prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: According to VA officials and Omaha donor group representatives, two main factors coalesced to become the impetus for the CHIP-IN Act  One factor was an Omaha donor group’s interest in constructing an ambulatory care center that could help address the needs of veterans in the area, given uncertainty about when or whether VA would be able to build a planned replacement medical center  In 2011, VA allocated $56 million for the design of the replacement medical center in Omaha, which had a total estimated cost of $560 million  However, VA officials told us that given the agency’s backlog of construction projects, the replacement medical center was not among its near-term projects  In the meantime, according to VA officials and the Omaha donor group, they discussed a change in the scope of the project— from the original plan of a replacement medical center to a smaller- scope project for a new ambulatory care center—that could potentially be constructed using the existing appropriation of $56 million plus a donation from the Omaha donor group  Another factor was the Congress’s and VA’s broader interest in testing innovative approaches to meeting VA’s infrastructure needs  According to VA officials, the agency was interested in constructing medical facilities in a more expeditious manner and developing legislation that allowed private money to help address VA’s needs  The CHIP-IN Act authorized a total of five pilot projects but did not name any specific project locations  Subsequently, the Omaha donor group applied to participate in the pilot program—with the construction of an ambulatory care center—and VA executed a donation agreement in April 2017  VA may accept up to four more real property donations under the pilot program, which is authorized through 2021  The CHIP-IN Act places certain requirements on donations under the pilot program  VA may accept CHIP-IN donations only if the property: (1) has already received appropriations for a VA facility project, or (2) has been identified as a need as part of VA’s long-range capital planning process and the location is included on the Strategic Capital Investment Planning process priority list provided in VA’s most recent budget submission to Congress  The CHIP-IN Act also requires that a formal agreement between VA and the non-federal entity provide that the entity conduct necessary environmental and historic preservation due diligence, obtain permits, and use construction standards required of VA, though the VA Secretary may permit exceptions  VA entered into an agreement with the Omaha donor group for the design and construction of an ambulatory care center in April 2017—4 months after enactment of the CHIP-IN Act  According to this agreement, which establishes the terms of the donation, the Omaha donor group will complete the design and construction of the facility and consult with VA  The facility will provide approximately 158,000 gross square feet of outpatient clinical functions, including primary care, an eye clinic, general purpose radiology and ambulatory surgery, specialty care, and mental health care  According to VA officials, planning for the facility began in April 2017, after the donation agreement was executed, and the project broke ground in April 2018  This donation agreement includes the mutually agreed- upon design and construction standards, which incorporate both VA’s standards and private sector building standards  The donation agreement also sets the terms of VA’s review of the design and construction documents and establishes escrow operations for the holding and disbursement of federal funds  Upon the Omaha donor group’s completion of the facility (scheduled for summer 2020) and VA’s acceptance, the Omaha donor group will turn the facility over to VA  The total estimated project cost is approximately $86 million  VA is contributing the $56 million that had already been appropriated for the design of the replacement medical facility  The Omaha donor group will donate the remaining approximately $30 million in private sector donations needed to build the facility  As shown in figure 2 and described below, VA officials told us that several offices are involved in various aspects of the CHIP-IN pilot—such as executing the Omaha project, seeking additional partnerships, and establishing the overall pilot program effort  The VA Office of Construction and Facilities Management (CFM) includes its Office of Real Property (ORP) and Office of Operations  ORP has taken a lead role in establishing the pilot program, while CFM Operations has led the execution of the Omaha project  Other VA offices that have been involved at different stages include the Office of General Counsel and the Secretary’s Center for Strategic Partnerships  Within the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the local medical-center leadership was involved with developing the Omaha project, and the Office of Capital Asset Management, Engineering, and Support (Capital Asset Management Office) has contributed to efforts to identify additional projects  Some of these offices are involved with a steering committee created to implement the CHIP-IN Act (CHIP-IN steering committee)  This steering committee met for the first time in September 2018  In 2016, we identified five leading practices for designing a well- developed and documented pilot program: articulating an assessment methodology, developing an evaluation plan, assessing scalability, and ensuring stakeholder communication  (See fig  3 ) These practices enhance the quality, credibility, and usefulness of pilot program evaluations and help ensure that time and resources are used effectively  While each of the five practices serves a purpose on its own, taken together, they form a framework for effective pilot design  VA officials have worked to communicate with relevant stakeholders, but have not yet established objectives, developed an assessment methodology and evaluation plan, or documented how they will make decisions about scalability of the pilot program  In 2016, we reported that clear, measurable objectives can help ensure that appropriate evaluation data are collected from the outset of a pilot program  Measurable objectives should be defined in qualitative or quantitative terms, so that performance toward achieving the objectives can be assessed, according to federal standards for internal control  For example, broad pilot objectives should be translated into specific researchable questions that articulate what will be assessed  Establishing well-defined objectives is critical to effectively implementing the other leading practices for a pilot program’s design  Objectives are needed to develop an assessment methodology to help determine the data and information that will be collected  Objectives also inform the evaluation plan because performance of the pilot should be evaluated against these objectives  In addition, objectives are needed to assess the scalability of the pilot, to help inform decisions on whether and how to implement a new approach in a broader context (i e , whether the approach could be replicable in other settings)  Relevant VA stakeholders have not yet collectively agreed upon and documented overall objectives for the CHIP-IN pilot program, but the stakeholders said they are planning to do so  However, at the time of our review, each of the VA offices we interviewed presented various ideas of what the objectives for the pilot should be, reflecting their varied missions and roles in the CHIP-IN pilot  For example, A senior VHA official said the objectives should include (1) determining whether the CHIP-IN donation partnership approach is an effective use of VA resources and (2) defining general principles for the pilot, including a repeatable process for future CHIP-IN projects  A senior VA official who has been closely involved with the pilot said one objective should be determining how VA can partner with the private sector for future construction projects, whether through donation partnerships or other means  Officials from ORP, who have taken a lead role in establishing the pilot, told us their objectives include identifying the four additional projects authorized by the CHIP-IN Act, developing a process to undertake potential projects, and determining whether a recommendation should be made that Congress extend VA’s CHIP-IN authority beyond the 5-year pilot  ORP officials said they have written some of these objectives in an early draft of plans for the CHIP-IN steering committee, but they have also discussed other objectives that are not yet documented  While the various VA offices involved may have somewhat different interests in the pilot program, developing a set of clear, measureable objectives is an important part of a good pilot design  For example, several VA officials who are involved in the pilot told us that it would be useful for relevant internal stakeholders to collectively agree upon and document overall objectives  ORP officials told us that the newly formed CHIP-IN steering committee will discuss and formalize objectives for the pilot  However, at the time of our review, a draft of these objectives had not been developed and a timeline for developing objectives was not yet established  A discussion of objectives was planned for the steering committee’s first meeting in September but had been rescheduled for the next meeting in October 2018  VA officials told us that they did not immediately move to establish a framework for the pilot program—which would include objectives for the pilot—for various reasons  Some officials said that VA and the Omaha donor group entered into formal discussions shortly after the CHIP-IN Act was enacted, and that their focus at the time was on negotiating and then executing a donation agreement for that particular project  As such, formal efforts to establish the framework for the overall pilot effort were in initial stages at the time of our review  ORP officials also said that the enactment of the CHIP-IN Act was not anticipated at the time CFM was planning and budgeting its resources for fiscal years 2017 and 2018, so work on the pilot had to be managed within available resources, largely as an additional duty for staff  In addition, a senior VHA official said a meeting to agree upon the pilot program’s objectives was needed but had not been held yet, noting that VA has competing priorities and vacancies at the senior executive level  ORP officials said they are now following project management principles in implementing the pilot  As part of this effort, they said that they intend to develop foundational documents for review by the CHIP-IN steering committee—such as a program plan containing objectives—but they have not done so yet  Without clearly defined and agreed-upon objectives, stakeholders within VA may have different understandings of the pilot’s purpose and intended outcomes  As a result, the agency risks pursuing projects that may not contribute to what VA hopes to learn or gain from the pilot  While VA officials are planning to establish objectives as they formalize the CHIP-IN steering committee, at the time of our review these objectives had not been documented and no timeline has been established for when they would be  Without clear, measurable objectives, VA will be unable to implement other leading practices for pilot design, such as determining how to make decisions about scalability  Further, not defining objectives in the near future would ultimately affect VA’s ability to evaluate the pilot and provide information to Congress about its results  We have reported that developing a clearly articulated assessment methodology and a detailed evaluation plan are leading practices for pilot design  The assessment methodology and evaluation plan should be linked to the pilot’s objectives so that evaluation results will show successes and challenges of the pilot, to help the agency draw conclusions about whether the pilot met its objectives  The assessment methodology and evaluation plan are also needed to determine scalability, because evaluation results will show whether and how the pilot can be expanded or incorporated into broader efforts  Given that several VA offices are involved in the pilot’s implementation, it is important for relevant stakeholders to be involved with defining and agreeing upon the assessment methodology and evaluation plan  VA has not yet fully developed and documented either an assessment methodology or evaluation plan for the pilot, but VA officials told us they plan to do so  For example, ORP officials said they intend to collect lessons learned and then evaluate the pilot at its end in 2021 by reviewing this information with relevant stakeholders  However, more specific details for this assessment methodology have not been defined in accordance with this leading practice  For example, we found that ORP has not yet determined which offices will contribute lessons learned, how frequently that information will be collected, or who will collect it  Similarly, details for an evaluation plan have not been defined, including who will participate in the evaluation and how information will be analyzed to evaluate the pilot’s implementation and performance  Now that the CHIP- IN steering committee has met for the first time, this group intends to discuss assessment of the pilot at a future meeting, but it is not clear when that discussion will occur, what leading practices will be considered, and when plans will be defined and documented  According to VA officials, an assessment methodology and evaluation plan have not been developed because, as discussed above, after the CHIP-IN Act was enacted, efforts were focused on negotiating the Omaha donation agreement and then executing that project  As such, formal efforts to establish the pilot through the CHIP-IN steering committee were in initial stages at the time of our review  Further, until VA has agreed- upon and documented objectives for the pilot program, it may be difficult to determine what information is needed for an assessment methodology and how the pilot will be evaluated  Unless VA establishes a clear assessment methodology that articulates responsibilities for contributing and documenting lessons learned, VA may miss opportunities to gather this information from the pilot  For example, while some stakeholders are documenting lessons learned relevant to their roles in the pilot, others are not  Specifically, ORP and CFM Operations are documenting lessons learned, but other VA offices and the Omaha donor group have not, though some told us they would be willing to share lessons learned if asked  Without an assessment methodology, there may also be confusion about who is responsible for documenting lessons learned  For example, a senior CFM official said that the Omaha donor group was compiling lessons learned from the pilot overall and would subsequently share those with VA  However, representatives from the donor group told us they have not been asked to share lessons learned with VA, but they would be willing to do so  When key individuals leave their positions—a situation that has occurred a number of times during implementation of the CHIP-IN pilot—their lessons learned may not be captured  For example, VA officials and donor group representatives told us that two VA officials who were involved in developing the pilot have since left the agency  In addition, stakeholders’ memories of lessons learned may fade unless they record them  Waiting to develop an evaluation plan—which should include details about how lessons learned will be used to measure the pilot’s performance—may ultimately affect VA’s preparedness to evaluate the pilot and provide information to Congress about its results  The purpose of a pilot is to generally inform a decision on whether and how to implement a new approach in a broader context—or in other words, whether the pilot can be scaled up or increased in size to a larger number of projects over the long term  Our prior work has found that it is important to determine how scalability will be assessed and the information needed to inform decisions about scalability  Scalability is connected to other leading practices for pilot design, as discussed above  For example, criteria to measure scalability should provide evidence that the pilot objectives have been met, and the evaluation’s results should inform scalability by showing whether and how the pilot could be expanded or how well lessons learned from the pilot can be incorporated into broader efforts  VA officials have begun to implement this leading practice by considering the pilot as a means of testing the viability of the donation partnership approach; however, plans for assessing scalability have not been fully defined and documented  A senior VA official said scalability is seen as a way to determine if the donation approach or other types of private sector partnerships are a viable way to address VA’s infrastructure needs  Similarly, ORP officials told us they are first considering scalability in terms of whether the CHIP-IN donation approach is an effective or feasible way of delivering VA projects  These officials said scalability will be largely determined by whether all five authorized projects can be executed before authorization for the CHIP-IN pilot program sunsets  For example, if VA can find four additional projects and execute donation agreements before the pilot’s authority expires, then potentially VA could seek congressional reauthorization to extend the program beyond the 5- year pilot  ORP officials are also considering scalability in terms of any changes to the program, such as incentives for donors, that could potentially increase its effectiveness  However, ORP officials explained that scalability may be limited because the types of projects that can be accomplished with the CHIP-IN donation approach may not be the projects that are most needed by VA  Along with other pilot design topics, the CHIP-IN steering committee intends to discuss scalability at a future meeting, but it is not clear when that discussion will occur  Thus, while VA officials have considered what scalability might look like, they have not fully determined and documented how to make decisions about whether the pilot is scalable  Since VA has not defined and documented the pilot’s objectives and its evaluation plans, it may be more difficult to determine how to make decisions about scalability  Considering how the pilot’s objectives and evaluation plans will inform decisions about scalability is critical to providing information about the pilot’s results  For example, at the end of the pilot, VA and Congress will need clear information to make decisions about whether the CHIP-IN donation approach could be extended beyond a pilot program, if any changes could enhance the program’s effectiveness, or if particular lessons learned could be applied to VA construction projects more broadly  Without clear information about scalability, VA may be limited in its ability to communicate quality information about the achievement of its objectives  Such communication is part of the federal standards for internal control  We have reported that appropriate two-way stakeholder communication and input should occur at all stages of the pilot, including design, implementation, data gathering, and assessment  To that end, it is critical that agencies identify who or what entities the relevant stakeholders are and communicate with them early and often  This process may include communication with external stakeholders and among internal stakeholders  Communicating quality information both externally and internally is also consistent with federal standards for internal control  VA has begun to implement this practice, with generally successful communication with the Omaha donor group  While VA has experienced some external and internal communication challenges about the pilot, officials have taken steps to help resolve some of these challenges  External communication  VA officials and representatives from the Omaha donor group generally described excellent communication between their two parties  For example, donor group representatives told us that in-person meetings helped to establish a strong relationship that has been useful in negotiating the donation agreement and executing the project to date  Further, VA officials and donor group representatives said that all relevant stakeholders—such as the donor group’s construction manager, general contractor, and architect, as well VA’s engineer, project manager, and medical center director—were included in key meetings once the Omaha project began, and said that this practice has continued during the construction phase  Although the Omaha donor group reported overall effective relations and communications with VA, donor group representatives noted that additional public relations support from VA would have been helpful  For example, after the CHIP-IN project was initiated in Omaha, the donor group encountered a public relations challenge when news reports about unauthorized waiting lists at the Omaha medical center jeopardized some donors’ willingness to contribute to the project  While donor group representatives said this challenge was addressed when the donor group hired a public relations firm, they also explained that it would be helpful for VA headquarters to provide more proactive public relations support to the local areas where future CHIP-IN projects are located  VA officials stated that they experienced some initial challenges communicating pilot requirements to external entities that are interested in CHIP-IN donation partnerships, but officials said that in response the agency has changed its outreach approach  As discussed below, the donation commitment aspect of the pilot can be a challenge
