prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Oil and petroleum products markets have changed substantially in the years since the establishment of the SPR  Specifically, U S  domestic crude oil production has generally been increasing, consumption has been relatively stable, and crude oil and petroleum products markets have become increasingly global  Additionally, U S  crude oil production is projected to rise further in the future, according to EIA and IEA projections, further reversing a decades-long decline  Recent technological improvements have made onshore production from shale formations economically viable, and domestic crude oil production began to rise in about 2008  The combination of increasing production and relatively stable consumption has resulted in declining net crude oil and petroleum products imports, from a high of about 12 million barrels per day in 2005 to fewer than 4 million barrels per day in 2017  Since these trends are expected to continue, the IEA and EIA both project net U S  crude oil and petroleum products imports will decline to zero sometime in the late 2020s and the United States will become a net exporter shortly thereafter  Since the IEA 90-day reserve obligation is based on a country’s net imports, there is no such obligation for net exporters; therefore, the United States would have no 90-day reserve obligation as long as it is a net exporter, though it would still be obligated to release reserves in response to supply disruptions  Over the longer term, EIA’s projections show U S  net exports peaking in 2037 and the United States again becoming a net importer between 2040 and 2050  At the time of the Arab oil embargo, price controls in the United States prevented the prices of oil and petroleum products from increasing as much as they otherwise might have, contributing to a physical oil shortage that caused long lines at gasoline stations throughout the United States  In addition, in the 1970s, oil prices were often set in long-term contracts, which meant that prices would not automatically rise in the face of greater scarcity  This generally reduced incentives for producers to expand production and sales as well as for consumers to reduce consumption in the face of greater scarcity caused by a supply disruption  Now that crude oil and petroleum product markets are global, the prices of these commodities are determined in the world market, primarily on the basis of supply and demand  In the absence of long-term contracted prices or price controls, scarcity from a supply disruption is generally expressed in the form of higher prices, as purchasers are free to bid as high as they are willing to pay to secure oil supply  In a global market, a large enough supply disruption anywhere in the world raises prices everywhere  This creates incentives for producers unaffected by the disruption to increase their production and release existing inventories and for consumers everywhere to reduce consumption in the ways they find most efficient and least disruptive  While it can take time for some of these actions to affect crude oil and petroleum product markets—according to DOE officials, it can take approximately 6 months from when a producer drills an oil well until oil production comes on line—all these actions tend to mitigate the effects of supply disruptions  The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 authorized the creation of the SPR, partly in response to the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 that caused a shortfall in the international oil market  The purposes of the SPR are, among other things, to reduce the impact of disruptions in supplies of petroleum products and to carry out obligations of the United States under the international energy program  Specifically, the 1974 International Energy Program Agreement, a joint strategy and treaty, established the IEA to address oil security issues on an international scale  The SPR is owned by the federal government, managed by DOE’s Office of Petroleum Reserves, and maintained by Fluor Federal Petroleum Operations LLC  The SPR stores crude oil in underground salt caverns along the Gulf Coast in Louisiana and Texas  The SPR currently maintains four storage sites—Bayou Choctaw, Big Hill, Bryan Mound, and West Hackberry—with a design capacity of 713 5 million barrels  Under conditions prescribed by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, as amended, the President has discretion to authorize the release of petroleum products from the SPR to minimize significant supply disruptions  When oil is released from the SPR, it is distributed through commercial pipelines or on waterborne vessels to refineries, where it is converted into gasoline and other petroleum products, and then transported to distribution centers for sale to the public  According to DOE documents, well-functioning infrastructure is fundamental to the SPR’s ability to maintain operational readiness and meet mission requirements  However, most of the critical infrastructure for moving SPR oil has exceeded its serviceable life, which has led to increasing maintenance costs and decreasing system reliability  Specifically, the reserve relies on a complex system of salt caverns, pipelines, wells, and pumps, with other infrastructure and equipment  Any failures, such as ruptured pipelines, could affect the readiness of a site for an oil release  According to DOE officials, a growing backlog of major maintenance needs raises concerns about the ability of the system to operate as designed  In addition, there have been equipment failures that have rendered parts of the system temporarily inoperable  For example, the SPR has experienced at least five major equipment failures since fiscal year 2013, including the Big Hill site pipe failure shown in figure 1  The United States has two regional petroleum product reserves—the Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve and the Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve  The Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve, which is not part of the SPR, holds 1 million barrels of ultra low sulfur distillate, a petroleum product essentially equivalent to diesel fuel but that is also used for heating oil  The Northeast United States is heavily dependent on the use of heating oil in winter months  The distillate is stored in leased commercial tank storage in terminals in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey  In 2000, the President directed the creation of the reserve to hold approximately 10 days of inventory, the time required for ships to carry additional heating oil from the Gulf of Mexico to New York Harbor  The Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve, a part of the SPR, holds 1 million barrels of gasoline for consumers in the northeastern United States  According to DOE’s website, this region is particularly vulnerable to gasoline disruptions as a result of hurricanes and other natural events  For example, Hurricane Sandy caused widespread gasoline shortages in the region in 2012  DOE conducted a test sale of the SPR in 2014 and used a portion of the proceeds from the sale to create the reserve  The gasoline is stored in leased commercial tank storage in terminals in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Jersey  The SPR helps the United States meet its IEA obligation to hold the equivalent of 90 days of net imports of crude oil and petroleum products  In order to meet the IEA 90-day reserve obligation, countries, including the United States, can count existing private reserves of crude oil and petroleum products in addition to public reserves (in the United States, the SPR)  In most years, the United States has met its 90-day reserve obligation with a combination of SPR and private reserves  The days of import protection may vary based on actual net U S  crude oil and petroleum products imports as well as the inventory levels of the SPR and private reserves  As discussed previously, because the IEA 90-day reserve obligation is based on a country’s net imports, there is no such reserve obligation for countries that are net exporters of crude oil and petroleum products  The United States also relies on the SPR to meet its IEA obligation to release reserves in the event of a collective action to respond to a supply disruption  Countries contribute to an IEA collective action based on their share of IEA oil consumption, and they can meet their obligation by whatever measure they choose, including release of public or private reserves, or demand restraint  IEA collective actions are designed to mitigate the negative effects of sudden supply shortages by making additional crude oil and petroleum products available to the global market through a combination of emergency response measures, which include increasing supply and reducing demand  In the event of a global market disruption, IEA member countries can call for a collective action after reaching consensus on whether a response is needed  DOE stated that the collective action IEA obligation is more relevant to the SPR’s mission of protecting the U S  economy from severe petroleum supply interruptions than the 90-day reserve obligation  The United States has participated in each of the three IEA collective actions  In 1991, with the commencement of Operation Desert Storm, DOE released 17 3 million barrels of SPR crude oil  After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, DOE released 11 million barrels of SPR crude oil  Most recently, in June 2011, in response to crude oil supply disruptions driven by hostilities in Libya, DOE released 30 6 million barrels of crude oil from the SPR  The Libya collective action is an example of how, in practice, member countries participate according to national circumstances  After consultations with IEA member countries, all IEA member countries agreed to the Libya collective action, under which 12 of the 28 members at that time contributed to the action  In addition to the three IEA collective actions, the SPR has been used 10 times in response to U S  domestic supply disturbances that were not IEA collective actions, most notably in response to severe weather events  In terms of how they meet their IEA obligations, most other IEA members differ from the United States in two basic ways  Specifically, as of December 2017, most IEA members rely at least in part on private rather than public reserves to meet their obligations, and most hold significant proportions of these reserves as petroleum products rather than as crude oil  In December 2017, before Mexico joined the IEA in early 2018, there were 29 member countries  Of these 29 countries, 25 IEA members had two common attributes: (1) as net importers, they had a 90-day reserve obligation and met that obligation, and (2) they had formal processes for holding and releasing these reserves  As of December 2017, 18 of these 25 members relied entirely or in part on private reserves to meet their reserve obligations  Specifically, based on IEA data as of December 2017, these 18 countries met their 90-day reserve obligation through private reserves and either had no public reserves or had public reserves of less than 90 days  According to a 2014 IEA report, some of these countries require industry to hold reserves and, when needed, release them  For example, according to a 2014 IEA report and documentation provided by government officials, the United Kingdom meets its entire obligation by requiring private industry to hold reserves  In contrast, New Zealand had publicly held reserves amounting to 26 days of net imports, according to IEA data as of December 2017  According to a 2014 IEA report, New Zealand relied on industry reserves held for commercial purposes to meet the rest of its 90-day reserve obligation, although New Zealand does not formally require industry to hold reserves specifically for this purpose  Unlike the 18 countries that rely at least in part on private reserves, as of December 2017, the United States and 6 other IEA members met the 90- day reserve obligation exclusively through public reserves  Specifically, according to IEA data on member reserves, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, and the United States held public reserves equal to 90 days or more of net imports  Although the United States currently meets its IEA 90-day reserve obligation solely with public reserves, for most of the SPR’s existence, public reserves were insufficient to meet this obligation, so the United States also had to rely on private reserves  Specifically, according to EIA data, the United States has relied, at least in part, on private reserves together with the SPR to meet the 90-day reserve obligation with the exception of two time periods (1984-1987 and 2012-present), when the United States has relied solely on the SPR  The United States does not require industry to hold reserves for the purposes of meeting IEA obligations  Figure 2 compares the United States’ reserves in days of net imports to the IEA’s 90-day reserve obligation  According to a 2014 IEA report, most IEA members hold at least a third of their reserves as petroleum products, such as gasoline and diesel fuel, rather than as crude oil  Holding petroleum products can be advantageous during certain disruptions because such reserves can be directly distributed to consumers, whereas crude oil must first be refined and turned into products, adding response time  According to the IEA’s 2014 report, Germany’s stockholding agency holds 55 percent of its reserve as petroleum products  Similarly, France holds only petroleum products that are distributed geographically across the country so that the reserves can be used quickly in the event of a supply disruption  In contrast, more than 99 percent of the SPR (665 5 million barrels as of March 2018) is held as crude oil, all of which is stored at the four storage sites in Louisiana and Texas  The exception is the Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve, which, as mentioned previously, is a 1 million barrel gasoline reserve in terminals in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Jersey that was established in 2014 after Hurricane Sandy and that is considered part of the SPR  According to DOE officials, there are several reasons the SPR holds predominantly crude oil, including that it is more costly to store petroleum products than crude oil and that the United States has the largest refining capacity of any IEA member country  Because of the large U S  refining sector, crude oil from the SPR can be domestically refined into petroleum products to meet demand  Some IEA member countries store some of their reserves abroad, though the United States does not  According to a 2014 IEA report, some IEA member countries allow part of their reserves to be stored abroad to leverage spare storage capacity or more cost-effective storage by utilizing available storage space or excess private reserves in other countries  For example, approximately 30 percent of Ireland’s reserves are held in other European Union countries  In some of these cases, countries use short-term contracts, also known as tickets, instead of directly acquiring and storing oil and petroleum products  For example, according to documents provided by government officials, since 1995 the United Kingdom has increased its reserves held under ticket agreements outside of the country from around 10 percent of its total reserves to more than 25 percent  In addition, unlike the United States, some IEA countries specify the size of their public or private reserves in terms of net imports or consumption, rather than a specific volume  In the United States, the total volume of crude oil and petroleum products held in the SPR is the result of amounts historically purchased to fill the reserve and subsequent sales as mandated by Congress or released in response to a supply disruption  According to DOE, it cannot otherwise reduce or increase volumes held in reserve without congressional action—either through requirements to purchase additional oil or laws authorizing or mandating sales  On the other hand, some IEA countries have tied their reserves’ volumes of crude oil and petroleum products to a metric such as days of net imports or a percent of consumption  For example, according to documentation provided by government officials, in 2015 Japan changed how it specifies its target reserves from a specified amount to days of net imports  In specifying the size of reserves in this way, the amount held is adjusted as market conditions change—for example, if net imports change and require more or fewer reserves to meet the IEA 90-day reserve obligation, or when other underlying factors affecting a nation’s energy security needs change  While DOE has examined a range of sizes for the SPR, it has not identified the optimal size for the SPR to meet U S  energy security needs and IEA obligations, and DOE’s analysis of SPR sizes was limited in three ways  DOE also has not identified whether additional regional petroleum product reserves should be part of the SPR in U S  regions identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions  DOE has not identified the optimal size for the SPR and though the agency examined a range of SPR sizes, its analysis was limited in at least three ways  In response to direction from Congress and recommendations from GAO and the DOE Inspector General, DOE developed and published a long-term strategic review of the SPR in August 2016  In DOE’s 2016 review, the agency examined the expected economic benefits of SPR sizes ranging from 430 million to 695 million barrels of oil over a 25-year time horizon (2016 through 2040), but it did not recommend an optimal size for the reserve  DOE’s review did not identify the optimal size for the SPR because of three limitations: DOE did not fully evaluate implications of market fluctuations and estimate needs  DOE did not fully evaluate the implications of falling net imports of crude oil and petroleum products with respect to meeting IEA obligations to hold the equivalent of 90 days of net imports and to respond to collective actions  As mentioned previously, the United States is expected to become a net exporter of crude oil and petroleum products by the late 2020s  Since the IEA 90-day reserve obligation is based on a country’s net imports, this means that at that point the United States would not have a 90-day reserve obligation  However, even as a net exporter, the United States would still have to meet the IEA obligation to respond to a collective action  Yet, DOE’s analysis did not evaluate the SPR’s configuration as it relates to projected fluctuations in net imports or estimate the minimal amount of reserves needed to meet potential future collective actions  Without considering projected fluctuations in net imports or providing an analysis of how much oil is estimated to be needed to meet IEA collective actions, DOE cannot fully advise Congress on the optimal size of the SPR  DOE did not consider private-sector response  DOE’s analyses in its 2016 review focused on the publicly held reserves in the SPR as the only means to respond to oil supply disruptions and did not consider a response from the private sector or through consumers reducing demand  According to DOE’s 2016 review, the underlying analysis for the benefits of the SPR did not consider a response from the private sector for three reasons: (1) while U S  commercial stocks could conceivably address part of a supply disruption, private industry could also hold oil inventories in a crisis instead of releasing them; (2) unlike most other IEA member countries, the United States does not require private-sector response; and (3) research on the exact nature of private-sector response during a disruption is needed  DOE officials told us the agency has not studied the extent to which SPR releases of crude oil displace what would otherwise have been private releases of inventories  As we reported in September 2014, changing market conditions— most importantly the significant increase in domestic production of oil—have implications for the SPR’s size because increased production has led to increasing private reserves  According to IEA data as of December 2017, U S  private reserves held the equivalent of 194 days of net import protection coverage, up from about 59 days in 2006  Further, private reserves in the United States consist of both crude oil and petroleum products with more than half in the latter category  For example, as of January 2018, total private reserves of crude oil and petroleum products were about 1 215 billion barrels, of which about 420 million barrels were in the form of crude oil and 795 million barrels were petroleum products, according to the EIA  As of 2013, these private reserves were distributed across the entire country in more than 1,400 terminals, according to the EIA  As we reported in December 2007, international trade in oil and petroleum products has expanded significantly over the past 2 decades, making markets for gasoline and other petroleum products increasingly global in nature  In such a global oil market, higher levels of private reserves can benefit the United States and the rest of the world by helping mitigate a supply disruption  Most experts and stakeholders we interviewed generally agreed that the private sector is in a better position to respond to supply disruptions than they were when the SPR was created  With regard to demand response, DOE officials told us they do not consider this because there is no mechanism to require industry to respond to supply disruptions or consumers to reduce demand in response to a supply disruption  However, DOE has not studied how voluntary response to changes in petroleum product prices affects the need for or efficacy of strategic releases  Without conducting an analysis of how private parties respond to supply disruptions, DOE cannot advise Congress on the optimal size of the SPR because it cannot know how effective such private responses could be in mitigating supply disruptions  DOE did not fully examine costs of differently sized reserves  DOE’s review of the expected economic benefits of differently sized reserves did not fully examine the corresponding costs of those sizes  According to DOE officials, there was no requirement or need to conduct a formal cost benefit analysis of the SPR because the SPR’s oil acquisition and initial capital costs to create the reserve are sunk costs and the ongoing operational costs to maintain the reserve are minimal in comparison  However, this does not take into account the opportunity cost to the government that holding reserves represents; as Congress has mandated several times recently, crude oil from the reserve can be sold to fund other federal priorities  Without additional analysis, such as of the costs and benefits of SPR’s size, DOE cannot fully advise Congress on the optimal size of the SPR  When we reviewed the SPR in 2006 and 2014, we found that DOE had not periodically re-examined the strategic reserves  In 2006, we recommended that the Secretary of Energy reexamine the appropriate size of the SPR  In its response to our recommendation, DOE stated that its reexamination had taken the form of more “actionable items,” including not requesting expansion funding in its 2011 budget and canceling and redirecting the prior year’s expansion funding to general operations of the SPR, based on the Administration’s decision that the SPR’s current size at the time was adequate  Similarly, as previously mentioned, in 2014 we found that changing market conditions have implications for the size, location, and composition of the SPR, but DOE had not reexamined the SPR’s size since 2005  Accordingly, we recommended that the Secretary of Energy undertake a comprehensive reexamination of the appropriate size of the SPR  In response to our recommendation, the 2014 DOE Inspector General recommendation mentioned previously, and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, DOE published its 2016 review  As previously mentioned and reported, crude oil and petroleum markets are constantly changing, but DOE conducted its full evaluations of the SPR more than a decade apart  According to DOE officials, there is no formal policy to periodically reevaluate the SPR  We previously found that federal programs should be reexamined if there have been significant changes in the country or the world that relate to the reason for initiating the program  In that report, we found that many federal programs and policies were designed decades ago to respond to trends and challenges that existed at the time of their creation  Moreover, the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94 for benefit-cost analysis of federal programs includes guidelines that apply to any analysis used to support government decisions to initiate, renew, or expand programs or projects that would result in a series of measurable benefits or costs extending for 3 or more years into the future  Given changing market conditions and future projections, without conducting additional analysis to supplement its 2016 review and thereafter periodically reexamining the SPR to take into account changes in market conditions and include a thorough consideration of the costs and benefits of a wide range of SPR sizes, DOE cannot provide information to Congress to inform decisions about the appropriate size of the SPR and risks holding too much or too little in the SPR to meet the United States’ evolving energy security needs and IEA obligations  DOE has also not fully identified whether additional regional petroleum product reserves should be part of the SPR  Because the SPR stores oil nearly exclusively along the Gulf Coast, the SPR is configured primarily to respond to global oil supply disruptions  However, as we reported in November 2017, the SPR has primarily been used in response to domestic disruptions  The SPR is limited in its ability to respond to domestic disruptions because reserves are almost entirely composed of crude oil and not refined petroleum products, which may not be effective in responding to disruptions that affect the refining sector  For example, as we reported in November 2017, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria damaged infrastructure and property, caused the loss of life, and disrupted the operations of refineries representing at least 15 percent of the nation’s refining capacity  DOE has identified regions subject to product supply vulnerabilities as shown in Figure 3  The Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015 recommended that the agency analyze the need for additional or expanded regional product reserves by undertaking updated cost-benefit analyses for all of the regions of the United States that have been identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions  In response to this recommendation, DOE studied the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves in the West Coast and Southeast Coast  According to DOE officials, weather events in the Southeast Coast are of higher probability but lower consequence, and events in the West Coast are of lower probability but higher consequence  DOE did not finalize its 2015 studies on regional petroleum product reserves and make them publicly available  However, the draft 2015 studies concluded that a product reserve in the Southeast would provide significant net economic benefits to the region and the United States, particularly in the event of a major hurricane, while further analyses are needed to determine the potential benefits of a reserve on the West Coast  A prior DOE study also suggests that petroleum product reserves merit consideration—in 2011, DOE carried out a cost-benefit study of the establishment of a refined product reserve in the Southeast and estimated that such a reserve would reduce the average gasoline price rise by 50 percent to 70 percent in the weeks immediately after a hurricane landfall, resulting in consumer cost savings, according to the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015  According to DOE officials, the agency has no plans to conduct additional studies  DOE’s 2016 review of the SPR did not fully assess whether there is a need for additional regional product reserves in other U S  regions identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions, as recommended by DOE’s studies and the 2015 Quadrennial Energy Review  Without completing studies on the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves for all the vulnerable U S  regions and publicly releasing the results, DOE cannot ensure that it and Congress have the information they need to make decisions about whether additional regional product reserves are needed  DOE has taken steps to take into account the effects of congressionally mandated oil sales in its plans for modernizing the SPR, though DOE’s current plans are based on information largely developed prior to the most recent congressionally mandated oil sales  According to DOE, the SPR modernization program is focused on a life extension project to modernize aging infrastructure to ensure the SPR will be able to meet its mission requirements for the next several decades  The project’s scope of work has undergone several revisions since its inception in response to changing conditions and requirements, according to the agency  DOE has estimated the total cost for the SPR’s modernization at up to $1 4 billion  DOE raised about $323 million for modernization through the sale of SPR oil in fiscal year 2017, and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 provided that DOE is to draw down and sell an amount of crude oil not to exceed $350 million for modernization in fiscal year 2018  As of the end of February 2018, DOE has spent $22 million on modernization efforts and the additional funds will allow DOE to continue moving forward with the project, according to agency officials  According to DOE’s modernization plans, the first major construction is scheduled for fiscal year 2019  However, these plans are largely based on information DOE analyzed before recent congressionally mandated sales of an additional 117 million barrels of oil  Since the most recent mandated sales, DOE has taken steps to update its modernization plans and has changed its assumptions for SPR’s modernization  For example, DOE now assumes that the reserve will hold about 405 million barrels of oil and that one of the four SPR sites may close after congressionally mandated sales are completed at the end of fiscal year 2027, according to agency officials  However, DOE has not fully updated the SPR’s modernization plans based on these assumptions  According to DOE officials, in March 2018, DOE commenced a study—the SPR post-sale configuration study—to examine potential future reserve configurations  This study is to take into account the effects of congressionally mandated sales on the reserve and its modernization, and is targeted for completion in October 2018, according to agency officials  Information from the study will inform DOE’s updates to the SPR’s modernization plans, according to DOE officials  As part of its post-sale configuration study, DOE plans to examine how the agency may handle the potentially excess SPR facilities created by the mandated sales  In January 2017, the SPR had a design capacity to hold 713 5 million barrels of oil and actually held 695 million barrels  As shown in figure 4, without action by DOE to reduce the SPR’s design capacity or otherwise use SPR facilities, congressionally mandated sales will cause excess storage capacity to grow to 308 million barrels or more by the end of fiscal year 2027—meaning that about 43 percent of the SPR’s total design capacity to store oil would be unused  DOE plans to explore some options to use these potentially excess SPR assets in its ongoing post-sale configuration study  In withdrawing oil to meet congressionally mandated oil sales currently in place (290 million barrels through fiscal year 2027), DOE could close at least one SPR site based on our analysis of projected excess storage capacity  For example, if DOE were to close the smallest SPR site, Bayou Choctaw, the agency could also explore selling the connected pipeline and marine terminal, which are currently being leased to a private company  DOE could also consider leasing excess storage capacity to other countries so that they could store oil at the SPR  DOE has not entered into any such leases with other countries and has not considered such leases because, according to DOE, the SPR has historically lacked capacity to store additional oil  DOE has not proposed any of these options or explored the revenue the agency could generate by selling or leasing these assets  According to DOE officials, the agency will examine the feasibility of such options in the ongoing SPR post-sale configuration study  As DOE takes steps to plan for the SPR’s modernization, ongoing uncertainty regarding the SPR’s long-term size and configuration have complicated DOE’s efforts  According to DOE officials, this uncertainty makes it extremely difficult to effectively perform any mid-to long-range planning efforts for the SPR’s modernization project, including the execution of major maintenance projects  Congress has generally set the SPR’s size by mandating purchases or sales of oil, and has established and amended the minimum size of the SPR as it pertains to the release of oil for emergency protection  Since 2015, Congress has, across six pieces of legislation, mandated 290 million barrels in additional oil sales  However, DOE developed its modernization plans in 2016  DOE officials told us they do not know whether additional sales will be mandated over the next 10 years or whether other changes may be required to the configuration of the reserve  Any additional congressionally mandated sales or direction to pursue additional petroleum product reserves would require DOE to again revisit its modernization plans and assessments of the potential uses of any excess SPR assets  Oil market projections also have implications for the future of the SPR  Under current projections, the United States may fluctuate between being a net importer and net exporter over the next several decades  Specifically, the United States is projected to become a net exporter by the late 2020s and would then no longer have a 90-day reserve obligation, but it is projected to return to being a net importer between 2040 and 2050  These projected fluctuations could affect the desired size of the SPR in the future  This uncertainty creates risks for DOE’s modernization plans, as DOE may end up spending funds on facilities that later turn out to be unnecessary should Congress ultimately decide on a larger- or smaller-sized SPR than DOE anticipates  Having a long-term target for the size and configuration of reserves helps other IEA member countries manage their reserves  For example, as previously discussed, unlike the United States, some other IEA members have specified in dynamic terms the amount of reserves to be held, such as days of net import protection or days of consumption, rather than specifying a specific static volume amount  Under such approaches, the amount held varies over time as entities managing the reserve acquire or sell reserves in order to meet the target  Setting a long-term target for the size and configuration of the SPR—taking into account projections for oil production, consumption, and IEA obligations—could better position DOE to ensure that funds spent on the SPR’s modernization do not modernize a system that is no longer needed and that DOE is able to adequately plan for potentially excess SPR assets  In the course of our work, we also identified other options for handling potentially excess SPR assets that DOE is not planning on examining, largely because DOE does not currently have the authority to pursue them, according to agency officials  First, DOE could explore leasing storage capacity to private industry  U S  oil production has generally increased over the last decade  As a result, the private sector may want to lease excess SPR capacity, which may be cheaper than above-ground storage, according to a representative of a private company we spoke with  Fees for doing so could help defray public reserve storage costs  However, officials told us that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act gives DOE authority to lease underutilized storage to other countries, but not to the private sector  Second, if Congress determines that the SPR holds oil in excess of that needed domestically, DOE could explore selling contracts or tickets for the excess oil rather than selling the oil outright  Australian and New Zealand officials told us that if DOE were to sell tickets for SPR oil, tickets would help these countries meet their IEA 90- day reserve obligations  Australian officials told us they have discussed this option with DOE  Currently the United States and Australia have agreed, through an arrangement, to allow Australia to contract for petroleum stocks located in the United States and controlled by commercial entities  According to DOE officials, the arrangement would permit Australia to receive credit from the IEA for tickets it purchases from the U S  private sector  While the arrangement does not cover government-owned oil in the SPR, if it did, based on our analysis, DOE could generate up to approximately $15 million annually if Australia purchased the maximum allowable amount of oil specified in an arrangement through tickets for excess SPR oil  However, although the Energy Policy and Conservation Act allows DOE to lease underutilized storage to other countries, DOE lacks the authority to sell tickets and does not plan to seek this authority, according to DOE officials  DOE officials told us that they do not plan to examine these options  According to DOE’s real property asset management order, the agency is to identify real property assets that are no longer needed to meet the program’s mission needs and that may be candidates for reuse or disposal  Once identified, the agency is to undertake certain actions, including determining whether to dispose of these assets by sale or lease  As part of its SPR post-sale configuration study, DOE plans to determine whether it is appropriate to close SPR facilities, and the relative benefit of any closures would be informed by potential lease revenues from maintaining sites so they could be leased, according to officials  However, without examining a full range of options in the post-sale configuration study, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources  Given changing crude oil and petroleum product market conditions and the constrained budget environment, it is important that DOE ensures the SPR is effective at meeting U S  energy security needs and IEA obligations while being managed and maintained in an efficient manner  In response to congressional direction and recommendations from GAO and DOE Inspector General, DOE conducted a long-term strategic review of the SPR in 2016 after its last comprehensive examination in 2005  In its review, DOE did not determine an optimal size for the SPR, and its analysis was limited in several ways  In particular, DOE did not fully consider recent and expected future changes in crude oil and petroleum market conditions such as the implications of projected fluctuations in U S  net imports or the role that increased levels of private reserves could play in responding to supply disruptions  DOE also did not perform a full cost-benefit analysis of holding different volumes of reserves  Without supplementing its 2016 strategic review by conducting additional analysis, and periodically conducting such analyses going forward, DOE cannot provide information to Congress to inform decisions about the appropriate amounts of crude oil and petroleum products to hold in the SPR and risks holding too much or too little in the SPR to meet the United States’ energy security needs and international obligations  Such information is needed on a timely basis, to reflect the pace of change in oil and petroleum markets and other relevant factors that affect the optimal size of the SPR  Though the SPR has primarily been used in response to domestic supply disruptions, such as hurricanes, the reserve is limited in this role because it is almost entirely composed of crude oil, and not petroleum products  In this regard, the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015 recommended that DOE analyze the need for additional regional product reserves for U S  regions that have been identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions  DOE has not identified whether additional regional product reserves should be part of the SPR or completed studies of all vulnerable U S  regions, and it has no plans to do so, according to DOE officials  Without conducting or completing studies for all the vulnerable U S  regions and releasing the results, DOE cannot ensure it and Congress have the information they need to make decisions about potential additional regional product reserves  In the face of declining net U S  imports, Congress has taken repeated steps to reduce the size of the reserve  Given that net imports are projected to continue to decline through the late 2020s and fluctuate in the future, there may be additional congressionally mandated SPR oil sales  This has created long-term uncertainty regarding the future size and configuration of the SPR  Congress could address this uncertainty by identifying a long-term target for the size of the SPR—either by volume or in terms tied to factors, such as consumption or net import protection, that affect the country’s energy security needs and IEA obligations  Setting such a long-term target could better position DOE to ensure the efficiency and efficacy of federal funds spent on the reserve  DOE has recently begun to study the potential effects of congressionally mandated sales on its modernization plans  As part of its SPR post-sale configuration study, DOE plans to determine whether it is appropriate to close SPR facilities, and the relative benefit of any closures would be informed by potential lease revenues from maintaining sites so they could be leased, according to officials  However, we identified other options for handling potentially excess SPR assets that DOE is not planning to examine in its study, inconsistent with the agency’s order on real property asset management  Although DOE does not currently have the authority to implement these options, according to officials, examining their potential use, including possible revenue enhancement, could inform Congress as it examines whether it should grant such authority  Without examining a full range of options in the post-sale configuration study for handling potentially excess SPR assets, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources  We are making the following matter for congressional consideration: Congress may wish to consider setting a long-range target for the size and configuration of the SPR that takes into account projections for future oil production, oil consumption, the efficacy of the existing SPR to respond to domestic supply disruptions, and U S  IEA obligations  (Matter 1) We are making four recommendations to DOE: The Secretary of Energy should supplement the agency’s 2016 long-term strategic review by conducting an additional analysis that takes into account private-sector response, oil market projections, and costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Energy should take actions to ensure that the agency periodically conducts and provides to Congress a strategic review of the SPR that, among other things, takes into account changes in crude oil and petroleum product market conditions and contains additional analysis, such as the costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes  (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Energy should conduct or complete studies on the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves for all U S  regions that have been identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions, and the Secretary should report the results to Congress  (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Energy, in completing DOE’s ongoing study on the effects of congressionally mandated sales, should consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets and, if needed, request congressional authority for the disposition of these assets  (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOE for review and comment  DOE provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I  Of the four recommendations, DOE agreed with two, partially agreed with one, and disagreed with one  Regarding our recommendation that DOE supplement its 2016 long- term strategic review with an additional analysis that takes into account private sector response, oil market projections, and costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes, the agency partially agreed with the recommendation  DOE agreed to conduct an additional analysis to assess the purpose, goals, and objectives of the SPR, taking into account private sector response, oil market projections, and any other relevant factors, that will lead to an evaluation of possible optimal sizes of the SPR in the future  In response to taking into account the costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes, DOE stated that the agency determined the projected benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes ranging from 430 million barrels of oil to 695 million barrels of oil in its 2016 review  However, the minimum SPR size considered by DOE is greater than the projected SPR size after congressionally mandated sales have occurred  Further, the SPR size after congressionally mandated sales is projected to be far in excess of the IEA obligation to hold a minimum of 90 days of net imports  DOE must also consider the minimum size needed to meet its IEA obligations in the event of a collective action  In conducting additional analysis, DOE should consider a smaller lower bound, in line with congressionally mandated sales, for the size of the SPR, and more fully consider the size needed to meet the IEA 90-day net import and collective action obligations  Regarding our recommendation that DOE conduct periodic reviews of the SPR, the agency agreed with the recommendation  DOE stated that a 5-year time interval between reviews would strike an appropriate balance between the need to periodically conduct a strategic assessment and evaluation of the SPR and the limitations on resources to plan and conduct such a review  Regarding our recommendation that DOE conduct or complete studies on the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves, the agency disagreed  DOE stated that it is the agency's position that government owned and operated regional petroleum product reserves are an inefficient and expensive solution to respond to regional fuel supply disruptions  DOE further stated, based on studies done in 2015 that DOE officials told us were pre-decisional and therefore could not be reported, that there are additional concerns associated with government-owned and operated regional refined petroleum product reserves, including little to no storage capacity for lease in commercial terminals and high costs for government owned and operated regional product reserves  However, these same studies took these concerns into account, and concluded that a product reserve in the Southeast would provide significant net economic benefits (benefits minus costs) to the region and the United States in the event of a major hurricane  These studies also concluded that additional analyses are required to inform decisions regarding the potential benefits of a similar reserve on the West Coast  Further, the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015 recommended that similar analyses be completed for other areas deemed by DOE to be vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions  Therefore, we continue to believe that conducting these analyses, as recommended in the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015, will provide Congress with information needed to make decisions about regional product reserves  Regarding our recommendation that DOE consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets, DOE agreed with the recommendation  DOE stated that in its ongoing study, the agency will include an assessment of disposition options for any potential excess or underutilized SPR assets, to include the need for new legislative authority, as necessary, for the disposition of assets  DOE expects this study to be completed in October 2018  DOE also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the individual named above, Quindi Franco (Assistant Director), Nkenge Gibson (Analyst-in-Charge), Philip Farah, Ellen Fried, Cindy Gilbert, Greg Marchand, Celia Mendive, Patricia Moye, Camille Pease, Oliver Richard, Dan Royer, Rachel Stoiko, and Marie Suding made key contributions to this report 


Report 2: 6 million people will migrate from 2011 to 2050 due to the effects of climate change  Challenges in Stability and Security Migration due to climate change is cited as a potential destabilizing factor in Bangladesh by ADB, and others  The low-income population in Bangladesh is dependent on agriculture, making the effects of climate change—including impacts on food security—a particular concern  By 2030, these effects on livelihoods and food security could increase the poverty rate in Bangladesh by 15 percent, as the IPCC has reported  Given the proximity of Bangladesh to India, some individuals may also choose to cross the border  Increased migration to India is a potential concern, according to some sources, as India may not have the resources to absorb large numbers of Bangladeshi migrants  The CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: 2007); and Population Council, “Effects of Future Climate Change on Cross-Border Migration in North Africa and India,” Population and Development Review, Vol  36, No  2 (2010)  The effects of climate change in South America vary by region, according to the the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as potentially impacting migration and stability  On the coast, risks include sea level rise, depletion of fisheries, and coral reef bleaching, according to IOM  Coastal cities with growing populations are particularly vulnerable  Melting glaciers in the Andean mountain region, and increased rainfall are expected to change the distribution of water resources, and impact food production as global demand for food is growing  Desertification and land degradation, complicated by the effects of climate change, are contributing to migration from rural areas to cities in South America, as IOM has reported  An estimated 77 percent of people living in high risk areas in South America are located in cities, according to IOM  IOM predicts that as these people feel the effects of sea level rise and water scarcity, they will migrate from the large coastal cities to smaller urban areas  While South America has experienced economic growth in the last decade, poverty rates remain high, and the effects of climate change, including possible migration, may exacerbate inequalities, putting further pressure on cities to meet the needs of their populations  Water security in particular is expected to disproportionaly impact low-income communities, according to the IPCC  For example, in Brazil, drought in the northeast may increase migration to southern cities that are facing rising sea levels and landslides, with consequences for food, water, and energy security  Observed and Projected Effects of Climate Change Brazil’s cities and rural regions may encounter a range of climate change effects, according to the IPCC and IOM  Rural areas, particularly in the northeast, could experience significant impacts from climate change partly due to poverty rates, and historical vulnerability to drought  Higher temperatures are expected to affect crop yields and household incomes, especially for low-income communities  In northeastern Brazil, temperatures are expected to increase and rainfall to decrease  The northeast could see a 22 percent reduction in precipitation by 2100, according to IPCC projections  Brazil’s coastal areas, including cities, are also vulnerable to rising sea levels, heavy precipitation, flooding, and landslides  The vast majority of Brazil’s population, about 86 percent, lives in cities, many in coastal areas, according to the United Nations Development Program  As their populations have grown, urban areas have extended out  This urban growth in Brazil’s megacities has caused further increases in temperature, rainfall, and landslides  For example, current levels of urbanization in the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo may already be responsible for the 2°C warming observed in the city over the last 50 years, as well as the rise in extreme rainfall, according to the IPCC  The metropolitan area is expected to extend its area 38 percent by 2030  Multiple studies of the effects of urbanization on Sao Paulo’s climate suggest higher temperatures affect convective rainfall, which occurs when warm air rises, condenses to form clouds, and produces extreme rain  Other concerns are the depletion of coral reefs and mangrove forests on Brazil’s coastlines, and decreases in biodiversity  Migration from drought in northeastern Brazil to cities has increased urban populations, putting more people at risk of displacement from flooding and landslides  Migration from the northeast is a historical trend in Brazil, as economic migrants have sought seasonal jobs in more productive agricultural regions, or moved permanently to southern cities  Projected declines in rainfall have led some to predict further increases in migration in northeastern Brazil, as the IPCC has reported  However, remittances from family members who leave Brazil’s northeast support resilience for those who remain and may help to reduce migration  Already environmental factors contribute to migration to cities, including to favelas, informal settlements often constructed in hilly areas and floodplains outside of Brazilian cities  A significant number of the favela residents in Rio de Janeiro are migrants from northeastern Brazil, according to IOM  These new migrants may be at risk of further displacement if heavy rainfall, flooding, and other climate change effects destroy their vulnerable homes  For example, heavy rainfall in April 2010 resulted in landslides across Rio de Janeiro, displacing an estimated 5,000 people, according to a report from the World Bank  Brazil is also a destination for migrants from other countries in the region  Migrants from Venezuela searching for jobs and improved food security have come in growing numbers in recent years, as have migrants from Haiti fleeing a series of natural disasters, as IOM has reported  Challenges in Stability and Security Although Brazil ranks 106th out of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index, the effects of climate change may contribute to challenges with water, food, and energy access according to the IPCC  Decreased