prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Cluster munitions are weapons that open in mid-air and disperse smaller submunitions—anywhere from a few dozen to hundreds—into an area  They can be delivered by aircraft or from ground systems such as artillery, rockets, and missiles  Cluster munitions are valued militarily because one munition can kill or destroy many targets within its impact area, and fewer weapons systems are needed to deliver fewer munitions to attack multiple targets  Cluster munitions also permit a smaller force to engage a larger adversary and are considered by some an "economy of force" weapon  Many cluster munitions rely on simple mechanical fuzes that arm the submunition based on its rate of spin and explode on impact or after a time delay  A newer generation of sensor-fuzed submunitions is being introduced by a number of nations to improve the munitions' and submunitions' accuracy and to reduce the large number of residual unexploded submunitions  These sensor-fuzed submunitions are designed to sense and destroy vehicles without creating an extensive hazard area of unexploded submunitions  Cluster bombs were first used in World War II, and inclusive of their debut, cluster munitions have been used in at least 21 states by at least 13 different countries  Cluster munitions were used extensively in Southeast Asia by the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates that in Laos alone, 9 million to 27 million unexploded submunitions remained after the conflict, resulting in over 10,000 civilian casualties to date  Cluster munitions were used by the Soviets in Afghanistan, by the British in the Falklands, by the Coalition in the Gulf War, and by the warring factions in Yugoslavia  In Kosovo and Yugoslavia in 1999, NATO forces dropped 1,765 cluster bombs containing approximately 295,000 submunitions  From 2001 through 2002, the United States dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 submunitions in Afghanistan, and U S  and British forces used almost 13,000 cluster munitions containing an estimated 1 8 million to 2 million submunitions during the first three weeks of combat in Iraq in 2003  Senior U S  government officials have stated that the United States has not used cluster munitions since 2003, during the intervention in Iraq  It is widely believed that confusion over U S  cluster submunitions (BLU-97/B) that were the same color and size as air-dropped humanitarian food packets played a major role in the U S  decision to suspend cluster munitions use in Afghanistan but not before using them in Iraq  In 2006, Israeli use of cluster munitions against Hezbollah forces in Lebanon resulted in widespread international criticism  Israel was said to have fired significant quantities of cluster munitions—primarily during the last 3 days of the 34-day war after a U N  cease-fire deal had been agreed to —resulting in almost 1 million unexploded cluster bomblets to which the U N  attributed 14 deaths during the conflict  Reports maintain that Hezbollah fired about 113 "cluster rockets" at northern Israel and, in turn, Israel's use of cluster munitions supposedly affected 26% of southern Lebanon's arable land and contaminated about 13 square miles with unexploded submunitions  One report states that there was a failure rate of upward of 70% of Israel's cluster weapons  The fundamental criticisms of cluster munitions are that they disperse large numbers of submunitions imprecisely over an extended area, that they frequently fail to detonate and are difficult to detect, and that submunitions can remain explosive hazards for decades  Civilian casualties are primarily caused by munitions being fired into areas where soldiers and civilians are intermixed, inaccurate cluster munitions landing in populated areas, or civilians traversing areas where cluster munitions have been employed but failed to explode  Two technical characteristics of submunitions—failure rate and lack of a self-destruct capability—have received a great deal of attention  There appear to be significant discrepancies among failure rate estimates  Some manufacturers claim a submunition failure rate of 2% to 5%, whereas mine clearance specialists have frequently reported failure rates of 10% to 30%  A number of factors influence submunition reliability  These include delivery technique, age of the submunition, air temperature, landing in soft or muddy ground, getting caught in trees and vegetation, and submunitions being damaged after dispersal, or landing in such a manner that their impact fuzes fail to initiate  Submunitions lacking a self-destruct capability—referred to as "dumb" munitions—are of particular concern because they can remain a hazard for decades, thereby increasing the potential for civilian casualties  Some nations are developing "smart" or sensor-fuzed weapons with greater reliability and a variety of self-destruct mechanisms intended to address the residual hazard of submunitions  Experts maintain that self-destruct features reduce—but do not eliminate—the unexploded ordnance problem caused by cluster munitions and that the advantage gained by using "smart" cluster munitions is negated when high-failure rate and/or "dumb" cluster munitions are used in the same area  For some nations, replacing "dumb" and high-failure rate cluster munitions may not be an option—China, Russia, and the Republic of Korea maintain that they cannot afford to replace all current submunitions with "smart" submunitions  In an effort to restrict or ban specific types of weapons used in armed conflicts, 51 states negotiated the CCW in 1980  When the treaty entered into force in December 1983, it applied only to incendiary weapons, mines and booby-traps, and weapons intended to cause casualties through very small fragments  Since then, some states-parties have added provisions through additional protocols to address other types of weapons  Acting in accordance with the recommendation of a group of experts established during the 2006 CCW review conference, states-parties to the convention decided in 2007 to "negotiate a proposal to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions " Negotiations took place in 2008 and 2009, but the parties have not reached agreement on a new proposal  The experts group continued negotiations in 2011 "informed by" a Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions  However, the CCW states-parties were unable to reach agreement on a protocol during their November 2011 review conference  Described as "frustrated with the CCW process," a number of CCW members—led by Norway—initiated negotiations in 2007 outside of the CCW to ban cluster munitions  On May 30, 2008, they reached an agreement to ban cluster munitions  The United States, Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, India, and Pakistan did not participate in the talks or sign the agreement  During the Signing Conference in Oslo on December 3-4, 2008, 94 states signed the convention and 4 of the signatories ratified the convention at the same time  China, Russia, and the United States did not sign the convention, but France, Germany, and the United Kingdom were among the 18 NATO members to do so  The convention was to enter into force six months after the deposit of the 30 th ratification  The United Nations received the 30 th ratification on February 16, 2010, and the convention entered into force on August 1, 2010  As of January 2, 2019, 105 states were party to the convention  The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), inter alia, bans the use of cluster munitions, as well as their development, production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling  The convention does not prohibit cluster munitions that can detect and engage a single target or explosive submunitions equipped with an electronic self-destruction or self-deactivating feature —an exemption that seemingly permits sensor-fuzed or "smart" cluster submunitions  U S  officials were concerned that early versions of the CCM would prevent military forces from non-states-parties from providing humanitarian and peacekeeping support and significantly affect NATO military operations, but the version signed May 30, 2008, does permit states-parties to engage in military cooperation and operations with non-states-parties (Article 21, Paragraph 3)  Then-Acting Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Stephen Mull stated in May 2008 that the United States relies on cluster munitions "as an important part of our own defense strategy," and that Washington's preferred alternative to a ban is "to pursue technological fixes that will make sure that these weapons are no longer viable once the conflict is over " U S  officials note that Cluster munitions are available for use by every combat aircraft in the U S  inventory, they are integral to every Army or Marine maneuver element and in some cases constitute up to 50 percent of tactical indirect fire support  U S  forces simply can not fight by design or by doctrine without holding out at least the possibility of using cluster munitions  The United States also maintains that using cluster munitions reduces the number of aircraft and artillery systems needed to support military operations, and that if cluster munitions were eliminated, significantly more money would need to be spent on new weapons systems, ammunition, and logistical resources  Officials further suggest that if cluster munitions were eliminated, most militaries would increase their use of massed artillery and rocket barrages, which would likely increase destruction of key infrastructure  Then-Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh stated November 9, 2009, that the United States has determined that its "national security interests cannot be fully ensured consistent with the terms" of the CCM  The Barack Obama Administration announced on November 25, 2011, that the United States would continue to implement the DOD policy on cluster munitions issued June 19, 2008, which recognized the need to minimize harm to civilians and infrastructure but also reaffirmed that "cluster munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military utility " The central directive in the Pentagon's policy was the unwaiverable requirement that cluster munitions used after 2018 must leave less than 1% of unexploded submunitions on the battlefield  Prior to that deadline, U S  use of cluster munitions that did not meet this criterion required combatant commander approval  On November 30, 2017, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan issued a revised policy on cluster munitions  The memorandum describing the policy noted that [c]luster munitions provide the Joint Force with an effective and necessary capability to engage area targets, including massed formations of enemy forces, individual targets dispersed over a defined area, targets whose precise location are not known, and time-sensitive or moving targets  Cluster munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military utility, as they provide distinct advantages against a range of threats in the operating environment  Additionally, the use of cluster munitions may result in less collateral damage than the collateral damage that results from use of unitary munitions alone  Since the inception of the 2008 policy, in the midst of extended combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have witnessed important changes in the global security environment and experienced several years of budgets that under-invested in replacement systems and the modernization of the Joint Force more broadly  Our adversaries and our potential adversaries have developed advanced capabilities and operational approaches specifically designed to limit our ability to project power  Both Shanahan and Admiral Harry Harris Jr  have also argued that sustaining the current U S  cluster munitions arsenal is necessary to prepare for a potential conflict with North Korea  The revised policy reverses the 2008 policy that established an unwaiverable requirement that cluster munitions used after 2018 must leave less than 1% of unexploded submunitions on the battlefield  Combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands  Furthermore, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate, and these munitions will be removed only after new munitions that meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard are fielded in sufficient quantities to meet combatant commander requirements  However, the new DOD policy stipulates that the department "will only procure cluster munitions containing submunitions or submunition warheads" meeting the 2008 UXO requirement or possessing "advanced features to minimize the risks posed by unexploded submunitions " Specifically, DOD's revised policy stipulates the following: Continuing or beginning with their respective FY2019 budgets, the military departments will program for capabilities to replace cluster munitions currently in active inventories that do not meet the above-described standards for procuring new cluster munitions  The department's annual Program and Budget Review will be used to assess the sufficiency of the replacement efforts  The department's operational planners should plan for the availability of cluster munitions  The approval authority to employ cluster munitions that do not meet the standards prescribed by this policy for procuring new cluster munitions, however, rests with the combatant commanders  In accordance with their existing authorities, commanders may use cluster munitions that meet the standards prescribed by this policy for procuring new cluster munitions  The military departments and combatant commands, in keeping with U S  legal obligations under CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War and consistent with past practices, will continue to record and retain information on the use of cluster munitions and provide relevant information to facilitate the removal or destruction of unexploded submunitions  The military departments and combatant commands will maintain sufficient inventories and a robust stockpile surveillance program to ensure operational quality and reliability of cluster munitions  In extremis, to meet immediate warfighting demand, combatant commanders may accept transfers of cluster munitions that do not meet the above-described cluster-munition procurement standards  Cluster munitions that do not meet the standards prescribed by this policy for procuring new cluster munitions will be removed from active inventories and demilitarized after their capabilities have been replaced by sufficient quantities of munitions that meet the standards in this policy  The department will not transfer cluster munitions except as provided for under U S  law  The operational use of cluster munitions that include Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL) submunitions shall comply with presidential policy  Furthermore, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Expect(s) the Department to achieve the goals in this policy as rapidly as industry can support  Combatant Commanders will continue to ensure that the employment of cluster munitions is consistent with the law of war and applicable international agreements in order to minimize their harmful effects on civilian populations and infrastructure  In developing a new generation of cluster munitions less dangerous to civilians, DOD will need to determine whether such a high level of performance is achievable under both controlled laboratory conditions and real-world conditions  Factors such as delivery technique, landing in soft or muddy ground, getting caught in trees and vegetation, and submunitions being damaged after dispersal or landing could result in an appreciable number of dud submunitions, even if they have a self-deactivation feature  DOD and the services have been and are currently involved in efforts to reduce cluster munitions failure rates  The Army's Alternative Warhead Program (AWP) is intended to assess and recommend new technologies to reduce or eliminate cluster munitions failure rates  The AWP program is viewed as particularly relevant, as the Pentagon estimates that "upward of 80 percent of U S  cluster munitions reside in the Army artillery stockpile " In December 2008, the Army decided to cease procurement of a Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) warhead—the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) warhead—because its submunitions had a dud rate up to 5%  The Air Force has also acquired cluster munitions that comply with the less than 1% failure rate—the CBU-97 Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) and the CBU-105 WCMD/SFW  While DOD's new 2017 cluster munitions policy calls for DOD to continue its efforts to meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard "as rapidly as industry can support," it is not yet known how this policy will affect the aforementioned programs or how it could result in the establishment of new programs  It may be argued that even with advances in "sensor-fuzed" type submunitions that seek out and destroy certain targets, cluster munitions are still essentially an indiscriminate area weapon in an era where precision weapons are increasingly becoming the military norm  In Operation Desert Storm in 1991, only about 10% of ordnance used were precision-guided, but by the time of the Iraq invasion in 2003, "the ratio of 'smart' to dumb weapons was nearly reversed " Since then, this trend toward greater precision has continued, if not accelerated with the development of precision rocket, artillery, mortar munitions, and smaller precision aerial bombs designed to reduce collateral damage  Given current and predicted future precision weaponry trends, cluster munitions might be losing their military relevance—much as chemical weapons did between World War I and World War II  According to the State Department, the U S  military suspended its use of cluster munitions in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003  For subsequent military operations, where cluster munitions would otherwise have been the weapon of choice, Congress might review what types of weapons were substituted in place of cluster munitions and how effective they were in achieving the desired tactical results  Also worth considering are effects-based weapons systems and operations, which seek to achieve the same or similar effect against a potential target without applying a "kinetic solution" such as a cluster munition  Such insights could prove valuable in analyzing U S  policy options on the future of cluster munitions  DOD's November 2017 revised policy on cluster munitions potentially raises a number of issues for possible congressional consideration  With limits on cluster munition use after 2018 rescinded, how does this affect combatant commanders' operational plans in their respective theaters? Does this mean a lesser degree of military risk because combatant commanders can employ cluster munitions to meet warfighting demands, possibly translating into fewer forces needed to achieve the same result when the 2008 policy was in effect? Despite DOD emphasis on achieving a 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard "as rapidly as industry can support," will DOD funding restrictions slow or stall programs previously intended to replace those systems that exceeded 1% because there no longer is an urgent operational need to replace those systems? In a similar manner, will defense industry view this as a renewed opportunity to develop systems with a 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard or take a more sanguine view that since DOD is no longer time constrained to develop and field 1% or less weapons that funding these programs will be less of a priority and, therefore, an unprofitable venture? Another possible issue for consideration is how this U S  policy reversal on the military use of cluster munitions will be perceived by the international community and how this might affect future U S  and international military treaty initiatives  Consolidated Appropriations Acts The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P L  111-117 ), which the President signed into law December 16, 2009, prohibits the provision of military assistance for cluster munitions, the issuing of defense export licenses for cluster munitions, or the sale or transfer of cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology unless "the submunitions of the cluster munitions, after arming, do not result in more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments " Moreover, any agreement "applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of such cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology" must specify that the munitions "will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians " Subsequent appropriations laws have included similar provisions; the most recent is the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  116-6 ), which the President signed into law on February 15, 2019  


Report 2: This report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on war-related and other international emergency or contingency-designated funding since FY2001  Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority designated for emergencies or OCO/GWOT in support of the broad U S  government response to the 9/11 attacks and for other related international affairs activities  This figure includes $1 8 trillion for the Department of Defense (DOD), $154 billion for the Department of State and U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), and $3 billion for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Coast Guard (see Figure 1 )  This CRS report is meant to serve as a reference on certain funding designated as emergency requirement s or for Overseas Contingency Ope rations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT), as well as related budgetary and policy issues  It does not provide an estimate of war costs within the OCO/GWOT account (all of which may not be for activities associated with war or defense) or such costs in the DOD base budget or other agency funding (which may be related to war activities, such as the cost of health care for combat veterans)  For additional information on the FY2019 budget and related issues, see CRS Report R45202, The Federal Budget: Overview and Issues for FY2019 and Beyond , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS In Focus IF10942, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: An Overview of H R  5515 , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R45168, Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]  For additional information on the Budget Control Act as amended, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions , by [author name scrubbed]  For additional information on U S  policy in Afghanistan and the Middle East, see CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U S  Policy , by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report R45096, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U S  Response , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]  Congress may consider one or more supplemental appropriations bills (colloquially called supplementals) for a fiscal year to provide funding for unforeseen needs (such as a response to a national security threat or a natural disaster), or to increase appropriations for other activities that have already been funded  Supplemental appropriations measures generally provide additional funding for selected activities over and above the amount provided through annual or continuing appropriations  Throughout the 20 th century, Congress relied on supplemental appropriations to fund war-related activities, particularly in the period immediately following the start of hostilities  For example, in 1951, a year after the start of the Korean War, Congress approved DOD supplemental appropriations totaling $32 8 billion ($268 billion in constant FY2019 dollars)  In 1952, DOD supplemental appropriations totaled just $1 4 billion ($11 billion in constant FY2019), as the base budget incorporated costs related to the war effort  A similar pattern occurred, to varying degrees, during the Vietnam War and 1990-1991 Gulf War  During the post-9/11 conflicts, primarily conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq but also in other countries, Congress has, for an extended period and to a much greater degree than in previous conflicts in the 20 th century, appropriated supplemental and specially designated funding over and above the base DOD budget—that is, funding for planned or regularly occurring costs to man, train, and equip the military force  Since FY2001, DOD funding designated for OCO/GWOT has averaged 17% of the department's total budget authority (see Figure 2 )  By comparison, during the conflict in Vietnam—the only other to last more than a decade—DOD funding designated for non-base activities averaged 6% of the department's total budget authority  Supplemental appropriations can provide flexibility for policymakers to address demands that arise after funding has been appropriated  However, that flexibility has caused some to question whether supplementals should only be used to respond to unforeseen events, or whether they should also provide funding for activities that could reasonably be covered in regular appropriations acts  Congress used supplemental appropriations to provide funds for defense and foreign affairs activities related to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq following 9/11, and each subsequent fiscal year through FY2010  Initially understood as reflecting needs that were not anticipated during the regular appropriations cycle, supplemental appropriations were generally enacted as requested, and almost always designated as emergency requirements  Beginning in FY2004, DOD received some of its war-related funding in its regular annual appropriations; these funds were designated as emergency  When funding needs for war and non-war-related activities were higher than anticipated, the Bush Administration submitted supplemental requests  In the FY2011 appropriations cycle, the Obama Administration moved away from submitting supplemental appropriations requests to Congress for war-related activities and used the regular budget and appropriation process to fund operations  This approach implied that while the funds might be war-related, they largely supported predictable ongoing activities rather than unanticipated needs  In concert with this change in budgetary approach, the Obama Administration began formally using the term Overseas Contingency Op erations in place of the Bush Administration's term Global War on Terror   Both the Obama and Trump Administrations requested that OCO funding be designated in a manner that would effectively exempt such funding from the BCA limits on discretionary defense spending  Currently, there is no overall procedural or statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO/GWOT-designated spending that may be appropriated on an annual basis  Both Congress and the President have roles in determining how much emergency or OCO/GWOT spending is provided to federal agencies each fiscal year  Such spending must be designated as such within the President's budget request for congressional consideration  The President must separately designate the spending after Congress enacts appropriations for it to be available for expenditure  The emergency funding designation predated the OCO/GWOT designation  Through definitions statutorily established by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P L  99-177 ), spending designated as emergency requirements is for "unanticipated" purposes, such as those that are "sudden     urgent     unforeseen     and temporary " The BBEDCA does not further specify the types of activities that are eligible for that designation  Thus, any discretionary funding designated by Congress and the President as being for an emergency is effectively exempted from certain statutory and procedural budget enforcement mechanisms, such as the BCA limits on discretionary spending  Debate of what should constitute OCO/GWOT or emergency activities and expenses has shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of U S  military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere  Over the years, both Congress and the President have at times adopted more, and at times less, expansive definitions of such designations to accommodate the strategic, budgetary, and political needs of the moment  Prior to February 2009, U S  operations in response to the 9/11 attacks were collectively referred to as the Global War on Terror , or GWOT  Between September 2001 and February 2009, there was no separate budgetary designation for GWOT funds—instead, funding associated with those operations was designated as an emergency requirement  The term OCO was not applied to the post-9/11 military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan until 2009  In February 2009, the Obama Administration released A New Era of Responsibili ty: Renewing America's Promise , a presidential fiscal policy document  That document did not mention or reference GWOT; instead, it used the term OCO in reference to ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan  The first request for emergency funding for OCO—not GWOT—was delivered to Congress in April 2009  Since the FY2010 budget cycle, DOD has requested both base budget and OCO funding as part of its annual budget submission to Congress  Beginning with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (NDAA; P L  111-84 ), the annual defense authorization bills have referenced the authorization of additional appropriations for OCO rather than the names of U S  military operations conducted primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq  In 2011, the BCA ( P L  112-125 ) amended the BBEDCA to create the Overseas Contingency Ope rations/Global War on Terrorism designation, which provided Congress and the President with an alternate way to exempt funding from the BCA caps without using the emergency designation  Beginning with the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P L  112-74 ), annual appropriations bills have referenced the OCO/GWOT designation  The foreign affairs agencies began formally requesting OCO/GWOT funding in FY2012, distinguishing between what is referred to as enduring, ongoing or base costs versus any extraordinary, temporary costs of the State Department and USAID in supporting ongoing U S  operations and policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan  Congress, having used OCO/GWOT exemption for DOD, adopted this approach for foreign affairs, though its uses for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) activities have never been permanently defined in statute  For the first foreign affairs OCO/GWOT appropriation, in FY2012, funds were provided for a wide range of recipient countries beyond the countries in the President's request, including Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, and the Philippines  In addition to country-specific uses, OCO/GWOT-designated funds were also appropriated for the Global Security Contingency Fund  All budgetary legislation is subject to a set of enforcement procedures associated with the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 ( P L  93-344 ), as well as other rules, such as those imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P L  112-125 ) as amended  Those rules provide mechanisms to enforce both procedural and statutory limits on discretionary spending  Enacted on August 2, 2011, the BCA as amended sets limits on defense and nondefense spending  As part of an agreement to increase the statutory limit on public debt, the BCA aimed to reduce annual federal budget deficits by a total of at least $2 1 trillion from FY2012 through FY2021, with approximately half of the savings to come from defense  The spending limits (or caps ) apply separately to defense and nondefense discretionary budget authority  The caps are enforced by a mechanism called sequestration   Sequestration automatically cancels previously enacted appropriations (a form of budget authority) by an amount necessary to reach prespecified levels  The BCA effectively exempted certain types of discretionary spending from the statutory limits, including funding designated for OCO/GWOT  As a result, Congress and the President have designated funding for OCO to support activities that, in previous times, had been funded within the base budget  This was done, in part, as a response to the discretionary spending limits enacted by the BCA  By designating funding for OCO for certain activities not directly related to contingency operations, Congress and the President can effectively continue to increase topline defense, foreign affairs, and other related discretionary spending without triggering sequestration  Congress has repeatedly amended the legislation to raise the spending limits (thus lowering its deficit-reduction effect by corresponding amounts)  Congress has passed four bills that revised the automatic spending caps initially established by the BCA, including the following: American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P L  112-240 ); Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013; P L  113-67 ); Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P L  114-74 ); and Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P L  115-123 )  On February 9, 2018, three days before President Donald Trump submitted his FY2019 budget request, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P L  115-123 )  The act raised the discretionary spending limits set by the BCA from $1 069 trillion for FY2017 to $1 208 trillion for FY2018 and to $1 244 trillion for FY2019  The BBA 2018 increased FY2019 discretionary defense funding levels (excluding OCO) by the largest amounts to date—$85 billion, from $562 billion to $647 billion, and nondefense funding (including SFOPS) by $68 billion, from $529 billion to $597 billion  It did not change discretionary spending limits for FY2020 and FY2021  DOD documents indicate the department in recent years has used OCO funding for activities viewed as unrelated to war  For example, the department's FY2019 budget request estimates $358 billion in OCO funding from FY2015 through FY2019  Of that amount, DOD categorizes $68 billion (19%) for activities unrelated to operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria  These activities are described as "EDI/Non-War," referring in part to the European Deterrence Initiative, and "Base-to-OCO," referring to OCO funding used for base-budget requirements  Similarly, a DOD Cost of War report from June 2018 shows $1 8 trillion in war-related appropriations from FY2001 through FY2018 for operations primarily conducted in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria  Of that total, DOD categorizes $219 billion (12%) as other than "war funds " These funds are described as "Classified," "Modularity," "Fuel (non-war)," "Noble Eagle (Base)," and "Non-War " International affairs agencies also began increasing the share of their budgets designated for OCO, and applying the designation to an increasing range of activities apparently unrelated to conflicts  OCO as a share of the international affairs budget grew from about 21% in FY2012 to nearly 35% in FY2017  Unlike DOD, however, the State Department and USAID have not specified whether any OCO-designated funds are considered part of the agencies' base budgets  According to a DOD budget document from FY2016, the Obama Administration planned to "transition all enduring costs currently funded in the OCO budget to the base budget beginning in 2017 and ending by 2020 " The plan was to describe "which OCO costs should endure as the United States shifts from major combat operations, how the Administration will budget for the uncertainty surrounding unforeseen future crises, and the implications for the base budgets of DOD, the Intelligence Community, and State/OIP  This transition will not be possible if the sequester-level discretionary spending caps remain in place " The BCA remained in effect and OCO funding was used for base-budget requirements  Some defense officials and policymakers say OCO funding enables a flexible and timely response to an emergency or contingency and provides a political and fiscal safety valve to the BCA caps and threat of sequestration  They say if OCO funding were not used in such a manner and discretionary spending limits remained in place, DOD and other federal agencies would be forced to cut base budgets and revise strategic priorities  For example, former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has said if Congress allows the FY2020 and FY2021 defense spending caps to take effect, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which calls for the United States to bolster its military advantage against potential competitors such as Russia and China, "is not sustainable " Critics, including Acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, have described the OCO account as a "slush fund" for military and foreign affairs spending unrelated to contingency operations  Mulvaney, former director of the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), has described the use of OCO funding for base budget requirements as "budget gimmicks " Critics argue what was once generally restricted to a fund for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupplying expended munitions, transporting troops to and through war zones, and distributing foreign aid to frontline states has "ballooned into an ambiguous part of the budget to which government financiers increasingly turn to pay for other, at times unrelated, costs " OMB criteria for OCO funding include the combat losses of ground vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment; replenishment of munitions expended in combat operations; facilities and infrastructure in the theater of operations; transport of personnel, equipment, and supplies to and from the theater; among other items and activities  Determining which activities are directly related, tangentially related, or unrelated to war operations is often a point of debate  Some have questioned the use of OCO funding to purchase F-35 fighter jets: "It is jumping the shark     There's no pretense that it has anything to do with the region " Others have argued it makes sense for the military to use OCO funding to purchase new aircraft to replace planes used in current conflicts and no longer in production: "What are the conditions that are making the combatant commanders and those with train/equip authority to say, 'We need more of this?'" Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority for war-related and other international emergency or contingency-designated activities since 9/11  This figure is a CRS estimate of funding designated for emergencies or OCO/GWOT in support of the broad U S  government response to the 9/11 attacks, as well as other foreign affairs activities, from FY2001 through FY2019  This includes $1 8 trillion for DOD, $154 billion for the Department of State and USAID, and $3 billion for DHS and the Coast Guard (see Table 1 )  These figures do not include emergency-designated funding appropriated in this period for domestic programs, such as disaster response  From FY2001 through FY2009, DOD received $1 8 trillion in appropriations for OCO/GWOT, or approximately 17% of the department's total discretionary budget authority of $10 8 trillion during the period  The department's OCO/GWOT funding peaked in FY2008 both in terms of nominal dollars, at $186 9 billion, and as a share of its discretionary budget, at 28 1% (see Figure 3 ), after the Bush Administration surged additional U S  military personnel to Iraq  The department's OCO funding also increased as a share of its discretionary spending from FY2009 to FY2010 following the Obama Administration's deployment of more U S  military personnel to Afghanistan, and again in FY2017 following enactment of legislation in response to the Trump Administration's request for additional appropriations  In FY2019, the department's OCO/GWOT funding totaled $68 8 billion, or 10% of its discretionary spending  In terms of appropriations titles, more than two-thirds of OCO/GWOT funding since FY2001 has been for Operation and Maintenance (O&M)—nearly double the percentage of base budget funding for O&M over the same period (see Figure 4 )  O&M funds pay for the operating costs of the military such as fuel, maintenance to repair facilities and equipment, and the mobilization of forces  DOD describes "war-related operational costs" as operations, training, overseas facilities and base support, equipment maintenance, communications, and replacement of combat losses and enhancements  In terms of the military services, more than half (55%) of OCO/GWOT funding since FY2001 has gone to the Army—more than double the percentage of base budget funding for the service during this period (see Figure 5 )  Emergency appropriations were initially provided as general "defense-wide" appropriations  Beginning in FY2003, as operations evolved and planning developed, allocations increased and were specifically provided for the services  OCO funding for DOD has not decreased at the same rate as the number of U S  troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has decreased  For example, the number of U S  military personnel in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria decreased from a peak of 187,000 personnel in FY2008 (including 148,000 in Iraq and 39,000 in Afghanistan) to an assumed level of nearly 18,000 personnel in FY2019 (including 11,958 personnel in Afghanistan and 5,765 personnel in Iraq and Syria)—a decline of approximately 169,000 personnel (90%)  Meanwhile, OCO funding decreased from a peak of $187 billion in FY2008 to $69 billion in FY2019—a decline of approximately $118 billion (63%)  While the number of U S  forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has decreased since FY2009, the number of U S  troops deployed or stationed elsewhere to support those personnel has fallen by a lesser degree and, in recent years, remained relatively steady  For example, the number of support forces—that is, personnel from units and forces operating outside of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries (including those stationed in the continental United States or otherwise mobilized) decreased from 112,000 personnel in FY2009 to an assumed level of 76,073 personnel in FY2019—a decline of 35,927 personnel (32%)  In addition, when these support forces are combined with in-country force levels, the total force level decreases by a percentage more similar to the OCO budget, from 297,000 personnel in FY2009 to an assumed level of 93,796 personnel in FY2019—a decline of 203,204 personnel (68%) (see Figure 6 )  Some of these support forces serve in U S  Central Command's area of responsibility, which includes 20 countries in West Asia, North Africa, and Central Asia, and whose forward headquarters is based in Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar  According to DOD, the reason OCO funding has not fallen in proportion to the number of U S  troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria is "due to the fixed, and often inelastic, costs of infrastructure, support requirements, and in-theater presence to support contingency operations " For example, in FY2019, the department requested $20 billion in OCO funding for "in-theater support"—nearly 30% of the OCO request and more than any other functional category  However, some analysts have noted the U S  military's fixed costs in Afghanistan remained relatively stable at roughly $7 billion a year from FY2005 through FY2013 until after the BCA went into effect—and have since increased to roughly $32 billion a year, suggesting "that roughly $25 billion in 'enduring' or base budget costs migrated into the Afghanistan budget, effectively circumventing the budget caps  The actual funding needed for operations in Afghanistan is roughly $20 billion in FY2019 " Title 10, Section 101, of the United States Code, defines a contingency operation as any Secretary of Defense-designated military operation "in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force " Since the 1990s NATO intervention in the Balkans, DOD Financial Management Regulations (FMR) have defined contingency operations costs as those expenses necessary to cover incremental costs "that would not have been incurred had the contingency operation not been supported " Such incremental costs would not include, for example, base pay for troops or planned equipment modernization, as those expenditures are normal peacetime needs of the DOD  In September 2010, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in collaboration with DOD, issued criteria for the department to use in making war/overseas contingency operations funding requests (see Appendix A )  In January 2017, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded the criteria for deciding whether items belong in the base budget or OCO funding "are outdated and do not address the full scope of activities" in the budget request  "For example, they do not address geographic areas such as Syria and Libya, where DOD has begun military operations; DOD's deterrence and counterterrorism initiatives; or requests for OCO funding to support requirements not related to ongoing contingency operations" it states  Section 1524 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 ( P L  115-91 ), directed the Secretary of Defense to "update the guidelines regarding the budget items that may be covered by overseas contingency operations accounts " Congress has enacted legislation directing DOD to compile reports on the costs of certain contingency operations  Section 1266 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 ( P L  115-91 ) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit the Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution report, known as the Cost of War report, on a quarterly basis to the congressional defense committees and the GAO: "Not later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal year quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees and the Comptroller General of the United States the Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution report for such fiscal year quarter " The conference report accompanying the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-245 ) requires DOD to report incremental costs for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries in the U S  Central Command area of responsibility and directs: the Secretary of Defense to continue to report incremental costs for all named operations in the Central Command Area of Responsibility on a quarterly basis and to submit, also on a quarterly basis, commitment, obligation, and expenditure data for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund, and for all security cooperation programs funded under the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide Account  DOD's June 2018 Cost of War report to Congress details $1 5 trillion in obligations associated with certain contingency operations from FY2001 through FY2018  That figure includes $757 1 billion for those conducted primarily in Iraq—Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation New Dawn (OND), and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR); $727 7 billion for those conducted primarily in Afghanistan—Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS); and $27 8 billion for those conducted primarily in the United States (see Table 2 and Figure 7 )  DOD's quarterly Cost of War reports are intended to provide Congress, GAO, and other stakeholders insight into the how the department obligates war-related appropriations  The reports include base and OCO obligations related to war activities, as well as obligation data broken down by certain major operations, service, component, agency, and appropriation  However, as GAO has noted, "the proportion of OCO appropriations not associated with specific operations identified in the statutory Cost of War reporting requirement has trended upward" in part because the criteria DOD uses for making OCO funding requests is outdated and not always used  More recently, the June 2018 Cost of War report does not appear to reference three recently classified overseas contingency operations targeting militants affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS): Operation Yukon Journey in the Middle East, Northwest Africa Counterterrorism, and East Africa Counterterrorism  Some observers have noted other limitations to Cost of War reports, such as incomplete accounting of costs, limited distribution of the documents and underlying data, and formatting that makes it difficult to reconcile the data with information contained in budget justification documents  Between FY2001 and FY2018, Congress appropriated a total of $154 billion in OCO funds for State Department and USAID  For FY2018 (the most recent full-year appropriations for foreign affairs agencies), OCO funding amounted to 22% of the total appropriations for State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Programs appropriation  The Obama Administration's FY2012 International Affairs budget request was the first to include a request for OCO funds for "extraordinary and temporary costs of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan " At the time, the Administration indicated that the use of this designation was intended to provide a transparent, whole-of-government approach to the exceptional war-related costs incurred in those three countries, thus better aligning the associated military and civilian costs  This first foreign affairs OCO request identified the significant resource demands placed on the State Department as a result of the transitions from military-led to civilian-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the importance of a stable Pakistan for the U S  effort in Afghanistan  The FY2012 foreign affairs OCO request included: for Iraq, funding for the U S  Embassy in Baghdad, consulates throughout Iraq, security costs in light of the then-planned U S  military withdrawal, a then-planned civilian-led Police Development and Criminal Justice Program, military and development assistance in Iraq, and oversight of U S  foreign assistance through the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction; for Afghanistan, funding to strengthen the Afghan government and build institutional capacity, support State/USAID and other U S  government agency civilians deployed in Afghanistan, provide short-term economic assistance to address counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts, and provide oversight of U S  foreign assistance programs in Afghanistan through the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction; and for Pakistan, funding to support U S  diplomatic presence and diplomatic security in Pakistan, provide Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Funds (PCCF) to train and equip Pakistani forces to eliminate insurgent sanctuaries and promote stability and security in neighboring Afghanistan and the region  In subsequent years, the Administration designated certain State Department activities in Syria and other peacekeeping activities as OCO, and Congress accepted and broadened this expanded use of OCO in annual appropriations  In the FY2017 budget request, the Administration further broadened its use of State OCO funds, applying the designation to funds for countering Russian aggression, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and aid to Africa  In addition to OCO funds requested through the normal appropriations process, the Administration in recent years requested emergency supplemental funding (designated as OCO) to support State/USAID efforts in countering the Islamic State and to respond to global health threats such as the Ebola and Zika viruses  For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested no OCO/GWOT funding for the Department of State and USAID, although the FY2019 House and Senate SFOPS bills ( H R  6385 and S  3108 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated approximately $8 billion in OCO-designated funding for various priorities  The estimated $154

ground_truth: Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been highly criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but in 2008 instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions to 1% or less after 2018. In November 2017, a new DOD policy was issued that essentially reversed the 2008 policy. Under the new policy, combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands. In addition, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate and states that DOD "will retain cluster munitions currently in active inventories until the capabilities they provide are replaced with enhanced and more reliable munitions." Potential issues for Congress include cluster munitions in an era of precision weapons, other weapons in lieu of cluster munitions, and the potential impact of DOD's 2017 revised cluster munitions policy.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: 1 billion in emergency and OCO/GWOT appropriations enacted to date for State/USAID includes major non-war-related programs, such as aid for the 2004 tsunami along Indian Ocean coasts, 2010 earthquake in Haiti, 2013 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, and 2015 worldwide outbreak of the Zika virus; as well as diplomatic operations (e g , paying staff, providing security, and building and maintaining embassies)  OCO/GWOT has also funded a variety of foreign aid programs, ranging from the Economic Support Fund to counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, among other activities in other countries  Figure 8 depicts the emergency or OCO appropriations for foreign affairs activities  Since 2012, when the OCO designation was first used for foreign affairs, more OCO funds have been appropriated than were requested each year, and those have also been authorized to be used in additional countries  Since January 2002, approximately $3 billion of post-9/11 emergency and OCO-designated funding has been provided to the U S  Coast Guard (USCG) for its traditional homeland security missions and for USCG operations in support of U S  Navy activities  This funding has been provided at various times as either an appropriation to the Coast Guard's operating expenses accounts, or as a transfer from Navy accounts to the Coast Guard  Open-source information on the use of those funds has varied  One FY2009 supplemental appropriations request included funding as a transfer, with the intent of funding "Coast Guard operations in support of OIF and OEF, as well as other classified activities " The FY2017 OCO request for annual appropriations for Navy Operations and Maintenance included $163 million for Coast Guard operational support for the deployment of patrol boats to the Northern Arabian Gulf and a port security unit to Guantanamo Bay, among other pay and equipment expenses  The Trump Administration initially requested a total of $89 billion in OCO funding for FY2019  All the funding was requested by DOD  In an amendment to the budget after Congress raised the BCA spending caps as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P L  115-123 ), the Administration removed the OCO designation from $20 billion of the funding, in effect, shifting that amount into the DOD base budget request  In a statement on the budget amendment, Mulvaney said the request fixes "long-time budget gimmicks" in which OCO funding has been used for base budget requirements  Beginning in FY2020, "the Administration proposes returning to OCO's original purpose by shifting certain costs funded in OCO to the base budget where they belong," he wrote  Of the revised amount of $69 billion requested for DOD OCO funding in FY2019: $46 3 billion (67%) was for Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS) in Afghanistan and related missions; $13 billion (22%) for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq and Syria and related missions; $4 8 billion (9%) for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to boost the U S  military presence in eastern Europe to deter Russian military aggression; and $0 9 billion (1%) for security cooperation (see Figure 9 )  The FY2019 OCO budget assumes a total force level (average annual troop strength) of 93,796 personnel  That figure includes: 11,958 primarily in Afghanistan (OFS); 5,765 primarily in Iraq and Syria (OIR); 59,463 for in-theater support; and 16,610 primarily in the continental United States (CONUS) or otherwise mobilized (see Figure 10 )  The number of personnel actually in-country or in-theater at any given time may exceed or fall below those assumed levels  The FY2019 force level assumes an increase of 3,153 personnel (3 5%) from the FY2018 assumed level, all of which is assumed for in-theater support  (For analysis of troop level and budget trends, see the section, " Trends in OCO Funding and Troop Levels ," earlier in this report ) As previously discussed, DOD acknowledges "OCO funding has not declined at the same rate as the in-country troop strength … due to the fixed, and often inelastic, costs of infrastructure, support requirements, and in-theater presence to support contingency operations " The departments lists the following as OCO cost drivers: In-theater support, including infrastructure costs like command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and base operations for U S  Central Command (CENTCOM) locations; Persistent demand for combat support such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets used to enhance force protection; Equipment reset, which lags troop level changes and procurement of contingency-focused assets like munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles and force protection capabilities that may not be linked directly to in-country operations; and International programs and deterrence activities, which are linked to U S  engagement in contingency operations and support U S  interests but are not directly proportional to U S  troop presence  DOD also breaks down the FY2019 OCO budget request by functional category (see Table 3 )  By this measure, the largest portion of OCO funding was $20 billion for in-theater support, followed by operations and force protection (including the incremental cost of military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries), at $14 7 billion; and unspecified classified programs, at $9 9 billion  According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), approximately $47 billion (68%) of the FY2019 OCO budget request consists of enduring activities—that is, "those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts"—that could be funded in the DOD base budget  CBO associates enduring activities with the following DOD functional categories: in-theater support, classified programs, equipment reset and readiness, European Deterrence Initiative, security cooperation, and joint improvised-threat defeat  Executive Branch budget documents for FY2019 show differing projections for how much OCO would be apportioned over the Future Years Defense Program (also known as the FYDP, pronounced "fiddip," the five-year period from FY2019 through FY2023)  For example, Table 1-11 in DOD's National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, citing OMB data, projects five-year OCO funding at $359 billion  However, Table 1-9 of the same document puts the figure at $149 billion after assuming a higher amount of OCO funding shifting into the base budget  According to OMB, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected increasing caps on defense discretionary base budget authority by $84 billion (15%) to $660 billion in FY2020 and by $87 billion (15%) to $677 billion in FY2021  It also projected defense funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) totaling $73 billion in FY2020 and $66 billion in FY2021  Thus, projected defense discretionary funding would total $733 billion in FY2020 and $743 billion in FY2021  FY2019 DOD budget documents show the same defense discretionary topline for FY2020 and FY2021  But they list an "Outyears Placeholder for OCO" of $20 billion in fiscal years FY2020-FY2023, and an "OCO to Base" amount of $53 billion in FY2020 and $45 8 billion in each year from FY2021-FY2023  The documents do not break down what accounts or activities are included in these amounts  The emergence of any new contingencies or conflicts would likely change DOD assumptions about OCO needs  Congress has appropriated a total of $68 8 billion for DOD OCO funding in FY2019, including the following amounts: $67 9 billion in defense funds provided in the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-245 ), which Congress passed on September 26, 2018; and $921 million in defense funds provided in the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-244 ), which Congress passed on September, 21, 2018  For the Department of State and USAID, as well as the Department of Homeland Security and U S  Coast Guard, FY2019 OCO levels have not yet been determined  They remain at prorated FY2018 levels because of continuing resolutions (CR) to fund certain agencies through December 21, 2018  The FY2019 House and Senate SFOPS bills ( H R  6385 and S  3108 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated approximately $8 billion in OCO-designated funding for various priorities  The House committee-reported version of the Homeland Security appropriations bill ( H R  6776 , 115 th Congress) would not have appropriated any OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard, while the Senate committee-reported version of the bill ( S  3109 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated $165 million for OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard  Any decision by the 116 th Congress to change discretionary defense and nondefense spending limits that remain in effect for FY2020 and FY2021 under the Budget Control Act (BCA; P L  112-25 ) could impact future OCO funding levels  Lawmakers may consider the following questions: Will Congress keep the BCA as is and rely on OCO funding that is not subject to the caps to meet agency requirements? Will Congress repeal the BCA and use less OCO funding? Will Congress amend the BCA limits for future years and continue to use OCO funding, as it has in the past? Will Congress significantly reduce DOD and international affairs funding to stay within the BCA caps and not use OCO funding? In a November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission, a bipartisan panel created by Congress, issued recommendations related to OCO and the BCA  Recommendation No  24 states, "Congress should eliminate the final two years of caps under the BCA " Recommendation 29 states, "To better prepare for major-power competition, Congress should gradually integrate OCO spending back into the base Pentagon budget  This also requires a dollar-for-dollar increase in the BCA spending caps, should they remain in force, so that this transfer does not result in an overall spending cut " Both House and Senate FY2019 committee-reported appropriations bills from the 115 th Congress included about $8 billion in OCO funding for State/USAID  It remains to be seen if the 116 th Congress will pass this OCO level as requested or extend the continuing resolution  Congress could enact legislation to authorize and appropriate a level of base and OCO spending to meet current or revised discretionary defense spending caps in any number of ways  In FY2019 budget documents from OMB and DOD, the Trump Administration projected increasing defense spending in FY2020 and FY2021 beyond the statutory limits of the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P L  112-25 ), but by differing amounts based on differing OCO projections  These figures serve as possible scenarios or options for Congress to consider  According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $660 billion (which assumes an $84 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO defense budget of $73 billion (see Figure 11 )  According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $713 billion (which assumes a $137 billion, or 24%, increase in the BCA defense cap—what would be the largest increase to the BCA defense caps yet—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion  Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $733 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $576 billion and designate an additional $157 billion for OCO  According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $677 billion (which assumes an $87 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $66 billion (see Figure 11 )  According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $723 billion (which assumes a $133 billion, or 23%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion  Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $743 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $590 billion and designate an additional $153 billion for OCO  As previously discussed, these figures would change with different toplines for the national defense budget function (050)  Former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and the National Defense Strategy Commission have recommended that Congress increase the defense budget between 3% and 5% a year above inflation ("real growth") to meet U S  strategic goals  President Donald Trump has said the discretionary defense spending request would total $700 billion in FY2020, a decrease of 2% in nominal terms from FY2019  Trump said, "We know what the budget—the new budget is for the Defense Department  It will probably be $700 billion " However, some media outlets have since reported that the President intends to request a discretionary defense budget of $750 billion in FY2020  Senator James Inhofe, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Representative Mac Thornberry, ranking member of the House Armed Services Committees in the 116 th Congress, have argued, "Any cut in the defense budget would be a senseless step backward " Thornberry has also said transferring recurring OCO costs into the regular budget "makes sense … it makes for more predictable budgeting, but it's all about what happens on the topline " Representative Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in the 116 th Congress, has said of the defense budget: "I think the number is too high, and it's certainly not going to be there in the future … We've got a debt, we've got a deficit, we've got infrastructure problems, we've got healthcare, education—there's a whole lot that is necessary to make our country safe, secure, and prosperous " Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan has talked about a flat topline for national defense: "When you look at the $700 billion, it's not just for one year drop down, [or] a phase, it's a drop and then held constant" over the FYDP  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer David Norquist, who is also performing the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, at one time was reportedly preparing two budgets for FY2020—one assuming $733 billion for national defense and another assuming $700 billion  An analyst has noted "returning enduring OCO costs to the base budget, particularly a vast majority of those enduring costs over a short period as DOD has outlined, could significantly complicate an agreement between congressional Democrats and Republicans to increase both the defense and nondefense BCA budget caps for FY2020 and FY2021 " As analyst noted, "OCO has become an even less-defined pot of money … Congress needs to properly question the DOD budget planners on the future of OCO " In a January 2017 report, GAO concluded, "Without a reliable estimate of DOD's enduring OCO costs, decision makers will not have a complete picture of the department's future funding needs or be able to make informed choices and trade-offs in budget formulation and decision making " The department states it has not fully estimated those costs in part because of the BCA  In a response to GAO, DOD wrote, "Developing reliable estimates of enduring OCO costs is an important first step to any future effort to transition enduring OCO costs to the base budget  In the context of such an effort, the Department would consider developing and reporting formal estimates of those costs  However, until there is sufficient relief from the budgetary caps established in the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Department will need OCO to finance counterterrorism operations, in particular [OFS] and [OIR] " In an October 2018 report, the Congressional Budget Office estimated OCO funding for DOD enduring activities—that is, those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts—totaled more than $50 billion a year (in 2019 dollars) from 2006 to 2018—and are projected to total about $47 billion a year starting in FY2020  This figure appears to be consistent with projections published by DOD  According to the department's FY2019 budget documents, DOD projected $53 billion for "OCO to Base" in FY2020 and $45 8 billion for "OCO to Base" for FY2021 through FY2023  Some analysts have concluded: Uncertainty created by current reliance on OCO, particularly to fund base budget needs, could be detrimental to national security on three levels: (a) by undermining budget controls and contributing thereby to larger deficits, (b) by generating insecurity in the defense workforce and in defense suppliers, and (c) by creating long-term uncertainty in defense planning  The alternative, transitioning longer-term OCO expenses to the base budget, could be achieved through a combination of increased budget caps, targeted cuts in inefficient Defense programs, and increased revenues  For example, a potential enduring activity in the OCO budget is the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)  It was previously known as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), an effort that began in June 2014 to increase the number of U S  military personnel and prepositioned equipment in Central and Eastern Europe intended in part to reassure NATO allies after Russia's military seized Crimea  As some analysts have noted, "Because it is in the OCO part of the budget request, EDI funding does not include a projection for how much funding will be allocated in future years, which can create uncertainty in the minds of allies and adversaries alike about the U S  military's commitment to the program " On the other hand, some contend that it is precisely EDI's flexibility that allows the commander of European Command to quickly respond to changing security and posture needs in Europe, and ensure that monies intended for European deterrence will not be redirected to other DOD priorities  In its November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission quoted the late military strategist Bernard Brodie, who wrote "strategy wears a dollar sign " The panel concluded that relying on OCO funding to increase the defense budget "is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources" for the type of great power competition outlined in the Secretary of Defense's 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which calls for the United States to bolster its competitive military advantage relative to threats posed by China and Russia: Because of budgetary constraints imposed by the BCA, lawmakers and the Department of Defense have increasingly relied upon the overseas contingency operations (OCO) fund to pay for warfighting operations in the greater Middle East, as well as other activities and initiatives  Yet this approach to resourcing has produced problems and distortions of its own  For one thing, the amount of money devoted to OCO since the BCA was enacted no longer corresponds to warfighting operations in the greater Middle East  Furthermore, such operations are no longer a top priority as articulated in the NDS  Finally, reorienting the military toward high-end competition and conflict will require new capabilities beyond the current program of record  OCO is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources for such a long-term endeavor, given its lack of predictability and the limitations on what OCO funds can be used to buy " Appendix A  Statutes, Guidance, and Regulations The designation of funding as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) is governed by several statues as well as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and the Department of Defense (DOD) Financial Management Regulation (FMR)  The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA) of 1985 BBEDCA, as amended, includes the statutory definitions of emergency and unanticipated as they relate to budget enforcement through sequestration  The act also allows for appropriations to be designated by Congress and the President as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism   Such appropriations are effectively exempt from the statutory discretionary spending limits  Title 10, United States Code—Armed Forces 10 U S C  101—Definitions Section 101 provides definitions of terms applicable to Title 10  While it does not define overseas contingency operations, it does include a definition of a contingency operations   Administration and Internal Guidance In addition to statutory requirements, the DOD and the Department of State are subject to guidance on OCO spending from the Administration  In October 2006 , under the Bush Administration, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directed the services to break with long-standing DOD regulatory policies and expand their request for supplemental funding to reflect incremental costs related to the "longer war on terror " There was no specific definition for the "longer war on terror," now one of the core missions of the DOD  In February 2009, at the beginning of the Obama Administration, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued updated budget guidance that required DOD to move some OCO costs back into the base budget  However, within six months of issuing the new criteria, officials waived restrictions related to pay and that would have prohibited end-strength growth  In a letter from OMB to the then-Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert Hale, the agency characterized its 2009 criteria as "very successful" for delineating base and OCO spending but stated, "This update clarifies language, eliminates areas of confusion and provides guidance for areas previously unanticipated " GAO subsequently reported that the revised guidance significantly changed the criteria used to build the fiscal year 2010 OCO funding request by: specifying stricter definitions for repair and procurement of equipment; limiting applicability of OCO funds for RDT&E; excluding pay and allowances for end-strength above the level requested in the budget; excluding enduring family support initiatives; and excluding base realignment and closures (BRAC) amounts  OMB again revised its guidance in September 2010 following a number of GAO reports that had concluded DOD reporting on OCO costs was of "questionable reliability," due in part to imprecisely defined financial management regulations related to OCO spending  (as of September 9, 2010) Source: Letter from Steven M  Kosiak, Associate Director for Defense and Foreign Affairs, OMB, to Robert Hale, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, "Revised War Funding Criteria," September 9, 2010  DOD Financial Management Regulations DOD incorporated the September 2010 OMB criteria for war costs into the Financial Management Regulation  Table 1 includes the general cost categories DOD uses in accounting for costs of contingency operations  Appendix B  Transfer Authorities, Special Purpose Accounts In addition to the supplemental appropriations and emergency or OCO/GWOT designation, the Department of Defense and the Department of State also have the authority to shift funds from one budget account to another in response to operational needs  For DOD, these transfers (sometimes called reprogramings ) are statutorily authorized by 10 U S C  2214—Transfer of funds: procedures and limitations  This authority allows the Secretary of Defense to reallocate funds for higher priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements, after receiving written approval from the four congressional defense committees  DOD may also reprogram funds within an account from one activity to another, as long as the general purpose for the use of those funds remains unchanged  Specific limits to transfer or reprogramming authorities have also been added to these general authorities through provisions in annual defense authorization and appropriation acts  The FY2019 defense appropriations bill sets the base budget transfer cap at $4 billion and the OCO transfer cap at $2 billion  The Department of State's OCO transfer authority has been provided in appropriations acts and has specifically authorized the Administration to transfer OCO funds only to other OCO funds within Title VIII SFOPS appropriations, not between OCO and base accounts  The transfer authority is capped, specified by account, and requires regular congressional notification procedures  Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) The OCOTF was established for DOD in FY1997 as a no year transfer account (meaning amounts are available until expended) in order to provide additional flexibility to meet operational requirements  Transfers from the OCOTF are processed using existing reprogramming procedures  A quarterly report is submitted to the congressional oversight committees, documenting all transfers from the OCOTF to DOD components base budget accounts  Beginning in FY2002, funds to support Southwest Asia, Kosovo, and Bosnia contingency requirements were appropriated directly to DOD components' Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel accounts rather than to the OCOTF for later disbursement  FY2014 was the last year the Administration requested a direct appropriation to the OCOTF  Contingency Operations Funded in the DOD Base Budget As first mandated by section 8091 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P L  110-116 ), Congress has required DOD to provide separate annual budget justification documents detailing the costs of U S  armed forces' participation in all named contingency operations where the total cost of the operation exceeds $100 million or is staffed by more than 1,000 U S  military personnel  Funding for certain DOD contingency operations has been moved to the base budget request, and is no longer designated as emergency or OCO/GWOT requirements  This movement of funding from the OCO request to the base budget request typically occurs as the operational activities of an enduring contingency operation evolve over time and DOD determines that certain elements of the associated military operations have become stable enough to be planned, financed, and executed within the base budget  For example, funding for Operation Noble Eagle, which provides fighter aircraft on 24/7 alert at several U S  military bases, was moved from the GWOT request to the base budget request in 2005  Contingency operations and other activities funded wholly or in part through DOD's base budget have included: NATO Operations in the Balkans   The U S  Army and U S  Air Force provide support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led operations in the Balkans region  Most U S  forces are deployed to Kosovo in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)  A small number of U S  personnel are deployed to the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Joint Task Force - Bravo   U S  forces support this task force, which operates from Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras and supports joint, combined, and interagency exercises and operations in Central America to counter the influence of transnational organized crime; carry out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and build military capacity with regional partners and allied nations to promote regional cooperation and security; Operation Juniper Shield  Previously known as Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), this operation supports efforts to defeat violent extremist organizations in East Africa  This operation also provides military-to-military engagement with partner African countries, as well as readiness for crisis response and evacuation of U S  military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel; Operation Noble Eagle   This operation funds the continuing efforts to defend the United States from airborne attacks, maintain the sovereignty of the United States airspace, and defend critical U S  facilities from potentially hostile threats or unconventional attacks; Operation Enduring Freedom- Horn of Africa   This operation was established to support efforts to defeat violent extremist organizations in East Africa; provide military-to-military engagement with partner African countries, as well as readiness for crisis response and evacuation of U S  military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel throughout East Africa; Operation Enduring Freedom- Caribbean and Central America   A U S  regional military operation initiated in 2008, under the operational control of Special Operations Command-South, this operation was established to focus on counterterrorism to support DOD's overall military objectives and the larger fight against terrorism  Operation Observant Compass   This operation was established to support the deployment of approximately 100 U S  military personnel assisting the Ugandan People's Defense Force and neighboring partner African countries in countering the Lord's Resistance Army operations  Operation Spartan Shield  This operation was established to support ongoing U S  Central Command missions  Other Congressionally Authorized Funds or Programs Through the OCO authorization and appropriation process, Congress has created numerous funds and programs that are designed to finance specific overseas contingency operations-related activities that do not fit into traditional budgetary accounts  Many of these funds and programs are supplied with amounts that are available until expended—however, authorization for the specified fund or program has an expiration date, thereby requiring further congressional action for reauthorization of affected funds or programs  Congress has also provided increased transfer authority to provide greater flexibility for U S  government activities in situations that are typically unpredictable  Examples of these types of congressionally authorized OCO programs or funds have included: Afghan istan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)   These funds were established to provide funding and support for the training, equipping, and expansion of selected military and security forces in support of U S  objectives; Counterterrorism Partnership s Fund   This fund was established to provide funding and support to partner nations engaged in counterterrorism and crisis response activities; Command er's Emergency Response Program  This program was established to support infrastructure improvements, such as road repair and construction and enable military commanders on the ground to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs by undertaking activities that will immediately aid local populations and assist U S  forces in maintaining security gains; Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) Defeat Fund   This fund was established to coordinate and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing research and development, throughout DOD  Due to the enduring nature of the threat, DOD began moving associated funding to the base budget in FY2010; Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) Fund   This fund was intended to expedite the procurement and deployment of MRAPs to Iraq and Afghanistan; European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)   Initially the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), this effort was established to provide funding and support to NATO allies and partners to "reassure allies of the U S  commitment to their security and territorial integrity as members of the NATO Alliance, provide near-term flexibility and responsiveness to the evolving concerns of our allies and partners in Europe, especially Central and Eastern Europe, and help increase the capability and readiness of U S  allies and partners;" Global Security Contingency Fund   This fund was established to provide funding for the Department of State and the Department of Defense "to facilitate an interagency approach to confronting security challenges;" Complex Crise s Fund   This fund was established to provide funding through the State Department and USAID "to help prevent crises and promote recovery in post-conflict situations during unforeseen political, social, or economic challenges that threaten regional security;" Migration and Refugee Assistance Fund   This fund was established to provide funding to respond to refugee crises in Africa, the Near East, South and Central Asia, and Europe and Eurasia; and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative   This initiative was established to provide assistance, including training, equipment, lethal weapons, of a defensive nature; logistics support; supplies and services; sustainment; and intelligence support to the military and national security forces of Ukraine  This is an update to a report originally co-authored by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in Defense Readiness and Infrastructure  It references research previously compiled by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in U S  Defense Policy and Budget; Christopher Mann, Analyst in Defense Policy and Trade; [author name scrubbed], Analyst in U S  Defense Acquisition Policy; [author name scrubbed], CRS Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process; and [author name scrubbed], CRS Analyst in Public Finance  [author name scrubbed], Research Assistant, helped compile the graphics 
