shemya Island, shared between two of its major commands: Air Force Space Command and Pacific Air Forces  Table 5 summarizes the information the Air Force included in its report on how funding will be shared for Shemya Island  We also reviewed a support agreement between Air Force Space Command and Pacific Air Forces that identifies how they will sustain the site and the calculation for sharing costs  The agreement describes the specific work to sustain the site, including maintaining the airfield, support facilities, and communication infrastructure  Air Force officials told us that they are constantly addressing challenges related to operational access to the site at Shemya Island, but Air Force Space Command and Pacific Air Forces work together to address those challenges  We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment  DOD told us that it had no comments on the draft report  We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Sustainment; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and the Commanders of U S  Northern Command and U S  Strategic Command  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Joe Kirschbaum at (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made contributions to the report are listed in Appendix I  In addition to the contact named above, Kevin O’Neill (Assistant Director), Scott Bruckner, Vincent Buquicchio, Martin De Alteriis, Amie Lesser, and Richard Powelson made key contributions to the report 


Report 2: With the passage of the NDAA in December 2016, PLCY is to be led by an Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans, who is appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate  The Under Secretary is to report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security  Prior to the NDAA, the office was headed by an assistant secretary  Since the passage of the act, the undersecretary position has been vacant, and as of June 5, 2018, the President had not nominated an individual to fill the position  According to PLCY officials, elevating the head of the office to an undersecretary was important because it equalizes PLCY with other DHS management offices and DHS headquarters components  The NDAA further authorizes, but does not require, the Secretary to establish a position of deputy undersecretary within PLCY  If the position is established, the NDAA provides that the Secretary may appoint a career employee to the position (i e , not a political appointee)  In March 2018, the Secretary named a Deputy Under Secretary, who has been performing the duties of the Deputy Under Secretary and the Under Secretary since then  As shown in figure 1, PLCY is divided into five sub- offices, each with a different focus area  As of June 5, 2018, the top position in these sub-offices was an assistant secretary and two of the five positions were vacant  As of June 5, 2018, 6 of PLCY’s 12 deputy assistant secretary positions were vacant or filled by acting staff temporarily performing the duties in the absence of permanent staff placement  The NDAA codified many of the functions and responsibilities that PLCY had been carrying out prior to the act’s enactment and, with a few exceptions as discussed later in this report, were largely consistent with the duties the office was already pursuing  According to the act and PLCY officials, one of the office’s fundamental responsibilities is to lead, conduct, and coordinate departmentwide policy development and implementation, and strategic planning  According to PLCY officials, there are four categories of policy and strategy efforts that PLCY leads, conducts, or coordinates: Statutory responsibilities: among others, the Homeland Security Act, as amended by the NDAA, includes such responsibilities as establishing standards of validity and reliability for statistical data collected by the department, conducting or overseeing analysis and reporting of such data, and maintaining all immigration statistical information of U S  Customs and Border Protection, U S  Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U S  Citizenship and Immigration Services; the Immigration and Nationality Act includes such responsibilities as providing for a system for collection and dissemination to Congress and the public of information useful in evaluating the social, economic, environmental, and demographic impact of immigration laws, and reporting annually on trends in lawful immigration flows, naturalizations, and enforcement actions, Representing DHS in interagency efforts: coordinating or representing departmental policy and strategy positions for larger interagency efforts (e g , interagency policy committees convened by the White House), Secretary’s priorities: leading or coordinating efforts that correspond to the Secretary of Homeland Security’s priorities (e g , certain immigration or law-enforcement related issues), and Self-initiated activities: opportunities to better harmonize policy and strategy or create additional efficiencies given PLCY’s ability to see across the department  For example, PLCY officials said that DHS observed an increase in e-commerce and small businesses shipping items via carriers other than the U S  Postal Service, thus exploiting a gap in DHS monitoring, which covers the U S  Postal Service and other traditional shipping entities  PLCY officials noted that DHS’s interest in addressing e-commerce issues occurred just before opioids and other controlled substances were being mailed through small businesses and the U S  Postal Service  As a result, PLCY developed an e-commerce strategy for, among other things, the shipping of illegal items and how to provide information to U S  Customs and Border Protection before parcels are shipped to the United States from abroad  In accordance with the NDAA, as PLCY leads, conducts, and coordinates policy and strategy, it is to do so in a manner that promotes and ensures quality, consistency, and integration across DHS and applies risk-based analysis and planning to departmentwide strategic planning efforts  The NDAA further provides that all component heads are to coordinate with PLCY when establishing or modifying policies or strategic planning guidance to ensure consistency with DHS’s policy priorities  In addition to the roles PLCY plays that are directly related to leading, conducting, and coordinating policy and strategy, the office is responsible for select operational functions  For example, PLCY is charged with operating the REAL ID and Visa Waiver Programs  The NDAA also conferred responsibilities to PLCY that had not been responsibilities of the DHS Office of Policy prior to the NDAA’s enactment  Among other things, the NDAA charged PLCY with responsibility for establishing standards of reliability and validity for statistical data collected and analyzed by the department, and ensuring the accuracy of metrics and statistical data provided to Congress  In conferring this responsibility, the act also transferred to PLCY the maintenance of all immigration statistical information of the U S  Customs and Border Protection, U S  Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U S  Citizenship and Immigration Services  PLCY has established five performance goals: build departmental policy-making capacity, coordination, and foster the Unity of Effort, mature the office as a mission-oriented, component-focused organization that is responsive to DHS leadership, effectively engage and leverage stakeholders, enhance productivity and effectiveness of policy personnel through appropriate alignment of knowledge, skills, and abilities, and accountability, transparency, and leadership  PLCY officials stated that the office established the performance goals in fiscal year 2015 and they were still in effect as of fiscal year 2018  As previously discussed, DHS has eight operational components  DHS also has six support components  Although each one has a distinct role to play in helping to secure the homeland, there are operational and support functions that cut across mission areas  For example, nearly every operational component has, as part of its security operations, a need for screening, vetting, and credentialing procedures and risk- targeting mechanisms  Likewise, nearly all operational components have some form of international engagement, deploying staff abroad to help secure the homeland before threats reach U S  borders  Finally, as shown in figure 2, different aspects of broad mission areas fall under the purview of more than one DHS operational component  PLCY is responsible for coordinating three key DHS strategic efforts: the QHSR, the DHS Strategic Plan, and the Resource Planning Guidance  The QHSR is a comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of the nation that is to occur every 4 years and include recommendations regarding the long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security of the nation and guidance on the programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of DHS  The QHSR is to be conducted in consultation with the heads of other federal agencies, key DHS officials (including the Under Secretary, PLCY), and key officials from other relevant governmental and nongovernmental entities  The DHS Strategic Plan describes how DHS can accomplish the missions it identifies in the QHSR report, identifies high-priority mission areas within DHS, and lays the foundation for DHS to accomplish its Unity of Effort Initiative as well as various cross-agency priority goals in the strategic plan, such as cybersecurity  The Resource Planning Guidance describes DHS’s annual resource allocation process in order to execute the missions and goals of the QHSR and DHS Strategic Plan  The Resource Planning Guidance contains guidance over a 5-year period and informs several forward- looking reports to Congress, including the annual fiscal year Congressional Budget Justification as well as the Future Years Homeland Security Program Report  Although PLCY has effectively carried out key coordination functions at the senior level related to strategy, PLCY’s ability to lead and coordinate policy have been limited due to ambiguous roles and responsibilities and a lack of predictable, accountable, and repeatable procedures  According to our analysis and interviews with operational components, PLCY’s efforts to lead and coordinate departmentwide and crosscutting strategies—a key organizational objective—have been effective in providing opportunities for all relevant stakeholders to learn about and contribute to departmentwide or crosscutting strategy development  In this role, PLCY routinely serves as the executive agent for the Deputies Management Action Group and the Senior Leaders Council, which involve analytical and coordination support  PLCY also provides support for deputy- and principal-level decision making  For example, the Strategy and Policy Executive Steering Committee (S&P ESC) meetings have been used to discuss components’ implementation plans for crosscutting strategies, PLCY’s requests for information from components for an upcoming strategy, and updates on departmentwide strategic planning initiatives  According to PLCY and operational component officials, PLCY also provides leadership for the Resource Planning Guidance and Winter Studies, both of which help inform departmentwide resource decision- making  For example, officials from one operational component stated that PLCY’s leadership of the Resource Planning Guidance is a helpful practice for coordination and collaboration on departmentwide or crosscutting strategies  The officials stated that PLCY reaches out to ensure that the component is covering the Secretary’s priorities and this helps the component to ensure that its budget includes them  Furthermore, PLCY develops and coordinates policy options and opinions for the Secretary to present at the National Security Council and other White House-level meetings  For example, PLCY officials told us that, in light of allegations of Russian involvement in using poisonous nerve agents on two civilians in Great Britain, PLCY coordinated the collection of information to develop a policy recommendation for the Secretary to present at a National Security Council meeting  PLCY has encountered challenges leading and coordinating efforts to develop, update, or harmonize policy—also a key organizational objective—because it does not have clearly-defined roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms to implement these responsibilities in a predictable, repeatable, and accountable way  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should establish an organizational structure, assign responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve the entity’s objectives  As such, an organization’s management should develop an organizational structure with an understanding of the overall responsibilities and assign these responsibilities to discrete units to enable the organization to operate in an efficient and effective manner  An organization’s management should also implement control activities through policies  It is important that an organization’s management document and define policies and communicate those policies and procedures to personnel, so they can implement control activities for their assigned responsibilities  In addition, leading collaboration practices we have identified in our prior work include defining and articulating a common outcome, clarifying roles and responsibilities, and establishing mutually-reinforcing or joint strategies to enhance and sustain collaboration, such as the work that PLCY and the components need to do together to ensure that departmentwide and crosscutting policy is effective for all relevant parties  According to PLCY officials, in general, PLCY is responsible for leading the development of a policy when it crosses multiple components or if there is a national implication, including White House interest in the policy  However, PLCY officials acknowledged that this practice does not always make them the lead and there are no established criteria that define the circumstances under which PLCY (or another organizational unit) should lead development of policies that cut across organizational boundaries  PLCY officials said the lead entity for a policy is often announced in an email from the Secretary’s office, on a case-by-case basis  According to PLCY officials, once components have been assigned responsibility for a policy, they have generally tended to retain it, and PLCY may not have oversight for crosscutting policies that are maintained by operational components  Therefore, there is no established, coordinated system of oversight to periodically monitor the need for policy harmonization, revision, or rescission  In the absence of clear roles and responsibilities, and processes and procedures to support them, PLCY and officials in 5 of the 8 components have encountered challenges in coordinating with each other  Although PLCY and most component officials we interviewed described overall positive experiences in coordinating with each other, we identified multiple instances of (1) confusion about which parties should lead and engage in policy efforts, (2) not engaging components at the right times, (3) incompatible expectations around timelines, and (4) uncertainty about PLCY’s role and the extent to which it can and should identify and drive policy in support of a more cohesive DHS  Confusion about who should lead and engage  Officials from one operational component told us that they were tasked with leading a departmentwide policy development effort they believed was outside their area of responsibility and expertise  Officials in another operational component stated that components sometimes end up coordinating among themselves, but that policy development could be more effective and efficient if PLCY took the role of convener and facilitator to ensure the departmentwide perspective is present and all relevant stakeholders participate  Officials from a third component stated that they spent significant time and resources to develop a policy directly related to their component’s mission  As the component got ready to implement the policy, PLCY became aware of it and asked the component to stop working on the policy, so PLCY could develop a departmentwide policy  According to component officials, while they were supportive of a departmentwide policy, PLCY’s timing delayed implementation of the policy the component had developed and wasted the resources it had invested  Moreover, officials from four operational components told us that sometimes counselors from outside PLCY, such as the Secretary’s office, have led policy efforts that seem like they should be PLCY’s responsibility, which created more confusion about what PLCY’s ongoing role should be  PLCY officials agreed that, at times, it has been challenging to define PLCY’s role relative to counselors for the Secretary, and acknowledged that clear guidance to define who is leading which types of policy development and coordination would be helpful  Not engaging components at the right times  Officials from 5 of 8 operational components told us that they had not always been engaged at the right times by PLCY in departmentwide or crosscutting policies that affected their missions  For example, officials from an operational component described a crosscutting policy that had significant implications for some of its key operational resources, but the component was not made aware of the policy until it was about to be presented at the White House  Officials from another component stated that they learned of a new policy after it was in place and had to find significant training and software resources to implement it even though they viewed the policy as unnecessary for their mission  PLCY officials stated that, while they intend to identify all components that should be involved in a policy, there are times when PLCY is unaware a component is developing a policy that affects other components  PLCY officials said they will involve other components when PLCY becomes aware that a component is developing such a policy  PLCY officials stated that it would be helpful to have a process and procedures for cross-component coordination on policies to help guide engagement regardless of who is developing the policy  Incompatible expectations around timelines  Officials at 4 of 8 operational components stated that short timelines from PLCY to provide input and feedback can prevent PLCY from obtaining thoughtful and complete information from components  For example, officials from one component stated that PLCY asked them to perform an analysis that would inform major, departmental decision-making and quickly provide the analysis  Component officials told us that they did not understand why PLCY needed the analysis on such an accelerated timeline, which seemed inappropriate given the level of importance and purpose of the analysis  Officials from another component told us that PLCY had not always provided enough time to provide thoughtful feedback; therefore, component officials were not sure if PLCY really wanted their feedback  Officials from a third component stated that sometimes PLCY did not provide sufficient time for thoughtful input or feedback that had cleared the component’s legal review, so component officials elected to miss PLCY’s deadline and provide late feedback  PLCY officials told us that, frequently, timelines are not within their control, a situation that some component officials also noted during our interviews with them  However, PLCY officials agreed that a documented, predictable, and repeatable process and procedures for policies may help ensure PLCY provides sufficient comment time when in its control and may provide a basis to help negotiate timelines with DHS leadership in other situations  PLCY officials stated that, even with a documented process and procedures, there would still be circumstances when short timelines are unavoidable  Uncertainty about PLCY’s role in driving policy harmonization  Policy officials at 6 of 8 operational components told us that they were unsure or not aware of PLCY’s role in harmonizing policy across the department, and stated a desire for PLCY to be more involved in harmonizing or enhancing departmentwide and crosscutting policy or for greater clarity about PLCY’s responsibility to play this role  As previously discussed, PLCY’s policy and strategy efforts fall into four categories—statutory responsibilities, interagency efforts, Secretary’s priorities, and self- initiated activities; these activities include efforts to better harmonize policies and strategies  According to PLCY officials, the category with the lowest priority is self-initiated activities

ground_truth: First fielded in 1976 on Shemya Island in Alaska, the Cobra Dane radar faces growing sustainment challenges that DOD plans to address through modernization projects. Anticipating future needs, DOD began investing in new radar systems that share capabilities with Cobra Dane to support ballistic missile defense and space surveillance, including the LRDR (Alaska), the Space Fence (Marshall Islands), and the Pacific Radar (location to be determined). The conference report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision that GAO review the Air Force's report to Congress on the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane. This report identifies information included in the Air Force's report and describes additional information that GAO reviewed on (1) the capabilities of the Cobra Dane radar and other planned radars to meet DOD's mission requirements, (2) Cobra Dane's operational availability and the plan to mitigate the effect on those missions when Cobra Dane is not available, and (3) DOD's funding plan and project cost estimates for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane and its site at Shemya Island. GAO reviewed the Air Force report and related documentation, and interviewed relevant officials. In its January 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force reported how the Cobra Dane radar and the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) have shared and unique capabilities to support ballistic missile defense and space surveillance missions. The report noted that the respective locations of both radar systems affect their ability to provide those capabilities. The Department of Defense (DOD) also has other radar investments—the Pacific Radar and the Space Fence, which, according to DOD officials, may reduce DOD's reliance on Cobra Dane to provide ballistic missile defense and space surveillance capabilities. The Air Force's report to Congress noted that Cobra Dane met its requirement for operational availability, which refers to the percentage of time that the radar is able to meet its missions. GAO found that the Air Force has developed procedures to mitigate risks when Cobra Dane is not available. For example, U.S. Northern Command and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials stated that they can mitigate risks when Cobra Dane is not available by using the Sea-Based X-band radar to provide support for ballistic missile defense. The Air Force would face some limitations in its ability to conduct space surveillance if Cobra Dane were not available, as Cobra Dane tracks objects no other radar can track. However, MDA officials noted there are no plans to take Cobra Dane offline long enough to compromise space surveillance. The Air Force and MDA plan to contribute total funding of $278.6 million for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane, according to their fiscal year 2019 budget plans. Specifically, the Air Force and MDA plan to share funding for the operation and maintenance of the Cobra Dane radar and for three modernization projects that make up their sustainment plan for the radar. Further, the Air Force report noted that the Air Force also plans to provide $140 million in funding for the sustainment and maintenance of operational access to Cobra Dane's site at Shemya Island. In addition, GAO found that the Air Force developed a total cost estimate for one project—known as the transmitter group replacement—but not for its other two projects. Air Force officials plan to complete cost estimates for those two projects in conjunction with their fiscal year 2020 budget submission.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  PLCY officials stated that PLCY makes tradeoffs and rarely chooses to work on self-initiated projects over its other three categories of effort  According to the officials, PLCY’s work on the other three higher-priority categories is sufficient to ensure that the office is effectively leading, conducting, and coordinating strategy and policy across the department  Given its organizational position and strategic priorities, PLCY is uniquely situated to identify opportunities to better harmonize or enhance departmentwide and crosscutting policy, a role that is in line with its strategic priority to build departmental policymaking capacity and foster Unity of Effort  In the absence of clear articulation of the department’s expectations for PLCY in this role, it is difficult for PLCY and DHS leadership to make completely informed and deliberate decisions about the tradeoffs they make across any available resources  In addition to statutory authority that PLCY received in the NDAA, PLCY officials stated that a separate, clear delegation of authority—a mechanism by which the Secretary delegates responsibilities to other organizational units within DHS—is needed to help confront the ambiguous roles it has experienced in the past  PLCY officials stated that past efforts to finalize a delegation of authority have stalled during leadership changes and that the initiative has been a lower priority, in part, due to where PLCY is in its maturation process and DHS is in its evolution into a more cohesive department under the Unity of Effort  As of May 2018, the effort had been revived, but it is not clear whether and when DHS will finalize it  According to a senior official in the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, a delegation of authority is important for PLCY  He described the creation of a delegation of authority as a process that does more than simply delegate the Secretary’s authority  He noted that defining PLCY’s roles and responsibilities in relation to other organizational units presents an opportunity to engage all relevant components and agree on appropriate roles  He said that, earlier in the organizational life of the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, it went through a process like this, which has been vital in it being able to carry out its mission  He said now that PLCY has a deputy undersecretary in place, this is a good time to restart the process to develop the delegation of authority  Until the delegation or a similar process clearly and fully articulates PLCY’s roles and responsibilities, PLCY and the operational components are likely to continue to experience limitations in collaboration on crosscutting and departmentwide policy  PLCY determines its workforce needs through the annual budget process, but systematic identification of workforce demand, capacity gaps, and strategies to address them could help ensure that PLCY’s workforce aligns with its and DHS’s priorities and goals  To determine its workforce needs each year, PLCY officials told us that, as part of the annual budget cycle, they work with PLCY staff and operational components to determine the scope of activities required for each PLCY area of responsibility and the associated staffing needs  PLCY officials said there are three skill sets needed to carry out the office’s responsibilities: policy analysis, social science analysis, and regional affairs analysis  PLCY officials explained that the office’s priorities can change rapidly as events occur and the Secretary’s and administration’s priorities shift  Therefore, according to PLCY officials, their staffing model must be flexible  They said that, rather than a defined system of full-time equivalents with set position types and levels, PLCY officials start with their budget allotment and consider current and potential emerging needs to set position types and levels, which may fluctuate significantly from year to year  In addition, PLCY officials stated that PLCY staff are primarily generalists and, given the versatility in skill sets of their workforce, PLCY has a lot of flexibility to move staff around if there is an emerging need  For example, if there is an emerging law enforcement issue that affects all law enforcement agencies, PLCY may be tasked with developing a policy to ensure the issue is addressed quickly and that the resulting policy is harmonized across the department and with other law enforcement agencies, such as the Department of Justice  While PLCY completes some workforce planning activities as part of its annual budgeting process, PLCY does not systematically address several aspects of the DHS Workforce Planning Guide that may create more efficient operations and greater alignment with DHS priorities  According to the DHS Workforce Planning Guide, workforce planning is a process that ensures the right number of people with the right skills are in the right jobs at the right time for DHS to achieve the mission  This process provides a framework to: align workforce planning to the department’s mission and goals, predict, then assess how evolving missions, new processes, or environmental conditions may impact the way that work will be performed at DHS in the future, identify gaps in capacity, develop and implement strategies and action plans to address capacity and capability gaps, and continuously monitor the effectiveness of action plans and modify, as necessary  The DHS Workforce Planning Guide stipulates that an organization’s management should not only lead and show support during the workforce planning process, but ensure alignment with the strategic direction of the agency  Moreover, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives  For example, management uses an entity’s operational processes to make informed decisions and evaluate the entity’s performance in achieving key agency objectives  According to PLCY officials, the current staffing paradigm involves shifting the office’s staff when new and urgent issues arise from the Secretary or White House, and adding these unexpected tasks to staff’s existing responsibilities  However, this means that tradeoffs are made, resulting in some priority items taking longer to address or not getting attention at all  PLCY officials stated that they have been caught off-guard at times by changes in demands placed on PLCY and had to scramble to address the new needs  Additionally, PLCY officials said they have a number of vacancies, which hamper the office’s ability to meet certain aspects of its mission  For example, PLCY’s Office of Cyber, Infrastructure, and Resilience was created in 2015  According to PLCY officials, PLCY has had some resources to address cyber issues, however, there has not been funding to staff this office and an assistant secretary has not been appointed to lead it  Therefore, PLCY officials stated that PLCY has not been able to address its responsibilities for infrastructure resilience  Similarly, PLCY has limited capacity for risk analysis  A provision of the NDAA provides that PLCY is to: develop and coordinate strategic plans and long-term goals of the department with risk-based analysis and planning to improve operational mission effectiveness, including consultation with the Secretary regarding the quadrennial homeland security review under section 707 [6 U S C  § 347]  However, PLCY officials acknowledged that their focus on identifying needs for risk analyses and conducting them has been limited, in part, because DHS disbanded the risk management office  Officials from one component told us that they contribute to a report that PLCY coordinates, called Homeland Security National Risk Characteristics, which is prepared as a precursor to the DHS Strategic Plan  PLCY officials stated that, outside of these foundational documents and some risk-based analyses completed as part of specific policy development efforts, PLCY does not have the capacity to complete any additional risk analysis activities  Although PLCY officials said they conduct some analysis of potential demands as a starting point for how to allocate PLCY’s annual staffing budget, these efforts are largely informal and internal and have not resulted in a systematic analysis that provides PLCY and DHS management with the information they need to understand the effects of resource tradeoffs  Also, PLCY officials said they track accomplishments toward PLCY’s strategic priorities as part of a weekly meeting and report, however, officials acknowledged they do not analyze what role workforce decisions have played in achieving or not achieving strategic priorities  Moreover, although PLCY officials stated that they have intermittent, in- person, informal communication about resource use, they have not used the principles outlined in the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to systematically identify and communicate workforce demands, capacity gaps, and strategies to address workforce issues  According to PLCY officials, they have not conducted such analysis, in part, because the Secretary’s office has not requested it of them or the other DHS offices that are funded in the same part of the DHS budget  Regardless of whether the Secretary expects workforce analysis as part of the budgeting process, the DHS Workforce Planning Guide could be used within and outside of the budgeting process to help inform resource decision making throughout the year  PLCY officials stated that at the PLCY Deputy Under Secretary’s initiative, they recently began a review of all relevant statutory authorities, which they will map against the current organizational structure and day- to-day operations  The Deputy Under Secretary plans to use the results of the review to enhance PLCY’s efficiency and effectiveness, and the results could serve as a foundation for a more holistic and systematic analysis of workforce demand, any capacity gaps, and strategies to address them  Employing workforce planning principles—in particular, systematic identification of workforce demand, capacity gaps, and strategies to address them—consistent with the DHS Workforce Planning Guide could better position PLCY to use its workforce as effectively as possible under uncertain conditions  Moreover, using the DHS guide would help PLCY to systematically communicate information about any workforce gaps to DHS leadership, so there is transparency about how workforce tradeoffs affect PLCY’s ability to support DHS goals  As discussed earlier, officials from PLCY and DHS operational components praised existing mechanisms to coordinate and communicate at the senior level, especially about strategy  However, component officials identified opportunities for PLCY to better connect at the staff level to identify and respond to emerging policy and strategy needs  Leading practices for collaboration that we have identified in our prior work state that it is important to ensure that all relevant participants have been included in a collaborative effort, and positive working relationships among participants from different agencies or offices can bridge organizational cultures  These relationships build trust and foster communication, which facilitate collaboration  Also, as previously stated, PLCY has mechanisms like the S&P ESC to communicate and coordinate with operational components and other DHS stakeholders at the senior level (e g , Senior Executive Service officials)  However, PLCY does not have a mechanism to effectively engage in routine communication and collaboration at the staff level (e g , program and policy specialists working at operational components to oversee or implement policy and strategy functions)  Specifically, officials with responsibility for policy and strategy at 6 of 8 operational components told us that they did not have regular contact with or know who to contact at PLCY for questions about policies or strategies, or that the reason they knew who to contact was because of existing working relationships, not because of efforts PLCY had undertaken to facilitate such contacts  In addition, some component officials noted that, when they tried to use the PLCY website to coordinate, they found it to be out of date and lacking sufficient information  PLCY officials acknowledged that the website needs improvement  They stated that the office has developed improved content for the website, but does not have the necessary staff to update the website  According to the officials, the needed staff should be hired soon and improved content should be on the website by the end of summer 2018  Although officials at 5 of the 8 operational components we interviewed stated that the quality of PLCY’s coordination and collaboration has improved in the past 2 years or so, component officials offered several suggestions to enhance PLCY’s coordination and collaboration, especially at the staff level  Among these were: conduct routine information sharing meetings with staff-level officials who have policy and strategy responsibilities at each operational component, clearly articulate points of contact, their contact information, and their portfolios at PLCY as well as at other policy and strategy stakeholders, ensure the PLCY website is up-to-date with contact information for PLCY and components that work in strategy and policy areas, and with relevant information about crosscutting strategy and policy initiatives underway, host a forum—such as an annual conference—to bring together policy and strategy officials from PLCY and DHS components to share ideas and make contacts, and prepare a standard briefing for component officials with strategy and policy responsibilities to help ensure that staff at all levels understand what PLCY does, how it works, and opportunities for engagement on emerging policy and strategy needs or identified harmonization opportunities  For example, officials from one component told us that they would like PLCY officials to have in-person meetings with component staff to discuss what PLCY does, who to contact in PLCY, where to find information about policies and strategies, and other relevant information to ensure a smooth working relationship between the component and PLCY  According to PLCY officials, the office recognizes the value of creating mechanisms to connect staff, who work on policy and strategy at all levels in DHS  PLCY officials said they have historically done a better job in coordinating at the senior level, but are interested in expanding opportunities to connect other staff with policy and strategy responsibilities  PLCY officials stated that they are considering creating a working group structure that mirrors existing organizational mechanisms to coordinate at the senior level, but have not taken steps to do so  Routine collaboration among PLCY, operational components, and other DHS offices at the staff level is important to ensure that PLCY is able to carry out its functions under the NDAA, including the effective coordination of policies and strategies  A positive working relationship among these stakeholders can build trust, foster communication, and facilitate collaboration  Such enhanced communication and collaboration across PLCY and among component officials with policy and strategy responsibility could help the department more quickly and completely identify emerging, crosscutting strategy and policy needs and opportunities to enhance policy harmonization  PLCY’s efforts to lead, conduct, and coordinate departmentwide and crosscutting policies have sometimes been hampered by the lack of clearly-defined roles and responsibilities  In addition, PLCY does not have a consistent process and procedures for its strategy development and policymaking efforts  Without a delegation of authority or similar documentation from DHS leadership clearly articulating PLCY’s missions, roles, and responsibilities—along with defined processes and procedures to carry them out in a predictable and repeatable manner—there is continuing risk that confusion and uncertainty about PLCY’s authority, missions, roles, and responsibilities will limit its effectiveness  PLCY employs some workforce planning, but does not systematically apply key principles of the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help predict workforce demand, and identify any workforce gaps and design strategies to address them  Without this analysis, PLCY faces limitations in ensuring that its workforce is aligned with its and DHS’s priorities and goals  Moreover, the results of this analysis would better position PLCY to communicate to DHS leadership any potential tradeoffs in workforce allocation that would affect PLCY’s ability to meet priorities and goals  PLCY could enhance its use of mechanisms for collaboration and communication with DHS stakeholders at the staff level  Implementation of additional mechanisms at the staff level for regular communication and coordination, including providing up-to-date information to stakeholders about the office, could help PLCY and operational components to better connect in order to identify and address emerging policy and strategy needs  We are making the following four recommendations to DHS: The Secretary of Homeland Security should finalize a delegation of authority or similar document that clearly defines PLCY’s mission, roles, and responsibilities relative to DHS’s operational and support components  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Homeland Security should create corresponding processes and procedures to help implement the mission, roles, and responsibilities defined in the delegation of authority or similar document to help ensure predictability, repeatability, and accountability in departmentwide and crosscutting strategy and policy efforts  (Recommendation 2) The Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans should use the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help identify and analyze any gaps in PLCY’s workforce, design strategies to address any gaps, and communicate this information to DHS leadership  (Recommendation 3) The Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans should enhance the use of collaboration and communication mechanisms to connect with staff in the components with responsibilities for policy and strategy to better identify and address emerging needs  (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DHS  DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I  DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate  DHS concurred with three of our recommendations and described actions planned to address them  DHS did not concur with one recommendation  Specifically, DHS did not concur with our recommendation that PLCY should use the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help identify and analyze any gaps in PLCY’s workforce, design strategies to address any gaps, and communicate this information to DHS leadership  The letter described a number of actions, including actions that are also described in the report, which PLCY takes to help ensure alignment of its staff with organizational needs  In the letter, PLCY officials pointed to the workforce activities PLCY undertakes as part of the annual budgeting cycle  We acknowledge that the actions described to predict upcoming priorities and resource needs as part of the annual budgeting cycle are in line with the DHS workforce planning principles  However, as we noted, there are opportunities to apply the workforce planning principles outside the annual budgeting cycle to provide greater visibility and awareness of resource tradeoffs to management inside PLCY and in the Secretary’s office  In the letter, PLCY officials made note of the dynamic and changing nature of its operational environment, stating that it often required them to shift resources and priorities on a more frequent or ad hoc basis than many organizations  We acknowledged in the report that PLCY’s operating environment requires it to maintain flexibility in its staffing approach  However, PLCY has a number of important duties, including helping foster Unity of Effort throughout the department and helping to ensure the availability of risk information for departmental decision making, that require longer-term, sustained attention and strategic management  During interviews, PLCY officials acknowledged that striking a balance between these needs has been difficult and at times they have faced significant struggles  The report describes some areas where, during the time we were conducting our work, it was clear that some tasks and functions, such as risk analyses, lacked the resources or focus necessary to ensure they received sustained institutional attention  It is because of PLCY’s dynamic operating environment, coupled with the need for sustained institutional attention to other key responsibilities, that we recommended PLCY undertake workforce planning activities that would help generate better information for PLCY and DHS management to have full visibility and awareness of gaps and resource tradeoffs  Finally, the letter stated that because PLCY is a very small and flat organization, it is able to identify capacity gaps and develop action plans without obtaining all of the data collected through each recommended element, worksheet, form, and template of the model proposed in the DHS Workforce Planning Guide  We acknowledge that it would be counterproductive for PLCY to engage in data collection and analysis that are significantly more elaborate than its planning needs  Nevertheless, we continue to believe that PLCY could use the principles more robustly, outside the annual budgeting process, to help ensure that it identifies and communicates the effect that resource tradeoffs have on its ability to accomplish its multifaceted mission  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of Homeland Security  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in Appendix II  In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Godfrey (Assistant Director), Joseph E  Dewechter (Analyst-in-Charge), Michelle Loutoo Wilson, Ricki Gaber, Dominick Dale, Thomas Lombardi, Ned Malone, David Alexander, Sarah Veale, and Michael Hansen made key contributions to this report 
Report 2:  5515 , the House agreed to by voice vote H Amdt  644 , an en bloc amendment including, inter alia, amendment number 91 as printed in H Rept  115-698 of May 21, 2018, providing for consideration of H R  5515   Amendment 91 added Section 1298, which states the following: SEC  1298  Modification to annual report on military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China  Paragraph (22) of section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65; 10 U S C  113 note), as most recently amended by section 1261 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91; 131 Stat  1688), is further amended by striking "activities in the South China Sea" and inserting the following: ""activities— "(A) in the South China Sea; "(B) in the East China Sea, including in the vicinity of the Senkaku islands; and "(C) in the Indian Ocean region "  In S  2987 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee ( S Rept  115-262 of June 5, 2018), Section 1064 states the following: SEC  1064  United States policy with respect to freedom of navigation and overflight  (a) Declaration of policy —It is the policy of the United States to fly, sail, and operate throughout the oceans, seas, and airspace of the world wherever international law allows  (b) Implementation of policy —In furtherance of the policy set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense should— (1) plan and execute a robust series of routine and regular air and naval presence missions throughout the world and throughout the year, including for critical transportation corridors and key routes for global commerce; (2) in addition to the missions executed pursuant to paragraph (1), execute routine and regular air and maritime freedom of navigation operations throughout the year, in accordance with international law, including the use of expanded military options and maneuvers beyond innocent passage; and (3) to the maximum extent practicable, execute the missions pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) with regional partner countries and allies of the United States  Section 1241 of S  2987 as reported states the following: SEC  1241  Redesignation, expansion, and extension of Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative  (a) Redesignation as Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative — (1) IN GENERAL —Subsection (a)(2) of section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (10 U S C  333 note) is amended by striking "the 'Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative'" and inserting "the 'Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative'"  (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT —The heading of such section is amended to read as follows: "SEC  1263  Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative"  (b) Expansion — (1) EXPANSION OF REGION TO RECEIVE ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING —Subsection (a)(1) of such section is amended by inserting "and the Indian Ocean" after "South China Sea" in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)  (2) RECIPIENT COUNTRIES OF ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING GENERALLY —Subsection (b) of such section is amended— (A) in paragraph (2), by striking the comma at the end and inserting a period; and (B) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: "(6) Bangladesh  "(7) Sri Lanka "  (3) COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR PAYMENT OF CERTAIN INCREMENTAL EXPENSES —Subsection (e)(2) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: "(D) India "  (c) Extension —Subsection (h) of such section is amended by striking "September 30, 2020" and inserting "December 31, 2025"  Regarding Section 1241, S Rept  115-262 states the following: Redesignation, expansion, and extension of Southeast AsiaMaritime Security Initiative (sec  1241) The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92) to: redesignate the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative; add Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as recipient countries of assistance and training; add India as a covered country eligible for payment of certain incremental expenses; and extend the authority under the section through December 31, 2025  The committee continues to strongly support efforts under the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative aimed at enhancing the capabilities of regional partners to more effectively exercise control over their maritime territory and to deter adversaries  The committee is encouraged by the progress that has been made under the initiative, and notes that to date, the Department of Defense has utilized the authority under section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92), as amended, to support specified partner capacity-building efforts in the region, to include the provision of training, sustainment support, and participation in multilateral engagements  The committee recognizes that the initiative was designed to support a long-term capacity building effort, which will require increased resources in future years as requirements are established and refined, as programs mature, and as the regional security environment continues to evolve  The committee believes the Department's efforts to improve maritime domain awareness and maritime security should be fully integrated into a U S  strategy for a free and open Indo-Pacific  Therefore, the committee supports redesignating the authority under section 1263 as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative, the inclusion of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as recipient countries, and the addition of India as a covered country to encourage its participation in regional security initiatives of this kind  Furthermore, as a demonstration of the United States' commitment to allies and partners in the region, the committee supports the extension of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative through the end of 2025  Beyond the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative, the committee encourages the Department to make use of the full complement of security cooperation authorities available to the Department, particularly those under section 1241 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328), to enhance the capabilities of foreign security partners in South and Southeast Asia to protect mutual security interests  (Pages 296-297) Section 1245 of S  2987 as reported states the following: SEC  1245  Prohibition on participation of the People's Republic of China in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercises  (a) Sense of Congress —It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the pace and militarization by the Government of the People's Republic of China of land reclamation activities in the South China Sea is destabilizing the security of United States allies and partners and threatening United States core interests; (2) these activities of the Government of the People's Republic of China adversarially threaten the maritime security of the United States and our allies and partners; (3) no country that acts adversarially should be invited to multilateral exercises; and (4) the involvement of the Government of the People's Republic of China in multilateral exercises should undergo reevaluation until such behavior changes  (b) Conditions for future participation in RIMPAC —The Secretary of Defense shall not enable or facilitate the participation of the People's Republic of China in any Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise unless the Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees that China has— (1) ceased all land reclamation activities in the South China Sea; (2) removed all weapons from its land reclamation sites; and (3) established a consistent four-year track record of taking actions toward stabilizing the region  A June 26, 2018, statement of Administration policy regarding S  2987 stated the following: Prohibition on Participation of the People's Republic of China in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Naval Exercises  The Administration objects to section 1245 because China's participation in RIMPAC and other military-to-military events may be appropriate or inappropriate in any given year, depending on numerous other factors  Section 1245 would place restrictions on the Secretary of Defense's ability to manage a strategic relationship in the context of competition, limiting DOD's options on China and ability to act in the national security interest of the United States  Section 1251 of S  2987 as reported states the following: SEC  1251  Report on military and coercive activities of the People's Republic of China in South China Sea  (a) In general —Except as provided in subsection (d), immediately after the commencement of any significant reclamation or militarization activity by the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea, including any significant military deployment or operation or infrastructure construction, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the congressional defense committees, and release to the public, a report on the military and coercive activities of China in the South China Sea in connection with such activity  (b) Elements of report to public —Each report on a significant reclamation or militarization activity under subsection (a) shall include a short narrative on, and one or more corresponding images of, such significant reclamation or militarization activity  (c) Form — (1) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS —Any report under subsection (a) that is submitted to the congressional defense committees shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex  (2) RELEASE TO PUBLIC —If a report under subsection (a) is released to the public, such report shall be so released in unclassified form  (d) Waiver — (1) RELEASE OF REPORT TO PUBLIC —The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement in subsection (a) for the release to the public of a report on a significant reclamation or militarization activity if the Secretary determines that the release to the public of a report on such activity under that subsection in the form required by subsection (c)(2) would have an adverse effect on the national security interests of the United States  (2) NOTICE TO CONGRESS —If the Secretary issues a waiver under paragraph (1) with respect to a report on an activity, not later than 48 hours after the Secretary issues such waiver, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees written notice of, and justification for, such waiver  Regarding Section 1251, S Rept  115-262 states the following: Report on military and coercive activities of the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea (sec  1251) The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit to the congressional defense committees and release to the public, a report on the military and coercive activities of China in the South China Sea in connection with such activity immediately after the commencement of any significant reclamation or militarization activity by the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea, including any significant military deployment or operation or infrastructure construction  The committee is concerned that sufficient information has not been made publicly available in a timely fashion regarding China's reclamation and militarization activities of China in the South China Sea  Therefore, the committee urges the Secretary of Defense to determine that the public interest in selective declassification of China's activities in the South China Sea outweighs the potential damage from disclosure  The Secretary should consider mandating that the directors of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency provide the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) at the State Department with declassified aircraft-generated imagery and supporting analysis describing Chinese activities of concern  The committee also urges that the State Department brief and distribute the reports to the media and throughout Southeast Asia  (Page 300) In the conference report ( H Rept  115-874 of July 25, 2018) on H R  5515 / P L  115-232 of August 13, 2018, Section 1086 states the following: SEC  1086  UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT  (a) DECLARATION OF POLICY —It is the policy of the United States to fly, sail, and operate throughout the oceans, seas, and airspace of the world wherever international law allows  (b) IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY —In furtherance of the policy set forth in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense should— (1) plan and execute a robust series of routine and regular air and naval presence missions throughout the world and throughout the year, including for critical transportation corridors and key routes for global commerce; (2) in addition to the missions executed pursuant to paragraph (1), execute routine and regular air and maritime freedom of navigation operations throughout the year, in accordance with international law, including, but not limited to, maneuvers beyond innocent passage; and (3) to the maximum extent practicable, execute the missions pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) with regional partner countries and allies of the United States  Section 1252 of H R  5515 states the following: SEC  1252  REDESIGNATION, EXPANSION, AND EXTENSION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVE  (a) REDESIGNATION AS INDO-PACIFIC MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVE — (1) IN GENERAL —Subsection (a)(2) of section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (10 U S C  333 note) is amended by striking ''the 'Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative' '' and inserting ''the 'Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative' ''  (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT —The heading of such section is amended to read as follows: ''SEC  1263  INDO-PACIFIC MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVE ''  (b) EXPANSION — (1) EXPANSION OF REGION TO RECEIVE ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING —Subsection (a)(1) of such section is amended by inserting ''and the Indian Ocean'' after ''South China Sea'' in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)  (2) RECIPIENT COUNTRIES OF ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING GENERALLY —Subsection (b) of such section is amended— (A) in paragraph (2), by striking the comma at the end and inserting a period; and (B) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ''(6) Bangladesh  ''(7) Sri Lanka ''  (3) COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR PAYMENT OF CERTAIN INCREMENTAL EXPENSES —Subsection (e)(2) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ''(D) India ''  (c) EXTENSION —Subsection (h) of such section is amended by striking ''September 30, 2020'' and inserting ''December 31, 2025''  Section 1259 of H R  5515 states the following: SEC  1259  PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN RIM OF THE PACIFIC (RIMPAC) NAVAL EXERCISES  (a) CONDITIONS FOR FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN RIMPAC — (1) IN GENERAL —The Secretary of Defense shall not enable or facilitate the participation of the People's Republic of China in any Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise unless the Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees that China has— (A) ceased all land reclamation activities in the South China Sea; (B) removed all weapons from its land reclamation sites; and (C) established a consistent four-year track record of taking actions toward stabilizing the region  (2) FORM —The certification under paragraph (1) shall be in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex as necessary  (b) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER — (1) IN GENERAL —The Secretary of Defense may waive the certification requirement under subsection (a) if the Secretary determines the waiver is in the national security interest of the United States and submits to the congressional defense committees a detailed justification for the waiver  (2) FORM —The justification required under paragraph (1) shall be in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex as necessary  Section 1262 of H R  5515 states the following: SEC  1262  REPORT ON MILITARY AND COERCIVE ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN SOUTH CHINA SEA  (a) IN GENERAL —Except as provided in subsection (d), immediately after the commencement of any significant reclamation, assertion of an excessive territorial claim, or militarization activity by the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea, including any significant military deployment or operation or infrastructure construction, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, and release to the public, a report on the military and coercive activities of China in the South China Sea in connection with such activity  (b) ELEMENTS OF REPORT TO PUBLIC —Each report on the commencement of a significant reclamation, an assertion of an excessive territorial claim, or a militarization activity under subsection (a) shall include a short narrative on, and one or more corresponding images of, such commencement of a significant reclamation, assertion of an excessive territorial claim, or militarization activity  (c) FORM — (1) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS —Any report under subsection (a) that is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex  (2) RELEASE TO PUBLIC —If a report under subsection (a) is released to the public, such report shall be so released in unclassified form  (d) WAIVER — (1) RELEASE OF REPORT TO PUBLIC —The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement in subsection (a) for the release to the public of a report on the commencement of any significant reclamation, an assertion of an excessive territorial claim, or a militarization activity by the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea if the Secretary determines that the release to the public of a report on such activity under that subsection in the form required by subsection (c)(2) would have an adverse effect on the national security interests of the United States  (2) NOTICE TO CONGRESS —If the Secretary issues a waiver under paragraph (1) with respect to a report on an activity, not later than 48 hours after the Secretary issues such waiver, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees written notice of, and justification for, such waiver  (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED —In this section, the term ''appropriate congressional committees'' means— (1) the congressional defense committees; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives  Regarding Section 1262, H Rept  115-874 states the following: Report on military and coercive activities of the People's Republic of China in South China Sea (sec  1262) The House bill contained a provision (sec  1261) that would require Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, to submit a report to appropriate congressional committees on a quarterly basis describing China's activities in the Indo-Pacific region, and to disseminate the report to regional allies and partners and provide public notification, as appropriate  The provision would require that the dissemination and availability of the report and public notification be made in a manner consistent with national security and the protection of classified national security information  The Senate amendment contained a similar provision (sec  1251) that would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit to the congressional defense committees and release to the public, a report on the military and coercive activities of China in the South China Sea in connection with such activity immediately after the commencement of any significant reclamation or militarization activity by the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea, including any significant military deployment or operation or infrastructure construction  The House recedes with an amendment that would clarify that the required report shall be submitted to the congressional defense committees immediately after the commencement of any significant reclamation, assertion of an excessive territorial claim, or military activity by the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea  The conferees are concerned that sufficient information has not been made publicly available in a timely fashion regarding China's reclamation and militarization activities in the South China Sea  Moreover, the conferees recognize that China has engaged in provocative military activities elsewhere throughout the Indo-Pacific Region, including the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Indian Ocean  The conferees urge the Secretary of Defense to give full consideration to the strategic and public interest in selective declassification of China's activities in the South China Sea and elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region  (Pages 993-994) Section 1288 of H R  5515 states the following: SEC  1288  MODIFICATION OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS  Subsection (a) of section 1275 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat  2540), as amended by section 1262(a)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91; 131 Stat  1689), is further amended by striking ''the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives'' and inserting ''the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives''  Appendix A  Strategic Context from U S  Perspective This appendix presents a brief discussion of some elements of the strategic context from a U S  perspective in which the issues discussed in this report may be considered  There is also a broader context of U S -China relations and U S  foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific that is covered in other CRS reports  Shift in International Security Environment World events have led some observers, starting in late 2013, to conclude that the international security environment has undergone a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the past 20 to 25 years, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U S -led international order that has operated since World War II  China's actions in the SCS and ECS can be viewed as one reflection of that shift  Uncertainty Regarding Future U S  Role in World The overall U S  role in the world since the end of World War II in 1945 (i e , over the past 70 years) is generally described as one of global leadership and significant engagement in international affairs  A key aim of that role has been to promote and defend the open international order that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the years after World War II  In addition to promoting and defending the open international order, the overall U S  role is generally described as having been one of promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights, while criticizing and resisting authoritarianism where possible, and opposing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia or a spheres-of-influence world  Certain statements and actions from the Trump Administration have led to uncertainty about the Administration's intentions regarding the future U S  role in the world  Based on those statements and actions, some observers have speculated that the Trump Administration may want to change the U S  role in one or more ways  A change in the overall U S  role could have profound implications for U S  foreign policy, including U S  policy regarding maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China  U S  Grand Strategy Discussion of the above-mentioned shift in the international security environment has led to a renewed emphasis in discussions of U S  security and foreign policy on grand strategy and geopolitics  From a U S  perspective, grand strategy can be understood as strategy considered at a global or interregional level, as opposed to strategies for specific countries, regions, or issues  Geopolitics refers to the influence on international relations and strategy of basic world geographic features such as the size and location of continents, oceans, and individual countries  From a U S  perspective on grand strategy and geopolitics, it can be noted that most of the world's people, resources, and economic activity are located not in the Western Hemisphere, but in the other hemisphere, particularly Eurasia  In response to this basic feature of world geography, U S  policymakers for the past several decades have chosen to pursue, as a key element of U S  grand strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another, on the grounds that such a hegemon could represent a concentration of power strong enough to threaten core U S  interests by, for example, denying the United States access to some of the other hemisphere's resources and economic activity  Although U S  policymakers have not often stated this key national strategic goal explicitly in public, U S  military (and diplomatic) operations in recent decades—both wartime operations and day-to-day operations—can be viewed as having been carried out in no small part in support of this key goal  Focus on Great Power Competition with China and Russia The Trump Administration's December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 11-page unclassified summary of its January 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) reorient U S  national security strategy and, within that, U S  defense strategy, toward an explicit primary focus on great power competition with China and Russia and on countering Chinese and Russian military capabilities  The new U S  strategy orientation set forth in the 2017 NSS and 2018 NDS is sometimes referred to a "2+3" strategy, meaning a strategy for countering two primary challenges (China and Russia) and three additional challenges (North Korea, Iran, and terrorist groups)  Concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) In addition to the 2017 NSS and 2018 NDS, the Trump Administration has highlighted the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), with the term Indo-Pacific referring to the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, and the countries (particularly those in Eurasia) bordering on those two oceans  The concept, which is still being fleshed out by the Trump Administration, appears to be a general U S foreign policy and national security construct for the region, but observers view it as one that includes a military component  Challenge to U S  Sea Control and U S  Position in Western Pacific Observers of Chinese and U S  military forces view China's improving naval capabilities as posing a potential challenge in the Western Pacific to the U S  Navy's ability to achieve and maintain control of blue-water ocean areas in wartime—the first such challenge the U S  Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War  More broadly, these observers view China's naval capabilities as a key element of an emerging broader Chinese military challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific  Regional U S  Allies and Partners The United States has certain security-related policies pertaining to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act ( H R  2479 / P L  96-8 of April 10, 1979)  The United States has bilateral security treaties with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and an additional security treaty with Australia and New Zealand  In addition to U S  treaty allies, certain other countries in the Western Pacific can be viewed as current or emerging U S  security partners  Appendix B  U S  Treaties with Japan and Philippines This appendix presents brief background information on the U S  security treaties with Japan and the Philippines  U S -Japan Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security The 1960 U S -Japan treaty on mutual cooperation and security states in Article V that Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes  The United States has reaffirmed on a number of occasions over the years that since the Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan, they are included in the territories referred to in Article V of the treaty, and that the United States "will honor all of our treaty commitments to our treaty partners " (At the same time, the United States, noting the difference between administration and sovereignty, has noted that such affirmations do not prejudice the U S  approach of taking no position regarding the outcome of the dispute between China, Taiwan, and Japan regarding who has sovereignty over the islands ) Some observers, while acknowledging the U S  affirmations, have raised questions regarding the potential scope of actions that the United States might take under Article V  U S -Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty The 1951 U S -Philippines mutual defense treaty states in Article IV that Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes  Article V states that For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific  The United States has reaffirmed on a number of occasions over the years its obligations under the U S -Philippines mutual defense treaty  On May 9, 2012, Filipino Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F  del Rosario issued a statement providing the Philippine perspective regarding the treaty's application to territorial disputes in the SCS  U S  officials have made their own statements regarding the treaty's application to territorial disputes in the SCS  Appendix C  Treaties and Agreements Related to the Maritime Disputes This appendix briefly reviews some international treaties and agreements that bear on the issues discussed in this report  UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes a treaty regime to govern activities on, over, and under the world's oceans  UNCLOS was adopted by Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in December 1982, and entered into force in November 1994  The treaty established EEZs as a feature of international law, and contains multiple provisions relating to territorial waters and EEZs  As of May 10, 2018, 168 nations were party to the treaty, including China and most other countries bordering on the SCS and ECS (the exceptions being North Korea and Taiwan)  The treaty and an associated 1994 agreement relating to implementation of Part XI of the treaty (on deep seabed mining) were transmitted to the Senate on October 6, 1994  In the absence of Senate advice and consent to adherence, the United States is not a party to the convention and the associated 1994 agreement  A March 10, 1983, statement on U S  ocean policy by President Ronald Reagan states that UNCLOS contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interests of all states  Today I am announcing three decisions to promote and protect the oceans interests of the United States in a manner consistent with those fair and balanced results in the Convention and international law  First, the United States is prepared to accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans—such as navigation and overflight  In this respect, the United States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the United States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal states  Second, the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the convention  The United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses  Third, I am proclaiming today an Exclusive Economic Zone in which the United States will exercise sovereign rights in living and nonliving resources within 200 nautical miles of its coast  This will provide United States jurisdiction for mineral resources out to 200 nautical miles that are not on the continental shelf  UNCLOS builds on four 1958 law of the sea conventions to which the United States is a party: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the High Seas, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas  1972 Convention on Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) China and the United States, as well as more than 150 other countries (including all those bordering on the South East and South China Seas, but not Taiwan), are parties to an October 1972 multilateral convention on international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, commonly known as the collision regulations (COLREGs) or the "rules of the road " Although commonly referred to as a set of rules or regulations, this multilateral convention is a binding treaty  The convention applies "to all vessels upon the high seas and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels " It thus applies to military vessels, paramilitary and law enforcement (i e , coast guard) vessels, maritime militia vessels, and fishing boats, among other vessels  In a February 18, 2014, letter to Senator Marco Rubio concerning the December 5, 2013, incident involving the Cowpens , the State Department stated the following: In order to minimize the potential for an accident or incident at sea, it is important that the United States and China share a common understanding of the rules for operational air or maritime interactions  From the U S  perspective, an existing body of international rules and guidelines—including the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs)—are sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation between U S  forces and the force of other countries, including China  We will continue to make clear to the Chinese that these existing rules, including the COLREGs, should form the basis for our common understanding of air and maritime behavior, and we will encourage China to incorporate these rules into its incident-management tools  Likewise, we will continue to urge China to agree to adopt bilateral crisis management tools with Japan and to rapidly conclude negotiations with ASEAN on a robust and meaningful Code of Conduct in the South China in order to avoid incidents and to manage them when they arise  We will continue to stress the importance of these issues in our regular interactions with Chinese officials  In the 2014 edition of its annual report on military and security developments involving China, the DOD states the following: On December 5, 2013, a PLA Navy vessel and a U S  Navy vessel operating in the South China Sea came into close proximity  At the time of the incident, USS COWPENS (CG 63) was operating approximately 32 nautical miles southeast of Hainan Island  In that location, the U S  Navy vessel was conducting lawful military activities beyond the territorial sea of any coastal State, consistent with customary international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention  Two PLA Navy vessels approached USS COWPENS  During this interaction, one of the PLA Navy vessels altered course and crossed directly in front of the bow of USS COWPENS  This maneuver by the PLA Navy vessel forced USS COWPENS to come to full stop to avoid collision, while the PLA Navy vessel passed less than 100 yards ahead  The PLA Navy vessel's action was inconsistent with internationally recognized rules concerning professional maritime behavior (i e , the Convention of International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea), to which China is a party  2014 Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) On April 22, 2014, representatives of 21 Pacific-region navies (including China, Japan, and the United States), meeting in Qingdao, China, at the 14 th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), unanimously agreed to a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES)  CUES, a nonbinding agreement, establishes a standardized protocol of safety procedures, basic communications, and basic maneuvering instructions for naval ships and aircraft during unplanned encounters at sea, with the aim of reducing the risk of incidents arising from such encounters  The CUES agreement in effect supplements the 1972 COLREGs Convention (see previous section); it does not cancel or lessen commitments that countries have as parties to the COLREGS Convention  Two observers stated that "the [CUES] resolution is non-binding; only regulates communication in 'unplanned encounters,' not behavior; fails to address incidents in territorial waters; and does not apply to fishing and maritime constabulary vessels [i e , coast guard ships and other maritime law enforcement ships], which are responsible for the majority of Chinese harassment operations " DOD stated in 2015 that Going forward, the Department is also exploring options to expand the use of CUES to include regional law enforcement vessels and Coast Guards  Given the growing use of maritime law enforcement vessels to enforce disputed maritime claims, expansion of CUES to MLE [maritime law enforcement] vessels would be an important step in reducing the risk of unintentional conflict  U S  Navy officials have stated that the CUES agreement is generally working well, and that the United States (as noted in the passage above) is interested in expanding the agreement to cover coast guard ships  Officials from Singapore and Malaysia reportedly have expressed support for the idea  An Obama Administration fact sheet about Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to the United States on September 24-25, 2015, stated the following: The U S  Coast Guard and the China Coast Guard have committed to pursue an arrangement whose intended purpose is equivalent to the Rules of Behavior Confidence Building Measure annex on surface-to-surface encounters in the November 2014 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Department of Defense and the People's Republic of China Ministry of National Defense  A November 3, 2018, press report published following an incident in the SCS between a U S  Navy destroyer and a Chinese destroyer stated the following: The U S  Navy's chief of naval operations has called on China to return to a previously agreed-upon code of conduct for at-sea encounters between the ships of their respective navies, stressing the need to avoid miscalculations  During a Nov  1 teleconference with reporters based in the Asia-Pacific region, Adm  John Richardson said he wants the People's Liberation Army Navy to "return to a consistent adherence to the agreed-to code that would again minimize the chance for a miscalculation that could possibly lead to a local incident and potential escalation " The CNO cited a case in early October when the U S  Navy's guided-missile destroyer Decatur reported that a Chinese Type 052C destroyer came within 45 yards of the Decatur as it conducted a freedom-of-navigation operation in the South China Sea  However, he added that the "vast majority" of encounters with Chinese warships in the South China Sea "are conducted in accordance with the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea and done in a safe and professional manner " The code is an agreement reached by 21 Pacific nations in 2014 to reduce the chance of an incident at sea between the agreement's signatories  2014 U S -China MOU on Air and Maritime Encounters In November 2014, the U S  DOD and China's Ministry of National Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters  The MOU makes reference to UNCLOS, the 1972 COLREGs convention, the Conventional on International Civil Aviation (commonly known as the Chicago Convention), the Agreement on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety (MMCA), and CUES  The MOU as signed in November 2014 included an annex on rules of behavior for safety of surface-to-surface encounters  An additional annex on rules of behavior for safety of air-to-air encounters was signed on September 15 and 18, 2015  An October 20, 2018, press report states the following: Eighteen nations including the U S  and China agreed in principle Saturday [October 20] to sign up to guidelines governing potentially dangerous encounters by military aircraft, a step toward stabilizing flashpoints but one that leaves enough wiggle room to ignore the new standards when a country wants  The guidelines essentially broaden a similar agreement reached by the U S  and China three years ago and are an attempt to mitigate against incidents and collisions in some of the world's most tense areas…  The in-principle agreement, which will be put forward for formal adoption by the group of 18 nations next year, took place at an annual meeting of defense ministers under the aegis of the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations, hosted by Singapore  Asean nations formally adopted the new guidelines themselves Friday  "The guidelines are very useful in setting norms," Singapore's defense minister Ng Eng Hen told reporters after the meeting  "All the 18 countries agreed strong in-principle support for the guidelines "… The aerial-encounters framework agreed to Saturday includes language that prohibits fast or aggressive approaches in the air and lays out guidelines on clear communications including suggestions to "refrain from the use of uncivil language or unfriendly physical gestures " Signatories to the agreement, which is voluntary and not legally binding, would agree to avoid unprofessional encounters and reckless maneuvers…  The guidelines fall short on enforcement and geographic specifics, but they are "better than nothing at all," said Evan Laksmana, senior researcher with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta  "Confidence-building surrounding military crises or encounters can hardly move forward without some broadly agreed-upon rules of the game," he said  Negotiations on SCS Code of Conduct (COC) In 2002, China and the 10 member states of ASEAN signed a nonbinding Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea in which the parties, among other things,     reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea         undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea         undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner        reaffirm that the adoption of a [follow-on] code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective     In July 2011, China and ASEAN adopted a preliminary set of principles for implementing the DOC  U S  officials since 2010 have encouraged ASEAN and China to develop the follow-on binding Code of Conduct (COC) mentioned in the final quoted paragraph above  China and ASEAN have conducted negotiations on the follow-on COC, but China has not yet agreed with the ASEAN member states on a final text  On March 8, 2017, China announced that the first draft of a framework for the COC had been completed, and that "China and ASEAN countries feel satisfied with this " On May 18 and 19, 2017, it was reported that the China and the ASEAN countries had agreed on the framework  An article from a Chinese news outlet stated the following: All countries involved have agreed not to release the framework document, but to maintain it as an internal document at this time since the consultation will continue and they do not want any external interference, [Vice-Foreign Minister] Liu [Zhenmin] said  "Against the backdrop of economic globalization, China and ASEAN countries should continue making our regional rules to guide our own actions and protect our common interests," Liu said  A May 18, 2017, press report stated that Liu Zhemin "called on others to stay out [of the negotiations], apparently a coded message to the United States  'We hope that our consultations on the code are not subject to any outside interference,' Liu said " An August 3, 2017, press report stated the following: Southeast Asian ministers meeting this week are set to avoid tackling the subject of Beijing's arming and building of manmade South China Sea islands, preparing to endorse a framework for a code of conduct that is neither binding nor enforceable  The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has omitted references to China's most controversial activities in its joint communique, a draft reviewed by Reuters shows  In addition, a leaked blueprint for establishing an ASEAN-China code of maritime conduct does not call for it to be legally binding, or seek adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)     Analysts and some ASEAN diplomats worry that China's sudden support for negotiating a code of conduct is a ploy to buy time to further boost its military capability     The agreed two-page framework is broad and leaves wide scope for disagreement, urging a commitment to the "purposes and principles" of UNCLOS, for example, rather than adherence  The framework papers over the big differences between ASEAN nations and China, said Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New American Security  "Optimists will see this non-binding agreement as a small step forward, allowing habits of cooperation to develop, despite differences," he said  "Pessimists will see this as a gambit favorable to a China determined to make the majority of the South China Sea its domestic lake " An August 6, 2017, press report stated the following: Southeast Asian nations agreed with China on Sunday [August 6] to endorse a framework for a maritime code of conduct that would govern behavior in disputed waters of the South China Sea, a small step forward in a negotiation that has lasted well over a decade  Though not the long-discussed code itself, the framework sets out parameters for discussion of an agreement intended to bring predictability to a potential flashpoint as China increasingly asserts its military presence over the area in the face of rival claims  The 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will meet with China at the end of August to discuss legalities for negotiations on the code of conduct, with formal talks beginning soon after, Philippines department of foreign affairs spokesman Robespierre Bolivar said Sunday  The endorsement of the framework, which was tentatively agreed to in May, came during a bilateral meeting between China and Asean on the sidelines of a series of security-oriented meetings that will conclude Tuesday  The unsticking of the framework after years of obstruction is widely seen as a concession by China, which has opposed any legally binding code on maritime engagement, stepped up naval patrols and built artificial islands to enforce its claims, equipping them with military weapons  Beijing's move to allow discussion on the code of conduct follows a resetting of ties with the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte, who in October—just four months after taking office—visited Beijing and declared a new friendship between the two countries  An August 8, 2017, blog post about the framework states the following: In Manila on 6 August 2017, the foreign ministers of ASEAN and China endorsed the framework for the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea (COC)  While the framework is a step forward in the conflict management process for the South China Sea, it is short on details and contains many of the same principles and provisions contained in the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) which has yet to be even partially implemented  The text includes a new reference to the prevention and management of incidents, as well as a seemingly stronger commitment to maritime security and freedom of navigation  However, the phrase "legally binding" is absent, as are the geographical scope of the agreement and enforcement and arbitration mechanisms  The framework will form the basis for further negotiations on the COC  Those discussions are likely to be lengthy and frustrating for those ASEAN members who had hoped to see a legally binding, comprehensive and effective COC  Some observers have argued that China has been dragging out the negotiations on the COC for years as part of a "talk and take strategy," meaning a strategy in which China engages in (or draws out) negotiations while taking actions to gain control of contested areas  A May 25, 2017, news report states the following: To call negotiations between China and the ten-country Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) over rival claims in the South China Sea "drawn out" would be a gross understatement  At the centre of the matter is an unsquareable circle: the competing claims of China and several South-East Asian countries  Nobody wants to go to war; nobody wants to be accused of backing down  Still, at a meeting of senior Chinese and ASEAN officials on May 18 th , something happened: the two sides agreed on a "framework" for a code of conduct  An official from Singapore (which currently co-ordinates ASEAN-China relations) called the agreement a sign of "steady progress"     ASEAN members called for a legally binding code of conduct as far back as 1996     Since then, code-of-conduct negotiations have proceeded glacially     Last July, after China received an unfavourable ruling on its maritime claims in a case brought by the Philippines to a tribunal in The Hague, China agreed to expedite the talks     The draft framework will be presented to ASEAN and Chinese foreign ministers at a conference in August  This will then form the basis for the thorny negotiations to follow  The text has not (yet) been leaked  But its most salient feature may be what it appears to lack: any hint of enforcement mechanisms or consequences for violations  China has long rejected a legally binding agreement—or indeed any arrangement that could limit its actions in the South China Sea  The result, explains Ian Storey, of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, a think-tank in Singapore, is a framework "that makes China look co-operative…without having to do anything that might constrain its freedom of action"  ASEAN, meanwhile, gets the appearance of progress  "The ASEAN secretariat is a bureaucracy, and bureaucrats like process," explains Mr Storey  A July 13, 2018, blog post states the following: The COC has become a "holy grail," highly desired but unattainable  A major concern should be that this holy grail could turn into a tool for China to legitimize its actions in the South China Sea by engaging in the process while subverting its spirit  To this end, the challenges to the COC process are likely to be: China will use the COC talks to delay, exploit, and divert focus from any ASEAN consensus on the South China Sea; China will seek to include unhelpful and imprecise language in the COC which it could then use to justify its actions; China will nonetheless claim the COC as a diplomatic success and will use it as cover to avoid criticism while still pursuing its unilateral strategy to control the South China Sea…  If the COC process continues on its current trajectory, and China succeeds in filling the document with vague articles that would have little impact on its behavior, it would effectively be abusing the rules-based order to its own benefit  Instead of protecting against unilateral actions in the South China Sea, the rules-based order in the form of the COC could assist and justify China's expansion and ultimately its sole control of the South China Sea  Other regional actors need to recognize these traps of concluding a counter-productive COC, and resist the urge to reach an agreement just to be able to say they made progress  Instead, they should insist on negotiating the terms and conditions of a real COC, one that would establish effective rules-based dispute management mechanisms, not one that would by-pass them for the sake of an easy "win " An August 2, 2018, press report states the following: After more than a decade of talks, a bloc of Southeast Asian nations and China have agreed on a draft code of conduct that will lay the foundation for negotiations over the disputed South China Sea  Observers said the agreement showed that China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) could make progress through talks despite rising regional tensions, but they also warned that there was still a long way to go until a final deal  The agreement on the "Single Draft COC Negotiating Text" was announced at a meeting of Asean foreign ministers in Singapore on Thursday [August 2], after being nailed down at a China-Asean meeting in the central Chinese city of Changsha in June  An August 9, 2018, press report stated the following: Talks on completing a code of conduct for the disputed South China Sea will be long and complex and it would be unrealistic to set a timetable, state media on Thursday [August 9] cited a senior Chinese diplomat as saying…  In an interview with China Newsweek magazine, Yi Xianliang, Director General of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs, said the talks were continuing  Many of the topics were complex and sensitive and there were many different points of view, he said  "If these issues are to be resolved, and the code finally comes together, all sides need to keep looking for the greatest common denominator," Yi added  "There are voices from the outside, who are trying to set a timetable for the talks on the code  I think this is unrealistic," he said  Any multilateral talks take time, especially on such a complex issue as the South China Sea, Yi added  "It is impossible to define a timetable  Instead of setting the timetable unrealistically, and binding one's hands, it's better to step forward one foot at a time "… "Certain countries outside the region have been agitating that the code must be legally binding  This issue is quite complicated, including the domestic legal procedures involved in the countries concerned," he added, without elaborating  An October 22, 2018, press report stated the following: As China moves to complete the creation of military outposts in the South China Sea, Beijing's negotiation with southeastern Asian nations over a binding code of conduct is gaining momentum  But U S  officials and experts warn China's insertions in the draft South China Sea code of conduct may put Washington and Beijing on a collision course  The text of the draft also shows that deep divisions remain among claimants  One of the Chinese provisions in the text states, "The Parties shall not hold joint military exercises with countries from outside the region, unless the parties concerned are notified beforehand and express no objection " China also proposed cooperation on the marine economy "shall not be conducted in cooperation with companies from countries outside the region " A State Department spokesperson told VOA the United States is concerned by reports China has been pressing members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations "in the closed-door talks, to accept restrictions on their ability to conduct exercises with security partners, and to agree not to conduct oil and gas exploration in their claimed waters with energy firms based in countries which are not part of the ongoing negotiations " "These proposals, if accepted, would limit the ability of ASEAN nations to conduct sovereign, independent foreign and economic policies and would directly harm the interests of the broader international community," added the State Department spokesperson…  "In other words, China would like a veto over all the military exercises held by ASEAN countries with other nations  I think this really provides some evidence that China indeed is trying to limit American influence in the region, one might go so far as to say to push American military presence out of the region eventually, but certainly in the area of the South China Sea," said Bonnie Glaser, director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington…  The United States is also calling for ongoing discussions on the South China Sea code of conduct to be transparent and consultative with the rest of the international community  U S  officials said the international community has direct stakes in the outcome  A September 6, 2018, blog post stated the following: After two decades of talks, scepticism about the development of a South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC) is well-deserved, but it is also important to acknowledge progress when it happens  The agreement on a single draft negotiating text, revealed ahead of the ASEAN–China Post Ministerial Meeting on 2 August 2018, is an important step in the process that deserves recognition  The COC will not resolve the South China Sea disputes, nor was it ever meant to  Instead the COC is intended to manage disputes to avoid conflict pending their eventual resolution by direct negotiation or arbitration among the claimants  But any system to effectively manage the South China Sea disputes would require three things, none of which are achieved yet in the draft text  First, an effective COC would need to be geographically defined…  Second, an effective COC would need a dispute settlement mechanism…  Third, any effective regime to manage the South China Sea disputes would need detailed provisions on fisheries management and oil and gas development…  The solution to this problem could be a COC signed by all 10 ASEAN members and China that establishes general rules of behaviour within a clear geographic area, sets up an effective dispute settlement mechanism and endorses the immediate start of follow-on negotiations involving only the relevant claimants on fisheries management and oil and gas cooperation  Such a document would be a major step towards peacefully managing the South China Sea disputes and there are hints that at least some sections of the negotiating text might be on the right track  But the differences between parties remain considerable and final agreement on an effective COC still seems some way off  An October 29, 2018, press report states the following: The Philippines on Monday said a set of rules intended to prevent conflict in the South China Sea need not legally compel countries to follow it—an issue of importance for the Chinese government  Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr  raised this possibility during a joint news conference with Wang Yi, his Chinese counterpart, in Davao City where they held bilateral talks to firm up preparations for President Xi Jinping's visit to Manila next month  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China are negotiating a code of conduct in the South China Sea  The 10-member bloc wants it to be legally binding, but Beijing prefers just "binding," ASEAN diplomats have said  "Perhaps, we will not be able to arrive at a legally binding COC, but it will be a standard on how people of ASEAN and governments of ASEAN will behave with each other -- always with honor, never with aggression, and always for mutual progress," Locsin said…  Wang said China will abide by the code whether it is legally binding or not  He said China hopes to finish the negotiations before Manila's term as ASEAN-China coordinator ends  "We welcome constructive opinions within the framework    that has been agreed," Wang said, referring to the general outline agreed last year, which dropped a reference to a legally binding code  The framework essentially repeats the spirit of a 2002 declaration on the South China Sea that called on parties to exercise restraint to avoid escalating tensions, and respect international law, among other things  Critics and ASEAN officials said the declaration failed to manage tensions in the disputed area because it was not legally binding  A November 14, 2018, press report stated the following: A rulebook to settle disputes in the hotly contested South China Sea should be finished in three years, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said on Tuesday, insisting his nation does not seek "hegemony or expansion " Li's comments appeared to be the first clear timeframe for finishing the code of conduct  Talks have dragged on for years, with China accused of delaying progress as it prefers to deal with less powerful countries on a one-to-one basis  Appendix D  July 2016 Tribunal Award in SCS Arbitration Case Involving Philippines and China This appendix provides background information on the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China  Overview In 2013, the Philippines sought arbitration under UNCLOS over the role of historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain maritime features and the maritime entitlements they are capable of generating, and the lawfulness of certain actions by China that were alleged by the Philippines to violate UNCLOS  A tribunal was constituted under UNCLOS to hear the case  China stated repeatedly that it would not accept or participate in the arbitration and that, in its view, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction in this matter  China's nonparticipation did not prevent the case from moving forward, and the tribunal decided that it had jurisdiction over various matters covered under the case  On July 12, 2016, the tribunal issued its award (i e , ruling) in the case  The award was strongly in favor of the Philippines—more so than even some observers had anticipated  The tribunal ruled, among other things, that China's nine-dash line claim had no legal basis; that none of the land features in the Spratlys is entitled to any more than a 12-nm territorial sea; that three of the Spratlys features that China occupies generate no entitlement to maritime zones; and that China violated the Philippines' sovereign rights by interfering with Philippine vessels and by damaging the maritime environment and engaging in reclamation work on a feature in the Philippines' EEZ  Under UNCLOS, the award is binding on both the Philippines and China (China's nonparticipation in the arbitration does not change this)  There is, however, no mechanism for enforcing the tribunal's award  The United States has urged China and the Philippines to abide by the award  China, however, has declared the ruling null and void  Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who took office just before the tribunal's ruling, has not sought to enforce it  The tribunal's press release summarizing its award states the following in part: The Award is final and binding, as set out in Article 296 of the Convention [i e , UNCLOS] and Article 11 of Annex VII [of UNCLOS]  Historic Rights and the 'Nine-Dash Line':     On the merits, the Tribunal concluded that the Convention comprehensively allocates rights to maritime areas and that protections for pre-existing rights to resources were considered, but not adopted in the Convention  Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that, to the extent China had historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they were incompatible with the exclusive economic zones provided for in the Convention  The Tribunal also noted that, although Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other States, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources  The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the 'nine-dash line'  Status of Features:     Features that are above water at high tide generate an entitlement to at least a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, whereas features that are submerged at high tide do not  The Tribunal noted that the reefs have been heavily modified by land reclamation and construction, recalled that the Convention classifies features on their natural condition, and relied on historical materials in evaluating the features  The Tribunal then considered whether any of the features claimed by China could generate maritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles  Under the Convention, islands generate an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf, but "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf "     the Tribunal concluded that none of the Spratly Islands is capable of generating extended maritime zones  The Tribunal also held that the Spratly Islands cannot generate maritime zones collectively as a unit  Having found that none of the features claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found that it could—without delimiting a boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China  Lawfulness of Chinese Actions:     Having found that certain areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, the Tribunal found that China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone  The Tribunal also held that fishermen from the Philippines (like those from China) had traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal and that China had interfered with these rights in restricting access  The Tribunal further held that Chinese law enforcement vessels had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine vessels  Harm to Marine Environment: The Tribunal considered the effect on the marine environment of China's recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands and found that China had caused severe harm to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species  The Tribunal also found that Chinese authorities were aware that Chinese fishermen have harvested endangered sea turtles, coral, and giant clams on a substantial scale in the South China Sea (using methods that inflict severe damage on the coral reef environment) and had not fulfilled their obligations to stop such activities  Aggravation of Dispute: Finally, the Tribunal considered whether China's actions since the commencement of the arbitration had aggravated the dispute between the Parties  The Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the implications of a stand-off between Philippine marines and Chinese naval and law enforcement vessels at Second Thomas Shoal, holding that this dispute involved military activities and was therefore excluded from compulsory settlement  The Tribunal found, however, that China's recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands was incompatible with the obligations on a State during dispute resolution proceedings, insofar as China has inflicted irreparable harm to the marine environment, built a large artificial island in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, and destroyed evidence of the natural condition of features in the South China Sea that formed part of the Parties' dispute  Assessments of Impact of Arbitral Award One Year Later In July 2017, a year after the arbitral panel's award, some observers assessed the impact to date of the award  For example, one observer stated the following: One year ago, China suffered a massive legal defeat when an international tribunal based in The Hague ruled that the vast majority of Beijing's extensive claims to maritime rights and resources in the South China Sea were not compatible with international law  Beijing was furious  At an official briefing immediately after the ruling, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin twice called it "nothing more than a piece of waste paper," and one that "will not be enforced by anyone " And yet, one year on, China is, in many ways, abiding by it     China is not fully complying with the ruling—far from it  On May 1, China imposed a three-and-a-half-month ban on fishing across the northern part of the South China Sea, as it has done each year since 1995  While the ban may help conserve fish stocks, its unilateral imposition in wide areas of the sea violates the ruling  Further south, China's occupation of Mischief Reef, a feature that is submerged at high tide and the tribunal ruled was part of the Philippines' continental shelf, endures  Having built a vast naval base and runway here, China looks like it will remain in violation of that part of the ruling for the foreseeable future  But there is evidence that the Chinese authorities, despite their rhetoric, have already changed their behavior  In October 2016, three months after the ruling, Beijing allowed Philippine and Vietnamese boats to resume fishing at Scarborough Shoal, west of the Philippines  A China Coast Guard ship still blocks the entrance to the lagoon, but boats can still fish the rich waters around it  The situation is not perfect but neither is China flaunting its defiance     Much more significantly, China has avoided drilling for oil and gas on the wrong side of the invisible lines prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)         the ruling means China has no claim to the fish, oil or gas more than 12 nautical miles from any of the Spratlys or Scarborough Shoal  The Chinese authorities appear not to accept this     There are clear signs from both China's words and deeds that Beijing has quietly modified its overall legal position in the South China Sea  Australian researcher Andrew Chubb noted a significant article in the Chinese press in July last year outlining the new view         China's new position seems to represent a major step towards compliance with UNCLOS and, therefore, the ruling  Most significantly, it removes the grounds for Chinese objections to other countries fishing and drilling in wide areas of the South China Sea     Overall, the picture is of a China attempting to bring its vision of the rightful regional order (as the legitimate owner of every rock and reef inside the U-shaped line) within commonly understood international rules  Far from being "waste paper," China is taking the tribunal ruling very seriously  It is still some way from total compliance but it is clearly not deliberately flouting the ruling  Another observer stated the following: A year ago today, an arbitral tribunal formed pursuant to the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea issued a blockbuster award finding much of China's conduct in the South China Sea in violation of international law  As I detailed that day on this blog and elsewhere, the Philippines won about as big a legal victory as it could have expected  But as many of us also warned that day, a legal victory is not the same as an actual victory  In fact, over the past year China has succeeded in transforming its legal defeat into a policy victory by maintaining its aggressive South China Sea policies while escaping sanction for its non-compliance  While the election of a new pro-China Philippines government is a key factor, much of the blame for China's victory must also be placed on the Obama Administration     International law seldom enforces itself, and even the reputational costs of violating international law do not arise unless other states impose those costs on the law-breaker  Both the Philippines and the U S  had policy options that would have raised the costs of China's non-compliance with the award  But neither country's government chose to press China on the arbitral award     Looking back after one year, we cannot say (yet) that U S  policy in the South China Sea is a failure  But we can say that the U S  under President Obama missed a huge opportunity to change the dynamics in the region in its favor, and it is hard to know whether or when another such opportunity will arise in the future  Reported Chinese Characterization of Arbitral Award as "Waste Paper" When the arbitral panel's award was announced, China stated that "China does not accept or recognize it," and that the award "is invalid and has no binding force " The first of the two passages quoted above states that "at an official briefing immediately after the ruling, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin twice called it 'nothing more than a piece of waste paper,' and one that 'will not be enforced by anyone '" A November 22, 2017, press report states the following: An eight-page essay pumped through social media and Chinese state newspapers in recent days extolled the virtues of president Xi Jinping  Among his achievements, in the Chinese language version, was that he had turned the South China Sea Arbitration at The Hague—which found against China—into "waste paper"  It was an achievement that state news agency Xinhua's lengthy hymn, entitled "Xi and His Era", did not include in the English version for foreign consumption  Assessments and Events Two Years Later Another observer writes in a May 10, 2018, commentary piece that Two years after an international tribunal rejected expansive Chinese claims to the South China Sea, Beijing is consolidating control over the area and its resources  While the U S  defends the right to freedom of navigation, it has failed to support the rights of neighboring countries under the tribunal's ruling  As a result, Southeast Asian countries are bowing to Beijing's demands…  While Beijing's dramatic military buildup in the South China Sea has received much attention, its attempts at "lawfare" are largely overlooked  In May, the Chinese Society of International Law published a "critical study" on the South China Sea arbitration case  It rehashed old arguments but also developed a newer one, namely that China is entitled to claim maritime zones based on groups of features rather than from individual features  Even if China is not entitled to historic rights within the area it claims, this argument goes, it is entitled to resources in a wide expanse of sea on the basis of an exclusive economic zone generated from outlying archipelagoes  But the Convention on the Law of the Sea makes clear that only archipelagic states such as the Philippines and Indonesia may draw straight archipelagic baselines from which maritime zones may be claimed  The tribunal also explicitly found that there was "no evidence" that any deviations from this rule have amounted to the formation of a new rule of customary international law  China's arguments are unlikely to sway lawyers, but that is not their intended audience  Rather Beijing is offering a legal fig leaf to political and business elites in Southeast Asia who are already predisposed to accept Beijing's claims in the South China Sea  They fear China's threat of coercive economic measures and eye promises of development through offerings such as the Belt and Road Initiative  Why did Washington go quiet on the 2016 tribunal decision? One reason is Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte's turn toward China and offer to set aside the ruling  The U S  is also worried about the decision's implications for its own claims to exclusive economic zones from small, uninhabited land features in the Pacific  The Trump administration's failure to press Beijing to abide by the tribunal's ruling is a serious mistake  It undermines international law and upsets the balance of power in the region  Countries have taken note that the tide in the South China Sea is in China's favor, and they are making their strategic calculations accordingly  This hurts U S  interests in the region  A July 12, 2018, press report stated the following: The Philippines is celebrating today the second anniversary of its landmark arbitration award against China's territorial claims in the South China Sea handed down by an arbitral tribunal in The Hague…  Until now, the Philippines remains sharply divided on how to leverage its arbitration award  Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte has repeatedly downplayed the relevance of the ruling by questioning its enforceability amid China's vociferous opposition  Soon after taking office in mid-2016, Duterte declared that he would "set aside" the arbitration award in order to pursue a "soft landing" in bilateral relations with China  In exchange, he has hoped for large-scale Chinese investments as well as resource-sharing in the South China Sea…  Other major leaders in the Philippines, however, have taken a tougher stance and continue to try to leverage the award to resist China's expanding footprint in the area  The Stratbase-Albert Del Rosario Institute, an influential think tank co-founded by former Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario, hosted today a high-level forum on the topic at the prestigious Manila Polo Club  Del Rosario oversaw the arbitration proceedings against China under Duterte's predecessor, Benigno Aquino  He opened the event attended by dignitaries from major Western and Asian countries with a strident speech which accused China of trying to "dominate the South China Sea through force and coercion " He defended the arbitration award as an "overwhelming victory" to resist "China's unlawful expansion agenda " The ex-top diplomat also accused the Duterte administration of acquiescence to China by acting as an "abettor" and "willing victim" by soft-pedaling the Philippines' claims in the South China Sea and refusing to raise the arbitration award in multilateral fora  The keynote speaker of the event was Vice President Leni Robredo, who has recently emerged as the de facto leader of the opposition against Duterte  Though falling short of directly naming Duterte, her spirited speech served as a comprehensive indictment of the administration's policy in the South China Sea…  Her keynote address, widely covered by the local media, was followed by an even more spirited speech by interim Supreme Court Chief Justice Antonio Carpio, another leading critic of Duterte's foreign policy  The chief magistrate, who also oversaw the Philippines' arbitration proceedings against China, lashed out at Duterte for placing the landmark award in a "deep freeze " He called on the Duterte administration to leverage the award by negotiating maritime delimitation agreements with other Southeast Asian claimant states such as Malaysia and Vietnam which welcomed the arbitral tribunal's nullification of China's nine-dashed-line map  He also called on the Philippines to expand its maritime entitlement claims in the area, in accordance to the arbitration award, by applying for an extended continental shelf in the South China Sea at the UN  Another July 12, 2018, press report stated the following: Tarpaulins bearing the words "Welcome to the Philippines, province of China" were seen hanging from several footbridges in Metro Manila Thursday, two years after the country won its arbitration case against China  The red banners bore the Chinese flag and Chinese characters  It is unclear who installed the tarpaulins, which are possible reference to a "joke" by President Rodrigo Duterte that the country can be a province of the Asian giant  "He (Xi Jinping) is a man of honor  They can even make us 'Philippines, province of China,' we will even avail of services for free," Duterte said in apparent jest before an audience of Chinese-Filipino business leaders earlier in 2018  "If China were a woman, I'd woo her "… In a Palace briefing, presidential spokesperson Harry Roque said enemies of the government are behind the tarpaulins  A report on ANC said that the Metro Manila Development Authority already took the banners down  The tarpaulins sparked outrage among social media users  A July 17, 2018, press report stated the following: Protesters held a rally in front of the Chinese Consulate [in San Francisco] before proceeding to the Philippine Consulate downtown, demanding that China "get out of Philippine territory in the West Philippine Sea " The protest was timed with others in Los Angeles and Vancouver on the second anniversary of the UN's Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that China had no right to the territory it was claiming  Filipino American Human Rights Advocates (FAHRA) in a statement celebrated the court's finding that "China's historical claim of the "nine-dash line" [is] illegal and without basis " "China continues to violate the UN's decision with the backing of its puppet Philippine government headed by President Duterte, who is deceived by the 'build, build, build' economic push while China establishes a 'steal, steal, steal' approach to islands and territories belonging to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines as determined by UN," the statement lamented  FAHRA also found it unacceptable that Filipino fishermen must now ask permission to fish in the Philippine waters from "a Chinese master " "Duterte is beholden to the $15-billion loan with monstrous interest rate and China's investments in Boracay and Marawi, at the expense of Philippine sovereignty," FAHRA claimed  "This is not to mention that China remains to be the premier supplier of illegal drugs to the country through traders that include the son, Paolo Duterte, with his P6 billion shabu shipment to Davao," it further charged  The group demanded that "China abide by the UN International Tribunal Court's decision two years ago, to honor the full sovereignty of the Philippines over all territories at the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) including the West Philippine Sea and the dismantling of the nuclear missiles and all military facilities installed by the Chinese government at the Spratly islands meant to coerce the Filipinos and all peace-loving people of Southeast Asia who clamor for equal respect and equal sovereignty in the area" among others  Appendix E  Additional Elements of China's Approach to Maritime Disputes This appendix presents background information on additional elements of China's approach to the maritime disputes in the SCS and ECS  Map of Nine-Dash Line China depicts its claims in the SCS using the so-called map of the nine-dash line—a Chinese map of the SCS showing nine line segments that, if connected, would enclose an area covering roughly 90% (earlier estimates said about 80%) of the SCS ( Figure E-1 )  The area inside the nine line segments far exceeds what is claimable as territorial waters under customary international law of the sea as reflected in UNCLOS, and, as shown in Figure E-2 , includes waters that are within the claimable EEZs (and in some places are quite near the coasts) of the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam  The map of the nine-dash line, also called the U-shaped line or the cow tongue, predates the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949  The map has been maintained by the PRC government, and maps published in Taiwan also show the nine line segments  In a document submitted to the United Nations on May 7, 2009, which included the map shown in Figure E-1 as an attachment, China stated the following: China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached map [of the nine-dash line])  The above position is consistently held by the Chinese Government, and is widely known by the international community  The map does not always have exactly nine dashes  Early versions of the map had as many as 11 dashes, and a map of China published by the Chinese government in June 2014 includes 10 dashes  The exact positions of the dashes have also varied a bit over time  China has maintained ambiguity over whether it is using the map of the nine-dash line to claim full sovereignty over the entire sea area enclosed by the nine-dash line, or something less than that  Maintaining this ambiguity can be viewed as an approach that preserves flexibility for China in pursuing its maritime claims in the SCS while making it more difficult for other parties to define specific objections or pursue legal challenges to those claims  It does appear clear, however, that China at a minimum claims sovereignty over the island groups inside the nine line segments—China's domestic Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, enacted in 1992, specifies that China claims sovereignty over all the island groups inside the nine line segments  China's implementation on January 1, 2014, of a series of fishing regulations covering much of the SCS suggests that China claims at least some degree of administrative control over much of the SCS  An April 30, 2018, blog post states the following: In what is likely a new bid to reinforce and even expand China's sweeping territorial claims in the South China Sea, a group of Chinese scholars recently published a "New Map of the People's Republic of China " The alleged political national map, reportedly first published in April 1951 but only "discovered" through a recent national archival investigation, could give new clarity to the precise extent of China's official claims in the disputed waters  Instead of dotted lines, as reflected in China's U-shaped Nine-Dash Line claim to nearly all of the South China Sea, the newly discovered map provides a solid "continuous national boundary line and administrative region line " The Chinese researchers claim that through analysis of historical maps, the 1951 solid-line map "proves" beyond dispute that the "U-boundary line is the border of China's territorial sea" in the South China Sea  They also claim that the solid administrative line overlaying the U-boundary "definitely indicated that the sovereignty of the sea" enclosed within the U-boundary "belonged to China " The study, edited by the Guanghua and Geosciences Club and published by SDX Joint Publishing Company, has not been formally endorsed by the Chinese government  April 2018 Press Report of Proposal for Continuous Boundary Line in SCS An April 22, 2018, press report states the following: Researchers are proposing a new boundary in the South China Sea that they say will help the study of natural science while potentially adding weight to China's claims over the disputed waters, according to a senior scientist involved in the government-funded project  The new boundary will help to define more clearly China's claims in the contested region, but it is not clear whether or when it will be officially adopted by Beijing, the scientist said  A precise continuous line will split the Gulf of Tonkin between China and Vietnam, go south into waters claimed by Malaysia, take a U-turn to the north along the west coast of the Philippines and finish at the southeast of Taiwan  For decades, China's sovereign claim in the South China Sea has been murky, in large part because of the use of a segmented, vaguely located borderline known as the 'nine-dash line'  A United Nations tribunal ruled in July 2016 that China had no legal basis to claim the area within the dash lines  One reason for China losing the case was that it could not define the territory precisely  However, analysts said Beijing was unlikely to officially change the nine-dash line any time soon, in the face of potential international opposition     The vast area of blue outlined by the new boundary, hanging on a map like a Christmas stocking under South China, overlaps the dashes and fills in the gaps  It includes all contested waters, such as the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, James Shoal and Scarborough Shoal  The boundary would determine for the first time the exact area that China claimed to own with historic rights in the South China Sea, according to the researcher  Its purpose was partly the study of natural science and partly driven by a political motivation "to strengthen China's claims" over the waters to prepare for possible changes in its South China Sea policy in the future, the researcher said  Within the boundary, China would claim the right to activities ranging from fishing, prospecting and mining for energy or mineral resources to the construction of military bases with deep water ports or airports  Other countries' access to these rights would, however, be open for discussion, as is the case at Scarborough Shoal, which China controls but allows Philippine fishing boats to access  While Beijing would consider the area within the boundary its territory, other countries would still have freedom of navigation, the researcher said     "Soon we will have a clear idea of what belongs to us in the South China Sea and what does not," said the researcher  "This will allow us to better plan and coordinate the efforts to protect our national interest in the region while reducing the risk of conflict with other countries caused by the absence of a border over the ocean "    "More often, when we are sending vessels out to the sea or looking down at an area via satellite, we are not sure whether it was our water," said the researcher in the boundary-drawing project  "The nine-dash line can no longer meet the demands of increasing Chinese activities in the South China Sea "    The continuous boundary was generated not only by curve-extending, gap-filling algorithms on computer  It was also based on a solid piece of historic evidence, according to the project team  In 1951, an official map approved by the central government of China marked the China-claimed area in the South China Sea with a pair of non-stopping lines  There was an inner black line indicating the sovereign boundary and an outer red line representing where China could exercise administrative power  "We were thrilled when we found the map," the researcher said  "It is something we can show the world " A detailed description of the map was published by the project team in a paper in domestic academic journal China Science Bulletin in March this year  Its authors recommended using the continuous U-shape boundary line as a replacement for the nine-dash line  The "U-boundary is the border of China's sea in the South China Sea, and its sovereignty belongs to China", the authors wrote in the paper  It "can further express the certainty of the integrity, continuity and border of China's seas in the South China Sea", they wrote, adding that it was "more vivid, accurate, complete and scientific"  Professor Yu Minyou, director of the China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies at Wuhan University, said that if the old map was published with government approval, which was usually the case in China, "it surely will add legal weight to China's claim" in the region     But other countries should bear in mind that it did not represent the Chinese government's position as long as the dash lines stayed on official maps, Yu said, adding that China's strategy for the South China Sea was "open and clear"  "China wants to achieve peace, stability, harmony and prosperity in the region," he said  "We are willing to share natural resources with other countries and leave the disputes to be solved in the future  "What we are doing now is creating a suitable environment for the final settlement of the issue " A government expert at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in Haikou, Hainan, said the continuous boundary would serve as a useful tool for some studies of natural science  But it was highly unlikely to be printed on an official map, said the expert, who requested not to be named because he was not allowed to speak to overseas media about sensitive issues  "To my knowledge, the Chinese government currently has no plan to change the dash lines," he said  "Most diplomats and ocean law experts will oppose joining the dashes " The tension in the South China Sea has eased significantly in recent times, with neighbouring countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam no longer seeking direct confrontation with China over disputed areas  "Things are moving towards the right direction," the government expert said  "It is not the best time to cut a boundary " September 2017 Press Report of Potential New "Four-Sha" Legal Claim A September 21, 2017, press report states the following: The Chinese government recently unveiled a new legal tactic to promote Beijing's aggressive claim to own most of the strategic South China Sea  The new narrative that critics are calling "lawfare," or legal warfare, involves a shift from China's so-called "9-Dash Line" ownership covering most of the sea  The new lawfare narrative is called the "Four Sha"—Chinese for sand—and was revealed by Ma Xinmin, deputy director general in the Foreign Ministry's department of treaty and law, during a closed-door meeting with State Department officials last month  China has claimed three of the island chains in the past and recently added a fourth zone in the northern part of the sea called the Pratas Islands near Hong Kong  The other locations are the disputed Paracels in the northwestern part and the Spratlys in the southern sea  The fourth island group is located in the central zone and includes Macclesfield Bank, a series of underwater reefs and shoals  China calls the island groups Dongsha, Xisha, Nansha, and Zhongsha, respectively  Ma, the Foreign Ministry official, announced during the meetings in Boston on Aug  28 and 29 that China is asserting sovereignty over the Four Sha through several legal claims  He stated the area is China's historical territorial waters and also part of China's 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone that defines adjacent zones as sovereign territory  Beijing also claims ownership by asserting the Four Sha are part of China's extended continental shelf  U S  officials attending the session expressed surprise at the new Chinese ploy to seek control over the sea as something not discussed before     A State Department notice at the end of what was billed as an annual U S -China Dialogue on the Law of the Sea and Polar Issues made no mention of the new Chinese lawfare tactic  The statement said only that officials from foreign affairs and maritime agencies "exchanged views on a wide range of issues related to oceans, the law of the sea, and the polar regions " A September 25, 2017, blog post about the claim states the following: While dropping or even de-emphasizing China's Nine-Dash Line claim in favor of the Four Shas has important diplomatic and political implications, the legal significance of such a shift is harder to assess  The constituent parts of China's Four Sha claims have long been set forth publicly in Chinese domestic law and official statements  Based on what we know so far, these new Chinese legal justifications are no more lawful than China's Nine-Dash Line claim  The challenge for critics of Chinese claims in the South China Sea, however, will be effectively explaining and articulating why this shift does not actually strengthen China's legal claims in the South China Sea  The Four Sha claim has a long pedigree in Chinese law and practice  China's 1992 law on the territorial sea and contiguous zone, for example, declared that China's land territory included the "Dongsha island group, Xisha island group, Zhongsha island group, [and] Nansha island group " A 2016 white paper disputing the Philippines' claims in the South China Sea arbitral process similarly claimed that: China's Nanhai Zhudao (the South China Sea Islands) consist of Dongsha Qundao (the Dongsha Islands), Xisha Qundao (the Xisha Islands), Zhongsha Qundao (the Zhongsha Islands) and Nansha Qundao (the Nansha Islands)  These Islands include, among others, islands, reefs, shoals and cays of various numbers and sizes     In a 2016 white paper, Beijing stated that, "China has, based on Nanhai Zhudao [the "Four Sha"], internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf " Neither the white paper nor the Beacon's report explain how China derives these maritime zones from the four island groups     Because China is not constituted "wholly by one or more archipelagos" (think Indonesia or the Philippines), the U S  and most countries would view straight baselines around an island group as contrary to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)     For this reason, this new Chinese legal strategy is even weaker than the Nine-Dash Line given that it clearly violates UNCLOS (e g , Articles 46 and 47)  Most Chinese defenses of the Nine Dash Line argued that the claim predated China's accession to UNCLOS and therefore not governed by it  Despite the legal weaknesses of its possible new strategy, China may still reap some benefits from trading the Nine-Dash Line for the Four Shas  First, the Chinese leadership may have realized that the Nine Dash Line has become too much of a diplomatic liability  The Nine-Dash Line is completely sui generis and no other state has made a historic maritime claim anything like it  For this reason, the Nine-Dash Line makes China an easy target for foreign criticism in a way that straight baselines around island groups probably will not  Second, by adopting language more similar to that found in UNCLOS, China may be betting that it can tamp down criticism, and win potential partners in the region     Third, and most intriguingly, China may have concluded that it can better shape (or undermine, depending on your point of view) the law of the sea by adopting UNCLOS terminology     So while we might be encouraged to see the Nine-Dash Line pass into the (legal) dustbins of history, we should be skeptical about whether the Four Shas herald a new more modest Chinese role in the South China Sea  China's legal justification for the Four Shas is just as weak, if not weaker, than its Nine-Dash Line claim  But explaining why the Four Shas is weak and lawless will require sophisticated legal analysis married with effective public messaging  Comparison with U S  Actions Toward Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico Some observers have compared China's approach toward its near-seas region with the U S  approach toward the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico in the age of the Monroe Doctrine  It can be noted, however, that there are significant differences between China's approach to its near-seas region and the U S  approach—both in the 19 th and 20 th centuries and today—to the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico  Unlike China in its approach to its near-seas region, the United States has not asserted any form of sovereignty or historical rights over the broad waters of the Caribbean or Gulf of Mexico (or other sea areas beyond the 12-mile limit of U S  territorial waters), has not published anything akin to the nine-dash line for these waters (or other sea areas beyond the 12-mile limit), and does not contest the right of foreign naval forces to operate and engage in various activities in waters beyond the 12-mile limit  Appendix F  U S  Position on Operational Rights in EEZs This appendix presents additional background information on the U S  position on the issue of operational rights of military ships in the EEZs of other countries  Operational Rights in EEZs Regarding a coastal state's rights within its EEZ, Scot Marciel, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated the following as part of his prepared statement for a July 15, 2009, hearing before the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: I would now like to discuss recent incidents involving China and the activities of U S  vessels in international waters within that country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)  In March 2009, the survey ship USNS Impeccable was conducting routine operations, consistent with international law, in international waters in the South China Sea  Actions taken by Chinese fishing vessels to harass the Impeccable put ships of both sides at risk, interfered with freedom of navigation, and were inconsistent with the obligation for ships at sea to show due regard for the safety of other ships  We immediately protested those actions to the Chinese government, and urged that our differences be resolved through established mechanisms for dialogue—not through ship-to-ship confrontations that put sailors and vessels at risk  Our concern over that incident centered on China's conception of its legal authority over other countries' vessels operating in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the unsafe way China sought to assert what it considers its maritime rights  China's view of its rights on this specific point is not supported by international law  We have made that point clearly in discussions with the Chinese and underscored that U S  vessels will continue to operate lawfully in international waters as they have done in the past  As part of his prepared statement for the same hearing, Robert Scher, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, stated that we reject any nation's attempt to place limits on the exercise of high seas freedoms within an exclusive economic zones [sic] (EEZ)  Customary international law, as reflected in articles 58 and 87 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, guarantees to all nations the right to exercise within the EEZ, high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, as well as the traditional uses of the ocean related to those freedoms  It has been the position of the United States since 1982 when the Convention was established, that the navigational rights and freedoms applicable within the EEZ are qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those rights and freedoms applicable on the high seas  We note that almost 40% of the world's oceans lie within the 200 nautical miles EEZs, and it is essential to the global economy and international peace and security that navigational rights and freedoms within the EEZ be vigorously asserted and preserved  As previously noted, our military activity in this region is routine and in accordance with customary international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention  As mentioned earlier in the report, if China's position on whether coastal states have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs were to gain greater international acceptance under international law, it could substantially affect U S  naval operations not only in the SCS and ECS (see Figure F-1 for EEZs in the SCS and ECS), but around the world, which in turn could substantially affect the ability of the United States to use its military forces to defend various U S  interests overseas  As shown in Figure F-2 , significant portions of the world's oceans are claimable as EEZs, including high-priority U S  Navy operating areas in the Western Pacific, the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean Sea  Some observers, in commenting on China's resistance to U S  military survey and surveillance operations in China's EEZ, have argued that the United States would similarly dislike it if China or some other country were to conduct military survey or surveillance operations within the U S  EEZ  Skeptics of this view argue that U S  policy accepts the right of other countries to operate their military forces freely in waters outside the 12-mile U S  territorial waters limit, and that the United States during the Cold War acted in accordance with this position by not interfering with either Soviet ships (including intelligence-gathering vessels known as AGIs) that operated close to the United States or with Soviet bombers and surveillance aircraft that periodically flew close to U S  airspace  The U S  Navy states that When the commonly recognized outer limit of the territorial sea under international law was three nautical miles, the United States recognized the right of other states, including the Soviet Union, to exercise high seas freedoms, including surveillance and other military operations, beyond that limit  The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention moved the outer limit of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles  In 1983, President Reagan declared that the United States would accept the balance of the interests relating to the traditional uses of the oceans reflected in the 1982 Convention and would act in accordance with those provisions in exercising its navigational and overflight rights as long as other states did likewise  He further proclaimed that all nations will continue to enjoy the high seas rights and freedoms that are not resource related, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight, in the Exclusive Economic Zone he established for the United States consistent with the 1982 Convention  DOD states that the PLA Navy has begun to conduct military activities within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other nations, without the permission of those coastal states  Of note, the United States has observed over the past year several instances of Chinese naval activities in the EEZ around Guam and Hawaii  One of those instances was during the execution of the annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in July/August 2012  While the United States considers the PLA Navy activities in its EEZ to be lawful, the activity undercuts China's decades-old position that similar foreign military activities in China's EEZ are unlawful  In July 2014, China participated, for the first time, in the biennial U S -led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise, the world's largest multilateral naval exercise  In addition to the four ships that China sent to participate in RIMPAC, China sent an uninvited intelligence-gathering ship to observe the exercise without participating in it  The ship conducted operations inside U S  EEZ off Hawaii, where the exercise was located  A July 29, 2014, press report stated that The high profile story of a Chinese surveillance ship off the cost of Hawaii could have a positive aspect for U S  operations in the Pacific, the head of U S  Pacific Command (PACOM) said in a Tuesday [July 29] afternoon briefing with reporters at the Pentagon  "The good news about this is that it's a recognition, I think, or acceptance by the Chinese for what we've been saying to them for sometime," PACOM commander Adm  Samuel Locklear told reporters  "Military operations and survey operations in another country's [Exclusive Economic Zone]—where you have your own national security interest—are within international law and are acceptable  This is a fundamental right nations have " One observer stated the following: The unprecedented decision [by China] to send a surveillance vessel while also participating in the RIMPAC exercises calls China's proclaimed stance on international navigation rights [in EEZ waters] into question    During the Cold War, the U S  and Soviets were known for spying on each other's exercises  More recently, Beijing sent what U S  Pacific Fleet spokesman Captain Darryn James called "a similar AGI ship" to Hawaii to monitor RIMPAC 2012—though that year, China was not an official participant in the exercises         the spy ship's presence appears inconsistent with China's stance on military activities in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)     That Beijing's AGI [intelligence-gathering ship] is currently stationed off the coast of Hawaii suggests either a double standard that could complicate military relations between the United States and China, or that some such surveillance activities are indeed legitimate—and that China should clarify its position on them to avoid perceptions that it is trying to have things both ways     In its response to the Chinese vessel's presence, the USN has shown characteristic restraint  Official American policy permits surveillance operations within a nation's EEZ, provided they remain outside of that nation's 12-nautical mile territorial sea (an EEZ extends from 12 to 200 nautical miles unless this would overlap with another nations' EEZ)  U S  military statements reflect that position unambiguously     That consistent policy stance and accompanying restraint have characterized the U S  attitude toward foreign surveillance activity since the Cold War  Then, the Soviets were known for sending converted fishing ships equipped with surveillance equipment to the U S  coast, as well as foreign bases, maritime choke points, and testing sites  The U S  was similarly restrained in 2012, when China first sent an AGI to observe RIMPAC     China has, then, sent a surveillance ship to observe RIMPAC in what appears to be a decidedly intentional, coordinated move—and in a gesture that appears to contradict previous Chinese policy regarding surveillance and research operations (SROs)  The U S  supports universal freedom of navigation and the right to conduct SROs in international waters, including EEZs, hence its restraint when responding to the current presence of the Chinese AGI  But the PRC opposes such activities, particularly on the part of the U S , in its own EEZ     How then to reconcile the RIMPAC AGI with China's stand on surveillance activities? China maintains that its current actions are fully legal, and that there is a distinct difference between its operations off Hawaii and those of foreign powers in its EEZ  The PLAN's designated point of contact declined to provide information and directed inquiries to China's Defense Ministry  In a faxed statement to Reuters, the Defense Ministry stated that Chinese vessels had the right to operate "in waters outside of other country's territorial waters," and that "China respects the rights granted under international law to relevant littoral states, and hopes that relevant countries can respect the legal rights Chinese ships have " It did not elaborate  As a recent Global Times article hinted—China's position on military activities in EEZs is based on a legal reading that stresses the importance of domestic laws  According to China maritime legal specialist Isaac Kardon, China interprets the EEZ articles in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as granting a coastal state jurisdiction to enforce its domestic laws prohibiting certain military activities—e g , those that it interprets to threaten national security, economic rights, or environmental protection—in its EEZ  China's domestic laws include such provisions, while those of the United States do not  Those rules would allow China to justify its seemingly contradictory approach to AGI operations—or, as Kardon put it, "to have their cake and eat it too " Therefore, under the Chinese interpretation of UNCLOS, its actions are neither hypocritical nor illegal—yet do not justify similar surveillance against China  Here, noted legal scholar Jerome Cohen emphasizes, the U S  position remains the globally dominant view—"since most nations believe the coastal state has no right to forbid surveillance in its EEZ, they do not have domestic laws that do so " This renders China's attempted constraints legally problematic, since "international law is based on reciprocity " To explain his interpretation of Beijing's likely approach, Cohen invokes the observation that a French commentator made several decades ago in the context of discussing China's international law policy regarding domestic legal issues: "I demand freedom from you in the name of your principles  I deny it to you in the name of mine " Based on his personal experience interacting with Chinese officials and legal experts, Kardon adds, "China is increasingly confident that its interpretation of some key rules and—most critically—its practices reinforcing that interpretation can over time shape the Law of the Sea regime to suit its preferences " But China is not putting all its eggs in that basket  There are increasing indications that it is attempting to promote its EEZ approach vis-à-vis the U S  not legally but politically  "Beijing is shifting from rules- to relations-based objections," Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute Director Peter Dutton observes  "In this context, its surveillance operations in undisputed U S  EEZs portend an important shift, but that does not mean that China will be more flexible in the East or South China Seas " The quasi-authoritative Chinese commentary that has emerged thus far supports this interpretation     [A recent statement from a Chinese official] suggests that Beijing will increasingly oppose U S  SROs on the grounds that they are incompatible with the stable, cooperative Sino-American relationship that Beijing and Washington have committed to cultivating  The Obama Administration must ensure that the "new-type Navy-to-Navy relations" that Chinese Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Wu Shengli has advocated to his U S  counterpart does not contain expectations that U S  SROs will be reduced in nature, scope, or frequency     China's conducting military activities in a foreign EEZ implies that, under its interpretation, some such operations are indeed legal  It therefore falls to China now to clarify its stance—to explain why its operations are consistent with international law, and what sets them apart from apparently similar American activities  If China does not explain away the apparent contradiction in a convincing fashion, it risks stirring up increased international resentment—and undermining its relationship with the U S  Beijing is currently engaging in activities very much like those it has vociferously opposed  That suggests the promotion of a double standard untenable in the international system, and very much at odds with the relationships based on reciprocity, respect, and cooperation that China purports to promote     If, however, China chooses to remain silent, it will likely have to accept—at least tacitly, without harassing—U S  surveillance missions in its claimed EEZ  So, as we watch for clarification on Beijing's legal interpretation, it will also be important to watch for indications regarding the next SROs in China's EEZ  In September 2014, a Chinese surveillance ship operated in U S  EEZ waters near Guam as it observed a joint-service U S  military exercise called Valiant Shield  A U S  spokesperson for the exercise stated the following: "We'd like to reinforce that military operations in international commons and outside of territorial waters and airspace is a fundamental right that all nations have     The Chinese were following international norms, which is completely acceptable " Appendix G  Options Suggested by Observers for Strengthening U S  Actions This appendix presents a bibliography of some recent writings by observers who have suggested options (or are reporting on options suggested by others) for strengthening U S  actions for responding to China's actions in the SCS and ECS, organized by date, beginning with the most-recent item  Andrew S  Erickson, "Maritime Numbers Game, Understanding and Responding to China's Three Sea Forces," Indo-Pacific Defense Forum , January 28, 2019  James R  Holmes, "Use It or Lose It: Seagoing Nations Must Defend Embattled Waterways," The Hill , January 27, 2019  Gregory Poling and Eric Sayers, "Time to Make Good on the U S -Philippine Alliance," War on the Rocks , January 21, 2019  Gregory Poling and Bonnie S  Glaser, "How the U S  Can Step Up in the South China Sea," Foreign Affairs , January 16, 2019  Zack Cooper and Gregory Poling, "America's Freedom of Navigation Operations Are Lost at Sea, Far Wider Measures Are Needed to Challenge Beijing's Maritime Aggression," Foreign Policy , January 8, 2019  Andrew S  Erickson, "Shining a Spotlight: Revealing China's Maritime Militia to Deter its Use," National Interest , November 25, 2018  Eric Sayers, "Assessing America's Indo-Pacific Budget Shortfall," War on the Rocks , November 15, 2018  Patrick N  Cronin and Richard Javad Heydarian, "This Is How America and the Philippines Can Upgrade Their Alliance," National Interest , November 12, 2018  John Lee, Freedom of Navigation and East Asian Stability: Countering Beijing's Campaign of Historical Revisionism ," Hudson Institute, November 2018, 8 pp  Ryan Martinson and Peter Dutton, "Chinese Scientists Want to Conduct Research in U S  Waters—Should Washington Let Them?" National Interest , November 4, 2018  Hunter Stires, "Understanding and Defeating China's Maritime Insurgency in the South china Sea," National Interest , November 1, 2018  Robert D  Kaplan, "How President Trump Is Helping Beijing Win in the South China Sea," Washington Post , October 9, 2018  Tuan Pham, "China's Worth Nightmare: RIMPAC 2020 in the South China Sea?" National Interest , September 29, 2018  Patrick M  Cronin, "China is Waging a Maritime Insurgency in the South China Sea  It's Time for the Unitd States to Counter It " National Interest , August 6, 2018  Shigeki Sakamoto, "China's South China Sea Project Must Not Succeed; The International Community Shouldn't Quietly Let China Ignore the 2016 [Arbitral Tribunal] Decision " Diplomat , August 6, 2018  James Amedeo, "America Needs a Clear Strategy to Counter China's Expansion in the South China Sea," National Interest , August 1, 2018  Lynn Kuok, "Countering China's Actions in the South China Sea," Lawfare , August 1, 2018  Timothy Perry, "Use Maritime-Law Trends to Offset Beijing's Gains in the South China Sea," Defense One , July 24, 2018  J  Michael Cole, "It's Time to Stop China's Seaward Expansion," National Interest , July 21, 2018  Lindsey W  Ford, "Was China's RIMPAC Exclusion An Opening or a Wasted Shot?" East Asia Forum , July 20, 2018  Lynn Kuok, "China Is Winning in the South China Sea," Wall Street Journal , July 17, 2018  "Washington and Its Allies Need to Contain Beijing," Financial Times , July 1, 2018  Patrick M  Cronin and Melodiw Ha, "Toward a New maritime Strategy in the South China Sea," The Diplomat , June 22, 2018  (A similar version was posted as: Patrick M  Cronin and Melodie Ha, "Toward a New Maritime Strategy in the South China Sea," CSIS, June 21, 2018 (PacNet #42)  Paul J  Leaf, "Taiwan and the South China Sea Must Be Taken Off the Back Burner," National Interest , June 18, 2018  Robert E  McCoy, "A Better Way to Repel China in the South China Sea," Asia Times , June 8, 2018  Robert Farley, "The South China Sea Conundrum for the United States," The Diplomat , June 5 2018  Joel Gehrke, "Marco Rubio: US Must Develop Plan to 'Destroy' Chinese Assets in South China Sea," Washington Examiner , June 4, 2018  Duncan DeAeth, "Taiwan Should Invite US to Open Military Base on Taiping Island, Says DPP Think-Tank," Taiwan News , June 4, 2018  Julian Ku, "It's Time for South China Sea Economic Sanctions," Lawfare , June 1, 2018  Eric Sayers, "Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific," War on the Rocks , June 1, 2018  Matthew Krull, "America's Annual Naval Patrol Report and How to Fix It," National Interest , May 29, 2018  Tuan N  Pham, "A Sign of the Times: China's Recent Actions and the Undermining of Global Rules, Pt  3," CIMSEC (Center for International Maritime Security), May 24, 2018  Ryan D  Martinson and Andrew Erickson, "Re-Orienting American Seapower for the China Challenge," War on the Rocks , May 10, 2018  Ben Cipperley, "In the Era of Great Power Competition, the US Needs to Step Up Its Game," The Diplomat , May 8, 2018  Stephen Bryen, "How to Counter China's Fortified Islands in South China Sea," Asia Times , May 5, 2018  Ely Ratner, "Exposing China's Actions in the South China Sea," Council on Foreign Relations, April 6, 2018  Shawn Lansing, "A White Hull Approach to Taming the Dragon: Using the Coast Guard to Counter China," War on the Rocks , February 22, 2018  Dean Cheng, "Wanted: A Strategy to Limit China's Grand Plans for the South China Sea," National Interest , January 30, 2018  Hal Brands, "China Hasn't Won the Pacific (Unless You Think It Has)," Bloomberg , January 5, 2018 

ground_truth: GAO has designated DHS management as high risk because of challenges in building a cohesive department. PLCY supports cohesiveness by, among other things, coordinating departmentwide policy and strategy. In the past, however, questions have been raised about PLCY's efficacy. In December 2016, the NDAA codified PLCY's organizational structure, roles, and responsibilities. GAO was asked to evaluate PLCY's effectiveness. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS established an organizational structure and processes and procedures that position PLCY to be effective, (2) DHS and PLCY have ensured alignment of workforce with priorities, and (3) PLCY has engaged relevant component staff to help identify and respond to emerging needs. GAO analyzed the NDAA, documents describing specific responsibilities, and departmentwide policies and strategies. GAO also interviewed officials in PLCY and all eight operational components. According to our analysis and interviews with operational components, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans' (PLCY) organizational structure and efforts to lead and coordinate departmentwide and crosscutting strategies—a key organizational objective–have been effective. For example, PLCY's coordination efforts for a strategy and policy executive steering committee have been successful, particularly for strategies. However, PLCY has encountered challenges leading and coordinating efforts to develop, update, or harmonize policies that affect multiple DHS components. In large part, these challenges are because DHS does not have clearly-defined roles and responsibilities with accompanying processes and procedures to help PLCY lead and coordinate policy in a predictable, repeatable, and accountable manner. Until PLCY's roles and responsibilities for policy are more clearly defined and corresponding processes and procedures are in place, situations where the lack of clarity hampers PLCY's effectiveness in driving policy are likely to continue. Development of a delegation of authority, which involves reaching agreement about PLCY's roles and responsibilities and clearly documenting them, had been underway. However, it stalled due to changes in department leadership. As of May 2018, the effort had been revived, but it is not clear whether and when DHS will finalize it. PLCY does some workforce planning as part of its annual budgeting process, but does not systematically apply key principles of the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help ensure that PLCY's workforce aligns with its and DHS's priorities and goals. According to PLCY officials, the nature of its mission requires a flexible staffing approach. As such, a portion of the staff functions as generalists who can be assigned to meet the needs of different situations, including unexpected changing priorities due to an emerging need. However, shifting short-term priorities requires tradeoffs, which may divert attention and resources from longer-term priorities. As of June 5, 2018, PLCY also had a number of vacancies in key leadership positions, which further limited attention to certain priorities. According to PLCY officials, PLCY recently began a review to identify the office's authorities in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA) and other statutes, compare these authorities to the current organization and operations, and address any workforce capacity gaps. Employing workforce planning principles—in particular, systematic identification of workforce demand, capacity gaps, and strategies to address them—consistent with the DHS Workforce Planning Guide could better position PLCY to use its workforce as effectively as possible under uncertain conditions and to communicate effectively with DHS leadership about tradeoffs. Officials from PLCY and DHS operational components praised existing mechanisms to coordinate and communicate at the senior level, especially about strategy, but component officials identified opportunities to better connect PLCY and component staff to improve communication flow about emerging policy and strategy needs. Among the ideas offered by component officials to enhance communication and collaboration were holding routine small-group meetings, creating forums for periodic knowledge sharing, and maintaining accurate and up-to-date contact information for all staff-level stakeholders. GAO is making four recommendations. DHS concurred with three recommendations, including that DHS finalize a delegation of authority defining PLCY's roles and responsibilities and develop corresponding processes and procedures. DHS did not concur with a recommendation to apply the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to identify and communicate workforce needs. GAO believes this recommendation is valid as discussed in the report.