prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: We found that from October 2013 through March 2017, the five selected VA medical centers required reviews of a total of 148 providers’ clinical care after concerns were raised about their care, but officials at these medical centers could not provide documentation to show that almost half of these reviews were conducted  We found that all five VA medical centers lacked at least some documentation of the reviews they told us they conducted, and in some cases, we found that the required reviews were not conducted at all  Specifically, across the five VA medical centers, we found the following: The medical centers lacked documentation showing that one type of review—focused professional practice evaluations (FPPE) for cause—had been conducted for 26 providers after concerns had been raised about their care  FPPEs for cause are reviews of providers’ care over a specified period of time, during which the provider continues to see patients and has the opportunity to demonstrate improvement  Documentation of these reviews is explicitly required under VHA policy  Additionally, VA medical center officials confirmed that FPPEs for cause that were required for another 21 providers were never conducted  The medical centers lacked documentation showing that retrospective reviews—which assess the care previously delivered by a provider during a specific period of time— had been conducted for 8 providers after concerns had been raised about their clinical care  One medical center lacked documentation showing that reviews had been conducted for another 12 providers after concerns had been raised about their care  In the absence of any documentation, we were unable to identify the types of reviews, if any, that were conducted for these 12 providers  We also found that the five selected VA medical centers did not always conduct reviews of providers’ clinical care in a timely manner  Specifically, of the 148 providers, the VA medical centers did not initiate reviews of 16 providers for 3 months, and in some cases, for multiple years, after concerns had been raised about the providers’ care  In a few of these cases, additional concerns about the providers’ clinical care were raised before the reviews began  We found that two factors were largely responsible for the inadequate documentation and untimely reviews of providers’ clinical care we identified at the selected VA medical centers  First, VHA policy does not require VA medical centers to document all types of reviews of providers’ clinical care, including retrospective reviews, and VHA has not established a timeliness requirement for initiating reviews of providers’ clinical care  Second, VHA’s oversight of the reviews of providers’ clinical care is inadequate  Under VHA policy, networks are responsible for overseeing the credentialing and privileging processes at their respective VA medical centers  While reviews of providers’ clinical care after concerns are raised are a component of credentialing and privileging, we found that none of the network officials we spoke with described any routine oversight of such reviews  This may be in part because the standardized tool that VHA requires the networks to use during their routine audits does not direct network officials to ensure that all reviews of providers’ clinical care have been conducted and documented  Further, some of the VISN officials we interviewed told us they were not using the standardized audit tool as required  Without adequate documentation and timely completion of reviews of providers’ clinical care, VA medical center officials lack the information they need to make decisions about providers’ privileges, including whether or not to take adverse privileging actions against providers  Furthermore, because of its inadequate oversight, VHA lacks reasonable assurance that VA medical center officials are reviewing all providers about whom clinical care concerns have been raised and are taking adverse privileging actions against the providers when appropriate  To address these shortcomings, we recommended that VHA 1) require documentation of all reviews of providers’ clinical care after concerns have been raised, 2) establish a timeliness requirement for initiating such reviews, and 3) strengthen its oversight by requiring networks to oversee VA medical centers to ensure that such reviews are documented and initiated in a timely manner  VA concurred with these recommendations and described plans for VHA to revise existing policy and update the standardized audit tool used by the networks to include more comprehensive oversight of VA medical centers’ reviews of providers’ clinical care after concerns have been raised  We found that from October 2013 through March 2017, the five VA medical centers we reviewed had only reported one of nine providers required to be reported to the NPDB under VHA policy  These nine providers either had adverse privileging actions taken against them or resigned or retired while under investigation before an adverse privileging action could be taken  None of these nine providers were reported to state licensing boards as required by VHA policy  The VA medical centers documented that these nine providers had significant clinical deficiencies that sometimes resulted in adverse outcomes for veterans  For example, the documentation shows that one provider’s surgical incompetence resulted in numerous repeat surgeries for veterans  Another provider’s opportunity to improve through an FPPE for cause had to be halted and the provider was removed from providing care after only a week due to concerns that continuing the review would potentially harm patients  In addition to these nine providers, one VA medical center terminated the services of four contract providers based on deficiencies in the providers’ clinical performance, but the facility did not follow any of the required steps for reporting providers to the NPDB or relevant state licensing boards  This is concerning, given that the VA medical center documented that one of these providers was terminated for cause related to patient abuse after only 2 weeks of work at the facility  Two of the five VA medical centers we reviewed each reported one provider to the state licensing boards for failing to meet generally accepted standards of clinical practice to the point that it raised concerns for the safety of veterans  However, we found that the medical centers’ reporting to the state licensing board took over 500 days to complete in both cases, which was significantly longer than the 100 days suggested in VHA policy
Report 2:  As part of this exercise, the Secret Service also compared its employee work-life offerings (e g , on-site childcare and telework program) to those available at other agencies  In addition, the Secret Service developed and implemented action plans for improving employee morale  Among these action plans, for example, the component implemented a student loan repayment program and expanded its tuition assistance program’s eligibility requirements  Establish and track metrics of success for improving employee morale, and report to agency leadership on progress improving morale—fully implemented  The Secret Service tracked metrics for improving employee morale and reported the results to leadership  For example, the component tracked metrics on the percentage of the workforce, including IT staff, that participated in the student loan repayment and tuition assistance programs  In addition, the Chief Strategy Officer reported to the Chief Operating Officer the results related to meeting those metrics  Maintain leadership support and commitment to ensure continued progress in improving employee morale, and demonstrate sustained improvement in morale—partly implemented  Secret Service leadership developed and implemented initiatives that demonstrated their commitment to improving the morale of the Secret Service’s workforce  For example, since 2014, the Secret Service had worked with a contractor to identify ways to improve the morale of its entire workforce, including IT staff  However, as of June 2018, the Secret Service was unable to demonstrate that it had sustained improvement in the morale of the component’s IT staff  In particular, the component was only able to provide IT workforce-specific results from one employee morale assessment that was conducted subsequent to the consolidation of this workforce into OCIO in March 2017  These results were from an assessment conducted by the component’s Inspection Division in December 2017 (the assessment found that the majority of the Secret Service’s IT employees rated their morale as “very good” or “excellent ”) While the component also provided certain employee morale results from the Office of Personnel Management’s Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey in 2017, these results were not specific to the IT workforce  Instead, this workforce’s results were combined with those from staff in another Secret Service division  According to OCIO officials, the results were combined because, at the time of the survey, the IT workforce was administratively identified as being part of that other division  OCIO officials stated that, going forward, they plan to continue to assess the morale of the IT workforce on an annual basis as part of the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey  In addition, the officials stated that OCIO-specific results may be available as part of the 2018 survey results, which the officials expect to receive by September 2018  By measuring employee satisfaction on an annual basis, the Secret Service should have increased knowledge of whether its initiatives that are aimed at improving employee morale are in fact increasing employee satisfaction  Agencies can use performance management systems as a tool to foster a results-oriented organizational culture that links individual performance to organizational goals  We have previously identified numerous leading practices related to performance management that are intended to enhance performance and ensure individual accountability  Among the performance management practices, agencies should (1) establish a performance management system that differentiates levels of staff performance and defines competencies in order to provide a fuller assessment of performance, (2) explicitly align individual performance expectations with organizational goals to help individuals see the connection between their daily activities and organizational goals, and (3) periodically provide individuals with regular performance feedback  The Secret Service substantially implemented the selected three leading practices associated with the performance management workforce area  Specifically, the component fully implemented one of the three practices and partly implemented the other two practices  Table 12 lists these selected leading practices and provides our assessment of the Secret Service’s implementation of the practices  Establish a performance management system that differentiates levels of staff performance and defines competencies in order to provide a fuller assessment of performance—partly implemented  The Secret Service’s performance management process requires leadership to make meaningful distinctions between levels of staff performance  In particular, the component’s performance plans for IT staff, which are developed by the Office of Human Resources and tailored by OCIO, as necessary, specify the criteria that leadership use to determine if an individual has met or exceeded the expectations associated with each competency identified in their respective performance plan  The performance plans include pre-established, department-wide competencies that are set by DHS, as well as occupational series-specific goals that may be updated by the Secret Service  However, because OCIO did not fully define and document all of its technical competency needs for the IT workforce, as discussed earlier, the Secret Service’s performance plans for IT staff did not include performance expectations related to the full set of technical competencies required for their respective positions  In addition, because OCIO officials were unable to specify a time frame for when they will identify all of the technical competency needs for the IT workforce (as previously discussed), the officials were also unable to specify a time frame for when they would update the IT workforce’s performance plans to include those relevant technical competencies  Until OCIO updates the performance plans for each occupational series within the IT workforce to include the relevant technical competencies, once identified, against which IT staff performance should be assessed, the office will be limited in its ability to provide IT staff with a complete assessment of their performance  In addition, Secret Service management will have limited knowledge of the extent to which IT staff are meeting all relevant technical competencies  Explicitly align individual performance expectations with organizational goals to help individuals see the connection between their daily activities and organizational goals—partly implemented  The Secret Service’s performance plans for IT staff identified certain goals that appeared to be related to organizational goals and objectives  For example, the performance plan for the Telecommunications Specialist occupational series (which is one of the series included in OCIO’s IT workforce) identified a goal for staff to support the voice, wireless, radio, satellite, and video systems serving the Secret Service’s protective and investigative mission  This performance plan goal appeared to be related to the component’s strategic goal on Advanced Technology, which included an objective to create the infrastructure needed to fulfill mission responsibilities  However, the Secret Service was unable to provide documentation that explicitly showed how individual employee performance links to organizational goals, such as a mapping of the goals identified in employee performance plans to organizational goals  Specifically, while Office of Human Resources officials stated that each Secret Service directorate is responsible for ensuring that employee goals map to high-level organizational goals, OCIO officials stated that they did not complete this mapping  The officials were unable to explain why they did not align the goals in their employees’ performance plans to the component’s high-level goals  According to the officials, the Secret Service is in the process of implementing a new automated tool that will require each office to explicitly align individual performance expectations to organizational goals  The officials stated that OCIO plans to use this tool to create employees’ fiscal year 2019 performance plans  By explicitly demonstrating how individual performance expectations align with organizational goals, the Secret Service’s IT staff should have a better understanding of how their daily activities contribute towards achieving the Secret Service’s goals  Periodically provide individuals with regular performance feedback—fully implemented  Secret Service leadership periodically provided their IT staff with performance feedback  Specifically, on an annual basis, OCIO staff received feedback during a mid-year and end-of-year performance feedback assessment  In our prior work, we have stressed that candid and constructive feedback can help individuals maximize their contribution and potential for understanding and realizing the goals and objectives of an organization  Further, this feedback is one of the strongest drivers of employee engagement  According to leading practices of the Software Engineering Institute, effective program oversight includes monitoring program performance and conducting reviews at predetermined checkpoints or milestones  This is done by, among other things, comparing actual cost, schedule, and performance data with estimates in the program plan and identifying significant deviations from established targets or thresholds for acceptable performance levels  In addition, the Software Engineering Institute previously identified leading practices for effectively monitoring the performance of agile projects  According to the Institute, agile development methods focus on delivering usable, working software frequently; as such, it is important to measure the value delivered during each iteration of these projects  To that end, the Institute reported that agile projects should be measured on velocity (i e , number of story points completed per sprint or release), development progression (e g , the number of user stories planned and accepted), product quality (e g , number of defects), and post-deployment user satisfaction  DHS and the Secret Service had fully implemented the selected leading practice for monitoring the performance of one program and three projects within the IITT investment, and conducting reviews of this program and these projects at predetermined checkpoints  In addition, with regard to the selected leading practice for monitoring agile projects, the Secret Service had fully implemented this practice for one of its two projects being implemented using agile and had partially implemented this practice for the other project  Table 13 provides a summary of DHS’s and the Secret Service’s implementation of these leading practices, as relevant for one program and three projects within IITT  Monitor program performance and conduct reviews at predetermined checkpoints or milestones  Consistent with leading practices, DHS and the Secret Service monitored the performance of IITT’s program and projects by comparing actual cost, schedule, and performance information against planned targets and conducting reviews at predetermined checkpoints  For example, within the Secret Service: The Enabling Capabilities program and Multi-Level Security project monitored their contractors’ costs spent to-date on a monthly basis and compared them to the total contract amounts  OCIO used integrated master schedules to monitor the schedule performance of the Enabling Capabilities program and Multi-Level Security project  OCIO also monitored the cost, schedule, and performance of the Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management projects during monthly status reviews  In addition, DHS and the Secret Service conducted acquisition decision event reviews and systems engineering life cycle technical reviews of IITT’s program and projects at predetermined checkpoints and, when applicable, identified deviations from established cost, schedule, and performance targets  For example: Secret Service OCIO met with DHS’s Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management in February 2017, and with DHS’s Acting Under Secretary for Management in June 2017, to discuss a schedule breach for the Enabling Capabilities program  In particular, the Enabling Capabilities program informed DHS that the program needed to change the planned date for acquisition decision event 3 (the point at which a decision is made to fully deploy the system) in order to conduct tests in an operational environment prior to that decision event  This delay was due to the Secret Service misunderstanding the tests that it was required to conduct prior to that decision event  Specifically, the Enabling Capabilities program had conducted tests on “production representative” systems, but these tests were not sufficient to meet the requirements for acquisition decision event 3  The project team for Multi-Level Security identified that certain technical issues they had experienced would delay system deployment and full operational capability (the point at which an investment becomes fully operational)  As such, in October 2017, the project notified the Secret Service Component Acquisition Executive of these expected delays  In particular, the web browser that was intended to provide users on “Sensitive But Unclassified” workstations the ability to view information from different security levels, experienced technical delays in meeting personal identity verification requirements  The project team also described for the executive how the schedule delay would affect the project’s performance metrics and funding, and subsequently updated the project plan accordingly  Measure and monitor agile projects on, among other things, velocity (i e , number of story points completed per sprint or release), development progression (e g , the number of features and user stories planned and accepted), product quality (e g , number of defects), and post-deployment user satisfaction  Secret Service OCIO measured its two agile projects—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management— using certain agile metrics  In particular, OCIO officials measured the Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management projects using key metrics related to velocity and development progression  For example, the officials measured development progression for both projects on a daily basis  In addition, OCIO officials monitored each project’s progress against these metrics during bi-weekly reviews that they conducted with each project team  The OCIO officials also tracked product quality metrics for the Uniformed Division Resource Management System  For example, on a monthly basis, the officials tracked the number of helpdesk tickets that had been resolved related to the system  In addition, on a quarterly basis, they tracked the number of Uniformed Division Resource Management System defects that (1) had been fixed and (2) were in the backlog  However, while OCIO officials received certain post-deployment user satisfaction information from end-users of the Uniformed Division Resource Management System by, among other things, tracking the number of helpdesk tickets related to the system and via daily verbal, undocumented feedback from certain Uniformed Division officers, OCIO officials had not fully measured and documented post- deployment user satisfaction with the system, such as via a survey of employees who use the system  The officials stated that they had not conducted and documented a survey because they were focused on (1) addressing software performance issues that occurred after they deployed the system to a limited number of users, and (2) continuing system deployment to the remaining users after they addressed the performance issues  OCIO officials stated that they plan to conduct such a documented survey by the end of September 2018  The results of the user satisfaction survey should provide OCIO with important information on whether the Uniformed Division Resource Management System is meeting users’ needs  The Secret Service’s full implementation of 11 of 14 component-level CIO responsibilities constitutes a significant effort to establish CIO oversight for the component’s IT portfolio  Additional efforts to fully implement the remaining 3 responsibilities, including ensuring that all IT contracts are reviewed, as appropriate; ensuring that the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy appropriately specifies the CIO’s role in developing and reviewing the component’s IT budget formulation and execution; and ensuring agile projects measure product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction, will further position the CIO to effectively manage the Secret Service’s IT portfolio  When effectively implemented, IT workforce planning and management activities can facilitate the successful accomplishment of an agency’s mission  However, the Secret Service had not fully implemented all of the 15 selected practices for its IT workforce for any of the five areas— strategic planning, recruitment and hiring, training and development, employee morale, and performance management  The Secret Service’s lack of (1) a strategic workforce planning process, including the identification of all required knowledge and skills, assessment of competency gaps, and targeted strategies to address specific gaps in competencies and staffing; (2) targeted recruiting activities, including metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the recruitment program and adjustment of the recruitment program and hiring efforts based on metrics; (3) a training program, including the identification of required training for IT staff, ensuring that staff take required training, and assessment of performance data regarding the training program; and (4) a performance management system that includes all relevant technical competencies, greatly limits its ability to ensure the timely and effective acquisition and maintenance of the Secret Service’s IT infrastructure and services  On the other hand, by monitoring program performance and conducting reviews at predetermined checkpoints for one program and three projects associated with the IITT investment, in accordance with leading practices, the Secret Service and DHS provided important oversight needed to guide that program and those projects  Measuring projects on leading agile metrics also provided the Secret Service CIO with important information on project performance  We are making the following 13 recommendations to the Director of the Secret Service: The Director should ensure that the CIO establishes and documents an IT acquisition review process that ensures the CIO or the CIO’s delegate reviews all contracts containing IT, as appropriate  (Recommendation 1) The Director should update the enterprise governance policy to specify (1) the CIO’s current role and responsibilities on the Executive Resources Board, to include developing and reviewing the IT budget formulation and execution; and (2) the Deputy CIO’s role and responsibilities on the Enterprise Governance Council  (Recommendation 2) The Director should ensure that the Secret Service develops a charter for its Executive Resources Board that specifies the roles and responsibilities of all board members, including the CIO  (Recommendation 3) The Director should ensure that the CIO includes product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction metrics in the modular outcomes and target measures that the CIO sets for monitoring agile projects  (Recommendation 4) The Director should ensure that the CIO identifies all of the required knowledge and skills for the IT workforce  (Recommendation 5) The Director should ensure that the CIO regularly analyzes the IT workforce to identify its competency needs and any gaps it may have  (Recommendation 6) The Director should ensure that, after OCIO completes an analysis of the IT workforce to identify any competency and staffing gaps it may have, the Secret Service updates its recruiting and hiring strategies and plans to address those gaps, as necessary  (Recommendation 7) The Director should ensure that the Office of Human Resources (1) develops and tracks metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the Secret Service’s recruitment activities for the IT workforce, including their effectiveness at addressing skill and staffing gaps; and (2) reports to component leadership on those metrics  (Recommendation 8) The Director should ensure that the Office of Human Resources and OCIO adjust their recruitment and hiring plans and activities, as necessary, after establishing and tracking metrics for assessing the effectiveness of these activities for the IT workforce  (Recommendation 9) The Director should ensure that the CIO (1) defines the required training for each IT workforce group, (2) determines the activities that OCIO will include in its IT workforce training and development program based on its available training budget, and (3) implements those activities  (Recommendation 10) The Director should ensure that the CIO ensures that the IT workforce completes training specific to their positions (after defining the training required for each workforce group)  (Recommendation 11) The Director should ensure that the CIO collects and assesses performance data (including qualitative or quantitative measures, as appropriate) to determine how the IT training program contributes to improved performance and results (once the training program is implemented)  (Recommendation 12) The Director should ensure that the CIO updates the performance plans for each occupational series within the IT workforce to include the relevant technical competencies, once identified, against which IT staff performance should be assessed  (Recommendation 13) DHS provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendix III  In its comments, the department concurred with all 13 of our recommendations and provided estimated completion dates for implementing each of them  For example, with regard to recommendation 2, the department stated that the Secret Service would update its enterprise governance policy and related policies to outline the roles and responsibilities of the CIO and Deputy CIO, among others, by March 31, 2019  In addition, for recommendation 13, the department stated that the Secret Service OCIO will include relevant technical competencies in performance plans, as appropriate, in the next performance cycle that starts in July 2019  If implemented effectively, these actions should address the weaknesses we identified  The department also identified a number of other actions that it said had been taken to address our recommendations  For example, in response to recommendation 8, which calls for the Office of Human Resources to (1) develop and track metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the Secret Service’s recruitment activities for the IT workforce and (2) report to component leadership on those metrics, DHS stated that the Secret Service’s Office of Human Resources’ Outreach Branch provides to the department metrics on recruitment efforts toward designated priority mission-critical occupations  However, for fiscal year 2017, only 1 of the 12 occupational series associated with the Secret Service’s IT workforce was designated as a mission-critical occupation for the component (i e , the 2210 IT Specialist series)  The 11 other occupational series were not designated as mission- critical occupations  In addition, for fiscal year 2018, none of these 12 occupational series were designated as mission-critical occupations  As such, metrics on recruiting for these IT series may not have been reported to DHS leadership  Moreover, while we requested documentation of the recruiting metrics for the Secret Service’s IT workforce and, during the course of our review, had multiple subsequent discussions with the Secret Service regarding such metrics, the component did not provide documentation that demonstrated it had established recruiting metrics for its IT workforce  Tracking such metrics and reporting the results to Secret Service leadership, as we recommended, would provide management with important information necessary to make effective recruitment decisions  Further, in response to recommendation 10, which among other things, calls for the CIO to define the required training for each IT workforce group, the department stated that the Secret Service OCIO recently developed training requirements for each workforce group, which were issued during our audit  However, while during our audit OCIO provided a list of recommended training courses, the office did not identify them as being required courses  Defining training that is required for each IT workforce group, as we recommended, would inform OCIO of the necessary training for each position and enable the office to prioritize this training, to ensure that its staff have the needed knowledge and skills  In addition to the aforementioned comments, we received technical comments from DHS and Secret Service officials, which we incorporated, as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Secret Service, and other interested parties  In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  Should you or your staffs have any questions on information discussed in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4456 or HarrisCC@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  Our objectives were to evaluate the extent to which: (1) the U S  Secret Service (Secret Service) Chief Information Officer (CIO) has implemented selected information technology (IT) oversight responsibilities, (2) the Secret Service has implemented leading workforce planning and management practices for its IT workforce, and (3) the Secret Service and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have implemented selected performance and progress monitoring practices for the Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment  To address the first objective, we analyzed DHS’s policies and guidance on IT management to identify the responsibilities that were to be implemented by the component-level CIO related to overseeing the Secret Service’s IT portfolio, including existing systems, acquisitions, and investments  From the list of 33 responsibilities that we identified, we then excluded the responsibility that was associated with information security, which is expected to be addressed as part of a separate, subsequent GAO review  We also excluded those responsibilities that were significantly large in scope (e g , implement an enterprise architecture) or that, in our professional judgment, lacked specificity (e g , provide timely delivery of mission IT services)  As a result, we excluded from consideration for this review a total of 10 CIO responsibilities  For the 23 that remained, we then combined certain responsibilities that overlapped with other related responsibilities  For example, we combined related responsibilities on the component CIO’s review of IT contracts  As a result, we identified 14 responsibilities for review  We validated with the acting DHS CIO that these responsibilities were key responsibilities for the department’s component-level CIOs  We then included all 14 of the responsibilities in our review  The 14 selected component-level CIO responsibilities were: 1  Develop and review the component IT budget formulation and execution  2  Manage the component IT investment portfolio, including establishing an IT acquisition review process that enables component and DHS review of component acquisitions (i e , contracts) that contain IT  3  Develop, implement, and maintain a detailed IT strategic plan  4  Ensure all component IT policies are in compliance and alignment with DHS IT directives and instructions  5  Concur with each program’s and/or project’s systems engineering life cycle tailoring plan  6  Support the Component Acquisition Executive to ensure processes are established that enable systems engineering life cycle technical reviews and that they are adhered to by programs and/or projects  7  Ensure that all systems engineering life cycle technical review exit criteria are satisfied for each of the component’s IT programs and/or projects  8  Ensure the necessary systems engineering life cycle activities have been satisfactorily completed as planned for each of the component’s IT programs and/or projects  9  Concur with the systems engineering life cycle technical review completion letter for each of the component’s IT programs and/or projects  10  Maintain oversight of their component’s agile development approach for IT by appointing the responsible personnel, identifying investments for adoption, and reviewing artifacts  11  With Component Acquisition Executives, evaluate and approve the application of agile development for IT programs consistent with the component’s agile development approach  12  Set modular outcomes and target measures to monitor the progress in achieving agile implementation for IT programs and/or projects within their component  13  Participate on DHS’s CIO Council, Enterprise Architecture Board, or other councils/boards as appropriate, and appoint employees to serve when necessary  14  Meet the IT competency requirements established by the DHS CIO, as required in the component CIO’s performance plan  To determine the extent to which the Secret Service CIO has implemented these responsibilities, we obtained and assessed relevant component documentation and compared it to the responsibilities  Specifically, we obtained and analyzed documentation including evidence of the CIO’s participation on the Secret Service governance board that has final decision authority and responsibility for enterprise governance, including the IT budget; monthly program management reports showing the CIO’s oversight of IT programs, projects, and systems; monthly status reports on program spending; the Secret Service’s IT strategic plan; the Secret Service’s enterprise governance policy; meeting minutes from the DHS board and council on which the CIO participated (i e , the CIO Council and Enterprise Architecture Board); and documentation demonstrating whether the CIO met the IT competency requirements  In addition, we obtained and analyzed relevant documentation related to the CIO’s oversight of the major IT investments on which the Secret Service was spending development, modernization, and enhancement funds during fiscal year 2017  As of July 2017, the component had one investment—IITT—that met this criterion  IITT is a portfolio investment that, as of July 2017, included two programs (one of which included three projects) and one standalone project (i e , it was not part of another program) that had capabilities that were in planning or development and modernization: the Enabling Capabilities program, Enterprise Resource Management System program (which included three projects, called Uniformed Division Resource Management System, Events Management, and Enterprise-wide Scheduling), and Multi-Level Security project  In particular, we obtained and analyzed documentation related to the CIO’s oversight of the systems engineering life cycles for IITT’s Enabling Capabilities program and the Uniformed Division Resource Management System, Events Management, and Multi-Level Security projects  This documentation included acquisition program baselines, systems engineering life cycle tailoring plans, and systems engineering life cycle technical review briefings and completion letters  We then compared the documentation against the five selected systems engineering life cycle oversight responsibilities (responsibilities 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9)  We also obtained and analyzed documentation related to the CIO’s oversight of two projects that the Secret Service was implementing using an agile methodology—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management  Specifically, we obtained and assessed documentation of (1) the CIO’s approval for these projects to be implemented using an agile methodology and (2) the agile development metrics that the CIO established for each of these projects  We then compared this documentation to the three agile development-related component-level CIO responsibilities (responsibilities 10, 11, and 12)  Further, to determine the extent to which the Secret Service CIO had established an IT acquisition (i e , contract) review process that enabled component and DHS review of component contracts that contain IT (which is part of responsibility 2), we first asked Secret Service officials to provide us with a list of all new, unclassified IT contracts that the component awarded between October 1, 2016, and June 30, 2017  The Secret Service officials provided a list of 54 contracts  We validated that these were contracts for IT or IT services by: (1) searching for them in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation; (2) identifying their associated product or service codes, as reported in that system; and (3) determining whether those codes were included in the universe of 79 IT product or service codes identified by the Category Management Leadership Council  In validating the list of 54 contracts provided by the Secret Service, we determined that 5 of the contracts were not associated with an IT product or service code  As such, we removed those contracts from the list  In addition, we found that three other items identified by the component were not in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation  Secret Service officials subsequently confirmed that these three items were not contracts  We therefore removed these three items from the list  As such, the final list of validated contracts identified by the Secret Service included 46 IT contracts  In addition, to identify any IT contracts that were not included in the list provided by the Secret Service, we conducted a search of the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation to identify all unclassified contracts that (1) the component awarded between October 1, 2016, and June 30, 2017; (2) were not a modification of a contract; and (3) were associated with 1 of the 79 IT product or service codes identified by the Category Management Leadership Council  Based on these criteria, we identified 144 Secret Service IT contracts in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation (these 144 contracts included the 46 contracts previously identified by Secret Service officials)  We then asked Secret Service officials to validate the accuracy, completeness, and reliability of these data, which they did  From each of these two lists of IT contracts (i e , the list of 46 IT contracts identified by the Secret Service and the list of 144 IT contracts that we identified from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation), we then selected random, non-generalizable samples of contracts, as described below  First, from the list of 46 IT contracts identified by Secret Service officials, we removed 4 contracts that had total values of less than $10,000  To ensure that we selected across all contract sizes, we randomly selected 12 contracts from the remaining list of 42 contracts, using the following cost ranges: $10,000 to $50,000 (4 contracts), more than $50,000 to less than $250,000 (4 contracts), and more than $250,000 (4 contracts)  Second, from our list of 144 IT contracts that we identified from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation, we removed the 46 contracts identified by Secret Service officials  We also removed 12 contracts that had total values of less than $10,000  To ensure that we selected across all contract sizes, we randomly selected 21 contracts from the remaining list of 86 contracts, using the following cost ranges: $10,000 to $50,000 (7 contracts), more than $50,000 to less than $250,000 (7 contracts), and more than $250,000 (7 contracts)  In total, we selected 33 IT contracts for review  We separated the contracts into the three cost ranges identified above in order to ensure that contracts of different value levels had been selected  This enabled us to determine the extent to which the CIO appropriately reviewed contracts of all values  To determine the extent to which the CIO had established an IT contract approval process that enabled the Secret Service and DHS, as appropriate, to review IT contracts, we first asked Secret Service Office of the CIO (OCIO) officials for documentation of their IT contract approval process  These officials were unable to provide such documentation  Instead, the officials stated that the Secret Service CIO or the CIO’s delegate approves all IT contracts prior to award  The officials also provided documentation that identified four staff to whom the CIO had delegated his approval authority  Further, the officials stated that, in accordance with DHS’s October 2016 IT acquisition review guidance, they submitted to DHS OCIO for approval any IT contracts that met DHS’s thresholds for review, including those that (1) had total estimated procurement values of $2 5 million or more, and (2) were associated with a major investment  Based on the IT acquisition review process that Secret Service OCIO officials described, we then obtained and analyzed each of the 33 selected IT contracts and associated approval documentation to determine whether or not the Secret Service CIO or the CIO’s delegate had approved each of the contracts  In particular, we (1) reviewed the name of the contract approver on the approval documentation, and (2) compared the signature dates that were on the contracts to the signature dates that were identified on the associated approval documentation  In addition, to determine whether or not the Secret Service CIO submitted to DHS OCIO for approval the IT contracts that (1) had total estimated procurement values of $2 5 million or more, and (2) were associated with major investments, we first analyzed the 144 Secret Service IT contracts that we had previously pulled from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation to determine which contracts met the $2 5 million threshold  We identified 4 contracts that met this threshold  We then requested that OCIO identify the levels (i e , major or non-major) of the investments associated with these contracts  According to OCIO officials, 3 of the 4 contracts were associated with non-major investments and 1 was not associated with an investment  As such, based on DHS’s October 2016 IT acquisition review guidance, none of these contracts needed to be submitted to DHS OCIO for review  We also interviewed Secret Service officials, including the CIO and Deputy CIO, regarding the CIO’s implementation of the 14 selected component-level responsibilities  We assessed the evidence against the selected responsibilities to determine the extent to which the CIO had implemented them  To address the second objective—determining the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented leading workforce planning and management practices for its IT workforce—we first identified seven topic areas associated with human capital management based on the following sources: The Office of Personnel Management’s Human Capital Framework  Office of Personnel Management and the Chief Human Capital Officers Council Subcommittee for Hiring and Succession Planning, End-to-End Hiring Initiative  GAO, High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others  GAO, IT Workforce: Key Practices Help Ensure Strong Integrated Program Teams; Selected Departments Need to Assess Skill Gaps  GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Taking Further Action to Better Determine Causes of Morale Problems Would Assist in Targeting Action Plans  GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government  GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Creating a Clear Linkage between Individual Performance and Organizational Success  DHS acquisition guidance  Secret Service acquisition guidance  Among these topic areas, we then selected five areas that, in our professional judgment, were of particular importance to successful workforce planning and management  They were also previously identified as part of our high-risk and key issues work on human capital management  These areas include: (1) strategic planning, (2) recruitment and hiring, (3) training and development, (4) employee morale, and (5) performance management  We also reviewed these same sources and identified numerous leading practices associated with the five topic areas  Among these leading practices, we then selected three leading practices within each of the five areas (for a total of 15 selected practices)  The selected practices were foundational practices that, in our professional judgment, were of particular importance to successful workforce planning and management  Table 14 identifies the five selected workforce areas and 15 selected associated practices  To determine the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented the selected leading workforce planning and management practices for its IT workforce, we obtained and assessed documentation and compared it against the 15 selected practices  In particular, we analyzed the Secret Service’s human capital strategic plan, human capital staffing plan, IT strategic plan, documentation of the component’s staffing model that it used to determine the number of IT staff needed, an independent verification and validation report on the component’s staffing models, documentation of the current number of IT staff, the Secret Service’s recruitment and outreach plans, documentation of DHS’s hiring authorities (which are applicable to the Secret Service), the Secret Service’s training strategic plan, IT workforce training plan, action plans for improving employee morale, and templates used for measuring and reporting employee performance  We also interviewed Secret Service officials—including the CIO, Deputy CIO, and workforce planning staff—about the component’s workforce- related policies and documentation  Further, we discussed with the officials the Secret Service’s efforts to implement the selected workforce practices for its IT workforce  Regarding our assessments of the Secret Service’s implementation of the 15 selected workforce planning and management practices, we assessed a practice as being fully implemented if component officials provided supporting documentation that demonstrated all aspects of the practice  We assessed a practice as not implemented if the officials did not provide any supporting documentation for that practice, or if the documentation provided did not demonstrate any aspect of the practice  We assessed a practice as being partly implemented if the officials provided supporting documentation that demonstrated some, but not all, aspects of the selected practice  In addition, related to our assessments of the Secret Service’s implementation of the five selected overall workforce areas, we assessed each area as follows, based on the implementation of the three selected practices within each area: Fully implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it had fully implemented all three of the selected practices within the workforce area; Substantially implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it had either fully implemented two selected practices and partly implemented the remaining one selected practice within the workforce area, or fully implemented one selected practice and partly implemented the remaining two selected practices within the workforce area; Partially implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it had partly implemented each of the three selected practices within the workforce area; Minimally implemented: The Secret Service provided evidence that it partly implemented two selected practices and not implemented the remaining one selected practice within the workforce area, or partly implemented one selected practice and not implemented the remaining two selected practices within the workforce area; or Not implemented: The Secret Service did not provide evidence that it had implemented any of the three selected practices within the workforce area  To address the third objective—determining the extent to which the Secret Service and DHS have implemented selected performance and progress monitoring practices for IITT—we reviewed leading project monitoring practices and guidance from the Software Engineering Institute  First, we reviewed the practices within the Project Monitoring and Control process area of the Institute’s Capability Maturity Model Integration® for Acquisition  Based on our review, we identified four practices associated with monitoring program performance and progress  In our professional judgment, all four of these practices were of significance to managing the IITT investment given the phase of the life cycle that the investment was in  As such, we elected to include all four of these practices in our review, and combined them into one practice, as follows: Monitor program performance and conduct reviews at predetermined checkpoints or milestones by, among other things, comparing actual cost, schedule, and performance data with estimates in the program plan and identifying significant deviations from established targets or thresholds for acceptable performance levels  Next, given the agile development methodology that the Secret Service was using for certain projects within IITT, we reviewed the Software Engineering Institute’s technical note on the progress monitoring of agile contractors  Based on our review, and in consultation with an internal expert, we selected four agile metrics that the Institute identified as important for successful agile implementations and that, in our professional judgment, were of most significance to monitoring the performance of IITT’s agile projects  We then combined these four metrics into one practice, as follows: Measure and monitor agile projects on velocity (i e , number of story points completed per sprint or release), development progression (e g , the number of features and user stories planned and accepted), product quality (e g , number of defects), and post-deployment user satisfaction  To determine the extent to which DHS and the Secret Service had implemented the first selected practice, we analyzed relevant program management and governance documentation for IITT’s Enabling Capabilities program, and Multi-Level Security, Uniformed Division Resource Management System, and Events Management projects  In particular, we analyzed acquisition program baselines, DHS acquisition decision event memorandums, artifacts from DHS and Secret Service program oversight reviews, cost monitoring reports, program integrated master schedules, and program status briefings, and compared this documentation to the selected practice  We also interviewed Secret Service OCIO officials regarding the Secret Service’s and DHS’s efforts to monitor the IITT investment’s performance and progress  To determine the extent to which the Secret Service had implemented the second selected practice related to measuring and monitoring agile projects on agile metrics (i e , velocity, development progression, product quality, and post-deployment user satisfaction), we obtained and analyzed agile-related documentation for the two projects that the Secret Service was implementing using an agile methodology—Uniformed Division Resource Management System and Events Management  Specifically, to determine the extent to which the Secret Service was measuring and monitoring these two projects on metrics for velocity and development progression, we obtained and analyzed documentation, such as sprint burndown charts and monthly program status reports, and compared it to the selected practice  In addition, the agile metrics for product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction were only applicable to projects that had been deployed to users  As such, these metrics were applicable to the Uniformed Division Resource Management System (which the Secret Service had deployed to users) and were not applicable to Events Management (which the Secret Service had not yet deployed to users, as of early May 2018)  We therefore obtained and analyzed documentation demonstrating that Secret Service OCIO measured product defects for the Uniformed Division Resource Management System  We also requested documentation demonstrating that OCIO had measured and monitored post-deployment user satisfaction for this project, including via a survey  OCIO officials stated that they had not conducted such a survey and were unable to provide documentation demonstrating they had measured post- deployment user satisfaction for the Uniformed Division Resource Management System  To assess the reliability of the cost, schedule, and agile-related data that were in DHS and the Secret Service’s program management and governance documentation for the IITT investment, we (1) analyzed related documentation and assessed the data against existing agency records to identify consistency in the information, and (2) examined the data for obvious outliers, incomplete, or unusual entries  We determined that the data in these documents were sufficiently reliable for our purpose, which was to evaluate the extent to which DHS and the Secret Service had implemented processes for monitoring the IITT investment’s performance and progress  We conducted this performance audit from May 2017 to November 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  As of June 2018, the Secret Service’s Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment included two programs (one of which included three projects) and one project that had capabilities that were in planning or development and modernization, as described below: Enabling Capabilities  This program is intended to, among other things, (1) modernize and enhance the Secret Service’s information technology (IT) network infrastructure, including increasing bandwidth and improving the speed and reliability of the Secret Service’s IT system performance; (2) enhance cybersecurity to protect against potential intrusions and viruses; and (3) provide counterintelligence and data mining capabilities to improve officials’ ability to perform the Secret Service’s investigative mission  Enterprise Resource Management System  This program comprises three projects that are intended to provide: a system that will enable the Secret Service’s Uniformed Division to efficiently and effectively plan, provision, and schedule missions (this project is referred to as Uniformed Division Resource Management System), a system that will unify the logistical actions (e g , assigning personnel) surrounding special events that Secret Service agents need to protect, such as the United Nations General Assembly (this project is referred to as Events Management), and a capability for creating schedules for Secret Service agents and administrative, professional, and technical staff, as well as the ability to generate reports on information such as monthly hours worked (this project is referred to as Enterprise-wide Scheduling)  Multi-Level Security  This project is intended to enable authorized Secret Service users to view two levels of classified information on a single workstation  Previously, data at various security levels were contained and used in multiple disparate systems  Multi-Level Security is intended to streamline users’ access to information at different security levels in order to enable them to more quickly and effectively perform their duties  Table 15 provides the planned life cycle cost and schedule estimates (threshold values) for each IITT program and project that had capabilities in planning or development and modernization, as of June 2018  In addition, the table describes any changes in those cost and schedule estimates, as well as the key reasons for any changes, as identified by officials from the Secret Service’s Office of the Chief Information Officer  In addition to the contact named above, the following staff made key contributions to this report: Shannin O’Neill (Assistant Director), Emily Kuhn (Analyst-in-Charge), Quintin Dorsey, Rebecca Eyler, Javier Irizarry, and Paige Teigen 

ground_truth: According to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the federal workforce consists of an estimated two million civilian employees. Federal law categorizes these employees into three types of service—the competitive service, the excepted service, and the Senior Executive Service (SES)—that may be distinguished by different selection, compensation, and other standards. Title 5 of the U.S. Code (Title 5) contains most of the standards governing federal employment, and OPM is generally responsible for implementing these requirements. The competitive service largely consists of all civil service positions in the executive branch, other than (1) positions excepted from the competitive service by statute; (2) positions appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate; and (3) the SES. Traditionally, OPM has administered examinations for entrance into the competitive service. These examinations are meant to be "practical in character" and relate to "matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointment sought." Title 5 also authorizes OPM to prescribe rules allowing agencies to hire candidates directly under specified circumstances. The excepted service includes designated civil service positions that are not in the competitive service or the SES and are not subject to competitive examination. OPM maintains authority to exempt a position from the competitive service when it determines that an appointment through competitive examination is not practicable, or the recruitment of students or recent graduates would be better achieved through alternate recruitment and assessment processes. The pay structure for the competitive service and the excepted service is similar. Both services are typically paid in accordance with the General Schedule, a schedule of annual basic pay rates that consists of 15 grades, designated "GS-1" through "GS-15." This fixed pay scale is generally designed to reflect, among other things, equal pay for substantially equal work within a local pay area. Additionally, the competitive service and the excepted service generally have similar notice and appeal rights for adverse personnel actions. For example, before a removal, a suspension for more than 14 days, a reduction in grade or pay, or a furlough of 30 days or less, the agency must provide at least 30 days' advance written notice to the affected employee. The employee must also be given a reasonable time to respond to the notice and provide affidavits and other evidence to support the answer. Some adverse actions may also be appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board), an independent, quasi-judicial agency that reviews and adjudicates specified personnel actions taken against qualifying federal employees. The SES is a corps of some 7,000 high-level government administrators who manage major programs and projects within most federal agencies. In these leadership roles, SES members may serve as a link between top-level political appointees of an agency and career civil servants within the agency. The SES is governed by a regulatory structure separate from the competitive and excepted services. While SES members are primarily career appointees chosen through a merit-based competitive hiring process, others are noncareer, limited term or limited emergency appointees (commonly political appointees) selected by agency leadership. To shield certain SES roles from political influence, some SES positions (career reserved positions) must be filled with career appointees, and Title 5 limits the number of noncareer and limited term appointees that may serve in SES positions. The SES pay structure is distinct from the rest of the civil service. Title 5 specifies that SES members are paid within a particular range based on an executive's individual performance or contribution to agency performance (or both), as measured under a performance appraisal system. In addition, Title 5 articulates special conditions and procedures for removing, suspending, or taking other adverse actions against a member of the SES. For example, career SES appointees who have successfully completed a one-year probationary period may be removed or subject to adverse action only for specified reasons, including misconduct and substandard performance. Career appointees must receive advance written notice of these actions, and an opportunity to appeal the action. In comparison, noncareer, limited term, and limited emergency appointees are generally not subject to the same protections and may be removed from the SES at any time.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The federal government is the nation's largest employer, with over two million workers employed in the United States, U S  Territories, and foreign countries  A majority of these employees work in the competitive service of the executive branch  Applicants for competitive service positions compete with other applicants and are evaluated according to objective standards  The executive branch includes two other service classifications—the excepted service and the Senior Executive Service (SES)—with hiring and removal standards that diverge from those prescribed for the competitive service  Positions in the excepted service are specifically excepted from the competitive service by statute, by the President, or by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)  SES positions are also not in the competitive service  The SES includes senior managerial, supervisory, and policy positions that are subject to a different pay scale, as well as different hiring and removal standards  This report examines the three service classifications, and reviews some of the central features and notable differences among these classifications  The competitive service consists of all civil service positions in the executive branch, except the following: positions that are specifically excepted from the competitive service by or under statute; positions to which appointments are made by presidential nomination for confirmation by the Senate, unless the Senate otherwise directs; and positions in the SES  The competitive service also includes non-executive branch positions and positions in the District of Columbia government that are specifically included in the competitive service by statute  OPM administers examinations for entrance into the competitive service  These examinations are meant to be "practical in character" and relate to "matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointment sought[ ]" OPM identifies the relative weights for the subjects in an examination, and assigns numerical ratings on a 100-point scale  Applicants who meet the minimum requirements for entrance to an examination, such as citizenship and residence requirements, and are rated 70 or more in the examination are eligible for appointment in the competitive service  These individuals are placed on registers or lists of eligibles  When an agency seeks to fill a competitive service position, it requests a certificate of eligibles from OPM  This certificate is to include enough names from the top of the relevant register to allow an agency appointing official to consider at least three individuals for every position to be filled  The competitive service includes several types of appointments  An individual selected for a continuing position is generally appointed as a career-conditional employee subject to an initial one-year probationary period  After three continuous years of service in a career-conditional appointment, an employee will be converted to a career appointment  A term appointment is a nonpermanent appointment for a period of more than one year, but less than four years  An agency may make a term appointment when the need for an employee's services is not permanent, but involves a special project, extraordinary workload, or reorganization  A temporary appointment is a time-limited appointment for a period not to exceed one year  An agency may make a temporary appointment to fill a short-term position or meet an employment need that is scheduled to end within a specified timeframe  Employees in the competitive service are generally paid in accordance with the General Schedule, a schedule of annual basic pay rates that consists of 15 grades, designated "GS-1" through "GS-15 " The grades include 10 steps that provide for increasing rates of pay  An employee who has not reached the maximum pay rate for his or her position is generally advanced to the next step at specified intervals  General Schedule salaries are based on the principles that there is equal pay for substantially equal work within a local pay area, that any pay distinctions are based on work and performance, that federal pay rates are comparable with non-federal pay rates for the same level of work, and that any pay disparities between federal and non-federal employees should be eliminated  Employees in the competitive service who are not serving a probationary or trial period, or have completed one year of current continuous service in a position other than a temporary appointment limited to one year or less, maintain specified notice and appeal rights for adverse personnel actions  Before an agency may suspend such a qualifying employee for 14 days or less, the employee must be given an advance written notice that identifies the specific reasons for the suspension  The employee must also be provided a reasonable time to answer the notice and furnish affidavits and other evidence to support the answer  Similar notice is required before an agency may subject a qualifying employee to other adverse personnel actions  Before a removal, a suspension for more than 14 days, a reduction in grade or pay, or a furlough of 30 days or less, the agency must provide at least 30 days' advance written notice to the employee  The employee must also be given a reasonable time to respond to the notice and provide affidavits and other evidence to support the answer  Unlike suspensions for 14 days or less, these adverse actions may be appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board), an independent, quasi-judicial agency that reviews and adjudicates specified personnel actions taken against qualifying federal employees  In general, an agency must establish three factors to withstand an individual's challenge of his or her adverse personnel action  First, the agency must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the charged conduct occurred  Second, it must establish a nexus between that conduct and the efficiency of the civil service  Finally, the agency must show that the penalty imposed on the employee is reasonable  An agency's action may not be sustained if the appellant shows: (1) harmful error in applying the agency's procedures in arriving at its decision; (2) that the decision was based on a prohibited personnel practice; or (3) that the decision was not in accordance with law  About one-third of all federal workers are employed in the excepted service  The excepted service consists of those civil service positions that are not in the competitive service or the SES  Positions in the excepted service may be designated by statute or by OPM, and are not subject to competitive examination  OPM will exempt a position from the competitive service when it determines that an appointment through competitive examination is not practicable, or the recruitment of certain students or recent graduates would be better achieved through alternate recruitment and assessment processes  For example, OPM may determine that a position should be excepted from the competitive service because it is impracticable to examine the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for a position  Positions in the excepted service are categorized into four schedules  Schedule A includes positions that are not of a confidential or policy-determining character for which it is not practicable to examine applicants  Attorneys, chaplains, and short-term positions for which there is a critical hiring need are examples of schedule A positions  Schedule B also includes positions that are not of a confidential or policy-determining character for which it is not practicable to examine applicants  Unlike Schedule A positions, however, these positions require an applicant to satisfy basic qualification standards established by OPM for the relevant occupation and grade level  Individuals appointed to schedule B positions engage in a variety of activities, including policy analysis, teaching, and technical assistance  Positions in schedule C are policy-determining or involve a close and confidential working relationship with the head of an agency or other key appointed officials  These positions include most political appointees below the cabinet and subcabinet levels  An agency's senior advisor and special assistant positions are typically in schedule C  Finally, schedule D includes positions that are not of a confidential or policy-determining character for which competitive examination makes it difficult to recruit a sufficient number of certain students or recent graduates  Examples of schedule D positions include those involving science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) occupations and positions in the Presidential Management Fellows Program  Schedule D positions generally require an applicant to satisfy basic qualification standards established by OPM for the relevant occupation and grade level  Like employees in the competitive service, excepted service employees are generally paid in accordance with the General Schedule  In addition, excepted service employees maintain the same notice and appeal rights for adverse personnel actions  Some employees in the excepted service, however, must satisfy different durational requirements before these rights become available  So-called "preference eligibles" in an executive agency, the Postal Service, or the Postal Rate Commission must complete one year of current continuous service to avail themselves of the relevant notice and appeal rights  The term "preference eligible" refers to specified military veterans and some of their family members, such as an unmarried widow, and the wife or husband of a service-connected disabled veteran  Employees in the excepted service who are not preference eligibles and (1) are not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service, or (2) have completed two years of current or continuous service in the same or similar position, have the same notice and appeal rights as qualifying employees in the competitive service  The SES is a cadre of high-level government administrators who manage major programs and projects within most federal agencies  While they are considered federal employees within the civil service system, the SES is governed by a regulatory structure separate from the competitive and excepted services  As defined in statute, SES positions are generally managerial or supervisory positions that are classified above the GS-15 grade (or certain equivalent positions) and need not be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate  In these leadership roles, SES members may serve as intermediaries between top-level political appointees of an agency who seek to carry out the objectives of a particular President and career civil servants with institutional experience relating to relevant issues  According to a 2018 report, there are currently more than 7,000 permanent SES positions  There are two types of SES positions: (1) career reserved and (2) general  Career reserved positions must be filled with career appointees to shield certain SES roles from political influence  Generally, agency heads are to determine whether a particular SES position warrants a career reserved designation, to "ensure impartiality, or the public's confidence in the impartiality, of the Government " OPM regulations reflect the types of SES roles in which this designation is appropriate, including those involving adjudication and appeals, auditing, and law enforcement duties  General positions may be filled by career appointees, as well as other noncareer and limited term (i e , political) appointees  There are four types of SES appointments: career, noncareer, limited term, and limited emergency appointees  The SES mainly consists of "career appointees" chosen through a merit-based competitive hiring process  As part of this process, each agency must maintain a recruitment program for career appointees, as well as at least one executive board that reviews qualifications and makes recommendations regarding SES candidates  An OPM-convened Qualification Review Board (QRB) must certify the executive and managerial qualifications of a selected candidate before a career appointment may be made to an SES position  Unlike career appointees, noncareer appointees are not subject to the competitive selection process, but agency heads must determine that these appointees meet the qualifications of the SES position  While noncareer appointees are not QRB-certified, OPM must approve these appointees  Limited term and limited emergency appointees make up a small subset of the SES, and their terms are non-renewable  These appointments are used when a position is needed for a specified period (such as to manage a special project), or a position is established to meet a "bona fide, unanticipated, urgent need " Limited term and limited emergency appointments are also subject to OPM approval  To restrict the politicization of the SES, Title 5 of the U S  Code (Title 5) limits the number of noncareer and limited term appointees who may serve in SES positions  The SES pay structure is also distinct from the rest of the civil service  Title 5 specifies that the pay rate of each senior executive is based on the executive's individual performance or contribution to agency performance (or both), as measured under a "rigorous" performance appraisal system  Each federal agency must maintain at least one of these appraisal systems, subject to OPM standards, review, and approval  Performance appraisals of SES members may consider factors such as improvements in efficiency, productivity, and quality of work or service, cost efficiency, and performance timeliness  In response to earlier concerns that SES appraisal systems were flawed because most executives received the highest rating, Title 5 tasks OPM, in collaboration with the Office of Management and Budget, with the establishment and maintenance of a government-wide performance appraisal system certification process, in an effort to ensure that an agency's appraisal systems for SES employees make "meaningful distinctions based on relative performance " Title 5 also sets out different pay rates for the SES, with a minimum rate of basic pay equal to 120 percent of the rate for GS-15, step 1, and a maximum rate of basic pay equal to the rate for Level III of the Executive Schedule  But SES members' annual aggregate pay (that includes additional compensation such as bonuses, awards, and other payments in addition to basic pay) is capped at the rate for Level I of the Executive Schedule  If a senior executive's total compensation exceeds the aggregate limitation, the executive receives the overage in the following calendar year  To encourage federal agencies to establish and maintain an OPM-certified performance appraisal system, Title 5 allows for a higher range of SES pay for agencies that have these certified systems  Title 5 also articulates conditions and procedures for removing, suspending, or taking other adverse actions against a member of the SES  Career SES appointees who have successfully completed a one-year probationary period may be removed or subject to adverse action only for specified reasons  For example, an SES career appointee may be removed from the civil service or suspended for more than 14 days only for misconduct, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or failure to accept a directed reassignment or to accompany a position in a transfer of function  SES members must receive advance written notice about the action and opportunity to provide an answer or receive hearing, subject to exception  The senior executive may also appeal the employment action to the MSPB  A career appointee receiving a single unsatisfactory performance rating may be reassigned or transferred within the SES or removed from the SES  A career SES member who receives two unsatisfactory ratings in any period of five consecutive years, or twice in any period of three consecutive years receives less than fully successful ratings, must be removed from the SES  Affected SES career appointees must receive advance written notice of these actions  While these appointees may not appeal these actions to the MSPB, they may request an informal hearing before the Board  SES career appointees are also generally entitled to be placed in a civil service position at GS-15 or above (or an equivalent position)  In comparison, noncareer, limited term, and limited emergency appointees are generally not subject to the same removal protections and may be removed from the SES at any time  The procedures for removal of noncareer and limited term appointees are largely not addressed in federal statute, and the terms and procedures for their removal are mainly at the discretion of the agency head  In response to concerns about performance and accountability of SES members employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Congress recently created special removal requirements that apply to these positions  In 2017, Congress passed the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act, which amended an existing provision concerning removal procedures for these covered senior executives  Under the 2017 Act, the VA Secretary has discretion to suspend, demote, remove, or take other actions against SES career appointees or other high-level executives if the Secretary determines that the individual's misconduct or performance warrants such action  To address SES job performance issues more expeditiously, SES employees at the VA Department are entitled to abbreviated notice and appeals rights, as compared to the removal procedures in place in other federal agencies 


Report 2:  Across the five VA medical centers, we found that providers were not reported to the NPDB and state licensing boards as required for two reasons  First, VA medical center officials were generally not familiar with or misinterpreted VHA policies related to NPDB and state licensing board reporting  For example, at one VA medical center, we found that officials failed to report six providers to the NPDB because they were unaware that they had been delegated responsibility for NPDB reporting  Officials at two other VA medical centers incorrectly told us that VHA cannot report contract providers to the NDPB  At another VA medical facility, officials did not report a provider to the NPDB or to any of the state licensing boards where the provider held a medical license because medical center officials learned that one state licensing board had already found out about the issue independently  Therefore, VA officials did not believe that they needed to report the provider  This misinterpretation of VHA policy meant that the NPDB and the state licensing boards in other states where the provider held licenses were not alerted to concerns about the provider’s clinical practice  Second, VHA policy does not require the networks to oversee whether VA medical centers are reporting providers to the NPDB or state licensing boards when warranted  We found, for example, that network officials were unaware of situations in which VA medical center officials failed to report providers to the NPDB  We concluded that VHA lacks reasonable assurance that all providers who should be reported to these entities are reported  VHA’s failure to report providers to the NPDB and state licensing boards as required facilitates providers who provide substandard care at one facility obtaining privileges at another VA medical center or at hospitals outside of VA’s health care system  We found several cases of this occurring among the providers who were not reported to the NPDB or state licensing boards by the five VA medical centers we reviewed  For example, we found that two of the four contract providers whose contracts were terminated for clinical deficiencies remained eligible to provide care to veterans outside of that VA medical center  At the time of our review, one of these providers held privileges at another VA medical center, and another participated in the network of providers that can provide care for veterans in the community  We also found that a provider who was not reported as required to the NPDB during the period we reviewed had their privileges revoked 2 years later by a non-VA hospital in the same city for the same reason the provider was under investigation at the VA medical center  Officials at this VA medical center did not report this provider following a settlement agreement under which the provider agreed to resign  A committee within the VA medical center had recommended that the provider’s privileges be revoked prior to the agreement  There was no documentation of the reasons why this provider was not reported to the NPDB under VHA policy  To improve VA medical centers’ reporting of providers to the NPDB and state licensing boards and VHA oversight of these processes, we recommended that VHA require its networks to establish a process for overseeing VA medical centers to ensure they are reporting to the NPDB and to state licensing boards and to ensure that this reporting is timely  VA concurred with this recommendation and told us that it plans to include oversight of timely reporting to the NPDB and state licensing boards as part of the standard audit tool used by the networks  If you or your staff members have any questions concerning this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 (williamsonr@gao gov)  Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Other individuals who made key contributions to this testimony include Marcia A  Mann (Assistant Director), Kaitlin M  McConnell (Analyst-in-Charge), Summar C  Corley, Krister Friday, and Jacquelyn Hamilton  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 

ground_truth: This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's November 2017 report, entitled VA Health Care: Improved Policies and Oversight Needed for Reviewing and Reporting Providers for Quality and Safety Concerns ( GAO-18-63 ). Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical center (VAMC) officials are responsible for reviewing the clinical care delivered by their privileged providers—physicians and dentists who are approved to independently perform specific services—after concerns are raised. The five VAMCs GAO selected for review collectively required review of 148 providers from October 2013 through March 2017 after concerns were raised about their clinical care. GAO found that these reviews were not always documented or conducted in a timely manner. GAO identified these providers by reviewing meeting minutes from the committee responsible for requiring these types of reviews at the respective VAMCs, and through interviews with VAMC officials. The selected VAMCs were unable to provide documentation of these reviews for almost half of the 148 providers. Additionally, the VAMCs did not start the reviews of 16 providers for 3 months to multiple years after the concerns were identified. GAO found that VHA policies do not require documentation of all types of clinical care reviews and do not establish timeliness requirements. GAO also found that the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) does not adequately oversee these reviews at VAMCs through its Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), which are responsible for overseeing the VAMCs. Without documentation and timely reviews of providers' clinical care, VAMC officials may lack information needed to reasonably ensure that VA providers are competent to provide safe, high quality care to veterans and to make appropriate decisions about these providers' privileges. GAO also found that from October 2013 through March 2017, the five selected VAMCs did not report most of the providers who should have been reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) or state licensing boards (SLB) in accordance with VHA policy. The NPDB is an electronic repository for critical information about the professional conduct and competence of providers. GAO found that selected VAMCs did not report to the NPDB eight of nine providers who had adverse privileging actions taken against them or who resigned during an investigation related to professional competence or conduct, as required by VHA policy, and none of these nine providers had been reported to SLBs. GAO found that officials at the selected VAMCs misinterpreted or were not aware of VHA policies and guidance related to NPDB and SLB reporting processes resulting in providers not being reported. GAO also found that VHA and the VISNs do not conduct adequate oversight of NPDB and SLB reporting practices and cannot reasonably ensure appropriate reporting of providers. As a result, VHA's ability to provide safe, high quality care to veterans is hindered because other VAMCs, as well as non-VA health care entities, will be unaware of serious concerns raised about a provider's care. For example, GAO found that after one VAMC failed to report to the NPDB or SLBs a provider who resigned to avoid an adverse privileging action, a non-VA hospital in the same city took an adverse privileging action against that same provider for the same reason 2 years later.