Report 2:  Developing international military capacity  U S  officials told us that UN peacekeeping operations provide an indirect benefit of helping to professionalize the military units from many developing countries that contribute troops to the UN  We have previously reported that building military capacity of foreign partners to address security-related threats is an important goal of U S  national security strategy and foreign policy  According to U S  and UN officials, the relative strengths of U S  peacekeeping operations would be faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capabilities  Deployment speed  State, DOD, and UN officials highlighted the United States’ ability to deploy troops and police to peacekeeping operations more quickly than the UN  Unlike the U S  military, which can draw from a ready pool of military personnel, the UN must seek troops from UN member states, which takes time  UN officials told us that the UN faces a shortage of both troops and UN police, which slows deployment  Further, a 2015 report by the UN High-level Panel on Peacekeeping stated that the UN “has struggled to get sufficient forces on the ground quickly enough and relies on under-resourced uniformed capabilities ” The report also stated that aviation, medical, and engineering specialists, among others, are difficult to mobilize in advance of infantry units  Command and control  State, DOD, and UN officials told us that U S  operations would enable the U S  military to have direct command and control, whereas UN operations, which are inherently multinational, face challenges with command and control over troops from several different countries  The UN High-level Panel report noted that UN peacekeeping operations’ weak command and control is a well-known constraint that limits the type of operations the UN can undertake  Logistics support  U S  and UN officials told us that U S  operations have superior logistics systems  U S  procurement likely would be faster than UN procurement, which lacks a standing supply chain and, therefore, relies on third-party vendors, according to UN officials  In addition, the UN High Level Panel report stated that UN peacekeeping operations’ logistics systems and structures in the field are under severe strain, which can limit the mobility of these operations  Intelligence capability  U S  and UN officials agreed that U S  operations would involve superior intelligence capability  The UN only recently established an intelligence policy—in May 2017—having recognized that some peacekeeping operations had been deployed in fragile political and security environments with asymmetrical and complex threats  However, UN officials acknowledged that the scope of UN intelligence capability remains limited  Counterterrorism capability  DOD officials told us that a U S  peacekeeping operation would have the capability to include a counterterrorism component and would not be constrained in the use of force, if needed, in response to terrorist threats  UN peacekeeping operations, on the other hand, lack the capabilities and specialized military preparation to engage in counterterrorism operations, according to the UN High-level Panel report  The UN report stated that counterterrorism should be undertaken by the host government, a capable regional force, or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the UN Security Council  According to the UN report, UN peacekeeping operations may engage in proactive and preemptive use of force to protect civilians and UN personnel from threats; however, offensive force to degrade, neutralize or defeat an opponent is a fundamentally different type of posture that should be authorized by the Security Council only under limited and exceptional circumstances  We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, and the UN for review and comment  DOD provided a letter, reproduced in appendix II, which stated that it had no comments  State did not provide comments  The UN provided technical comments, which we incorporated into our report as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Secretary- General of the United Nations  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  The objectives of this report were to (1) compare the reported costs of a specific United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identify factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations  To compare the reported costs of a specific UN peacekeeping operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we selected the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) as a case study  We compared the reported UN expenditures for MINUSCA, which included both military and civilian components, with estimated costs for a hypothetical U S  operation with a similar level of military and civilian personnel  Our comparison covers a total of 3 years and 3 months—from MINUSCA’s establishment in April 2014 through June 30, 2017, the end of UN fiscal year 2017  We selected MINUSCA because it is in sub-Saharan Africa, where most UN peacekeeping operations established since 2003 have taken place, and has a typical scope and budget compared to other UN peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa, according to U S  and UN officials  In addition, MINUSCA is one of the most recent UN peacekeeping operations; thus, initial expenditures for the operation are relatively current  Because the results of our cost comparison are based on a single case study, they cannot be generalized to all UN peacekeeping operations  To determine the UN’s costs for MINUSCA, we analyzed UN budget and expenditure data covering the initial start-up period (April 2014 to June 2014) and the first 3 UN fiscal years (July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2017)  We spoke with officials of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support, and Management at UN Headquarters in New York, New York, to better understand the characteristics of MINUSCA and the different costs affecting MINUSCA’s budget and expenditures  We assessed UN expenditure data through discussions with cognizant UN officials and a review of external audits of UN budgetary information and found them sufficiently reliable for our purposes  We also analyzed data on U S  contributions to UN peacekeeping operations for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 from the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Organization Affairs to determine total U S  contributions to MINUSCA, and UN peacekeeping operations overall  To estimate the costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we developed a hypothetical scenario for a U S  operation based on the MINUSCA budget and supporting documents, assuming deployment of the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel in the Central African Republic (CAR) over the same time period (April 2014 through June 2017)  To estimate the military portion of the operation, we interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) officials and staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a DOD-sponsored non-profit corporation involved in developing cost estimates for U S  contingency operations  The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller and IDA generated a cost estimate for the military components included in the hypothetical operation using the Contingency Operations Support Tool (cost estimating tool)  DOD uses this tool to develop cost estimates for all military contingency operations  The cost estimate included only the incremental costs of the operation—those directly attributable to the operation that would not be incurred if the operation did not take place  For example, the estimate produced by the cost estimating tool did not include the direct salaries of active duty personnel as those costs would be incurred by the United States regardless of a possible decision to undertake the hypothetical operation  We assessed the cost estimating tool’s applicability to developing a hypothetical cost estimate for the purposes of this report through discussions with DOD and IDA officials, and compared the tool to the accurate and comprehensive characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, as described in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide  While we found the DOD cost estimating tool generated a sufficiently reliable cost estimate for a hypothetical U S  peacekeeping operation, we did not assess the overall reliability of the tool or its capability to generate accurate or comprehensive estimates for future U S  operations  To generate our estimate of U S  military costs using the DOD’s estimating tool, we used UN military deployment numbers as a baseline for the scale of a hypothetical, comparable U S  peacekeeping operation, while using