prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Our past work has identified progress and challenges in a number of areas related to DHS’s management of the CFATS program including (1) the process for identifying high risk chemical facilities; (2) how it assesses risk and prioritizes facilities; (3) reviewing and approving facility security plans; (4) how it conducts facility compliance inspections; and (5) efforts to conduct stakeholder outreach and gather feedback  DHS has made a number of programmatic changes to CFATS in recent years that may also impact its progress in addressing our open recommendations; these changes are included as part of our ongoing review of the program  In May 2014, we found that more than 1,300 facilities had reported having ammonium nitrate to DHS  However, based on our review of state data and records, there were more facilities with ammonium nitrate holdings than those that had reported to DHS under the CFATS program  Thus, we concluded that some facilities that were required to report may have failed to do so  We recommended that DHS work with other agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to develop and implement methods of improving data sharing among agencies and with states as members of a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group  DHS agreed with our recommendation and has since addressed it  Specifically, DHS compared DHS data with data from other federal agencies, such as EPA, as well as member states from the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group to identify potentially noncompliant facilities  As a result of this effort, in July 2015, DHS officials reported that they had identified about 1,000 additional facilities that should have reported information to comply with CFATS and subsequently contacted these facilities to ensure compliance  DHS officials told us that they continue to engage with states to identify potentially non-compliant facilities  For example, as of June 2018, DHS officials stated they have received 43 lists of potentially noncompliant facilities from 34 state governments, which are in various stages of review by DHS  DHS officials also told us that they recently hired an individual to serve as the lead staff member responsible for overseeing this effort  DHS has also taken action to strengthen the accuracy of data it uses to identify high risk facilities  In July 2015, we found that DHS used self- reported and unverified data to determine the risk categorization for facilities that held toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released  At the time, DHS required that facilities self- report the Distance of Concern—an area in which exposure to a toxic chemical cloud could cause serious injury or fatalities from short-term exposure—as part of its Top-Screen  We estimated that more than 2,700 facilities with a toxic release threat had misreported the Distance of Concern and therefore recommended that DHS (1) develop a plan to implement a new Top-Screen to address errors in the Distance of Concern submitted by facilities, and (2) identify potentially miscategorized facilities that could cause the greatest harm and verify that the Distance of Concern of these facilities report is accurate  DHS has fully addressed both of these recommendations  Specifically, DHS implemented an updated Top-Screen in October 2016 and now collects data from facilities and calculates the Distance of Concern itself, rather than relying on the facilities’ calculation  In response to our second recommendation, in November 2016, DHS officials stated they completed an assessment of all Top-Screens that reported threshold quantities of toxic release chemicals of interest and identified 158 facilities with the potential to cause the greatest harm  As of May 2017, according to ISCD officials, 156 of the 158 facilities submitted updated Top-Screens and 145 of the 156 Top-Screens had undergone a quality assurance review process  DHS has also taken actions to better assess regulated facilities’ risks in order to place the facilities into the appropriate risk tier  In April 2013, we reported that DHS’s risk assessment approach did not consider all of the elements of threat, vulnerability, and consequence associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals  Our work showed that DHS’s risk assessment was based primarily on consequences from human casualties, but did not consider economic consequences, as called for by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the CFATS regulation  We also found that (1) DHS’s approach was not consistent with the NIPP because it treated every facility as equally vulnerable to a terrorist attack regardless of location or on-site security and (2) DHS was not using threat data for 90 percent of the tiered facilities—those tiered for the risk of theft or diversion—and using 5-year-old threat data for the remaining 10 percent of those facilities that were tiered for the risks of release or sabotage  We recommended that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk and conduct a peer review after doing so  DHS agreed with our recommendations and has made progress towards addressing them  Specifically, with regard to our recommendation that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk, DHS worked with Sandia National Laboratories to develop a model to estimate the economic consequences of a chemical attack  In addition, DHS worked with Oak Ridge National Laboratory to devise a new tiering methodology, called the Second Generation Risk Engine  In so doing, DHS revised the CFATS threat, vulnerability, and consequence scoring methods to better cover the range of CFATS security issues  Additionally, with regard to our recommendation that DHS conduct a peer review after enhancing its risk assessment approach, DHS conducted peer reviews and technical reviews with government organizations and facility owners and operators, and worked with Sandia National Laboratories to verify and validate the new tiering approach  We are currently reviewing the reports and data that DHS has provided about its new tiering methodology as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of this work later this summer  To further enhance its risk assessment approach, in fall 2016, DHS also revised its Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT), which supports DHS efforts to gather information from facilities to assess their risk  According to DHS officials, the new tool—called CSAT 2 0—is intended to eliminate duplication and confusion associated with DHS’s original CSAT  DHS officials told us that they have improved the tool by revising some questions in the original CSAT to make them easier to understand; eliminating some questions; and pre-populating data from one part of the tool to another so that users do not have to retype the same information multiple times  DHS officials also told us that the facilities that have used the CSAT 2 0 have provided favorable feedback that the new tool is more efficient and less burdensome than the original CSAT  Finally, DHS officials told us that as of June 2018, DHS has completed all notifications and has processed tiering results for all but 226 facilities  DHS officials stated they are currently working to identify correct points of contact to update registration information for these remaining facilities  We are currently assessing DHS’s efforts to assess risk and prioritize facilities as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of this work in our report later this summer  DHS has also made progress reviewing and approving facility site security plans by reducing the time it takes to review these plans and eliminating the backlog of plans awaiting review  In April 2013, we reported that DHS revised its procedures for reviewing facilities’ security plans to address DHS managers’ concerns that the original process was slow, overly complicated, and caused bottlenecks in approving plans  We estimated that it could take DHS another 7 to 9 years to review the approximately 3,120 plans in its queue at that time  We also estimated that, given the additional time needed to do compliance inspections, the CFATS program would likely be implemented in 8 to 10 years  We did not make any recommendations for DHS to improve its procedures for reviewing facilities’ security plans because DHS officials reported that they were exploring ways to expedite the process, such as reprioritizing resources and streamlining inspection requirements  In July 2015, we reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities  DHS officials attributed the increased approval rate to efficiencies in DHS’s review process, updated guidance, and a new case management system  Subsequently, DHS reported in its December 2016 semi-annual report to Congress that it had eliminated its approval backlog  Finally, we found in our 2017review that DHS also took action to implement an Expedited Approval Program (EAP)  The CFATS Act of 2014 required that DHS create the EAP as another option that tier 3 and tier 4 chemical facilities may use to develop and submit security plans to DHS  Under the program, facilities may develop a security plan based on specific standards published by DHS (as opposed to the more flexible performance standards using the standard, non-expedited process)  DHS issued guidance intended to help facilities prepare and submit their EAP security plans to DHS, which includes an example that identifies prescriptive security measures that facilities are to have in place  According to committee report language, the EAP was expected to reduce the regulatory burden on smaller chemical companies, which may lack the compliance infrastructure and the resources of large chemical facilities, and help DHS to process security plans more quickly  If a tier 3 or 4 facility chooses to use the expedited option, DHS is to review the plan to determine if it is facially deficient, pursuant to the reporting requirements of the CFATS Act of 2014  If DHS approves the EAP site security plan, it is to subsequently conduct a compliance inspection  In 2017, we found that DHS had implemented the EAP and had reported to Congress on the program, as required by the CFATS Act of 2014  In addition, as of June 2018 according to DHS officials, only 18 of the 3,152 facilities eligible to use the EAP opted to use it  DHS officials we interviewed attributed the low participation to several possible factors including: DHS had implemented the expedited program after most eligible facilities already submitted standard (non-expedited) security plans to DHS; facilities may consider the expedited program’s security measures to be too strict and prescriptive, not providing facilities the flexibility of the standard process; and the lack of an authorization inspection may discourage some facilities from using the expedited program because this inspection provides useful information about a facility’s security  We also found in 2017 that recent changes made to the CFATS program could affect the future use of the expedited program  As discussed previously, DHS has revised its methodology for determining the level of each facility’s security risk, which could affect a facility’s eligibility to participate in the EAP  DHS continues to apply the revised methodology to facilities regulated under the CFATS program and but it is too early to assess the impact on participation in the EAP  In our July 2015 report, we found that DHS began conducting compliance inspections in September 2013, and by April 2015, had conducted inspections of 83 of the 1,727 facilities that had approved security plans  Our analysis showed that nearly half of the facilities were not fully compliant with their approved site security plans and that DHS had not used its authority to issue penalties because DHS officials found it more productive to work with facilities to bring them in compliance  We also found that DHS did not have documented processes and procedures for managing the compliance of facilities that had not implemented planned measures by the deadlines outlined in the plans  We recommended that DHS document processes and procedures for managing compliance to provide more reasonable assurance that facilities implement planned measures and address security gaps  DHS agreed and has taken steps toward implementing this recommendation  DHS updated its CFATS Enforcement Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and has made progress on the new CFATS Inspections SOP  Once completed these two documents collectively are expected to formally document the processes and procedures currently being used to track noncompliant facilities and ensure they implement planned measures as outlined in their approved site security plans, according to ISCD officials  DHS officials stated they expect to finalize these procedures by the end of fiscal year 2018  We are examining compliance inspections as part of our ongoing work and will report on the results of our work in our report later this summer  In April 2013, we reported that DHS took various actions to work with facility owners and operators, including increasing the number of visits to facilities to discuss enhancing security plans, but that some trade associations had mixed views on the effectiveness of DHS’s outreach  We found that DHS solicited informal feedback from facility owners and operators in its efforts to communicate and work with them, but did not have an approach for obtaining systematic feedback on its outreach activities  We recommended that DHS take action to solicit and document feedback on facility outreach consistent with DHS efforts to develop a strategic communication plan  DHS agreed and implemented this recommendation by developing a questionnaire to solicit feedback on outreach with industry stakeholders and began using the questionnaire in October 2016  Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member Tonko, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time  If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Other individuals making key contributions to this work include John Mortin, Assistant Director; and Brandon Jones, Analyst-in-Charge; Michael Lennington, Ben Emmel, and Hugh Paquette  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2: NSF relies on two programs for bringing rotators into the agency: (1) the IPA program and (2) the VSEE program  The Office of Personnel Management develops policies on agencies’ use of the IPA program and promulgates program regulations  Rotators in NSF’s IPA and VSEE programs differ in key respects, including their employment status and compensation  IPA rotators  NSF enters into written agreements with rotators’ home institutions for all IPA assignments  The agreements detail rotators’ salaries and health, retirement, and other fringe benefits at their home institutions, as well as the cost-sharing amounts NSF and home institutions are to pay during rotators’ assignments  NSF reimburses its cost-sharing amounts to home institutions, which continue to pay rotators’ full salaries and benefits  NSF does not cap the salaries of IPA rotators; as a result, IPA rotators may receive salaries that exceed the maximum federal salary for the position they hold at NSF  In contrast, if an IPA rotator’s salary is less than the minimum federal salary for the position, NSF will supplement the salary to the minimum rate  VSEE rotators  NSF appoints VSEE rotators as federal employees on a nonpaid leave of absence from their home institutions  VSEE rotators receive their salaries directly from NSF but are not eligible for certain federal benefits, such as retirement; instead, NSF reimburses home institutions for the employer’s share of retirement, life insurance, and health benefits that would otherwise be discontinued  NSF’s policy is to set salaries for VSEE rotators that are generally comparable to the salaries the rotators would receive at their home institutions  In setting salaries, NSF also takes into account other sources of income, such as consulting, and allows for locality pay adjustments applicable to employees in the Washington, D C , metropolitan area  However, because VSEE rotators are federal employees, NSF caps their salaries at the federal maximum for the position they hold at NSF  Both IPA and VSEE rotators are eligible for certain other types of reimbursement  In particular, rotators have the option of having NSF pay their moving expenses to and from Washington, D C , or receiving per diem allowances in accordance with federal travel regulations for up to 2 years  In addition, NSF may reimburse rotators for travel-related expenses related to their participation in NSF’s Independent Research and Development program, which enables NSF staff to maintain their involvement with their professional research and research-related activities at their home institutions  Table 1 shows additional information on IPA and VSEE rotator expenses  Rotators are generally assigned to one of NSF’s seven directorates that support science and engineering research and education (see table 2)  Each directorate is headed by an assistant director and deputy assistant director  Directorates are further subdivided into divisions, offices, or sections  Each division is headed by a division director and typically a deputy division director, and each office is headed by an office director and typically a deputy office director  All these positions are executive positions at NSF  At the staff level, NSF uses program directors—subject matter experts in the scientific areas they manage—to conduct reviews of proposals and recommend which projects the agency should fund  With an annual budget of about $7 5 billion, NSF funds approximately 24 percent of all federally supported basic research conducted by colleges and universities in the United States  In 2016, NSF established the Steering Committee for Policy and Oversight of the IPA Program  The steering committee serves as the primary body for considering policy on NSF’s use of IPA rotators and overseeing common approaches to budgeting and implementation of the IPA program  The committee’s membership includes NSF’s chief human capital officer, who serves as the chair, and several other NSF officials  The steering committee has established strategic principles for management of the IPA program  These principles include maintaining a balance between IPA rotators and federal staff and a commitment to ongoing improvement of the program  NSF officials told us that there is no similar steering committee for overseeing VSEE rotators  Instead, each VSEE rotator is individually overseen by his or her respective supervisor  For the agency as a whole, NSF’s Office of Information and Resource Management and its Division of Human Resource Management conduct human capital management  NSF officials stated that the head of the Office of Information and Resource Management serves as the Chief Human Capital Officer and develops and oversees NSF’s human capital approaches and strategies  These officials also told us that the Deputy Chief Human Capital Officer serves as the division director of Human Resource Management and is responsible for administering the division’s day-to-day operations  The Division of Human Resource Management administers the agency’s human capital policies as set forth in NSF’s personnel manual  The numbers of rotators and their costs to NSF in proportion to other staff have remained relatively stable  Most rotators were IPA rotators, and were used in both executive and program director (staff-level) positions  NSF generally used VSEE rotators in program director positions  Most rotators at NSF were IPA rotators, and the proportion of rotators relative to other staff has remained relatively stable over time (see fig  1)  During the 10-year period we reviewed, from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2017, IPA and VSEE rotators comprised about 12 percent and about 3 percent, respectively, of NSF’s total workforce; and the number of IPA rotators ranged from 162 to 190 (about 11 to 12 percent of total staff), and the number of VSEE rotators ranged from 22 to 52 (about 1 to 3 percent of total staff)  NSF primarily used rotators across its seven scientific directorates, using IPA rotators in executive and program director positions and VSEE rotators in program director positions  The agency used rotators in these positions alongside NSF’s permanent staff to perform day-to-day agency operations, including managing the agency’s merit review process for determining which projects to fund  NSF used IPA rotators in executive positions such as assistant director  According to agency officials, individuals in executive positions at NSF are responsible for setting the direction for the scientific area they are assigned, leading scientific and technical matters, establishing an organizational culture, overseeing outreach and collaboration with NSF stakeholders, and contributing to NSF and national policy development and implementation  For example, an executive IPA rotator that we interviewed told us that he emphasized forming partnerships with industry when setting the direction for his directorate, including issuing joint solicitations for research proposals with industry partners  In addition, according to NSF officials, individuals in executive positions provide guidance and team management for staff  The proportion of IPA rotators to federal employees in executive positions within NSF’s seven scientific directorates and other staff offices has generally increased since fiscal year 2012  As shown in figure 4, from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2017, the number and proportion of executive positions filled by IPA rotators ranged from 18 of 98 (about 18 percent) in 2008 to 30 of 108 (about 28 percent) in fiscal year 2016  In November 2017, IPA rotators filled 29 of 88 (about 33 percent) executive positions within NSF’s seven scientific directorates  At that time, the proportion of executive positions filled by IPA rotators varied among directorates, as shown in table 3  For example, IPA rotators filled 4 of 8 (50 percent) of the executive positions in the Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences and 2 of 14 (about 14 percent) of the executive positions in the Directorate for Mathematical and Physical Sciences  According to NSF officials, NSF often pairs IPA rotators and federal employees at the executive level so that each can benefit from the other’s experience and perspective  For example, in all but one directorate, an IPA rotator filled the assistant director position and a federal employee filled the corresponding deputy assistant director position  Two NSF executives we interviewed, including an IPA rotator and a federal employee, commented positively on the pairing of IPA rotators and federal employees at the executive level  For example, they said that rotators maintain close ties to the research community and federal employees may have more experience with NSF’s institutional history  One NSF executive told us that IPA rotators help keep the agency at the forefront of science because they have deep ties with the research community and regularly publish their own research  Additionally, a federal program director we interviewed told us that in one previous instance in which an IPA rotator filled an executive position without being paired with a federal employee, the rotator’s lack of institutional knowledge of NSF and the steep learning curve for the position caused inefficiencies during the rotator’s first year at NSF  The agency, however, does not require pairing IPA rotators and federal employees at the executive level, according to NSF officials  For example, in November 2017, IPA rotators filled both the division director and deputy division director positions in the Division of Behavioral and Cognitive Science and Division of Undergraduate Education  In our interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of NSF employees and rotators, we found mixed perceptions about the effect of NSF’s use of IPA rotators on opportunities for advancement for permanent employees  For example, in response to a question about this effect, one permanent NSF employee told us that she advanced to an executive position and that opportunities exist for advancement within the agency  In contrast, another NSF employee we interviewed told us that she did not feel there were opportunities for advancement because, in her view, executive vacancies created by the departure of rotators were exclusively filled with other rotators  NSF officials said that the agency has no policy that restricts repeatedly filling certain executive positions with rotators and that such a situation is a common practice  Nevertheless, NSF officials told us 32 of the 88 executives (about 36 percent) in NSF’s seven scientific directorates in November 2017 had held staff-level positions within the agency before becoming executives  NSF uses both IPA and VSEE rotators in program director positions, which are staff-level positions  In fiscal year 2016, NSF had a total of 506 program directors, including 139 IPA rotators (about 27 percent) and 39 VSEE rotators (about 8 percent)  According to NSF officials, program directors are responsible for conducting long-range planning and developing budgets for the areas of science represented by their program and for administrating the merit review process  In particular, IPA and VSEE rotators who serve as program directors help determine the projects that NSF funds  To do so, they review proposals, identify experts in their field to serve as external reviewers, and make funding recommendations to their respective division directors  NSF officials told us that, similar to the pairing of IPA rotators and federal employees at the executive level, permanent and rotating program directors frequently work together on a shared program so that each can benefit from the other’s experience and perspective  For example, a rotating program director we interviewed told us that she worked under the guidance of a program lead, who is typically a permanent employee  Another rotating program director told us that NSF’s permanent federal employees are good at training incoming rotators  Beginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted rotator program cost- management strategies expected to achieve the greatest savings with the least harm to recruitment, but NSF officials said it is too soon to determine the full results because these new strategies are being phased in for new IPA agreements only  NSF considered other strategies to manage rotator costs, but it did not adopt them, generally because NSF anticipated negative effects on rotator recruitment or because it estimated the resulting cost savings would be small  NSF has adopted three strategies to manage rotators’ costs in fiscal year 2017, but, NSF officials said it is too soon to determine the full results because these new strategies are being phased in for new IPA agreements only  All three of these strategies relate to IPA rotators; NSF officials told us that they have not considered or adopted any cost- management strategies related to VSEE rotators  The officials explained that any such strategies could affect NSF’s entire federal workforce because VSEE rotators are federal employees  The three strategies are: (1) obtaining a minimum 10 percent cost-share from each IPA rotator’s home institution, (2) limiting IPA rotators’ paid trips to their home institutions to 12 per year, and (3) no longer reimbursing IPA rotators for consulting income that they forgo while at NSF  NSF officials told us they expect to issue a report with the results of evaluations of all three strategies in December 2018  In October 2016, NSF implemented a cost-sharing pilot program that requires institutions covered by the program—those who entered into negotiations for new IPA agreements in fiscal year 2017—to pay for at least 10 percent of the IPA rotators’ salaries and fringe benefits  Implementing this cost-management strategy, and the other strategies that NSF adopted, was consistent with recommendations from NSF’s steering committee for oversight of IPA rotators  This cost-management strategy targeted NSF’s costs for IPA rotators’ salary and fringe benefits, which constitute the largest component of IPA rotators’ costs  For example, these costs were about $34 7 million, or about 89 percent of IPA rotator costs in fiscal year 2017  Previously, according to NSF officials, the agency requested an optional cost-share amount of 15 percent from rotators’ home institutions, but it typically received less because of variations in the amounts that home institutions provided  According to an October 2016 report from the task force on fiscal oversight, NSF decided on 10 percent for the cost-sharing pilot program because, historically, few home institutions provided the full 15 percent and NSF believed a requirement of 10 percent would not significantly affect its ability to recruit and hire IPA rotators  If a home institution is unable to provide the full 10 percent, the institution may request that NSF waive the cost-sharing requirement  According to NSF officials, such requests must be signed by a senior administrator at the rotator’s home institution and include the rationale for not being able to provide the required amount, the financial impact on the institution if it were to provide the full 10 percent, and associated documentation, among other things  Changes made in implementing this strategy, and the other strategies that NSF adopted, applied to new IPA agreements made in fiscal year 2017  These changes did not apply to IPA rotators with agreements made prior to 2017—even if those agreements are subsequently extended or renewed—or that were being negotiated at the time of the policy change, provided that the rotators’ appointment memoranda were already being reviewed by NSF’s Division of Human Resource Management  NSF officials told us that as of March 2018, the agency had not conducted full evaluations of this strategy or the other strategies because it was too soon to determine their full effects and NSF had not yet collected enough data to do so  Instead, NSF issued reports in January and March 2018 containing its preliminary analyses  In general, these preliminary reports found that the cost-management strategies resulted in savings to NSF  Similarly, our analysis of data from NSF found that cost sharing as a percentage of IPA rotators’ salary and fringe benefits increased from about 7 percent in fiscal year 2016 to about 8 percent in fiscal year 2017  NSF officials told us that of the 55 IPA rotators who were subject to the cost-sharing requirement in fiscal year 2017: the home institutions for 54 rotators met or exceeded the 10 percent cost-share requirement, and of those, 16 exceeded the cost-share requirement; and the home institution for 1 rotator did not cost-share because the rotator was from a Federally Funded Research and Development Center and NSF waived the cost-share requirement because cost- sharing would not decrease the overall federal cost  In November 2017, NSF decided to extend the cost-sharing pilot through at least the end of fiscal year 2018, to ensure a full evaluation could be conducted  In particular, NSF officials told us that they need more data and experience with this pilot program to better understand its effects, such as the ability to recruit potential IPA rotators  For example, one IPA rotator that we interviewed expressed concern with the cost-sharing requirement’s potential effect on small or publicly funded universities, which may lack funds to contribute to the cost of an IPA assignment  According to NSF officials, their evaluation will include an analysis of the cost of IPA rotators under the cost-sharing requirement and its effect on the IPA program, including recruitment  Beginning in fiscal year 2017, for IPA rotators who entered into negotiations for new agreements in that fiscal year, NSF placed a limit of 12 agency-funded trips per year that rotators may take to their home institutions under the Independent Research and Development program  In our analysis of data from NSF, we found that NSF’s costs for IPA rotators under this program decreased from about $1 5 million (about 3 percent of IPA rotator costs) in fiscal year 2016 to $1

ground_truth: Thousands of facilities have hazardous chemicals that could be targeted or used to inflict mass casualties or harm surrounding populations in the United States. In accordance with the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007, DHS established the CFATS program in 2007 to, among other things, identify and assess the security risk posed by chemical facilities. DHS inspects high-risk facilities after it approves facility security plans to ensure that the facilities are implementing required security measures and procedures. This statement summarizes progress and challenges related to DHS's CFATS program management. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from July 2012 through June 2017, along with updates conducted in June 2018 on DHS actions to address prior GAO recommendations. To conduct the prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and DHS policies for administering the CFATS program, how DHS assesses risk, and data on high-risk chemical facilities. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and reviewed information on DHS actions to implement its prior recommendations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress addressing challenges that GAO's past work identified to managing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The following summarizes progress made and challenges remaining in key aspects of the program. Identifying high-risk chemical facilities. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS used self-reported and unverified data to determine the risk of facilities holding toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released. GAO recommended that DHS should better verify the accuracy of facility-reported data. DHS implemented this recommendation by revising its methodology so it now calculates the risk of toxic release, rather than relying on facilities to do so. Assessing risk and prioritizing facilities. In April 2013, GAO reported weaknesses in multiple aspects of DHS's risk assessment and prioritization approach. GAO made two recommendations for DHS to review and improve this process, including that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. DHS launched a new risk assessment methodology in October 2016 and is currently gathering new or updated data from about 27,000 facilities to (1) determine which facilities should be categorized as high-risk because of the threat of sabotage, theft or diversion, or a toxic release and (2) assign those facilities deemed high risk to one of four risk-based tiers. GAO has ongoing work assessing these efforts and will report later this summer on the extent to which they fully address prior recommendations. Reviewing and approving facilities' site security plans . DHS is to review security plans and visit facilities to ensure their security measures meet DHS standards. In April 2013, GAO reported a 7 to 9 year backlog for these reviews and visits. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities. DHS has since taken additional action to expedite these activities and has eliminated this backlog. Inspecting facilities and ensuring compliance. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS conducted compliance inspections at 83 of the 1,727 facilities with approved security plans. GAO found that nearly half of the inspected facilities were not fully compliant with their approved security plans and that DHS did not have documented procedures for managing facilities' compliance. GAO recommended that DHS document procedures for managing compliance. As a result, DHS has developed an enforcement procedure and a draft compliance inspection procedure and expects to finalize the compliance inspection procedure by the end of fiscal year 2018. GAO has made various recommendations to strengthen DHS's management of the CFATS program, with which DHS has generally agreed. DHS has implemented or described planned actions to address most of these recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: 1 million (about 3 percent of IPA rotator costs) in fiscal year 2017  NSF officials told us that the new limit applies only to an IPA rotator’s trips to their home institution and does not limit travel to other locations for fieldwork or scientific conferences, among other things  These officials explained that NSF chose not to limit trips to these other locations because they are considered fundamental to IPA rotators’ research and are infrequent—occurring one to three times per year, on average, per IPA rotator  Additionally, rotators are permitted to use annual leave, leave without pay, or flexitime to take trips using non-NSF funds for activities performed on a rotator’s own time  In adopting this cost-management strategy, NSF sought to balance the benefits of IPA rotators’ travel with the travel costs  According to the Task Force on Fiscal Oversight’s October 2016 report, NSF’s support for travel benefits the agency by providing a way for program directors and executives to stay current in their scientific fields, conduct outreach with scientific communities, and provide oversight and stewardship of NSF’s programs and awards  NSF officials told us that the agency sought to control travel costs under the Independent Research and Development program by setting a reasonable limit to NSF-funded trips that would cause the least harm to rotators’ research so as not to discourage them from coming to NSF  As a result, NSF decided on a maximum of 12 trips per year under this program because, historically, more than 80 percent of the IPA rotator participants traveled to their home institution less than once per month  In fiscal year 2017, for IPA rotators who entered into new agreements in that fiscal year, NSF ended reimbursements for consulting income that the rotators forgo as a result of their assignment to NSF  Previously, when an IPA rotator discontinued consulting activities during an IPA assignment, NSF would reimburse the rotator up to $10,000 a year  IPA rotators who entered into negotiations or agreements with NSF prior to this change may still receive this reimbursement  In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for lost consulting reimbursements to IPA rotators was $150,000  This amount represented a decrease of about $160,000, or about 52 percent, from fiscal year 2016  NSF made this change because it determined that doing so would not negatively affect the IPA program  In particular, NSF found that other federal science agencies typically did not reimburse IPA rotators for lost consulting income and it concluded that IPA rotators typically do not expect NSF to offer reimbursement  In addition to the three adopted strategies, NSF’s Task Force on Fiscal Oversight identified other potential cost management strategies for the IPA program  The task force reviewed various data on the costs that make up the IPA program, such as the number of IPA rotators who received a particular form of compensation or who would be affected by the potential strategies  In addition, the task force took into account anecdotal and other evidence on how IPA rotators might react to the strategies  Using input from the task force, NSF opted against the other potential strategies because it either (1) expected the resulting cost savings to be small or (2) anticipated potential negative effects from implementing them, such as increased difficulty in hiring IPA rotators  These potential cost-management strategies primarily related to IPA rotator compensation, as described below  Capping IPA rotators’ salaries  NSF decided against establishing a salary cap for IPA rotators at various levels between about $185,000 and $240,000 annually  The task force found that salary caps at lower levels would have greater cost savings because of the higher number of individuals covered by the cap, but that the caps would also pose a significant risk to NSF’s ability to recruit IPA rotators  In particular, the task force found that salary caps at lower levels would disproportionately affect IPA rotators in two of its directorates—the Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering and the Directorate for Engineering—because of the higher salaries of individuals in positions associated with those fields  As a result, the task force recommended that NSF first assess the effects of its cost-sharing pilot program before proceeding with any cap on IPA rotators’ salaries  Reducing or eliminating IPA rotators’ supplemental pay  NSF decided against reducing or eliminating the supplemental pay that IPA rotators receive when their salary at their home institution is below the minimum for their NSF position  In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for IPA rotators’ supplemental pay was $1 0 million (about 3 percent of IPA rotator costs)  The task force recommended against this potential cost-management strategy because it would disproportionately affect IPA rotators in two of its directorates—the Directorate for Biological Sciences and the Directorate for Geosciences  In addition, the task force expected that any cost savings associated with this strategy would be small  Reducing IPA rotators’ per diem payments  NSF decided against reducing or eliminating per diem payments for lodging (excluding taxes), meals, and incidental expenses incurred during the length of rotators’ assignments  In fiscal year 2017, NSF’s cost for per diem payments was $3 1 million (about 8 percent of IPA costs)  The task force concluded, based on its analysis of per diem costs and anecdotal evidence, that many IPA rotators would opt to depart NSF if NSF did not provide per diem payments  As a result, the task force recommended against this strategy  As of June 2018, NSF had not developed an agency-wide workforce strategy for using rotators, as its IPA program steering committee recommended  In addition, NSF has not fully evaluated or developed plans to evaluate both IPA and VSEE rotator program results in terms of progress toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results  As of June 2018, NSF had not developed an agency-wide workforce strategy that includes use of rotators, as NSF’s IPA program steering committee had recommended  In an August 2016 report on the IPA program, the steering committee stated that NSF did not have an agency- wide workforce strategy; instead, each directorate made decisions on its own about when and how to use IPA rotators in executive and program director positions  According to the report, an agency-wide framework would enable NSF to ensure an optimal balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors, which is a strategic principle that the steering committee developed for the IPA program  In February 2017, the committee issued an internal report to agency leadership that recommended expanding what was originally envisioned as a workforce strategy for the IPA program into a comprehensive agency-wide workforce strategy  The report stated that expanding the scope of the workforce strategy would have the greatest impact across the agency and would help NSF leadership in making strategic human capital decisions  The report outlined a process for developing a workforce strategy with various steps, including the following: Job analyses  The report recommended job analyses to review the roles and responsibilities of executive and staff-level positions and to identify the skills and capabilities required for successful performance of the work  According to the report, the steering committee’s working group for developing a workforce strategy found, based on its initial efforts to review position descriptions and roles and responsibilities, that some functions may be better served if performed by permanent federal employees and other functions by rotators  However, the working group concluded that NSF should obtain additional input and evidence before initiating large-scale changes in its workforce  Analysis of workforce gaps and surpluses  The report stated that identifying gaps and surpluses in the demand and supply for federal and rotator scientific staff would inform opportunities to optimize recruitment and retention efforts  The report recommended separate analyses for executive and scientific staff- level positions  Development of strategies to close workforce gaps and address surpluses  According to the steering committee’s report, examples of strategies include succession planning and rebalancing the mix of permanent federal staff and rotators to ensure an optimal workforce with the skills, experience, and capabilities to accomplish NSF’s science-related work  According to NSF officials, the agency’s Division of Human Resource Management was responsible for implementing the steering committee’s recommendation  In particular, it undertook an effort to work with senior leadership to develop a broad strategic workforce plan for the agency  However, in June 2018, NSF officials told us that they shifted their focus from developing a separate workforce strategy in order to focus instead on (1) development of a human capital operating plan, which agencies are required to develop and approve annually, and update as needed, under OPM regulations that went into effect on April 11, 2017; and (2) an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) memorandum issued in April 2017 directing agency heads to develop reform plans that identify ways to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of their respective agencies  The NSF officials explained that they recognized the value in having a workforce strategy, but they did not consider it appropriate for the Division of Human Resource Management to develop a workforce strategy at the same time that the agency was completing the OPM and OMB plans  NSF did not specify how its efforts to complete the OPM and OMB plans would address the need the steering committee identified for an agency- wide framework that would enable NSF to ensure an optimal balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors  In particular, NSF’s human capital operating plan, which it approved in April 2018, does not discuss NSF’s use of rotators or include information on balancing the agency’s use of rotators with permanent staff  Furthermore, NSF has not yet determined how it will address its use of rotators as part of its agency reform plan  In particular, NSF officials told us in June 2018 that they may address the agency’s use of rotators under the workforce focus area of its reform plan, but that they were only just beginning to identify and select initiatives under this focus area and that these initiatives have not yet been finalized  The process the NSF steering committee laid out in its internal report, when implemented, would align with two key principles GAO has identified for effective strategic workforce planning  Specifically, it would align with the principles of (1) determining the skills and competencies that are critical to successfully achieving missions and goals, and (2) developing human capital strategies to address gaps and enable the contribution of critical skills and competencies needed for mission success  By incorporating the NSF’s steering committee’s recommendation for a workforce strategy—and the process outlined by the steering committee for developing this strategy—into its human capital operating plan or agency reform plan, NSF could better manage its use of rotators and balance them with its permanent staff  We have previously found that high-performing organizations recognize the fundamental importance of measuring both the outcomes of human capital strategies and how these outcomes have helped the organizations accomplish their missions and programmatic goals  However, as of May 2018, NSF had not fully evaluated and did not have plans to evaluate the results of its IPA and VSEE rotator programs in terms of progress toward human capital goals and the contributions the programs made toward achieving programmatic results  One of GAO’s key principles for effective strategic workforce planning states that agencies should monitor and evaluate progress toward the agencies’ human capital goals and the contribution that human capital results have made toward achieving programmatic results  In particular, we previously found that evaluation activities can improve the effectiveness of workforce strategies by identifying shortfalls in performance and other improvement opportunities  OPM also requires agencies to develop a human capital operating plan that will support the evaluation of the agency’s human capital strategies  In March 2014, NSF published a summary of the results of focus groups with IPA rotators and their supervisors  This summary outlined benefits and challenges of the program from the perspectives of both groups, such as the benefit of bringing fresh perspective and new ideas to NSF and the challenge of recruiting and retaining qualified IPA rotators  However, the summary did not provide the agency’s assessment of progress towards programmatic results and human capital goals  For example, it summarized the benefits of the program from the standpoint of rotators and did not provide NSF’s assessment of how individual IPA rotators or the program as a whole contributed to NSF’s scientific mission  In addition, the summary did not provide an assessment of the extent to which the current workforce balance of federal and rotator executives and program directors is aligned with NSF’s work  In our semistructured interviews with federal staff and rotators in executive and staff-level positions at NSF, most were comfortable with the current balance, but three individuals raised concerns about the use of rotators in executive positions, suggesting that NSF could benefit from further analysis of its balance of rotators and federal staff  In April 2018, NSF adopted its human capital operating plan which identifies specific, short-term actions that the agency will take to achieve its human capital goals  In its plan, NSF identified strategies derived from NSF’s commitment to ongoing improvement, such as reviewing and realigning its workforce to meet future needs  Also, NSF’s process for developing a workforce strategy, outlined in the steering committee’s February 2017 internal report, included recommendations to conduct an assessment of the outcomes of workforce strategies and the impact of these outcomes on helping NSF accomplish its scientific mission and related programmatic goals  However, plans for this assessment did not include an evaluation of the agency’s rotator programs  Moreover, neither the steering committee’s February 2017 internal report nor NSF’s April 2018 report committed to conducting such an evaluation or specified how assessments described in its reports would address NSF’s rotator programs  For example, neither report specified how NSF would evaluate the extent to which the rotator programs have achieved NSF’s objectives, which we identified through our review of NSF documentation and interviews with NSF officials  These objectives include: bringing fresh perspectives from across the country and across all fields of science and engineering supported by NSF; helping influence new directions for research in science, engineering, and education, including emerging interdisciplinary fields; providing scientific leadership and management of NSF’s research and education programs; and providing opportunities for researchers to gain first-hand knowledge of the philosophy and mechanisms of federal support for research and bring this knowledge back to their home institutions  According to NSF officials, the agency has not separately evaluated the results of its rotator programs in part because rotators are blended into its permanent federal workforce, making it difficult to evaluate the results of its rotator programs separately from those of its overall workforce  In our December 2003 report on key principles for effective strategic workforce planning, we found that federal agencies in general have experienced difficulties in defining practical and meaningful measures that assess the effects human capital strategies have on programmatic results  However, without an evaluation of the extent of the rotator programs’ contributions toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results, NSF is limited in its ability to demonstrate the programs’ benefits to external stakeholders, such as the Congress, and to adjust the programs, if warranted  Such adjustments could include increasing or decreasing the use of rotators overall or in certain types of positions, such as executive or staff-level positions  In recent years, NSF has recognized the need to think more strategically about its use of rotators and has taken positive steps to manage its rotator programs  For example, beginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted several strategies to manage the cost of rotators  However, as of June 2018, NSF had decided against developing a separate agency-wide strategy for balancing its use of IPA rotators and federal staff, as NSF’s steering committee for the IPA program recommended in February 2017  NSF officials said that they recognized the value in having a workforce strategy but wanted to focus instead on addressing OPM and OMB requirements related to workforce planning  By following through on the steering committee’s recommendation for a workforce strategy, NSF could better manage its use of rotators and balance them with its permanent staff  Moreover, as of June 2018, NSF had not fully evaluated the results of the rotator programs, as called for by key principles for effective strategic workforce planning  NSF officials told us they have not done so, in part, because rotators are blended into NSF’s permanent federal workforce, making it difficult to evaluate the results of its rotator program separately from those of its overall workforce  However, without an evaluation of the extent of the rotator programs’ contributions toward NSF’s human capital goals or programmatic results, NSF is limited in its ability to demonstrate the programs’ benefits to external stakeholders, such as the Congress, and to adjust the programs, if warranted  We are making the following two recommendations to NSF: The NSF Director of Human Resource Management should complete the development of an agency-wide workforce strategy for balancing the agency’s use of IPA and VSEE rotators with permanent staff as part of NSF’s current agency reform planning efforts or updates to its human capital operating plan  (Recommendation 1) The NSF Director of Human Resource Management should evaluate the contributions of the IPA and VSEE rotator programs toward NSF’s human capital goals and the contributions the programs have made toward achieving programmatic results  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to NSF for comment  In its written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I, NSF concurred with our recommendations and stated that implementation of the recommendations will enhance efforts to fulfill the agency’s mission and strengthen its workforce  NSF also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies to the appropriate Congressional Committees, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or neumannj@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the individual named above, Joseph Cook (Assistant Director), Nkenge Gibson, Kathryn Smith, and Douglas Hunker made key contributions to this report  Also contributing to this report were Antoinette Capaccio, Serena Lo, Timothy Guinane, Cynthia Norris, and Sara Sullivan 
Report 2: 1 billion in emergency and OCO/GWOT appropriations enacted to date for State/USAID includes major non-war-related programs, such as aid for the 2004 tsunami along Indian Ocean coasts, 2010 earthquake in Haiti, 2013 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, and 2015 worldwide outbreak of the Zika virus; as well as diplomatic operations (e g , paying staff, providing security, and building and maintaining embassies)  OCO/GWOT has also funded a variety of foreign aid programs, ranging from the Economic Support Fund to counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, among other activities in other countries  Figure 8 depicts the emergency or OCO appropriations for foreign affairs activities  Since 2012, when the OCO designation was first used for foreign affairs, more OCO funds have been appropriated than were requested each year, and those have also been authorized to be used in additional countries  Since January 2002, approximately $3 billion of post-9/11 emergency and OCO-designated funding has been provided to the U S  Coast Guard (USCG) for its traditional homeland security missions and for USCG operations in support of U S  Navy activities  This funding has been provided at various times as either an appropriation to the Coast Guard's operating expenses accounts, or as a transfer from Navy accounts to the Coast Guard  Open-source information on the use of those funds has varied  One FY2009 supplemental appropriations request included funding as a transfer, with the intent of funding "Coast Guard operations in support of OIF and OEF, as well as other classified activities " The FY2017 OCO request for annual appropriations for Navy Operations and Maintenance included $163 million for Coast Guard operational support for the deployment of patrol boats to the Northern Arabian Gulf and a port security unit to Guantanamo Bay, among other pay and equipment expenses  The Trump Administration initially requested a total of $89 billion in OCO funding for FY2019  All the funding was requested by DOD  In an amendment to the budget after Congress raised the BCA spending caps as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P L  115-123 ), the Administration removed the OCO designation from $20 billion of the funding, in effect, shifting that amount into the DOD base budget request  In a statement on the budget amendment, Mulvaney said the request fixes "long-time budget gimmicks" in which OCO funding has been used for base budget requirements  Beginning in FY2020, "the Administration proposes returning to OCO's original purpose by shifting certain costs funded in OCO to the base budget where they belong," he wrote  Of the revised amount of $69 billion requested for DOD OCO funding in FY2019: $46 3 billion (67%) was for Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS) in Afghanistan and related missions; $13 billion (22%) for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq and Syria and related missions; $4 8 billion (9%) for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to boost the U S  military presence in eastern Europe to deter Russian military aggression; and $0 9 billion (1%) for security cooperation (see Figure 9 )  The FY2019 OCO budget assumes a total force level (average annual troop strength) of 93,796 personnel  That figure includes: 11,958 primarily in Afghanistan (OFS); 5,765 primarily in Iraq and Syria (OIR); 59,463 for in-theater support; and 16,610 primarily in the continental United States (CONUS) or otherwise mobilized (see Figure 10 )  The number of personnel actually in-country or in-theater at any given time may exceed or fall below those assumed levels  The FY2019 force level assumes an increase of 3,153 personnel (3 5%) from the FY2018 assumed level, all of which is assumed for in-theater support  (For analysis of troop level and budget trends, see the section, " Trends in OCO Funding and Troop Levels ," earlier in this report ) As previously discussed, DOD acknowledges "OCO funding has not declined at the same rate as the in-country troop strength … due to the fixed, and often inelastic, costs of infrastructure, support requirements, and in-theater presence to support contingency operations " The departments lists the following as OCO cost drivers: In-theater support, including infrastructure costs like command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and base operations for U S  Central Command (CENTCOM) locations; Persistent demand for combat support such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets used to enhance force protection; Equipment reset, which lags troop level changes and procurement of contingency-focused assets like munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles and force protection capabilities that may not be linked directly to in-country operations; and International programs and deterrence activities, which are linked to U S  engagement in contingency operations and support U S  interests but are not directly proportional to U S  troop presence  DOD also breaks down the FY2019 OCO budget request by functional category (see Table 3 )  By this measure, the largest portion of OCO funding was $20 billion for in-theater support, followed by operations and force protection (including the incremental cost of military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries), at $14 7 billion; and unspecified classified programs, at $9 9 billion  According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), approximately $47 billion (68%) of the FY2019 OCO budget request consists of enduring activities—that is, "those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts"—that could be funded in the DOD base budget  CBO associates enduring activities with the following DOD functional categories: in-theater support, classified programs, equipment reset and readiness, European Deterrence Initiative, security cooperation, and joint improvised-threat defeat  Executive Branch budget documents for FY2019 show differing projections for how much OCO would be apportioned over the Future Years Defense Program (also known as the FYDP, pronounced "fiddip," the five-year period from FY2019 through FY2023)  For example, Table 1-11 in DOD's National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, citing OMB data, projects five-year OCO funding at $359 billion  However, Table 1-9 of the same document puts the figure at $149 billion after assuming a higher amount of OCO funding shifting into the base budget  According to OMB, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected increasing caps on defense discretionary base budget authority by $84 billion (15%) to $660 billion in FY2020 and by $87 billion (15%) to $677 billion in FY2021  It also projected defense funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) totaling $73 billion in FY2020 and $66 billion in FY2021  Thus, projected defense discretionary funding would total $733 billion in FY2020 and $743 billion in FY2021  FY2019 DOD budget documents show the same defense discretionary topline for FY2020 and FY2021  But they list an "Outyears Placeholder for OCO" of $20 billion in fiscal years FY2020-FY2023, and an "OCO to Base" amount of $53 billion in FY2020 and $45 8 billion in each year from FY2021-FY2023  The documents do not break down what accounts or activities are included in these amounts  The emergence of any new contingencies or conflicts would likely change DOD assumptions about OCO needs  Congress has appropriated a total of $68 8 billion for DOD OCO funding in FY2019, including the following amounts: $67 9 billion in defense funds provided in the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-245 ), which Congress passed on September 26, 2018; and $921 million in defense funds provided in the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-244 ), which Congress passed on September, 21, 2018  For the Department of State and USAID, as well as the Department of Homeland Security and U S  Coast Guard, FY2019 OCO levels have not yet been determined  They remain at prorated FY2018 levels because of continuing resolutions (CR) to fund certain agencies through December 21, 2018  The FY2019 House and Senate SFOPS bills ( H R  6385 and S  3108 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated approximately $8 billion in OCO-designated funding for various priorities  The House committee-reported version of the Homeland Security appropriations bill ( H R  6776 , 115 th Congress) would not have appropriated any OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard, while the Senate committee-reported version of the bill ( S  3109 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated $165 million for OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard  Any decision by the 116 th Congress to change discretionary defense and nondefense spending limits that remain in effect for FY2020 and FY2021 under the Budget Control Act (BCA; P L  112-25 ) could impact future OCO funding levels  Lawmakers may consider the following questions: Will Congress keep the BCA as is and rely on OCO funding that is not subject to the caps to meet agency requirements? Will Congress repeal the BCA and use less OCO funding? Will Congress amend the BCA limits for future years and continue to use OCO funding, as it has in the past? Will Congress significantly reduce DOD and international affairs funding to stay within the BCA caps and not use OCO funding? In a November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission, a bipartisan panel created by Congress, issued recommendations related to OCO and the BCA  Recommendation No  24 states, "Congress should eliminate the final two years of caps under the BCA " Recommendation 29 states, "To better prepare for major-power competition, Congress should gradually integrate OCO spending back into the base Pentagon budget  This also requires a dollar-for-dollar increase in the BCA spending caps, should they remain in force, so that this transfer does not result in an overall spending cut " Both House and Senate FY2019 committee-reported appropriations bills from the 115 th Congress included about $8 billion in OCO funding for State/USAID  It remains to be seen if the 116 th Congress will pass this OCO level as requested or extend the continuing resolution  Congress could enact legislation to authorize and appropriate a level of base and OCO spending to meet current or revised discretionary defense spending caps in any number of ways  In FY2019 budget documents from OMB and DOD, the Trump Administration projected increasing defense spending in FY2020 and FY2021 beyond the statutory limits of the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P L  112-25 ), but by differing amounts based on differing OCO projections  These figures serve as possible scenarios or options for Congress to consider  According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $660 billion (which assumes an $84 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO defense budget of $73 billion (see Figure 11 )  According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $713 billion (which assumes a $137 billion, or 24%, increase in the BCA defense cap—what would be the largest increase to the BCA defense caps yet—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion  Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $733 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $576 billion and designate an additional $157 billion for OCO  According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $677 billion (which assumes an $87 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $66 billion (see Figure 11 )  According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $723 billion (which assumes a $133 billion, or 23%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion  Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $743 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $590 billion and designate an additional $153 billion for OCO  As previously discussed, these figures would change with different toplines for the national defense budget function (050)  Former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and the National Defense Strategy Commission have recommended that Congress increase the defense budget between 3% and 5% a year above inflation ("real growth") to meet U S  strategic goals  President Donald Trump has said the discretionary defense spending request would total $700 billion in FY2020, a decrease of 2% in nominal terms from FY2019  Trump said, "We know what the budget—the new budget is for the Defense Department  It will probably be $700 billion " However, some media outlets have since reported that the President intends to request a discretionary defense budget of $750 billion in FY2020  Senator James Inhofe, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Representative Mac Thornberry, ranking member of the House Armed Services Committees in the 116 th Congress, have argued, "Any cut in the defense budget would be a senseless step backward " Thornberry has also said transferring recurring OCO costs into the regular budget "makes sense … it makes for more predictable budgeting, but it's all about what happens on the topline " Representative Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in the 116 th Congress, has said of the defense budget: "I think the number is too high, and it's certainly not going to be there in the future … We've got a debt, we've got a deficit, we've got infrastructure problems, we've got healthcare, education—there's a whole lot that is necessary to make our country safe, secure, and prosperous " Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan has talked about a flat topline for national defense: "When you look at the $700 billion, it's not just for one year drop down, [or] a phase, it's a drop and then held constant" over the FYDP  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer David Norquist, who is also performing the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, at one time was reportedly preparing two budgets for FY2020—one assuming $733 billion for national defense and another assuming $700 billion  An analyst has noted "returning enduring OCO costs to the base budget, particularly a vast majority of those enduring costs over a short period as DOD has outlined, could significantly complicate an agreement between congressional Democrats and Republicans to increase both the defense and nondefense BCA budget caps for FY2020 and FY2021 " As analyst noted, "OCO has become an even less-defined pot of money … Congress needs to properly question the DOD budget planners on the future of OCO " In a January 2017 report, GAO concluded, "Without a reliable estimate of DOD's enduring OCO costs, decision makers will not have a complete picture of the department's future funding needs or be able to make informed choices and trade-offs in budget formulation and decision making " The department states it has not fully estimated those costs in part because of the BCA  In a response to GAO, DOD wrote, "Developing reliable estimates of enduring OCO costs is an important first step to any future effort to transition enduring OCO costs to the base budget  In the context of such an effort, the Department would consider developing and reporting formal estimates of those costs  However, until there is sufficient relief from the budgetary caps established in the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Department will need OCO to finance counterterrorism operations, in particular [OFS] and [OIR] " In an October 2018 report, the Congressional Budget Office estimated OCO funding for DOD enduring activities—that is, those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts—totaled more than $50 billion a year (in 2019 dollars) from 2006 to 2018—and are projected to total about $47 billion a year starting in FY2020  This figure appears to be consistent with projections published by DOD  According to the department's FY2019 budget documents, DOD projected $53 billion for "OCO to Base" in FY2020 and $45 8 billion for "OCO to Base" for FY2021 through FY2023  Some analysts have concluded: Uncertainty created by current reliance on OCO, particularly to fund base budget needs, could be detrimental to national security on three levels: (a) by undermining budget controls and contributing thereby to larger deficits, (b) by generating insecurity in the defense workforce and in defense suppliers, and (c) by creating long-term uncertainty in defense planning  The alternative, transitioning longer-term OCO expenses to the base budget, could be achieved through a combination of increased budget caps, targeted cuts in inefficient Defense programs, and increased revenues  For example, a potential enduring activity in the OCO budget is the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)  It was previously known as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), an effort that began in June 2014 to increase the number of U S  military personnel and prepositioned equipment in Central and Eastern Europe intended in part to reassure NATO allies after Russia's military seized Crimea  As some analysts have noted, "Because it is in the OCO part of the budget request, EDI funding does not include a projection for how much funding will be allocated in future years, which can create uncertainty in the minds of allies and adversaries alike about the U S  military's commitment to the program " On the other hand, some contend that it is precisely EDI's flexibility that allows the commander of European Command to quickly respond to changing security and posture needs in Europe, and ensure that monies intended for European deterrence will not be redirected to other DOD priorities  In its November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission quoted the late military strategist Bernard Brodie, who wrote "strategy wears a dollar sign " The panel concluded that relying on OCO funding to increase the defense budget "is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources" for the type of great power competition outlined in the Secretary of Defense's 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which calls for the United States to bolster its competitive military advantage relative to threats posed by China and Russia: Because of budgetary constraints imposed by the BCA, lawmakers and the Department of Defense have increasingly relied upon the overseas contingency operations (OCO) fund to pay for warfighting operations in the greater Middle East, as well as other activities and initiatives  Yet this approach to resourcing has produced problems and distortions of its own  For one thing, the amount of money devoted to OCO since the BCA was enacted no longer corresponds to warfighting operations in the greater Middle East  Furthermore, such operations are no longer a top priority as articulated in the NDS  Finally, reorienting the military toward high-end competition and conflict will require new capabilities beyond the current program of record  OCO is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources for such a long-term endeavor, given its lack of predictability and the limitations on what OCO funds can be used to buy " Appendix A  Statutes, Guidance, and Regulations The designation of funding as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) is governed by several statues as well as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and the Department of Defense (DOD) Financial Management Regulation (FMR)  The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA) of 1985 BBEDCA, as amended, includes the statutory definitions of emergency and unanticipated as they relate to budget enforcement through sequestration  The act also allows for appropriations to be designated by Congress and the President as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism   Such appropriations are effectively exempt from the statutory discretionary spending limits  Title 10, United States Code—Armed Forces 10 U S C  101—Definitions Section 101 provides definitions of terms applicable to Title 10  While it does not define overseas contingency operations, it does include a definition of a contingency operations   Administration and Internal Guidance In addition to statutory requirements, the DOD and the Department of State are subject to guidance on OCO spending from the Administration  In October 2006 , under the Bush Administration, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directed the services to break with long-standing DOD regulatory policies and expand their request for supplemental funding to reflect incremental costs related to the "longer war on terror " There was no specific definition for the "longer war on terror," now one of the core missions of the DOD  In February 2009, at the beginning of the Obama Administration, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued updated budget guidance that required DOD to move some OCO costs back into the base budget  However, within six months of issuing the new criteria, officials waived restrictions related to pay and that would have prohibited end-strength growth  In a letter from OMB to the then-Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert Hale, the agency characterized its 2009 criteria as "very successful" for delineating base and OCO spending but stated, "This update clarifies language, eliminates areas of confusion and provides guidance for areas previously unanticipated " GAO subsequently reported that the revised guidance significantly changed the criteria used to build the fiscal year 2010 OCO funding request by: specifying stricter definitions for repair and procurement of equipment; limiting applicability of OCO funds for RDT&E; excluding pay and allowances for end-strength above the level requested in the budget; excluding enduring family support initiatives; and excluding base realignment and closures (BRAC) amounts  OMB again revised its guidance in September 2010 following a number of GAO reports that had concluded DOD reporting on OCO costs was of "questionable reliability," due in part to imprecisely defined financial management regulations related to OCO spending  (as of September 9, 2010) Source: Letter from Steven M  Kosiak, Associate Director for Defense and Foreign Affairs, OMB, to Robert Hale, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, "Revised War Funding Criteria," September 9, 2010  DOD Financial Management Regulations DOD incorporated the September 2010 OMB criteria for war costs into the Financial Management Regulation  Table 1 includes the general cost categories DOD uses in accounting for costs of contingency operations  Appendix B  Transfer Authorities, Special Purpose Accounts In addition to the supplemental appropriations and emergency or OCO/GWOT designation, the Department of Defense and the Department of State also have the authority to shift funds from one budget account to another in response to operational needs  For DOD, these transfers (sometimes called reprogramings ) are statutorily authorized by 10 U S C  2214—Transfer of funds: procedures and limitations  This authority allows the Secretary of Defense to reallocate funds for higher priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements, after receiving written approval from the four congressional defense committees  DOD may also reprogram funds within an account from one activity to another, as long as the general purpose for the use of those funds remains unchanged  Specific limits to transfer or reprogramming authorities have also been added to these general authorities through provisions in annual defense authorization and appropriation acts  The FY2019 defense appropriations bill sets the base budget transfer cap at $4 billion and the OCO transfer cap at $2 billion  The Department of State's OCO transfer authority has been provided in appropriations acts and has specifically authorized the Administration to transfer OCO funds only to other OCO funds within Title VIII SFOPS appropriations, not between OCO and base accounts  The transfer authority is capped, specified by account, and requires regular congressional notification procedures  Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) The OCOTF was established for DOD in FY1997 as a no year transfer account (meaning amounts are available until expended) in order to provide additional flexibility to meet operational requirements  Transfers from the OCOTF are processed using existing reprogramming procedures  A quarterly report is submitted to the congressional oversight committees, documenting all transfers from the OCOTF to DOD components base budget accounts  Beginning in FY2002, funds to support Southwest Asia, Kosovo, and Bosnia contingency requirements were appropriated directly to DOD components' Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel accounts rather than to the OCOTF for later disbursement  FY2014 was the last year the Administration requested a direct appropriation to the OCOTF  Contingency Operations Funded in the DOD Base Budget As first mandated by section 8091 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P L  110-116 ), Congress has required DOD to provide separate annual budget justification documents detailing the costs of U S  armed forces' participation in all named contingency operations where the total cost of the operation exceeds $100 million or is staffed by more than 1,000 U S  military personnel  Funding for certain DOD contingency operations has been moved to the base budget request, and is no longer designated as emergency or OCO/GWOT requirements  This movement of funding from the OCO request to the base budget request typically occurs as the operational activities of an enduring contingency operation evolve over time and DOD determines that certain elements of the associated military operations have become stable enough to be planned, financed, and executed within the base budget  For example, funding for Operation Noble Eagle, which provides fighter aircraft on 24/7 alert at several U S  military bases, was moved from the GWOT request to the base budget request in 2005  Contingency operations and other activities funded wholly or in part through DOD's base budget have included: NATO Operations in the Balkans   The U S  Army and U S  Air Force provide support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led operations in the Balkans region  Most U S  forces are deployed to Kosovo in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)  A small number of U S  personnel are deployed to the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Joint Task Force - Bravo   U S  forces support this task force, which operates from Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras and supports joint, combined, and interagency exercises and operations in Central America to counter the influence of transnational organized crime; carry out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and build military capacity with regional partners and allied nations to promote regional cooperation and security; Operation Juniper Shield  Previously known as Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), this operation supports efforts to defeat violent extremist organizations in East Africa  This operation also provides military-to-military engagement with partner African countries, as well as readiness for crisis response and evacuation of U S  military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel; Operation Noble Eagle   This operation funds the continuing efforts to defend the United States from airborne attacks, maintain the sovereignty of the United States airspace, and defend critical U S  facilities from potentially hostile threats or unconventional attacks; Operation Enduring Freedom- Horn of Africa   This operation was established to support efforts to defeat violent extremist organizations in East Africa; provide military-to-military engagement with partner African countries, as well as readiness for crisis response and evacuation of U S  military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel throughout East Africa; Operation Enduring Freedom- Caribbean and Central America   A U S  regional military operation initiated in 2008, under the operational control of Special Operations Command-South, this operation was established to focus on counterterrorism to support DOD's overall military objectives and the larger fight against terrorism  Operation Observant Compass   This operation was established to support the deployment of approximately 100 U S  military personnel assisting the Ugandan People's Defense Force and neighboring partner African countries in countering the Lord's Resistance Army operations  Operation Spartan Shield  This operation was established to support ongoing U S  Central Command missions  Other Congressionally Authorized Funds or Programs Through the OCO authorization and appropriation process, Congress has created numerous funds and programs that are designed to finance specific overseas contingency operations-related activities that do not fit into traditional budgetary accounts  Many of these funds and programs are supplied with amounts that are available until expended—however, authorization for the specified fund or program has an expiration date, thereby requiring further congressional action for reauthorization of affected funds or programs  Congress has also provided increased transfer authority to provide greater flexibility for U S  government activities in situations that are typically unpredictable  Examples of these types of congressionally authorized OCO programs or funds have included: Afghan istan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)   These funds were established to provide funding and support for the training, equipping, and expansion of selected military and security forces in support of U S  objectives; Counterterrorism Partnership s Fund   This fund was established to provide funding and support to partner nations engaged in counterterrorism and crisis response activities; Command er's Emergency Response Program  This program was established to support infrastructure improvements, such as road repair and construction and enable military commanders on the ground to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs by undertaking activities that will immediately aid local populations and assist U S  forces in maintaining security gains; Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) Defeat Fund   This fund was established to coordinate and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing research and development, throughout DOD  Due to the enduring nature of the threat, DOD began moving associated funding to the base budget in FY2010; Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) Fund   This fund was intended to expedite the procurement and deployment of MRAPs to Iraq and Afghanistan; European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)   Initially the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), this effort was established to provide funding and support to NATO allies and partners to "reassure allies of the U S  commitment to their security and territorial integrity as members of the NATO Alliance, provide near-term flexibility and responsiveness to the evolving concerns of our allies and partners in Europe, especially Central and Eastern Europe, and help increase the capability and readiness of U S  allies and partners;" Global Security Contingency Fund   This fund was established to provide funding for the Department of State and the Department of Defense "to facilitate an interagency approach to confronting security challenges;" Complex Crise s Fund   This fund was established to provide funding through the State Department and USAID "to help prevent crises and promote recovery in post-conflict situations during unforeseen political, social, or economic challenges that threaten regional security;" Migration and Refugee Assistance Fund   This fund was established to provide funding to respond to refugee crises in Africa, the Near East, South and Central Asia, and Europe and Eurasia; and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative   This initiative was established to provide assistance, including training, equipment, lethal weapons, of a defensive nature; logistics support; supplies and services; sustainment; and intelligence support to the military and national security forces of Ukraine  This is an update to a report originally co-authored by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in Defense Readiness and Infrastructure  It references research previously compiled by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in U S  Defense Policy and Budget; Christopher Mann, Analyst in Defense Policy and Trade; [author name scrubbed], Analyst in U S  Defense Acquisition Policy; [author name scrubbed], CRS Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process; and [author name scrubbed], CRS Analyst in Public Finance  [author name scrubbed], Research Assistant, helped compile the graphics 

ground_truth: NSF has identified potential benefits and challenges associated with its use of rotators. Benefits include fresh perspectives and close connections to the scientific community, while challenges include staffing turnover and higher costs for some rotators compared with permanent employees. GAO was asked to review NSF's use and management of the IPA and VSEE rotator programs, among other things. This report examines (1) the number, costs, and uses of NSF rotators for fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2017; (2) the strategies NSF has used to manage rotator costs and the results of these efforts; and (3) the extent to which NSF has a workforce strategy for using rotators and has evaluated the results of its rotator programs. GAO analyzed summary-level data on NSF's rotators; reviewed key documents; interviewed NSF officials; conducted semistructured interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of rotators and permanent federal employees selected from different scientific directorates within NSF; and compared NSF's management of the program to key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. The numbers of rotators—outside scientists, engineers, and educators on temporary assignment—at the National Science Foundation (NSF) and their costs in proportion to other staff remained relatively stable in fiscal years 2008 through 2017. Most rotators joined NSF under its Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) mobility program. IPA rotators comprised about 12 percent of NSF's workforce and 17 percent of staff costs on average and were not subject to a federal salary cap. They remain employees of their home institutions, with NSF reimbursing the institutions for most of their salaries and benefits. The remaining rotators are considered temporary federal employees under the Visiting Scientist, Engineer, and Educator (VSEE) program; their salaries could not exceed the federal maximum for their positions. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted IPA rotator program cost management strategies expected to achieve the greatest savings with the least harm to recruitment, but NSF officials said it is too soon to determine the full results. For example, for new IPA rotators who had not yet begun negotiating their assignments, NSF began requiring their home institutions to pay for 10 percent of the rotators' salary and benefits. NSF officials told GAO they expect to issue a report evaluating the strategies in December 2018. NSF's IPA program steering committee recommended developing a workforce strategy for balancing the agency's use of rotators with federal staff, but as of June 2018, NSF had not developed a strategy or fully evaluated the IPA and VSEE rotator programs' results, as called for by GAO's key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. NSF officials said they recognized the value of a workforce strategy but were focusing instead on other workforce planning efforts, and they had not fully evaluated program results in part because rotators are blended into the agency's permanent workforce, making a separate evaluation difficult. Without a workforce strategy and evaluation of results, NSF is limited in its ability to manage and, if warranted, adjust its use of rotators. GAO recommends that NSF develop an agency-wide strategy for balancing the agency's use of rotators with permanent staff and evaluate the contributions of its rotator programs toward NSF's human capital goals and programmatic results. NSF agreed with GAO's recommendations.