prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Report 1: In the United States, both FRA and FTA regulate rail transportation safety  FRA oversees safety of railroads operating on what is known as the general system, a network of standard gage track over which goods may be transported and passengers may travel  This system includes freight railroads, which typically own their own tracks and locomotives, transporting products among states and regions  FRA also oversees safety of intercity passenger and commuter railroads that operate over tracks owned by freight railroads and other entities  FTA oversees safety of rail transit systems that typically serve individual metropolitan areas, using track not shared with freight and other passenger trains  Rail transit includes a variety of modes, such as heavy and light rail, streetcars, automated guideways, cable cars, and others  Rail transit is an important component of the nation’s transportation network, particularly in large metropolitan areas  Rail transit systems provided over 4 4 billion passenger trips in 2016  “Heavy rail” systems in large cities account for much of the total rail transit activity, including 88 percent of passenger trips in 2016  According to FTA, 61 rail transit systems within 28 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico are subject to safety oversight by one of the 31 agencies in FTA’s state safety oversight program (see fig  1)  The states have long played a central role in conducting safety oversight of rail transit systems  The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 required, among other things, that states with rail transit operators designate an agency to oversee the safety of those systems, known as a state safety oversight agency  In overseeing state safety agencies, FTA designed the program as one in which FTA, states, and rail transit operators collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems  However, limitations have been identified in the state safety oversight program  In 2006, we reported on some state safety agency challenges in overseeing rail transit safety  Specifically, we found many of the state safety agencies lacked enough qualified staff and adequate levels of training to meet their responsibilities  In a 2009 hearing before the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, then Secretary Ray LaHood of the Department of Transportation discussed some of the weaknesses under the current state safety oversight program and introduced a public transportation safety legislative proposal  In 2010, various bills were introduced in both houses of Congress that would have provided FTA with various enforcement mechanisms and with the authority to issue safety regulations  Additionally, the bills would have required the Secretary to establish a federal certification program for employees and contractors who carry out a state public transportation safety program  In the 112th Congress, the Senate amended a House bill to include a public transportation safety provision, which eventually became section 20021 of MAP-21, the federal public transportation safety program  MAP-21 enhanced FTA’s authority to oversee the safety of rail transit, potentially addressing some of the weaknesses identified by various stakeholders  Specifically, MAP-21 established a comprehensive Public Transportation Safety Program, which continues to rely on state safety agencies to monitor rail transit systems’ safety operations  MAP-21 required that, within 3 years of the effective date of a final state safety oversight program rule, each eligible state have in place a state safety oversight program certified by FTA  An eligible state must, among other things, establish a state safety agency and determine, in consultation with FTA, an appropriate staffing level for this state agency that is commensurate with the number, size, and complexity of the rail transit systems within the state  Additionally, a state safety agency must be financially and legally independent from any rail transit system it oversees and have investigative and enforcement authority with respect to the safety for its rail transit systems, among other things  Each eligible state has until April 15, 2019, to receive FTA approval of its state safety oversight program, or else FTA will be prohibited from obligating certain federal financial assistance to any entity in the state that is otherwise eligible to receive that federal financial assistance  After that approval, state safety agencies will be evaluated for continued compliance with FTA regulations a minimum of once every 3 years through a triennial review process  According to FTA, these requirements represent a dramatic increase in federal expectations for state safety oversight and for the rail transit industry  MAP-21 also established a state safety oversight grant program, offering federal funding to states for their state safety activities  FTA’s Office of Transit Safety and Oversight administers the state safety oversight program  Freight and passenger railroads have played a transformational role in the development of America and continue to be an important part of the economy  The general railroad system consists of a vast network of operations (see fig  2)  The $60 billion freight rail industry is operated by seven Class I, and hundreds of smaller, railroads  In addition, about 40 railroads move passengers, which carry greater than 670 million passengers per year  The federal government has long provided regulatory oversight of railroad safety, both passenger and freight, that operate on the general system  The Interstate Commerce Commission, the first federal regulatory commission in U S  history, was established in 1887 to regulate interstate commerce by rail  The Commission’s safety functions were transferred to FRA, which was created by the Department of Transportation Act in 1966  In its role as federal regulator and overseer of railroad safety, FRA prescribes and enforces railroad safety regulations and conducts research and development in support of improved railroad safety and rail transportation policy  FRA utilizes safety inspectors and specialists, primarily covering five safety disciplines, to review and enforce compliance with these regulations  FRA’s safety disciplines are track, signal, and train control; motive power and equipment; operating practices; and hazardous materials  Following several fatal rail accidents between 2002 and 2008, the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 was enacted, the first authorization of FRA’s safety programs since 1994  This act directed FRA to, among other things, issue new safety regulations for different aspects of railroad safety, such as hours of service requirements for passenger railroad workers, positive train control implementation, track inspection rules, and safety at highway-rail grade crossings  FRA’s Office of Railroad Safety administers the agency’s safety program  Rail transportation is a relatively safe way to transport people and products though serious incidents continue to occur on railroads and rail transit  According to an analysis of DOT’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics data by the American Public Transportation Association, travel by rail transit is far safer than automobile travel  From 2000-2014, for instance, there were 6 53 and 0 33 fatalities per billion passenger-miles traveled in cars or light trucks and rail transit, respectively  Within rail travel, the fatality rates on both railroads and rail transit operators have remained similar in recent years  Further, the rate of accidents and incidents—including collisions and derailments—also do not appear to differ substantially between railroads and rail transit in recent years  Nevertheless, serious incidents continue to occur on railroads and rail transit, posing safety risks to passengers, railroad employees, and the public  For example, in June 2009, two WMATA trains collided, resulting in 52 injuries and 9 deaths  A smoke incident on WMATA’s Metrorail system in January 2015 also resulted in the death of 1 person and injured over 90  In a 10-month period from May 2013 to March 2014, the Metro- North commuter railroad, which serves New York and Connecticut, was involved in five accidents that resulted in the death of 6 people and 126 injured  In June 2016, two BNSF Railway freight trains collided near Panhandle, Texas, resulting in the death of three crew members  Incidents such as these have prompted investigations into both the causes and contributing factors of the specific accidents as well as broader rail safety oversight  FRA has a more centralized safety oversight program for railroads, while FTA is implementing changes to the rail transit oversight program, established in federal statute, which relies on states to monitor and enforce safety  Key characteristics of both programs include: (1) the establishment of safety regulations, (2) inspections and other oversight activities, such as audits and investigations, based on those regulations, and (3) enforcement mechanisms to ensure that safety deficiencies are addressed (see fig  3)  FRA has developed extensive railroad safety regulations over decades  FRA’s railroad safety regulations include requirements governing track design and inspection, grade crossings, signal and train control, mechanical equipment including locomotives, and railroad-operating practices including worker protection rules  For example, FRA’s regulations for track and equipment include detailed, prescriptive minimum requirements, such as formulas that determine the maximum allowable speeds on curved track  Many of FRA’s rail safety regulations establish minimum safety requirements, though railroads can apply for waivers  As FRA updates its safety regulations, it has proposed more performance-based regulations in recent years  Many of FRA’s current safety regulations specify the behavior or manner of compliance that railroads must adopt, such as inspecting each locomotive at least every 92 days  Performance-based regulations, however, specify a desired outcome rather than a behavior or manner of compliance  For example, FRA’s recent rulemaking to amend its passenger equipment safety regulations proposes performance-based crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements, rather than explicit targets or tolerances  According to FRA, establishing performance requirements in these areas would allow a more open rail market that incorporates recent technologies  FTA is currently assessing the need for rail transit safety regulations, having been provided the authority to issue safety regulations in 2012  Since MAP-21 was enacted, FTA has finalized regulations implementing the public transportation safety program authorized by statute  These include regulations that establish rules for FTA’s administration of a comprehensive safety program to improve rail transit safety as well as updated regulations governing state safety oversight of rail transit  In addition to its public transportation safety program regulations, FTA also has regulations governing its drug and alcohol testing program  MAP-21 also authorized FTA, for the first time, to issue rail transit safety regulations, which would establish minimum safety performance requirements for rail transit operators, as part of its requirement to develop a National Public Transportation Safety Plan  FTA initiated a regulatory development effort after the passage of MAP-21, which included a compilation and evaluation of existing transit safety standards, guidance, and best practices from the federal government, states, industry, and other sources  After the evaluation, FTA issued a report that concluded there was limited documentation or evidence of the effectiveness of these existing rail transit safety standards  The report included recommendations that are intended to enable FTA to undertake further data-driven, risk-based analysis of rail transit safety performance and the applicability and effectiveness of the identified safety standards  FTA is also currently analyzing specific focus areas to determine any areas that should be addressed by federal safety regulations  For example, FTA is studying the need for regulations related to rail transit vehicle crashworthiness  Since no federal rail transit safety regulations that establish minimum safety performance requirements for rail transit operators currently exist, rail transit operators are subject to different safety standards, depending largely on what voluntary standards they have chosen to adopt, according to American Public Transportation Association officials we spoke with  The American Public Transportation Association, for instance, has issued a variety of rail transit safety standards, addressing various aspects of the industry including operations, training, and inspections  In addition, states vary in the extent to which they have regulations for rail transit operators  For example, officials from the California Public Utilities Commission noted that it has issued a variety of safety regulations applicable to rail transit operators within the state of California to improve safety of rail operations  Both FRA and FTA have mechanisms to gather the input of stakeholders—including rail operators, labor unions, industry associations, and others—when considering development of safety regulations  In developing most of its safety regulations, FRA seeks input from stakeholders through its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee  In 1996, FRA established this committee to develop new regulations through a collaborative process, with the rail community working together to create mutually satisfactory solutions to safety issues  FTA is collaborating with stakeholders as it assesses the need for rail transit safety regulations  More specifically, FTA’s research partner, the Center for Urban Transportation Research, established a working group to collaborate with industry stakeholders to inform the safety regulations development process  FTA also solicited comments from industry stakeholders on its compilation of existing rail transit safety standards  More broadly, FTA also has a Transit Advisory Committee for Safety, which provides information, advice, and recommendations to FTA on safety matters  FRA fulfills its mission, in part, through safety compliance audits and inspections, and investigations  FRA ensures compliance with its safety regulations through inspections, using a staff of railroad safety experts, inspectors, and other professionals assigned to eight regional offices across the nation  For example, to determine a railroad’s compliance with FRA safety regulations, inspectors examine track, equipment, signal devices, employee actions, and procedures and review maintenance and accident records  Additionally, 31 states have rail safety programs that partner with FRA  Under this approach, FRA enters into agreements with states to allow state inspectors to participate in investigative and surveillance activities concerning federal railroad safety laws  State inspectors who participate in this program submit inspection reports to FRA  More broadly, FRA’s inspections are guided by a risk-based model  Under this approach, FRA focuses its inspections on locations that, according to the data-driven model, are likely to have safety problems  Like other operating administrations within DOT, FRA has relatively few resources for overseeing railroads, compared with the size of the general system  The risk-based model is designed to help FRA target the greatest safety risks  FRA has begun utilizing automated inspections as well  In particular, according to FRA, new imaging technologies have the potential to better inspect track for cracks in the rail that could lead to breakage as well as measure the track’s geometry to ensure that rails are positioned to meet standards  To further promote safety in railroad operations, FRA conducts accident investigations  Separate from investigations conducted by NTSB, FRA investigates select railroad accidents to determine root causation, and any contributing factors, so that railroad properties can implement corrective actions to prevent similar incidents in the future  Resources for railroad safety oversight activities have increased in recent years  FRA was appropriated about $218 million in fiscal year 2017, an increase over the approximately $187 million it received in fiscal year 2015, for safety and operations, which funds FRA’s personnel, including inspectors, and safety programs  According to FRA, Congress provided FRA with increased funding in recent years for the purpose of increasing staffing related to specific safety issues, such as trespasser prevention and passenger rail safety  As part of this effort, FRA has hired additional inspectors, going from 347 inspectors in fiscal year 2013 to over 360 currently, out of the nearly 930 total full-time equivalent staff  FRA officials told us, as we have reported in the past, that it can be difficult to recruit, train, and certify qualified inspectors in a timely manner, especially in certain areas of expertise  Further, according to FRA, its inspectors have the ability to inspect less than 1 percent of the general system annually  Though FTA now has more robust inspection authorities, states will continue to conduct front-line rail transit safety oversight activities  MAP- 21 provided FTA with new authorities to inspect, audit, and investigate practices at rail transit agencies, including safety practices, while also preserving the role of state safety agencies to monitor rail transit systems’ safety operations  According to FTA officials, any federal inspections of rail transit operators are intended to supplement a state safety agency’s oversight activities, except where FTA assumes temporary, direct oversight of a rail transit system from an inadequate state safety agency  FTA officials told us that establishing a nationwide safety inspection program at the federal level is inconsistent with the statutory framework of the state safety oversight program and with congressional intent, which contemplates preserving the primary role of state safety agencies in providing direct safety oversight of rail transit systems  The officials also noted that the state-based approach to rail transit safety oversight is valuable because states are generally closer to, and more familiar with, rail transit operators  To date, FTA has utilized its new inspection authorities only on WMATA’s rail system  As part of oversight activities, some state safety agencies have conducted inspections of the rail transit systems they oversee, though they were not required to do so, according to FTA officials we spoke with  To strengthen states’ abilities to conduct oversight activities, FTA has recommended that state safety agencies develop risk-based inspection programs  Further, to ensure the independence of state safety agencies, these agencies cannot receive funding from the rail transit entities they oversee  Resources for FTA’s rail transit safety oversight administrative expenses have remained relatively stable in recent years, though more are needed, according to FTA  Since fiscal year 2012, FTA’s appropriations for administrative expenses, which funds FTA personnel and support activities including the Office of Transit Safety and Oversight, has increased $14 million, to about $113 million in fiscal year 2017, according to FTA  However, for several years, FTA has averaged about 508 total full-time equivalent staff agency-wide, and a little over 30 safety staff in the Office of Transit Safety and Oversight  According to FTA, the Office of Transit Safety and Oversight has been under-resourced since it was established in response to new safety authority provided in MAP-21  For fiscal year 2018, FTA requested in their submission for the President’s Budget proposal funding to hire up to an additional 20 positions for various lines of safety work  FRA’s and FTA’s oversight activities also include regular audits of, and communication with, the rail operators under their oversight  Given finite resources and large rail networks, FRA and FTA audit rail operators’ own inspections rather than conducting comprehensive federal inspections  More specifically, FRA inspectors, and state safety agencies in FTA’s oversight program, regularly examine records of rail operators’ internal inspections to identify safety deficiencies  Officials from FRA, FTA, and five rail stakeholders we spoke with told us that FRA and FTA rail safety oversight programs also rely on collaboration and communication between rail operators and regulators to ensure safety  For example, regular meetings between FRA and railroad staff to discuss safety trends and industry developments are important to ensuring safety, according to officials we spoke with from FRA and the railroads  FRA specialists and inspectors participate, with representatives of railroad labor and management, in the implementation of voluntary safety programs  For example, FRA sponsors the Confidential Close Call Reporting System, a voluntary, confidential program allowing railroads and their employees to report accident and incident “close calls ” According to FRA officials, voluntary programs such as this increase industry awareness of railroad safety and engagement with it  FTA also collaborates with state safety agencies as rail transit safety issues arise, according to FTA officials, using federal oversight and enforcement authorities as a “back-stop” against the oversight of state safety agencies  Additionally, according to officials we spoke with from FTA and two rail transit operators, state safety agency staff meet with rail transit operators regularly, using knowledge of local operating conditions to help ensure safety  FRA uses a variety of tools, including civil penalties, to resolve safety issues  While some safety issues are resolved informally through discussion and collaboration between FRA and railroads, as noted above, some defects identified during inspections are classified as violations and subject to financial penalties  More specifically, when railroads do not resolve issues in a timely manner or identified defects are serious, FRA has the authority to cite violations and assess civil penalties, against either railroads or individuals  Further, as authorized by law, FRA negotiates settlements with railroads and other entities subject to its safety jurisdiction to resolve claims for civil penalties  In fiscal year 2016, FRA assessed over $11 8 million in civil penalties against railroads  According to FRA, fiscal year 2016 was the second year in a row that it took steps to increase penalty amounts paid by railroads, as part of a continued effort to increase consequences for violations that negatively affect safety  To ensure the safety of rail transit systems, states will continue to be the primary enforcers of safety requirements, according to FTA officials, though FTA now has more enforcement tools  MAP-21 preserved the role of state safety agencies as the primary enforcement body for rail transit  FTA has now required that state safety agencies have enforcement authorities sufficient to compel action from rail transit entities to address safety deficiencies  Though no specific authorities are required, FTA has suggested that a variety of mechanisms could be appropriate, such as the ability to remove deficient equipment from service or assess fines  According to FTA, this requirement is designed to overcome a long- standing vulnerability in state safety oversight, which allowed safety deficiencies to remain for long periods of time  MAP-21 and the FAST Act also provided FTA with more options for enforcement when rail transit operators are found to be out of compliance with safety requirements  In particular, FTA can withhold federal funding for rail transit operators or direct a rail transit operator to use federal funding for a specific purpose  Additionally, after FTA assumes temporary direct oversight of an inadequate state safety agency, FTA can withhold federal funds from the state until the state safety oversight program has been certified  To date, FTA has utilized this authority only with the states responsible for safety oversight of WMATA’s rail system  In February 2017, FTA announced that it would withhold 5 percent of fiscal year 2017 urbanized area formula funds from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia until a new state safety oversight program is certified for WMATA’s rail system  This action built upon FTA’s determination that WMATA’s state safety agency was ineffective at “providing adequate oversight consistent with prevention of substantial risk of death or personal injury ” FRA and FTA also have the authority to directly intervene in rail operations  In particular, both FRA and FTA can suspend the service of rail operators in response to certain safety concerns  Additionally, FTA can assume direct safety oversight of a rail transit operator if FTA determines the state safety oversight program is not adequate, among other things  In response to safety incidents on WMATA’s rail system, FTA assumed temporary and direct safety oversight of WMATA in October 2015, as previously noted  FRA and FTA’s approaches to their rail safety oversight missions each have strengths and limitations, including how the agencies develop safety regulations, conduct inspections, and carry out enforcement  Compared to FRA’s long-standing role in providing safety oversight over railroads, FTA is in the process of implementing significant changes to its program for rail transit safety oversight after being granted new authorities in MAP- 21 and the FAST Act  With respect to regulations, FRA’s extensive and well-established safety regulations are a strength  FTA has made some progress toward developing appropriate safety regulations, such as identifying subjects for potential regulatory action  With respect to inspections, FRA’s use of a risk-based approach to distributing inspection resources is a strength  FTA has sought to address previously identified deficiencies in state safety oversight by recommending that state safety agencies develop risk-based inspection programs  FTA, though, has not provided states guidance for these efforts  With respect to enforcement, FRA’s use of its enforcement authorities is a strength  FTA is also implementing new statutory requirements that state safety agencies have enforcement authorities but does not have a process or methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of these enforcement practices  Extensive and well-established safety regulations are a strength of FRA’s safety oversight program based on studies we reviewed and discussions with rail operators and stakeholder organizations  According to NTSB, FRA’s railroad safety regulations are an important and effective part of its oversight program  Our previous work reported that according to stakeholders, the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee provides a collaborative environment where stakeholders in the rail community work with FRA to identify issues and proposals for safety standards and regulations that improved the quality of railroads’ safety initiatives and fostered a greater level of compliance with safety regulations  This is consistent with views of stakeholders we spoke with, who characterized FRA’s safety regulations as a strength  An industry association told us that FRA’s regulations promote safety by helping to ensure that no operator falls below a minimum threshold for safe operations, while a rail operator told us that federal regulations help to standardize the operating environment and prevent a patchwork of various state regulations  Four stakeholders also characterized the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, which plays a large role in crafting FRA’s railroad safety regulations, as effective and inclusive  However, based on studies we reviewed and discussions with rail operators’ and stakeholders’ organizations, FRA faces limitations in its efforts to regulate safety across railroad systems that differ from one another and sometimes change more quickly than the federal regulatory process  Five railroad operators and an industry association told us that some of FRA’s safety regulations do not account for differences in railroads or innovation in safety practices, with three railroad operators stating that this approach requires the extensive use of waivers for particular regulations  Further, two railroad operators and a rail transit operator we spoke with stated that additional federal regulations are needed to provide minimum baseline requirements in specific areas of railroad safety such as medical fitness for duty  In 2014, NTSB also found that FRA needs to do more to regulate particular safety issues including medical fitness for duty and signal protection  FRA officials acknowledged that time and resources are two of the primary challenges that the agency faces when developing safety regulations but also noted additional ways in which the agency can require railroads to adopt safety practices  FRA officials described the process of creating or significantly amending a regulation as involving years of work, even before the agency commences with the process of drafting a rule  The officials also noted that the agency has additional tools to compel railroads to adopt safety practices  For example, FRA officials discussed the use of compliance agreements, in which railroads can have fines reduced in exchange for adopting safety measures that go beyond what FRA regulations require  FRA officials are considering the use of performance-based regulations as they update their safety regulations  As noted above, FRA’s proposed regulations regarding passenger equipment safety incorporates performance -based safety requirements, rather than explicit safety targets or tolerances  FRA has promulgated performance-based regulations about the implementation of positive train control, a communications-based system designed to prevent certain types of train accidents, as well as system safety programs that set general safety parameters and thresholds by which successful performance is governed  FRA’s consideration of performance-based regulations is in line with federal guidance  OMB’s Circular A-4 states that performance standards “are generally superior to engineering or design standards because performance standards give the regulated parties the flexibility to achieve regulatory objectives in the most cost-effective way ” Additionally, under Executive Order 12866, agencies should (to the extent permitted by law and where applicable) identify and assess alternative forms of regulation and specify performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities must adopt  However, as the language of OMB’s Circular A-4 and Executive Order 12866 suggest that performance-based regulations are not always feasible, studies of performance-based regulations find that as with any other form of regulation, performance-based standards have trade-offs  FRA officials told us that under certain circumstances, performance- based regulations are appropriate for issues regarding design, maintenance, operation, and technology-driven safety requirements  FRA officials we spoke with did not think performance-based standards are appropriate for areas that require standardization  One example is track safety standards, where the need for different operators to use the same equipment precludes a performance-based approach that allows railroads to meet requirements through different means  FRA officials added that a key aspect of the success of performance-based regulations concerns how railroads demonstrate compliance  This concern is consistent with other studies of performance-based regulations, which find that these regulations are most appropriate when regulators have capacity to measure and monitor performance  Though FTA has made progress assessing the state of rail transit safety standards, a limitation of FTA’s rail transit safety oversight program is the lack of federal rail transit safety regulations, which may contribute to inconsistent safety practices across the rail transit industry, according to studies we reviewed and discussions with rail operators and stakeholder organizations  NTSB reported that the structure of FTA’s oversight process leads to inconsistent practices, inadequate standards, and marginal effectiveness  In addition, a 2016 DOT OIG report found that because FTA’s safety standards are voluntary, they are unenforceable  In 2012, FTA gained the authority to issue safety regulations, though it has not done so yet, and NTSB and other stakeholders we spoke with indicated that the lack of such federal safety regulations is a weakness in federal rail transit safety oversight  Despite differences across rail transit systems, there is value in establishing federal rail transit safety regulations, according to stakeholders from all categories of those we interviewed, including a state safety agency, three rail transit operators, a railroad operator, and two industry associations  Some stakeholders identified specific areas that would benefit from federal rail transit regulations  For example, two rail transit agencies called for federal regulations to address operator fatigue  Some of these officials stated that federal rail transit safety regulations could help ensure safety by establishing clear and consistent minimum standards  Officials from a rail transit entity and an industry association stated that voluntary standards are not enough to ensure that transit entities will adopt appropriate safety measures  According to our analysis, a past study, and stakeholders we spoke with, FTA’s ability to develop and implement performance-based regulations is limited by its lack of capacity to collect and analyze rail safety performance data  In 2017, DOT OIG found that data limitations of FTA’s National Transit Database results in limited safety performance criteria in FTA’s National Public Transportation Safety Plan  Further, two rail transit entities as well as a state safety agency we spoke with stated that they face challenges in analyzing data due to either the size of their systems or their capacity  FTA officials told us that they need more data to inform their decisions regarding whether to establish rail transit safety regulations, and also added that a limitation to their ongoing assessment of potential areas for rail transit safety regulation is the concern about public disclosure of safety data provided to FTA and its potential use in private litigation  According to FTA officials, they need more information to do a comprehensive evaluation of efficacy of current safety standards and practices  As required by the FAST Act, FTA has entered into an agreement with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, to conduct a study to evaluate whether it is in the public interest to withhold from federal or state court proceedings any information collected by DOT through its public transportation safety program oversight activities  The National Academies of Sciences is expected to complete this study in 2018  FTA is taking positive steps toward developing safety regulations that may address inconsistent safety practices across rail transit operators  FTA officials stated that the agency is considering issuing rail transit safety regulations and also employs additional tools to compel rail transit entities to adopt safety measures  As noted above, FTA is currently studying whether federal regulations are appropriate for specific areas of rail transit safety  Executive Order 12866 and OMB’s Circular A-4 direct federal agencies to consider performance-based regulations when developing regulations  Further, as the Transportation Research Board recently reported, any decision to use performance-based regulations “must take into account the regulator’s own ability to enforce and motivate compliance (through methods such as auditing and field inspections) as well as the capacity of regulated entities to meet their obligations ” FTA officials noted that they are actively engaged with members of the Transportation Research Board in reviewing and discussing these recent findings related to safety regulations for high-hazards industries  In January 2017, FTA issued its National Public Transportation Safety Plan, which FTA officials noted is one component of their transit safety standard development program  According to FTA officials, the plan identifies a list of issue areas that the agency is currently studying to determine whether national regulations are needed  FTA officials also stated that the plan includes “voluntary standards,” which are intended to put the industry “on notice” that federal safety regulations may be proposed in those areas  FTA officials stated that they view the National Public Transportation Safety Plan as iterative and more easily updated compared with official regulations  Additional tools that FTA officials stated the agency employs in its approach to safety oversight include general directives as well as the requirements associated with FTA grants  Based on our assessment and studies we reviewed, a strength of FRA’s safety oversight program is its risk-based approach to distributing inspection resources, which may serve as an example for FTA and state safety agencies  According to NTSB, FRA’s qualified inspectors are a strength of its oversight program  To help target these inspectors to the areas of highest risk, FRA developed the National Inspection Plan, which includes a quantitative model for allocating inspection resources in a way that tries to minimize railroad accidents  This model utilizes data including: (1) accident and incident data that railroads are required to report, (2) data from FRA inspection activity, and (3) information on railroad activities such as train miles and other data  Based on our assessment of FRA’s model, we believe that it can be an appropriate and useful tool for directing its inspection resources based on risk because it relies on statistical methods commonly used to predict the risk of a violation for regulated entities  While we did not review FRA’s entire modeling process, nor did we validate the results it generates, we do believe that FRA’s approach to using these statistical models as a key part of its inspection program is appropriate  However, a potential limitation of FRA’s inspection program is the flexibility granted to individual inspectors and whether the manner and extent to which inspectors implement this discretion may be inconsistent with the risk-based National Inspection Plan  FRA’s National Inspection Plan provides guidance for inspectors about how much time they should spend inspecting individual railroads  According to FRA officials, FRA inspectors have considerable flexibility to deviate from the National Inspection Plan based on their judgment regarding where to more effectively use their resources  FRA officials stated that situations arise that call for deviations in planned inspections  For example, a particular railroad may experience a serious accident and therefore require more oversight from FRA  According to FRA officials, regional offices make these decisions based on their understanding of emerging issues  Inspectors are expected to know their region and decide which locations to go to, and are in part evaluated based on these decisions  When a region’s record of total inspection time spent on a particular railroad differs from the National Inspection Plan by more than 5 percent, the region’s leadership submits an explanation to FRA’s Office of Railroad Safety  This practice, if not monitored, could allow inspectors to deviate from the data-driven model results in ways that undermine the goal of the National Inspection Plan to deploy FRA’s limited resources efficiently and based on risk  However, FRA officials told us that flexibility for individual inspectors is important, and that FRA is continuously monitoring the model’s performance and making changes as appropriate  Further, OECD’s Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy note that it is important to ensure “that sufficient flexibility is left to enforcement and inspection officials to adapt their response in proportion to the facts on the ground ” A strength of FTA’s approach to rail transit safety oversight is that it is working to overcome weaknesses in state oversight of rail transit identified in our prior work and stakeholders we spoke with  For example, FTA has noted that in the past some state safety agencies lacked sufficient oversight authorities  To now be certified by FTA, state safety agencies must demonstrate that they have authority to review, approve and oversee the implementation of rail transit operator’s safety plans  Additionally, we have found, and FTA has also noted, that some state safety agencies would benefit from more training and additional staff  To now be certified by FTA, state safety agencies must be capable of directly hiring and developing staff and contract support, as well as have a training plan for certain staff  Though FTA is seeking to implement stronger safety oversight activities, a limitation of its program is that state safety agencies have not received the guidance and support necessary to develop effective inspection programs  FTA does not currently plan to conduct widespread inspections itself and recommends that state safety agencies develop risk-based inspection programs  According to FTA, states have discretion to establish their inspection programs in accordance with their program standards, and are not required to actually conduct inspections as the method of verifying rail transit operators’ compliance with safety rules  However, direct observation, audits, and performance indicator tracking are useful methods for an oversight agency in assessing a regulated entity’s safety culture  Officials we spoke with from selected state safety agencies say that they have received little guidance from FTA on what their risk-based inspection programs should look like  In the materials FTA provided to states, it said that it intends to provide guidance to states on risk-based inspections but did not provide us with a plan or timeline for doing so  Without guidance from FTA, state safety agencies may not develop effective risk-based inspection programs and thus not use their resources efficiently  Effective risk-based inspection programs are particularly important given state safety agencies’ limited resources  We have reported in the past that some state safety agencies lack sufficient resources, including training and staff  Officials from two rail transit operators and all four industry associations we spoke with stated that state safety agencies continue to have limited resources and capacity  Several state safety agencies we spoke with rely on contractors or employees with other responsibilities besides oversight of rail transit to meet their increased oversight responsibilities and achieve certification from FTA  Federal standards for internal control as well as leading practices for regulatory inspections state that agency objectives, including those related to inspections and enforcement, should be clearly communicated  Specifically, federal standards for internal control require that management communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the agency’s objectives  Additionally, the OECD’s Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy recommends that governments ensure clarity of rules and processes for enforcement and inspections and clearly articulate rights and obligations of officials  According to OECD, the frequency of inspections and the resources employed should be proportional to the level of risk  A strength of FRA’s safety oversight program is that the agency has and utilizes clear enforcement authority, according to NTSB and stakeholders we spoke with  As previously discussed, FRA has several enforcement tools available when inspectors find that railroads are noncompliant with applicable regulations, including civil penalties, individual liability, compliance orders, and emergency orders  According to NTSB, this array of specific enforcement tools helps ensure safety deficiencies are addressed by railroads  FRA officials also told us that the process of adjudicating civil penalties provides a forum for FRA and railroad officials to meet to discuss safety issues  Four rail operators also told us that FRA’s authority to issue civil penalties is necessary to ensure railroads’ compliance with regulations  However, a potential limitation of FRA’s approach to enforcement is that it is difficult to quantify the effectiveness of FRA’s civil penalties  FRA has reported that it cannot determine whether observable safety improvements are directly attributable to discrete civil penalties or whether the amount of civil penalties has any effect on safety  We have reported in the past about the challenges of determining the effect of penalties on compliance in tax policy, though we also noted that, despite these challenges, some analyses likely would be useful for better understanding the effect of penalties on compliance  FRA also reported, though, that according to the judgments of its inspectors, issuing civil penalties yields observable improvements in safety practices and compliance with the law  Further, according to FRA, though it does not quantify the impact of civil penalties, FRA monitors railroad responses to its enforcement activity and adjusts its oversight as necessary  More broadly, civil penalties are not meant, by themselves, to ensure railroad safety  Instead, FRA reported that it uses its entire regulatory regime as a whole to try and ensure safety  FRA officials also noted that the agency has additional tools, apart from civil penalties, to compel railroads to adopt safety practices  A strength of FTA’s rail transit safety oversight is that it seeks to improve historically weak state safety agency enforcement authorities, as described in our previous report as well stakeholders we spoke with  FTA requires state safety agencies to adopt enforcement authorities that are sufficient to enable states to compel action from rail transit agencies to address identified deficiencies  FTA has also communicated to states that it is focusing its evaluation of each state’s enforcement authorities in two major areas: ensuring that the state can carry out its primary responsibility for rail transit safety in response to (1) an imminent threat to public safety on the rail transit system and (2) a lack of action or non- compliance from the rail transit operator in carrying out certain safety plans  FTA has provided states with examples of the enforcement authorities and policies state safety agencies could establish to address these specific concerns  Authorities to address imminent safety threats may include the authority to suspend rail transit agencies’ operations, inspect and remove deficient equipment or system infrastructure from service, or issue an order requiring the rail transit agency to correct an unsafe condition prior to placing equipment or infrastructure back into passenger service  FTA has also provided state safety agencies with examples of authorities to address a lack of action or cooperation by the rail transit operator, including the authority to withhold or redirect funds, levy civil or criminal fines or penalties, and a formal citation or ticketing program  Though federal law requires that state safety agencies have enforcement authorities over the safety of the rail transit entities they oversee, a limitation of FTA’s approach is that FTA has not developed a method to evaluate the effectiveness of states’ enforcement practices  Certified state safety agencies will be evaluated for continued compliance with FTA regulations every 3 years  This triennial review process (for rail transit safety) seeks to ensure that states are effectively carrying out their responsibilities  While FTA officials told us that they will evaluate state safety agencies’ enforcement during the triennial reviews, FTA has not developed a process or methodology to evaluate whether state enforcement authorities and practices as a whole are effective  Without a method for determining the effectiveness of state safety agencies’ enforcement, FTA may not have the information needed to identify ineffective safety enforcement  As a result, deficiencies may remain for long periods of time, potentially contributing to safety incidents  Federal standards for internal control maintain that agency managers should perform a range of practices that would facilitate the establishment of a system to monitor the effectiveness of agency activities, which in the context of FTA’s mission includes the effectiveness of its rail transit safety oversight  Agency managers should define objectives clearly to enable the identification of risks, establish activities to monitor performance measures and indicators, and externally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives  Internal control standards further stipulate that agency managers should perform monitoring activities regarding their internal control system and evaluate the results  To do so, federal standards for internal control state that agency managers should monitor ongoing operations and effectiveness, evaluate the results of this monitoring, and identify any changes that need to be made to achieve improvement in agency operations  The effectiveness of state safety agency enforcement is especially important because questions have been raised about the efficacy of FTA’s own enforcement mechanisms, including its ability to withhold funds from and assume direct control over safety oversight for a rail transit entity  Rail transit operators and industry association representatives we spoke with stated that FTA’s authority to withhold funding from states is overly punitive, and two stakeholders said the FTA needs more precise tools  Officials from an industry association added that withholding funds can be counterproductive, as most state safety agencies are already underfunded and understaffed  FTA officials pointed to examples in which the agency successfully supported state safety agencies in compelling action from rail transit agencies as evidence that the state safety oversight model, in which FTA backs up state safety agencies, is effective  Additionally, officials from numerous state safety agencies and others questioned whether FTA has the capacity to effectively assume direct safety oversight of rail transit operators  FTA has not assumed direct safety oversight of any rail transit operators outside of WMATA, and FTA officials noted that they intend to continue supporting state safety agencies in their oversight wherever possible  The approaches to rail safety oversight utilized by FRA and FTA each have strengths and limitations  However, FTA’s program is currently in transition as the agency implements new authorities and responsibilities provided in federal law  Though FTA has made progress by evaluating existing rail transit safety standards and providing some guidance to states as part of the certification process, limitations in FTA’s approach may still hinder the success of the state-based rail transit safety oversight program  Given the looming 2019 deadline for state safety oversight programs to achieve FTA certification, FTA can improve its efforts to implement its new rail transit safety oversight program  In particular, without guidance from FTA on how to develop and carry out risk-based inspection programs, state safety agencies may not use limited resources efficiently, risking that important safety issues will go undetected  Further, without a method for how it will monitor the effectiveness of states safety agencies’ enforcement, FTA will lack the information needed to identify ineffective state enforcement, which risks allowing safety deficiencies to remain for long periods of time  By providing this additional guidance and direction to the state safety agencies, FTA would help ensure that states are able to effectively identify and resolve rail transit safety issues  We are making the following two recommendations to FTA: The Office of Transit Safety and Oversight should create a plan, with a timeline, for developing guidance for state safety agencies about how to develop and implement a risk-based inspection program  (Recommendation 1) The Office of Transit Safety and Oversight should develop and communicate a method for how it will monitor the effectiveness of the enforcement authorities and practices of state safety agencies  (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft copy of this report to DOT, NTSB, and WMATA for review and comment  In written comments, reproduced in appendix I, DOT agreed with both our recommendations  DOT also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  In e-mails, NTSB and WMATA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  NTSB noted that we do not discuss the role of system safety initiatives, such as safety management systems, in the FRA and FTA rail safety oversight programs  We agree with NTSB that system safety concepts are increasingly influencing the FRA and FTA approaches to rail safety oversight but, as NTSB also noted, both FRA and FTA lack finalized regulations codifying their approaches to system safety initiatives  Because the extent of rail entities’ implementation of these initiatives varies and is not complete we did not include an assessment of the strengths and limitations of those initiatives in our scope  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Transportation, Chairman of NTSB, General Manager of WMATA, and the appropriate congressional committees  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  Individuals who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II  In addition to the contact named above, Steve Cohen (Assistant Director); Kyle Browning (Analyst in Charge); Melissa Bodeau; Lacey Coppage; Serena Lo; Sean Miskell; and Josh Ormond made key contributions to this report 


Report 2:  Instead, the motion to suspend the rules discharges the committee and moves the legislation directly to the House floor  In the 114 th Congress, 517 (70%) suspension measures were ordered to be reported by a House committee  Of this number, 398 were reported with an accompanying House committee report  Twenty measures that did not have a House report did have a Senate report, while 325 measures had no written report from either chamber (43% of the total number of suspension measures)  Pursuant to Rule XV, motions to suspend the rules are regularly in order on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays or on the last six days of a session of Congress  However, suspension motions may be considered on other days by unanimous consent or under the terms of a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and agreed to by the House  As displayed in Figure 6 , in the 114 th Congress, the plurality of suspension measures were considered on Tuesdays (312, 42% of the total number considered), followed by Mondays (291, 39%) and Wednesdays (114, 15%)  In addition, 25 suspension measures were considered on Thursdays and one on a Friday  Of these, one was considered by unanimous consent, while 25 were called up under suspension pursuant to permission included in a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and agreed to by the full House  Such special rules included a provision stating, "It shall be in order at any time on the legislative day of ___ for the Speaker to entertain motions that the House suspend the rules as though under clause 1 of rule XV " Pursuant to Rule XV, suspension measures are "debatable for 40 minutes, one-half in favor of the motion and one-half in opposition thereto " In practice, there is rarely a true opponent to a motion to suspend the rules, and the time is divided between two floor managers, usually one from each party, who both favor the motion  The floor managers each control 20 minutes of debate  The managers may be their parties' sole representative for or against the motion, or they may yield increments of the 20-minute allotment to other Members  Typically, the relevant committee chairs and ranking members select the majority and minority floor managers for particular bills and resolutions  These managers may be the measure's sponsor, the chair or ranking member of the measure's committee of primary jurisdiction, or another committee member  In the 114 th Congress, the measure's sponsor served as the majority manager on 26% of the suspension measures receiving floor action  The committee chair managed 29% of the measures  The minority manager was the measure's sponsor for 11% of the measures and the committee's ranking member for 26% of the measures considered  Occasionally, floor managers controlling time on a motion to suspend the rules ceded their control to other Members during debate  In two identified cases, both the majority and minority floor managers favored the measure, and another Member claimed the time in true opposition during the initial floor consideration of the measure  In at least one other instance, the minority manager asked unanimous consent to yield managerial control to another Member  A majority floor manager makes the motion to suspend the rules by stating, "Mr  [Madam] Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill [or resolution] ____ " The Speaker [or Speaker pro tempore] responds, "Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman[woman] from [state] and the gentleman[woman] from [state] each will control twenty minutes " The majority and minority managers then, in turn, make opening statements regarding the measure using the 20 minutes each controls  If the majority and minority managers have secured additional speakers, the speakers generally alternate between the parties within the 40-minute limit  During the 114 th Congress, on a motion to suspend the rules, the average number of speakers in addition to the floor managers was fewer than two  On 83% of the measures (620) considered, there were one or two additional speakers  On 27% of the measures (199) considered, there were no additional speakers, and in 16% of the measures (120) considered, there were 3 to 12 additional speakers  Three measures had 20, 21, and 25 additional speakers, respectively  At the start of the debate period, the majority manager may request "unanimous consent that all Members may have five legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and add extraneous materials on this bill [resolution] " This request enables general leave statements to be inserted into the Congressional Record   In 29% of the suspension measures considered in the 114 th Congress, a written general leave statement appeared in the Record following in-person remarks, indicating that the remarks were submitted on the day the legislation was considered  General leave statements submitted on a day other than the day of consideration appear in the Extension of Remarks section of the Congressional Record   Suspension measures are limited to a maximum of 40 minutes of debate under Rule XV  However, if there are time gaps between speakers or procedural interruptions, such as a vote on a motion to adjourn, the time period between the start of the first speaker's remarks and the conclusion of debate may exceed 40 minutes  The statistics displayed in Figure 7 show the length of consideration of suspension measures as documented in Congress gov, not the accumulated length of statements, as kept by official timekeepers in the chamber  In the 114 th Congress, the average length of consideration on a motion to suspend the rules was 13 minutes and 10 seconds, and half of the measures considered had a debate period of 10 minutes or less  Thus, while overall debate is limited to 40 minutes under the rule, on most suspension measures, only a fraction of that time was actually expended during consideration  Seventeen measures, however, had consideration periods that exceeded 40 minutes due to procedural delays or, in the case of one measure, a request for unanimous consent to extend debate by 10 minutes to each side  House leaders generally choose measures for suspension that are likely to achieve the two-thirds majority threshold for passage  Thus, almost all suspension measures were passed by the House in the 114 th Congress  The full House approved all House resolutions (28), concurrent resolutions (12), joint resolutions (2), and Senate bills (82) that were considered under suspension  The House also passed, via motions to suspend the rules, 612 of the 619 House bills that were initially considered under suspension  Seven bills did not receive the requisite supermajority  Two of these bills were later considered and approved under the terms of a special rule  The remaining five bills did not return to the floor and therefore did not pass the House  Most suspension motions are agreed to in the House by voice vote, which is the chamber's default method of voting on most questions  In 2015 and 2016, this method of voting led to the final approval of 72% (531) of the motions to suspend the rules and pass the measures (see Figure 8 )  After the initial voice vote, Members triggered an eventual record vote (often called a roll call vote) on 212 (28%) of the suspension measures considered in the 114 th Congress  This was done by demanding the "yeas and nays," objecting to the vote "on the grounds that a quorum is not present," or, in one case, demanding a recorded vote  In most instances, the chair elected to postpone the vote to a later period, within two additional legislative days, pursuant to clause 8 of House Rule XX  Of the 212 record votes, 3 immediately followed debate on the measure  The remaining 209 votes were postponed to another time on the legislative schedule, usually later the same day  In the 114 th Congress, 205 suspension motions were adopted by record vote, and 7 motions to suspend the rules were defeated by record votes  The defeat of a motion to suspend the rules, however, does not necessarily kill the legislation  The Speaker may choose to recognize a Member at a later time to make another motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, or the House may consider the measure pursuant to a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules  Accordingly, two of the initially unsuccessful measures were later called up and passed under the terms of a special rule  Five measures were not considered again, via any House floor procedure, before the end of the 114 th Congress  Although suspension measures generally receive broad support, measures that receive the requisite two-thirds majority in the House are not guaranteed passage in the Senate  As noted in Table 1 , in the 114 th Congress, the Senate passed 197 of the 619 House bills initially considered under suspension (32%)  Additionally, the Senate agreed to 1 of the 2 House joint resolutions and 5 of the 11 House concurrent resolutions considered under suspension of the rules  Of the number of suspension measures that passed the House and Senate, 60 required a resolution of differences between the chambers  Forty-four House measures and 15 Senate bills were subject to an amendment exchange process, and on one occasion, a conference committee was used to resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of a House bill  The Senate passed three House bills, initially approved in the House under suspension, that did not become public law because the House did not agree to the final bill text, as amended by the Senate  In those instances, the House did not reconsider the bills once the Senate returned the Senate-amended versions to the House chamber  Thus, 194 House bills were presented to the President for signature  Of the measures initially considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress, President Obama was presented with 194 House bills, 82 Senate bills, and 1 House joint resolution for signature or veto  The President vetoed H R  1777 (Presidential Allowance Modernization Act of 2016) and S  2040 (Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act)  The House chose not to attempt a veto override on H R  1777 , so the measure did not become public law  Both the Senate and House voted to override the veto of S  2040 , enabling it to become law without the President's signature ( P L  114-222 )  Thus, of the 703 law-making measures (bills and joint resolutions) initially considered under suspension of the rules, 193 House bills, 82 Senate bills, and 1 House joint resolution became public law (see Table 1 ) 

ground_truth: In 2012 and 2015, DOT was provided with additional authority to oversee the safety of rail transit. Within DOT, FTA is now implementing this authority. The DOT's Office of Inspector General has reported, though, that FTA faces challenges in carrying out its enhanced safety oversight. FRA, also in DOT, has long carried out safety oversight of freight, intercity passenger, and commuter railroads. GAO was asked to review various rail safety and oversight issues, including the differences between FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs. This report examines (1) key characteristics of FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs and (2) strengths and limitations of FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs. GAO assessed FRA's and FTA's information about rail safety oversight activities against guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, leading practices developed by the transit industry, and federal standards for internal control. GAO also interviewed stakeholders, including rail operators chosen based on mode, size, and location. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) carry out different approaches to rail safety oversight. FRA has a more centralized safety oversight program for railroads, while FTA's program for oversight of rail transit safety largely relies on state safety agencies to monitor and enforce rail transit safety, as established in federal statute. Key characteristics of both programs include: (1) safety regulations, (2) inspections and other oversight activities, and (3) enforcement mechanisms to ensure that safety deficiencies are addressed (see figure). There are strengths and limitations to FRA's and FTA's approaches to their safety oversight missions, including how the two agencies develop safety regulations, conduct inspections, and carry out enforcement. The National Transportation Safety Board has reported, and stakeholders GAO spoke with generally agreed, that strengths of FRA's rail safety oversight program include its safety regulations, its risk-based inspection program, and its enforcement authorities. FRA also has potential limitations in its oversight framework, though, such as difficulty evaluating the effectiveness of its enforcement mechanisms. FTA has made some progress implementing changes to the rail transit safety program. However, FTA has not provided all the necessary guidance and support to states' safety agencies to ensure they develop appropriate and effective rail transit safety inspection programs. In particular, FTA has not provided states with guidance on how to develop and implement risk-based inspection programs. Though FTA has said that it will develop such guidance, it does not have a plan or timeline to do so. Without guidance from FTA on how to develop and carry out risk-based inspections, state safety agencies may not allocate their limited resources efficiently, and important safety issues may go undetected. In addition, FTA has not developed a process or methodology to evaluate whether state safety agency enforcement authorities and practices are effective. Without clear evidence that state safety agencies' enforcement is effective, states and FTA may not be able to compel rail transit operators to remedy safety deficiencies. As a result, deficiencies may remain for long periods, potentially contributing to safety incidents. GAO recommends that FTA (1) create a plan, with timeline, for developing risk-based inspection guidance for state safety agencies, and (2) develop and communicate a method for how FTA will monitor whether state safety agencies' enforcement practices are effective. DOT agreed with our recommendations. DOT, NTSB, and WMATA provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.



Report 2: This report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on war-related and other international emergency or contingency-designated funding since FY2001  Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority designated for emergencies or OCO/GWOT in support of the broad U S  government response to the 9/11 attacks and for other related international affairs activities  This figure includes $1 8 trillion for the Department of Defense (DOD), $154 billion for the Department of State and U S  Agency for International Development (USAID), and $3 billion for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Coast Guard (see Figure 1 )  This CRS report is meant to serve as a reference on certain funding designated as emergency requirement s or for Overseas Contingency Ope rations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT), as well as related budgetary and policy issues  It does not provide an estimate of war costs within the OCO/GWOT account (all of which may not be for activities associated with war or defense) or such costs in the DOD base budget or other agency funding (which may be related to war activities, such as the cost of health care for combat veterans)  For additional information on the FY2019 budget and related issues, see CRS Report R45202, The Federal Budget: Overview and Issues for FY2019 and Beyond , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS In Focus IF10942, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: An Overview of H R  5515 , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R45168, Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]  For additional information on the Budget Control Act as amended, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions , by [author name scrubbed]  For additional information on U S  policy in Afghanistan and the Middle East, see CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U S  Policy , by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report R45096, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U S  Response , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]  Congress may consider one or more supplemental appropriations bills (colloquially called supplementals) for a fiscal year to provide funding for unforeseen needs (such as a response to a national security threat or a natural disaster), or to increase appropriations for other activities that have already been funded  Supplemental appropriations measures generally provide additional funding for selected activities over and above the amount provided through annual or continuing appropriations  Throughout the 20 th century, Congress relied on supplemental appropriations to fund war-related activities, particularly in the period immediately following the start of hostilities  For example, in 1951, a year after the start of the Korean War, Congress approved DOD supplemental appropriations totaling $32 8 billion ($268 billion in constant FY2019 dollars)  In 1952, DOD supplemental appropriations totaled just $1 4 billion ($11 billion in constant FY2019), as the base budget incorporated costs related to the war effort  A similar pattern occurred, to varying degrees, during the Vietnam War and 1990-1991 Gulf War  During the post-9/11 conflicts, primarily conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq but also in other countries, Congress has, for an extended period and to a much greater degree than in previous conflicts in the 20 th century, appropriated supplemental and specially designated funding over and above the base DOD budget—that is, funding for planned or regularly occurring costs to man, train, and equip the military force  Since FY2001, DOD funding designated for OCO/GWOT has averaged 17% of the department's total budget authority (see Figure 2 )  By comparison, during the conflict in Vietnam—the only other to last more than a decade—DOD funding designated for non-base activities averaged 6% of the department's total budget authority  Supplemental appropriations can provide flexibility for policymakers to address demands that arise after funding has been appropriated  However, that flexibility has caused some to question whether supplementals should only be used to respond to unforeseen events, or whether they should also provide funding for activities that could reasonably be covered in regular appropriations acts  Congress used supplemental appropriations to provide funds for defense and foreign affairs activities related to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq following 9/11, and each subsequent fiscal year through FY2010  Initially understood as reflecting needs that were not anticipated during the regular appropriations cycle, supplemental appropriations were generally enacted as requested, and almost always designated as emergency requirements  Beginning in FY2004, DOD received some of its war-related funding in its regular annual appropriations; these funds were designated as emergency  When funding needs for war and non-war-related activities were higher than anticipated, the Bush Administration submitted supplemental requests  In the FY2011 appropriations cycle, the Obama Administration moved away from submitting supplemental appropriations requests to Congress for war-related activities and used the regular budget and appropriation process to fund operations  This approach implied that while the funds might be war-related, they largely supported predictable ongoing activities rather than unanticipated needs  In concert with this change in budgetary approach, the Obama Administration began formally using the term Overseas Contingency Op erations in place of the Bush Administration's term Global War on Terror   Both the Obama and Trump Administrations requested that OCO funding be designated in a manner that would effectively exempt such funding from the BCA limits on discretionary defense spending  Currently, there is no overall procedural or statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO/GWOT-designated spending that may be appropriated on an annual basis  Both Congress and the President have roles in determining how much emergency or OCO/GWOT spending is provided to federal agencies each fiscal year  Such spending must be designated as such within the President's budget request for congressional consideration  The President must separately designate the spending after Congress enacts appropriations for it to be available for expenditure  The emergency funding designation predated the OCO/GWOT designation  Through definitions statutorily established by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P L  99-177 ), spending designated as emergency requirements is for "unanticipated" purposes, such as those that are "sudden     urgent     unforeseen     and temporary " The BBEDCA does not further specify the types of activities that are eligible for that designation  Thus, any discretionary funding designated by Congress and the President as being for an emergency is effectively exempted from certain statutory and procedural budget enforcement mechanisms, such as the BCA limits on discretionary spending  Debate of what should constitute OCO/GWOT or emergency activities and expenses has shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of U S  military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere  Over the years, both Congress and the President have at times adopted more, and at times less, expansive definitions of such designations to accommodate the strategic, budgetary, and political needs of the moment  Prior to February 2009, U S  operations in response to the 9/11 attacks were collectively referred to as the Global War on Terror , or GWOT  Between September 2001 and February 2009, there was no separate budgetary designation for GWOT funds—instead, funding associated with those operations was designated as an emergency requirement  The term OCO was not applied to the post-9/11 military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan until 2009  In February 2009, the Obama Administration released A New Era of Responsibili ty: Renewing America's Promise , a presidential fiscal policy document  That document did not mention or reference GWOT; instead, it used the term OCO in reference to ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan  The first request for emergency funding for OCO—not GWOT—was delivered to Congress in April 2009  Since the FY2010 budget cycle, DOD has requested both base budget and OCO funding as part of its annual budget submission to Congress  Beginning with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (NDAA; P L  111-84 ), the annual defense authorization bills have referenced the authorization of additional appropriations for OCO rather than the names of U S  military operations conducted primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq  In 2011, the BCA ( P L  112-125 ) amended the BBEDCA to create the Overseas Contingency Ope rations/Global War on Terrorism designation, which provided Congress and the President with an alternate way to exempt funding from the BCA caps without using the emergency designation  Beginning with the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P L  112-74 ), annual appropriations bills have referenced the OCO/GWOT designation  The foreign affairs agencies began formally requesting OCO/GWOT funding in FY2012, distinguishing between what is referred to as enduring, ongoing or base costs versus any extraordinary, temporary costs of the State Department and USAID in supporting ongoing U S  operations and policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan  Congress, having used OCO/GWOT exemption for DOD, adopted this approach for foreign affairs, though its uses for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) activities have never been permanently defined in statute  For the first foreign affairs OCO/GWOT appropriation, in FY2012, funds were provided for a wide range of recipient countries beyond the countries in the President's request, including Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, and the Philippines  In addition to country-specific uses, OCO/GWOT-designated funds were also appropriated for the Global Security Contingency Fund  All budgetary legislation is subject to a set of enforcement procedures associated with the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 ( P L  93-344 ), as well as other rules, such as those imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P L  112-125 ) as amended  Those rules provide mechanisms to enforce both procedural and statutory limits on discretionary spending  Enacted on August 2, 2011, the BCA as amended sets limits on defense and nondefense spending  As part of an agreement to increase the statutory limit on public debt, the BCA aimed to reduce annual federal budget deficits by a total of at least $2 1 trillion from FY2012 through FY2021, with approximately half of the savings to come from defense  The spending limits (or caps ) apply separately to defense and nondefense discretionary budget authority  The caps are enforced by a mechanism called sequestration   Sequestration automatically cancels previously enacted appropriations (a form of budget authority) by an amount necessary to reach prespecified levels  The BCA effectively exempted certain types of discretionary spending from the statutory limits, including funding designated for OCO/GWOT  As a result, Congress and the President have designated funding for OCO to support activities that, in previous times, had been funded within the base budget  This was done, in part, as a response to the discretionary spending limits enacted by the BCA  By designating funding for OCO for certain activities not directly related to contingency operations, Congress and the President can effectively continue to increase topline defense, foreign affairs, and other related discretionary spending without triggering sequestration  Congress has repeatedly amended the legislation to raise the spending limits (thus lowering its deficit-reduction effect by corresponding amounts)  Congress has passed four bills that revised the automatic spending caps initially established by the BCA, including the following: American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P L  112-240 ); Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013; P L  113-67 ); Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P L  114-74 ); and Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P L  115-123 )  On February 9, 2018, three days before President Donald Trump submitted his FY2019 budget request, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P L  115-123 )  The act raised the discretionary spending limits set by the BCA from $1 069 trillion for FY2017 to $1 208 trillion for FY2018 and to $1 244 trillion for FY2019  The BBA 2018 increased FY2019 discretionary defense funding levels (excluding OCO) by the largest amounts to date—$85 billion, from $562 billion to $647 billion, and nondefense funding (including SFOPS) by $68 billion, from $529 billion to $597 billion  It did not change discretionary spending limits for FY2020 and FY2021  DOD documents indicate the department in recent years has used OCO funding for activities viewed as unrelated to war  For example, the department's FY2019 budget request estimates $358 billion in OCO funding from FY2015 through FY2019  Of that amount, DOD categorizes $68 billion (19%) for activities unrelated to operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria  These activities are described as "EDI/Non-War," referring in part to the European Deterrence Initiative, and "Base-to-OCO," referring to OCO funding used for base-budget requirements  Similarly, a DOD Cost of War report from June 2018 shows $1 8 trillion in war-related appropriations from FY2001 through FY2018 for operations primarily conducted in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria  Of that total, DOD categorizes $219 billion (12%) as other than "war funds " These funds are described as "Classified," "Modularity," "Fuel (non-war)," "Noble Eagle (Base)," and "Non-War " International affairs agencies also began increasing the share of their budgets designated for OCO, and applying the designation to an increasing range of activities apparently unrelated to conflicts  OCO as a share of the international affairs budget grew from about 21% in FY2012 to nearly 35% in FY2017  Unlike DOD, however, the State Department and USAID have not specified whether any OCO-designated funds are considered part of the agencies' base budgets  According to a DOD budget document from FY2016, the Obama Administration planned to "transition all enduring costs currently funded in the OCO budget to the base budget beginning in 2017 and ending by 2020 " The plan was to describe "which OCO costs should endure as the United States shifts from major combat operations, how the Administration will budget for the uncertainty surrounding unforeseen future crises, and the implications for the base budgets of DOD, the Intelligence Community, and State/OIP  This transition will not be possible if the sequester-level discretionary spending caps remain in place " The BCA remained in effect and OCO funding was used for base-budget requirements  Some defense officials and policymakers say OCO funding enables a flexible and timely response to an emergency or contingency and provides a political and fiscal safety valve to the BCA caps and threat of sequestration  They say if OCO funding were not used in such a manner and discretionary spending limits remained in place, DOD and other federal agencies would be forced to cut base budgets and revise strategic priorities  For example, former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has said if Congress allows the FY2020 and FY2021 defense spending caps to take effect, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which calls for the United States to bolster its military advantage against potential competitors such as Russia and China, "is not sustainable " Critics, including Acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, have described the OCO account as a "slush fund" for military and foreign affairs spending unrelated to contingency operations  Mulvaney, former director of the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), has described the use of OCO funding for base budget requirements as "budget gimmicks " Critics argue what was once generally restricted to a fund for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupplying expended munitions, transporting troops to and through war zones, and distributing foreign aid to frontline states has "ballooned into an ambiguous part of the budget to which government financiers increasingly turn to pay for other, at times unrelated, costs " OMB criteria for OCO funding include the combat losses of ground vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment; replenishment of munitions expended in combat operations; facilities and infrastructure in the theater of operations; transport of personnel, equipment, and supplies to and from the theater; among other items and activities  Determining which activities are directly related, tangentially related, or unrelated to war operations is often a point of debate  Some have questioned the use of OCO funding to purchase F-35 fighter jets: "It is jumping the shark     There's no pretense that it has anything to do with the region " Others have argued it makes sense for the military to use OCO funding to purchase new aircraft to replace planes used in current conflicts and no longer in production: "What are the conditions that are making the combatant commanders and those with train/equip authority to say, 'We need more of this?'" Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority for war-related and other international emergency or contingency-designated activities since 9/11  This figure is a CRS estimate of funding designated for emergencies or OCO/GWOT in support of the broad U S  government response to the 9/11 attacks, as well as other foreign affairs activities, from FY2001 through FY2019  This includes $1 8 trillion for DOD, $154 billion for the Department of State and USAID, and $3 billion for DHS and the Coast Guard (see Table 1 )  These figures do not include emergency-designated funding appropriated in this period for domestic programs, such as disaster response  From FY2001 through FY2009, DOD received $1 8 trillion in appropriations for OCO/GWOT, or approximately 17% of the department's total discretionary budget authority of $10 8 trillion during the period  The department's OCO/GWOT funding peaked in FY2008 both in terms of nominal dollars, at $186 9 billion, and as a share of its discretionary budget, at 28 1% (see Figure 3 ), after the Bush Administration surged additional U S  military personnel to Iraq  The department's OCO funding also increased as a share of its discretionary spending from FY2009 to FY2010 following the Obama Administration's deployment of more U S  military personnel to Afghanistan, and again in FY2017 following enactment of legislation in response to the Trump Administration's request for additional appropriations  In FY2019, the department's OCO/GWOT funding totaled $68 8 billion, or 10% of its discretionary spending  In terms of appropriations titles, more than two-thirds of OCO/GWOT funding since FY2001 has been for Operation and Maintenance (O&M)—nearly double the percentage of base budget funding for O&M over the same period (see Figure 4 )  O&M funds pay for the operating costs of the military such as fuel, maintenance to repair facilities and equipment, and the mobilization of forces  DOD describes "war-related operational costs" as operations, training, overseas facilities and base support, equipment maintenance, communications, and replacement of combat losses and enhancements  In terms of the military services, more than half (55%) of OCO/GWOT funding since FY2001 has gone to the Army—more than double the percentage of base budget funding for the service during this period (see Figure 5 )  Emergency appropriations were initially provided as general "defense-wide" appropriations  Beginning in FY2003, as operations evolved and planning developed, allocations increased and were specifically provided for the services  OCO funding for DOD has not decreased at the same rate as the number of U S  troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has decreased  For example, the number of U S  military personnel in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria decreased from a peak of 187,000 personnel in FY2008 (including 148,000 in Iraq and 39,000 in Afghanistan) to an assumed level of nearly 18,000 personnel in FY2019 (including 11,958 personnel in Afghanistan and 5,765 personnel in Iraq and Syria)—a decline of approximately 169,000 personnel (90%)  Meanwhile, OCO funding decreased from a peak of $187 billion in FY2008 to $69 billion in FY2019—a decline of approximately $118 billion (63%)  While the number of U S  forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has decreased since FY2009, the number of U S  troops deployed or stationed elsewhere to support those personnel has fallen by a lesser degree and, in recent years, remained relatively steady  For example, the number of support forces—that is, personnel from units and forces operating outside of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries (including those stationed in the continental United States or otherwise mobilized) decreased from 112,000 personnel in FY2009 to an assumed level of 76,073 personnel in FY2019—a decline of 35,927 personnel (32%)  In addition, when these support forces are combined with in-country force levels, the total force level decreases by a percentage more similar to the OCO budget, from 297,000 personnel in FY2009 to an assumed level of 93,796 personnel in FY2019—a decline of 203,204 personnel (68%) (see Figure 6 )  Some of these support forces serve in U S  Central Command's area of responsibility, which includes 20 countries in West Asia, North Africa, and Central Asia, and whose forward headquarters is based in Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar  According to DOD, the reason OCO funding has not fallen in proportion to the number of U S  troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria is "due to the fixed, and often inelastic, costs of infrastructure, support requirements, and in-theater presence to support contingency operations " For example, in FY2019, the department requested $20 billion in OCO funding for "in-theater support"—nearly 30% of the OCO request and more than any other functional category  However, some analysts have noted the U S  military's fixed costs in Afghanistan remained relatively stable at roughly $7 billion a year from FY2005 through FY2013 until after the BCA went into effect—and have since increased to roughly $32 billion a year, suggesting "that roughly $25 billion in 'enduring' or base budget costs migrated into the Afghanistan budget, effectively circumventing the budget caps  The actual funding needed for operations in Afghanistan is roughly $20 billion in FY2019 " Title 10, Section 101, of the United States Code, defines a contingency operation as any Secretary of Defense-designated military operation "in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force " Since the 1990s NATO intervention in the Balkans, DOD Financial Management Regulations (FMR) have defined contingency operations costs as those expenses necessary to cover incremental costs "that would not have been incurred had the contingency operation not been supported " Such incremental costs would not include, for example, base pay for troops or planned equipment modernization, as those expenditures are normal peacetime needs of the DOD  In September 2010, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in collaboration with DOD, issued criteria for the department to use in making war/overseas contingency operations funding requests (see Appendix A )  In January 2017, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded the criteria for deciding whether items belong in the base budget or OCO funding "are outdated and do not address the full scope of activities" in the budget request  "For example, they do not address geographic areas such as Syria and Libya, where DOD has begun military operations; DOD's deterrence and counterterrorism initiatives; or requests for OCO funding to support requirements not related to ongoing contingency operations" it states  Section 1524 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 ( P L  115-91 ), directed the Secretary of Defense to "update the guidelines regarding the budget items that may be covered by overseas contingency operations accounts " Congress has enacted legislation directing DOD to compile reports on the costs of certain contingency operations  Section 1266 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 ( P L  115-91 ) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit the Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution report, known as the Cost of War report, on a quarterly basis to the congressional defense committees and the GAO: "Not later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal year quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees and the Comptroller General of the United States the Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution report for such fiscal year quarter " The conference report accompanying the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-245 ) requires DOD to report incremental costs for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries in the U S  Central Command area of responsibility and directs: the Secretary of Defense to continue to report incremental costs for all named operations in the Central Command Area of Responsibility on a quarterly basis and to submit, also on a quarterly basis, commitment, obligation, and expenditure data for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund, and for all security cooperation programs funded under the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide Account  DOD's June 2018 Cost of War report to Congress details $1 5 trillion in obligations associated with certain contingency operations from FY2001 through FY2018  That figure includes $757 1 billion for those conducted primarily in Iraq—Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation New Dawn (OND), and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR); $727 7 billion for those conducted primarily in Afghanistan—Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS); and $27 8 billion for those conducted primarily in the United States (see Table 2 and Figure 7 )  DOD's quarterly Cost of War reports are intended to provide Congress, GAO, and other stakeholders insight into the how the department obligates war-related appropriations  The reports include base and OCO obligations related to war activities, as well as obligation data broken down by certain major operations, service, component, agency, and appropriation  However, as GAO has noted, "the proportion of OCO appropriations not associated with specific operations identified in the statutory Cost of War reporting requirement has trended upward" in part because the criteria DOD uses for making OCO funding requests is outdated and not always used  More recently, the June 2018 Cost of War report does not appear to reference three recently classified overseas contingency operations targeting militants affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS): Operation Yukon Journey in the Middle East, Northwest Africa Counterterrorism, and East Africa Counterterrorism  Some observers have noted other limitations to Cost of War reports, such as incomplete accounting of costs, limited distribution of the documents and underlying data, and formatting that makes it difficult to reconcile the data with information contained in budget justification documents  Between FY2001 and FY2018, Congress appropriated a total of $154 billion in OCO funds for State Department and USAID  For FY2018 (the most recent full-year appropriations for foreign affairs agencies), OCO funding amounted to 22% of the total appropriations for State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Programs appropriation  The Obama Administration's FY2012 International Affairs budget request was the first to include a request for OCO funds for "extraordinary and temporary costs of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan " At the time, the Administration indicated that the use of this designation was intended to provide a transparent, whole-of-government approach to the exceptional war-related costs incurred in those three countries, thus better aligning the associated military and civilian costs  This first foreign affairs OCO request identified the significant resource demands placed on the State Department as a result of the transitions from military-led to civilian-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the importance of a stable Pakistan for the U S  effort in Afghanistan  The FY2012 foreign affairs OCO request included: for Iraq, funding for the U S  Embassy in Baghdad, consulates throughout Iraq, security costs in light of the then-planned U S  military withdrawal, a then-planned civilian-led Police Development and Criminal Justice Program, military and development assistance in Iraq, and oversight of U S  foreign assistance through the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction; for Afghanistan, funding to strengthen the Afghan government and build institutional capacity, support State/USAID and other U S  government agency civilians deployed in Afghanistan, provide short-term economic assistance to address counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts, and provide oversight of U S  foreign assistance programs in Afghanistan through the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction; and for Pakistan, funding to support U S  diplomatic presence and diplomatic security in Pakistan, provide Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Funds (PCCF) to train and equip Pakistani forces to eliminate insurgent sanctuaries and promote stability and security in neighboring Afghanistan and the region  In subsequent years, the Administration designated certain State Department activities in Syria and other peacekeeping activities as OCO, and Congress accepted and broadened this expanded use of OCO in annual appropriations  In the FY2017 budget request, the Administration further broadened its use of State OCO funds, applying the designation to funds for countering Russian aggression, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and aid to Africa  In addition to OCO funds requested through the normal appropriations process, the Administration in recent years requested emergency supplemental funding (designated as OCO) to support State/USAID efforts in countering the Islamic State and to respond to global health threats such as the Ebola and Zika viruses  For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested no OCO/GWOT funding for the Department of State and USAID, although the FY2019 House and Senate SFOPS bills ( H R  6385 and S  3108 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated approximately $8 billion in OCO-designated funding for various priorities  The estimated $154 1 billion in emergency and OCO/GWOT appropriations enacted to date for State/USAID includes major non-war-related programs, such as aid for the 2004 tsunami along Indian Ocean coasts, 2010 earthquake in Haiti, 2013 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, and 2015 worldwide outbreak of the Zika virus; as well as diplomatic operations (e g , paying staff, providing security, and building and maintaining embassies)  OCO/GWOT has also funded a variety of foreign aid programs, ranging from the Economic Support Fund to counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, among other activities in other countries  Figure 8 depicts the emergency or OCO appropriations for foreign affairs activities  Since 2012, when the OCO designation was first used for foreign affairs, more OCO funds have been appropriated than were requested each year, and those have also been authorized to be used in additional countries  Since January 2002, approximately $3 billion of post-9/11 emergency and OCO-designated funding has been provided to the U S  Coast Guard (USCG) for its traditional homeland security missions and for USCG operations in support of U S  Navy activities  This funding has been provided at various times as either an appropriation to the Coast Guard's operating expenses accounts, or as a transfer from Navy accounts to the Coast Guard  Open-source information on the use of those funds has varied  One FY2009 supplemental appropriations request included funding as a transfer, with the intent of funding "Coast Guard operations in support of OIF and OEF, as well as other classified activities " The FY2017 OCO request for annual appropriations for Navy Operations and Maintenance included $163 million for Coast Guard operational support for the deployment of patrol boats to the Northern Arabian Gulf and a port security unit to Guantanamo Bay, among other pay and equipment expenses  The Trump Administration initially requested a total of $89 billion in OCO funding for FY2019  All the funding was requested by DOD  In an amendment to the budget after Congress raised the BCA spending caps as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P L  115-123 ), the Administration removed the OCO designation from $20 billion of the funding, in effect, shifting that amount into the DOD base budget request  In a statement on the budget amendment, Mulvaney said the request fixes "long-time budget gimmicks" in which OCO funding has been used for base budget requirements  Beginning in FY2020, "the Administration proposes returning to OCO's original purpose by shifting certain costs funded in OCO to the base budget where they belong," he wrote  Of the revised amount of $69 billion requested for DOD OCO funding in FY2019: $46 3 billion (67%) was for Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS) in Afghanistan and related missions; $13 billion (22%) for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq and Syria and related missions; $4 8 billion (9%) for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to boost the U S  military presence in eastern Europe to deter Russian military aggression; and $0 9 billion (1%) for security cooperation (see Figure 9 )  The FY2019 OCO budget assumes a total force level (average annual troop strength) of 93,796 personnel  That figure includes: 11,958 primarily in Afghanistan (OFS); 5,765 primarily in Iraq and Syria (OIR); 59,463 for in-theater support; and 16,610 primarily in the continental United States (CONUS) or otherwise mobilized (see Figure 10 )  The number of personnel actually in-country or in-theater at any given time may exceed or fall below those assumed levels  The FY2019 force level assumes an increase of 3,153 personnel (3 5%) from the FY2018 assumed level, all of which is assumed for in-theater support  (For analysis of troop level and budget trends, see the section, " Trends in OCO Funding and Troop Levels ," earlier in this report ) As previously discussed, DOD acknowledges "OCO funding has not declined at the same rate as the in-country troop strength … due to the fixed, and often inelastic, costs of infrastructure, support requirements, and in-theater presence to support contingency operations " The departments lists the following as OCO cost drivers: In-theater support, including infrastructure costs like command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and base operations for U S  Central Command (CENTCOM) locations; Persistent demand for combat support such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets used to enhance force protection; Equipment reset, which lags troop level changes and procurement of contingency-focused assets like munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles and force protection capabilities that may not be linked directly to in-country operations; and International programs and deterrence activities, which are linked to U S  engagement in contingency operations and support U S  interests but are not directly proportional to U S  troop presence  DOD also breaks down the FY2019 OCO budget request by functional category (see Table 3 )  By this measure, the largest portion of OCO funding was $20 billion for in-theater support, followed by operations and force protection (including the incremental cost of military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries), at $14 7 billion; and unspecified classified programs, at $9 9 billion  According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), approximately $47 billion (68%) of the FY2019 OCO budget request consists of enduring activities—that is, "those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts"—that could be funded in the DOD base budget  CBO associates enduring activities with the following DOD functional categories: in-theater support, classified programs, equipment reset and readiness, European Deterrence Initiative, security cooperation, and joint improvised-threat defeat  Executive Branch budget documents for FY2019 show differing projections for how much OCO would be apportioned over the Future Years Defense Program (also known as the FYDP, pronounced "fiddip," the five-year period from FY2019 through FY2023)  For example, Table 1-11 in DOD's National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, citing OMB data, projects five-year OCO funding at $359 billion  However, Table 1-9 of the same document puts the figure at $149 billion after assuming a higher amount of OCO funding shifting into the base budget  According to OMB, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected increasing caps on defense discretionary base budget authority by $84 billion (15%) to $660 billion in FY2020 and by $87 billion (15%) to $677 billion in FY2021  It also projected defense funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) totaling $73 billion in FY2020 and $66 billion in FY2021  Thus, projected defense discretionary funding would total $733 billion in FY2020 and $743 billion in FY2021  FY2019 DOD budget documents show the same defense discretionary topline for FY2020 and FY2021  But they list an "Outyears Placeholder for OCO" of $20 billion in fiscal years FY2020-FY2023, and an "OCO to Base" amount of $53 billion in FY2020 and $45 8 billion in each year from FY2021-FY2023  The documents do not break down what accounts or activities are included in these amounts  The emergence of any new contingencies or conflicts would likely change DOD assumptions about OCO needs  Congress has appropriated a total of $68 8 billion for DOD OCO funding in FY2019, including the following amounts: $67 9 billion in defense funds provided in the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-245 ), which Congress passed on September 26, 2018; and $921 million in defense funds provided in the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P L  115-244 ), which Congress passed on September, 21, 2018  For the Department of State and USAID, as well as the Department of Homeland Security and U S  Coast Guard, FY2019 OCO levels have not yet been determined  They remain at prorated FY2018 levels because of continuing resolutions (CR) to fund certain agencies through December 21, 2018  The FY2019 House and Senate SFOPS bills ( H R  6385 and S  3108 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated approximately $8 billion in OCO-designated funding for various priorities  The House committee-reported version of the Homeland Security appropriations bill ( H R  6776 , 115 th Congress) would not have appropriated any OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard, while the Senate committee-reported version of the bill ( S  3109 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated $165 million for OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard  Any decision by the 116 th Congress to change discretionary defense and nondefense spending limits that remain in effect for FY2020 and FY2021 under the Budget Control Act (BCA; P L  112-25 ) could impact future OCO funding levels  Lawmakers may consider the following questions: Will Congress keep the BCA as is and rely on OCO funding that is not subject to the caps to meet agency requirements? Will Congress repeal the BCA and use less OCO funding? Will Congress amend the BCA limits for future years and continue to use OCO funding, as it has in the past? Will Congress significantly reduce DOD and international affairs funding to stay within the BCA caps and not use OCO funding? In a November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission, a bipartisan panel created by Congress, issued recommendations related to OCO and the BCA  Recommendation No  24 states, "Congress should eliminate the final two years of caps under the BCA " Recommendation 29 states, "To better prepare for major-power competition, Congress should gradually integrate OCO spending back into the base Pentagon budget  This also requires a dollar-for-dollar increase in the BCA spending caps, should they remain in force, so that this transfer does not result in an overall spending cut " Both House and Senate FY2019 committee-reported appropriations bills from the 115 th Congress included about $8 billion in OCO funding for State/USAID  It remains to be seen if the 116 th Congress will pass this OCO level as requested or extend the continuing resolution  Congress could enact legislation to authorize and appropriate a level of base and OCO spending to meet current or revised discretionary defense spending caps in any number of ways  In FY2019 budget documents from OMB and DOD, the Trump Administration projected increasing defense spending in FY2020 and FY2021 beyond the statutory limits of the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P L  112-25 ), but by differing amounts based on differing OCO projections  These figures serve as possible scenarios or options for Congress to consider  According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $660 billion (which assumes an $84 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO defense budget of $73 billion (see Figure 11 )  According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $713 billion (which assumes a $137 billion, or 24%, increase in the BCA defense cap—what would be the largest increase to the BCA defense caps yet—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion  Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $733 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $576 billion and designate an additional $157 billion for OCO  According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $677 billion (which assumes an $87 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $66 billion (see Figure 11 )  According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $723 billion (which assumes a $133 billion, or 23%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion  Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $743 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $590 billion and designate an additional $153 billion for OCO  As previously discussed, these figures would change with different toplines for the national defense budget function (050)  Former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and the National Defense Strategy Commission have recommended that Congress increase the defense budget between 3% and 5% a year above inflation ("real growth") to meet U S  strategic goals  President Donald Trump has said the discretionary defense spending request would total $700 billion in FY2020, a decrease of 2% in nominal terms from FY2019  Trump said, "We know what the budget—the new budget is for the Defense Department  It will probably be $700 billion " However, some media outlets have since reported that the President intends to request a discretionary defense budget of $750 billion in FY2020  Senator James Inhofe, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Representative Mac Thornberry, ranking member of the House Armed Services Committees in the 116 th Congress, have argued, "Any cut in the defense budget would be a senseless step backward " Thornberry has also said transferring recurring OCO costs into the regular budget "makes sense … it makes for more predictable budgeting, but it's all about what happens on the topline " Representative Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in the 116 th Congress, has said of the defense budget: "I think the number is too high, and it's certainly not going to be there in the future … We've got a debt, we've got a deficit, we've got infrastructure problems, we've got healthcare, education—there's a whole lot that is necessary to make our country safe, secure, and prosperous " Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan has talked about a flat topline for national defense: "When you look at the $700 billion, it's not just for one year drop down, [or] a phase, it's a drop and then held constant" over the FYDP  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer David Norquist, who is also performing the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, at one time was reportedly preparing two budgets for FY2020—one assuming $733 billion for national defense and another assuming $700 billion  An analyst has noted "returning enduring OCO costs to the base budget, particularly a vast majority of those enduring costs over a short period as DOD has outlined, could significantly complicate an agreement between congressional Democrats and Republicans to increase both the defense and nondefense BCA budget caps for FY2020 and FY2021 " As analyst noted, "OCO has become an even less-defined pot of money … Congress needs to properly question the DOD budget planners on the future of OCO " In a January 2017 report, GAO concluded, "Without a reliable estimate of DOD's enduring OCO costs, decision makers will not have a complete picture of the department's future funding needs or be able to make informed choices and trade-offs in budget formulation and decision making " The department states it has not fully estimated those costs in part because of the BCA  In a response to GAO, DOD wrote, "Developing reliable estimates of enduring OCO costs is an important first step to any future effort to transition enduring OCO costs to the base budget  In the context of such an effort, the Department would consider developing and reporting formal estimates of those costs  However, until there is sufficient relief from the budgetary caps established in the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Department will need OCO to finance counterterrorism operations, in particular [OFS] and [OIR] " In an October 2018 report, the Congressional Budget Office estimated OCO funding for DOD enduring activities—that is, those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts—totaled more than $50 billion a year (in 2019 dollars) from 2006 to 2018—and are projected to total about $47 billion a year starting in FY2020  This figure appears to be consistent with projections published by DOD  According to the department's FY2019 budget documents, DOD projected $53 billion for "OCO to Base" in FY2020 and $45 8 billion for "OCO to Base" for FY2021 through FY2023  Some analysts have concluded: Uncertainty created by current reliance on OCO, particularly to fund base budget needs, could be detrimental to national security on three levels: (a) by undermining budget controls and contributing thereby to larger deficits, (b) by generating insecurity in the defense workforce and in defense suppliers, and (c) by creating long-term uncertainty in defense planning  The alternative, transitioning longer-term OCO expenses to the base budget, could be achieved through a combination of increased budget caps, targeted cuts in inefficient Defense programs, and increased revenues  For example, a potential enduring activity in the OCO budget is the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)  It was previously known as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), an effort that began in June 2014 to increase the number of U S  military personnel and prepositioned equipment in Central and Eastern Europe intended in part to reassure NATO allies after Russia's military seized Crimea  As some analysts have noted, "Because it is in the OCO part of the budget request, EDI funding does not include a projection for how much funding will be allocated in future years, which can create uncertainty in the minds of allies and adversaries alike about the U S  military's commitment to the program " On the other hand, some contend that it is precisely EDI's flexibility that allows the commander of European Command to quickly respond to changing security and posture needs in Europe, and ensure that monies intended for European deterrence will not be redirected to other DOD priorities  In its November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission quoted the late military strategist Bernard Brodie, who wrote "strategy wears a dollar sign " The panel concluded that relying on OCO funding to increase the defense budget "is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources" for the type of great power competition outlined in the Secretary of Defense's 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which calls for the United States to bolster its competitive military advantage relative to threats posed by China and Russia: Because of budgetary constraints imposed by the BCA, lawmakers and the Department of Defense have increasingly relied upon the overseas contingency operations (OCO) fund to pay for warfighting operations in the greater Middle East, as well as other activities and initiatives  Yet this approach to resourcing has produced problems and distortions of its own  For one thing, the amount of money devoted to OCO since the BCA was enacted no longer corresponds to warfighting operations in the greater Middle East  Furthermore, such operations are no longer a top priority as articulated in the NDS  Finally, reorienting the military toward high-end competition and conflict will require new capabilities beyond the current program of record  OCO is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources for such a long-term endeavor, given its lack of predictability and the limitations on what OCO funds can be used to buy " Appendix A  Statutes, Guidance, and Regulations The designation of funding as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) is governed by several statues as well as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and the Department of Defense (DOD) Financial Management Regulation (FMR)  The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA) of 1985 BBEDCA, as amended, includes the statutory definitions of emergency and unanticipated as they relate to budget enforcement through sequestration  The act also allows for appropriations to be designated by Congress and the President as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism   Such appropriations are effectively exempt from the statutory discretionary spending limits  Title 10, United States Code—Armed Forces 10 U S C  101—Definitions Section 101 provides definitions of terms applicable to Title 10  While it does not define overseas contingency operations, it does include a definition of a contingency operations   Administration and Internal Guidance In addition to statutory requirements, the DOD and the Department of State are subject to guidance on OCO spending from the Administration  In October 2006 , under the Bush Administration, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directed the services to break with long-standing DOD regulatory policies and expand their request for supplemental funding to reflect incremental costs related to the "longer war on terror " There was no specific definition for the "longer war on terror," now one of the core missions of the DOD  In February 2009, at the beginning of the Obama Administration, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued updated budget guidance that required DOD to move some OCO costs back into the base budget  However, within six months of issuing the new criteria, officials waived restrictions related to pay and that would have prohibited end-strength growth  In a letter from OMB to the then-Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert Hale, the agency characterized its 2009 criteria as "very successful" for delineating base and OCO spending but stated, "This update clarifies language, eliminates areas of confusion and provides guidance for areas previously unanticipated " GAO subsequently reported that the revised guidance significantly changed the criteria used to build the fiscal year 2010 OCO funding request by: specifying stricter definitions for repair and procurement of equipment; limiting applicability of OCO funds for RDT&E; excluding pay and allowances for end-strength above the level requested in the budget; excluding enduring family support initiatives; and excluding base realignment and closures (BRAC) amounts  OMB again revised its guidance in September 2010 following a number of GAO reports that had concluded DOD reporting on OCO costs was of "questionable reliability," due in part to imprecisely defined financial management regulations related to OCO spending  (as of September 9, 2010) Source: Letter from Steven M  Kosiak, Associate Director for Defense and Foreign Affairs, OMB, to Robert Hale, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, "Revised War Funding Criteria," September 9, 2010  DOD Financial Management Regulations DOD incorporated the September 2010 OMB criteria for war costs into the Financial Management Regulation  Table 1 includes the general cost categories DOD uses in accounting for costs of contingency operations  Appendix B  Transfer Authorities, Special Purpose Accounts In addition to the supplemental appropriations and emergency or OCO/GWOT designation, the Department of Defense and the Department of State also have the authority to shift funds from one budget account to another in response to operational needs  For DOD, these transfers (sometimes called reprogramings ) are statutorily authorized by 10 U S C  2214—Transfer of funds: procedures and limitations  This authority allows the Secretary of Defense to reallocate funds for higher priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements, after receiving written approval from the four congressional defense committees  DOD may also reprogram funds within an account from one activity to another, as long as the general purpose for the use of those funds remains unchanged  Specific limits to transfer or reprogramming authorities have also been added to these general authorities through provisions in annual defense authorization and appropriation acts  The FY2019 defense appropriations bill sets the base budget transfer cap at $4 billion and the OCO transfer cap at $2 billion  The Department of State's OCO transfer authority has been provided in appropriations acts and has specifically authorized the Administration to transfer OCO funds only to other OCO funds within Title VIII SFOPS appropriations, not between OCO and base accounts  The transfer authority is capped, specified by account, and requires regular congressional notification procedures  Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) The OCOTF was established for DOD in FY1997 as a no year transfer account (meaning amounts are available until expended) in order to provide additional flexibility to meet operational requirements  Transfers from the OCOTF are processed using existing reprogramming procedures  A quarterly report is submitted to the congressional oversight committees, documenting all transfers from the OCOTF to DOD components base budget accounts  Beginning in FY2002, funds to support Southwest Asia, Kosovo, and Bosnia contingency requirements were appropriated directly to DOD components' Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel accounts rather than to the OCOTF for later disbursement  FY2014 was the last year the Administration requested a direct appropriation to the OCOTF  Contingency Operations Funded in the DOD Base Budget As first mandated by section 8091 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P L  110-116 ), Congress has required DOD to provide separate annual budget justification documents detailing the costs of U S  armed forces' participation in all named contingency operations where the total cost of the operation exceeds $100 million or is staffed by more than 1,000 U S  military personnel  Funding for certain DOD contingency operations has been moved to the base budget request, and is no longer designated as emergency or OCO/GWOT requirements  This movement of funding from the OCO request to the base budget request typically occurs as the operational activities of an enduring contingency operation evolve over time and DOD determines that certain elements of the associated military operations have become stable enough to be planned, financed, and executed within the base budget  For example, funding for Operation Noble Eagle, which provides fighter aircraft on 24/7 alert at several U S  military bases, was moved from the GWOT request to the base budget request in 2005  Contingency operations and other activities funded wholly or in part through DOD's base budget have included: NATO Operations in the Balkans   The U S  Army and U S  Air Force provide support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led operations in the Balkans region  Most U S  forces are deployed to Kosovo in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)  A small number of U S  personnel are deployed to the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Joint Task Force - Bravo   U S  forces support this task force, which operates from Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras and supports joint, combined, and interagency exercises and operations in Central America to counter the influence of transnational organized crime; carry out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and build military capacity with regional partners and allied nations to promote regional cooperation and security; Operation Juniper Shield  Previously known as Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), this operation supports efforts to defeat violent extremist organizations in East Africa  This operation also provides military-to-military engagement with partner African countries, as well as readiness for crisis response and evacuation of U S  military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel; Operation Noble Eagle   This operation funds the continuing efforts to defend the United States from airborne attacks, maintain the sovereignty of the United States airspace, and defend critical U S  facilities from potentially hostile threats or unconventional attacks; Operation Enduring Freedom- Horn of Africa   This operation was established to support efforts to defeat violent extremist organizations in East Africa; provide military-to-military engagement with partner African countries, as well as readiness for crisis response and evacuation of U S  military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel throughout East Africa; Operation Enduring Freedom- Caribbean and Central America   A U S  regional military operation initiated in 2008, under the operational control of Special Operations Command-South, this operation was established to focus on counterterrorism to support DOD's overall military objectives and the larger fight against terrorism  Operation Observant Compass   This operation was established to support the deployment of approximately 100 U S  military personnel assisting the Ugandan People's Defense Force and neighboring partner African countries in countering the Lord's Resistance Army operations  Operation Spartan Shield  This operation was established to support ongoing U S  Central Command missions  Other Congressionally Authorized Funds or Programs Through the OCO authorization and appropriation process, Congress has created numerous funds and programs that are designed to finance specific overseas contingency operations-related activities that do not fit into traditional budgetary accounts  Many of these funds and programs are supplied with amounts that are available until expended—however, authorization for the specified fund or program has an expiration date, thereby requiring further congressional action for reauthorization of affected funds or programs  Congress has also provided increased transfer authority to provide greater flexibility for U S  government activities in situations that are typically unpredictable  Examples of these types of congressionally authorized OCO programs or funds have included: Afghan istan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)   These funds were established to provide funding and support for the training, equipping, and expansion of selected military and security forces in support of U S  objectives; Counterterrorism Partnership s Fund   This fund was established to provide funding and support to partner nations engaged in counterterrorism and crisis response activities; Command er's Emergency Response Program  This program was established to support infrastructure improvements, such as road repair and construction and enable military commanders on the ground to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs by undertaking activities that will immediately aid local populations and assist U S  forces in maintaining security gains; Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) Defeat Fund   This fund was established to coordinate and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing research and development, throughout DOD  Due to the enduring nature of the threat, DOD began moving associated funding to the base budget in FY2010; Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) Fund   This fund was intended to expedite the procurement and deployment of MRAPs to Iraq and Afghanistan; European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)   Initially the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), this effort was established to provide funding and support to NATO allies and partners to "reassure allies of the U S  commitment to their security and territorial integrity as members of the NATO Alliance, provide near-term flexibility and responsiveness to the evolving concerns of our allies and partners in Europe, especially Central and Eastern Europe, and help increase the capability and readiness of U S  allies and partners;" Global Security Contingency Fund   This fund was established to provide funding for the Department of State and the Department of Defense "to facilitate an interagency approach to confronting security challenges;" Complex Crise s Fund   This fund was established to provide funding through the State Department and USAID "to help prevent crises and promote recovery in post-conflict situations during unforeseen political, social, or economic challenges that threaten regional security;" Migration and Refugee Assistance Fund   This fund was established to provide funding to respond to refugee crises in Africa, the Near East, South and Central Asia, and Europe and Eurasia; and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative   This initiative was established to provide assistance, including training, equipment, lethal weapons, of a defensive nature; logistics support; supplies and services; sustainment; and intelligence support to the military and national security forces of Ukraine  This is an update to a report originally co-authored by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in Defense Readiness and Infrastructure  It references research previously compiled by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in U S  Defense Policy and Budget; Christopher Mann, Analyst in Defense Policy and Trade; [author name scrubbed], Analyst in U S  Defense Acquisition Policy; [author name scrubbed], CRS Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process; and [author name scrubbed], CRS Analyst in Public Finance  [author name scrubbed], Research Assistant, helped compile the graphics 
Report 2:  Instead, the motion to suspend the rules discharges the committee and moves the legislation directly to the House floor  In the 114 th Congress, 517 (70%) suspension measures were ordered to be reported by a House committee  Of this number, 398 were reported with an accompanying House committee report  Twenty measures that did not have a House report did have a Senate report, while 325 measures had no written report from either chamber (43% of the total number of suspension measures)  Pursuant to Rule XV, motions to suspend the rules are regularly in order on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays or on the last six days of a session of Congress  However, suspension motions may be considered on other days by unanimous consent or under the terms of a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and agreed to by the House  As displayed in Figure 6 , in the 114 th Congress, the plurality of suspension measures were considered on Tuesdays (312, 42% of the total number considered), followed by Mondays (291, 39%) and Wednesdays (114, 15%)  In addition, 25 suspension measures were considered on Thursdays and one on a Friday  Of these, one was considered by unanimous consent, while 25 were called up under suspension pursuant to permission included in a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and agreed to by the full House  Such special rules included a provision stating, "It shall be in order at any time on the legislative day of ___ for the Speaker to entertain motions that the House suspend the rules as though under clause 1 of rule XV " Pursuant to Rule XV, suspension measures are "debatable for 40 minutes, one-half in favor of the motion and one-half in opposition thereto " In practice, there is rarely a true opponent to a motion to suspend the rules, and the time is divided between two floor managers, usually one from each party, who both favor the motion  The floor managers each control 20 minutes of debate  The managers may be their parties' sole representative for or against the motion, or they may yield increments of the 20-minute allotment to other Members  Typically, the relevant committee chairs and ranking members select the majority and minority floor managers for particular bills and resolutions  These managers may be the measure's sponsor, the chair or ranking member of the measure's committee of primary jurisdiction, or another committee member  In the 114 th Congress, the measure's sponsor served as the majority manager on 26% of the suspension measures receiving floor action  The committee chair managed 29% of the measures  The minority manager was the measure's sponsor for 11% of the measures and the committee's ranking member for 26% of the measures considered  Occasionally, floor managers controlling time on a motion to suspend the rules ceded their control to other Members during debate  In two identified cases, both the majority and minority floor managers favored the measure, and another Member claimed the time in true opposition during the initial floor consideration of the measure  In at least one other instance, the minority manager asked unanimous consent to yield managerial control to another Member  A majority floor manager makes the motion to suspend the rules by stating, "Mr  [Madam] Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill [or resolution] ____ " The Speaker [or Speaker pro tempore] responds, "Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman[woman] from [state] and the gentleman[woman] from [state] each will control twenty minutes " The majority and minority managers then, in turn, make opening statements regarding the measure using the 20 minutes each controls  If the majority and minority managers have secured additional speakers, the speakers generally alternate between the parties within the 40-minute limit  During the 114 th Congress, on a motion to suspend the rules, the average number of speakers in addition to the floor managers was fewer than two  On 83% of the measures (620) considered, there were one or two additional speakers  On 27% of the measures (199) considered, there were no additional speakers, and in 16% of the measures (120) considered, there were 3 to 12 additional speakers  Three measures had 20, 21, and 25 additional speakers, respectively  At the start of the debate period, the majority manager may request "unanimous consent that all Members may have five legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and add extraneous materials on this bill [resolution] " This request enables general leave statements to be inserted into the Congressional Record   In 29% of the suspension measures considered in the 114 th Congress, a written general leave statement appeared in the Record following in-person remarks, indicating that the remarks were submitted on the day the legislation was considered  General leave statements submitted on a day other than the day of consideration appear in the Extension of Remarks section of the Congressional Record   Suspension measures are limited to a maximum of 40 minutes of debate under Rule XV  However, if there are time gaps between speakers or procedural interruptions, such as a vote on a motion to adjourn, the time period between the start of the first speaker's remarks and the conclusion of debate may exceed 40 minutes  The statistics displayed in Figure 7 show the length of consideration of suspension measures as documented in Congress gov, not the accumulated length of statements, as kept by official timekeepers in the chamber  In the 114 th Congress, the average length of consideration on a motion to suspend the rules was 13 minutes and 10 seconds, and half of the measures considered had a debate period of 10 minutes or less  Thus, while overall debate is limited to 40 minutes under the rule, on most suspension measures, only a fraction of that time was actually expended during consideration  Seventeen measures, however, had consideration periods that exceeded 40 minutes due to procedural delays or, in the case of one measure, a request for unanimous consent to extend debate by 10 minutes to each side  House leaders generally choose measures for suspension that are likely to achieve the two-thirds majority threshold for passage  Thus, almost all suspension measures were passed by the House in the 114 th Congress  The full House approved all House resolutions (28), concurrent resolutions (12), joint resolutions (2), and Senate bills (82) that were considered under suspension  The House also passed, via motions to suspend the rules, 612 of the 619 House bills that were initially considered under suspension  Seven bills did not receive the requisite supermajority  Two of these bills were later considered and approved under the terms of a special rule  The remaining five bills did not return to the floor and therefore did not pass the House  Most suspension motions are agreed to in the House by voice vote, which is the chamber's default method of voting on most questions  In 2015 and 2016, this method of voting led to the final approval of 72% (531) of the motions to suspend the rules and pass the measures (see Figure 8 )  After the initial voice vote, Members triggered an eventual record vote (often called a roll call vote) on 212 (28%) of the suspension measures considered in the 114 th Congress  This was done by demanding the "yeas and nays," objecting to the vote "on the grounds that a quorum is not present," or, in one case, demanding a recorded vote  In most instances, the chair elected to postpone the vote to a later period, within two additional legislative days, pursuant to clause 8 of House Rule XX  Of the 212 record votes, 3 immediately followed debate on the measure  The remaining 209 votes were postponed to another time on the legislative schedule, usually later the same day  In the 114 th Congress, 205 suspension motions were adopted by record vote, and 7 motions to suspend the rules were defeated by record votes  The defeat of a motion to suspend the rules, however, does not necessarily kill the legislation  The Speaker may choose to recognize a Member at a later time to make another motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, or the House may consider the measure pursuant to a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules  Accordingly, two of the initially unsuccessful measures were later called up and passed under the terms of a special rule  Five measures were not considered again, via any House floor procedure, before the end of the 114 th Congress  Although suspension measures generally receive broad support, measures that receive the requisite two-thirds majority in the House are not guaranteed passage in the Senate  As noted in Table 1 , in the 114 th Congress, the Senate passed 197 of the 619 House bills initially considered under suspension (32%)  Additionally, the Senate agreed to 1 of the 2 House joint resolutions and 5 of the 11 House concurrent resolutions considered under suspension of the rules  Of the number of suspension measures that passed the House and Senate, 60 required a resolution of differences between the chambers  Forty-four House measures and 15 Senate bills were subject to an amendment exchange process, and on one occasion, a conference committee was used to resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of a House bill  The Senate passed three House bills, initially approved in the House under suspension, that did not become public law because the House did not agree to the final bill text, as amended by the Senate  In those instances, the House did not reconsider the bills once the Senate returned the Senate-amended versions to the House chamber  Thus, 194 House bills were presented to the President for signature  Of the measures initially considered under suspension during the 114 th Congress, President Obama was presented with 194 House bills, 82 Senate bills, and 1 House joint resolution for signature or veto  The President vetoed H R  1777 (Presidential Allowance Modernization Act of 2016) and S  2040 (Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act)  The House chose not to attempt a veto override on H R  1777 , so the measure did not become public law  Both the Senate and House voted to override the veto of S  2040 , enabling it to become law without the President's signature ( P L  114-222 )  Thus, of the 703 law-making measures (bills and joint resolutions) initially considered under suspension of the rules, 193 House bills, 82 Senate bills, and 1 House joint resolution became public law (see Table 1 ) 

ground_truth: Congressional interest in Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding has continued as Members debate ways of funding priorities without breaching discretionary spending limits set in law. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority designated as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) in support of the broad U.S. government response to the 9/11 attacks and for other related international affairs activities. This figure amounts to approximately 9.4% of total discretionary spending during this period. Congress has used supplemental appropriation acts or designated funding for emergency requirements or OCO/GWOT—or both—in statute. These funds are not subject to limits on discretionary spending in congressional budget resolutions or to the statutory discretionary spending limits established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-125). The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P.L. 99-177) allows emergency funding to be excluded from budget control limits. The BCA added the OCO/GWOT designation to the BBEDCA exemption, thereby providing Congress and the President with an alternate way to exclude funding from the BCA spending limits. While there is no overall statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO/GWOT spending, both Congress and the President have fundamental roles in determining how much of the spending to provide each fiscal year. Congress must designate any such funding in statute on an account-by-account basis. The President is also required to designate it as such after it is appropriated to be available for expenditure. Debate over what should constitute OCO/GWOT or emergency activities and expenses has shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Funding designated for OCO/GWOT has also been used to fund base-budget requirements of the DOD and State Department and to prevent or respond to crises abroad, including armed conflict, as well as human-caused and natural disasters. Some defense officials and policymakers argue OCO funding allows for flexible response to contingencies, and provides a "safety valve" to the spending caps and threat of sequestration—the automatic cancellation of budget authority largely through across-the-board reductions of nonexempt programs and activities—under the BCA. Critics, however, have described OCO/GWOT as a loophole or "gimmick"—morphing from an account for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupplying expended munitions, and transporting troops through war zones, to a "slush fund" for activities unrelated to contingency operations. Congress appropriated approximately $103 billion for OCO in FY2017 (8.5% of all discretionary appropriations), $78 billion for OCO in FY2018 (5.5% of all discretionary appropriations), and $68.8 billion for OCO so far in FY2019. Discretionary appropriations for FY2019 are not yet final; a continuing resolution expired December 21, 2018. Following passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which raised discretionary budget caps for defense and foreign affairs agencies in FY2018 and FY2019, the Administration proposed shifting some OCO funding into the base, or regular, budget. Although Congress has generally not followed Administration requests for reduced funding for foreign affairs and domestic activities and has increased funding for defense, the President has asked cabinet secretaries to propose spending cuts of 5% in FY2020. Such proposals, if requested in a budget submission, may create difficult choices for Congress in FY2020 and FY2021—the final two years of the BCA discretionary spending limits. Congress's decisions on OCO/GWOT designations will affect how much agency funding is available for military operations and foreign affairs activities overseas, how much is subject to the BCA caps, and how much is incorporated into regular budgets and long-term budget projections.