prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Since 1993, USAID has obligated more than $5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, primarily using funds appropriated through the ESF  According to State officials, through the ESF, USAID provides project assistance and debt relief payments to PA creditors  USAID, with overall foreign policy guidance from State, implements most ESF programs, including programs related to private sector development, health, water and road infrastructure, local governance, civil society, rule of law, education, and youth development  According to USAID officials, this assistance to the West Bank and Gaza contributes to building a more democratic, stable, prosperous, and secure Palestinian society—a goal that USAID described as being in the interest of the Palestinians, the United States, and Israel  Figure 1 shows the location of the West Bank and Gaza relative to surrounding countries  USAID assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is conducted under antiterrorism policies and procedures outlined in an administrative policy document known as Mission Order 21  The stated purpose of the mission order, as amended, is to describe policies and procedures to ensure that the mission’s program assistance does not inadvertently provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism  We have previously reported on the status of ESF assistance to the Palestinians and USAID’s antiterrorism policies and procedures in the West Bank and Gaza  As of March 31, 2018, USAID had obligated about $544 1 million (over 99 percent) and expended about $350 6 million (over 64 percent) of approximately $544 5 million in ESF assistance allocated for the West Bank and Gaza in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 (see table 1)  USAID obligated portions of the allocated funds for direct payments to PA creditors—specifically, payments to two Israeli fuel companies, to cover debts for petroleum purchases, and to a local Palestinian bank, to pay off a line of credit used for PA medical referrals to six hospitals in the East Jerusalem Hospital network  Project assistance obligated for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 accounted for about $215 million (74 percent) and $184 million (72 percent), respectively, of USAID’s obligations of ESF assistance for the West Bank and Gaza for those fiscal years (see fig  1)  Payments to the PA’s creditors accounted for the remaining obligations—about $75 million (26 percent) of fiscal year 2015 obligations and about $70 million (28 percent) of fiscal year 2016 obligations  According to USAID documents, ESF project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 was obligated for three USAID development objectives: Economic Growth and Infrastructure (about $239 million), Investing in the Next Generation (about $107 million), and Governance and Civic Engagement (about $25 million)  Program support—which sustains all development objectives, according to USAID—accounted for about $29 million (see table 2)  Economic Growth and Infrastructure  The largest share—about 60 percent—of USAID’s ESF project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 supported the agency’s Economic Growth and Infrastructure development objective  According to USAID documents, as of March 31, 2018, the agency had obligated about $239 million and expended approximately $89 million (about 37 percent) for projects under this objective  USAID officials stated that the agency funded these projects under the following standard State-budgeted program areas: health (including water), infrastructure, private sector competiveness, and stabilization operations and security sector reform  The largest project—the Architecture and Engineering Services project—received about $20 million of fiscal year 2015 ESF assistance and $17 million of fiscal year 2016 ESF assistance  The purpose of the project was to rehabilitate and construct infrastructure through the procurement of infrastructure services, including engineering design and construction management, among other things  The contractor was required to coordinate with relevant PA and Israeli entities, as well as with USAID, to assist in the selection of PA water and wastewater projects and in the planning and design of water projects such as small- to large-scale water distribution systems, water treatment systems, and institutional capacity building  Investing in the Next Generation  The second-largest share—about 27 percent—of USAID’s fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza supported the agency’s Investing in the Next Generation development objective  According to USAID documents, as of March 31, 2018, the agency had obligated about $107 million and expended approximately $79 million (about 74 percent) for projects under this objective  Program areas funded included education, health, social and economic services and protection of vulnerable populations  The largest project funded under this objective—a grant to the World Food Program for assistance to vulnerable groups—received $12 million in fiscal year 2015 and $15 million in fiscal year 2016 ESF assistance  The project focused on ensuring food security, including meeting food needs, of the nonrefugee population; increasing food availability and dietary diversity for the most vulnerable and food-insecure nonrefugee population; and establishing linkages with the Palestinian private sector (shopkeepers, farms, and factories) to produce and deliver the aid being provided to Palestinians  For example, the project directly distributed a standard food ration through both direct food distribution and electronic food vouchers to vulnerable nonrefugee families  Governance and Civic Engagement  The smallest share—about 6 percent—of USAID’s fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF project assistance for the West Bank and Gaza supported the agency’s Governance and Civic Engagement development objective  According to USAID documents, as of March 31, 2018, USAID had obligated about $24 6 million and expended approximately $14 5 million (about 60 percent) for projects in program areas that included civil society, good governance, and rule of law  The largest project funded under this objective—a contract for the Communities Thrive Project— received about $5 2 million and $8 million in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance, respectively  The project aimed to help 55 West Bank municipalities improve fiscal management, fiscal accountability and transparency, and delivery and management of municipal services, among other things  Under debt relief grant agreements with the PA, USAID made direct payments of ESF assistance to PA creditors totaling about $75 million from fiscal year 2015 funds and $70 million from fiscal year 2016 funds  USAID paid about $40 million from fiscal year 2015 funds and $45 million from fiscal year 2016 funds to two oil companies to cover debts for petroleum purchases  In addition, USAID paid about $35 million from fiscal year 2015 funds and $25 million from fiscal year 2016 funds to the Bank of Palestine, to pay off a PA line of credit that was used to cover PA medical referrals to six hospitals in the East Jerusalem Hospital network  Before using fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance to pay PA creditors, USAID vetted the creditors to ensure that the assistance would not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism, as required by its policies and procedures  USAID determined that certain legal requirements, including the requirement for an assessment of the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning, were not applicable for direct payments of these funds to PA creditors  Nevertheless, USAID continued to commission external assessments and financial audits of the PA Ministries of Health and Finance and Planning  USAID documentation for payments to creditors shows that before signing debt relief agreements with the PA, mission officials checked, as required by Mission Order 21, the vetting status of PA creditors who would receive direct payments under the agreements, to ensure their eligibility before any payment was made  USAID Mission Order 21 requires that before payments to PA creditors are executed, the creditors must be vetted—that is, the creditors’ key individuals and other identifying information must be checked against the federal Terrorist Screening Center database and other information sources to determine whether they have links to terrorism  According to USAID policies and procedures, each PA creditor must be vetted if more than 12 months have passed since the last time the creditor was vetted and approved to receive ESF payments  We found that for payments made to PA creditors using fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance, USAID vetted each PA creditor that received payments and completed the vetting during the 12- month period before the debt relief agreements with the PA were signed (see table 3)  USAID determined that certain legal requirements applicable to cash transfers to the PA were not applicable to direct payments to PA creditors of fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance  In September 2015, we reported that USAID ceased making cash payments directly to the PA in 2014 and began making payments of ESF assistance directly to PA creditors  In reviewing USAID’s compliance with key legal requirements, we found that USAID had complied with the requirements when making cash transfers to the PA in fiscal year 2013  However, USAID had determined that some requirements were not applicable to direct payments made to PA creditors in fiscal year 2014, because no funds were being provided directly to the PA  After fiscal year 2015, USAID further defined the scope of statutory requirements it deemed applicable to payments to PA creditors using fiscal years 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance, under the rationale that these payments do not constitute direct payments to the PA  Specifically, according to USAID, the agency determined that the following statutory requirements discussed in our prior report were not applicable to direct payments to PA creditors  A requirement to notify the Committees on Appropriations 15 days before obligating funds for a cash transfer to the PA A requirement for the PA to maintain cash transfer funds in a separate account A requirement for the President to waive the prohibition on providing funds to the PA and to submit an accompanying report to the Committees on Appropriations A requirement for the Secretary of State to provide a certification and accompanying report to the Committees on Appropriations when the President waives the prohibition on providing funds to the PA Requirements for direct government-to-government assistance, including an assessment of the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning According to USAID officials, they currently do not plan to resume cash payments to the PA, because making direct payments to creditors minimizes the misuse of funds and assures full transparency and appropriateness of transfers  Although USAID concluded that the statutory requirement mandating assessments of the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning did not apply to direct payments to PA creditors, the West Bank and Gaza mission commissioned external assessments of the PA Ministry of Health’s medical referral services and Ministry of Finance and Planning’s petroleum procurement system  According to a USAID document, while the payments to the creditors did not constitute direct budget support to the PA, the agency chose to commission external assessments to determine whether the PA’s financial systems were sufficient to ensure adequate accountability for USAID funds consistent with legislative requirements for direct budget support funds  These external assessments identified weaknesses in both systems  Ministry of Health medical referrals  The assessment report stated that the ministry did not have approved policies and procedures for the medical referral process, a list of medical services covered by the referral system, and written criteria for selecting referral hospitals in the medical referral systems  In response, in a January 2016 internal memorandum, the West Bank and Gaza mission officials concluded, among other things, that the findings did not pose a significant risk to USAID funds  They also stated that the Ministry of Health’s medical referral system had adequate policies and procedures for referrals to local hospitals  However, after the assessment report was issued, a USAID contractor worked with the Ministry of Health to update, revise, and approve guidelines for medical referrals  Ministry of Finance and Planning petroleum procurements  The assessment report stated that the ministry lacked specific policies and procedures to prevent or detect fraud in the petroleum procurement systems  In the West Bank and Gaza mission’s January 2016 memorandum, USAID mission officials disagreed with the assessment’s findings regarding the petroleum procurement system, stating that the assessment did not take into account sufficient and adequate internal controls at the ministry as a first line of defense against fraud  The memorandum also stated that the finding did not affect USAID debt relief payments to the PA creditors  USAID officials told us that, while they did not believe the external assessments’ findings affected the integrity of USAID’s debt relief payment process, they took four additional steps to mitigate findings noted in the assessment of the Ministry of Finance and Planning’s fuel procurement processes  According to USAID officials, they (1) confirmed that the fuel companies had controls and systems to ensure an objective and transparent system in receiving and recording PA orders, (2) dispatched orders with official and properly signed shipping delivery and receipt documents, (3) obtained written confirmation from the fuel companies of the costs of the fuel provided to the PA, and (4) confirmed the PA’s petroleum debt with the fuel companies before initiating the payments and after making the payments  In addition, in 2016, USAID commissioned two routine financial audits of the debt relief grant agreed to by USAID and the PA for the use of fiscal year 2015 ESF assistance to make direct payments to PA creditors  According to USAID officials, the auditors were to examine the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning’s recording of USAID payments to PA creditors in its financial records as well as the ministry’s and USAID’s compliance with the terms of the grant agreement and related implementation letters  The audits did not identify any questioned or ineligible costs, reportable material weaknesses in internal control, or material instances of noncompliance with the terms of the debt relief grant  Also, in 2017, USAID contracted for a financial audit of the fiscal year 2016 debt relief grant agreed to by USAID and the PA  According to a USAID document, in May 2018, USAID held an entrance conference with the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning for the audit of the fiscal year 2016 grant  In July 2018, USAID sent the final audit report to the Regional Inspector General for review  According to the USAID document, the report did not identify any questioned or ineligible costs, reportable material weaknesses in internal controls, or material instances of noncompliance with the terms of the grant  We provided a draft of this report to USAID and State for review and comment  USAID provided comments, which we have reproduced in appendix II, as well as technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  State did not provide comments  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Administrator of USAID, and the Secretary of State  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who contributed to this report are listed in appendix III  Appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 included provisions for GAO to review the treatment, handling, and uses of funds provided through the ESF for assistance to the West Bank and Gaza  This report examines (1) the status of ESF assistance and projects provided to the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including payments to PA creditors, and (2) the extent to which USAID conducted required vetting of PA creditors to ensure that assistance would not support entities or individuals associated with terrorism and assessed PA ministries’ capacity to use ESF assistance as intended  To address our first objective, we reviewed appropriations legislation, related budget justification documents, and financial data for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including expenditures as of March 31, 2018, provided by USAID’s West Bank and Gaza mission in Tel Aviv, Israel  We reviewed data that USAID provided on obligations and expenditures of all ESF assistance for the West Bank and Gaza as of March 31, 2018, from annual allocations for fiscal years 2015 and 2016  We also reviewed relevant USAID documents, including notifications to Congress regarding the use of appropriated funds  In addition, we interviewed USAID and State officials in Washington, D C , and Tel Aviv  To determine whether the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, we requested and reviewed information from USAID officials about their procedures for entering contract and financial information into USAID’s data system  We determined that the USAID data were sufficiently reliable  For the project information included in this report, we relied on data that USAID provided, showing its obligations and expenditures of fiscal year 2015 and 2016 ESF assistance for West Bank and Gaza  For illustrative purposes, we requested and obtained from USAID descriptions of projects that, according to USAID officials, represented the largest financial obligations for each development objective in fiscal years 2015 and 2016  To address our second objective, we identified and reviewed relevant legal requirements as well as USAID policies and procedures to comply with those requirements  USAID Mission Order 21 is the primary document that details USAID procedures to ensure that the mission’s assistance program does not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism, consistent with the prohibition on such support found in relevant laws and executive orders  In addition, we reviewed 27 USAID determinations of compliance for payments to PA creditors and discussed with USAID mission officials their efforts to comply with the policies and procedures in Mission Order 21 before executing payments to hospitals, companies, and banks that facilitated the payments  We also reviewed the timing of USAID’s vetting of each PA creditor that received payments, to ensure that, as required by Mission Order 21, the vetting occurred within 12 months before USAID signed the relevant debt relief grant agreement with the PA  Further, we reviewed external assessments of the PA Ministries of Health and Finance and Planning and financial audits of the PA Ministry of Finance and Planning, and we discussed the assessments’ and audits with USAID officials responsible for payments to PA creditors  We conducted this performance audit from September 2017 to August 2018, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the contact named above, Judith McCloskey (Assistant Director), Tom Zingale (Analyst-in-Charge), Eddie Uyekawa, Jeff Isaacs, and Nicole Willems made significant contributions to this report  David Dornisch, Neil Doherty, Reid Lowe, and Roger Stoltz also contributed to the report 


Report 2:  Administrations supported the general international stance that the Golan is Syrian territory occupied by Israel, with its final status subject to negotiation  In reaction to the U S  proclamation, others in the international community have insisted that the Golan's status has not changed  In Congress, Senate and House bills introduced in February 2019 ( S  567 and H R  1372 ) support Israeli sovereignty claims to the Golan, and would treat the Golan as part of Israel in any existing or future law "relating to appropriations or foreign commerce " For decades after 1967, various Israeli leaders, reportedly including Prime Minister Netanyahu as late as 2011, had entered into indirect talks with Syria aimed at returning some portion of the Golan as part of a lasting peace agreement  However, the effect of civil war on Syria and the surrounding region, including an increase in Iran's presence, may have influenced Netanyahu to shift focus from negotiating with Syria on a "land for peace" basis to obtaining international support for Israel's claims of sovereignty  As part of the periodic conflict in Syria between Israel and Iran , some Iranian missiles have targeted Israeli positions in the Golan  The Syrian government has denounced the U S  policy change as an illegal violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and insisted that Syria is determined to recover the Golan  Additionally, observers have argued that the policy change could unintentionally bolster Syrian President Bashar al Asad within Syria by rallying Syrian nationalistic sentiment in opposition to Israel's claims to the Golan and deflecting attention from Iran's activities inside Syria  Since 1974, the U N  Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled an area of the Golan Heights between the regions controlled by Israel and Syria, with about 880 troops from five countries stationed there as of January 2019  During that time, Israel's forces in the Golan have not faced serious military resistance to their continued deployment, despite some security threats and diplomatic challenges  Periodic resolutions by the U N  General Assembly have criticized Israel's occupation as hindering regional peace and Israel's settlement and de facto annexation of the Golan as illegal  Hezbollah's forces and Israel's military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader conflict  Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional implications  Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah's buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds  Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran over Iran's presence in Syria raises questions about the potential for Hezbollah's forces in Lebanon to open another front against Israel  After the September 2018 incident leading to Russia's installation of an S-300 system in Syria (discussed above), Iran reportedly began directly transferring weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon while reducing Syria's use as a transshipment hub  One Israeli media account warned that Hezbollah's threat to Israel is increasing because of initiatives to build precision-weapons factories in Lebanon and to set up a military infrastructure in southern Syria  In late 2018 and early 2019, Israel's military undertook an effort—dubbed "Operation Northern Shield"—to seal six Hezbollah attack tunnels to prevent them from crossing into Israel  Israeli officials claim that they do not want another war, while at the same time taking measures aimed at constraining and deterring Hezbollah, including through consultation with the U N  Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)  President Trump has expressed interest in brokering a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and his Administration has supposedly prepared a proposal to facilitate negotiations, but the Administration has repeatedly postponed releasing the proposal  Many factors may account for the delays, including recent U S  actions regarding Jerusalem, tension in and around the Gaza Strip, reduced funding for the Palestinians, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and political jockeying and domestic constraints among Israelis and Palestinians  The U S  decision—announced in December 2017—to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the U S  embassy there has fed U S -Palestinian tensions  Israeli leaders generally celebrated the change, but Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas strongly objected  Many other countries opposed President Trump's actions on Jerusalem, as reflected in action at the United Nations  Claiming U S  bias favoring Israel, Palestinian leaders broke off high-level political contacts with the United States shortly after the December 2017 announcement and have made efforts to advance Palestinian national claims in international fora  However, the PA continues security coordination with Israel in the West Bank  U S -Palestinian tensions appear to have influenced Administration decisions to cut off various types of U S  funding to the Palestinians, and arguably have dimmed prospects for restarting Israeli-Palestinian talks  In a September 2018 address before the U N  General Assembly, PLO Chairman/PA President Abbas denounced Administration actions that he characterized as taking disputed Israeli-Palestinian issues—such as Jerusalem's status and Palestinian refugee claims—off the negotiating table  Funding for economic and humanitarian needs in the West Bank and Gaza could become even scarcer  In February 2019, Israel announced that it would withhold a portion of the tax revenue it collects for the PA because—pursuant to a law passed by the Knesset in 2018—Israel had determined that amount represented PLO/PA payments made on behalf of individuals allegedly involved in terrorist acts  In response, Abbas announced that the PA would completely reject monthly revenue transfers from Israel if it withheld any amount, even though the transfers comprise approximately 65% of the PA budget  For February, Israel withheld approximately $11 million from the $193 million due to the PA, with the PA rejecting the entire amount as a result  The PA is reportedly seeking temporary financial support from the private sector and local banks, and also asking the Arab League to follow through on its 2010 decision to provide $100 million per month as a "financial safety net" for the PA  At the end of January 2019, U S  bilateral aid to the Palestinians—including nonlethal security assistance that Israel generally supports—ended completely due to the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA, P L  115-253 ), which became law on October 3, 2018  Two months after the law's enactment, PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah informed Secretary of State Michael Pompeo that the PA would not accept aid that subjected it to federal court jurisdiction  Apparently, U S  aid will not resume unless Congress amends or repeals the ATCA, or the Administration channels the aid differently  Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor Jared Kushner has stated that the Administration will publicly release a peace plan sometime after Israeli national elections, which are set to occur on April 9, 2019  According to Kushner, the peace plan contains detailed proposals on the various issues that divide Israel and the PLO  Many observers express skepticism about the prospect that these proposals can serve as a basis for the serious resumption of bilateral talks, but Kushner has reportedly said that the Administration is focusing on formulating "realistic solutions," and that "privately, people are more flexible " U S  officials hope to surmount potential obstacles to the peace plan in the Israeli and Palestinian domestic arenas by obtaining political and economic support for the U S  initiative from key Arab states in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Egypt  A number of Arab states share common interests in working behind the scenes with Israel to counter Iranian regional influence  While some diplomatic developments have fed speculation about warming Arab-Israeli ties, reports suggest that key Arab Gulf states remain reluctant to embrace more formal relations with Israel without a resolution of the Palestinian issue  Saudi Arabia's press agency responded to the U S  recognition of Israel's claims to sovereignty in the Golan Heights by saying that it "will have significant negative effects on the peace process in the Middle East and the security and stability of the region " In a statement with implications both for domestic and international audiences, Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly said that the March 2019 change in U S  policy on the Golan proves that countries can retain territory captured in a defensive war  His statement prompted speculation over the possibility that Israeli leaders might consider annexing part of the West Bank and whether the situation in the Golan is sufficiently similar to invite comparison  Days before the April elections, Netanyahu asserted that if he were to lead the next government, he would apply Israeli law to West Bank settlements  The closely contested Israeli national elections—scheduled for April 9, 2019—and the subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for the country's leadership and future policies  Prime Minister Netanyahu faces a challenge from the centrist Blue and White party under the combined leadership of former top general Benny Gantz and former Finance Minister Yair Lapid  Some setbacks for Netanyahu during the campaign have included the attorney general's announcement of probable corruption-related indictments against Netanyahu, new media allegations of possible misconduct relating to Israel's procurement of German submarines, and questions about some individuals or groups possibly spreading rumors against Netanyahu's opponents via social media  Yet, some observers calculate that Netanyahu's Likud could possibly get fewer Knesset seats than Blue and White and still form the next coalition  For more information on the actors involved in the elections, see CRS Insight IN11068, Israel: April 2019 Elections and Probable Indictments Against Prime Minister Netanyahu , by Jim Zanotti and this report's Appendix   In July 2018, the Knesset passed a Basic Law defining Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people  Some observers have expressed concern that the law might further undermine the place of Arabs in Israeli society, while others view its effect as mainly symbolic  In March 2019, Netanyahu said that Israel is a Jewish, democratic state with equal rights for all its citizens, and "the nation-state not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people," reviving domestic debate about the 2018 law and perhaps seeking support during the election campaign from sympathetic voter groups 

ground_truth: Since 1993, the U.S. government has committed more than $5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. According to the Department of State, this assistance to the Palestinians promotes U.S. economic and political foreign policy interests by supporting Middle East peace negotiations and financing economic stabilization programs. USAID is primarily responsible for administering ESF assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. Appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 included provisions for GAO to review the treatment, handling, and uses of funds provided through the ESF for assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. This report examines (1) the status of ESF assistance and projects provided to the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including project assistance and payments to PA creditors, and (2) the extent to which USAID conducted required vetting of PA creditors to ensure that this assistance would not support entities or individuals associated with terrorism and assessed PA ministries' capacity to use ESF assistance as intended. GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations and USAID financial data, policies, procedures, and documents. GAO also interviewed USAID and State Department officials. As of March 2018, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had allocated about $545 million of funding appropriated to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) for assistance in the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016. USAID obligated about $544 million (over 99 percent) and expended about $351 million (over 64 percent) of the total allocations. Project assistance accounted for approximately $399 million of the obligated funds, while payments to Palestinian Authority (PA) creditors accounted for $145 million (see figure). USAID's obligations for project assistance in the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 supported three development objectives—Economic Growth and Infrastructure ($239 million), Investing in the Next Generation ($107 million), and Governance and Civic Engagement (about $25 million). In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, USAID made payments directly to PA creditors—two Israeli fuel companies, to cover debts for petroleum purchases, and a local Palestinian bank, to pay off a line of credit used for PA medical referrals to six hospitals in the East Jerusalem Hospital network. USAID vetted PA creditors to ensure that the program assistance would not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism and also conducted external assessments and financial audits of PA ministries of Health and Finance and Planning. USAID documentation showed that, as required, officials checked the vetting status of each PA creditor within 12 months before USAID signed its debt relief grant agreements with the PA. In addition, although USAID determined that it was not legally required to assess the PA Ministry of Health's medical referral services and the Ministry of Finance and Planning's petroleum procurement system, the agency commissioned external assessments of both ministries. These assessments found some weaknesses in both ministries' systems; however, USAID mission officials stated that these weaknesses did not affect USAID debt relief payments to the PA creditors. Nevertheless, USAID took additional steps to mitigate the identified weaknesses. For example, a USAID contractor worked with the Ministry of Health to update, revise, and approve guidelines for medical referrals. In addition, USAID commissioned financial audits of the debt relief grant agreements between USAID and the PA for direct payments to PA creditors in fiscal year 2015 and 2016. The audits did not identify any ineligible costs, reportable material weaknesses in internal control, or material instances of noncompliance with the terms of the agreements. GAO is not making recommendations in this report.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: Cybersecurity incidents continue to impact federal entities and the information they maintain  According to OMB’s 2018 annual FISMA report to Congress, agencies reported 35,277 information security incidents to DHS’s U S  Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) in fiscal year 2017  As shown in figure 1, these incidents involved threat vectors, such as web-based attacks, phishing attacks, and the loss or theft of computer equipment, among others  These incidents and others like them can pose a serious challenge to economic, national, and personal privacy and security  The following examples highlight the impact of such incidents: In March 2018, the Department of Justice reported that it had indicted nine Iranians for conducting a massive cybersecurity theft campaign on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps  According to the department, the Iranians allegedly stole more than 31 terabytes of documents and data from more than 140 American universities, 30 U S  companies, and 5 federal government agencies, among other entities  In March 2018, a joint alert from DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation stated that, since at least March 2016, Russian government actors had targeted U S  government entities and critical infrastructure sectors, including the energy, nuclear, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors  In June 2015, the Office of Personnel Management reported that an intrusion into its systems had affected the personnel records of about 4 2 million current and former federal employees  Then, in July 2015, the agency reported that a separate but related incident had compromised its systems and the files related to background investigations for at least 21 5 million individuals  The federal approach and strategy for securing information systems is prescribed by federal law and policy  FISMA sets requirements for effectively securing federal systems and information  In addition, the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 requires protecting federal networks through the use of federal intrusion prevention and detection capabilities  Further, Executive Order 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure, directs agencies to manage cybersecurity risks to the federal enterprise by, among other things, using the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (cybersecurity framework)  FISMA was enacted to improve federal cybersecurity and clarify government-wide responsibilities  The law is intended to provide for improved oversight of federal agencies’ information security programs  Specifically, the law provides a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over information resources that support federal operations and assets  The law is also intended to ensure the effective oversight of information security risks, including those throughout civilian, national security, and law enforcement agencies  FISMA assigns OMB and DHS oversight roles in ensuring federal agencies’ compliance with the law  Among other things, FISMA requires OMB to develop and oversee the implementation of policies, principles, standards, and guidelines on information security in federal agencies, except with regard to national security systems  The law also assigns OMB the responsibility of requiring agencies to identify and provide information security protections commensurate with assessments of risk to their information and information systems  The law further requires DHS to administer the implementation of agency information security policies and practices for non-national security information systems, in consultation with OMB, by developing, issuing, and overseeing implementation of binding operational directives; monitoring agency implementation of information security policies and practices; and convening meetings with senior agency officials to help ensure their effective implementation of information security policies and practices, among other things  FISMA assigned to NIST the responsibility for developing standards and guidelines that include minimum information security requirements  To this end, NIST has issued several publications to provide guidance for agencies in implementing an information security program  For example, NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 provides guidance to agencies on the selection and implementation of information security and privacy controls for systems  FISMA also assigns to the head of each executive branch agency, responsibility for providing information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency  The law also delegates to the agency chief information officer (CIO), or comparable official, the authority to ensure compliance with FISMA requirements  The CIO is responsible for designating a senior agency information security officer whose primary duty is information security  In addition, the law requires agencies to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security program to secure federal information systems  Specifically, these information security programs are to provide risk-based protections for the information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency  Further, FISMA requires agencies to comply with DHS binding operational directives, OMB policies and procedures, and NIST federal information processing standards  FISMA also has reporting requirements for OMB and federal agencies  Specifically, OMB is to report annually, in consultation with DHS, on the effectiveness of agency information security policies and practices, including a summary of major agency information security incidents and an assessment of agency compliance with NIST standards  Further, the law requires agencies to report annually to OMB, DHS, certain congressional committees, and the Comptroller General of the United States on the adequacy and effectiveness of their information security policies, procedures, and practices, as well as their compliance with FISMA  The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015, among other things, sets forth authority for enhancing federal intrusion prevention and detection capabilities among federal entities  The act contains several provisions for DHS and OMB  Specifically, the act requires that DHS deploy, operate, and maintain capabilities to prevent and detect cybersecurity risks in network traffic traveling to or from an agency’s information system  DHS is to make these capabilities available for use by any agency  In addition, the act requires DHS to improve intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, as appropriate, by regularly deploying new technologies and modifying existing technologies  The act also requires OMB and DHS, in consultation with appropriate agencies, to review and update government-wide policies and programs to ensure appropriate prioritization and use of network security monitoring tools within agency networks, and to brief appropriate congressional committees  In May 2017, the President signed Executive Order 13800, which sets policy for managing cybersecurity risk as an executive branch enterprise  Specifically, it outlines actions to enhance cybersecurity across federal agencies and critical infrastructure to improve the nation’s cyber posture and capabilities against cybersecurity threats  To this end, the order states that the President will hold executive agency heads accountable for managing agency-wide cybersecurity risk and directs each executive agency to use the NIST cybersecurity framework to manage those risks  The cybersecurity framework, which provides guidance for cybersecurity activities, is based on five core security functions: Identify: Develop an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, assets, data, and capabilities  Protect: Develop and implement appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical services  Detect: Develop and implement appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event  Respond: Develop and implement appropriate activities to take action regarding a detected cybersecurity incident  Recover: Develop and implement appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience and to restore capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity incident  According to NIST, these five functions should be performed concurrently and continuously to address cybersecurity risk  In addition, when considered together, they provide a high-level, strategic view of the life cycle of an organization’s management of cybersecurity risk  Within the five functions are 23 categories and 108 subcategories that include controls for achieving the intent of each function  Appendix II provides a description of the cybersecurity framework categories and subcategories of controls  In February 2013, we reported that the government had issued a variety of strategy-related documents that addressed priorities for enhancing cybersecurity within the federal government, as well as for encouraging improvements in the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure within the private sector  However, we noted that no overarching cybersecurity strategy had been developed that articulated priority actions, assigned responsibilities for performing them, and set time frames for their completion  Accordingly, we recommended that the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator in the Executive Office of the President develop an overarching federal cybersecurity strategy that included all key elements of the desirable characteristics of a national strategy  These characteristics would include, among other things, milestones and performance measures for major activities to address stated priorities; cost and resources needed to accomplish stated priorities; and specific roles and responsibilities of federal organizations related to the strategy’s stated priorities  Since that time, the executive branch has made progress toward outlining a federal strategy for confronting cyber threats  For example, in September 2018, we reported that recent executive branch initiatives that identify cybersecurity priorities for the federal government provide a good foundation toward establishing a more comprehensive strategy  Nevertheless, we pointed out that additional efforts were needed to address all of the desirable characteristics of a national strategy that we recommended  Specifically, recently issued executive branch strategy documents did not include key elements of desirable characteristics that can enhance the usefulness of a national strategy as guidance for decision makers in allocating resources, defining policies, and helping to ensure accountability  For example, these strategy documents did not generally include: milestones and performance measures to gauge results; resources needed to carry out the goals and objectives; and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for key agencies, such as DHS, the Department of Defense, and OMB  Ultimately, we determined that a more clearly defined, coordinated, and comprehensive approach to planning and executing an overall strategy would likely lead to significant progress in furthering strategic goals and lessening persistent weaknesses  Subsequent to our September 2018 report, the President issued the National Cyber Strategy on September 20, 2018  The strategy builds upon Executive Order 13800 and describes actions that federal agencies and the administration are to take to, among other things, secure federal information systems  For example, the strategy states that the administration is expected to further enable DHS to secure federal department and agency networks, to include ensuring that DHS has appropriate access to agency information systems for cybersecurity purposes and can take and direct action to safeguard systems  In addition, the strategy states that the administration plans to continue with its existing efforts underway to transition agencies to shared services and infrastructure and that DHS is to have appropriate visibility into those services and infrastructure to improve cybersecurity posture  DHS’s Network Security Deployment (NSD) division manages cybersecurity programs that are intended to improve the cybersecurity posture of the federal government  Among these programs, NCPS provides a capability to detect and prevent potentially malicious network traffic from entering agencies’ networks  In addition, the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program provides tools to agencies intended to identify and resolve cyber vulnerabilities on an ongoing basis  Operated by DHS’s US-CERT, NCPS is intended to detect and prevent cyber intrusions into agency networks, analyze network data for trends and anomalous data, and share information with agencies on cyber threats and incidents  Deployed in stages, this system, operationally known as EINSTEIN, has provided increasing capabilities to detect and prevent potential cyberattacks involving the network traffic entering or exiting the networks of participating federal agencies  Table 1 provides an overview of the EINSTEIN deployment stages to date  In January 2016, we reported the projected total life-cycle cost of the program was approximately $5 7 billion through fiscal year 2018  In addition, according to the Federal CIO, Congress appropriated $468 million in fiscal year 2017 and $402 million in fiscal year 2018 for NCPS  In that report, we also noted that NCPS was partially, but not fully, meeting most of its stated system objectives  Although the system’s intrusion detection capabilities provided the ability to detect known patterns of malicious activity on agency networks, it was limited in its capabilities to identify potential threats using anomaly-based detection  We also reported that although DHS had developed metrics for measuring the performance of NCPS, the metrics did not gauge the quality, accuracy, or effectiveness of the system’s intrusion detection and prevention capabilities  The department had also identified needs for future capabilities, but had not defined requirements for the capability to detect threats entering and exiting cloud service providers  Further, DHS had not considered specific vulnerability information for agency information systems in making risk- based decisions about future intrusion prevention capabilities  Accordingly, we made nine recommendations to DHS to, among other things, enhance the NCPS capabilities for meeting its objectives and better define requirements for future capabilities  DHS agreed with each of our nine recommendations and indicated that it would take steps to address them  DHS’s CDM program provides federal agencies with tools and services that have the intended capability to automate network monitoring, correlate and analyze security-related information, and enhance risk- based decision making at agency and government-wide levels  These tools include sensors that perform automated scans or searches for known cyber vulnerabilities, the results of which can feed into a dashboard that, at an agency level, is intended to alert network managers and enable the agency to allocate resources based on the risk  Summary data from each participating agency’s dashboard is expected to be transmitted to the Federal Dashboard where the data can be used to inform decisions about cybersecurity risks across the federal government  There are four phases of CDM implementation: Phase 1—involves deploying products to automate hardware and software asset management, configuration settings, and common vulnerability management capabilities  According to the Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan, DHS purchased phase 1 tools and integration services for all participating agencies in fiscal year 2015  DHS plans to have all phase 1 tools deployed at participating agencies by the end of the second quarter of fiscal year 2019  Phase 2—intends to address privilege management and infrastructure integrity by allowing agencies to monitor users on their networks and to detect whether users are engaging in unauthorized activity  According to the Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan, DHS was to provide agencies with additional phase 2 capabilities throughout fiscal year 2016, with the full suite of CDM phase 2 capabilities delivered by the end of that fiscal year  However, according to the OMB FISMA Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2017, the CDM program began deploying Phase 2 tools and sensors during fiscal year 2017  DHS plans to have all phase 2 tools deployed at participating agencies by the end of fiscal year 2019  Phase 3—includes detection capabilities that are intended to assess agency network activity and identify any anomalies that may indicate a cybersecurity compromise  Full operating capability for phases 1, 2, and 3 is planned to be achieved by the end of fiscal year 2022  Phase 4—intends to provide tools to (1) protect data at rest, in transit, and in use; (2) prevent loss of data; and (3) manage and mitigate data breaches  According to CDM program officials, phase 4 has not been approved and no tools have been selected  An approach for protecting systems against cybersecurity compromise is for federal agencies to build successive layers of defense mechanisms at strategic points in their information technology infrastructures  This approach, commonly referred to as defense in depth, entails implementing a series of protective mechanisms so that if one mechanism fails to detect and prevent an attack, another will provide a backup defense  By utilizing defense in depth, federal agencies can reduce the risk of a successful cyberattack by implementing intrusion detection and prevention capabilities  NIST has developed guidelines for protecting agency information systems using intrusion detection and prevention capabilities  For example, NIST SP 800-53 recommends that agencies strategically deploy capabilities and perform monitoring of their systems to include observation of events occurring on their network and at the external boundary of their network  In addition, NIST SP 800-94 provides agencies with guidance in designing, implementing, configuring, securing, monitoring, and maintaining such capabilities  As part of their defense-in-depth approach and, as recommended by the NIST guidelines, agencies can deploy the following list of capabilities, among others, on their networks to detect and prevent an attack: Protecting email from intrusions: According to OMB, email, by way of phishing attacks, remains one of the most common threat vectors across the government  Methods for protecting email include encryption, false email alerts, and anti-spear-phishing training  Monitoring cloud services: Cloud vendors provide services to agencies, including Software as a Service, Platform as a Service, and Infrastructure as a Service  As agencies increasingly rely on cloud services, monitoring traffic to and from their cloud service providers helps to ensure that agencies detect malicious traffic  Using host-based intrusion prevention: Host-based intrusion prevention systems provide defense at an individual system or device level by protecting against malicious activities  Host-based capabilities include memory-based protection and application whitelisting  Monitoring external and internal traffic: Agencies can monitor external and internal traffic, including: encrypted traffic, traffic between workstations and servers on the network, and direct connections to outside entities such as universities  Monitoring traffic helps to ensure that agencies detect malicious activity  Using security information and event management: A security information and event management capability produces real-time alerts and notifications of significant security events  Security alerts and notifications can provide the agency with better situational awareness regarding possible intrusion activity  According to inspectors general, agency CIOs, and OMB reports on federal information security practices, many agencies were not effectively implementing the federal government’s approach and strategy to securing information systems as of fiscal year 2017  Agencies’ inspectors general determined that most of the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies did not have effective agency-wide information security programs  They also reported that agencies did not have effective information security controls in place, leading to deficiencies in internal control over financial reporting  In addition, the CIOs demonstrated that, during fiscal years 2016 and 2017, most agencies had not met all targets for the cybersecurity CAP goal for improving cybersecurity performance  Further, based on FISMA metrics reported for fiscal year 2017, OMB determined that 13 of the 23 agencies were managing risks to their enterprise, while the other 10 agencies were at risk of ineffectively identifying, protecting, detecting, responding to, and if necessary, recovering from cyber intrusions  Figure 2 summarizes agencies’ efforts to implement the government’s approach and strategy for securing information systems as of fiscal year 2017  Appendix III includes a table that provides an additional overview of the effectiveness of each agency’s implementation of the government’s approach and strategy to securing information systems  Inspectors general determined that more than half of the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies did not have effective agency-wide information security programs as of fiscal year 2017  Further, in agency financial statement audit reports for fiscal year 2017, inspectors general reported that, despite improvements being made in information security practices, most of the civilian CFO Act agencies continued to exhibit deficiencies in information security controls  As a result of these deficiencies, inspectors general reported material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in internal control over financial reporting  FISMA requires inspectors general to determine the effectiveness of their respective agencies’ information security programs  To do so, FISMA reporting instructions direct inspectors general to provide a maturity rating for agency information security policies, procedures, and practices related to the five core security functions established in the NIST cybersecurity framework, as well as for the agency-wide information security program  The ratings used to evaluate the effectiveness of agencies’ information security programs are based on a five-level maturity model, as described in table 2  According to this maturity model, Level 4 (managed and measurable) represents an effective level of security  Therefore, if an inspector general rates the agency’s information security program at Level 4 or Level 5, then that agency is considered to have an effective information security program  For fiscal year 2017, the inspectors general for 6 of the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies reported that their agencies had an effective agency-wide information security program  More specifically, for the 5 core security functions, most inspectors general reported that their agency was at Level 3 (consistently implemented) for the identify, protect, and recover functions, and at Level 2 (defined) for the detect and respond functions, as shown in figure 3  Inspectors general report on the effectiveness of agencies’ information security controls as part of the annual audits of the agencies’ financial statements  The reports resulting from these audits include a description of information security control deficiencies related to the five major control categories defined by the Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM)—access controls, configuration management, segregation of duties, contingency planning, and security management  The reports also identify the inspectors general’s designation of information security as a significant deficiency or material weakness in internal control over financial reporting systems  For fiscal year 2017, inspectors general continued to identify information security control deficiencies in each of the five major control categories across the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies  The number of agencies with deficiencies in the access control and contingency planning information security control categories decreased between fiscal years 2016 and 2017, according to the inspectors general  Nevertheless, the inspectors general reported that agencies continued to exhibit deficiencies in these two control categories  In addition, the number of agencies with deficiencies in the security management and segregation of duties control categories increased from the prior year  The number of agencies reported as having deficiencies in the configuration management control category remained the same  Figure 4 shows the number of agencies that reported deficiencies in each of the information security control categories for fiscal years 2016 and 2017  Overall, inspectors general for the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies reported progress in agencies’ information security practices for fiscal year 2017  Specifically, during that time, 17 inspectors general designated information security as either a significant deficiency (11) or material weakness (6) in internal control over financial reporting systems for their agencies  This is a decrease from the previous fiscal year when 19 inspectors general designated information security as a significant deficiency (12) or material weakness (7)  Reporting instructions contained in the fiscal year 2017 FISMA metrics directed CIOs to assess their agencies’ progress toward achieving outcomes that strengthen federal cybersecurity  To do this, CIOs evaluated their agencies’ performance in reaching targets for specific FISMA reporting metrics  According to the reporting instructions, certain metrics were selected to represent the administration’s cybersecurity CAP goal  These selected metrics allowed CIOs to evaluate their agencies progress in meeting targets for that goal  The cybersecurity CAP goal for fiscal years 2015 through 2017 was to improve cybersecurity performance by having an ongoing awareness of information security, vulnerabilities, and threats impacting the operating information environment; ensuring that only authorized users have access to resources and information; and implementing technologies and processes that reduce the risk of malware  The cybersecurity CAP goal consisted of three priority areas with a total of nine performance indicators  Each of the nine performance indicators had an expected level of performance, or target, for implementation  Table 3 shows the three priority areas and related performance indicators and targets of the cybersecurity CAP goal for fiscal years 2015 through 2017  According to agency CIO assessments for fiscal year 2017, 6 of the 23 agencies met all 9 targets for the cybersecurity CAP goal  More specifically, 8 agencies met all four targets for the information security continuous 16 agencies met the two targets for the identity, credential, and access management priority area; and 17 agencies met all three targets for the anti-phishing and malware defense priority area  In addition, CIOs reported that agencies were making progress in meeting the targets for the nine performance indicators for fiscal years 2016 and 2017, with increases in the number of agencies meeting the targets within each of the three priority areas  However, although the number of agencies that met the targets in individual priority areas showed a net increase, not all agencies maintained their status  For example, the CIO for one agency reported meeting all three targets for the anti-phishing and malware defense priority area in fiscal year 2016, but reported that the agency only met two of the three targets in fiscal year 2017  Figure 5 shows the number of agencies that reported meeting each of the targets within the individual cybersecurity CAP goal priority areas for fiscal years 2016 and 2017  Although the CIOs for only six agencies reported meeting each of the targets associated with all nine performance indicators for the three cybersecurity CAP goal priority areas, the CIOs at an additional eight agencies reported meeting each target for two of the three priority areas  Specifically, one CIO reported that its agency met each of the targets for the (1) information security continuous monitoring and (2) identity, credential, and access management priority areas; another CIO reported that its agency met each of the targets for the (1) information security continuous monitoring and (2) anti-phishing and malware defense priority areas; and the CIOs at six other agencies met each of the targets for the (1) identity, credential, and access management and (2) anti-phishing and malware defense priority areas  In fiscal year 2018, the President’s Management Agenda replaced the three cybersecurity-focused CAP goal priority areas with updated performance indicators, most of which are to be met by 2020: 1  the manage asset security priority area is similar to the information security continuous monitoring priority area from the previous CAP goal and has a focus on understanding the assets and users on agency networks  In addition to hardware asset and software asset management, this priority area includes performance indicators for authorization and mobile device management  2  the limit personnel access priority area focuses on issues of access management  This area includes performance indicators for using automated access management and managing access for privileged network and high-impact system users  The privileged network access management performance indicator is a continuation of the identity, credential, and access management priority area of the previous cybersecurity CAP goal  Therefore, agencies are expected to complete this metric by the end of the fiscal year 2018 FISMA reporting year  3  the protect networks and data priority area, which is similar to the anti-phishing and malware defense priority area from the previous cybersecurity CAP goal, has three new performance indicators: intrusion detection and prevention, exfiltration and enhanced defenses, and data protection  Appendix IV describes the updated cybersecurity-focused CAP priority areas and performance indicators in more detail  In Executive Order 13800, the President directed OMB, in coordination with DHS, to assess and report to the executive branch on the sufficiency and appropriateness of federal agencies’ processes for managing cybersecurity risks  For these risk management assessments, OMB leveraged the FISMA metrics reported by agency CIOs and inspectors general for fiscal year 2017  The metrics addressed domains that correspond with the five core security functions identified in the cybersecurity framework  Table 4 lists these domains and their relationship to the core functions  Based on OMB’s evaluation of these domains, agency risk management processes related to the five core security functions and overall agency enterprise fell into one of the following three rating categories: managing risk: required cybersecurity policies, procedures, and tools are in use and the agency actively manages cybersecurity risks; at risk: some essential policies, processes, and tools are in place to mitigate overall cybersecurity risk, but significant gaps remain; and high risk: key fundamental cybersecurity policies, processes, and tools are either not in place or not deployed sufficiently  For fiscal year 2017, OMB reported that not all agencies were managing risk  When considering each of the five core security functions, OMB reported that most of the 23 agencies were at risk or at high risk with regard to the identify and protect core security functions  Less than half of the 23 agencies were at risk with regard to the detect, respond, and recover core security functions  Overall, OMB determined that 13 agencies were managing risk and that the remaining 10 agencies were at risk of not effectively identifying, protecting, detecting, responding to, and if necessary, recovering from cyber intrusions  Figure 6 shows OMB’s risk management assessment ratings by core security function across the 23 agencies for fiscal year 2017  DHS and OMB, as required by law and policy, have taken various actions to facilitate the agencies’ use of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to secure federal systems  For example, DHS has developed an intrusion assessment plan, deployed NCPS to offer intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to agencies, and is providing tools and services to agencies to monitor their networks through its CDM program  However, NCPS still had limitations in detecting certain types of traffic and agencies were not sending all appropriate traffic through the system  Further, CDM was behind at meeting planned implementation dates, and agencies have requested additional training and guidance for these services  OMB has taken steps to improve upon agencies’ capabilities, but has not completed a policy and strategy to do so, or fully reported on its assessment of agencies’ capabilities  The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 requires DHS, in coordination with OMB, to develop and implement an intrusion assessment plan to proactively detect, identify, and remove intruders in agency information systems on a routine basis  The act also requires that the plan be updated, as necessary  In December 2016, DHS documented its Intrusion Assessment Plan  In the plan, DHS outlined tools, platforms, resources, and ongoing work that the department provides, and that are intended to help agencies detect, identify, and remove intruders on their networks and systems  The intrusion assessment plan also outlines a defense-in-depth strategy, which utilizes multiple layers of cybersecurity and deploys multiple capabilities in combination, to secure agencies’ networks and information systems  For example, the plan calls for DHS to implement NCPS to provide a perimeter defense for the networks of federal civilian executive branch agencies, while the agencies are to deploy their own intrusion detection and prevention capabilities inside their networks  DHS submitted its intrusion assessment plan to OMB in January 2017  The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 also requires DHS to deploy, operate, and maintain a capability to detect cybersecurity risks and prevent network traffic associated with such risks from transiting to or from an agency information system  In addition, the act requires that DHS make regular improvements to intrusion detection and prevention capabilities by deploying new technologies and modifying existing technologies  Further, the act requires agencies to use this capability on all information traveling between their information systems and any information system other than an agency information system  DHS developed NCPS, operationally known as EINSTEIN, to provide the capabilities to detect and prevent potentially malicious network traffic from entering agency networks  Consistent with recommendations we made to DHS in January 2016, DHS has taken actions to improve these capabilities and has other actions underway  For example, the department determined that enhancing NCPS’s current intrusion detection approach to include functionality that would detect deviations from normal network behavior baselines would be feasible  In addition, according to DHS officials, the department was operationalizing functionality intended to identify malicious activity in network traffic otherwise missed by signature-based methods  determined that developing enhancements to current intrusion detection capabilities to facilitate the scanning of Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) traffic would be feasible  According to DHS officials, the department has developed plans to fully support IPv6 for several of its NCPS intrusion detection capabilities  Further, the department has developed implementation schedules and begun roll-out of the enhancements  updated the tool it uses to manage and deploy intrusion detection signatures to include a mechanism to clearly link signatures to publicly available, open-source information  developed clearly defined requirements for detecting threats on agency internal networks and at cloud service providers to help better ensure effective support of information security activities  According to DHS officials, the department was also continuing pilot activities with cloud service providers to enhance protections of agency assets  developed processes and procedures for using vulnerability information, such as data from the CDM program as it becomes available, to help ensure the department is using a risk-based approach for the selection/development of future NCPS intrusion prevention capabilities  Nevertheless, NCPS continues to have known limitations in its ability to identify potential threats  For example: NCPS does not have the ability to effectively detect intrusions across multiple types of traffic  Specifically, DHS determined that developing enhancements to current intrusion detection capabilities to facilitate the scanning of traffic related to supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) control systems would not be feasible  However, according to DHS officials, the department is exploring capabilities that are intended to provide critical, cross-sector, real-time visibility into critical infrastructure companies that utilize SCADA systems  In addition, DHS determined that the scanning of encrypted traffic would not be feasible  Nevertheless, according to its officials, the department performed research on potential architectural, technical, and policy mitigation strategies that could provide both the protection and situational awareness for encrypted traffic  The department has actions under way to continue its research in this area  DHS does not always explicitly ask agencies for feedback or confirmation of receipt of NCPS-related notification  While the department had drafted a standard operating procedure related to its incident notification process, the policy did not instruct DHS analysts specifically to include a solicitation of feedback from agencies within the notification  Further, US-CERT could not provide any information regarding the timetable for when these procedures would take effect  Metrics for NCPS, as provided by DHS, do not provide information about how well the system is enhancing government information security or the quality, efficiency and accuracy of supporting actions  Without the deployment of comprehensive measures, DHS cannot appropriately articulate the value provided by NCPS  While the department had taken actions to develop new measures, these measures did not provide a qualitative or quantitative assessment of the system’s ability to fulfill the system’s objectives  NSD did not provide guidance to agencies on how to securely route their information to their Internet service providers  Without providing network routing guidance, NSD has no assurance that the traffic it sees constitutes all or only a subset of the traffic the customer agencies intend to send  As shown in table 5, as of October 2018, the department had implemented five of the nine recommendations and was in the process of implementing the remainder  However, until DHS completes implementation of the remaining recommendations, the effectiveness of NCPS’s intrusion detection and prevention capabilities may be hindered  In addition, the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies had implemented NCPS capabilities to varying degrees  In a March 2018 report, OMB reported that 21 (about 91 percent) of the 23 agencies had implemented the first two iterations of the NCPS capabilities  In addition, 15 (about 65 percent) of the 23 agencies had implemented all three NCPS capabilities, as shown in table 6 below  However, agencies did not route all network traffic for all information traveling between their information systems and any information system other than an agency information system through NCPS sensors  For example, officials at 13 of 23 agencies stated that not all of their agency external network traffic flowed through NCPS  To illustrate, officials at one agency estimated that 20 percent of their external network traffic did not flow through the system  In addition, 4 of the agencies in our review previously cited several challenges in routing all of their traffic through NCPS intrusion detection sensors, including capacity limitations of the sensors, agreements with external business partners that use direct network connections, interagency network connections that do not route through Internet gateways, use of encrypted communications mechanisms, and backup network circuits that are not used regularly  NSD officials stated that agencies are responsible for routing their traffic to the intrusion detection sensors, and DHS does not have a role in that aspect of NCPS implementation  As a result, potential cyberattacks may not be detected or prevented for a portion of the external traffic at federal agencies  As noted above, we previously recommended that DHS work with agencies to better ensure the complete routing of information to NCPS sensors  The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 requires DHS to include, in the efforts of the department to continuously diagnose and mitigate cybersecurity risks, advanced network security tools to improve the visibility of network activity and to detect and mitigate intrusions and anomalous activity  According to DHS officials, the department is addressing the requirement to improve the visibility of network activity by including advanced network security tools as a part of CDM phase 3  In April 2018, we testified that DHS had previously planned to provide 97 percent of federal agencies with the services they needed for CDM phase 3 in fiscal year 2017  In addition, according to OMB’s annual FISMA report for fiscal year 2017, the CDM program was to continue to incorporate additional capabilities, including phase 3, in fiscal year 2018  However, DHS now expects initial operational capabilities to be in place for phase 3 in fiscal year 2019  The department has awarded contracts of approximately $3 26 billion to support its Dynamic and Evolving Federal Enterprise Network Defense (also known as DEFEND) aspect of the CDM program, which is to include phase 3  DEFEND also is to provide coverage for existing agency deployments  According to DHS documentation, the task orders associated with DEFEND are to be issued between the second quarter of fiscal year 2018 and the second quarter of fiscal year 2024  FISMA requires that DHS provide operational and technical assistance to agencies in implementing policies, principles, standards, and guidelines on information security  Toward this end, DHS has available training and guidance related to the implementation of the capabilities of NCPS (i e , EINSTEIN) and CDM  Specifically: According the DHS officials, the department offers training and guidance to agencies on EINSTEIN 1 implementation  For example, DHS established a program in which the Software Engineering Institute will provide training and mentoring to agencies looking to enhance their understanding of, and proficiency with, the EINSTEIN 1 capability (e g , network traffic information)  NCPS program officials stated that agencies can use this service, which is available at no charge to them, on an unlimited basis as long as the requests relate to EINSTEIN 1  According to the officials, training and guidance related to EINSTEIN 2 and EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated is limited because DHS intentionally restricts the amount of data provided to agencies  According to DHS officials, the department also offers training and guidance to assist agencies with the implementation and use of resources associated with the CDM program, including webinars, guides, and computer-based training  The DEFEND contracts that the department awarded also include a mechanism for agencies to procure specialized tailored training, such as on the use of CDM tools  The department also offers customer advisory forums every other month that agencies are invited to attend  According to CDM program officials, the program’s governance, among other topics, is commonly discussed during these forums  Further, the department provides agencies with guidance, such as various governance documents, best practices, and frequently asked questions, through a web portal that is made available by OMB  In addition, US-CERT offers the CDM training program, which is to provide CDM implementation resources  Nevertheless, most agencies told us that they wanted DHS to provide more training and guidance as it relates to their implementation of the capabilities made available by NCPS and CDM  Specifically, Officials from 16 of 23 agencies reported that they wanted to receive additional training on NCPS capabilities  For example, officials at 5 agencies stated that they would like to receive training related to using network traffic information, understanding alerts, or implementing capabilities for cloud services  The officials also stated that they wanted training specific to agency security personnel  Officials from 19 of 23 agencies stated that they wanted to receive additional guidance related to NCPS’s capabilities, but not all of the 19 provided specific details  For example, officials from at least 3 agencies stated that they wanted additional guidance such as, “how to” documents, descriptions of architecture details, or guidance documents that explain NCPS’s capabilities so that agencies can gauge the gap between the security that the system provides and the security being provided by their own agency’s capabilities  Officials from 21 of 23 agencies reported that they wanted to receive additional training on implementing CDM at their agencies  For example, officials from 7 agencies suggested that additional training on the use of the tools would be beneficial  Officials from 22 of 23 agencies stated that they wanted additional guidance as it relates to CDM implementation  For example, officials from one agency stated that they would like examples of best practices and successful deployments  These requests for additional training and guidance demonstrate that agencies are either unaware of the available training and guidance, or that the training may not meet their needs  Until DHS coordinates with agencies to determine if additional training and guidance are needed, agencies may not be able to fully realize the benefits of the capabilities provided by the NCPS and CDM programs  Although OMB took steps to report on agencies’ implementation of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, it did not report on all required actions  For example, the office did not submit DHS’s intrusion plan to Congress as required by the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015  In addition, OMB provided various reports to Congress that described agencies’ intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, but the reports did not always include all information required by the act  Further, OMB developed a draft policy and strategy that were intended to improve agency capabilities, but it had not finalized these documents  The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 requires OMB to submit the intrusion assessment plan developed by DHS to the appropriate congressional committees no later than 6 months after the date of enactment of the act  The act also required OMB to submit to Congress a description of the implementation of the intrusion assessment plan and the findings of the intrusion assessments conducted pursuant to the intrusion assessment plan no later than 1 year after the date of enactment of the act, and annually thereafter  Although DHS developed and documented an intrusion assessment plan, which described a defense-in-depth approach to security, OMB did not submit the plan to Congress, as called for in the act  Even though DHS submitted the plan to OMB in January 2017, OMB had not submitted it to Congress as of October 2018 (21 months after DHS submitted the plan and 28 months past the due date)  On the other hand, OMB did submit its own reports to Congress which generally described elements of the implementation of DHS’s intrusion assessment plan and intrusion assessment findings  In September 2017, OMB issued its analysis of agencies’ implementation of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, or more specifically, agencies’ implementation of the various versions of NCPS  In addition, the office’s annual FISMA report, issued most recently in March 2018, generally covered elements of the intrusion assessment plan  OMB personnel within the Office of the Federal CIO believed that these two reports, along with a process the office had initiated to validate incidents across the government, addressed the requirement for OMB to submit to Congress a description of the implementation of the intrusion assessment plan and the findings of the intrusion assessments conducted pursuant to the plan  However, the September 2017 and March 2018 reports did not address other elements described in DHS’s intrusion assessment plan  For example, OMB did not describe agency roles associated with segmenting their networks, identifying key servers based on threat and impact, ensuring all applications are appropriately tracked and configured, and categorizing and tagging data based on threat and impact  While OMB has provided important information to congressional stakeholders through its own reports, until it submits the plan and addresses all elements described in DHS’s intrusion assessment plan, it will continue to be remiss in providing timely and sufficiently detailed information regarding the intrusion assessment plan to congressional stakeholders to support their oversight responsibilities  The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 also required that OMB submit an analysis of agencies’ application of the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to Congress no later than 18 months after the date of enactment of the act, and annually thereafter  OMB was to include a list of federal agencies and the degree to which each agency had applied the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities in this analysis  As discussed previously in this report, OMB issued its analysis of agencies’ implementation of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities in September 2017  However, the analysis did not include the degree to which agencies had applied the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities  For example, the analysis did not reflect that not all agencies were using this capability on all information traveling between their systems and any system other than an agency system, as required by the act  Until OMB includes the degree to which agencies have applied intrusion detection and prevention capabilities in its analysis, it cannot provide congressional stakeholders with an accurate portrayal of the extent to which the capabilities are detecting and preventing potential intrusions  The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 further required that the Federal Chief Information Officer, within OMB, submit a report to Congress no earlier than 18 months after the date of enactment, but no later than 2 years after that date, assessing the intrusion detection and intrusion prevention capabilities that DHS made available to agencies  The act required that the report address (1) the effectiveness of DHS’s system used for detecting, disrupting, and preventing cyber-threat actors, including advanced persistent threats, from accessing agency information and agency information systems; (2) whether the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, continuous diagnostics and mitigation, and other systems deployed are effective in securing federal information systems; (3) the costs and benefits of the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, including as compared to commercial technologies and tools, and including the value of classified cyber threat indicators; and (4) the capability of agencies to protect sensitive cyber threat indicators and defensive measures if they were shared through unclassified mechanisms for use in commercial technologies and tools  In a report issued in September 2018 (about 8 months past the required due date), the Federal Chief Information Officer provided Congress an assessment of intrusion detection and intrusion prevention capabilities across the federal enterprise  The report pointed out, among other things, that agencies did not possess or properly deploy capabilities to detect or prevent intrusions or minimize the impact of intrusions when they occur  In addition, the report acknowledged the need to improve the effectiveness of intrusion detection and intrusion prevention capabilities and stated that OMB would track performance through the CAP goal and annual FISMA reports  However, the report did not address all of the requirements specified in the act  For example, the report did not address whether DHS’s system (i e , NCPS) was effective in detecting advanced persistent threats  In addition, the report did not include a comparison of the costs and benefits of the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities versus commercial technologies and tools, or the value of classified cyber threat indicators  Further, the report did not address the capability of agencies to protect sensitive cyber threat indicators and defensive measures  Until OMB updates the Federal CIO report to address all of the requirements specified in the act, it will continue to be remiss in providing timely and sufficiently detailed information, such as that related to costs and benefits, among other elements in the act, to congressional stakeholders to support their oversight responsibilities  In addition to OMB’s responsibilities in the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015, OMB has initiated plans for further improving agencies’ intrusion detection and prevention capabilities  In response to a tasking in Executive Order 13800, the Director of the American Technology Council coordinated the development of a report to the President from the Secretary of DHS, the Director of OMB, and the Administrator of the General Services Administration, regarding the modernization of federal information technology (IT)  The report, Report to the President on Federal IT Modernization, identified actions that OMB should take for (1) prioritizing the modernization of high-risk, high-value assets and (2) modernizing the Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) program and NCPS to improve protections, remove barriers, and enable commercial cloud migration  For example, OMB was to take the following actions subsequent to the December 13, 2017 report issuance date: Within 60 days: Update a TIC policy to address challenges with agencies’ perimeter-based architectures, such as the modernization of NCPS  In addition, introduce a “90 day sprint” during which approved projects would pilot proposed changes in TIC requirements  Within 90 days: Update the annual FISMA and CAP goal metrics to focus on those critical capabilities that were most commonly lacking among agencies and focus oversight assessments on high-value assets  Within 120 days: In conjunction with DHS, develop a strategy for optimally realigning resources across agencies to reduce the risk to high-value assets and respond to cybersecurity incidents for those assets  OMB has taken steps toward implementing several, but not all, of these actions  For example, it introduced a “90 day sprint” and, according to knowledgeable OMB staff, the outcomes of this action are directly informing changes in TIC requirements  In addition, OMB updated the annual FISMA and CAP goal metrics by including several metrics that focus on high-value assets  The updated FISMA and CAP goal metrics went into effect in April 2018  However, while OMB had taken steps toward updating the TIC policy and developing a strategy for optimally realigning resources, the policy and strategy were in draft and had not yet been finalized as of October 2018  The agency did not specify a time frame for finalizing the policy and strategy  Until OMB finalizes the TIC policy and the strategy for optimally realigning resources, the enhancements offered through the policy and strategy are unlikely to be realized  FISMA requires agencies to provide information security protections to prevent unauthorized access to their systems and information  Officials from the 23 selected agencies reported to us that they generally took steps to meet this requirement by augmenting the tools and services provided by DHS with their own intrusion detection and prevention capabilities  However, agencies did not consistently implement five key capabilities specified by DHS and NIST guidance  In addition, most of the agencies did not fully implement any of the phases of DHS’s CDM program that is intended to improve their capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions  Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 18-01 instructs agencies to enhance email security  These enhancements include enabling encrypted email transmission, ensuring that receiving mail servers know what actions the agency would like taken when an email falsely claims to have originated from the agency, and removing certain insecure protocols, among others  The final deadline for implementing all BOD 18-01 requirements was October 16, 2018  Additionally, NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4 recommends that security awareness training include training on how to recognize and prevent spear-phishing attempts  As of September 2018, only 2 of the 23 agencies reported implementing all of the email requirements  For the remaining 21 agencies: 9 agencies stated that their agency had plans to implement all enhancements by the October 2018 deadline, 1 agency was uncertain whether it would meet the deadline, and 11 stated they would not be able to meet the deadline  By contrast, the majority of agencies (22 of 23) reported that they had trained staff on spear-phishing exercises, as recommended by NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4  Officials at the remaining agency told us that the agency planned to have spear-phishing exercises in fiscal year 2019  Such training should help ensure that phishing will be a less effective attack vector against the majority of agencies  While agencies benefit from secure protocols and spear-phishing training, implementing the remaining BOD 18-01 email requirements would provide additional protection to agency information systems  NIST recommends that federal agencies deploy intrusion detection and prevention capabilities  These capabilities include monitoring cloud services, using host-based intrusion prevention systems, monitoring external and internal network traffic, and using a security information and event management (SIEM) system  However, in our semi-structured interviews of the 23 agencies, officials told us that they often had not implemented many of these capabilities  Such inconsistent implementation exposes federal systems and the information they contain to additional risk  As part of their continuing oversight efforts, OMB and DHS can use the information below to work with agencies to identify obstacles and impediments affecting the agencies’ abilities to implement these capabilities  NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4 states that agencies should monitor and control communications at the external boundary of the network  However, as of June 2018, fewer than half of the agencies that used cloud computing services were monitoring cloud traffic  Specifically: 10 of 22 agencies that used Infrastructure as a Service were monitoring inbound and outbound Infrastructure as a Service traffic, 7 of 21 agencies that used Platform as a Service were monitoring inbound and outbound Platform as a Service traffic, and 10 of 23 agencies that used Software as a Service were monitoring inbound and outbound Software as a Service traffic  Without monitoring traffic to and from cloud service providers, agencies risk a greater chance of malicious cloud activity detrimentally affecting agency information security  NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4 states that agency internal monitoring may be achieved by utilizing intrusion prevention capabilities  These capabilities include using host-based intrusion prevention systems to provide defense at an individual system or device level by protecting against malicious activities  Host-based capabilities include memory-based protection and application whitelisting  As of June 2018, officials at the 23 agencies reported the following to us: 16 agencies used host-based intrusion prevention capabilities, 15 agencies used memory-based protection, and 8 agencies used host-based application whitelisting  Until host-based intrusion protections are fully deployed, agencies will be at greater risk of malicious activity adversely affecting agency operations  NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4 also states that agencies should monitor and control communications at the external boundary of the network and at key internal boundaries (e g , network traffic)  NIST guidance also stated that an agency should deploy monitoring devices strategically within the network to detect essential information  However, the agencies in our review did not always monitor external and internal traffic  For example, of the 23 agencies: 5 reported that they were not monitoring inbound or outbound direct connections to outside entities  11 reported that they were not persistently monitoring inbound encrypted traffic  8 reported that they were not persistently monitoring outbound encrypted traffic  In addition, 13 agencies reported they were not using a network-based session capture solution  Of the 10 agencies that reported using this solution, officials from 2 agencies stated that they were not capturing workstation-to-workstation connections  Without thorough monitoring of external and internal traffic, agencies will have less assurance that they are aware of compromised or potentially compromised traffic within their network  NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4 states that agencies should establish enhanced monitoring capabilities  Such capabilities should include automated mechanisms that collect and analyze incident data for increased threat and situational awareness  According to NIST, a security information and event management (SIEM) system analyzes data from different sources and identifies and prioritizes significant events  Sources of data used by SIEM systems include logs from database systems, network devices, security systems, web applications, and workstation operating systems  Of the 23 agencies that we reviewed, 21 reported using a SIEM capability  Over half of the agencies employing a SIEM used one or more of their logs to match against known vulnerabilities and advanced persistent threats, as well as to create real-time alerts  For example, of the 21 agencies: 14 agencies reported collecting database logs, but only 7 agencies reported using the logs to match against known vulnerabilities and persistent threats and to create real-time alerts; 20 agencies reported collecting network logs, but only 13 agencies reported using them to match against known vulnerabilities and persistent threats and to create real-time alerts; 21 agencies reported collecting security logs, but only 13 reported using them to match against known vulnerabilities and persistent threats and to create real-time alerts; 15 agencies reported collecting web application logs, but only 9 agencies reported using them to match against known vulnerabilities and persistent threats and to create real-time alerts; and 13 agencies reported collecting workstation logs, but only 8 agencies reported using them to match against known vulnerabilities and persistent threats and to create real-time alerts  Only 5 agencies collected all 5 types of logs and used them to match against known vulnerabilities and persistent threats and to create real- time alerts  By not fully using SIEM capabilities, agencies will have less assurance that relevant personnel will be aware of possible weaknesses or intrusions  To further enhance their intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies were in the process of implementing DHS’s CDM program  As previously discussed, Phase 1 of the program involves deploying products to automate hardware and software asset management, configuration settings, and common vulnerability management capabilities  Phase 2 intends to address privilege management and infrastructure integrity by allowing agencies to monitor users on their networks and to detect whether users are engaging in unauthorized activity  Phase 3 is intended to assess agency network activity and identify any anomalies that may indicate a cybersecurity compromise  As of June 2018, most agencies had not fully implemented any of the three phases  As shown in Figure 7, 15 agencies had partially implemented phase 1, 21 had partially or not yet begun to implement phase 2, and none of the agencies had fully implemented phase 3  Agencies’ implementation status has been affected, at least in part, due to delays in DHS’s deployment of the program phases  As a result, federal systems will remain at risk until the program is fully deployed  Many agencies have not effectively implemented the federal approach and strategy for securing information systems  For example, the inspectors general for 17 of the 23 selected agencies reported that their agencies had not effectively implemented their information security programs and had significant information security deficiencies associated with internal control over financial reporting  In addition, CIOs for 17 agencies reported not meeting all nine targets for the cybersecurity cross- agency priority goal  Further, OMB determined that that only 13 of the 23 agencies were managing risks to their overall enterprise, while the other 10 agencies were at risk  Until agencies more effectively implement the government’s approach and strategy, federal systems will remain at risk  DHS and OMB have initiatives underway that are intended to further improve agencies’ security posture  However, although DHS had provided training and guidance for NCPS and CDM, agencies expressed the need for more  In addition, OMB had also not finalized its policy and strategy aimed at addressing challenges with perimeter security and protecting high value assets, respectively  OMB had also not provided useful information to Congress, such as a description of agencies’ implementation of DHS’s intrusion assessment plan, the degree to which agencies are using NCPS, a complete analysis of agencies’ implementation of DHS’s intrusion assessment plan, or the costs and benefits of using commercial tools  Although agencies’ officials reported various efforts underway to enhance their agency’s intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, implementation efforts across the federal government were not consistent  OMB and DHS can use the information provided in this report to work with agencies to identify obstacles and impediments affecting the agencies’ abilities to implement these capabilities  We are making a total of nine recommendations, including two to DHS and seven to OMB  Specifically: The Secretary of DHS should direct the Network Security Deployment division to coordinate further with federal agencies to identify training and guidance needs for implementing NCPS and CDM  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of DHS should direct the appropriate staff to work with OMB to follow up with agencies to identify obstacles and impediments affecting their abilities to implement intrusion detection and prevention capabilities  (Recommendation 2) The Director of OMB should submit the intrusion assessment plan to the appropriate congressional committees  (Recommendation 3) The Director of OMB should report on implementation of the defense- in-depth strategy described in the intrusion assessment plan, including all elements described in the plan  (Recommendation 4) The Director of OMB should update the analysis of agencies’ intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to include the degree to which agencies are using NCPS  (Recommendation 5) The Director of OMB should direct the Federal CIO to update her report to Congress to include required information, such as detecting advanced persistent threats, a comparison of the costs and benefits of the capabilities versus commercial technologies and tools, and the capability of agencies to protect sensitive cyber threat indicators and defense measures  (Recommendation 6) The Director of OMB should establish a time frame for finalizing the Trusted Internet Connections policy intended to address challenges with agencies’ perimeter-based architectures and issue it when finalized  (Recommendation 7) The Director of OMB should establish a time frame for finalizing the strategy for realigning resources across agencies to protect high- value assets and issue it when finalized  (Recommendation 8) The Director of OMB should direct the Federal CIO to work with DHS to follow-up with agencies to identify obstacles and impediments affecting their abilities to implement intrusion detection and prevention capabilities  (Recommendation 9) We provided a draft of this report to OMB and the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies, including DHS, covered by our review  In response, OMB provided comments via email, and DHS and three other agencies (the Department of Commerce, Social Security Administration, and U S  Agency for International Development) provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendices V through VIII, respectively  The 19 remaining agencies (the Departments of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs; as well as the Environmental Protection Agency, General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management, and Small Business Administration) stated via email that they had no comments  In its comments, which the OMB liaison provided to GAO via email on December 7, 2018, OMB did not state whether it agreed or disagreed with the seven recommendations that we made to it  Rather, according to the liaison, OMB agreed with the facts in our draft report, but found that the report did not reflect the agency’s rationale for not submitting the DHS intrusion assessment plan to Congress and a report on the implementation of the plan, as required by the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015  The liaison stated that OMB is working closely with DHS to provide strategic direction in assessing gaps in, and modernizing, the manner in which intrusion detection and prevention capabilities are delivered to the federal government  Further, in a subsequent email on December 10, 2018, OMB said it believes the Federal CIO’s September 2018 report to Congress, along with data provided in OMB’s fiscal year 2017 FISMA report to Congress, achieves the outcomes sought by the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 and demonstrates OMB's continuous engagement with DHS across the evolution of the intrusion detection and prevention program  As stated in our report, we acknowledge that OMB has provided important information to congressional stakeholders through its reports  However, OMB’s reports did not cover all outcomes described in the act  For example, as we pointed out, these reports did not fully address implementation of the defense-in-depth strategy described in DHS’s intrusion assessment plan  In addition, although OMB reported on several elements required by the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015, it did not report on all of the required elements  For example, the reports did not address whether DHS’s NCPS was effective in detecting advanced persistent threats  The reports also did not include a comparison of the costs and benefits of the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities versus commercial technologies and tools, or the value of classified cyber threat indicators  Further, the reports did not address the capability of agencies to protect sensitive cyber threat indicators and defensive measures  Accordingly, we maintain that our recommendations for OMB to report on required elements in the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 are warranted  In addition, OMB suggested that we revise our recommendations to the agency to include a shared responsibility with DHS to help drive desired outcomes  However, six of the seven recommendations we are making to OMB are related to specific OMB responsibilities cited in either the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 or the Report to the President on Federal IT Modernization  As such, we believe the recommendations are appropriately addressed to OMB  Furthermore, our recommendations do not prevent OMB from working with DHS to implement them  Our seventh recommendation to OMB—to work with DHS to follow up with agencies to identify obstacles and impediments affecting their abilities to implement intrusion detection and prevention capabilities—includes a shared responsibility with DHS  OMB also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate  Subsequent to providing initial comments on our draft report, OMB issued a memorandum intended to provide a strategy for realigning resources across agencies to protect high-value assets  This action addresses our recommendation 8, which called for the Director of OMB to establish a time frame for finalizing the strategy for realigning resources across agencies to protect high-value assets, and to issue the strategy when finalized  In its comments, DHS stated that it concurred with the two recommendations we made to the department  DHS stated that it expects to implement the recommendations in 2019  The Department of Commerce commented that the report was reasonable and that the department agreed with the findings and recommendations  In its comments, the Social Security Administration stated that protecting its networks and information is a critical priority  According to the agency, it continued to make improvements in fiscal year 2018, such as improvements and progress in securing applications, leveraging the cloud, managing its assets and vulnerabilities, strengthening its network and incident response capabilities, improving its security training, and enhancing the overall effectiveness of its cybersecurity program  Finally, the U S  Agency for International Development commented that its inspector general had improved the agency’s capability maturity ratings for core security functions in fiscal year 2018  The agency also pointed out that it was the only selected agency in which fiscal year 2017 indicators of effectiveness in implementing the federal approach and strategy for securing information systems were all positive (as noted in Appendix III)  We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees, the Director of OMB, the heads of the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies and their inspectors general, and other interested congressional parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Gregory C  Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IX  The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015, which was enacted December 18, 2015, included a provision for GAO to report on the effectiveness of the federal government’s approach and strategy for securing agency information systems, including intrusion detection and prevention capabilities  The objectives of our review were to assess: (1) the reported effectiveness of selected agencies’ implementation of the federal government’s approach and strategy to securing agency information systems; (2) the extent to which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have facilitated the use of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to secure federal agency information systems; and (3) the extent to which selected agencies reported implementing intrusion detection and prevention capabilities  Selected agencies for our review were the 23 civilian agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act)  We did not include the Department of Defense because the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 only pertains to civilian agencies  Because we focused our work on the 23 civilian agencies, results from these reviews are not generalizable to the entire federal government  To assess the reported effectiveness of agencies’ implementation of the federal government’s approach and strategy to securing agency information systems, we described the federal government’s approach and strategy by summarizing the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), Executive Order 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (cybersecurity framework)  assessed the reported effectiveness of agencies’ implementation of the approach and strategy by reviewing annual reports from OMB and the inspectors general (IG) of the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies regarding the reported implementation of FISMA for fiscal year 2017  We described the IG reported maturity levels, including the Office of Inspectors General FISMA Reporting Metrics definition of “effectiveness ” These maturity levels are based on security domains aligned with the five core functions in NIST’s cybersecurity framework  We also summarized IG reported conclusions on the effectiveness of agencies’ information security programs for fiscal year 2017  reviewed the fiscal year 2016 and 2017 financial statement audit reports for each of the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies to identify the extent to which any significant deficiencies or material weaknesses related to information security over financial systems had been reported and to identify information security control weaknesses reported by the IGs  identified whether agencies had met the targets for the cybersecurity- focused cross-agency priority goal for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 by examining agency-reported performance metrics for fiscal years 2016 and 2017  evaluated OMB’s agency risk management assessment ratings to make a determination on how agencies were managing risk to their enterprise  These conclusions were based on FISMA metrics, and are aligned with the five core security functions defined in the cybersecurity framework  interviewed knowledgeable OMB officials and staff to obtain their views on the reported effectiveness of the federal government’s approach and strategy to securing agency information systems  To assess the extent to which OMB and DHS have facilitated the use of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to secure federal agency information systems, we determined the extent OMB and DHS fulfilled their requirements described in the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 by collecting and reviewing artifacts from OMB and DHS and comparing them to the provisions outlined in the act  We also interviewed knowledgeable officials from OMB and DHS regarding their efforts to fulfill their requirements described in the act  determined the effectiveness of corrective actions taken by DHS to address nine previously reported recommendations we made in our report related to NCPS  Specifically, we collected appropriate artifacts and assessed the artifacts against the criteria used in that report, and determined the extent to which the actions taken by DHS met the intent of the recommendations, and we met with DHS staff responsible for the remediation activities and obtained their views of the status of actions taken to address the recommendations  held semi-structured interviews with knowledgeable officials from the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies  During these interviews, we obtained the agency’s views on whether they need more training and guidance from DHS for NCPS and CDM  We also interviewed knowledgeable officials and staff at DHS to obtain their views on how DHS had improved the intrusion detection and prevention capabilities it provides to federal agencies  We also interviewed DHS officials to obtain their views on the training and guidance that the department makes available to agencies  To assess the extent to which selected agencies reported implementing intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, we described the reported intrusion detection and prevention capabilities implemented by the 23 civilian CFO Act civilian agencies by summarizing implemented intrusion detection and prevention capability information obtained from the semi-structured interviews at the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies described above; identifying the extent to which the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies were in compliance with DHS’s binding operating directive (BOD) pertaining to enhanced email and web security (BOD 18-01) by collecting and summarizing Cyber Hygiene Trustworthy Email reports from the 23 agencies and determining the extent to which the agencies had taken required actions to implement the BOD  During the semi-structured interviews, we also obtained the agency’s views and experiences with other programs and services provided by DHS, including the extent to which agencies had implemented the tools offered by the department’s Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program  To determine the reliability of submitted data and obtain clarification about agencies’ processes to ensure the accuracy and completeness of data used in their respective FISMA reports, we analyzed documents and conducted interviews with officials from 6 of the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies  To select these six agencies, we sorted agency fiscal year 2017 information technology budget data from highest to lowest amount and then divided the data into three tiers: high spending, medium spending, and low spending  We then randomly selected two agencies from each of the three tiers  The selected agencies were the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs, and the U S  Agency for International Development  While not generalizable to all agencies, the information we collected and analyzed about the six selected agencies provided insights into various processes in place to produce FISMA reports  Based on this assessment, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives  We conducted this performance audit from December 2017 to December 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  The National Institute of Standards and Technology established the cybersecurity framework to provide guidance for cybersecurity activities within the private sector and government agencies at all levels  The cybersecurity framework consists of five core functions: identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover  Within the five functions are 23 categories and 108 subcategories that define discrete outcomes for each function, as described in table 7  The federal approach and strategy for securing information systems is prescribed by federal law and policy, including the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 and the presidential executive order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure  Accordingly, federal reports describing agency implementation of this law and policy, and reports of related agency information security activities, indicated the effectiveness of agencies’ efforts to implement the federal approach and strategy  Table 8 summarizes the reported effectiveness of the 23 civilian Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 agencies to implement the government’s approach and strategy to securing information systems  The President’s Management Agenda identifies cross-agency priority (CAP) goals to target areas where multiple agencies must collaborate to effect change  The agenda issued in fiscal year 2018 established an information technology modernization goal that includes a cybersecurity objective with specific priority areas and performance indicators  This cybersecurity-focused goal is intended to drive progress in the government’s efforts to modernize information technology to increase productivity and security  Figure 8 describes the 3 updated cybersecurity- focused cross-agency priority areas and 10 performance indicators  Each federal agency is expected to meet one of the 10 new performance indicators by the end of fiscal year 2018 and the remainder by 2020  In addition to the individual named above, Jeffrey Knott (assistant director), Daniel Swartz (analyst-in-charge), David Blanding, Chris Businsky, Kristi Dorsey, Di’Mond Spencer, Priscilla Smith, and Edward Varty made key contributions to this report  West Coile, Franklin Jackson, and Chris Warweg also provided assistance 
Report 2:  Administrations supported the general international stance that the Golan is Syrian territory occupied by Israel, with its final status subject to negotiation  In reaction to the U S  proclamation, others in the international community have insisted that the Golan's status has not changed  In Congress, Senate and House bills introduced in February 2019 ( S  567 and H R  1372 ) support Israeli sovereignty claims to the Golan, and would treat the Golan as part of Israel in any existing or future law "relating to appropriations or foreign commerce " For decades after 1967, various Israeli leaders, reportedly including Prime Minister Netanyahu as late as 2011, had entered into indirect talks with Syria aimed at returning some portion of the Golan as part of a lasting peace agreement  However, the effect of civil war on Syria and the surrounding region, including an increase in Iran's presence, may have influenced Netanyahu to shift focus from negotiating with Syria on a "land for peace" basis to obtaining international support for Israel's claims of sovereignty  As part of the periodic conflict in Syria between Israel and Iran , some Iranian missiles have targeted Israeli positions in the Golan  The Syrian government has denounced the U S  policy change as an illegal violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and insisted that Syria is determined to recover the Golan  Additionally, observers have argued that the policy change could unintentionally bolster Syrian President Bashar al Asad within Syria by rallying Syrian nationalistic sentiment in opposition to Israel's claims to the Golan and deflecting attention from Iran's activities inside Syria  Since 1974, the U N  Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled an area of the Golan Heights between the regions controlled by Israel and Syria, with about 880 troops from five countries stationed there as of January 2019  During that time, Israel's forces in the Golan have not faced serious military resistance to their continued deployment, despite some security threats and diplomatic challenges  Periodic resolutions by the U N  General Assembly have criticized Israel's occupation as hindering regional peace and Israel's settlement and de facto annexation of the Golan as illegal  Hezbollah's forces and Israel's military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader conflict  Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional implications  Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah's buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds  Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran over Iran's presence in Syria raises questions about the potential for Hezbollah's forces in Lebanon to open another front against Israel  After the September 2018 incident leading to Russia's installation of an S-300 system in Syria (discussed above), Iran reportedly began directly transferring weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon while reducing Syria's use as a transshipment hub  One Israeli media account warned that Hezbollah's threat to Israel is increasing because of initiatives to build precision-weapons factories in Lebanon and to set up a military infrastructure in southern Syria  In late 2018 and early 2019, Israel's military undertook an effort—dubbed "Operation Northern Shield"—to seal six Hezbollah attack tunnels to prevent them from crossing into Israel  Israeli officials claim that they do not want another war, while at the same time taking measures aimed at constraining and deterring Hezbollah, including through consultation with the U N  Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)  President Trump has expressed interest in brokering a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and his Administration has supposedly prepared a proposal to facilitate negotiations, but the Administration has repeatedly postponed releasing the proposal  Many factors may account for the delays, including recent U S  actions regarding Jerusalem, tension in and around the Gaza Strip, reduced funding for the Palestinians, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and political jockeying and domestic constraints among Israelis and Palestinians  The U S  decision—announced in December 2017—to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the U S  embassy there has fed U S -Palestinian tensions  Israeli leaders generally celebrated the change, but Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas strongly objected  Many other countries opposed President Trump's actions on Jerusalem, as reflected in action at the United Nations  Claiming U S  bias favoring Israel, Palestinian leaders broke off high-level political contacts with the United States shortly after the December 2017 announcement and have made efforts to advance Palestinian national claims in international fora  However, the PA continues security coordination with Israel in the West Bank  U S -Palestinian tensions appear to have influenced Administration decisions to cut off various types of U S  funding to the Palestinians, and arguably have dimmed prospects for restarting Israeli-Palestinian talks  In a September 2018 address before the U N  General Assembly, PLO Chairman/PA President Abbas denounced Administration actions that he characterized as taking disputed Israeli-Palestinian issues—such as Jerusalem's status and Palestinian refugee claims—off the negotiating table  Funding for economic and humanitarian needs in the West Bank and Gaza could become even scarcer  In February 2019, Israel announced that it would withhold a portion of the tax revenue it collects for the PA because—pursuant to a law passed by the Knesset in 2018—Israel had determined that amount represented PLO/PA payments made on behalf of individuals allegedly involved in terrorist acts  In response, Abbas announced that the PA would completely reject monthly revenue transfers from Israel if it withheld any amount, even though the transfers comprise approximately 65% of the PA budget  For February, Israel withheld approximately $11 million from the $193 million due to the PA, with the PA rejecting the entire amount as a result  The PA is reportedly seeking temporary financial support from the private sector and local banks, and also asking the Arab League to follow through on its 2010 decision to provide $100 million per month as a "financial safety net" for the PA  At the end of January 2019, U S  bilateral aid to the Palestinians—including nonlethal security assistance that Israel generally supports—ended completely due to the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA, P L  115-253 ), which became law on October 3, 2018  Two months after the law's enactment, PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah informed Secretary of State Michael Pompeo that the PA would not accept aid that subjected it to federal court jurisdiction  Apparently, U S  aid will not resume unless Congress amends or repeals the ATCA, or the Administration channels the aid differently  Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor Jared Kushner has stated that the Administration will publicly release a peace plan sometime after Israeli national elections, which are set to occur on April 9, 2019  According to Kushner, the peace plan contains detailed proposals on the various issues that divide Israel and the PLO  Many observers express skepticism about the prospect that these proposals can serve as a basis for the serious resumption of bilateral talks, but Kushner has reportedly said that the Administration is focusing on formulating "realistic solutions," and that "privately, people are more flexible " U S  officials hope to surmount potential obstacles to the peace plan in the Israeli and Palestinian domestic arenas by obtaining political and economic support for the U S  initiative from key Arab states in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Egypt  A number of Arab states share common interests in working behind the scenes with Israel to counter Iranian regional influence  While some diplomatic developments have fed speculation about warming Arab-Israeli ties, reports suggest that key Arab Gulf states remain reluctant to embrace more formal relations with Israel without a resolution of the Palestinian issue  Saudi Arabia's press agency responded to the U S  recognition of Israel's claims to sovereignty in the Golan Heights by saying that it "will have significant negative effects on the peace process in the Middle East and the security and stability of the region " In a statement with implications both for domestic and international audiences, Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly said that the March 2019 change in U S  policy on the Golan proves that countries can retain territory captured in a defensive war  His statement prompted speculation over the possibility that Israeli leaders might consider annexing part of the West Bank and whether the situation in the Golan is sufficiently similar to invite comparison  Days before the April elections, Netanyahu asserted that if he were to lead the next government, he would apply Israeli law to West Bank settlements  The closely contested Israeli national elections—scheduled for April 9, 2019—and the subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for the country's leadership and future policies  Prime Minister Netanyahu faces a challenge from the centrist Blue and White party under the combined leadership of former top general Benny Gantz and former Finance Minister Yair Lapid  Some setbacks for Netanyahu during the campaign have included the attorney general's announcement of probable corruption-related indictments against Netanyahu, new media allegations of possible misconduct relating to Israel's procurement of German submarines, and questions about some individuals or groups possibly spreading rumors against Netanyahu's opponents via social media  Yet, some observers calculate that Netanyahu's Likud could possibly get fewer Knesset seats than Blue and White and still form the next coalition  For more information on the actors involved in the elections, see CRS Insight IN11068, Israel: April 2019 Elections and Probable Indictments Against Prime Minister Netanyahu , by Jim Zanotti and this report's Appendix   In July 2018, the Knesset passed a Basic Law defining Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people  Some observers have expressed concern that the law might further undermine the place of Arabs in Israeli society, while others view its effect as mainly symbolic  In March 2019, Netanyahu said that Israel is a Jewish, democratic state with equal rights for all its citizens, and "the nation-state not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people," reviving domestic debate about the 2018 law and perhaps seeking support during the election campaign from sympathetic voter groups 

ground_truth: Federal agencies are dependent on information systems to carry out operations. The risks to these systems are increasing as security threats evolve and become more sophisticated. To reduce the risk of a successful cyberattack, agencies can deploy intrusion detection and prevention capabilities on their networks and systems. GAO first designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. In 2015, GAO expanded this area to include protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information. Most recently, in September 2018, GAO updated the area to identify 10 critical actions that the federal government and other entities need to take to address major cybersecurity challenges. The federal approach and strategy for securing information systems is grounded in the provisions of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 and Executive Order 13800. The act requires agencies to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide program to secure their information systems. The Executive Order, issued in May 2017, directs agencies to use the National Institute of Standards and Technology's cybersecurity framework to manage cybersecurity risks. The Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 contained a provision for GAO to report on the effectiveness of the government's approach and strategy for securing its systems. GAO determined (1) the reported effectiveness of agencies' implementation of the government's approach and strategy; (2) the extent to which DHS and OMB have taken steps to facilitate the use of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to secure federal systems; and (3) the extent to which agencies reported implementing capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed OMB reports related to agencies' information security practices including OMB's annual report to Congress for fiscal year 2017. GAO also analyzed and summarized agency-reported security performance metrics and IG-reported information for the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies. In addition, GAO evaluated plans, reports, and other documents related to DHS intrusion detection and prevention programs, and interviewed OMB, DHS, and agency officials. The 23 civilian agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) have often not effectively implemented the federal government's approach and strategy for securing information systems (see figure below). Until agencies more effectively implement the government's approach and strategy, federal systems will remain at risk. To illustrate: As required by Office of Management and Budget (OMB), inspectors general (IGs) evaluated the maturity of their agencies' information security programs using performance measures associated with the five core security functions—identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. The IGs at 17 of the 23 agencies reported that their agencies' programs were not effectively implemented. IGs also evaluated information security controls as part of the annual audit of their agencies' financial statements, identifying material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in internal controls for financial reporting at 17 of the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies. Chief information officers (CIOs) for 17 of the 23 agencies reported not meeting all elements of the government's cybersecurity cross-agency priority goal. The goal was intended to improve cybersecurity performance through, among other things, maintaining ongoing awareness of information security, vulnerabilities, and threats; and implementing technologies and processes that reduce malware risk. Executive Order 13800 directed OMB, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to assess and report on the sufficiency and appropriateness of federal agencies' processes for managing cybersecurity risks. Using performance measures for each of the five core security functions, OMB determined that 13 of the 23 agencies were managing overall enterprise risks, while the other 10 agencies were at risk. In assessing agency risk by core security function, OMB identified a few agencies to be at high risk (see figure at the top of next page). DHS and OMB facilitated the use of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to secure federal agency systems, but further efforts remain. For example, in response to prior GAO recommendations, DHS had improved the capabilities of the National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS), which is intended to detect and prevent malicious traffic from entering agencies' computer networks. However, the system still had limitations, such as not having the capability to scan encrypted traffic. The department was also in the process of enhancing the capabilities of federal agencies to automate network monitoring for malicious activity through its Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program. However, the program was running behind schedule and officials at most agencies indicated the need for additional training and guidance. Further, the Federal CIO issued a mandated report assessing agencies' intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, but the report did not address required information, such as the capability of NCPS to detect advanced persistent threats, and a cost/benefit comparison of capabilities to commercial technologies and tools. Selected agencies had not consistently implemented capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions into their computer networks. Specifically, the agencies told GAO that they had not fully implemented required actions for protecting email, cloud services, host-based systems, and network traffic from malicious activity. For example, 21 of 23 agencies had not, as of September 2018, sufficiently enhanced email protection through implementation of DHS' directive on enhanced email security. In addition, less than half of the agencies that use cloud services reported monitoring these services. Further, most of the selected 23 agencies had not fully implemented the tools and services available through the first two phases of DHS's CDM program. Until agencies more thoroughly implement capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions, federal systems and the information they process will be vulnerable to malicious threats. GAO is making two recommendations to DHS, to among other things, coordinate with agencies to identify additional needs for training and guidance. GAO is also making seven recommendations to OMB to, among other things, direct the Federal CIO to update the mandated report with required information, such as detecting advanced persistent threats. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. OMB did not indicate whether it concurred with the recommendations or not.