prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: T he Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program provides cash benefits to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers; firefighters; employees of emergency management agencies; and members of emergency medical services agencies who are killed or permanently and totally disabled as the result of personal injuries sustained in the line of duty  The Public Safety Officers' Educational Assistance (PSOEA) program, a component of the PSOB program, provides higher-education assistance to the children and spouses of public safety officers killed or permanently disabled in the line of duty  Both programs are administered by the PSOB Office of the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)  Congress appropriates funds for these programs in the annual Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act  For FY2019, the one-time lump-sum PSOB benefit is $359,316 and the monthly full-time attendance PSOEA assistance is $1,224  The PSOB and PSOEA benefit amounts are indexed to reflect changes in the cost of living  Table 1 shows PSOB and PSOEA claims and approvals as reported by DOJ  To be eligible for PSOB benefits for death or disability, a person must have served in one of the following categories of public safety officers: law enforcement officer, firefighter, or chaplain in a public agency; FEMA employee or a state, local, or tribal emergency management agency employee; or emergency medical services member  There is no minimum amount of time a person must have served to be eligible for benefits  To be eligible for PSOB benefits as a law enforcement officer, firefighter, or chaplain, a person must have served in a "public agency" in an official capacity, with or without compensation  For the purposes of PSOB eligibility, a public agency is defined as the federal government and any department, agency, or instrumentality of the federal government; and any state government, the District of Columbia government, and any U S  territory or possession; and any local government, department, agency, or instrumentality of a state, the District of Columbia, or any U S  territory or possession  For the purposes of PSOB eligibility, a law enforcement officer is defined as "an individual involved in crime and juvenile delinquency control or reduction, or enforcement of the criminal laws (including juvenile delinquency), including, but not limited to, police, corrections, probation, parole, and judicial officers " For the purposes of PSOB eligibility, the definition of firefighter includes both professional firefighters and persons serving as an "officially recognized or designated member of a legally organized volunteer fire department " A chaplain is eligible for PSOB benefits (1) if he or she is either an "officially recognized or designated member of a legally organized volunteer fire department or legally organized police department" or public employee of a police or fire department and (2) only if he or she was performing the duties of a chaplain in an official capacity while responding to a police, fire, or rescue emergency  Employees of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and state, local, or tribal emergency management agencies may be eligible for PSOB benefits under certain conditions provided in statute  A FEMA employee or an employee of a state, local, or tribal emergency management agency working with FEMA is eligible for PSOB benefits if he or she is performing official duties that are related to a major disaster or an emergency declared under the Robert T  Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) and that are considered hazardous by the FEMA Administrator or the head of the state, local, or tribal agency  A member, including a volunteer member, of a rescue squad or "ambulance crew" who is authorized or licensed by law and the applicable agency and is engaging in rescue services or providing emergency medical services may be eligible for PSOB benefits  The rescue squad or ambulance service may provide ground or air ambulance services and may be either a public agency or a nonprofit entity authorized to provide rescue or emergency medical services  By PSOB regulation, eligible emergency medical services workers include rescue workers, ambulance drivers, paramedics, health care responders, emergency medical technicians, or others who are trained in rescue activity or emergency medical services and have the legal authority and responsibility to provide such services  The PSOB program pays benefits if a public safety officer becomes permanently and totally disabled or dies "as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty " To qualify for coverage under the PSOB program, a public safety officer's disability or death must have been the result of a personal injury  The PSOB regulation defines an injury for the purposes of benefit eligibility as a traumatic physical wound (or a traumatized physical condition of the body) directly and proximately caused by external force (such as bullets, explosives, sharp instruments, blunt objects, or physical blows), chemicals, electricity, climatic conditions, infectious disease, radiation, virii, or bacteria     The regulation also provides that the definition of an injury does not include an occupational disease or a condition of the body caused by stress or strain, including psychological conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder  However, the PSOB statute specifically provides for deaths caused by certain cardiovascular conditions  The death of a public safety officer due to a heart attack, stroke, or vascular rupture shall be presumed to be a death from a personal injury for the purposes of PSOB eligibility if the officer engaged in nonroutine stressful or strenuous physical activity as part of an emergency response or training exercise; and if the condition began during the physical activity, while the officer remained on duty after the physical activity, or within 24 hours of the physical activity  The PSOB program covers a public safety officer's death or disability if it occurred as the result of an injury incurred in the line of duty  The PSOB regulations provide that an injury occurs in the line of duty if it (1) is the result of the public safety officer's authorized activities while on duty, (2) occurs while responding to an emergency or request for assistance, or (3) occurs while commuting to or from duty in an authorized department or personal vehicle  In addition, if there is convincing evidence that the injury was the result of the individual's status as a public safety officer, that injury is covered by the PSOB program  The lump-sum PSOB death and disability benefit for FY2019 is $359,316  The benefit amount is adjusted annually to reflect changes in the cost of living using the annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers (CPI-U) for the one-year period ending in the previous June  If a public safety officer receives a disability benefit and later dies from the same injury, the officer's survivors may not receive a PSOB death benefit  The payable benefit amount is based on the date of the public safety officer's death or the date of the injury that caused the disability, rather than on the date of application for benefits or disability determination  Thus, if a benefit increase occurs while an application is pending, the benefit is payable at the previous, lower, benefit level  Death and disability benefits are not subject to the federal income tax  In general, PSOB death and disability benefits are paid in addition to any other workers' compensation, life insurance, or other benefits paid for the death of a public safety officer  However, the PSOB death benefit is offset by the following benefits: benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) payable to state and local law enforcement officers injured or killed while enforcing federal law; benefits under the D C  Retirement and Disability Act of 1916 for certain police officers and firefighters in the District of Columbia; and payments from the September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund (VCF)  PSOB death benefits are payable to the eligible spouse and children of a public safety officer  A spouse is the person to whom the officer is legally married, even if physically separated, under the marriage laws of the jurisdiction where the marriage took place  Pursuant to regulations issued after the Supreme Court struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act in United States v  Windsor , the legally married spouse of a public safety office may be of the same sex as the officer  A child is defined as any "natural, illegitimate, adopted, or posthumous child or stepchild" of the public safety officer who, at the time of the public safety officer's fatal or catastrophic injury, is 18 years of age or under; between 18 and 23 years of age and a full-time student in high school or undergraduate higher education; or over 18 years of age and incapable of self-support because of physical or mental disability  PSOB death benefits are paid to eligible survivors in the following order: 1  if the officer is survived by only a spouse, 100% of the death benefits are payable to the spouse; 2  if the officer is survived by a spouse and children, 50% of the death benefits are payable to the spouse and the remaining 50% is distributed equally among the officer's children; 3  if the officer is survived by only children, the death benefits are equally distributed among the officer's children; 4  if the officer has no surviving spouse or children, the death benefits are paid to the individual or individuals designated by the officer in the most recently executed designation of beneficiary on file at the time of the officer's death; or if the officer does not have a designation of beneficiary on file, the benefits are paid to the individual or individuals designated by the officer in the most recently executed life insurance policy on file at the time of the officer's death; 5  if the officer has no surviving spouse or eligible children, and the officer does not have a life insurance policy, the death benefits are equally distributed between the officer's surviving parents; or 6  if the officer has no surviving spouse, eligible children, or parents, and the officer did not have a designation of beneficiary or a life insurance policy on file at the time of his or her death, the death benefits are payable to surviving adult, nondependent, children of the officer  PSOB disability benefits are paid only in cases of permanent and total disability  There are no benefits payable for partial or short-term disabilities  A disability is considered permanent for the purposes of PSOB eligibility if, given the current state of medicine in the United States, there is a degree of medical certainty that the condition will remain constant or deteriorate over the person's lifetime or that the public safety officer has reached maximum medical improvement  A public safety officer is considered to be totally disabled for the purposes of PSOB eligibility if given the current state of medicine in the United States, there is a degree of medical certainty that the officer is unable to perform any gainful work  PSOB regulation defines gainful work as "full- or part-time activity that is compensated or commonly compensated " Applications for PSOB death and disability benefits are filed with the PSOB office, which determines benefit eligibility and commences benefit payment  Unless extended for good cause, application deadlines must be met  Complete benefit applications must be filed no later than for death benefits: three years after the death; one year after the determination of the officer's employing agency to award or deny death benefits payable by that agency; or one year after certification by the officer's employing agency that the agency is not authorized to pay any death benefits; and for disability benefits: three years after the date of the injury; one year after the determination of the officer's employing agency to award or deny workers' compensation or disability benefits payable by that agency; or one year after certification by the officer's employing agency that the agency is not authorized to pay any workers' compensation or disability benefits  A lump-sum interim payment of up to $3,000 may be made if a PSOB death benefit will "probably be paid " The interim payment amount reduces the final PSOB payment amount  If the ultimate decision is to deny death benefits, the interim payment must be returned to the federal government, unless this repayment is waived because it would create a hardship for the beneficiary  Section 611 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act; P L  107-56 ) provides for expedited payment of PSOB death and disability benefits if the officer's injury occurred "in connection with prevention, investigation, rescue, or recovery efforts related to a terrorist attack " In such cases, PSOB benefits must be paid within 30 days of certification from the officer's employing agency that the officer's death or disability was related to terrorism  The Public Safety Officers' Education Assistance (PSOEA) program provides financial assistance with costs associated with higher education to the spouse or children of a public safety officer who is eligible for PSOB death or disability benefits  The spouse or child of a public safety officer who is eligible for PSOB death or disability benefits may be eligible for PSOEA benefits  To be eligible for PSOEA benefits, a spouse must have been married to an eligible public safety officer at the time of the officer's death or injury  A child is eligible for PSOEA benefits until the age of 27  This age limit can be extended by the Attorney General in extraordinary circumstances, or, pursuant to Section 3 of the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Improvement Act of 2017 ( P L  115-36 ), if there is a delay of more than one year in approving PSOB or PSOEA benefits  In addition, to be eligible for PSOEA benefits, the spouse or child must be enrolled at an eligible educational institution  For the purposes of PSOEA eligibility, an eligible education institution is one that meets the definition of an "institution of higher education" as provided by Section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and that is eligible for federal student aid  PSOEA benefits are payable to the claimant and may be used only to defray costs associated with higher education attendance, including tuition, room, board, book and supplies, and education-related fees  The monthly PSOEA benefit amount is equal to the monthly benefit amount payable under the GI Bill Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance (DEA) program, which is administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for spouses and dependents of veterans with disabilities or who died as a result of service-connected conditions  The PSOEA benefit amounts are adjusted annually to reflect changes in the cost of living in accordance with changes to the GI Bill DEA benefit amounts  For FY2019, the PSOEA monthly benefit for a student attending an educational institution full-time is $1,224  The PSOEA benefit rates are prorated for less than full-time attendance  The maximum duration of PSOEA benefits for any person is 45 months of full-time education or a proportionate duration of part-time education  A person is ineligible for PSOEA if he or she is in default on a federal student loan or is ineligible for federal benefits due to a drug trafficking or drug possession conviction  In addition, the Attorney General may discontinue PSOEA benefits for a student that fails to make satisfactory progress in his or her course of study as defined by Section 484(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965  A claimant who is dissatisfied with a PSOB disability benefit denial may request a reconsideration  There is no reconsideration offered for denials of PSOB death or PSOEA benefits  A claimant who is dissatisfied with a PSOB or PSOEA benefit denial may request a de novo hearing before a hearing officer assigned by the director of the DOJ PSOB Office  The determination of a hearing officer may be appealed to the PSOB Office director  The director's determination is considered the final agency determination and is not subject to any further agency administrative review or appeal  However, provided all administrative appeals remedies have been exhausted, the PSOB Office director's determination may be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit  The PSOB statute authorizes the BJA to prescribe the maximum fee that an attorney or other representative may charge a claimant for services rendered in connection with a claim, with attorney fees generally limited to between 3% and 6% of the total benefit paid, depending on the level in the administrative appeals process the claim is approved  Program regulation prohibits stipulated-fee and contingency-fee arrangements for PSOB representation  Congress provides funding for PSOB and PSOE benefits and associated administrative expenses in the annual Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act  Funding for PSOB death benefits and associated administrative expenses is considered mandatory spending and Congress appropriates "such sums as may be necessary" for the payment of these benefits  Funding for PSOB disability and PSOEA benefits is considered discretionary and is subject to specific congressional appropriations  Annual appropriations language grants the Attorney General the authority to transfer from any available appropriations to the DOJ the funds necessary to respond to emergent circumstances that require additional funding for PSOB disability benefits and PSOEA benefits  


Report 2: The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA)  Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area of the coterminous United States (see Figure 1 )  Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P L  93-205 ; 16 U S C  §§1531 et seq ), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies  In general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by federal dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification—that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve  With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the U S  Bureau of Reclamation (BOR)  PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e g , "preference customers"), selling their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U S  Treasury on schedule for the portion of federal facility costs that have been allocated to hydropower beneficiaries  Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i e , receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority  Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress  Each PMA also has unique elements and regional issues that affect its business  They are discussed in alphabetical order  Created by the Bonneville Project Act of 1937 (16 U S C  §832) just before the completion of two large dams in the Pacific Northwest—Bonneville Dam in 1938 and Grand Coulee Dam in 1941—BPA was the first PMA  Though it serves a smaller geographical area, BPA is on par with WAPA (which serves the largest area) in the size of its transmission system  The agency operates and maintains about 75% of the high voltage transmission lines in its service territory, which includes Idaho, Oregon, Washington, western Montana and small parts of eastern Montana, California, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming  BPA also markets wholesale electricity from 31 federally owned hydropower facilities in the Northwest  These generation facilities are owned both by the Corps and BOR  BPA differs from the other three PMAs in that it is self-financed: it receives no federal appropriations  Since