Report 2:  According to officials from the 11 stakeholder organizations we interviewed—which represent authorized collectors and long-term care facilities—several factors may explain why relatively few pharmacies and other eligible entities have chosen to become authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs  These factors include the associated costs of participating, uncertainty over proper implementation, and participation in other, similar efforts for disposing of unused prescription drugs  Costs: Stakeholders said that the costs associated with purchasing, installing, and managing the disposal bins is a factor that explains the relatively low rate of participation  One stakeholder told us that many eligible entities may decide that the benefit of participating does not outweigh the costs associated with doing so  Specifically, stakeholders told us that the major costs associated with participating include the one-time cost of purchasing and installing a disposal bin; the ongoing costs to train personnel to manage the bins; and the cost of contracting with a reverse distributor to periodically dispose of the bin’s inner liner and contents  Stakeholders gave varying examples of the specific costs associated with these investments  For example, one stakeholder estimated the yearly costs of maintaining a disposal bin ranged from $500 to $600 per location; another stakeholder said that the cost is thousands of dollars per location per year, but did not provide a specific estimate  These stakeholders added that costs can increase if the disposal bins fill more quickly and need to be emptied more often than expected  For their part, officials from the reverse distributor stakeholders we interviewed cited incinerating hazardous waste, the availability of incinerators, and the cost of personnel as factors that increase the cost of their services for authorized collectors  One reverse distributor stakeholder told us that there are not many incinerators available, requiring them to travel long distances to incinerate collected waste  The other reverse distributor stakeholder added that DEA’s requirement that a second employee be present during the transportation and disposal increases the cost of their services  While some stakeholders speculated that costs are a reason for low participation, a few stakeholders told us that the benefits are worth the costs  In fact, two stakeholders we spoke with told us that the benefit to the communities was so important that they decided to provide funding to retail pharmacies, alleviating an individual pharmacy’s concern about the cost of installing and maintaining the disposal bins  We found that as of April 2017, over a quarter of the 2,233 authorized collectors using disposal bins received external funding to pay for the costs associated with installing and maintaining the disposal bins  In addition, stakeholders told us that some localities have enacted laws known as extended producer responsibility ordinances, which require that pharmaceutical manufacturers pay for certain costs associated with drug disposal  When asked about the costs associated with operating disposal bins, DEA officials told us that addressing cost issues with eligible participants falls outside of their responsibilities  Uncertainty: Stakeholders also told us that uncertainty regarding how to comply with aspects of DEA’s regulations for prescription drug disposal bins affected their decisions to participate  One stakeholder added that many eligible entities decide not to participate because uncertainties over participation requirements could result in inadvertent non-compliance with DEA’s regulations  As an example of their uncertainty over some of the requirements governing the disposal bins, officials from both of the reverse distributor stakeholders we interviewed cited DEA’s non-retrievable standard for destruction of the inner liners of the bins  DEA requires that the method of destruction be sufficient to render all controlled substances non- retrievable, meaning that the physical and chemical conditions of the controlled substances must be permanently altered and unusable in order to prevent diversion for illicit purposes  Both reverse distributor stakeholders told us that they are uncertain about whether certain disposal methods meet this standard, and they said that the agency has not provided further guidance on how reverse distributors can meet this requirement  DEA officials told us that the agency responds to questions about whether a specific method of destruction meets the non-retrievable standard by telling the registrant to test the remnants after destruction, to see if any components of the controlled substance are still present  In its summary of the regulations implementing the Disposal Act, DEA stated that in order to allow for the development of various methods of destruction, the agency did not require a specific method of destruction as long as the desired result is achieved  However, DEA officials stated that to their knowledge, incineration is the only method known to meet the non-retrievable standard to date, but the officials hoped other methods will be developed in the future  When asked about the guidance they provide to authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs or those eligible to become authorized collectors, DEA officials told us that they post frequently-asked questions on their website, routinely answer questions from participants and others, and give training presentations at conferences that include information on the disposal bins  In our prior work, we found problems with DEA’s communication and guidance to stakeholders  In 2015, we recommended that DEA identify and implement cost-effective means for communicating regularly with pharmacies and other entities authorized to handle controlled substances  DEA agreed with the recommendation, and officials told us that, starting in August 2017, these entities can subscribe to DEA’s website to receive notifications when it is updated with new guidance  Stakeholders also noted that some DEA requirements related to disposal bins may conflict with other state and federal requirements governing the transportation and disposal of hazardous waste, which includes some controlled substances  For example, the two reverse distributor stakeholders told us that some incinerator permits issued by states require that hazardous waste be examined before incineration; however, DEA requirements do not allow the contents of the liners to be examined, even at the time of incineration  To address the incinerator permit requirements, one reverse distributor told us that they use the Environmental Protection Agency’s hazardous waste household exemption, which treats the liners as household waste and thereby allows incinerator facilities to destroy the liners without examining the contents or violating their state permit  In addition, some stakeholders raised concerns that DEA’s regulations may conflict with other federal regulations  For instance, one stakeholder noted that they recently learned that transporting the disposal bin’s inner liners could violate Department of Transportation regulations  DEA officials told us that they were aware of this, explaining that the conflict was between DEA’s requirement that controlled substances be transported in liners and the Department of Transportation’s requirement that this type of waste be transported in sturdy containers  According to DEA officials, this conflict has been resolved by the Department of Transportation allowing reverse distributors to place the liners inside sturdy containers kept on trucks  Participation in or Availability of Similar Efforts: Stakeholders said that some pharmacies and other eligible entities were already participating in other, similar efforts that allow for the safe disposal of controlled substances, and therefore they did not want to invest additional resources into participating as authorized collectors using disposal bins  For example, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services has an established process that long-term care facilities use to dispose of their unused controlled substances  As a result, all of the long-term care stakeholders told us that long-term care facilities may choose not to partner with pharmacies interested in placing disposal bins within their facilities because it adds significant cost and effort without any additional benefit  Furthermore, pharmacy stakeholders noted that because of the availability of other prescription drug collection efforts in their communities, they did not think that maintaining a disposal bin at their locations was needed  For example, two of the stakeholders explained that local law enforcement precincts already had a similar type of disposal bin in place to collect unused prescription drugs  DEA officials told us that they were aware of other options for the public and entities such as long-term care facilities that are not registered as authorized collectors to dispose of controlled substances  The officials also indicated that the availability of disposal options at law enforcement agencies contributes to the low participation rates among pharmacies as authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs  We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Justice for comment  DEA, part of the Department of Justice, provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the Attorney General of the United States and the Administrator of DEA  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or draperd@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the contact name above, Elizabeth H  Curda (Director), Will Simerl (Assistant Director), Kathryn Richter (Analyst-In-Charge), Nick Bartine, Giselle Hicks, Jessica Lin, and Emily Wilson made key contributions to this report  Also contributing were Muriel Brown and Krister Friday 

ground_truth: Congressional interest in Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding has continued as Members debate ways of funding priorities without breaching discretionary spending limits set in law. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority designated as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) in support of the broad U.S. government response to the 9/11 attacks and for other related international affairs activities. This figure amounts to approximately 9.4% of total discretionary spending during this period. Congress has used supplemental appropriation acts or designated funding for emergency requirements or OCO/GWOT—or both—in statute. These funds are not subject to limits on discretionary spending in congressional budget resolutions or to the statutory discretionary spending limits established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-125). The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P.L. 99-177) allows emergency funding to be excluded from budget control limits. The BCA added the OCO/GWOT designation to the BBEDCA exemption, thereby providing Congress and the President with an alternate way to exclude funding from the BCA spending limits. While there is no overall statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO/GWOT spending, both Congress and the President have fundamental roles in determining how much of the spending to provide each fiscal year. Congress must designate any such funding in statute on an account-by-account basis. The President is also required to designate it as such after it is appropriated to be available for expenditure. Debate over what should constitute OCO/GWOT or emergency activities and expenses has shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Funding designated for OCO/GWOT has also been used to fund base-budget requirements of the DOD and State Department and to prevent or respond to crises abroad, including armed conflict, as well as human-caused and natural disasters. Some defense officials and policymakers argue OCO funding allows for flexible response to contingencies, and provides a "safety valve" to the spending caps and threat of sequestration—the automatic cancellation of budget authority largely through across-the-board reductions of nonexempt programs and activities—under the BCA. Critics, however, have described OCO/GWOT as a loophole or "gimmick"—morphing from an account for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupplying expended munitions, and transporting troops through war zones, to a "slush fund" for activities unrelated to contingency operations. Congress appropriated approximately $103 billion for OCO in FY2017 (8.5% of all discretionary appropriations), $78 billion for OCO in FY2018 (5.5% of all discretionary appropriations), and $68.8 billion for OCO so far in FY2019. Discretionary appropriations for FY2019 are not yet final; a continuing resolution expired December 21, 2018. Following passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which raised discretionary budget caps for defense and foreign affairs agencies in FY2018 and FY2019, the Administration proposed shifting some OCO funding into the base, or regular, budget. Although Congress has generally not followed Administration requests for reduced funding for foreign affairs and domestic activities and has increased funding for defense, the President has asked cabinet secretaries to propose spending cuts of 5% in FY2020. Such proposals, if requested in a budget submission, may create difficult choices for Congress in FY2020 and FY2021—the final two years of the BCA discretionary spending limits. Congress's decisions on OCO/GWOT designations will affect how much agency funding is available for military operations and foreign affairs activities overseas, how much is subject to the BCA caps, and how much is incorporated into regular budgets and long-term budget projections.