prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: The DEA, within the Department of Justice, is responsible for ensuring the availability of controlled substances for legitimate uses while preventing their diversion through its administration and enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act and its implementing regulations  Under the Controlled Substances Act, all persons or entities that manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances are required to register with DEA, unless specifically exempted  DEA regulates these entities to limit diversion and prevent abuse  For example, DEA regulates pharmaceutical companies that manufacture controlled substances, health care providers who prescribe them to patients, and pharmacies that dispense them  In October 2010, the Disposal Act amended the Controlled Substances Act to allow the public to deliver unused controlled substances to an entity authorized by DEA to dispose of the substances  DEA was given responsibility for promulgating the implementing regulations, and the Disposal Act stipulated that the regulations should prevent diversion of controlled substances while also taking into consideration public health and safety, ease and cost of implementation, and participation by various communities  In addition to disposal bins, DEA’s regulations describe two other options for the public to transfer controlled substances for the purpose of disposal: mail-back programs and take-back events  Law enforcement agencies may use all three methods of drug disposal without the need for authorization by DEA  The Disposal Act stipulates that the regulations cannot require an entity to participate in or establish any of the disposal options  To participate as authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs, eligible entities—retail pharmacies, hospitals/clinics with an on-site pharmacy, narcotic treatment programs, reverse distributors, distributors, and drug manufacturers that are already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances—must modify their DEA registration  According to DEA officials, such modification is free and simple to do  Eligible retail pharmacies or hospitals/clinics that become authorized collectors are able to install and maintain disposal bins in long-term care facilities in addition to their own location  DEA’s website contains a public search feature to identify authorized collectors located near a specific zip code or address  Authorized collectors must install, manage, and maintain the disposal bins following DEA regulations  For example, under DEA’s regulations for maintaining the disposal bins, the disposal bin must be securely fastened to a permanent structure, securely locked, substantially constructed with a permanent outer container and removable inner liner, and have a small opening that allows contents to be added but not removed; the bin must also prominently display a sign indicating which types of substances are acceptable; users must dispose the unused prescriptions into the collection receptacle themselves without handing them to staff at the pharmacy; the disposal bin must typically be located in an area where an employee is present and near where controlled substances are stored, and the bin must be made inaccessible to the public when an employee is not present; the inner liner of the disposal bin must meet certain requirements, including being waterproof, tamper-evident, tear-resistant, opaque, and having the size and identification number clearly labeled; and the installation and removal of inner liners must be performed under the supervision of at least two employees of the authorized collector  DEA regulations also require that all controlled substances collected in the disposal bin’s inner liners must be destroyed in compliance with applicable federal, state, and local laws and rendered non-retrievable  According to DEA regulations, non-retrievable means that the physical and chemical conditions of the controlled substance must be permanently altered, thereby rendering the controlled substance unavailable and unusable for all practical purposes  Authorized collectors are permitted to destroy the inner liner on their premises if they have the capacity to do so  If not, the inner liners can be transported to a separate location to be destroyed  Typically, in this case, an authorized collector contracts with a reverse distributor to periodically remove, transport, and destroy the inner liners  DEA regulations require that two reverse distributor employees transport the inner liners directly to the disposal location without any unnecessary stops or stops of an extended duration  Authorized collectors must document certain information, including inner liner identification numbers and the dates that each liner is installed, removed, and transferred for destruction  The authorized collectors must maintain these records for 2 years  Figure 1 summarizes the steps involved in the collection of unused prescription drugs  About 3 percent of pharmacies and other eligible entities have voluntarily chosen to become DEA-authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs, according to DEA data  As of April 2017, 2,233 of the 89,550 (2 49 percent) of eligible entities—which are already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances—had registered to use disposal bins to collect unused prescription drugs  Most of the authorized collectors— about 81 percent—were pharmacies, followed by hospitals or clinics  (See table 1)  Narcotic treatment programs, reverse distributors, and distributors made up approximately 1 percent of the authorized collectors  We also found that participation rates varied by state, though in most states relatively few of the eligible entities had registered with DEA to become authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs  In 44 states, less than 5 percent of the eligible entities had registered  (See figure 2 and appendix I for more information on the participation rates of authorized collectors in each state)  As of April 2017, Connecticut, Missouri, and Maine had the lowest participation rates, with 0 11, 0 22, and 0 70 percent, respectively  In contrast, North Dakota had the highest participation rate, with 32 0 percent of its pharmacies and other eligible entities registered to be authorized collectors  The state with next highest participation rate was Alaska, with 8 96 percent  In North Dakota, the state’s Board of Pharmacy provides funding for authorized collectors to purchase and maintain the disposal bins  According to a board official, the board decided to fund these activities to increase participation rates and plans to continue its funding indefinitely using revenue generated from prescription drug licensing fees it collects  In addition, our analysis shows that about 82 percent of all authorized collectors were located in urban areas as of April 2017  However, when comparing the entities registered to be authorized collectors with the total number of eligible entities, we found that a larger percentage of the eligible entities in rural areas became authorized collectors compared with those in urban areas (see table 2)  The data we obtained on the number of eligible and participating authorized collectors and their locations are the only available DEA data on the use of disposal bins to collect unused prescription drugs  According to DEA officials, the agency does not collect any other information on the use of disposal bins, such as the extent to which the bins are used, or the amount and types of prescription drugs deposited into the bins  For example, to minimize the risk of diversion, DEA regulations do not allow authorized collectors to open and inspect the inner liners of the disposal bins, so information on their contents cannot be collected  According to DEA officials, the agency is not responsible for collecting information on the amount and types of prescription drugs destroyed through the disposal bins  DEA officials told us that the agency views its responsibility solely as giving pharmacies and other eligible entities the opportunity to become authorized collectors  Though we do not have information on the extent to which individuals use DEA’s prescription drug disposal bins, we were able to estimate that as of April 2017, about half of the country’s population lived less than 5 miles away from a pharmacy or other DEA-authorized entity offering a prescription disposal bin  In 21 states, at least 50 percent of the state’s population lived within 5 miles of a prescription disposal bin  (See figure 3)  While close to half of the nation’s population lived less than 5 miles from a disposal bin as of April 2017, the availability of nearby disposal bins varied significantly for people depending on whether they lived in an urban or a rural area  Specifically, about 52 percent of the population in urban areas lived less than 5 miles away from a disposal bin, compared to about 13 percent of the population in rural areas  Furthermore, about 44 percent of the population in rural areas lived even further away—more than 30 miles away from a disposal bin  An exception to this is North Dakota, where about 86 percent of its urban population and about 64 percent of its rural population lived within 5 miles of a disposal bin  According to officials from the 11 stakeholder organizations we interviewed—which represent authorized collectors and long-term care facilities—several factors may explain why relatively few pharmacies and other eligible entities have chosen to become authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs  These factors include the associated costs of participating, uncertainty over proper implementation, and participation in other, similar efforts for disposing of unused prescription drugs  Costs: Stakeholders said that the costs associated with purchasing, installing, and managing the disposal bins is a factor that explains the relatively low rate of participation  One stakeholder told us that many eligible entities may decide that the benefit of participating does not outweigh the costs associated with doing so  Specifically, stakeholders told us that the major costs associated with participating include the one-time cost of purchasing and installing a disposal bin; the ongoing costs to train personnel to manage the bins; and the cost of contracting with a reverse distributor to periodically dispose of the bin’s inner liner and contents  Stakeholders gave varying examples of the specific costs associated with these investments  For example, one stakeholder estimated the yearly costs of maintaining a disposal bin ranged from $500 to $600 per location; another stakeholder said that the cost is thousands of dollars per location per year, but did not provide a specific estimate  These stakeholders added that costs can increase if the disposal bins fill more quickly and need to be emptied more often than expected  For their part, officials from the reverse distributor stakeholders we interviewed cited incinerating hazardous waste, the availability of incinerators, and the cost of personnel as factors that increase the cost of their services for authorized collectors  One reverse distributor stakeholder told us that there are not many incinerators available, requiring them to travel long distances to incinerate collected waste  The other reverse distributor stakeholder added that DEA’s requirement that a second employee be present during the transportation and disposal increases the cost of their services  While some stakeholders speculated that costs are a reason for low participation, a few stakeholders told us that the benefits are worth the costs  In fact, two stakeholders we spoke with told us that the benefit to the communities was so important that they decided to provide funding to retail pharmacies, alleviating an individual pharmacy’s concern about the cost of installing and maintaining the disposal bins  We found that as of April 2017, over a quarter of the 2,233 authorized collectors using disposal bins received external funding to pay for the costs associated with installing and maintaining the disposal bins  In addition, stakeholders told us that some localities have enacted laws known as extended producer responsibility ordinances, which require that pharmaceutical manufacturers pay for certain costs associated with drug disposal  When asked about the costs associated with operating disposal bins, DEA officials told us that addressing cost issues with eligible participants falls outside of their responsibilities  Uncertainty: Stakeholders also told us that uncertainty regarding how to comply with aspects of DEA’s regulations for prescription drug disposal bins affected their decisions to participate  One stakeholder added that many eligible entities decide not to participate because uncertainties over participation requirements could result in inadvertent non-compliance with DEA’s regulations  As an example of their uncertainty over some of the requirements governing the disposal bins, officials from both of the reverse distributor stakeholders we interviewed cited DEA’s non-retrievable standard for destruction of the inner liners of the bins  DEA requires that the method of destruction be sufficient to render all controlled substances non- retrievable, meaning that the physical and chemical conditions of the controlled substances must be permanently altered and unusable in order to prevent diversion for illicit purposes  Both reverse distributor stakeholders told us that they are uncertain about whether certain disposal methods meet this standard, and they said that the agency has not provided further guidance on how reverse distributors can meet this requirement  DEA officials told us that the agency responds to questions about whether a specific method of destruction meets the non-retrievable standard by telling the registrant to test the remnants after destruction, to see if any components of the controlled substance are still present  In its summary of the regulations implementing the Disposal Act, DEA stated that in order to allow for the development of various methods of destruction, the agency did not require a specific method of destruction as long as the desired result is achieved  However, DEA officials stated that to their knowledge, incineration is the only method known to meet the non-retrievable standard to date, but the officials hoped other methods will be developed in the future  When asked about the guidance they provide to authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs or those eligible to become authorized collectors, DEA officials told us that they post frequently-asked questions on their website, routinely answer questions from participants and others, and give training presentations at conferences that include information on the disposal bins  In our prior work, we found problems with DEA’s communication and guidance to stakeholders  In 2015, we recommended that DEA identify and implement cost-effective means for communicating regularly with pharmacies and other entities authorized to handle controlled substances  DEA agreed with the recommendation, and officials told us that, starting in August 2017, these entities can subscribe to DEA’s website to receive notifications when it is updated with new guidance  Stakeholders also noted that some DEA requirements related to disposal bins may conflict with other state and federal requirements governing the transportation and disposal of hazardous waste, which includes some controlled substances  For example, the two reverse distributor stakeholders told us that some incinerator permits issued by states require that hazardous waste be examined before incineration; however, DEA requirements do not allow the contents of the liners to be examined, even at the time of incineration  To address the incinerator permit requirements, one reverse distributor told us that they use the Environmental Protection Agency’s hazardous waste household exemption, which treats the liners as household waste and thereby allows incinerator facilities to destroy the liners without examining the contents or violating their state permit  In addition, some stakeholders raised concerns that DEA’s regulations may conflict with other federal regulations  For instance, one stakeholder noted that they recently learned that transporting the disposal bin’s inner liners could violate Department of Transportation regulations  DEA officials told us that they were aware of this, explaining that the conflict was between DEA’s requirement that controlled substances be transported in liners and the Department of Transportation’s requirement that this type of waste be transported in sturdy containers  According to DEA officials, this conflict has been resolved by the Department of Transportation allowing reverse distributors to place the liners inside sturdy containers kept on trucks  Participation in or Availability of Similar Efforts: Stakeholders said that some pharmacies and other eligible entities were already participating in other, similar efforts that allow for the safe disposal of controlled substances, and therefore they did not want to invest additional resources into participating as authorized collectors using disposal bins  For example, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services has an established process that long-term care facilities use to dispose of their unused controlled substances  As a result, all of the long-term care stakeholders told us that long-term care facilities may choose not to partner with pharmacies interested in placing disposal bins within their facilities because it adds significant cost and effort without any additional benefit  Furthermore, pharmacy stakeholders noted that because of the availability of other prescription drug collection efforts in their communities, they did not think that maintaining a disposal bin at their locations was needed  For example, two of the stakeholders explained that local law enforcement precincts already had a similar type of disposal bin in place to collect unused prescription drugs  DEA officials told us that they were aware of other options for the public and entities such as long-term care facilities that are not registered as authorized collectors to dispose of controlled substances  The officials also indicated that the availability of disposal options at law enforcement agencies contributes to the low participation rates among pharmacies as authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs  We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Justice for comment  DEA, part of the Department of Justice, provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the Attorney General of the United States and the Administrator of DEA  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7114 or draperd@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the contact name above, Elizabeth H  Curda (Director), Will Simerl (Assistant Director), Kathryn Richter (Analyst-In-Charge), Nick Bartine, Giselle Hicks, Jessica Lin, and Emily Wilson made key contributions to this report  Also contributing were Muriel Brown and Krister Friday 


Report 2:  Developing international military capacity  U S  officials told us that UN peacekeeping operations provide an indirect benefit of helping to professionalize the military units from many developing countries that contribute troops to the UN  We have previously reported that building military capacity of foreign partners to address security-related threats is an important goal of U S  national security strategy and foreign policy  According to U S  and UN officials, the relative strengths of U S  peacekeeping operations would be faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities  Deployment speed  State, DOD, and UN officials highlighted the United States’ ability to deploy troops and police to peacekeeping operations more quickly than the UN  Unlike the U S  military, which can draw from a ready pool of military personnel, the UN must seek troops from UN member states, which takes time  UN officials told us that the UN faces a shortage of both troops and UN police, which slows deployment  Further, a 2015 report by the UN High-level Panel on Peacekeeping stated that the UN “has struggled to get sufficient forces on the ground quickly enough and relies on under-resourced uniformed capabilities ” The report also stated that aviation, medical, and engineering specialists, among others, are difficult to mobilize in advance of infantry units  Command and control  State, DOD, and UN officials told us that U S  operations would enable the U S  military to have direct command and control, whereas UN operations, which are inherently multinational, face challenges with command and control over troops from several different countries  The UN High-level Panel report noted that UN peacekeeping operations’ weak command and control is a well-known constraint that limits the type of operations the UN can undertake  Logistics support  U S  and UN officials told us that U S  operations have superior logistics systems  U S  procurement likely would be faster than UN procurement, which lacks a standing supply chain and, therefore, relies on third-party vendors, according to UN officials  In addition, the UN High Level Panel report stated that UN peacekeeping operations’ logistics systems and structures in the field are under severe strain, which can limit the mobility of these operations  Intelligence capability  U S  and UN officials agreed that U S  operations would involve superior intelligence capability  The UN only recently established an intelligence policy—in May 2017—having recognized that some peacekeeping operations had been deployed in fragile political and security environments with asymmetrical and complex threats  However, UN officials acknowledged that the scope of UN intelligence capability remains limited  Counterterrorism capability  DOD officials told us that a U S  peacekeeping operation would have the capability to include a counterterrorism component and would not be constrained in the use of force, if needed, in response to terrorist threats  UN peacekeeping operations, on the other hand, lack the capabilities and specialized military preparation to engage in counterterrorism operations, according to the UN High-level Panel report  The UN report stated that counterterrorism should be undertaken by the host government, a capable regional force, or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the UN Security Council  According to the UN report, UN peacekeeping operations may engage in proactive and preemptive use of force to protect civilians and UN personnel from threats; however, offensive force to degrade, neutralize or defeat an opponent is a fundamentally different type of posture that should be authorized by the Security Council only under limited and exceptional circumstances  We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, and the UN for review and comment  DOD provided a letter, reproduced in appendix II, which stated that it had no comments  State did not provide comments  The UN provided technical comments, which we incorporated into our report as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Secretary- General of the United Nations  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  The objectives of this report were to (1) compare the reported costs of a specific United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identify factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations  To compare the reported costs of a specific UN peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we selected the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) as a case study  We compared the reported UN expenditures for MINUSCA, which included both military and civilian components, with estimated costs for a hypothetical U S  operation with a similar level of military and civilian personnel  Our comparison covers a total of 3 years and 3 months—from MINUSCA’s establishment in April 2014 through June 30, 2017, the end of UN fiscal year 2017  We selected MINUSCA because it is in sub-Saharan Africa, where most UN peacekeeping operations established since 2003 have taken place, and has a typical scope and budget compared to other UN peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa, according to U S  and UN officials  In addition, MINUSCA is one of the most recent UN peacekeeping operations; thus, initial expenditures for the operation are relatively current  Because the results of our cost comparison are based on a single case study, they cannot be generalized to all UN peacekeeping operations  To determine the UN’s costs for MINUSCA, we analyzed UN budget and expenditure data covering the initial start-up period (April 2014 to June 2014) and the first 3 UN fiscal years (July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2017)  We spoke with officials of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support, and Management at UN Headquarters in New York, New York, to better understand the characteristics of MINUSCA and the different costs affecting MINUSCA’s budget and expenditures  We assessed UN expenditure data through discussions with cognizant UN officials and a review of external audits of UN budgetary information and found them sufficiently reliable for our purposes  We also analyzed data on U S  contributions to UN peacekeeping operations for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 from the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Organization Affairs to determine total U S  contributions to MINUSCA, and UN peacekeeping operations overall  To estimate the costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we developed a hypothetical scenario for a U S  operation based on the MINUSCA budget and supporting documents, assuming deployment of the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel in the Central African Republic (CAR) over the same time period (April 2014 through June 2017)  To estimate the military portion of the operation, we interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) officials and staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a DOD-sponsored non-profit corporation involved in developing cost estimates for U S  contingency operations  The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller and IDA generated a cost estimate for the military components included in the hypothetical operation using the Contingency Operations Support Tool (cost estimating tool)  DOD uses this tool to develop cost estimates for all military contingency operations  The cost estimate included only the incremental costs of the operation—those directly attributable to the operation that would not be incurred if the operation did not take place  For example, the estimate produced by the cost estimating tool did not include the direct salaries of active duty personnel as those costs would be incurred by the United States regardless of a possible decision to undertake the hypothetical operation  We assessed the cost estimating tool’s applicability to developing a hypothetical cost estimate for the purposes of this report through discussions with DOD and IDA officials, and compared the tool to the accurate and comprehensive characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, as described in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide  While we found the DOD cost estimating tool generated a sufficiently reliable cost estimate for a hypothetical U S  peacekeeping operation, we did not assess the overall reliability of the tool or its capability to generate accurate or comprehensive estimates for future U S  operations  To generate our estimate of U S  military costs using the DOD’s estimating tool, we used UN military deployment numbers as a baseline for the scale of a hypothetical, comparable U S  peacekeeping operation, while using unit sizes and rotations in deployment that were considered appropriate for the U S  military, according to DOD and IDA officials  We based the hypothetical U S  operation, and hence the cost estimate, on the following assumptions, which correspond approximately with MINUSCA’s actual UN personnel deployments: Theater of operation: Central African Republic (CAR) Type of operation: military contingency Operation time frame: April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017 Military contingents: as of June 30, 2017, 11,495 total personnel Infantry: 10 units of 630-785 personnel per unit, approximately 90 percent active duty / 10 percent reserves Communication / signals: 1 unit, 124 personnel per unit Engineering: 4 units, 200 personnel per unit Military police: 1 unit, 120 personnel per unit Formed police units (military police): 12 units, 140 personnel per Hospital / medical: 1 level III hospital, 248 beds, 495 personnel Helicopter units: 2 UH-60 C3 units, 1 MH-60M Assault attack helicopter unit, 100 personnel per unit Quick reaction force: 1 unit, 160 personnel per unit Special forces: 1 tactical civilian affairs unit, 1 Marine special operations intelligence unit, 160 personnel per unit Unmanned aerial vehicle: 1 unit, 84 personnel Transportation: 1 heavy transport unit, 120 personnel per unit Operational tempo: 1 0 for all phases of operation and units, except aviation units (set at 1 5) Deployment schedule and phasing: phased deployment, including 14 days for predeployment (e g , training), 5 days for deployment, 180 days for active duty unit sustainment and 270 days for reserve unit sustainment, 5 days for redeployment, and 0 days for reconstitution Housing: contractor-provided semi-permanent housing Transportation: personnel and equipment transported by airlift from the United States (primarily Fort Hood, Texas), material (such as water, food, and other consumables) transported by airlift from Italy We obtained input on the operational design for the military portion of the cost estimate from DOD officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Policy, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, and IDA officials  However, the military portions of the scenario and their corresponding cost estimate have some limitations  As a result of rounding for some units, U S  military personnel numbers do not exactly match the MINUSCA deployment levels  In addition, based on input from DOD officials, we attempted to select military units that would provide an essential function per U S  common practices while keeping the overall personnel deployment level as close as possible to MINUSCA’s deployment level  An actual U S  military plan may differ significantly from the UN plan as a result of differences between U S  and UN military operations, structure, doctrine, and circumstances at the time of the operation  To estimate U S  civilian costs, we matched the number of U S  civilian police and personnel to the number serving in MINUSCA  We then estimated the costs of deploying these U S  civilian personnel in CAR for the same time period as MINUSCA  We did not attempt to determine how the U S  government would actually implement civilian components of a peacekeeping operation in CAR  To estimate U S  civilian police costs, we met with State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to identify State’s costs for civilian police contractors providing police training and technical assistance in sub-Saharan Africa  Based on INL’s input we assumed that the base salary of civilian police would be grade 13, step 5 on the Office of Personnel Management’s general schedule salary tables for federal employees  In addition to the average base salary, we identified other costs—with input from INL—including, among others, personal equipment, travel from the United States, and State’s published allowances specific to CAR for local cost of living, post hardship differential, danger pay, and living quarters  We applied the average cost per officer to the average number of UN civilian police officers deployed in MINUSCA  To estimate U S  civilian personnel costs, we met with State’s Bureau of Budget and Planning to identify the costs of State Foreign Service officers and locally employed staff, based on the number of UN international and national civilian staff deployed to MINUSCA, respectively  We matched the number of State Foreign Service officers for the U S  cost estimate to the number of UN international staff in MINUSCA, with input from State to align the grade levels  The estimated costs for Foreign Service officers include average salaries based on State’s Foreign Service salary tables and State’s allowances specific to CAR, including local cost of living, post hardship differential, and danger pay  We also met with State Bureau of Budget and Planning officials to estimate other costs for Foreign Service officers, which we included in our cost estimate, including post assignment travel, administrative support costs, residential furnishings, and residential guards, among others, but we did not assess the reliability of these additional costs provided by State  In addition, State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations provided the actual costs of residential leases for Foreign Service officers in CAR in fiscal year 2017, which we used to estimate the cost of housing Foreign Service officers in CAR  We also matched the number of State locally employed staff to the number of UN national staff deployed to MINUSCA and added their average salaries and other costs in CAR based on data provided by State’s Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services  While MINUSCA’s expenditures also included costs for sending an annual average of up to about 200 UN volunteers to CAR, State officials told us that the United States generally would not send volunteers through its assistance efforts to a high-risk post, such as CAR  Therefore, we did not include any costs related to volunteers in the cost estimate  We also did not include costs related to host-government-provided personnel serving in MINUSCA  In addition, UN expenditures included about $7 million for “quick-impact projects” to support local government infrastructure and civil society initiatives  We did not include comparable costs for quick-impact projects in our U S  cost estimate because we did not have a basis for matching these costs  To identify factors that affect cost differences between MINUSCA and a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we reviewed the U S  cost estimate generated in conjunction with DOD, IDA, and State officials, and identified significant areas of cost for the United States and the assumptions incorporated in the estimate or factors specified by U S  officials that drive those costs  We compared the U S  cost estimate, including these significant areas of cost, to UN costs to identify differences  We interviewed U S  and UN officials regarding U S  and UN standards and policies that explain differences between MINUSCA costs and the estimated costs of a U S  operation  To identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations, we reviewed UN reports on peacekeeping operations and interviewed UN, DOD, and State officials  In addition, we reviewed GAO’s 2006 report comparing the costs as well as the strengths of a UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti with those of a hypothetical U S  operation  We conducted our review from February 2017 through February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the individual named above, Drew Lindsey (Assistant Director), Howard Cott, Juan Pablo Avila-Tournut, Debbie Chung, Martin de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Jennifer Leotta, Caitlin Mitchell, Elizabeth Repko, and Alex Welsh made significant contributions to this report 

ground_truth: In 2015, 3.8 million Americans reported misusing prescription drugs within the last month, and deaths from prescription opioids have more than quadrupled since 1999. About half of the people who reported misusing prescription drugs in 2015 received them from a friend or relative. One way to help prevent this kind of diversion and potential misuse is by providing secure and convenient ways to dispose of unused, unneeded, or expired prescription medications. The Secure and Responsible Drug Disposal Act of 2010 authorizes pharmacies and other entities already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances to also collect unused prescription drugs for disposal. In 2014, DEA finalized regulations for the implementation of the Act, establishing a voluntary process for eligible entities to become authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs using disposal bins. GAO was asked to review participation among authorized collectors that maintain disposal bins. In this report GAO describes (1) participation rates among entities eligible to collect unused prescription drugs and (2) factors that affect participation. GAO analyzed the most currently available DEA data from April 2017 on entities eligible to participate and those participating as authorized collectors. GAO also conducted interviews with DEA officials and a nongeneralizable sample of 11 stakeholder organizations selected to illustrate different types of authorized collectors and long-term care facilities. GAO is not making any recommendations. DEA provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. GAO found that about 3 percent of pharmacies and other entities eligible to collect unused prescription drugs for disposal have volunteered to do so. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) authorizes these entities to dispose of unused drugs to help reduce their potential misuse. Analysis of DEA data shows that as of April 2017, 2,233 of the 89,550 (2.49 percent) eligible entities—that is, certain entities already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances—had registered with DEA to use disposal bins to collect unused prescription drugs. Most—about 81 percent—of the authorized collectors were pharmacies, followed by hospitals or clinics. GAO also found that participation rates varied by state, though in 44 states less than 5 percent of the state's pharmacies and other eligible entities had registered to become authorized collectors. Stakeholders cited several factors that may explain why relatively few pharmacies and other eligible entities have registered with DEA as authorized collectors of unused drugs. Most notably, stakeholders representing authorized collectors told GAO that because participation is voluntary, the cost associated with maintaining a disposal bin—which includes purchasing and installing the bin according to DEA requirements and paying for the destruction of its contents—is an important factor to weigh against potential benefits. DEA noted that availability of disposal by law enforcement agencies also contributes to low participation.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: The federal government has recognized 573 Indian tribes as distinct, independent political communities with tribal sovereignty  There are different categories of tribal lands, with differing implications with respect to ownership and administration  Reservations are defined geographic areas with established boundaries recognized by the United States  Tribal lands vary in size, demographics, and location  For example, those lands smallest in size are less than one square mile, and the largest, the Navajo Nation, is more than 24,000 square miles (the size of West Virginia)  Tribal land locations can range from extremely remote, rural locations to urban areas  Figure 1 shows tribal lands in the United States according to the 2010 Census  The term “broadband” commonly refers to Internet access that is high speed and provides an “always-on” connection, so users do not have to reestablish a connection each time they access the Internet  Broadband service may be “fixed”—that is, providing service to a single location, such as a customer’s home—or “mobile,” that is, providing service wherever a customer has access to a mobile wireless network, including while on the move, through a mobile device, such as a smartphone  Fixed and mobile broadband providers deploy and maintain infrastructure to connect consumers to the Internet  Providers offer fixed Internet service through a number of technologies, such as copper phone lines, fiber-optic lines, coaxial cables, wireless antennas, satellites, or a mix of technologies (see fig  2)  To install fixed or wireless infrastructure, providers must obtain permits from government entities with jurisdiction over the land or permission from public utilities to deploy infrastructure on existing utility poles  The federal government has emphasized the importance of ensuring Americans have access to broadband, and a number of agencies, including FCC, currently provide funding to subsidize broadband deployment in areas in which the return on investment has not attracted private investment  The Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, specifies that consumers in “rural, insular, and high-cost areas” should have access to telecommunication services and rates that are “reasonably comparable” to consumers in urban areas  To achieve this goal, FCC administers the High-Cost program, which provides subsidies to providers of phone service in rural, insular, and other remote areas  In 2011, FCC launched a series of reforms to its High-Cost program, including adding support for broadband services, and created the Connect America Fund, which provides subsidies to fixed and mobile providers of telecommunications and broadband services in rural, insular, and other remote areas where the costs of providing service is high  To be eligible for Universal Service Fund support from FCC, a provider must be designated an Eligible Telecommunications Carrier by the appropriate state or by FCC and must meet certain service obligations  The Connect America Fund has distributed approximately $4 5 billion per year, and has separate funding mechanisms targeted to specific goals  For example, there are funds for fixed-phone and broadband service and funds for mobile service, including a Tribal Mobility Fund (Phase 1) that awarded nearly $50 million in 2014 for the provision of 3G and 4G service to unserved tribal areas  In addition to FCC, a number of other agencies provide funding for broadband deployment in unserved or underserved areas  For example, the United States Department of Agriculture’s Community Connect Program, which provides grants to rural communities to provide high- speed Internet service to unserved areas  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) mandated the development of a nationwide map of broadband availability  To implement the act, the National Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA)—an agency within the Department of Commerce—established a grant program to enable U S  states and territories to collect state-level broadband mapping data  NTIA used these data to launch the National Broadband Map (www broadbandmap gov) in February 2011  As the funding for the NTIA’s program came to an end in 2014, NTIA stopped collecting data to update the map and, according to FCC officials, created a memorandum of understanding with FCC through which FCC agreed to maintain public access to the last version of the map  FCC issued rules in 2013 to begin collecting broadband deployment data, in addition to the broadband subscription data it had collected from providers since 2000  FCC sought, but did not receive, $3 million to update the National Broadband Map in its fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2016 budgets  In 2018, Congress directed FCC to develop a report by March 23, 2019, evaluating broadband coverage in certain tribal lands (to include an assessment of areas that have adequate broadband coverage, as well as an assessment of unserved areas), and to complete a proceeding to address unserved areas by September 23, 2020  Currently, FCC requires broadband providers to report on their broadband deployment by filing a form twice a year (Form 477)  Fixed broadband providers submit a list of the census blocks in which their broadband service is available, and mobile providers submit “shapefiles”—a geospatial depiction of the coverage area, which FCC refers to as “polygons”—of their coverage areas  FCC uses providers’ 477 data to develop a statutorily mandated annual report on advanced telecommunications capability  In addition, in 2016, FCC began publishing its own maps of broadband deployment, using the information from providers’ Form 477 filings  In February 2018, FCC launched an updated map of fixed broadband deployment (https://broadbandmap fcc gov/#/)  This map allows users to search for broadband deployment by address and provides summary-level statistics regarding broadband deployment in specific tribal lands (see fig  3)  According to FCC officials, this new map format will support more frequent data updates  FCC also provides national maps of mobile LTE coverage; these maps do not allow users to access data at the same level of granularity as the maps of fixed broadband (see fig  4)  FCC collects and uses data that capture broadband availability to measure broadband access on tribal lands, leading to overstatements of broadband access on tribal lands  Specifically, FCC’s method of collecting mobile and fixed broadband data from providers (the Form 477) does not accurately or completely capture broadband access on tribal lands because it (1) captures nationwide broadband availability data— areas where providers may have broadband infrastructure—but does so in a way that leads to overstatements of availability, and (2) does not capture information on factors that FCC and tribal stakeholders have stated can affect broadband access on tribal lands, such as affordability, service quality, and denials of service  Nonetheless, FCC uses its Form 477 broadband availability data in annual broadband deployment reports to measure the percentage of Americans living on tribal lands with or without access to broadband, and to measure progress toward FCC’s strategic goal of increasing all Americans’ access to affordable broadband  By using broadband availability data to measure broadband access on tribal lands, FCC overstates broadband access on tribal lands  FCC’s Form 477, its primary method of collecting nationwide broadband data, collects information on broadband availability, which identifies where providers have broadband infrastructure and could potentially provide broadband services but not where consumers can actually access those services  Moreover, the Form 477’s mobile broadband data- collection methods are not standardized, and its fixed broadband data- collection methods are not sufficiently granular to provide information about broadband availability on tribal lands  FCC’s Form 477 requires mobile broadband providers to report their coverage areas by submitting geospatial data depicting the areas in which consumers could expect to receive the minimum advertised speed  FCC has previously noted the importance of collecting nationally standardized, uniform broadband data from providers to assess broadband availability and allow for easy comparison across providers  However, the Form 477 does not require that providers use a standardized method with defined technical parameters (such as signal strength, or amount of interference) when determining their coverage area, resulting in data that cannot be meaningfully compared across providers, according to FCC  To map their coverage areas, providers may use predictive models based on different measurement methods and a variety of factors known to affect mobile broadband service such as topography, tree cover, and buildings, among other factors  Providers and tribal stakeholders have expressed concern with the accuracy of FCC’s mobile broadband data, and FCC has acknowledged concerns that the lack of a standardized method resulted in data that were unreliable for the purposes of determining mobile broadband coverage for specific geographic areas, such as tribal lands  About half of the tribal government representatives we interviewed told us that they believe FCC’s data overstate mobile LTE broadband availability on their lands  For example, a few representatives expressed concerns with the accuracy of the mobile data in areas with varied terrain, such as mountains and valleys  In comments to FCC, broadband providers have also raised concerns regarding the accuracy of the mobile coverage data generated by the Form 477 for the purposes of identifying areas eligible for funding through FCC’s Mobility Fund Phase II program, which provides federal funding to increase mobile broadband services in unserved areas  In 2017, in response to such concerns, FCC reversed its prior decision to use the Form 477 data to identify specific areas eligible for federal funding through the Mobility Fund Phase II program  Instead, FCC undertook a one-time special data collection, for which it required providers to measure their coverage based on a common set of standards, in order to better identify unserved areas that would be presumptively eligible for funding  FCC plans to allow parties, including tribal governments, to challenge the data where they believe the data overstate mobile broadband coverage through August, 2018  Additionally, in an August 2017 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC requested comment on potential changes to modernize its Form 477 data collection, including whether it should require all providers to use a standardized method when submitting mobile coverage data on the form  FCC officials told us that they do not have a timeline for the development of a final rule, and as of August 2018, FCC had not yet issued a final rule on modernizing the Form 477  The Form 477 collects fixed broadband data that are not sufficiently granular to accurately depict broadband availability on tribal lands  Specifically, FCC directs fixed broadband providers to submit a list of census blocks where service is available on the Form 477  FCC defines “available” as whether the provider does—or could, within a typical service interval or without an extraordinary commitment of resources— provide service to at least one end-user premises in a census block  Thus, in its annual reports and maps of fixed broadband service, FCC considers an entire block to be served if a provider reports that it does, or could offer, service to at least one household in the census block  FCC does not define a typical service interval or an extraordinary commitment of resources in its Form 477 instructions  However, FCC officials stated that providers should not report service in areas in which major construction would be required to provide service  A few providers told us that the lack of clear guidance from FCC regarding how to determine where broadband is available has led different providers to interpret the Form 477 directions in different ways, which can affect the accuracy and consistency of reporting from provider to provider  For example, in a filing with FCC, one provider stated that it had misapplied the definition of “available” and, as a result, overstated the availability of its services by almost 3,000 census blocks  As shown in figure 5, FCC’s definition of availability leads to overstatements of fixed broadband availability on tribal lands by: (1) counting an entire census block as served if only one location has broadband, and (2) allowing providers to report availability in blocks where they do not have any infrastructure connecting homes to their networks if the providers determine they could offer service to at least one household  Almost all the providers and private companies, and most of the representatives of tribal governments and organizations we spoke with told us that due to these issues, FCC’s definition of availability results in data that overstate broadband availability  According to FCC officials, FCC requires providers to report fixed broadband availability where they could provide service within a “typical service interval” and without “an extraordinary commitment of resources” in order to: (1) ensure that it captures instances in which a provider has a network nearby but has not installed the last connection to the homes, and (2) identify where service is connected to homes, but homes have not subscribed  FCC officials also told us that FCC measures availability at the census block level because sub-census block data may be costly to collect  In 2013, FCC considered collecting more granular nationwide data on broadband deployment but decided against collecting these data because it determined that the burden would outweigh the benefit  However, FCC, tribal stakeholders, and providers have noted that FCC’s approach leads to overstatements of availability  For example, in its 2017 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on modernizing the Form 477 data collection, FCC acknowledged that by requiring a provider to report where it could provide service, it is impossible to tell whether the provider would be unable or unwilling to take on additional subscribers in a census block it lists as served  According to FCC, this limits the value of the data to inform FCC policies  In addition, several providers and tribal stakeholders we interviewed said that some “digital subscriber line” (DSL) and fixed wireless providers may overstate their service areas on the Form 477 because they may not take into account technological or terrain limitations that would affect their ability to actually provide service  FCC has also recognized that by measuring availability at the census block level, not every person will have access to broadband in a block that the data show as served, and FCC has noted that in rural areas, such as tribal lands, census blocks can be large and providers may only deploy service to a portion of the census block  A few representatives for tribal governments and organizations noted that the use of census blocks may uniquely overstate broadband availability on tribal lands when census blocks contain both tribal and non-tribal areas, because availability in the non-tribal portion of the block can result in the tribal area of the census block also being counted as served  FCC is considering requiring providers to report whether they are willing and able to serve additional customers in a census block and collecting sub-census block data in its 2017 proposed rulemaking on modernizing the Form 477  About one-third of the parties that commented on FCC’s proposals were not in favor of FCC collecting these more granular data on the Form 477, stating that the data would be less accurate and more burdensome for providers to collect and report, among other reasons, and questioned whether more detailed information on nationwide broadband availability is necessary  We heard similar concerns from a few of the providers and trade associations we interviewed  However, about one- third of the parties that commented on FCC’s proposals were in favor of collecting more granular data, stating that such data would be more useful for policymakers and more accurate  Additionally, a few tribally owned and non-tribal providers we interviewed told us that providers already maintain data for business purposes that would allow them to report more granular information on broadband availability  One stakeholder we spoke with pointed out that, as the federal government and states work to ensure the last remaining unserved areas—rural, low- population density areas including tribal lands—have service, sub- census-block-level data are needed to ensure that governments are making wise and accurate investments  FCC does not collect information on several factors that FCC and tribal stakeholders have stated can affect broadband access  FCC and tribal stakeholders have noted that broadband access can be affected by factors such as the affordability and quality of the broadband services being offered, and the extent to which providers deny service to those who request it  By collecting and using data on factors that can affect broadband access, FCC would have more complete information on the extent to which Americans living on tribal lands have access to broadband Internet services  Affordability: FCC has noted that affordability of broadband services can affect broadband access but does not collect information on the cost of broadband service on tribal lands on the Form 477  For example, in the National Broadband Plan, FCC cited affordable access to robust broadband service as a long-term goal, and in its Strategic Plan 2018–2022, FCC acknowledged that affordability is an important factor affecting broadband access and a key driver of the digital divide  Moreover, most of the representatives of tribal governments and organizations we spoke to told us that the affordability of broadband services is an important factor for understanding whether or not people on tribal lands could realistically access broadband services  Tribal government officials from one tribe we spoke with told us that residents on their lands cannot access broadband because it is too costly  For example, a provider that advertises services on the tribe’s land charges $130 per month for broadband services, approximately one-and-a-half times the average rate providers charge for comparable services in urban areas, according to FCC (see fig  6)  In the 2018 Broadband Deployment Report, FCC acknowledged that affordability can influence a consumer’s decision on whether to purchase broadband, but FCC did not consider cost in its assessment of broadband access on tribal lands, stating that pricing does not go to the congressional requirement to assess deployment and availability in conducting its inquiry as required by Congress under section 706 of the Telecommunications Act and also citing a lack of reliable comprehensive data on this issue  In addition, FCC officials we interviewed acknowledged that while broadband service may be technically available, it may be prohibitively expensive for some, which may make availability alone an incomplete indicator of broadband access  Quality of Service: In the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Congress recognized the importance of service quality by defining advanced telecommunications capability as any technology that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications  In keeping with this legislation, FCC has consistently set thresholds for speeds that qualify as broadband services and has stated that “latency” and consistency of service figure prominently into whether a broadband service is able to provide advanced capabilities and thus whether users can access high-quality telecommunications  Likewise, almost all of the representatives for tribal governments or organizations we interviewed told us that quality of service is a key component of access to broadband and that routine outages, slow speeds, and high latency keep people on tribal lands from consistently accessing the Internet  Most tribal stakeholders and a few providers we interviewed told us that factors such as terrain, weather, and type of technology can all affect the quality of service an end user receives and, ultimately, the subscribers’ ability to access the Internet (see fig  7)  For example, some representatives of tribal governments and organizations told us issues like oversubscription— when a provider signs up more customers than its equipment can handle—and outdated or limited infrastructure result in low-quality services that cannot support advanced and, in some cases, basic functions  Though FCC uses the Form 477 to collect some data on advertised speeds from providers, FCC does not collect data on actual speeds, service outages, and latency on the form  In its 2018 Broadband Deployment Report, FCC stated that it did not consider FCC data on actual speed, latency, or consistency of service when evaluating broadband access due to the lack of appropriate data  FCC noted that the lack of Form 477 data on actual speeds in particular constrained evaluation of mobile broadband access  Service Denials: FCC has recognized that information on denials of service is pertinent to understanding actual broadband access but does not collect data on service denials in the Form 477  Specifically, in the National Broadband Plan, FCC recommended that FCC collect data to determine whether broadband service is being denied to potential residential customers based on the income of the residents in a particular geographic area  Some representatives of the tribal governments or organizations told us that that they were aware of a provider denying service to residents of tribal lands, despite the provider reporting broadband availability on at least a portion of those lands, according to our analysis of the Form 477 data  These representatives told us that they believed service was denied because of disputes with the tribal government, low demand for service, or the high costs of extending services to the home on tribal lands  Some representatives of tribal governments or organizations we spoke with also told us that providers may have denied service because their equipment was at capacity and could not accommodate new users (see fig  8)  For example, on three of the tribal lands we visited, we observed fiber optic cable located close to government and residential structures that did not have broadband access via fiber  According to tribal government officials, despite the physical proximity of the fiber optic cable, the tribal government and residents could not access it because the provider was not offering service or was unwilling or unable to build to the structures  A few providers we interviewed stated that they may not provide services to individuals who request them because of high-costs, administrative barriers, or technical limitations  However, FCC does not collect data on service denials on the Form 477  In its Strategic Plan 2018–2022 and the National Broadband Plan, FCC identified increasing all Americans’ access to affordable broadband as a long-term, strategic goal  Congress has similarly directed FCC to develop policies and programs aimed at increasing access to affordable broadband in all regions of the United States, including tribal lands, and required FCC to report annually on its progress  According to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), as enhanced by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), agencies should use accurate and reliable data to measure progress toward achieving their goals  Additionally, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that agencies should use quality information— information that is complete, appropriate, and reliable—to inform decision-making processes and evaluate the agency’s performance in achieving goals  According to these standards, agencies should also communicate quality information externally to achieve the agency’s goals  However, FCC has used its Form 477 data, which do not accurately or completely measure broadband access on tribal lands, as its primary source to evaluate progress toward FCC’s strategic goal of increasing broadband access and to develop maps and reports intended to depict broadband access on tribal lands  For example, in its 2018 Broadband Deployment Report, FCC found that 64 6 percent of Americans residing on tribal lands have access to fixed broadband services  By using these data, FCC has overstated the extent to which Americans living on tribal lands can actually access broadband Internet services and FCC’s progress toward increasing broadband access  As a result, the digital divide may appear less significant as a national challenge, and FCC and tribal stakeholders working to target broadband funding to unserved or underserved tribal lands will be limited in their ability to make informed decisions  This increases the risk that residents living on tribal lands will continue to lack broadband access  Some tribal officials stated that inaccurate data have affected their ability to plan their own broadband networks and obtain federal broadband funding, and most of the tribal stakeholders we interviewed identified a pressing need for accurate data on the gaps in broadband access on tribal lands in order to ensure that tribes can qualify for federal funding and to effectively target the areas that need it most  For example, representatives for one tribal government that is providing broadband services said the government will not be able to use a federal grant to build broadband infrastructure in areas of their reservation that lack access, because the Form 477 data overstate actual access on the tribe’s land  As more than three quarters of the tribal governments we spoke to are working to provide broadband services on their lands in some capacity, overstating broadband access on tribal lands could affect the ability of a number of tribes to access federal funding to increase broadband access on their lands  As previously discussed, FCC is considering proposals to modify its Form 477 data collection as part of a 2017 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, but FCC officials told us that the Commission does not have a timeline for issuance of a final rule  While some of FCC’s proposals could help address some of the limitations identified above by, for example, collecting more granular nationwide broadband availability data, FCC has not addressed specifically the collection of more accurate and complete data on broadband access for tribal lands in this proceeding  FCC has identified the need to improve broadband data for tribal lands in particular, and as previously noted, in 2018 Congress directed FCC to develop a report evaluating broadband coverage in certain tribal lands and initiate a proceeding to address the unserved areas identified in the report  FCC officials told us that FCC has not determined how it will address this requirement, but it is currently considering its options, including potentially addressing the requirement as part of its ongoing proposed rulemaking on modernizing the Form 477 data collection  An evaluation of broadband coverage on tribal lands that relies on the current Form 477 data would be subject to the limitations described above, including the overstatement of broadband access on tribal lands  Additionally, FCC has demonstrated that it is possible in some circumstances to collect more granular data when such data collection is targeted to a specific need or area  For example, in 2017 FCC began requiring certain providers that receive funding through the Connect America Fund to report the latitude and longitude of locations where broadband is available, and FCC has noted that these more granular data are extremely useful to the Commission, especially for rural areas where census blocks can be quite large  A few large providers and trade associations similarly stated in public comments on FCC’s proposed rulemaking to modernize the Form 477 process that FCC should target its collection of more granular broadband data to areas where the data are most likely to be overstated—specifically, large, rural census blocks with low population densities, such as those on tribal lands  Additionally, as discussed above, FCC undertook a one-time special data collection for Mobility Fund II to ensure that the mobile broadband data it collected would be reliable for the intended use  By developing and implementing methods for collecting and reporting accurate and complete data on broadband access specific to tribal lands, FCC would be able to better identify tribal areas without access to broadband and to target federal broadband funding to the tribal areas most in need  FCC uses data submitted by broadband providers via the Form 477 process to develop maps and datasets depicting broadband services nationwide, and in specific locations, such as tribal lands, but does not have a formal process to obtain input from tribes on the accuracy of the broadband data  FCC’s 2010 National Broadband Plan noted the need for the federal government to improve the quality of data regarding broadband on tribal lands and recommended that FCC work with tribes to ensure that any information collected is accurate and useful  It also noted that tribal representatives should have the opportunity to review mapping data about tribal lands and offer supplemental data or corrections  Similarly, federal internal control standards note the need for federal agencies to communicate with external entities, such as tribal governments, and to enable these entities to provide quality information to the agency that will help it achieve its objectives  FCC officials told us that they address questions and concerns regarding provider coverage claims submitted to the Office of Native Affairs and Policy, which will work with tribal governments to help them identify inaccurate broadband data for tribal lands, and share tribal questions and concerns with the appropriate FCC bureaus  However, FCC does not have a formal process for tribes (or other governmental entities) to provide input to ensure that the broadband data FCC collects through the 477 process, or the resulting maps that FCC creates to depict broadband on tribal lands, are accurate  Similarly, FCC does not use other methods to verify provider-submitted Form 477 data on tribal lands against other sources of information, such as on-site tests or data collected by other agencies  When discussing the lack of a formal process for tribal representatives or other governmental entities to provide feedback on the accuracy of the 477 broadband data, FCC officials noted that if consumers and local officials have information on individual locations that lack broadband service, such information does not indicate that the entire census block lacks broadband service  Additionally, FCC officials noted that providers attest to the accuracy of the data and that FCC staff validate the data by conducting internal checks to identify possible errors, such as unlikely changes in a providers’ coverage area, and may follow-up with a provider to discuss such changes  However, these checks do not include soliciting input from tribes  About half of the tribal stakeholders we spoke to raised concerns that FCC’s broadband deployment data rely solely on unverified information submitted by providers  Additionally, most tribal stakeholders we interviewed told us that consistent with the recommendations in the National Broadband Plan, FCC should work directly with tribes to obtain information from them to improve the accuracy of its broadband deployment data for tribal lands  These stakeholders identified several ways in which FCC could work with tribes on this issue, including: conducting on-site visits with tribal stakeholders to observe the extent to which broadband infrastructure and services are present; conducting outreach and technical assistance for tribal stakeholders to raise awareness and use of FCC’s broadband data; and providing opportunities for the tribes to collect their own data or submit feedback regarding the accuracy of FCC’s data  FCC’s National Broadband Plan notes the importance of supporting tribal efforts to build technical expertise with respect to broadband issues, and federal internal control standards state that federal agencies should obtain quality information from external entities  Officials we interviewed in FCC’s Office of Native Affairs and Policy told us that they provide some outreach and technical assistance to tribal officials at regional and national workshops, and FCC officials stated that they conducted specific outreach to tribal entities regarding the Mobility Fund Phase II challenge process, while, about half of the tribal representatives we spoke to stated that they were not aware of the Form 477 data or corresponding maps, or raised concerns about a lack of outreach from FCC to inform tribes about the data  Some tribal stakeholders stated that if FCC were to solicit tribal input as part of its verification of the broadband data and maps, technical training and assistance could help tribes use and provide feedback on the data, or improve the collection and submission of their own data  A few of the stakeholders we interviewed noted that tribes can face difficulties when they attempt to challenge FCC’s broadband availability data  For example, in 2013, prior to the auction that distributed Tribal Mobility Fund Phase 1 support, FCC allowed interested parties to challenge FCC’s preliminary determinations regarding which census blocks lacked 3G or better service and would be eligible for support in the auctions  However, all of the tribal entities that challenged the accuracy of FCC’s data were unsuccessful in increasing the number of eligible areas  According to FCC officials, the tribal entities did not provide sufficient or sufficiently verifiable information to support their challenges  A few tribal stakeholders provided varying reasons for this, one of which was the need for more technical expertise to help the tribe meet FCC’s requirements  Because FCC lacks a formal process to obtain tribal input on its broadband data, FCC is missing an important source of information regarding areas in which the data may overstate broadband service on tribal lands  Tribal stakeholders are able to provide a first-hand perspective on the extent to which service is available within their lands and the extent to which factors like affordability, service quality, and service denials affect residents’ ability to access broadband  FCC plans to award nearly $2 billion in support from the Connect America Fund to areas that it has identified as lacking broadband, including tribal lands  Any inaccuracies in its broadband data could affect FCC’s funding decisions and the ability of tribal lands to access broadband in the future  Additionally, in its 2017 report on tribal infrastructure, the National Congress of American Indians stressed the importance of including tribal governments in a leadership role with respect to collecting data on local infrastructure needs  Specifically, it stressed the need for the federal government to invest in tribal data systems and researchers to generate useful, locally specific data that can inform the development and implementation of infrastructure development projects and assess the effectiveness of those projects over time  By establishing a process to obtain input from tribal governments on the accuracy of provider- submitted broadband data that includes outreach and technical assistance, as recommended in the National Broadband Plan, FCC could help tribes develop and share locally specific information on broadband access, which would in turn improve the accuracy of FCC’s broadband data for tribal lands  The success of such an effort may rely on the tribes’ knowledge of, and technical ability to participate in, the process  When discussing the need to improve data regarding broadband on tribal lands, FCC’s 2010 National Broadband Plan recommended that FCC develop a process for tribes to receive information from providers about broadband services on tribal lands  In 2011, FCC required that Eligible Telecommunications Carriers (providers receiving Universal Service Funds from FCC) serving tribal lands meaningfully engage with tribes regarding communications services (including broadband)  Specifically, the providers must file an annual report documenting that this engagement included a discussion of, among other things, a needs assessment and deployment planning for communications services, including broadband  FCC’s 2012 guidance on fulfilling the engagement obligations, which FCC officials confirmed is still in effect, noted that the stated goal of the engagement requirement was to benefit tribal government leaders, providers, and consumers by fostering a dialogue between tribal governments and providers that would lead to improved services on tribal lands  The guidance further noted that the tribal engagement process “cannot be viewed as simply another ‘check the box’ requirement by either party,” and states that a provider should “demonstrate repeated good faith efforts to meaningfully engage with the tribal government ” Finally, FCC noted in its 2012 guidance that the guidance would evolve over time based on the feedback of both tribal governments and broadband providers and that FCC would develop further guidance and best practices  This approach is consistent with federal internal control standards, which call for agencies to communicate with, and obtain quality information from, external parties  About half of the tribal stakeholders we interviewed raised concerns about difficulties accessing information from providers regarding broadband deployment on their tribe’s lands, a key part of the provider engagement process, according to FCC’s guidance  For example, a representative from one tribe stated that a provider declined his requests to meet more than once a year to discuss the provider’s deployment of broadband services on the tribe’s land  A representative from another tribal government stated that some providers are very focused and transparent about their broadband plans and work with the tribe, while other providers treat tribal engagement as a “box to check” and send the tribe broadband deployment information that is not useful because it is redacted  Similarly, some tribal stakeholders stated that providers heavily redacted deployment information (which providers may consider proprietary) or required the tribe sign non-disclosure agreements to access deployment data  According to one tribal stakeholder, these non-disclosure agreements could possibly require tribes to waive tribal sovereign immunity in order to view the data  Some of the industry stakeholders we interviewed stated that they attempt to engage with tribes but the level of responsiveness from tribes varies  For example, some stakeholders stated that they send letters and do not hear back from tribes  One stakeholder stated that they make repeated attempts to contact tribes when they do not hear back after their initial contact, while another stated that a provider meets regularly with some tribes  Although FCC stated in its 2012 guidance that it would update the tribal engagement guidance and develop best practices based on feedback from tribal governments and broadband providers, it has taken limited steps to obtain such feedback from providers and tribal governments to determine whether its guidance is enabling meaningful tribal engagement  Additionally, FCC has not updated the guidance or issued best practices  Thus, FCC has limited information regarding whether its tribal engagement requirement is fulfilling its intended purpose  FCC officials we interviewed said that the Office of Native Affairs and Policy (ONAP) provided information and, in some cases, held training sessions about the tribal engagement obligation during workshops with tribal representatives, and encouraged representatives to contact ONAP with any concerns  ONAP officials also noted that they handle complaints from tribes regarding a lack of provider engagement and reach out to providers to address tribal concerns  ONAP officials stated that they have had internal discussions about whether the guidance is clear or needs revision, but this has not gone beyond internal discussions  A few of the tribal stakeholders provided examples of the benefits of providers engaging with tribes to ensure tribal representatives have access to information regarding broadband availability on their lands  For example, one representative stated that this information could help the tribes plan deployments by focusing on areas that they know the provider does not plan to serve  Another representative stated that tribal engagement could help improve the accuracy of FCC’s broadband maps  By obtaining feedback from both tribal stakeholders and providers on the effectiveness of FCC’s tribal engagement guidance to determine whether changes are needed, FCC would be better positioned to ensure that tribal governments and providers are sharing information in a manner that will lead to improved services on tribal lands  FCC has collected data and developed maps and reports depicting broadband on tribal lands and has noted the lower levels of broadband access on tribal lands, in comparison to other areas  However, limitations in FCC’s existing process for collecting and reporting broadband data have led FCC to overstate broadband access on tribal lands  By taking steps to address these limitations and to collect data that more accurately and completely depict broadband access on tribal lands, FCC would have greater assurance that it is making progress on reducing the digital divide on tribal lands and targeting broadband funding to tribal lands most in need  Without taking these steps, FCC increases the risk that residents living on tribal lands will continue to lack broadband access  Compounding the limitations in FCC’s data collection process is FCC’s lack of a formal process to obtain tribal input on the accuracy of provider- submitted broadband data for tribal lands  By developing a process to solicit tribal input and ensuring that tribes know about the process and are equipped with the technical skills and abilities necessary to provide this information, FCC would be better able to ensure the accuracy of its broadband data for tribal lands  Moreover, FCC would be able to obtain firsthand, locally specific information on broadband access that could inform FCC’s policies and funding decisions and help FCC achieve its goal of increasing broadband access for all Americans, including those living on tribal lands  Finally, by obtaining feedback from providers and tribal stakeholders on the effectiveness of FCC’s tribal engagement guidance, FCC would be better positioned to assess whether its guidance is helping providers meet requirements and ultimately whether providers’ engagement is fulling its intended purpose of fostering a dialogue between tribal governments and providers that would lead to improved services on tribal lands  We are making the following three recommendations to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission  The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission should develop and implement methods—such as a targeted data collection—for collecting and reporting accurate and complete data on broadband access specific to tribal lands  (Recommendation 1) The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission should develop a formal process to obtain tribal input on the accuracy of provider-submitted broadband data that includes outreach and technical assistance to help tribes participate in the process  (Recommendation 2) The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission should obtain feedback from tribal stakeholders and providers on the effectiveness of FCC’s 2012 statement to providers on how to fulfill their tribal engagement requirements to determine whether FCC needs to clarify the agency’s tribal engagement statement  (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report to FCC for review and comment  In written comments provided by FCC (reproduced in appendix III), FCC agreed with our findings and recommendations  In its written comments, FCC described efforts, some of which are already under way, that it felt would address each recommendation and stated its intent to build upon those efforts  For example, FCC explained that it is exploring methods to collect more granular broadband deployment data and noted the need to balance the burden on Form 477 filers  FCC also noted that it is starting work to address a statutorily-required evaluation of broadband coverage on certain tribal lands  We agree that increasing the granularity of deployment data is helpful in addressing data accuracy issues, but we also note that it is important to collect data related to factors that affect broadband access on tribal lands  FCC also described informal efforts to collect tribal feedback on providers’ broadband data and stated it would explore options for a formal process to collect feedback  Regarding our recommendation related to providers’ engagement efforts, FCC outlined its existing methods by which tribal stakeholders can provide feedback on providers’ engagement efforts and agreed that seeking additional feedback from tribal stakeholders and providers would be desirable  We agree that improving feedback in these ways could help FCC determine whether it needs to clarify its tribal engagement statement  FCC also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or GoldsteinM@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV  Appendix I: List of Interviewees Representatives from tribal governments or tribally owned broadband providers Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma (OK) Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation (WA) Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa (MN) Fort Belknap Indian Community (MT) Gila River Telecommunications, Inc  (AZ) Hopi Telecommunications, Inc  (AZ) Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe (WA) Karuk Tribe (CA) Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe (MN) Makah Tribe (WA) Navajo Tribal Utility Authority (AZ, NM, UT) Nez Perce Tribe (ID) Osage Nation (OK) Pueblo of Acoma (NM) Pueblo of Pojoaque (NM) Pueblo of San Ildefonso (NM) Taos Pueblo (NM) Red Spectrum Communications (Coeur d’Alene Tribe (ID)) Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe and Mohawk Networks, LLC (NY) San Carlos Apache Telecommunications Utility, Inc  (AZ) Southern California Tribal Chairmen’s Association - Tribal Digital Village Network (CA) Spokane Tribe of Indians and Spokane Tribe Telecom Exchange (WA) Standing Rock Telecommunications, Inc  (ND, SD) Warm Springs Telecommunications Co  (OR) Yurok Tribe and Yurok Connect (CA) Representatives from tribal associations/consortiums that include tribes Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians Middle Rio Grande Pueblo Consortium National Congress of American Indians Native American Finance Officers Association (NAFOA) REDINet Representatives from companies/academic groups that work with tribes AMERIND Risk Arizona State University, American Indian Policy Institute and School of Public Affairs Turtle Island Communications Representatives from providers/trade associations (non-tribally owned) AT&T Representatives from companies that collect broadband data Alexicon Connected Nation Government Agencies (non-tribal) Census Bureau U S  Department of Agriculture’s Rural Utilities Service Department of Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs National Telecommunications and Information Administration Minnesota Office of Broadband Development One broadband provider we interviewed did not want to be included in this appendix  This report discusses the extent to which: (1) the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) approach to collecting broadband availability data accurately captures the ability of Americans living on tribal lands to access broadband Internet services and (2) FCC obtains tribal input on the accuracy of provider-submitted broadband data for tribal lands  To address both objectives, we analyzed FCC’s December 2016 fixed and mobile broadband availability data—the most recent data at the time of our review—to identify the speeds, technologies, and availability providers reported for federally recognized tribal lands  Providers currently report this information to FCC by filing a “Form 477,” twice a year  We also used 2010 U S  Census data to identify census blocks completely or partially on tribal lands  To assess the reliability of FCC’s data and 2010 U S  Census data, we reviewed a previous GAO reliability assessment, and for FCC’s data we conducted electronic testing and analysis of the data, reviewed FCC guidance and documentation, and interviewed FCC officials  Based on the results of our analysis, we determined the data to be reliable for our purposes, which were: (1) to inform our selection of tribal governments and providers for interviews and visits, as described below, and (2) to develop maps depicting fixed and mobile broadband availability for the nine tribal lands we selected for visits, in order to obtain tribal representatives’ feedback on the data  Specifically, we mapped; fixed broadband data according to speed and technology, and mobile data for long-term evolution (LTE) services by provider for each tribal land  We used those maps during our visits to discuss the accuracy of the data with representatives for each tribal government or tribally owned provider  Though we analyzed all up and download speeds that providers reported in the Form 477, for the purposes of this report we defined “broadband” as fixed Internet service reaching at least 25 megabits per second (Mbps) download and 3 Mbps upload speeds, in accordance with FCC’s advanced telecommunications capability benchmark in its 2018 Broadband Deployment Report  We also report on the availability of mobile broadband, which, for the purposes of this report, does not have a speed threshold and refers to long-term evolution (LTE) services  To address both objectives and obtain tribal government representatives’ feedback on the accuracy of FCC’s broadband data for their lands, we interviewed representatives from 25 tribal governments or tribally owned providers, including visits to 9 tribal lands  We considered a range of factors when we selected tribal governments and tribally owned providers for interviews, including our analysis of Form 477 data, recommendations from tribal, industry, or government stakeholders regarding tribal and non- tribal representatives familiar with broadband data issues, and demographic and geographic characteristics, among others  For example, we considered demographic characteristics such as unemployment rate from the 2011– 2015 American Community Survey data, and geographic characteristics such as rurality from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Rural-Urban Commuting Area Codes data  The tribes included in our review vary with respect to location, level of broadband availability according to FCC, land mass, and population size and density  The results of our interviews are not generalizable to all tribal governments or tribally owned broadband providers  In addition to tribal governments and tribally owned providers, we interviewed six tribal organizations and four stakeholders who work with tribes on broadband issues  For reporting purposes, we developed the following series of indefinite quantifiers to describe the tribal responses from the 35 entities representing tribal stakeholders we interviewed: 3 to 7 is defined as “a few;” 8 to 15 is described as “some;” 16 to 20 is described as “about half;” 21 to 27 is described as “most;” and 28 to 34 is described as “almost all ” A full list of the tribal stakeholders we interviewed can be found in appendix I  Further, to obtain industry perspectives, we reviewed public comments submitted by providers and industry associations in FCC’s ongoing 2017 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Modernizing the Form 477 Data Program  We also interviewed 10 non-tribally owned fixed and mobile broadband providers and three industry associations to understand providers’ views on the Form 477 and how providers interact with tribal governments  When selecting providers for interviews, we included providers that reported serving the lands of tribal governments we interviewed and selected providers that varied in the percentage of tribal lands they reported serving  The providers we interviewed represent large, nationwide carriers as well as small, local carriers, and offer broadband via a variety of technologies, including fiber optics, digital subscriber line (DSL), fixed wireless, and mobile LTE  The results of our interviews with providers are not generalizable to all broadband providers  In addition, to address both objectives, we interviewed representatives from other government entities, as well as private companies that collect and report broadband data  A full list of the industry stakeholders we interviewed can be found in appendix I  To identify the extent to which FCC’s approach to collecting broadband availability data reflects the ability of Americans living on tribal lands to actually access broadband Internet services, we reviewed documentation of the Form 477 process, including submission guidance, and FCC’s proposals and public comments in its 2017 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Modernizing the Form 477 Data Program and Mobility Fund Phase II proceedings  We also interviewed FCC officials, industry stakeholders, and tribally owned broadband providers to understand FCC’s current process for collecting broadband data  To understand the purpose of the Form 477 data collection process and FCC’s strategic goals, we reviewed relevant statutes, and FCC documents, including FCC’s Strategic Plan 2018––2022, the National Broadband Plan, and FCC’s broadband deployment and progress reports  Given the importance placed on broadband access in these documents, we interviewed tribal stakeholders, as described above and reviewed FCC documents to identify factors affecting the ability of Americans living on tribal lands to access broadband Internet services  We also reviewed previous GAO work that identified barriers to broadband access on tribal lands  We compared the Form 477 process to FCC’s strategic goals and to factors affecting broadband access to determine the extent to which the Form 477 was designed to collect information on those factors and to meet FCC’s goals  We further evaluated this information against the Government Performance and Results Act, as enhanced by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  We also reviewed documentation for other FCC data collection programs, including the Measuring Broadband America program and the Urban Rate Survey, to determine the extent to which FCC collected data on factors affecting broadband access outside of the Form 477 process  To determine the extent to which FCC obtains tribal input on the accuracy of provider-submitted broadband data for tribal lands, we interviewed FCC officials and analyzed FCC documents regarding the collection procedures for the Form 477 data and FCC’s policies for working with tribal governments, as well as Connect America Fund documents regarding requirements for providers to share information with tribal governments  We also reviewed documents on past FCC Universal Service Fund processes to challenge broadband data and identified prior instances in which tribal governments or tribally owned providers challenged FCC’s broadband data and the outcomes of those challenges  Additionally, we interviewed tribal stakeholders, as described above, to understand the extent to which: (1) FCC involves tribal governments and other stakeholders in the validation of Form 477 broadband data, (2) tribal governments can access broadband data from FCC or providers, and (3) FCC’s Form 477 data accurately reflected broadband access on their lands  For the nine tribal lands we visited, we asked tribal governments or tribally owned providers to identify where the data do or do not accurately reflect broadband access on maps of FCC’s data  Further, to identify how providers complied with FCC’s tribal engagement requirement and obtain their perspectives, we interviewed providers and industry associations  We compared FCC’s data validation procedures and tribal stakeholders’ feedback on the process to FCC’s policies for working with tribal governments, FCC recommendations from the National Broadband Plan and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  We also interviewed and received written comments from officials from other federal agencies that have broadband programs, including USDA Rural Utilities Service, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and others, in addition to a state agency and three private companies that collect and report broadband data to understand how other entities collect and validate broadband data  We conducted this performance audit from June 2017 to September 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  Mark L  Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or GoldsteinM@gao gov  In addition to the contact named above, Keith Cunningham (Assistant Director); Crystal Huggins (Analyst in Charge); Katherine Blair; Lilia Chaidez; Camilo Flores; Adam Gomez; Serena Lo; Jeffery Malcolm; John Mingus; Joshua Ormond; Jay Spaan; James Sweetman, Jr ; Elaine Vaurio; and Michelle Weathers made key contributions to this report 
Report 2:  Developing international military capacity  U S  officials told us that UN peacekeeping operations provide an indirect benefit of helping to professionalize the military units from many developing countries that contribute troops to the UN  We have previously reported that building military capacity of foreign partners to address security-related threats is an important goal of U S  national security strategy and foreign policy  According to U S  and UN officials, the relative strengths of U S  peacekeeping operations would be faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities  Deployment speed  State, DOD, and UN officials highlighted the United States’ ability to deploy troops and police to peacekeeping operations more quickly than the UN  Unlike the U S  military, which can draw from a ready pool of military personnel, the UN must seek troops from UN member states, which takes time  UN officials told us that the UN faces a shortage of both troops and UN police, which slows deployment  Further, a 2015 report by the UN High-level Panel on Peacekeeping stated that the UN “has struggled to get sufficient forces on the ground quickly enough and relies on under-resourced uniformed capabilities ” The report also stated that aviation, medical, and engineering specialists, among others, are difficult to mobilize in advance of infantry units  Command and control  State, DOD, and UN officials told us that U S  operations would enable the U S  military to have direct command and control, whereas UN operations, which are inherently multinational, face challenges with command and control over troops from several different countries  The UN High-level Panel report noted that UN peacekeeping operations’ weak command and control is a well-known constraint that limits the type of operations the UN can undertake  Logistics support  U S  and UN officials told us that U S  operations have superior logistics systems  U S  procurement likely would be faster than UN procurement, which lacks a standing supply chain and, therefore, relies on third-party vendors, according to UN officials  In addition, the UN High Level Panel report stated that UN peacekeeping operations’ logistics systems and structures in the field are under severe strain, which can limit the mobility of these operations  Intelligence capability  U S  and UN officials agreed that U S  operations would involve superior intelligence capability  The UN only recently established an intelligence policy—in May 2017—having recognized that some peacekeeping operations had been deployed in fragile political and security environments with asymmetrical and complex threats  However, UN officials acknowledged that the scope of UN intelligence capability remains limited  Counterterrorism capability  DOD officials told us that a U S  peacekeeping operation would have the capability to include a counterterrorism component and would not be constrained in the use of force, if needed, in response to terrorist threats  UN peacekeeping operations, on the other hand, lack the capabilities and specialized military preparation to engage in counterterrorism operations, according to the UN High-level Panel report  The UN report stated that counterterrorism should be undertaken by the host government, a capable regional force, or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the UN Security Council  According to the UN report, UN peacekeeping operations may engage in proactive and preemptive use of force to protect civilians and UN personnel from threats; however, offensive force to degrade, neutralize or defeat an opponent is a fundamentally different type of posture that should be authorized by the Security Council only under limited and exceptional circumstances  We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, and the UN for review and comment  DOD provided a letter, reproduced in appendix II, which stated that it had no comments  State did not provide comments  The UN provided technical comments, which we incorporated into our report as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Secretary- General of the United Nations  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  The objectives of this report were to (1) compare the reported costs of a specific United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identify factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations  To compare the reported costs of a specific UN peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we selected the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) as a case study  We compared the reported UN expenditures for MINUSCA, which included both military and civilian components, with estimated costs for a hypothetical U S  operation with a similar level of military and civilian personnel  Our comparison covers a total of 3 years and 3 months—from MINUSCA’s establishment in April 2014 through June 30, 2017, the end of UN fiscal year 2017  We selected MINUSCA because it is in sub-Saharan Africa, where most UN peacekeeping operations established since 2003 have taken place, and has a typical scope and budget compared to other UN peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa, according to U S  and UN officials  In addition, MINUSCA is one of the most recent UN peacekeeping operations; thus, initial expenditures for the operation are relatively current  Because the results of our cost comparison are based on a single case study, they cannot be generalized to all UN peacekeeping operations  To determine the UN’s costs for MINUSCA, we analyzed UN budget and expenditure data covering the initial start-up period (April 2014 to June 2014) and the first 3 UN fiscal years (July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2017)  We spoke with officials of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support, and Management at UN Headquarters in New York, New York, to better understand the characteristics of MINUSCA and the different costs affecting MINUSCA’s budget and expenditures  We assessed UN expenditure data through discussions with cognizant UN officials and a review of external audits of UN budgetary information and found them sufficiently reliable for our purposes  We also analyzed data on U S  contributions to UN peacekeeping operations for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 from the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Organization Affairs to determine total U S  contributions to MINUSCA, and UN peacekeeping operations overall  To estimate the costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we developed a hypothetical scenario for a U S  operation based on the MINUSCA budget and supporting documents, assuming deployment of the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel in the Central African Republic (CAR) over the same time period (April 2014 through June 2017)  To estimate the military portion of the operation, we interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) officials and staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a DOD-sponsored non-profit corporation involved in developing cost estimates for U S  contingency operations  The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller and IDA generated a cost estimate for the military components included in the hypothetical operation using the Contingency Operations Support Tool (cost estimating tool)  DOD uses this tool to develop cost estimates for all military contingency operations  The cost estimate included only the incremental costs of the operation—those directly attributable to the operation that would not be incurred if the operation did not take place  For example, the estimate produced by the cost estimating tool did not include the direct salaries of active duty personnel as those costs would be incurred by the United States regardless of a possible decision to undertake the hypothetical operation  We assessed the cost estimating tool’s applicability to developing a hypothetical cost estimate for the purposes of this report through discussions with DOD and IDA officials, and compared the tool to the accurate and comprehensive characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, as described in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide  While we found the DOD cost estimating tool generated a sufficiently reliable cost estimate for a hypothetical U S  peacekeeping operation, we did not assess the overall reliability of the tool or its capability to generate accurate or comprehensive estimates for future U S  operations  To generate our estimate of U S  military costs using the DOD’s estimating tool, we used UN military deployment numbers as a baseline for the scale of a hypothetical, comparable U S  peacekeeping operation, while using unit sizes and rotations in deployment that were considered appropriate for the U S  military, according to DOD and IDA officials  We based the hypothetical U S  operation, and hence the cost estimate, on the following assumptions, which correspond approximately with MINUSCA’s actual UN personnel deployments: Theater of operation: Central African Republic (CAR) Type of operation: military contingency Operation time frame: April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017 Military contingents: as of June 30, 2017, 11,495 total personnel Infantry: 10 units of 630-785 personnel per unit, approximately 90 percent active duty / 10 percent reserves Communication / signals: 1 unit, 124 personnel per unit Engineering: 4 units, 200 personnel per unit Military police: 1 unit, 120 personnel per unit Formed police units (military police): 12 units, 140 personnel per Hospital / medical: 1 level III hospital, 248 beds, 495 personnel Helicopter units: 2 UH-60 C3 units, 1 MH-60M Assault attack helicopter unit, 100 personnel per unit Quick reaction force: 1 unit, 160 personnel per unit Special forces: 1 tactical civilian affairs unit, 1 Marine special operations intelligence unit, 160 personnel per unit Unmanned aerial vehicle: 1 unit, 84 personnel Transportation: 1 heavy transport unit, 120 personnel per unit Operational tempo: 1 0 for all phases of operation and units, except aviation units (set at 1 5) Deployment schedule and phasing: phased deployment, including 14 days for predeployment (e g , training), 5 days for deployment, 180 days for active duty unit sustainment and 270 days for reserve unit sustainment, 5 days for redeployment, and 0 days for reconstitution Housing: contractor-provided semi-permanent housing Transportation: personnel and equipment transported by airlift from the United States (primarily Fort Hood, Texas), material (such as water, food, and other consumables) transported by airlift from Italy We obtained input on the operational design for the military portion of the cost estimate from DOD officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Policy, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, and IDA officials  However, the military portions of the scenario and their corresponding cost estimate have some limitations  As a result of rounding for some units, U S  military personnel numbers do not exactly match the MINUSCA deployment levels  In addition, based on input from DOD officials, we attempted to select military units that would provide an essential function per U S  common practices while keeping the overall personnel deployment level as close as possible to MINUSCA’s deployment level  An actual U S  military plan may differ significantly from the UN plan as a result of differences between U S  and UN military operations, structure, doctrine, and circumstances at the time of the operation  To estimate U S  civilian costs, we matched the number of U S  civilian police and personnel to the number serving in MINUSCA  We then estimated the costs of deploying these U S  civilian personnel in CAR for the same time period as MINUSCA  We did not attempt to determine how the U S  government would actually implement civilian components of a peacekeeping operation in CAR  To estimate U S  civilian police costs, we met with State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to identify State’s costs for civilian police contractors providing police training and technical assistance in sub-Saharan Africa  Based on INL’s input we assumed that the base salary of civilian police would be grade 13, step 5 on the Office of Personnel Management’s general schedule salary tables for federal employees  In addition to the average base salary, we identified other costs—with input from INL—including, among others, personal equipment, travel from the United States, and State’s published allowances specific to CAR for local cost of living, post hardship differential, danger pay, and living quarters  We applied the average cost per officer to the average number of UN civilian police officers deployed in MINUSCA  To estimate U S  civilian personnel costs, we met with State’s Bureau of Budget and Planning to identify the costs of State Foreign Service officers and locally employed staff, based on the number of UN international and national civilian staff deployed to MINUSCA, respectively  We matched the number of State Foreign Service officers for the U S  cost estimate to the number of UN international staff in MINUSCA, with input from State to align the grade levels  The estimated costs for Foreign Service officers include average salaries based on State’s Foreign Service salary tables and State’s allowances specific to CAR, including local cost of living, post hardship differential, and danger pay  We also met with State Bureau of Budget and Planning officials to estimate other costs for Foreign Service officers, which we included in our cost estimate, including post assignment travel, administrative support costs, residential furnishings, and residential guards, among others, but we did not assess the reliability of these additional costs provided by State  In addition, State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations provided the actual costs of residential leases for Foreign Service officers in CAR in fiscal year 2017, which we used to estimate the cost of housing Foreign Service officers in CAR  We also matched the number of State locally employed staff to the number of UN national staff deployed to MINUSCA and added their average salaries and other costs in CAR based on data provided by State’s Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services  While MINUSCA’s expenditures also included costs for sending an annual average of up to about 200 UN volunteers to CAR, State officials told us that the United States generally would not send volunteers through its assistance efforts to a high-risk post, such as CAR  Therefore, we did not include any costs related to volunteers in the cost estimate  We also did not include costs related to host-government-provided personnel serving in MINUSCA  In addition, UN expenditures included about $7 million for “quick-impact projects” to support local government infrastructure and civil society initiatives  We did not include comparable costs for quick-impact projects in our U S  cost estimate because we did not have a basis for matching these costs  To identify factors that affect cost differences between MINUSCA and a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we reviewed the U S  cost estimate generated in conjunction with DOD, IDA, and State officials, and identified significant areas of cost for the United States and the assumptions incorporated in the estimate or factors specified by U S  officials that drive those costs  We compared the U S  cost estimate, including these significant areas of cost, to UN costs to identify differences  We interviewed U S  and UN officials regarding U S  and UN standards and policies that explain differences between MINUSCA costs and the estimated costs of a U S  operation  To identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations, we reviewed UN reports on peacekeeping operations and interviewed UN, DOD, and State officials  In addition, we reviewed GAO’s 2006 report comparing the costs as well as the strengths of a UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti with those of a hypothetical U S  operation  We conducted our review from February 2017 through February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the individual named above, Drew Lindsey (Assistant Director), Howard Cott, Juan Pablo Avila-Tournut, Debbie Chung, Martin de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Jennifer Leotta, Caitlin Mitchell, Elizabeth Repko, and Alex Welsh made significant contributions to this report 

ground_truth: Broadband furthers economic development, educational attainment, and public health and safety; however, residents of tribal lands have lower levels of broadband access relative to the U.S. population. Congress has prioritized identifying and targeting funds to unserved areas. FCC uses data from broadband providers to develop maps and reports depicting broadband availability in the United States, with specific information on tribal lands. GAO was asked to review FCC's efforts to collect broadband data for tribal lands. This report examines the extent to which: (1) FCC's approach to collecting broadband data accurately captures broadband access on tribal lands and (2) FCC obtains tribal input on the data. GAO interviewed stakeholders from 25 tribal governments or tribally owned providers, and visited nine tribal lands. The selected tribes varied geographically and in levels of broadband availability, among other characteristics. GAO also reviewed FCC's rulemakings on broadband data and interviewed other tribal stakeholders, FCC officials, and 13 non-tribal broadband providers selected to include a diversity of technologies. Provider and tribal interviews were based on non-generalizable samples. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) collects data on broadband availability from providers, but these data do not accurately or completely capture broadband access on tribal lands. Specifically, FCC collects data on broadband availability; these data capture where providers may have broadband infrastructure. However, FCC considers broadband to be “available” for an entire census block if the provider could serve at least one location in the census block. This leads to overstatements of service for specific locations like tribal lands (see figure). FCC, tribal stakeholders, and providers have noted that this approach leads to overstatements of broadband availability. Because FCC uses these data to measure broadband access, it also overstates broadband access—the ability to obtain service—on tribal lands. Additionally, FCC does not collect information on several factors—such as affordability, quality, and denials of service—that FCC and tribal stakeholders stated can affect the extent to which Americans living on tribal lands can access broadband services. FCC provides broadband funding for unserved areas based on its broadband data. Overstatements of access limit FCC's and tribal stakeholders' abilities to target broadband funding to such areas. For example, some tribal officials stated that inaccurate data have affected their ability to plan their own broadband networks and obtain funding to address broadband gaps on their lands. By developing and implementing methods for collecting and reporting accurate and complete data on broadband access specific to tribal lands, FCC would be better able to target federal broadband funding to tribal areas that need it the most and to more accurately assess FCC's progress toward its goal of increasing all Americans' access to affordable broadband. FCC does not have a formal process to obtain tribal input on the accuracy of provider-submitted broadband data. In the National Broadband Plan , FCC highlighted the need for a targeted approach to improve broadband availability data for tribal lands. As outlined in the plan, such an approach would include working with tribes to ensure that information is accurate and useful. About half of the tribal stakeholders GAO interviewed raised concerns that FCC relies solely on data from providers, and most stated FCC should work with tribes to improve the accuracy of FCC's data. Establishing a formal process to obtain input from tribal governments on the accuracy of provider-submitted broadband data could help improve the accuracy of FCC's broadband data for tribal lands. GAO is making three recommendations to FCC, including that it collect and report data that accurately measure tribal broadband access as well as develop a process to obtain tribal input on the accuracy of the data. FCC agreed with the recommendations.