rainfall could decrease agricultural productivity, with potential health impacts for poor populations  These conditions are of particular concern in northeastern Brazil, as extreme weather and low crop yields are associated with more violence, according to the IPCC  Brazil also receives about 70 percent of its electricity from hydroelectric power, according the United Nations Environment Programme, and recent droughts caused power cuts across many major cities  Although not linked to the effects of climate change, absorbing a growing number of migrants fleeing political and economic instability in Venezuela may impact the broader region, according to the U S  Department of Defense and the National Intelligence Council  Neighboring countries, including Brazil, may struggle to absorb the influx of migrants  On average, 800 Venezuelans are crossing the border to Brazil every day in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, according to the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency  The effects of climate change in the Arctic, including higher temperatures and melting ice, have contributed to shifts in migration across the Arctic, and may have security implications  Increasing temperatures may have a variety of impacts in the Arctic, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  The effects of rising temperatures are disrupting livelihoods and food security, especially for indigenous communities, and opening up untapped natural resources to extraction  Both trends have impacted migration flows in the Arctic  Rising temperatures and melting ice have opened up previously inaccessible waterways in the Arctic, with implications for national security, according to the Department of Defense and others  Greenland, located in the Arctic and considered part of Kingdom of Denmark, exhibits many of these trends  Greenland is experiencing the effects of climate change, including glacial and ice melt, shifts in wildlife distribution, and newly available oil and mineral deposits, among others  The Greenland Ice Sheet covers approximately 80 percent of Greenland’s land mass  The ice sheet’s melting rate is slow, but uncertain  Increases in temperature greater than 1°C may result in the near loss of the entire ice sheet over a millennium and significant sea level rise, according to the IPCC  In the short term, predicting the ice sheet’s melting rate is a challenge as predictions vary in the scientific community  Accurate predictions would support mitigation and adaptation efforts in vulnerable areas  Rising temperatures and shrinking ice cover have shifted the distribution and migration patterns of marine mammals and fish, and impacted food security according to the IPCC and the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum for Arctic states  For example, the economy in Paamiut, Greenland, depended primarily on cod fisheries until changing climate conditions caused cod to disappear, and the town was slow to adapt to newly available shrimp  Similarly, fisheries in Disko Bay, Greenland, have struggled to adapt to new conditions  Rising temperatures and the resulting reduction in ice cover have required a shift to fishing from boats in open water instead of hunting and fishing over ice cover  Lastly, warming and ice melt may make significant oil and mineral deposits accessible for extraction in the future  The potential expansion of extraction industries makes environmental sustainability another possible concern  For example, an estimated 31 billion barrels of oil and gas may exist off the coast of Northeast Greenland, according to the Kingdom of Denmark’s 2011-2020 Arctic Strategy  The strategy stresses the importance of assessing and reducing risks to the environment resulting from the exploration and extraction of oil and gas  The effects of climate change are predicted to contribute to internal and external migration in Greenland  For example, young people are increasingly leaving indigenous communities in rural areas for cities in Greenland in search of work, as traditional livelihoods become unsustainable  Greenland is home to a majority indigenous population, primarily Inuit, whose traditional hunting and fishing practices require travel across ice  In the past, people adapted to seasonal changes to support livelihoods by migrating, and the practice was embedded into indigenous social structures  With reduced ice cover, however, migrating to hunt, fish, and maintain connections to community is more dangerous or restricted  Government policies promoting centralized services, such as health care and education, have also played a role in the shift away from migration as a way of life  As a result, indigenous livelihoods are more difficult to maintain, and young people often migrate to towns and cities in Greenland, or to Denmark, for education  At the same time, warmer temperatures have made mineral extraction feasible  As the extraction industry grows, new jobs may draw migrants from outside the Arctic region  In 2011 companies spent $100 million on the exploration of minerals in the Artic, and the estimated number of new mines is expected to require more workers than now live in the region 17 79Currently, more people leave than migrate to Greenland  The local Inuit population in Uummannaq, Greenland relies heavily on ice coverage for fishing and travel by traditional dog-sled  Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, A Complex Constellation: Displacement, Climate Change and Arctic Peoples (January 30, 2013)  Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement  The effects of climate change on Sub-Saharan Africa vary depending on the region and have impacts on migration and security, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)  Coastal areas, for example, in West and East Africa are at risk from sea level rise that could affect major cities  Drought and the risk of desertification in the Sahel is cited as a concern, as is increased rainfall in parts of Central Africa accompanied by lower agricultural yields  As desertification threatens the livelihoods of farmers and herders, and drought makes fishing more challenging, rural dwellers may be more likely to migrate to cities, according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)  Urbanization and population growth across Sub-Saharan Africa is already making densely populated cities vulnerable to flooding, storms, and erosion, increasing the number of people at risk of displacement by sudden-onset disasters  Climate change effects and changing migration flows across Sub-Saharan Africa may impact access to natural resources and contribute to existing tensions and conflicts, according to UNEP and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  In Nigeria, the effects of climate change may effect a variety of livelihoods and increase migration south, while also exacerbating existing conflicts  The effects of climate change on Nigeria may impact the country’s agriculture and economy, according to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)  Higher temperatures and decreased rainfall have contributed to drought in northern Nigeria  Desertification is also a concern  Some regions in northern Nigeria have less than 10 inches of rain a year, an amount that has decreased by 25 percent since the 1980’s, according to USIP  In other areas across Nigeria flooding has resulted in major crop losses, according to UNEP  Rising sea level, water inundation, and erosion are concerns in Nigeria’s coastal areas  Rising sea level is predicted to pose medium to very high risks to Africa’s coastal areas by 2100, according to the IPCC  Future sea level rise could result in the inundation of over 70 percent of the Nigerian coast  A rise of 0 2 meters in sea level could risk billions of dollars in assets, including oil wells near the coast  Even without a rapid rise in sea level, Nigeria’s coastal areas could experience erosion and significant land loss by 2100, as the IPCC has reported  The effects of climate change on livelihoods in northern Nigeria may contribute to migration to the south according to UNEP, while conflict in the north drives separate migration trends  As the effects of climate change make farming and fishing more challenging elsewhere in Nigeria, migration to southern coastal cities may increase  Traditionally, farmers, herders, and fishery workers migrated for temporary employment during the off season, including migration to Nigeria’s cities to work in the oil industry  Permanent migration south as well as to cities may become more common if land suitable for farming decreases  As fish habitats like Lake Chad dry up, fishery workers may also migrate  Larger urban populations on the coast will put more people at risk of sea level rise, water inundation, and erosion, according to the IPCC  A rise in sea level of 1 meter could put over 3 million people at risk of displacement as the IPCC has reported  Herders have also moved further south due to increased drought in northern Nigeria, as UNEP and USIP have reported  A 2010 survey of herdsmen in Nigeria, for example, found that nearly one-third of them had migrated southeast as a result of changes in the natural environment, according to the UNEP  The ongoing conflict with Boko Haram, while not caused by climate change, has further resulted in millions of displaced people across the Lake Chad region, including many Nigerians who have fled to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger  Nigerian refugees at the Minawao camp in Cameroon  Challenges in Stability and Security The effects of climate change, migration, and conflict are interconnected in Nigeria, as USIP has reported  The country is ranked 14th of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index  Events in northwest Africa, including Boko Haram’s attacks in Nigeria, have underscored concerns about the region’s vulnerability to the spread of violent extremism  The effects of climate change may exacerbate these concerns, according to USIP  Nigerians fleeing attacks from Boko Haram in the north have gone to communities in neighboring Chad, Cameroon, and Niger that are already experiencing food shortages due in part to climate change  These neighboring countries as a result have fewer resources to support both their own residents and the newer refugees  Non-state actors may also take advantage of government inaction on the effects of climate change  Boko Haram, for example, has justified its acts of violence by pointing to government failures, according to the USIP  Separately, increased drought in the north may aggravate historic tensions over land and water use between farmers in the south and herders migrating from the north, according to UNEP  Nigeria’s oil fields on the coast, which represent a significant part of the economy, are also at risk from sea level rise  Potential losses in oil revenue could impact Nigeria’s ability to respond to humanitarian crises and conflict at home  Increased violence within its borders could also affect Nigeria’s ability to support regional peacekeeping missions, such as the United Nations Mission in Liberia from 2003 to 2018, where Nigerian troops worked to restore security after a civil war  The effects of climate change in the Middle East and North Africa, including on its desert regions, may impact water access and compound migration and stability challenges, according to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)  Over 60 percent of the population already experiences high or very high water stress, according to the World Bank  Coupled with unsustainable water use, climate change may further exacerbate challenges with water security  The region continues to experience rising temperatures and declining annual rainfall, trends that contribute to the severity and length of drought, land degradation, and desertification  Decreased water security affects the livelihood and quality of life of farmers in the region, contributing to an increase in their migration to the cities and more urbanization, according to the World Bank  In contrast, many people are expected to migrate away from coastal cities as a result of sea level rise, according to UNEP  These potential migrations would be taking place in a region that already hosts large numbers of migrants such as those displaced by conflict and violence, including 18 percent of the world’s refugees, according to the International Organization for Migration  Challenges in water security may put greater pressure on unstable governments in the region, by intensifying existing tensions and conflicts between populations and their governments as well as between countries that share sources of water  The conflict in Syria illustrates the complex nature of climate change, migration, and conflict in the region, and the challenges to accurately assessing the links among the three, as noted in a technical paper commissioned by the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID)  Rising temperatures and declining rainfall have contributed to recent droughts in Syria, a trend that may continue  The country underwent an extended drought from about 2006 until 2011  During the drought an estimated 60 percent of Syria experienced severe crop failure, and accompanying impacts on food security  Some studies have linked the length and severity of the drought in Syria to climate change, as USAID has reported  Others, however, have pointed to government land and water use policies, combined with the effects of climate change, as responsible for the severity of the drought  Agricultural policies, for example, encouraged farmers to grow water intensive crops like wheat, and supported inefficient irrigation practices, policies which further depleted ground water and made the region more vulnerable to decreases in rainfall linked to climate change  Across the Middle East, the rising temperatures and declining rainfalls of recent decades may worsen, according to the World Bank  If these trends continue, countries in the Middle East, including Syria, could continue to experience periods of severe drought and reduced crop yields  Migration Trends The ongoing conflict in Syria, in which migration due to climate change may have been a contributing factor, has caused large-scale migration to neighboring countries in the Middle East and to Europe  Leading up to the civil war, prolonged drought, among other factors, had increased migration to Syrian cities  Because of the drought, in 2009, over 800,000 Syrians lost their livelihoods in the agricultural sector, while nearly 1 million experienced food insecurity  In 2010, an estimated 200,000 people migrated from farms in rural areas to cities, according to a UN report  The conflict in Syria, which began in 2011, has further displaced large numbers of people within the country and across the Middle East, as we have previously reported At the beginning of the conflict, Syrians, as well as Iraqi and Palestinian refugees who had been residing in Syria, fled mainly to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey  As the conflict persisted, refugees fled in larger numbers to Turkey, with the UNHCR reporting that nearly 1 million Syrians sought protection in that country in 2015  Starting that year, a growing number of Syrians risked dangerous sea voyages to reach countries in Europe, such as Greece, Germany, and Sweden  As of June 2017, more than 5 million registered Syrian refugees were living in neighboring countries, including more than 3 million in Turkey, and more than 1 million in Lebanon  Challenges in Stability and Security Sources agree that the Syrian conflict is a significant security challenge that has resulted in large scale migration across the Middle East and to Europe  Yet the link between prolonged drought, rural to urban migration, and the current conflict in Syria is uncertain  Some academic sources argue that the increased strain on urban infrastructure and resources due to the rural to urban migration played a role in Syria’s growing instability  Others highlight the complex nature of the Syrian conflict, pointing to broader political factors that exacerbated resource scarcity and inequality  For example, as the drought intensified, the Syrian government downplayed the severity of the humanitarian crisis, as described in research cited in a technical report commissioned by USAID result, appeals to the international community for emergency aid received minimal support  Combined with existing sectarian divisions, ongoing revolutions across the Middle East, and other factors, the government’s response to the drought may have contributed to the current conflict  Migration and displacement are a concern in the region, according to the Department of Defense and others  The U S  government has provided significant humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees in the Middle East, including in Lebanon and Jordan, as we have previously reported However, a technical report commissioned by USAID has cautioned that the ongoing conflict in Syria makes it difficult to conduct research and draw conclusions related to climate, migration and conflict  As a The effects of climate change on Oceania, particularly rising seas, may significantly impact coastal populations and increase migration in the future, as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have reported  Rising temperatures and declining rainfall may also contribute to lower yields from fisheries and agriculture, and a significant decrease in coral reef cover  Extreme weather events, including higher temperatures, wind, and rainfall, have already increased in number and intensity across the region  In the majority of Pacific island nations, of those who migrate, more people leave than come, according to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Observatory on Migration  The majority of migration in the region is economically driven  In the future, climate change may further impact these migration patterns across the region, according to the IPCC  Climate change has already exacerbated challenges that aid-dependent nations in the region face, restricting livelihoods and resources and contributing to pressures to migrate  The costs of climate change, including a decline in crop yields, a rise in energy demands, and a loss of coastal land, are predicted to be significant  The ADB estimates these costs will reach 12 7 percent of the Pacific regions’ GDP by 2100  Increased migration may also impact political stability and play a role in geopolitical rivalries within the region, according to the IPCC  The effects of climate change, especially rising sea levels, may result in forced migration from the Republic of the Marshall Islands (the Marshall Islands) and have additional impacts on the U S  defense infrastructure on the islands  Observed and Projected Effects of Climate Change Rising sea levels are a grave threat to the Marshall Islands The country consists of islands, low-lying atolls—coral caps sitting on top of submerged volcanoes—making it particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels  On average, the Marshall Islands are 2 meters above sea level  In Majuro, the country’s most populous atoll, observed rates of sea level rise are already twice as fast as the global average  Population centers experience significant flooding, with damage to roads, houses, and infrastructure, especially during La Niña years, which are significantly wetter and more prone to extreme rainfall  Flooding is expected to worsen with rising sea levels, with consequences for the availabity of drinking water  On Roi-Namur island, for example, a 0 4 meter rise in sea level combined with wave-driven flooding is predicted to make groundwater undrinkable year round as early as 2055  This salt water inundation may contaminate already limited groundwater across the Marshall Islands  Lastly, during the 1940s and 1950s, the Marshall Islands was the site of 67 U S  nuclear weapons tests on or near Bikini and Enewetak Atolls  Projected increases in frequency of flooding may negatively impact efforts to contain radioactive material stored on Runit Island  A number of factors have increased migration from the Marshall Islands, including to the United States  In 1986, the United States entered into a compact of free association with the country that allowed its citizens to migrate to the United States, as we have previously reported  As a result, more than 20,000 Marshallese now live in the United States People are more likely to migrate abroad as the effects of climate change on the Marshall Islands—including rising sea levels—increasingly impact livelihoods The threat of mass displacement and forced migration is also a concern, as the International Organization for Migration has reported  However, Marshallese culture has a strong connection to the land, which means that many view migration as a last resort  For people still living in the Marshall Islands, they face overpopulation in urban centers and displacement by sudden-onset disasters like cyclones and flooding  Factors influencing people deciding to move abroad include displacement, lack of economic opportunity—sometimes exacerbated by climate change—and limited access to health care  Climate change is likely to increase risks to public health in the country Increased rainfall, for instance, may expand mosquito breeding grounds, raising the risk of diseases like dengue fever  The country’s limited health care system may further contribute to migration from the islands  Challenges in Stability and Security In the future, the Marshall Islands may become uninhabitable  This prospect threatens the existence of the Marshall Islands as a sovereign state, as well as the United States defense facilities located on the islands  The total loss of land could result in the Marshall Islands being uninhabitable, which raises problems of migration, resettlement, cultural survival, and sovereignty  Relocation of the population of the Marshall Islands, and of other Pacific Island nations at risk of rising seas, could cause significant geopolitical challenges The Marshall Islands are also of strategic importance for the United States  Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States has permission to use several islands— including Kwajalein Atoll, the location of the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Range—until 2066  The country’s proximity to the equator makes the Marshall Islands ideal for missile defense and space work  Yet the island’s defense infrastructure and operations are at significant risk due to rising sea levels, flooding, and diminishing supplies of potable water  As the Department of Defense has noted, climate change will have serious implications for the department’s ability to maintain its infrastructure and ensure military readiness in the future  DOD, 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap (Alexandria, VA: June 2014)  The effects of climate change on Central America and the Caribbean may increase migration and exacerbate poverty rates, as the National Intelligence Council has reported  The climate in Central America and the Caribbean is predicted to be warmer and dryer  The Caribbean’s extensive coastlines and low-lying areas are vulnerable to sea level rise and an increase in sudden-onset disasters, including hurricanes and storm surges  Drought is a particular concern in Central America, where declines in rainfall have reduced crop yields and threatened livelihoods in recent years  Some evidence shows that drought in parts of Central America has contributed to migration north, including to the United States  Population growth, especially in coastal cities, has increased the number of people at risk during hurricane season, and the number and intensity of hurricanes have grown in recent years  Some attribute the increase in intensity to higher sea surface temperatures caused by climate change  However, there remains debate about long term hurricane trends  Recent hurricanes have caused displacement, and significant losses and damages—including to infrastructure—across the region  The depletion of coral reefs and mangrove trees, natural barriers to coastal erosion and flooding, has exacerbated vulnerability to storms in coastal areas  Climate change is likely to have negative impacts on tourism in the Caribbean, where the industry is an important part of the economy, according to Inter-American Development Bank  Climate change impacts on the economy may make it increasingly difficult for governments to reduce poverty and move towards environmental sustainability  Haiti’s geography, location, and high poverty rates make the country especially vulnerable  Haiti is highly vulnerable to climate change effects, partly due to its long coastline Hurricanes routinely make landfall in the country, and increases in rainfall and wind speeds associated with hurricanes are likely  Severe hurricanes, including Hurricane Matthew in September 2016, have hit Haiti in recent years  Hurricane Matthew was the first category 4 storm in Haiti since 1964  Damage from severe flooding and severe winds during the hurricane affected over 2 million people and created significant food security and public health challenges  Significant deforestation has further exacerbated Haiti’s vulnerability to hurricanes, as trees previously provided a natural barrier to the erosion that strong winds and more rainfall can cause  Rising temperature and highly variable rainfall have led to extreme drought and flash flooding, according to the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID) 32 2 These trends decrease crop yields, affecting the livelihoods of farmers, and threaten water access  Projected increase in temperature and decreases in rainfall are likely to intensify drought in Haiti’s interior  USAID, Haiti: Environment and Climate Change Fact Sheet (January 2016)  Migration Trends Slow-onset climate events, such as drought, and rising sea levels, and sudden-onset events, including earthquakes, affect Haiti, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)  Haiti is also particularly exposed to extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, which can lead to displacement  In January 2010, a catastrophic earthquake in Haiti killed an estimated 230,000 people and left close to 1 5 million people homeless  According to IOM, the recurrence of environmental disruptions increases risks and vulnerabilities  When Hurricane Sandy struck Haiti in October 2012, the country had still not recovered from the 2010 earthquake  The worsening of climate change effects around the world, particularly in low-income countries, may increase the number of people wanting to immigrate to the United States, where approximately 700,000 Haitians live today Remittances from family members living outside Haiti make up a significant portion of the economy, at 24 7 percent of GDP  The majority of these remittances come from the United States, as we have previously reported 34 4Remittances may support resilience to climate change effects as migrants send money home for disaster recovery and adaptation  Challenges in Stability and Security Haiti, the poorest country in the western hemisphere, has experienced political instability for most of its history, and ranks 12th of 178 on the Fragile States Index  The government has a low capacity to respond to additional challenges like those related to climate change, according to USAID  The Ministry of Environment, for example, is a relatively new organization within the Haitian government, and local and regional governments have a limited ability to enforce environmental laws and regulations  The United States has provided substantial aid to Haiti, both in disaster response and broader development projects  Official development assistance for Haiti in 2015, for instance, totaled slightly more than $1 billion  According to a January 2018 UN report, 2 8 million people were still in need of humanitarian assistance  GAO, Remittances To Fragile Countries: Treasury Should Assess Risks from Shifts to Non-Banking Channels, GAO-18-313 (Washington, D C , March 8, 2018)  The Department of State’s Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (State/OES) provided about $78 million in adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative for eight projects for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 (see table 2)  The Global Climate Change Initiative was established in 2010 to promote resilient, low- emission development, and integrate climate change considerations into U S  foreign assistance and was divided into three main programmatic initiatives: (1) Adaptation assistance, (2) Clean Energy assistance, and (3) Sustainable Landscapes assistance  The primary purpose of these contributions to the LDCF was to address the adaptation needs of the least developed countries, which are especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change  The LDCF financed the preparation and implementation of National Adaptation Programs of Action, which identify a country’s priorities for adaptation actions  Initial grant to the National Adaptation Plans Global Network  The network is focused on increasing the capacity of national and subnational governments to identify and assess climate risks, integrate these risk considerations in sector planning, develop a pipeline of projects to address risks, identify and secure funding for projects, and track progress toward resilience targets  Colombia, East Caribbean (Guyana, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Ethiopia, Peru, South Africa, Uganda, West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Togo) and, under current consideration, East Caribbean (Dominica, Suriname), and Pacific (Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu) The cost amendment intensified the technical support on National Adaptation Plans to select countries dependent upon specific country adaption needs  In addition, the cost amendment continued the learning and progress from the initial grant  Implemented through the Department of Treasury, this funding supported a Treasury grant to the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative Multi Donor Trust Fund at the World Bank  This activity established the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Foundation and the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Company, among other things  The goal of PIER is to increase private sector investment in resilience to climate change in eight developing countries  The first phase of the project will assess and identify opportunities for private investment in resilience, as well as build public and private capacity for climate risk assessment in all the countries  In the second phase, public and private sector partners will develop and pilot climate risk-reduction investment models in four of the countries  The third phase will publicize the piloted investment models and lessons learned among the eight countries  Implemented through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, this activity aims to implement a capacity-building partnership with India to promote effective climate resilient decision making at national, state, and local levels  In addition to the contacts named above, the following individuals made key contributions to this report: Miriam Carroll Fenton (Assistant Director), Kristy Williams (Assistant Director), Rachel Girshick (Analyst-in-Charge), Nancy Santucci, Miranda Cohen, Aldo Salerno, Neil Doherty, and Judith Williams  Alexander Welsh, Justin Fisher, and Joseph Thompson provided technical and other support  Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Needs to Better Incorporate Adaptation into Planning and Collaboration at Overseas Installations  GAO-18-206  Washington, D C : November 13, 2017  Compacts Of Free Association: Actions Needed to Prepare for The Transition of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands to Trust Fund Income  GAO-18-415  Washington, D C : May 17, 2018  Remittances to Fragile Countries: Treasury Should Assess Risks from Shifts to Non-Banking Channels  GAO-18-313  Washington, D C : March 8, 2018  Syrian Refugees: U S  Agencies Conduct Financial Oversight Activities for Humanitarian Assistance but Should Strengthen Monitoring  GAO-18-58  Washington, D C : October 31, 2017  International Food Assistance: Agencies Should Ensure Timely Documentation of Required Market Analyses and Assess Local Markets for Program Effects  GAO-17-640  Washington, D C : July 13, 2017  High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others  GAO-17-317  Washington, D C : February 15, 2017  Federal Disaster Assistance: Federal Departments and Agencies Obligated at Least $277 6 Billion during Fiscal Years 2005 through 2014  GAO-16-797  Washington, D C : September 22, 2016  Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy Is Underway, but Agency Could Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps  GAO-16-453  Washington, D C : July 12, 2016  Climate Information: A National System Could Help Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Decision Makers Use Climate Information  GAO-16-37  Washington, D C : November 23, 2015  Hurricane Sandy: An Investment Strategy Could Help the Federal Government Enhance National Resilience for Future Disasters  GAO-15-515  Washington, D C : July 30, 2015  High-Risk Series: An Update  GAO-15-290  Washington, D C : February 11, 2015  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  GAO-14-704G  Washington, D C : September 10, 2014  Combating Terrorism: U S  Efforts in Northwest Africa Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management  GAO-14-518  Washington, D C : June 24, 2014  Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Can Improve Infrastructure Planning and Processes to Better Account for Potential Impacts  GAO-14-446  Washington, D C : May 30, 2014  Extreme Weather Events: Limiting Federal Fiscal Exposure and Increasing the Nation’s Resilience  GAO-14-364T  Washington, D C : February 12, 2014  Climate Change: State Should Further Improve Its Reporting on Financial Support to Developing Countries to Meet Future Requirements and Guidelines  GAO-13-829  Washington, D C : September 19, 2013  High-Risk Series: An Update  GAO-13-283  Washington, D C : February 14, 2013  International Climate Change Assessments: Federal Agencies Should Improve Reporting and Oversight of U S  Funding  GAO-12-43  Washington, D C : November 17, 2011  Climate Change Adaptation: Federal Efforts to Provide Information Could Help Government Decision Making  GAO-12-238T  Washington, D C : November 16, 2011  Foreign Relation: Kwajalein Atoll Is the Key U S  Defense Interest in Two Micronesian Nations, GAO-02-119  Washington D C : January 22, 2002 

ground_truth: More than 4 decades ago, Congress authorized the creation of the SPR to reduce the impact of disruptions in supplies of petroleum products. DOE manages the SPR. As a member of the International Energy Agency, the United States is obligated to maintain reserves equivalent to at least 90 days of the previous year's net imports (imports minus exports). The SPR's storage and related infrastructure is aging, and DOE has plans to modernize these facilities. Since 2015, Congress has mandated crude oil sales. As of March 2018, the SPR held about 665 million barrels of crude oil. GAO was asked to examine the SPR's ability to meet U.S. energy security needs. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which (1) DOE has identified the optimal size of the SPR, and (2) DOE's plans for modernizing the SPR take into account the effects of congressionally mandated crude oil sales. GAO reviewed DOE's plans and studies, and interviewed agency officials and nine experts selected based on prior work, referrals, and a literature review. The Department of Energy (DOE) has not identified the optimal size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). In 2016, DOE completed a long-term strategic review of the SPR after its last comprehensive examination conducted in 2005. The 2016 review examined the benefits of several SPR sizes, but it did not identify an optimal size and its review was limited in several ways. In particular, DOE did not fully consider recent and expected future changes in market conditions, such as the implications of falling net imports, or the role that increased levels of private reserves (reserves held by private companies for their own purposes) may play in responding to supply disruptions. These changes have contributed to SPR and private reserves reaching historically high levels on a net imports basis (see figure). These changes are expected to continue to evolve—according to government projections, the United States will become a net exporter in the late 2020s before again becoming a net importer between 2040 and 2050. GAO has found that agencies should reexamine their programs if conditions change. Without addressing the limitations of its 2016 review and periodically performing reexaminations in the future, DOE cannot be assured that the SPR will be sized appropriately into the future. DOE has taken steps to take into account congressionally mandated sales of SPR crude oil in its $1.4 billion modernization plans for SPR's infrastructure and facilities. The SPR is projected to hold 405 million barrels of oil by the end of fiscal year 2027. However, DOE's current plans are based on information analyzed prior to recently mandated sales. According to DOE officials, the agency began a study in March 2018 to assess the effects of these sales on the SPR's modernization. However, this study is not examining all options for handling any excess SPR assets that may be created by currently mandated sales or any additional sales that may be mandated in the future, inconsistent with an agency order on real property asset management that calls for identifying excess assets. For example, DOE does not plan to examine the potential to lease unused SPR storage capacity to the private sector because DOE is not currently authorized to enter into such leases, according to agency officials. If authorized, leasing capacity could generate revenues that could help offset the costs of modernization. By not examining a full range of options, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources. GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOE (1) supplement the 2016 review by conducting an additional analysis, (2) ensure that the agency periodically reexamines the size of the SPR, and (3) consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets as it conducts its study, among other things. DOE agreed with two, partially agreed with one, and disagreed with another recommendation on refined product reserve studies. GAO maintains that the recommendations are valid.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: Beginning the summer 2013 through 2016, there were numerous reports in the media on sexual assault incidents in the U S  armed services  In many cases, such reports were followed by questions on what actions were taken by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Obama Administration, and Congress to address the issue  This report lists a comprehensive chronology of official activities in response to incidents of military sexual assault, as well as legislative action on the issue  The report is divided into three sections: the DOD and the Obama Administration's actions, congressional action, and legislation in the 113 th (2013-2014) and 114 th (2015-2016) Congresses  Also included is a resources section with related articles, hearings, and reports  Information in this report was compiled from the official government websites of DOD, the Obama White House and Congress gov for historical background and will not be updated  June 13, 2012 – DOD announced Army Major General Gary S  Patton as the new director of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO)  September 25, 2012 – As part of the DOD's efforts to confront the crime of sexual assault in the military, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced improvements to prospective commander and senior enlisted training and a review of the initial military training environment in every service  December 21, 2012 – DOD released key findings from the Academic Program Year (APY) 2011-2012 Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the United States Military Service Academies  According to this report, the overall prevalence rate of unwanted sexual contact increased in all three military academies  From 2011 to 2012, the Air Force Academy in Colorado showed the largest increase in reported sexual assaults from 33 to 52 incidents  Sexual assaults at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD, increased from 11 to 15, and were up at the U S  Military Academy in West Point, NY, from 10 to 13  January 18, 2013 – DOD announced the release of the 2012 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Reserve Component Members   This report included rates of unwanted sexual contact, unwanted gender-related behaviors (i e , sexual harassment and sexist behavior), and gender discriminatory behaviors and sex discrimination reported by survey respondents during the past 12 months  March 7, 2013 – Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, in a letter responding to Members of Congress, wrote that an internal review was being conducted of a decision by a senior Air Force commander, Lt  Gen  Craig Franklin, to overturn the sexual assault conviction of an Air Force fighter pilot, Lt  Col  James Wilkerson  Colonel Wilkerson was found guilty in November 2012 of aggravated sexual assault and was sentenced to one year in military prison  Lt  General Franklin's decision to overturn the findings of the court-martial freed Colonel Wilkerson, and allowed him to be reinstated in the Air Force  In his letter, Hagel said that while General Franklin's decision could not be overturned, he had asked Pentagon lawyers and the Secretary of the Air Force to review the way in which General Franklin decided the case  He also said he wanted a review of whether the military should change the way it handles sexual assault cases  April 2, 2013 – Secretary Chuck Hagel stated in a message to all DOD personnel on Sexual Assault Awareness and Prevention Month that, "Together, we must work every day to instill a climate that does not tolerate or ignore sexist behavior, sexual harassment, or sexual assault  These have no place in the United States military and violate everything we stand for and the values we defend " April 8, 2013 – Secretary Hagel announced that DOD's Office of General Counsel will review Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) after an Air Force officer's court-martial conviction for sexual assault was dismissed using the authority provided by Article 60  May 6, 2013 – The Office of the Secretary of Defense released a 24-page memorandum from Secretary Hagel to all heads of the military services regarding DOD's 2013 Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Strategy, and the release of the Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 2012 (2 volumes)  According to this report, in FY2012 (October 1, 2011, through September 30, 2012), the number of sexual assaults reported by members of the military rose 6% to 3,374  An anonymous survey of military personnel showed the number of service members who had experienced unwanted sexual contact could be as many as 26,000 but most never reported the incidents  That number is an increase over the 19,000 estimated assaults in 2011  These reports involved offenses ranging from abusive sexual contact to rape  May 7, 2013 – In a DOD press briefing, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Major General Gary Patton, director of SAPRO, announced new series of actions to further DOD's sexual assault and prevention efforts  Hagel directed service chiefs to develop methods to hold all military commanders accountable for establishing command climates of dignity and respect in incorporating sexual assault prevention and victim care principles in their commands  May 7, 2013 – DOD announced the establishment of the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel consisting of nine selected appointees  Secretary of Defense Hagel appointed five members to serve on the response systems panel, who joined four members appointed by the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the chairman and ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee  May 14, 2013 – The Army announced that an Army Sergeant First Class assigned to III Corps, Fort Hood, TX, was under investigation for pandering, abusive sexual contact, assault, and maltreatment of subordinates  May 15, 2013 – Returning from NATO meetings in Brussels, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen  Martin E  Dempsey, told reporters that sexual assault in the Armed Forces constitutes a crisis in the military  He further stated that "We're losing the confidence of the women who serve that we can solve this problem, and that's a crisis " May 16, 2013 – At the White House, President Obama met with senior military leaders on the issue of sexual assault in the U S  Armed Forces  The President stated that not only is it "shameful and disgraceful" but also "dangerous to our national security " May 17, 2013 – During a press briefing, Defense Secretary Hagel and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army Gen  Martin Dempsey discussed their meeting with President Obama, Vice President Biden, and senior enlisted and officer leadership in the U S  military  Dempsey told the Armed Forces Press Service that he believes that the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may be factors in the growing incidents of sexual assault  He also stated that: "If a perpetrator shows up at a court-martial with a rack of ribbons and has four deployments and a Purple Heart, there is certainly a risk that we might be a little too forgiving of that particular crime " May 17, 2013 – In an interview, Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen  Mark Walsh, said that sexual assaults in his branch of the military typically involve alcohol use and can be traced to a lack of respect for women  "We have a problem with respect for women that leads to many of the situations that result in sexual assault in our Air Force," he told reporters in his Pentagon office  Walsh further stated that combatting the crisis is his top priority and that he reviews every reported case of sexual assault  May 22, 2013 – The Pentagon announced that DOD's sexual assault prevention staff would be exempt from furloughs  According to Pentagon spokeswoman, Cynthia O  Smith, "The full-time civilians working these programs and implementing policies will not be furloughed  This will ensure responsive victim care and ensure all the programs recently directed by Secretary Hagel are implemented swiftly and efficiently " May 24, 2013 – President Obama addressed graduates of the U S  Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD, and noted in his commencement speech that the misconduct of some in the military can endanger U S  forces and undermine U S  efforts to achieve security and peace worldwide  He further stated that those who commit sexual assault are not only committing a crime, they also "threaten the trust and discipline that make our military strong " May 25, 2013 – In a commencement speech at the U S  Military Academy at West Point, NY, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel told graduates that they must be the generation of leaders that will commit to building a culture of respect for every member of the military  He stated that sexual harassment and sexual assault in the military "are a profound betrayal of sacred oaths and sacred trusts " He also quoted President Obama's remarks at the Naval Academy when he said, "these crimes have no place in the greatest military on earth " May 30, 2013 – Pentagon officials reaffirmed DOD's commitment to fighting sexual assault by launching the Safe HelpRoom at http://SafeHelpline org , a Sexual Assault Support Service for the DOD community  This new service allows victims to participate in moderated group chat sessions to connect with and support one another in a secure online environment  The Safe HelpRoom is in response to a need for peer support services identified by users of DOD's Safe Helpline for sexual assault victims  June 6, 2013 – In a speech at the 2013 Joint Women's Leadership Symposium, Navy Adm  James A  Winnefeld Jr , vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said plans to combat and eliminate sexual assault include a greater investment in specially trained sexual assault investigators and a push for more psychological, medical, and legal assistance for victims  The vice chairman also said officials will examine the scientific roots of behavioral factors associated with potential predators, which will assist sexual assault prevention efforts  June 7, 2013 – The Pentagon released a statement that Maj  Gen  Michael T  Harrison was suspended of his duties as the Commanding General of United States Army Japan and I Corps for failing in his duties as a commander to report or investigate an allegation of sexual assault  June 7, 2013 – Air Force officials announced Maj  Gen  Margaret H  Woodward has been assigned to direct the Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to replace Lt  Col  Jeffrey Krusinski, the former chief of the Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program  He was arrested and charged by Arlington County, VA, police for allegedly being drunk and groping a woman in a parking lot one mile from the Pentagon  In the previous year, Maj  Gen  Woodward led the investigation of Air Force training in the wake of a sexual assault scandal centered at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas  June 27, 2013 – Defense Secretary Hagel met in person with the Sexual Assault Response Systems Review Panel for the first time  According to the Pentagon, "the panel will conduct an independent review and assessment of the systems used to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate crimes involving sexual assault and related offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and will develop recommendations to improve the effectiveness of those systems " DOD established the panel in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 ( P L  112-239 , Section 576 (a))  Previously, Hagel held a teleconference with panel members  July 3, 2013 – The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Army Gen  Frank J  Grass, launched a comprehensive campaign designed to assist National Guard units in combating sexual assault as part of a military-wide effort to protect victims and eradicate the crime from the ranks  July 9, 2013 – DOD Inspector General (IG) released its report, Joint Warfighting and Readiness Evaluation of the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations Sexual Assault Investigations   The report evaluated the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations' (MCIOs') sexual assault investigations in 2010 to determine whether they were adequately investigated  The report found most MCIO investigations (89%) met or exceeded the investigative standards and returned only cases with significant deficiencies (11%) to the MCIOs for corrective action  July 18, 2013 – The Air Force adopted two new measures to eliminate sexual assault from within the ranks, including requiring mandatory discharge for airmen, officer or enlisted, who commit sexual assault, and requiring the Air Force's most senior commanders to review actions taken on these cases  In addition, the Air Force Academy is reviewing the results of a survey on sexual assault taken on June 24, 2013  Suggestions from survey respondents ranged from involving faculty with character coaching to a complete revamping of how the Air Force Academy trains its freshmen  July 18, 2013 – Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced additional resources for investigators and a new initiative designed to enhance accountability and transparency across the Navy  Mabus approved nearly $10 million to hire more than 50 additional Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Family and Sexual Violence Program personnel to shorten investigation times, and directed the Navy and Marine Corps to regularly publish online the results of each service's courts- martial  July 18, 2013 – The Air Force announced that airmen who commit sexual assaults will be discharged, and senior commanders must review actions taken on sexual assault cases under new Air Force initiatives as of July 2, 2013  August 15, 2013 – Defense Secretary Hagel announced seven new anti-sexual assault initiatives in a memo detailing "    absolute and sustained commitment to providing a safe environment in which every service member and DOD civilian is free from the threat of sexual harassment and assault," he wrote in a statement  "Our success depends on a dynamic and responsive approach  We, therefore, must continually assess and strive to improve our prevention and response programs " October 3, 2013 – Air Force Col  Alan R  Metzler, the deputy director for SAPRO, emphasized that the first step to stopping sexual assault in the military is through prevention but when prevention fails, new measures to improve victims' confidence and combat underreporting were needed  Metzler outlined the DOD Sexual Assault Advocate Certification Program (D-SAACP) and the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID), two initiatives set to improve the advocacy services provided to victims of sexual assault  November 9, 2013 – Army Maj  Gen  Gary S  Patton, director of DOD's SAPRO, reported on DOD's recent prevention and awareness successes before the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel  He testified that new DOD initiatives to combat sexual assault helped create a 46% jump in victims reporting compared to the previous year  December 20, 2013 – President Obama instructed Defense Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey to continue their efforts to make substantial improvements with respect to sexual assault prevention and response, including to the military justice system  He also directed that they report back with a full-scale review of their progress, by December 1, 2014  January 10, 2014 – Army Maj  Gen  Jeffrey J  Snow, the new SAPRO chief announced the release of the Annual Report to Congress on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies   The report covered the 2012-13 academic year, and found in 2013, reports of sexual assault decreased at the U S  Military Academy at West Point, New York and the U S  Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado  The number of reported incidents went up at the U S  Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland  January 30, 2014 – The independent Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel accepted a subcommittee recommendation that senior military commanders retain authority for referring these crimes to courts-martial  May 1, 2014 – DOD released the 2013 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military   The report covered the period from Oct  1, 2012, through Sept  30, 2013, and revealed 5,061 reports of sexual assault in the Defense Department, a 50 percent jump from the previous year  More than 70 percent of all cases that the military had jurisdiction resulted in criminal charges  July 17, 2014 – DOD collaborated with the Justice Department's Office for Victims of Crime to develop a curriculum that expands on the skills learned in initial sexual assault response coordinator and sexual assault prevention and response victim advocate training  December 4, 2014 – Secretary Hagel released DOD's Report to the President of the United States on Sexual Assault Prevention and Response on its progress in addressing sexual assault in the military, and announced four directives to further strengthen the department's prevention and response program  According to this report, based on survey data, servicemembers experienced fewer sexual assaults in FY2014 than in FY2012, an estimated 19,000, down from 26,000  January 16, 2015 – Secretary Hagel at the Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Summit remarked that the fight to end sexual assault in the military must be "personal " He cited "encouraging progress" over the last year, but acknowledged more can be done, notably in areas such as social retaliation, which he said stems from the overall environment  February 11, 2015 – The annual report on sexual harassment and violence at the military service academies estimated that overall rates of unwanted sexual contact at the military service academies declined in Academic Program Year (APY) 2013-2014, decreased for both men and women, indicating that fewer sexual assaults occurred at the academies in APY 13-14 than in APY 11-12  February 19, 2015 – Health and criminal investigation experts spoke at the Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response Program Summit on the underreporting of male victims of sexual assault in the military due to factors such as shame and fear of being ostracized  March 26, 2015 – SAPRO head Army Maj  Gen  Jeffrey Snow monitored 50 initiatives put in place by past Defense secretaries Leon Panetta and Chuck Hagel  According to Snow, the most recent data, gathered last year, shows the past-year prevalence of sexual assault is down significantly, Snow said  Estimates indicate there were 6,000 to 7,000 fewer sexual assaults in 2014 than in 2012  May 1, 2015 – According to the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Stud y, "the percentage of active duty women who experienced unwanted sexual contact over the past year declined from 6 1% in 2012 to an estimated 4 3% in 2014  For active duty men, the estimated prevalence rate dropped from 1 2% in 2012 to 0 9% in 2014  Based on these rates, an estimated 18,900 service members experienced unwanted sexual contact in 2014, down from around 26,000 in 2012 " May 22, 2015 – Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced Army Maj  Gen  Camille M  Nichols will assume duties as director of SAPRO effective June 8, 2015  January 8, 2016 – DOD announced the release of the Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies for A cademic P rogram Y ear 2014-2015   Data in the report indicated the academies received 91 sexual assault reports during the academic year, an increase of 32 reports over the previous year  April 2 8 , 2016 – Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced a sexual assault retaliation prevention and response strategy aimed at how the department supports servicemembers who experience retaliation, while aligning prevention and response efforts across the services  May 5, 2016 – The annual report of the Defense Department's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program indicated that DOD's efforts are having an impact  In FY2015, service members made 6,083 reports of sexual assault – the same rate as the previous fiscal year, with four in 1,000 servicemembers reporting sexual assault despite a smaller active force size  In addition, 21 percent of those making restricted reports in fiscal 2015 chose to convert to unrestricted reports, enabling them to participate in the military justice process  September 19 , 2016 – The Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD, hosted an all-day training event to strengthen how military and civilian communities work together to support servicemembers who report sexual assault in a joint program between DOD and the Justice Department  October 19, 2016 – DOD released the 2016 Military Investigation and Justice Experience Survey that allowed servicemembers who have experienced sexual assault and elected to participate in the military justice process the opportunity to provide DOD with direct feedback on their experiences; and to improve the services and support servicemembers reporting sexual assault  December 15, 2016 – Defense Department officials announced the release of the "DOD Plan to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Assault of Military Men," designed to enhance outreach to military men and increase efforts to help them recover  The following information was compiled using Congress gov, Congressional Quarterly (CQ com), House gov, Senate gov, and Roll Call  See the section "Resources" for a list of congressional hearings, reports and other documents  January 23, 2013 – The House Armed Services Committee held a hearing on sexual misconduct at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, TX  January 25, 2013 – H R  430 , Protect Our Military Trainees Act, was introduced  This legislation would have amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice to protect new members of the Armed Forces who are undergoing basic training from the sexual advances of the members of the Armed Forces responsible for their instruction  It also requires that violators be punished as a court-martial may direct  March 5, 2013 – H R  975 , the Servicemember Mental Health Review Act, was introduced  This bill would have amended Title 10, United States Code, to extend the duration of the Physical Disability Board of Review and to the expand the authority of such Board to review the separation of members of the Armed Forces on the basis of a mental condition not amounting to disability, including separation on the basis of a personality or adjustment disorder  This would have included a review of those victims who have suffered military sexual trauma  March 13, 2013 – S  548 , Military Sexual Assault Prevention Act of 2013, was introduced, read twice, and referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee  This legislation aimed to amend Title 10, United States Code, and to improve capabilities of the Armed Forces to prevent and respond to sexual assault and sexual harassment in the Armed Forces  March 13, 2013 – Victims of sexual assault in the military testified before a Senate panel examining the military's handling of sexual assault cases and stated that the "military justice system is broken " They urged Congress to make changes in the law that would stem the rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment that they said are pervasive in the service branches  Several male Navy veterans testified before the Senate Armed Service Committee's military personnel panel investigating sexual assaults in the military  One recounted that he was raped in 2000 by a higher-ranking petty officer aboard a submarine  He told the committee that he carries permanent shame not for the sexual assault but over how the Navy forced him to leave  He stated in his testimony, "I carry my discharge as an official and permanent symbol of shame, on top of the trauma of the physical attack, the retaliation and its aftermath " March 20, 2013 – S  628 , Servicemember Mental Health Review Act, was introduced, read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  Related to H R  975 , this bill would have amended Title 10, United States Code, to extend the duration of the Physical Disability Board of Review and to the expand the authority of such board to review the separation of members of the Armed Forces on the basis of a mental condition not amounting to disability, including separation on the basis of a personality or adjustment disorder  This would have included a review of those victims who may have suffered military sexual trauma  April 17, 2013 – H R  1593 , Sexual Assault Training Oversight and Prevention (STOP) Act, was introduced  This bill seeks to amend Title 10, United States Code, by establishing a Sexual Assault Oversight and Response Council and an enhanced Sexual Assault Oversight and Response Office "to improve the prevention of and response to sexual assault in the Armed Forces, and by requiring the appointment of a Director of Military Prosecutions for sexual-related offenses committed by a member of the Armed Forces " April 26, 2013 – A U S  senator reportedly put a hold on the nomination of Air Force Lt  Gen  Susan Helms, nominated to serve as vice commander of the U S  Space Command  Earlier in February 2012, Gen  Helms rejected the recommendation of legal counsel and overturned the conviction of an Air Force captain who had been found guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a female lieutenant  May 7, 2013 – S  871 , Combating Military Sexual Assault Act of 2013, was introduced, read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  This legislation would have aimed to provide any victim with a special military lawyer who would assist them throughout the process, prohibit sexual contact between instructors and trainees during and within 30 days of completion of basic training or its equivalent, and ensure that sexual assault response coordinators are available to help members of the National Guard and Reserve  May 7, 2013 – H R  1864 , to amend Title 10, United States Code, would have required an Inspector General investigation of allegations of retaliatory personnel actions taken in response to making protected communications regarding sexual assault, was introduced and referred to the House Armed Services Committee  This bill would have required the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with respect to the Coast Guard, or any of the military departments to investigate allegations of retaliatory personnel actions taken in response to making protected communications regarding alleged instances of rape, sexual assault, or other forms of sexual misconduct in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice  May 7, 2013 – At the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Personnel hearing Gen  Mark Welsh, the Air Force's Chief of Staff, told the committee that he and Air Force Secretary Michael Donley were "appalled" by the charges against Lt  Col  Jeffrey Krusinski, branch chief of the Air Force's Sexual Assault and Prevention Office  He was arrested and charged by Arlington County, VA, police for allegedly being drunk and groping a woman in a parking lot one mile from the Pentagon  "Sexual assault prevention and response efforts are critically important to us," Welsh said  "It is unacceptable that this occurs anywhere, at any time, in our Air Force " May 8, 2013 – H R  1867 , the Better Enforcement for Sexual Assault Free Environments (BE SAFE) Act of 2013, was introduced, read twice, and referred to the House Armed Services Committee  This bill would have amended Title 10, United States Code, "to require an Inspector General investigation of allegations of retaliatory personnel actions taken in response to making protected communications regarding sexual assault " This bill would ensure those found guilty of rape, sexual assault, sodomy, or an attempt to commit any of those crimes, are—at a minimum—dismissed or dishonorably discharged from the military  The five-year statute of limitations within the military's justice system for sexual assault cases would be eliminated, and legal assistance services available to victims would be expanded  May 8, 2013 – In a hearing of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, senators questioned the Air Force's top leaders over rising sexual assaults in the military  Some senators cited DOD statistics from the Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 2012 on the number of incidents of sexual assaults the same week Lt  Col  Jeffrey Krusinski, Chief of the Air Force's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Branch, was arrested and charged with sexual battery  May 9, 2013 – A hearing of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on the Air Force budget was held  Witnesses included Michael Donley, Secretary of the Air Force, and General Mark Welsh, Air Force Chief of Staff  Members of the committee questioned them on Defense Secretary Hagel's review of the decision by Lt  Gen  Craig Franklin to dismiss Lt  Col  James Wilkerson's sexual assault conviction  May 14, 2013 – H Res  213 , a resolution to establish the "Special Committee on Sexual Assault and Abuse in the Armed Forces" was introduced  A "Dear Colleague" memorandum urged support of this legislation referencing Gen  Martin Dempsey's denouncement of military sexual assault as a "crisis" and the need for Congress to address this problem in a "deeper, more comprehensive manner " This Special Committee would have included 19 members appointed by the Speaker and Minority Leader, as well as chairman and ranking members of the committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, Judiciary, and Oversight and Government Reform  May 14, 2013 – H R  1960 , a bill to authorize appropriations for FY2014 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes, was introduced  The FY2014 NDAA addressed the issue of sexual assault in the military by establishing minimum sentencing guidelines for any service members found guilty of sexual assault as well as other provisions  May 15, 2013 – H R  1986 , Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) Deployment Act, was introduced  This bill would have provided for the assignment of Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners-Adult/Adolescent to brigades and equivalent units of the Armed Forces  May 15, 2013 – H R  2002 , Combating Military Sexual Assault Act of 2013, was introduced and referred to the House Committee on Armed Services  This bill was related to S  871 , and would have provided any sexual assault victim with a special military lawyer who would assist them throughout the process, prohibit sexual contact between instructors and trainees during and within 30 days of completion of basic training or its equivalent, and ensure that sexual assault response coordinators (SARCs) are available to help members of the National Guard and Reserve  May 16, 2013 – H R  2016 , Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013, was introduced and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  This bill would have required "a commanding officer who receives a report of a sexual-related offense involving a member in such officer's chain of command to act immediately upon such report by way of referral to the appropriate criminal investigative office or service " This bill was related to S  538 , Military Sexual Assault Prevention Act of 2013, and S  967 , Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013  May 16, 2013 – S  967 , Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013, was introduced, read twice, and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  This bill would have required a commanding officer who receives a report of a sex-related offense involving a member in such officer's chain of command to act immediately upon such report by way of referral to the appropriate criminal investigative office or service  May 21, 2013 – S  992 , a bill to provide for offices on sexual assault prevention and response under the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, to require reports on additional offices and selection of sexual assault prevention and response personnel, and for other purposes  This bill was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  May 22, 2013 – A House panel passed a number of changes in sexual assault prevention programs that limited commander discretion in reducing or dismissing rape and assault charges and expanded support services for victims  The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel approved the personnel issues as part of H R  1960 , the FY2014 NDAA bill  May 22, 2013 – The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense held a hearing on the Army's FY 2014 Budget Request  Witnesses included Secretary of the Army, John McHugh and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond T  Odierno  Army Secretary McHugh announced at this hearing that the service will soon require soldiers being considered for sexual assault prevention jobs to undergo behavioral-health evaluations as a way of screening out potential sex offenders from these high-profile positions  This was in response to a senator's question about the criteria for sexual assault prevention jobs  McHugh said that service record and availability are the only criteria commanders are using to fill these jobs since sexual-assault prevention positions do not fall under any military occupational specialty and lack career incentives  May 23, 2013 – S  1032 , Better Enforcement for Sexual Assault Free Environments Act of 2013, was introduced, read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  This bill would amend Title 10, United States Code, to make certain improvements in the Uniform Code of Military Justice related to sex-related offenses committed by members of the Armed Forces  June 4, 2013 – The uniformed chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard appeared before a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Personnel  These military leaders acknowledged that despite a "zero tolerance" for sexual abuse, they had neglected the "epidemic" in the ranks by not always monitoring subordinate commanders  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen  Martin Dempsey pointed to competing demands and pressures of fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as a justification for lack of adequate monitoring  The Service Chiefs voiced support for legislative changes that would take tougher action against offenders and provide more support for victims of military sexual assault  They opposed a legislative proposal that would remove unit commanders' legal power to oversee major criminal cases and transfer that authority to uniformed prosecutors  The Army Chief of Staff, Gen  Ray Odierno, noted that taking away commanders' authority in matters of military justice would adversely impact discipline and that "we cannot, however, simply 'prosecute' our way out of this problem  At its heart, sexual assault is a discipline issue that requires a culture change " June 4, 2013 – S  1092 was introduced, read twice, and referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee  This bill would have amended Title 10, United States Code, to require an Inspector General investigation of allegations of retaliatory personnel actions taken in response to making protected communications regarding sexual assault  June 6, 2013 –would allow victims of sexual assault to apply for a permanent change The House Armed Services Committee passed H R  1960 , the NDAA for FY2014, by a vote of 59-2  According to the Committee's Fact Sheet, "the FY14 NDAA of station or unit transfer, while authorizing the Secretary of Defense to inform commanders of their authority to remove or temporarily reassign service members who are the alleged perpetrators of sexual assault  It also requires the provision of victims' counsels, qualified and specially trained lawyers in each of the services, to be made available to provide legal assistance to the victims of sex-related offenses  The FY14 NDAA adds rape, sexual assault, or other sexual misconduct to the protected communications of service members with a Member of Congress or an Inspector General " June 14, 2013 – The House passed H R  1960 , the NDAA for FY2014 by a vote of 315 to 108 (Roll no  244)  This bill includes a provision protecting victims of sexual assault in the Armed Forces as protected communications under military whistle-blower laws, to shield victims against retaliatory actions  The measure seeks to encourage more victims to report assaults, rape and other forms of sexual misconduct  June 17, 2013 – H R  2397 , "Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014," was introduced and referred to the House Committee on Appropriations  It was reported as an original measure, H Rept  113-113   Lawmakers wrote in this committee report that they were "outraged by the pervasive problem of sexual assault in the Armed Forces  Sexual assault is not just an issue in the military; it is an epidemic  To address it, the Committee believes that there must be a culture change at every level of the military, from the most senior leadership to the most junior ranks " Included was a measure that would provide $182 million for the Pentagon's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) and for an expansion of a victim's counseling program  For FY2013, the programs received $95 million  The bill included $25 million that was not requested by the administration in a transfer account to expand assistance across the Defense Department  June 20, 2013 – S  1197 , NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014, was introduced in the Senate  This bill would have authorized "appropriations for fiscal year 2014 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes," and referred to the Committee on Armed Services  The original measure was reported to the Senate in Report No  113-44 and placed on the Legislative Calendar under General Orders (Calendar No  91)  Included in this bill was Title V—Military Personnel Policy, Subtitle E—Sexual Assault Prevention and Response and Military Justice  June 27, 2013 – H R  1864 , a bill "To amend Title 10, United States Code, to require an Inspector General investigation of allegations of retaliatory personnel actions taken in response to making protected communications regarding sexual assault," was agreed to/passed in the House, 423-0 (Roll no  294)  July 18, 2013 – Army Gen  Martin E  Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Navy Adm  James A  Winnefeld Jr , the vice chairman, in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee said that commanders should retain responsibility for prosecuting service members accused of sexual assault, and taking that authority away could harm good order and discipline  July 2 2 , 2013 – H R  2777 , Stop Pay for Violent Offenders Act, was introduced "to amend Title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to suspend the pay and allowances of a member of the Armed Forces who is held in confinement pending trial by court-martial or by civil authority for any sex-related offense or capital offense " July 24, 2013 – H Amdt  408 to H R  2397 , an amendment to provide funds to identify individuals who were separated from the military on the grounds of a disorder subsequent to reporting a sexual assault and, if appropriate, correcting their record  This amendment (A065) was agreed to by voice vote  July 24, 2013 – H R  2397 , "Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014," was passed/agreed to in House, 315 - 109 (Roll no  414)  October 22, 2013 – H R  3304 , the NDAA for FY2014, was introduced in the House  As introduced, the bill would have provided for a defense counsel interview of victim of an alleged sex-related offense in presence of trial counsel, counsel for the victim, or a Sexual Assault Victim Advocate, prohibition on service in the Armed Forces by individuals who have been convicted of certain sexual offenses, Coast Guard regulations regarding request for permanent change of station or unit transfer by victim of sexual assault, temporary administrative reassignment or removal of an active duty member accused of committing a sexual assault, Inspector General investigation of allegations of retaliatory personnel actions taken in response to making protected communications regarding sexual assault, compliance tracking of commanding officers in conducting organizational climate assessments for purposes of preventing and responding to sexual assaults, advancement of submittal deadline for report of independent panel on assessment of military response systems to sexual assault, retention of certain forms on sexual assault, timely access to Sexual Assault Response Coordinators by the National Guard and Reserves, and qualifications and selection of Department of Defense sexual assault prevention and response personnel and required availability of Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners  It also would establish commanding officer actions regarding sexual assault reports, an eight-day incident reporting requirement in response to unrestricted report of sexual assault in which the victim is a member of the Armed Forces, and curricula that addresses the prevention of sexual assault at the military service academies  December 26, 2013 – H R  3304 , the NDAA for FY2014 became P L  113-66   As enacted, the bill included more than two dozen provisions to address an epidemic of sexual assault in the military in Title XVII—Sexual Assault Prevention and Response and Related Reforms, Subtitle A—Reform of Uniform Code of Military Justice  February 26, 2014 – Dr  Karen S  Guice, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, and other Defense Department officials testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee's personnel subcommittee on the relationship between military sexual assault survivors and the subsequent development of suicide and post-traumatic stress disorder  April 9, 2014 – H R  4435 , the Howard P  "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, was introduced in the House  The bill would have applied Title XVII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 ( P L  113-66 ; 127 Stat  950) to the military service academies, consulted with victims of sexual assault regarding victims' preference for prosecution of offense by court-martial or civilian court, created a confidential review of characterization of terms of discharge for victims of sexual offenses, revised requirements relating to DOD policy on retention of evidence in a sexual assault case to allow return of personal property upon completion of related proceedings, required the DOD Inspector General to review separation of members who made unrestricted reports of sexual assault, and would have created a deadline for submission of report containing results of review of Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity role in sexual harassment cases  Prior to passing in the House, the House Armed Services Committee rejected an amendment from Congresswoman Speier that would have removed the military chain of command from decisions to prosecute sexual assault cases and other major crimes, except offenses that are unique to the military  She offered an alternative proposal, which would have only removed commanding officers' prosecutorial discretion for instances of sexual assault, that was also rejected by a 28-34 vote  It was received in the Senate, read twice, and placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders  Calendar No  425  June 2, 2014 — S  2410 , the Carl Levin National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, was introduced in the Senate  It was placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders  Calendar No  402  The bill included measures on military justice such as enhancing sexual assault prevention and response, the application of P L  113-66 , Title XVII to military academies, and the collaboration between the Departments of Justice and Defense  December 19 , 2014 — H R  3979 , the Carl Levin and Howard P  "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, was signed as P L  113-291   Subtitle D—Military Justice, Including Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Prevention and Response addressed the following: modification of DOD policy on retention of evidence in a sexual assault cases to permit return of personal property upon completion of related proceedings; requirements relating to Sexual Assault Forensic Examiner; analysis and assessment of disposition of most serious offenses; a plan for limited use of certain information on sexual assaults in restricted reports by military criminal investigative organizations; the establishment of a Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces; confidential review of the terms of discharge of sexual assault survivors; deadline for submission of report containing results of review of Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity role in sexual harassment cases; and applied Title XVII of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 ( P L  113-66 ; 127 Stat  950) to the military service academies  January 13, 2015 — S  178 , the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 was introduced in the Senate  Title V of this bill "Military Sex Offender Reporting" stipulates that the Secretary of Defense shall provide the Attorney General information about sex offenders in the military to be included in the National Sex Offender Registry and the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website  It became P L  114-22 on May 29, 2015  February 3, 2015 — H R  677 , American Heroes COLA Act of 2015, was introduced in the House, passed on February 9, and the next day was received in the Senate, read twice, and referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs  Section 6 proposed that veterans whose claims were being reviewed again in relation to a previously denied claim relating to military sexual trauma be given priority, among other claims  February 12, 2015 — H R  956 , the Military Track, Register and Alert Communities Act of 2015 (Military TRAC Act) was introduced in the House and referred to the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Military Personnel on November 23  This bill intended to require DOD to maintain a sex offender registry of individuals convicted of certain sex offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or of other military offenses appropriate for sex offender registration purposes  April 13, 2015 — H R  1735 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, was introduced in the House  Subtitle D addressed military justice, including sexual assault and domestic violence prevention and response  April 24, 2015 — H R  2029 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 was introduced in the House and later became P L  114-113   Section 8057 specified that "$25,000,000 shall be for continued implementation and expansion of the Sexual Assault Special Victims' Counsel Program " May 14, 2015 — S  1356 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 was introduced in the Senate and later became P L  114-92 on November 25, 2015  Subtitle D "Military Justice, Including Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Prevention and Response" amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice, authorized Special Victims' Counsel for civilian DOD employees, required the DOD to develop a policy to standardize the training for Special Victims' Counsel, required the establishment of Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces within 90 days, required the development of a plan to improve prevention and response to sexual assaults of male members of the Armed Forces, required the establishment of a strategy to prevent retaliation against Armed Forces members who report or intervene on behalf of sexual assault victims, and authorized the President to modify Rule 304(c) of the Military Rules of Evidence to conform to the rules governing the admissibility of the corroboration of admissions and confessions in the trial of criminal cases in the U S  district courts  June 11, 2015 — S  1558 , Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2016, was introduced in the Senate  The bill would have required specified O&M funds to be used for continued implementation and expansion of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program  June 11, 2015 — S  1567 , a bill to amend Title 10, United States Code, to provide for a review of the characterization or terms of discharge from the Armed Forces of individuals with mental health disorders alleged to affect terms of discharge, was introduced in the Senate  The bill proposed to address medical evidence reviews for former members applying for relief from the terms of their discharge due to military sexual trauma among other conditions  June 11, 2015 — S Amdt  1578 to S Amdt  1463 in H R  1735 , National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, was proposed in the Senate and later considered and defeated on June 16  This bill was intended to reform procedures for determinations to proceed to trial by court-martial for certain offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice  It did not achieve 60 votes in the Senate by Yea-Nay Vote  The final vote was 50 - 49  April 12, 2016 — H R  4909 , the NDAA for FY2017, was introduced in the House where it passed on May 18  On May 26, it was received in the Senate, read twice, and placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders  Calendar No  502  April 18, 2016 — H R  4991 , the Prevent Retaliation and Open up Transparency to Expand Care for Troops (PROTECT) Act of 2016, was introduced in the House and later referred to the House Armed Services' Subcommittee on Military Personnel  The bill intended to amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice to establish the offense of retaliation with provisions that would permit any person intent on retaliating against anyone for reporting or planning to report a criminal offense to be punished as a court-martial may direct  May 18, 2016 — S  2943 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, was introduced in the Senate and became P L  114-328 on December 23  Subtitle D specified requirements for the review by a discharge review board of claims by former members asserting post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or traumatic brain injury (TBI) in connection with combat or sexual trauma  Subtitle E "Military Justice and Legal Assistance Matters" required an annual report on sexual assault and response efforts, required Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to establish evaluation metrics and best practices in the prevention of and response to retaliation, and modified the definition of sexual harassment for the purposes of investigations of complaints of harassment by commanding officers  Title XXXV "Maritime Matters" established requirements for policies and training regarding sexual harassment and sexual assault prevention and response at the U S  Merchant Marine Academy and required the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation to submit a report to Congress about the sexual harassment and sexual assault prevention and response program at the U S  Merchant Marine Academy  Title LIV "Court-Martial Jurisdiction" specified the sexual offenses over which general courts-martial have exclusive jurisdiction  Title LX "Punitive Articles" created a new section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice addressing accountability for sexual misconduct committed by recruiters and trainers during the various phases within the recruiting and basic military training environments, revised the definition of ''sexual act'' with respect to the offenses of rape and sexual assault  May 19, 2016 — H R  5293 , Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017, was introduced in the House, passed on June 16, received in the Senate the next day, where it received a motion to proceed to consideration  The bill would have required O&M funds to be used for continued implementation and expansion of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program  May 26, 2016 — S  3000 , Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017, was introduced in the Senate and placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders  Calendar No  500  The Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense held several hearings prior from February-April  The bill would have required specified O&M funds to be used for continued implementation and expansion of the SAPR Program  DOD Directive No  6495 01  "Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program," January 23, 2012, Incorporating Change 3, April 11, 2017, at http://www esd whs mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/649501p pdf DOD Directive No  6495 02  "Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures," March 28, 2013, Incorporating Change 3, May 24, 2017, at https://www esd whs mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/649502p pdf DOD Inspector General (IG)  E valuation of the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations Sexual Assault Investigations, DODIG-2013-091, July 9, 2013, 104 p   at http://www dodig mil/reports html/Article/1118941/evaluation-of-the-military-criminal-investigative-organizations-sexual-assault/ Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) at https://www sapr mil/ Includes the full text of DOD Annual Reports, FY2004 - FY2016, and reports on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the U S  Military Service Academies, Academic Program Years (APY) 2005-2018  "Final 2014–2015 Academic Program Year Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault at the United States Merchant Marine Academy," Maritime Administration, undetermined date, at https://www marad dot gov/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Final-2014-2015-SASH-Report pdf "Department of Transportation U S  Merchant Marine Academy Culture Audit, Deliverable 4  Final Report," U S  Merchant Marine Academy, December 2016, at https://cms dot gov/sites/dot gov/files/docs/mission/civil-rights/263966/dot-usmma-report pdf "Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program," United States Coast Guard, LMI, December 2016, at https://media defense gov/2017/Mar/29/2001723560/-1/-1/0/CIM_1754_10E PDF "Preliminary 2015-2016 Academic Year Biennial Survey and Report on Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault at the United States Merchant Marine Academy," Maritime Administration, January 12, 2017, at https://www marad dot gov/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Preliminary-2015-2016-SASH-Report pdf Military Justice: Oversight and Better Collaboration Needed for Sexual Assault Investigations and Adjudications , GAO-11-579, Jun 22, 2011, 42 p  http://www gao gov/products/GAO-11-579 Preventing Sexual Harassment: DOD Needs Greater Leadership Commitment and an Oversight Framework , GAO-11-809, Sep 21, 2011, 47 p  http://www gao gov/assets/590/585344 pdf Prior GAO Work on DOD's Actions to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Assault in the Military , GAO-12-571R, Mar 30, 2012, 40 p  http://www gao gov/assets/590/589780 pdf DOD Has Taken Steps to Meet the Health Needs of Deployed Servicewomen, but Actions Are Needed to Enhance Care for Sexual Assault Victims, GAO-13-182, January 29, 2013, 40 p  http://www gao gov/assets/660/651624 pdf Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Address Sexual Assaults of Male Servicemembers, Report to the Committee on Armed Services , GAO-15-284, March 19, 2015, 86 p  http://www gao gov/products/GAO-15-284 Sexual Assault: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Prevention Strategy and to Help Ensure It Is Effectively Implemented, GAO-16-61, November 4, 2015, 59 p  http://www gao gov/products/GAO-16-61 DOD and Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Increase Oversight and Management Information on Hazing Incidents Involving Servicemembers, GAO-16-226, Feb 9, 2016, 74 p  http://www gao gov/products/GAO-16-226 The following news sources are listed in chronological order to make it easier to follow the numerous incidents of wide-spread misconduct reported in the media  Military com has ongoing news on military sexual assault at http://www military com/topics/sexual-assault   Montgomery, Nancy  "Johnson Found Guilty of Last Two Counts; Awaits Sentencing " Stars and Stripes , June 13, 2012, at http://www stripes com/news/johnson-found-guilty-of-last-two-counts-awaits-sentencing-1 180204 Carroll, Chris  "Air Force has Identified 31 Alleged Victims in Lackland Sex Abuse Scandal," Stars and Stripes, June 28, 2012, at http://www stripes com/news/air-force-has-identified-31-alleged-victims-in-lackland-sex-abuse-scandal-1 181597 Dao, James  "Instructor for Air Force Is Convicted in Sex Assaults," New York Times , July 20, 2012, at http://www nytimes com/2012/07/21/us/lackland-air-force-base-instructor-guilty-of-sex-assaults html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Blansett, Susan and Hoffman, Michael  "Sexual Assault Cases Flood Military Courts," Military com, August 13, 2012, at http://www military com/daily-news/2012/08/13/sex-assault-cases-flood-military-courts html Risen, James  "Honor Betrayed: Attacked at 19 by an Air Force Trainer, and Speaking Out," New York Times , February 26, 2013, at http://www nytimes com/2013/02/27/us/former-air-force-recruit-speaks-out-about-rape-by-her-sergeant-at-lackland html?pagewanted=all Mulrine, Anne  "Seeking the Sex-Assault Solution," Air Force Magazine , April 2013, at http://www airforcemag com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2013/April%202013/0413solution aspx "5 Former Lackland Commanders Disciplined," Military com, May 2, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/05/02/5-former-lackland-commanders-disciplined html Kime, Patricia  "Lawmakers Act Fast with New Legislation on Military Sexual Assault " Army Times , May 7, 2013  Shapira, Ian  "July Trial Set for Jeffrey Krusinski, Air Force Officer Accused of Sexual Battery " Washington Post , May 9, 2013, at https://www washingtonpost com/local/july-trial-set-for-air-force-officer-accused-of-sexual-battery/2013/05/09/8a21eb92-b8d9-11e2-92f3-f291801936b8_story html?utm_term= e0d4951e6573 Steinhauer, Jennifer  "Lawmakers, at White House, Discuss Sex Abuse in Military " New York Times , May 9, 2013, at http://www nytimes com/2013/05/10/us/politics/lawmakers-huddle-at-white-house-on-sex-abuse-in-military html?_r=0 Whitlock, Craig  "Pentagon Grapples with Sex Crimes by Military Recruiters," Washington Post , May 12, 2013, at http://articles washingtonpost com/2013-05-12/world/39210853_1_military-recruiters-sexual-abuse-army-reserve Sisk, Richard  "Assault Prevention NCO Investigated for Sex Crimes " Military com, May 15, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/05/15/assault-prevention-nco-investigated-for-sex-crimes html Whitlock, Craig  "Some in Congress want Changes in Military Law as a Result of Sex Crimes," Washington Post , May 15, 2013, at http://www washingtonpost com/world/national-security/some-in-congress-want-changes-in-military-law-as-result-of-sex-crimes/2013/05/15/672a2a8a-bd8b-11e2-a31d-a41b2414d001_story html Sisk, Richard  "Sex Assault Crisis Pushes Senate to Overhaul UCMJ," Military com, May 16, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/05/16/sex-assault-crisis-pushes-senate-to-overhaul-ucmj html Tilghman, Andrew  "Dempsey: DOD May Have Become 'Too Forgiving' of Sexual Assault," Army Times , May 17, 2013  Brady, Gen  Roger Brady (ret )  "Commentary: Telling Truths about Sexual Assault is Risky," Air Force Times , May  21, 2013  Salcedo, Michele  "Senator: Fire Commanders Allowing Sex Assault," Army Times, May 26, 2013  Tucker, Eric  "More Details Released on Annapolis Sex Assault Investigation: Allegations Made Against Three Football Players," Navy Times , May 30, 2013  Lardner, Richard  "Brass Seeks to Temper Military Justice Overhaul," Associated Press, June 3, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/06/03/brass-seeks-to-temper-military-justice-overhaul html Cassata, Donna and Richard Lardner  "Sexual Assaults Force Changes to Military Justice," Associated Press, June 4, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/06/04/sexual-assaults-force-changes-to-military-justice html Zengerle, Patricia  "U S  Lawmakers Act to Limit Military Authority in Sex Assault Cases," Reuters, June 5, 2013, at http://www reuters com/article/2013/06/05/us-usa-military-sexassault-congress-idUSBRE9541IG20130605 Cassata, Donna and Richard Lardner  " House OKs 2-Yr Jail Term for Military Sex Assault ," Associated Press, June 14, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/06/14/house-oks-2-year-jail-term-for-military-sex-assault html Montgomery, Nancy  " After 2 decades of sexual assault in military, no real change in message ," Stars and Stripes , July 7, 2013, at https://www stripes com/news/after-2-decades-of-sexual-assault-in-military-no-real-change-in-message-1 229091 Steinhauer, Jennifer  "Complex Fight in Senate over Curbing Military Sex Assaults," New York Times , June 14, 2013, at http://www nytimes com/2013/06/15/us/politics/in-senate-complex-fight-over-curbing-sexual-military-assaults html?pagewanted=all Dao, James  "In Debate over Military Sexual Assault, Men Are Overlooked Victims," New York Times , June 23, 2013, at http://www nytimes com/2013/06/24/us/in-debate-over-military-sexual-assault-men-are-overlooked-victims html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Sisk, Richard  "Military Tries to Sever Booze, Sex Assault Link," Military com, July 8, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/07/08/military-tries-to-sever-booze-sex-assault-link html Watson, Julie  "Military Works to Change Culture to Combat Rape," Associated Press, July 15, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/07/15/military-works-to-change-culture-to-combat-rape html Olson, Wyatt  "IG Review Finds Deficiencies in Sex Assault Cases," Stars and Stripes, July 16, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/07/16/ig-review-finds-deficiencies-in-sex-assault-cases html Shanker, Thom  "New Support for Military in Sex Cases," New York Times , July 24, 2013, at http://www nytimes com/2013/07/25/us/politics/new-support-for-military-in-sex-cases html Taranto, James  "A Strange Sort of Justice at West Point," The Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2013, at https://www wsj com/articles/a-strange-sort-of-justice-at-west-point-1376453937 Cassata, Donna, "Senator Targets Military Law over Sexual Assault," Associated Press, July 29, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/07/29/senator-targets-military-law-over-sexual-assault html?comp=7000023317843&rank=3 Groer, Annie  " Military brass claim progress in pursuing sexual assault cases ," Washington Post, August 1, 2013, at https://www washingtonpost com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2013/08/01/military-brass-claim-progress-in-pursing-sexual-assault-cases/?utm_term= 72e55e7e218c Jennifer Koons  "Sexual Assault in the Military: Can the Pentagon stem the rise in incidents?" CQ Researcher , vol  23, no  29 (A ugust 9, 2013 ), p p  693-716   Laird, Lorelei  " Military lawyers confront changes as sexual assault becomes big news ," ABA (American Bar Association) Journal , September 2013, at http://www abajournal com/magazine/article/military_lawyers_confront_changes_as_sexual_assault_becomes_big_news/ Jelinek, Pauline  " Pentagon: Reports of Sexual Assault Up 46 Percent ," Associated Press, November 8, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/11/08/pentagon-reports-of-sexual-assault-up-46-percent html Matthews, Michael F  " The Untold Story of Military Sexual Assault ," The New York Times, November 24, 2013, at http://www nytimes com/2013/11/25/opinion/the-untold-story-of-military-sexual-assault html " Men Sexually Assaulted in the Military Speak Out ," Baltimore Sun, December 20, 2013, at http://www military com/daily-news/2013/12/20/men-sexually-assaulted-in-the-military-speak-out html Kageyama, Yuri and Richard Lardner  "Documents Reveal Chaotic Military Sex-Abuse Record," Associated Press, February 10, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/02/10/documents-reveal-chaotic-military-sex-abuse-record html Montgomery, Nancy  "AF Program Rare Bright Spot in Sex Assault Fight," Stars and Stripes , February 27, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/02/27/air-force-program-rare-bright-spot-in-sex-assault-fight html Cox, Matthew  "Alcohol Policies Reviewed as Sex Assault Rises," Military com, May 1, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/05/01/alcohol-policies-reviewed-as-sex-assault-rises html Burns, Robert  "Army Knocks 2-Star Down to 1-Star Rank," Associated Press, August 27, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/08/27/army-knocks-2-star-down-to-1-star-rank html Milham, Matt  "Army: It's Good News That Sexual Assault Reports Are Up," Stars and Stripes , September 26, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/09/26/army-its-good-news-that-sexual-assault-reports-are-up html Draper, Robert  The Military's Rough Justice on Sexual Assault," New York Times , November 26, 2014, at https://www nytimes com/2014/11/30/magazine/the-militarys-rough-justice-on-sexual-assault html Sisk, Richard  "Sexual Assault Reports Increase 8%, Pentagon Cites Progress," Military com, December 4, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/12/04/sexual-assault-reports-increase-8-pentagon-cites-progress html Baldor, Lolita C  "Male Military Sex Assault Victims Slow to Complain," Associated Press, December 9, 2014, at http://www military com/daily-news/2014/12/09/male-military-sex-assault-victims-slow-to-complain html Roulo, Claudette  "Sexual Assault Rates Decrease at Military Service Academies," DOD News, Defense Media Activity, February 11, 2015, at http://archive defense gov/news/newsarticle aspx?id=128158 Pellerin, Cheryl  "DOD Honors Sexual Assault Response Coordinators," DOD News, April 23, 2015, at https://www defense gov/News/Article/Article/604510/ Rowe, Major Derek  "General courts-martial for sexual assault: How do they work?" Air Force News , April 28, 2015, at http://www af mil/News/Commentaries/Display/Article/586763/general-courts-martial-for-sexual-assault-how-do-they-work/ Sisk, Richard  "Military Sexual Assault Reports Increased 11 Percent Last Year," Military com, May 1, 2015, at http://www military com/daily-news/2015/05/01/military-sexual-assault-reports-increased-11-percent-last-year html Johnson, Lieutenant General Michelle D , U S  Air Force Academy superintendent; Vice Admiral Walter E  "Ted" Carter Jr , superintendent, U S  Naval Academy; Lieutenant General Robert L  Caslen, superintendent, U S  Military Academy; Rear Admiral James A  Helis, superintendent, U S  Merchant Marine Academy; Rear Admiral Sandra L  Stosz, superintendent, U S  Coast Guard Academy  "Lessons to Share: The five superintendents of federal service academies discuss how their institutions -- which faced scrutiny over sexual assault before many other colleges attracted such attention -- have responded to the issue," Inside Higher Ed, May 7, 2015, at https://www insidehighered com/views/2015/05/07/essay-how-federal-service-academics-prevent-and-punish-sexual-assault Tilghman, Andrew  "Military sexual assault claims: 1 in 20 lead to jail time," Military Times, May 13, 2015, at https://www militarytimes com/2015/05/13/military-sexual-assault-claims-1-in-20-lead-to-jail-time/ Schogol, Jeff  "Defense seeks dismissal of sexual assault case transferred to Washington," Air Force Times, October 17, 2015, at https://www airforcetimes com/news/your-air-force/2015/10/17/defense-seeks-dismissal-of-sexual-assault-case-transferred-to-washington/ Whitlock, Craig  "In the war against sexual assault, the Army keeps shooting itself in the foot," Washington Post, December 19, 2015, at https://www washingtonpost com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/12/19/in-the-war-against-sexual-assault-the-army-keeps-shooting-itself-in-the-foot/?utm_term= d856136e939b Defense Media Activity  "Defense Department Proposes UCMJ Changes," DOD News, December 28, 2015, at https://www defense gov/News/Article/Article/638108/defense-department-proposes-ucmj-changes/ Losey, Stephen  "USAF launches new strategy to curb sexual assault," Air Force Times, December 30, 2015, at https://www airforcetimes com/news/your-air-force/2015/12/30/usaf-launches-new-strategy-to-curb-sexual-assault/ Kime, Patricia  "Sexual assault reporting rises at U S  service academies," Military Times , January 8, 2016, at https://www militarytimes com/news/your-military/2016/01/08/sexual-assault-reporting-rises-at-u-s-service-academies/ Larter, David B  "Navy sex assault victims may be eligible for early separation," Navy Times, January 20, 2016, at https://www navytimes com/news/your-navy/2016/01/20/navy-sex-assault-victims-may-be-eligible-for-early-separation/ Cox, John Woodrow  "Why sex assault reports have spiked at the Naval Academy, West Point and the Air Force Academy, Washington Post , March 11, 2016, at https://www washingtonpost com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/11/why-sex-assault-reports-have-spiked-at-the-naval-academy-west-point-and-the-air-force-academy/?utm_term= a5e15f2f16f1 Whitlock, Craig, Thomas Gibbons-Neff  "Military bringing more charges against ofﬁcers for sexual assault," Washington Post, March 20, 2016, at https://www stripes com/news/us/military-bringing-more-charges-against-of%EF%AC%81cers-for-sexual-assault-1 400140# WeTFNOFRXUc Lardner, Richard  "Pentagon misled lawmakers on military sexual assault cases," Associated Press , April 18, 2016, at https://apnews com/23aed8a571f64a9d9c81271f0c6ae2fa/pentagon-misled-lawmakers-military-sexual-assault-cases Kheel, Rebecca  "Senators ask Obama to investigate whether Pentagon misled Congress," The Hill, April 19, 2016, at http://thehill com/policy/defense/276832-senators-ask-obama-to-investigate-pentagons-sexual-assault-comments Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs  "Air Force report on sexual assault highlights program's progress," Air Force News , May 05, 2016, at http://www af mil/News/Article-Display/Article/752653/air-force-report-on-sexual-assault-highlights-programs-progress/ Tilghman, Andrew  "Military sex assault: Just 4 percent of complaints result in convictions," Military Times , May 5, 2016, at https://www militarytimes com/veterans/2016/05/05/military-sex-assault-just-4-percent-of-complaints-result-in-convictions/ Montgomery, Nancy  "US Military Court Addresses 'Incapable of Consent' to Sex Issue," Stars and Stripes , May 18, 2016, at http://www military com/daily-news/2016/05/18/us-military-court-addresses-incapable-of-consent-to-sex-issue html Losey, Stephen  "Military must do right by wrongly-discharged sexual assault victims, advocates say," Air Force Times , May 19, 2016, at https://www airforcetimes com/news/your-air-force/2016/05/19/military-must-do-right-by-wrongly-discharged-sexual-assault-victims-advocates-say/ Lyle, Amaani  "DoD Safe Helpline Offers Specialized Support to Sexual Assault Victims," DOD News, July 15, 2016, at https://dod defense gov/News/Article/Article/841166/dod-safe-helpline-offers-specialized-support-to-sexual-assault-victims/ Rein, Lisa  "Merchant Marine Academy under fire for sexual assault allegations," Stars and Stripes, August 12, 2016, at https://www stripes com/news/us/merchant-marine-academy-under-fire-for-sexual-assault-allegations-1 423595 Lyle, Amaani  "DoD Unveils Plan to Broaden Sexual Assault Support to Men," DOD News, Defense Media Activity, December 15, 2016, at https://www defense gov/News/Article/Article/1030795/dod-unveils-plan-to-broaden-sexual-assault-support-to-men/ The following sources are listed in alphabetical order by author  Burgess, Ann W , Donna M  Slattery, and Patricia A  Herlihy  "Military Sexual Trauma: A Silent Syndrome " Journal of Psychosocial Nursing & Mental Health Services 51, no  2 (2013): 20-6  D'Ambrosio-Woodward, Tricia  "Military Sexual Assault: A Comparative Legal Analysis of the 2012 Department of Defense Report on Sexual Assault in the Military: What It Tells Us, What It Doesn't Tell Us, and How Inconsistent Statistic Gathering Inhibits Winning the 'Invisible War '" Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender & Society 29, no  2 (2014): 173-211  Farris, Coreen, Terry L  Schell and Terri Tanielian  Physical and Psychological Health Following Military Sexual Assault: Recommendations for Care, Research, and Policy   Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013  http://www rand org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP382 Firestone, Juanita M , J  M  Miller, and Richard Harris  "Implications for Criminal Justice from the 2002 and 2006 Department of Defense Gender Relations and Sexual Harassment Surveys " American Journal of Criminal Justice : AJCJ 37, no  3 (2012): 432-451  Gibson, Carolyn J , Kristen E  Gray, Jodie G  Katon, Tracy L  Simpson, and Keren Lehavot  "Sexual Assault, Sexual Harassment, and Physical Victimization during Military Service across Age Cohorts of Women Veterans " Women's Health Issues 26, no  2 (2016): 225-231  Harrell, Margaret C , Laura Werber, Marisa Adelson, Sarah J  Gaillot, Charlotte Lynch and Amanda Pomeroy  A Compendium of Sexual Assault Research   Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009  http://www rand org/pubs/technical_reports/TR617 Holland, Kathryn, Rabelo, Verónica, and Cortina, Lilia  Sexual Assault Training in the Military: Evaluating Efforts to End the 'Invisible War ' American Journal of Community Psychology 54, no  3/4 (2014): 289-303  Morral, Andrew R , Kristie Gore, and Terry L  Schell  Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment in the U S  Military, Volume 1  Design of the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study   Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, 2014  https://www rand org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9841 html Morral, Andrew R , Kristie Gore, and Terry L  Schell  Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment in the U S  military: Volume 2  Estimates for Department of Defense Service members from the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study   Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, 2015  https://www rand org/pubs/research_reports/RR870z2-1 html O'Brien, Carol, Jessica Keith, and Lisa Shoemaker  "Don't Tell: Military Culture and Male Rape " Psychological Services 12, no  4 (2015): 357-365  Stander, Valeria A  and Cynthia J  Thomsen  "Sexual Harassment and Assault in the U S  Military: A Review of Policy and Research Trends " AMSUS Military Medicine (Association of Military Surgeons of the United States) 181, no  1S (2016): 20-27  This chronological list of hearings was compiled from Congress gov and CQ com  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee, A Review of Sexual Misconduct by Basic Training Instructors at Lackland Air Force Base , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , January 23, 2013, H A S C  No  113-2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 2014 , Part 1, 113th Cong , 1 st sess , February 26, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Personnel, Testimony on Sexual Assault in the Military, 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , March 13, 2013, S  Hrg  113-303 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2014 , 113th Cong , 1 st sess , April 17, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 2014, Part 2 , 113th Cong , 1 st sess , April 24, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2014 , 113th Cong , 1 st sess , April 24, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, President Obama's Fiscal 2014 Budget Proposal for the U S  Navy and Marine Corps , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , May 7, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, D epartment of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2014 and the Future Years Defense Program , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , May 7, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, President Obama's Fiscal 2014 Budget Proposal for the U S  Army , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , May 8, 2013  (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, President Obama's Fiscal 2014 Budget Proposal for the U S  Air Force , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , May 8, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, President Obama's Fiscal 2014 Budget Proposal for the U S  Air Force , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , May 9, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2014 , 113th Cong , 1 st sess , May 22, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Pending Legislation Regarding Sexual Assaults in the Military , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , June 4, 2013, S  Hrg  113–320 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Personnel, Markup of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , June 11, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2014 , 113th Cong , 1 st sess , June 11, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Women in Service Review s , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , July 24, 2013, H A S C  No  113–50 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress , Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Personnel, The Relationships Between Military Sexual Assault, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Suicide, and on Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Treatment and Management of Victims of Sexual Trauma , 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , February 26, 2014, S  Hrg  113-480 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)   U S  Congress, Armed Services Committee , Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of Defense , 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , March 6 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Navy , 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , March 12 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 2015, Part 1 , 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , March 13, 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee , Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Air Force , 113 th Cong  , 2 nd sess , March 14, 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee , Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Army , 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , March 25 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense , Department of Defense Appropriations for 2015 , 113th Cong , 2 nd sess , March 26 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee , Department of Defense Appropriations for 2015 , Part 2, 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , April 2, 2014, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense , Department of Defense Appropriations for 2015 , 113th Cong , 2 nd sess , April 2 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee , National Defense Priorities from the Members for the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act , 113 th Cong  , 2 nd sess , April 9 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015 , 113th Cong , 2 nd sess , April 9, 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015 , 113th Cong , 2 nd sess , April 30, 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense , Department of Defense Appropriations for 2015 , 113th Cong , 2 nd sess , June 18 , 2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee , Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2016 and the Future Years Defense Program , Part 1 , 114th Cong , 1 st sess , March 3 , 10 , 12 , 18 , 19, 26, April 4, 30 , 2015 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services , Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2016 and the Future Years Defense Program , Part 7 Strategic Forces, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , March 4, 25, April 15, 22, 29 , 2015 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2016 and the Future Years Defense Program , Part 3 Readiness and Management Support, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , March 11, 25, April 22, 2015 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, The Current State of Readiness of U S  Forces in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2016 and the Future Years Defense Program , 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , March 25, 2015 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2017 and the Future Years Defense Program , Part 1 , 114 th Cong , 2 nd sess , February 11, 23, March 3, 10, 15, 17, April 5, 7, 26, 2016 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, House Armed Services Committee, The Fiscal Year 2017 Na tional Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of Defense , 114 th Cong , 2 nd sess , March 22, 2016 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, The Current State of Research, Diagnosis, and Treatment for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury , 114 th Cong , 2 nd sess , April 20, 2016 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 on H R 1960 with Additional and Dissenting Views, 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , H  Rept  113-102 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2014 to Accompany H R  2397 together with Additional Views, 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , H  Rept  113-113 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 to accompany S  1197, 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , S  Rept  113-44 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2014 to accompany S 1429, 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , S  Rept  113-85 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, First Annual Report on the Activities of the Committee on Armed Services for the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress , 113 th Cong , 1 st sess , H  Rept  113-309 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Howard P  "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 to accompany H R 4435, 113 th Cong, 2 nd sess , H  Rept  113-446 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Howard P  "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 supplemental report to accompany H R 4435, 113 th Cong  2 nd sess , H  Rept  113-446 part 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Carl Levin National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 to accompany S 2410, 113 th Cong, 2 nd sess , S  Rept  113-176 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2015 to accompany H R 4870, 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , H  Rept  113-473 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2015 to accompany H R 4870, 113 th Cong , 2 nd sess , S  Rept  113-211 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Armed Service, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 to accompany H R 1735, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , H  Rept  114-102 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 to accompany S 1376, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , S  Rept  114-49 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016 to accompany H R 2685, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , H  Rept  114-139 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016 to accompany S 1558, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , S  Rept  114-63 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, House Conference Report, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 to accompany H R 1735, 114 th Cong , 1 st sess , H  Rept  114-270 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 on H R 4909, 114 th Cong , 2 nd sess , H  Rept  114-537 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 to accompany S 2943, 114 th Cong, 2 nd sess , S  Rept  114-255 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2017 to accompany H R 5293, 114 th Cong , 2 nd sess , H  Rept  114-577 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2017 to accompany S 3000, 114 th Cong , 2 nd sess , S  Rept  114-263 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016)  U S  Congress, House Conference Report, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 to accompany S  2943, 114 th Cong, 2 nd sess , H  Rept  114-840 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016) 
Report 2: 6 million people will migrate from 2011 to 2050 due to the effects of climate change  Challenges in Stability and Security Migration due to climate change is cited as a potential destabilizing factor in Bangladesh by ADB, and others  The low-income population in Bangladesh is dependent on agriculture, making the effects of climate change—including impacts on food security—a particular concern  By 2030, these effects on livelihoods and food security could increase the poverty rate in Bangladesh by 15 percent, as the IPCC has reported  Given the proximity of Bangladesh to India, some individuals may also choose to cross the border  Increased migration to India is a potential concern, according to some sources, as India may not have the resources to absorb large numbers of Bangladeshi migrants  The CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: 2007); and Population Council, “Effects of Future Climate Change on Cross-Border Migration in North Africa and India,” Population and Development Review, Vol  36, No  2 (2010)  The effects of climate change in South America vary by region, according to the the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as potentially impacting migration and stability  On the coast, risks include sea level rise, depletion of fisheries, and coral reef bleaching, according to IOM  Coastal cities with growing populations are particularly vulnerable  Melting glaciers in the Andean mountain region, and increased rainfall are expected to change the distribution of water resources, and impact food production as global demand for food is growing  Desertification and land degradation, complicated by the effects of climate change, are contributing to migration from rural areas to cities in South America, as IOM has reported  An estimated 77 percent of people living in high risk areas in South America are located in cities, according to IOM  IOM predicts that as these people feel the effects of sea level rise and water scarcity, they will migrate from the large coastal cities to smaller urban areas  While South America has experienced economic growth in the last decade, poverty rates remain high, and the effects of climate change, including possible migration, may exacerbate inequalities, putting further pressure on cities to meet the needs of their populations  Water security in particular is expected to disproportionaly impact low-income communities, according to the IPCC  For example, in Brazil, drought in the northeast may increase migration to southern cities that are facing rising sea levels and landslides, with consequences for food, water, and energy security  Observed and Projected Effects of Climate Change Brazil’s cities and rural regions may encounter a range of climate change effects, according to the IPCC and IOM  Rural areas, particularly in the northeast, could experience significant impacts from climate change partly due to poverty rates, and historical vulnerability to drought  Higher temperatures are expected to affect crop yields and household incomes, especially for low-income communities  In northeastern Brazil, temperatures are expected to increase and rainfall to decrease  The northeast could see a 22 percent reduction in precipitation by 2100, according to IPCC projections  Brazil’s coastal areas, including cities, are also vulnerable to rising sea levels, heavy precipitation, flooding, and landslides  The vast majority of Brazil’s population, about 86 percent, lives in cities, many in coastal areas, according to the United Nations Development Program  As their populations have grown, urban areas have extended out  This urban growth in Brazil’s megacities has caused further increases in temperature, rainfall, and landslides  For example, current levels of urbanization in the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo may already be responsible for the 2°C warming observed in the city over the last 50 years, as well as the rise in extreme rainfall, according to the IPCC  The metropolitan area is expected to extend its area 38 percent by 2030  Multiple studies of the effects of urbanization on Sao Paulo’s climate suggest higher temperatures affect convective rainfall, which occurs when warm air rises, condenses to form clouds, and produces extreme rain  Other concerns are the depletion of coral reefs and mangrove forests on Brazil’s coastlines, and decreases in biodiversity  Migration from drought in northeastern Brazil to cities has increased urban populations, putting more people at risk of displacement from flooding and landslides  Migration from the northeast is a historical trend in Brazil, as economic migrants have sought seasonal jobs in more productive agricultural regions, or moved permanently to southern cities  Projected declines in rainfall have led some to predict further increases in migration in northeastern Brazil, as the IPCC has reported  However, remittances from family members who leave Brazil’s northeast support resilience for those who remain and may help to reduce migration  Already environmental factors contribute to migration to cities, including to favelas, informal settlements often constructed in hilly areas and floodplains outside of Brazilian cities  A significant number of the favela residents in Rio de Janeiro are migrants from northeastern Brazil, according to IOM  These new migrants may be at risk of further displacement if heavy rainfall, flooding, and other climate change effects destroy their vulnerable homes  For example, heavy rainfall in April 2010 resulted in landslides across Rio de Janeiro, displacing an estimated 5,000 people, according to a report from the World Bank  Brazil is also a destination for migrants from other countries in the region  Migrants from Venezuela searching for jobs and improved food security have come in growing numbers in recent years, as have migrants from Haiti fleeing a series of natural disasters, as IOM has reported  Challenges in Stability and Security Although Brazil ranks 106th out of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index, the effects of climate change may contribute to challenges with water, food, and energy access according to the IPCC  Decreased rainfall could decrease agricultural productivity, with potential health impacts for poor populations  These conditions are of particular concern in northeastern Brazil, as extreme weather and low crop yields are associated with more violence, according to the IPCC  Brazil also receives about 70 percent of its electricity from hydroelectric power, according the United Nations Environment Programme, and recent droughts caused power cuts across many major cities  Although not linked to the effects of climate change, absorbing a growing number of migrants fleeing political and economic instability in Venezuela may impact the broader region, according to the U S  Department of Defense and the National Intelligence Council  Neighboring countries, including Brazil, may struggle to absorb the influx of migrants  On average, 800 Venezuelans are crossing the border to Brazil every day in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, according to the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency  The effects of climate change in the Arctic, including higher temperatures and melting ice, have contributed to shifts in migration across the Arctic, and may have security implications  Increasing temperatures may have a variety of impacts in the Arctic, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  The effects of rising temperatures are disrupting livelihoods and food security, especially for indigenous communities, and opening up untapped natural resources to extraction  Both trends have impacted migration flows in the Arctic  Rising temperatures and melting ice have opened up previously inaccessible waterways in the Arctic, with implications for national security, according to the Department of Defense and others  Greenland, located in the Arctic and considered part of Kingdom of Denmark, exhibits many of these trends  Greenland is experiencing the effects of climate change, including glacial and ice melt, shifts in wildlife distribution, and newly available oil and mineral deposits, among others  The Greenland Ice Sheet covers approximately 80 percent of Greenland’s land mass  The ice sheet’s melting rate is slow, but uncertain  Increases in temperature greater than 1°C may result in the near loss of the entire ice sheet over a millennium and significant sea level rise, according to the IPCC  In the short term, predicting the ice sheet’s melting rate is a challenge as predictions vary in the scientific community  Accurate predictions would support mitigation and adaptation efforts in vulnerable areas  Rising temperatures and shrinking ice cover have shifted the distribution and migration patterns of marine mammals and fish, and impacted food security according to the IPCC and the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum for Arctic states  For example, the economy in Paamiut, Greenland, depended primarily on cod fisheries until changing climate conditions caused cod to disappear, and the town was slow to adapt to newly available shrimp  Similarly, fisheries in Disko Bay, Greenland, have struggled to adapt to new conditions  Rising temperatures and the resulting reduction in ice cover have required a shift to fishing from boats in open water instead of hunting and fishing over ice cover  Lastly, warming and ice melt may make significant oil and mineral deposits accessible for extraction in the future  The potential expansion of extraction industries makes environmental sustainability another possible concern  For example, an estimated 31 billion barrels of oil and gas may exist off the coast of Northeast Greenland, according to the Kingdom of Denmark’s 2011-2020 Arctic Strategy  The strategy stresses the importance of assessing and reducing risks to the environment resulting from the exploration and extraction of oil and gas  The effects of climate change are predicted to contribute to internal and external migration in Greenland  For example, young people are increasingly leaving indigenous communities in rural areas for cities in Greenland in search of work, as traditional livelihoods become unsustainable  Greenland is home to a majority indigenous population, primarily Inuit, whose traditional hunting and fishing practices require travel across ice  In the past, people adapted to seasonal changes to support livelihoods by migrating, and the practice was embedded into indigenous social structures  With reduced ice cover, however, migrating to hunt, fish, and maintain connections to community is more dangerous or restricted  Government policies promoting centralized services, such as health care and education, have also played a role in the shift away from migration as a way of life  As a result, indigenous livelihoods are more difficult to maintain, and young people often migrate to towns and cities in Greenland, or to Denmark, for education  At the same time, warmer temperatures have made mineral extraction feasible  As the extraction industry grows, new jobs may draw migrants from outside the Arctic region  In 2011 companies spent $100 million on the exploration of minerals in the Artic, and the estimated number of new mines is expected to require more workers than now live in the region 17 79Currently, more people leave than migrate to Greenland  The local Inuit population in Uummannaq, Greenland relies heavily on ice coverage for fishing and travel by traditional dog-sled  Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, A Complex Constellation: Displacement, Climate Change and Arctic Peoples (January 30, 2013)  Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement  The effects of climate change on Sub-Saharan Africa vary depending on the region and have impacts on migration and security, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)  Coastal areas, for example, in West and East Africa are at risk from sea level rise that could affect major cities  Drought and the risk of desertification in the Sahel is cited as a concern, as is increased rainfall in parts of Central Africa accompanied by lower agricultural yields  As desertification threatens the livelihoods of farmers and herders, and drought makes fishing more challenging, rural dwellers may be more likely to migrate to cities, according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)  Urbanization and population growth across Sub-Saharan Africa is already making densely populated cities vulnerable to flooding, storms, and erosion, increasing the number of people at risk of displacement by sudden-onset disasters  Climate change effects and changing migration flows across Sub-Saharan Africa may impact access to natural resources and contribute to existing tensions and conflicts, according to UNEP and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  In Nigeria, the effects of climate change may effect a variety of livelihoods and increase migration south, while also exacerbating existing conflicts  The effects of climate change on Nigeria may impact the country’s agriculture and economy, according to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)  Higher temperatures and decreased rainfall have contributed to drought in northern Nigeria  Desertification is also a concern  Some regions in northern Nigeria have less than 10 inches of rain a year, an amount that has decreased by 25 percent since the 1980’s, according to USIP  In other areas across Nigeria flooding has resulted in major crop losses, according to UNEP  Rising sea level, water inundation, and erosion are concerns in Nigeria’s coastal areas  Rising sea level is predicted to pose medium to very high risks to Africa’s coastal areas by 2100, according to the IPCC  Future sea level rise could result in the inundation of over 70 percent of the Nigerian coast  A rise of 0 2 meters in sea level could risk billions of dollars in assets, including oil wells near the coast  Even without a rapid rise in sea level, Nigeria’s coastal areas could experience erosion and significant land loss by 2100, as the IPCC has reported  The effects of climate change on livelihoods in northern Nigeria may contribute to migration to the south according to UNEP, while conflict in the north drives separate migration trends  As the effects of climate change make farming and fishing more challenging elsewhere in Nigeria, migration to southern coastal cities may increase  Traditionally, farmers, herders, and fishery workers migrated for temporary employment during the off season, including migration to Nigeria’s cities to work in the oil industry  Permanent migration south as well as to cities may become more common if land suitable for farming decreases  As fish habitats like Lake Chad dry up, fishery workers may also migrate  Larger urban populations on the coast will put more people at risk of sea level rise, water inundation, and erosion, according to the IPCC  A rise in sea level of 1 meter could put over 3 million people at risk of displacement as the IPCC has reported  Herders have also moved further south due to increased drought in northern Nigeria, as UNEP and USIP have reported  A 2010 survey of herdsmen in Nigeria, for example, found that nearly one-third of them had migrated southeast as a result of changes in the natural environment, according to the UNEP  The ongoing conflict with Boko Haram, while not caused by climate change, has further resulted in millions of displaced people across the Lake Chad region, including many Nigerians who have fled to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger  Nigerian refugees at the Minawao camp in Cameroon  Challenges in Stability and Security The effects of climate change, migration, and conflict are interconnected in Nigeria, as USIP has reported  The country is ranked 14th of 178 countries on the Fragile States Index  Events in northwest Africa, including Boko Haram’s attacks in Nigeria, have underscored concerns about the region’s vulnerability to the spread of violent extremism  The effects of climate change may exacerbate these concerns, according to USIP  Nigerians fleeing attacks from Boko Haram in the north have gone to communities in neighboring Chad, Cameroon, and Niger that are already experiencing food shortages due in part to climate change  These neighboring countries as a result have fewer resources to support both their own residents and the newer refugees  Non-state actors may also take advantage of government inaction on the effects of climate change  Boko Haram, for example, has justified its acts of violence by pointing to government failures, according to the USIP  Separately, increased drought in the north may aggravate historic tensions over land and water use between farmers in the south and herders migrating from the north, according to UNEP  Nigeria’s oil fields on the coast, which represent a significant part of the economy, are also at risk from sea level rise  Potential losses in oil revenue could impact Nigeria’s ability to respond to humanitarian crises and conflict at home  Increased violence within its borders could also affect Nigeria’s ability to support regional peacekeeping missions, such as the United Nations Mission in Liberia from 2003 to 2018, where Nigerian troops worked to restore security after a civil war  The effects of climate change in the Middle East and North Africa, including on its desert regions, may impact water access and compound migration and stability challenges, according to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)  Over 60 percent of the population already experiences high or very high water stress, according to the World Bank  Coupled with unsustainable water use, climate change may further exacerbate challenges with water security  The region continues to experience rising temperatures and declining annual rainfall, trends that contribute to the severity and length of drought, land degradation, and desertification  Decreased water security affects the livelihood and quality of life of farmers in the region, contributing to an increase in their migration to the cities and more urbanization, according to the World Bank  In contrast, many people are expected to migrate away from coastal cities as a result of sea level rise, according to UNEP  These potential migrations would be taking place in a region that already hosts large numbers of migrants such as those displaced by conflict and violence, including 18 percent of the world’s refugees, according to the International Organization for Migration  Challenges in water security may put greater pressure on unstable governments in the region, by intensifying existing tensions and conflicts between populations and their governments as well as between countries that share sources of water  The conflict in Syria illustrates the complex nature of climate change, migration, and conflict in the region, and the challenges to accurately assessing the links among the three, as noted in a technical paper commissioned by the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID)  Rising temperatures and declining rainfall have contributed to recent droughts in Syria, a trend that may continue  The country underwent an extended drought from about 2006 until 2011  During the drought an estimated 60 percent of Syria experienced severe crop failure, and accompanying impacts on food security  Some studies have linked the length and severity of the drought in Syria to climate change, as USAID has reported  Others, however, have pointed to government land and water use policies, combined with the effects of climate change, as responsible for the severity of the drought  Agricultural policies, for example, encouraged farmers to grow water intensive crops like wheat, and supported inefficient irrigation practices, policies which further depleted ground water and made the region more vulnerable to decreases in rainfall linked to climate change  Across the Middle East, the rising temperatures and declining rainfalls of recent decades may worsen, according to the World Bank  If these trends continue, countries in the Middle East, including Syria, could continue to experience periods of severe drought and reduced crop yields  Migration Trends The ongoing conflict in Syria, in which migration due to climate change may have been a contributing factor, has caused large-scale migration to neighboring countries in the Middle East and to Europe  Leading up to the civil war, prolonged drought, among other factors, had increased migration to Syrian cities  Because of the drought, in 2009, over 800,000 Syrians lost their livelihoods in the agricultural sector, while nearly 1 million experienced food insecurity  In 2010, an estimated 200,000 people migrated from farms in rural areas to cities, according to a UN report  The conflict in Syria, which began in 2011, has further displaced large numbers of people within the country and across the Middle East, as we have previously reported At the beginning of the conflict, Syrians, as well as Iraqi and Palestinian refugees who had been residing in Syria, fled mainly to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey  As the conflict persisted, refugees fled in larger numbers to Turkey, with the UNHCR reporting that nearly 1 million Syrians sought protection in that country in 2015  Starting that year, a growing number of Syrians risked dangerous sea voyages to reach countries in Europe, such as Greece, Germany, and Sweden  As of June 2017, more than 5 million registered Syrian refugees were living in neighboring countries, including more than 3 million in Turkey, and more than 1 million in Lebanon  Challenges in Stability and Security Sources agree that the Syrian conflict is a significant security challenge that has resulted in large scale migration across the Middle East and to Europe  Yet the link between prolonged drought, rural to urban migration, and the current conflict in Syria is uncertain  Some academic sources argue that the increased strain on urban infrastructure and resources due to the rural to urban migration played a role in Syria’s growing instability  Others highlight the complex nature of the Syrian conflict, pointing to broader political factors that exacerbated resource scarcity and inequality  For example, as the drought intensified, the Syrian government downplayed the severity of the humanitarian crisis, as described in research cited in a technical report commissioned by USAID result, appeals to the international community for emergency aid received minimal support  Combined with existing sectarian divisions, ongoing revolutions across the Middle East, and other factors, the government’s response to the drought may have contributed to the current conflict  Migration and displacement are a concern in the region, according to the Department of Defense and others  The U S  government has provided significant humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees in the Middle East, including in Lebanon and Jordan, as we have previously reported However, a technical report commissioned by USAID has cautioned that the ongoing conflict in Syria makes it difficult to conduct research and draw conclusions related to climate, migration and conflict  As a The effects of climate change on Oceania, particularly rising seas, may significantly impact coastal populations and increase migration in the future, as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have reported  Rising temperatures and declining rainfall may also contribute to lower yields from fisheries and agriculture, and a significant decrease in coral reef cover  Extreme weather events, including higher temperatures, wind, and rainfall, have already increased in number and intensity across the region  In the majority of Pacific island nations, of those who migrate, more people leave than come, according to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Observatory on Migration  The majority of migration in the region is economically driven  In the future, climate change may further impact these migration patterns across the region, according to the IPCC  Climate change has already exacerbated challenges that aid-dependent nations in the region face, restricting livelihoods and resources and contributing to pressures to migrate  The costs of climate change, including a decline in crop yields, a rise in energy demands, and a loss of coastal land, are predicted to be significant  The ADB estimates these costs will reach 12 7 percent of the Pacific regions’ GDP by 2100  Increased migration may also impact political stability and play a role in geopolitical rivalries within the region, according to the IPCC  The effects of climate change, especially rising sea levels, may result in forced migration from the Republic of the Marshall Islands (the Marshall Islands) and have additional impacts on the U S  defense infrastructure on the islands  Observed and Projected Effects of Climate Change Rising sea levels are a grave threat to the Marshall Islands The country consists of islands, low-lying atolls—coral caps sitting on top of submerged volcanoes—making it particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels  On average, the Marshall Islands are 2 meters above sea level  In Majuro, the country’s most populous atoll, observed rates of sea level rise are already twice as fast as the global average  Population centers experience significant flooding, with damage to roads, houses, and infrastructure, especially during La Niña years, which are significantly wetter and more prone to extreme rainfall  Flooding is expected to worsen with rising sea levels, with consequences for the availabity of drinking water  On Roi-Namur island, for example, a 0 4 meter rise in sea level combined with wave-driven flooding is predicted to make groundwater undrinkable year round as early as 2055  This salt water inundation may contaminate already limited groundwater across the Marshall Islands  Lastly, during the 1940s and 1950s, the Marshall Islands was the site of 67 U S  nuclear weapons tests on or near Bikini and Enewetak Atolls  Projected increases in frequency of flooding may negatively impact efforts to contain radioactive material stored on Runit Island  A number of factors have increased migration from the Marshall Islands, including to the United States  In 1986, the United States entered into a compact of free association with the country that allowed its citizens to migrate to the United States, as we have previously reported  As a result, more than 20,000 Marshallese now live in the United States People are more likely to migrate abroad as the effects of climate change on the Marshall Islands—including rising sea levels—increasingly impact livelihoods The threat of mass displacement and forced migration is also a concern, as the International Organization for Migration has reported  However, Marshallese culture has a strong connection to the land, which means that many view migration as a last resort  For people still living in the Marshall Islands, they face overpopulation in urban centers and displacement by sudden-onset disasters like cyclones and flooding  Factors influencing people deciding to move abroad include displacement, lack of economic opportunity—sometimes exacerbated by climate change—and limited access to health care  Climate change is likely to increase risks to public health in the country Increased rainfall, for instance, may expand mosquito breeding grounds, raising the risk of diseases like dengue fever  The country’s limited health care system may further contribute to migration from the islands  Challenges in Stability and Security In the future, the Marshall Islands may become uninhabitable  This prospect threatens the existence of the Marshall Islands as a sovereign state, as well as the United States defense facilities located on the islands  The total loss of land could result in the Marshall Islands being uninhabitable, which raises problems of migration, resettlement, cultural survival, and sovereignty  Relocation of the population of the Marshall Islands, and of other Pacific Island nations at risk of rising seas, could cause significant geopolitical challenges The Marshall Islands are also of strategic importance for the United States  Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States has permission to use several islands— including Kwajalein Atoll, the location of the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Range—until 2066  The country’s proximity to the equator makes the Marshall Islands ideal for missile defense and space work  Yet the island’s defense infrastructure and operations are at significant risk due to rising sea levels, flooding, and diminishing supplies of potable water  As the Department of Defense has noted, climate change will have serious implications for the department’s ability to maintain its infrastructure and ensure military readiness in the future  DOD, 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap (Alexandria, VA: June 2014)  The effects of climate change on Central America and the Caribbean may increase migration and exacerbate poverty rates, as the National Intelligence Council has reported  The climate in Central America and the Caribbean is predicted to be warmer and dryer  The Caribbean’s extensive coastlines and low-lying areas are vulnerable to sea level rise and an increase in sudden-onset disasters, including hurricanes and storm surges  Drought is a particular concern in Central America, where declines in rainfall have reduced crop yields and threatened livelihoods in recent years  Some evidence shows that drought in parts of Central America has contributed to migration north, including to the United States  Population growth, especially in coastal cities, has increased the number of people at risk during hurricane season, and the number and intensity of hurricanes have grown in recent years  Some attribute the increase in intensity to higher sea surface temperatures caused by climate change  However, there remains debate about long term hurricane trends  Recent hurricanes have caused displacement, and significant losses and damages—including to infrastructure—across the region  The depletion of coral reefs and mangrove trees, natural barriers to coastal erosion and flooding, has exacerbated vulnerability to storms in coastal areas  Climate change is likely to have negative impacts on tourism in the Caribbean, where the industry is an important part of the economy, according to Inter-American Development Bank  Climate change impacts on the economy may make it increasingly difficult for governments to reduce poverty and move towards environmental sustainability  Haiti’s geography, location, and high poverty rates make the country especially vulnerable  Haiti is highly vulnerable to climate change effects, partly due to its long coastline Hurricanes routinely make landfall in the country, and increases in rainfall and wind speeds associated with hurricanes are likely  Severe hurricanes, including Hurricane Matthew in September 2016, have hit Haiti in recent years  Hurricane Matthew was the first category 4 storm in Haiti since 1964  Damage from severe flooding and severe winds during the hurricane affected over 2 million people and created significant food security and public health challenges  Significant deforestation has further exacerbated Haiti’s vulnerability to hurricanes, as trees previously provided a natural barrier to the erosion that strong winds and more rainfall can cause  Rising temperature and highly variable rainfall have led to extreme drought and flash flooding, according to the U S  Agency for International Development (USAID) 32 2 These trends decrease crop yields, affecting the livelihoods of farmers, and threaten water access  Projected increase in temperature and decreases in rainfall are likely to intensify drought in Haiti’s interior  USAID, Haiti: Environment and Climate Change Fact Sheet (January 2016)  Migration Trends Slow-onset climate events, such as drought, and rising sea levels, and sudden-onset events, including earthquakes, affect Haiti, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)  Haiti is also particularly exposed to extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, which can lead to displacement  In January 2010, a catastrophic earthquake in Haiti killed an estimated 230,000 people and left close to 1 5 million people homeless  According to IOM, the recurrence of environmental disruptions increases risks and vulnerabilities  When Hurricane Sandy struck Haiti in October 2012, the country had still not recovered from the 2010 earthquake  The worsening of climate change effects around the world, particularly in low-income countries, may increase the number of people wanting to immigrate to the United States, where approximately 700,000 Haitians live today Remittances from family members living outside Haiti make up a significant portion of the economy, at 24 7 percent of GDP  The majority of these remittances come from the United States, as we have previously reported 34 4Remittances may support resilience to climate change effects as migrants send money home for disaster recovery and adaptation  Challenges in Stability and Security Haiti, the poorest country in the western hemisphere, has experienced political instability for most of its history, and ranks 12th of 178 on the Fragile States Index  The government has a low capacity to respond to additional challenges like those related to climate change, according to USAID  The Ministry of Environment, for example, is a relatively new organization within the Haitian government, and local and regional governments have a limited ability to enforce environmental laws and regulations  The United States has provided substantial aid to Haiti, both in disaster response and broader development projects  Official development assistance for Haiti in 2015, for instance, totaled slightly more than $1 billion  According to a January 2018 UN report, 2 8 million people were still in need of humanitarian assistance  GAO, Remittances To Fragile Countries: Treasury Should Assess Risks from Shifts to Non-Banking Channels, GAO-18-313 (Washington, D C , March 8, 2018)  The Department of State’s Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (State/OES) provided about $78 million in adaptation funding from the Global Climate Change Initiative for eight projects for fiscal years 2014 through 2017 (see table 2)  The Global Climate Change Initiative was established in 2010 to promote resilient, low- emission development, and integrate climate change considerations into U S  foreign assistance and was divided into three main programmatic initiatives: (1) Adaptation assistance, (2) Clean Energy assistance, and (3) Sustainable Landscapes assistance  The primary purpose of these contributions to the LDCF was to address the adaptation needs of the least developed countries, which are especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change  The LDCF financed the preparation and implementation of National Adaptation Programs of Action, which identify a country’s priorities for adaptation actions  Initial grant to the National Adaptation Plans Global Network  The network is focused on increasing the capacity of national and subnational governments to identify and assess climate risks, integrate these risk considerations in sector planning, develop a pipeline of projects to address risks, identify and secure funding for projects, and track progress toward resilience targets  Colombia, East Caribbean (Guyana, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Ethiopia, Peru, South Africa, Uganda, West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Togo) and, under current consideration, East Caribbean (Dominica, Suriname), and Pacific (Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu) The cost amendment intensified the technical support on National Adaptation Plans to select countries dependent upon specific country adaption needs  In addition, the cost amendment continued the learning and progress from the initial grant  Implemented through the Department of Treasury, this funding supported a Treasury grant to the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative Multi Donor Trust Fund at the World Bank  This activity established the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Foundation and the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Company, among other things  The goal of PIER is to increase private sector investment in resilience to climate change in eight developing countries  The first phase of the project will assess and identify opportunities for private investment in resilience, as well as build public and private capacity for climate risk assessment in all the countries  In the second phase, public and private sector partners will develop and pilot climate risk-reduction investment models in four of the countries  The third phase will publicize the piloted investment models and lessons learned among the eight countries  Implemented through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, this activity aims to implement a capacity-building partnership with India to promote effective climate resilient decision making at national, state, and local levels  In addition to the contacts named above, the following individuals made key contributions to this report: Miriam Carroll Fenton (Assistant Director), Kristy Williams (Assistant Director), Rachel Girshick (Analyst-in-Charge), Nancy Santucci, Miranda Cohen, Aldo Salerno, Neil Doherty, and Judith Williams  Alexander Welsh, Justin Fisher, and Joseph Thompson provided technical and other support  Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Needs to Better Incorporate Adaptation into Planning and Collaboration at Overseas Installations  GAO-18-206  Washington, D C : November 13, 2017  Compacts Of Free Association: Actions Needed to Prepare for The Transition of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands to Trust Fund Income  GAO-18-415  Washington, D C : May 17, 2018  Remittances to Fragile Countries: Treasury Should Assess Risks from Shifts to Non-Banking Channels  GAO-18-313  Washington, D C : March 8, 2018  Syrian Refugees: U S  Agencies Conduct Financial Oversight Activities for Humanitarian Assistance but Should Strengthen Monitoring  GAO-18-58  Washington, D C : October 31, 2017  International Food Assistance: Agencies Should Ensure Timely Documentation of Required Market Analyses and Assess Local Markets for Program Effects  GAO-17-640  Washington, D C : July 13, 2017  High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others  GAO-17-317  Washington, D C : February 15, 2017  Federal Disaster Assistance: Federal Departments and Agencies Obligated at Least $277 6 Billion during Fiscal Years 2005 through 2014  GAO-16-797  Washington, D C : September 22, 2016  Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy Is Underway, but Agency Could Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps  GAO-16-453  Washington, D C : July 12, 2016  Climate Information: A National System Could Help Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Decision Makers Use Climate Information  GAO-16-37  Washington, D C : November 23, 2015  Hurricane Sandy: An Investment Strategy Could Help the Federal Government Enhance National Resilience for Future Disasters  GAO-15-515  Washington, D C : July 30, 2015  High-Risk Series: An Update  GAO-15-290  Washington, D C : February 11, 2015  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  GAO-14-704G  Washington, D C : September 10, 2014  Combating Terrorism: U S  Efforts in Northwest Africa Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management  GAO-14-518  Washington, D C : June 24, 2014  Climate Change Adaptation: DOD Can Improve Infrastructure Planning and Processes to Better Account for Potential Impacts  GAO-14-446  Washington, D C : May 30, 2014  Extreme Weather Events: Limiting Federal Fiscal Exposure and Increasing the Nation’s Resilience  GAO-14-364T  Washington, D C : February 12, 2014  Climate Change: State Should Further Improve Its Reporting on Financial Support to Developing Countries to Meet Future Requirements and Guidelines  GAO-13-829  Washington, D C : September 19, 2013  High-Risk Series: An Update  GAO-13-283  Washington, D C : February 14, 2013  International Climate Change Assessments: Federal Agencies Should Improve Reporting and Oversight of U S  Funding  GAO-12-43  Washington, D C : November 17, 2011  Climate Change Adaptation: Federal Efforts to Provide Information Could Help Government Decision Making  GAO-12-238T  Washington, D C : November 16, 2011  Foreign Relation: Kwajalein Atoll Is the Key U S  Defense Interest in Two Micronesian Nations, GAO-02-119  Washington D C : January 22, 2002 

ground_truth: This report focuses on previous activity in Congress regarding high profile incidents of sexual assault in the military during the summer 2013 through 2016. Included are separate sections on the official responses related to these incidents by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Obama Administration, and Congress including legislation during the 113th (2013-2014) Congress and 114th Congress (2015-2016). The last section is a resource guide for sources in this report and related materials on sexual assault and prevention during this period. This report will not be updated and supersedes CRS Report R43168, Military Sexual Assault: Chronology of Activity in Congress and Related Resources. For current information regarding Congress and issues on sexual assault in the military, see CRS Report R44944, Military Sexual Assault: A Framework for Congressional Oversight, by Kristy N. Kamarck and Barbara Salazar Torreon. For legislative initiatives in the 115th Congress, see CRS Report R44923, FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, by Kristy N. Kamarck, Lawrence Kapp, and Barbara Salazar Torreon and CRS Report R45343, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, by Bryce H. P. Mendez et al.