prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: NSF relies on two programs for bringing rotators into the agency: (1) the IPA program and (2) the VSEE program  The Office of Personnel Management develops policies on agencies’ use of the IPA program and promulgates program regulations  Rotators in NSF’s IPA and VSEE programs differ in key respects, including their employment status and compensation  IPA rotators  NSF enters into written agreements with rotators’ home institutions for all IPA assignments  The agreements detail rotators’ salaries and health, retirement, and other fringe benefits at their home institutions, as well as the cost-sharing amounts NSF and home institutions are to pay during rotators’ assignments  NSF reimburses its cost-sharing amounts to home institutions, which continue to pay rotators’ full salaries and benefits  NSF does not cap the salaries of IPA rotators; as a result, IPA rotators may receive salaries that exceed the maximum federal salary for the position they hold at NSF  In contrast, if an IPA rotator’s salary is less than the minimum federal salary for the position, NSF will supplement the salary to the minimum rate  VSEE rotators  NSF appoints VSEE rotators as federal employees on a nonpaid leave of absence from their home institutions  VSEE rotators receive their salaries directly from NSF but are not eligible for certain federal benefits, such as retirement; instead, NSF reimburses home institutions for the employer’s share of retirement, life insurance, and health benefits that would otherwise be discontinued  NSF’s policy is to set salaries for VSEE rotators that are generally comparable to the salaries the rotators would receive at their home institutions  In setting salaries, NSF also takes into account other sources of income, such as consulting, and allows for locality pay adjustments applicable to employees in the Washington, D C , metropolitan area  However, because VSEE rotators are federal employees, NSF caps their salaries at the federal maximum for the position they hold at NSF  Both IPA and VSEE rotators are eligible for certain other types of reimbursement  In particular, rotators have the option of having NSF pay their moving expenses to and from Washington, D C , or receiving per diem allowances in accordance with federal travel regulations for up to 2 years  In addition, NSF may reimburse rotators for travel-related expenses related to their participation in NSF’s Independent Research and Development program, which enables NSF staff to maintain their involvement with their professional research and research-related activities at their home institutions  Table 1 shows additional information on IPA and VSEE rotator expenses  Rotators are generally assigned to one of NSF’s seven directorates that support science and engineering research and education (see table 2)  Each directorate is headed by an assistant director and deputy assistant director  Directorates are further subdivided into divisions, offices, or sections  Each division is headed by a division director and typically a deputy division director, and each office is headed by an office director and typically a deputy office director  All these positions are executive positions at NSF  At the staff level, NSF uses program directors—subject matter experts in the scientific areas they manage—to conduct reviews of proposals and recommend which projects the agency should fund  With an annual budget of about $7 5 billion, NSF funds approximately 24 percent of all federally supported basic research conducted by colleges and universities in the United States  In 2016, NSF established the Steering Committee for Policy and Oversight of the IPA Program  The steering committee serves as the primary body for considering policy on NSF’s use of IPA rotators and overseeing common approaches to budgeting and implementation of the IPA program  The committee’s membership includes NSF’s chief human capital officer, who serves as the chair, and several other NSF officials  The steering committee has established strategic principles for management of the IPA program  These principles include maintaining a balance between IPA rotators and federal staff and a commitment to ongoing improvement of the program  NSF officials told us that there is no similar steering committee for overseeing VSEE rotators  Instead, each VSEE rotator is individually overseen by his or her respective supervisor  For the agency as a whole, NSF’s Office of Information and Resource Management and its Division of Human Resource Management conduct human capital management  NSF officials stated that the head of the Office of Information and Resource Management serves as the Chief Human Capital Officer and develops and oversees NSF’s human capital approaches and strategies  These officials also told us that the Deputy Chief Human Capital Officer serves as the division director of Human Resource Management and is responsible for administering the division’s day-to-day operations  The Division of Human Resource Management administers the agency’s human capital policies as set forth in NSF’s personnel manual  The numbers of rotators and their costs to NSF in proportion to other staff have remained relatively stable  Most rotators were IPA rotators, and were used in both executive and program director (staff-level) positions  NSF generally used VSEE rotators in program director positions  Most rotators at NSF were IPA rotators, and the proportion of rotators relative to other staff has remained relatively stable over time (see fig  1)  During the 10-year period we reviewed, from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2017, IPA and VSEE rotators comprised about 12 percent and about 3 percent, respectively, of NSF’s total workforce; and the number of IPA rotators ranged from 162 to 190 (about 11 to 12 percent of total staff), and the number of VSEE rotators ranged from 22 to 52 (about 1 to 3 percent of total staff)  NSF primarily used rotators across its seven scientific directorates, using IPA rotators in executive and program director positions and VSEE rotators in program director positions  The agency used rotators in these positions alongside NSF’s permanent staff to perform day-to-day agency operations, including managing the agency’s merit review process for determining which projects to fund  NSF used IPA rotators in executive positions such as assistant director  According to agency officials, individuals in executive positions at NSF are responsible for setting the direction for the scientific area they are assigned, leading scientific and technical matters, establishing an organizational culture, overseeing outreach and collaboration with NSF stakeholders, and contributing to NSF and national policy development and implementation  For example, an executive IPA rotator that we interviewed told us that he emphasized forming partnerships with industry when setting the direction for his directorate, including issuing joint solicitations for research proposals with industry partners  In addition, according to NSF officials, individuals in executive positions provide guidance and team management for staff  The proportion of IPA rotators to federal employees in executive positions within NSF’s seven scientific directorates and other staff offices has generally increased since fiscal year 2012  As shown in figure 4, from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2017, the number and proportion of executive positions filled by IPA rotators ranged from 18 of 98 (about 18 percent) in 2008 to 30 of 108 (about 28 percent) in fiscal year 2016  In November 2017, IPA rotators filled 29 of 88 (about 33 percent) executive positions within NSF’s seven scientific directorates  At that time, the proportion of executive positions filled by IPA rotators varied among directorates, as shown in table 3  For example, IPA rotators filled 4 of 8 (50 percent) of the executive positions in the Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences and 2 of 14 (about 14 percent) of the executive positions in the Directorate for Mathematical and Physical Sciences  According to NSF officials, NSF often pairs IPA rotators and federal employees at the executive level so that each can benefit from the other’s experience and perspective  For example, in all but one directorate, an IPA rotator filled the assistant director position and a federal employee filled the corresponding deputy assistant director position  Two NSF executives we interviewed, including an IPA rotator and a federal employee, commented positively on the pairing of IPA rotators and federal employees at the executive level  For example, they said that rotators maintain close ties to the research community and federal employees may have more experience with NSF’s institutional history  One NSF executive told us that IPA rotators help keep the agency at the forefront of science because they have deep ties with the research community and regularly publish their own research  Additionally, a federal program director we interviewed told us that in one previous instance in which an IPA rotator filled an executive position without being paired with a federal employee, the rotator’s lack of institutional knowledge of NSF and the steep learning curve for the position caused inefficiencies during the rotator’s first year at NSF  The agency, however, does not require pairing IPA rotators and federal employees at the executive level, according to NSF officials  For example, in November 2017, IPA rotators filled both the division director and deputy division director positions in the Division of Behavioral and Cognitive Science and Division of Undergraduate Education  In our interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of NSF employees and rotators, we found mixed perceptions about the effect of NSF’s use of IPA rotators on opportunities for advancement for permanent employees  For example, in response to a question about this effect, one permanent NSF employee told us that she advanced to an executive position and that opportunities exist for advancement within the agency  In contrast, another NSF employee we interviewed told us that she did not feel there were opportunities for advancement because, in her view, executive vacancies created by the departure of rotators were exclusively filled with other rotators  NSF officials said that the agency has no policy that restricts repeatedly filling certain executive positions with rotators and that such a situation is a common practice  Nevertheless, NSF officials told us 32 of the 88 executives (about 36 percent) in NSF’s seven scientific directorates in November 2017 had held staff-level positions within the agency before becoming executives  NSF uses both IPA and VSEE rotators in program director positions, which are staff-level positions  In fiscal year 2016, NSF had a total of 506 program directors, including 139 IPA rotators (about 27 percent) and 39 VSEE rotators (about 8 percent)  According to NSF officials, program directors are responsible for conducting long-range planning and developing budgets for the areas of science represented by their program and for administrating the merit review process  In particular, IPA and VSEE rotators who serve as program directors help determine the projects that NSF funds  To do so, they review proposals, identify experts in their field to serve as external reviewers, and make funding recommendations to their respective division directors  NSF officials told us that, similar to the pairing of IPA rotators and federal employees at the executive level, permanent and rotating program directors frequently work together on a shared program so that each can benefit from the other’s experience and perspective  For example, a rotating program director we interviewed told us that she worked under the guidance of a program lead, who is typically a permanent employee  Another rotating program director told us that NSF’s permanent federal employees are good at training incoming rotators  Beginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted rotator program cost- management strategies expected to achieve the greatest savings with the least harm to recruitment, but NSF officials said it is too soon to determine the full results because these new strategies are being phased in for new IPA agreements only  NSF considered other strategies to manage rotator costs, but it did not adopt them, generally because NSF anticipated negative effects on rotator recruitment or because it estimated the resulting cost savings would be small  NSF has adopted three strategies to manage rotators’ costs in fiscal year 2017, but, NSF officials said it is too soon to determine the full results because these new strategies are being phased in for new IPA agreements only  All three of these strategies relate to IPA rotators; NSF officials told us that they have not considered or adopted any cost- management strategies related to VSEE rotators  The officials explained that any such strategies could affect NSF’s entire federal workforce because VSEE rotators are federal employees  The three strategies are: (1) obtaining a minimum 10 percent cost-share from each IPA rotator’s home institution, (2) limiting IPA rotators’ paid trips to their home institutions to 12 per year, and (3) no longer reimbursing IPA rotators for consulting income that they forgo while at NSF  NSF officials told us they expect to issue a report with the results of evaluations of all three strategies in December 2018  In October 2016, NSF implemented a cost-sharing pilot program that requires institutions covered by the program—those who entered into negotiations for new IPA agreements in fiscal year 2017—to pay for at least 10 percent of the IPA rotators’ salaries and fringe benefits  Implementing this cost-management strategy, and the other strategies that NSF adopted, was consistent with recommendations from NSF’s steering committee for oversight of IPA rotators  This cost-management strategy targeted NSF’s costs for IPA rotators’ salary and fringe benefits, which constitute the largest component of IPA rotators’ costs  For example, these costs were about $34 7 million, or about 89 percent of IPA rotator costs in fiscal year 2017  Previously, according to NSF officials, the agency requested an optional cost-share amount of 15 percent from rotators’ home institutions, but it typically received less because of variations in the amounts that home institutions provided  According to an October 2016 report from the task force on fiscal oversight, NSF decided on 10 percent for the cost-sharing pilot program because, historically, few home institutions provided the full 15 percent and NSF believed a requirement of 10 percent would not significantly affect its ability to recruit and hire IPA rotators  If a home institution is unable to provide the full 10 percent, the institution may request that NSF waive the cost-sharing requirement  According to NSF officials, such requests must be signed by a senior administrator at the rotator’s home institution and include the rationale for not being able to provide the required amount, the financial impact on the institution if it were to provide the full 10 percent, and associated documentation, among other things  Changes made in implementing this strategy, and the other strategies that NSF adopted, applied to new IPA agreements made in fiscal year 2017  These changes did not apply to IPA rotators with agreements made prior to 2017—even if those agreements are subsequently extended or renewed—or that were being negotiated at the time of the policy change, provided that the rotators’ appointment memoranda were already being reviewed by NSF’s Division of Human Resource Management  NSF officials told us that as of March 2018, the agency had not conducted full evaluations of this strategy or the other strategies because it was too soon to determine their full effects and NSF had not yet collected enough data to do so  Instead, NSF issued reports in January and March 2018 containing its preliminary analyses  In general, these preliminary reports found that the cost-management strategies resulted in savings to NSF  Similarly, our analysis of data from NSF found that cost sharing as a percentage of IPA rotators’ salary and fringe benefits increased from about 7 percent in fiscal year 2016 to about 8 percent in fiscal year 2017  NSF officials told us that of the 55 IPA rotators who were subject to the cost-sharing requirement in fiscal year 2017: the home institutions for 54 rotators met or exceeded the 10 percent cost-share requirement, and of those, 16 exceeded the cost-share requirement; and the home institution for 1 rotator did not cost-share because the rotator was from a Federally Funded Research and Development Center and NSF waived the cost-share requirement because cost- sharing would not decrease the overall federal cost  In November 2017, NSF decided to extend the cost-sharing pilot through at least the end of fiscal year 2018, to ensure a full evaluation could be conducted  In particular, NSF officials told us that they need more data and experience with this pilot program to better understand its effects, such as the ability to recruit potential IPA rotators  For example, one IPA rotator that we interviewed expressed concern with the cost-sharing requirement’s potential effect on small or publicly funded universities, which may lack funds to contribute to the cost of an IPA assignment  According to NSF officials, their evaluation will include an analysis of the cost of IPA rotators under the cost-sharing requirement and its effect on the IPA program, including recruitment  Beginning in fiscal year 2017, for IPA rotators who entered into negotiations for new agreements in that fiscal year, NSF placed a limit of 12 agency-funded trips per year that rotators may take to their home institutions under the Independent Research and Development program  In our analysis of data from NSF, we found that NSF’s costs for IPA rotators under this program decreased from about $1 5 million (about 3 percent of IPA rotator costs) in fiscal year 2016 to $1 1 million (about 3 percent of IPA rotator costs) in fiscal year 2017  NSF officials told us that the new limit applies only to an IPA rotator’s trips to their home institution and does not limit travel to other locations for fieldwork or scientific conferences, among other things  These officials explained that NSF chose not to limit trips to these other locations because they are considered fundamental to IPA rotators’ research and are infrequent—occurring one to three times per year, on average, per IPA rotator  Additionally, rotators are permitted to use annual leave, leave without pay, or flexitime to take trips using non-NSF funds for activities performed on a rotator’s own time  In adopting this cost-management strategy, NSF sought to balance the benefits of IPA rotators’ travel with the travel costs  According to the Task Force on Fiscal Oversight’s October 2016 report, NSF’s support for travel benefits the agency by providing a way for program directors and executives to stay current in their scientific fields, conduct outreach with scientific communities, and provide oversight and stewardship of NSF’s programs and awards  NSF officials told us that the agency sought to control travel costs under the Independent Research and Development program by setting a reasonable limit to NSF-funded trips that would cause the least harm to rotators’ research so as not to discourage them from coming to NSF  As a result, NSF decided on a maximum of 12 trips per year under this program because, historically, more than 80 percent of the IPA rotator participants traveled to their home institution less than once per month  In fiscal year 2017, for IPA rotators who entered into new agreements in that fiscal year, NSF ended reimbursements for consulting income that the rotators forgo as a result of their assignment to NSF  Previously, when an IPA rotator discontinued consulting activities during an IPA assignment, NSF would reimburse the rotator up to $10,000 a year  IPA rotators who entered into negotiations or agreements with NSF prior to this change may still receive this reimbursement  In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for lost consulting reimbursements to IPA rotators was $150,000  This amount represented a decrease of about $160,000, or about 52 percent, from fiscal year 2016  NSF made this change because it determined that doing so would not negatively affect the IPA program  In particular, NSF found that other federal science agencies typically did not reimburse IPA rotators for lost consulting income and it concluded that IPA rotators typically do not expect NSF to offer reimbursement  In addition to the three adopted strategies, NSF’s Task Force on Fiscal Oversight identified other potential cost management strategies for the IPA program  The task force reviewed various data on the costs that make up the IPA program, such as the number of IPA rotators who received a particular form of compensation or who would be affected by the potential strategies  In addition, the task force took into account anecdotal and other evidence on how IPA rotators might react to the strategies  Using input from the task force, NSF opted against the other potential strategies because it either (1) expected the resulting cost savings to be small or (2) anticipated potential negative effects from implementing them, such as increased difficulty in hiring IPA rotators  These potential cost-management strategies primarily related to IPA rotator compensation, as described below  Capping IPA rotators’ salaries  NSF decided against establishing a salary cap for IPA rotators at various levels between about $185,000 and $240,000 annually  The task force found that salary caps at lower levels would have greater cost savings because of the higher number of individuals covered by the cap, but that the caps would also pose a significant risk to NSF’s ability to recruit IPA rotators  In particular, the task force found that salary caps at lower levels would disproportionately affect IPA rotators in two of its directorates—the Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering and the Directorate for Engineering—because of the higher salaries of individuals in positions associated with those fields  As a result, the task force recommended that NSF first assess the effects of its cost-sharing pilot program before proceeding with any cap on IPA rotators’ salaries  Reducing or eliminating IPA rotators’ supplemental pay  NSF decided against reducing or eliminating the supplemental pay that IPA rotators receive when their salary at their home institution is below the minimum for their NSF position  In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for IPA rotators’ supplemental pay was $1 0 million (about 3 percent of IPA rotator costs)  The task force recommended against this potential cost-management strategy because it would disproportionately affect IPA rotators in two of its directorates—the Directorate for Biological Sciences and the Directorate for Geosciences  In addition, the task force expected that any cost savings associated with this strategy would be small  Reducing IPA rotators’ per diem payments  NSF decided against reducing or eliminating per diem payments for lodging (excluding taxes), meals, and incidental expenses incurred during the length of rotators’ assignments  In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for per diem payments was $3 1 million (about 8 percent of IPA costs)  The task force concluded, based on its analysis of per diem costs and anecdotal evidence, that many IPA rotators would opt to depart NSF if NSF did not provide per diem payments  As a result, the task force recommended against this strategy  As of June 2018, NSF had not developed an agency-wide workforce strategy for using rotators, as its IPA program steering committee recommended  In addition, NSF has not fully evaluated or developed plans to evaluate both IPA and VSEE rotator program results in terms of progress toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results  As of June 2018, NSF had not developed an agency-wide workforce strategy that includes use of rotators, as NSF’s IPA program steering committee had recommended  In an August 2016 report on the IPA program, the steering committee stated that NSF did not have an agency- wide workforce strategy; instead, each directorate made decisions on its own about when and how to use IPA rotators in executive and program director positions  According to the report, an agency-wide framework would enable NSF to ensure an optimal balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors, which is a strategic principle that the steering committee developed for the IPA program  In February 2017, the committee issued an internal report to agency leadership that recommended expanding what was originally envisioned as a workforce strategy for the IPA program into a comprehensive agency-wide workforce strategy  The report stated that expanding the scope of the workforce strategy would have the greatest impact across the agency and would help NSF leadership in making strategic human capital decisions  The report outlined a process for developing a workforce strategy with various steps, including the following: Job analyses  The report recommended job analyses to review the roles and responsibilities of executive and staff-level positions and to identify the skills and capabilities required for successful performance of the work  According to the report, the steering committee’s working group for developing a workforce strategy found, based on its initial efforts to review position descriptions and roles and responsibilities, that some functions may be better served if performed by permanent federal employees and other functions by rotators  However, the working group concluded that NSF should obtain additional input and evidence before initiating large-scale changes in its workforce  Analysis of workforce gaps and surpluses  The report stated that identifying gaps and surpluses in the demand and supply for federal and rotator scientific staff would inform opportunities to optimize recruitment and retention efforts  The report recommended separate analyses for executive and scientific staff- level positions  Development of strategies to close workforce gaps and address surpluses  According to the steering committee’s report, examples of strategies include succession planning and rebalancing the mix of permanent federal staff and rotators to ensure an optimal workforce with the skills, experience, and capabilities to accomplish NSF’s science-related work  According to NSF officials, the agency’s Division of Human Resource Management was responsible for implementing the steering committee’s recommendation  In particular, it undertook an effort to work with senior leadership to develop a broad strategic workforce plan for the agency  However, in June 2018, NSF officials told us that they shifted their focus from developing a separate workforce strategy in order to focus instead on (1) development of a human capital operating plan, which agencies are required to develop and approve annually, and update as needed, under OPM regulations that went into effect on April 11, 2017; and (2) an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) memorandum issued in April 2017 directing agency heads to develop reform plans that identify ways to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of their respective agencies  The NSF officials explained that they recognized the value in having a workforce strategy, but they did not consider it appropriate for the Division of Human Resource Management to develop a workforce strategy at the same time that the agency was completing the OPM and OMB plans  NSF did not specify how its efforts to complete the OPM and OMB plans would address the need the steering committee identified for an agency- wide framework that would enable NSF to ensure an optimal balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors  In particular, NSF’s human capital operating plan, which it approved in April 2018, does not discuss NSF’s use of rotators or include information on balancing the agency’s use of rotators with permanent staff  Furthermore, NSF has not yet determined how it will address its use of rotators as part of its agency reform plan  In particular, NSF officials told us in June 2018 that they may address the agency’s use of rotators under the workforce focus area of its reform plan, but that they were only just beginning to identify and select initiatives under this focus area and that these initiatives have not yet been finalized  The process the NSF steering committee laid out in its internal report, when implemented, would align with two key principles GAO has identified for effective strategic workforce planning  Specifically, it would align with the principles of (1) determining the skills and competencies that are critical to successfully achieving missions and goals, and (2) developing human capital strategies to address gaps and enable the contribution of critical skills and competencies needed for mission success  By incorporating the NSF’s steering committee’s recommendation for a workforce strategy—and the process outlined by the steering committee for developing this strategy—into its human capital operating plan or agency reform plan, NSF could better manage its use of rotators and balance them with its permanent staff  We have previously found that high-performing organizations recognize the fundamental importance of measuring both the outcomes of human capital strategies and how these outcomes have helped the organizations accomplish their missions and programmatic goals  However, as of May 2018, NSF had not fully evaluated and did not have plans to evaluate the results of its IPA and VSEE rotator programs in terms of progress toward human capital goals and the contributions the programs made toward achieving programmatic results  One of GAO’s key principles for effective strategic workforce planning states that agencies should monitor and evaluate progress toward the agencies’ human capital goals and the contribution that human capital results have made toward achieving programmatic results  In particular, we previously found that evaluation activities can improve the effectiveness of workforce strategies by identifying shortfalls in performance and other improvement opportunities  OPM also requires agencies to develop a human capital operating plan that will support the evaluation of the agency’s human capital strategies  In March 2014, NSF published a summary of the results of focus groups with IPA rotators and their supervisors  This summary outlined benefits and challenges of the program from the perspectives of both groups, such as the benefit of bringing fresh perspective and new ideas to NSF and the challenge of recruiting and retaining qualified IPA rotators  However, the summary did not provide the agency’s assessment of progress towards programmatic results and human capital goals  For example, it summarized the benefits of the program from the standpoint of rotators and did not provide NSF’s assessment of how individual IPA rotators or the program as a whole contributed to NSF’s scientific mission  In addition, the summary did not provide an assessment of the extent to which the current workforce balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors is aligned with NSF’s work  In our semistructured interviews with federal staff and rotators in executive and staff-level positions at NSF, most were comfortable with the current balance, but three individuals raised concerns about the use of rotators in executive positions, suggesting that NSF could benefit from further analysis of its balance of rotators and federal staff  In April 2018, NSF adopted its human capital operating plan which identifies specific, short-term actions that the agency will take to achieve its human capital goals  In its plan, NSF identified strategies derived from NSF’s commitment to ongoing improvement, such as reviewing and realigning its workforce to meet future needs  Also, NSF’s process for developing a workforce strategy, outlined in the steering committee’s February 2017 internal report, included recommendations to conduct an assessment of the outcomes of workforce strategies and the impact of these outcomes on helping NSF accomplish its scientific mission and related programmatic goals  However, plans for this assessment did not include an evaluation of the agency’s rotator programs  Moreover, neither the steering committee’s February 2017 internal report nor NSF’s April 2018 report committed to conducting such an evaluation or specified how assessments described in its reports would address NSF’s rotator programs  For example, neither report specified how NSF would evaluate the extent to which the rotator programs have achieved NSF’s objectives, which we identified through our review of NSF documentation and interviews with NSF officials  These objectives include: bringing fresh perspectives from across the country and across all fields of science and engineering supported by NSF; helping influence new directions for research in science, engineering, and education, including emerging interdisciplinary fields; providing scientific leadership and management of NSF’s research and education programs; and providing opportunities for researchers to gain first-hand knowledge of the philosophy and mechanisms of federal support for research and bring this knowledge back to their home institutions  According to NSF officials, the agency has not separately evaluated the results of its rotator programs in part because rotators are blended into its permanent federal workforce, making it difficult to evaluate the results of its rotator programs separately from those of its overall workforce  In our December 2003 report on key principles for effective strategic workforce planning, we found that federal agencies in general have experienced difficulties in defining practical and meaningful measures that assess the effects human capital strategies have on programmatic results  However, without an evaluation of the extent of the rotator programs’ contributions toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results, NSF is limited in its ability to demonstrate the programs’ benefits to external stakeholders, such as the Congress, and to adjust the programs, if warranted  Such adjustments could include increasing or decreasing the use of rotators overall or in certain types of positions, such as executive or staff-level positions  In recent years, NSF has recognized the need to think more strategically about its use of rotators and has taken positive steps to manage its rotator programs  For example, beginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted several strategies to manage the cost of rotators  However, as of June 2018, NSF had decided against developing a separate agency-wide strategy for balancing its use of IPA rotators and federal staff, as NSF’s steering committee for the IPA program recommended in February 2017  NSF officials said that they recognized the value in having a workforce strategy but wanted to focus instead on addressing OPM and OMB requirements related to workforce planning  By following through on the steering committee’s recommendation for a workforce strategy, NSF could better manage its use of rotators and balance them with its permanent staff  Moreover, as of June 2018, NSF had not fully evaluated the results of the rotator programs, as called for by key principles for effective strategic workforce planning  NSF officials told us they have not done so, in part, because rotators are blended into NSF’s permanent federal workforce, making it difficult to evaluate the results of its rotator program separately from those of its overall workforce  However, without an evaluation of the extent of the rotator programs’ contributions toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results, NSF is limited in its ability to demonstrate the programs’ benefits to external stakeholders, such as the Congress, and to adjust the programs, if warranted  We are making the following two recommendations to NSF: The NSF Director of Human Resource Management should complete the development of an agency-wide workforce strategy for balancing the agency’s use of IPA and VSEE rotators with permanent staff as part of NSF’s current agency reform planning efforts or updates to its human capital operating plan  (Recommendation 1) The NSF Director of Human Resource Management should evaluate the contributions of the IPA and VSEE rotator programs toward NSF’s human capital goals and the contributions the programs have made toward achieving programmatic results  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to NSF for comment  In its written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I, NSF concurred with our recommendations and stated that implementation of the recommendations will enhance efforts to fulfill the agency’s mission and strengthen its workforce  NSF also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies to the appropriate Congressional Committees, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or neumannj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the individual named above, Joseph Cook (Assistant Director), Nkenge Gibson, Kathryn Smith, and Douglas Hunker made key contributions to this report  Also contributing to this report were Antoinette Capaccio, Serena Lo, Timothy Guinane, Cynthia Norris, and Sara Sullivan 