passage of the Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act of 1974 (16 U S C  §838), BPA has covered its operating costs through power rates set to ensure repayment to the Treasury of capital and interest on funds used to construct the Columbia River power system  BPA also has permanent Treasury borrowing authority, which it may use for capital on large projects  This money is repaid with interest, through power sales  As of 2018, BPA had $5 53 billion of bonds outstanding to the U S  Treasury, with BPA's current borrowing authority capped by Congress at $7 70 billion  BPA has also looked at other financing options as it approaches its debt limit, looking at nonfederal debt refinancing, lease-purchases, and other asset management strategies  BPA has initiated strategies and a financial plan to address a changing power generation and demand market, as it endeavors to meet its mandate for cost-based electric power rates  These plans are outlined in its Strategic Plan for 2018 to 2023, and address goals from financial health to infrastructure modernization  Wholesale power prices in the United States are generally trending downward, while BPA's firm power rates have trended upward  BPA repays its funding from the U S  Treasury largely through electricity sales to customers  While BPA generates its electricity from hydropower (which is traditionally one of the lower-cost means of power generation), increasing amounts of renewable electricity from growing wind and solar capacity installations in the Pacific Northwest are challenging BPA's price competitiveness, and perhaps its ability to repay its debts in a timely manner  In 2014, BPA entered into the Regional Cooperation Agreement (RCA) with the State of Washington to address the debt of Energy Northwest, a "joint action agency formed by the Washington state legislature in 1957" to manage public power utility costs  Energy Northwest owns and operates four electric power generation facilities: White Bluffs Solar Station, Packwood Lake Hydroelectric Project, Nine Canyon Wind Project, and the Columbia Generating Station  The Regional Cooperation debt is "the issuance of new bonds by Energy Northwest to refund outstanding bonds shortly before their maturities when substantial principal repayments were and are due " According to BPA, this allows for "integrated debt management" for the combined total debt portfolios of BPA and Energy Northwest, with a net effect reducing the "weighted average interest rate and the maturity of BPA's overall debt portfolio" over the life of the program  This refinancing, according to BPA, has enabled BPA to prepay higher-interest-rate federal obligations, and has "preserved or restored U S  Treasury borrowing authority " However, the debt service of the RCA is "borne by BPA ratepayers through BPA rates " BPA estimates that the "aggregate potential principal amount" of RCA refunding through bonds issued in fiscal years 2019 through 2030 could exceed $4 0 billion  BPA is responsible for maintaining and modernizing the generation and transmission infrastructure of its systems, and preserving and enhancing its physical and cybersecurity  With energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) in the West, BPA is considering whether to join the EIM, and how this might affect its operations and customers  Environmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i e , operations consistent with the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act  In addition, several environmental groups filed a lawsuit blaming the dams for warm river waters in summer 2015 that resulted in the deaths of about 250,000 adult sockeye salmon migrating up the Columbia and Snake Rivers  Some of these parties have sought to remove the four lower dams on the Snake River to ensure survival of some salmon and steelhead species  In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams  However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020  The memorandum ordered the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce "to appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind any regulations or procedures that unduly burden" water infrastructure projects so they "are better able to meet the demands of their authorized purposes " How this will affect the fish endangerment finding is unclear at this time  The Southeastern Power Administration was created in 1950 by the Secretary of the Interior to carry out the functions assigned to the Secretary by the Flood Control Act of 1944 (P L  78-534) in 11 states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia)  SEPA is unique among the four PMAs in two ways  It is the smallest PMA, with just over 40 employees, and, unlike the other three agencies, SEPA does not operate or maintain any transmission facilities, and thus contracts with other utilities for transmitting the federal power it markets to more than 12 million consumers  Southeastern markets approximately 3,400 MW of power produced at 22 multipurpose water projects, operated and maintained by the Corps  SEPA's facilities are aging; for instance, in 2018 it reported that its Cumberland System customers have agreed to fund $1 2 billion of planned rehabilitations of the nine hydroelectric facilities in the Corps' Nashville District  According to SEPA, it has an overcapacity issue  Projections for electricity load growth (in consultation with its preference customers) made before the 2008 economic downturn reportedly led to SEPA acquiring additional capacity it currently does not use  As a result, municipalities and electric cooperatives in SEPA's service area will have to make economic decisions regarding how to handle this excess capacity  As of 2018, at least one preference customer has terminated its contract with SEPA due to this issue  Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 (P L  78-534) established the Southwestern Power Administration  SWPA markets hydroelectric power in Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas from 24 multipurpose Corps dams with a combined capacity of 2,194 MW  SWPA serves more than 100 preference customer utilities with more than 8 million end-use customers  The agency manages nearly 1,400 miles of high-voltage transmission lines  SWPA is the only U S  electrical balancing area supported solely by hydroelectric generation, and its use of the reservoirs and river systems within the SWPA marketing area must be balanced with flood control and other required uses so that the power needs of its customers can be met  SWPA states that it uses alternative financing and offsetting collection authorities to fund expenses and purchase power to help SWPA meet its obligations while minimizing congressional appropriations  Periodically, SWPA has been challenged by low water conditions  It has a rain-based water supply—rather than one that is snow-based, like the mountain snowpack water supply of WAPA and BPA—and sells power from a comparatively small reservoir system which stores that water  Extended dry periods sometimes mean that SWPA must purchase replacement power and energy to meet its contractual obligations  This means that SWPA requires congressional authority to use its revenues from power sales over the long term—across high and low water years  Prior year balances have been available to Southwestern so that we are financially prepared and able to achieve rate stability for our customers  This authority is critical to operating our program according to sound business principles  Southwestern's program is funded by authority to use receipts, alternative financing, and other authorities approved by Congress, including appropriations, which represent only 6 5% of Southwestern's total program  Created by the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 ( P L  95-91 ), WAPA is the newest and largest of the PMAs in terms of service area  WAPA's service area covers 1 3 million square miles, and its power—transmitted by a high voltage grid over 17,000 miles long—serves customers in 15 western states  WAPA markets and transmits hydropower from 56 federal dams operated by BOR, and the Corps  It also sells hydropower power produced by facilities administered by the International Boundary and Water Commission, and markets the United States' 24 3% share (547 megawatts) of the coal-fired Navajo Generating Station in Arizona  In addition to the types of public bodies traditionally served as preference customers by the other PMAs, WAPA has developed a policy to give preference to Native American tribes regardless of their utility status  WAPA has been working with other regional entities to address the changing electric power needs of its customers  In 2014, WAPA published its Strategic Roadmap 2024, titled "Powering the Energy Frontier " The document is intended to serve as WAPA's strategic plan to guide the agency's actions for the next 10 years  However, according to some, the developing Energy Imbalance Market in the West may provide additional options for WAPA to address transmission development needs to balance regional generation and demand  An issue of continuing importance to WAPA is its role in relieving transmission congestion within its marketing area  There are a number of constrained transmission paths in the West whose limited capacity to transfer power may reduce the ability of utilities to serve electric loads on a seasonal or ongoing basis  In 2009, Section 402 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( P L  111-5 ) amended the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 to give WAPA authority to borrow up to $3 25 billion from the U S  Treasury to pursue transmission projects that integrate renewable generation sources into the electric transmission grid  The law provides authority to construct and upgrade transmission lines to help deliver renewable resources to market  Western created the Transmission Infrastructure Program, also known as TIP, to implement this new initiative  Several transmission projects have been initiated under the program  Previous budget proposals and legislation have proposed repealing WAPA's loan authority, but to date, none of these proposals have been enacted  In 2015, WAPA's Upper Great Plains (UGP) region joined the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO)  Under the operating agreement with SPP, WAPA was required to transfer functional control of UGP's eligible transmission facilities to SPP  WAPA is the first PMA to formally join an RTO, and states that benefits to date from joining SPP have significantly exceeded the original estimate of $11 5 million per year  WAPA reports that two of its other regions are considering joining SPP  For Water Year 2017, WAPA reported that it delivered 26,148 gigawatt-hours of hydroelectric power to its customers, which is 101% of average annual power sales  The West has been experiencing periodic droughts for a number of years, resulting in lower snowmelts and less water in storage and available for power generation  To help smooth the resulting annual differences, a "drought-adder" reduction program has been implemented in recent years  A drought-adder charge was levied to help repay deferred drought costs accrued during the 2000s in the Rocky Mountain and Upper Great Plains regions  The balance was paid a year ahead of schedule and, as of this year, has resulted in $40 million annual savings for more than 50 percent of WAPA's customers in Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas and the western sections of Minnesota and Iowa  This is the second year that 417 of WAPA's customers, out of 700, have had a rate reduction  The drought-adder component of the rate remains available to WAPA to adjust to the variable hydropower resource—a lasting risk if drought conditions persist in WAPA's territory  Moderate to extreme drought conditions have been reported in parts of the western United States  In addition to issues specific to individual PMAs, some recent proposals have applied to multiple PMAs  In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations  The proposal suggested that "eliminating or reducing" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets and increasing the private sector role would "encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers " The proposal calls for federal transmission infrastructure assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) to be sold, with the private sector and/or state and local entities potentially taking over the transmission functions now provided by the PMAs  The Federal entities that would result after such sales could contract with other utilities to provide transmission service for the delivery of Federal power just as the Southeastern Power Administration, which does not own transmission lines, already does  The proposal reports that according to the Administration's FY2019 budget justification, the sale of federal transmission assets would result in a net budgetary savings of $9 5 billion, in total, over a 10-year window  Reportedly, the Administration dropped the plan due to stakeholder opposition, with the Department of Energy stating that such a sale of PMA transmission assets would not proceed unless directed by Congress  Proposals to sell all or part of the PMAs are not new, and have been made in some form by almost every President since Reagan  However, Congress has sought to prevent executive branch alterations of PMA structures and authority  Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 ( P L  99-349 ), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress  The Trump Administration divestment proposal could have had an indirect impact on the original congressional intent for the PMAs to provide electricity at the lowest possible cost  This in turn could require changes to the following provisions: Flood Control Act of 1944, as amended (FCA; 16 U S C  §825s et seq  ); The 1937 Bonneville Project Act (BPA; 16 U S C  §832c ); and The Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (RPA; 43 U S C  §485h(c))   These laws also stipulate a preference of public bodies for the sale of federal power  Selling federally owned transmission assets could potentially affect the "lowest possible" rates of sale, and the statutory preference for publicly or cooperatively owned utilities to be the vehicle for sale of electric power produced by federal facilities 

ground_truth: The Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program provides cash benefits to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers; firefighters; employees of emergency management agencies; and members of emergency medical services agencies who are killed or permanently and totally disabled as the result of personal injuries sustained in the line of duty. The Public Safety Officers' Educational Assistance (PSOEA) program, a component of the PSOB program, provides higher-education assistance to the children and spouses of public safety officers killed or permanently disabled in the line of duty. The PSOB and PSOEA programs are administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). However, claimants dissatisfied with denials of benefits may pursue administrative appeals within DOJ and may seek judicial review before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Each year, Congress appropriates funding for PSOB death benefits, which is considered mandatory spending, and for PSOB disability benefits and PSOEA benefits, which is subject to annual appropriations. For FY2019, the one-time lump-sum PSOB death and disability benefit is $359,316 and the PSOEA monthly benefit for a student attending an educational institution full-time is $1,224. In FY2017, the DOJ approved 399 claims for PSOB death benefits, 82 claims for PSOB disability benefits, and 601 claims for PSOEA benefits.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: According to the President’s budget, the federal government plans to invest more than $96 billion for IT in fiscal year 2018—the largest amount ever budgeted  Despite such large IT expenditures, we have previously reported that investments in federal IT too often result in failed projects that incur cost overruns and schedule slippages, while contributing little to the desired mission-related outcomes  For example: The tri-agency National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System was disbanded in February 2010 by the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy after the program spent 16 years and almost $5 billion  The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Secure Border Initiative Network program was ended in January 2011, after the department obligated more than $1 billion for the program  The Department of Veterans Affairs’ Financial and Logistics Integrated Technology Enterprise program was intended to be delivered by 2014 at a total estimated cost of $609 million, but was terminated in October 2011  The Department of Defense’s Expeditionary Combat Support System was canceled in December 2012 after spending more than a billion dollars and failing to deploy within 5 years of initially obligating funds  The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) decided to terminate its Integrated Health Information System project in 2015  As reported by the agency in August 2017, the Coast Guard spent approximately $60 million over 7 years on this project, which resulted in no equipment or software that could be used for future efforts  Our past work has found that these and other failed IT projects often suffered from a lack of disciplined and effective management, such as project planning, requirements definition, and program oversight and governance  In many instances, agencies had not consistently applied best practices that are critical to successfully acquiring IT  Such projects have also failed due to a lack of oversight and governance  Executive-level governance and oversight across the government has often been ineffective, specifically from CIOs  For example, we have reported that some CIOs’ roles were limited because they did not have the authority to review and approve the entire agency IT portfolio  In addition to failures when acquiring IT, security deficiencies can threaten systems once they become operational  As we previously reported, in order to counter security threats, 23 civilian Chief Financial Officers Act agencies spent a combined total of approximately $4 billion on IT security-related activities in fiscal year 2016  Even so, our cybersecurity work at federal agencies continues to highlight information security deficiencies  The following examples describe the types of risks we have found at federal agencies  In November 2017, we reported that the Department of Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid did not consistently analyze privacy risks for its electronic information systems, and policies and procedures for protecting information systems were not always up to date  In August 2017, we reported that, since the 2015 data breaches, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had taken actions to prevent, mitigate, and respond to data breaches involving sensitive personal and background investigation information  However, we noted that the agency had not fully implemented recommendations made to OPM by DHS’s United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team to help the agency improve its overall security posture and improve its ability to protect its systems and information from security breaches  In July 2017, we reported that IT security at the Internal Revenue Service had weaknesses that limited its effectiveness in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer data  An underlying reason for these weaknesses was that the Internal Revenue Service had not effectively implemented elements of its information security program  In May 2016, we reported that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, OPM, and the Department of