prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: The U S  Constitution does not clearly specify how military bases should be managed  Article II, Section 2, appoints the President as the commander-in-chief, with the implied power to deploy, and redeploy, the armed forces as necessary for national defense  In common practice, this has included the authority to create and close military installations needed to accommodate and train personnel under the President's command  However, Article I, Section 8, charges Congress with the responsibility to raise armies, maintain a Navy, and regulate the militia  Through annual authorization and appropriation legislation, Congress legislates policy for managing DOD real property assets and funds the construction, maintenance, operation, and disposal of military infrastructure  Throughout most of American history, the President has exercised broad, relatively unchallenged authority for opening, closing, or realigning military installations  Congress largely deferred to the Executive branch primarily because the President, as commander-in-chief, is empowered with the responsibility of deploying military forces  Prompted by large-scale closures of World War II era infrastructure during the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted legislation in 1977 that effectively limited the Executive branch's ability to close or realign major military installations  The new statute, later codified as 10 U S C  2687 (Section 612 of the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1978, P L  95-82 ), generally required DOD to conduct comprehensive and lengthy assessments of major basing decisions as part of a congressional report-and-wait process  These assessments could be challenged in court on environmental grounds or on questions related to their sufficiency, further lengthening delays  The new legislation effectively halted DOD's ability to close or realign domestic bases of significant size  In the decade that followed the passage of 10 U S C  2687, congressional pressure grew to accommodate DOD basing priorities  By 1988, ongoing negotiations between the Secretary of Defense and the House and Senate Armed Service Committees led to new legislation ( P L  100-526 ) that authorized a limited number of base closures based on the oversight of an independent panel  Though later modified, the effort marked the beginning of the first Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, which was intended to insulate base closings from considerations such as favoritism or other political interference  Widely considered a success, the 1988 BRAC legislation was taken up again and modified in succeeding BRAC rounds; first in 1991, 1993, and 1995; and again in 2005  The modern BRAC process refers to a temporary authority that amends the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 ( P L  101-510 ), hereinafter referred to as the Base Closure Act , and features a framework of elements that entrusts an independent commission with certifying closure and realignment recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense  In general, the process has required the Secretary to submit a list of military installations recommended for closure or realignment to an independent, bipartisan BRAC commission  After analyzing the Secretary's recommendations, the commission may accept, reject, or modify the list  Upon completing its review, the commission forwards its final findings and recommendations to the President  Upon acceptance of commission's recommendations, the President then submits them to Congress  If the President does not submit the recommendations to Congress within the timeframe required under the Base Closure Act, the BRAC process is terminated  Upon receipt of the report from the President, Congress has the opportunity to disapprove of the recommendations in toto through the enactment of a joint resolution  The hallmarks of this framework include establishment of an independent commission whose members are appointed by the President, in consultation with congressional leadership (and the advice and consent of the Senate); reliance on objective and uniform criteria for evaluating basing recommendations; GAO review and certification of DOD data; deliberations that include open hearings, solicitation of feedback, installation visits, and data available for public review; requirement that the commission's final list of closure and realignment actions be accepted or rejected in its entirety; and presidential and congressional off-ramps that would terminate the BRAC process when certain conditions are not met  The timeline to complete an entire BRAC round has varied; however, the most recent one conducted in 2005 took approximately 10 years, from authorization to completion (end of the six-year BRAC implementation period)  Key milestones of a typical BRAC timeline include DOD force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and analysis of options (up to four years); nomination and confirmation of BRAC commissioners; DOD submission of BRAC recommendations (and associated reports) to the commission; commission deliberations (typically four months); final report sent to the President for approval; 45-day deadline for Congress to reject recommendations in their entirety (Joint Resolution of Disapproval) or allow implementation to begin; DOD implementation (two years to begin; six years to complete); and DOD disposal of real property (indeterminate)  BRAC is often characterized as a cost efficiency measure that enables DOD to more effectively manage its real property assets by allowing it to shed excess infrastructure, but historically, potential costs and savings have been a consideration that have ranked below military value  No BRAC round has established cost savings targets, floors, or ceilings  During BRAC rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to develop and report a set of objective selection criteria that would be used for identifying bases for closure and realignment  For the 2005 round, Congress amended the BRAC statute to require the Secretary to regard military value (defined below) as the primary consideration  Other factors, such as potential costs and savings, were explicitly categorized as lower priority  Because the amended legislative language reflected longstanding DOD policy, the 2005 BRAC criteria appear almost identical when compared with previous versions, with additional language added for emphasis or included for explanatory examples  The excerpt below indicates the 2005 BRAC selection criteria  Emphasized text (in italics) represents new language not included as part of the 1995 criteria  SEC  2913  SELECTION CRITERIA FOR 2005 ROUND  (a) FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA —The final criteria to be used by the Secretary in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005 shall be the military value and other criteria specified in subsections (b) and (c)  (b) MILITARY VALUE CRITERIA —The military value criteria are as follows: (1) The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness  (2) The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations  (3) The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training  (4) The cost of operations and the manpower implications  (c)  OTHER CRITERIA —The other criteria that the Secretary shall use in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005 are as follows: (1) The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs  (2) The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations  (3) The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel  (4) The environmental impact , including the impact of costs related to potential environ mental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities  The transfer and disposal of DOD real property made available following the implementation of a BRAC round is a complex process that may extend for years beyond the initial six-year implementation window  Disposal may be delayed or otherwise affected by the participation of local and state communities and the degree to which environmental remediation by federal authorities is necessary  The graph below shows the total acreage from previous BRAC rounds yet to be disposed  The Base Closure Act authorizes a variety of conveyance mechanisms not otherwise available for the transfer and disposal of federal property, a process typically performed by the General Services Administration (GSA)  Under a BRAC, conveyance authority is delegated from GSA, through the Secretary of Defense to the various military departments, which receive special approval to supersede GSA regulations with BRAC specific regulations  The primary difference between the routine disposal of federal property and real property conveyed under a BRAC is the role of local communities  Under normal (non-BRAC) circumstances, the General Services Administration (GSA) is directly responsible for disposing of any surplus federal real property, which includes defense property  A military department in possession would, for example, declare property as excess to its needs and turn over the administration of a site to the GSA  The GSA would then follow a number of consecutive steps for disposal of federal property laid out in statute  It would first offer the excess property to other federal agencies  If none expressed an interest, the excess property would be declared surplus   The GSA would then offer the surplus property to state or local governments and non-profits that might use it for a public benefit ( public benefit conveyance) , such as a homeless shelter or medical center  Finally, if the property has neither been transferred nor conveyed in the previous steps, the surplus property would be offered for sale to the public  Under a BRAC, local communities can significantly affect the BRAC property transfer and disposal decisions, which are managed by the Secretary of the responsible military department  