prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.



Report 2: T he unemployment insurance (UI) system has two primary objectives: (1) to provide temporary, partial wage replacement for involuntarily unemployed workers and (2) to stabilize the economy during recessions  In support of these goals, several UI programs provide benefits for eligible unemployed workers  In general, when eligible workers lose their jobs, the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program may provide up to 26 weeks of income support through regular UC benefit payments  UC benefits may be extended for up to 13 weeks or 20 weeks by the Extended Benefit (EB) program if certain economic situations exist within the state  As of the date of this publication, although both the UC and EB programs are authorized, no state is in an active EB period  For an overview of EB, see the Appendix   The Social Security Act of 1935 (P L  74-271) authorizes the joint federal-state UC program to provide unemployment benefits  Most states provide up to a maximum of 26 weeks of UC benefits  Former federal workers may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) program  Former U S  military servicemembers may be eligible for unemployment benefits through the Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX) program  The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 ( P L  102-164 ) provides that ex-servicemembers be treated the same as other unemployed workers with respect to benefit levels, the waiting period for benefits, and benefit duration  Although federal laws and regulations provide broad guidelines on UC benefit coverage, eligibility, and determination, the specifics regarding UC benefits are determined by each state  This results in essentially 53 different programs  Generally, UC eligibility is based on attaining qualified wages and employment in covered work over a 12-month period (called a base period) prior to unemployment  All states require a worker to have earned a certain amount of wages or to have worked for a certain period of time (or both) within the base period to be eligible to receive any UC benefits  The methods states use to determine eligibility vary greatly  Most state benefit formulas replace approximately half of a claimant's average weekly wage up to a weekly maximum  Additionally, each state's UC law requires individuals to have lost their jobs through no fault of their own, and recipients must be able to work, available for work, and actively seeking work  These eligibility requirements help ensure that UC benefits are directed toward workers with significant labor market experience and who are unemployed because of economic conditions  The UC program is financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under each state's State Unemployment Tax Act (SUTA)  The 0 6% effective net FUTA tax paid by employers on the first $7,000 of each employee's earnings (equaling no more than $42 per worker per year) funds federal and state administrative costs, loans to insolvent state UC accounts, the federal share (50%) of EB payments, and state employment services  SUTA taxes on employers are limited by federal law to funding regular UC benefits and the state share (50%) of EB payments  Federal law requires that the state tax be on at least the first $7,000 of each employee's earnings and that the maximum state tax rate be at least 5 4%  Federal law also requires each employer's state tax rate to be based on the amount of UC paid to former employees (known as "experience rating")  Within these broad requirements, each state has great flexibility in determining its SUTA structure  Generally, the more UC benefits paid out to its former employees, the higher the tax rate of the employer, up to a maximum established by state law  Funds from FUTA and SUTA are deposited in the appropriate accounts within the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF)  The sequester order required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P L  112-25 ) and implemented on March 1, 2013 (after being delayed by P L  112-240 ), affected some but not all types of UI expenditures  Regular UC, UCX, and UCFE payments are not subject to the sequester reductions  EB and most forms of administrative funding are subject to the sequester reductions  The FY2019 sequestration order requires a 6 2% reduction in all nonexempt nondefense mandatory expenditures, but no sequestration reductions are applicable to discretionary programs, projects, and activities  As a result, EB expenditures are required to be reduced 6 2% (only on the federal share of EB benefits) for weeks of unemployment during FY2019  As of January 22, 2019, EB has not been activated in any state during FY2019  The lapse in federal appropriations that occurred from December 22, 2018, until January 25, 2019, caused a partial government shutdown  As a result, during this lapse in appropriations, agencies without funding furloughed federal employees, and many federal employees excepted from furlough were working without pay  Furloughed federal employees may be eligible for UCFE benefits  States are required to operate the UCFE program under the same terms and conditions that apply to regular state UC  Therefore, UCFE eligibility is determined under the laws of the state in which an individual's official duty station in federal civilian service is located  Federal employees who are in furlough status on account of a government shutdown are generally treated by state law as laid off with an expectation of recall  Depending on state laws and regulations, the state may have an option to not require federal employees to search for work given an expected recall  However, according to guidance from U S  Department of Labor (DOL), excepted federal employees who are performing services (but working without pay) would generally be ineligible for UCFE benefits based on states' definitions of "unemployment " Private-sector workers who are furloughed or laid off due to the partial government shutdown because they were employed by government contractors or other businesses may be eligible for regular UC benefits  UC eligibility for these workers would be based on the requirements set out under the state laws in the state where they had worked  In this climate, there has been congressional interest in assisting furloughed and excepted federal employees through the UI system  For example, as described below in the section on " Unemployment Compensation for Excepted Federal Employees During a Government Shutdown ," there are proposals to provide new authority to pay UCFE benefits to excepted federal workers who are working without pay  The most recent lapse in federal appropriations began December 22, 2018, and ended on January 25, 2019, with the enactment of H J Res  28   Because retroactive pay for furloughed and excepted federal employees was authorized under S  24 , the Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019 (enacted January 16, 2019), UCFE payments made to federal employee claimants during this lapse in appropriations may be deemed an overpayment, subject to state UC laws regarding overpayment recovery  According to guidance from the Office of Personnel Management on this issue The state UI agency will determine whether or not an overpayment exists and, generally, the recovery of the UCFE overpayment is a matter for state action under its law; however, some state UI laws require the employer to recover such overpayment by collecting the overpayment amount from the employee  The Federal and state agencies will need to coordinate to determine the required action in accordance with the individual state UI law  Federal agencies are encouraged to develop lists or spreadsheets that can be provided to the state(s) containing the employees' names, social security numbers, and the amounts and periods of time covered by the retroactive payment  If a recession is deep enough and if state unemployment tax (SUTA) revenue is inadequate for long periods of time, states may have insufficient funds to pay for UC benefits  Federal law, which requires states to pay these benefits, provides a loan mechanism within the UTF framework that an insolvent state may use to meet its UC benefit payment obligations  States must pay back these loans  If the loans are not paid back quickly (depending on the timing of the beginning of the loan period), states may face interest charges, and states' employers may face increased net FUTA rates until the loans are repaid  The U S  Virgin Islands is the only jurisdiction with an outstanding loan  As of January 18, 2019, it had an outstanding loan of $68 4 million from the federal accounts within the UTF  At the end of 2017, fewer than half of states (24) had accrued enough funds in their accounts to meet or exceed the minimally solvent standard of an average high cost multiple (AHCM) of 1 0 in order to be prepared for a recession  Beginning in FY2015, DOL funded state efforts "addressing individual reemployment needs of UI claimants, and working to prevent and detect UI overpayments" through the voluntary Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessment (RESEA) program  RESEA provides funding to states to conduct in-person interviews with selected UI claimants to (1) assure that claimants are complying with the eligibility rules, (2) determine if reemployment services are needed for the claimant to secure future employment, (3) refer the individual to reemployment services as necessary, and (4) provide labor market information that addresses the claimant's specific needs  Section 30206 of P L  115-123 codified the authority for DOL to administer a RESEA program  It also set out various requirements for states to use certain types of evidence-based interventions for UI claimants under RESEA and allocated discretionary funding for RESEA across three categories (base funding, outcome payments, and research and technical assistance)  State RESEA programs must include reasonable notice and accommodations to participating UI beneficiaries  On April 4, 2019, DOL published a proposed methodology to allocate base RESEA funds and outcome payments  DOL requested state and public comments on this proposal by May 6, 2019  The President's budget for FY2020 proposes changes to several aspects of the UI system  It would create a new required standard for state account balances within the UTF and a new benefit entitlement for paid parental leave financed through state unemployment taxes  The President's FY2020 budget also proposes a set of additional integrity measures, including the required use of certain databases to confirm UC eligibility and requiring Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits offset UI benefits  The President's budget proposal for FY2020 would require states to maintain a minimum level of solvency in their UTF account balances to be at least half (0 5) of the state's AHCM  The proposal would alter the rules for calculating the net FUTA rate, requiring a higher net FUTA rate on a state's employers if that state maintained an AHCM of less than 0 5 on January 1 of two or more consecutive years  The additional FUTA revenue would be deposited into the state UTF account and would be terminated once the state met the 0 5 AHCM criteria  The President's budget proposal for FY2020 would require states to establish a paid parental leave benefit by 2020, using the UC program as its base for an administrative framework  States would be required to provide six weeks of benefits to a worker on leave or otherwise absent from work for the birth or adoption of the worker's child  States would have discretion to determine the parameters of eligibility and financing for this new paid parental leave benefit  The President's 2020 budget would require states to use three specific data sources to confirm an individual's eligibility for UC benefits: the State Information Data Exchange System (SIDES, administered by Information Technology Support Center [ITSC] and DOL); the National Directory for New Hires (NDNH, administered by the Department of Health and Human Services); and the Prisoner Update Processing System (PUPS, administered by the Social Security Administration)  The proposal would create several additional integrity measures, including giving the Secretary of Labor the authority to implement new corrective action measures in response to poor state administrative performance within the program; allowing states to retain a percentage of UC overpayments for program integrity use; requiring states to deposit all UC penalty and interest payments into a special state fund, with these funds required to be used for improving state UI administration as well as providing reemployment services for UI claimants; and offsetting SSDI benefits to account for concurrent receipt of UI benefits  Section 2105 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P L  112-96 ; February 22, 2012) amended federal law to allow states to conduct two types of drug testing  First, it expanded the long-standing state option to disqualify UC applicants who were discharged from employment with their most recent employer (as defined under state law) for unlawful drug use by allowing states to drug test these applicants to determine UC benefit eligibility or disqualification
Report 2:  Regarding interviews, DHS officials stated that the working group established a requirement for all applicants seeking an immigration benefit, including NIV applicants, to undergo a baseline uniform national security and public safety interview  DHS officials stated that the working group modeled its interview baseline on elements of the refugee screening interview  To help implement this standard, DHS officials stated that the department is offering more training courses in enhanced communications (i e  detecting deception and eliciting responses) and making such courses accessible to other U S  government entities and U S  officials overseas  Regarding security checks, the working group identified certain checks that should be conducted for all applicants seeking an immigration benefit, including NIV applicants  For example, DHS officials stated that the working group concluded that all applicants for U S  immigration benefits should be screened against DHS’s TECS, among other federal databases  In February 2018, DHS Office of Policy officials stated that they were also exploring the extent to which current screening and vetting technologies can be expanded  For example, technology that is being used to screen applicants for counterterrorism concerns can potentially be modified to screen applicants for other concerns such as public safety or participation in transnational organized crime  However, these officials noted such changes to technology can take a long time  DHS officials stated that each department and agency is responsible for implementing the uniform standards for their relevant immigration programs  For example, with regard to maintaining information electronically, State officials stated that for nonimmigrant and immigrant visas, as of May 2018, they collected most, but not all, of the application data elements  In addition to executive actions taken in calendar year 2017, the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 9 on February 6, 2018, which directed DHS, in coordination with State, DOJ, and ODNI, to establish a National Vetting Center to optimize the use of federal government information in support of the national vetting enterprise  This memorandum stated that the U S  government must develop an integrated approach to the use of intelligence and other data, across national security components, in order to improve how departments and agencies coordinate and use information to identify individuals presenting a threat to national security, border security, homeland security, or public safety  The center is to be overseen and guided by a National Vetting Governance Board, consisting of six senior executives designated by DHS, DOJ, ODNI, State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense  Further, within 180 days of the issuance of the memorandum, these six departments and agencies, in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget, are to jointly submit to the President for approval an implementation plan for the center, addressing, among other things, the initial scope of the center’s vetting activities; the roles and responsibilities of agencies participating in the center; a resourcing strategy for the center; and a projected schedule to reach both initial and full operational capability  On February 14, 2018, the Secretary of Homeland Security selected an official to serve as the Director of the National Vetting Center and delegated the center’s authorities to CBP  DHS Office of Policy officials stated in February 2018 that the center is intended to serve as the focal point of the larger screening and vetting enterprise, and will coordinate policy and set priorities  The center will use the uniform baselines for screening and vetting standards and procedures established per EO-2 to set short- and long-term priorities to improve screening and vetting across the U S  government  Further, these officials stated screening and vetting activities will continue to be implemented by the entities that are currently implementing such efforts, but roles and responsibilities for screening and vetting for immigration benefits may be modified in the future based on the work of the center  According to DHS Office of Policy officials, efforts to implement National Security Presidential Memorandum 9, such as the development of an implementation plan, are ongoing as of June 2018  Implementation of new visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures  In response to the EOs and a March 2017 presidential memorandum issued the same day as EO-2, State has taken several actions to implement new visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures  For example, State sought and received emergency approval from the Office of Management and Budget in May 2017 to develop a new form, the DS-5535  The form collects additional information from a subset of visa applicants to more rigorously evaluate applicants for visa ineligibilities, including those related to national security and terrorism  The new information requested includes the applicant’s travel history over the prior 15 years, all phone numbers used over the prior 15 years, and all email addresses and social media handles used in the last 5 years  State estimated that, across all posts, the groups requiring additional vetting represented about 70,500 individuals per year  We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS, DOJ, State, and ODNI  DHS, DOJ, and State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until seven days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence  In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777or GamblerR@gao gov  Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV  There are many nonimmigrant visas (NIV), which are issued to foreign nationals such as tourists, business visitors, and students seeking temporary admission into the United States  For the purposes of this report, we placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups  In the following enclosures, we provide a descriptive overview of each group on the basis of our analysis of the Department of State’s (State) fiscal years 2012 through 2017 NIV data  Each enclosure also contains the following: Description of the group  In this section, we provide a narrative description of the group, as well as a table of the specific NIVs that comprise the group  Characteristics of the applicants  In this section, we provide the number of annual NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the specific NIVs adjudicated in fiscal year 2017 within the group, the regions to which applicants applied for these NIVs in fiscal year 2017, and the top five nationalities that applied for NIVs in the group in fiscal year 2017  Issuances  In this section, we provide the number of NIVs issued within this group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Refusals  In this section, we provide the refusal rate for the entire NIV group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  For the NIVs that were refused in fiscal year 2017 for this group, we also provide the top ground for refusal  NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U S  immigration law and State policy  However, across all visa groups, the top categories were either ineligible nonimmigrant or inadequate documentation: Ineligible nonimmigrant  For most NIV categories, the applicant is presumed to be an intending immigrant until the applicant establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer that he or she is entitled to a nonimmigrant status  An applicant may be refused under this provision if, among other things, the consular officer determines the applicant lacks sufficient ties to his or her home country, or intends to abandon foreign residence; that evidence otherwise indicates an intent to immigrate to the United States permanently; or that the applicant is likely to violate the terms of the visa after being admitted  Inadequate documentation  The consular officer determined that the application is not in compliance with the INA because, for example, it lacks necessary documentation to allow the consular officer to determine visa eligibility  In such cases, the applicant would not be found eligible for the visa unless and until satisfactory documentation is provided to the consular officer or after the completion of administrative processing, such as security advisory opinions  Visa types (FY 2017) (9,968,157 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (9,968,157 adjudications) percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2015, and declined by about 13 percent from fiscal years 2015 to 2017  ● The refusal rate for tourist and business visitor visas generally increased each year from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2017  ● The vast majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (992,855 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (992,855 adjudications) ● The refusal rate for student and exchange visitor issuances decreased each year from fiscal years 2015 through 2017  visas peaked in fiscal year 2016, and slightly declined in fiscal year 2017  ● The vast majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (884,667 adjudications) 19% 10% 16% Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (884,667 adjudications) ● Generally, the refusal rates for temporary worker years 2012 through 2017  visas decreased from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Department of State officials noted, for example, that H-2A visas are not numerically limited by statute  They also stated that they believe U S  employers are increasingly less likely to hire workers without lawful status and are petitioning for lawfully admitted workers  ● In fiscal year 2017, temporary worker visas were most frequently refused because the applicant did not provide adequate documentation to the consular officer  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (330,117 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (330,117 adjudications) ● The refusal rates for transit and crewmember visas about 8 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (from about 295,000 to 320,000)  varied over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Specifically, issued C-1/D visas increased over the ● The majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were same time period, but the number of issued visas for the remaining visa types in this category have decreased  due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (166,187 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (166,187 adjudications) ● The refusal rates for foreign official and employee visas remained under 4 percent  ● In fiscal year 2017, foreign official and employee visas were most frequently refused because the applicant did not provide adequate documentation to the consular officer  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (68,580 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (68,580 adjudications) ● Generally, refusal rates for treaty trader and investor increased over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  visas increased slightly over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Issuances for E-3 visas nearly doubled from fiscal ● The majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were year 2012 through 2017, but comprise a small percentage of this category overall  due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of their intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (40,533 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (40,533 adjudications) ● Refusal rates for fiancé(e) and spouse visas were fluctuated over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017, but increased overall during this time period  relatively low during the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017  ● Most refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to inadequate documentation from the visa applicant, potentially indicating that such applications failed to include necessary documentation for the consular officer to ascertain whether the applicant was eligible to receive a visa at that time  Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Nonimmigrant visas (NIV) are issued to foreign nationals such as tourists, business visitors, and students seeking temporary admission into the United States  The Department of State (State) is generally responsible for the adjudication of NIV applications, and manages the application process, including the consular officer corps and its functions at more than 220 U S  embassies and consulates (i e , visa-issuing posts) overseas  Depending on various factors, such as the particular NIV sought, the applicant’s background, and visa demand, State officials noted that the length of the visa adjudication process can vary from a single day to months  This appendix provides descriptive statistics of NIV adjudications, issuances, and refusals for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  Specific details are shown in table 8 below  State data from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 indicate that NIV adjudications generally followed an annual cycle, ebbing during certain months during the fiscal year; however, adjudications in fiscal year 2017 departed slightly from this trend  Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the number of NIV adjudications typically reached its highest peak in the summer months, as shown in table 9  For example, State officials noted that a summer peak is generally due to international students who are applying for their visas for the coming academic year  There are many NIVs, and for the purposes of this report, we have placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups  Table 10 includes the annual NIV adjudications, issuances, and refusal rates, for each visa group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV applicants seeking to travel to the United States represent many different nationalities, but the countries of nationality with the most NIV adjudications have remained relatively consistent in recent years  Table 11 provides the top 25 countries of nationality for NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV applicants can apply for their NIVs at more than 220 visa-issuing U S  posts overseas  Table 12 describes the regions to which NIV applicants applied from fiscal years 2012 through 2017  NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U S  immigration law and State policy  For the purposes of this report, we have grouped most of these grounds for refusal into one of seven categories, and group the remaining into a miscellaneous category, as shown in table 13  From January through October 2017, the administration took various executive actions establishing nationality-based entry restrictions for certain categories of foreign nationals from designated countries  This appendix supplements information included in this report to provide a more comprehensive presentation of changes to U S  immigration policy affecting nonimmigrant and immigrant entry into the United States, and outlines the legal standards applied, and precedent developed and relied upon, by federal courts in resolving challenges to the executive actions  In particular, it describes relevant aspects of the executive actions specifically addressed in this report—Executive Orders 13769 and 13780, both titled Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, and Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats—that imposed visa entry restrictions on certain countries’ nationals and included provisions addressing NIV screening and vetting, as well as other executive actions on immigration issued by the current administration  Furthermore, this appendix provides a detailed account of the interrelated challenges to these executive actions brought in the federal courts through June 2018  In summary, on March 6, 2017, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which instituted visa and refugee entry restrictions, and an accompanying memorandum addressed to the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security and the Attorney General, calling for heightened screening and vetting of visa applications and other immigration benefits  EO 13780 stated that it is U S  policy to improve the screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with the visa-issuance process and U S  Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP)  Enforcement of sections 2(c) and 6(a) of EO 13780 which established visa entry restrictions for nationals of six countries of particular concern—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—for a 90-day period, and suspended all refugee admissions for 120 days, was enjoined by federal district court orders issued in March 2017  On appeal, the U S  Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits generally upheld these decisions  Upon review by the U S  Supreme Court in June 2017, the injunction was partially lifted except with respect to foreign nationals who have bona fide ties to the United States Implementation of EO 13780 commenced on June 29, 2017  On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats  This proclamation restricts entry into the United States of certain categories of foreign nationals from eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—for an indefinite period  Preliminary injunctions issued by the U S  District Courts for the Districts of Maryland (Maryland federal district court) and Hawaii (Hawaii federal district court) in October 2017 prohibited implementation of these visa entry restrictions except with respect to North Korean and Venezuelan nationals  On December 4, 2017, the U S  Supreme Court issued two orders staying these district court injunctions; and on January 19, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for review of the December 22, 2017, decision of the Ninth Circuit, which partially affirmed the Hawaii federal district court’s preliminary injunction  As of June 2018, these latest visa entry restrictions continue to be fully implemented consistent with the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the President may lawfully establish nationality-based entry restrictions, and that Proclamation 9645 itself “is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority ” The following sections describe these executive actions and related litigation in greater detail  On January 27, 2017, the President issued EO 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which directed a review of information needs for adjudicating visas and other immigration benefits to confirm individuals seeking such benefits are who they claim to be, and are not security or public-safety threats  To temporarily reduce investigative burdens during the review period, the EO suspended U S  entry for nationals of seven countries of particular concern—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen  In addition, EO 13769 put USRAP on hold for 120 days and indefinitely barred admission of Syrian refugees  Shortly after its issuance, however, the EO faced numerous legal challenges in federal courts across the country involving various constitutional and statutory issues such as detainee applications for writs of habeas corpus, alleged religious or nationality-based discrimination, and the extent of the EO’s applicability to certain categories of foreign nationals, including U S  lawful permanent residents (LPR) and dual nationals holding passports issued by a listed country as well as another nation not subject to visa entry restrictions  On February 3, 2017, the Washington federal district court entered a nationwide temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting enforcement of the EO’s entry restrictions  In rejecting the government’s argument that a TRO only cover the particular states at issue, the court reasoned that partial implementation would “undermine the constitutional imperative of ‘a uniform Rule of Naturalization’ and Congress’s instruction that the ‘immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly ’” On February 9, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the nationwide injunction, thereby denying the government’s emergency motion for a stay of the Washington federal district court’s TRO pending appeal, because the government did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of its appeal, or that failure to enter a stay would cause irreparable injury  On March 6, 2017, however, the President issued EO 13780, which revoked and replaced EO 13769, and established revised restrictions on entry for nationals of the same countries of particular concern, except Iraq  On March 6, 2017, the President signed EO 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which revoked and replaced EO 13769 and put in place revised visa and refugee entry restrictions, and issued an accompanying memorandum calling for heightened screening and vetting of visa applications and other immigration benefits  In general, sections 2(c) and 6(a) of EO 13780 barred visa travel for nationals of six designated countries—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—for 90 days, and all refugee admission for 120 days  On March 15, 2017, sections 2 and 6 of the EO were enjoined on statutory grounds (i e , based on potential violation of U S  immigration law) pursuant to the order of the Hawaii federal district court granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO  On March 16, 2017, the Maryland federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring implementation of visa entry restrictions on a nationwide basis with respect to nationals of the six listed countries  On May 25, 2017, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Maryland federal district court’s injunction on constitutional grounds (i e , based on potential violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U S  Constitution)  On June 12, 2017, the Ninth Circuit generally affirmed the Hawaii federal district court’s ruling, but vacated the district court’s order to the extent it enjoined internal review procedures not burdening individuals outside the Executive Branch, therefore permitting the administration to conduct the internal reviews of visa information needs as directed in the EO  On June 14, 2017, the President issued a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, Attorney General, and Director of National Intelligence, directing that sections 2 and 6 of EO 13780 were to be implemented 72 hours after all applicable injunctions are lifted or stayed  On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court granted, in part, the government’s application to stay the March 15 and 16 injunctions of the Hawaii and Maryland federal district courts, as generally upheld on May 25 and June 12 by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits  The Court explained that the administration may enforce visa and refugee travel restrictions under sections 2 and 6 except with respect to an individual who can “credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States ” In the case of a visa or refugee applicant who is the relative of a person in the United States, such foreign national would be exempt from entry restrictions provided the family connection with their U S  relative meets the “close familial relationship” standard  The Court further explained that a qualifying relationship with a U S  entity would have to be formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, and not for the purpose of evading EO 13780  On June 29, 2017, the day that implementation of EO 13780 began, the State Department issued guidance providing that a close familial relationship exists for the parents, spouse, children, adult sons or daughters, sons and daughters-in-law, and siblings of a person in the United States, but not for such person’s grandparents, grandchildren, uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, sisters-in-law, brothers-in-law or other relatives  The State of Hawaii filed a motion with the Hawaii federal district court seeking, among other things, a declaration that the partial injunction in place after the Supreme Court’s ruling prohibited application of travel restrictions to fiancés, grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the United States  On July 13, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court ruled, among other things, that section 2 of the EO, generally barring travel to the United States for nationals of certain countries, does not apply to the grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews and cousins of persons in the United States, who were initially excluded from the administration’s interpretation of “close family ” The government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court  On July 19, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the government’s motion seeking further clarification of its June 26 ruling, stayed the Hawaii federal district court’s order to the extent it included refugees covered by a formal assurance from a U S -based resettlement agency within the scope of the preliminary injunction, pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and left unchanged the district court’s broader formulation of exempt “close family ” On September 7, 2017, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Hawaii federal district court’s definition of close family members who are not to be subjected to travel restrictions, and rejected the government’s argument that refugees who had undergone a stringent review process and been approved by U S -based resettlement agencies lack a bona fide relationship to the United States, thus allowing admission of such refugees  On September 11, 2017, the Supreme Court temporarily enjoined aspects of the Hawaii federal district court’s holding that would permit admission of certain refugees with formal assurances from a U S  resettlement entity  The next day, on September 12, 2017, the Supreme Court indefinitely stayed the Ninth Circuit’s September 7 ruling with respect to refugees covered by a formal assurance, thereby permitting the administration to suspend entry of such refugees  On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public Safety Threats, which expanded the scope and duration of visa entry restrictions from six to eight countries, and from a 90-day to an indefinite period for the listed countries  On September 25, 2017, in light of the September 24 proclamation, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file briefs addressing whether, or to what extent, the cases before it regarding EO 13780 are moot  On October 10, 2017, after receiving the parties’ supplemental briefs, the Supreme Court decided that because section 2(c) of EO 13780 expired on September 24, there was no live case or controversy; and without expressing a view on the merits, the Court vacated and remanded the Maryland case to the Fourth Circuit with instructions to dismiss as moot the challenge to EO 13780  On October 24, 2017, consistent with its October 10 ruling, the Supreme Court also vacated and remanded the Hawaii case related to EO 13780 to the Ninth Circuit with instructions to dismiss it as moot  Consequently, after challenges to EO 13780 visa and refugee entry restrictions, as curtailed by the Supreme Court’s ruling of June 26, 2017, were rendered moot, litigation continued with respect to the President’s proclamation of September 24, 2017  On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645 (the Proclamation), Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, which imposes certain conditional restrictions and limitations on entry into the United States of nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—for an indefinite period  According to the Proclamation, travel restrictions are tailored to each nation’s information sharing and identity management deficiencies based on standard immigration screening and vetting criteria established by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and are to remain in effect until such time as the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State determine that a country provides sufficient information for the United States to assess adequately whether its nationals pose a security or safety threat  On October 17, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court issued a TRO, on statutory grounds, enjoining on a nationwide basis the implementation and enforcement of travel restrictions provided for under the Proclamation, except with respect to North Korean or Venezuelan nationals  On the same day, the Maryland federal district court granted in part plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, primarily on constitutional grounds, thereby prohibiting implementation of visa entry restrictions nationwide, except for nationals of North Korea and Venezuela as well as other covered foreign nationals who lack a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States  On October 20, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court converted its October 17 TRO into a preliminary injunction, thereby continuing the nationwide prohibition on enforcement or implementation of the suspension on entry for nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen  The district court did not stay its ruling or hold it in abeyance should an appeal be filed in the Ninth Circuit  On November 13, 2017, the Ninth Circuit granted, in part, the government’s request for an emergency stay of the Hawaii federal district court’s preliminary injunction, thereby allowing visa entry restrictions to go into effect with respect to the nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen  However, consistent with the Supreme Court’s June 2017 ruling, the court ordered that those with a bone fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States not be subject to such travel restrictions  On November 20, 2017, the government petitioned the Supreme Court for a stay of the preliminary injunction issued by the Hawaii federal district court, pending consideration and disposition of the government’s appeal from that injunction to the Ninth Circuit and, if that court affirms the injunction, pending filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari and any further proceedings in the Supreme Court  On November 28, 2017, plaintiffs in the challenge to the Proclamation arising out of Hawaii asked that the Supreme Court deny the government’s request to lift the partial injunction left in place by the Ninth Circuit  On the same day, plaintiffs in the case arising out of Maryland requested that the Supreme Court not grant a stay of the federal district court’s preliminary injunction  In both cases, plaintiffs assert that the more expansive visa entry restrictions violate U S  immigration law; additionally, for the Maryland case, plaintiffs argue that such restrictions are unconstitutional as a form of discrimination based on national origin  On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court issued two orders staying the Maryland and Hawaii federal district courts’ orders of October 17 and 20 that preliminarily enjoined implementation of the Proclamation, pending decisions of the Ninth and Fourth Circuits in the government’s appeals, and of the Supreme Court regarding a petition for a writ of certiorari (if sought)  As a result, the Proclamation’s visa entry restrictions were permitted to go into full effect unless and until they are either enjoined by the courts of appeals and a writ of certiorari is not sought thereafter, or the Supreme Court either denies a petition for certiorari (thereby resulting in termination of the Supreme Court’s stay order) or grants such petition followed by a final injunction prohibiting current or future implementation of the Proclamation’s restrictions  The Supreme Court further noted its expectation that the courts of appeals will render decisions “with appropriate dispatch,” in light of both courts having decided to consider their respective cases on an expedited basis  On December 8, 2017, the Department of State announced that it began fully implementing the Proclamation, as permitted by the Supreme Court, at the opening of business at U S  embassies and consulates overseas  On December 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the Hawaii federal district court’s October 20 order enjoining enforcement of visa entry restrictions under the Proclamation, while limiting the preliminary injunction’s scope to foreign nationals who have a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States  Without reaching plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, the court of appeals concluded that the Proclamation exceeded the scope of authority delegated to the President by Congress under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), in particular, sections 202(a)(1)(A) (immigrant visa nondiscrimination) and 212(f) (presidential suspension of, or imposition of restrictions on, alien entry), by deviating from statutory text, legislative history and prior executive practice; not including the requisite finding that entry of certain foreign nationals would be detrimental to U S  interests; and contravening the INA’s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas  However, the court stayed its decision, given that the Supreme Court’s December 4 order lifted the federal district courts’ injunctions pending not only review by the courts of appeals, but also “disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought ” On January 5, 2018, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the December 22, 2017, judgment of the Ninth Circuit which left in place the Hawaii federal district court injunction of the Proclamation’s visa entry restrictions for individuals with bona fide ties to the United States  On January 19, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the government’s certiorari petition and will therefore consider, and issue an opinion on the merits of, the Ninth Circuit’s decision  On February 15, 2018, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction granted by the Maryland federal district court on constitutional grounds, but stayed its decision pending the outcome of the Ninth Circuit case before the Supreme Court  The court of appeals found that “laintiffs offer undisputed evidence that the President has openly and often expressed his desire” to bar the entry of Muslims into the United States  Therefore, the court concluded that, in light of the President’s official statements, the Proclamation likely violates the Establishment Clause as it “fails to demonstrate a primarily secular purpose,” and also goes against the basic principle that government is not to act with religious animus  On February 23, 2018, Fourth Circuit challengers filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking for the Supreme Court to consolidate their case with the Court’s ongoing review of the Ninth Circuit decision  These petitioners requested that the Court additionally consider their argument that the preliminary injunction should not have been limited to individuals with a bona fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States  On February 26, 2018, the Supreme Court granted Fourth Circuit petitioners’ motion to expedite consideration of their certiorari petition  On April 10, 2018, the President issued a proclamation announcing that because Chad has improved its identity-management and information sharing practices sufficiently to meet U S  baseline security standards, nationals of Chad will again be able to receive visas for travel to the United States  On June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court held that the President lawfully exercised the broad discretion granted to him under INA § 212(f) (presidential suspension of, or imposition of restrictions on, alien entry), by issuing Proclamation No  9645, which established nationality-based visa entry restrictions applicable to categories of foreign nationals from eight (now seven) countries for an indefinite period  In addition, while three individual plaintiffs had standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to entry restrictions prohibiting their relatives from coming to the United States, the Court found the Proclamation to be legitimate on its face as a way to prevent entry of certain foreign nationals where the government determines there is insufficient information for visa vetting  As a result of the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the establishment of nationality-based entry restrictions is a lawful exercise of the President’s broad discretion in matters of immigration and national security, the visa entry restrictions imposed on categories of foreign nationals from certain countries pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9645 continue to be fully implemented , as they have been since the Supreme Court’s December 4, 2017, orders staying the lower courts’ injunctions  On October 24, 2017, the same day the 120-day suspension of refugee admissions under EO 13780 expired, the President signed EO 13815, Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions program With Enhanced Vetting Capabilities, which resumed USRAP and directed that special measures be applied to certain categories of refugees posing potential threats to the security and welfare of the United States  On December 23, 2017, the Washington federal district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction on aspects of EO 13815 (and its accompanying memorandum), thus prohibiting the administration from: (1) temporarily suspending admission of refugees from 11 previously identified countries of concern, and reallocating resources from the processing of their applications during the 90-day review period (except for those lacking a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States); and (2) indefinitely barring admission of, and application processing for, all following-to-join refugees  On January 5, 2018, the Washington federal district court denied the government’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s December 23, 2017, order temporarily halting enforcement of refugee entry restrictions that were to be implemented as part of the resumption of USRAP under the EO  Specifically, the government “ask the court to ‘modify its preliminary injunction to exclude from coverage refugee applicants who seek to establish a on the sole ground that they have received a formal assurance from a resettlement agency ’” In denying the government’s motion for reconsideration, the court relied on the September 7, 2017, decision of the Ninth Circuit which, among other things, rejected the notion that refugees with formal assurances from U S -based resettlement agencies do not meet the Supreme Court’s bona fide relationship standard  The court treated this Ninth Circuit ruling as binding precedent given that the Supreme Court’s indefinite stay of September 12 neither vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision, nor provided any underlying reason(s) that would allow another court to discern its rationale  On January 9, 2018, the Washington federal district court also denied the government’s emergency motion for a stay of the court’s December 23, 2017, preliminary injunction, pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit  On January 31, 2018, DHS announced additional security measures to prevent exploitation of USRAP  Specifically, these security measures include additional screening for certain nationals of high-risk countries, a more risk-based approach to administering USRAP, and a periodic review and update of the refugee high-risk countries list and selection criteria  Therefore, as of June 2018, while the administration has announced additional security measures to strengthen the integrity of USRAP, the Washington federal district court’s December 23, 2017, preliminary injunction of EO 13815 continues to: (1) prohibit implementation of the temporary suspension of admission, and reallocation of resources from processing applications, of refugees from 11 previously identified countries of concern; and (2) forbid enforcement of the indefinite bar on entry of following-to-join refugees  In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet (Assistant Director), Colleen Corcoran, Eric Hauswirth, Thomas Lombardi, Amanda Miller, Sasan J  “Jon” Najmi, Erin O’Brien, Garrett Riba, and Dina Shorafa made significant contributions to this report 

ground_truth: In October 2017, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) announced that the projected life-cycle cost of the 2020 Census had climbed to $15.6 billion, a more than $3 billion (27 percent) increase over its 2015 estimate. A high-quality, reliable cost estimate is a key tool for budgeting, planning, and managing the 2020 Census. Without this capability, the Bureau is at risk of experiencing program cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. GAO was asked to evaluate the reliability of the Bureau's life-cycle cost estimate. This report evaluates the reliability of the Bureau's revised life-cycle cost estimate for the 2020 Census and the extent to which the Bureau is using it as a management tool, and compares the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates to describe key drivers of cost growth. GAO reviewed documentary and testimonial evidence from Bureau officials responsible for developing the 2020 Census cost estimate and used its cost assessment guide ( GAO-09-3SP ) as criteria. Since 2015, the Census Bureau (Bureau) has made significant progress in improving its ability to develop a reliable cost estimate. While improvements have been made, the Bureau's October 2017 cost estimate for the 2020 Census does not fully reflect all the characteristics of a reliable estimate. (See figure.) Specifically, for the characteristic of being well-documented, GAO found that some of the source data either did not support the information described in the cost estimate or was not in the files provided for two of its largest field operations. In GAO's assessment of the 2015 version of the 2020 Census cost estimate, GAO recommended that the Bureau take steps to ensure that each of the characteristics of a reliable cost estimate is met. The Bureau agreed and has taken steps, but has not fully implemented this recommendation. A reliable cost estimate serves as a tool for program development and oversight, helping management make informed decisions. During this review, GAO found the Bureau used the cost estimate to inform decision making. Factors that contributed to cost fluctuations between the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates include: Changes in assumptions. Among other changes, a decrease in the assumed rate for self-response from 63.5 percent in 2015 to 60.5 percent in 2017 increased the cost of collecting responses from nonresponding housing units. Improved ability to anticipate and quantify risk. In general, contingency allocations designed to address the effects of potential risks increased overall from $1.3 billion in 2015 to $2.6 billion in 2017. An overall increase in information technology (IT) costs. IT cost increases, totaling $1.59 billion, represented almost 50 percent of the total cost increase from 2015 to 2017. GAO is not making any new recommendations but maintains its earlier recommendation—that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Bureau to take specific steps to ensure its cost estimate meets the characteristics of a high-quality estimate. In its response to this report, Commerce generally agreed with the findings related to cost estimation improvements, but disagreed that the cost estimate was not reliable. However, until GAO's recommendation is fully implemented the cost estimate cannot be considered reliable.

prompt_front: You are given two reports by the government agency.



Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 2.

Report 1: A high-quality, reliable cost estimate is a key tool for budgeting, planning, and managing the 2020 Census  According to OMB, programs must maintain current and well-documented estimates of program costs, and these estimates must encompass the full life-cycle of the program  Among other things, OMB states that generating reliable program cost estimates is a critical function necessary to support OMB’s capital programming process  Without this capability, agencies are at risk of experiencing program cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls  A reliable cost estimate is critical to the success of any federal government program  With the information from reliable estimates, managers can: make informed investment decisions, allocate program resources, measure program progress, proactively correct course when warranted, and ensure overall accountability for results  To be considered reliable, a cost estimate must meet the criteria for each of the four characteristics outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide  According to our analysis, a cost estimate is considered reliable if the overall assessment ratings for each of the four characteristics are substantially or fully met  If any of the characteristics are not met, minimally met, or partially met, then the cost estimate does not fully reflect the characteristics of a high-quality estimate and cannot be considered reliable  Those characteristics are: Well-documented: An estimate is thoroughly documented, including source data and significance, clearly detailed calculations and results, and explanations of why particular methods and references were chosen  Data can be traced to their source documents  Accurate: An estimate is unbiased, the work is not overly conservative or overly optimistic, and is based on an assessment of most likely costs  Few, if any, mathematical mistakes are present  Credible: Any limitations of the analysis because of uncertainty or bias surrounding data or assumptions are discussed  Major assumptions are varied, and other outcomes are recomputed, to determine how sensitive they are to changes in the assumptions  Risk and uncertainty analysis is performed to determine the level of risk associated with the estimate  The estimate’s results are cross- checked, and an independent cost estimate (ICE) is conducted to see whether other estimation methods produce similar results  Comprehensive: An estimate has enough detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double counted  All cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions are detailed in the estimate’s documentation  Meeting best practices outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide for a reliable cost estimate has been a long-standing challenge for the Bureau  In 2008 we reported that the 2010 Census cost estimate was not reliable because it lacked documentation and was not comprehensive, accurate, or credible  For example, in our 2008 report on the Bureau’s cost estimation process, Bureau officials were unable to provide documentation that supported the assumptions for the initial 2001 life-cycle cost estimate as well as the updates  Consequently, we recommended that the Bureau establish guidance, policies, and procedures for estimating costs that would meet best practices criteria  The Bureau agreed with the recommendation and said at the time that it already had efforts underway to improve its future cost estimation methods and systems  Moreover, weaknesses in the life-cycle cost estimate were one reason we designated the 2010 Census a GAO High- Risk Area in 2008  In 2012 we reported that, while the Bureau was taking steps to strengthen its life-cycle cost estimates, it had not yet established guidance for developing cost estimates  We recommended that the Bureau finalize its guidance, policies, and procedures for cost estimation in accordance with best practices  The Bureau agreed with the overall theme of the report but did not comment on the recommendation  During this review we found that the Bureau took steps to address this recommendation, which is discussed later in this report  Such guidance can help to institutionalize best practices and ensure consistent processes and operations for producing reliable estimates  In a 2016 report we found that the October 2015 version of the Bureau’s life-cycle cost estimate for the 2020 Census was not reliable  Overall, we reported that the 2020 Census life-cycle cost estimate partially met two of the characteristics of a reliable cost estimate (comprehensive and accurate) and minimally met the other two (well-documented and credible)  We recommended that the Bureau take specific steps to ensure its cost estimate meets the characteristics of a high-quality estimate  The Bureau agreed with this recommendation, and took steps to improve the reliability of its cost estimate, which we focus on later in this report  Consequently, an unreliable life-cycle cost estimate is one of the reasons we designated the 2020 Census a GAO High-Risk Area in 2017  In October 2015, the Bureau estimated the cost of the 2020 Census to be $12 3 billion  According to the Bureau, the October 2015 version was the Bureau’s first attempt to model the life-cycle cost of its planned 2020 Census, in contrast to its earlier 2011 estimate, which the Bureau said was intended to produce an approximation of potential savings and to begin developing the methodology for producing decennial life-cycle cost estimates covering all phases of the decennial life cycle  To help control costs while maintaining accuracy, the Bureau introduced significant change to how it conducts the decennial census in 2020  Its planned innovations include reengineering how it builds its address list, improving self-response by encouraging the use of the Internet and telephone, using administrative records to reduce field work, and reengineering field operations using technology to reduce manual effort and improve productivity  In contrast to the estimated $12 3 billion in 2015, the 2020 Census would cost $17 8 billion in constant 2020 dollars if the Bureau repeated the 2010 Census design and methods, according to the Bureau’s estimates  In October 2017, Commerce announced that it had updated the October 2015 life-cycle cost estimate, projecting the life-cycle cost of the 2020 Census to be $15 6 billion, an increase of over $3 billion (27 percent) over its 2015 estimate  (See figure 1 ) In developing the 2017 version of the cost estimate, Bureau cost estimators identified cost inputs, their ranges for possible outcomes, and overall cost estimating relationships (i e , logical or mathematical formulas, or both)  To identify cost inputs and the ranges of potential outcomes, the Bureau worked with subject matter experts and used historical data to support assumptions and generate inputs  The Bureau’s cost estimation team used a software tool to generate the cost estimate  Because cost estimates predict future program costs, uncertainty is always associated with them  For example, data from the past (such as fuel prices) may not always be relevant in the future  Risk and uncertainty refer to the fact that because a cost estimate is a forecast, there is always a chance that the actual cost will differ from the estimate  One way to determine whether a program is realistically budgeted is to perform an uncertainty analysis, so that the probability associated with achieving its point estimate can be determined, usually relying on simulations such as those of Monte Carlo methods  This can be particularly useful in portraying the uncertainty implications of various cost estimates  Consistent with cost estimation practices outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, the estimate was compared with two independent cost estimates (ICE), developed by Commerce’s Office of Acquisition Management (OAM) and the Bureau’s Office of Cost Estimation, Analysis, and Assessment  The offices producing the ICEs and the cost estimate team worked together to examine the process each used, an effort known as the reconciliation process  Through this reconciliation, the Bureau identified areas where discrepancies existed and elements that could require additional review and possible improvement  According to Bureau documentation the estimate will be updated as the program meets milestones and to reflect changes in technical or program assumptions  Figure 2 details the Bureau’s cost estimation process  OAM was involved extensively in the development of the 2017 estimate, an increased involvement compared to 2015, according to Bureau officials  OAM participated in regular review meetings throughout the development of the estimate and also developed an independent cost estimate, as shown in the figure below  End-to-end system testing activities for the 2020 Census are currently underway in Providence, Rhode Island  According to the Bureau, information collected from the test, such as overall response rates and the use of administrative records to inform census records, will inform future versions of the life-cycle cost estimate  Some updates from the test will be incorporated into the next cost estimate, which will be available in the first quarter of the coming fiscal year  Since our June 2016 report, in which we reviewed the Bureau’s 2015 version of the cost estimate, the Bureau has made significant progress  For example, the Bureau has put into place a work breakdown structure (WBS) that defines the work, products, activities, and resources necessary to accomplish the 2020 Census and is standardized for use in budget planning, operational planning, and cost estimation  However, the Bureau’s October 2017 cost estimate for the 2020 Census does not fully reflect characteristics of a high-quality estimate as described in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and cannot be considered reliable  Our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide describes best practices for developing reliable cost estimates  For our reporting needs, we collapsed these best practices into four characteristics for sound cost estimating— comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible—and identified specific best practices for each characteristic  To be considered reliable, an organization must meet or substantially meet each characteristic  Our review found the Bureau met or substantially met three out of the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate, while it partially met one characteristic: well-documented  When compared to the October 2015 estimate, the 2017 estimate shows considerable improvement  (See figure 3 below ) Cost estimates are considered valid if they are well-documented to the point they can be easily repeated or updated and can be traced to original sources through auditing, according to best practices  The Bureau only partially met the criteria for well-documented, as set forth in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide  A cost estimate that does not fully meet the criteria for well-documented cannot be used by management to make informed and effective implementation decisions  The well-documented characteristic comprises five best practices  The Bureau substantially met two out of five best practices (as shown in figure 4)  First, the estimate describes in sufficient detail the calculations performed and the estimating methodology used to derive each element’s cost, and the cost estimate had been reviewed by management  Since cost estimates can inform key decisions and budget requests, it is vital that management review and understand how the estimate was developed, including risks associated with the underlying data and methods  The cost estimate only partially met three best practices for the characteristic of being well-documented  In general, some documentation was missing, inconsistent, or difficult to understand  First, we found that source data did not always support the information described in the basis of estimate document or could not be found in the files provided for two of the Bureau’s largest field operations: Address Canvassing and Non- Response Follow-Up (NRFU)  For example, the cost estimate documentation referred to actual data from the 2010 Census and information obtained from experts as sources for address canvassing rework rates  However, the folder source documents provided as support for the basis of estimate did not include this information  Next, in several cases, we could not replicate calculations, such as for mileage costs, using the description provided  Lastly, we found that some of the cost elements did not trace clearly to supporting spreadsheets and assumption documents  Failure to document an estimate in enough detail makes it more difficult to replicate calculations, or to detect possible errors in the estimate; reduces transparency of the estimation process; and can undermine the ability to use the information to improve future cost estimates or even to reconcile the estimate with another independent cost estimate  The Bureau told us it would continue to make improvements to ensure the estimate is well- documented  For the estimate to be considered well-documented, the Bureau will need to address these issues  An accurate cost estimate supports measurement of program progress by providing unbiased and correct data, which can help management ensure accountability for scheduled results  We found the Bureau’s cost estimate substantially met the criteria for accuracy  As shown in figure 5, and in line with best practices outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, the estimate was not overly optimistic; appeared to be free of errors; was based on historical data or input from subject matter experts; and, according to Bureau officials, is updated regularly as information becomes available  The Bureau can enhance the accuracy of their estimate by increasing the level of detail included in the documentation, such as detail on specific inflation indices used, and by monitoring actual costs against estimates  We identified areas for improvement, which, according to Bureau officials, will be addressed as part of its ongoing efforts  For example, while the basis of estimate document describes different inflation indexes, it was not clear exactly which indexes were applied to the various cost elements in the estimate  Also, evidence of how variances between estimated costs and actual expenses would be tracked over time was not available at the time of our analysis  Tools to track variance enable management to measure progress against planned outcomes  Bureau officials stated that they already have systems in place that can be adapted for tracking estimated and actual costs  All estimates include a certain amount of informed judgment about the future  Assumptions made at the start of a program can turn out to be inaccurate  Credible cost estimates identify limitations due to uncertainty or bias surrounding data or assumptions, and control for these uncertainties by identifying and quantifying cost elements that represent the most risk  We found that the Bureau’s cost estimate substantially met the criteria for credible, as shown in figure 6 below  The Bureau’s cost estimate clearly identifies risks and uncertainties, and describes approaches taken to mitigate them  In line with best practices outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, the Bureau did the following: Sensitivity analysis  The Bureau conducted sensitivity analysis to identify possible changes to estimated costs for the 2020 Census based on varying major assumptions, parameters, and data inputs  For example, the Bureau calculated the likely cost implications for a range of possible response rates to identify a range of projected costs and to calculate appropriate reserves for risk  Bureau officials stated that they also identified the estimate input parameters that contributed the most to estimate uncertainty  Risk and uncertainty analysis  A cost estimate is a forecast, and as such, there is always a chance that the actual cost will differ from the estimate  Uncertainty is the indefiniteness about the outcome of a situation  Uncertainty is assessed in cost estimate models to estimate the risk (or probability) that a specific funding level will be exceeded  We found the Bureau performed an uncertainty analysis on a portion of the estimate to determine whether estimated costs were realistic and to establish the probability of achieving projections outlined in the estimate  The Bureau used a combination of modeling based on Monte Carlo analysis and allocations of funding for risks  The Monte Carlo simulation was performed on a portion of the estimate to account for uncertainty around various operational parameters for which a range of outcomes was possible, including Internet response rates and the extent to which data collection issues might be resolved using administrative records  To account for the inherent uncertainty of assumptions included within the life-cycle cost estimate, the Bureau added funding to the cost estimate totaling approximately $292 million to account for risks based on the results of the Monte Carlo analysis  For other risks, such as acquisition lead time and the possibility of delays in information technology (IT) development, contingency funding was added to the estimate to reflect the potential cost of resolving these issues, through use of a backup system or an alternative approach  These are described as “special risks” in the Bureau’s basis of estimate, and total approximately $171 million  Based on additional sensitivity analysis, the Bureau added approximately $965 million to the cost estimate to reflect discrete risks outlined in the risk register as well as those associated with (1) variability in self-response rates, (2) the effect of fluctuations in the size and wage rate of the temporary workforce on the cost of field operations, and (3) the potential need to reduce the enumerator-to- manager staffing ratio in case expected efficiencies in field operations are not realized  In addition to these provisions, the Secretary of Commerce added a contingency amount of about $1 2 billion to account for what the Bureau refers to as unknown-unknowns  Bureau documentation states that conducting a decennial census is an extremely complex, high-risk operation  In order to mitigate some of the risk, contingency funding must be available to initiate ad hoc activities necessary to overcome unforeseen issues  According to Bureau documentation these include such risks as natural disasters or cyber-attacks  The Bureau provides a description of how the general risk contingency is calculated  However, this description does not clearly link calculated amounts to the risks themselves  In our June 2016 report we reported the Bureau had not properly accounted for risk and recommended the Bureau, in part; improve control over how risk and uncertainty are accounted for  We continue to believe the prior recommendation from our June 2016 report remains valid and should be addressed: that the Bureau properly account for risk in the 2020 Census cost estimate, among other things  As such, risks need to be linked to the $1 2 billion general risk contingency fund  Independent cost estimate  According to best practices outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, an independent cost estimate should be performed to determine whether alternate estimate approaches produce similar results  The Bureau compared their estimate with two independent cost estimates, developed by Commerce’s Office of Acquisition Management and the Bureau’s Office of Cost Estimation and Assessment  As part of their process for finalizing the cost estimate, Bureau officials reconciled differences between the estimates in discussions with the two offices, resulting in more conservative assumptions by the Bureau around risk and uncertainty in both cases  In addition to implementing our recommendation to properly account for risk, going forward, while the Bureau substantially met the credibility characteristic it will be important for them to also integrate regular cross-checks of methodology into their cost estimation process  In our analysis we observed that no specific cross-checks of cost methodology were performed  According to the Bureau, cross- checks were not performed because the Bureau considered the independent cost estimates as overall cross-checks on the reliability of their methodology and did not conduct additional cross-checks  The main purpose of cross-checking is to determine whether alternative methods for specific cost elements within the cost estimate could produce similar results  An independent cost estimate, though important for the credibility of an estimate, does not fulfill the same function as a targeted cross-check of individual elements  Comprehensive estimates have enough detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double-counted, all cost-influencing assumptions are detailed in the estimate’s documentation, and a work breakdown structure is defined  Our analysis of the 2017 cost estimate demonstrates improvement over the 2015 cost estimate when the Bureau’s cost estimate only partially met the criteria for comprehensive  We found the Bureau met or substantially met all four best practices for the comprehensive characteristic, as shown in figure 7  For example, all life-cycle costs are included in the estimate along with a complete description of the 2020 Census program and current schedule  We also found that the Bureau substantially met criteria for documenting cost influencing ground rules and assumptions  A standardized WBS (as detailed in table 1) with supporting dictionary outlines the major work of the program and describes the activities and deliverables at the project level where costs are tracked  In 2016, the Bureau’s WBS did not contain sufficient detail and we found significant differences in the presentation of the work between sources  In 2017, based on our review of Bureau documentation and interviews with Bureau officials, we found that the WBS is standardized and cost elements are presented in detail  The WBS is a necessary program management tool because it provides a basic framework for a variety of related tasks like estimating costs, developing schedules, identifying resources, determining where risks may occur, and providing the means for measuring program status  Although the Bureau’s updated life-cycle cost estimate reflects three of the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate, we are not making any new recommendations to the Bureau in this report  We continue to believe the prior recommendation, made in 2016, remains relevant: that the Secretary of Commerce ensure that the Bureau finalizes the steps needed to fully meet the characteristics of a high-quality estimate, most notably in the well-documented area  The Bureau told us it has used our best practices for cost estimation to develop their cost estimate, and will focus on those best practices that require attention moving forward  Without a reliable cost estimate, the Bureau is limited in its ability to make informed decisions about program resources and to effectively measure progress against operational objectives  OMB, in its guidance for preparing and executing agency budgets, cites that credible cost estimates are vital for sound management decision making and for any program or capital project to succeed  A well- developed cost estimate serves as a tool for program development and oversight, supporting management to make informed decisions  According to the Bureau, the 2020 Census cost estimate is used as a management tool to guide decision making  Bureau officials stated the cost estimate is used to examine the cost impact of program changes  For example, the cost estimate served as the basis for the fiscal year 2019 funding request developed by the Bureau  The Bureau also said it used the 2020 Census life-cycle cost estimate to establish cost controls during budget formulation activities and to monitor spending levels for fiscal year 2019 activities  According to the Bureau, as detailed operational and implementation plans are defined, the 2020 Census life- cycle cost estimate has been and will continue to be used to support ongoing “what-if” analyses in determining the cost impacts of design decisions  Specifically, using the cost estimate to model the impact of changes on overall cost, the Bureau adjusted the scope of the Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCaP) operation  The processes for developing and updating estimates are designed to inform management about program progress and the use of program resources, supporting cost-driven planning efforts and well-informed decision making  Our work has identified a number of best practices for use in developing guidance related to cost estimation and analysis that are the basis of effective program cost estimating and should result in reliable and valid cost estimates that management can use for making informed decisions  In 2012 we reported that the Bureau had not yet established guidance for developing cost estimates  We recommended that the Bureau establish guidance, policies, and procedures for developing cost estimates that would meet best practice criteria  The Bureau agreed with the theme of the report but did not specifically agree with the recommendation  Moreover, in June 2016, we also reported that the cost estimation team did not record how and why it changed assumptions that were provided to it and did not document the sources of all data it used  The documentation of these changes to assumptions did not happen because the Bureau lacked written guidance and procedures for the cost estimation team to follow  During this review we found the Bureau has since established reliable guidance, processes, and policies for developing cost estimates and managing the cost estimation process  The following documents, shown in table 2, establish roles and responsibilities for oversight and approval of cost estimation processes, provide a detailed description of the steps taken to produce a high-quality cost estimate, and clarify the process for updating the cost estimate and associated documents over the life of a project  The Decennial Census Program’s Cost Estimate and Analysis Process, which provides a detailed description of the steps taken to produce a high-quality estimate, is reliable as it met the criteria for 8 steps and substantially met the criteria for 4 steps of the 12 best steps outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, as shown below in figure 8  To avoid cost overruns and to support high performance, it will be important for the Bureau to abide by their newly developed policies and guidance and continue to use the life-cycle cost estimate as a management tool  The 2017 life-cycle cost estimate includes significantly higher costs than those included in the 2015 estimate  In 2015, the Bureau estimated that they could conduct the operation at a cost of $12 3 billion in constant 2020 dollars  The Bureau’s latest cost estimate, announced in October 2017, reflects the same design, but at an expected cost of $15 6 billion  Figure 9 below shows the change in cost by WBS category for 2015 and 2017  The largest increases occurred in the Response, Managerial Contingency, and Census/Survey Engineering categories  Increased costs of $1 3 billion in the response category (costs related to collecting, maintaining, and processing survey response data) were in part due to reduced assumptions for self-response rates, leading to increases in the amount of data collected in the field, which is more costly to the Bureau  Contingency allocations increased overall from $1 35 billion in 2015 to $2 6 billion in 2017, as the Bureau gained a greater understanding of risks facing the 2020 Census  Increases of $838 million in the Census/Survey Engineering category were due mainly to the cost of an IT contract for integrating decennial survey systems that was not included in the 2015 cost estimate  Bureau officials attribute a decrease of $551 million in estimated costs for Program Management to changes in the categorization of costs associated with risks: In the 2017 version of the estimate, estimated costs related to program risks were allocated to their corresponding WBS element  More generally, factors that contributed to cost fluctuations between the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates include: changes in assumptions for census operations, improved ability to anticipate and quantify risk, an overall increase in IT costs, and more defined contract requirements  Several assumptions for the implementation of the 2020 Census have changed since the 2015 cost estimate  Some assumptions contributing to cost changes, mainly in the Response (related to collecting and processing response data) and Frame (the mapping and collecting addresses to frame enumeration activities) categories, include the following: Self-response rates  Changes in assumptions for expected self- response rates contributed to increases in the response category, as the assumed rate decreased from 63 5 percent in 2015 to 60 5 percent in 2017, thereby increasing the anticipated percentage and associated cost of nonresponse follow-up  When the Bureau does not receive responses by mail, phone, or Internet, census enumerators visit each nonresponding household to obtain data  Thus, reduced self-response rates lead to increases in the amount of data collected in the field, which is more costly to the Bureau  Bureau officials attributed this decrease to a forecasted reduction in Internet response due to added authentication steps at log in and the elimination of the function allowing users to save their responses and return later to complete the survey  Productivity rates  The productivity of enumerators collecting data for NRFU is another variable in the cost estimate that was updated, contributing to cost increases in the response category  Expected productivity rates for NRFU decreased from the 2015 estimate of 4 attempts per hour to 2 9  According to Bureau documentation, this more conservative estimate is based on historical data, rather than research and test data  In-office address canvassing rates  The Bureau will not go door-to- door to conduct in-field address canvassing across the country to update address and map information for every housing unit, as it has in prior decennial censuses  Rather, some areas would only need a review of their address and map information using computer imagery and third-party data sources—what the Bureau calls “in-office” address canvassing procedures  However, in March 2017, citing budget uncertainty the Bureau decided to discontinue one of the phases of in-office review address canvassing for the 2020 Census  The cancellation of that phase of in-office review is expected to increase the number of housing units canvassed in-field by 5 percent (from 25 to 30 percent of all canvassed housing units)  In-field canvassing is more labor intensive compared to in office procedures  The 2017 version of the cost estimate reflects this increase in workload for in-field address canvassing, though overall changes in estimated costs for the Frame category, of which Address Canvassing is a part, were minimal  Staffing  Updated analysis resulted in changes to several staffing assumptions, which resulted in decreases across WBS categories  Changes included reduced pay rates for field data collection staff based on current labor market conditions and reductions in the length of staff engagement  In general, contingency allocations increased overall from $1 35 billion in 2015 to $2 6 billion in 2017  This increase in contingency can be attributed, in part, to the Bureau gaining a clearer understanding of risk and uncertainty in the 2020 Census as it approaches  The Bureau developed some of its contingency based on proven risk management techniques, including Monte Carlo analysis and allocated funding for known risk scenarios  The 2017 estimate includes close to $1 4 billion in estimated costs for these risks, almost three times the amount included in the 2015 estimate  The basis of estimate contains detail on the various risks and the process for calculating the associated contingency  The 2017 version also includes a contingency amount of $1 2 billion for general risks, or unknown-unknowns, such as natural disasters and cyber-attacks  Contingency amounts were reallocated within the WBS to more closely reflect the nature of the risk: Bureau officials attribute a decrease from the 2015 estimate of $551 million in estimated costs for program management to changes in the categorization of costs associated with risks  Officials stated that, in 2015, discrete program risks were previously consolidated as program management costs  In 2017, these discrete costs were reallocated to associate risks with the appropriate WBS element  For example, contingency amounts related to the likelihood of achieving a certain response rate previously included in the program management work breakdown category are now a part of the “response” work breakdown category  Increases in IT costs, totaling $1 59 billion, represented almost 50 percent of the total cost increase from 2015 to 2017  The total share of IT costs as a percentage of total census costs increased from 28 percent in 2015 to 32 percent in 2017, or from $3 41 billion to approximately $5 billion  Increases in IT costs are spread across seven cost categories  Figure 10 shows the IT and non-IT cost by WBS for the 2017 cost estimate  IT costs in infrastructure, response data, and census/survey WBSs account for the majority of the approximately $5 billion  The Bureau’s October 2015 cost estimate included IT costs for, among other things, system engineering, test and evaluation, and infrastructure, as well as for a portion of the Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCaP) program  The 2017 estimated IT cost increases were due, in large part, to the Bureau (1) updating the cost estimate for CEDCaP; (2) including an estimate for technical integration services that contributed to increases in the Census and Survey Engineering category; and (3) updating costs related to other major contracts (such as mobile device as a service, field IT services, and payroll systems)  Bureau documents described an overall improvement in the Bureau’s ability to define and specify contract requirements  This resulted in updated estimates for several contracts, including for the Census Questionnaire Assistance (CQA) contract  Assumptions regarding call volume to the CQA were increased by 5 percent to account for expected response by phone after the elimination of the option to save Internet responses and return to complete the form later  The Bureau also cited updated cost data and the results of reconciliation with independent cost estimates as factors contributing to the increased costs of other major contracts, including for the procurement of data collection devices  The Secretary of Commerce provided comments on a draft of this report on August 2, 2018  The comments are reprinted in appendix II  The Department of Commerce generally agreed with our findings regarding the improvements the Census Bureau has made in its cost estimates  However, Commerce did not agree with our assessment that the Bureau’s 2017 lifecycle cost estimate is “not reliable ” Commerce noted that it had conducted two independent cost analyses and was satisfied that the cost estimate was reliable  The Bureau also provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate  We maintain that, to be considered reliable, a cost estimate must meet or substantially meet the criteria for each of the four characteristics outlined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide  These characteristics are derived from measures consistently applied by cost estimating organizations throughout the federal government and industry and are considered best practices for the development of reliable cost estimates  Without a reliable cost estimate, the Bureau is limited in its ability to make informed decisions about program resources and to effectively measure progress against operational objectives  Thus, while the Bureau has made considerable progress in all four of the characteristics, it has only partially met the criteria for the characteristic of being well-documented  Until the Bureau meets or substantially meets the criteria for this characteristic, the cost estimate cannot be considered reliable  As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date  At that time, we will send copies of the report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Under Secretary of Economic Affairs, the Acting Director of the U S  Census Bureau, and other interested parties  In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://gao gov  If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao gov  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report  GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III  The purpose of our review was to evaluate the reliability of the Census Bureau’s (Bureau) life-cycle cost estimate using our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide  We reviewed (1) the extent to which the Bureau’s life-cycle cost estimate and associated guidance met our best practices for cost estimation using documentation and information obtained in discussions with the Bureau related to the 2020 life-cycle cost estimate and (2) compared the 2015 and 2017 life-cycle cost estimates to describe key drivers of cost growth  For both objectives we reviewed documentation from the Bureau on the 2020 life-cycle cost estimate and interviewed Bureau and Department of Commerce officials  For the first objective, we relied on our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide as criteria  Our cost specialists assessed measures consistently applied by cost-estimating organizations throughout the federal government and industry and considered best-practices for developing reliable cost estimates  We analyzed the cost estimating practices used by the Bureau against these best practices and evaluated them in four categories: comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible  Comprehensive  The cost estimate should include both government and contractor costs of the program over its full life-cycle, from inception of the program through design, development, deployment, and operation and maintenance to retirement of the program  It should also completely define the program, reflect the current schedule, and be technically reasonable  Comprehensive cost estimates should be structured in sufficient detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double counted  Specifically, the cost estimate should be based on a product-oriented work breakdown structure (WBS) that allows a program to track cost and schedule by defined deliverables, such as hardware or software components  Finally, where information is limited and judgments are made, the cost estimate should document all cost-influencing assumptions  Well-documented  A good cost estimate—while taking the form of a single number—is supported by detailed documentation that describes how it was derived and how the expected funding will be spent in order to achieve a given objective  Therefore, the documentation should capture in writing such things as the source data used, the calculations performed and their results, and the estimating methodology used to derive each WBS element’s cost  Moreover, this information should be captured in such a way that the data used to derive the estimate can be traced back to, and verified against, their sources so that the estimate can be easily replicated and updated  The documentation should also discuss the technical baseline description and how the data were normalized  Finally, the documentation should include evidence that the cost estimate was reviewed and accepted by management  Accurate  The cost estimate should provide for results that are unbiased, and it should not be overly conservative or optimistic  An estimate is accurate when it is based on an assessment of most likely costs; adjusted properly for inflation; and contains few, if any, minor mistakes  In addition, a cost estimate should be updated regularly to reflect significant changes in the program—such as when schedules or other assumptions change—and actual costs, so that it is always reflecting current status  During the update process, variances between planned and actual costs should be documented, explained, and reviewed  Among other things, the estimate should be grounded in a historical record of cost estimating and actual experiences on other comparable programs  Credible  The cost estimate should discuss any limitations of the analysis because of uncertainty or biases surrounding data or assumptions  Major assumptions should be varied, and other outcomes recomputed to determine how sensitive they are to changes in the assumptions  Risk and uncertainty analysis should be performed to determine the level of risk associated with the estimate  Further, the estimate’s cost drivers should be cross-checked, and an independent cost estimate conducted by a group outside the acquiring organization should be developed to determine whether other estimating methods produce similar results  If any of the characteristics are not met, minimally met, or partially met, then the cost estimate does not fully reflect the characteristics of a high- quality estimate and cannot be considered reliable  We also analyzed the Bureau’s cost estimation and analysis guidance and evaluated them against a 12-step process outlined in our Cost Estimation and Assessment Guide  A high-quality cost estimating process integrates the following: 1  Define estimate’s purpose  2  Develop estimating plan  3  Define program characteristics  4  Determine estimating structure  5  Identify ground rules and assumptions  6  Obtain data  7  Develop point estimate and compare it to an independent cost estimate  8  Conduct sensitivity analysis  9  Conduct risk and uncertainty analysis  10  Document the estimate  11  Present estimate to management for approval  12  Update the estimate to reflect actual costs and changes  These 12 steps, when followed correctly, should result in reliable and valid cost estimates that management can use for making informed decisions  If any of the steps in the Bureau’s process do not meet, minimally meet, or partially meet the 12 steps, then the cost estimate guidance does not fully reflect best practices for developing a high-quality estimate and cannot be considered reliable  Lastly, to describe key drivers of cost growth, we compared cost information included in the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates  We analyzed both summary and detailed cost information to assess key changes in totals overall, by WBS category, and by information technology (IT) vs  Non-IT costs  We used this analysis in conjunction with information received from the Bureau during interviews and through document transfers to describe overall changes in the cost estimate from 2015 to 2017  We conducted this performance audit from December 2017 to August 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives  In addition to the contact named above, Lisa Pearson (Assistant Director), Karen Cassidy (Analyst in Charge), Brian Bothwell, Jackie Chapin, Ann Czapiewski, Jason Lee, Ty Mitchell, Kayla Robinson, and Tim Wexler made significant contributions to this report 


Report 2:  Second, it allowed states to drug test UC applicants for whom suitable work (as defined under state law) is available only in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing, to be determined under new regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor  As required by  P L  112-96 , on August 1, 2016, DOL promulgated  20 C F R  Part 620 ,  a new rule to implement the provisions of the law relating to the drug testing of UC applicants for whom suitable work (as defined under state law) is available only in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing  Amid concerns voiced by stakeholders about the 2016 DOL rule, Congress repealed this UC drug testing rule using the Congressional Review Act (CRA) via H J Res  42 / P L  115-17   On November 5, 2018, DOL published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to reissue the rule identifying occupations that regularly conduct drug testing for purposes of Section 2105 of  P L  112-96   The CRA prohibits an agency from reissuing the rule in "substantially the same form" or issuing a "new rule that is substantially the same" as the disapproved rule, "unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule " Notably, this is the first time an agency has proposed to reissue a rule after the original version was disapproved under the CRA  According to the 2018 NPRM, DOL has addressed the reissue requirements of the CRA by proposing a substantially different and more flexible approach to the statutory requirements than the 2016 Rule, enabling states to enact legislation to require drug testing for a far larger group of UC applicants than the previous rule permitted  This flexibility is intended to respect the diversity of states' economies and the different roles played by employment drug testing in those economies  Comments on the proposed 2018 rule were required to be submitted by January 4, 2019  On January 16, 2019, Senator Richard Blumenthal introduced S  165 , the Federal Unemployment Compensation Equity Act of 2019  This proposal would amend UCFE law and create a new permanent UCFE eligibility category for excepted federal employees who are unpaid but required to work during a government shutdown due to a lapse in appropriations  During any shutdown beginning on or after December 22, 2018, all excepted federal workers would be deemed eligible for UCFE benefits  Additionally, these employees would not be subject to a one-week waiting period (otherwise often required under state laws) before UCFE benefits were to be paid  On January 23, 2019, Representative Debbie Dingell introduced H R  725 , the Pay Federal Workers Act  This proposal would also provide UCFE benefits in a similar manner to S  165 , including permanently amending 5 U S C  Chapter 85 to provide federal authority for these benefits  On January 23, 2019, Representative Anthony Brown introduced H R  720   This proposal would deem excepted federal employees during a government shutdown to be eligible for UCFE during FY2019  The authority to provide UCFE to these excepted workers would expire at the end of FY2019  On February 8, 2019, Representative Katie Hill introduced H R  1117 , the Shutdown Fairness Act of 2019  This proposal would deem excepted federal employees and unpaid military servicemembers during a government shutdown to be eligible for UCFE or UCX during FY2019  The authority to provide UCFE to these excepted workers would expire at the end of FY2019  On January 15, 2019, Senator Ron Wyden and Representative Danny Davis introduced S  136 and H R  556 , the Economic Ladders to End Volatility and Advance Training and Employment Act of 2019 (the ELEVATE Act)   Among other provisions, this proposal would establish new self-employment and relocation assistance benefits for unemployed workers to be administered by the Social Security Administration, in consultation with DOL  The self-employment assistance benefits would provide weekly income replacement (half of prior earnings up to the maximum weekly benefit amount in the state) for up to of 26 weeks to individuals  They would be available to individuals who are (1) eligible for any type of UI benefit; or ineligible for any type of UI benefit, but became involuntarily unemployed over the previous 12 weeks; or were previously self-employed, but lost a hiring contract, and (2) have a viable business plan approved by their state department of labor, workforce board, or the Small Business Administration  Additionally, Section 3 of S  136 and H R  556 would provide up to $2,000 (or more, depending on family size) to fund to up to 90% of certain relocation expenses for eligible individuals and their families  In order to be eligible for this relocation assistance, an individual must be a (1) dislocated worker, (2) long-term unemployed individual, or (3) underemployed individual and also have filed a claim for relocation assistance and obtained suitable work with an expectation of obtaining such work in a new geographic region  On March 7, 2019, Representative Karen Bass introduced H R  1585 , the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019  Among many other provisions, Section 703 of H R  1585 would require states to consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits  The House passed H R  1585 on April 4, 2019  On March 14, 2019, Representative Stephanie Murphy introduced H R  1759 , the Building on Reemployment Improvements to Deliver Good Employment (BRIDGE) for Workers Act  This proposal would extend eligibility to any claimant of unemployment benefits, including those profiled as likely to exhaust benefits (rather than limiting eligibility to those who were profiled as likely to exhaust benefits)  The House passed H R  1759 on April 9, 2019  The Extended Benefit (EB) program was established by the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (EUCA; P L  91-373) (26 U S C  §3304, note)  EUCA may extend receipt of unemployment benefits (extended benefits) at the state level if certain economic conditions exist within the state  As of the date of this publication, EB is not active in any state  Extended Benefit Triggers The EB program is triggered when a state's insured unemployment rate (IUR) or total unemployment rate (TUR) reaches certain levels  All states must pay up to 13 weeks of EB if the IUR for the previous 13 weeks is at least 5% and is 120% of the average of the rates for the same 13-week period in each of the two previous years  States may choose to enact two other optional thresholds  (States may choose one, two, or none ) If the state has chosen one or more of the EB trigger options, it would provide the following: Option 1—up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's IUR is at least 6%, regardless of previous years' averages  Option 2—up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's TUR is at least 6 5% and is at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years; up to an additional 20 weeks of benefits if the state's TUR is at least 8% and is at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years  EB benefits are not "grandfathered" (phased out) when a state triggers "off" the program  When a state triggers "off" of an EB period, all EB benefit payments in the state cease immediately regardless of individual entitlement  The EB benefit amount is equal to the eligible individual's weekly regular UC benefits  Under permanent law, FUTA finances half (50%) of the EB payments and 100% of EB administrative costs  States fund the other half (50%) of EB benefit costs through their SUTA  On March 7, 2019, Representative Karen Bass introduced H R  1585 , the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019  Among many other provisions, Section 703 of H R  1585 would require states to consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits  The House passed H R  1585 on April 4, 2019  On March 14, 2019, Representative Stephanie Murphy introduced H R  1759 , the Building on Reemployment Improvements to Deliver Good Employment (BRIDGE) for Workers Act  This proposal would extend eligibility to any claimant of unemployment benefits, including those profiled as likely to exhaust benefits (rather than limiting eligibility to those who were profiled as likely to exhaust benefits)  The House passed H R  1759 on April 9, 2019 

ground_truth: The 116th Congress has begun to consider several issues related to two programs in the unemployment insurance (UI) system: Unemployment Compensation (UC) and Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE). The lapse in federal appropriations that occurred from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019, created a partial government shutdown. As a result, agencies without funding furloughed many federal employees, and many federal employees excepted from furlough were working without pay during the lapse in appropriations. Furloughed federal employees may be eligible for UCFE benefits. Private-sector workers who are furloughed or laid off due to the partial government shutdown because they were employed by government contractors may be eligible for regular UC benefits. But, according to guidance from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), excepted federal employees who are performing services (without pay) would generally be ineligible for UCFE benefits based on states' definitions of "unemployment." In this climate, there has been congressional interest in assisting furloughed and excepted federal employees through the UI system. UI legislative issues currently facing the 116th Congress include the following: the effects of the FY2019 sequester order on UI programs and benefits, the role of UI in providing temporary income replacement during a government shutdown, state fiscal concerns related to financing UC benefits, reemployment services and eligibility assessments (RESEA), potential consideration of the UI proposals included in the President's FY2020 budget, and congressional oversight related to a proposed UC drug testing rule reissued by DOL after previously being disapproved using the Congressional Review Act. In the 116th Congress, policymakers have introduced legislation related to UCFE benefits in response to the recent partial government shutdown (S. 165, H.R. 720, H.R. 725, and H.R. 1117), legislation to provide self-employment and relocation assistance benefits (S. 136 and H.R. 556), legislation to require that states consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits (H.R. 1585), and legislation to amend Title III of the Social Security Act to extend RESEA to all UC claimants (H.R. 1759). For a brief overview of UC, see CRS In Focus IF10336, The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation.