prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: Several U S  agencies have roles and responsibilities related to the screening and vetting of NIV applicants, as shown in table 1  Key Visa Adjudication Process Terms Validity period: The length of time during which a nonimmigrant visa (NIV) is valid for use by a foreign national seeking to travel to a U S  port of entry and apply for admission into the United States  Entries: The number of applications for admission into the country permitted under a single NIV  Reciprocity arrangements: An understanding or arrangement between the U S  government and another country on the length of time visas issued by either or both nations are valid for admission  There are many NIVs, and for the purposes of this report, we have placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups, as shown in table 2  The validity period and number of entries varies depending on (1) the particular NIV and (2) reciprocity arrangement with an individual’s country of nationality, among other factors  For example, a foreign national of one country may be issued a tourist visa valid for 1 year that allows for a single U S  entry, while a foreign national of another country may be issued a tourist visa valid for 5 years and that permits multiple entries  However, the authorized period of stay—that is, the amount of time that the nonimmigrant is permitted to remain in the United States after being admitted—has no relation to the validity period  For more information on the various NIVs, see appendix I  State is generally responsible for the adjudication of NIV applications, and manages the NIV application process, including the consular officer corps and its functions at more than 220 visa-issuing posts overseas  Depending on various factors, such as the particular NIV sought, the applicant’s background, and visa demand, State officials noted that the length of the visa adjudication process can vary from a single day to months  This screening and vetting process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains several steps, as shown in figure 1: Petitions  Prior to State’s adjudication process, some NIVs require applicants to first obtain an approved petition from U S  Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), as shown in table 3  For example, applicants seeking an employment-based NIV or a U S  citizen’s foreign national fiancé(e) seeking U S  entry to conclude a valid marriage, must obtain an approved petition from USCIS prior to applying for their NIV  The petitioner (i e , a U S  citizen, organization or business entity) completes the petition on behalf of the applicant (i e , the beneficiary), and the petition would be submitted to a U S -based USCIS service center for adjudication  USCIS Background Checks  As part of the adjudication process for visas requiring a USCIS-approved petition before the NIV application is submitted to State, USCIS conducts background checks on U S - based petitioners and foreign beneficiaries  For example, petitioner and beneficiary information is screened against TECS—DHS’s principal law enforcement and antiterrorism database that includes enforcement, inspection, and operational records  Further, for U S  citizens petitioning for a K-1 visa on behalf of their fiancé(e), an FBI fingerprint check may also be required of the U S  citizen petitioner  If the background checks identify a potential match to derogatory information, the background check unit at the USCIS service center that received the petition is to conduct further research to confirm the match, such as running checks against other government systems and collaborating with other government agencies  If all background check hits have been resolved and documented, and there is no reason not to proceed, USCIS will adjudicate the petition  In fiscal year 2017, USCIS reported that it received about 640,000 petitions for NIVs, and approved over 550,000  NIV Application  After having obtained USCIS approval of the NIV petition, as applicable, the foreign national begins the consular process by completing an online NIV application, known as a DS-160  Upon submitting an application, the applicant can schedule an interview at a post overseas and pays the processing fee  Key Visa Adjudication Process Terms Inadmissible: Individuals are inadmissible to the United States if they fall within the classes of foreign nationals defined as such under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, Pub  L  No  82-414, tit  II, ch  2, § 212(a), 66 Stat  163, 182-87 (1952) (classified, as amended, at 8 U S C  § 1182(a)), such as foreign nationals who have engaged in terrorist or criminal activities or previously violated U S  immigration law  If a visa applicant is found inadmissible, and has not obtained a waiver from the Department of Homeland Security, the applicant would be statutorily ineligible for a visa  Ineligible: An individual is ineligible for a visa if it appears to the Department of State consular officer, based on the application or supporting documentation, that the applicant is not qualified to receive a visa under any provision of law  If the consular officer decides that an applicant is ineligible for visa issuance, the refusal may be based on statutory grounds of inadmissibility under INA § 212(a), or may be due to the individual’s failure to otherwise satisfy the applicable eligibility requirements for the particular visa, as defined in the INA  For example, a consular officer may refuse a J-1 exchange visitor visa to an applicant coming to the United States to perform services as a member of the medical profession if the applicant does not either demonstrate competency in oral and written English or hold a degree from an accredited school of medicine, as required of such visa applicants under INA § 212(j)  eligibility concerns related to visa applicants  Prior to adjudicating the visa application, consular officers must review all such security check results  Some applicants are not subjected to all of the security checks depending on certain characteristics, such as age and visa category  For example, State does not generally require that fingerprints be collected for applicants who are either under 14 years old or over 79 years old, or for foreign government officials seeking certain visas  As needed, some applicants undergo an interagency review process called a security advisory opinion (SAO), which is a multi-agency, U S-based review process for certain NIV applicants  For example, SAOs are mandatory in cases of certain security check hits, a foreign national’s background, or a foreign national’s intention while in the United States  In addition, consular officers have the discretion to request an SAO for any visa applicant  Through the SAO process, consular officers send additional information on applicants to U S - based agencies, who review that information against their holdings  Department of State data indicate that consular officers made over 180,000 requests for SAOs for NIV applicants in fiscal year 2017  Adjudication  If the consular officer determines that the applicant is eligible for the visa on the basis of the application, supporting documentation, and other relevant information such as statements made in an interview, he or she will take the applicant’s passport for final processing, but the visa cannot be printed until all security checks have been returned and reviewed  If the consular officer determines that the applicant is inadmissible to the United States or otherwise ineligible under the applicable visa eligibility criteria, he or she informs the applicant that the visa has been refused, and identifies the provision(s) of law under which the visa was refused  Recurrent vetting  In March 2010, shortly after the December 2009 attempted bombing by a foreign national traveling to the United States on a valid visa, CBP began vetting individuals with NIVs on a recurrent basis  This program has led State to revoke visas after they have been issued when information was later discovered that rendered the individual inadmissible to the United States or otherwise ineligible for the visa  In addition, CBP analysts may take other actions as needed after identifying new derogatory information, such as recommending that the airline deny boarding to the traveler because the traveler is likely to be deemed inadmissible upon arrival in the United States (known as a no-board recommendation) or making a referral to ICE, which may seek to remove the individual if already within the United States  According to NCTC, KFE also conducts recurrent vetting of NIV holders against emerging threat information  The total number of NIV applications that consular officers adjudicated annually (or, NIV adjudications) peaked at about 13 4 million in fiscal year 2016, which was an increase of approximately 30 percent since fiscal year 2012  In fiscal year 2017, NIV adjudications decreased by about 880,000 adjudications, or about 7 percent  Figure 2 shows the number of applications adjudicated each year from fiscal year 2012 through 2017  Appendix II includes additional data on NIV adjudications related to this and the other figures in this report  Annual Monthly Trends  State data from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 indicate that NIV adjudications generally followed an annual cycle, ebbing during certain months during the fiscal year; however, adjudications in fiscal year 2017 departed slightly from this trend  Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the number of NIV adjudications typically peaked in the summer months  State officials noted that the summer peak is generally due to international students who are applying for their visas for the coming academic year  However, in fiscal year 2017, the summer months did not experience a similar increase from previous months, departing from the trend over the previous five fiscal years, according to State data  Instead, NIV adjudications peaked in December of fiscal year 2017  State officials attributed some of the decline in fiscal year 2017 to a decrease in Chinese NIV applicants, which we discuss later in this report  Figure 3 shows monthly NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  State data on NIV applications adjudicated from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 indicate that the number of adjudications by visa group, applicant’s country of nationality, and location of adjudication were generally consistent, with some exceptions  Visa Group  From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, about 80 percent of NIV adjudications were for tourist and business visitors as shown in figure 4  The next largest groups were visas for students and exchange visitors and temporary workers, which accounted for an average of 9 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of all adjudications during this time period  Although adjudications for visas in some categories increased, others decreased over time  For example, as shown in figure 5, NIV adjudications for temporary workers increased by approximately 50 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (592,000 to 885,000)  During the same time period, adjudications for tourist and business visitors also increased by approximately 20 percent overall (from 8 18 million to 9 97 million), but decreased from fiscal years 2016 to 2017  However, NIV adjudications for student and exchange visitor visas decreased by about 2 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (1 01 million to 993,000) overall, but experienced a peak in fiscal year 2015 of 1 2 million  Appendix I includes additional information on NIV adjudication by visa group from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  State officials identified reasons to explain these trends: Temporary Workers  Although there was an increase in adjudications across all types of temporary worker visas, the largest percentage increase was for H-2A visas, which are for foreign workers seeking to perform agricultural services of a temporary or seasonal nature  Specifically, adjudications of H-2A visas increased by 140 percent from fiscal years 2012 to 2017 (from about 71,000 to 170,000)  State officials noted that H-2A visas are not numerically limited by statute  Further, State officials stated that they believe U S  employers are increasingly less likely to hire workers without lawful status and are petitioning for lawfully admitted workers, which in part led to an increase in H-2A visa demand  Tourist and Business Visitors  State officials partly attributed the overall changes to tourist and business visitor visas to the extension of the validity period of such visas for Chinese nationals, which represented the largest single country of nationality for tourist and business visitor visas in fiscal year 2017 (17 7 percent)  In November 2014, the United States and the People’s Republic of China reciprocally increased the validity periods of multiple-entry tourist and business visitor visas issued to each other’s citizens for up to 10 years  The change in policy was intended to support improved trade, investment, and business by facilitating travel between the two countries  According to State officials, extending validity periods can create an initial increase in demand for such visas, followed by a period of stabilization or even decline as NIV holders would be required to apply for renewal less frequently  According to State officials, in early fiscal year 2015, the increase in the validity period to 10 years for such visas created a spike in Chinese demand in fiscal year 2015, and by fiscal year 2016, the initial demand for these visas had been met and Chinese economic growth was simultaneously slowing, resulting in fewer adjudications for such visas in fiscal year 2017  State data for this time period indicate that the number of adjudications for tourist and business visitor visas for Chinese nationals increased from 1 58 million in fiscal year 2014 to 2 54 million in fiscal year 2015, followed by a decline to 2 34 million in fiscal year 2016 and 1 76 million in fiscal year 2017  Student and Exchange Visitors  Similar to tourist and business visitors, State officials partly attributed the overall changes in student and exchange visitor visa adjudications to the extension of the validity period of such visas for Chinese nationals, which represented the largest single country of nationality for student and exchange visitor visas in fiscal year 2017 (19 percent)  In November 2014, the United States extended the validity period of the F visa for academic students from 1 year to 5 years  State officials noted that similar to tourist and business visitor visas, there was an initial surge in Chinese F-visa applicants due to the new 5-year F-visa validity period that began in fiscal year 2015, but the number dropped subsequently because Chinese students with such 5-year visas no longer needed to apply as frequently for F visas  State data for this time period indicate that the number of visa adjudications for F visas for Chinese nationals increased from about 267,000 in fiscal year 2014 to 301,000 in fiscal year 2015, followed by a decline of 172,000 in fiscal year 2016 and 134,000 in fiscal year 2017  Applicant’s Country of Nationality  In fiscal year 2017, more than half of all NIV adjudications were for applicants of six countries of nationality: China (2 02 million, or 16 percent), Mexico (1 75 million, or 14 percent), India (1 28 million, or 10 percent), Brazil (670,000, or 5 percent), Colombia (460,000, or 4 percent), and Argentina (370,000, or 3 percent), as shown in figure 6  Location of Adjudication  State data indicate that the geographic distribution of NIV adjudications across visa-issuing posts worldwide remained relatively consistent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV adjudications from visa-issuing posts in the Western Hemisphere comprised the largest proportion worldwide during this time period; however, this proportion decreased from 48 8 percent in fiscal year 2012 to 41 7 percent in fiscal year 2017  During the same time period, the proportion of NIV adjudications at visa-issuing posts in other regions increased slightly  For example, the percentage of NIV adjudications from posts in Africa increased from 3 8 percent to 5 5 percent, and the percentage of adjudications from posts in South and Central Asia increased from 7 9 percent to 11 2 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Figure 7 provides the proportion of NIV adjudications at visa- issuing posts from each region from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  The percentage of NIVs refused—known as the refusal rate—increased from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, and was about the same in fiscal year 2017 as the previous year  As shown in figure 8, the NIV refusal rate rose from about 14 percent in fiscal year 2012 to about 22 percent in fiscal year 2016, and remained about the same in fiscal year 2017; averaging about 18 percent over the time period  As a result, the total number of NIVs issued peaked in fiscal year 2015 at about 10 89 million, before falling in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 to 10 38 million and 9 68 million, respectively  The NIV refusal rate can fluctuate from year to year due to many factors  For example, according to State officials, removing a large, highly- qualified set of travelers from the NIV applicant population can drive up the statistical refusal rate  State officials also noted that when a country joins the Visa Waiver Program or a visa for certain nationalities increase from 1-year to 10-year visa validity periods, these individuals no longer apply for visas and affect the overall refusal rate  Further, State officials noted that changes in political and economic conditions in individual countries can affect visa eligibility, which in turn affects the overall refusal rate  State officials noted that the degree to which an applicant might seek to travel to the United States unlawfully is directly related to political, economic, and social conditions in their countries  For example, if global or regional economic conditions deteriorate, more applicants may have an incentive to come to the United States illegally by, for example, obtaining a NIV with the intent to unlawfully stay for a particular time period or purpose other than as permitted by their visa, which then would increase the number of NIV applications that consular officers are refusing  From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the refusal rate varied by visa group  The highest refusal rate was for tourists and business visitors, which rose from about 15 percent in fiscal year 2012 to over 25 percent in fiscal year 2017, as shown in figure 9  Other visa categories, such as foreign officials and employees, transit and crewmembers, and fiancé(e)s and spouses, had refusal rates below 5 percent during this time period  State officials noted that because different visa categories have different eligibility and documentary requirements, they have different refusal rates  For example, F, J, and H visas require documentation of eligibility for student, exchange, or employment status, respectively  According to State data, while the majority of NIV refusals from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 were a result of consular officers finding the applicants ineligible, a relatively small number of refusals were due to terrorism and other security-related concerns  NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U S  immigration law and State policy  For the purposes of this report, we have grouped most of these grounds for refusal into one of seven categories, as shown in table 4  State data indicate the more than 90 percent of NIVs refused each year from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 were based on the consular officers’ determination that the applicants were ineligible nonimmigrants—in other words, the consular officers believed that the applicant was an intending immigrant seeking to stay permanently in the United States, which would generally violate NIV conditions, or that the applicant otherwise failed to demonstrate eligibility for the particular visa he or she was seeking  For example, an applicant applying for a student visa could be refused as an ineligible nonimmigrant for failure to demonstrate possession of sufficient funds to cover his or her educational expenses as required  Similarly, an applicant could be refused as an ineligible nonimmigrant for indicating to the consular officer an intention to obtain a student visa to engage in unsanctioned activities while in the United States, such as full-time employment instead of pursuing an approved course of study  According to State data, the second most common reason for refusal during this time period was inadequate documentation, which accounted for approximately 5 percent of refusals each year  In such cases, a consular officer determined that the application failed to include necessary documentation for the consular officer to ascertain whether the applicant was eligible to receive a visa at that time  If, for example, the applicant provides sufficient additional information in support of the application, a consular officer may subsequently issue the visa, as appropriate  Our analysis of State data indicates that relatively few applicants— approximately 0 05 percent—were refused for terrorism and other security-related reasons from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Security- related reasons can include applicants who have engaged in genocide, espionage, or torture, among other grounds  Terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility include when an applicant has engaged in or incited terrorist activity, is a member of a terrorist organization, or is the child or spouse of a foreign national who has been found inadmissible based on terrorist activity occurring within the last five years, among other reasons  As shown in figure 10, in fiscal year 2017, State data indicate that 1,256 refusals (or 0 05 percent) were based on terrorism and other security-related concerns, of which 357 refusals were specifically for terrorism-related reasons  In calendar year 2017, the President issued two executive orders and a presidential proclamation that required, among other actions, visa entry restrictions for nationals of certain countries of concern, a review of information needed for visa adjudication, and changes to visa (including NIV) screening and vetting protocols and procedures (see timeline in figure 11)  Initially, the President issued Executive Order 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States (EO-1), in January 2017  In March 2017, the President revoked and replaced EO-1 with the issuance of Executive Order 13780 (EO-2), which had the same title as EO-1  Among other things, EO-2 suspended entry of certain foreign nationals for a 90 day period, subject to exceptions and waivers  It further directed federal agencies—including DHS, State, DOJ and ODNI—to review information needs from foreign governments for visa adjudication and develop uniform screening and vetting standards for U S  entities to follow when adjudicating immigration benefits, including NIVs  In September 2017, as a result of the reviews undertaken pursuant to EO-2, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Proclamation), which imposes certain conditional restrictions and limitations on the entry of nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen—into the United States for an indefinite period  These restrictions are to remain in effect until the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State determine that a country provides sufficient information for the United States to assess adequately whether its nationals pose a security or safety threat  Challenges to both EOs and the Proclamation have affected their implementation and, while EO-2’s entry restrictions have expired, the visa entry restrictions outlined in the Proclamation continue to be fully implemented as of June 2018, consistent with the U S  Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the President may lawfully establish nationality-based entry restrictions under the INA, and that Proclamation 9645 itself “is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority ” A more detailed listing of the executive actions and related challenges to those actions brought in the federal courts can be found in appendix III  Our analysis of State data indicates, out of the nearly 2 8 million NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017, 1,338 were refused due to visa entry restrictions implemented in accordance with the executive actions  To implement the entry restrictions, in March 2017, State directed its consular officers to continue to accept all NIV applications and determine whether the applicant was otherwise eligible for a visa without regard to the applicable EO or Proclamation  If the applicant was ineligible for the visa on grounds unrelated to the executive action, such as having prior immigration violations, the applicant was to be refused on those grounds  If the applicant was otherwise eligible for the visa, but fell within the scope of the nationality-specific visa restrictions implemented pursuant to the applicable EO or Proclamation and was not eligible for a waiver or exception, the consular officer was to refuse the visa and enter a refusal code into State’s NIV database indicating that the applicant was refused solely due to the executive actions  More than 90 percent of the NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017 pursuant to an executive action were for tourist and business visitor visas, and more than 5 percent were for students and exchange visitors  State data also indicate that the number of applications adjudicated for nationals of the 7 countries identified in EO-1—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen—decreased by 22 percent in fiscal year 2017, as compared to a 7 percent general decrease in NIV adjudications worldwide that year  For example, as shown in table 5, the decrease in adjudications from fiscal years 2016 to 2017 for nationals of the 7 countries identified in EO-1 ranged from around 12 percent to more than 40 percent  As directed by the executive actions, DHS, State, DOJ, and ODNI took several steps to enhance NIV screening and vetting processes given their responsibilities for implementing the presidential actions  Among other things, the responsibilities included: (1) a review of information needed for visa adjudication; (2) the development of uniform screening standards for immigration programs; and (3) implementation of enhanced visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures  Review of information needed for visa adjudication  In accordance with EO-2, DHS conducted a worldwide review, in consultation with State and ODNI, to identify additional information needed from foreign countries to determine that an individual is not a security or public-safety threat when adjudicating an application for a visa, admission, or other immigration benefit  According to State officials, an interagency working group composed of State, DHS, ODNI, and National Security Council staff was formed to conduct the review  To conduct this review, DHS developed a set of criteria for information sharing in support of immigration screening and vetting, as shown by table 6  According to DHS officials, to develop these criteria, DHS, in coordination with other agencies, identified current standards and best practices for information collection and sharing under various categories of visas to create a core list of information needed from foreign governments in the visa adjudication process  For example, State sent an information request to all U S  posts overseas requesting information on host nations’ information sharing practices, according to State officials  To assess the extent to which countries were meeting the newly established criteria, DHS officials stated that they used various information sources to preliminarily develop a list of countries that were or were not meeting the standards for adequate information sharing  For example, DHS officials stated that they reviewed information from INTERPOL on a country’s frequency of reporting lost and stolen passport information, consulted with ODNI for information on which countries are terrorist safe havens, and worked with State to obtain information that State officials at post may have on host nations’ information sharing practices  According to the Proclamation, based on DHS assessments of each country, DHS reported to the President on July 9, 2017, that 47 countries were “inadequate” or “at risk” of not meeting the standards  DHS officials identified several reasons that a country may have been assessed as “inadequate” with regard to the criteria  For example, some countries may have been willing to provide information, but lacked the capacity to do so  Or, some countries may not have been willing to provide certain information, or simply did not currently have diplomatic relations with the U S  government  As was required by EO-2, State engaged with foreign governments on their respective performance based on these criteria for a 50-day period  In July 2017, State directed its posts to inform their respective host governments of the new information sharing criteria and request that host governments provide the required information or develop a plan to do so  Posts were directed to then engage more intensively with countries DHS’s report preliminarily deemed “inadequate” or “at risk”  Each post was to submit an assessment of mitigating factors or specific interests that should be considered in the deliberations regarding any travel restrictions for nationals of those countries  DHS officials stated that they reviewed the additional information host nations provided to State and then reevaluated the initial classifications to determine if any countries remained “inadequate ” On September 15, 2017, in accordance with EO-2, DHS submitted to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a presidential proclamation that would prohibit certain categories of foreign nationals of such countries from entering the United States  The countries listed were Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen— which were assessed as “inadequate,” and Somalia, which was identified as a terrorist safe haven  The Presidential Proclamation indefinitely suspended entry into the United States of certain nonimmigrants from the listed countries (see table 7) and directed DHS, in consultation with State, to devise a process to assess whether the entry restrictions should be continued, modified or terminated  In September 2017, State issued additional guidance to posts on implementation of the Presidential Proclamation  As of July 2018, State continues to accept and process the NIV applications of foreign nationals from the eight countries covered by the Proclamation  Such applicants are to be interviewed, according to State guidance, and consular officers are to determine if the applicant is otherwise eligible for the visa, meets any of the proclamation’s exceptions, or qualifies for a waiver  Development of uniform screening standards for U S  immigration benefit programs  Consistent with EO-2, State, DHS, DOJ, and ODNI developed a uniform baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures by the U S  government  According to State officials, an interagency working group comprised of State, DHS, DOJ, and ODNI staff is implementing these requirements  Based on its review of existing screening and vetting processes, DHS officials stated that the working group established uniform standards for (1) applications, (2) interviews, and (3) security system checks (i e , biographic and biometric)  Regarding applications, DHS officials stated that the group identified data elements against which applicants are to be screened and vetted  In February 2018, DHS Office of Policy officials stated that they had taken steps to create more consistency across U S  government forms that collect information used for screening and vetting purposes, such as State’s DS-160 NIV application as well as 12 DHS forms  For example, officials stated that they anticipate issuing Federal Register notices announcing the intended changes to such forms


Report 2:  Regarding interviews, DHS officials stated that the working group established a requirement for all applicants seeking an immigration benefit, including NIV applicants, to undergo a baseline uniform national security and public safety interview  DHS officials stated that the working group modeled its interview baseline on elements of the refugee screening interview  To help implement this standard, DHS officials stated that the department is offering more training courses in enhanced communications (i e  detecting deception and eliciting responses) and making such courses accessible to other U S  government entities and U S  officials overseas  Regarding security checks, the working group identified certain checks that should be conducted for all applicants seeking an immigration benefit, including NIV applicants  For example, DHS officials stated that the working group concluded that all applicants for U S  immigration benefits should be screened against DHS’s TECS, among other federal databases  In February 2018, DHS Office of Policy officials stated that they were also exploring the extent to which current screening and vetting technologies can be expanded  For example, technology that is being used to screen applicants for counterterrorism concerns can potentially be modified to screen applicants for other concerns such as public safety or participation in transnational organized crime  However, these officials noted such changes to technology can take a long time  DHS officials stated that each department and agency is responsible for implementing the uniform standards for their relevant immigration programs  For example, with regard to maintaining information electronically, State officials stated that for nonimmigrant and immigrant visas, as of May 2018, they collected most, but not all, of the application data elements  In addition to executive actions taken in calendar year 2017, the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 9 on February 6, 2018, which directed DHS, in coordination with State, DOJ, and ODNI, to establish a National Vetting Center to optimize the use of federal government information in support of the national vetting enterprise  This memorandum stated that the U S  government must develop an integrated approach to the use of intelligence and other data, across national security components, in order to improve how departments and agencies coordinate and use information to identify individuals presenting a threat to national security, border security, homeland security, or public safety  The center is to be overseen and guided by a National Vetting Governance Board, consisting of six senior executives designated by DHS, DOJ, ODNI, State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense  Further, within 180 days of the issuance of the memorandum, these six departments and agencies, in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget, are to jointly submit to the President for approval an implementation plan for the center, addressing, among other things, the initial scope of the center’s vetting activities; the roles and responsibilities of agencies participating in the center; a resourcing strategy for the center; and a projected schedule to reach both initial and full operational capability  On February 14, 2018, the Secretary of Homeland Security selected an official to serve as the Director of the National Vetting Center and delegated the center’s authorities to CBP  DHS Office of Policy officials stated in February 2018 that the center is intended to serve as the focal point of the larger screening and vetting enterprise, and will coordinate policy and set priorities  The center will use the uniform baselines for screening and vetting standards and procedures established per EO-2 to set short- and long-term priorities to improve screening and vetting across the U S  government  Further, these officials stated screening and vetting activities will continue to be implemented by the entities that are currently implementing such efforts, but roles and responsibilities for screening and vetting for immigration benefits may be modified in the future based on the work of the center  According to DHS Office of Policy officials, efforts to implement National Security Presidential Memorandum 9, such as the development of an implementation plan, are ongoing as of June 2018  Implementation of new visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures  In response to the EOs and a March 2017 presidential memorandum issued the same day as EO-2, State has taken several actions to implement new visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures  For example, State sought and received emergency approval from the Office of Management and Budget in May 2017 to develop a new form, the DS-5535  The form collects additional information from a subset of visa applicants to more rigorously evaluate applicants for visa ineligibilities, including those related to national security and terrorism  The new information requested includes the applicant’s travel history over the prior 15 years, all phone numbers used over the prior 15 years, and all email addresses and social media handles used in the last 5 years  State estimated that, across all posts, the groups requiring additional vetting represented about 70,500 individuals per year  We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS, DOJ, State, and ODNI  DHS, DOJ, and State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until seven days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777or GamblerR@gao gov  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV  There are many nonimmigrant visas (NIV), which are issued to foreign nationals such as tourists, business visitors, and students seeking temporary admission into the United States  For the purposes of this report, we placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups  In the following enclosures, we provide a descriptive overview of each group on the basis of our analysis of the Department of State’s (State) fiscal years 2012 through 2017 NIV data  Each enclosure also contains the following: Description of the group  In this section, we provide a narrative description of the group, as well as a table of the specific NIVs that comprise the group  Characteristics of the applicants  In this section, we provide the number of annual NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the specific NIVs adjudicated in fiscal year 2017 within the group, the regions to which applicants applied for these NIVs in fiscal year 2017, and the top five nationalities that applied for NIVs in the group in fiscal year 2017  Issuances  In this section, we provide the number of NIVs issued within this group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Refusals  In this section, we provide the refusal rate for the entire NIV group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  For the NIVs that were refused in fiscal year 2017 for this group, we also provide the top ground for refusal  NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U S  immigration law and State policy  However, across all visa groups, the top categories were either ineligible nonimmigrant or inadequate documentation: Ineligible nonimmigrant  For most NIV categories, the applicant is presumed to be an intending immigrant until the applicant establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer that he or she is entitled to a nonimmigrant status  An applicant may be refused under this provision if, among other things, the consular officer determines the applicant lacks sufficient ties to his or her home country, or intends to abandon foreign residence; that evidence otherwise indicates an intent to immigrate to the United States permanently; or that the applicant is likely to violate the terms of the visa after being admitted  Inadequate documentation  The consular officer determined that the application is not in compliance with the INA because, for example, it lacks necessary documentation to allow the consular officer to determine visa eligibility  In such cases, the applicant would not be found eligible for the visa unless and until satisfactory documentation is provided to the consular officer or after the completion of administrative processing, such as security advisory opinions  Visa types (FY 2017) (9,968,157 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (9,968,157 adjudications) percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2015, and declined by about 13 percent from fiscal years 2015 to 2017  ● The refusal rate for tourist and business visitor visas generally increased each year from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2017  ● The vast majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (992,855 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (992,855 adjudications) ● The refusal rate for student and exchange visitor issuances decreased each year from fiscal years 2015 through 2017  visas peaked in fiscal year 2016, and slightly declined in fiscal year 2017  ● The vast majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (884,667 adjudications) 19% 10% 16% Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (884,667 adjudications) ● Generally, the refusal rates for temporary worker years 2012 through 2017  visas decreased from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Department of State officials noted, for example, that H-2A visas are not numerically limited by statute  They also stated that they believe U S  employers are increasingly less likely to hire workers without lawful status and are petitioning for lawfully admitted workers  ● In fiscal year 2017, temporary worker visas were most frequently refused because the applicant did not provide adequate documentation to the consular officer  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (330,117 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (330,117 adjudications) ● The refusal rates for transit and crewmember visas about 8 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (from about 295,000 to 320,000)  varied over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Specifically, issued C-1/D visas increased over the ● The majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were same time period, but the number of issued visas for the remaining visa types in this category have decreased  due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (166,187 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (166,187 adjudications) ● The refusal rates for foreign official and employee visas remained under 4 percent  ● In fiscal year 2017, foreign official and employee visas were most frequently refused because the applicant did not provide adequate documentation to the consular officer  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (68,580 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (68,580 adjudications) ● Generally, refusal rates for treaty trader and investor increased over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  visas increased slightly over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Issuances for E-3 visas nearly doubled from fiscal ● The majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were year 2012 through 2017, but comprise a small percentage of this category overall  due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of their intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (40,533 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (40,533 adjudications) ● Refusal rates for fiancé(e) and spouse visas were fluctuated over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017, but increased overall during this time period  relatively low during the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Most refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to inadequate documentation from the visa applicant, potentially indicating that such applications failed to include necessary documentation for the consular officer to ascertain whether the applicant was eligible to receive a visa at that time  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Nonimmigrant visas (NIV) are issued to foreign nationals such as tourists, business visitors, and students seeking temporary admission into the United States  The Department of State (State) is generally responsible for the adjudication of NIV applications, and manages the application process, including the consular officer corps and its functions at more than 220 U S  embassies and consulates (i e , visa-issuing posts) overseas  Depending on various factors, such as the particular NIV sought, the applicant’s background, and visa demand, State officials noted that the length of the visa adjudication process can vary from a single day to months  This appendix provides descriptive statistics of NIV adjudications, issuances, and refusals for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Specific details are shown in table 8 below  State data from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 indicate that NIV adjudications generally followed an annual cycle, ebbing during certain months during the fiscal year; however, adjudications in fiscal year 2017 departed slightly from this trend  Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the number of NIV adjudications typically reached its highest peak in the summer months, as shown in table 9  For example, State officials noted that a summer peak is generally due to international students who are applying for their visas for the coming academic year  There are many NIVs, and for the purposes of this report, we have placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups  Table 10 includes the annual NIV adjudications, issuances, and refusal rates, for each visa group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV applicants seeking to travel to the United States represent many different nationalities, but the countries of nationality with the most NIV adjudications have remained relatively consistent in recent years  Table 11 provides the top 25 countries of nationality for NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV applicants can apply for their NIVs at more than 220 visa-issuing U S  posts overseas  Table 12 describes the regions to which NIV applicants applied from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U S  immigration law and State policy  For the purposes of this report, we have grouped most of these grounds for refusal into one of seven categories, and group the remaining into a miscellaneous category, as shown in table 13  From January through October 2017, the administration took various executive actions establishing nationality-based entry restrictions for certain categories of foreign nationals from designated countries  This appendix supplements information included in this report to provide a more comprehensive presentation of changes to U S  immigration policy affecting nonimmigrant and immigrant entry into the United States, and outlines the legal standards applied, and precedent developed and relied upon, by federal courts in resolving challenges to the executive actions  In particular, it describes relevant aspects of the executive actions specifically addressed in this report—Executive Orders 13769 and 13780, both titled Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, and Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats—that imposed visa entry restrictions on certain countries’ nationals and included provisions addressing NIV screening and vetting, as well as other executive actions on immigration issued by the current administration  Furthermore, this appendix provides a detailed account of the interrelated challenges to these executive actions brought in the federal courts through June 2018  In summary, on March 6, 2017, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which instituted visa and refugee entry restrictions, and an accompanying memorandum addressed to the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security and the Attorney General, calling for heightened screening and vetting of visa applications and other immigration benefits  EO 13780 stated that it is U S  policy to improve the screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with the visa-issuance process and U S  Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP)  Enforcement of sections 2(c) and 6(a) of EO 13780 which established visa entry restrictions for nationals of six countries of particular concern—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—for a 90-day period, and suspended all refugee admissions for 120 days, was enjoined by federal district court orders issued in March 2017  On appeal, the U S  Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits generally upheld these decisions  Upon review by the U S  Supreme Court in June 2017, the injunction was partially lifted except with respect to foreign nationals who have bona fide ties to the United States Implementation of EO 13780 commenced on June 29, 2017  On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats  This proclamation restricts entry into the United States of certain categories of foreign nationals from eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—for an indefinite period  Preliminary injunctions issued by the U S  District Courts for the Districts of Maryland (Maryland federal district court) and Hawaii (Hawaii federal district court) in October 2017 prohibited implementation of these visa entry restrictions except with respect to North Korean and Venezuelan nationals  On December 4, 2017, the U S  Supreme Court issued two orders staying these district court injunctions; and on January 19, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for review of the December 22, 2017, decision of the Ninth Circuit, which partially affirmed the Hawaii federal district court’s preliminary injunction  As of June 2018, these latest visa entry restrictions continue to be fully implemented consistent with the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the President may lawfully establish nationality-based entry restrictions, and that Proclamation 9645 itself “is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority ” The following sections describe these executive actions and related litigation in greater detail  On January 27, 2017, the President issued EO 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which directed a review of information needs for adjudicating visas and other immigration benefits to confirm individuals seeking such benefits are who they claim to be, and are not security or public-safety threats  To temporarily reduce investigative burdens during the review period, the EO suspended U S  entry for nationals of seven countries of particular concern—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen  In addition, EO 13769 put USRAP on hold for 120 days and indefinitely barred admission of Syrian refugees  Shortly after its issuance, however, the EO faced numerous legal challenges in federal courts across the country involving various constitutional and statutory issues such as detainee applications for writs of habeas corpus, alleged religious or nationality-based discrimination, and the extent of the EO’s applicability to certain categories of foreign nationals, including U S  lawful permanent residents (LPR) and dual nationals holding passports issued by a listed country as well as another nation not subject to visa entry restrictions  On February 3, 2017, the Washington federal district court entered a nationwide temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting enforcement of the EO’s entry restrictions  In rejecting the government’s argument that a TRO only cover the particular states at issue, the court reasoned that partial implementation would “undermine the constitutional imperative of ‘a uniform Rule of Naturalization’ and Congress’s instruction that the ‘immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly ’” On February 9, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the nationwide injunction, thereby denying the government’s emergency motion for a stay of the Washington federal district court’s TRO pending appeal, because the government did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of its appeal, or that failure to enter a stay would cause irreparable injury  On March 6, 2017, however, the President issued EO 13780, which revoked and replaced EO 13769, and established revised restrictions on entry for nationals of the same countries of particular concern, except Iraq  On March 6, 2017, the President signed EO 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which revoked and replaced EO 13769 and put in place revised visa and refugee entry restrictions, and issued an accompanying memorandum calling for heightened screening and vetting of visa applications and other immigration benefits  In general, sections 2(c) and 6(a) of EO 13780 barred visa travel for nationals of six designated countries—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—for 90 days, and all refugee admission for 120 days  On March 15, 2017, sections 2 and 6 of the EO were enjoined on statutory grounds (i e , based on potential violation of U S  immigration law) pursuant to the order of the Hawaii federal district court granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO  On March 16, 2017, the Maryland federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring implementation of visa entry restrictions on a nationwide basis with respect to nationals of the six listed countries  On May 25, 2017, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Maryland federal district court’s injunction on constitutional grounds (i e , based on potential violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U S  Constitution)  On June 12, 2017, the Ninth Circuit generally affirmed the Hawaii federal district court’s ruling, but vacated the district court’s order to the extent it enjoined internal review procedures not burdening individuals outside the Executive Branch, therefore permitting the administration to conduct the internal reviews of visa information needs as directed in the EO  On June 14, 2017, the President issued a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, Attorney General, and Director of National Intelligence, directing that sections 2 and 6 of EO 13780 were to be implemented 72 hours after all applicable injunctions are lifted or stayed  On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court granted, in part, the government’s application to stay the March 15 and 16 injunctions of the Hawaii and Maryland federal district courts, as generally upheld on May 25 and June 12 by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits  The Court explained that the administration may enforce visa and refugee travel restrictions under sections 2 and 6 except with respect to an individual who can “credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States ” In the case of a visa or refugee applicant who is the relative of a person in the United States, such foreign national would be exempt from entry restrictions provided the family connection with their U S  relative meets the “close familial relationship” standard  The Court further explained that a qualifying relationship with a U S  entity would have to be formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, and not for the purpose of evading EO 13780  On June 29, 2017, the day that implementation of EO 13780 began, the State Department issued guidance providing that a close familial relationship exists for the parents, spouse, children, adult sons or daughters, sons and daughters-in-law, and siblings of a person in the United States, but not for such person’s grandparents, grandchildren, uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, sisters-in-law, brothers-in-law or other relatives  The State of Hawaii filed a motion with the Hawaii federal district court seeking, among other things, a declaration that the partial injunction in place after the Supreme Court’s ruling prohibited application of travel restrictions to fiancés, grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the United States  On July 13, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court ruled, among other things, that section 2 of the EO, generally barring travel to the United States for nationals of certain countries, does not apply to the grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews and cousins of persons in the United States, who were initially excluded from the administration’s interpretation of “close family ” The government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court  On July 19, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the government’s motion seeking further clarification of its June 26 ruling, stayed the Hawaii federal district court’s order to the extent it included refugees covered by a formal assurance from a U S -based resettlement agency within the scope of the preliminary injunction, pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and left unchanged the district court’s broader formulation of exempt “close family ” On September 7, 2017, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Hawaii federal district court’s definition of close family members who are not to be subjected to travel restrictions, and rejected the government’s argument that refugees who had undergone a stringent review process and been approved by U S -based resettlement agencies lack a bona fide relationship to the United States, thus allowing admission of such refugees  On September 11, 2017, the Supreme Court temporarily enjoined aspects of the Hawaii federal district court’s holding that would permit admission of certain refugees with formal assurances from a U S  resettlement entity  The next day, on September 12, 2017, the Supreme Court indefinitely stayed the Ninth Circuit’s September 7 ruling with respect to refugees covered by a formal assurance, thereby permitting the administration to suspend entry of such refugees  On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public Safety Threats, which expanded the scope and duration of visa entry restrictions from six to eight countries, and from a 90-day to an indefinite period for the listed countries  On September 25, 2017, in light of the September 24 proclamation, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file briefs addressing whether, or to what extent, the cases before it regarding EO 13780 are moot  On October 10, 2017, after receiving the parties’ supplemental briefs, the Supreme Court decided that because section 2(c) of EO 13780 expired on September 24, there was no live case or controversy; and without expressing a view on the merits, the Court vacated and remanded the Maryland case to the Fourth Circuit with instructions to dismiss as moot the challenge to EO 13780  On October 24, 2017, consistent with its October 10 ruling, the Supreme Court also vacated and remanded the Hawaii case related to EO 13780 to the Ninth Circuit with instructions to dismiss it as moot  Consequently, after challenges to EO 13780 visa and refugee entry restrictions, as curtailed by the Supreme Court’s ruling of June 26, 2017, were rendered moot, litigation continued with respect to the President’s proclamation of September 24, 2017  On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645 (the Proclamation), Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, which imposes certain conditional restrictions and limitations on entry into the United States of nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—for an indefinite period  According to the Proclamation, travel restrictions are tailored to each nation’s information sharing and identity management deficiencies based on standard immigration screening and vetting criteria established by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and are to remain in effect until such time as the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State determine that a country provides sufficient information for the United States to assess adequately whether its nationals pose a security or safety threat  On October 17, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court issued a TRO, on statutory grounds, enjoining on a nationwide basis the implementation and enforcement of travel restrictions provided for under the Proclamation, except with respect to North Korean or Venezuelan nationals  On the same day, the Maryland federal district court granted in part plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, primarily on constitutional grounds, thereby prohibiting implementation of visa entry restrictions nationwide, except for nationals of North Korea and Venezuela as well as other covered foreign nationals who lack a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States  On October 20, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court converted its October 17 TRO into a preliminary injunction, thereby continuing the nationwide prohibition on enforcement or implementation of the suspension on entry for nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen  The district court did not stay its ruling or hold it in abeyance should an appeal be filed in the Ninth Circuit  On November 13, 2017, the Ninth Circuit granted, in part, the government’s request for an emergency stay of the Hawaii federal district court’s preliminary injunction, thereby allowing visa entry restrictions to go into effect with respect to the nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen  However, consistent with the Supreme Court’s June 2017 ruling, the court ordered that those with a bone fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States not be subject to such travel restrictions  On November 20, 2017, the government petitioned the Supreme Court for a stay of the preliminary injunction issued by the Hawaii federal district court, pending consideration and disposition of the government’s appeal from that injunction to the Ninth Circuit and, if that court affirms the injunction, pending filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari and any further proceedings in the Supreme Court  On November 28, 2017, plaintiffs in the challenge to the Proclamation arising out of Hawaii asked that the Supreme Court deny the government’s request to lift the partial injunction left in place by the Ninth Circuit  On the same day, plaintiffs in the case arising out of Maryland requested that the Supreme Court not grant a stay of the federal district court’s preliminary injunction  In both cases, plaintiffs assert that the more expansive visa entry restrictions violate U S  immigration law; additionally, for the Maryland case, plaintiffs argue that such restrictions are unconstitutional as a form of discrimination based on national origin  On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court issued two orders staying the Maryland and Hawaii federal district courts’ orders of October 17 and 20 that preliminarily enjoined implementation of the Proclamation, pending decisions of the Ninth and Fourth Circuits in the government’s appeals, and of the Supreme Court regarding a petition for a writ of certiorari (if sought)  As a result, the Proclamation’s visa entry restrictions were permitted to go into full effect unless and until they are either enjoined by the courts of appeals and a writ of certiorari is not sought thereafter, or the Supreme Court either denies a petition for certiorari (thereby resulting in termination of the Supreme Court’s stay order) or grants such petition followed by a final injunction prohibiting current or future implementation of the Proclamation’s restrictions  The Supreme Court further noted its expectation that the courts of appeals will render decisions “with appropriate dispatch,” in light of both courts having decided to consider their respective cases on an expedited basis  On December 8, 2017, the Department of State announced that it began fully implementing the Proclamation, as permitted by the Supreme Court, at the opening of business at U S  embassies and consulates overseas  On December 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the Hawaii federal district court’s October 20 order enjoining enforcement of visa entry restrictions under the Proclamation, while limiting the preliminary injunction’s scope to foreign nationals who have a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States  Without reaching plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, the court of appeals concluded that the Proclamation exceeded the scope of authority delegated to the President by Congress under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), in particular, sections 202(a)(1)(A) (immigrant visa nondiscrimination) and 212(f) (presidential suspension of, or imposition of restrictions on, alien entry), by deviating from statutory text, legislative history and prior executive practice; not including the requisite finding that entry of certain foreign nationals would be detrimental to U S  interests; and contravening the INA’s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas  However, the court stayed its decision, given that the Supreme Court’s December 4 order lifted the federal district courts’ injunctions pending not only review by the courts of appeals, but also “disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought ” On January 5, 2018, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the December 22, 2017, judgment of the Ninth Circuit which left in place the Hawaii federal district court injunction of the Proclamation’s visa entry restrictions for individuals with bona fide ties to the United States  On January 19, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the government’s certiorari petition and will therefore consider, and issue an opinion on the merits of, the Ninth Circuit’s decision  On February 15, 2018, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction granted by the Maryland federal district court on constitutional grounds, but stayed its decision pending the outcome of the Ninth Circuit case before the Supreme Court  The court of appeals found that “laintiffs offer undisputed evidence that the President has openly and often expressed his desire” to bar the entry of Muslims into the United States  Therefore, the court concluded that, in light of the President’s official statements, the Proclamation likely violates the Establishment Clause as it “fails to demonstrate a primarily secular purpose,” and also goes against the basic principle that government is not to act with religious animus  On February 23, 2018, Fourth Circuit challengers filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking for the Supreme Court to consolidate their case with the Court’s ongoing review of the Ninth Circuit decision  These petitioners requested that the Court additionally consider their argument that the preliminary injunction should not have been limited to individuals with a bona fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States  On February 26, 2018, the Supreme Court granted Fourth Circuit petitioners’ motion to expedite consideration of their certiorari petition  On April 10, 2018, the President issued a proclamation announcing that because Chad has improved its identity-management and information sharing practices sufficiently to meet U S  baseline security standards, nationals of Chad will again be able to receive visas for travel to the United States  On June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court held that the President lawfully exercised the broad discretion granted to him under INA § 212(f) (presidential suspension of, or imposition of restrictions on, alien entry), by issuing Proclamation No  9645, which established nationality-based visa entry restrictions applicable to categories of foreign nationals from eight (now seven) countries for an indefinite period  In addition, while three individual plaintiffs had standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to entry restrictions prohibiting their relatives from coming to the United States, the Court found the Proclamation to be legitimate on its face as a way to prevent entry of certain foreign nationals where the government determines there is insufficient information for visa vetting  As a result of the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the establishment of nationality-based entry restrictions is a lawful exercise of the President’s broad discretion in matters of immigration and national security, the visa entry restrictions imposed on categories of foreign nationals from certain countries pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9645 continue to be fully implemented , as they have been since the Supreme Court’s December 4, 2017, orders staying the lower courts’ injunctions  On October 24, 2017, the same day the 120-day suspension of refugee admissions under EO 13780 expired, the President signed EO 13815, Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions program With Enhanced Vetting Capabilities, which resumed USRAP and directed that special measures be applied to certain categories of refugees posing potential threats to the security and welfare of the United States  On December 23, 2017, the Washington federal district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction on aspects of EO 13815 (and its accompanying memorandum), thus prohibiting the administration from: (1) temporarily suspending admission of refugees from 11 previously identified countries of concern, and reallocating resources from the processing of their applications during the 90-day review period (except for those lacking a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States); and (2) indefinitely barring admission of, and application processing for, all following-to-join refugees  On January 5, 2018, the Washington federal district court denied the government’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s December 23, 2017, order temporarily halting enforcement of refugee entry restrictions that were to be implemented as part of the resumption of USRAP under the EO  Specifically, the government “ask the court to ‘modify its preliminary injunction to exclude from coverage refugee applicants who seek to establish a on the sole ground that they have received a formal assurance from a resettlement agency ’” In denying the government’s motion for reconsideration, the court relied on the September 7, 2017, decision of the Ninth Circuit which, among other things, rejected the notion that refugees with formal assurances from U S -based resettlement agencies do not meet the Supreme Court’s bona fide relationship standard  The court treated this Ninth Circuit ruling as binding precedent given that the Supreme Court’s indefinite stay of September 12 neither vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision, nor provided any underlying reason(s) that would allow another court to discern its rationale  On January 9, 2018, the Washington federal district court also denied the government’s emergency motion for a stay of the court’s December 23, 2017, preliminary injunction, pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit  On January 31, 2018, DHS announced additional security measures to prevent exploitation of USRAP  Specifically, these security measures include additional screening for certain nationals of high-risk countries, a more risk-based approach to administering USRAP, and a periodic review and update of the refugee high-risk countries list and selection criteria  Therefore, as of June 2018, while the administration has announced additional security measures to strengthen the integrity of USRAP, the Washington federal district court’s December 23, 2017, preliminary injunction of EO 13815 continues to: (1) prohibit implementation of the temporary suspension of admission, and reallocation of resources from processing applications, of refugees from 11 previously identified countries of concern; and (2) forbid enforcement of the indefinite bar on entry of following-to-join refugees  In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet (Assistant Director), Colleen Corcoran, Eric Hauswirth, Thomas Lombardi, Amanda Miller, Sasan J  “Jon” Najmi, Erin O’Brien, Garrett Riba, and Dina Shorafa made significant contributions to this report 

ground_truth: The combination of growing liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and new requirements for less polluting fuels in the maritime shipping industry has heightened interest in LNG as a maritime fuel. The use of LNG as an engine ("bunker") fuel in shipping is also drawing attention from federal agencies and is beginning to emerge as an issue of interest in Congress. In 2008, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) announced a timeline to reduce the maximum sulfur content in vessel fuels to 0.5% by January 1, 2020. Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships requires vessels to either use fuels containing less than 0.5% sulfur or install exhaust-cleaning systems ("scrubbers") to limit a vessel's airborne emissions of sulfur oxides to an equivalent level. An option for vessel operators to meet the IMO 2020 standards is to install LNG-fueled engines, which emit only trace amounts of sulfur. Adopting LNG engines requires more investment than installing scrubbers, but LNG-fueled engines may offset their capital costs with operating cost advantages over conventional fuels. Savings would depend on the price spread between LNG and fuel oil. Recent trends suggest that LNG may be cheaper in the long run than conventional fuels. LNG bunkering requires specialized infrastructure for supply, storage, and delivery to vessels. To date, the number of ports worldwide that have developed such infrastructure is limited, although growth in this area has accelerated. Early adoption of LNG bunkering is occurring in Europe where the European Union requires a core network of ports to provide LNG bunkering by 2030. LNG bunkering is also advancing in Asia, led by Singapore, the world's largest bunkering port. Asian countries, together with Australia and the United Arab Emirates, have about 10 coastal ports offering LNG bunkering, with another 15 projects in development. LNG bunkering in the United States currently takes place in Jacksonville, FL, and Port Fourchon, LA—with a third facility under development in Tacoma, WA. Bunkering of LNG-fueled cruise ships using barges also is planned for Port Canaveral, FL. The relative locations of other U.S. ports and operating LNG terminals suggest that LNG bunkering could be within reach of every port along the Eastern Seaboard and in the Gulf of Mexico. On the West Coast, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA, are near the Costa Azul LNG terminal in Ensenada, MX. Seattle and Tacoma are adjacent to the proposed Tacoma LNG project. Since 2015, Jones Act coastal ship operators have taken steps to transition their fleets to use cleaner burning fuels, including LNG. Shippers of dry goods to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have taken delivery or have ordered LNG-fueled and LNG-capable vessels from U.S. shipyards in Philadelphia, PA, and Brownsville, TX. Another company operates five LNG-powered offshore supply vessels built in Gulfport, MS. Depending upon LNG conversions, the global LNG bunker fuel market could grow to several billion dollars by 2030. If U.S. LNG producers were to supply a significant share of this market—on the strength of comparatively low LNG production costs—LNG bunkering could increase demand for U.S. natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction. Opportunities in LNG-related shipbuilding might be more limited, as most shipbuilding occurs overseas, although domestically-constructed LNG bunkering barges could be one area of economic growth. Finally, engineering and construction firms could benefit from new opportunities to develop port infrastructure for LNG storage and transfer. However, while vessel conversion to LNG fuel may increase demand for U.S.-produced natural gas, it partially could be offset by reduced demand for U.S.-produced crude oil or refined products. Furthermore, while LNG can reduce direct emissions from vessels, fugitive emissions and environmental impacts from natural gas production and transportation could reduce overall emissions benefits. While the LNG industry has experienced few accidents, the Coast Guard has been developing new standards to address unique safety and security risks associated with LNG in vessel operations. The overarching consideration about LNG bunkering in the United States is uncertainty about how the global shipping fleet will adapt to the IMO sulfur standards over time. This uncertainty complicates decisions related to both private investment and public policy. Although Congress has limited ability to influence global shipping, it could influence the growth of LNG bunkering through the tax code and regulation, or through policies affecting the LNG industry or domestic shipping industry as a whole. Evaluating the potential implications of LNG bunkering within the context of broader energy and environmental policies may become an additional consideration for Congress. If LNG bunkering expands significantly, Congress also may examine the adequacy of existing measures to ensure the safety and security of LNG vessels, storage, and related facilities.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The combination of growing supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and new requirements for less polluting fuels in the international maritime shipping industry has heightened interest in LNG as a maritime fuel  For decades, LNG tanker ships have been capable of burning boil-off gas from their LNG cargoes as a secondary fuel  However, using LNG as a primary fuel is a relatively new endeavor; the first LNG-powered vessel—a Norwegian ferry—began service in 2000  Several aspects of LNG use in shipping may be of congressional interest  LNG as an engine, or "bunker," fuel potentially could help the United States reduce harmful air emissions, it could create a new market for domestic natural gas, and it could create economic opportunities in domestic shipbuilding  However, U S  ports would need specialized vessels and land-based infrastructure for LNG "bunkering" (vessel refueling) as well as appropriate regulatory oversight of the associated shipping and fueling operations  The storage, delivery, and use of LNG in shipping also has safety implications  These and other aspects of LNG bunkering may become legislative or oversight issues for Congress  One bill in the 115 th Congress, the Waterway LNG Parity Act of 2017 ( S  505 ), would have imposed excise taxes on LNG used by marine vessels on inland waterways  This report discusses impending International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards limiting the maximum sulfur content in shipping fuels, the market conditions in which LNG may compete to become a common bunker fuel for vessel operators, and the current status of LNG bunkering globally and in the United States  A broader discussion of oil market implications is outside the scope of this report  The IMO is the United Nations organization that negotiates standards for international shipping  Its standards limiting sulfur emissions from ships, adopted in 2008, have led vessel operators to consider alternatives to petroleum-based fuels to power their ships  In 1973, the IMO adopted the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)  Annex VI of the convention, which came into force in 2005, deals with air pollution from ships  The annex established limits on nitrogen oxide (NO x ) emissions and set a 4 5% limit on the allowable sulfur content in vessel fuels  In 2008, the IMO announced a timeline to reduce the maximum sulfur content in vessel fuels from 4 5% to 0 5% by January 1, 2020  Annex VI requires vessel operators to either use fuels containing less than 0 5% sulfur or install exhaust gas-cleaning systems ("scrubbers") to limit a vessel's sulfur oxide (SO x ) emissions to a level equivalent to the required sulfur limit  MARPOL is implemented in the United States through the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships ()  The United States effectively ratified MARPOL Annex VI in 2008 when President Bush signed the Maritime Pollution Prevention Act ( P L  110-280 )  The act requires that the U S  Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) jointly enforce the Annex VI emissions standards  MARPOL's Annex VI requirements are codified at 40 C F R  §1043  They apply to U S -flagged ships wherever located and to foreign-flagged ships operating in U S  waters  In addition to its global sulfur standards, MARPOL Annex VI provides for the establishment of Emissions Control Areas (ECAs), which are waters close to coastlines where more stringent emissions controls may be imposed  The North American ECA limits the sulfur content of bunker fuel to 0 1% of total fuel weight, an even lower bar than that set by the IMO 2020 standards  This standard is enforced by Coast Guard and EPA in waters up to 200 miles from shore  Currently, most ships operating in the North American ECA meet the emissions requirements by switching to low-sulfur fuels once they enter ECA waters  The European Union also has an ECA with a 0 1% limit on sulfur in bunker fuels, and the Chinese government is considering putting the same standard in place  The IMO 2020 emissions requirement applies to vessels of 400 gross tons and over, which is estimated to cover about 110,000 vessels worldwide  However, analysts indicate that many of the smaller vessels in this group already burn low-sulfur fuel  Accounting for these smaller vessels, one estimate is that about 55,000 vessels currently burn high-sulfur fuel  Ship owners have two main options for meeting the emission requirements with existing engines: burn low-sulfur conventional fuel (or biofuels) or install scrubbers to clean their exhaust gases  Alternatively, ship owners may opt to install new LNG-fueled engines to comply with the IMO standard  The simplest option for vessel owners to comply with the IMO sulfur standards, and the one that appears most popular, is switching to low-sulfur fuel oils or distillate fuels  Although switching to low-sulfur fuels would increase fuel costs compared to conventional, high-sulfur fuels, it would require little or no upfront capital cost and would allow ocean carriers to use existing infrastructure to bunker ships at ports  Anticipating widespread adoption of this approach, many analysts predict that the implementation of the IMO 2020 regulations will drive up demand for low-sulfur fuel and, therefore, significantly increase its price above current levels  Such a trend could also reduce demand for high-sulfur fuels, increasing the price spread between low- and high-sulfur bunkers fuels  Switching to lower-sulfur fuel could increase fuel cost across the industry by up to $60 billion in 2020 for full compliance with the IMO standards  Moreover, while it may allow vessels to meet the existing IMO sulfur standards, low-sulfur fuel does not necessarily support compliance with potential future IMO emissions standards, especially with respect to greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) discussed later in this report  Scrubbers are systems which remove sulfur from a vessel's engine exhaust emissions  A ship with a scrubber would be capable of meeting the IMO 2020 standard while using conventional high-sulfur fuel  Retrofitting a scrubber on an existing engine can cost several million dollars, however, before factoring in the lost revenue from taking the ship out of service for a month for the installation  Therefore, while using a scrubber will allow a ship to continue using (currently) cheaper high-sulfur fuel, it may take years to recover the initial investment  For example, one industry study estimates that, in the case of a typical tanker, a scrubber installation could cost $4 2 million with a payback time of approximately 4 8 years  Furthermore, scrubbers installed to capture sulfur emissions might have to be further refitted or replaced to comply with any future IMO standards for GHG emissions  The rate of scrubber adoption could affect the financial impacts of installing them in terms of fuel costs  Scrubbers ultimately offset some or all of their initial costs because they allow vessel operators to continue using relatively inexpensive high-sulfur fuel  However, the return on investment for scrubbers depends on the relative prices of high- and low-sulfur bunker fuels  The demand—and therefore, prices—for low-sulfur and high-sulfur fuels will be affected by how many vessels use the respective fuels under the IMO standards that take effect in 2020  For example, limited scrubber adoption could result in more vessels demanding more low-sulfur fuel oil, creating upward pressure on low-sulfur fuel prices  Under such a scenario, scrubbers would provide greater fuel cost savings for vessels that installed them  Alternatively, high-sulfur fuel could become more costly due to refinery production cutbacks (because shippers will not be allowed to burn it without scrubbers)  In this case, the economic benefits of scrubbers would be diminished  Given the uncertain fuel supply and demand dynamics, it is difficult for vessel operators to know how big the market distortions from scrubber installation could be or how many other operators may choose to install scrubbers  As of September 2018, there were approximately 660 ships retrofitted with scrubbers and over 600 ships under construction with plans to install scrubbers  By 2020, projecting additional construction orders, some analysts predict about 2,000 vessels could have scrubbers installed  However, even with higher demand for the technology, the ability of vessel owners to install scrubbers is constrained; analysts estimate that current maximum capacity for installing scrubbers is be between 300 to 500 ships per year  Another option for ship owners to comply with the IMO 2020 sulfur standards is to switch to engines that burn LNG as a bunker fuel  LNG-fueled vessels emit only trace amounts of sulfur oxides in their exhaust gases—well below even the 0 1% fuel-equivalent threshold in some of the ECA zones—so they would be fully compliant with the IMO standards  As a secondary benefit, using LNG as an engine fuel also would reduce particulate matter (PM) emissions relative to both high- and low-sulfur marine fuel oils  Furthermore, LNG vessels have the potential to emit less CO 2 than vessels running on conventional, petroleum-based fuels  However, LNG vessels would have the potential to result in more fugitive emissions of methane, another GHG, because methane is the primary component of natural gas, further discussed below  Installing an LNG-fueled engine can add around $5 million to the cost of a new ship  Retrofitting existing ships appears to be less desirable because of the extra space required for the larger fuel tanks (new ships can be designed with the larger fuel tanks)  The costs of retraining crews to work with LNG engines could also factor into a vessel operator's decision about switching to LNG  However, apart from their lower emissions, LNG-fueled engines may offset their capital costs with fuel cost advantages over engines burning petroleum-derived fuels  These savings would depend on the price spread between natural gas and fuel oil—which has been volatile in recent years  The likelihood that switching to LNG will produce long-term fuel costs savings relative to conventional fuels is, therefore, a critical consideration for many vessel owners  The 1920 Merchant Marine Act (known colloquially as the Jones Act) requires that vessels engaged in U S  domestic transport be built domestically  Many newly built domestic ships receive a federal loan guarantee under the Maritime Administration's so-called "Title XI" program  In 2014, the program was modified to include the use of "alternative energy technologies" to power ships as part of the relevant criteria in evaluating a loan application  The Maritime Administration counts LNG-fueled engines as an "alternative energy technology" and may be more likely to approve loan applications for ships with LNG-capable engines  Since the North American ECA was established in 2015, Jones Act coastal ship operators have taken steps to transition their fleets to use cleaner burning fuels, including LNG  The three Jones Act operators that ship dry goods to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have taken delivery or have ordered LNG-fueled and LNG-capable vessels from U S  shipyards in Philadelphia, PA, and Brownsville, TX  Harvey Gulf International has put into service five LNG-powered offshore supply vessels that service offshore oil rigs  Some Jones Act tanker operators that have recently built or ordered vessels have chosen to install LNG-ready engines while other operators have chosen to install scrubbers on their existing fleet  Ship engines and scrubbers for the Jones Act fleet do not have to be manufactured in the United States because they are not considered an integral part of the hull or superstructure of a ship  Seagoing barges, known as articulated tug barges, are also a significant portion of the domestic coastal fleet, especially for moving liquid cargoes  However, these vessels traditionally have burned lower-sulfur fuels and thus the ECA has not prompted fleet conversions  IMO fuel requirements do not apply to river barges operating on the nation's inland waterway system, although this fleet potentially could be a market for LNG as fuel  Bunkering vessels (small tankers with hoses for refueling ships) in U S  waters must also be Jones Act compliant  Barges are the predominant method for bunkering ships in U S  ports  An LNG bunkering vessel for the Port of Jacksonville—the first Jones Act-compliant LNG bunkering vessel to enter service in the United States—was built in 2017 by Conrad Shipyards in Orange, TX  Recent energy sector trends suggest that LNG may be cheaper in the long-run than petroleum-based, low-sulfur fuels  However, these price movements are correlated to some extent  Many existing long-term LNG contracts link LNG prices to oil prices (although such contract terms are on the decline), even in the spot market  Starting in 2008, the advent of shale natural gas production dramatically decreased natural gas prices in the United States  Natural gas spot prices in the United States at the Henry Hub—the largest U S  trading hub for natural gas—averaged around $3/MMBtu (million British Thermal Units) in 2018, about a quarter of the peak in average price a decade before, just prior to the shale gas boom ( Figure 1 )  Liquefying natural gas into LNG adds around $2/MMBtu to the production cost  Including additional producer charges and service costs would bring the total cost of LNG available at a U S  port (based on the 2018 average price in Figure 1 ) to approximately $6/MMBtu  Shipping of LNG from the United States to Asia or Europe adds from $1 to $2/MMBtu, so, based on the 2018 average cost in Figure 1 , LNG delivered to a port overseas would cost on the order of $7 to $8/MMbtu under long-term contracts, depending upon timing and location  Higher or lower prices could occur for specific long-term contracts and in the LNG spot market (i e , for individual cargoes), based on the location and the supply and demand balance at the time  In general, the U S  market will have the lowest-priced LNG  Northern Asia will have the highest LNG prices due to the region's comparative lack of pipeline gas supplies and its distance from LNG suppliers  Figure 2 compares LNG spot market prices in the Japan LNG market—the highest-priced LNG market—to spot prices for two common petroleum-based bunker fuels, low-sulfur gas oil and high-sulfur fuel oil  As the figure shows, over the last five years, Japan LNG generally has been cheaper than low-sulfur fuel and more expensive than high-sulfur fuel on an energy-equivalent basis (i e , per MMbtu)  However, Japan LNG and high-sulfur fuel prices converged in 2018  As the figure shows, spot prices for LNG deliveries to the Japan market fell below $6/MMBtu in 2016 from a high above $16/MMBtu in 2013  Likewise, low-sulfur gas oil prices have doubled, and high-sulfur fuel oil prices have tripled, since 2016  The volatility of the bunker fuel markets and the global LNG market lead to considerable unpredictability about the relative prices among fuels going forward  LNG may become increasingly price-competitive versus low-sulfur fuel as the 2020 IMO sulfur standards take effect  As discussed above, many analysts predict prices for low-sulfur gas oil, which are already higher than those for high-sulfur fuel oil, to increase significantly after 2020 due to a standards-driven rise in demand  Although fuel prices as shown in Figure 2 indicate favorable economics for LNG versus low-sulfur fuel, if prices for high-sulfur fuel oils collapse as some expect after the 2020 IMO regulations enter into force, it is possible that LNG could lose its price advantage over residual fuel oils  Likewise, the price spread between low-sulfur gasoil and high-sulfur fuel oil would increase, incentivizing more carriers to install scrubbers to capitalize on the savings in fuel costs by continuing to burn high-sulfur fuel  An additional complication is the variability of LNG prices by region  Many shipping lines are global operators seeking low-priced fuel worldwide, but unlike the global oil market, natural gas markets are regional  Because the price of LNG can vary significantly by region, the relative economics of LNG versus other bunker fuels would also vary by region  Another uncertainty in the market for LNG bunkering is the discrepancy between the spot price for traded LNG and the price for LNG sold as bunker fuel in ports  Added costs associated with marketing, storing and transporting LNG in bunkering operations (discussed below) would likely require ports to charge a rate for LNG bunker fuel above spot market prices  These additional overhead costs are likely to vary among ports  Before factoring in any effect of IMO standards on fuel prices, and assuming a favorable LNG-fuel oil price spread, it still could take years for the savings generated by using LNG to pay back the capital costs of switching fuels  Through May 2018, there were 122 LNG-powered vessels in operation and another 135 ordered or under construction  Many of the first LNG vessels delivered and ordered were Norwegian-flagged vessels, as the Norwegian government has subsidized LNG-fueled vessels with a "NO x Fund " The fund provides LNG-operated ships with an exemption from the country's tax on NO x emissions  As an alternative to committing to LNG as a fuel, some vessel owners may hedge their bets by opting to install "LNG-ready" engines, which can burn low-sulfur fuel oil currently, but are designed to make future LNG conversion easier  The number of LNG ships that may be in operation by 2030 is difficult to predict  First, as noted above, growth in LNG powered vessels is likely to be driven primarily by new builds rather than retrofits  However, the shipping industry has experienced nearly a decade of vessel overcapacity and slow growth  Weak growth in the shipping industry could result in slower growth in vessel orders overall and, therefore, fewer orders for LNG-powered vessels  Of new vessels ordered, or set to be delivered, in 2018 or after, 13 5% (by tonnage) are LNG-fueled—up from 1 4% in 2010  If this trend continues, demand for LNG from the shipping industry could still be relatively high, even if overall growth in the shipping industry remains slow  Because LNG bunkering infrastructure among global ports is currently limited, vessels that use large amounts of fuel and travel predictable routes—along which LNG is available—are the most suitable for LNG fuel  For this reason, cruise ships, vehicle ferries, and container ships initially may be the most likely vessel types to adopt LNG as bunker fuel  Order books have reflected this assessment: one quarter of all cruise ships on order by tonnage at the end of 2017 were LNG-powered  Likewise, a major container ship line, CMA CGM, recently announced that it was ordering nine extra-large container ships powered by LNG  The carrier stated that the fuel tanks will displace space for "just a few containers" and said it intends to refuel these ships just once on their round trip voyages between Asia and Europe  Conversely, LNG fuel adoption may be less likely for oil tankers  Half the global oil tanker fleet operates on the shipping spot market (also known as the "tramp" market), meaning that ship owners enter into contracts with cargo owners only for a single voyage  In this kind of trade, many oil tankers lack a consistent route  Having to limit spot contracts only to ports that may bunker LNG could reduce the arbitrage opportunities of tankers  Dry bulk cargo vessels (carrying grain, coal, and other commodities) also typically operate in the tramp market  LNG-powered vessels have lower direct exhaust emissions than comparable vessels using petroleum-derived fuels  However, the lifecycle—or "well-to-wake"—GHG emissions (especially of methane) and of volatile organic compound emissions from natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction complicates the comparison  One study in 2015 concluded, "performing a ['well-to-wake'] GHG study on LNG used as a marine fuel is more complex than previously thought  Further studies are needed     to investigate this subject " A 2016 study found that the relative GHG emissions benefits of LNG versus conventional fuel oil on a "well-to-wake" basis was highly dependent upon fugitive methane emissions in the LNG supply chain  A 2017 study funded by NGVA Europe, an association which promotes the use of natural gas in vehicles and ships, concluded that LNG as a bunker fuel provides a 21% well-to-wake reduction in GHG emissions compared to convention fuel oil  Evaluating such studies is beyond the scope of this report, although they indicate uncertainty about environmental benefits of LNG fuel, which may require further examination  Despite concerns over lifecycle emissions from the natural gas supply chain, in the short term, ships that pair LNG engines with newer vessel designs could reduce onboard GHG emissions  However, whether these GHG emission reductions would be sufficient to meet the future standards could become another issue for ship owners  The IMO has set a provisional goal of reducing GHG emissions from ships by 50% by 2050  Depending upon the state of engine technology, LNG-fueled ships might become less viable if GHG limits were to be established well before 2050  Concerns about such GHG limits might lead to a decrease in orders of LNG-powered ships over time  Commercial vessels have a typical lifespan of over 20 years, so firms ordering new ships have to take into account compliance with potential standards issued decades in the future  If renewable fuels, such as biodiesel, become more available and cheaper in the coming decades, renewable fuel-powered ships may take over part of the market that LNG-powered ships could occupy  A key requirement for ocean carriers to adopt LNG as an engine fuel is the availability of LNG bunkering facilities  Because LNG is extremely cold (-260 °F) and volatile, LNG bunkering requires specialized infrastructure for supply, storage, and fuel delivery to vessels  Depending upon the specific circumstances, LNG bunkering could require transporting LNG to a port from an offsite liquefaction facility for temporary storage at the port, or building an LNG liquefaction terminal on site  Alternatively, LNG could be delivered from offsite facilities directly to vessels in port via truck or supply vessel ( Figure 3 )  Truck-to-vessel LNG bunkering, in particular, provides some fueling capabilities without large upfront capital investments  LNG tanker trucks could also bring LNG to a storage tank built on site at the port, which could then bunker the LNG to arriving ships via pipeline  Supplying LNG using tanker trucks in this way may face capacity limitations due to truck size, road limitations, or other logistical constraints, but it has been demonstrated as a viable approach to LNG bunkering at smaller scales  The predominant method of bunkering today with high-sulfur fuel is vessel to vessel, either by a tank barge or smaller tanker  The type of infrastructure needed to temporarily store (if needed) and deliver LNG within a given port would depend on the size and location of the port, as well as the types of vessels expected to bunker LNG  Truck to ship bunkering is best suited for supporting smaller and mid-sized vessels, such as ferries or offshore supply vessels (OSVs) that support offshore oil platforms  Liquefaction facilities built on site can provide the greatest capacity of any LNG bunkering option, for example, to provide fuel for large vessels in transoceanic trade  However, constructing small-scale liquefaction facilities to produce and deliver LNG on site requires considerable planning and significant capital investment, in one case on the order of $70 million for a mid-sized port  Each LNG bunkering option in Figure 3 may be a viable means to begin LNG bunkering service in a given port  However, ports may face practical constraints as bunkering increases in scale  For example, a container port of significant size typically has multiple terminals, so even with an on-site liquefaction facility, it may need additional infrastructure or supply vessels for moving LNG to other port locations where a cargo ship might be berthed  There may also be port capacity and timing constraints upon the movement of LNG bunkering barges trying to refuel multiple large vessels in various locations around a crowded port  To date, the LNG bunkering operations already in place or in development are comparatively small, but scale constraints could become a factor as LNG bunkering grows and might require additional bunkering-related port investments  Early adoption of LNG bunkering occurred in Europe, where the first sulfur ECAs were created in 2006 and 2007  Through Directive 2014/94/EU, the European Union requires that a core network of marine ports be able to provide LNG bunkering by December 2025 and that a core network of inland ports provide LNG bunkering by 2030  This mandate has been promoted, in part, with European Commission funds to support LNG bunkering infrastructure development  In addition, the European Maritime Safety Agency published regulatory guidance for LNG bunkering in 2018  Over 40 European coastal ports have LNG bunkering capability currently in operation—primarily at locations on the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, and in Spain, France, and Turkey  These locations include major port cities such as Rotterdam, Barcelona, Marseilles, and London  Another 50 LNG bunkering facilities at European ports are in development  LNG bunkering is also advancing in Asia, led by Singapore, the world's largest bunkering port  Singapore has agreed to provide $4 5 million to subsidize the construction of two LNG bunkering vessels  The Port of Singapore plans to source imported LNG at the adjacent Jurong Island LNG terminal, loading it into the bunkering vessels for ship-to-ship fueling of vessels in port  Singapore also has signed a memorandum of understanding with 10 other partners—including a Japanese Ministry and the Chinese Port of Ningbo-Zhoushan—to create a focus group aimed at promoting the adoption of LNG bunkering at ports around the world  In Japan, one consortium is implementing plans to begin vessel-to-vessel LNG bunkering at the Port of Keihin in Tokyo Bay by 2020  Japan's NYK line, a large ship owner, recently announced that it had reached an agreement with three Japanese utilities to add LNG bunkering to ports in Western Japan  Asian countries, together with Australia and the United Arab Emirates, currently have around 10 coastal ports offering LNG bunkering, with another 15 projects in development  Some LNG bunkering operations in Europe and Asia are associated with existing LNG marine terminals, which already have LNG storage and port infrastructure in place  However, many smaller operations—including most of the projects in development—employ trucking, dedicated bunkering vessels, on-site liquefaction, and other means to extend LNG availability beyond the ports with major LNG terminals  LNG bunkering is not so advanced in South America, although with nine operating LNG marine terminals (one for export), and another six in development, South America also could support significant LNG bunkering operations in the near future  LNG bunkering in the United States currently takes place in two locations—Jacksonville, FL, and Port Fourchon, LA—with a third bunkering facility under development in Tacoma, WA  The LNG facilities in these ports serve the relatively small U S -flag domestic market  Bunkering of LNG-fueled cruise ships also is planned for Port Canaveral, FL  However, ports in North America have significant potential to expand the nation's LNG bunkering capability  Jacksonville is the largest LNG bunkering operation at a U S  port  One bunkering facility at the port, developed by JAX LNG, initially began truck-to-ship refueling operations in 2016 for two LNG-capable container ships  (The LNG is sourced from a liquefaction plant in Macon, GA  ) In August 2018, upon delivery of the Clean Jacksonville bunker barge, the facility began to replace truck-to-ship bunkering with ship-to-ship bunkering  In the future, the barge plans to source LNG from a new, small-scale liquefaction plant which JAX LNG is currently constructing at the port  A second facility at Jacksonville's port, operated by Eagle LNG, provides LNG bunkering sourced from a liquefaction plant in West Jacksonville  Eagle LNG also is constructing an on-site liquefaction and vessel bunkering facility in another part of the port, expected to begin service in 2019  Taken together, the JAX LNG and Eagle LNG facilities is expected to establish Jacksonville as a significant LNG-bunkering location with the capability to serve not only the domestic fleet but larger international vessels as well  In 2015, Harvey Gulf International Marine (Harvey) began LNG bunkering operations in the Gulf of Mexico to fuel its small fleet of LNG-powered offshore supply vessels serving offshore oil rigs  Harvey has since constructed a $25 million facility at its existing terminal in Port Fourchon to store and bunker LNG sourced from liquefaction plants in Alabama and Texas  The facility can provide truck-to-ship bunkering services for LNG-fueled offshore supply vessels, tank barges, and other vessels  A Harvey subsidiary has ordered two LNG bunkering barges to enable ship-to-ship fueling in the future  Puget Sound Energy has proposed an LNG liquefaction and bunkering facility at the Port of Tacoma, WA  Vessels traveling between Washington and Alaska typically spend the entire journey within the 200-mile North America ECA  Consequently, vessel owners operating along these routes have been interested in LNG as bunker fuel  TOTE Maritime, for example, a ship owner involved in trade between Alaska and the lower 48 states, has begun the process of retrofitting the engines of two of its container ships to be LNG-compatible  The proposed Tacoma LNG facility would be capable of producing up to 500,000 gallons of LNG per day and would include an 8 million gallon storage tank  The facility would serve the dual purposes of providing fuel for LNG-powered vessels and providing peak-period natural gas supplies for the local gas utility system  Its total construction cost reportedly is expected to be $310 million  Community and environmental concerns have slowed the progress of the proposal, which is still under regulatory review  Puget Sound Energy originally planned to put the LNG facility into service in late 2019; however, permitting issues appear likely to delay its opening until 2020 or later—if it is eventually approved  Q-LNG Transport, a company 30% owned by Harvey, has placed orders for two LNG bunkering barges to provide ship-to-ship LNG fueling as well as "ship-to-shore transfers to small scale marine distribution infrastructure in the U S  Gulf of Mexico and abroad " Q-LNG's first barge initially is expected to provide fuel to new LNG-fueled cruise ships based in Port Canaveral (and, potentially, Miami), while service from its second barge is still uncommitted  Initial plans are for the LNG to be sourced from the Elba Island LNG import/export terminal near Savannah, GA—approximately 230 nautical miles away—although the company may seek to develop an on-site LNG storage facility in the future  As noted above, U S  LNG bunkering activities thus far have been limited to a handful of vessels in domestic trade and tourism  LNG bunkering for the much larger fleet of foreign-flag ships carrying U S  imports and exports is still to be developed  As in Europe and Asia, domestic ports located near major LNG import or export terminals may serve as anchors for expanded LNG bunkering operations  Figure 4 shows existing LNG import and export terminals in North America  LNG can be liquefied from pipeline natural gas (or imported natural gas) and stored in large quantities at these facilities  The LNG can then be bunkered on site or transported to bunkering facilities elsewhere in the region by truck, rail, or barge  As discussed above, the distance between Port Canaveral and Elba Island in Q-LNG's bunker sourcing plan is 230 nautical miles  Taking this distance as a measure of how far away LNG can be sourced and barged economically, it is possible to extrapolate which U S  ports are within reach of a potential supply of LNG for vessel bunkering  Table 1 lists the top 20 U S  container shipment ports in the United States and their proximity to existing LNG import/export terminals  Of these top 20 ports, 12 are less than 230 nautical miles from an operating LNG terminal  Distances between LNG terminals and the other East Coast ports are not much greater, suggesting that LNG for vessel bunkering could be within reach of every U S  port along the Eastern Seaboard and in the Gulf of Mexico  On the West Coast, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach—the two largest U S  ports—are relatively close to the Costa Azul LNG import terminal in Ensenada, MX  Seattle and Tacoma are far from Ensenada, but would be served by the proposed Tacoma LNG bunkering project, if constructed  LNG bunkering for Seattle and Tacoma alternatively could be sourced from an existing LNG port facility around 100 nautical miles north in Vancouver, BC, which is expanding to provide LNG bunkering services to international carriers  Alaska's existing LNG export terminal currently is inactive, but potentially could supply LNG bunker fuel in the Pacific Northwest as well  Although existing LNG import or export terminals in North America could supply LNG for regional bunkering operations, such activities would require additional investment for infrastructure such as LNG transfer facilities and bunker barges  CRS is not aware of any public announcements among the LNG terminals above to develop bunkering operations  However, at least one LNG terminal owner, Cheniere Energy, which operates LNG terminals in Louisiana and Texas, identifies vessel bunkering as one source of future LNG demand growth worldwide  The IMO adopted safety standards for ships using natural gas as a bunker fuel in 2015  The standards, which took effect in 2017, apply to all new ships and conversions of ships (except LNG tankers, which have their own standards)  The IMO standards address engine design, LNG storage tanks, distribution systems, and electrical systems  They also establish new training requirements for crews handling LNG and other low flashpoint fuels  As is the case for the sulfur standards, the IMO LNG safety standards apply to all IMO member nations, including the United States  In addition, a number of U S  federal agencies, especially the Coast Guard and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, have jurisdiction over specific aspects of domestic LNG storage infrastructure and bunkering operations  The Coast Guard has the most prominent role in LNG bunkering, given its general authority over port operations and waterborne shipping  In 2015, the Coast Guard issued two guidelines for the handling of LNG fuel and for waterfront facilities conducting bunkering operations  In 2017, the Coast Guard issued additional guidelines to Captains of the Port, the local Coast Guard officials responsible for port areas, for conducting safe LNG bunkering simultaneously with other port operations  The guidelines advise on quantitative risk assessment of facilities bunkering LNG, which allows Captains of the Port to assess the risks posed to crews and facilities  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) plays a role in LNG bunkering due to its jurisdiction over the siting of LNG import and export terminals under the Natural Gas Act of 1938  Specifically, FERC asserts approval authority over the place of entry and exit, siting, construction, and operation of new LNG terminals as well as modifications or extensions of existing LNG terminals  Notwithstanding this siting authority, FERC reportedly does not intend to assert jurisdiction over the permitting of LNG bunkering facilities, but it may require amendment of permits it has issued for LNG import or export terminals to account for bunkering operations added afterwards  In addition to the Coast Guard and FERC, other federal agencies may have jurisdiction over specific aspects of LNG bunkering operations in U S  ports under a range of statutory authorities  For example, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration within the Department of Transportation regulates the safety of natural gas pipelines and certain associated LNG storage facilities (e g , peak-shaving plants)  LNG facilities also may need to comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's regulations for Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals  Other federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, the U S  Army Corps of Engineers, and the Transportation Security Administration, may regulate other aspects of LNG bunkering projects  CRS is not aware of new regulations to date among these agencies specifically addressing LNG bunkering  World production of LNG has been rising rapidly over the last few years, driven by growth in the natural gas sector in new regions—especially Australia and the United States  According to one industry analysis ( Figure 5 ), global LNG supply is expected to increase from 300 to 400 million metric tons per annum (MMtpa) from 2017 to 2021 based on new LNG liquefaction projects already operating or under development  An additional 150 MMtpa appears likely to come online after that  Collectively, LNG supply from these new liquefaction projects could exceed projections of demand, which would put downward pressure on LNG prices  While increases in the global supply of LNG do not necessarily translate directly into an increase in LNG available for bunkering, such increases could provide options for LNG bunkering in more ports  Estimating potential demand for LNG in the maritime sector is complicated and uncertain  One study of future LNG demand for bunkering, specifically, projects that LNG-powered vessels in operation and under construction as of June 2018 will require between 1 2 and 3 0 MMt of LNG per year  The study's review of several LNG consumption forecasts in the maritime sector shows a consensus projection between 20 to 30 MMt per year by 2030  This level of demand growth implies an increase in LNG-powered vessel construction from the current rate of around 120 ships per year to between 400 and 600 new builds per year  If these levels were reached, they could create a significant new market for LNG suppliers  Assuming a Henry Hub spot market price of $4/MMBtu in 2030, the annual market for LNG in shipping could be worth $2 9 billion to $5 8 billion, before accounting for liquefaction and transportation charges  Some studies have projected the LNG bunkering market to be even larger and to grow more quickly  However, key variables—such as the prices of Henry Hub natural gas and crude oil, the number of new vessel orders, and the future costs of emissions technology—are notoriously hard to predict with accuracy  Thus, it is not assured that natural gas consumption in the maritime sector will absorb more than a small amount of the global liquefaction capacity in development  The IMO sulfur standards apply to ship owners globally, as does the development of new LNG supply and bunkering infrastructure  In addition to these factors, domestic LNG bunkering also may be influenced by considerations more specific to the United States  These considerations include growth of the U S  natural gas supply, domestic shipbuilding opportunities, and LNG safety and security  Because of its leading role in global natural gas production, the United States has a particular interest in any new source of natural gas demand  According to the Energy Information Administration, the United States has been the world's top producer of natural gas since 2009, when it surpassed Russia  In 2017, increases in production outstripped increases in domestic gas consumption, leading to the United States becoming a net exporter of natural gas for the first time in nearly 60 years  As discussed above, North America (primarily the United States) is expected to add the most new LNG production capacity through 2030 when including projects that are operating, under construction, and likely (according to investment analysts)  Past increases in U S  LNG exports were driven by greater throughput at the Sabine Pass LNG export terminal—the only operating U S  LNG export terminal in 2017  In March 2018, the Cove Point terminal in Maryland became the second operating U S  LNG export terminal  Four additional projects under construction or commissioning are set to nearly triple U S  liquefaction by the end of 2019  This increase in liquefaction capacity likely will motivate LNG producers to secure new buyers  Figure 6 shows estimated LNG prices for various locations around the world as of October 2018  As the figure shows, LNG prices are substantially lower in North America than in Asia, Europe, and South America  Even after adding $1 00 to $2 00/MMBtu to transport the LNG to overseas ports, LNG produced in the United States is globally competitive at these prices  If LNG from the new liquefaction capacity coming online can be produced and delivered with similar economics, the cost advantage may create an opportunity for U S  LNG in bunker supply  There are over 400 petroleum fuel bunkering ports in the world, but 60% of bunkering in recent years has happened in six countries: Singapore, the United States, China, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, and the Netherlands  Of these countries, only the United States is a significant LNG producer  Therefore, the United States could be a favorable source of LNG for domestic bunkering and for bunkering at the other major ports  While the LNG industry historically has had a good safety record, there are unique safety risks associated with LNG in vessel operations  Leakage of LNG during LNG shipping or bunkering can pose several hazards  LNG is stored at temperatures below -162 °C (-260 °F), far below the -20°C at which the carbon steels typically used in shipbuilding become brittle  Consequently, extreme care must be taken to ensure that LNG does not drip or spill onto ship hulls or decking because it could lead to brittle fracture, seriously damaging a ship or bunkering barge  LNG spilled onto water can pose a more serious hazard as it will rapidly and continuously vaporize into natural gas, which could ignite  The resulting "pool fire" would spread as the LNG spill expands away from its source and continues evaporating  A pool fire is intense, far hotter and burning far more rapidly than oil or gasoline fires, and it cannot be extinguished; all the LNG must be consumed before it goes out  Because an LNG pool fire is so hot, its thermal radiation may injure people and damage vessels or property a considerable distance from the fire itself  Many experts agree that a large pool fire, especially on water, is the most serious LNG hazard  Leaks of boil-off gas (the small amount of LNG that vaporizes in storage) can also release natural gas into a port area and cause fires or explosions  Major releases of LNG from large LNG carriers would be most dangerous within 500 meters of the spill and would pose some risk at distances up to 1,600 meters from the spill  While a bunkering barge or a vessel using LNG for fuel contains far less LNG than large LNG carriers, LNG spills in bunkering operations could still be a significant concern  Risks associated with bunkering LNG are complicated in ports seeking to engage in "simultaneous operations" during the bunkering process  Simultaneous operations entail loading and unloading cargo and personnel from a ship, maintenance, and other logistical operations performed while a ship is bunkering  Accidents that occur during such operations (for example, the operation of heavy machinery near pipes transporting LNG) can result in a spill of LNG which can threaten workers positioned near the site of operations  LNG tankers, bunkering vessels, and land-based facilities could be vulnerable to terrorism  Bunkering tanks or vessels might be physically attacked to destroy the LNG they hold—and vessels might be commandeered for use as weapons against port or coastal targets  Potential terrorist attacks on LNG terminals or tankers in the United States have long been a key concern of the public and policymakers in the context of large scale LNG imports or exports because such attacks could cause catastrophic fires in ports and nearby populated areas  For example, a 2007 report by the Government Accountability Office stated that, "the ship-based supply chain for energy commodities," specifically including LNG, "remains threatened and vulnerable, and appropriate security throughout the chain is essential to ensure safe and efficient delivery " Affected communities and federal officials continue to express concern about the security risks of LNG  The potential risks from terrorism to LNG bunkering infrastructure may be different than those of larger LNG import or export operations due to smaller quantities of LNG involved, but the risks may become more widespread if LNG bunkering operations are established in more locations  The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA, P L  107-295 ) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code give the Coast Guard far-ranging authority over the security of hazardous materials in maritime shipping  The Coast Guard has developed port security plans addressing how to deploy federal, state, and local resources to prevent terrorist attacks  Under the MTSA, the Coast Guard has assessed the overall vulnerability of marine vessels, their potential to transport terrorists or terror materials, and their use as potential weapons  The Coast Guard has employed these assessments to augment port security as necessary and to develop maritime security standards for LNG port facilities  The IMO's overall framework for controlling vessels emissions (MARPOL Annex VI) has been in place since 2005  While the United States, as an IMO member, is subject to the IMO's 2020 sulfur standards, the international standards apply equally to all parties and all vessels  The impacts of sulfur standards on bunker fuel have been an important consideration, but IMO member nations have agreed to the standards independent of any particular energy policies  Moreover, MARPOL Annex VI preceded the U S  shale gas boom, so commitment to that initial IMO framework could not have anticipated United States' current role as a dominant energy producer  Any changes within the international shipping fleet to install sulfur scrubbers, fuel engines with LNG, or switch to other low sulfur fuels, are being driven primarily by market forces in fuel supply, shipbuilding, and shipping—not by any particular push to favor one fuel over another  Nonetheless, given its particular status, the question arises whether the standards may create an economic opportunity for the United States, in energy or otherwise  More specifically, could international adoption of LNG as a bunker fuel create an important new market for U S  natural gas producers, shipbuilders, or infrastructure developers? As discussed above, depending upon the adoption of LNG bunkering in the global fleet, the LNG bunker fuel market could grow to several billion dollars by 2030  If U S  LNG producers were to supply a significant share of this market—on the strength of comparatively low LNG production costs—LNG bunkering could increase demand for U S  natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction  Opportunities in LNG-related shipbuilding might be more limited, as most of this occurs overseas, with the exception of Jones Act vessels  In the latter case, demand for domestically-constructed LNG bunkering barges could be one significant area of economic growth  Engineering and construction firms could benefit from new opportunities to develop new port infrastructure for LNG storage and transfer  While likely limited in number, such port facilities could be complex, high value projects costing tens or hundreds of millions of dollars to complete  Such projects could create jobs in engineering, construction, and operation, which could be important to local communities  Although LNG bunkering could present the United States with new economic opportunities, it may pose challenges as well  Rising demand for LNG in the maritime sector could increase natural gas prices for domestic consumers  In addition to being the world's largest natural gas producer, as of 2018, the United States is also the world's largest producer of crude oil and the second largest bunkering hub  Consequently, while vessel conversion to LNG bunkering may increase demand for U S -produced natural gas, it could be partially offset by reduced demand for U S -produced crude oil or refined products  Exactly how changing demand in one sector could affect the other is unclear  Furthermore, while LNG can reduce pollutant emissions from vessels, emissions and environmental impacts from increased natural gas production and transportation could increase overall emissions  Much of the net environmental impact depends upon practices in the natural gas industry, which are the subject of ongoing study and debate  Although new LNG bunkering infrastructure can create jobs, as the Tacoma LNG projects shows, the construction of such port facilities can be controversial for reasons of safety, security, and environmental impact  Overarching the considerations above is uncertainty about how the global shipping fleet will adapt to the IMO sulfur standards over time  This uncertainty complicates decisions related to both private investment and public policy  LNG-fueled ships still account for only a fraction of the U S  and global fleets, and it may take several decades for significant benefits of LNG-powered vessels to be realized  It is also possible that alternative ship fuels, including biofuels, electric engines, and hybrid engines, will become more economically viable in coming years  Given the uncertainty surrounding the future of LNG as a ship fuel, it is hard to predict the potential benefits or costs that LNG bunkering may provide to the United States  Until now, the private sector has added LNG-fueled vessels to fleets in the United States in a piecemeal manner under existing federal statutes and regulation  Congress could encourage the growth of LNG bunkering by various means, such as providing tax incentives to support the construction of LNG bunkering facilities and vessels, addressing any statutory or regulatory barriers to bunkering facility siting or operations, and providing funding for technical support to domestic carriers seeking to adopt LNG technology  Alternatively, Congress could seek to encourage competing bunker fuel options, such as biofuels, by incentivizing them in similar ways  In addition, Congress could also affect growth in LNG bunkering through policies affecting the LNG industry or domestic shipping industry as a whole  Changes in federal regulation related to natural gas production, or changes to the Jones Act, for example, while not directed at LNG bunkering, could nonetheless affect its economics  Therefore, evaluating the potential implications on LNG bunkering of broader energy, environmental, or economic objectives may become an additional consideration in congressional oversight and legislative initiatives  If LNG bunkering expands significantly in U S  ports, Congress also may examine the adequacy of existing measures to ensure the safety and security of LNG vessels, storage, and related facilities 


Report 2: Oil and petroleum products markets have changed substantially in the years since the establishment of the SPR  Specifically, U S  domestic crude oil production has generally been increasing, consumption has been relatively stable, and crude oil and petroleum products markets have become increasingly global  Additionally, U S  crude oil production is projected to rise further in the future, according to EIA and IEA projections, further reversing a decades-long decline  Recent technological improvements have made onshore production from shale formations economically viable, and domestic crude oil production began to rise in about 2008  The combination of increasing production and relatively stable consumption has resulted in declining net crude oil and petroleum products imports, from a high of about 12 million barrels per day in 2005 to fewer than 4 million barrels per day in 2017  Since these trends are expected to continue, the IEA and EIA both project net U S  crude oil and petroleum products imports will decline to zero sometime in the late 2020s and the United States will become a net exporter shortly thereafter  Since the IEA 90-day reserve obligation is based on a country’s net imports, there is no such obligation for net exporters; therefore, the United States would have no 90-day reserve obligation as long as it is a net exporter, though it would still be obligated to release reserves in response to supply disruptions  Over the longer term, EIA’s projections show U S  net exports peaking in 2037 and the United States again becoming a net importer between 2040 and 2050  At the time of the Arab oil embargo, price controls in the United States prevented the prices of oil and petroleum products from increasing as much as they otherwise might have, contributing to a physical oil shortage that caused long lines at gasoline stations throughout the United States  In addition, in the 1970s, oil prices were often set in long-term contracts, which meant that prices would not automatically rise in the face of greater scarcity  This generally reduced incentives for producers to expand production and sales as well as for consumers to reduce consumption in the face of greater scarcity caused by a supply disruption  Now that crude oil and petroleum product markets are global, the prices of these commodities are determined in the world market, primarily on the basis of supply and demand  In the absence of long-term contracted prices or price controls, scarcity from a supply disruption is generally expressed in the form of higher prices, as purchasers are free to bid as high as they are willing to pay to secure oil supply  In a global market, a large enough supply disruption anywhere in the world raises prices everywhere  This creates incentives for producers unaffected by the disruption to increase their production and release existing inventories and for consumers everywhere to reduce consumption in the ways they find most efficient and least disruptive  While it can take time for some of these actions to affect crude oil and petroleum product markets—according to DOE officials, it can take approximately 6 months from when a producer drills an oil well until oil production comes on line—all these actions tend to mitigate the effects of supply disruptions  The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 authorized the creation of the SPR, partly in response to the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 that caused a shortfall in the international oil market  The purposes of the SPR are, among other things, to reduce the impact of disruptions in supplies of petroleum products and to carry out obligations of the United States under the international energy program  Specifically, the 1974 International Energy Program Agreement, a joint strategy and treaty, established the IEA to address oil security issues on an international scale  The SPR is owned by the federal government, managed by DOE’s Office of Petroleum Reserves, and maintained by Fluor Federal Petroleum Operations LLC  The SPR stores crude oil in underground salt caverns along the Gulf Coast in Louisiana and Texas  The SPR currently maintains four storage sites—Bayou Choctaw, Big Hill, Bryan Mound, and West Hackberry—with a design capacity of 713 5 million barrels  Under conditions prescribed by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, as amended, the President has discretion to authorize the release of petroleum products from the SPR to minimize significant supply disruptions  When oil is released from the SPR, it is distributed through commercial pipelines or on waterborne vessels to refineries, where it is converted into gasoline and other petroleum products, and then transported to distribution centers for sale to the public  According to DOE documents, well-functioning infrastructure is fundamental to the SPR’s ability to maintain operational readiness and meet mission requirements  However, most of the critical infrastructure for moving SPR oil has exceeded its serviceable life, which has led to increasing maintenance costs and decreasing system reliability  Specifically, the reserve relies on a complex system of salt caverns, pipelines, wells, and pumps, with other infrastructure and equipment  Any failures, such as ruptured pipelines, could affect the readiness of a site for an oil release  According to DOE officials, a growing backlog of major maintenance needs raises concerns about the ability of the system to operate as designed  In addition, there have been equipment failures that have rendered parts of the system temporarily inoperable  For example, the SPR has experienced at least five major equipment failures since fiscal year 2013, including the Big Hill site pipe failure shown in figure 1  The United States has two regional petroleum product reserves—the Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve and the Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve  The Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve, which is not part of the SPR, holds 1 million barrels of ultra low sulfur distillate, a petroleum product essentially equivalent to diesel fuel but that is also used for heating oil  The Northeast United States is heavily dependent on the use of heating oil in winter months  The distillate is stored in leased commercial tank storage in terminals in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey  In 2000, the President directed the creation of the reserve to hold approximately 10 days of inventory, the time required for ships to carry additional heating oil from the Gulf of Mexico to New York Harbor  The Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve, a part of the SPR, holds 1 million barrels of gasoline for consumers in the northeastern United States  According to DOE’s website, this region is particularly vulnerable to gasoline disruptions as a result of hurricanes and other natural events  For example, Hurricane Sandy caused widespread gasoline shortages in the region in 2012  DOE conducted a test sale of the SPR in 2014 and used a portion of the proceeds from the sale to create the reserve  The gasoline is stored in leased commercial tank storage in terminals in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Jersey  The SPR helps the United States meet its IEA obligation to hold the equivalent of 90 days of net imports of crude oil and petroleum products  In order to meet the IEA 90-day reserve obligation, countries, including the United States, can count existing private reserves of crude oil and petroleum products in addition to public reserves (in the United States, the SPR)  In most years, the United States has met its 90-day reserve obligation with a combination of SPR and private reserves  The days of import protection may vary based on actual net U S  crude oil and petroleum products imports as well as the inventory levels of the SPR and private reserves  As discussed previously, because the IEA 90-day reserve obligation is based on a country’s net imports, there is no such reserve obligation for countries that are net exporters of crude oil and petroleum products  The United States also relies on the SPR to meet its IEA obligation to release reserves in the event of a collective action to respond to a supply disruption  Countries contribute to an IEA collective action based on their share of IEA oil consumption, and they can meet their obligation by whatever measure they choose, including release of public or private reserves, or demand restraint  IEA collective actions are designed to mitigate the negative effects of sudden supply shortages by making additional crude oil and petroleum products available to the global market through a combination of emergency response measures, which include increasing supply and reducing demand  In the event of a global market disruption, IEA member countries can call for a collective action after reaching consensus on whether a response is needed  DOE stated that the collective action IEA obligation is more relevant to the SPR’s mission of protecting the U S  economy from severe petroleum supply interruptions than the 90-day reserve obligation  The United States has participated in each of the three IEA collective actions  In 1991, with the commencement of Operation Desert Storm, DOE released 17 3 million barrels of SPR crude oil  After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, DOE released 11 million barrels of SPR crude oil  Most recently, in June 2011, in response to crude oil supply disruptions driven by hostilities in Libya, DOE released 30 6 million barrels of crude oil from the SPR  The Libya collective action is an example of how, in practice, member countries participate according to national circumstances  After consultations with IEA member countries, all IEA member countries agreed to the Libya collective action, under which 12 of the 28 members at that time contributed to the action  In addition to the three IEA collective actions, the SPR has been used 10 times in response to U S  domestic supply disturbances that were not IEA collective actions, most notably in response to severe weather events  In terms of how they meet their IEA obligations, most other IEA members differ from the United States in two basic ways  Specifically, as of December 2017, most IEA members rely at least in part on private rather than public reserves to meet their obligations, and most hold significant proportions of these reserves as petroleum products rather than as crude oil  In December 2017, before Mexico joined the IEA in early 2018, there were 29 member countries  Of these 29 countries, 25 IEA members had two common attributes: (1) as net importers, they had a 90-day reserve obligation and met that obligation, and (2) they had formal processes for holding and releasing these reserves  As of December 2017, 18 of these 25 members relied entirely or in part on private reserves to meet their reserve obligations  Specifically, based on IEA data as of December 2017, these 18 countries met their 90-day reserve obligation through private reserves and either had no public reserves or had public reserves of less than 90 days  According to a 2014 IEA report, some of these countries require industry to hold reserves and, when needed, release them  For example, according to a 2014 IEA report and documentation provided by government officials, the United Kingdom meets its entire obligation by requiring private industry to hold reserves  In contrast, New Zealand had publicly held reserves amounting to 26 days of net imports, according to IEA data as of December 2017  According to a 2014 IEA report, New Zealand relied on industry reserves held for commercial purposes to meet the rest of its 90-day reserve obligation, although New Zealand does not formally require industry to hold reserves specifically for this purpose  Unlike the 18 countries that rely at least in part on private reserves, as of December 2017, the United States and 6 other IEA members met the 90- day reserve obligation exclusively through public reserves  Specifically, according to IEA data on member reserves, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, and the United States held public reserves equal to 90 days or more of net imports  Although the United States currently meets its IEA 90-day reserve obligation solely with public reserves, for most of the SPR’s existence, public reserves were insufficient to meet this obligation, so the United States also had to rely on private reserves  Specifically, according to EIA data, the United States has relied, at least in part, on private reserves together with the SPR to meet the 90-day reserve obligation with the exception of two time periods (1984-1987 and 2012-present), when the United States has relied solely on the SPR  The United States does not require industry to hold reserves for the purposes of meeting IEA obligations  Figure 2 compares the United States’ reserves in days of net imports to the IEA’s 90-day reserve obligation  According to a 2014 IEA report, most IEA members hold at least a third of their reserves as petroleum products, such as gasoline and diesel fuel, rather than as crude oil  Holding petroleum products can be advantageous during certain disruptions because such reserves can be directly distributed to consumers, whereas crude oil must first be refined and turned into products, adding response time  According to the IEA’s 2014 report, Germany’s stockholding agency holds 55 percent of its reserve as petroleum products  Similarly, France holds only petroleum products that are distributed geographically across the country so that the reserves can be used quickly in the event of a supply disruption  In contrast, more than 99 percent of the SPR (665 5 million barrels as of March 2018) is held as crude oil, all of which is stored at the four storage sites in Louisiana and Texas  The exception is the Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve, which, as mentioned previously, is a 1 million barrel gasoline reserve in terminals in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Jersey that was established in 2014 after Hurricane Sandy and that is considered part of the SPR  According to DOE officials, there are several reasons the SPR holds predominantly crude oil, including that it is more costly to store petroleum products than crude oil and that the United States has the largest refining capacity of any IEA member country  Because of the large U S  refining sector, crude oil from the SPR can be domestically refined into petroleum products to meet demand  Some IEA member countries store some of their reserves abroad, though the United States does not  According to a 2014 IEA report, some IEA member countries allow part of their reserves to be stored abroad to leverage spare storage capacity or more cost-effective storage by utilizing available storage space or excess private reserves in other countries  For example, approximately 30 percent of Ireland’s reserves are held in other European Union countries  In some of these cases, countries use short-term contracts, also known as tickets, instead of directly acquiring and storing oil and petroleum products  For example, according to documents provided by government officials, since 1995 the United Kingdom has increased its reserves held under ticket agreements outside of the country from around 10 percent of its total reserves to more than 25 percent  In addition, unlike the United States, some IEA countries specify the size of their public or private reserves in terms of net imports or consumption, rather than a specific volume  In the United States, the total volume of crude oil and petroleum products held in the SPR is the result of amounts historically purchased to fill the reserve and subsequent sales as mandated by Congress or released in response to a supply disruption  According to DOE, it cannot otherwise reduce or increase volumes held in reserve without congressional action—either through requirements to purchase additional oil or laws authorizing or mandating sales  On the other hand, some IEA countries have tied their reserves’ volumes of crude oil and petroleum products to a metric such as days of net imports or a percent of consumption  For example, according to documentation provided by government officials, in 2015 Japan changed how it specifies its target reserves from a specified amount to days of net imports  In specifying the size of reserves in this way, the amount held is adjusted as market conditions change—for example, if net imports change and require more or fewer reserves to meet the IEA 90-day reserve obligation, or when other underlying factors affecting a nation’s energy security needs change  While DOE has examined a range of sizes for the SPR, it has not identified the optimal size for the SPR to meet U S  energy security needs and IEA obligations, and DOE’s analysis of SPR sizes was limited in three ways  DOE also has not identified whether additional regional petroleum product reserves should be part of the SPR in U S  regions identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions  DOE has not identified the optimal size for the SPR and though the agency examined a range of SPR sizes, its analysis was limited in at least three ways  In response to direction from Congress and recommendations from GAO and the DOE Inspector General, DOE developed and published a long-term strategic review of the SPR in August 2016  In DOE’s 2016 review, the agency examined the expected economic benefits of SPR sizes ranging from 430 million to 695 million barrels of oil over a 25-year time horizon (2016 through 2040), but it did not recommend an optimal size for the reserve  DOE’s review did not identify the optimal size for the SPR because of three limitations: DOE did not fully evaluate implications of market fluctuations and estimate needs  DOE did not fully evaluate the implications of falling net imports of crude oil and petroleum products with respect to meeting IEA obligations to hold the equivalent of 90 days of net imports and to respond to collective actions  As mentioned previously, the United States is expected to become a net exporter of crude oil and petroleum products by the late 2020s  Since the IEA 90-day reserve obligation is based on a country’s net imports, this means that at that point the United States would not have a 90-day reserve obligation  However, even as a net exporter, the United States would still have to meet the IEA obligation to respond to a collective action  Yet, DOE’s analysis did not evaluate the SPR’s configuration as it relates to projected fluctuations in net imports or estimate the minimal amount of reserves needed to meet potential future collective actions  Without considering projected fluctuations in net imports or providing an analysis of how much oil is estimated to be needed to meet IEA collective actions, DOE cannot fully advise Congress on the optimal size of the SPR  DOE did not consider private-sector response  DOE’s analyses in its 2016 review focused on the publicly held reserves in the SPR as the only means to respond to oil supply disruptions and did not consider a response from the private sector or through consumers reducing demand  According to DOE’s 2016 review, the underlying analysis for the benefits of the SPR did not consider a response from the private sector for three reasons: (1) while U S  commercial stocks could conceivably address part of a supply disruption, private industry could also hold oil inventories in a crisis instead of releasing them; (2) unlike most other IEA member countries, the United States does not require private-sector response; and (3) research on the exact nature of private-sector response during a disruption is needed  DOE officials told us the agency has not studied the extent to which SPR releases of crude oil displace what would otherwise have been private releases of inventories  As we reported in September 2014, changing market conditions— most importantly the significant increase in domestic production of oil—have implications for the SPR’s size because increased production has led to increasing private reserves  According to IEA data as of December 2017, U S  private reserves held the equivalent of 194 days of net import protection coverage, up from about 59 days in 2006  Further, private reserves in the United States consist of both crude oil and petroleum products with more than half in the latter category  For example, as of January 2018, total private reserves of crude oil and petroleum products were about 1 215 billion barrels, of which about 420 million barrels were in the form of crude oil and 795 million barrels were petroleum products, according to the EIA  As of 2013, these private reserves were distributed across the entire country in more than 1,400 terminals, according to the EIA  As we reported in December 2007, international trade in oil and petroleum products has expanded significantly over the past 2 decades, making markets for gasoline and other petroleum products increasingly global in nature  In such a global oil market, higher levels of private reserves can benefit the United States and the rest of the world by helping mitigate a supply disruption  Most experts and stakeholders we interviewed generally agreed that the private sector is in a better position to respond to supply disruptions than they were when the SPR was created  With regard to demand response, DOE officials told us they do not consider this because there is no mechanism to require industry to respond to supply disruptions or consumers to reduce demand in response to a supply disruption  However, DOE has not studied how voluntary response to changes in petroleum product prices affects the need for or efficacy of strategic releases  Without conducting an analysis of how private parties respond to supply disruptions, DOE cannot advise Congress on the optimal size of the SPR because it cannot know how effective such private responses could be in mitigating supply disruptions  DOE did not fully examine costs of differently sized reserves  DOE’s review of the expected economic benefits of differently sized reserves did not fully examine the corresponding costs of those sizes  According to DOE officials, there was no requirement or need to conduct a formal cost benefit analysis of the SPR because the SPR’s oil acquisition and initial capital costs to create the reserve are sunk costs and the ongoing operational costs to maintain the reserve are minimal in comparison  However, this does not take into account the opportunity cost to the government that holding reserves represents; as Congress has mandated several times recently, crude oil from the reserve can be sold to fund other federal priorities  Without additional analysis, such as of the costs and benefits of SPR’s size, DOE cannot fully advise Congress on the optimal size of the SPR  When we reviewed the SPR in 2006 and 2014, we found that DOE had not periodically re-examined the strategic reserves  In 2006, we recommended that the Secretary of Energy reexamine the appropriate size of the SPR  In its response to our recommendation, DOE stated that its reexamination had taken the form of more “actionable items,” including not requesting expansion funding in its 2011 budget and canceling and redirecting the prior year’s expansion funding to general operations of the SPR, based on the Administration’s decision that the SPR’s current size at the time was adequate  Similarly, as previously mentioned, in 2014 we found that changing market conditions have implications for the size, location, and composition of the SPR, but DOE had not reexamined the SPR’s size since 2005  Accordingly, we recommended that the Secretary of Energy undertake a comprehensive reexamination of the appropriate size of the SPR  In response to our recommendation, the 2014 DOE Inspector General recommendation mentioned previously, and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, DOE published its 2016 review  As previously mentioned and reported, crude oil and petroleum markets are constantly changing, but DOE conducted its full evaluations of the SPR more than a decade apart  According to DOE officials, there is no formal policy to periodically reevaluate the SPR  We previously found that federal programs should be reexamined if there have been significant changes in the country or the world that relate to the reason for initiating the program  In that report, we found that many federal programs and policies were designed decades ago to respond to trends and challenges that existed at the time of their creation  Moreover, the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94 for benefit-cost analysis of federal programs includes guidelines that apply to any analysis used to support government decisions to initiate, renew, or expand programs or projects that would result in a series of measurable benefits or costs extending for 3 or more years into the future  Given changing market conditions and future projections, without conducting additional analysis to supplement its 2016 review and thereafter periodically reexamining the SPR to take into account changes in market conditions and include a thorough consideration of the costs and benefits of a wide range of SPR sizes, DOE cannot provide information to Congress to inform decisions about the appropriate size of the SPR and risks holding too much or too little in the SPR to meet the United States’ evolving energy security needs and IEA obligations  DOE has also not fully identified whether additional regional petroleum product reserves should be part of the SPR  Because the SPR stores oil nearly exclusively along the Gulf Coast, the SPR is configured primarily to respond to global oil supply disruptions  However, as we reported in November 2017, the SPR has primarily been used in response to domestic disruptions  The SPR is limited in its ability to respond to domestic disruptions because reserves are almost entirely composed of crude oil and not refined petroleum products, which may not be effective in responding to disruptions that affect the refining sector  For example, as we reported in November 2017, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria damaged infrastructure and property, caused the loss of life, and disrupted the operations of refineries representing at least 15 percent of the nation’s refining capacity  DOE has identified regions subject to product supply vulnerabilities as shown in Figure 3  The Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015 recommended that the agency analyze the need for additional or expanded regional product reserves by undertaking updated cost-benefit analyses for all of the regions of the United States that have been identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions  In response to this recommendation, DOE studied the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves in the West Coast and Southeast Coast  According to DOE officials, weather events in the Southeast Coast are of higher probability but lower consequence, and events in the West Coast are of lower probability but higher consequence  DOE did not finalize its 2015 studies on regional petroleum product reserves and make them publicly available  However, the draft 2015 studies concluded that a product reserve in the Southeast would provide significant net economic benefits to the region and the United States, particularly in the event of a major hurricane, while further analyses are needed to determine the potential benefits of a reserve on the West Coast  A prior DOE study also suggests that petroleum product reserves merit consideration—in 2011, DOE carried out a cost-benefit study of the establishment of a refined product reserve in the Southeast and estimated that such a reserve would reduce the average gasoline price rise by 50 percent to 70 percent in the weeks immediately after a hurricane landfall, resulting in consumer cost savings, according to the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015  According to DOE officials, the agency has no plans to conduct additional studies  DOE’s 2016 review of the SPR did not fully assess whether there is a need for additional regional product reserves in other U S  regions identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions, as recommended by DOE’s studies and the 2015 Quadrennial Energy Review  Without completing studies on the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves for all the vulnerable U S  regions and publicly releasing the results, DOE cannot ensure that it and Congress have the information they need to make decisions about whether additional regional product reserves are needed  DOE has taken steps to take into account the effects of congressionally mandated oil sales in its plans for modernizing the SPR, though DOE’s current plans are based on information largely developed prior to the most recent congressionally mandated oil sales  According to DOE, the SPR modernization program is focused on a life extension project to modernize aging infrastructure to ensure the SPR will be able to meet its mission requirements for the next several decades  The project’s scope of work has undergone several revisions since its inception in response to changing conditions and requirements, according to the agency  DOE has estimated the total cost for the SPR’s modernization at up to $1 4 billion  DOE raised about $323 million for modernization through the sale of SPR oil in fiscal year 2017, and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 provided that DOE is to draw down and sell an amount of crude oil not to exceed $350 million for modernization in fiscal year 2018  As of the end of February 2018, DOE has spent $22 million on modernization efforts and the additional funds will allow DOE to continue moving forward with the project, according to agency officials  According to DOE’s modernization plans, the first major construction is scheduled for fiscal year 2019  However, these plans are largely based on information DOE analyzed before recent congressionally mandated sales of an additional 117 million barrels of oil  Since the most recent mandated sales, DOE has taken steps to update its modernization plans and has changed its assumptions for SPR’s modernization  For example, DOE now assumes that the reserve will hold about 405 million barrels of oil and that one of the four SPR sites may close after congressionally mandated sales are completed at the end of fiscal year 2027, according to agency officials  However, DOE has not fully updated the SPR’s modernization plans based on these assumptions  According to DOE officials, in March 2018, DOE commenced a study—the SPR post-sale configuration study—to examine potential future reserve configurations  This study is to take into account the effects of congressionally mandated sales on the reserve and its modernization, and is targeted for completion in October 2018, according to agency officials  Information from the study will inform DOE’s updates to the SPR’s modernization plans, according to DOE officials  As part of its post-sale configuration study, DOE plans to examine how the agency may handle the potentially excess SPR facilities created by the mandated sales  In January 2017, the SPR had a design capacity to hold 713 5 million barrels of oil and actually held 695 million barrels  As shown in figure 4, without action by DOE to reduce the SPR’s design capacity or otherwise use SPR facilities, congressionally mandated sales will cause excess storage capacity to grow to 308 million barrels or more by the end of fiscal year 2027—meaning that about 43 percent of the SPR’s total design capacity to store oil would be unused  DOE plans to explore some options to use these potentially excess SPR assets in its ongoing post-sale configuration study  In withdrawing oil to meet congressionally mandated oil sales currently in place (290 million barrels through fiscal year 2027), DOE could close at least one SPR site based on our analysis of projected excess storage capacity  For example, if DOE were to close the smallest SPR site, Bayou Choctaw, the agency could also explore selling the connected pipeline and marine terminal, which are currently being leased to a private company  DOE could also consider leasing excess storage capacity to other countries so that they could store oil at the SPR  DOE has not entered into any such leases with other countries and has not considered such leases because, according to DOE, the SPR has historically lacked capacity to store additional oil  DOE has not proposed any of these options or explored the revenue the agency could generate by selling or leasing these assets  According to DOE officials, the agency will examine the feasibility of such options in the ongoing SPR post-sale configuration study  As DOE takes steps to plan for the SPR’s modernization, ongoing uncertainty regarding the SPR’s long-term size and configuration have complicated DOE’s efforts  According to DOE officials, this uncertainty makes it extremely difficult to effectively perform any mid-to long-range planning efforts for the SPR’s modernization project, including the execution of major maintenance projects  Congress has generally set the SPR’s size by mandating purchases or sales of oil, and has established and amended the minimum size of the SPR as it pertains to the release of oil for emergency protection  Since 2015, Congress has, across six pieces of legislation, mandated 290 million barrels in additional oil sales  However, DOE developed its modernization plans in 2016  DOE officials told us they do not know whether additional sales will be mandated over the next 10 years or whether other changes may be required to the configuration of the reserve  Any additional congressionally mandated sales or direction to pursue additional petroleum product reserves would require DOE to again revisit its modernization plans and assessments of the potential uses of any excess SPR assets  Oil market projections also have implications for the future of the SPR  Under current projections, the United States may fluctuate between being a net importer and net exporter over the next several decades  Specifically, the United States is projected to become a net exporter by the late 2020s and would then no longer have a 90-day reserve obligation, but it is projected to return to being a net importer between 2040 and 2050  These projected fluctuations could affect the desired size of the SPR in the future  This uncertainty creates risks for DOE’s modernization plans, as DOE may end up spending funds on facilities that later turn out to be unnecessary should Congress ultimately decide on a larger- or smaller-sized SPR than DOE anticipates  Having a long-term target for the size and configuration of reserves helps other IEA member countries manage their reserves  For example, as previously discussed, unlike the United States, some other IEA members have specified in dynamic terms the amount of reserves to be held, such as days of net import protection or days of consumption, rather than specifying a specific static volume amount  Under such approaches, the amount held varies over time as entities managing the reserve acquire or sell reserves in order to meet the target  Setting a long-term target for the size and configuration of the SPR—taking into account projections for oil production, consumption, and IEA obligations—could better position DOE to ensure that funds spent on the SPR’s modernization do not modernize a system that is no longer needed and that DOE is able to adequately plan for potentially excess SPR assets  In the course of our work, we also identified other options for handling potentially excess SPR assets that DOE is not planning on examining, largely because DOE does not currently have the authority to pursue them, according to agency officials  First, DOE could explore leasing storage capacity to private industry  U S  oil production has generally increased over the last decade  As a result, the private sector may want to lease excess SPR capacity, which may be cheaper than above-ground storage, according to a representative of a private company we spoke with  Fees for doing so could help defray public reserve storage costs  However, officials told us that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act gives DOE authority to lease underutilized storage to other countries, but not to the private sector  Second, if Congress determines that the SPR holds oil in excess of that needed domestically, DOE could explore selling contracts or tickets for the excess oil rather than selling the oil outright  Australian and New Zealand officials told us that if DOE were to sell tickets for SPR oil, tickets would help these countries meet their IEA 90- day reserve obligations  Australian officials told us they have discussed this option with DOE  Currently the United States and Australia have agreed, through an arrangement, to allow Australia to contract for petroleum stocks located in the United States and controlled by commercial entities  According to DOE officials, the arrangement would permit Australia to receive credit from the IEA for tickets it purchases from the U S  private sector  While the arrangement does not cover government-owned oil in the SPR, if it did, based on our analysis, DOE could generate up to approximately $15 million annually if Australia purchased the maximum allowable amount of oil specified in an arrangement through tickets for excess SPR oil  However, although the Energy Policy and Conservation Act allows DOE to lease underutilized storage to other countries, DOE lacks the authority to sell tickets and does not plan to seek this authority, according to DOE officials  DOE officials told us that they do not plan to examine these options  According to DOE’s real property asset management order, the agency is to identify real property assets that are no longer needed to meet the program’s mission needs and that may be candidates for reuse or disposal  Once identified, the agency is to undertake certain actions, including determining whether to dispose of these assets by sale or lease  As part of its SPR post-sale configuration study, DOE plans to determine whether it is appropriate to close SPR facilities, and the relative benefit of any closures would be informed by potential lease revenues from maintaining sites so they could be leased, according to officials  However, without examining a full range of options in the post-sale configuration study, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources  Given changing crude oil and petroleum product market conditions and the constrained budget environment, it is important that DOE ensures the SPR is effective at meeting U S  energy security needs and IEA obligations while being managed and maintained in an efficient manner  In response to congressional direction and recommendations from GAO and DOE Inspector General, DOE conducted a long-term strategic review of the SPR in 2016 after its last comprehensive examination in 2005  In its review, DOE did not determine an optimal size for the SPR, and its analysis was limited in several ways  In particular, DOE did not fully consider recent and expected future changes in crude oil and petroleum market conditions such as the implications of projected fluctuations in U S  net imports or the role that increased levels of private reserves could play in responding to supply disruptions  DOE also did not perform a full cost-benefit analysis of holding different volumes of reserves  Without supplementing its 2016 strategic review by conducting additional analysis, and periodically conducting such analyses going forward, DOE cannot provide information to Congress to inform decisions about the appropriate amounts of crude oil and petroleum products to hold in the SPR and risks holding too much or too little in the SPR to meet the United States’ energy security needs and international obligations  Such information is needed on a timely basis, to reflect the pace of change in oil and petroleum markets and other relevant factors that affect the optimal size of the SPR  Though the SPR has primarily been used in response to domestic supply disruptions, such as hurricanes, the reserve is limited in this role because it is almost entirely composed of crude oil, and not petroleum products  In this regard, the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015 recommended that DOE analyze the need for additional regional product reserves for U S  regions that have been identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions  DOE has not identified whether additional regional product reserves should be part of the SPR or completed studies of all vulnerable U S  regions, and it has no plans to do so, according to DOE officials  Without conducting or completing studies for all the vulnerable U S  regions and releasing the results, DOE cannot ensure it and Congress have the information they need to make decisions about potential additional regional product reserves  In the face of declining net U S  imports, Congress has taken repeated steps to reduce the size of the reserve  Given that net imports are projected to continue to decline through the late 2020s and fluctuate in the future, there may be additional congressionally mandated SPR oil sales  This has created long-term uncertainty regarding the future size and configuration of the SPR  Congress could address this uncertainty by identifying a long-term target for the size of the SPR—either by volume or in terms tied to factors, such as consumption or net import protection, that affect the country’s energy security needs and IEA obligations  Setting such a long-term target could better position DOE to ensure the efficiency and efficacy of federal funds spent on the reserve  DOE has recently begun to study the potential effects of congressionally mandated sales on its modernization plans  As part of its SPR post-sale configuration study, DOE plans to determine whether it is appropriate to close SPR facilities, and the relative benefit of any closures would be informed by potential lease revenues from maintaining sites so they could be leased, according to officials  However, we identified other options for handling potentially excess SPR assets that DOE is not planning to examine in its study, inconsistent with the agency’s order on real property asset management  Although DOE does not currently have the authority to implement these options, according to officials, examining their potential use, including possible revenue enhancement, could inform Congress as it examines whether it should grant such authority  Without examining a full range of options in the post-sale configuration study for handling potentially excess SPR assets, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources  We are making the following matter for congressional consideration: Congress may wish to consider setting a long-range target for the size and configuration of the SPR that takes into account projections for future oil production, oil consumption, the efficacy of the existing SPR to respond to domestic supply disruptions, and U S  IEA obligations  (Matter 1) We are making four recommendations to DOE: The Secretary of Energy should supplement the agency’s 2016 long-term strategic review by conducting an additional analysis that takes into account private-sector response, oil market projections, and costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Energy should take actions to ensure that the agency periodically conducts and provides to Congress a strategic review of the SPR that, among other things, takes into account changes in crude oil and petroleum product market conditions and contains additional analysis, such as the costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes  (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Energy should conduct or complete studies on the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves for all U S  regions that have been identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions, and the Secretary should report the results to Congress  (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Energy, in completing DOE’s ongoing study on the effects of congressionally mandated sales, should consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets and, if needed, request congressional authority for the disposition of these assets  (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOE for review and comment  DOE provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I  Of the four recommendations, DOE agreed with two, partially agreed with one, and disagreed with one  Regarding our recommendation that DOE supplement its 2016 long- term strategic review with an additional analysis that takes into account private sector response, oil market projections, and costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes, the agency partially agreed with the recommendation  DOE agreed to conduct an additional analysis to assess the purpose, goals, and objectives of the SPR, taking into account private sector response, oil market projections, and any other relevant factors, that will lead to an evaluation of possible optimal sizes of the SPR in the future  In response to taking into account the costs and benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes, DOE stated that the agency determined the projected benefits of a wide range of different SPR sizes ranging from 430 million barrels of oil to 695 million barrels of oil in its 2016 review  However, the minimum SPR size considered by DOE is greater than the projected SPR size after congressionally mandated sales have occurred  Further, the SPR size after congressionally mandated sales is projected to be far in excess of the IEA obligation to hold a minimum of 90 days of net imports  DOE must also consider the minimum size needed to meet its IEA obligations in the event of a collective action  In conducting additional analysis, DOE should consider a smaller lower bound, in line with congressionally mandated sales, for the size of the SPR, and more fully consider the size needed to meet the IEA 90-day net import and collective action obligations  Regarding our recommendation that DOE conduct periodic reviews of the SPR, the agency agreed with the recommendation  DOE stated that a 5-year time interval between reviews would strike an appropriate balance between the need to periodically conduct a strategic assessment and evaluation of the SPR and the limitations on resources to plan and conduct such a review  Regarding our recommendation that DOE conduct or complete studies on the costs and benefits of regional petroleum product reserves, the agency disagreed  DOE stated that it is the agency's position that government owned and operated regional petroleum product reserves are an inefficient and expensive solution to respond to regional fuel supply disruptions  DOE further stated, based on studies done in 2015 that DOE officials told us were pre-decisional and therefore could not be reported, that there are additional concerns associated with government-owned and operated regional refined petroleum product reserves, including little to no storage capacity for lease in commercial terminals and high costs for government owned and operated regional product reserves  However, these same studies took these concerns into account, and concluded that a product reserve in the Southeast would provide significant net economic benefits (benefits minus costs) to the region and the United States in the event of a major hurricane  These studies also concluded that additional analyses are required to inform decisions regarding the potential benefits of a similar reserve on the West Coast  Further, the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015 recommended that similar analyses be completed for other areas deemed by DOE to be vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions  Therefore, we continue to believe that conducting these analyses, as recommended in the Quadrennial Energy Review of 2015, will provide Congress with information needed to make decisions about regional product reserves  Regarding our recommendation that DOE consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets, DOE agreed with the recommendation  DOE stated that in its ongoing study, the agency will include an assessment of disposition options for any potential excess or underutilized SPR assets, to include the need for new legislative authority, as necessary, for the disposition of assets  DOE expects this study to be completed in October 2018  DOE also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy, and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the individual named above, Quindi Franco (Assistant Director), Nkenge Gibson (Analyst-in-Charge), Philip Farah, Ellen Fried, Cindy Gilbert, Greg Marchand, Celia Mendive, Patricia Moye, Camille Pease, Oliver Richard, Dan Royer, Rachel Stoiko, and Marie Suding made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: More than 4 decades ago, Congress authorized the creation of the SPR to reduce the impact of disruptions in supplies of petroleum products. DOE manages the SPR. As a member of the International Energy Agency, the United States is obligated to maintain reserves equivalent to at least 90 days of the previous year's net imports (imports minus exports). The SPR's storage and related infrastructure is aging, and DOE has plans to modernize these facilities. Since 2015, Congress has mandated crude oil sales. As of March 2018, the SPR held about 665 million barrels of crude oil. GAO was asked to examine the SPR's ability to meet U.S. energy security needs. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which (1) DOE has identified the optimal size of the SPR, and (2) DOE's plans for modernizing the SPR take into account the effects of congressionally mandated crude oil sales. GAO reviewed DOE's plans and studies, and interviewed agency officials and nine experts selected based on prior work, referrals, and a literature review. The Department of Energy (DOE) has not identified the optimal size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). In 2016, DOE completed a long-term strategic review of the SPR after its last comprehensive examination conducted in 2005. The 2016 review examined the benefits of several SPR sizes, but it did not identify an optimal size and its review was limited in several ways. In particular, DOE did not fully consider recent and expected future changes in market conditions, such as the implications of falling net imports, or the role that increased levels of private reserves (reserves held by private companies for their own purposes) may play in responding to supply disruptions. These changes have contributed to SPR and private reserves reaching historically high levels on a net imports basis (see figure). These changes are expected to continue to evolve—according to government projections, the United States will become a net exporter in the late 2020s before again becoming a net importer between 2040 and 2050. GAO has found that agencies should reexamine their programs if conditions change. Without addressing the limitations of its 2016 review and periodically performing reexaminations in the future, DOE cannot be assured that the SPR will be sized appropriately into the future. DOE has taken steps to take into account congressionally mandated sales of SPR crude oil in its $1.4 billion modernization plans for SPR's infrastructure and facilities. The SPR is projected to hold 405 million barrels of oil by the end of fiscal year 2027. However, DOE's current plans are based on information analyzed prior to recently mandated sales. According to DOE officials, the agency began a study in March 2018 to assess the effects of these sales on the SPR's modernization. However, this study is not examining all options for handling any excess SPR assets that may be created by currently mandated sales or any additional sales that may be mandated in the future, inconsistent with an agency order on real property asset management that calls for identifying excess assets. For example, DOE does not plan to examine the potential to lease unused SPR storage capacity to the private sector because DOE is not currently authorized to enter into such leases, according to agency officials. If authorized, leasing capacity could generate revenues that could help offset the costs of modernization. By not examining a full range of options, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources. GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOE (1) supplement the 2016 review by conducting an additional analysis, (2) ensure that the agency periodically reexamines the size of the SPR, and (3) consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets as it conducts its study, among other things. DOE agreed with two, partially agreed with one, and disagreed with another recommendation on refined product reserve studies. GAO maintains that the recommendations are valid.