prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: Justice Management Division (JMD) JMD provides the Federal Bureau of Prisons senior management with guidance as it relates to Department of Justice (DOJ) policy for all matters pertaining to organization, management, and administration, including the use of human capital flexibilities such as retention incentives  BOP is responsible for incarcerating all federal offenders sentenced to prison  To carry out its mission, BOP, under the oversight of DOJ’s JMD, manages the human resource operations of its institutions, including the use of retention incentives  BOP administers, monitors, and oversees retention incentives through its Central Office, regional offices, and institutions  Central Office  The Central Office serves as BOP’s headquarters and provides oversight of BOP operations and program areas  Within the Central Office is BOP’s Human Resource Management Division (HRMD) which is responsible for developing, implementing and administering human resource policies and programs, including the use of retention incentives that meet OPM and DOJ requirements  In addition, the Central Office’s Program Review Division (PRD) is responsible for assessing BOP programs, including human resources, to ensure that they are managed and operated effectively  Regional offices  BOP has six regional offices that cover the Mid- Atlantic, North Central, Northeast, South Central, Southeast, and Western regions of the United States  These offices, each led by a regional director, oversee the operations of the 122 federal institutions within their respective geographic regions of the country  According to BOP officials, regional office staff also provide local level oversight of institutions’ human capital programs, such as retention incentives, among other things  Institutions  BOP institutions are managed by a warden and other officials, including an executive assistant and associate warden who generally provide overall direction and, in part, administer the institution’s human capital policies, including policies on retention incentives  Correctional services staff represent the largest segment of each institution’s workforce and are responsible for the correctional treatment, custody, and supervision of inmates  Non-correctional services staff include, among others, those employees assigned to non-correctional services management, facility operations, and the health services unit  Workers in health services and psychology services are responsible for providing inmates with medical, dental, and mental health services and include, for example, dentists, pharmacists, physicians, nurses, psychologists, and drug treatment specialists  The Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 first authorized OPM to allow federal agencies to give incentives, including retention incentives, to employees  The Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2004 provided federal agencies increased flexibilities regarding these incentives  For example, individual retention incentives that were capped at 25 percent of an employee’s basic pay rate could be increased up to 50 percent in cases of critical agency need with OPM’s approval  Generally, under OPM regulations, an agency is authorized to pay a retention incentive to employees  This happens when the agency determines that the unusually high or unique qualifications of the employee or a special need of the agency for the employee’s services makes it essential to retain the employee and that the employee would be likely to leave federal service in the absence of an incentive  In addition, OPM requires agencies to develop plans for using retention incentives outlining, in part, the required documentation for justifying the retention incentive and any criteria for determining the amount of incentive and the length of the service period  Generally, agencies must require that employees sign a written service agreement that outlines the terms of the service such as the employee’s agreement to remain a certain length of time with the agency  Additionally, according to OPM regulations, to qualify for a retention incentive, each employee must have a performance rating of at least “fully successful” or an agency’s equivalent performance rating  BOP funds the majority of its retention incentives through its Salaries and Expenses appropriation account which represented almost 93 percent of BOP’s budget in FY 2016  According to BOP officials, BOP’s Central Office allocates funding from the Salaries and Expenses account to the regional offices  These regional offices then determine how to allocate their budget among various salary and expense activities, including retention incentives  HRMD delegates retention incentive determinations to each institution  In accordance with OPM requirements and BOP’s October 2016 Program Statement on Compensation, the wardens make retention incentive requests based on documented evidence that the employee possesses unusually high or unique qualifications or meets a special need of the agency and has a performance rating of at least “successful or its equivalent ” These incentives are calculated as a percentage of the employee’s basic pay and are disbursed in installments to the employee each pay period  In addition to retention incentives, BOP has authority to provide other compensation-based human capital flexibilities to employees, in certain circumstances  The following summarizes some of the compensation- based human capital flexibilities that BOP uses in addition to retention incentives, to retain and recruit staff: Recruitment and relocation incentives  BOP pays recruitment incentives to new hires and relocation incentives to current employees who elect to move to a different geographic area, when a position is likely to be difficult to fill in the absence of an incentive  Student loan repayments  Using this authority, BOP may repay federally-insured student loans to attract job candidates or retain current employees  Special salary rates  With OPM approval, BOP may establish higher rates of pay for an occupation or group of occupations nationwide or in a local area when it finds the government’s recruitment or retention efforts are, or would likely become, significantly handicapped without those higher rates  Physicians and dental comparability allowances  Comparability allowances may be paid to certain eligible physicians or dental professionals who enter into service agreements  These allowances are paid only to categories of physicians and dentists for which the agency is experiencing recruitment and retention problems and are fixed at the minimum amounts necessary to deal with such problems  BOP retention incentive expenditures generally increased from $10 7 million in fiscal year 2012 to $14 0 million in fiscal year 2016  Additionally, as illustrated in table 1, the number of employees who received retention incentives increased each year from 2,024 employees in fiscal year 2012 to 2,460 employees in fiscal year 2016  In general, BOP employees who received retention incentives received the incentive for more than one year  For example, from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, a total of 3,382 BOP employees received retention incentive payments  Of those, 82 percent (2,766 of 3,382) received retention incentive payments for at least 2 years and 39 percent received retention incentives all 5 years, as shown in figure 1  From fiscal years 2012 through 2016, BOP spent more than 97 percent of its total retention incentive expenditures on employees at four California institutions and for medical professionals nationwide  BOP’s total retention incentive expenditures for the four California institutions and medical professionals nationwide in fiscal year 2016 are provided in figure 2  Four California Institutions  The California institutions—United States Penitentiary (USP) Atwater, Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Herlong, FCI Mendota, and Federal Correctional Complex (FCC) Victorville—constituted the largest portion of BOP’s total retention incentive expenditures, and the level of their expenditures remained relatively steady from fiscal year 2012 through 2016  BOP provides group retention incentives for staff at the General Schedule (GS) grades level 12 and below and those in the Federal Wage System at three institutions—USP Atwater, FCI Herlong, and FCC Victorville  BOP also provides individual retention incentives to its employees at GS grades level 12 and below and in the Federal Wage System at FCI Mendota  As shown in figure 3, our analysis of BOP data found that from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, these four California institutions had the largest percentage of retention incentive expenditures across institutions as well as the largest percentage of employees who received retention incentives  Additionally, the four California institutions’ retention incentive expenditures remained relatively steady—around $8 1 to $8 2 million during the 5-year period—even though the overall number of employees who received the incentives generally increased  BOP officials told us that these California institutions’ retention incentive expenditures remained relatively steady in spite of an overall increase in the number of employees receiving incentives, in part, because in fiscal year 2013 BOP reduced the retention incentive rate—the percentage of an employee’s basic pay that determines the employee’s retention incentive— by 3 percent at the four California institutions  BOP officials reported using retention incentives primarily at these four institutions to supplement correctional officers’ salaries and compensate for the gap between BOP’s and other institutions’ salaries  Specifically, officials told us that these four California institutions were consistently understaffed as a result of their lower salaries in comparison to salaries offered at California state and local prisons and at other BOP institutions in California metropolitan areas  The Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the average salary for correctional officers in California in 2016 was $70,020  For the same year, the annual average salary for BOP correctional officers at these four institutions was $50,859  To bring these four California institutions’ salaries in line with those offered by state, local, and other BOP institutions in California metropolitan areas, BOP officials told us that they first use recruitment incentives to attract and hire staff and then provide retention incentives to employees with a performance rating of at least “successful ” Medical Professionals  From fiscal years 2012 through 2016, BOP retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals increased by an average of approximately 21 percent per year  Our analysis showed that most recently—for fiscal years 2015 and 2016—BOP retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals accounted for the largest portion of BOP’s total retention incentive expenditures across the various occupation groups and was primarily responsible for the overall increase in BOP’s total retention incentive expenditures from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016  For example, in fiscal year 2016, BOP spent approximately 42 percent of total retention incentives expenditures for medical professionals ($5 8 million), 27 percent on correctional officers ($3 8 million), and the remaining 31 percent on employees in other occupations  In total, BOP retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals increased from approximately $2 7 million in fiscal year 2012 to $5 8 million in fiscal year 2016, as shown in figure 4  The increase accounted for 92 percent of BOP’s total increase in retention incentive expenditures during the five-year period  In comparison, BOP’s retention incentive expenditures for correctional officers and all other occupations remained relatively steady from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, increasing by an average of approximately 1 percent per year  According to our analysis, the increase in retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals during the five years is partially explained by the increase in the number of institutions providing retention incentives to medical professionals  Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the number of institutions providing retention incentives to medical professionals increased from 53 institutions with 341 employees in medical occupations receiving retention incentives to 84 institutions providing retention incentives to a total of 646 employees in medical occupations  According to BOP officials, BOP primarily uses retention incentives for medical professionals in an effort to retain these employees by supplementing BOP salaries which are generally lower than salaries offered to medical professionals in the private sector  Officials told us that BOP has designated medical professional positions as hard-to-fill and, therefore, BOP retaining these professionals in a correctional setting requires the use of a variety of incentives, including retention incentives, in order to increase pay  BOP has a number of internal controls in place to ensure that retention incentive applications meet BOP and other requirements  BOP officials told us that these controls are part of a multilayered application and review process that begins at the institution and culminates at BOP’s Central Office  Our review of a random sample of 40 application packet case files for retention incentives awarded from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2016 found that they all generally incorporated the internal controls described by officials  The key controls in this process include: Application review at the institution and regional levels  According to BOP officials, the retention incentive application process begins with an institution’s human resources office, whose staff complete a retention incentive application on behalf of an employee  The institution’s human resources office verifies that the information in the application justifies a retention incentive and that funds are available to pay the incentive  Although it is not required, BOP officials said that they use a retention incentive application checklist to help institutions ensure that retention incentive applications are complete  The institution’s human resources office then submits the completed application packet, which includes supporting documentation, to the warden for review  Next, the application packet is forwarded to the respective BOP regional director who also reviews it for accuracy and completeness  The regional director then adds an approval statement and forwards the packet to the Central Office for final review and approval  Of the 40 randomly selected application packet case files that we reviewed, 36 included a retention incentive checklist used by the institutions and all contained information to justify the retention incentive as well as a statement of the regional director’s approval  Central Office’s final application approval  BOP policy requires that all retention incentive applications undergo two levels of review in BOP’s Central Office: first by the Human Resource Management Division’s (HRMD) Staffing and Employee Relations Section (SERS) and next by HRMD’s Personnel Director, for final review and approval  According to BOP officials, during the review process there is ongoing communication between the various entities to ensure that applications are complete and accurate; for example, if SERS finds an error in the application or requests additional information, SERS returns the application to the regional or institutional level for correction and re-review  All of the 40 BOP application packet case files that we reviewed included approvals by HRMD’s Personnel Director or an authorized official, as required by BOP policy  Annual review and re-certification to continue retention incentives  According to BOP policy, on an annual basis, institutions’ human resources offices are required to review employees’ retention incentives to determine whether the incentive is still warranted  Payment of a retention incentive may be recertified and continued as long as the conditions giving rise to the original determination to pay the incentive still exist and funds are available  For each retention incentive, an institution’s human resources office must determine whether to continue, adjust, or terminate the incentive within one year of the initial or most recent approval  If the human resources office decides to continue the retention incentive, the institution’s warden must again submit a retention incentive application  Applications to continue the retention incentive proceed through the same review and approval process as initial applications  Of the 40 application files that we reviewed, 29 were continuations and 8 were initial requests for a retention incentive  According to BOP officials, after the initial approval of a retention incentive, an institution’s human resources office has primary responsibility for the monitoring of retention incentive payments  According to officials, institutions use a variety of internal controls to monitor the expiration, continuation, or termination of retention incentives, for example: Monitoring expiration dates  BOP officials stated that institutions’ human resources offices monitor retention incentives in order to identify incentives that are approaching their expiration date and need to be terminated or renewed  For example, according to BOP officials from USP Atwater, FCC Butner and FCI Phoenix, staff from their institutions’ human resources offices may generate a retention incentive activity report and cross reference this report with their locally generated tracking sheets  This process helps identify retention incentives approaching their expiration dates so that the human resources offices can submit a request for continuation before the incentive expires  Using automated reminders to prompt file review  BOP officials stated that institutions use automated reminders to alert human resources staff to check the records of retention incentive recipients for human resources-related events such as promotions or relocations that could affect the continuation of a retention incentive  Following a checklist of steps for relocation processes  BOP officials told us that in April 2016 they instituted a checklist that outlines steps that an institution’s human resources staff must take when employees relocate to a different institution  Based on our review of this checklist, one step on the sheet prompts human resources staff to review the employee’s retention incentive  According to BOP policy, when an employee receiving a retention incentive transfers to another location, the human resources office where the employee was receiving the retention incentive is responsible for submitting a request to terminate the incentive  The termination must be effective the last day of the pay period that the employee occupies the position  Submitting forgiveness waivers  BOP officials told us that institutions submit forgiveness waivers if a request to continue a retention incentive is not submitted and approved prior to the retention incentive expiring  BOP officials said that a forgiveness waiver is considered an acknowledgement of an administrative error and is a late submission of a retention incentive renewal that was still warranted  The waiver is not a request to forgive an overpayment since the employee was still considered to be eligible for the retention incentive  Of the 40 retention incentive applications that we reviewed, 5 applications included forgiveness waivers to excuse the tardiness of the filing and request continuations of the retention incentive  According to BOP officials, BOP conducts periodic audits and reviews of its human capital activities and related internal controls, to ensure that retention incentives are being used appropriately  The following offices conduct various audits and reviews involving BOP’s retention incentives: BOP’s Program Review Division (PRD) audits regional and institutional human resources functions  PRD audits BOP’s regional and institutional human resources offices to ensure that they are in compliance with BOP policies and procedures  According to BOP officials, as part of the audit process, PRD audits retention incentives to ensure that they have the proper approvals and are justified  PRD audits each institution’s human resources office at least every three years  During these audits, PRD generates retention incentive activity reports (the same reports that institutions run when monitoring for expiration dates), to check the accuracy of retention incentive programs under review  Following each audit, PRD issues a final report with findings to the institution and to the staff operating the program area under audit
Report 2:  While the exemption for American Samoa has traditionally been set at 84% of the standard salary level, the other territories have been subject to the standard level  The application of the provisions of the FLSA is determined by the Congressional Accountability Act (CAA, P L  104-1 ), which was enacted in 1995 and extends some FLSA provisions, including overtime provisions, and other labor and workplace laws to congressional employees  In addition, the CAA created the Office of Compliance (now the Office of Congressional Workplace Rights), headed by a five-member Board of Directors (Board), to enforce the CAA  Rulemaking on the EAP exemptions would apply to congressional staff if the Board adopts them and Congress approves the Board's regulations, pursuant to the process established in the CAA  In other words, regulations adopted by the Board do not have legal effect until they are approved by Congress  When the Secretary of Labor issued new regulations to update the EAP exemptions in 2004, the Board adopted them; but thus far, Congress has apparently not approved the 2004 overtime regulations  Thus, overtime regulations that were adopted by the Board and approved by Congress in 1996, based on DOL regulations originally promulgated in 1975, currently apply to congressional staff  In the absence of action by the Board and by Congress, the provisions in any future final rules would not change the status quo  Congress can pass legislation to repeal rules or compel new rules  For example, prior to the publication of the 2016 final rule, legislation was introduced that would have prohibited the Secretary of Labor from enforcing the final rule and would have required additional analysis from the Secretary before the issuance of any substantially similar rule in the future  Given that rulemaking on the EAP exemptions typically includes increases in the salary level threshold for the EAP exemption, a greater number of employees become eligible for overtime pay with each upward adjustment of the salary level  To comply with the proposed regulations, employers would have several options, including the following: pay overtime to newly covered EAP employees if they work more than 40 hours in a workweek; increase the weekly pay for workers near the salary threshold to a level above it so that the EAP employees would become exempt and thus not be eligible for overtime pay; reduce work hours of nonexempt (covered) employees to 40 or fewer so that overtime pay would not be triggered; hire additional workers to offset the reduction in hours from nonexempt employees; or reduce base pay of nonexempt workers and maintain overtime hours so that base pay plus overtime pay would not exceed, or would remain close to, previous employer costs of base pay plus overtime  This section provides an overview of the main provisions of the 2019 proposed rule on EAP exemptions  For context, some provisions of the 2016 final rule are discussed  A final rule updating the EAP exemptions was published in the Federal Register on May 23, 2016, with an effective date of December 1, 2016  However, on November 22, 2016, the U S  District Court for the Eastern District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction blocking the implementation of the rule  On August 31, 2017, the U S  District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ruled that DOL exceeded its authority by setting the threshold at the salary level in the 2016 final rule ($913 per week) and thus invalidated it  Subsequently, DOJ appealed that decision to the U S  Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which granted DOJ's motion to hold the appeal in abeyance until DOL issued new rulemaking on the EAP salary level  Thus, DOL is currently enforcing the EAP regulations in effect on November 30, 2016, which include a standard salary level of $455 per week  DOL issued a request for information (RFI) related to the EAP exemptions on July 26, 2017, seeking information from the public to assist in formulating a proposal to revise the exemptions  On March 22, 2019, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was published in the Federal Register to define and delimit EAP exemptions  The proposed rule would not only revise the regulations on the EAP exemptions but would also formally rescind the 2016 final rule  Such a rescission would provide that if any or all of the substantive provisions of the 2019 rule were invalidated or not put into effect, the EAP regulations would revert to those promulgated in the 2004 final rule  Due to the invalidation of the 2016 final rule (discussed above), DOL currently enforces the provisions of the 2004 final rule  The main changes to the EAP exemptions in the 2019 proposed rule, as summarized in Table 1 , include the following: an increase in the salary level test from the current $455 per week ($23,660 annually) to $679 per week ($35,308 annually); an increase in the annual salary threshold for the HCE exemption from $100,000 to $147,414; an allowance that up to 10% of the standard salary level may be comprised of nondiscretionary bonuses, incentive payments, and commissions; a salary level of $455 per week for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U S  Virgin Islands, and of $380 in American Samoa; and an increase in the "base rate" weekly salary level for employees in the motion picture industry from $695 per week to $1,036 per week  Since the FLSA was enacted in 1938, the salary level threshold has been increased eight times, including the proposed 2019 increase  Each of the previous increases have occurred through intermittent rulemaking by the Secretary of Labor, with periods between adjustments ranging from 2 years (1938–1940) to 29 years (1975–2004)  Since 1938, measures of the salary level have fluctuated according to DOL's identification of data sources most suitable for studying wage distributions and the department's determinations of the proportion and types of workers who should be below salary thresholds, as well as its determinations of whether regional, industry, or cost-of-living considerations should be factored into salary tests  Starting with the 2004 final rule, DOL has used survey data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) in determining the salary level for the EAP exemptions, albeit with different methodological choices  Effective January 2020 (approximately), the standard salary level threshold would equal the 20 th percentile of weekly earnings of full-time non-hourly workers in the lowest-wage Census region, which in 2019 is the South, and/or in the retail sector nationwide  In 2020, about 20% of full-time salaried workers in the South region and/or the retail sector nationwide are estimated to earn at or below $679 per week ($35,308 annually)  Effective January 2020 (approximately), the HCE salary level for the EAP exemptions would equal the annual earnings equivalent of the 90 th percentile of the weekly earnings of full-time non-hourly workers nationally  In 2020, 90% of full-time non-hourly workers are estimated to earn at or below $147,414 per year  Effective January 2020 (approximately), the salary level for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U S  Virgin Islands would be $455 per week, and in American Samoa it would be $380 per week  Except for American Samoa, this would depart from past regulations by establishing a salary threshold for the territories below the standard level  Effective January 2020 (approximately), the motion picture industry employee salary level for the EAP exemption would be $1,036 per week  This level was derived by increasing the previous threshold ($695 per week) proportionally to the increase in the standard salary level  This would continue a special salary test created in 1953 for the motion picture industry that provides an exception to the "salary basis" test  Specifically, employees in the motion picture industry may be classified as exempt if they meet the duties tests for EAP exemption and are paid a "base rate" (rather than on a "salary basis") equal to the salary level for this exemption  The 2019 proposed rule would implement a commitment by DOL to update the EAP salary level thresholds every four years by submitting an NPRM for comment  If the 2019 proposed rule is finalized, DOL would publish its first proposed update on January 1, 2023, and subsequent updates every four years thereafter  The future salary level updates would be based on the same data source (CPS) and methodology of the salary levels established in the 2019 proposed rule: the standard salary level would be adjusted to the 20 th percentile of weekly earnings of full-time salaried workers in the lowest-wage Census region and/or in the retail sector, the HCE salary level threshold would be adjusted to the 90 th percentile of annual earnings of full-time non-hourly workers nationally, and the quadrennial NPRM would seek comment on whether to update the salary level for the territories established in the 2019 proposed rule  The 2019 proposed rule would expand overtime coverage to EAP employees through a higher salary level threshold rather than through additional classes of employees  As such, EAP employees making between $455 per week (the current effective level) and the new rate of $679 per week in 2019 would likely become nonexempt (i e , covered) by the overtime provisions and entitled to overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek  It is difficult to project the number of employees currently exempt under the EAP exemptions who would no longer be exempt under the 2019 proposed rule  This is due in part to uncertainty about potential employer responses, such as increasing salaries above the new threshold to maintain exemption for EAP employees  DOL estimates, with caveats, that approximately 4 9 million workers would be affected by the proposed rule  DOL identifies two groups in particular that would be affected—newly covered workers and workers with strengthened protections  Specifically, DOL estimates the following: In the first year under the provisions of the 2019 proposed rule, about 1 3 million EAP employees would become newly entitled to overtime pay due to the increase in the salary threshold: about 1 1 million employees in this group meet the duties test for the EAP exemption but earn between the current standard salary threshold ($455 per week) and the proposed threshold ($679 per week); and an additional 201,000 employees in this group meet the HCE duties test for exemption, but not the standard test, and earn at least the current HCE salary threshold ($100,000 per year) but less than the proposed threshold ($147,414 per year)  An additional 3 6 million workers would receive "strengthened" overtime protections, including the following: An additional 2 0 million white collar workers who are paid on a salary basis and earn between the current salary threshold of $455 per week and the proposed threshold of $679 per week but do not meet the EAP duties test (i e , they perform nonexempt work but might be misclassified) would gain overtime protections because their exemption status would not depend on the duties test  In other words, this group of workers would gain overtime coverage because the higher salary threshold would create a clearer line exemption test and reduce misclassification for exemption purposes  About 1 6 million salaried workers in blue collar occupations whose overtime coverage would have been clearer with the higher salary threshold  As DOL notes, this group of workers should currently be covered by overtime provisions but may not be due to worker classification  By comparison, DOL estimated that in the first year under the provisions of the 2016 final rule, approximately 13 1 million workers would have been affected  This total would have included about 4 2 million EAP employees who would have become newly entitled to overtime pay due to the increase in the salary threshold and an additional 8 9 million workers who would have received "strengthened" overtime protections  The data in Table 2 provide a summary of the estimated numbers of affected workers under the 2019 proposed rule and the 2016 final rule 

ground_truth: DOD spends billions of dollars annually to sustain its weapon systems to support current and future operations. The Air Force and Navy are operating many of their fixed-wing aircraft well beyond their original designed service lives and therefore are confronted with sustainment challenges. House Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to evaluate the sustainment of major weapon systems. This report, among other things, (1) examines the trends in availability and O&S costs for selected Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft since fiscal year 2011, including whether they met availability goals, and (2) assesses the extent that the departments documented sustainment strategies, reviewed sustainment metrics, and implemented plans to improve aircraft availability. GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 fixed-wing aircraft by considering a variety of factors, such as the type, age, and manufacturer of the aircraft, among other factors, and analyzed condition and availability data, O&S costs, and sustainment challenges from fiscal year 2011 through March 2017 for each aircraft in a “Sustainment Quick Look.” GAO also analyzed policies, strategies, and plans, and interviewed Navy and Air Force officials in program offices, squadrons, and maintenance depots. Between fiscal years 2011 and 2016, the Air Force and Navy generally did not meet aircraft availability goals, and operating and support (O&S) cost trends for GAO's selected fixed-wing aircraft varied. Specifically, GAO found that availability declined for 6 of 12 aircraft—3 from each service—between fiscal years 2011 and 2016; availability fell short of goals for 9 of 12 aircraft in fiscal year 2016; and O&S costs increased for 5 of the aircraft, and maintenance costs—the largest share—increased for 8 of 12 aircraft. GAO found, and officials agreed, that these aircraft face similar challenges. a Obsolescence means a part is unavailable due to its lack of usefulness or it is no longer current or available for production. b Diminishing manufacturing sources is a loss or impending loss of manufacturers or suppliers. The Air Force and Navy have documented sustainment strategies for some aircraft, regularly reviewed sustainment metrics, and implemented improvement plans. The Air Force has documented sustainment strategies for all aircraft GAO reviewed; however, the Navy has not documented or updated its sustainment strategies for four aircraft. Specifically, the Navy does not have a documented sustainment strategy for the C-2A, and has not updated the strategies for the E2C, EA-18G, and F/A-18A-D since before 2012. The Navy is in the process of documenting its strategies, but Department of Defense (DOD) policy is unclear on whether a sustainment strategy is required and has to be updated every 5 years for weapon systems that are in the operations and support phase of their life cycle (i.e., legacy systems). Also, Navy guidance does not specify a requirement for legacy systems, although Air Force guidance does. Clarifying the requirements to document sustainment strategies for legacy systems, and documenting those strategies, would add additional visibility over the availability and O&S costs of DOD aircraft and any associated sustainment risks. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in April 2018. Information on aircraft availability and other related information was deemed to be sensitive and has been omitted from this report. GAO is recommending that DOD and the Navy update or issue new policy and guidance clarifying the requirements for documenting sustainment strategies for legacy weapon systems. DOD concurred with the recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The inventories of the selected Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft in our review totaled 2,823 aircraft and required approximately $20 billion to operate and support in fiscal year 2016  The inventory, aircraft status, initial operational capability, and service life forecast for each of the 12 selected fixed-wing aircraft are shown in figure 1  Sustainment of fixed-wing aircraft and other weapon systems comprises the logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations, and DOD policy provides direction to service components on sustainment planning across the life cycle of the weapon system  Specifically, DOD policy requires the services to develop and implement a sustainment strategy, such as a Life-cycle Sustainment Plan, for sustaining its weapon systems  According to DOD’s policy, this strategy should be the basis for all sustainment efforts, including sustainment metrics mapped to key performance parameters and key system attributes, such as aircraft availability, to manage sustainment performance  The policy states that, after initial operating capability, programs should update the sustainment plan whenever there are major changes to its strategy for sustaining the weapon system, or every 5 years, whichever occurs first  The Air Force and the Navy also have guidance that implements the requirements of the DOD guidance  These services’ guidance include sustainment-planning requirements for life-cycle sustainment and assurance of affordability  There are a variety of DOD offices that have roles and responsibilities related to sustaining fixed-wing aircraft  For instance, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD ), is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning acquisition and sustainment  Specifically, USD (A&S) is responsible for establishing policies for logistics, maintenance, and sustainment support for all elements of DOD, including fixed-wing aircraft  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness (ASD ) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the USD (A&S) on logistics and materiel readiness within DOD  Specifically, the ASD (L&MR) is responsible for (1) establishing DOD policies and procedures for logistics, maintenance, materiel readiness, strategic mobility, and sustainment support; (2) providing related guidance to the Secretaries of the military departments, including developing the Life- cycle Sustainment Plan outline; and (3) monitoring and reviewing programs associated with these areas, among other duties and responsibilities  For the Air Force, the Air Force Materiel Command develops, acquires, and sustains weapon systems through research, development, testing, evaluation, acquisition, maintenance, and program management of the systems and their components  This command provides acquisition and life-cycle management services and logistics support, among other things  The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center within the Air Force Materiel Command is responsible for the life-cycle management of weapon systems from inception to retirement  A Program Executive Officer—responsible for managing a specific portfolio of weapon systems—is responsible for each of the selected fixed-wing aircraft  The Program Executive Officer oversees the program office that manages each weapon system  For the Navy and Marine Corps, the Naval Air Systems Command is responsible for providing the full life-cycle support of naval aviation aircraft, weapons, and systems  This support includes research, design, development and systems engineering; acquisition; test and evaluation; training facilities and equipment; repair and modification; and in-service engineering and logistics support  As with the Air Force, Program Executive Officers oversee their assigned program managers  DOD relies on program managers to lead the development, delivery, and sustainment of individual weapon systems through their life cycles  The program managers are the designated individuals with responsibility for and authority to accomplish the program’s sustainment objectives to meet the users’ operational needs  Product support managers, who work within the program offices, are responsible for developing and implementing support strategies for weapon systems that maintain readiness and control life-cycle costs  Weapon systems are sustained under various arrangements that may include contractors, DOD organic facilities, or some combination of the two  For example, the Air Force Sustainment Center provides depot maintenance through its Air Logistics Complexes for weapon systems  Naval Air Systems Command is responsible for the Navy Fleet Readiness Centers, which provide depot-level maintenance for Navy and Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft  Additionally, the Air Force Sustainment Center and the Navy Supply Systems Command, as well as the Defense Logistics Agency, manage inventories of repair parts, and individual weapon systems programs are typically supported by a complex supplier network that includes a prime contractor, subcontractors, and various tiers of parts suppliers  On the other hand, sustainment responsibilities—in their entirety or particular elements—may be contracted out as part of a public-private partnership or a performance-based logistics agreement, such as with the F-22 Raptor  The Air Force and Navy monitor the readiness status of selected fixed- wing aircraft through numerous performance metrics  Specifically, the Air Force measures how well a fleet is performing by calculating the availability of the fleets’ aircraft, which is the number of aircraft that are available for flight operations  The Navy measures its aircraft availability through two metrics: (1) Ready-Basic-Aircraft (RBA)—the number of aircraft that are able to safely fly—and (2) Ready-for-Tasking (RFT)—the number of aircraft that are able to conduct specific missions  Both the Air Force and Navy have established goals associated with aircraft availability  In addition to measuring the availability of the aircraft against the associated goals, the Air Force and Navy track the reasons for aircraft not being available or able to conduct missions  Specifically, the Air Force and Navy track the following: Aircraft in depot: Aircraft unavailable to conduct missions because of scheduled or unscheduled depot maintenance or modification  Not mission capable maintenance: Aircraft that are not in depot and not capable of performing any of their assigned missions because of maintenance  Not mission capable supply: Aircraft that are not in depot and not capable of performing any of their assigned missions because of the lack of a repair part  In addition to these three metrics, the Air Force also tracks the following: Not mission capable for both supply and maintenance: Aircraft that are not in depot and not capable of performing any of their assigned missions because of both maintenance and the lack of a repair part  Units possessed not reported: Aircraft that are not available for use for reasons other than depot and not mission capable status, but possessed by the squadron  There are various costs associated with operating and supporting weapon systems  DOD’s Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide provides direction to the service components on developing estimates to support various analyses and reviews throughout the program life cycle  According to the guide, as a program matures, it remains necessary to continue to track and assess O&S costs and trends to ensure that the program remains sustainable, affordable, and properly funded  Each military department maintains a database that collects historical data on the O&S costs for major fielded weapon systems  DOD’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation provides policy guidance on this requirement, known as the Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs program; specifies the common format in which the data are to be reported; and monitors its implementation by each of the military departments  O&S costs are categorized using the following six overarching elements: unit level manpower—cost of operators, maintainers, and other support manpower assigned to operating units; unit operations—cost of unit operating materiel such as fuel, and training material, unit support services, and unit travel; maintenance—cost of system maintenance including depot- and sustaining support—cost of system support activities that are provided by organizations other than the system’s operating units; continuing system improvements—cost of system hardware and software modifications; and indirect support—cost of activities that provide general services that lack the visibility of actual support to specific force units or systems  For the selected Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft in our review, aircraft availability and O&S cost trends varied over the 6-year period between fiscal years 2011 and 2016, and the aircraft generally did not meet availability goals  We found that 6 of 12 fixed-wing aircraft—3 from each service—experienced decreased aircraft availability between fiscal years 2011 and 2016  One aircraft met availability goals each year between fiscal year 2011 and 2016  Conversely, six aircraft met the goals in some years but not others, and five aircraft did not meet the goals in any year  In the latest year included in our review—fiscal year 2016—9 of 12 of the fixed-wing aircraft did not meet their associated availability goals  With respect to O&S costs, the overall O&S total for all 12 aircraft was about $20 billion annually over the 6-year period; some aircraft experienced increases while the costs to operate and support others decreased  The reasons for changes in costs included increases in maintenance costs for 8 of 12 fixed-wing aircraft  Below we summarize these trends, and the “Sustainment Quick Looks” in appendices II–XIII provide detailed information on the trends associated with each of the 12 fixed-wing aircraft and appendix XV provides additional information on operating and support cost per aircraft  Our analysis found that: between fiscal years 2011 and 2016, aircraft availability for two of five selected Air Force fixed-wing aircraft fluctuated and for three decreased; between fiscal 2011 and 2016, two aircraft met availability goals in some years, and three aircraft did not meet availability goals in any of the years; and in fiscal year 2016, four of the five aircraft did not meet availability goals  Specific details regarding aircraft availability and not mission capable status for maintenance, supply, and both maintenance and supply were omitted because DOD deemed this information as sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  According to officials, when aircraft availability goals are not met, training and operational missions may not be fulfilled as timely as needed  For example, F-22 squadron officials explained that the lack of available aircraft creates a shortage of trained pilots  F-22 pilots need extensive training to fulfill their air-superiority role  Further, command officials explained that when aircraft availability goals are not met, there may not be enough aircraft to respond to contingency requirements  Officials expressed concern that, given the capability and expectation of the F-22 to be available to create air superiority in any operation, missions may not be met  Additionally, E-8C program office officials stated that missions are often limited to top priority, which means supported combatant commands may not obtain all needed capabilities, such as the E-8C not being able to provide surveillance capability to particular combatant commands  From fiscal years 2011 through 2016, O&S costs for the Air Force aircraft in our review totaled about $13 billion annually  These costs decreased for the C-17, F-16, and the F-22, but increased for the B-52 and E-8C, as shown in figure 2  For example, the F-16’s total annual O&S costs decreased by about $943 million (or about 19 percent) because of decreases in all cost elements—the largest decrease being unit operations—except sustaining support  According to officials, the decrease in unit operations can be attributed to the retiring of aircraft and the consolidation of squadrons  The C-17’s and F-22’s O&S costs decreased mainly because of decreases in two cost elements: continuing system improvements and unit operations  In contrast, the B-52’s and the E-8C’s O&S costs increased, by $76 million (or about 6 percent) and $41 million (or about 6 percent), respectively  The increases occurred because two of the cost elements—continuing system improvements and maintenance costs—increased more than the other costs elements decreased  Based on our analysis of the O&S cost elements, maintenance cost generally is one of the largest portions—on average about 36 percent—of total O&S costs for each aircraft  As shown in figure 3, maintenance costs for four of the five aircraft generally have increased from fiscal years 2011 through 2016  Specifically, maintenance costs for the C-17, E-8C, and F- 22 increased because of additional depot maintenance needs  B-52 maintenance costs fluctuated year to year, but increased overall during this period  The overall maintenance costs for the F-16 decreased by approximately $140 million  According to our analysis, even though there was an increase in some of the F-16 maintenance cost elements, the fleet’s executed flying hours decreased  Therefore, the flying hour depot- level reparable costs decreased by approximately $123 million and engine repair decreased by $115 million, causing the overall maintenance cost to decrease  Our analysis found that: between fiscal years 2011 and 2016, aircraft availability increased for three of the seven Navy fixed-wing aircraft, fluctuated for one, and decreased for the remaining three aircraft; between fiscal 2011 and 2016, one aircraft met aircraft availability goals in each year, and four aircraft met goals in some years, while two aircraft did not meet goals in any of the years; and in fiscal year 2016, the Navy did not meet aircraft availability goals for five of the seven aircraft  Specific details regarding aircraft availability and not mission capable status for maintenance and supply were omitted because DOD deemed this information as sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  To address decreases in aircraft availability, the Navy has moved available aircraft between squadrons to help ensure deploying squadrons are fully equipped for their assigned missions  In November 2017, the Commander of Naval Air Forces testified before the House Armed Services Committee that to equip the air wings with the required number of mission capable aircraft for the deployment of three aircraft carriers in 2017, the Navy had to transfer 94 strike fighters to and from the maintenance depots or between squadrons  This transfer included pulling aircraft from fleet replacement squadrons, where the focus should be on training new aviators  The Commander of Naval Air Forces, in his November 2017 testimony, summarized the issue: “That strike fighter inventory management, or shell game, leaves non-deployed squadrons well below the number of jets required to keep aviators proficient and progressing toward their career qualifications and milestones, with detrimental impacts to both retention and future experience levels ” Furthermore, based on our analysis, F/A- 18A-D squadrons have underexecuted their flight hours by an average of 4 percent from fiscal years 2011 through 2016  According to officials, this is largely due to low aircraft availability  Additionally, placing further strain on aircraft availability, the F/A-18A-D inventory has decreased from 581 aircraft in fiscal year 2011 to 537 aircraft in fiscal year 2016  From fiscal years 2011 through 2016, O&S costs for the Navy’s seven selected fixed-wing aircraft totaled about $7 billion annually  Also, the Navy has experienced varying O&S and maintenance costs since fiscal year 2011 for these aircraft  Specifically, annual O&S costs decreased for the AV-8B, C-2A, E-2C, and F/A-18A-D, and increased for the E-2D, EA- 18G, and F/A-18E-F, as shown in figure 4  We found that O&S costs for the F/A-18A-D decreased by about 22 percent from about $3 1 billion in fiscal year 2011 to about $2 4 billion in fiscal year 2016  According to officials, this decrease can be attributed to the decrease in inventory as aircraft are retired and squadrons transition to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter  In another example, O&S costs for the E- 2D increased from about $1 6 million in fiscal year 2012 to about $125 million in fiscal year 2016  The size of the fleet has increased by 17 aircraft—from 3 to 20 since fiscal year 2011  According to officials, this aircraft remains in production with a projected fleet size of 75; as inventory increases, so will O&S costs  Based on our analysis of the O&S cost elements, maintenance cost generally is one of the largest portions—about 42 percent—of total O&S costs for the seven aircraft in our review  Annual maintenance costs have increased for the C-2A, E-2D, EA-18G, and F/A-18E-F, and decreased for the AV-8B, E-2C, and F/A-18A-D, as shown in figure 5  We found that maintenance cost for the C-2A increased by about 7 percent from about $89 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $95 million in fiscal year 2016  According to officials, the increase in maintenance cost can be attributed to increased demand for outer wing panels, which resulted in a $16 million increase in depot-level repair costs and a more than 10 percent increase in executed flight hours, among other things  In another example, maintenance cost for the AV-8B decreased by about 9 percent from about $375 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $341 million in fiscal year 2016  According to officials, these decreases can be attributed to the AV-8B no longer being used in Operation Enduring Freedom in 2012, the loss of six aircraft, and the transition of AV-8B squadrons to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter  The Air Force and Navy face similar sustainment challenges that relate to aging, maintenance, and supply support that affect aircraft availability and O&S costs for the 12 aircraft selected in our review, as shown in figure 6  Specifically, 10 of 12 aircraft are experiencing sustainment challenges related to aging; all 12 are experiencing challenges related to maintenance; and all 12 are also experiencing challenges related to supply support  Below is a brief overview of these challenges: Aging: A number of these aircraft are aging and operating beyond their planned service life, partly because of delays in replacement aircraft  Specifically, the Air Force and Navy plan to replace the F-16, AV-8B, and F/A-18A-D with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter  The Navy is expected to transition the F/A-18A-D through 2030 and the Marine Corps is planning to use the F/A-18A-D beyond 2030 (although these time frames have been extended several times already)  The Navy plans to retire the AV-8B in 2026  On the other hand, the Air Force is not expected to retire the F-16 until at least 2040  Because of aging, according to officials, there are parts on some aircraft that need to be repaired and replaced that were not accounted for during initial sustainment analysis  To mitigate some challenges associated with the age of the fixed-wing aircraft, the Air Force and Navy program officials have decided to extend the service life of some aircraft by repairing and overhauling airframes and components, as well as developing the engineering specifications for parts that were never planned to be repaired or replaced  Maintenance: Delays in getting aircraft into and through depot maintenance, as well as shortages of skilled maintainers, are contributing to some aircraft missing their availability goals  Both services reported losing experienced maintainers, either to retirement or to other programs such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter  To address maintenance challenges, program offices for the selected aircraft have improved the efficiency and speed of depot maintenance, as well as are working to ensure there are sufficient numbers of trained maintainers  Supply Support: Some aircraft are encountering supply shortages as a result of parts not being available, in some cases due to obsolescence issues or diminishing manufacturer sources  Overcoming part shortages through either searching for replacement parts or reengineering parts takes time, which can contribute to aircraft being unavailable for longer periods  To mitigate supply challenges, officials have proactively upgraded aircraft before obsolescence occurs or located available parts and reengineered parts that are no longer in production, as well as identified suitable manufacturers in advance, among other things  For more specific information on sustainment challenges related to aging aircraft, maintenance, and supply support for each of the fixed-wing aircraft, see the “Sustainment Quick Looks” in appendixes II–XIII  The Air Force has documented sustainment strategies for its five selected aircraft in our review, but the Navy has not documented sustainment strategies or updated the strategies for four of seven of its aircraft in our review  The Air Force and Navy also regularly reviewed sustainment metrics and have implemented plans to improve aircraft availability  The Air Force has documented sustainment strategies for the five selected fixed-wing aircraft and updated them in accordance with Air Force guidance  However, the Navy has not documented a sustainment strategy or updated the strategies for four of the seven aircraft in our review since 2012  See figure 7 for the year of the most recent update to the sustainment strategy for the aircraft in our review  While sustainment strategies do not guarantee successful outcomes, they serve as a tool to guide operations as well as support planning and implementation of activities through the life-cycle of the aircraft  Specifically, at a high-level the strategy is aimed at integrating requirements, product support elements, funding, and risk management to provide oversight of the aircraft  For example, these sustainment strategies can be documented in a life-cycle sustainment plan, postproduction support plan, or an in-service support plan, among other types of documented strategies  Additionally, program officials stated that an aircraft’s sustainment strategy is an important management tool for the sustainment of the aircraft by documenting requirements that are known by all stakeholders, including good practices identified in sustaining each aircraft  For example: The strategy for the Air Force B-52 has been updated several times in recent years because of several major modifications  For example, in 2014 the Air Force issued an updated sustainment plan within the life- cycle management plan to update the combat network communications technology program because the B-52’s communications system is still the original from the 1950s and has limitations related to making mission or target changes in flight  The plan addresses the testing, resource management, and numerous program performance indicators and requirements of the system  The strategy for the Air Force F-16 outlines plans for the aircraft’s service life extension and includes proactive measures and data forecasting to bundle depot modifications in order to minimize fleet- wide effects on aircraft availability  The service life extension for the F- 16 is designed to extend the service life of 300 F-16 aircraft from 8,000 to 13,856 flight hours at an estimated cost of $740 million (as of June 2016)  The strategy for the Navy E-2D provides a systematic approach to ensure that a comprehensive support package is in place to support the sustainment of the aircraft  Also, it describes the overall plan for the management and execution of the product support package by communicating the sustainment strategy to stakeholders in the acquisition, engineering, and logistics communities  However, the Navy had not documented a sustainment strategy for the C- 2A because a strategy was not required when the aircraft, now a legacy system, was going through the acquisition process prior to 1965  According to Navy officials, while they have not documented a strategy for the C-2A, they are undertaking efforts, such as updating technical publications, performing maintenance analysis on the landing gear, and evaluating depot tasks to decrease turnaround time, among other efforts, to sustain the aircraft  However, a documented sustainment strategy for the C-2A would help guide the planning and implementation of these efforts, as well as serve as a management tool by documenting these requirements that are known by all stakeholders  In addition, the Navy’s sustainment strategies for the E-2C (2011), EA- 18G (2006), and F/A-18A-D (2001) were developed prior to 2012 and thus have not been updated in over 5 years  With respect to the EA-18G, Navy officials told us that the sustainment strategy should be updated in accordance with DOD’s acquisition policy—DOD Instruction 5000 02— since the EA-18G is still in the acquisition process, as it continues to be produced  For the E-2C and F/A-18A-D, Naval Air Systems Command officials and program office officials told us that they were not required to document sustainment strategies because these aircraft were legacy systems at the time the requirement to develop and maintain a sustainment strategy was implemented  Therefore, according to these officials, the DOD requirements to document and update sustainment strategies every 5 years in DOD Instruction 5000 02 were not applicable  DOD Instruction 5000 02 requires weapon systems to have some form of a sustainment strategy that is not older than 5 years; however, it is unclear whether this policy is applicable to legacy weapon systems  Specifically, the policy states that program managers for all programs are responsible for developing and maintaining a sustainment strategy, such as a Life-cycle Sustainment Plan, beginning at the risk-reduction decision point (i e , Milestone A of the acquisition process)  However, based on our discussions with Navy program officials for our selected aircraft and our review of the policy, it is unclear whether the policy—as currently written—is applicable to legacy systems that were no longer in production and thus had completed the risk-reduction decision point (or Milestone A) prior to the requirement to update a sustainment strategy every 5 years  According to DOD officials, the intent of the policy is for all programs, including legacy weapon systems, to develop and maintain a sustainment strategy; however, the policy does not explicitly state that legacy systems are expected to fulfill this requirement  In May 2017, the Air Force updated its sustainment guidance to require sustainment strategies for legacy systems and for those strategies to be updated every 5 years  Air Force officials told us that they did this because the DOD policy was unclear whether it was applicable to legacy systems and it was a good practice to ensure the guidance was explicit for all weapon systems to document and update a sustainment strategy  This instruction explicitly states that the requirement to document a sustainment strategy and update it every 5 years is applicable to all weapon systems, including legacy systems that are in the O&S phase of their life cycles  Additionally, the Air Force Instruction states that these legacy systems are not required to retroactively meet requirements identified for previous phases of the acquisition life-cycle, but should meet the requirements needed for continued operations of the system  However, the Navy has not made the requirement explicit for legacy systems in its guidance  Specifically, Navy guidance does not explicitly state that documenting a sustainment strategy and updating that strategy every 5 years is a requirement for legacy systems  While Navy guidance requires the development and use of sustainment metrics for legacy systems and requires the Naval Air Systems Command be responsible for aviation weapon systems in sustainment, the Navy does not address any requirement for sustainment strategies for legacy systems  The lack of clarity in DOD Instruction 5000 02 and the Navy guidance regarding whether legacy systems are required to document a sustainment strategy and update that strategy every 5 years has resulted in confusion regarding sustainment planning requirements among Navy program offices and could cause confusion with other weapon system program offices across DOD  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management should define objectives in specific terms so they are understood at all levels of the entity  The standards also state that guidance should clearly define what is to be achieved, who is to achieve it, how it will be achieved, and the time frames for achievement  As indicated by the Air Force’s 2017 update to its sustainment guidance, clarifying DOD and Navy guidance and the applicability of sustainment strategy requirements to legacy systems could be done through very small additions and clarifications to the applicable guidance documents  Until DOD and the Navy update or issue new guidance clarifying the requirements for documenting sustainment strategies for legacy systems, weapon system program offices, such as those for fixed-wing aircraft, as well as Naval Air Systems Command and DOD may not have full visibility of necessary requirements to achieve program objectives or any related risks associated with the sustainment of these weapon systems  While the DOD policy and Navy guidance is unclear, Naval Air Systems Command and Navy program offices for the four aircraft—C-2A, E-2C, EA-18G, and F/A-18A-D—that either do not have a sustainment strategy or have not updated the strategy within the last 5 years are taking actions to document or update the sustainment strategies for these aircraft  According to Naval Air Systems Command officials, once it was brought to their attention that the intent of DOD Instruction 5000 02 was for legacy systems to have an updated documented sustainment strategy, they began to take action to develop or update the respective sustainment strategies  Specifically, according to C-2A, E-2C, and E-2D program officials, they are currently updating the E-2D strategy for its 5-year update, which is due in fiscal year 2018, and it will include updates for the C-2A and E-2C since the airframe for all three aircraft are very similar  Also, program officials for the EA-18G and F/A-18A-D told us that they are currently updating the strategies for these aircraft and are expected to complete the process in fiscal year 2018  Given that the Navy is already taking action to update its sustainment strategies and has established timelines for these updates, we are not making any recommendations to the Navy regarding updating the respective sustainment strategies  The Air Force and the Navy have (1) regularly reviewed sustainment metrics for fixed-wing aircraft and (2) implemented improvement plans to address aircraft availability  The Air Force and Navy have regularly monitored the condition of their fixed-wing aircraft, which includes measuring aircraft availability against planned goals as well as monitoring other sustainment metrics  Specifically, the Air Force Materiel Command monitors aircraft availability and other sustainment metrics through quarterly Weapon System Enterprise Review (WSER) briefings  The program office in conjunction with the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center generates the WSER, which is briefed through Air Force Materiel Command and the Program Executive Offices to the Air Force Chief of Staff  The WSER delivers insight into the comprehensive health of a system by flagging gaps in performance and identifying mitigating actions, which is used to conduct crosscutting enterprise analysis and provide input into readiness reviews  In addition to the WSER, the program offices manage their performance through their Health of the Fleet briefs  These briefs—conducted monthly or quarterly depending upon the aircraft—include readiness assessments that provide insight on maintenance and management practices  The assessment is delivered by the program’s maintenance group, and includes aircraft performance metrics, issues, actions, and schedules to inform program leadership on fleet status and to help prioritize and make decisions concerning the issues  The Navy monitors aircraft availability through its aircraft status dashboard for each aircraft, which provides specific information, such as goals, actual availability, and gaps between the two  More specifically, the Navy tracks the status of each of its aircraft through the dashboard, including those aircraft that are available (i e , Ready-Basic-Aircraft ), are in depot maintenance, or are not mission capable due to maintenance or supply, among other metrics  The dashboard is updated monthly, and there are weekly meetings with key stakeholders, including Naval Air Systems Command officials, industry partners, and depot officials, to monitor the performance of each aircraft and make adjustments to improve aircraft availability  Additionally, all program offices have processes in place to manage the fleet within their portfolios, including semiannual or annual program reviews such as Program Management Reviews and Executive Steering Reviews  These reviews focus on readiness, cost drivers, and initiatives to address program risk and ways to resolve issues affecting each aircraft  Further, the Marine Corps Commandant for Aviation leads biannual Executive Steering Summits to assess readiness issues affecting Marine Corps aircraft  The Air Force and Navy have implemented improvement plans to address aircraft availability for each of the selected fixed-wing aircraft  Air Force program offices for the fixed-wing aircraft in our review have plans for improving availability  Since 2005, the Air Force Materiel Command has had an annual process to improve aircraft availability, which is known as the Aircraft Availability Improvement Program  The process enables the program offices to assess and limit risk, incorporate available support funding, and specifically address where there are effects on availability, such as aircraft in depot  This process also incorporates projecting historical and goal rates in order to leverage scheduled and modernization maintenance  Program offices create plans, known as aircraft availability improvement plans, based on these projections to forecast improvements that can facilitate increased availability and reduction of costs, among other things  The Air Force provides guidance in the form of a template to ensure consistency amongst the plans, which typically must include improvement initiatives with milestone goals  This information includes projected aircraft availability rates for mission capable, units possessed not reported, not mission capable for supply, not mission capable for maintenance, and depot possession  Officials noted that the program office creates an improvement plan each year, regardless of whether it is short of its availability goal, since the plan serves as a forecasting measure  The program is designed to ensure the program offices have plans in place to meet target goals, and the information and milestones laid out in the plans feed into the WSER briefings to senior management  For example: The B-52 plan for fiscal year 2017 discusses the process and milestones for replacing actuator seals for the fleet, the costs of the repair, and the expected benefit to B-52 availability—1 05 percent improvement to the not mission capable supply metric  The C-17 plan for fiscal year 2017 identifies the current and future modifications, timelines for beginning and completion, and the effect on availability  For example, the future replacement of a legacy computer system with a modernized system and display is set to begin in fiscal year 2019 with an estimated completion date of 2026  This replacement is planned to be done concurrently with other maintenance, and to prevent future declines in the C-17’s availability  The F-22 plan for fiscal year 2017 identifies several projects taking place between 2016 and 2021 that are expected to improve availability by almost 2 percent  Further, officials said they are currently working with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) to develop an Air Force manual that would make developing an Aircraft Availability Improvement Plan a requirement  This manual will become a supplement to Air Force Instruction 63-101/20-101, according to the officials  Navy program offices for all seven fixed-wing aircraft in our review also have plans for improving availability  According to Navy officials, they started preparing “summary playbooks,” which is the Navy’s term for improvement plans, in late 2015 and started implementing these plans in early 2016 to increase aircraft availability  Officials told us that there was a limitation in funding because of sequestration prior to fiscal year 2017, which hampered their ability to fully implement the playbooks  At a broad level, the Navy’s playbooks include efforts such as maintenance planning, supply support, aircraft material condition and management, and technical data, among other things  These efforts are linked to specific initiatives such as working with the manufacturer and contractors to provide maintenance support, identifying obsolete parts, conducting aircraft fatigue analysis, and updating technical publications, among other things, which have been identified by the program office as ways to improve aircraft availability  Additionally, these playbooks include the extent to which these initiatives are funded, underfunded, or partially funded and the appropriation account that would fund each initiative  The playbooks include the status of each initiative, and some of the playbooks also provide an approximate time frame for implementing each initiative  For example: The playbook for the C-2A has a fatigue analysis initiative focused on analyzing the landing gear to update its design, provide a depot repair manual, and increase its service life, among other things  This initiative is considered funded, is expected to improve aircraft availability, and has an estimated time frame for implementation between fiscal years 2017 and 2021  The playbook for the E-2D contains a maintenance initiative focused on improving the maintenance planning process of the C-2A, E-2C, and E-2D aircraft by completing elements of the product support package, such as training, publications, support equipment, and tools, among others  This initiative is considered partially funded, is expected to improve aircraft availability by decreasing the not mission- capable rates related to maintenance and supply and decreasing maintenance down time, and has an estimated time frame for implementation between fiscal years 2017 through 2019  The playbook for the F/A-18A-D includes a product improvement initiative to conduct a case study to assess the condition of the wiring of the aircraft in the fleet  This initiative is considered funded and is expected to help to sustain aircraft availability  However, there is no time frame for implementing this initiative  The playbook for the F/A-18E-F contains a service life modification initiative focused on extending the service life of the aircraft through modifications  According to officials, this initiative is considered partially funded, is expected to help to sustain aircraft availability, and is expected to help the fleet realize an 80 percent cost avoidance because the Navy will not have to pay the cost to replace these aircraft  Also, this initiative has an estimated time frame for implementation between fiscal years 2018 through 2040  The Departments of the Air Force and Navy spend tens of billions of dollars each year to sustain their fixed-wing aircraft, which need expensive logistics support, including maintenance and repair, to meet goals for availability  The departments spent at least $20 billion annually since 2011 to sustain the 12 aircraft that we examined  The Air Force and Navy share a variety of sustainment challenges, including the age of their aircraft as well as maintenance and supply support issues  These challenges have led to half (6 of 12) of the aircraft in our review experiencing decreasing availability and to the aircraft in general not being able to meet aircraft availability goals  For example, 9 of 12 aircraft did not meet availability goals in fiscal year 2016  These trends are occurring even though the Air Force and Navy regularly review sustainment metrics for the aircraft and are implementing plans for improving aircraft availability  However, DOD’s policy and the Navy’s guidance are not clear on whether the services should have a current sustainment strategy for legacy weapon systems, including fixed-wing aircraft, and on whether the strategies are required to be updated every 5 years  Without clarity about whether the DOD instruction and the Navy guidance apply to legacy systems, program officials will not know whether they are required to have a sustainment strategy or are required to update the plan for their respective fixed-wing aircraft  Furthermore, the program offices, the services, and DOD may not have full visibility of necessary requirements to document program objectives, related risks, and the effectiveness of the program, ultimately jeopardizing the sustainability and affordability of each of the programs  We are making the following two recommendations to DOD: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment updates or issues new policy clarifying the requirements for documenting sustainment strategies for legacy weapon systems, including fixed-wing aircraft  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of the Navy should update or issue new guidance clarifying the requirements for documenting sustainment strategies for legacy weapon systems, including fixed-wing aircraft  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of the sensitive report to DOD for review and comment  In written comments that are reproduced in appendix XVI, DOD concurred with our recommendations and noted planned actions to address each recommendation  The Air Force and Navy also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment; and the Director, Defense Logistics Agency  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at merrittz@gao gov or (202) 512-5257  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix XVII  Over the past several years, we have conducted work on a number of issues that affect the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to sustain its weapon systems  In September 2017, we found that several factors were important to the success of Product Support Managers  These factors included teamwork and collaboration, early implementation of the Product Support Manager position, and organizational support and emphasis on sustainment  We also found that in response to our 2014 recommendations regarding the implementation of the Product Support Manager position, DOD had developed a comprehensive career path and associated guidance to develop, train, and support future Product Support Managers  Additionally, DOD revised guidance to define roles, responsibilities, and reporting relationships between support staff and Product Support Managers  However, DOD was still in the process of implementing our other three recommendations, such as issuing clear, comprehensive, centralized guidance regarding the roles and responsibilities of PSMs and collecting and evaluating information on the effects, if any, that Product Support Managers are having on life-cycle sustainment decisions for their assigned weapon systems  In September 2017, we also found that DOD does not have complete information to identify and manage single-source-of-supply risks  Specifically, some parts are provided by a single source of supply (e g , one manufacturing facility), and if that single source were no longer able to provide the part, DOD could face challenges in maintaining weapon systems  DOD concurred with our six recommendations focused on improving the completeness of information for single-source-of-supply risks, including issuing department-wide policy that clearly defines requirements of Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages management, and details responsibilities and procedures to be followed to implement the policy  DOD is in the process of taking action to implement these recommendations  In June 2016, we found that the Defense Logistics Agency and the military services have not adopted metrics to measure the accuracy of planning factors, such as the accuracy of part lists, or the costs created by backorders  As a result, depot maintenance may not be efficient or cost-effective, resulting in unnecessary delays in the repair of weapon systems  DOD concurred with our six recommendations to develop metrics to monitor the accuracy of demand planning factors and disruption costs created by the lack of parts at depot maintenance sites and is in the process of taking action to implement these recommendations  For a listing of relevant past GAO work, see the Related GAO Products list at the end of this report  Sustainment: Depot maintenance conducted organically at the designated air logistics complex and contractually for some depot- level repairs at contractor facilities  The B-52 is a long-range, heavy bomber that can perform a variety of missions, including strategic attack, close air support, air interdiction, maritime operations, and offensive counter-air missions  It can carry nuclear or precision-guided conventional ordnance with worldwide precision navigation capability  However, the B-52s are some of the oldest aircraft in the Air Force’s fleet, and will continue to operate until at least 2040 (see fig  8)  Operating and support (O&S) costs for the B-52s have remained relatively steady, generally fluctuating around $1 2 billion–$1 3 billion per year  As a predominantly military-maintained system, most of that O&S cost is related to maintenance and manpower, with depot maintenance and depot-level reparables—direct labor and materials for item repairs, transportation, and storage, among other things—accounting for most of the maintenance cost  Technology Program (2014) is focused on upgrading outdated communications technology  The communications modification requires 7,000 hours of work and is estimated to be complete by 2020  The fleet has active sustainment plans for other components of the aircraft, such as the B-52 Anti-skid Replacement Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (2015), which is estimated to cost over $40 million and be completed by 2019  The B-52 faces sustainment challenges related to its age and, according to officials, replacement parts are difficult to obtain  Several modernization efforts are under way (communications, engines, etc ), and is working with vendors and its own service engineers to identify problem areas and plan ahead so that replacement parts will be available  Depot maintenance on the B-52 is managed by the program office and conducted at Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex depot  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The C-17 is a long-range, heavy logistic transport aircraft powered by four F-117 turbofan engines with air-refueling capability that was first manufactured in 1987 (see fig  10)  It is capable of rapid strategic delivery of troops and all types of cargo to main operating bases or to bases in any forward deployment area  The C-17 can perform tactical airlift and airdrop missions and can transport ambulatory patients during aeromedical evacuations, when required  The C-17 can carry virtually all air-transportable equipment  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the C-17 have decreased from about $5 3 billion in fiscal 2011 to about $4 0 billion in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit operations decreased, while maintenance costs have generally increased during this period due to contractor logistics support because the C-17 is a predominantly contractor-managed aircraft  The C-17 Enterprise Life Cycle Management Plan and Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (2014) documents current and future acquisition, sustainment, and integration efforts of the aircraft  It also addresses contractual arrangements and partnership support agreements between Air Force, Boeing, and other service providers for aircraft sustainment  Boeing provides continued sole-source life-cycle support for the C-17 under the terms of the Globemaster Integrated Sustainment Program (2013)  Under this program, Boeing is responsible for sustainment, to include material management and depot maintenance support  The C-17 participates in a virtual fleet arrangement, a global network of 43 additional C-17 aircraft, which allows participants total aircraft parts access from any fleet participant worldwide  The C-17 is an aircraft being modified to meet its requirements as well as to address maintenance and supply issues  The Air Force’s actions to mitigate these challenges include processes to increase the service life of the aircraft, allowing managers to quickly hire skilled workers for critical positions, and locating other vendor source for parts  Logistics Complex, and at its facility in San Antonio; landing gear overhaul occurs at Ogden Air Logistics Complex, and engine overhaul occurs at Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex in partnership with Pratt & Whitney, the original equipment manufacturer on the F-117 turbofan engine  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  Sustainment: Depot maintenance conducted by Northrop Grumman, and field maintenance conducted organically, by the National Guard  The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (E-8C) was first manufactured in 1967 (see fig  12)  Its primary mission is to provide theater ground and air commanders with ground surveillance to support attack operations and targeting that contributes to the delay, disruption, and destruction of enemy forces  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the E-8C have generally increased from about $686 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $734 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, maintenance cost has increased partly because of increases in contractor logistics support since the E-8C is maintained by Northrop Grumman  E-8C aircraft were formerly used as commercial airliners and purchased by the Air Force  Therefore, the exact usage of the aircraft was unknown with any degree of specificity  The program office has utilized new analysis conducted by Boeing to develop an improved method of determining and tracking service life for the E-8C aircraft  The new method uses a quantitative analysis capability to identify safety of flight structural concerns, allowing for planning and execution of risk mitigation  The E-8C is an aircraft with significant maintenance and supply issues according to Air Force officials  The Air Force’s actions to mitigate these challenges include updating the Maintenance Plan and the Corrosion Plan for the E-8C (formerly a commercial airframe) to bring them in line with military standards  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  Sustainment: Depot maintenance conducted organically at the designated air logistics complex, and field maintenance conducted organically and by contractors  The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a compact, single-engine, multirole fighter aircraft first manufactured in 1978 (see figure 14)  It is highly maneuverable and participates in air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack  There are four versions of the F-16: A, single-seat model; B, two-seat model with tandem cockpits; C and D, single- and two-seat models, respectively, incorporating newer capabilities  Total operating and support (O&S) cost for the F-16 decreased from about $5 billion in fiscal year 2011 to about $4 billion in fiscal year 2016 because of a 6 percent reduction of inventory  Specifically, maintenance cost has generally decreased during this same period as a result of a decrease in cost of depot maintenance  Sustainment: Performance-based logistics contract with depot maintenance subcontracted to Ogden Air Logistics Complex, Utah, and field maintenance performed organically  and is designed to project air dominance, rapidly and at great distances, and defeat threats  Overall operating and support costs (O&S) for the F-22 have decreased about $248 million overall since fiscal year 2011  Maintenance issues continue to be an area of concern for the aircraft, and these costs increased approximately $255 million from fiscal years 2011 to 2016, due to increases in contractor logistics costs  maintaining a comprehensive diminishing manufacturing sources program and proactively supporting the continued sustainment of component parts of the aircraft through various replacement programs, such as the F-22 Reliability and Maintainability Maturation  This initiative is an ongoing effort to drive continuous improvement in availability  The F-22 faces issues with its low- observable coating and supply funding  Actions to mitigate these challenges include contracting a repair facility to conduct coating reversion repair and securing additional spares funding  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The AV-8B Harrier (AV-8B) is a Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing attack aircraft first manufactured in 1984 (see fig  18)  The AV-8B has the capability of conducting close air support using conventional weapons for intermediate range intercept and attack missions  The AV-8B is capable of deploying and operating on aircraft carriers and other suitable seagoing platforms, advanced bases, expeditionary airfields, and remote tactical landing sites  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the AV-8B have decreased from about $815 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $646 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit-level manpower and operations as well as maintenance costs have decreased partly because the inventory is decreasing as AV-8B squadrons transition to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter  Average number of flying hours: 4,711 hours per aircraft Operating and support cost: $646 million Depot maintenance activity and squadron locations: AV-8B Program Strategic Sustainment and Warfighting Relevance Plan (2013) addresses strategic sustainment and warfighting requirements to ensure relevance, reliability, safety, and sustainability through five pillars: recruit and retain high-quality people, develop a comprehensive readiness and sustainment plan, meet combatant commander requirements, retain and sustain government and industry agencies to support engineering and logistics requirements, and integrate capabilities to remain tactically relevant and operationally effective  AV-8B is maintained organically at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under planned maintenance intervals occurring every 1,500 flight hours; supply support is provided organically by Naval Supply Systems Command and Defense Logistics Agency; contractor support services are provided by Boeing  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  Manufacturer: Grumman Corporation (acquired by Northrop Grumman) The C-2A Greyhound Logistics Aircraft (C-2A) is a high-wing, twin-engine monoplane cargo aircraft first manufactured in 1965 (see fig  20)  It is designed to land on aircraft carriers, with a primary mission of providing critical logistics support to Carrier Strike Groups by transporting high-priority cargo, mail, and passengers between carriers and shore bases  The original C-2A aircraft were overhauled to extend their operational life in 1973 and again from 2004 through 2011  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the C-2A have generally decreased from about $233 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $207 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit-level manpower, unit operations, and continuing system improvements have decreased, while maintenance costs have increased  landing gear, and avionics system, among others  The Navy will include an appendix for the C-2A when it updates the sustainment strategy for the E 2D for its 5-year update  C-2A completed a service life extension program from 2004 through 2011 to increase flight hours from 10,000 to 15,000 and landings from 16,020 to 36,000, among other things  Aircraft are maintained organically by field maintainers and at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under a planned maintenance interval cycle with three planned maintenance interval events occurring consecutively every 24 months, and supply support is provided organically by the Naval Supply Systems Command and Defense Logistics Agency  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The E-2 Hawkeye (E-2C) is the Navy’s all-weather, carrier-based tactical battle management, surface surveillance coordination and airborne early warning, command and control aircraft, with a planned sunset in 2026 when the last E-2D is delivered (see fig  22)  The E-2 is a twin-engine, five- crewmember, high-wing turboprop aircraft with a 24-foot diameter radar rotodome attached to the upper fuselage  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the E-2 have decreased from about $536 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $345 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit manpower and maintenance costs have decreased, partly because E-2C inventory is decreasing as E-2C squadrons transition to the E-2D fleet  comprehensive sustainment logistics, engineering programs, and financial resources necessary to ensure continued platform sustainment and attainment of readiness and safety operations  The Navy will include an appendix for the E-2C when it updates the sustainment strategy for the E-2D for its 5-year update  E-2C is maintained organically by field maintainers and at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under a planned maintenance interval cycle: initial planned maintenance interval is performed by field maintainers at 42 months and the second cycle is performed at a Fleet Readiness Center 46 months after the initial planned maintenance interval  Supply support is provided organically by the Naval Supply Systems Command and Defense Logistics Agency; contractor support services are provided by General Dynamics and Wyle Labs  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D) is the newest variant of the E-2 aircraft platform, expecting to reach full operational capability by 2027 (see fig  24)  Using the same configuration as the E-2C, the E-2D aircraft is used for surface-surveillance coordination and airborne early warning, and command control  Its mission is to provide advanced warning of approaching enemy surface units, and cruise missiles and aircraft, among other things  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the E-2D have increased consistently since fiscal year 2011 to about $125 million in fiscal year 2016  This increase is driven by the addition of aircraft to the inventory as the Navy continues to produce E-2D aircraft through 2026  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The EA-18G Growler is the fourth major variant of the F/A-18 family of aircraft manufactured in 2007 to replace the EA-6B Prowler (see fig  26)  The EA-18G is the first newly designed electronic warfare aircraft produced in more than 35 years and combines the proven F/A-18 Super Hornet platform with a sophisticated electronic warfare suite  Total O&S costs for the EA-18G have consistently increased from about $334 million in fiscal year 2011 to about $868 million in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit manpower and maintenance costs have increased partly because the inventory is increasing, as EA-18Gs are still in production  design, development, and fielding of the aircraft  Some of the key support program elements include developing support equipment and technical data, testing requirements for avionics, and facilities requirements, among others  The Navy is updating this plan and expects to finalize it in 2018  The aircraft are maintained organically at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under planned maintenance intervals, which typically occur every 72 months  Also, the Navy partners with Boeing to provide wholesale supply and depot repair support for major components, such as the engine  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The F/A-18A-D Hornet Strike Fighter is a twin-engine, mid-wing, multimission tactical aircraft initially fielded in the 1980s (see fig  28)  In its fighter mode, it is used primarily as a fighter escort and for air defense; in its attack mode, it is used for force projection, interdiction, and air support  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the F/A-18A-D have decreased consistently from about $3 1 billion in fiscal year 2011 to about $2 4 billion in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit manpower, operations, and maintenance costs have decreased, partly because the F/A-18A-Ds are being permanently transitioned out of service to be replaced by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter   and financial resources necessary to ensure continued readiness and supportability for the remainder of the aircraft’s service life  The Navy is currently updating this plan and expects to finalize it in 2018  The aircraft are maintained organically at Navy Fleet Readiness Centers under planned maintenance intervals, which typically occur every 48 months for carrier-deploying aircraft, and every 72 months for land-based aircraft  The Navy implemented the High-Flight-Hour program in 2006 to extend the service life from 8,000 to 10,000 flight hours by inspecting and repairing airframes, and replacing major components and parts  The High-Flight-Hour program, along with other factors, has led to maintenance carryover (i e , into the next fiscal year) due to maintenance events taking longer than planned  In 1999, the Navy entered into a contract with Boeing for engineering support to leverage resources within the technology and industrial base to improve efficiency of the maintenance process and address the maintenance backlog  The F/A-18A-D is operating beyond its planned service life with maintenance and supply issues  The Navy’s actions to mitigate these challenges include extending the service life of the aircraft, allowing maintainers to work overtime to reduce backlog, and cannibalizing parts—moving parts from one aircraft to another  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  The F/A-18E-F Super Hornet was first manufactured in 1998 (see fig  30)  The F/A-18E-F is highly capable across the full mission spectrum: air superiority, fighter escort, reconnaissance, aerial refueling, close air support, air defense suppression, and day/night precision strike  The F/A-18E-F provides aircrew the capability and performance necessary to face 21st century threats  Total operating and support (O&S) costs for the F/A-18E-4 have increased from about $2 2 billion in fiscal year 2011 to about $3 1 billion in fiscal year 2016  Specifically, unit manpower, maintenance, and continuing system support have increased, partly because the inventory is increasing, as the F/A-18E-F is still in production  the Navy is conducting an assessment to determine the number of flight hours the aircraft can safely continue to fly, and then extend the service life of the program through inspections, repairs, and modifications, among other things  The Navy contracted with Boeing to potentially begin these efforts by fiscal year 2018  The F/A-18E-F is a high operational tempo aircraft supporting contingency operations with maintenance and supply issues  The Navy’s actions to mitigate these challenges include plans to extend the service life of the aircraft, training maintainers to transition to vacated positions, and cannibalizing parts—removing parts from one aircraft to another  This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we issued on April 25, 2018  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable rates, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only)  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  To examine the trends in aircraft availability and operating and support (O&S) costs for selected Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft, including whether the aircraft met availability goals, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 fixed-wing aircraft managed by the Departments of the Air Force and the Navy  These included two Marine Corps aircraft that are managed by the Department of the Navy  This nongeneralizable sample was selected to ensure a mix of aircraft, including type of aircraft (fighter, bomber, cargo, etc ), age of the aircraft, and size of inventory, and whether the aircraft were sustained organically by the Department of Defense (DOD) or through contract arrangements, such as public-private partnerships or performance-based logistics, among other factors  For the Air Force, we selected five fixed-wing aircraft—the B-52 Stratofortress, C-17 Globemaster III, E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), F-16 Fighting Falcon, and F-22 Raptor  For the Navy, including the Marine Corps, we selected seven fixed-wing aircraft—the AV-8B Harrier, C-2A Greyhound Logistics Aircraft, E-2 Hawkeye Early Warning and Control Aircraft, E-2 Advanced Hawkeye Early Warning and Control Aircraft, EA-18G Growler, F/A-18 Hornet Strike Fighter A-D, and F/A-18 Super Hornet E-F  The Marine Corps uses the AV-8B Harrier and also uses a variant of the F/A-18A-D  For the selected aircraft, we obtained and reviewed the aircraft availability, sustainment, and O&S data for accuracy and completeness, interviewed officials regarding their data-collection processes, and reviewed available related policies and procedures associated with the collection of the data  As a result, we found the information to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting sustainment metrics, such as aircraft availability and O&S costs  status due to maintenance, supply, and both  With respect to O&S costs, we collected and analyzed data from fiscal years 2011 through 2016  We conducted data-reliability assessments for the data provided by the Air Force and the Navy  To do this, we sent data-reliability questionnaires to both departments requesting information on the sources that generated the data  For the Air Force, we conducted data-reliability assessments on the Air Force Total Ownership Cost system and the Logistics Installation and Mission Support system  For the Navy, we conducted data-reliability assessments on the Aviation Management Supply and Readiness Reporting—Type Model Series Integrated Database, the Decision Knowledge Programming for Logistics Analysis and Technical Evaluation system, the Flying Hour Projection System / Cost Adjustment and Visibility Tracking System, and the Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs system  We reviewed responses from both departments on these sources as well as documentation—such as guidance, user manuals, and data dictionaries—provided to corroborate questionnaire responses, and interviewed knowledgeable officials to discuss the data  We concluded that the data provided by the Air Force and the Navy were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting condition metrics such as aircraft availability; not mission capable status due to maintenance, supply, and both; depot inductions; budgeted and executed flight hours; and O&S costs for the selected fixed-wing aircraft in our review  To identify the sustainment challenges and mitigation actions for the selected aircraft, we reviewed sustainment metrics data, performance briefings, and other relevant documentation to identify specific challenges for each of the 12 aircraft in our review  We also reviewed ongoing and planned actions to address those challenges  Additionally, we interviewed program officials, depot officials, field maintainers, and squadron personnel to obtain their views on the challenges they face in sustaining the aircraft and the actions they take to mitigate those challenges  In some instances, we visited depots and squadrons to observe aircraft undergoing maintenance, discuss the respective maintenance processes, and discuss challenges and mitigation actions with officials  We then grouped the identified challenges into categories and represented them in a table to demonstrate which aircraft are experiencing specific challenges  To assess the extent to which the Air Force and the Navy have sustainment strategies, regularly review sustainment metrics, and have plans to improve aircraft availability for the selected fixed-wing aircraft, we obtained and analyzed sustainment strategies, performance management frameworks (i e , sustainment metrics collected and monitored as well as the levels of management review), and improvement plans for each of the selected 12 fixed-wing aircraft  We also identified and reviewed DOD, Air Force, and Navy guidance to analyze the departments’ efforts in sustaining these aircraft and to determine whether these were consistent with federal standards for internal control that deal with management defining objectives in specific terms  Specifically, we reviewed DOD Instruction 5000 02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, which provides management principles and mandatory policies for defense acquisition systems such as fixed- wing aircraft  These policies incorporate decision processes and assessing of readiness, which includes the creation of and requirements for a Life-cycle Sustainment Plan  We also reviewed Air Force Instruction 63-101/20-101, Integrated Life Cycle Management, which implements various Air Force and DOD policy directives, including DOD Instruction 5000 02  It establishes the integrated life-cycle management guidelines and procedures for Air Force personnel who develop, review, approve, or manage the systems, subsystems, end-items, services, and activities procured by the Air Force  For the Navy, we reviewed Secretary of the Navy M-5000 2, Department of the Navy Acquisition and Capabilities Guidebook, which provides guidance for the operation of the defense acquisition system and the joint capabilities integration and development system  It also implements DOD Instruction 5000 02 for the Navy and Marine Corps, including guidance on the management and execution of a sustainment strategy  and service guidance  We also reviewed the Air Force’s and the Navy’s performance metric briefings and improvement plans to determine whether the departments regularly reviewed sustainment metrics and had plans aimed at improving aircraft availability  We interviewed DOD, Air Force, and Navy officials knowledgeable about sustainment of these selected fixed-wing aircraft to discuss DOD’s and the departments’ efforts in sustaining these aircraft, including historical information on each aircraft, applicability of policy and guidance for legacy aircraft, and overviews of performance management frameworks identified by the departments to monitor and improve aircraft availability  To develop the fixed-wing aircraft sustainment summary documents (i e , “Sustainment Quick Looks”) in appendixes II–XIII we obtained historical and current information including background on aircraft capabilities, manufacturer, sustainment strategy, depot maintenance and squadron locations, and key dates in the life cycle of each aircraft (i e , first manufactured, initial and full operational capability, last production, and planned sunset year)  We collected and analyzed the following metrics: aircraft availability, not mission capable maintenance, not mission capable supply, and not mission capable aircraft from fiscal year 2011 through March 2017; the number of aircraft in depots for fiscal years 2011 through 2016; budgeted and executed flight hours from fiscal years 2011 through overall O&S and maintenance costs for fiscal years 2011 through 2016  We compared availability actuals to goals, aircraft in depots to availability trends, and budgeted and executed flight hours to availability trends  We analyzed O&S cost by reviewing its six elements and compared them to availability trends  We also analyzed the subcategories of the maintenance costs element  Through interviews with knowledgeable officials and reviewing documentation, we identified sustainment challenges (i e , aging, maintenance and supply support) and mitigation actions to address these challenges for each selected fixed-wing aircraft  DOD deemed some of the information, such as aircraft availability, not mission capable status, number of aircraft in depots, and budgeted and executed flight hours, to be sensitive (i e , For Official Use Only), which must be protected from public disclosure  This public report omits the information that DOD deemed to be sensitive  Additionally, to support our work for each objective we conducted site visits and interviewed officials to discuss data trends and identify specific sustainment challenges such as aging, maintenance, and supply support, among other challenges affecting aircraft availability, and mitigation actions to address these challenges  For the Air Force, we met with the following entities: Headquarters—Secretary of the Air Force, Logistics and Product Support and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cost and Economics, Air Force Cost Analysis Agency; Materiel Commands—Air Force Materiel Command and Air Force Life Cycle Management Center; Program Offices—B-52 Program Office, C-17 Program Office, E-8C Program Office, F-16 Program Office, and F-22 Program Office; Depots—Tinker Air Force Base at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (B-52); Robins Air Force Base at Warner Robbins, Georgia (C-17); Northrop Grumman facility at Lake Charles, Louisiana (E-8C); Ogden Air Logistics Center / Hill Air Force Base at Ogden, Utah (F-16 and F-22); and Squadrons—437th Maintenance Group, Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina (C-17); 461st Air Control Wing, Robins Air Force Base Georgia (E-8C); 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina (F-16); and 325th Maintenance Group, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida (F-22)  For the Navy, we met with the following entities: Headquarters—Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy— Expeditionary Programs and Logistics Management, Marine Corps Aviation Plans and Policy Branch, and Air Warfare Division; Materiel Commands—Commander, Fleet Readiness Center; Naval Air Systems Command; and Naval Supply Systems Command; Program Offices—Program Manager–Air (PMA)-231 (C-2A, E-2C, and E-2D); PMA- 257 (AV-8B); and PMA-265 (F/A-18A-F, and EA- 18G); Depots—Fleet Readiness Center–East at Cherry Point, North Carolina; Fleet Readiness Center–Mid Atlantic at Naval Air Station Norfolk, Virginia, and Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia; Squadrons—Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina; Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California; Naval Air Station Norfolk, Virginia; and Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia; and Other—Naval Center for Cost Analysis  The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted from September 2016 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate, evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We subsequently worked with DOD from April 2018 to September 2018 to prepare this unclassified version of the original sensitive report for public release  This public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards  For fiscal year 2016, total operating and support (O&S) costs for the five Air Force fixed-wing aircraft selected in our review were about $12 billion, and the average O&S cost per aircraft across all five fleets was about $96 million, as shown in figure 32  Each of the C-17 and F-16 fleets accounted for about 33 percent of the total O&S cost, and the E-8C’s average cost per aircraft accounted for about 48 percent of the total average cost per aircraft  For fiscal year 2016, total O&S costs for the seven Navy fixed-wing aircraft selected in our review were about $7 7 billion, and the average O&S cost per aircraft across all seven fleets was about $44 million, as shown in figure 33  The F/A-18E-F fleet accounted for about 40 percent of the total O&S cost, and the E-2C’s average cost per aircraft accounted for about 19 percent of the total average cost per aircraft  In addition to the contact named above, John Bumgarner (Assistant Director), Clarine Allen, Ron Aribo, Vincent Buquicchio, Amie Lesser, Richard Powelson, Steven Putansu, Matt Spiers, and Natasha Wilder made key contributions to this report  Defense Supply Chain: DOD Needs Complete Information on Single Sources of Supply to Proactively Manage the Risks  GAO-17-768  Washington, D C : September 27, 2017  Weapon Systems Management: Product Support Managers’ Perspectives on Factors Critical to Influencing Sustainment-Related Decisions  GAO-17-744R  Washington, D C : September 12, 2017  Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs  GAO-17-333SP  Washington, D C : March 30, 2017  Depot Maintenance: Executed Workload and Maintenance Operations at DOD Depots  GAO-17-82R  Washington, D C : February 3, 2017  Defense Inventory: Further Analysis and Enhanced Metrics Could Improve Service Supply and Depot Operations  GAO-16-450  Washington, D C : June 9, 2016  Weapon Systems Management: DOD Has Taken Steps to Implement Product Support Managers but Needs to Evaluate Their Effects  GAO-14-326  Washington, D C : April 29, 2014 


Report 2:  Institutions respond to the report with corrective actions that the institution will take to address the findings  When the institution has resolved all corrective actions from the audit, the audit is closed  Additionally, each quarter, PRD provides HRMD with a report that summarizes its quarterly audit findings  According to BOP officials, HRMD uses these reports to identify any agency-wide trends that need to be addressed  Our review of BOP data showed that between fiscal years 2012 and 2016, PRD conducted nearly 200 audits  For example, in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016, PRD audited five institutions’ and regional offices’ human resource management functions  During these audits, PRD identified nine deficiencies, one of which pertained to retention incentives  Specifically, it found that one audited institution did not terminate an employee’s retention incentive after the employee had relocated to another institution  To correct the deficiency, the institution cancelled the retention incentive which discontinued future disbursements  According to BOP officials, a bill was generated to recoup the overpayment from the employee  BOP institutions conduct annual operation reviews of internal functions, such as human resources  BOP officials told us that each institution conducts annual operational reviews of various internal functions, such as human resources  According to BOP’s Program Review Guidelines for Human Resource Servicing Offices, during these reviews, institutions are required to review supporting documentation for staff currently receiving an incentive to determine if the incentives are still warranted  If the initial request for the retention incentive was made over the preceding 12 months, institutions are also required to ensure that it was approved  According to BOP officials, the results of these reviews are reported to PRD through the Central Office  DOJ’s Justice Management Division (JMD) audits BOP’s human resources programs  According to BOP officials, JMD conducts audits of component-level human resources programs to determine whether BOP’s systems are compliant with DOJ policy and aligned with DOJ’s Human Capital Strategic Plan  JMD’s most recent audit of BOP’s human resources programs that included a review of BOP’s retention incentives occurred in September 2010 at BOP’s Human Resource Service Center in Grand Prairie, Texas  JMD found that in some cases BOP granted retention incentives prior to the signing of service agreements  JMD also found that BOP lacked documentation to authorize a group retention incentive for employees at its Victorville, California institution  BOP’s written response to the findings stated that JMD incorrectly applied the service agreement requirement, as service agreements were not warranted in the specific case that it identified  Additionally, BOP stated that the documents JMD identified as missing from the case files in question were kept in separate files and not required to be part of the retention incentive application  JMD agreed with BOP’s responses and in January 2013, JMD closed out the audit’s findings noting that these responses satisfied all required corrective actions  While BOP takes a number of steps to determine current workforce needs and how to fill those needs, BOP does not strategically plan for how retention incentives can be used to meet long-term human capital goals  BOP officials stated that planning for human capital needs is conducted at institutions during quarterly workforce utilization meetings or manpower salary meetings  During these meetings, executive staff at the institution discuss the current state of the institution’s workforce  According to the BOP officials, while considering attrition, hiring, and turnover rates, the executive staff decide strategies they will employ to attract and retain employees for their current needs  While officials we spoke with at four institutions have discussed retention incentives at their workforce utilization meetings, details about the content of these discussions ranged  According to these officials and our review of meeting minutes from the four institutions, discussions about retention incentives respond to each institution’s short-term staffing situation rather than address future staffing needs based on an overall strategic human capital plan  For example: USP Atwater officials told us that they review the current turnover rate, budget, projected vacancies, and use of retention incentives at annual budget development meetings  Meeting minutes reflected the following on retention incentives: “retention … still necessary to retain staff and hard-to-fill positions ” FCC Butner is a medical facility that offers retention incentives to all medical officers (all types of doctors) and nurses (practitioners, registered, etc ) at the institution  According to Butner officials, during workforce utilization meetings, Butner officials discuss recruitment and staffing trends for the institution and plans for how to address any staffing challenges  Meeting minutes we reviewed did not indicate specific discussions about the use of retention incentives  FCC Pollock executive staff discuss current institutional salary expenditures and projections and the status of vacant positions at workforce utilization meetings  While meeting minutes we reviewed indicated discussions about projected expenditures for incentive awards, the minutes did not differentiate between retention incentive awards, and other incentive awards such as recruitment or relocation incentive awards  FCI Phoenix officials stated that in their workforce utilization meetings, executive staff discuss salary projections and vacancy statuses  Meeting minutes we reviewed did not indicate specific discussions about the use of retention incentives  BOP decisions about retention incentives are currently not tied to any strategic human capital plan for how to use human capital flexibilities— such as retention incentives—to address their ongoing challenge of retaining staff in hard-to-fill positions  According to officials, retention incentives are awarded on an as-needed basis, determined by an institution’s warden, if funds are available  According to key principles for effective strategic human capital planning, such planning is an important component of an agency’s effort to develop long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff needed for an agency to achieve its goals  Specifically, senior leaders should be involved in developing, communicating, and implementing strategic human capital plans  Within an agency’s strategic human capital plan, the human capital policies, practices, and programs—for example, an agency’s retention incentive program—should clearly link to the human capital and program goals of the organization  By not having a strategic human capital plan that clearly establishes strategies that will be used to achieve specific human capital goals, BOP cannot ensure that its institutions are strategically managing their workforces in a manner that meets the agency’s human capital needs  In August 2017, BOP officials told us that they began drafting a strategic human capital operating plan that will include strategic objectives, action plans, performance objectives and measures, and evaluation/reporting requirements  Officials stated that the plan will also include planning regarding the use of human capital flexibilities, such as retention incentives  BOP officials told us that they anticipate that the strategic human capital operating plan will be a supplement to their workforce utilization meetings and that an agency-wide plan will provide a set of strategies for all institutions to consider  However, BOP could not provide documentation of the project beginning or whether it would include a strategic approach specific to retention incentives  Including retention incentives in BOP’s strategic human capital operating plan would create a roadmap for the agency and the institutions to use to move from being reactive in their current workforce needs—for example, awarding retention incentives on an ad hoc basis when funds are available—to being strategic in how retention incentives are used and to ensure that these and other flexibilities help the agency achieve its long-term workforce goals  From fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016, BOP spent more than $59 million on retention incentives but has not established any measures to evaluate their effectiveness  According to officials, BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of its use of retention incentives because BOP officials consider a retention incentive successful if an employee does not leave the agency  However, BOP also uses other human capital flexibilities along with retention incentives to help retain staff  For example, BOP uses physician and dental comparability allowances—additional pay to a physician or dentist who enters into an agreement for a specified period of service—to help retain these medical personnel  According to officials, it would otherwise be difficult to compete with private sector salaries without the use of all available incentives  However, BOP has not studied whether or how retention incentives have contributed to employees’ retention in relation to other incentives such as physician and dental comparability allowances  According to our work on strategic human capital management and OPM’s guidance, it is crucial for organizations to evaluate the success of their human capital strategies, such as the use of retention incentives  In measuring the performance of these strategies and their contribution to key programmatic results, agencies can make adjustments, if necessary  For example, agencies can use evaluation results to make targeted investments in certain human capital strategies—such as the use of retention incentives—creating a cycle of strategic workforce management, where evaluation informs planning, planning dictates strategies, and strategies are evaluated for effectiveness  While BOP uses retention incentives to address critical skills gaps—such as with medical professionals—evaluating the effectiveness of retention incentives would help BOP determine whether and how retention incentives, as well as other human capital flexibilities, contribute to an employee’s continued employment at BOP or if adjustments to BOP retention strategies must be made for improved results  BOP officials agreed that evaluating the effectiveness of retention incentives would help them be more strategic about their human capital needs and spending on incentives  By including and implementing such an evaluation in its upcoming strategic human capital operating plan, BOP could better determine if it is making maximum use of its funds to retain the necessary qualified personnel or if changes must be made to most effectively retain its staff  As the largest employer within DOJ with some staff working in remote locations and undesirable conditions, BOP relies on a number of available flexibilities, including retention incentives, to help retain its employees  However, BOP currently lacks a strategic approach for using and evaluating retention incentives to address human capital goals  Given BOP’s ongoing staffing challenges, for example, retaining staff in hard-to- fill medical positions, developing a plan that includes a thoughtful blueprint for using retention incentives could help BOP better anticipate and address staffing needs  Moreover, evaluating its use of retention incentives could help BOP determine whether these incentives are effective or whether adjustments are needed to better retain its employees  By using evaluation results to inform planning, and planning to inform how retention incentives are used, BOP would be better positioned to achieve its long-term human capital goals and address its critical staffing needs  We are making two recommendations to BOP: 1  The Director of BOP should include in the forthcoming strategic human capital operating plan, 1) human capital goals and 2) strategies on how human capital flexibilities—including retention incentives—will be used to meet these goals  (Recommendation 1) 2  The Director of BOP should evaluate the effectiveness of BOP’s use of retention incentives to help determine whether the incentives have helped BOP achieve its human capital goals or if adjustments in retention incentives are needed  (Recommendation 2) We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOJ  In an email received November 15, 2017, the DOJ liaison stated that DOJ concurred with our recommendations  The Department did not provide official written comments to include in our report, but did provide written technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Attorney General and the Director of BOP  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in Appendix III  This report examines (1) how BOP has used its authority to pay retention incentives; (2) what internal controls are in place for the use of retention incentives; and (3) the extent to which BOP plans for and evaluates the use of retention incentives  To determine how BOP has used its authority to pay retention incentives, we reviewed BOP’s July 2012 report on its use of recruitment, relocation, and retention (3R) incentives  We then obtained underlying retention incentive expenditure data from DOJ’s Justice Management Division because it serves as the focal point for performance and financial information for all Department of Justice components and employees, including BOP  In particular, we obtained employee-level retention incentive payroll data for fiscal years 2012 through 2016  We selected this time period because it includes the most recent five complete fiscal years for which data were available and because we believe five years is sufficient time to identify trends in BOP’s retention incentive expenditures  We analyzed and aggregated the employee-level data by institution, occupation, and employee grade level  To identify trends, we compared per fiscal year expenditures across the various categories of occupations and locations across the five years  Additionally, we categorized institutions by BOP region, institutions that use group retention incentives, and institutions that use individual retention incentives  We also categorized occupations as medical professionals, correctional officers, and all other occupations and compared aggregate retention incentive expenditures for the different groups  Using information from BOP’s website and testimonial evidence from BOP officials on its health care system, for the purposes of this report, we defined medical professionals as BOP employees in occupations that provide medical, dental, and mental health care services and who do not solely provide these services in an administrative function  For the purposes of our analyses, medical professionals are dentists, dental assistants and hygienists, diagnostic radiological technologists, health aid and technicians, medical doctors (including psychiatrists), medical technologists, nurses, pharmacists, pharmacy technicians, physician assistants, and practical nurses and psychologists  To assess the employee-level retention incentive payroll data’s reliability, we obtained and analyzed documentation on systems’ capabilities and data control, interviewed data users and managers responsible for maintaining data, conducted checks for completeness and logical consistency, and compared the employee-level data to aggregated institution-level retention incentive expenditure data from BOP’s Financial Management Information System  We found the employee-level data to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this report  Additionally for this objective, we reviewed documents such as the DOJ’s Financial Management Information System Sub-Object Classification Code Guide and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families to respectively identify the system codes used to track retention incentives expenditures and to identify the names for each occupational series code in the datasets  We also interviewed BOP Human Resource Management headquarters officials to obtain information on the primary purposes for BOP’s use of retention incentives and their views on identified retention incentive expenditures trends  We also interviewed U S  Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Public Health Service (PHS) officials to better understand how BOP and PHS manage costs, including retention incentive expenditures, for PHS staff assigned to BOP  BOP partners with PHS to acquire medical staff to provide medical care for BOP’s inmate population  BOP reimburses PHS for the costs of compensation and benefits—including retention incentive payments, if applicable—for PHS staff assigned to BOP  PHS has final approval authority for retention incentives paid to PHS staff assigned to BOP facilities  Furthermore, we obtained aggregated retention incentive expenditure data from PHS on the total amount of funds BOP reimbursed PHS for fiscal years 2012 through 2016  For the reliability of PHS’s data, we reviewed the system’s data fields to check that the appropriate fields were used to provide data and interviewed data users and managers to discuss how expenditures are recorded and maintained  We found the PHS data to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this report  To identify and describe the internal controls that BOP has in place related to retention incentives, we obtained and analyzed documentation regarding BOP requirements and guidance for the use of retention incentives  We also interviewed officials from BOP’s Central Office who are responsible for the administration, management, and oversight of BOP’s human capital management systems, including retention incentives  We focused on the management and administrative controls used by BOP to review, approve, re-certify, and monitor retention incentives  Additionally, we interviewed the warden and human capital officers at 4 of the 122 institutions to obtain illustrative examples regarding the internal controls in place at these institutions to ensure the proper disbursement of retention incentives  We interviewed BOP officials at Federal Correctional Complex Pollock in Pollock, LA; Federal Correctional Complex Butner in Butner, NC; United States Penitentiary, Atwater in Atwater, CA and Federal Correctional Institution Phoenix, in Phoenix, AZ  These institutions were selected to ensure variation in the number and types of employees receiving retention incentives, BOP region, and security-level  Although the information we obtained from the interviews with officials at these four institutions cannot be generalized to other BOP institutions, these interviews provided important insights and perspectives about the use of retention incentives at BOP institutions  We also reviewed a non-generalizable random sample of 40 retention incentive application packet case files to determine the extent to which these files contained documentation on the internal control activities in place to monitor the application, approval, and funds disbursement processes of BOP’s retention incentive program  To identify our sample, we used employee-level expenditure data to randomly select 40 application files from the universe of BOP employees who received retention incentives from fiscal years 2014 through 2016  Each application file was reviewed by two GAO analysts who each assessed the extent to which each application contained the appropriate justification, approval signatures, and other documentation such as an application checklist and whether the application was an initial or continuation application  To determine the extent to which BOP plans for and evaluates the use of retention incentives, we interviewed BOP officials regarding their experiences with retention incentives, how they use retention incentives to strategically manage their workforce needs, how the agency evaluates the effectiveness of retention incentives, and how retention incentives contribute to BOP’s broader human capital goals  We then compared these efforts to our work on strategic human capital planning, specifically in terms of planning for and evaluating the use of human capital flexibilities  Additionally, we interviewed the warden and human capital officers at four BOP institutions mentioned above to obtain illustrative examples of how workforce planning occurs at these institutions  We also reviewed the DOJ’s Office of Inspector General Report 16-02 “Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Medical Staffing Challenges” (March 2016) and our past work to better understand the challenges that BOP faces in retaining medical professionals and other staff  Table 2 provides the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) fiscal year 2016 retention incentive expenditures by various occupations and groups of occupations, such as medical professionals, correctional officers, and other occupations  A range of occupations are reflected in the table primarily as a result of four California institutions—United States Penitentiary (USP) Atwater, Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Herlong, FCI Mendota, and Federal Correctional Complex Victorville—providing retention incentives to all employees at General Schedule grades level 12 and below and those in the Federal Wage System  In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Locke (Assistant Director) and Meghan Squires (Analyst-in-Charge) managed the work  Also, David Alexander, Renee Caputo, Willie Commons III, Jamarla Edwards, Robert Goldenkoff, Chelsa Gurkin, Eric Hauswirth, Janice Latimer, Lerone Reid, Rachel Stoiko, and Adam Vogt made significant contributions to this report 

ground_truth: BOP is the largest employer within DOJ and is responsible for the care and custody of an inmate population of about 186,000. BOP has faced challenges retaining staff at correctional facilities, although it has used retention incentives, along with other human capital flexibilities. GAO was asked to review BOP's use of retention incentives. This report addresses: (1) how BOP used its authority to pay retention incentives; (2) internal controls BOP has in place for the use of retention incentives; and (3) the extent to which BOP plans for and evaluates the use of retention incentives. GAO obtained employee-level retention incentive expenditure data from DOJ's Justice Management Division for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. GAO also reviewed agency documentation, such as policy statements and 40 randomly selected retention incentive application packet case files from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. GAO also interviewed officials from BOP's Central Office and four correctional facilities that use retention incentives, selected to reflect variation in the number and types of employees receiving retention incentives, BOP regions, and BOP institution security levels. From fiscal years 2012 to 2016, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) total retention incentive expenditures generally increased from $10.7 to $14.0 million and the number of employees receiving retention incentives increased from 2,024 to 2,460. During those five years, BOP spent more than 97 percent of its total retention incentive expenditures on employees at four BOP institutions in California and for medical professionals nationwide. Further, total retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals increased by an average of 21 percent per year (see figure). According to BOP officials, BOP uses retention incentives, for example, to supplement BOP's medical professionals' salaries which are generally lower than private sector salaries. BOP has a variety of internal controls in place throughout the retention incentive process that help ensure retention incentive applications and approvals meet requirements. For example, each application goes through multiple levels of review to verify its accuracy and completeness. BOP takes steps to determine workforce needs and how to fill those needs, but has not strategically planned for and evaluated its use of retention incentives. According to BOP, planning for human capital needs is conducted at institutions during quarterly meetings, but discussions about these incentives respond to short-term staffing situations rather than proactively addressing future staffing needs. Including human capital goals and strategies in BOP's human capital plan would create a roadmap so the agency could move from being reactive to its current workforce needs to being strategic in trying to achieve its long-term workforce goals. Additionally BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of its use of retention incentives in retaining staff. As a result, BOP does not know whether retention incentives have contributed to employees' retention in relation to other incentives used by BOP. Consistent with key principles for strategic human capital planning, planning for and evaluating the use of retention incentives could help BOP better determine if these incentives are an efficient and effective means by which to retain staff. GAO recommends that BOP (1) include human capital goals and how retention incentives will be used to achieve these goals in its human capital plan; and (2) evaluate the use of retention incentives. BOP concurred with GAO's recommendations.