prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, and gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations  The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition strategies and proposed funding levels for the Aegis BMD program  Congress's decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U S  BMD capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base  For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the Aegis BMD program may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke  Most of the Navy's cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are equipped with the Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers, software, displays, weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that defended Zeus  The Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s for defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and subsurface threats  The system was first deployed by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated many times since  The Navy's Aegis ships include Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers  A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994  The first five ships in the class (CGs 47 through 51), which were built to an earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005, leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73)  A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and FY2005; the first entered service in 1991 and the 62 nd entered service in FY2012  The first 28 ships are known as Flight I/II DDG-51s  The next 34 ships, known as Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some design changes, including the addition of a helicopter hangar  No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009  The Navy during this period instead procured three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers  The DDG-1000 design does not use the Aegis system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations  Navy plans do not call for modifying the three DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable  Procurement of DDG-51s resumed in FY2010, following procurement of the three DDG-1000s  A total of 20 DDG-51s were procured in FY2010-FY2019  DDG-51s procured in FY2017 and subsequent years are being built to a new version of the DDG-51 design called the Flight III version  The Flight III version is to be equipped with a new radar, called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) or the SPY-6 radar, that is more capable than the SPY-1 radar installed on all previous Aegis cruisers and destroyers  Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s  Allied countries that now operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway  Most of Japan's Aegis-equipped ships are currently BMD-capable, and Japan plans to make all of them BMD-capable in coming years  The Aegis-equipped ships operated by South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway are not BMD-capable  Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to the Aegis system's computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor missiles  In-service Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s procured in FY2010 and subsequent years are being built from the start with a BMD capability  The Aegis BMD system exists in several variants  Listed in order of increasing capability, these include (but are not necessarily limited to) 3 6 X variant, the 4 0 3 variant, the 4 1 variant (also known as the Aegis Baseline [BL] 5 4 variant), the 5 0 CU (Capability Upgrade) variant (also known as the BL 9 1 variant), the 5 1 variant (also known as the BL 9 2 variant), and the 6 X variant (also known as the BL 10 variant)  Figure 1 summarizes the capabilities of some of these variants (using their designations as of 2016) and correlates them with the phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA; see discussion below) for European BMD operations  As shown in Figure 1 , the Aegis BMD system was originally designed primarily to intercept theater-range ballistic missiles, meaning short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs, respectively)  In addition to its capability for intercepting theater-range ballistic missiles, detection and tracking data collected by the Aegis BMD system's radar might be passed to other U S  BMD systems that are designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which might support intercepts of ICBMs that are conducted by those other U S  BMD systems  With the advent of the Aegis BMD system's new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor (which is discussed further in the next section), DOD is now evaluating the potential for the Aegis BMD system to intercept certain ICBMs  Section 1680 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act ( H R  2810 / P L  115-91 of December 12, 2017) directed DOD to "conduct a test to evaluate and demonstrate, if technologically feasible, the capability to defeat a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat using the standard missile 3 block IIA missile interceptor " DOD's January 2019 missile defense review report states the following: The SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor is intended as part of the regional missile defense architecture, but also has the potential to provide an important "underlay" to existing GBIs [ground-based interceptors] for added protection against ICBM threats to the homeland  This interceptor has the potential to offer an additional defensive capability to ease the burden on the GBI system and provide continuing protection for the U S  homeland against evolving rogue states' long-range missile capabilities  Congress has directed DoD to examine the feasibility of the SM-3 Blk IIA against an ICBM-class target  MDA will test this SM-3 Blk IIA capability in 2020  Due to the mobility of sea-based assets, this new underlay capability will be surged in a crisis or conflict to further thicken defensive capabilities for the U S  homeland  Land-based sites in the United States with this SM-3 Blk IIA missile could also be pursued  A March 18, 2019, press report states: The Pentagon plans a "first-of-its-kind" test of an unprecedented weapons capability to intercept and destroy an enemy Intercontinental Ballistic Missile "ICBM" -- from a Navy ship at sea using a Standard Missile-3 Block IIA  The concept, as articulated by Pentagon officials and cited briefly in this years' DoD "Missile Defense Review," would be to use an advanced SM-3 IIA to "underlay" and assist existing Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI), adding new dimensions to the current US missile defense posture … The testing, Pentagon officials tell Warrior, is slated for as soon as next year  The effectiveness and promise of the Raytheon-built SM-3 IIA shown in recent testing have inspired Pentagon weapons developers to envision an even broader role for the weapon  The missile is now "proven out," US weapons developers say…  "The SM-3 IIA was not designed to take out ICBMs, but is showing great promise  This would be in the upper range of its capability -- so we are going to try," the Pentagon official told Warrior…  The SM-3 IIA's size, range, speed and sensor technology, the thinking suggests, will enable it to collide with and destroy enemy ICBMs toward the beginning or end of their flight through space, where they are closer to the boundary of the earth's atmosphere  "The SM-3 IIA would not be able to hit an ICBM at a high altitude, but it can go outside the earth's atmosphere," the Pentagon official said  "You want to hit it as far away as possible because a nuke could go off " A March 26, 2018, press report states the following: [MDA] Director Lt  Gen  Sam Greaves said MDA "is evaluating the technical feasibility of the capability of the SM-3 Block IIA missile, currently under development, against an ICBM-class target " "If proven to be effective against an ICBM, this missile could add a layer of protection, augmenting the currently deployed GMD [ground-based missile defense] system," Greaves said in written testimony submitted March 22 to the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee  [Greaves] said MDA will conduct a demonstration of the SM-3 Block IIA against an ICBM-like target by the end of 2020 " The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), the SM-2 Block IV, and the SM-6  The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles above the atmosphere (i e , exo-atmospheric intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy ballistic missile's flight  It is equipped with a "hit-to-kill" warhead, called a kinetic vehicle, that is designed to destroy a ballistic missile's warhead by colliding with it  MDA and Navy plans call for fielding increasingly capable versions of the SM-3 in coming years  The current versions, called the SM-3 Block IA and SM-3 Block IB, are to be supplemented in coming years by SM-3 Block IIA  Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting its course  Compared to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster stage at the bottom but are 13 5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block IIA version has a 21-inch diameter along its entire length  The increase in diameter to a uniform 21 inches provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout velocity (a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater than that of the Block IA and IB versions, as well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead  The United States and Japan have cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA version, with Japan funding a significant share of the effort  The SM-2 Block IV is designed to intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere (i e , endo-atmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy ballistic missile's flight  It is equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead  The existing inventory of SM-2 Block IVs—72 as of February 2012—was created by modifying SM-2s that were originally built to intercept aircraft and ASCMs  A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs were modified, and at least 3 were used in BMD flight tests  MDA and the Navy are now procuring a more capable terminal-phase (endo-atmospheric intercept) BMD interceptor based on the SM-6 air defense missile (the successor to the SM-2 air defense missile)  The SM-6 is a dual-capability missile that can be used for either air defense (i e , countering aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles) or ballistic missile defense  A July 23, 2018, press report states the following: The Defense Department has launched a prototype project that aims to dramatically increase the speed and range of the Navy's Standard Missile-6 by adding a larger rocket motor to the ship-launched weapon, a move that aims to improve both the offensive and defensive reach of the Raytheon-built system  On Jan  17, the Navy approved plans to develop a Dual Thrust Rocket Motor with a 21-inch diameter for the SM-6, which is currently fielded with a 13 5-inch propulsion package  The new rocket motor would sit atop the current 21-inch booster, producing a new variant of the missile: the SM-6 Block IB  On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new approach for regional BMD operations called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA)  The first application of the approach is in Europe, and is called the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)  EPAA calls for using BMD-capable Aegis ships, a land-based radar in Europe, and two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland to defend Europe against ballistic missile threats from countries such as Iran  Phase I of EPAA involved deploying Aegis BMD ships and a land-based radar in Europe by the end of 2011  Phase II involved establishing the Aegis Ashore site in Romania with SM-3 IB interceptors in 2016  Phase 3 involves establishing the Aegis Ashore site in Poland with SM-3 IIA interceptors by perhaps FY2020  The completion of construction of the Poland site has been delayed by at least a year, MDA says, due to contractor performance issues  Each Aegis Ashore site in the EPAA is to include a structure housing an Aegis system similar to the deckhouse on an Aegis ship and 24 SM-3 missiles launched from a relocatable Vertical Launch System (VLS) based on the VLS that is installed in Navy Aegis ships  Although BMD-capable Aegis ships were deployed to European waters before 2011, the first BMD-capable Aegis ship officially deployed to European waters as part of the EPAA departed its home port of Norfolk, VA, on March 7, 2011, for a deployment to the Mediterranean that lasted several months  Under the FY2020 budget submission, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is projected to increase from 38 at the end of FY2018 to 59 at the end of FY2024  During the period FY2018-FY2024, the portion of the force equipped with earlier Aegis variants is to decrease, and the number equipped with later variants is to increase  On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the EPAA, four BMD-capable Aegis ships were to be forward-homeported (i e , based) at the naval base at Rota, Spain  The four ships were transferred to Rota in FY2014 and FY2015  Navy officials have said that the four Rota-based ships can provide a level of level of presence in the Mediterranean for performing BMD patrols and other missions equivalent to what could be provided by about 10 BMD-capable Aegis ships that are homeported on the U S  east coast  The Rota homeporting arrangement thus effectively releases about six U S  Navy BMD-capable Aegis ships for performing BMD patrols or other missions elsewhere  The Aegis BMD development effort, including Aegis BMD flight tests, has been described as following a development philosophy long held within the Aegis program office of "build a little, test a little, learn a lot," meaning that development is done in manageable steps, then tested and validated before moving on to the next step  For a summary of Aegis BMD flight tests since 2002, see Appendix A   Japan is modifying all six of its Aegis destroyers to include the Aegis BMD capability  As of August 2017, four of the six ships reportedly had been modified, and Japan planned to modify a fifth by March 2018, or perhaps sooner than that  In November 2013, Japan announced plans to procure two additional Aegis destroyers and equip them as well with the Aegis BMD capability, which will produce an eventual Japanese force of eight BMD-capable Aegis destroyers  The two additional ships are expected to enter service in 2020 and 2021  Japanese BMD-capable Aegis ships have participated in some of the flight tests of the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor (see Table A-1 in Appendix A )  Japan cooperated with the United States on development the SM-3 Block IIA missile  Japan developed certain technologies for the missile, and paid for the development of those technologies, reducing the missile's development costs for the United States  Japan plans to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems that reportedly are to be located at Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) facilities in Akita Prefecture in eastern Japan and Yamaguchi Prefecture in western Japan, and would be operated mainly by the GSDF (i e , Japan's army)  The two systems reportedly will be equipped with a new Lockheed-made radar called the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) rather than the Raytheon-made SPY-6 AMDR that is being installed on U S  Navy Flight III DDG-51s, and reportedly will go into operation by 2023  A July 6, 2018, press report states that "The U S  and Japan are looking to jointly develop next-generation radar technology that would use Japanese semiconductors to more than double the detection range of the Aegis missile defense system " An October 12, 2018, press report states that "the South Korean military has decided to buy ship-based SM-3 interceptors to thwart potential ballistic missile attacks from North Korea, a top commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed Oct  12  Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Denmark, and Australia  Spain, South Korea, and Australia either operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis ships  The other countries operate destroyers and frigates with different combat systems that may have potential for contributing to BMD operations  The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA's budget  The Navy's budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts  Table 1 shows MDA procurement and research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program  Research and development funding for the land-based SM-3 is funding for Aegis Ashore sites  MDA's budget also includes additional funding not shown in the table for operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) for the Aegis BMD program  One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA's FY2019 procurement and research and development funding requests for the program  In considering this issue, Congress may consider various factors, including whether the work that MDA is proposing to fund for FY2019 is properly scheduled for FY2019, and whether this work is accurately priced  Another potential issue for Congress concerns required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships  Some observers are concerned about the potential operational implications of a shortfall in the available number of BMD-capable relative to the required number  Regarding the required number of BMD-capable Aegis ships, an August 15, 2018, Navy information paper states the following: The [Navy's] 2016 Force Structure Assessment [FSA] sets the requirement [for BMD-capable ships] at 54 BMD-capable ships, as part of the 104 large surface combatant requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support defense of the sea base and limited expeditionary land base sites…  The minimum requirement for 54 BMD ships is based on the Navy unique requirement as follows  It accepts risk in the sourcing of combatant commander (CCDR) requests for defense of land  - 30 to meet CVN escort demand for rotational deployment of the carrier strike groups - 11 INCONUS for independent BMD deployment demand - 9 in forward deployed naval forces (FDNF) Japan to meet operational timelines in USINDOPACOM - 4 in FDNF Europe for rotational deployment in EUCOM  A related potential issue for Congress is the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy's fleet of Aegis ships, particularly since performing BMD patrols requires those ships to operate in geographic locations that may be unsuitable for performing other U S  Navy missions, and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U S  Navy Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites  A June 16, 2018, press report states the following: The U S  Navy's top officer wants to end standing ballistic missile defense patrols and transfer the mission to shore-based assets  Chief of Naval Operations Adm  John Richardson said in no uncertain terms on June 12 that he wants the Navy off the tether of ballistic missile defense patrols, a mission that has put a growing strain on the Navy's hard-worn surface combatants, and the duty shifted towards more shore-based infrastructure  "Right now, as we speak, I have six multi-mission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea," Richardson said during his address at the U S


Report 2:  Naval War College's Current Strategy Forum  "And if you know a little bit about this business you know that geometry is a tyrant  "You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile  So, we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little box, defending land " Richardson continued, saying the Navy could be used in emergencies but that in the long term the problem demands a different solution  "It's a pretty good capability and if there is an emergent need to provide ballistic missile defense, we're there," he said  "But 10 years down the road, it's time to build something on land to defend the land  Whether that's AEGIS ashore or whatever, I want to get out of the long-term missile defense business and move to dynamic missile defense " The unusually direct comments from the CNO come amid growing frustration among the surface warfare community that the mission, which requires ships to stay in a steaming box doing figure-eights for weeks on end, is eating up assets and operational availability that could be better used confronting growing high-end threats from China and Russia  The BMD mission was also a factor in degraded readiness in the surface fleet  Amid the nuclear threat from North Korea, the BMD mission began eating more and more of the readiness generated in the Japan-based U S  7th Fleet, which created a pressurized situation that caused leaders in the Pacific to cut corners and sacrifice training time for their crews, an environment described in the Navy's comprehensive review into the two collisions that claimed the lives of 17 sailors in the disastrous summer of 2017  Richardson said that as potential enemies double down on anti-access technologies designed to keep the U S  Navy at bay, the Navy needed to focus on missile defense for its own assets  "We're going to need missile defense at sea as we kind of fight our way now into the battle spaces we need to get into," he said  "And so restoring dynamic maneuver has something to do with missile defense  A June 23, 2018, press report states the following: The threats from a resurgent Russia and rising China―which is cranking out ships like it's preparing for war―have put enormous pressure on the now-aging [U S  Navy Aegis destroyer] fleet  Standing requirements for BMD patrols have put increasing strain on the U S  Navy's surface ships  The Navy now stands at a crossroads  BMD, while a burden, has also been a cash cow that has pushed the capabilities of the fleet exponentially forward over the past decade  The game-changing SPY-6 air and missile defense radar destined for DDG Flight III, for example, is a direct response to the need for more advanced BMD shooters  But a smaller fleet, needed for everything from anti-submarine patrols to freedom-of-navigation missions in the South China Sea, routinely has a large chunk tethered to BMD missions  "Right now, as we speak, I have six multimission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea," Chief of Naval Operations Adm  John Richardson said during an address at the recent U S  Naval War College's Current Strategy Forum  "You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile  So we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little box, defending land " And for every six ships the Navy has deployed in a standing mission, it means 18 ships are in various stages of the deployment cycle preparing to relieve them  The Pentagon, led by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, wants the Navy to be more flexible and less predictable―"dynamic" is the buzzword of moment in Navy circles  What Richardson is proposing is moving standing requirements for BMD patrols away from ships underway and all the associated costs that incurs, and toward fixed, shore-based sites, and also surging the Navy's at-sea BMD capabilities when there is an active threat     In a follow-up response to questions posed on the CNO's comments, Navy spokesman Cmdr  William Speaks said the Navy's position is that BMD is an integral part of the service's mission, but where long-term threats exist, the Navy should "consider a more persistent, land-based solution as an option " "This idea is not about the nation's or the Navy's commitment to BMD for the U S  and our allies and partners―the Navy's commitment to ballistic missile defense is rock-solid," Speaks said  "In fact, the Navy will grow the number of BMD-capable ships from 38 to 60 by 2023, in response to the growing demand for this capability  "The idea is about how to best meet that commitment  In alignment with our national strategic documents, we have shifted our focus in an era of great power competition―this calls us to think innovatively about how best to meet the demands of this mission and optimize the power of the joint force "    While the idea of saving money by having fixed BMD sites and freeing up multimission ships is sensible, it may have unintended consequences, said Bryan McGrath, a retired destroyer skipper and owner of the defense consultancy The FerryBridge Group  "The BMD mission is part of what creates the force structure requirement for large surface combatants," McGrath said on Twitter after Defense News reported the CNO's comments  "Absent it, the number of CG's and DDG's would necessarily decline  This may in fact be desirable, depending on the emerging fleet architecture and the roles and missions debate underway  Perhaps we need more smaller, multi-mission ships than larger, more expensive ones  "But it cannot be forgotten that while the mission is somewhat wasteful of a capable, multi-mission ship, the fact that we have built the ships that (among other things) do this mission is an incredibly good thing  If there is a penalty to be paid in peacetime sub-optimization in order to have wartime capacity--should this not be considered a positive thing?" McGrath went on to say that the suite of combat systems that have been built into Aegis have been in response to the BMD threat  And indeed, the crown jewels of the surface fleet―Aegis Baseline 9 software, which allows a ship to do both air defense and BMD simultaneously; the Aegis common-source library; the forthcoming SPY-6; cooperative engagement―have come about either in part or entirely driven by the BMD mission     A Navy official who spoke on condition of anonymity, to discuss the Navy's shifting language on BMD, acknowledged the tone had shifted since the 2000s when the Navy latched onto the mission  But the official added that the situation more than a decade later has dramatically shifted  "The strategic environment has changed significantly since the early 2000s―particularly in the western Pacific  We have never before faced multiple peer rivals in a world as interconnected and interdependent as we do today," the official said  "Nor have we ever seen technologies that could alter the character of war as dramatically as those we see emerging around us  China and Russia have observed our way of war and are on the move to reshape the environment to their favor " In response to the threat and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis' desire to use the force more dynamically, the Navy is looking at its options, the official said  "This includes taking a look at how we employ BMD ships through the lens of great power competition to compete, deter and win against those who threaten us " A January 29, 2019, press report states the following: The Navy is looking to get out of the missile defense business, the service's top admiral said today, and the Pentagon's new missile defense review might give the service the off-ramp it has been looking for to stop sailing in circles waiting for ground-based missile launches  This wasn't the first time Adm  John Richardson bristled in public over his ships sailing in "small boxes" at sea tasked with protecting land, when they could be out performing other missions challenging Chinese and Russian adventurism in the South China Sea and the North Atlantic…  "We've got exquisite capability, but we've had ships protecting some pretty static assets on land for a decade," Richardson said at the Brookings Institute  "If that [stationary] asset is going to be a long-term protected asset, then let's build something on land and protect that and liberate these ships from this mission " Japan is already moving down the path of building up a more robust ground-based sensor and shooter layer, while also getting its own ships out to sea armed with the Aegis radar and missile defense system, both of which would free up American hulls from what Richardson on Monday called "the small [geographic] boxes where they have to stay for ballistic missile defense " Another related potential issue for Congress concerns burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U S  naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations, particularly in light of constraints on U S  defense spending, worldwide operational demands for U S  Navy Aegis ships, and calls by some U S  observers for increased allied defense efforts  The issue can arise in connection with both U S  allies in Europe and U S  allies in Asia  Regarding U S  allies in Asia, a December 12, 2018, press report states the following: In June, US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson said during a speech at the US Naval War College that the US Navy should terminate its current practice of dedicating several US Navy warships solely for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)  Richardson wanted US warships to halt BMD patrols off Japan and Europe as they are limiting, restrictive missions that could be better accomplished by existing land-based BMD systems such as Patriot anti-missile batteries, the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and the Aegis Ashore anti-missile system  In the months since dropping his bombshell, Richardson—and much of the debate—has gone quiet  "My guess is the CNO got snapped back by the Pentagon for exceeding where the debate actually stood," one expert on US naval affairs told Asia Times  But others agree with him  Air Force Lt Gen Samuel A Greaves, the director of the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA), acknowledges Richardson's attempts to highlight how these BMD patrols were placing unwelcome "strain on the (US Navy's) crews and equipment " But there are complications  While it may free US Navy warships for sea-control, rather than land defense, there is a concern that next- generation hypersonic cruise missiles could defeat land-based BMD systems, such as Aegis Ashore, while the US Navy's Aegis-equipped warships offer the advantages of high-speed mobility and stealth, resulting in greater survivability overall  As Japan prepares to acquire its first Aegis Ashore BMD system – and perhaps other systems such as the THAAD system which has been deployed previously in Romania and South Korea – the possibility that the US Navy will end its important BMD role represents abrupt change…  Japan's decision to deploy Aegis Ashore can fill in any gap created by a possible US Navy cessation of BMD patrols  "The land-based option is more reliable, less logistically draining, and despite being horrendously expensive, could be effective in the sense that it provides a degree of reassurance to the Japanese people and US government, and introduces an element of doubt of missile efficacy into [North Korean] calculations," said [Garren Mulloy, Associate Professor of International Relations at Daito Bunka University in Saitama, Japan], adding, however, that these systems could not cover Okinawa  "Fixed sites in Japan could be vulnerable, and the Aegis vessels provide a flexible forward-defense, before anything enters Japanese airspace, but with obviously limited reactions times," Mulloy said  "Aegis Ashore gives more reaction time – but over Japanese airspace "… The silence about this sudden possible shift in the US defense posture in the western Pacific is understandable: it is a sensitive topic in Washington and Tokyo  However, the Trump administration has urged its allies to pay more for their own defense needs and to support US troops deployed overseas  Meanwhile, Tokyo needs to proceed cautiously given the likelihood that neighbors might view a move on BMD as evidence that Tokyo is adopting an increasingly aggressive defense posture in the region  But for them, it is a no-win situation  If the US does ditch the BMD patrol mission, China and North Korea might view the shift as equally menacing given that it greatly enhances the US Navy's maritime warfare capabilities  Another potential issue for Congress is whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site  DOD's January 2019 missile defense review report states, in a section on improving or adapting existing BMD systems, that Another repurposing option is to operationalize, either temporarily or permanently, the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center in Kauai, Hawaii, to strengthen the defense of Hawaii against North Korean missile capabilities  DoD will study this possibility to further evaluate it as a viable near-term option to enhance the defense of Hawaii  The United States will augment the defense of Hawaii in order to stay ahead of any possible North Korean missile threat  MDA and the Navy will evaluate the viability of this option and develop an Emergency Activation Plan that would enable the Secretary of Defense to operationalize the Aegis Ashore test site in Kauai within 30 days of the Secretary's decision to do so, the steps that would need to be taken, associated costs, and personnel requirements  This plan will be delivered to USDA&S, USDR&E, and USDP within six months of the release of the MDR  A January 25, 2019, press report states the following: The Defense Department will examine the funding breakdown between the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency should the government make Hawaii's Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center into an operational resource, according to the agency's director  "Today, it involves both Navy resources for the operational crews -- that man that site -- as well as funds that come to MDA for research, development and test production and sustainment," Lt  Gen  Sam Greaves said of the test center when asked how the funding would shake out between the Navy and MDA should the Pentagon move forward with the recommendation  Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential for ship-based lasers, electromagnetic railguns (EMRGs), and gun-launched guided projectiles (GLGPs, previously known as hypervelocity projectiles [HVPs]) to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles  Another CRS report discusses the potential value of ship-based lasers, EMRGs, and GLGPs for performing various missions, including, potentially, terminal-phase BMD operations  Another potential oversight issue for Congress is technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program  Regarding this issue, a December 2018 report from DOD's Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—DOT&E's annual report for FY2018—stated the following in its section on the Aegis BMD program: Assessment • Results from flight testing, high-fidelity M&S, HWIL, and distributed ground testing demonstrate that Aegis BMD can intercept non-separating, simple-separating, and complex-separating ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase  However, flight testing and M&S did not address all expected threat types, ground ranges, and raid sizes  • FTM-45 successfully and fully demonstrated the Aegis BL 9 2 organic engagement capability and corrective action for the previous FTM-29 missile failure  FTM-29 was only partially able to demonstrate EOR capability given the in-flight missile failure  In FTM-29, the Aegis Weapon System supported the SM-3 Block IIA missile and demonstrated bi-directional communication between the SM-3 Block IIA guidance section and the KW until loss of signal at horizon  However, the weapon system did not exercise all aspects of communication after KW eject  DOT&E considers the FTM-29 failure to be an example of a shortfall in conducting ground testing in an operationally representative way, and an example of a deficiency found in OT that DT should have discovered  • The MDA implemented process improvements to better identify, report, and fi x common failures and anomalies identified during SM-3 ground testing prior to flight testing  • SM CTV-03 demonstrated the capability of the Aegis BMD 4 1 upgrade to fi re an SM-6 Dual I missile  The BMD 4 1 build incorporates BL 9 C1 capabilities into the BMD 4 0 baseline  • FS-17 demonstrated the Aegis BMD 4 0 3 capability to interoperate with NATO partners over operational communication architectures during cruise missile and ballistic missile engagements, and to use remote data provided by NATO partners to prosecute remote engagements  JFTM-05 Event 2 demonstrated inter-ship communication between U S  and Japanese destroyers using a realistic communications architecture while prosecuting ballistic missile engagements  Pacific Dragon demonstrated interoperability between U S  Aegis BMD assets, Japanese destroyers, and Republic of Korea naval assets  • Aegis BMD has exercised rudimentary engagement coordination with Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense firing units, but not with Patriot  The MDA plans to include Patriot in FTO-03  MDA ground tests have routinely demonstrated that inter-element coordination and interoperability need improvement to increase situational awareness and improve engagement efficiency  • The MDA has been collaborating with DOT&E and the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) to establish an affordable ground testing approach to support assessments of reliability  DOT&E cannot assess SM-3 missile reliability with confidence until the MDA is able to provide additional ground test data that simulates the in-flight environment  DOT&E is working with the MDA to determine if existing ground test venues are able to provide the needed missile reliability data  Recommendations The MDA should: 1  Ensure that ground tests of all SM-3 missile components, sections, and all-up rounds use the same configuration as will be flown in flight tests (i e , "test as you fly")  2  Determine how to properly score acceptance ground test data for production missiles to enable their use in estimating SM-3 reliability  3  Fund and execute high-fidelity M&S RFRs for Aegis BL 9 2 SM-3 Block IIA and SM-6 Dual II scenarios that span the engagement battlespace  Regarding the SM-6 missile, the January 2018 DOT&E report also stated the following: Assessment • As reported in the DOT&E FY18 SM-6 BLK I FOT&E Report, the SM-6 remains effective and suitable with the exception of the classified deficiency identified in the FY13 IOT&E Report  The SM-6 Block 1 satisfactorily demonstrated compatibility with Aegis Weapon System Baseline 9 Integrated Fire Control capability  • In FY17-18, the Navy developed and tested specific software improvements to SM-6 BLK I to mitigate the classified performance problems discovered during IOT&E  As previously reported, testing conducted by the Navy demonstrated the software improvements perform as intended, but did not eliminate them  Recommendation 1  The Navy should continue to improve software based on IOT&E results and verify corrective actions with flight tests  Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the FY2020 request for MDA procurement and research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program  Appendix A  Aegis BMD Flight Tests Table A-1 presents a summary of Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002  As shown in the table, since January 2002, the Aegis BMD system has achieved 33 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 42 attempts using the SM-3 missile (including 4 successful intercepts in 5 attempts by Japanese Aegis ships, and 2 successful intercepts in 3 attempts attempt using the Aegis Ashore system), and 7 successful endo-atmospheric intercepts in 7 attempts using the SM-2 Block IV and SM-6 missiles, making for a combined total of 40 successful intercepts in 49 attempts  In addition, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser operating northwest of Hawaii used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system with the SM-3 missile to shoot down an inoperable U S  surveillance satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit  Including this intercept in the count increases the totals to 34 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 43 attempts using the SM-3 missile, and 41 successful exo- and endo-atmospheric intercepts in 50 attempts using SM-3, SM-2 Block IV, and SM-6 missiles 

ground_truth: More than 2.7 million miles of pipeline transport and distribute oil, natural gas, and other hazardous products throughout the United States. Interstate pipelines run through remote areas and highly populated urban areas, and are vulnerable to accidents, operating errors, and malicious physical and cyber-based attack or intrusion. The energy sector accounted for 35 percent of the 796 critical infrastructure cyber incidents reported to DHS from 2013 to 2015. Several federal and private entities have roles in pipeline security. TSA is primarily responsible for the oversight of pipeline physical security and cybersecurity. GAO was asked to review TSA's efforts to assess and enhance pipeline security and cybersecurity. This report examines, among other objectives: (1) the guidance pipeline operators reported using to address security risks and the extent that TSA ensures its guidelines reflect the current threat environment; (2) the extent that TSA has assessed pipeline systems' security risks; and (3) the extent TSA has assessed its effectiveness in reducing pipeline security risks. GAO analyzed TSA documents, such as its Pipeline Security Guidelines ; evaluated TSA pipeline risk assessment efforts; and interviewed TSA officials, 10 U.S. pipeline operators—selected based on volume, geography, and material transported—and representatives from five industry associations. Pipeline operators reported using a range of guidelines and standards to address physical and cybersecurity risks, including the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Pipeline Security Guidelines , initially issued in 2011. TSA issued revised guidelines in March 2018 to reflect changes in the threat environment and incorporate most of the principles and practices from the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity . However, TSA's revisions do not include all elements of the current framework and TSA does not have a documented process for reviewing and revising its guidelines on a regular basis. Without such a documented process, TSA cannot ensure that its guidelines reflect the latest known standards and best practices for physical security and cybersecurity, or address the dynamic security threat environment that pipelines face. Further, GAO found that the guidelines lack clear definitions to ensure that pipeline operators identify their critical facilities. GAO's analysis showed that operators of at least 34 of the nation's top 100 critical pipeline systems (determined by volume of product transported) deemed highest risk had identified no critical facilities. This may be due, in part, to the guidelines not clearly defining the criteria to determine facilities' criticality. To assess pipeline security risks, TSA conducts pipeline security reviews—Corporate Security Reviews and Critical Facility Security Reviews—to assess pipeline systems' vulnerabilities. However, GAO found that the number of TSA security reviews has varied considerably over the last several years, as shown in the table on the following page. TSA officials stated that staffing limitations have prevented TSA from conducting more reviews. Staffing levels for TSA's Pipeline Security Branch have varied significantly since fiscal year 2010 with the number of staff ranging from 14 full-time equivalents in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 to 1 in 2014. Further, TSA does not have a strategic workforce plan to help ensure it identifies the skills and competencies—such as the required level of cybersecurity expertise—necessary to carry out its pipeline security responsibilities. By establishing a strategic workforce plan, TSA can help ensure that it has identified the necessary skills, competencies, and staffing. GAO also identified factors that likely limit the usefulness of TSA's risk assessment methodology for prioritizing pipeline system reviews. Specifically, TSA has not updated its risk assessment methodology since 2014 to reflect current threats to the pipeline industry. Further, its sources of data and underlying assumptions and judgments regarding certain threat and vulnerability inputs are not fully documented. In addition, the risk assessment has not been peer reviewed since its inception in 2007. Taking steps to strengthen its risk assessment, and initiating an independent, external peer review would provide greater assurance that TSA ranks relative risk among pipeline systems using comprehensive and accurate data and methods. TSA has established performance measures to monitor pipeline security review recommendations, analyze their results, and assess effectiveness in reducing risks. However, these measures do not possess key attributes—such as clarity, and having measurable targets—that GAO has found are key to successful performance measures. By taking steps to ensure that its pipeline security program performance measures exhibit these key attributes, TSA could better assess its effectiveness at reducing pipeline systems' security risks. Pipeline Security Branch officials also reported conducting security reviews as the primary means for assessing the effectiveness of TSA's efforts to reduce pipeline security risks. However, TSA has not tracked the status of Corporate Security Review recommendations for the past 5 years. Until TSA monitors and records the status of these reviews' recommendations, it will be hindered in its efforts to determine whether its recommendations are leading to significant reduction in risk. GAO makes 10 recommendations to TSA to improve its pipeline security program management (many are listed on the next page), and DHS concurred. GAO recommends, among other things, that the TSA Administrator take the following actions: implement a documented process for reviewing, and if deemed necessary, for revising TSA's Pipeline Security Guidelines at defined intervals; clarify TSA's Pipeline Security Guidelines by defining key terms within its criteria for determining critical facilities; develop a strategic workforce plan for TSA's Security Policy and Industry Engagement‘s Surface Division; update TSA's pipeline risk assessment methodology to include current data to ensure it reflects industry conditions and threats; fully document the data sources, underlying assumptions and judgments that form the basis of TSA's pipeline risk assessment methodology; take steps to coordinate an independent, external peer review of TSA's pipeline risk assessment methodology; ensure the Security Policy and Industry Engagement‘s Surface Division has a suite of performance measures which exhibit key attributes of successful performance measures; and enter information on Corporate Security Review recommendations and monitor and record their status.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The national pipeline system consists of more than 2 7 million miles of networked pipelines transporting oil, natural gas, and other hazardous liquids  Hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines—primarily buried underground in the continental United States—run under remote and open terrain, as well as densely populated areas  These pipelines are of three main types: Hazardous liquid: About 216,000 miles of hazardous liquid pipeline transport crude oil, diesel fuel, gasoline, jet fuel, anhydrous ammonia, and carbon dioxide  Natural gas transmission and storage: About 319,000 miles of pipeline—mostly interstate—transport natural gas from sources to communities  Natural gas distribution: About 2 2 million miles of pipeline—mostly intrastate—transport natural gas from transmission sites to consumers  Figure 1 depicts the network of hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission pipelines in the United States  More than 3,000 pipeline companies operate the nation’s pipeline systems, which can traverse multiple states and the U S  borders with Canada and Mexico  Many pipeline systems are comprised of the pipelines themselves, as well as a variety of facilities, such as storage tanks, compressor stations, and control centers  Most pipeline systems are monitored and moderated through automated ICS or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems using remote sensors, signals, and preprogramed parameters to activate and deactivate valves and pumps to maintain flows within tolerances  Federal agencies and pipeline operators determine the criticality of pipeline systems and their facilities based on their importance to the nation’s energy infrastructure; service to installations critical to national defense; or, if attacked, have the potential to cause mass casualties and significant impact on public drinking water affecting major population centers  Accordingly, those determined to be critical merit increased attention to security  However, as we previously reported, the inherent design and operation of U S  pipeline systems may reduce some potential impacts of lost service  The pipeline sector is generally considered to be resilient and versatile  Historically, pipeline operators have been able to quickly respond to the adverse consequences of an incident—whether it is damage from a major hurricane or a backhoe—and quickly restore pipeline service  Pipeline infrastructure also includes redundancies such as parallel pipelines or interconnections that enable operators to reroute material through the network  Figure 2 depicts the U S  pipeline system, its basic components, examples of vulnerabilities, and the entities to which it supplies energy and raw materials  These entities include utility companies, airports, military sites, and industrial and manufacturing facilities  According to TSA, pipelines are vulnerable to physical attacks—including the use of firearms or explosives—largely due to their stationary nature, the volatility of transported products, and the dispersed nature of pipeline networks spanning urban and outlying areas  The nature of the transported commodity and the potential effect of an attack on national security, commerce, and public health make some pipelines and their assets more attractive targets for attack  Oil and gas pipelines have been and continue to be targeted by terrorists and other malicious groups globally  Terrorists have also targeted U S  pipelines, but have not succeeded in attacking them  Further, environmental activists and lone actors seeking to halt the construction of new pipelines through sabotage have recently emerged as a new threat to pipelines  For example, in March 2017, activists used blowtorches to cut holes in empty portions of the Dakota Access Pipeline in two states  In February 2017, local law enforcement officers fatally shot a man who used an assault rifle to damage the Sabal Trail Pipeline, a natural gas pipeline under construction in Florida  The sophisticated computer systems that pipeline operations rely on are also vulnerable to various cyber threats  According to DOE, the frequency, scale, and sophistication of cyber threats have increased, and attacks have become easier to launch  NCCIC reported that the energy sector, which includes pipelines, experienced more cyber incidents than any sector from 2013 to 2015, accounting for 35 percent of the 796 incidents reported by all critical infrastructure sectors  In 2016, NCCIC reported that the energy sector was the third most frequently attacked sector  Further, according to DOE, the cost of preventing and responding to cyber incidents in the energy sector is straining the ability of companies to adequately protect their critical cyber systems  For example, a 2015 study by the Ponemon Institute estimated the annualized cost of cyber crime for an average energy company to be about $28 million  Ineffective protection of cyber assets from these threats can increase the likelihood of security incidents and cyber attacks that disrupt critical operations; lead to inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information; and threaten national security, economic well-being, and public health and safety  Unintentional or nonadversarial threat sources may include failures in equipment or software due to aging, resource depletion, and errors made by end users  They also include natural disasters and failures of critical infrastructure on which the organization depends, but that are outside of the control of the organization  Intentional or adversarial threats may include corrupt employees, criminal groups, terrorists, and nations that seek to leverage the organization’s dependence on cyber resources (i e , information in electronic form, information and communications technologies, and the communications and information-handling capabilities provided by those technologies)  These threat adversaries vary in terms of their capabilities, their willingness to act, and their motives, which can include seeking monetary gain or seeking an economic, political, or military advantage  Cyber threat adversaries make use of various techniques, tactics, practices, and exploits to adversely affect an organization’s computers, software, or networks, or to intercept or steal valuable or sensitive information  For example, an attacker could infiltrate a pipeline’s operational systems via the internet or other communication pathways to potentially disrupt its service and cause spills, releases, explosions, or fires  Moreover, ICS, which were once largely isolated from the Internet and the company’s information technology systems, are increasingly connected in modern energy systems, allowing cyber attacks to originate in business systems and migrate to operational systems  For example, malicious nation-state actors used spear-phishing and other similar approaches in 2018 against energy sector organizations to gain access to their business systems, conduct reconnaissance, and collect information about their ICS  Similarly, in April 2012, the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team reported that an unidentified cyber attacker had conducted a series of cyber intrusions into U S  natural gas pipeline systems beginning in December 2011  Federal policy and public-private plans establish roles and responsibilities for the protection of critical infrastructure, including pipelines  These include Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), the NIPP, and Executive Order 13636  PPD-21, issued in February 2013, reflects an all- hazards approach to protecting critical infrastructure, including natural disasters, terrorism, and cyber incidents  The directive also identifies the 16 critical infrastructure sectors and assigns roles and responsibilities for each critical infrastructure sector among nine designated federal sector-specific agencies  While PPD-21 identified the critical infrastructure sectors and assigned responsibility for each sector’s sector-specific agency, the NIPP outlines critical infrastructure stakeholder roles and responsibilities regarding critical security and resilience  It describes a voluntary partnership model as the primary means of coordinating government and private sector efforts to protect critical infrastructure  As part of the partnership structure, the designated sector-specific agencies serve as the lead coordinators for security programs of their respective sector  As sector-specific agencies, federal departments or agencies lead, facilitate, or support the security and resilience programs and associated activities of their designated critical infrastructure sector  For example, DHS and DOT are both designated as sector-specific agencies for the transportation systems sector, which includes pipelines  Each sector also has a government coordinating council, consisting of representatives from various levels of government, and many have a sector coordinating council (SCC) consisting of owner-operators of these critical assets or members of their respective trade associations  For example, the Transportation Government Coordinating Council has been established, and the Pipeline Modal SCC has been established to represent pipeline operators  The NIPP also outlines a risk management framework for critical infrastructure protection  As shown in Figure 3, the NIPP uses a risk management framework as a planning methodology intended to inform how decision makers take actions to manage risk  The risk management framework calls for public and private critical infrastructure partners to conduct risk assessments to understand the most likely and severe incidents that could affect their operations and communities, and use this information to support planning and resource allocation  According to DHS, the risk management framework is influenced by the nature and magnitude of a threat, the vulnerabilities to that threat, and the consequences that could result, as shown in Figure 4  Federal policy has encouraged voluntary information-sharing mechanisms between the federal government and critical infrastructure owners and operators  For example, Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) are formed by critical infrastructure owners and operators to gather, analyze, appropriately sanitize, and disseminate intelligence and information related to critical infrastructure  They typically collect, analyze and disseminate actionable threat information to their members and provide members with tools to mitigate risks and enhance resiliency  ISACs in which pipeline operators may participate have been formed including the Oil and Natural Gas ISAC, Downstream Natural Gas ISAC, and Electricity ISAC  Finally, in February 2013, the president issued Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which cited repeated cyber intrusions into critical infrastructure as demonstrating the need for improved cybersecurity  Executive Order 13636 outlined actions for improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity, including direction for the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to lead the development of a voluntary risk-based cybersecurity framework that would comprise a set of industry standards and best practices to help organizations manage cybersecurity risks  NIST issued the framework in 2014 and updated it in April 2018  The order also addressed the need to improve cybersecurity information sharing and collaboratively develop risk-based standards and stated that U S  policy was to increase the volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber threat information shared with private sector entities so that these entities may better protect and defend themselves against cyber threats  Protecting the nation’s pipeline systems is a responsibility shared by both the federal government and private industry  As a result, several federal departments, agencies, and the private sector have significant roles in pipeline physical and cyber-related security  These entities include the following: Transportation Security Administration (TSA)  TSA, within DHS, has primary oversight responsibility for the physical security and cybersecurity of transmission and distribution pipeline systems  Within TSA, the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Pipeline Security Branch is charged with overseeing its pipeline security program  Pursuant to its authority, TSA’s Pipeline Security Branch first issued its voluntary Pipeline Security Guidelines in 2011, and released revised guidelines in March 2018  In accordance with the 9/11 Commission Act, TSA’s Pipeline Security Branch identifies the top 100 critical pipeline systems in the nation  To do so, it uses system annual throughput, which is based on the amount of hazardous liquid or natural gas product transported through a pipeline in 1 year (i e , annual throughput)  TSA also ranks the relative risk among the top 100 critical pipeline systems, discussed later in the report  Additionally, TSA’s Pipeline Security Branch is responsible for conducting voluntary Corporate Security Reviews (CSR) and Critical Facility Security Reviews (CFSR), which assess the extent to which the 100 most critical pipeline systems are following the intent of TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines  See figure 5 below for an overview of the CSR and CFSR processes  In addition, TSA Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for collecting and analyzing threat information related to the transportation network, and sharing relevant threat information to pipeline stakeholders  National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)  Within DHS, NCCIC assists critical infrastructure owners in addressing cyber incidents and attacks, including those targeting industrial control systems  The NCCIC’s mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of incidents that may significantly compromise the security and resilience of the nation’s critical information technology and communications networks  NCCIC’s role is to serve as the federal civilian interface for sharing information related to cybersecurity risks, incidents, analysis, and warnings with federal and nonfederal entities, and to provide shared situational awareness to enable real-time actions to address cybersecurity risks and incidents to federal and nonfederal entities  Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)  PHMSA, within DOT, is responsible for regulating the safety of hazardous materials transportation and the safety of pipeline systems, some aspects of which can be related to pipeline security  In 2004, PHMSA and TSA entered into a memorandum of understanding regarding their respective roles in all modes of transportation  In 2006, they signed an annex to the memorandum of understanding that further delineates lines of authority and responsibility between TSA and PHMSA on pipeline and hazardous materials transportation security  The annex identifies TSA as the lead federal entity for transportation security, including hazardous materials and pipeline security, and PHMSA as responsible for administering a national program of safety in natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline transportation, including identifying pipeline safety concerns and developing uniform safety standards  Department of Energy (DOE)  DOE is responsible for protecting electric power, oil, and natural gas delivery infrastructure and, in December 2015, was identified in statute as the sector-specific agency for cybersecurity for the energy sector  The Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response is the lead for DOE’s cybersecurity efforts  In addition, DOE operates the National SCADA Test Bed Program, a partnership with Idaho National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and other national laboratories which addresses control system security challenges in the energy sector  Among its key functions, the program performs control systems testing, research, and development; control systems requirements development; and industry outreach  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)  FERC regulates the U S  bulk electric power system, which is increasingly powered by natural gas pipeline systems  FERC has regulatory authority over interstate natural gas pipelines under the Natural Gas Act  However, its role is limited to natural gas pipeline siting and rate regulation  The North American Electric Reliability Corporation is the federally designated U S  Electric Reliability Organization, and is overseen by FERC  The North American Electric Reliability Corporation, with approval from FERC, has developed mandatory critical infrastructure protection standards for protecting electric utility–critical and cyber-critical assets  Private sector  Although TSA has primary federal responsibility for overseeing interstate pipeline security, private sector pipeline operators are responsible for implementing asset-specific protective security measures  As we previously reported, operators have increased their attention on security by incorporating security practices and programs into their overall business operations  Pipeline operators’ interests and concerns are primarily represented by five major trade associations with ties to the pipeline industry—the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), American Gas Association (AGA), American Public Gas Association, American Petroleum Institute (API), and Association of Oil Pipe Lines  According to TSA officials, pipeline operators, and association representatives, these associations have worked closely with the federal government on a variety of pipeline security-related issues, including collaborating on TSA’s voluntary standards and information sharing  All of the pipeline operators and pipeline association representatives we interviewed reported receiving security information from federal and nonfederal entities  Pipeline operators also reported providing security- related information to federal agencies, including TSA, as incidents occur  Multiple federal entities exchange alerts of physical and cybersecurity incidents and other risk-related information with critical infrastructure partners, including pipeline operators  For example, DHS components including TSA’s Intelligence and Analysis and NCCIC share security- related information on physical and cyber threats and incidents with sector stakeholders  Specifically, Intelligence and Analysis provides quarterly intelligence briefings to pipeline operators  NCCIC also issues indicator bulletins, which can contain information related to cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and cybersecurity risks and incidents  In addition, TSA and other federal entities have coordinated to address specific pipeline-related security incidents  For example, TSA officials coordinated with DOT, DOE, the Department of Justice, and FERC through the Oil and Natural Gas subsector SCC to address ongoing incidents of vandalism and sabotage of critical pipeline assets by environmental activists in 2016  In July 2017, according to DOT officials, PHMSA and TSA collaborated on a web-based portal to facilitate sharing sensitive but unclassified incident information among federal agencies with pipeline-related responsibilities  See table 1 for the key federal information sharing entities and programs that exchange security-related or incident information with critical infrastructure stakeholders, including the pipeline sector  Pipeline operators also share security-related information with TSA and the NCCIC  In its Pipeline Security Guidelines, TSA requests that pipeline operators report by telephone or email to its Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) any physical security incidents that are indicative of a deliberate attempt to disrupt pipeline operations or activities that could be considered precursors to such an attempt  TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines also request that operators report any actual or suspected cyber attacks that could impact pipeline industrial control systems or other information technology-based systems to the NCCIC  According to the TSOC’s operating procedures, if a reported incident meets certain criteria, such as the incident was intended to or resulted in damage or requires a general evacuation of a facility, the TSOC watch officer is then to contact Office of Security and Industry Engagement officials  According to TSA officials, the TSOC does not conduct investigations of the specific security incidents that pipeline operators report  However, TSOC staff do analyze the incident information they receive for national trends and common threats  TSA officials stated that they share their observations with pipeline operators and other critical infrastructure asset owners during monthly and quarterly conference calls that TSA holds with pipeline operators  All the pipeline operators and association representatives we interviewed identified other nonfederal information sharing entities, including ISACs, fusion centers, industry associations, and SCCs, which provide forums for exchanging information about physical and cyber incidents throughout the pipeline sector  See table 2 for nonfederal information sharing entities identified as available to pipeline operators  Operators and TSA officials reported that the current backlog in granting security clearances for some key pipeline operator employees was a significant factor affecting information sharing between TSA and pipeline operators  TSA officials acknowledged that some pipeline operators have had difficulty obtaining security clearances for key employees due to ongoing backlogs in processing requests by the Office of Personnel Management National Background Investigation Bureau, and that TSA’s ability to share timely information with operators whose staff do not have a clearance may be hindered  Three of the 10 pipeline operators we interviewed identified receiving timely classified security information as a specific challenge due, in part, to difficulties staff have had obtaining security clearances  Further, 7 of the 10 pipeline operators that we interviewed reported experiencing delays in obtaining a security clearance or were aware of others who had experienced this issue  However, according to three operators we interviewed, TSA was helpful in facilitating approval of security clearances for the operators’ personnel to access classified information when necessary  This security clearance challenge is not faced by pipeline operators alone  In January 2018, we designated the backlog of investigations for the clearance process and the government-wide personnel security clearance process as a high-risk area  We will continue to monitor agencies’ progress in reducing the backlog and improving the security clearance process  Pipeline operators that we interviewed reported using a range of guidelines and standards to address their physical and cybersecurity risks, and all of them reported implementing TSA’s voluntary Pipeline Security Guidelines that were applicable to their operations  TSA revised and issued its Pipeline Security Guidelines in March 2018, but the revised guidelines lack a defined process to consider updates to supporting guidance such as to the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Cybersecurity Framework)  Furthermore, TSA has not clearly defined the terms within the criteria that pipeline operators are to use to determine the criticality of their facilities  Pipeline operators that we interviewed reported using a range of guidelines and standards to address their physical and cybersecurity risks  For example, all 10 of the pipeline operators we interviewed stated they had implemented the voluntary 2011 TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines the operators determined to be applicable to their operations  The guidelines provide TSA’s recommendations for pipeline industry security practices such as establishing a corporate security program and identifying critical facilities among others (see sidebar)  Five of the 10 pipeline operators we interviewed characterized the guidelines as generally or somewhat effective in helping to secure their operations, 1 was neutral on their effectiveness, and 4 did not provide an assessment of the guidelines’ effectiveness  However, one operator pointed out that they had not adopted the guidelines’ recommended interval of 36 months or less for conducting security vulnerability assessments due to staffing limitations  Also, another pipeline operator noted that they were working to implement the guidelines in the operations of a newly acquired asset that they determined was not using the guidelines in the same manner as their company  All of the pipeline operators we interviewed reported using other guidelines or standards to address pipeline systems’ security risks  For example, pipeline operators reported using and industry association representatives reported that their members use INGAA’s Control Systems Cyber Security Guidelines for the Natural Gas Pipeline Industry, API’s Pipeline SCADA Security standard, and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework as sources of cybersecurity standards, guidelines, and practices that may be scaled and applied to address a pipeline operator’s cybersecurity risks  Further, pipeline operators are required to adhere to regulations related to pipeline safety and, depending upon their assets, operations, and location, may be required to adhere to regulations for electrical utilities, chemical storage facilities, and locations near waterways  For example, all pipeline operators must adhere to DOT’s PHMSA safety regulations  In addition, pipeline operators whose systems include chemical facilities may be required to comply with DHS’s Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)  Pipeline operators whose systems include a terminal located on a U S  port may be required to comply with Maritime Transportation Security Act regulations  For a listing of federal and industry guidelines identified as applicable to security by the pipeline operators, see appendix I  TSA’s Pipeline Security Branch issued its revised Pipeline Security Guidelines in March 2018, but TSA has not established a documented process to ensure that revisions occur and fully capture updates to supporting standards and guidance  The guidelines were revised to, among other things, reflect the dynamic threat environment and to incorporate cybersecurity principles and practices from the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, which were initially issued in February 2014  To revise the guidelines and incorporate feedback, according to Pipeline Security Branch officials, they incorporated outcomes from pipeline modal threat assessments and best practices from security reviews, and collaborated with pipeline sector stakeholders—including industry associations and other federal agencies with a role in pipeline security  Officials from the industry associations we interviewed confirmed that they provided input to the revised pipeline guidelines, including meeting with and consolidating comments from member pipeline operators  See figure 6 for a timeline of events pertinent to federal pipeline security guidelines  TSA’s Pipeline Security Smart Practice Observations for pipeline operators states that security plans should have a documented process to include security plan reviews and updates on a periodic and an as- needed basis  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that periodic review of policies, procedures, and related control activities should occur to determine their continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving identified objectives or addressing related risks  The NIPP and NIST also emphasize the need to provide updates on incident response guidance and security procedures, respectively  Moreover, other pipeline industry guidance cited by TSA’s guidelines also has a prescribed interval for review and revision  For example, API reviews its standards at least every 5 years  However, TSA has not instituted a documented process to consider the need to update the Pipeline Security Guidelines on a regular basis  Pipeline Security Branch officials acknowledged the value of having a defined process for reviewing and, if necessary, revising TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines at regular defined intervals to ensure it includes, among other things, newly identified best practices and updated industry guidance that are relevant to pipeline operators, such as the elements of the latest version of NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework  For example, TSA’s revisions to its guidelines incorporated some, but not all of the elements of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework version 1  Specifically, to improve incident response, the NIST framework recommends implementing an incident response analysis and feedback function to a security program  However, TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines do not include similar steps for pipelines operators to include in their pipeline security programs  Further, because NIST released version 1 1 of the Cybersecurity Framework in April 2018, the guidelines that TSA released in March 2018 do not incorporate cybersecurity elements that NIST added to the latest Cybersecurity Framework such as the Supply Chain Risk Management category  Pipeline Security Branch officials said that they have not instituted a review process on a regular basis because they intended to review and revise TSA’s guidelines on an as-needed basis in response to updated supporting guidance, but could provide no timeline for doing so  Without a documented process defining how frequently Pipeline Security Branch staff are to review and revise its guidelines, TSA cannot ensure that its guidelines reflect the latest known standards and best practices for physical and cybersecurity, or address the persistent and dynamic security threat environment currently facing the nation’s pipeline system  Under TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines, pipeline operators are to self- identify the critical facilities within their system and report their critical facilities to TSA  TSA’s Pipeline Security Branch conducts CFSRs at the critical facilities that pipeline operators have identified  However, our analysis of TSA’s data found that at least 34 of the top 100 critical pipeline systems deemed highest risk indicated that they had no critical facilities  Accordingly, TSA would not conduct a CFSR at any of these systems’ facilities because their operators identified none of them as critical  The fact that pipeline operators of about one third of the highest risk systems identified no critical facilities may be due, in part, to the Pipeline Security Branch not clearly defining the criteria outlined in the Pipeline Security Guidelines that pipeline operators are to use to determine the criticality of their facilities  Three of the 10 operators we interviewed stated that some companies reported to TSA that they had no critical facilities, and may possibly be taking advantage of the guidelines’ lack of clarity  Accordingly, operators that report no critical facilities would avoid TSA’s reviews of their facilities  service or deliverability resulting in a state or local government's inability to provide essential public services and emergency response for an extended period of time; Significantly damage or destroy national intended use of major rivers, lakes, or waterways (e g , public drinking water for large populations or disruption of major commerce or public transportation routes); service or deliverability to a significant number of customers or individuals for an extended period of time; operations for an extended period of time (i e , business critical facilities)  Our review of the eight criteria included in TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines (see sidebar) found that no additional examples or clarification are provided to help operators determine criticality  Although we previously noted that 5 of the 10 operators we interviewed generally found TSA’s Guidelines as a whole helpful in addressing pipeline security, more than half of the operators we interviewed identified TSA’s criticality criteria as a specific area for improvement  Specifically, 3 of the 10 pipeline operators that we interviewed stated that TSA had not clearly defined certain terms within the criteria, and 3 additional operators of the 10 reported that additional consultation with TSA was necessary to appropriately apply the criteria and determine their facilities’ criticality  For example, 2 operators told us that individual operators may interpret TSA’s criterion, “cause mass casualties or significant health effect,” differently  One of these operators that we interviewed stated that this criterion could be interpreted either as a specific number of people affected or a sufficient volume to overwhelm a local health department, which could vary depending on the locality  Another operator reported that because TSA’s criteria were not clear, they created their own criteria which helped the operator identify two additional critical facilities  Pipeline Security Branch officials acknowledged there are companies that report having no critical facilities in their pipeline systems  According to Pipeline Security Branch officials, pipeline operators are in the best position to determine which of their facilities are critical, and the companies that have determined that their pipeline systems have no critical facilities also have reported sufficient redundancies to make none of their facilities critical to the continuity of their operations  According to these officials, they have had extensive discussions with pipeline company officials to assess the validity of their criticality determinations, and have closely questioned companies to ensure they have properly applied TSA’s criteria  However, according to TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines, operators should use a consistent set of criteria for determining the criticality of their facilities  In addition, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should define objectives clearly to enable the identification of risks  To achieve this, management generally defines objectives in specific and measurable terms and ensures the terms are fully and clearly set forth so they can be easily understood  Pipeline Security Branch officials acknowledged that the criticality definitions in the Pipeline Security Guidelines could be clarified to be more specific  Additionally, an industry association representative reported that the association, in consultation with TSA, has been developing supplementary guidance for its members to clarify certain terms in TSA’s critical facility criteria  As of October 2018 this guidance is still under review at the association and has not been made available to the association’s members  Pipeline Security Branch officials confirmed they worked with the industry association on its supplementary guidance, but also acknowledged that the supplementary guidance may only be distributed to the association’s membership  Without clearly defined criteria for determining pipeline facilities’ criticality, TSA cannot ensure that pipeline operators are applying its guidance uniformly  Further, because TSA selects the pipeline facilities on which to conduct CFSRs based on operators’ determinations, TSA cannot fully ensure that all of the critical facilities across the pipeline sector have been identified using the same criteria, or that their vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed  TSA’s Intelligence and Analysis identifies security risks to pipeline systems through various assessments  Additionally, TSA’s Pipeline Security Branch conducts security reviews to assess pipeline operators’ implementation of TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines, but gaps in staffing and lack of a workforce plan may affect its ability to carry out effective reviews  The Pipeline Security Branch also developed a pipeline risk assessment to rank relative risk of the top 100 critical pipeline systems and to prioritize its security reviews of pipeline companies, but shortfalls in its calculations of threat, vulnerability, and consequence may limit its ability to accurately identify pipeline systems with the highest risk  Finally, the pipeline risk assessment has not been peer reviewed to validate the assessment’s data and methodology, which we previously reported as a best practice in risk management  TSA’s Intelligence and Analysis produces assessments related to pipeline security risks, including Pipeline Modal and Cyber Modal Threat Assessments and the Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment  The Pipeline and Cyber Modal Threat Assessments are issued on a semiannual basis; TSA Intelligence and Analysis may also issue additional situation-based products on emerging threats  The Pipeline Modal and Cyber Modal Threat Assessments evaluate, respectively, physical and cyber threats to pipelines  The pipeline modal threat assessment evaluates terrorist threats to hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines, and the cyber modal threat assessment evaluates cyber threats to transportation, including pipelines  Both assessments specifically analyze the primary threat actors, their capabilities, and activities—including attacks occurring internationally—as well as other characteristics of threat  The Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment assesses threat, vulnerability, and consequence for various attack scenarios across the five transportation modes for which TSA is responsible  The scenarios define a type of threat actor—including homegrown violent extremists and transnational extremists, such as al Qaeda and its affiliates—a target, and an attack mode  For example, a scenario might assess the risk of attacks using varying sizes of improvised explosive devices on pipeline system assets  As part of the assessment process, TSA engages with subject matter experts from TSA and industry stakeholder representatives to compile vulnerabilities for each mode, and TSA analyzes both direct and indirect consequences of the various attack scenarios  According to Pipeline Security Branch officials, the assessments produced by TSA’s Intelligence and Analysis provide key information to inform the pipeline security program’s efforts  According to TSA officials, TSA conducts pipeline security reviews— Corporate Security Reviews (CSRs) and Critical Facility Security Reviews (CFSRs)—to assess pipeline vulnerabilities and industry implementation of TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines  However, as shown by Figure 7 below, the number of CSRs and CFSRs completed by TSA has varied during the last five fiscal years, ranging from zero CSRs conducted in fiscal year 2014 to 23 CSRs conducted in fiscal year 2018, as of July 31, 2018  TSA officials reported that staffing limitations have prevented TSA from conducting more reviews  As shown in table 3, TSA Pipeline Security Branch staffing levels (excluding contractor support) have varied significantly over the past 9 years ranging from 14 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 to one FTE in fiscal year 2014  They stated that, while contractor support has assisted with conducting CFSRs, there were no contractor personnel providing CSR support from fiscal years 2010 through 2017, but that has now increased to two personnel in fiscal year 2018  TSA prioritizes reviewing and collecting information on the nation’s top 100 critical pipeline systems  According to TSA officials, they would need to conduct 46 CSRs in order to review the top 100 critical pipeline systems  In July 2018, TSA officials stated that TSA’s current target was to assess each pipeline company every 2 to 3 years; this would equate to about 15 to 23 CSRs per year  TSA officials stated that they expect to complete 20 CSRs and 60 CFSRs per fiscal year with Pipeline Security Branch employees and contract support, and have completed 23 CSRs through July 2018 for fiscal year 2018  Given the ever-increasing cybersecurity risks to pipeline systems, ensuring that the Pipeline Security Branch has the required cybersecurity skills to effectively evaluate pipeline systems’ cybersecurity is essential  Pipeline operators we interviewed emphasized the importance of cybersecurity skills among TSA staff  Specifically, 6 of the 10 pipeline operators and 3 of the 5 industry representatives we interviewed reported that the level of cybersecurity expertise among TSA staff and contractors may challenge the Pipeline Security Branch’s ability to fully assess the cybersecurity portions of its security reviews  TSA officials stated that Security Policy and Industry Engagement staff are working with DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate to help address cyber- related needs, including identifying specific cybersecurity skills and competencies required for the pipeline security program  The officials were uncertain, however, whether TSA would use contractor support or support from the National Protection and Programs Directorate to provide identified skills and competencies  TSA officials also stated that Security Policy and Industry Engagement staff work with TSA’s human resource professionals to identify critical skills and competencies needed for Pipeline Security Branch personnel, and helps its workforce maintain professional expertise by providing training and education for any identified skill or competency gaps  Our previous work has identified principles that a strategic workforce planning process should follow including developing strategies tailored to address gaps in number, deployment, and alignment of human capital approaches for enabling and sustaining the contributions of all critical skills and competencies  Workforce planning efforts, linked to an agency’s strategic goals and objectives, can enable it to remain aware of and be prepared for its needs, including the size of its workforce, its deployment across the organization, and the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for it to pursue its mission  Agencies should consider how hiring, training, staff development, performance management, and other human capital strategies can be aligned to eliminate gaps and improve the long-term contribution of skills and competencies identified as important for mission success  TSA has not established a workforce plan for its Security Policy and Industry Engagement or its Pipeline Security Branch that identifies staffing needs and skill sets such as the required level of cybersecurity expertise among TSA staff and contractors  When asked for TSA strategic workforce planning documents used to inform staffing allocations related to the pipeline security program, TSA officials acknowledged they do not have a strategic workforce plan  Rather, according to these officials, TSA determines agency-level staffing allocations through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process, which is used to decide policy, strategy, and the development of personnel and capabilities to accomplish anticipated missions  According to TSA officials, when they use this process they look at existing resources and then set priorities based on the TSA Administrator’s needs  However, a strategic workforce plan allows an agency to identify and prepare for its needs, such as the size of its workforce, its deployment across the organization, and the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to pursue its mission  TSA officials stated that the agency has a detailed allocation plan for strategically aligning resources to screen passengers at TSA-regulated airports, but not for the entire agency  By establishing a strategic workforce plan, TSA can help ensure it has identified the knowledge, skills, and abilities that the future workforce of TSA’s Pipeline Security Branch may need in order to meet its mission of reducing pipeline systems’ vulnerabilities to physical and cybersecurity risks, especially in a dynamic and evolving threat environment  Further, as greater emphasis is placed on cybersecurity, determining the long- term staffing needs of the Pipeline Security Branch will be essential  Furthermore, a workforce plan could enable TSA to determine the number of personnel it needs to meet its stated goals for conducting CSRs and CFSRs  After TSA identifies the top 100 critical pipeline systems based on throughput, the Pipeline Security Branch uses the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool (risk assessment), which it developed in 2007, to assess various security risks of those systems  We previously reported, in 2010, that the Pipeline Security Branch was the first of TSA’s surface transportation modes to develop a risk assessment model that combined all three components of risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequence—to generate a risk score  The risk assessment generates a risk score for each of the 100 most critical pipeline systems and ranks them according to risk  The risk assessment calculates threat, vulnerability, and consequence for each pipeline system on variables such as the amount of throughput in the pipeline system and the number critical facilities  The risk assessment combines data collected from pipeline operators, as well as other federal agencies, such as the Departments of Transportation and Defense, to generate the risk score  However, the last time the Pipeline Security Branch calculated relative risk among the top 100 critical pipeline systems using the risk assessment was in 2014  Pipeline Security Branch officials told us that they use the pipeline risk assessment to rank relative risk of the top 100 critical pipeline systems, and the standard operating procedures for conducting CSRs state the results of the risk ranking are the primary factor considered when prioritizing corporate security reviews of pipeline companies  According to Pipeline Security Branch officials, the risk assessment has not changed since 2014 because the Pipeline Security Branch is still conducting CSRs based on the 2014 ranking of pipeline systems  As outlined in table 4 below, we identified several factors that likely limit the usefulness of the current risk assessment in calculating threat, vulnerability, and consequence to allow the Pipeline Security Branch to effectively prioritize reviews of pipeline systems  For example, because the risk assessment has not changed since 2014, information on threat may be outdated  Additionally, sources of data and underlying assumption and judgments regarding certain threat and vulnerability inputs to the assessment are not fully documented  For example, threats to cybersecurity are not specifically accounted for in the description of the risk assessment methodology, making it unclear if cybersecurity is part of the assessment’s threat factor  Further, the risk assessment does not include information that is consistent with the NIPP and other DHS priorities for critical infrastructure risk mitigation, such as information on natural hazards and the ability to measure risk reduction (feedback data)  According to Pipeline Security Branch officials, the risk ranking assessment is not intended to be a fully developed risk model detailing all pipeline factors influencing risk  Rather, officials said they are primarily interested in assessing risk data that impacts security  However, because TSA’s Pipeline Security Program is designed to enhance the security preparedness of the pipeline systems, incorporating additional factors that enhance security into their risk calculation would better align their efforts with PPD-21  For example, PPD-21 calls for agencies to integrate and analyze information to prioritize assets and manage risks to critical infrastructure, as well as anticipate interdependencies and cascading impacts  For a more detailed discussion of the shortfalls we identified, refer to appendix II  In addition to the shortfalls identified above, the risk assessment has not been peer reviewed since its conception in 2007  In our past work, we reported that independent, external peer reviews are a best practice in risk management and that independent expert review panels can provide objective reviews of complex issues  According to the National Research Council of the National Academies, external peer reviews should, among other things, address the structure of the assessment, the types and certainty of the data, and how the assessment is intended to be used  The National Research Council has also recommended that DHS improve its risk analyses for infrastructure protection by validating the assessments and submitting them to independent, external peer review  Other DHS components have implemented our prior recommendations to conduct peer reviews of their risk assessments  For example, in April 2013, we reported on DHS’s management of its Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program and found that the approach used to assess risk did not consider all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals  The Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, which manages the CFATS program conducted a multiyear effort to improve their risk assessment methodology and included commissioning a peer review by the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, which resulted in multiple recommendations  As part of the implementation of some of the peer review’s recommendations, DHS conducted peer reviews and technical reviews with government organizations and facility owners and operators, and worked with Sandia National Laboratories to verify and validate the CFATS program’s revised risk assessment methodology, which was completed in January 2017  According to Pipeline Security Branch officials, they are considering updates to the risk assessment methodology including changes to the vulnerability and consequence factors  These officials said the risk assessment was previously reviewed within the past 18 months by industry experts and they consider input from several federal partners including DHS, DOT, and the Department of Defense  Officials also said they will consider input from industry experts and federal partners while working on updating the risk assessment  However, most of the proposed changes to the risk assessment methodology officials described are ones that have been deliberated since our last review in 2010  Therefore, an independent, external peer review would provide the opportunity for integration and analysis of additional outside expertise across the critical infrastructure community  While independent, external peer reviews cannot ensure the success of a risk assessment approach, they can increase the probability of success by improving the technical quality of projects and the credibility of the decision-making process  According to the National Research Council of the National Academies, independent, external peer reviews should include validation and verification to ensure that the structure of the risk assessment is both accurate and reliable  Thus, an independent, external peer review would provide better assurance that the Pipeline Security Branch can rank relative risk among pipeline systems using the most comprehensive and accurate threat, vulnerability, and consequence information  TSA has established performance measures, as well as databases to monitor pipeline security reviews and analyze their results  However, weaknesses in its performance measures and its efforts to record pipeline security review recommendations limit its ability to determine the extent that its pipeline security program has reduced pipeline sector risks  Furthermore, we identified data reliability issues in the information that TSA collects to track the status of pipeline security review recommendations, such as missing data, inconsistent data entry formats, and data entry errors  TSA has three sets of performance measures for its pipeline efforts: the Pipeline Security Plan in the 2018 Biennial National Strategy for Transportation Security (NSTS), a management measure in the DHS fiscal year 2019 congressional budget justification, and summary figures in their CSR and CFSR databases  As a result of our 2010 work, TSA established performance measures and linked them to Pipeline Security Plan goals within the Surface Security Plan of the 2018 NSTS  See table 5 below for the 2018 NSTS Pipeline Security Plan performance measures  As shown in table 6 below, DHS also included a management measure in its fiscal year 2019 congressional budget justification to track the annual number of completed pipeline security reviews  Finally, TSA Pipeline Security Branch officials said they use summary figures in the CFSR status database and the CSR goals and priorities database as performance measures  For example, these include the percentage of CFSR recommendations implemented and the average percentage compliance with the guidelines by fiscal year  We previously found that results-oriented organizations set performance goals to clearly define desired program outcomes and develop performance measures that are clearly linked to the performance goals  Performance measures should focus on whether a program has achieved measurable standards toward achieving program goals, and allow agencies to monitor and report program accomplishments on an ongoing basis  Our previous work on performance metrics identified 10 attributes of effective performance  Table 7 identifies each key attribute of effective performance measures along with its definition  We evaluated the current performance measures included in the 2018 NSTS, the DHS fiscal year 2019 congressional budget justification, the CSR goals and priorities database, and the CFSR status database related to TSA’s Pipeline Security Branch  We primarily focused on key attributes which could be applied to individual measures  These include clarity, linkage, measurable targets, objectivity, reliability, and baseline and trend data  Our prior work on performance measurement found that all performance measure attributes are not equal and failure to have a particular attribute does not necessarily indicate that there is a weakness in that area or that the measure is not useful; rather, it may indicate an opportunity for further refinement  Based on our evaluation, the TSA-identified measures do not possess attributes that we have identified as being key to successful performance measures  As a result, TSA cannot fully determine the extent to which the Pipeline Security Branch has achieved desired outcomes, including the effectiveness of its efforts to reduce risks to pipelines  Specifically, many of TSA’s measures cover agency goals and mission, but they generally lack clarity and measurable targets, provide significantly overlapping information, and do not include baseline and trend data  Clarity  The pipeline-related measures in the 2018 NSTS are not clear because they do not describe the methodology used to calculate them, and the names and definitions are not clearly described  For example, NSTS goal 1 includes an objective to conduct training of employees responding to terrorist attacks  The desired outcome is to improve the capability of industry employees to respond and recover from terrorist attacks  However, the performance measure is the percentage of critical pipeline systems implementing the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines  It is not clear if this measure is specific to the sections of the guidelines related to employee training or overall implementation of the guidelines  The CFSR status database measures include the percentage of recommendations implemented by topic, such as “Site Specific Security Measures,” “Signage,” or “Miscellaneous ” However, the database does not specifically define these topics or explain the methodology for calculating the measures  Unclear measures could be confusing and misleading to users  Core program activities  The pipeline-related measures in the 2018 NSTS cover some of the agency’s core program activities, such as conducting security exercises with the pipeline industry and providing intelligence and information products to the industry  However, the NSTS Pipeline Security Plan measures do not specifically include some core program activities, such as updating the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines or the results of conducting CSRs and CFSRs in order to collect the information necessary for the existing performance measures  The CSR goals and priorities database and the CFSR status database include measures intended to track some of the results of pipeline security reviews, such as the average percentage compliance with the guidelines by fiscal year and the percentage of CFSR recommendations implemented  If core program activities are not covered, there may not be enough information available in those areas to managers and stakeholders  Limited overlap  The pipeline-related measures in the 2018 NSTS do not have limited overlap  As discussed previously, four of the five NSTS measures are based on the percentage of critical pipeline systems implementing TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines  The management measure is based on the number of complete pipeline security reviews  The CFSR status database measures are based on the percentage of recommendations implemented overall and by groups  Finally, the CSR goals and priorities database measures are based on the average compliance percentage of companies that had CSRs conducted in fiscal years 2016 and 2017  This is similar to four of the five NSTS measures  Significantly overlapping measures may lead to redundant, costly information that does not add value for TSA management  Linkage  The pipeline-related measures in the 2018 NSTS generally exhibited this key attribute  For example, all of the NSTS measures were arranged by agency strategic goals and risk-based priorities  However, the management measure in DHS’s fiscal year 2019 congressional budget justification and the CFSR status database measures did not specify the TSA goals and priorities to which they were aligned  If measures are not aligned with division and agency- wide goals and mission, the behaviors and incentives created by these measures do not support achieving those goals or mission  Measurable target  TSA’s measures generally did not include measurable targets in the form of a numerical goal and none of the NSTS measures had measurable targets  For example, the NSTS measure under the Security Planning priority, which tracks the percentage of critical pipeline systems implementing TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines, does not state what specific percentages would be considered an improvement in industry security plans  However, the management measure did include target numbers of pipeline security reviews by fiscal year  Both the CFSR status database measures and CSR goals and priorities database measures did not include measurable targets  Without measurable targets, TSA cannot tell if performance is meeting expectations  Objectivity  Because the pipeline-related measures in the 2018 NSTS, the CFSR status database, and the CSR goals and priorities database generally lack clarity and measurable targets, TSA cannot ensure its measures are free from bias or manipulation, and therefore, are not objective  If measures are not objective, the results of performance assessments may be systematically overstated or understated  Reliability  Because the pipeline-related measures in the 2018 NSTS, the CFSR status database, and the CSR goals and priorities database generally lack clarity, measurable targets, and baseline and trend data, it is not clear if TSA’s measures produce the same result under similar conditions; therefore, the pipeline-related measures are unreliable  If measures are not reliable, reported performance data may be inconsistent and add uncertainty  Baseline and trend data  TSA’s measures generally did not include baseline and trend data  For example, none of the NSTS measures included past results and compared them to measurable targets  TSA officials were unable to identify measures or goals to assess the extent to which pipeline operators have fully implemented the guidelines or increased pipeline security, but did say developing a feedback mechanism to measure progress in closing vulnerability gaps was important  However, the management measure did include the number of completed pipeline security reviews for each fiscal year from 2014 through 2017, as well as numerical goals  The CFSR status database includes information on CFSRs conducted from May 22, 2012, through June 29, 2017, but the measures are calculated for the entire time period rather than year-by-year  The CSR goals and priorities database measures include percentage compliance with the guidelines for CSRs conducted in fiscal years 2016 and 2017, as well as a combined measure  However, baseline and trend data are not tracked or reported in either database  Collecting, tracking, developing, and reporting baseline and trend data allows agencies to better evaluate progress being made and whether or not goals are being achieved  Pipeline Security Branch officials explained that in addition to the measures reported in the 2018 NSTS Pipeline Security Plan, they primarily rely on measures assessing CSR and CFSR implementation for assessing the value of its pipeline security program  TSA officials reported that they collect and analyze data and information collected from CSRs and CFSRs to, among other things, determine strengths and weaknesses at critical pipeline facilities, areas to target for risk reduction strategies, and pipeline industry implementation of the voluntary Pipeline Security Guidelines  For example, TSA officials reported that they analyzed information from approximately 734 CFSR recommendations that were made during fiscal years 2012 through 2016  They found that pipeline operators had made the strongest improvements in security training, public awareness outreach and law enforcement coordination, and site specific security measures  The most common areas in need of improvement were 24x7 monitoring, frequency of security vulnerability assessments, and proper signage  However, as described above, we found those measures also did not comport with key attributes for successful measures and we report below on reliability concerns for underlying data supporting those measures  In addition, while the Pipeline Security Branch may not rely on the measures included in the 2018 NSTS Pipeline Security Plan and the fiscal year 2019 congressional budget justification, they are important for reporting the status of pipeline security efforts to TSA as a whole and to external stakeholders such as Congress  Taking steps to ensure that the pipeline security program performance measures exhibit key attributes of successful performance measures could allow TSA to better assess the program’s effectiveness at reducing pipeline physical and cybersecurity risks  This could include steps such as modifying its suite of measures so they are clear, have measurable targets, and add baseline and trend data  Further examples include the following: Adding measurable targets consisting of numerical goals could allow TSA to better determine if the pipeline security program is meeting expectations  For example, measurable targets could be added to TSA’s existing measures by developing annual goals for the percentage of recommendations implemented to the CFSR status database and then reporting annual results  To make measures clearer, TSA could verify that each measure has a clearly stated name, definition, and methodology for how the measure is calculated  For example, the NSTS objective for security training mentioned above could have more specific language explaining how the measure is calculated and whether it applies to pipeline operators’ implementation of the training-related portions of the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines or overall implementation  Finally, adding baseline and trend data could allow TSA to identify, monitor, and report changes in performance and help ensure that performance is viewed in context  For example, the NSTS measures, CFSR status database measures, and CSR goals and priorities database measures could have annual results from prior years  This could help TSA and external stakeholders evaluate the effectiveness of the pipeline security program and whether it is making progress toward its goals  According to TSA officials, the primary means for assessing the effectiveness of the agency’s efforts to reduce pipeline security risks is through conducting pipeline security reviews— Corporate Security Reviews (CSRs) and Critical Facility Security Reviews (CFSRs)  However, TSA has not tracked the status of CSR recommendations for over 5 years and related security review data are not sufficiently reliable  When conducting CSRs and CFSRs, TSA staff makes recommendations to operators, if appropriate  For example, a CSR recommendation might include a suggestion to conduct annual security-related drills and exercises, and a CFSR recommendation might include a suggestion to install barbed wire on the main gate of a pipeline facility  In response to recommendations that we made in our 2010 report, TSA developed three databases to track CSR and CFSR recommendations and their implementation status by pipeline facility, system, operator, and product type  In addition, the agency recently developed a fourth database to collect and analyze information gathered from pipeline operators’ responses to CSR questions  TSA officials reported that they use this database to assess the extent that TSA’s pipeline security program has met NSTS goals and Pipeline Security Branch priorities  TSA officials stated that they use the CSR goals and priorities database for follow-up on recommendations, indications of improvement in pipeline security, and as an input into TSA performance goals and measures, including the performance measures for the 2018 NSTS Pipeline Security Plan  We found several problems with the databases that indicate that the pipeline security program data are not sufficiently reliable and do not provide quality information that is current, complete, and accurate  First, the CSR recommendations database only included information for reviews conducted from November 2010 through February 2013  TSA officials stated that the agency stopped capturing CSR recommendations and status information in 2014  A TSA official stated that one factor was that the pipeline staffing level was one FTE in fiscal year 2014  However, the Pipeline Security Branch did not resume entering CSR recommendation-related information when staffing levels rose to 6 FTEs in the following year and beyond  As a result, TSA is missing over 5 years of data for the recommendations it made to pipeline operators when conducting CSRs  The agency collected some information from CSRs conducted in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 in the separate CSR goals and priorities database  However, this database does not include all of the information that TSA collects when conducting CSRs  Specifically, the CSR goals and priorities database does not state which companies were reviewed, what specific recommendations were made, or the current status of those recommendations, and only records operators’ responses to 79 of the 222 CSR questions  Second, our review identified instances of missing data, inconsistent data entry formats, and data entry errors in the four databases  For example: The CSR recommendations database had missing data in all 13 of the included fields and a data entry error shifted 50 observations into the wrong fields, impacting both the Status Date and Completion Code fields  The CSR goals and priorities database had seven entries with inconsistent data formatting and five of those entries were not taken into account when calculating summary figures  The CFSR recommendations database had missing data in 3 of 9 fields  There was also inconsistent data entry formats in 3 fields  The CFSR status database had missing data in 7 of 29 fields and inconsistent data entry formats in 4 fields  Finally, TSA has not documented its data entry and verification procedures, such as in a data dictionary or user manual, and does not have electronic safeguards for out-of-range or inconsistent entries for any of the databases it uses to track the status of CSR or CFSR recommendations and analyze operator responses to the CSR  TSA Pipeline Security Branch officials told us that they had not documented data entry and verification procedures and did not have electronic safeguards  This was for two reasons  First, the officials stated that the databases are small and maintained in a commercial spreadsheet program that does not allow for electronic safeguards  However, based on our review of the databases, the spreadsheet program does allow for a variety of electronic safeguards  For example, entries can be restricted to only allow selections from a drop-down list or only allow dates to be entered  Second, only a small number of TSA employees enter information into these databases  TSA officials explained that typically one TSA employee is responsible for entering information from pipeline security reviews, and another individual, usually whoever conducted the review, is tasked to verify the accuracy of the data entered  As a result, according to the officials, any errors would be self-evident and caught during these TSA employees’ reviews  Our work has emphasized the importance of quality information for management to make informed decisions and evaluate agencies’ performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks  The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should use quality information to achieve agency objectives, where “quality” means, among other characteristics, current, complete, and accurate  In addition, DHS’s Information Quality Guidelines state that all DHS component agencies should treat information quality as integral to every step of the development of information, including creation, collection, maintenance, and dissemination  The guidelines also state that agencies should substantiate the quality of the information disseminated through documentation or other appropriate means  Without current, complete, and accurate information, it is difficult for TSA to evaluate the performance of the pipeline security program  Until TSA monitors and records the status of these reviews’ recommendations, it will be hindered in its efforts to determine whether its recommendations are leading to significant reduction in risk  By entering information on CSR recommendations and monitoring and recording their status, developing written documentation of its data entry and verification procedures and electronic safeguards, and improving the quality of its pipeline security program data, TSA could better ensure it has the information necessary to effectively monitor pipeline operators’ progress in improving their security posture, and evaluate its pipeline security program’s effectiveness in reducing security risks to pipelines  A successful pipeline attack could have dire consequences on public health and safety, as well as the U S  economy  Recent coordinated campaigns by environmental activists to disrupt pipeline operations, and the successful attempts by nation-state actors to infiltrate and obtain sensitive information from pipeline operators’ business and operating systems, demonstrate the dynamic and continuous threat to the security of our nation’s pipeline network  To help ensure the safety of our pipelines throughout the nation, it is important for TSA to address weaknesses in the management of its pipeline security program  TSA’s Pipeline Security Branch revised its security guidelines in March 2018 to, among other things, reflect the dynamic threat environment and incorporate NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework cybersecurity principles and practices  However, without a documented process defining how frequently TSA is to review and, if deemed necessary, revise its guidelines, TSA cannot ensure that its guidelines reflect the latest known standards and best practices for physical and cybersecurity, or address the persistent and dynamic security threat environment currently facing the nation’s pipeline system  Further, without clearly defined criteria for determining pipeline facilities’ criticality, TSA cannot ensure that pipeline operators are applying guidance uniformly and that all of the critical facilities across the pipeline sector have been identified; or that their vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed  TSA could improve its ability to conduct pipeline security reviews and the means that it uses to prioritize which pipeline systems to review based on their relative risk ranking  Establishing a strategic workforce plan could help TSA ensure that it has identified the necessary skills, competencies, and staffing allocations that the Pipeline Security Branch needs to carry out its responsibilities, including conducting security reviews of critical pipeline companies and facilities, as well as their cybersecurity posture  Better considering threat, vulnerability, and consequence elements in its risk assessment and incorporating an independent, external peer review in its process would provide more assurance that the Pipeline Security Branch ranks relative risk among pipeline systems using comprehensive and accurate data and methods  We are making 10 recommendations to TSA: The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to implement a documented process for reviewing, and if deemed necessary, for revising TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines at regular defined intervals  (Recommendation 1) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to clarify TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines by defining key terms within its criteria for determining critical facilities  (Recommendation 2) The TSA Administrator should develop a strategic workforce plan for its Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division, which could include determining the number of personnel necessary to meet the goals set for its Pipeline Security Branch, as well as the knowledge, skills, and abilities, including cybersecurity, that are needed to effectively conduct CSRs and CFSRs  (Recommendation 3) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to update the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool to include up-to-date data to ensure it reflects industry conditions, including throughput and threat data  (Recommendation 4) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to fully document the data sources, underlying assumptions and judgments that form the basis of the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool, including sources of uncertainty and any implications for interpreting the results from the assessment  (Recommendation 5) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to identify or develop other data sources relevant to threat, vulnerability, and consequence consistent with the NIPP and DHS critical infrastructure risk mitigation priorities and incorporate that data into the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool to assess relative risk of critical pipeline systems, which could include data on prior attacks, natural hazards, feedback data on pipeline system performance, physical pipeline condition, and cross-sector interdependencies  (Recommendation 6) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to take steps to coordinate an independent, external peer review of its Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool, after the Pipeline Security Branch completes enhancements to its risk assessment approach  (Recommendation 7) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to ensure that it has a suite of performance measures which exhibit key attributes of successful performance measures, including measurable targets, clarity, and baseline and trend data  (Recommendation 8) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to take steps to enter information on CSR recommendations and monitor and record their status  (Recommendation 9) The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to improve the quality of its pipeline security program data by developing written documentation of its data entry and verification procedures, implementing standardized data entry formats, and correcting existing data entry errors  (Recommendation 10) We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOE, DOT, and FERC  DHS provided written comments which are reproduced in appendix III  In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendations and described actions planned to address them  DHS, DOE, DOT, FERC, also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We also provided draft excerpts of this product to the American Petroleum Institute (API), the Association of Oil Pipe Lines, the American Gas Association (AGA), the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), the American Public Gas Association, and the selected pipeline operators that we interviewed  For those who provided technical comments, we incorporated them as appropriate  With regard to our first recommendation, that TSA implement a documented process for reviewing, and if deemed necessary, for revising its Pipeline Security Guidelines at regular defined intervals, DHS stated that TSA will implement a documented process for reviewing and revising its Pipeline Security Guidelines at regular defined intervals, as appropriate  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by March 31, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our second recommendation, that TSA clarify its Pipeline Security Guidelines by defining key terms within its criteria for determining critical facilities, DHS stated that TSA will clarify its Pipeline Security Guidelines by defining key terms within its criteria for determining critical facilities  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by May 31, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our third recommendation, that TSA develop a strategic workforce plan for its Security Policy and Industry Engagement's Surface Division, DHS stated that TSA will develop a strategic workforce plan for the division, which includes determining the number of personnel necessary to meet the goals set for the Pipeline Security Branch, as well as the knowledge, skills, and abilities, including cybersecurity, that are needed to effectively conduct CSRs and CFSRs  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by June 30, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our fourth recommendation, that TSA update the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool to include up-to-date data in order to ensure it reflects industry conditions, including throughput and threat data, DHS stated that TSA will update the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool to include up-to-date data in order to ensure it reflects industry conditions, including throughput and threat data  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by February 28, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our fifth recommendation, that TSA fully document the data sources, underlying assumptions, and judgements that form the basis of the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool, including sources of uncertainty and any implications for interpreting the results from the assessment, DHS stated that TSA will fully document the data sources, underlying assumptions, and judgements that form the basis of the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool  According to DHS, this will include sources of uncertainty and any implications for interpreting the results from the assessment  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by February 28, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our sixth recommendation, that TSA identify or develop other data sources relevant to threat, vulnerability, and consequence consistent with the NIPP and DHS critical infrastructure risk mitigation priorities and incorporate that data into the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool to assess relative risk of critical pipeline systems, DHS stated that TSA will identify and/or develop other sources relevant to threat, vulnerability, and consequence consistent with the NIPP and DHS critical infrastructure risk mitigation priorities  DHS also stated that TSA will incorporate that data into the Pipeline Risk Ranking Tool to assess relative risk of critical pipeline systems, which could include data on prior attacks, natural hazards, feedback data on pipeline system performance, physical pipeline condition, and cross-sector interdependencies  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by June 30, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our seventh recommendation, that TSA take steps to coordinate an independent, external peer review of its Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool, after the Pipeline Security Branch completes enhancements to its risk assessment approach, DHS stated that, after completing enhancements to its risk assessment approach, TSA will take steps to coordinate an independent, external peer review of its Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by November 30, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our eighth recommendation, that TSA ensure that the Security Policy and Industry Engagement's Surface Division has a suite of performance measures which exhibit key attributes of successful performance measures, including measurable targets, clarity, baseline, and trend data, DHS stated that TSA’s Surface Division’s Pipeline Section will develop both physical and cyber security performance measures, in consultation with pipeline stakeholders, to ensure that it has a suite of performance measures which exhibit key attributes of successful performance measures, including measurable targets, clarity, baseline, and trend data  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by November 30, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our ninth recommendation, that TSA take steps to enter information on CSR recommendations and monitor and record their status, DHS stated that TSA will enter information on CSR recommendations and monitor and record their status  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by October 31, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  With regard to our tenth recommendation, that TSA take steps to improve the quality of its pipeline security program data by developing written documentation of its data entry and verification procedures, implementing standardized data entry formats, and correcting existing data entry errors, DHS stated that TSA will develop written documentation of its data entry and verification procedures, implementing standardized data entry formats, and correcting existing data entry errors  DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by July 31, 2019  This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until one day from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Energy, Homeland Security, and Transportation; the Executive Director of the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee; and other interested parties  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao gov, and Nick Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or marinosn@gao gov  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV  This appendix lists security guidance and guidance-related tools that the pipeline operators and industry association officials we interviewed identified as adopted or available in order to secure their physical and cyber operations  This list should not be considered to include all physical and cybersecurity guidance that may be available or used by all pipeline operators nor do all operators use all guidance listed  The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Pipeline Security Branch developed the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool (risk assessment) in 2007  The risk assessment calculates threat, vulnerability, and consequence on variables such as the amount of throughput in the pipeline system (consequence input)  Pipeline Security Branch officials told us that they use the pipeline risk assessment to rank relative risk of the top 100 critical pipeline systems, and the standard operating procedures for conducting Corporate Security Reviews (CSR) state the results of the risk ranking are the primary factor considered when prioritizing CSRs of pipeline companies  However, we identified several factors that likely limit the usefulness of the current assessment in calculating threat, vulnerability, and consequence to allow the Pipeline Security Branch to effectively prioritize reviews of pipeline systems  For example, because the risk assessment has not changed since 2014, information on threat may be outdated  Additionally, sources of data and underlying assumption and judgments regarding certain threat and vulnerability inputs to the assessment are not fully documented  For example, threats to cybersecurity are not specifically accounted for in the description of the risk assessment methodology, making it unclear if cybersecurity is part of the assessment’s threat factor  Further, the risk assessment does not include information that is consistent with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) priorities for critical infrastructure risk mitigation, such as information on natural hazards and the ability to measure risk reduction (feedback data)  According to Pipeline Security Branch officials, the risk ranking assessment is not intended to be a fully developed risk model detailing all pipeline factors influencing risk  Rather, officials said they are primarily interested in assessing risk data that impacts security  However, because TSA’s Pipeline Security Program is designed to enhance the security preparedness of the pipeline systems, incorporating additional factors that enhance security into their risk calculation of the most critical pipeline systems would better align their efforts with Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21)  For example, PPD-21 calls for agencies to integrate and analyze information to prioritize assets and manage risks to critical infrastructure, as well as anticipate interdependencies and cascading impacts  Below we present the various shortfalls in the risk assessment—outdated data, limited description of sources and methodology, and opportunities to better align with the NIPP and other DHS priorities for critical infrastructure risk mitigation—in the context of the components that comprise a risk assessment: threat, vulnerability, and consequence  Whereas in 2010 we made recommendations to improve the consequence component in the pipeline relative risk ranking tool, we have currently identified shortfalls that cut across all risk components: threat, vulnerability, and consequence  We identified several shortfalls in the pipeline risk assessment’s calculation of threat  First, while the risk assessment assesses consequence and vulnerability by pipeline system through use of multiple variables, it currently ranks threat for pipeline systems equally  Second, the evolving nature of threats to pipelines may not be reflected, since the risk assessment was last updated in 2014  Third, the threat calculation does not take into account natural hazards  Pipeline Security Branch officials said they currently rank threat equally across pipeline systems because they do not have granular enough threat information to distinguish threat by pipeline  However, ranking threat equally effectively has no effect on the risk calculation for pipeline systems  Further, this judgment is not documented in the risk assessment’s methodology  According to the NIPP, a risk assessment’s methodology must clearly document what information is used and how it is synthesized to generate a risk estimate, including any assumptions and judgments  Additionally, our analysis of the pipeline risk assessment found that it includes at least one field that TSA could use to differentiate threat by pipeline  Specifically, the risk assessment includes a field that accounts for whether a pipeline experienced a previous security threat (including failed attacks), and information provided by Pipeline Security Branch suggests some pipeline systems have experienced such threats  However, the Pipeline Security Branch did not capture these events in the risk assessment’s calculation, which Pipeline Security Branch officials said should be part of the threat calculation, but could not account for why they were not calculated for the systems in the risk assessment  These officials also clarified that incidents such as suspicious photography or vandalism do not constitute an attack to be accounted for in the threat calculation  Documenting such assumptions, judgments, or decisions to exclude information could provide increased transparency to those expected to interpret or use the results  Pipeline Security Branch officials also said that they ranked threat equally because TSA Intelligence and Analysis data show that threats to the oil and natural gas sector have been historically low, and Intelligence and Analysis does not conduct specific threat analysis against individual pipeline systems  However, the Pipeline Security Branch has not updated the risk assessment since June 2014; therefore, the threat information it used to determine threat calculations—and decide to rank threat equally—may be outdated and not reflect the threats to the industry that have emerged in recent years  In fact, pipeline operators we interviewed indicated that the types of threats that concern pipeline operators have evolved  For example, 5 of the 10 operators we interviewed indicated that environmental activists were an increased threat to the pipeline industry because they use sabotage techniques, such as valve turning and cutting in service pipelines with blow torches, against pipelines  Additionally, 6 of 10 pipeline operators we interviewed said cyber attacks from nation-state actors were a primary threat to their industry  Further, when TSA issued its revised Pipeline Security Guidelines in March 2018, it stated that its revisions to the guidelines were made to reflect the ever-changing threat environment in both the physical and cybersecurity realms  However, threats to cybersecurity are not specifically accounted for in the description of the risk assessment methodology  Recent Pipeline Modal and Cyber Modal Threat Assessments include cyber threats to the pipeline industry, but the description of the pipeline risk assessment’s methodology does not specify what types of threat assessments (sources) are used to calculate its threat score  To better align with the guidance in the NIPP for documenting sources of information when conducting risk assessments, the Pipeline Security Branch should document the information used  Keeping the risk assessment updated with current information, as well as documenting those data sources, could help the Pipeline Security Branch ensure it is using its limited resources to review the pipeline systems with greater risk  Natural Hazard Threats to Pipelines The Transportation Systems Sector, of which pipelines are a part, is critical to the Pacific Northwest, but also at risk from natural hazards, like earthquakes  For example, according to the Department of Homeland Security, an earthquake in the Puget Sound region—which relies on the transportation of crude oil from Alaska—could cripple the ports of Seattle and Tacoma, as well as the Olympic and Williams Pipelines greatly impacting the Pacific Northwest Economic Region  Hurricanes are the most frequent disruptive natural hazard for the oil and natural gas subsector and can cause the shutdown of facilities in an area, even when the facilities themselves are not directly affected by the storms  For example, according to the U S  Energy Information Administration, the flow of petroleum into the New York area via pipeline from the Gulf Coast relies on the ability to move it through major terminals  In August 2017, Hurricane Harvey caused major disruptions to crude oil and petroleum product supply chains, including those to New York Harbor from Houston, Texas via the Colonial Pipeline  Due to the hurricane, decreased supplies of petroleum products available for the pipeline in Houston forced Colonial Pipeline to limit operations temporarily  Finally, another shortfall in the current pipeline risk assessment methodology is that it does not account for natural hazards in its threat calculation, even though DHS’s definition of threat includes natural hazards, and security and resilience of critical infrastructure are often presented in the context of natural hazards  According to the NIPP, threat is a natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or property  As such, along with terrorism, criminal activity and cybersecurity, natural disasters are a key element of DHS’s critical infrastructure security and resilience mission  According to Pipeline Security Branch officials, there is not sufficient historical data available that would indicate a significant impact from natural disasters on specific pipeline systems  However, we identified possible sources of data for the Pipeline Security Branch to consider  For example, a 2016 RAND Corporation study examined national infrastructure systems’ exposure to natural hazards, including pipelines  Additionally, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has collaborated with stakeholders to develop the National Risk Index to, among other things, establish a baseline of natural hazards risk for the United States While there may not be historical data of natural hazard impact for every pipeline system, consulting other sources or experts could provide regional data or analysis to build a more comprehensive threat picture to help distinguish threats by pipeline system  According to the NIPP, hazard assessments should rely not only on historical information, but also future predictions about natural hazards to assess the likelihood or frequency of various hazards  We also identified multiple shortfalls in the vulnerability factors used in the risk assessment methodology, such as the potential uncertainty of the number of critical facilities and incorporating a feedback mechanism to calculate overall risk reduction  Other considerations for vulnerability calculations include physical condition of the pipeline system, cybersecurity activities, and interdependencies among sectors  The number of critical facilities a pipeline system has identified is used as an input for its vulnerability calculation in the Pipeline Security Branch’s risk assessment methodology  As discussed earlier, we identified deficiencies in TSA’s criteria for identifying critical facilities, and found that well-defined criteria and consistent application of the criteria for identifying critical facilities could improve the results of the Pipeline Security Branch’s risk assessment  Nevertheless, communicating in the risk assessment the uncertainty that may be inherent in this self-reported information would better align the risk assessment with the NIPP  Measuring Effectiveness in a Voluntary Environment According to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the use of performance metrics is an important step in the critical infrastructure risk management process to enable assessment of improvements in critical infrastructure security and resilience  The metrics provide a basis for the critical infrastructure community to establish accountability, document actual performance, promote effective management, and provide a feedback mechanism to inform decision making  By using metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of voluntary partnership efforts to achieve national and sector priorities, critical infrastructure partners can adjust and adapt their security and resilience approaches to account for progress achieved, as well as changes in the threat and other relevant environments  Metrics are used to focus attention on areas of security and resilience that warrant additional resources or other changes through an analysis of challenges and priorities at the national, sector, and owner/operator levels  Metrics also serve as a feedback mechanism for other aspects of the critical infrastructure risk management approach  Another shortfall in the risk assessment is its inability to reliably measure the progress a pipeline system made in addressing vulnerability gaps between security reviews  The current risk assessment includes a CSR score as part of its vulnerability calculation, which was developed in part in response to our 2010 recommendation to use more reliable data to measure a pipeline system’s vulnerability gap  However, during our review, Pipeline Security Branch officials said they plan to remove pipeline companies’ CSR scores from the risk assessment calculations, because they and industry partners do not have confidence that the score appropriately measures a pipeline system’s vulnerability  For example, Pipeline Security Branch officials explained that pipeline companies consider security factors differently, which can lead to variation in implementing risk reduction activities and by extension lead to different CSR scores  However, removing the CSR score eliminates the only feedback mechanism in the risk assessment from a pipeline company’s actual security review conducted by the Pipeline Security Branch  The NIPP and DHS’s Risk Management fundamentals emphasize the important role that such feedback mechanisms play in risk management  Officials from the Pipeline Security Branch agree on the importance of a feedback mechanism tying results of reviews to a revised vulnerability metric, but said they need a better measure than the current CSR score which is unreliable for comparative and analytic purposes  Developing a feedback mechanism based on implementation of TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines could be an important input to the risk assessment’s vulnerability calculation  This information would also inform the amount of risk pipeline companies are reducing by implementing the guidelines and could be used to inform overall risk reduction  The physical and cyber environments in which the pipeline sector operates also present vulnerabilities not accounted for in the pipeline risk assessment  In recent years, DHS has listed the potential for catastrophic losses to dramatically increase the overall risk associated with failing infrastructure and highlighted risks due to climate change and natural hazards to pipelines  For example, DHS reported extreme temperatures—such as higher and lower temperatures over prolonged periods of time—increase vulnerability to the critical infrastructure by causing elements to break and cease to function  Pipelines that freeze and then rupture can affect the energy and transportation systems sectors  As noted above, according to the NIPP, a natural or man-made occurrence or action with the potential to harm life is considered a threat, whereas vulnerability is defined as a physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity open to exploitation or susceptible to a given threat or hazard  While pipeline physical condition is typically thought of in context of safety, pipeline condition or location (such as above or below ground) could touch upon pipeline security as it relates to system vulnerability  For example, a pipeline system or segment of a system with a compromised physical condition due to corrosion or age could affect the system’s vulnerability to threats and affect its ability to recover from such threats by potentially increasing the time a system is offline  According to the Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan, vulnerabilities to damage in aging transportation infrastructure—of which pipelines are a part—are projected to increase with the continued effects of climate change  Further, according to TSA’s Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan, pipeline integrity efforts—including the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of pipelines—are important to pipeline security because well-maintained, safe pipelines are more likely to tolerate a physical attack  The Pipeline Security Branch already collects information from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) for its risk assessment, specifically information on High Consequence Area and High Threat Urban Area mileage  By considering additional information PHMSA collects on pipeline integrity, the Pipeline Security Branch could also use the information to help pipeline operators identify security measures to help reduce the consequences related to the comparatively higher vulnerability of an aging or compromised system  This would align with the Pipeline Security Branch’s efforts to improve security preparedness of pipeline systems and could better inform its vulnerability calculations for relative risk ranking of pipeline systems  Capturing cybersecurity in the risk assessment is also an area for improvement  Pipeline Security Branch officials told us they consulted with the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center to revise TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines to align with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework and that absent data specific to pipelines on their cybersecurity vulnerabilities, they are unable to include a pipelines’ vulnerability to cyber attack in the risk assessment  However, the Pipeline Security Branch recently updated the security review questions asked of pipeline operators during corporate and critical facility reviews based on the recently updated Pipeline Security Guidelines  Using these updated questions related to companies’ cybersecurity posture, the Pipeline Security Branch could collect additional information on cybersecurity vulnerabilities which could inform the risk assessment  This could be an element of the feedback mechanism described above and emphasized in the NIPP  Additionally, NIST identified several supply chain vulnerabilities associated with cybersecurity, which are not currently accounted for in TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines  As pipeline operators implement increasing levels of network technologies to control their systems, the Pipeline Security Branch may not be fully accounting for pipeline systems’ cybersecurity posture by not including the cybersecurity-related vulnerabilities in its risk assessment inputs  Finally, we identified shortfalls in cross-sector interdependencies, which could affect vulnerability calculations  According to the NIPP, understanding and addressing risks from cross-sector dependencies and interdependencies is essential to enhancing critical infrastructure security and resilience  The Pipeline Security Branch’s pipeline risk assessment currently considers the effects of a pipeline system’s ability to service assets such as major airports, the electric grid, and military bases  However, consequence is calculated on the loss or disruption of the pipeline system to these other assets and does not capture the dependency of the pipeline system on other energy sources, such as electricity  Weather events such as Gulf of Mexico hurricanes and Superstorm Sandy highlighted the interdependencies between the pipeline and electrical sectors  Specifically, according to a 2015 DHS annual report on critical infrastructure, power failures during Superstorm Sandy in 2012 closed major pipelines for 4 days, reducing regional oil supplies by 35 to 40 percent  The report goes on to say that the interconnected nature of infrastructure systems can lead to cascading impacts and are increasing in frequency  Pipeline Security Branch officials are considering cross-sector interdependencies and said they discuss these factors with operators as they relate to system resiliency  Considering interdependencies of sectors in both directions—such as calculating the likelihood that an input like electricity could fail and cause disruptions to critical pipelines—could improve the calculations in the pipeline risk assessment  As previously discussed, the Pipeline Security Branch last calculated relative risk among the top 100 pipeline systems in 2014  When doing so, it used pipeline systems’ throughput data from 2010 to assess relative risk  According to Pipeline Security Branch officials, the amount of throughput in pipeline systems does not change substantially year to year  However, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for management to use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives, including using relevant data from reliable sources obtained in a timely manner  The Pipeline Security Branch uses throughput data as a consequence factor in the risk assessment to determine a pipeline system’s relative risk score  Throughput changes could affect relative risk ranking and the Pipeline Security Branch’s ability to accurately prioritize reviews based on relative risk  Chris P  Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao gov Nick Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or marinosn@gao gov  In addition to the contacts named above, Ben Atwater, Assistant Director; Michael W  Gilmore, Assistant Director; and Michael C  Lenington, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment  Chuck Bausell, David Blanding, Dominick Dale, Eric Hauswirth, Kenneth A  Johnson, Steve Komadina, Susanna Kuebler, Thomas Lombardi, David Plocher, and Janay Sam made significant contributions to this report 


Report 2: The House of Representatives has standing rules that govern how bills and resolutions are to be taken up and considered on the floor  However, to expedite legislation receiving floor action, the House may temporarily set aside these rules for measures that are not otherwise privileged for consideration  This can be done by agreeing to a special order of business resolution (special rule) or by adopting a motion to suspend the rules and pass the underlying measure  In general, special rules enable the consideration of complex or contentious legislation, such as major appropriations or reauthorizations, while the suspension of the rules procedure is usually applied to broadly supported legislation that can be approved without floor amendments or extensive debate in the chamber  Most bills and resolutions that receive floor action in the House are called up and considered under suspension of the rules  The suspension procedure allows nonprivileged measures to be raised without a special rule, waives points of order, limits debate, and prohibits floor amendments  Motions to suspend the rules and pass the measure require a two-thirds vote, so the procedure is typically reserved for bills and resolutions that can meet a supermajority threshold  Decisions to schedule bills for consideration under suspension are generally based on how widely supported the measures are, how long Members wish to debate them, and whether they want to propose floor amendments  These decisions are not necessarily related to the subject matter of the measure  Accordingly, measures brought up under suspension cover a wide range of policy areas but most often address government operations, such as the designation of federal facilities  This report describes the suspension procedure, which is defined in clause 1 of House Rule XV, and provides an analysis of measures considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress (2015-2016)  Figures 1- 8 display statistical data, including the prevalence and form of suspension measures, sponsors of measures, committee consideration, length of floor debate, voting, and resolution of differences between the chambers  Table 1 summarizes the final legislative status of measures initially considered in the House under the suspension of the rules  Finally, Figure A-1 depicts the use of the suspension procedure from the 110 th through the 114 th Congresses (2007-2016)  The suspension of the rules procedure is established by clause 1 of House Rule XV  Bills, resolutions, House amendments to Senate bills, amendments to the Constitution, conference reports, and other types of business may be considered under suspension, even those "that would otherwise be subject to a point of order … [or have] not been reported or referred to any calendar or previously introduced " Suspension motions are in order on designated days  As Rule XV states, "the Speaker may not entertain a motion that the House suspend the rules except on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays and during the last six days of a session of Congress " Suspension measures, however, may be considered on other days by unanimous consent or under the terms of a special order of business (special rule) reported by the Committee on Rules and agreed to by the House  A motion to suspend the rules is a compound motion to suspend the House rules and pass a bill or agree to a resolution  When considering such a motion, the House is voting on the two questions simultaneously  Once recognized, the Member making the motion will say, "Mr  [or Madam] Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass___ " The House rules that are suspended under this procedure include those that "would impede an immediate vote on passage of a measure … such as ordering the previous question, third reading, recommittal, or division of the question " A measure considered under the suspension procedure is not subject to floor amendment  The motion to suspend and pass the measure, though, may provide for passage of the measure in an amended form  That is, the text to be approved may be presented in a form altered by committee amendments or by informal negotiations  Suspension measures that are passed with changes incorporated into the text are passed "as amended " There are no separate votes on the floor approving such amendments  Suspension motions are "debatable for 40 minutes, one-half in favor of the motion and one-half in opposition thereto " However, in most instances, a true opponent never claims half the time, and most speakers come to the floor to express support for the measure  Debate time is controlled by two floor managers, one from each party, who sit on a committee of jurisdiction  Each manager makes an opening statement and may yield increments of the 20 minutes they control to other Members to debate the measure  Once debate has concluded, a single vote is held on the motion to suspend the rules and pass the measure  The motion requires approval by "two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum being present " Should the vote fall short of the two-thirds required for passage (290, if all Members vote), the measure is not permanently rejected  Before the end of the Congress, the House may consider the measure again under suspension, or the Committee on Rules may report a special rule that provides for floor consideration of the measure  As illustrated in Figure 1 , the majority of measures considered on the House floor during the 114 th Congress were called up under the suspension of the rules procedure  Sixty-two percent of all measures that received floor action were considered under suspension (743 out of the 1,200), compared to those under the terms of a special rule (14%), unanimous consent (7%), or privileged business (16%)  Figure 2 displays the form of suspension measures  Most of the measures considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress (94%) were bills  House bills made up 83% of the suspension total, Senate bills 11%  As represented in Figure 3 , most suspension measures were sponsored by members of the majority party during the 114 th Congress  House or Senate majority-party members sponsored 69% of all bills and resolutions initially considered in the House under suspension, while House majority-party members sponsored 467 (71%) of the 660 House-originated measures (designated with an H R , H Res , H Con Res  or H J Res  prefix)  Suspension is, however, the most common procedure used to consider minority-sponsored legislation in the House by a wide margin  In the 114 th Congress, 85% of the minority-sponsored measures that were considered on the House floor were raised under the suspension procedure  Members of the House or Senate minority parties sponsored 31% of all suspension measures originating in either chamber, compared to 9% of legislation subject to different procedures, including privileged business (17 measures), unanimous consent (21 measures), and special rules (one Senate bill)  Minority-party House Members sponsored 193 (29%) of the 660 House measures considered under suspension  No minority-party House Member sponsored a House-originated measure that was considered under a special rule  Most suspension measures are referred to at least one House committee before their consideration on the chamber floor  In the 114 th Congress, 710 out of the 743 suspension measures considered (96%) were previously referred to a House committee  Of the 33 measures that were considered without a referral, 31 were Senate bills that were "held at the desk," and two were House resolutions that provided concurrence to Senate amendments  Measures may be referred to multiple House committees before receiving floor action  When a bill or resolution is referred to more than one House committee, the Speaker will designate one committee as primary, meaning it is the committee exercising jurisdiction over the largest part of the measure  Generally, the chair of the committee of primary jurisdiction works with majority party leadership to determine if and when a measure should be considered under suspension  Figure 4 shows the number and percentage of measures brought up under suspension from each House committee of primary jurisdiction  The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (now Oversight and Reform) was the committee of primary jurisdiction for the plurality of measures considered under suspension in the 114 th Congress: 106, or 14%, of the total number of suspension measures considered  Many of these bills designated names for post offices or other federal properties  For most House committees, the majority of their referred measures that reached the floor were raised under the suspension procedure  In the 114 th Congress, the four exceptions were the Committee on House Administration—which had several measures considered by unanimous consent—and the Committees on Appropriations, the Budget, and Armed Services, which had at least half of their measures considered pursuant to special rules  For the other committees, suspension measures ranged from 57% to 100% of the total number of the committee's measures receiving floor action ( Figure 5 )  Since suspension motions require a two-thirds majority for passage, House committees that handle less contentious subjects tend to have more of their measures considered under the suspension procedure in comparison to other committees  In the 114 th Congress, high-suspension committees included Small Business (100% of measures receiving floor action) and Veterans' Affairs (92%)  The Small Business Committee's measures sought to authorize new business development programs  Veterans' Affairs measures included authorizations, reauthorizations, and bills designating federal facilities  While suspension measures are not subject to floor amendments, committees may recommend amendments to legislative texts during markup meetings or through informal negotiations  The motion to suspend the rules can include these proposed changes when a Member moves to suspend the rules and pass the measure "as amended " In the 114 th Congress, 396 suspension measures (53% of the total) were considered "as amended," meaning that the text to be approved differed from the measure's introduced text  Clause 2 of House Rule XIII requires that measures reported by House committees must be accompanied by a written report  Otherwise, they are not placed on a calendar of measures eligible for floor consideration  However, the written report requirement is among those rules suspended under the suspension procedure  Thus, measures may be called up on the floor under suspension of the rules even if a committee never ordered them to be reported or wrote an accompanying committee report  Instead, the motion to suspend the rules discharges the committee and moves the legislation directly to the House floor  In the 114 th Congress, 517 (70%) suspension measures were ordered to be reported by a House committee  Of this number, 398 were reported with an accompanying House committee report  Twenty measures that did not have a House report did have a Senate report, while 325 measures had no written report from either chamber (43% of the total number of suspension measures)  Pursuant to Rule XV, motions to suspend the rules are regularly in order on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays or on the last six days of a session of Congress  However, suspension motions may be considered on other days by unanimous consent or under the terms of a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and agreed to by the House  As displayed in Figure 6 , in the 114 th Congress, the plurality of suspension measures were considered on Tuesdays (312, 42% of the total number considered), followed by Mondays (291, 39%) and Wednesdays (114, 15%)  In addition, 25 suspension measures were considered on Thursdays and one on a Friday  Of these, one was considered by unanimous consent, while 25 were called up under suspension pursuant to permission included in a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and agreed to by the full House  Such special rules included a provision stating, "It shall be in order at any time on the legislative day of ___ for the Speaker to entertain motions that the House suspend the rules as though under clause 1 of rule XV " Pursuant to Rule XV, suspension measures are "debatable for 40 minutes, one-half in favor of the motion and one-half in opposition thereto " In practice, there is rarely a true opponent to a motion to suspend the rules, and the time is divided between two floor managers, usually one from each party, who both favor the motion  The floor managers each control 20 minutes of debate  The managers may be their parties' sole representative for or against the motion, or they may yield increments of the 20-minute allotment to other Members  Typically, the relevant committee chairs and ranking members select the majority and minority floor managers for particular bills and resolutions  These managers may be the measure's sponsor, the chair or ranking member of the measure's committee of primary jurisdiction, or another committee member  In the 114 th Congress, the measure's sponsor served as the majority manager on 26% of the suspension measures receiving floor action  The committee chair managed 29% of the measures  The minority manager was the measure's sponsor for 11% of the measures and the committee's ranking member for 26% of the measures considered  Occasionally, floor managers controlling time on a motion to suspend the rules ceded their control to other Members during debate  In two identified cases, both the majority and minority floor managers favored the measure, and another Member claimed the time in true opposition during the initial floor consideration of the measure  In at least one other instance, the minority manager asked unanimous consent to yield managerial control to another Member  A majority floor manager makes the motion to suspend the rules by stating, "Mr  [Madam] Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill [or resolution] ____ " The Speaker [or Speaker pro tempore] responds, "Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman[woman] from [state] and the gentleman[woman] from [state] each will control twenty minutes " The majority and minority managers then, in turn, make opening statements regarding the measure using the 20 minutes each controls  If the majority and minority managers have secured additional speakers, the speakers generally alternate between the parties within the 40-minute limit  During the 114 th Congress, on a motion to suspend the rules, the average number of speakers in addition to the floor managers was fewer than two  On 83% of the measures (620) considered, there were one or two additional speakers  On 27% of the measures (199) considered, there were no additional speakers, and in 16% of the measures (120) considered, there were 3 to 12 additional speakers  Three measures had 20, 21, and 25 additional speakers, respectively  At the start of the debate period, the majority manager may request "unanimous consent that all Members may have five legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and add extraneous materials on this bill [resolution] " This request enables general leave statements to be inserted into the Congressional Record   In 29% of the suspension measures considered in the 114 th Congress, a written general leave statement appeared in the Record following in-person remarks, indicating that the remarks were submitted on the day the legislation was considered  General leave statements submitted on a day other than the day of consideration appear in the Extension of Remarks section of the Congressional Record   Suspension measures are limited to a maximum of 40 minutes of debate under Rule XV  However, if there are time gaps between speakers or procedural interruptions, such as a vote on a motion to adjourn, the time period between the start of the first speaker's remarks and the conclusion of debate may exceed 40 minutes  The statistics displayed in Figure 7 show the length of consideration of suspension measures as documented in Congress gov, not the accumulated length of statements, as kept by official timekeepers in the chamber  In the 114 th Congress, the average length of consideration on a motion to suspend the rules was 13 minutes and 10 seconds, and half of the measures considered had a debate period of 10 minutes or less  Thus, while overall debate is limited to 40 minutes under the rule, on most suspension measures, only a fraction of that time was actually expended during consideration  Seventeen measures, however, had consideration periods that exceeded 40 minutes due to procedural delays or, in the case of one measure, a request for unanimous consent to extend debate by 10 minutes to each side  House leaders generally choose measures for suspension that are likely to achieve the two-thirds majority threshold for passage  Thus, almost all suspension measures were passed by the House in the 114 th Congress  The full House approved all House resolutions (28), concurrent resolutions (12), joint resolutions (2), and Senate bills (82) that were considered under suspension  The House also passed, via motions to suspend the rules, 612 of the 619 House bills that were initially considered under suspension  Seven bills did not receive the requisite supermajority  Two of these bills were later considered and approved under the terms of a special rule  The remaining five bills did not return to the floor and therefore did not pass the House  Most suspension motions are agreed to in the House by voice vote, which is the chamber's default method of voting on most questions  In 2015 and 2016, this method of voting led to the final approval of 72% (531) of the motions to suspend the rules and pass the measures (see Figure 8 )  After the initial voice vote, Members triggered an eventual record vote (often called a roll call vote) on 212 (28%) of the suspension measures considered in the 114 th Congress  This was done by demanding the "yeas and nays," objecting to the vote "on the grounds that a quorum is not present," or, in one case, demanding a recorded vote  In most instances, the chair elected to postpone the vote to a later period, within two additional legislative days, pursuant to clause 8 of House Rule XX  Of the 212 record votes, 3 immediately followed debate on the measure  The remaining 209 votes were postponed to another time on the legislative schedule, usually later the same day  In the 114 th Congress, 205 suspension motions were adopted by record vote, and 7 motions to suspend the rules were defeated by record votes  The defeat of a motion to suspend the rules, however, does not necessarily kill the legislation  The Speaker may choose to recognize a Member at a later time to make another motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, or the House may consider the measure pursuant to a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules  Accordingly, two of the initially unsuccessful measures were later called up and passed under the terms of a special rule  Five measures were not considered again, via any House floor procedure, before the end of the 114 th Congress  Although suspension measures generally receive broad support, measures that receive the requisite two-thirds majority in the House are not guaranteed passage in the Senate  As noted in Table 1 , in the 114 th Congress, the Senate passed 197 of the 619 House bills initially considered under suspension (32%)  Additionally, the Senate agreed to 1 of the 2 House joint resolutions and 5 of the 11 House concurrent resolutions considered under suspension of the rules  Of the number of suspension measures that passed the House and Senate, 60 required a resolution of differences between the chambers  Forty-four House measures and 15 Senate bills were subject to an amendment exchange process, and on one occasion, a conference committee was used to resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of a House bill  The Senate passed three House bills, initially approved in the House under suspension, that did not become public law because the House did not agree to the final bill text, as amended by the Senate  In those instances, the House did not reconsider the bills once the Senate returned the Senate-amended versions to the House chamber  Thus, 194 House bills were presented to the President for signature  Of the measures initially considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress, President Obama was presented with 194 House bills, 82 Senate bills, and 1 House joint resolution for signature or veto  The President vetoed H R  1777 (Presidential Allowance Modernization Act of 2016) and S  2040 (Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act)  The House chose not to attempt a veto override on H R  1777 , so the measure did not become public law  Both the Senate and House voted to override the veto of S  2040 , enabling it to become law without the President's signature ( P L  114-222 )  Thus, of the 703 law-making measures (bills and joint resolutions) initially considered under suspension of the rules, 193 House bills, 82 Senate bills, and 1 House joint resolution became public law (see Table 1 ) 

ground_truth: Suspension of the rules is the most commonly used procedure to call up measures on the floor of the House of Representatives. As the name suggests, the procedure allows the House to suspend its standing and statutory rules in order to consider broadly supported legislation in an expedited manner. More specifically, the House temporarily sets aside its rules that govern the raising and consideration of measures and assumes a new set of constraints particular to the suspension procedure. The suspension of the rules procedure has several parliamentary advantages: (1) it allows nonprivileged measures to be raised on the House floor without the need for a special rule, (2) it enables the consideration of measures that would otherwise be subject to a point of order, and (3) it streamlines floor action by limiting debate and prohibiting floor amendments. Given these features, as well as the required two-thirds supermajority vote for passage, suspension motions are generally used to process less controversial legislation. In the 114th Congress (2015-2016), measures considered under suspension made up 62% of the bills and resolutions that received floor action in the House (743 out of 1,200 measures). The majority of suspension measures were House bills (83%), followed by Senate bills (11%) and House resolutions (4%). The measures covered a variety of policy areas but most often addressed government operations, such as the designation of federal facilities or amending administrative policies. Most measures that are considered in the House under the suspension procedure are sponsored by a House or Senate majority party member. However, suspension is the most common House procedure used to consider minority-party-sponsored legislation regardless of whether the legislation originated in the House or Senate. In 2015 and 2016, minority-party members sponsored 31% of suspension measures, compared to 9% of legislation subject to different procedures, including privileged business (17 measures), unanimous consent (21 measures), and under the terms of a special rule (one Senate bill). Most suspension measures are referred to at least one House committee before their consideration on the floor. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (now called the Committee on Oversight and Reform) was the committee of primary jurisdiction for the plurality of suspension measures considered in the 114th Congress. Additional committees—such as Energy and Commerce, Homeland Security, Natural Resources, Foreign Affairs, and Veterans' Affairs—also served as the primary committee for a large number of suspension measures. Suspension motions are debatable for up to 40 minutes. In most cases, only a fraction of that debate time is actually used. In the 114th Congress, the average amount of time spent considering a motion to suspend the rules was 13 minutes and 10 seconds. The House adopted nearly every suspension motion considered in 2015 and 2016. Approval by the House, however, did not guarantee final approval in the 114th Congress. The Senate passed or agreed to 40% of the bills, joint resolutions, and concurrent resolutions initially considered in the House under suspension of the rules, and 276 measures were signed into law. This report briefly describes the suspension of the rules procedure, which is defined in House Rule XV, and provides an analysis of measures considered under this procedure during the 114th Congress. Figures and one table display statistics on the use of the procedure, including the prevalence and form of suspension measures, sponsorship of measures by party, committee consideration, length of debate, voting, resolution of differences between the chambers, and the final status of legislation. In addition, an Appendix illustrates trends in the use of the suspension procedure from the 110th to the 114th Congress (2007-2016).