prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: To help manage its multi-billion dollar acquisition investments, DHS has established policies and processes for acquisition management, requirements development, test and evaluation, and resource allocation  The department uses these policies and processes to deliver systems that are intended to close critical capability gaps, helping enable DHS to execute its missions and achieve its goals  DHS policies and processes for managing its major acquisition programs are primarily set forth in its Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 and Acquisition Management Instruction 102-01-001  DHS issued the initial version of this directive in November 2008 in an effort to establish an acquisition management system that effectively provides required capability to operators in support of the department’s missions  DHS’s Under Secretary for Management is currently designated as the department’s Chief Acquisition Officer and, as such, is responsible for managing the implementation of the department’s acquisition policies  DHS’s Under Secretary for Management serves as the acquisition decision authority for the department’s largest acquisition programs, those with LCCEs of $1 billion or greater  Component Acquisition Executives—the most senior acquisition management officials within each of DHS’s components—may be delegated acquisition decision authority for programs with cost estimates between $300 million and less than $1 billion  Table 1 identifies how DHS has categorized the 28 major acquisition programs we review in this report, and table 7 in appendix III specifically identifies the programs within each level  DHS acquisition management policy establishes that a major acquisition program’s decision authority shall review the program at a series of predetermined acquisition decision events to assess whether the major program is ready to proceed through the acquisition life-cycle phases  Depending on the program, these events can occur within months of each other, or be spread over several years  Figure 1 depicts the acquisition life cycle established in DHS acquisition management policy  An important aspect of an acquisition decision event is the decision authority’s review and approval of key acquisition documents  See table 2 for a description of the type of key acquisition documents requiring department-level approval before a program moves to the next acquisition phase  DHS acquisition management policy establishes that the APB is the agreement between program, component, and department-level officials establishing how systems will perform, when they will be delivered, and what they will cost  Specifically, the APB establishes a program’s schedule, costs, and key performance parameters  DHS defines key performance parameters as a program’s most important and non- negotiable requirements that a system must meet to fulfill its fundamental purpose  For example, a key performance parameter for an aircraft may be airspeed and a key performance parameter for a surveillance system may be detection range  The APB schedule, costs, and key performance parameters are defined in terms of an objective and minimum threshold value  According to DHS policy, if a program fails to meet any schedule, cost, or performance threshold approved in the APB, it is considered to be in breach  Programs in breach are required to notify their acquisition decision authority and develop a remediation plan that outlines a time frame for the program to return to its APB parameters, re-baseline—that is, establish new schedule, cost, or performance goals—or have a DHS-led program review that results in recommendations for a revised baseline  In addition to the acquisition decision authority, other bodies and senior officials support DHS’s acquisition management function: The Acquisition Review Board reviews major acquisition programs for proper management, oversight, accountability, and alignment with the department’s strategic functions at acquisition decision events and other meetings as needed  The board is chaired by the acquisition decision authority or a designee and consists of individuals who manage DHS’s mission objectives, resources, and contracts  The Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) is responsible for DHS’s overall acquisition governance process, supports the Acquisition Review Board, and reports directly to the Under Secretary for Management  PARM develops and updates program management policies and practices, reviews major programs, provides guidance for workforce planning activities, provides support to program managers, and collects program performance data  Components, such as U S  Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security Administration, and the U S  Coast Guard sponsor specific acquisition programs  The head of each component is responsible for oversight of major acquisition programs once the programs complete delivery of all planned capabilities to end users  Component Acquisition Executives within the components are responsible for overseeing the execution of their respective portfolios  Program management offices, also within the components, are responsible for planning and executing DHS’s individual programs  They are expected to do so within the cost, schedule, and performance parameters established in their APBs  If they cannot do so, programs are considered to be in breach and must take specific steps, as noted above  Figure 2 depicts the relationship between acquisition managers at the department, component, and program level  DHS established a Joint Requirements Council (JRC) to develop and lead a component-driven joint requirements process for the department  The JRC has issued policies outlining a process for analyzing and validating capability gaps, needs, and requirements  The JRC consists of a chair and 14 members who are senior executives or officers that represent key DHS headquarters offices and seven of the department’s operational components  The JRC chair rotates annually among the seven operational components  JRC members represent the views of their components or office leadership, endorse and prioritize validated capability needs and operational requirements (user-defined performance parameters outlining what a system must do), and make recommendations that are supported by analytical rigor  Figure 3 depicts the current headquarters and component members of the JRC  The JRC provides input to two senior-level entities: The Acquisition Review Board—as a member, the JRC chair advises the board on capability gaps, needs, and requirements at key milestones in the acquisition life cycle  The Deputy’s Management Action Group, which the Secretary established in April 2014, is a decision-making body that is chaired by the Deputy Secretary  Its membership consists of the DHS Chief of Staff, DHS Under Secretaries, senior operational component deputies and select support component deputies, and the Chief Financial Officer  The group provides recommendations to the Deputy Secretary for consideration in the annual resource allocation process that reflects DHS’s investment priorities  The group reviews JRC- validated capability needs and recommendations, provides direction and guidance to the JRC, and endorses or directs related follow-on JRC activities  The JRC is responsible for validating proposed capability needs and requirements for all major acquisitions, as well as for programs that are joint or of interest to the Deputy’s Management Action Group, regardless of level  See table 3 for a description of the key requirements documents requiring JRC validation  In general, the DHS requirements development process moves from broad mission needs and capability gaps to operational requirements  See figure 4  In May 2009, DHS established policies that describe processes for testing the capabilities delivered by the department’s major acquisition programs  The primary purpose of test and evaluation is to provide timely, accurate information to managers, decision makers, and other stakeholders to reduce programmatic, financial, schedule, and performance risks  We provide an overview of each of the 28 programs’ test activities in the individual program assessments presented in appendix I  DHS testing policy assigns specific responsibilities to particular individuals and entities throughout the department: Program managers have overall responsibility for planning and executing their programs’ testing strategies, including scheduling and funding test activities and delivering systems for testing  They are also responsible for controlling developmental testing, which is used to assist in the development and maturation of products, manufacturing, or support processes  Developmental testing includes engineering- type tests used to verify that design risks are minimized, substantiate achievement of contract technical performance, and certify readiness for operational testing  Operational test agents are responsible for planning, conducting, and reporting on operational test and evaluation, which is intended to identify whether a system can meet its key performance parameters and provide an evaluation of the operational effectiveness, suitability, and cybersecurity of a system in a realistic environment  Operational effectiveness refers to the overall ability of a system to provide a desired capability when used by representative personnel  Operational suitability refers to the degree to which a system can be placed into field use and sustained satisfactorily  The operational test agents may be organic to the component, another government agency, or a contractor, but must be independent of the developer in order to present credible, objective, and unbiased conclusions  The Director, Office of Test and Evaluation is responsible for approving major acquisition programs’ operational test agent and test and evaluation master plans, among other things  A program’s test and evaluation master plan must describe the developmental and operational testing needed to determine technical performance and operational effectiveness, suitability, and cybersecurity  As appropriate, the Director is also responsible for observing operational tests, reviewing operational test agents’ reports, and assessing the reports  Prior to a program’s acquisition decision event 3, the Director provides the program’s acquisition decision authority a letter of assessment that includes an appraisal of the program’s operational test, a concurrence or non-concurrence with the operational test agent’s evaluation, and any further independent analysis  As an acquisition program proceeds through its life cycle, the testing emphasis moves gradually from developmental testing to operational testing  See figure 5  DHS has established a planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process to allocate resources to acquisition programs and other entities throughout the department  DHS uses this process to produce the department’s annual budget request and multi-year funding plans presented in the FYHSP, a database that contains, among other things, 5-year funding plans for DHS’s major acquisition programs  According to DHS guidance, the 5-year plans should allow the department to achieve its goals more efficiently than an incremental approach based on 1-year plans  DHS guidance also states that the FYHSP articulates how the department will achieve its strategic goals within fiscal constraints  At the outset of the annual resource allocation process, the department’s Offices of Policy and Chief Financial Officer provide planning and fiscal guidance, respectively, to the department’s components  In accordance with this guidance, the components should submit 5-year funding plans to the Chief Financial Officer  These plans are subsequently reviewed by DHS’s senior leaders, including the DHS Secretary and Deputy Secretary  DHS’s senior leaders are expected to modify the plans in accordance with their priorities and assessments, and they document their decisions in formal resource allocation decision memorandums  DHS submits the revised funding plans to the Office of Management and Budget, which uses them to inform the President’s annual budget request—a document sent to Congress requesting new budget authority for federal programs, among other things  In some cases, the funding appropriated to certain accounts in a given fiscal year can be carried over to subsequent fiscal years  Figure 6 depicts DHS’s annual resource allocation process  Federal law requires DHS to submit an annual FYHSP report to Congress at or about the same time as the President’s budget request  This report presents the 5-year funding plans in the FYHSP database at that time  Two offices within DHS’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer support the annual resource allocation process: The Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) is responsible for establishing policies for the annual resource allocation process and overseeing the development of the FYHSP  In this role, PA&E develops the Chief Financial Officer’s planning and fiscal guidance, reviews the components’ 5-year funding plans, advises DHS’s senior leaders on resource allocation issues, maintains the FYHSP database, and submits the annual FYHSP report to Congress  The Cost Analysis Division is responsible for reviewing, analyzing, and evaluating acquisition programs’ LCCEs to ensure the cost of DHS programs are presented accurately and completely, in support of resource requests  This division also supports affordability assessments of the department’s budget, in coordination with PA&E, and develops independent cost estimates for major acquisition programs upon request by DHS’s Under Secretary for Management or Chief Financial Officer  Of the 24 programs we assessed with approved schedule and cost goals, 10 were on track to meet those goals during 2017  The other 14 programs were not on track because they changed or breached their schedule goals, cost goals, or both  We found that most programs updated their cost estimates in response to requirements DHS established in January 2016 that are intended to provide decision makers with more timely information  These actions are in accordance with GAO’s best practice to regularly update cost estimates and we plan to use these updated estimates to measure programs’ cost changes going forward  Based on our April 2014 recommendation, DHS revised the format of its fiscal year 2018–2022 FYHSP report to Congress to include acquisition affordability tables for select major acquisition programs  However, the report shows—and our analysis of programs’ current cost estimates confirms— that some programs face acquisition funding gaps in fiscal year 2018  We also reviewed 4 programs that were early in the acquisition process and planned to establish department-approved schedule and cost goals in calendar year 2017  However, these programs were delayed in getting department approval for their initial APBs for various reasons and, therefore, we excluded them from our assessment of whether programs were on track to meet their schedule and cost goals during 2017  DHS leadership subsequently approved initial APBs for 2 particularly complex and costly programs—a border wall system along the southwest U S  border and the Coast Guard’s Heavy Polar Icebreaker—in January 2018  We plan to assess these programs in next year’s review, but provide more details on all 4 additional programs we reviewed in the individual assessments in appendix I  Table 4 summarizes our findings and we present more detailed information after the table  From January 2017 to January 2018, 10 of the 24 programs we assessed with department-approved APBs were on track to meet their schedule and cost goals  This is fewer than our last annual review in which we found that 17 of the 26 programs we assessed were on track during 2016  Three of the 10 programs on track during 2017 were on track against initial schedule and cost goals; that is, the schedule and cost estimates in the baseline DHS leadership initially approved after the department’s acquisition management policy went into effect in November 2008  The other 7 programs had re-baselined prior to January 2017 and were on track against revised schedules and cost estimates that reflected past schedule slips, cost growth, or both  However, some of the programs on track in 2017 identified risks that may lead to schedule slips or cost growth in the future  For example, officials from the Technology Infrastructure Modernization program told us that staffing challenges may impede their ability to execute the program in accordance with its current APB  We also identified 2 programs that are in the process of re-baselining or plan to re-baseline in the near future to account for significant program changes or to add capabilities  For example, the Next Generation Networks Priority Services program plans to update its APB to establish schedule, cost, and performance goals for the next increment, which is intended to address landline capabilities for providing government officials emergency telecommunication services  During 2017, 14 of the 24 programs we assessed with department- approved APBs were not on track  Twelve of these programs had at least one major acquisition milestone that slipped, including 6 of these programs that also changed or breached their cost goals  Two additional programs changed or breached only their cost goals  As of January 2018, 6 of the 12 programs that experienced a schedule slip were in breach and had not yet revised their goals  Therefore, the magnitude of the schedule slips is unknown  For the remaining 6 programs, the change in schedule during 2017 ranged from a delay of 6 months to 66 months  Figure 7 identifies the programs that experienced schedule slips and the extent to which their major milestones slipped in 2017, as well as—for additional context—in prior years  While there are various reasons for schedule delays, the result is that end users may not get needed capabilities when they originally anticipated  Examples of the reasons why these key milestones slipped in 2017 include the following: New requirements: For example, the Passenger Screening Program re-baselined in May 2017 for the fifth time since its initial APB was approved in January 2012  This latest re-baseline was to remediate a 17-month breach caused by delays in incorporating new cybersecurity requirements in one of the program’s transportation security equipment technologies, known as the Credential Authentication Technology  The program now plans to achieve full operational capability for this system by December 2023—more than 9 years later than it initially planned  In another example, the Tactical Communications Modernization program re-baselined in November 2017—4 months after the program notified DHS leadership that it would not achieve full operational capability as planned  The reason for this re-baseline was to resolve issues related to federal information security requirements  The program now plans to achieve this milestone by March 2019, which is more than a year later than its initial APB threshold  Technical challenges: For example, the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program re-baselined in June 2017 to account for significant coverage gaps identified during the deployment of phase 1 sensors and to establish cost, schedule, and performance goals for phase 3 tools  The program’s full operational capability date slipped almost 4 years after this milestone was redefined as the point in time at which phase 1–3 tools are available to all participating civilian agencies  Additionally, the Automated Commercial Environment program declared a schedule breach in April 2017—its second in less than a year—after encountering difficulties developing its remaining functionality  These difficulties have caused further delays to the program’s final acquisition milestone decision  External factors: Officials from the Logistics Supply Chain Management System program notified DHS leadership in September 2017 that the program would not complete all required activities to achieve acquisition decision event 3 and subsequent events, including full operational capability  The primary reason for the delay was because program staff were deployed to support response and recovery efforts during the 2017 hurricane season  Additionally, the Medium Lift Helicopter program experienced delays in getting key acquisition documents approved in time to achieve its acquisition decision event 3  These delays were attributed, in part, to DHS leadership directing Customs and Border Protection to develop a comprehensive border plan that included the helicopter’s capabilities  We elaborate on the reasons for all 12 programs’ schedule slips in the individual assessments in appendix I  Of the 14 programs not on track during 2017, 8 revised or breached their established cost goals  Four of these 8 programs revised their cost goals when they re-baselined to address new requirements and technical challenges, among other things  When the Passenger Screening Program re-baselined in May 2017, the program’s APB threshold for its life-cycle costs increased $418 million (8 percent) over its previous APB  However, the revised threshold is $1 billion below the threshold established in the program’s initial APB, which was approved in January 2012  From 2012 to 2015, the program’s scope was reduced in response to funding constraints  However, emerging threats drove the program to increase capability requirements, which has subsequently increased costs  When the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program re- baselined in June 2017, the APB threshold for life-cycle costs decreased by $15 million (1 percent)  However, the program shifted some acquisition costs to operations and maintenance (O&M) to be consistent with DHS’s new common appropriations structure  This, in addition to other changes, increased the APB threshold for O&M by $631 million (3,712 percent)  When the National Security Cutter program re-baselined in November 2017 to account for a ninth ship—as directed by Congress—the APB cost thresholds for acquisition and O&M increased by $453 million (8 percent) and $123 million (1 percent), respectively  When the Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s TECS Modernization program re-baselined in November 2017 in preparation for acquisition decision event 3, the APB cost thresholds increased overall  Specifically, the acquisition cost threshold decreased by $14 million (6 percent) when the program included actual costs through fiscal year 2016, among other things, and the O&M cost threshold increased by $147 million (92 percent) when the program extended the estimate by 4 years and included support costs for an additional 11 years  The other 4 programs breached their established cost goals during 2017  The Medium Lift Helicopter and Electronic Baggage Screening programs breached certain APB cost thresholds when they shifted costs between categories, such as O&M to acquisitions or vice versa, to be consistent with DHS’s new common appropriations structure  The Tactical Communications Modernization program experienced a cost breach primarily because of increases in costs for contractor labor and support for facilities and infrastructure  The program’s APB cost threshold for O&M increased by $110 million (23 percent) when it re-baselined in November 2017  The Automated Commercial Environment program experienced a cost breach because it had to extend its contracts to address the development difficulties discussed above  The magnitude of the program’s cost goal changes is not yet known because the program does not plan to revise its APB until August 2018  We elaborate on the reasons for all 8 programs’ cost goal changes or breaches in the individual program assessments in appendix I  In January 2016, based on several of our past recommendations, DHS required major acquisition programs to begin submitting to headquarters (1) detailed data on program affordability, such as updates to the program’s LCCE and funding source information, to help inform the department’s annual resource allocation process, and (2) an annual LCCE update  These requirements are intended to provide more timely information that may improve DHS’s efforts to address acquisition program affordability issues, as well as internal and external oversight of programs’ progress against its cost goals  These actions are in accordance with GAO’s cost estimating best practices, which state that cost estimates should be updated with actual costs so that they are always relevant and current  As a result, we have used these sources to provide the programs’ current estimate in the individual assessments in appendix I, as appropriate, and plan to use these data sources to measure programs’ cost changes going forward  According to officials from the Cost Analysis Division, a program’s annual LCCE update should inform the affordability submission to support the annual resource allocation process and can be completed at any point during the fiscal year leading up to this process  We examined documentation to ascertain whether the programs we reviewed complied with the two requirements  For the 24 programs we assessed with department-approved APBs, we found the following: All 24 programs submitted the detailed data on program affordability to headquarters by June 2017 to inform the fiscal year 2019 resource allocation cycle  Most programs’ submissions accounted for changes since the program’s last LCCE was approved by DHS’s Chief Financial Officer, except three  For example, the Long Range Surveillance Aircraft program’s submission reflected no updates from its November 2011 LCCE because the program was in the process of re-baselining to account for significant changes  The program began re-baselining nearly 3 years ago and has been delayed for various reasons, including challenges with the vendor hired to complete a revision of the program’s LCCE  Eighteen of the 24 programs submitted annual LCCE updates  Three programs—Automated Commercial Environment, H-65, and Transformation—did not submit an annual LCCE update because they were in breach  The other 3 programs—all within the Coast Guard—did not submit an annual LCCE because, according to Coast Guard officials, they have limited internal cost estimating capability and rely on outside sources for this service, which led to delays in completing the annual LCCEs for these programs  Coast Guard officials said they are reviewing options to resolve these delays and improve the Coast Guard’s cost estimating capability  Cost Analysis Division officials anticipate the Coast Guard will increase compliance with the annual LCCE requirement in fiscal year 2018  They also plan to update the annual LCCE template to include additional information, such as comparisons of the updated estimates to the program’s APB cost goals and projected funding  In addition, DHS revised the format of its FYHSP report to Congress, improving insight into major programs’ acquisition funding, but decreasing insight into O&M funding  In April 2014, we found that DHS could better communicate its funding needs for acquisition programs to Congress and recommended that DHS enhance the content for future FYHSP reports by presenting programs’ annual cost estimates and any anticipated funding gaps, among other things  DHS concurred with the recommendation and, for the first time, included acquisition affordability tables that presented programs’ annual acquisition cost estimates compared to projected acquisition funding for select major acquisition programs in its FYHSP report for fiscal years 2018–2022  However, DHS no longer reported O&M funding for individual programs  DHS reported in the FYHSP that it focused on acquisition information because O&M funding estimates are generally stable year-to-year and components manage O&M in various ways, such as by individual program or across a portfolio of programs  By removing O&M funding information in the FYHSP for all programs, DHS presents an incomplete picture of programs’ full funding needs and affordability  In April 2018, we assessed the extent to which DHS had accounted for O&M costs and funding in greater detail and recommended that DHS reverse the exclusion of O&M funding at the acquisition program level in its FYHSP report to Congress for all components  DHS officials stated that they plan to re-introduce O&M funding for major acquisition programs in the FYHSP report for fiscal years 2019–2023 based on multiple internal discussions about the best way to present a more comprehensive view of programs’ total costs and feedback from key stakeholders, such as the Office of Management and Budget  Based on the information presented in the FYHSP report for fiscal years 2018–2022, DHS’s acquisition portfolio is not affordable over the next 5 years  For example, the report contained acquisition affordability tables for 18 of the 24 programs we assessed that have approved APBs  Of these 18 programs, 9 were projected to have an acquisition affordability gap in fiscal year 2018  However, some of these projections are outdated since the FYHSP report—which was issued in September 2017—relied on cost information as of April 2016  Therefore, we updated these tables using the programs’ current acquisition cost estimate presented in the individual assessments in appendix I  Based on our assessment of programs’ current cost estimates, we also found that a total of 9 programs are projected to have an acquisition affordability gap in fiscal year 2018  However, 3 of these 9 programs were different programs than those identified based on the FYHSP report  Of the 9 programs we identified with a projected acquisition affordability gap in fiscal year 2018, we found the following: Five programs identified other funding, such as funding from previous fiscal years that remained available for obligation—known as carryover funding—which would address their projected acquisition funding gap  For example, in the FYHSP report, DHS projected allocating approximately $16 million in funding for the Technology Infrastructure Modernization program in fiscal year 2018 to cover an estimated $16 million in acquisition costs  However, in its November 2017 annual LCCE update, this program’s acquisition cost increased to almost $30 million, resulting in a projected acquisition affordability gap of almost 45 percent  The program plans to realign $57 million in O&M carryover funding to cover this and any future acquisition shortfalls  Four programs did not identify other funding that would address their projected acquisition funding gap, which increases the likelihood that they will cost more and take longer to deliver capabilities to end users than expected  For example, in the FYHSP report, DHS projected allocating $109 million in funding for the Non-Intrusive Inspection Systems program in fiscal year 2018 to cover an estimated $103 million in acquisition costs  However, in its April 2017 annual LCCE update, this program’s acquisition costs increased to nearly $186 million, resulting in a projected acquisition affordability gap of 41 percent  The program identified only $2 5 million in fiscal year 2017 acquisition carryover funding  Further, 5 of the 24 programs we assessed were not included in the fiscal years 2018–2022 FYHSP report because they were no longer expected to receive acquisition funding  Officials from 3 of these 5 programs projected funding gaps that could cause future program execution challenges, such as schedule slips or cost growth  For example, the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility anticipates a projected funding shortfall of approximately $90 million over the next 5 years, which officials said could delay a number of activities to make the facility operational  We elaborate on programs’ affordability over the next 5 years in the individual program assessments in appendix I  We assessed DHS’s policies outlining the department’s processes for acquisition management, resource allocation, and requirements and found that, when considered collectively, they generally reflect key portfolio management practices  In March 2007, we examined the practices that private sector entities use to achieve a balanced mix of new projects and found that successful commercial companies use a disciplined and integrated approach to prioritize needs and allocate resources when making investments  This approach, known as portfolio management, requires companies to view each of their investments as contributing to a collective whole, rather than as independent and unrelated  With this perspective, companies can effectively (1) identify and prioritize opportunities, and (2) allocate available resources to support the highest priority—or most promising—opportunities  Based on this and other work, we identified four key practice areas for portfolio management in September 2012  We previously assessed DHS’s acquisition management and resource allocation policies against our key portfolio management practices in September 2012 and April 2014, respectively  We found that the policies in place at the time of our reviews did not fully reflect all of the key portfolio management practices and recommended that DHS revise its policies to do so  DHS concurred with our recommendations and subsequently took actions to mature and solidify the department’s portfolio management processes and policies  In April 2014, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum titled Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort, which aimed to strengthen DHS’s structures and processes to improve departmental cohesiveness and operational effectiveness, among other things  The memorandum identified several initial focus areas intended to build organizational capacity, one of which centered on improving and integrating the department’s processes for acquisition oversight, resource allocation, and joint requirements analysis  To improve these processes, the memorandum directed senior DHS leaders to update the existing acquisition management and resource allocation processes, as well as lead an expedited review to provide alternatives for developing and facilitating a component-driven joint requirements process, which ultimately led to the re-establishment of the JRC  In response to our recommendations and the Unity of Effort memorandum, DHS issued new policies outlining the acquisition management, resource allocation, and requirements processes in 2016  We assessed these policies and found that, when considered collectively, they generally reflect the key portfolio management practices, as shown in table 5  Because DHS’s new policies were issued in 2016, we did not specifically assess DHS’s implementation of them  However, we did review documentation resulting from the acquisition management, resource allocation, and requirements processes since January 2016 to get a sense of how the department began implementation  Examples of how DHS’s policies reflect the key portfolio management practices and their implementation status are outlined below  Clearly define and empower leadership: the policies identify the roles and responsibilities for decision makers in the acquisition management, resource allocation, and requirements processes, as well as establish cross-functional teams to support those decision makers  For example, to fulfill the role of acquisition decision authority, the Under Secretary for Management is supported by the Acquisition Review Board, which consists of key DHS senior leaders responsible for managing the department’s finances, contracts, and testing, among other things  We reviewed the memorandums issued since January 2016 that document Acquisition Review Board decisions and found that, through this group, DHS has taken steps to manage across programs through its acquisition management process  For example, after reviewing the status of several individual Customs and Border Protection programs in 2016, the Acquisition Review Board identified the need for a comprehensive border plan that depicts the component’s current land, maritime, and air domain awareness capabilities  In October 2016, the Deputy Under Secretary for Management—who was serving as acquisition decision authority at the time—directed Customs and Border Protection to develop such a plan  The plan is to consist of separate analyses for each of the three domains—starting with land— that reflect end users’ capability requirements for systems, such as Integrated Fixed Towers, Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft, and Medium Lift Helicopter, that address relevant domain threats  As of February 2018, Customs and Border Protection had not yet completed the analysis for land domain awareness capabilities  Establish standard assessment criteria and demonstrate comprehensive knowledge of the portfolio: the policies establish standard criteria for assessing major acquisition programs through the acquisition management, resource allocation, and requirements processes  For example, the updated resource allocation handbook established that PA&E conduct annual assessments of all major investments using standard criteria in five main categories— contribution to DHS’s mission, program health, risk, resources, and governance—to assess the portfolio of investments and present alternatives for leadership decision  PA&E officials told us they used these criteria when assessing components’ resource allocation requests during development of the President’s fiscal year 2018 budget to develop funding options for the Deputy’s Management Action Group, which is responsible for making resource allocation recommendations for the Secretary’s approval  PA&E presented its funding options by DHS mission, which, according to officials associated with the Deputy’s Management Action Group, allowed the group to make cross-component allocation decisions that directly aligned with the department’s strategic goals  We could not verify these officials’ assertions based on the documentation we were provided, but will continue to monitor PA&E’s assessment of major acquisition programs against the standard criteria as the department’s implementation of its resource allocation policies matures  In addition, PARM formally established its Acquisition Program Health Assessments in October 2016 after more than a year of development and pilot efforts  These assessments are intended to monitor major acquisition programs quarterly (both on an individual program level and in aggregate) by rating programs against standard criteria in several categories—such as program management, financial management, and human capital—that DHS deemed important for successful program execution  We reviewed the quarterly reports issued from January 2016 to April 2017 and found that they primarily focused on individual programs  The portfolio-level information contained in these reports was limited to program results grouped in various categories, such as by component, by acquisition life-cycle phase, and by investment type (e g , information technology)  PARM officials said they plan to use the health assessments as a portfolio management tool in the future and are working to determine how to best to analyze and present portfolio-level data  We will continue to track PARM’s implementation of the health assessment process moving forward through GAO’s High Risk work to determine DHS’s progress in demonstrating that major acquisition programs are on track to achieve their established goals  Prioritize investments by integrating the requirements, acquisition, and budget processes: the policies identify areas where DHS’s requirements, acquisition management, and resource allocation processes are integrated and establish processes for prioritizing investments  For example, the updated resource allocation policies require reviews of DHS’s major acquisition portfolio during this annual process  When the portfolio faces a funding gap, programs are to be returned to their respective components for scope or funding adjustments, or prioritized by department leadership to identify an affordable set of programs  For the fiscal year 2018 resource allocation cycle, PA&E officials provided an example where DHS leadership directed components to identify funding from alternative sources to fund specific purposes related to DHS’s mission to prevent terrorism and enhance security  However, as previously discussed, the resulting FYHSP report for fiscal years 2018–2022 showed that DHS’s portfolio of major acquisition programs is not affordable over the next 5 years  In addition, the requirements policies established the Joint Assessment of Requirements, an annual process to prioritize emerging and existing requirements to inform the department’s resource allocation decisions  As we found in October 2016, the JRC plans to implement the Joint Assessment of Requirements through a 3-year phased approach that is expected to be fully implemented in time to inform DHS’s fiscal year 2021 budget request  In fiscal year 2016, the JRC completed the first phase, which included (1) developing initial criteria to evaluate emerging requirements, and (2) evaluating and prioritizing a sample of those requirements against the initial criteria  Based on these results, JRC officials told us in September 2017 that they are working to develop assessment metrics for the criteria as part of the next phase  We will continue to track the JRC’s progress through GAO’s High Risk work to determine DHS’s progress to effectively operate the JRC  Continually make go/no go decisions to rebalance the portfolio: the requirements policies outlining the Joint Assessment of Requirements process also reflected the key practices to conduct reviews (1) annually to make requirement scoping adjustments as priorities change and (2) when new investments are identified  However, as previously discussed, the JRC is still in the process of implementing this process  We consider this overall key practice area to be partially met because DHS’s policies do not reflect the key practice (3) to reassess programs that breach established thresholds within the context of the portfolio to determine if the program remains relevant and affordable  PARM officials told us that—in practice—DHS reassesses programs in the context of their component’s overall acquisition portfolio based on a certification of funds memorandum submitted to DHS’s Chief Financial Officer when programs re-baseline as a result of a cost, schedule, or performance breach  The memorandum is intended to enable the Acquisition Review Board to discuss affordability by certifying a program’s funding levels and identifying trade-offs necessary to address any projected funding gaps  We previously found that the certification of funds memorandum was an effective tool for DHS leadership to assess program affordability  However, DHS’s acquisition management policy requires components to submit this memorandum prior to most acquisition decision events, but not when a program re-baselines as a result of a cost, schedule, or performance breach  During our review of programs’ progress against schedule and cost goals in 2017, we found one instance where a component did not follow the practice to submit this memorandum when one of its programs re-baselined as a result of a breach  Specifically, Customs and Border Protection did not submit a certification of funds memorandum when the Tactical Communications Modernization program re-baselined in November 2017 as a result of a schedule and cost breach  Nevertheless, DHS leadership approved the program’s revised APB and removed it from breach status, even though DHS’s Chief Financial Officer identified that the program’s revised LCCE was not affordable  PARM officials stated that this instance was an oversight because, at the time, the department was still determining when certification of funds memorandums should be submitted  According to the federal standards for internal control, documentation of internal control practices is necessary so that they can be implemented effectively  By amending its acquisition management policy to require a certification when a program re-baselines as a result of a cost, schedule, or performance breach, DHS can ensure that leadership receives the necessary information to reassess that program’s affordability in the context of a larger portfolio  PARM officials stated that, moving forward, components will be required to submit a certification of funds memorandum for each program when a new APB is submitted for DHS leadership approval  In contrast, the acquisition management policy does reflect the key practice (4) to use information gathered from post-implementation reviews to fine tune investment processes and the portfolio to achieve strategic outcomes  For example, DHS’s acquisition management policy requires programs to conduct post-implementation reviews 6 to 18 months after initial operational capability to identify and document any deployment or implementation and coordination issues, how they were resolved, and how they could be prevented in the future  These reviews are intended to help identify capability gaps that may inform future acquisitions, among other things  However, PARM officials said that they do not consider the results of the post-implementation reviews when managing the department’s current acquisition portfolio because these reviews are typically conducted after program oversight shifts from PARM to the component  While post-implementation reviews are conducted later in the acquisition life cycle, the insights they provide could be leveraged by other programs in the acquisition portfolio, not just the program under review  For example, the Integrated Fixed Towers program completed a post-implementation review in June 2016 after its initial deployment of capabilities to the Arizona border  The review found that changes in illegal traffic patterns as a result of the program’s deployment may be predicted, and other technologies may be able to compensate for changes in these patterns  This information could help other programs under development plan for similar outcomes or enable DHS to change deployment plans for existing programs to address changes in threats  PARM has an opportunity to use the results from programs’ post- implementation reviews since it is responsible for overseeing the department’s acquisition portfolio by monitoring each investment’s cost, schedule, and performance against established baselines  Federal standards for internal control state that management should obtain data on a timely basis so that they can be used for effective monitoring and that separate evaluations may provide feedback on the effectiveness of ongoing monitoring  By leveraging the results from post-implementation reviews in its monitoring efforts, PARM may be better able to ensure that programs in the current acquisition portfolio achieve their baselines  PARM officials stated they have generally focused on leveraging information gathered from canceled acquisition programs, such as where and why plans went wrong  However, they agreed that they could better leverage post- implementation review information gathered from programs that complete planned capability deployments  DHS’s mission to safeguard the American people and homeland requires a broad portfolio of acquisitions  However, the performance of DHS’s major acquisition portfolio during 2017 did not improve compared to our last review because we found that more programs will require more time and may require more money to complete than initially planned  DHS is collecting more timely cost estimate information on its acquisition programs to make more informed investment decisions  Yet DHS continues to face challenges in funding its acquisition portfolio, which highlights the need for disciplined policies that reflect best practices to ensure that the department does not pursue more programs than it can afford  DHS leadership has taken positive steps in recent years by strengthening its policies for acquisition management and resource allocation, and establishing policies related to requirements  Collectively, these policies reflect an integrated approach to managing investments  However, opportunities remain to further strengthen the acquisition management policy by documenting DHS’s current practice to reassess programs that breach their established cost, schedule, or performance thresholds to ensure they are still worth pursuing within the context of the portfolio  Additionally, leveraging information learned once programs complete deployment across the acquisition portfolio could help ensure that programs stay on track against their baselines in the first place  This is particularly relevant because DHS is initiating a number of complex and costly acquisition programs, such as development of a wall system along the southwest border and the Coast Guard’s Heavy Polar Icebreaker, which could benefit from this type of information  We are making the following two recommendations to DHS: The Under Secretary for Management should update DHS’s acquisition management policy to require components to submit a certification of funds memorandum when a major acquisition program re-baselines in response to a breach  (Recommendation 1) The Under Secretary for Management should require PARM to assess the results of major acquisition programs’ post-implementation reviews and identify opportunities to improve performance across the acquisition portfolio  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment  In its comments, reproduced in appendix IV, DHS concurred with both of our recommendations and identified actions it planned to take to address them  DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of Homeland Security  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or makm@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V  This appendix presents individual assessments for each of the 28 programs we reviewed  Each assessment presents information current as of January 2018  They include standard elements, such as an image, a program description, and summaries of the program’s progress in meeting cost and schedule goals, performance and testing activities, and program management-related issues, such as staffing  Each assessment also includes the following figures: Fiscal Years 2018–2022 Affordability  This figure compares the funding plan presented in the Future Years Homeland Security Program report to Congress for fiscal years 2018–2022 to the program’s current cost estimate  We use this funding plan because the data are approved by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Office of Management and Budget, and was submitted to Congress to inform the fiscal year 2018 budget process  The figure only presents acquisition funding because DHS did not report operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs in its funding plan to Congress  In addition, the data do not account for other potential funding sources, such as carryover  Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) vs  Current Estimate  This figure compares the program’s cost thresholds from the initial APB approved after DHS’s acquisition management policy went into effect in November 2008 and the program’s current DHS-approved APB to the program’s expected costs as of January 2018  The source for the current estimate is the most recent cost data we collected (i e , a department-approved life-cycle cost estimate, updated life-cycle cost estimates submitted during the resource allocation process to inform the fiscal year 2019 budget request, or a fiscal year 2017 annual life- cycle cost estimate update)  Schedule Changes  This figure consists of two timelines that identify key milestones for the program  The first timeline is based on the initial APB DHS leadership approved after the department’s current acquisition management policy went into effect  The second timeline identifies when the program expected to reach its major milestones as of January 2018 and includes milestones introduced after the program’s initial APB  Dates shown are based on the program’s APB threshold dates or updates provided by the program office  Test Status  This table identifies key recent and upcoming test events  It also includes DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation’s assessment of programs’ test results, if an assessment was conducted  Staffing Profile  This figure identifies the total number of staff a program needs (measured in full time equivalents) including how many are considered critical and how many staff the program actually has  Lastly, each program assessment summarizes comments provided by the program office and identifies whether the program provided technical comments  AUTOMATED COMMERCIAL ENVIRONMENT (ACE) CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP) The ACE program is developing software that will electronically collect and process information submitted by the international trade community  ACE is intended to provide private and public sector stakeholders access to information, enhance the government’s ability to determine whether cargo should be admitted into the United States, and increase the efficiency of operations at U S  ports by eliminating manual and duplicative trade processes, and enabling faster decision making  Final deployment and operational testing of ACE functionality delayed  Program plans to identify an approach to address collections functionality in March 2018  We last reported on this program in March 2018 and April 2017 (GAO-18-271, GAO-17-346SP)  CBP declared a cost and schedule breach in April 2017—5 months after re-baselining the program in response to a prior breach—because of difficulties developing the collections aspect of ACE’s remaining functionality, which collects and processes duties owed on imported goods  CBP reported that its officials were not versed in the complexities of collections in the legacy system and underestimated the level of effort required to integrate collections capabilities into ACE  As a result, the program delayed final deployment of ACE functionality several times and missed the deadlines for completing the remaining milestones in its current acquisition program baseline (APB), including achieving acquisition decision event (ADE) 3 and full operational capability (FOC) by the revised dates of June 2017 and September 2017, respectively  Additional coding and testing to complete ACE development also required contract extensions that exceeded the current APB cost thresholds  The program subsequently decoupled collections from ACE’s remaining functionality to permit deployment of the other post-release capabilities—such as liquidations and reconciliation—using a phased approach between September 2017 and February 2018  In November 2017, CBP officials estimated that efforts to decouple collections from post-release functionality would be an additional $32 million in acquisition costs  CBP officials plan to cover these costs with $18 million in fiscal year 2017 carryover funding and by reprogramming $14 million from ACE disaster recovery funding  CBP is in the process of determining a path forward for collections, which is due to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership by the end of March 2018  CBP then plans to update the program’s acquisition documentation, including APB and life- cycle cost estimate, by August 2018  Until then, the time frame for completing ACE’s remaining milestones and true cost of the program, including the cost to complete collections development is unknown  The program was not included in DHS’s funding plan to Congress for fiscal years 2018 to 2022 because DHS did not report operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs  CBP officials anticipate receiving approximately $535 million in O&M funding over this 5-year period  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) AUTOMATED COMMERCIAL ENVIRONMENT (ACE) When DHS leadership re-baselined ACE’s cost, schedule, and performance parameters in 2013, the program adopted an agile software development methodology to accelerate software creation and increase flexibility in the development process  As of October 2017, the ACE program office oversees 11 agile teams that conduct development and O&M activities  CBP officials said they extended the program’s agile development contracts in 2017 to permit further development of the collections function  In identifying a path forward for collections, CBP officials stated there are three main options: 1  leave collections in the legacy system, 2  continue to pursue development and deployment in ACE, or 3  move collections to a different program altogether  The program previously experienced a schedule breach in June 2016 because it delayed events to address external stakeholders’ concerns about transitioning to ACE  According to CBP officials, CBP has signed a memorandum of understanding with each of the 22 partner agencies responsible for clearing or licensing cargo that provides access to ACE  As of February 2018, 21 of the partner agencies had transitioned to ACE and the program was piloting a solution for the remaining partner  In September 2017, CBP reported that ACE continued to lack a director of testing and evaluation  CBP officials said they do not plan to fill this vacancy despite plans to conduct further testing because existing staff have successfully covered the workload and a large portion of testing has already been completed  CBP officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP) The Biometric Entry-Exit Program is developing capabilities to enhance traveler identification upon departure from the U S  at air, land, and sea ports of entries by collecting biometric data, such as fingerprints and facial recognition  The program plans to match this data to biometric data obtained from travelers upon their arrival into the U S  to identify foreign nationals that stay in the U S  beyond their authorized periods of admission and verify the identities of travelers leaving the U S  CBP completed four biometric pilot programs and selected a solution for development  DHS has explored biometric exit capabilities since 2009, but was directed to expedite implementation in March 2017  GAO last reported on this program in February 2017 (GAO- 17-170)  In June 2017, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Under Secretary for Management (USM) granted the Biometric Entry-Exit Program acquisition decision event (ADE) 1 approval after CBP completed several pilot initiatives to study the feasibility of proposed biometric exit solutions at air and land ports of entry  The USM also authorized the program to continue testing a pilot exit solution at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport and conduct technology demonstrations as needed, but directed the program to achieve ADE 2A prior to deploying a solution to the 20 U S  airports with the most international flights  CBP officials initially planned to achieve ADE 2A approval in September 2017—the point at which the program would establish cost, schedule, and performance goals in a DHS-approved acquisition program baseline (APB)—and pursue separate ADE 2B decisions to initiate development of a biometric solution for each type of port of entry, starting with air  As of December 2017, the program had yet to conduct its ADE 2A because CBP officials have had to resolve several issues identified by the Joint Requirements Council that has delayed approval of the program’s operational requirements document (ORD)  In January 2018, CBP officials said the program plans to conduct ADE 2A in February or March 2018 and is aiming for ADE 2B for the biometric air solution in December 2018  In December 2015, Congress established an account to be used for the development and implementation of the biometric entry-exit system starting in 2017  Specifically, Congress provided that half the amount collected from fee increases for certain visa applications from fiscal years 2016 through 2025—up to $1 billion—would be available to DHS until expended  In February 2017, DHS leadership approved the program to use about $73 million of this funding in fiscal year 2017 for information technology investments and programmatic and operational support, among other things  In September 2017, DHS’s Chief Financial Officer approved the program’s life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE), which CBP expects to refine as the program progresses to meet the fee-funding limit  According to CBP officials, the current funding structure poses challenges because the fees will fluctuate based on immigration rates  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of a traveler to different sources—one technology compared the photo to the traveler’s passport upon entrance to the U S ; the other technology compared the photo to a gallery of photos based on the outbound flight manifest during an airline’s boarding process  According to CBP officials, the facial recognition technology that matched photos during an airline’s boarding process was the most viable approach and served as the foundation for its development of the ADE 2A acquisition documents  Officials stated a similar approach may be feasible for land border crossings, but will require further planning  In January 2018, CBP officials stated they were developing a test and evaluation master plan—which will outline the developmental and operational test approach—for the biometric exit air solution  DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation will need to review and approve this plan prior to the program’s ADE 2B  Since 1996, several federal statutes have required development of an entry and exit system for foreign nationals  DHS has been exploring biometric exit capabilities since 2009 and an Executive Order issued in March 2017 directed DHS to expedite the implementation of the biometric entry-exit system  The Biometric Entry-Exit Program plans to develop a capability to match a traveler’s biometric data against data contained in existing DHS biometric data repositories— primarily the National Protection and Program Directorate’s IDENT system  DHS is in the process of replacing and modernizing IDENT through the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART) program because IDENT is at risk of failure  However, HART has experienced delays, which could affect the Biometric Entry-Exit Program’s development progress  For the air biometric solution, CBP plans to pursue a public/private partnership in which airlines and airports invest in the equipment to collect biometric data  According to CBP officials, this approach could reduce program costs and improve the passenger boarding process  In August 2017, CBP officials told GAO that several airlines have expressed interest in partnering with the program, including one that expanded CBP’s pilot of facial recognition matching for outbound flights to additional gates at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport  CBP officials reported a staffing gap of 14 full time equivalent staff which the program plans to fill once partnerships with airlines are established  CBP officials stated that authorized funds are collected from visa fee increases that expire in fiscal year 2025  Beyond 2025, officials stated that additional funding will need to be appropriated or the fee increases extended to continue the program  They added that fee collections are currently below forecasted levels and may come under the current $1 billion limit  CBP officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP) The border wall system is intended to prevent the illegal entry of people, drugs, and other contraband by enhancing and adding to the 654 miles of existing barriers along the U S  southwest border  CBP plans to create a border enforcement zone between a primary barrier—such as a fence—and a secondary barrier  To establish the enforcement zone, the wall system may also include detection technology, surveillance cameras, lighting, and roads for maintenance and patrolling  CBP has evaluated prototypes for new barrier designs, but risks with planned detection technologies exist  CBP is leveraging staff and the contracting strategy from prior border fencing programs  GAO last reported on the existing Southwest border barriers in February 2017 (GAO-17-331)  In April 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership granted CBP permission to procure barrier prototypes to inform new design standards and approved the construction of the first segment of the wall system  CBP subsequently awarded 8 task orders with a total value of over $3 million for the development of prototypes and selected San Diego as the first segment  CBP plans to replace an existing 14 miles of primary and secondary barriers in San Diego  DHS plans to use fiscal year 2017 funding for the replacement of the primary barrier, which it plans to rebuild to existing design standards  DHS has requested funding for replacement of the secondary barrier beginning in fiscal year 2018 that it plans to rebuild to new design standards once established  DHS leadership plans to approve acquisition documentation—including an acquisition program baseline (APB) and a life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE)—for each segment to determine affordability prior to authorizing construction  However, CBP officials said they do not plan to develop an APB for the San Diego segment because DHS already approved construction  In January 2018, DHS leadership approved an APB establishing cost, schedule, and performance goals for a second segment in the Rio Grande Valley (RGV), which will extend an existing barrier by 60 miles  To inform leadership’s decision, DHS headquarters conducted an independent cost estimate, which CBP adopted as the program’s LCCE  The LCCE includes costs for both the San Diego and RGV segments  However, DHS officials stated that the amounts in the LCCE are not releasable until CBP evaluates the prototypes, determines, and designs a final solution for the San Diego secondary barrier, and updates the LCCE—which is not expected to be complete until June 2018  The costs presented here are only for the RGV segment  CBP reported that construction of the RGV segment would be sufficiently funded if it receives $1 3 billion of acquisition funding in fiscal year 2018  However, CBP identified a shortfall in operations and maintenance (O&M) funding from fiscal years 2019 to 2022 that it plans to cover with existing funding from the Tactical Infrastructure program, which will be responsible for maintenance of the wall system as segments are complete  If funded, the program expects to achieve full operational capability for the RGV segment in March 2023  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) The Border Wall System Program was initiated in response to an Executive Order issued in January 2017 stating that the executive branch is to secure the southern border through the immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern border of the U S  To expedite the acquisition planning process, CBP officials said they leveraged expertise from staff that worked on previous border fencing programs and were familiar with implementation challenges, such as land access  CBP intends to prioritize segments based on threat levels, land ownership, and geography, among other things  From fiscal years 2007 to 2015, CBP spent approximately $2 3 billion to construct pedestrian and vehicle fencing along the southwest border  CBP’s Tactical Infrastructure program is responsible for sustaining this fencing and other infrastructure—such as gates, roads, and bridges— over its lifetime  CBP plans to continue coordinating with the U S  Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for engineering support and for awarding and oversight of construction contracts  CBP anticipates that all contract awards issued by USACE in support of the RGV segment will be firm fixed price  If appropriations are received, the program plans to award construction contracts for the first portion of RGV in May 2018 and for the secondary barrier in San Diego in August 2018  In February 2018, CBP officials stated that staffing the program office is a challenge because funding has not yet been received  CBP officials said that existing work for the program is being handled by current CBP staff  CBP officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  INTEGRATED FIXED TOWERS (IFT) CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP) The IFT program helps the Border Patrol detect, track, identify, and classify illegal entries in remote areas  IFT consists of fixed surveillance tower systems equipped with ground surveillance radar, daylight and infrared cameras, and communications systems linking the towers to command and control centers  CBP plans to deliver or upgrade approximately 53 IFT systems across six areas of responsibility (AoR) in Arizona: Nogales, Douglas, Sonoita, Ajo, Tucson, and Casa Grande  System acceptance test completed in Douglas AoR and requirements were met  Program is adequately staffed, but simultaneous deployments in the future may have a negative impact  GAO last reported on this program in November and April 2017 (GAO-18-119, GAO-17-346SP)  In December 2017, CBP declared a schedule breach of the IFT program’s current acquisition program baseline (APB) because the program did not receive the funding needed to complete planned deployments on time to achieve its full operational capability (FOC) date of September 2020  The program’s FOC date previously slipped 5 years because of delays in the initial contract award process and funding shortfalls  CBP completed IFT deployments to the Douglas AoR in June 2017 and anticipates completing deployments to the Sonoita AoR in December 2017, as scheduled  However, in September 2017, CBP officials stated that they requested—but did not receive—additional funding from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to address new IFT requirements, including camera upgrades and replacement of existing tower systems deployed under a legacy program  In January 2015, Border Patrol requested the program prioritize replacement of the legacy systems in the Tucson and Ajo AoRs because the technology was obsolete and more expensive to maintain than the IFT technology planned for deployment in other AoRs  Without additional funding, CBP officials stated that they would be unable to exercise the contract options for the remaining AoRs on time  In June 2017, the program updated its life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE), which is slightly less than its current APB cost thresholds  This LCCE update includes estimated costs for the new requirements  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs  CBP identified $8 million in acquisition carryover funding for fiscal year 2018 and officials anticipate receiving $126 million in O&M funding to cover $100 million in O&M costs over the next 5 years  The program plans to submit a revised APB to DHS leadership by June 2018  However, the FOC date may be further delayed because of land access issues  CBP officials told GAO that they have not yet reached an agreement with the Tohono O’odham Nation—a sovereign Native American Nation—to access tribal lands, which these officials said is necessary for the construction of IFTs in the Ajo and Casa Grande AoRs  10/15 Initial operational capability (Nogales) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) INTEGRATED FIXED TOWERS (IFT) When CBP initiated the IFT program, it decided to procure a non-developmental system, and it required that prospective contractors demonstrate their systems prior to CBP awarding the contract  The program awarded the contract to EFW, Inc  in February 2014, but the award was protested  GAO sustained the protest and CBP had to reevaluate the offerors’ proposals before it again decided to award the contract to EFW, Inc  As a result, EFW, Inc  could not initiate work at the deployment sites until fiscal year 2015  According to CBP officials, the number of IFT systems deployed to a single AoR is subject to change based on assessments by the Border Patrol  DHS leadership directed CBP to develop a comprehensive border plan in October 2016 that includes IFT capabilities and—when preparing for the last budget cycle—the program estimated costs for expansion to the southwest border beginning in fiscal year 2019  In September 2017, CBP officials told GAO that they did not have any current staffing gaps  However, CBP officials added that if the program receives full funding and reaches an agreement with the Tohono O’odham Nation to initiate IFT deployments to the Ajo and Casa Grande AoRs, while concurrently deploying capability to the Sonoita and Tucson sectors, they will be short on government and contracted staff  CBP officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  MEDIUM LIFT HELICOPTER (UH-60) CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP) UH-60 is a medium-lift helicopter that CBP uses for law enforcement and border security operations, air and mobility support and transport, search and rescue, and other missions  CBP’s UH-60 fleet consists of 20 aircraft acquired from the U S  Army in three different models  CBP previously acquired 4 modern UH-60M aircraft and converted 6 of its older 16 UH-60A aircraft into more capable UH-60L models  CBP is replacing the remaining 10 UH-60A with reconfigured Army HH-60L aircraft  CBP test agent and the Army completed testing of reconfigured HH-60L prototype  CBP has initiated efforts to acquire additional converted HH-60L aircraft from the Army  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  The program breached the cost and schedule goals in its acquisition program baseline (APB) and, as of December 2017, CBP officials stated they were in the process of developing the breach notification required under the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) acquisition policy  In its annual life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) update, the program shifted some operations and maintenance (O&M) costs to acquisitions to be consistent with DHS’s new appropriation structure  For example, the program shifted costs for recurring upgrades from O&M to acquisition because these upgrades require development and production  As a result, the program’s updated acquisition cost estimate exceeded the APB acquisition cost threshold, which constitutes a cost breach under DHS’s acquisition policy  CBP officials stated that they did not initially declare a cost breach because the program’s total LCCE was within the APB threshold  The program also did not hold its acquisition decision event (ADE) 3 by the APB deadline of September 2017  The ADE 3 is intended to approve the transfer of CBP’s remaining UH-60A aircraft for reconfigured Army HH60-L aircraft based on an evaluation of a reconfigured prototype  According to CBP officials, the program did not complete the required acquisition documentation by the ADE 3 deadline, in part, because DHS leadership directed CBP to develop a comprehensive border plan in October 2016 that includes UH-60 capabilities  It is unclear when the ADE 3 will occur because, as of December 2017, several documents were pending validation by the Joint Requirements Council  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained O&M funding for individual programs  In addition, CBP officials previously told GAO that UH-60 O&M is funded through a separate, central funding account for all of CBP’s air and marine assets  CBP officials stated that the projected acquisition funding gap in fiscal years 2019 and 2020 is primarily for replacing obsolete parts that were previously considered O&M  According to these officials, the Army conducts an annual obsolescence study that will help CBP identify and prioritize replacements across the UH-60 fleet based on available funding levels  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) MEDIUM LIFT HELICOPTER (UH-60) CBP previously acquired UH-60 as a part of its Strategic Air and Marine Program (StAMP)  In July 2016, DHS leadership designated UH-60 as a separate and distinct major acquisition program  CBP initially planned to convert all 16 of its UH-60A aircraft into UH-60L models, but changed its strategy once it learned the Army planned to divest several HH-60L aircraft that could more easily be converted into UH-60L aircraft for CBP missions  CBP officials anticipated the new strategy could reduce the program’s costs by an estimated $70 million, accelerate its schedule, and result in newer aircraft since the Army’s HH-60L airframes had fewer operating hours than CBP’s existing UH-60A aircraft  In September 2017, CBP officials told GAO they had initiated efforts to acquire additional HH-60L aircraft by conducting a study of current capability gaps and drafting a mission need statement  As of September 2017, program officials confirmed that they maintain a consolidated program office where the same staff from StAMP continue to support all remaining acquisitions, including the UH-60  However, these officials stated that they plan to realign staff to a dedicated asset over time  Program officials also stated that the program has hired a dedicated cost estimator and would like to hire additional staff to focus on procuring spare parts and common component issues, such as radio replacements, for CBP’s air and marine assets  CBP officials reiterated that the changes in acquisition costs were primarily a result of cost realignment and that the program’s total life-cycle cost is still within the initial APB LCCE goals  CBP officials also stated that—to supplement Army test data—the program’s OTA participated in the flight tests and will provide a formal report on the results  MULTI-ROLE ENFORCEMENT AIRCRAFT (MEA) CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP) MEA are fixed-wing, multi-engine aircraft that can be configured to perform multiple missions including maritime, air, and land interdiction, as well as signals detection to support law enforcement  The current MEA configuration is equipped with marine search radar and an electro-optical/infrared sensor to support maritime and land surveillance and airborne tracking missions  MEA will replace CBP’s fleet of aging C-12, PA-42, and BE-20 aircraft  Testing of new configuration planned for May 2018, but requirements not yet defined  Began retrofitting accepted MEA with new mission system in fiscal year 2017  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17- 346SP)  According to CBP officials, the program is on track to meet the cost and schedule goals in its current acquisition program baseline (APB) for 16 maritime interdiction MEA and is actively pursuing additional aircraft  In April 2016, CBP developed a report that identified capability needs in three mission areas and proposed increasing the program’s total to 38 aircraft by adding 13 air and 6 land interdiction MEA, and 3 signals detection MEA  The Joint Requirements Council endorsed CBP’s findings, but recommended CBP develop a number of requirements documents—including an operational requirements document—to fully validate the findings  As of September 2017, CBP officials told GAO they were in the process of updating these documents to focus on air interdiction capabilities—the next MEA configuration  These officials stated that completing these documents has been delayed, in part, because Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership directed CBP to develop a comprehensive border plan in October 2016 that includes MEA capabilities  Despite not yet completing all the updated documents, DHS leadership approved CBP’s request to procure MEA 17 in September 2017 after the congressional conferees agreed to an additional aircraft beyond DHS’s budget request  CBP anticipates delivery of MEA 17 by September 2018, which is within the program’s full operational capability (FOC) date  However, if the program receives approval to acquire additional aircraft, the FOC date will be extended  The program completed an annual life-cycle cost estimate update, which exceeds the program’s current APB cost thresholds, because it reflects costs for all 38 aircraft, among other reasons  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs  In addition, CBP officials previously told GAO that MEA’s O&M is funded through a separate, central funding account for all of CBP’s air and marine assets  In September 2017, CBP officials said that the program was fully funded for 17 aircraft but had some affordability challenges with spare parts, which they are working with CBP and DHS headquarters to address  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) MULTI-ROLE ENFORCEMENT AIRCRAFT (MEA) CBP is replacing the mission system processor on the MEA with a system used by the U S  Navy and U S  Coast Guard that is intended to enhance operator interface and sensor management, as well as replace obsolete equipment  CBP’s OTA tested a prototype of the processor during an operational assessment in July 2015  The OTA found that the MEA had resolved issues found during prior testing, but also made 29 additional recommendations and findings to improve the aircraft and new mission system’s effectiveness  DHS’s Director, Office of Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) concurred with the OTA’s findings  CBP previously acquired MEA as a part of its Strategic Air and Marine Program (StAMP)  In July 2016, DHS leadership designated MEA as a separate and distinct major acquisition program  CBP initially planned to procure 50 MEA and awarded the first production contract in September 2009  However, the aircraft did not perform well during testing  In October 2014, DHS leadership said CBP could not procure or accept transfer of additional MEA without approval  CBP procured 12 aircraft under the initial contract and—with DHS approval—CBP awarded a new indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract in September 2016 for 1 base year and four 1-year options to support procurement of additional aircraft  In December 2017, CBP officials said the program had received 12 aircraft and awarded contracts for 5 more  According to program officials, MEA 13-16 will be delivered with the new mission system and CBP began retrofitting previously delivered aircraft in fiscal year 2017  As of September 2017, program officials confirmed that they maintain a consolidated program office where the same staff from StAMP continue to support all remaining acquisitions, including MEA  However, these officials stated that they plan to re-align staff to a dedicated asset over time  Program officials also stated that the program has hired a dedicated cost estimator and would like to hire additional staff to focus on procuring spare parts and common component issues, such as radio replacements, for CBP’s air and marine assets  CBP officials stated that delays in receiving approval of the program’s requirements documents may pose a risk to exercising options for additional MEA on an existing contract, which could stop production and increase contract costs associated with procuring future aircraft  CBP officials added that air and marine requirements officers continue to produce documentation requested by the Joint Requirements Council to provide sufficient context for the mission need and border security  CBP officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP) The NII Systems Program supports CBP’s interdiction of weapons of mass destruction, contraband such as narcotics, and illegal aliens being smuggled into the United States, while facilitating the flow of legitimate commerce  CBP officers use large- and small-scale NII systems at air, sea, and land ports of entry; border checkpoints; and international mail facilities to examine the contents of containers, railcars, vehicles, baggage, and mail  CBP initiated efforts for future NII requirements and procurements  66 percent staffing gap contributed to delays in NII deployments  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  The NII Systems Program is on track to meet its approved schedule and cost goals  The estimates in the program’s annual life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) update continued to decrease overall compared to its approved acquisition program baseline (APB) cost thresholds  Specifically, compared to the prior year’s estimate, the program’s acquisition costs decreased by $96 million and operations and maintenance (O&M) costs increased by $22 million  However, the LCCE update only estimated costs through fiscal year 2026—9 years short of the program’s final year  The LCCE primarily decreased because of a reduction of 1,977 planned additional and replacement NII systems  CBP officials said fewer large- and small-scale systems are needed because some systems have longer estimated lives than expected, and systems procured have better capability  CBP officials do not anticipate that the reduction in quantities will have an adverse effect on operations because they stated that the new systems can provide dual purpose capabilities (i e , one system can replace multiple separate systems)  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained O&M funding for individual programs  CBP officials anticipate receiving approximately $605 million of O&M funding over this 5-year period to cover about $626 million in estimated O&M costs, which includes $100 million to operate and maintain radiation detection equipment acquired by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office  These officials also identified $37 million in carryover funding to cover the remaining $21 million of O&M estimated costs  However, the program is projected to have a $266 million acquisition funding gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 The program has a plan to address funding shortfalls but, according to CBP officials, it has not yet needed to implement the strategies in this plan because of several factors, including cost reductions achieved through combined life-cycle contracts and lower-than-expected actual technology costs in fiscal year 2016  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) trucks as they are driven through the inspection portals—low dose X-ray to inspect the truck cab and high dose X-ray to inspect the cargo trailer  In March 2017, the Joint Requirements Council validated a capability analysis report that assessed current capability gaps in NII operations to assist with identifying potential upgrades to existing systems and developing requirements for future systems  According to program officials, CBP plans to review and update, as necessary, the mission need statement in fiscal year 2018  Additionally, program officials are preparing a consolidated acquisition plan for future procurements  These officials said CBP has not yet determined whether future procurements would be included into the current NII Systems Program of record or constitute a new acquisition program  CBP’s ability to successfully execute the existing NII Systems Program and plan for future efforts may be at risk because of understaffing  As of January 2018, the NII Systems Program continued to face a staffing gap of approximately 66 percent, including critical vacancies such as the acquisition program manager and a logistics program manager  Officials also noted that a lack of adequate personnel to procure, test, and deploy NII systems forces the program to prioritize its acquisitions, which can result in delays of NII deployments and testing efforts  For example, one manufacturer increased its output rate of NII systems, but the program did not have the staff to accept the systems at the increased rate  Officials anticipate the program may remain understaffed until CBP completes a reorganization that started more than a year ago, in which acquisition programs are realigned from a mission-support office to their operational entity  CBP officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  REMOTE VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (RVSS) CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP) The RVSS program helps the Border Patrol detect, track, identify and classify illegal entries across U S borders  RVSS consists of daylight and infrared video cameras mounted on fixed towers and buildings with communications systems that link to command and control centers  From 1995 to 2005, CBP deployed approximately 310 RVSS towers along the U S  northern and southern borders, and initiated efforts to upgrade legacy RVSS towers in Arizona in 2011  Program does not plan to conduct additional operational testing on future deployments  Once funded, program plans to award a new contract for deployments in sectors along the southwest border  GAO last reported on this program in November 2017 (GAO-18-119)  In April 2016, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership elevated RVSS from a level 3 program—which focused on upgrading legacy RVSS in Arizona—to a level 1 program after approving CBP’s plan to expand deployments to the Rio Grande Valley (RGV) sector and adding an additional 6 sectors along the southwest border  At this time, DHS leadership approved the program to move forward with deployments to two RGV stations, which can be completed as options under the program’s existing contract  However, the program was required to re-baseline to account for its expanded scope and conduct an acquisition decision event (ADE) to obtain approval for additional deployments  As of January 2018, the program had not yet conducted its ADE or obtained DHS approval for an acquisition program baseline (APB) that established cost, schedule, and performance goals for the expanded program  In September 2017, CBP officials told us that they had drafted the APB and other required documentation, such as a life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE), but were unsure when the ADE would occur because the program had not received funding for the additional deployments  In addition, the ADE may have been delayed because DHS leadership directed CBP to develop a comprehensive border plan in October 2016 that includes RVSS capabilities  In September 2017, DHS leadership approved the RVSS’s revised LCCE which totaled nearly $4 billion for all program costs from fiscal years 2011 through 2042, including expansion along the southwest border and new initiatives such as a pilot for relocatable RVSS towers  DHS conducted an independent cost estimate for the program, which DHS cost estimating officials stated was within 2 percent of the program’s LCCE  RVSS was not included in DHS’s funding plan to Congress for fiscal years 2018 to 2022 because it had not yet been elevated to a level 1 program at the time the plan was developed  CBP officials stated that the program has received acquisition funding to cover the approved RGV deployments  However, CBP officials told GAO that the program may also assume responsibility for maintaining all legacy RVSS, but has not received adequate operations and maintenance funding to do so  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) REMOTE VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (RVSS) In July 2013, CBP awarded a firm fixed-price contract for a commercially available, non-developmental system  This contract covered the program’s initial scope to deploy upgraded RVSS in Arizona and two stations within the RGV sector, which can be completed as options  According to CBP officials, the program will need to award a new contract to cover expansion to the remaining six sectors along the southwest border  In September 2017, CBP officials said that the request for proposals for the new contract had been drafted but it cannot be released until the program receives funding  CBP officials told GAO that RVSS is coordinating with CBP’s Border Wall System Program on some planned deployments within the RGV sector  For example, CBP is considering moving 2 of the planned RVSS towers to be co-located with the planned barrier, which officials stated may provide better surveillance  If the Border Wall System Program does not receive funding, CBP officials said the towers will be placed in the originally planned locations  CBP officials stated that the RVSS program requires additional staff for contracting activities, maintenance activities for legacy RVSS, and for relocatable tower pilot deployments  To mitigate the staffing gap, CBP officials said they prioritize responsibilities of current personnel to meet program execution needs  CBP officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP) The TACCOM program is intended to upgrade land mobile radio infrastructure and equipment to support approximately 95,000 users at CBP and other federal agencies  It is replacing obsolete radio systems with modern digital systems across various sectors located in 19 different service areas, linking these service areas to one another through a nationwide network, and building new communications towers to expand coverage in 5 of the 19 service areas  Issues related to security requirements have delayed full operational capability by more than a year  Program is being re-organized under Border Patrol, but still faces staffing challenges  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  In November 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership re-baselined the TACCOM program, removing it from breach status after the program experienced a schedule slip and cost growth  In July 2017, CBP officials notified DHS leadership that the program would not achieve full operational capability (FOC) as planned due to issues related to federal information security requirements  The program now plans to achieve FOC by March 2019—more than a year later than its initial acquisition program baseline (APB) deadline  According to CBP officials, FOC will include planned upgrades to the San Diego system, which requires transitioning management of the legacy system from the Department of Justice to DHS  In August 2017, CBP officials stated that both agencies were reviewing an agreement with plans to complete the transition in fiscal year 2018  CBP officials stated that the program realized it would exceed its initial APB cost thresholds as it was developing its annual life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) update and subsequently submitted a revised LCCE for DHS leadership approval  The program’s costs primarily grew because of increases in costs for contractor labor and support for facilities and infrastructure  CBP officials said the program’s initial estimates were immature; however, DHS leadership approved the initial LCCE in December 2015—4 years after the program began sustaining capabilities  DHS’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) approved the program’s revised LCCE in November 2017, but noted that the program’s estimate exceeded its available funding and requested that the program address the affordability gap before it was re-baselined  CBP officials said that they are conducting an affordability analysis, which they anticipate will be completed by March 2018  Nevertheless, DHS leadership approved the program’s re-baseline in November 2017  CBP officials subsequently identified errors in the approved APB cost threshold tables and provided revised amounts, which are presented here  The program was not included in DHS’s funding plan to Congress for fiscal years 2018 to 2022 because DHS did not report operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs  CBP officials anticipate receiving approximately $120 million in O&M funding over this 5-year period  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) CBP officials told GAO that in January 2018, the program will move from a mission support office to a joint program office under Border Patrol as a part of CBP’s reorganization that started more than a year ago  The goal of this move is to make CBP land mobile radio capabilities seamless by combining the mission critical voice functions of Air and Marine Operations, the Border Patrol, and the Office of Field Operations—the TACCOM program’s primary customers—under one organizational leader, the Border Patrol Chief  CBP officials anticipate that the current TACCOM program structure will remain in place after this move with the exception of the program’s engineers, which will move to CBP’s Office of Information and Technology but be assigned to support TACCOM full time  In August 2017, CBP officials told GAO they were in the process of hiring staff to fill the program’s vacant positions  They added that the fiscal year 2019 budget contains plans for additional infrastructure enhancements, which will require technical staff to assist in the planning and execution of these efforts and may put additional strain on the program’s limited government technical staff  They noted that the hiring and retention of qualified land mobile radio engineers and information technology technical staff is a challenge because of competition with the private sector, among other factors  In addition to maintenance of the CBP Land Mobile Radio System that provides critical communication needs for CBP agents and officers protecting U S  borders, CBP officials stated the TACCOM program is providing infrastructure, such as building an engineering lab to facilitate design, development, test, and evaluation activities, to support improvements in CBP’s current and future Land Mobile Radio Systems  CBP officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP) TECS (not an acronym) is a law-enforcement information system that has been in place since the 1980s and helps CBP officials determine the admissibility of persons entering the United States at border crossings, ports of entry, and prescreening sites located abroad  CBP initiated efforts to modernize TECS to provide users with enhanced capabilities for accessing and managing data  Immigration and Customs Enforcement has a separate TECS Modernization program  System operationally effective and suitable, but cybersecurity testing needed  CBP working to address and prevent major system outages  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  In July 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership granted the program acquisition decision event (ADE) 3 approval, but required CBP to conduct follow-on operational test and evaluation (OT&E) before declaring full operational capability (FOC)  This is more than a 2-year delay from CBP’s initial FOC date and a 9-month delay from its most recent revised FOC date  DHS approved the fourth version of the program’s acquisition program baseline (APB) in July 2016  In this APB, CBP split FOC into two separate operational capability milestones at its data centers to better reflect the program’s activities  CBP delivered operational capability at the primary data center in Decemberas scheduled—which provides redundant TECS access to minimize downtime during system maintenance or unscheduled outages  However, not all test results were available in time for the program’s ADE 3 decision, which contributed to DHS leadership’s decision to delay declaring FOC  2016, which included transitioning all TECS users to the modernized system  CBP delivered operational capability at the secondary data center in June 2017—The program updated its life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) for ADE 3, which is within its current APB cost thresholds  However, the LCCE only included costs through fiscal year 2021—7 years short of DHS’s guidance that states program cost estimates should cover at least 10 years from the FOC date  Nevertheless, DHS granted the program ADE 3 approval without an understanding of the program’s full life-cycle costs, as required by its acquisition policy  CBP officials plan to update the LCCE by the end of calendar year 2018 to include costs for future years and other items, such as costs associated with follow-on OT&E and moving the data centers to a cloud environment—a CBP-wide initiative  The program was not included in DHS’s funding plan to Congress for fiscal years 2018 to 2022 because DHS did not report operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs  CBP officials anticipate receiving approximately $205 million in O&M funding over the next 4 years and have identified carryover for each year  However, CBP officials said there may be a small funding gap starting in fiscal year 2020, but they expect to achieve savings by migrating the data centers to a cloud environment  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Since the program has completed development, CBP is focused on ensuring that the modernized TECS system works as intended by addressing operational issues as they are identified  For example, on January 2, 2017, a primary TECS Modernization application experienced a major outage that resulted in long airport delays  In August 2017, CBP officials said they continually monitor system health through a 24/7 operations center and have established a group dedicated to addressing the issues related to the January 2, 2017, outage  In September 2017, DHS’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that nearly 100 outages, periods of latency, or degraded service were reported for three TECS Modernization applications between June 2016 and March 2017  The OIG also found that CBP’s monthly reports on TECS system availability did not include periods of slowness or service interruptions that were caused by external factors  For example, the January 2, 2017, incident was identified in CBP outage reports, but was not captured in the monthly report because it was caused by a change to an external feed to the TECS system  CBP officials clarified that the monthly reports only account for interruptions that result in a full loss of operations for all TECS system users  The OIG recommended that CBP develop a plan to address factors that contributed to challenges regarding availability of primary traveler screening applications, among other things  CBP concurred with the recommendations  On January 1, 2018, the TECS system experienced another major outage that caused long airport delays; CBP officials said this incident is under review  CBP officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  LOGISTICS SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (LSCMS) FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) LSCMS is a computer-based tracking system that FEMA officials use to track shipments during disaster-response efforts  It is largely based on commercial-off-the- shelf software  FEMA initially deployed LSCMS in 2005, and initiated efforts to enhance the system in 2009  According to FEMA officials, LSCMS can identify when a shipment leaves a warehouse and the location of a shipment after it reaches a FEMA staging area near a disaster location  FEMA now anticipates reaching full operational capability by June 2019, up to 6 months late  Recent testing shows progress, but additional operational testing delayed to May 2018  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  In November 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership approved a revised acquisition program baseline (APB) after the LSCMS program experienced a schedule breach  In September 2017, FEMA officials notified DHS leadership that it would not complete all required activities—including follow-on operational test and evaluation (OT&E)—to achieve acquisition decision event (ADE) 3 and full operational capability (FOC) by its initial APB dates of September 2018 and December 2018, respectively  According to FEMA officials, the delay was primarily caused by the need to deploy LSCMS program personnel in support of response and recovery efforts during the 2017 hurricane season  The program now plans to achieve FOC by June 2019—up to 6 months later than initially planned  DHS leadership authorized LSCMS to resume all development and acquisition efforts in March 2016 after a nearly 2-year program pause following program management issues  In October 2017, FEMA officials told GAO that they had completed several development efforts—such as integration with DHS’s asset management system—and were in the process of adding Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) to allow LSCMS to interface with its partners’ information systems  The program’s annual life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) update continued to be within its APB cost thresholds  However, the program’s APB thresholds are not adjusted to account for risk, which increases the chance that the program could experience a cost breach  As of November 2017, FEMA officials did not anticipate that its schedule delays would lead to a cost breach  Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) LOGISTICS SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (LSCMS) The LSCMS program previously experienced significant execution challenges because of poor governance  FEMA initially deployed the enhanced LSCMS in 2013 without DHS leadership approval, a DOT&E letter of assessment, or a DHS-approved APB documenting the program’s costs, schedule, and performance parameters, as required by DHS’s acquisition policy  DHS’s Office of Inspector General also found that neither DHS nor FEMA leadership ensured the program office identified all mission needs before selecting a solution  In response, DHS leadership paused all LSCMS development efforts in April 2014 until the program addressed these issues, among others  FEMA subsequently completed an analysis of alternatives and developed an APB based on this assessment  DHS leadership approved the APB in December 2015 and authorized FEMA to resume all LSCMS development and acquisition efforts in March 2016  In October 2017, FEMA officials told GAO that the LSCMS program had minimal staffing shortages and was working to recruit additional staff  Officials previously attributed the program’s governance and testing challenges, in part, to staffing shortages and we previously found that it only had 7 of the 22 5 full time equivalents it needed in fiscal year 2014  Although the program has obtained more staff since then, FEMA officials noted in October 2017 that during disasters—such as 2017 hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria—LSCMS program personnel are deployed to support response and recovery efforts, which leave program positions vacant for the duration of the deployment  FEMA officials stated that during the response to hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria in 2017, LSCMS processed supply chain transactions that exceeded the total number of transactions from the preceding 12 years—which includes the response to Hurricane Katrina  They added that the program provided support for nearly 130 million meals in 2017 compared to a total of approximately 84 million from the 12 previous years  FEMA officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) Since the 1980s, TECS (not an acronym) has provided case management, intelligence reporting, and information sharing capabilities to support ICE’s mission to investigate and enforce border control, customs, and immigration laws  ICE initiated efforts to modernize TECS in 2009 to replace aging functionality and provide end users with additional functionality to meet mission needs  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) executes a separate TECS Modernization program  Conducted additional testing of a revised key performance parameter and cybersecurity  Program has improved integration with external systems  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  In November 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership approved a revised life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) and acquisition program baseline (APB) in preparation for the program’s acquisition decision event (ADE) 3 following deployment of final functionality  According to ICE officials, the program completed deployment of full operational capability (FOC) functionality in August 2017—4 months earlier than initially planned  FOC functionality included enhancements to case management capabilities, such as improved system search capabilities  The functionality was deployed in conjunction with enhancements and fixes for initial operational capability (IOC) functionality  The program achieved IOC in June 2016, which entailed delivering 80 percent of the modernized TECS functionality and successfully transitioning ICE off the legacy system  The overall cost thresholds in the current APB increased compared to the program’s prior APB from July 2016  Specifically, the acquisition cost threshold decreased by $14 million and the operations and maintenance (O&M) cost threshold increased by $147 million  These costs changed for various reasons, such as the following: The acquisition cost threshold decreased when ICE included actual costs through fiscal year 2016 and accounted for funding shortfalls  ICE officials told GAO that the program experienced a funding shortfall in fiscal year 2017 that led it to adjust spending under multiple contracts and shift some costs to fiscal year 2018  The O&M cost threshold increased when ICE extended the estimate from fiscal years 2024 to 2028 and continued contractor and systems engineering support for an additional 11 years  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained O&M funding for individual programs  ICE officials anticipate receiving approximately $94 million in O&M funding to cover an estimated $105 million in O&M costs over this 5-year period  ICE officials said that they are pursuing strategies to reduce future O&M costs, such as awarding a competitive contract in March 2018 for O&M activities and any future enhancements  ICE officials continue to work closely with CBP to provide users access to various systems through the modernized TECS system  The program previously worked to resolve technical problems with CBP support services that emerged during final integration testing of the ICE and CBP modernized TECS systems, which contributed to a 3-month delay in achieving IOC  Users reported during initial OT&E that the modernized ICE TECS system was an improvement over the legacy system but they requested better integration with external systems, such as CBP’s Seized Assets and Case Tracking System (SEACATS), which they use to determine the disposition of seized assets for case management and reporting purposes  According to ICE officials, CBP subsequently decided to modernize SEACATS  ICE officials stated that they have coordinated closely with CBP to integrate the two modernized systems and ensure un-interrupted access to SEACATS for TECS users  For example, ICE developed a workaround so that TECS users maintain access to the latest seizure data available from the modernized SEACATS  ICE officials added that they continue to make improvements in interfaces with other external systems as prioritized by end users  In July 2017, ICE reported that the program was fully staffed  ICE officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  CONTINUOUS DIAGNOSTICS AND MITIGATION (CDM) NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE (NPPD) The CDM program aims to strengthen the cybersecurity of the federal government’s networks at more than 65 participating civilian agencies by providing tools and dashboards that continually monitor and report on network vulnerabilities  Tools are delivered in four phases: phase 1 and 2 tools report vulnerabilities in hardware and software, and user access controls, respectively; phase 3 tools will report on efforts to prevent attacks; and phase 4 tools will provide encryption to protect network data  Program revised its key performance parameters and test and evaluation master plan as a part of its rebaseline  Program plans to change its acquisition strategy and continues to face workforce challenges  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  In June 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership re-baselined the CDM program for the third time to approve initiating development of phase 3 and to address challenges encountered during phase 1  Specifically, contractors previously found large gaps—ranging from 19 to 384 percent—in the actual number of devices needing phase 1 tools than what was originally reported by 12 agencies  The operations and maintenance (O&M) cost thresholds increased by $631 million when the program shifted some potential acquisition costs to beThe program’s new acquisition program baseline (APB) modified the program’s cost, schedule, and performance parameters  For example: consistent with DHS’s new appropriation structure, among other things  The O&M cost thresholds previously decreased by $1 2 billion, in part, because DHS leadership determined the program would only fund CDM tools for the first 2 years after deployment  The acquisition costs did not increase despite phase 1 challenges, in part, because coverage for the U S  Postal Service— The program’s full operational capability (FOC) date slipped almost 4 years after which had the largest gap in estimated devices—will no longer be funded by the CDM program  it was redefined from deployment of phase 1-3 tools at 5 agencies to the availability of these tools to all participating agencies  However, the program’s costs will increase and its FOC date may slip further once the program establishes goals for phase 4  NPPD officials said they were unable to complete planning efforts for phase 4 in time to incorporate it into the most recent APB revision and, therefore, plan to re-baseline the CDM program again in 2018  The CDM program identified a potential acquisition affordability gap in fiscal year 2018 based on its revised life-cycle cost estimate, which it addressed by adjusting the phase 3 schedule to shift some acquisition costs out to fiscal year 2020  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained O&M funding for individual programs  However, the program anticipates receiving approximately $281 million in O&M funding over the 5-year period  12/16 Phase 1 initial operational capability (IOC) National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) CONTINUOUS DIAGNOSTICS AND MITIGATION (CDM) The CDM program updated its acquisition plan as a part of its re-baselining efforts, which reflects a change in strategy for procuring CDM tools and integration services for participating agencies through the General Services Administration (GSA)  Previously, the CDM program issued task orders for these tools and services through blanket purchase agreements established under vendors’ GSA Federal Supply Schedule contracts  These agreements are set to expire in August 2018  Going forward, the program plans to use an existing GSA government-wide acquisition contract—known as Alliant—to obtain CDM tools and services  According to NPPD officials, the new acquisition strategy is intended to provide greater flexibility in contracting for current capabilities and to support future capabilities  It will also allow participating agencies to order additional CDM-approved products or services from GSA’s schedule for information technology equipment, software, and services; however, as of September 2017, NPPD officials stated they were in the process of determining how this process will work  NPPD officials said that the program continues to face workforce challenges related to managing the program’s change in contracts and planning for phase 4  In February 2018, NPPD officials stated that they had on-boarded 5 staff to help address the program’s reported fiscal year 2017 gap of 16 full time equivalents  They noted that another 5 candidates were in the hiring process and that NPPD continues to work with officials from DHS’s Office of the Chief Security Officer to reduce continued challenges in onboarding new staff due to the lengthy security clearance process  In addition to activities outlined in this assessment, NPPD officials stated that the CDM program continues to manage its budget to ensure program costs match available funding, and is leveraging the collective buying power of federal agencies and strategic sourcing to achieve government cost savings on CDM products  NPPD officials also stated that, as of December 2017, CDM has deployed agency dashboards to 23 agencies and was conducting and testing information exchanges of data between agency dashboards and the federal dashboard  HOMELAND ADVANCED RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY (HART) NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE (NPPD) HART will replace and modernize the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) legacy biometric identification system—known as IDENT—which shares information on foreign nationals with U S  government and foreign partners to facilitate legitimate travel, trade, and immigration  NPPD plans to develop HART in four increments: increments 1 and 2 will replace and enhance IDENT functionality; increments 3 and 4 will provide additional biometric services, as well as a web portal and new tools for analysis and reporting  Key performance parameters will be demonstrated as capability is developed  Program has developed mitigation plans to address workforce risks  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  In June 2017, NPPD declared a schedule breach when it determined the HART program would not be able to meet its initial acquisition program baseline (APB) milestones  DHS leadership approved the program’s APB in April 2016 and authorized the program to initiate development efforts for increments 1 and 2 in October 2016  NPPD officials attribute the schedule slip to multiple delays in awarding the contract for increments 1 and 2 as a result of issues with the request for proposals (RFP)  The program released the RFP in February 2017 and awarded the contract in September 2017—approximately 9 months later than NPPD officials had planned  However, the program experienced additional delays after a bid protest to the contract award was filed with GAO in October 2017  GAO subsequently denied the protest and NPPD officials said the program plans to initiate work with the contractor in March 2018  HART initially planned to achieve initial operational capability (IOC) with the deployment of increment 1 in December 2018, at which point program officials anticipated beginning to transition users from IDENT to HART  However, it is unclear when this will now occur, which is a significant challenge because IDENT is at risk of failure and may be unable to fully support requirements related to new programs— such as Customs and Border Protection’s Biometric Entry-Exit  As a result, delays in HART could contribute to delays in other DHS acquisition programs  The program updated its life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) in June 2017 to inform the budget process  This LCCE is within its current APB cost thresholds, but does not account for the contractor’s solution  The program plans to update its LCCE and other acquisition documentation, such as its APB, after initiating work with the contractor  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs  However, the program anticipates receiving approximately $1 3 billion in O&M funding to cover $1 5 billion in O&M costs  NPPD officials explained that the current O&M cost estimate includes costs for maintaining IDENT  Future LCCE updates will reflect delivery of services through HART, which NPPD officials anticipate will be more cost effective  National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) HOMELAND ADVANCED RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY (HART) NPPD officials told GAO they are currently planning for increments 3 and 4 and plan to refine the cost, schedule, and performance goals for these increments in its next APB  NPPD plans to pursue a separate contract for the development and delivery of increments 3 and 4  However, the program will require DHS leadership approval prior to initiating these development efforts  In September 2017, NPPD officials told GAO they had hired two staff and planned to hire additional staff to address the program’s staffing gap of 5 5 full time equivalents  In response to DHS leadership’s direction, the program coordinated with DHS’s Chief Technology Officer to assess the skills and functions of staff necessary to execute the program and to develop the HART staffing plan  In its June 2017 staffing plan, the program identified workforce risks, including the potential for experiencing insufficient technical skillsets and inadequate resources to simultaneously execute development of HART and operate IDENT  To mitigate these risks, the program plans to develop a training plan to address the gap in skills, leverage support within the program by cross- training staff, and issue contracts for additional support as needed, among other things  However, if the program does not have adequate staff to complete these efforts, it may experience further schedule delays  NPPD officials stated that the program’s schedule delays pose a challenge because IDENT remains at risk of failure despite incremental improvements to extend its service life and may be unable to fully support new customer requirements or requirements related to new programs  They added that the program has a risk management process, which it is using to manage a variety of identified risks—including several related to workforce  They noted that these risks have not yet materialized  NPPD officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY PROTECTION SYSTEM (NCPS) NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE (NPPD) NCPS is intended to defend the federal civilian government from cyber threats  NCPS develops and delivers capabilities through a series of “blocks ” Blocks 1 0, 2 0, and 2 1 are fully deployed and provide intrusion-detection and analytic capabilities across the government  The NCPS program is currently deploying EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated (EA) to provide intrusion-prevention capabilities and plans to deliver block 2 2 to improve information sharing across agencies  A at 95 percent of agencies and departments  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  NPPD officials said the program is on track to meet the schedule and cost goals in its current acquisition program baseline (APB), which reflected changes resulting from the adoption of some of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) capabilities for block 2 2 rather than developing custom solutions  However, challenges in completing test plans delayed testing: Initial operational test and evaluation (OT&E) for EA transition to sustainment— slipped from September 2016 to May 2017  The initial test event for block 2 2—intended to inform the ADE 2C for deploying additional block 2 2 capabilities—slipped from March 2017 to September 2017  As of August 2017, NPPD officials said NCPS had adopted all planned HSIN capabilities but one because of security concerns, which HSIN is addressing by piloting a new tool  The program updated its life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) in June 2017 to inform the budget process, which is within its current APB cost thresholds  However, the program plans to update the LCCE again to support the EA, and costs through fiscal year 2022  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s funding plan no longer contained O&M funding for individual programs  NPPD officials anticipate receiving $1 8 billion in O&M funding over this 5-year period  The program is also projected to have an $83 million surplus in acquisition funding over this 5-year period, which NPPD officials anticipate will be less once the LCCE revision is complete  National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY PROTECTION SYSTEM (NCPS) A intrusion-prevention capabilities have been primarily provided through sole source contracts with internet service providers (ISP) and a contract to provide basic intrusion-prevention services  In December 2015, Congress required DHS to make available for use by federal agencies, certain capabilities, such as those provided by NCPS’s EA at approximately 93 percent of civilian federal agencies and departments and, in January 2018, NPPD officials said NCPS was up to 95 percent  According to NPPD officials, the program first focused on integrating EA for individual agencies and departments, but stated that they continue to work with all agencies and departments to provide EA services and approximately 95 percent of the federal civilian  gov user population is protected by at least one EA and an OA of NCPS block 2 2 information sharing capabilities in 2017  NPPD officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS PRIORITY SERVICES (NGN-PS) NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE (NPPD) NGN-PS is intended to address an emerging capability gap in the government’s emergency telecommunications service, which prioritizes select officials’ phone calls when networks are overwhelmed  NPPD executes NGN-PS through commercial telecommunications service providers, which addresses the government’s requirements as they modernize their own networks  NPPD is executing NGN-PS in two phases—(1) voice and (2) data and video  Initial operational capability for voice phase wireless capabilities achieved in August 2017  Acquisition of data and video phase capabilities to begin in September 2021  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  In November 2017, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Chief Financial Officer approved a revised life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) for NGN-PS, which includes costs for the entire program’s voice phase and eliminates operations and maintenance (O&M) costs  The program removed O&M costs because capabilities acquired through NGN-PS are transferred to and funded through NPPD’s Priority Telecommunications Service (PTS) once they become operational  NGN-PS is currently focused on delivering its voice phase, which is divided into three increments: Increment 1 maintains current priority service on long distance calls as commercial service providers update their networks; Increment 2 delivers wireless capabilities; and Increment 3 is intended to address landline capabilities  The program’s previous LCCE and current acquisition program baseline (APB) only include costs associated with increments 1 and 2  NPPD officials told GAO they plan to update the program’s APB in January 2018 to include costs, schedule, and performance goals for increment 3 and expect to receive DHS leadership approval to initiate development by August 2018  NGN-PS remains on track to meet its cost and schedule goals for the first two increments of the voice phase  The program’s full operational capability (FOC) for increment 1 previously slipped from June 2017 to March 2019, which NPPD officials attributed to funding shortfalls  NGN-PS achieved initial operational capability (IOC) for increment 2 wireless capabilities in August 2017 when priority service via cellular towers was demonstrated by the program’s largest service provider  The program projects an acquisition affordability gap of $92 million from fiscal years 2018 to 2022  However, DHS’s current funding plan does not include funding for increment 3, which accounts for the funding shortfall in fiscal years 2021 and 2022  NPPD officials said they anticipate receiving an additional $79 million in acquisition funding over this 2-year period, but will continue to prioritize capabilities if additional funding is not provided  These officials also said the program has achieved cost savings on increments 1 and 2 that will mitigate some of the projected shortfall in fiscal years 2018 and 2019  National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS PRIORITY SERVICES (NGN-PS) NGN-PS was established in response to an Executive Order requiring the federal government to have the ability to communicate at all times during all circumstances to ensure national security and manage emergencies  A Presidential Policy Directive issued in July 2016 superseded previous directives requiring continuous communication services for select government officials  According to NPPD officials, the new directive validates the program’s requirements for the voice phase and was used to develop requirements for the video and data phase  The program expects to begin the acquisition of the phase 2 for video and data in September 2021  In July 2017, NPPD reported that the program needed a systems engineer and was mitigating the vacancy with contracted support staff  The program also identified a need for an additional systems engineer and program support staff starting in fiscal year 2019 to support the start of increment 3  In August 2017, NPPD officials told GAO they continue to face challenges hiring and retaining engineers with adequate experience because of competition with the private sector  The program has historically mitigated staffing gaps by leveraging support from contracted and PTS program staff, as needed  In addition to activities identified in this assessment, NPPD officials stated that the program has received Joint Requirements Council validation of the phase 2 concept of operations and DHS leadership approval of the phase 2 operational requirements document  As of January 2018, the updated APB was in the approval process  NPPD officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY (NBAF) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE (S&T) The NBAF program is constructing a state-of-the-art laboratory in Manhattan, Kansas to replace the Plum Island Animal Disease Center  The facility will enable the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to conduct research, develop vaccines, and provide enhanced diagnostic capabilities to protect against foreign animal, emerging, and zoonotic diseases that threaten the nation’s food supply, agricultural economy, and public health  Commissioning process underway, but performance will not be demonstrated until construction is complete  NBAF adequately staffed, but staffing needs will change as operational stand-up activities begin  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  The program’s annual life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) update is within its current acquisition program baseline (APB) cost thresholds and, according to NBAF officials, the program remains on track to meet its schedule goals  In August 2017, NBAF officials said that construction activities thus far—such as pouring concrete for the main laboratory and steel framing—have proceeded as anticipated and will continue through December 2020  NBAF officials told GAO the program has already received full acquisition funding for facility construction efforts through federal appropriations and gift funds from the state of Kansas  As construction continues, the program plans to begin operational stand-up activities for the facility  However, a potential affordability gap may delay the program’s ability to complete these stand-up activities, which are needed to begin conducting laboratory operations  The program was not included in DHS’s funding plan to Congress for fiscal years 2018 to 2022 because DHS did not report operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs  However, NBAF officials anticipate receiving only $149 million in O&M funding to cover an estimated $239 million in O&M costs over the next 5 years, resulting in a projected shortfall of approximately $90 million  NBAF officials stated the O&M funding gap could delay a number of operational stand-up activities, including plans to award a management operations and research support contract in October 2018, the purchase of laboratory and information technology equipment, and hiring of operations management staff  According to NBAF officials, if operational stand-up activities are delayed, there is a risk the facility will not be fully operational by December 2022, as is currently planned  This may delay the transition from the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, which is nearing the end of its useful life  NBAF officials reported that S&T plans to communicate the program’s future funding needs to DHS leadership through the annual budget process  If the program does not receive the funding it requests, these officials stated that S&T will prioritize the operational stand-up activities that best reduce the risk of schedule delays  Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY (NBAF) NBAF officials reported that they coordinate regularly with key stakeholders  For example, they hold regular coordination meetings with USDA officials to discuss NBAF operations, including operational stand-up activities and future procurement  The NBAF program office has also begun outreach to the federal regulators responsible for awarding the registrations needed for NBAF to conduct laboratory operations to begin planning for this authorization process  The NBAF program office is currently fully staffed  However, NBAF officials reported the program’s staffing needs will change in the coming years, as the program progresses through construction and begins operational stand-up of the facility  For example, over the next 5 years, the program will need to hire an operations director, bio-risk manager, chief information officer, and facility manager, among others, for NBAF operations management  However, the projected O&M funding shortfall during this same period could affect the program’s ability to hire new staff when needed and complete operational stand-up activities on time  NBAF officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  ELECTRONIC BAGGAGE SCREENING PROGRAM (EBSP) TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA) Established in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, EBSP tests, procures, and deploys transportation security equipment, such as explosives trace detectors and explosives detection systems, across approximately 440 U S  airports to ensure 100 percent of checked baggage is screened for explosives  EBSP is primarily focused on delivering new systems with enhanced screening capabilities and developing software upgrades for existing systems  Program is incorporating requirements to address cybersecurity risk for existing systems  EBSP plans to pursue a new procurement approach in 2018, and staffing challenges exist  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  In the program’s annual life-cycle cost estimate update, its operations and maintenance (O&M) costs exceeded the acquisition program baseline (APB) cost threshold, which constitutes a breach under the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) acquisition policy  The O&M costs increased when TSA accounted for updated maintenance costs and quantities, and shifted salaries from acquisition to O&M to align with DHS’s new appropriation structure  TSA officials said they did not submit a breach notification because they considered the movement of salaries to be an administrative change  The program plans to update its APB in calendar year 2018 to reflect a new plan for procuring equipment under its current acquisition strategy  TSA officials said this APB will also reflect the cost changes  In May 2016, DHS leadership approved a revised APB for EBSP, which reflects its current acquisition strategy to competitively procure systems on an ongoing basis using qualified product lists  The program’s revised APB cost thresholds decreased compared to its initial APB, which TSA officials attributed to various reasons, including shortening the program’s end date by 3 years and lower than anticipated actual costs, among other things  TSA officials told GAO that one of their primary challenges is funding, and the program is projected to face a $72 million acquisition funding shortfall in fiscal year 2018  TSA identified $70 million in carryover funding to address this gap  To mitigate anticipated funding gaps in future years, TSA officials said they may shift projects from one fiscal year to another or cancel them altogether, which may result in the delay or elimination of screening capabilities  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained O&M funding for individual programs  TSA anticipates receiving $980 million in O&M funding over this 5-year period to cover $1 billion in O&M costs  TSA officials anticipate achieving the program’s final APB milestone—initial operational capability (IOC) for systems that detect additional materials and provide an advanced threat detection algorithm—by its revised threshold date  Previously, EBSP planned to award contracts for these systems in September 2015 and September 2018, respectively  Transportation Security Administration (TSA) ELECTRONIC BAGGAGE SCREENING PROGRAM (EBSP) As of December 2017, EBSP had deployed 1,664 explosives detection systems and 2,638 explosives trace detectors nationwide  In 2018, EBSP plans to pursue a new competitive procurement approach to replace and update existing systems that will include: New contract vehicles to better align EBSP procurement activities with the program’s strategic roadmap  Updates to EBSP’s vendor qualification process to allow for vendor collaboration before testing  Transitioning from procuring systems with different sizes and speeds to two types: (1) inline systems that integrate with a baggage handling system and are linked through a network and (2) standalone systems that may be integrated with a baggage handling system, but not linked to a network  The program is in the process of updating its acquisition documentation to reflect this new procurement approach and TSA officials anticipate opening a qualified products list for new systems starting in June 2018  TSA officials said that staffing remains a challenge for the program because of cuts in government and contracted mission support staff and critical vacancies, including a division director  In September 2017, TSA reported that existing personnel across the program have assumed responsibilities of these positions, but workloads are unsustainable at current staffing levels  TSA officials stated that EBSP continues to procure, test, and deploy equipment and capabilities to recapitalize older equipment, improve security screening capability at airports, and enhance the detection capabilities of the fleet  They added that TSA employs extensive testing to verify the suitability and effectiveness of equipment to meet requirements  Moving forward, EBSP intends to establish IOC milestones for new technologies and capabilities, while allowing TSA the flexibility to make risk-based decisions  TSA officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  PASSENGER SCREENING PROGRAM (PSP) TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established PSP in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001  PSP identifies, tests, procures, deploys, and sustains transportation security equipment across approximately 440 U S  airports to help TSA officers identify threats concealed on people and in their carryon items  The program aims to increase threat detection capabilities, improve the efficiency of passenger screening, and balance passenger privacy and security  Started testing on the Credential Authentication Technology in TSA Precheck lanes during 2017  Critical staffing vacancies persist and may delay followon acquisition planning efforts  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  In May 2017, the DHS Under Secretary for Management (USM) approved the sixth version of the PSP acquisition program baseline (APB) and subsequently removed the program from breach status  In January 2016, TSA declared a schedule breach of a key milestone—acquisition decision event (ADE) 3—for the Credential Authentication Technology (CAT) because of delays in incorporating new cybersecurity requirements  Consistent with previous versions of the program’s APB, the new baseline modified the program’s cost, schedule, and performance parameters  For example, the program established the following: Separate CAT milestone dates for TSA Precheck and standard lanes  TSA officials stated there is no capability difference between screening lanes, but an initial focus on TSA Precheck lanes will assist with demonstrating CAT requirements and resolving past testing issues that contributed to an initial 4-year delay to CAT’s full operational capability (FOC) date  PSP now plans to reach FOC for CAT more than 5 years later than its revised target of June 2018 and more than 9 years later than initially planned  New FOC dates for other technologies, which TSA officials said are expected to be more realistic about delivery dates and account for changes in some FOC quantities  For example, TSA requested and received approval in September 2017 to increase FOC quantities for second generation Advanced Technology (AT-2) TierI systems to meet increasing passenger volume and expected airport growth  In May 2017, the USM also directed the program to revise its life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) in response to less-than-expected funding levels  The new LCCE also shifted some acquisition costs to operations and maintenance (O&M) to be consistent with DHS’s new appropriation structure  TSA officials believe the new funding profile will be sufficient to sustain legacy PSP equipment, but will significantly limit the program’s ability to enhance existing equipment capabilities and support operational needs  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained O&M funding for individual programs  TSA anticipates receiving $906 million in O&M funding over this 5-year period to cover $923 million in O&M costs  05/17 APB version 6 0 approved 03/20 CAT ADE 3 (precheck lanes) 09/21 CAT ADE 3 (standard lanes) 12/21 CAT FOC (precheck lanes) 12/23 CAT FOC (standard lanes) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) PASSENGER SCREENING PROGRAM (PSP) Automated screening lanes operational utility assessment AT-2 tier II follow-on operational test & evaluation (OT&E) TSA employs two acquisition strategies to acquire PSP systems: Qualified Product List (QPL) approach—used for proven technologies when capability requirements are rigid and contractors’ systems are mature  Any contractors’ systems that demonstrate they meet the capability requirements are added to the QPL  TSA has used this approach to acquire the second generation AT-2 systems, Bottled Liquid Scanners, and Explosive Trace Detectors  Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) approach—used when capability requirements are flexible and contractors’ systems are evolving  Under this approach, PSP uses a series of development contracts to enhance systems’ capabilities over time  PSP is currently using this approach to acquire CAT  TSA planned to initiate new acquisition programs starting in fiscal year 2018 that will replace PSP, but this effort may be at risk because of understaffing  In August 2017, TSA reported that its checkpoint screening division—whose staff is concurrently responsible for PSP and its follow-on programs—continued to have staffing vacancies, including project managers, analysts, and a deputy program manager  TSA is mitigating these gaps with existing staff and, according to TSA officials, the staffing challenges may decrease because the new programs may be delayed in response to funding cuts  TSA officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE MODERNIZATION (TIM) TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA) The TIM program was initiated to address shortfalls in TSA’s threat assessment screening and vetting functions by providing a modern and centralized end-to-end credentialing system  The TIM system will manage credential applications and the review process for millions of transportation workers and travelers across three segment populations: maritime, surface, and aviation  It will support large programs, such as TSA Precheck and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential  Operational testing identified limitations with the system; cybersecurity has not been assessed  Staffing gaps in key areas, such as systems engineering and testing, are a significant program risk  GAO last reported on this program in October and April 2017 (GAO-18-46, GAO-17- 346SP)  The TIM program is on track to meet the cost and schedule goals in its current acquisition program baseline (APB)  In September 2016, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Under Secretary for Management approved the TIM program’s revised APB—which reflected a new technical approach to deploy capabilities using an agile development methodology—and subsequently removed the program from breach status, authorizing TSA to resume new development after a nearly 22-month pause  DHS leadership paused new development in January 2015 after the program breached its initial APB goals for various reasons, including technical challenges, insufficient contractor performance, and the addition of new requirements after DHS leadership had approved the program’s initial acquisition strategy  The program now plans to achieve full operational capability (FOC) in March 2022 and its life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) increased to account for this 6-year schedule slip and integration with the Transportation Vetting System, among other things  Since the program’s re-baseline, it has been developing and deploying capabilities in 2-month incremental agile releases, such as functionality to transition TSA Precheck program to the TIM system  The program updated its LCCE in November 2017 to inform a program review with DHS leadership, which is within its current APB cost thresholds  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for individual programs  TSA officials anticipate receiving approximately $318 million in O&M funding over this 5-year period, which includes nearly $118 million in fees from vetting programs  TSA officials plan to realign $57 million to cover the projected acquisition shortfall, and said any additional surplus funding available in fiscal year 2022 would be used to implement new system requirements identified by the program’s customers  In November 2017, TSA officials identified several program and technical risks that could affect the program’s cost, schedule, and performance  These risks include an increase in new requirements and increased risk of system vulnerabilities and cyberattacks if the program does not identify a provider to perform software updates on open source code  TSA officials are working to mitigate these risks  Transportation Security Administration (TSA) TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE MODERNIZATION (TIM) Under the program’s new technical approach, TSA plans to replace the TIM system’s existing commercial-off-the-shelf applications with open source applications—software that can be accessed, used, modified, and shared by anyone—and move to a new virtual environment  The program’s new agile development methodology develops, tests, and deploys capabilities using an iterative, rather than a sequential approach  Consistent with this strategy, TSA awarded task orders in 2016 and 2017 totaling $34 5 million to the program’s existing contractor for agile design and development services, and plans to competitively award a new contract by May 2018  In October 2017, GAO found that TSA had not fully implemented several leading practices to ensure successful agile adoption  GAO also found that TSA and DHS needed to conduct more effective oversight of the TIM program to reduce the risk of repeating past mistakes  DHS concurred with all 14 recommendations made by GAO to improve program execution and oversight, and identified actions DHS and TSA can take to address them  TSA reported that staffing challenges are a significant risk to the program’s success and identified gaps in key areas—such as systems engineering, testing, and agile development  Program officials told GAO these positions cannot be filled because of a hiring freeze within TSA, which the component has imposed to assess their current workforce and restructure, if necessary  Program officials told GAO they requested waivers from the hiring freeze and, as of January 2018, they had received approval to hire 4 additional staff  TSA officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  FAST RESPONSE CUTTER (FRC) UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG) The USCG uses the FRC to conduct search and rescue, migrant and drug interdiction, and other law enforcement missions  The FRC carries one cutter boat on board and is able to conduct operations in moderate sea conditions  The FRC replaces the USCG’s Island Class patrol boat and provides improved fuel capacity, surveillance, and communications interoperability with other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Defense assets  FRC found operationally effective and suitable, and all key performance parameters validated  Main diesel engine issues persist, which may require further retrofits  GAO last reported on this program in March and April 2017 (GAO-17-218, GAO-17- 346SP)  According to USCG officials, the FRC program is on track to meet its current cost and schedule goals  The USCG plans to acquire 58 FRCs and, as of September 2017, 25 had been delivered and 19 were on contract  To inform the budget process, the program updated its life-cycle cost estimate in June 2017, which is within its current acquisition program baseline (APB) cost thresholds  Previously, the program’s initial operational capability (IOC) date slipped after a bid protest related to the program’s initial contract award—now known as phase 1—and the need for structural modifications  USCG officials attributed the 5-year slip in the program’s full operational capability (FOC) date to a decrease in annual procurement quantities under the phase 1 contract  Specifically, in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, the quantities decreased from 6 FRCs per year to 4  In May 2014, the USCG determined that it would procure only 32 of the 58 FRCs through this contract and initiated efforts to conduct a full and open competition for the remaining 26 vessels—known as phase 2  In May 2016, the USCG awarded the phase 2 contract for the remaining 26 FRCs, which has a potential value of $1 42 billion  Under the phase 2 contract, the USCG can procure 4 to 6 FRCs per option period  The USCG ordered 6 FRCs at the time of the phase 2 award and, in June 2017, exercised an option for an additional 6 FRCs  The USCG has established that the annual procurement quantity will be dictated by funding levels, and funding shortfalls could cause further schedule delays  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because—as we found in April 2015—DHS’s funding plan to Congress does not contain operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for USCG programs  USCG officials anticipate receiving $1 6 billion in O&M funding over this 5-year period  USCG officials stated that they expect to exercise an option for 4 FRCs in fiscal year 2018 and that the USCG plans to prioritize acquisition funding in fiscal years 2019 and 2020 to procure the final 10 hulls and complete procurement of all 58 FRCs  United States Coast Guard (USCG) FAST RESPONSE CUTTER (FRC) The USCG continues to work with the contractor—Bollinger Shipyards, LLC—to address issues covered by the warranty and acceptance clauses for each ship  For example, 18 engines—9 operational engines and 9 spare engines—have been replaced under the program’s warranty  According to USCG documentation, 65 percent of the current issues with the engines have been resolved through retrofits; however, additional problems with the engines have been identified since our April 2017 review  For example, issues with water pump shafts are currently being examined through a root cause analysis and will be redesigned and are scheduled to undergo retrofits starting in December 2018  We previously found that the FRC’s warranty resulted in improved cost and quality by requiring the shipbuilder to pay for the repair of defects  As of September 2017, USCG officials said the replacements and retrofits completed under the program’s warranty allowed the USCG to avoid an estimated $104 million in potential unplanned costs—of which $63 million is related to the engines  The FRC program does not have any critical staffing vacancies, but the USCG identified insufficient staffing for shore-side support groups as a potential risk that could affect the asset’s operations  These groups provide maintenance to the FRCs while they are in port  In order to mitigate this staffing issue, the USCG is using commercial contracts for maintenance to supplement the capacity of the USCG’s maintenance staff  USCG officials stated that the FRC program is fully funded, executable, and on track to reach FOC by March of 2027  They added that FRCs were recently delivered to locations in Mississippi, Alaska, and Hawaii  USCG officials stated that FRCs are integral to USCG operations, such as providing critical support during the recent hurricane season, and that the program office continues to work with the contractor and stakeholders to quickly and properly address issues with FRCs as they are identified  USCG officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  H-65 CONVERSION/SUSTAINMENT PROGRAM (H-65) UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG) The H-65 aircraft is a short-range helicopter that the USCG uses to fulfill its missions, including search and rescue, ports and waterways security, marine safety, and defense readiness  The H-65 acquisition program increased the fleet’s size by 7 aircraft, added armament capabilities, upgraded navigation systems, and replaced each of the helicopters’ engines  The program is currently focused on upgrades to radar sensors, the automatic flight control system (AFCS), and avionics  Operational assessment of avionics upgrade planned to start in February 2018  Program fully staffed, but schedule slips raise risks with future staffing requirements  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  As of November 2017, the program remains in breach of its current acquisition program baseline (APB)  In November 2016, the USCG notified Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership that it would not complete all activities required—including developmental testing and an operational assessment—to achieve acquisition decision event (ADE) 2C for low-rate initial production of the avionics and AFCS upgrades by its current APB threshold date of March 2017  USCG officials primarily attributed these delays to an underestimation of the technical effort necessary to meet the requirements and have subsequently worked with the contractor to continue development of avionic upgrades  In January 2017, DHS leadership directed the program to update its APB, life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) and test and evaluation master plan by May 2017  However, the USCG did not meet this deadline, in part, because it decided to add a service life extension program (SLEP) to the H-65 program  The SLEP is expected to extend the current 20,000 flight hour service life of each aircraft by another 10,000 flight hours by replacing obsolete aircraft components  USCG officials stated that this will allow the USCG to delay purchasing new aircraft to prioritize funding for the Offshore Patrol Cutter  USCG officials plan to obtain approval for the SLEP when the program submits its revised APB for DHS approval, which is expected by March 2018  The program is revising its LCCE, but provided an update in June 2017 to inform the budget process  This update exceeds its current APB thresholds because it includes an initial estimate for the SLEP  The USCG estimates that the SLEP will cost $54 million for the entire fleet  USCG officials attributed the increase in operations and maintenance (O&M) costs to the additional extension of the aircraft’s operational life  The program’s O&M costs previously increased due to the USCG’s decision to extend the aircraft’s operational life from 2030 to 2039  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because— as we found in April 2015—DHS’s funding plan to Congress does not contain O&M funding for USCG programs  USCG officials anticipate receiving $1 6 billion in O&M funding over this 5-year period  United States Coast Guard (USCG) H-65 CONVERSION/SUSTAINMENT PROGRAM (H-65) The USCG awarded new contracts to Rockwell Collins—the original equipment manufacturer of the legacy AFCS and avionics—to address the challenges encountered with development of the new upgrades  Specifically, the program awarded new contracts to support continued development of the AFCS and avionics upgrades in July 2016 and March 2017, respectively  As of September 2017, the combined value of both contracts totaled more than $15 million  The USCG cancelled development of a dedicated surface search radar capability for the H-65 in 2014, but USCG officials said a commercial off-the-shelf weather radar with surface search capability will be installed as part of the avionics upgrade  USCG officials said there is some risk involved with extending the aircrafts’ service life beyond 20,000 flight hours since it has never been done by other agencies that operate the H-65  However, USCG officials stated that the aircraft manufacturer, Airbus, assisted the USCG’s chief aeronautical engineer in identifying specific parts needing replacement and is providing support  In July 2017, the USCG reported that the program was fully staffed, but that the schedule slips have introduced potential risks with future staffing requirements  The program is mitigating these risks by extending some military personnel and ensuring rotating personnel are replaced by new staff with the expertise needed to complete the program’s planned activities, such as testing  USCG officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG) The program is intended to assist the USCG in maintaining the capability to access the Arctic and Antarctic polar regions  The USCG requires its icebreaking fleet to conduct multiple missions, including defense readiness; marine environmental protection; ports, waterway, and coastal security; and search and rescue  The USCG plans to acquire three heavy icebreakers to recapitalize the only existing operational heavy icebreaker, which is nearing the end of its service life  Program initiated model testing of hull and propulsion systems, which will inform design decisions  Program office integrates USCG and Navy personnel, but funding responsibilities may cause challenges  GAO last reported on this program in September 2017 (GAO-17-698R)  In June 2014, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership granted the program acquisition decision event (ADE) 1 approval  The Acting Under Secretary for Management also acknowledged the USCG’s need to accelerate the acquisition process to mitigate gaps in the heavy icebreaking capability because the service life of the USCG’s only heavy polar icebreaker, which had already been extended, could end as early as 2020  In January 2018, DHS leadership approved the program’s initial acquisition program baseline (APB) establishing cost, schedule, and performance goals  The USCG planned to achieve a combined ADE 2A and 2B by December 2017, which would authorize the initiation of development efforts  According to DHS officials, this milestone was delayed to February 2018 to allow for the completion of required acquisition documents to inform the decision, such as the program’s life-cycle cost estimate and APB  The USCG is partnering with the Navy to leverage shipbuilding expertise and engaging early with potential shipbuilders through industry studies to mitigate some risks associated with the program’s accelerated acquisition schedule  However, GAO previously found that the program faces challenges in implementing the accelerated schedule  For example, the first icebreaker—which is preliminarily estimated to cost about $750 million to design and construct—would need to be fully funded in fiscal year 2019 at the same time the USCG is expecting to prioritize funding for the Offshore Patrol Cutter  In fiscal year 2017, the Consolidated Appropriations Act or associated explanatory materials, reflected funding for the program, including $150 million for advance procurement of heavy polar icebreakers and $25 million to the USCG for programmatic costs, respectively  USCG officials stated that the Navy funding could cover most of the design costs but would not cover long lead items or construction costs for any of the ships  They further stated that uncertainties with the amount and source of future appropriations have made planning the icebreaker acquisition challenging  United States Coast Guard (USCG) DHS leadership approved four key performance parameters (KPP) related to the ship’s ability to independently break through ice, the ship’s operating duration, and communications  In May 2017, the USCG began model testing of potential hull designs and propulsion configurations  USCG officials explained that the hulls of icebreakers are unique from other ships because they must balance a hull design optimized for icebreaking, which are generally broad and blunt, against a hull design optimized for seakeeping, which are generally narrow and streamlined  USCG officials noted that the power demands and propulsion system for the ship are dependent on the hull design  USCG officials stated that maneuverability was identified as a challenge during model testing and explained that azimuthing propulsors—propellers that sit below the ship and can rotate 360 degrees—offered better maneuverability than traditional propulsion systems  USCG officials said these propulsors are widely used on commercial ships, but may need modification to meet the USCG’s requirements  USCG officials anticipate results from the model testing to be completed by March 2018 and plan to use these results to inform the final specifications for the ships  The USCG established an integrated heavy polar icebreaker program office with the Navy and in 2017, DHS, the USCG, and Navy entered into several agreements that outline oversight roles, among other things  For example, these agreements state that the program will follow DHS acquisition policies with DHS leadership serving as the acquisition decision authority for program milestones  However, the Navy will review and approve acquisition documents before the program seeks DHS approval  These agreements also state that the program’s contracting actions could be funded by either USCG or Navy appropriations, and the source of the appropriations will award the contract  The program plans to competitively award a contract, which would include options for the detail design and construction for all three ships to a single shipbuilder by June 2019  Program officials stated they plan to award the contract under full and open competition to obtain competitive prices and include the construction of the three ships as options to accommodate the program’s funding uncertainties  In February 2017, the USCG awarded contracts to five shipbuilders—valued at approximately $4 million each—for design studies which will inform program decisions  Program officials stated that under these design studies contracts, the shipbuilders developed several potential ship designs and preliminary costs, with a focus on alternative propulsion options and hull designs  In August 2017, USCG officials told GAO that the program’s staffing gap was not negatively impacting program efforts  USCG officials stated that the program office had completed requirements for ADE 2A and 2B, and is on track to release the request for proposals for the detail design and construction contract by March 2018  These officials added that, during 2017, the program office refined the program’s requirements, completed ice and open water model testing, and partnered with five industry teams to evaluate multiple design solutions  USCG officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  LONG RANGE SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT (HC-130H/J) UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG) The USCG uses HC-130H and HC-130J aircraft to conduct search and rescue missions, transport cargo and personnel, support law enforcement, and execute other operations  Both aircraft are quad-engine propeller-driven platforms  The HC-130J is a modernized version of the HC-130H, which has advanced engines, propellers, and equipment that provide enhanced speed, altitude, range, and surveillance capabilities  Performance testing of new mission system processor complete  Transfer of HC-130H aircraft to other agencies ongoing  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 (GAO-17-346SP)  During 2017, the USCG continued a nearly 3-year effort to re-baseline the program— which includes revisions to the program’s life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) and acquisition program baseline (APB)—to account for significant changes  Specifically, the USCG decided to pursue an all HC-130J fleet and, in fiscal year 2014, Congress directed the transfer of 7 HC-130H aircraft to the U S  Air Force  The USCG was in the process of upgrading these aircraft, but cancelled further HC-130H upgrades  In September 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership directed the USCG to submit the revised APB by January 2018  According to USCG officials, the re-baseline has been delayed, in part, because Congress also directed the USCG to conduct a multi-phased analysis of its mission needs  In November 2016, the USCG submitted the results of its analysis for fixed- wing aircraft, which confirmed the planned total quantity of 22 HC-130J aircraft and an annual flight-hour goal of 800 hours per aircraft  USCG officials said the results of the analysis will be reflected in the program’s revised LCCE and subsequent APB, but noted that challenges with the vendor hired to complete the LCCE revision have also contributed to delays  The program submitted cost information in June 2017 to inform the budget process, but it reflected no updates from the program’s November 2011 LCCE  USCG officials previously attributed the acquisition cost growth and schedule slip from the program’s initial APB to the increase in HC-130J quantities from 6 to 22  However, when the revised LCCE is complete, estimated costs may decrease since the HC-130J aircraft are less expensive to maintain  As of December 2017, USCG officials stated they had received 11 HC-130J aircraft and had awarded contracts for 3 more—some of which were not requested  USCG officials previously stated that the program needs to acquire 1-2 HC-130J aircraft per year to meet its full operational capability (FOC) date  However, it is unclear how the USCG will meet its FOC date because it only requested funding for 1 aircraft over the next 5 years  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because—as we found in April 2015—DHS’s funding plan to Congress does not contain operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for USCG programs  USCG officials anticipate receiving approximately $1 4 billion in O&M funding over this 5- year period  United States Coast Guard (USCG) LONG RANGE SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT (HC-130H/J) In December 2013, Congress directed the transfer of 7 HC-130H aircraft to the U S  Air Force for modifications—which consists of upgrades and installing a fire retardant delivery system—and subsequent transfer to the U S  Forest Service  This direction factored into the USCG’s decision to pursue an all HC-130J fleet  As of December 2017, the Forest Service had not yet received any modified aircraft primarily because of issues with contractors  According to USCG officials, the original contract the Air Force awarded to install the fire retardant delivery system in May 2016 was terminated 7 months later due to an unqualified vendor and a new contract has not yet been awarded  In the meantime, the Forest Service is using 2 of the 7 HC-130Hs  USCG officials said these aircraft are not modified, but outfitted with a less effective firefighting device  As of November 2017, the USCG plans to operate 14 of its HC-130H aircraft until the end of their service lives or until they can be replaced with new HC-130J aircraft  However, as previously discussed, the USCG has not requested funding for the additional HC-130J aircraft to support this plan  In October 2017, USCG officials reported that they were in the process of hiring staff to address the program’s staffing gap  USCG officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated, as appropriate  MEDIUM RANGE SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT (HC-144A/ C-27J) UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG) The USCG uses HC-144A and C-27J aircraft to conduct all types of missions, including search and rescue and disaster response  All 32 aircraft—18 HC-144A aircraft and 14 C-27J aircraft—are twin-engine propeller driven platforms  The interior of both aircraft are able to be re-configured to accommodate cargo, personnel or medical transports  Developmental testing of new mission system processor is ongoing  Program continues to face challenges related to purchasing spare parts and accessing technical data  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 and March 2015 (GAO-17-346SP, GAO-15-325)  USCG officials said the program is on track to meet the cost and schedule goals in its current acquisition program baseline (APB), which Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership approved in August 2016 to reflect the restructuring of the HC-144A acquisition program  The USCG initially planned to procure a total of 36 HC-144A aircraft, but reduced that number to the 18 it had already procured after Congress directed the transfer of 14 C-27J aircraft from the U S  Air Force to the USCG in fiscal year 2014  The program’s APB divides the program into two phases: phase 1 includes acceptance of the 18 HC-144A aircraft and upgrades to the aircraft’s mission and flight management systems, and phase 2 includes acceptance of and modifications to the C-27J aircraft to meet the USCG’s mission needs  In October 2017, USCG officials told GAO that the program had initiated phase 1 efforts to upgrade the first HC-144A aircraft  The USCG plans to complete upgrades on all HC-144As by the end of fiscal year 2021  For phase 2, the USCG has accepted all 14 C-27Js from the U S  Air Force and plans to complete the modification of all C-27Js by March 2025 to achieve full operational capability (FOC)  To inform the budget process, the program updated its life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) in June 2017, which is within its current APB cost thresholds  This estimate includes C-27J modification costs, such as installation of a new sensor package and new mission system processor  The program’s LCCE for the 36 HC-144A aircraft previously increased to $28 7 billion in 2012 when the USCG accounted for 5 years of additional costs, among other things  The current LCCE represents a considerable decrease, but also reflects a reduction in the number of aircraft and planned flight hours  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because—as we found in April 2015—DHS’s funding plan to Congress does not contain operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for USCG programs  USCG officials anticipate receiving nearly $1 7 billion in total funding over this 5-year period to cover nearly $1 8 billion in total costs  United States Coast Guard (USCG) MEDIUM RANGE SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT (HC-144A/C-27J) The USCG still faces challenges in transitioning the C-27J into the USCG fleet  In March 2015, GAO found that the successful and cost-effective fielding of the C-27J aircraft is contingent on the USCG’s ability to address risk areas including, purchasing spare parts and accessing technical data, among other issues  According to USCG officials, the program continues to face challenges purchasing spare parts and accessing technical data  The program is reliant on the aircraft original equipment manufacturer for about 35 percent of spare C-27J parts  For other parts, USCG officials said that the USCG continues to look for ways to provide the same or similar parts for the aircraft at a faster rate and the USCG plans to award contracts to two additional manufacturers in calendar year 2018  USCG officials stated that retrieving technical data for the C-27J aircraft remains a challenge, but the USCG is working with the Department of Defense to obtain rights to data currently owned by the original equipment manufacturer  Once the USCG receives appropriate rights to C-27J technical data, the USCG officials said they can begin modification of the aircraft  The USCG also plans to purchase the same surface search radar used on the HC-144A or the HC-130J for the C-27J, which will give the USCG some commonality in maintenance, logistics, and training for this aspect of the aircraft  In October 2017, USCG officials told GAO that the program’s staffing is adequate and the gap has not negatively affected the program  USCG officials stated that the program remains on track to meet the cost, schedule, and performance goals outlined in its current APB and that they monitor APB key parameters in accordance with DHS guidance  These officials added that market research continues to increase supply chain sources and to identify products for new mission systems  USCG officials also provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER (NSC) UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG) The USCG uses the NSC to conduct search and rescue, migrant and drug interdiction, environmental protection, and other missions  The NSC replaces and provides improved capabilities over the USCG’s High Endurance Cutters  The NSC carries helicopters and cutter boats, provides an extended on-scene presence at forward deployed locations, and operates worldwide  Follow-on operational testing began in October 2017, but cybersecurity testing delayed  The USCG is conducting a study to determine root cause of propulsion system issues  GAO last reported on this program in March and April 2017 (GAO-17-218, GAO-17- 346SP)  In November 2017, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership approved a revised acquisition program baseline (APB), which accounted for the addition of a ninth NSC to the program of record  The USCG originally planned to acquire only eight NSCs; however, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Congress directed that not less than $640 million be immediately available and allotted to contract for the production of a ninth NSC  In December 2016, the USCG awarded a contract to produce the ninth NSC and, as of November 2017, six NSCs had been delivered and three were under construction  The USCG anticipates delivery of the ninth NSC in September 2020, which coincides with the program’s prior APB threshold date for full operational capability (FOC)  However, the revised APB extends this date by 1 year to account for any risks in delivering the additional ship  The program’s FOC date previously slipped 4 years, which USCG officials attributed to funding shortfalls, among other things  The ninth NSC contributed to a $453 million and $123 million increase in the program’s APB cost thresholds for acquisition and operations and maintenance (O&M), respectively  However, the program’s revised life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) is still lower than its initial estimate for eight ships, which USCG officials attribute to more accurate estimates  The revised LCCE also included costs for several design changes the USCG has had to implement on equipment with known issues  As of September 2017, 12 equipment systems required design changes, which totaled an estimated cost of over $260 million  This work includes structural enhancement work on the first two NSCs and the replacement of the gantry crane, which aids in the deployment of cutter boats  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because— as we found in April 2015—DHS’s funding plan to Congress does not contain O&M funding for USCG programs  USCG officials anticipate receiving approximately $2 1 billion in O&M funding over this 5-year period to cover the NSC’s estimated $1 8 billion in O&M costs, but stated it will refine its annual budget request based on the program’s needs each year  The USCG also identified carryover funding to cover the projected acquisition funding shortfall in fiscal year 2018  United States Coast Guard (USCG) NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER (NSC) The NSC program does not have any critical staffing vacancies  However, in July 2017, the program reported that the greatest staffing challenge is a potential extension to the program’s end date if the USCG acquires more than 9 NSCs  If this occurs, the program office must reassess future staffing requirements to ensure adequate program oversight continues until the last NSC completes post-delivery activities  In addition, the USCG has made changes to its staffing model for operating the NSCs  The USCG initially planned to implement a crew rotational concept in which crews would rotate while NSCs were underway to achieve a goal of 230 days away from the cutter’s homeport  In February 2018, USCG officials told GAO they abandoned the crew rotational concept because the concept did not provide the USCG with the expected return on investment  Instead, USCG officials said a new plan has been implemented that does not rotate crew and is anticipated to increase the days away from home port from the current capability of 185 days to 200 days  USCG officials stated that NSCs had a record year of narcotics seizures in 2017  In addition to the test activities identified in this assessment, USCG officials stated that the first follow-on OT&E event was completed in December 2017 and the first cybersecurity test event is scheduled for February 2018  They also noted that the shipbuilder continues to show improving cost performance and is completing construction within budget  USCG officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  OFFSHORE PATROL CUTTER (OPC) UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG) The USCG plans to use the OPC to conduct patrols for homeland security, law enforcement, and search and rescue operations  The OPC is being designed for long-distance transit, extended on-scene presence, and operations with deployable aircraft and small boats  It is intended to replace the USCG’s aging Medium Endurance Cutters (MEC) and bridge the operational capabilities provided by the Fast Response Cutters and National Security Cutters (NSC)  Program plans to refine the ship’s design, as needed, based on early operational assessment results  Program’s acquisition strategy incorporated some best practices  GAO last reported on this program in April and June 2017 (GAO-17-346SP, GAO-17-654T)  According to USCG officials, the OPC program is on track to meet its cost and schedule goals  In September 2014, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership approved the program’s current acquisition program baseline (APB), which accounts for schedule slips resulting from delays in awarding the program’s initial contracts and a subsequent bid protest  The USCG expects to start construction of the first OPC in fiscal year 2019 and procure a total of 25 ships  The USCG plans to initially fund one OPC per year and eventually two OPCs per year until all 25 OPCs are delivered  USCG officials have stated that additional OPC delays will decrease the USCG’s operational capacity because the MECs will likely require increased downtime for maintenance and other issues, reducing their availability  In January 2016, DHS leadership directed the USCG to revise the OPC life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE) and submit it for approval within 6 months of awarding the detailed design and construction contract for the ships—which the USCG subsequently awarded in September 2016  In June 2017, the program submitted an updated LCCE to inform the budget process that—while not approved by DHS leadership—accounts for the contract award and the program’s schedule slips  As of December 2017, the program’s revised LCCE still had not been approved  It is unclear whether it will address other issues, such as an increase in the estimated weight of each ship  The OPC’s initial LCCE was based in large part on the estimated weight of each ship  However, in November 2017, USCG officials said the ship is expected to weigh up to 35 percent more than originally estimated  Nevertheless, USCG officials expect to procure all 25 OPCs for the program’s APB objective cost of $10 5 billion because the contractor identified cost efficiencies to compensate for the increased weight  GAO previously raised questions about the OPC’s affordability and its effect on other USCG acquisition programs, such as the Heavy Polar Icebreaker  Specifically, GAO noted that the OPC procurement will consume about two-thirds of the USCG’s planned acquisition budget between fiscal years 2018 and 2032 based on recent funding history  The program’s affordability gap from fiscal years 2020 to 2022 may be overstated because—as we found in April 2015—DHS’s funding plan to Congress does not report operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for USCG programs  USCG officials anticipate receiving $103 million in O&M funding over this 5-year period  United States Coast Guard (USCG) OFFSHORE PATROL CUTTER (OPC) The USCG is in the process of completing the design of the OPC before starting construction, which is in-line with GAO shipbuilding best practices  In addition, USCG officials stated that the program is using state-of-the-market technology that has been proven on other ships as opposed to state-of-the-art technology, which lowers the risk of the program  The USCG used a two-phased down-select strategy to select a contractor to deliver the OPC  For phase 1, the USCG conducted a full and open competition and selected three contractors to perform preliminary design work  For phase 2, the USCG selected one of the phase 1 contractors—Eastern Shipbuilding—to develop a detailed design of the OPC and construct no more than the first 11 ships  The contract—worth approximately $110 million—includes separate options for each ship  The options for ships 10 and 11 were unpriced and included in the solicitation as an incentive to convert the contract type from fixed price incentive to firm fixed price  These options will be included in a repricing proposal submitted by the contractor for ships 6-9 after delivery of the first ship  USCG officials have stated the USCG will decide whether to exercise the option for ships 10 and 11 based on the contractor’s re-pricing proposal for ships 6-9  The USCG plans to re-compete the contract for the remaining 14-16 ships  The OPC program continued to increase its required staffing level and the USCG reported that adjustments to staffing will continue as the program matures  The program faces shortages including engineers, a logistics manager, and a technical director, but USCG officials said they are hiring staff to address these gaps  USCG officials stated that the OPC program is fully funded, executable, and on track to award construction for the first OPC in September 2018  These officials said design efforts are on track and the contractor is meeting the milestones to deliver the first OPC in 2021  USCG officials noted that they are continuing to increase staff at the contractor’s facility to prepare for the start of construction for the first OPC  USCG officials also provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (USCIS) The Transformation program was established in 2006 to transition USCIS from a fragmented, paper-based filing environment to a consolidated, paperless environment for processing immigration and citizenship applications  The program developed a new system architecture and delivers capability through releases that correspond to new product lines within four lines of business: Citizenship, Immigrant, Non-Immigrant, and Humanitarian  Revision of key performance parameters and test and evaluation master plan in progress  Program is reorganizing to leverage expertise within USCIS and revise its approach  GAO last reported on this program in April 2017 and July 2016 (GAO-17-346SP, GAO-16- 467)  The program remains in breach of its current acquisition program baseline (APB)  In September 2016, the Transformation program experienced a schedule breach when it failed to complete deployment of all the product lines associated with the Citizenship line of business  The deployment was delayed because of challenges processing new product lines on the new system architecture and other technical issues with the case management system  Prior to the breach, the program deployed six product lines, which supported approximately 24 percent of the total workload processed by USCIS in fiscal year 2016  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership previously re- baselined the program in April 2015 after USCIS determined that it could not use any of the architecture delivered under its initial strategy, despite having invested more than $475 million in its development  In December 2016, DHS leadership directed USCIS to stop planning and development for new product lines, develop a breach remediation plan, and update its acquisition documentation  In February 2017, DHS leadership approved the program’s remediation plan and the program has since made progress in implementing this plan  However, DHS leadership elected to continue with the program’s pause in new development following program reviews in March 2017, July 2017, and October 2017  USCIS officials said they are revising the program’s acquisition documents—including its APB and life-cycle cost estimate (LCCE)—and plan to re-baseline by March 2018  The program updated the total costs in its LCCE to inform the budget process, but these costs do not reflect the program’s re-baselining plans  As a result, the status of the program against its cost and schedule goals is unclear  However, the program is more than 3 years past its original full operational capability (FOC) date  The affordability gap from fiscal years 2018 to 2022 may be overstated because DHS’s funding plan to Congress no longer contained operations and maintenance funding for individual programs  USCIS uses revenue from premium processing fees to fund the Transformation program and routinely collects more fees than the program’s estimated costs  USCIS officials told GAO that the program office underwent a reorganization in January 2017 to help address the program’s recent challenges  This effort included dismantling the program office and repositioning Transformation under the USCIS Office of Information Technology so the program could leverage expertise in areas such as engineering within USCIS  USCIS officials reported that the program no longer plans to deliver capability by product lines because this strategy focused too narrowly on the automation of forms associated with the lines of business  Going forward, USCIS officials said the program plans to develop capabilities that will address broader objectives, such as reducing the time it takes to process applications and decisions  The program previously made significant changes after it experienced a 5-month delay with its first release, which was deployed in May 2012  DHS attributed this delay to weak contractor performance and pursuing an unnecessarily complex system, among other things  To address these issues, the Office of Management and Budget, DHS, and USCIS determined the program should implement a new acquisition strategy, which allowed for an agile software development methodology and increased competition for development work  This strategy was reflected in the program’s April 2015 re-baseline  USCIS officials told GAO that they plan to address the Transformation program’s staffing gap now that the reorganization is complete  USCIS officials provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which GAO incorporated as appropriate  To help determine the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken actions to enhance its policies and processes to better reflect key portfolio management practices, we assessed the department’s requirements, acquisition management, and resource allocation policies using key practices we established in September 2012  These key practices are based on our past work, in which we examined the practices that private sector entities use to achieve a balanced mix of new projects and found that successful commercial companies use a disciplined and integrated approach to prioritize needs and allocate resources  As a result, these organizations can avoid pursuing more projects than their resources can support and better optimize the return on their investments  This approach, known as portfolio management, requires companies to view each of their investments as contributing to a collective whole, rather than as independent and unrelated  The objectives of this audit were designed to provide congressional committees insight into the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) major acquisition programs  We assessed the extent to which (1) DHS’s major acquisition programs are on track to meet their schedule and cost goals and (2) DHS has taken actions to enhance its policies and processes to better reflect key portfolio management practices  To answer these questions, we reviewed 28 of DHS’s 79 major acquisition programs  We reviewed all 16 of DHS’s Level 1 acquisition programs— those with life-cycle cost estimates (LCCE) of $1 billion or more—that had at least one project, increment, or segment in the Obtain phase—the stage in the acquisition life cycle when programs develop, test, and evaluate systems—at the initiation of our audit  Additionally, we reviewed 12 other major acquisition programs—including 8 Level 1 programs that either had not yet entered or were beyond the Obtain phase, and 4 Level 2 programs that have LCCEs between $300 million and less than $1 billion—that we identified were at risk of not meeting their cost estimates, schedules, or capability requirements based on our past work and discussions with DHS officials  Specifically, we met with representatives from DHS’s Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM)—DHS’s main body for acquisition oversight—as a part of our scoping effort to determine which programs (if any) were facing difficulties in meeting their cost estimates, schedules, or capability requirements  The 28 selected programs were sponsored by eight different components, and they are identified in table 7, along with our rationale for selecting them  To determine the extent to which DHS’s major acquisition programs are on track to meet their schedule and cost goals, we collected key acquisition documentation for each of the 28 programs, such as all LCCEs and acquisition program baselines (APB) approved at the department level since DHS’s current acquisition management policy went into effect in November 2008  DHS policy establishes that all major acquisition programs should have a department-approved APB, which establishes a program’s critical cost, schedule, and performance parameters, before they initiate efforts to obtain new capabilities  Twenty four of the 28 programs had one or more department-approved LCCEs and APBs between November 2008 and December 31, 2017  We used these APBs to establish the initial and current cost and schedule goals for the programs  We then developed a data collection instrument to help validate the information from the APBs and collect similar information from programs without department-approved APBs  Specifically, for each program, we pre-populated a data collection instrument to the extent possible with the schedule and cost information we had collected from the APBs and our 2017 assessment (if applicable) to identify schedule and cost goal changes, if any, since (a) the program’s initial baseline was approved and (b) January 2017—the data cut-off date of the report we issued in April 2017  We shared our data collection instruments with officials from the program offices to confirm or correct our initial analysis and to collect additional information to enhance the timeliness and comprehensiveness of our data sets  We then met with program officials to identify causes and effects associated with any identified schedule and cost goal changes  Subsequently, we drafted preliminary assessments for each of the 28 programs, shared them with program and component officials, and gave these officials an opportunity to submit comments to help us correct any inaccuracies, which we accounted for as appropriate (such as when new information was available)  Additionally, in July 2017, we collected copies of the detailed data on affordability that programs submitted to inform the fiscal year 2019 resource allocation process  We also collected copies of any annual LCCE updates programs submitted in fiscal year 2017  For each of the 24 programs with a department-approved APB, we compared (a) the most recent cost data we collected (i e , a department-approved LCCE, the detailed LCCE information submitted during the resource allocation process, a fiscal year 2017 annual LCCE update, or an update provided by the program office) to (b) DHS’s funding plan presented in the Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) report to Congress for fiscal years 2018–2022, which presents 5-year funding plans for DHS’s major acquisition programs, to assess the extent to which a program was projected to have an acquisition funding gap in fiscal year 2018  Through this process, we determined that our data elements were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this engagement  The FYHSP reports information by the department’s new common appropriation structure, which created standard appropriation fund types including (1) procurement, construction, and improvements and (2) operations and support  We refer to these types of funding as (1) acquisition and (2) operations and maintenance throughout this report  which are listed in appendix II—and identified any significant shortfalls  Specifically, we assessed the joint requirements directives and instruction manual; DHS’s Acquisition Management Directive 102-01, Acquisition Management Instruction 102-01-001, and other related guidance; and DHS’s resource allocation directive, instruction, and handbook  First, we assessed each group of policies against the key practices using the following ratings: Met—the documents fully reflected the key practice  Partially met—the documents reflected some, but not all parts of the key practice  Not met—the documents did not reflect the key practice  We shared our preliminary analysis for each group of policies with the DHS officials responsible for implementing them—specifically, the Joint Requirements Council (JRC), PARM, and the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E)—to discuss our findings, identify relevant sections of the documents we had not yet accounted for, and solicit their thoughts on those key practices that were not reflected in the policies  Second, we used the scores for each group of policies to develop a department-wide rating for each key practice  When applicable, we weighted the department-wide rating based on the intent of the key practice  For example, the department-wide rating for the key practice related to resource allocation across the portfolio was based more heavily on the rating for the resource allocation policies, rather than the ratings for the requirements or acquisition management policies  Third, we rolled-up the ratings for all the key practices in a particular area—as identified in appendix II—to establish a department-wide overall rating for each key practice area  We concluded that a key practice area was met if all ratings for the individual key practices in that area were met; partially met if the ratings for the individual key practices in that area were all partially met or a mix of met and not met; or not met if the ratings for the individual key practices in that area were all not met  In addition, we reviewed documentation that resulted from DHS’s requirements, acquisition management, and resource allocation processes since January 2016 to get a sense of how the department has implemented its current policies  For example, we reviewed JRC- validated requirements documents; acquisition decision memorandums; Acquisition Program Health Assessment reports; and documentation related to the development of DHS’s fiscal year 2018 budget request and the fiscal year 2018–2022 FYHSP report, including resource allocation guidance, presentations to DHS leadership, and preliminary decisions  We also interviewed officials from the JRC, PARM, PA&E, and the Deputy’s Management Action Group to identify any current and planned initiatives to improve management of the department’s portfolio of major acquisition programs  We then compared our assessment of DHS’s current policies, practices, and planned initiatives to our previous findings and the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  We conducted this performance audit from March 2017 through May 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the contact listed above, Rick Cederholm (Assistant Director), Aryn Ehlow (Analyst-in-Charge), Pete Anderson, Lorraine Ettaro, Helena Johnson, TyAnn Lee, Alexis Olson, Sylvia Schatz, Roxanna Sun, and Lindsay Taylor made key contributions to this report  Other contributors included Mathew Bader, Carissa Bryant, Andrew Burton, Erin Butkowski, Lisa Canini, Jenny Chow, John Crawford, Lindsey Cross, Laurier R  Fish, Betsy Gregory-Hosler, Claire Li, Sarah Martin, Marycella Mierez, Erin O’Brien, Katherine Pfeiffer, John Rastler, Ashley Rawson, Andrew Redd, Jill Schofield, Charlie Shivers III, and Jeanne Sung  DHS Program Costs: Reporting Program-Level Operations and Support Costs to Congress Would Improve Oversight  GAO-18-344  Washington, D C : April 25, 2018  Homeland Security Acquisitions: Identifying All Non-Major Acquisitions Would Advance Ongoing Efforts to Improve Management  GAO-17-396  Washington, D C : April 13, 2017  Homeland Security Acquisitions: Earlier Requirements Definition and Clear Documentation of Key Decisions Could Facilitate Ongoing Progress  GAO-17-346SP  Washington, D C : April 6, 2017  Coast Guard Cutters: Depot Maintenance Is Affecting Operational Availability and Cost Estimates Should Reflect Actual Expenditures  GAO-17-218  Washington, D C : March 2, 2017  Homeland Security Acquisitions: Joint Requirements Council’s Initial Approach Is Generally Sound and It Is Developing a Process to Inform Investment Priorities  GAO-17-171  Washington, D C : October 24, 2016  Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management, but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure  GAO-16-338SP  Washington, D C : March 31, 2016  National Security Cutter: Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure Problems Discovered during Testing and Operations Are Addressed  GAO-16-148  Washington, D C : January 12, 2016  TSA Acquisitions: Further Actions Needed to Improve Efficiency of Screening Technology Test and Evaluation  GAO-16-117  Washington, D C : December 17, 2015  Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal Actions Needed to Improve Accountability  GAO-15-171SP  Washington, D C : April 22, 2015  Coast Guard Aircraft: Transfer of Fixed-Wing C-27J Aircraft Is Complex and Further Fleet Purchases Should Coincide with Study Results  GAO-15-325  Washington, D C : March 26, 2015  Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Should Better Define Oversight Roles and Improve Program Reporting to Congress  GAO-15-292  Washington, D C : March 12, 2015  Coast Guard Acquisitions: Better Information on Performance and Funding Needed to Address Shortfalls  GAO-14-450  Washington, D C : June 5, 2014  Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Could Better Manage Its Portfolio to Address Funding Gaps and Improve Communications with Congress  GAO-14-332  Washington, D C : April 17, 2014  Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment Management to Help Meet Mission Needs  GAO-12-833  Washington, D C : September 18, 2012  Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions  GAO-10-588SP  Washington, D C : June 30, 2010  Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major Programs Lack Appropriate Oversight  GAO-09-29  Washington, D C : November 18, 2008 


Report 2: DOD has defined various types of unwanted sexual behaviors, including sexual assault, sexual harassment, and domestic violence  Sexual assault: DOD defines sexual assault as intentional sexual contact, characterized by use of force, threats, intimidation, abuse of authority, or when the victim does not or cannot consent  The term includes a broad category of sexual offenses consisting of the following specific Uniform Code of Military Justice offenses: rape, sexual assault, aggravated sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, forcible sodomy (forced oral or anal sex), or attempts to commit these acts  Sexual harassment: DOD defines sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person’s job, pay, or career; (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or employment decisions affecting that person; or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment  However, as noted earlier, a provision of the NDAA for FY 2017 changed the definition of sexual harassment for the military for purposes of investigations by commanding officers so that it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination, but is recognized as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behavior that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault  We discuss this changed definition of sexual harassment later in this report  Domestic violence: DOD defines domestic violence as an offense under the United States Code, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or state law involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force or violence against a person, or a violation of a lawful order issued for the protection of a person who is a current or former spouse, a person with whom the abuser shares a child in common or a current or former intimate partner with whom the abuser shares or has shared a common domicile  Sexual assault of spouses and intimate partners is a subset of domestic violence  Various offices and organizations within DOD play a role in addressing unwanted sexual behaviors in the military  The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for developing the overall policy and guidance for the department’s efforts to prevent and respond to instances of sexual assault, except for criminal investigative policy matters assigned to the DOD Inspector General and legal processes in the Uniform Code of Military Justice  The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness oversees the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO), which serves as the department’s single point of authority, accountability, and oversight for its sexual assault prevention and response program  The responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and SAPRO with regard to sexual assault prevention and response include providing the military services with guidance and technical support and facilitating the identification and resolution of issues; developing programs, policies, and training standards for the prevention of, reporting of, and response to sexual assault; developing strategic program guidance and joint planning objectives; overseeing the department’s collection and maintenance of data on reported alleged sexual assaults involving servicemembers; establishing mechanisms to measure the effectiveness of the department’s sexual assault prevention and response program; and preparing the department’s mandated annual reports to Congress on sexual assaults involving servicemembers  The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for establishing policies for preventing and responding to sexual assault within their respective military service, and for ensuring compliance with DOD’s policy  Further, they are responsible for establishing policies that ensure commander accountability for program implementation and execution  Each military service has established an office that is responsible for overseeing and managing the military service’s sexual assault prevention and response program  Each military service also maintains a primary policy document on its sexual assault prevention and response program  Much like DOD’s directive and instruction on sexual assault prevention and response, the military service policies outline responsibilities of relevant stakeholders, including commanders, sexual assault response coordinators, and victim advocates and training requirements for all personnel  The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has responsibility for developing the overall policy for DOD’s military equal opportunity program and monitoring compliance with the department’s policy  According to the policy, all servicemembers are afforded equal opportunity in an environment free from harassment, including sexual harassment, and unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex (including gender), and sexual orientation  The chain of command is used as the primary and preferred channel to (1) identify and correct unlawful discrimination practices, (2) process and resolve complaints of unlawful discrimination or harassment, to include sexual, and (3) ensure that military equal opportunity matters are taken seriously and acted on as necessary  The Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity (ODMEO) oversees the department’s efforts to promote equal opportunity, diversity, and inclusion management, and to help prevent unlawful discrimination and harassment throughout DOD  The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute develops training and studies on equal opportunity  Behaviors under the purview of the military equal opportunity program include unlawful discrimination on the basis of color, national origin, race, religion, or sex  The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for developing policies to prevent unlawful discrimination and harassment, (including sexual harassment), ensuring compliance with DOD’s policy, and establishing both formal and informal means of resolving complaints  The chain of command is the primary and preferred channel for identifying and correcting discriminatory practices and resolving servicemembers’ complaints of sexual harassment  The military services encourage servicemembers to resolve any complaints of sexual harassment they may have at the lowest possible level first  For servicemembers who wish to report a complaint of sexual harassment, DOD provides two complaint options—formal and informal  A formal complaint is an allegation of sexual harassment that a complainant submits in writing to the authority designated for the receipt of such complaints in military service implementing guidance  Formal complaints require specific actions to be taken, are subject to timelines, and require documentation of the actions taken, in accordance with federal law  In contrast, an informal complaint is an allegation of sexual harassment, made either orally or in writing, which is not submitted as a formal complaint  Informal complaints may be resolved directly by the complainant, such as by confronting the individual or by involving another individual or the chain of command  Servicemembers who elect to resolve their complaints informally may submit a formal complaint if they are dissatisfied with the outcome of the informal process  In 2014, DOD directed the military services to develop implementing instructions and mechanisms for reporting instances of sexual harassment anonymously  The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family Policy under the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for the development and oversight of policy for the military departments to implement a coordinated community response approach to addressing domestic abuse  The DOD Family Advocacy Program (FAP) office provides guidance and technical assistance to the military departments and DOD components to support their efforts to address, among other things, domestic abuse  The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for developing military service-wide policies, supplementary standards, and instructions to provide for the requirements within their respective installations FAPs  Each military service has established a FAP that is responsible for overseeing and managing, among other things, the installation-level FAPs and the military service’s domestic violence and domestic abuse prevention and response programs  When domestic abuse does occur, the military service installation FAP conducts a risk assessment and works to ensure the safety of the victims and help military families overcome the effects as well as change destructive patterns  CDC is one of the major operating components of the Department of Health and Human Services, which serves as the federal government’s principal agency for protecting the health of U S  citizens  As part of its health-related mission, CDC serves as the national focal point for developing and applying disease prevention and control, environmental health, and health promotion and education activities  CDC, among other things, conducts research to enhance prevention, develops and advocates public health policies, implements prevention strategies, promotes healthy behaviors, fosters safe and healthful environments, and provides associated training  In 1992, CDC established the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control as the lead federal organization for violence prevention  The center’s Division of Violence Prevention focuses on stopping violence, including sexual violence, before it begins and works to achieve this by conducting research on the factors that put people at risk for violence, examining the effective adoption and dissemination of prevention strategies, and evaluating the effectiveness of violence prevention programs  In 2004, CDC published a framework for effective sexual violence prevention strategies  This framework includes prevention concepts and strategies, such as identifying risk and protective factors (i e , factors that may put a person at risk for committing sexual assault or that, alternatively, may prevent harm)  CDC’s framework defines sexual violence as including non-contact unwanted sexual behaviors, sexual harassment, and physical sexual assault  DOD has acknowledged that connections exist across the continuum of unwanted sexual behaviors including sexual harassment and sexual assault and that this continuum of harm is reflected in key documents that guide prevention and response activities  For example, SAPRO has also reported that certain behavior and activities, such as hazing, can lead to sexual assault  Additionally, DOD’s Prevention Roundtable and 2014- 2016 Sexual Assault Prevention Strategy have both adopted CDC’s definition of “prevention” as it applies to sexual violence  CDC defines sexual violence to include sexual harassment and sexual assault  In 2014 and 2017, DOD contracted with RAND to conduct independent assessments of behaviors across the continuum of harm, including sexual assault and sexual harassment  In its 2014 report, RAND found that (1) 34 percent of male servicemembers who were surveyed reported that the sexual assault was part of a hazing incident, (2) servicemembers who experienced sexual harassment or gender discrimination in the past year also experienced higher rates of sexual assault, and (3) approximately one-third of servicemembers who are sexually assaulted stated the offender sexually harassed them before the assault  In its 2017 report, RAND found that (1) people are more likely to engage in problematic behaviors, such as sexual harassment, if that person perceives that peers and leaders condone those actions and (2) some organizations responsible for addressing unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment lack adequate policies, plans, information systems, and resources needed to establish a departmental approach to certain behavioral issues, inform senior leadership about these problems, and ensure that leadership’s decisions about problematic behaviors are uniformly enforced  CDC research revealed that behaviors such as bullying and homophobic teasing in early adolescence are significant predictors of sexual harassment over time  According to the CDC, these youth are at an increased potential to perpetrate sexual violence and engage in sexually harassing behavior  In response, CDC recommends that communities work to prevent all types of violence from occurring and coordinate and integrate responses to violence in a way that recognizes these connections  CDC’s research has also established that survivors of one form of violence are more likely to be victims of other forms of violence, that survivors of violence are at higher risk for behaving violently, and that people who behave violently are more likely to commit other forms of violence  Further, CDC states that violence prevention and intervention efforts that focus on only one form of violence can be broadened to address multiple, connected forms of violence to increase the public health impact  DOD’s policies on sexual harassment include some but not all of CDC’s principles and most relevant legislative elements  OSD and military service-specific sexual harassment policies generally include prevention strategies that CDC has identified in its principles for sexual violence prevention but leave out risk and protective factors, as well as risk domains  Additionally, DOD’s sexual harassment policies include most elements identified in section 579 of the NDAA for FY 2013, but do not consistently include mechanisms for anonymous reporting  ODMEO officials stated that they plan to issue a new policy that is intended to focus on sexual harassment and other forms of harassment, but it is too early to know whether that policy will include all the CDC principles or mechanisms for anonymous reporting  We also noted during our review that most existing policies have not yet been updated to reflect a provision in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA that redefined sexual harassment for certain purposes so it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination but is recognized also as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behaviors that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault  DOD’s sexual harassment policies include some of the principles that have been developed by CDC as part of a framework for preventing sexual violence, but other principles are not included  OSD includes sexual harassment as part of its broader military equal opportunity policy  It addresses, among other things, processes for preventing and responding to cases of discrimination, including sexual harassment; education and training in equal opportunity; and complaints processing  The military services’ policies on sexual harassment cover similar topics, such as chain of command responsibilities, complaint processing, and definitions for sexual harassment; however, they have some differences  For example, while all policies include provisions on sexual harassment prevention training, the Army’s and the Navy’s policies include specific characteristics of effective training  Both policies also specify what should be included in trainings for different levels of the chain of command  The Marine Corps and Air Force policies simply state that commanders must conduct sexual harassment prevention training  CDC’s framework defines sexual violence as including non-contact unwanted sexual behaviors, sexual harassment, and physical sexual assault  We applied six principles for sexual violence prevention from CDC’s framework to DOD’s sexual harassment policies  These principles are: Risk factors: Factors that may put people at risk for sexual violence perpetration or victimization, such as an organizational climate that either explicitly or implicitly condones sexual harassment  Protective factors: Factors that may protect high-risk people from harm, such as an organizational climate that promotes respect amongst personnel at all levels  Primary strategies for prevention: Strategies that occur before sexual violence takes place to prevent initial perpetration, such as sexual harassment prevention training  Secondary strategies for prevention: Immediate responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the early identification of victims and the short-term consequences of violence, such as mechanisms for reporting instances of sexual harassment and immediate interventions  Tertiary strategies for prevention: Long-term responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the lasting consequences of violence and sex-offender treatment interventions, such as long-term treatment of the victim and perpetrator  Risk domains: Levels at which risk and protective factors should be categorized, including: individual, relationship, community, and societal  In its sexual assault prevention strategy, DOD adapted risk domains to the military population, using the levels of: individual, relationship, leaders at all levels, military community, and society  Our comparison of DOD sexual harassment policies with CDC’s framework for preventing sexual violence showed that the policies include some of the principles in the framework but not others (see table 1 ) Our analysis showed that the OSD and the Air Force policies each include two of the six principles in CDC’s framework, and the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps policies include three principles  Specifically, the policies generally identify sexual harassment prevention training for the armed forces, a primary strategy for prevention  In addition, the policies generally outline mechanisms for reporting and responding to sexual harassment, considered a secondary strategy for prevention  The Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps policies outline counseling support and referral services, as well as specifying the options available for administrative or judicial punishment, including discharge from service for perpetrators, which can be considered to be tertiary strategies for prevention  Common elements missing from DOD’s sexual harassment policies are risk factors and protective factors, which identify conditions or behaviors that might heighten or lower the risk of sexual harassment victimization or perpetration, respectively  Examples of risk factors for sexual violence identified by the CDC include, but are not limited to, alcohol and drug use, hypermasculinity, emotionally unsupportive family environments, general tolerance of sexual violence within the community, and societal norms that support male superiority and sexual entitlement  Examples of protective factors from the CDC include emotional health and connectedness, and empathy and concern for how one’s actions affect others  Additionally, RAND identified an organizational climate that is oppositional to sexual violence as a protective factor  The policies also did not include risk domains, which would categorize risk and protective factors at the individual, relationship, community, and society levels  ODMEO officials told us that they are familiar with the CDC framework and are considering using it as a source of best practices for a new sexual harassment prevention strategy  DOD has previously used CDC’s sexual violence prevention framework to guide its sexual assault prevention strategy  In the absence of more comprehensive policies on sexual harassment that fully include principles in the CDC framework for sexual violence prevention, DOD may be missing opportunities to address and potentially reduce incidents of sexual harassment in the military population based on risk and protective factors and effective, tested strategies  Specifically, DOD may be missing the opportunity to identify risk factors, which would help to recognize situations where individuals and populations may be at a higher risk of sexual harassment perpetration or victimization; identify protective factors to lower the risk of sexual harassment; develop mechanisms to address sexual harassment across risk domains—at the individual, relationship, community, and society levels; and develop tertiary strategies, or long-term responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the lasting consequences of violence and sex- offender treatment interventions  DOD’s sexual harassment policies include three elements required by section 579 of the NDAA for FY 2013 but some do not include one element involving the anonymous reporting of incidents  Section 579 mandated that DOD, among other things, develop a comprehensive sexual harassment policy that includes the following elements: (1) prevention training for members of the armed forces; (2) mechanisms for reporting sexual harassment, including mechanisms for anonymous reporting; and (3) mechanisms for resolving sexual harassment that include the prosecution of perpetrators  In 2014, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued a policy memorandum addressing the provisions of Section 579 and directed the military services to develop implementing instructions that include mechanisms for anonymous reporting  We compared DOD’s policies with the required elements in section 579 and found that OSD and military service policies generally include required elements except for the element focused on DOD including anonymous reporting in its policies for sexual harassment  The OSD, Army, and Marine Corps policies do not include anonymous reporting, while the Air Force policy and a new Navy policy do  Officials from ODMEO said that providing an option for anonymous reporting is important because it increases the odds that incidents will be reported  ODMEO officials also told us that the services have hotlines that servicemembers can use to anonymously report complaints of sexual harassment, and the Air Force and Navy policies note that their respective military servicemembers have options for anonymous reporting  While the military services may have mechanisms in place for anonymous reporting of sexual harassment, these mechanisms are not included in OSD’s policy—as required by section 579—or the policies of two of the Services, those of the Army and the Marine Corps  Without including anonymous reporting of sexual harassment complaints in DOD’s sexual harassment policies, the statutory requirement for anonymous reporting may be interpreted and applied inconsistently throughout the military services, or left unmet  OSD is developing a new policy—planned to be issued in fiscal year 2018—that will specifically focus on various forms of harassment, including sexual harassment, hazing, and bullying  ODMEO officials who are developing the new policy stated that it is intended, among other things, to enhance oversight of sexual harassment prevention and response within the department  However, because the policy is under development, it is too early to determine how the policy will address the CDC principles and anonymous reporting, as discussed earlier  Further, it is unclear how OSD plans to improve oversight and whether it intends to include performance goals, objectives, milestones, and metrics as we previously recommended in 2011  Although OSD in 2014 directed the military services to improve their oversight of sexual harassment, none of the military services were able to demonstrate that they had implemented all the required elements  Specifically, DOD’s 2014 policy memorandum addressing the provisions of section 579 also directs the military services to develop a sexual harassment oversight framework to be reviewed quarterly by a senior leadership forum that includes long-term goals, objectives, and milestones; criteria for measuring progress; results-oriented performance measures to assess effectiveness of service sexual harassment policies and programs; standards for holding leaders accountable for promoting, supporting, and enforcing policies, plans and programs; and strategies to implement the oversight framework  While some of the military services have included elements of the oversight framework directive from the 2014 policy memorandum, none of them were able to provide information that demonstrated that they had fulfilled all requirements set forth by that policy memorandum  For instance, when asked, none of the military services were able to provide details that they have senior leader forums that review their oversight efforts on a quarterly basis  Officials from the Air Force told us that they were waiting for ODMEO to release a new sexual harassment policy before establishing the oversight framework  Officials from the Navy referred us to their July 2017 sexual harassment policy, which instructs the Navy Sexual Harassment Prevention and Equal Opportunity Office to develop and implement standards for holding leaders accountable for promoting, supporting, and enforcing sexual harassment prevention and response policies, plans, and programs, and to develop results-oriented performance measures to assess the effectiveness of sexual harassment prevention and response policies and programs  Officials from the Army referred us to their SHARP Campaign Plan, which outlines methods to hold leaders accountable for taking appropriate action to address sexual harassment; goals and objectives for the program; and ways to measure program effectiveness  The Marine Corps did not respond to our request for information regarding an oversight framework for sexual harassment  A new department-wide policy on sexual harassment could be helpful to the military services as they review and update their respective policies  As noted earlier, military service policies have some differences in how they address aspects of sexual harassment  The Marine Corps told us that they have been waiting for additional guidance from OSD before updating their sexual harassment policies  However, following publicized incidents of Marines posting inappropriate photos on line of female servicemembers without their consent, the Marine Corps updated its guidance in May 2017 adding “the distribution or broadcasting of an intimate image, without consent” to its list of sexual harassment incidents that mandate separation processing  Additionally, in May 2017, a Marine Corps official said the service was revising its sexual harassment policy  The Navy updated its sexual harassment policy in July 2017 without additional guidance from OSD  We also noted during our review that most existing policies have not yet been updated to reflect a provision in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA that redefined sexual harassment for certain purposes so it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination but is recognized also as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behavior that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault  We asked DOD officials from several offices about the implications of this change  They identified some actions they will take, but the full implications, if any, of the change are unclear  Officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness said that there are no significant implications of the sexual harassment definition change beyond making conforming revisions to policy documents and guidance  ODMEO officials said that adjusting to the new definition of sexual harassment would not significantly affect their work at the OSD level, since they are already updating their sexual harassment policy to reflect this change and since sexual harassment is expected to remain within the responsibilities of ODMEO  They added that the military services will likely have to adjust to the new definition of sexual harassment, but did not offer details in how they would have to adjust  The Navy’s new policy dated July 2017 reflects the new definition, but the other military services have yet to incorporate the change  Officials from SAPRO said that they are working with ODMEO to revise surveys on unwanted sexual behaviors to reflect the new definition  SAPRO officials further stated that sexual harassment should remain under ODMEO’s purview since ODMEO personnel are trained specifically in sexual harassment response  Officials from the Army’s SHARP program said that the new definition means that sexual harassment will more often be considered misconduct, and taken more seriously  Since OSD is in the process of updating its policy, we are not making any recommendations  However, it will be important for OSD and the military services to address our prior recommendation regarding improving the oversight framework as well as incorporating the new definition of sexual harassment required by the fiscal year 2017 NDAA while updating their policies  DOD has processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on sexual assault incidents and domestic violence incidents that involve sexual assault, but the department does not have similar assurance of consistent data on incidents of sexual harassment  SAPRO and FAP each use centralized databases that enable them to maintain and report consistent data on those incidents that fall under their purview  In contrast, DOD relies on military service-specific databases on sexual harassment incidents and does not have assurance of consistent data from these databases because it has not established standard data elements and definitions to guide the military services in maintaining and reporting these data  DOD uses centralized databases to maintain and report data on sexual assault incidents in the military and domestic violence incidents involving sexual assault  Specifically, SAPRO and the military services use the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID), and FAP uses the DOD Central Registry  These databases maintain data on incidents that are included in statutorily required annual reports to Congress on sexual assaults in the military  In 2011, Congress mandated that DOD provide annual reports that include: the number of sexual assaults committed against and by members of the armed forces that were reported to military officials, including unsubstantiated and substantiated reports with a synopsis of each substantiated case organized by offense and the action taken, including disciplinary actions; the policies, processes, and procedures implemented by the Secretary concerned during the year covered by the report in response to incidents of sexual assaults; the number of substantiated sexual assault cases in which the victim is deployed where the assailant is a foreign national; and a description of the implementation of the accessibility plan, including a description of the steps taken to ensure that trained personnel, appropriate supplies, and transportation resources are available to deployed units  The most recent DOD annual report on sexual assault was issued in May 2017 and covered fiscal year 2016  The report includes data on the number of both restricted and unrestricted reports of sexual assault involving servicemembers  The report also contains separate enclosures for the Army, the Navy (including the Marine Corps), the Air Force, and the National Guard, as well as annexes on the Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members (WGRA) and the Military Investigation and Justice Experience Survey (MIJES)  The WGRA annex discusses topics including the continuum of harm and the MIJES annex contains information on closed cases of sexual assault  SAPRO and FAP both contributed sexual assault incident data to the fiscal year 2016 report, and our review of the underlying databases found that data elements and definitions were defined and management was able to process the data into consistent information  Specifically, the two databases used are the: DSAID Data on Sexual Assault Incidents: DSAID captures DOD-wide data on certain incidents of sexual assault that involve a servicemember or in some cases, when a sexual assault involves a servicemember’s spouse or adult family member or a DOD civilian or contractor  However, FAP-related sexual assault incidents are not captured in DSAID  Using information generated by DSAID, SAPRO includes both substantiated and unsubstantiated reports of sexual assault in its annual report  In 2017, we reviewed DSAID and found that DOD had taken steps to ensure the quality and consistency of data in DSAID as well as to monitor the data entered into the system  In addition, OSD had provided the military services with definitions for required data elements in the database, which include details on the incident, victim, and alleged offender  In addition, we identified several technical challenges with the system, including issues with the system’s speed and ease of use; interfaces with other external DOD databases; and users’ ability to query data and generate reports  At the time of the report’s release, DOD had plans to modify DSAID  As of July 2017, DOD officials told us that they are still in the process of making modifications to DSAID to resolve or alleviate the technical challenges for users  DOD Central Registry Data on Domestic Abuse Incidents Involving Sexual Assault: The DOD Central Registry captures DOD-wide data on reports of domestic abuse on populations within FAP’s purview, including on family members of servicemembers as well as on their intimate partners  The DOD Central Registry includes details of each case such as the status of cases, the demographics of the perpetrator and victim, the specific type of abuse, and other details surrounding the incident  FAP officials explained that they do not use the “substantiated” and “unsubstantiated” terminology like SAPRO does  Rather, FAP, which is not responsible for determining criminal or legal disposition, uses the terms “met criteria” and “not met criteria” for maltreatment  This difference in terminology has to do with FAP’s process for determining if an incident meets the clinical criteria to be classified as abuse for the purpose of developing an intervention/treatment plan for both the victim and the offenders involved in the allegations of domestic violence  Incidents that are determined as having met criteria are entered into the DOD Central Registry  We reviewed the DOD Central Registry and found that it includes well defined data elements and descriptions for collecting data on cases of domestic violence including those that involve sexual assault  The data in the DOD Central Registry includes 46 discrete data elements, including the relationship between the victim and perpetrator, the timeline of the case, and actions taken and treatments administered in response to the incident  The elements are defined and described in an OSD policy  In its annual reporting to Congress, FAP provides the number of domestic violence incidents involving sexual assault that met criteria and the total number of instances of domestic violence that did not meet criteria  However, FAP does not maintain or report data on the total number of reported domestic violence incidents that specifically involve sexual assault  That is because only the details of cases that meet criteria are recorded in the DOD Central Registry  A FAP official said that the military services likely have more detailed information about cases that did not meet the criteria, but it does not collect these data in the DOD Central Registry  A provision in the NDAA for FY 2017 requires DOD to submit an annual report on child abuse and domestic abuse incident data, including the number of incidents reported during the year involving the physical or sexual abuse of a spouse, intimate partner, or child  This report is to be submitted simultaneously with submission of DOD’s annual sexual assault report to Congress  FAP officials told us that they are currently working with SAPRO to ensure that all reported incidents of domestic violence involving sexual assault, including those that did not meet the criteria, are included in the annual sexual assault report  Though not required to do so, DOD has included sexual harassment incident data in an appendix of its annual report on sexual assault in the military  The appendix provides information on the total number of sexual harassment reports over the fiscal year and the total number of substantiated sexual harassment reports  It also breaks down complaints by sex, service, and pay grade  ODMEO generates the reported data through annual data calls to each military service; however, it does not have assurance that the services maintain consistent data on sexual harassment incidents consistent with federal standards of internal control  The military services maintain sexual harassment incident data in military service-specific databases, and there is no centralized database similar to DSAID or the Central Registry  The military service databases are intended to collect data on formal complaints  According to the military services, the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps use web-based systems, and the Navy tracks data using an Excel spreadsheet  Each service has a discrete process for entering and performing quality checks on sexual harassment incident data in its respective database, as shown in table 2  Although the military services perform some data quality checks as shown in table 2, ODMEO does not have assurance the military services are maintaining consistent data because it has not defined standard data elements and definitions for the information in their databases  Rather, the individual military services have established their own data elements and definitions  We compared data elements and definitions from each of the military services and found that there are several data elements that remain consistent throughout the services  For example, each military service records whether the complainant and offender are in the same unit, what their relationship is to each other, and the disposition of cases  However, we also found inconsistencies in data fields and their definitions across the military services, and some of the military services have data fields and definitions that do not exist in other databases  For example, the Marine Corps records whether or not the incident involves alcohol or drug use, which the rest of the military services do not record, and the military services record dates differently between their respective databases  For example, the Air Force records an initial date, the date the complaint form was signed, the date the general court martial was sent, the date the legal review was completed, and the final review date  The Marine Corps records the date the incident was reported, the date the incident occurred and whether the incident occurred over multiple dates; the dates associated with notifications and status updates to general courts martial proceedings; the dates associated with steps in the investigation, including any extensions; the dates associated with dispositions; and the dates associated with appeals  Additionally, the military services have different ways of categorizing sexual harassment incidents, as shown in table 3  As shown in table 3, while some data descriptions are similar—for instance, each of the military services include crude/offensive behavior, unwanted sexual attention, and sexual coercion—there are differences as well  The Air Force also categorizes sexual harassment into verbal, nonverbal, physical, and other, for example, whereas the other military services’ top-level categories are different  The Navy has a “not applicable” category that it describes as sexual harassment complaints that do not fall under sexual harassment, and only the Air Force has an “other” category

ground_truth: Each year, the DHS invests billions of dollars in a diverse portfolio of major acquisition programs to help execute its many critical missions. DHS's acquisition activities are on GAO's High Risk List, in part, because of management and funding issues. The Explanatory Statement accompanying the DHS Appropriations Act, 2015 included a provision for GAO to review DHS's major acquisitions. This report, GAO's fourth annual review, assesses the extent to which: (1) DHS's major acquisition programs are on track to meet their schedule and cost goals, and (2) DHS has taken actions to enhance its policies and processes to better reflect key practices for effectively managing a portfolio of investments. GAO reviewed 28 acquisition programs, including DHS's largest programs that were in the process of obtaining new capabilities as of April 2017, and programs GAO or DHS identified as at risk of poor outcomes. GAO assessed cost and schedule progress against baselines, assessed DHS's policies and processes against GAO's key portfolio management practices, and met with relevant DHS officials. During 2017, 10 of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs GAO assessed that had approved schedule and cost goals were on track to meet those goals. GAO reviewed 28 programs in total, 4 of which were new programs that GAO did not assess because they did not establish cost and schedule goals before the end of calendar year 2017 as planned. The table shows the status of the 24 programs GAO assessed. Reasons for schedule delays or cost increases included technical challenges, changes in requirements, and external factors. Recent enhancements to DHS's acquisition management, resource allocation, and requirements policies largely reflect key portfolio management practices (see table). However, DHS is in the early stages of implementing these policies. GAO identified two areas where DHS could strengthen its portfolio management policies and implementation efforts: DHS's policies do not reflect the key practice to reassess a program that breaches—or exceeds—its cost, schedule, or performance goals in the context of the portfolio to ensure it is still relevant or affordable. Acquisition management officials said that, in practice, they do so based on a certification of funds memorandum—a tool GAO has found to be effective for DHS leadership to assess program affordability—submitted by the component when one of its programs re-baselines in response to a breach. Documenting this practice in policy would help ensure DHS makes strategic investment decisions within its limited budget. DHS is not leveraging information gathered from reviews once programs complete implementation to manage its portfolio of active acquisition programs. DHS's acquisition policy requires programs to conduct post-implementation reviews after initial capabilities are deployed, which is in line with GAO's key practices. Acquisition management officials said they do not consider the results of these reviews in managing DHS's portfolio because the reviews are typically conducted after oversight for a program shifts to the components. Leveraging these results across DHS could enable DHS to address potential issues that may contribute to poor outcomes, such as schedule slips and cost growth, for other programs in its acquisition portfolio. GAO recommends DHS update its acquisition policy to require certification of fund memorandums when programs re-baseline as a result of a breach and assess programs' post-implementation reviews to improve performance across the acquisition portfolio. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2:  Because the military services have different descriptors for similar data fields, DOD cannot ensure that the services are categorizing similar types of sexual harassment in the same way  In addition, we found that the Army is more detailed in characterizing different types of sexual harassment  Specifically, as shown in table 4, the Army has an additional data field that provides more detailed descriptions of three types of sexual harassment; the other military services’ respective databases do not have this level of detail  Because the Army has this additional data field, it can capture information on multiple types of harassment that may occur in a single incident  The other military services, in contrast, do not have this capability in their respective databases  To illustrate, if one case of sexual harassment involved both verbal and nonverbal forms of sexual harassment, the Army could choose a more specific characterization to describe the incident, while the other military services would characterize the incident in more general terms  ODMEO officials are considering adapting an existing system to track instances of sexual harassment department-wide  That system, called Force Risk Reduction (FR2), is currently used to track safety issues like military injuries, civilian workers’ compensation claims, and casualty notifications at DOD  ODMEO recently completed a pilot of the system with the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the Army to test whether it would be useable for adaptation for sexual harassment data, and is planning a second pilot to include the Air Force and the National Guard Bureau  According to ODMEO officials, their adaptation of FR2 is intended to collect aggregate-level sexual harassment data from the military services, and the military services will continue to operate and rely on their individual databases to maintain more detailed case-level information on incidents  For example, ODMEO’s adaptation of FR2 would not have details such as descriptions of specific incidents, or information on dates associated with investigations or appeals  These types of data will continue to be maintained in the service systems  ODMEO officials told us that their new data system, if implemented, is not designed to collect case-level details in order to avoid personally identifiable information  Federal internal control standards state that management should define the identified information requirements at the relevant level and requisite specificity for appropriate personnel  Management should also process the obtained data into quality information  Consistency of information meets the identified information requirements when relevant data from reliable sources are used  While DOD is exploring implementing a system to track instances of sexual harassment department-wide, as currently planned this system will not collect case-level details and individual military service systems will continue to be relied upon for this type of information  Inconsistencies in data elements and definitions among the military services generally mean that one military service may be maintaining sexual harassment data that are more or less detailed than sexual harassment data maintained by other military services, or that is simply different from the data maintained by other military services  Additionally, inconsistent data elements and definitions may create difficulties in reporting sexual harassment data from the military services to OSD for a department-wide report, since ODMEO has to adapt data from the services to fit reporting requirements  Without standard data elements and definitions for sexual harassment data, DOD will continue to lack assurance about the consistency of these data across the military services  DOD has several overarching efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm  Specifically, the department established an office to oversee the integration and coordination of unwanted sexual behaviors in 2015 and is in the process of developing an overarching prevention strategy  However, because the strategy is under development, it is unclear whether it will contain key elements for long-term and results-oriented strategic planning  DOD also has ongoing collaborative efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors along the continuum of harm  Specifically, we identified 15 collaborative efforts, including regular meetings, Integrated Product Teams, and working groups that involve multiple entities that address unwanted sexual behaviors  DOD has taken steps to integrate activities related to the continuum of harm and is in the process of developing an overarching prevention strategy  Based on its research, DOD has sought to understand and define the continuum of harm, including the shared characteristics that contribute to increased unwanted sexual behaviors along the continuum and implications for prevention and response efforts  Also, in November 2015, DOD established a new entity—the Office of the Executive Director for Force Resiliency, within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness—to oversee policies and initiatives related to the continuum of harm  Specifically, the Executive Director for Force Resiliency was expected to provide senior leader policy guidance and oversight on high visibility departments that include SAPRO and ODMEO  In November 2016, the Office of the Executive Director for Force Resiliency was absorbed under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness  According to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, the functions of the Office of the Executive Director for Force Resiliency remain and coordination of the efforts of several offices that address the continuum of harm continues  Officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and SAPRO told us that they are drafting an overarching prevention strategy to encompass behaviors along the continuum of harm  However, because the strategy is still under development, its contents and timelines are unclear  We have previously identified six elements of strategic management planning that are key for establishing a long-term, results- oriented strategic planning framework: (1) a mission statement, (2) long- term goals, (3) strategies to achieve goals, (4) external factors that could affect goals, (5) the use of metrics to gauge progress, and (6) evaluations of the plan to monitor goals and objectives  By incorporating the elements of a comprehensive and results-oriented strategy into its overarching prevention strategy, the department will be better positioned to effectively coordinate and integrate prevention activities and reduce unwanted sexual behaviors  A mission statement, along with long-term goals and strategies to achieve those goals, should help to focus efforts in integrating prevention activities, and metrics and evaluations will allow the department to gauge progress and make changes as necessary, while also accounting for external factors that may impact progress towards goals  Our review identified 15 collaborative efforts that DOD has used to address behaviors along the continuum of harm, including sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual assault  Three of these efforts are cross-cutting between all three of the key OSD stakeholders—ODMEO, FAP, and SAPRO—and five involve cross-cutting efforts by at least two of the key stakeholders  Figure 1 lists DOD’s 15 collaborative efforts  Regarding the three cross-cutting efforts involving all three of the key stakeholders, The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Integrated Product Team provides a forum for OSD, the military departments, and the National Guard Bureau to address sexual assault prevention efforts  The team meets bimonthly and serves as the implementation and oversight arm for DOD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program  The team also coordinates new policies; reviews existing SAPR policies and programs to ensure they are consistent with applicable instructions; and monitors the progress of program elements including DOD’s SAPR strategic plan tasks, DOD’s sexual assault prevention strategy tasks, and implementation of NDAA- related sexual assault issues  SAPRO leads this effort  The Prevention Collaboration Forum and working group develops coordinated prevention approaches that address factors impacting personnel readiness such as sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual assault  According to its proposed charter, the focus of the forum is on enhancing the health of military unit and family climates as well as strengthening and promoting the resiliency and readiness of the total force through a coordinated effort around integrated policies, collaborative direction of research, alignment of resources, analysis of gaps, and synchronization of activities  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness leads this effort with SAPRO providing administrative and facilitation support  The Victim Assistance Leadership Council advises the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on policies and practices related to victim assistance across DOD  According to its charter, the council provides a forum for senior leaders to exchange information and collaborate on issues affecting victims of all forms of crime and harassment within DOD, including but not limited to victims of sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual abuse  Leadership rotates between SAPRO, FAP, and ODMEO and other offices  Regarding the cross-cutting efforts involving two of the three key stakeholders, the Sexual Harassment Prevention and Response Working Group is led by ODMEO and includes SAPRO  The group was established to evaluate how to best position sexual harassment prevention and response policy and oversight and to leverage technology to automate annual reporting requirements  The four other cross-cutting efforts are (1) the hazing and bullying working group, (2) retaliation working groups created under the SAPR Integrated Process Team, (3) domestic abuse rapid improvement events, and (4) ODMEO and SHARP meetings  The remaining collaborative efforts we identified are specific to FAP, SAPRO, and ODMEO  For example, the Sexual Assault Prevention Roundtable is a forum for representatives from OSD, the military departments, and the National Guard Bureau to share information on sexual assault prevention efforts and requirements  According to its charter, the roundtable’s activities include, among other things, sharing promising practices and prevention updates; discussing challenges in prevention program implementation, including servicemember training, and identifying approaches to address them; identifying metrics to assess the impact and effectiveness of prevention efforts, and opportunities to collaborate on research projects; and tracking the implementation of prevention tasks identified in the DOD SAPR strategy  SAPRO leads this effort  The Defense Diversity Working Group is an ODMEO-specific group that collaborates with various OSD and military service offices on military and civilian diversity and inclusion issues and implements mandated diversity plans and programs  Studies by DOD and others have shown that unwanted sexual behaviors do not exist in isolation but are part of a range of interconnected, inappropriate behaviors that are connected to the occurrence of a sexual assault  While DOD has policies and procedures to prevent and respond to these types of unwanted behaviors, some of the policies do not include key elements like anonymous reporting of sexual harassment and principles in the CDC framework for sexual violence prevention  Fully including these elements in the department’s policies can help ensure that the military services are interpreting and applying prevention and response efforts consistently and may also decrease the risk of perpetration or victimization related to instances on unwanted sexual behaviors  Further, DOD has developed reliable data systems for collecting and reporting data on some of the unwanted sexual behaviors including sexual assault and instances of domestic violence with sexual assault  However, inconsistencies in sexual harassment data elements and definitions may be creating difficulties in developing department-wide reports on unwanted sexual behaviors  Improving and standardizing data collection efforts will not only improve the quality of data that DOD and the military services collect but may also increase the ability for DOD to further develop its understanding of the connection between unwanted sexual behaviors  Finally, DOD officials have stated that they are in the early stages of developing an overarching strategy to address the interconnected nature of the range of unwanted sexual behaviors  To ensure that the department is appropriately concentrating its efforts to prevent and respond to the full range of unwanted behaviors, it is important that DOD include elements of a long-term, results-oriented strategy into its overarching prevention strategy  In doing so, DOD will be in a better position to effectively coordinate and integrate prevention activities and ultimately reduce instances of unwanted sexual behaviors  We are making the following four recommendations to DOD: The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should fully include in the new policy for sexual harassment the principles in the Centers for Disease Control’s framework for sexual violence prevention, including risk and protective factors, risk domains, and tertiary strategies  (Recommendation 1) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should include in the new policy for sexual harassment mechanisms for anonymous reporting of incidents consistent with section 579 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013  (Recommendation 2) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should (1) direct the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity to develop standard data elements and definitions for maintaining and reporting information on sexual harassment incidents at the military service level, and (2) direct the military services to incorporate these data elements and definitions into their military service-specific databases  (Recommendation 3) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness to incorporate in its continuum of harm prevention strategy all the elements that are key for establishing a long-term, results-oriented strategic planning framework  The elements are (1) a mission statement, (2) long-term goals, (3) strategies to achieve goals, (4) external factors that could affect goals, (5) use of metrics to gauge progress, and (6) evaluations of the plan to monitor goals and objectives  (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOD and CDC for review and comment  In its written comments, DOD concurred with three recommendations and partially concurred with one, noting planned actions to address this recommendation  DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II  DOD and CDC also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate  DOD concurred with our three recommendations that DOD fully include in the new policy for sexual harassment the principles in the CDC's framework for sexual violence prevention, that DOD also include in the new sexual harassment policy mechanisms for anonymous reporting, and that DOD incorporate in its continuum of harm strategy all the elements that are key for establishing a long-term, results-oriented strategic planning framework  With regard to our recommendation that DOD develop standard data elements and definitions for maintaining and reporting information on sexual harassment incidents and direct the military services to incorporate these into their databases, DOD partially concurred and stated that while a 2013 policy memorandum provides standard data elements and definitions, the services collect other data elements based on their unique needs  DOD stated that ODMEO will conduct a review to determine compliance with DOD reporting requirements and identify emerging policy modifications or changes/additions to standard definitions  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has policies on sexual harassment that include Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) principles and relevant legislative elements, we obtained and reviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and service-level sexual harassment policies  We compared the policies with a framework developed by the CDC for preventing sexual violence, which CDC defines as including non-contact unwanted sexual behaviors, sexual harassment, and physical sexual assault  CDC’s model is based on the concept of addressing the health of a given population based on common risk and protective factors and effective, tested strategies  We reviewed CDC’s framework for preventing sexual violence as well as our report on DOD’s sexual assault prevention strategy to identify six principles that an organization can include in a sexual violence prevention strategy or policy: Risk factors: Factors that may put people at risk for sexual violence perpetration or victimization, such as an organizational climate that either explicitly or implicitly condones sexual harassment; Protective factors: Factors that may protect high-risk people from harm, such as an organizational climate that promotes respect among personnel at all levels; Primary strategies for prevention: Strategies that occur before sexual violence takes place to prevent initial perpetration, such as sexual harassment prevention training; Secondary strategies for prevention: Immediate responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the early identification of victims and the short-term consequences of violence, such as reporting mechanisms and immediate interventions; Tertiary strategies for prevention: Long-term responses after sexual violence has occurred to address the lasting consequences of violence and sex-offender treatment interventions, such as the long- term treatment of the victim and perpetrator; and Risk domains: Levels at which risk and protective factors should be categorized, including: individual, relationship, community, and society  DOD has previously adapted risk domains to the military population, using the levels of: individual, relationship, leaders at all levels, military community, and society  DOD previously used CDC’s framework for preventing sexual violence in the department’s 2014-2016 Sexual Assault Prevention Strategy  In addition, we reviewed the OSD and service-level sexual harassment policies to determine the extent to which they included three elements identified in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2013, which directed DOD to develop a comprehensive policy that includes sexual harassment prevention training for the armed forces; mechanisms for reporting incidents, including mechanisms for anonymous reporting; and mechanisms for responding to and resolving instances of sexual harassment, including for the prosecution of perpetrators  Two GAO analysts independently reviewed the policies and determined whether or not each element was included  Any discrepancies were resolved through discussion and consultation with a third analyst  We interviewed officials in the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, who oversee department- wide policy on sexual harassment, to obtain an understanding of their roles and processes regarding sexual harassment as well as the status of policy development in that area  We also interviewed officials from military equal opportunity offices in the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, as well as officials from the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Office to obtain an understanding of the service sexual harassment offices and roles, as well as the status of updates to their respective policies  To determine the extent to which DOD has processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors, we reviewed DOD reports to Congress that provide incident data regarding unwanted sexual behaviors, including DOD’s most recent annual report on sexual assault in the military  We identified the databases that generate the reported data and evaluated the processes for assuring the quality and consistency of data in those databases—including the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database, which maintains sexual assault data; the Central Registry database, which maintains data on domestic violence involving sexual assault; and various military service- level databases that maintain sexual harassment data  To evaluate DOD’s reported data we reviewed pertinent statutory provisions, DOD guidance, and the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government that address agencies’ use of quality data and our prior reports evaluating sexual assault data  In evaluating the reported data, we obtained and reviewed statutory provisions with reporting requirements, as well as DOD guidance on data collection for sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual abuse  With regard to DOD efforts to collect and maintain sexual assault data, we met with OSD, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps officials in their respective Sexual Assault Prevention and Response offices as well as officials in the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention office  We also reviewed our prior report on DOD’s Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database and our prior report that evaluated sexual assault data across agencies  To determine whether DOD has processes for collecting and maintaining consistent data for domestic violence with sexual assault, we obtained and compared data elements and processes from DOD’s Central Registry database, which contains data for domestic violence throughout the department  We also obtained and reviewed policies that outline processes for collecting and reporting domestic violence involving sexual abuse data, and interviewed officials from Family Advocacy Program offices in OSD and the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force to determine data reliability and comprehensiveness  To determine the extent to which reports of sexual assault, including reports of sexual assault among servicemembers and reports of domestic abuse involving sexual assault, meet statutory requirements for reporting, we reviewed DOD reports to Congress that provide sexual assault incident data, including DOD’s most recent annual report on sexual assault in the military and compared those reports with requirements in the NDAA for FY 2011, which directs DOD to report the total number of substantiated and unsubstantiated sexual assault incidents, among other things  With regard to sexual harassment data, we interviewed officials in the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, as well as officials from the Military Equal Opportunity offices in the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, and officials from the Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention office  We collected and compared data fields and data definitions from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force offices that address sexual harassment  We compared the data elements to determine whether the data elements and definitions across the services are consistent  To identify the extent to which DOD has overarching efforts, including a prevention strategy, to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm, we met with officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and DOD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response office  We reviewed our prior work and provisions from the Government Performance and Results Act to identify key elements that should be included in strategic plans as well as standards for coordinating within agencies  Key elements include (1) mission statement, (2) long-term goals, (3) strategies to achieve goals, (4) external factors that could affect goals, (5) use of metrics to gauge progress, and (6) evaluations of the plan to monitor goals and objectives  We identified and reviewed coordinating mechanisms used by OSD and the service offices that guide and oversee efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors  We reviewed DOD, RAND Corporation, and CDC reports that addressed the continuum of harm and the relationship between the various forms of unwanted sexual behaviors  We interviewed officials from OSD and service-level Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, Family Advocacy, and Military Equal Opportunity offices and the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention to identify the various efforts in which they participate  We also collected and reviewed charters and meeting notes for integrated product teams and working groups to identify their intended purposes, their activities, their membership, and whether they involved multiple offices addressing unwanted sexual behaviors  In identifying DOD’s collaborative efforts, we also reviewed our prior work on collaboration among federal agencies but we did not assess the effectiveness of department’s collaborative efforts  We conducted this performance audit from August 2016 to December 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the staff named above, key contributors to this report include Thomas Gosling (Assistant Director); Isabel Band; Matthew Bond; Vincent Buquicchio; Caroline DeCelles; Mae Jones; Kirsten Lauber; and Brian Pegram  Sexual Assault: Better Resource Management Needed to Improve Prevention and Response in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve  GAO-17-217  Washington, D C : February 27, 2017  Military Personnel: DOD Has Processes for Operating and Managing Its Sexual Assault Incident Database  GAO-17-99  Washington, D C : January 10, 2017  Sexual Violence Data: Actions Needed to Improve Clarity and Address Differences Across Federal Data Collection Efforts  GAO-16-546  Washington, D C : July 19, 2016  DOD and Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Increase Oversight and Management Information on Hazing Incidents Involving Servicemembers  GAO-16-226  Washington, D C : February 9, 2016  Sexual Assault: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Prevention Strategy and to Help Ensure It Is Effectively Implemented  GAO-16-61  Washington, D C : November 4, 2015  Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Address Sexual Assaults of Male Servicemembers  GAO-15-284  Washington, D C : March 19, 2015  Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Take Further Actions to Prevent Sexual Assault during Initial Military Training  GAO-14-806  Washington, D C : September 9, 2014  Military Personnel: DOD Has Taken Steps to Meet the Health Needs of Deployed Servicewomen, but Actions Are Needed to Enhance Care for Sexual Assault Victims  GAO-13-182  Washington, D C : January 29, 2013  Preventing Sexual Harassment: DOD Needs Greater Leadership Commitment and an Oversight Framework  GAO-11-809  Washington, D C : September 21, 2011  Military Justice: Oversight and Better Collaboration Needed for Sexual Assault Investigations and Adjudications  GAO-11-579  Washington, D C : June 22, 2011  Military Personnel: DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Need to Be Further Strengthened  GAO-10-405T  Washington, D C : February 24, 2010  Military Personnel: Additional Actions Are Needed to Strengthen DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs  GAO-10-215  Washington, D C : February 3, 2010  Military Personnel: DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Face Implementation and Oversight Challenges  GAO-08-924  Washington, D C : August 29, 2008  Military Personnel: The DOD and Coast Guard Academies Have Taken Steps to Address Incidents of Sexual Harassment and Assault, but Greater Federal Oversight Is Needed  GAO-08-296  Washington, D C : January 17, 2008 
Report 2:  In 1952, coverage was extended to civilian employees of nonappropriated fund instrumentalities of the armed forces , such as service clubs and post exchanges  Coverage was extended in 1953 to employees working on the Outer Continental Shelf in the exploration and the development of natural resources , such as workers on offshore oil platforms  Employers required by the LHWCA to provide workers' compensation coverage to their employees may either purchase private insurance or self-insure  The DOL is responsible for authorizing insurance carriers to provide coverage under the LHWCA program and for authorizing companies to self-insure  However, the DOL does not set or regulate insurance premiums  These insurance arrangements are the primary means of providing LHWCA benefits to injured, sick, and deceased workers and their families  General revenue is not used to pay any LHWCA benefits  The DOL operates the Special Fund to provide LHWCA benefits in cases in which the responsible employer or insurance carrier cannot pay or in which benefits must be paid for a second injury under Section 8(f) of the LHWCA  The Special Fund is financed through an annual assessment charged to employers and insurance carriers based on the previous year's claims, payments required when an employee dies without any survivors, disability payments due to an employee without survivors after his or her death, and penalties and fines assessed for noncompliance with LHWCA program rules  The administrative costs associated with the LHWCA are largely provided by general revenue  General revenue is used to pay for most oversight functions associated with the LHWCA and the processing of LHWCA claims  General revenue is also used to pay legal and investigative costs associated with the DOL Office of the Solicitor and Office of the Inspector General  Revenue from the Special Fund is used to finance oversight activities related to the Special Fund and the program's vocational rehabilitation activities  In 2016, total administrative costs associated with the LHWCA were approximately $15 8 million, of which $13 6 million, or 86%, was paid by general revenue and $2 2 million, or 14%, was paid by the Special Fund  The LHWCA provides medical benefits for covered injuries and illnesses and disability benefits to partially cover wages lost due to covered injuries or illnesses, and it provides survivors benefits to the families of workers who die on the job  The LHWCA provides medical benefits to fully cover the cost of any medical treatment associated with a covered injury or illness  These medical benefits are provided without any deductibles, copayments, or costs paid by the injured worker  Prescription drugs and medical procedures are fully covered, as are costs associated with travelling to and from medical appointments  A covered worker may select his or her own treating physician, provided the physician has not been debarred from the LHWCA program for violating program rules  Covered workers are entitled to vocational rehabilitation services provided under the LHWCA  Vocational rehabilitation services are designed to assist the covered worker in returning to employment  There is no cost to the covered worker for vocational rehabilitation and workers actively participating in a rehabilitation program are entitled to an additional benefit of $25 per week  All costs associated with vocational rehabilitation under the LHWCA are paid out of the Special Fund  Vocational rehabilitation services may be provided by public or private rehabilitation agencies  The LHWCA provides disability benefits to covered workers to partially cover wages lost due to the inability to work because of a covered injury or illness  The amount of disability benefits is based on the worker's pre-disability wage, subject to maximum and minimum benefits based on the National Average Weekly Wage (NAWW) as determined by the DOL  The NAWW is updated October 1 of each year and is based on average wages across the United States for the three calendar quarters ending on June 30 of that year  The minimum weekly benefit that can be paid to a covered employee is equal to 50% of the NAWW and the maximum weekly benefit that can be paid is equal to 200% of the NAWW  Disability benefits under the LHWCA, like all workers' compensation benefits, are not subject to federal income taxes  Unlike most state workers' compensation benefits, however, LHWCA benefits are adjusted based on wage inflation rather than price inflation  Benefits are adjusted annually each October 1 to reflect the change in the NAWW from the previous year, up to a maximum increase of 5%  The LHWCA provides benefits in cases of total disability  Under the LHWCA, a worker is considered totally disabled if he or she is unable to earn his or her pre-injury wage because of a covered injury or illness  In addition, a worker is also considered totally disabled if he or she loses both hands, arms, feet, legs, or eyes, or any two of these body systems, such as the loss of one arm and one leg  Total disability benefits under the LHWCA are equal to two-thirds of the covered worker's wage at the time of the injury or illness  Total disability benefits continue until the worker is no longer totally disabled or dies  If a covered worker is able to partially return to work or return to work at a wage level less than his or her wage at the time of injury, then he or she is considered partially disabled  In cases of temporary partial disability, the LHWCA benefit is equal to two-thirds of the difference between the workers' pre-injury wage and his or her current earning capacity or actual earnings  Section 8(c) of the LHWCA provides a schedule of benefits to be paid in cases of permanent partial disability (PPD), such as the loss of a limb  The benefit schedule provides the number of weeks of compensation, at two-thirds of the pre-injury wage, for each type of PPD  For example, the LHWCA schedule provides that a worker who loses an arm is entitled to 312 weeks of compensation  Benefits in cases not listed on the schedule are paid at two-thirds of the difference between the pre-injury wage and current earning capacity for the duration of the disability  Schedule benefits for PPD are paid regardless of the current work status or earnings capacity of the employee  Thus, an employee with a PPD can fully return to work and earn his or her wage in addition to the PPD compensation  A copy of the LHWCA PPD schedule can be found in the Appendix to this report  If a worker has an illness that was caused by his or her covered employment but did not manifest itself until after his or her retirement, then he or she is entitled to disability benefits equal to two-thirds of the NAWW multiplied by the percentage of his or her impairment  The percentage of impairment is determined using the current edition of the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides ), or another professionally recognized source if the condition is not listed in the AMA Guides  The LHWCA provides cash benefits to the surviving spouses and minor children of workers killed on the job  Benefits for a surviving spouse end when the spouse remarries or dies and benefits for surviving children continue until the children reach the age of 18, age 23 if a full-time student, or for the life a child with a disability  A surviving spouse with no eligible children is entitled to one-half of the deceased worker's wage at the time of death under the LHWCA  A surviving spouse with one or more eligible children is entitled to two-thirds of the deceased worker's wage at the time of death  Once all children become ineligible for benefits because of their ages, the surviving spouse's benefit is reduced to the level of a spouse without any eligible children  If an eligible spouse becomes ineligible for benefits because of death or remarriage, or if there is no surviving spouse, benefits are still paid to any surviving children  Under the LHWCA, a single surviving eligible child is entitled to one-half of the deceased worker's wage at the time of death, and two or more surviving children are eligible for a combined two-thirds of the wage at the time of death  The survivors of a covered worker killed on the job are entitled under the LHWCA to a cash payment to provide for the burial and funeral of the deceased  The burial and funeral allowance is capped by Section 9(a) of the LHWCA at $3,000, and this cap not adjusted to reflect changes in prices or wages  If a covered worker who is receiving scheduled PPD benefits dies of a cause unrelated to his or her illness or injury, then the balance of any remaining PPD benefits is paid to his or her survivors  If a covered worker who dies on the job leaves no survivors, his or her employer or the employer's insurance carrier is required to pay $5,000 into the Special Fund  Although the responsibility for the payment of benefits under the LHWCA rests with the employer or the employer's insurance company, decisions on benefit eligibility and the amount of benefits are made by the DOL  Upon the report of an injury, illness, or death, the LHWCA claims process begins  If the employer or insurance carrier does not controvert the claim, then arrangements are made by the DOL for the claim to be paid  If, however, the employer controverts any part of the claim, then the DOL sets up an informal conference, either in person or by phone, between the employer or insurance carrier and worker with the goal of resolving any disputes over the claim  If this informal conference fails to resolve all outstanding disputes, then a formal hearing before a DOL administrative law judge (ALJ) is scheduled  If the employer or insurance carrier or the worker is dissatisfied with the decision of the ALJ, then this decision may be appealed to the Benefits Review Board (BRB)  The BRB is made up of five members appointed by the Secretary of Labor  Either party dissatisfied with the decision of the BRB may file a petition with the U S  Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred praying that the BRB's decision be set aside or modified  If an employer or insurance carrier fails to pay compensation in accordance with a final decision on a claim, the covered worker or the DOL may request that the U S  District Court order that payment be made 

ground_truth: Unwanted sexual behaviors in the military—including sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual assault—undermine core values, unit cohesion, combat readiness, and public goodwill. Recent studies suggest that these behaviors are part of a “continuum of harm,” which DOD defines as a range of interconnected, inappropriate behaviors that are connected to the occurrence of sexual assault and that support an environment that tolerates these behaviors. Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review efforts by DOD to prevent unwanted sexual behaviors in the military. GAO assessed the extent to which DOD has (1) policies on sexual harassment that include CDC principles and relevant legislative elements; (2) processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors; and (3) overarching efforts, including a prevention strategy, to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm. GAO reviewed DOD policies and pertinent databases, and interviewed agency officials. The Department of Defense's (DOD) policies on sexual harassment include some but not all of the Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) principles for preventing sexual violence and include most relevant legislative elements. GAO identified six principles from CDC's framework for preventing sexual violence, which CDC defines as including sexual harassment. GAO found that Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military service policies generally include CDC's principles regarding prevention strategies, but none address risk and protective factors, which identify conditions or behaviors that might heighten or lower the risk of sexual harassment victimization or perpetration, respectively. Additionally, a statutory provision in fiscal year 2013 mandated that DOD, among other things, develop a comprehensive sexual harassment policy that includes prevention training, mechanisms for anonymous reporting, and mechanisms for resolving incidents of sexual harassment. OSD and service policies are generally consistent with those required elements except for the inclusion of anonymous reporting. DOD is developing a new department-wide policy that will address sexual harassment, but it is too early to determine how the policy will address these issues. Without policies that include CDC's principles and mechanisms for anonymous reporting, DOD may miss opportunities to address and potentially reduce incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors. Finally, a statutory change in fiscal year 2017 redefined sexual harassment for certain purposes so it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination but is recognized also as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behavior that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault. While officials indicated a need to update policies, they were unclear on the full implications, if any, of this change. DOD has processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors including sexual assault and incidents of domestic violence that involve sexual assault, but does not have similar processes for maintaining and reporting data on incidents of sexual harassment. Specifically, DOD uses centralized databases to maintain and report data on incidents of sexual assault and domestic violence that involve sexual assault, but relies on military service-specific databases for information on incidents of sexual harassment. DOD has not established standard data elements and definitions to guide the services in maintaining and reporting data on sexual harassment. Inconsistencies in data elements and definitions generally mean that one service may be maintaining data that is more or less detailed than, or that differs from, the data maintained by other services. Such inconsistencies may create difficulties in reporting department-wide sexual harassment data, since the individual service data must be adapted to fit reporting requirements. DOD has several overarching efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm, including developing an overarching prevention strategy. However, it is unclear whether the strategy under development will contain key elements for long-term and results-oriented strategic planning such as long-term goals, strategies to achieve goals, and metrics to gauge progress. Without incorporating these elements into its overarching prevention strategy, DOD may not be in a position to effectively coordinate and integrate prevention activities and reduce instances of unwanted sexual behaviors. GAO recommends that DOD fully include in its new policy on sexual harassment CDC's principles for sexual violence prevention and mechanisms for anonymous reporting, develop standard data elements and definitions for reporting sexual harassment incidents, and incorporate in its overarching prevention strategy elements key for a long-term, results-oriented strategy. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations.