prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: With a staff of over 47,000 members, the Coast Guard operates a multimission fleet of 201 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and over 1,400 boats and ships  Operational control of surface and air assets is divided into two geographic Areas (Pacific and Atlantic), within which are nine Districts consisting of 37 sectors and the stations within them  The Coast Guard’s program oversight, policy development, and personnel administration are carried out at the Coast Guard’s headquarters  As shown in table 1, the Coast Guard is responsible for 11 statutory missions identified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended  The Coast Guard manages these missions through six mission programs, also listed in table 1  As part of its marine safety mission, for example, the Coast Guard conducts, among other activities, safety inspections and vessel accident investigations, including those involving commercial fishing vessels, which are part of an industry with one of the highest death rates of any industry in the United States  For each of its 11 missions, the Coast Guard has developed goals and targets to assess and communicate agency performance  The Coast Guard’s performance assessment process also includes identifying performance gaps and implementing corrective actions to address unmet performance goals  As part of its process, the Coast Guard is to establish targets for the current and subsequent 2 fiscal years, according to Coast Guard officials  Each target is set by the Coast Guard, but according to the Coast Guard’s Annual Performance Report (APR), some are derived from external factors  For example, DHS requires that Coast Guard set a 100 percent target for the percent of people in imminent danger saved in the maritime environment  Further, several of the Coast Guard’s assets used to conduct these missions are approaching the end of their intended service lives  As part of its efforts to modernize its assets used to carry out various missions, the Coast Guard has begun acquiring new vessels, such as the National Security Cutter, the Fast Response Cutter as well as other assets  However, concerns surrounding the affordability of this effort remain as the Coast Guard continues to pursue multiple new acquisitions without long-term planning to guide the affordability of its acquisition portfolio  Figure 1 shows the Coast Guard’s Fast Response Cutter and National Security Cutter  We previously reported on actions the Coast Guard could take to ensure that, among other things, it addresses limitations posed by incomplete data, the use of unrealistic asset performance data, and limitations with its performance goal data, for more effective program management  Examples of data limitations that we have recommended that the Coast Guard take action on are below  Improve completeness of mission data  In December 2017, we found that several different federal agencies play a role in overseeing and promoting commercial fishing vessel safety, including the Coast Guard  As part of its marine safety activities, the Coast Guard conducts, among other activities, safety inspections and vessel accident investigations  Commercial fishing has one of the highest death rates of any industry in the United States and vessel disasters are the leading cause of fatalities among fishers, according to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health  However, our December 2017 review found that more information is needed to calculate vessel safety statistics that could enhance the Coast Guard’s knowledge about accident, injury, and fatality trends involving commercial fishing vessels  The Coast Guard collects some data on commercial fishing vessels that operate in federal waters—including a vessel’s length and construction date—but data on the population of the active U S  commercial fishing vessel fleet are not complete  Between 2006 and 2015, the Coast Guard investigated 2,101 commercial fishing vessel accidents that were identified as occurring in federal waters  While the number of accidents generally increased over this time period, the number of injuries and fatalities declined over the same 10-year period  However, we could not assess the number of accidents, injuries, and fatalities by fishery— meaning the area in which a certain type of fish (e g , shrimp, salmon, crab) is caught—because the Coast Guard’s data is not complete  Further, we were unable to calculate the rates of commercial fishing vessel accidents, injuries, and fatalities, because reliable data on certain information needed to do so—including the total number of vessels that are actively fishing and the fishery or region in which the vessel operates—are either not maintained or are not collected by the Coast Guard or other federal agencies  Having this information could be useful to carrying out the Coast Guard’s marine safety mission, which includes enforcing laws to prevent death, injury and property loss in the marine environment  We recommended in our December 2017 report that the Coast Guard ensure that data it collects during commercial fishing vessel incident investigations is accurately captured  We also recommended that the Coast Guard work with stakeholders to form a working group to determine an efficient means to establish a reliable estimate of the population of active commercial fishing vessels  The Coast Guard agreed with both recommendations, and in February 2018 informed us that it is in the process of developing additional data fields to capture more information, such as the fishery in which the commercial fishing is involved, and is engaging stakeholders to establish an appropriate working group  We will continue to monitor these actions  Use more realistic asset performance data  In our May 2016 report on Coast Guard strategic planning, we found that the Coast Guard did not provide field units with realistic goals for allocating assets, by mission  We reported that the Coast Guard’s strategic allocations of assets were based on unrealistic assumptions about the performance capacity of its assets and did not reflect asset condition and unscheduled maintenance  This was due, in part, to the Coast Guard not including information from its field units on the actual performance of its assets  For example, agency officials noted that one of its classes of cutters was 50 years old and these cutters were hampered by mechanical failures requiring emergency dry dock repairs, which resulted in reduced availability to carry out their missions during the year  In another example, a field unit stated that based on historical use, it planned for 575 hours per vessel for one type of cutter instead of the 825 hours performance capacity  Because actual asset use has consistently fallen below asset performance capacities, there is not a direct alignment between the Coast Guard’s strategic operational goals and its prospects for achieving those goals  As a result, the headquarters’ strategic intent, which is based on asset capacity rather than actual performance, did not provide the field with strategic, realistic goals for allocating assets by mission  Agencies should use quality information that is appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and timely to achieve objectives and address related risks  We recommended that the Coast Guard incorporate field unit input, such as information on assets’ actual performance, to inform more realistic asset allocation decisions  The Coast Guard concurred with this recommendation, and in February 2018 informed us that it plans to address this recommendation through changes to two process documents that are under revision, with an expected completion date in March 2018  Improve performance goal data  In our October 2017 review of Coast Guard performance goals, we reported that the Coast Guard and DHS identified limitations with two of the seven selected performance goals we reviewed, including the five year average number of recreational boating deaths and injuries  In particular, officials believe that many recreational boating injuries that do not require hospitalization are not reported to the Coast Guard  These officials believe that the amount of underreporting may vary over time due to changes in industry trends, making it difficult to accurately determine actual injury rates and program performance  We determined that the data for this performance goal was not sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives due to these likely limitations  We found that the Coast Guard did not report the possible extent of these limitations with this performance goal in its fiscal year 2016 APR  For the other performance goal, the Coast Guard and DHS identified limitations with the number of detected incursions of foreign fishing vessels violating U S  waters, which is publicly reported in DHS’s APR  DHS’s review of this performance goal, reported in August 2015, raised questions about the validity of this goal—that is, whether it provides a useful measure of the Coast Guard’s performance  Specifically, the review noted that this performance goal is intended to measure a deterrence effect, but doing so is inherently difficult and may lead to contradictory interpretations of performance  In October 2017, we found that the data for this performance goal was sufficiently reliable for our reporting objective purposes, but questions remain about its validity  Reliable data is not a useful indication of performance unless it is also a valid representation of the goal being addressed  DHS officials reported that they did not include a discussion of the limitations for this performance goal in DHS’s fiscal year 2015 APR because the performance goal met the minimum threshold for data reliability despite the goal’s limitations  Coast Guard officials reported they were aware of these limitations and were working with DHS and OMB to improve the performance goal and implement corrective actions within 1 to 2 years  We recommended that the Coast Guard assess the extent to which documentation on performance data reliability contains appropriate information on known data reliability limitations and update these documents, as needed, based on the results of the assessment  The Coast Guard concurred and in February 2018, informed us that it had taken initial actions to address our recommendation  However, our preliminary review of these actions indicates that further action will be needed to fully address our recommendation, such as documenting and reporting the limitations of performance data  Our previous reports have identified areas in which the Coast Guard could improve the transparency of its data used for reporting on its mission performance and planning  Improve transparency of data on mission performance  In our October 2017 report on performance goals, we found that the Coast Guard’s APR has not been released publicly since 2011 due to a previous DHS leadership decision  Consequently, there has not been full visibility over performance across all of the Coast Guard’s missions  For example, one of the Coast Guard’s missions—defense readiness—has no goals that are publicly reported or shared with Congress, even though measures related to defense readiness are included in the Coast Guard’s APR  Coast Guard officials stated that they could see the benefit of publicly releasing their APR; however, DHS’s decision to limit the number of performance goals shared publicly has so far deterred the Coast Guard from pursuing the public release of its APR  DHS officials told us that the department is concerned about conflicting information that a component’s APR might present because it is vetted and produced separately from the DHS APR  However, the lack of transparency regarding performance data shared publicly and with Congress can result in an incomplete picture of mission performance and can limit effective oversight of Coast Guard operations  As a result, the public and Congress may be unable to determine the extent to which the Coast Guard is meeting its missions  We recommended that future Coast Guard APRs be available on the Coast Guard’s public website  The Coast Guard concurred with this recommendation and in February 2018, the Coast Guard informed us that it had completed its 2017 APR and are determining an appropriate approach for making it publicly available  Improve capital planning transparency  In our previously issued work on the Coast Guard’s annual 5-year capital investment plan (CIP), we found that the CIP does not consistently reflect current total cost estimates or the effects of tradeoffs that are made as part of the annual budget cycle  We made several recommendations in recent years intended to help the Coast Guard plan for future acquisitions and the difficult tradeoff decisions it will likely face  The Coast Guard generally concurred with these recommendations and is in various stages of implementation  For example, in 2017 we reported that we have made recommendations that DHS and the Coast Guard take several actions to gain an understanding of what the Coast Guard needs to meet its mission within its likely acquisition funding levels  These recommended actions included the Coast Guard: (1) conducting a comprehensive portfolio review across all its acquisitions to develop revised baselines that meet mission needs and reflect realistic funding scenarios and (2) developing a 20-year plan that identifies all necessary recapitalization efforts and any fiscal resources likely necessary to complete these efforts  For example, in 2014 we recommended the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to maintain the current level of service and the fiscal resources needed to acquire them  Without these efforts, the Coast Guard will continue, as it has in recent years, to plan its future acquisitions through the annual budgeting process, an approach that has led to delayed and reduced capabilities  In 2016, the Coast Guard revised its 2005 Mission Needs Statement, which provides a basic foundation for long-term investment planning that is to serve as the basis for evaluating the effectiveness of various fleet mixes, and inform the Coast Guard’s CIP  However, the 2016 Mission Needs Statement did not identify specific assets the Coast Guard needs to achieve its missions, nor did it update the annual hours it needs from each asset class to satisfactorily complete its missions  The Coast Guard has stated it is developing a 20-year Long-term Major Acquisition Plan, but it has not stated when the plan will be completed or what will be included in this plan, such as potential trade-offs that could be made across the Coast Guard’s portfolio of acquisitions to better meet mission needs within realistic funding levels  A long-term plan with a tradeoff analysis would facilitate a full understanding of the affordability challenges facing the Coast Guard while it builds the Offshore Patrol Cutter  DHS concurred with our 2014 recommendation, but it is unclear when the Coast Guard plans to complete the 20-year plan  Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, and members of the sub- committee, this completes my prepared statement  I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time  If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony, please contact Nathan Anderson at (202) 512-3841 or andersonn@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  Other individuals making key contributions to this work, and the underlying reports on which it is based, include Dawn Hoff (Assistant Director); Andrew Curry (Analyst-in-Charge); Chuck Bausell; David Bieler; Richard Cederholm; John Crawford; Timothy J  DiNapoli; Michele Fejfar; Laurier R  Fish; Peter Haderlein; Eric Hauswirth; Laura Jezewski; Tracey King; Benjamin Licht; Marie A  Mak; Gary Malavenda; Diana Moldafsky; Heidi Nielson; Meg Ullengren; and Kayli Westling  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 


Report 2: The combination of growing supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and new requirements for less polluting fuels in the international maritime shipping industry has heightened interest in LNG as a maritime fuel  For decades, LNG tanker ships have been capable of burning boil-off gas from their LNG cargoes as a secondary fuel  However, using LNG as a primary fuel is a relatively new endeavor; the first LNG-powered vessel—a Norwegian ferry—began service in 2000  Several aspects of LNG use in shipping may be of congressional interest  LNG as an engine, or "bunker," fuel potentially could help the United States reduce harmful air emissions, it could create a new market for domestic natural gas, and it could create economic opportunities in domestic shipbuilding  However, U S  ports would need specialized vessels and land-based infrastructure for LNG "bunkering" (vessel refueling) as well as appropriate regulatory oversight of the associated shipping and fueling operations  The storage, delivery, and use of LNG in shipping also has safety implications  These and other aspects of LNG bunkering may become legislative or oversight issues for Congress  One bill in the 115 th Congress, the Waterway LNG Parity Act of 2017 ( S  505 ), would have imposed excise taxes on LNG used by marine vessels on inland waterways  This report discusses impending International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards limiting the maximum sulfur content in shipping fuels, the market conditions in which LNG may compete to become a common bunker fuel for vessel operators, and the current status of LNG bunkering globally and in the United States  A broader discussion of oil market implications is outside the scope of this report  The IMO is the United Nations organization that negotiates standards for international shipping  Its standards limiting sulfur emissions from ships, adopted in 2008, have led vessel operators to consider alternatives to petroleum-based fuels to power their ships  In 1973, the IMO adopted the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)  Annex VI of the convention, which came into force in 2005, deals with air pollution from ships  The annex established limits on nitrogen oxide (NO x ) emissions and set a 4 5% limit on the allowable sulfur content in vessel fuels  In 2008, the IMO announced a timeline to reduce the maximum sulfur content in vessel fuels from 4 5% to 0 5% by January 1, 2020  Annex VI requires vessel operators to either use fuels containing less than 0 5% sulfur or install exhaust gas-cleaning systems ("scrubbers") to limit a vessel's sulfur oxide (SO x ) emissions to a level equivalent to the required sulfur limit  MARPOL is implemented in the United States through the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships ()  The United States effectively ratified MARPOL Annex VI in 2008 when President Bush signed the Maritime Pollution Prevention Act ( P L  110-280 )  The act requires that the U S  Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) jointly enforce the Annex VI emissions standards  MARPOL's Annex VI requirements are codified at 40 C F R  §1043  They apply to U S -flagged ships wherever located and to foreign-flagged ships operating in U S  waters  In addition to its global sulfur standards, MARPOL Annex VI provides for the establishment of Emissions Control Areas (ECAs), which are waters close to coastlines where more stringent emissions controls may be imposed  The North American ECA limits the sulfur content of bunker fuel to 0 1% of total fuel weight, an even lower bar than that set by the IMO 2020 standards  This standard is enforced by Coast Guard and EPA in waters up to 200 miles from shore  Currently, most ships operating in the North American ECA meet the emissions requirements by switching to low-sulfur fuels once they enter ECA waters  The European Union also has an ECA with a 0 1% limit on sulfur in bunker fuels, and the Chinese government is considering putting the same standard in place  The IMO 2020 emissions requirement applies to vessels of 400 gross tons and over, which is estimated to cover about 110,000 vessels worldwide  However, analysts indicate that many of the smaller vessels in this group already burn low-sulfur fuel  Accounting for these smaller vessels, one estimate is that about 55,000 vessels currently burn high-sulfur fuel  Ship owners have two main options for meeting the emission requirements with existing engines: burn low-sulfur conventional fuel (or biofuels) or install scrubbers to clean their exhaust gases  Alternatively, ship owners may opt to install new LNG-fueled engines to comply with the IMO standard  The simplest option for vessel owners to comply with the IMO sulfur standards, and the one that appears most popular, is switching to low-sulfur fuel oils or distillate fuels  Although switching to low-sulfur fuels would increase fuel costs compared to conventional, high-sulfur fuels, it would require little or no upfront capital cost and would allow ocean carriers to use existing infrastructure to bunker ships at ports  Anticipating widespread adoption of this approach, many analysts predict that the implementation of the IMO 2020 regulations will drive up demand for low-sulfur fuel and, therefore, significantly increase its price above current levels  Such a trend could also reduce demand for high-sulfur fuels, increasing the price spread between low- and high-sulfur bunkers fuels  Switching to lower-sulfur fuel could increase fuel cost across the industry by up to $60 billion in 2020 for full compliance with the IMO standards  Moreover, while it may allow vessels to meet the existing IMO sulfur standards, low-sulfur fuel does not necessarily support compliance with potential future IMO emissions standards, especially with respect to greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) discussed later in this report  Scrubbers are systems which remove sulfur from a vessel's engine exhaust emissions  A ship with a scrubber would be capable of meeting the IMO 2020 standard while using conventional high-sulfur fuel  Retrofitting a scrubber on an existing engine can cost several million dollars, however, before factoring in the lost revenue from taking the ship out of service for a month for the installation  Therefore, while using a scrubber will allow a ship to continue using (currently) cheaper high-sulfur fuel, it may take years to recover the initial investment  For example, one industry study estimates that, in the case of a typical tanker, a scrubber installation could cost $4 2 million with a payback time of approximately 4 8 years  Furthermore, scrubbers installed to capture sulfur emissions might have to be further refitted or replaced to comply with any future IMO standards for GHG emissions  The rate of scrubber adoption could affect the financial impacts of installing them in terms of fuel costs  Scrubbers ultimately offset some or all of their initial costs because they allow vessel operators to continue using relatively inexpensive high-sulfur fuel  However, the return on investment for scrubbers depends on the relative prices of high- and low-sulfur bunker fuels  The demand—and therefore, prices—for low-sulfur and high-sulfur fuels will be affected by how many vessels use the respective fuels under the IMO standards that take effect in 2020  For example, limited scrubber adoption could result in more vessels demanding more low-sulfur fuel oil, creating upward pressure on low-sulfur fuel prices  Under such a scenario, scrubbers would provide greater fuel cost savings for vessels that installed them  Alternatively, high-sulfur fuel could become more costly due to refinery production cutbacks (because shippers will not be allowed to burn it without scrubbers)  In this case, the economic benefits of scrubbers would be diminished  Given the uncertain fuel supply and demand dynamics, it is difficult for vessel operators to know how big the market distortions from scrubber installation could be or how many other operators may choose to install scrubbers  As of September 2018, there were approximately 660 ships retrofitted with scrubbers and over 600 ships under construction with plans to install scrubbers  By 2020, projecting additional construction orders, some analysts predict about 2,000 vessels could have scrubbers installed  However, even with higher demand for the technology, the ability of vessel owners to install scrubbers is constrained; analysts estimate that current maximum capacity for installing scrubbers is be between 300 to 500 ships per year  Another option for ship owners to comply with the IMO 2020 sulfur standards is to switch to engines that burn LNG as a bunker fuel  LNG-fueled vessels emit only trace amounts of sulfur oxides in their exhaust gases—well below even the 0 1% fuel-equivalent threshold in some of the ECA zones—so they would be fully compliant with the IMO standards  As a secondary benefit, using LNG as an engine fuel also would reduce particulate matter (PM) emissions relative to both high- and low-sulfur marine fuel oils  Furthermore, LNG vessels have the potential to emit less CO 2 than vessels running on conventional, petroleum-based fuels  However, LNG vessels would have the potential to result in more fugitive emissions of methane, another GHG, because methane is the primary component of natural gas, further discussed below  Installing an LNG-fueled engine can add around $5 million to the cost of a new ship  Retrofitting existing ships appears to be less desirable because of the extra space required for the larger fuel tanks (new ships can be designed with the larger fuel tanks)  The costs of retraining crews to work with LNG engines could also factor into a vessel operator's decision about switching to LNG  However, apart from their lower emissions, LNG-fueled engines may offset their capital costs with fuel cost advantages over engines burning petroleum-derived fuels  These savings would depend on the price spread between natural gas and fuel oil—which has been volatile in recent years  The likelihood that switching to LNG will produce long-term fuel costs savings relative to conventional fuels is, therefore, a critical consideration for many vessel owners  The 1920 Merchant Marine Act (known colloquially as the Jones Act) requires that vessels engaged in U S  domestic transport be built domestically  Many newly built domestic ships receive a federal loan guarantee under the Maritime Administration's so-called "Title XI" program  In 2014, the program was modified to include the use of "alternative energy technologies" to power ships as part of the relevant criteria in evaluating a loan application  The Maritime Administration counts LNG-fueled engines as an "alternative energy technology" and may be more likely to approve loan applications for ships with LNG-capable engines  Since the North American ECA was established in 2015, Jones Act coastal ship operators have taken steps to transition their fleets to use cleaner burning fuels, including LNG  The three Jones Act operators that ship dry goods to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have taken delivery or have ordered LNG-fueled and LNG-capable vessels from U S  shipyards in Philadelphia, PA, and Brownsville, TX  Harvey Gulf International has put into service five LNG-powered offshore supply vessels that service offshore oil rigs  Some Jones Act tanker operators that have recently built or ordered vessels have chosen to install LNG-ready engines while other operators have chosen to install scrubbers on their existing fleet  Ship engines and scrubbers for the Jones Act fleet do not have to be manufactured in the United States because they are not considered an integral part of the hull or superstructure of a ship  Seagoing barges, known as articulated tug barges, are also a significant portion of the domestic coastal fleet, especially for moving liquid cargoes  However, these vessels traditionally have burned lower-sulfur fuels and thus the ECA has not prompted fleet conversions  IMO fuel requirements do not apply to river barges operating on the nation's inland waterway system, although this fleet potentially could be a market for LNG as fuel  Bunkering vessels (small tankers with hoses for refueling ships) in U S  waters must also be Jones Act compliant  Barges are the predominant method for bunkering ships in U S  ports  An LNG bunkering vessel for the Port of Jacksonville—the first Jones Act-compliant LNG bunkering vessel to enter service in the United States—was built in 2017 by Conrad Shipyards in Orange, TX  Recent energy sector trends suggest that LNG may be cheaper in the long-run than petroleum-based, low-sulfur fuels  However, these price movements are correlated to some extent  Many existing long-term LNG contracts link LNG prices to oil prices (although such contract terms are on the decline), even in the spot market  Starting in 2008, the advent of shale natural gas production dramatically decreased natural gas prices in the United States  Natural gas spot prices in the United States at the Henry Hub—the largest U S  trading hub for natural gas—averaged around $3/MMBtu (million British Thermal Units) in 2018, about a quarter of the peak in average price a decade before, just prior to the shale gas boom ( Figure 1 )  Liquefying natural gas into LNG adds around $2/MMBtu to the production cost  Including additional producer charges and service costs would bring the total cost of LNG available at a U S  port (based on the 2018 average price in Figure 1 ) to approximately $6/MMBtu  Shipping of LNG from the United States to Asia or Europe adds from $1 to $2/MMBtu, so, based on the 2018 average cost in Figure 1 , LNG delivered to a port overseas would cost on the order of $7 to $8/MMbtu under long-term contracts, depending upon timing and location  Higher or lower prices could occur for specific long-term contracts and in the LNG spot market (i e , for individual cargoes), based on the location and the supply and demand balance at the time  In general, the U S  market will have the lowest-priced LNG  Northern Asia will have the highest LNG prices due to the region's comparative lack of pipeline gas supplies and its distance from LNG suppliers  Figure 2 compares LNG spot market prices in the Japan LNG market—the highest-priced LNG market—to spot prices for two common petroleum-based bunker fuels, low-sulfur gas oil and high-sulfur fuel oil  As the figure shows, over the last five years, Japan LNG generally has been cheaper than low-sulfur fuel and more expensive than high-sulfur fuel on an energy-equivalent basis (i e , per MMbtu)  However, Japan LNG and high-sulfur fuel prices converged in 2018  As the figure shows, spot prices for LNG deliveries to the Japan market fell below $6/MMBtu in 2016 from a high above $16/MMBtu in 2013  Likewise, low-sulfur gas oil prices have doubled, and high-sulfur fuel oil prices have tripled, since 2016  The volatility of the bunker fuel markets and the global LNG market lead to considerable unpredictability about the relative prices among fuels going forward  LNG may become increasingly price-competitive versus low-sulfur fuel as the 2020 IMO sulfur standards take effect  As discussed above, many analysts predict prices for low-sulfur gas oil, which are already higher than those for high-sulfur fuel oil, to increase significantly after 2020 due to a standards-driven rise in demand  Although fuel prices as shown in Figure 2 indicate favorable economics for LNG versus low-sulfur fuel, if prices for high-sulfur fuel oils collapse as some expect after the 2020 IMO regulations enter into force, it is possible that LNG could lose its price advantage over residual fuel oils  Likewise, the price spread between low-sulfur gasoil and high-sulfur fuel oil would increase, incentivizing more carriers to install scrubbers to capitalize on the savings in fuel costs by continuing to burn high-sulfur fuel  An additional complication is the variability of LNG prices by region  Many shipping lines are global operators seeking low-priced fuel worldwide, but unlike the global oil market, natural gas markets are regional  Because the price of LNG can vary significantly by region, the relative economics of LNG versus other bunker fuels would also vary by region  Another uncertainty in the market for LNG bunkering is the discrepancy between the spot price for traded LNG and the price for LNG sold as bunker fuel in ports  Added costs associated with marketing, storing and transporting LNG in bunkering operations (discussed below) would likely require ports to charge a rate for LNG bunker fuel above spot market prices  These additional overhead costs are likely to vary among ports  Before factoring in any effect of IMO standards on fuel prices, and assuming a favorable LNG-fuel oil price spread, it still could take years for the savings generated by using LNG to pay back the capital costs of switching fuels  Through May 2018, there were 122 LNG-powered vessels in operation and another 135 ordered or under construction  Many of the first LNG vessels delivered and ordered were Norwegian-flagged vessels, as the Norwegian government has subsidized LNG-fueled vessels with a "NO x Fund " The fund provides LNG-operated ships with an exemption from the country's tax on NO x emissions  As an alternative to committing to LNG as a fuel, some vessel owners may hedge their bets by opting to install "LNG-ready" engines, which can burn low-sulfur fuel oil currently, but are designed to make future LNG conversion easier  The number of LNG ships that may be in operation by 2030 is difficult to predict  First, as noted above, growth in LNG powered vessels is likely to be driven primarily by new builds rather than retrofits  However, the shipping industry has experienced nearly a decade of vessel overcapacity and slow growth  Weak growth in the shipping industry could result in slower growth in vessel orders overall and, therefore, fewer orders for LNG-powered vessels  Of new vessels ordered, or set to be delivered, in 2018 or after, 13 5% (by tonnage) are LNG-fueled—up from 1 4% in 2010  If this trend continues, demand for LNG from the shipping industry could still be relatively high, even if overall growth in the shipping industry remains slow  Because LNG bunkering infrastructure among global ports is currently limited, vessels that use large amounts of fuel and travel predictable routes—along which LNG is available—are the most suitable for LNG fuel  For this reason, cruise ships, vehicle ferries, and container ships initially may be the most likely vessel types to adopt LNG as bunker fuel  Order books have reflected this assessment: one quarter of all cruise ships on order by tonnage at the end of 2017 were LNG-powered  Likewise, a major container ship line, CMA CGM, recently announced that it was ordering nine extra-large container ships powered by LNG  The carrier stated that the fuel tanks will displace space for "just a few containers" and said it intends to refuel these ships just once on their round trip voyages between Asia and Europe  Conversely, LNG fuel adoption may be less likely for oil tankers  Half the global oil tanker fleet operates on the shipping spot market (also known as the "tramp" market), meaning that ship owners enter into contracts with cargo owners only for a single voyage  In this kind of trade, many oil tankers lack a consistent route  Having to limit spot contracts only to ports that may bunker LNG could reduce the arbitrage opportunities of tankers  Dry bulk cargo vessels (carrying grain, coal, and other commodities) also typically operate in the tramp market  LNG-powered vessels have lower direct exhaust emissions than comparable vessels using petroleum-derived fuels  However, the lifecycle—or "well-to-wake"—GHG emissions (especially of methane) and of volatile organic compound emissions from natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction complicates the comparison  One study in 2015 concluded, "performing a ['well-to-wake'] GHG study on LNG used as a marine fuel is more complex than previously thought  Further studies are needed     to investigate this subject " A 2016 study found that the relative GHG emissions benefits of LNG versus conventional fuel oil on a "well-to-wake" basis was highly dependent upon fugitive methane emissions in the LNG supply chain  A 2017 study funded by NGVA Europe, an association which promotes the use of natural gas in vehicles and ships, concluded that LNG as a bunker fuel provides a 21% well-to-wake reduction in GHG emissions compared to convention fuel oil  Evaluating such studies is beyond the scope of this report, although they indicate uncertainty about environmental benefits of LNG fuel, which may require further examination  Despite concerns over lifecycle emissions from the natural gas supply chain, in the short term, ships that pair LNG engines with newer vessel designs could reduce onboard GHG emissions  However, whether these GHG emission reductions would be sufficient to meet the future standards could become another issue for ship owners  The IMO has set a provisional goal of reducing GHG emissions from ships by 50% by 2050  Depending upon the state of engine technology, LNG-fueled ships might become less viable if GHG limits were to be established well before 2050  Concerns about such GHG limits might lead to a decrease in orders of LNG-powered ships over time  Commercial vessels have a typical lifespan of over 20 years, so firms ordering new ships have to take into account compliance with potential standards issued decades in the future  If renewable fuels, such as biodiesel, become more available and cheaper in the coming decades, renewable fuel-powered ships may take over part of the market that LNG-powered ships could occupy  A key requirement for ocean carriers to adopt LNG as an engine fuel is the availability of LNG bunkering facilities  Because LNG is extremely cold (-260 °F) and volatile, LNG bunkering requires specialized infrastructure for supply, storage, and fuel delivery to vessels  Depending upon the specific circumstances, LNG bunkering could require transporting LNG to a port from an offsite liquefaction facility for temporary storage at the port, or building an LNG liquefaction terminal on site  Alternatively, LNG could be delivered from offsite facilities directly to vessels in port via truck or supply vessel ( Figure 3 )  Truck-to-vessel LNG bunkering, in particular, provides some fueling capabilities without large upfront capital investments  LNG tanker trucks could also bring LNG to a storage tank built on site at the port, which could then bunker the LNG to arriving ships via pipeline  Supplying LNG using tanker trucks in this way may face capacity limitations due to truck size, road limitations, or other logistical constraints, but it has been demonstrated as a viable approach to LNG bunkering at smaller scales  The predominant method of bunkering today with high-sulfur fuel is vessel to vessel, either by a tank barge or smaller tanker  The type of infrastructure needed to temporarily store (if needed) and deliver LNG within a given port would depend on the size and location of the port, as well as the types of vessels expected to bunker LNG  Truck to ship bunkering is best suited for supporting smaller and mid-sized vessels, such as ferries or offshore supply vessels (OSVs) that support offshore oil platforms  Liquefaction facilities built on site can provide the greatest capacity of any LNG bunkering option, for example, to provide fuel for large vessels in transoceanic trade  However, constructing small-scale liquefaction facilities to produce and deliver LNG on site requires considerable planning and significant capital investment, in one case on the order of $70 million for a mid-sized port  Each LNG bunkering option in Figure 3 may be a viable means to begin LNG bunkering service in a given port  However, ports may face practical constraints as bunkering increases in scale  For example, a container port of significant size typically has multiple terminals, so even with an on-site liquefaction facility, it may need additional infrastructure or supply vessels for moving LNG to other port locations where a cargo ship might be berthed  There may also be port capacity and timing constraints upon the movement of LNG bunkering barges trying to refuel multiple large vessels in various locations around a crowded port  To date, the LNG bunkering operations already in place or in development are comparatively small, but scale constraints could become a factor as LNG bunkering grows and might require additional bunkering-related port investments  Early adoption of LNG bunkering occurred in Europe, where the first sulfur ECAs were created in 2006 and 2007  Through Directive 2014/94/EU, the European Union requires that a core network of marine ports be able to provide LNG bunkering by December 2025 and that a core network of inland ports provide LNG bunkering by 2030  This mandate has been promoted, in part, with European Commission funds to support LNG bunkering infrastructure development  In addition, the European Maritime Safety Agency published regulatory guidance for LNG bunkering in 2018  Over 40 European coastal ports have LNG bunkering capability currently in operation—primarily at locations on the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, and in Spain, France, and Turkey  These locations include major port cities such as Rotterdam, Barcelona, Marseilles, and London  Another 50 LNG bunkering facilities at European ports are in development  LNG bunkering is also advancing in Asia, led by Singapore, the world's largest bunkering port  Singapore has agreed to provide $4 5 million to subsidize the construction of two LNG bunkering vessels  The Port of Singapore plans to source imported LNG at the adjacent Jurong Island LNG terminal, loading it into the bunkering vessels for ship-to-ship fueling of vessels in port  Singapore also has signed a memorandum of understanding with 10 other partners—including a Japanese Ministry and the Chinese Port of Ningbo-Zhoushan—to create a focus group aimed at promoting the adoption of LNG bunkering at ports around the world  In Japan, one consortium is implementing plans to begin vessel-to-vessel LNG bunkering at the Port of Keihin in Tokyo Bay by 2020

ground_truth: The Coast Guard, a component of DHS, serves as the principal federal agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship in U.S. ports and waterways. To ensure that the Coast Guard is effectively fulfilling its missions, agency managers must have accurate information and base decisions on sound analyses for effective program management. This statement discusses Coast Guard actions needed to (1) improve the quality of data used for program management and (2) improve the transparency of its data for reporting on mission performance and planning. This statement is based on relevant products GAO issued from June 2014 through December 2017 on Coast Guard strategic planning and management issues, as well as related recommendation follow-up conducted through February 2018. GAO reviewed applicable laws, regulations, policies and guidance. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials responsible for administering these programs and obtained information on how they used data to inform decisionmaking. GAO interviewed a range of stakeholders, including federal and industry officials. GAO's prior work recommended multiple actions to improve the Coast Guard's program management by improving the quality of data it uses to manage and report on its mission performance. Specifically, GAO recommended actions such as collecting more complete data and clarifying the data limitations to facilitate more effective program management. For example, in December 2017, GAO found that more information is needed to calculate vessel safety statistics that could enhance the Coast Guard's knowledge about accident, injury, and fatality trends involving commercial fishing vessels. Having more complete information could be useful to carrying out its marine safety mission, and GAO recommended, among other things, that the Coast Guard ensure that data collected during commercial fishing vessel incident investigations is accurately captured. In 2018, the Coast Guard reported taking initial steps to capture more accurate data. GAO's prior work also identified areas where the Coast Guard could improve the transparency of the data it uses for reporting on its mission performance as well its capital planning purposes. For example, in an October 2017 report on performance goals, GAO found the Coast Guard's Annual Performance Report (APR) has not been released publicly since 2011. Consequently, there has not been full visibility over performance across all of the Coast Guard's missions. Coast Guard officials stated that a decision by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership to limit the number of performance goals shared publicly had deterred the Coast Guard from public release of its APR. GAO recommended that APRs be available on the Coast Guard's website; the Coast Guard plans to publicly release future APRs. In addition, previous GAO reports found that the Coast Guard's annual 5-year capital investment plan, which projects acquisition funding needs for the upcoming 5 years, did not consistently reflect current total cost estimates or the effects of tradeoffs made as part of the annual budget cycle. GAO made recommendations to help the Coast Guard plan for future acquisitions and the difficult trade off decisions it will face given funding constraints. The Coast Guard agreed, but it is unclear when it will complete the 20-year plan. GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement but has made them to the Coast Guard and DHS in the past on improving its program management through, among other things, better quality and more transparent data. DHS and the Coast Guard agreed with these recommendations and reported actions or plans to address them.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  Japan's NYK line, a large ship owner, recently announced that it had reached an agreement with three Japanese utilities to add LNG bunkering to ports in Western Japan  Asian countries, together with Australia and the United Arab Emirates, currently have around 10 coastal ports offering LNG bunkering, with another 15 projects in development  Some LNG bunkering operations in Europe and Asia are associated with existing LNG marine terminals, which already have LNG storage and port infrastructure in place  However, many smaller operations—including most of the projects in development—employ trucking, dedicated bunkering vessels, on-site liquefaction, and other means to extend LNG availability beyond the ports with major LNG terminals  LNG bunkering is not so advanced in South America, although with nine operating LNG marine terminals (one for export), and another six in development, South America also could support significant LNG bunkering operations in the near future  LNG bunkering in the United States currently takes place in two locations—Jacksonville, FL, and Port Fourchon, LA—with a third bunkering facility under development in Tacoma, WA  The LNG facilities in these ports serve the relatively small U S -flag domestic market  Bunkering of LNG-fueled cruise ships also is planned for Port Canaveral, FL  However, ports in North America have significant potential to expand the nation's LNG bunkering capability  Jacksonville is the largest LNG bunkering operation at a U S  port  One bunkering facility at the port, developed by JAX LNG, initially began truck-to-ship refueling operations in 2016 for two LNG-capable container ships  (The LNG is sourced from a liquefaction plant in Macon, GA  ) In August 2018, upon delivery of the Clean Jacksonville bunker barge, the facility began to replace truck-to-ship bunkering with ship-to-ship bunkering  In the future, the barge plans to source LNG from a new, small-scale liquefaction plant which JAX LNG is currently constructing at the port  A second facility at Jacksonville's port, operated by Eagle LNG, provides LNG bunkering sourced from a liquefaction plant in West Jacksonville  Eagle LNG also is constructing an on-site liquefaction and vessel bunkering facility in another part of the port, expected to begin service in 2019  Taken together, the JAX LNG and Eagle LNG facilities is expected to establish Jacksonville as a significant LNG-bunkering location with the capability to serve not only the domestic fleet but larger international vessels as well  In 2015, Harvey Gulf International Marine (Harvey) began LNG bunkering operations in the Gulf of Mexico to fuel its small fleet of LNG-powered offshore supply vessels serving offshore oil rigs  Harvey has since constructed a $25 million facility at its existing terminal in Port Fourchon to store and bunker LNG sourced from liquefaction plants in Alabama and Texas  The facility can provide truck-to-ship bunkering services for LNG-fueled offshore supply vessels, tank barges, and other vessels  A Harvey subsidiary has ordered two LNG bunkering barges to enable ship-to-ship fueling in the future  Puget Sound Energy has proposed an LNG liquefaction and bunkering facility at the Port of Tacoma, WA  Vessels traveling between Washington and Alaska typically spend the entire journey within the 200-mile North America ECA  Consequently, vessel owners operating along these routes have been interested in LNG as bunker fuel  TOTE Maritime, for example, a ship owner involved in trade between Alaska and the lower 48 states, has begun the process of retrofitting the engines of two of its container ships to be LNG-compatible  The proposed Tacoma LNG facility would be capable of producing up to 500,000 gallons of LNG per day and would include an 8 million gallon storage tank  The facility would serve the dual purposes of providing fuel for LNG-powered vessels and providing peak-period natural gas supplies for the local gas utility system  Its total construction cost reportedly is expected to be $310 million  Community and environmental concerns have slowed the progress of the proposal, which is still under regulatory review  Puget Sound Energy originally planned to put the LNG facility into service in late 2019; however, permitting issues appear likely to delay its opening until 2020 or later—if it is eventually approved  Q-LNG Transport, a company 30% owned by Harvey, has placed orders for two LNG bunkering barges to provide ship-to-ship LNG fueling as well as "ship-to-shore transfers to small scale marine distribution infrastructure in the U S  Gulf of Mexico and abroad " Q-LNG's first barge initially is expected to provide fuel to new LNG-fueled cruise ships based in Port Canaveral (and, potentially, Miami), while service from its second barge is still uncommitted  Initial plans are for the LNG to be sourced from the Elba Island LNG import/export terminal near Savannah, GA—approximately 230 nautical miles away—although the company may seek to develop an on-site LNG storage facility in the future  As noted above, U S  LNG bunkering activities thus far have been limited to a handful of vessels in domestic trade and tourism  LNG bunkering for the much larger fleet of foreign-flag ships carrying U S  imports and exports is still to be developed  As in Europe and Asia, domestic ports located near major LNG import or export terminals may serve as anchors for expanded LNG bunkering operations  Figure 4 shows existing LNG import and export terminals in North America  LNG can be liquefied from pipeline natural gas (or imported natural gas) and stored in large quantities at these facilities  The LNG can then be bunkered on site or transported to bunkering facilities elsewhere in the region by truck, rail, or barge  As discussed above, the distance between Port Canaveral and Elba Island in Q-LNG's bunker sourcing plan is 230 nautical miles  Taking this distance as a measure of how far away LNG can be sourced and barged economically, it is possible to extrapolate which U S  ports are within reach of a potential supply of LNG for vessel bunkering  Table 1 lists the top 20 U S  container shipment ports in the United States and their proximity to existing LNG import/export terminals  Of these top 20 ports, 12 are less than 230 nautical miles from an operating LNG terminal  Distances between LNG terminals and the other East Coast ports are not much greater, suggesting that LNG for vessel bunkering could be within reach of every U S  port along the Eastern Seaboard and in the Gulf of Mexico  On the West Coast, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach—the two largest U S  ports—are relatively close to the Costa Azul LNG import terminal in Ensenada, MX  Seattle and Tacoma are far from Ensenada, but would be served by the proposed Tacoma LNG bunkering project, if constructed  LNG bunkering for Seattle and Tacoma alternatively could be sourced from an existing LNG port facility around 100 nautical miles north in Vancouver, BC, which is expanding to provide LNG bunkering services to international carriers  Alaska's existing LNG export terminal currently is inactive, but potentially could supply LNG bunker fuel in the Pacific Northwest as well  Although existing LNG import or export terminals in North America could supply LNG for regional bunkering operations, such activities would require additional investment for infrastructure such as LNG transfer facilities and bunker barges  CRS is not aware of any public announcements among the LNG terminals above to develop bunkering operations  However, at least one LNG terminal owner, Cheniere Energy, which operates LNG terminals in Louisiana and Texas, identifies vessel bunkering as one source of future LNG demand growth worldwide  The IMO adopted safety standards for ships using natural gas as a bunker fuel in 2015  The standards, which took effect in 2017, apply to all new ships and conversions of ships (except LNG tankers, which have their own standards)  The IMO standards address engine design, LNG storage tanks, distribution systems, and electrical systems  They also establish new training requirements for crews handling LNG and other low flashpoint fuels  As is the case for the sulfur standards, the IMO LNG safety standards apply to all IMO member nations, including the United States  In addition, a number of U S  federal agencies, especially the Coast Guard and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, have jurisdiction over specific aspects of domestic LNG storage infrastructure and bunkering operations  The Coast Guard has the most prominent role in LNG bunkering, given its general authority over port operations and waterborne shipping  In 2015, the Coast Guard issued two guidelines for the handling of LNG fuel and for waterfront facilities conducting bunkering operations  In 2017, the Coast Guard issued additional guidelines to Captains of the Port, the local Coast Guard officials responsible for port areas, for conducting safe LNG bunkering simultaneously with other port operations  The guidelines advise on quantitative risk assessment of facilities bunkering LNG, which allows Captains of the Port to assess the risks posed to crews and facilities  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) plays a role in LNG bunkering due to its jurisdiction over the siting of LNG import and export terminals under the Natural Gas Act of 1938  Specifically, FERC asserts approval authority over the place of entry and exit, siting, construction, and operation of new LNG terminals as well as modifications or extensions of existing LNG terminals  Notwithstanding this siting authority, FERC reportedly does not intend to assert jurisdiction over the permitting of LNG bunkering facilities, but it may require amendment of permits it has issued for LNG import or export terminals to account for bunkering operations added afterwards  In addition to the Coast Guard and FERC, other federal agencies may have jurisdiction over specific aspects of LNG bunkering operations in U S  ports under a range of statutory authorities  For example, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration within the Department of Transportation regulates the safety of natural gas pipelines and certain associated LNG storage facilities (e g , peak-shaving plants)  LNG facilities also may need to comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's regulations for Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals  Other federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, the U S  Army Corps of Engineers, and the Transportation Security Administration, may regulate other aspects of LNG bunkering projects  CRS is not aware of new regulations to date among these agencies specifically addressing LNG bunkering  World production of LNG has been rising rapidly over the last few years, driven by growth in the natural gas sector in new regions—especially Australia and the United States  According to one industry analysis ( Figure 5 ), global LNG supply is expected to increase from 300 to 400 million metric tons per annum (MMtpa) from 2017 to 2021 based on new LNG liquefaction projects already operating or under development  An additional 150 MMtpa appears likely to come online after that  Collectively, LNG supply from these new liquefaction projects could exceed projections of demand, which would put downward pressure on LNG prices  While increases in the global supply of LNG do not necessarily translate directly into an increase in LNG available for bunkering, such increases could provide options for LNG bunkering in more ports  Estimating potential demand for LNG in the maritime sector is complicated and uncertain  One study of future LNG demand for bunkering, specifically, projects that LNG-powered vessels in operation and under construction as of June 2018 will require between 1 2 and 3 0 MMt of LNG per year  The study's review of several LNG consumption forecasts in the maritime sector shows a consensus projection between 20 to 30 MMt per year by 2030  This level of demand growth implies an increase in LNG-powered vessel construction from the current rate of around 120 ships per year to between 400 and 600 new builds per year  If these levels were reached, they could create a significant new market for LNG suppliers  Assuming a Henry Hub spot market price of $4/MMBtu in 2030, the annual market for LNG in shipping could be worth $2 9 billion to $5 8 billion, before accounting for liquefaction and transportation charges  Some studies have projected the LNG bunkering market to be even larger and to grow more quickly  However, key variables—such as the prices of Henry Hub natural gas and crude oil, the number of new vessel orders, and the future costs of emissions technology—are notoriously hard to predict with accuracy  Thus, it is not assured that natural gas consumption in the maritime sector will absorb more than a small amount of the global liquefaction capacity in development  The IMO sulfur standards apply to ship owners globally, as does the development of new LNG supply and bunkering infrastructure  In addition to these factors, domestic LNG bunkering also may be influenced by considerations more specific to the United States  These considerations include growth of the U S  natural gas supply, domestic shipbuilding opportunities, and LNG safety and security  Because of its leading role in global natural gas production, the United States has a particular interest in any new source of natural gas demand  According to the Energy Information Administration, the United States has been the world's top producer of natural gas since 2009, when it surpassed Russia  In 2017, increases in production outstripped increases in domestic gas consumption, leading to the United States becoming a net exporter of natural gas for the first time in nearly 60 years  As discussed above, North America (primarily the United States) is expected to add the most new LNG production capacity through 2030 when including projects that are operating, under construction, and likely (according to investment analysts)  Past increases in U S  LNG exports were driven by greater throughput at the Sabine Pass LNG export terminal—the only operating U S  LNG export terminal in 2017  In March 2018, the Cove Point terminal in Maryland became the second operating U S  LNG export terminal  Four additional projects under construction or commissioning are set to nearly triple U S  liquefaction by the end of 2019  This increase in liquefaction capacity likely will motivate LNG producers to secure new buyers  Figure 6 shows estimated LNG prices for various locations around the world as of October 2018  As the figure shows, LNG prices are substantially lower in North America than in Asia, Europe, and South America  Even after adding $1 00 to $2 00/MMBtu to transport the LNG to overseas ports, LNG produced in the United States is globally competitive at these prices  If LNG from the new liquefaction capacity coming online can be produced and delivered with similar economics, the cost advantage may create an opportunity for U S  LNG in bunker supply  There are over 400 petroleum fuel bunkering ports in the world, but 60% of bunkering in recent years has happened in six countries: Singapore, the United States, China, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, and the Netherlands  Of these countries, only the United States is a significant LNG producer  Therefore, the United States could be a favorable source of LNG for domestic bunkering and for bunkering at the other major ports  While the LNG industry historically has had a good safety record, there are unique safety risks associated with LNG in vessel operations  Leakage of LNG during LNG shipping or bunkering can pose several hazards  LNG is stored at temperatures below -162 °C (-260 °F), far below the -20°C at which the carbon steels typically used in shipbuilding become brittle  Consequently, extreme care must be taken to ensure that LNG does not drip or spill onto ship hulls or decking because it could lead to brittle fracture, seriously damaging a ship or bunkering barge  LNG spilled onto water can pose a more serious hazard as it will rapidly and continuously vaporize into natural gas, which could ignite  The resulting "pool fire" would spread as the LNG spill expands away from its source and continues evaporating  A pool fire is intense, far hotter and burning far more rapidly than oil or gasoline fires, and it cannot be extinguished; all the LNG must be consumed before it goes out  Because an LNG pool fire is so hot, its thermal radiation may injure people and damage vessels or property a considerable distance from the fire itself  Many experts agree that a large pool fire, especially on water, is the most serious LNG hazard  Leaks of boil-off gas (the small amount of LNG that vaporizes in storage) can also release natural gas into a port area and cause fires or explosions  Major releases of LNG from large LNG carriers would be most dangerous within 500 meters of the spill and would pose some risk at distances up to 1,600 meters from the spill  While a bunkering barge or a vessel using LNG for fuel contains far less LNG than large LNG carriers, LNG spills in bunkering operations could still be a significant concern  Risks associated with bunkering LNG are complicated in ports seeking to engage in "simultaneous operations" during the bunkering process  Simultaneous operations entail loading and unloading cargo and personnel from a ship, maintenance, and other logistical operations performed while a ship is bunkering  Accidents that occur during such operations (for example, the operation of heavy machinery near pipes transporting LNG) can result in a spill of LNG which can threaten workers positioned near the site of operations  LNG tankers, bunkering vessels, and land-based facilities could be vulnerable to terrorism  Bunkering tanks or vessels might be physically attacked to destroy the LNG they hold—and vessels might be commandeered for use as weapons against port or coastal targets  Potential terrorist attacks on LNG terminals or tankers in the United States have long been a key concern of the public and policymakers in the context of large scale LNG imports or exports because such attacks could cause catastrophic fires in ports and nearby populated areas  For example, a 2007 report by the Government Accountability Office stated that, "the ship-based supply chain for energy commodities," specifically including LNG, "remains threatened and vulnerable, and appropriate security throughout the chain is essential to ensure safe and efficient delivery " Affected communities and federal officials continue to express concern about the security risks of LNG  The potential risks from terrorism to LNG bunkering infrastructure may be different than those of larger LNG import or export operations due to smaller quantities of LNG involved, but the risks may become more widespread if LNG bunkering operations are established in more locations  The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA, P L  107-295 ) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code give the Coast Guard far-ranging authority over the security of hazardous materials in maritime shipping  The Coast Guard has developed port security plans addressing how to deploy federal, state, and local resources to prevent terrorist attacks  Under the MTSA, the Coast Guard has assessed the overall vulnerability of marine vessels, their potential to transport terrorists or terror materials, and their use as potential weapons  The Coast Guard has employed these assessments to augment port security as necessary and to develop maritime security standards for LNG port facilities  The IMO's overall framework for controlling vessels emissions (MARPOL Annex VI) has been in place since 2005  While the United States, as an IMO member, is subject to the IMO's 2020 sulfur standards, the international standards apply equally to all parties and all vessels  The impacts of sulfur standards on bunker fuel have been an important consideration, but IMO member nations have agreed to the standards independent of any particular energy policies  Moreover, MARPOL Annex VI preceded the U S  shale gas boom, so commitment to that initial IMO framework could not have anticipated United States' current role as a dominant energy producer  Any changes within the international shipping fleet to install sulfur scrubbers, fuel engines with LNG, or switch to other low sulfur fuels, are being driven primarily by market forces in fuel supply, shipbuilding, and shipping—not by any particular push to favor one fuel over another  Nonetheless, given its particular status, the question arises whether the standards may create an economic opportunity for the United States, in energy or otherwise  More specifically, could international adoption of LNG as a bunker fuel create an important new market for U S  natural gas producers, shipbuilders, or infrastructure developers? As discussed above, depending upon the adoption of LNG bunkering in the global fleet, the LNG bunker fuel market could grow to several billion dollars by 2030  If U S  LNG producers were to supply a significant share of this market—on the strength of comparatively low LNG production costs—LNG bunkering could increase demand for U S  natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction  Opportunities in LNG-related shipbuilding might be more limited, as most of this occurs overseas, with the exception of Jones Act vessels  In the latter case, demand for domestically-constructed LNG bunkering barges could be one significant area of economic growth  Engineering and construction firms could benefit from new opportunities to develop new port infrastructure for LNG storage and transfer  While likely limited in number, such port facilities could be complex, high value projects costing tens or hundreds of millions of dollars to complete  Such projects could create jobs in engineering, construction, and operation, which could be important to local communities  Although LNG bunkering could present the United States with new economic opportunities, it may pose challenges as well  Rising demand for LNG in the maritime sector could increase natural gas prices for domestic consumers  In addition to being the world's largest natural gas producer, as of 2018, the United States is also the world's largest producer of crude oil and the second largest bunkering hub  Consequently, while vessel conversion to LNG bunkering may increase demand for U S -produced natural gas, it could be partially offset by reduced demand for U S -produced crude oil or refined products  Exactly how changing demand in one sector could affect the other is unclear  Furthermore, while LNG can reduce pollutant emissions from vessels, emissions and environmental impacts from increased natural gas production and transportation could increase overall emissions  Much of the net environmental impact depends upon practices in the natural gas industry, which are the subject of ongoing study and debate  Although new LNG bunkering infrastructure can create jobs, as the Tacoma LNG projects shows, the construction of such port facilities can be controversial for reasons of safety, security, and environmental impact  Overarching the considerations above is uncertainty about how the global shipping fleet will adapt to the IMO sulfur standards over time  This uncertainty complicates decisions related to both private investment and public policy  LNG-fueled ships still account for only a fraction of the U S  and global fleets, and it may take several decades for significant benefits of LNG-powered vessels to be realized  It is also possible that alternative ship fuels, including biofuels, electric engines, and hybrid engines, will become more economically viable in coming years  Given the uncertainty surrounding the future of LNG as a ship fuel, it is hard to predict the potential benefits or costs that LNG bunkering may provide to the United States  Until now, the private sector has added LNG-fueled vessels to fleets in the United States in a piecemeal manner under existing federal statutes and regulation  Congress could encourage the growth of LNG bunkering by various means, such as providing tax incentives to support the construction of LNG bunkering facilities and vessels, addressing any statutory or regulatory barriers to bunkering facility siting or operations, and providing funding for technical support to domestic carriers seeking to adopt LNG technology  Alternatively, Congress could seek to encourage competing bunker fuel options, such as biofuels, by incentivizing them in similar ways  In addition, Congress could also affect growth in LNG bunkering through policies affecting the LNG industry or domestic shipping industry as a whole  Changes in federal regulation related to natural gas production, or changes to the Jones Act, for example, while not directed at LNG bunkering, could nonetheless affect its economics  Therefore, evaluating the potential implications on LNG bunkering of broader energy, environmental, or economic objectives may become an additional consideration in congressional oversight and legislative initiatives  If LNG bunkering expands significantly in U S  ports, Congress also may examine the adequacy of existing measures to ensure the safety and security of LNG vessels, storage, and related facilities 
Report 2:  Specifically, the $456 0 million appropriation in FY2001 was more than double the amount provided for other purposes in any other year  These appropriations were used to fund more than a dozen programs in the Clinton Administration's Lands Legacy Initiative  In that year, total LWCF appropriations exceeded the annual authorization level, totaling nearly $1 billion  This record level of funding was provided partly in response to President Clinton's Lands Legacy Initiative, which sought $1 4 billion for about two dozen resource-protection programs, including the LWCF  It also was provided partly in response to some congressional interest in securing increased and more certain funding for the LWCF  The highest percentage of annual funds provided for other purposes occurred in FY2006 and FY2007 (59% in both years), in response to President George W  Bush's request for funding for an array of programs  For instance, in FY2007 the Bush Administration sought funding from the LWCF for 15 programs in addition to land acquisition and state grants  For that year, the appropriation for five other purposes was $216 1 million, out of a total LWCF appropriation of $366 1 million  In some years, the appropriation for other purposes was significantly less than the Administration requested  For example, for FY2008 the Bush Administration sought $313 1 million for other purposes, or 83% of the total request of $378 7 million  The FY2008 appropriation for other purposes was $101 3 million, or 40% of the LWCF total of $255 1 million  The $2 7 billion appropriated from the LWCF from FY1998 to FY2019 for other purposes represents 27% of the $10 0 billion total appropriations from LWCF during the period  FWS and FS have received the largest shares of the appropriations for other purposes, about $1 4 billion (53%) and $1 0 billion (38%), respectively  BLM, NPS, the U S  Geological Survey, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs have shared the remaining $0 2 billion (9%) of the appropriations for other purposes  (See Figure 1  ) Because there is no set of other purposes specified in the LWCF Act to be funded from the LWCF, presidents have sought funds for a variety of purposes  Congress has chosen which of these requests to fund from the LWCF, and whether to fund any additional programs from the LWCF not suggested by the President  Appropriations for other purposes have been provided for more than a dozen diverse natural resource-related programs, including facility maintenance of the land management agencies, ecosystem restoration, the Historic Preservation Fund, the Payments in Lieu of Taxes program, the FS Forest Legacy program, FWS State and Tribal Wildlife Grants, the FWS Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund, U S  Geological Survey science and cooperative programs, and Bureau of Indian Affairs Indian Land and Water Claim Settlements  (See Appendix A  ) Although in earlier years several other purposes typically were funded from LWCF, since FY2008, funds have been appropriated annually only for grants under two programs: Forest Legacy and Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund  (See Appendix B and Figure 2   ) The total appropriation from LWCF for these two programs (since FY1998) is $1 7 billion, or 63% of all appropriations for other purposes ($2 7 billion)  These two programs and a third grant program funded prior to FY2008 from LWCF—FWS State and Tribal Wildlife Grants—have received more than three-quarters ($2 1 billion, 79%) of the total appropriations for other purposes  The appropriations through FY2019 are $944 4 million for Forest Legacy (35% of the other purposes total), $753 3 million for Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund (28% of total), and $448 5 million for State and Tribal Wildlife Grants (17% of total)  Grants under the Forest Legacy program are used to acquire lands or conservation easements to preserve private forests threatened by conversion to non-forest uses, such as agriculture or residences  FS provides matching grants to states through a competitive process that requires state approval and then national approval and ranking  The ranking is based on the importance of the project (potential public benefits from protection), the likelihood of the forest's conversion to non-forest uses, and the strategic relevance of the project, among other factors  The program is implemented primarily through state partners, usually state forestry agencies  State partners generally acquire, hold, and administer the easements or land purchases, although the federal government also may do so  The Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund provides grants "for species and habitat conservation actions on non-Federal lands, including habitat acquisition, conservation planning, habitat restoration, status surveys, captive propagation and reintroduction, research, and education " In addition to appropriations from LWCF, the Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund typically receives additional appropriations  In recent years, the appropriations from LWCF generally have been used for two types of land acquisition grants provided to state and territories on a matching basis  Recovery land acquisition grants have been made for acquisition of habitats in support of species recovery goals and objectives  Habitat conservation plan land acquisition grants have been made for acquisition of lands that are associated with habitat conservation plans  State and Tribal Wildlife Grants are provided to states, territories, and tribes to develop and implement programs for the benefit of fish and wildlife and their habitats, including nongame species  State and Tribal Wildlife Grants received funding from the LWCF for FY2001-FY2007; subsequently, funding has been provided from the General Fund of the U S  Treasury  Currently, the largest portion of the program is for formula grants to states and territories on a matching basis  Funds from the formula grants may be used to develop state conservation plans and to implement specific conservation projects  Smaller amounts of funding have been appropriated for competitive grants to states and territories, and to tribal governments  The competitive grant programs do not have matching requirements  Appendix A shows the total LWCF appropriations for other purposes summed from FY1998 to FY2019  Appendix B shows the other purposes that received LWCF appropriations each year, the amount of LWCF appropriations for each purpose, and the total annual appropriations for other purposes  Appendix A  Total LWCF Appropriations for Other Purposes Appendix B  Annual LWCF Appropriations for Other Purposes 

ground_truth: The combination of growing liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and new requirements for less polluting fuels in the maritime shipping industry has heightened interest in LNG as a maritime fuel. The use of LNG as an engine ("bunker") fuel in shipping is also drawing attention from federal agencies and is beginning to emerge as an issue of interest in Congress. In 2008, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) announced a timeline to reduce the maximum sulfur content in vessel fuels to 0.5% by January 1, 2020. Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships requires vessels to either use fuels containing less than 0.5% sulfur or install exhaust-cleaning systems ("scrubbers") to limit a vessel's airborne emissions of sulfur oxides to an equivalent level. An option for vessel operators to meet the IMO 2020 standards is to install LNG-fueled engines, which emit only trace amounts of sulfur. Adopting LNG engines requires more investment than installing scrubbers, but LNG-fueled engines may offset their capital costs with operating cost advantages over conventional fuels. Savings would depend on the price spread between LNG and fuel oil. Recent trends suggest that LNG may be cheaper in the long run than conventional fuels. LNG bunkering requires specialized infrastructure for supply, storage, and delivery to vessels. To date, the number of ports worldwide that have developed such infrastructure is limited, although growth in this area has accelerated. Early adoption of LNG bunkering is occurring in Europe where the European Union requires a core network of ports to provide LNG bunkering by 2030. LNG bunkering is also advancing in Asia, led by Singapore, the world's largest bunkering port. Asian countries, together with Australia and the United Arab Emirates, have about 10 coastal ports offering LNG bunkering, with another 15 projects in development. LNG bunkering in the United States currently takes place in Jacksonville, FL, and Port Fourchon, LA—with a third facility under development in Tacoma, WA. Bunkering of LNG-fueled cruise ships using barges also is planned for Port Canaveral, FL. The relative locations of other U.S. ports and operating LNG terminals suggest that LNG bunkering could be within reach of every port along the Eastern Seaboard and in the Gulf of Mexico. On the West Coast, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA, are near the Costa Azul LNG terminal in Ensenada, MX. Seattle and Tacoma are adjacent to the proposed Tacoma LNG project. Since 2015, Jones Act coastal ship operators have taken steps to transition their fleets to use cleaner burning fuels, including LNG. Shippers of dry goods to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have taken delivery or have ordered LNG-fueled and LNG-capable vessels from U.S. shipyards in Philadelphia, PA, and Brownsville, TX. Another company operates five LNG-powered offshore supply vessels built in Gulfport, MS. Depending upon LNG conversions, the global LNG bunker fuel market could grow to several billion dollars by 2030. If U.S. LNG producers were to supply a significant share of this market—on the strength of comparatively low LNG production costs—LNG bunkering could increase demand for U.S. natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction. Opportunities in LNG-related shipbuilding might be more limited, as most shipbuilding occurs overseas, although domestically-constructed LNG bunkering barges could be one area of economic growth. Finally, engineering and construction firms could benefit from new opportunities to develop port infrastructure for LNG storage and transfer. However, while vessel conversion to LNG fuel may increase demand for U.S.-produced natural gas, it partially could be offset by reduced demand for U.S.-produced crude oil or refined products. Furthermore, while LNG can reduce direct emissions from vessels, fugitive emissions and environmental impacts from natural gas production and transportation could reduce overall emissions benefits. While the LNG industry has experienced few accidents, the Coast Guard has been developing new standards to address unique safety and security risks associated with LNG in vessel operations. The overarching consideration about LNG bunkering in the United States is uncertainty about how the global shipping fleet will adapt to the IMO sulfur standards over time. This uncertainty complicates decisions related to both private investment and public policy. Although Congress has limited ability to influence global shipping, it could influence the growth of LNG bunkering through the tax code and regulation, or through policies affecting the LNG industry or domestic shipping industry as a whole. Evaluating the potential implications of LNG bunkering within the context of broader energy and environmental policies may become an additional consideration for Congress. If LNG bunkering expands significantly, Congress also may examine the adequacy of existing measures to ensure the safety and security of LNG vessels, storage, and related facilities.