prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: As of June 30, 2017, the UN had carried out 71 peacekeeping operations since 1948, and had 16 active UN peacekeeping operations worldwide  Eight of these UN peacekeeping operations were in sub-Saharan Africa (see fig  1)  In their earliest days, UN peacekeeping operations were primarily military in nature and limited to monitoring cease-fire agreements and stabilizing situations on the ground while political efforts were being made to resolve conflicts  Today, in response to increasingly complex situations in which conflicts may be internal, involve many parties, and include civilians as deliberate targets, UN peacekeeping operations are more commonly “multidimensional”—deploying civilian and police personnel in addition to military personnel  Multidimensional peacekeeping operations seek to create a secure and stable environment while working with national authorities and actors to make sure the peace agreement or political process is implemented  According to the UN, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are designed to protect civilians and often assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections; protect and promote human rights; and assist in restoring the rule of law  Figure 2 shows examples of UN peacekeepers serving in different capacities as part of MINUSCA in Bangui, CAR  Each UN peacekeeping operation, including its mandated size and tasks, is authorized through a UN Security Council resolution  The operation’s budget and resources are subject to General Assembly approval  The UN’s approved budget for global peacekeeping operations in UN fiscal year 2017 was about $7 9 billion  Individual operation budgets ranged from about $36 million for the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo to more than $1 2 billion for the peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see table 1)  The UN reported in June 2017 that it maintained 95,544 uniformed peacekeepers, 5,004 international civilians, 10,149 local civilians, and 1,597 UN volunteers in support of its operations around the world  According to UN documents, civilian peacekeeping personnel are generally recruited to peacekeeping operations as individuals, while police and military personnel are volunteered by member states to participate as part of their country’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations  The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations  From fiscal years 2014 to 2017, the United States contributed an average of about $2 1 billion per year to these operations  The UN General Assembly sets the assessment levels for UN member contributions to peacekeeping operations every 3 years  The United States’ assessment has averaged about 28 5 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget; however, Congress has authorized payment with appropriated funds at about 27 percent for U S  fiscal years 2014 through 2016, and 25 percent for U S  fiscal year 2017  In April 2014, UN Security Council Resolution 2149 established MINUSCA following escalating sectarian violence in CAR that resulted in the destruction of state institutions, thousands of deaths, and 2 5 million people—more than half of CAR’s entire population—in need of humanitarian aid, according to a UN report  The conflict also resulted in 174,000 people being internally displaced and over 400,000 fleeing to neighboring countries, according to the UN report  MINUSCA’s tasks include protecting civilians, given the security, humanitarian, human rights, and political crisis in CAR; supporting the implementation of the transition process, including efforts to extend state authority and preserve territorial integrity; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and promoting and protecting human rights; supporting justice and the rule of law; and facilitating the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation processes  On November 15, 2017, UN Security Council Resolution 2387 (2017) extended MINUSCA’s mandate for a fourth time, through November 15, 2018  MINUSCA’s approved personnel levels for UN fiscal year 2017 comprised 10,750 military personnel, 400 individual police officers, and 1,680 formed police unit personnel, as well as 790 international civilian and 696 national civilian personnel, 238 UN volunteers, and 40 government- provided personnel, according to a UN Secretary-General report  Table 2 shows average annual personnel deployment for MINUSCA and the number of authorized positions for the first 3 full fiscal years of the operation  Based on data and other input from the UN, DOD, and State, we estimate that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to MINUSCA, the ongoing UN operation in the Central African Republic (CAR)  In addition, the estimated cost of a U S  operation in CAR far exceeds U S  contributions to MINUSCA  Based on an estimate we developed in conjunction with DOD and State officials, a hypothetical, comparable U S  operation would likely cost nearly $5 7 billion, more than twice as much as MINUSCA, the ongoing UN operation in CAR  Our comparison covers the time from which MINUSCA was established in April 2014 through the end of UN fiscal year 2017, which ended on June 30, 2017—a total of 3 years and 3 months, the first 39 months of MINUSCA  Over this time period, UN costs for MINUSCA totaled approximately $2 4 billion  Using roughly the same basic parameters for MINUSCA, including similar deployment levels of military and civilian personnel over the same time period, in consultation with DOD and State officials, we estimate that a comparable, hypothetical U S  operation would likely cost nearly $5 7 billion, more than twice the UN cost for MINUSCA (see table 3 for a detailed comparison of estimated U S  costs and actual UN costs)  This estimate does not include, among other things, the cost for State diplomatic security and office space for civilian staff, the inclusion of which could further increase the total estimated U S  cost for such an operation  During the same time period, from April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017, the United States contributed approximately $700 million to the UN to support MINUSCA  Therefore, the estimated cost of a U S  operation (nearly $5 7 billion) would be almost eight times greater than the United States’ contribution to MINUSCA  See figure 3 for a comparison of these costs with the U S  estimate  Various factors contribute to the differences in costs between actual UN expenditures for MINUSCA from April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017— the first 39 months of MINUSCA—and a hypothetical, comparable U S  operation over the same time period, including disparities in the cost of sourcing and transporting equipment and supplies, staffing and compensating military and police personnel, and maintaining facilities and communications and intelligence systems  These disparities reflect operational, structural, and doctrinal differences in the way the United States likely would undertake a hypothetical, comparable operation, should such an operation be deemed in the U S  national interest  High U S  costs to source and transport supplies and equipment to the Central African Republic (CAR) contribute to the difference between our cost estimate for the hypothetical U S  peacekeeping operation and the UN’s actual costs for MINUSCA  In the hypothetical U S  operation, based on input from DOD and IDA officials and the output of the IDA cost estimating tool, the United States would fly in most of its consumable supplies from outside CAR  Specifically, materials such as water, ice, food, and other subsistence items would be airlifted into CAR from Italy, a supply location validated as reasonable by DOD and IDA officials given its proximity to the operation and because MINUSCA relies on a UN global service center there, one of two such UN centers in Europe  The estimated U S  cost of airlifting water alone over the 39-month time period for the hypothetical operation would total nearly $700 million  The United States would still deploy its equipment and personnel to CAR from the United States, at a cost of nearly $600 million  Transportation of equipment and supplies within CAR would cost an additional estimated $316 million  In contrast, the UN does not fly in water or consumables on the same scale as the United States would in the hypothetical operation  Instead, the UN relies on some in-country or local infrastructure and consumables  Military and formed police unit equipment is provided by the troop- and police-contributing countries  The UN reimburses these countries for equipment at set rates  The UN cost of reimbursing countries for deploying their equipment to CAR likely would be less than the amount the United States would spend on airlifting the equipment to CAR alone  For example, the UN cost of freight, deployment, and country reimbursements for military and formed police equipment was approximately $229 million over a 2-year period (July 2014 through June 2016), while in the hypothetical operation the U S  cost of deploying equipment alone would be over $382 million, which is about $154 million more than the UN cost over a similar 2-year period (September 2014 through August 2016)  The United States would staff and compensate its military and police personnel differently than the UN, leading to differences between the estimated U S  costs and actual UN costs  While neither the hypothetical U S  cost estimate nor UN expenditures include the cost of salaries for active duty personnel or troops contributed by other countries, respectively, the United States would bear the additional cost of salaries for the share of personnel drawn from military reserves  According to DOD officials, 10 percent of infantry unit personnel would have been reservist personnel in a hypothetical, comparable U S  operation, based on the average ratio of active to reserve personnel deployed by the United States in fiscal years 2015 through 2017, roughly the same time period as the first 39 months of MINUSCA  As a result, the total estimated cost of the hypothetical U S  operation reflects the additional U S  expense of paying full salaries and hardship duty pay for U S  reservist military personnel  The estimate also includes the incremental costs the United States would incur for deploying active duty military personnel, including hardship duty pay that is not incurred when those personnel are in the United States  For military troops deployed to MINUSCA, the UN pays a standard troop cost reimbursement to the troop-contributing countries, which is intended also to cover incremental expenses but not the cost of troops’ salaries  U S  costs for civilian police also are significantly higher than UN costs  The United States would pay over $167 million for U S  civilian police for the duration of the hypothetical operation, while the UN spent $41 million on its individual police officers over the same time frame  The U S  estimate includes the cost of police salaries and the additional costs of deployment, whereas UN costs for deploying individual police officers do not include salaries, which are borne by the police-contributing countries  Higher U S  standards for certain aspects of the hypothetical peacekeeping operation in CAR would contribute to costs that exceed those of MINUSCA  Facilities  The higher estimated U S  costs reflect higher U S  standards for facilities, according to State officials  The U S  cost estimate includes more than $1 1 billion for facilities and related costs, which include facility maintenance, food service, laundry, management and administration, and residential leases for civilian personnel  In contrast, the actual UN cost for facilities as part of MINUSCA totaled $292 million over the same time period  Communications and intelligence systems  The United States incurs costs associated with meeting U S  intelligence standards that are not part of UN operations, which lack comparable intelligence capabilities  The U S  cost estimate includes $140 million for the cost of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems, which represents additional operational costs to meet higher U S  standards for U S  communications and intelligence capabilities  Medical capability  Higher U S  standards for medical care and medical evacuation capability as compared to the UN are another factor that would contribute to higher U S  medical costs for a hypothetical operation, according to DOD and State officials  Some UN hospitals may not meet U S  minimum standards for medical care, according to DOD officials  Although medical costs do not constitute a significant portion of the U S  cost estimate, estimated U S  medical costs ($132 million) greatly exceed actual UN medical costs ($8 million) over the same time period  UN and U S  peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U S  and UN officials we met with  Relative strengths of UN peacekeeping operations include international and local acceptance, access to global expertise, and the ability to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks, according to these officials  Relative strengths of U S  peacekeeping operations would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities, according to U S  and UN officials  According to U S  and UN officials, UN peacekeeping operations benefit from greater international and local acceptance, access to global expertise, and the ability to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks  UN peacekeeping operations also provide indirect benefits to the military capacity of participating countries  International and local acceptance  As a multilateral organization, the UN benefits from greater international and local acceptance for its peacekeeping operations, according to State, DOD, and UN officials  These officials noted that the UN’s multinational character contributes to a reputation for local impartiality  Conversely, the United States acting alone may not be viewed as impartial and could face challenges gaining or maintaining international or local support for peacekeeping operations, according to State and DOD officials  Global expertise  UN officials noted that the UN has unmatched convening power and access to expertise and experience from across the globe to implement the objectives of multidimensional peacekeeping operations  The UN is able to bring in people with subject matter expertise, native language skills, and knowledge of local customs to work for these operations, according to U S  and UN officials  Leveraging multilateral assistance  U S  officials told us that the UN is better able to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and multilateral development banks to expand the scope of assistance provided in support of the goals of peacekeeping operations  For example, according to a UN report, MINUSCA is partnering with the UN Development Fund to provide capacity building related to elections, police, courts, and prisons  The report also noted that the UN, European Union, and World Bank supported the Central African Republic government in developing a “National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan” while harmonizing humanitarian and development funding to ensure complementarity with the UN peacekeeping operation  Developing international military capacity  U S  officials told us that UN peacekeeping operations provide an indirect benefit of helping to professionalize the military units from many developing countries that contribute troops to the UN  We have previously reported that building military capacity of foreign partners to address security-related threats is an important goal of U S  national security strategy and foreign policy  According to U S  and UN officials, the relative strengths of U S  peacekeeping operations would be faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities  Deployment speed  State, DOD, and UN officials highlighted the United States’ ability to deploy troops and police to peacekeeping operations more quickly than the UN  Unlike the U S  military, which can draw from a ready pool of military personnel, the UN must seek troops from UN member states, which takes time  UN officials told us that the UN faces a shortage of both troops and UN police, which slows deployment  Further, a 2015 report by the UN High-level Panel on Peacekeeping stated that the UN “has struggled to get sufficient forces on the ground quickly enough and relies on under-resourced uniformed capabilities ” The report also stated that aviation, medical, and engineering specialists, among others, are difficult to mobilize in advance of infantry units  Command and control  State, DOD, and UN officials told us that U S  operations would enable the U S  military to have direct command and control, whereas UN operations, which are inherently multinational, face challenges with command and control over troops from several different countries  The UN High-level Panel report noted that UN peacekeeping operations’ weak command and control is a well-known constraint that limits the type of operations the UN can undertake  Logistics support  U S  and UN officials told us that U S  operations have superior logistics systems  U S  procurement likely would be faster than UN procurement, which lacks a standing supply chain and, therefore, relies on third-party vendors, according to UN officials  In addition, the UN High Level Panel report stated that UN peacekeeping operations’ logistics systems and structures in the field are under severe strain, which can limit the mobility of these operations  Intelligence capability  U S  and UN officials agreed that U S  operations would involve superior intelligence capability  The UN only recently established an intelligence policy—in May 2017—having recognized that some peacekeeping operations had been deployed in fragile political and security environments with asymmetrical and complex threats  However, UN officials acknowledged that the scope of UN intelligence capability remains limited  Counterterrorism capability  DOD officials told us that a U S  peacekeeping operation would have the capability to include a counterterrorism component and would not be constrained in the use of force, if needed, in response to terrorist threats  UN peacekeeping operations, on the other hand, lack the capabilities and specialized military preparation to engage in counterterrorism operations, according to the UN High-level Panel report  The UN report stated that counterterrorism should be undertaken by the host government, a capable regional force, or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the UN Security Council  According to the UN report, UN peacekeeping operations may engage in proactive and preemptive use of force to protect civilians and UN personnel from threats; however, offensive force to degrade, neutralize or defeat an opponent is a fundamentally different type of posture that should be authorized by the Security Council only under limited and exceptional circumstances  We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, and the UN for review and comment  DOD provided a letter, reproduced in appendix II, which stated that it had no comments  State did not provide comments  The UN provided technical comments, which we incorporated into our report as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Secretary- General of the United Nations  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  The objectives of this report were to (1) compare the reported costs of a specific United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identify factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations  To compare the reported costs of a specific UN peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we selected the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) as a case study  We compared the reported UN expenditures for MINUSCA, which included both military and civilian components, with estimated costs for a hypothetical U S  operation with a similar level of military and civilian personnel  Our comparison covers a total of 3 years and 3 months—from MINUSCA’s establishment in April 2014 through June 30, 2017, the end of UN fiscal year 2017  We selected MINUSCA because it is in sub-Saharan Africa, where most UN peacekeeping operations established since 2003 have taken place, and has a typical scope and budget compared to other UN peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa, according to U S  and UN officials  In addition, MINUSCA is one of the most recent UN peacekeeping operations; thus, initial expenditures for the operation are relatively current  Because the results of our cost comparison are based on a single case study, they cannot be generalized to all UN peacekeeping operations  To determine the UN’s costs for MINUSCA, we analyzed UN budget and expenditure data covering the initial start-up period (April 2014 to June 2014) and the first 3 UN fiscal years (July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2017)  We spoke with officials of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support, and Management at UN Headquarters in New York, New York, to better understand the characteristics of MINUSCA and the different costs affecting MINUSCA’s budget and expenditures  We assessed UN expenditure data through discussions with cognizant UN officials and a review of external audits of UN budgetary information and found them sufficiently reliable for our purposes  We also analyzed data on U S  contributions to UN peacekeeping operations for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 from the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Organization Affairs to determine total U S  contributions to MINUSCA, and UN peacekeeping operations overall  To estimate the costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we developed a hypothetical scenario for a U S  operation based on the MINUSCA budget and supporting documents, assuming deployment of the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel in the Central African Republic (CAR) over the same time period (April 2014 through June 2017)  To estimate the military portion of the operation, we interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) officials and staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a DOD-sponsored non-profit corporation involved in developing cost estimates for U S  contingency operations  The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller and IDA generated a cost estimate for the military components included in the hypothetical operation using the Contingency Operations Support Tool (cost estimating tool)  DOD uses this tool to develop cost estimates for all military contingency operations  The cost estimate included only the incremental costs of the operation—those directly attributable to the operation that would not be incurred if the operation did not take place  For example, the estimate produced by the cost estimating tool did not include the direct salaries of active duty personnel as those costs would be incurred by the United States regardless of a possible decision to undertake the hypothetical operation  We assessed the cost estimating tool’s applicability to developing a hypothetical cost estimate for the purposes of this report through discussions with DOD and IDA officials, and compared the tool to the accurate and comprehensive characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, as described in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide  While we found the DOD cost estimating tool generated a sufficiently reliable cost estimate for a hypothetical U S  peacekeeping operation, we did not assess the overall reliability of the tool or its capability to generate accurate or comprehensive estimates for future U S  operations  To generate our estimate of U S  military costs using the DOD’s estimating tool, we used UN military deployment numbers as a baseline for the scale of a hypothetical, comparable U S  peacekeeping operation, while using unit sizes and rotations in deployment that were considered appropriate for the U S  military, according to DOD and IDA officials  We based the hypothetical U S  operation, and hence the cost estimate, on the following assumptions, which correspond approximately with MINUSCA’s actual UN personnel deployments: Theater of operation: Central African Republic (CAR) Type of operation: military contingency Operation time frame: April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017 Military contingents: as of June 30, 2017, 11,495 total personnel Infantry: 10 units of 630-785 personnel per unit, approximately 90 percent active duty / 10 percent reserves Communication / signals: 1 unit, 124 personnel per unit Engineering: 4 units, 200 personnel per unit Military police: 1 unit, 120 personnel per unit Formed police units (military police): 12 units, 140 personnel per Hospital / medical: 1 level III hospital, 248 beds, 495 personnel Helicopter units: 2 UH-60 C3 units, 1 MH-60M Assault attack helicopter unit, 100 personnel per unit Quick reaction force: 1 unit, 160 personnel per unit Special forces: 1 tactical civilian affairs unit, 1 Marine special operations intelligence unit, 160 personnel per unit Unmanned aerial vehicle: 1 unit, 84 personnel Transportation: 1 heavy transport unit, 120 personnel per unit Operational tempo: 1 0 for all phases of operation and units, except aviation units (set at 1 5) Deployment schedule and phasing: phased deployment, including 14 days for predeployment (e g , training), 5 days for deployment, 180 days for active duty unit sustainment and 270 days for reserve unit sustainment, 5 days for redeployment, and 0 days for reconstitution Housing: contractor-provided semi-permanent housing Transportation: personnel and equipment transported by airlift from the United States (primarily Fort Hood, Texas), material (such as water, food, and other consumables) transported by airlift from Italy We obtained input on the operational design for the military portion of the cost estimate from DOD officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Policy, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, and IDA officials  However, the military portions of the scenario and their corresponding cost estimate have some limitations  As a result of rounding for some units, U S  military personnel numbers do not exactly match the MINUSCA deployment levels  In addition, based on input from DOD officials, we attempted to select military units that would provide an essential function per U S  common practices while keeping the overall personnel deployment level as close as possible to MINUSCA’s deployment level  An actual U S  military plan may differ significantly from the UN plan as a result of differences between U S  and UN military operations, structure, doctrine, and circumstances at the time of the operation  To estimate U S  civilian costs, we matched the number of U S  civilian police and personnel to the number serving in MINUSCA  We then estimated the costs of deploying these U S  civilian personnel in CAR for the same time period as MINUSCA  We did not attempt to determine how the U S  government would actually implement civilian components of a peacekeeping operation in CAR  To estimate U S  civilian police costs, we met with State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to identify State’s costs for civilian police contractors providing police training and technical assistance in sub-Saharan Africa  Based on INL’s input we assumed that the base salary of civilian police would be grade 13, step 5 on the Office of Personnel Management’s general schedule salary tables for federal employees  In addition to the average base salary, we identified other costs—with input from INL—including, among others, personal equipment, travel from the United States, and State’s published allowances specific to CAR for local cost of living, post hardship differential, danger pay, and living quarters  We applied the average cost per officer to the average number of UN civilian police officers deployed in MINUSCA  To estimate U S  civilian personnel costs, we met with State’s Bureau of Budget and Planning to identify the costs of State Foreign Service officers and locally employed staff, based on the number of UN international and national civilian staff deployed to MINUSCA, respectively  We matched the number of State Foreign Service officers for the U S  cost estimate to the number of UN international staff in MINUSCA, with input from State to align the grade levels  The estimated costs for Foreign Service officers include average salaries based on State’s Foreign Service salary tables and State’s allowances specific to CAR, including local cost of living, post hardship differential, and danger pay  We also met with State Bureau of Budget and Planning officials to estimate other costs for Foreign Service officers, which we included in our cost estimate, including post assignment travel, administrative support costs, residential furnishings, and residential guards, among others, but we did not assess the reliability of these additional costs provided by State  In addition, State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations provided the actual costs of residential leases for Foreign Service officers in CAR in fiscal year 2017, which we used to estimate the cost of housing Foreign Service officers in CAR  We also matched the number of State locally employed staff to the number of UN national staff deployed to MINUSCA and added their average salaries and other costs in CAR based on data provided by State’s Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services  While MINUSCA’s expenditures also included costs for sending an annual average of up to about 200 UN volunteers to CAR, State officials told us that the United States generally would not send volunteers through its assistance efforts to a high-risk post, such as CAR  Therefore, we did not include any costs related to volunteers in the cost estimate  We also did not include costs related to host-government-provided personnel serving in MINUSCA  In addition, UN expenditures included about $7 million for “quick-impact projects” to support local government infrastructure and civil society initiatives  We did not include comparable costs for quick-impact projects in our U S  cost estimate because we did not have a basis for matching these costs  To identify factors that affect cost differences between MINUSCA and a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we reviewed the U S  cost estimate generated in conjunction with DOD, IDA, and State officials, and identified significant areas of cost for the United States and the assumptions incorporated in the estimate or factors specified by U S  officials that drive those costs  We compared the U S  cost estimate, including these significant areas of cost, to UN costs to identify differences  We interviewed U S  and UN officials regarding U S  and UN standards and policies that explain differences between MINUSCA costs and the estimated costs of a U S  operation  To identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations, we reviewed UN reports on peacekeeping operations and interviewed UN, DOD, and State officials  In addition, we reviewed GAO’s 2006 report comparing the costs as well as the strengths of a UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti with those of a hypothetical U S  operation  We conducted our review from February 2017 through February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the individual named above, Drew Lindsey (Assistant Director), Howard Cott, Juan Pablo Avila-Tournut, Debbie Chung, Martin de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Jennifer Leotta, Caitlin Mitchell, Elizabeth Repko, and Alex Welsh made significant contributions to this report 


Report 2: Requirements for military awards and decorations can change over time  New events and changes in military, political, or social conditions can generate debate over who is eligible for various military awards  These changes tend to be controversial, especially with veterans groups  Congress has considered several pieces of legislation that would change who would be eligible to receive the Purple Heart, and under what conditions  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have greatly increased the number of servicemembers receiving the Purple Heart award as well as the potential conditions under which they receive the award  Increasingly acknowledged conditions, such as traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as well as accidents and other events while deployed, bring up new questions as to when a servicemember deserves a Purple Heart  The July 17, 2015, shooting of servicemembers at a Marine recruiting office and a naval reserve center in Chattanooga, TN, again prompted questions about applying the Purple Heart to terrorist attacks versus criminal acts  Veterans groups often voice their views when Congress or the President proposes making changes to expand eligibility for the Purple Heart  These groups argue, for example, that a servicemember who acquires PTSD may not always deserve the same recognition as a servicemember killed or wounded in direct combat, while others contend that these medical conditions can debilitate servicemembers just as much as physical injuries and can have lasting effects on servicemembers' lives  Determining which actions and events make a servicemember qualified for receiving a Purple Heart, and whether expanding eligibility does a disservice to those who have already earned the award, are contentious elements of this debate  Although Congress has traditionally left many military award requirements to the executive branch, the Constitution does allow Congress to act in this area, and events have prompted changes regarding eligibility for the Purple Heart  On December 19, 2014, Congress passed The Carl Levin and Howard P  "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015  Section 571 of the NDAA for FY2015 expanded eligibility by redefining what should be considered an attack by a "foreign terrorist organization" for purposes of determining eligibility for the Purple Heart  As a result, servicemembers wounded and killed in the 2009 shootings in Little Rock, AR, and at Fort Hood, TX, were awarded Purple Hearts in 2015  Congressional offices often receive questions about Purple Heart eligibility from constituents, especially when eligibility rules change  The number of these questions is likely to increase as servicemembers return from conflicts around the world and if eligibility requirements are again changed  This report will examine the history of the Purple Heart and changes in eligibility over time as well as current issues facing Congress  In 1782, George Washington created the Badge of Military Merit to reward "any singularly meritorious action" displayed by a soldier, noncommissioned officer, or officer in the Continental Army  This award was intended to encourage gallantry and fidelity among soldiers, and would later become known as the Purple Heart  The Badge of Military Merit was designed as a purple heart of cloth edged with a narrow lace  Records are incomplete and researchers debate how many soldiers received this award  According to Military Order of the Purple Heart, three soldiers from Connecticut were the first to receive the Badge of Military Merit during the American Revolutionary War  All three were noncommissioned officers and the only recipients who received the award from General Washington  The soldiers were Sergeant William Brown, 5 th Connecticut Regiment of the Connecticut Line on May 3, 1783; Sergeant Elijah Churchill, 2 nd Continental Light Dragoons on May 3, 1783; and Sergeant Daniel Bissell, 2 nd Connecticut Regiment of the Connecticut Line, on June 10, 1783  However, the Badge of Military Merit fell into disuse shortly after its conception  The Badge of Military Merit was not seriously considered again until General Douglas MacArthur (then Army Chief of Staff) revived the award on February 22, 1932, the 200 th anniversary of George Washington's birth  This award, renamed the "Purple Heart," was redesigned to its modern appearance: a purple heart-shaped medal with bronze border and George Washington's coat of arms between two green spray leaves  See Figure 1   General MacArthur also redefined the eligibility requirements to those who received Meritorious Service Citation certificates from World War I or those authorized to wear wound chevrons by Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-22, Military Awards   It was at this point that the Purple Heart became focused on soldiers killed and wounded in combat, rather than "any singularly meritorious act " In 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt extended the Purple Heart award, which to this point was exclusively an Army award, to Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard members serving in World War II  In 1952, President Truman retroactively awarded Purple Hearts to personnel in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard that qualified after April 5, 1917, thus including World War I veterans of all services  From 1962 until 1998, eligibility for the Purple Hearts was changed on several occasions  President Kennedy authorized Purple Hearts to all servicemembers, and civilians serving with the Armed Forces, who were engaged in armed conflict against an opposing military or hostile foreign force  This expansion was written to permit U S  servicemembers, and the civilians that accompanied them, who were killed or wounded in Vietnam to receive the Purple Heart, as many of those servicemembers were officially considered advisors to the Republic of Vietnam, rather than combatants  Purple Heart eligibility was expanded again by President Reagan to include military personnel and government civilians killed or wounded in international terrorist attacks after March 28, 1973, or those serving in peacekeeping operations outside of the United States  This expansion was in response to increased terrorist attacks against U S  servicemembers abroad, namely the Marine Corps Barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983  The NDAA for Fiscal Year 1996 expanded eligibility to prisoners of war injured or wounded in captivity prior to 1962, a group of servicemembers previously not covered for Purple Heart eligibility by President Kennedy's executive order  In 1997, President Clinton signed the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1998, which limited future awards of the Purple Heart to military personnel  It has since remained a military-only award  The Department of Defense does not maintain a record of the number of Purple Heart recipients  However, some military historians estimated more than 1 million Purple Hearts have been awarded mostly to soldiers since 1932  Likewise, the National Purple Heart Hall of Honor estimates 1 8 million Purple Hearts have been awarded since the medal was established by the Army in 1932  During the 115 th Congress (2017-2018), H R  7097 was introduced as the "Find our Hearts Act " It would have amended Title 10, United States Code, to require the establishment of a searchable database containing the names and citations of members of the Armed Forces who have been awarded the Purple Heart  H R  7097 was referred to the House Armed Services Committee but saw no further action  See Table 1 for current Purple Heart legislation  Currently, the Purple Heart is authorized for any member of the U S  Armed Forces who has been wounded or died from wounds sustained under one of the following conditions: (1) In accordance with E O  11016, subject to the provisions of Sections 1129, 1129a, and 1131 of Title 10, U S C , and P L  104-106 , the Secretary of a Military Department, will, in the name of the President of the United States, award the PH, with suitable ribbons and appurtenances, to any Service member under the jurisdiction of that Department who, after April 5, 1917, has been wounded, killed, or who has died or may hereafter die of wounds received under any of the following circumstances: (a) In action against an opposing armed force of a foreign country in which U S  Armed Forces are or have been engaged  (b) In any action with an opposing armed force of a foreign country in which the Military Services are or have been engaged  (c) While serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party  (d) As a result of an act of any such enemy or opposing armed forces  (e) As the result of an act of any hostile foreign force  (f) After March 28, 1973, as a result of an international terrorist attack against the United States or a foreign nation friendly to the United States, recognized as such an attack for purposes of award of the PH by the Secretary of the Military Department concerned, or jointly by the Secretaries of the Military Departments concerned if members from more than one Military Department are wounded in the attack  The Secretary of the Military Department concerned shall notify the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness USD(P&R) prior to awarding the PH for an international terrorist attack that occurs in the United States or its territories  (g) After March 28, 1973, as a result of military operations while serving outside the territory of the United States as part of a peacekeeping force  (h) On or after December 7, 1941, pursuant to Section 1129 of Title 10, U S C , a service member who is killed or wounded in action as the result of action by friendly weapon fire while directly engaged in combat, other than as a result of an act of an enemy of the United States, unless (in the case of a wound) the wound is the result of willful misconduct of the member  (i) Before April 25, 1962, pursuant to Section 521 of P L  104-106 which held as a prisoner of war (POW), or while being taken captive in the same manner as a former POW who is wounded on or after that date while held as a POW  A person will be considered to be a former POW if the person is eligible for the POW Medal under Section 1128 of Title 10, U S C  (j) On or after December 7, 1941, to a Service member who is killed or dies while in captivity as a prisoner of war (POW) under circumstances establishing eligibility for the POW medal pursuant to section 1128 of Title 10, U S C , and Volume 2 of DoD Manual 1348 33, Manual of Military Decorations and Awards , unless compelling evidence is presented that shows that the member's death was not the result of enemy action  (k) After September 11, 2001, pursuant to section 1129a of Title 10, U S C , to a Service member on active duty who is killed or wounded in an attack by a foreign terrorist organizations in circumstances where the death or wound is the result of an attack targeted on the member due to such member's status as a member of the armed forces  An attack by an individual or entity shall be considered to be a foreign terrorist attack if the individual or entity was in communication with the foreign terrorist organization before the attack and the attack was inspired or motivated by the foreign terrorist organization  An award is not authorized if the death or wound was the result of the willful misconduct of the Service member  To assist in making a PH determination pursuant to section 1129a of Title 10, U S C , the Military Department Secretary concerned may request an intelligence assessment from the Defense Intelligence Agencies' Defense Combating Terrorism Center (DCTC)  The DCTC assessment of potential foreign terrorist attacks by an individual or entity will assess whether the individual or entity was in communication with the foreign terrorist organization before the attack, and if the attack was inspired or motivated by the foreign terrorist organization  The assessment shall include supporting citations and rationale  (2) A wound for which the award is made must have been of such severity that it required treatment, not just examination, by a military medical officer  (a) Treatment must be noted in the Servicemember's medical record  (b) Award may be made of wounds treated by a medical professional other than a medical officer provided a medical officer issues a statement in the Service member's medical record that the extent of the wounds were such that the wounds would have required treatment from a medical officer if one had one been available to treat the wounds  (3) After May 17, 1998, pursuant to Section 1131 of Title 10, U S C , the PH may only be awarded to a person who is a Service member at the time the person is killed or wounded under circumstances otherwise qualifying that person for award of the PH  Before this date, the Secretary of the Military Department concerned was authorized to award the PH to U S  civilian nationals who were serving under competent authority in any capacity with the armed forces of that department  For deceased servicemembers, the Purple Heart may be given to the representatives of the deceased as the individual Service Secretary considers appropriate  Servicemembers can be awarded multiple Purple Hearts for separate incidents  The servicemember receives the Purple Heart medal for the first award  Subsequent awards are indicated with oak leaf clusters or 5/16 inch service stars, depending on the rules of the recipient's service  Purple Hearts may not be awarded to foreign military personnel  Although the decision to award medals and other military decorations traditionally rests with the executive branch, Congress has been expanding its role in this area in recent decades, exercising its constitutional power "To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces " Previously, Congress took the lead and adjusted Purple Heart eligibility in both the NDAA for FY1996 and the NDAA for FY1998  See Appendix A   In response to some mass shootings in recent years, Congress passed a provision in the NDAA for FY2015 that expanded the Purple Heart's eligibility requirements  On June 1, 2009, a man who was allegedly angry over the killing of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan opened fire on two U S  Army soldiers near a recruiting station in Little Rock, AR, killing one and wounding the other  On November 5, 2009, an Army major opened fire at Ft  Hood, TX, killing 13 and wounding 29, many of them servicemembers  Both men were charged with murder and other crimes  Federal and local law enforcement authorities initially considered these acts to be crimes, and the Defense Department reports the Fort Hood shooting as "workplace violence," not acts perpetrated by an enemy or hostile force, which made them ineligible for the Purple Heart  However, some believed these acts should be viewed as acts of war or domestic terrorism because they involved Muslim perpetrators angered over U S

ground_truth: To promote international peace and security, the UN had 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations worldwide as of June 30, 2017, with a total budget of almost $8 billion in UN fiscal year 2017 and contributions of over 100,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from more than 120 countries. The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, providing an average of about 28 percent of total funding annually. The Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, includes a provision for GAO to compare the costs, strengths, and limitations of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. This report (1) compares the reported costs of a specific UN operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identifies factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identifies stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. GAO worked with the UN, DOD, and State to generate a cost estimate of a hypothetical U.S.-led operation in the Central African Republic comparable to MINUSCA. GAO developed this estimate using DOD's cost estimating tool for contingency operations and State data on civilian costs, assuming a U.S. operation using roughly the same levels of military and civilian personnel as MINUSCA. The cost estimate should not be construed as suggesting that the United States would likely implement such an operation in the Central African Republic or that it would implement such an operation in the same way. GAO is making no recommendations. Based on United Nations (UN) and Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) data, GAO estimates that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). MINUSCA cost the UN approximately $2.4 billion for the first 39 months of the operation. GAO estimates that a hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic of roughly the same size and duration would cost nearly $5.7 billion—almost eight times more than the $700 million the United States contributed to MINUSCA over the same time period. Various factors affect differences between the actual cost of MINUSCA and the estimated cost of a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation in the Central African Republic. The United States and the UN would source and transport some supplies and equipment differently, affecting the cost of both operations; for example, the United States would airlift water into the Central African Republic, while the UN does not do so to the same extent. The United States also would incur the cost of civilian police and military reservist salaries, while the UN does not pay any troop or police salaries. Finally, some higher standards for facilities, intelligence, and medical services increase the U.S. cost estimate relative to UN costs for similar operational elements. UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U.S. and UN officials. These officials said that, because the UN is a multilateral organization, UN peacekeeping operations have international acceptance and are more likely to be viewed as impartial. Officials also said that the UN enjoys global access to expertise and experience, and can leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks. Relative strengths of a U.S. peacekeeping operation would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capability, according to U.S. and UN officials.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  actions in Iraq and Afghanistan  Section 571 of the NDAA for FY2015 ( P L  113-291 ) expanded the eligibility for the Purple Heart by redefining what should be considered an attack by a "foreign terrorist organization" for purposes of determining eligibility for the Purple Heart  The law states that an event should be considered an attack by a foreign terrorist organization if the perpetrator of the attack "was in communication with the foreign terrorist organization before the attack" and "the attack was inspired or motivated by the foreign terrorist organization " Still, some are opposed to awarding the Purple Heart for terrorist acts that were initially deemed "workplace violence" by the Department of Defense (DOD) or a criminal act, and not earned on a battlefield  This act arguably sets a precedent for the future and could make Purple Heart eligibility more subjective, allowing public sentiment to determine what events are worthy of a Purple Heart  On April 10, 2015, then-Army Secretary John McHugh and Army Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland, 3 rd Corps and Fort Hood commanding general, presented Purple Hearts to the families of the 10 servicemembers killed and to the 26 servicemembers wounded during the attack  Defense of Freedom Medals were also awarded to DOD civilians killed and wounded during the attack  In a memorandum, Secretary McHugh directed the Army to "expedite certain other benefits for which soldiers receiving the Purple Heart are traditionally eligible " In addition to the victims of the Fort Hood shooting, the two victims of the June 2009, shooting at a recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, received Purple Hearts on July 1, 2015  Army Private William Andrew "Andy" Long was killed and Army Private Quinton Ezeagwula was wounded in that attack by Abdulhakim Muhammad, who was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole  Encouraged by the expanded eligibility provision in the NDAA for FY2015, legislation was introduced during the 114 th Congress to award Purple Hearts to other military victims of domestic terrorism  Section 583 of the House-passed version of H R  1735 , the NDAA for FY2016, would have awarded the Purple Heart to servicemembers who were victims of the April 19, 1995, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma bombing  Supporters for awarding the Purple Heart to the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing refer to the FY2015 NDAA as precedent  However, critics contend that the bombing was an act of domestic terrorism and does not meet the current eligibility requirements of the assailant being inspired by or motivated by an international terrorist organization  The final version of the FY2016 NDAA ( P L  114-92 ) did not include this provision  On July 16, 2015, Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez shot at a Marine Corps recruiting center and Naval Reserve Center in Chattanooga, TN  This incident again raised congressional interest regarding the eligibility for the Purple Heart for servicemembers killed and wounded during an attack inspired by or motivated by international terrorist organizations  Four marines were killed and one was injured during the rampage, and the lone sailor later died from his injuries  The FBI investigation later concluded that Abdulazeez was "motivated by foreign terrorist organization propaganda," but that it was difficult to determine which terrorist group may have inspired him  On December 16, 2015, then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that the Purple Heart would be awarded to five servicemembers killed and one wounded in the July 2015 shootings at two naval centers in Chattanooga, Tennessee  Secretary Mabus stated that "following an extensive investigation, the FBI and NCIS have determined that this attack was inspired by a foreign terrorist group, the final criteria required for the awarding of the Purple Heart to this Sailor and these Marines " On January 14, 2016, then-Navy Vice Admiral Robin Braun presented the Purple Heart to the family of Logistics Specialist 2 nd Class Randall Smith at the Navy Operational Support Center Chattanooga  Brigadier General Terry V  Williams presented the Purple Heart on January 26, 2016, to Sergeant DeMonte R  Cheeley, who survived the attack, at a ceremony in Chattanooga  On April 20, 2016, Lieutenant General Rex McMillian, then-head of Marine Corps Forces Reserve, presented Purple Hearts to the families of Gunnery Sergeant Thomas Sullivan, Staff Sergeant David Wyatt, Sergeant Carson Holmquist, and Lance Corporal Squire "Skip" Wells in a ceremony at the Hunter Museum of American Art in Chattanooga  U S  Airman 1 st Class Spencer Stone was onboard a train from Amsterdam to Paris with two friends, Anthony Sadler and Alek Skarlatos, when they subdued a heavily armed gunman who attempted to fire an AK-47 at the passengers  Stone was stabbed in the face and neck by the gunman as the trio restrained him before he could discharge his weapon  The vacationing Americans were hailed as heroes and awarded the French Legion of Honor on August 24, 2015  On September 14, 2015, Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James announced that Stone would receive the Purple Heart along with the Airman's Medal, the Air Force's highest noncombat award  At the Pentagon on September 17, 2015, then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter presented Stone the Purple Heart and Airman's Medal  During the ceremony, Carter presented the Soldier's Medal to Oregon National Guard Specialist Alek Skarlatos, and civilian Anthony Sadler received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Valor  On June 12, 2016, a security guard, Omar Mateen, killed 49 people and wounded 53 others in an attack inside Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida  Army Reserve Captain Antonio Davon Brown was one of the 49 people killed and may be eligible for the Purple Heart depending on the outcome of the FBI investigation  According to the FBI, Mateen had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group after his attack in a call to 911  At this time, it is unclear if the Army will make a decision regarding Captain Brown's eligibility for the Purple Heart  On September 28, 2016, H R  6234 was introduced to amend Title 18, U S C , to provide for penalties for the sale of any Purple Heart awarded to a member of the Armed Forces  This legislation would have made selling the medal punishable by fines and up to six months in prison  H R  6234 would have placed the Purple Heart into a new protected category, keeping it away from not just con artists but also memorabilia collectors  The measure was named for Private Corrado Piccoli, a World War II infantryman killed in action in 1944, whose Purple Heart was found for sale at an antique store in 2009  This bill was referred to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations but saw no further action in the 114 th Congress  This legislation was reintroduced in the 115 th Congress on January 13, 2017, as H R  544 , the Private Corrado Piccoli Purple Heart Preservation Act of 2017, and a related bill, S  765 , was passed by the Senate on August 3, 2017  Both bills were referred to committee in the House but saw no further action  On January 15, 2019, S  122 , Private Corrado Piccoli Purple Heart Preservation Act, was introduced in the 116 th Congress  The bill was read twice and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee  The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2019, H R  5515 , included a provision (Section 629) that would extend certain morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) privileges to certain veterans, including Purple Hearts recipients, and their caregivers  This bill became P L  115-232 on August 13, 2018  Section 621 of the enacted bill adopted House Section 629, which extends eligibility of certain MWR and commissary privileges to certain veterans, including Purple Heart recipients, and their caregivers starting in 2020  For additional information see section, "Defense Commissary System," in CRS Report R45343, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues   For bill summaries of Purple Heart legislation in the 116 th Congress as introduced, see Table 1   The large number of veterans with invisible wounds returning from Iraq and Afghanistan has the Department of Defense (DOD) reevaluating Purple Heart eligibility for traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and mental conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)  DOD considers some TBIs eligible for the Purple Heart, as many of those injuries can be diagnosed using brain scans and other objective medical tests  However, there is continued debate on the inclusion of mental conditions, such as PTSD, as part of the appropriate criteria for the Purple Heart  Congress, as well as various executive agencies and departments, is funding and conducting studies regarding PTSD  The National Alliance on Mental Illness, a national grassroots advocacy group representing families and people affected by mental illness, is advocating that the Purple Heart be awarded for psychological wounds including PTSD to eliminate stigma and encourage servicemembers to seek care  At this time, DOD does not consider servicemembers with PTSD eligible for the Purple Heart  Army Regulation 600-8-22 allows "concussion injuries caused as a result of enemy generated explosions" but specifically disqualifies post-traumatic stress disorders  Army guidance emphasizes "the degree to which the enemy caused the injury" when determining eligibility and places PTSD in a column of noneligible injuries  The Marine Corps defines PTSD as a "severe combat stress injury" and says that combat stress injuries are "not directly caused by the enemy's intentional use of an outside force or agent," and thus do not qualify  Servicemembers are divided on this issue  Some servicemembers believe that mental injuries such as PTSD should be eligible for the Purple Heart, while others believe that it would dishonor those who have received Purple Hearts for physical injuries  Proponents argue that some veterans are less likely to seek help for their mental-health injuries because of the stigma associated with PTSD, and that stigma could be lessened by recognizing their injuries as real  Opponents, including some veterans from the Military Order of the Purple Heart and Veterans of Foreign Wars, are resistant to accepting PTSD as grounds for eligibility  A representative of The Military Order of the Purple Heart stated, "We believe strongly in and support the criteria that the wound or death should be sustained in combat at the hands of the enemies of the United States " In addition, the national spokesman for the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Joseph E  Davis, said, "Medals aren't awarded for illness or disease, but for 'achievement and valor '" Appendix A  Timeline of Purple Heart Eligibility August 7, 1782: George Washington creates the Badge of Military Merit  Awarded to several Continental soldiers but it quickly falls from use  February 22, 1932: Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur revives the Badge of Military Merit as an Army award, renamed "the Purple Heart," and retroactively awarded to wounded WWI veterans  December 3, 1942: Executive Order 9277—President Franklin Roosevelt expands Purple Heart eligibility to include U S  Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard  Retroactively awards Purple Hearts to December 6, 1941  November 12, 1952: Executive Order 10409—President Truman retroactively awards Purple Hearts to U S  Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard veterans after April 5, 1917  April 25, 1962: Executive Order 11016—President Kennedy extends eligibility to civilians serving with military forces  February 23, 1984: Executive Order 12464—President Reagan awards Purple Hearts to those killed and wounded in terrorist attacks after March 28, 1973, or on peacekeeping missions outside the United States  February 10, 1996: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Section 521, P L  104-106 ) includes "prisoners of war wounded before April 25, 1962, while held as a prisoner of war (or while being taken captive) in the same manner as a former prisoner of war who is wounded on or after that date while held as a prisoner of war (or while being taken captive) " November 18, 1997: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Section 571, P L  105-85 ) limits future Purple Heart awards to members of the Armed Forces  October 17, 2006: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Section 556, P L  109-364 ) includes prisoners of war captured after December 7, 1941  April 30, 2008: Purple Heart Family Equity Act of 2007 ( P L  110-207 ) revises the congressional charter of the Military Order of the Purple Heart to authorize associate membership for the spouse and siblings of a recipient of the Purple Heart medal  December 19, 2014: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Section 571, P L  113-291 ) expands eligibility for the Purple Heart by redefining what should be considered an attack by a foreign terrorist organization, and awards Purple Heart medals to servicemembers wounded or killed during the 2009 shootings at Ft  Hood, Texas, and Little Rock, Arkansas  Appendix B  Staffer Instructions for Medal Requests Members of Congress are able to directly request that a Service Secretary consider awarding military decorations to individuals or groups  Upon receiving a request from a Member's office, the Service Secretary concerned will review the proposal for the award or presentation of a decoration (or the upgrading of a decoration)  Based on that review, the Secretary shall determine the merits of approving the award or presentation of the decoration and other necessary determinations  The Secretary shall submit a notice to the requesting Member, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the House Armed Services Committee with one of the following results: (1) The award or presentation of the decoration does not warrant approval on the merits  A statement explaining the Secretary's reason will be included  (2) The award or presentation of the decoration warrants approval and a waiver by law of time restrictions prescribed by law is recommended  (3) The award or presentation of the decoration warrants approval on the merits and has been approved as an exception to policy  (4) The award or presentation of the decoration warrants approval on the merits, but a waiver of the time restrictions prescribed in law is not recommended  A statement explaining the Secretary's reason will be included  Source: Compiled from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 ( P L  104-106 , §526), February 10, 1996 
Report 2:  Better selection criteria for its lender reviews could, in turn, improve identification and remediation of such noncompliance, helping ensure that the 7(a) program serves its target population  Representatives at 8 of the 11 lenders that we contacted said they believed that SBA’s current credit elsewhere criteria are adequate in targeting small business borrowers who cannot obtain credit at reasonable terms  Representatives of these lenders also agreed that the criteria generally serve the types of small businesses that would otherwise have trouble obtaining conventional credit, such as new businesses or those with a shortage of collateral  One lender representative told us its most commonly used criterion related to the overall time in business because of the higher risk of failure  Another lender representative cited the lack of collateral as the most common criterion used  Additionally, representatives at an industry association told us that one of the most commonly used criteria was the one related to loan maturity and many small businesses seek 7(a) loans because they offer repayment terms of up to 10 years, compared to 1 to 3 years for conventional loans  Representatives of two other lenders suggested that the credit elsewhere criteria should not be overly prescriptive, which could limit lenders’ ability to make 7(a) loans to some businesses  For example, one representative said the credit elsewhere criteria should remain flexible because banks have different lending policies  In addition, representatives at three lenders indicated that they were hesitant to use the “other factors” criterion  One lender believed the requirement was open to interpretation and could be used inappropriately with lenders determining their own individual conventional loan policies  Another lender commented that the criterion was vague and rarely used by his institution, noting that SBA should provide some additional guidance on its use  Lenders consider multiple factors in determining whether to offer small businesses a conventional loan or a 7(a) loan, according to stakeholders with whom we spoke  For example, representatives at an industry association stated that a bank goes through several analyses to determine what loan product to offer the borrower  These representatives stated that the credit elsewhere requirement is embedded in the analysis a bank performs, such as whether the borrower qualifies for a loan and has a financial need for an SBA loan and whether the 7(a) program is right for that borrower  Representatives at two other lenders also stated that many small businesses have already been turned down for conventional loans before they seek a 7(a) loan  One representative noted that the “reasonable rates and terms” component of the 7(a) program was important as it allows lenders to look more broadly at a borrower’s needs  For instance, the representative explained, lenders can assess whether repayment terms are reasonable given a particular borrower’s situation and the resources the borrower will have to repay the loan  Economic conditions also affect lending policies, including whether borrowers qualify for a conventional loan, according to representatives at seven lenders with whom we spoke  For example, during the recent economic downturn, banks tightened their underwriting standards for small businesses and were less willing to lend without a government guarantee, according to one lender representative  SBA has issued revised primary operational guidance for the 7(a) program, effective January 1, 2018  As discussed previously, lenders are required to make a determination that the desired credit is not available to the applicant from nonfederal sources  Under the previous guidance, the lender had to determine that some or the entire loan was not available from nonfederal sources or the resources of the applicant business  However under the revised guidance, the scope of nonfederal sources a lender must review was further defined to include sources both related and unrelated to the applicant  The updated guidance states that lenders must consider: Nonfederal sources related to the applicant, including the liquidity of owners of 20 percent or more of the equity of the applicant, their spouses and minor children, and the applicant itself; or Nonfederal sources unrelated to the applicant, including conventional lenders or other sources of credit  Representatives of five lenders told us they have been determining how to interpret the new procedures with a few stating they would like additional guidance, including what information to retain in the file  Representatives of two lenders stated that there is some ambiguity in how to determine nonfederal resources and how to assess whether small business owners have too many available liquid resources to qualify for a 7(a) loan  One representative said that lenders can have different interpretations of what constitutes “available resources,” which is not specified in the new SOP  As a result, he said, there may be some confusion about how to assess family members of the borrower who have high net worths and whether the borrower should decline a family member contribution to qualify for an SBA loan  A representative of one lender stated that lenders will not know what SBA expects until loans are approved under the new procedures, default, and are then reviewed  Another lender’s representative suggested additional guidance on documentation, such as whether the bank must obtain a personal financial statement for each owner of the business  A SBA staff told us SBA has provided multiple training presentations to SBA staff, lenders, and trade associations on the statutory changes to the credit elsewhere requirements and standard operating procedure updates  These have included a presentation at a trade association conference, four monthly conference calls for SBA staff, and two conference calls for SBA lenders  SBA staff said SBA also plans to hold monthly training sessions with SBA field offices, quarterly training sessions with the industry, and at least four training sessions in 2018 at lender trade conferences  Additionally, a representative from an industry association told us it is providing industry training on SBA’s revised procedures, including the credit elsewhere liquidity requirement  SBA’s 7(a) loan program is required to serve creditworthy small business borrowers who cannot obtain credit through a conventional lender at reasonable terms, and SBA largely relies on lenders with delegated authority to make credit elsewhere determinations  However, although there is a high rate of lender noncompliance with the credit elsewhere documentation requirement, SBA does not require its reviewers to document their assessment of the policies and procedures lenders use to meet the requirement  Without better information from lender reviews on how lenders are implementing the requirement to document their credit elsewhere decisions, SBA may be limited in its ability to promote compliance with requirements and, in turn, use such information to help ensure that 7(a) loans are reaching their target population  Furthermore, SBA does not routinely collect or analyze information on the criteria used for credit elsewhere justifications to evaluate patterns in lender practices  SBA recently began collecting some information on lenders’ use of the criteria, but this information is limited, and SBA does not analyze the information that it does collect to better understand lenders’ practices  Without more robust information and analysis, SBA may be limited in its ability to understand how lenders are using the credit elsewhere criteria and whether 7(a) loans are reaching borrowers who cannot obtain credit from other sources at reasonable terms  We are making the following three recommendations to SBA  The Administrator of SBA should require reviewers to consistently document their assessments of a lender’s policies and practices  (Recommendation 1) The Administrator of SBA should use its on-site and off-site reviews to routinely collect information on lenders’ use of credit elsewhere criteria as part of its monitoring of lender practices related to the credit elsewhere requirement  (Recommendation 2) The Administrator of SBA should analyze information on lenders’ use of credit elsewhere criteria obtained from its reviews to identify lenders that may be at greater risk of noncompliance and to inform its selection of lenders for further review for credit elsewhere compliance  (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report for review and comment  SBA’s written comments are reprinted in appendix IV  SBA generally agreed with the recommendations  SBA also provided additional comments on certain statements in the draft report, which are summarized below with our responses  SBA noted that the draft Highlights did not discuss how credit elsewhere is determined for nondelegated loans  We have not revised the Highlights in response to this comment because our review focused on delegated lenders  In the body of the report we note that approximately 70 percent of 7(a) loans are approved under delegated authority  We also refer to SBA’s nondelegated loans in the report for additional context  According to SBA, the statement on our draft Highlights did not fully reflect its monitoring of lender compliance  SBA identified a variety of reviews it uses in addition to on-site reviews by third party contractors, which we discuss in the body of the report  We have modified the Highlights to reflect these other reviews  Also in reference to the draft Highlights, SBA stated that it provides oversight on every on-site lender review and that an SBA employee is present as a subject-matter expert on every review  We revised the Highlights by adding that SBA provides oversight to the on-site reviews conducted by third-party contractors  In response to a statement in our draft report that SBA guarantees loans to small businesses for working capital and other general business purposes, SBA commented that working capital generally is not the primary purpose for SBA-guaranteed loans  We did not revise the statement because SBA’s SOP 50 10 5 (version J) specifies that SBA’s 7(a) loan proceeds may be used for permanent working capital and revolving working capital, among other things  In relation to a footnote in our report that mentions two lender reviews for which we did not receive documentation, SBA stated that on February 15, 2018, it provided documentation to us related to the reviews and that we had confirmed its receipt  However, the text in the footnote in question refers to two targeted lender reviews from 2016 that included corrective actions  The information SBA provided to us on February 15, 2018, was related to on-site reviews conducted in 2016  As a result, we did not revise the footnote  SBA’s letter also contained technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees, agencies, and other interested parties  In addition, this report will be available at no charge on our website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8678 or shearw@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V  This report discusses (1) 7(a) lending to selected categories of small business borrowers from fiscal years 2007 through 2016; (2) how the Small Business Administration (SBA) monitors lenders’ compliance with the credit elsewhere requirement; (3) the extent to which SBA evaluates trends in lender practices related to the credit elsewhere requirement; and (4) lenders’ views on the criteria used to determine eligibility for 7(a) loans and other issues related to the 7(a) program  For background on the 7(a) program and the credit elsewhere requirement, we reviewed the legislative history of the 7(a) program and our previous reports  We also interviewed officials from SBA’s Office of Credit Risk Management on guidance provided to 7(a) lenders  For background on constraints in the small business credit market, we reviewed recent academic literature on the characteristics of small businesses that historically have had more difficulty accessing credit  In addition, we reviewed recent studies published by the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta; Cleveland; Kansas City; and New York  To describe the population of borrowers served by the 7(a) program, we selected characteristics (such as gender, minority status, and percentage of new business) that we used in our 2007 report and that were the subject of the recent studies by Federal Reserve Banks  We obtained and analyzed SBA loan-level data to describe 7(a) loans and borrowers  Specifically, SBA provided us with 581,393 records from its administrative data systems, which contained information on all loans approved and disbursed in fiscal years 2007 through 2016  The SBA data included various types of information describing each loan, including the total gross approval amount; the amount guaranteed by SBA; the loan term; and the interest rate; delivery method; and status of the loan  The SBA data also included information on borrower characteristics: Age of business  Firms were classified as new (less than 2 years in operation) or existing  Gender  Firms were classified as 100 percent male-owned; 50 percent or greater women owned; 50 percent or less women-owned; or “unknown ” Information on gender was voluntarily provided by borrowers  Economically distressed area  We identified borrowers in economically distressed areas by matching borrower zip codes provided by SBA to those in the 2011 through 2015 American Community Survey  We defined distressed areas as zip codes where at least 20 percent of households had incomes below the national poverty line  In about 1 percent of the cases, we were unable to classify a lender because a zip code had changed or had insufficient population to report a poverty rate  We consider 1 percent of unmatched cases to be low by data reliability standards  Race/ethnicity  Borrowers were placed in one of nine categories of race/ethnicity, including an “unknown” category  We aggregated these to create minority, nonminority, and undetermined categories  The minority category included all borrowers who reported being a race/ethnicity other than white  The nonminority category included borrowers who reported being white  Information on race was voluntarily provided by borrowers  Industry  Firms were assigned a North American Industrial Classification code  These six-digit codes begin with a two-digit sector code that we used to draw more general conclusions about industries  Geographic information  The data provided the state where the borrower is located  In addition, we obtained information from SBA on loan- and lender-level Small Business Risk Portfolio Solution scores (predictive scores) provided by Dunn & Bradstreet and Fair Isaac Company, for loans approved in fiscal year 2016, the latest available  We were able to obtain predictive scores for approximately 81 percent of the loans for which SBA had provided other information  According to SBA, some loans may not have been disbursed at the time we obtained the predictive scores and, as a result, we do not have scores associated with these loans  We analyzed the information to determine the range of predictive scores and the range of average predictive scores by lender  To assess the reliability of loan-level data on borrower and loan characteristics and predictive scores we received from SBA, we interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data and reviewed related documentation  We also conducted electronic testing, including checks for outliers, missing data, and erroneous values  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing the characteristics of borrowers who received 7(a) loans and the distribution of predictive scores  To assess how SBA monitors lenders’ compliance with the credit elsewhere requirement and criteria, we reviewed SBA’s standard operating procedures and other guidance on 7(a) program regulations and lender oversight  Specifically, we reviewed SOP 50 10 5 (versions I and J) on Lender and Development Company Loan Programs, SOP 50 53(A) on Lender Supervision and Enforcement, and SOP 51 00, On-Site Lender Reviews/Examinations, as well as information and policy notices related to the credit elsewhere requirement  Additionally, we interviewed representatives including those at SBA’s Office of Capital Access and Office of Credit Risk Management on lender oversight and lender review processes  We reviewed all the on-site lender review reports (40 reviews), including corrective actions or requirements related to the credit elsewhere requirement (documentation for 11 lenders), and targeted review reports that had credit elsewhere findings (7 reviews) that SBA conducted in fiscal year 2016  We also interviewed officials and reviewed recent reports from SBA’s Office of Inspector General  To assess the extent to which SBA evaluates trends in lender practices related to the credit elsewhere requirement, we interviewed SBA officials and reviewed documentation for SBA’s online portal for loan origination  We also incorporated information from interviews with a nongeneralizable, nonrepresentative sample of 7(a) lenders, which we discuss below  To obtain lenders’ views on the criteria used to determine eligibility for 7(a) loans and other program-related issues, we interviewed SBA staff including from the Office of Capital Access, and representatives of the National Association of Government Guaranteed Lenders; American Bankers Association; Independent Community Bankers Association; and National Federation of Independent Businesses  We also interviewed 11 banks (one bank provided written responses) in order to obtain the lender perspective of credit elsewhere  Nine of the banks were selected by us using a random process that concentrated on larger lenders  These nine lenders selected by us represent about 13 percent of the loans approved and 16 percent of the dollars approved in 2016  In addition, we interviewed two additional banks that represented an industry group – one larger bank and one small bank  Although we partially selected at random, the lenders we interviewed should not be considered generalizable because of the small number  We conducted this performance audit from August 2017 to June 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In this appendix, we provide information on the total amount and number of approved 7(a) loans and the top eight industry sectors receiving 7(a) loans  Data are also presented on fiscal year 2016 loan volume by state and per capita  As shown in figure 6 below, the total amount of approved 7(a) loans decreased during the period associated with the Great Recession (2007 through 2009)  From fiscal year 2009 on, the total amount of approved 7(a) loans increased until a decline in fiscal year 2012  During this timeframe, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 provided fee relief and higher guaranties  The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 also provided a temporary increase in Small Business Administration (SBA) Express loan limits to $1 million (instead of $350,000)  These programs have since expired  7(a) Loans by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code  Table 1 shows the largest eight industrial sectors by proportion of the total amount of 7(a) loans approved, using the NAICS code  The combined share of the top eight sectors declined slightly from 85 percent to 80 percent of the total lending from fiscal years 2007 through 2016, with an average of 82 percent  During this period, the Accommodation and Food Services sector had the largest average share of total loan amount at 17 percent, followed by the Retail Trade sector at 15 percent  Approved loan amount and per capita dollars by state  As shown in figure 7, California; Texas; Florida; Georgia; and New York received the highest total of approved loan dollars in fiscal year 2016  The average approval amount across all loans was $380,619  Georgia and Arkansas had the largest average approval amount in 2016  Also, during this period, Utah; Colorado; Georgia; California; and Washington received the highest per capita approved loan dollars  In fiscal-year 2016, creditworthiness varied widely among 7(a) program borrowers  We analyzed creditworthiness using the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Small Business Risk Portfolio Solution score (predictive score), which ranges from 70 to 300, with 300 indicating the least risky loan  According to SBA, loans with scores above 180 are considered “lower risk,” scores between 140 and 179 are considered “moderate risk,” and scores 139 and lower are considered “higher risk ” There did not appear be differences in score based on the gender of the borrower or the age of the business  While SBA relies on the Predictive Score data to identify lenders that may pose excessive risk to the SBA 7(a) portfolio, the data also provide potential insights related to lender implementation of the credit elsewhere requirement  Variation  We found that some 7(a) borrowers were much more creditworthy than others  In 2016, the only year for which we obtained data, the predictive score at origination varied widely among borrowers  In 2016, the scores of borrowers ranged from a low of 91 to a high of 246  However, most scores were between 171 and 203, and the median score was 188  Race/ethnicity  We found that there were slight differences in creditworthiness by race/ethnicity, with median scores ranging from 180 to 189 depending on the category  Specifically, loans to African Americans in 2016 had a median score of 180, and loans to Hispanics had a median score of 183  In contrast, loans to whites had a median score of 188, and loans to Asian and Pacific Islanders had a median score of 189  Lender size  We found that lenders with larger numbers of SBA loans tended to have slightly more creditworthy borrowers  The top 5 percent of lenders had a median average score of 187, whereas the bottom 75 percent of lenders had a median average score of 182 5  Among the top 5 percent of lenders (with 374 loans per lender on average, collectively representing about 70 percent of the loans approved), the average score ranged from 171 to 195  Among all lenders, the average score ranged from 116 to 233  However, because many lenders only approved one or two loans in 2016, the average may reflect very few borrowers for that lender, making it difficult to tell whether the scores reflect a real difference between lenders  In addition to the contact named above, Harry Medina (Assistant Director); Janet Fong (Analyst in Charge); Benjamin A  Bolitzer; Gita DeVaney; David S  Dornisch; Amanda D  Gallear (intern); Marc W  Molino; Jennifer W  Schwartz; and Tyler L  Spunaugle made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The Purple Heart is one of the oldest and most recognized American military medals, awarded to servicemembers who were killed or wounded by enemy action. The conflicts 2001 to the present have greatly increased the number of Purple Hearts awarded to servicemembers. Events over the past few years have spurred debate on the eligibility criteria for the Purple Heart. Shootings on U.S. soil and medical conditions such as traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have prompted changes to the eligibility requirements for the Purple Heart. Some critics believe that these changes may lessen the value of the medal and the sacrifices of past recipients on the battlefield. In the past, efforts to modify the Purple Heart's eligibility requirements were contentious, and veterans groups were vocal concerning eligibility changes. While medal requirements are often left to the military and executive branch to decide, Congress is involved in Purple Heart eligibility, utilizing its constitutional power "To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clause 14). The Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291) included language that expands eligibility for the Purple Heart. Previous debates have raised several questions about the Purple Heart. In some respects, how an event is defined can determine eligibility: Is a servicemember the victim of a crime or a terrorist attack? Conversely, arguing that killed or wounded servicemembers "should" be eligible for the Purple Heart can redefine an event: Is the servicemember an advisor to a foreign military or a combatant? Are PTSD and other mental health conditions adequate injuries to warrant the Purple Heart? These are questions that Congress might consider if it chooses to act on this issue.