Once approved for closure, communities around an installation typically organize a Local Redevelopment Authority (LRA) for the purpose of creating and executing a redevelopment plan for the property  While the plan is not binding on DOD, the Department has been statutorily directed to give the plan considerable weight  DOD makes economic development grants and technical support available through its Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to assist LRAs with the process  In recent BRAC rounds, Congress has authorized a special transfer authority that has permitted DOD to transfer title to property at less than fair market value, or even at no cost, if the LRA agrees to certain conditions designed to create employment at the former defense facility  This has been referred to as an Economic Development Conveyance (EDC)  DOD has asserted that savings generated from BRAC are generally the result of avoiding the cost of retaining and operating unneeded infrastructure, with upfront costs eventually offset by annual savings  Between FY2012 and FY2018, the Department consistently argued for a new BRAC, asserting that "absent another BRAC round, the Department will continue to operate some of its installations sub-optimally as other efficiency measures, changing force structure, and technology reduce the number of missions and personnel " Emphasizing the potential cost savings, DOD has suggested a new "efficiency-focused BRAC" could save the Department billions of dollars annually: "Savings from BRAC rounds are real and substantial  The last five BRAC rounds are collectively saving the Department $12B annually  A new efficiency-focused BRAC could save the Department an additional ~$2B annually (based on the '93/'95 rounds) " In its ongoing series of BRAC-related reports, the GAO has noted the unreliability of DOD cost savings estimates  In 2013, GAO concluded that, though the Department had achieved annual recurring savings as the result of the 2005 round, visibility into the outcome has been limited due to missing and inconsistent recordkeeping  Similar studies have raised questions about the data DOD has used to predict and monitor BRAC effectiveness, long-term savings, and outcomes  For example "    the services did not develop baseline operating costs before implementing the BRAC recommendations, which would have enabled it to determine whether savings were achieved " "    We found that DOD's process for providing the BRAC commission with cost and savings estimates was hindered by underestimating recommendation-specific requirements and that DOD did not fully anticipate information technology requirements for many of the recommendations " "The department cannot provide documentation to show to what extent it reduced plant replacement value or vacated leased space as it reported in May 2005 that it was intended to do     In addition, DOD bundled multiple closures     thus limiting visibility into the estimated costs and savings for individual closures and realignments " "    DOD has not reported to Congress how the cleanup of emerging contaminants, especially certain perfluorinated compounds, at installations closed under BRAC will significantly increase the estimated (BRAC) cleanup costs " "    We found that OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) did not have a fully developed method for accurately collecting information on costs, savings, and efficiencies achieved specifically from joint basing, and that OSD had not developed a plan to guide joint bases in achieving cost savings and efficiencies    " "    DOD has not committed to take action on some of our recommendations related to implementing any future BRAC rounds, such as improving DOD's ability to estimate potential liabilities, and savings to achieve desired outcomes " In its final report to the President, the 2005 BRAC commission noted DOD's initial estimate of savings had been "vastly overestimated," and suggested that the Department had claimed savings that were "not truly savings in the commonly understood sense of the term " Reflecting on the quality of cost estimates and savings associated with 2005 BRAC round, Anthony Principi, Chairman of the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, has suggested opportunities exist for the DOD to improve its analysis by adopting more consistent accounting practices and inclusive metrics: To start, DoD has to do a better job estimating the true cost of any closure or realignment     Second, the cost of base realignment actions (COBRA) accounting procedure, used by DoD as a basis of comparison among scenarios, should include cost estimates for environmental restoration not just "clean to current use" standards  In addition, COBRA or some other cost evaluation process should also include transportation and infrastructure costs and burden sharing with the federal government     In addition to refining DOD accounting metrics, some observers have suggested congressional visibility into BRAC cost and long-term effectiveness could be improved by amending the process to require the Department to disclose how closure and realignment recommendations meet expected cost saving and reduced infrastructure targets  A BRAC process is the chief means by which DOD disposes of excess infrastructure  Each year between 2013 and 2017, the Department requested a new BRAC round as a means of realizing greater efficiency and reducing excess infrastructure  It has also attempted to allay concerns related to the 2005 BRAC experience - marked by unexpectedly high costs and complexity - by emphasizing cost savings and efficiencies rather than force transformation  In April 2016, DOD submitted to the House Armed Services Committee an I nfrastructure C apacity R eport (interim version) that assessed 22% of the Department's base infrastructure excess to its needs  The methodology used in the report—required by Section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2016 (P L
Report 2:  According to officials from the 11 stakeholder organizations we interviewed—which represent authorized collectors and long-term care facilities—several factors may explain why relatively few pharmacies and other eligible entities have chosen to become authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs  These factors include the associated costs of participating, uncertainty over proper implementation, and participation in other, similar efforts for disposing of unused prescription drugs  Costs: Stakeholders said that the costs associated with purchasing, installing, and managing the disposal bins is a factor that explains the relatively low rate of participation  One stakeholder told us that many eligible entities may decide that the benefit of participating does not outweigh the costs associated with doing so  Specifically, stakeholders told us that the major costs associated with participating include the one-time cost of purchasing and installing a disposal bin; the ongoing costs to train personnel to manage the bins; and the cost of contracting with a reverse distributor to periodically dispose of the bin’s inner liner and contents  Stakeholders gave varying examples of the specific costs associated with these investments  For example, one stakeholder estimated the yearly costs of maintaining a disposal bin ranged from $500 to $600 per location; another stakeholder said that the cost is thousands of dollars per location per year, but did not provide a specific estimate  These stakeholders added that costs can increase if the disposal bins fill more quickly and need to be emptied more often than expected  For their part, officials from the reverse distributor stakeholders we interviewed cited incinerating hazardous waste, the availability of incinerators, and the cost of personnel as factors that increase the cost of their services for authorized collectors  One reverse distributor stakeholder told us that there are not many incinerators available, requiring them to travel long distances to incinerate collected waste  The other reverse distributor stakeholder added that DEA’s requirement that a second employee be present during the transportation and disposal increases the cost of their services  While some stakeholders speculated that costs are a reason for low participation, a few stakeholders told us that the benefits are worth the costs  In fact, two stakeholders we spoke with told us that the benefit to the communities was so important that they decided to provide funding to retail pharmacies, alleviating an individual pharmacy’s concern about the cost of installing and maintaining the disposal bins  We found that as of April 2017, over a quarter of the 2,233 authorized collectors using disposal bins received external funding to pay for the costs associated with installing and maintaining the disposal bins  In addition, stakeholders told us that some localities have enacted laws known as extended producer responsibility ordinances, which require that pharmaceutical manufacturers pay for certain costs associated with drug disposal  When asked about the costs associated with operating disposal bins, DEA officials told us that addressing cost issues with eligible participants falls outside of their responsibilities  Uncertainty: Stakeholders also told us that uncertainty regarding how to comply with aspects of DEA’s regulations for prescription drug disposal bins affected their decisions to participate  One stakeholder added that many eligible entities decide not to participate because uncertainties over participation requirements could result in inadvertent non-compliance with DEA’s regulations  As an example of their uncertainty over some of the requirements governing the disposal bins, officials from both of the reverse distributor stakeholders we interviewed cited DEA’s non-retrievable standard for destruction of the inner liners of the bins  DEA requires that the method of destruction be sufficient to render all controlled substances