prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, and gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations  The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition strategies and proposed funding levels for the Aegis BMD program  Congress's decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U S  BMD capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base  For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the Aegis BMD program may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  Most of the Navy's cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are equipped with the Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers, software, displays, weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that defended Zeus  The Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s for defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and subsurface threats  The system was first deployed by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated many times since  The Navy's Aegis ships include Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers  A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994  The first five ships in the class (CGs 47 through 51), which were built to an earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005, leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73)  A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and FY2005; the first entered service in 1991 and the 62 nd entered service in FY2012  The first 28 ships are known as Flight I/II DDG-51s  The next 34 ships, known as Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some design changes, including the addition of a helicopter hangar  No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009  The Navy during this period instead procured three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers  The DDG-1000 design does not use the Aegis system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations  Navy plans do not call for modifying the three DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable  Procurement of DDG-51s resumed in FY2010, following procurement of the three DDG-1000s  A total of 20 DDG-51s were procured in FY2010-FY2019  DDG-51s procured in FY2017 and subsequent years are being built to a new version of the DDG-51 design called the Flight III version  The Flight III version is to be equipped with a new radar, called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) or the SPY-6 radar, that is more capable than the SPY-1 radar installed on all previous Aegis cruisers and destroyers  Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s  Allied countries that now operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway  Most of Japan's Aegis-equipped ships are currently BMD-capable, and Japan plans to make all of them BMD-capable in coming years  The Aegis-equipped ships operated by South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway are not BMD-capable  Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to the Aegis system's computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor missiles  In-service Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s procured in FY2010 and subsequent years are being built from the start with a BMD capability  The Aegis BMD system exists in several variants  Listed in order of increasing capability, these include (but are not necessarily limited to) 3 6 X variant, the 4 0 3 variant, the 4 1 variant (also known as the Aegis Baseline [BL] 5 4 variant), the 5 0 CU (Capability Upgrade) variant (also known as the BL 9 1 variant), the 5 1 variant (also known as the BL 9 2 variant), and the 6 X variant (also known as the BL 10 variant)  Figure 1 summarizes the capabilities of some of these variants (using their designations as of 2016) and correlates them with the phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA; see discussion below) for European BMD operations  As shown in Figure 1 , the Aegis BMD system was originally designed primarily to intercept theater-range ballistic missiles, meaning short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs, respectively)  In addition to its capability for intercepting theater-range ballistic missiles, detection and tracking data collected by the Aegis BMD system's radar might be passed to other U S  BMD systems that are designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which might support intercepts of ICBMs that are conducted by those other U S  BMD systems  With the advent of the Aegis BMD system's new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor (which is discussed further in the next section), DOD is now evaluating the potential for the Aegis BMD system to intercept certain ICBMs  Section 1680 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  2810 / P L  115-91 of December 12, 2017) directed DOD to "conduct a test to evaluate and demonstrate, if technologically feasible, the capability to defeat a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat using the standard missile 3 block IIA missile interceptor " DOD's January 2019 missile defense review report states the following: The SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor is intended as part of the regional missile defense architecture, but also has the potential to provide an important "underlay" to existing GBIs [ground-based interceptors] for added protection against ICBM threats to the homeland  This interceptor has the potential to offer an additional defensive capability to ease the burden on the GBI system and provide continuing protection for the U S  homeland against evolving rogue states' long-range missile capabilities  Congress has directed DoD to examine the feasibility of the SM-3 Blk IIA against an ICBM-class target  MDA will test this SM-3 Blk IIA capability in 2020  Due to the mobility of sea-based assets, this new underlay capability will be surged in a crisis or conflict to further thicken defensive capabilities for the U S  homeland  Land-based sites in the United States with this SM-3 Blk IIA missile could also be pursued  A March 18, 2019, press report states: The Pentagon plans a "first-of-its-kind" test of an unprecedented weapons capability to intercept and destroy an enemy Intercontinental Ballistic Missile "ICBM" -- from a Navy ship at sea using a Standard Missile-3 Block IIA  The concept, as articulated by Pentagon officials and cited briefly in this years' DoD "Missile Defense Review," would be to use an advanced SM-3 IIA to "underlay" and assist existing Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI), adding new dimensions to the current US missile defense posture … The testing, Pentagon officials tell Warrior, is slated for as soon as next year  The effectiveness and promise of the Raytheon-built SM-3 IIA shown in recent testing have inspired Pentagon weapons developers to envision an even broader role for the weapon  The missile is now "proven out," US weapons developers say…  "The SM-3 IIA was not designed to take out ICBMs, but is showing great promise  This would be in the upper range of its capability -- so we are going to try," the Pentagon official told Warrior…  The SM-3 IIA's size, range, speed and sensor technology, the thinking suggests, will enable it to collide with and destroy enemy ICBMs toward the beginning or end of their flight through space, where they are closer to the boundary of the earth's atmosphere  "The SM-3 IIA would not be able to hit an ICBM at a high altitude, but it can go outside the earth's atmosphere," the Pentagon official said  "You want to hit it as far away as possible because a nuke could go off " A March 26, 2018, press report states the following: [MDA] Director Lt  Gen  Sam Greaves said MDA "is evaluating the technical feasibility of the capability of the SM-3 Block IIA missile, currently under development, against an ICBM-class target " "If proven to be effective against an ICBM, this missile could add a layer of protection, augmenting the currently deployed GMD [ground-based missile defense] system," Greaves said in written testimony submitted March 22 to the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee  [Greaves] said MDA will conduct a demonstration of the SM-3 Block IIA against an ICBM-like target by the end of 2020 " The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), the SM-2 Block IV, and the SM-6  The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles above the atmosphere (i e , exo-atmospheric intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy ballistic missile's flight  It is equipped with a "hit-to-kill" warhead, called a kinetic vehicle, that is designed to destroy a ballistic missile's warhead by colliding with it  MDA and Navy plans call for fielding increasingly capable versions of the SM-3 in coming years  The current versions, called the SM-3 Block IA and SM-3 Block IB, are to be supplemented in coming years by SM-3 Block IIA  Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting its course  Compared to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster stage at the bottom but are 13 5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block IIA version has a 21-inch diameter along its entire length  The increase in diameter to a uniform 21 inches provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout velocity (a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater than that of the Block IA and IB versions, as well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead  The United States and Japan have cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA version, with Japan funding a significant share of the effort  The SM-2 Block IV is designed to intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere (i e , endo-atmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy ballistic missile's flight  It is equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead  The existing inventory of SM-2 Block IVs—72 as of February 2012—was created by modifying SM-2s that were originally built to intercept aircraft and ASCMs  A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs were modified, and at least 3 were used in BMD flight tests  MDA and the Navy are now procuring a more capable terminal-phase (endo-atmospheric intercept) BMD interceptor based on the SM-6 air defense missile (the successor to the SM-2 air defense missile)  The SM-6 is a dual-capability missile that can be used for either air defense (i e , countering aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles) or ballistic missile defense  A July 23, 2018, press report states the following: The Defense Department has launched a prototype project that aims to dramatically increase the speed and range of the Navy's Standard Missile-6 by adding a larger rocket motor to the ship-launched weapon, a move that aims to improve both the offensive and defensive reach of the Raytheon-built system  On Jan  17, the Navy approved plans to develop a Dual Thrust Rocket Motor with a 21-inch diameter for the SM-6, which is currently fielded with a 13 5-inch propulsion package  The new rocket motor would sit atop the current 21-inch booster, producing a new variant of the missile: the SM-6 Block IB  On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new approach for regional BMD operations called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA)  The first application of the approach is in Europe, and is called the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)  EPAA calls for using BMD-capable Aegis ships, a land-based radar in Europe, and two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland to defend Europe against ballistic missile threats from countries such as Iran  Phase I of EPAA involved deploying Aegis BMD ships and a land-based radar in Europe by the end of 2011  Phase II involved establishing the Aegis Ashore site in Romania with SM-3 IB interceptors in 2016  Phase 3 involves establishing the Aegis Ashore site in Poland with SM-3 IIA interceptors by perhaps FY2020  The completion of construction of the Poland site has been delayed by at least a year, MDA says, due to contractor performance issues  Each Aegis Ashore site in the EPAA is to include a structure housing an Aegis system similar to the deckhouse on an Aegis ship and 24 SM-3 missiles launched from a relocatable Vertical Launch System (VLS) based on the VLS that is installed in Navy Aegis ships  Although BMD-capable Aegis ships were deployed to European waters before 2011, the first BMD-capable Aegis ship officially deployed to European waters as part of the EPAA departed its home port of Norfolk, VA, on March 7, 2011, for a deployment to the Mediterranean that lasted several months  Under the FY2020 budget submission, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is projected to increase from 38 at the end of FY2018 to 59 at the end of FY2024  During the period FY2018-FY2024, the portion of the force equipped with earlier Aegis variants is to decrease, and the number equipped with later variants is to increase  On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the EPAA, four BMD-capable Aegis ships were to be forward-homeported (i e , based) at the naval base at Rota, Spain  The four ships were transferred to Rota in FY2014 and FY2015  Navy officials have said that the four Rota-based ships can provide a level of level of presence in the Mediterranean for performing BMD patrols and other missions equivalent to what could be provided by about 10 BMD-capable Aegis ships that are homeported on the U S  east coast  The Rota homeporting arrangement thus effectively releases about six U S  Navy BMD-capable Aegis ships for performing BMD patrols or other missions elsewhere  The Aegis BMD development effort, including Aegis BMD flight tests, has been described as following a development philosophy long held within the Aegis program office of "build a little, test a little, learn a lot," meaning that development is done in manageable steps, then tested and validated before moving on to the next step  For a summary of Aegis BMD flight tests since 2002, see Appendix A   Japan is modifying all six of its Aegis destroyers to include the Aegis BMD capability  As of August 2017, four of the six ships reportedly had been modified, and Japan planned to modify a fifth by March 2018, or perhaps sooner than that  In November 2013, Japan announced plans to procure two additional Aegis destroyers and equip them as well with the Aegis BMD capability, which will produce an eventual Japanese force of eight BMD-capable Aegis destroyers  The two additional ships are expected to enter service in 2020 and 2021  Japanese BMD-capable Aegis ships have participated in some of the flight tests of the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor (see Table A-1 in Appendix A )  Japan cooperated with the United States on development the SM-3 Block IIA missile  Japan developed certain technologies for the missile, and paid for the development of those technologies, reducing the missile's development costs for the United States  Japan plans to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems that reportedly are to be located at Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) facilities in Akita Prefecture in eastern Japan and Yamaguchi Prefecture in western Japan, and would be operated mainly by the GSDF (i e , Japan's army)  The two systems reportedly will be equipped with a new Lockheed-made radar called the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) rather than the Raytheon-made SPY-6 AMDR that is being installed on U S  Navy Flight III DDG-51s, and reportedly will go into operation by 2023  A July 6, 2018, press report states that "The U S  and Japan are looking to jointly develop next-generation radar technology that would use Japanese semiconductors to more than double the detection range of the Aegis missile defense system " An October 12, 2018, press report states that "the South Korean military has decided to buy ship-based SM-3 interceptors to thwart potential ballistic missile attacks from North Korea, a top commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed Oct  12  Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Denmark, and Australia  Spain, South Korea, and Australia either operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis ships  The other countries operate destroyers and frigates with different combat systems that may have potential for contributing to BMD operations  The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA's budget  The Navy's budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts  Table 1 shows MDA procurement and research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program  Research and development funding for the land-based SM-3 is funding for Aegis Ashore sites  MDA's budget also includes additional funding not shown in the table for operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) for the Aegis BMD program  One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA's FY2019 procurement and research and development funding requests for the program  In considering this issue, Congress may consider various factors, including whether the work that MDA is proposing to fund for FY2019 is properly scheduled for FY2019, and whether this work is accurately priced  Another potential issue for Congress concerns required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships  Some observers are concerned about the potential operational implications of a shortfall in the available number of BMD-capable relative to the required number  Regarding the required number of BMD-capable Aegis ships, an August 15, 2018, Navy information paper states the following: The [Navy's] 2016 Force Structure Assessment [FSA] sets the requirement [for BMD-capable ships] at 54 BMD-capable ships, as part of the 104 large surface combatant requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support defense of the sea base and limited expeditionary land base sites…  The minimum requirement for 54 BMD ships is based on the Navy unique requirement as follows  It accepts risk in the sourcing of combatant commander (CCDR) requests for defense of land  - 30 to meet CVN escort demand for rotational deployment of the carrier strike groups - 11 INCONUS for independent BMD deployment demand - 9 in forward deployed naval forces (FDNF) Japan to meet operational timelines in USINDOPACOM - 4 in FDNF Europe for rotational deployment in EUCOM  A related potential issue for Congress is the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy's fleet of Aegis ships, particularly since performing BMD patrols requires those ships to operate in geographic locations that may be unsuitable for performing other U S  Navy missions, and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U S  Navy Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites  A June 16, 2018, press report states the following: The U S  Navy's top officer wants to end standing ballistic missile defense patrols and transfer the mission to shore-based assets  Chief of Naval Operations Adm  John Richardson said in no uncertain terms on June 12 that he wants the Navy off the tether of ballistic missile defense patrols, a mission that has put a growing strain on the Navy's hard-worn surface combatants, and the duty shifted towards more shore-based infrastructure  "Right now, as we speak, I have six multi-mission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea," Richardson said during his address at the U S  Naval War College's Current Strategy Forum  "And if you know a little bit about this business you know that geometry is a tyrant  "You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile  So, we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little box, defending land " Richardson continued, saying the Navy could be used in emergencies but that in the long term the problem demands a different solution  "It's a pretty good capability and if there is an emergent need to provide ballistic missile defense, we're there," he said  "But 10 years down the road, it's time to build something on land to defend the land  Whether that's AEGIS ashore or whatever, I want to get out of the long-term missile defense business and move to dynamic missile defense " The unusually direct comments from the CNO come amid growing frustration among the surface warfare community that the mission, which requires ships to stay in a steaming box doing figure-eights for weeks on end, is eating up assets and operational availability that could be better used confronting growing high-end threats from China and Russia  The BMD mission was also a factor in degraded readiness in the surface fleet  Amid the nuclear threat from North Korea, the BMD mission began eating more and more of the readiness generated in the Japan-based U S  7th Fleet, which created a pressurized situation that caused leaders in the Pacific to cut corners and sacrifice training time for their crews, an environment described in the Navy's comprehensive review into the two collisions that claimed the lives of 17 sailors in the disastrous summer of 2017  Richardson said that as potential enemies double down on anti-access technologies designed to keep the U S  Navy at bay, the Navy needed to focus on missile defense for its own assets  "We're going to need missile defense at sea as we kind of fight our way now into the battle spaces we need to get into," he said  "And so restoring dynamic maneuver has something to do with missile defense  A June 23, 2018, press report states the following: The threats from a resurgent Russia and rising China―which is cranking out ships like it's preparing for war―have put enormous pressure on the now-aging [U S  Navy Aegis destroyer] fleet  Standing requirements for BMD patrols have put increasing strain on the U S  Navy's surface ships  The Navy now stands at a crossroads  BMD, while a burden, has also been a cash cow that has pushed the capabilities of the fleet exponentially forward over the past decade  The game-changing SPY-6 air and missile defense radar destined for DDG Flight III, for example, is a direct response to the need for more advanced BMD shooters  But a smaller fleet, needed for everything from anti-submarine patrols to freedom-of-navigation missions in the South China Sea, routinely has a large chunk tethered to BMD missions  "Right now, as we speak, I have six multimission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea," Chief of Naval Operations Adm  John Richardson said during an address at the recent U S  Naval War College's Current Strategy Forum  "You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile  So we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little box, defending land " And for every six ships the Navy has deployed in a standing mission, it means 18 ships are in various stages of the deployment cycle preparing to relieve them  The Pentagon, led by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, wants the Navy to be more flexible and less predictable―"dynamic" is the buzzword of moment in Navy circles  What Richardson is proposing is moving standing requirements for BMD patrols away from ships underway and all the associated costs that incurs, and toward fixed, shore-based sites, and also surging the Navy's at-sea BMD capabilities when there is an active threat     In a follow-up response to questions posed on the CNO's comments, Navy spokesman Cmdr  William Speaks said the Navy's position is that BMD is an integral part of the service's mission, but where long-term threats exist, the Navy should "consider a more persistent, land-based solution as an option " "This idea is not about the nation's or the Navy's commitment to BMD for the U S  and our allies and partners―the Navy's commitment to ballistic missile defense is rock-solid," Speaks said  "In fact, the Navy will grow the number of BMD-capable ships from 38 to 60 by 2023, in response to the growing demand for this capability  "The idea is about how to best meet that commitment  In alignment with our national strategic documents, we have shifted our focus in an era of great power competition―this calls us to think innovatively about how best to meet the demands of this mission and optimize the power of the joint force "    While the idea of saving money by having fixed BMD sites and freeing up multimission ships is sensible, it may have unintended consequences, said Bryan McGrath, a retired destroyer skipper and owner of the defense consultancy The FerryBridge Group  "The BMD mission is part of what creates the force structure requirement for large surface combatants," McGrath said on Twitter after Defense News reported the CNO's comments  "Absent it, the number of CG's and DDG's would necessarily decline  This may in fact be desirable, depending on the emerging fleet architecture and the roles and missions debate underway  Perhaps we need more smaller, multi-mission ships than larger, more expensive ones  "But it cannot be forgotten that while the mission is somewhat wasteful of a capable, multi-mission ship, the fact that we have built the ships that (among other things) do this mission is an incredibly good thing  If there is a penalty to be paid in peacetime sub-optimization in order to have wartime capacity--should this not be considered a positive thing?" McGrath went on to say that the suite of combat systems that have been built into Aegis have been in response to the BMD threat  And indeed, the crown jewels of the surface fleet―Aegis Baseline 9 software, which allows a ship to do both air defense and BMD simultaneously; the Aegis common-source library; the forthcoming SPY-6; cooperative engagement―have come about either in part or entirely driven by the BMD mission     A Navy official who spoke on condition of anonymity, to discuss the Navy's shifting language on BMD, acknowledged the tone had shifted since the 2000s when the Navy latched onto the mission  But the official added that the situation more than a decade later has dramatically shifted  "The strategic environment has changed significantly since the early 2000s―particularly in the western Pacific  We have never before faced multiple peer rivals in a world as interconnected and interdependent as we do today," the official said  "Nor have we ever seen technologies that could alter the character of war as dramatically as those we see emerging around us  China and Russia have observed our way of war and are on the move to reshape the environment to their favor " In response to the threat and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis' desire to use the force more dynamically, the Navy is looking at its options, the official said  "This includes taking a look at how we employ BMD ships through the lens of great power competition to compete, deter and win against those who threaten us " A January 29, 2019, press report states the following: The Navy is looking to get out of the missile defense business, the service's top admiral said today, and the Pentagon's new missile defense review might give the service the off-ramp it has been looking for to stop sailing in circles waiting for ground-based missile launches  This wasn't the first time Adm  John Richardson bristled in public over his ships sailing in "small boxes" at sea tasked with protecting land, when they could be out performing other missions challenging Chinese and Russian adventurism in the South China Sea and the North Atlantic…  "We've got exquisite capability, but we've had ships protecting some pretty static assets on land for a decade," Richardson said at the Brookings Institute  "If that [stationary] asset is going to be a long-term protected asset, then let's build something on land and protect that and liberate these ships from this mission " Japan is already moving down the path of building up a more robust ground-based sensor and shooter layer, while also getting its own ships out to sea armed with the Aegis radar and missile defense system, both of which would free up American hulls from what Richardson on Monday called "the small [geographic] boxes where they have to stay for ballistic missile defense " Another related potential issue for Congress concerns burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U S  naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations, particularly in light of constraints on U S  defense spending, worldwide operational demands for U S  Navy Aegis ships, and calls by some U S  observers for increased allied defense efforts  The issue can arise in connection with both U S  allies in Europe and U S  allies in Asia  Regarding U S  allies in Asia, a December 12, 2018, press report states the following: In June, US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson said during a speech at the US Naval War College that the US Navy should terminate its current practice of dedicating several US Navy warships solely for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)  Richardson wanted US warships to halt BMD patrols off Japan and Europe as they are limiting, restrictive missions that could be better accomplished by existing land-based BMD systems such as Patriot anti-missile batteries, the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and the Aegis Ashore anti-missile system  In the months since dropping his bombshell, Richardson—and much of the debate—has gone quiet  "My guess is the CNO got snapped back by the Pentagon for exceeding where the debate actually stood," one expert on US naval affairs told Asia Times  But others agree with him  Air Force Lt Gen Samuel A Greaves, the director of the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA), acknowledges Richardson's attempts to highlight how these BMD patrols were placing unwelcome "strain on the (US Navy's) crews and equipment " But there are complications  While it may free US Navy warships for sea-control, rather than land defense, there is a concern that next- generation hypersonic cruise missiles could defeat land-based BMD systems, such as Aegis Ashore, while the US Navy's Aegis-equipped warships offer the advantages of high-speed mobility and stealth, resulting in greater survivability overall  As Japan prepares to acquire its first Aegis Ashore BMD system – and perhaps other systems such as the THAAD system which has been deployed previously in Romania and South Korea – the possibility that the US Navy will end its important BMD role represents abrupt change…  Japan's decision to deploy Aegis Ashore can fill in any gap created by a possible US Navy cessation of BMD patrols  "The land-based option is more reliable, less logistically draining, and despite being horrendously expensive, could be effective in the sense that it provides a degree of reassurance to the Japanese people and US government, and introduces an element of doubt of missile efficacy into [North Korean] calculations," said [Garren Mulloy, Associate Professor of International Relations at Daito Bunka University in Saitama, Japan], adding, however, that these systems could not cover Okinawa  "Fixed sites in Japan could be vulnerable, and the Aegis vessels provide a flexible forward-defense, before anything enters Japanese airspace, but with obviously limited reactions times," Mulloy said  "Aegis Ashore gives more reaction time – but over Japanese airspace "… The silence about this sudden possible shift in the US defense posture in the western Pacific is understandable: it is a sensitive topic in Washington and Tokyo  However, the Trump administration has urged its allies to pay more for their own defense needs and to support US troops deployed overseas  Meanwhile, Tokyo needs to proceed cautiously given the likelihood that neighbors might view a move on BMD as evidence that Tokyo is adopting an increasingly aggressive defense posture in the region  But for them, it is a no-win situation  If the US does ditch the BMD patrol mission, China and North Korea might view the shift as equally menacing given that it greatly enhances the US Navy's maritime warfare capabilities  Another potential issue for Congress is whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site  DOD's January 2019 missile defense review report states, in a section on improving or adapting existing BMD systems, that Another repurposing option is to operationalize, either temporarily or permanently, the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center in Kauai, Hawaii, to strengthen the defense of Hawaii against North Korean missile capabilities  DoD will study this possibility to further evaluate it as a viable near-term option to enhance the defense of Hawaii  The United States will augment the defense of Hawaii in order to stay ahead of any possible North Korean missile threat  MDA and the Navy will evaluate the viability of this option and develop an Emergency Activation Plan that would enable the Secretary of Defense to operationalize the Aegis Ashore test site in Kauai within 30 days of the Secretary's decision to do so, the steps that would need to be taken, associated costs, and personnel requirements  This plan will be delivered to USDA&S, USDR&E, and USDP within six months of the release of the MDR  A January 25, 2019, press report states the following: The Defense Department will examine the funding breakdown between the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency should the government make Hawaii's Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center into an operational resource, according to the agency's director  "Today, it involves both Navy resources for the operational crews -- that man that site -- as well as funds that come to MDA for research, development and test production and sustainment," Lt  Gen  Sam Greaves said of the test center when asked how the funding would shake out between the Navy and MDA should the Pentagon move forward with the recommendation  Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential for ship-based lasers, electromagnetic railguns (EMRGs), and gun-launched guided projectiles (GLGPs, previously known as hypervelocity projectiles [HVPs]) to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles  Another CRS report discusses the potential value of ship-based lasers, EMRGs, and GLGPs for performing various missions, including, potentially, terminal-phase BMD operations  Another potential oversight issue for Congress is technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program  Regarding this issue, a December 2018 report from DOD's Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—DOT&E's annual report for FY2018—stated the following in its section on the Aegis BMD program: Assessment • Results from flight testing, high-fidelity M&S, HWIL, and distributed ground testing demonstrate that Aegis BMD can intercept non-separating, simple-separating, and complex-separating ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase  However, flight testing and M&S did not address all expected threat types, ground ranges, and raid sizes  • FTM-45 successfully and fully demonstrated the Aegis BL 9 2 organic engagement capability and corrective action for the previous FTM-29 missile failure  FTM-29 was only partially able to demonstrate EOR capability given the in-flight missile failure  In FTM-29, the Aegis Weapon System supported the SM-3 Block IIA missile and demonstrated bi-directional communication between the SM-3 Block IIA guidance section and the KW until loss of signal at horizon  However, the weapon system did not exercise all aspects of communication after KW eject  DOT&E considers the FTM-29 failure to be an example of a shortfall in conducting ground testing in an operationally representative way, and an example of a deficiency found in OT that DT should have discovered  • The MDA implemented process improvements to better identify, report, and fi x common failures and anomalies identified during SM-3 ground testing prior to flight testing  • SM CTV-03 demonstrated the capability of the Aegis BMD 4 1 upgrade to fi re an SM-6 Dual I missile  The BMD 4 1 build incorporates BL 9 C1 capabilities into the BMD 4 0 baseline  • FS-17 demonstrated the Aegis BMD 4 0 3 capability to interoperate with NATO partners over operational communication architectures during cruise missile and ballistic missile engagements, and to use remote data provided by NATO partners to prosecute remote engagements  JFTM-05 Event 2 demonstrated inter-ship communication between U S  and Japanese destroyers using a realistic communications architecture while prosecuting ballistic missile engagements  Pacific Dragon demonstrated interoperability between U S  Aegis BMD assets, Japanese destroyers, and Republic of Korea naval assets  • Aegis BMD has exercised rudimentary engagement coordination with Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense firing units, but not with Patriot  The MDA plans to include Patriot in FTO-03  MDA ground tests have routinely demonstrated that inter-element coordination and interoperability need improvement to increase situational awareness and improve engagement efficiency  • The MDA has been collaborating with DOT&E and the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) to establish an affordable ground testing approach to support assessments of reliability  DOT&E cannot assess SM-3 missile reliability with confidence until the MDA is able to provide additional ground test data that simulates the in-flight environment  DOT&E is working with the MDA to determine if existing ground test venues are able to provide the needed missile reliability data  Recommendations The MDA should: 1  Ensure that ground tests of all SM-3 missile components, sections, and all-up rounds use the same configuration as will be flown in flight tests (i e , "test as you fly")  2  Determine how to properly score acceptance ground test data for production missiles to enable their use in estimating SM-3 reliability  3  Fund and execute high-fidelity M&S RFRs for Aegis BL 9 2 SM-3 Block IIA and SM-6 Dual II scenarios that span the engagement battlespace  Regarding the SM-6 missile, the January 2018 DOT&E report also stated the following: Assessment • As reported in the DOT&E FY18 SM-6 BLK I FOT&E Report, the SM-6 remains effective and suitable with the exception of the classified deficiency identified in the FY13 IOT&E Report  The SM-6 Block 1 satisfactorily demonstrated compatibility with Aegis Weapon System Baseline 9 Integrated Fire Control capability  • In FY17-18, the Navy developed and tested specific software improvements to SM-6 BLK I to mitigate the classified performance problems discovered during IOT&E  As previously reported, testing conducted by the Navy demonstrated the software improvements perform as intended, but did not eliminate them  Recommendation 1  The Navy should continue to improve software based on IOT&E results and verify corrective actions with flight tests  Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the FY2020 request for MDA procurement and research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program  Appendix A  Aegis BMD Flight Tests Table A-1 presents a summary of Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002  As shown in the table, since January 2002, the Aegis BMD system has achieved 33 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 42 attempts using the SM-3 missile (including 4 successful intercepts in 5 attempts by Japanese Aegis ships, and 2 successful intercepts in 3 attempts attempt using the Aegis Ashore system), and 7 successful endo-atmospheric intercepts in 7 attempts using the SM-2 Block IV and SM-6 missiles, making for a combined total of 40 successful intercepts in 49 attempts  In addition, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser operating northwest of Hawaii used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system with the SM-3 missile to shoot down an inoperable U S  surveillance satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit  Including this intercept in the count increases the totals to 34 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 43 attempts using the SM-3 missile, and 41 successful exo- and endo-atmospheric intercepts in 50 attempts using SM-3, SM-2 Block IV, and SM-6 missiles 


Report 2: The House of Representatives has standing rules that govern how bills and resolutions are to be taken up and considered on the floor  However, to expedite legislation receiving floor action, the House may temporarily set aside these rules for measures that are not otherwise privileged for consideration  This can be done by agreeing to a special order of business resolution (special rule) or by adopting a motion to suspend the rules and pass the underlying measure  In general, special rules enable the consideration of complex or contentious legislation, such as major appropriations or reauthorizations, while the suspension of the rules procedure is usually applied to broadly supported legislation that can be approved without floor amendments or extensive debate in the chamber  Most bills and resolutions that receive floor action in the House are called up and considered under suspension of the rules  The suspension procedure allows nonprivileged measures to be raised without a special rule, waives points of order, limits debate, and prohibits floor amendments  Motions to suspend the rules and pass the measure require a two-thirds vote, so the procedure is typically reserved for bills and resolutions that can meet a supermajority threshold  Decisions to schedule bills for consideration under suspension are generally based on how widely supported the measures are, how long Members wish to debate them, and whether they want to propose floor amendments  These decisions are not necessarily related to the subject matter of the measure  Accordingly, measures brought up under suspension cover a wide range of policy areas but most often address government operations, such as the designation of federal facilities  This report describes the suspension procedure, which is defined in clause 1 of House Rule XV, and provides an analysis of measures considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress (2015-2016)  Figures 1- 8 display statistical data, including the prevalence and form of suspension measures, sponsors of measures, committee consideration, length of floor debate, voting, and resolution of differences between the chambers  Table 1 summarizes the final legislative status of measures initially considered in the House under the suspension of the rules  Finally, Figure A-1 depicts the use of the suspension procedure from the 110 th through the 114 th Congresses (2007-2016)  The suspension of the rules procedure is established by clause 1 of House Rule XV  Bills, resolutions, House amendments to Senate bills, amendments to the Constitution, conference reports, and other types of business may be considered under suspension, even those "that would otherwise be subject to a point of order … [or have] not been reported or referred to any calendar or previously introduced " Suspension motions are in order on designated days  As Rule XV states, "the Speaker may not entertain a motion that the House suspend the rules except on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays and during the last six days of a session of Congress " Suspension measures, however, may be considered on other days by unanimous consent or under the terms of a special order of business (special rule) reported by the Committee on Rules and agreed to by the House  A motion to suspend the rules is a compound motion to suspend the House rules and pass a bill or agree to a resolution  When considering such a motion, the House is voting on the two questions simultaneously  Once recognized, the Member making the motion will say, "Mr  [or Madam] Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass___ " The House rules that are suspended under this procedure include those that "would impede an immediate vote on passage of a measure … such as ordering the previous question, third reading, recommittal, or division of the question " A measure considered under the suspension procedure is not subject to floor amendment  The motion to suspend and pass the measure, though, may provide for passage of the measure in an amended form  That is, the text to be approved may be presented in a form altered by committee amendments or by informal negotiations  Suspension measures that are passed with changes incorporated into the text are passed "as amended " There are no separate votes on the floor approving such amendments  Suspension motions are "debatable for 40 minutes, one-half in favor of the motion and one-half in opposition thereto " However, in most instances, a true opponent never claims half the time, and most speakers come to the floor to express support for the measure  Debate time is controlled by two floor managers, one from each party, who sit on a committee of jurisdiction  Each manager makes an opening statement and may yield increments of the 20 minutes they control to other Members to debate the measure  Once debate has concluded, a single vote is held on the motion to suspend the rules and pass the measure  The motion requires approval by "two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum being present " Should the vote fall short of the two-thirds required for passage (290, if all Members vote), the measure is not permanently rejected  Before the end of the Congress, the House may consider the measure again under suspension, or the Committee on Rules may report a special rule that provides for floor consideration of the measure  As illustrated in Figure 1 , the majority of measures considered on the House floor during the 114 th Congress were called up under the suspension of the rules procedure  Sixty-two percent of all measures that received floor action were considered under suspension (743 out of the 1,200), compared to those under the terms of a special rule (14%), unanimous consent (7%), or privileged business (16%)  Figure 2 displays the form of suspension measures  Most of the measures considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress (94%) were bills  House bills made up 83% of the suspension total, Senate bills 11%  As represented in Figure 3 , most suspension measures were sponsored by members of the majority party during the 114 th Congress  House or Senate majority-party members sponsored 69% of all bills and resolutions initially considered in the House under suspension, while House majority-party members sponsored 467 (71%) of the 660 House-originated measures (designated with an H R , H Res , H Con Res  or H J Res  prefix)  Suspension is, however, the most common procedure used to consider minority-sponsored legislation in the House by a wide margin  In the 114 th Congress, 85% of the minority-sponsored measures that were considered on the House floor were raised under the suspension procedure  Members of the House or Senate minority parties sponsored 31% of all suspension measures originating in either chamber, compared to 9% of legislation subject to different procedures, including privileged business (17 measures), unanimous consent (21 measures), and special rules (one Senate bill)  Minority-party House Members sponsored 193 (29%) of the 660 House measures considered under suspension  No minority-party House Member sponsored a House-originated measure that was considered under a special rule  Most suspension measures are referred to at least one House committee before their consideration on the chamber floor  In the 114 th Congress, 710 out of the 743 suspension measures considered (96%) were previously referred to a House committee  Of the 33 measures that were considered without a referral, 31 were Senate bills that were "held at the desk," and two were House resolutions that provided concurrence to Senate amendments  Measures may be referred to multiple House committees before receiving floor action  When a bill or resolution is referred to more than one House committee, the Speaker will designate one committee as primary, meaning it is the committee exercising jurisdiction over the largest part of the measure  Generally, the chair of the committee of primary jurisdiction works with majority party leadership to determine if and when a measure should be considered under suspension  Figure 4 shows the number and percentage of measures brought up under suspension from each House committee of primary jurisdiction  The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (now Oversight and Reform) was the committee of primary jurisdiction for the plurality of measures considered under suspension in the 114 th Congress: 106, or 14%, of the total number of suspension measures considered  Many of these bills designated names for post offices or other federal properties  For most House committees, the majority of their referred measures that reached the floor were raised under the suspension procedure  In the 114 th Congress, the four exceptions were the Committee on House Administration—which had several measures considered by unanimous consent—and the Committees on Appropriations, the Budget, and Armed Services, which had at least half of their measures considered pursuant to special rules  For the other committees, suspension measures ranged from 57% to 100% of the total number of the committee's measures receiving floor action ( Figure 5 )  Since suspension motions require a two-thirds majority for passage, House committees that handle less contentious subjects tend to have more of their measures considered under the suspension procedure in comparison to other committees  In the 114 th Congress, high-suspension committees included Small Business (100% of measures receiving floor action) and Veterans' Affairs (92%)  The Small Business Committee's measures sought to authorize new business development programs  Veterans' Affairs measures included authorizations, reauthorizations, and bills designating federal facilities  While suspension measures are not subject to floor amendments, committees may recommend amendments to legislative texts during markup meetings or through informal negotiations  The motion to suspend the rules can include these proposed changes when a Member moves to suspend the rules and pass the measure "as amended " In the 114 th Congress, 396 suspension measures (53% of the total) were considered "as amended," meaning that the text to be approved differed from the measure's introduced text  Clause 2 of House Rule XIII requires that measures reported by House committees must be accompanied by a written report  Otherwise, they are not placed on a calendar of measures eligible for floor consideration  However, the written report requirement is among those rules suspended under the suspension procedure  Thus, measures may be called up on the floor under suspension of the rules even if a committee never ordered them to be reported or wrote an accompanying committee report

ground_truth: The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under the FY2020 budget submission, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is projected to increase from 38 at the end of FY2018 to 59 at the end of FY2024. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA's budget. The Navy's budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA's proposed FY2020 budget requests a total of $1,784.2 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion) in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania. MDA's budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program. Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA's FY2020 funding procurement and research and development funding requests for the program; required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships; the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy's fleet of Aegis ships, and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites; burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations; whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site; the potential for ship-based lasers, electromagnetic railguns (EMRGs), and hypervelocity projectiles (HVPs) to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles; and technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  Instead, the motion to suspend the rules discharges the committee and moves the legislation directly to the House floor  In the 114 th Congress, 517 (70%) suspension measures were ordered to be reported by a House committee  Of this number, 398 were reported with an accompanying House committee report  Twenty measures that did not have a House report did have a Senate report, while 325 measures had no written report from either chamber (43% of the total number of suspension measures)  Pursuant to Rule XV, motions to suspend the rules are regularly in order on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays or on the last six days of a session of Congress  However, suspension motions may be considered on other days by unanimous consent or under the terms of a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and agreed to by the House  As displayed in Figure 6 , in the 114 th Congress, the plurality of suspension measures were considered on Tuesdays (312, 42% of the total number considered), followed by Mondays (291, 39%) and Wednesdays (114, 15%)  In addition, 25 suspension measures were considered on Thursdays and one on a Friday  Of these, one was considered by unanimous consent, while 25 were called up under suspension pursuant to permission included in a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and agreed to by the full House  Such special rules included a provision stating, "It shall be in order at any time on the legislative day of ___ for the Speaker to entertain motions that the House suspend the rules as though under clause 1 of rule XV " Pursuant to Rule XV, suspension measures are "debatable for 40 minutes, one-half in favor of the motion and one-half in opposition thereto " In practice, there is rarely a true opponent to a motion to suspend the rules, and the time is divided between two floor managers, usually one from each party, who both favor the motion  The floor managers each control 20 minutes of debate  The managers may be their parties' sole representative for or against the motion, or they may yield increments of the 20-minute allotment to other Members  Typically, the relevant committee chairs and ranking members select the majority and minority floor managers for particular bills and resolutions  These managers may be the measure's sponsor, the chair or ranking member of the measure's committee of primary jurisdiction, or another committee member  In the 114 th Congress, the measure's sponsor served as the majority manager on 26% of the suspension measures receiving floor action  The committee chair managed 29% of the measures  The minority manager was the measure's sponsor for 11% of the measures and the committee's ranking member for 26% of the measures considered  Occasionally, floor managers controlling time on a motion to suspend the rules ceded their control to other Members during debate  In two identified cases, both the majority and minority floor managers favored the measure, and another Member claimed the time in true opposition during the initial floor consideration of the measure  In at least one other instance, the minority manager asked unanimous consent to yield managerial control to another Member  A majority floor manager makes the motion to suspend the rules by stating, "Mr  [Madam] Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill [or resolution] ____ " The Speaker [or Speaker pro tempore] responds, "Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman[woman] from [state] and the gentleman[woman] from [state] each will control twenty minutes " The majority and minority managers then, in turn, make opening statements regarding the measure using the 20 minutes each controls  If the majority and minority managers have secured additional speakers, the speakers generally alternate between the parties within the 40-minute limit  During the 114 th Congress, on a motion to suspend the rules, the average number of speakers in addition to the floor managers was fewer than two  On 83% of the measures (620) considered, there were one or two additional speakers  On 27% of the measures (199) considered, there were no additional speakers, and in 16% of the measures (120) considered, there were 3 to 12 additional speakers  Three measures had 20, 21, and 25 additional speakers, respectively  At the start of the debate period, the majority manager may request "unanimous consent that all Members may have five legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and add extraneous materials on this bill [resolution] " This request enables general leave statements to be inserted into the Congressional Record   In 29% of the suspension measures considered in the 114 th Congress, a written general leave statement appeared in the Record following in-person remarks, indicating that the remarks were submitted on the day the legislation was considered  General leave statements submitted on a day other than the day of consideration appear in the Extension of Remarks section of the Congressional Record   Suspension measures are limited to a maximum of 40 minutes of debate under Rule XV  However, if there are time gaps between speakers or procedural interruptions, such as a vote on a motion to adjourn, the time period between the start of the first speaker's remarks and the conclusion of debate may exceed 40 minutes  The statistics displayed in Figure 7 show the length of consideration of suspension measures as documented in Congress gov, not the accumulated length of statements, as kept by official timekeepers in the chamber  In the 114 th Congress, the average length of consideration on a motion to suspend the rules was 13 minutes and 10 seconds, and half of the measures considered had a debate period of 10 minutes or less  Thus, while overall debate is limited to 40 minutes under the rule, on most suspension measures, only a fraction of that time was actually expended during consideration  Seventeen measures, however, had consideration periods that exceeded 40 minutes due to procedural delays or, in the case of one measure, a request for unanimous consent to extend debate by 10 minutes to each side  House leaders generally choose measures for suspension that are likely to achieve the two-thirds majority threshold for passage  Thus, almost all suspension measures were passed by the House in the 114 th Congress  The full House approved all House resolutions (28), concurrent resolutions (12), joint resolutions (2), and Senate bills (82) that were considered under suspension  The House also passed, via motions to suspend the rules, 612 of the 619 House bills that were initially considered under suspension  Seven bills did not receive the requisite supermajority  Two of these bills were later considered and approved under the terms of a special rule  The remaining five bills did not return to the floor and therefore did not pass the House  Most suspension motions are agreed to in the House by voice vote, which is the chamber's default method of voting on most questions  In 2015 and 2016, this method of voting led to the final approval of 72% (531) of the motions to suspend the rules and pass the measures (see Figure 8 )  After the initial voice vote, Members triggered an eventual record vote (often called a roll call vote) on 212 (28%) of the suspension measures considered in the 114 th Congress  This was done by demanding the "yeas and nays," objecting to the vote "on the grounds that a quorum is not present," or, in one case, demanding a recorded vote  In most instances, the chair elected to postpone the vote to a later period, within two additional legislative days, pursuant to clause 8 of House Rule XX  Of the 212 record votes, 3 immediately followed debate on the measure  The remaining 209 votes were postponed to another time on the legislative schedule, usually later the same day  In the 114 th Congress, 205 suspension motions were adopted by record vote, and 7 motions to suspend the rules were defeated by record votes  The defeat of a motion to suspend the rules, however, does not necessarily kill the legislation  The Speaker may choose to recognize a Member at a later time to make another motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, or the House may consider the measure pursuant to a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules  Accordingly, two of the initially unsuccessful measures were later called up and passed under the terms of a special rule  Five measures were not considered again, via any House floor procedure, before the end of the 114 th Congress  Although suspension measures generally receive broad support, measures that receive the requisite two-thirds majority in the House are not guaranteed passage in the Senate  As noted in Table 1 , in the 114 th Congress, the Senate passed 197 of the 619 House bills initially considered under suspension (32%)  Additionally, the Senate agreed to 1 of the 2 House joint resolutions and 5 of the 11 House concurrent resolutions considered under suspension of the rules  Of the number of suspension measures that passed the House and Senate, 60 required a resolution of differences between the chambers  Forty-four House measures and 15 Senate bills were subject to an amendment exchange process, and on one occasion, a conference committee was used to resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of a House bill  The Senate passed three House bills, initially approved in the House under suspension, that did not become public law because the House did not agree to the final bill text, as amended by the Senate  In those instances, the House did not reconsider the bills once the Senate returned the Senate-amended versions to the House chamber  Thus, 194 House bills were presented to the President for signature  Of the measures initially considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress, President Obama was presented with 194 House bills, 82 Senate bills, and 1 House joint resolution for signature or veto  The President vetoed H R  1777 (Presidential Allowance Modernization Act of 2016) and S  2040 (Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act)  The House chose not to attempt a veto override on H R  1777 , so the measure did not become public law  Both the Senate and House voted to override the veto of S  2040 , enabling it to become law without the President's signature ( P L  114-222 )  Thus, of the 703 law-making measures (bills and joint resolutions) initially considered under suspension of the rules, 193 House bills, 82 Senate bills, and 1 House joint resolution became public law (see Table 1 ) 
Report 2:  Lastly, the CFPA applies only to "covered persons" or "service providers " The statute defines "covered persons" as persons who offer or provide a consumer financial product or service, and it defines "service providers" as those who provide a "material service" to a "covered person" in connection with offering or providing a consumer financial product or service  As some commentators have noted, the CFPB could follow in the FTC's footsteps and use its UDAAP authority to regulate data protection  However, the CFPB has generally been inactive in the data privacy and security space  Indeed, to date, it has brought only one such enforcement action, which involved allegations that an online payment platform, Dwolla, Inc , made deceptive statements regarding its data security practices and the safety of its online payments system  To the extent it does use its authority, the CFPB has some powerful procedural advantages in comparison with the FTC  In particular, the CFPB can enact rules identifying and prohibiting particular UDAAP violations through the standard APA rulemaking process, whereas the FTC must follow the more burdensome Magnuson-Moss rulemaking procedures  Regarding enforcement, the CFPA authorizes the CFPB to bring civil or administrative enforcement actions against entities engaging in UDAAPs  Unlike the FTC, the CFPB can seek civil penalties in all such enforcement actions, as well as equitable relief such as disgorgement or injunctions  However, as with the FTC Act, the CFPA does not provide a private right of action that would allow adversely affected individuals to sue companies violating the Act  The statute also does not impose any criminal penalties for UDAAP violations  Adding to the complex federal patchwork of data protection statutes are the laws of the fifty states  First and foremost, major regulators of privacy and data protection in the states include the courts, via tort and contract law  With respect to tort law, in addition to the "privacy" causes of action that developed at the state level during the early 20th century (discussed above), negligence and other state tort law claims serve as a means to regulate businesses that are injured from data security issues or otherwise fail to protect their customers from foreseeable harm  Contracts, implied contracts, and other commercial causes of action can also form important bulwarks for privacy  The common law, however, is not perfect: it is subject to variability from state to state, and within states, from judge to judge and jury to jury  In addition to the common law, most states have their own statutory framework which may affect data protection and the use of data by private entities  For example, many states have a consumer protection law, sometimes prohibiting unfair or deceptive practices, often referred to as "little FTC Acts " These laws, like the FTC Act, are increasingly being used to address privacy matters  In addition, each state has passed a data breach response law, requiring some form of response or imposing liability on companies in the event of a breach of their data security  While an examination of every state data security law is beyond the scope of this report, at least one state has undertaken a general and ambitious effort to regulate data security  Specifically, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), enacted in 2018, has captured significant attention  Unlike the federal patchwork provisions, neither the method of data collection nor the industry that the business operates in limits the potential application of the CCPA  Instead, the CCPA applies to any company that collects the personal information of Californians, is for-profit, does business in California, and satisfies a basic set of thresholds  Analysts have suggested that these thresholds are low enough that the law could reach a considerable number of even "relatively small" businesses with websites accessible in California  The CCPA also does not distinguish between the sources of the data that comes within its scope  Rather, the CCPA regulates all "personal information," which, by the CCPA's definition, covers nearly any information a business would collect from a consumer  The law does not require the presence of any individual identifier, such as a name or address, for data to fall within the meaning of personal information  Rather, the CCPA broadly defines personal information as "information that identifies, relates to, describes, or is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household " Following this definition, the CCPA provides some telling illustrations of what constitutes personal information, including any "electronic network activity [such as] browsing history, search history, and information regarding a consumer's interaction with an Internet Web site, application, or advertisement" and "inferences drawn from any of" this information  The CCPA provides consumers with three main "rights " The first of these is a " right to know " the information that businesses have collected or sold about them  This right requires that businesses must, in advance of any collection, "inform [by mail or electronically] consumers as to the categories of personal information to be collected and the purposes" to which the information will be put  Second, the CCPA provides consumers with the " right to opt out " of the sale of a consumer's information  Under the new law, businesses must inform consumers of this right, and if a consumer so affirmatively opts out, the business cannot again sell the consumer's information unless the consumer subsequently provides the business express authorization  Finally, the CCPA gives consumers the right, in certain circumstances, to request that a business delete any information collected about the consumer (i e , " right to delete ")  Under the law, a business that receives such a request must delete the information collected and direct its "service providers" to do the same  The primary means to enforce the CCPA are actions brought by the California Attorney General  According to the statute, businesses that fail to provide the protections required by the CCPA and fail to cure those violations within 30 days are liable for civil penalties of up to $7,500 per violation  Penalties or settlements collected under the CCPA are to be deposited with the newly created Consumer Privacy Fund, the funds for which are used only to offset costs incurred in connection with the administration of the CCPA  While the CCPA provides for a private cause of action, allowing for individual and class action lawsuits against businesses, this cause of action is only available in the case of a consumer whose "nonencrypted or nonredacted personal information" is subject to "unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure" as a result of a failure to "implement and maintain reasonable security procedures " Further, such actions can be brought only if a consumer provides a business with 30 days' written notice and provides the business with opportunity to cure the violation, unless the consumer suffered actual pecuniary damages  The statute does not specify how a business could "cure" a violation of this type  Consumers may obtain damages under this section of no less than $100 and no more than $750 "per incident," or actual damages, whichever is greater, as well as injunctive relief  Statements by some Members of Congress during Congressional hearings have already noted the CCPA's likely importance to future federal legislative efforts  Further, some outside commentators have argued explicitly that the CCPA should be preempted by a future federal law  These statements may be motivated by the likely fact that, if left intact, the California law could shape industry and consumer concerns both inside and outside California  First, the law is likely to be the "first in a long line of similar pieces of legislation," all of which may model themselves after the CCPA, or will have to respond to its impact  Second, even though the statute is the product of a single state, its broad jurisdictional reach would bring companies throughout the United States and from around the world into its sweep  These factors combined are likely to make the CCPA important to federal legislators  Furthermore, some of the provisions of the California law could form a model for future federal regulation—although along those lines, another potential model it has to compete with is Europe's GDPR  In addition to U S  states like California, some foreign nations have enacted comprehensive data protection legislation  The EU, in particular, has long applied a more wide-ranging data protection regulatory scheme  Whereas privacy principles in the U S  Constitution focus on government intrusions into private life and U S  data privacy statutes generally are sector-specific, European privacy regulations have generally concerned any entity's accumulation of large amounts of data  As a result, foundational EU treaties provide individuals with a general right to "protection of personal data" from all potential interferences  The objective of the EU's most recent data privacy legislation—the GDPR—is to safeguard this right to personal data protection, while ensuring that data moves freely within the EU  Beginning in the 1970s, individual European countries began enacting broad, omnibus national statutes concerning data protection, privacy, and information practices  Although these domestic laws shared certain features, their differing data privacy and protection standards occasionally impeded the free flow of information between European countries  As a consequence, the EU attempted to harmonize its various national privacy laws by adopting an EU-wide data privacy and protection initiative—the 1995 Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (Data Protection Directive)  While the Data Protection Directive applied on an EU-wide basis, EU law authorized each member-nation to implement the directive's requirements into the country's national law  By 2012, the European Commission—the executive body of the EU —came to view differing implementations of the Data Protection Directive at the national level as problematic  The Commission concluded that a single regulation should be developed in order to eliminate the fragmentation and administrative burdens created by the directive-based system  The Commission also sought to bring EU law up to date with developments in technology and globalization that changed the way data is collected, accessed, and used  In pursuit of these goals, the EU developed and adopted the GDPR, which replaced the 1995 Data Protection Directive and went into effect on May 25, 2018  The GDPR regulates the processing of personal data that meet its territoriality requirements, discussed below  Processing includes collection, use, storage, organization, disclosure or any other operation or set of operations performed on personal data, unless an exception applies  Personal data is defined as any information relating to an identified or identifiable person, and it can include names, identification numbers, location data, IP addresses, cookies, and any other information through which an individual can be directly or indirectly identified  The GDPR applies different requirements for controllers and processors of personal data  In general, a controller determines the purposes and means of processing personal data, and a processor is responsible for processing data on behalf of a controller  From a territorial perspective, the GDPR applies to organizations that have an "establishment" in the EU and that process personal data in the context of the activities of that establishment  The GDPR does not define "establishment," but states that it "implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements " In a pre-GDPR case, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that the concept of establishment under the 1995 Data Protection Directive extended "to any real and effective activity—even a minimal one—exercised through stable arrangements " Entities that meet the establishment requirement are subject to the GDPR even if their data processing activities take place outside the EU  The GDPR also applies to non-EU-established entities that offer goods or services to individuals in the EU or monitor individuals' behavior in the EU  Because many businesses with an online presence offer goods and services to EU individuals, the GDPR applies to many businesses outside the EU  The GDPR lays out seven guiding principles for the processing of personal data  While these principles are not "hard and fast rules" themselves, they inform the interpretation of the GDPR and its more concrete requirements, discussed below  The GDPR requires data controllers and processors to have a lawful basis to process personal data  The regulation delineates six possible legal bases: (1) consent; (2) performance of contract; (3) compliance with a legal obligations; (4) protection of the "vital interests" (i e , the life) of the data subject or another individual; (5) tasks carried out in the public interest (e g , by a government entity); and (6) the "legitimate interests" of the controller or a third party, unless the fundamental rights and freedom of the data subject override those interests  Commentators describe the "legitimate interests" category as the most flexible and as the potential basis for a host of common activities, such as processing carried out in the normal course of business, provided that the processing is not unethical, unlawful, or otherwise illegitimate  When data processing is premised on consent, the consent must be freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous, and it can be withdrawn at any time  Additional consent requirements and restrictions apply to especially sensitive data, such as children's information and data that reveals ethnic origins, political opinions, religious beliefs, union status, sexual orientation, health information, and criminal histories  The GDPR provides a series of rights to individuals and corresponding obligations for data controllers, unless an exception applies  The GDPR requires organizations to implement a range of measures designed to ensure and demonstrate that they are in compliance with the regulation  When proportionate in relation to the processing activities, such measures may include adopting and implementing data protection policies and taking a "data protection by design and default" approach whereby the organization implements compliance measures into all stages of data processing  Measures may also include the following: establishing GDPR-conforming contracts with data processors; maintaining records of processing activities; conducting impact assessments on personal data use that is likely to risk individual rights and freedoms; appointing a data protection officer; and adhering to relevant codes of conduct and compliance certification schemes  The GDPR also requires controllers and processors to implement technical and organizational measures to ensure a level of data security that is "appropriate to the risk" presented by the data processing  In implementing data security measures, organizations must consider the "state of the art, the costs of implementation," the nature, scope, and context, and purposes of processing, and the likelihood and potential severity of an infringement on individual rights if data security were to be violated  The GDPR does not impose a "one-size-fits-all" requirement for data security, and security measures that are "appropriate" (and therefore mandatory) will depend on the specific circumstances and risks  For example, a company with an extensive network system that holds a large amount of sensitive or confidential information presents greater risk, and therefore must install more rigorous data security protections than an entity that holds less data  When appropriate, organizations should consider encryption and pseudonymization —the processing of personal data such that the data can no longer be attributed to a specific individual  Security measures should ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and resilience of processing systems; be able to restore access to personal data in the event of an incident; and include a process for testing security effectiveness  In the event of a personal data breach, the GDPR requires controllers to notify the designated EU government authority "without undue delay" and no later than 72 hours after learning of the breach, unless the breach is "unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons " For example, whereas a company must report the theft of a customer database that contains information that could be used for future identity fraud given the high level of risk to individuals, it may not need to report the loss of more innocuous data, such as a directory of staff office phone numbers  When notification to the government is required, the notification must describe the nature and likely consequences of the breach, identify measures to address the breach, and identify the employee responding to the incident  When data processors experience a breach, they must notify the controller without undue delay  In addition to governmental notification, controllers must notify the individuals whose data has been compromised if the breach is likely to result in a "high risk to the rights and freedoms" of individuals  The "high risk" threshold is higher than the threshold for notifying the government authority, but it could met in circumstances when individuals may need to take steps to protect themselves from the effects of a data breach  According to the United Kingdom's data protection regulatory authority, for example, a hospital that disclosed patient medical records as a result of a data breach may present a "high risk" to individuals, but a university that accidentally deleted, but was able to re-create, an alumni contact information database may not meet the mandatory individual reporting threshold  Notification to the individual must describe the breach in clear and plain language and contain at least the same information as provided in the governmental notifications  Notification to the individual is not required in the following cases: the controller implemented appropriate technical and organizational protection measures, such as encryption, that will render the data unintelligible; the controller took subsequent measures that will ensure that the high risk to individual rights and freedom are no longer likely to materialize; or individual notifications would involve disproportionate efforts, in which case the controller must provide public notice of the breach  Regardless of whether notification is required, controllers must document all data breaches so that government supervisory authorities can verify compliance at a later date  The EU has long regulated the transfer of data from EU member states to foreign countries, and the GDPR continues to restrict such international data transfers  Like the 1995 Data Protection Directive, the GDPR authorizes data transfer from within the EU to a non-EU country if the receiving country ensures an adequate level of protection for personal data  To meet this requirement, the non-EU country must offer a level of protection that is "essentially equivalent to that ensured" by the GDPR  If the European Commission previously made an adequacy decision under the Data Protection Directive's legal framework, that decision remains in force under the GDPR  U S  and EU officials previously developed a legal framework—the U S -EU Privacy Shield—for protecting transatlantic data flow into the United States  Under the Privacy Shield framework, U S -based organizations self-certify to the International Trade Administration in the Department of Commerce that they will comply with the framework's requirements for protecting personal data by complying with, among other provisions, notice requirements, data retention limits, security requirements, and data processing purpose principles  In 2016, the European Commission concluded that the Privacy Shield framework provided adequate protections under the Data Protection Directive  That adequacy determination continues to apply under the GDPR, although the European Commission annually reviews whether the Privacy Shield framework continues to provide an adequate level of protection  In the absence of an adequacy decision from the European Commission, the GDPR permits data transfers outside the EU when (1) the recipient of the data has itself established appropriate safeguards , and (2) effective legal remedies exist for individuals to enforce their data privacy and protection rights  Appropriate safeguards include: a legally binding agreement between public authorities or bodies; binding corporate rules; standard contract clauses adopted by the European Commission; and approved codes of conduct and certification mechanisms  U S  companies that do not participate in Privacy Shield often must rely on standard contract clauses to be able to receive data from the EU  The GDPR also identifies a list of circumstances in which data may be transferred outside the EU even without appropriate safeguards or an adequacy decision  These circumstances include, among other reasons, when: an individual has provided informed consent; transfer is necessary for the performance of certain contracts involving the data subject; or the transfer is necessary for important reasons of public interests  One of the most commented-upon aspects of the GDPR is its high ceiling for administrative fines  For the most serious infractions of the GDPR, regulatory bodies within individual EU countries may impose fines up to 20 million euro (approximately $22 million) or 4% of global revenue, whichever is higher, for certain violations of the GDPR  The GDPR also provides tools for individuals to enforce compliance with its terms  Individuals whose personal data is processed in a way that does not comport with the GDPR may lodge a complaint with regulatory authorities  Individuals also have the right to an "effective judicial remedy" (i e , to pursue a lawsuit) against the responsible data processor or controller, and individuals may obtain compensation for their damages from data processors or controllers  The GDPR may be relevant to the 116th Congress' consideration of data protection initiatives in several ways  Because the GDPR applies to U S  companies that offer goods and services to individuals in the EU, many U S  companies have developed new data protection practices in an effort to comply with its requirements  Other businesses reported that they withdrew from the European market rather than attempt to obtain compliance GDPR  For those companies that remained in the European market, some have stated that they will apply their GDPR-compliant practices on a company-wide basis rather than changing their model only when doing business in the EU  Consequently, the GDPR already directly impacts the data protection practices of some U S  companies  The GDPR also has served as a prototype for comprehensive data protection legislation in other governments  For example, commentators have described China's Personal Information Security Specification, which defines technical standards related to the collection, storage, use, transfer, and disclosure of personal information, as modeled on the GDPR  And the CCPA includes elements similar to the GDPR, such as an enumeration of individual rights related to data privacy  If this trend continues, GDPR-like data protection laws may become more commonplace internationally  Finally, some argue that Congress should consider enacting comprehensive federal data protection legislation similar to the GDPR  As discussed below, however, other observers and some officials in the Trump Administration have criticized the GDPR, describing the regulation as overly prescriptive and likely to result in negative unintended consequences  Regardless of the merits of these positions, the GDPR may remain a focal point of discussion in the debate over whether the United States should develop a more comprehensive data protection policy  Although some commentators argue that the federal government should supplement the current patchwork of federal data protection laws with more comprehensive legislation modeled on the CCPA or GDPR, some Trump Administration officials have criticized these legislative approaches and questioned whether they will improve data privacy outcomes  The Administration has argued that many comprehensive data privacy models have resulted in "long, legal, regulator-focused privacy policies and check boxes, which only help a very small number of users[ ]" Rather than pursuing a prescriptive model in which the government defines (or prescribes) data protection rules, the Trump Administration advocates for what it describes as an outcome-based approach whereby the government focuses on the "outcomes of organizational practices, rather than on dictating what those practices should be " In September 2018, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in the Department of Commerce issued a request for public comments on the Trump Administration's efforts to develop an outcome-based approach to advancing consumer privacy that also protects prosperity and innovation  According to NTIA, changes in technology have led consumers to conclude that they are losing control over their personal information, while at the same time that foreign and state privacy laws have led to a fragmented regulatory landscape that disincentives innovation  Accordingly, NTIA is attempting to develop a set of "user-centric" privacy outcomes and goals that would underpin the protections that should be produced by any federal actions related to consumer privacy  NTIA's proposed policy focuses on a set of outcomes that the Trump Administration seeks to achieve: In addition to identifying desired outcomes, NTIA's request for public comments states that the Trump Administration is in the process of developing "high-level goals for Federal action" related to data privacy  NTIA's proposed privacy framework shares certain elements of prescriptive legal regimes like the GDPR and CCPA  Common features include a right to withdraw consent to certain uses of personal data; accountability for third-party vendors and servicers; and a right to access, amend, complete, correct, or delete personal data  But NTIA's request for public comments does not specifically describe how the Trump Administration intends to accomplish its outcomes and goals  Instead, it states that NTIA "understand[s] that there is considerable work to be done to achieve" the identified objectives  The comment period closed on November 9, 2018, and NTIA received input from more than 200 individuals and entities  The debate over whether Congress should consider federal legislation regulating data protection implicates numerous legal variables and options  "Data protection" itself is an expansive concept that melds the fields of data privacy (i e , how to control the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information) and data security (i e , how to protect personal information from unauthorized access or use and respond to such unauthorized access or use)  There is no single model for data protection legislation in existing federal, state, or foreign law  For example, some state laws focus solely on data security or address a particular security concern, such as data breach notifications  Other state laws isolate a single privacy-related issue, such as the transparency of data brokers—companies that aggregate and sell consumers' information, but that often do not have a direct commercial relationship with consumers  Recent data protection laws such as the CCPA and GDPR appear to indicate a trend toward combining data privacy and security into unified legislative initiatives  These unified data protection paradigms typically are structured on two related features: (1) an enumeration of statutory rights given to individuals related to their personal information and (2) the creation of legal duties imposed on the private entities that possess personal information  The specific list and nature of rights and duties differ depending on the legislation, and some have proposed to define new rights in federal legislation that do not have a clear analog in existing state or foreign law  Consequently, at present, there is no agreed-upon menu of data protection rights and obligations that could be included in federal legislation  Although data protection laws and proposals are constantly evolving, some frequently discussed legal rights include: the right to know what personal data is being collected, used, and disseminated, and how those activities are occurring; the right to control the use and dissemination of personal data, which may include the right to opt out or withhold consent to the collection or sharing of such data; the right to review personal data that has been collected and to delete or correct inaccurate information; the right to obtain a portable copy of personal data; the right to object to improper activities related to personal data; and the right to learn when a data breach occurs; Commonly discussed obligations for companies that collect, use, and disseminate personal data include rules defining: how data is collected from individuals; how companies use data internally; how data is disseminated or disclosed to third parties; what information companies must give individuals related to their data; how data is kept secure; when breaches of security must be reported; the accuracy of data; and reporting requirements to ensure accountability and compliance  Whether to enact federal data protection legislation that includes one or more of these rights and obligations has been the subject of a complex policy debate and multiple hearings in recent Congresses  Part of the legislative debate concerns how to enforce such rights and obligation and raises questions over the role of federal agencies, state attorneys general, and private citizen suits  In addition, some elements of the data protection proposals and models could implicate legal concerns and constitutional limitations  While the policy debate is outside the scope of this report, the following sections discuss legal considerations relevant to federal data protection proposals that the 116th Congress may choose to consider  These sections begin by analyzing legal issues related to the internal structure and definition of data protection-related rights and obligations and then move outward toward an examination of external legal constraints  A primary conceptual point of debate concerning data protection legislation is whether to utilize the so-called "prescriptive" method or an "outcome-based" approach to achieve a particular law's objectives  Under the prescriptive approach, the government defines data protection rules and requires regulated individuals and entities to comply with those rules  Both the GDPR and CCPA use a prescriptive approach, and some legislation proposed in the 116th Congress would use this method by delineating certain data protection requirements  The Trump Administration, however, has argued that a prescriptive approach can stymie innovation and result in compliance checklists without providing measurable privacy benefits  As an alternative methodology, the Administration advocated for what it described as an outcome-based approach whereby the government focuses on the outcomes of organizational practices, rather than defining the practices themselves  Some federal information technology laws, such as the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), use an outcome-oriented approach to achieve federal objectives, although agency implementation of such laws may become prescriptive in nature  The Administration has not specified how it intends to achieve its desired data protection goals without prescribing data protection rules, but additional direction appears to be forthcoming, according to the NTIA's request for public comment  Another issue that may be considered in crafting federal data protection policy is how to define the contours of the data that the federal government proposes to protect or the specific entities or industries that it proposes to regulate  The patchwork of existing data protection statutes define protected information in a variety of ways, many of which depend on the context of the law  For example, HIPAA is limited to "protected health information" and GLBA governs "financial information" that is personally identifiable but not publicly available  By contrast, GDPR and CCPA regulate all "personal" information—a term defined in both laws as information that is associated with a particular individual or is capable of being associated with an individual  Some federal data proposals would apply a similar scope to those of the GDPR and CCPA  If enacted, such broad data protection laws have the potential to create multiple layers of federal data protection requirements: (1) general data protection requirements for "personal" information and (2) sector-specific requirements for data regulated by the existing "patchwork" of data protection laws  Other legislative proposals have sought to avoid dual layers of regulations by stating that the proposed data protection requirements would not apply to individuals or entities covered by certain existing federal privacy laws  Agency enforcement is another key issue to consider when crafting any future federal data protection legislation  As discussed, under the current patchwork of federal data protection laws, there are multiple federal agencies responsible for enforcing the myriad federal statutory protections, such as the FTC, CFPB, FCC, and HHS  Of these agencies, the FTC is often viewed—by industry representatives, privacy advocates, and FTC commissioners themselves —as the appropriate primary enforcer of any future national data protection legislation, given its significant privacy experience  There are, however, several relevant legal constraints on the FTC's enforcement authority  First, the FTC generally lacks the ability to issue fines for first-time offenses  In UDAP enforcement actions, the FTC may issue civil penalties only in certain limited circumstances, such as when a person violates a consent decree or a cease and desist order  Consequently, the FTC often enters into consent decrees addressing a broad range of conduct, such as a company's data security practices, seeking penalties for violations of those decrees  However, as the LabMD case discussed earlier in this report suggests, if the FTC imposes penalties based on imprecise legal standards provided in a rule or order, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment may constrain the agency's authority  Second, the plain text of the FTC Act deprives the FTC of jurisdiction over several categories of entities, including banks, common carriers, and nonprofits  Third, the FTC generally lacks authority to issue rules under the APA's notice-and-comment process that is typically used by agencies to issue regulations  Rather, the FTC must use a more burdensome—and, consequently, rarely used—process under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act  As some FTC Commissioners and commentators have noted, these legal limitations may be significant in determining the appropriate federal enforcement provisions in any national data security legislation  While Congress may not be able to legislate around constitutional constraints, future legislation could address some of these limitations—for instance, by allowing the FTC to seek penalties for first-time violations of rules, expanding its jurisdictions to include currently excluded entities, or providing the FTC notice-and-comment rulemaking authority under the APA  These current legal constraints on FTC authority may also be relevant in determining whether national legislation should allow private causes of action or enforcement authority for state attorneys general, as some commentators have suggested that private causes of action and enforcement by state attorneys general are essential supplements to FTC enforcement  Legislation involving privacy may propose to allow individuals to seek private remedy for violations in the courts  Congress may seek to establish a private right of action allowing a private plaintiff to bring an action against a third party based directly on that party's violation of a public statute  As it has done with many sector-specific privacy laws, Congress, in a data protection statute, could provide not only for this right, but also for specific remedies beyond compensatory damages, such as statutory damages or even treble damages for injured individuals  However, it may be very difficult to prove that someone has been harmed in a clear way by many of the violations that might occur under a hypothetical data protection and privacy regime  Victims of data breaches and other privacy violations, generally speaking, do not experience clear and immediate pecuniary or reputational harm  This obstacle might threaten not only a consumer's ability to obtain monetary relief, but also could run up against the limits of the federal courts' "judicial power" under Article III of the U S  Constitution  Article III extends the judicial power of the federal courts to only "cases" and "controversies " As part of that limitation, the Supreme Court has stated that courts may adjudicate a case only where a litigant possesses Article III standing  A party seeking relief from a federal court must establish standing  Specifically, the party must show that he has a genuine stake in the relief sought because he has personally suffered (or will suffer): (1) a concrete, particularized and actual or imminent injury; (2) that is traceable to the allegedly unlawful actions of the opposing party; and (3) that is redressable by a favorable judicial decision  These requirements, particularly the requirement of "imminence," form significant barriers for lawsuits based on data protection  Imminence, according to the Supreme Court in Clapper v  Amnesty International , requires that alleged injury be " certainly impending " to constitute injury-in-fact  Speculation and assumptions cannot be the basis of standing  This reasoning has caused courts to dismiss data breach claims where plaintiffs cannot show actual misuse of data, but can only speculate that future thieves may someday cause them direct harm  These requirements are constitutional in nature and apply regardless of whether a statute purports to give a party a right to sue  This constitutional requirement limits Congress' ability to use private rights of action as an enforcement mechanism for federal rights, as the recent Supreme Court case Spokeo, Inc  v  Robins illustrates  Spokeo involved a Federal Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) lawsuit brought by Thomas Robins against a website operator that allowed users to search for particular individuals and obtain personal information harvested from a variety of databases  Robins alleged that Spokeo's information about him was incorrect, in violation of the FCRA requirement that consumer reporting agencies "follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy" of consumer reports  As discussed earlier in this report, FCRA provides for a private right of action making any person who willfully fails to comply with its requirements liable to individuals for, among other remedies, statutory damages  The lower court understood that Robins did not specifically allege any actual damages he had suffered, such as the loss of money resulting from Spokeo's actions  Nonetheless, the court concluded that the plaintiff had standing to seek statutory damages because his injury was sufficiently particular to him—FCRA had created a statutory right for Robins and his personal interest was sufficient for standing  The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court, however, explaining that the lower court had erred by eliding the difference between Article III's "concreteness" and "particularization" requirements  Specifically, the Court concluded that a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete injury separate from a particularized injury, meaning that plaintiffs must show that their injury "actually exist[s] " While tangible injuries, like monetary loss, are typically concrete, a plaintiff with an "intangible injury" must show that it is "real" and not "abstract" in order to demonstrate concreteness  For example, the Spokeo Court suggested that the mere publication of an incorrect zip code, although it could violate FCRA, would not be a sufficiently concrete injury for standing purposes  As a result, the Court remanded the case to the lower court to determine if the injury alleged in the case was both particularized and concrete  Spokeo does not eliminate Congress' role in creating standing where it might not otherwise exist  The Supreme Court explained that the concreteness requirement is "grounded in historical practice" and, as a result, Congress' judgment on whether an intangible harm is sufficiently concrete can be "instructive " However, as Spokeo explained, Congress cannot elevate every privacy violation to the status of a concrete injury  Both before and after Spokeo , the lower courts have resolved standing disputes in lawsuits involving privacy and data protection, where parties argue about whether particular injuries are sufficiently concrete for purpose of Article III  Congress can possibly resolve some of these disputes by elevating some otherwise intangible injuries to concrete status  But Spokeo illustrates that there may be a residuum of harmless privacy violations for which Congress cannot provide a judicial remedy  Another legal issue Congress may need to consider with respect to any federal program involving data protection and privacy is how to structure the federal-state regime—that is, how to balance whatever federal program is enacted with the programs and policies in the states  Federal law, under the Supremacy Clause, has the power to preempt or displace state law  As discussed above, there are a host of different state privacy laws, and some states have begun to legislate aggressively in this area  The CCPA in particular represents a state law that is likely to have a national effect  Ultimately, unless Congress chooses to occupy the entire field of data protection law, it is likely that the state laws will end up continuing to have a role in this area  Further, given that the states are likely to continue to experiment with legislation, the CCPA being a prime example, it is likely that preemption will be a highly significant issue in the debate over future federal privacy legislation  As the Supreme Court has recently explained, preemption can take three forms: "conflict," "express," and "field " Conflict preemption requires any state laws that conflict with a valid federal law to be without effect  Conflict preemption can occur when it is impossible for a private party to simultaneously comply with both federal and state requirements, or when state law amounts to an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes of Congress  Express preemption occurs when Congress expresses its intent in the text of the statute as to which state laws are displaced under the federal scheme  Finally, field preemption occurs when federal law occupies a 'field' of regulation "so comprehensively that it has left no room for supplementary state legislation " Ultimately, the preemptive scope of any federal data protection legislation will turn on the "purpose" of Congress and the specific language used to effectuate that purpose  If Congress seeks to adopt a relatively comprehensive system for data protection, perhaps the most obvious means to preempt a broad swath of state regulation would be to do so "expressly" within the text of the statute by including a specific preemption provision in the law  For example, several existing federal statutes expressly preempt all state law that "relate to" a particular subject matter  The Supreme Court has held that this "related to" language encompasses any state law with a "connection with, or reference to" the subject matter referenced  Similar language can be used to displace all state laws in the digital data privacy sphere to promote a more uniform scheme  Congress could alternatively take a more modest approach to state law  For example, Congress could enact a data protection framework that expressly preserves state laws in some ways and preempts them in others  A number of federal statutes preempt state laws that impose standards "different from" or "in addition to" federal standards, or allow the regulator in charge of the federal scheme some authority to approve certain state regulations  These approaches would generally leave intact state schemes parallel to or narrower than the federal scheme  For example, a statute could permit a state to provide for additional liability or different remedies for violation of a federal standard  Congress could do the same with federal data protection legislation, using statutory language to try to ensure the protection of the provisions of state law that it sought to preserve  Although legislation on data protection could take many forms, several approaches that would seek to regulate the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information online may have to confront possible limitations imposed by the First Amendment of the U S  Constitution  The First Amendment guarantees, among other rights, "freedom of speech " Scholars have split on how the First Amendment should be applied to proposed regulation in the data protection sphere  In one line of thinking, data constitutes speech, and regulation of this speech, even in the commercial context, should be viewed skeptically  Other scholars have argued that an expansive approach would limit the government's ability to regulate ordinary commercial activity, expanding the First Amendment beyond its proper role  This scholarly debate informs the discussion, but does not provide clear guidance on how to consider any particular proposed regulation  The Supreme Court has never interpreted the First Amendment as prohibiting all regulation of communication  Instead, when confronting a First Amendment challenge to a regulation, a court asks a series of questions in order to determine whether a particular law or rule runs afoul of the complicated thicket of case law that has developed in this area  The first question courts face when considering a First Amendment challenge is whether the challenged regulation involves speech or mere non-expressive conduct  As the Supreme Court has explained, simply because regulated activity involves "communication" does not mean that it comes within the ambit of the First Amendment  Where speech is merely a "component" of regulated activity, the government generally can regulate that activity without inviting First Amendment scrutiny  For example, "a law against treason…is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense secrets," but that does not bring the law within the ambit of First Amendment scrutiny  Assuming the regulation implicates speech rather than conduct, it typically must pass First Amendment scrutiny  However, not all regulations are subject to the same level of scrutiny  Rather, the Court has applied different tiers of scrutiny to different types of regulations  For example, the Court has long considered political and ideological speech at the "core" of the First Amendment—as a result, laws which implicate such speech generally are subject to strict scrutiny  Pursuant to this standard, the government must show that such laws are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest  By contrast, the Court has historically applied less rigorous scrutiny to laws regulating "commercial speech " Commercial speech is subject to a lower level of scrutiny known as the Central Hudson test, which generally requires the government to show only that its interest is "substantial" and that the regulation "directly advances the governmental interest asserted" without being "more extensive than necessary to serve that interest " These principles have provided general guidance to lower courts in deciding cases that intersect with data protection, but implicit disagreements between these courts have repeatedly demonstrated the difficulty in striking the balance between First Amendment interests and data-protection regulation  For example, in 2001 in Trans Union Corp  v  FTC , the D C  Circuit upheld an FTC order that prohibited Trans Union from selling marketing lists containing the names and addresses of individuals  The court assumed that disclosing or using the marketing lists was speech, not conduct, but concluded that the FTC's restrictions on the sale of the marketing lists generally concerned "no public issue," and, as such, was subject to "reduced constitutional protection " The court derived its "no public issue" rule from the Supreme Court's case law on defamation, which generally views speech that is solely in the private interest of the speaker as being subject to lower First Amendment protection from defamation suits than speech regarding matters of a public concern  Applying this "reduced constitutional protection" to the context of Trans Union's marketing lists, the court determined that the regulations were appropriately tailored  While the Trans Union court did not cite to Central Hudson , other courts have gone on to apply similar reasoning to uphold data protection laws from constitutional challenge under the ambit of Central Hudson 's commercial speech test  In contrast with the relatively lenient approach applied to a privacy regulation in Trans Union , in U S  West v  FCC , the Tenth Circuit struck down FCC regulations on the use and disclosure of Consumer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI)  The regulations stated that telecommunications carriers could use or disclose CPNI only for the purpose of marketing products to customers if the customer opted in to this use  The court determined that these provisions regulated commercial speech because they limited the ability of carriers to engage in consumer marketing  Applying Central Hudson , the court held that although the government alleged a general interest in protecting consumer privacy, this interest was insufficient to justify the regulations  The panel ruled that the regulations did not materially advance a substantial state interest because the government failed to tie the regulations to specific and real harm, supported by evidence  The court also concluded that a narrower regulation, such as a consumer opt-out, could have served the same general purpose  After the Tenth Circuit's decision in U S  West , the FCC responded by making minor changes to its regulations, maintaining some elements of the opt-in procedure for the use of CPNI and reissuing them with a new record  After this reissuance, the D C  Circuit considered these modified-but-similar regulations in a 2009 case  In that case, the D C  Circuit upheld the regulations without attaching much significance to the FCC's changes, and apparently implicitly disagreeing with the Tenth Circuit about both the importance of the privacy interest at stake and whether the opt-in procedure was proportional to that interest  The Supreme Court's first major examination of the First Amendment in this context came in 2011  That year, the Court decided Sorrell v  IMS Health, Inc  , a case that is likely to be critical to understanding the limits of any future data protection legislation  In Sorrell , the Court considered the constitutionality of a Vermont law that restricted certain sales, disclosures, and uses of pharmacy records  Pharmaceutical manufacturers and data miners challenged this statute on the grounds that it prohibited them from using these records in marketing, thereby imposing what they viewed to be an unconstitutional restriction on their protected expression  Vermont first argued that its law should be upheld because the "sales, transfer, and use of prescriber-identifying information" was mere conduct and not speech  The Court explained that, as a general matter, "the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment," and thus there was "a strong argument that prescriber identifying information is speech for First Amendment purposes " Ultimately, however, the Court stopped short of fully embracing this conclusion, merely explaining that it did not matter whether the actual transfer of prescriber-identifying information was speech because the law nonetheless impermissibly sought to regulate the content of speech—the marketing that used that data, as well as the identities of speakers—by regulating an input to that speech  As the Court explained, the Vermont law was like "a law prohibiting trade magazines from purchasing or using ink " Second, Vermont argued that, even if it was regulating speech, its regulations passed the lower level of scrutiny applicable to commercial speech  The Court disagreed  The Court explained that the Vermont law enacted "content- and speaker-based restrictions on the sale, disclosure and use of prescriber identifying information" because it specifically targeted pharmaceutical manufacturers and prohibited certain types of pharmaceutical marketing  As the Court stated in a previous case, "[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid" because they "raise[] the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace " Further, the Sorrell Court observed that the legislature's stated purpose was to diminish the effectiveness of marketing by certain drug manufacturers, in particular those that promoted brand-name drugs, suggesting to the Court that the Vermont law went "beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination " As a result, the Court concluded that some form of "heightened scrutiny" applied  Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that, even if Central Hudson 's less rigorous standard of scrutiny applied, the law failed to meet that standard because its justification in protecting physician privacy was not supported by the law's reach in allowing prescriber-identifying information's use "for any reason save" marketing purposes  Most of the lower courts outside the data protection and privacy context that have considered Sorrell have held that Sorrell 's reference to "heightened scrutiny" did not override the Central Hudson test in commercial speech cases, even where those cases include content- or speaker- based restrictions  Others, however, have held that content- and speaker-based restrictions must comport with something more rigorous than the traditional Central Hudson test, but it is not clear what this new standard requires or where it leads to a different outcome than Central Hudson   As a result, while Sorrell 's impact on privacy and data protection regulation has been considered by a few courts, no consensus exists on the impact it will have  However, a few commentators have observed that the case will likely have an important effect on the future of privacy regulation, if nothing else, by having all but concluded that First Amendment principles apply to the regulation of the collection, disclosure, and use of personally identifiable information as speech, not conduct  With respect to such future regulation, policymakers will likely want, at the minimum, to meet the Central Hudson requirement of ensuring that any restrictions on the creation, disclosure or use of information are justified by a substantial interest and that the regulations are no more extensive than necessary to further that interest  To illustrate, the Court in Sorrell identified HIPAA as a permissible "privacy" regulation because it allowed "the information's sale or disclosure in only a few narrow and well-justified circumstances " This dictum suggests that Congress is able to regulate in the data protection sphere as long as it avoids the pitfalls of the law in Sorrell   However, it may not always be easy to determine whether any given law involves speaker or content discrimination  In Sorrell itself, for instance, three dissenting Justices argued that the content and speaker discrimination that took place under the Vermont law was inevitable in any economic regulation  As a result, resolving these issues as data privacy legislation becomes more complex is likely to create new challenges for legislators  The current legal landscape governing data protection in the United States is complex and highly technical, but so too are the legal issues implicated by proposals to create unified federal data protection policy  Except in extreme incidents and cases of government access to personal data, the "right to privacy" that developed in the common law and constitutional doctrine provide few safeguards for the average internet user  Although Congress has enacted a number of laws designed to augment individual's data protection rights, the current patchwork of federal law generally is limited to specific industry participants, specific types of data, or data practices that are unfair or deceptive  This patchwork approach also extends to certain state laws  Seeking a more comprehensive data protection system, some governments—such as California and the EU—have enacted wide-ranging laws regulating many forms of personal data  Some argue that Congress should consider creating similar protections in federal law, but others have criticized the EU's and California's approach to data protection  Should the 116th Congress consider a comprehensive federal data protection program, its legislative proposals may involve numerous decision points and legal considerations  An initial decision point is the scope and nature of any legislative proposal  There are numerous data protection issues that could be addressed in any future legislation, and different possible approaches for addressing those issues (such as using a "prescriptive" or "outcome-based" approach)  Other decision points may include defining the scope of any protected information and determining the extent to which any future legislation should be enforced by a federal agency  Further, to the extent Congress wants to allow individuals to enforce data protection laws and seek remedies for the violations of such laws in court, it must account for Article III's standing requirements  Under the Supreme Court's 2016 Spokeo Inc  v  Robins decision, plaintiffs must experience more than a "bare procedural violation" of a federal privacy law to satisfy Article III and to sue to rectify a violation of that law  Federal preemption also raises complex legal questions—not only of whether to preempt state law, but what form of preemption Congress should employ  Finally, from a First Amendment perspective, Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that while some "privacy" regulations are permissible, any federal law that restricts protected speech, particularly if it targets specific speakers or content, may be subject to more stringent review by a reviewing court 

ground_truth: Suspension of the rules is the most commonly used procedure to call up measures on the floor of the House of Representatives. As the name suggests, the procedure allows the House to suspend its standing and statutory rules in order to consider broadly supported legislation in an expedited manner. More specifically, the House temporarily sets aside its rules that govern the raising and consideration of measures and assumes a new set of constraints particular to the suspension procedure. The suspension of the rules procedure has several parliamentary advantages: (1) it allows nonprivileged measures to be raised on the House floor without the need for a special rule, (2) it enables the consideration of measures that would otherwise be subject to a point of order, and (3) it streamlines floor action by limiting debate and prohibiting floor amendments. Given these features, as well as the required two-thirds supermajority vote for passage, suspension motions are generally used to process less controversial legislation. In the 114th Congress (2015-2016), measures considered under suspension made up 62% of the bills and resolutions that received floor action in the House (743 out of 1,200 measures). The majority of suspension measures were House bills (83%), followed by Senate bills (11%) and House resolutions (4%). The measures covered a variety of policy areas but most often addressed government operations, such as the designation of federal facilities or amending administrative policies. Most measures that are considered in the House under the suspension procedure are sponsored by a House or Senate majority party member. However, suspension is the most common House procedure used to consider minority-party-sponsored legislation regardless of whether the legislation originated in the House or Senate. In 2015 and 2016, minority-party members sponsored 31% of suspension measures, compared to 9% of legislation subject to different procedures, including privileged business (17 measures), unanimous consent (21 measures), and under the terms of a special rule (one Senate bill). Most suspension measures are referred to at least one House committee before their consideration on the floor. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (now called the Committee on Oversight and Reform) was the committee of primary jurisdiction for the plurality of suspension measures considered in the 114th Congress. Additional committees—such as Energy and Commerce, Homeland Security, Natural Resources, Foreign Affairs, and Veterans' Affairs—also served as the primary committee for a large number of suspension measures. Suspension motions are debatable for up to 40 minutes. In most cases, only a fraction of that debate time is actually used. In the 114th Congress, the average amount of time spent considering a motion to suspend the rules was 13 minutes and 10 seconds. The House adopted nearly every suspension motion considered in 2015 and 2016. Approval by the House, however, did not guarantee final approval in the 114th Congress. The Senate passed or agreed to 40% of the bills, joint resolutions, and concurrent resolutions initially considered in the House under suspension of the rules, and 276 measures were signed into law. This report briefly describes the suspension of the rules procedure, which is defined in House Rule XV, and provides an analysis of measures considered under this procedure during the 114th Congress. Figures and one table display statistics on the use of the procedure, including the prevalence and form of suspension measures, sponsorship of measures by party, committee consideration, length of debate, voting, resolution of differences between the chambers, and the final status of legislation. In addition, an Appendix illustrates trends in the use of the suspension procedure from the 110th to the 114th Congress (2007-2016).