prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President shall appoint officers of the United States "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate " The method by which the Senate provides advice and consent on presidential nominations, referred to broadly as the confirmation process, serves several purposes  First, largely through committee investigations and hearings, the confirmation process allows the Senate to examine the qualifications of nominees and any potential conflicts of interest  Second, Senators can influence policy through the confirmation process, either by rejecting nominees or by extracting promises from nominees before granting consent  Also, the Senate sometimes has delayed the confirmation process in order to increase its influence with the executive branch on unrelated matters  Senate confirmation is required for several categories of government officials  Military appointments and promotions make up the majority of nominations, approximately 65,000 per two-year Congress, and most are confirmed routinely  Each Congress, the Senate also considers approximately 2,000 civilian nominations, and, again, many of them, such as appointments to or promotions in the Foreign Service, are routine  Civilian nominations considered by the Senate also include federal judges and specified officers in executive departments, independent agencies, and regulatory boards and commissions  Many presidential appointees are confirmed routinely by the Senate  With tens of thousands of nominations each Congress, the Senate cannot possibly consider them all in detail  A regularized process facilitates quick action on thousands of government positions  The Senate may approve en bloc hundreds of nominations at a time, especially military appointments and promotions  The process also allows for close scrutiny of candidates when necessary  Each year, a few hundred nominees to high-level positions are regularly subject to Senate investigations and public hearings  Most of these are routinely approved, while a small number of nominations are disputed and receive more attention from the media and Congress  Judicial nominations, particularly Supreme Court appointees, are generally subject to greater scrutiny than nominations to executive posts, partly because judges may serve for life  Among the executive branch positions, nominees for policymaking positions are more likely to be examined closely, and are slightly less likely to be confirmed, than nominees for non-policy positions  There are several reasons that the Senate confirms a high percentage of nominations  Most nominations and promotions are not to policymaking positions and are of less interest to the Senate  In addition, some sentiment exists in the Senate that the selection of persons to fill executive branch positions is largely a presidential prerogative  Historically, the President has been granted wide latitude in the selection of his Cabinet and other high-ranking executive branch officials  Another important reason for the high percentage of confirmations is that Senators are often involved in the nomination stage  The President would prefer a smooth and fast confirmation process, so he may decide to consult with Senators prior to choosing a nominee  Senators most likely to be consulted, typically by White House congressional relations staff, are Senators from a nominee's home state, leaders of the committee of jurisdiction, and leaders of the President's party in the Senate  Senators of the President's party are sometimes invited to express opinions or even propose candidates for federal appointments in their own states  There is a long-standing custom of "senatorial courtesy," whereby the Senate will sometimes decline to proceed on a nomination if a home-state Senator expresses opposition  Positions subject to senatorial courtesy include U S  attorneys, U S  marshals, and U S  district judges  Over the past decade, Senators have expressed concerns over various aspects of the confirmation process, including the rate of confirmation for high-ranking executive branch positions and judgeships, as well as the speed of Senate action on routine nominations  When the Senate is controlled by the party of the President, this concern has often been raised as a complaint that minority party Senators are disputing a higher number of nominations, and have increasingly used their leverage under Senate proceedings to delay or even block their consideration  These concerns have led the Senate to make several changes to the confirmation process since 2011  The changes are taken into account in the following description of the process and are described in detail in other CRS Reports  The President customarily sends nomination messages to the Senate in writing  Once received, nominations are numbered by the executive clerk and read on the floor  The clerk actually assigns numbers to the presidential messages, not to individual nominations, so a message listing several nominations would receive a single number  Except by unanimous consent, the Senate cannot vote on nominations the day they are received, and most are referred immediately to committees  Senate Rule XXXI provides that nominations shall be referred to appropriate committees "unless otherwise ordered " A standing order of the Senate provides that some nominations to specified positions will not be referred unless a Senator requests referral  Instead of being immediately referred, the nominations are instead listed in a special section of the Executive Calendar , a document distributed daily to congressional offices and available online  This section of the Calendar is titled "Privileged Nominations " After the chair of the committee with jurisdiction over a nomination has notified the executive clerk that biographical and financial information on the nominee has been received, this is indicated in the Calendar  After 10 days, the nomination is moved from the "Privileged Nominations" section of the Calendar and placed on the "Nominations" section with the same status as a nomination that had been reported by a committee  (See " Executive Calendar " below ) Importantly, at any time that the nomination is listed in the new section of the Executive Calendar , any Senator can request that a nomination be referred, and it is then sent to the appropriate committee of jurisdiction  Formally the presiding officer, but administratively the executive clerk's office, refers the nominations to committees according to the Senate's rules and precedents  The Senate rule concerning committee jurisdictions (Rule XXV) broadly defines issue areas for committees, and the same jurisdictional statements generally apply to nominations as well as legislation  An executive department nomination can be expected to be referred to the committee with jurisdiction over legislation concerning that department or to the committee that handled the legislation creating the position  Judicial branch nominations, including judges, U S  attorneys, and U S  marshals, are under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee  In some instances, the committee of jurisdiction for a nomination has been set in statute  The number of nominations referred to various committees differs considerably  The Committee on Armed Services, which handles all military appointments and promotions, receives the most  The two other committees with major confirmation responsibilities are the Committee on the Judiciary, with its jurisdiction over nominations in the judicial branch, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, which considers ambassadorial and other diplomatic appointments  Occasionally, nominations are referred to more than one committee, either jointly or sequentially  A joint referral might occur when the jurisdictional claim of two committees is essentially equal  In such cases, both committees must report on the nomination before the whole Senate can act on it, unless the Senate discharges one or both committees  If two committees have unequal jurisdictional claims, then the nomination is more likely to be sequentially referred  In this case, the first committee must report the nomination before it is sequentially referred to the second committee  The second referral often is subject to a requirement that the committee report within a certain number of days  Typically, nominations are jointly or sequentially referred by unanimous consent  Sometimes the unanimous consent agreement applies to all future nominations to a position or category of positions  Most Senate committees that consider nominations have written rules concerning the process  Although committee rules vary, most contain standards concerning information to be gathered from a nominee  Many committees expect a biographical resumé and some kind of financial statement listing assets and liabilities  Some specify the terms under which financial statements will or will not be made public  Committee rules also frequently contain timetables outlining the minimum layover required between committee actions  A common timing provision is a requirement that nominations be held for one or two weeks before the committee proceeds to a hearing or a vote, permitting Senators time to review a nomination before committee consideration  Other committee rules specifically mandate a delay between steps of the process, such as the receipt of pre-hearing information and the date of the hearing, or the distribution of hearing transcripts and the committee vote on the nomination  Some of the written rules also contain provisions for the rules to be waived by majority vote, by unanimous consent, or by the chair and the ranking minority Member  Committees often gather and review information about a nominee either before or instead of a formal hearing  Because the executive branch acts first in selecting a nominee, congressional committees are sometimes able to rely partially on any field investigations and reports conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  Records of FBI investigations are provided only to the White House, although a report or a summary of a report may be shared, with the President's authorization, with Senators on the relevant committee  The practices of the committees with regard to FBI materials vary  Some rarely if ever request them  On other committees, the chair and ranking Member review any FBI report or summary, but on some committees these materials are available to any Senator upon request  Committee staff usually do not review FBI materials  Almost all nominees are also asked by the Office of the Counsel to the President to complete an "Executive Personnel Financial Disclosure Report, SF-278," which is reviewed and certified by the relevant agency as well as the Director of the Office of Government Ethics  The documents are then forwarded to the relevant committee, along with opinion letters from ethics officers in the relevant agency and the director of the Office of Government Ethics  In contrast to FBI reports, financial disclosure forms are made public  All committees review financial disclosure reports and some make them available in committee offices to Members, staff, and the public  To varying degrees, committees also conduct their own information-gathering exercises  Some committees, after reviewing responses to their standard questionnaire, might ask a nominee to complete a second questionnaire  Committees frequently require that written responses to these questionnaires be submitted before a hearing is scheduled  The Committee on the Judiciary sends form letters, sometimes called "blue slips," to Senators from a nominee's home state to determine whether they support the nomination  The Committee on the Judiciary also has its own investigative staff  The Committee on Rules and Administration handles relatively few nominations and conducts its own investigations, sometimes with the assistance of the FBI or the Government Accountability Office (GAO)  It is not unusual for nominees to meet with committee staff prior to a hearing  High-level nominees may meet privately with Senators  Generally speaking, these meetings, sometimes initiated by the nominee, serve basically to acquaint the nominee with the Members and committee staff, and vice versa  They occasionally address substantive matters as well  A nominee also might meet with the committee's chief counsel to discuss the financial disclosure report and any potential conflict-of-interest issues  Historically, approximately half of all civilian appointees were confirmed without a hearing  All committees that receive nominations do hold hearings on some nominations, and the likelihood of hearings varies with the importance of the position and the workload of the committee  The Committee on the Judiciary, for example, which receives a large number of nominations, does not usually hold hearings for U S  attorneys, U S  marshals, or members of part-time commissions  The Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, on the other hand, typically hold hearings on most nominations that are referred to them  Committees often combine related nominations into a single hearing  The length and nature of hearings varies  One or both home-state Senators will often introduce a nominee at a hearing  The nominee typically testifies at the hearing, and occasionally the committee will invite other witnesses, including Members of the House of Representatives, to testify as well  Some hearings function as routine welcomes, while others are directed at influencing the policy program of an appointee  In addition to policy views, hearings might address the nominee's qualifications and potential conflicts of interest  Senators also might take the opportunity to ask questions of particular concern to them or their constituents  Committees sometimes send questions to nominees in advance of a hearing and ask for written responses  Nominees also might be asked to respond in writing to additional questions after a hearing  Especially for high-level positions, the nomination hearing may be only the first of many times an individual will be asked to testify before a committee  Therefore, the committee often gains a commitment from the nominee to be cooperative with future oversight activities of the committee  Hearings, under Senate Rule XXVI, are open to the public unless closed by majority vote for one of the reasons specified in the rule  Witness testimony is sometimes made available online through the website of the relevant committee and also through several commercial services, including Congressional Quarterly  Most committees print the hearings, although no rule requires it  The number of Senators necessary to constitute a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony varies from committee to committee, but it is usually smaller than a majority of the membership  A committee considering a nomination has four options  It may report the nomination to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, or it may choose to take no action at all  It is more common for a committee to take no action on a nomination than to report unfavorably  Particularly for policymaking positions, committees sometimes report a nomination favorably, subject to the commitment of the nominee to testify before a Senate committee  Sometimes, committees choose to report a nomination without recommendation  Even if a majority of Senators on a committee do not agree that a nomination should be reported favorably, a majority might agree to report a nomination without a recommendation in order to permit a vote by the whole Senate  The timing of a vote to report a nomination varies in accordance with committee rules and practice  Most committees do not vote to report a nomination on the same day that they hold a hearing, but instead wait until the next meeting of the committee  Senate Rule XXVI, clause 7(a)(1) requires that a quorum for making a recommendation on a nomination consist of a majority of the membership of the committee  In most cases, the number of Senators necessary to constitute a quorum for making a recommendation on a nomination to the Senate is the same that the committee requires for reporting a measure  Every committee reports a majority of nominations favorably  Most of the time, committees do not formally present reports on nominations on the floor of the Senate  Instead, committee staff prepare the appropriate paperwork on behalf of the committee chair and file it with the clerk  The executive clerk then arranges for the nomination to be printed in the Congressional Record and placed on the Executive Calendar   If a report were presented on the floor, it would have to be done in executive session  Executive session and the Executive Calendar will be discussed in the next section  According to Senate Rule XXXI, the Senate cannot vote on a nomination the same day it is reported except by unanimous consent  It is fairly common for the Senate to discharge a committee from consideration of an unreported nomination by unanimous consent  This removes the nomination from the committee in order to allow the full Senate to consider it  When the Senate discharges a committee by unanimous consent, it is doing so with the support of the committee for the purposes of simplifying the process  It is unusual for Senators to attempt to discharge a committee by motion or resolution, instead of by unanimous consent, and only a few attempts have ever been successful  Senate Rule XVII does permit any Senator to submit a motion or resolution that a committee be discharged from the consideration of a subject referred to it  The discharge process, however, does not allow a simple majority to quickly initiate consideration of a nomination still in committee  It requires several steps and, most notably, a motion or resolution to discharge is debatable  This means that a cloture process may be necessary to discharge a committee  Cloture on a discharge motion or resolution requires the support of three-fifths of the Senate, usually 60 Senators, and several days  The Senate handles executive business, which includes both nominations and treaties, separately from its legislative business  All nominations reported from committee, regardless of whether they were reported favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, are listed on the Executive Calendar , a separate document from the Calendar of Business , which lists pending bills and resolutions  Usually, the majority leader schedules the consideration of nominations on the Calendar  Nominations are considered in executive session, a parliamentary form of the Senate in session that has its own journal and, to some extent, its own rules of procedure  After a committee reports a nomination or is discharged from considering it, the nomination is assigned a number by the executive clerk and placed on the Executive Calendar   Under a standing order of the Senate, certain nominations might also be placed in this status on the Executive Calendar after certain informational and time requirements are met  The list of nominations in the Executive Calendar includes basic information such as the name and office of the nominee, the name of the previous holder of the office, and whether the committee reported the nomination favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation  Long lists of routine nominations are printed in the Congressional Record and identified only by a short title in the Executive Calendar , such as "Foreign Service nominations (84) beginning John F  Aloia, and ending Paul G  Churchill " In addition to reported nominations and treaties, the Executive Calendar contains the text of any unanimous consent agreements concerning executive business  The Executive Calendar is distributed to Senate personal offices and committee offices when there is business on it  It is also available online by following the link to "Calendars and Schedules" on the Virtual Reference Desk under the Reference tab of the Senate website (www Senate gov)   Business on the Executive Calendar , which consists of nominations and treaties, is considered in executive session  In contrast, all measures and matters associated with lawmaking are considered in legislative session  Until 1929 executive sessions were also closed to the public, but now they are open unless ordered otherwise by the Senate  The Senate usually begins the day in legislative session and enters executive session either by a non-debatable motion or, far more often, by unanimous consent  Only if the Senate adjourned or recessed while in executive session would the next meeting automatically open in executive session  The motion to go into executive session can be offered at any time, is not debatable, and cannot be laid upon the table  All business concerning nominations, including seemingly routine matters such as requests for joint referral or motions to print hearings, must be done in executive session  In practice, Senators often make such motions or unanimous consent requests "as if in executive session " These usually brief proceedings during a legislative session do not constitute an official executive session  In addition, at the start of each Congress, the Senate adopts a standing order, by unanimous consent, that allows the Senate to receive nominations from the President and for them to be referred to committees even on days when the Senate does not meet in executive session  The majority leader, by custom, makes most motions and requests that determine when or whether a nomination will be called up for consideration  For example, the majority leader may move or ask unanimous consent to "immediately proceed to executive session to consider the following nomination on the Executive Calendar     " By precedent, the motion to go into executive session to take up a specified nomination is not debatable  The nomination itself, however, is debatable  It is not in order for a Senator to move to consider a nomination that is not on the Calendar, and, except by unanimous consent, a nomination on the Calendar cannot be taken up until it has been on the Calendar at least one day (Rule XXXI, clause 1)  A day for this purpose is a calendar day  In other words, a nomination reported and placed on the Calendar on a Monday can be considered on Tuesday, even if it is the same legislative day  If the Senate simply resolved into executive session, the business immediately pending would be the first item on the Executive Calendar   A motion to proceed to another matter on the Calendar would be debatable and subject to a filibuster  For this reason, the Senate does not begin consideration of executive business this way  Instead, the motion made to call up a nomination is a motion to proceed to executive session to consider that specific nomination  If the Senate is already in executive session, and the Leader wishes to call up a nomination, the Leader will first move that the Senate enter legislative session and then that the Senate enter executive session to take up the nomination  Both motions (to enter legislative session and to enter executive session) are not subject to debate and are decided by a simple majority  Typically they are approved by voice vote  The question before the Senate when a nomination is taken up is "will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?" The Senate can approve or reject a nomination  A majority of Senators present and voting, a quorum being present, is required to approve a nomination  According to Senate Rule XXXI, any Senator who voted with the majority on the nomination has the option of moving to reconsider a vote on the day of the vote or the next two days the Senate meets in executive session  Only one motion to reconsider is in order on each nomination, and often the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table, by unanimous consent, shortly after the vote on the nomination  This action prevents any subsequent attempt to reconsider  After the Senate acts on a nomination, the Secretary of the Senate attests to a resolution of confirmation or disapproval and transmits it to the White House  Many nominations are brought up by unanimous consent and approved without objection; routine nominations often are grouped by unanimous consent in order to be brought up and approved together, or en bloc   A small proportion of nominations, generally to higher-level positions, may need more consideration  When there is debate on a nomination, the chair of the committee usually makes an opening speech  For positions within a state, Senators from the state may wish to speak on the nominee, particularly if they were involved in the selection process  Under Senate rules, there are no time limits on debate except when conducted under cloture or a unanimous consent agreement  Senate Rule XXII provides a means to bring debate on a nomination to a close, if necessary  Under the terms of Rule XXII, at least 16 Senators sign a cloture motion to end debate on a pending nomination  The motion proposed is "to bring to a close the debate upon [the pending nomination] " A Senator can interrupt a Senator who is speaking to present a cloture motion  Cloture may be moved only on a question that is pending before the Senate; therefore, absent unanimous consent, the Senate must be in executive session and considering the nomination when the motion is filed  After the clerk reads the motion, the Senate returns to the business it was considering before the presentation of the motion  Unless a unanimous consent agreement provides otherwise, the Senate does not vote on the cloture motion until the second day of session after the day it is presented; for example, if the motion was presented on a Monday, the Senate would act on it on Wednesday  One hour after the Senate has convened on the day the motion "ripened," the presiding officer can interrupt the proceedings during an executive session to present a cloture motion for a vote  If the Senate is in legislative session when the time arrives for voting on the cloture motion, it proceeds into executive session prior to taking action on the cloture petition  According to Rule XXII, the presiding officer first directs the clerk to call the roll to ascertain that a quorum is present, although this requirement is often waived by unanimous consent  Senators then vote either yea or nay on the question: "Is it the sense of the Senate that the debate shall be brought to a close?" In April 2017, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII in order to allow cloture to be invoked on all nominations by a majority of Senators voting (a quorum being present), including Supreme Court justice nominations  This expanded the results of similar actions taken by the Senate in November 2013, which changed the cloture vote requirement to a majority for nominations except to the Supreme Court  Once cloture is invoked, for most nominations there can be a maximum of two hours of post-cloture consideration  The two hour maximum includes debate as well as any actions taken while the nomination is formally pending, including quorum calls  If cloture is invoked on nominations to the highest ranking executive branch positions, or on nominations to the Supreme Court or the U S  Circuit Court of Appeals, then the maximum time for consideration after cloture is invoked is 30 hours (see Table 1 )  Under the rule, the 2 or 30 hours is floor time spent considering the nomination in the Senate, not simply the passage of time  Thus, for time to count against the 2 or 30-hour maximum, the Senate must be in session and the question must be pending  Time spent in recess or adjournment does not count, and if the Senate were to take up other business by unanimous consent, the time spent on that other business also would not count against the post-cloture time  A hold is a request by a Senator to his or her party leader to prevent or delay action on a nomination or a bill  Holds are not mentioned in the rules or precedents of the Senate, and they are enforced only through the agenda decisions of party leaders  A standing order of the Senate aims to ensure that any Senator who places a hold on any matter (including a nomination) make public his or her objection to the matter  Senators have placed holds on nominations for a number of reasons  One common purpose is to give a Senator more time to review a nomination or to consult with the nominee  Senators may also place holds because they disagree with the policy positions of the nominee  Senators have also admitted to using holds in order to gain concessions from the executive branch on matters not directly related to the nomination  The Senate precedents reducing the threshold necessary to invoke cloture on nominations, and the recent precedent reducing the time necessary for a cloture process, could affect the practice of holds  In some sense, holds are connected to the Senate traditions of mutual deference, since they may have originated as requests for more time to examine a pending nomination or bill  The effectiveness of a hold, however, ultimately has been grounded in the power of the Senator placing the hold to filibuster the nomination and the difficulty of invoking cloture to overcome a filibuster  Invoking cloture is now easier because the support of fewer Senators is necessary, and in most cases, the floor time required for a cloture process is less  The large number of nominations submitted by the President for Senate consideration, however, might still lead Senators to seek unanimous consent to quickly approve nominations  On April 3, 2019, the Senate reinterpreted Senate Rule XXII to reduce, from 30 hours to 2 hours, the maximum time allowed for consideration of most nominations after cloture is invoked  The Senate took this step by reversing two rulings by the Presiding Officer  The first vote established that "postcloture time under rule XXII for all executive branch nominations other than a position at level 1 of the Executive Schedule under section 5312 of title 5 of the United States Code is 2 hours " On the second vote, the Senate established that "postcloture time under rule XXII for all judicial nominations, other than circuit courts or Supreme Court of the United States, is 2 hours" (see Table 1 )  It is uncommon for the Senate to reverse a decision by the Presiding Officer  Any Senator can attempt to reverse a ruling by making an appeal, and except in specific cases, appeals are decided by majority vote  In most circumstances, however, appeals are debatable, and therefore supermajority support (through a cloture process) is typically necessary to reach a vote to reverse a decision of the Presiding Officer  In the April 3 proceedings, however, the appeal was raised after cloture had been invoked  Senate Rule XXII states that after a successful cloture vote, "appeals from the decision of the Presiding Officer, shall be decided without debate " Therefore, when the Majority Leader appealed the rulings of the Presiding Officer, the questions on whether the ruling should stand as the judgment of the Senate received a vote without an opportunity for extended debate  The Senate voted that the ruling should not stand, and thereby upheld instead the position of the Majority Leader  The future impact of these decisions on the nominations process is difficult to assess  The immediate and obvious expected impact is that the time between a cloture vote and a confirmation vote will decrease  In recent years, a vote to confirm a nominee has typically occurred the day after cloture was invoked (or on the next day of Senate session)  Usually, Senators did not spend all of the time between the votes debating the nomination  Instead, Senators typically debated the nomination for some time post-cloture, but also usually entered into unanimous consent agreements that affected when the vote would occur  For example, it became common in recent Congresses for the Senate to agree, by unanimous consent, to consider the time the Senate spent in adjournment or recesses (e g , overnight) to count as post-cloture time  The cloture rule affected the time of the vote set by unanimous consent: the rule provided for up to 30 hours of consideration of the nomination, and the Senate would agree to vote on the nomination a day later—reflecting the approximate time that the Senate could have debated the nomination under the rule  Assuming the Senate continues to establish times for voting on nominations by unanimous consent, those negotiations will be affected by the reinterpretation of the rule  In the absence of a unanimous consent agreement, most nominations can now receive a vote two hours after a vote to invoke cloture  The two hours is not formally divided between the parties pursuant to the rule (or pursuant to the reinterpretation of the rule), but it might be divided, by unanimous consent, between the Majority and Minority Leader  Even without an explicit unanimous consent agreement, the Majority and Minority Leaders are recognized before any other Senators  In addition, a Senator can speak for a maximum of one hour post-cloture  As a result, the Majority Leader could claim the first hour, and the Minority Leader the second, or vice versa  (Of course, Senators could speak on a nomination at times other than after cloture has been invoked, even when the nomination is not formally pending before the Senate  ) It is also possible that the recent reinterpretation of the rule will affect how often the Senate relies on the cloture process to approve nominations  After the first reinterpretation of the cloture rule in 2013, the number of nominations subjected to cloture motions increased significantly in both of the Congresses when the Senate was controlled by the same party as the President (113 th (2013-2014) and 115 th (2017-2018) Congresses)  Nominations that are not confirmed or rejected are returned to the President at the end of a session or when the Senate adjourns or recesses for more than 30 days (Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6)  If the President still wants a nominee considered, he must submit a new nomination to the Senate  The Senate can, however, waive this rule by unanimous consent, and it often does to allow nominations to remain "in status quo" between the first and second sessions of a Congress or during a long recess  The majority leader or his designee also may exempt specific nominees by name from the unanimous consent agreement, allowing them to be returned during the recess or adjournment  The Constitution, in Article II, Section 2, grants the President the authority to fill temporarily vacancies that "may happen during the Recess of the Senate " These appointments do not require the advice and consent of the Senate; the appointees temporarily fill the vacancies without Senate confirmation  In most cases, recess appointees have also been nominated to the positions to which they were appointed  Furthermore, when a recess appointment is made of an individual previously nominated to the position, the President usually submits a new nomination to the Senate in order to comply with a provision of law affecting the pay of recess appointees (5 U S C  5503(a))  Recess appointments have sometimes been controversial and have occasionally led to inter-branch conflict 


Report 2: T he federal government collects various fees and other charges from businesses and households  Choosing to raise public funds via user fees, as opposed to other means such as taxes, has important administrative and economic consequences  Many fees stem from "business-like activities," in which the government provides a service or benefit in return for payment  For example, many n ational p arks charge entry fees , which then help fund maintenance projects  Some fees are closely tied to regulatory or judicial activities, such as filing or inspection fees, which stem from the federal government's sovereign powers  Other federal fees or charges are intragovernmental transactions that do not involve the public  For example, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) charges other federal agencies fees to cover the cost of background investigations  For many federal agencies, fees or user charges amount to a minimal portion of budgetary resources  Other regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), are wholly or partially funded by user fees and other nontax receipts  User fees from the public accounted for $331 billion in FY2017, about a tenth of total federal receipts ( $3 32 trillion )  Fees and charges generally result from voluntary choices, such as entering a national park  By contrast, the collection of taxes ultimately relies on the government's sovereign power to compel payments  Fees may not be compulsory, but not paying them may make it impossible to carry out many activities legally  For instance, without paying passport application fees and obtaining a passport, people cannot fly to other countries  Nor can businesses issue securities without paying federal filing fees  The statutory basis for each particular fee or user charge varies in specificity and in the degree of discretion granted to the executive branch  For example, authorizing legislation might specify in detail how certain fees are imposed and how proceeds are used  In other cases, federal agencies rely on broader authorities to impose user fees  User fees have several advantages as a means of financing public activities  They are voluntary, they connect the burden of financing activities to those who directly benefit from them, and they can help decentralize decisionmaking by bypassing centralized allocation of resources  At times, proposals to raise fees may encounter less political resistance than proposals to raise an equivalent sum via taxes  On the other hand, the flow of user fees and charges may reflect fluctuations in economic conditions, which may complicate the financing of government operations  Some are also concerned that funding arrangements may bypass regular congressional scrutiny and dilute Congress's power of the purse  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a user fee as a fee assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government  User fees generally apply to federal programs or activities that provide special benefits to identifiable recipients above and beyond what is normally available to the public  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines the term user charge to include transactions not normally considered fees, such as land or asset sales  OMB's budget preparation documents state that user charges include not only proceeds from selling postage stamps, electricity, and Medicare Part B premiums, but also sales of assets and natural resources, among other categories  The federal government, which operates on a modified cash accounting basis, does not recognize in its budgetary accounts the loss of asset values when it sells assets or natural resources, as a private firm would using typical business accounting methods  For instance, if the government were to sell oil at a price of $60 per barrel that it bought at $120 per barrel, only the current revenues would be reflected in budget accounts  A private firm would normally adjust its balance sheet to reflect a loss  OMB designates whether each account receives collections associated with user charges, and that information is contained within OMB's MAX budget data system  OMB has not released data on those designations  The Budget Appendix that OMB issues annually, while not including information on that designation, does present detailed subaccount-level data that often indicate whether a federal program's budgetary resources rely on fee income  The format of the Budget Appendix, however, makes it an impractical source of data for government-wide research  As far as CRS can determine, a comprehensive and authoritative list of federal fees is not publicly available  Budget and financial documents from OMB and the U S  Treasury, however, do provide detailed information on offsetting collections and offsetting receipts—the budget categories that typically contain user fees and other charges—as well as information on budgetary accounts  In some cases, account descriptions clearly indicate an association with one or more fees  In other cases, however, whether or not an account receives fees is unclear  For example, an account might be labeled as miscellaneous receipts, or as fines, fees, and penalties  User fees classified as offsetting collections, which go into expenditure accounts, generally can be used without further congressional action  Offsetting collections, as the term suggests, typically count as offsets to spending when accounts are scored to check compliance with various budgetary controls  Scorekeeping is the process of measuring the budgetary effects of legislation  For example, the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P L  112-25 ) imposed caps on specified categories of discretionary budget authority  When evaluating compliance with those caps, scorekeepers (CBO, OMB, and the b udget c ommittees) subtract offsetting collections from budget authority totals  User fees or charges are collected into the U S  Treasury General Fund or into special fund accounts  Offsetting receipts, which go into receipt accounts, typically require approval through appropriations acts  User fees can be classified as discretionary or mandatory spending, depending on how those fees are authorized  Some payments to the federal government, such as electromagnetic spectrum auction proceeds or offshore continental shelf oil and gas leases that are classified as undistributed offsetting receipts, do not offset spending of any agency, but are recorded as reducing the federal deficit  OMB provides a discussion of budget concepts related to offsetting receipts and offsetting collections, which include the bulk of user fees and charges in terms of dollar amounts, in the President's annual budget submission  More detailed supplementary tables that summarize collections of offsetting receipts and offsetting collections are also provided online  The U S  Treasury's Bureau of the Fiscal Service issues its annual Combined Statement that reports budget data for all federal agencies at an account level as well as detailed summaries of receipts, including user fees  The Monthly Treasury Statement and a quarterly statement of offsetting receipts provide data on an ongoing basis  As the Treasury's role and responsibilities differ from those of OMB, totals from Treasury sources may not coincide with data issued by OMB due to various budgetary reporting adjustments  GAO has analyzed the administration of various user fees and has set out some principles for the design of those fees   User fees, as noted above, can tie benefits enjoyed by households or firms—such as passports, access to national parks, or approvals to raise investment funds from the public—to payments that can help defray public costs of providing them  An economist's rule of thumb known as the benefit principle, which suggests linking the fiscal burden of publicly provided benefits to those who enjoy those benefits, can promote fairness and efficiency  For example, many would contend that those with the opportunity to travel abroad should shoulder more of the costs of reviewing passport applications and issuing documents than those who do not  Moreover, if fees are set at levels that match the incremental cost of providing benefits, then when an agency is called to expand its work—such as an uptick in demand for passports, park visits, or company registrations—then those fees could fund the needed extra resources  Matching fees to incremental costs, however, is difficult where demand is irregular or unpredictable  OMB guidelines on user fees outline aims similar to the benefit principle, mandating that federal agencies ensure that each service, sale, or use of Government goods or resources provided by an agency to specific recipients be self-sustaining; promote efficient allocation of the Nation's resources by establishing charges for special benefits provided to the recipient that are at least as great as costs to the Government of providing the special benefits; and allow the private sector to compete with the Government without disadvantage in supplying comparable services, resources, or goods where appropriate  OMB mandates that agencies review user fees every other year  OMB also encourages agencies seeking new authority to assess fees to "seek to remove restraints on user charges " In some cases, federal agencies and regulated industries negotiate over user fee levels and the improvements in federal regulatory operations supported in large part by those fees  For instance, pharmaceutical companies negotiate with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) over fees charged to review drug applications  Over time, the scope of FDA activities supported in part by fees has expanded  Some contend that the FDA's increasing reliance on user fees has tilted the agency's priorities toward industry interests and away from consumer protection responsibilities  One 2005 analysis of the FDA drug review process found that approval times decreased after legislation expanded the agency's reliance on user fees, while it found no statistically significant evidence of a decrease in one proxy measure of drug safety  Federal agencies such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are largely supported from amounts paid by covered industries  The costs and benefits associated with many goods and services mainly involve buyers and sellers  For example, buying a stamp allows a correspondent to mail a letter, which leads the postal service to incur roughly similar costs  Others—at least to a first approximation—are not affected  For other goods, market or market-like transactions may impose costs or convey benefits on third parties  When prices paid by buyers or received by sellers do not reflect spillover costs or benefits to others, economic theory suggests levels of transactions will be inefficient, in the sense that alternative economic arrangements could make all participants—at least potentially—better off  The benefit principle is in some ways similar to the concept of Pigou taxation—that taxing goods linked to negative spillovers, such as pollution, can enhance economic efficiency by diminishing those spillovers  More generally, spillovers are costs borne or benefits enjoyed by one party due to activities of another party where no voluntary exchange or market transaction occurs  Conversely, subsidizing goods or services that provide beneficial spillovers can also increase economic efficiency  For instance, some justify federal tax subsidies to home ownership on the grounds that homeowners generate positive spillovers in their neighborhoods  Charges aimed at limiting negative spillovers are known as Pigou taxes, after the English economist who first articulated the concept  Pigou taxation provides a more narrowly based efficiency rationale for user fees that would limit negative spillovers  Moreover, administering an excise tax imposed on Pigou tax grounds—which would involve a private vendor collecting and remitting tax revenues—differs from user fees and charges collected directly by a government  Nonetheless, the same logic that raising the end-user price of goods linked to negative spillovers can enhance economic efficiency can be applied to the design of user fees  For instance, federal policymakers might choose to charge pharmaceutical companies application fees lower than the full cost of associated approval processes because introducing new drugs onto the market may have wider positive social benefits  The economic suitability of the benefit principle depends on whether the publicly provided benefit has meaningful spillover effects  For example, benefits generated by governments such as national defense or support for basic research are widely shared and thus, arguably, are appropriately supported by general taxation  By contrast, while the broader economy benefits from the ability of firms to raise capital in transparent and competitive markets, the chief beneficiary of having a security offering approved is the issuing firm  Similarly, a family visiting a federal park presumably benefits more than another family that stayed at home  Financing more of park maintenance through general taxation would thus involve an implicit subsidy from nonusers to users, something that reliance on user fees would mitigate  In other cases, the linkage between fees and benefits is not apparent  For example, a 2009 law ( Travel Promotion Act of 2009 , TPA; P L  111-145 ) imposed a $10 fee on most international air travelers from visa-waiver countries to fund tourism marketing initiatives 

ground_truth: Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President shall appoint officers of the United States "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." This report describes the process by which the Senate provides advice and consent on presidential nominations, including receipt and referral of nominations, committee practices, and floor procedure. Committees play the central role in the process through investigations and hearings. Senate Rule XXXI provides that nominations shall be referred to appropriate committees "unless otherwise ordered." Most nominations are referred, although a Senate standing order provides that some "privileged" nominations to specified positions will not be referred unless requested by a Senator. The Senate rule concerning committee jurisdictions (Rule XXV) broadly defines issue areas for committees, and the same jurisdictional statements generally apply to nominations as well as legislation. A committee often gathers information about a nominee either before or instead of a formal hearing. A committee considering a nomination has four options. It can report the nomination to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, or it can choose to take no action. It is more common for a committee to take no action on a nomination than to reject a nominee outright. The Senate handles executive business, which includes both nominations and treaties, separately from its legislative business. All nominations reported from committee are listed on the Executive Calendar, a separate document from the Calendar of Business, which lists pending bills and resolutions. Generally speaking, the majority leader schedules floor consideration of nominations on the Calendar. Nominations are considered in "executive session," a parliamentary form of the Senate in session that has its own journal and, to some extent, its own rules of procedure. The Senate can call up a nomination expeditiously, because a motion to enter executive session to consider a specific nomination on the Calendar is not debatable. This motion requires a majority of Senators present and voting, a quorum being present, for approval. After a nomination has been called up, the question before the Senate is "will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?" A majority of Senators voting is required to approve a nomination. However, Senate rules place no limit on how long a nomination may be debated, and ending consideration could require invoking cloture. On April 6, 2017, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII in order to allow cloture to be invoked on nominations to the Supreme Court by a majority of Senators voting. This expanded the results of similar actions taken by the Senate in November 2013, which changed the cloture vote requirement to a majority for nominations other than to the Supreme Court. After the 2013 decision, the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process increased. On April 3, 2019, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII again. The Senate reduced, from 30 hours to 2 hours, the maximum time nominations can be considered after cloture has been invoked. This change applied to all executive branch nominations except to high-level positions such as heads of departments, and it applied to all judicial nominations except to the Supreme Court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The full impact of this change is difficult to assess at this time, but it is likely to shorten the time between a cloture vote and a vote on the nomination. If Senators respond as they did to the last reinterpretation of the cloture rule, it might also increase the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process. Nominations that are pending when the Senate adjourns sine die at the end of a session or recesses for more than 30 days are returned to the President unless the Senate, by unanimous consent, waives the rule requiring their return (Senate Rule XXXI, clause 6). If a nomination is returned, and the President still desires Senate consideration, he must submit a new nomination.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  An exact match between the level of user fees and publicly provided benefits may be hard or impossible to determine in many situations  While public corporations operating on a largely commercial basis, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, may set prices and fees much as a private firm would, many of the federal government's activities are within the public sector because past policymakers considered them to be closely associated with inherently governmental functions—such as providing security—or as services that the private sector would have had trouble providing, such as basic research  The U S  Postal Service sets rates to cover nearly all of its costs according to a 2006 statutory framework   Subsidized rates for certain classes of mail users, such as the blind, reflect adaptation of pricing schemes to broader social priorities  The proper boundaries between public, private, and nonprofit sectors, of course, is an ongoing concern of policymakers  In many cases, it is difficult to design fees, charges, or taxes that directly influence activities generating negative spillovers  For instance, cars and trucks generate air pollution as well as wear and tear on roadways  Excise taxes on gasoline and other fuels—if set at levels that approximate the costs of pollution and road wear—can motivate drivers to use roads less often when the total costs of driving, including pollution, road wear, and other costs, exceed the benefits of driving  Thus, excise taxes can be a way of using the price mechanism to induce individuals to make decisions that lead to more economically efficient outcomes  Setting excise taxes at levels that reflect all costs to third parties may involve complex estimates  For instance, while higher fuel usage implies greater use of roads and more production of air pollutants, several other factors complicate that linkage  Heavier vehicles may cause disproportionate damage to roads  Vehicles vary widely in fuel efficiency and in the volume of pollutants generated  In addition, driving also imposes congestion costs on other drivers, and those costs vary by location and time of day  One recent analysis estimated that fuel excise taxes addressed less than a third of the air-pollution-related efficiency losses  While excise taxes are a public finance instrument that is distinct from user fees and charges, similar complications may be encountered  In some cases, adopting new fiscal instruments—such as using road charges or tolls—may prove more effective tools in increasing efficiency  In the case of transportation policy, increased economic efficiency, depending on how consumers and policymakers respond, might manifest itself in some combination of higher after-tax incomes, greater provision of publicly provided goods, cleaner air, and less-congested highways  Changes in the design of some user fees or charges might also yield analogous efficiency improvements  Some observers have raised concerns that federal agencies that rely more heavily on user fees may put greater weight on the interests of those paying fees rather than the broader public interest  For instance, the U S  Patent and Trademark Office charges application and examination fees to those seeking to obtain a patent  Certainly, the applicant would be a central beneficiary of a patent, if granted, although many others—including other inventors, business competitors, and consumers—might also be significantly harmed or benefited  Some contend that the Patent Office's reliance on fees motivates it to approve invalid patents   Tying patent fees narrowly to the benefits obtained by the applicant, while overlooking wider spillover effects, might then result in poor decisions  Of course, nonfinancial policy instruments, such as applicable laws, regulations, or congressional oversight, may affect outcomes more directly  Administrative concerns may also play a role  In some cases, where the costs of collecting fees are high relative to the costs of providing public services, imposing user fees may be a suboptimal choice of funding  For instance, federal courts collect more in PACER fees (which provide access to court documents ) than is needed to maintain the underlying computer system , with excess fees being earmarked for other court improvements  Some argue that funding that system and other court improvements with general revenues would allow broader access to court filings and related public documents, which one proposal ( H R  6714 introduced in the 115 th Congress ) would have implemented  Charging access fees above incremental costs—which for electronic documents may be minimal—can limit access to public information  Eliminating PACER user fees , however, may require Congress to shift that fiscal burden elsewhere  Other policy concerns also may play a role  Ability to pay among households varies widely; a national park entrance fee that one family regarded as trivial might deter another family  Policymakers may also wish to express preferences for identifiable groups, such as the elderly, children, or veterans  The classification of fees, charges, taxes, and even negative loan subsidy amounts hinges on budget concepts outlined above along with scorekeeping rules and precedents  In some cases, the distinctions made to categorize a given receipt might seem arbitrary to some  For example, the Travel Promotion Act fees imposed on most international air travelers convey n o special benefit on them, but are not categorized a s tax es   Refundable biofuel tax credits are counted as