Veteran Affairs did not always control access to selected high-impact systems, patch known software vulnerabilities, and plan for contingencies  An underlying reason for these weaknesses was that the agencies had not fully implemented key elements of their information security programs  In August 2016, we reported that the IT security of the Food and Drug Administration had significant weaknesses that jeopardized the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems and industry and public health data  Congress and the President have enacted various key pieces of reform legislation to address IT management issues  These include the federal IT acquisition reform legislation commonly referred to as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA)  This legislation was intended to improve covered agencies’ acquisitions of IT and enable Congress to monitor agencies’ progress and hold them accountable for reducing duplication and achieving cost savings  The law includes specific requirements related to seven areas: Agency CIO authority enhancements  CIOs at covered agencies have the authority to, among other things, (1) approve the IT budget requests of their respective agencies and (2) review and approve IT contracts  Federal data center consolidation initiative (FDCCI)  Agencies covered by FITARA are required, among other things, to provide a strategy for consolidating and optimizing their data centers and issue quarterly updates on the progress made  Enhanced transparency and improved risk management  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and covered agencies are to make detailed information on federal IT investments publicly available, and agency CIOs are to categorize their investments by level of risk  Portfolio review  Covered agencies are to annually review IT investment portfolios in order to, among other things, increase efficiency and effectiveness and identify potential waste and duplication  Expansion of training and use of IT acquisition cadres  Covered agencies are to update their acquisition human capital plans to support timely and effective IT acquisitions  In doing so, the law calls for agencies to consider, among other things, establishing IT acquisition cadres (i e , multi-functional groups of professionals to acquire and manage complex programs), or developing agreements with other agencies that have such cadres  Government-wide software purchasing program  The General Services Administration is to develop a strategic sourcing initiative to enhance government-wide acquisition and management of software  In doing so, the law requires that, to the maximum extent practicable, the General Services Administration should allow for the purchase of a software license agreement that is available for use by all executive branch agencies as a single user  Maximizing the benefit of the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative  Federal agencies are required to compare their purchases of services and supplies to what is offered under the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative  In June 2015, OMB released guidance describing how agencies are to implement FITARA  This guidance is intended to, among other things: assist agencies in aligning their IT resources with statutory establish government-wide IT management controls to meet the law’s requirements, while providing agencies with flexibility to adapt to unique agency processes and requirements; strengthen the relationship between agency CIOs and bureau CIOs; strengthen CIO accountability for IT costs, schedules, performance, and security  The guidance identifies a number of actions that agencies are to take to establish a basic set of roles and responsibilities (referred to as the common baseline) for CIOs and other senior agency officials; and thus, to implement the authorities described in the law  For example, agencies are to conduct a self-assessment and submit a plan describing the changes they intend to make to ensure that common baseline responsibilities are implemented  In addition, in August 2016, OMB released guidance intended to, among other things, define a framework for achieving the data center consolidation and optimization requirements of FITARA  The guidance directs agencies to develop a data center consolidation and optimization strategic plan that defines the agency’s data center strategy for fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018  This strategy is to include, among other things, a statement from the agency CIO indicating whether the agency has complied with all data center reporting requirements in FITARA  Further, the guidance indicates that OMB is to maintain a public dashboard to display consolidation-related costs savings and optimization performance information for the agencies  Congress has recognized the importance of agencies’ continued implementation of FITARA provisions, and has taken legislative action to extend selected provisions beyond their original dates of expiration  Specifically, Congress and the President enacted laws to: remove the expiration date for enhanced transparency and improved risk management provisions, which were set to expire in 2019; remove the expiration date for portfolio review, which was set to expire in 2019; and extend the expiration date for FDCCI from 2018 to 2020  In addition, Congress and the President enacted a law to authorize the availability of funding mechanisms to help further agencies’ efforts to modernize IT  The law, known as the Modernizing Government Technology (MGT) Act, authorizes agencies to establish working capital funds for use in transitioning from legacy IT systems, as well as for addressing evolving threats to information security  The law also creates the Technology Modernization Fund, within the Department of the Treasury, from which agencies can “borrow” money to retire and replace legacy systems, as well as acquire or develop systems  Further, in February 2018, OMB issued guidance for agencies to implement the MGT Act  The guidance was intended to provide agencies additional information regarding the Technology Modernization Fund, and the administration and funding of the related IT working capital funds  Specifically, the guidance allowed agencies to begin submitting initial project proposals for modernization on February 27, 2018  In addition, in accordance with the MGT Act, the guidance provides details regarding a Technology Modernization Board, which is to consist of (1) the Federal CIO; (2) a senior official from the General Services Administration; (3) a member of DHS’s National Protection and Program Directorate; and (4) four federal employees with technical expertise in IT development, financial management, cybersecurity and privacy, and acquisition, appointed by the Director of OMB  Congress and the President enacted the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) to improve federal cybersecurity and clarify government-wide responsibilities  The act addresses the increasing sophistication of cybersecurity attacks, promotes the use of automated security tools with the ability to continuously monitor and diagnose the security posture of federal agencies, and provides for improved oversight of federal agencies’ information security programs  Specifically, the act clarifies and assigns additional responsibilities to entities such as OMB, DHS, and the federal agencies  Table 1 describes a selection of OMB, DHS, and agency responsibilities  Beyond the implementation of FITARA, FISMA, and related actions, the current administration has also initiated other efforts intended to improve federal IT  Specifically, in March 2017, the administration established the Office of American Innovation, which has a mission to, among other things, make recommendations to the President on policies and plans aimed at improving federal government operations and services  In doing so, the office is to consult with both OMB and the Office of Science and Technology Policy on policies and plans intended to improve government operations and services, improve the quality of life for Americans, and spur job creation  In May 2017, the Administration also established the American Technology Council, which has a goal of helping to transform and modernize federal agency IT and how the federal government uses and delivers digital services  The President is the chairman of this council, and the Federal CIO and the United States Digital Service Administrator are among the members  In addition, on May 11, 2017, the President signed Executive Order 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure  This executive order outlined actions to enhance cybersecurity across federal agencies and critical infrastructure to improve the nation’s cyber posture and capabilities against cyber security threats  Among other things, the order tasked the Director of the American Technology Council to coordinate a report to the President from the Secretary of DHS, the Director of OMB, and the Administrator of the General Services Administration, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, regarding the modernization of federal IT  As a result, the Report to the President on Federal IT Modernization was issued on December 13, 2017, and outlined the current and envisioned state of federal IT  The report focused on modernization efforts to improve the security posture of federal IT and recognized that agencies have attempted to modernize systems but have been stymied by a variety of factors, including resource prioritization, ability to procure services quickly, and technical issues  The report provided multiple recommendations intended to address these issues through the modernization and consolidation of networks and the use of shared services to enable future network architectures  Further, in March 2018, the Administration issued the President’s Management Agenda, which lays out a long-term vision for modernizing the federal government  The agenda identifies three related drivers of transformation—IT modernization; data, accountability, and transparency; and the workforce of the future—that are intended to push change across the federal government  The Administration also established 14 related Cross-Agency Priority goals, many of which have elements that involve IT  In particular, the Cross-Agency Priority goal on IT modernization states that modern IT must function as the backbone of how government serves the public in the digital age and provides three priorities that are to guide the Administration’s efforts to modernize federal IT: (1) enhancing mission effectiveness by improving the quality and efficiency of critical services, including the increased utilization of cloud-based solutions; (2) reducing cybersecurity risks to the federal mission by leveraging current commercial capabilities and implementing cutting edge cybersecurity capabilities; and (3) building a modern IT workforce by recruiting, reskilling, and retaining professionals able to help drive modernization with up-to-date technology  Most recently, on May 15, 2018, the President signed Executive Order 13833, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Agency Chief Information Officers  Among other things, this executive order is intended to better position agencies to modernize their IT systems, execute IT programs more efficiently, and reduce cybersecurity risks  The order pertains to 22 of the 24 Chief Financial Officer Act agencies: the Department of Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are exempt  For the covered agencies, the executive order strengthens the role of agency CIOs by, among other things, requiring to report directly to their agency head; to serve as their agency head’s primary IT strategic advisor; and to have a significant role in all management, governance, and oversight processes related to IT  In addition, one of the cybersecurity requirements directs agencies to ensure that the CIO works closely with an integrated team of senior executives, including those with expertise in IT, security, and privacy, to implement appropriate risk management measures  In the February 2017 update to our high-risk series, we reported that agencies still needed to complete significant work related to the management of IT acquisitions and operations We stressed that OMB and federal agencies should continue to expeditiously implement FITARA and OMB’s related guidance, which include enhancing CIO authority, consolidating data centers, and acquiring and managing software licenses  Our update to this high-risk area also stressed that OMB and agencies needed to continue to implement our prior recommendations in order to improve their ability to effectively and efficiently invest in IT  Specifically, from fiscal years 2010 through 2015, we made 803 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to address shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations  In addition, in fiscal year 2016, we made 202 new recommendations, thus, further reinforcing the need for OMB and agencies to address the shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations  As stated in the update, OMB and agencies should demonstrate government-wide progress in the management of IT investments by, among other things, implementing at least 80 percent of our recommendations related to managing IT acquisitions and operations within 4 years  As of May 2018, OMB and agencies had fully implemented 489 (or about 61 percent) of the 803 recommendations  Figure 1 summarizes the progress that OMB and agencies have made in addressing our recommendations as compared to the 80 percent target  Overall, federal agencies would be better positioned to realize billions in cost savings and additional management improvements if they address these recommendations, including those aimed at implementing CIO responsibilities, review of IT acquisitions; improving data center consolidation; and managing software licenses  In all, the various laws, such as FITARA, and related guidance assign 35 IT management responsibilities to CIOs in six key areas  These areas are: leadership and accountability, budgeting, information security, investment management, workforce, and strategic planning  In a draft report on CIO responsibilities that we have provided to the agencies for comment and plan to issue in June 2018, our preliminary results suggest that none of the 24 agencies we reviewed had policies that fully addressed the role of their CIO, as called for by federal laws and guidance  In this regard, a majority of the agencies fully or substantially addressed the role of their CIOs for the area of leadership and accountability  In addition, a majority of the agencies substantially or partially addressed the role of their CIOs for two areas: information security and IT budgeting  However, most agencies partially or minimally addressed the role of their CIOs for two areas: investment management and strategic planning  These preliminary results are shown in figure 2  Despite these shortfalls, most agency officials stated that their CIOs are implementing the responsibilities even if the agencies do not have policies requiring implementation  Nevertheless, the CIOs of the 24 selected agencies acknowledged in responses to a survey that we administered for our draft report that they were not always very effective in implementing the six IT management areas  Specifically, our preliminary results show that at least 10 of the CIOs indicated that they were less than very effective for each of the six areas of responsibility  We believe that until agencies fully address the role of CIOs in their policies, agencies will be limited in addressing longstanding IT management challenges  Figure 3 depicts that extent to which the CIOs reported their effectiveness in implementing the six areas of responsibility  Beyond the actions of the agencies, however, our preliminary results indicate that shortcomings in agencies’ policies also are partially attributable to two weaknesses in OMB’s FITARA implementation guidance  First, the guidance does not comprehensively address all CIO responsibilities, such as those related to assessing the extent to which personnel meet IT management knowledge and skill requirements, and ensuring that personnel are held accountable for complying with the information security program  Correspondingly, the majority of the agencies’ policies did not fully address nearly all of the responsibilities that were not included in OMB’s guidance  Second, OMB’s guidance does not ensure that CIOs have a significant role in (1) IT planning, programming, and budgeting decisions and (2) execution decisions and the management, governance, and oversight processes related to IT, as required by federal law and guidance  In the absence of comprehensive guidance, CIOs will not be positioned to effectively acquire, maintain, and secure their IT systems  Based on our preliminary results, 24 agency CIOs also identified a number of factors that enabled and challenged their ability to effectively manage IT  As shown in figure 4, five factors were identified by at least half of the 24 CIOs as major enablers and three factors were identified by at least half of the CIOs as major challenges  Specifically, most agency CIOs cited five factors as being enablers to effectively carry out their responsibilities: (1) NIST guidance, (2) the CIO’s position in the agency hierarchy, (3) OMB guidance, (4) coordination with the Chief Acquisition Officer (CAO), and (5) legal authority  Further, three factors were cited by CIOs as major factors that have challenged their ability to effectively carry out responsibilities: (1) processes for hiring, recruiting, and retaining IT personnel; (2) financial resources; and (3) the availability of personnel/staff resources  As our draft report states, although OMB has issued guidance aimed at addressing the three factors that were identified by at least half of the CIOs as major challenges, the guidance does not fully address those challenges  Further, regarding the financial resources challenge, OMB recently required agencies to provide data on CIO authority over IT spending; however, its guidance does not provide a complete definition of the authority  We believe that in the absence of such guidance, agencies have created varying definitions of CIO authority  Further, until OMB updates its guidance to include a complete definition of the authority that CIOs are to have over IT spending, it will be difficult for OMB to identify any deficiencies in this area and to help agencies make any needed improvements  In order to address challenges in implementing CIO responsibilities, we intend to include in our draft report recommendations to OMB and each of the selected 24 federal agencies to improve the effectiveness of CIOs’ implementation of their responsibilities for each of the six IT management areas  FITARA includes a provision to enhance covered agency CIOs’ authority through, among other things, requiring agency heads to ensure that CIOs review and approve IT contracts  OMB’s FITARA implementation guidance expanded upon this aspect of the legislation in a number of ways  Specifically, according to the guidance: CIOs may review and approve IT acquisition strategies and plans, rather than individual IT contracts; CIOs can designate other agency officials to act as their representatives, but the CIOs must retain accountability; CAOs are responsible for ensuring that all IT contract actions are consistent with CIO-approved acquisition strategies and plans; and CAOs are to indicate to the CIOs when planned acquisition strategies and acquisition plans include IT  In January 2018, we reported that most of the CIOs at 22 selected agencies were not adequately involved in reviewing billions of dollars of IT acquisitions  For instance, most of the 22 agencies did not identify all of their IT contracts


Report 2:  In this regard, the agencies identified 78,249 IT- related contracts, to which they obligated $14 7 billion in fiscal year 2016  However, we identified 31,493 additional contracts with $4 5 billion obligated, raising the total amount obligated by these agencies to IT contracts in fiscal year 2016 to at least $19 2 billion  Figure 5 reflects the obligations that the 22 selected agencies reported to us relative to the obligations we identified  The percentage of additional IT contract obligations we identified varied among the selected agencies  For example, the Department of State did not identify 1 percent of its IT contract obligations  Conversely, 8 agencies did not identify over 40 percent of their IT contract obligations  Many of the selected agencies that did not identify these IT contract obligations did not follow OMB guidance  Specifically, 14 of the 22 agencies did not involve the acquisition office in their process to identify IT acquisitions for CIO review, as required by OMB  In addition, 7 agencies did not establish guidance to aid officials in recognizing IT  We concluded that until these agencies involve the acquisitions office in their IT acquisition identification processes and establish supporting guidance, they cannot ensure that they will identify all IT acquisitions  Without proper identification of IT acquisitions, these agencies and CIOs cannot effectively provide oversight of these acquisitions  In addition to not identifying all IT contracts, 14 of the 22 selected agencies did not fully satisfy OMB’s requirement that the CIO review and approve IT acquisition plans or strategies  Further, only 11 of 96 randomly selected IT contracts at 10 agencies that we evaluated were CIO-reviewed and approved as required by OMB’s guidance  The 85 IT contracts not reviewed had a total possible value of approximately $23 8 billion  We believe that until agencies ensure that CIOs are able to review and approve all IT acquisitions, CIOs will continue to have limited visibility and input into their agencies’ planned IT expenditures and will not be able to use the increased authority that FITARA’s contract approval provision is intended to provide  Further, agencies will likely miss an opportunity to strengthen CIOs’ authority and the oversight of IT acquisitions  As a result, agencies may award IT contracts that are duplicative, wasteful, or poorly conceived  As a result of these findings, we made 39 recommendations in our January 2018 report  The recommendations included that agencies ensure that their acquisition offices are involved in identifying IT acquisitions and issuing related guidance, and that IT acquisitions are reviewed in accordance with OMB guidance  OMB and the majority of the agencies generally agreed with or did not comment on the recommendations  In our February 2017 high-risk update, we stated that OMB and agencies needed to demonstrate additional progress on achieving data center consolidation savings in order to improve the management of IT acquisitions and operations  Further, data center consolidation efforts are key to implementing FITARA  Specifically, OMB established the FDCCI in February 2010 to improve the efficiency, performance, and environmental footprint of federal data center activities  The enactment of FITARA in 2014 codified and expanded the initiative  In a series of reports that we issued from July 2011 through August 2017, we noted that, while data center consolidation could potentially save the federal government billions of dollars, weaknesses existed in several areas, including agencies’ data center consolidation plans, data center optimization, and OMB’s tracking and reporting on related cost savings  In these reports, we made a total of 160 recommendations to OMB and 24 agencies to improve the execution and oversight of the initiative  Most agencies and OMB agreed with our recommendations or had no comments  As of May 2018, 80 of these 160 recommendations remained unimplemented  Further, we recently reported in May 2018 that the 24 agencies participating in OMB’s Data Center Optimization Initiative (DCOI) had communicated mixed progress toward achieving OMB’s goals for closing data centers by September 2018  Over half of the agencies reported that they had either already met, or planned to meet, all of their OMB- assigned goals by the deadline  This would result in the closure of 7,221 of the 12,062 centers that agencies reported in August 2017  However, 4 agencies reported that they do not have plans to meet all of their assigned goals and 2 agencies are working with OMB to establish revised targets  With regard to agencies’ progress in achieving cost savings, 24 agencies reported $3 9 billion in cost savings through 2018  The 24 agencies also reported limited progress against OMB’s five data center optimization targets for server utilization and automated monitoring, energy metering, power usage effectiveness, facility utilization, and virtualization  As of August 2017, 1 agency reported that it had met four targets, 1 agency reported that it had met three targets, 6 agencies reported having met either one or two targets, and 14 agencies reported meeting none of the targets  Further, as of August 2017, most agencies were not planning to meet OMB’s fiscal year 2018 optimization targets  Specifically, 4 agencies reported plans to meet all of their applicable targets by the end of fiscal year 2018; 14 agencies reported plans to meet some of the targets; and 4 reported that they did not plan to meet any targets  Figure 6 summarizes agency-reported plans to meet or exceed the OMB’s data center optimization targets, as of August 2017  In 2016 and 2017, we made 81 recommendations to OMB and the 24 DCOI agencies to help improve the reporting of data center-related cost savings and to achieve optimization targets  As of May 2018, 71 of these 81 recommendations have not been fully addressed  In our 2015 high-risk report’s discussion of IT acquisitions and operations, we identified the management of software licenses as an area of concern, in part because of the potential for cost savings  Federal agencies engage in thousands of software licensing agreements annually  The objective of software license management is to manage, control, and protect an organization’s software assets  Effective management of these licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses, which can result in unused software, as well as too few licenses, which can result in noncompliance with license terms and cause the imposition of additional fees  As part of its PortfolioStat initiative, OMB has developed policy that addresses software licenses  This policy requires agencies to conduct an annual, agency-wide IT portfolio review to, among other things, reduce commodity IT spending  Such areas of spending could include software licenses  In May 2014, we reported on federal agencies’ management of software licenses and determined that better management was needed to achieve significant savings government-wide  Of the 24 selected agencies we reviewed, only 2 had comprehensive policies that included the establishment of clear roles and central oversight authority for managing enterprise software license agreements, among other things  Of the remaining 22 agencies, 18 had policies that were not comprehensive, and 4 had not developed any policies  Further, we found that only 2 of the 24 selected agencies had established comprehensive software license inventories, a leading practice that would help them to adequately manage their software licenses  The inadequate implementation of this and other leading practices in software license management was partially due to weaknesses in agencies’ policies  As a result, we concluded that agencies’ oversight of software license spending was limited or lacking, thus potentially leading to missed savings  However, the potential savings could be significant considering that, in fiscal year 2012, 1 major federal agency reported saving approximately $181 million by consolidating its enterprise license agreements, even when its oversight process was ad hoc  Accordingly, we recommended that OMB issue a directive to help guide agencies in managing software licenses  We also made 135 recommendations to the 24 agencies to improve their policies and practices for managing licenses  Among other things, we recommended that the agencies regularly track and maintain a comprehensive inventory of software licenses and analyze the inventory to identify opportunities to reduce costs and better inform investment decision making  Most agencies generally agreed with the recommendations or had no comments  As of May 2018, 78 of the 135 recommendations had not been implemented  Table 2 reflects the extent to which the 24 agencies implemented the recommendations in these two areas  Since information security was added to the high-risk list in 1997, we have consistently identified shortcomings in the federal government’s approach to cybersecurity  We have previously testified that, even though agencies have acted to improve the protections over federal and critical infrastructure information and information systems, the federal government needs to take the following actions to strengthen U S  cybersecurity: Effectively implement risk-based entity-wide information security programs consistently over time  Among other things, agencies need to (1) implement sustainable processes for securely configuring operating systems, applications, workstations, servers, and network devices; (2) patch vulnerable systems and replace unsupported software; (3) develop comprehensive security test and evaluation procedures and conduct examinations on a regular and recurring basis; and (4) strengthen oversight of contractors providing IT services  Improve its cyber incident detection, response, and mitigation capabilities  DHS needs to expand the capabilities and support wider adoption of its government-wide intrusion detection and prevention system  In addition, the federal government needs to improve cyber incident response practices, update guidance on reporting data breaches, and develop consistent responses to breaches of personally identifiable information  Expand its cyber workforce planning and training efforts  The federal government needs to (1) enhance efforts for recruiting and retaining a qualified cybersecurity workforce and (2) improve cybersecurity workforce planning activities  Expand efforts to strengthen cybersecurity of the nation’s critical infrastructures  The federal government needs to develop metrics to (1) assess the effectiveness of efforts promoting the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and (2) measure and report on the effectiveness of cyber risk mitigation activities and the cybersecurity posture of critical infrastructure sectors  Better oversee protection of personally identifiable information  The federal government needs to (1) protect the security and privacy of electronic health information, (2) ensure privacy when face recognition systems are used, and (3) protect the privacy of users’ data on state-based health insurance marketplaces  As we have previously noted, in order to take the preceding actions and strengthen the federal government’s cybersecurity posture, agencies should implement the information security programs required by FISMA  In this regard, FISMA provides a framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls for federal information resources  The law requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an agency- wide information security program  Such a program includes risk assessments; the development and implementation of policies and procedures to cost-effectively reduce risks; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems; security awareness and specialized training; the testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of controls; the planning, implementation, evaluation, and documentation of remedial actions to address information security deficiencies; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; and plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations  Since 2010, we have made 2,733 recommendations to agencies aimed at improving the security of federal systems and information  These recommendations have identified actions for agencies to take to strengthen technical security controls over their computer networks and systems  They also have included recommendations for agencies to fully implement aspects of their information security programs, as mandated by FISMA  Nevertheless, many agencies continue to be challenged in safeguarding their information systems and information, in part because many of these recommendations have not been implemented  As of May 2018, 793 of information security-related recommendations we have made have not been implemented  In order to determine the effectiveness of the agencies’ information security programs and practices, FISMA requires that federal agencies’ inspectors general conduct annual independent evaluations  The agencies are to report the results of these evaluations to OMB, and OMB is to summarize the results in annual reports to Congress  In these evaluations, the inspectors general frame the scope of their analysis, identify key findings, and detail recommendations to address the findings  The evaluations also are to capture maturity model ratings for their respective agencies  Toward this end, in fiscal year 2017, the inspector general community, in partnership with OMB and DHS, finalized a 3-year effort to create a maturity model for FISMA metrics that align to the five function areas in the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Cybersecurity Framework): identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover  This alignment is intended to help promote consistent and comparable metrics and criteria and provides agencies with a meaningful independent assessment of their information security programs  This maturity model is designed to summarize the status of agencies’ information security programs on a five-level capability maturity scale  The five maturity levels are defined as follows: Level 1 Ad-hoc: Policies, procedures, and strategy are not formalized; activities are performed in an ad-hoc, reactive manner  Level 2 Defined: Policies, procedures, and strategy are formalized and documented but not consistently implemented  Level 3 Consistently Implemented: Policies, procedures, and strategy are consistently implemented, but quantitative and qualitative effectiveness measures are lacking  Level 4 Managed and Measurable: Quantitative and qualitative measures on the effectiveness of policies, procedures, and strategy are collected across the organizations and used to assess them and make necessary changes  Level 5 Optimized: Policies, procedures, and strategy are fully institutionalized, repeatable, self-generating, consistently implemented and regularly updated based on a changing threat and technology landscape and business/mission needs  In March 2018, OMB issued its annual FISMA report to Congress, which showed the combined results of the inspectors general’s fiscal year 2017 evaluations  Based on data from 76 agency inspector general and independent auditor assessments, OMB determined that the government-wide median maturity model ratings across the five NIST Cybersecurity Framework areas did not exceed a level 3 (consistently implemented)  Table 3 shows the inspectors general’s median ratings for each of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework areas  In its efforts toward strengthening the federal government’s cybersecurity, OMB also requires agencies to submit related cybersecurity metrics as part of its Cross-Agency Priority goals  In particular, OMB developed the IT modernization goal so that federal agencies will be able to build and maintain more modern, secure, and resilient IT  A key part of this goal is to reduce cybersecurity risks to the federal mission through three strategies: manage asset security, protect networks and data, and limit personnel access  The key targets supporting each of these strategies correspond to areas within the FISMA metrics  Table 4 outlines the strategies and their associated targets  In conclusion, FITARA and FISMA present opportunities for the federal government to address the high-risk areas on improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations, and ensuring the security of federal IT, thereby saving billions of dollars  Most agencies have taken steps to execute key IT management and cybersecurity initiatives, including implementing CIO responsibilities, requiring CIO review of IT acquisitions, realizing data center consolidation cost savings, managing software assets, and complying with FISMA requirements  The agencies have also continued to address the recommendations that we have made over the past several years  However, further efforts by OMB and federal agencies to implement our previous recommendations would better position them to improve the management and security of federal IT  To help ensure that these efforts succeed, we will continue to monitor agencies’ efforts toward implementing these recommendations  Chairmen Meadows and Hurd, Ranking Members Connolly and Kelly, and Members of the Subcommittees, this completes my prepared statement  I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time  If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact David A  Powner, Director, Information Technology, at (202) 512- 9286 or pownerd@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement  GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Kevin Walsh (Assistant Director), Chris Businsky, Rebecca Eyler, Meredith Raymond, and Jessica Waselkow (Analyst in Charge)  This is a work of the U S  government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States  The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO  However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately 

ground_truth: The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area. Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205; 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq.), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies. In general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification—that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve. With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). By statute, PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e.g., "preference customers"), and sell their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U.S. Treasury for the portion of federal facility costs allocated to hydropower beneficiaries. With energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market in the West, BPA and WAPA may have to adapt their plans with regard to generation needs and how transmission systems are developed. In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations. The proposal suggested that "eliminating or reducing" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets, and increasing the private sector's role, would "encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers." The resulting PMA entities would then contract with other utilities to provide transmission services for the delivery of federal power, similar to what SEPA does currently. Reportedly, the proposed sale of PMA assets was dropped after opposition to the plan emerged from stakeholders. Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 (P.L. 99-349), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress. Environmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i.e., the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the ESA. In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams. However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020. Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i.e., receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority. Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress.