prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Since January 2017, the Navy has suffered four significant mishaps at sea that have resulted in serious damage to Navy ships and the loss of 17 sailors (see figure 1)  Three of the four at sea mishaps that have occurred—two collisions and one grounding—have involved ships homeported overseas in Yokosuka, Japan  Appendix II provides a summary of major mishaps for Navy ships at sea in fiscal years 2009 through 2017  The Navy currently has 277 ships, a 17 percent reduction from the 333 ships it had in 1998  Over the past two decades, as the number of Navy ships has decreased, the number of ships deployed overseas has remained roughly constant at about 100 ships; consequently, each ship is being deployed more to maintain the same level of presence  We reported in September 2016 that the Navy, along with the other military services, had been reporting persistently low readiness levels  The Navy attributes these, in part, to the increased deployment lengths needed to meet the continuing high demand for its aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships  For example, the deployment lengths for carrier strike groups had increased from an average of 6 4 months during the period of 2008 through 2011 to a less sustainable 9 months for three carrier strike groups that were deployed in 2015  In 2016, the Navy extended the deployments of the Harry S Truman and Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Groups to 8 and 8 5 months, respectively  In addition, the Navy has had to shorten, eliminate, or defer training and maintenance periods to support these high deployment rates  These decisions have resulted in declining ship conditions across the fleet and have increased the amount of time required for the shipyards to complete maintenance on these ships  Lengthened maintenance periods, in turn, compress the time that ships are available for training and operations  As we previously reported, to help meet the operational demands using its existing inventory of ships, the Navy has assigned more of its surface combatants and amphibious ships to overseas homeports  Since 2006, the Navy has doubled the percentage of the fleet assigned to overseas homeports  In 2006, 20 ships were homeported overseas (7 percent of the fleet); today, 40 ships are homeported overseas (14 percent of the fleet) in Japan, Spain, Bahrain, and Italy; and an additional destroyer will be homeported in Yokosuka, Japan in 2018 (see figure 2)  According to the Navy, homeporting ships overseas is an efficient method for providing forward presence and rapid crisis response  Our prior work confirms that having ships homeported overseas provides additional presence, but it comes at a cost  For example, we found in May 2015 that homeporting ships overseas results in higher operations and support costs than homeporting ships in the United States  In addition, the operational schedules the Navy uses for overseas-homeported ships limit dedicated training and maintenance periods, resulting in difficulty keeping crews fully trained and ships maintained  In fact, the primary reason that Navy ships homeported overseas provide more deployed time than ships homeported in the United States is that the Navy reduces their training and maintenance periods in order to maximize their operational availability  Ships homeported overseas do not operate within the traditional fleet response plan cycles that apply to U S -based ships  Since the ships are in permanent deployment status during their time homeported overseas, they do not have designated ramp-up and ramp- down maintenance and training periods built into their operational schedules (see figure 3)  Navy officials told us that because the Navy expects these ships to be operationally available for the maximum amount of time, their intermediate and depot-level maintenance are executed through more frequent, shorter maintenance periods or deferred until after they return to a U S  homeport—generally after 7 to 10 years overseas  In May 2015, we also found that high operational tempo for ships homeported overseas limits the time for crew training when compared with training time for ships homeported in the United States  Navy officials told us that U S -based crews are completely qualified and certified prior to deploying from their U S  homeports, with few exceptions  In contrast, the high operational tempo of ships homeported overseas had resulted in what Navy personnel called a “train on the margins” approach, a shorthand way to say there was no dedicated training time set aside for the ships so crews trained while underway or in the limited time between underway periods  We found that, at the time of our 2015 review, there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships homeported in Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan  As a result, these crews did not have all of their needed training and certifications  We recommended that the Navy develop and implement a sustainable operational schedule for all ships homeported overseas  DOD concurred with this recommendation and reported in 2015 that it had developed revised operational schedules for all ships homeported overseas  However, when we contacted DOD to obtain updated information in August 2017, U S  Pacific Fleet officials stated that the revised operational schedules for the cruisers and destroyers homeported in Japan were still under review and had not been employed  As of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser and destroyer crews homeported in Japan had expired, and over two-thirds of the expired certifications—including mobility-seamanship and air warfare—had been expired for 5 months or more  This represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare certifications for these ships since our May 2015 report  The Navy’s Surface Force Readiness Manual states that the high operational tempo and frequent tasking of ships homeported overseas requires that these ships always be prepared to execute complex operations and notes that this demand for continuous readiness also means that ships homeported overseas should maintain maximum training, material condition, and manning readiness  With respect to the material condition of the ships, we found in May 2015 that casualty reports—incidents of degraded or out-of-service equipment—nearly doubled over the 2009 through 2014 time frame, and the condition of overseas-homeported ships decreased even faster than that of U S -based ships (see figure 4)  The Navy uses casualty reports to provide information on the material condition of ships in order to determine current readiness  For example, casualty report data provide information on equipment or systems that are degraded or out of service, the lack of which will affect a ship’s ability to support required mission areas  In 2015, Navy officials acknowledged an increasing number of casualty reports on Navy ships and a worsening trend in material ship condition  They stated that equipment casualties require unscheduled maintenance and have a negative effect on fleet operations, because there is an associated capability or capacity loss  In our May 2015 report, we recommended that the Navy develop a comprehensive assessment of the long-term costs and risks to its fleet associated with the Navy’s increasing reliance on overseas homeporting to meet presence requirements; make any necessary adjustments to its overseas presence based on this assessment; and reassess these risks when making future overseas homeporting decisions  DOD concurred with this recommendation, but, as of August 2017, it has not conducted an assessment, even though it has continued to increase the number of ships homeported overseas  In the early 2000s, the Navy made several changes to its process for determining the size and composition of ship crews that may contribute to sailor overwork and create readiness and safety risks  These changes were intended to drive down crew sizes in order to save on personnel costs  However, as we reported in May 2017, these changes were not substantiated with analysis and may be creating readiness and safety risks  With fewer sailors operating and maintaining surface ships, the material condition of the ships declined, and we found that this decline ultimately contributed to an increase in operating and support costs that outweighed any savings on personnel (see figure 5)  The Navy eventually reassessed and reversed some of the changes it had made during this period—known as “optimal manning”—but it continued to use a workweek standard that does not reflect the actual time sailors spend working and does not account for in-port workload—both of which may be leading to sailors being overworked  Additionally, we found that heavy workload does not end after ships return to port  Crews typically operate with fewer sailors while in port, so those crew members remaining must cover the workload of multiple sailors, causing additional strain and potential overwork  In 2014, the Navy conducted a study of the standard workweek and identified significant issues that could negatively affect a crew’s capabilities to accomplish tasks and maintain the material readiness of ships, as well as crew safety issues that might result if crews slept less to accommodate workload that was not accounted for  The Navy study found that sailors were on duty 108 hours a week, exceeding their weekly on-duty allocation of 81 hours  This on-duty time included 90 hours of productive work—20 hours per week more than the 70 hours that are allotted in the standard workweek  This, in turn, reduced the time available for rest and resulted in sailors spending less time sleeping than was allotted, a situation that the study noted could encourage a poor safety culture  Moving forward, the Navy will likely face manning challenges, especially given its current difficulty in filling authorized positions, as it seeks to increase the size of its fleet by as much as 30 percent over its current size  Navy officials stated that even with manpower requirements that accurately capture all workload, the Navy will be challenged to fund these positions and fill them with adequately trained sailors at current personnel levels  Figure 6 shows the Navy’s projected end strength and fleet size  In our May 2017 report, we found that the Navy’s guidance does not require that the factors it uses to calculate manpower requirements be reassessed periodically or when conditions change, to ensure that these factors remain valid and that crews are appropriately sized  We made several recommendations to address this issue, including that the Navy should (1) reassess the standard workweek, (2) require examination of in- port workload, (3) develop criteria to reassess the factors used in its manpower requirements process, and (4) update its ship manpower requirements  DOD concurred with our recommendations, stating that it is committed to ensuring that the Navy’s manpower requirements are current and analytically based and will meet the needs of the existing and future surface fleet  As of August 2017, DOD had not yet taken any actions to implement these recommendations  We believe that, until the Navy makes the needed changes, its ships may not have the right number and skill mix of sailors to maintain readiness and prevent overworking its sailors  To address its persistently low readiness levels, the Navy began implementing a revised operational schedule in November 2014, which it referred to as the optimized fleet response plan  This plan seeks to maximize the employability of the existing fleet while preserving adequate time for maintenance and training, providing continuity in ship leadership and carrier strike group assignments, and restoring operational and personnel tempos to acceptable levels  The Navy’s implementation of the optimized fleet response plan—and readiness recovery more broadly—is premised on adherence to deployment, training, and maintenance schedules  However, in May 2016, we found that the Navy was having difficulty in implementing its new schedule as intended  Both the public and private shipyards were having difficulty completing maintenance on time, owing primarily to the poor condition of the ships after more than a decade of heavy use, deferred maintenance, and the Navy’s inability to accurately predict how much maintenance they would need  We reported that in 2011 through 2014 only 28 percent of scheduled maintenance for surface combatants was completed on time and just 11 percent was completed on time for aircraft carriers  We updated these data as of August 2017 to include maintenance availabilities completed through the end of fiscal year 2016 and found continued difficulty completing maintenance on time for key portions of the Navy fleet (see figure 7): Aircraft Carriers (CVNs): In fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 18 of 21 (86 percent) aircraft carriers resulted in a total of 1,103 lost operational days—days that ships were not available for operations—the equivalent of losing the use of 0 5 aircraft carriers each year  Surface Combatants (DDGs and CGs): In fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 107 of 169 (63 percent) surface combatants resulted in a total of 6,603 lost operational days—the equivalent of losing the use of 3 0 surface combatants each year  Submarines (SSNs, SSBNs, and SSGNs): In fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 39 of 47 (83 percent) submarines resulted in a total of 6,220 lost operational days—the equivalent of losing the use of 2 8 submarines each year  Navy officials are aware of the challenges faced by both the public and private shipyards and have taken steps to address the risks these pose to maintenance schedules, including hiring additional shipyard workers and improving their maintenance planning processes  However, Navy officials have told us that it will take time for these changes to bring about a positive effect  For example, as of May 2016, data on the public shipyards’ workforce showed that 32 percent of all employees had fewer than 5 years of experience  According to Navy officials, this workforce inexperience negatively affects the productivity of the shipyards, and it will take several years for them to attain full productivity  Just last week, we issued another report, prepared in response to direction from this committee, examining the ability of the Navy’s public shipyards to support the Navy’s readiness needs  We found that capacity limitations as well as the poor condition of the shipyards’ facilities and equipment contributed to the maintenance delays we discussed earlier and were hindering the shipyards’ ability to support the Navy  Specifically, we found that the shipyards will be unable to support 73—or about one-third—of 218 maintenance periods planned over the next 23 years  In addition, this estimate did not factor in planned increases to the fleet  We made three recommendations, with which the Navy agreed to take steps to improve its management of capital investment in the shipyards  However, we noted that at current average funding levels it would take at least 19 years and a Navy-estimated $4 86 billion to clear the backlog of restoration and modernization projects at the shipyards  Furthermore, this estimate does not include the $9 billion that the Navy estimates it will need for capacity and capability upgrades over the next 12 years to support maintenance operations for the current fleet  In September 2016, we found that although DOD has stated that readiness rebuilding is a priority, implementation and oversight of department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts did not fully include key elements of sound planning, and the lack of these elements puts the overall rebuilding efforts at risk  The Navy states that its overall goal for readiness recovery is to reach a predictable and sustainable level of global presence and surge capacity from year to year  The Navy identified carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups as key force elements in its plan for readiness recovery and had set 2020 for reaching a predictable and sustainable level of global presence and surge capacity by implementing the optimized fleet response plan  However, we found in 2016 that the Navy faced significant challenges, such as delays in completing maintenance and emerging demands, in achieving its readiness recovery goals for carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups, and projections show that the Navy will not meet its time frames for achieving readiness recovery  As a result, we recommended that DOD and the services establish comprehensive readiness goals, strategies for implementing them, and associated metrics that can be used to evaluate whether readiness recovery efforts are achieving intended outcomes  DOD generally concurred with our recommendations and, in November 2016, issued limited guidance to the military services on rebuilding readiness; it has also started to design a framework to guide the military services in achieving readiness recovery but has not yet implemented our recommendations  The Navy has since extended its time frame for readiness recovery to at least 2021, but it still has not developed specific benchmarks or interim goals for tracking and reporting on readiness recovery  Navy officials cited several challenges to rebuilding readiness, chief among them the continued high demand for its forces, the unpredictability of funding, and the current difficulty with beginning and completing ship maintenance on time  In January 2017, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a readiness review and identify actions that can be implemented in fiscal year 2017 to improve readiness  DOD and Navy officials told us that, as part of this readiness review, the Navy prioritized immediate readiness gaps and shortfalls  These officials added that this review would guide the Navy’s investment decisions in future budget cycles, with the intention to rebuild readiness and prepare the force for future conflicts  However, high demand for naval presence will continue to put pressure on a fleet that is already stretched thin across the globe  Looking to the future, the Navy has plans to grow its fleet by as much as 30 percent, but it has not yet shown the ability to adequately man, maintain, and operate the current fleet  These readiness problems need to be addressed and will require the Navy to implement our recommendations—particularly in the areas of assessing the risks associated with overseas basing, reassessing sailor workload and the factors used to size ship crews, managing investments in its shipyards, and applying sound planning and sustained management attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts  In addition, continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and other challenges  Chairmen McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time  If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact John Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao gov  Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Steven Banovac, Chris Cronin, Kerri Eisenbach, Joanne Landesman, Amie Lesser, Felicia Lopez, Tobin McMurdie, Shari Nikoo, Cody Raysinger, Michael Silver, Grant Sutton, and Chris Watson  Over the past three years, we issued several reports related to Navy readiness cited in this statement  Table 1 summarizes the status of recommendations made in these reports, which contained a total of 14 recommendations  The Department of Defense generally concurred with all of these recommendations but has implemented only one of them to date  For each of the reports, the specific recommendations and their implementation status are summarized in tables 2 through 5  The Navy defines a class A mishap as one that results in $2 million or more in damages to government or other property, or a mishap that resulted in a fatality or permanent total disability  We analyzed data compiled by the Naval Safety Center for fiscal years 2009 through 2017 to provide a summary of major Navy mishaps at sea (see table 6)  Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are Classified  Classified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances and need to know, upon request  Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions that Affect Operation  GAO-17-548  Washington, D C : September 12, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-798T  Washington, D C : September 7, 2017  Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges  GAO-17-369  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  Military Readiness: Coastal Riverine Force Challenges  GAO-17-462C  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  (SECRET) Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and Composition of Ship Crews  GAO-17-413  Washington, D C : May 18, 2017  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-841  Washington, D C : September 7, 2016  Navy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness  GAO-16-481RC  Washington, D C : May 25, 2016  (SECRET//NOFORN) Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan  GAO-16-466R  Washington, D C : May 2, 2016  Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports  GAO-15-329  Washington, D C : May 29, 2015  Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Assess Risks to Its Strategy to Improve Ship Readiness  GAO-12-887  Washington, D C : September 21, 2012  Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions  GAO-12-711  Washington, D C : June 6, 2012  Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and Assumptions for Ship Crewing Requirements and Training  GAO-10-592  Washington, D C : June 9, 2010  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2: Safety defect vehicle recalls (auto recalls) are initiated when a defect in a vehicle or vehicle equipment creates an unreasonable safety risk, as determined by NHTSA or a manufacturer  After a recall is initiated, manufacturers are required to provide written notification to vehicle owners via First-Class Mail within 60 days and remedy the defect  Franchised dealers—which sell or lease an auto manufacturer’s new vehicles—perform the recall remedy  Before manufacturers send recall notification letters to affected vehicle owners, NHTSA reviews draft letters and envelopes to ensure they include required information about the safety defect  Required information includes, among other things, a clear description of the safety defect, an evaluation of the risk to vehicle safety, and a statement that the manufacturer will remedy the defect without charge  See appendix II for an example of a notification letter  The number of vehicles affected by safety defect vehicle recalls has increased dramatically since 2011 (see fig  1)  The increase reflects, in part, several large-scale recalls  For example, in 2014, General Motors initiated a recall of over 8 million vehicles with faulty ignition switches  Similarly, according to NHTSA in 2014 and 2015, some passenger vehicle manufacturers began recalling Takata air bag inflators, recalls that have grown to include approximately 34 million vehicles and 19 auto manufacturers  For the Takata recall, NHTSA issued various orders and established a Coordinated Remedy Program under which the agency oversees the supply of remedy parts and risk-based prioritization of vehicles for repair, and manages related recalls with the assistance of an Independent Monitor  The Independent Monitor assesses compliance with the applicable orders issued by NHTSA and makes recommendations aimed at enhancing the remedy program  According to NHTSA’s Strategic Plan 2016–2020, this unprecedented recall activity encouraged the agency to improve its system for identifying and addressing defective vehicles  For example, the plan states that NHTSA’s “vision is to achieve a 100-percent completion rate for every recall by improving communication at every level, at every step of the way ” Thus, according to the plan, NHTSA and the auto industry have committed to identifying and implementing effective strategies to inform consumers of safety defects and envision that their coordination will bolster recall efforts to improve completion rates  NHTSA reported that annual completion rates for passenger vehicle recalls have remained relatively flat, ranging from 63 to 67 percent between calendar year 2011 and calendar year 2014  See appendix III for completion rates by vehicle component and vehicle type  In part, to improve communication and encourage consumers to complete repairs, NHTSA and manufacturers provide auto recall information to the public on their websites  For example, certain motor vehicle manufacturers are required to allow consumers to search a vehicle’s recall remedy status on the Internet using the vehicle identification number (VIN)  NHTSA also provides publicly available auto recall information on its website, including examples of recall notification letters  In December 2016, NHTSA began consolidating its websites into NHTSA gov to provide a single access point for its auto recall content  One of these websites, safercar gov, was once NHTSA’s primary method of communicating auto recall information to consumers; however, the agency is in the process of moving this information to NHTSA gov  NHTSA’s Strategic Plan 2016–2020 states that the agency wants NHTSA gov to be a comprehensive user-friendly platform that serves as the premier source of vehicle safety information by, for example, improving the website’s search capabilities  NHTSA also aims to encourage consumers to use its website’s auto recall information through its communications program  NHTSA’s Office of Communications and Consumer Information (OCCI) is the primary office responsible for implementing the agency’s public communication efforts  OCCI intends to increase public engagement with the agency’s information through its social media channels, such as Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook  The amount OCCI obligated to support the agency’s auto recall efforts has increased from nearly $ 5 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $2 5 million in fiscal year 2016  According to NHTSA officials, these obligations supported various efforts, including public awareness campaigns, an auto recall hotline, advertising agencies, exhibits at auto shows, and NHTSA’s mobile application  As part of our focus group discussion sessions, consumers selected safety risk and convenience as the two most influential factors they considered when using auto recall information to decide whether to complete repairs  All factors considered: During each session, we first asked consumers to describe all the factors they considered  Across the sessions, consumers shared a wide variety of factors including availability of a loaner vehicle, time to schedule and complete the repair, safety risk, and other factors  For example, some consumers had not yet repaired their vehicles because they were “just waiting” for parts to become available  Other consumers considered their previous customer service experiences at the franchised dealership or the distance they would need to travel to complete the repair  For example, one consumer at our rural focus group location told us it would take roughly 2 hours to reach the dealership’s repair shop  Most influential factors considered: After the discussion of all factors, we then asked each consumer to select the single most influential factor they considered  Consumers in the sessions overwhelmingly selected safety risk and convenience as the two most influential factors (see table 1)  More than half of consumers in our focus group discussion sessions selected safety risk as the most influential factor they considered when making repair decisions  They told us that their perception of the risk influenced whether or not they repaired their vehicle  For instance, some consumers stated that they completed repairs immediately, because the risks “sounded serious” or that they considered the defect a “safety concern ” Conversely, some consumers said they did not complete the repairs because the defect “didn’t sound very urgent ” While each recall notification letter is required to include an evaluation of the risk to vehicle safety reasonably related to the defect, consumers in our focus group sessions shared mixed opinions about the quality and clarity of safety risk information included in the notification letter they received  For example, some consumers told us the letter’s safety risk information seemed vague  For instance, one consumer told us the letter’s description of the safety defect did not clearly state the chances of an increased risk of injury and so he “had to figure out on his own ” In addition, some consumers commented that the safety risk information could be more prominent in the notification letter, that the letter could emphasize the severity of the risk, or that the letter could describe the risk in simpler language  However, other consumers stated the notification letter they received adequately described the recall’s safety risk  In June 2011, we recommended that NHTSA modify the requirements for defect notification letters to include additional information to obtain readers’ attention  In 2013, NHTSA responded to our recommendation by requiring manufacturers to include the statement “IMPORTANT SAFETY RECALL” at the top of auto recall notification letters  Focus Group Participant’s Comment “I don't want to be without a car for half the day or stay with my kids all day ” Consumers in our focus group discussion sessions selected convenience as the second most influential factor they considered in making repair decisions  While some consumers described the “hassle” of the repair and being “too busy” to schedule and fix the defect, other consumers told us they repaired their vehicles more easily because, for example, they could take advantage of previously scheduled service appointments to also repair the defect  Also, some consumers in our sessions stated that the letter or notification they received could better address the inconvenience of the recall, for example by including better estimates of how long repairs might take  In addition, some consumers recommended the letter include options for scheduling needed repairs  As we discuss later in the report, NHTSA officials told us they continue to work with auto manufacturers to identify ways to encourage consumers to complete needed repairs, while representatives from some manufacturers we met with described specific steps they have taken to address some of the inconveniences consumers may experience in completing repairs  For example, one manufacturer facilitated a pilot program for a third-party service provider in conjunction with dealers to repair vehicles at the owner’s home or place of work, while another manufacturer told us they work with individual dealers to hold events specifically for recall repairs when consumers can come in to have repairs performed after normal business hours  Industry stakeholders’ use of auto recall information varies because these stakeholders play different roles in the auto recall process  Auto manufacturers are primarily responsible for providing auto recall information to the public and others, including NHTSA and auto dealers  Franchised dealers are responsible for performing the recall remedy for manufacturers and therefore use manufacturer-provided information for that purpose  Specifically, all of the franchised dealers we interviewed told us they identify recalls on new vehicles in their inventory primarily by accessing auto recall information through internal manufacturer databases  These franchised dealers may also use information from third-party providers or publicly available auto recall information on NHTSA’s website to identify recalls affecting used vehicles  Independent dealers—which are not generally authorized by manufacturers to perform recall remedies—may use publicly available auto recall information to identify open recalls  Specifically, 2 of the 3 independent dealers we met with told us they use NHTSA’s VIN look-up tool to search for open recalls affecting vehicles in their inventory before selling them to consumers  However, these dealers told us that the current design of the tool takes too much time to use, because it requires users to search each VIN individually  For example, one dealer told us each search took about 15 seconds to perform, resulting in significant time and cost because the dealership has tens of thousands of vehicles in its inventory  These dealers told us being able to search multiple VINs in a single search (i e , VIN-batch search) could save them time or money  Representatives from the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers stated they—in coordination with other industry stakeholders—are working with a third-party provider to develop a search tool that would address this concern by enabling VIN-batch searches for use by government agencies, such as state departments of motor vehicles, and commercial entities  The group anticipates the tool will be available in the first half of 2018  Although the vast majority of consumers who participated in our focus group discussion sessions reported a preference to receive auto recall notification by mail, most preferred to receive notifications by at least one additional electronic means such as e-mail, phone calls, and text messages  Eighty of the 94 consumers in our sessions reported a preference for receiving notification by mail, and all but 4 reported actually receiving mailed notification (see fig  2)  However, 69 of the 94 consumers in our sessions also reported a preference for receiving recall notification by electronic means, but only 7 reported actually receiving at least one type of electronic notification  This result suggests a gap between industry recall notification practices and notification preferences for most consumers in our focus groups, especially for younger consumers who were more likely to report a preference for notification by electronic means  For complete results of the questionnaire we administered to consumers for the discussion session, see appendix IV  As we discuss later in this report, in September 2016, NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that proposes to require auto manufacturers to notify consumers about auto recalls by electronic means in addition to First-Class Mail  NHTSA officials told us the agency is working with the administration on NHTSA’s regulatory portfolio and priorities, including this rulemaking  Some manufacturers told us they use additional methods to reach consumers, including notifying consumers by electronic means and translating recall information into Spanish  For example, representatives from one manufacturer told us they always notify consumers by e-mail before sending out the required First-Class Mail letter notification  These representatives told us using multiple recall notification means resulted in higher recall completion rates  In addition, eight of the remaining nine manufacturers told us they use supplemental electronic means notification on a case-by-case basis—generally using additional means to improve recall completion rates—while four manufacturers stated they consider safety risk severity when deciding when or how to use additional notification means for individual recalls  Also, representatives from 3 of the 10 manufacturers we spoke with told us they translate the entire mailed notification letter into Spanish  In late 2016, NHTSA launched its redesigned NHTSA gov website, including the auto recall areas consumers assessed during our testing sessions  According to responses to a questionnaire we administered during our testing sessions, 78 of the 94 consumers found the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov either “somewhat” or “very easy” to use (see fig  3)  See appendix V for complete participant responses to the questionnaire we administered to each consumer  To inform the development of the redesigned website, NHTSA worked with a contractor to conduct a usability study in 2015 to evaluate users’ reactions to the agency’s websites, including NHTSA gov  According to agency officials, NHTSA implemented several changes based on the findings from the usability study, including: the creation of a dedicated “recalls” area of NHTSA gov, and the ability for users to access the VIN look-up tool in three different ways—on the homepage, in the “recalls” area, and through direct links either in a NHTSA e-mail for subscribers or from an external website  In addition, NHTSA officials told us that Department of Transportation (DOT) and NHTSA staff meet as needed to discuss the website and consider improvements  For example, the officials said they monitor user searches for the relevance and accuracy of results and adjust the search software to better assist users in finding auto recall information  Officials also told us the agency collects a variety of other information about how visitors use NHTSA gov, including how visitors access the website, and makes adjustments accordingly  For instance, NHTSA incorporated responsive web design as part of the agency’s ongoing consolidation effort—meaning the site is optimized for viewing on desktop, tablet, and mobile devices  In addition to monitoring searches and how visitors access NHTSA gov, NHTSA officials told us they collect and consider online survey data to make website improvements and use web-analytic software to monitor, for example, where visitors choose to exit the website  Officials stated that such monitoring activities have allowed NHTSA to identify and correct problems with NHTSA gov  We did not directly evaluate the accessibility of the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov to ensure the ability of people with physical or mental disabilities to use the website  However, NHTSA officials provided us with an overview of several steps the agency takes to ensure NHTSA gov complies with website accessibility requirements  For example, according to officials, NHTSA subscribes to a service that provides monthly accessibility scans of the agency’s websites  While most consumers in our usability testing sessions generally found the auto recall areas of NHTSA’s website easy to use, some consumers experienced difficulties completing tasks we asked them to perform (see table 2)  Specifically, during each testing session we asked participants to perform tasks using the primary means NHTSA gov provides for consumers to access information about auto recalls affecting their vehicles: searching for auto recalls using their vehicle’s VIN; searching for auto recalls using their vehicle’s year, make, and model; and locating NHTSA’s auto recall notification e-mail subscription service  In addition, an evaluation we requested to corroborate the results of our consumer usability testing, identified similar issues  As discussed below, consumers experienced these difficulties because the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov do not always reflect federal and industry key website usability practices, which describe standards and guidelines for making websites easy to use  Following such practices can assist agencies in creating quality websites while providing the flexibility necessary to meet organizational needs  Website usability is particularly important for agencies, such as NHTSA, that are responsible for conveying safety information to the public  Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should communicate quality information externally and select appropriate methods for communicating with the public  While most consumers in our usability testing sessions found searching for recalls by VIN somewhat or very easy, some consumers found the search results did not provide the information they were seeking  When we asked consumers to perform VIN searches, they generally found the VIN look-up tool easy to use—88 of 94 consumers found searching with a VIN either somewhat or very easy  But some consumers experienced difficulties performing this task  Specifically, some consumers who had had their vehicles repaired expected to find the completed recall on the search results page  However, they were confused because the page is designed to display only open (i e , unrepaired) recalls, not completed (i e , repaired) recalls—leading these consumers to question the accuracy of the results  In addition, the evaluation conducted by website usability professionals found that, when an error occurred during a VIN search, the error message was too difficult to locate on the search results page  The evaluation recommended the error message have greater weight and more prominence on the page  Federal key website usability practices state that agencies should ensure that results of user searches provide the precise information being sought, and in a format matching users’ expectations  When users are confused by search results, or do not immediately find what they are searching for, they become frustrated and may abandon the search or the website entirely  Since NHTSA launched the VIN look-up tool in August 2014, the number of VIN searches performed has increased (see fig  4)  According to NHTSA officials, major increases occurred in mid-2015— when the Takata air bag inflator recalls were announced—and in early 2017, when NHTSA made the VIN look-up tool search function available on NHTSA gov and displayed it prominently on the website  Ensuring the usability of NHTSA’s VIN look-up tool is particularly important because it is the only way on NHTSA gov for a consumer to determine whether their specific vehicle has an open safety recall  Recall Search Using Vehicle Year, Make, and Model Some consumers’ vehicle year, make, and model searches were hampered by the information required to conduct an accurate search, as the content on the website is not always in plain language  We asked consumers to perform a recall search using their vehicles’ year, make, and model, and 78 of 94 consumers found the task to be either somewhat or very easy  However, some consumers found that they did not know enough information about their specific vehicles to feel confident that they were searching for the correct vehicle  For example, a year, make, and model search for a 2009 Toyota Tacoma may ask the consumer to choose among vehicle options, including “2009 TOYOTA TACOMA REGULAR CAB W/SAB RWD/AWD ” Acronyms such as “W/SAB”— which stands for “with side air bags”—may be confusing to consumers  Federal key website usability practices state that federal agencies should write website content using plain language, so website visitors can easily find and use what they need  Focus Group Participant’s Comment “I think [the Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up is] poorly placed  I had to scroll to find it  I had to search for it  You want at the top  ” Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up Some consumers suggested improvements to make the Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up easier to locate on the homepage  NHTSA first made its Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up available in March 2008  Of the 94 consumers in our testing sessions, 66 found it either “somewhat” or “very easy” to find the Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up—making this the least easy of the three tasks we asked consumers to perform  Specifically, several consumers said the Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-Up should include a clearer description, be easier to find, and be located at the top of the homepage (see fig  5)  These improvements are particularly important because some consumers in our focus group sessions told us that the ability to sign up for auto recall e-mail notifications was the most useful part of the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov  The website evaluation conducted by website usability professionals recommended that NHTSA streamline its homepage with more of a focus on primary website tasks  The evaluation also found that users must move through too many pages to sign up for recall e-mails  Federal key website design and usability practices state that agencies should put important items closer to the top of the page, where users can better locate the information  Key practices also state that agencies should design their websites so users can successfully complete the most common tasks in the fewest number of steps  The website usability difficulties that consumers in our focus groups experienced may be due to the fact that NHTSA has not studied the website’s usability since the agency redesigned NHTSA gov in late 2016 and, therefore, may have been unaware of these difficulties prior to our review  NHTSA plans to conduct a website usability study with consumers after the consolidation effort, discussed above, is complete  However, NHTSA could not provide a general time frame for conducting the study because it has not yet determined when the consolidation effort will be complete  We have previously reported that it is essential for organizations to effectively guide their information technology efforts by establishing timelines to complete them, among other strategic planning best practices  Without establishing a completion date for its website consolidation effort, the website usability difficulties we identified may persist and limit the effectiveness of NHTSA’s primary means of providing consumers with safety recall information about their vehicles on NHTSA gov  In January 2016, NHTSA launched a national advertising campaign encouraging consumers to check for open recalls using the agency’s VIN and year, make, and model look-up tools  Through March 2017, NHTSA spent about $1 million on its Safe Cars Save Lives campaign, which sponsors advertisements on Google, Facebook, and other media platforms  For example, Google might place NHTSA’s advertisement above other search results, when a consumer typed certain keywords— such as “recall,” “airbag recalls,” or “safercar gov”—into the search  NHTSA evaluated the campaign’s effectiveness by monitoring website traffic performance reports to determine how frequently consumers clicked on NHTSA-sponsored advertisements and ultimately searched for open recalls using the agency’s look-up tools  NHTSA also compared results across media platforms and adjusted the campaign’s strategy to improve performance  For example, NHTSA optimized advertisements on mobile devices, since mobile-device users performed more recall searches than other users  According to NHTSA data, the awareness campaign resulted in consumers performing 1 1 million recall searches through March 2017—a cost of about $0 90 per search  Agency data indicate that this cost generally decreased as NHTSA improved the campaign’s strategy  Agency officials told us NHTSA plans to spend another approximately $1 8 million on Safe Cars Save Lives from September 2017 through September 2018 due to the campaign’s effectiveness in raising the public’s awareness about auto recalls

ground_truth: Since January 2017, the Navy has suffered four significant mishaps at sea that resulted in serious damage to its ships and the loss of 17 sailors. Three of these incidents involved ships homeported in Japan. In response to these incidents, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered an operational pause for all fleets worldwide, and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of surface fleet operations, stating that these tragic incidents are not limited occurrences but part of a disturbing trend in mishaps involving U.S. ships. This statement provides information on the effects of homeporting ships overseas, reducing crew size on ships, and not completing maintenance on time on the readiness of the Navy and summarizes GAO recommendations to address the Navy's maintenance, training, and other challenges. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on work it has published since 2015 related to the readiness of ships homeported overseas, sailor training and workload issues, maintenance challenges, and other issues. GAO updated this information, as appropriate, based on Navy data. GAO's prior work shows that the Navy has increased deployment lengths, shortened training periods, and reduced or deferred maintenance to meet high operational demands, which has resulted in declining ship conditions and a worsening trend in overall readiness. The Navy has stated that high demand for presence has put pressure on a fleet that is stretched thin across the globe. Some of the concerns that GAO has highlighted include: Degraded readiness of ships homeported overseas: Since 2006, the Navy has doubled the number of ships based overseas. Overseas basing provides additional forward presence and rapid crisis response, but GAO found in May 2015 that there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers based in Japan. As a result, the crews of these ships did not have all of their needed training and certifications. Based on updated data, GAO found that, as of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser and destroyer crews based in Japan—including certifications for seamanship—had expired. This represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare certifications for these ships since GAO's May 2015 report. The Navy has made plans to revise operational schedules to provide dedicated training time for overseas-based ships, but this schedule has not yet been implemented. Crew size reductions contribute to sailor overwork and safety risks: GAO found in May 2017 that reductions to crew sizes the Navy made in the early 2000s were not analytically supported and may now be creating safety risks. The Navy has reversed some of those changes but continues to use a workweek standard that does not reflect the actual time sailors spend working and does not account for in-port workload—both of which have contributed to some sailors working over 100 hours a week. Inability to complete maintenance on time: Navy recovery from persistently low readiness levels is premised on adherence to maintenance schedules. However, in May 2016, GAO found that the Navy was having difficulty completing maintenance on time. Based on updated data, GAO found that, in fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 107 of 169 surface ships (63 percent) resulted in 6,603 lost operational days (i.e., the ships were not available for training and operations). Looking to the future, the Navy wants to grow its fleet by as much as 30 percent but continues to face challenges with manning, training, and maintaining its existing fleet. These readiness problems need to be addressed and will require the Navy to implement GAO's recommendations—particularly in the areas of assessing the risks associated with overseas basing, reassessing sailor workload and the factors used to size ship crews, managing investments to modernize and improve the efficiency of the naval shipyards, and applying sound planning and sustained management attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts. In addition, continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and other challenges. GAO made 14 recommendations in prior work cited in this statement. The Department of Defense generally concurred with all of them but has implemented only 1. Continued attention is needed to ensure that these recommendations are addressed, such as the Navy assessing the risks associated with overseas basing and reassessing sailor workload and factors used in its manpower requirements process.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  NHTSA began implementing a mandated 2-year pilot grant program intended to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of informing consumers about open auto recalls during state vehicle registration  In September 2016, NHTSA solicited applications to participate in the program, wherein selected states would inform consumers—at no charge—about open recalls using all means that permit consumers to register vehicles within the state (e g , in person, Internet, and mail)  According to NHTSA, only one state applied for the grant  In September 2017, NHTSA awarded the sole applicant $223,000  Under the program, the grantee needs to collect and report program performance data, including the extent to which open recalls have been identified and repaired  In addition, the grantee must report whether certain notification means were more effective than others and what could be done to improve the program  Upon completion of the pilot program, NHTSA is required to evaluate the extent to which open recalls identified have been remedied  Auto manufacturers we met with were generally supportive of the program  Specifically, representatives from 9 of the 10 manufacturers told us that notifying consumers about open recalls during vehicle registration can raise consumer awareness or improve recall completion rates  In September 2016, NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), which proposes to require auto manufacturers to notify consumers about open recalls by electronic means—such as e-mails, phone calls, and text messages, in addition to First-Class Mail  As we described earlier, auto manufacturers are currently required to notify consumers about safety recalls affecting their vehicles via First-Class Mail  According to NHTSA, the NPRM aims to aid in efficiently and effectively improving recall completion rates, by proposing that manufacturers provide notification using electronic means in addition to First-Class Mail  Consumers in our focus groups as well as auto manufacturers and consumer associations we interviewed generally supported additional notification using electronic means  Consumers in our focus groups: As we discussed earlier, 69 of the consumers in our focus group discussion sessions reported they would prefer to receive additional notification by at least one type of electronic means  However, only 7 consumers actually received such notifications—suggesting a gap between industry notification practices and notification preferences for these consumers  Auto manufacturers: Representatives from 9 of 10 manufacturers we interviewed told us they generally support providing notification using electronic means  Although the NPRM proposes a broad definition of electronic means to give manufacturers flexibility to determine the most effective means, these representatives also shared implementation concerns  For example, representatives from 1 of the 9 manufacturers told us that—although the company collects e- mail addresses from some customers for other purposes—not all customers provide e-mail addresses, and those collected are not always accurate  As we discussed previously, most manufacturers we met with currently use supplemental electronic means notification on a case-by-case basis  Consumer associations: Similarly, both consumer associations we interviewed told us additional electronic notification can help reach consumers who do not complete repairs after receiving initial mailed notification  NHTSA’s proposal would maintain manufacturer reporting requirements, though it may result in additional reporting  This additional information could help the agency evaluate the effectiveness of various means of consumer notification  We previously found that NHTSA may be able to use manufacturers’ data to identify what factors make some recalls more or less successful than others  We recommended that NHTSA use the recall data it collects to analyze particular patterns or trends that may characterize successful recalls and determine whether these factors represent best practices  If the NPRM is finalized, manufacturers would provide NHTSA with representative copies of the newly required electronic notifications, in addition to mailed notifications, and would specify the electronic means used, such as e-mail or text message  According to NHTSA officials, this information could allow the agency to track and evaluate the effectiveness of various notification means used by manufacturers by, for example, comparing completion rates across means—a key step in identifying best practices that could encourage consumers to complete repairs  However, it is too early for NHTSA to conduct such an evaluation, because the agency has not issued a final rule  NHTSA officials told us the agency is working with the administration on NHTSA’s regulatory portfolio and priorities, including this rulemaking  NHTSA has also taken steps to collaborate with industry stakeholders and explore consumer education best practices  For example, in April 2015 NHTSA hosted a day-long workshop that brought together auto industry stakeholders to examine public education of the recall process  During the workshop, participants identified current barriers to the public’s awareness of auto recalls and discussed potential solutions to address them, such as using text messages and social media to communicate with younger consumers and using different delivery methods for recall notices  Similarly, in January 2016 NHTSA and 18 auto manufacturers adopted a set of Proactive Safety Principles to explore and employ new ways to increase safety recall participation rates  For example, NHTSA and auto manufacturers agreed to share industry best practices and policies based on lessons learned from ongoing safety recalls  The Independent Monitor of Takata in conjunction with NHTSA has also issued a set of coordinated communications recommendations based on consumer research, best practices observed during the Takata recall, and discussions with manufacturers  For example, the recommendations encourage manufacturers to: pursue a “multi-touch” communications strategy that employs non- traditional means, such as e-mail and text messages; convey risk in clear, accurate and urgent terms; and include a clear “call to action” designed to facilitate prompt and efficient scheduling of repairs  According to NHTSA officials, the agency relies on auto manufacturers to evaluate the effectiveness of these efforts  However, agency officials told us NHTSA reviews manufacturers communication plans as part of the Takata recall’s Coordinated Remedy Program and provides ongoing recommendations on manufacturers’ communication language, approach, and strategies  With the recent steep increase in safety defect vehicle recalls and continued low recall completion rates, it is vital for consumers to be able to easily access and use publicly available auto recall information  NHTSA has taken important steps to improve its website—which provides safety recall information to consumers—resulting in most consumers in our focus groups finding the website easy to use  However, the difficulties some experienced in attempting to complete essential auto recall tasks demonstrated that NHTSA gov does not always reflect key website usability practices for website design  Although NHTSA plans to conduct a website usability study with consumers after consolidating its websites, it has not determined a completion date for this effort—an essential step for organizations to effectively guide their information technology efforts  Without such a date, the website usability difficulties may persist and limit the effectiveness of NHTSA gov in providing consumers with recall information about their vehicles  By addressing these difficulties in the interim, NHTSA can better assure that consumers obtain this information, which can be vital to their safety  We are making the following two recommendations to NHTSA: The Administrator of NHTSA should determine a completion date for the agency’s website consolidation effort  (Recommendation 1) The Administrator of NHTSA should, while the agency continues its website consolidation effort, take interim steps to improve the usability of the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov by addressing the website usability difficulties we identified  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment  In its written comments, reproduced in appendix VI, DOT stated that it concurred with our recommendations  The department also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to relevant congressional committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Administrator of NHTSA  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII  This report examines the use of publicly available auto recall information for safety defects affecting passenger vehicles  The report addresses the following objectives: (1) How do consumers and industry stakeholders use publicly available auto recall information? (2) How easy or difficult to use do consumers find the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov? (3) What steps, if any, has the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) taken to raise consumer awareness about auto recalls and how has NHTSA evaluated the effectiveness of these steps? We define publicly available auto recall information to include information on the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov, such as examples of notification letters that manufacturers mail to consumers  This report focuses on safety defect vehicle recalls affecting passenger vehicles that are initiated when a defect in a vehicle or vehicle equipment creates an unreasonable safety risk, as determined by NHTSA or a manufacturer  To determine how consumers use publicly available auto recall information, we conducted and analyzed transcripts and questionnaires from 12 consumer focus groups we conducted with used and new vehicle owners who had experienced an auto recall in the last 24 months  Each focus group was split into two sessions: (1) a discussion session to explore participants’ thoughts, experiences, and preferences about auto recall information and (2) a website usability testing session  Also, we administered a questionnaire as part of each of these sessions  For the discussion session, we asked consumers about the recall notification process and how they used the recall information, and for the website usability testing session, we asked consumers to fill in a questionnaire during the session itself as they assessed the usability of the auto recall areas of NHTSA’s website  We conducted the 12 focus groups at six locations across the country, with each group including 7 or 8 consumers for a total of 94 participants  Half of the focus groups were comprised of consumers who had completed the repair and the remaining half included consumers who had not completed the repair  We selected the six focus group locations to provide population and geographic dispersion  To ensure geographic dispersion, we selected at least one location in each U S  Census region (see table 3)  To ensure population dispersion, we selected Metropolitan Statistical Areas representing a range of population sizes based on 2015 U S  Census estimates  To ensure our selection included the perspectives of vehicle owners in geographically distant or isolated communities, we also selected a rural location, which we defined as a city or town that has a population of less than 50,000 inhabitants and is not an urbanized area contiguous and adjacent to a city or town that has a population of greater than 50,000 inhabitants  Using information provided by the participants, we selected focus group participants based on age, income, gender, education level, race, and ethnicity to ensure we collected a range of perspectives on auto recall information use  However, since we did not select a representative sample of participants, focus group results are not generalizable to all vehicle owners  During focus group discussion sessions, we asked participants to discuss factors they considered when deciding whether to repair their recalled vehicle and then to select the single most influential factor  Each of the 12 focus group sessions was audio recorded and transcriptions were created; transcripts served as the record for each group  We then evaluated those transcripts using systematic content analysis to identify the factors consumers considered when deciding whether to complete repairs and any suggested improvements to the auto recall communication process  The analysis was conducted in three steps  First, two analysts independently developed a code framework and then worked together to resolve any discrepancies  Second, each transcript was coded independently by analysts using the framework and any discrepancies were resolved by both analysts agreeing on the coding of the associated statement by a participant  Third, if needed, another analyst adjudicated any continued disagreement between coders  Because the transcripts did not include a unique identifier for each focus group participant, we conducted our analysis of focus group session discussions at the group level (i e , of the 12 focus groups we conducted)  We also administered and analyzed a questionnaire as part of each discussion session to quantify responses regarding consumers’ use of auto recall information, including how they received and preferred to receive auto recall notifications  Our analysis of the questionnaire responses was conducted at the individual consumer level (i e , of the 94 consumers who participated)  These focus group sessions were structured, guided by a moderator who used a standardized list of questions to encourage participants to share their thoughts, experiences, and preferences  We also conducted two pretest focus groups at our headquarters and made some revisions to the focus group guide prior to beginning the sessions with consumers  Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to demonstrate the extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population or provide statistically representative samples or reliable quantitative estimates  Instead, they are intended to generate in-depth information about the reasons for the focus group participants’ thoughts, experiences, and preferences on specific topics  The projectability of the information produced by our focus group sessions is limited  For example, the information includes only the responses from the vehicle owners from the 12 selected groups and their individual responses to questions we asked  The experiences and preferences expressed may not reflect other vehicle owners’ thoughts and preferences  In addition, while the composition of the groups was designed to ensure a range of age and education levels, among the other criteria mentioned previously, the groups were not constructed using a random sampling method  To determine how industry stakeholders use auto recall information, we interviewed selected auto manufacturers, selected franchised and independent auto dealerships, NHTSA program officials, and other industry stakeholders  Specifically, we interviewed representatives from the following 10 auto manufacturers, selected based on each manufacturer’s sales market share (small, medium, and large), place of ownership (foreign and domestic), and experience with auto recalls (lower to higher based on the average annual number of auto recall campaigns and average market share of each manufacturer from 2010 to 2014) to collect a range of perspectives on how manufacturers use auto recall information: Tesla Motors, Inc  To understand the perspective of auto dealers, we interviewed four franchised dealerships, one in each of the four U S  Census regions where we conducted focus groups with consumers  We also interviewed three independent auto dealerships in two U S  Census regions  The results of these interviews are not generalizable to all auto manufacturers and dealerships, but provide insights about how some industry stakeholders use auto recall information  We conducted interviews with NHTSA program officials to understand NHTSA’s role in the auto recall process  In addition, we interviewed other stakeholders, including the Independent Monitor of Takata, which assists NHTSA in overseeing the Takata recall, as well as officials from consumer associations and other industry groups (see table 4)  To evaluate how easy or difficult consumers find the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov to use, we reviewed various website usability resources to understand federal and industry key website usability practices for making websites easy to use, such as focusing on design and how easily users can find information  In addition, we reviewed federal standards for internal control related to communicating quality information externally  During our usability testing sessions, we asked consumers to attempt to complete auto recall tasks—the primary means NHTSA gov provides for consumers to access information about auto recalls affecting their vehicles—and discuss their experiences  We then compared consumers’ experiences with the usability of the website against these practices  To identify key website usability practices, we analyzed guidance documents from NHTSA and other federal agencies  For example, we analyzed the General Services Administration’s (GSA) and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Research-Based Web Design & Usability Guidelines, which includes quantified, peer-reviewed guidelines intended to help federal agencies improve the design and usability of their information-based websites  We also analyzed GSA’s Requirements for Federal Websites and Digital Services, and the U S  Digital Services Playbook to identify key practices for making websites easy to use  Identified key practices are: (1) design and content— focusing on the layout, headers, and design; (2) navigation—how easily users can find information; (3) clarity—the ability to read and digest content; (4) identity and purpose—whether the site clearly presents its purpose; and (5) accessibility—the ability of people with physical or mental disabilities to use the site  To analyze the results of focus group website testing sessions, we performed a systematic content analysis of the session transcripts using the same content analysis methods described above and an analysis of the questionnaire we administered to each participant during the website usability sessions  Specifically, we analyzed the transcripts from the website usability testing sessions to account for consumers’ experiences, including their initial impressions of the website and any suggested usability improvements  We also analyzed the results of the questionnaire that each participant completed where participants were asked to mark responses regarding their experience including an assessment of the usability of the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov  Our analysis of the results from the questionnaire responses was conducted at the individual consumer level (i e , of the 94 consumers who participated) while our analysis of focus group session discussions was conducted at the group level (i e , of the 12 focus groups we conducted)  To corroborate the results of usability testing sessions we conducted with the consumers in our focus groups, we requested that five website usability professionals from GSA’s Federal User Experience Community conduct an independent evaluation of the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov against federal and industry key website usability practices (described above)  The website usability professionals developed a website usability evaluation form, which they used to individually evaluate the auto recall areas of NHTSA’s website  The website usability professionals then met to form a consensus and provided us with one final group evaluation of the website usability of the auto recall areas of NHTSA gov  Also, although neither our usability testing nor the website usability evaluation conducted by website usability professionals directly addressed accessibility, we interviewed responsible agency officials about how the agency assesses the accessibility of NHTSA gov  We also requested and analyzed website data provided by NHTSA to understand how consumers access and use NHTSA gov  Requested data included the number of subscribers to NHTSA’s Recall Notification E-mail System Sign-up; the number of weekly vehicle identification number (VIN) searches performed on NHTSA gov from August 2014 through May 2017; and NHTSA gov usage data by device (i e , usage by mobile devices, tablets, and desktop computers)  We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing any supporting documents provided by the agency and interviewing responsible NHTSA officials, and concluded the data were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes  While we did not independently review the usability of auto manufacturers’ auto recall websites, we requested and reviewed the results of any audits that NHTSA performed of these websites, including whether the websites met statutory and regulatory requirements for providing auto recall information to the public  We then corroborated any audit findings by reviewing the auto recall websites of the selected auto manufacturers that we interviewed  To determine any steps NHTSA has taken to raise consumer awareness about auto recalls and how NHTSA evaluates the effectiveness of any steps, we reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and proposed rules, including the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking related to recall notification methods  We also reviewed agency and other documents that describe or evaluate NHTSA’s public awareness activities  For example, we analyzed NHTSA’s strategic planning documents—such as NHTSA’s Strategic Plan 2016–2020—to identify ongoing public awareness activities along with their related goals, objectives, or performance metrics  Similarly, we requested and analyzed any documents NHTSA uses to evaluate the effectiveness of its public awareness activities, including performance reports for NHTSA’s ongoing Safe Cars Save Lives campaign  To assess the reliability of data included in these performance reports— such as VIN searches performed—we reviewed agency documentation and interviewed agency officials about the reliability, accuracy, and completeness of the data and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes  We reviewed performance management practices as provided in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, and standards for internal control in the federal government to identify any opportunities for improvement  We also performed a literature review to identify any related published articles and research studies  To understand how NHTSA implements and evaluates any public awareness activities, we also interviewed responsible agency officials from NHTSA’s Office of Communications and Consumer Information and other offices  In addition, we discussed NHTSA’s public awareness efforts during interviews with industry stakeholders, including selected auto manufacturers, selected franchised and independent auto dealerships, and other industry stakeholders  We analyzed the results of these interviews along with the focus group discussions we conducted with consumers (discussed above) to identify perspectives on the effectiveness of NHTSA’s public awareness steps  We conducted this performance audit from October 2016 to December 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is required to conduct a biennial analysis of vehicle safety recall completion rates and submit the results of its analysis in a report to certain congressional committees  The report must include, among other things, the annual recall completion rate by vehicle type and vehicle component (such as brakes, fuel systems, and air bags) for each of the 5 years preceding the year the report is submitted  According to NHTSA’s May 2017 report, completion rates for all vehicles combined ranged between 63 percent and 67 percent between calendar year 2011 and calendar year 2014 (see table 5)  However, NHTSA reported wider variation when the recall completion rates are broken down by vehicle type  Similarly, the report found that completion rates for most component categories fall within a range of 60 percent to 75 percent (see table 6)  The annual completion rate is a volume-based, weighted metric, such that the more vehicles affected by the recall, the more weight or influence it has on the computed rate  Focus group participants responded to a questionnaire we administered to collect information on consumers’ auto recall notification preferences during our discussion sessions  Table 7 shows participants’ responses to the administered questionnaire, by age group  We present these responses by age group, because consumers’ notification preferences may vary according to their ages  Focus group participants responded to a questionnaire we administered to collect information on the usability of NHTSA gov during our usability testing sessions  Table 8 shows focus group participants’ responses to the administered questionnaire, by age group  We present these responses by age group, because consumers’ website usability needs or preferences may vary according to their ages  In addition to the individual named above, H  Brandon Haller (Assistant Director); Katherine Blair; Jason Blake; Melissa Bodeau; Alicia Cackley; William Colwell (Analyst in Charge); Lacey Coppage; Elizabeth Dretsch; Jaci Evans; Marcia Fernandez; Sarah Kaczmarek; Malika Rice; Todd Schartung; and Andrew Stavisky made key contributions to this report 
Report 2:  Federal internal control standards state that management should share quality information throughout an organization to enable personnel to perform key roles, and we have previously reported that by regularly sharing useful performance information with leaders at multiple levels of an organization, agencies can help leaders make informed decisions  Without this information, individual unit commanders or the commanders’ supervisors cannot determine whether Coast Guard servicemembers under their command completed TAP or identify whether there is a need for corrective actions to ensure they do so  As we mention earlier in this report, the Coast Guard plans to adopt DOD’s TAP-IT Enterprise System, which according to officials, could help the Coast Guard ensure eligible servicemembers participate in the program  According to a Coast Guard official, once the system is fully implemented by the Coast Guard, commanders will be required to verify and document whether Coast Guard servicemembers under their command completed TAP, potentially making commanders more vested in the process  We previously reported that a senior DOD official said that the TAP-IT Enterprise System may be able to generate unit- and installation-level reports for the four DOD-led military services by October 2018, and a Coast Guard official said he would work with DOD to identify whether this capability could also extend to the Coast Guard  Once data reliability improves, sharing installation and unit-level TAP performance information with Coast Guard commanders could support monitoring efforts  The performance measures tracked by the TAP interagency working group do not reflect TAP implementation broadly across all five military services, according to a Coast Guard official we interviewed  The Coast Guard does not currently share TAP data it collects with DOD or other members of the interagency performance working group  While the benefits of interagency data sharing cannot be realized without the Coast Guard first improving the quality and completeness of its TAP data, we have identified leading practices for interagency collaboration, including that members of interagency working groups identify and share relevant agency performance data  Moreover, federal internal control standards call for management to communicate quality information to external parties  Because the Coast Guard does not share TAP data, the performance measures tracked by the interagency group do not reflect Coast Guard servicemembers’ experiences and thus do not provide a complete picture of TAP implementation across the five military services  More specifically for the Coast Guard, without such data sharing, future TAP evaluations may not be able to assess the effectiveness of TAP delivery, hindering the Coast Guard’s ability to make program adjustments to better prepare its servicemembers to successfully transition to life after military service  Coast Guard officials said migrating to DOD’s TAP-IT Enterprise System will facilitate information sharing with interagency partners and that improving data completeness and reliability is a top priority for 2018  Given the sacrifices servicemembers have made to serve their country, it is imperative they are afforded every chance to adequately prepare for civilian life before leaving military service  In order to make a successful transition, servicemembers need to be well-positioned to get a job or make an informed decision about whether to pursue additional education or start a small business  As such, the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) serves a critically important function—to give servicemembers the tools and information they need to successfully transition to life outside the military  Federal law requires that the Coast Guard ensure all eligible servicemembers participate in the program, but thousands of Coast Guard servicemembers may have transitioned without the support provided by TAP  Reliably tracking participation has proven to be a challenge for the Coast Guard, in part because it lacks a current Commandant Instruction that defines the roles and responsibilities of staff responsible for implementing TAP and ensuring complete and reliable data are collected  In preparing to issue an updated Commandant Instruction, the Coast Guard has taken a positive step toward addressing the limitations of its current TAP data, and will be better positioned to ensure compliance with VOW Act requirements using reliable data  In addition to collecting reliable data, the Coast Guard could further demonstrate its commitment to meeting TAP requirements by establishing formal performance goals that measure the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP  By establishing interim performance goals, the agency would be able to show its progress towards achieving full compliance  Moreover, communicating performance goals to unit and installation commanders could enhance accountability and might spur progress toward meeting federal program requirements  By expanding its monitoring efforts beyond tracking participation in TAP’s required classes, the Coast Guard could enhance its ability to ensure other TAP requirements are met and that its servicemembers are able to access additional transition resources  Monitoring the timeliness of participation would help ensure Coast Guard servicemembers have adequate time to complete TAP before leaving the military  Further, by monitoring requests to participate in additional 2-day classes and 2-day class attendance, the Coast Guard would be in a better position to identify whether servicemembers who wish to attend the classes are able to do so, to determine whether more classes are needed, and to communicate this information to the interagency partners responsible for delivering these classes  Commanders can also play a key role in bolstering TAP participation  Having an up-to-date written Commandant Instruction that explicitly describes commanders’ roles and responsibilities could enhance commanders’ ability to ensure TAP’s proper implementation and compliance with VOW Act requirements  Moreover, once data quality improves, providing commanders a mechanism to readily determine whether servicemembers under their command have completed TAP could help them monitor the program to ensure that all TAP-eligible servicemembers receive the resources they need to successfully transition to civilian life  Finally, once more reliable data on Coast Guard servicemember participation are available, sharing this information with interagency partners could improve TAP implementation on a broader scale  Sharing reliable data, such as participation figures for the Coast Guard, would give TAP interagency partners a more complete picture of implementation across all five military services  Sharing such information would also enhance the interagency group’s ability to evaluate how well TAP serves the entire population of servicemembers  Improving the reliability of the Coast Guard’s TAP data will be essential for the benefits of data sharing to be realized  To ensure that all eligible Coast Guard servicemembers are provided the opportunity to complete the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), we recommend the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following seven actions: Issue an updated Commandant Instruction that establishes policies and procedures to improve the reliability and completeness of TAP data by including when and by whom data should be recorded and updated  (Recommendation 1) Establish a formal performance goal with a measurable target for participation rates in VOW Act-mandated portions of TAP  (Recommendation 2) Monitor the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP within prescribed time frames  (Recommendation 3) Monitor the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers who elect to participate in additional 2-day classes are afforded the opportunity to attend  (Recommendation 4) Issue an updated Commandant Instruction that defines the roles and responsibilities of the personnel who administer the program and ensure servicemembers’ participation  (Recommendation 5) Once reliable data are available by installation or unit, enable unit commanders and the higher-level commanders to whom they report to access TAP performance information specifically for the units they oversee so that they can monitor compliance with all TAP requirements  (Recommendation 6) Once reliable data are available, share TAP information with DOD and other interagency partners, such as data on participation in required TAP courses and additional 2-day classes  (Recommendation 7) We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Education, Labor, and Veterans Affairs, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Small Business Administration for their review and comment  The formal written response of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is reproduced in appendix II  In addition, DHS provided technical comments from Coast Guard officials that we incorporated into the report as appropriate  The other agencies did not provide any comments  In its written comments, DHS agreed with all seven of our recommendations  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or brownbarnesc@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  This report examines (1) what is known about the reliability of Transition Assistance Program (TAP) data on participation levels and the factors that affect Coast Guard servicemembers’ participation, and (2) the extent to which the Coast Guard measures TAP performance and monitors key areas of TAP implementation  To address these questions, we surveyed Coast Guard installations with full-time TAP operations; reviewed Coast Guard data on TAP participation for fiscal years 2012 to 2017; visited one Coast Guard installation and interviewed TAP managers from two additional Coast Guard installations selected for diversity in location, among other reasons; and interviewed Coast Guard officials responsible for overseeing TAP implementation for the Coast Guard  We also reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, policies, documents, and publications  Information in this report is current as of the date GAO received formal agency comments from DHS  Our survey of Coast Guard installations with full-time TAP operations asked about how TAP was being implemented  The survey included questions about the accessibility of TAP components, challenges Coast Guard servicemembers faced in attending the components, and the level of commander support for participation  Our survey targeted front-line TAP managers, who could draw on the expertise of TAP course facilitators, transition counselors, career counselors, and other key TAP staff as necessary  After drafting the survey questions, we pretested them with a TAP manager to ensure (1) the questions were clear and unambiguous, (2) terminology was used correctly, (3) the survey did not place an undue burden on agency officials, (4) the information could feasibly be obtained, and (5) the survey was comprehensive and unbiased  We revised the content and format of the survey based on the feedback we received  We initially sent the survey to TAP managers at all 13 Coast Guard installations at which TAP staff were located  We removed one installation when we later found that the TAP manager position was vacant and revised the total to 12 Coast Guard installations  The survey was accessible online from October 31, 2016, through January 18, 2017, through a secure server that recipients were able to access using unique usernames and passwords  We sent an email announcement to TAP staff at all 13 Coast Guard installations at which TAP staff are located on October 24, 2016  We sent a second email on October 31, 2016 to notify participants the survey was available online, and provided their unique passwords and usernames  We sent two follow-up e-mails (November 14, 2016 and November 28, 2016) to those who had not responded  Finally, we contacted all remaining nonrespondents by telephone starting December 5, 2016  The survey was available online until we reached a 100 percent response rate  To increase our understanding into how TAP was being implemented at installations and supplement our survey findings, we visited one Coast Guard installation and interviewed TAP managers from two additional installations  We selected the installations based on several factors, including the size of the installation, proximity to Department of Defense (DOD) installations, and diverse locations in the United States  (See table 1 ) At Coast Guard Base Elizabeth City in North Carolina, the installation we visited, we interviewed the TAP manager, uniformed career counselors, and senior installation leadership  During our interviews with TAP managers at all three installations, we asked about the extent to which Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP’s required and additional 2-day classes, including whether the servicemembers attended classes online or in a classroom setting, challenges to ensuring Coast Guard servicemembers participate in TAP, and the extent to which they monitor Coast Guard servicemembers’ participation in TAP  At Coast Guard Base Elizabeth City, we also interviewed 25 Coast Guard servicemembers (both officers and enlisted personnel) to get their perspective on how well TAP worked and any challenges they had participating  To help guide the interviews with the Coast Guard servicemembers, we asked them to complete a short questionnaire that asked about their experiences with the TAP program  We also interviewed TAP staff at Coast Guard headquarters to learn about TAP policy, monitoring efforts, and performance measures for the service overall  For example, we asked what policies and procedures guide installations’ TAP implementation; what performance measures the Coast Guard uses to monitor TAP; how performance results are reported and shared with different levels of Coast Guard leadership; and to what extent the Coast Guard uses results from TAP participant satisfaction assessments  We also asked whether the Coast Guard plans to shift to DOD’s new TAP-IT Enterprise System and how using the new system could affect its monitoring efforts in the future  In evaluating the Coast Guard’s performance measures, we focused on measures related to servicemembers’ transition experiences before leaving the military  We did not gather information on post-program evaluations and outcomes because they were determined to be outside the scope of this review  We reviewed DHS data on TAP participation for fiscal years 2012 to 2017  To assess the reliability of the Coast Guard’s TAP participation data, we interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data  We determined these data were not sufficiently reliable due to limitations with the Coast Guard’s data collection system  Specifically, the system lacks adequate controls to ensure TAP data are complete and accurate  We conducted this performance audit from February 2016 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the contact named above, Meeta Engle (Assistant Director), Amy MacDonald (Analyst-in-Charge), James Bennett, Holly Dye, David Forgosh, Ying Long, Jonathan McMurray, Jean McSween, Andrew Sherrill, Benjamin Sinoff, and Timothy Young, made significant contributions to this report  Also contributing to this report were Susan Aschoff, Jessie Battle, Ramona Burton, Melinda Cordero, Elizabeth Curda, Dawn Hoff, Ben Licht, Serena Lo, Sheila McCoy, Almeta Spencer, Christopher Schmitt, James Whitcomb, and Jill Yost  Transitioning Veterans: DOD Needs to Improve Performance Reporting and Monitoring for the Transition Assistance Program, GAO-18-23  Washington, D C : November, 8, 2017  Transitioning Veterans: Improvements Needed in DOD’s Performance Reporting and Monitoring of the Transition Assistance Program, GAO-18-225T  Washington, D C : November 8, 2017  Department of Defense: Transition Assistance Program (TAP) for Military Personnel, GAO-16-302R  Washington, D C : December 17, 2015  Veterans’ Employment: Need for Further Workshops Should Be Considered before Making Decisions on Their Future, GAO-15-518  Washington, D C : July 16, 2015  Military and Veteran Support: DOD and VA Programs That Address the Effects of Combat and Transition to Civilian Life, GAO-15-24  Washington, D C : November 7, 2014  Veterans Affairs: Better Understanding Needed to Enhance Services to Veterans Readjusting to Civilian Life, GAO-14-676  Washington, D C : September 10, 2014  Transitioning Veterans: Improved Oversight Needed to Enhance Implementation of Transition Assistance Program, GAO-14-144  Washington, D C : March 5, 2014  Military and Veterans’ Benefits: Enhanced Services Could Improve Transition Assistance for Reserves and National Guard, GAO-05-544  Washington, D C : May 20, 2005  Military and Veterans’ Benefits: Observations on the Transition Assistance Program, GAO-02-914T (July 18, 2002) 

ground_truth: The number of vehicles affected by safety defect recalls increased sharply in recent years—from nearly 13 million in 2011 to over 51 million in 2016. Once a defect is identified, auto manufacturers are required to send written notification to vehicle owners by mail. NHTSA also aims to enhance awareness of auto recalls by providing information on its website, NHTSA.gov . The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act includes a provision requiring GAO to study the use of publicly available safety recall information. This report addresses: (1) how consumers and industry stakeholders use such information and (2) how easy to use do consumers find the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov, among other objectives. To understand consumers' use of auto recall information and to test website usability, GAO conducted 12 focus groups with 94 consumers who had a recall. Focus groups were held in six locations selected for population and geographic variation. GAO identified key website usability practices and requested an evaluation by website usability professionals. GAO reviewed statutes, regulations, and NHTSA documents, and interviewed industry stakeholders—including 10 manufacturers selected based on sales market share and other factors. Consumers, manufacturers, and auto dealers use publicly available auto recall information differently. For example, the 94 consumers in 12 focus groups that GAO conducted used this information to decide whether to repair their vehicles. These consumers overwhelmingly cited safety risk and convenience as the two most influential factors they considered. Most consumers reported a preference for receiving recall notification by at least one electronic means, such as by e-mail or text message, in addition to mail. However, only 7 of 94 consumers reported receiving electronic notifications, suggesting a gap between the industry's auto recall notification practices and consumers' preferences. (See fig.). In response to a mandate in law, in September 2016, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a proposed rule that, if finalized, would require manufacturers to notify consumers about auto recalls by electronic means in addition to mail. Most consumers in GAO's focus group website usability tests found the auto recall areas of NHTSA's website—NHTSA.gov—easy to use; however, some consumers experienced difficulties when asked to complete auto recall related tasks. For example, when consumers attempted to search for recalls affecting their specific vehicles, some found the search results confusing, leading them to question the accuracy of the results. Similarly, some consumers were hampered in searching for recalls by their vehicles' year, make, and model because the website did not always display model options using plain language. GAO found that the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov do not always reflect federal and industry key website usability practices, and that an independent evaluation conducted by website usability professionals at GAO's request identified similar issues. NHTSA is in the process of consolidating its websites and plans to conduct a website usability study of NHTSA.gov with consumers after the consolidation is complete. However, the agency has not determined a completion date for the consolidation effort—an essential step for organizations to effectively guide their information technology efforts. Without establishing a completion date and taking interim steps to improve the usability of NHTSA.gov, consumers will likely continue to experience difficulties, which may limit the effectiveness of the website's primary means of providing consumers with information about recalls affecting their vehicles. GAO recommends that NHTSA determine a completion date for its website consolidation effort and take interim steps to improve the usability of NHTSA.gov by addressing the website usability difficulties GAO identified. The Department of Transportation concurred with the recommendations.