negative taxes in budget documents rather than as subsidy outlays  Those distinctions, however, can affect the tax treatment of those receipts  For instance, a firm can generally deduct an excise tax from its gross revenues, but typically cannot deduct a fee  Some governments have instituted user fees to fill shortfalls in tax revenues  The economic burden of higher fees or charges might be less obvious and therefore subject to less resistance than broad-based taxes  For example, policymakers in several states have sought to avoid increases in general taxes by increasing fee revenues  That strategy may have two downsides  First, more narrowly focused fees set at higher levels could cause greater economic distortions than smaller taxes applied to a broader base  Second, more narrowly based fees might be less stable in economic downturns  To the extent that fees diverge from the incremental costs of publicly provided services, sudden fiscal adjustments might be required  If benefits from federal operations are distributed narrowly enough to justify financing them via user fees or charges, one might ask whether those activities should be carried out by the private sector  State and local governments and the federal government have privatized many services previously provided by government  Foreign governments have also privatized provision of goods and services once delivered by the public sector  Some activities, however, may involve inherently governmental responsibilities that would be difficult to devolve to the private sector  A 1997 GAO report noted that rigorous evaluations of cost savings of privatization initiatives at the state and local government level were not common  GAO also noted that privatization increased the need for oversight and evaluation, although some local officials deemed that the "weakest link" in privatization initiatives  Others note that while privatization may yield efficiency gains, it may also lead to policy or operational failure  Conflicts between executive branch agencies, which often have sought greater flexibility to use funds to respond to public priorities as they see them, and Congress, which has sought to defend its fiscal prerogatives and ability to set federal policy priorities, are long-standing  In 1849, Congress sought to bolster its powers of the purse by passing the Miscellaneous Receipts Act , which required all government revenues, aside from postal sales, to be deposited into the U S  Treasury "at as early a day as practicable, without any abatement or deduction on account of salary, fees, costs, charges, expenses, or claim of any description whatever…" Over time, Congress set out exceptions to the modern version of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act that let agencies charge user fees, accept gifts, and collect and retain fines and penalties within specified limits or as detailed in appropriations laws  Some legislative proposals, such as H R  850 (115 th Congress) , would eliminate most exceptions and require most fees and charges to be deposited in the U S  Treasury General Fund  Congress could fund agencies and activities directly through annual appropriations  Funding through lump-sum appropriations, as opposed to via user fees, however, might change incentives facing decisionmakers and could affect federal operations and programmatic outcomes  Congress could constrain agency discretion by requiring more user fee proceeds be either subject to annual appropriations or deposited in the U S  Treasury General Fund, although that may limit agencies' capacity to respond to new public demands and other changing conditions, as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted   Some inspectors general and congressional committees have also called for tighter, more efficient, and more consistent financial management of user fee funds  During the mid-1980s, Congress, with GAO support, conducted a comprehensive review of so-called "backdoor spending"—an informal term for budget authority provided in laws other than appropriations acts—including spending supported by user fees, which was updated in 1996   A narrower follow-up in 2017 covering five agencies concluded that "all entities GAO examined have policies and procedures to manage and report on their permanent funding authorities," but that "some, however, could improve practices to manage funds and report information that facilitates oversight " Sweeping changes to the budgetary treatment of user fees, however, could add new pressures on the congressional appropriations process  Proposals to require that most fees be collected into the Treasury General Fund and that activities previously supported by those fees be funded by annual appropriations could create new demands on appropriations committees  Such proposals could also affect the division of responsibilities among authorizing committees and appropriations committees  Statutory texts governing many fees, including those noted above, have evolved over many years and involve substantive policy decisions, often related to industry or programmatic concerns  Congress may also enhance its oversight of agencies reliant on user fees by requiring more timely and detailed financial reports as well as more precise and systematic explanations of linkages between those fees and associated programs  OMB and Treasury issue extensive information on user fees and charges  Nonetheless, the format and level of detail of published data make it difficult to address some government-wide policy questions regarding user fees and charges  Congress could modify laws governing the President's budget submission (31 U S C  1105) to require OMB to release data that it collects on which budget accounts receive material amounts of user fee and user charge revenues  That could allow Congress to track and analyze user fees and charges more easily  In particular, it would also provide a means to distinguish discretionary and mandatory fees and charges, which could be useful in understanding the effects or constraints imposed by budget enforcement measures  That might provide Congress with a clearer view of its fiscal options when considering budgetary measures  Mandating that OMB or other agencies provide more data would probably require additional budgetary resources to cover costs of new personnel and capabilities  Congress can promote economic efficiency and an equitable sharing of public burdens by choosing appropriate means of financing federal operations  User fees and charges, as noted above, can help tie the costs of supporting specific federal operations with those who benefit from them  Even if closely regulated industries may find federal requirements, inspections, or approval processes burdensome, they also presumably benefit from the increased demand for their products that carry the imprimatur of explicit or implicit federal approval  Federal regulation and inspection operations, however, also serve broader interests of consumers, taxpayers, and related industries  To the extent that inherently governmental responsibilities motivate federal operations, the argument for using general revenues may be stronger  If benefits of federal actions are more narrowly distributed, the case for financing operations with user fees or charges may become stronger  Of course, the structure and administration of federal inspection and regulation plays a central role in enhancing efficiency and minimizing burdens borne relative to benefits enjoyed 
Report 2:  We found the COBRA model to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and savings among alternatives  (See fig  3 ) As with any model, the quality of the output from COBRA was a direct function of the data DOD included in the model  Also, DOD’s COBRA model relied to a large extent on standard factors and averages and did not represent budget quality estimates that were developed once BRAC decisions were made and detailed implementation plans were developed  Nonetheless, the financial information provided important input into the selection process as decision makers weighed the financial implications—along with military value criteria and other considerations—in arriving at final decisions about the suitability of various closure and realignment options  Establish an organizational structure  The Office of the Secretary of Defense emphasized the need for joint cross-service groups to analyze common business-oriented functions  For the 2005 BRAC round, as for the 1993 and 1995 rounds, these joint cross-service groups performed analyses and developed closure and realignment options in addition to those developed by the military departments  Our evaluation of DOD’s 1995 BRAC round found that few cross- service recommendations were made, in part because of the lack of high-level leadership to encourage consolidations across the departments’ functions  In the 1995 BRAC round, the joint cross- service groups submitted options through the military services for approval, but few were approved  The number of approved recommendations that the joint cross-service groups developed significantly increased in the 2005 BRAC round  This increase was, in part, because high-level leadership ensured that the options were approved not by the military departments but rather by a DOD senior- level group, known as the Infrastructure Steering Group  As shown in figure 4, the Infrastructure Steering Group was placed organizationally on par with the military departments  Establish a common analytical framework  To ensure that the selection criteria were consistently applied, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, and the seven joint cross- service groups first performed a capacity analysis of facilities and functions  Before developing the candidate recommendations, DOD’s capacity analysis relied on data calls to hundreds of locations to obtain certified data to assess such factors as maximum potential capacity, current capacity, current usage, and excess capacity  Then, the military departments and joint cross-service groups performed a military value analysis for the facilities and functions based on primary military value criteria, which included a facility’s or function’s current and future mission capabilities, physical condition, ability to accommodate future needs, and cost of operations  Develop BRAC oversight mechanisms to improve accountability for implementation  In the 2005 BRAC round, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the first time required the military departments to develop business plans to better inform the Office of the Secretary of Defense of the status of implementation and financial details for each of the BRAC 2005 recommendations  These business plans included: (1) information such as a listing of all actions needed to implement each recommendation; (2) schedules for personnel relocations between installations; and (3) updated cost and savings estimates by DOD based on current information  This approach permitted senior-level intervention if warranted to ensure completion of the BRAC recommendations by the statutory completion date  Involve the audit community to better ensure data accuracy  The DOD Inspector General and military department audit agencies played key roles in identifying data limitations, pointing out needed corrections, and improving the accuracy of the data used in the process  In their oversight roles, the audit organizations, which had access to relevant information and officials as the process evolved, helped to improve the accuracy of the data used in the BRAC process and thus strengthened the quality and integrity of the data used to develop closure and realignment recommendations  For example, the auditors worked to ensure certified information was used for BRAC analysis and reviewed other facets of the process, including the various internal control plans, the COBRA model, and other modeling and analytical tools that were used in the development of recommendations  We identified two key challenges that affected DOD’s implementation of BRAC 2005 and would need to be addressed for VA to adopt a BRAC- like process for its asset and infrastructure review  Some transformational-type BRAC recommendations required sustained senior leadership attention and a high level of coordination among many stakeholders to complete by the required date  Implementation of some transformational BRAC recommendations—especially those where a multitude of organizations had roles to play to ensure the achievement of the goals of the recommendation—illustrated the need to involve key stakeholders and effective planning  For example, the Defense Logistics Agency committed sustained high-level leadership and included relevant stakeholders to address implementation challenges faced with the potential for disruptions to depot operations during implementation of the BRAC consolidation recommendation  To implement the BRAC recommendations, the agency had to develop strategic agreements with the services that ensured that all stakeholders agreed on its plans for implementation, and had to address certain human capital and information technology challenges  Large number of actions and interdependent recommendations complicated the implementation process  The large number and variety of BRAC actions presented challenges during implementation  The BRAC 2005 round had more individual actions (813) than the four prior rounds combined (387)  The executive staff of the Commission told us that it was more difficult to assess the costs and the amount of time for the savings to offset the implementation costs since many of the recommendations contained multiple interdependent actions, all of which needed to be reviewed  Specifically, many of the BRAC 2005 recommendations were interdependent and had to be completed in a sequential fashion within the statutory implementation period  In cases where interdependent recommendations required multiple relocations of large numbers of personnel, delays in completing one BRAC recommendation had a cascading effect on the implementation of other recommendations  Specifically, DOD had to synchronize the relocations of over 123,000 people with about $24 7 billion in new construction or renovation  Commission officials told us that in prior BRAC rounds each base was handled by a single integrated recommendation  However, in BRAC 2005, many installations were simultaneously affected by multiple interconnected BRAC recommendations  Given the complexity of interdependent recommendations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense required the military departments and defense agencies to provide periodic updates on implementation challenges and progress  Chairman Roe, Ranking Member Walz, and Members of the Committee, this concludes our prepared statement  We are happy to answer any questions related to our work on VA’s efforts to align its medical facilities and services or on DOD’s BRAC process  If you or your staff members have any questions concerning this testimony, please contact David Wise at (202) 512-2834 or wised@gao gov regarding federal real property, or Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao gov regarding the BRAC process  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Other individuals who made key contributions to this testimony include Keith Cunningham, Assistant Director; Gina Hoffman, Assistant Director; Tracy Barnes; Jeff Mayhew; Kevin Newak; Richard Powelson; Malika Rice; Jodie Sandel; Eric Schwab; Amelia M  Weathers; and Crystal Wesco  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 

ground_truth: The federal government collects various fees from businesses and households. Choosing to raise public funds via user fees, as opposed to other means such as taxes, has important administrative and economic consequences. Many fees stem from "business-like activities," in which the government provides a service or benefit in return for payment. For example, many national parks charge entry fees, which then help fund maintenance projects. Such fees and charges that result from voluntary choices, such as entering a national park, are distinguished from taxes—which stem from the government's sovereign power to compel payments. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a user fee as a "fee assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government. User fees generally apply to federal programs or activities that provide special benefits to identifiable recipients above and beyond what is normally available to the public." User fees and charges have several advantages as a means of financing public activities. They are voluntary, they connect the burden of financing activities to those who directly benefit from them, and can help decentralize decisionmaking by bypassing centralized allocation of resources. Some have expressed concerns that user fee arrangements may bypass regular congressional scrutiny and dilute Congress's power of the purse. Collections of fees and charges may also be more sensitive to economic fluctuations, which could complicate financing of programs dependent on those revenue streams. Many user fees or charges are classified as offsetting collections, which are deposited into expenditure accounts. Offsetting collections can be used to offset agency spending and typically require no further congressional approval to use. Other fees and charges are classified as offsetting receipts, which are collected into revenue accounts and typically require congressional authorization to be spent. User fees and charges can be classified as discretionary or mandatory spending, depending on how they are legally authorized. The levels and administration of some fees are specified in detailed statutory text, while other fees are created under broader agency authorities. Certain agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have increased their reliance on user fees in past decades. Some critics have raised concerns that increased reliance on user fees could shift incentives facing those agencies. Some legislative proposals, such as H.R. 850 introduced in the 115th Congress, would limit or eliminate most exceptions and require most fees and charges to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund. Congress could fund agencies and activities now funded in whole or in part via user fees directly through the annual appropriations process. Such proposals would mark a departure from past practice. Statutory text governing many fees has evolved over many years and involves substantive policy decisions, often related to the industry or programmatic concerns. A general change in funding from user fees and charges to annual appropriations would likely shift the division of responsibilities between authorizing committees and appropriations committees. Congress may also enhance its oversight of agencies reliant on user fees by requiring more timely and detailed financial reports as well as more precise and systematic explanations of linkages between those fees and associated programs. Congress could also ask for greater transparency in fiscal data. While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Treasury Bureau of the Fiscal Service provide extensive data on user fees and charges, it is difficult to conduct governmentwide analyses using publicly available sources. Congress could mandate more detailed and more easily accessed data on user fees and charges. Additional funding may be needed to develop the capacity to issue those data.