prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: The federal government owns roughly 640 million acres, more than a quarter of the land in the United States  These lands are heavily concentrated in 12 western states (including Alaska), where t he federal government owns roughly half of the overall land area  Four federal agencies—the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM), all in the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the U S  Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture—administer about 95% of those lands  No single law provides authority for these four agencies to acquire and/or disposal of lands  Rather, Congress provided various acquisition and disposal authorities through laws enacted over more than a century  This report describes the primary authorities of the four agencies  The extent to which each of the agencies has authority to acquire and dispose of land, and the nature of the authorities, varies considerably  Some of the agencies have relatively broad authority to acquire and/or dispose of land  Most notably, the BLM has relatively broad authority for both acquisitions and disposals  By contrast, the NPS has no general authority to acquire land to create new park units or to dispose of park lands  The extent of the acquisition and disposal authorities for the FS and the FWS are not nearly as broad as the BLM's but not nearly as restrictive as the NPS's  The FS authority to acquire lands is mostly limited to lands within or contiguous to the boundaries of a national forest  The agency has various authorities to dispose of land, but they are relatively constrained and infrequently used  The FWS has various authorities to acquire lands but no general authority to dispose of its lands  The acquisition authorities differ as to the circumstances in which they apply, and the disposal authorities likewise differ as to their purposes  Thus, where a specific acquisition or disposal by an agency is contemplated, the particular authority at issue should be consulted  In general, the acquisition authorities are designed to allow federal agencies to acquire lands that could be viewed as benefitting from federal management  Among other circumstances, acquisition might be authorized to bring inholdings or lands adjacent to federal lands into federal ownership to improve or simplify management of federal lands  Acquisitions also might be authorized to conserve species, protect natural and cultural resources, and increase opportunities for recreation  The disposal authorities generally are designed to allow federal agencies to dispose of land that is no longer required for a federal purpose, might be inefficient to manage, or might be chiefly valuable for another purpose  For instance, disposal might be authorized to allow lands to be used for agriculture, community development, mineral extraction, or educational purposes  Agencies also acquire and dispose of federal land in exchanges  Exchanges are not discussed separately in this report, as often the authorities to acquire and dispose of lands also apply to land exchange  However, there are provisions of law particularly applicable to exchanges  The exchange authorities for the NPS and the FWS are relatively narrow  The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA; 43 U S C  §§1701-1781) provides broader exchange authority and is the main authority governing exchanges by the BLM and the FS  Congress often faces questions on the adequacy of existing acquisition and disposal authorities; the nature, extent, and location of their use; the extent of federal land ownership overall; and the sources and levels of land acquisition funds, among other issues  The suitability of the acquisition and disposal authorities, and the extent and circumstances of their use by the agencies, forms the backdrop for congressional consideration of measures to establish, modify, or eliminate the use of authorities  With regard to the establishment of new authorities, for instance, some 115 th Congress proposals would authorize states to exchange land grant parcels for federal lands  Other measures would authorize the BLM and FS to convey small tracts to adjacent landowners and to govern the use of proceeds from these conveyances  Proposals to modify authorities include measures in the 115 th Congress to reauthorize and amend BLM authority to sell or exchange land under the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act (FLTFA; 43 U S C  §§2301 et seq ), as well as bills to amend the Small Tracts Act (16 U S C  §521e) regarding the type and value of FS lands that can be disposed of and the use of related proceeds  Among the provisions to eliminate the use of authorities are those to prevent the disposal of federal land under the General Mining Law of 1872, which have been contained in annual Interior appropriations laws since FY1995  In addition, Congress frequently considers legislation authorizing and governing the acquisition or disposal of specific parcels  For example, Title XXX of P L  113-291 contained various provisions to authorize the acquisition and/or disposal of land  Congress may consider such legislation to provide an agency with acquisition or disposal authority in a particular instance because it is lacking  In other cases, Congress directs a particular acquisition or disposal to facilitate the action  For instance, the legislation may seek to direct an acquisition based on Congress's assessment of public needs and priorities  It may expedite the process for acquiring a parcel of land, such as by limiting the assessments and evaluations that ordinarily would be required under law  The legislation also might authorize actions not ordinarily permitted, such as the conveyance of land at reduced or no cost rather than at fair market value  Congress also addresses acquisition and disposal policy in the context of deliberations on the role and goals of the federal government in owning and managing land generally  The extent to which the federal government should own land remains controversial  Many westerners contend that there is excessive federal influence over their lives and economies and that the federal government should divest itself of many lands  Many others support the policy of retaining lands in federal ownership on behalf of the public and sometimes advocate adding more lands to enhance protection  Recent Congresses considered diverse bills pertaining to the extent of federal land ownership  Among others, 115 th Congress measures would authorize or direct the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to offer to sell a certain percentage of land in each of several fiscal years  Other bills provide that where a land management agency acquires land, an equal number of acres is to be offered for sale  Another set of issues pertains to the sources and levels of funds for land acquisition  The principal financing mechanism for federal land acquisition is discretionary appropriations under the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF)  Provisions of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 (LWCF Act; 54 U S C  §§200301 et seq ) had provided for $900 million in specified revenues to be deposited in the LWCF annually  These provisions expired September 30, 2018  Each year, Congress determines the level of appropriations from the LWCF for federal land acquisition  Total appropriations for land acquisition and the amount provided to each of the federal land management agencies have varied substantially since the program's origin in 1965  In the 115 th Congress, some measures propose permanent reauthorization of the LWCF and/or mandatory appropriations at the authorized level  Advocates of such bills typically seek stable, predictable funding to promote a strong federal role in acquiring and managing sensitive resources  Other measures would direct a portion of funding to particular purposes, such as acquisitions in areas with restricted access for fishing, hunting, and other types of recreation  Still other proposals would allow LWCF to be used for a broader array of purposes, including nonacquisition purposes, due to concerns about the extent of federal land ownership and the availability of funding for other federal activities  Additional sources of funding are available for some agencies or under certain authorities  For instance, the FWS has a mandatory source of funds for land acquisition through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, as discussed below  As another example, the BLM also has mandatory spending authorities that allow the agency to keep the proceeds of land sales and use these proceeds for subsequent acquisitions and other purposes  These authorities are discussed below  The application of mandatory spending authorities, including the uses of the proceeds, has been the subject of congressional debate  As noted above, various laws authorizing and governing specific land acquisitions have been enacted  In addition, the four federal land management agencies have different standing authorities for acquiring lands  In general, all four agencies are authorized to accept land as gifts and bequests  In addition, each generally is authorized to use eminent domain —taking private property, through condemnation, for public use—while compensating the landowner  However, this practice is controversial, and it is rarely used by the land management agencies  The primary land acquisition authorities are described below for each of the four federal land management agencies  In general, the agencies are presented in the order of the breadth of their authorities, with the NPS (the narrowest authorities) first and the BLM (the broadest authorities) last  The NPS does not have standing authority to acquire lands for new or existing units of the National Park System, except in limited circumstances  Rather, most units have been created by Congress, and the law creating a park unit typically includes specific authority for the NPS to acquire nonfederal inholdings within the identified boundaries of that park  The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to make certain boundary adjustments of park units for "proper preservation, protection, interpretation, or management" and to acquire the nonfederal lands within the adjusted boundary, under specified provisions and conditions (54 U S C  §100506(c))  Some of these conditions have been interpreted to apply particularly to boundary adjustments requiring land purchases, as opposed to those in which added lands are acquired by donation, transfer, or exchange  The President has authority to create national monuments on federal lands under the Antiquities Act of 1906 (54 U S C  §§320301 et seq )  In total, 158 monuments have been created by presidential proclamation  Most are managed by the NPS, but some are managed by the BLM and other agencies  Under law, the Secretary of the Interior and the NPS have responsibilities related to the potential acquisition of lands for the National Park System  Among other requirements, the Secretary is directed "to investigate, study, and continually monitor the welfare of" areas that could potentially be added to the system and to report to Congress on possible additions (54 U S C  §100507)  Furthermore, the general management plan for each unit is to include potential changes to the boundaries of the unit and the reasons for such changes (54 U S C  §100502)  The Secretary also is to conduct a "systematic and comprehensive review of certain aspects of the National Park System" and to submit a related report to Congress at least every three years (54 U S C  §100505(a)) that includes a list of all authorized but unacquired lands within the boundaries of park units and a priority listing of these unacquired parcels (54 U S C  §100505(c))  The Secretary of Agriculture has various authorities to acquire lands for the National Forest System (NFS)  The NFS consists of 284 units covering 232 4 million acres of federal and nonfederal land, including national forests, national grasslands, purchase units, land utilization projects, and other areas  Today, only an act of Congress can create new NFS units, but the Secretary may acquire lands within or contiguous to the proclaimed exterior boundaries of an NFS unit  The NFS contains substantial acreage of nonfederal lands within the proclaimed boundaries of the system, particularly in the east, where national forests were established after extensive settlement  NFS units in the Eastern and Southern Regions average about 46% nonfederal land within their boundaries, while Western Region NFS units average about 10%  The FS has very limited regulatory authority over the uses of the 39 5 million acres of nonfederal land within the NFS  The FS's primary land acquisition authority is the Weeks Act of 1911 (16 U S C  §515), which was used to acquire many of the lands that became the eastern national forests  The Weeks Act authority continues to be the agency's primary authority to acquire lands; however, acquisitions are now limited to lands within (or adjacent to) established NFS unit boundaries  The Weeks Act also authorizes the Secretary to modify the NFS unit boundary as needed to encompass new acquisitions  Other laws authorize the FS to acquire lands for the national forests, typically in specific areas or for specific purposes  For example, Section 205 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA; P L  94-579 ) authorizes the acquisition of access corridors—including easements—to national forests across nonfederal lands (43 U S C  §1715(a))  Another example is the Act of August 3, 1956 (7 U S C  §428(a)), which authorizes the FS to acquire lands without any geographical limitations but does require a provision be made in a specific appropriation or other law  Another law authorizes proceeds from certain land sales or exchanges to be used for acquisitions, including for administrative sites and enhancement of recreational access  However, the acquisitions are limited to the state in which FS previously conveyed NFS land under specific disposal authorities, as discussed later in this report  Several other acquisition authorities apply to specific national forests, such as the Act of June 11, 1940, which authorizes the purchase of lands within the Angeles National Forest in California  In addition, the Secretary of Agriculture and the secretary of a military department that has lands within or adjacent to proclaimed NFS land may interchange lands, without reimbursement or transfer of funds  Many of the acquisition authorities also allow the FS to accept donations of land as specified  Within the NFS, the Secretary of Agriculture also is authorized to acquire privately owned lands within or adjacent to designated wilderness areas (16 U S C  §1134(c)), Wild and Scenic River corridors (16 U S C  §1277), and certain segments of designated National Trails (16 U S C  §1244), as specified by the law creating the trail  Lands may be added to the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS) in a number of ways, including through congressional and administrative actions and donations  A principal FWS land acquisition authority is the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929 (MBCA; 16 U S C  §§715 et seq )  This act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to recommend areas "necessary for the conservation of migratory birds" to the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission, after consulting with the relevant governor (or state agency) and appropriate local government officials (16 U S C  §715a and §715c)  In addition, the state in which the purchase is located must have consented to the acquisition by law (16 U S C  §715f and §715k-5)  The Secretary may then purchase or rent areas or interests therein approved by the commission and acquire by gift or devise any area or interest therein (16 U S C  §715d)  The MBCA authority is used frequently because of the availability of funding through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund (MBCF, 16 U S C  §718d)  The MBCF is supported by multiple sources of funding, including three major sources: the sale of hunting and conservation stamps (commonly known as duck stamps); import duties on arms and ammunition; and a portion of certain refuge entrance fees  MBCF funds are permanently appropriated to the extent of receipts and, after paying certain administrative costs, may be used for the "location, ascertainment, and acquisition of suitable areas for migratory bird refuges    " (16 U S C  §718d(b))  The predictability of funding and permanent authority for use makes the MBCF, and thus the MBCA, particularly important for FWS land acquisition and unique among the four agencies  Other laws provide general authority to expand the NWRS, including the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934 (16 U S C  §§661-667a), the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 (16 U S C  §§742a et seq ), and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U S C  §§1531-1544)  The National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966 (16 U S C  §§668dd-668ee) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire land or interests therein through donated funds or exchange (16 U S C  §668dd(b))  Further, FLPMA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw lands from the public domain for creating or adding to refuges (which would be an interagency transfer), although withdrawals exceeding 5,000 acres are subject to congressional approval (43 U S C  §1714(c))  In contrast to NPS and FS land acquisition, where the lands generally must be within the boundaries of established units, the FWS can acquire new lands to create a new refuge or to expand an existing one under the general FWS authorities cited above, as well as under certain other laws  Some national wildlife refuge (NWR) units have been created by specific acts of Congress, such as Protection Island NWR (WA) and Bayou Sauvage Urban NWR (LA) (16 U S C  §668dd note)  Units also can be created by executive order; for example, the Midway Atoll NWR was created by President Clinton in Executive Order 13022  The BLM has broad, general authority to acquire lands, principally under Section 205 of FLPMA  Specifically, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire, by purchase, exchange, donation, or use of eminent domain, lands or interests therein (43 U S C  §1715(a))  The BLM acquires land or interests in land, including inholdings, for a variety of reasons  These include to protect natural and cultural resources, to increase opportunities for public access and recreation, and to improve management of lands  As noted above, various laws directing the disposal of particular lands sometimes have been enacted  In addition, the four federal land management agencies have different standing authorities for disposing of lands  The specific disposal authorities are discussed below for each of the four agencies in the order of their apparent breadth, with the NPS (the narrowest authorities) first and the BLM (the broadest authorities) last  The NPS does not have general authority to dispose of National Park System lands  Units and lands of the Park System that were established by acts of Congress can be disposed of only by acts of Congress  Preservation of park units is a management goal and provisions of law limit the power of the Secretary of the Interior to dispose of land in changing park boundaries  Although the Secretary can, under specified conditions, make boundary changes that concurrently add and remove land within the boundary, minor boundary revisions solely to remove NPS acreage can be made only by Congress  Also, the Secretary can acquire by exchange lands that are adjacent to a boundary revision, but the Secretary cannot dispose of NPS land to do so (54 U S C  §100506(c))  Presidents have modified the boundaries of national monuments established by previous presidential proclamations, in some cases reducing the size of the monument  However, no president has terminated a monument established by proclamation  The FWS does not have general authority to dispose of its lands  With certain exceptions, wildlife refuge lands administered by the FWS can be disposed only by an act of Congress (16 U S C  §§668dd(a)(5) and (6))  For refuge lands reserved from the public domain, FLPMA prohibits the Secretary of the Interior from modifying or revoking any withdrawal which added lands to the NWRS (43 U S C  §1714(j))  For acquired lands, disposal is allowed only if: (1) the disposal is part of an authorized land exchange (16 U S C  §§668dd(a)(6) and (b)(3)); or (2) the Secretary determines the lands are no longer needed and the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission approves the disposal (16 U S C  §668dd(a)(5))  In the latter case, the disposal must recover the acquisition cost or be at the fair market value (whichever is higher), and the receipts must be deposited in the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund  The Secretary of Agriculture has numerous authorities to convey lands within proclaimed NFS boundaries out of federal ownership—through sale or exchange—although previous, broader authorities have been modified or revoked  Many of the authorities put constraints on land disposal, such as applying only to a specific geographical area or to the disposal of particular administrative properties or facilities  Many of the authorities are used in conjunction with FLPMA and other federal law and as such may place requirements on the sale or exchange of land  This includes obtaining at least fair market value for the sale of federal lands; requiring that nonfederal land exchanged for federal land be in the same state; and requiring exchanged lands to be of equal value, although value may be partially equalized with a cash payment (43 U S C  §1716)  The General Exchange Act of 1922 (16 U S C  §485) authorizes the exchange of NFS land or timber that was reserved from the public domain if the Secretary determines it will be in the public interest  The nonfederal land must be within the same state and within the exterior boundary of a national forest, and it must be chiefly valuable for national forest purposes, among other provisions  The Weeks Act of 1911 allows for similar exchanges for acquired NFS lands (16 U S C  §516)  The 1983 Small Tracts Act authorizes the Secretary to dispose of NFS land by sale or exchange, generally up to certain specified acreage limits  The disposal may be To improve management efficiencies where NFS lands are interspersed with nonfederal mineral rights owners, or if the Secretary determines the parcels to be inaccessible, physically isolated from other federal land, or to have lost national forest character (40 acres maximum); To relieve encroachments including due to erroneous surveys, or encroachments by a permanent habitable improvement if there is no evidence that the encroachment was intentional or due to negligence (10 acres maximum); To dispose of unneeded federal rights-of-way substantially surrounded by nonfederal lands (no specified acreage limitation); and If the parcel is used as a cemetery, landfill, or sewage plant pursuant to a special use authorization for the use and occupancy of NFS land (no specified acreage limitation) (16 U S C  §521e)  The conveyance must be determined to be in the public interest and the tracts may not be valued at more than $500,000  The land can be disposed of for cash, lands, interests in land (such as an easement), or any combination thereof for at least the value of the land being sold or exchanged (16 U S C  §521d) plus "all reasonable costs of administration, survey, and appraisal incidental to such conveyance" (16 U S C  §521f)  In some cases, the proceeds may be used for specified land acquisition purposes  The 1958 Townsites Act authorizes the Secretary to transfer up to 640 acres of NFS land adjacent to communities in Alaska or the 11 western states for townsites, if the "indigenous community objectives     outweigh the public objectives and values which would be served by maintaining such tract in Federal ownership" (16 U S C  §478a)  Public notice of the application for such transfer is required, and upon a "satisfactory showing of need," the Secretary may offer the land to a local governmental entity at "not less than the fair market value " The Education Land Grant Act, also known as the Sisk Act (16 U S C  §479a), authorizes the Secretary to transfer up to 80 acres of NFS land for a nominal cost upon written application of a public school district  It provides for reversion of the title to the federal government if the lands are not used for the educational purposes for which they were acquired  There are a few other specific authorities that allow for the disposal of NFS lands  For example, the 1911 Weeks Act authorizes the disposal of NFS lands that are "chiefly valuable for agriculture" but were acquired inadvertently or otherwise, if agricultural use will not injure the forests or streamflows and the lands are not needed for public purposes  The lands can be sold as homesteads in parcels of up to 80 acres (16 U S C  §519)  The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937 (7 U S C  §§1010-1012) also authorizes the disposal of lands acquired under its authority, although the FS has adopted regulations stating that the Bankhead-Jones lands comprising the national grasslands will be held permanently (36 C F R  §213 1(b))  The BLM can dispose of land under several authorities  They include (1) exchanges and sales under FLPMA, (2) sales or exchanges under the FLTFA, (3) transfers to other governmental units or nonprofit entities for public purposes, (4) patents under the General Mining Law of 1872, and (5) geographically limited sale authorities  With regard to exchanges under FLPMA, the exchanges must serve the public interest, and the federal and nonfederal lands in the exchange must be located in the same state and be of equal value (with cash equalization payments possible), among other requirements (43 U S C  §1716)  With regard to sales under FLPMA, the BLM is authorized to sell certain tracts of public land that are identified through the land-use planning process  Such tracts must meet specific criteria (43 U S C  §1713(a)): (1) such tract because of its location or other characteristics is difficult and uneconomic to manage as part of the public lands, and is not suitable for management by another Federal department or agency; or (2) such tract was acquired for a specific purpose and the tract is no longer required for that or any other Federal purpose; or (3) disposal of such tract will serve important public objectives, including but not limited to, expansion of communities and economic development, which cannot be achieved prudently or feasibly on land other than public land and which outweigh other public objectives and values, including, but not limited to, recreation and scenic values, which would be served by maintaining such tract in Federal ownership  The size of the tracts for sale is determined by "the land use capabilities and development requirements " Proposals to sell tracts of more than 2,500 acres first must be submitted to Congress and can be disapproved by Congress  Lands may not be sold at less than their fair market value  They generally must be sold through competitive bidding, although modified competition and noncompetitive sales are allowed  FLTFA provides for the sale or exchange of BLM lands identified for disposal under BLM land- use plans  The law create s a separate Treasury account for most of the proceeds (96%) from the sale or exchange, and it provide s for the use of those funds by the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture  The Secretaries may acquire nonfederal lands, specifically inholdings , lands adjacent to federal lands that contain exceptional resources , and areas adjacent to inaccessible lands that are open to recreation  Up to 20% of the funds in the account may be used for administrative costs, and at least 80% of the funds for acquisition are to be in the state in which the funds are generated   The Recreation and Public Purposes Act (43 U S C  §869) authorizes the Secretary, upon application by a qualified applicant, to dispose of any public lands to a State, Territory, county, municipality, or other State, Territorial, or Federal instrumentality or political subdivision for any public purposes, or to a nonprofit corporation or nonprofit association for any recreational or any public purpose consistent with its articles of incorporation or other creating authority  The lands can be sold or leased, and the act specifies conditions, qualifications, and acreage limitations for transfer  The price of the land depends on the type of entity that will receive it, for instance, whether a state government or a nonprofit organization  The price also depends on the intended use of the land, with some sales and leases made at no cost  Although the BLM can dispose of lands through patents under the General Mining Law of 1872, since FY1995 a series of annual moratoria on issuing mineral patents has been enacted into law  These moratoria, contained in the annual Interior appropriations laws, have effectively prevented this means of federal land disposal  Specifically, the Mining Law allows access to and development of hardrock minerals on federal lands that have not been withdrawn from entry  With evidence of valuable minerals and sufficient developmental effort, the Mining Law allows mining claims to be patented, with full title (of surface and mineral rights) transferred to the claimant upon payment of the appropriate fee  Nonmineral lands used for associated milling or other processing operations can also be patented (30 U S C  §42)  Patented lands may be used for purposes other than mineral development  The BLM also has geographically limited land sale authorities  The program with the largest revenue stream has been the Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act of 1998, which allows the Secretary of the Interior to sell or exchange certain lands around Las Vegas  The BLM and the local government unit jointly decide on the lands to be offered for sale or exchange  In general, 85% of the proceeds are deposited into a special account, and are available to the Secretary of the Interior for land acquisition in Nevada and other purposes in the state, such as certain capital improvements and development of parks, trails, and natural areas  The other 15% of the proceeds are for state or local purposes, specifically the State of Nevada General Education Fund (5%) and the Southern Nevada Water Authority (10%)  Other provisions of law similarly provide for BLM land sales in particular areas (mostly in Nevada), with specific allocations of the proceeds  Further, the BLM continues to dispose of land in Alaska as required by law, such as through transfers to the state of Alaska and to Alaska native corporations  A total of about 150 million acres in Alaska will be transferred from federal to state and private ownership  


Report 2:  After a Houthi-fired missile with alleged Iranian origins landed deep inside Saudi Arabia in November 2017, the coalition instituted a full blockade of all of Yemen's ports, including the main port of Hudaydah, exacerbating the country's humanitarian crisis  The White House issued four press statements on the conflict between November 8 and December 8, including a statement on December 6 in which President Trump called on Saudi Arabia to "completely allow food, fuel, water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who desperately need it  This must be done for humanitarian reasons immediately " On December 20, 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would end its blockade of Hudaydah port for a 30-day period and permit the delivery of four U S -funded cranes to Yemen to increase the port's capability to off-load commercial and humanitarian goods  The next day, the White House issued a statement welcoming "Saudi Arabia's announcement of these humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict " As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate also proposed use of the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U S  support for the coalition's military intervention  On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S J Res  54 , a joint resolution to "direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress (except for those U S  forces engaged in counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces) " Efforts in the Senate followed a late 2017 attempt in the House (see Table 1 below), in which a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove U S  forces from Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed nonbinding resolution  Throughout 2018, between Congress and the Trump Administration and within Congress itself, there was disagreement as to whether U S  forces assisting the Saudi-led coalition have been introduced into active or imminent hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution  Some Members claimed that by providing support to the Saudi-led coalition, U S  forces have been introduced into a "situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated" based on the criteria of the War Powers Resolution  The Trump Administration disagreed  In February 2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the extent of current U S  support , and reported that "the United States provides the KSA-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties " On March 20, 2018, the Senate considered S J Res  54 on the floor  During debate, arguments centered on a number of issues, ranging from concern over exacerbating Yemen's humanitarian crisis to reasserting the role of Congress in authorizing the use of armed force abroad  After then-Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker promised to propose new legislation and hold hearings scrutinizing U S  policy in Yemen, a majority of Senators voted to table a motion to discharge the Foreign Relations committee from further consideration of S J Res  54   Senator Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker's approach, a view shared by some other Senators who voted to table the motion  The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Yemen a month later  In parallel testimony before Congress, U S  defense officials stated that while the United States refueled Saudi aircraft and provided advice on targeting techniques, CENTCOM did not track coalition aircraft after they were refueled and did not provide advice on specific targets  Then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert S  Karem testified that "It's correct that we do not monitor and track all of the Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen " During the same hearing, U S  officials acknowledged that pressure from Congress has altered how the Administration deals with the coalition over the Yemen conflict  Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield told Senator Todd Young and the SFRC the following: Senator, your efforts, the efforts of your colleagues in this body and on this Committee have been exceedingly helpful in allowing the Administration to send a message from whole of government regarding the very specific concerns we have over any limitations, restrictions, constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial goods specifically to include fuel to have unrestricted and expeditious entry into Yemen  And that messaging which comes from us, the Executive Branch, also comes from this body is extremely important  After the promised hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also proposed new legislation to place conditions on U S  assistance to the coalition  In May, the committee reported S J Res  58 to the Senate; it would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U S  funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained  The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the SFRC-reported text of S J Res  58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 ( S  2987 )  The provision was modified further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the FY2019 NDAA ( H R  5515 )  It was signed into law as P L  115-232 in mid-August, giving the Administration until mid-September 2018 to make certain certifications  In a statement accompanying the President's signing of P L  115-232 into law, President Trump objected to provisions such as Section 1290, stating the Administration's view that such provisions "encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is feasible and consistent" with "[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs " As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of 2018  On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched "Operation Golden Victory," aimed at retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah  As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could become widespread throughout northern Yemen  On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and then-Secretary of Defense Mattis saying, "We are concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical infrastructure  We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a near-term political resolution to the conflict " Several weeks later, Senator Robert Menendez, the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, placed a hold on a potential U S  sale of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates  In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said, I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective leverage to push back on Iran's actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own self-defense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates humanitarian suffering…  Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world's worst humanitarian crisis  On August 9, the coalition conducted an airstrike that hit a bus in a market near Dahyan, Yemen, in the northern Sa'ada governorate adjacent to the Saudi border  The strike reportedly killed 51 people, 40 of whom were children  The coalition claims that its airstrike was a "legitimate military operation" and conducted in response to a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi city of Jizan a day earlier that killed a Yemeni national in the kingdom  The U S  State Department called on the Saudi-led coalition to conduct a "thorough and transparent investigation into the incident " Several Members of Congress wrote to the Administration seeking additional information regarding U S  operations in the wake of the August 2018 coalition strike at Dahyan  Several Senators also submitted an amendment to the FY2019 Defense Department appropriations act ( H R  6157 ) that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to support the Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to Congress that the coalition air campaign "does not violate the principles of distinction and proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians " The provision did not apply to support for ongoing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Yemen  On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a certification that would allow the use of FY2019 defense funds to support in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft to continue, per the terms of Section 1290 (see discussion above) of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P L  115-232 )  Some Members of Congress criticized the Administration's actions, asserting that the coalition has not met the act's specified benchmarks for avoiding civilian casualties in Yemen  On September 26, several House Members introduced H Con Res  138 , which sought to direct the President to remove U S  Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, except for Armed Forces engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, within 30 days unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use has been enacted into law  In response to a similar initiative in the Senate, the Administration submitted a detailed argument expressing its view that U S  forces supporting Saudi-led coalition operations are not engaged in hostilities in Yemen  By late 2018, the prospect of widespread famine in Yemen coupled with international reprobation over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi pressured the Administration and the coalition to accelerate moves toward peace talks  On October 30, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for all parties to reach a cease-fire and resume negotiations  On November 9, Secretary Mattis further announced that effective immediately, the coalition would use its own military capabilities—rather than U S  capabilities—to conduct in-flight refueling in support of its operations in Yemen  Though fighting continued along several fronts, on December 13, 2018, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire centered on the besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah (Yemen's largest port)  As part of the U N -brokered deal (known as the Stockholm Agreement), the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside Hudaydah city and port  The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment  The international community praised the Stockholm Agreement as a first step toward broader de-escalation and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace settlement  Also on December 13, 2018, the Senate amended and passed S J Res  54 (56-41), which, among other things, directed the President to remove U S  forces from hostilities in Yemen, except U S  forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces  In the House, lawmakers twice narrowly approved rules resolutions containing provisions that made similar resolutions directing the President to remove U S  forces from hostilities in Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration ( H Res  1142 and H Res  1176 )  On December 13, the Senate also passed S J Res  69 , which, among other things, expresses the sense of the Senate that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is responsible for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and that there is no statutory authorization for United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war  The 115th Congress frequently debated the extent and terms of the United States' involvement in the ongoing conflict in Yemen  Lawmakers questioned the extent to which successive Administrations have adhered to existing law related to providing security assistance, including sales or transfers of defense goods and defense services, while upholding international human rights standards (e g , 22 U S C  §2754 or 22 U S C  §2304)  They also enacted new legislation that would condition or prohibit the use of U S  funds for some activities related to Yemen and extend legislative oversight over the executive branch's policy toward the war in Yemen  While the House and its Rules Committee voted to make resolutions with respect to war powers and Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration, the Senate passage of S J Res  54 at the conclusion of the 115 th Congress demonstrated growth in congressional opposition to U S  involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen relative to previous years  Over time, the balance of votes shifted in favor of measures that could be described as critical or restrictive of U S  support for Saudi-led coalition operations with regard to arms sales, oversight measures, and war powers measures  Nevertheless, after nearly four years of conflict, it remains difficult to identify the locus of congressional consensus about Yemen  Many in the House and Senate state that they seek to preserve cooperative U S -Saudi relations in broad terms and express concern about Iranian activities in Yemen, while also expressing support for expanded humanitarian access and efforts to bring the conflict to a close  Some lawmakers express opposition to the intervention and U S  involvement on moral grounds, citing errant coalition airstrikes and the prospect of a looming famine  Others argue the conflict's continuation creates opportunities for Iran and Sunni Islamist extremist groups to expand their influence and operations in Yemen  Still others may have come to oppose continued U S  support for the intervention based on factors not directly related to Yemen itself, including the opaque mechanisms used by the executive branch to support the coalition and/or anger with the Saudi government over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi  It remains to be seen whether recent congressional consideration of Yemen legislation is a harbinger of broader efforts by Members of Congress to reassert congressional prerogatives toward U S  foreign policy writ large  Measures to enhance oversight over U S  support to the Saudi-led coalition and U S  strategy toward Yemen have received broad bipartisan support, while proponents of other recently considered arms sales and war powers measures have used mechanisms to ensure privileged consideration of their proposals  The 116 th Congress may continue to debate U S  support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen  It is uncertain whether lawmakers may also broaden the scope of their oversight activities beyond the current conflict to more fully address the root causes of Yemen's chronic instability  Even if the United States is no longer an active supporter of coalition military efforts, Yemen itself has been devastated by years of war and remains the world's worst humanitarian crisis  Experts expect Yemen to require sustained international attention and financial assistance in order to help local actors reach and sustain a political settlement  This suggests that Congress may grapple with questions about the conduct of U S  diplomacy, the provision of U S  security support, and the investment of U S  assistance and defense funds for years to come 

ground_truth: The federal government owns roughly 640 million acres, heavily concentrated in 12 western states. Four agencies—the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture—administer about 95% of those lands. The extent to which each of these four federal agencies have authority to acquire and dispose of land varies considerably. The BLM has relatively broad authority for both acquisitions and disposals under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). The agency also has other authorities for disposing of land, including two laws that allow the agency to retain the proceeds for subsequent land acquisition, among other purposes, and a law that allows transfers to governmental units and other entities for public purposes. By contrast, the NPS has no general authority to acquire land to create new park units or to dispose of park lands. The FS authority to acquire lands is mostly limited to lands within or contiguous to the boundaries of a national forest. The agency has various authorities to dispose of land, but they are relatively constrained and infrequently used. The FWS has various authorities to acquire lands but no general authority to dispose of its lands. The agency frequently uses acquisition authority under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929 because of the availability of funding through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund. The nature of the acquisition and disposal authorities of the four federal agencies also varies. In general, the acquisition authorities are designed to allow the four agencies to bring into federal ownership lands that many contend could benefit from federal management. Disposal authorities generally are designed to allow agencies to convey land that is no longer needed for a federal purpose or that might be chiefly valuable for another purpose. Some of the authorities specify particular circumstances where they can be used, such as the conveyance of FS land for educational purposes and the disposal of BLM land for recreation and public purposes. Congress often faces questions on the adequacy of existing acquisition and disposal authorities; the nature, extent, and location of their use; and the extent of federal land ownership overall. The current acquisition and disposal authorities form the backdrop for consideration of measures to establish, modify, or eliminate authorities, or to provide for the acquisition or disposal of particular lands. In some cases, Congress enacts bills to provide authority to acquire or dispose of particular parcels where no standing authority exists and, in other cases, to direct or facilitate land transactions. Congress also addresses acquisition and disposal policy in the context of debates on the role and goals of the federal government in owning and managing land generally, and it has considered broader measures to dispose of lands or to promote acquisition. Other issues for Congress pertain to the sources and levels of funds for land acquisition. The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) is the primary source of funding for land acquisition. Congress has considered diverse measures related to the LWCF, such as legislation to make LWCF funding permanent and bills to direct LWCF monies to additional, nonacquisition purposes. Additionally, the FWS has the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, an account with mandatory spending authority supported by revenue from three sources. The BLM also has mandatory spending authorities that allow the proceeds from land sales to be used for land acquisition, among other purposes.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: The Navy currently has 51 attack submarines—comprising 33 Los Angeles class, 3 Seawolf class, and 15 Virginia class submarines (see fig  1)  Attack submarines are homeported at bases in the United States: in New London, Connecticut; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Norfolk, Virginia; San Diego, California; and Bangor, Washington; 4 are homeported overseas, in the U S  territory of Guam  Submarine Safety Controls and Culture On April 10, 1963, the USS Thresher (SSN 593) sank during deep submergence tests off the coast of New England  One hundred and twelve officers and enlisted sailors and 17 civilians perished in the tragedy  The accident investigation concluded that the Navy did not have adequate procedures in place to prevent and respond to a catastrophic flooding incident  time, and that maintenance delays reduce the amount of time during which ships and submarines are available for training and operations  Submarine fleet and squadron officials emphasized the strict safety culture that permeates the submarine community  This emphasis on meeting safety certification criteria means that the Navy operates a supply-based submarine force that does not compromise on adherence to training and maintenance standards to meet combatant commander demands, according to these officials (see sidebar)  Officials added that the Navy will delay deployment dates if necessary to ensure that these standards are met  As a result, deployed readiness is high and attack submarines are in excellent materiel condition as compared with the rest of the Navy fleet  The loss of the USS Thresher and its crew spurred the Navy to establish stringent safety requirements for submarines to prevent another loss at sea  Following the accident, the Navy established submarine safety certification criteria to provide maximum reasonable assurance that critical systems would protect the crew from flooding and allow the submarine to conduct an emergency surfacing should flooding occur  This program, known as SUBSAFE, is still in use today, to ensure that these critical systems receive a high quality of work and that all work is properly documented  According to the Navy, the SUBSAFE certification status of a submarine is fundamental to its mission capability, as it provides a thorough and systematic approach to quality, and to a culture that permeates the entire submarine community  According to Navy officials, since the SUBSAFE program was established in 1963, no SUBSAFE-certified submarine has ever been lost  The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and support cost expenditures  Our analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between fiscal year 2008 and the end of fiscal year 2018, attack submarines will have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards  Our analysis found that the primary driver affecting attack submarines are delays in completing depot maintenance  For example, of the 10,363 total days of lost time since fiscal year 2008, 8,472 (82 percent) were due to depot maintenance delays  As we previously reported, completing ship and submarine maintenance on time is essential to Navy readiness, as maintenance periods lasting longer than planned could reduce the number of days during which ships and crews are available for training or operations  Attack submarines also face delays in beginning maintenance when the public shipyards have no available capacity, in some cases forcing submarines to idle pierside because they are no longer certified to conduct normal operations  According to Navy officials, the SUBSAFE program—its program to ensure and certify submarine safety—requires submarines to adhere to strict maintenance schedules and pass materiel condition assessments before they are allowed to submerge  Attack submarines that go too long without receiving required maintenance are at risk of having their materiel certification expire  Should this certification expire, these submarines are restricted to sitting idle, pierside, while they wait until a shipyard has the capacity to begin their maintenance period (see fig  2)  We found that since fiscal year 2008, 14 attack submarines have spent a combined 61 months (1,891 days) idling while waiting to enter shipyards for maintenance  Idle time incurred while waiting to begin a maintenance period is often coupled with maintenance delays while at the shipyards, thus compounding total delays  We also found that the Navy incurs significant costs in operating and supporting submarines that are experiencing maintenance delays and idle time  We analyzed the operating and support costs the Navy incurs on average to estimate the costs of crewing, maintaining, and supporting attack submarines that are delayed in getting into and out of the shipyards  Using historical daily cost data the Navy adjusted for inflation, we estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has spent more than $1 5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars on attack submarines sitting idle while waiting to enter the shipyards, and on those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards (see table 1)  While the Navy would incur these costs regardless of whether the submarine was delayed, idled, or deployed, our estimate of $1 5 billion represents costs incurred from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2018 for attack submarines without receiving any operational capability in return  While acknowledging the magnitude of these costs, Navy officials stated that there may be some benefits that could be realized from these operating and support costs since crews on idle attack submarines can conduct some limited training  Operating and support costs include payment of crew salaries, purchasing of spare parts, and conducting of maintenance, among other things, but they do not represent the full operational impact incurred by the Navy from the idle time and maintenance delays  For example, attack submarine depot-level maintenance requires the use of a drydock, and officials from the three public shipyards we visited told us that their drydock capacity was limited  A delayed attack submarine maintenance period can restrict the use of a drydock for much longer than originally anticipated, thereby preventing the shipyard from using that drydock to maintain other vessels, including other types of ships, or to conduct necessary repairs on the facilities  The Navy has started to address workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards  These efforts to address the Navy’s maintenance challenges are important steps, but they will require several years of sustained management attention to reach fruition  As we reported in September 2017, maintenance on ships and submarines may be delayed for numerous reasons, including workforce gaps and inexperience, the poor condition of facilities and equipment, parts shortages, changes in planned maintenance work, and weather  According to Navy officials, all of these issues continue to affect the Navy’s ability to complete attack submarine maintenance on time  According to officials, the Navy has begun to address some of these challenges  For example: The public shipyards have been hiring to address workforce shortages  The number of civilian full-time employees at the shipyards increased from 25,087 in 2007 to 34,160 in 2017, with a goal to reach 36,100 by 2020  Navy officials cautioned that this newly hired workforce is largely inexperienced and will require time to attain full proficiency  The Navy has released a plan to guide public shipyard capital investments  In September 2017 we reported that the Navy projected an inability to support 50 planned submarine maintenance periods over the ensuing 23 years, due to capacity and capability shortfalls at the public shipyards  We recommended that the Navy develop a comprehensive plan for shipyard capital investment  In February 2018 the Navy published its shipyard optimization plan, outlining an estimated $21 billion investment needed to address shipyard facility and equipment needs over 20 years to meet the operational needs of the current Navy fleet, but not the larger fleet size planned for the future  While the public shipyards have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing  The Navy expects the maintenance backlogs at the public shipyards to continue  We estimate that, as a result of these backlogs, the Navy will incur approximately $266 million in operating and support costs in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars for idle submarines from fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year 2023, as well as additional depot maintenance delays  The Navy may have options to mitigate idle time and maintenance delays  For example, officials at the private shipyards—General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News Shipbuilding—told us that they will have available capacity for repair work for at least the next 5 years  Although the Navy has shifted about 8 million man-hours in attack submarine maintenance to private shipyards over the past 5 years, it has done so sporadically, having decided to do so in some cases only after experiencing lengthy periods of idle time  According to private shipyard officials, the sporadic shifts in workload have resulted in repair workload gaps that have disrupted private shipyard workforce, performance, and capital investment—creating costs that are ultimately borne in part by the Navy  We believe that the Navy has not fully mitigated this challenge because it has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards, and to proactively minimize attack submarine idle time and maintenance delays  Such an analysis would help the Navy better assess private shipyard capacity to perform attack submarine maintenance and would help it incorporate a complete accounting of all costs, benefits, and risks, including: the large operating and support costs of having attack submarines sitting idle; the qualitative benefits associated with providing additional availability to the combatant commanders; and the potential for additional work at private shipyards to reduce schedule risk to submarine construction programs by allowing the yards to build and maintain a stable shipyard workforce  The April 2011 DOD Product Support Business Case Analysis Guidebook provides standards for DOD’s process for conducting analyses of costs, benefits, and risks  It states that data sources used to conduct a business case analysis should be comprehensive and should include both quantitative and qualitative values  It notes that benefits, such as the availability of a weapon system, may be qualitative in nature, and that DOD should evaluate all possible support options, to include government- and contractor-provided maintenance  Navy leadership has acknowledged that they need to be more proactive in leveraging private shipyard repair capacity, but officials cautioned that maintenance could cost more at a private shipyard than at a public shipyard  However, without a complete accounting of all costs, benefits, and risks, the Navy will remain unable to determine whether the cost of performing a maintenance period at a private shipyard would outweigh the mission benefits of having reduced idle time, additional operational availability, and the potential for reduced risk to submarine construction programs  The nation’s investment in attack submarines provides the United States an asymmetric advantage to gather intelligence undetected, attack enemy targets, and insert special forces, among other capabilities  However, the Navy’s attack submarine fleet has suffered from persistent and costly maintenance delays  Although the Navy has several activities underway to reduce maintenance delays for the attack submarine fleet, it has not yet taken additional steps to maximize attack submarine readiness that fully address challenges such as the allocation of maintenance periods between public and private shipyards  Without addressing this challenge, the Navy will not achieve the full benefit of the nation’s investment in its attack submarines, and it risks continued expenditure of operating and support funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance  The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Chief of Naval Operations conducts a business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards; this analysis should include an assessment of private shipyard capacity to perform attack submarine maintenance, and should incorporate a complete accounting of both (a) the costs and risks associated with attack submarines sitting idle, and (b) the qualitative benefits associated with having the potential to both mitigate risk in new submarine construction and provide additional availability to the combatant commanders  We provided a draft of the classified version of the report to DOD for review and comment  That draft contained the same recommendation as this unclassified version as well as three additional recommendations DOD deemed sensitive  In written comments provided by DOD (reprinted in appendix II), DOD concurred with our recommendation stating that it has taken the first steps to take a more holistic view of submarine maintenance requirements and impacts across both the public and private shipyards  The Navy also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy, and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  To assess the extent to which the Navy has experienced maintenance delays in its attack submarine fleet, we analyzed attack submarine maintenance delay and idle time data from Naval Sea Systems Command, and we reviewed prior GAO work on shipyard maintenance delays  The Navy determines depot maintenance delays by counting each day in which a submarine maintenance period extends beyond the planned completion date  Two Navy offices within Naval Sea Systems Command—that is, the Logistics, Maintenance, and Industrial Operations office and Program Executive Office Submarines—track days incurred from depot-level maintenance delays and idle time  To determine the total number of days of maintenance delays for each fiscal year within our scope, we subtracted the planned completion date from the actual completion date to produce the number of days of maintenance delays for each maintenance period for each submarine  We added together the days of maintenance delays across all attack submarines for each fiscal year, and then added the fiscal year totals to produce the overall total  Although the data included some maintenance periods that began before fiscal year 2008, we counted days of maintenance delays only from periods that were incurred in fiscal years 2008 through 2018  We also tracked the total number of days that the Navy completed maintenance periods ahead of schedule—that is, 153—but we noted these separately instead of subtracting them from the total number of days of maintenance delays  To estimate costs associated with these delays, we analyzed annual data from fiscal years 2011 through 2017 (the most current data available at the time of our review) from the Navy’s Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs system  We also reviewed prior work on determining the operating and support costs of Navy ships  The Navy calculates total operating and support expenditures for each attack submarine on an annual basis, as well as the yearly average expenditure for each attack submarine class, including Los Angeles class, Seawolf class, and Virginia class blocks one and two  For each class, we converted the Navy’s annual class averages into daily average costs by adding the annual class averages together for each year that data were available, fiscal years 2011 through 2017, then dividing that number by the total number of days  We then multiplied the daily class average by the total number of days of maintenance delays and idle time incurred by submarines within that class, according to our calculations outlined above, between fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2018, and we added these totals together to produce the total estimated operating and support cost for days of maintenance delays and idle time incurred during this period  The data did not include annual class average costs for fiscal years 2008, 2009, 2010, or 2018  However, the annual class averages for fiscal years 2011 through 2017 did not show significant variation, so we applied these averages to 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2018  To assess the extent to which the Navy has addressed any challenges and developed mitigation plans for any maintenance delays, we reviewed the Navy’s plans to address attack submarine maintenance delays and interviewed Navy headquarters, fleet, and squadron officials, attack submarine crews, and public and private shipyard officials to understand any plans to address attack submarine maintenance delays and idle time  We analyzed data on factors contributing to attack submarine maintenance delays, such as cannibalization rates  We visited three of the four public shipyards, including Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and Norfolk Naval Shipyard, to observe operations, training, and the condition of the facilities and equipment, and to interview officials about challenges affecting operational efficiency and performance  We also met with Navy maintainers at Naval Station Norfolk and Naval Submarine Base New London, and with the crew of the submarine tenders USS Frank Cable (AS-40) and USS Emory S  Land (AS-39) in Guam  We toured the two private shipyards that conduct attack submarine repair work—General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News Shipbuilding—and interviewed executives at both locations  We also toured attack submarines and met with crew leadership, selected according to which submarines and crews were available for tours at each of the sites we visited  We visited the USS Boise (SSN 764) at Naval Station Norfolk and four attack submarines in depot-level maintenance: the USS Albany (SSN 753), the USS Jefferson City (SSN 759), the USS New Mexico (SSN 779), and the USS Springfield (SSN 761)  We met with the crews of two attack submarines assigned to the operating forces at the time of our visit, the USS Missouri (SSN 780) and the USS North Dakota (SSN 784)  We evaluated the Navy’s plans to address any challenges against criteria in federal standards for internal control, which state that agencies should evaluate performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks; the Department of Defense’s business case analysis guidebook, which provides standards for the process used to conduct analyses of costs, benefits, and risks; the Project Management Book of Knowledge, which provides best practices for project management; and the Secretary of the Navy’s December 2017 Strategic Readiness Review, which calls for the early identification of systemic risks before problems occur  To assess the reliability of the data sources for conducting analyses to address all of the objectives in this report, we reviewed systems documentation and interviewed officials to understand system operating procedures, organizational roles and responsibilities, and error-checking mechanisms  We selected the time frames for each of the data series above after assessing their availability and reliability, to maximize the amount of data available for us to make meaningful comparisons  We assessed the reliability of each of the data sources  The Navy provided information based on our questions regarding data reliability, including information on an overview of the data, data-collection processes and procedures, data quality controls, and overall perceptions of data quality  The Navy provided documentation of how the systems are structured and what written procedures are in place to help ensure that the appropriate information is collected and properly categorized  Additionally, we interviewed Navy officials to obtain further clarification on data reliability, discuss how the data were collected and reported, and explain how we planned to use the data  We also conducted our own error checks to look for inaccurate or questionable data, and we discussed with officials any data irregularities we found  We conducted these assessments on the following data for attack submarines: Navy deployed and surge-ready submarines from fiscal years 2011 through 2018; maintenance timeliness from fiscal years 2000 through 2018; idle time from fiscal years 2008 through 2018; operating and support costs from fiscal years 2011 through 2017; and cannibalization rates from 2012 through 2017  Some of these data were used in prior reports, and their reliability had previously been assessed  After further assessing any data that we had not recently used, we determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of summarizing attack submarine readiness trends and related information  We interviewed officials, and where appropriate obtained documentation, at the following locations: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Undersea Warfare Division (N97) Warfare Integration Division (N83) U S  Fleet Forces Command Commander, Submarine Force, U S  Atlantic Fleet Commander, Submarine Squadron 4 Commander, Regional Support Group Groton Commander, Submarine Force, U S  Pacific Fleet Commander, Submarine Squadron 1 Commander, Submarine Squadron 7 Commander, Submarine Squadron 15 Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Logistics, Maintenance, and Industrial Operations (NAVSEA 04) Program Executive Office, Submarines Attack Submarine Program Office (PMS 392) Submarine Maintenance Engineering, Planning, and Procurement (SUBMEPP) Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP) Newport News, Virginia Navy Education and Training Command Submarine Learning Facility Norfolk Navy Board of Inspection and Survey Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine Newport News Shipbuilding, Virginia, operated by Huntington Ingalls Industries Electric Boat, Groton, Connecticut, operated by General Dynamics The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from August 2017 to October 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We worked with DOD to prepare this unclassified version of the report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards  Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are Classified  Classified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances and need to know, upon request  Columbia Class Submarine: Immature Technologies Present Risks to Achieving Cost Schedule and Performance Goals  GAO-18-158  Washington, D C : Dec  21, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Affecting the Fleet  GAO-17-809T  Washington, D C : Sept  19, 2017  Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions that Affect Operations  GAO-17-548  Washington, D C : Sept  12, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-798T  Washington, D C : Sept  7, 2017  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-841  Washington, D C : Sept  7, 2016  Navy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness  GAO-16-481RC  Washington, D C : May 25, 2016  (SECRET//NOFORN) Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan  GAO-16-466R  Washington, D C : May 2, 2016  Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports  GAO-15-329  Washington, D C : May 29, 2015  In addition to the contact named above, Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Chris Watson, Analyst in Charge; Herb Bowsher; Chris Cronin; Ally Gonzalez; Cynthia Grant; Carol Petersen; Amber Sinclair; and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this report 
Report 2:  After a Houthi-fired missile with alleged Iranian origins landed deep inside Saudi Arabia in November 2017, the coalition instituted a full blockade of all of Yemen's ports, including the main port of Hudaydah, exacerbating the country's humanitarian crisis  The White House issued four press statements on the conflict between November 8 and December 8, including a statement on December 6 in which President Trump called on Saudi Arabia to "completely allow food, fuel, water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who desperately need it  This must be done for humanitarian reasons immediately " On December 20, 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would end its blockade of Hudaydah port for a 30-day period and permit the delivery of four U S -funded cranes to Yemen to increase the port's capability to off-load commercial and humanitarian goods  The next day, the White House issued a statement welcoming "Saudi Arabia's announcement of these humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict " As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate also proposed use of the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U S  support for the coalition's military intervention  On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S J Res  54 , a joint resolution to "direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress (except for those U S  forces engaged in counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces) " Efforts in the Senate followed a late 2017 attempt in the House (see Table 1 below), in which a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove U S  forces from Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed nonbinding resolution  Throughout 2018, between Congress and the Trump Administration and within Congress itself, there was disagreement as to whether U S  forces assisting the Saudi-led coalition have been introduced into active or imminent hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution  Some Members claimed that by providing support to the Saudi-led coalition, U S  forces have been introduced into a "situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated" based on the criteria of the War Powers Resolution  The Trump Administration disagreed  In February 2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the extent of current U S  support , and reported that "the United States provides the KSA-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties " On March 20, 2018, the Senate considered S J Res  54 on the floor  During debate, arguments centered on a number of issues, ranging from concern over exacerbating Yemen's humanitarian crisis to reasserting the role of Congress in authorizing the use of armed force abroad  After then-Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker promised to propose new legislation and hold hearings scrutinizing U S  policy in Yemen, a majority of Senators voted to table a motion to discharge the Foreign Relations committee from further consideration of S J Res  54   Senator Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker's approach, a view shared by some other Senators who voted to table the motion  The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Yemen a month later  In parallel testimony before Congress, U S  defense officials stated that while the United States refueled Saudi aircraft and provided advice on targeting techniques, CENTCOM did not track coalition aircraft after they were refueled and did not provide advice on specific targets  Then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert S  Karem testified that "It's correct that we do not monitor and track all of the Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen " During the same hearing, U S  officials acknowledged that pressure from Congress has altered how the Administration deals with the coalition over the Yemen conflict  Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield told Senator Todd Young and the SFRC the following: Senator, your efforts, the efforts of your colleagues in this body and on this Committee have been exceedingly helpful in allowing the Administration to send a message from whole of government regarding the very specific concerns we have over any limitations, restrictions, constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial goods specifically to include fuel to have unrestricted and expeditious entry into Yemen  And that messaging which comes from us, the Executive Branch, also comes from this body is extremely important  After the promised hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also proposed new legislation to place conditions on U S  assistance to the coalition  In May, the committee reported S J Res  58 to the Senate; it would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U S  funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained  The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the SFRC-reported text of S J Res  58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 ( S  2987 )  The provision was modified further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the FY2019 NDAA ( H R  5515 )  It was signed into law as P L  115-232 in mid-August, giving the Administration until mid-September 2018 to make certain certifications  In a statement accompanying the President's signing of P L  115-232 into law, President Trump objected to provisions such as Section 1290, stating the Administration's view that such provisions "encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is feasible and consistent" with "[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs " As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of 2018  On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched "Operation Golden Victory," aimed at retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah  As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could become widespread throughout northern Yemen  On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and then-Secretary of Defense Mattis saying, "We are concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical infrastructure  We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a near-term political resolution to the conflict " Several weeks later, Senator Robert Menendez, the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, placed a hold on a potential U S  sale of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates  In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said, I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective leverage to push back on Iran's actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own self-defense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates humanitarian suffering…  Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world's worst humanitarian crisis  On August 9, the coalition conducted an airstrike that hit a bus in a market near Dahyan, Yemen, in the northern Sa'ada governorate adjacent to the Saudi border  The strike reportedly killed 51 people, 40 of whom were children  The coalition claims that its airstrike was a "legitimate military operation" and conducted in response to a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi city of Jizan a day earlier that killed a Yemeni national in the kingdom  The U S  State Department called on the Saudi-led coalition to conduct a "thorough and transparent investigation into the incident " Several Members of Congress wrote to the Administration seeking additional information regarding U S  operations in the wake of the August 2018 coalition strike at Dahyan  Several Senators also submitted an amendment to the FY2019 Defense Department appropriations act ( H R  6157 ) that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to support the Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to Congress that the coalition air campaign "does not violate the principles of distinction and proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians " The provision did not apply to support for ongoing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Yemen  On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a certification that would allow the use of FY2019 defense funds to support in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft to continue, per the terms of Section 1290 (see discussion above) of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P L  115-232 )  Some Members of Congress criticized the Administration's actions, asserting that the coalition has not met the act's specified benchmarks for avoiding civilian casualties in Yemen  On September 26, several House Members introduced H Con Res  138 , which sought to direct the President to remove U S  Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, except for Armed Forces engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, within 30 days unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use has been enacted into law  In response to a similar initiative in the Senate, the Administration submitted a detailed argument expressing its view that U S  forces supporting Saudi-led coalition operations are not engaged in hostilities in Yemen  By late 2018, the prospect of widespread famine in Yemen coupled with international reprobation over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi pressured the Administration and the coalition to accelerate moves toward peace talks  On October 30, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for all parties to reach a cease-fire and resume negotiations  On November 9, Secretary Mattis further announced that effective immediately, the coalition would use its own military capabilities—rather than U S  capabilities—to conduct in-flight refueling in support of its operations in Yemen  Though fighting continued along several fronts, on December 13, 2018, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire centered on the besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah (Yemen's largest port)  As part of the U N -brokered deal (known as the Stockholm Agreement), the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside Hudaydah city and port  The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment  The international community praised the Stockholm Agreement as a first step toward broader de-escalation and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace settlement  Also on December 13, 2018, the Senate amended and passed S J Res  54 (56-41), which, among other things, directed the President to remove U S  forces from hostilities in Yemen, except U S  forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces  In the House, lawmakers twice narrowly approved rules resolutions containing provisions that made similar resolutions directing the President to remove U S  forces from hostilities in Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration ( H Res  1142 and H Res  1176 )  On December 13, the Senate also passed S J Res  69 , which, among other things, expresses the sense of the Senate that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is responsible for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and that there is no statutory authorization for United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war  The 115th Congress frequently debated the extent and terms of the United States' involvement in the ongoing conflict in Yemen  Lawmakers questioned the extent to which successive Administrations have adhered to existing law related to providing security assistance, including sales or transfers of defense goods and defense services, while upholding international human rights standards (e g , 22 U S C  §2754 or 22 U S C  §2304)  They also enacted new legislation that would condition or prohibit the use of U S  funds for some activities related to Yemen and extend legislative oversight over the executive branch's policy toward the war in Yemen  While the House and its Rules Committee voted to make resolutions with respect to war powers and Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration, the Senate passage of S J Res  54 at the conclusion of the 115 th Congress demonstrated growth in congressional opposition to U S  involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen relative to previous years  Over time, the balance of votes shifted in favor of measures that could be described as critical or restrictive of U S  support for Saudi-led coalition operations with regard to arms sales, oversight measures, and war powers measures  Nevertheless, after nearly four years of conflict, it remains difficult to identify the locus of congressional consensus about Yemen  Many in the House and Senate state that they seek to preserve cooperative U S -Saudi relations in broad terms and express concern about Iranian activities in Yemen, while also expressing support for expanded humanitarian access and efforts to bring the conflict to a close  Some lawmakers express opposition to the intervention and U S  involvement on moral grounds, citing errant coalition airstrikes and the prospect of a looming famine  Others argue the conflict's continuation creates opportunities for Iran and Sunni Islamist extremist groups to expand their influence and operations in Yemen  Still others may have come to oppose continued U S  support for the intervention based on factors not directly related to Yemen itself, including the opaque mechanisms used by the executive branch to support the coalition and/or anger with the Saudi government over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi  It remains to be seen whether recent congressional consideration of Yemen legislation is a harbinger of broader efforts by Members of Congress to reassert congressional prerogatives toward U S  foreign policy writ large  Measures to enhance oversight over U S  support to the Saudi-led coalition and U S  strategy toward Yemen have received broad bipartisan support, while proponents of other recently considered arms sales and war powers measures have used mechanisms to ensure privileged consideration of their proposals  The 116 th Congress may continue to debate U S  support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen  It is uncertain whether lawmakers may also broaden the scope of their oversight activities beyond the current conflict to more fully address the root causes of Yemen's chronic instability  Even if the United States is no longer an active supporter of coalition military efforts, Yemen itself has been devastated by years of war and remains the world's worst humanitarian crisis  Experts expect Yemen to require sustained international attention and financial assistance in order to help local actors reach and sustain a political settlement  This suggests that Congress may grapple with questions about the conduct of U S  diplomacy, the provision of U S  security support, and the investment of U S  assistance and defense funds for years to come 

ground_truth: According to the Navy, its 51 attack submarines provide the United States an asymmetric advantage to gather intelligence undetected, attack enemy targets, and insert special forces, among others. These capabilities make attack submarines some of the most–requested assets by the global combatant commanders. GAO was asked to review the readiness of the Navy's attack submarine force. This report discusses the extent to which the Navy (1) has experienced maintenance delays in its attack submarine fleet and costs associated with any delays; and (2) has addressed any challenges and developed mitigation plans for any maintenance delays. GAO analyzed readiness information from fiscal years 2008-2018, operating and support costs, maintenance performance, and other data; visited attack submarines and squadrons; and interviewed public and private shipyard and fleet officials. This is a public version of a classified report issued in October 2018. Information the Department of Defense deemed classified or sensitive, such as attack submarine force structure requirements and detailed data on attack submarine maintenance delays, has been omitted. The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and support cost expenditures. GAO's analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between fiscal year 2008 and 2018, attack submarines have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards. For example, the Navy originally scheduled the USS Boise to enter a shipyard for an extended maintenance period in 2013 but, due to heavy shipyard workload, the Navy delayed the start of the maintenance period. In June 2016, the USS Boise could no longer conduct normal operations and the boat has remained idle, pierside for over two years since then waiting to enter a shipyard (see figure). GAO estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has spent more than $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle while waiting to enter the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards. The Navy has started to address challenges related to workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards. However, it has not effectively allocated maintenance periods among public shipyards and private shipyards that may also be available to help minimize attack submarine idle time. GAO's analysis found that while the public shipyards have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing. The Navy may have options to mitigate this idle time and maintenance delays by leveraging private shipyard capacity for repair work. But the Navy has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis as recommended by Department of Defense guidelines to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. Navy leadership has acknowledged that they need to be more proactive in leveraging potential private shipyard repair capacity. Without addressing this challenge, the Navy risks continued expenditure of operating and support funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance. GAO recommends that the Navy conduct a business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO's recommendation.