prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: The issue of executive discretion has been at the center of constitutional debates in liberal democracies throughout the twentieth century  How to balance a commitment to the rule of law with the exigencies of modern political and economic crises has engaged legislators and scholars in the United States and around the world  The United States Constitution is silent on questions of emergency power  As such, over the past two centuries, Congress and the President have answered those questions in varied and often ad hoc ways  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the answer was often for the President to act without congressional approval in a time of crisis, knowingly risking impeachment and personal civil liability  Congress claimed primacy over emergency action and would decide subsequently to either ratify the President's actions or indemnify the President for any civil liability  By the twentieth century, a new pattern had begun to emerge  Instead of retroactively judging an executive's extraordinary actions in a time of emergency, Congress created statutory bases permitting the President to declare a state of emergency and make use of extraordinary delegated powers  The expanding delegation of emergency powers to the executive and the increase of governing via emergency power by the executive has been a common trajectory among twentieth-century liberal democracies  As innovation has quickened the pace of social change and global crises, some legislatures have felt compelled to delegate to the executive, who traditional political theorists assumed could operate with greater "dispatch" than deliberate, future-oriented legislatures  Whether such actions subvert the rule of law or are a standard feature of healthy modern constitutional orders has been a subject of extensive debate  The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is one such example of a twentieth-century delegation of emergency authority  One of 123 emergency statutes under the umbrella of the National Emergencies Act (NEA), IEEPA grants the President extensive power to regulate a variety of economic transactions during a state of emergency  Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977 to rein in the expansive emergency economic powers that it had been delegated to the President under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)  Nevertheless, some scholars argue that judicial and legislative actions subsequent to IEEPA's enactment have made it, like TWEA, a source of expansive and unchecked executive authority in the economic realm  Others, however, argue that Presidents often use IEEPA to implement the will of Congress either as directed by law or as encouraged by congressional activity  Until recently, there has been little congressional discussion of modifying either IEEPA or its umbrella statute, the NEA  Recent presidential actions, however, have drawn attention to presidential emergency powers under the NEA of which IEEPA is the most frequently used  Should Congress consider changing IEEPA, there are two issues that Congress may wish to address  The first pertains to how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and its umbrella statute, the NEA  The second pertains to choices made in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018  The First World War (1914-1918) saw an unprecedented degree of economic mobilization  The executive departments of European governments began to regulate their economies with or without the support of their legislatures  The United States, in contrast, was in a privileged position relative to its allies in Europe  Separated by an ocean from Germany and Austria-Hungary, the United States was never under substantial threat of invasion  Rather than relying on the inherent powers of the presidency, or acting unconstitutionally and waiting for congressional ratification, President Wilson sought explicit pre-authorization for expansive new powers to meet the global crisis  Between 1916 and the end of 1917, Congress passed 22 statutes empowering the President to take control of private property for public use during the war  These statutes gave the President broad authority to control railroads, shipyards, cars, telegraph and telephone systems, water systems, and many other sectors of the American economy  TWEA was one of those 22 statutes  It granted to the executive an extraordinary degree of control over international trade, investment, migration, and communications between the United States and its enemies  TWEA defined "enemy" broadly and included "any individual, partnership, or other body of individuals [including corporations], of any nationality, resident within the territory     of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside of the United States and doing business within such a territory     " The first four sections of the act granted the President extensive powers to limit trading or communication with, or transporting enemies (or their allies) of the United States  These sections also empowered the President to censor foreign communications and place extensive restrictions on enemy insurance or reinsurance companies  It was Section 5(b) of TWEA, however, that would form one of the central bases of presidential emergency economic power in the twentieth century  Section 5(b), as originally enacted, states: That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly within the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of the ownership of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person within the United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is completed  The statute gave the President exceptional control over private international economic transactions in times of war  While Congress terminated many of the war powers in 1921, TWEA was specifically exempted because the U S  Government had yet to dispose of a large amount of alien property in its custody  The Great Depression, a massive global economic downturn that began in 1929, presented a challenge to liberal democracies in Europe and the Americas  To deal with the complexities presented by the crisis, nearly all such democracies began delegating discretionary authority to their executives to a degree that had only previously been done in times of war  The U S  Congress responded, in part, by dramatically expanding the scope of TWEA, delegating to the President the power to declare states of emergency in peacetime and assume expansive domestic economic powers  Such a delegation was made possible by analogizing economic crises to war  In public speeches about the crisis, President Franklin D  Roosevelt asserted that the Depression was to be "attacked," "fought against," "mobilized for," and "combatted" by "great arm[ies] of people " The economic mobilization of the First World War had blurred the lines between the executive's military and economic powers  As the Depression was likened to "armed strife" and declared to be "an emergency more serious than war" by a Justice of the Supreme Court, it became routine to use emergency economic legislation enacted in wartime as the basis for extraordinary economic authority in peacetime  As the Depression entered its third year, the newly-elected President Roosevelt sought from Congress "broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe " In his first act as President, Roosevelt proclaimed a bank holiday, suspending all transactions at all banking institutions located in the United States and its territories for four days  In his proclamation, Roosevelt claimed to have authority to declare the holiday under Section 5(b) of TWEA  However, because the United States was not in a state of war and the suspended transactions were primarily domestic, the President's authority to issue such an order was dubious  Despite the tenuous legality, Congress ratified Roosevelt's actions by passing the Emergency Banking Relief Act three days after his proclamation  The act amended Section 5(b) of TWEA to read: During time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President , the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, investigate, regulate, or prohibit     This amendment gave the President the authority to declare that a national emergency existed and assume extensive controls over the national economy previously only available in times of war  By 1934, Roosevelt had used these extensive new powers to regulate "Every transaction in foreign exchange, transfer of credit between any banking institution within the United States and any banking institution outside of the United States " With America's entry into the Second World War in 1941, Congress again amended TWEA to grant the President extensive powers over the disposition of private property, adding the so-called "vesting" power, which authorized the permanent seizure of property  Now in its most expansive form, TWEA authorized the President to declare a national emergency and, in so doing, to regulate foreign exchange, domestic banking, possession of precious metals, and property in which any foreign country or foreign national had an interest  The Second World War ended in 1945  Following the conflict, the allied powers constructed institutions and signed agreements designed to keep the peace and to liberalize world trade  However, the United States did not immediately resume a peacetime posture with respect to emergency powers  Instead, the onset of the Cold War rationalized the continued use of TWEA and other emergency powers outside the context of a declared war  Over the next several decades, Presidents declared four national emergencies under Section 5(b) of TWEA and assumed expansive authority over economic transactions in the postwar period  During the Cold War, economic sanctions became an increasingly popular foreign policy and national security tool, and TWEA was a prominent source of presidential authority to use the tool  In 1950, President Harry S  Truman declared a national emergency, citing TWEA, to impose economic sanctions on North Korea and China  Subsequent Presidents referenced that national emergency as authority for imposing sanctions on Vietnam, Cuba, and Cambodia  Truman likewise used Section 5(b) of TWEA to maintain regulations on foreign exchange, transfers of credit, and the export of coin and currency that had been in place since the early 1930s  Presidents Richard M  Nixon and Gerald R  Ford invoked TWEA to continue export controls established under the Export Administration Act when the act expired  TWEA was also a prominent instrument of postwar presidential monetary policy  Presidents Dwight D  Eisenhower and John F  Kennedy used TWEA and the national emergency declared by President Roosevelt in 1933 to maintain and modify regulations controlling the hoarding and export of gold  In 1968, President Lyndon B  Johnson explicitly used Truman's 1950 declaration of emergency under Section 5(b) of TWEA to limit direct foreign investment by U S  companies in an effort to strengthen the balance of payments position of the United States after the devaluation of the pound sterling by the United Kingdom  In 1971, after President Nixon ended the convertibility of the U S  dollar to gold, effectively ending the postwar monetary order, he made use of Section 5(b) of TWEA to declare a state of emergency and place a 10% ad valorem supplemental duty on all dutiable goods entering the United States  The reliance by the executive on the powers granted by Section 5(b) of TWEA meant that postwar sanctions regimes and significant parts of U S  international monetary policy relied on continued states of emergency for their operation  By the mid-1970s, in the wake of U S  military involvement in Vietnam, revelations of domestic spying, assassinations of foreign political leaders, the Watergate break-in, and other related abuses of power, Congress increasingly focused on checking the executive branch  The Senate formed a bipartisan special committee chaired by Senators Frank Church and Charles Mathias to reevaluate the expansive delegations of emergency authority to the President  The special committee issued a report surveying the President's emergency powers in which it asserted that the United States had technically "been in a state of national emergency since March 9, 1933" and that there were four distinct declarations of national emergency in effect  The report also noted that the United States had "on the books at least 470 significant emergency statutes without time limitations delegating to the Executive extensive discretionary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Legislature, which affect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encompassing ways " In the course of its investigations, Senator Mathias, committee co-chair, noted, "A majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency government " Senator Church, the other co-chair, said the central question before the committee was "whether it [was] possible for a democratic government such as ours to exist under its present Constitution and system of three separate branches equal in power under a continued state of emergency " Among the more controversial statutes highlighted by the committee was TWEA  In 1977, during the House markup of a bill revising TWEA, Representative Jonathan Bingham, Chairperson of the House International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Economic Policy, described TWEA as conferring "on the President what could have been dictatorial powers that he could have used without any restraint by Congress " According to the Department of Justice, TWEA granted the President four major groups of powers in a time of war or other national emergency: (a) Regulatory powers with respect to foreign exchange, banking transfers, coin, bullion, currency, and securities; (b) Regulatory powers with respect to "any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest"; (c) The power to vest "any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof"; and (d) The powers to hold, use, administer, liquidate, sell, or otherwise deal with "such interest or property" in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States  The House report on the reform legislation called TWEA "essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without congressional review " The criticisms of TWEA centered on the following: (a) It required no consultation or reports to Congress with regard to the use of powers or the declaration of a national emergency  (b) It set no time limits on a state of emergency, no mechanism for congressional review, and no way for Congress to terminate it  (c) It stated no limits on the scope of TWEA's economic powers and the circumstances under which such authority could be used  (d) The actions taken under the authority of TWEA were rarely related to the circumstances in which the national emergency was declared  In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Professor Harold G  Maier summed up the development and the main criticisms of TWEA: Section 5(b)'s effect is no longer confined to "emergency situations" in the sense of existing imminent danger  The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit, by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President…" Congress's reforms to emergency powers under TWEA came in two acts  First, Congress enacted the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976  The NEA provided for the termination of all existing emergencies in 1978, except those making use of Section 5(b) of TWEA, and placed new restrictions on the manner of declaring and the duration of new states of emergency, including: Requiring the President to immediately transmit to Congress of the declaration of national emergency  Requiring a biannual review whereby "each House of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a concurrent [now joint, see below] resolution to determine whether that emergency shall be terminated " Authorizing Congress to terminate the national emergency through a privileged concurrent [now joint] resolution  Second, Congress tackled the thornier question of TWEA  Because the authorities granted by TWEA were heavily entwined with postwar international monetary policy and the use of sanctions in U S  foreign policy, unwinding it was a difficult undertaking  The exclusion of Section 5(b) reflected congressional interest in preserving existing regulations regarding foreign assets, foreign funds, and exports of strategic goods  Similarly, establishing a means to continue existing uses of TWEA reflected congressional interest in "improving future use rather than remedying past abuses " The subcommittee charged with reforming TWEA spent more than a year preparing reports, including the first complete legislative history of TWEA, a tome that ran nearly 700 pages  In the resulting legislation, Congress did three things  First, Congress amended TWEA so that it was, as originally intended, only applicable "during a time of war " Second, Congress expanded the Export Administration Act to include powers that previously were authorized by reference to Section 5(b) of TWEA  Finally, Congress wrote the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to confer "upon the President a new set of authorities for use in time of national emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of section 5(b) and subject to procedural limitations, including those of the [NEA] " The Report of the House Committee on International Relations summed up the nature of an "emergency" in their "new approach" to international emergency economic powers: [G]iven the breadth of the authorities, and their availability at the President's discretion upon a declaration of a national emergency, their exercise should be subject to various substantive restrictions  The main one stems from a recognition that emergencies are by their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal ongoing problems  A national emergency should be declared and emergency authorities employed only with respect to a specific set of circumstances which constitute a real emergency, and for no other purpose  The emergency should be terminated in a timely manner when the factual state of emergency is over and not continued in effect for use in other circumstances  A state of national emergency should not be a normal state of affairs  IEEPA, as currently amended, empowers the president to: (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit: (i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or national thereof, (iii) the importing or exporting of currencies or securities; and (B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States  (C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes  These powers may be exercised "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat " Presidents may invoke IEEPA under the procedures set forth in the NEA  When declaring a national emergency, the NEA requires that the President "immediately" transmit the proclamation declaring the emergency to Congress and publish it in the Federal Register   The President must also specify the provisions of law that he or she intends to use  In addition to the requirements of the NEA, IEEPA provides several further restrictions  Preliminarily, IEEPA requires that the President consult with Congress "in every possible instance" before exercising any of the authorities granted under IEEPA  Once the President declares a national emergency invoking IEEPA, he or she must immediately transmit a report to Congress specifying: (1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority; (2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States; (3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to deal with those circumstances; (4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances; and (5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such actions are to be taken with respect to those countries  The President subsequently is to report on the actions taken under the IEEPA at least once in every succeeding six-month interval that the authorities are exercised  As per the NEA, the emergency may be terminated by the President, by a privileged joint resolution of Congress, or automatically if the President does not publish in the Federal Register and transmit to Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary  Congress has amended IEEPA eight times ( Table 1 )  Five of the eight amendments have altered civil and criminal penalties for violations of orders issued under the statute  Other amendments excluded certain informational materials and expanded IEEPA's scope following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001  Congress also amended the NEA in response to a ruling by the Supreme Court to require a joint rather than a concurrent resolution to terminate a national emergency  As originally enacted, IEEPA protected the rights of U S  persons to participate in the exchange of "any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value" with a foreign person otherwise subject to sanctions  Amendments in 1988 and 1994 updated this list of protected rights to include the exchange of published information in a variety of formats  The act currently protects the exchange of "information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds," provided such exchange is not otherwise controlled for national security or foreign policy reasons related to weapons proliferation or international terrorism  Unlike the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), IEEPA did not allow the President to vest assets as originally acted  In 2001, at the request of George W  Bush Administration, Congress amended IEEPA as part of the USA PATRIOT Act to return to the President the authority to vest frozen assets, but only under certain circumstances:     the President may     when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that [the President] determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes  Speaking about the efforts of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify and disrupt the flow of terrorist finances, Attorney General John Ashcroft told Congress: At present the President's powers are limited to freezing assets and blocking transactions with terrorist organizations  We need the capacity for more than a freeze  We must be able to seize  Doing business with terrorist organization must be a losing proposition  Terrorist financiers must pay a price for their support of terrorism, which kills innocent Americans  Consistent with the President's [issuance of E O  13224 ] and his statements [of September 24, 2001], our proposal gives law enforcement the ability to seize the terrorists' assets  Further, criminal liability is imposed on those who knowingly engage in financial transactions, money-laundering involving the proceeds of terrorist acts  The House Judiciary Committee report explaining the amendments described its purpose as follows: Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U S C  § 1702) grants to the President the power to exercise certain authorities relating to commerce with foreign nations upon his determination that there exists an unusual and extraordinary threat to the United States  Under this authority, the President may, among other things, freeze certain foreign assets within the jurisdiction of the United States  A separate law, the Trading With the Enemy Act, authorizes the President to take title to enemy assets when Congress has declared war  Section 159 of this bill amends section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to provide the President with authority similar to what he currently has under the Trading With the Enemy Act in circumstances where there has been an armed attack on the United States, or where Congress has enacted a law authorizing the President to use armed force against a foreign country, foreign organization, or foreign national  The proceeds of any foreign assets to which the President takes title under this authority must be placed in a segregated account can only be used in accordance with a statute authorizing the expenditure of such proceeds  Section 159 also makes a number of clarifying and technical changes to section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, most of which will not change the way that provision currently is implemented  The government has apparently never employed the vesting power to seize Al Qaeda assets within the United States  Instead, the government has sought to confiscate them through forfeiture procedures  The first, and to date, apparently only, use of this power under IEEPA occurred on March 20, 2003  On that date, in Executive Order 13290, President George W  Bush ordered the blocked "property of the Government of Iraq and its agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled entities" to be vested "in the Department of the Treasury     [to] be used to assist the Iraqi people and to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq " However, the President's order excluded from confiscation Iraq's diplomatic and consular property, as well as assets that had, prior to March 20, 2003, been ordered attached in satisfaction of judgments against Iraq rendered pursuant to the terrorist suit provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and § 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (which reportedly totaled about $300 million)   A subsequent executive order blocked the property of former Iraqi officials and their families, vesting title of such blocked funds in the Department of the Treasury for transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) to be "used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, for the cost of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefitting of the Iraqi people " The DFI was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which required member states to freeze all assets of the former Iraqi government and of Saddam Hussein, senior officials of his regime and their family members, and transfer such assets to the DFI, which was then administered by the United States  Most of the vested assets were used by the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) for reconstruction projects and ministry operations  The USA PATRIOT Act made three other amendments to Section 203 of IEEPA  After the power to investigate, it added the power to block assets during the pendency of an investigation  It clarified that the type of interest in property subject to IEEPA is an "interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States " It also added subsection (c), which provides: In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera  This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review  As described in the House Judiciary Committee report, these provisions were meant to clarify and codify existing practices  Like TWEA prior to its amendment in 1977, the President and Congress together have often turned to IEEPA to impose economic sanctions in furtherance of U S  foreign policy and national security objectives  While initially enacted to rein in presidential emergency authority, presidential emergency use of IEEPA has expanded in scale, scope, and frequency since the statute's enactment  The House report on IEEPA stated, "emergencies are by their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with normal, ongoing problems " National emergencies invoking IEEPA, however, have increased in frequency and length since its enactment  Since 1977, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in 54 declarations of national emergency  On average, these emergencies last nearly a decade  Most emergencies have been geographically specific, targeting a specific country or government  However, since 1990, Presidents have declared non-geographically-specific emergencies in response to issues like weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and malicious cyber-enabled activities  The erosion of geographic limitations has been accompanied by an expansion in the nature of the targets of sanctions issued under IEEPA authority  Originally, IEEPA was used to target foreign governments; however, Presidents have increasingly targeted groups and individuals  While Presidents usually make use of IEEPA as an emergency power, Congress has also directed the use of IEEPA or expressed its approval of presidential emergency use in several statutes  IEEPA is the most frequently cited emergency authority when the President invokes NEA authorities to declare a national emergency  ( Figure 1 )  Rather than referencing the same set of emergencies, as had been the case with TWEA, IEEPA has required the President to declare a national emergency for each independent use  As a result, the number of national emergencies declared under the terms of the NEA has proliferated over the past four decades  Presidents declared only four national emergencies under the auspices of TWEA in the four decades prior to IEEPA's enactment  In contrast, Presidents have invoked IEEPA in 54 of the 61 declarations of national emergency issued under the National Emergen cies Act  As of March 1, 2019, there were 32 ongoing national emergencies; all but three involved IEEPA  Each year since 1990, Presidents have issued roughly 4 5 executive orders citing IEEPA and declared 1 5 new national emergencies citing IEEPA  ( Figure 2 )  On average, emergencies invoking IEEPA last nearly a decade  The longest emergency was also the first  President Jimmy Carter, in response to the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, declared the first national emergency under the provisions of the National Emergencies Act and invoked IEEPA  Six successive Presidents have renewed that emergency annually for nearly forty years  As of March 1, 2019, that emergency is still in effect, largely to provide a legal basis for resolving matters of ownership of the Shah's disputed assets  That initial emergency aside, the length of emergencies invoking IEEPA has increased each decade  The average length of an emergency invoking IEEPA declared in the 1980s was four years  That average extended to 10 years for emergencies declared in the 1990s and 11 years for emergencies declared in the 2000s ( Figure 3 )  As such, the number of ongoing national emergencies has grown nearly continuously since the enactment of IEEPA and the NEA ( Figure 4 )  Between January 1, 1979, and January 1, 2019, there were on average 14 ongoing national emergencies each year, 13 of which invoked IEEPA  In most cases, the declared emergencies citing IEEPA have been geographically specific ( Figure 5 )  For example, in the first use of IEEPA, President Jimmy Carter issued an executive order that both declared a national emergency with respect to the "situation in Iran" and "blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran [   ] " Five months later, President Carter issued a second order dramatically expanding the scope of the first EO and effectively blocked the transfer of all goods, money, or credit destined for Iran by anyone subject to the jurisdiction of the United States  A further order expanded the coverage to block imports to the United States from Iran  Together, these orders touched upon virtually all economic contacts between any place or legal person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and the territory and government of Iran  Many of the executive orders invoking IEEPA have followed this pattern of limiting the scope to a specific territory, government, or its nationals  Executive Order 12513, for example, prohibited "imports into the United States of goods and services of Nicaraguan origin" and "exports from the United States of goods to or destined for Nicaragua " The order likewise prohibited Nicaraguan air carriers and vessels of Nicaraguan registry from entering U S  ports  Executive Order 12532 prohibited various transactions with the "Government of South Africa or to entities owned or controlled by that Government " While the majority (38) of national emergencies invoking IEEPA have been geographically specific, ten have lacked explicit geographic limitations  President George H W  Bush declared the first geographically nonspecific emergency in response to the threat posed by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons  Similarly, President George W  Bush declared a national emergency in response to the threat posed by "persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism " President Barack Obama declared emergencies to respond to the threats of "transnational criminal organizations" and "persons engaging in malicious cyber-enabled activities " Without explicit geographic limitations, these orders have included provisions that are global in scope  These geographically nonspecific emergencies have increased in frequency over the past 40 years—three of the ten have been declared since 2015  In addition to the erosion of geographic limitations, the stated motivations for declaring national emergencies have expanded in scope as well  Initially, stated rationales for declarations of national emergency citing IEEPA were short and often referenced either a specific geography or the specific actions of a government  Presidents found that circumstances like "the situation in Iran," or the "policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua," constituted "unusual and extraordinary threat[s] to the national security and foreign policy of the United States" and would therefore declare a national emergency  The stated rationales have, however, expanded over time in both the length and subject matter  Presidents have increasingly declared national emergencies, in part, to respond to human and civil rights abuses, slavery, denial of religious freedom, political repression, public corruption, and the undermining of democratic processes  While the first reference to human rights violations as a rationale for a declaration of national emergency came in 1985, most of such references have come in the past twenty years  Table A-2   Presidents have also expanded the nature of the targets of IEEPA sanctions  Originally, the targets of sanctions issued under IEEPA were foreign governments  The first use of IEEPA targeted "Iranian Government Property " Use of IEEPA quickly expanded to target geographically defined regions  Nevertheless, Presidents have also increasingly targeted groups, such as political parties or terrorist organizations, and individuals, such as supporters of terrorism or suspected narcotics traffickers  The first instances of orders directed at groups or persons were limited to foreign groups or persons  For example, in Executive Order 12978, President Bill Clinton targeted specific "foreign persons" and "persons determined [   ] to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of" such foreign persons  An excerpt is included below: Except to the extent provided in section 203(b) of IEEPA (50 U S C  1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property that are or hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, of: (a) the foreign persons listed in the Annex to this order; (b)  foreign persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State: (i) to play a significant role in international narcotics trafficking centered in Colombia; or (ii) materially to assist in, or provide financial or technological support for or goods or services in support of, the narcotics trafficking activities of persons designated in or pursuant to this order; and (c) persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of, persons designated in or pursuant to this order  However, in 2001, President George W  Bush issued Executive Order 13219 to target "persons who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans " While the order was similar to that of Executive Order 12978, it removed the qualifier "foreign " As such, persons in the United States, including U S  citizens, could be targets of the order  The following is an excerpt of the order: Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(1), (3), and (4) of IEEPA (50 U S C  1702(b)(1), (3), and (4)), the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (title IX, P L  106-387 ), and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date, all property and interests in property of: (i)  the persons listed in the Annex to this order; and (ii)  persons designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, because they are found: (A) to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of violence    Several subsequent invocations of IEEPA have similarly not been limited to foreign targets  In sum, presidential emergency use of IEEPA was directed at foreign states initially, with targets that were delimited by geography or nationality  Since the 1990s, however, Presidents have expanded the scope of their declarations to include individual persons, regardless of nationality or geographic location, who are engaged in specific activities  While IEEPA is often categorized as an emergency statute, Congress has used IEEPA outside of the context of national emergencies  When Congress legislates sanctions, it often authorizes or directs the President to use IEEPA authorities to impose those sanctions  In the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018, the most recent example, Congress directed the President to exercise "all powers granted to the President [by IEEPA] to the extent necessary to block and prohibit [certain transactions] " Penalties for violations by a person of a measure imposed by the President under the Act would be, likewise, determined by reference to IEEPA  The trend has been long-term  Congress first directed the President to make use of IEEPA authorities in 1986 as part of an effort to assist Haiti in the recovery of assets illegally diverted by its former government  That statute provided: The President shall exercise the authorities granted by section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act [50 USC 1702] to assist the Government of Haiti in its efforts to recover, through legal proceedings, assets which the Government of Haiti alleges were stolen by former president-for-life Jean Claude Duvalier and other individuals associated with the Duvalier regime  This subsection shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of section 202 of that Act  [50 USC 1701] In directing the President to use IEEPA, Congress waived the requirement that he declare a national emergency (and none was declared)  Subsequent legislation has followed this general pattern, with slight variations in language and specificity  The following is an example of current legislative language that has appeared in several recent statutes: (a) IN GENERAL —The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to—     (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED — (1) IN GENERAL —The sanctions described in this subsection are the following: (A) ASSET BLOCKING —The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U S C  1701 et seq ) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person      (2) PENALTIES —A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of paragraph (1)(A) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out paragraph (1)(A) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U S C  1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section  Congress has also expressed, retroactively, its approval of unilateral presidential invocations of IEEPA in the context of a national emergency  In the Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, for example, Congress declared, "It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State should continue to implement Executive Order No  13382 " Presidents, however, have also used IEEPA to preempt or modify parallel congressional activity  On September 9, 1985, President Reagan, finding "that the policies and actions of the Government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States," declared a national emergency and limited transactions with South Africa  The President declared the emergency despite the fact that legislation limiting transactions with South Africa was quickly making its way through Congress  In remarks about the declaration, President Reagan stated that he had been opposed to the bill contemplated by Congress because unspecified provisions "would have harmed the very people [the U S  was] trying to help " Nevertheless, members of the press at the time (and at least one scholar since) noted that the limitations imposed by the Executive Order and the provisions in legislation then winding its way through Congress were "substantially similar " In general, IEEPA has served as an integral part of the postwar international sanctions regime  The President, either through a declaration of emergency or via statutory direction, has used IEEPA to limit economic transactions in support of administrative and congressional national security and foreign policy goals  Much of the action taken pursuant to IEEPA has involved blocking transactions and freezing assets  Once the President declares that a national emergency exists, he may use the authority in Section 203 of IEEPA (Grants of Authorities; 50 U S C  § 1702) to investigate, regulate, or prohibit foreign exchange transactions, transfers of credit, transfers of securities, payments, and may take specified actions relating to property in which a foreign country or person has interest—freezing assets, blocking property and interests in property, prohibiting U S  persons from entering into transactions related to frozen assets and blocked property, and in some instances denying entry into the United States  Pursuant to Section 203, Presidents have prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as engaging in malicious cyber-enabled activities, including "interfering with or undermining election processes or institutions" [Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015, as amended; 50 U S


Report 2: C  § 1701 note  See also Executive Order 13848 of September 12, 2018; 83 F R  46843 ]; prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as illicit narcotics traffickers including foreign drug kingpins; prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as engaging in human rights abuses or significant corruption; prohibited transactions related to illicit trade in rough diamonds; prohibited transactions with and blocked property of those designated as Transnational Criminal Organizations; prohibited transactions with "those who disrupt the Middle East peace process;" prohibited transactions related to overflights with certain nations; instituted and maintained maritime restrictions; prohibited transactions related to weapons of mass destruction, in coordination with export controls authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979, and in furtherance of efforts to deter the weapons programs of specific countries (i e , Iran, North Korea); prohibited transactions those designated as "persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism;" maintained the dual-use export control system at times when its then-underlying authority, the Export Administration Act authority had lapsed; blocked property of and transactions with those designated as engaged in cyber activities that compromise critical infrastructures including election processes or the private sector's trade secrets; blocked property of and prohibited transactions with those designated as responsible for serious human rights abuse or engaged in corruption; blocked certain property of and transactions with foreign nationals of specific countries those designated as engaged in activities that constitute an extraordinary threat  No President has used IEEPA to place tariffs on imported products from a specific country or on products imported to the United States in general  However, IEEPA's similarity to TWEA, coupled with its relatively frequent use to ban imports and exports, suggests that such an action could happen  In addition, no President has used IEEPA to enact a policy that was primarily domestic in effect  Some scholars argue, however, that the interconnectedness of the global economy means it would probably be permissible to use IEEPA to take an action that was primarily domestic in effect  The ultimate disposition of assets frozen under IEEPA may serve as an important part of the leverage economic sanctions provide to influence the behavior of foreign actors  The President and Congress have each at times determined the fate of blocked assets to further foreign policy goals  Presidents have used frozen assets as a bargaining tool during foreign policy crises and to bring a resolution to such crises, at times by unfreezing the assets, returning them to the sanctioned entity or channeling them to a follow-on government  The following are some examples of how Presidents have made use of blocked assets to resolve foreign policy issues  President Carter invoked authority under IEEPA to impose trade sanctions against Iran, freezing Iranian assets in the United States, in response to the hostage crisis in 1979  On January 19, 1981, the United States and Iran entered into a series of executive agreements brokered by Algeria under which the hostages were freed, a portion of the blocked assets ($5 1 billion) was used to repay outstanding U S  bank loans to Iran, another part ($2 8 billion) was returned directly to Iran, another $1 billion was transferred into a security account in the Hague to pay other U S  claims against Iran as arbitrated by the Iran-U S  Claims Tribunal (IUSCT), and an additional $2 billion remained blocked pending further agreement with Iran or decision of the Tribunal  The United States also undertook to freeze the assets of the former Shah's estate along with those of the Shah's close relatives pending litigation in U S  courts to ascertain Iran's right to their return  Iran's litigation was unsuccessful, and none of the contested assets were returned to Iran  Presidents have also been able to channel frozen assets to opposition governments in cases where the United States continued to recognize a previous government that had been removed by coup d'état or otherwise replaced as the legitimate government of a country  For example, after Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle tried to dismiss de facto military ruler General Manuel Noriega from his post as head of the Panamanian Defense Forces, which resulted in Delvalle's own dismissal by the Panamanian Legislative Assembly, President Reagan recognized Delvalle as the legitimate head of government and instituted economic sanctions against the Noriega regime  The Department of State advised U S  banks not to disburse funds to the Noriega regime, and Delvalle was able to obtain court orders permitting him access to the funds  President Reagan issued Executive Order 12635, which blocked all property and interests in payments of the government of Panama, and the Department of the Treasury issued regulations requiring companies who owed money to Panama to pay those funds into an escrow account established at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which also held payments owed by the United States for the operation of the Panama Canal Commission  Some of the funds in the escrow account were used to pay the operating expenses of the Delvalle government  After the U S  invasion of Panama, President George H W  Bush lifted economic sanctions and used some of the frozen funds to repay debts owed by Panama to foreign creditors, with remaining funds returned to the successor government  In a similar more recent case, the Trump Administration's recognition of Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's interim president permitted Guaidó access to Venezuelan government assets held at the United States Federal Reserve and other insured United States financial institutions  President Barrack Obama initially froze Venezuelan government assets in 2015, pursuant to IEEPA and the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014  After official recognition of Guaidó, the Trump Administration imposed new sanctions under IEEPA to freeze the assets of the main Venezuelan state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa), which could both significantly reduce funds available to the regime of Nicolas Maduro and channel them to Guaidó  There is also precedent for using frozen foreign assets for purposes authorized by the U N  Security Council  After the first war with Iraq, President George H W  Bush ordered the transfer of frozen Iraqi assets derived from the sale of Iraqi petroleum held by U S  banks to be transferred to a holding account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to fulfill "the rights and obligations of the United States under U N  Security Council Resolution No  778 " The President cited a section of the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA), as well as IEEPA, as authority to take the action  The transferred funds were used to provide humanitarian relief and to finance the United Nations Compensation Commission, which was established to adjudicate claims against Iraq arising from the invasion  Other Iraqi assets remained frozen and accumulated interest until they were vested in 2003 (see below)  In some cases, the United States has ended sanctions and returned frozen assets to successor governments  In the case of the former Yugoslavia, for example, in 2003, $237 6 million in frozen funds belonging to the Central Bank of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were transferred to the central banks of the successor states  In the case of Afghanistan, $217 million in frozen funds belonging to the Taliban were released to the Afghan Interim Authority in January 2002  The executive branch has traditionally resisted congressional efforts to vest foreign assets to pay U S  claimants without first obtaining a settlement agreement with the country in question  Congress has overcome such resistance in the case of foreign governments that have