prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) is responsible for promulgating SNAP program regulations, ensuring that state officials administer the program in compliance with program rules, and authorizing and monitoring retailers from which recipients may purchase food  States are responsible for determining applicant eligibility, calculating the amount of their benefits, issuing benefits on Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards—which can be used like debit cards to purchase food from authorized retailers—and investigating possible program violations by recipients  SNAP recipients are subject to various work requirements  Generally, all SNAP recipients ages 16 through 59, unless exempted by law or regulation, must comply with work requirements, including registering for work, reporting to an employer if referred by a state agency, accepting a bona fide offer of a suitable job, not voluntarily quitting a job or reducing work hours below 30 hours a week, and participating in a SNAP E&T program or a workfare program—in which recipients perform work on behalf of the state—if assigned by the state agency  SNAP recipients are generally exempt from complying with these work requirements if they are physically or mentally unfit, responsible for caring for a dependent child under age 6 or an incapacitated person, employed for 30 or more hours per week or receive weekly earnings which equal the minimum hourly rate set under federal law multiplied by 30, or are a bona fide student enrolled half-time or more in any recognized school training program, or institution of higher education, amongst other exemptions  SNAP recipients subject to the work requirements—known as work registrants— may lose their eligibility for benefits if they fail to comply with these requirements without good cause  One segment of the work registrant population, SNAP recipients ages 18 through 49 who are “able-bodied,” not responsible for a dependent child, and do not meet other exemptions—able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs)—are generally subject to additional work requirements  In addition to meeting the general work requirements, ABAWDs must work or participate in a work program 20 hours or more per week, or participate in workfare, in which ABAWDs perform work to earn the value of their SNAP benefits  Participation in SNAP E&T, which is a type of work program, is one way for ABAWDs to meet the 20 hour per week ABAWD work requirement, but other work programs are acceptable as well  Unless ABAWDs meet these work requirements or are determined to be exempt, they are limited to 3 months of SNAP benefits in a 36-month period  At the request of states, FNS may waive the ABAWD time limit for ABAWDs located in certain areas of a state or an entire state under certain circumstances  A waiver may be granted if the area has an unemployment rate of over 10 percent or there are an insufficient number of jobs to provide employment for these individuals  If the time limit is waived, ABAWDs are not required to meet the ABAWD work requirement in order to receive SNAP for more than 3 months in a 36-month period yet they must still comply with the general work requirements  Federal requirements for state SNAP E&T programs were first enacted in 1985 and provide state SNAP agencies with flexibility in how they design their SNAP E&T programs, including who to serve and what services to offer  The state has the option to offer SNAP E&T services on a voluntary basis to some or all SNAP recipients, an approach commonly referred to as a voluntary program  Alternatively, the state can require some or all SNAP work registrants to participate in the SNAP E&T program as a condition of eligibility, an approach commonly referred to as a mandatory program  Further, states determine which service components to provide participants through their SNAP E&T programs, although they must provide at least one from a federally determined list  This list includes job search programs, job search training programs, workfare, programs designed to improve employability through work experience or training, education programs to improve basic skills and employability, job retention services, and programs to improve self-sufficiency through self- employment  Total federal expenditures on SNAP E&T programs were more than $337 million in fiscal year 2016  States are eligible to receive three types of federal funding available for state SNAP E&T programs: 100 percent funds—formula grants for program administration, 50 percent federal reimbursement funds, and ABAWD pledge funds—grants to states that pledge to serve all of their at-risk ABAWDs  The Office of Management and Budget has designated SNAP as a high- priority program due to the estimated dollar amount in improper payments—any payments that should not have been made or were made in an incorrect amount (including overpayments and underpayments) under statutory, contractual, administrative, or other legally applicable requirements  According to USDA’s fiscal year 2015 agency financial report, $2 6 billion, or 3 66 percent, of all SNAP benefits paid in fiscal year 2014 were improper, the most recent year for which data are available  SNAP improper payments are caused by variances in any of the key factors involved in determining SNAP eligibility and benefit amounts, and, according to USDA, household income was the most common primary cause of dollar errors  States review the accuracy of SNAP payments to recipients on an ongoing basis, and FNS assesses the accuracy of state reviews and determines a national improper payment rate annually  FNS and states share responsibility for addressing SNAP fraud, which can occur through the eligibility process and when benefits are being used  Specifically, recipients may commit eligibility fraud when they misrepresent their household size, income, or expenses in order to fraudulently obtain SNAP benefits  Another type of fraud—trafficking— occurs when recipients exchange benefits with authorized retailers or other individuals for cash or non-food items (e g  rent or transportation)  In a typical retailer trafficking situation, for example, a retailer may charge $100 to a recipient’s EBT card and give the recipient $50 in cash instead of $100 in food  The federal government reimburses the retailer $100, which results in a fraudulent $50 profit to the retailer  State agencies are directly responsible for preventing, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting recipient fraud, including eligibility fraud and trafficking by SNAP recipients, under the oversight and guidance of FNS  States play a key role in preventing fraud when determining eligibility for SNAP  State agencies collect applicant information, such as household income and employment, and verify it through data matches with other information sources  After benefits are issued, the agencies may monitor EBT transaction data to identify spending patterns that may indicate trafficking  If an individual or household intentionally violates SNAP rules, such as by trafficking or making false or misleading statements in order to obtain benefits, states conduct administrative disqualification hearings or, in some cases, refer the case for criminal prosecution  FNS is responsible for authorizing and overseeing retailers who participate in the program—totaling more than 263,000 in fiscal year 2017—including investigating potential retailer trafficking  In order to participate in SNAP, a retailer applies to FNS and demonstrates that they meet program requirements, such as those on the amount and types of food that authorized stores must carry  FNS verifies a retailer’s compliance with these requirements and generally authorizes retailers for 5 years  FNS then monitors retailers’ continued compliance with program requirements and administratively disqualifies, or assesses money penalties on, those who are found to have trafficked benefits  To this end, FNS officials collect and monitor EBT transaction data to detect irregular patterns of transactions that may indicate trafficking and also conduct undercover investigations  If found to be trafficking, retailers are generally permanently disqualified from SNAP or incur a monetary penalty in lieu of permanent disqualification  According to FNS data, about 14 percent of SNAP recipients, or about 6 1 million, were work registrants who were subject to work requirements, and about 0 5 percent of SNAP recipients, or about 200,000, participated in state SNAP E&T programs, in an average month of fiscal year 2016  (See fig  1 ) According to FNS, most SNAP recipients are exempt from work requirements  For example, according to FNS, almost two-thirds of SNAP recipients were children, elderly, or adults with a disability in an average month of fiscal year 2016—groups that are generally exempt  Further, adults who are already working at least 30 hours a week are also exempt from SNAP work requirements, and according to FNS data, more than 31 percent of non-elderly adult SNAP recipients were employed in an average month of fiscal year 2016  SNAP work registrants who are not participating in SNAP E&T programs may be participating in other activities to meet work requirements or eligible for other exemptions  FNS officials told us that the state data reported to FNS on SNAP E&T participants are the best and most recent data available on this group, yet they also have limitations, which we will continue to explore in our ongoing work  In recent years, the number and percentage of SNAP recipients and work registrants participating in SNAP E&T programs appears to have decreased, according to FNS data  From fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2016, the average monthly number of SNAP E&T participants decreased from about 256,000 to about 207,000, or by 19 percent, according to state data on SNAP E&T participants reported to FNS  (See fig  2 ) However, over the same time period, the average monthly number of SNAP recipients appears to have increased from about 27 8 million to about 43 5 million, and work registrants appears to have increased from about 3 million to about 6 1 million, according to FNS data  As a result, the percentage of total SNAP recipients participating in SNAP E&T programs decreased from about 0 9 to about 0 5 percent, and the percentage of SNAP work registrants participating in these programs decreased from approximately 8 1 percent to 3 4 percent, from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2016  Available information suggests the characteristics of SNAP E&T participants are generally similar to those of SNAP work registrants who do not participate in these programs  A recent FNS study, which surveyed SNAP E&T participants and SNAP work registrants who had not participated in SNAP E&T, found that members of the two groups had similar demographic characteristics, including age and gender, and received similar monthly SNAP benefit amounts  Further, at the time they were surveyed, about one third of each group were employed, and their average wage rates were similar, at about $10 per hour  State SNAP agencies have broad flexibility in how they design their SNAP E&T programs, and the characteristics of these programs have changed in several ways over the last decade  For example, states have increasingly moved from mandatory to voluntary programs, focused on serving ABAWDs, and partnered with state and local organizations to deliver services  According to FNS data, states have increasingly moved from mandatory to voluntary SNAP E&T programs in recent years  In fiscal year 2010, 17 states operated voluntary programs; however, by fiscal year 2017, 35 states operated voluntary programs, according to FNS data  (See fig  3 ) FNS officials told us that they have been actively encouraging states to provide more robust employment and training services, such as vocational training or work experience, through voluntary programs  They said that they believe these types of robust services are more effective in moving participants toward self-sufficiency, but that funding may not be sufficient to provide these to the large numbers of participants served in mandatory programs  In addition, FNS officials told us that voluntary programs are less administratively burdensome than mandatory programs, as they allow states to focus on serving motivated participants rather than sanctioning non-compliant individuals  According to FNS officials, when states move to a voluntary program, they generally experience a decline in SNAP E&T participation—a trend consistent with our analysis of FNS data—which may have contributed to the decline in overall SNAP E&T participation  Of the 22 states or territories that changed from a mandatory to a voluntary program from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2016, according to FNS data, 13 experienced a decrease in SNAP E&T participation—ranging from a 21 percent decrease to a 93 percent decrease  Overall, voluntary programs are generally smaller than mandatory programs, according to our analysis of FNS data  In fiscal year 2016, for example, the 32 states or territories operating voluntary programs together served less than half of the total number of SNAP E&T participants served by the 21 states or territories operating mandatory programs, although these two groups of states had similar numbers of new work registrants  Furthermore, states operating voluntary programs served an average of nearly 7,000 SNAP E&T participants per state, while states operating mandatory programs served an average of 23,000 SNAP E&T participants per state  Evidence suggests that states have increased their focus on serving ABAWDs—a sub-population of SNAP recipients subject to benefit time limits and additional work requirements—through SNAP E&T, as related waivers have expired in recent years, according to FNS data  During and after the 2007-2009 recession, the majority of states operated under statewide waivers of the ABAWD time limit due to economic conditions  However, as the economy recovered, most statewide waivers expired, and the ABAWD time limit was reinstated  For example, according to FNS data, in fiscal year 2011, 45 states or territories had a statewide waiver and 7 states had a partial waiver—one applying to certain localities  By fiscal year 2017, the number of states or territories with a statewide waiver had decreased to 9, while 27 states had partial waivers  FNS officials and state SNAP agency officials we spoke with in some states told us that, as the waivers have ended, state SNAP E&T programs have become increasingly focused on serving ABAWDs  Although state data on SNAP E&T programs reported to FNS suggest a greater percentage of ABAWDs have been participating in these programs in recent years, according to FNS officials, these data have limited usefulness in assessing state trends in serving ABAWDs for several reasons  For example, in recent years, FNS officials learned that there was widespread confusion among states regarding the need to track ABAWDs when waivers were in place, and that as a result, some states had not been tracking ABAWDs or properly documenting SNAP recipients’ ABAWD status  This is consistent with what some of the selected states we spoke with reported  As part of our ongoing work, we are continuing to explore the availability and reliability of data on ABAWDs  State SNAP agencies have increasingly partnered with other state and local organizations, such as workforce agencies, community-based social service providers, and community colleges, to provide services to SNAP E&T participants in recent years, according to FNS and states we selected for our review  In fiscal year 2018, nearly all states partnered with at least one other organization to deliver SNAP E&T services, with the majority partnering with more than one, according to an analysis by FNS  In recent years, FNS has urged states to make use of the broad network of American Job Centers  The American Job Centers, also known as one- stop centers, are funded through the Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration and designed to provide a range of employment-related services, such as training referrals, career counseling, job listings, and similar employment-related services, to job seekers under one roof  Our prior work has highlighted the value of coordination between federally funded employment and training programs to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources  Despite encouraging such partnerships, FNS officials said that American Job Centers typically provide lighter touch services to SNAP E&T participants, such as job search and job search training, and they therefore may not be well suited for SNAP E&T participants who have multiple barriers to employment  In our 2003 work on SNAP E&T, we found that while workforce system programs offered some of the activities needed by SNAP E&T participants, officials from 12 of the 15 states we contacted said that most participants were not ready for these activities, in part, because they lacked basic skills, such as reading and computer literacy, that would allow them to successfully participate  An alternative service delivery strategy that FNS has promoted is the development of third party partnerships with community-based social service providers, community colleges, and other entities to help states enhance their SNAP E&T programs  According to FNS, in this model, third party organizations use non-federal funding to provide allowable SNAP E&T services and supports, which are then eligible for 50 percent federal reimbursement funds through the state’s SNAP E&T program  According to FNS officials, third party partnerships enable states to leverage additional resources, grow their SNAP E&T programs, and reach more SNAP participants  In addition, FNS officials said that these partnerships allow states to improve their program outcomes by tapping into providers currently serving communities that include SNAP recipients  Federal 50 percent reimbursement funds expended increased from nearly $182 million to more than $223 million, or by 23 percent, from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2016
Report 2:  According to an Air Force analysis, doing so would achieve savings of over $67 million as it replaces or retires devices  As of July 2018, the Air Force had not fully implemented this guidance  Efforts by the military services to demonstrate that they have achieved print device reduction goals have been limited because they have not monitored the actions they have taken to reduce the number of print devices  Military service officials we interviewed said they were unaware of any efforts by the DOD CIO to ensure that device reductions occurred and that DOD components achieved their planned savings, such as providing information to the CIO on the status of their efforts to implement the guidance in the memorandum or data on reductions in the number of devices  Standards for internal control state that management should implement control activities through policies that use quality information to achieve an entity’s objectives, monitor the internal control system, and evaluate the results of the system  Efforts to implement the memorandum to achieve print device reduction goals have also been limited because responsibility for implementation was not clearly assigned  According to a DOD CIO official, the responsibility for the memorandum is not clearly assigned to a member of the CIO staff  This official also stated that because of the consolidation of information technology services in the Pentagon and the national capital region, the Defense Information Systems Agency’s Joint Service Provider assumed responsibility for implementing the memorandum  According to Joint Service Provider officials, however, they were only responsible for implementing the memorandum for the customers they serve in the Pentagon and the national capital region, and not for other DOD components outside those areas, such as military services  Standards for internal control state that management should ensure that key roles in operating the internal control system are clearly assigned  In the absence of these controls, such as reporting procedures to monitor actions to reduce the number of print devices and establishing clear responsibility for implementing the CIO memorandum, DOD has been unable to ensure that it is achieving any estimated savings, which could represent tens of millions of dollars annually  DLA Document Services may be able to realize additional savings from further consolidating facilities beyond those already identified, but it does not currently plan to do so, and it does not have the complete data it would need to make those determinations  As a part of its transformation plan, DLA Document Services identified 38 of its 112 facilities in the continental United States that it would retain  DLA Document Services officials stated that they considered a number of factors in determining whether to consolidate or retain facilities, including the number of staff and customers and the facilities’ workloads, but that they generally consolidated or retained facilities based on whether the facility provided “mission specialty” services  These mission specialties are services that DLA Document Services officials believe cannot be easily outsourced, such as printing and reproduction of classified and sensitive documents and on-demand printing and distribution of certain technical materials  However, our analysis of DLA Document Services data found that some facilities retained for certain mission specialties were responsible for a relatively small share of business for those specialties in fiscal year 2016 (the last full year for which data were provided), which suggests that further consolidations are possible  For example, for each of the four mission specialties for which DLA Document Services provided us with revenue data, the bottom quartile (25 percent) of the facilities retained for each specialty were responsible for less than 5 percent of the total revenue for that specialty, as shown in figure 6  We also found some cases in which DLA Document Services retained facilities that reported less revenue for a given specialty than facilities that it did not retain  According to officials, DLA Document Services took a number of factors into consideration in deciding on consolidations, including the complexity of the work at a facility and whether nearby sites could fulfill the orders  According to these officials, this allowed them to consolidate some facilities even if those facilities had greater revenue from a given mission specialty than other facilities  DOD Instruction 5330 03 requires DLA Document Services to provide effective and efficient document services support to DOD components  Our key practices for efficiency initiatives also note the importance of targeting both short-term and long-term efficiency initiatives  DLA Document Services officials stated that they would consider additional consolidations of facilities, but they have not conducted any analysis or planning to gain further efficiencies and do not currently have plans to do so  These officials stated they are committed to implementing the current transformation plan as announced  Officials also stated that they want to have a better sense of the results from the current transformation, including how workloads may change among facilities as consolidations occur, before considering additional consolidations  DLA Document Services’ current transformation plan includes the possible consolidation of facilities outside the continental United States following the implementation of its current plan (which only addressed facilities inside the continental United States); it does not have any plans for further consolidations within the continental United States  We also found that DLA Document Services did not have revenue data on all of its mission specialties to inform any future decisions on facility consolidations  Standards for internal control state that entities’ management should use quality information to achieve the entities’ objectives  However, DLA Document Services could not provide revenue data on three specific mission specialties—sensitive, classified, and Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information—for which it retained 30 of its facilities, including some that it retained exclusively for those specialties  According to DLA Document Services officials, they did not collect revenue data for these mission specialties because the facilities responsible for processing this type of information were generally retained, regardless of the revenue they produced, due to the sensitive nature of this work  As noted above, our analysis of available mission specialty data found that some facilities that DLA retained for certain mission specialties did a relatively small share of business for those specialties, indicating that there may be opportunities for additional facility consolidations  DLA Document Services officials told us that they had consulted with managers at the facilities about the amount of sensitive and classified they conducted  Because of these consultations, DLA Document Services is closing some facilities that handled sensitive and classified information  However, DLA Document Services does not routinely collect these data as it does for other mission specialties  By collecting and analyzing more complete revenue data on its mission specialties and using those data to evaluate opportunities for further consolidations, DLA Document Services would be better positioned to determine if opportunities exist to achieve additional cost savings  DOD reports some financial information regarding its document services, but this information does not accurately capture the scope of its document services mission  We reviewed the O&M obligations for printing and reproduction in fiscal years 2012 through 2016 that were reported to Congress by the military services  The total obligations ranged from about $534 million to about $736 million annually for the 5-year period (see fig  7)  Our analysis found that DOD’s O&M budget materials for printing and reproduction are inaccurate in two ways  First, the budget materials include obligations that are primarily for non-printing activities, such as the purchase of advertising and radio and television time  DOD and military service financial management officials prepare budget justification materials for their O&M funding requests on an annual basis  DOD and the services report printing and reproduction costs in the Summary of Price and Program Changes budget exhibit (the “OP-32”)  It contains information by line item, detailing, among other items, printing and reproduction and related operations performed by the military services, DLA, or GPO  It also contains elements of expenses for purchases related to document services that are provided by DLA  The OP-32 exhibits are provided to Congress with the budget justification materials accompanying the President’s annual budget request  Officials from AMRG told us that, in accordance with Army guidance, printing and reproduction obligations are coupled with other obligations, including the purchase of advertising space and radio and television time for recruiting activities  Data provided by these officials show that in fiscal year 2016, AMRG’s obligations for printing and reproduction accounted for only about $2 million, or 2 percent, of the Army’s total fiscal year 2016 obligations included in the printing and reproduction line of the OP-32  Obligations for the publication of notices, advertising, and radio and television time accounted for about $78 million, or 63 percent, of the obligations reported for printing and reproduction  According to officials, the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps also follow their respective guidance on reporting printing and reproduction obligations together with these other obligations  Second, the budget justification information does not represent the full scope of the military services’ document services mission  Specifically, we found that the military services’ annual budget requests do not provide distinct information on two areas of their document services mission— print device procurement and electronic content management  Data we reviewed indicate that the military services obligate a considerable amount of resources in these areas  For example, according to DLA Document Services, sales to DOD and the military services for its print device services are comparable to sales for its printing and reproduction services  According to DLA data, in fiscal year 2017, it received in revenue about $108 million for print device and about $105 million for printing and reproduction services  Officials from the military services told us that obligations for these activities are included within the budget requests for various IT procurement categories  For example, Army Budget Office officials noted that the budget request for IT procurement and office supplies would include estimates associated with the purchase and sustainment of devices, but those line items would include other, non-printing obligations as well  According to these officials, the Army has made efforts to standardize the procurement of information technology, including collecting better data on spending for these types of devices  They told us that these efforts will result in shifts in how those obligations are reported in budget justification materials  The accuracy and completeness of DOD’s financial information about its document services can affect the allocation of budgetary resources, and inaccurate or incomplete information can hamper initiatives to gain further efficiencies  The Handbook of Federal Accounting Standards states that its managerial cost accounting concepts and standards are aimed at agencies providing reliable and timely information on the full costs of their federal programs that congressional and executive decision makers can use in making decisions about allocating federal resources and program managers can use in making decisions to improve operating economy and efficiency  DOD’s Financial Management Regulation lays out the structure of the budget exhibits that the military services develop during the department’s budget process  According to a DOD Comptroller official, DOD has historically reported its budget requests following the format prescribed by the Financial Management Regulation, and it follows this format in its reporting of printing and reproduction costs that are coupled with non-printing costs  Although the department has followed this format, the House Armed Services Committee has expressed concern about the military services’ printing budgets, noting that they were excessive and that portions of the budgets should be realigned to address unfunded readiness priorities  Further, as we discussed earlier in this report, DOD has outlined specific steps it intends to take to achieve a recommended goal of 34 percent reduction in spending on its printing and related activities  Without quality information on the scope of its document services mission, DOD will lack the information it needs to assess whether it is achieving this goal  To assess its progress toward achieving this goal, it will be critical for decision makers to have accurate financial information  According to a DOD Comptroller official, the Financial Management Regulation provides flexibility in how obligations are categorized and reported internally and to Congress, but DOD has not evaluated options to report more accurate funding information on its document services  Unless DOD evaluates options to report more accurate funding information and takes steps to improve the accuracy of its budgetary and financial information reporting, DOD and Congress will not have the full visibility over these costs that they need to make informed decisions  DOD is taking important steps to address congressional concerns about its spending on document service activities  Most notably, DOD is implementing its plan to transform its DLA Document Services mission and has taken certain steps to reduce the number and cost of print devices  These efforts have begun to produce results, but DOD can do more to build on these gains  By better managing fragmentation in printing and reproduction services, DOD could ensure that DLA Document Services is providing the best value in obtaining document services  DOD could further reduce overlap in print device procurement by assessing the various approaches employed by DLA and the military services to determine what constitutes the most cost-effective approach for the department  DOD has set goals intended to reduce the number of print devices and realize tens of millions of dollars in savings each year, but it has not demonstrated that it has achieved these savings, because of limitations in internal controls  Additional efforts aimed at collecting and analyzing information to examine areas for further consolidation of DLA Document Services’ mission specialty locations might provide DOD with additional cost savings  DOD’s O&M budget materials for printing and reproduction activities include information on non-printing activities that make up a much larger portion of its reported spending than printing does  In addition, these O&M budget materials omit information that would capture the full scope of DOD’s document services mission, such as device procurement and electronic content management, which are included with information technology budget materials  By providing more accurate costs for its document services activities, DOD would ensure that Congress and departmental leaders have the insight needed to make informed decisions  We are making a total of six recommendations to DOD  The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment assesses whether DLA Document Services’ single manager role for printing and reproduction provides the best value to the government—as determined by quality, price, and delivery time and in light of DLA Document Services’ transformation plan—and whether any additional efficiencies are possible, and use the results of that assessment to inform the revision of DOD Instruction 5330 03  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment assesses whether DOD’s current approach to obtaining print devices represents the best value to the government or whether other approaches, such as further consolidations under DLA Document Services as a proposed single manager for print device procurement, would be more cost effective  (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the DOD CIO implements controls, such as reporting procedures, to routinely monitor actions to reduce the number of print devices, consistent with department-wide goals for reducing the number of print devices that are included in the CIO’s 2012 memorandum  (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the DOD CIO assigns responsibility for implementing the CIO’s 2012 memorandum on optimizing the use of employee information technology devices  (Recommendation 4) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Director, DLA, in coordination with the Director, DLA Document Services and following implementation of the current transformation plan, gathers data on workload revenue at retained facilities and all mission specialties and evaluate whether additional opportunities for consolidation exist based on those data  (Recommendation 5) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in consultation with the military services and DLA, evaluates options to report more accurate funding information and takes steps to improve the accuracy of its budgetary and financial information reporting on document services internally and to Congress, including making distinctions between printing and non-printing-related costs and information on device procurement and electronic content management  This information could be provided as part of DOD’s annual O&M budget justification materials  (Recommendation 6) We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment  In its written comments, DOD concurred with five recommendations and identified specific actions and time frames for addressing them, and it partially concurred with the remaining recommendation  DOD’s written comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II  DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, where appropriate  DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in consultation with the military services and DLA, evaluate options to report more accurate funding information and take steps to improve the accuracy of budgetary and financial information reporting on document services internally and to Congress, including making distinctions between printing and non- printing-related costs and information on device procurement and electronic content management  Our recommendation noted that this information could be provided as part of DOD’s annual O&M budget justification materials  DOD stated that the budget materials it submits to Congress are in compliance with OMB Circular A-11’s definitions of printing and reproduction and equipment  It further noted that Working Capital Fund exhibits provided with each annual budget include a breakout, by service, of the appropriated and Working Capital Fund activities and a detailed accounting of unit cost and pricing for all sub- activities of DLA Document Services  As we noted in our report, a DOD Comptroller official told us that the Financial Management Regulation provides DOD with flexibility in categorizing and reporting obligations internally and to Congress  However, we found that, based on this flexibility, DOD’s O&M budget materials reported obligations for printing and reproduction that were primarily for non-printing activities, such as the purchase of advertising and radio and television time  This budget information did not represent the full scope of DOD’s document services mission, since it omitted obligations for print device procurement and electronic content management  We also reported that DOD had not evaluated options to report more accurate funding information on its document services  DOD’s comments did not include plans to address this recommendation  We continue to believe that by providing more accurate costs for its document services activities, DOD would ensure that Congress and departmental leaders have the insight needed to make more informed decisions  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the DOD Chief Information Officer, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2775 or fielde1@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  Our objectives were to evaluate (1) the progress the Department of Defense (DOD) has made in achieving efficiencies in its document services and opportunities, if any, for further efficiencies, and (2) the extent to which DOD reports accurate financial information about its document services to key stakeholders  For our first objective, we reviewed DOD documents and interviewed DOD officials in order to understand how each military service obtains document services and identify department-wide and military service efficiency initiatives for these services  We also reviewed the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) and the military services’ document services activities and compared them with a DOD statutory periodic review; DOD Instructions and other guidance; Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance; internal control standards; and best practices for consolidation initiatives, efficiency initiatives, and strategic sourcing to identify any potentially unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation and any opportunities for greater efficiencies  For specific efficiency initiatives identified by DOD officials or in DOD documents, we interviewed DOD officials regarding their progress in implementing and meeting the goals of these initiatives  To evaluate DLA Document Services’ transformation plan, we interviewed DLA Document Services officials, reviewed DLA Document Services documents regarding the plan, and assessed that plan based on leading practices for consolidation and efficiency initiatives  To assess the plan against these practices, one analyst reviewed the testimony and documents provided and compared it to our key questions to consider when evaluating proposals to consolidate physical infrastructure and management functions  A second analyst reviewed and concurred with the first analyst’s assessments  In any cases where there was a disagreement, the analysts discussed any discrepancies  If they were not resolved, a third analyst reviewed the assessments  To assess the extent to which there may be additional opportunities for facility consolidations, we obtained DLA Document Services data on revenue reported by each facility, which DOD Document Services officials told us they used in determining which facilities to consolidate as a part of their transformation plan  We analyzed the share of mission specialty revenue reported by facilities that (1) were retained by DLA Document Services for a given mission specialty, (2) were retained but not for a given specialty, and (3) were not retained  We further divided those facilities retained for a given specialty into quartiles to better understand the concentration of revenue in those facilities  To assess the reliability of these data, we interviewed DLA Documents Services officials regarding how the data were gathered, analyzed, reported, and used  We found that these data were reliable for the purpose of analyzing the shares of mission specialty revenue represented by each facility or group of facilities  To compare the cost of print devices offered by DLA Document Services, the Army, and the Air Force, we gathered and analyzed data on the monthly cost of multifunction devices with comparable specifications  We compared costs for similar devices based on device specifications including print speeds, monthly volumes, and paper capacities  Because Army and Air Force costs are estimated and there might be other differences in device specifications, approaches to obtaining devices, and which associated services were included, this analysis does not allow us to conclude which sources provide the greatest value  However, it illustrates differences in the cost of print devices across sources  For DLA Document Services, we used DLA Document Services’ standard monthly pricing for 2018 for various categories of multifunction devices  For the Army, Army officials were unable to provide data on the cost of multifunction devices purchased by Army customers  Instead, they provided us with documentation of vendor responses to requests for quotes from the Army’s mandatory source for print devices from April 2017 through January 2018  We reviewed those documents and assigned each device to a DLA Document Services category, based on the device’s specifications as identified in the documentation  We then estimated the monthly cost for each device  For leased devices, we used the monthly cost of the lease  For purchased devices, we used the total cost of the device divided by an estimated service life for the device  We estimated this service life using some indication available in the documentation, such as the length of time a maintenance agreement or extended warranty was provided for the device  Army officials provided 183 quotes for devices  Of those, we were able to include 24 in our analysis  We excluded the other 159 because either we could not determine the cost for individual devices in a quote, there was not enough information on a device’s specifications, there was no DLA Document Services equivalent for the device, or we were unable to estimate a service life based on the information provided  Because the information included all vendor quotes provided and not just those that were selected by a customer, the costs may not represent the actual costs of devices to the customer  For the Air Force, we used an estimated average monthly cost based the standard pricing included in the Air Force’s 2018 catalog for print devices  We reviewed the catalog and assigned each multifunction device offered to a DLA Document Services category, based on the devices’ specifications  The Air Force’s catalog contained 32 devices; we were able to determine the equivalent DLA Document Services category for 13 of those devices  All devices in the Air Force’s catalog are available for purchase and include a 4-year maintenance agreement; therefore, we estimated the average monthly cost as the purchase price divided by 48  To evaluate the extent to which DOD reports accurate and complete financial information to key stakeholders to manage its document services, we analyzed DOD’s operation and maintenance (O&M) budget justification materials for fiscal years 2012 through 2016 and Defense Logistics Agency data on its document services mission  We focused our review on O&M obligations reported by DLA and the military services, which accounted for an average of about 92 percent of DOD’s total document service costs reported by DLA Document Services in fiscal years 2012 through 2016  We interviewed officials, including officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), DLA Document Services, and the military services to determine how they reported costs for document services  We assessed the information we collected against federal accounting standards on how information should be recorded and communicated to management and others  To determine the reliability of the O&M budget justification data provided to us by DOD, we obtained information on how the data were collected, managed, and used through interviews with relevant officials  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to represent the military services’ total O&M obligations for document services for fiscal years 2012 through 2016  We interviewed officials and, where appropriate, obtained documentation, from the following organizations: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Department of Defense Chief Information Officer Defense Logistics Agency – Chief Information Officer Defense Logistics Agency – Document Services Defense Information Systems Agency – Joint Service Provider Army Chief Information Officer Army Publishing Directorate Army Marketing Research Group Army 7th Signal Command Headquarters Air Force – Chief Information Officer Department of the Navy – Chief Information Officer Headquarters Marine Corps Command, Control, Communications, Headquarters Marine Corps Publishing and Logistics Headquarters Marine Corps Budget and Execution Marine Corps Combat Camera Marine Corps Reprographic Equipment Management Program We conducted this performance audit from August 2017 to October 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the contact named above, Matthew Ullengren (Assistant Director), Adam Hatton (Analyst in Charge), Adam Brooks, Joanne Landesman, Amie Lesser, Daniel Ramsey, Carter Stevens, and Walter Vance made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: According to the Navy, its 51 attack submarines provide the United States an asymmetric advantage to gather intelligence undetected, attack enemy targets, and insert special forces, among others. These capabilities make attack submarines some of the most–requested assets by the global combatant commanders. GAO was asked to review the readiness of the Navy's attack submarine force. This report discusses the extent to which the Navy (1) has experienced maintenance delays in its attack submarine fleet and costs associated with any delays; and (2) has addressed any challenges and developed mitigation plans for any maintenance delays. GAO analyzed readiness information from fiscal years 2008-2018, operating and support costs, maintenance performance, and other data; visited attack submarines and squadrons; and interviewed public and private shipyard and fleet officials. This is a public version of a classified report issued in October 2018. Information the Department of Defense deemed classified or sensitive, such as attack submarine force structure requirements and detailed data on attack submarine maintenance delays, has been omitted. The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and support cost expenditures. GAO's analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between fiscal year 2008 and 2018, attack submarines have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards. For example, the Navy originally scheduled the USS Boise to enter a shipyard for an extended maintenance period in 2013 but, due to heavy shipyard workload, the Navy delayed the start of the maintenance period. In June 2016, the USS Boise could no longer conduct normal operations and the boat has remained idle, pierside for over two years since then waiting to enter a shipyard (see figure). GAO estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has spent more than $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle while waiting to enter the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards. The Navy has started to address challenges related to workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards. However, it has not effectively allocated maintenance periods among public shipyards and private shipyards that may also be available to help minimize attack submarine idle time. GAO's analysis found that while the public shipyards have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing. The Navy may have options to mitigate this idle time and maintenance delays by leveraging private shipyard capacity for repair work. But the Navy has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis as recommended by Department of Defense guidelines to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. Navy leadership has acknowledged that they need to be more proactive in leveraging potential private shipyard repair capacity. Without addressing this challenge, the Navy risks continued expenditure of operating and support funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance. GAO recommends that the Navy conduct a business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO's recommendation.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The Navy currently has 51 attack submarines—comprising 33 Los Angeles class, 3 Seawolf class, and 15 Virginia class submarines (see fig  1)  Attack submarines are homeported at bases in the United States: in New London, Connecticut; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Norfolk, Virginia; San Diego, California; and Bangor, Washington; 4 are homeported overseas, in the U S  territory of Guam  Submarine Safety Controls and Culture On April 10, 1963, the USS Thresher (SSN 593) sank during deep submergence tests off the coast of New England  One hundred and twelve officers and enlisted sailors and 17 civilians perished in the tragedy  The accident investigation concluded that the Navy did not have adequate procedures in place to prevent and respond to a catastrophic flooding incident  time, and that maintenance delays reduce the amount of time during which ships and submarines are available for training and operations  Submarine fleet and squadron officials emphasized the strict safety culture that permeates the submarine community  This emphasis on meeting safety certification criteria means that the Navy operates a supply-based submarine force that does not compromise on adherence to training and maintenance standards to meet combatant commander demands, according to these officials (see sidebar)  Officials added that the Navy will delay deployment dates if necessary to ensure that these standards are met  As a result, deployed readiness is high and attack submarines are in excellent materiel condition as compared with the rest of the Navy fleet  The loss of the USS Thresher and its crew spurred the Navy to establish stringent safety requirements for submarines to prevent another loss at sea  Following the accident, the Navy established submarine safety certification criteria to provide maximum reasonable assurance that critical systems would protect the crew from flooding and allow the submarine to conduct an emergency surfacing should flooding occur  This program, known as SUBSAFE, is still in use today, to ensure that these critical systems receive a high quality of work and that all work is properly documented  According to the Navy, the SUBSAFE certification status of a submarine is fundamental to its mission capability, as it provides a thorough and systematic approach to quality, and to a culture that permeates the entire submarine community  According to Navy officials, since the SUBSAFE program was established in 1963, no SUBSAFE-certified submarine has ever been lost  The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and support cost expenditures  Our analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between fiscal year 2008 and the end of fiscal year 2018, attack submarines will have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards  Our analysis found that the primary driver affecting attack submarines are delays in completing depot maintenance  For example, of the 10,363 total days of lost time since fiscal year 2008, 8,472 (82 percent) were due to depot maintenance delays  As we previously reported, completing ship and submarine maintenance on time is essential to Navy readiness, as maintenance periods lasting longer than planned could reduce the number of days during which ships and crews are available for training or operations  Attack submarines also face delays in beginning maintenance when the public shipyards have no available capacity, in some cases forcing submarines to idle pierside because they are no longer certified to conduct normal operations  According to Navy officials, the SUBSAFE program—its program to ensure and certify submarine safety—requires submarines to adhere to strict maintenance schedules and pass materiel condition assessments before they are allowed to submerge  Attack submarines that go too long without receiving required maintenance are at risk of having their materiel certification expire  Should this certification expire, these submarines are restricted to sitting idle, pierside, while they wait until a shipyard has the capacity to begin their maintenance period (see fig  2)  We found that since fiscal year 2008, 14 attack submarines have spent a combined 61 months (1,891 days) idling while waiting to enter shipyards for maintenance  Idle time incurred while waiting to begin a maintenance period is often coupled with maintenance delays while at the shipyards, thus compounding total delays  We also found that the Navy incurs significant costs in operating and supporting submarines that are experiencing maintenance delays and idle time  We analyzed the operating and support costs the Navy incurs on average to estimate the costs of crewing, maintaining, and supporting attack submarines that are delayed in getting into and out of the shipyards  Using historical daily cost data the Navy adjusted for inflation, we estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has spent more than $1 5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars on attack submarines sitting idle while waiting to enter the shipyards, and on those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards (see table 1)  While the Navy would incur these costs regardless of whether the submarine was delayed, idled, or deployed, our estimate of $1 5 billion represents costs incurred from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2018 for attack submarines without receiving any operational capability in return  While acknowledging the magnitude of these costs, Navy officials stated that there may be some benefits that could be realized from these operating and support costs since crews on idle attack submarines can conduct some limited training  Operating and support costs include payment of crew salaries, purchasing of spare parts, and conducting of maintenance, among other things, but they do not represent the full operational impact incurred by the Navy from the idle time and maintenance delays  For example, attack submarine depot-level maintenance requires the use of a drydock, and officials from the three public shipyards we visited told us that their drydock capacity was limited  A delayed attack submarine maintenance period can restrict the use of a drydock for much longer than originally anticipated, thereby preventing the shipyard from using that drydock to maintain other vessels, including other types of ships, or to conduct necessary repairs on the facilities  The Navy has started to address workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards  These efforts to address the Navy’s maintenance challenges are important steps, but they will require several years of sustained management attention to reach fruition  As we reported in September 2017, maintenance on ships and submarines may be delayed for numerous reasons, including workforce gaps and inexperience, the poor condition of facilities and equipment, parts shortages, changes in planned maintenance work, and weather  According to Navy officials, all of these issues continue to affect the Navy’s ability to complete attack submarine maintenance on time  According to officials, the Navy has begun to address some of these challenges  For example: The public shipyards have been hiring to address workforce shortages  The number of civilian full-time employees at the shipyards increased from 25,087 in 2007 to 34,160 in 2017, with a goal to reach 36,100 by 2020  Navy officials cautioned that this newly hired workforce is largely inexperienced and will require time to attain full proficiency  The Navy has released a plan to guide public shipyard capital investments  In September 2017 we reported that the Navy projected an inability to support 50 planned submarine maintenance periods over the ensuing 23 years, due to capacity and capability shortfalls at the public shipyards  We recommended that the Navy develop a comprehensive plan for shipyard capital investment  In February 2018 the Navy published its shipyard optimization plan, outlining an estimated $21 billion investment needed to address shipyard facility and equipment needs over 20 years to meet the operational needs of the current Navy fleet, but not the larger fleet size planned for the future  While the public shipyards have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing  The Navy expects the maintenance backlogs at the public shipyards to continue  We estimate that, as a result of these backlogs, the Navy will incur approximately $266 million in operating and support costs in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars for idle submarines from fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year 2023, as well as additional depot maintenance delays  The Navy may have options to mitigate idle time and maintenance delays  For example, officials at the private shipyards—General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News Shipbuilding—told us that they will have available capacity for repair work for at least the next 5 years  Although the Navy has shifted about 8 million man-hours in attack submarine maintenance to private shipyards over the past 5 years, it has done so sporadically, having decided to do so in some cases only after experiencing lengthy periods of idle time  According to private shipyard officials, the sporadic shifts in workload have resulted in repair workload gaps that have disrupted private shipyard workforce, performance, and capital investment—creating costs that are ultimately borne in part by the Navy  We believe that the Navy has not fully mitigated this challenge because it has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards, and to proactively minimize attack submarine idle time and maintenance delays  Such an analysis would help the Navy better assess private shipyard capacity to perform attack submarine maintenance and would help it incorporate a complete accounting of all costs, benefits, and risks, including: the large operating and support costs of having attack submarines sitting idle; the qualitative benefits associated with providing additional availability to the combatant commanders; and the potential for additional work at private shipyards to reduce schedule risk to submarine construction programs by allowing the yards to build and maintain a stable shipyard workforce  The April 2011 DOD Product Support Business Case Analysis Guidebook provides standards for DOD’s process for conducting analyses of costs, benefits, and risks  It states that data sources used to conduct a business case analysis should be comprehensive and should include both quantitative and qualitative values  It notes that benefits, such as the availability of a weapon system, may be qualitative in nature, and that DOD should evaluate all possible support options, to include government- and contractor-provided maintenance  Navy leadership has acknowledged that they need to be more proactive in leveraging private shipyard repair capacity, but officials cautioned that maintenance could cost more at a private shipyard than at a public shipyard  However, without a complete accounting of all costs, benefits, and risks, the Navy will remain unable to determine whether the cost of performing a maintenance period at a private shipyard would outweigh the mission benefits of having reduced idle time, additional operational availability, and the potential for reduced risk to submarine construction programs  The nation’s investment in attack submarines provides the United States an asymmetric advantage to gather intelligence undetected, attack enemy targets, and insert special forces, among other capabilities  However, the Navy’s attack submarine fleet has suffered from persistent and costly maintenance delays  Although the Navy has several activities underway to reduce maintenance delays for the attack submarine fleet, it has not yet taken additional steps to maximize attack submarine readiness that fully address challenges such as the allocation of maintenance periods between public and private shipyards  Without addressing this challenge, the Navy will not achieve the full benefit of the nation’s investment in its attack submarines, and it risks continued expenditure of operating and support funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance  The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Chief of Naval Operations conducts a business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards; this analysis should include an assessment of private shipyard capacity to perform attack submarine maintenance, and should incorporate a complete accounting of both (a) the costs and risks associated with attack submarines sitting idle, and (b) the qualitative benefits associated with having the potential to both mitigate risk in new submarine construction and provide additional availability to the combatant commanders  We provided a draft of the classified version of the report to DOD for review and comment  That draft contained the same recommendation as this unclassified version as well as three additional recommendations DOD deemed sensitive  In written comments provided by DOD (reprinted in appendix II), DOD concurred with our recommendation stating that it has taken the first steps to take a more holistic view of submarine maintenance requirements and impacts across both the public and private shipyards  The Navy also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy, and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  To assess the extent to which the Navy has experienced maintenance delays in its attack submarine fleet, we analyzed attack submarine maintenance delay and idle time data from Naval Sea Systems Command, and we reviewed prior GAO work on shipyard maintenance delays  The Navy determines depot maintenance delays by counting each day in which a submarine maintenance period extends beyond the planned completion date  Two Navy offices within Naval Sea Systems Command—that is, the Logistics, Maintenance, and Industrial Operations office and Program Executive Office Submarines—track days incurred from depot-level maintenance delays and idle time  To determine the total number of days of maintenance delays for each fiscal year within our scope, we subtracted the planned completion date from the actual completion date to produce the number of days of maintenance delays for each maintenance period for each submarine  We added together the days of maintenance delays across all attack submarines for each fiscal year, and then added the fiscal year totals to produce the overall total  Although the data included some maintenance periods that began before fiscal year 2008, we counted days of maintenance delays only from periods that were incurred in fiscal years 2008 through 2018  We also tracked the total number of days that the Navy completed maintenance periods ahead of schedule—that is, 153—but we noted these separately instead of subtracting them from the total number of days of maintenance delays  To estimate costs associated with these delays, we analyzed annual data from fiscal years 2011 through 2017 (the most current data available at the time of our review) from the Navy’s Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs system  We also reviewed prior work on determining the operating and support costs of Navy ships  The Navy calculates total operating and support expenditures for each attack submarine on an annual basis, as well as the yearly average expenditure for each attack submarine class, including Los Angeles class, Seawolf class, and Virginia class blocks one and two  For each class, we converted the Navy’s annual class averages into daily average costs by adding the annual class averages together for each year that data were available, fiscal years 2011 through 2017, then dividing that number by the total number of days  We then multiplied the daily class average by the total number of days of maintenance delays and idle time incurred by submarines within that class, according to our calculations outlined above, between fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2018, and we added these totals together to produce the total estimated operating and support cost for days of maintenance delays and idle time incurred during this period  The data did not include annual class average costs for fiscal years 2008, 2009, 2010, or 2018  However, the annual class averages for fiscal years 2011 through 2017 did not show significant variation, so we applied these averages to 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2018  To assess the extent to which the Navy has addressed any challenges and developed mitigation plans for any maintenance delays, we reviewed the Navy’s plans to address attack submarine maintenance delays and interviewed Navy headquarters, fleet, and squadron officials, attack submarine crews, and public and private shipyard officials to understand any plans to address attack submarine maintenance delays and idle time  We analyzed data on factors contributing to attack submarine maintenance delays, such as cannibalization rates  We visited three of the four public shipyards, including Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and Norfolk Naval Shipyard, to observe operations, training, and the condition of the facilities and equipment, and to interview officials about challenges affecting operational efficiency and performance  We also met with Navy maintainers at Naval Station Norfolk and Naval Submarine Base New London, and with the crew of the submarine tenders USS Frank Cable (AS-40) and USS Emory S  Land (AS-39) in Guam  We toured the two private shipyards that conduct attack submarine repair work—General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News Shipbuilding—and interviewed executives at both locations  We also toured attack submarines and met with crew leadership, selected according to which submarines and crews were available for tours at each of the sites we visited  We visited the USS Boise (SSN 764) at Naval Station Norfolk and four attack submarines in depot-level maintenance: the USS Albany (SSN 753), the USS Jefferson City (SSN 759), the USS New Mexico (SSN 779), and the USS Springfield (SSN 761)  We met with the crews of two attack submarines assigned to the operating forces at the time of our visit, the USS Missouri (SSN 780) and the USS North Dakota (SSN 784)  We evaluated the Navy’s plans to address any challenges against criteria in federal standards for internal control, which state that agencies should evaluate performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks; the Department of Defense’s business case analysis guidebook, which provides standards for the process used to conduct analyses of costs, benefits, and risks; the Project Management Book of Knowledge, which provides best practices for project management; and the Secretary of the Navy’s December 2017 Strategic Readiness Review, which calls for the early identification of systemic risks before problems occur  To assess the reliability of the data sources for conducting analyses to address all of the objectives in this report, we reviewed systems documentation and interviewed officials to understand system operating procedures, organizational roles and responsibilities, and error-checking mechanisms  We selected the time frames for each of the data series above after assessing their availability and reliability, to maximize the amount of data available for us to make meaningful comparisons  We assessed the reliability of each of the data sources  The Navy provided information based on our questions regarding data reliability, including information on an overview of the data, data-collection processes and procedures, data quality controls, and overall perceptions of data quality  The Navy provided documentation of how the systems are structured and what written procedures are in place to help ensure that the appropriate information is collected and properly categorized  Additionally, we interviewed Navy officials to obtain further clarification on data reliability, discuss how the data were collected and reported, and explain how we planned to use the data  We also conducted our own error checks to look for inaccurate or questionable data, and we discussed with officials any data irregularities we found  We conducted these assessments on the following data for attack submarines: Navy deployed and surge-ready submarines from fiscal years 2011 through 2018; maintenance timeliness from fiscal years 2000 through 2018; idle time from fiscal years 2008 through 2018; operating and support costs from fiscal years 2011 through 2017; and cannibalization rates from 2012 through 2017  Some of these data were used in prior reports, and their reliability had previously been assessed  After further assessing any data that we had not recently used, we determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of summarizing attack submarine readiness trends and related information  We interviewed officials, and where appropriate obtained documentation, at the following locations: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Undersea Warfare Division (N97) Warfare Integration Division (N83) U S  Fleet Forces Command Commander, Submarine Force, U S  Atlantic Fleet Commander, Submarine Squadron 4 Commander, Regional Support Group Groton Commander, Submarine Force, U S  Pacific Fleet Commander, Submarine Squadron 1 Commander, Submarine Squadron 7 Commander, Submarine Squadron 15 Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Logistics, Maintenance, and Industrial Operations (NAVSEA 04) Program Executive Office, Submarines Attack Submarine Program Office (PMS 392) Submarine Maintenance Engineering, Planning, and Procurement (SUBMEPP) Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP) Newport News, Virginia Navy Education and Training Command Submarine Learning Facility Norfolk Navy Board of Inspection and Survey Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine Newport News Shipbuilding, Virginia, operated by Huntington Ingalls Industries Electric Boat, Groton, Connecticut, operated by General Dynamics The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from August 2017 to October 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We worked with DOD to prepare this unclassified version of the report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards  Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are Classified  Classified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances and need to know, upon request  Columbia Class Submarine: Immature Technologies Present Risks to Achieving Cost Schedule and Performance Goals  GAO-18-158  Washington, D C : Dec  21, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Affecting the Fleet  GAO-17-809T  Washington, D C : Sept  19, 2017  Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions that Affect Operations  GAO-17-548  Washington, D C : Sept  12, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-798T  Washington, D C : Sept  7, 2017  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-841  Washington, D C : Sept  7, 2016  Navy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness  GAO-16-481RC  Washington, D C : May 25, 2016  (SECRET//NOFORN) Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan  GAO-16-466R  Washington, D C : May 2, 2016  Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports  GAO-15-329  Washington, D C : May 29, 2015  In addition to the contact named above, Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Chris Watson, Analyst in Charge; Herb Bowsher; Chris Cronin; Ally Gonzalez; Cynthia Grant; Carol Petersen; Amber Sinclair; and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this report 


Report 2:  FNS has taken steps to increase federal support of states’ SNAP E&T programs by increasing the number of federal staff responsible for SNAP E&T and providing additional technical assistance to states  Specifically, FNS officials said that in 2014, they created the Office of Employment and Training to provide support and oversight for the SNAP E&T program and expanded SNAP E&T staff in FNS headquarters from one to five fulltime employees  FNS has also taken steps to increase technical assistance to states  For example, they have developed tools, including the SNAP E&T Operations Handbook, intended to help states implement and grow their program, and by adding a dedicated SNAP E&T official in each of FNS’s seven regional offices  According to FNS, regional officials have targeted technical assistance to states on, for example, developing third-party partnerships, and they have emphasized evidence-based approaches to administering the program, such as providing skills-based training for in-demand occupations  FNS officials rely on various information sources to oversee states’ SNAP E&T programs, including participant outcome data reported by states for the first time in January 2018  For example, FNS officials conduct management evaluation reviews of states, annually review states’ SNAP E&T plans for compliance, and collect data from states on program participation and expenditures  In addition, as of January 2018, FNS has begun receiving new data on SNAP E&T program participants and outcomes from states  These data include employment outcomes, such as the number of SNAP E&T participants in unsubsidized employment after participation in the program, and participant characteristics, such as the number of participants entering the program with a high school degree or equivalent  FNS officials said that although states generally submitted the new data on time, states experienced challenges that likely affected the accuracy of the data  For example, some states needed to manually collect data on participant characteristics due to the limited capacity of their data systems  Further, according to FNS officials, some states did not correctly interpret certain reporting definitions or time periods  To address these challenges, FNS officials have been providing technical assistance to states to help them refine their participant and outcome data reports  Officials told us that they expect the states to submit revised reports by May 2018; we will examine these data and related issues in our ongoing work  FNS and the states partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud, and FNS has taken some steps to address challenges in these areas, but concerns remain  For example, regarding SNAP recipient and retailer fraud, FNS has taken some steps to address challenges identified in our 2006 and 2014 reports related to fraud committed by SNAP recipients and authorized retailers, but more remains to be done  We currently have ongoing work to assess the steps FNS and states have taken to address our recommendations related to recipient and retailer fraud and other program vulnerabilities  In 2016, we reviewed SNAP improper payment rates and found that states’ adoption of program flexibilities and changes in federal SNAP policy in the previous decade, as well as improper payment rate calculation methods, likely affected these rates  For example, when states adopted available SNAP policy flexibilities that simplified or lessened participant reporting requirements, these changes reduced the opportunity for error and led to a decline in the improper payment rate, according to a USDA study  In addition, we found that the methodology SNAP used to calculate its improper payment rate was generally similar to the methodologies used for other large federal programs for low- income individuals, including Medicaid, Earned Income Tax Credit, and Supplemental Security Income  However, we also found that some of the procedural and methodological differences in the rate calculation among these programs likely affected the resulting improper payment rates, such as how cases with insufficient information or certain kinds of errors were factored into the improper payment rate  In 2014, USDA identified SNAP improper payment data quality issues in some states and has since been working with the states to improve improper payment estimates  Although USDA reported national SNAP improper payment estimates for benefits paid through fiscal year 2014, USDA did not report a national SNAP improper payment estimate for benefits paid in fiscal years 2015 or 2016  In response to a report from USDA’s Office of Inspector General that identified concerns in the application of SNAP’s quality control process, which is used to identify improper payments, USDA began a review of state quality control systems in all states in 2014  According to USDA, due to the data quality issues uncovered in 42 of 53 states during the reviews, the improper payment rates for those states could not be validated, and the department was unable to calculate a national improper payment rate for benefits paid in fiscal year 2015  To address the data quality concerns, USDA updated guidance, provided training to relevant state and federal staff, and worked with states to update their procedures to ensure consistency with federal guidelines  According to USDA, the department also required individual states to develop corrective action plans to address issues identified and monitored progress to ensure states took identified actions  On June 30, 2017, USDA notified the states that the department would not release a national SNAP improper payment rate for benefits paid in fiscal year 2016 and remained focused on conducting the fiscal year 2017 review  FNS has increased its oversight of state anti-fraud activities in recent years by developing new guidance and providing training and technical assistance to states on detecting fraud by SNAP recipients and reporting on anti-fraud activities to FNS  In 2014, we reported on 11 selected states’ efforts to combat SNAP recipient fraud and made several recommendations to FNS to address the challenges states faced  We found that FNS and states faced challenges in the following areas: Guidance on use of data tools to detect fraud: States faced challenges using FNS-recommended data tools to detect fraud, and FNS is in the process of developing improved guidance to address this concern  Specifically, FNS’s guidance on the use of EBT transaction data to uncover potential patterns of benefit trafficking lacked the specificity states needed to uncover such activity, and we recommended FNS develop additional guidance  Since then, FNS contracted with a private consulting firm to provide 10 states with technical assistance in recipient fraud prevention and detection, which included exploring the use of data analytics to analyze and interpret eligibility and transaction data to identify patterns or trends and create models that incorporate predictive analytics  FNS officials also recently told us that the agency is developing a SNAP Fraud Framework to provide guidance to states on improving fraud prevention and detection  FNS officials anticipated releasing the framework in mid- 2018  Tools for monitoring e-commerce websites: We also found FNS- recommended tools for automatically monitoring potential SNAP trafficking on e-commerce websites to be of limited use and less effective than manual searches, and FNS has developed but not finalized guidance on using such tools  We recommended that FNS reassess the effectiveness of its current guidance and tools for states to monitor e-commerce and social media websites  In August 2017, FNS officials told us that they had developed revised guidance for states on using social media in detection of SNAP trafficking  According to FNS, the guidance will be incorporated into the SNAP Fraud Framework  Staff levels: During the time of our 2014 work, most of our 11 selected states reported difficulties conducting fraud investigations due to reduced or stagnant staff levels while numbers of SNAP recipients had greatly increased, but FNS decided not to make changes to address this issue  Specifically, 8 of the 11 states we reviewed reported inadequate staffing due to attrition, turnover, or lack of funding  Some states suggested changing the financial incentive structure to promote fraud investigations because agencies were not rewarded for cost-effective, anti-fraud efforts that could prevent ineligible people from receiving benefits  Specifically, when fraud by a SNAP recipient is discovered, a state may generally retain 35 percent of any recovered overpayments  However, there are no recovered funds when a state detects potential fraud by an applicant and denies the application  To help address states’ concerns about resources needed to conduct investigations, we recommended in our 2014 report that FNS explore ways that federal financial incentives could be used to better support cost-effective anti-fraud strategies  FNS reported that it took some steps to explore alternative financial incentives, through a review of responses to a Request for Information in the Federal Register  However, FNS decided not to pursue bonus awards for anti-fraud and program integrity activities  Given that FNS has not made changes in this area, state SNAP fraud agencies may continue to report resource concerns in addressing fraud  Reporting guidance: We also found that FNS did not have consistent and reliable data on states’ activities because of unclear reporting guidance, and FNS has since revised its data collection form and provided training on the changes  To improve FNS’s ability to monitor states and obtain information about more efficient and effective ways to combat recipient fraud, we recommended in 2014 that FNS take steps, such as providing guidance and training, to enhance the consistency of what states report on their anti-fraud activities  In response, FNS revised the form used to collect recipient integrity information and changed the reporting frequency from annual to quarterly, effective fiscal year 2017  FNS officials also reported providing training to approximately 400 state agency and FNS regional office personnel on the updates to the form and related instructions  In our ongoing work, we are further reviewing states’ use of data analytics to identify SNAP recipient fraud, including that which may be occurring during out-of-state transactions  Because transactions that may appear suspicious—such as those made out-of-state—may in fact be legitimate, states may use data analytic techniques to include additional factors that may help them better target their efforts to identify potential fraud  However, states may have different levels of capacity for using data analytics to detect fraud  We are examining how 7 selected states are using data analytics and identifying the advantages and challenges states have experienced in doing so  We are also assessing FNS’s efforts to assist states in implementing GAO’s leading practices for data analytics outlined in GAO’s Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs outlined in GAO’s Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs  In addition, we are conducting our own analysis of EBT out-of-state SNAP transaction data  We expect to report on our findings later this year  FNS has taken some steps to prevent, detect, and respond to retailers who traffic SNAP benefits since our last report on the issue in 2006, but trafficking continues to be a problem  For example, in February 2018, a federal jury convicted a grocery store operator in Baltimore on charges of wire fraud in connection with a scheme to traffic more than $1 6 million in SNAP benefits for food sales that never occurred  The grocery store operator paid cash for SNAP benefits, typically paying the recipient half the value of the benefits and keeping the other half for himself  In our 2006 report, we found that SNAP was vulnerable to retailer trafficking in several areas, including: Requirements for food that retailers must stock to participate in SNAP: In 2006, we found that FNS had minimal requirements for the amounts of food that retailers must stock, which could allow retailers more likely to traffic into the program, although the agency has since taken steps to increase these requirements  In our 2006 report, FNS officials said that they authorized stores with limited food stock to provide access to food in low-income areas where large grocery stores were scarce  At that time, retailers were generally required to stock a minimum of 12 food items (at least 3 varieties of 4 staple food categories, such as fruits and vegetables), but FNS rules did not specify how many items of each variety would constitute sufficient stock  FNS officials told us that a retailer that only carries small quantities of food, such as a few cans of one kind of vegetable, may intend to traffic  In 2016, FNS promulgated a final rule increasing food stock requirements  FNS officials told us that these new rules are designed to encourage stores to provide more healthy food options for recipients and discourage trafficking  According to FNS, retailers are now generally required to stock at least 36 food items (a certain variety and quantity of staple foods in each of the 4 staple food categories)  Focus on high-risk retailers: We also found in 2006 that FNS had not conducted analyses to identify characteristics of retailers at high risk of trafficking and to target its resources—a shortcoming FNS has since taken some steps to address  For example, we reported that some stores may be at risk of trafficking because one or more previous owners had been found trafficking at the same location  However, FNS did not have a system in place to ensure that these retailers were quickly targeted for heightened attention  In addition, once a store was authorized to participate in the program, FNS staff typically would not inspect the store again until it applied for reauthorization 5 years later  We recommended that FNS identify the stores most likely to traffic and provide earlier, more targeted oversight to those stores  In 2009, FNS began establishing risk levels for each authorized retailer, identifying high-risk stores as those with a prior permanent disqualification at that location or a nearby location  In 2013, FNS required all high-risk retailers to go through reauthorization and to provide additional documentation regarding store ownership  That same year, FNS also consolidated its retailer management functions, including those for authorizing stores and analyzing EBT transaction data, into a single national structure known as the Retailer Operations Division  FNS officials told us that this structure enables the agency to identify and deploy their investigative resources to the areas of highest risk nationally, rather than within a given region  Penalties to deter retailer trafficking: We also found in our 2006 report that FNS’s penalties for retailer trafficking may be insufficient to deter traffickers, and since then, FNS has proposed—but not finalized—rules to increase them  FNS imposes administrative penalties for retailer trafficking—generally a permanent disqualification from the program or a monetary penalty  FNS relies on the USDA Office of Inspector General (OIG) and other law enforcement entities to conduct investigations that can lead to criminal prosecutions  In our 2006 report, we recommended that FNS develop a strategy to increase penalties for trafficking  The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (known as the 2008 Farm Bill) gave USDA authority to impose higher monetary penalties, and the authority to impose both a monetary penalty and program disqualification on retailers found to have violated relevant law or regulations (which includes those found to have trafficked)  In 2012, FNS proposed regulatory changes to implement these authorities  However, FNS has not finalized these rules, and as of fall 2017, the rules were considered “inactive ” In our ongoing work, we are continuing to assess FNS’s efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to retailer trafficking, as well as examining what is known about the extent of retailer trafficking nationwide  As part of this work, we are continuing to review FNS’s response to our prior recommendations, as well as related recommendations made by USDA’s OIG  We are also studying FNS’s periodic estimates of the rate of retailer trafficking, expressed as the dollar value and percentage of all SNAP benefits that were trafficked and the percentage of retailers involved  These data suggest an increase in the estimated rate of retailer trafficking since our 2006 report  However, we and others, including a group of experts convened by FNS, have identified some limitations with the retailer trafficking estimates  For example, the trafficking rate is calculated based on a sample of retailers that FNS considers most likely to traffic  Although FNS adjusts the data to better represent the broader population of authorized retailers, it is uncertain whether the resulting estimates accurately reflect the extent of trafficking nationwide  We are reviewing these limitations and FNS’s efforts to address them in our ongoing work  Chairman Jordan, Chairman Palmer, Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi, Ranking Member Raskin, and Members of the Subcommittees, this completes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time  If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Kathryn Larin, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues at (202) 512-7215 or LarinK@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony include Rachael Chamberlin, Celina Davidson, Swati Deo, Rachel Frisk, Alexander Galuten, Danielle Giese, Kristen Jones, Morgan Jones, Lara Laufer, Monica Savoy, and Kelly Snow  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 

ground_truth: SNAP is the largest federally funded nutrition assistance program. In fiscal year 2017, it provided about $63 billion in benefits. USDA and the states jointly administer SNAP and partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud. GAO has previously reported on various aspects of SNAP, including state SNAP E&T programs, improper payment rates, recipient fraud, and retailer trafficking. This testimony discusses GAO's prior and ongoing work on (1) SNAP E&T programs, including program participants, design, and USDA oversight, and (2) USDA's efforts to address SNAP program integrity, including improper payments, as well as recipient and retailer fraud. As part of its ongoing work on SNAP E&T programs, GAO analyzed E&T expenditures and participation data from fiscal years 2007 through 2016, the most recent data available; reviewed relevant research from USDA; and interviewed USDA and selected state and local officials. The prior work discussed in this testimony is based on four GAO products on E&T programs (GAO-03-388), improper payments (GAO-16-708T), recipient fraud (GAO-14-641), and retailer trafficking (GAO-07-53). Information on the scope and methodology of our prior work is available in each product. Overseen by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and administered by states, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Employment and Training (E&T) programs served about 0.5 percent of the approximately 43.5 million SNAP recipients in an average month of fiscal year 2016, according to the most recent USDA data available. These programs are generally designed to help SNAP recipients increase their ability to obtain regular employment through services such as job search and training. Some recipients may be required to participate. According to USDA, about 14 percent of SNAP recipients were subject to work requirements in an average month of fiscal year 2016, while others, such as children and the elderly, were generally exempt from these requirements. States have flexibility in how they design their E&T programs. Over the last several years, states have 1) increasingly moved away from programs that mandate participation, 2) focused on serving able-bodied adults without dependents whose benefits are generally time-limited unless they comply with work requirements, and 3) partnered with state and local organizations to deliver services. USDA has taken steps to increase support and oversight of SNAP E&T since 2014, including collecting new data on participant outcomes from states. GAO has ongoing work reviewing SNAP E&T programs, including USDA oversight. USDA and the states partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud, and USDA has taken some steps to address challenges in these areas, but issues remain. Improper Payments. In 2016, GAO reviewed SNAP improper payment rates and found that states' adoption of program flexibilities and changes in federal SNAP policy in the previous decade, as well as improper payment rate calculation methods, likely affected these rates. Although USDA reported improper payment estimates for SNAP in previous years, USDA did not report an estimate for benefits paid in fiscal years 2015 or 2016 due to data quality issues in some states. USDA has since been working with the states to improve improper payment estimates for the fiscal year 2017 review. Recipient Fraud. In 2014, GAO made recommendations to USDA to address challenges states faced in combatting recipient fraud. For example, GAO found that USDA's guidance on the use of transaction data to uncover potential trafficking lacked specificity and recommended USDA develop additional guidance. Since then, USDA has provided technical assistance to some states, including on the use of data analytics. GAO has ongoing work reviewing states' use of data analytics to identify SNAP recipient fraud. Retailer Trafficking. In 2006, GAO identified several ways in which SNAP was vulnerable to retailer trafficking—a practice involving the exchange of benefits for cash or non-food items. For example, USDA had not conducted analyses to identify high-risk retailers and target its resources. Since then, USDA has established risk levels for retailers based on various factors. GAO has ongoing work assessing how USDA prevents, detects, and responds to retailer trafficking and reviewing the usefulness of USDA's estimates of the extent of SNAP retailer trafficking. GAO is not making new recommendations. USDA generally concurred with GAO's prior recommendations.