unit sizes and rotations in deployment that were considered appropriate for the U S  military, according to DOD and IDA officials  We based the hypothetical U S  operation, and hence the cost estimate, on the following assumptions, which correspond approximately with MINUSCA’s actual UN personnel deployments: Theater of operation: Central African Republic (CAR) Type of operation: military contingency Operation time frame: April 10, 2014 through June 30, 2017 Military contingents: as of June 30, 2017, 11,495 total personnel Infantry: 10 units of 630-785 personnel per unit, approximately 90 percent active duty / 10 percent reserves Communication / signals: 1 unit, 124 personnel per unit Engineering: 4 units, 200 personnel per unit Military police: 1 unit, 120 personnel per unit Formed police units (military police): 12 units, 140 personnel per Hospital / medical: 1 level III hospital, 248 beds, 495 personnel Helicopter units: 2 UH-60 C3 units, 1 MH-60M Assault attack helicopter unit, 100 personnel per unit Quick reaction force: 1 unit, 160 personnel per unit Special forces: 1 tactical civilian affairs unit, 1 Marine special operations intelligence unit, 160 personnel per unit Unmanned aerial vehicle: 1 unit, 84 personnel Transportation: 1 heavy transport unit, 120 personnel per unit Operational tempo: 1 0 for all phases of operation and units, except aviation units (set at 1 5) Deployment schedule and phasing: phased deployment, including 14 days for predeployment (e g , training), 5 days for deployment, 180 days for active duty unit sustainment and 270 days for reserve unit sustainment, 5 days for redeployment, and 0 days for reconstitution Housing: contractor-provided semi-permanent housing Transportation: personnel and equipment transported by airlift from the United States (primarily Fort Hood, Texas), material (such as water, food, and other consumables) transported by airlift from Italy We obtained input on the operational design for the military portion of the cost estimate from DOD officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Policy, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, and IDA officials  However, the military portions of the scenario and their corresponding cost estimate have some limitations  As a result of rounding for some units, U S  military personnel numbers do not exactly match the MINUSCA deployment levels  In addition, based on input from DOD officials, we attempted to select military units that would provide an essential function per U S  common practices while keeping the overall personnel deployment level as close as possible to MINUSCA’s deployment level  An actual U S  military plan may differ significantly from the UN plan as a result of differences between U S  and UN military operations, structure, doctrine, and circumstances at the time of the operation  To estimate U S  civilian costs, we matched the number of U S  civilian police and personnel to the number serving in MINUSCA  We then estimated the costs of deploying these U S  civilian personnel in CAR for the same time period as MINUSCA  We did not attempt to determine how the U S  government would actually implement civilian components of a peacekeeping operation in CAR  To estimate U S  civilian police costs, we met with State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to identify State’s costs for civilian police contractors providing police training and technical assistance in sub-Saharan Africa  Based on INL’s input we assumed that the base salary of civilian police would be grade 13, step 5 on the Office of Personnel Management’s general schedule salary tables for federal employees  In addition to the average base salary, we identified other costs—with input from INL—including, among others, personal equipment, travel from the United States, and State’s published allowances specific to CAR for local cost of living, post hardship differential, danger pay, and living quarters  We applied the average cost per officer to the average number of UN civilian police officers deployed in MINUSCA  To estimate U S  civilian personnel costs, we met with State’s Bureau of Budget and Planning to identify the costs of State Foreign Service officers and locally employed staff, based on the number of UN international and national civilian staff deployed to MINUSCA, respectively  We matched the number of State Foreign Service officers for the U S  cost estimate to the number of UN international staff in MINUSCA, with input from State to align the grade levels  The estimated costs for Foreign Service officers include average salaries based on State’s Foreign Service salary tables and State’s allowances specific to CAR, including local cost of living, post hardship differential, and danger pay  We also met with State Bureau of Budget and Planning officials to estimate other costs for Foreign Service officers, which we included in our cost estimate, including post assignment travel, administrative support costs, residential furnishings, and residential guards, among others, but we did not assess the reliability of these additional costs provided by State  In addition, State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations provided the actual costs of residential leases for Foreign Service officers in CAR in fiscal year 2017, which we used to estimate the cost of housing Foreign Service officers in CAR  We also matched the number of State locally employed staff to the number of UN national staff deployed to MINUSCA and added their average salaries and other costs in CAR based on data provided by State’s Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services  While MINUSCA’s expenditures also included costs for sending an annual average of up to about 200 UN volunteers to CAR, State officials told us that the United States generally would not send volunteers through its assistance efforts to a high-risk post, such as CAR  Therefore, we did not include any costs related to volunteers in the cost estimate  We also did not include costs related to host-government-provided personnel serving in MINUSCA  In addition, UN expenditures included about $7 million for “quick-impact projects” to support local government infrastructure and civil society initiatives  We did not include comparable costs for quick-impact projects in our U S  cost estimate because we did not have a basis for matching these costs  To identify factors that affect cost differences between MINUSCA and a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States, we reviewed the U S  cost estimate generated in conjunction with DOD, IDA, and State officials, and identified significant areas of cost for the United States and the assumptions incorporated in the estimate or factors specified by U S  officials that drive those costs  We compared the U S  cost estimate, including these significant areas of cost, to UN costs to identify differences  We interviewed U S  and UN officials regarding U S  and UN standards and policies that explain differences between MINUSCA costs and the estimated costs of a U S  operation  To identify stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U S  peacekeeping operations, we reviewed UN reports on peacekeeping operations and interviewed UN, DOD, and State officials  In addition, we reviewed GAO’s 2006 report comparing the costs as well as the strengths of a UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti with those of a hypothetical U S  operation  We conducted our review from February 2017 through February 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the individual named above, Drew Lindsey (Assistant Director), Howard Cott, Juan Pablo Avila-Tournut, Debbie Chung, Martin de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Jennifer Leotta, Caitlin Mitchell, Elizabeth Repko, and Alex Welsh made significant contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area. Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205; 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq.), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies. In general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification—that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve. With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). By statute, PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e.g., "preference customers"), and sell their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U.S. Treasury for the portion of federal facility costs allocated to hydropower beneficiaries. With energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market in the West, BPA and WAPA may have to adapt their plans with regard to generation needs and how transmission systems are developed. In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations. The proposal suggested that "eliminating or reducing" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets, and increasing the private sector's role, would "encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers." The resulting PMA entities would then contract with other utilities to provide transmission services for the delivery of federal power, similar to what SEPA does currently. Reportedly, the proposed sale of PMA assets was dropped after opposition to the plan emerged from stakeholders. Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 (P.L. 99-349), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress. Environmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i.e., the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the ESA. In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams. However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020. Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i.e., receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority. Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA)  Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area of the coterminous United States (see Figure 1 )  Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P L  93-205 ; 16 U S C  §§1531 et seq ), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies  In general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by federal dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification—that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve  With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the U S  Bureau of Reclamation (BOR)  PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e g , "preference customers"), selling their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U S  Treasury on schedule for the portion of federal facility costs that have been allocated to hydropower beneficiaries  Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i e , receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority  Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress  Each PMA also has unique elements and regional issues that affect its business  They are discussed in alphabetical order  Created by the Bonneville Project Act of 1937 (16 U S C  §832) just before the completion of two large dams in the Pacific Northwest—Bonneville Dam in 1938 and Grand Coulee Dam in 1941—BPA was the first PMA  Though it serves a smaller geographical area, BPA is on par with WAPA (which serves the largest area) in the size of its transmission system  The agency operates and maintains about 75% of the high voltage transmission lines in its service territory, which includes Idaho, Oregon, Washington, western Montana and small parts of eastern Montana, California, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming  BPA also markets wholesale electricity from 31 federally owned hydropower facilities in the Northwest  These generation facilities are owned both by the Corps and BOR  BPA differs from the other three PMAs in that it is self-financed: it receives no federal appropriations  Since passage of the Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act of 1974 (16 U S C  §838), BPA has covered its operating costs through power rates set to ensure repayment to the Treasury of capital and interest on funds used to construct the Columbia River power system  BPA also has permanent Treasury borrowing authority, which it may use for capital on large projects  This money is repaid with interest, through power sales  As of 2018, BPA had $5 53 billion of bonds outstanding to the U S  Treasury, with BPA's current borrowing authority capped by Congress at $7 70 billion  BPA has also looked at other financing options as it approaches its debt limit, looking at nonfederal debt refinancing, lease-purchases, and other asset management strategies  BPA has initiated strategies and a financial plan to address a changing power generation and demand market, as it endeavors to meet its mandate for cost-based electric power rates  These plans are outlined in its Strategic Plan for 2018 to 2023, and address goals from financial health to infrastructure modernization  Wholesale power prices in the United States are generally trending downward, while BPA's firm power rates have trended upward  BPA repays its funding from the U S  Treasury largely through electricity sales to customers  While BPA generates its electricity from hydropower (which is traditionally one of the lower-cost means of power generation), increasing amounts of renewable electricity from growing wind and solar capacity installations in the Pacific Northwest are challenging BPA's price competitiveness, and perhaps its ability to repay its debts in a timely manner  In 2014, BPA entered into the Regional Cooperation Agreement (RCA) with the State of Washington to address the debt of Energy Northwest, a "joint action agency formed by the Washington state legislature in 1957" to manage public power utility costs  Energy Northwest owns and operates four electric power generation facilities: White Bluffs Solar Station, Packwood Lake Hydroelectric Project, Nine Canyon Wind Project, and the Columbia Generating Station  The Regional Cooperation debt is "the issuance of new bonds by Energy Northwest to refund outstanding bonds shortly before their maturities when substantial principal repayments were and are due " According to BPA, this allows for "integrated debt management" for the combined total debt portfolios of BPA and Energy Northwest, with a net effect reducing the "weighted average interest rate and the maturity of BPA's overall debt portfolio" over the life of the program  This refinancing, according to BPA, has enabled BPA to prepay higher-interest-rate federal obligations, and has "preserved or restored U S  Treasury borrowing authority " However, the debt service of the RCA is "borne by BPA ratepayers through BPA rates " BPA estimates that the "aggregate potential principal amount" of RCA refunding through bonds issued in fiscal years 2019 through 2030 could exceed $4 0 billion  BPA is responsible for maintaining and modernizing the generation and transmission infrastructure of its systems, and preserving and enhancing its physical and cybersecurity  With energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) in the West, BPA is considering whether to join the EIM, and how this might affect its operations and customers  Environmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i e , operations consistent with the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act  In addition, several environmental groups filed a lawsuit blaming the dams for warm river waters in summer 2015 that resulted in the deaths of about 250,000 adult sockeye salmon migrating up the Columbia and Snake Rivers  Some of these parties have sought to remove the four lower dams on the Snake River to ensure survival of some salmon and steelhead species  In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams  However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020  The memorandum ordered the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce "to appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind any regulations or procedures that unduly burden" water infrastructure projects so they "are better able to meet the demands of their authorized purposes " How this will affect the fish endangerment finding is unclear at this time  The Southeastern Power Administration was created in 1950 by the Secretary of the Interior to carry out the functions assigned to the Secretary by the Flood Control Act of 1944 (P L  78-534) in 11 states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia)  SEPA is unique among the four PMAs in two ways  It is the smallest PMA, with just over 40 employees, and, unlike the other three agencies, SEPA does not operate or maintain any transmission facilities, and thus contracts with other utilities for transmitting the federal power it markets to more than 12 million consumers  Southeastern markets approximately 3,400 MW of power produced at 22 multipurpose water projects, operated and maintained by the Corps  SEPA's facilities are aging; for instance, in 2018 it reported that its Cumberland System customers have agreed to fund $1 2 billion of planned rehabilitations of the nine hydroelectric facilities in the Corps' Nashville District  According to SEPA, it has an overcapacity issue  Projections for electricity load growth (in consultation with its preference customers) made before the 2008 economic downturn reportedly led to SEPA acquiring additional capacity it currently does not use  As a result, municipalities and electric cooperatives in SEPA's service area will have to make economic decisions regarding how to handle this excess capacity  As of 2018, at least one preference customer has terminated its contract with SEPA due to this issue  Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 (P L  78-534) established the Southwestern Power Administration  SWPA markets hydroelectric power in Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas from 24 multipurpose Corps dams with a combined capacity of 2,194 MW  SWPA serves more than 100 preference customer utilities with more than 8 million end-use customers  The agency manages nearly 1,400 miles of high-voltage transmission lines  SWPA is the only U S  electrical balancing area supported solely by hydroelectric generation, and its use of the reservoirs and river systems within the SWPA marketing area must be balanced with flood control and other required uses so that the power needs of its customers can be met  SWPA states that it uses alternative financing and offsetting collection authorities to fund expenses and purchase power to help SWPA meet its obligations while minimizing congressional appropriations  Periodically, SWPA has been challenged by low water conditions  It has a rain-based water supply—rather than one that is snow-based, like the mountain snowpack water supply of WAPA and BPA—and sells power from a comparatively small reservoir system which stores that water  Extended dry periods sometimes mean that SWPA must purchase replacement power and energy to meet its contractual obligations  This means that SWPA requires congressional authority to use its revenues from power sales over the long term—across high and low water years  Prior year balances have been available to Southwestern so that we are financially prepared and able to achieve rate stability for our customers  This authority is critical to operating our program according to sound business principles  Southwestern's program is funded by authority to use receipts, alternative financing, and other authorities approved by Congress, including appropriations, which represent only 6 5% of Southwestern's total program  Created by the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 ( P L  95-91 ), WAPA is the newest and largest of the PMAs in terms of service area  WAPA's service area covers 1 3 million square miles, and its power—transmitted by a high voltage grid over 17,000 miles long—serves customers in 15 western states  WAPA markets and transmits hydropower from 56 federal dams operated by BOR, and the Corps  It also sells hydropower power produced by facilities administered by the International Boundary and Water Commission, and markets the United States' 24 3% share (547 megawatts) of the coal-fired Navajo Generating Station in Arizona  In addition to the types of public bodies traditionally served as preference customers by the other PMAs, WAPA has developed a policy to give preference to Native American tribes regardless of their utility status  WAPA has been working with other regional entities to address the changing electric power needs of its customers  In 2014, WAPA published its Strategic Roadmap 2024, titled "Powering the Energy Frontier " The document is intended to serve as WAPA's strategic plan to guide the agency's actions for the next 10 years  However, according to some, the developing Energy Imbalance Market in the West may provide additional options for WAPA to address transmission development needs to balance regional generation and demand  An issue of continuing importance to WAPA is its role in relieving transmission congestion within its marketing area  There are a number of constrained transmission paths in the West whose limited capacity to transfer power may reduce the ability of utilities to serve electric loads on a seasonal or ongoing basis  In 2009, Section 402 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( P L  111-5 ) amended the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 to give WAPA authority to borrow up to $3 25 billion from the U S  Treasury to pursue transmission projects that integrate renewable generation sources into the electric transmission grid  The law provides authority to construct and upgrade transmission lines to help deliver renewable resources to market  Western created the Transmission Infrastructure Program, also known as TIP, to implement this new initiative  Several transmission projects have been initiated under the program  Previous budget proposals and legislation have proposed repealing WAPA's loan authority, but to date, none of these proposals have been enacted  In 2015, WAPA's Upper Great Plains (UGP) region joined the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO)  Under the operating agreement with SPP, WAPA was required to transfer functional control of UGP's eligible transmission facilities to SPP  WAPA is the first PMA to formally join an RTO, and states that benefits to date from joining SPP have significantly exceeded the original estimate of $11 5 million per year  WAPA reports that two of its other regions are considering joining SPP  For Water Year 2017, WAPA reported that it delivered 26,148 gigawatt-hours of hydroelectric power to its customers, which is 101% of average annual power sales  The West has been experiencing periodic droughts for a number of years, resulting in lower snowmelts and less water in storage and available for power generation  To help smooth the resulting annual differences, a "drought-adder" reduction program has been implemented in recent years  A drought-adder charge was levied to help repay deferred drought costs accrued during the 2000s in the Rocky Mountain and Upper Great Plains regions  The balance was paid a year ahead of schedule and, as of this year, has resulted in $40 million annual savings for more than 50 percent of WAPA's customers in Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas and the western sections of Minnesota and Iowa  This is the second year that 417 of WAPA's customers, out of 700, have had a rate reduction  The drought-adder component of the rate remains available to WAPA to adjust to the variable hydropower resource—a lasting risk if drought conditions persist in WAPA's territory  Moderate to extreme drought conditions have been reported in parts of the western United States  In addition to issues specific to individual PMAs, some recent proposals have applied to multiple PMAs  In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations  The proposal suggested that "eliminating or reducing" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets and increasing the private sector role would "encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers " The proposal calls for federal transmission infrastructure assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) to be sold, with the private sector and/or state and local entities potentially taking over the transmission functions now provided by the PMAs  The Federal entities that would result after such sales could contract with other utilities to provide transmission service for the delivery of Federal power just as the Southeastern Power Administration, which does not own transmission lines, already does  The proposal reports that according to the Administration's FY2019 budget justification, the sale of federal transmission assets would result in a net budgetary savings of $9 5 billion, in total, over a 10-year window  Reportedly, the Administration dropped the plan due to stakeholder opposition, with the Department of Energy stating that such a sale of PMA transmission assets would not proceed unless directed by Congress  Proposals to sell all or part of the PMAs are not new, and have been made in some form by almost every President since Reagan  However, Congress has sought to prevent executive branch alterations of PMA structures and authority  Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 ( P L  99-349 ), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress  The Trump Administration divestment proposal could have had an indirect impact on the original congressional intent for the PMAs to provide electricity at the lowest possible cost  This in turn could require changes to the following provisions: Flood Control Act of 1944, as amended (FCA; 16 U S C  §825s et seq  ); The 1937 Bonneville Project Act (BPA; 16 U S C  §832c ); and The Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (RPA; 43 U S C  §485h(c))   These laws also stipulate a preference of public bodies for the sale of federal power  Selling federally owned transmission assets could potentially affect the "lowest possible" rates of sale, and the statutory preference for publicly or cooperatively owned utilities to be the vehicle for sale of electric power produced by federal facilities 


Report 2:  When interested entities contact VA to request information on the CHIP-IN pilot, VA officials told us they find the entities are often surprised by the donation commitment  For example, two entities that responded to VA’s RFI told us they were not clear about the donation requirement or the expected level of donation, or both  One respondent did not understand the pilot required a donation and would not provide an opportunity for a financial return on investment  Another respondent indicated that when they asked VA for clarification about the expected project’s scope, personnel from a headquarters office and the local VA medical center could not fully answer their questions  VA officials acknowledged these challenges and said they have changed their outreach efforts to focus on certain potential CHIP-IN locations, rather than RFIs aimed at a broader audience  Further, VA officials said that when speaking with potential donors going forward, they plan to involve a small group of officials who are knowledgeable about the pilot and its donation approach  Internal communication  While VA initially experienced some challenges in ensuring that all relevant internal stakeholders have been included in the pilot’s implementation, according to officials, the agency has taken recent steps to address this concern and involve appropriate internal offices  For example, officials from the Capital Asset Management Office said they could have assisted ORP in narrowing the list of potential projects in the RFIs but were not consulted  Later, after revising the marketing approach, ORP reached out to the Capital Asset Management Office and other relevant offices for help in determining priority locations for additional CHIP-IN projects, according to an ORP official  Officials from the Capital Asset Management Office told us that with improved engagement they were able to participate more actively in discussions about the pilot  In addition, initial plans for the CHIP-IN steering committee did not include VHA representation  However, in summer 2018 ORP expanded the planned steering committee to include VHA representatives, a plan that some other VA offices told us is needed to ensure that the pilot addresses the agency’s healthcare needs and that VHA offices are informed about pilot efforts  Based on the experience with the Omaha project, the CHIP-IN donation approach can result in potential cost and time savings—through the leveraging of private-sector funding, contracting, and construction practices—according to VA officials and the Omaha donor group  Regarding cost savings, one VA official stated that using donations makes VA’s appropriated funds available to cover other costs  In addition, based on the experience with the Omaha project, other VA officials told us that a CHIP-IN project can potentially be completed for a lower cost because of practices resulting from private sector leadership  Specifically, VA estimated that the Omaha ambulatory care center would cost about $120 million for VA to build outside of a donation partnership—as a standard federal construction project  Under the CHIP-IN pilot, however, the total estimated cost of the Omaha facility is $86 million—achieving a potential $34 million cost savings  Regarding time savings, CHIP-IN projects can potentially be completed at a faster pace because of the use of certain private sector practices and because projects can be addressed earlier than they otherwise would be, according to VA officials  The use of private-sector building practices can result in cost and time savings in a number of ways, according to VA officials and the Omaha donor group, as follows: The use of private-sector building standards contributed to cost savings for the Omaha project, according to VA officials and donor group representatives  VA and the donor group negotiated a combination of industry and VA building standards  A CFM official told us that using this approach and working with the private sector donor group encouraged the design team to think creatively about the risk assessment process and about how to meet the intent of VA’s physical security standards, but at a lower cost than if they were required to build a facility using all of VA’s building standards as written  For example, when assessing the safety and physical-security risk, the donor group and VA identified a location where two sides of the facility will not have direct exposure to the public or roadway traffic  Prohibiting exposure to roadways on two sides of the facility will mean spending less money to harden (i e , protect) the facility against threats such as vehicular ramming  According to VA officials, using the combined standards did not compromise security on the Omaha project  Involving the general contractor early on in the design for the Omaha project, an approach VA does not typically take, contributed to both time and cost savings  VA officials told us that engaging the general contractor during the project’s design stage allowed the project to begin more quickly and was also helpful in obtaining information about costs and keeping the project within budget  However, VA officials said that depending on the project and contracting method used, it might not be possible to apply this contracting practice to VA construction projects outside of the pilot program  A private-sector design review method helped to save time  The Omaha donor group used a software package that allowed all design- document reviewers to simultaneously review design documents and then store their comments in a single place  VA officials said this approach was more efficient than VA’s typical review method and cut about 18 weeks from the project’s timeline  VA officials also said use of this software was a best practice that could be applied to VA construction projects more broadly  In addition, the donor group and VA employed fewer rounds of design reviews than VA typically uses; this streamlining also helped to save time during the design process, according to VA officials  Further, VA officials said that the CHIP-IN donation approach can allow VA to address projects more quickly because they are addressed outside of VA’s typical selection and funding process  For example, VA officials told us that because of the agency’s current major construction backlog, using the CHIP-IN donation approach allowed work on the Omaha project to begin at least 5 years sooner than if the CHIP-IN approach had not been used  The Omaha project’s priority was low relative to other potential projects, so that it was unlikely to receive additional funding for construction for several years  For example, one agency official noted that even if the project was at the top of VA’s priorities, there is a backlog of 20 major construction projects worth $5 billion ahead of it—meaning the Omaha project would probably not be addressed for at least 5 years  VA officials also told us that as they consider future CHIP-IN projects, they are looking for other projects that, like the one in Omaha, are needed, but may not be a top priority given available funding and could be moved forward with a private sector donation  In addition, use of the CHIP-IN donation approach and decision to pursue an ambulatory care center contributed to an earlier start on a project to address veterans’ needs  However, as mentioned earlier, VA officials said that future construction projects will be necessary to address some needs that were part of the original replacement medical center plan  A main challenge to establishing pilot partnerships is the reliance on large philanthropic donations, according to VA officials, the Omaha donor group, and RFI respondents  In general, the potential donor pool may not be extensive given the size of the expected donations—in some cases tens or hundreds of millions of dollars—and the conditions under which the donations must be made  For example, as discussed earlier, VA officials said that when interested entities contact them about the pilot, they are often surprised by the donation commitment  When we spoke with two entities that responded to VA’s RFI, one told us that they “could not afford to work for free” under the pilot while another told us that developers are more likely to participate in the pilot if they see an incentive, or a return on their financial contribution  Also, VA officials told us that some potential project locations have not received any appropriations—making the projects’ implementation less appealing to potential donors  The Omaha donor group noted that a VA financial contribution at or above 50 percent of a project’s estimated cost is essential for demonstrating the agency’s commitment and for leveraging private-sector donations  To address challenges involving the philanthropic nature of the pilot, ORP officials told us that VA has tried to identify strategies or incentives that could encourage donor involvement  For example, the CHIP-IN steering committee is considering what incentives might be effective to encourage greater participation  One ORP official told us that such incentives could include potential naming opportunities (that is, authority to name items such as facility floors, wings, or the actual facility), although offering such incentives may require changes in VA’s authority  Further, because it may be difficult to secure donations for larger, more costly projects, some VA officials, donor group representatives, and one RFI respondent we spoke to suggested that VA consider developing less costly CHIP-IN projects—giving VA a better chance of serving veterans by filling gaps in service needs  Other VA officials, however, said they wanted to focus on larger projects because the pilot allows only five projects  Another challenge is that VA generally does not possess marketing and philanthropic development experience  VA officials told us that this makes the inherent challenge of finding donors more difficult  While VA officials have used the assistance of a nonprofit entity that has marketing expertise, they also said that going forward it would be helpful to have staff with relevant marketing and philanthropic development experience to assist with identifying donors  VA officials said this expertise could possibly be acquired through hiring a contractor, but funding such a hire may be difficult within their existing resources  As discussed above, the CHIP-IN pilot presents an uncharted approach to VA’s implementation of projects, and using CHIP-IN has aspects of an organizational transformation in property acquisition for the agency because it leverages donation partnerships and streamlines VA’s typical funding process  We have found that a key practice of organizational transformation includes a dedicated implementation team to manage the transformation process and that leading practices for cross-functional teams include clear roles and responsibilities, and committed members with relevant expertise  VA officials and Omaha donor group representatives acknowledged that a dedicated CHIP-IN team could help focus pilot implementation—and that no such team existed within the agency  ORP officials told us that the newly formed CHIP-IN steering committee would provide the necessary leadership for pilot implementation  They anticipate that a working group will be part of the committee and serve as a dedicated team for the pilot  However, as discussed below, roles and responsibilities have not been defined and staff resource decisions have not been made  Clear and documented roles and responsibilities  Several VA officials told us that responsibility for managing the overall pilot effort had not been assigned, and that they had different interpretations of which office had responsibility for leading the pilot  Some officials identified ORP as the leader, while others thought it was CFM or the Center for Strategic Partnerships  One CFM official told us that a clear definition of responsibilities is needed under the pilot along with a dedicated office or person with the ability to make decisions when an impasse across offices exists  Similarly, a senior VHA official told us that leadership roles and responsibilities for the pilot are not fully understood within the agency, which has made establishing partnerships under the pilot a challenge  For example, both VA officials and Omaha donor group representatives identified the lack of a senior-level leader for the pilot as a challenge and emphasized the need for strong pilot leadership going forward  Now that a CHIP-IN steering committee is being formed to provide pilot leadership, ORP officials intend to discuss committee members’ roles and responsibilities  This discussion was planned for the first committee meeting but was rescheduled for the next meeting in October 2018  ORP officials, however, told us that they do not expect to assign individual members’ roles and responsibilities until a future date  VA officials did not have a timeline for when committee or individual members’ roles and responsibilities would be formally documented  ORP officials said that roles and responsibilities for the pilot have not been defined because after enactment of the CHIP-IN Act, their first priority was to engage the Omaha donor group and negotiate an agreement  Later, after the Omaha project was progressing, ORP officials said they turned their attention to formalizing the pilot program and identifying additional donation partnerships  While it is important to concentrate on completion of individual projects, it is also important to plan for the overall pilot’s implementation—to help ensure that the pilot’s purpose and goals are met and in a timely manner  We have found that clarifying roles and responsibilities is an important activity in facilitating strong collaboration and building effective cross-functional teams  In addition, we have found that articulating roles and responsibilities is a powerful tool in collaboration and that it is beneficial to detail such collaborations in a formal, written document  Committed team members  Various VA offices and staff members have worked on the CHIP-IN pilot in addition to their other responsibilities, but several VA officials told us the resources currently dedicated to the pilot are insufficient  During our review, an ORP official told us that two ORP staff each spent about 4 to 6 hours per week on the pilot, as collateral duties  However, since that time, one of these two staff members has left the agency  A senior VA official told us that ORP and the Center for Strategic Partnerships could each use two to three more dedicated staff members to work solely on the pilot  While one ORP official said that additional staff would likely be assigned after other