been designated as "State Supporters of Terrorism " U S  nationals who are victims of state-supported terrorism involving designated states have been able to sue those countries for damages under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) since 1996  To facilitate the payment of judgments under the exception, Congress passed Section 117 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999, which further amended the FSIA by allowing attachment and execution against state property with respect to which financial transactions are prohibited or regulated under Section 5(b) TWEA, Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act (authorizing the trade embargo against Cuba), or Sections 202 and 203 of IEEPA, or any orders, licenses or other authority issued under these statutes  Because of the Clinton Administration's continuing objections, however, Section 117 also gave the President authority to "waive the requirements of this section in the interest of national security," an authority President Clinton promptly exercised in signing the statute into law  The Section 117 waiver authority protecting blocked foreign government assets from attachment to satisfy terrorism judgments has continued in effect ever since, prompting Congress to take other actions to make frozen assets available to judgment holders  Congress enacted §2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA) to mandate the payment from frozen Cuban assets of compensatory damages awarded against Cuba under the FSIA terrorism exception on or prior to July 20, 2000  The Department of the Treasury subsequently vested $96 7 million in funds generated from long-distance telephone services between the United States and Cuba in order to compensate claimants in Alejandre v  Republic of Cuba , the lawsuit based on the1996 downing of two unarmed U S  civilian airplanes by the Cuban air force  Another payment of more than $7 million was made using vested Cuban assets to a Florida woman who had won a lawsuit against Cuba based on her marriage to a Cuban spy  As unpaid judgments against designated state sponsors of terrorism continued to mount, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA)  Section 201 of TRIA overrode long-standing objections by the executive branch to make the frozen assets of terrorist states available to satisfy judgments for compensatory damages against such states (and organizations and persons) as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (b), in every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable  Subsection (b) of Section 201 provided waiver authority "in the national security interest," but only with respect to frozen foreign government "property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations " When Congress amended the FSIA in 2008 to revamp the terrorism exception, it provided that judgments entered under the new exception could be satisfied out of the property of a foreign state notwithstanding the fact that the property in question is regulated by the United States government pursuant to TWEA or IEEPA  Congress has also directed that the proceeds from certain sanctions violations be paid into a fund for providing compensation to the former hostages of Iran and terrorist state judgment creditors  To fund the program, Congress designated that certain real property and bank accounts owned by Iran and forfeited to the United States could go into the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, along with the sum of $1,025,000,000, representing the amount paid to the United States pursuant to the June 27, 2014, plea agreement and settlement between the United States and BNP Paribas for sanctions violations  The fund is replenished through criminal penalties and forfeitures for violations of IEEPA or TWEA-based regulations, or any related civil or criminal conspiracy, scheme, or other federal offense related to doing business or acting on behalf of a state sponsor of terrorism  Half of all civil penalties and forfeitures relating to the same offenses are also deposited into the fund  A number of lawsuits seeking to overturn actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have made their way through the judicial system, including challenges to the breadth of congressionally delegated authority and assertions of violations of constitutional rights  As demonstrated below, most of these challenges have failed  The few challenges that succeeded did not seriously undermine the overarching statutory scheme for sanctions  The breadth of presidential power under IEEPA is illustrated by the Supreme Court's 1981 opinion in Dames & Moore v  Regan   In Dames & Moore , petitioners had challenged President Carter's executive order establishing regulations to further compliance with the terms of the Algiers Accords, which the President had entered into to end the hostage crisis with Iran  Under these agreements, the United States was obligated (1) to terminate all legal proceedings in U S  courts involving claims of U S  nationals against Iran, (2) to nullify all attachments and judgments, and (3) to resolve outstanding claims exclusively through binding arbitration in the Iran-U S  Claims Tribunal (IUSCT)  The President, through executive orders, revoked all licenses that permitted the exercise of "any right, power, or privilege" with regard to Iranian funds, nullified all non-Iranian interests in assets acquired after a previous blocking order, and required banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be held or transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury  Dames and Moore had sued Iran for breach of contract to recover compensation for work performed  The district court had entered summary judgment in favor of Dames and Moore and issued an order attaching certain Iranian assets for satisfaction of any judgment that might result, but stayed the case pending appeal  The executive orders and regulations implementing the Algiers Accords resulted in the nullification of this prejudgment attachment and the dismissal of the case against Iran, directing that it be filed at the IUSCT  In response, Dames and Moore sued the government  The plaintiffs claimed that the President and the Secretary of the Treasury exceeded their statutory and constitutional powers to the extent they adversely affected Dames and Moore's judgment against Iran, the execution of that judgment, the prejudgment attachments, and the plaintiff's ability to continue to litigate against the Iranian banks  The government defended its actions, relying largely on IEEPA, which provided explicit support for most of the measures taken—nullification of the prejudgment attachment and transfer of the property to Iran—but could not be read to authorize actions affecting the suspension of claims in U S  courts  Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority: Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA…directly authorizes the President's suspension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor of Congress' legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the President is acting alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress  As we have noted, Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act  Such failure of Congress specifically to delegate authority does not, "especially       in the areas of foreign policy and national security," imply "congressional disapproval" of action taken by the Executive  On the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President's authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may be considered to "invite" "measures on independent presidential responsibility " At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of legislative intent and when, as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President  The Court remarked that Congress's implicit approval of the long-standing presidential practice of settling international claims by executive agreement was critical to its holding that the challenged actions were not in conflict with acts of Congress  For support, the Court cited to Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co  v  Sawyer stating that "a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned … may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art  II " Consequently, it may be argued that Congress's exclusion of certain express powers in IEEPA do not necessarily preclude the President from exercising them, at least where a court finds sufficient precedent exists  Lower courts have examined IEEPA under a number of other constitutional doctrines  Courts have reviewed whether Congress violated the non-delegation principle of separation of powers by delegating too much power to the President to legislate, in particular by creating new crimes  These challenges have generally failed  As the U S  Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained while evaluating IEEPA, delegations of congressional authority are constitutional so long as Congress provides through a legislative act an "intelligible principle" governing the exercise of the delegated authority  Even if the standards are higher for delegations of authority to define criminal offenses, the court held, IEEPA provides sufficient guidance  The court stated: The IEEPA "meaningfully constrains the [President's] discretion," by requiring that "[t]he authorities granted to the President     may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared " And the authorities delegated are defined and limited  The Second Circuit found it significant that "IEEPA relates to foreign affairs—an area in which the President has greater discretion," bolstering its view that IEEPA does not violate the non-delegation doctrine  The U S  Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Section 207(b) of IEEPA is an unconstitutional legislative veto  That provision states: The authorities described in subsection (a)(1) may not continue to be exercised under this section if the national emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent resolution pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act [50 U S C  § 1622] and if the Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution that such authorities may not continue to be exercised under this section  In U S  v  Romero-Fernandez , two defendants convicted of violating the terms of an executive order issued under IEEPA argued on appeal that IEEPA was unconstitutional, in part, because of the above provision  The Eleventh Circuit accepted that the provision was an unconstitutional legislative veto (as conceded by the government) based on INS v  Chadha , in which the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot void the exercise of power by the executive branch through concurrent resolution, but can act only through bicameral passage followed by presentment of the law to the President  The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless upheld the defendants' convictions for violations of IEEPA regulations, holding that the legislative veto provision was severable from the rest of the statute  Courts have also addressed whether certain actions taken pursuant to IEEPA have effected an uncompensated taking of property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment  The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prohibits "private property [from being] taken for public use, without just compensation " The Fifth Amendment's prohibitions apply as well to regulatory takings, in which the government does not physically take property but instead imposes restrictions on the right of enjoyment that decreases the value of the property or right therein  The Supreme Court has held that the nullification of prejudgment attachments pursuant to regulations issued under IEEPA was not an uncompensated taking, suggesting that the reason for this position was the contingent nature of the licenses that had authorized the attachments  The Court also suggested that the broader purpose of the statute supported the view that there was no uncompensated taking: This Court has previously recognized that the congressional purpose in authorizing blocking orders is "to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President    " Such orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency  The frozen assets serve as a "bargaining chip" to be used by the President when dealing with a hostile country  Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner's argument because the practical effect of it is to allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate this "bargaining chip" through attachments, garnishments, or similar encumbrances on property  Neither the purpose the statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language supports such a result  Similarly, a lower court held that the extinguishment of contractual rights due to sanctions enacted pursuant to IEEPA does not amount to a regulatory taking requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment  Even though the plaintiff suffered "obvious economic loss" due to the sanctions regulations, that factor alone was not enough to sustain plaintiff's claim of a compensable taking  The court quoted long-standing Supreme Court precedent to support its finding: A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals great losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless  They may destroy the worth of contracts  But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be changed, or a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared?      [W]as it ever imagined this was taking private property without compensation or without due process of law? Accordingly, it seems unlikely that entities whose business interests are harmed by the imposition of sanctions pursuant to IEEPA will be entitled to compensation from the government for their losses  Persons whose assets have been directly blocked by the U S  Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) pursuant to IEEPA have likewise found little success challenging the loss of the use of their assets as uncompensated takings  Many courts have recognized that a temporary blocking of assets does not constitute a taking because it is a temporary action that does not vest title in the United States  This conclusion is apparently so even if the blocking of assets necessitates the closing altogether of a business enterprise  In some circumstances, however, a court may analyze at least the initial blocking of assets under a Fourth Amendment standard for seizure  One court found a blocking to be unreasonable under a Fourth Amendment standard where there was no reason that OFAC could not have first obtained a judicial warrant  Some persons whose assets have been blocked have asserted that their right to due process has been violated  The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law  Where one company protested that the blocking of its assets without a pre-deprivation hearing violated its right to due process, a district court found that a temporary deprivation of property does not necessarily give rise to a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard  A second district court stated that the exigencies of national security and foreign policy considerations that are implicated in IEEPA cases have meant that OFAC historically has not provided pre-deprivation notice in sanctions programs  A third district court stated that OFAC's failure to provide a charitable foundation with notice or a hearing prior to its designation as a terrorist organization and blocking of its assets did not violate its right to procedural due process, because the OFAC designation and blocking order serve the important governmental interest of combating terrorism by curtailing the flow of terrorist financing  That same court also held that prompt action by the government was necessary to protect against the transfer of assets subject to the blocking order  In Al Haramain Islamic Foundation v  U S  Department of Treasury , the U S  Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether OFAC's use of classified information without any disclosure of its content in its decision to freeze the assets of a charitable organization, and its failure to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, violated the organization's right to procedural due process  The court applied the balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court in its landmark administrative law case Mathews v  Eldridge to resolve these questions  Under the Eldridge test, to determine if an individual has received constitutional due process, courts must weigh: (1) [the person's or entity's] private property interest, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, as well as the value of additional safeguards, and (3) the Government's interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of additional procedural requirements " While weighing the interests and risks at issue in Al Haramain , the Ninth Circuit found the organization's property interest to be significant: By design, a designation by OFAC completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity  All assets are frozen  No person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with the entity, other than a very narrow category of actions such as legal defense  Civil penalties attach even for unwitting violations  Criminal penalties, including up to 20 years' imprisonment, attach for willful violations  For domestic organizations such as AHIF–Oregon, a designation means that it conducts no business at all  The designation is indefinite  Although an entity can seek administrative reconsideration and limited judicial relief, those remedies take considerable time, as evidenced by OFAC's long administrative delay in this case and the ordinary delays inherent in our judicial system  In sum, designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct  Nevertheless, the court found "the government's interest in national security [could not] be understated " In evaluating the government's interest in maintaining its procedures, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Constitution requires that the government "take reasonable measures to ensure basic fairness to the private party and that the government follow procedures reasonably designed to protect against erroneous deprivation of the private party's interests " While the Ninth Circuit had previously held that the use of undisclosed information in a case involving the exclusion of certain longtime resident aliens should be considered presumptively unconstitutional, the court found that the presumption had been overcome in this case  The Ninth Circuit noted that all federal courts that have considered the argument that OFAC may not use undisclosed classified information in making its determinations have rejected it  Although the court found that OFAC's failure to provide even an unclassified summary of the information at issue was a violation of the organization's due process rights, the court deemed the error harmless because it would not likely have affected the outcome of the case  In the same case, the Ninth Circuit also considered the organization's argument that it had been denied adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard  Specifically, the organization asserted that OFAC had refused to disclose its reasons for investigating and designating the organization, leaving it unable to respond adequately to OFAC's unknown suspicions  Because OFAC had provided the organization with only one document to support its designation over the four-year period between the freezing of its assets and the redesignation of the organization as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT), the court agreed that the organization had been deprived of due process rights  However, the court found that this error too was harmless  Some courts have considered whether asset blocking or penalties imposed pursuant to regulations promulgated under IEEPA have violated the subjects' First Amendment rights to free association, free speech, or religion  Challenges on these grounds have typically failed  Courts have held that there is no First Amendment right to support terrorists  The U S  Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit distinguished advocacy from financial support and held that the blocking of assets affected only the ability to provide financial support, but did not implicate the organization's freedom of association  Similarly, a district court interpreted relevant case law to hold that government actions prohibiting charitable contributions are subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, a higher standard that applies to political contributions  With respect to a free speech challenge brought by a charitable organization whose assets were temporarily blocked during the pendency of an investigation, a district court explained that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms " Accordingly, the district court applied the following test to determine whether the designations and blocking actions were lawful  Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v  O'Brien , the court stated that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if: it is within the constitutional power of the government; it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest  The court found the government's actions to fall within the bounds of this test: First, the President clearly had the power to issue the Executive Order  Second, the Executive Order promotes an important and substantial government interest—that of preventing terrorist attacks  Third, the government's action is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; it prohibits the provision of financial and other support to terrorists  Fourth, the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are no greater than necessary  However, with respect to an organization that was not itself designated as an SDGT but wished to conduct coordinated advocacy with another organization that was so designated, one appellate court found that an OFAC regulation barring such coordinated advocacy based on its content was subject to strict scrutiny  Accordingly, the court rejected the government's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Holder v  Humanitarian Law Project to find that the regulation impermissibly implicated the organization's right to free speech  Accordingly, there may be some circumstances where the First Amendment protects speech coordinated with (but not on behalf of) an organization designated as an SDGT  Until the recent enactment of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, export of dual use goods and services was regulated pursuant to the authority of the Export Administration Act (EAA), which was subject to periodic expiry and reauthorization  President Reagan was the first President to use IEEPA as a vehicle for continuing the enforcement of the EAA's export controls  After Congress did not extend the expired EAA, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12444 in 1983, finding that "unrestricted access of foreign parties to United States commercial goods, technology, and technical data and the existence of certain boycott practices of foreign nations constitute, in light of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security " Although the EAA had been reauthorized for short periods since its initial expiration in 1983, every subsequent President utilized the authorities granted under IEEPA to maintain the existing system of export controls during periods of lapse  Figure 1   In the latest iteration, President George W  Bush issued Executive Order 13222 in 2001, finding the existence of a national emergency with respect to the expiration of the EAA and directing—pursuant to the authorities allocated under IEEPA—that "the provisions for administration of the [EAA] shall be carried out under this order so as to continue in full force and effect…the export control system heretofore maintained " Presidents Obama and Trump annually extended the 2001 executive order  Courts have generally treated this arrangement as authorized by Congress, although certain provisions of the EAA in effect under IEEPA have led to challenges  The determining factor appears to be whether IEEPA itself provides the President the authority to carry out the challenged action  In one case, the U S  Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a conviction for an attempt to violate the regulations even though the EAA had expired and did not expressly criminalize such attempts  The circuit court rejected the defendants' argument that the President had exceeded his delegated authority under the EEA by "enlarging" the crimes punishable under the regulations  Nevertheless, a district court held that the conspiracy provisions of the EAA regulations were rendered inoperative by the lapse of the EAA and "could not be repromulgated by executive order under the general powers that IEEPA vests in the President " The district court found that, even if Congress intended to preserve the operation of the EAA through IEEPA, that intent was limited by the scope of the statutes' substantive coverage at the time of IEEPA's enactment, when no conspiracy provision existed in either statute  The U S  Court of Appeals for the D C  Circuit upheld the application of the EAA as a statute permitting the government to withhold information under exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which exempts from disclosure information exempted from disclosure by statute, even though the EAA had expired  Referring to legislative history it interpreted as congressional approval of the use of IEEPA to continue the EAA provisions during periods of lapse, the court stated: Although the legislative history does not refer to the EAA's confidentiality provision, it does evince Congress's intent to authorize the President to preserve the operation of the export regulations promulgated under the EAA  Moreover, it is significant for purposes of determining legislative intent that Congress acted with the knowledge that the EAA's export regulations had long provided for confidentiality and that the President's ongoing practice of extending the EAA by executive order had always included these confidentiality protections  The D C  Circuit distinguished this holding in a later case involving appellate jurisdiction over a decision by the Department of Commerce to apply sanctions for a company's violation of the EAA regulations  Pursuant to the regulations and under the direction of the Commerce Department, the company sought judicial review directly in the D C  Circuit  The D C  Circuit, however, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction: This court would have jurisdiction pursuant to the President's order only if the President has the authority to confer jurisdiction—an authority that, if it exists, must derive from either the Executive's inherent power under the Constitution or a permissible delegation of power from Congress  The former is unavailing, as the Constitution vests the power to confer jurisdiction in Congress alone  Whether the executive order can provide the basis of our jurisdiction, then, turns on whether the President can confer jurisdiction on this court under the auspices of IEEPA…  We conclude that the President lacks that power  Nothing in the text of IEEPA delegates to the President the authority to grant jurisdiction to any federal court  Consequently, the appeal of the agency decision was determined to belong in the district court according to the default rule under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)  Congress may wish to address a number of issues with respect to IEEPA; two are addressed here  The first pertains to how Congress has delegated its authority under IEEPA and its umbrella statute, the NEA  The second pertains to choices made in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018  Although the stated aim of the drafters of the NEA and IEEPA was to restrain the use of emergency powers, the use of such powers has expanded by several measures  Presidents declare national emergencies and renew them for years or even decades  The limitation of IEEPA to transactions involving some foreign interest was intended to limit IEEPA's domestic application  However, globalization has eroded that limit, as few transactions today do not involve some foreign interest  Many of the other criticisms of TWEA that IEEPA was supposed to address—consultation, time limits, congressional review, scope of power, and logical relationship to the emergency declared—are criticisms that scholars levy against IEEPA today  In general, three common criticisms are levied by scholars with respect to the structure of the NEA and IEEPA that may be of interest to Congress  First, the NEA and IEEPA do not define the phrases "national emergency" and "unusual and extraordinary threat" and Presidents have interpreted these terms broadly  Second, the scope of presidential authority under IEEPA has become less constrained in a highly globalized era  Third, owing to rulings by the Supreme Court and amendments to the NEA, Congress would likely have to have a two-thirds majority rather than a simple majority to terminate a national emergency  Despite these criticisms, Congress has not acted to terminate or otherwise express displeasure with an emergency declaration invoking IEEPA  This absence of any explicit statement of disapproval, coupled with explicit statements of approval in some instances, may indicate congressional approval of presidential use of IEEPA thus far  Arguably, then, IEEPA could be seen as an effective tool for carrying out the will of Congress  Neither the NEA nor IEEPA define what constitutes a "national emergency " IEEPA conditions its invocation in a declaration on its necessity for dealing with an "unusual and extraordinary threat … to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States " In the markup of IEEPA in the House, Fred Bergsten, then-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the Department of the Treasury, praised the requirement that a national emergency for the purposes of IEEPA be "based on an unusual and extraordinary threat" because such language "emphasizes that such powers should be available only in true emergencies " Because "unusual" and "extraordinary" are also undefined, the usual and ordinary invocation of the statute seems to conflict with those statutory conditions  If Congress wanted to refine the meaning of "national emergency" or "unusual and extraordinary threat," it could do so through statute  Additionally, Congress could consider requiring some sort of factual finding by a court prior to, or shortly after, the exercise of any authority, such as under the First Militia Act of 1792 or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act  However, Congress may consider that the ambiguity in the existing statute provides the executive with the flexibility necessary to address national emergencies with the requisite dispatch  While IEEPA nominally applies only to foreign transactions, the breadth of the phrase, "any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof" has left a great deal of room for executive discretion  The interconnectedness of the modern global economy has left few major transactions in which a foreign interest is not involved  As a result, at least one scholar has concluded, "the exemption of purely domestic transactions from the President's transaction controls seems to be a limitation without substance " Presidents have used IEEPA since the 1980s to control exports by maintaining the dual-use export control system, enshrined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in times when its underlying authorization, the Export Administration Act (EAA), periodically expired  During those times when Congress did not reauthorize the EAA, Presidents have declared emergencies to maintain the dual-use export control system  The current emergency has been ongoing since 2001  While Presidents have used IEEPA to implement trade restrictions against adversaries, it has not been used as a general way to impose tariffs  However, as noted above, President Nixon used TWEA to impose a 10% ad valorem tariff on goods entering the United States to avoid a balance of payments crisis after he ended the convertibility of the U S  dollar to gold  Although the use of TWEA in this instance was criticized at the time, it does not appear that the subsequent reforms resulting in the enactment of IEEPA would prevent the President from imposing tariffs or other restrictions on trade  However, the availability of diverse other authorities for addressing trade, including for national security purposes, makes the use of IEEPA for this purpose unlikely  The scope of powers over individual targets is also extensive  Under IEEPA, the President has the power to prohibit all financial transactions with individuals designated by Executive Order  Such power allows the President to block all the assets of a U S  citizen or permanent resident  Such uses of IEEPA may reflect the will of Congress or they may represent a grant of authority that may have gone beyond what Congress originally intended  The heart of the curtailment of presidential power by the NEA and IEEPA was the provision that Congress could terminate a state of emergency declared pursuant to the NEA with a concurrent resolution  When the "legislative veto" was struck down by the Supreme Court (see above), it left Congress with a steeper climb—presumably requiring passage of a veto-proof joint resolution—to terminate a national emergency declared under the NEA  Two such resolutions have ever been introduced and neither declarations of emergency involved IEEPA  The lack of congressional action here could be the result of the necessity of obtaining a veto-proof majority or it could be that the use of IEEPA has so far reflected the will of Congress  If Congress wanted to assert more authority over the use of IEEPA, it could amend the NEA or IEEPA to include a "sunset provision," terminating any national emergency after a certain number of days  At least one scholar has recommended such an amendment  Alternatively, Congress could amend IEEPA to provide for a review mechanism that would give Congress an active role  In the Senate during the 115 th Congress, for example, Senator Mike Lee introduced the Global Trade Accountability Act of 2017 required the President to report to Congress on any proposed trade action (including the use of IEEPA), including a description of the proposal together with a list of items to be affected, an economic impact study of the proposal including potential retaliation  Congress, using expedited procedures, would need to approve the President's action through a joint resolution within a 60-day period  The legislation would have provided for a temporary one-time unilateral trade action for a 90-day period  Similarly, in the 116 th Congress, Senator Lee introduced S  764 , a bill to provide for congressional approval of national emergency declarations, and for other purposes, which would amend the NEA to require an act of Congress within 30 days to allow a national emergency to continue  Another approach would establish a means for Congress to pass a resolution of disapproval if IEEPA authorities are invoked  An example of this approach is the Trade Authority Protection Act (H R  5760)  After the submission of similar reporting requirement to S  177 (above), Congress could, under Congressional Review Act (CRA)-style procedures, pass a joint resolution of disapproval  Congress does have the authority to pass a joint resolution under IEEPA, as noted above, but the use of CRA procedures would allow for certain expedited consideration  Alternatively, Congress could use any of these mechanisms to amend the current disapproval resolution process in IEEPA or the NEA itself  In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations in 1977, Professor Harold G  Maier summed up the main criticisms of TWEA: Section 5(b)'s effect is no longer confined to "emergency situations" in the sense of existing imminent danger  The continuing retroactive approval, either explicit or implicit, by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has converted the section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President…" Like TWEA before it, IEEPA sits at the center of the modern U S  sanction regime  Like TWEA before it, Congress has often approved explicitly of the President's use of IEEPA  In several circumstances, Congress has directed the President to impose a variety of sanctions under IEEPA and waived the requirement of an emergency declaration  Even when Congress has not given explicit approval, no Member of Congress has ever introduced a resolution to terminate a national emergency citing IEEPA  The NEA requires that both houses of Congress meet every six months to consider a vote on a joint resolution on terminating an emergency  Neither house has ever met to do so  In response to concerns over the scale and scope of the emergency economic powers granted by IEEPA, supporters of the status quo would argue that Congress has implicitly and explicitly expressed approval of the statute and its use  In 2018, Congress passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA)  The legislation repealed the expired Export Administration Act of 1979, the regulations of which had been continued by reference to IEEPA since 2001  The ECRA became the new statutory authority for Export Administration Regulations  Nevertheless, several export controls addressed in the Export Administration Act of 1979 were not updated in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018; instead, Congress chose to require the President to continue to use IEEPA to continue to implement the three sections of the Export Administration Act of 1979 that were not repealed  Going forward, Congress may wish to revisit these provisions, which all relate to deterring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction  Appendix A  NEA and IEEPA Use

ground_truth: The federal government continues to work to reduce its real property inventory and associated costs. GSA provides space for agencies in government-owned and commercially leased buildings. In 2015, the OMB issued a memorandum requiring the 24 agencies with chief financial officers to reduce their domestic office and warehouse space. These agencies are required to set annual reduction targets for a 5-year time period and update their real property plans annually. GAO was asked to review the implementation of this space reduction initiative. This report discusses: (1) the approaches and any challenges the 24 agencies identified to achieving their reduction targets for all their domestic office and warehouse space; (2) the extent these agencies reduced their space and met their fiscal year 2016 targets; and (3) how GSA manages vacated space it had leased to these agencies. GAO conducted a content analysis of the 24 agencies' real property plans for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 and analyzed agencies' data as submitted to GSA on their targets and reductions for fiscal year 2016, the only year for which data were available. GAO selected five agencies as case studies based on several factors, including size of the agencies' office and warehouse portfolio, agency reduction targets, and fiscal year 2016 reported reductions. GAO reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed officials from GSA, OMB, and GAO's case study agencies. GAO provided a draft of this product to GSA, OMB, and our case study agencies for comment. GAO incorporated technical comments, as appropriate. Most of the 24 agencies with chief financial officers reported to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA) that they planned to consolidate their office and warehouse space and allocate fewer square feet per employee as the key ways to achieve their space reduction targets. For example, the Department of Agriculture reported it will consolidate staff from five component agencies in two office buildings. When complete, the space allocated per employee will average about 250 square feet down from a high of 420 square feet per employee. In taking these actions, the agencies most often identified the cost of space reduction projects as a challenge to achieving their targets. Agencies cited costs such as for space renovations to accommodate more staff and required environmental clean-up before disposing of property as challenges to completing projects. Some agencies required to maintain offices across the country reported that their mission requirements limit their ability to reduce their space. In fiscal year 2016, 17 of the 24 agencies reported they reduced their space, but had varying success achieving their first-year targets. Of the 17 agencies, 9 exceeded their target and reduced more space than planned, 7 missed their target (by anywhere between 2.8 and 96.7 percent), and 1 reduced space, despite a targeted increase. Agency officials said that it is not unusual for projects to shift to different years and that such shifts could lead to missing targets one year and exceeding them the next. GSA has processes to manage the space vacated by agencies that is leased through GSA. For example, starting in November 2016, GSA started tracking agencies' space release requests centrally to help standardize the process and established an e-mail address to which agencies can submit requests. GSA relies on regional offices to manage real property in their regions and to identify tenants for vacant space or to remove unused space from the inventory. GSA's regional officials said regular monitoring and coordinating with agencies minimizes the likelihood GSA is caught off guard by a return of space. These processes also help them to plan ahead. GSA met its 2016 performance goal to have an annual vacant space rate of no more than 3.2 percent in its federally owned and leased buildings. However, given the recent implementation of the space reduction initiative, it is too early to determine the extent to which agencies will return space to GSA prior to the end of their leases and the effect on GSA's inventory.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: The federal government owns and leases hundreds of thousands of buildings across the country that cost billions of dollars annually to operate and maintain  In recent years, the federal government has taken steps to improve the management of federal real property and address long-standing issues by undertaking several government-wide initiatives and issuing memorandums to the CFO Act agencies  Within the executive branch, OMB and GSA provide leadership in managing federal real property  As the chief management office for the executive branch, OMB oversees how federal agencies devise, implement, manage, and evaluate programs and policies  OMB provides direction to federal agencies by, among other things, issuing policies and memorandums on real property management  In 2012, OMB issued a memorandum that required agencies to move aggressively to dispose of excess properties held by the federal government and more efficiently use real estate assets  This memorandum initially laid out the requirement to “freeze the footprint ” In 2013, OMB issued a memorandum clarifying the Freeze the Footprint policy  This memorandum required agencies going forward to maintain no more than their fiscal year 2012 total square footage of domestic office and warehouse space  The policy required agencies to specifically identify existing properties to be disposed of to offset any new property acquisitions  In March 2015, OMB transitioned from freezing the federal government’s real property footprint to reducing it  Specifically, OMB issued the National Strategy for the Efficient Use of Real Property (National Strategy) to provide a framework to guide agencies’ real property management, increase efficient real property use, control costs, and reduce federal real property  The National Strategy outlined three key steps to improve real property management: (1) freeze growth in the inventory; (2) measure performance and use data to identify opportunities to improve the efficiency of the real property portfolio; and (3) reduce the size of the inventory by consolidating, co-locating, and disposing of properties  OMB also issued the RTF policy which clarified existing policy to dispose of excess properties and promote more efficient use of real property assets  The RTF policy requires agencies to: (1) submit annual Real Property Efficiency Plans (Plan) to GSA and OMB; (2) issue a policy that specifies a design standard for maximum useable square feet by workstation for use in domestic office space; (3) set and specify in their Plans annual reduction targets for their domestic office and warehouse space for a 5-year period; (4) set and specify in their Plans annual reduction targets for domestic owned building properties reported in the Federal Real Property Profile; and (5) continue to not increase the square footage of their domestic inventory of office and warehouse space  Additionally, agencies must identify in their Plans potential projects related to office and warehouse consolidation, co-location, disposal, as well as construction and acquisition efforts  OMB is responsible for reporting the progress of agencies’ efforts in reducing the amount of federal real property space under the RTF policy  GSA has two key leadership responsibilities related to real property management  First, GSA’s Public Buildings Service functions as the federal government’s principal landlord  In this role, GSA acquires, manages, and disposes of federally owned real property for which it has custody and control on behalf of federal agencies that occupy the space  Additionally, GSA leases commercial buildings on behalf of agencies and manages the lease agreements  In these situations, GSA executes an occupancy agreement with a customer agency for each space assignment that is similar to a sublease between GSA and the agency  The occupancy agreement outlines both the financial specifics of the agreement and the responsibilities of GSA and the customer agency  There are certain unique advantages for customer agencies when GSA leases on their behalf  For example, GSA is able to enter into longer-term leases, and agencies can release space back to GSA with 4 months’ written notice if certain conditions are met, relieving the agencies of the cost for the returned space  Second, GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy is responsible for, among other things, identifying, evaluating, and promoting best practices to improve the efficiency of management processes  In this policy role, GSA provides guidance for federal agencies and publishes performance measures  It also maintains the Federal Real Property Profile, a real property inventory database that contains information on federal real property government-wide  Based on our review of agencies’ 2016 and 2017 Plans, we found that all 24 CFO Act agencies described strategies for reducing office and warehouse space  As previously mentioned, these annual Plans must include all potential projects related to office and warehouse consolidation, co-location, disposal, as well as construction and acquisition efforts  The agencies’ Plans cited consolidation, co-location, and disposal as the primary means to reduce their office and warehouse space, activities mentioned in the National Strategy  Agencies also cited other methods, such as utilizing telework and decreasing the space they allocate per person to achieve space reductions  The space reduction strategies included most often in the Plans we reviewed include the following  Consolidation: All 24 agencies reported planned or ongoing efforts to reduce their space by consolidating their offices or operations  For example, we spoke with officials at HUD, which is in the process of consolidating staff from four offices in the National Capital Region into its 1 12-million square foot headquarters building in Washington, D C  HUD started by remodeling one floor to create a more open floor plan and intends to apply this design throughout the building  As part of the consolidation project, HUD has reduced the size of some office cubicles from 64 square feet to 56 square feet  (See fig  1 ) HUD leases its space through GSA and estimates that it will be able to return about 175,000 square feet of unneeded space back to GSA once all four offices are closed  At that point, GSA would then bear the cost of the space and work to lease it to another agency or otherwise dispose of it  Once the project is completed, HUD estimated that its headquarters building will accommodate about 500 more personnel (for a total of 3,200) and reduce its annual lease payments by about $11 million  Fifteen of the 24 agencies identified consolidation opportunities outside of their headquarters buildings  For example, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) discussed a consolidation project involving five component agencies in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in its fiscal year 2017 Plan  According to USDA officials, four component agencies occupying nearly 44,500 square feet in one building were to be consolidated into about 34,000 square feet of space in another building already occupied by a different USDA agency  In the prior location, the multiple components spaces’ square footage per person averaged 327, but the proposed consolidation would bring the utilization rate down to 255 square feet per person  USDA estimated that the consolidation project would result in about $238,000 in annual rent cost savings for the four components  Additionally, to enable this consolidation project, the component agency already occupying the building consolidated and vacated about 20,000 square feet, a move that resulted in an annual rental savings of about $500,000  In its fiscal year 2017 Plan, Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation anticipated eliminating 87,000 square feet of office space by consolidating operations from two buildings in Denver, Colorado  Interior estimated that the consolidation will result in a 40 percent reduction in its overall utilization rate to 165 square feet per person and an annual cost savings of about $2 1 million  Co-location: Thirteen of the 24 agencies’ Plans stated that they are exploring or implementing co-location projects to reduce space by merging staff from different components or agencies into another agency’s space  For example, the Social Security Administration (SSA) recently initiated a co-location pilot program with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) within Treasury to combine SSA field offices with IRS Taxpayer Assistance Centers  Co-location of operations can reduce the overall space required by allowing agencies to share common space such as waiting rooms, an action that can reduce rent and operating costs for the co-located agencies  Since the inception of the 1-year program in January 2017, four IRS offices are participating and have moved into SSA field offices  According to SSA, IRS and SSA staff have adjusted to sharing space and the IRS presence in SSA space has not affected SSA wait times or created security or parking issues  According to an IRS official, IRS employees continue all normal operations from their co-located offices with SSA, including meeting with taxpayers in-person  The official also noted that IRS has extended the terms of its agreement with SSA for an additional year  However, SSA noted that the agencies are still working through customer access issues that could determine whether it would be possible to expand the pilot program and pursue additional co-location opportunities  In another example, according to Interior officials, the U S  Geological Survey is co-locating staff from Menlo Park, California, to a National Aeronautics and Space Administration facility in the nearby city of Mountain View, California  About 40 percent of the staff will move early in fiscal year 2019, and the U S  Geological Survey expects the remaining staff to be co- located by the end of 2021  Interior officials estimate that the co- location will result in an overall reduction of 165,000 square feet (about 50 percent of its space) and expects to save about $12 to $14 million in annual rent costs  To help agencies identify potential co-location opportunities and work with other agencies to meet their space requirements, GSA developed and provided agencies access to its Asset Consolidation Tool in fiscal year 2015  This database tool provides agencies with information about federal spaces in their area, including the buildings’ vacancy and utilization rates  Disposal of unneeded space: Thirteen of the 24 agencies reported that they plan to reduce their real property footprint by disposing of unneeded space, including selling or demolishing federal buildings or terminating leases, among other actions  For example, IRS has five tax submission-processing centers that receive all mailed income-tax returns and have warehouses that store the physical tax records  Each of these five processing centers, which include both office and warehouse spaces in multiple buildings, is approximately 500,000 square feet  According to IRS officials, 87 percent of all 2016 individual income-tax returns were filed electronically  As a result, the IRS plans to dispose of three of the five centers by 2024 to align with its reduced need for income-tax return processing and storage space  GSA has the statutory authority to dispose of property for all federal agencies and generally does so on their behalf  In addition, some federal agencies, such as Energy, or departmental components have statutory authority to dispose of buildings and other types of property and are not required to notify or use the services of GSA to complete the disposal  Better utilization of existing space: In their Plans, agencies also reported using tactical tools, such as incorporating space utilization rates into their capital-planning process, to identify opportunities to reduce space  For example, 22 of the 24 agencies reported incorporating office space design standards and agency utilization rates into their processes to identify space reduction opportunities  Agencies set their own space design standards and space utilization rates, which may vary based on agency mission requirements across their components  The RTF policy requires agencies to establish a design standard for the maximum workstation size, which should, at a minimum, be applied to all space renovations and new acquisitions  In addition, GSA has a recommended office space-utilization rate range of 150 to 200 square feet per person  Officials from our case study agencies noted several practices they said were helpful to identify opportunities to better utilize and ultimately reduce their space  For example, Commerce officials described developing a process for identifying and prioritizing space reduction opportunities using a two-factor matrix  Through this process, Commerce plans to target office space with a large number of employees and poor utilization rates (compared to its 170 square foot utilization rate)  According to Commerce officials, these situations may offer the most opportunity for space reductions and achieving significant rent and operating cost savings, particularly in high-cost real estate markets  Using this process, Commerce identified the potential for reducing as much as 1 6-million square feet (16 percent) of its total office space within 52 high priority facilities  According to IRS, retirements, hiring freezes, budget reductions, and increased telework have resulted in excess space throughout its portfolio  In fiscal year 2016, IRS started using a Strategic Facility Plan model to help identify space reduction projects  IRS’s objectives include consolidating multiple offices within a metropolitan area, closing outlying buildings, and leveraging telework, mobility, and its attrition rates  This model utilizes a template form to provide a consistent decision-making framework for assessing various options, articulating the rationale for selecting the preferred option, and documenting decisions and concurrence  According to IRS officials, this model has helped IRS to reduce a lot of its space  In 2014, GSA developed and provided agencies with access to the Real Property Management Tool, which can aid agencies that want to more effectively utilize their space  The database tool provides agencies with the capability to comprehensively view their real property portfolio by consolidating data from the assets that agencies directly manage with the assets that GSA manages on their behalf  As such, regardless of whether an agency initiated the action or GSA did so on its behalf, the tool gives an agency the ability to see all of its data, such as on expiring leases, in one place  The tool enables agencies to create individualized analytic reports allowing them to analyze the data in various ways  Teleworking and hoteling: Fifteen of the 24 agencies also described alternate workplace arrangements enabled by information technology, such as telework and hoteling, to help reduce office space  Telework is a work flexibility arrangement under which an employee performs their work responsibilities at an approved alternative worksite (e g , home)  Executive agencies are required to establish policies that authorize eligible employees to telework, determine the eligibility of all employees to participate in telework, and notify all employees of their eligibility  Federal law also requires that agencies consider whether space needs can be met using alternative workspace arrangements when deciding whether to acquire new space  As such, some agencies are eliminating designated offices for staff who primarily telework, a step that can improve space utilization  In a hoteling arrangement, employees use non-dedicated, non-permanent workspaces assigned for use by reservation and on an as needed basis  For example, the Office of Personnel Management implemented a workspace sharing initiative at one of its program offices  Staff who are not physically present in the office 4 or more days per week are required to share cubicles and offices  The Office of Personnel Management estimated that the initiative resulted in a 47 percent office space reduction for the program office  As part of their fiscal year 2016 and 2017 Plans, the 24 CFO Act agencies also described the major challenges they anticipated facing in their efforts to meet their space reduction targets  The agencies most frequently cited the following challenges: Space reduction costs: Twenty of 24 agencies stated that the costs of space reduction projects pose a challenge  Agencies are generally responsible for the up-front costs associated with relocations and tenant improvements, such as acquiring new furniture and renovating existing areas to reduce space or to accommodate more personnel in a smaller area  For example, the Department of Labor (Labor) reported in its fiscal year 2017 Plan that it did not have sufficient funding to implement a space reduction project that would have reduced commercially leased office space by 4,000 square feet  Similarly, the Department of Veterans Affairs’ fiscal year 2017 Plan noted that assuming a limited budget, large scale consolidations would be difficult to achieve  Some agencies have used or report that they intend to use funding from GSA’s Consolidation Activities program to help fund their space reduction projects  According to GSA, from fiscal years 2014 to 2017, GSA’s Consolidation Activities program funded projects that will eliminate 1 4-million rentable square feet from the GSA inventory and reduce agencies’ annual rent payments by $54 million  According to the IRS, GSA’s Consolidation funds have helped the agency reduce about 500,000 square feet of space  IRS officials noted that these funds helped the agency implement larger and more expensive space reduction projects than it would have been able to do otherwise  However, according to officials from several agencies, to use this program, agencies must also contribute funds to the projects  HUD officials stated that they considered applying for project funding through GSA but did not do so because HUD did not have sufficient funds for the agency’s share of project costs  Three of the 24 agencies specifically noted that the cost to clean up environmentally contaminated buildings is a challenge to disposing of excess office and warehouse space  Agencies are required to consider the environmental impact of property disposals  We have previously found that assessments and remediation of contaminated properties can be expensive and complicate the disposal process  Also, agencies are responsible for supervising decontamination of excess and surplus real property that has been contaminated with hazardous materials of any sort  In its fiscal year 2017 Plan, Energy estimated that over 60 percent of its excess buildings require extensive decontamination prior to disposal  Overall, Energy projected that its total liability for environmental clean-up could cost more than $280 billion  Mission delivery: Thirteen of the 24 agencies reported that mission delivery requirements can also affect their ability to reduce space  Agency missions may require office locations in certain areas or require additional space to accommodate activities such as customer interactions  These requirements may preclude disposals or limit opportunities to reduce space  For example, in its fiscal year 2017 Plan, SSA stated that its efforts to reduce space are affected by its mission, which requires offices widely dispersed throughout the country to administer and support its benefit programs, among other things  SSA has about 1,500 office spaces nationwide, most of which require space to accommodate the public  SSA had an overall office space utilization rate of 301 square feet per person, which exceeded GSA’s recommended office space utilization rate range of 150 to 200 square feet per person  USDA’s fiscal year 2017 Plan stated that its missions require office space in rural areas to, among other things, provide program assistance and leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, rural development, nutrition, and related issues  In its fiscal year 2017 Plan, USDA also observed that the real estate market in rural areas is less competitive than in urban areas because there are fewer rental options, a situation that can also drive up rent costs  As such, USDA noted that these factors may contribute to difficulties identifying disposal opportunities and finding alternate spaces that could allow for more effective space utilization  Employee organization concerns: Ten of the 24 agencies reported that considering employee organizations’ concerns and addressing collective bargaining requirements when reconfiguring space can add time and affect the extent of their space reductions  For example, in its fiscal year 2017 Plan, SSA noted that the agency must meet with three employee unions when revising office space policies or design standards and collaborating with these organizations adds to the project’s implementation timeline  In July 2017, we reported that SSA officials met with employee union groups about the impact of potential changes to its space configuration or usage  Officials said that while the interactions with the union groups were positive—including gaining input on issues such as ergonomics, the security of field offices, and overall implementation—at times, these negotiations caused delays to individual projects and complicated reduction efforts by requiring union buy-in  In addition, Labor reported in its fiscal year 2017 Plan that its collective bargaining agreement and agency mission requirements for offices and work stations do not always enable it to take advantage of the previously discussed GSA Consolidation Funding program as well as GSA’s Total Workplace Furniture & Information Technology program  For example, the Total Workplace Furniture & Information Technology program requires that cubicles and offices must not exceed a specified square footage  However, according to Labor officials, Labor’s Departmental Space Management Regulation requires a certain utilization rate per person which may make it challenging to also stay within the program’s square footage requirements  Workload growth: Eight of the 24 agencies noted that increases in their workload limited their ability to achieve overall agency space reductions  For example, according to the Department of Justice’s fiscal year 2017 Plan, the agency anticipated having to provide additional court rooms to support an increased volume of immigration cases and accommodate the additional immigration judges needed to handle that volume  The Department of Justice estimated that the space needed to accommodate the new judges and additional public areas could add about 155,000 square feet to its portfolio  Also, according to the Department of Health and Human Services’ fiscal years 2016 and 2017 Plans, the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals experienced a 30 percent growth in cases and expected 1 2- million new cases annually after 2017  The Department of Health and Human Services projected that the growth in cases and additional staff needed to process the cases required additional field offices, which would increase its total office space square footage  As previously mentioned, agencies are required to set annual square foot reduction targets for domestic office and warehouse space in their annual Plans  According to an OMB official, to help ensure the targets are realistic, agencies are also required to identify the specific projects that will help them to achieve their space reduction targets  According to GSA and OMB officials, agencies submit their Plans, including their reduction targets, and their Plans are reviewed by both GSA and OMB  But each individual agency ultimately establishes its targets based on what it determines to be cost-effective and feasible  Through its Real Property Efficiency Plan template, GSA provides guidance to agencies on what is expected in their annual submissions  Each agency is required to document its internal controls, such as the process for identifying and prioritizing reductions to office and warehouse space and disposal of properties based on return on investment and mission requirements  The identified internal controls should help ensure that an agency’s proposed space reduction projects reflect an efficient use of space and are cost effective  A review of our five case study agencies illustrated some of the different approaches agencies used to determine their reduction targets  For example, several agencies’ targets were based on the total estimated feasible reductions identified by each agency component  In contrast, one agency centrally established a reduction target percentage and then asked its components to develop projects to meet that target  According to case-study agency officials, the agencies considered many factors, including their missions, priorities, component needs, and available budgets, when determining their targets  We found that the number and magnitude of the space reduction projects agencies identified in their fiscal year 2017 Plans varied greatly and were generally proportional to the size of the agency’s real property portfolio  The number of projects identified in agency Plans ranged from as few as 3 projects (the minimum required in the Plans) to nearly 400 projects  The estimated space reductions per project across agencies ranged from about 1,400 to over 94,000 square feet  For example, the Department of Veterans Affairs has a relatively large office and warehouse portfolio of over 28-million square feet  As part of its fiscal year 2017 Plan, the agency reported 320 planned or ongoing projects with an average space reduction of about 1,800 square feet per project  Conversely, the Office of Personnel Management has a relatively small office space portfolio of about 1-million square feet; its fiscal year 2017 Plan identified 4 ongoing or potential projects with an average space reduction of about 6,000 square feet  In fiscal year 2016—the first and only year RTF data were available at the time of our review—the majority (71 percent or 17 of the 24 agencies) reported they achieved reductions in their office and warehouse space even though the agencies had varying success in achieving the individual targets they set for themselves  For example, as shown in figure 2, of the 17 agencies that reduced space, 9 exceeded their targets (i e , reduced more space than planned); 7 reduced space but missed their target (by anywhere between 2 8 and 96 7 percent); and 1 agency expected to increase in square footage, but reduced space  Whether an agency met its target is not the only indicator of an agency’s success in reducing space  For example, although some agencies missed their targets, they reduced their office and warehouse space by a larger percentage than some agencies that exceeded their targets  Also, the fact that some agencies missed their targets can in part be attributed to setting more aggressive targets than other agencies  Agencies’ fiscal year 2016 targets ranged from a 0 8 percent increase to an 8 4 percent decrease in office and warehouse space  Of the 9 agencies that exceeded their reduction targets, 4 more than tripled their target  As mentioned, agency targets are set by the agency and are a reflection of their unique situation including mission needs and priorities and therefore cannot be generalized across agencies  For example, Energy exceeded its fiscal year 2016 reduction target and reduced 292,140 square feet of space (0 8 percent of its total square footage)  However, the Environmental Protection Agency missed its target, which was the second most aggressive target across all the agencies at 7 2 percent of its total square footage; but the agency reduced 174,003 square feet (3 24 percent of its total square footage)  Of the three agencies with the most aggressive target reductions—those that ranged between 6 7 and 8 4 percent of their total square footage—only one met its target  Figure 3 shows the extent to which each of the CFO Act agencies met its fiscal year 2016 targets  See appendix II for more detailed information on each agencies’ square footage of space, reduction targets and fiscal year 2016 reductions  Officials from our case study agencies cited a number of factors that influenced whether or not they met their fiscal year 2016 targets, and may also affect their target achievement in subsequent years  Of our five case study agencies, three exceeded their fiscal year 2016 reduction target and two missed their target  Timing and funding: Officials from two case study agencies cited timing as a factor, noting that there is fluidity to the project’s planning, implementation, and disposal process that may not always be within an agency’s control  As a result, space reductions anticipated in one fiscal year may not be realized until a subsequent fiscal year; conversely, some space reduction opportunities may present themselves unexpectedly  For example, according to officials at HUD, which missed its fiscal year 2016 reduction target, some projects take longer than anticipated to start or complete  HUD officials said that their fiscal year 2016 target may have been too ambitious and planned projects were delayed because they were unable to secure sufficient funding  As such, the officials said the agency must carefully select which projects to move forward with in a given fiscal year, but expected to move forward with their delayed, planned projects in the next fiscal year  Energy on the other hand, exceeded its fiscal year 2016 reduction target  Energy officials said that they tend to be conservative in listing potential RTF projects in their Plans  They noted that it takes a long time to dispose of a building and the timing was dependent on the building’s level of contamination, location, size, agency budget, and other factors  As a result, even though the agency may have planned to dispose of a building in a given fiscal year, there were numerous reasons why the project may get delayed  Further, RTF is a long-term effort and should not be judged based on agencies’ progress in their first year  According to an OMB official, it is understood that there may be circumstances in a given year that may hinder agencies from reaching their RTF targets, such as budget constraints or the timing of leases; however, the expectation is that agencies will continue to work toward accomplishing their target in the next year  Accordingly, under RTF, agencies set annual space reduction targets for a 5-year period  Officials from our case study agencies emphasized that the 5-year targets are not static, but rather are subject to annual updates  The RTF policy also acknowledged that changes to mission requirements and the availability of budgetary resources may require modifications to an agency’s targets, particularly in each of the subsequent years  Lastly, given that the RTF policy is still relatively recent, an OMB official noted that agencies are still in the process of learning how to set appropriate targets  Previous space reductions: Officials from three of our case study agencies noted that prior space reductions made during the Freeze the Footprint policy limited their ability to reduce space more aggressively  Though the thrust of Freeze the Footprint was to maintain the fiscal year 2012 size of an agency’s portfolio, agencies started to look more strategically for opportunities to dispose of excess space in their portfolios  The majority of agencies (18 of 24) have been decreasing the square footage of their domestic office and warehouse space since the Freeze the Footprint policy was implemented in 2013  OMB reported that under Freeze the Footprint, agencies achieved a 24 7-million square foot reduction between fiscal years 2012 and 2015  Officials from the IRS, which accounts for 70 percent of Treasury’s real property inventory, noted it has released 2 7-million square feet (approximately 10 percent) in the past 5 years, bringing its total square footage down to 25 3 million  According to officials from three of our case study agencies, a certain amount of space is required to effectively fulfill their missions  As such, the closer agencies get to attaining their optimum footprint, their ability to achieve further space reductions may be limited  In November 2016, GSA put into effect a new standard operating procedure to, among other things, standardize and streamline the process of receiving, reviewing, and documenting agencies’ space release actions  As previously mentioned, GSA’s occupancy agreements for space it leases on behalf of its customer agencies generally allow the agencies to release space back to GSA with as little as 4 months’ notice, if certain conditions are met  This can enable agencies to reduce their space and related rent costs relatively quickly without penalty  As a result of this new process, GSA established a centralized e-mail for agencies to submit their space release requests  The e-mail is maintained at GSA headquarters before it is forwarded to the respective GSA region  GSA also developed a centralized space release tracking spreadsheet to help ensure that all GSA regions were (1) notifying the customer agency of GSA’s determination on whether the space release request was within GSA’s policy, and (2) processing the space release and ceasing rent billings in a timely manner  According to GSA headquarters officials, this new process was implemented to rectify past concerns that space release requests were not centrally tracked, GSA regions may not have been making consistent determinations, and some requests either were missed or were not processed within the appropriate time frames  GSA officials noted that GSA similarly manages all vacant space in federally owned property under its custody and control and in commercial space it leases, and the agency seeks to utilize the space as quickly as possible  GSA has 11 regional offices throughout the country that generally conduct the day-to-day real property management activities for its customer agencies  These responsibilities include acquiring, managing, and disposing of real property, as well as executing, renewing, and terminating leases on behalf of its customer agencies in exchange for a monthly fee for GSA’s services  GSA headquarters officials told us that GSA regional offices track all the occupancy agreements and proactively work with customer agencies to help manage their space needs well before the agreements expire to understand ongoing space requirements  For example, according to GSA headquarters officials, this process includes working with agencies at a strategic level and helping them think about how they can accomplish their space needs and meet their targets 4 to 5 years in advance  GSA headquarters and regional officials noted that the advance planning helps the GSA regional officials integrate agencies’ potential space needs into the work they are already doing in the region as GSA manages the regional inventory as a whole, including managing the amount of vacant space  GSA regional officials told us that they work closely with the agencies in their space consolidation and reduction efforts to minimize the likelihood that GSA would be caught off guard by a release of space  This work enables GSA to develop options for either filling vacant space based on the known needs in the region or developing an alternative plan to effectively utilize the unneeded space  One of GSA’s strategic objectives is to improve the federal utilization of space in order to lower the government’s operational costs  To assess progress, GSA has an agency-wide vacant space performance goal of 3 2 percent for its federally-owned and leased inventory (with a 5 percent goal for federally owned and 1 5 percent goal for leased space)  Based on GSA data, the agency has steadily lowered its percentage of vacant space under its custody and control from 3 8 percent in fiscal year 2013 to 3 percent in fiscal year 2016, exceeding its performance goal of 3 2 percent for the first time in 4 years  The vacant space performance goal’s data help GSA evaluate its real property assets and plan for and make investment decisions while meeting its customer’s needs  According to GSA officials, the lower vacant space percentage is a reflection of the agency’s continued focus on working with its customer agencies to: (1) move into federally owned space, when possible; (2) decrease the size of commercially leased space to reduce agency rental costs and overall government reliance on leased space; and (3) dispose of unneeded federally owned assets  However, GSA officials noted that a certain level of vacant space is necessary to meet the space needs of new customers and customers with changing space requirements  According to GSA officials, GSA also tracks and reports annual cost avoidance data for all office and warehouse space reductions  These data include space covered under RTF in federally owned buildings under GSA’s custody and control and commercial space that GSA leases  Cost avoidance is defined as the results of an action taken in the immediate timeframe that will decrease future costs  The government-wide cost avoidance for fiscal year 2016 was $104 million based upon a net 10 7 million square foot reduction to all office and warehouse space  Of the government-wide figure, according to GSA, the total cost avoidance associated with office and warehouse space reductions in federally- owned space under GSA’s custody and control and commercial space GSA leased in fiscal year 2016 was over $75 8 million and 3 1 million square feet  In its cost avoidance calculation, GSA accounts for space returned to it by customer agencies only if there is a net square footage reduction in GSA’s total square footage across all the space that it manages  Similarly, the space returned to GSA does not reduce the federal government’s overall office and warehouse square footage unless GSA disposes of it  However, space that is returned to GSA is reflected as a square footage reduction for the customer agency and contributes toward that agency’s RTF target reduction  According to GSA regional officials, agencies’ requests to return space prior to the end of their occupancy agreements appear to have increased since the implementation of the RTF policy  Thus far, GSA has processes to manage agencies’ space release requests and keep its vacant space to a minimum  However, it is too early to determine how the recent increase in space release requests, in combination with agencies’ continued focus on occupying a smaller footprint and reducing their square footage, will affect: (1) the size of GSA’s inventory of vacant space in the long term, (2) GSA’s regional office workload to manage the requests, and (3) the cost savings for the federal government  We provided a draft of this report to GSA, OMB, Commerce, Energy, HUD, Interior, and Treasury for review and comment  We received technical comments from Energy, which we incorporated, where appropriate  GSA, OMB, Commerce, HUD, Interior, and Treasury did not have comments on our draft report  We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Administrator of GSA; the Director of the OMB; the Secretaries of the Departments of Commerce, Energy, HUD, the Interior, and the Treasury; and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  Our objectives were to determine: (1) the approaches and any challenges the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies identified to achieving their Reduce the Footprint (RTF) reduction targets for all their domestic office and warehouse space; (2) the extent to which these agencies reduced space and met their fiscal year 2016 RTF targets; and (3) how the General Services Administration (GSA) manages vacated space that it had leased to these agencies  To obtain background information for all three objectives, we reviewed relevant literature, including laws governing federal real-property management and agencies’ efforts to reduce their real property portfolios and Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) and GSA’s memorandums and guidance governing the RTF policy  We also reviewed prior GAO and GSA inspector general reports describing agencies’ real-property management and efforts to more efficiently manage their real property portfolios  To determine the approaches used and any challenges faced by the CFO Act agencies in achieving their RTF reduction targets for all their domestic office and warehouse space, we conducted a content analysis of the agencies’ 5-year Real Property Efficiency Plans (Plans) for fiscal years 2016 and 2017  These Plans were obtained directly from each of the agencies  Each Plan describes an agency’s overall strategic and tactical approach in managing its real property, provides a rationale for and justifies its optimum portfolio, and directs the identification and execution of real property disposals, efficiency improvements, general usage, and cost-savings measures  The content analysis of the Plans helped us to understand the approaches agencies used to reduce space, how space- reduction targets were set, and any challenges they experienced in reducing their space  To identify agencies’ approaches to achieving their RTF targets, we reviewed all agencies’ Plans to determine the most frequently mentioned approaches agencies reported using or planned to use to reduce their real-property footprints  As part of their plans, each agency is required to include a section detailing approaches it plans to use to reduce space  While these sections were the primary focus of the analysis, we analyzed the Plans as a whole for any additional mention of agencies’ approaches to reduce space  Based on the frequently identified approaches, codes were developed  An analyst reviewed all the agencies’ Plans and coded the approaches and another analyst reviewed the coding  If there was a disagreement, the two analysts reviewed and discussed until they reached an agreement  As a result of the analysis, five approaches were identified that agencies most frequently reported using or were planning to use to achieve their RTF targets  These five approaches are described in more detail in the report: (1) consolidation; (2) co-location; (3) disposition of unneeded space; (4) better utilization of existing space; and (5) teleworking and hoteling  For the purposes of our report, telework and hoteling were combined because these approaches are often used in combination  For example, agencies can use telework strategically to reduce space needs and increase efficiency by making hoteling (i e , desk sharing) possible  To identify any challenges agencies faced in achieving their RTF targets, we similarly conducted a content analysis of agencies’ fiscal year 2016 and 2017 Plans  As part of their Plans, each agency included a section describing challenges it faced to reducing space  While these sections were the primary focus of the analysis, we analyzed the Plans as a whole for any additional mention of agencies’ challenges  Based on the frequently identified challenges, codes were developed  An analyst went through all the agencies’ Plans to code the challenges and another analyst reviewed the coding  If there was a disagreement, the two analysts reviewed and discussed until they reached an agreement  As a result of the analysis, we identified the four challenges that agencies most frequently described in their Plans: (1) space reduction costs; (2) mission delivery; (3) employee organization concerns; and (4) workload growth  In our report, we relied specifically on agencies’ fiscal year 2016 and 2017 Plans to provide examples and context for our description of the approaches agencies use and challenges they experience in achieving their RTF targets  However, after these Plans were submitted, agencies reported that the specific details as described in their Plans may in some instances, have changed due to a variety of factors  For our case study agencies, to the extent possible, we have provided updated information from agency officials as of December 2017  We selected five agencies as case studies to inform our first two objectives  We selected the agencies using a variety of considerations such as the diversity in the size of the agency’s domestic office and warehouse portfolio, the extent to which the agency met its fiscal year 2016 RTF targets, the types of real property authorities the agency has, as well as suggestions from GSA and OMB related to agencies’ experiences  Based on these factors, we selected the: (1) Department of Commerce (Commerce); (2) Department of Energy (Energy); (3) Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); (4) Department of the Interior (Interior); and (5) Department of the Treasury (Treasury)  While our case-study agencies and their experiences reducing their space are not generalizable to all CFO Act agencies, they provide a range of examples of how agencies are implementing the RTF policy  We interviewed officials at the selected agencies as well as GSA and OMB, and reviewed relevant agency real-property management and RTF guidance, to obtain more detailed information about agencies’ RTF approaches, challenges, specific RTF projects, RTF project funding and prioritization, and experiences in meeting their RTF targets  In addition, we visited three office buildings of our case study agencies in Washington, D C , with ongoing or recently completed RTF projects that illustrated approaches the agencies used to reduce space and met with officials to discuss the projects in more detail  The spaces we visited were the headquarters buildings for Commerce, HUD, and Interior  We selected the buildings based on recommendations from officials at our case study agencies  To determine to what extent agencies reduced their space and met their fiscal year 2016 RTF targets, we analyzed the 24 CFO Act agencies’ data as submitted to GSA on their RTF targets and reported reductions for fiscal year 2016  The office and warehouse square footage reductions are calculated annually using GSA occupancy agreement data and agencies’ self-reported data in GSA’s Federal Real Property Profile  For example, for fiscal year 2016, the space reduction calculations based on these data sources at the end of the fiscal year was compared to the square footage reported in fiscal year 2015  At the time of our review, this was the first and only year of RTF data available as the policy was implemented in March 2015  We conducted a data reliability assessment of the RTF data GSA provided by interviewing GSA officials and reviewing documentation, and concluded the data were reliable for our purposes  We also interviewed officials at GSA and OMB and reviewed relevant documentation to learn more about each agency’s role and the requirements of the RTF policy  We interviewed officials from our selected case-study agencies to obtain supporting documentation and to improve our understanding of how agencies set their RTF targets, agencies’ progress toward those targets, and the approaches used and challenges faced in meeting those targets  We also asked the agency officials for examples of successful practices used to reduce their office and warehouse space  To determine how GSA manages vacated federally owned and commercially leased space that it leases to agencies, we reviewed federal requirements and GSA policies and vacancy data  We conducted a data reliability assessment of GSA’s vacancy and cost avoidance data by interviewing GSA officials and reviewing documentation, and concluded the data were reliable for our purposes  We also interviewed GSA headquarters and regional officials and obtained documentation on how GSA manages space returned by agencies  We conducted this performance audit from April 2017 to March 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  FY 2016- FY 2020 target reduction (118,127) Social Security Administration Missed target and increased in space Department of Health and Human Services (170,147) (520,987) (15,466) (47,946) (56,062) In addition to the individual named above, Maria Edelstein (Assistant Director); Lacey Coppage; Edgar Garcia; Delwen Jones; Catherine Kim (Analyst-in-Charge); Michael Mgebroff; Malika Rice; Kelly Rubin; and David Wise made key contributions to this report 


Report 2: According to the National Inventory of Dams, as of January 2016 there are approximately 90,500 dams in the United States and about 2 5 percent of these (approximately 2,100 dams) are associated with hydropower projects  Hydropower projects are owned and operated by both non-federal entities—such as private utility companies, municipalities, and state government agencies—or federal government agencies—primarily the U S  Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation  Collectively, these dams associated with hydropower projects account for about 8 percent of the total electric generating capacity in the United States  Hydropower projects generally consist of one or more dams and other key components associated with hydroelectric power generation and water storage, and are uniquely designed to accommodate watersheds, geology, and other natural conditions present at the time of construction  These components include both those that allow operators to adjust reservoir water levels, such as spillways and gates, as well as those that produce and distribute electricity, such as transmission lines and powerhouses, among others  (See fig  1 ) The Federal Power Act provides for FERC’s regulatory jurisdiction over a portfolio of about 1,000 non-federal hydropower projects comprising over 2,500 dams  While FERC does not construct, own, or operate dams, it licenses and provides oversight of non-federal hydropower projects to promote their safe operation  Licensees are responsible for the safety and liability of dams, pursuant to the Federal Power Act, and for their continuous upkeep and repair using sound and prudent engineering practices  FERC officials in each of the agency’s five regional offices work directly with licensees to help ensure these projects comply with licenses and meet federal guidelines for dam safety  In addition, stakeholder groups such as the Association of State Dam Safety Officials can assist licensees in staying current on federal and state dam laws and regulations, dam operations and maintenance practices, and emergency action planning, among other things  FERC’s regulations, supplemented by its Operating Manual and Engineering Guidelines, establish a framework for its dam safety oversight approach  FERC’s Operating Manual provides guidelines for the FERC staff performing inspections that are aimed at ensuring that structures are safe, are being properly maintained, and are being operated safely  FERC’s Engineering Guidelines provides FERC staff and licensees with procedures and criteria for the review and analysis of license applications, project modification proposals, technical studies, and dam designs  For example, one chapter presents guidelines for FERC staff to use to determine the appropriateness and level of geotechnical investigations and studies for dams  The Engineering Guidelines states that every dam is unique and that safety analysis of each dam require that engineers apply technical judgement based on their professional experience  As part of FERC’s safety oversight approach, it assigns a hazard classification to each dam in accordance with federal guidelines that consider the potential human or economic consequences of the dam’s failure  The hazard classification does not indicate the structural integrity of the dam itself, but rather the probable effects if a failure should occur  Depending on the hazard classification, the extent of and the frequency of safety oversight activities can vary  Low hazard dams are those where failure —an uncontrolled release of water from a water-retaining structure—would result in no probable loss of human life but could cause low economic and/or environmental losses  Significant hazard dams are those dams where failure would result in no probable loss of human life, but could cause economic loss, environmental damage, or other losses  High hazard dams are those dams where failure would probably cause loss of human life  FERC has designed a multi-layered oversight approach that involves both independent and coordinated actions with dam owners and independent consultants  Key elements of this approach include ensuring licensees have a safety program in place, conducting regular safety inspections, reviewing technical analyses, and analyzing safety as a part of project relicensing  (See fig  2 ) Licensee’s dam safety program  According to FERC guidance, licensees have the most important role in ensuring dam safety through continuous visual surveillance and ongoing monitoring to evaluate the health of the structure  Beyond this expectation for continuous oversight, FERC requires licensees of high and significant hazard dams to have an Owner’s Dam Safety Program  FERC dam safety inspection  The dam safety inspection, also called operation inspection, is a regularly-scheduled inspection conducted by a FERC regional office project engineer primarily addressing dam and public safety  FERC’s Operating Manual establishes the frequency that a FERC engineer conducts dam safety inspections  Independent consultant inspection and potential failure mode analysis  FERC requires licensees to hire a FERC-approved independent consulting engineer to inspect and evaluate high hazard dams and certain types of dams above a certain height or size and submit a report detailing the findings  Additionally, FERC requires the licensee of a high or significant hazard dam to conduct a potential failure mode analysis  A potential failure mode analysis is an exercise to identify and assess all potential failure modes under normal operating water levels and under extreme conditions caused by floods, earthquakes, and other events  FERC relicensing of projects  FERC issues hydropower licenses for the construction of new hydropower projects, and reissues licenses for existing projects when licenses expire  Licensees may submit applications for a new license for the continued operation of existing projects as part of a process known as relicensing  During relicensing, in addition to the power and development purposes for which FERC issues licenses, FERC must evaluate safety, environmental, recreational, cultural, and resource development among other factors when evaluating projects, according to its guidance  In addition, FERC requires licensees to conduct various engineering studies related to dam performance in accordance with FERC safety requirements  Required engineering studies focus on dam performance as affected by hydrology, seismicity, and dam stability  Licensees may also produce engineering studies, such as a focused spillway assessment, for their own operations or at the request of FERC  We found, based on our analysis of the 42 dam safety inspections we reviewed, that FERC staff generally conducted and collected information from these inspections consistent with guidance in its Operating Manual  According to FERC’s Operating Manual, staff’s approach to conducting these inspections and collecting information is to include preparing for the inspection by reviewing documents, conducting a field inspection of the dam and associated project components, and discussing inspection findings with licensees and with FERC supervisors  Preparation for inspection: We found that FERC staff generally met document review requirements in preparation for safety inspections of the 42 dams we reviewed  (See table 1 ) According to the Operating Manual, FERC staff are to review safety-related information contained in documents such as potential failure mode analyses and hazard potential classifications  For example, we found that staff documented their review of the most recent independent consultant inspection report and potential failure mode analysis for each of the 16 high hazard dams we reviewed  FERC staff told us that they generally used checklists when preparing for these inspections  For example, some of the staff told us they tailor the checklist included in the Operating Manual, based on the dam’s type, characteristics, and hazard classification  Additionally, for each of the dams in our sample, staff stated that they prepared for the inspection by reviewing prior inspection reports and recommendations  Field inspection: We found that FERC staff generally met requirements for reviewing project components and documenting their findings from field inspections of the 42 dams we reviewed  (See table 2 ) According to the Operating Manual, FERC staff are to conduct visual inspections of the dam, typically alongside the licensee, to assess the dam and project components by observing their condition and identifying any safety deficiency or maintenance requirement  Also during the inspection, FERC staff are to compare current conditions of the dam and project components to those described in prior inspection reports, and as applicable, collect information on the licensee’s progress towards resolving deficiencies and maintenance issues that can affect safety  To assess safety, FERC staff we interviewed stated that they primarily rely on their engineering judgment  Inspection findings: According to our interviews with FERC staff from selected projects, we found that staff generally followed FERC guidance in discussing inspection findings with licensees and supervisors prior to preparing inspection reports to document their findings  According to the Operating Manual, following the dam safety inspection, FERC staff are to discuss the inspection with the licensee, giving direction on how to address any findings  Additionally, upon returning to the office, staff are to discuss inspection findings with their supervisors who may suggest additional actions  FERC staff are then to develop a dam safety inspection report that documents observations and conclusions from their pre-inspection preparation and their field inspection and identifies follow-up actions for the licensee  We found that FERC staff prepared inspection reports to document findings from the 42 dam safety inspections we reviewed  In response to inspection findings, FERC requires licensees to submit a plan and schedule to remediate any deficiency, actions that FERC staff then reviews, approves, and monitors until the licensees have addressed the deficiency  While we found that FERC staff conducted inspections and collected inspection findings consistently in the files we reviewed, FERC’s approach to recording information varies across its regions, thus limiting the usefulness of the information  FERC’s approach to recording inspection information relies on multiple systems to record inspection information and affords broad discretion to its staff on how to characterize findings, such as whether to track inspection findings as maintenance issues or as safety deficiencies  As related to systems for recording inspection information, FERC staff use the Data and Management System (DAMS), the Office of Energy Projects-IT (OEP-IT) system, as well as spreadsheets  In particular, according to FERC staff: Four out of FERC’s five regional offices use DAMS—which is primarily a workload tracking tool—to track plans and schedules associated with safety investigations and modifications as well as inspection follow-up items  FERC staff stated that since the inspection information in DAMS is recorded as narrative text in a data field instead of as discrete categories, sorting or analysis of the information is difficult  One regional office uses OEP-IT to track safety deficiencies while the system is more widely used across FERC to track licensees’ compliance with the terms and conditions of their licenses  Three out of FERC’s five regional offices also use spreadsheets and other tools that are not integrated with DAMS or OEP-IT to track inspection information and licensee progress toward resolving safety deficiencies  FERC staff said that use of these different systems to record deficiencies identified during inspections limits their ability to analyze safety information  For example, according to FERC officials, OEP-IT was not designed to track safety deficiency information and is not compatible with DAMS for use in tracking information on a national level  Furthermore, because spreadsheets and other tools are specific to the regional office in which they are used, FERC staff does not use the information they contain for agency-wide analysis  Concerning decisions on how to characterize inspection findings, FERC staff relies on professional judgment, informed by their experience and the Engineering Guidelines, to determine whether to track inspection findings as a safety deficiency or as a maintenance item, according to FERC officials  With input from their supervisors, FERC staff also determines what information to record and how to track the status of the inspection finding  For example, staff assigned to a dam at a FERC- licensed project in New Hampshire observed concrete deterioration on several parts of the dam and its spillway and asked the licensee to monitor all concrete surfaces, making repairs as necessary  According to staff we interviewed, regional staff and supervisors decided not to identify this as a deficiency to be tracked in DAMS because concrete deterioration is normal and to be expected in consideration of the area’s harsh winter weather  In contrast, staff assigned to a dam at a FERC- licensed project in Minnesota observed concrete deterioration on several parts of the project, including the piers and the powerhouse walls, and entered the safety item in DAMS as requiring repair by the licensee  FERC officials stated they are comfortable with the use of professional judgement to classify and address inspection findings because it is important to allow for consideration of the characteristics unique to each situation and how they affect safety  FERC’s approach to recording inspection information is inconsistent because FERC has not provided standard language and procedures about how staff should record and track deficiencies including which system to use  Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should design an entity’s information system and related control activities to achieve objectives and control risks  In practice, this means that an agency would design control activities—such as policies and procedures—over the information technology infrastructure to support the completeness, accuracy, and validity of information processing by information technology  FERC officials acknowledged that there are inconsistent approaches in where and how staff record safety deficiency information, approaches that limit the information’s usefulness as an input to its oversight  While the agency has not developed guidance, officials stated that FERC plans to take steps to improve the consistency of recorded information by replacing the OEP-IT system with a new system, tentatively scheduled for September 2018, that will have a specific function to track dam safety requirements  However, this new system will not replace the functions of DAMS, which FERC will continue to use to store inspection information  The two will exist as parallel systems with the eventual goal of the two systems’ sharing information  By developing standard language and procedures to standardize the recording of information collected during inspections, FERC officials could help ensure that the information shared across these systems is comparable, steps that would allow FERC to identify the extent of and characteristics associated with common safety deficiencies across its entire portfolio of regulated dams  Moreover, with a consistent approach to recording information from individual dam safety inspections, FERC will be positioned to proactively identify comparable safety deficiencies across its portfolio and to tailor its inspections towards evaluating them  While FERC uses inspection information to monitor a licensee’s efforts to address a safety deficiency for an individual dam, FERC has not analyzed information collected from its dam safety inspections to evaluate safety risks across the entire regulated portfolio of dams  For example, FERC has not reviewed inspection information to identify common deficiencies among certain types of dams  Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to their objectives  These standards note that one method for management to identify risks is the consideration of deficiencies identified through audits and other assessments  Dam safety inspections are an example of such an assessment  As part of such an approach, the agency analyzes risks to estimate their significance, which provides a basis for responding to the risk through specific actions  Furthermore, in our previous work on federal facilities, we have identified that an advanced use of risk management involving the ability to gauge risk across a portfolio of facilities could allow stakeholders to comprehensively identify and prioritize risks at a national level and direct resources toward alleviating them  FERC officials stated that they have not conducted a portfolio-wide analysis in part due to the inconsistency of recorded inspection data and because such an evaluation has not been a priority compared to inspecting individual dams  According to officials, the FERC headquarters office collects and reviews information semi-annually from each of its five regional offices on the progress of outstanding dam investigations and modifications in those regions  FERC’s review is designed to monitor the status of investigations on each individual dam but does not analyze risks across the portfolio of dams at the regional or national level  For example, officials from the New York Regional Office stated they do not perform trend analysis across the regional portfolio of dams under their authority, but they compile year-to-year data for each separate dam to show any progression or changes from previous data collected from individual dams  A portfolio-wide analysis could help FERC proactively identify safety risks and prioritize them at a national level  FERC officials stated that a proactive analysis of its portfolio could be useful to determining how to focus its inspections to alleviate safety risks, but it was not an action that FERC had taken to date  The benefits of a proactive analysis, for example, could be similar to those FERC derived from the analysis it conducted in reaction to the Oroville Dam incident  To conduct this analysis, FERC required 184 project licensees, identified by FERC regional offices as having spillways similar to the failed spillway at the Oroville Dam, to assess the spillways’ safety and capacity  According to FERC officials, these assessments identified 27 dam spillways with varying degrees of safety concerns  They stated that FERC’s spillway assessment initiative was a success because they were able to target a specific subgroup of dams within the portfolio and identify these safety concerns at 27 dam spillways  FERC officials stated that they are working with the dam licensees to address these safety concerns  A similar and proactive approach based on analysis of common deficiencies across the portfolio of dams under FERC’s authority could also help to identify any safety risks that may not have been targeted during the inspections of individual dams and prior to a safety incident  As directed by FERC, licensees and their consultants develop and review, or update, various engineering studies related to dam performance to help ensure their dams meet FERC requirements and remain safe  FERC regulations and guidelines describe the types and frequency of studies and analyses required based on dams’ hazard classifications  For all high hazard and some significant hazard dams, existing studies are to be reviewed by each licensee’s consultants every 5 years, as part of the independent consultant inspection and accompanying potential failure mode analysis  According to FERC officials, for those significant hazard dams that do not require an independent consultant inspection and for low hazard dams, FERC’s regulations and guidelines do not require any studies, but in practice FERC directs many licensees to conduct them  FERC also may request engineering studies in response to dam safety incidents at other projects, or engage a board of consultants to oversee the completion of a study  For example, as previously noted, following the Oroville Dam incident in 2017, FERC requested a special assessment of all dams with spillways similar to the failed spillway at the Oroville Dam  To develop these studies, all six of the consultants we interviewed stated that they follow guidelines provided by FERC and other dam safety agencies  Specifically, they stated that they use FERC’s Engineering Guidelines, which provide engineering principles to guide the development and review of engineering studies  In recognition of the unique characteristics of each dam, including its construction, geography, and applicable loading conditions, the Guidelines provides consultants with flexibility to apply engineering judgment, and as a result, the approach that licensees and their consultants use and the focus of their reviews of engineering studies may vary across regions or projects  For example, one independent consultant we interviewed noted that seismicity studies are not highlighted during the independent consultant inspections for projects in the Upper Midwest in comparison to projects in other areas of the country because the region is not seismically active, but that inspections do look closely at ice loads during the winter months  To create these studies, we found that licensees and their consultants generally use data from other federal agencies and rely on available modeling tools developed by federal agencies and the private sector to evaluate dam performance  For example, many of the engineering studies we reviewed rely on data from the National Weather Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to estimate precipitation patterns and the U S  Geological Survey to estimate seismic activity  In addition, licensees and their consultants use modeling tools and simulations, such as those developed by the Corps to estimate hydrology, to develop engineering studies  FERC staff noted that the engineering studies developed by licensees and their consultants generally focus on the analysis of extreme events, such as earthquakes and floods  In reference to extreme events, FERC staff said that both actual past events and likely future events are considered in determining their magnitude  FERC staff noted the probable maximum flood—the flood that would be expected to result from the most extreme combination of reasonably possible meteorological and hydrological conditions—as an example of a dam design criterion that is based on application of analysis of extreme events  In describing the efficacy of probable maximum flood calculations, FERC officials stated that they had not observed a flood that exceeded the probable maximum flood calculated for any dam and noted that their Engineering Guidelines provides a conservative approach to estimating the probable maximum flood and other extreme events  FERC officials stated that requiring a conservative approach to estimating extreme events helps to mitigate the substantial uncertainty associated with these events, including in consideration of emerging data estimating the effects of climate change on extreme weather events  Once developed, engineering studies we reviewed often remained in effect for a number of years, until FERC or the licensee and its consultant determined an update was required  For example, we found that the hydrology studies were 20 years or older for 17 of the 42 dams in our review, including for 9 of the 16 high hazard dams in our sample  FERC’s Engineering Guidelines states that studies should be updated as appropriate  For example, FERC’s Engineering Guidelines on hydrology studies state that previously accepted flood studies are not required to be reevaluated unless it is determined that a re-analysis is warranted  The Guidelines notes that FERC or the consultant may consider reanalyzing the study for several reasons, including if they identify (1) significant errors in the original study; (2) new data that may significantly alter previous study results; or (3) significant changes in the conditions of the drainage basin  FERC staff and consultants we interviewed stated that age alone is not a primary criterion to update or replace studies and that studies should be updated as needed depending on several factors including age, new or additional data, and professional judgment  Consultants we interviewed identified some limitations that can affect their ability to develop engineering studies for a dam  For example, they noted that some dams may lack original design information, used prior to construction of the dam, which includes the assumptions and calculations used to determine the type and size of dam, the amount of water storage capacity, and information on the pre-construction site geology and earthquake potential  FERC officials estimated that for a large percentage of the dams they relicense, the original information is no longer available  For example, according to the report from the independent forensic team investigating the Oroville Dam incident and as previously noted, some design drawings and construction records for the dam’s spillway could not be located and some other documents that were available were not included in the most recent independent consultant inspection report submitted to FERC  To overcome the lack of original design information, FERC told us that licensees and their consultants may use teams of experts, advanced data collection techniques, and other modern methods, where feasible, to assess the dam’s ability to perform given current environmental conditions  In cases where design or other engineering information is incomplete, consultants stated that they generally recommend the licensee conduct additional studies based on the risk presented by the missing information but also noted that the financial resources of a licensee may affect its willingness and ability to conduct additional studies  However, FERC officials stated that FERC staff are ultimately responsible for making decisions on whether additional engineering studies are needed to evaluate a dam’s performance  FERC has established policies and procedures that use formal guidance, and permit the use of professional judgment, to evaluate and review engineering studies of dam performance submitted by licensees and their consultants  FERC officials in both the headquarters and regional offices emphasized that their role as the regulator is to review and validate engineering studies developed by the licensee and their consultants  FERC generally does not develop engineering studies as officials noted that dam safety, including the development of engineering studies, is primarily the licensee’s responsibility  To carry out their responsibility to ensure public safety, FERC staff stated they use procedures and criteria in the FERC Engineering Guidelines to review engineering studies and apply professional judgment to leverage their specialized knowledge, skills, and abilities to support their determinations of dam safety  FERC’s Engineering Guidelines provides a framework for the review of engineering studies, though the Guidelines recognizes that each dam is unique and allows for flexibility and exemptions in their use  Moreover, the Guidelines notes that analysis of data is useful when evaluating a dam’s performance, but should not be used as a substitute for judgment based on experience and common sense  Because FERC’s Engineering Guidelines allows for the application of professional judgment, the methods used to review these studies vary depending on the staff, the region, and individual dam characteristics  For example, FERC staff said that when they review consultants’ assumptions, methods, calculations and conclusions, in some cases they may decide to conduct a sensitivity analysis if—based on the staff’s judgment—they need to take additional steps to validate or confirm factors of safety for the project  FERC officials also stated that staff may conduct their own independent analyses, as appropriate, such as evaluating a major structural change to the dam or validating submitted studies  For example, as part of its 2016 review of the Union Valley Dam in California, FERC staff validated the submitted hydrology study by independently calculating key inputs, such as precipitation rates and peak floods, to evaluate the dam’s performance and verify the spillway’s reported capacity  In addition, FERC has established various controls to help ensure the quality of its review, including using a risk-based review process, assigning multiple staff to review the studies, and rotating staff responsibilities over time  We have previously found in our reporting on other regulatory agencies that practices such as rotating staff in key decision-making roles, and including at least two supervisory staff when conducting oversight reviews help reduce threats to independence and regulatory capture  Risk-based review process  FERC’s review approach is risk-based, as the frequency of staff’s review of these studies is based on the hazard classification of the dam as well as professional judgment  FERC relies on three primary engineering studies (hydrology, seismicity, and stability), and others as appropriate, which form the basis for determining if a dam is safe  In addition, FERC requires licensees to hire a FERC-approved independent consulting engineer at least every 5 years to inspect and evaluate high hazard and other applicable dams and submit a report detailing the findings as part of the independent consultant inspection process  In general, for the dams we reviewed, we found that FERC staff reviewed engineering studies for dams subject to independent consultant inspections (which are typically high or significant hazard dams) more frequently than those engineering studies associated with dams for which FERC does not require an independent consultant inspection (typically low hazard dams)  For example, we found FERC staff had reviewed the most recent hydrology studies for all 22 high and significant hazard dams in our sample subject to independent consultant inspections within the last 6 years and documented their analysis  According to FERC officials, for dams not subject to an independent consultant inspection, FERC staff review engineering studies on an as needed basis, depending on whether the underlying assumptions and information from the previous studies are still relevant  For example, for the 20 dams in our study not subject to an independent consultant inspection, we found that most (15) of these studies were reviewed by FERC within the past 10 years, usually during the project’s relicensing  Multiple levels of supervisory review  As part of FERC’s quality control and internal oversight process, multiple FERC staff are to review the studies produced by the licensee and its consultant, with the number of successive reviews proportional to the complexity or importance of the study, according to FERC officials  FERC’s Operating Manual establishes the general procedure for the review of engineering studies  To begin the review process, the staff assigned to a dam is to review the engineering study and prepares an internal memo on its findings; that memo is then to be reviewed for accuracy and completeness by both a regional office Branch Chief, and the Regional Engineer  If necessary, Washington, D C , headquarters office staff are to review and approve the final memo  Upon completion of review, FERC staff are to provide a letter to the licensee indicating any particular areas where additional information is needed or where more studies are needed to evaluate the dam’s performance  According to FERC officials, each level of review adds successive quality control steps performed by experienced staff  We have previously found in reporting on other regulatory agencies that additional levels of review increases transparency and accountability and diminishes the risk of regulatory capture  Rotation of FERC staff responsibilities  As part of an internal quality control program to help minimize the risk of missing important safety- related items, FERC officials told us they rotate staff assignments and responsibilities approximately every 3 to 4 years  According to FERC officials, this practice decreases the chance that a deficiency would be missed over time due to differences in areas of engineering expertise between or among staff  We have previously found in our reporting on other regulatory agencies that strategies such as more frequently rotating staff in key roles can help reduce the risk to supervisory independence and regulatory capture  Some FERC regional offices have developed practices to further enhance their review of these studies  For example, the New York Regional Office established a subject matter expert team that helps review dams with unusually complex hydrology issues  This team was created, in part, because FERC staff noted that some of the hydrology studies conducted in the 1990s and 2000s were not as thorough as they would have wanted, and warranted a re-examination  Currently, the New York Regional Office is reviewing the hydrology analysis associated with 12 dam break studies to determine if the hydrology data used in developing these studies were as rigorously developed and validated  According to the FERC staff in this office, utilizing a team of subject matter experts has reduced Regional Office review time and improved the hydrology studies’ accuracy  FERC staff in the New York Regional Office also told us that they are working with other regional offices on setting up similar technical teams  For example, FERC staff in the New York Regional Office have been working with the Portland Regional Office to set up a similar team  FERC procedures require the use of engineering studies at key points over the dam’s licensing period to inform components of its safety oversight approach, including during the potential failure mode analyses of individual dams as well as during relicensing  Potential failure mode analysis  The potential failure mode analysis is to occur during the recurring independent consultant inspection and is conducted by the licensee’s independent consultant along with other key dam safety stakeholders  As previously explained, the analysis incorporates the engineering studies and identifies events that could cause a dam to potentially fail  During the potential failure mode analysis, FERC, the licensee, the consultant, and other key dam safety stakeholders are to refer to the engineering studies to establish environmental conditions that inform dam failure scenarios, the risks associated with these failures, and their consequences for an individual dam  Further, according to a FERC white paper on risk analysis, FERC is beginning to use information related to potential failure modes as inputs to an analysis tool that quantifies risks at each dam  With this information, FERC expects to make relative risk estimates of dams within its inventory and establish priorities for further study or remediation of risks at individual dams, according to the white paper  Relicensing  During relicensing, FERC staff are to review the engineering studies as well as information such as historical hydrological data and extreme weather events, which also inform their safety evaluation of the licensee’s application  FERC officials also stated that as a result of their relicensing review, they might alter the articles of the new license before it is issued should their reviews indicate that environmental conditions affecting the dam’s safety have changed  We found that FERC generally met its requirement to evaluate dam safety during the relicensing process for the 42 dams we reviewed  During the relicensing process, we found that for the dams we reviewed, FERC staff review safety information such as the past reports, inspections, and studies conducted by FERC, the licensee, and independent consultants and determine whether or not a dam owner operated and maintained its dam safely  According to FERC staff, the safety review for relicensing is generally a summary of prior safety and inspection information, rather than an analysis of new safety information, unless the licensee proposes a change to the operation or structure  FERC’s review during relicensing for the high hazard and significant hazard dams we reviewed was generally consistent with its guidance and safety memo template, though the extent of its review of low hazard dams varied  (See fig  3 ) For example, for the 22 high and significant hazard dams we reviewed, the safety relicensing memos followed the template and nearly all included summaries of hydrology studies, stability analyses, prior FERC inspections, and applicable independent consultant reports  For the 20 low hazard dams, FERC staff noted that some requirements in the template are not applicable or have been exempted and therefore were not reviewed during relicensing  While low hazard dams were more inconsistently reviewed during relicensing, FERC staff also noted that there has been a recent emphasis to more closely review, replace, or conduct engineering studies, such as the stability study, for low hazard dams during relicensing  Moreover, FERC staff told us that the safety risks associated with these dams are minimal, as the failure of a low hazard dam, by definition, does not pose a threat to human life or economic activity  According to FERC staff, if a licensee proposed altering the dam or its operations in any way as part of its application for a new license, FERC staff would review the proposed change and may recommend adding articles to the new license prior to its issuance to ensure dam safety  FERC officials noted that, as part of their review, any structural or operational changes proposed by the licensee during relicensing are reviewed by FERC  These officials also noted that FERC generally recommends modifications to the licensees’ proposed changes prior to their approval and inclusion in the new license  However, FERC officials noted that, in some cases, additional information is needed prior to approving the structural or operational change to ensure there are no risks posed by the changes  In those instances, FERC may recommend that articles be added to the new license, that require the licensee to conduct additional engineering studies of the issue and submit them to FERC for review and approval  For example, during the relicensing of the Otter Creek project in Vermont in 2014, the licensee proposed changes to the project’s operation resulting from construction  As a result, FERC’s staff recommended adding a number of articles to the license, including that the licensee conduct studies to evaluate the effect of the change on safety and to ensure safety during construction  During relicensing, third parties—such as environmental organizations, nearby residents and communities, and other federal agencies, such as the U S  Fish and Wildlife Service—may provide input on various topics related to the project, including safety  However, FERC officials said that very few third parties file studies or comments related to dam safety during relicensing  FERC’s template and guidance do not specifically require the consideration of such analyses as part of its safety review, and we did not identify any safety studies submitted by third parties for dams or reviewed by FERC in our sample  According to FERC officials, when stakeholders submit comments during relicensing, the comments tend to focus on environmental aspects of the project, such as adding passages for fish migration  Further, FERC is not required under the Federal Power Act to respond to any comments, including those related to dam safety, from third parties, according to FERC officials  However, according to FERC officials, courts have held that the Administrative Procedure Act precludes an agency from arbitrarily and capriciously ignoring issues raised in comments  Furthermore, these officials stated that if a court determines that FERC did not sufficiently address issues raised during the relicensing process, its orders are subject to being reversed and remanded by applicable United States courts of appeals  Moreover, FERC officials noted that the information needed to develop third party safety studies, such as the dam design drawings and engineering studies, are property of the licensee, rather than FERC  In addition, this information may not be readily available to third parties or the public if FERC designates it as critical energy infrastructure information, which would preclude its release to the general public  FERC staff we interviewed stated that there have been no instances where the Commission denied a new license to a licensee as a result of its safety review during relicensing  FERC staff stated that given the frequency of other inspections, including the FERC staff inspections, and independent consultant inspections, it is unlikely staff would find a previously unknown major safety issue during relicensing  FERC staff told us that rather than deny a license for safety deficiencies, FERC will keep a dam owner under the terms of a FERC license to better ensure the licensee remedies existing safety deficiencies  Specifically, FERC staff noted that under a license, FERC can ensure dam safety by (1) closely monitoring the deficiency’s remediation progress through its inspection program, (2) adding license terms in the new license tailored to the specific safety deficiency, and (3), as necessary, pursuing compliance and enforcement actions, such as civil penalties or stop work orders, to enforce the terms and conditions of the license  For example, prior to and during the relicensing of a FERC-licensed project in Wisconsin in 2014, FERC’s review identified that the spillway capacity was inadequate  While the project was relicensed in 2017 without changes to the spillway, FERC officials stated that they have been overseeing the plans and studies of the remediation of the spillway through their ongoing inspection program  However, if an imminent safety threat is identified during the relicensing review, FERC officials stated that they will order that the licensee take actions to remedy the issue immediately  Moreover, FERC officials noted that, if necessary, a license can be revoked for failure to comply with the terms of its license  FERC designed a multi-layered safety approach—which uses inspections, studies, and other assessments of individual dams—to reduce exposure to safety risks  However, as the spillway failure at the Oroville Dam project in 2017 demonstrated, it is not possible to eliminate all uncertainties and risks  As part of a continuing effort to ensure dam safety at licensed projects, FERC could complement its approach to evaluating the safety of individual dams by enhancing its capability to assess and identify the risks across its portfolio of licensed dams  Specifically, while FERC has collected and stored a substantial amount of information from its individual dam safety inspections, FERC’s approach to recording this information is inconsistent due to a lack of standard language and procedures  By clarifying its approach to the recording of information collected during inspections, FERC officials could help ensure that the information recorded is comparable when shared across its regions  Moreover, the absence of standard language and procedures to consistently record inspection information impedes a broader, portfolio- wide analysis of the extent of and characteristics associated with common safety deficiencies identified during FERC inspections  While FERC has not yet conducted such an analysis, a proactive assessment of common safety inspection deficiencies across FERC’s portfolio of licensed dams— similar to its identification of dam spillways with safety concerns following the Oroville Dam incident—could help FERC and its licensees identify safety risks prior to a safety incident and to develop approaches to mitigate those risks  We are making the following two recommendations to FERC: FERC should provide standard language and procedures to its staff on how to record information collected during inspections, including how and where to record information about safety deficiencies, in order to facilitate analysis of safety deficiencies across FERC’s portfolio of regulated dams  (Recommendation 1) FERC should use information from its inspections to assess safety risks across its portfolio of regulated dams to identify and prioritize safety risks at a national level  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to FERC for review and comment  In its comments on the draft report, FERC said it generally agreed with the draft report’s findings and found the recommendations to be constructive  FERC said that it would direct staff to develop appropriate next steps to implement GAO’s recommendations  These comments are reproduced in appendix IV  In addition, FERC provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the Chairman of FERC and other interested parties  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at 202-512-2834 or vonaha@gao gov  Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V  FERC seeks to ensure licensees’ compliance with FERC regulations and license requirements, including remediating safety deficiencies, by using a mix of preventative strategies to help identify situations before they become problems and reactive strategies such as issuing penalties  As part of its efforts, FERC published a compliance handbook in 2015 that provides an overall guide to compliance and enforcement of a variety of license requirements, including dam safety  The handbook includes instructions for implementing FERC rules, regulations, policies, and programs designed to ensure effective compliance with license conditions, which include dam safety, to protect and enhance beneficial public uses of waterways  FERC developed a range of enforcement actions, that include holding workshops to encourage compliance and issuing guidance, that increase in severity depending on the non- compliance issue  (See fig  4 ) More broadly, FERC’s guidance directs officials to determine enforcement actions and time frames for those actions on a case-by-case basis, depending on the characteristics of the specific compliance issue  According to FERC officials, many of these safety compliance discussions are handled informally  In addition, their compliance approach emphasizes activities that assist, rather than force, licensees to achieve compliance, according to its guidance  These activities include facilitating open lines of communication with licensees, participating in technical workshops, and publishing brochures and guidance documents, among other efforts  Also, according to these officials, FERC works with licensees to provide guidance and warnings of possible non-compliance matters, in order to avoid usage of any enforcement tools, if possible  According to FERC officials, any safety issues that endanger the public will result in immediate penalty or removal of the dam from power generation, but this action is not lightly taken  Additionally, the length of time between when a safety deficiency is identified and is resolved varies substantially depending on the specific project  As stated earlier in this report, FERC works with licensees to determine a plan and schedule for investigating safety issues and making any needed modifications  However, FERC officials stated that the majority of safety compliance issues are resolved within a month  However, FERC officials stated that if a licensee repeatedly does not take steps to address a compliance issue, FERC will explore enforcement actions through a formal process  According to officials, FERC’s enforcement options are based on authorities provided under the Federal Power Act and such options are flexible because of the variation in hazards, consequences, and dams  According to FERC officials, to ensure compliance with safety regulations, if a settlement cannot be reached, FERC may, among other things, issue an order to show cause, issue civil penalties in the form of fines to licensees, impose stop work or cease power generation orders, revoke licenses, and seek injunctions in federal court  Nevertheless, FERC officials stated that there is no specific requirement for how quickly the compliance issues or deficiencies should be resolved and that some issues can take years to resolve  For example, in 2004, the current licensee of a hydroelectric project operating in Edenville, Michigan, acquired the project, which was found by FERC to be in a state of non-compliance at that time  FERC staff made numerous attempts to work with the licensee to resolve the compliance issues  However, they were unable to resolve these issues and as a result issued a cease generation order in 2017, followed in 2018 by a license revocation order  In practice, FERC’s use of these enforcement tools to resolve safety issues has been fairly limited, particularly in comparison to other license compliance issues, according to FERC officials  Since 2013, FERC has issued one civil penalty for a safety-related hydropower violation and has issued compliance orders on eight other projects for safety-related reasons, including orders to cease generation on three projects  For the 14 projects and 42 dams we reviewed, FERC licensees and their consultants used a variety of tools to develop engineering studies of dam performance (see table 3)  These tools included programs and modeling tools developed by government agencies, such as the U S  Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), as well as commercially available modeling tools  FERC officials stated that they also used a number of the same tools used by its licensees and consultants  Similarly, for the 14 projects and 42 dams we reviewed, FERC licensees and their consultants used a variety of datasets to develop engineering studies of dam performance (see table 4)  These datasets included data maintained and updated by various government agencies, including the United States Geological Survey and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  FERC officials stated that they also used a number of the same datasets used by its licensees and consultants  This report assesses: (1) how FERC collects information from its dam safety inspections and the extent to which FERC analyzes it; (2) how FERC evaluates engineering studies of dam performance to analyze safety, and (3) the extent to which FERC reviews dam safety information during relicensing and the information FERC considers  This report also includes information on FERC actions to ensure licensee compliance with license requirements related to dam safety (app  I) and selected models and data sets used to develop and evaluate engineering studies of dam performance (app  II)  For each of the objectives, we reviewed laws, regulations, FERC guidance, templates, and other documentation pertaining to FERC’s evaluation of dam safety  In addition, we reviewed an independent forensic team’s assessment of the causes of the Oroville Dam incident, including the report’s analysis of FERC’s approach to ensuring safety at the project, to understand any limitations of FERC’s approach identified by the report  We also reviewed dam safety documentation, including dam performance studies, FERC memorandums, the most recent completed inspection report, and other information, from a non-probability sample of 14 projects encompassing 42 dams relicensed from fiscal years 2014 through 2017  (See table 5 ) We selected these projects and dams to include ones that were geographically dispersed, had varying potential risks associated with their potential failure, and had differences in the length of their relicensing process  We developed a data collection instrument to collect information from the dam safety documentation and analyzed data from the sample to evaluate the extent to which FERC followed its dam safety guidance across the selected projects  To develop the data collection instrument, we reviewed and incorporated FERC oversight requirements from its regulations, guidance, and templates  We conducted three pre-tests of the instrument, and revised the instrument after each pre-test  To ensure consistency and accuracy in the collection of this information, for each dam in the sample, one analyst conducted an initial review of the dam safety documentation; a second analyst reviewed the information independently; and the two analysts reconciled any differences  Following our review of the information from the dam safety documentation, we conducted semi-structured interviews with FERC engineering staff associated with each of the 14 projects and 42 dams to obtain information about FERC’s inspections, review of dam performance studies, and analysis of safety during the relicensing of these projects  Our interviews with these FERC staff provided insight into FERC’s dam safety oversight approach and are not generalizable to all projects  We also interviewed FERC officials responsible for dam safety about dam safety practices  In addition, to review how FERC collects information from its dam safety inspections and the extent to which FERC analyzes it, we also reviewed inspection data from FERC’s information management systems from fiscal years 2014 through 2017  To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed guidance and interviewed FERC officials  We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes  We compared FERC’s approach to collecting, recording and using safety information to federal internal control standards for the design of information systems and related control activities  We also reviewed our prior work on portfolio- level risk management  To evaluate how FERC evaluates engineering studies of dam performance to analyze dam safety, we reviewed FERC policies and guidance  We interviewed six independent consultants having experience inspecting and analyzing FERC-regulated dams to understand how engineering studies of dam performance are developed  We selected consultants who had submitted an inspection report to FERC recently (between December 2017 and February 2018) based on the geographic location of the project they reviewed and experience conducting these inspections, and the number of reports submitted to FERC over this time period  (See table 6 ) Our interviews with these consultants provided insight into FERC’s approach to conducting and reviewing studies and are not generalizable to all projects or consultants  To evaluate the extent to which FERC reviews dam safety information during relicensing and the information it considers, we reviewed templates developed by FERC to assess safety during the relicensing and analyzed the extent to which staff followed guidance in these templates for the 14 projects and 42 dams in our sample  We also interviewed stakeholders, including the National Hydropower Association and Friends of the River to obtain general perspectives on FERC’s relicensing approach  Our interviews with these stakeholders provided insight into FERC’s approach to relicensing, and these views are not generalizable across all stakeholders  To review actions to ensure licensee compliance with license requirements related to dam safety, we reviewed FERC’s guidance related to compliance and enforcement and interviewed FERC officials responsible for implementation of the guidance  To review information on models and datasets used to develop and evaluate engineering studies of dam performance, we reviewed dam safety documentation associated with the projects in our sample (described previously), reviewed FERC documentation, and interviewed FERC officials  We conducted this performance audit from July 2017 to October 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  Andrew Von Ah, (202) 512-2834 or vonaha@gao gov  In addition to the contact named above, Mike Armes (Assistant Director); Matt Voit (Analyst-in-Charge); David Blanding; Brian Chung; Geoff Hamilton; Vondalee Hunt; Rich Johnson; Jon Melhus; Monique Nasrallah; Madhav Panwar; Malika Rice; Sandra Sokol; and Michelle Weathers made key contributions to this report 

ground_truth: In February 2017, components of California's Oroville Dam failed, leading to the evacuation of nearly 200,000 nearby residents. FERC is the federal regulator of the Oroville Dam and over 2,500 other dams associated with nonfederal hydropower projects nationwide. FERC issues and renews licenses—which can last up to 50 years—to dam operators and promotes safe dam operation by conducting safety inspections and reviewing technical engineering studies, among other actions. GAO was asked to review FERC's approach to overseeing dam safety. This report examines: (1) how FERC collects information from its dam safety inspections and the extent of its analysis, and (2) how FERC evaluates engineering studies of dam performance to analyze safety, among other objectives. GAO analyzed documentation on a non-generalizable sample of 42 dams associated with projects relicensed from fiscal years 2014 through 2017, selected based on geography and hazard classifications, among other factors. GAO also reviewed FERC regulations and documents; and interviewed FERC staff associated with the selected projects and technical consultants, selected based on the frequency and timing of their reviews. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) staff generally followed established guidance in collecting safety information from dam inspections for the dams GAO reviewed, but FERC has not used this information to analyze dam safety portfolio-wide. For these 42 dams, GAO found that FERC staff generally followed guidance in collecting safety information during inspections of individual dams and key structures associated with those dams. (See figure.) However, FERC lacks standard procedures that specify how and where staff should record safety deficiencies identified. As a result, FERC staff use multiple systems to record inspection findings, thereby creating information that cannot be easily analyzed. Further, while FERC officials said inspections help oversee individual dam's safety, FERC has not analyzed this information to identify any safety risks across its portfolio. GAO's prior work has highlighted the importance of evaluating risks across a portfolio. FERC officials stated that they have not conducted portfolio-wide analyses because officials prioritize the individual dam inspections and response to urgent dam safety incidents. However, following the Oroville incident, a FERC-led initiative to examine dam structures comparable to those at Oroville identified 27 dam spillways with varying degrees of safety concerns, on which FERC officials stated they are working with dam licensees to address. A similar and proactive portfolio-wide approach, based on analysis of common inspection deficiencies across the portfolio of dams under FERC's authority, could help FERC identify safety risks prior to a safety incident. Guidelines recognize that each dam is unique and allow for flexibility and exemptions in its use. FERC staff use the studies to inform other components of their safety approach, including the analysis of dam failure scenarios and their review of safety to determine whether to renew a license. GAO recommends that FERC: (1) develop standard procedures for recording information collected as part of its inspections, and (2) use inspection information to assess safety risks across FERC's portfolio of dams. FERC agreed with GAO's recommendations.