Report 2:  1119 / P L  105-85 of November 18, 1997), which granted the Navy the authority to use a single contract for the procurement of the first four Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines  The 4 boats were scheduled to be procured during the 5-year period FY1998-FY2002 in annual quantities of 1-1-0-1-1  Congress provided the authority granted in Section 121(b) at least in part to reduce the combined procurement cost of the four submarines  Using MYP was not an option for the Virginia-class program at that time because the Navy had not even begun, let alone finished, construction of the first Virginia-class submarine, and consequently could not demonstrate that it had a stable design for the program  When Section 121(b) was enacted, there was no name for the contracting authority it provided  The term block buy contracting came into use later, when observers needed a term to refer to the kind of contracting authority that Congress authorized in Section 121(b)  As discussed in the next section, this can cause confusion, because the term block buy was already being used in discussions of DOD acquisition to refer to something else  What's the difference between block buy cont r acting and block buys? In discussions of defense procurement, the term "block buy" by itself (without "contracting" at the end) is sometimes used to refer to something quite different from block buy contracting—namely, the simple act of funding the procurement of more than one copy of an item in a single year, particularly when no more than one item of that kind might normally be funded in a single year  For example, when Congress funded the procurement of two aircraft carriers in FY1983, and another two in FY1988, these acts were each referred to as block buys, because aircraft carriers are normally procured one at a time, several years apart from one another  This alternate meaning of the term block buy predates by many years the emergence of the term block buy contracting  The term block buy is still used in this alternate manner, which can lead to confusion in discussions of defense procurement  For example, for FY2017, the Air Force requested funding for procuring five Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs) for its EELV Launch Services (ELS) program  At the same time, Navy officials sometimes refer to the use of block buy contracts for the first four Virginia-class submarines, and in the LCS program, as block buys, when they might be more specifically referred to as instances of block buy contract ing   How much can BBC save, compared with MYP? BBC can reduce the unit procurement costs of ships by amounts less than or perhaps comparable to those of MYP, if the authority granted for using BBC explicitly includes authority for making economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases of components  If the authority granted for using BBC does not explicitly include authority for making EOQ purchases, then the savings from BBC will be less  Potential savings under BBC might also be less than those under MYP if the BBC contract does not include a cancellation penalty, or includes one that is more limited than typically found in an MYP contract, because this might give the contractor less confidence than would be the case under an MYP contract that the future stream of business will materialize as planned, which in turn might reduce the amount of money the contractor invests to optimize its workforce and production facilities for producing the items to be procured under the contract  How frequently has BBC been used? Since its use at the start of the Virginia-class program, BBC has been used very rarely  The Navy did not use it again in a shipbuilding program until December 2010, when it awarded two block buy contracts, each covering 10 LCSs to be procured over the six-year period FY2010-FY2015, to the two LCS builders  (Each contract was later amended to include an 11 th ship in FY2016, making for a total of 22 ships under the two contracts ) A third example is the John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler program, in which the Navy is using a block buy contract to procure the first six ships in the program  A fourth example, arguably, is the Air Force's KC-46 aerial refueling tanker program, which is employing a fixed price incentive fee (FPIF) development contract that includes a "back end" commitment to procure certain minimum numbers of KC-46s in certain fiscal years  When might BBC be suitable as an alternative to MYP? BBC might be particularly suitable as an alternative to MYP in cases where using a multiyear contract can reduce costs, but the program in question cannot meet all the statutory criteria needed to qualify for MYP  As shown in the case of the first four Virginia-class boats, this can occur at or near the start of a procurement program, when design stability has not been demonstrated through the production of at least a few of the items to be procured (or, for a shipbuilding program, at least one ship)  What i s the difference between an MYP or block buy contract and a contract with options? The military services sometimes use contracts with options to procure multiple copies of an item that are procured over a period of several years  The Navy, for example, used a contract with options to procure Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class dry cargo ships that were procured over a period of several years  A contract with options can be viewed as somewhat similar to an MYP or block buy contract in that a single contract is used to procure several years' worth of procurement of a given kind of item  There is, however, a key difference between an MYP or block buy contract and a contract with options: In a contract with options, the service is under no obligation to exercise any of the options, and a service can choose to not exercise an option without having to make a penalty payment to the contractor  In contrast, in an MYP or block buy contract, the service is under an obligation to continue implementing the contract beyond the first year, provided that Congress appropriates the necessary funds  If the service chooses to terminate an MYP or block buy contract, and does so as a termination for government convenience rather than as a termination for contractor default, then the contractor can, under the contract's termination for convenience clause, seek a payment from the government for cost incurred for work that is complete or in process at the time of termination, and may include the cost of some of the investments made in anticipation of the MYP or block buy contract being fully implemented  The contractor can do this even if the MYP or block buy contract does not elsewhere include a provision for a cancellation penalty  As a result of this key difference, although a contract with options looks like a multiyear contract, it operates more like a series of annual contracts, and it cannot achieve the kinds of savings that are possible under MYP and BBC  Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used; and whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP  Should MYP and BBC in the future be used more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used? Supporters of using MYP and BBC more frequently in the future might argue the following: Since MYP and BBC can reduce procurement costs, making greater use of MYP and BBC can help DOD get more value out of its available procurement funding  This can be particularly important if DOD's budget in real (i e , inflation-adjusted) terms remains flat or declines in coming years, as many observers anticipate  The risks of using MYP have been reduced by Section 811 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  4986 / P L  110-181 of January 28, 2008), which amended 10 U S C  2306b to strengthen the process for ensuring that programs proposed for MYP meet certain criteria (see " Permanent Statute Governing MYP ")  Since the value of MYP contracts equated to less than 8% of DOD's procurement budget in FY2012, compared to about 17% of DOD's procurement budget in FY2000, MYP likely could be used more frequently without exceeding past experience regarding the share of DOD's procurement budget accounted for by MYP contracts  Supporters of using MYP and BBC less frequently in the future, or at least no more frequently than now, might argue the following: Using MYP and BBC more frequently would further reduce Congress's and DOD's flexibility for making changes in DOD procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances  The risks of reducing flexibility in this regard are increased now because of uncertainties in the current strategic environment and because efforts to reduce federal budget deficits could include reducing DOD spending, which could lead to a reassessment of U S  defense strategy and associated DOD acquisition programs  Since actual savings from using MYP and BBC rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify, it is not clear that the financial benefits of using MYP or BBC more frequently in the future would be worth the resulting further reduction in Congress's and DOD's flexibility for making changes in procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances  Should Congress create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute (10 U S C  2306b) that governs the use of MYP? Supporters of creating a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC might argue the following: Such a statute could encourage greater use of BBC, and thereby increase savings in DOD procurement programs by giving BBC contracting a formal legal standing and by establishing a clear process for DOD program managers to use in assessing whether their programs might be considered suitable for BBC  Such a statute could make BBC more advantageous by including a provision that automatically grants EOQ authority to programs using BBC, as well as provisions establishing qualifying criteria and other conditions intended to reduce the risks of using BBC  Opponents of creating a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC might argue the following: A key advantage of BBC is that it is not governed by a permanent statute  The lack of such a statute gives DOD and Congress full flexibility in determining when and how to use BBC for programs that may not qualify for MYP, but for which a multiyear contract of some kind might produce substantial savings  Such a statute could encourage DOD program managers to pursue their programs using BBC rather than MYP  This could reduce discipline in DOD multiyear contracting if the qualifying criteria in the BBC statute are less demanding than the qualifying criteria in 10 U S C  2306b  Should the Coast Guard should begin making use of MYP and BBC? Although the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Coast Guard is a military service and a branch of the U S  Armed Forces at all times (14 U S C  1), and 10 U S C  2306b provides authority for using MYP not only to DOD, but also to the Coast Guard (and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as well)  In addition, Section 311 of the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 ( S  140 / P L  115-282 of December 4, 2018) provides permanent authority for the Coast Guard to use block buy contracting with EOQ purchases of components in its major acquisition programs  The authority is now codified at 14 U S C  1137  As discussed earlier in this report, the Navy in recent years has made extensive use of MYP and BBC in its ship and aircraft acquisition programs, reducing the collective costs of those programs, the Navy estimates, by billions of dollars  The Coast Guard, like the Navy, procures ships and aircraft  In contrast to the Navy, however, the Coast Guard has never used MYP or BBC in its ship or aircraft acquisition programs  Instead, the Coast has tended to use contracts with options  As discussed earlier, although a contract with options looks like a multiyear contract, it operates more like a series of annual contracts, and it cannot achieve the kinds of savings that are possible under MYP and BBC  CRS in recent years has testified and reported on the possibility of using BBC or MYP in Coast Guard ship acquisition programs, particularly the Coast Guard's 25-ship Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program and the Coast Guard's three-ship polar icebreaker program  CRS estimates that using multiyear contracting rather than contracts with options for the entire 25-ship OPC program could reduce the cost of the OPC program by about $1 billion  The OPC program is the Coast Guard's top-priority acquisition program, and it represents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reduce the acquisition cost of a Coast Guard acquisition program by an estimated $1 billion  CRS also estimates that using BBC for a three-ship polar icebreaker program could reduce the cost of that program by upwards of $150 million  The Coast Guard has expressed some interest in using BBC in the polar icebreaker program, but its baseline acquisition strategy for that program, like its current acquisition strategy for the OPC program, is to use a contract with options  As part of its FY2020 budget submission, the Department of Defense is proposing continued funding for implementing several MYP contracts initiated in fiscal years prior to FY2020, but it has not highlighted any requests for authority for new MYP or block buy contracts for major acquisition programs that would begin in FY2020  Appendix A  Text of 10 U S C  2306b The text of 10 U S C  2306b as of April 29, 2019, is as follows: §2306b  Multiyear contracts: acquisition of property (a) In General -To the extent that funds are otherwise available for obligation, the head of an agency may enter into multiyear contracts for the purchase of property whenever the head of that agency finds each of the following: (1) That the use of such a contract will result in significant savings of the total anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts  (2) That the minimum need for the property to be purchased is expected to remain substantially unchanged during the contemplated contract period in terms of production rate, procurement rate, and total quantities  (3) That there is a reasonable expectation that throughout the contemplated contract period the head of the agency will request funding for the contract at the level required to avoid contract cancellation  (4) That there is a stable design for the property to be acquired and that the technical risks associated with such property are not excessive  (5) That the estimates of both the cost of the contract and the anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a multiyear contract are realistic  (6) In the case of a purchase by the Department of Defense, that the use of such a contract will promote the national security of the United States  (7) In the case of a contract in an amount equal to or greater than $500,000,000, that the conditions required by subparagraphs (C) through (F) of subsection (i)(3) will be met, in accordance with the Secretary's certification and determination under such subsection, by such contract  (b) Regulations -(1) Each official named in paragraph (2) shall prescribe acquisition regulations for the agency or agencies under the jurisdiction of such official to promote the use of multiyear contracting as authorized by subsection (a) in a manner that will allow the most efficient use of multiyear contracting  (2)(A) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the Department of Defense  (B) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the Coast Guard, except that the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense shall apply to the Coast Guard when it is operating as a service in the Navy  (C) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration  (c) Contract Cancellations -The regulations may provide for cancellation provisions in multiyear contracts to the extent that such provisions are necessary and in the best interests of the United States  The cancellation provisions may include consideration of both recurring and nonrecurring costs of the contractor associated with the production of the items to be delivered under the contract  (d) Participation by Subcontractors, Vendors, and Suppliers -In order to broaden the defense industrial base, the regulations shall provide that, to the extent practicable- (1) multiyear contracting under subsection (a) shall be used in such a manner as to seek, retain, and promote the use under such contracts of companies that are subcontractors, vendors, or suppliers; and (2) upon accrual of any payment or other benefit under such a multiyear contract to any subcontractor, vendor, or supplier company participating in such contract, such payment or benefit shall be delivered to such company in the most expeditious manner practicable  (e) Protection of Existing Authority -The regulations shall provide that, to the extent practicable, the administration of this section, and of the regulations prescribed under this section, shall not be carried out in a manner to preclude or curtail the existing ability of an agency- (1) to provide for competition in the production of items to be delivered under such a contract; or (2) to provide for termination of a prime contract the performance of which is deficient with respect to cost, quality, or schedule  (f) Cancellation or Termination for Insufficient Funding -In the event funds are not made available for the continuation of a contract made under this section into a subsequent fiscal year, the contract shall be canceled or terminated  The costs of cancellation or termination may be paid from- (1) appropriations originally available for the performance of the contract concerned; (2) appropriations currently available for procurement of the type of property concerned, and not otherwise obligated; or (3) funds appropriated for those payments  (g) Contract Cancellation Ceilings Exceeding $100,000,000 -(1) Before any contract described in subsection (a) that contains a clause setting forth a cancellation ceiling in excess of $100,000,000 may be awarded, the head of the agency concerned shall give written notification of the proposed contract and of the proposed cancellation ceiling for that contract to the congressional defense committees, and such contract may not then be awarded until the end of a period of 30 days beginning on the date of such notification  (2) In the case of a contract described in subsection (a) with a cancellation ceiling described in paragraph (1), if the budget for the contract does not include proposed funding for the costs of contract cancellation up to the cancellation ceiling established in the contract, the head of the agency concerned shall, as part of the certification required by subsection (i)(1)(A),1 give written notification to the congressional defense committees of- (A) the cancellation ceiling amounts planned for each program year in the proposed multiyear procurement contract, together with the reasons for the amounts planned; (B) the extent to which costs of contract cancellation are not included in the budget for the contract; and (C) a financial risk assessment of not including budgeting for costs of contract cancellation  (h) Defense Acquisitions of Weapon Systems -In the case of the Department of Defense, the authority under subsection (a) includes authority to enter into the following multiyear contracts in accordance with this section: (1) A multiyear contract for the purchase of a weapon system, items and services associated with a weapon system, and logistics support for a weapon system  (2) A multiyear contract for advance procurement of components, parts, and materials necessary to the manufacture of a weapon system, including a multiyear contract for such advance procurement that is entered into in order to achieve economic-lot purchases and more efficient production rates  (i) Defense Acquisitions Specifically Authorized by Law -(1) In the case of the Department of Defense, a multiyear contract in an amount equal to or greater than $500,000,000 may not be entered into under this section unless the contract is specifically authorized by law in an Act other than an appropriations Act  (2) In submitting a request for a specific authorization by law to carry out a defense acquisition program using multiyear contract authority under this section, the Secretary of Defense shall include in the request the following: (A) A report containing preliminary findings of the agency head required in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a), together with the basis for such findings  (B) Confirmation that the preliminary findings of the agency head under subparagraph (A) were supported by a preliminary cost analysis performed by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation  (3) A multiyear contract may not be entered into under this section for a defense acquisition program that has been specifically authorized by law to be carried out using multiyear contract authority unless the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing, not later than 30 days before entry into the contract, that each of the following conditions is satisfied: (A) The Secretary has determined that each of the requirements in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a) will be met by such contract and has provided the basis for such determination to the congressional defense committees  (B) The Secretary's determination under subparagraph (A) was made after completion of a cost analysis conducted on the basis of section 2334(e)(2) 1 of this title, and the analysis supports the determination  (C) The system being acquired pursuant to such contract has not been determined to have experienced cost growth in excess of the critical cost growth threshold pursuant to section 2433(d) of this title within 5 years prior to the date the Secretary anticipates such contract (or a contract for advance procurement entered into consistent with the authorization for such contract) will be awarded  (D) A sufficient number of end items of the system being acquired under such contract have been delivered at or within the most current estimates of the program acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost for such system to determine that current estimates of such unit costs are realistic  (E) During the fiscal year in which such contract is to be awarded, sufficient funds will be available to perform the contract in such fiscal year, and the future-years defense program for such fiscal year will include the funding required to execute the program without cancellation  (F) The contract is a fixed price type contract  (G) The proposed multiyear contract provides for production at not less than minimum economic rates given the existing tooling and facilities  (4) If for any fiscal year a multiyear contract to be entered into under this section is authorized by law for a particular procurement program and that authorization is subject to certain conditions established by law (including a condition as to cost savings to be achieved under the multiyear contract in comparison to specified other contracts) and if it appears (after negotiations with contractors) that such savings cannot be achieved, but that significant savings could nevertheless be achieved through the use of a multiyear contract rather than specified other contracts, the President may submit to Congress a request for relief from the specified cost savings that must be achieved through multiyear contracting for that program  Any such request by the President shall include details about the request for a multiyear contract, including details about the negotiated contract terms and conditions  (5)(A) The Secretary may obligate funds for procurement of an end item under a multiyear contract for the purchase of property only for procurement of a complete and usable end item  (B) The Secretary may obligate funds appropriated for any fiscal year for advance procurement under a contract for the purchase of property only for the procurement of those long-lead items necessary in order to meet a planned delivery schedule for complete major end items that are programmed under the contract to be acquired with funds appropriated for a subsequent fiscal year (including an economic order quantity of such long-lead items when authorized by law)  (6) The Secretary may make the certification under paragraph (3) notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the conditions of such certification are not met, if the Secretary determines that, due to exceptional circumstances, proceeding with a multiyear contract under this section is in the best interest of the Department of Defense and the Secretary provides the basis for such determination with the certification  (7) The Secretary may not delegate the authority to make the certification under paragraph (3) or the determination under paragraph (6) to an official below the level of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics  (j) Defense Contract Options for Varying Quantities -The Secretary of Defense may instruct the Secretary of the military department concerned to incorporate into a proposed multiyear contract negotiated priced options for varying the quantities of end items to be procured over the period of the contract  (k) Multiyear Contract Defined -For the purposes of this section, a multiyear contract is a contract for the purchase of property for more than one, but not more than five, program years  Such a contract may provide that performance under the contract during the second and subsequent years of the contract is contingent upon the appropriation of funds and (if it does so provide) may provide for a cancellation payment to be made to the contractor if such appropriations are not made  (l) Various Additional Requirements With Respect to Multiyear Defense Contracts -(1)(A) The head of an agency may not initiate a contract described in subparagraph (B) unless the congressional defense committees are notified of the proposed contract at least 30 days in advance of the award of the proposed contract  (B) Subparagraph (A) applies to the following contracts: (i) A multiyear contract- (I) that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of $20,000,000 in any one year of the contract; or (II) that includes an unfunded contingent liability in excess of $20,000,000  (ii) Any contract for advance procurement leading to a multiyear contract that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of $20,000,000 in any one year  (2) The head of an agency may not initiate a multiyear contract for which the economic order quantity advance procurement is not funded at least to the limits of the Government's liability  (3) The head of an agency may not initiate a multiyear procurement contract for any system (or component thereof) if the value of the multiyear contract would exceed $500,000,000 unless authority for the contract is specifically provided in an appropriations Act  (4) Each report required by paragraph (5) with respect to a contract (or contract extension) shall contain the following: (A) The amount of total obligational authority under the contract (or contract extension) and the percentage that such amount represents of- (i) the applicable procurement account; and (ii) the agency procurement total  (B) The amount of total obligational authority under all multiyear procurements of the agency concerned (determined without regard to the amount of the multiyear contract (or contract extension)) under multiyear contracts in effect at the time the report is submitted and the percentage that such amount represents of- (i) the applicable procurement account; and (ii) the agency procurement total  (C) The amount equal to the sum of the amounts under subparagraphs (A) and (B), and the percentage that such amount represents of- (i) the applicable procurement account; and (ii) the agency procurement total  (D) The amount of total obligational authority under all Department of Defense multiyear procurements (determined without regard to the amount of the multiyear contract (or contract extension)), including any multiyear contract (or contract extension) that has been authorized by the Congress but not yet entered into, and the percentage that such amount represents of the procurement accounts of the Department of Defense treated in the aggregate  (5) The head of an agency may not enter into a multiyear contract (or extend an existing multiyear contract), the value of which would exceed $500,000,000 (when entered into or when extended, as the case may be), until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a report containing the information described in paragraph (4) with respect to the contract (or contract extension)  (6) The head of an agency may not terminate a multiyear procurement contract until 10 days after the date on which notice of the proposed termination is provided to the congressional defense committees  (7) The execution of multiyear contracting authority shall require the use of a present value analysis to determine lowest cost compared to an annual procurement  (8) This subsection does not apply to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or to the Coast Guard  (9) In this subsection: (A) The term "applicable procurement account" means, with respect to a multiyear procurement contract (or contract extension), the appropriation account from which payments to execute the contract will be made  (B) The term "agency procurement total" means the procurement accounts of the agency entering into a multiyear procurement contract (or contract extension) treated in the aggregate  (m) Increased Funding and Reprogramming Requests -Any request for increased funding for the procurement of a major system under a multiyear contract authorized under this section shall be accompanied by an explanation of how the request for increased funding affects the determinations made by the Secretary under subsection (i)  Appendix B  Programs Approved for MYP in Annual DOD Appropriations Acts Since FY1990 This appendix presents, in two tables, programs approved for MYP in annual DOD appropriations acts since FY1990  Table B-1 covers FY2011 to the present, and Table B-2 covers FY1990 through FY2010 

ground_truth: NSF has identified potential benefits and challenges associated with its use of rotators. Benefits include fresh perspectives and close connections to the scientific community, while challenges include staffing turnover and higher costs for some rotators compared with permanent employees. GAO was asked to review NSF's use and management of the IPA and VSEE rotator programs, among other things. This report examines (1) the number, costs, and uses of NSF rotators for fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2017; (2) the strategies NSF has used to manage rotator costs and the results of these efforts; and (3) the extent to which NSF has a workforce strategy for using rotators and has evaluated the results of its rotator programs. GAO analyzed summary-level data on NSF's rotators; reviewed key documents; interviewed NSF officials; conducted semistructured interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of rotators and permanent federal employees selected from different scientific directorates within NSF; and compared NSF's management of the program to key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. The numbers of rotators—outside scientists, engineers, and educators on temporary assignment—at the National Science Foundation (NSF) and their costs in proportion to other staff remained relatively stable in fiscal years 2008 through 2017. Most rotators joined NSF under its Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) mobility program. IPA rotators comprised about 12 percent of NSF's workforce and 17 percent of staff costs on average and were not subject to a federal salary cap. They remain employees of their home institutions, with NSF reimbursing the institutions for most of their salaries and benefits. The remaining rotators are considered temporary federal employees under the Visiting Scientist, Engineer, and Educator (VSEE) program; their salaries could not exceed the federal maximum for their positions. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted IPA rotator program cost management strategies expected to achieve the greatest savings with the least harm to recruitment, but NSF officials said it is too soon to determine the full results. For example, for new IPA rotators who had not yet begun negotiating their assignments, NSF began requiring their home institutions to pay for 10 percent of the rotators' salary and benefits. NSF officials told GAO they expect to issue a report evaluating the strategies in December 2018. NSF's IPA program steering committee recommended developing a workforce strategy for balancing the agency's use of rotators with federal staff, but as of June 2018, NSF had not developed a strategy or fully evaluated the IPA and VSEE rotator programs' results, as called for by GAO's key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. NSF officials said they recognized the value of a workforce strategy but were focusing instead on other workforce planning efforts, and they had not fully evaluated program results in part because rotators are blended into the agency's permanent workforce, making a separate evaluation difficult. Without a workforce strategy and evaluation of results, NSF is limited in its ability to manage and, if warranted, adjust its use of rotators. GAO recommends that NSF develop an agency-wide strategy for balancing the agency's use of rotators with permanent staff and evaluate the contributions of its rotator programs toward NSF's human capital goals and programmatic results. NSF agreed with GAO's recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: In the United States, both FRA and FTA regulate rail transportation safety  FRA oversees safety of railroads operating on what is known as the general system, a network of standard gage track over which goods may be transported and passengers may travel  This system includes freight railroads, which typically own their own tracks and locomotives, transporting products among states and regions  FRA also oversees safety of intercity passenger and commuter railroads that operate over tracks owned by freight railroads and other entities  FTA oversees safety of rail transit systems that typically serve individual metropolitan areas, using track not shared with freight and other passenger trains  Rail transit includes a variety of modes, such as heavy and light rail, streetcars, automated guideways, cable cars, and others  Rail transit is an important component of the nation’s transportation network, particularly in large metropolitan areas  Rail transit systems provided over 4 4 billion passenger trips in 2016  “Heavy rail” systems in large cities account for much of the total rail transit activity, including 88 percent of passenger trips in 2016  According to FTA, 61 rail transit systems within 28 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico are subject to safety oversight by one of the 31 agencies in FTA’s state safety oversight program (see fig  1)  The states have long played a central role in conducting safety oversight of rail transit systems  The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 required, among other things, that states with rail transit operators designate an agency to oversee the safety of those systems, known as a state safety oversight agency  In overseeing state safety agencies, FTA designed the program as one in which FTA, states, and rail transit operators collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems  However, limitations have been identified in the state safety oversight program  In 2006, we reported on some state safety agency challenges in overseeing rail transit safety  Specifically, we found many of the state safety agencies lacked enough qualified staff and adequate levels of training to meet their responsibilities  In a 2009 hearing before the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, then Secretary Ray LaHood of the Department of Transportation discussed some of the weaknesses under the current state safety oversight program and introduced a public transportation safety legislative proposal  In 2010, various bills were introduced in both houses of Congress that would have provided FTA with various enforcement mechanisms and with the authority to issue safety regulations  Additionally, the bills would have required the Secretary to establish a federal certification program for employees and contractors who carry out a state public transportation safety program  In the 112th Congress, the Senate amended a House bill to include a public transportation safety provision, which eventually became section 20021 of MAP-21, the federal public transportation safety program  MAP-21 enhanced FTA’s authority to oversee the safety of rail transit, potentially addressing some of the weaknesses identified by various stakeholders  Specifically, MAP-21 established a comprehensive Public Transportation Safety Program, which continues to rely on state safety agencies to monitor rail transit systems’ safety operations  MAP-21 required that, within 3 years of the effective date of a final state safety oversight program rule, each eligible state have in place a state safety oversight program certified by FTA  An eligible state must, among other things, establish a state safety agency and determine, in consultation with FTA, an appropriate staffing level for this state agency that is commensurate with the number, size, and complexity of the rail transit systems within the state  Additionally, a state safety agency must be financially and legally independent from any rail transit system it oversees and have investigative and enforcement authority with respect to the safety for its rail transit systems, among other things  Each eligible state has until April 15, 2019, to receive FTA approval of its state safety oversight program, or else FTA will be prohibited from obligating certain federal financial assistance to any entity in the state that is otherwise eligible to receive that federal financial assistance  After that approval, state safety agencies will be evaluated for continued compliance with FTA regulations a minimum of once every 3 years through a triennial review process  According to FTA, these requirements represent a dramatic increase in federal expectations for state safety oversight and for the rail transit industry  MAP-21 also established a state safety oversight grant program, offering federal funding to states for their state safety activities  FTA’s Office of Transit Safety and Oversight administers the state safety oversight program  Freight and passenger railroads have played a transformational role in the development of America and continue to be an important part of the economy  The general railroad system consists of a vast network of operations (see fig  2)  The $60 billion freight rail industry is operated by seven Class I, and hundreds of smaller, railroads  In addition, about 40 railroads move passengers, which carry greater than 670 million passengers per year  The federal government has long provided regulatory oversight of railroad safety, both passenger and freight, that operate on the general system  The Interstate Commerce Commission, the first federal regulatory commission in U S  history, was established in 1887 to regulate interstate commerce by rail  The Commission’s safety functions were transferred to FRA, which was created by the Department of Transportation Act in 1966  In its role as federal regulator and overseer of railroad safety, FRA prescribes and enforces railroad safety regulations and conducts research and development in support of improved railroad safety and rail transportation policy  FRA utilizes safety inspectors and specialists, primarily covering five safety disciplines, to review and enforce compliance with these regulations  FRA’s safety disciplines are track, signal, and train control; motive power and equipment; operating practices; and hazardous materials  Following several fatal rail accidents between 2002 and 2008, the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 was enacted, the first authorization of FRA’s safety programs since 1994  This act directed FRA to, among other things, issue new safety regulations for different aspects of railroad safety, such as hours of service requirements for passenger railroad workers, positive train control implementation, track inspection rules, and safety at highway-rail grade crossings  FRA’s Office of Railroad Safety administers the agency’s safety program  Rail transportation is a relatively safe way to transport people and products though serious incidents continue to occur on railroads and rail transit  According to an analysis of DOT’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics data by the American Public Transportation Association, travel by rail transit is far safer than automobile travel  From 2000-2014, for instance, there were 6 53 and 0 33 fatalities per billion passenger-miles traveled in cars or light trucks and rail transit, respectively  Within rail travel, the fatality rates on both railroads and rail transit operators have remained similar in recent years  Further, the rate of accidents and incidents—including collisions and derailments—also do not appear to differ substantially between railroads and rail transit in recent years  Nevertheless, serious incidents continue to occur on railroads and rail transit, posing safety risks to passengers, railroad employees, and the public  For example, in June 2009, two WMATA trains collided, resulting in 52 injuries and 9 deaths  A smoke incident on WMATA’s Metrorail system in January 2015 also resulted in the death of 1 person and injured over 90  In a 10-month period from May 2013 to March 2014, the Metro- North commuter railroad, which serves New York and Connecticut, was involved in five accidents that resulted in the death of 6 people and 126 injured  In June 2016, two BNSF Railway freight trains collided near Panhandle, Texas, resulting in the death of three crew members  Incidents such as these have prompted investigations into both the causes and contributing factors of the specific accidents as well as broader rail safety oversight  FRA has a more centralized safety oversight program for railroads, while FTA is implementing changes to the rail transit oversight program, established in federal statute, which relies on states to monitor and enforce safety  Key characteristics of both programs include: (1) the establishment of safety regulations, (2) inspections and other oversight activities, such as audits and investigations, based on those regulations, and (3) enforcement mechanisms to ensure that safety deficiencies are addressed (see fig  3)  FRA has developed extensive railroad safety regulations over decades  FRA’s railroad safety regulations include requirements governing track design and inspection, grade crossings, signal and train control, mechanical equipment including locomotives, and railroad-operating practices including worker protection rules  For example, FRA’s regulations for track and equipment include detailed, prescriptive minimum requirements, such as formulas that determine the maximum allowable speeds on curved track  Many of FRA’s rail safety regulations establish minimum safety requirements, though railroads can apply for waivers  As FRA updates its safety regulations, it has proposed more performance-based regulations in recent years  Many of FRA’s current safety regulations specify the behavior or manner of compliance that railroads must adopt, such as inspecting each locomotive at least every 92 days  Performance-based regulations, however, specify a desired outcome rather than a behavior or manner of compliance  For example, FRA’s recent rulemaking to amend its passenger equipment safety regulations proposes performance-based crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements, rather than explicit targets or tolerances  According to FRA, establishing performance requirements in these areas would allow a more open rail market that incorporates recent technologies  FTA is currently assessing the need for rail transit safety regulations, having been provided the authority to issue safety regulations in 2012  Since MAP-21 was enacted, FTA has finalized regulations implementing the public transportation safety program authorized by statute  These include regulations that establish rules for FTA’s administration of a comprehensive safety program to improve rail transit safety as well as updated regulations governing state safety oversight of rail transit  In addition to its public transportation safety program regulations, FTA also has regulations governing its drug and alcohol testing program  MAP-21 also authorized FTA, for the first time, to issue rail transit safety regulations, which would establish minimum safety performance requirements for rail transit operators, as part of its requirement to develop a National Public Transportation Safety Plan  FTA initiated a regulatory development effort after the passage of MAP-21, which included a compilation and evaluation of existing transit safety standards, guidance, and best practices from the federal government, states, industry, and other sources  After the evaluation, FTA issued a report that concluded there was limited documentation or evidence of the effectiveness of these existing rail transit safety standards  The report included recommendations that are intended to enable FTA to undertake further data-driven, risk-based analysis of rail transit safety performance and the applicability and effectiveness of the identified safety standards  FTA is also currently analyzing specific focus areas to determine any areas that should be addressed by federal safety regulations  For example, FTA is studying the need for regulations related to rail transit vehicle crashworthiness  Since no federal rail transit safety regulations that establish minimum safety performance requirements for rail transit operators currently exist, rail transit operators are subject to different safety standards, depending largely on what voluntary standards they have chosen to adopt, according to American Public Transportation Association officials we spoke with  The American Public Transportation Association, for instance, has issued a variety of rail transit safety standards, addressing various aspects of the industry including operations, training, and inspections  In addition, states vary in the extent to which they have regulations for rail transit operators  For example, officials from the California Public Utilities Commission noted that it has issued a variety of safety regulations applicable to rail transit operators within the state of California to improve safety of rail operations  Both FRA and FTA have mechanisms to gather the input of stakeholders—including rail operators, labor unions, industry associations, and others—when considering development of safety regulations  In developing most of its safety regulations, FRA seeks input from stakeholders through its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee  In 1996, FRA established this committee to develop new regulations through a collaborative process, with the rail community working together to create mutually satisfactory solutions to safety issues  FTA is collaborating with stakeholders as it assesses the need for rail transit safety regulations  More specifically, FTA’s research partner, the Center for Urban Transportation Research, established a working group to collaborate with industry stakeholders to inform the safety regulations development process  FTA also solicited comments from industry stakeholders on its compilation of existing rail transit safety standards  More broadly, FTA also has a Transit Advisory Committee for Safety, which provides information, advice, and recommendations to FTA on safety matters  FRA fulfills its mission, in part, through safety compliance audits and inspections, and investigations  FRA ensures compliance with its safety regulations through inspections, using a staff of railroad safety experts, inspectors, and other professionals assigned to eight regional offices across the nation  For example, to determine a railroad’s compliance with FRA safety regulations, inspectors examine track, equipment, signal devices, employee actions, and procedures and review maintenance and accident records  Additionally, 31 states have rail safety programs that partner with FRA  Under this approach, FRA enters into agreements with states to allow state inspectors to participate in investigative and surveillance activities concerning federal railroad safety laws  State inspectors who participate in this program submit inspection reports to FRA  More broadly, FRA’s inspections are guided by a risk-based model  Under this approach, FRA focuses its inspections on locations that, according to the data-driven model, are likely to have safety problems  Like other operating administrations within DOT, FRA has relatively few resources for overseeing railroads, compared with the size of the general system  The risk-based model is designed to help FRA target the greatest safety risks  FRA has begun utilizing automated inspections as well  In particular, according to FRA, new imaging technologies have the potential to better inspect track for cracks in the rail that could lead to breakage as well as measure the track’s geometry to ensure that rails are positioned to meet standards  To further promote safety in railroad operations, FRA conducts accident investigations  Separate from investigations conducted by NTSB, FRA investigates select railroad accidents to determine root causation, and any contributing factors, so that railroad properties can implement corrective actions to prevent similar incidents in the future  Resources for railroad safety oversight activities have increased in recent years  FRA was appropriated about $218 million in fiscal year 2017, an increase over the approximately $187 million it received in fiscal year 2015, for safety and operations, which funds FRA’s personnel, including inspectors, and safety programs  According to FRA, Congress provided FRA with increased funding in recent years for the purpose of increasing staffing related to specific safety issues, such as trespasser prevention and passenger rail safety  As part of this effort, FRA has hired additional inspectors, going from 347 inspectors in fiscal year 2013 to over 360 currently, out of the nearly 930 total full-time equivalent staff  FRA officials told us, as we have reported in the past, that it can be difficult to recruit, train, and certify qualified inspectors in a timely manner, especially in certain areas of expertise  Further, according to FRA, its inspectors have the ability to inspect less than 1 percent of the general system annually  Though FTA now has more robust inspection authorities, states will continue to conduct front-line rail transit safety oversight activities  MAP- 21 provided FTA with new authorities to inspect, audit, and investigate practices at rail transit agencies, including safety practices, while also preserving the role of state safety agencies to monitor rail transit systems’ safety operations  According to FTA officials, any federal inspections of rail transit operators are intended to supplement a state safety agency’s oversight activities, except where FTA assumes temporary, direct oversight of a rail transit system from an inadequate state safety agency  FTA officials told us that establishing a nationwide safety inspection program at the federal level is inconsistent with the statutory framework of the state safety oversight program and with congressional intent, which contemplates preserving the primary role of state safety agencies in providing direct safety oversight of rail transit systems  The officials also noted that the state-based approach to rail transit safety oversight is valuable because states are generally closer to, and more familiar with, rail transit operators  To date, FTA has utilized its new inspection authorities only on WMATA’s rail system  As part of oversight activities, some state safety agencies have conducted inspections of the rail transit systems they oversee, though they were not required to do so, according to FTA officials we spoke with  To strengthen states’ abilities to conduct oversight activities, FTA has recommended that state safety agencies develop risk-based inspection programs  Further, to ensure the independence of state safety agencies, these agencies cannot receive funding from the rail transit entities they oversee  Resources for FTA’s rail transit safety oversight administrative expenses have remained relatively stable in recent years, though more are needed, according to FTA  Since fiscal year 2012, FTA’s appropriations for administrative expenses, which funds FTA personnel and support activities including the Office of Transit Safety and Oversight, has increased $14 million, to about $113 million in fiscal year 2017, according to FTA  However, for several years, FTA has averaged about 508 total full-time equivalent staff agency-wide, and a little over 30 safety staff in the Office of Transit Safety and Oversight  According to FTA, the Office of Transit Safety and Oversight has been under-resourced since it was established in response to new safety authority provided in MAP-21  For fiscal year 2018, FTA requested in their submission for the President’s Budget proposal funding to hire up to an additional 20 positions for various lines of safety work  FRA’s and FTA’s oversight activities also include regular audits of, and communication with, the rail operators under their oversight  Given finite resources and large rail networks, FRA and FTA audit rail operators’ own inspections rather than conducting comprehensive federal inspections  More specifically, FRA inspectors, and state safety agencies in FTA’s oversight program, regularly examine records of rail operators’ internal inspections to identify safety deficiencies  Officials from FRA, FTA, and five rail stakeholders we spoke with told us that FRA and FTA rail safety oversight programs also rely on collaboration and communication between rail operators and regulators to ensure safety  For example, regular meetings between FRA and railroad staff to discuss safety trends and industry developments are important to ensuring safety, according to officials we spoke with from FRA and the railroads  FRA specialists and inspectors participate, with representatives of railroad labor and management, in the implementation of voluntary safety programs  For example, FRA sponsors the Confidential Close Call Reporting System, a voluntary, confidential program allowing railroads and their employees to report accident and incident “close calls ” According to FRA officials, voluntary programs such as this increase industry awareness of railroad safety and engagement with it  FTA also collaborates with state safety agencies as rail transit safety issues arise, according to FTA officials, using federal oversight and enforcement authorities as a “back-stop” against the oversight of state safety agencies  Additionally, according to officials we spoke with from FTA and two rail transit operators, state safety agency staff meet with rail transit operators regularly, using knowledge of local operating conditions to help ensure safety  FRA uses a variety of tools, including civil penalties, to resolve safety issues  While some safety issues are resolved informally through discussion and collaboration between FRA and railroads, as noted above, some defects identified during inspections are classified as violations and subject to financial penalties  More specifically, when railroads do not resolve issues in a timely manner or identified defects are serious, FRA has the authority to cite violations and assess civil penalties, against either railroads or individuals  Further, as authorized by law, FRA negotiates settlements with railroads and other entities subject to its safety jurisdiction to resolve claims for civil penalties  In fiscal year 2016, FRA assessed over $11 8 million in civil penalties against railroads  According to FRA, fiscal year 2016 was the second year in a row that it took steps to increase penalty amounts paid by railroads, as part of a continued effort to increase consequences for violations that negatively affect safety  To ensure the safety of rail transit systems, states will continue to be the primary enforcers of safety requirements, according to FTA officials, though FTA now has more enforcement tools  MAP-21 preserved the role of state safety agencies as the primary enforcement body for rail transit  FTA has now required that state safety agencies have enforcement authorities sufficient to compel action from rail transit entities to address safety deficiencies  Though no specific authorities are required, FTA has suggested that a variety of mechanisms could be appropriate, such as the ability to remove deficient equipment from service or assess fines  According to FTA, this requirement is designed to overcome a long- standing vulnerability in state safety oversight, which allowed safety deficiencies to remain for long periods of time  MAP-21 and the FAST Act also provided FTA with more options for enforcement when rail transit operators are found to be out of compliance with safety requirements  In particular, FTA can withhold federal funding for rail transit operators or direct a rail transit operator to use federal funding for a specific purpose  Additionally, after FTA assumes temporary direct oversight of an inadequate state safety agency, FTA can withhold federal funds from the state until the state safety oversight program has been certified  To date, FTA has utilized this authority only with the states responsible for safety oversight of WMATA’s rail system  In February 2017, FTA announced that it would withhold 5 percent of fiscal year 2017 urbanized area formula funds from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia until a new state safety oversight program is certified for WMATA’s rail system  This action built upon FTA’s determination that WMATA’s state safety agency was ineffective at “providing adequate oversight consistent with prevention of substantial risk of death or personal injury ” FRA and FTA also have the authority to directly intervene in rail operations  In particular, both FRA and FTA can suspend the service of rail operators in response to certain safety concerns  Additionally, FTA can assume direct safety oversight of a rail transit operator if FTA determines the state safety oversight program is not adequate, among other things  In response to safety incidents on WMATA’s rail system, FTA assumed temporary and direct safety oversight of WMATA in October 2015, as previously noted  FRA and FTA’s approaches to their rail safety oversight missions each have strengths and limitations, including how the agencies develop safety regulations, conduct inspections, and carry out enforcement  Compared to FRA’s long-standing role in providing safety oversight over railroads, FTA is in the process of implementing significant changes to its program for rail transit safety oversight after being granted new authorities in MAP- 21 and the FAST Act  With respect to regulations, FRA’s extensive and well-established safety regulations are a strength  FTA has made some progress toward developing appropriate safety regulations, such as identifying subjects for potential regulatory action  With respect to inspections, FRA’s use of a risk-based approach to distributing inspection resources is a strength  FTA has sought to address previously identified deficiencies in state safety oversight by recommending that state safety agencies develop risk-based inspection programs  FTA, though, has not provided states guidance for these efforts  With respect to enforcement, FRA’s use of its enforcement authorities is a strength  FTA is also implementing new statutory requirements that state safety agencies have enforcement authorities but does not have a process or methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of these enforcement practices  Extensive and well-established safety regulations are a strength of FRA’s safety oversight program based on studies we reviewed and discussions with rail operators and stakeholder organizations  According to NTSB, FRA’s railroad safety regulations are an important and effective part of its oversight program  Our previous work reported that according to stakeholders, the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee provides a collaborative environment where stakeholders in the rail community work with FRA to identify issues and proposals for safety standards and regulations that improved the quality of railroads’ safety initiatives and fostered a greater level of compliance with safety regulations  This is consistent with views of stakeholders we spoke with, who characterized FRA’s safety regulations as a strength  An industry association told us that FRA’s regulations promote safety by helping to ensure that no operator falls below a minimum threshold for safe operations, while a rail operator told us that federal regulations help to standardize the operating environment and prevent a patchwork of various state regulations  Four stakeholders also characterized the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, which plays a large role in crafting FRA’s railroad safety regulations, as effective and inclusive  However, based on studies we reviewed and discussions with rail operators’ and stakeholders’ organizations, FRA faces limitations in its efforts to regulate safety across railroad systems that differ from one another and sometimes change more quickly than the federal regulatory process  Five railroad operators and an industry association told us that some of FRA’s safety regulations do not account for differences in railroads or innovation in safety practices, with three railroad operators stating that this approach requires the extensive use of waivers for particular regulations  Further, two railroad operators and a rail transit operator we spoke with stated that additional federal regulations are needed to provide minimum baseline requirements in specific areas of railroad safety such as medical fitness for duty  In 2014, NTSB also found that FRA needs to do more to regulate particular safety issues including medical fitness for duty and signal protection  FRA officials acknowledged that time and resources are two of the primary challenges that the agency faces when developing safety regulations but also noted additional ways in which the agency can require railroads to adopt safety practices  FRA officials described the process of creating or significantly amending a regulation as involving years of work, even before the agency commences with the process of drafting a rule  The officials also noted that the agency has additional tools to compel railroads to adopt safety practices  For example, FRA officials discussed the use of compliance agreements, in which railroads can have fines reduced in exchange for adopting safety measures that go beyond what FRA regulations require  FRA officials are considering the use of performance-based regulations as they update their safety regulations  As noted above, FRA’s proposed regulations regarding passenger equipment safety incorporates performance -based safety requirements, rather than explicit safety targets or tolerances  FRA has promulgated performance-based regulations about the implementation of positive train control, a communications-based system designed to prevent certain types of train accidents, as well as system safety programs that set general safety parameters and thresholds by which successful performance is governed  FRA’s consideration of performance-based regulations is in line with federal guidance  OMB’s Circular A-4 states that performance standards “are generally superior to engineering or design standards because performance standards give the regulated parties the flexibility to achieve regulatory objectives in the most cost-effective way ” Additionally, under Executive Order 12866, agencies should (to the extent permitted by law and where applicable) identify and assess alternative forms of regulation and specify performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities must adopt  However, as the language of OMB’s Circular A-4 and Executive Order 12866 suggest that performance-based regulations are not always feasible, studies of performance-based regulations find that as with any other form of regulation, performance-based standards have trade-offs  FRA officials told us that under certain circumstances, performance- based regulations are appropriate for issues regarding design, maintenance, operation, and technology-driven safety requirements  FRA officials we spoke with did not think performance-based standards are appropriate for areas that require standardization  One example is track safety standards, where the need for different operators to use the same equipment precludes a performance-based approach that allows railroads to meet requirements through different means  FRA officials added that a key aspect of the success of performance-based regulations concerns how railroads demonstrate compliance  This concern is consistent with other studies of performance-based regulations, which find that these regulations are most appropriate when regulators have capacity to measure and monitor performance  Though FTA has made progress assessing the state of rail transit safety standards, a limitation of FTA’s rail transit safety oversight program is the lack of federal rail transit safety regulations, which may contribute to inconsistent safety practices across the rail transit industry, according to studies we reviewed and discussions with rail operators and stakeholder organizations  NTSB reported that the structure of FTA’s oversight process leads to inconsistent practices, inadequate standards, and marginal effectiveness  In addition, a 2016 DOT OIG report found that because FTA’s safety standards are voluntary, they are unenforceable  In 2012, FTA gained the authority to issue safety regulations, though it has not done so yet, and NTSB and other stakeholders we spoke with indicated that the lack of such federal safety regulations is a weakness in federal rail transit safety oversight  Despite differences across rail transit systems, there is value in establishing federal rail transit safety regulations, according to stakeholders from all categories of those we interviewed, including a state safety agency, three rail transit operators, a railroad operator, and two industry associations  Some stakeholders identified specific areas that would benefit from federal rail transit regulations  For example, two rail transit agencies called for federal regulations to address operator fatigue  Some of these officials stated that federal rail transit safety regulations could help ensure safety by establishing clear and consistent minimum standards  Officials from a rail transit entity and an industry association stated that voluntary standards are not enough to ensure that transit entities will adopt appropriate safety measures  According to our analysis, a past study, and stakeholders we spoke with, FTA’s ability to develop and implement performance-based regulations is limited by its lack of capacity to collect and analyze rail safety performance data  In 2017, DOT OIG found that data limitations of FTA’s National Transit Database results in limited safety performance criteria in FTA’s National Public Transportation Safety Plan  Further, two rail transit entities as well as a state safety agency we spoke with stated that they face challenges in analyzing data due to either the size of their systems or their capacity  FTA officials told us that they need more data to inform their decisions regarding whether to establish rail transit safety regulations, and also added that a limitation to their ongoing assessment of potential areas for rail transit safety regulation is the concern about public disclosure of safety data provided to FTA and its potential use in private litigation  According to FTA officials, they need more information to do a comprehensive evaluation of efficacy of current safety standards and practices  As required by the FAST Act, FTA has entered into an agreement with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, to conduct a study to evaluate whether it is in the public interest to withhold from federal or state court proceedings any information collected by DOT through its public transportation safety program oversight activities  The National Academies of Sciences is expected to complete this study in 2018  FTA is taking positive steps toward developing safety regulations that may address inconsistent safety practices across rail transit operators  FTA officials stated that the agency is considering issuing rail transit safety regulations and also employs additional tools to compel rail transit entities to adopt safety measures  As noted above, FTA is currently studying whether federal regulations are appropriate for specific areas of rail transit safety  Executive Order 12866 and OMB’s Circular A-4 direct federal agencies to consider performance-based regulations when developing regulations  Further, as the Transportation Research Board recently reported, any decision to use performance-based regulations “must take into account the regulator’s own ability to enforce and motivate compliance (through methods such as auditing and field inspections) as well as the capacity of regulated entities to meet their obligations ” FTA officials noted that they are actively engaged with members of the Transportation Research Board in reviewing and discussing these recent findings related to safety regulations for high-hazards industries  In January 2017, FTA issued its National Public Transportation Safety Plan, which FTA officials noted is one component of their transit safety standard development program  According to FTA officials, the plan identifies a list of issue areas that the agency is currently studying to determine whether national regulations are needed  FTA officials also stated that the plan includes “voluntary standards,” which are intended to put the industry “on notice” that federal safety regulations may be proposed in those areas  FTA officials stated that they view the National Public Transportation Safety Plan as iterative and more easily updated compared with official regulations  Additional tools that FTA officials stated the agency employs in its approach to safety oversight include general directives as well as the requirements associated with FTA grants  Based on our assessment and studies we reviewed, a strength of FRA’s safety oversight program is its risk-based approach to distributing inspection resources, which may serve as an example for FTA and state safety agencies  According to NTSB, FRA’s qualified inspectors are a strength of its oversight program  To help target these inspectors to the areas of highest risk, FRA developed the National Inspection Plan, which includes a quantitative model for allocating inspection resources in a way that tries to minimize railroad accidents  This model utilizes data including: (1) accident and incident data that railroads are required to report, (2) data from FRA inspection activity, and (3) information on railroad activities such as train miles and other data  Based on our assessment of FRA’s model, we believe that it can be an appropriate and useful tool for directing its inspection resources based on risk because it relies on statistical methods commonly used to predict the risk of a violation for regulated entities  While we did not review FRA’s entire modeling process, nor did we validate the results it generates, we do believe that FRA’s approach to using these statistical models as a key part of its inspection program is appropriate  However, a potential limitation of FRA’s inspection program is the flexibility granted to individual inspectors and whether the manner and extent to which inspectors implement this discretion may be inconsistent with the risk-based National Inspection Plan  FRA’s National Inspection Plan provides guidance for inspectors about how much time they should spend inspecting individual railroads  According to FRA officials, FRA inspectors have considerable flexibility to deviate from the National Inspection Plan based on their judgment regarding where to more effectively use their resources  FRA officials stated that situations arise that call for deviations in planned inspections  For example, a particular railroad may experience a serious accident and therefore require more oversight from FRA  According to FRA officials, regional offices make these decisions based on their understanding of emerging issues  Inspectors are expected to know their region and decide which locations to go to, and are in part evaluated based on these decisions  When a region’s record of total inspection time spent on a particular railroad differs from the National Inspection Plan by more than 5 percent, the region’s leadership submits an explanation to FRA’s Office of Railroad Safety  This practice, if not monitored, could allow inspectors to deviate from the data-driven model results in ways that undermine the goal of the National Inspection Plan to deploy FRA’s limited resources efficiently and based on risk  However, FRA officials told us that flexibility for individual inspectors is important, and that FRA is continuously monitoring the model’s performance and making changes as appropriate  Further, OECD’s Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy note that it is important to ensure “that sufficient flexibility is left to enforcement and inspection officials to adapt their response in proportion to the facts on the ground ” A strength of FTA’s approach to rail transit safety oversight is that it is working to overcome weaknesses in state oversight of rail transit identified in our prior work and stakeholders we spoke with  For example, FTA has noted that in the past some state safety agencies lacked sufficient oversight authorities  To now be certified by FTA, state safety agencies must demonstrate that they have authority to review, approve and oversee the implementation of rail transit operator’s safety plans  Additionally, we have found, and FTA has also noted, that some state safety agencies would benefit from more training and additional staff  To now be certified by FTA, state safety agencies must be capable of directly hiring and developing staff and contract support, as well as have a training plan for certain staff  Though FTA is seeking to implement stronger safety oversight activities, a limitation of its program is that state safety agencies have not received the guidance and support necessary to develop effective inspection programs  FTA does not currently plan to conduct widespread inspections itself and recommends that state safety agencies develop risk-based inspection programs  According to FTA, states have discretion to establish their inspection programs in accordance with their program standards, and are not required to actually conduct inspections as the method of verifying rail transit operators’ compliance with safety rules  However, direct observation, audits, and performance indicator tracking are useful methods for an oversight agency in assessing a regulated entity’s safety culture  Officials we spoke with from selected state safety agencies say that they have received little guidance from FTA on what their risk-based inspection programs should look like  In the materials FTA provided to states, it said that it intends to provide guidance to states on risk-based inspections but did not provide us with a plan or timeline for doing so  Without guidance from FTA, state safety agencies may not develop effective risk-based inspection programs and thus not use their resources efficiently  Effective risk-based inspection programs are particularly important given state safety agencies’ limited resources  We have reported in the past that some state safety agencies lack sufficient resources, including training and staff  Officials from two rail transit operators and all four industry associations we spoke with stated that state safety agencies continue to have limited resources and capacity  Several state safety agencies we spoke with rely on contractors or employees with other responsibilities besides oversight of rail transit to meet their increased oversight responsibilities and achieve certification from FTA  Federal standards for internal control as well as leading practices for regulatory inspections state that agency objectives, including those related to inspections and enforcement, should be clearly communicated  Specifically, federal standards for internal control require that management communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the agency’s objectives  Additionally, the OECD’s Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy recommends that governments ensure clarity of rules and processes for enforcement and inspections and clearly articulate rights and obligations of officials  According to OECD, the frequency of inspections and the resources employed should be proportional to the level of risk  A strength of FRA’s safety oversight program is that the agency has and utilizes clear enforcement authority, according to NTSB and stakeholders we spoke with  As previously discussed, FRA has several enforcement tools available when inspectors find that railroads are noncompliant with applicable regulations, including civil penalties, individual liability, compliance orders, and emergency orders  According to NTSB, this array of specific enforcement tools helps ensure safety deficiencies are addressed by railroads  FRA officials also told us that the process of adjudicating civil penalties provides a forum for FRA and railroad officials to meet to discuss safety issues  Four rail operators also told us that FRA’s authority to issue civil penalties is necessary to ensure railroads’ compliance with regulations  However, a potential limitation of FRA’s approach to enforcement is that it is difficult to quantify the effectiveness of FRA’s civil penalties  FRA has reported that it cannot determine whether observable safety improvements are directly attributable to discrete civil penalties or whether the amount of civil penalties has any effect on safety  We have reported in the past about the challenges of determining the effect of penalties on compliance in tax policy, though we also noted that, despite these challenges, some analyses likely would be useful for better understanding the effect of penalties on compliance  FRA also reported, though, that according to the judgments of its inspectors, issuing civil penalties yields observable improvements in safety practices and compliance with the law  Further, according to FRA, though it does not quantify the impact of civil penalties, FRA monitors railroad responses to its enforcement activity and adjusts its oversight as necessary  More broadly, civil penalties are not meant, by themselves, to ensure railroad safety  Instead, FRA reported that it uses its entire regulatory regime as a whole to try and ensure safety  FRA officials also noted that the agency has additional tools, apart from civil penalties, to compel railroads to adopt safety practices  A strength of FTA’s rail transit safety oversight is that it seeks to improve historically weak state safety agency enforcement authorities, as described in our previous report as well stakeholders we spoke with  FTA requires state safety agencies to adopt enforcement authorities that are sufficient to enable states to compel action from rail transit agencies to address identified deficiencies  FTA has also communicated to states that it is focusing its evaluation of each state’s enforcement authorities in two major areas: ensuring that the state can carry out its primary responsibility for rail transit safety in response to (1) an imminent threat to public safety on the rail transit system and (2) a lack of action or non- compliance from the rail transit operator in carrying out certain safety plans  FTA has provided states with examples of the enforcement authorities and policies state safety agencies could establish to address these specific concerns  Authorities to address imminent safety threats may include the authority to suspend rail transit agencies’ operations, inspect and remove deficient equipment or system infrastructure from service, or issue an order requiring the rail transit agency to correct an unsafe condition prior to placing equipment or infrastructure back into passenger service  FTA has also provided state safety agencies with examples of authorities to address a lack of action or cooperation by the rail transit operator, including the authority to withhold or redirect funds, levy civil or criminal fines or penalties, and a formal citation or ticketing program  Though federal law requires that state safety agencies have enforcement authorities over the safety of the rail transit entities they oversee, a limitation of FTA’s approach is that FTA has not developed a method to evaluate the effectiveness of states’ enforcement practices  Certified state safety agencies will be evaluated for continued compliance with FTA regulations every 3 years  This triennial review process (for rail transit safety) seeks to ensure that states are effectively carrying out their responsibilities  While FTA officials told us that they will evaluate state safety agencies’ enforcement during the triennial reviews, FTA has not developed a process or methodology to evaluate whether state enforcement authorities and practices as a whole are effective  Without a method for determining the effectiveness of state safety agencies’ enforcement, FTA may not have the information needed to identify ineffective safety enforcement  As a result, deficiencies may remain for long periods of time, potentially contributing to safety incidents  Federal standards for internal control maintain that agency managers should perform a range of practices that would facilitate the establishment of a system to monitor the effectiveness of agency activities, which in the context of FTA’s mission includes the effectiveness of its rail transit safety oversight  Agency managers should define objectives clearly to enable the identification of risks, establish activities to monitor performance measures and indicators, and externally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives  Internal control standards further stipulate that agency managers should perform monitoring activities regarding their internal control system and evaluate the results  To do so, federal standards for internal control state that agency managers should monitor ongoing operations and effectiveness, evaluate the results of this monitoring, and identify any changes that need to be made to achieve improvement in agency operations  The effectiveness of state safety agency enforcement is especially important because questions have been raised about the efficacy of FTA’s own enforcement mechanisms, including its ability to withhold funds from and assume direct control over safety oversight for a rail transit entity  Rail transit operators and industry association representatives we spoke with stated that FTA’s authority to withhold funding from states is overly punitive, and two stakeholders said the FTA needs more precise tools  Officials from an industry association added that withholding funds can be counterproductive, as most state safety agencies are already underfunded and understaffed  FTA officials pointed to examples in which the agency successfully supported state safety agencies in compelling action from rail transit agencies as evidence that the state safety oversight model, in which FTA backs up state safety agencies, is effective  Additionally, officials from numerous state safety agencies and others questioned whether FTA has the capacity to effectively assume direct safety oversight of rail transit operators  FTA has not assumed direct safety oversight of any rail transit operators outside of WMATA, and FTA officials noted that they intend to continue supporting state safety agencies in their oversight wherever possible  The approaches to rail safety oversight utilized by FRA and FTA each have strengths and limitations  However, FTA’s program is currently in transition as the agency implements new authorities and responsibilities provided in federal law  Though FTA has made progress by evaluating existing rail transit safety standards and providing some guidance to states as part of the certification process, limitations in FTA’s approach may still hinder the success of the state-based rail transit safety oversight program  Given the looming 2019 deadline for state safety oversight programs to achieve FTA certification, FTA can improve its efforts to implement its new rail transit safety oversight program  In particular, without guidance from FTA on how to develop and carry out risk-based inspection programs, state safety agencies may not use limited resources efficiently, risking that important safety issues will go undetected  Further, without a method for how it will monitor the effectiveness of states safety agencies’ enforcement, FTA will lack the information needed to identify ineffective state enforcement, which risks allowing safety deficiencies to remain for long periods of time  By providing this additional guidance and direction to the state safety agencies, FTA would help ensure that states are able to effectively identify and resolve rail transit safety issues  We are making the following two recommendations to FTA: The Office of Transit Safety and Oversight should create a plan, with a timeline, for developing guidance for state safety agencies about how to develop and implement a risk-based inspection program  (Recommendation 1) The Office of Transit Safety and Oversight should develop and communicate a method for how it will monitor the effectiveness of the enforcement authorities and practices of state safety agencies  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft copy of this report to DOT, NTSB, and WMATA for review and comment  In written comments, reproduced in appendix I, DOT agreed with both our recommendations  DOT also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  In e-mails, NTSB and WMATA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  NTSB noted that we do not discuss the role of system safety initiatives, such as safety management systems, in the FRA and FTA rail safety oversight programs  We agree with NTSB that system safety concepts are increasingly influencing the FRA and FTA approaches to rail safety oversight but, as NTSB also noted, both FRA and FTA lack finalized regulations codifying their approaches to system safety initiatives  Because the extent of rail entities’ implementation of these initiatives varies and is not complete we did not include an assessment of the strengths and limitations of those initiatives in our scope  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Transportation, Chairman of NTSB, General Manager of WMATA, and the appropriate congressional committees  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Individuals who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the contact named above, Steve Cohen (Assistant Director); Kyle Browning (Analyst in Charge); Melissa Bodeau; Lacey Coppage; Serena Lo; Sean Miskell; and Josh Ormond made key contributions to this report 
Report 2:  1119 / P L  105-85 of November 18, 1997), which granted the Navy the authority to use a single contract for the procurement of the first four Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines  The 4 boats were scheduled to be procured during the 5-year period FY1998-FY2002 in annual quantities of 1-1-0-1-1  Congress provided the authority granted in Section 121(b) at least in part to reduce the combined procurement cost of the four submarines  Using MYP was not an option for the Virginia-class program at that time because the Navy had not even begun, let alone finished, construction of the first Virginia-class submarine, and consequently could not demonstrate that it had a stable design for the program  When Section 121(b) was enacted, there was no name for the contracting authority it provided  The term block buy contracting came into use later, when observers needed a term to refer to the kind of contracting authority that Congress authorized in Section 121(b)  As discussed in the next section, this can cause confusion, because the term block buy was already being used in discussions of DOD acquisition to refer to something else  What's the difference between block buy cont r acting and block buys? In discussions of defense procurement, the term "block buy" by itself (without "contracting" at the end) is sometimes used to refer to something quite different from block buy contracting—namely, the simple act of funding the procurement of more than one copy of an item in a single year, particularly when no more than one item of that kind might normally be funded in a single year  For example, when Congress funded the procurement of two aircraft carriers in FY1983, and another two in FY1988, these acts were each referred to as block buys, because aircraft carriers are normally procured one at a time, several years apart from one another  This alternate meaning of the term block buy predates by many years the emergence of the term block buy contracting  The term block buy is still used in this alternate manner, which can lead to confusion in discussions of defense procurement  For example, for FY2017, the Air Force requested funding for procuring five Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs) for its EELV Launch Services (ELS) program  At the same time, Navy officials sometimes refer to the use of block buy contracts for the first four Virginia-class submarines, and in the LCS program, as block buys, when they might be more specifically referred to as instances of block buy contract ing   How much can BBC save, compared with MYP? BBC can reduce the unit procurement costs of ships by amounts less than or perhaps comparable to those of MYP, if the authority granted for using BBC explicitly includes authority for making economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases of components  If the authority granted for using BBC does not explicitly include authority for making EOQ purchases, then the savings from BBC will be less  Potential savings under BBC might also be less than those under MYP if the BBC contract does not include a cancellation penalty, or includes one that is more limited than typically found in an MYP contract, because this might give the contractor less confidence than would be the case under an MYP contract that the future stream of business will materialize as planned, which in turn might reduce the amount of money the contractor invests to optimize its workforce and production facilities for producing the items to be procured under the contract  How frequently has BBC been used? Since its use at the start of the Virginia-class program, BBC has been used very rarely  The Navy did not use it again in a shipbuilding program until December 2010, when it awarded two block buy contracts, each covering 10 LCSs to be procured over the six-year period FY2010-FY2015, to the two LCS builders  (Each contract was later amended to include an 11 th ship in FY2016, making for a total of 22 ships under the two contracts ) A third example is the John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler program, in which the Navy is using a block buy contract to procure the first six ships in the program  A fourth example, arguably, is the Air Force's KC-46 aerial refueling tanker program, which is employing a fixed price incentive fee (FPIF) development contract that includes a "back end" commitment to procure certain minimum numbers of KC-46s in certain fiscal years  When might BBC be suitable as an alternative to MYP? BBC might be particularly suitable as an alternative to MYP in cases where using a multiyear contract can reduce costs, but the program in question cannot meet all the statutory criteria needed to qualify for MYP  As shown in the case of the first four Virginia-class boats, this can occur at or near the start of a procurement program, when design stability has not been demonstrated through the production of at least a few of the items to be procured (or, for a shipbuilding program, at least one ship)  What i s the difference between an MYP or block buy contract and a contract with options? The military services sometimes use contracts with options to procure multiple copies of an item that are procured over a period of several years  The Navy, for example, used a contract with options to procure Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class dry cargo ships that were procured over a period of several years  A contract with options can be viewed as somewhat similar to an MYP or block buy contract in that a single contract is used to procure several years' worth of procurement of a given kind of item  There is, however, a key difference between an MYP or block buy contract and a contract with options: In a contract with options, the service is under no obligation to exercise any of the options, and a service can choose to not exercise an option without having to make a penalty payment to the contractor  In contrast, in an MYP or block buy contract, the service is under an obligation to continue implementing the contract beyond the first year, provided that Congress appropriates the necessary funds  If the service chooses to terminate an MYP or block buy contract, and does so as a termination for government convenience rather than as a termination for contractor default, then the contractor can, under the contract's termination for convenience clause, seek a payment from the government for cost incurred for work that is complete or in process at the time of termination, and may include the cost of some of the investments made in anticipation of the MYP or block buy contract being fully implemented  The contractor can do this even if the MYP or block buy contract does not elsewhere include a provision for a cancellation penalty  As a result of this key difference, although a contract with options looks like a multiyear contract, it operates more like a series of annual contracts, and it cannot achieve the kinds of savings that are possible under MYP and BBC  Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used; and whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP  Should MYP and BBC in the future be used more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used? Supporters of using MYP and BBC more frequently in the future might argue the following: Since MYP and BBC can reduce procurement costs, making greater use of MYP and BBC can help DOD get more value out of its available procurement funding  This can be particularly important if DOD's budget in real (i e , inflation-adjusted) terms remains flat or declines in coming years, as many observers anticipate  The risks of using MYP have been reduced by Section 811 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  4986 / P L  110-181 of January 28, 2008), which amended 10 U S C  2306b to strengthen the process for ensuring that programs proposed for MYP meet certain criteria (see " Permanent Statute Governing MYP ")  Since the value of MYP contracts equated to less than 8% of DOD's procurement budget in FY2012, compared to about 17% of DOD's procurement budget in FY2000, MYP likely could be used more frequently without exceeding past experience regarding the share of DOD's procurement budget accounted for by MYP contracts  Supporters of using MYP and BBC less frequently in the future, or at least no more frequently than now, might argue the following: Using MYP and BBC more frequently would further reduce Congress's and DOD's flexibility for making changes in DOD procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances  The risks of reducing flexibility in this regard are increased now because of uncertainties in the current strategic environment and because efforts to reduce federal budget deficits could include reducing DOD spending, which could lead to a reassessment of U S  defense strategy and associated DOD acquisition programs  Since actual savings from using MYP and BBC rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify, it is not clear that the financial benefits of using MYP or BBC more frequently in the future would be worth the resulting further reduction in Congress's and DOD's flexibility for making changes in procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances  Should Congress create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute (10 U S C  2306b) that governs the use of MYP? Supporters of creating a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC might argue the following: Such a statute could encourage greater use of BBC, and thereby increase savings in DOD procurement programs by giving BBC contracting a formal legal standing and by establishing a clear process for DOD program managers to use in assessing whether their programs might be considered suitable for BBC  Such a statute could make BBC more advantageous by including a provision that automatically grants EOQ authority to programs using BBC, as well as provisions establishing qualifying criteria and other conditions intended to reduce the risks of using BBC  Opponents of creating a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC might argue the following: A key advantage of BBC is that it is not governed by a permanent statute  The lack of such a statute gives DOD and Congress full flexibility in determining when and how to use BBC for programs that may not qualify for MYP, but for which a multiyear contract of some kind might produce substantial savings  Such a statute could encourage DOD program managers to pursue their programs using BBC rather than MYP  This could reduce discipline in DOD multiyear contracting if the qualifying criteria in the BBC statute are less demanding than the qualifying criteria in 10 U S C  2306b  Should the Coast Guard should begin making use of MYP and BBC? Although the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Coast Guard is a military service and a branch of the U S  Armed Forces at all times (14 U S C  1), and 10 U S C  2306b provides authority for using MYP not only to DOD, but also to the Coast Guard (and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as well)  In addition, Section 311 of the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 ( S  140 / P L  115-282 of December 4, 2018) provides permanent authority for the Coast Guard to use block buy contracting with EOQ purchases of components in its major acquisition programs  The authority is now codified at 14 U S C  1137  As discussed earlier in this report, the Navy in recent years has made extensive use of MYP and BBC in its ship and aircraft acquisition programs, reducing the collective costs of those programs, the Navy estimates, by billions of dollars  The Coast Guard, like the Navy, procures ships and aircraft  In contrast to the Navy, however, the Coast Guard has never used MYP or BBC in its ship or aircraft acquisition programs  Instead, the Coast has tended to use contracts with options  As discussed earlier, although a contract with options looks like a multiyear contract, it operates more like a series of annual contracts, and it cannot achieve the kinds of savings that are possible under MYP and BBC  CRS in recent years has testified and reported on the possibility of using BBC or MYP in Coast Guard ship acquisition programs, particularly the Coast Guard's 25-ship Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program and the Coast Guard's three-ship polar icebreaker program  CRS estimates that using multiyear contracting rather than contracts with options for the entire 25-ship OPC program could reduce the cost of the OPC program by about $1 billion  The OPC program is the Coast Guard's top-priority acquisition program, and it represents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reduce the acquisition cost of a Coast Guard acquisition program by an estimated $1 billion  CRS also estimates that using BBC for a three-ship polar icebreaker program could reduce the cost of that program by upwards of $150 million  The Coast Guard has expressed some interest in using BBC in the polar icebreaker program, but its baseline acquisition strategy for that program, like its current acquisition strategy for the OPC program, is to use a contract with options  As part of its FY2020 budget submission, the Department of Defense is proposing continued funding for implementing several MYP contracts initiated in fiscal years prior to FY2020, but it has not highlighted any requests for authority for new MYP or block buy contracts for major acquisition programs that would begin in FY2020  Appendix A  Text of 10 U S C  2306b The text of 10 U S C  2306b as of April 29, 2019, is as follows: §2306b  Multiyear contracts: acquisition of property (a) In General -To the extent that funds are otherwise available for obligation, the head of an agency may enter into multiyear contracts for the purchase of property whenever the head of that agency finds each of the following: (1) That the use of such a contract will result in significant savings of the total anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts  (2) That the minimum need for the property to be purchased is expected to remain substantially unchanged during the contemplated contract period in terms of production rate, procurement rate, and total quantities  (3) That there is a reasonable expectation that throughout the contemplated contract period the head of the agency will request funding for the contract at the level required to avoid contract cancellation  (4) That there is a stable design for the property to be acquired and that the technical risks associated with such property are not excessive  (5) That the estimates of both the cost of the contract and the anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a multiyear contract are realistic  (6) In the case of a purchase by the Department of Defense, that the use of such a contract will promote the national security of the United States  (7) In the case of a contract in an amount equal to or greater than $500,000,000, that the conditions required by subparagraphs (C) through (F) of subsection (i)(3) will be met, in accordance with the Secretary's certification and determination under such subsection, by such contract  (b) Regulations -(1) Each official named in paragraph (2) shall prescribe acquisition regulations for the agency or agencies under the jurisdiction of such official to promote the use of multiyear contracting as authorized by subsection (a) in a manner that will allow the most efficient use of multiyear contracting  (2)(A) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the Department of Defense  (B) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the Coast Guard, except that the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense shall apply to the Coast Guard when it is operating as a service in the Navy  (C) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration  (c) Contract Cancellations -The regulations may provide for cancellation provisions in multiyear contracts to the extent that such provisions are necessary and in the best interests of the United States  The cancellation provisions may include consideration of both recurring and nonrecurring costs of the contractor associated with the production of the items to be delivered under the contract  (d) Participation by Subcontractors, Vendors, and Suppliers -In order to broaden the defense industrial base, the regulations shall provide that, to the extent practicable- (1) multiyear contracting under subsection (a) shall be used in such a manner as to seek, retain, and promote the use under such contracts of companies that are subcontractors, vendors, or suppliers; and (2) upon accrual of any payment or other benefit under such a multiyear contract to any subcontractor, vendor, or supplier company participating in such contract, such payment or benefit shall be delivered to such company in the most expeditious manner practicable  (e) Protection of Existing Authority -The regulations shall provide that, to the extent practicable, the administration of this section, and of the regulations prescribed under this section, shall not be carried out in a manner to preclude or curtail the existing ability of an agency- (1) to provide for competition in the production of items to be delivered under such a contract; or (2) to provide for termination of a prime contract the performance of which is deficient with respect to cost, quality, or schedule  (f) Cancellation or Termination for Insufficient Funding -In the event funds are not made available for the continuation of a contract made under this section into a subsequent fiscal year, the contract shall be canceled or terminated  The costs of cancellation or termination may be paid from- (1) appropriations originally available for the performance of the contract concerned; (2) appropriations currently available for procurement of the type of property concerned, and not otherwise obligated; or (3) funds appropriated for those payments  (g) Contract Cancellation Ceilings Exceeding $100,000,000 -(1) Before any contract described in subsection (a) that contains a clause setting forth a cancellation ceiling in excess of $100,000,000 may be awarded, the head of the agency concerned shall give written notification of the proposed contract and of the proposed cancellation ceiling for that contract to the congressional defense committees, and such contract may not then be awarded until the end of a period of 30 days beginning on the date of such notification  (2) In the case of a contract described in subsection (a) with a cancellation ceiling described in paragraph (1), if the budget for the contract does not include proposed funding for the costs of contract cancellation up to the cancellation ceiling established in the contract, the head of the agency concerned shall, as part of the certification required by subsection (i)(1)(A),1 give written notification to the congressional defense committees of- (A) the cancellation ceiling amounts planned for each program year in the proposed multiyear procurement contract, together with the reasons for the amounts planned; (B) the extent to which costs of contract cancellation are not included in the budget for the contract; and (C) a financial risk assessment of not including budgeting for costs of contract cancellation  (h) Defense Acquisitions of Weapon Systems -In the case of the Department of Defense, the authority under subsection (a) includes authority to enter into the following multiyear contracts in accordance with this section: (1) A multiyear contract for the purchase of a weapon system, items and services associated with a weapon system, and logistics support for a weapon system  (2) A multiyear contract for advance procurement of components, parts, and materials necessary to the manufacture of a weapon system, including a multiyear contract for such advance procurement that is entered into in order to achieve economic-lot purchases and more efficient production rates  (i) Defense Acquisitions Specifically Authorized by Law -(1) In the case of the Department of Defense, a multiyear contract in an amount equal to or greater than $500,000,000 may not be entered into under this section unless the contract is specifically authorized by law in an Act other than an appropriations Act  (2) In submitting a request for a specific authorization by law to carry out a defense acquisition program using multiyear contract authority under this section, the Secretary of Defense shall include in the request the following: (A) A report containing preliminary findings of the agency head required in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a), together with the basis for such findings  (B) Confirmation that the preliminary findings of the agency head under subparagraph (A) were supported by a preliminary cost analysis performed by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation  (3) A multiyear contract may not be entered into under this section for a defense acquisition program that has been specifically authorized by law to be carried out using multiyear contract authority unless the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing, not later than 30 days before entry into the contract, that each of the following conditions is satisfied: (A) The Secretary has determined that each of the requirements in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a) will be met by such contract and has provided the basis for such determination to the congressional defense committees  (B) The Secretary's determination under subparagraph (A) was made after completion of a cost analysis conducted on the basis of section 2334(e)(2) 1 of this title, and the analysis supports the determination  (C) The system being acquired pursuant to such contract has not been determined to have experienced cost growth in excess of the critical cost growth threshold pursuant to section 2433(d) of this title within 5 years prior to the date the Secretary anticipates such contract (or a contract for advance procurement entered into consistent with the authorization for such contract) will be awarded  (D) A sufficient number of end items of the system being acquired under such contract have been delivered at or within the most current estimates of the program acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost for such system to determine that current estimates of such unit costs are realistic  (E) During the fiscal year in which such contract is to be awarded, sufficient funds will be available to perform the contract in such fiscal year, and the future-years defense program for such fiscal year will include the funding required to execute the program without cancellation  (F) The contract is a fixed price type contract  (G) The proposed multiyear contract provides for production at not less than minimum economic rates given the existing tooling and facilities  (4) If for any fiscal year a multiyear contract to be entered into under this section is authorized by law for a particular procurement program and that authorization is subject to certain conditions established by law (including a condition as to cost savings to be achieved under the multiyear contract in comparison to specified other contracts) and if it appears (after negotiations with contractors) that such savings cannot be achieved, but that significant savings could nevertheless be achieved through the use of a multiyear contract rather than specified other contracts, the President may submit to Congress a request for relief from the specified cost savings that must be achieved through multiyear contracting for that program  Any such request by the President shall include details about the request for a multiyear contract, including details about the negotiated contract terms and conditions  (5)(A) The Secretary may obligate funds for procurement of an end item under a multiyear contract for the purchase of property only for procurement of a complete and usable end item  (B) The Secretary may obligate funds appropriated for any fiscal year for advance procurement under a contract for the purchase of property only for the procurement of those long-lead items necessary in order to meet a planned delivery schedule for complete major end items that are programmed under the contract to be acquired with funds appropriated for a subsequent fiscal year (including an economic order quantity of such long-lead items when authorized by law)  (6) The Secretary may make the certification under paragraph (3) notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the conditions of such certification are not met, if the Secretary determines that, due to exceptional circumstances, proceeding with a multiyear contract under this section is in the best interest of the Department of Defense and the Secretary provides the basis for such determination with the certification  (7) The Secretary may not delegate the authority to make the certification under paragraph (3) or the determination under paragraph (6) to an official below the level of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics  (j) Defense Contract Options for Varying Quantities -The Secretary of Defense may instruct the Secretary of the military department concerned to incorporate into a proposed multiyear contract negotiated priced options for varying the quantities of end items to be procured over the period of the contract  (k) Multiyear Contract Defined -For the purposes of this section, a multiyear contract is a contract for the purchase of property for more than one, but not more than five, program years  Such a contract may provide that performance under the contract during the second and subsequent years of the contract is contingent upon the appropriation of funds and (if it does so provide) may provide for a cancellation payment to be made to the contractor if such appropriations are not made  (l) Various Additional Requirements With Respect to Multiyear Defense Contracts -(1)(A) The head of an agency may not initiate a contract described in subparagraph (B) unless the congressional defense committees are notified of the proposed contract at least 30 days in advance of the award of the proposed contract  (B) Subparagraph (A) applies to the following contracts: (i) A multiyear contract- (I) that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of $20,000,000 in any one year of the contract; or (II) that includes an unfunded contingent liability in excess of $20,000,000  (ii) Any contract for advance procurement leading to a multiyear contract that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of $20,000,000 in any one year  (2) The head of an agency may not initiate a multiyear contract for which the economic order quantity advance procurement is not funded at least to the limits of the Government's liability  (3) The head of an agency may not initiate a multiyear procurement contract for any system (or component thereof) if the value of the multiyear contract would exceed $500,000,000 unless authority for the contract is specifically provided in an appropriations Act  (4) Each report required by paragraph (5) with respect to a contract (or contract extension) shall contain the following: (A) The amount of total obligational authority under the contract (or contract extension) and the percentage that such amount represents of- (i) the applicable procurement account; and (ii) the agency procurement total  (B) The amount of total obligational authority under all multiyear procurements of the agency concerned (determined without regard to the amount of the multiyear contract (or contract extension)) under multiyear contracts in effect at the time the report is submitted and the percentage that such amount represents of- (i) the applicable procurement account; and (ii) the agency procurement total  (C) The amount equal to the sum of the amounts under subparagraphs (A) and (B), and the percentage that such amount represents of- (i) the applicable procurement account; and (ii) the agency procurement total  (D) The amount of total obligational authority under all Department of Defense multiyear procurements (determined without regard to the amount of the multiyear contract (or contract extension)), including any multiyear contract (or contract extension) that has been authorized by the Congress but not yet entered into, and the percentage that such amount represents of the procurement accounts of the Department of Defense treated in the aggregate  (5) The head of an agency may not enter into a multiyear contract (or extend an existing multiyear contract), the value of which would exceed $500,000,000 (when entered into or when extended, as the case may be), until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a report containing the information described in paragraph (4) with respect to the contract (or contract extension)  (6) The head of an agency may not terminate a multiyear procurement contract until 10 days after the date on which notice of the proposed termination is provided to the congressional defense committees  (7) The execution of multiyear contracting authority shall require the use of a present value analysis to determine lowest cost compared to an annual procurement  (8) This subsection does not apply to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or to the Coast Guard  (9) In this subsection: (A) The term "applicable procurement account" means, with respect to a multiyear procurement contract (or contract extension), the appropriation account from which payments to execute the contract will be made  (B) The term "agency procurement total" means the procurement accounts of the agency entering into a multiyear procurement contract (or contract extension) treated in the aggregate  (m) Increased Funding and Reprogramming Requests -Any request for increased funding for the procurement of a major system under a multiyear contract authorized under this section shall be accompanied by an explanation of how the request for increased funding affects the determinations made by the Secretary under subsection (i)  Appendix B  Programs Approved for MYP in Annual DOD Appropriations Acts Since FY1990 This appendix presents, in two tables, programs approved for MYP in annual DOD appropriations acts since FY1990  Table B-1 covers FY2011 to the present, and Table B-2 covers FY1990 through FY2010 

ground_truth: In 2012 and 2015, DOT was provided with additional authority to oversee the safety of rail transit. Within DOT, FTA is now implementing this authority. The DOT's Office of Inspector General has reported, though, that FTA faces challenges in carrying out its enhanced safety oversight. FRA, also in DOT, has long carried out safety oversight of freight, intercity passenger, and commuter railroads. GAO was asked to review various rail safety and oversight issues, including the differences between FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs. This report examines (1) key characteristics of FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs and (2) strengths and limitations of FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs. GAO assessed FRA's and FTA's information about rail safety oversight activities against guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, leading practices developed by the transit industry, and federal standards for internal control. GAO also interviewed stakeholders, including rail operators chosen based on mode, size, and location. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) carry out different approaches to rail safety oversight. FRA has a more centralized safety oversight program for railroads, while FTA's program for oversight of rail transit safety largely relies on state safety agencies to monitor and enforce rail transit safety, as established in federal statute. Key characteristics of both programs include: (1) safety regulations, (2) inspections and other oversight activities, and (3) enforcement mechanisms to ensure that safety deficiencies are addressed (see figure). There are strengths and limitations to FRA's and FTA's approaches to their safety oversight missions, including how the two agencies develop safety regulations, conduct inspections, and carry out enforcement. The National Transportation Safety Board has reported, and stakeholders GAO spoke with generally agreed, that strengths of FRA's rail safety oversight program include its safety regulations, its risk-based inspection program, and its enforcement authorities. FRA also has potential limitations in its oversight framework, though, such as difficulty evaluating the effectiveness of its enforcement mechanisms. FTA has made some progress implementing changes to the rail transit safety program. However, FTA has not provided all the necessary guidance and support to states' safety agencies to ensure they develop appropriate and effective rail transit safety inspection programs. In particular, FTA has not provided states with guidance on how to develop and implement risk-based inspection programs. Though FTA has said that it will develop such guidance, it does not have a plan or timeline to do so. Without guidance from FTA on how to develop and carry out risk-based inspections, state safety agencies may not allocate their limited resources efficiently, and important safety issues may go undetected. In addition, FTA has not developed a process or methodology to evaluate whether state safety agency enforcement authorities and practices are effective. Without clear evidence that state safety agencies' enforcement is effective, states and FTA may not be able to compel rail transit operators to remedy safety deficiencies. As a result, deficiencies may remain for long periods, potentially contributing to safety incidents. GAO recommends that FTA (1) create a plan, with timeline, for developing risk-based inspection guidance for state safety agencies, and (2) develop and communicate a method for how FTA will monitor whether state safety agencies' enforcement practices are effective. DOT agreed with our recommendations. DOT, NTSB, and WMATA provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.