CHIP-IN projects are identified, a Center for Strategic Partnerships official said a specified percentage of staff time should be dedicated now to identifying potential donors  As mentioned above, VA officials told us they anticipate a working group will be part of the CHIP-IN steering committee and will serve as the dedicated team to implement the pilot  However, VA has not yet documented how it will staff the working group, including how it will obtain the needed expertise within its existing resources  According to one VA official, staff had not been initially dedicated to the pilot because the CHIP-IN Act did not provide resources to fund a dedicated team for the pilot, so VA has needed to implement the pilot within its existing resources  This VA official also told us that they were not certain VA could support a dedicated team with existing resources  Another official indicated that VA would need to consider how to incorporate CHIP-IN into the agency’s operations if the pilot program were expanded beyond the initial pilot and then dedicate needed resources  Dedicating a strong and stable implementation team is important to ensuring that the effort receives the focused, full-time attention needed  Team members with relevant knowledge and expertise  As previously discussed, VA officials told us that it would be helpful for a CHIP-IN team to include stakeholders with certain expertise, such as marketing and philanthropic development experience  In addition, representatives from the Omaha donor group said going forward, proactive public relations expertise is needed from VA headquarters (in particular, for external communications outside of the partnership) to quickly and positively address any incidents that could negatively impact VA’s ability to encourage donor participation in the pilot at the local level  For example, in the event of critical news reports about a local VA facility, such as what occurred in Omaha, donor group representatives said that additional public relations support would be helpful  VA officials also told us that a CHIP-IN team should be a collaborative effort across several offices  Specifically, one senior VA official said a cross-functional team with representation from ORP, CFM Operations, the Center for Strategic Partnerships, VHA, and the Office of Asset Enterprise Management (which has budget and finance expertise) would be useful in focusing and implementing the pilot  Leading practices for cross-functional teams include having members with a wide diversity of knowledge and expertise  Having a dedicated team or working group that consists of committed members with clear roles and responsibilities could assist VA in implementing the CHIP-IN pilot  For example, the working group could focus time and attention on strengthening design of the pilot program as a whole, instead of implementing projects on a piecemeal basis  Further, clearly identifying and documenting roles and responsibilities could help relevant stakeholders define and agree upon pilot objectives as well as an assessment methodology and evaluation plan  In addition, including stakeholders with relevant expertise on the dedicated team may assist VA in identifying viable projects and negotiating partnership agreements more readily  The CHIP-IN pilot is a unique, time-limited opportunity for VA to test a new way of building needed medical facilities by using non-federal funding sources—donors—to leverage federal funds  Though the first project is still under way, stakeholders have already noted benefits of the donation partnership approach, including potential cost and time savings as well as learning about private sector practices that could be applied more broadly to VA construction  However, VA is not yet collecting the information it needs to support decisions by VA or Congress about the pilot  Without a strengthened pilot design—including measurable objectives, an assessment methodology, and an evaluation plan—that can help inform decisions about the scalability of the pilot, it may not be clear to VA and Congress whether the CHIP-IN approach could be part of a longer-term strategy or how lessons learned could enhance other VA construction efforts  While leadership for the pilot had not been previously assigned, a newly formed CHIP-IN steering committee is meant to focus on the pilot’s implementation  Defining and documenting roles and responsibilities for this committee—and identifying the resources needed to effectively implement the pilot—could assist VA in partnering with additional donors and creating new opportunities to meet the urgent needs of veterans  We are making the following three recommendations to VA  The Secretary of VA should ensure that internal stakeholders—such as the CHIP-IN steering committee’s members—agree to and document clear, measurable objectives for the CHIP-IN pilot that will help inform decisions about whether and how to scale the program  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of VA should ensure that internal stakeholders—such as the CHIP-IN steering committee’s members—develop an assessment methodology and an evaluation plan that are linked to objectives for the CHIP-IN pilot and that help inform decisions about whether and how to scale the program  (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of VA should ensure that the CHIP-IN steering committee documents the roles and responsibilities of its members and identifies available staff resources, including any additional expertise and skills that are needed to implement the CHIP-IN pilot program  (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report to VA for comment  In its written comments, reproduced in appendix I, VA concurred with our recommendations and stated that it has begun or is planning to take actions to address them  VA also provided a general comment on the role of VHA in the CHIP-IN pilot, which we incorporated in our report  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (213) 830-1011 or vonaha@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the contact named above, Cathy Colwell (Assistant Director), Kate Perl (Analyst in Charge), Melissa Bodeau, Jennifer Clayborne, Peter Del Toro, Shirley Hwang, Terence Lam, Malika Rice, Crystal Wesco, and Elizabeth Wood made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: VA has pressing infrastructure needs. The Communities Helping Invest through Property and Improvements Needed for Veterans Act of 2016 (CHIP-IN Act) authorized VA to accept donated real property—such as buildings or facility construction or improvements—through a pilot program. VA has initiated one project in Omaha, Nebraska, through a partnership with a donor group. VA can accept up to five donations through the pilot program, which is authorized through 2021. The CHIP-IN Act includes a provision for GAO to report on donation agreements. This report (1) examines the extent to which the VA's pilot design aligns with leading practices and (2) discusses what VA has learned from the pilot to date. GAO reviewed VA documents, including plans for the pilot program, and visited the Omaha pilot project. GAO interviewed VA officials, the Omaha donor group, and three non-federal entities that responded to VA's request seeking donors. GAO compared implementation of VA's pilot to leading practices for pilot design, organizational transformation, and cross-functional teams. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is conducting a pilot program, called CHIP-IN, that allows VA to partner with non-federal entities and accept real property donations from them as a way to help address VA's infrastructure needs. Although VA signed its first project agreement under the program in April 2017, VA has not yet established a framework for effective design of the pilot program. Specifically, VA's pilot program design is not aligned with four of five leading practices for designing a well-developed and documented pilot program. VA has begun to implement one leading practice by improving its efforts to communicate with relevant stakeholders, such as including external stakeholders in key meetings. However, the VA offices involved have not agreed upon and documented clear, measurable objectives for the pilot program, which is a leading practice. Further, VA has not developed an assessment methodology or an evaluation plan that would help inform decisions about whether or how the pilot approach could be expanded. While VA officials said they intend to develop these items as tasks for the newly formed CHIP-IN steering committee, they have no timeline for doing so. Without clear objectives and assessment and evaluation plans, VA and Congress may have difficulty determining whether the pilot approach is an effective way to help address VA's infrastructure needs. To date, the CHIP-IN pilot suggests that donation partnerships could improve construction projects, but identifying donors and establishing a team for the pilot program have presented challenges. Officials from VA and the donor group for the first pilot project—an ambulatory care center in Omaha, Nebraska—said they are completing the project faster than if it had been a standard federal construction project, while achieving potential cost savings by using private sector practices. However, VA officials said it is challenging to find partners to make large donations with no financial return, and VA's lack of marketing and philanthropic development experience exacerbates that challenge. VA and the donor group agreed that a dedicated team of individuals with relevant expertise could facilitate the pilot's implementation. The new CHIP-IN steering committee could serve this purpose, but it lacks documented roles and responsibilities. Establishing a team with clear roles and responsibilities and identifying both available and needed staff resources could assist VA in partnering with additional donors and creating new opportunities to meet veterans' needs. GAO is recommending that VA: (1) establish pilot program objectives, (2) develop an assessment methodology and an evaluation plan, and (3) document roles and responsibilities and identify available and needed staff resources. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations.