prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: We testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services in September 2017 after four significant mishaps at sea resulted in the loss of 17 sailors’ lives and serious damage to Navy ships  We reported on some of the Navy’s challenges, including the degraded condition and expired training certifications of ships homeported overseas, reductions to ship crews that contributed to sailor overwork and safety risks, and an inability to complete maintenance on time  Since that time, the Navy has completed two internal reviews to address these and other challenges, identifying 111 recommendations to improve surface fleet readiness  The Navy formed an executive group to guide and closely track the implementation of recommendations, and its reform efforts are ongoing  As of November 2018, the Navy reported that it had implemented 78 (i e , 70 percent) of these recommendations  Navy officials recognize that full implementation will take significant time and management attention to address the fundamental readiness challenges identified  In figure 1, we show photographs of two of the four Navy ships involved in significant mishaps that occurred in 2017  Both the USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S  McCain were involved in collisions that resulted in sailor fatalities  DOD has reported that more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and reductions in force structure have degraded its readiness; in response, the department has made rebuilding readiness a priority  The 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness across the entire spectrum of conflict is critical to success in the emerging security environment  Nevertheless, DOD reported that readiness of the total military force remains low and has remained so since 2013  Our work has shown that the Navy has experienced increasing maintenance challenges as a high pace of operations has continued and maintenance has been deferred  Maintenance and personnel challenges also hinder readiness recovery of Navy aircraft  For the Marine Corps, our work has shown that ground force readiness has improved and remained stable in recent years, but acute readiness problems remain in aviation units  Over the past year, DOD has made department-wide progress in developing a plan to rebuild the readiness of the military force, with the military services providing regular input on the status of their readiness recovery efforts  In August 2018, we reported that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has developed a Readiness Recovery Framework that the department is using to guide the services’ efforts and plans to use to regularly assess, validate, and monitor readiness recovery  The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services have recently revised readiness goals and accompanying recovery strategies, metrics, and milestones to align with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance  We have ongoing work assessing DOD’s progress in achieveing its overall readiness goals  DOD’s readiness rebuilding efforts are occurring in a challenging context that requires the department to make difficult decisions regarding how best to address continuing operational demands while preparing for future challenges  Our work has shown that an important aspect of this, across all of the services, is determining an appropriate balance between maintaining and upgrading legacy weapon systems currently in operational use and procuring new ones to overcome rapidly advancing future threats  Based on updated information we received in November 2018, the Navy has taken steps to provide dedicated training time so its surface forces may meet existing Navy training standards and their training is certified when they deploy  However, the Navy continues to struggle with rebuilding the readiness of the existing fleet due to enduring maintenance and manning challenges  As the Navy seeks to expand its fleet by 25 percent, these challenges will likely be further exacerbated and the Navy will likely face additional affordability challenges  After the collisions in 2017, the Navy focused on training surface ship crews to its existing standards  We testified in September 2017 that there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers based in Japan and 37 percent of training certifications for these surface ship crews had lapsed as of June 2017  Since that time, the Navy has worked to ensure surface ships are certified before they are deployed  For example, the Navy has established controls to limit waivers that allowed training lapses to worsen, now requiring multiple high-level approvals for ships to operate uncertified  Based on our analysis of updated data, the Navy has improved markedly in the percentage of cruisers and destroyers with lapsed certifications in Japan, from 41 percent of certifications expired in September 2017 to 9 percent as of November 2018, with less than 3 percent of certifications expired on ships in operational status  While the Navy has demonstrated its commitment to ensuring that crews are certified prior to deploying, training for amphibious operations and higher-level collective training may not be fully implemented for several years  In September 2017, we reported that some Marine Corps units were limited in their ability to complete training to conduct an amphibious operation—a military operation that is launched from the sea to introduce a landing force ashore—by several factors, including a decline in the number of amphibious ships from 62 in 1990 to 32 as of November 2018, access to range space, and a high pace of deployments, among others  We recommended that the Navy and the Marine Corps develop an approach to mitigate their amphibious operations training shortfalls as the services await the arrival of additional amphibious ships into the fleet  Marine Corps officials told us that the Marine Corps and the Navy are working together to maximize amphibious training opportunities  Additionally, the Navy has plans to phase in high-level collective training into the operational schedules of its ships homeported in Japan over the next several years  Previously, advanced and integrated training involving multiple ships was conducted ad hoc if at all for ships homeported in Japan  Such collective training is important because the 2018 National Defense Strategy states that the department’s principal priority is to prepare for threats from strategic competitors due to the magnitude of the threat they pose  However, in November 2018, officials from Fleet Forces Command told us that fully implementing its training approach to prepare for advanced adversaries would not be fully implemented across the fleet for several years  We have reported that the Navy faces persistent challenges in completing maintenance on time and providing sufficient manning to its ships  Unless these challenges are addressed, the Navy will be hampered in its ability to rebuild readiness and prepare for the future  Our work has found that the Navy has been unable to complete ship and submarine maintenance on time, resulting in continuing schedule delays that reduce time for training and operations and create costly inefficiencies in a resource constrained environment  The Navy’s readiness recovery is premised on the rigorous adherence to deployment, training, and maintenance schedules  However, we reported in May 2016 on the difficulty that both the public and private shipyards were having in completing maintenance on time  We reported that, from 2011 through 2014, about 28 percent of scheduled maintenance for surface combatants was completed on time and 11 percent was completed on time for aircraft carriers  We updated these data as of November 2018 to include maintenance periods completed through the end of fiscal year 2018 and found that the Navy continues to struggle to complete maintenance on time  For fiscal years 2012-2018, our analysis for key portions of the Navy fleet shows that 30 percent of Navy maintenance was completed on time, leading to more than 27,000 days in which ships were delayed and unavailable for training and operations as shown in figure 2 below  In addition to affecting training and operations, maintenance delays are costly  In November 2018, we examined attack submarine maintenance delays and reported that the Navy was incurring significant operating and support costs to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that are delayed getting into and out of shipyard maintenance periods  We estimated that over the past 10 years the Navy has spent $1 5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle no longer certified to conduct normal operations—while waiting to enter the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards (see figure 3)  We recommended that the Navy analyze how it allocates its maintenance workload across public and private shipyards  DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that it has taken the first steps to take a more holistic view of submarine maintenance requirements and impacts across both the public and private shipyards  In an update provided in November 2018, the Navy told us that they are developing a contracting strategy to conduct two additional depot maintenance periods at private shipyards in the future  Our prior work has shown that three primary factors at the naval shipyards contribute to maintenance delays: Poor conditions and aging equipment limit the ability of the shipyards to meet current and future demands  We reported in September 2017 that facility and equipment limitations at the shipyards contributed to maintenance delays for the aircraft carriers and submarines, hindering the shipyards’ ability to support the Navy  Specifically, we found that the shipyards would be unable to support an estimated one-third of maintenance periods planned over the next 23 years  We recommended that the Navy take steps to improve its management of shipyard investments; the Navy concurred with this recommendation and we are encouraged by its response  For example, the Navy has developed a plan for the optimal placement of facilities and major equipment at each public shipyard, which the Navy estimates can ultimately increase its maintenance efficiency by reducing personnel and materiel travel by an average of 65 percent  This equates to recovering about 328,000 man days per year—an amount roughly equal to that of an aircraft carrier maintenance period  However, the Navy’s preliminary estimate —that this effort will require an estimated $21 billion and 20 years to address—is well beyond historical funding levels, and does not include some potentially significant costs (e g , for utilities, roads, or environmental remediation)  Shipyard workforce gaps and inexperience are limiting factors  The Navy has reported a variety of workforce challenges at the Navy’s four public shipyards such as hiring personnel in a timely manner and providing personnel with the training necessary to gain proficiency in critical skills  The Navy has noted that some occupations require years of training before workers become proficient  According to Navy officials, a large portion of its workforce is inexperienced  For example, 45 percent of the Puget Sound and 30 percent of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyards’ skilled workforce have fewer than 5 years of experience  According to DOD officials, workforce shortages and inexperience contribute to maintenance delays  For example, at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, two submarines were delayed approximately 20 months, in part because of shortages in ship fitters and welders, among other skilled personnel  Most of DOD’s depots, which include the naval shipyards, have taken actions to maintain critical skills through retention incentives, bonuses, and awards  We plan to issue a report examining DOD’s depot skill gaps, including those at the naval shipyards, later this month  Depot supply support may not be cost-effective  In June 2016, we reported that the naval shipyards and other depots had not implemented actions that would likely improve the cost-effectiveness of their supply operations  Specifically, the Navy had not transferred certain functions to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) at the shipyards in the same manner as the Navy and Air Force did for their aviation depots  The Navy and Air Force aviation depots that transferred these functions to DLA had reaped a number of efficiencies in their supply operations, including a 10-percent reduction in backorders over a 5-year period  We recommended that the Navy analyze whether such a transfer of functions is warranted at the shipyards and the Navy concurred with the recommendation  However, as of October 2018, the Navy had not conducted a comprehensive analysis of transferring these functions and had provided no plans to do so  In May 2017, we reported that the Navy’s process for determining manpower requirements—the number and skill mix of sailors needed on the Navy’s ships—did not fully account for all ship workload  The Navy was using outdated standards to calculate the size of ship crews that may have been leading to overburdened crews working long hours  We recommended steps to help ensure the Navy’s manpower requirements meet the needs of the existing and future surface fleet, and the Navy has been studying ship workload and revising its guidance  As of November 2018, the Navy was continuing to analyze the manpower requirements of its ship classes to better size and compose ship crews, and the Navy was also working to improve shipboard manning  However, these efforts are not yet complete and it is too early to assess their effectiveness  Until manpower requirements are reassessed across the fleet, the Navy risks that ship crews will continue to be undersized and sailors will be overworked with potential negative effects on readiness and safety  Additionally, the Navy provided information in November 2018 that showed that it is taking steps to ensure that ships have a minimum percentage of crew assigned and with the appropriate skills  The Navy has prioritized manning its surface ships homeported overseas  The Navy established a minimum threshold of filling at least 95 percent of authorized billets in its ship crews with sailors (referred to as fill), with a minimum goal of 92 percent of those sailors having the right qualifications for the billet (known as fit)  According to Navy officials, the Navy is for the most part meeting its fill goals Navy-wide, but has not consistently met its fit goals  However, during group discussions in November 2018 with ship crews and interviews with Navy officials in Japan, we learned that the Navy’s methods for tracking fit and fill do not account for sailor experience and may be inaccurately capturing the actual presence of sailors onboard and available for duty on its ships  Moreover, sailors consistently told us that ship workload has not decreased, and it is still extremely challenging to complete all required workload while getting enough sleep  Navy officials told us that manning challenges will continue through at least fiscal year 2021 as the Navy increases its end strength and trains its new sailors to gain the proper mix of skills to operate and maintain the fleet  To meet continued operational demands, the Navy is planning for the most significant fleet size increase in over 30 years  According to the Navy’s fiscal year 2019 shipbuilding plan, the Navy plans to build and maintain a fleet of 355 battle force ships—an increase of about 25 percent above the Navy’s current force of 287 ships  To reach its goal, the Navy plans to buy 301 ships through 2048 and extend the service life of its 66 Arleigh Burke class destroyers and up to 7 attack submarines  Together, the fiscal year 2019 shipbuilding plan and the service life extensions would allow the Navy to reach a 355-ship fleet by the 2030s  Congressional Budget Office reporting and our past work have shown that the Navy has consistently and significantly underestimated the cost and timeframes for delivering new ships to the fleet  For example, the Navy estimates that buying the new ships specified in the fiscal year 2019 plan would cost $631 billion over 30 years while the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that those new ships would cost $801 billion—a difference of 27 percent  We also reported in June 2018 that acquisition outcomes for ship classes built during the last 10 years have often not achieved cost, schedule, quality, or performance goals that were established  Furthermore, we have reported that: all 8 of the lead ships delivered over the past decade that we reviewed were provided to the fleet behind schedule, and more than half of those ships were delayed by more than 2 years, and six ships of different classes valued at $6 3 billion were delivered to the Navy with varying degrees of incomplete work and quality problems  As a result of past cost and schedule problems, our work has shown that the Navy has a less-capable and smaller fleet today than it planned over 10 years ago  The Navy has also received $24 billion more in funding than it originally planned in its 2007 long-range shipbuilding plan but has 50 fewer ships in its inventory today, as compared with the goals it first established  Therefore, we have reported that as the Navy moves forward in implementing its shipbuilding plan it will be paramount for the Navy to learn from and apply lessons learned from the past  In addition to the cost of buying the ships and submarines to expand fleet size, the Navy will likely face affordability challenges with regard to the manning of an expanded fleet with the right number of sailors with the right mix of skills  In May 2017, we reported that the personnel costs for surface ship classes in fiscal years 2000-2015 were the largest share of total operating and support costs and that careful planning will be needed as new ships are brought into the fleet  We also reported that crew sizes on recently inducted ship classes grew from original projections as the Navy gained experience operating them  For example, the total crew size of Littoral Combat Ships has grown from 75 in 2003 to 98 personnel in 2016, a 31-percent increase  Navy officials told us that they plan to better articulate the personnel and resources needed for a larger fleet after fully accounting for workload and right-sizing ship crews  The Navy’s end strength has since increased by over 11,000 personnel from fiscal year 2017 levels, which should help alleviate manning challenges as the fleet grows  In November 2018, officials from Fleet Forces Command provided us with projections of its manning shortfalls continuing through at least fiscal year 2021 and steps it was planning to take to mitigate them  Our work has shown that Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited by aging aircraft, delayed maintenance, and insufficient supply support  Pilot and maintenance personnel shortfalls further limit readiness recovery across legacy air platforms  The growing F-35 program, which is meant to replace many aging aircraft, has presented additional operational and sustainment challenges, which will likely persist into the future if not corrected  DOD, the Navy, and the Marine Corps have emphasized mission capability of critical aviation platforms— including the Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18s and F-35s—and are taking steps to improve availability, but these efforts will take time to realize results  Navy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited by challenges associated with aging aircraft fleets, depot maintenance, and supply support challenges that limit the services’ ability to keep aviation units ready  The Navy and Marine Corps spend billions of dollars each year on sustainment, such as for spare parts and depot maintenance, to meet aircraft availability goals  However, aircraft availability rates have generally declined since fiscal year 2011  While specific aircraft availability data are considered sensitive by the Navy and the Marine Corps, and cannot be discussed in detail, we found in September 2018 that the Navy and the Marine Corps generally did not meet aircraft availability goals in fiscal years 2011-2016 for the seven aircraft we reviewed  In updating data in November 2018, we found that none of the aircraft met aircraft availability goals for fiscal years 2017 and 2018  According to the Navy, the pace of operations has increased wear and tear on its aircraft and decreased the time available for maintenance and modernization—a necessity for an aging fleet  For example, the average age of a legacy F/A-18A-D Hornet is 26 years, of an AV-8B Harrier is 21 years, and of the C-2A Greyhound is 29 years  Both services expect these aircraft will continue to be used for the foreseeable future and in some cases into the 2030s  The Navy and the Marine Corps face delays in the arrival of the F-35 to replace their legacy F/A-18A-D Hornets and AV-8B Harriers  To compensate for the delay, the Navy and the Marine Corps are planning to procure additional aircraft, such as the F/A-18E-F Super Hornet, and extend the service life and upgrade the capabilities of their legacy aircraft  However, these efforts and the sustainment of the Navy and Marine Corps legacy aircraft fleet face key challenges as shown in figure 4  Specifically, our prior work has shown that the Navy and the Marine Corps are confronted with two sets of challenges in sustaining their aircraft: Depot maintenance complexities for aging aircraft and spare parts availability  Depot maintenance on aging weapon systems, including Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, becomes less predictable as structural fatigue occurs and parts that were not expected to be replaced begin to wear out  While the Navy and the Marine Corps reported that sustainment funding accounts, such as those for depot maintenance and spare parts, have been funded at increased levels in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, efforts to improve spare parts availability take time to produce results due to long lead times for acquiring some items  In addition, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft face challenges associated with diminishing manufacturing sources and parts obsolescence  DOD has a program intended to manage these risks, but we reported in September 2017 that its implementation varied across DOD weapon system program offices  We made recommendations to improve the program’s management; DOD concurred and has initiated improvement efforts  Maintenance personnel inexperience and retention  The Navy has had difficulty attracting and retaining skilled maintainers, such as sheet metal workers and machinists at its aviation depots (i e , Fleet Readiness Centers), which directly affects its ability to complete planned maintenance  Some of the depots experienced challenges attracting and retaining skilled personnel due to competition with nearby contractors that are able to offer higher pay, according to Navy depot officials  Similar to the shipyards, the aviation depots also lack experienced personnel, affecting the efficiency and quality of maintenance  For example, 41 percent of the skilled workers at Fleet Readiness Center Southwest have 2 years or fewer of experience  Workforce inexperience and attrition of skilled personnel were some of the reasons cited for machining defects detected in the landing gear for F/A-18, E-2, and C-2A aircraft by a recent Navy report  All of the depots have undertaken retention efforts such as incentives, bonuses, and awards to address these issues  Until the Navy and Marine Corps address maintenance and supply challenges it will be difficult to meet Secretary of Defense-established mission capability goals  Specifically, in September 2018, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum emphasizing that a key component of implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy is ensuring critical aviation platforms meet their mission capability targets by the end of fiscal year 2019  The memorandum established a goal of achieving a minimum of 80-percent mission capable rates for various aircraft, including for the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ F/A-18 inventories, by the end of fiscal year 2019 while also reducing operating and maintenance costs  To accomplish this, the Navy and the Marine Corps developed the Return to Readiness strategy in November 2018 that includes a broad array of actions to improve the availability of spare parts and evaluate the application of best commercial practices to naval aviation sustainment, among other actions  Office of the Secretary of Defense and Navy program officials told us, and based on our prior work we agree, that this goal will be challenging to achieve by the end of fiscal year 2019  We reported in April 2018 that fighter pilot shortages in the Navy and the Marine Corps have been worsening in recent years and shortfalls are projected to remain through at least fiscal year 2023  Our analysis of Navy and Marine Corps data showed that the Navy’s shortage of first operational tour fighter pilots more than doubled from 12 percent in fiscal year 2013 to 26 percent in fiscal year 2017  Similarly, the Marine Corps’ overall shortage of fighter pilots quadrupled from 6 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 24 percent in fiscal year 2017  Also, as we reported in April 2018, service officials attributed the pilot shortages to reduced training opportunities and increased attrition due to career dissatisfaction, among other factors  Officials from both services stated at the time that they have ensured that deploying squadrons have been fully staffed with fighter pilots by using various approaches including using senior pilots to staff junior positions and having pilots deploy more frequently and for longer periods  However, we reported that squadron leaders and fighter pilots said that these approaches had a negative impact on the fighter pilot training and retention and ultimately may be exacerbating the situation  Further compounding their pilot shortages, we also found that the services have not recently reevaluated squadron requirements to reflect an increased fighter pilot workload  As a result, the reported shortage actually could be greater  The services were taking actions, including increasing retention incentives for fighter pilots  To help determine the magnitude of the shortages and help target strategies to better meet their personnel needs, we recommended, and the Navy and Marine Corps agreed, to reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements  Sustainment challenges are not just an issue for older aircraft, but represent an enduring challenge for the F-35 Lightning II aircraft—a key component to the future of tactical aviation for the Navy and Marine Corps  The Navy and Marine Corps are both flying F-35s now as the program ramps up development, and they plan to procure nearly 700 aircraft over the coming decades  The sustainment costs of the F-35 fleet are projected to exceed $1 trillion over its 60-year life cycle  In October 2017, we reported that: F-35B aircraft (including Marine Corps aircraft) were available (i e , the aircraft were safe to fly, available for use, and able to perform at least one tasked mission) about 52 percent of the time from March 2017 through June 2017, which fell short of the 65-percent goal established by the Marine Corps for non-deployed units and F-35B aircraft (including Marine Corps aircraft) were fully mission capable (i e , the aircraft were capable of accomplishing all tasked missions) about 15 percent of the time from March 2017 through June 2017, which fell short of the 60-percent goal established by the Marine Corps for non-deployed units  We also reported on numerous sustainment challenges leading to less than desirable outcomes for F-35 warfighter readiness  For example, F-35 aircraft were unable to fly 22 percent of the time because of parts shortages from January 2017 through August 7, 2017  Additionally, DOD’s capabilities to repair F-35 parts at military depots were 6 years behind schedule, which resulted in average part repair times that are twice that of the program’s objective  As DOD gains experience with the F-35, our work has shown that the department has encountered additional challenges  In 2017, the Marine Corps became the first military service to station F-35 aircraft overseas, transferring aircraft to Iwakuni, Japan  While in the Pacific, DOD expects to disperse its F-35s into smaller detachments to outmaneuver the enemy and counter regional threats  However, in April 2018, we reported that this approach posed logistics and supply challenges  In June 2018, we reported that the F-35 program had not improved its reliability and maintainability over the past year and continued to fall short on half of its performance targets  Furthermore, we found that the program may not meet its required targets before each variant of the F-35 is expected to demonstrate maturity—the point at which the aircraft has flown enough hours to predictably determine reliability and maintainability over its lifespan  This means that the Navy and the Marine Corps may have to decide whether they are willing to accept less reliable and maintainable aircraft than originally planned  Among other outcomes, this could result in higher maintenance costs and lower aircraft availability than anticipated which also could pose readiness challenges in the future  As we reported in October 2017, the poor reliability of certain parts is already contributing to shortages of F-35 spare parts  Challenges posed by the F-35 program are largely the result of sustainment plans that do not fully include or consider key requirements  Our work has shown that planning for sustainment and aligning its funding are critical if DOD wants to meet its aircraft availability goals and effectively deploy to support operations  To address the challenges associated with F-35 sustainment and operational deployment, we recommended that DOD revise its sustainment plans, align associated funding, and mitigate the risks associated with key supply chain-related challenges for deployed F-35s in the Pacific, among others  DOD concurred with these recommendations and stated that it is taking steps to address them


Report 2:  Furthermore, as previously discussed, the Secretary of Defense has established an 80-percent mission capability goal for critical aviation assets, including the F-35  Due to current low availability and numerous sustainment issues, the F-35 fleet will be challenged in meeting the goal  In sum, the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ significant readiness challenges have developed over more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and reductions in force structure  Both services have made encouraging progress identifying the causes of their readiness decline and have begun efforts to arrest and reverse it; however, our prior work shows that fully addressing the persistent readiness challenges will require years of sustained management attention  Our work cited today contains 25 specific recommendations to the Navy and the Marine Corps and an additional 20 recommendations to various other DOD components to assist these services in rebuilding the readiness of their forces and in modernizing for the future  Attention to these recommendations can assist the Navy and the Marine Corps as they seek to rebuild the readiness of their forces  Chairmen Wicker and Sullivan, Ranking Members Hirono and Kaine, and Members of the Subcommittees, this concludes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time  If you or your staff have questions about this testimony, please contact John H  Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Clarine Allen; Steven Banovac; John Bumgarner; Chris Cronin; Benjamin Emmel; Cynthia Grant; Mae Jones; Amie Lesser; Tobin McMurdie; Shahrzad Nikoo; Carol Petersen; Cody Raysinger; Michael Silver; John E  “Jet” Trubey; and Chris Watson  Over the past 4 years, we have issued a number of reports related to Navy and Marine Corps readiness and we used them to develop this statement  Table 1 summarizes the recommendations in these reports  The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with most of the 45 recommendations and has many actions underway  However, DOD has not fully implemented any of the recommendations to date  For each of the reports, the specific recommendations and any progress made in implementing them are summarized in tables 2 through 16  Report numbers with a C or RC suffix are classified  Report numbers with a SU suffix are sensitive but unclassified  Classified and sensitive but unclassified reports are available to personnel with the proper clearances and need to know, upon request  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet  GAO-19-229  Washington, D C : November 19, 2018  Air Force Readiness: Actions Needed to Rebuild Readiness and Prepare for the Future  GAO-19-120T  Washington, D C : October 10, 2018  Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need to Be Clarified  GAO-18-678  Washington, D C : September 10, 2018  Weapon System Sustainment: Selected Air Force and Navy Aircraft Generally Have Not Met Availability Goals, and DOD and Navy Guidance Need Clarification  GAO-18-146SU  Washington, D C : April 25, 2018  Military Readiness: Update on DOD’s Progress in Developing a Readiness Rebuilding Plan  GAO-18-441RC  Washington, D C : August 10, 2018  (SECRET) Military Personnel: Collecting Additional Data Could Enhance Pilot Retention Efforts  GAO-18-439  Washington, D C : June 21, 2018  F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Development Is Nearly Complete, but Deficiencies Found in Testing Need to Be Resolved  GAO-18-321  Washington, D C : June 5, 2018  Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Share F-35 Operational Lessons Across the Military Services  GAO-18-464R  Washington, D C : April 25, 2018  Military Readiness: Clear Policy and Reliable Data Would Help DOD Better Manage Service Members’ Time Away from Home  GAO-18-253  Washington, D C : April 25, 2018  Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Fighter Pilot Workforce Requirements  GAO-18-113  Washington, D C : April 11, 2018  Military Aircraft: F-35 Brings Increased Capabilities, but the Marine Corps Needs to Assess Challenges Associated with Operating in the Pacific  GAO-18-79C  Washington, D C : March 28, 2018  (SECRET) Navy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training  GAO-18-212T  Washington, DC : December 1, 2017  F-35 Aircraft Sustainment: DOD Needs to Address Challenges Affecting Readiness and Cost Transparency  GAO-18-75  Washington, D C : October 26, 2017  Defense Supply Chain: DOD Needs Complete Information on Single Sources of Supply to Proactively Manage the Risks  GAO-17-768  Washington, D C : September 28, 2017  Navy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training  GAO-17-789  Washington, D C : September 26, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-809T  Washington, D C : September 19, 2017  Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions That Affect Operation  GAO-17-548  Washington, D C : September 12, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Maintenance, Training, and Other Challenges Facing the Fleet  GAO-17-798T  Washington, D C : September 7, 2017  Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Maintain Viable Surge Sealift and Combat Logistics Fleets GAO-17-503  Washington, D C : August 22, 2017 (reissued on Oct 31, 2017)  Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges  GAO-17-369  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  Military Readiness: Coastal Riverine Force Challenges  GAO-17-462C  Washington, D C : June 13, 2017  (SECRET) Navy Shipbuilding: Policy Changes Needed to Improve the Post-Delivery Process and Ship Quality  GAO-17-418  Washington, D C : July 13, 2017 Offshore Petroleum Discharge System: The Navy Has Not Mitigated Risk Associated with System Limitations  GAO-17-531C  Washington, D C : June 22, 2017  (SECRET) Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and Composition of Ship Crews  GAO-17-413  Washington, D C : May 18, 2017  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-841  Washington, D C : September 7, 2016  Military Readiness: DOD’s Readiness Rebuilding Efforts May Be at Risk without a Comprehensive Plan  GAO-16-534C  Washington, D C : June 30, 2016  (SECRET) Defense Inventory: Further Analysis and Enhanced Metrics Could Improve Service Supply and Depot Operations  GAO-16-450  Washington, D C : June 9, 2016  Navy and Marine Corps: Services Face Challenges to Rebuilding Readiness  GAO-16-481RC  Washington, D C : May 25, 2016  (SECRET//NOFORN) Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan  GAO-16-466R  Washington, D C : May 2, 2016  F-35 Sustainment: DOD Needs a Plan to Address Risks Related to Its Central Logistics System  GAO-16-439  Washington, D C : April 14, 2016  Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports  GAO-15-329  Washington, D C : May 29, 2015  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 

ground_truth: Since 1993, the U.S. government has committed more than $5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. According to the Department of State, this assistance to the Palestinians promotes U.S. economic and political foreign policy interests by supporting Middle East peace negotiations and financing economic stabilization programs. USAID is primarily responsible for administering ESF assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. Appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 included provisions for GAO to review the treatment, handling, and uses of funds provided through the ESF for assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. This report examines (1) the status of ESF assistance and projects provided to the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including project assistance and payments to PA creditors, and (2) the extent to which USAID conducted required vetting of PA creditors to ensure that this assistance would not support entities or individuals associated with terrorism and assessed PA ministries' capacity to use ESF assistance as intended. GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations and USAID financial data, policies, procedures, and documents. GAO also interviewed USAID and State Department officials. As of March 2018, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had allocated about $545 million of funding appropriated to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) for assistance in the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016. USAID obligated about $544 million (over 99 percent) and expended about $351 million (over 64 percent) of the total allocations. Project assistance accounted for approximately $399 million of the obligated funds, while payments to Palestinian Authority (PA) creditors accounted for $145 million (see figure). USAID's obligations for project assistance in the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 supported three development objectives—Economic Growth and Infrastructure ($239 million), Investing in the Next Generation ($107 million), and Governance and Civic Engagement (about $25 million). In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, USAID made payments directly to PA creditors—two Israeli fuel companies, to cover debts for petroleum purchases, and a local Palestinian bank, to pay off a line of credit used for PA medical referrals to six hospitals in the East Jerusalem Hospital network. USAID vetted PA creditors to ensure that the program assistance would not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism and also conducted external assessments and financial audits of PA ministries of Health and Finance and Planning. USAID documentation showed that, as required, officials checked the vetting status of each PA creditor within 12 months before USAID signed its debt relief grant agreements with the PA. In addition, although USAID determined that it was not legally required to assess the PA Ministry of Health's medical referral services and the Ministry of Finance and Planning's petroleum procurement system, the agency commissioned external assessments of both ministries. These assessments found some weaknesses in both ministries' systems; however, USAID mission officials stated that these weaknesses did not affect USAID debt relief payments to the PA creditors. Nevertheless, USAID took additional steps to mitigate the identified weaknesses. For example, a USAID contractor worked with the Ministry of Health to update, revise, and approve guidelines for medical referrals. In addition, USAID commissioned financial audits of the debt relief grant agreements between USAID and the PA for direct payments to PA creditors in fiscal year 2015 and 2016. The audits did not identify any ineligible costs, reportable material weaknesses in internal control, or material instances of noncompliance with the terms of the agreements. GAO is not making recommendations in this report.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: Since 1993, USAID has obligated more than $5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, primarily using funds appropriated through the ESF  According to State officials, through the ESF, USAID provides project assistance and debt relief payments to PA creditors  USAID, with overall foreign policy guidance from State, implements most ESF programs, including programs related to private sector development, health, water and road infrastructure, local governance, civil society, rule of law, education, and youth development  According to USAID officials, this assistance to the West Bank and Gaza contributes to building a more democratic, stable, prosperous, and secure Palestinian society—a goal that USAID described as being in the interest of the Palestinians, the United States, and Israel  Figure 1 shows the location of the West Bank and Gaza relative to surrounding countries  USAID assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is conducted under antiterrorism policies and procedures outlined in an administrative policy document known as Mission Order 21  The stated purpose of the mission order, as amended, is to describe policies and procedures to ensure that the mission’s program assistance does not inadvertently provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism  We have previously reported on the status of ESF assistance to the Palestinians and USAID’s antiterrorism policies and procedures in the West Bank and Gaza  As of March 31, 2018, USAID had obligated about $544 1 million (over 99 percent) and expended about $350 6 million (over 64 percent) of approximately $544 5 million in ESF assistance allocated for the West Bank and Gaza in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 (see table 1)  USAID obligated portions of the allocated funds for direct payments to PA creditors—specifically, payments to two Israeli fuel companies, to cover debts for petroleum purchases, and to a local Palestinian bank, to pay off a line of credit used for PA medical referrals to six hospitals in the East Jerusalem Hospital network  Project assistance obligated for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 accounted for about $215 million (74 percent) and $184 million (72 percent), respectively, of USAID’s obligations of ESF assistance for the West Bank and Gaza for those fiscal years (see fig  1)  Payments to the PA’s creditors accounted for the remaining obligations—about $75 million (26 percent) of fiscal year 2015 obligations and about $70 million (28 percent) of fiscal year 2016 obligations  According to USAID documents, ESF project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 was obligated for three USAID development objectives: Economic Growth and Infrastructure (about $239 million), Investing in the Next Generation (about $107 million), and Governance and Civic Engagement (about $25 million)  Program support—which sustains all development objectives, according to USAID—accounted for about $29 million (see table 2)  Economic Growth and Infrastructure  The largest share—about 60 percent—of USAID’s ESF project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 supported the agency’s Economic Growth and Infrastructure development objective  According to USAID documents, as of March 31, 2018, the agency had obligated about $239 million and expended approximately $89 million (about 37 percent) for projects under this objective  USAID officials stated that the agency funded these projects under the following standard State-budgeted program areas: health (including water), infrastructure, private sector competiveness, and stabilization operations and security sector reform  The largest project—the Architecture and Engineering Services project—received about $20 million of fiscal year 2015 ESF assistance and $17 million of fiscal year 2016 ESF assistance  The purpose of the project was to rehabilitate and construct infrastructure through the procurement of infrastructure services, including engineering design and construction management, among other things  The contractor was required to coordinate with relevant PA and Israeli entities, as well as with USAID, to assist in the selection of PA water and wastewater projects and in the planning and design of water projects such as small- to large-scale water distribution systems, water treatment systems, and institutional capacity building  Investing in the Next Generation  The second-largest share—about 27 percent—of USAID’s fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza supported the agency’s Investing in the Next Generation development objective  According to USAID documents, as of March 31, 2018, the agency had obligated about $107 million and expended approximately $79 million (about 74 percent) for projects under this objective  Program areas funded included education, health, social and economic services and protection of vulnerable populations  The largest project funded under this objective—a grant to the World Food Program for assistance to vulnerable groups—received $12 million in fiscal year 2015 and $15 million in fiscal year 2016 ESF assistance  The project focused on ensuring food security, including meeting food needs, of the nonrefugee population; increasing food availability and dietary diversity for the most vulnerable and food-insecure nonrefugee population; and establishing linkages with the Palestinian private sector (shopkeepers, farms, and factories) to produce and deliver the aid being provided to Palestinians  For example, the project directly distributed a standard food ration through both direct food distribution and electronic food vouchers to vulnerable nonrefugee families  Governance and Civic Engagement  The smallest share—about 6 percent—of USAID’s fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza supported the agency’s Governance and Civic Engagement development objective  According to USAID documents, as of March 31, 2018, USAID had obligated about $24 6 million and expended approximately $14 5 million (about 60 percent) for projects in program areas that included civil society, good governance, and rule of law  The largest project funded under this objective—a contract for the Communities Thrive Project— received about $5 2 million and $8 million in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance, respectively  The project aimed to help 55 West Bank municipalities improve fiscal management, fiscal accountability and transparency, and delivery and management of municipal services, among other things  Under debt relief grant agreements with the PA, USAID made direct payments of ESF assistance to PA creditors totaling about $75 million from fiscal year 2015 funds and $70 million from fiscal year 2016 funds  USAID paid about $40 million from fiscal year 2015 funds and $45 million from fiscal year 2016 funds to two oil companies to cover debts for petroleum purchases  In addition, USAID paid about $35 million from fiscal year 2015 funds and $25 million from fiscal year 2016 funds to the Bank of Palestine, to pay off a PA line of credit that was used to cover PA medical referrals to six hospitals in the East Jerusalem Hospital network  Before using fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance to pay PA creditors, USAID vetted the creditors to ensure that the assistance would not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism, as required by its policies and procedures  USAID determined that certain legal requirements, including the requirement for an assessment of the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning, were not applicable for direct payments of these funds to PA creditors  Nevertheless, USAID continued to commission external assessments and financial audits of the PA Ministries of Health and Finance and Planning  USAID documentation for payments to creditors shows that before signing debt relief agreements with the PA, mission officials checked, as required by Mission Order 21, the vetting status of PA creditors who would receive direct payments under the agreements, to ensure their eligibility before any payment was made  USAID Mission Order 21 requires that before payments to PA creditors are executed, the creditors must be vetted—that is, the creditors’ key individuals and other identifying information must be checked against the federal Terrorist Screening Center database and other information sources to determine whether they have links to terrorism  According to USAID policies and procedures, each PA creditor must be vetted if more than 12 months have passed since the last time the creditor was vetted and approved to receive ESF payments  We found that for payments made to PA creditors using fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance, USAID vetted each PA creditor that received payments and completed the vetting during the 12- month period before the debt relief agreements with the PA were signed (see table 3)  USAID determined that certain legal requirements applicable to cash transfers to the PA were not applicable to direct payments to PA creditors of fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance  In September 2015, we reported that USAID ceased making cash payments directly to the PA in 2014 and began making payments of ESF assistance directly to PA creditors  In reviewing USAID’s compliance with key legal requirements, we found that USAID had complied with the requirements when making cash transfers to the PA in fiscal year 2013  However, USAID had determined that some requirements were not applicable to direct payments made to PA creditors in fiscal year 2014, because no funds were being provided directly to the PA  After fiscal year 2015, USAID further defined the scope of statutory requirements it deemed applicable to payments to PA creditors using fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance, under the rationale that these payments do not constitute direct payments to the PA  Specifically, according to USAID, the agency determined that the following statutory requirements discussed in our prior report were not applicable to direct payments to PA creditors  A requirement to notify the Committees on Appropriations 15 days before obligating funds for a cash transfer to the PA A requirement for the PA to maintain cash transfer funds in a separate account A requirement for the President to waive the prohibition on providing funds to the PA and to submit an accompanying report to the Committees on Appropriations A requirement for the Secretary of State to provide a certification and accompanying report to the Committees on Appropriations when the President waives the prohibition on providing funds to the PA Requirements for direct government-to-government assistance, including an assessment of the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning According to USAID officials, they currently do not plan to resume cash payments to the PA, because making direct payments to creditors minimizes the misuse of funds and assures full transparency and appropriateness of transfers  Although USAID concluded that the statutory requirement mandating assessments of the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning did not apply to direct payments to PA creditors, the West Bank and Gaza mission commissioned external assessments of the PA Ministry of Health’s medical referral services and Ministry of Finance and Planning’s petroleum procurement system  According to a USAID document, while the payments to the creditors did not constitute direct budget support to the PA, the agency chose to commission external assessments to determine whether the PA’s financial systems were sufficient to ensure adequate accountability for USAID funds consistent with legislative requirements for direct budget support funds  These external assessments identified weaknesses in both systems  Ministry of Health medical referrals  The assessment report stated that the ministry did not have approved policies and procedures for the medical referral process, a list of medical services covered by the referral system, and written criteria for selecting referral hospitals in the medical referral systems  In response, in a January 2016 internal memorandum, the West Bank and Gaza mission officials concluded, among other things, that the findings did not pose a significant risk to USAID funds  They also stated that the Ministry of Health’s medical referral system had adequate policies and procedures for referrals to local hospitals  However, after the assessment report was issued, a USAID contractor worked with the Ministry of Health to update, revise, and approve guidelines for medical referrals  Ministry of Finance and Planning petroleum procurements  The assessment report stated that the ministry lacked specific policies and procedures to prevent or detect fraud in the petroleum procurement systems  In the West Bank and Gaza mission’s January 2016 memorandum, USAID mission officials disagreed with the assessment’s findings regarding the petroleum procurement system, stating that the assessment did not take into account sufficient and adequate internal controls at the ministry as a first line of defense against fraud  The memorandum also stated that the finding did not affect USAID debt relief payments to the PA creditors  USAID officials told us that, while they did not believe the external assessments’ findings affected the integrity of USAID’s debt relief payment process, they took four additional steps to mitigate findings noted in the assessment of the Ministry of Finance and Planning’s fuel procurement processes  According to USAID officials, they (1) confirmed that the fuel companies had controls and systems to ensure an objective and transparent system in receiving and recording PA orders, (2) dispatched orders with official and properly signed shipping delivery and receipt documents, (3) obtained written confirmation from the fuel companies of the costs of the fuel provided to the PA, and (4) confirmed the PA’s petroleum debt with the fuel companies before initiating the payments and after making the payments  In addition, in 2016, USAID commissioned two routine financial audits of the debt relief grant agreed to by USAID and the PA for the use of fiscal year 2015 ESF assistance to make direct payments to PA creditors  According to USAID officials, the auditors were to examine the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning’s recording of USAID payments to PA creditors in its financial records as well as the ministry’s and USAID’s compliance with the terms of the grant agreement and related implementation letters  The audits did not identify any questioned or ineligible costs, reportable material weaknesses in internal control, or material instances of noncompliance with the terms of the debt relief grant  Also, in 2017, USAID contracted for a financial audit of the fiscal year 2016 debt relief grant agreed to by USAID and the PA  According to a USAID document, in May 2018, USAID held an entrance conference with the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning for the audit of the fiscal year 2016 grant  In July 2018, USAID sent the final audit report to the Regional Inspector General for review  According to the USAID document, the report did not identify any questioned or ineligible costs, reportable material weaknesses in internal controls, or material instances of noncompliance with the terms of the grant  We provided a draft of this report to USAID and State for review and comment  USAID provided comments, which we have reproduced in appendix II, as well as technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  State did not provide comments  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Administrator of USAID, and the Secretary of State  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who contributed to this report are listed in appendix III  Appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 included provisions for GAO to review the treatment, handling, and uses of funds provided through the ESF for assistance to the West Bank and Gaza  This report examines (1) the status of ESF assistance and projects provided to the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including payments to PA creditors, and (2) the extent to which USAID conducted required vetting of PA creditors to ensure that assistance would not support entities or individuals associated with terrorism and assessed PA ministries’ capacity to use ESF assistance as intended  To address our first objective, we reviewed appropriations legislation, related budget justification documents, and financial data for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including expenditures as of March 31, 2018, provided by USAID’s West Bank and Gaza mission in Tel Aviv, Israel  We reviewed data that USAID provided on obligations and expenditures of all ESF assistance for the West Bank and Gaza as of March 31, 2018, from annual allocations for fiscal years 2015 and 2016  We also reviewed relevant USAID documents, including notifications to Congress regarding the use of appropriated funds  In addition, we interviewed USAID and State officials in Washington, D C , and Tel Aviv  To determine whether the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, we requested and reviewed information from USAID officials about their procedures for entering contract and financial information into USAID’s data system  We determined that the USAID data were sufficiently reliable  For the project information included in this report, we relied on data that USAID provided, showing its obligations and expenditures of fiscal year 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance for West Bank and Gaza  For illustrative purposes, we requested and obtained from USAID descriptions of projects that, according to USAID officials, represented the largest financial obligations for each development objective in fiscal years 2015 and 2016  To address our second objective, we identified and reviewed relevant legal requirements as well as USAID policies and procedures to comply with those requirements  USAID Mission Order 21 is the primary document that details USAID procedures to ensure that the mission’s assistance program does not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism, consistent with the prohibition on such support found in relevant laws and executive orders  In addition, we reviewed 27 USAID determinations of compliance for payments to PA creditors and discussed with USAID mission officials their efforts to comply with the policies and procedures in Mission Order 21 before executing payments to hospitals, companies, and banks that facilitated the payments  We also reviewed the timing of USAID’s vetting of each PA creditor that received payments, to ensure that, as required by Mission Order 21, the vetting occurred within 12 months before USAID signed the relevant debt relief grant agreement with the PA  Further, we reviewed external assessments of the PA Ministries of Health and Finance and Planning and financial audits of the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning, and we discussed the assessments’ and audits with USAID officials responsible for payments to PA creditors  We conducted this performance audit from September 2017 to August 2018, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the contact named above, Judith McCloskey (Assistant Director), Tom Zingale (Analyst-in-Charge), Eddie Uyekawa, Jeff Isaacs, and Nicole Willems made significant contributions to this report  David Dornisch, Neil Doherty, Reid Lowe, and Roger Stoltz also contributed to the report 


Report 2: Since 2001, the United States has made a commitment to building Afghanistan’s security and governance in order to prevent the country from once again becoming a sanctuary for terrorists  To achieve its security objectives, the United States currently has two missions in Afghanistan: a counterterrorism mission that it leads and the NATO-led Resolute Support train, advise, and assist mission, which it participates in with other coalition nations  The objective of Resolute Support, according to DOD reporting, is to establish self-sustaining Afghan security ministries and forces that work together to maintain security in Afghanistan  The United States is conducting these missions within a challenging security environment that has deteriorated since the January 2015 transition to Afghan-led security  The United Nations reported nearly 24,000 security incidents in Afghanistan in 2017—the most ever recorded—and, despite a slight decrease in the overall number of security incidents in early 2018, the United Nations noted significant security challenges, including a spike in high-casualty attacks in urban areas and coordinated attacks by the insurgency on ANDSF checkpoints  DOD provides both personnel and funding to support its efforts in Afghanistan  DOD documents indicate that the United States contributes more troops to Resolute Support than any other coalition nation  As of May 2018, the United States was contributing 54 percent of Resolute Support military personnel, according to DOD reporting  Of the approximately 14,000 U S  military personnel in Afghanistan as of June 2018, about 8,500 were assigned to Resolute Support to train, advise, and assist the ANDSF, according to DOD reporting  For fiscal year 2018, Congress appropriated about $4 67 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund—the primary mechanism of U S  financial support for manning, training, and equipping the ANDSF  Other international donors provided about $800 million, and the Afghan government committed to providing about $500 million, according to DOD reporting  Under Resolute Support and the International Security Assistance Force mission that preceded it, CSTC-A is the DOD organization responsible for (1) overseeing efforts to equip and train the ANA and ANP; (2) validating requirements, including equipment requirements; (3) validating existing supply levels; (4) submitting requests to DOD components to contract for procurement of materiel for the ANDSF; and (5) ensuring that the Afghan government appropriately uses and accounts for U S  funds provided as direct contributions from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund  OSD-P is responsible for developing policy on and conducting oversight of the bilateral security relationship with Afghanistan focused on efforts to develop the Afghan security ministries and their forces  In August 2017, we reported that the United States had spent almost $18 billion on equipment and transportation for the ANDSF from fiscal years 2005 through April 2017, representing the second-largest expenditure category from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund  In that report, we identified six types of key equipment the United States funded for the ANDSF in fiscal years 2003 through 2016, including approximately: 600,000 weapons, such as rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, shotguns, and pistols; 163,000 tactical and nontactical radios, such as handheld radios and 76,000 vehicles, such as Humvees, trucks, recovery vehicles, and mine resistant ambush protected vehicles; 30,000 equipment items for detecting and disposing of explosives, such as bomb disposal robots and mine detectors; 16,000 equipment items for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, such as unmanned surveillance drones and night vision devices; and 208 aircraft, such as helicopters, light attack aircraft, and cargo airplanes  The Ministry of Defense oversees the ANA, and the Ministry of the Interior oversees the ANP  According to DOD reporting, the authorized force level for the ANDSF, excluding civilians, as of June 2018 was 352,000: 227,374 for the Ministry of Defense and 124,626 for the Ministry of Interior  The ANA includes the ANA corps, Afghan Air Force, Special Mission Wing, ANA Special Operations Command, and Ktah Khas (counterterrorism forces)  The ANP includes the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Anti-Crime Police, Afghan Border Police, Public Security Police, Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, and General Command of Police Special Units  The ANA Special Mission Wing, Ktah Khas, ANA Special Operations Command, and ANP General Command of Police Special Units are collectively referred to as the Afghan Special Security Forces  In this report, we refer to the Afghan Air Force and the Afghan Special Security Forces as specialized forces, and the other components of the ANDSF as conventional forces  According to DOD reporting, the combined authorized force level for the specialized forces as of June 2018 was approximately 34,500, or about 10 percent of the ANDSF’s total authorized force level of 352,000, compared with the conventional forces, which make up about 74 percent of the total authorized force level for the ANDSF  Figure 1 shows the ANDSF’s organization  U S  and coalition advisors from Resolute Support focus on capacity building at the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and ANDSF regional headquarters, according to DOD reporting  Ministerial advisors are located at Resolute Support headquarters in Kabul  At the ministerial level, advisors provide assistance to improve institutional capabilities, focusing on several functional areas  Table 1 summarizes the indicators of effectiveness that ministerial advisors are to use to measure ministerial progress in developing functioning systems that can effectively execute each of the functional areas  Regional Resolute Support advisors from seven advising centers located throughout Afghanistan provide support to nearby ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters personnel, according to DOD reporting  Some advisors are embedded with their ANDSF counterparts, providing a continuous coalition presence, while others provide less frequent support, based on proximity to and capability of their ANDSF counterparts  Regional advisors are to track ANDSF capability development by assessing the progress of the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters based on five capability pillars (see table 2)  DOD and other Resolute Support advisors are to document the results of these assessments each quarter in an ANDSF Assessment Report  According to DOD reporting, in addition to ministerial and regional advising, two tactical-level advisory commands provide continuous support for the ANDSF’s specialized forces: Train, Advise, and Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air) advises the Afghan Air Force down to the unit level, and NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) primarily provides tactical-level special operations advising for the Afghan Special Security Forces  TAAC-Air and NSOCC-A assess capabilities at the headquarters level based on the five capability pillars described above in table 2, and these assessments are included in the quarterly ANDSF Assessment Report  Figure 2 shows the levels of advising each Resolute Support advisory command type provides for the ANDSF conventional forces and specialized forces  Since Resolute Support began, the ANDSF have improved some capabilities related to the functional areas and capability pillars described above, but face several capability gaps that leave them reliant on coalition assistance, according to publicly available DOD reporting  DOD defines capability as the ability to execute a given task  A capability gap is the inability to execute a specified course of action, such as an ANDSF functional area or a capability pillar (see tables 1 and 2 above)  According to DOD guidance, a gap may occur because forces lack a materiel or non-materiel capability, lack proficiency or sufficiency in a capability, or need to replace an existing capability solution to prevent a future gap from occurring  According to DOD reporting on the Afghan security ministries, ANA corps, and ANP zones, the ANDSF generally have improved in some capability areas since Resolute Support began, with some components performing better than others  For example, DOD has reported that the Afghan ministries have improved in operational planning, strategic communications, and coordination between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense at the national level  In general, the ANA is more capable than the ANP, according to DOD reporting  According to DOD officials and SIGAR reporting, this is due, in part, to the ANA having more coalition advisors and monitoring than the ANP  DOD officials also noted that the Ministry of Interior, which oversees the ANP, and Afghanistan’s justice system are both underdeveloped, hindering the effectiveness of the ANP  Corruption, understaffing, and training shortfalls have also contributed to the ANP’s underdevelopment, according to DOD and SIGAR reporting  The Afghan Special Security Forces are the most capable within the ANDSF and can conduct the majority of their operations independently without coalition enablers, according to DOD reporting  DOD and SIGAR reports have attributed the Afghan Special Security Forces’ relative proficiency to factors such as low attrition rates, longer training, and close partnership with coalition forces  The Afghan Air Force is becoming increasingly capable, and can independently plan for and perform some operational tasks, such as armed overwatch and aerial escort missions, according to DOD reporting  However, DOD has reported that the ANDSF generally continue to need support in several key areas  For example, as of December 2017, DOD reported several ministerial capability gaps, including force management; logistics; and analyzing and integrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information  DOD also reported that, as of December 2017, the ANA and ANP continued to have capability gaps in several key areas, such as weapons and equipment sustainment and integrating fire from aerial and ground forces  The ANDSF rely on support from contractors and coalition forces to mitigate capability gaps in these key areas  For some capability areas, such as aircraft and vehicle maintenance and logistics, the ANDSF is not expected to be self- sufficient until at least 2023, according to DOD reporting  According to DOD officials and SIGAR reporting, coalition and contractor support helps mitigate ANDSF capability gaps in the immediate term but may make it challenging to assess the ANDSF’s capabilities and gaps independent of such support  For example, vehicle and aircraft maintenance contractors are responsible for sustaining specific operational readiness rates for the equipment they service  While this helps ensure that ANDSF personnel have working equipment to accomplish their mission, thereby closing an immediate capability gap, it may mask the ANDSF’s underlying capabilities and potentially prolong reliance on such support, according to DOD officials and SIGAR reporting  DOD and the ANDSF have begun implementing plans and initiatives that aim to strengthen ANDSF capabilities  These include the following, among others: ANDSF Roadmap  In 2017, the Afghan government began implementing the ANDSF Roadmap—a series of developmental initiatives that seek to strengthen the ANDSF and increase security and governance in Afghanistan, according to DOD reporting  The Roadmap is structured to span 4 years, but DOD has reported that its full implementation will likely take longer than that  According to DOD reporting, the Roadmap aims to improve four key elements: (1) fighting capabilities; (2) leadership development; (3) unity of command and effort; and (4) counter-corruption efforts  Under the Roadmap’s initiative to increase the ANDSF’s fighting capabilities, DOD and the ANDSF have begun implementing plans to increase the size of the specialized forces  Specifically, DOD reports that the ANDSF plans to nearly double the size of the Afghan Special Security Forces by 2020 as an effort to bolster the ANDSF’s offensive reach and effectiveness  The Afghan Special Security Forces are to become the ANDSF’s primary offensive force, the conventional ANA forces are to focus on consolidating gains and holding key terrain and infrastructure, and the conventional ANP forces are to focus on community policing efforts  In addition, to provide additional aerial fire and airlift capabilities, the ANDSF began implementing an aviation modernization plan in 2017  The aim is to increase personnel strength and the size of the Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing fleets by 2023  Enhanced vehicle maintenance efforts  To help improve the ANDSF’s vehicle maintenance abilities, DOD awarded a National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract, which, according to DOD officials, became fully operational in December 2017  The National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract consolidated five separate vehicle maintenance and training contracts into a single contract and contains provisions for building the capacity of ANDSF and Afghan contractors to incrementally take control of vehicle maintenance over a 5-year period  Additional U S  military personnel  As part of the South Asia strategy, the United States committed 3,500 additional military personnel to increase support to its missions in Afghanistan  According to DOD reporting, most of the additional personnel will support the Resolute Support mission, providing more advising and combat enabler support to the ANDSF  Additionally, in March 2018, the United States began deploying a Security Force Assistance Brigade—a new type of unit made up of U S  Army personnel with expertise in training foreign militaries—to Afghanistan  The Security Force Assistance Brigade will advise conventional and specialized forces at and below the corps and zone levels and will accompany and support ANA conventional forces at the battalion level in ground operations as needed, according to DOD and SIGAR reporting  DOD collects some reliable information about the operation and maintenance abilities of ANDSF specialized forces, in part because advisors are embedded at the tactical level with the specialized forces, according to DOD officials  Specifically, U S  and coalition forces advise specialized forces at the tactical level under Resolute Support because building ANDSF aviation and special operations abilities are considered particularly important, according to DOD reporting  DOD officials told us that since U S  and coalition forces are embedded at the tactical level for specialized forces, they can monitor, assess, and report on tactical abilities, including the ability to operate and maintain equipment  Our analysis of information provided by DOD about the Afghan Air Force’s ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters illustrates that DOD has some detailed information about specialized forces  TAAC-Air advisors help train Afghan pilots and maintainers and collect information on their tactical abilities  For example, TAAC-Air advisors track the percentage of maintenance performed by Afghan Air Force maintainers and aircraft operational readiness rates, according to DOD officials  According to DOD reporting and officials, as of December 2017, the Afghan Air Force could independently conduct MD-530 helicopter operations for short intervals without contractor support but relied on contractors to perform the majority of maintenance and sustainment activities  See appendix II for more information on the Afghan Air Force’s ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters  U S  and coalition forces perform high-level assessments of the ANDSF conventional forces’ capabilities at the corps and zone levels but do not assess their tactical abilities, such as the ability to operate and maintain equipment, according to DOD officials  For example, U S  and coalition forces assess the ANA and ANP conventional forces in quarterly ANDSF Assessment Reports, but these reports are at the corps and zone headquarters levels, and are not meant to provide an evaluation of the entire ANDSF, according to DOD reporting  DOD officials stated that other U S - and coalition-produced reports and assessments, such as DOD’s semiannual Section 1225 reports to Congress, semiannual periodic mission reviews, and annual Afghanistan Plans of Record, provide some information on the ANDSF’s high-level capabilities  However, according to DOD officials, these reports do not routinely assess the conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain equipment  According to DOD officials, DOD does not assess conventional forces’ tactical abilities because advisors have had little or no direct contact with conventional units below the corps and zone levels, and thus do not collect such information on conventional forces  Specifically, under Resolute Support, U S  and coalition forces have not embedded with the conventional forces below the corps and zone levels except in limited circumstances  Since U S  and coalition forces do not collect firsthand information on the conventional units’ tactical abilities, they rely on those units’ self-reporting for information on ANDSF abilities below the corps and zone levels, which, according to DOD officials, may be unreliable  ANDSF reporting is not verified by U S  officials and can be unreliable in its consistency, comprehensiveness, and credibility, according to DOD officials and SIGAR  For example, the ANDSF produce a monthly tracker on vehicle availability, maintenance backlog, repair times, and personnel productivity, but DOD officials told us that the trackers are of questionable accuracy  Our analysis of information provided by DOD about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain tactical and nontactical radios illustrates the limited amount of information DOD has on ANDSF conventional forces’ tactical abilities  Specifically, DOD officials could not say how well ANDSF personnel on the front lines operate radios in the field and had only limited information on the ANDSF’s ability to maintain radios  For example, the officials noted that the ANA conventional forces can perform some unit-level radio repairs but that complex ANA radio maintenance and all ANP radio maintenance is conducted by contractors  DOD officials at Resolute Support headquarters told us that they provide ministerial- level advising on how to manage ANDSF radio systems and do not provide tactical advising or inventory control for radios  See appendix III for more information on the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain radios  Our analysis of information provided by DOD about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV) highlights the limited amount of information DOD has on ANDSF conventional forces’ tactical abilities compared with specialized forces  DOD officials were able to provide operation and maintenance information for MSFVs that had transferred to the specialized forces as of January 2018 but were unable to provide operation and maintenance information for any other MSFVs  The ANDSF began transferring one of the ANDSF’s two MSFV brigades from the conventional to specialized forces in August 2017, according to DOD officials  As part of this transfer, NSOCC-A advisors—who provide tactical-level advising for the Afghan Special Security Forces—assumed oversight for the first brigade from Resolute Support headquarters advisors  DOD officials stated that the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain MSFVs in this brigade prior to the transfer was unknown, as neither Resolute Support headquarters nor the ANA had assessed this  The operation and maintenance abilities of the second brigade, which is still in the conventional forces, remains unknown  DOD officials at NSOCC-A were able to provide information such as inventory and mission capability rates for the MSFVs that had transferred, but only for the short period of time the vehicles had been under the control of the specialized forces  DOD officials told us that NSOCC-A plans to collect more information on the specialized forces’ ability to operate and maintain MSFVs as they are transferred  See appendix IV for more information on the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain MSFVs  In the absence of embedded advisors at the tactical level, DOD has not implemented alternative approaches to collect reliable information about the conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain equipment  Federal internal control standards state that U S  agencies should obtain and process reliable information to evaluate performance in achieving key objectives and assessing risks  DOD officials acknowledged that some of the plans described above that DOD and the ANDSF have begun implementing to address capability gaps may provide opportunities for DOD to collect more reliable information on the conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment  For example, the National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support contract requires that contractors regularly report the total work orders received, work in progress, and completed maintenance work performed by ANDSF personnel as well as vehicle availability rates, which may be more reliable than the ANDSF’s monthly report on vehicle availability  In addition, the Security Force Assistance Brigade may be able to collect and report on the tactical abilities of units they advise and accompany on missions since they are being deployed at or below the corps and zone levels  However, as of June 2018, DOD officials had not decided which, if any, of these options to pursue  Without reliable information on the equipment operation and maintenance abilities of ANDSF conventional forces, which represent nearly 75 percent of the ANDSF, DOD may be unable to fully evaluate the success of its train, advise, assist, and equip efforts in Afghanistan  The United States invested nearly $84 billion in Afghan security in the 17- year period spanning fiscal years 2002 through 2018, but DOD continues to face challenges to developing a self-sustaining ANDSF  While DOD has reported the ANDSF have improved in several capability areas, they continue to face critical capability gaps, impeding their ability to maintain security and stability in Afghanistan independent of U S  and coalition forces  Moreover, DOD lacks reliable information about the degree to which conventional forces—which make up about three-quarters of the ANDSF—are able to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment  This limits DOD’s ability to fully evaluate the success of its train, advise, assist, and equip efforts in Afghanistan  The Secretary of Defense should develop and, as appropriate, implement options for collecting reliable information on the ANDSF conventional forces’ ability to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment  (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this report to DOD and State for comment  DOD declined to provide written comments specifically on this public version of the report, but DOD’s comments on the sensitive version of this report are reprinted in appendix V  The sensitive version of this report included two recommendations, which DOD cited in its comments on the draft of the sensitive report  One of those recommendations related to information that DOD deemed to be sensitive and that must be protected from public disclosure  Therefore, we have omitted that recommendation from DOD’s comment letter in appendix V  This omission did not have a material effect on the substance of DOD’s comments  In its comments, DOD concurred with the recommendation we made in this version of the report and stated it will take steps to implement it  DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  The Department of State had no comments  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff has any questions about this report please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or farbj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI  House Report 114-537 associated with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for us to review the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ (ANDSF) capability and capacity to operate and sustain U S -purchased weapon systems and equipment  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on September 20, 2018  Our September report included three objectives, including one on the extent to which DOD considers ANDSF input and meets their needs when identifying equipment requirements  DOD deemed the information related to that objective to be sensitive, which must be protected from public disclosure  Consequently, we removed that objective and a related recommendation from this public report  This version includes information on the other two objectives: (1) what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment  Although the information provided in this report is more limited, the report uses the same methodology for the two objectives as the sensitive report  To identify what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps, we reviewed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and DOD documents and reports, such as DOD’s semiannual Section 1225 reports to Congress, produced after the start of the NATO-led Resolute Support mission on January 1, 2015  To determine what steps DOD and NATO have taken to try to address gaps, we reviewed reports the Center for Naval Analyses produced for DOD, as well as DOD and NATO documents and reports produced after January 1, 2015, and reports from GAO, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and the DOD Inspector General  We also interviewed Center for Naval Analyses representatives and DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan, including DOD officials at the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-P) who helped create the DOD reporting we reviewed  To determine the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U S -purchased equipment, we reviewed DOD documents and reports and interviewed DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan, including DOD officials who advise the ANDSF  We also reviewed federal internal control standards to determine what responsibilities agencies have specifically related to information collection  To provide illustrative examples of information DOD has about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U S - purchased equipment and what that information indicates about the ANDSF’s abilities and challenges, we interviewed and analyzed written responses from DOD officials, including DOD officials who provide procurement and lifecycle management for some ANDSF aircraft and vehicles, about three equipment types—MD-530 helicopters, Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV), and radios  We selected these three equipment types from a list that we developed, for an August 2017 report, of key ANDSF equipment the United States purchased from fiscal years 2003 through 2016  We made our selections after reviewing DOD documentation and interviewing DOD officials regarding a number of considerations, such as (1) how critical the equipment is to the ANDSF’s ability to achieve its mission; (2) which ANDSF component uses the equipment (i e , Afghan National Police, Afghan National Army, or both); (3) whether DOD intends to continue procuring the equipment for the ANDSF; and (4) whether the equipment had been in use at least 5 years  We collected detailed information about the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters, MSFVs, and radios, as well as other key statistics DOD provided about the equipment, such as inventory, average lifespan, average cost, role, and training  This information was based mainly on DOD responses collected from January 2018 to February 2018 as well as DOD documents and reports produced after January 1, 2015  The total amount of MD-530s and radios authorized for procurement was based on DOD data that we collected for our August 2017 report on key ANDSF equipment the United States purchased in fiscal years 2003 through 2016, which we supplemented with additional data DOD provided on U S -purchased equipment from October 1, 2016, through December, 31, 2017  The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from August 2016 to September 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We subsequently worked with DOD from September 2018 to October 2018 to prepare this public version of the original sensitive report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with those standards  Manufacturer: MD Helicopters, Inc  U S  Program Management Office: U S  Army, Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft Project Management Office Program Advising: Train Advise Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air) The United States originally procured 6 unarmed MD-530s for the AAF for rotary wing training in 2011  In 2014, the United States purchased 12 armed MD-530s and began retrofitting the 5 remaining trainer helicopters with armament for operational missions to address a close air attack gap  MD- 530s were chosen to fill the gap over other aircraft, in part because they could be delivered relatively quickly as the AAF awaited A-29 light attack aircraft that were experiencing procurement delays, according to Department of Defense (DOD) officials  The United States procured additional MD-530s in 2015, 2016, and 2017 because of the aircraft’s positive impact on the battlefield, according to DOD officials (see fig  3)  Key Statistics Variants: All can be armed with  50-cal machine gun pods and/or 2 75 inch rocket pods  Total Authorized for Procurement: 60 as of December 31, 2017 Inventory: 25 as of January 2018 (30 are scheduled for delivery; attrition of 5 due to crashes and enemy fire) Average Lifespan: Absent mishaps, and with good maintenance, there is no defined lifespan limit for MD-530s, according to DOD officials  National Army and Afghan National Police, depending on the mission, in all but one region of Afghanistan, which is supported by other aircraft  MD-530s are typically tasked two at a time for missions, according to DOD officials  An MD-530 crew consists of a pilot and co-pilot, according to DOD  Average cost: $6 3 million per aircraft, including all electronic devices, weapons management systems, and weapons (excluding ordnance), according to DOD officials  o Division of labor is based on the individual crew members' capabilities, with one pilot handling navigation and communication while the other identifies targets and operates the weapon systems  Army pilot advisors at Kandahar Air Field, according to DOD officials  o MD-530 pilot training takes about 3 years (see fig  4)  1  The GAO report number cited in DOD’s letter refers to a draft of the sensitive version of this report, which we issued on September 20, 2018  Prior to issuing that version, we changed its report number to GAO-18- 662SU to reflect its sensitive nature  That version of this report included two recommendations  The second recommendation has been omitted from DOD’s letter in this public version because it was related to information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  In addition to the contact named above, Joyee Dasgupta (Assistant Director), Kara Marshall, Katherine Forsyth, and Bridgette Savino made key contributions to this report  The team also benefitted from the expert advice and assistance of David Dayton, Neil Doherty, Justin Fisher, Ashley Alley, Cary Russell, Marie Mak, James Reynolds, Sally Williamson, Ji Byun, and J  Kristopher Keener 

ground_truth: Developing independently capable ANDSF is a key component of U.S. and coalition efforts to create sustainable security and stability in Afghanistan under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support mission. The United States is the largest contributor of funding and personnel to Resolute Support, providing and maintaining ANDSF equipment, along with training, advising, and assistance to help the ANDSF effectively use and sustain the equipment in the future. House Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to review the ANDSF's capability and capacity to operate and sustain U.S.-purchased weapon systems and equipment. This report addresses (1) what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF's ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD and NATO reports and documents, examined three critical equipment types, and interviewed DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in September 2018. Information that DOD deemed sensitive has been omitted. Since the Resolute Support mission began in 2015, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have improved some fundamental capabilities, such as high-level operational planning, but continue to rely on U.S. and coalition support to fill several key capability gaps, according to Department of Defense (DOD) reporting. DOD has initiatives to address some ANDSF capability gaps, such as a country-wide vehicle maintenance and training effort, but DOD reports it does not expect the ANDSF to develop and sustain independent capabilities in some areas, such as logistics, for several years. While DOD has firsthand information on the abilities of the Afghan Air Force and Special Security Forces to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment, it has little reliable information on the equipment proficiency of conventional ANDSF units. U.S. and coalition advisors are embedded at the tactical level for the Air Force and Special Security Forces, enabling DOD to directly assess those forces' abilities. However, the advisors have little direct contact with conventional ANDSF units on the front lines. As a result, DOD relies on those units' self-assessments of tactical abilities, which, according to DOD officials, can be unreliable. GAO's analysis of three critical equipment types illustrated the varying degrees of DOD's information (see figure above). For example, DOD provided detailed information about the Air Force's ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters and the Special Security Forces' ability to operate and maintain Mobile Strike Force Vehicles; however, DOD had limited information about how conventional forces operate and maintain radios and Mobile Strike Force Vehicles. DOD's lack of reliable information on conventional forces' equipment operations and maintenance abilities adds to the uncertainty and risk in assessing the progress of DOD efforts in Afghanistan. GAO recommends that DOD develop options for collecting reliable information on conventional ANDSF units' ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. DOD concurred with this recommendation.