non- retrievable, meaning that the physical and chemical conditions of the controlled substances must be permanently altered and unusable in order to prevent diversion for illicit purposes  Both reverse distributor stakeholders told us that they are uncertain about whether certain disposal methods meet this standard, and they said that the agency has not provided further guidance on how reverse distributors can meet this requirement  DEA officials told us that the agency responds to questions about whether a specific method of destruction meets the non-retrievable standard by telling the registrant to test the remnants after destruction, to see if any components of the controlled substance are still present  In its summary of the regulations implementing the Disposal Act, DEA stated that in order to allow for the development of various methods of destruction, the agency did not require a specific method of destruction as long as the desired result is achieved  However, DEA officials stated that to their knowledge, incineration is the only method known to meet the non-retrievable standard to date, but the officials hoped other methods will be developed in the future  When asked about the guidance they provide to authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs or those eligible to become authorized collectors, DEA officials told us that they post frequently-asked questions on their website, routinely answer questions from participants and others, and give training presentations at conferences that include information on the disposal bins  In our prior work, we found problems with DEA’s communication and guidance to stakeholders  In 2015, we recommended that DEA identify and implement cost-effective means for communicating regularly with pharmacies and other entities authorized to handle controlled substances  DEA agreed with the recommendation, and officials told us that, starting in August 2017, these entities can subscribe to DEA’s website to receive notifications when it is updated with new guidance  Stakeholders also noted that some DEA requirements related to disposal bins may conflict with other state and federal requirements governing the transportation and disposal of hazardous waste, which includes some controlled substances  For example, the two reverse distributor stakeholders told us that some incinerator permits issued by states require that hazardous waste be examined before incineration; however, DEA requirements do not allow the contents of the liners to be examined, even at the time of incineration  To address the incinerator permit requirements, one reverse distributor told us that they use the Environmental Protection Agency’s hazardous waste household exemption, which treats the liners as household waste and thereby allows incinerator facilities to destroy the liners without examining the contents or violating their state permit  In addition, some stakeholders raised concerns that DEA’s regulations may conflict with other federal regulations  For instance, one stakeholder noted that they recently learned that transporting the disposal bin’s inner liners could violate Department of Transportation regulations  DEA officials told us that they were aware of this, explaining that the conflict was between DEA’s requirement that controlled substances be transported in liners and the Department of Transportation’s requirement that this type of waste be transported in sturdy containers  According to DEA officials, this conflict has been resolved by the Department of Transportation allowing reverse distributors to place the liners inside sturdy containers kept on trucks  Participation in or Availability of Similar Efforts: Stakeholders said that some pharmacies and other eligible entities were already participating in other, similar efforts that allow for the safe disposal of controlled substances, and therefore they did not want to invest additional resources into participating as authorized collectors using disposal bins  For example, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services has an established process that long-term care facilities use to dispose of their unused controlled substances  As a result, all of the long-term care stakeholders told us that long-term care facilities may choose not to partner with pharmacies interested in placing disposal bins within their facilities because it adds significant cost and effort without any additional benefit  Furthermore, pharmacy stakeholders noted that because of the availability of other prescription drug collection efforts in their communities, they did not think that maintaining a disposal bin at their locations was needed  For example, two of the stakeholders explained that local law enforcement precincts already had a similar type of disposal bin in place to collect unused prescription drugs  DEA officials told us that they were aware of other options for the public and entities such as long-term care facilities that are not registered as authorized collectors to dispose of controlled substances  The officials also indicated that the availability of disposal options at law enforcement agencies contributes to the low participation rates among pharmacies as authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs  We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Justice for comment  DEA, part of the Department of Justice, provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the Attorney General of the United States and the Administrator of DEA  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or draperd@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the contact name above, Elizabeth H  Curda (Director), Will Simerl (Assistant Director), Kathryn Richter (Analyst-In-Charge), Nick Bartine, Giselle Hicks, Jessica Lin, and Emily Wilson made key contributions to this report  Also contributing were Muriel Brown and Krister Friday 

ground_truth: The federal government owns roughly 640 million acres, heavily concentrated in 12 western states. Four agencies—the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture—administer about 95% of those lands. The extent to which each of these four federal agencies have authority to acquire and dispose of land varies considerably. The BLM has relatively broad authority for both acquisitions and disposals under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). The agency also has other authorities for disposing of land, including two laws that allow the agency to retain the proceeds for subsequent land acquisition, among other purposes, and a law that allows transfers to governmental units and other entities for public purposes. By contrast, the NPS has no general authority to acquire land to create new park units or to dispose of park lands. The FS authority to acquire lands is mostly limited to lands within or contiguous to the boundaries of a national forest. The agency has various authorities to dispose of land, but they are relatively constrained and infrequently used. The FWS has various authorities to acquire lands but no general authority to dispose of its lands. The agency frequently uses acquisition authority under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929 because of the availability of funding through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund. The nature of the acquisition and disposal authorities of the four federal agencies also varies. In general, the acquisition authorities are designed to allow the four agencies to bring into federal ownership lands that many contend could benefit from federal management. Disposal authorities generally are designed to allow agencies to convey land that is no longer needed for a federal purpose or that might be chiefly valuable for another purpose. Some of the authorities specify particular circumstances where they can be used, such as the conveyance of FS land for educational purposes and the disposal of BLM land for recreation and public purposes. Congress often faces questions on the adequacy of existing acquisition and disposal authorities; the nature, extent, and location of their use; and the extent of federal land ownership overall. The current acquisition and disposal authorities form the backdrop for consideration of measures to establish, modify, or eliminate authorities, or to provide for the acquisition or disposal of particular lands. In some cases, Congress enacts bills to provide authority to acquire or dispose of particular parcels where no standing authority exists and, in other cases, to direct or facilitate land transactions. Congress also addresses acquisition and disposal policy in the context of debates on the role and goals of the federal government in owning and managing land generally, and it has considered broader measures to dispose of lands or to promote acquisition. Other issues for Congress pertain to the sources and levels of funds for land acquisition. The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) is the primary source of funding for land acquisition. Congress has considered diverse measures related to the LWCF, such as legislation to make LWCF funding permanent and bills to direct LWCF monies to additional, nonacquisition purposes. Additionally, the FWS has the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, an account with mandatory spending authority supported by revenue from three sources. The BLM also has mandatory spending authorities that allow the proceeds from land sales to be used for land acquisition, among other purposes.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The federal government owns roughly 640 million acres, more than a quarter of the land in the United States  These lands are heavily concentrated in 12 western states (including Alaska), where t he federal government owns roughly half of the overall land area  Four federal agencies—the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM), all in the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the U S  Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture—administer about 95% of those lands  No single law provides authority for these four agencies to acquire and/or disposal of lands  Rather, Congress provided various acquisition and disposal authorities through laws enacted over more than a century  This report describes the primary authorities of the four agencies  The extent to which each of the agencies has authority to acquire and dispose of land, and the nature of the authorities, varies considerably  Some of the agencies have relatively broad authority to acquire and/or dispose of land  Most notably, the BLM has relatively broad authority for both acquisitions and disposals  By contrast, the NPS has no general authority to acquire land to create new park units or to dispose of park lands  The extent of the acquisition and disposal authorities for the FS and the FWS are not nearly as broad as the BLM's but not nearly as restrictive as the NPS's  The FS authority to acquire lands is mostly limited to lands within or contiguous to the boundaries of a national forest  The agency has various authorities to dispose of land, but they are relatively constrained and infrequently used  The FWS has various authorities to acquire lands but no general authority to dispose of its lands  The acquisition authorities differ as to the circumstances in which they apply, and the disposal authorities likewise differ as to their purposes  Thus, where a specific acquisition or disposal by an agency is contemplated, the particular authority at issue should be consulted  In general, the acquisition authorities are designed to allow federal agencies to acquire lands that could be viewed as benefitting from federal management  Among other circumstances, acquisition might be authorized to bring inholdings or lands adjacent to federal lands into federal ownership to improve or simplify management of federal lands  Acquisitions also might be authorized to conserve species, protect natural and cultural resources, and increase opportunities for recreation  The disposal authorities generally are designed to allow federal agencies to dispose of land that is no longer required for a federal purpose, might be inefficient to manage, or might be chiefly valuable for another purpose  For instance, disposal might be authorized to allow lands to be used for agriculture, community development, mineral extraction, or educational purposes  Agencies also acquire and dispose of federal land in exchanges  Exchanges are not discussed separately in this report, as often the authorities to acquire and dispose of lands also apply to land exchange  However, there are provisions of law particularly applicable to exchanges  The exchange authorities for the NPS and the FWS are relatively narrow  The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA; 43 U S C  §§1701-1781) provides broader exchange authority and is the main authority governing exchanges by the BLM and the FS  Congress often faces questions on the adequacy of existing acquisition and disposal authorities; the nature, extent, and location of their use; the extent of federal land ownership overall; and the sources and levels of land acquisition funds, among other issues  The suitability of the acquisition and disposal authorities, and the extent and circumstances of their use by the agencies, forms the backdrop for congressional consideration of measures to establish, modify, or eliminate the use of authorities  With regard to the establishment of new authorities, for instance, some 115 th Congress proposals would authorize states to exchange land grant parcels for federal lands  Other measures would authorize the BLM and FS to convey small tracts to adjacent landowners and to govern the use of proceeds from these conveyances  Proposals to modify authorities include measures in the 115 th Congress to reauthorize and amend BLM authority to sell or exchange land under the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act (FLTFA; 43 U S C  §§2301 et seq ), as well as bills to amend the Small Tracts Act (16 U S C  §521e) regarding the type and value of FS lands that can be disposed of and the use of related proceeds  Among the provisions to eliminate the use of authorities are those to prevent the disposal of federal land under the General Mining Law of 1872, which have been contained in annual Interior appropriations laws since FY1995  In addition, Congress frequently considers legislation authorizing and governing the acquisition or disposal of specific parcels  For example, Title XXX of P L  113-291 contained various provisions to authorize the acquisition and/or disposal of land  Congress may consider such legislation to provide an agency with acquisition or disposal authority in a particular instance because it is lacking  In other cases, Congress directs a particular acquisition or disposal to facilitate the action  For instance, the legislation may seek to direct an acquisition based on Congress's assessment of public needs and priorities  It may expedite the process for acquiring a parcel of land, such as by limiting the assessments and evaluations that ordinarily would be required under law  The legislation also might authorize actions not ordinarily permitted, such as the conveyance of land at reduced or no cost rather than at fair market value  Congress also addresses acquisition and disposal policy in the context of deliberations on the role and goals of the federal government in owning and managing land generally  The extent to which the federal government should own land remains controversial  Many westerners contend that there is excessive federal influence over their lives and economies and that the federal government should divest itself of many lands  Many others support the policy of retaining lands in federal ownership on behalf of the public and sometimes advocate adding more lands to enhance protection  Recent Congresses considered diverse bills pertaining to the extent of federal land ownership  Among others, 115 th Congress measures would authorize or direct the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to offer to sell a certain percentage of land in each of several fiscal years  Other bills provide that where a land management agency acquires land, an equal number of acres is to be offered for sale  Another set of issues pertains to the sources and levels of funds for land acquisition  The principal financing mechanism for federal land acquisition is discretionary appropriations under the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF)  Provisions of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 (LWCF Act; 54 U S C  §§200301 et seq ) had provided for $900 million in specified revenues to be deposited in the LWCF annually  These provisions expired September 30, 2018  Each year, Congress determines the level of appropriations from the LWCF for federal land acquisition  Total appropriations for land acquisition and the amount provided to each of the federal land management agencies have varied substantially since the program's origin in 1965  In the 115 th Congress, some measures propose permanent reauthorization of the LWCF and/or mandatory appropriations at the authorized level  Advocates of such bills typically seek stable, predictable funding to promote a strong federal role in acquiring and managing sensitive resources  Other measures would direct a portion of funding to particular purposes, such as acquisitions in areas with restricted access for fishing, hunting, and other types of recreation  Still other proposals would allow LWCF to be used for a broader array of purposes, including nonacquisition purposes, due to concerns about the extent of federal land ownership and the availability of funding for other federal activities  Additional sources of funding are available for some agencies or under certain authorities  For instance, the FWS has a mandatory source of funds for land acquisition through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, as discussed below  As another example, the BLM also has mandatory spending authorities that allow the agency to keep the proceeds of land sales and use these proceeds for subsequent acquisitions and other purposes  These authorities are discussed below  The application of mandatory spending authorities, including the uses of the proceeds, has been the subject of congressional debate  As noted above, various laws authorizing and governing specific land acquisitions have been enacted  In addition, the four federal land management agencies have different standing authorities for acquiring lands  In general, all four agencies are authorized to accept land as gifts and bequests  In addition, each generally is authorized to use eminent domain —taking private property, through condemnation, for public use—while compensating the landowner  However, this practice is controversial, and it is rarely used by the land management agencies  The primary land acquisition authorities are described below for each of the four federal land management agencies  In general, the agencies are presented in the order of the breadth of their authorities, with the NPS (the narrowest authorities) first and the BLM (the broadest authorities) last  The NPS does not have standing authority to acquire lands for new or existing units of the National Park System, except in limited circumstances  Rather, most units have been created by Congress, and the law creating a park unit typically includes specific authority for the NPS to acquire nonfederal inholdings within the identified boundaries of that park  The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to make certain boundary adjustments of park units for "proper preservation, protection, interpretation, or management" and to acquire the nonfederal lands within the adjusted boundary, under specified provisions and conditions (54 U S C  §100506(c))  Some of these conditions have been interpreted to apply particularly to boundary adjustments requiring land purchases, as opposed to those in which added lands are acquired by donation, transfer, or exchange  The President has authority to create national monuments on federal lands under the Antiquities Act of 1906 (54 U S C  §§320301 et seq )  In total, 158 monuments have been created by presidential proclamation  Most are managed by the NPS, but some are managed by the BLM and other agencies  Under law, the Secretary of the Interior and the NPS have responsibilities related to the potential acquisition of lands for the National Park System  Among other requirements, the Secretary is directed "to investigate, study, and continually monitor the welfare of" areas that could potentially be added to the system and to report to Congress on possible additions (54 U S C  §100507)  Furthermore, the general management plan for each unit is to include potential changes to the boundaries of the unit and the reasons for such changes (54 U S C  §100502)  The Secretary also is to conduct a "systematic and comprehensive review of certain aspects of the National Park System" and to submit a related report to Congress at least every three years (54 U S C  §100505(a)) that includes a list of all authorized but unacquired lands within the boundaries of park units and a priority listing of these unacquired parcels (54 U S C  §100505(c))  The Secretary of Agriculture has various authorities to acquire lands for the National Forest System (NFS)  The NFS consists of 284 units covering 232 4 million acres of federal and nonfederal land, including national forests, national grasslands, purchase units, land utilization projects, and other areas  Today, only an act of Congress can create new NFS units, but the Secretary may acquire lands within or contiguous to the proclaimed exterior boundaries of an NFS unit  The NFS contains substantial acreage of nonfederal lands within the proclaimed boundaries of the system, particularly in the east, where national forests were established after extensive settlement  NFS units in the Eastern and Southern Regions average about 46% nonfederal land within their boundaries, while Western Region NFS units average about 10%  The FS has very limited regulatory authority over the uses of the 39 5 million acres of nonfederal land within the NFS  The FS's primary land acquisition authority is the Weeks Act of 1911 (16 U S C  §515), which was used to acquire many of the lands that became the eastern national forests  The Weeks Act authority continues to be the agency's primary authority to acquire lands; however, acquisitions are now limited to lands within (or adjacent to) established NFS unit boundaries  The Weeks Act also authorizes the Secretary to modify the NFS unit boundary as needed to encompass new acquisitions  Other laws authorize the FS to acquire lands for the national forests, typically in specific areas or for specific purposes  For example, Section 205 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA; P L  94-579 ) authorizes the acquisition of access corridors—including easements—to national forests across nonfederal lands (43 U S C  §1715(a))  Another example is the Act of August 3, 1956 (7 U S C  §428(a)), which authorizes the FS to acquire lands without any geographical limitations but does require a provision be made in a specific appropriation or other law  Another law authorizes proceeds from certain land sales or exchanges to be used for acquisitions, including for administrative sites and enhancement of recreational access  However, the acquisitions are limited to the state in which FS previously conveyed NFS land under specific disposal authorities, as discussed later in this report  Several other acquisition authorities apply to specific national forests, such as the Act of June 11, 1940, which authorizes the purchase of lands within the Angeles National Forest in California  In addition, the Secretary of Agriculture and the secretary of a military department that has lands within or adjacent to proclaimed NFS land may interchange lands, without reimbursement or transfer of funds  Many of the acquisition authorities also allow the FS to accept donations of land as specified  Within the NFS, the Secretary of Agriculture also is authorized to acquire privately owned lands within or adjacent to designated wilderness areas (16 U S C  §1134(c)), Wild and Scenic River corridors (16 U S C  §1277), and certain segments of designated National Trails (16 U S C  §1244), as specified by the law creating the trail  Lands may be added to the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS) in a number of ways, including through congressional and administrative actions and donations  A principal FWS land acquisition authority is the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929 (MBCA; 16 U S C  §§715 et seq )  This act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to recommend areas "necessary for the conservation of migratory birds" to the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission, after consulting with the relevant governor (or state agency) and appropriate local government officials (16 U S C  §715a and §715c)  In addition, the state in which the purchase is located must have consented to the acquisition by law (16 U S C  §715f and §715k-5)  The Secretary may then purchase or rent areas or interests therein approved by the commission and acquire by gift or devise any area or interest therein (16 U S C  §715d)  The MBCA authority is used frequently because of the availability of funding through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund (MBCF, 16 U S C  §718d)  The MBCF is supported by multiple sources of funding, including three major sources: the sale of hunting and conservation stamps (commonly known as duck stamps); import duties on arms and ammunition; and a portion of certain refuge entrance fees  MBCF funds are permanently appropriated to the extent of receipts and, after paying certain administrative costs, may be used for the "location, ascertainment, and acquisition of suitable areas for migratory bird refuges    " (16 U S C  §718d(b))  The predictability of funding and permanent authority for use makes the MBCF, and thus the MBCA, particularly important for FWS land acquisition and unique among the four agencies  Other laws provide general authority to expand the NWRS, including the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934 (16 U S C  §§661-667a), the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 (16 U S C  §§742a et seq ), and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U S C  §§1531-1544)  The National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966 (16 U S C  §§668dd-668ee) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire land or interests therein through donated funds or exchange (16 U S C  §668dd(b))  Further, FLPMA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw lands from the public domain for creating or adding to refuges (which would be an interagency transfer), although withdrawals exceeding 5,000 acres are subject to congressional approval (43 U S C  §1714(c))  In contrast to NPS and FS land acquisition, where the lands generally must be within the boundaries of established units, the FWS can acquire new lands to create a new refuge or to expand an existing one under the general FWS authorities cited above, as well as under certain other laws  Some national wildlife refuge (NWR) units have been created by specific acts of Congress, such as Protection Island NWR (WA) and Bayou Sauvage Urban NWR (LA) (16 U S C  §668dd note)  Units also can be created by executive order; for example, the Midway Atoll NWR was created by President Clinton in Executive Order 13022  The BLM has broad, general authority to acquire lands, principally under Section 205 of FLPMA  Specifically, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire, by purchase, exchange, donation, or use of eminent domain, lands or interests therein (43 U S C  §1715(a))  The BLM acquires land or interests in land, including inholdings, for a variety of reasons  These include to protect natural and cultural resources, to increase opportunities for public access and recreation, and to improve management of lands  As noted above, various laws directing the disposal of particular lands sometimes have been enacted  In addition, the four federal land management agencies have different standing authorities for disposing of lands  The specific disposal authorities are discussed below for each of the four agencies in the order of their apparent breadth, with the NPS (the narrowest authorities) first and the BLM (the broadest authorities) last  The NPS does not have general authority to dispose of National Park System lands  Units and lands of the Park System that were established by acts of Congress can be disposed of only by acts of Congress  Preservation of park units is a management goal and provisions of law limit the power of the Secretary of the Interior to dispose of land in changing park boundaries  Although the Secretary can, under specified conditions, make boundary changes that concurrently add and remove land within the boundary, minor boundary revisions solely to remove NPS acreage can be made only by Congress  Also, the Secretary can acquire by exchange lands that are adjacent to a boundary revision, but the Secretary cannot dispose of NPS land to do so (54 U S C  §100506(c))  Presidents have modified the boundaries of national monuments established by previous presidential proclamations, in some cases reducing the size of the monument  However, no president has terminated a monument established by proclamation  The FWS does not have general authority to dispose of its lands  With certain exceptions, wildlife refuge lands administered by the FWS can be disposed only by an act of Congress (16 U S C  §§668dd(a)(5) and (6))  For refuge lands reserved from the public domain, FLPMA prohibits the Secretary of the Interior from modifying or revoking any withdrawal which added lands to the NWRS (43 U S C  §1714(j))  For acquired lands, disposal is allowed only if: (1) the disposal is part of an authorized land exchange (16 U S C  §§668dd(a)(6) and (b)(3)); or (2) the Secretary determines the lands are no longer needed and the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission approves the disposal (16 U S C  §668dd(a)(5))  In the latter case, the disposal must recover the acquisition cost or be at the fair market value (whichever is higher), and the receipts must be deposited in the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund  The Secretary of Agriculture has numerous authorities to convey lands within proclaimed NFS boundaries out of federal ownership—through sale or exchange—although previous, broader authorities have been modified or revoked  Many of the authorities put constraints on land disposal, such as applying only to a specific geographical area or to the disposal of particular administrative properties or facilities  Many of the authorities are used in conjunction with FLPMA and other federal law and as such may place requirements on the sale or exchange of land  This includes obtaining at least fair market value for the sale of federal lands; requiring that nonfederal land exchanged for federal land be in the same state; and requiring exchanged lands to be of equal value, although value may be partially equalized with a cash payment (43 U S C  §1716)  The General Exchange Act of 1922 (16 U S C  §485) authorizes the exchange of NFS land or timber that was reserved from the public domain if the Secretary determines it will be in the public interest  The nonfederal land must be within the same state and within the exterior boundary of a national forest, and it must be chiefly valuable for national forest purposes, among other provisions  The Weeks Act of 1911 allows for similar exchanges for acquired NFS lands (16 U S C  §516)  The 1983 Small Tracts Act authorizes the Secretary to dispose of NFS land by sale or exchange, generally up to certain specified acreage limits  The disposal may be To improve management efficiencies where NFS lands are interspersed with nonfederal mineral rights owners, or if the Secretary determines the parcels to be inaccessible, physically isolated from other federal land, or to have lost national forest character (40 acres maximum); To relieve encroachments including due to erroneous surveys, or encroachments by a permanent habitable improvement if there is no evidence that the encroachment was intentional or due to negligence (10 acres maximum); To dispose of unneeded federal rights-of-way substantially surrounded by nonfederal lands (no specified acreage limitation); and If the parcel is used as a cemetery, landfill, or sewage plant pursuant to a special use authorization for the use and occupancy of NFS land (no specified acreage limitation) (16 U S C  §521e)  The conveyance must be determined to be in the public interest and the tracts may not be valued at more than $500,000  The land can be disposed of for cash, lands, interests in land (such as an easement), or any combination thereof for at least the value of the land being sold or exchanged (16 U S C  §521d) plus "all reasonable costs of administration, survey, and appraisal incidental to such conveyance" (16 U S C  §521f)  In some cases, the proceeds may be used for specified land acquisition purposes  The 1958 Townsites Act authorizes the Secretary to transfer up to 640 acres of NFS land adjacent to communities in Alaska or the 11 western states for townsites, if the "indigenous community objectives     outweigh the public objectives and values which would be served by maintaining such tract in Federal ownership" (16 U S C  §478a)  Public notice of the application for such transfer is required, and upon a "satisfactory showing of need," the Secretary may offer the land to a local governmental entity at "not less than the fair market value " The Education Land Grant Act, also known as the Sisk Act (16 U S C  §479a), authorizes the Secretary to transfer up to 80 acres of NFS land for a nominal cost upon written application of a public school district  It provides for reversion of the title to the federal government if the lands are not used for the educational purposes for which they were acquired  There are a few other specific authorities that allow for the disposal of NFS lands  For example, the 1911 Weeks Act authorizes the disposal of NFS lands that are "chiefly valuable for agriculture" but were acquired inadvertently or otherwise, if agricultural use will not injure the forests or streamflows and the lands are not needed for public purposes  The lands can be sold as homesteads in parcels of up to 80 acres (16 U S C  §519)  The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937 (7 U S C  §§1010-1012) also authorizes the disposal of lands acquired under its authority, although the FS has adopted regulations stating that the Bankhead-Jones lands comprising the national grasslands will be held permanently (36 C F R  §213 1(b))  The BLM can dispose of land under several authorities  They include (1) exchanges and sales under FLPMA, (2) sales or exchanges under the FLTFA, (3) transfers to other governmental units or nonprofit entities for public purposes, (4) patents under the General Mining Law of 1872, and (5) geographically limited sale authorities  With regard to exchanges under FLPMA, the exchanges must serve the public interest, and the federal and nonfederal lands in the exchange must be located in the same state and be of equal value (with cash equalization payments possible), among other requirements (43 U S C  §1716)  With regard to sales under FLPMA, the BLM is authorized to sell certain tracts of public land that are identified through the land-use planning process  Such tracts must meet specific criteria (43 U S C  §1713(a)): (1) such tract because of its location or other characteristics is difficult and uneconomic to manage as part of the public lands, and is not suitable for management by another Federal department or agency; or (2) such tract was acquired for a specific purpose and the tract is no longer required for that or any other Federal purpose; or (3) disposal of such tract will serve important public objectives, including but not limited to, expansion of communities and economic development, which cannot be achieved prudently or feasibly on land other than public land and which outweigh other public objectives and values, including, but not limited to, recreation and scenic values, which would be served by maintaining such tract in Federal ownership  The size of the tracts for sale is determined by "the land use capabilities and development requirements " Proposals to sell tracts of more than 2,500 acres first must be submitted to Congress and can be disapproved by Congress  Lands may not be sold at less than their fair market value  They generally must be sold through competitive bidding, although modified competition and noncompetitive sales are allowed  FLTFA provides for the sale or exchange of BLM lands identified for disposal under BLM land- use plans  The law create s a separate Treasury account for most of the proceeds (96%) from the sale or exchange, and it provide s for the use of those funds by the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture  The Secretaries may acquire nonfederal lands, specifically inholdings , lands adjacent to federal lands that contain exceptional resources , and areas adjacent to inaccessible lands that are open to recreation  Up to 20% of the funds in the account may be used for administrative costs, and at least 80% of the funds for acquisition are to be in the state in which the funds are generated   The Recreation and Public Purposes Act (43 U S C  §869) authorizes the Secretary, upon application by a qualified applicant, to dispose of any public lands to a State, Territory, county, municipality, or other State, Territorial, or Federal instrumentality or political subdivision for any public purposes, or to a nonprofit corporation or nonprofit association for any recreational or any public purpose consistent with its articles of incorporation or other creating authority  The lands can be sold or leased, and the act specifies conditions, qualifications, and acreage limitations for transfer  The price of the land depends on the type of entity that will receive it, for instance, whether a state government or a nonprofit organization  The price also depends on the intended use of the land, with some sales and leases made at no cost  Although the BLM can dispose of lands through patents under the General Mining Law of 1872, since FY1995 a series of annual moratoria on issuing mineral patents has been enacted into law  These moratoria, contained in the annual Interior appropriations laws, have effectively prevented this means of federal land disposal  Specifically, the Mining Law allows access to and development of hardrock minerals on federal lands that have not been withdrawn from entry  With evidence of valuable minerals and sufficient developmental effort, the Mining Law allows mining claims to be patented, with full title (of surface and mineral rights) transferred to the claimant upon payment of the appropriate fee  Nonmineral lands used for associated milling or other processing operations can also be patented (30 U S C  §42)  Patented lands may be used for purposes other than mineral development  The BLM also has geographically limited land sale authorities  The program with the largest revenue stream has been the Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act of 1998, which allows the Secretary of the Interior to sell or exchange certain lands around Las Vegas  The BLM and the local government unit jointly decide on the lands to be offered for sale or exchange  In general, 85% of the proceeds are deposited into a special account, and are available to the Secretary of the Interior for land acquisition in Nevada and other purposes in the state, such as certain capital improvements and development of parks, trails, and natural areas  The other 15% of the proceeds are for state or local purposes, specifically the State of Nevada General Education Fund (5%) and the Southern Nevada Water Authority (10%)  Other provisions of law similarly provide for BLM land sales in particular areas (mostly in Nevada), with specific allocations of the proceeds  Further, the BLM continues to dispose of land in Alaska as required by law, such as through transfers to the state of Alaska and to Alaska native corporations  A total of about 150 million acres in Alaska will be transferred from federal to state and private ownership  


Report 2:  114-92)—remained consistent with excess capacity reports submitted prior to the 1998 and 2005 BRAC rounds round  The Department stated its purpose for obtaining "a sense of excess and whether excess remains after various changes, such as (prior) BRAC or force structure reductions " A final infrastructure capacity report, submitted to Congress in October 2017, modified the original excess capacity estimate to 19%  The Department concluded its infrastructure capacity analysis by arguing it had established sufficient justification for a new BRAC round, a process that would allow it to more effectively dispose of excess infrastructure and manage remaining real property assets  The Department believes we have addressed all congressional concerns     The time to authorize another BRAC round is now  The BRAC process requires considerable time to analyze and develop recommendations, have those recommendations reviewed by the independent BRAC Commission, and then implemented over a six-year period of time  The longer authorization is delayed, the longer the Department will be forced to expend valuable resources on unnecessary facilities instead of weapons systems, readiness, and other national security priorities  Critics of the Department's methodology for estimating excess infrastructure have asserted it includes unreasonable research assumptions and metrics, undermining the basis for DOD's conclusion  For example, observers have cited the report's reliance on Cold War baseline values to establish excess capacity, inconsistent application of existing metrics for measuring capacity shortfalls, and overly broad categorization schemes  Some observers have also cited longstanding data management challenges that continue to affect the Department's ability to measure current excess facility inventory and utilization rates  Others have noted the dearth of data that support DOD claims related to BRAC effectiveness and the disposal of excess property  During a news briefing on the FY2019 defense budget, Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) David L  Norquist noted that the Department had declined to propose a BRAC round that year, stating that it would work instead to focus on internal reforms while preparing for a financial audit  And so, I think we're looking at doing two things, going forward  One is, working with Congress to find common areas where we can make reforms and changes that don't create the same types of obstacles  The other is that we are undergoing a financial-statement audit that includes a look at property, and assets and investments and improving the accuracy of the data behind it  And as a view of being able to take advantage of the data coming out of that process, to help us make better decision-making on real property  But, yes, you are correct, there is not (a) request for another BRAC round in this budget  In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, Lucian Niemeyer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment, indicated DOD would be working in FY2019 to improve its excess infrastructure accounting processes and demolish unneeded infrastructure: In lieu of another request for legislation in FY 2019 to authorize an additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, we will review our facilities, to include facility usage optimization review to ensure we have a better accounting of excess infrastructure  We also have proposed for FY 2019 increased efforts to demolish unneeded or obsolete facilities over the course of this year  The 2005 BRAC round was unique among all previous rounds due to its relative size, scope and complexity  (See Figure 2 for comparison of major and minor BRAC actions between rounds ) Colloquially called "the mother of all BRACs," the objectives of the 2005 round were primarily about transforming military infrastructure; however, unanticipated expenses have played a role in shaping subsequent congressional views of the BRAC process and, according to many observers, dampened support for consideration of a new round  Savings estimates submitted during the 2005 round were overvalued by as much as 67%, according to GAO analysis, with one-time implementation costs rising from $21 to $35 1 billion  GAO found that the $14 1 billion increase was due primarily to the rising cost of new construction associated with subsidiary projects not included in the original BRAC implementation plan  Referring to the implementation of the 2005 round, Assistant Secretary Niemeyer, noted, "BRAC legislation effectively limited the ability of Congress to oversee BRAC implementation costs and the Department made deliberate decisions to use BRAC implementation as a recapitalization tool, expanding facility requirements and associated costs " To address congressional concerns about spiraling costs in new BRAC rounds, DOD has periodically proposed legislative language that would constrain the Secretary's ability to recommend BRAC actions that would not yield savings within 20 years and to emphasize recommendations that would yield net savings within five years  Each year, Congress appropriates funding for the Department of Defense Base Closure Account, part of the Military Construction Defense-Wide appropriation  With no BRAC round authorized or underway, the primary purpose of continuing BRAC appropriations is to fund the environmental cleanup and caretaker functions at bases that were closed under prior rounds (see Figure 3 )  In FY2020, the Trump Administration has requested $278 5 million for BRAC continuing environmental and caretaker costs, with $158 3 million provided for the Navy (57%), $66 1 million for the Army (24%), and $54 million for the Air Force (19%)  The total request represents a $63 million decrease (19%) from FY2019 enacted levels ($342 million)  In FY2018, Congress urged DOD to accelerate environmental remediation at BRAC sites  In report language, appropriators stated that additional funds were provided to speed environmental remediation at installations closed under previous rounds  Accelerated cleanup —The agreement includes additional funding to accelerate environmental remediation at installations closed during previous Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds  Priority should be given to those sites with newly identified radiological cleanup cost  There are many factors hindering the cleanup of BRAC sites  However, strategic investments can lead to quicker clean-ups and faster turnover of DOD property to the local community  Therefore, the Department is directed to submit to the congressional defense committees a spend plan for the additional BRAC funds not later than 30 days after enactment of this Act  Congressional authorizers and appropriators have regularly inserted language into annual defense legislation that would disallow the use of funds for the purpose of a new BRAC round  In FY2019, for example, though DOD did not propose a BRAC, authorizers inserted language into the annual NDAA that prohibited a new round: SEC  2703  Prohibition on Conducting Additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Round  Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize an additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round  A similar provision was included in the final FY2019 defense appropriations bill: SEC  8122  None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to propose, plan for, or execute a new or additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round  In 2017, Members in both chambers proposed legislation that would have authorized a new round of base closures  Though no legislation for a full BRAC was enacted, a provision included the following year in the final FY2019 NDAA  Under the new scenario described by Section 2702 of the John S  McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H R  5515 , P L  115-232 ), BRAC-like actions are authorized within the confines of a state based on the recommendation of the governor and support of local communities affected by the proposed actions  Unlike a traditional BRAC process, the new authorities would forgo the creation of an independent review panel  The Secretary of Defense is, instead, required to deliver a report of planned BRAC actions to congressional defense committees and, following a 90-day waiting period, begin implementation  For details, please refer to "In-State BRAC" in Appendix A of this report  The BRAC related legislative proposals above illustrate the flexibility Congress has for amending or adopting the template of past BRAC processes that DOD has called "the only fair, objective, and comprehensive process to achieve these goals (eliminating excess infrastructure) " Congress may consider whether future legislative proposals for base closures and realignments will adopt the lessons learned from previous rounds while retaining the basic framework, or fundamentally alter the process  No BRAC legislation has so far been proposed in the 116 th Congress  Additionally, the Department has asserted that it does not intend to use the new BRAC-like authorities authorized by Section 2702 of the FY2019 NDAA  To date, DOD has received no state requests under this authority  Appendix A  Legislative References BRAC Authorizing Legislation 1988 Round The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, enacted October 24, 1988 (P L 100-526) 1991, 1993, 1995 Rounds National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, enacted November 5, 1990 (P L  107-107, Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Title XXIX) 2005 Round National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, ( P L  101-510 ; amended the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 ( P L  101-510 ) 10 U S C  2687, 10 U S C  993 Summary In 1977, Congress enacted 10 U S C  2687, the first statutory restriction on the President's ability to close or realign military installations  Amended over the years, the statute has retained its essential elements, establishing procedures the Secretary of Defense must follow before closing a military installation where a threshold number (currently 300) of civilian personnel are authorized to be employed, or realigning an installation that involves a reduction by more than 50% (or 1,000) of civilian workers  A more recent statute, 10 U S C  993, introduced additional reporting requirements that would restrict the Secretary's ability to realign installations if the plan would affect more than 1,000 assigned members of the Armed Forces  In-State BRAC Section 2702 of the John S  McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H R  5515 , P L  115-232 ) authorizes new in-state BRAC authorities  Text of the provision is included below in its entirety  SEC  2702  ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO REALIGN OR CLOSE CERTAIN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS  (a) Authorization —Notwithstanding sections 993 or 2687 of title 10, United States Code, and subject to subsection (d), the Secretary of Defense may take such actions as may be necessary to carry out the realignment or closure of a military installation in a State during a fiscal year if— (1) the military installation is the subject of a notice which is described in subsection (b); and (2) the Secretary includes the military installation in the report submitted under paragraph (2) of subsection (c) with respect to the fiscal year  (b) Notice From Governor of State —A notice described in this subsection is a notice received by the Secretary of Defense from the Governor of a State (or, in the case of the District of Columbia, the Mayor of the District of Columbia) in which the Governor recommends that the Secretary carry out the realignment or closure of a military installation located in the State, and which includes each of the following elements: (1) A specific description of the military installation, or a specific description of the relevant real and personal property  (2) Statements of support for the realignment or closure from units of local government in which the installation is located  (3) A detailed plan for the reuse or redevelopment of the real and personal property of the installation, together with a description of the local redevelopment authority which will be responsible for the implementation of the plan  (c) Response to Notice — (1) Mandatory response to governor and congress —Not later than 1 year after receiving a notice from the Governor of a State (or, in the case of the District of Columbia, from the Mayor of the District of Columbia), the Secretary of Defense shall submit a response to the notice to the Governor and the congressional defense committees indicating whether or not the Secretary accepts the recommendation for the realignment or closure of a military installation which is the subject of the notice  (2) Acceptance of recommendation —If the Secretary of Defense determines that it is in the interests of the United States to accept the recommendation for the realignment or closure of a military installation which is the subject of a notice received under subsection (b) and intends to carry out the realignment or closure of the installation pursuant to the authority of this section during a fiscal year, at the time the budget is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for the fiscal year, the Secretary shall submit a report to the congressional defense committees which includes the following: (A) The identification of each military installation for which the Secretary intends to carry out a realignment or closure pursuant to the authority of this section during the fiscal year, together with the reasons the Secretary of Defense believes that it is in the interest of the United States to accept the recommendation of the Governor of the State involved for the realignment or closure of the installation  (B) For each military installation identified under subparagraph (A), a master plan describing the required scope of work, cost, and timing for all facility actions needed to carry out the realignment or closure, including the construction of new facilities and the repair or renovation of existing facilities  (C) For each military installation identified under subparagraph (A), a certification that, not later than the end of the fifth fiscal year after the completion of the realignment or closure, the savings resulting from the realignment or closure will exceed the costs of carrying out the realignment or closure, together with an estimate of the annual recurring savings that would be achieved by the realignment or closure of the installation and the timeframe required for the financial savings to exceed the costs of carrying out the realignment or closure  (d) Limitations — (1) Timing —The Secretary may not initiate the realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of this section until the expiration of the 90-day period beginning on the date the Secretary submits the report under paragraph (2) of subsection (c)  (2) Total costs —Subject to appropriations, the aggregate cost to the government in carrying out the realignment or closure of military installations pursuant to the authority of this section for all fiscal years may not exceed $2,000,000,000  In determining the cost to the government for purposes of this section, there shall be included the costs of planning and design, military construction, operations and maintenance, environmental restoration, information technology, termination of public-private contracts, guarantees, and other factors contributing to the cost of carrying out the realignment or closure, as determined by the Secretary  (e) Process for Implementation —The implementation of the realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of this section shall be carried out in accordance with section 2905 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (title XXIX of P L  101-510 ; 10 U S C  2687 note) in the same manner as the implementation of a realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of such Act  (f) State Defined —In this section, the term ``State'' means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands  (g) Termination of Authority —The authority of the Secretary to carry out a realignment or closure pursuant to this section shall terminate at the end of fiscal year 2029  Appendix B  BRAC Acreage Disposal Status, By State

ground_truth: Since 1977, statutory thresholds have effectively constrained the President's ability to close or realign major military installations in the United States. Congress has instead periodically granted temporary authorities—known as a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)—that have established independent commissions for the review and approval of basing changes submitted by the Secretary of Defense. These unique and transient authorities last expired on April 16, 2006. There have been five rounds of base closures: 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005. Though Congress has periodically adjusted the BRAC process to account for lessons learned, the modern framework has remained generally consistent with earlier rounds, and includes establishment of an independent commission; reliance on objective and uniform criteria; Government Accountability Office (GAO) review and certification of Department of Defense (DOD) data; deliberations designed to be transparent that include open hearings, solicitation of feedback, installation visits, and data available for public review; and requirement that the final list of closure and realignment recommendations be accepted or rejected in their entirety. Congress has defined BRAC selection criteria in statute, thus requiring the Secretary to prioritize military value over cost savings. Additionally, Congress has required the Secretary to align the Department's recommendations with a comprehensive 20-year force structure plan. The commission may modify, reject, or add recommendations during its review before forwarding a final list to the President. After receiving the Commission's list of recommendations, the President may either accept the report in its entirety or seek to modify it by indicating disapproval and returning it to the commission for further evaluation. If the President accepts the commission's recommendations, they are forwarded to Congress. BRAC implementation begins by default unless Congress rejects the recommendations in their entirety within 45 days by enacting a joint resolution. During the implementation phase, DOD is required to initiate closures and realignments within two years and complete all actions within six years. The BRAC process represents a legislative compromise between the executive and legislative branches wherein each shares power in managing the closure and realignment of military bases. The imposition of an independent, third-party mediator was intended to insulate base closings from political considerations by both branches that had complicated similar actions in the past. This report provides background on the development of BRAC, describes its major elements and milestones, and outlines issues frequently cited in the context of new rounds, such as potential savings.